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THE SECURITISATION OF ETHNIC IDENTITIES AND THE 1993 GENOCIDE IN BURUNDI

AN INTERPRETATIVE CASE STUDY

A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy specialising in Justice and Transformation

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'The war between Tutsis and Hutus … is it because they don't have the same land?'

'No, they have the same country.'

'So … they don't have the same language?'

'No, they speak the same language.'

'So, they don't have the same God?'

'No, they have the same God.'

'So … why are they at war?'

'Because they don't have the same nose.'

- Gaël Faye[1]

[1] Gaël Faye, *Small Country*, trans. Sarah Ardizzone (London: Vintage, 2016), 1f.

i. Abstract

This dissertation investigates the 1993 Genocide of Burundi's Hutu and Tutsi population as the product of the securitisation of ethnic identities. By utilising an International Security Studies approach in combination with a Fanonian conception of colonial society, this dissertation provides an alternative interpretation as to why the genocide occurred. At heart of its analysis is the question of 'how did ethnic identities in Burundi become securitised?', which it seeks to answer through a qualitative research design based on the interpretative case study method. By reconstructing particular representations of enmity in historical perspective, the dissertation locates the crux of the Burundian tragedy in the emergence of ethnicised discourses on security. Incidentally, the interpretative analysis reveals a convergence in the subject matter of African Studies and International Security Studies that presents a promising potential for further research. The explorative approach of this dissertation may be of interest to scholars in Conflict Studies, African Studies, International Security Studies, Political Science, and anyone fascinated by the small African country.

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my parents,
for their patience and encouragement.

a special someone,
for everything.

iii. List of Abbreviations

CS – Copenhagen School

FNL – Forces Nationales de Libération

FRODEBU – Front Democratique du Burundi

ISS – International Security Studies

JNR – Jeunesse Nationaliste Rwagasore

PALIPEHUTU – Parti pour la Libération du People Hutu

PARMEHUTU – Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu

PDC – Parti Démocrate Chrétien

RPF – Rwandan Patriotic Front

UN – United Nations

UNAR – Union Nationale Rwandaise

UPRONA – Parti de l'Unité et du Progrès National

iv. Map: Regions and Towns in Rwanda and Burundi[2]



Map 1. Rwanda and Burundi: Regions and Towns

[2] René Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), v.

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1 Introduction

> "Simply stated, the conflict in Burundi involves Hutu against Tutsi. Beyond this elementary truth are violent disagreements among participants and observers alike about almost every other dimension of the conflict, including the nature of Hutu and Tutsi identities, the cause of their antagonisms, the scale of the human losses suffered by each side, and how best to achieve a measure of social harmony between them." [3]
>
> - *René Lemarchand*

1.1 Prelude

On October 20, 1993, President Melchior Ndadaye of Burundi, inaugurated only 102 days prior to the cabinet meeting he was heading that day, was approached by his Minister of Communications about a creeping coup d'état of the armed forces and his concerns over the inadequacy of presidential protection.[4] Unbeknownst to both President and Minister, the army's putschist conspiracy was already well under way on that late Wednesday afternoon. In the early hours of the following morning, President Ndadaye only narrowly escaped heavy artillery attacks on the presidential palace. A few hours later, he was captured and murdered by a group of soldiers. Melchior Ndadaye was not just any president in the annals of Burundi's history. He was the country's first president to accede to office as the result of a democratic election. More importantly, he was Burundi's first president to identify as a member of its Hutu ethnic majority, which has been excluded, discriminated against, and persecuted by the Tutsi minority government since the country's independence from Belgium in 1962. Against this background, "the bayonets thrust into President Melchior Ndadaye's thorax"[5] inaugurated a period of brutal inter-ethnic massacres between Burundi's Hutu and Tutsi population that amounted to an attempt at mutual annihilation. Despicable atrocities committed on both sides

[3] René Lemarchand, *Burundi - Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, Woodrow Wilson Center Series, (Washington, D.C. and New York, N.Y.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1994), 17.

[4] Ambassador Robert Krueger and Kathleen Tobin Krueger, *From Bloodshed to Hope in Burundi: Our Embassy Years During Genocide* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 3f.

[5] Ibid., 22.

sought "to destroy not only their bodies but also their dignity and their hope for a better future".[6] More than 150 000 Burundians lost their lives in the Genocide.[7]

Appalled by the horrors of the human carnage in 1993, the dissertation builds upon a basic but pivotal question: Why did the Genocide occur? Predicated on the definition introduced by Raphael Lemkin, the term 'genocide' is thereby understood as a type of political violence that connotes the deliberate and organised destruction of a particular group, typically defined in ethnic, religious, or national terms, and the targeting of "individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group".[8] In its attempt to understand the logic driving the gruesome violence, the conception of this dissertation's historical analysis fundamentally differs from existing research in two important ways: Firstly, it considers the concept of identity crucial to understanding the perpetration of the Genocide.[9] Secondly, and in departure from the existing literature on the role of social, economic, and political forces in the genocide, this dissertation seeks answers in the realm of security. In conjunction of these two conceptual approaches, the dissertation understands the 1993 Genocide as a function of a range of historico-political dynamics that enabled the construction of ethnicity as a security issue.[10]

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[6] Ibid., xiv.

[7] Ibid., 41.

[8] Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe; Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, 1944), 79.

[9] This is in accordance with Moshman's assertion that „the concept of identity is crucial to any explanation of genocide". David Moshman, "Us and Them: Identity and Genocide," *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research* 7, no. 2 (2007): 116.

[10] *This thesis is aware that its research focus on identities may reinforce or reproduce the constructed differences between Hutu and Tutsi. Therefore, it has carefully weighed this consideration against the academic and actual advantage of exploring the ethnic dimension of the conflict in a way that reveals and emphasises multiple dimensions of identity construction and repudiates essentialist claims. Analogous to renowned scholars in the field, such as Mahmood Mamdani or René Lemarchand, this dissertation seeks to find answers to the Hutu-Tutsi-schism in the history of continuities and ruptures of the identity formation process. In its analysis of the colonial experience and its legacy in Burundi's post-independence period, the dissertation uses colonial language that is offensive and dehumanising in nature. These terms are used in their historical context to explain the pseudo-science of the colonialist and its devastating impact on ethnic relations in Burundi. They do not reflect the language nor opinion of the author and are, therefore, denoted in inverted commas. Related to the colonial racialisation of ethnicity in Burundi, this dissertation may refer, where insightful to the polarisation of ethnic identities, to particular stereotypes and biases. It is emphasised that these considerations do not reflect the author's prejudice but are used solely to illuminate Burundi's trajectory of ethnic violence. Lastly, this dissertation is aware of the suffering and marginalisation of Burundi's third ethnic group, the Twa, that has been virtually absent from the scholarship on Burundi. This dissertation encourages inquiries into Twa experiences of the violence during the Genocide but is unable to incorporate these considerations into its own framework. This is due to the research question's focus on the emergence of a pervasive Hutu-Tutsi-schism in the violence.*

Drawing upon the concept of security as developed by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, the analysis reconstructs, in historical perspective, the deterioration of ethnic peace with the rise of particular representations of enmity. By complementing the Eurocentric analytical framework with a Fanonian conception of colonial society as institutionalised structural violence,[11] the dissertation develops a novel analytical approach to the intersections of (ethnic) identity, political violence, security, and the state in Africa. As such, it offers an alternative interpretation of the role of ethnicity in the Burundian tragedy that aims to mitigate the untenable lack of academic knowledge on the roots and mechanisms of ethno-political violence in the country.[12] Incidentally, the interpretative analysis reveals a convergence in the subject matter of African Studies and International Security Studies that presents a promising potential for further research. The explorative approach of this dissertation may be of interest to scholars in Conflict Studies, African Studies, International Security Studies, Political Science, and anyone fascinated by the small African country.

1.2 Literature Review

Despite its turbulent post-independence history, the Great Lakes region of Africa has, for most part of the late twentieth century, been relegated to the margins of political and academic interest.[13] Until the early 1990s, the scholarship on the region was defined by a cadre of academics from Belgium, France, and the US, who devoted decades of their academic careers to study the region's peoples and their histories.[14] Since the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, an "explosion of writings on this hitherto almost unknown country" entered the body of literature, along with a "rapidly growing number of new scholars who began their work after the genocide and usually because of it".[15] Their fascination with the Rwandan case has, however, tempted

[11] This conception mainly draws on Fanon's seminal work in 'The Wretched of the Earth'. See therefore Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1963).

[12] René Lemarchand, "The Burundi Genocide," in *Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts*, ed. Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, and Israel W. Charny (New York: Routledge, 2004), 321.

[13] Adam Jones, "The Great Lakes Genocides: Hidden Histories, Hidden Precedents," in *Hidden Genocides: Power, Knowledge, Memory*, ed. Alexander Laban Hinton, Thomas La Pointe, and Douglas Irvin-Erickson (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2014), 130.

[14] This includes, but is by no means limited to, Jean-Pierre Chrétien, René Lemarchand, Filip Reyntjens, Gérard Prunier, Jaques Maquet, Jan Vansina, as well as David and Catharine Newbury, whose anthropological and historiographical work in the region built the very foundation of the scholarship on the Great Lakes region. Arguably, it is virtually impossible to analyse the history and causes of violence in Rwanda and Burundi without consulting the works of at least one of these scholars.

[15] Peter Uvin, "Reading the Rwandan Genocide," *International Studies Review* 3, no. 3 (2001): 76.

many to dismiss its violence as exceptional,[16] thereby obscuring cognate ethno-political tragedies in the region. Adam Jones, therefore, suggests that "the numerous genocidal events preceding and following the 1994 watershed may all be classed as hidden genocides".[17]

The brutal consistency of bloodshed in post-colonial Burundi that climaxed into the Genocide of 1993 is one of the regional calamities that was virtually eclipsed by the notorious aberration of ethnic violence in Rwanda. Although the carnage of 1993, the ensuing civil war, and the Mandela-mediated peace talks in Arusha have contributed to a surge of academic interest in the small African country, there is, to this day, an untenable lack of understanding for the roots, mechanisms, and drivers of its ethno-political violence.[18] While the post-modern Africanist literature on the Burundian conflict has steadily worked towards closing this intellectual gap, the dissertation argues that its parochial fixation on the calculated manipulation of ethnic feelings by political elites has inhibited the development of a convincing account for the occurrence of the Genocide. The subsequent sections provide a synopsis of the transient macro-level political, economic, and socio-cultural forces emphasised in the existing literature, followed by a critical reflection upon their explanatory value.

1.2.1 Economic Approaches

Existing economic approaches have primarily interpreted ethnic violence in Burundi as the symptom of a distributional conflict[19] attributable to issues of resource scarcity, overpopulation, and discrimination in the access to opportunities for personal enrichment.[20] With the African state as the largest employer and the public sector as the main source of

[16] In this context Mamdani asserts that "many write as if genocide has no history and as if the Rwandan genocide had no precedent, even in this century replete with political violence. The Rwandan genocide thus appears as an anthropological oddity. For Africans, it turns into a Rwandan oddity; and for non-Africans, the aberration is Africa." Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020), 7.

[17] Jones, "The Great Lakes Genocides," 129.

[18] Lemarchand, "The Burundi Genocide," 321.

[19] E.g. Léonce Ndikumana, *Distributional Conflict, the State, and Peace Building in Burundi*, University of Massachusetts Amherst (2005).

[20] Burundi exhibits the second highest population density on the African continent, while estimates assume that approximately 60% of its population live below the poverty line. Combined with a general scarcity of resources and the unequal distribution thereof, the dire ecological situation is presumed to inevitably result in conflict. For a development of this argument please refer to Floribert Ngaruko and Janvier D. Nkurunziza, "An Economic Interpretation of Conflict in Burundi," *Journal of African Economies* 9, no. 3 (2000).

financial accumulation,[21] the predatory bureaucracy is ascribed to political elites' desire for control of the state apparatus as a guarantee for privileged access to and appropriation of scant resources.[22] This strand of research, furthermore, emphasises the role of underdevelopment, poverty,[23] as well as disputes arising from land pressures in the deterioration of social harmony in multi-ethnic societies.[24] In terms of the causality between overpopulation, resource scarcity, and conflict, proponents of the 'hard Malthusian argument'[25] establish a direct and inevitable causal connection, while the 'softer' Malthusian interpretation takes into consideration intervening political and social variables. Hence, the latter approach strongly features elements of the discourse on the failed neo-patrimonial state in Africa, with special emphasis on patterns of rent extraction, corruption and nepotism, mismanagement and poor governance, as well as opportunism and elite manipulation.[26]

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[21] Filip Reyntjens, "Rwanda: Genocide and Beyond," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 9, no. 3 (1996): 242.

[22] Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, "An Economic Interpretation of Conflict in Burundi," 370-371. Johnstone Summit Oketch and Tara Polzer, "Conflict and Coffee in Burundi," in *Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa's Conflicts*, ed. Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2002), 85.

[23] E.g. Mariam Bibi Jooma, *"We Can't Eat the Constitution": Transformation and the Socio-Economic Reconstruction of Burundi*, Institute for Security Studies (2005). Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, "An Economic Interpretation of Conflict in Burundi." Juana Brachet and Howard Wolpe, *Conflict-Sensitive Development Assistance: The Case of Burundi*, The World Bank (2005).

[24] Van Leeuwen, for example, examines the relevance of land disputes in the perpetuation of Burundi's ethnic conflict, specifically those arising from illegal land-grabbing and subsequent property claims of returning refugees. For the full analysis please refer to Mathijs van Leeuwen, "Crisis or Continuity? Framing Land Disputes and Local Conflict Resolution in Burundi," *Land Use Policy* 27 (2010). Bundervoet, on the other hand, accentuates the conflict potential of communal land pressure arising from asymmetries in the availability of farmland, the rate of population growth and the existence of economic opportunities outside of farming. His research establishes a linear causality between population density, and by implication, land pressure, and the spatial scope of killings during the 1993 Genocide. For the full analysis please refer to Tom Bundervoet, "Livestock, Land and Political Power: The 1993 Killings in Burundi," *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 3 (2009).

[25] The Malthusian argument bases upon an economic theory developed by Thomas Robert Malthus in the 18th century, which concerns the interaction between population growth, resource constraints and means of subsistence. It proposes that population growth and food supply production occur at different growth rates and, as a result, populations, if left unfettered, may outgrow their resources. A Malthusian approach to the history of Burundi is, inter alia, offered in Hubert Cochet, "Agrarian Dynamics, Population Growth and Resource Management: The Case of Burundi," *GeoJournal* 60 (2004). Sam Desiere and Marijke D'Haese, "Boserup Versus Malthus: Does Population Pressure Drive Agricultural Intensification? Evidence from Burundi" (9th Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society, University of Warwick, England, 2015).

[26] E.g. Janvier D Nkurunziza, *The Origin and Persistence of State Fragility in Burundi*, LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development (London, 2018).

1.2.2 Political and Socio-Cultural Approaches

In explaining the recurrence of ethnic conflict in Burundi, another branch of conflict analysis emphasises the destabilising effects of political forces, such as poor governance,[27] institutional failure,[28] and militarism.[29] In addition, this research takes regional dynamics into consideration and acknowledges, based on the striking similarities in their ethnic composition, the interdependency of political stability and ethnic harmony in Rwanda and Burundi.[30] In accounting for the escalation of ethnic violence in both countries, a considerable number of scholars have pointed towards the manipulation of ethnicity as the central elite strategy in the struggle for and preservation of power, privilege, and control. As such, grievances of political elites are believed to inform state policies in Rwanda and Burundi, which "exacerbated ethnic divisions to thwart democratization and power-sharing".[31] Maguire, for instance, claims that "rarely has ethnicity been so effectively manipulated by the few to influence the many as in Rwanda and Burundi", which in her opinion constitutes "an almost archetypical example of the underlying causes of ethnic conflict".[32] Similarly, Daley concludes that "so long as competition for access to state power and to state resources remains intense, ethnicity will persist as a convenient tool".[33]

The elites' success in mobilising ethnic groups for violent confrontations is, thereby, frequently explained with socio-cultural and psychological factors. For Reyntjens, demographic bipolarity i.e., a clear Hutu majority versus a distinct Tutsi minority, is a decisive incubator for the

[27] E.g. Floribert Ngaruko and Janvier D Nkurunziza, "Civil War and Its Duration in Burundi," in *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, ed. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Washington: The World Bank, 2005). Anastase Shyaka, "Understanding the Conflicts in the Great Lakes Region: An Overview," *Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies* 1, no. 1 (2008).

[28] E.g. Léonce Ndikumana, "Institutional Failure and Ethnic Conflicts in Burundi," *African Studies Review* 41, no. 1 (1998).

[29] E.g. J. 'Bayo Adekanye, "Rwanda/Burundi: 'Uni-Ethnic' Dominance and the Cycle of Armed Ethnic Formations," *Social Identities* 2, no. 1 (1996).

[30] E.g. Ravi Bhavnani and Jerry Lavery, "Transnational Ethnic Ties and the Incidence of Minority Rule in Rwanda and Burundi (1959–2003)," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 17, no. 3 (2011).

[31] Peter Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence," *Comparative Politics* 31, no. 3 (1999): 253.

[32] Linda Maguire, "Power Ethnicized: The Pursuit of Protection and Participation in Rwanda and Burundi," *Buffalo Journal of International Law* 2, no. 49 (1995): 65.

[33] Patricia Daley, "Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa: The Challenge to the Burundi State," *Political Geography* 25 (2006): 676.

manipulation of ethnic feelings by political elites.[34] Others emphasise socio-cultural beliefs in obedience to authority, as well as patriotism,[35] opportunism,[36] and psychological elements such as fear[37] and a desire for revenge[38] in the successful mobilisation of population segments.

1.2.3 Critical Reflection

While this dissertation does not refute the role of individual politicians and the state in instigating, organising, and legitimising genocides, it believes that genocidal violence cannot be detached from underlying social and political processes and generically attributed to the manipulation by elites alone.[39] Therefore, the dissertation maintains that the focus on elite interests curtails complex and protracted conflicts to the spoils of an elitist struggle for power and wealth that obscures an entire dimension of violence that rests upon intersubjective dynamics. Moreover, the role of ethnicity in African conflict is reduced to an elitist utensil for power politics, whereby the agency of ethnic groups in developing and vindicating socio-political interests of their own is entirely negated. As Weilenmann has pointed out, it appears as if ethnicity "was merely a morally reprehensible instrument of leadership which only set off the unconscious desires – and not political constellations that on all levels also produce (social) desires".[40] As such, the narrative of elite manipulation frames perpetration as reactive rather than proactive and "substitutes collective guilt for individual culpability".[41] On that note, these approaches notoriously "underestimate if not entirely neglect how much the elites themselves believe in the ideological message they broadcast".[42] In consequence, analyses frequently go

[34] Reyntjens, "Rwanda: Genocide and Beyond," 244.

[35] E.g. Aidan Russell, "Obedience and Selective Genocide in Burundi," *Africa Today* 85, no. 3 (2015).

[36] E.g. Jeremy J. Greenland, "Black Racism in Burundi," *New Blackfriars* 54, no. 641 (1973).

[37] E.g. Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*. Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda " 263.

[38] E.g. Richard Cornwell and Hannelie de Beer, "Burundi: The Politics of Intolerance," *African Security Studies* 8, no. 6 (1999): 88.

[39] This is based on Peter Uvin's observation that "All genocides in history have been instigated, organized, and legitimized by the state, and no explanation could be accurate without including the role played by local state representatives in the 'micromanagement' of the genocide. Yet these explanations do not grasp the whole story. They fail to account for the deeper social basis upon which these processes rest". Uvin, "Reading the Rwandan Genocide," 80.

[40] Markus Weilenmann, "Reactive Ethnicity: Some Thoughts on Political Psychology Based on the Developments in Burundi, Rwanda and South-Kivu," *Journal of Psychology in Africa* 10, no. 1 (2000): 6.

[41] René Lemarchand, "Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which Genocide? Whose Genocide?," *African Studies Review* 41, no. 1 (1998): 3.

[42] Uvin, "Reading the Rwandan Genocide," 81.

through great lengths in contextualising the acts of the population with reference to the constructed nature of ethnicity, while writing off elite policies under the banner of political, economic, and social advancement.[43]

In addition to the foregoing, this dissertation is convinced that the emphasis on prospects of materialistic gain as a driver of ethnic violence fails to decipher the dehumanisation, the vile atrocities, and the attempt at the annihilation of the other that characterise the act of genocide. Moreover, it is concerned that the parochial fixation on elite manipulation and materialistic opportunism endorses a dangerous notion of 'African savagery'[44] that conveys an equally distorted representation of ethnicity in Africa as the essentialist depiction it tries to overcome.

1.2.4 Core Literature

In view of the fact that the nature of ethnicity and its role in the genocides of the Great Lakes region has rarely been interrogated, two scholars stand out manifestly, whose work will be outlined in the following.

1.2.4.1 Mahmood Mamdani on the Colonial Construction of Political Identities

The seminal work of Ugandan scholar Mahmood Mamdani traces the politicisation of ethnicity to the nature in which the colonial state was constructed and the way in which it absorbed the colonised.[45] According to the author, at the heart of this process is a bifurcated state that is inherently unable to function outside of the logic of binary. As such, it differentiates between settlers and natives, citizens and subjects, races and ethnic groups, and ultimately Tutsi and Hutu, whereby each side of the dyad is governed by a radically different logic than the other. Tragically, these categorical distinctions were not just an intellectual construct. Rather, the alleged dissimilarities between the groups were institutionalised and inscribed into law, resulting in the unequivocal definition of each individual's relation to the state, as well as the rights and obligations deriving from it. By setting the parameters of its political community, the colonial state *produced* a set of political identities, which, due to their genesis in the process of state formation, Mamdani considers to be distinct from cultural and market-based

[43] See for example Daley, "Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa."

[44] For an analysis of the construction of 'African savagery' please refer to Wendy C. Hamblet, *Savage Constructions: The Myth of African Savagery* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008).

[45] Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject : Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

identities.[46] Pursuant to his logic, the nature and polarisation of these identities can only be understood by historicising the transformations in the meaning-producing institutional structures.[47]

In view of the foregoing, the dissertation submits that Mamdani's work on the dualistic construction of the colonial state rests upon a Fanonian conception of colonial society as a Manichean world.[48] Mamdani, therefore, conceives of colonial identity politics as a form of structural violence that institutionalised, normalised, and routinised violence against 'the native'. In line with Fanon's reflections, Mamdani confirms the colonial experience as one not only characterised by physical violence but, given the assumptions upon which the colonial state was designed, also one of structural psychological violence against its subjects. Understanding this dimension of colonial society, in turn, has pivotal implications for how he conceptualises the structural pressures that shaped the parameters of identity politics among the colonised and the way in which they resisted the colonial enterprise.

Albeit written to explain the Rwandan tragedy, Mamdani's conceptualisation can be transferred to the Burundian context in view of the two kingdom's administrative union as 'Ruanda-Urundi' during the colonial period.[49] Against this background, the dissertation considers the author's deliberations in 'When Victims Become Killers' paramount to any attempt at understanding the racialisation and polarisation of ethnic identity in Burundi and the question of why ethnicity evolved as the conflict's fault line. As such, his work greatly informs the present approach to the construction of ethnicity in the process of state formation.

Nonetheless, the dissertation is not entirely convinced of the conceptual connection Mamdani establishes between the politicisation of ethnic identities and genocidal violence. As Wimmer maintains:

> "[T]he politicisation of ethnicity is to be interpreted as a central aspect of modern state-building. For only when 'people' and state are mutually related within the ideal of a legitimate order does the question arise for which ethnic group the state has to act, who is regarded as its legitimate owner, and who is entitled to have access to its services."[50]

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[46] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 21f.

[47] Ibid., 59.

[48] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 41.

[49] Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda " 253.

[50] Andreas Wimmer, "Who Owns the State? Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Post-Colonial Societies," *Nations and Nationalism* 3, no. 4 (1997): 631.

If the politicisation of ethnicity, is in fact, an integral part of the nation-building process itself and not exceptional to neither the Rwandan nor the Burundian situation, how do we then explain the exceptional escalation of political violence between Hutu and Tutsi into a Genocide? The dissertation will return to this question at a later stage.

1.2.4.2 René Lemarchand's Exclusionary Thesis

With respect to the particularities of ethnic conflict in Burundi, the work of Great Lakes scholar René Lemarchand is indispensable to any analysis seeking to illuminate the country's descent into endemic ethno-political violence. Based on his earlier work 'Rwanda and Burundi',[51] 'Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice'[52] investigates the extraordinary combination of circumstances that shaped the social construction of an ethnic fault line in Burundi's post-independence period. Lemarchand offers a balanced evaluation of conflict dynamics ingrained in non-ethnic precolonial cleavages, colonial divide and rule policies, as well as post-colonial power-politics. At the heart of his etiology of conflict is an exclusionary thesis that has come to form the foundation of diverse scholarly interpretations on the sequences of relative deprivation, rebellion, and repression in post-colonial Burundi.[53] In this respect, Uvin similarly avers to a "radicalization of animosity and the routinization of violence"[54], while Weinstein warns of the difficulties of breaking the cycle of violence and counter-violence once set in motion.[55]

Notwithstanding the validity of these conclusions, Lemarchand and others continuously refer in their reconstruction of Burundi's political trajectory to the role of threats and fears.[56] Yet, they fail to sufficiently conceptualise the connection between the threat and the subject of such

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[51] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*.

[52] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*.

[53] E.g. Stephen Weissman, *Preventing Genocide in Burundi: Lessons from International Diplomacy*, US Institute of Peace (1998). Filip Reyntjens, "The Proof of the Pudding Is in the Eating: The June 1993 Elections in Burundi," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31, no. 4 (1993).

[54] Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda " 253.

[55] Warren Weinstein and Robert Schrire, "Ethnic Strategies and the Primacy of Ethnic Survival: The Case of Burundi," *International Review of Modern Sociology* 5, no. 2 (1975): 191.

[56] René Lemarchand, "Burundi: The Politics of Ethnic Amnesia," in *Genocide Watch*, ed. Helen Fein (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 76,86. Rockfeler P. Herisse, "Development on a Theater: Democracy, Governance and the Socio-Political Conflict in Burundi," *Agriculture and Human Values* 18 (2001): 299. Kara Hoofnagle, "Burundi: A History of Conflict and State Crime," in *State Crime - Current Perspectives*, ed. Dawn L. Rothe and Christopher W. Mullins (Rutgers University Press, 2011), 147.

security articulations. What is, as such, radically absent in the literature on the Burundian conflict is a conceptualisation of who feels threatened, by what and why, on the one hand, and genocidal violence on the other hand. The objective of the present dissertation is, hence, to redress this scholarly void.

1.3 Defining the Research Problem

The point of departure in the development of this dissertation's research question is an uncomfortable truth: Genocides are a phenomenon of human behaviour. Although it is difficult to grasp what atrocities humans are capable of inflicting upon another and although "we may agree that genocidal violence cannot be understood as rational; yet, we need to understand it as thinkable".[57] But how can we grasp the mania of indiscriminate violence against Tutsi families in the months following Ndadaye's murder? How can we understand the atrocious mutilations by Tutsi soldiers that "sought to send the message that no more Hutu should be born"?[58] And how can we comprehend the unintelligible commitment to the annihilation of the other?

Beyond the inconceivability of satisfactory answers to those questions lies another sobering realisation: The 1993 Genocide was "perpetrated by individuals acting collectively on behalf of what they perceive to be their own group against what they perceive to be a different group".[59] Hence, the inter-ethnic carnage was a confrontation of identities, not individuals; a battle for the weal of the collective and not for the personal gain of its constituents. Yet, there has been little to no meaningful engagement beyond essentialist determinism with the causal connection between the identity collective and the genocidal violence of 1993. Conversely, the genocide has frequently been dismissed as the function of greed, a desire for revenge, and the pervasive fear in an ethnic security dilemma. A comprehensive scrutiny for why ethnicised representations of enmity resonated with certain constituents in Burundi at particular points of history is largely absent from the scholarly discourse on the 1993 Genocide.

This dissertation seeks to bridge the conceptual gap between cause and effect of ethnic fear in the Burundian tragedy through an International Security Studies ('ISS') approach that relates

[57] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 7.

[58] Krueger and Krueger, *From Bloodshed to Hope in Burundi* xiii.

[59] Moshman, "Us and Them: Identity and Genocide," 116.

ethnic identity and genocidal violence in their security nexus. Based on the vocabulary of the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory, this dissertation conceives of the 1993 Genocide in Burundi as an extraordinary emergency response to an existential threat against a particular referent object defined in ethnic terms. While this conceptualisation addresses the questions of 'who feels threatened by what and with what effect', there is no unambiguous answer as to why ethnicity came to be perceived as a security issue to begin with. As such, this dissertation locates the crux of the Burundian tragedy in its history of identity construction, rather than in the advent of the genocide itself. By utilising the analytical tools of the Copenhagen framework, the dissertation reconstructs the political history of Hutu and Tutsi identities in search for conditions enabling the ethnicisation of security discourses. Put differently, in order to explain the emergence of ethnic antagonisms and the occurrence of the genocide in 1993, the dissertation asks, 'how did ethnicity become *securitised*?'

Thereby, the relationship between securitised ethnic identities and the struggle for state control as the trigger of genocidal violence in 1993 is addressed in a threefold conceptualisation: Firstly, based on the state's power and capacity to decide over who lives under its protection and who dies of its wrath,[60] state control is conceived of as a primary physical security strategy. Secondly, based on the very construction of ethnic identities via the idea of the nation, state control is understood as an ontological security need. Thirdly, and as a function of the former, the state is deciphered as the referent object of security in an ethnicised national security discourse.

This dissertation decidedly underscores that the logic of security as survival and the vocabulary of existential threats used throughout the analysis does not intend to rationalise nor excuse the horrors of ethnic violence and genocide in Burundi. Instead, it aims to demonstrate how "the invocation of security has [not only] been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally … has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats".[61] As such, it problematises the emergence of ethnicised security discourses and their role in the discursive legitimation of ethnic violence of genocidal scale. Mindful of securitisation theory's inability to account for security dynamics below the level of emergency,

[60] Based on Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitics," *Public Culture* 15, no. 1 (2003).

[61] Barry Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 21.

the dissertation supplements its analytical approach with a Fanonian conception of the nature of colonial society and the process of decolonisation. In doing so, it accounts for the structural dimension of ethnic violence in Burundi, its zero-sum logic, and its particular gruesomeness. In this way, the dissertation provides an alternative explanation for the occurrence of the Genocide and the role of ethnicity in its perpetration. The following section presents the methodological approach to this research undertaking.

1.4 Research Methodology

Predicated on a constructivist ontology,[62] the concepts at the heart of this dissertation's research problem i.e., ethnic identity and security, are conceived of as socially constructed, hence fluid, contextual, and subjective. Accordingly, the epistemological objective is not to uncover generalisable social facts or transhistorical causality,[63] but to illuminate novel facets of meaning production through an alternate reading of Burundi's social world. Thereby, the primary subject of interests is specified as the 1993 Genocide in Burundi, conceptualised as the symptom of a historically evolving intersubjective process of threat construction. Considered incomprehensible without an awareness for historical ruptures and continuities,[64] the subject of inquiry warrants a historical perspective based on the study of mainly secondary online resources.[65]

[62] Ontology, linguistically derived from the Greek 'onto' (being) and 'logos' (science), describes a branch of meta-physics concerned with the study of 'being'. Its main debate evolves between the proponents of foundationalism/realism and anti-foundationalism/relativism, representing the two extremes of the objectivist-subjectivist continuum. Epistemology, on the other hand, concerns the study of knowledge i.e., its nature and production. Its main debate is fought between positivists and anti-positivists/constructivists. Following works are suggested for a more detailed elaboration of the paradigms and the respective debates surrounding them: Tony Lawson, "A Conception of Social Ontology," in *Social Ontology and Modern Economics*, ed. Stephen Pratten (New York: Routledge, 2015). James Scotland, "Exploring the Philosophical Underpinnings of Research: Relating Ontology and Epistemology to the Methodology and Methods of the Scientific, Interpretive, and Critical Research Paradigms," *English Language Teaching Journal* 5, no. 9 (2012). David Marsh and Paul Furlong, "A Skin, Not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science," in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, ed. David Marsh & Gerry Stoker (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

[63] The positivist epistemology of natural sciences believes in the objectivity of knowledge and generalisability in form of laws and predictions. Often using quantitative methods, it establishes causality and hypothesised regularities. For a more detailed description please refer to the recommended literature in the above footnote.

[64] In the context of Rwanda and Burundi, Adam Jones has similarily argued that the genocides of the 1990 are incomprehensible without consideration for former instances of violence. For the detailed argument please consult Jones, "The Great Lakes Genocides."

[65] Regrettably, the study of primary sources and, to some extent, print media was unfeasible due to the closure of libraries and archives and the restrictions on travel in the context of the Covid-19 Pandemic.

Endogenously generated by the overarching constructivist research paradigm, rather than the product of methodological choice, the approach to the outlined research question is founded upon a qualitative strategy. The inquiry follows a case study design[66] that is retrospective, idiographic, and descriptive in nature. As the research problem has been construed on basis of an established theory i.e., securitisation theory, its analysis requires a theory-guided case study design that, pursuant to Lijphart's typology,[67] can be classified as an 'interpretative case study'. According to Lijphart,

> "Interpretative case studies resemble atheoretical case studies in one respect: they, too, are selected for analysis because of an interest in the case rather than an interest in the formulation of general theory. They differ, however, in that they make explicit use of established theoretical propositions. In these studies, a generalization is applied to a specific case with the aim of throwing light on the case rather than of improving the generalization in any way."[68]

As a hybrid approach between intrinsic and instrumental case studies, the interpretative case study design allows the researcher to utilise theory as a malleable 'thinking tool' by using theoretical propositions considered insightful to the case under consideration, while foreclosing others. The theoretical propositions informing the analytical framework to the present case study of the 1993 Genocide in Burundi will be outlined in chapter two.

1.5 Significance

The importance of studying the ethnic violence between Burundi's Hutu and Tutsi population that has culminated in 1993 into a genocide and an ensuing twelve-year long civil war is manifold. First and foremost, it recognises and validates the suffering of a population that has had to endure multiple bloody episodes of mass killings since passing the threshold of independence. Moreover, the approach offered in this dissertation acknowledges that the 1993 Genocide in Burundi was fundamentally about identities without descending into essentialist

[66] Although the case study approach has gained widespread popularity in social science research, the academic community has not come to a consensus on the definition of the 'case' or the 'case study'. A discussion of different case study typologies, designs, and purposes is offered in Jack S. Levy, "Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25 (2008). Gary Thomas, "A Typology for the Case Study in Social Science Following a Review of Definition, Discourse, and Structure," *Qualitative Inquiry* 17, no. 6 (2011).

[67] Arendt Lijphart differentiates between six different types of case studies: atheoretical, interpretative, hypothesis-generating, theory-confirming, theory-infirming and deviant case studies. For an elaboration of their characteristics, advantages, and limitations, please refer to the original typologisation in Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *The American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (1971).

[68] Ibid., 692.

determinism. By reconstructing the securitisation of ethnicity, this dissertation demonstrates that conflict is not inherent to Burundi's ethnic groups but rather the product of the social construction of security communities and the threats they oppose. The emphasis on the intersubjectivity of this process, thereby, recognises the agency and consequentially the responsibility of the 'ordinary' citizens that became the subaltern culprits of ethnic violence.

On a more positive note, the constructivist approach to the violence of 1993 allows for the conclusion that if ethnic identity was constructed as a security issue, it can be deconstructed and reverted into a matter of ordinary politics. Understanding the process of securitisation and its enabling conditions is, hence, not only instructive for endeavours of *desecuritisation*[69] but may also contribute to an early detection of harmful securitisation practices and their obstruction. This, in turn, creates hopes for a future of sustainable ethnic harmony in Burundi and the Great Lakes region more generally, as matters of (in)security have often been intertwined and interdependent between its constituent states.

1.6 Limitations

A significant limitation to this research derives from the conditions under which it was conducted. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, archives and libraries were, for most part of the dissertation process, shut down. Thus, a large proportion of the research undertaken during this period relied on a rather limited number of online resources and digitalised versions of printed works. This is in addition to the general lack of research available on the issue under consideration.

1.7 Chapter Outline

This dissertation consists of six chapters and four thematic streams. Chapter one and two introduce the reader to the foundations of this study's conception. The present introductory chapter has put forward the security studies approach as this dissertation's main contribution to the literature on the causes of the 1993 Genocide in Burundi. In the subsequent chapter, the analytical approach will be further specified through a discussion of the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory. Thereinafter, the dissertation thematically turns to the construction of

[69] Desecuritisation is "the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere". See therefore Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework*, 4.

Hutu and Tutsi identities in Burundi. Chapter three begins with an outline of the emergence of political identities in the precolonial process of state formation and provides an overall introduction to the precolonial Kingdom of Burundi. Subsequently, the chapter considers the racialisation and rigidification of Hutu and Tutsi identities under colonial rule. From the politicisation and racialisation of ethnicity in the colonial era, the thesis turns to the ethnicisation of security discourses in the period of decolonisation in Rwanda and Burundi. Through the political trajectory in both countries, chapter four explores the construction of ethnic identity as a security issue i.e., its *securitisation*. Finally, chapter five considers the interplay of security and ethnic violence in three major episodes of inter-ethnic massacres in Burundi. In this context, the 1993 Genocide is analysed as the function of a historical process of ethnicised threat construction. The dissertation concludes with a reflection on its main arguments and an evaluation of their significance to further research on the Burundian case study.

2 The Copenhagen School's Analytical Framework

The purpose of this chapter is to present the reader with the conceptual framework that guides the analysis of the Burundian case study through the tool book of International Security Studies ('ISS'). Following a brief synopsis of the main debates within the field, the Copenhagen School ('CS') will be presented as a critical response to the inadequacy of the traditional realist agenda of security. Subsequently, two of the School's principal analytical tools, securitisation theory and the sectoral approach, will be outlined. Special emphasis is devoted to the way in which the CS logic of security informs the analytical approach to the Burundian case study. Lastly, the chapter introduces an alternate reading of the theoretical archetype that reconciles the absence in the theorisation of facilitating conditions with the contextual dimension of Burundi's security discourses.

> "The concept of security is not important for what it *means*; it is important for what it *does*: for the way in which it marks an issue as one of survival, requiring the adoption of emergency measures and the suspension of normal rules of social and political life." [70]
>
> - *Keith Krause and Michael Williams*

2.1 Introducing the Copenhagen School of Security Studies

Spawned by the beginning of the Cold War and the rise of the nuclear threat, the novel agenda of international politics engendered a distinct body of literature concerned with 'security' as its lead concept. Promptly subsumed into the ranks of the rapidly advancing discipline of International Relations, ISS evolved as a field characteristically concerned with the military security needs and interests of states.[71] Despite realism's inherent inability to incorporate into its structures the new types of conflict actors, threats, and epiphenomena that were swiftly increasing in relevance, it was not until the rapid transformations in the world politics of the early 1990s that the commonly held assumptions of the field were challenged by critical

[70] Keith Krause and Michael Williams, "Security and "Security Studies" Conceptual Evolution and Historical Transformation," ed. Alexandra Gheciu and William C. Wohlforth, *The Oxford Handbook of International Security* (Oxford University Press, 2018), https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198777854.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198777854. 9. Original Emphasis.

[71] Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 10.

scholars from various disciplines.[72] "What unites these efforts", according to Krause and Williams, "is a conviction that the neorealist focus on safeguarding the 'core values' of a state from military threats emanating from outside its borders is no longer adequate (if it ever was) as a means of understanding what (or who) is to be secured, from what threats, and by what means".[73] Questioning 'whose security' ISS can and should account for, these scholars laid the intellectual groundwork for a new agenda of security, that encompasses a range of referent objects, their distinct security concerns, and the nature of their vulnerabilities.[74] This new programme of ISS did, however, not materialise without significant resistance from traditionalists, who believed that the progressive expansion of the realm of security would eventually lead to the incorporation of the whole social and political agenda and thereby endanger the field's intellectual coherence.[75]

Founded by a small group of scholars at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, CS emerged from the intra-ISS debate as a 'widening' approach[76], that considered security to encompass "a range of dynamics, some of which are fundamentally different from military-political ones".[77] Albeit explicitly acknowledging the multi-dimensionality and versatility of security, CS retained the traditional understanding of security as *survival*. Against this backdrop, CS scholars, most notably Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, have developed a range of distinctive conceptual tools to facilitate the application of their logic of security to threats of non-military character and subjects other than states.[78] Two of the school's major contributions to security analysis will be outlined in the following. Special emphasis is placed on the way in which these analytical tools inform the conceptual framework of this dissertation.

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[72] Alam Saleh, "Broadening the Concept of Security: Identity and Societal Security," *Geopolitics Quarterly* 6, no. 4 (2010): 229. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, "Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School Replies," *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 2 (1997): 242.

[73] Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods," *Mershon international Studies Review* 40, no. 2 (1996): 230.

[74] Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, 14.

[75] Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 47.

[76] Sarah Bertrand notes that competing interpretations have frequently denied the Copenhagen School's critical status on grounds of its alleged "elite-centric, discourse-dominated, conservative, politically passive, and neither progressive nor radical" character. For Bertrand's full argument please refer to Sarah Bertrand, "Can the Subaltern Securitize? Postcolonial Perspectives on Securitization Theory and Its Critics," *European Journal of International Security* 3, no. 3 (2018): 281-282.

[77] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework*, 195.

[78] Ibid., 4f.

2.2 Securitisation Theory and the 'Making' of Security

One of the principal approaches to the study of security in the CS toolkit is the concept of 'securitisation'. The genesis of securitisation theory lies in the constructivist conviction that security, as much as any other social category, is not an extrinsic and unchangeable political condition, but rather product of socially negotiated processes. To the scholars in Copenhagen, the source of security, that is "the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics",[79] is to be located within discursive practices, wherein the rhetoric of an existential threat brokers a sense of emergency. Thereby, the term 'securitisation move' refers to distinct speech acts, in which a 'securitising actor' presents an issue to an audience as an *existential threat* to a certain referent object.[80] If the respective audience accepts the presented existential danger of the threat as such, the issue is moved out of the realm of politics into the domain of security. Hence, an issue *becomes* a security issue through an intersubjective process. In other words, the issue is *securitised*. Within the arena of security, the gravity of danger then *justifies*, if not *requires*, an *extraordinary* response in form of emergency measures, that often lie beyond the constraints of ordinary politics.[81]

Based on the foregoing considerations, the elucidatory value of securitisation theory to the analysis of the Burundian case is identified in following aspects: Foremost, securitisation theory locates the genesis of security issues in intersubjective processes of threat *construction*. Hence, it acknowledges that "the domain of (in)security is not predefined"[82] and that security discourses can emerge, evolve, and dissolve over time. In the case of Burundi, the securitisation of the ethnic other can, therefore, not constitute an immutable epiphenomenon of ethnic hatred, but must rather be considered the product of socially negotiated threat perceptions, influenced by the respective historico-political circumstances. This dissertation believes that a critical analysis thereof is the crucial missing piece in the deconstruction of ethnic tensions and the decipherment of the logic of ethnic violence in Burundi. In this regard, securitisation theory's

[79] Ibid., 23.

[80] Due to its foundational link to John Austin's speech act theory, Wæver himself has located the concept of securitisation within language theory. See therefore Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

[81] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework*, 23-24.

[82] Thierry Balzacq et al., "'Securitization' Revisited: Theory and Cases," *International Relations* 30, no. 4 (2016): 498.

language of urgency and survival, epitomised in the logic of 'existential threats', offers a unique understanding of the 1993 Genocide in Burundi by allowing the mutual project of annihilation to be approached as the most extreme conceivable 'emergency response' to a perceived existential threat.

2.3 Societal Security and Identity Politics

The sectoral approach to security constitutes a second pillar of CS's critical response to the inadequacy of traditional Security Studies in explaining a) the emergence of security issues, and b) phenomena such as migration, nationalism, and ethnic conflict. According to Buzan and Wæver "these issues were not simply absent in the sense that classical security studies did not care; they were radically absent because they could not be represented in the classical state-centric theory".[83] Against this backdrop, Barry Buzan, in his 1993 work 'People, States and Fear'[84], introduced a sectoral approach to security, that widened the scope of ISS beyond the security needs of the state. According to Buzan, the array of objects of security discourses can be grouped into five distinct sectors (military, political, economic, societal, and environmental), each of which is governed by its own internal security dynamics.[85]

The idiosyncrasy of the individual sectors is epitomised in the phenomenon of ethnic conflict, which vindicates Buzan's contention that security interests of state and society do not invariably align but may, conversely, find one another on opposing ends.[86] In these cases, it is not only the need for protection that derivates, but the very logic of what needs to be safeguarded. While national security inextricably links sovereignty and territorial integrity to the survival of the state as a self-sufficient entity, the organising principle of societal security is *identity* i.e., "those ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social group".[87] Hence, societal insecurity occurs whenever the respective 'we' is threatened as to its identity.[88] In other words, when the survival as an identity community is at risk.

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[83] Buzan and Wæver, "Slippery? Contradictory?," 242.

[84] Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983).

[85] Ibid., 70 ff.

[86] Ibid., 18.

[87] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework*, 119.

[88] Ibid., 123.

The politics of 'belonging' to the collective and the related question of who forms part of its internal security discourses is historically contingent and highly contextual. While in Europe, for example, groups predominantly congregate based on nationality, the case of Burundi exemplifies the organisational relevance of identity markers such as clan, tribe, and social class as well as the volatility of their pertinence. Deconstructing the organisational principles of identity communities in Burundi, therefore, offers crucial insights into the ideas that are considered substantial to the self-conception of its members, their relation to the state as an identity-generating entity, as well as the vulnerabilities that are constitutive of what is considered a threat to their security.[89] Owing to the sectoral approaches' widening of the security agenda, securitisation theory can be applied to the societal sector, in which ethnic groups may constitute both the referent object of security, as well as the security threat that needs to be averted. Moreover, the approach allows the existential danger to be conceived of not only in terms of physical survival, but in terms of the ontological security of collectives, who "need to feel secure in who they are, as identities or selves".[90] An inquiry into the constitutive elements of these identities may therefore reveal what identity collectives in Burundi attempted to secure or, put differently, what the conflict that culminated into the 1993 Genocide was about.

Notwithstanding the significance of the sectoral approach to the conceptual framework of the present dissertation, it should be noted that a clear analytical distinction between the two sectors is not always helpful, let alone possible in all parts of the present analysis. This signifies the possible interdependencies in the construction of national and societal security.

2.4 Copenhagen under Scrutiny

Since its formulation in the mid-1990s, securitisation theory has been subject to heavy criticism by various strands of the critical scholarship, remarking the concept's overly reliance on the

[89] Based on the distinctiveness of sectors and threats, Buzan et al. conclude that "different societies have different vulnerabilities depending upon how their identity is constructed", which they illustrate, subsequently, by pointing toward core ideas of different societies and the vulnerabilities that derive from them. A non-exhaustive list of potential threats in accordance with identity particularities can be found at ibid., 124 ff.

[90] Jennifer Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma," *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 3 (2006): 342.

medium of speech and the moment of the speech act.[91] A substantial proportion of these critics came, in fact, from the ranks of securitisation scholars themselves, albeit of a strand of theorists with radically different meta-theoretical interpretations of what the theory can and should illuminate. While the theoretical archetype proposes an internalist-poststructural reading that focuses on the speech act as a performative moment of meaning production (illocution),[92] the externalist-constructivist understanding interprets securitisation as a contextually embedded practice[93] that occurs through a variety of staggered, yet incremental processes.[94] Scholars of the latter strand of securitisation research maintain that security acquires its meaning in 'the context of its pronouncement'.[95] Although CS acknowledges the existence of facilitating conditions and their place in the research agenda,[96] it has been asserted that they remain "so under-theorized as to ultimately remain outside the framework itself".[97]

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[91] Wilkinson, for example, reflects on the inapplicability of securitisation theory in non-Western contexts, where free speech is frequently impaired or non-existent. As such, other forms of expressing security, e.g. migration or protest, are of crucial importance, but remain, however, outside of Copenhagen's logocentric framework. For the full analysis please refer to Claire Wilkinson, "The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?," *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 1 (2007).

In her 2018 article, Sarah Bertrand discusses the marginalisation of the subaltern in the security discourse, which, according to her, constructs a colonial relationship between those voices that can be heard and those voices that security is spoken for. For further elaboration please refer to Bertrand, "Can the Subaltern Securitize?."

Lene Hansen, on the other hand, offers an excellent feminist critique in pointing to the inability of securitisation theory to incorporate gender into its speech act framework. Because gendered insecurity can often not be voiced, due to either structural constraints or a possible consequence of the speech act aggravating the threat, it falls under the radar of security as conceptualised by the Copenhagen School. For a detailed development of this argument, please refer to the original work at Lene Hansen, "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School," *Millenium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2000).

[92] According to the post-structural reading, language *produces* meaning and can, hence, be analysed and understood outside of any contextual particularities. An explanation of the illocutionary logic can be found in John Austin's speech act theory. John Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* William James Lectures, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).

[93] Holger Stritzel, "Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 3 (2007): 359.

[94] Matt McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security," *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (2009): 564.

[95] Balzacq et al., "'Securitization' Revisited," 504.

[96] In 'Security: A New Framework for Analysis', Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde make reference to two categories of facilitating conditions, one being internal and of linguistic-grammatical nature, the other external and of contextual/social nature. In the original theorisation of the authors, context was, however, rather confined to the immediate circumstances of the securitisation actor, e.g., his position in society. The role of facilitating conditions in explaining the success of the securitisation act was addressed in the form of mention rather than conceptualisation. Please refer, therefore, to the original work at Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework*, 32.

[97] McDonald, "Securitization," 565.

Almost three decades after the original formulation of the theory, the attention to context as a facilitating condition has acquired the status of an essential component in contemporary analyses of securitisation practices.[98] This research highlights the formative influence of certain political, social, and historical conditions in generating particular discourses of security, facilitating the process of securitisation and determining the likelihood of its success based on the receptivity of certain audiences to particular security pronouncements.[99] Therefore, "the explanatory role of the context is not primarily found in its substantial components but in its constraining and/or enabling effects – in brief, in its epistemological underpinnings".[100]

In the context of the research problem as outlined in chapter one, the dissertation considers the transformations in the historico-political conjecture as pivotal to reconstructing a) the emergence of Hutu and Tutsi as identity communities in Burundi and b) the significance of identity in the rise of ethnicised security discourses. Otherwise stated, this dissertation utilises the externalist-constructivist orientation to explore "the processes through which particular definitions or discourses of security come to constitute the lens through which specific issues are conceptualized and addressed by different political communities".[101] The conceptual framework of this dissertation, however, inverts the rationale of conventional securitisation research. Thus, it is not concerned with elucidating securitisation moves through the context of their pronouncements but rather utilises the CS logic of security to illuminate aspects of the historico-political context that are considered crucial to the outbreak of the 1993 Genocide in Burundi. The theory's shortcomings in accounting for dynamics below the level of emergency are redressed by supplementing the CS analytical framework with a Fanonian conception of the structural violence in colonial societies.

2.5 Conclusion

In the foregoing, it was established that the conceptual framework to this dissertation is informed by two theoretical concepts that originate from the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. Firstly, the chapter outlined how securitisation theory's rhetoric of 'existential threats' frames security as survival and legitimises, even demands, extraordinary emergency responses.

[98] Balzacq et al., "'Securitization' Revisited," 504.

[99] Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (2005).

[100] Balzacq et al., "'Securitization' Revisited," 502.

[101] McDonald, "Securitization," 565.

With the ‘making’ of security at its core, securitisation theory was presented as a powerful analytical tool for the inquiry into the emergence of ethnicised security discourses in Burundi. In this context, the concept of security sectors was introduced as enabling the applicability of the ISS approach to societal groupings, within which identity politics determine the collectives’ membership, values, and vulnerabilities. Mindful of the distinct logic of societal security, the CS framework acknowledges threats to be of both physical and ontological nature. Lastly, the chapter alluded to the significance of the externalist-constructivist reading for the enabling role of context in the present case study. In the following chapters, the outlined conceptual framework will guide the inquiry into the intersection of identity and security in the major epochs of Burundian history.

3 The Kingdom of Burundi in Precolonial and Colonial Perspective

This chapter introduces the reader to the socio-political organisation of the Kingdom of Burundi in the precolonial and colonial era. The first part of the chapter outlines the contours of identity politics in the precolonial Kingdom of Burundi, beginning with a discussion of different strands of research on the origin of the peoples inhabiting its territory and the nature of their distinction. Thereinafter, the Kingdom's political system will be presented in relation to its cohesive qualities, followed by an elucidation of the social pecking order's organisational principles. The second part of the chapter is devoted to Burundi's relatively brief but overwhelmingly impactful colonial experience. Specifically, it aims at delineating the modification and rigidification of ethnic identity in Burundi, as well as the transformation of state power under colonial rule. At the outset, a brief synopsis of the Kingdom's colonial conquest is provided, followed by a discussion of the Hamitic Hypothesis, as the central paradigm to the colonial encounter, in relation to its impact on ethnic relations in Burundi.

> "Ethnic identities were not primordial, they were contextually created; they altered over time, and they evolved differently in different places and contexts."[102]
>
> - *David Newbury*

> "Since the first contact with Europeans the Tutsi-Hutu antagonism in Rwanda and Burundi gained practical priority and intellectual primacy. To ask what happened during colonization is not to deny how old this cleavage is but rather to understand why it became so obsessive to the point of eclipsing every other problem." [103]
>
> - *Jean-Pierre Chrétien*

3.1 The Precolonial Kingdom of Burundi

3.1.1 The Peoples of Burundi – A Story of Origin

The origin of the peoples inhabiting the territory today known as Rwanda and Burundi and the nature of their distinction is, to this day, one of the most contested issues in the Great Lakes

[102] David Newbury, "Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda: Local Loyalties, Regional Royalties," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 34, no. 2 (2001): 271.

[103] Jean-Pierre Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History*, trans. Scott Straus (New York: Zone Books, 2006), 281f.

scholarship. Within this debate, two distinct points of view have crystallised. One is based on the colonial theory of migration and conquest whereby nomadic Tutsi pastoralists are believed to have migrated from Ethiopia to the region around the fifteenth century. According to this supposition, the local agricultural 'Bantu' (Hutu) and 'pygmy' hunters (Twa) were subjugated to the Tutsi culture and supremacy upon their 'invasion', though this process is often described as peaceful.[104] Fundamentally, this theory of human settlement understands the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa of Burundi as biologically distinct peoples with separate histories, cultures, physiologies, and occupational lifestyles.[105] As will be revealed at later point, this conception of the story of origin would play a powerful role in colonial identity politics and the nature of Hutu nationalism in the post-colonial period.

A second strand of research emerged as an oppositional response to the colonial anthropology of the migration hypothesis and emphasises, in lieu of dramatic ruptures, the significance of integrative processes and peaceful cohabitation.[106] Above all, it challenges the common conception of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa as purely ethnic categories in the face of the single cohesive economic, cultural, linguistic, and political community formed by these peoples in the precolonial era.[107] Given the common practice of intermarriage, proponents of this view hold any distinction based on physiological characteristics notoriously unreliable.[108] In lieu of genealogy, scholars such as Mamdani and Newbury have traced the origin of their distinction to the identity-generating properties of the state formation process.

In the Rwandan context, Mamdani believes the term 'Hutu' to have signified a trans-ethnic category of subjects to the authority of the aggressively expanding Rwandan state. Hence, it signified a *political identity* which builds upon 'a common project for the future' as opposed to the common historical inheritance cultural identities denote.[109] The connotation of the 'Hutu'

[104] WM. Roger Louis, *Ruanda-Urundi 1884-1919* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 108.

[105] For an insightful summary of the different types of research associated with the theory of migration and conquest and its proponents, please refer to Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, Chapter 2.

[106] Ibid., 42.

[107] Thomas Laley, "Peasants, Local Communities, and Central Power in Burundi," *The jorunal of Modern African Studies* 35, no. 4 (1997): 698.

[108] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 7.; Newbury, "Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda," 272.

[109] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 23.

as an inferior class, thereby, derived from the practice of substituting local chiefs with royal retainers of the Tutsi monarchy.[110]

The Kingdom of Burundi, on the other hand, is construed by Newbury's research as a conglomerate of internally differentiated and regionally integrated autonomous political units. Based on the respective ecological realities, rather than genealogical descent, each of these polities displayed distinct political and cultural identities, as well as occupational lifestyles.[111] Similar to Mamdani's research in neighbouring Rwanda, Newbury traces the genesis of 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' to the Kingdom's conquests in the nineteenth century. Thereby, the subordination of diverse regional identities to the national logic of the state sought to forge a common identity among the Kingdom's subjects.[112] This process was, however, neither spatially inclusive nor comprehensive. As noted by Newbury, remnant regional identities coexisted in remote areas rather uneasily with both the centralised political identity and the class identity generated by the process of state expansion.[113]

The contingency of Hutu and Tutsi identities upon state penetration, hence, suggests that outside the royal court's sphere of influence the Hutu-Tutsi distinction was untenable. According to Newbury,

> "there was no broad social category uniting all as 'Hutu'; in fact, the very term 'Hutu' was meaningless. Only with the slow infiltration of state power, and in a complex process of mutual agency, did people come to see themselves as part of a collective 'Hutu' identity that transcended lineage and hill."[114]

The significance of this process of state-induced identity formation lies in the fact that the meaning of the 'Hutu' identity only manifested in relation to its Tutsi counterpart. Simply put, without a Tutsi identity there could not be a Hutu identity and vice versa. Even if the monarchy itself was not the architect of their existence per se, one can surmise from their strong connection to the court's authority that the state would play an important role in the ideas that define the very essence of the Hutu and Tutsi identity.

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[110] Ibid., 70.

[111] Newbury, "Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda," 259ff.

[112] Ibid., 266.

[113] Ibid., 266-271.

[114] Ibid., 273f.

In view of the foregoing considerations, this dissertation considers the integrative strand of research more differentiated and inclusive of the complexities of identity formation in Burundi. In consonance with the research conducted by Mamdani and Newbury, the dissertation accentuates the complex interplay of regional, national, and cultural identity markers and thus explicitly rejects the connotation of Hutu and Tutsi as immortal and purely ethnic identities.

3.1.2 The Political Organisation of the Kingdom of Burundi

The organisational principle that defined the political community of the Burundian people was one of a divine monarchy with the king (‘*mwami*’*)* at its centre. More than just a governing body, the crown united all members of society into a ‘psychic whole’ of meaning and purpose and thus stood as a symbol of national unity. On account of this robust legitimacy, the monarchy did not rely on the maintenance of any particular system of stratification in order to preserve its authority. In contrast to its counterpart in Rwanda, it was, therefore, relatively free of bias towards any group.[115] Expanding its sphere of influence through both conquest and peaceful assimilation, the crown administered its newly acquired provinces by installing a royal aristocracy, the princes of blood (‘*ganwa*’), in its chieftaincies.[116]

The *ganwa* were considered an ethnically distinct group, whose privileges and sovereign powers in the respective administrative domains derived from the rules of royal succession. Anticipating a cyclical alternation between *mwamis* and their corresponding dynasties[117], the precolonial order provided, in theory, for a peaceful transfer of power. In practice, however, the traditional system institutionalised periodic conflict between the princely factions.[118] Unwilling to cede their power and privileges in the process of *gutahira*[119] to the succeeding dynasty of *Bezi* princes, the *Batare* continued to administer their provinces in defiance of the authority of the new king, Mwezi Kisabo, who acceded the throne in 1852. The result was

[115] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 303.

[116] Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa*, 163.; Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 27.

[117] The traditional order dictates the dynastic names of Burundi’s *mwamis* as *Ntare*, *Mwezi*, *Mutaga,* and *Mwabutsa* as the eponyms of the *ganwa* dynasties of the *Batare*, *Bezi*, *Bataga,* and *Bambutswa*, respectively. An explanation of the rules and dynamics of the royal succession is offered by Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 22ff.

[118] Ibid., 22.

[119] The practice of *gutahira* is described as the social demotion of *ganwa* to the status of a simple Batutsi upon their succession after a cycle of four reigns by Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa*, 164.; Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 8.; and Newbury, "Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda," 274.

twofold: Firstly, to the detriment of the *mwami's* ability to assert effective control over vast parts of his territory, the political domain fragmented into continually multiplying small politico-territorial units in the second half of the nineteenth century.[120] Secondly, the progressive political disintegration within the top strata resulted in the deep entrenchment of competition for and dispersion of authority. This had the effect that the aristocratic powerholders needed to generate support from both the Hutu and Tutsi population in order to preserve and extend their authority. In this way, the dynastic feud between *Bezi* and *Batare* became not only generic for the political culture for decades to come but paradoxically evolved as a crucial factor of cohesion in the social realm.[121] With ethnic favouritism considered a jeopardy to the stability of their reign, the *ganwa* customarily appointed their subchiefs based on clan affiliation and individual merit.[122]

In stark contrast to Rwanda, where the political realm was predominantly associated with the Tutsi oligarchy, the administration of the Kingdom of Burundi was performed by a comparatively high proportion of Hutu chiefs with considerably higher social status than most ordinary Tutsi.[123] Taking this into account, Thomas Laley concludes that "the socio-political position and the respective rights of all descent groups were defined by their often specialised duties and functions for the royal court, the *mwami*, or the aristocracy" and not by the Hutu/Tutsi affiliation in of itself.[124] While their relationship to the crown was one based on responsibilities in the royal realm, the relationship among these socio-political aggregates themselves was defined by a system of vassalage. Though separate from and subsidiary to the political structure, the institution of clientage "in a fundamental sense … served as the normative frame of reference for the institutionalization of political ties".[125]

While this system of social relations will be explained in further detail in the following section, it should be noted at this point that the regulation of access to political power by highly personalised bonds of dependency had immediate consequences for the way in which politics

[120] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 22.

[121] Ibid., 24.

[122] Ibid., 28.

[123] Ibid.

[124] Laley, "Peasants, Local Communities, and Central Power in Burundi," 700.

[125] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 12.

were conducted in the Kingdom. In this respect, Laley contends that a political culture of secrecy, intrigue, and calumny was cultivated, that significantly inhibited the emersion of public political discourse.[126] This style of political behaviour would percolate throughout the epochs of Burundi's political history and significantly affect ethnic perceptions. For now, the dissertation infers from the foregoing that the articulation of security needs was predominantly of an interpersonal or regional nature, rather than a part of the national discourse. The structure of social security arrangements will be further explicated in the following section.

3.1.3 The Social Organisation of the Kingdom of Burundi

The clan, as the oldest structure of society, was not only the fulcrum of political relations and authority, but also the fundamental basis of social identification in precolonial Burundi. Approximately two-hundred kinship groups situated each Burundian in relation to other members of the trans-ethnic and trans-national social networks.[127] Compared to the omnipresence of kinship affiliations in the Kingdom's precolonial social and political life, ethnicity played a rather subsidiary role as a constituent of belonging. Hutu and Tutsi identities, however, did exist as both political identities attached to the authority of the Kingdom and as social identities tied to a contextually generated consciousness.

Alongside the kinship networks, Burundians were interconnected in a complex web of mutual rights and obligations in the institution of clientage. According to Lemarchand, the essential premise "at the heart of the institution was a relationship of exchange between individuals of unequal status, between a client in need of protection and a patron with enough wealth … and influence to provide such protection".[128] Though personalised security arrangements under the vassalage relations premised on the condition of inequality, the role allocation of patron and client did not intersect with ethnic affiliation, nor was it mutually exclusive. In this context, the term 'Hutu' referred to a 'social subordinate' i.e., the client in the clientage arrangement, that applied irrespective of ethnic identity.[129] In this way, a Tutsi patron may have concomitantly been at the receiving end of a clientage relationship vis-à-vis a wealthier patron. Within this social bond, the client assumed a Hutu social consciousness, despite continuing to ethnically

[126] Laley, "Peasants, Local Communities, and Central Power in Burundi," 705.

[127] Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa*, 88-91.

[128] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 12.

[129] Ibid., 10.

identify as Tutsi.[130] Similarly, Hutu were able to 'shed' their 'Hutuness' through the acquisition of wealth and assume the social identity of a Tutsi (*kihutura*).[131] In light of the foregoing and in contrast to the primordial assumptions on the endogeneity and consistency of identity, the semantics of Hutu and Tutsi were contextually contingent, fluid, and sometimes representative of dyadic and antithetical identification. As such, "ethnic labels did not apply to internally homogenous corporate groups, but to broad collective identities that emerged in a given context, based on concepts drawing on descent, occupation, class, and personal characteristics in various combinations".[132]

While intricate hierarchies of power, status, and privilege governed volatile social identification, status differentiations within the ethnic groups generated similarly complex power structures. Whereas stratification within the Hutu ethnos was marginal and mainly concerned ritualists of the royal court and community elders, intra-Tutsi class distinctions were so powerful as to transcend the perceptibility of inter-ethnic disparities.[133] The most salient binary concerned the Tutsi-Hima, who Newbury believes to be culturally distinct based on their strong affiliations with the eastern regions[134], and the Tutsi-Banyaruguru (literally 'people from above'), who Lemarchand considers a special class of powerful and prestigious Tutsi with historical connections to the monarchy.[135] Notwithstanding the salience of intra-ethnic disparities, the precolonial Burundian society was not free of ethnic cleavages and social tensions. However, it was precisely the variety and sophistication of status groups that furthered social cohesion.

3.2 The Colonial Experience

3.2.1 A Brief History of Colonial Conquest

In the aftermath of the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), the Kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi were formally incorporated into the colony of German East Africa as the administrative entity

[130] Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa*, 82f.; Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 9f.

[131] Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa*, 79.; Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 7.

[132] Newbury, "Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda," 275.

[133] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 24.

[134] Newbury, "Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda," 274.

[135] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 11.

'Ruanda-Urundi'.[136] While permanent residence was established in 1898, de facto administration of Burundi only commenced in 1906 after years of military occupation.[137] At the time of the European arrival, the ubiquitous feud between the *Bezi* and *Batare* lineage has plunged the Kingdom into a profound internal political crisis. To the European observer, Burundi found itself in a state of anarchy that demoted the monarch to a 'potentate of limited power'.[138] To the rebellious chiefs, the European presence constituted a resource in their struggle for autonomy. To the German colonialists, the contestation of political power was a window of opportunity to force Burundi's *mwami* into submission. The result of this 'divide and rule' policy was the fragmentation of the Kingdom into numerous spheres of influence.[139] Although, the colonial troops intermittently succeeded at centralising authority, the king's sudden death plunged the German administration into an acute crisis of control over its colony.[140]

Anticipating defeat by the allied forces, the Germans withdrew in early 1916 from Ruanda-Urundi, which, subsequent to the ratification of the Milner-Orts Agreement by the League of Nations, was transferred to Belgium.[141] In spite of the strong disappointment over the lack of natural resources in her new acquired territory, Belgium genuinely believed in her civilising mission. Hence, after a short period of absentia, Belgium established a system of indirect administration in the mid-1920s.[142] Soon thereafter, the economy was centralised and extroverted,[143] while a system of forced labour that mostly affected Burundi's Hutu population was introduced for its furtherance.[144] While Belgian colonial policy gradually amplified Hutu discrimination, administrative reforms in the 1930s encouraged the gravitation of power into the hands of what Belgium perceived as Burundi's 'traditional' elite. Who was considered part

[136] Liisa H. Malkki, *Purity and Exile : Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 27.

[137] Louis, *Ruanda-Urundi 1884-1919*, 127.

[138] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 49f.

[139] Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa*, 245.

[140] Louis, *Ruanda-Urundi 1884-1919*, 130ff. Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 52ff.

[141] Randall Fegley, *A History of Rwandan Identity and Trauma: The Mythmaker's Victims* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2016), 10.

[142] Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa*, 263.

[143] Oketch and Polzer, "Conflict and Coffee in Burundi," 93.

[144] Kristina A. Bentley and Roger Southall, *An African Peace Process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2005), 37.

of this political aristocracy was, however, not a reflection of Burundi's socio-political realities as outlined in section 3.1. Rather, the ruling class was determined by a pseudo-scientific conception of a hierarchy of human races that based on the ethno-historical anthropology of the colonialist.

3.2.2 On the Colonial Construction of a Hierarchy of Races

3.2.2.1 The Book of Genesis and the 'Curse of Ham'

The cognitive framework on basis of which the Belgians construed Burundian society predicated on the predominant thought on race relations in Europe at the time. Hermeneutically borrowed from Near Eastern scriptures of the sixteenth century, pre-Enlightenment Europeans found theological absolution for African enslavement in the dual interpretation of the 'Curse of Ham' devised in the Book of Genesis. Albeit the biblical protagonist's complexion remains unuttered in Genesis 9:18-27, Ham's execration by his father Noah was rendered the punishment with black skin and eternal servitude.[145] On account of the consequential depiction of Ham as a cursed sinner and his descendants as both 'degenerates' and 'natural slaves', "the early tradition identified 'Hamites' with 'Negroes' and endowed them with both certain physiognomic attributes and an undesirable character". In addition, the capability of Africans for human achievement was repudiated entirely.[146]

3.2.2.2 The Hamitic Hypothesis

With the efflorescence of scientific inquiry in Europe of the eighteenth century, interest in the etiology of blackness resurfaced among polygenist researchers. This was under the objective of establishing the 'innate' superiority of the Caucasian race in terms of scientific fact.[147] Ironically, Napoleon's Egyptian expedition in 1789 contemporaneously revealed the existence of ancient and sophisticated civilisation on the African continent. The reconciliation of the expedition's archaeological findings with the prevailing race theory on African inferiority, hence, required the de-classification of the Egyptians from the category of the 'Negroid'. Based

[145] David M. Goldenberg, ed., *Black and Slave - the Origins and History of the Curse of Ham*, vol. 10, Studies of the Bible and Its Reception (Germany: De Gruyter, 2017), 87.

[146] Edith R. Sanders, "The Hamitic Hypothesis; Its Origin and Functions in Time Perspective," *The Journal of African History* 10, no. 4 (1969): 522.

[147] Philip D. Curtin, "'Scientific" Racism and the British Theory of Empire," *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 2, no. 1: 42.

on the linguistic affinity of the Arab and Coptic languages, philologists, for instance, sought to establish the common descent of Egyptians with 'allied' i.e., 'non-Negroid', peoples. The clergy, on the other hand, offered a revised reading of the 'Curse of Ham' from which "the Egyptians emerged as Hamites, Caucasoid, uncursed and capable of high civilization".[148]

The new category of the 'civilising Hamite' was, henceforth, contrasted with the 'incompetent true Negro' by attributing anything found of value in 'black Africa' to the work of the Hamitic branch of the Caucasian race.[149] As such, the African kingdoms encountered by European explorers were thought to be categorically ruled by Hamitic aristocracies. These were believed to have conquered vast territories "thanks to their military superiority, political destiny and technical creativity". In the eyes of the Europeans, it was the 'Hamitic infiltration' that had torn "the simple-minded African from the depths of archaic barbarism".[150] In addition to this allegedly ostensible cognitive aptitude, the conceptual 'Hamite' was vested with the reputable traditional occupation of cattle breeding vis-à-vis the agricultural labour of the indigenous 'Negro'. By virtue of this occupational juxtaposition, "pastoralism and all its attributes became endowed with an aura of superiority of culture, giving the Hamite a third dimension: cultural identity".[151] Evidently, the substance of 'the Hamite' shifted from simple anthropological claims on the common genealogy with the Caucasian race toward more sophisticated conceptual attributions.

In essence, the manifoldness of ideas on what constitutes 'a Hamite' gradually expanded the racial model into an all-encompassing construct that fused race, class, occupation, culture, and moral conscience into one genre of the human race. As such, the European racial theory postulated a "fixity of species, considering a primordial organic form, permanent through time".[152] Alas, this raciology was more than just a mere abstract figment of the colonial mind. Rather, it served as the peremptory frame for the European exegesis of African societies and the subsequent construction of colonial policies in their territories. Its basic premises in context of the Great Lakes region will be assessed in the section below.

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[148] Sanders, "The Hamitic Hypothesis," 526f.

[149] Charles Gabriel Seligman, *Races of Africa* (London: Thorton Butterworth Ltd, 1930), 96.

[150] Michael Spöttel, "German Ethnology and Antisemitism: The Hamitic Hypothesis," *Dialectical Anthropology* 23, no. 2 (1998): 131.

[151] Sanders, "The Hamitic Hypothesis," 530.

[152] Ibid., 528.

3.2.2.3 Of 'Hutu Natives' and 'Tutsi Settlers' - A Story of Origin Revisited

The genesis of the colonialists' ethno-history of the peoples inhabiting the territory today known as the Great Lakes region of Africa, lies within the chronicles of late nineteenth century European explorers, merchants, and missionaries.[153] Having encountered a great variety of physical types and a "curious mixture of primitive and advanced elements in the social institutions of the Lacustrian communities",[154] the pioneers concluded to have come across different human races. In the words of Mahmood Mamdani: "Tutsi aristocrats *looked* different from Hutu commoners … [hence] colonial scholarship built on this observation and *constructed* Hutu and Tutsi as different".[155]

From this perspective, the Hamitic Hypothesis provided near self-evident explanation for both inter-racial cohabitation and the presence of civilised constituents in their community structures. This racialised cognitive framework gave rise to a particular European anthropology that premised on a 'Hamitic invasion' from the Horn of Africa around the thirteenth century.[156] Upon their predominantly peaceful conquest the patrician families of Nilotic origin were thought to have installed a feudal socio-political order that revived the indigenous 'apathetic Bantu' from the abyss of despair.[157]

Considering that the colonialist solely endowed the 'Hamites' of Africa with the capability for human achievement, the political class in the Lacustrian kingdoms was constitutively perceived in affiliation with a pastoral 'race of lords'.[158] Thereby, the affinity with the top strata of the triadically sedimented model of Burundian society was governed by anthropometric resemblance with the European master.[159] In other words, those who looked more like themselves were declared members of "the same great branch of mankind as almost all Europeans".[160] Analogous to the encounter with the Tutsi monarchy in the neighbouring

[153] Louis, *Ruanda-Urundi 1884-1919*, 101.; Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa*, 28.

[154] Seligman, *Races of Africa*, 214.

[155] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 42. Original emphasis.

[156] Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa*, 59, 73.

[157] Ibid., 105.

[158] Ibid., 72.

[159] Sanders, "The Hamitic Hypothesis," 528.

[160] Seligman, *Races of Africa*, 97.

Kingdom of Rwanda, the attendants of the Burundian sovereign were considered ethnic Tutsi and described as "slender, athletic, with long faces, aquiline noses, and relatively thin lips".[161] Accredited with superior intelligence and political aptitude, the alien Tutsi 'Hamite' was constructed in radical opposition to the physical, occupational, and characterological attributes inscribed to the indigenous population of 'Negroids'. The autochthonous population was thought to consist of two 'racial' groups. On the one hand, a numerically atomic community of 'pygmy' hunters, identified by the colonialists as ethnic Twa, and, on the other hand, a majoritarian population of 'Bantu' agriculturalists, classified as ethnic Hutu.[162] As per colonial ethnology, the Hutu peasantry was considered a populace of "hardworking, unmannerly and obedient laborers",[163] whose ancestry was believed to be discernible at hands of their short and stocky body type, flat noses, thick lips, and low foreheads.[164]

Evidently, the dictates of racial conformity replaced the complex interplay of various contextually contingent factors in the identity formation process of the precolonial period. As aptly remarked by Newbury, the bigoted race typology of the colonialist tended to "extrapolate to an entire cultural category the characteristics of an unrepresentative sample – if the ruling lineage was Tutsi, then all Tutsi are presumed to have been powerful; if some Hutu were landless, then all were said to have lived on the edge of poverty."[165] Intrinsic to this generalisation was the creation of a racial hierarchy that promulgated the Tutsi as "born to rule and the Hutu to be ruled".[166] Alas, this fatal conception of ethnic identity did not remain confined to the European mind but disseminated through the work of missionaries,[167] and later through the vector of colonial education to the psyche of the Africans under tutelage.[168] As explicated by Frantz Fanon, colonial thought constructed a Manichean and compartmentalised world, whose relationships were defined and sustained by violence.[169] Hence, he concludes that

[161] Homer L. Shantz, "Urundi, Territory and People," *Geographic Review* 12, no. 3 (1922): 342.

[162] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 19.

[163] Maguire, "Power Ethnicized: The Pursuit of Protection and Participation in Rwanda and Burundi," 64.

[164] Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa*, 72.

[165] Newbury, "Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda," 272.

[166] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 43.

[167] Goldenberg asserts that evidence for an adoption of the dual Curse of Ham was found, inter alia, in the cultural tales among the communities around Lake Tanganyika. For a detailed elaboration, as well as excerpts of these legends, consult Goldenberg, *Black and Slave*, 142-145.

[168] Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa*, 286.

[169] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 36-41.

"colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state".[170]

The structural violence of the colonial state was then sustained and reproduced by the colonial educational system, within which Tutsi not only enjoyed privileged access to education but were segregated from the 'indigenous' pupils through customised educational streams. The schooling of Tutsi, on the one hand, was geared towards the apprenticeship of competences for administration and statecraft and instructed in the language of the coloniser i.e., French. The colonial education of the Hutu, on the other hand, was taught in Kiswahili and limited to the conveyance of manual labour skills.[171] On account of the privilege in education and knowledge, an ample sense of superiority was fostered among the new generation of Tutsi leaders, who began to embrace the purported non-indigeneity of their identity.[172] In the words of Bentley and Southall "[f]or over 60 years they were bombarded with heavily value-laden stereotypes which inflated the Tutsi cultural ego and crushed Hutu feelings".[173] Ultimately, the result of the internalisation of this pervasive juxtaposition was the reformulation of the Hutu-Tutsi cleavage into a confrontation of two distinct races.

3.2.3 The Disintegration of the Precolonial Order

3.2.3.1 Effects on Burundi's Social Fabric

"Man is before he acts; nothing he does may change what he is." [174]

\- *Zygmunt Bauman*

With ethnicity racialised and incrementally evolving into an all-encompassing identity marker, transformation was most strongly felt in the social fabric of the precolonial order. Particularly precarious was the polarisation, racialisation, and therewith rigidification of the once multi-faceted, complex, and contextual process of identity formation. Based on both cattle-ownership and anthropometric criteria, a census conducted by the Belgian colonial administration in 1934 classified 85 percent of the population as Hutu, 1 percent as Twa, and 14 percent as belonging

[170] Ibid., 61.

[171] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 90.

[172] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 135.; Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 105.

[173] Bentley and Southall, *An African Peace Process*, 34.

[174] Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Polity Press 1989), 60.

to the Tutsi 'race of lords'. The latter category encompassed the *ganwa*, *Hima,* and *Banyaruguru* castes, and a number of relatively wealthy ethnic Hutu, who were, based on their possession of cows, classified as Tutsi.[175] The subsequent issuance of obligatory identity cards had a number of immediate and profound consequences: first and foremost, the bureaucratisation of belonging virtually diminished all avenues of social mobility and thereby froze once fluid ethnic and social identification into racial permanence. Beyond the conceptualisation as a mere intellectual construct, "racial ideology was embedded in institutions, which in turn undergirded racial privilege and reproduced racial ideology".[176] This legal and institutional codification of identity, as elaborated in Mamdani's work,[177] not only reinforced ideational fixity, but also extended Tutsi privilege across the Kingdom. The result was a pyramidal 'hierarchy of colonial access', that allowed for wealth and power to gradually accumulate into Tutsi hands.[178] With the Hutu racially, legally, and institutionally reduced to inferiority, clientage arrangements, once characterised by mutual rights and obligations, increasingly assumed an exploitative and violent character.[179] As such, the dissertation submits that the nature of the clientage institution incrementally took on resemblance with Fanon's conceptualisation of the native's exploitation by the settler as a relationship defined and sustained by violence.[180] In addition, as personalised security arrangements gradually diminished, the colonial state emerged as the primary provider of protection needs - predominantly of those controlling it.

3.2.3.2 Effects on Burundi's Political Organisation

In the wake of the territorial parcellation of the Kingdom under the 1929 administrative reforms, the *mwami's* entourage of humble origin was gradually replaced by the newly and inflationary empowered political elites of Tutsi and *ganwa* pedigree.[181] By 1945, Hutu chiefs have virtually vanished from the political landscape.[182] Considered the only racial group with

[175] Timothy Josep Stapleton, *A History of Genocide in Africa* (Santa Barabara, California: Praeger, 2017), 35.

[176] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 87.

[177] See therefore ibid., Chapter 3.

[178] Christina Cliff, "The Coming Genocide? Burundi's Past, Present, and Potentially Deadly Future," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 41, no. 9 (2018): 724.

[179] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 126.

[180] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 36.

[181] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 43.

[182] Chrétien, *The Great Lakes of Africa*, 268.

inherent capabilities for human achievement, Tutsi identity came to be associated with both racial and social superiority, as well as political leadership. This policy exemplifies that the colonial race typology did not only fuse racial identity with the aptitude for statecraft intellectually but also practically enforced the racially prescribed place of an individual in state and society.

Although colonial favouritism had profound implications for the relationship between Hutu and Tutsi, Lemarchand argues that its divisiveness was, at that time, more seriously felt on the level of the princely factions, whose escalating struggle for leadership defined Burundi's political landscape in the precolonial, colonial, and early post-colonial period.[183] Without refuting Lemarchand's contention, this dissertation argues that the might of colonial ideology lies not so much in the immediate or salient tensions it produced, but in the way it reshaped the character, purpose, and legitimacy of state power. Structurally, the colonial efforts at centralisation substantially amplified both the state's power and reach throughout the territory of the Kingdom.[184] Corollary, state power and legitimacy no longer emanated from webs of personal relationships and loyalties but based on an enforced obedience to a centralised national authority. Elementarily, the nature of the state shifted from a divine source of unity, purpose, and protection to a bureaucratised and divisive apparatus of colonial control over territory, productive performance, and economic extraction.[185] Fundamentally, the Kingdom's governing organs transformed into a tool of Belgian interest and a derivative source of the perpetuation of *ganwa*, and by extension Tutsi, supremacy. If, "political identities are the consequence of how power is organized" and if "[t]he organization of power … defines the parameters of the political community",[186] profound reformulations of political identities with the reorganisation of state power under colonial rule can be expected.

Certainly, the redefinition of political identities and the transfiguration of the parameters of the political community are not ad hoc processes. Hence, as the following chapter will reveal, it was the traditional pattern of princely struggles that dominated the political discourse of the decolonisation process. However, this dissertation argues that the colonial modification of

[183] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 24.

[184] Newbury, "Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda," 288.

[185] Weilenmann, "Reactive Ethnicity," 12.; Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda " 255.

[186] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 22.

power set a process in motion that thoroughly reshaped the state and the political identities it produced. It is, furthermore, submitted that this had profound effects on the meaning and purpose of political security. With the state transforming from a source of unity into one of division and gradually turning into a vehicle for the satisfaction of oligarchic interest, the identity of the state incrementally amalgamated with the identity of its rulers until a discourse of national security could no longer be separated from the stability of upper-tier rule. In the terminology of the Copenhagen School, the logic of the sector of national security began to merge with the societal security of the ruling class. This, in essence, is the structure of state the Burundian leadership inherited after passing the threshold of independence. The following chapter will, therefore, examine the transfer of power in the process of decolonisation.

3.3 Conclusion

This chapter has considered the profound transformations in the social and political organisation of the Kingdom of Burundi with the inception of colonial rule. The first part of the chapter emphasised the single cohesive community formed by the peoples in the precolonial Kingdom and the inconsequentiality of biological or physiognomic distinctions. In this context, Hutu and Tutsi identities were introduced as political identities, contingent on the process of state formation. In consideration of the variety of sources of identification, social cleavages, and avenues for upward mobility, social identity was elucidated as fluid, contextual, manifold, and distinct from ethnic identification. Thus, the dissertation concluded that ethnicity did not constitute a matter of security in the precolonial period. The second part of this chapter commenced by introducing the reader to the colonial thought on the hierarchy of races and the omnipresence of the colonial conceptualisation of the Tutsi as superior, foreign, and Caucasoid 'Hamites'. In this context, the fusion of race, occupation, physical and dispositional properties, as well as cultural identity was problematised. Predicated on the perceived commonalities with the colonial master, the colonial state's preferential treatment of the Tutsi was discerned. The final section offered a critical reflection on the colonial transformation of the state and the political identities it produced. Before this dissertation turns to the violent implications of this transfiguration, the following chapter will scrutinise the process of power transfer in the period of decolonisation and the endogenous security dynamics it produced.

4 The Process of Decolonisation

This chapter traces the origination of an ethnicised security discourse to the extraordinarily rapid and profound transformations of Rwandan and Burundian decolonisation. From the Belgian deliberations on the question of independence to the relative stability in Burundi's decolonisation process, the cataclysmic impact of the 1959 Hutu Revolution in Rwanda on the nature of ethnic relations in Burundi will be emphasised. The second part of the chapter investigates the import of the Rwandan model of threat construction into Burundi's political discourse. The consequential displacement of traditional patterns of conflict and the rise of ethnic confrontations will be reconstructed. The first incidents of ethnic violence and the attempt at a Hutu coup d'état in 1965 will be contextualised in their significance to the construction of a 'Hutu danger'.

> "Decolonization, as we know, is a historical process: that is to say that it cannot be understood, it cannot become intelligible nor clear to itself except in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give it historical form and content." [187]
>
> - *Frantz Fanon*

4.1 The Road to Independence

With the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN General Assembly in 1948, issues of equality, fundamental freedoms, and self-determination incrementally entered the jargon of international political discourse. At the same time, the shift in the administrative authorisation from League of Nations mandates to UN trusteeship agreements transformed the objective of territorial supervision into the progressive advancement towards self-government. Although initially reluctant to introduce drastic reforms, Belgium ultimately succumbed to the pressure of world opinion and initiated a process of democratic political reform in Ruanda-Urundi in 1959. While initially of slow and half-hearted character, Belgian reform policy entered a phase of accelerated democratisation in the mid-1950s. Thereby, the impediments to the success of this reform stage laid not so much in the reforms themselves, but rather in the inadequate preparation of the environment they ought to materialise in. Having introduced egalitarianist elements to a political culture it had previously conditioned to a value

[187] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 36.

system of racial inequality and a 'deference towards the ruling caste',[188] the first elections were bound to confirm the popular attachment to the colonial idea of born rulers. As such, the electoral process to the newly introduced advisory councils begot a spike of Tutsi accession to power at every level of the administrative hierarchy.[189] In Rwanda, these electoral results ignited an uprising of the Hutu population that radically inverted the pre-existing power constellation. In Burundi, on the other hand, the process of decolonisation was described as "orderly because of the better relations between Tutsis and Hutus".[190] Before turning to the cataclysmic revolution in Rwanda, the dissertation briefly examines the relative stability on Burundi's eve of independence.

4.2 Relative Stability in Burundi

A major factor in the deterrence of ethnic conflict during Burundi's accelerated democratisation process was the direction of the popular animus in the aftermath of the elections. Although anti-Tutsi sentiments were irrefutably existent, the educated Hutu were first and foremost antagonised by the dominance of traditional elements in the novel administrative structures.[191] Having risen to constitute the de facto power behind the throne, the *ganwa* sought to shield their political influence from the perils of transformation. To Samuel Huntington, modernisation is, however, the fundamental prerequisite for "all groups, old as well as new, [to] become increasingly aware of themselves as groups, and of their interests and claims in relation to other groups".[192] As such, the traditional oligarchy's apathy to change inhibited the emergence of a modernisation-induced popular group consciousness and thus the emersion of political aggregates of potential contenders to the establishment.[193] In the absence of political competition extraneous to their caste, the corporate identities of the *ganwa* dynasties consolidated to a degree virtually unheard of on the continent, whereby the identity politics of the two dominant lineages kept the political system in constant motion.[194] The endemic precolonial feud between *Bezi* and *Batare* resurfaced in the months preceding

[188] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 83.

[189] Ibid., 79-83.

[190] A.L. Latham-Koenig, "Ruanda-Urundi on the Threshold of Independence," *The World Today* 18, no. 7 (1962): 294.

[191] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 132f.

[192] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Political Modernization of Traditional Monarchies," 95, no. 3 (1966): 769.

[193] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 290f.

[194] Ibid., 310.

independence with such a force as to nip in the bud the embryonic struggles of modern political aggregates that emerged through the cracks in the fabric of the traditional order.

The forceful recrudescence of the dynastic struggle must be construed in context of the announced constitutional changes and the prospects of independence. Thereby, the promised transfer of power shifted the stakes in the negotiation of political space from the localised control of chieftaincies to the capture of the centralised national authority. Having little to gain from the *Bezi*-dominated status quo, the *Batare* began to support the Belgian reform policies, which increasingly crystalised as a jeopardy to the order sustained by the monarchic institutions.[195] It was in the background of the volatile position of the crown that the Parti de l'Unité et du Progrès National ('UPRONA') was founded. Although initially grounded in the ideology of traditionalism, nationalism, and monarchism, the young and forward-looking elite around *mwami* Mwabutsa's eldest son, Prince Rwagasore, quickly acknowledged the inevitability of reform.[196] Rwagasore, who took control of the party in 1958, envisioned UPRONA as the political envoy for both the chiefs and the masses. His incorporation of progressive liberal elements into the party's political outlook pacified populist tendencies, which simmered against the backdrop of the increasingly abusive and arbitrary character of chiefly rule. This dissertation argues that Rwagasore's neo-traditionalism created realistic prospects for the unification of ethnicised political identities around, what Mamdani calls, 'a common project for the future'.[197]

In consideration of the comparatively weak sentimental attachment of the masses to the novel and rather vague idea of democracy, the crown revived as the centre of emotional identification in the new nationalist discourse of UPRONA.[198] Henceforth, the crown positioned itself as the divine arbitrator between Hutu and Tutsi interests, and the source of cohesion and stability in a political system rattled by the forces of transformation. At the same time, Rwagasore's assemblage of a cabinet in ethnic parity portended to an incipient success story of political arbitration and ethnic arithmetic. The cult around the *Bezi* prince's persona, precipitated by the

[195] René Lemarchand, "Social Change and Political Modernisation in Burundi," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 4, no. 4 (1966): 411.

[196] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 324.

[197] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 23.

[198] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 306.

prosperity of his policies, also manifested within the Hutu populace[199] and accelerated on basis of the conformity of Rwagasore's physical appearance with the physical Hutu stereotype.[200]

Many of the old-guard aristocrats, however, did not share the exaltation over the fruition of the new ideological currents and considered UPRONA no longer able to cater for their interests. This sentiment prompted many orthodox chiefs to sever ties with Rwagasore's party and initiate political representations of their own. It was in this context that the Parti Démocrate Chrétien ('PDC'), associated with the *Batare* dynasty, came into being and emerged as UPRONA's fiercest critic and opponent.[201] Thereupon, the struggle between the *Bezi* and *Batare* resurfaced as "the continuation of precolonial rivalries in the guise of nominally modern political parties".[202] With the political discourse dominated by the question of which princely faction should lead the country into independence, ethnic cleavages had no room to substantially materialise in the political realm. Whereas the resilience of the royal succession struggle created relative stability in Burundi, the traditional political structure in Rwanda was unable to encompass the drastic transformations of the decolonisation process. In the following, a synopsis of the 1959 Hutu Revolution in Rwanda will be provided, subsequent to which its reverberation in the Burundian political landscape will be assessed.

4.3 The Rwandan Revolution

Considering that Rwanda and Burundi share striking similarities in many aspects, most notably their ethnic composition, comparative political scientists have frequently attributed the outbreak of ethnic violence in the two countries to identical forces.[203] Thereby, the subtle but crucial dissimilarities in their traditional structures, which spawned radically different trajectories of decolonisation, are often neglected.

According to regional experts, the existence of an ethnic Tutsi identity in precolonial Rwanda is plausible. However, the emergence of the aristocratic association, as the nucleus of Tutsi political identity, is widely believed to correlate with the manifestation and expansion of a

[199] Daley, "Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa," 666.

[200] Lemarchand, "Social Change and Political Modernisation in Burundi," 412.

[201] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 330f.

[202] René Lemarchand, *Selective Genocide in Burundi*, Minority Rights Group (1974), 11.

[203] Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda " 253.

Tutsi monarchy in the fifteenth century.[204] Thereby, the Tutsi ethnic affiliation of the monarchy, in contrast to its ethnic distinctiveness in Burundi, clearly demarcated the lines of social stratification and thus made the Rwandan order vulnerable to a Hutu-Tutsi confrontation at a much earlier stage. However, there was a substantial number of Rwandan Tutsi living in virtually indistinguishable socio-economic conditions from their Hutu counterparts, and it was only in the advent of colonialism that political privileges were conferred upon the Tutsi as a whole.[205] The Belgian institutional engineering of the 1930s then fostered a Tutsi corporate identity that centred around a consciousness of their alleged status as Rwanda's 'traditional' cultural and political elite. The Hutu, on the other hand, had little opportunity to develop an own political consciousness beyond occupational or racial classification.[206] With the decolonial winds sweeping through Rwanda's political landscape in the 1950s, this was, however, to change.

4.3.1 The Emergence of a Hutu Movement

4.3.1.1 The Rise of a Hutu Counter-Elite

The first major development in the series of social and political transformations leading up to the materialisation of an anti-colonial nationalist Hutu movement, was the emergence of a Hutu intelligentsia under the aegis of the Catholic Church. The new ecclesiastic orientation of the post-war era and the upsurge of the Flemish movement for political and cultural equality in Belgium of the 1930s spawned a reformist generation of Flemish priests in colonial service, who tended to sympathise with the marginalised Hutu.[207] Ill at ease with the inequities their predecessors had created in Burundi, the progressive European clergy increasingly recruited cohorts of Hutu students into their mission schools.[208] Discharged into a prejudiced and rejectionist labour market, this group of educated Hutu began to articulate a "burning sense of

[204] John F. Clark, "Rwanda: Tragic Land of Dual Nationalism," in *After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States*, ed. Lowell W. Barrington (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 2006), 75.

[205] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 74.

[206] Clark, "Rwanda: Tragic Land of Dual Nationalism," 78.

[207] Fegley, *A History of Rwandan Identity and Trauma*, 28f.

[208] Clark, "Rwanda: Tragic Land of Dual Nationalism," 81.

grievance from the monopoly exercised by the Tutsi caste over all sectors of the administration and the economy".[209]

Despite the articulated gravity of mischief, the general public remained rather reluctant to challenge the Tutsi monopoly, which many, after years of colonial education, genuinely believed to be grounded in racial superiority. Furthermore, the persistence of dependency relationships under the clientage institutions furthered the political apathy of the masses towards change.[210] Consequently, the gradual erosion of vassalage ties, epiphenomenal to the modernisation and diversification of the economy, and the ultimate abolition of the institution in 1954 was a sine qua non in the mobilisation of the masses.[211] While initially, their grievances were predominantly of social nature, the electoral reforms of the 1950s provoked a shift in the substance of Hutu demands.

4.3.1.2 The Rebirth of Hutu Identity and the Emergence of Hutu Nationalism

In light of the shift in ethnic political participation allowances under the 1952 electoral process, the Hutu intelligentsia clearly envisioned Hutu representation and participation in state affairs as an integral element to the political landscape of an independent Rwandan state.[212] Under these prospects, the Hutu consciousness of subjecthood that characterised the Hutu existence through most of the colonial experience began to transform into an identity of people reaching for power. Rooted in an anti-colonial discourse of legitimacy, the shibboleth 'Hutu Power!' came to signify both a badge of pride and a war cry against the Tutsi, who were increasingly identified as the source of Hutu hardship and despair.[213] In essence, the opposition to the Tutsi monopoly emerged as the fulcrum of the incipient political consciousness of the Hutu opposition. In consequence, the character and logic of the Hutu movement shifted from that of a social movement organised around popular grievances, to that of a political movement striving for the liberation of the oppressed majority. The oppressor was, thereby, identified as

[209] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 139.

[210] Ibid., 43, 126.

[211] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 117f.

[212] Cliff, "The Coming Genocide? Burundi's Past, Present, and Potentially Deadly Future," 725.

[213] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 117.

the Tutsi, constructed as an alien 'feudal coloniser'. As noted by Hintjens, the result was a complete obfuscation of Belgian responsibility for the colonial project.[214]

Suffice to say, the increase in Tutsi representation in the aftermath of the 1952 elections shattered the Hutu counter-elite's confidence in the transformative potential of the newly introduced democratic institutions. From the standpoint of the Hutu leadership, the revolutionary inversion of the system was the only viable means of protecting the fundamental rights of their community.[215] In light of the foregoing, this dissertation considers state capture to emerge out of the democratisation process as the primary security strategy of the Hutu collective.

4.3.1.3 The 'Bahutu Manifesto' and the Reproduction of Colonial Race-Branding

In 1957, a group of nine Hutu intellectuals published a seminal script, the Bahutu Manifesto, that positioned the necessity of a Hutu uprising in a distinct notion of nationalism that clearly carryied the imprint of colonial race education. According to the authors of the manifesto, the crux of the Hutu predicament lied in the imposition of a despotic order on their ancestors by a 'Hamitic race' from the Horn of Africa. Hence, the overtone of the manifesto connoted that the Tutsi, as alien to Rwanda, had no entitlement to shepherd the land of the 'indigenous' Hutu.[216] As such, the colonial logic of origin was inverted to construct the Rwandan state as a Hutu nation in need of liberation from foreign influence.[217] Similarly argued by Scott, the Rwandan problem was defined as one "not only of European colonialism but also of Hamitic or 'feudal' colonialism".[218] In essence, the Bahutu Manifesto confirmed and reproduced the colonial race-branding "through the nationalist political project which translated the colonial identity of Hutu as the indigenous Bantu race into the postcolonial Rwandan identity, thereby translating the colonial race-branding project into the postcolonial nation-building project".[219] This idea of

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[214] Helen M. Hintjens, "When Identity Becomes a Knife: Reflecting on the Genocide in Rwanda," *Ethnicities* 1, no. 1 (2001): 32.

[215] Clark, "Rwanda: Tragic Land of Dual Nationalism," 73f.

[216] Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda " 257.

[217] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 103-106.

[218] Scott Strauss, *Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 280.

[219] Mahmood Mamdani, "Making Sense of Political Violence in Postcolonial Africa," in *The Socialist Register 2003. Fighting Identities: Race, Religion and Ethno-Nationalism*, ed. Leo Panitch and Colin Leyz (London: Merlin Press, 2003), 144.

Hutu liberation received active support from the Catholic Church, which, due to the ascending anti-colonial radicalism among the Tutsi elites, began to endorse the notion of the Hutu as the 'authentic inhabitants of Rwanda' and the rightful heirs of the postcolonial state.[220]

4.3.1.4 Interpreting the Manifesto's Effect

In consideration of the changing notion of state control from a security strategy to an inherent right of the Hutu collective, this dissertation understands the Hutu political consciousness to have transformed into a national identity i.e., "a community of people organized around the idea of *self-determination*".[221] In accordance with an assertion made by Krause and Williams, the potential for violent ethnic confrontation is to be located precisely in this articulation of ideas on the identity of the nation and the nationalist turn of ethnic identity. According to the authors,

> "In ethnonationalist conflicts … competing claims to sovereignty, rather than the competition between existing sovereignties, often provide the source of conflict. What people are attempting to secure is an *idea*".[222]

In this way, Hutu nationalism engendered a competing conception of the Rwandan state and the idea of who belongs to it i.e., who or what constitutes the national 'we'. Therefore, the dissertation argues that the crux of the Rwandan trajectory is in this discursive process of state-building and the clash between the idea of the Rwandan Hutu nation and the Tutsi monarchic establishment. Alluding to the conflictual forces in the process of modern state formation, Wimmer maintains that,

> "It is the institution of the modern democratic state that first raises the question who may belong to its nation, because that state embodies the idea and political practice of national sovereignty: the state should, so to speak, be dyed by a nation's colour and designate the 'people' in whose name it rules over its territory. By contrast, the legitimacy of multiethnic empires rested on universalistic, hierarchical concepts of political representation."[223]

If the politicisation of identity is, in fact, an ordinary epiphenomenon of the modern state-building process, Mamdani's deliberations fail to explain the repeated outbreaks of large-scale ethnic violence in Rwanda vis-à-vis other post-colonial nations. According to Clark, the problem rests with the fixation on Hutu and Tutsi as ethnic, social, or political identities, which

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[220] Hintjens, "When Identity Becomes a Knife," 31.

[221] Ghia Nodia, "Nationalism and Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 3, no. 4 (1992): 11. Original emphasis.

[222] Krause and Williams, "Broadening the Agenda," 244. Original emphasis.

[223] Wimmer, "Who Owns the State?," 634.

neglects the importance of their nationalist tendencies.[224] Notwithstanding the appeal of both the politicised and nationalised conceptualisation of Hutu and Tutsi identities, this dissertation is convinced that the shortcomings of both approaches lie with the failure to address the nexus of identity and security. As for the Hutu, the Tutsi monarchy constituted not only an obstacle in the realisation of the Hutu nation, but an *existential threat* to their *idea* of the Rwandan state and their emergent identity as its rightful heirs. As conceptualised by the Copenhagen School's societal security model, the Hutu community i.e., the respective 'we', was threatened as to its *identity.* The existential threat i.e., Tutsi monopoly, was *securitised.*

While securitisation theory facilitates the conceptualisation of the decolonial struggle's fault line, Frantz Fanon's deliberations, on the other hand, give valuable insights into the nature of the encounter. To Fanon, decolonisation is "the meeting of two forces, opposed to each other by their very nature".[225] In other words, it is the confrontation between the settler and the native which "will only come to pass after a murderous and decisive struggle between the two protagonists".[226] As such, decolonisation, to Fanon, is an inherently violent phenomenon that is the logical consequence of the violent nature of colonial society. Considering that "[t]heir first encounter was marked by violence and their existence together – that is to say the exploitation of the native by the settler – was carried on by dint of a great array of bayonets and cannons",[227] Fanon concludes that violence is the only language the coloniser understands and the only medium through which the native can truly be liberated.[228] Violence is, however, not only directed against the system of the native's oppression, but against the oppressor himself. In the words of Fanon, "[f]or it is the settler who has brought the native into existence and who perpetuates his existence"[229] and, as such, "[f]or the native, life can only spring up again out of the rotting corpse of the settler".[230] As the native only ceases to exist upon the destruction of the settler, the decolonial encounter is characterised by the zero-sum logic of a 'murderous and decisive struggle'.[231] In this context, the decolonial struggle not only signifies

[224] Clark, "Rwanda: Tragic Land of Dual Nationalism," 73.

[225] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 36.

[226] Ibid., 37.

[227] Ibid., 36.

[228] Ibid., 84.

[229] Ibid., 36.

[230] Ibid., 93.

[231] Ibid., 37.

the liberation of the native but also his rebirth into a new identity that is detached from the Manicheism of colonial society. In the words of Fanon, decolonisation is "the veritable creation of new men".[232]

The tragedy in the Fanonian reading of Rwandan decolonisation is that the Rwandan decolonial struggle did not only pit the Hutu 'native' against the European settler, but also brought to the forefront a struggle between the colonised themselves. Having cast the Tutsi in the role of the 'Hamitic settler', the Bahutu Manifesto framed the liberation of the Hutu as conditional on the elimination of the Tutsi oppressor. From that moment, the cleavage between Rwanda's Hutu and Tutsi population took on the character of a zero-sum confrontation. As a result, the process of decolonisation became inherently unable to bridge colonial divisions in a common vision for an independent Rwanda. Instead, "we see that the primary Manicheism which governed colonial society is preserved intact during the period of decolonization; that is to say that the settler never ceases to be the enemy, the opponent, the foe that must be overthrown".[233] Fanonian decolonial thought, hence, introduces a new dynamic to the emergent Hutu-Tutsi-schism in Rwanda with momentous effects on ethnic cohabitation in the post-independence state.

4.3.2 The Tutsi Nationalist Response

In view of the political developments explicated in the foregoing, the Tutsi aristocracy grew increasingly anxious over the nationalist aspirations of the emergent Hutu elites and the threat they posed to both the security of its position in power and to its identity as a superior 'race of lords'. In response to Belgium's rapprochement to the Hutu leadership as a potential post-colonial partner and the rapid dissemination of the Bahutu Manifesto as "staple news item in the local press and a prime subject of discussion on the hills"[234], the Tutsi aristocracy hardened its position on race relations. In May 1958, a group of ultraconservative Tutsi at the royal court published a statement, reading: "[s]ince our king conquered the country and the Hutu and killed their petty kings, how can they claim to be our brothers?".[235] Similarly, in a letter to the UN mission, the group expressed that "Hutu and Tutsi do not share the same ancestors, but only

[232] Ibid., 36.

[233] Ibid., 50f.

[234] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 153.

[235] Ibid., 154.

share a slave-master relationship".[236] Albeit the sentiment of an ultraconservative minority, the group's pronouncements testify to the ideas that constituted the identity community of the Tutsi leadership at the time and that needed to be protected in order to maintain its ontological existence. This dynamic in Tutsi identity politics, in turn, redefined the parameters of national identity and security as "[f]or the state to be able to exclude the Other from within and to protect the inside from the outside, the traces of their connectedness have to be erased from representation. This erasure gives the state and appearance of coherence and, at the same time, totalizes the idea of the other".[237] The articulation and reinforcement of an ethnicised outsider/insider binary shattered any remnant glimpses of hope for a peaceful solution through democratic channels. Hence, Hutu united to challenge the regal symbols of their oppression, whereas cohesion and solidarity within the Tutsi community was fostered by the emergence of a contestation-induced Tutsi nationalism.

In consideration of the foregoing, the dissertation maintains that the nature of racialised Hutu and Tutsi identities and their relationship to ethnicised ideas about the nature of the Rwandan state created a facilitating environment for the *securitisation* of the ethnic other. As group identity was increasingly attached to and defined via state control, societal and national security concerns amalgamated. In addition, the construction of a common threat furthered the unification within and the solidification of the identity communities and reinforced their differences to the ethnic other. As such, the act of defining the common threat became tantamount to the renegotiation and reinforcement of what constitutes the 'we' in the first place. Mindful of Mamdani's conceptualisation of political identities, the dissertation argues that the nascent Hutu nationalism diametrically opposed the Tutsi political project for the post-colonial future and thereby clearly demarcated the Hutu political identity from the Tutsi political community. Considering the nearly identical ethnic composition of the two countries, the new forces in the ethnic identity politics in Rwanda had a consequential influence on their Burundian kinsmen. Before this impact will be examined, a brief synopsis of the unfolding of the 1959 Hutu uprising will be provided in the following section.

[236] Callixte Kavuro, "Exploring the Relationship between Hutu Refugees' Protracted Situation and Insecurity in the Great Lakes Region," *African Human Mobility Review* 4, no. 1 (2018): 1119.

[237] Josefina Achavarría Alvarez, "Re-Thinking (in)Security Discourses from a Critical Perspective," *Asteriskos Journal of International Peace Studies* 1, no. 2 (2006).

4.3.3 The 1959 Hutu Uprising

Tensions between the Belgian colonial administration and the Tutsi aristocracy reached a new level of intensity in 1959 when the latter imputed the sudden and enigmatic death of their king to a Belgian orchestrated assassination plot.[238] With the newly inserted *mwami* nothing more than a political figurehead, the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) was initially founded as an alternate source of social cohesion but quickly turned into a vector of Tutsi interests. In reaction to the emergence of a Tutsi dominated party landscape, the cultural movement 'Mouvement Social Muhutu' transformed into a political party ('PARMEHUTU') fully committed to the cause of the Hutu.[239] The formation of PARMEHUTU almost immediately triggered the discharge of ethnic tensions in form of violent clashes between militants of the two parties. In this volatile environment, the attack on one of PARMEHUTU's leading political figures was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. Localised protests ultimately turned into nationwide episodic violence following a series of open threats against the PARMEHUTU's leadership by a number of Tutsi chiefs hostile to the Hutu cause. In the following weeks, roving bands of armed Hutu pillaged and torched thousands of Tutsi huts, forced Tutsi chiefs to resign, and killed at least one thousand Tutsi with extraordinary brutality.[240] According to Mamdani, "for the first time in the history of the Rwandan state, the violence demarcated Hutu from Tutsi".[241]

Meanwhile, Belgium assisted the uprising of her new Hutu protégées by repressing the establishment's counter-insurgency measures and modifying the political baseline for the announced 1961 legislative elections in favour of an anticipated PARMEHUTU victory.[242] Concerned about the escalation of violence, the United Nations recommended to defer the elections, thus prompting a group of Hutu advocates to unilaterally proclaim the republic in a public gathering on January 28, 1961. The new status quo created by the 'coup of Gitarama' was ultimately confirmed in the 1962 UN-supervised general elections.[243] In the following years, the new exclusionist Hutu government met the subsequent attempts of exiled Tutsi at

[238] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 156-158.

[239] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 121.

[240] Jones, "The Great Lakes Genocides," 132.

[241] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 105.

[242] Ibid., 123f.

[243] Ibid., 124.

reinstating the status quo of the old regime with brutal and indiscriminate repressions against the local Tutsi population. Obsessed with the Tutsi restorationist peril, Hutu politics in Rwanda became the expression of Mamdani's 'world of the rat and the cat'.[244] Put differently, the securitisation of ethno-nationalist aspirations defined the parameters of national security discourses in terms of an ethnicised binary. The implications of the revolution's identity and security politics for the political landscape in neighbouring Burundi, as well as the reverberations of Rwanda's emergence as an ethnocratic Hutu nation from the decolonisation process, will be discussed in the following.

4.4 On the Import of the 'Rwandan Problem'

> "No other event did more to sharpen the edges of ethnic hatred in Burundi than the Hutu revolution in neighbouring Rwanda" [245]
>
> - *René Lemarchand*

The decolonisation process in Rwanda shook to the core the very foundations of the Tutsi-administered colonial state and gave rise to an ethnocratic post-colonial Rwanda, ruled by its majority population. The forces of the revolution were, however, not only felt within the boundaries of the Rwandan state but reverberated throughout the entire region of Africa's Great Lakes. Most notably, Rwanda's neighbouring countries were faced with a massive human exodus, created by months of targeted pogroms and the general political turmoil of the revolution. Among the region's governments, the Burundian monarchy was the most hospitable recipient of displaced Rwandans, absorbing 60 000[246] of an approximated total of 336 000[247] Rwandan refugees into its society. Burundi subsequently turned into the new centre of gravity in the political activities of exiled Tutsi monarchists, who, from 1963 onwards, planned and executed cross-border insurrections into Rwanda that aimed at restoring the pre-revolutionary status quo.[248]

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[244] Ibid., 105.

[245] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 60.

[246] René Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa: Reflections on the Crisis in the Great Lakes Region," *Africa Spectrum* 32, no. 2 (1997): 179.

[247] Stapleton, *A History of Genocide in Africa* 39.

[248] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 127.

The activity of these so-called 'refugee warriors' did not only strain the diplomatic relations of the two neighbours,[249] but also deteriorated regional security by raising concerns for both their country of origin and their host country.[250] Crucially, the dislocation of the conflict to the national frontiers sensitised the local communities in the border regions to the realities of a violent Hutu-Tutsi confrontation. Considering the ethnic affinity of Burundi's population with the warrying parties, the fallout of the Rwandan trajectory unfolded its most seditious effects in neighbouring Burundi, which imported the Rwandan dynamics of ethnic conflict by adopting the Bahutu Manifesto's 'Rwandan Problem' into its own social and political discourse.

In this context, the ideational force of ethnic affinity and the role of transnational ethnic ties in leading "actors in one state to act in solidarity with their ethnic kin in another" should not be underestimated.[251] With this in mind, one can begin to understand why the Hutu leadership harboured strong sympathies with the political aims and aspirations of their Rwandan kinsmen, despite the absence of a rigid Hutu-Tutsi cleavage in Burundi.[252] Epistemically, the common secondary education of Rwandan and Burundian Hutu at the group Scolaire d'Astrida goes a long way in explaining their cognitive fondness to the implications of majority rule in Rwanda. The founding of the Parti du People in December 1959, only one month after the outbreak of the revolution, is a testament to the absorption of the Rwandan formula into the agenda of Hutu politics in Burundi. Albeit lacking any weight in a political landscape dominated by dynastic strife, the party's programme carried the clear imprint of the ideas of the revolution.[253] Thereby, the import of the revolution's discursive patterns into the converse of the Hutu leadership in Burundi constituted a sine qua non in the convergence of political objectives and their development of a similarly powerful emotional connection to ethnic identity politics. As such, the Hutu leadership began to read and present socio-political cleavages through the lens of

[249] Warren Weinstein, "Conflict and Confrontation in Central Africa: The Revolt in Burundi, 1972," *Africa Today* 19, Lesotho, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, no. 4 (1972): 25.

[250] James Milner, "Refugees and the Regional Dynamics of Peacebuilding," *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (2009): 21.

[251] Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War," *International Organization* 60 (2006): 336.

[252] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 60.; Bhavnani and Lavery, "Transnational Ethnic Ties and the Incidence of Minority Rule in Rwanda and Burundi (1959–2003)," 231.

[253] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 324.; Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 112.

ethnicity and increasingly began to question the legitimacy and extent of Tutsi power within Burundi's state structures.

Considering the domination of Burundi's political system by the princes of blood, and not the Tutsi, the Bahutu Manifesto's formulation of the national problem transcribed rather uneasily to the Burundian context. This tension was resolved by imputing a hidden hegemonic agenda to the Tutsi leadership in Burundi that was allegedly to be executed on the heels of independence.[254] Incidental to these allegations was the reproduction of colonial stereotypes that cast the Tutsi into a treacherous and deceiving character. This racial representation warned of the untrustworthiness of the Tutsi and the practice of lying as both a 'custom' and a 'deeply rooted defect' of the Tutsi 'race'.[255] Given the increasingly active engagement of the Rwandan Tutsi diaspora in Burundi, the colonial characterology appeared to the Burundian Hutu leadership as a reliable indicator for the credibility of the hegemonic conjecture.[256]

According to Brinkerhoff, the specific grievances articulated by diaspora communities in the political discourse of the host country are frequently the product of a complex renegotiation of identity under the lived experience of displacement.[257] In the Burundian context, the grievances of parts of the Rwandan Tutsi diaspora related directly to their identity as Rwanda's 'traditional' leadership and their ability to retake their 'rightful' place. A Tutsi domination of the Burundian state was, thereby, considered a tactical advantage to the prospects of restoring the Tutsi monarchy in Kigali. Hence, by actively supporting Tutsi supremacy in Burundi, Tutsi restorationists aimed at altering the ethnic composition of the Burundian state structures to their advantage.[258] Externally, the result was an inextricable linkage of Rwandan and Burundian regime security to the developments of ethnic politics in the respective other. Internally, Tutsi interests became increasingly pronounced and salient, as the precarious balance of power was tilted in favour of the Tutsi community.

[254] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 60.

[255] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 44.

[256] Daley, "Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa," 667.

[257] Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, "Diaspora Identity and the Potential for Violence: Toward an Identity-Mobilization Framework," *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research* 8, no. 1 (2008): 77.

[258] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 61.

In light of these developments, the Hutu leadership in Burundi considered the implementation of the majoritarian ideal into lived reality for the Rwandese an appealing and tangible demonstration of the prospects of revolutionary change in their own country. Henceforth, the 'demonstration effect' of the Rwandan Revolution unfolded its potential to "lead actors in other states to update their beliefs about the efficacy and desirability of challenging their own governments" by evoking an entirely different set of attitudes among the Hutu leadership in Burundi.[259]

While the Rwandan trajectory of status quo inversion was somewhat of an empowering experience for the Burundian Hutu, it caused considerable anxiety among their Tutsi counterparts. The refugee population's appalling accounts of the violence they fled constructed the experience of purge and displacement as a public trauma of the Tutsi identity community. In addition, Lemarchand asserts that "the presence in the country of thousands of Tutsi refugees, homeless and destitute, was immediately seen by their Burundi kinsmen as living proof of the horrifying implications of the Rwandan model".[260] The Belgian complicity in the success of the revolution and its gradual endorsement of majority rule as a favourable political configuration for an independent Burundi, thereby, exacerbated the Tutsi anticipation for a Rwandan replication. In the face of what the Tutsi perceived an ominous prefiguration of their destiny, Hutu nationalism was constructed a peril to both national security and the physical integrity of the Burundian Tutsi population. Consequently, a tight grip to the institutions they controlled arose as an imperative security strategy in thwarting an emerging 'Hutu danger'. As such, the dissertation argues that the demonstration effect of the Rwandan Revolution facilitated the process of ethnicised discursive threat construction among the Tutsi leadership in Burundi.

However, Burundi's decolonisation process had not spawned a consciousness among the Burundian Hutu comparable to that of their Rwandan kinsmen, let alone a coherent mobilisation for a nationalist cause. Instead, the institution of kinship maintained strong popular legitimacy, whereas questions of high politics were negotiated, almost exclusively, between the competing dynasties. As such, the Burundian political system was, at least for the time being, able to deter and manage revolutionary impulses. However, Lemarchand argues

[259] Salehyan and Gleditsch, "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War," 336.

[260] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 61.

that "by giving the Burundi situation a false definition to begin with, Hutu and Tutsi politicians evoked a new set of attitudes among each other, which made their originally false imputations true".[261] In addition, the dissertation submits that the contradiction between the impetus from Rwanda and the political reality in Burundi produced an 'ontological uncertainty', that Bubandt defines as "the socially constructed anxiety that shapes pertinent kinds of danger, fears, and concerns for a particular community at a particular time".[262] According to Bubandt, these uncertainties "provide a perspective on different ways of imagining and institutionally maintaining political communities".[263]

On that account, the dissertation returns to the Burundian decolonisation process with the objective to scrutinise the ontological groundings of these fears and uncertainties, their manifestation, and evolution in Burundi. In the following it is argued that in the months immediately preceding independence – i.e. the epitome of political change and uncertainty – the demonstration effect of the Rwandan trajectory set in motion the ethnicisation of national and societal security discourses, that coexisted with and cut across the cleavages particular to the Burundian context.

4.5 Precursors of Ethnic Violence

4.5.1 The Death of the Prince

Before the excursion into the trajectory of decolonisation in Rwanda, this chapter alluded to the recrudescence of the dynastic struggle under the prospects of Burundi's independence. Through the vector of modern party politics, the *Bezi* and *Batare* lineages fought over supremacy in the state structure of a post-colonial Burundian state. In contrast to the PDC's outlook on the timeline towards self-government, UPRONA demanded immediate independence from Belgium and positioned the conflict between the coloniser and the colonised at the forefront of the national security discourse. To the indignation of the Belgian trust authority, Prince Rwagasore's amalgamation of tradition and democratic modernity was exceptionally successful in transforming UPRONA into a trans-ethnic conglomerate of anti-

[261] Ibid., 60.

[262] Nils Bubandt, "Vernacular Security: The Politics of Feeling Safe in Global, National and Local Worlds," *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 3 (2005): 277.

[263] Ibid., 291.

colonialists.[264] Fearing the loss of influence over Burundian politics, Belgium used its remaining authority to modify the baseline conditions to the advantage of the PDC. Conversely, its efforts resulted in the augmentation of Rwagasore's nationalist credentials, which secured his party a landslide victory in the 1961 legislative elections.[265] In a desperate attempt to retain control over its former colony, the Belgian administration together with the PDC conspired against their fierce political opponent. On October 13, 1961, exactly sixteen days after his appointment to the office of prime minister, Louis Rwagasore was assassinated at a local sidewalk restaurant by a PDC gunmen.[266] As observed by Lemarchand, the prince's death would mark the "first in a series of crises leading inexorably to a sharp polarization of ethnic feelings" in Burundi that was hitherto remarkably free of ethnic tensions.[267]

4.5.2 The Ethnicisation of Party Politics

Following the loss of UPRONA's paragon and soul, the party's leadership was filled by André Muhirwa – a *ganwa* of *Batare* descent. Muhirwa, who "epitomised many of the behavioural and personality traits associated with the Tutsi" and openly harboured strong pro-Tutsi sympathies, was challenged for UPRONA's presidency by Hutu politician Paul Mirerekano.[268] Considering their archetypical ethnic appearances, the politicians' prima facie struggle for UPRONA's leadership was widely perceived as a standoff between Hutu and Tutsi.[269] In light of the apparent relevance of physical appearance and ethnic perceptions, this dissertation infers that, after the revolution in Rwanda, political communities in Burundi increasingly demarcated their membership based on a perceived biological distinctions alongside regional and class identities.

This ethnicisation of political competition was accompanied by increasing social awareness for ethnic wealth disparities among Bujumbura's population. In these circumstances, the interpretation of social and political issues through the lens of ethnicity "unleashed an

[264] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 81.

[265] Cornwell and de Beer, "Burundi: The Politics of Intolerance," 85.

[266] Guy Poppe, "The Murder of Burundi's Prime Minister, Louis Rwagasore," *Afrika Focus* 28, no. 2 (2015): 157.

[267] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 59.

[268] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 351.

[269] Ibid., 350f.

inflationary spiral of ethnic claims and counterclaims".[270] To make matters worse, Belgium began to actively endorse the Hutu opposition, thereby fuelling rumours of an imminent revolution, led by Hutu *syndicalistes*, orchestrated by the Rwandan PARMEHUTU, and backed by Belgium.

4.5.3 The 1962 Kamenge Riots

Against this backdrop, UPRONA's youth wing, the Jeunesse Nationaliste Rwagasore (JNR), rapidly radicalised into an anti-colonial, anti-Hutu, and increasingly violence-prone organisation of Tutsi militants.[271] As the JNR gradually evolved into a major incubator of ethnically-motivated violence in the urban setting, the Hutu leadership grew increasingly anxious over rumours on the JNR's infiltration by Tutsi UNAR refugee warriors from Rwanda.[272] The ostensible security dilemma reached its peak of intensity in January 1962, when mutual provocations between the JNR and the Hutu trade unionists escalated into violent clashes in Bujumbura's Kamenge district. To the indignant Hutu leadership, the JNR's brutality during the Kamenge riots constituted unambiguous proof of ethnic hatred. In this fragile political climate, the Tutsi leadership's growing recourse to extra-legal means in the elimination of political opponents only reinforced the Hutu discernment over a Tutsi takeover.[273] In addition, it was transpired that the Tutsi representatives in the national assembly not only sympathised with the cause of their Rwandan kinsmen, but "that the ties of collaboration between the Tutsi refugee leadership from Rwanda and the indigenous Tutsi elites of Burundi were largely responsible for the recrudescence of border incidents".[274]

4.5.4 The Construction of a 'Tutsi Threat'

Against the backdrop of the accumulation of 'evidence' of a Tutsi plot for state capture, the relationship between the Tutsi-dominated state under UPRONA and the internal and external Hutu opposition to the leading party became increasingly characterised by patterns of

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[270] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 63.

[271] Mark Huband, *The Skull beneath the Skin: Africa after the Cold War* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2001), 101f.

[272] Jean-Marie Kagabo, *Democratic Engineering in Rwanda and Burundi* (Kampala, Uganda: Fountain Publishers 2018), 198.

[273] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 66.

[274] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 357.

'disengagement'. According to Laley, this dynamic between state and society manifests in citizen's active detachment from the state, which is "seen primarily as being responsible for incalculable sources of unpredictable dangers from which protection has to be sought".[275] As such, the prospects of a Tutsi dominated state were constructed not only as a peril to the political ambitions of Hutu representation, but also to the physical integrity of the overall ethnic community. As the threat's existential dimension crystallised gradually and gained in urgency by day, a forcible regime change emerged as the only viable solution to both Hutu salvation and liberation. This sentiment is unequivocally expressed in a letter written by a dissident university student to his co-conspirators in a plot against the government. The correspondence reads:

> "After the ignominious massacres of Kamenge… it would be a matter of legitimate self-defence to organise resistance, or a coup d'état, and even a revolution. We are faced with a moral obligation to defend ourselves… The loss of human lives is necessary and indeed inevitable. If we falter, we shall be the ones to be sent to the gallows. Do you really want to see 85 percent of the population thrown back into slavery?"[276]

Evidently, the letter features strong overtones of danger and emergency and may, therefore, be conceptualised as a generic *securitisation move*. Foremost, the issue that is to be securitised is constructed as an ethnic problem epitomised in the 'ignominious massacres of Kamenge'. Thereby, the 'we' i.e., '85 percent of the population' is constructed in the face of the common threat it opposes. The common threat is defined as *existential* with reference to the imminent danger of being 'sent to the gallows' or enslaved. In the face of this existential threat, self-defence is presented as a moral obligation and a factor in the legitimation of extraordinary emergency responses, such as 'to organise resistance, or a coup d'état, and even a revolution'. Within the threat response the 'self' is expected to sacrifice itself for the protection of the 'we', as 'the loss of human lives is necessary and indeed inevitable' in the quest for societal security.

Considered a representation of the wider discourse among the Hutu political leadership, the letter's rhetoric of self-defence and emergency indicates the discursive transfer of issues relating to the political regime under the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA into the realm of security. In other words, the question of the Burundian government's ethnic configuration was *securitised* among the Hutu political leadership. The result of the incipient process of securitisation is the effective reduction of possibilities for open engagement and dialogue in

[275] Laley, "Peasants, Local Communities, and Central Power in Burundi," 701.

[276] Unknown cited in Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 359.

favour of an evocation and legitimation of emergency response measures such as a Rwandan-style Hutu uprising.[277]

Although, compared to the literature on Rwanda, there is relatively little knowledge on the transformation of Hutu identity in Burundi, the dissertation identifies the violence of the Kamenge riots as an anchoring event in the manifestation of a pronounced nationalist Hutu identity and the inception of a securitisation of the ethnic other. However, as previously asserted, Burundi's traditional system inhibited the formation of a popular Hutu group consciousness and, as such, the ethnicised security discourse remained confined to the political leadership. Furthermore, the intervention of the crown played a major role in the transient aversion of a large-scale escalation in this extraordinarily tense environment of mutual fear and mistrust. In a historical turn of events that will be described in the following two sections, the crown would, however, emerge as a major stimulus for a Hutu coup d'état and the primary agent of its own demise.

4.6 The Profound Transformations of the Post-Independence Years

4.6.1 The Demise of Monarchic Legitimacy

In the context of UPRONA's demise and the deepening inter-ethnic rift in the capital, Burundi's governmental apparatus found itself paralysed in the final stage of the decolonisation process. Against this backdrop, the crown reasserted itself into the political vacuum as a non-partisan umpire between the colliding faction's interests. At the outset, *mwami* Mwambutsa's policy of reassurance proved successful in the pacification of the political climate. Subsequent to the diffusion of authority based on an ethnic arithmetic, the crown induced incentives for compromise and announced legislative elections with the aim of subduing revolutionary temptations and restoring governmental legitimacy.[278] On July 1, 1962, Burundi gained independence from Belgium under the framework of a constitutional monarchy.

In the wake of the shifting prerogatives and functions of the royal court, the traditional elites resurrected through the cracks of the political system. Their ensuing cultivation of a political culture of feudalism, nepotism, and corruption was, however, met with significant resistance

[277] Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," 56f.

[278] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 292-296.

from Burundi's young and westernised political elites, most notably those of Hutu extraction.[279] In light of the incompatibility of the oligarchy's political behaviour with the principles of the emergent counter-elite, the monarchy's legitimacy declined rapidly, thus allowing for the inception of a republican discourse. In response, *mwami* Mwabutswa tightened his grip to power and commence a rule of monarchic absolutism.

Following their landslide victory at the polls of the 1965 election, the Hutu leadership expected the appointment of a prime minister from within their own ranks. Upon the realisation that the democratic restoration of parliamentary legitimacy would come at the cost of his own powers, Mwambutswa, however, rejected the elected Hutu candidate and appointed his long-time *Bezi* protégé, Léopold Biha, to the office instead.[280] Since the incumbent's ethnicity was considered an indicator of the monarchy's overall preferences, the deliberate deprival of the Hutu electoral gains by *mwami* Mwabutswa was considered unambiguous proof of the monarchy's ethnic bias. As a result, "the crown has become for a growing number of politically-minded people the detested emblem of a by-gone era".[281]

4.6.2 The Abortive Coup of 1965

In the early morning hours of October 19, 1965, a group of Hutu army and gendarmerie officers rose to storm the royal palace and proclaim the republic in response to the humiliation and marginalisation suffered by the King's despotic policies. The loyal troops under the lead of Captain Michel Micombero, however, quickly restored order and arrested, tried, and executed the plotters of the abortive coup. Upon learning of the death of their leaders, armed Hutu militias in Muramvya, the epicentre of the hardline Hutu opposition, began to attack local Tutsi families and set arson to their properties.[282] Following the flight of panic-stricken Mwabutswa to neighbouring Zaire, the Tutsi elements in the security forces retaliated against their ethnic counterparts by executing scores of innocent Hutu peasants. According to Lemarchand, the brutality of the Tutsi-dominated army was the expression of a "need to satisfy an ethnic vengeance, and a fear that anything short of a 'total punishment' would lead to further

[279] Ibid., 323, 373.

[280] Weinstein and Schrire, "Ethnic Strategies and the Primacy of Ethnic Survival," 189f.

[281] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 290.

[282] Patrick Hajayandi, *Wounded Memories: Perceptions of Past Violence in Burundi and Perspectives for Reconciliation*, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (2019), 24.

troubles".[283] These sentiments, this dissertation argues, must be understood in relation to the events in Rwanda and the ethnicised fears, anxieties, and perceptions of danger it produced in Burundi.

With the benefit of hindsight, the coup d'état in 1965 can be identified as a Hutu revolt against a "socio-political order which denied them the opportunities for social, economic and political advancement to which they considered themselves entitled".[284] In other words, it represented a revolutionary class struggle of emergent political aggregates against a privileged oligarchy. To the Tutsi leadership, however, the coup vindicated the amassed Tutsi fear of a violent Hutu takeover in Burundi. With the memory of Kayibanda's genocide against their Rwandan kinsmen etched on their minds, Tutsi elites engaged in a total and disproportional counter-insurgency campaign, aimed at thwarting the Hutu threat to their physical and ontological security as Burundi's rightful potentates. While ethnic tensions, subsequently, reached alarming proportions in Bujumbura, the countryside, in which the game of politics often went unnoticed, was remarkably free of ethnic animosity.[285] This reinforces the previously made argument on the confinement of ethnicised security discourses to Burundi's political leadership. The character of this leadership, however, changed drastically in the aftermath of the coup. Firstly, resulting from the virtual decapitation of the Hutu leadership, statecraft became the *de facto* prerogative of the Tutsi. Moreover, the security forces acquired a political consciousness and agenda of their own that tilted the power balance in favour of the government.

4.6.3 The Proclamation of Burundi's First Republic

Initially, the political elites genuinely endeavoured to uphold the monarchic order in the aftermath of its attempted overthrow. The unwillingness of the royal successor, King Ntare III, to be reduced to a ceremonial decipher, however, collided dramatically with the reformist outlook of the security forces that acceded to power in the wake of the abortive Hutu coup. What followed was a brief trial of strength between the crown and the makeshift government; the old-guard aristocrats and the modern Tutsi leadership, and ultimately, between monarchists and republicans. Under the pressure of the Tutsi elites and with significant assistance from

[283] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 419.

[284] Ibid., 290.

[285] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 71f.

Rwandan diaspora elements in the army, a bloodless coup d'état on November 28, 1966, deposed the King and proclaimed the Republic under the presidency of coup-leader Captain Michel Micombero.[286]

4.7 On the Ontology of Burundi's Ethnicised Security Discourses

In the aftermath of the army's capture of state, a new set of political stakeholders, mostly from military backgrounds, acceded to power and with them a new set of attitudes on questions of national security. With the chairmanship over matters of security in the hands of a militarised political elite, a phase of accelerated threat construction is to be expected. As such, the dissertation submits that it was in in the period between the first abortive coup in 1965 and the outbreak of genocidal violence in 1972 that the substance of the 'Hutu danger' transcended the Rwandan definition and acquired a notion specific to the post-coup political configurations in Burundi. The agency of political actors in the construction of danger is, thereby, of extraordinary importance. As acknowledged by René Lemarchand,

> "one cannot overestimate the part played by individual actors in defining the nature of the threats posed to their respective communities, framing strategies designed to counter such threats, rallying support for their cause, bringing pressure to bear on key decision makers, and, in short, politicizing ethnoregional identities".[287]

This dissertation asserts that the significance of individual political actors, as characterised by Lemarchand, should not be attributed to their manipulation of a passive population but to their role in an inter-subjective process of threat construction. What Lemarchand essentially describes are the securitisation moves of political leaders that require the audience's acceptance in order to materialise in security discourse and action. Pursuant to this logic, political actors did not only politicise but also securitise ethno-regional identities. In an attempt to understand the rationale behind this securitisation process, this dissertation briefly turns to the nature of the referent object and its vulnerabilities, which are considered constitutive to what it perceives as a threat to its security.

4.7.1 The State as the Referent Object of Security

As a result of the westernisation of security discourses under colonial rule, the state emerged as the primary referent object of security. Colonial interpretations on its purpose, thereby,

[286] Ibid., 74f.

[287] Ibid., 77.

directly competed with the identity of the state as prescribed by the traditional order. Following the country's independence from Belgium in 1962, the foreign administrative elite, whose interests the state served, vanished from its political structures. The second major turning point for the Burundian state's identity was the abolition of the monarchy in 1966, following which the state could no longer claim to derive its authority from divine sources. Simply put, the profound political transformations in the years following independence triggered a national identity crisis that required the reformulation of the ideas embodied by the state and the renegotiation of "the 'people' in whose name it rules over its territory".[288] The following argues that the nature of the state's identity under Burundi's First Republic is a function of the conditions it emerged from.

Notwithstanding the impact of the clash between traditionalism and modernity, the military's bloodless seizure of power must be understood in the context of the close aversion of a Hutu republic in the previous year. Having thwarted the Rwandan fate by the blink of an eye, the dissertation submits an interpretation of the First Republic as the institutionalised opposition to the ideological currents of Hutu majoritarianism. As such, the identity of the state was less defined by what it is but, more importantly, by what it is not i.e., a Hutu nation. What may be called a process of 'identity formation by negation' similarly applies to the rejection of the traditional oligarchy's behaviour and the order it tried to sustain. Conversely, the new political aggregates' vision of the state order was governed by a reformist zeal that signified a break with Burundi's traditional past.

4.7.2 The Construction of a 'Monarchic Peril'

The disempowerment of the traditional elites, however, triggered a problem of national inheritance that has been discussed in more detail in the context of Rwanda's decolonisation.[289] In simple terms, the *ganwa*'s ouster from power raised the question of who owns the state. Since the post-coup purges have incapacitated the Hutu as competitors for state power, the answer to the national leadership problematic had to derive from within the Tutsi caste. Following the mitigation of the 'Hutu danger' the intra-Tutsi cohesion created by the existence of a common threat crumbled and exposed momentous cleavages over ethno-regional ties and

[288] Wimmer, "Who Owns the State?," 634.

[289] Ibid.

socio-cultural affiliations. Previously overshadowed by the ominous ethnic lens of the Rwandan Revolution, the conflict between the Tutsi-*Banyaruguru* and the Tutsi-*Hima* moved to the forefront of the national security discourse.

Principally, the abolition of the monarchy triggered somewhat of a status reversal that empowered the Tutsi-*Hima* under the lead of *Hima* president Michel Micombero.[290] As the *Banyaruguru*'s superior socio-political status was engendered by their connections to the royal palace, the restoration of their privileges required the reinstatement of the monarchic order. This, in turn, was only possible with substantial Hutu support. As such, the 'monarchic peril' entered the national security discourse as both an existential threat to the Burundian state's new republican identity and as the flipside of the 'Hutu danger'.

Subsequently, the two conflict dynamics oscillated in a reciprocating motion in contingency with external pressures. According to Lemarchand,

> "the greater the prominence of Hutu threats, the lesser the impact and visibility of intra-Tutsi differences; the more salient these latter differences were, the more tempting it became for Hutu elements to turn the situation to their advantage by playing one group of Tutsi off against the other."[291]

In this respect, it is important to take note of the colonial legacy in amalgamating the state's identity with that of its ruling elites in order to comprehend the translation of national security threats into societal security concerns for the Tutsi identity community. As such, the violence associated with a Hutu take-over of the Burundian state was framed as a type of violence affecting the overall Tutsi community. In this context, the notion of security as survival in discourses on the 'Hutu danger' acquired political clout. Henceforth, self-defence served as the discursive legitimation for the systematic discrimination of Burundian Hutu, which was termed 'black racism' by Jeremy Greenland.[292]

[290] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 80-82.

[291] Lemarchand, *Selective Genocide in Burundi*, 12.

[292] Greenland, "Black Racism in Burundi."

4.7.3 The Tutsi 'Defensive Reflex'

The distinct notions and vocabularies of security in the ethnicised security discourses among the Hutu and Tutsi leadership of Burundi are reflected in Martin Ndayahoze's account of the political climate in 1968. According to the Hutu politician:

> "Propagators of false rumors always harp on the same theme: the replay of 1965. Diabolically propagated among the population this theme provokes a *defensive reflex* [among Tutsi], and translates 'the Hutu peril imposes upon us a *struggle for survival*'. One ethnic group is thus subjected to permanent suspicions, each Hutu being automatically tagged a racist and subversive … This poisoned situation shows the existence of a Hutu-Tutsi racism inside our walls. On the Hutu side one finds theoreticians of a true democracy; they note that the administrative structure down to the lower echelons is in Tutsi hands, and they condemn the conscious or unconscious nepotism resulting from their ethnic monopoly … They have reached the conclusion that the Tutsi have invented the thesis of '*a struggle for survival in the face of a Hutu peril*' as a pretext to torture the Hutu and prolong or perpetuate their domination over them."[293]

Interestingly, Ndayahoze's report exemplifies both the Hutu leadership's awareness of a securitised discourse on their ethno-political identity and their rejection thereof. As such, Ndayahoze discredits the Tutsi 'struggle for survival in the face of a Hutu peril' with reference to the vocabulary associated with a 'Tutsi danger' i.e., the domination over and torture of the Hutu. What the Hutu politician's account aptly depicts are two ethnicised and diametrically opposed security discourses that historically increased in salience.

It was in this context that official allegations of a premeditated Hutu coup d'état for the night of September 16, 1969 surfaced, followed by yet another round of Hutu purges in both the government and the army based on conspiracy charges against the *security of the state*. The subsequent consolidation of the Tutsi monopoly provoked a number of Hutu students to relocate to the bush. Outside of the state's surveillance and espionage apparatus, they hoped to plan a major insurrection against the Tutsi government.[294]

With the Hutu threat once again circumvented, at least for the time being, the *Hima* government turned toward the dangers posed by the *Banyaruguru*'s accommodationist attitudes towards the Hutu and their pro-monarchist tendencies. In July 1971, the government's paranoia culminated in the public prosecution of a number of traditional elements for their alleged

[293] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 85-86. Emphasis added.

[294] Ibid., 86f.

involvement in a conspiracy against the national order. The unprecedented publicity of the trials carried the intra-Tutsi rivalry into the open and disseminated the government's representations of enmity to the wider population.[295]

It was amidst this fragile political climate of March 1972 that King Ntare, under guarantees for his safety, returned from exile. Shortly after his arrival in Bujumbura, the deposed sovereign was placed under house arrest and allegedly executed by government officials. However, the circumstances of his assassination are contested to this day. In this context, president Micombero suddenly dismissed his cabinet on April 29, 1972, and thereby triggered the final incident in a series of inter-related events that culminated in the first Genocide in Africa's Great Lakes region.[296]

4.8 Conclusion

In the context of its objective to reconstruct the historico-political circumstances that enabled the ethnicisation of security discourses, this chapter has emphasised the momentous decolonisation process in neighbouring Rwanda, more specifically, the anti-colonial uprising of its Hutu population in 1959. Most significantly, the Hutu Revolution in Rwanda confirmed the racial binary of the colonialists and translated the dichotomy between the 'indigenous' Hutu and the 'Hamitic' Tutsi into post-colonial political identities. In addition, it inextricably linked Hutu identity to the inheritance of the Rwandan state which was, in turn, constructed as a Hutu nation. Furthermore, the chapter concerned the import of the 'Rwandan problem' into Burundi's political discourse and the subsequent social construction of anxiety amongst the Burundian leadership. As a result, Burundi's political conflict was displaced from traditional rivalries among the princes of blood to an ethnic confrontation between Hutu and Tutsi. In 1962, the outbreak of ethnically motivated violence in Bujumbura's Kamenge district erected a discourse of self-defence among the Hutu leadership, whereby the Hutu coup of 1965 confirmed the amassed Tutsi fear of a repetition of the Rwandan Revolution in Burundi. Finally, the chapter scrutinised the ontological underpinnings of the ethnicised discourses on national security in Burundi's First Republic. The next and final chapter of this dissertation is dedicated to the transition from ethnicised discourses on security to threat-induced emergency responses in the form of ethnic violence.

[295] Ibid., 78.

[296] Weinstein, "The Revolt in Burundi, 1972," 20-22.

5 Security and Ethnic Violence

The purpose of the present and final chapter of the historical analysis is to provide the connecting piece between the ethnicised security discourses discussed in the previous chapter and the large-scale ethnic violence in the post-independence period. Principally, the outbreak of violence is framed as an extreme emergency response to a socially constructed *existential* threat and, as such, as the function of the securitisation of ethnic identity. Therefore, Burundi's episodes of ethnic massacres will be scrutinised in terms of the political circumstances leading up to their occurrence and the representations of enmity that motivated mass mobilisation for their cause. In accordance with the chronology of events, the chapter first analyses the 1972 Genocide of Burundi's Hutu intelligentsia, followed by an inquiry into the 1988 massacres of Hutu in Burundi's northern provinces. The chapter concludes with an interpretation of the 1993 Genocide as the product of the historico-political trajectory of threat construction.

> "nowhere else in Africa has so much violence killed so many people on so many occasions in so small a space as in Burundi during the years following independence" [297]
>
> - *René Lemarchand*

5.1 The Selective Genocide of 1972

The first genocide in the history of the Great Lakes region unfolded in the Burundian spring of 1972. Although post-independence Burundi was plagued by endemic regime instability (no less than six governments between 1962 and 1966),[298] it was hitherto relatively free of ethnically motivated violence. The 1972 massacres of educated Hutu, often referred to as a 'selective genocide', marked one of the most gruesome scenes of violence in the short history of post-colonial Burundi. This dissertation considers the 'catastrophe' of 1972 ('*Ikiza'* in Kirundi)[299] the 'anchoring event'[300] in the securitisation of ethnic identities in Burundi and

[297] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, xi.

[298] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 365.

[299] Russell, "Obedience and Selective Genocide in Burundi," 437.

[300] This is based on Jones' deliberations on the significance of 'anchoring genocides' in the comparative genocide scholarship. According to Jones there is a "tendency of comparative genocide scholarship, first, to orient itself around an 'anchoring' genocide, generally but not always one occurring on a vast scale, and second, once anchored, to begin explorations of contiguous analytical geopolitical territory, including genocidal events that are

hence devotes special attention to the nature of violence and the representations of enmity in its unfolding.

5.1.1 The Sequence of Violence

In a matter of hours after Micombero's sudden dismissal of his cabinet on April 29, 1972, violence erupted in the capital city and almost simultaneously in three southern provinces. Rough estimates suggest that up to 10 000 Hutu insurgents, supported by a number of Mulelist fighters from Zaire, attacked 'every Tutsi in sight' along with those Hutu who refused to join their ranks.[301] Though it is impossible to determine the exact number of Tutsi deaths, Cornwell & Beer estimate between 2000 and 3000 Tutsi to have lost their lives as a result of the insurgency.[302]

On the day following the initial attacks, the coordinated efforts of the JNR youth brigades and the army, which by 1972 had become "the extension of Tutsi politics and administration 'by other means'", launched a counter-insurgency campaign of unprecedented scale.[303] However, the rebels' firm control over the south of the country, where they had declared a 'People's Republic of Martyazo', prompted Micombero to request assistance from neighbouring Zaire.[304] Given the alleged involvement of Congolese Mulelists, who have not too long ago fought a guerrilla war against his own government, President Mobutu granted Micombero's request. Within less than a week of the arrival of Zairian assistance, the military alliance crushed the rebellion and recovered control over most part of the country, with the exception of small pockets of resistance in the south.[305]

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usually classed as secondary or subsidiary to the anchoring genocide and analyzed in relation to it". Thus, the anchoring genocide becomes the primary focus of attention and the frame of reference for the analysis and interpretation of preceding or relating configurations of mass violence. For a more detailed explanation of the concept of 'anchoring' genocides in genocide studies please refer to Jones, "The Great Lakes Genocides."

[301] Embassy of the Republic of Burundi, The White Paper on the Real Causes and Consequences of the Attempted Genocide against the Tutsi Ethny in Burundi, (Washington, D.C 1972).cited in Weinstein, "The Revolt in Burundi, 1972," 29.

[302] Cornwell and de Beer, "Burundi: The Politics of Intolerance," 86.

[303] Weinstein, "The Revolt in Burundi, 1972," 25.

[304] Aidan Russell, "Rebel and Rule in Burundi, 1972," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 48, Special Issue: Violence in the Contemporary Political History of Eastern Africa, no. 1 (2015): 85.

[305] Weinstein, "The Revolt in Burundi, 1972," 26f.

The government's interpretation of what constitutes an effective and sustained response to the Hutu insurrection, however, went far beyond the mere restoration of order. Rather, the state repression continued even after the suppression of the insurgency with the notion of a 'final solution'. Hence, the immediate goal of stability was amended to include a long-term project of threat elimination. In practice, the government's security objectives translated into the systematic liquidation of every actual or potential Hutu leader with the capacity to act as an auxiliar to a forthcoming revolt.[306]

In the first stage, prominent figures of the Hutu leadership were apprehended across the country in the first days of May 1972 and subsequently tried before ad hoc 'war councils' in the provincial centres.[307] Under the vindication of 'rightful punishment of a righteous state' the Hutu leadership was virtually and literally decapitated.[308] In a second step, the state sought to nip in the bud embryonic cells of Hutu resistance by preventing the Hutu intelligentsia from disseminating and mobilising around the Hutu cause. Although the government vehemently maintains to have only punished the guilty, the state's counter-insurgency campaign systematically targeted members of Burundi's educated and semi-educated Hutu strata. As such, the state repression was "genocidal in scale while being selective in method and process".[309] During this 'selective' genocide in 1972, Hutu across the country were apprehended and slaughtered by JNR brigades based on a drawn-up list of suspects. In this way, cadres of Hutu in different localities "including not only local administrators but chauffeurs, clerks, and skilled workers – were systematically rounded up, taken to jail and either shot or beaten to death", with 4,000 victims in Bujumbura alone.[310] According to Lemarchand, some of the most gruesome scenes of violence occurred on university campuses in the capital, where "scores of Hutu students were physically assaulted by their Tutsi *confrères*", some even beaten to death.[311]

[306] Francis Loft and Frances Loft, "Background to the Massacres in Burundi," *Review of African Political Economy* 43, Feeding Africa: What Now? (1988): 91.

[307] Greenland, "Black Racism in Burundi," 445.

[308] Russell, "Rebel and Rule in Burundi, 1972," 89.

[309] Russell, "Obedience and Selective Genocide in Burundi," 437.

[310] Lemarchand, *Selective Genocide in Burundi*, 15.

[311] Ibid. Original emphasis

In this context, “state violence established totalitarian control over the country” reaching far beyond the areas of rebel activity and affecting Hutu across all sectors of society.[312] Thereby, physical appearance often served as the sole indicator of culpability. Bearing in mind the unreliability of physical characteristics in the determination of ethnic affiliation, many Tutsi are believed to have fallen victim to the state repression based on a wrongful identification as members of the Hutu community. Relatedly, thousands of innocent families, both Hutu and Tutsi, are believed to have been falsely denounced as Hutu conspirators because a neighbour “coveted its land, was indebted to it, or had lost a civil suit to it”.[313] Since they were killed as enemies of the state, Greenland adds, “their cars bank balances and even household furniture and clothes are justified plunder to any Tutsi quick enough to appropriate them”.[314] In addition, the treacherous judas-imagery imposed on the deceased translated into the categorical exclusion of the bereaved from the access to victim funds.[315] As a result, power and wealth were, once again, reinforced as a Tutsi prerogative.

In attempting to capture the selective genocide as “one of the worst bloodlettings in the history of post-colonial Africa” [316] under its analytical framework, the dissertation in the following investigates the nature of rebel violence and reconstructs the state’s corresponding representations of enmity that claimed the lives of 100 000 – 300 000 Burundians.[317]

5.1.2 On the Nature of Rebel Violence

5.1.2.1 Four Narratives of the Insurgency

The nature of the Hutu uprising that unleashed the brutal state repression of 1972 is highly contested and varies depending on which antecedent political dynamics are emphasised. While one opinion considers the Hutu insurrection a deliberate Tutsi provocation to justify a ‘final solution’, another narrates the uprising as a monarchist plot, orchestrated by the exiled King

[312] Russell, "Rebel and Rule in Burundi, 1972," 75.

[313] Romain Forscher, "The Burundi Massacres: Tribalism in Black Africa," *International Journal of Politics* 4, East African Politics, no. 4 (1974-1975): 79.

[314] Greenland, "Black Racism in Burundi," 448.

[315] Jeremy J. Greenland, "The Two Options Now Facing Burundi," *A Journal of Opinion* 5, no. 2 (1975): 3.

[316] René Lemarchand, "The Killings Fields Revisited," *A Journal of Opinion* 18, no. 1 (1989): 22.

[317] Russell, "Obedience and Selective Genocide in Burundi," 437.

Ntare III. In both scenarios, the massacres of Tutsi are, at least in part, attributed to the reaction of kingship-loyal Hutu militias to the news of the death of their *mwami.*[318]

A third approach conceives of the rebellion in connection with the exposure of governmental instability during the 1971 public trials against traditional elements. According to this view, the Hutu insurrection was an attempt to capitalise on the climax of intra-Tutsi tensions, which opened a window of opportunity to re-enact the 1959 Revolution of their Rwandan kinsmen.[319] Rather than the function of elite manipulation or blind rage, this approach construes Hutu violence as political, directed against a state order that was built upon their oppression. Hence, "the aim of the rebellion in Bujumbura was not to kill every Tutsi in sight but to gain control of the radio station and military camp as a preliminary step towards a formal seizure of power".[320] As such, the Hutu insurgents initially targeted strategic objectives, whereby the "methods of selective violence communicated a political identity that was marshalled towards the decapitation and displacement of the state".[321] Accordingly, Weinstein concludes that it was only with the failure to capture or destroy these selected governmental amenities that violence spread across the countryside where it took on an uncontrollable, indiscriminate, and ethnicised dynamic.[322]

Russell, on the other hand, significantly departs from above accounts by emphasising the anti-coloniality of the rebellion and its link to the notion of Hutu liberation as construed during the Rwandan Revolution. Correspondingly, he conceives the objective of the rebellion, beyond the decapitation of the state, to include the remaking of society. According to Russell:

> "The old order of state power and social structure were to be eliminated in an act of revolutionary violence. The call to Hutu civilians attempted to evoke the rebellion as a matter of purifying violence that lay beyond law, a Fanonian liberatory violence of the oppressed."[323]

This conception of the initial attacks is not only seminal in its approach, but also contributes significantly to the advancement of the argument made by this dissertation. Hence, the notion

[318] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 91f.

[319] Loft and Loft, "Background to the Massacres in Burundi," 91.

[320] Lemarchand, *Selective Genocide in Burundi*, 18.

[321] Russell, "Rebel and Rule in Burundi, 1972," 84.

[322] Weinstein, "The Revolt in Burundi, 1972," 24.

[323] Russell, "Rebel and Rule in Burundi, 1972," 84.

of Hutu violence as Fanonian liberatory violence and its relation to the Burundian case study shall be briefly deconstructed in the following.

5.1.2.2 The Hutu Insurrection as Fanonian Revolutionary Violence

In reading the insurrection through a fused prism of the Bahutu Manifesto's anti-colonial thought and Frantz Fanon's conception of decolonisation, a distinct narrative emerges: Unlike in Rwanda, the process of decolonisation in Burundi did not dismantle the system of oppression – it merely replaced the oppressor. While the anti-colonial violence of the 1959 Revolution inverted the system and 'liberated' the Rwandan Hutu from both the European and the 'feudal' coloniser, Burundi's transition to independence left the political order intact. During its decolonisation, the domination of high politics by traditional elements left no discursive space for the emergence of a comprehensive anti-colonial discourse among Burundi's Hutu population. With the abolition of the monarchy in 1966 and the replacement of this privileged oligarchy by the second tier of the pyramidal structure of society, the 'Hamitic colonisation' of the Burundian Hutu had just begun. As such, the 1972 Hutu insurrection can be understood as part of an anti-colonial discourse that emerged during the Rwandan Revolution, but only acquired meaning in the Burundian context with the ethnicised interpretation of socio-political issues and the gradual transformation of the state into a system of Tutsi supremacy and Hutu oppression. The inferred characterisation of Burundi's First Republic as colonial in nature has profound consequences to the conceptualisation of the means necessary and discursively justifiable for its dismantlement. This is where the argument turns to Frantz Fanon.

In 'The Wretched of The Earth'[324] Fanon discusses in great detail, the violent nature of colonial society in its physical, psychological, and structural dimension. According to Fanon, colonialism "is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence".[325] Hence, decolonisation is an inherently violent phenomenon, as the true liberation of the native is in the destruction of the settler. In the words of Fanon: "For the native, life can only spring up again out of the rotting corpse of the settler".[326] Analogous to the argument made in the context of the 1959 Hutu uprising in Rwanda (see section 4.3.1.4 of this dissertation),

[324] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*.

[325] Ibid., 61.

[326] Ibid., 93.

the fatality of a Fanonian decolonial thought among the rebels of the 1972 initial attacks is that it construes the emancipation of the Hutu in the genocide of the Tutsi.

5.1.2.3 On Security as Emancipation and Violence as Nation-Building

The dissertation further submits that a Fanonian conception of the legitimating discourse of violence among the Hutu rebels has important implications for the prevalent logic of security in the insurrection, constituting a point of convergence in the subject matter of African Studies and ISS. On the one hand, the structural violence of the oppressive order constitutes the main source of insecurity for the Hutu community. Paradoxically, the primary strategy for the alleviation of Hutu insecurity is also violence. Hence, violence is the source of both insecurity and security of the Hutu identity community. In the context of the former, security means survival. In the context of the latter, the logic of security is one of emancipation, "liberating people from various forms of physical and structural violence, empowering them to control their own futures".[327] The dissertation argues, that this emancipatory dimension of security is, furthermore, reflected in the role Fanon ascribes to the liberation struggle in the production of political and cultural identities, as well as the process of nation-building. According to Fanon:

> "The practice of violence binds them together as a whole, since each individual forms a violent link in the great chain, a part of the great organism of violence which has surged upward in reaction to the settler's violence in the beginning. The groups recognize each other and the future nation is already indivisible … The mobilization of the masses, when it arises out of the war of liberation, introduces into each man's consciousness the ideas of a common cause, of a national destiny, and of a collective history."[328]

In the context of the 1972 insurrection, liberatory rebel violence did, however, not unfold its unifying potential. On the contrary, Hutu in many locations vigorously opposed the violence of their kinsmen and proactively contributed to Tutsi efforts at restoring order.[329] Popular endorsement for the rebellion's ethnic bloodshed was, in fact, so minimal that the Hutu insurgents had to enforce their 'righteous revolutionary justice' through tyranny.[330] Arguably, the lack of widespread support for the liberation struggle may be attributed to the absence of a cohesive group consciousness among the Hutu. It follows that without an awareness for the existence of the group, threats to this group cannot be successfully securitised, leaving

[327] Krause and Williams, "Security and "Security Studies"," 8.

[328] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 93.

[329] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 97.

[330] Russell, "Rebel and Rule in Burundi, 1972," 86.

emergency responses, such as liberatory violence, with no basis for legitimation or justification.

However, in Weinstein's opinion, the violence of the repression "may have forged a unity among remaining Hutu and a militant ethnic consciousness they have not had until now".[331] Contrary to Fanon's conception, Hutu identity in Burundi did, therefore, not emerge from liberatory violence (security) but in the face of repressive violence (insecurity) i.e., the mutual cognisance of belonging to a 'martyred community'.[332] Correspondingly, Malkki found in her seminal ethnographic study of the mythico-histories in two Tanzanian refugee camps that the Hutu diaspora "continually explored, reiterated, and emphasised the boundaries between self and other, Hutu and Tutsi, and good and evil", whereby the rhetoric of the colonial characterology became a defining linguistic tool in the depiction of the 'chief characters' in their discourse on security. In this way, "'[t]he Tutsi' were constituted, not only as a categorical opposite and enemy, but also as the embodiment of such abstract moral qualities as evil, laziness, beauty, danger, and 'malignity'".[333] As described by Fanon, "[t]o the theory of the 'absolute evil of the native' the theory of the 'absolute evil of the settler' replies".[334] From this oppositional process of identity construction, the Hutu gained, according to Malkki, a common consciousness of a categorically distinct people.[335] This inorganic process of identity formation is what Weinstein labels 'enforced ethnicity'.[336]

5.1.3 Threat Construction in the Governmental Discourse on Security

Whereas the previous section has explored the violence of the 1972 rebellion in its liberatory dimension under the logic of security as emancipation, this section turns to the relationship between violence and (in)security in the state repression. It is argued that the genocidal response of the Tutsi-dominated state communicated a logic of security as survival that can only be understood in connection with its perception of the threat it opposed.

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[331] Weinstein, "The Revolt in Burundi, 1972," 27.

[332] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 103.

[333] Malkki, *Purity and Exile*, 54.

[334] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 93.

[335] Malkki, *Purity and Exile*.

[336] Weinstein, "The Revolt in Burundi, 1972," 27.

5.1.3.1 The National Security Discourse

For Achille Mbembe, 'necropolitics', that is the power and capacity to decide over who lives and who dies, is the ultimate expression of sovereignty.[337] In conditions, where "the state of exception and the relation of enmity have become the normative basis of the right to kill … power", according to Mbembe, "continuously refers and appeals to exception, emergency, and a fictionalised notion of the enemy".[338] Simply put, the state holds the monopoly over the power to define the nature of adversity and the emergency measures avail to avert calamity. In applying this conception to the 1972 carnage in Burundi, Russell concludes that, "as the first and loudest voice to describe the violence of the rebellion, the state played an intimate part in shaping the social and political understanding of the violence that opposed it".[339]

As such, public perceptions of enmity were a function of the government's representations of the nature of the threat it opposed. These, in turn, were conditioned by the specific vulnerabilities of both the state as an abstract entity and the government as the representation of the Tutsi community. Hence, across months of national and international pronouncements, the state's depiction of the enemy's identity was characterised by contradictory imagery that reflected the reciprocation of different conflict dynamics in the language of emergency. According to Russell, the Hima government depicted the rebels as "counter-revolutionary monarchists, then foreign-sponsored imperialists, then bloody-mouthed tribalists, each accusation deriving from a preceding fear of the state".[340] What these representations have in common is the construction of the Hutu as the baseline of enmity. This is because no matter whether the underlying threat to the Republican order was monarchist, tribalist, or imperialist in character, it could only materialise via the Hutu insurrection as a 'carrier movement' for its own cause.[341]

The government's perceptions of the 'Hutu danger' was, thereby, clearly conditioned by colonial representations of the Hutu 'race' as betrayed in its construction of rebel violence as

[337] Mbembe, "Necropolitics," 11.

[338] Ibid., 16.

[339] Russell, "Rebel and Rule in Burundi, 1972," 77.

[340] Ibid.

[341] René Lemarchand, "Ethnic Genocide," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 10, no. 1/2 (1980): 56.

the function of 'native savagery'.[342] By its very nature, the colonial vocabulary stripped the rebellion of vision, control, and rationality and framed its violence as the product of a hateful impulse for destruction.[343] As such, it depicted the Hutu insurrection as the antithesis to the state's "desired identity as the bastion of civilization, assaulted by savages, not rebels".[344] Essentially, the government's definition of the state and its opponent reproduced the colonial binary of the 'native Hutu savage' and the 'Hamitic Tutsi civiliser'.

5.1.3.2 The Societal Security Discourse

In addition to the foregoing, Russell observes that "the government representations of rebel violence were shot through by an even more powerful image of ferocious, inhuman, and uncontrolled wildness".[345] This notion is reflected in the white paper, issued by the Burundian Embassy in the course of the 1972 trajectory. Alluding to the extraordinary brutality of the rebels, the white paper purports that:

> "They [the rebels] are not satisfied only with killing their victim; first they mutilate children, regardless of age, and in front of their parents slaughter them, then they attack women who are made to undergo indescribable atrocities; they are disembowelled if found pregnant, and finally it is the lot of men and the elderly, who are savagely assassinated".[346]

Without denying the perpetration of despicable atrocities by the rebels, the dissertation argues that their attachment to the colonial representations of 'native savagery' dehumanised the Hutu and enabled the legitimation of annihilation as a form of anticipatory self-defence. As such, this dissertation considers the vocabulary in the construction of the threat posed by the Hutu insurrection instructive to the measures of its containment. The result is described by Lemarchand as follows:

> "Undoubtedly, many Tutsi perceived the Hutu attacks as posing a mortal threat to their survival; nor is there any question that many Tutsi saw the wholesale elimination of Hutu elites as the only way of effectively dealing with this clear and present danger – in short, it was a kind of 'final solution' to a situation that threatened their very existence as a group. Acting on the principle that exceptional problems call for exceptional solutions, the more radical elements … saw the annihilation of all educated Hutu elements as the most sensible course to make Burundi safe for the Tutsi minority".[347]

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[342] Russell, "Rebel and Rule in Burundi, 1972," 80.

[343] Ibid., 79.

[344] Ibid., 80.

[345] Ibid., 79.

[346] Weinstein, "The Revolt in Burundi, 1972," 30.

[347] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 101.

What Lemarchand essentially describes is the securitisation of the Hutu identity as an existential threat to the survival of the Tutsi community. As a result, the intra-Tutsi feud faded in the face of a common threat, prompting the Tutsi to redefine their collective goal from the strife for economic welfare and power to the survival of the group.[348] As theorised by the Copenhagen School's sectoral approach to security, the primacy of survival speaks to both the physical and ontological dimension of societal security. Thereby, the latter is conditioned by the ideas and vulnerabilities at the core of the referent object's identity, which will be outlined in the following.

5.1.3.3 The Ontological Security Dimension

In view of the colonial legacy in the racialisation of state power, this dissertation has previously argued that the identity of the post-colonial Burundian state became gradually defined by its Tutsi administration, which, as per colonial race theory, was considered the only race fit for statesmanship. Thus, the dissertation argues that a transformation of the Burundian state into a Hutu Republic was not only inconceivable to the effect that the Hutu was constructed as incapable of civilisation, but it was also imagined an existential threat to the ontological survival of the state as the expression of the Tutsi identity of power. With the erection of a Hutu Republic in Burundi, the Tutsi would vanish from the socio-political landscape as a Hamitic 'race of lords' and since the racialised imbalance of power and wealth was virtually the only distinction between the groups, it may even be argued that the overall Tutsi identity would have ceased to exist. Consequently, the Tutsi were threatened as to their identity.

Moreover, and prima facie paradoxical to the previous argument, the dissertation submits that the ontological security of the state may, in fact, have required the cognition of the 'Hutu threat' in order to maintain and reproduce the state's identity as the institutionalised opposition to the idea of Hutu majoritarianism. As argued in chapter three of the dissertation, there is no Tutsi without a Hutu counterpart. This is in line with Campbell's observation that:

> "the state required discourses of 'danger' to provide a new theology of truth about who and what 'we' are by highlighting who or what 'we' are not, and what 'we' have to fear".[349]

[348] Weinstein and Schrire, "Ethnic Strategies and the Primacy of Ethnic Survival," 191.

[349] David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 54.

Analogous to Fanon's conception of the relationship between violence and nation-building, the formation of national identities in the articulation of national security has been similarly acknowledged by Alvarez. According to the author,

> "Security policies speak to us and speak Us. They define what a threat is and what is not; who is an insider and who is an outsider. In this process security discourses create identity categories, such as Us and Them, which 'are never merely descriptive, but always normative, and as such exclusionary'".[350]

This inevitably raises the question: Who does the state speak security for? In other words, who is the referent object of state-articulated security? According to Williams, "[t]he idea that the state speaks security for its society as a whole finds its root in liberal articulations of citizenship in which it is a person's status as an abstract persona (a citizen) that defines their relationship to the realm of (state-defined) security".[351] With reference to Mamdani's work,[352] this dissertation argues that colonialism constructed the Hutu not as citizens, but as subjects of the colonial state and, as such, precluded the group categorically from the realm of (state-defined) security. Having failed to transcend this binary, the post-colonial Burundian state spoke security for the Tutsi citizens on the inside against the Hutu threat from the outside. This, in turn, only reinforced the differences between Hutu and Tutsi and drew an additional line of demarcation through the subject matter of security concerns. In this respect, the articulation of national security reinforced the citizen-subject divisions to the effect that "the killing of Hutu seemed to have become part of the civic duty expected of every Tutsi citizen".[353]

Aptly summarised by Alvarez, the power effects of security discourses are precisely within "this logic how state representations create the ideal of the national (in whose name they operate) and how they recreate the notion of the other, otherness and difference (when naming danger)".[354] Most substantially, the violence crystallised Hutu and Tutsi as diametrically opposed identities and framed their security in mutually exclusive terms. Although the incrementalism of this process makes it impossible to pinpoint an exact 'moment' of securitisation, the dissertation concludes that by 1972 the intrenchment of ethnicised threat

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[350] Alvarez, "Re-Thinking (in)Security Discourses from a Critical Perspective," 72.

[351] Michael C. Williams, "Modernity, Identity and Securityl a Comment on the ‚Copenhagen Controversy'," *Review of International Studies* 24, no. 3 (1998): 438.

[352] Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject : Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*.

[353] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 98.

[354] Alvarez, "Re-Thinking (in)Security Discourses from a Critical Perspective," 74.

perceptions into the interpretative frames of danger has resulted in a thorough shift from *politicised* to *securitised* ethnic identities.

5.2 The Massacre of 1988

What emerged from the momentous events in 1972 was a country that operated under the illusion of modernity and democracy, while simultaneously functioning on basis of a deeply segregated system geared towards the perpetual exclusion of the Hutu. Not only did social cohesion, henceforth, yield to a climate thoroughly saturated with ethnic polarisation and fear, but ethnic cooperation was, in fact, actively discouraged by the tyranny of the security forces.[355] The following section provides a brief overview of the historical escalation of Hutu exclusion before reflecting upon the second major episode of mass-scale ethnic violence, the 1988 massacres, in Burundi.

5.2.1 Sketching the Historico-Political Context

In the aftermath of the 1972 Hutu insurrection and to the malevolence of the rest of the political leadership, Micombero grew increasingly paranoid and rapidly accumulated power into his own hands. On November 1, 1976, a military putsch by his cousin Lieutenant Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza ousted Micombero and inaugurated the Second Republic.[356] The Bagaza regime's hallmark policies were characterised by an official, but rather superficial commitment to the restoration of national unity. Covertly, it sought to "control rather than to integrate, to solidify and rationalize Tutsi hegemony rather than to mitigate its constraints".[357] What followed was yet another era of Tutsi favouritism and Hutu exclusion.[358] Moreover, the government banned and criminalised any reference to ethnicity in public as well as private converse and thereby forestalled opportunities for desecuritisation of the discursive patterns on ethnicity.[359] It was, however, not the inter-ethnic question that brought about the fall of the Bagaza regime, but its own austerity policies that enacted the discharge of a proportion of the security forces' personnel into early retirement. On September 3, 1987, a number of ousted

[355] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 97.

[356] Chuka Onwumechili and David Carle, *African Democratization and Military Coups* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 44.

[357] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 107.

[358] Bentley and Southall, *An African Peace Process*, 42.

[359] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 108.

officers seized power from Bagaza and inaugurated Major Pierre Buyoya as president of Burundi's Third Republic.[360]

President Buyoya, under significant pressure of the international community, progressively injected policies of appeasement towards the alienated Hutu population, which he believed to be of fundamental importance to the prevention of a bloody civil war.[361] Against the backdrop of the growing dissent by Tutsi hardliners and with many of the old regime's leading Tutsi figures still at the core of the state apparatus, the system proved inherently unresponsive to the anticipated reforms. It was in the context of this repeated relative deprivation of the Hutu, who had harboured high expectations for Buyoya's reformist course, that violence erupted in the coffee-growing north of Burundi.

5.2.2 The Anatomy of Violence

By virtue of the Buyoya regime's liberal stimuli and the resurgence of egalitarian aspirations, many Hutu in the northern provinces of Ntega and Marangara began to act upon their perceived liberalisation. However, their hopes for egalitarianism in Burundi were met with a cold front of resistance by the Tutsi administrators, who carried on with business as usual.[362] In this environment of contradiction and confusion, ethnic tensions grew steadily, leading to several violent interethnic incidents in the early months of 1988. On top of that, the circulation of anti-Tutsi tracts from Rwanda stirred ethnic tensions to a tipping point, prompting the government to order the immediate arrest of those suspected of conspiracy against the Tutsi administration. While the *Hima* regime's paranoia of a Rwandan-style revolution in Burundi was ominous, the local Hutu population grew increasingly anxious over threats and intimations of an imminent Tutsi crackdown, which were accompanied by a concomitant increase in proximate army activity. Though the military's manoeuvres were likely part of a national effort to combat the illicit transnational trade of coffee, the absence of official clarification left the Hutu with no

[360] Loft and Loft, "Background to the Massacres in Burundi," 92.

[361] Blaine Harden, "Money Lenders Horrified by Killings in Burundi," *The Washington Post* September 4, 1988, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/09/04/money-lenders-horrified-by-killings-in-burundi/87885636-412b-4365-881e-5c8dac740b91/.

[362] Blaine Harden, "Alive in a Wounded Nation," *The Washington Post* August 29,1988, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/08/29/alive-in-a-wounded-nation/95afd8cc-29a5-47f5-a427-b8582504d16e/.

choice but to anticipate the re-enactment of 1972.[363] These premonitions were further reinforced by Tutsi politicians' occasional use of implicit and explicit references to the carnage of 1972 that became part of a psychological warfare against the Hutu. Exemplary is the speech of Murangara's Tutsi mayor given on June 28, 1988, in which he addressed a group of Hutu with the warning that: "You are preparing your knives, but ours are already sharp, and they cut more than yours".[364] In terms of the illocutionary conception of the speech act, it was the historical context of the 1972 massacres that gave meaning and anticipation to the discursive articulations of such threats, whereby the perlocutionary effect pertained the need for emergency action. Hence, the 1972 rhetoric's historical resonance goes a long way in understanding the relationship between the discursive practices of existential threat allusion and the emergence of a discourse on self-defence amongst the Hutu.

In May 1988, which incidentally marked the period of Hutu commemoration for their in 1972 murdered kinsmen, the psychological warfare against the Hutu threatened to take on a physical dimension when a group of Tutsi students nearly succeeded in organising the slaughter of their Hutu classmates.[365] In consideration of the foregoing deliberations, the Hutu saw imminence in the conspicuous patrols of gendarmerie units and began to organise themselves into self-defence groups in August 1988.[366] Fears of the looming repetition of genocidal violence ultimately prompted the Hutu protection units to resort to a pre-emptive strike. As the elimination of the Tutsi threat became a duty to their kinsmen, Lemarchand avers that:

> "Ethnic hatred suddenly turned into a blind fury directed at every Tutsi in sight. The language of the assailants reveals the depth of their collective anger. 'Cutting down' (gutema) the Tutsi is how some described their mission; to kill meant to 'work' (gukora), as if the act of killing had become a necessary job (akazi)."[367]

The dissertation infers from Lemarchand's description of the killings as a 'necessary job' that the elimination of the Tutsi 'enemy' was not an individual mission for personal benefit but the duty and sacrifice of the individual for the weal of the collective.

[363] Lemarchand, "The Killings Fields Revisited," 24.

[364] Harden, "Alive in a Wounded Nation."

[365] Loft and Loft, "Background to the Massacres in Burundi," 92.

[366] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 124.

[367] Ibid., 125-126.

In consideration of the pre-existing discourse on a 'Hutu danger', the army responded to the Hutu insurrection with a rampage in their local communes. Using battalion equipment such as machine guns, helicopters, and armoured personnel carriers, the army evidently expected to confront a full-scale insurgence rather than a few rowing bands of armed Hutu.[368] Consequential to similar patterns of indiscriminate and disproportional repression as exhibited in 1972, an estimated 20 000 Hutu lost their lives, most of which were innocent civilians.[369] When confronted about the ethnic affinity of those killed in the violence, Buyoya, however, responded that "among those dead we have not made ethnic distinctions. The dead were all Burundian".[370] Notwithstanding the taboo on the ethnic motivations of the violence in public discourse, questions of ethnicity and security dominated peoples' minds.[371] Exemplary for the omnipresence of representations on the Hutu 'enemy' is the delineation of a Tutsi bishop, who reflects that "each time a group of Hutu gets together they are always suspected of plotting something".[372] At this point, CS's narrow focus on linguistic articulations in the production of security threats is rather unhelpful, as the post-1988 discursive environment in Burundi prohibited ethnic references but nonetheless produced security implications based on a historically constructed common understanding of the 'Hutu danger'.

5.3 The Zenith of Enmity – The Genocide of 1993

The final section of this chapter outlines the road to the mutual genocide of Burundian Hutu and Tutsi in 1993. Therefore, the international and domestic response to the 1988 massacres will be scrutinised as to its unifying and/or divisive impact on ethnic relations in Burundi. Thereinafter, the chapter closes with an analysis of the anatomy of violence in 1993.

5.3.1 Sketching the Historico-Political Context

In contrast to the unrestraint violence of the 1972 repression, the international community exerted considerable pressure on the Burundian government in 1988 and demanded the haltering of the atrocities committed by its security forces. Under the scrutiny of world opinion,

[368] Lemarchand, "The Killings Fields Revisited," 27.

[369] Cornwell and de Beer, "Burundi: The Politics of Intolerance," 87.

[370] Harden, "Alive in a Wounded Nation."

[371] Peter Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence," *Comparative Politics* 31, no. 3 (1999): 259.

[372] Lemarchand, "The Killings Fields Revisited," 24.

Buyoya, once again, embarked on a mission of national unification and reconciliation, however, not without considerable resistance from extremists on both sides. To the Tutsi hardliners, the vision of a liberalised Hutu population was tantamount to the inauguration of the majority's tyranny and as such nothing short of a sell-out to the security of the Burundian Tutsi. In contrast, the radical factions within the Hutu leadership considered Buyoya's reform policies a drop in the ocean or, in other words, a classic case of 'too little too late'.[373]

In October 1988, Buyoya appointed a consultative commission, consisting of twelve Hutu and twelve Tutsi members, to study the 'Question of National Unity'.[374] Arguably its report, published in the following year, shifted the battleground of the ethnic confrontation to the discursive arena.[375] Thereby, the main issue of dispute was the commission's negotiated narrative of the history of ethnic conflict in Burundi. To the Hutu hardliners, the compromised historical account demonstrated the ominous supremacy of the Tutsi, this time expressed in terms of discursive domination. In this regard, Lemarchand observes that the language of the report was conspicuously vague, elusive, and inattentive to the political conditions ethnic violence had become symptomatic for.[376] As such, the report acknowledged, for example, the existence of inter-ethnic tensions antecedent to the abortive coup in 1965, however, omitted the *mwami'*s pretermission of the electoral results and the preceding assassination plot against Hutu prime minister Ngendadumwe.[377]

Albeit the historical significance of the commission's work in acknowledging ethnicity as central to violence in post-colonial Burundi, the dissertation argues that the report lifted the episodes of inter-ethnic violence out of their respective contexts and hence reinforced the perception of Hutu coup d'états as the product of pugnacious instigators. Furthermore, this dissertation locates the trauma of the selective genocide at the core of modern Hutu identity in Burundi and, therefore, considers the acknowledgement of collective suffering an ontological

[373] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 142.

[374] Bentley and Southall, *An African Peace Process*, 44.

[375] For a discussion of the report itself please refer to René Lemarchand, "The Report of the National Commission to Study the Question of National Unity in Burundi: A Critical Comment," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 27, no. 4 (1989).

[376] Ibid., 686.

[377] For a more elaborate discussion refer to ibid., 687f.

security need of the Hutu identity community. The significance of an official history of violence in the state's discourses of security is expressed by Alvarez. According to the author,

> "security discourses, as part of the official culture, provide definitions of patriotism, loyalty, boundaries and belonging. The state speaks in the name of the whole, that tries to express the general will, the general ethos and idea which inclusively holds the official past, the founding fathers and texts, the pantheon of heroes and villains, and so on, and excludes what is foreign or different or undesirable in the past".[378]

As such, the commission's work did not only spawn a meta-conflict about the nature and history of violence in Burundi's past, but also about the future of the nation and the meaning of its security. In this way, the conflict about the nature of conflict emerged as a conflict driver in of itself. Ultimately, the repeal of the ban on ethnic references exposed the hidden transcripts of Burundi's past and dragged into the open the gaping ethnic cleavage. This discursive struggle over the official history of violence was accompanied by the biased prosecutions of Hutu elements for their alleged participation in the massacres of 1988, whereas Tutsi offenders evaded justice without any consequences.[379]

In the context of the contradicting forces of Buyoya's gradual democratisation and the gridlocked patterns of Hutu discrimination, Hutu voters progressively drifted towards radicalised political parties, which emerged subsequent to the repeal of restrictions on free speech and opposition movements. Support for the military wing of PALIPEHUTU, a party founded by a number of exiled Hutu in Tanzania, grew steadily, especially in the border regions that witnessed the RPF's invasion of Rwanda in 1990 and the subsequent outbreak of the civil war.[380] In November 1991, members of PALIPEHUTU-FNL attacked the military and police infrastructure in three localities, triggering another round of state repression and inter-ethnic violence. In spite of the looming crisis, President Buyoya moved unabated towards the anticipated democratic elections on June 1, 1993.[381]

[378] Alvarez, "Re-Thinking (in)Security Discourses from a Critical Perspective," 77.

[379] Lemarchand, *Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice*, 133.

[380] Ibid.

[381] Hajayandi, *Wounded Memories*, 27.

5.3.2 The Anatomy of Violence

Despite the ethnic tensions in the pre-electoral period, the elections of 1993 were reportedly conducted "in an atmosphere of peace and calm, with only minor technical issues".[382] Melchior Ndadaye, the presidential candidate of the Hutu movement FRODEBU, emerged victorious from the polls. Almost immediately, Tutsi students and civil servants decried the electoral results, whereas Tutsi elements in the army began to conspire against the incipient Hutu government.[383] After two failed attempts at a Tutsi seizure of power, Melchior Ndadaye acceded to office on July 10, 1993, as Burundi's first elected Hutu president.[384]

Despite his demonstrated commitment to the ideals of unity and inclusion, Ndadaye was assassinated in a coup d'état only three months after his accession to power.[385] Almost immediately, FRODEBU members embarked on a killing spree, which was followed by the outbreak of popular unrests throughout the country that took the lives of thousands of Tutsi civilians.[386] According to Lemarchand, up to 20 000 Tutsi were hacked and burnt to death during the anti-Tutsi violence in October and November of 1993.[387] While the unprecedented number of Tutsi deaths induced allegations of a FRODEBU-orchestrated genocide, the violence of the ensuing 'pacification' campaign of the Tutsi-dominated army, that forced more than 600 000[388] Hutu into exile, remained unacknowledged.[389] The gravity of the intervention by the security forces is illustrated by Uvin, who recalls that:

> "Since September 1993 … the majority of Hutu live in constant fear of random reprisals by the army and the military. Various Tutsi militia terrorize the Hutu population and kill with impunity. Hate propaganda flourishes. Journals incite violence, publishing lists of Hutu administrators to be killed"[390]

Although having peaked in intensity in the months following Ndadaye's murder, the mutual carnage of Burundi's Hutu and Tutsi population continued unabated for years.

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[382] Bentley and Southall, *An African Peace Process*, 45.

[383] Ibid., 49.

[384] Adekanye, "Rwanda/Burundi: 'Uni-Ethnic' Dominance and the Cycle of Armed Ethnic Formations," 57.

[385] Hajayandi, *Wounded Memories*, 28.

[386] Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda " 262.

[387] Lemarchand, "Genocide in the Great Lakes," 6.

[388] Cornwell and de Beer, "Burundi: The Politics of Intolerance," 88.

[389] Bentley and Southall, *An African Peace Process*, 51.

[390] Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda," 262.

5.3.3 Ontological Security and the Routinisation of Ethnic Violence

Mindful of the historical pattern of violence as outlined by this chapter and its routinisation in the aftermath of the 1993 Genocide, this dissertation returns to its argument of threat cognisance as an ontological security need. In this respect, Mitzen notes that:

> "Importantly, for theorists of ontological security individual identity is formed and sustained through relationships. Actors therefore achieve ontological security especially by routinizing their relations with significant others … Applied to states, ontological security-seeking reveals another, second, dilemma in international politics: ontological security can conflict with physical security. Even a harmful or self-defeating relationship can provide ontological security, which means that states can become attached to conflict."[391]

The dissertation argues that the discrepancies of ontological and physical security needs may not be exclusive to the realm of international politics but may similarly be identified in the routinisation of ethnic violence in Burundi. While it has been argued throughout this dissertation that the nature of Hutu and Tutsi identities transformed under external pressures, a historical continuity in their interdependency has been observed. As explicated in chapter three, Hutu and Tutsi identities emerged in the precolonial kingdoms in relation to one another. Hence, there could not be a social or political Tutsi identity without the Hutu counterpart. Colonial raciology confirmed and reproduced their interconnectedness, despite significantly transforming the nature of their distinction. As a result, there could not be a superior Tutsi 'Hamite' without his juxtaposition to an inferior 'Bantu' Hutu. Chapter four, in turn, has demonstrated that both Hutu and Tutsi nationalism built upon the colonial binary of indigeneity and non-indigeneity and were, therefore, equally conditioned by a Manichean dualism of Hutu and Tutsi. Ultimately, there could neither be a Rwandan Hutu nation, nor a Burundian Tutsi-state without the respective ethnic opposition. Pursuant to this logic, this dissertation attributes the violence of the state repression with a tension between the physical security need to eliminate the 'Hutu danger', on the one hand, and an ontological security need to maintain and confront the 'Hutu threat' to reproduce its own identity, on the other. Therefore, the dissertation submits that sustainable peace in Burundi hinges on both the desecuritisation of ethnic threat perceptions and the deconstruction of the colonial undertones of Hutu and Tutsi nationalism in their idea of Burundian national identity.

[391] Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics," 342.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has approached three major episodes of inter-ethnic violence in Burundi's post-colonial history under the objective of translating the reconstructed ethnicised security discourses into security action in form of ethnic violence. Primary emphasis was devoted to the representations of enmity in the context of the 1972 selective genocide of the Hutu intelligentsia. Therein, the dissertation has considered the Hutu insurrection as liberatory violence in the Fanonian sense, whereas the state repression was concluded to follow the logic of security as survival. Furthermore, the analysis critically reflected upon the role of colonial vocabulary in the interpretation of violence and the construction of existential threats. In addition, the chapter considered the power of security discourses in demarcating, redefining, and enforcing the essence and boundaries of identity communities. Subsequently, the chapter evaluated the impact of the security discourses of 1972 in framing and interpretating political events and inter-ethnic relations in Burundi's Second and Third Republic. Ultimately, the chapter turned to the 1993 Genocide as a function of the securitisation of ethnic identity. In a closing remark, the chapter alluded to the tension of ontological and physical security needs and the prospects for peace in Burundi.

6 Concluding Remarks

Having reconstructed the trajectory of ethnic relations throughout the defining epochs of Burundi's precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial history, the final chapter of this dissertation seeks to critically reflect upon the major arguments of the analysis and their implications for the present case study, theory, and methodology. Based on the findings and shortcomings of this dissertation's research approach, the chapter will deliberate on prospects for further research.

This dissertation's major contribution to the literature on the 1993 Genocide in Burundi lies in its very approach to ethnic violence. The focus on the intersection of identity and security has allowed the dissertation to explore the role of ethnicity in the genocidal violence without descending into essentialist determinism. Rather, the reconstruction of their interplay in historical perspective has exposed major ruptures and continuities in the nature of ethnic identities and their relation to one another. In this way, the findings of the dissertation decidedly repudiate primordial assumptions on ethnic permanence and tribal hatred. In this context, chapter three has illustrated the multi-dimensionality of ethnic identification in precolonial Burundi and its contingency on social, political, and cultural settings. At the same time, it has alluded to the reduction of this complexity through the colonial racialisation of ethnicity. The remaining parts of the analysis have revealed a constant renegotiation of the nature and boundaries of identity communities under external socio-political and security pressures. As such, this dissertation found that the way in which individuals situate and demarcate themselves from other members of society and the process in which they define and articulate security needs is influenced by a range of extrinsic variables and, hence, subject to change over time. Relatedly, the dissertation ascertained that the articulation of security correlates with a renegotiation of its ingroup and outgroup and, hence, often reinforces notions of distinctiveness and otherness. Due to constraints in the scope of this research, the dissertation has explored these transformations as generic processes that may not represent localised realities. Further research may, thus, draw on this dissertation's analytical approach to investigate community-level securitisation practices.

On a related note, the dissertation emphasised throughout its historical analysis the role of the state as a source of identity formation and a fulcrum of security needs. Having outlined the emergence of Hutu and Tutsi identities as political identities in the precolonial process of state formation, the dissertation deducted an interrelationship between shifts in the nature of the state and the nature of the political identities it produces. This was, inter alia, illustrated in chapter four with the reformulation of the Rwandan state as a Hutu nation and the subsequent redefinition of Hutu identity via the Rwandan state. As such, the dissertation concluded a nationalisation of ethnic identity in correlation with the ethnicisation of national identity. Having situated Hutu nationalism in relation to the colonial state's conception of the Tutsi as a race of 'born rulers' and the Hutu as 'subjects' not citizens, chapter four has outlined the clash of two competing notions of the Rwandan national identity that were closely intertwined with the securitisation of the ethnic other. In this context, a recourse to Frantz Fanon's anti-colonial thought assisted the decipherment of the decolonial encounter between the constructed 'native' and the 'settler' as inherently violent in nature. Governed by a zero-sum logic, the struggle between the two protagonists was concluded to have left the Manicheism of colonial society intact as opposed to having overcome existing divisions in the face of a common political project for the future.

The confirmation of the colonial binary of indigeneity and non-indigeneity in the ideational struggle in Rwanda was set out to have significantly preconditioned the discourse on national inheritance in Burundi. Although the Burundian leadership initially resisted the pressures of the events in neighbouring Rwanda, the profound political transformations of the post-independence years eventually triggered an ontological uncertainty that necessitated the renegotiation of the 'we' and its boundaries to 'the other'. Subsequently, ethnic violence occurred at key moments of political change,[392] which shook the existing status quo and challenged the key concepts of the identity collective. As argued in the final part of this dissertation, the mutual exclusiveness of security needs, both physical and ontological, ultimately resulted in the escalation of violence into a genocide in 1993.

The above outlined exegesis of the Burundian case study raises a number of theoretical reflection points for securitisation theory's propositions and the Copenhagen School more generally. Firstly, the redefinition of ethnic identity via claims of national inheritance indicates

[392] Uvin, "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda," 263.

the amalgamation of societal and national security. Hence, it is concluded that the sectoral distinction set forth by the Copenhagen School is not always practicable, yet useful. Secondly, in its deliberations on the question of national identity, this dissertation illuminated the ontological dimension of national security, which renders the military logic of the CS-defined national security sector inadequate. Based on these findings, the dissertation encourages further research into the ontological dimension of state security and its relation to physical security needs. Nonetheless, the dissertation underscores the overall value of the sectoral approach in widening the agenda of security studies and thus its elucidative capabilities that made this dissertation's research approach possible in the first place. Through the Burundian case study, this dissertation demonstrated that (in)security is much more than military threats and concerns over the physical integrity of states. Hence, the widening of the security agenda is paramount not only to understanding what security means, but also what it *does* across different sectors.[393]

Having considered both advantages and shortcomings of the analytical framework, the dissertation now turns to two major limitations of securitisation theory in the Burundian context specifically, and non-western settings more generally. Firstly, securitisation theory's overly focus on speech acts in the production of security obfuscates vital non-linguistic means of security articulation in contexts where free speech is not a given. For instance, the Bagaza regime's ban on private and public references to ethnicity antecedent to the 1988 massacres made the analysis of security articulations on basis of written or spoken utterances largely unfeasible. While the organisation of Hutu into self-defence units was considered a strong indicator for the oscillation of security dynamics, securitisation theory was inherently unable to account for this practice as an expression of security. On a similar note, the dissertation draws attention to securitisation theory's privileging of political elites in the 'making of security'. Hence, there is little understanding for the (im)possibility of securitisation from below and the security practices of the subaltern.[394] Another limitation has been encountered in terms of the routinisation and normalisation of violence in Burundi. This dissertation's

[393] Based on Krause and Williams, "Security and "Security Studies"," 9.

[394] One of the rare examples is an analysis of securitisation from below in the context of South African foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. For Hammerstad's analysis please refer to Anne Hammerstad, "Securitisation from Below: The Relationship between Immigration and Foreign Policy in South Africa's Approach to the Zimbabwe Crisis," *Conflict, Security and Development* 12, no. 1 (2012). Generally, subaltern securitisation practices are, however, drastically under-researched as has been pointed out by Bertrand and Spivak. See therefore Gayatry Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," in *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*, ed. Laura Chrisman and Patrick Williams (New York; Sydney: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993). Bertrand, "Can the Subaltern Securitize?."

historical analysis has revealed that securitisation theory's language of existential threats and exceptionality is inherently unable to account for securitisation practices below the level of emergency. Considering the existence of the Hutu threat in the national security discourse of the Burundian state for almost three decades, the dissertation concludes that, at least in the periods between the ethnic massacres, the state of emergency was somewhat normalised.

To overcome the Copenhagen School's deficiencies, the dissertation supplemented its analytical framework with Frantz Fanon's decolonial thought. Consequently, it was able to account for the structural violence of colonial society that raised security concerns below the level of emergency, whereas the constructivist ontology of the CS approach illuminated novel causes and dynamics of the Burundian tragedy that lie within the realm of security. The Fanonian interpretative lens, furthermore, helped to explain the personal and extraordinarily gruesome nature of Burundi's ethnic violence. In addition, it conceptualised the violent confrontation of Burundi's Hutu and Tutsi population as part of a deferred decolonial struggle between the colonially assigned 'native' and 'settler' identities. In this way, this dissertation's etiology of conflict significantly departed from accounts of the 1993 Genocide in the existing literature. Ultimately, the Fanonian addition to the analytical framework enabled the transcription of securitisation theory's rather Eurocentric outlook into the African context. As such, the dissertation revealed a convergence in the subject matter of International Security Studies and the Africanist Scholarship and encourages further inquiries into their intersections.

Methodologically, the interpretative case study method facilitated the utilisation of a malleable analytical framework by allowing for the extraction of those selected theoretical propositions that were considered insightful to the case study. Therefore, the dissertation considers the qualitative research strategy and the interpretative case study design the appropriate methodological choice to the present research undertaking. Furthermore, it is emphasised that as a result of research paradigm, question, and methodology, the dissertation's findings are highly interpretative and contextual and therefore not suitable for transhistorical generalisation.

As a final remark, the dissertation hopes to have sparked a renewed interest in the causes and dynamics of ethnic violence in Burundi and the Great Lakes region more generally. The dissertation strongly encourages prospective researchers to utilise its analytical framework for the study of more recent episodes of ethno-political violence in Burundi. In this way, it aspires to contribute to the creation of a peaceful future for the small African country.

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8 Declaration of Originality

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for examination at any other University in or outside South Africa. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been acknowledged at their point of usage. No inadmissible help from third parties was obtained to produce this dissertation.

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