SOFALA AND THE RIVERS OF CUAMA

CRUSADE AND COMMERCE IN S.E. AFRICA, 1505 - 1595

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)
River Save, Save mouth, Muringari Bay excavation)

ABBREVIATIONS

AHU Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino

AJA Ajuda, 'Jesuitas na Ásia'

AS Academia das Ciencias

BNL Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa

BNM Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid

BNP Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris

CC Corpo Cronológico (one of the series in the Lisbon National Archives)

CEHE Cambridge Economic History of Europe, 1967

doc document

DPM Documentos sobre os Portugueses em Moçambique, 6 vols, Salisbury, Rhodesia and Lisbon, 1962 - 1969

EB Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1961

ECU Extincto Conselho Ultramarino, (one of the series in AHU)

fl folio

HTA Historians in Tropical Africa, University College of Rhodesia, Salisbury, Rhodesia, 1962

JAH Journal of African History

m maço (bundle - a category in the Lisbon National Archives)

MS manuscript

PMC Portugaliae Monumenta Cartographica, 6 vols, Lisbon, 1962

RSEA Records of South-East Africa, 9 vols, Cape Town, 1898 - 1903

TT Arquivo Nacional da Torre de Tombo

References to locations in sixteenth century chroniclers are given thus:

for Barros, Da Índia, 1.4.1. = decade 1, book 4, chapter 1.

for Castanheda, História, 1.3. = book 1, chapter 3.

for Correa, Lendas, references are to chapter headings such as 'Vasco da Gama, 1502'.

for Góis, Crónica, 1.6. = part 1, chapter 6.

SOFALA AND THE RIVERS OF CUAMA

CRUSADE AND COMMERCE IN S.E. AFRICA 1505 - 1595

SYNOPSIS

INTRODUCTION: PRE-PORTUGUESE SOFALA AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

Was Sofala economically important as a Muslim port around A.D. 1500? Possible connections with Great Zimbabwe.

I PORTUGUESE ESTABLISHMENT AT SOFALA 1505 - 1506

Sofala chosen as one of the twin pillars of Portuguese enterprise in S.E. Africa. Why? (Gama knew in 1498 that Mozambique was a better port, and saw Sofala's difficult entrance in 1502.)

Establishment of the feitoria. Why virtually no resistance at first although the Moors well knew the Portuguese purpose? Why followed 8 months later by armed conflict? Crusade v. commerce. Was there any consistent royal policy or was all empirical?

II THE TRADE OF SOFALA 1506 - 1528

Links in the trade: Sofala Swahili and representatives of inland rulers. Volume of gold; contrast between official expectations and actual amounts received. Reasons for this: wars inland, choice of trade goods, quality of officials and their fluctuating relations with Africans, private trade by Swahili and Portuguese, licensed and unlicensed.

Neglect of ivory. Reasons: shortage of Portuguese shipping and survival of Muslim seaborne trade. Decline in gold trade coincides with rise in ivory trade. Why?

III THE JOURNEYS OF ANTÓNIO FERNANDES

Penetration of Fernandes a turning point in Portuguese trade and relations. The three great journeys: a new assessment of dating and geography. Economic effects of Fernandes' penetration on the trade of Sofala. Did the Portuguese delay unduly in using the information he provided about the Cuama?

IV AFRICAN COMMUNITIES AND MINOR TRADES AT SOFALA 1505 - 1528

The 4 groups: Muslim and non-Muslim Africans near and far. The Sofalan African community: clothing, food, identity. African rulers of the coastal plain: Moconde, Nyambia and Nyamunda.

Trade in ambergris, pearls, foodstuffs, including salt and pepper, and shipping supplies.

Effects of Portuguese presence on Sofalan life, economic, political and social.

V TRADE IN SOFALA AND ITS HINTERLAND 1530 - 1595

New trade policy recommended by captain Silveira and initiated by captain Pegado. The problem of the date of the establishment of Portuguese Sena.

New Cuama trade in ivory and gold; volume and nature of the trade. Why did the Treasury not benefit more? The 'trade ship', state of the hinterland, venality of the officials and their devotion to private trade. Why was Sofala not abandonned in favour of Mozambique?

VI AFRICAN KINGDOMS AND PEOPLES IN THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY

The monomotapa, his court, use of ritual and soldiery to maintain authority. Weakness of the Karanga compared with the Mongas, and the consequent dependence upon Portuguese armed help. Fission of the monomotapan state. Was the Portuguese penetration to blame?

The kiteve, territory, court, revenues and sources of power. The Karanga of Inhambane and its hinterland, hunting, government and religious practices. The Tonga and their distinctive customs, language and music. Were these Tonga at 16th century Sofala?

Important problems considered in the Appendices are: the 'Moors' of S.E. Africa, Sofala's gold and ivory trade and the cost of the establishment, the true date of the long, informative letter of António da Silveira, formerly dated 'post 1518', and its relevance to the rise of chief Nyamunda and Portuguese penetration along the Cuama, the location of chief Nyamânda.

An account is included of the investigations at Sofala and Nova Mambone into the pottery and beads of the old sites and the light they shed on the African peoples of the coast.


Baghdad
PERSIA
EGYPT
Ormuz
Canton
Mecca
ARABIA
OMAN
Muscat
Cambay
HADRAMAUT
YEMEN
Massawa
INDIA
Goa
Aden
Axum
Socotra
Zeila
MALABAR
Calicut
December - March
N. E. Monsoon
Malacca
Mogadishu
Equator
Malindi
Mombasa
Pemba
Zanzibar
Kilwa Kisiwani
June - October
S.E. Monsoon
Comoro Is.
Mocam-
bique
Angoxa
Quelimane
Sofala
Chiloane I.
Cabo das
Correntes
THE INDIAN OCEAN
IN THE 16th. CENTURY
0 500 1000
Statute Miles
RW
(R. Kafue)
Ingombe
Ilede
(Tete)
R. Zambezi or R. Cuama
(Mt. Darwin)
(R. Mazoe)
MONOMOTAPA
(Sena)
Quelimane
MANICA
R. Pungwe
BUTUA
(Umtali)
R. Buzi
Great
Zimbabwe
Sofala
Chiloane I.
(Bazaruto I.)
Mapungubwe
0 50 100 150
Statute Miles
16th. CENTURY SOFALA
AND ITS HINTERLAND
Modern names in brackets

INTRODUCTION: PRE-PORTUGUESE SOFALA AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE *

All ports are of interest to the historian and the port of Sofala, twenty-five miles south of Beira in Mozambique Province, is no exception. At this point on the south-east coast of Africa the products of the interior, gold and ivory in particular, drew first the attentions of Muslim traders and then of Iberian conquistadores. The history of this port provides a window through which a vital sector of African history may be viewed: the growth of Iron Age Bantu states in Rhodesia and Mozambique, the development of a Swahili trading community, its decline under Portuguese occupation, and the operation of the Estado da India at its southernmost east African station.

Recent research into the zimbabwes of Rhodesia, Iron Age complexes at Ingombe Ilede on the Zambezi and Mapungubwe on the Limpopo, the recent publication of early sixteenth century Portuguese records, and the remarkable agreement now reached between archaeological and ethnohistoric interpretations of the Rhodesian Iron Age, as well as preliminary excavations at Sofala itself, make the moment appropriate for a reappraisal of the significance of pre-Portuguese Sofala.

At the end of the fifteenth century Sofala presented to the incoming sailor not a vast bay as it does today, but a delta whose most prominent island, the Ilha de Misato, stood opposite the site chosen by the Portuguese for their feitoria. Into the delta flowed the Sofala river, which gave access to the highlands of Manica, now represented by the river Buzi which enters the Indian Ocean fifteen miles north of Sofala bay. (1) This river provided a line of penetration across the coastal plain for the Portuguese exploring the hinterland for trade

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* See Map opposite

(1) Today the very name Rio Sofala has disappeared. Instead, tiny streams, the largest being the twenty-mile long Donda, issue into the bay which is three miles broad at the mouth and proclaims the work of a considerable river in the past. The sixteenth century craft used on the river indicate that it was not very deep, but it was,

(cont. over)

or food supplies. Apart from the subsidence of the islands into sandbanks now visible only at low spring tide, and the divergence of the river, the site of old Sofala still displays all the features described by the first Portuguese who saw it: the dangerous shoal which prevented the larger caravels from crossing into the delta, the mud creeks lined with mangrove trees, whose branches met over the water, and the palm groves. Many present-day African houses are constructed in the style described by the conquistadores and the temporary huts, occupied only in the busy fishing season, are also evident in one of the early sixteenth century accounts. (2)

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(1) (cont.) nevertheless, long. Figueroa mentions the captain ordering supplies from fifty leagues upstream (Martim Fernández de Figueroa, Conquista deles indias de Persia e Arabia, Salamanca, 1512, titulo 10, reproduced in facsimile and translation in J.B. McKenna, A Spaniard in the Portuguese Indies, Harvard 1967, p 45) This would suggest a river about 150 miles long, approximately fitting the present reach of the river Buzi which now flows into the Indian Ocean fifteen miles to the north in a bay narrower and evidently younger than Sofala Bay. Aerial surveys show channels connecting the Buzi with Sofala Bay, which display the possibility of the original Sofala river driving a new channel to the sea at the present Buzi mouth. An African name for one of the river beds Buzi Mufo, or 'Dead Buzi' supports the thesis. (See F. Balsan's 'Les routes de l'or du Matabéléland in Acta Geographica, Paris Fasc. 44, Dec 1962, p 3). There is documentary witness to just such a change in Joseph Pinto Pereira's 'Informação' produced for the Conselho Ultramarino, 30.i.1684 (AHU Moçambique, caixa 2). He writes: "He Sofalla hum pequeno forte....a entrada por hũ Rio que fica tres legoas e mais para a parte do norte, por onde se conduzem as roupas em Almadias alguas 60 legoas." (Reference kindly supplied by Prof. A. Abraham). By the mid-seventeenth century, then, shipping using the Sofala river had evidently to employ a new entrance further north, by the distance mentioned not at that stage the present Buzi mouth.

(2) Fernão Lopes de Castanheda, História do descobrimento da Índia pelos portugueses, 8 books, Coimbra 1551-1561, bk 2 ch 11, reproduced in RSEA V p 333 mentions the seven straw houses on the feitoria site. Such temporary huts today are not clay-walled but simply roofed screens of palm thatch.

To the north lay the Swahili ports connected with Sofala by small coastal craft: Quelimane at the Zambezi mouth, Angoxa with its complex of islands two hundred miles further north. (3) Ilha de Moçambique, Kilwa, Mombasa, Malindi and Mogadishu.

An assessment of the importance of Sofala in pre-Portuguese days depends, in the absence of archaeological sequences at the site as so far examined (4) on three sources: Arab documentary evidence, archaeological testimony for the growth rhythm of the east African Muslim trading settlements connected with Sofala and archaeological evidence combined with ethnohistory for the growth of African states in the hinterland trading with the coast.

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(3) Spellings such as Angoja, Angoxe, Angoche, Amguoja and Anguoxa are used in sixteenth century Portuguese documents. The spelling adopted here is that of the Atlas of African History by J.D. Fage, London, 1958, map 26.

(4) The author has conducted in 1969 and 1970 two brief seasons of excavation at the site of old Sofala, in which 500 artefacts, mainly pottery but including also beads, glass and iron objects, have been recovered, unfortunately from unsealed positions. That is, so far there has been found no strata in the excavations other than natural ones. The old surfaces in the area which by early sixteenth century documentary evidence must be that of the latest pre-Portuguese Muslim site are now being eroded by flood and tidal action, aggravated by a tectonic tilt, which according to the Professor of Geology at the University of Rhodesia, Professor Bond, has led to a drop of about six feet in this land surface in the last four and a half centuries. The prolific scatters of pottery exposed by this erosion should provide a representative collection of sherds from the Swahili period. Out of 500 artefacts, however, only three predate 1500, which indicated that either an older Swahili port had been swallowed by ocean encroachment at Sofala, or that older Swahili Sofalas mentioned in the tenth century and later by Arab authors, existed elsewhere, possibly at Sena or at the mouth of the Sabi river. To test this hypothesis, a brief expedition was made in June 1971 to Muringari Bay at the Sabi mouth. A site of African settlement whose pottery and beads strongly indicate abandonment in the late fifteenth century has been identified, but as with Sofala, lacking so far any ceramic evidence of early medieval occupation. Further archaeological work is planned at this site for 1972.

The Arab documentary evidence available in translation is sparse and almost entirely hearsay, albeit hearsay by reliable authors. It spans the period 926 to 1331 A.D. al Mas'udi commenting on what he learnt of S.E. frica during his voyage in 926 A.D. mentions Sofala which he never visited. (5) His evidence is that Omani merchants sailed as far south as Sofala, southern limit of the country of the Zanj or black folk. Sofalah, he explains, was an Arab name for a shoal. (6) At Sofala, there was plenty of gold and ivory. The Zanj had their capital there, used oxen for transport and sold ivory which Persian sailors conveyed to India and China. They used iron rather than the abundant gold [which indicates that gold was traded]. Maklimi was the name of the ruler and Maklanjalu the name of the god the Zanj worshipped.

The difficulty in applying Mas'udi's description to the present-day site of Sofala is the uncertainty of whether he refers to a locality or an extensive coastal area where Omani merchants traded. Mas'udi's definition of the word sofalah could well fit any part of a strip of coast from the Lazaruto Islands to António Enes: in other words, the extent of shore facing the Sofala shoal. Abundance of ivory would characterize the same extent of coast; abundance of gold, however, indicates the coast flanking the Rhodesian plateau, which narrows the choice to the southern tip of the Zambezi delta. The name of the god has a Bantu flavour, as Meinhof has remarked, (7) and this accords well with the habits of the folk described: dark-skinned elephant hunters, miners and domesticators of cattle.

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(5) The only full edition of al Mas'udi's long account of his odyssey for European readers is Les prairies d'or, text with translation by C.B. Meynard and P. de Courteille, Paris, 9 Vols, 1861 sec. Sofala is described in vol.1 ch 10, p 2[illegible].

(6) op. cit vol 1, ch 16, p 332.

(7) See [illegible]. Doke, 'The earliest records of the Bantu' from Contributions to the history of Bantu linguistics, Johannesburg, 1961. A discussion of the two terms is to be found in W. Whiteley, Swahili, the rise of a national language London, 1969, p 32-33.

(cont. over)

Closely contemporary with Mas'udi was the Persian sea captain, Buzurg, who wrote of Sofala as possessing a harbour where a shipwrecked Omani crew were allowed to trade and were entertained by a black ruler and his entourage. (8) Buzurg, like Mas'udi, was writing without having visited Sofala, but he was constantly in touch with dhow (9) captains who frequented Sofalan waters.

Trade between 'Sufala of the Zanj' and China included rhino horn for knife handles, wrote the early eleventh century al Biruni. (10) Idrisi, Roger II of Sicily's geographer, writing in 1154, treats Sofala as an area whose principal commercial centres were Djentama and Dendema. At both centres, iron was smelted and gold exported. Two other towns of Sofala are mentioned: Siuna and Bukha. (11)

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(7) (cont.) Even though previously published transliterations are criticized as unsatisfactory in some of the six criteria the author regards as having to be met by an ideal interpretation of the Arabic consonants, his objections do not constitute a denial of the possibility of Bantu words underlying the Arabic of Mas'udi.

(8) See the extract from Kitab al-Ajaib al-Hind translated in G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville, The East African coast, Oxford, 1966, p 9-13.

(9) The word dhow is a convenient portmanteau covering the lateen-rigged vessels used by Muslim traders in the Indian Ocean. It is a term unused by the Muslim sailors themselves, however, and seems to have come into usage to describe modifications to the older mtepe. Original Arabic terms such as baghla (large capacity vessel), zaruk (swift, shallow skiff) and zanbuk (versatile coastal craft) were used to name specific vessels. The term dhow appears to derive from Swahili dau and is a very general name. (See G.F. Hourani, Arab seafaring in the Indian Ocean, Beirut, 1963, p 89; J. Hornell, 'The sea-going mtepe and dau of the Lamu Archipelago' in Tanganyika Notes and Records, Nov. 1942, pp 27-37.)

(10) Reference to Sofala in al Biruni's India is summarized in E.E. Burke, 'Some aspects of Arab contact with S.E. Africa' in Historians in tropical Africa, Salisbury, S. Rhodesia, 1962, p 99.

(11) See extract from Kitab Nujar in Burke op. cit. p 100.

For thirteenth century Ibn Said, the name Sofala is incorporated into that of a people, the Soufalis, with their capital at Sayouna, standing on a gulf into which flowed a river from Djabal al Quomr. (12) This author mentions the Soufalites and Zenj separately, but both have identical habits: praying to idols and exporting iron and gold, which could indicate that for Ibn Said the Soufalites were simply a branch of the Zenj.

In 1331, Ibn Battuta visited Kilwa and there learnt about Sofala, two weeks' sail away. Gold dust was brought from Yufi in the land of the Limis, to Sofala. (13)

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(12) E.E. Burke op. cit. pp 100-101 gives translated extracts from his geography. The similarity between Ibn Said's word Quomr and the early sixteenth century name for the lower Zambezi - Cuama - adds substance to the identification of Sayouna with Sena, and strengthens the thesis that earlier Sofalas than the present site existed, one of which was the convenient transshipment point of Sena on the lower Zambezi, which could connect well with the southern feeders of the river, in particular with the Mazoe, with many goldfields along its upper reaches.

(13) See Sir Hamilton Gibb, The travels of Ibn Battuta, Cambridge, 1953, 2 vols, for translated text and commentary. The Sofala extract is on p 112 of the text. Gibb notes (p 379) that Cooley equated the Limis with the Lamlam, a word used by other Arab geographers to indicate cannibals, and that a Fulbe metamorphosis of this word is Nyam Nyam, name of a cannibal tribe in the former Belgian Congo. Burke (op. cit. p 102) points to a more credible parallel between Battuta's Limis and Mas'udi's Waklimi.

The identification of Yufi by Coolie with Nupe on the left bank of the Niger between Jebba and Lokoja is very far-fetched. Yufe might well be another form of the word Ofir or Aufer, the names reported in the sixteenth century for Mount Darwin in N. Mashonaland. This would harmonize well with the Rhodesian plateau around the Mazoe River as one source of the gold mentioned by Ibn Battuta. The travelling time of a month from source of gold to coast seems somewhat excessive, but could be explained by delays in crossing chiefly boundaries, with the supply probably having to be exchanged for incoming trade goods at the Karanga capital at Great Zimbabwe, 300 miles south, where the paramount ruler could make his selection first.

A Swahili document, existing in sixteenth and nineteenth century versions, the Kilwa Chronicle, asserts that Sofala fell under the control of Kilwa, having formerly had trading connections with Mogadishu, 2,000 miles north, in the reign of Sulaiman al-Hasan, who beautified Kilwa and built a stone fortress there. (14)

Archaeological investigations of Islamic sites on the Somali, Tanzanian and Kenyan coasts have shown that the period of development typified by the emergence of stone structures began in the thirteenth century, with the possible exception of Zanzibar, where a Kufic inscription of the early twelfth century appears in the Zizimkazi mosque. (15) Stone building in the second quarter of the thirteenth century is represented by the construction of the Jamia tower in Mogadishu, firmly dated by an inscription of 1238 which is an integral part of the structure. (16)

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(14) The sixteenth century version is reproduced by João de Barros, in Da Ásia, decada I, Lisbon 1552, bk 10, ch 2, (RSEA VI pp 117-118). For the nineteenth century edition, see Freeman-Grenville's translation of the 1867 MS (British Museum Or. 2666), op. cit. pp34-49. The nineteenth century copy is abridged and lacks any reference to Sofala. The statement in the earlier copy that Sulaiman al-Hasan built in stone renders the evidence of the Kilwa Chronicle at this point suspect, for this sultan reigned from 1170 to 1188 and archaeology asserts that the first masonry at Kilwa was later (see P.S. Garlake, Early Islamic architecture of the east African coast, OUP, 1966, p 54).

(15) The inscription is, however, probably an import: see Garlake, op. cit. p 53.

(16) Garlake, op. cit. p 10.

According to Chittick, Kilwa received in the twelfth century, an influx of Shirazi immigrants from the Benadir coast, around Mogadishu. (17) Garlake has shown that in the next century the great mosque of Kilwa was rebuilt in stone. (18) About ten years before the close of the thirteenth century, Kilwa came under the rule of a new dynasty, immigrants from S. Arabia, who initiated fresh developments in the settlement. (19)

The next century provides the floruit of Husuni Kubwa. (20) The closing years of the century ushered in the century-long sequence of stone buildings at Ras Mkumbuu on Pemba Island. (21) In the same period, too, Gedi was first occupied by Muslim builders. (22)

From the mid fourteenth century, impressive developments occurred also inland, on the Rhodesian plateau and its river boundaries, the Zambezi and the Limpopo, clearly connected by the imports found on the ruins with the increased prosperity of the coastal Islamic settlements. At Ingombe Ilede, near the Kafue confluence with the Zambezi, lie the remains of an African community which grew increasingly wealthy from

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(17) N. Chittick, 'Kilwa' in Azania, vol I, EAP Nairobi, 1966.

(18) Garlake, op. cit. p 56.

(19) Chittick, op. cit.

(20) Garlake, op. cit. p 54.

(21) Ibid

(22) Ibid, p 56

c 1340 to 1445. (23) The folk grew sorghum and millet, raised cattle and goats and kept dogs. Elephant bones associated with the earliest burials demonstrate the commerce on which the prosperity of the settlement was based: trading the ivory of the upper Zambezi valley. The pottery, basically similar to that of the Batoka plateau to the north, betrays increasing Shona influence as the settlement progresses. Copper crosses and wire also occur, and show a second element in Ingombe Ilede's trade. Imports of glass beads gradually increase throughout the life of the site, showing a developing trade with the coast. The peak of prosperity is displayed in the lavish use of gold objects in the mid-fifteenth century burials of a small group. Copper objects helped to preserve cloth around the burials, which fall into two types: local bark cloth and imported cotton fabric, giving additional evidence of contact with the coast. (24)

Across the southern river boundary of Rhodesia, at Mapungubwe, on the site of an eleventh century settlement of African subsistence farmers, a later African community displaying the increasing wealth of a growing commercial centre appeared at a period closely approximating to that of Ingombe Ilede. A layer of black ash separates the two cultures, emphasising the break between them. The presence of increasing numbers of Shona folk is evidenced by the pottery finds, in association with which occur clay cattle figurines and daga huts, simple in form on the plain and more elaborate on the hill on whose summit lies a group of richly furnished burials, resplendent with copper bracelets, gold plate, tacks, wire and beads. One burial speaks of ritual in its gold-plated staff and headrest. Contact with the coast is attested

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(23) B. Fagan, Iron Age cultures in Zambia, London, 1969, 2 vols, vol II p 81.

(24) Fagan, op. cit. p 82.

by the quantity of glass beads associated with the burials of this affluent community. (25)

At widely spaced points within Rhodesia itself, there is evidence of chiefs able to command the building of impressive stone-screened complexes, the earliest work being carried out at Great Zimbabwe where the architecture may be said to have originated, the vast proliferation of Zimbabwe-type masonry occurring within the period of greatest contact with the coastal Muslim traders. At Great Zimbabwe, where wall- building in stone began around 1100 A.D., the finest masonry of period IV, including the Great Enclosure's decorated wall, the conical towers and parallel passages, commenced in the later fourteenth century. (26) At Lekkerwater, near Marandellas, wall-building similar to the P and Q styles at Great Zimbabwe (27) stood over late fourteenth century deposits. (28) At Chipadze's, near Rusape, similar walling and of closely contemporary date, occurs. (29) At Mbunguza, near Bindura, both P and Q style walls, close contemporaries in age, provide screening for clay huts which include one of elaborate internal design, like the Lekkerwater huts, speaking of ritual rather than domestic

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(25) Fagan, op. cit. p 82.

(26) K.R. Robinson, R. Summers and A. Whitty, Zimbabwe Excavations 1958, Cambridge, 1961, p 329, modified as to upper terminal date while the sequence remains unchallenged, by P.S. Garlake, 'The value of imported ceramics in the dating and interpretation of the Rhodesian Iron Age' in JAH vol IX, 1968, p 27.

(27) 'P' and 'Q' styles of masonry are terms used by A. Whitty to mark workmanship of the Acropolis and Great Enclosure buildings at Great Zimbabwe. The stonework techniques are described and illustrated in Robinson, Summers and Whitty, op. cit. pp 280-305.

(28) S. Rudd, 'Preliminary report of excavations 1963-1966 at Lekkerwater Ruins, Tsindi Hill' in Proceedings and transactions of the Rhodesian Scientific Association, Salisbury, S. Rhodesia, vol 52, p 49.

(29) P.A. Robins and A. Whitty, 'Excavations at Harleigh Farm 1958-1962, S. African Archaeological Bulletin, Cape Town, June 1966, vol 21, no 82, pp 61-80, esp. 77.

purpose. (30)

It is against this background of thirteenth and fourteenth century development on the coastal settlements of the Swahili and the hinterland chieftaincies of the Shona peoples that the pre-Portuguese history of Sofala is to be viewed. Archaeological investigations in Rhodesia are still inadequate for more than tentative conclusions at this stage, and further work at Sofala itself, combined with studies of the Sabi and Corongoza river mouths, Sena and Quelimane, are urgent. At Great Zimbabwe, some coastal contacts are in evidence from the early twelfth century, glass beads in quantity appearing with the wall-building of the late fourteenth century. (31) Projecting this development to the Sofalan coast, the inference is a sporadic trade in the twelfth century with no evidence at all so far of contacts two centuries earlier, and an increasing tempo of contact as one approaches the time of Ibn Battuta (c 1331).

The wealth of Kilwa, outwardly displayed in the masonry of the fourteenth century, was partly dependent on the gold trade through Sofala. The statement in Barros' version of the Kilwa Chronicle that Sofala fell under the sway of Kilwa when a stone fortress was constructed at the northern port blends with the rest of the picture, although the date assigned to this event does not. (32)

There is no evidence that Sofala was ever dignified with stone buildings in the pre-Portuguese period, and there are two reasons for this. Stone is rare around Sofala, and what there is is of very

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(30) Rhodesia Herald Sept. 4, 1969 p 7. The likely date of c 1400 awaits confirmation by C_{14} tests.

(31) R. Summers, Zimbabwe, a Rhodesian Mystery, Nelson, 1963, p 64, modified as to upper terminal date by Garlake, op. cit. - see note 26 supra.

(32) See note 14 supra.

poor quality for building, being simply compacted dune, a very friable sandstone. (33) The Portuguese had to supply some stone from as far afield as Portugal itself and seek further supplies from Kilwa, 1,000 miles north. (34) It was altogether easier, therefore, for the Muslim traders to accept the kind of buildings the African community at Sofala made: pole and daga huts thatched with palm leaf, modifying the design, however, to a long, narrow structure when a larger-than-usual building was required. (35) Furthermore, Kilwa imposed such heavy customs duties on traders calling at Sofala in comparison with the much lighter dues levied at Sofala itself, that there was little chance of such an external display of wealth there, even had material been available for the expression of it. (36)

Finally, a comparison between figures given for Sofala's Muslim community and that of Kilwa, Gedi and Mombasa, indicates a small outpost of metropolitan Kilwa rather than a flourishing port in its own right. (37) The ruler of Sofala asserted his independence from Kilwa just before the appearance of the Portuguese, but the break had come too late. (38) The development of Muslim Sofala was rendered stillborn by the arrival of the conquistadores.

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(33) Professor Bond, Geology, of the University of Rhodesia, kindly analysed the sample of stone I brought from the Praia quarry at Sofala.

(34) Barros, op. cit. I.9.6. (MSEA VI p 104) gives the story of the Portuguese stone loaded on the ships of the 1505 Sofala-bound flotilla. Kilwa stone for Sofala, probably a surplus after the stone houses had been destroyed at Kilwa to provide material for the 1505 fort, is mentioned in Nuno Vaz Pereira's letter to the factor of Kilwa, Kilwa, 15.i.1507, TT, CC II, 12-52 (DPM II p 46).

(35) Fernão Lopes de Castanheda, História do descobrimento da Índia pelos portuhueses, 8 vols, Coimbra, 1551-1561, vol 2, ch 10 (MSEA V pp 331-332).

(36) Diogo de Alcaçova, letter to the king, 20.xi.1506, TT, CC I 5-118 (3 & 3v) DPM I p 396.

(37) Sofala's Muslim community was estimated by Alcaçova as 800 (doc. cit. 3; DPM I 396). Freeman-Grenville gives in The Medieval history of the coast of Tanganyika, OUP, 1962, on p 192, the following estimates of Muslim populations: Kilwa - 10,000, Gedi - 3,000, Mombasa - 20,000.

(38) Alcaçova, doc. cit. 3v; DPM I pp 396-398.

CHAPTER I PORTUGUESE ESTABLISHMENT AT SOFALA 1505 - 1506

The strategy adopted by the Portuguese in 1505 for clamping control over the commerce of the western Indian Ocean was to take by agreement or force a number of points along the coastal rim. Feitorias or fortified trading posts were constructed at these places and combined garrisons and commercial staffs stationed there. Royal orders to captain-major Almeida in 1505 indicate that the taking of Sofala and Kilwa, together with care to preserve cordial relations with the sultan of Malindi, was considered to form an adequate S.E. African base for the enterprise. (1) Considerable reconnaissance had led to the selection of Kilwa and Sofala, on which a brief review is now presented.

The ten year gap separating the voyages of Dias and Gama may appear on the surface to be a loss of initiative. Much required to be done, however, before the discovery of Dias could be exploited. To ensure the confident south-westward sweep into the south Atlantic made from the Cape Verde Islands by Gama in contrast to the coast-hugging progress of Dias, must have required prolonged experiment to test the wind and current pattern. Although nothing is known of this, we do have information about continued espionage to gauge Muslim resources and seek a possible ally in Prester John. We know, for instance, of the mission of Pedro de Covilhã and Alfonso de Paiva, sent in 1487 by John II to contact Prester John and report on the spice trade. (2) Although Paiva disappeared without trace after

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(1) Instructions to captain-major D. Francisco de Almeida, Lisbon, 5.iii.1505, TT, Leis, 2-13, DPM I pp 156-258.

(2) The earliest account of the journey is in F. Alvarez, Verdadera informaçam das terras do Preste Joam, / Lisbon / 1540. C.F. Beckingham discusses this text and the variant information contained in Ramusio's Della navigationi et viaggi, Venice, 1563, and in Barros' Da Ásia, in 'The travels of Pero da Covilhã and their significance' in Actas, vol III, Lisbon 1961, pp 1-14.

reaching Ethiopia, Covilhã wandered for three years to Ormuz, Goa, Calicut, Cairo, Mecca, [3] and finally Ethiopia where he was well treated but forbidden to leave. It is thought that he reached Sofala, but this is not certain. It is not known whether the report Covilhã composed for the king ever reached king John. Beckingham considers it extremely likely, since the traveller had been contacted by two Jews sent to find him, and the royal rewards for such vital information would be a powerful incentive for success. [4] Axelson makes the point that the ten year gap between Dias and Gama is partly to be attributed to the necessity to receive Covilhã's report before the attempt on the Indian Ocean commerce could be mounted. [5] For the purpose of this thesis it is sufficient to note that whether or not Covilhã reached Sofala, his competent Arabic would enable him to learn of the port where the gold of S.E. Africa was obtained for the cloth and beads of Cambay, and that it is likely that Gama was armed with this information before he set sail on his first voyage to India.

Beckingham expresses surprise that if Gama knew of Sofala he should not have striven to discover the port. [6] Those who have sailed in the lee of the Sofala shoal know the answer. Even inside the shoal it is extremely difficult to distinguish Sofala on the utterly featureless shore. Outside the shoal, where larger vessels were forced to sail, it would be quite impossible, whereas the great volume of muddy water streaming out of the Zambezi mouth, and the considerable number of Muslim vessels which used the Quelimane mouth would betray the great river, and Mozambique Island would be difficult to miss.

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(3) Beckingham, op.cit. p 6, comments that the purpose of this visit might well have been to probe the feasibility of a crippling blow to Muslim commerce there by combined attack of Portuguese and Prester John.

(4) Ibid

(5) E.V. Axelson, S.E. Africa 1488-1530, London, 1940, p 31

(6) Beckingham, op.cit.

Gama learnt in 1498 at Mozambique, according to the chroniclers, of the importance of the Sofala trade in gold. (7) The information, however, was hearsay and inadequate, and a further seven years was to elapse before the crusade was mounted. This seven years, like the previous ten year gap, was filled with reconnaissance, and about this period we have much more information.

In 1501 a flotilla under Sancho de Tovar (8) was detached from Cabral's fleet after the captain-major had been told of the wealth of Sofala by his pilots in Malindi. (9) Tovar sailed in convoy with Mozambique merchants and observed the established staples of the Sofala trade: cloth from Cambay and red beads. The Portuguese presented the sheikh with a gaudy collection of trifles including crimson silk, mirrors, hawk-trappings, little Flemish bells and transparent glass beads. The Swahili * ruler politely acknowledged the bric-a-brac and responded with a gift of gold beads worth 1,000 cruzados. Sheikh Yusuf's act sealed the fate of Swahili Sofala, for here was the first proof that Sofala was receiving African gold. (10)

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(7) Barros, op.cit. 1.3.4. RSEA VI p 26; Castanheda, op.cit. 1.5., RSEA V p 312, writes that the island of Mozambique was peopled by Moors living in thatched huts, trading with Sofala and visited by other Moors from India and the Red Sea. Damião de Gois in his Chrónica d'el rei Dom Manuel, Lisbon 1566-1567, 1.36, (RSEA III, p 10) adds that Gama learnt about Sofala from the Moorish pilots he took aboard at Mozambique.

(8) who served from 1518-1521 as captain of Sofala.

(9) Gaspar Correa, Lendas da India, 4 parts, Lisbon, 1858-1866, printed from his sixteenth century account, 'Pedro Alvares Cabral', RSEA II p 26. See also Prospero Peragallo, 'Carta de El-Rei D. Manuel ao Rei Catholico...' in Centenário do descobrimento da America, Lisbon 1892, p 9, (DPM I p 44). This is a closely contemporary account of the voyage of Cabral in 1500-1502, written in 1505.

(10) The cruzado in 1500 was equal to 390 reis or approximately 4/5 of a mitical. See H.J. Livermore, History of Portugal, Cambridge, 1947, p 479.

* For discussion on the terms 'Moor' and 'Swahili' see appendix at the end of the text.

In 1502, king Manuel despatched Pedro Affonso d'Aguiar with two caravels to establish trade with the sheikh of Sofala. (11) The Portuguese were intrigued to see how profitable the Sofala trade was: for a piece of cloth worth 150 reis, the Moors received from the inland traders gold worth five times as much. (12) Duarte Barbosa records sixteen years later an even higher profit factor of a hundred to one. (13)

Further rich gifts were presented to the Portuguese which convinced Aguiar that Sofala was a most desirable prize. King Manuel was inspired to write, "Sophala... é uma ilha ao pe da barra de um rio: é habitada por muitos mercadores; aonde ha ouro infinito, que ahi e introduizido do sertão da África... Esta ilha é possuida pelo rei de Quiloa." (14) Here, concisely expressed is the reason for the occupation of Kilwa and Sofala: Sofala drew "unlimited gold... from the interior of Africa" and Sofala was "owned by the ruler of Kilwa". (15) The gold would be won by oriental cloth and beads at a handsome rate of exchange and in turn the gold would buy spices, the most lucrative cargo any ship could then carry.

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(11) Correa, op.cit., 2, 'Vasco da Gama, 1502' (HSDA II p 3).

(12) Ibid

(13) [Duarte Barbosa] 'Descrição da situação costumes e produtos de alguns lugares de África' [c. 1518] BNM, MS 3,016, fls 1-6, section 3, 'Reino de Çoffalla', DPM V p 356.

(14) Pergallo, op.cit., p 9, DPM I p 44

(15) It was at Kilwa that Gama received the 1,500 miticals of gold tribute which was fashioned into the 'monstrance of Belem', a constant reminder in the Jerónimos monastery of the potentialities of Kilwa and Sofala. For a contemporary description see the Receipt, TT, CC, Fragmentos, m 16, reproduced in DPM III p 534.

In the same year, Gama himself on his second expedition to India paused at Sofala to trade and select a site for the feitoria. (16) From

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(16) A Dutchman aboard one of Gama's ships whose name is now unknown produced a tantalising account of Sofala: "On the 14th of June we arrived before a town called Scafal [Sofala], and there we asked to buy and sell; but they would not allow it to us, because the inhabitants felt great anxieties from this side of the Paepians river [Zara or Cuama]; there flows a river from the country of the Paepians [Sabia, between the Cape and 20°S], for the country of the Paepians [Kaffir land] is situate in the interior of that country, shut by the walls, and they have no other issue towards the sea than the river of Scafal, and they were disturbed with anxiety lest we might discover that road; because the king of Scafal was then making war against the Paepians. For we spoke with the people of the Paepians' country, who had been made prisoners, and were their slave people: for the Paepians' country abounds in silver, gold, precious stones and riches, and this kingdom is 400 miles from the Cape of Good Hope." (The translation, including the inserts within square brackets is in J. Ph. Berjeau, Calcoen, a dutch narrative of the second voyage of Vasco da Gama to Calicut, printed in Antwerp, circa 1504, with introduction and translation, London, 1874.)

Calcoen is the old Dutch form for Calicut. There are no page numbers in Berjeau. Strange errors occur in the text: the voyage is originally stated to begin in 1501, for instance, and in the next sentence the date is given as 1502. The fleet is given as seventy vessels, whereas in fact only fifteen sailed. Such imperfections cast some doubt on the accuracy of the most puzzling statement for the historian: the reference to an African people in touch with Sofala as the Paepians. Beckingham comments (op. cit. p 12) that the word is simply Dutch for Prester John's people and that the ignorance of the African interior leading some sixteenth century cartographers to show Ethiopia extending far south of the equator could suggest the possibility that Prester John ruled Africans inland from Sofala. The war referred to is clearly the struggle between Changamire and the monomotapa described by Alcaçova (letter to the king, 1506, previously referred to, 1v - 2v, DPM I pp 392-394). The ruler of the Paepians coincides with the monomotapa, the ruler of the Sofala lands being the changamire. The editorial gloss equating the Sofala river with the Sabi is inaccurate; the present equivalent is the Buzi.

these two visits, Lisbon learnt of the difficulties of the Sofalan searoads. The king ordered Almeida in 1505 to use only "huum dos navyos pequenos ... que melhor seja pera a entrada do ryo de Cufalla." (17) Lisbon was made aware, too, by the two exploratory voyages, of the sea erosion at Sofala which is still a feature of the site and has caused the loss of a quarter-mile wide strip of land in the last century and a half. (18)

Why then, since the king was aware of the treacherous approach to Sofala and the unsatisfactory nature of the site, and since, moreover, he knew that Mozambique provided a far better way-station for the India fleet, did he persist in ordering the fortifying of Sofala? The answer is briefly that at the end of the fifteenth century, Sofala was the gold port for S.E. Africa and that the Moors were there. (19) Kilwa was traditionally associated with Sofala, and therefore two expensive establishments had to be founded. Since the two were a thousand miles apart, Mozambique had also to be occupied in some way, and the method chosen was the economical one of keeping a skeleton staff there and shuttling a proportion of Sofala's staff and garrison between the two ports. Sofala, southernmost of the important Swahili trading settlements, had to be retained to produce gold, and of equal importance, to deny its use to the Moors. It would appear to have been more logical to

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(17) Instructions to captain-major Almeida, 1505, already referred to, section 18, DPM I p 178.

(18) Ibid, section 20, DPM I p 182: "somos emformado que gasta o mar aly muyto della e que ha hy tambem grandes cheas do ryo."

(19) Ibid, section 29, DPM I p 198: "teemos enformaçam que ha gramde riqueza d'ouro pelo muito teempo que ha que teem o trato de Cufalla."

reverse the roles of Mozambique and Sofala right from the start, however, since Mozambique was equidistant from both the other settlements, an island with an excellent harbour and easily defensible. As an island, too, it could be expected to be much healthier than the mud flats of Sofala, despite the impression created of a white man's grave by the numbers of Portuguese who died on the island. (20)

The truth seems to be that the planners in Lisbon were over-impressed by the reputation of Sofala, and letters from officials did nothing to damp the enthusiasm, for the king and his staff selected the optimistic statements, such as Alcaçova's in 1506, claiming that a million miticals (21)

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(20) For an omnibus reference to mortality at Mozambique, see C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese seaborne empire, 1415-1825, London, 1969, p 218. Sofala by contrast was said by one visitor to be as "healthy as Sintra", the royal hilltop resort above Lisbon (letter from Duarte de Lemos to the king, 30.ix.1508, TT, CC I, 7-47, DPM II p 294). Wage and maintenance rolls confirm this: after the heavy toll taken by the fort-building and seige, deaths fell to about two a year. Such statistics, however, ignore the fact that it was at Mozambique that the sick and tired seafarers first disembarked on the S.E. African coast, of whom a high proportion died. Sofala, by contrast, received the toughened survivors.

(21) Mitical is the modern Portuguese form; many other spellings are used, such as metical, metical and mithcal. Some historians claim the value of this Arab gold weight cannot be known (e.g. R. Oliver and G. Mathew, History of East Africa, OUP 1963, p 113, note). It is important to distinguish between the value of the mitical which varied widely throughout Africa, some of the variation, no doubt, being a difference between buying and selling prices, and the weight, which can be fairly precisely known. The royal instructions to Sofala's captain in 1530 to adjust the gold scales to give the most favourable price is a contemporary case in point on the variable weight. (Regulations for Sofala, Lisbon, 20 v. 1530, TT, Miscelaneas do Convento da Graça, caixa 5, 30, DPM VI p 387). As to the weight of the mitical, Axelson opts for approximately 1/6 oz. (E.S. Africa, 1488 - 1530, p 6, note). Marion Johnson in 'The nineteenth century gold mithcal in west and north Africa' in JAH IX, 4, 1968, pp 547 - 569, confirms that such a weight (3/20 oz) is given for the Timbuctu area in the early sixteenth century by Leo Africanus and has remained standard ever since in Arab countries up to the present century. Accordingly, mitical = 1/6th oz. is adopted as approximate standard for economic calculations throughout this thesis.

or more passed in peace time through the port, ignoring his accompanying warning that for the past decade and longer, no trade had been possible because wars in the interior prevented it. (22) In the end, Sofala imposed its own logic, scaling down a Portuguese station with over a hundred white faces to one with very few, and a growing number of mesticos, and eventually in 1823, to the squalid situation observed by a cartographer in captain Owen's flotilla: "The port of Sofala... the Ophir of Solomon, whence his fleet returned laden with gold, almug trees and precious stones.... We found but a paltry fort and a few miserable mud huts." (23)

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(22) Letter from Alcaçova to the king, 1506, already referred to, 2 v, DPM I, p 394.

(23) Capt. W.F.W. Owen, Narrative of voyages to explore the shores of Africa, Arabia and Madagascar, 2 vols. London. 1833, vol I, p 318.

The events of 1505 - 1506 are given with wealth of detail by the chroniclers Barros, Castanheda and Gois. (24) It is necessary here to give only an outline before consideration of certain important issues.

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(24) The Barros narrative in Da Ásia was only published in 1552. Barros is, nevertheless, a most important source, for he was in a position to know the facts. Brought up in the household of king Manuel from which so many leaders of the enterprise were drawn, he was from 1532, factor-in-chief of the Casa da India.

Gois, also brought up during his youth at court, was not at first in the privileged position of Barros for knowing the men and the documents. He spent his working life up to 1545 outside Portugal on diplomatic missions in Italy and Flanders. He did, however, return to Portugal in 1545 and three years later became the chief archivist and royal chronicler to king John III. His chronicle first appeared in print in 1566 and was based on close study of the official records in the Torre de Tombo. For the events of 1505 - 1506 his account is substantially the same as that of Barros.

Castanheda's account was first published between 1551 and 1561, and was thus the first chronicle to appear. The author was official chronicler of India, and his work bears a striking literal resemblance to that of Gois.

A fourth author of the mid sixteenth century, Gaspar Correa, knew India well, for he went there as a boy with his father, a judge, in1512 and stayed there almost continuously until his death in 1562. He did not, however, have access to official documents to the extent of the other three, and his account, Lendas da India, not published until 1858 - 1866 in Lisbon, differs in important detail from the synoptic authors previously mentioned. Different successors to Yusuf and Anaia are given by Correa; the attack on the feitoria is said to last a month, whereas the others limit to three days; chronology is ignored by him when he introduces Saldanha's improvements to the fort five years before Saldanha assumed office at Sofala. This source, therefore, is to be used with caution.

One close-contemporary chronicle exists: the account of a Castilian man-at-arms of Anaia's garrison, Martin Fernandes de Figueroa, whose brief eye-witness story was printed by Juan Augur in Salamanca in 1512 as Conquista de las Indias de Persia e Arabia que fizo la armada del rey don Manuel de Portugal, reproduced and translated with commentary in J.B. McKenna, A Spaniard in the Portuguese Indies, Harvard, 1967. This source is most useful for supplying touches of local colour absent from the more formal histories.

The establishment of the Sofala feitoria was intended as part of the operations of a strong fleet sent to the Indian Ocean under the command of D. Francisco de Almeida in 1505. Whereas the main body left the Tagus in March, the Sofala-bound flotilla of three large caravels, intended eventually for the India trade, and three smaller vessels to form a coastal patrol unit, left under the command of Pedro d'Anaia only on May 18, due to the sinking of the captain's ship, laden with masonry for the fort, in the Tagus. Half the vessels arrived on September 4, to be joined by the rest on September 19, 1505. Leading Moors approached the company to discover the purpose of the visit. Anaia sought an audience with the sheikh. The Moors protested that Yusuf was old and blind, unable to travel, and that the river route to his palace was impassible for the Portuguese vessels. Anaia insisted on meeting Yusuf, and at the interview he asked for and was granted the right to select a site on which to build a feitoria. A mangrove pole and earth rampart on which artillery was mounted was hastily built and surrounded by a ditch. Officials were housed ashore, and before the end of the year, trade was in progress. European trade goods failed to attract the African gold trade, but plundered Indian cloth and beads from Kilwa and Mombasa lured African traders to Sofala in considerable numbers. The Moors, seeing their trade disappearing, persuaded the powerful African ruler Moconde to attack the Portuguese. Artillery broke the nerve of the African warriors who then turned on the Moorish village. When Moconde's forces had returned to their homes, Anaia raided the sheikh's palace which had survived the devastation. Yusuf was killed and his head displayed on the wall of the fort. His sons attempted an unsuccessful assault on the feitoria and finally came to terms with the Portuguese. Suleiman, the son who appeared most tractable, was approved by the Portuguese as successor, and peace was celebrated by presents of cloth to both the loyal Moors and the still smouldering opposition. Anaia fell victim to fever, and under his successor, acting captain Fernandes, helped by the crew of a visiting caravel, a stone tower was begun within the feitoria.

Three features call for discussion in the events outlined above: the odd nature of this crusade, the quite peaceful establishment of the Sofala feitoria, in such stark contrast with the brutal happenings which accompanied the foundation of the feitoria at Kilwa, and the causes of the armed conflict which followed the completion of the building.

"The naval campaigns against the Muslim in the Indian seas ... may be described as the last crusade." (25) In some senses this is true. The king was conscious of the crusading mission "to serve the lord our God" as he expressed it to the rulers of Castile in 1499. (26) The queen encouraged his desire to emulate the example of his predecessors in smiting the infidel in Africa. (27) Although Portugal had completed the subjugation of the Muslims by the mid thirteenth century, the spirit of crusade flared spasmodically as Portuguese forces went to the help of the Spanish rulers up to the last act of reconquest in 1492. It was particularly active in the fifteenth century, from the Ceuta campaign of 1415 to the search for Prester John as an ally to overthrow the Muslims. At the other end of the social scale, the man-at-arms saw in the Muslim his natural enemy, for had he not had relatives killed in the campaigns? (28)

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(25) Sir Ernest Barker in his article 'Crusades' in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1961, vol 6, p 792.

(26) Letter from king Manuel to the rulers of Castile, [1499], TT, Col. de S. Vicente, vol 3, p 515, DPM I p 28.

(27) Gois, op. cit. I.47, Coimbra, 1949, vol I p 114: "desejo que tinha de imitar hos reis seus antecessores, e ser lhes companheiro na gloria que alcançaram nas conquistas das cidades, villas, castellos e lugares que na terra destes infideis, elles suas pessoas, passando em Africa ganharam."

(28) e.g. the popular saying uttered by the man-at-arms, justifying his way of life in the east, in Diogo do Couto's O soldado prático, Goa, 1612: Mouro morreu meu pai, mouro quero eu morrer."

If it is impossible to deny that for the king and commoner alike there was at times a genuine crusading motive at work in the Indian Ocean enterprise, it is futile to deny that other motives were also at play. In one important royal document, the crusading motive is clearly subordinate to that of trade. (29) Indeed, it is quite apparent in contemporary sources that commerce and crusade were inextricably woven together (the sixteenth century saw nothing strange in this) and that the element of self-interest received far more attention than the spiritual side of the enterprise. The Castilian man-at-arms who left an eyewitness account of the events of 1505 demonstrates to us what urged men to join the crusade: not the surge of religious fervour, but the offer of two cruzados per month, two quintals of pepper per year, and free board until the return to Portugal. In addition those who volunteered for Sofala would qualify for a share in the loot from captured Moors. "This" comments Figueroa, "made those who wanted to go there very happy, and also the greedy rich people who hoped to gain more before their return." (30) Barros confirms the words of Figueroa, and estimates that a soldier might gain the equivalent of six months' pay on the sale of his pepper alone. (31)

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(29) Instructions to captain-major Almeida, already quoted, in which a half page out of 122 is devoted to the crusading purpose of the Sofala mission:"you shall explain that in ordering the capture of those Moors and their property, we are acting against the enemies of our religion." (Section 18, DPM I pp 178-180). And again: "this will result in much profit both to Christianity and to our exchequer." (Section 53, DPM I p 228 - crusade plus 5% !)

(30) Figueroa, op. cit. tit. IV, McKenna, pp 31-33.

(31) Barros, op. cit.1.8.3., RSEA VI p 72, where the man-at-arms' benefit is quoted as 800 reis per month from the date of leaving Portugal, to which was added 400 reis per month maintenance when he disembarked, plus two and a half quintals of pepper per year (allowed on homecoming caravels) which sold for about 5,000 reis. Officers received higher allocations of pepper according to their rank. The quintal was equivalent to 128 arrateis or lbs, each of sixteen oz. See the order from the Comptroller of the India Treasury to Salema, factor of Sofala, Mozambique, 24.viii.1517, TT, CC II, 71-53, (5), DPM V p 186.

To the satisfaction of a regular wage packet and the pepper bonus was added the lure of sharing the loot from Muslim vessels and trading settlements. Almeida's regimento of 1505 gives the rules under which the plunder was divided, ranging from the viceroy's twenty five parts to the single unit for an ordinary seaman. (32) Lust for spoil is evident in the chroniclers' accounts. Barros, for instance, writes of Kilwa that "the splendid dwellings, courtyards and minarets, set amid palm groves and orchards, made the city so attractive that our men clamoured to land and subdue this arrogant infidel." (33) Almeida's son "found the common soldiers so avaricious for plunder that only with great difficulty could he persuade them to return." (34) Of Mombasa, Barros recalls a proposal to call a truce which "raised uproar among the men" who "were eager to sack the city." The peace overtures were not pressed, and so much loot was loaded that the ships almost sank. The town was finally set alight. (35) This crusade was thus in the tradition of the Fourth which emerged from the cover of pious protestations to encompass the ruin of the brilliant city of Cobstantinople.

Confirmation of the comparative values placed on conversion of the heathen or confiscation of his property appears in the garrison structure at Sofala. The vicar of Sofala earned only one twelfth of

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(32) Instructions to captain-major Almeida, already referred to, section 87, DPM I pp 248-250.

(33) Barros, op. cit., 1.8.4., RSEA VI p 83.

(34) Ibid 1.8.5., RSEA VI p 86.

(35) Ibid 1.8.8., RSEA VI p 100.

the captain's salary, and less than the storekeeper, the gaoler and the doctor. (36)

Outright violent opposition to Islam was not the aim of king Manuel unless it were unavoidable. The ambivalence of his policy is seen in the instructions issued to captain-major Almeida in 1505. Friendly rulers, even though Muslim, were to be cultivated. At Sofala, the sheikh was to be protected, while other Muslim traders were to be robbed, and the chief members of the community seized and brought to Portugal. The rest were to be set to work as slaves on the building of the feitoria. If, however, a different, milder policy seemed to the leaders on the spot more likely to ensure the desired result of taking over the gold trade there, they were empowered to implement it. (37) The summum bonum was not so much the destruction of Islam as the capture of its trade.

By contrast with the barbarities perpetrated in Kilwa and Mombasa, the establishment of Portuguese Sofala was at first quite peaceful. The contrast is surprising in view of the reputation of Sofala for gold, and the known avidity for loot displayed by the newcomers. There were several reasons for the lack of conflict at the outset, despite the comparative easewith which such a small company could have been overwhelmed while building the feitoria by a combined

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(36) The earliest documentary evidence for comparative wages is in the pay and maintenance rolls for September, 1516, TT, CC II, 66-67, DPM IV pp 510-534, and for December, 1516, TT, CC II, 66-69, DPM IV pp 560-579. Vicar and chaplain each earned 30,000 reis p.a. Storekeeper, gaoler and doctor each earned 40,000 reis p.a. The capitão-mor's salary was 350,000 reis p.a.

(37) Instructions to the captain-major, 1505, already quoted, section 19, DPM I p 182.

attack from the forces of Yusuf and Moconde. (38) The fact is that the Muslims of Sofala were split both externally and internally, providing the most opportune moment possible for Portuguese entry. Alcaçova, writing in 1506, records that Yusuf had, from the outset of his reign, declared his independence from Kilwa. (39) It was therefore to his advantage to cultivate the friendship of the newcomers with such powerful weapons. (40) External isolation was matched by internal division. Yusuf, still in command, but too old to take a risky initiative, was opposed by his son-in-law, Menga Musaf, whose supporters wished to refuse the granting of privileges beyond what had been given to the trading ships of Tovar and Gama. (41) A strongly pro-Portuguese party soon emerged in the sheikh's council, however, nullifying for a time the vigorous proposals of Menga Musaf, led by the former Ethiopian slave and favourite of Yusuf, Yacote, encouraged, the chroniclers note, by judicious gifts from Anaia. (42) The captain

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(38) Anaia's force consisted of 139 men in early 1506. See the wage roll for Sofala, 1.iii.1506, TT, CC II, 10-130, DPM I p 424-443. Moconde was able to muster a mighty force: Gois and Castanheda say 1,000; Barros estimates between five and six thousand, according to Castanheda, forty men died and the rest became extremely weak in the labour of building. See Castanheda, op. cit. 2.11., RSEA V p 334. The critical period for the Portuguese was before the ramparts were complete and the artillery mounted, and while sickness was decimating the garrison. See also Figueroa, op. cit., tit. 10, McKenna p 45.

(39) Alcaçova, letter to the king already quoted, 3v, DPM I p 398.

(40) Whereas the Portuguese entered the Indian Ocean well supplied with bronze and iron cannon, the only artillery in the hands of the Moors were guns salvaged from the Portuguese shipwrecks. See Barros on the siege of Mombasa where the opening shots were fired from the Muslim defences by guns lost by Sancho de Tovar: op. cit., 1.8.7., RSEA VI p 94.

(41) Ibid, 1.9.6., RSEA VI p 103.

(42) Castanheda, op. cit., 2.11., RSEA V p 333; Gois, op. cit., 2.9., RSEA III p 51; Barros, op. cit., 1.9.6., RSEA VI p 108.

presented the ingenuous argument that Yusuf's trading community required protection against the surrounding African people, "a savage and insolent folk." The Portuguese were well able to protect their friends and ruin their enemies. (43) The first part of the argument can have carried little weight with Yusuf's council, for the Muslim traders had long ago forged effective links with the African rulers of the gold-producing lands and the routes to them. The second part, however, was patently obvious from reports which had reached Sofala before Anaia arrived there. (44) The truth was that Yusuf had to play for time. Time was required to contact Moconde, most powerful neighbouring African ruler, to solicit help in expelling Anaia's force. (45) Time might also, Yusuf considered, improve the balance of forces, for the Portuguese, worn by disease and gruelling labour and decimated by fever, would be much easier to destroy. (46)

Menga Musaf was more astute in his assessment of the time to strike than Yusuf. He was concerned to see that the Portuguese were wisely sparing themselves by hiring African labourers to cut and carry the heavy waterlogged mangrove trunks to build the palisade. (47) He incited the labourers to absent themselves, but Anaia broke the strike with a show of force. (48) Once the Portuguese had completed the ramparts and positioned their artillery, their position was secure. One chronicler complacently states that the Portuguese, within their palisade, were perfectly at peace with the inhabitants. (49) But it

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(43) Barros, op. cit., 1.9.6., RSEA VI p 108.

(44) Figueroa, op. cit., tit. 11, McKenna p 47.

(45) Barros, op. cit., 1.10.3., RSEA VI pp 121-122.

(46) Ibid 1.9.6., RSEA VI p 108.

(47) Ibid 1.10.2., RSEA VI pp 118-119.

(48) Ibid.

(49) Castanheda, op. cit. 2.29., RSEA V p 336.

was the lull before the storm.

What changed a policy of tame acceptance into one of determined resistance? In Figueroa's eyewitness account, the news reaching Sofala about violence in Kilwa and Mombasa occurs close to the story of the attack on the fort. (50) It is tempting, therefore, to assume that the indignation of Sofala's Muslims at such news caused Yusuf's decision to fight, but this cannot be so, for the news had reached Sofala before Anaia arrived there, and was followed by a period of peace. Other violence was reported from the north early in 1506: the buccaneering exploits of Anaia's son on his way to Kilwa. (51) Was this the spark that touched off the explosion? Again the answer must be negative, for Francisco d'Anaia's brutalities were on a much smaller scale than the ravaging of Mombasa. The importance of this episode is that the departure of the caravels under Francisco d'Anaia reduced an already depleted garrison and thereby improved the chances of Yusuf. The prime motivation appears to have been the sight of trade vanishing from Muslim hands: the Moors were, in fact, compelled to fight for their livelihood. In February 1506, the monomotapa (52) sent a trade mission to the newcomers, demonstrating his willingness to divert trade in gold to the stronger party. (53) The spoils from the ravaged north produced a trade boom for the Portuguese, attracting African buyers in great numbers to the feitoria. The Portuguese made sure of trade by selling at more favourable prices

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(50) Figueroa, op. cit., tit. 11, McKenna p 47.

(51) The exploits would rank as piracy today: he twice captured Muslim ships and murdered the entire body of crew and passengers. See Castanheda, op. cit., 2.29., RSEA V p 335.

(52) The spelling adopted here is that most often used in books on S.E. African history. D. Abraham, expert on Karanga history, prefers mwenemutapa, as closest to the Shona words, meaning 'master raider'. Many variants such as Benemotapa and Bonomotapa appear in sixteenth century writings.

(53) Order from Pero d'Anaia, Sofala, 19.v.1506, TT, CC II, 11-12, DPM I p 506.

than the Muslim traders. All this, says Barros, "persuaded the Moors to give vent to their hatred." (54) According to Barros, it was the sheikh's son-in-law who approached Moconde to mount an attack, and it is quite possible that he seized the opportunity to form an alliance aimed not only at ousting the Portuguese, but also at overthrowing Yusuf, for Barros states that Moconde had in mind from the outset, the possibility of an attack not solely on the Portuguese, but also on the Muslim settlement. (55)

The disaffection of Yusuf's favourite, Yacote, must have been a bitter blow to the aged sheikh. Yacote took a number of families with him to live in the shelter of the feitoria, (56) and this was a signal to Menga Musaf's party that the attack on the Portuguese must be made soon, before the enemy grew stronger by further desertions from the Muslim ranks, or by reinforcements from the sea.

Thus a conjunction of circumstances and reactions led to the attack in May, 1506, on Anaia's garrison. The sequel showed the technical superiority of crossbow and artillery over the weapons of Moconde's men, and also speaks clearly of the quality of leadership in Anaia who inspired a weary, anxious and fever-stricken company to resist attack by an overwhelmingly larger force. The outcome was not a foregone conclusion, however. What the loyal accounts of the chroniclers mask is how close the Muslim and Bantu forces were to victory. Even with the Portuguese safely ensconced within their

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(54) Barros, op. cit., 1.10.3., RSEA VI p 121.

(55) Ibid.

(56) There may be evidence here of a deep religious division in the Muslim ranks, for Barros states that the Sofalan Moors were split into orthodox Muslims and 'wandering Moors' or 'Omezaides' of whom Yacote and his group may have formed part. Barros, op. cit., 1.10.3., RSEA VI p 121.

fort, and artillery trained on the open space from which the attack was bound to come, one change of circumstance was all that was required to doom the defenders. If Yacote had not revealed the boasted intention of Moconde to use incendiary arrows, the result would have been a disaster for the Portuguese, amid their blazing thatch and exploding powder magazine. (57)

The hope expressed by king Manuel of ruining the Moors and befriending the other Africans was for the moment frustrated. (58) The Portuguese had not yet learnt how close were the links between the Muslim Africans and their cousins inland.

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(57) Castanheda, op. cit., 2.29., RSEA V p 335; Gois, op. cit., 2.9., RSEA III p 51.

(58) The royal policy was expressed in the instructions carried by Almeida in 1505, already quoted, section 18, DPM I p 180.

APPENDIX I 'Who were the Moors of Portuguese sixteenth century writings on S.E. Africa' appears at the end of the text.

CHAPTER II THE TRADE OF SOFALA 1506 - 1528

It was essential for the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, with limited resources in men and ships, and far from their home base, to be sparing in the number of feitories they established. It was equally vital to make the right choice of bases. Sofala and Kilwa were selected on the east African coast on the information that both were connected with the gold trade, and that Kilwa had grown wealthy by controlling the gold flowing through the southern port. (1) King Manuel anticipated that a gold surplus would be available at Sofala, some of which could be shipped to Portugal and some to India to be devoted to trade. (2) Two types of link were used to bring the gold of the Rhodesian massif to the port: envoys from African rulers in the hinterland came right to the feitoria, encouraged by presents from the captain and by return visits by Portuguese envoys. (3) The second and more usual link was by means of Swahili traders who took

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(1) See the summary of reasons for the selection in ch I pp 13-19

(2) (a) Instructions to captain-major Almeida, 1505, already quoted, section 22, DPM I p 184.
(b) Draft instructions to Cide Barbudo [1505] TT, Leis, m 1, doc 24, section 13, DPM I p 280.
(c) Instructions to captain-major Sequeira of one of the India fleets, [1510] TT, Gavetas XV, 21-28, section 2, DPM II p 472.

(3) e.g. (a) Order, captain Anaia of Sofala to the king's treasurers, Sofala, 31.i.1506, TT, CC II, 10-108, DPM I p 384.
(b) Ditto, 19.v.1506, TT, CC II, 11-12, DPM I p 506.
(c) Ditto, 19.v.1506, TT CC II, 11-23, DPM I p 508-510
(d) Order, captain Fernandes of Sofala to the king's treasurers, Sofala, 1.x.1506, TT, CC II, 11-150, DPM I p 686.
(e) Ditto, 30.xii.1506, TT, CC II, 13-133, DPM I p 768.

trade goods inland and there exchanged them for gold. (4) One of the first important inland rulers to send a delegation to Portuguese Sofala was the monomotapa. (5) Control over collection of gold in the Karanga kingdom lay in his hands. (6) Between the plateau and the coast were rulers over whom the monomotapa claimed authority, but whom the Portuguese found often at war with him. (7) The chiefs of the coastal plain behind Sofala were able at times to strangle the gold trade with the plateau. Indeed, in 1506, local Swahili merchants were afraid to venture more than a few miles from the port, (8) and the state of war inland which had closed the gold routes had already lasted twelve years. (9) The Swahili endeavoured to keep the trade network open by making gifts to important Africans; the Portuguese found it necessary to adopt the same policy. (10)

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(4) (a) Letter, factor Soares of Sofala to the king, Sofala, 30.vi.1513, TT, CC II, 18-27, DPM III pp 458-462.
(b) Letter, captain Almada of Sofala to the king, Sofala, 26.vi.1516, TT, CC I 20-64, section 4, DPM IV p 282.

(5) Order, captain-major Anaia of Sofala to the king's treasurers, Sofala, 19.v.1506, TT, CC II 11-12, DPM I p 506.

(6) (a) Letter, Alcaçova to the king, 1506, already quoted, fl 1 v, DPM I p 390.
(b) Letter, D. António de Silveira to the king, [1528 - see Appendix 5] TT, Cartas dos vicereis da India, no 13, fl 8, DPM V p 566, where, however, the letter is wrongly dated.

(7) In particular Changamire, see Alcaçova's letter of 1506 to the king, already quoted, fl 1 v, DPM I p 392, and Nyamunda, see D. António de Silveira's letter to the king [1528] already quoted, fl 8, DPM V p 568.
Moconde does not appear to have challenged the monomotapa, see Barros, op. cit., 1.10.3., RSEA VI pp 121-122, where it is recorded that Moconde, appealed to by the Swahili under the terms of his obligation to his liege-lord the monomotapa, responded readily.

(8) Letter of Alcaçova to the king, 1506, already quoted, fls 1 & 1 v, DPM I p 390.

(9) Ditto, fl 1v, DPM I p 392.

(10) Barros, op. cit., 1.10.1., RSEA VI p 111: "To obtain gold from the Africans, the Moors...lavish cloth, beads and trinkets upon them and their wives, which delights them ... all the gifts constitute credit, and the Moors tell the Africans to go off and dig for gold, which the Africans agree to do." The reference must be to African chiefs, for only they could order the mining of gold.

The clerk of Sofala who gave king Manuel the first full information about the gold trade and production estimated that between a million and 1.3 million miticals of gold passed through Sofala annually. (12) This vastly over-optimistic guess was probably gratifying to Alcaçova's sovereign. (13) If, however, Manuel really expected such profits, he was due for bitter disappointment. Such documents as survive for the period 1506 - 1518 for instance, give for five documented years of trade, a total of 54,887 miticals, an average per year of 10,977 miticals. (14) The first eleven months of trade yielded 8,176 miticals, and this was artificially boosted by a vast injection of loot from Almeida's 'harrying of the north'. (15)

A meagre period between 1510 and 1512 may be indicated by the fact that maintenence payments, unlike those for preceding years, were no longer made in gold. (16) The years 1513 and 1514 brought gold worth 25,028 miticals to Sofala, giving a better average than the first eleven months of trade in the feitoria, and the best average known from the documents extant.

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(12) Alcaçova's letter of 1506 to the king, already referred to, fl 2v, DPM I p 394. It is worth noting that Alcaçova was in Sofala for only a few months, until the timber fort was complete, when he was sent, sick, to India. He was, however, the feitoria clerk, a most responsible post carrying shared responsibility with captain and factor for the security of the gold in store, for instance, and would therefore be in a good position to collect sound information.

(13) The letter ends, "Consider, I pray your Highness, how long I have served you... I have five sons and daughters.... I beg you to grant me the post in Cannanore feitoria." (fl 3v, DPM I p 398). There is thus a clear motive for exaggeration to please the king.

(14) See Appendix 2.

(15) Barros, op. cit. 1.10.3., in RSEA VI p 121

(16) See Sofala Maintenance Rolls beginning June 1510, TT, CC II, 22-46 DPM II, p 452-462 etc., and beginning February 1506, TT, CC II, 10-130, DPM I p 424-446 etc.

At the end of the period served by financial documents, the gold trade declined slightly and then catastrophically: the year commencing August 1516 yielded 11,813 miticals; factor Brito, from September 1518 to August 1519, gained only 803 miticals. Before final extinction, the gold trade made a temporary recovery in the 20,852 miticals traded in three years by Nico.

Apart from disappointment in the absolute amount of gold traded at Sofala, the Treasury must have lamented the rarity of gold surplus to recurrent costs and available for trade. In fact, in all the extant documents of the sixteenth century, the only gold recorded as available after the running expenses of Sofala and Mozambique had been met, and sent to India for buying cloth and beads was 5,690 miticals in 1506-7. Viceroy Albuquerque complained in 1514 that it was odd that the Sofala gold trade always proved just sufficient to pay the costs of the feitoria. (17) So desperate for profit was the king by 1530 that he recommended 'fiddling' the scales when buyers at the feitoria were not watching. (18)

Sofala officials constantly offered the excuse for a poor trade figure that there were wars in the interior, disrupting contact with the port. (19)

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(17) Letter, Albuquerque to the king, Goa, 25.x.1514, TT, CC I 16-68, DPM III p 560.

(18) Regulations for Sofala, 1530, already quoted, fl 31, DPM VI p 386.

(19) e.g. (a) Alcaçova's letter of 1506 to the king, already quoted, fl 2 v, DPM I p 394;
(b) Statement by the clerks Sobrinho and Homem, 1512, already quoted, fl 4, DPM III, p 240.
(c) Letter, factor Soares of Sofala to the king, Sofala, 30.vi.1513, TT, CC I 18-27, DPM III pp 458-460.
(d) Letter, D. Lopo de Almeida to the king, Sofala, 27.viii.1527, TT, CC I 37-57, fl 1, DPM VI p 278.

To some extent the excuse was justified. When the brief encounter of 1506 between Europeans and Africans was over, for instance, the feitoria enjoyed a good trading year. 1510 to 1512, when insufficient gold was available to make maintenance payments, were years of Swahili activity, stirring opposition inland against the Portuguese. (20) At times, however, other factors were at play, and the story that the gold trade depended simply upon peace in the interior was shown to be an over-simplification of the situation. 1516-1518, for instance, was a period which saw Nyamunda at war with Nyambia and the monomotapa, (21) yet 11,818 miticals poured into the factor's coffers. (22) Wars inland did not always constrict the commerce of Sofala for the good reason that the African rulers in conflict required trade goods to pay their armies, and they competed bitterly for the trade of the port. (23)

Other factors, too, played a prominent part in the economic buoyancy of the feitoria. Choice of trade goods affected the market. The Portuguese, from their experience at El Mina, believed at first that there would be a ready sale for European beads and metal ware, and even woollen hats. African buyers, however, were very conservative, and little sale movement occurred in European imports, which gradually filled the store with an unsaleable assortment of crystal beads, Britanny linen, copper and brass-ware. (24) The stock had accordingly to be disposed of as gifts, raw material for weapon repair and the purchase of foodstuffs. The Europeans

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(20) Statement by clerks Sobrinho and Homem, 1512, already quoted, fl. 3 v, DPM III p 240.

(21) (a) Expenditure book of clerk Lopes [Sofala, 1.i.1515] TT, Núcleo Antigo, m 167, doc 803, fl 22 v, DPM IV p 142.
(b) Letter, captain Távora to the king, [1518-1519] TT, Cartas dos vicereis da Índia, no 143, fl 2, DPM VI p 4.
(c) Letter, factor Brito to the king, Sofala, 8.viii.1519, TT, CC I 25-7, fl 1 v, DPM VI p 12.

(22) See Appendix 2.

(23) D. António de Silveira's letter of 1528 to the king, already quoted, fl 8 v, DPM V p 568.

(24) See the stocklist for March 1507: Inventory of clerk Delfim Soares [Sofala] 25.iii.1507, TT, CC II 12-128, esp. fl 2, DPM II p 202.

gradually learnt, as the East India Company learnt later, that the sinews of the Indian Ocean trade were cloth and beads distributed through Cambay from time immemorial. (25)

The most important factor affecting the Sofalan trade was undoubtedly the quality of the Portuguese officials and their willingness or unwillingness to encourage cooperation from the local Swahili in the trade from whose control they had been ousted. The ambivalent policy towards the Swahili has already been mentioned. (26) The constant motive of the Portuguese was to secure the trade of the Indian Ocean, and it became evident to them that the links with the interior, forged originally by the Swahili, could still be manipulated by them. Sofalan officials became aware, for instance, that trade was being withdrawn by the Swahili to the Cuama, and that the large Swahili settlement of Angoxa was organizing the traffic. (27)

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(25) e.g. (a) Account of the voyage of D. Francisco de Almeida [1506] already quoted, section 15, DPM I p 532.
(b) Minutes of the Straits Fleet Council [Mozambique, 25.i.1509] TT, Gavetas xv, 19-22, fl iv, DPM I p 328.
(c) Abstract by Sec. of State Carneiro of a letter from Albuquerque to the king, 4.xi.1510, TT, Cartas de Afonso de Albuquerque, m único, doc 1, DPM II p 546
(d) Barbosa, op.cit. section 3, DPM V p 336
cf J. Irwin & P.R. Schwartz, Studies in Indo-European textile history, Ahmedabad, 1966, p 9: "It was soon discovered that the only commodity acceptable there, was Indian textiles, and this prompted the company to seek a market for its woollen goods in India with the idea of buying.... Indian cottons and silks..."

(26) See p 26 of Chapter I

(27) Angoxa (near the present António Enes) was a site peculiarly suitable for secret trade, honeycombed with mangrove creeks and close enough to Quelimane, reached along a creek-indented shore, to provide sheltered access to the Cuama where Indian goods could be trans-shipped into river transport. References to the Swahili Angoxa trade begin as early as 1507: Abstract by Sec. of State Carneiro of a letter from Pero Vaz de Horta to the king, 4.iii.1507, TT Gavetas XX, 4-15, item 3, DPM II p 178.

The first reference of any detail to the Cuama route occurs in 1511: Abstract by Sec. of State Carneiro of letters from captain Saldanha of Sofala to the king [1511] TT, Cartas de Afonso de Albuquerque, m único, doc 1, item 6, DPM III p 14.

Another facet of relations with the Swahili was the need, because of Portuguese shortages of resources, to abandon any thorough crusade policy in order to survive. On the sea the zambuks (28) of Muslim traders operating under royal licence, including the craft of friendly Malindi, were allowed to trade cloth for gold and ivory. Such tolerance was prudent, but posed a pretty problem for the Straits' Fleet Council of Mozambique: should the trade of licensed vessels be allowed, which could ruin Portuguese Sofala, or should violent confrontation be offered for which the Portuguese had inadequate resources and which could result in their defeat by starvation if not by force of arms? (29) The Council decided to allow the licensed trade, urging that it be limited to Kilwa, that is, not allowed to reach as far south as the Cuama; unlicensed vessels continued to be captured as prizes. (30)

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(28) The Portuguese word zambuco or sambuco comes from Arabic sambuk, a small, single lateen-sailed coastal vessel. (See The Book of Duarte Barbosa, tr. & ed. M.L. Darnes, Hakluyt Soc., London, 2 vols, 1918 & 1922, vol.I, p 7, note 1.) The earliest Portuguese description with any detail is in 'Descrição da viagem de D. Francisco de Almeida... pela costa oriental de África' [1506], Munich Library, 'Manuscrito de Valentim Fernandes', section 9, DPM I p 524: [In Kilwa] "there are many sambucos, some as large as a fifty ton caravel, others smaller. The big ones are always kept beached until a voyage begins. No nails are used, the hull being stitched with palm fibre which also serves to attach the rudder. They are waterproofed with white resin and gum. The vessels sail from here to Sofala, whence they bring gold, a distance of 255 leagues, and to other places."

The zambuks with their shallow draught, resilient construction and versatile lateen sail, were ideal craft for coastal and riverine traffic on the shoal-barred east African coast. There is mention in 1516 of the purchase of two large and one small zambuks for use at Sofala (Receipt and expenditure book of Cristovão Salema, factor of Sofala [1516], TT, Núcleo Antigo, m. 167, doc.806,44v, DPM IV p 424).

The word zambuk is now entirely forgotten at Sofala, but another term for a small vessel is remembered: almadia, derived from Berber al-maʿdiya, a ferry or dugout. The Ndau fishermen of Sofala use a variant, mwadiya to indicate a dugout log canoe of up to sixteen feet in length.

(29) (a) Order from captain Pereira of Sofala to the factor of Kilwa, Kilwa, 14.i.1507, TT, CC II, 12-48, DPM II p 36
(b) Ditto, 18.i.1507, TT, CC II, 12-59, DPM II p 64
(c) Minutes of Straits Fleet Council [Mozambique 25.i.1509] TT, Gavetas XV, 19-22, DPM II p 326-328

(30) e.g. (a) Register fragment, 20.iii,1510, TT, CC II 21-45, DPM II p 424
(b) Abstract by Sec. of State Carneiro of a letter from Lourenço Moreno & Diogo Pereira to the king, 20.xii.1510 item 2, DPM II p 560.

On land, relations between Portuguese and Sofalan Swahili fluctuated greatly, and constituted a vital element in the vicissitudes of trade at the port. The viceroy in 1507 proposed that the trade of Sofala be placed in the hands of the Muslims, for much gold could be obtained from them. (31) This policy evidently found favour, for Duarte de Lemos, captain in 1509 was accused of having allowed Moorish trade to oust Portuguese. (32) In 1511 the Muslim traders were still regarded by Sofala's captain as a permanent feature of the port, if only for the reason that the Portuguese "had not sufficient men to eject them." At the same time concern was mounting that the Cuama provided a serious leakage in the Portuguese trade system. (33) In the same year, personnel of the Estado da Índia were allowed to form trading associations with the Swahili, as long as the Europeans did not sell any of their ships. (34) The shareholders were even allowed to trade gold for a time. (35)

Despite this enlightened if self-interested policy at certain levels, the Sofala sheikhs did not accept the ruin of the power wielded by their predecessors without a continuing struggle. One sheikh was deported by the Portuguese, and his successor, Maulide, fearing the same fate awaited him, slipped off in 1511 to chief Maconde's capital and stirred up a campaign of implacable hatred against the Europeans. Trade in gold and foodstuffs was strangled with the cooperation of the Africans in control of the coastal plain and the Muslim wardens at small ports south of Sofala, and had factor Perestrelo not pursued and killed Maulide, the sheikh might

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(31) Abstract by Sec. of State Carneiro of a letter from Albuquerque to the king, 10.xi.1507, TT, Gavetas XX 4-15, item 5, DPM II p 218.

(32) Letter, factor Diogo Vaz of Mozambique to Sec. of State Carneiro, Mozambique, 4.ix.1509, TT, CC I 8-14, section 2, DPM II p 380.

(33) Abstract by Sec of State Carneiro of letters by captain Saldanha of Sofala, [1511] previously quoted, sections 6 & 10, DPM III pp 14, 16.

(34) Extract from instructions for factor Lourenço Moreno [1511] TT, Cartas dos vicereis, no 139, fls 2 & 2 v, DPM III p 24.

(35) (a) Abstract by Sec of State Carneiro of letters by captain Saldanha [1511] already quoted, item 7, DPM III p 14.
(b) Ibid, section 15, DPM III p 18.

well have sounded the death knell of Portuguese Sofala. This crisis seems to have been precipitated by the folly of factor Perestrelo in trying to reverse the policy of expediency and eject all Swahili from Sofala. (36) It illustrates how precarious was the hold of Portugal in south-east Africa, and how much the security of a coastal station could depend upon a successful foray.

Closely contemporary with the bold coup of Perestrelo was the wise despatch into the interior of that remarkable ship's carpenter and degredado, António Fernandes, who found the Swahili trading along the Cuama, encouraged by the recent closure of Portuguese Kilwa, hoping that continued Muslim pressure would force the closing of Sofala too. Before Fernandes' visits, the Africans had been frightened to renew their visits to the feitoria; the fear was Swahili-inspired. (37) Reference to Appendix 2 will show that around the time of Fernandes' first two great journeys to the monomotapa, factor Soares traded 6,500 to 7,000 miticals up to 1513, while the trade for 1513 and 1514 leapt to the record total of 25,028 miticals. Fernandes' success in persuading chiefs to send embassies again to the feitoria clearly had a most beneficial effect on trade.

Fernandes' last great journey to the goldfields some two years after his second visit, prompted Almada's glowing tribute: "they worship him as they would a god, so that wherever he journeys, where wars are in progress they are stopped for love of him." (38) The trade record for the period following the last great journey is less impressive: 11,818 miticals for the two years following 1516: less than half the 1513-1514 figure. The

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(36) Statement by clerks Sobrinho and Homem, 15.iv.1512, already quoted, fl 1, DPM III p 236.

(37) Ibid, fl 3 v, DPM III p 240.

(38) Letter, captain Almada of Sofala, Sofala, 26.vi.1516, TT, CC I, 20-64, section 4, DPM IV p 282.

reason lies in the rise to power of Nyamunda, new lord of the coastal plain. In 1515, references to Moconde cease and references to Nyamunda begin, and during the same year he is reported at war with both Nyambia, north of Sofala, and the monomotapa. (39) It was necessary for the Portuguese to woo not only the upland Karanga king, controller of the gold-producing areas, (40) but also Nyamunda who between 1515 and 1528 expanded his hold over the trade routes from Sofala to the plateau until it was absolute. Increasingly, the critical factor became relations with Nyamunda. In 1515 he made a bid for firearms and a Christian, not for his doctrine, but for his skill with weapons, aware, no doubt, of the immense advantage that European weapons would give him in his struggle against his enemies. (41) He demonstrated his eagerness to trade and gain support from Portuguese Sofala by sending 1,500 miticals of gold in December 1515 and January 1516. (42) Sofala at the time was poorly stocked with trade goods (43) and the captain refused for the time to send

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(39) (a) Expenditure book of clerk Lopes of Sofala [1515] already quoted, fl 22 v, DPM IV p 142.
(b) Letter, captain Almada of Sofala, 26.vi.1516, already quoted, section 2, DPM IV 276 - 278.

(40) The monomotapa controlled the gold production in his Karanga kingdom: see Alcaçova's letter of 20.xi.1506, already quoted, fl 1 v, DPM I p 390, and D. António de Silveira's letter of c 1528, already quoted, fl 8, DPM V p 566. He had authority also over "a city of Benamutapa", six days' journey south, where much gold was also obtained: see Barbosa, op. cit., section 4, DPM V pp 374 - 376. This could be a reference to gold- collecting at Great Zimbabwe, although the 250 miles would need more than twice the six days estimated.

(41) Captain Almada's letter of 26.vi.1516, already quoted, section 4, DPM IV p 282.

(42) (a) Ibid, section 2, DPM IV p 278.
(b) Ibid, section 4, DPM IV pp 284 - 286.

(43) Ibid, section 4, DPM IV p 286.

guns and white men. (44) This situation could well have infuriated Nyamunda, but through the assiduous efforts of António Fernandes, who spent an entire year at the chief's court, (45) the arteries of trade remained open and supplies of meat were sent by Nyamunda to the feitoria. (46)

That Nyamunda, master of the coastal plain rather than of the gold-producing plateau, should have been able to send considerable quantities of gold to Sofala is a measure of the control he was beginning to exert over the trade links with the interior. The decline in the gold received at Sofala between 1513 and 1518 was steep, but was soon followed by an almost complete dessication of trade. Before passing to this subsequent period, two important aspects of the Sofalan economy are to be examined: neglect of the ivory trade and the growth of private trade.

Professor Axelson has remarked on the apparent obsession with gold at Sofala to the neglect of ivory, (47) and it is pertinent to test the truth of the statement and examine, if true, the reasons for this strange neglect. Herds of elephant roamed close to Sofala when the Portuguese were constructing their fort. (48) One Portuguese official at least was aware as early as 1506 of the availability of ivory and the profits to be made from it. (49) Yet there is documentary evidence of very slight exploitation of the commodity before 1519. (50) During the first year of

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(44) Captain Almada's letter of 26.vi.1516, already quoted, section 4, DPM IV p 284.

(45) Sofala wage and maintenance roll, Sofala, 31.iii.1518, TT, CC II, 74-45, fl 7, DPM V p 428.

(46) Letter, Cristovão de Távora to the king, [1518 - 1519] already quoted, fl 2, DPM VI p 4.

(47) A.V. Axelson, op. cit., 1940, pp 162 - 163.

(48) Correa, op. cit., 'Dom Francisco d'Almeida, 1505' RSEA II p 13.

(50) Abstract from letter by captain Fogaça of Kilwa to the king, 31.viii.1506, TT, Gavetas XX 4-15, fl 10 v, DPM I p 620.

(51) See Appendix 3.

trade, which produced 8,176 miticals of gold, only 45 *faracollas*, or 9½ quintals of ivory were received at Sofala. (51) For factor Pessoa's period of twenty months up to November 1509, which realized 76 quintals, no comparis n with the gold trade is possible. A si ilar average amount of ivory was taken by factor Soares, 81 quintals over two years, but the gold trade had then advanced to the highest volume recorded in extant Sofalan documents: 25,028 miticals. Factor Brito at the end of one year of office showed what could be derived from the ivory merchants visiting Sofala by sending 150 quintals to India.

Calculations based on known prices of ivory and estimated profits show that the trade had a great potential. (52) Comparing factor Brito's ivory trade with that of his predecessors indicates that Axelson's statement is sound: the Portuguese did at first (in the first decade and a half) neglect

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(51) The faraçolla was 27 lb, the quintal 128 lb. (See António Nunes, 'Livro dos pesos da Índia, e asy medidas e mohedas' written in 1554, printed in *Subsidios para a história da Índia Portugueza*, ed. Rodrigo José de Lima Felner, Lisbon, 1868. See also note 31 to chapter I.

(52) (a) Captain Fogaça of Kilwa estimated in 1506 that ivory costing 15 miticals in east Africa could realise up to 100 in India.

(b) In 1515 a Sofala price for ivory may be calculated thus:
6½ *arrobas* of ivory cost 2 *arrateis* of pepper + 6 double *vespiças* (see clerk Lopes' expenditure book of 1515 already quoted, fl 13 v, DPM IV p 90 & 92) 1 *arrátel* of pepper = ½ mitical (ibid fl 5 v, DPM IV p 50) so 2 *arrateis* of pepper = 1 mitical. 2 double *vespiças*, new = 5 miticals (ibid fl 13, DPM iv p 88) so 6 *vespiças* = 15 miticals. Total price = 16 miticals.
1 *arroba* = 33 lb (Taylor's Portuguese Dictionary)
1 *quintal* = 128 lb (see note 51 supra)

$$6\tfrac{1}{2} \text{ arrobas} = \frac{33}{128} \times \frac{13}{2} \text{ quintals} = \frac{429}{256}$$

The price per quintal is thus approximately $\frac{256}{429} \times 16$ mit., or 9.5 miticals.
A reasonable yearly load was 40 quintals, whose purchase price would be 380 miticals; the best selling price on Fogaça's estimate could have reached $\frac{100}{15} \times 380 = 2533$ miticals, giving a gross profit of 2,153 miticals, equal to twice a good year's gold takings.

a potentially rich trade. Is there any reason, apart from a natural predilection for the more profitable (by weight) and convenient trade in gold, for such a neglect? There is evidence for two interlinked factors inhibiting the official Portuguese ivory trade. One is the constant serious lack of shipping space for such a bulky cargo; the other is the perpetual presence of private trade, Muslim and Portuguese, licensed and unlicensed, which undoubtedly drew off the major proportion of the trade in ivory. The factors will be considered in that order.

The anchorages close to Sofala could be reached only by small coastal vessels. (53) The regular coastal patrol based on Sofala consisted of three such small vessels augmented very occasionally by a fourth. Two of the regular flotilla were brigantines and the third was a small caravel of about forty tons. (54) The brigantines, requiring a crew of sixteen to twenty oarsmen each, were used for river journeys, local coastal patrol and supply foraging close to Sofala, and were capable of carrying only a

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(53) Chroniclers record that only Anaia's smaller vessels could cross the Sofala shoal: e.g. Figueroa, op. cit., tit. 7, McKenna, p 37.

(54) For brief descriptions of vessels see Axelson, op. cit. 1940, pp 128 - 131. The usefulness of the brigantine and small caravels in river estuary work is urged by Almada in 1516 (see his letter of 26.vi.1516 to the king, already quoted, fl 8 v, DPM IV p 288). Three vessels are mentioned at Sofala in 1517 of which the largest, the Conceyçam, had the smallest crew of eight only. This vessel was the true caravel in the flotilla, although all three craft are referred to as caravellas, and it was the Conceyçam which conveyed ivory to Mozambique. The other two vessels had a combined complement of thirty-two officers and men, which suggests that they were really brigantines requiring larger crews for their rowing benches.

very modest payload. (55) The vessel used to take ivory from Sofala, normally to Mozambique Island, returning with food supplies for the garrison, was the small caravel. (56)

The problem of conveying ivory from Sofala was one of space, and was particularly acute in the early years of the feitoria. Construction of Mozambique fort began in 1508 (57) and staffing was on the slenderest lines (58) requiring, therefore, augmentation from Sofala. The captain of Sofala, from the appointment of Vasco Gomes d'Abreu in 1507, and throughout the rest of the sixteenth century, commanded Mozambique also. (59) A pattern developed of the captain and a contingent of up to twenty-one men being absent from Sofala for three-quarters of the year. (60) They went by sea to Mozambique in the Sofala caravel, and the voyage could take from eight to thirty-nine days, depending on weather. (61) Such a complement of men and requirements of space for provisions would leave

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(55) e.g. the foraging expeditions of António Fernandes to Bangoe (the Pungwe mouth) twenty-five miles north of Sofala, recorded in Lopes' expenditure book of 1515, already quoted, fl 23, DPM IV p 144.

(56) e.g. Order from provost Almada to factor Salema, Sofala, 4.viii.1517, TT, CC II, 71-72, DPM V p 178.

(57) Letter, Duarte de Lemos to the king, Mozambique, 30.ix.1508, TT, CC I, 7-47, section 8, DPM II, p 290.

(58) Draft letter from captain Miranda of Sofala to the king, [1514] TT, CC Fragmentos, m 22, section 4, DPM III p 522.

(59) F Mendes, Cátalogo dos capitães-gerais e governadores de Moçambique, Lisbon, 1892.

(60) See Appendix 4.

(61) An eight day voyage is mentioned in João dos Santos, Éthiopia Oriental, 2 parts, Évora, 1609, bk 3, ch 17, RSEA VII pp 180 - 182. In really inclement weather, however, thirty nine days could be spent at sea - this was no doubt a very exceptional instance. See Figueroa, op. cit., tit. 18, McKenna p 61.

little room for a cargo of ivory. (62) No extra shipping was available from India once Albuquerque's expansion began in 1508 with the attack on Ormuz. Portuguese naval resources were stretched from this date on. Officials in east Africa complained in vain that on their side of the Indian Ocean there was a lack of shipping and craftsmen to keep the existing vessels in repair or make replacements. (63) The viceroy insisted that no help was to be expected from India, (64) and later ordered that with only three ships, António de Saldanha should patrol the entire east coast of Africa. (65) With such examples of the desperate shortages in Portuguese ships in east Africa, the Treasury caveat of 1510 that no Portuguese ships were to be sold to the Moors occasions no surprise, (66) and the reason for the early neglect of the ivory trade becomes clear. Only when the pressure of troop movement from Sofala to Mozambique was lessened, could the ivory trade be expected to improve.

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(62) The dimensions of a forty ton caravel would be of the order of 50' long by 17' maximum beam. The weight of 22 men, averaging 150 lb gives a total of 3,300 lb, which would only slightly tax the capacity of a ship of 100,800 lb (using 252 liquid gallons per ton, 10 lb per gallon). This would leave ample weight allowance for ivory, but not space.

(63) (a) Letter, Duarte de Lemos to the king, 30.ix.1508, already quoted, section 12, DPM II p 294.
(b) Minutes of Straits Council, Mozambique, 24.ii.1509, TT, Gavetas XV. 19-22, fl 3v, DPM II p 332.
(c) Letter, Távora to the king, [1518 - 1519] already quoted, fl 1 v, DPM VI p 4.

(64) Abstract by Sec. of State, Carneiro, of letter from Albuquerque to king, 10.xi.1507, TT, Gavetas XX, 4-15, item 6, DPM II p 218.

(65) Letter, Afonso de Albuquerque to king, Cochin, 20.viii.1512, TT, CC I 22-66, section 17, DPM III p 354.

(66) Copy, letter from Barac de Alvito, Almeirim, 14.vi.1510, TT, CC I, 8-68, fl 1 v, DPM II p 406.

The Portuguese, desperately short of shipping in east Africa, had to choose between maritime enterprises equally valuable to them, as for instance in 1516, when no trade embassy to chief Nyamunda, anxious for commercial relations with Sofala, could be sent since Sofalan craft were all deployed on provision-seeking. (67) Whereas the Portuguese in east Africa were in such a dire strait regarding shipping resources, and were promised no relief from Europe or India, (68) the Swahili were not so desperate despite the Portuguese eagerness to take unlicensed vessels as prizes. (69) Licensed Swahili merchants carried ivory freely (70) and much of the trade must have remained in Muslim hands in the 1506 - 1528 period when the Portuguese were at such a disadvantage.

It is revealing to compare the graph of the gold trade with that of ivory. (71) As the gold trade declines at the end of the third decade, the ivory trade rises. One reason for this contrary movement could be

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(67) Almada's letter of 26.vi.1516, already quoted, fl 2v, DPM IV p 278

(68) They were in fact driven to buying zambuks from the Swahili to make good their losses: see Receipt and Expenditure Book of factor Cristóvão Salema, Sofala, [26.viii.1516] TT, Núcleo antigo, m 167, doc 806, fl 44 v, DPM IV p 424. See also letter of Cristóvão de Tavora [1518 - 1519] already quoted, fls 1 v & 2, DPM VI p 4 for an example of very poorly repaired and improvised vessels.

(69) (a) Abstract by Sec. of State Carneira of letter by Pero Vaz da Horta, 4.iii.1507, already quoted, item 3, DPM II p 178.
(b) Abstract by Sec. of State Carneira of Saldanha's letters [1511] already quoted, item 1, DPM III p 10.
(c) Letter of factor Soares, 30.vi.1513, already quoted, fl 2 v, DPM III p 464.
(d) Letter, Albuquerque to king, 25.x.1514, TT, CC I, 16-68, item 2, DPM III p 560.

(70) (a) Order from captain Pereira of Sofala to the factor of Kilwa, Kilwa, 18.i.1507, TT, CC II 12-59, DPM II p 64.
(b) Letter from factor Vaz of Mozambique to Casa da Índia e Guiné superintendent, Mozambique, 4.ix.1509, TT, CC I 8-40, item 2, DPM II p 374.
(c) Letter, Diogo Vaz to Sec. of State, Mozambique, 4.ix.1509, TT, CC I 8-41, item 2, DPM II p 380.
(d) Barbosa, op. cit., c 1518, sections 5 & 6, DPM V p 362.

(71) See Appendices 2 & 3.

that Nyamunda's blockade of the gold routes forced the Portuguese to turn to a commodity which lay on their very doorstep and was much less vulnerable to Nyamunda's stranglehold than gold. Certainly the local crisis at its severest coincides with the opening of a period of growing emphasis on ivory rather than gold.

One of the gravest factors preventing the Treasury from benefitting from Sofala was the extent of private trade, licensed and unlicensed, in the hands of both Portuguese and Swahili. One may observe in the period 1505 - 1518 the growth of such trade in both gold and ivory which quite seriously reduced the royal revenue. The regimento issued by the king to Almeida in 1505 laid down instructions about the recording of items of licensed trade and the amount of duty to be paid by the private traders.[72] No exclusions are evident at this stage, but a later document prohibits the private trade in ivory.[73] Private licensed trade evidently reached vast proportions, for viceroy Albuquerque commented in 1510 that while no revenue accrued from Sofalan trade, gold in the hands of private individuals proceeding from Sofala to India amounted to 30,000 miticals.[74] He added that the proceeds of prizes were going into private pockets too.[75] If the viceroy is not here guilty of exaggeration[76] this figure represents

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(72) Instructions to captain-major Almeida, 5.iii.1505, previously quoted, sections 39,41,42,46,48, & 50, DPM I pp206-8, 210-14, 216-18, 220 & 224.

(73) Law of D. Manuel, Lisbon, 6.iii.2505, TT, Leis, m 2, doc 14, fl 1 v, DPM I p 264.

(74) Abstract by Sec. of State Carneira of a letter from Lourenço Moreno and Diogo Pereira to king, 20.xii.1510, TT, Cartas de Afonso de Albuquerque, m único, doc 1, item 1, DPM II, p 560.

(75) Ibid, item 2.

(76) As in his statement that over 20,000 men attacked Portuguese Sofala in 1506 (Letter of 1.iv.1512, already quoted, DPM III p 222) where Castanheda is satisfied with 1,000 and Barros does not exceed 6,000. In the matter of private trade to India, of course, the viceroy was in a better position to know.

an annual private trade under license of 10,000 miticals, an annual average equal to that of the royal trade in the first five years served by financial documents. (77)

The eagerness to recoup oneself in the three year term of office was one of the causes of active private trade. There was another. It is evident that at times officials' salaries were not paid at all promptly. (78) Goods were sometimes substituted for coin; (79) the official had then no recourse other than to trade privately in order to live.

In addition to legitimate private trade, it is clear that embezzlement and such smuggling were practised. The first accusation of embezzlement was levelled against acting captain Fernandes in respect of his conduct in 1506. (80) Savage penalties were prescribed to control smuggling (81) but the stakes were high enough for many to risk the rigours of the royal wrath. There are hints in 1507 of Sofalan gold being "handled very freely." (82) Duarte de Lemos, self-appointed captain of Sofala reported

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(77) See Appendix 2. Residents after a three year period in a feitoria could proceed to Portugal via India if no ship was available to take them home direct: see regulations for Sofala 20.v.1530, already quoted, fls 12 v & 13, DPM VI p 338.

(78) e.g. in 1513: see letter, Pero Quaresma to king, Mozambique, 25.vii.1513, TT, CC I 13-26, DPM III p 476 - 478.

(79) Order from Albuquerque to former factor of Kilwa, Cannanore, 9.x.1512, TT, CC II, 34-147, DPM III p 378, where ivory is substituted for wages.

(80) Enquiry ordered by captain Pereira of Sofala, [Sofala] 25.ii.1507, TT, CC II, 12-98, DPM II, pp 170 - 176.

(81) Instructions for captain-major Almeida 5.iii.1505, already quoted, section 47, DPM I pp 218 - 220.

(82) Abstract by Sec. of State of letter from Albuquerque to king, 6.ii.1507, Gavetas XX, 4-15, item 1, DPM II p 114.

in 1508 the activities of important Portuguese officials in Mozambique exchanging cloth for Sofalan gold via the Swahili of Angoxa who were bribed to assist with their fishing boats. (83) The complaint was renewed in 1515. (84)

Around 1510, the private handling of gold must have been forbidden, for a letter from captain Saldanha mentions the recent ban and his assiduity in confiscating 2,000 miticals' worth of contraband goods, the culprits being despatched to India to face charges. (85) The captain of Sofala himself, Simão de Miranda, was accused with the clerk of Mozambique, Gaspar Veloso, of private trading in Sofalan gold and of ensuring the sale of his own cloth at Sofala (for which he held a royal licence) by withholding the king's cloth until his own was sold. (86)

Further accusations against Veloso in 1517 strengthen the impression that he was guilty of malpractice. (87) The number of references to private trade, licensed and unlicensed, suggest that this was the principal factor depriving the Treasury of its expected return from Sofala. Comparing

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(83) Letter, Duarte de Lemos, 30.ix.1508, already quoted, section 14, DPM II p 296.

(84) Letter of Vaz Almada, 26.vi.1516, already quoted, item 8, DPM IV p 292

(85) Abstract by Sec. of State Barreira of letters by captain Saldanha of Sofala [1511] already quoted, item 7, DPM III p 14.

(86) Letter from Pero da Fonseca, provost and factor of Mozambique, to the king, Mozambique, 9.ii. [1514] TT, Cartas dos vicereis no 144, fls 2 & 2 v, DPM III p 530.

(87) Letter, captain Cristóvão de Távora to king, Mozambique, 20.ix.1517, TT, CC I, 22-85, DPM V pp 198 - 204.

the cost of the establishment with the income figures [88] for the feitoria shows that the situation was not even as healthy as Albuquerque imagined when he commented on the strange fact that the income of Sofala always just managed to equal the costs of the station. [89] At least one official, in a letter of 1513 to the king, revealed the other side of the coin: the extravagant wage-bill of the top Sofalan officials. The posts of captain and provost, carrying the highest salaries, could well be abolished, he suggested, and their responsibilities absorbed by the factor. [90] The opinion was naturally that of the factor! It was a counsel which Lisbon was very tardy to adopt: seventeen years elapsed before the scheme was adopted even in part. [91]

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(88) See Appendix 2. The approximate cost of the 1506 garrison amounted to 6,886 miticals, while income was 5,553. In 1516 the comparison is 5,658 miticals running costs against an income assessed as one third of the 12,818 miticals for the years 1516 - 1518, = 4,273. A steep rise in costs, including back pay, for 1517, amounted to 7,108 miticals, as against the average income figure of 4,273.

(89) See note 17 supra.

(90) Letter, factor Soares, 30.vi.1513, already quoted, fls 2 & 2 v, DPM III p 464.

(91) In the Sofala regimento already quoted for 1530, the posts of captain and factor were combined. See section 1, DPM VI p 306.

APPENDICES 2 'Sofala's gold trade'
3 'Sofala's ivory trade 1506 - 1519'
4 'Size of garrisons and crews 1508 - 1518'
all appear at the end of the text.

CHAPTER III THE JOURNEYS OF ANTÓNIO FERNANDES *

On October 25th 1514, viceroy Albuquerque summarized information on Sofala's trade given to him by the captain, Simão de Miranda. (1) It was so scanty as barely to cover the establishments costs, and the only ones profiting were the Muslims. Sofala, moreover, was by-passed by Muslim merchants established at "the river of Amgoja" and another river closer to Sofala where Cambay cloth was received via Mogadishu, Barawa, Pate, Lamu, Malindi and Mombasa. Small boats brought the textiles into south-east Africa whenever the Swahili of Mozambique Island reported the coast clear of Portuguese naval patrols. Miranda had requested an extra brigantine to strengthen his patrol and this had been supplied.

In the same despatch the viceroy made brief reference to "the man whom Sofala's officials had ordered to discover the city of Menamotapa, source of gold." The king, Albuquerque presumed, had already been informed of this enterprise.

Although no letter from captain Miranda survives giving information about Albuquerque's unnamed explorer, a long despatch to the king, copied no doubt to the viceroy, by Miranda's factor, Pero Vaz Soares, is extant. (2) This letter expands on the necessity which forced the Sofala command to initiate the peaceful penetration of the hinterland, and gives the essential background to the journeys to the Karanga capital. In eight months following his assumption of duty in October 1512, Soares had traded only up to 7,000 miticals of gold. 5,000 miticals had been absorbed by half a year's running expenses, including back pay. Despite the general peace which had prevailed since the monomotapa had concluded his recent wars, gold was not flowing in in sufficient quantity from the African uplands. What arrived was carried by Sofala's Muslim merchants

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* See map at end of chapter.

(1) Letter, viceroy Albuquerque to the king, Goa, 25.x.1514, TT, CC I, 16-68, DPM III p 558-560.

(2) Letter, factor Soares to the king, Sofala, 30.vi.1513, TT, CC I, 18-27, DPM III p 458-468.

who operated well-established fairs inland at which traders from the gold plateau gathered. The metal was scattered in small quantities throughout the producing area, making it uneconomical for any one producer to market it far afield. More serious in preventing direct contact between Portuguese Sofala and the Karanga plateau, however, was the persistent Swahili propaganda campaign to persuade the inland chiefs that the Europeans were profiteering and that honest trade was conducted only by the Muslims. To the Swahili stranglehold on Sofala was added the vast Muslim smuggling activity based on Angoxa and also on the great river Cuama (note the closeness here with the viceroy's summary quoted above). (3)

Both the Angoxa-Cuama and the Sofala situations had been tackled boldly, added Soares. A caravel had been sent to the Cuama mouth but this peaceful mission was extinguished in a treacherous attack by the Moorish of the estuary. To rulers of the Sofala hinterland the captain had sent envoys every six months with gifts and the king's banner to display as a sign of loyalty and an indication that traders would receive protection.

Such dangerous missions inland were commonly assigned to degredados and two documents naming an explorer, almost certainly a degradado ship's carpenter named António Fernandes, member of Sofala's garrison since 1505, were discovered, transcribed and translated by Professor Axelson in the Lisbon archives before the outbreak of World War II. (4) One of the

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(3) Cuama was the name given to the lower Zambezi: see, for example, the map in the style of Gaspar Viegas, [1537] reproduced in PMC I 49A, and Diogo Homem's Atlas of 1568, PMC II 137. Santos writes of the Cuama river when he deals with the coast (op. cit. 2.4. RSEA VI p 76). When he treats of the river between Sena and Tete, he uses the name 'Zambezi' (op. cit. 1.6. RSEA VII p 80). For Angoxa see note 27 of chapter II.

(4) E.V. Axelson, op.cit. 1940 p 278-281 (doc 124, Veloso); 255-260 (doc 62, Almada). The manuscripts are also reproduced in DPM:
(a) Notes made by Gaspar Veloso, clerk of Mozambique, and sent to the king [1512] TT, Cartas dos vicereis no 162, DPM III p 180-188.
(b) Letter, provost Almada to the king, Sofala, 26.vi.1516, TT, CC I, 20-64, DPM IV p 274-294.

documents, provost Alamada's letter, is firmly dated June 26th 1516, but lacks a notebook which Almada sent with it; the other, a notebook by Gaspar Veloso, with its accompanying letter missing, is full of puzzling geographic, political and economic detail and is unfortunately undated. By internal evidence it is likely to belong to late 1512 or early 1513. (5) Detailed interpretation of the two manuscripts was attempted by Hugh Tracey in 1940. (6) It has long been evident that his ingenious thesis is seriously awry. (7)

Tracey claims that Fernandes in his first journey described by Veloso took the Buzi - Sabi river route to the Karanga capital. The conjecture is based on two misconceptions: that the Angoxa river mentioned in the 'Apontamentos' as full of contraband trade lay south of Sofala, and that the traveller had to trek south to avoid the dangers of attack in the territory of the powerful chief Nyamunda whom Tracey mistakenly sites north of Sofala. Unfortunately, the one map which Tracey can quote in support

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(5) Veloso is first mentioned as clerk of Mozambique in 1512: Receipt, 10.vii.1512, TT, CC II, 25-7, DPM III p 318. His manuscript mentions the closing of Kilwa as a recent event. Barros, op. cit. 1.10.6., ASEA VI p 133, records the closing of Portuguese Kilwa and the transfer of Captain Francisco Pereira, without, however, giving any date. An order from viceroy Albuquerque to the former factor of Kilwa, Cannanore, 9.x.1512, TT, CC II, 34-147, DPM III p 378, supplies the missing link, dating the closure to before the date of the order by referring to Francisco Pereira as "captain que foy da dita fortaleza [Kilwa]."

(6) His 'António Fernandes, discoverer of Monomotapa' was originally deposited in typescript with the National Archives of Rhodesia, then translated into Portuguese and edited by Caetano Montez, published as António Fernandes, descobridor de Monomotapa, Lourenço Marques, 1940. It has since appeared in English, in Rhodesiana, vol. 19, Dec. 1968, p 1 - 26.

(7) Caetano Montez, op. cit. in editorial comment, R.A. Godlonton in his 'Journeys of António Fernandes' Transactions of the Rhodesia Scientific Association, vol 40, April 1945, amended by himself in the same journal, vol 48, 1960, p 44-48, and commented on by J.F. Schofield, 'The journeys of António Fernandes, some footnotes' in the same journal, vol 42, March 1949, p 84-93 and A. Lobato in A expansão portuguesa em Moçambique de 1498 a 1530, vol III, Lisbon 1960, have all rejected the Sabi route theory.

of a southern Angoxa is Pigafetta's of 1591. (8) The map is so inaccurate in comparison with other Portuguese charts from the time of Gaspar Viegas, c. 1537, which all show Angoxa between Quelimane and Mozambique Island, that it would be quite impossible to trust its information. (9) The remarks of Albuquerque and Soares about the two rivers of Muslim contraband activity make clear the sequence from north to south as Angoxa, Cuama and Sofala. One may be quite certain that Tracey is in error here, as his Portuguese editor in 1940 (10) and Godlonton in 1945 (11) pointed out.

The view that Fernandes was forced to use the Sabi valley because of Nyamunda's hostility is open to the following objection. The first journey of Fernandes, reported in 1512 or 1513 is most likely to have been made in 1511 or 1512, which is too early for the Nyamunda threat to Sofala. It was in fact not Nyamunda but Mocende whose activities threatened the existence of Portuguese Sofala by the food embargo which sheikh Maulide of Sofala had persuaded him to impose in 1511. The position of both Mocende and Nyamunda lay south of Sofala, (12) and if Fernandes had to choose it would have been in favour of a route north of Sofala, along the line of the Revue river towards Vila de Manica.

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(8) Tracey, op.cit. 1940, p 64 - 65. The map he reproduces corresponds very closely with that figured under the name Duarte Lopes, c 1590, PMC III 386. Santos was rightly suspicious of the cartographic skill of Lopes who produced the information on which Pigafetta's map was drawn: Ethiópia Oriental, 2.15, RSEA VII p 103, "Pigafetta... por informaçao de ... Duarte Lopes, faz uma descripçao das terras e cousas d'esta Ethiopia na qual troca uns rios por outros, e reinos por reinos..."

(9) cf Anónima [Gaspar Viegas, c. 1537] PMC I 49 A;
Diogo Homem, 1568, PMC II 137;
Fernão Vaz Dourado, 1580, PMC III 322

(10) Tracey, op. cit., 1940, pp 82 & 101.

(11) Godlonton, op. cit., 1945, p 92.

(12) Tracey in fact reverses the positions of Nyamunda and Nyambia (Embya or Nhambia): see his end maps in António Fernandes, 1940.
Their true positions will be considered in chapter IV.

Lobato has pointed to another misconception in Tracey's thesis: treating the documents of Veloso and Almada as closely contemporary and as describing the same journeys. (13) Lobato's correction posits three journeys instead of Tracey's two: two short ones by the highland route, described in Veloso, undertaken around 1511 or 1512, and a third, much longer journey to the monomotapa, touching the Zambezi valley near Sena, dated 1513 - 1514. The revision seems entirely logical and is adopted in the outline of journeys now given.

The geography of the travels according to Tracey suffers from yet another disadvantage: It attempts to pinpoint chiefs' centres by calculating from Veloso's term jornada as comprising a distance of approximately fifteen miles of continuous progress. This kind of conjecture must be treated with extreme caution, since the tracks followed would be most devious, the halts to wait upon the whims of chiefs of unknown duration, and since, asLobato objects, it is seriously to be doubted whether the order of place-names in Veloso can be taken as a route. (14) The only safe method, therefore, is to fasten upon places about which we have information, and in doing this

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(13) Lobato, op. cit. ch 6. The core of Lobato's argument for separating the Almada journey from the Veloso two and for assigning dates of 1511-12 to the Veloso journeys and 1512-13 to his report is as follows: (a) Veloso's report was described as secret; Almada's, later, when the king had already received Veloso's information, was not. (b) Veloso writes of the closing of Kilwa [pre October 1512] as a recent event. (c) The two Veloso journeys were of short duration, the first 4 months, the second longer, say 6 months [this is supported, one may add, by reference in Soares' letter of 30.vi.1513, to six-monthly visits to inland rulers]. Fernandes was setting out on a third as Veloso wrote. (d) This must be the journey that Almada reports, since he writes that "Antoneo Fernandez ... he homem que tem ja ydo a Bonamotapa." (Section 4, DPM IV p 282) (e) Information about copper trading is fuller in Almada, indicating the fruits of a later journey than those in Veloso. (f) Information about the Cuama is more detailed in Almada, arising from Fernandes' visit to the riverside capital of Dhyaroro (Dunlarouro). It may be added that throughout 1510, Fernandes appears on the maintenance rolls of Sofala; he is absent in 1511 and 1512, evidently on his travels. (Lists for 1513 and 1514 are unfortunately missing.) Gaspar Veloso was clerk of Mozambique from 1512 to 1513, and thus available to write up the journeys of 1511 - 1512.

(14) Lobato, op. cit., p 235.

to allow the broad sequence to emerge, interrupted by intervals of fanning out from a centre. Godlonton has already provided a quite pebetrating analysis of the possibilities, and subsequent research has confirmed his outline. (14) It is not necessary to assume, although Veloso says so, that Fernandes visited all the areas mentioned. In some serious danger threatened, and in others no gold was available, both situations relieving the explorer of the necessity to penetrate further. The general line to Manica and then on to the Karanga capital would follow a well-established Muslim trade route. (15)

The first chief mentioned, Mycandira, ruled a region adjoining Sofala. He could offer only food and ivory, and was therefore on the coastal plain, probably quite close to the Muslim village at Sofala itself. (16) The site of Quytongue cannot be placed with any certainly, although attempts have been made to associate it with the chieftaincy which emerged in the later sixteenth century as Kiteve (Quiteve). Embya is identifiable as a variant of Nyambia (Nhambia), the chief who controlled the area known as Bangoe, on the lower Pungwe river. The banditry attributed to this ruler fits the general pattern of a chief attempting to make a profit on the trade to Manica and later having to contend bitterly with Nyamunda for control of the coastal plain. (17)

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(15) The Sofala river provided two lines of penetration: the Buzi, leading to the south-east edge of the plateau, the Revue, penetrating the massif towards Vila de Manica. The second was the great trade route, affording direct access to the gold of Manica. See Santos, op. cit., 1.2. RSEA VII p 3.

(16) The name is echoed in the name of Chief Makandara, whom the author met at his home, half a mile from the area of the old Muslim village site at Sofala, on the inland side, in 1970.

(17) See (a) Expenditure Book of Pedro Lopes, 1515, already quoted, fl 22v, DPM IV p 147: "Nhambya de quem ho dicto Nhamunde he grande imigo." (b) Ditto, fl 23 v DPM IV p 148, where Fernandes, on a foraging expedition to Bangoe is recorded as paying customs to the "cafres de Nhambya" there.

Of Inhacovce nothing can be established except that the products of food and ivory suggest the coastal plain. Ynhaçouce, the next capital listed, was evidently a place of importance as the seat of the 'captain-major' of the monomotapa (18) and the locality of regular trade-fairs where Swahili bought gold by weight. Although we cannot be sure of the position, we may assume that Fernandes was being taken by guides who knew the trade route well, by the most direct route to Manica. Ready availability of food suggests that the sparse highland soils had not yet been reached, and Schofield's suggestion that such a centre would develop at the canoe navigation limit on the Revue seems as sound a conjecture as any. (19)

Manhique is easily recognisable, and although the area appears to have stretched southwards to the Mount Selinda area in the sixteenth century, (20) Schofield, from finds of porcelain and trade beads, would locate it near the present Vila de Manica. (21) Amçoce, a gold-producing centre which had to import food, would fit into the context of the vast rocky plains west of Busape.

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(18) Mention of the captain-major of the monomotapa doesn't necessarily help in placing this site except through a remark made very much later by Bezende ('Do Estado da India', British Museum MS, originally in 1635, sent to Philip III of Portugal, section entitled 'Descripsam de Tete' RSEA II p 416) that the captain-major of the monomotapa, called Vacoana, was generally a Botonga. This particular incumbent Bezende placed in Botonga lands near Condessaca. Around 1513, Barbosa gives the Africa title as Sono ('Descripçao da situaçao .. de alguns lugares de Africa', already quoted, section entitles 'Zimboache' DPA V, p 360). Joao Teixeira I, 1630, PMC IV 469 A, places a very similar name south of the Sabi. The fact that both areas have 'Tongas' today should not be allowed to confuse the issue; the Zambezi Tongas are quite distinct ethnically from those south of the Sabi. The earlier captain-major - the Sono - was in the right position for a coastal official astride a trade route connecting the Indian Ocean with Great Zimbabwe: a position appropriate for the former capital of the Maranga kingdom. The later captain-major would quite certainly have to be out of an area controlled by rivals to the monomotapa, and the appropriate position then would be somewhere accessible to the Zambezi trade route in the seventeenth century, the Manica trade route in the sixteenth, before the Manica ruler was in a position to challenge the monomotapa.

(19) Schofield, op. cit., p 86.

(20) In Couto, for instance, Manica included in its hegemony the mines of Butua. (op. cit., 9.25., RSEA VII p 338) Early seventeenth century maps, the earliest that can be used for such inland information, are unreliable guides to the extent of Manica, tending to distort the true picture by elongating far to the south the course of the Ruenya river, and showing Masapa, for instance, known to be near Mount Darwin, on the latitude of Bazaruto: see J. Teixeira I, 1630, in PMC IV 469 A.

(21) op. cit., p 86.

Barwe is of great interest. The Barwe people today are among those who live amid the Inyanga ruins. According to Doke, they were not originally a Shona-speaking folk, but relate closely to the Sena cluster, and according to Summers may also have connections far to the north-east. (22) The sixteenth century position of the Barwe was probably nearer to Sena, on the edge of the Zambezi valley plain rather than in the upland refuges into which frequent raids later drove them. The Veloso statement about abundance of ivory supports such a location. (23)

Betongua, a thinly disguised reference to the Botonga lands along the southern shelf of the Zambezi valley (24) suggests that Fernandes probed towards the great river, although the thinness of his information at this stage prevents the assumption that he reached the river itself, particularly in the direction of Sena where on the third journey his host, chief Unyaroro was so unwilling to let him continue.

Ynhaperapera, a gold-mining area ruled by a powerful chief, was reported later as in the region of Sena. (25) For gold to be mined in this Tonga area, Ynhaperapera must have ruled the plateau edge, unlike the ruler near Sena whom Fernandes visited later close to the river, whose power derived from a position on the trade route.

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(22) See R. Summers et alia, Inyanga, CUP, 1958, pp 265 -268 for an interesting discussion on ribbed-ornamented ware at places as far apart as Gedi and Inyanga, indicating cultural contacts and possibly movements of people. It is becoming evident that much work needs to be done on the distribution and varieties within such a distinctive class of wares as the ribbed-ornamented, so different from the Shona tradition of deep or light incisions. The fact that this ceramic technique is to be observed in sherds occurring at Gedi, Kilwa and Inyanga (coming from the plains near Sena at some time before the upland terracing and fortifying?) is thought-provoking. Now into the general picture must be fitted the occurrence of raised pattern ware as yet undateable, but lying with Celadon and early Ming contexts (i.e. c 1500) in the old Muslim area of Sofala where the author has excavated in 1969 and 1970. It seems likely that the ceramic tradition is a Swahili one, borne by trade and settlement to the coastal and Zambezi areas of Muslim commerce.

(23) Rezende, op.cit., section entitled 'Descripcam de Senna', RSEA II p 387, places Baro (Baroe?) between Sena and Manica.

(24) See Santos, op.cit., 2.2., RSEA VII p 72.

(25) Faria y Sousa, Asia Portuguesa , Lisbon 1666 - 1674, 1.1.10., RSEA I p 26, here spelt Inaparapala.

Boece, if the name as seems likely is a form of Mesa, would be in the same general area as Barue, on the flood plain of the lower Zambezi. (26) Its ruler must have drawn his substance by dues from Swahili traders crossing his land, for no gold was obtainable there.

From Boece the upper Mazoe with its alluvial gold lies north-west, and fits the next chiefdom on Veloso's list, Mazofe. (27) The monomotapa's capital, where he was busy erecting a dry stone wall when Fernandes reached him, was called Camanhaya and lay in a district called Embire. So far no convincing identification of the site has been achieved, although a strong claim has been made by Abraham that Mutota's guta on the west bank of the Utete river was the zimbabwe, the Portuguese counterclaiming with a site across the border in Portuguese territory. (28)

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(26) Summers, op. cit. p 266 - 267.
(27) Couto, op. cit. q. 22 ?, SEA VI p 318

(28) Schofield, op. cit. 1949, p 89 would place Embire near Mount Darwin from association with the name Mbire between the upper Ruenya and Mutwa rivers (see also F. Posselt, 'The Watawara and the Batonga' in NADA 1929, p 80 - 83) and the presence of loopholed forts, presumably near Masapa, established close to the Karanga capital, near mount Quizinga (Chizinga today) south of the confluence of the Mazoe and Mkaradzi rivers, near the Kuhoza.

D.Abraham in 'The Monomotapa dynasty' NADA vol 36, 1959, p 64 identifies Mutota's zimbabwe by ethnohistoric investigation as next to Chitako- Changonya Hill, on the west bank of the Utete, tributary of the Musengezi. In his 'The early political history of the kingdom of MweneMutapa, in HIA 1962, p 66, he gives the name of the hill on which the dry stone wall was being built as Samanyai. The possibility that Mutota's ruin could have been an early sixteenth century enclosure is not denied by K.R. Robinson in his description of the site and its associated surface pottery. (See 'A note on Iron Age sites in the Zambezi valley', Arnoldia no 27, vol I, Feb. 1965.) No thorough archaeological research, however, has ever been conducted there.

Dr. V.H.V. Crilo, in 'A localizacao do zimbabwe de M'bire Nhantekwe', Monumenta, Lourenço Marques, no 4, 1968, puts forward another claim, based on field work which examined walls, recovered sixteenth century Portuguese weapons and African pottery (if, as he claims, the pottery is Gokomere-type, it has no connection with the ruins). The zimbabwe named in local tradition as that of Nhantekwe, (Nyanhehwe in Abraham's spelling, also called Matope, son of Mutota, first monomotapa) lies near the source of the river M'bire, Unfortunately, no excavation was undertaken, and the claim cannot therefore be more than presumptive at present.

It is known that the monomotapas like their villagers moved home from time to time, and this fact must complicate any claim to identify the very zimbabwe that Fernandes saw. (See Decada composta por António Bocarro, dedicated to Philip III of Portugal and first

cont. over

Next in the Veloso catalogue is Butua, rich source of gold extracted along the rivers, which would include the washing of mined quartz as well as the panning of alluvial metal. (29) Southern neighbour of the monomotapa, Butua was constantly at war with him. The area cannot be defined at all exactly from sixteenth century accounts, but was said to include on its vast plains the oldest mines in the country, amid which lay a fortress built of great stones, unmortared. The reference to a tall tower and other stone buildings on an adjacent hill confirms that great Zimbabwe was being described. (30) This gives us a southerly extent of Butua to the Fort Victoria area. Couto records trade connections between Butua and Angola. (31) Santos adds that the two lands touched each other, (32) which indicates a rough western limit for the vast chieftaincy.

A great river separated Monomotapa from Mombara, the next chiefdom mentioned. Copper in the form of ingots was brought over in canoes by Africans lighter-skinned than most, reputed to be cannibals and unable to communicate with the Karanga except by signs. It is unlikely that the Nunyani, as Tracey suggests, could be described as a great river. The

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note 28 continued

published in Lisbon 1876, ch 123, RSEA III p 267 in which the capital is described as surrounded not by stone, but by a wooden pallisade, and ibid ch 129, RSEA III p 282 where the monomotapa is said to have been on the river Monzovo for a year only. See also Bezende, op. cit. 'Descripsam de Tete', RSEA II p 393, in which the monomotapa is recorded as moving his capital after burning the old one.

(29) Goes, op. cit., 2.10., RSEA III p 55, includes under Butua recovery of gold by mining.

(30) Barros, op. cit., 1.10.1., RSEA VI p 112

(31) Couto, op. cit., 9.22, RSEA VI p 338

(32) Santos, op. cit., 2.10., RSEA VII p 91

river later referred to by the monomotapa's subjects as Empando, the Divider of his kingdom (modern Shona mupanda , a division) was the Zambezi, [33] and this most probably was the river Veloso refers to. Mombara may be linked with the vaMbara, a folk possessed of copper-smelting skills who lived mostly north of the Zambezi and made scattered settlements in the Urungwe district of Rhodesia, where they eventually became absorbed and Shona-ized. [34]

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(33) Santos, op. cit., 2.10., RSEA VII p 91.

(34) See P.S. Garlake, 'Iron Age sites in the Urungwe district of Rhodesia' in the South African Archaeological Bulletin no 97, June 1970, pp 40 - 41, and J.D. White's appendix 'Oral traditions in Urungwe'. Garlake's argument for the copper mentioned in Veloso being from the Urungwe district and not therefore from beyond the Zambezi (pp 41 - 43) does not dispose of the difficulty of applying the term 'great river' to the Nunyani rather than the Zambezi. The concentration of copper crosses, windmill-sail ingots of a typical Ingombe-Ilede/ Chedzurwe form, distinct, as Garlake notes, from those found in other parts of Rhodesia, and the majority of the 62 so far found occurring in the Urungwe area, is a powerful argument until further archaeological work is done in Zambia. The dating of the ingots, however, is not securely anchored to the early sixteenth century even though the artefacts clearly belong to the culture spanning the Zambezi. The remark in Veloso about copper traders being cannibals Garlake dismisses as a traveller's tale, but cannibalism north of the Zambezi, produced no doubt by periodic failure of essential crops and livestock mortality, is well documented (see Rezende, op. cit., 'Rios de Cuama', RSEA II pp 384 - 385 in which the horror expressed by the Karanga at the sight of cannibal Bororo north of the Zambezi, campaigning with human limbs as iron rations, is described). It is to be doubted, too, whether the copper needs of the growing Karanga state could be satisfied without calling on the vast resources north of the Zambezi. Almada later quotes Fernandes' information that the source was the rivers of the Manycomguo, which Garlake dismisses lightly. The case for Rhodesian copper supplying all the demands of the monomotapa seems yet unproven.

The limit reached by Fernandes at Ynhoqua is impossible to place with any certainty. (35) From this point on, his store of gifts exhausted, the traveller had to seek chiefdoms where he had already complied with the custom of depositing presents with each ruler. He, nevertheless, found it possible to journey by a different route, and where names very similar to some on the outward journey occur, the inference is that Fernandes is in the same chiefdom, but is giving Veloso the name of the country.

Monzambia, where cotton was processed for sale in Monomotapa, was a Zambezi valley area, probably close to Sena where cotton production for the monomotapa was later reported. (36) Mozimba, a name corresponding closely with that of a people later known to be moving down the north bank of the Zambezi. (37) would be hearsay information for Fernandes, as would that of Monzambia. The mention again of cotton suggests the same section of the valley, but the northern flank.

Quytenge looks like a repetition of Quytongue of the outward journey, and is probably in incorrect sequence: it would make more sense following Baro rather than preceding it. Batongua, from reference to

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(35) Schofield argues that Ynhoqua is Luanze, site of a subsequent Portuguese trade-fair some 20 miles N.E. of Mtoko (op. cit. p 89 - 90). His theory that Moorish trade-fairs were later taken over by the Portuguese (logical, but requiring the test of archaeology) and that Fernandes was taken by Muslim guides to such places cannot, unfortunately at present be proved.

(36) Monclaro, op. cit. 'Dos costumes dos cafres e da terra, minas, comercio, e de outras cousas', RSEA III p 180.

(37) Couto, op. cit., 11.6, 11.10 and 11.27, RSEA VI p 345 - 7, 351-2, and 334 - 7, giving descriptions of the Zimbas and their movements north of the Zambezi in the later sixteenth century.

abundant gold and ivory must be an upland part of the Tonga area previously said to have no gold. (38) The river "that comes to meet" the Cuama and issues into the ocean sixteen leagues from the bar of Sofala is hearsay comment for Fernandes in his first two journeys for the reason suggested earlier (p. 3). In the later account by Almada, the increasing mastery over the geography of the Zambezi valley which the third journey allowed Fernandes to gain is evident in his more accurate statement of forty leagues between Sofala and the Cuama mouth, as against the sixteen he conjectured earlier.

In the case of the small river of Angunge and the river of Quytenge, Fernandes appears to have thought of Quytengwe as the entire lower area between the Pungwe and the Zambezi mouths, the latter region unvisited by him. He was aware, however, of the busy contraband traffic issuing from Angoxa and feeding into the Cuama. Discussions on the size of the island which Fernandes thought suitable for the establishment of a customs post to control the Cuama Muslim trade, and the necessity to use one clear of seasonal flooding in the Zambezi become much less critical if one assumes that on the two journeys reported in Veloso he never saw the river

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(38) Two references support the connections of part of the Tonga area with gold production.
(a) In 1516, news was brought to the captain of Sofala "by an important Moor who is called Quatyvo[an early reference to Quiteve ?] who lived in Sutonga where gold is found" - Almada, letter of 26.vi.1516 already referred to, fl 9v, ERM IV p 290.
(b) Barros, op. cit. i.10.1., RGEA VI p 110 gives the nearest gold mines to Sofala as in Manica, about 50 leagues west of Sofala in a Barèn area ringed round by mountains called Matuca. The miners were Botongas.

itself around Sena where the Muslim traffic would be thickest. (39) From reports he received, the likeliest island to suit the Portuguese purpose would have been one in the region of Sena.

If one accepts that Fernandes was under the impression that Quytenge extended to the Zambezi delta, the remark that from Quytenge, Betomgua had to be crossed to reach Baro (probably a variant of Barue, already considered) makes sense.

Since no detail is given about the second journey, one may assume a similar route to the monomotapa. The third journey of 1513 or 1514, described in the pages of Almada in 1516, was also to the monomotapa, but by a somewhat different route. Profiting from information about the busy Muslim trade along the Quama, Fernandes made first for a "king,lord of vast lands and many people, whose territory is very prosperous, situated four days'

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(39) The Veloso phrase computing the size of the island as "de compridam huma carreira de cavalho e outro tamto em larguo" has given rise to two quite different translations which would support two completely different solutions as to where Fernandes' Island lay. The first rendering of "a day's journey by horse in length and the same in width" led Tracey to postulate a very large island formed by the arms of the Sabi river, consonant with his view that Fernandes at first took a southern route. (See end maps to Tracey, op. cit., 1940) Godlonton, in 1945, using the same translation preferred Inhangoma island in the lower Zambezi. (See op. cit. 1945, p 92.) In 1960, Godlonton, using a different translation "about the size of a race-course" in which small islands could now compete for selection, swung his choice to Tete, which becomes an island under heavy flooding. (Op. cit., 1960) The translation has some classical warrant in the use of the word carreira by Góis (op. cit., ch 4) as equivalent to corrida, the term for a race-course, even though it has not been established that race-courses were in use in Portugal in the early sixteenth century - the first devotees in Europe are said to have appeared in England at the end of the sixteenth century. (Grande Encyclopaedia Brasileira - 'Corrida de cavalhos') Tete would seem to far from the very busy lower river to have served the Portuguese purpose well, compared with Sena.

journey from gold-producing country. "The ruler's name was Ounharouro (40) and his capital lay by a great river." The river was the Zambezi, and the centre, estimated as thirty leagues up-river from the coast must have been close to the site of Sena. (41) Fernandes offered a pact with the Portuguese which would make Unyaroro even more powerful, left a slave and a musket and continued to the Karanga capital. After his return to Sofala a proposal to establish a Portuguese post four days' journey inland from the riverside capital, to short-circuit Muslim trade with the gold plateau, and the provision of a caravel and brigantine to patrol the Cuama, were made.

From the Sena area, Fernandes continued to the Karanga capital, collecting further information about the trade in copper from Ambar (equivalent to Mombara of the Veloso accounts). The metal came in ingots shaped like windmill sails (asuas) (42) and the source was said to be the rivers of the Manyconguo. The potential profit from a Portuguese inland trade in copper was urged upon the king by Almada.

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(40) Unyaroro (Ounharouro) echoes the tribal name from north of the Zambezi, Bororo, perhaps the origin of the ruling group near Sena.

(41) Fernandes had not approached from the Zambezi delta (see his remark that Unyaroro could send him down the Cuama to the sea, which the explorer apparently did not know). Alluvial deposits would certainly be within a four day journey from the capital: probably the area referred to in Veloso as Ynhaperapera. From a reference in Carta Anónima do Curso do Zambezi (Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, Caveta D 59) to the prazo Mapororo and the place-name of a village in it of Nhancoroa, Lobato places Ounarouro near the confluence of the Zangue and the Zambezi. The name of the village Inhacoro (Atlas de Portugal Ultramarino, Lisbon 1957, map 74) may also be connected, Lobato considers. (Op. cit. 1960 p 244). Axelson's suggestion is that the site may lie on the first patch of high enough ground to the south west of Sena to clear the annual floods: Balamuana (Baramuana) Hill - see pl 9 in Axelson's Portugal and the Scramble for Africa 1878 - 1891, Johannesburg 1967 Both suggestions require the test of archaeology.

(42) See for example the copper cross figured in Fagan's Southern Africa in the Iron Age, pl 22.

On his return to Sofala, Fernandes spent his time cementing an alliance with the latest power on the coastal plain, Nyamunda. He stayed a whole year at the court of this important ruler. (43) A practice had begun in the period which saw so many attempts to solve the problem of the safety of the gold routes to Sofala, of a newly arrived captain sending out an embassy to the important hinterland ruler to announce a change in the management of the feitoria and consolidate the continuance of trading privileges. The Kiteve (Quiteve), successor to Nyamunda, was later to demand a gift of two hundred pieces of cloth (the curva) before he would accord the right to trade across his territory. The germ of the practice seems to originate with the gifts which the Swahili sent to inland rulers to establish peace and restore trade, and the meaning of the cryptic remark that the Moors could restore peace by such presents probably lies in the seizure of trade goods by inland rulers if no presents were made to them for the privilege. (44)

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(43) Almada, letter of 26.vi.1516, already referred to section 4, DPM IV p 282 - 286, and Wage roll, Sofala, 31.iii.1518, TT, CC II, 74 - 46, fl 7, DPM V p 428

(44) e.g. (a) letter of factor Soares of 30.vi.1513, already referred to, fl 1v, DPM III p 460

(b) letter of Almada of 26.vi.1516, already quoted, section 7, DPM IV p 292, and for the early reference to the Moorish practice, Alcaçova's letter of 20.xi.1506, already quoted fls 2v & 3, DPM I p 394 - 396.
Couto, op. cit., 9.24, HSEA VI p 390 gives a description of the curva.

The two journeys to the monomotapa by the mountain route including slight intelligence about the Zambezi, followed by more detailed knowledge of the Sena area in the third journey, mark the opening of a period in which the Portuguese attempted to follow the Swahili to their inland markets and to penetrate beyond the coast. Professor Axelson has drawn attention to the delay between the gathering of information by Fernandes and the exploitation of it in the 1560s and 1570s. (45) Was there really a delay so prolonged, and if so, why? One must take the examination of the situation further back than the great journeys of António Fernandes and survey the accounts the Portuguese received about the Angoxa-Cuama trade to fit the events into context, following through to measures which succeeded the degrado's missions, such as the strengthening of Mozambique, patrolling the Angoxa coast and finally the penetration which was initiated in the period of office of captain Vicente Pegado: to count the events of the 1560s and 1570s as the follow-up to Fernandes is to ignore all this. Delay in penetration even to 1531, of course, has to be accounted for, and this will be considered under the following themes: ties of friendship between Portugal and Malindi, the effect of the disparity in numbers of men and ships between Europeans and Swahili, and the temporising measures which such a situation induced.

As early as 1507, the existence of Angoxa as a Muslim trade centre was known to the Portuguese. (46) In the same year came the news, ominous for Portuguese trading prospects, that Mombasa, devastated only two years before by Almeida, was reviving. (47) Then from 1507 to 1530

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(45) Axelson, op. cit. 1940, p 149

(46) Sec. of State Carneiro's summary of a letter from Pero Vaz da Horta to the king, 4.iii.1507, TT, Gavetas, XX, 4 - 15, item 3, DPM II p178.

(47) Sec. of State Carneiro's summary of a letter from Albuquerque to the king, 10.xi.1507, item 7, DPM II, p 213

practically every year produces documentary witness to the stream of trade flowing through Angoxa, using the Cuama to exchange cloth and beads of the east for the gold and ivory of south-east Africa. Officials of the Estado da Índia warned that the Zambezi trade reduced that of Sofala.(48) With such frequent reference to the rival trade route, slowness of communication between overseas posts and Lisbon can hardly be offered as the excuse for neglecting to remedy the situation.

One aspect of the trade war stalemate was the tie of friendship between the Sultan of Melindi and the Portuguese, which posed the problem already mentioned in chapter II of whether it would be better to allow widespread licensed trade or offer violent confrontation.(49) The number of zambuks trading at Angoxa may be glimpsed in Saldanha's report of how the Portuguese, having

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(48) e.g. letter, Duarte de Lemos to the king, Mozambique, 30.ix.1508, TT,CC I, 7-47, item 14, DPM II p 296; letter, factor Diogo Vaz, to Sec. of State Carneiro, Mozambique, 4.ix.1509, TT, CC I, 8-41, item 2, DPM II p 380; Sec. of State Carneiro's summary of letters from captain of Sofala Saldanha to the king, [1511] TT, Cartas de Afonso de Albuquerque, m único, doc 1, DPM III pp 10 - 16; letter, factor Soares to the king, 30.vi.1513, already quoted, fls 2 v & 3, DPM III pp 464 - 466; letter, viceroy Albuquerque to the king, Goa, 25.x.1514, TT, CC I, 16-68, item 1, DPM III pp 558 - 560; letter, provost Almada, 26.vi.1516, already quoted, item 5, DPM IV p 286; letter, captain Távora to the king, Mozambique, 20.ix.1517, TT, CC I, 22-85, item 4, DPM V p 202; letter, D. António da Silveira to the king, [1528 - see Appendix 5 on the true date of this letter] TT, Cartas dos vicereis no 13, fl 7 v, DPM V p 566; culminating in the royal instructions for guarding the Cuama route against smuggling in the Regimento for Sofala, Lisbon, 20.v.1530, TT, Miscelâneas do Convento da Graça, caixa 5, pecúlio, tomo II, 'capitolo sobre os navios que são ordenados pera goardar da costa', DPM VI p 362.

(49) See p 38, chapter II and note 29 of that page.

been attacked when they sought provisions there [50] sent a punitive expedition which had to face 1,200 Moors and other Africans in their boats.[51] He estimated that the sheikh of Angoxa commanded 12,000 men, and even if this is exaggeration, it is clear that Angoxa was a very powerful Swahili counterweight to Sofala, and apart from sporadic attack there was little the Portuguese could do by reason of their chronic shortage of ships.[52] Moreover, the shoals of Angoxa were dangerous for larger ships [53] whereas the creeks provided good cover for the small Muslim craft. Short of attacking Angoxa itself in force and building a fort there, which was a very risky business in view of the numbers of Swahili there and the necessity of landing men in vulnerable longboats, the only plan which could be adopted for the time was to strengthen Mozambique.[54] Shortage of finance, however, bedevilled such a scheme and prevented the establishment of any more costly feitorias.[55] The necessity to choose which positions could be held in south-east Africa while grandiose schemes were being pursued in Asia is evident in the decision to close the Malindi feitoria around 1511,[56] and in 1512 to dismantle and abandon Kilwa.[57]

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(50) List of the India fleets, 1512, Pais, 'As famosas armadas portuguesas' MS 1650 p 26 item 2, DPM III p 173.

(51) Sec. of State Carneiro's summary of Saldanha's letters [1511] already quoted, item 1, DPM III p 10.

(52) See pp 44 - 46, chapter II.

(53) See List of the India fleets, 1512, already quoted, item 2, DPM III p 173.

(54) Carneiro's summary of Saldanha's letters [1511] already quoted, item 3, DPM III p 12.

(55) See for example the king's proposal that Kilwa could well exchange 60 residents for 30 degredados who would require no wages: letter from the king to captain Fogaça of Kilwa, [1507] TT, Cartas dos vicereis, no 102, DPM II p 26.

(56) As for note 54 supra.

(57) See note 5 supra on the closing of Kilwa.

By 1511 a little more was known about the mechanics of the Angoxa trade: "Goods are conveyed from there to Maena (58) ... a very big river.... [The Moors] disembark fully six leagues higher up the river at the house of an important African, a chief of that area, there pay his duties, and .... he provides them with canoes to take the cloth upstream. Further up there is a narrow stretch through which the canoes pass after transshipment. They load up again and sail a further stint of about twenty leagues, reaching a range of hills called Otonga, where there is a small village to which all the African and Moorish traders come to do business." Close to this time, and from the information in this letter originating from Saldanha, almost certainly as part of a policy which this active captain initiated, Fernandes made his first journey to discover the details of the Swahili traffic with the monomotapa.

At the same period, captain Saldanha proposed that "two of the smallest caravels and thirty men" were required to haunt Angoxa, and not to be drawn off on other duties. (59) An attempt was made to block the Angoxa- Cuama route with its "great quantity of ivory... and good trade in gold" which eneded in failure. (60) In 1513 a Sofala caravel with Sofalan Swahili aboard was sent to the mouth of the Cuama "to trade and prospect... with an offer of peace and goodwill to a sheikh, an African ruler who lived on an island at the river mouth." The caravel's captain, factor, clerk and gunner went ashore to present gifts from the captain of Sofala and were promptly attacked and killed. The caravel escaped with great difficulty to bring the news to Sofala. (61) Despite this plain warning of the need for

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(58) Source as for note 54 supra, item 6, DPM III p 14. The DPM editors rightly equate Maena with Cuama, but this may be even more significant as the first Portuguese reference to Sena.

(59) Carneiro's summary of Saldanha's letters [1511] already quoted, item 9, DPM III p 16.

(60) Factor Soares' letter to the king, 30.vi.1513, already quoted, fls 2 v & 3, DPM III pp 464 & 466.

(61) Ibid.

reinforcements near the Zambezi delta, the king in 1514 made a demand that the Mozambique garrison be reduced to its former strength of twelve. (62) There was a conflict of policy regarding the need to strengthen the Portuguese presence in the area. The king was for economy; the viceroy, closer to the situaution and urged by Simão de Miranda, captain of Sofala from 1512 to 1515, under whose orders the ill-fated Cuama trade mission had been sent and to whom Fernandes' information on the interior would be accessible, reported that he had given Miranda an additional brigantine and recommended that the caravels patrol as far north as Mombasa. (63) The same viceroy had already made it clear that Sofala could expect no reinforcements from India: help would have to come from Portugal. (64)

Having learnt the strength of Angoxa and Quelimane, the nearest navigable arm of the Zambezi to Angoxa, and in face of such a parsimonious royal policy, it would be natural for the captains of Sofala and Mozambique to hesitate to risk their meagre forces in attempting to create an additional base from which to control the Cuama trade.

Another element entered the situation in the first decade of the century. In 1509, the Turks, considerably tougher than the previous Muslims of the Indian Ocean, and possessing firearms, were in action against the Portuguese off Diu in north-west India. Their proximity is mentioned by the factor of Mozambique in the same year, but he considered them a lesser threat to his trade than the inept Portuguese officials. (65) By 1517, however, the threat was taken more seriously, and a Portuguese captain found he had to choose between retaining precious artillery and ammunition for service along the Cuama or surrender them to a nao captain on his way to test the strength of the Turks further north. (66)

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(62) Draft letter from captain Miranda to the king, [1514] TT, CC Fragmentos, m 22, item 4, DPM III p 522

(63) Letter, viceroy Albuquerque to the king, Goa, 25.x.1514, TT, CC I, 16-68, item 1, DPM III pp 558 & 560

(64) Sec. of State Carneiro's summary of letters from Albuquerque to the king, 10.xi.1507, TT, Gavetas XX 4-15, item 6, DPM II p 218

(65) Letter, factor Diogo Vaz to Sec. of State Carneiro, Mozambique, 4.ix.1509, TT, CC I, 8-41, item 2, DPM II p 378 & 380

(66) Letter, captain Távora to the king, Mozambique, 15.ii.1517, TT, CC I 21-37, item 2, DPM V P 34

It is time to consider what induced a change in the temporizing policy, and what led the Portuguese to begin in 1531 their commercial penetration in the Cuama valley. It will be seen that there is to some extent a parallel between 1531 and 1571: in both instances, the Portuguese were forced to act by a local crisis in Africa and in both cases it took several years even after the seriousness of the crisis was appreciated, before counter action was taken.

From 1518, as before, the Cuama trade continued unabated. Barbosa comments on the " great amounts of gold and ivory" passing down the Cuama in Muslim almadias, having been exchanged for textiles. (67) Lack of keeness to pursue patrol duty when one could just as easily be in Mozambique "drawing pay and rations" was noted by a ship's captain in 1521. (68) One further effort was made by a Sofala captain to control the Cuama trade before penetration of the Cuama valley was attempted. Tavora had a wooden tower prefabricated and conveyed by caravel to the Cuama mouth. The point for erection, however, was eight leagues from the bar, and since the caravelswas unable to cross the shallows, this device was abandoned. (69)

That Angoxa was not the only Muslim entrepôt was evident to those Portuguese who attacked the Querimba islands and found warehouses loaded with ivory and thirty-five Swahili ships drawn up on the beach. (70)

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(67) op. cit., item 5 'Kuama', DPM V p 362

(68) Letter, Sebastiao de Sousa to the king, Mozambique, 17.ix.1521, TT, CC I, 27-94, section 2, DPM VI p 64 & 66

(69) Letter, factor Brito of Sofala to the king, Sofala, 8.viii.1519, TT, CC I, 25-7, section 4, DPM VI p 14

(70) Letter D. Pedro de Castro to the king, Mozambique, 8.vii,1523, TT, CC I, 29-91, DPM VI p 172 - 173

The evidence for the need to control the situation was stronger than ever. What persuaded the Portuguese to act? Documents concerning the establishment of Portuguese Sena are conspicuous by their absence, but one important manuscript which throws considerable light on the events leading up to 1531 has hitherto been ignored in this respect because a wrong date has been assigned to it. (71) The most important feature of Silveira's letter in the light of subsequent Portuguese policy in south-east Africa is the emphasis he lays on the crisis which had developed in the Sofalan hinterland, rising to its climax at the date of composition of the letter, 1528. Nyamunda, whose rise to power has already been sketched (72) had now succeeded in his challenge to his overlord, the monomotapa. "He grew very strong, seizing lands along the rivers and also part of the upland territory, helped by the captains of the fortress [of Sofala]. Some of the mines are his. When he thought we were of use to him, he ... permitted gold to be brought to the feitoria; now he needs us no longer ... he laughs aloud, knowing the captain to be impotent to control him, closes the trade-routes, then writes to the captain to send an envoy, accepts his gifts, detains him in discussions for the full three years and finally kills him. (73) Nyamunda was now supplied with firearms (74) and the blockade averted by captain Távora in 1513 was now complete. (75) It is particularly ominous that in 1528 no reference occurs

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(71) Letter, D. António da Silveira to the king, TT, Cartas dos vicereis, no 13, DPM V pp 538 - 572, and Axelson, op. cit., 1940, p 261, 'doc 68', the first giving "post 1518", the second "-/7/1518" as the date. See appendix 5 on the true date.

(72) See pp 41 - 42 of chapter II.

(73) Silveira's letter to the king [1528] already referred to, fl 8, DPM V p 568.

(74) Incomplete receipt and expenditure book of storekeeper Matoso, [Sofala, post 4.x.1522] TT, CC II, 104-2, first item, DPM VI p 104.

(75) Letter, Cristovão de Távora to the king, [1518 - 1519] TT, Cartas dos vicereis no 143, fl 2, DPM VI p 4.

to Nyamunda's coastal rival of 1515 - 1518, Nyambia. (76) The clear inference is that Nyamunda had swallowed his rival and now stood stronger than before, confronting the monomotapa. He had Portuguese renegades to operate his new weapons and was therefore no longer dependent on Sofala. (77) The feitoria now lay completely cut off from the gold plateau, the local crisis was complete, and it was this that achieved what twenty years of urging by east African Portuguese officials had failed to achieve: the taking of a positive step to resolve the Cuama situation. The Portuguese acted when they were forced to by the complete embargo of Sofala. After Silveira's tenure of office at Sofala came a captain whose instructions contained passages closely modelled on Silveira's recommendations, Vicente Pegado. (78) Under this captain Portuguese commerce with the lower Zambezi which eventually drove out Muslim trade there, began.

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(76) Expenditure book of clerk Lopes [1515] already referred to, fl 22 v, DPM IV p 142; Almada's letter to the king, 26.vi.1516, already referred to, section 2, DPM IV, pp 276 - 278; the last known reference to Nyambia: Távora's letter to the king, [1518 - 1519] already referred to, fl 2, DPM VI p 6, here spelt "Ynhambre".

(77) Silveira's letter to the king [1528] already referred to, fl 8 v, DPM V p 570.

(78) Compare Silveira's letter fl 7 v, DPM V p 566 on guarding the Angoxa-Cuama with the 1530 Regimento for Sofala, already referred to, 'Chapter regarding the ships ordered to patrol the coast', DPM VI p 362.

APPENDIX 5 'The true date of D. António da Silveira's letter to the king' appears at the end of the text.


MONOMOTAPA
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shewing chieftaincies
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by
ANTÓNIO FERNANDES
c 1512 - 1516
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Boece
R. Cuama
(Hartley)
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BUTUA
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CHAPTER IV AFRICAN COMMUNITIES AND MINOR TRADES AT SOFALA 1505 - 1528

This chapter seeks to describe the various African communities living at, or dealing with, Sofala, their relationships with one another, and the effect of Portuguese presence upon them in the period 1505-1528.

African communities interlocking at Sofala and affected to differing degrees by the Portuguese entry into the Indian Ocean fall into four groups: Swahili communities near and far and non-Swahili near and far. The local Swahili traders, ruled by sheikh Yusuf, lived in two small settlements on either side of the fort site selected by Pero d'Anaia. Their houses, due to lack of stone in the Sofala area, utilized the same building materials as the other African huts around: clay and wattle, palm thatch being more plentiful than grass for roofing and temporary wall screens. In some instances, for example the council chamber where Yusuf and his leading merchants met Pero d'Anaia, a longer structure was created. The controlling factor in width would be the length of a mangrove pole, constricting a roof tree without centre support to about ten feet. In dress, the Swahili folk were distinguished by their use of turbans and sashes. Weapons, too marked them as people more in touch with the east than the surrounding African folk: Castanheda remarks on their scimitars with gold-decorated ivory handles. The sheikh, however, clung to traditional African weapons, keeping at his side a sheaf of assegais. Pottery, too, is possibly a distinguishing feature we may soon learn to recognise as marking off those African folk closely integrated into Muslim ways from those who were not. The prevalence at Sofala on the old Muslim site of flat and ring-based bowls of clearly African make and firing, yet reflecting clearly the influence of the imported Chinese bowls is suggestive of the work of the wives of men who required something a little more sophisticated than the gourd-shaped African pots. Although they differed little if at all from the other

African folk around in physical features, their way of life induced them to live as a separate community. (1)

Even within this tiny community, social rifts were apparent, as has already been noted. (2) Small in numbers: hundreds compared with thousands of non-Muslim Africans around them, weakened by internal division, and lacking any superior military technology, the Sofala Swahili were very dependent upon their neighbours. Sheikh Yusuf, in fact, was a client of Chief Moconde, entirely dependent on him for protection, having to call on him to attack the Portuguese and suffering a sack of his village when the original plan failed. (3) Swahili merchants in 1506 were too frightened to venture more than a few miles from their village for fear of African attack during the changamira-monomotapa strife. (4)

Although Yusuf had prior to the Portuguese arrival asserted his independence of Kilwa, (5) connections with the more northerly Muslim persisted, Angoxa taking over the place of prominence quitted by Kilwa, and drawing its supplies from Mombasa and Malindi. (6) The Portuguese

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(1) For more detailed description and sources on the Swahili community at Sofala, see pp 136-9 of Appendix 1. The pottery evidence is discussed in Appendix 9 on the Sofala excavations of 1969-1970.

(2) See page 27 of chapter I, and Barros, op.cit. 1.10.3., RSEA VI p122 where a distiction in religious observance within the group is noted.

(3) Barros, op.cit., 1.10.3., RSEA VI p 121 - 123.

(4) Alcaçova letter to the king, 20.xi.1506, already referred to, fl. 1, DPM I p 390.

(5) Ibid fl 3v, DPM I p 398.

(6) e.g. Letter, Duarte de Lemos to the king, Mozambique, 30.ix.1508, already quoted, section 14, DPM II p 296; letter, Diogo Vaz, factor of Mozambique to the Sec. of State, Mozambique, 4.ix.1509, TT, CC I, 8-41, section 2, DPM II p 380, accusing Duarte de Lemos of having allowed the Swahili of Mozambique to set up their agencies at Angoxa; letter, factor Soares to the king, 30.vi.1513, already quoted, fl. 3, DPM III p 466; Expenditure book of clerk Lopes, [1.i.1515] already quoted, fl 1, fl 5, & fl 20v, DPM IV, p 26, 43 & 128, all mentioning a visit of the sultan of Malindi to Sofala.

were often uneasily aware of the ties between the Sofalan Swahili and their cousins to the north. (7)

Another small Muslim trading settlement existed on the Hucicas islands (the Bazaruto group) dealing with pearls and ambergris. (8) The sheikh of Sofala had agents in the harbours south of Sofala who helped to create a food shortage for the Portuguese during the troubles of 1511. (9) Inland were further agents of the Swahili who facilitated

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(7) e.g. during the attack on the Sofala caravel at Quelimane in 1512 - 1513; see Soares' letter referred to in note 6 supra.

(8) (a) The pearls of the Bazaruto banks were still in prodigious production in the late nineteenth century. Jose' Fontes de Melo, in 'As péroles ... do ultramar portugues' in Revue de Associaçao Industrial Portuguesa no 144, 1954, Lisbon, records that from the 'famosos bancos peroliferos' of Bazaruto in 1888, £20,000 sterling worth of pearls was recovered, making a vast profit for the Indians who ran the business, but little for the African divers who faced shark attacks.

(b) Ambar or ambre, used in the Portuguese and French versions of Barbosa, can both mean amber, and there might have been some sale for such a decorative item, much as there was use by the Swahili merchants at Sofala of branches of coral. (See Castanheda, op. cit., 2.10, where the word is ambar also, but does not fit the translation 'amber' because of the description as 'branches'.) The great product of this coast, however, was ambergris, which is yet another possible translation of the Portuguese ambar. Mas'udi refers to this as a prominent product of the Sea of Zendj, describing it as round, pale blue, large as an ostrich egg, and evil-smelling, being vomited up by the fish el-aoual - the whale. (Op. cit., ed. Meynard & de Courtville, vol 1 p 334.) Ibn Battuta mentions an entire bazaar at Tabriz devoted to the sale of ambergris (op. cit., ed. Gibb, vol 1 p 345) supplying, no doubt the perfume manufacturers of the east, and to a lesser extent serving as a flavour in oriental cooking. Orta's treatise on drugs and medicines of India, originally published in Spanish in Burgos, 1578, treats of ambar entirely as ambergris, noting the wealth of supply existing on the Mozambique and Sofala coasts, and giving its origin in a way that shows the confusion existing among the naturalists of the day. (See Cristovão da Costa, Tratado das drogas e medicinas das Indias orientais, no qual se verifica muito do que escreveu Dr. Garcia de Orta, Lisbon, 1964, ch 26, p 129.

(9) Statement by clerks Sobrinho and Homem, Sofala, 15.iv.1512, TT, CC II, 31-58, fl 3 v, DPM III p 240.

trade between the coast and the plateau. (10) Such a network of Swahili influence does not imply constant control of trade in Swahili hands either before or after the arrival of Europeans. Trade links were ruptured during the changamira wars of the late fifteenth century and also in the period of expansion of chief Nyamunda, and it was probably necessary for the Swahili to pay a form of customs dues to the chiefs on the route to the gold plateau. (11) Although the influence of the Muslim element inland made in 1511 by a captain of Sofala was a guess and probably a calculated exaggeration. (12)

Non-Muslim African communities consisted of the local African group (or groups), chiefdoms of the coastal plain and the plateau. One purpose of this chapter is to try to establish the identity of the African people of Sofala and to clear up misconceptions about the location of the rulers of the coastal plain.

The Sofalan African community is briefly described by a Castilian man-at-arms in the company of Pero d'Anaia in 1505. (13) They were black, he wrote, wore cotton garments and worshipped the sun and the stars. The women went bare-headed, loading their legs with copper bangles and piercing their lips. Millet dough cooked in pots was an important item

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(10) Provost Almada's letter, 26.vi.1516, already quoted, section 6, DPM IV p 290. The inland network was observed and reported by Fernandes.

(11) Letter by Alcaçova to the king, 20.xi.1506, already quoted, fls 1 & 1 v, DPM I p 390, and 2v & 3, DPM I p 396, which latter gives the methods by which the Muslims could ensure peace, probably against not only faction fights but against the empata (Shona kubata, to seize) in which an African ruler would impound trade goods if dues were unpaid.

(12) Summary by Sec. of State Carneiro of a letter by captain Saldanha to the king, [1511] TT, Cartas de Afonso de Albuquerque, m único, doc 1, section 10, DPM III p 16. There was clear motive for exaggeration: the captain was excusing the poor gold yield at Sofala, inevitable, he implied, when 10,000 Moors existed inland depriving the Portuguese of most of the gold trade. The guess is perpetuated in Fagan's Southern Africa in the Iron Age, London, 1965 p 99.

(13) Figueroa, op. cit., titulo 9, McKenna p 43.

of diet, while for meat, hornless sheep with thin fleece (14) and poultry were kept to supplement products of the chase. Even rats were hunted, which surprised the soldier. (15) Crops included rice, millet, sugar cane and the versatile coconut which produced wine, vinegar, 'honey', cord, timber and thatch, as well as a kind of cloth "for the poorest folk." (16)

So little archaeology has been attempted in Mozambique province that one has not the pattern of folk movements already sketched for Rhodesia and Zambia. It would, however, be reasonable to suppose that a similar sequence occurred, complicated by the vulnerability of the coast to more rapid infiltration by folk who had learnt the ways of the shallow seas behind the Sofala shoal. Thus one may envisage that some of the first cultivators and herdsmen who are represented in Rhodesia by the presence of Gokomere

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(14) It is not known at what date the thin fleeced, fat-tailed sheep reached south-east Africa. According to C.K. Cooke in Rock Art in Rhodesia, Cape Town, 1969, p 108, the common distribution of early pottery, sheep figurines and fat-tailed sheep portrayed in rock paintings suggest that the earliest agriculturalists (Khoi Khoi?) brought sheep with them from the north.

(15) Rat-eating may be interpreted as indicating a shortage of meat in the Sofalan hinterland at times. Hunting would rarely fail in an area so prolific in game and fish, however, and it is more likely that the large cane rat was then, as now among the Ndau of Sofala, considered a great delicacy.

(16) Coconuts can self-sow themselves all around the rim of the Indian Ocean. The dense groves the Portuguese found at Sofala, however, were surely the product of Swahili settlement. G.P. Murdock in Africa, its peoples and their culture history, New York, 1959, p 23, gives south-east Asia as the home of rice and sugar cane, and these products must have come by trade and settlement. West Africa, Murdoch asserts, was the source of pearl millet and sorghum. Marvin Miracle in 'The introduction and spread of maize in Africa' in JAH VI, 1, 1965, pp 47 - 48 surmizes from the lack of mention in sixteenth century accounts of south-east Africa, that maize, originating in America, was of no importance in the area then. Following this, one would translate milho of such frequent occurence in Portuguese accounts as 'millet' rather than 'maize'. One must nevertheless allow for two types of sorghum produced in south-east Africa: the preferred 'milho' and when unavailable, the cheaper type known as meixoeira. The latter was used, like rice, as a substitute when milho was in short supply. (See for instance the Maintenance roll for Sofala, 1.ix.1511, TT, CC II 28-29, section 2, DPM III p 142.) Monclaro, op. cit., 1569, USEA III p 176, describes meixoeira as a grain similar to hemp or sesame seed, commonly given to birds in Portugal.

ware, dating from the first three hundred years of the Christian era, and whose domestic architecture and pottery connects them with the Bantu-speaking peoples, reached the coast during the migrations. The long historic spread of this folk (the Ziwa variety of early pottery persists to the beginning of the second millenium A.D. [17]) gives time for firm establishment at the coast. The sheep noted by Figueroa suggest the presence of this folk in the past at Sofala.

Subsistence farmers inland were joined by mining communities: the Leopard's Kopje/ Kalomo culture people, whose floruit is datable to c A.D. 900 - 1200. [18] This group too may have spread to the coast, although their way of life would anchor them mainly to the rocky plateau inland. Where penetration by river, as with Mapungubwe, allowed them to be contacted by traders from the Indian Ocean, exotic forms of pottery, such as flat and pedestal-based vessels were produced, [19] showing the external influence.

The emergence of the Karanga inland, developing in time a theocratic organisation and gaining widspread control over the production and trade in metals and ivory traffic would herald a further change in the population of Sofala. These folk, as distinct from the miners who had mainly to stay inland, sought control of trade, and ports from the Sena area to the region of Inhambane would be attractive targets for conquest and settlement. It is this flowering of African state-growth that was seen by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century. Alcaçova in 1506 reports Sofala as part of the Karanga kingdom, and later evidence, when the Portuguese were interested

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(17) B. Fagan, Southern Africa in the Iron Age, London, 1965, pp 59 & 62.

(18) Ibid p 79.

(19) Ibid p 84.

enough to include African words in their accounts, confirms that the predominant non-Muslim African people there were Shona-speaking, the ancestors, in fact, of the Ndau who live there today. (20)

Figueroa, however, noticed something which may indicate the presence of another ethnic group at Sofala. The women he observed pierced their upper lips in several places. Now this striking facial mutilation one would expect to provoke comment in any Portuguese descriptions wherever such folk were noticed. It is significant that it is mentioned of Africans Gama encountered at Quelimane (21) and others described seventy years later at Angoxa. (22) It is never again mentioned during the sixteenth century at Sofala, nor is it a feature in descriptions of the Karanga inland. The women with the bored lips could represent either wives brought by conquering Karanga from Maccua areas around the Zambezi delta or remnants of an earlier ethnic group settled at Sofala.

The non-Muslim rulers encountered by the Portuguese between the Zambezi and the Sabi rivers were all part of a Shona confederacy in process of fission around the time of arrival of the Europeans in south-east Africa. The story of the long rivalry between the two most prominent elements, the monomotapa and the changamira dynasties has been described in detail by Abraham. (23)

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(20) See Appendix 6 for an analysis of the ethnic groups.

(21) See Alvaro Velho's 'Diario da Viagem de Vasco da Gama', 1498, section 12, reproduced in DPM I p 14.

(22) See Monclaro, op. cit., RSEA III p 171.

(23) e.g. in 'The early political history of the kingdom of mwene mutapa' 1962, already quoted.

Claiming overlordship throughout the Karanga lands was the monomotapa, ruling from his capital in the Mount Darwin area on the edge of the Dande. For the first quarter century of Portuguese presence in south-east Africa, the monomotapa was, according to oral tradition collected by Abraham, Chikuyo Chisamarengo. (24) For the remainder of the sixteenth century the great political division inland was that between Butua (or Guruuswa), an area corresponding roughly to present-day Matabeleland, and ruled by the Rozwi changamiras, and the Karanga chiefdom of the monomotapa centred on the Mount Darwin area and the Dande. Portuguese penetration, following the Swahili trade network, concentrated on the monomotapa's areas, completely ignoring the resources of Butua. For the historian this means that while an increasing body of information becomes available about the monomotapas from the sixteenth century on, their Rozwi counterpart, responsible for the magnificent buildings such as Khami, Dhlo-Dhlo and Nanatali, is a complete blank in Portuguese documents.

Monomotapa Chikuyo showed an early interest in trading relations with the Portuguese, sending an envoy to Sofala in May 1506. (25) Later accounts make it clear that warring African chiefs paid their soldiers with cloth, (26) and the determination of the monomotapa to contact the newcomers to Sofala in the midst of his war with the Rozwi is an indication of his need not only for Cambay cloth, but for an ally in a struggle which had already lasted over ten years.

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(24) Abraham, op. cit., pp 65 & 66.

(25) Order from captain Anaia to the king's treasurers, Sofala, 19.v.1506, TT, CC II, 11-12, DPM I p 506.

(26) Letter, captain D. Lopo d'Almeida to the king, Sofala, 27.viii.1527, TT,CC I 37-57, fl 1 v, DPM VI p 278

It took the Portuguese another five years before they were able to send a mission right to the Karanga heartland, although it is possible that the occasional European refugee from Sofala had already established himself inland. (27) When Fernandes reached Chikuyo, he was surrounding his capital with a dry stone wall. After this contact, descriptions of the monomotapa and his state began to appear in Portuguese writings.

Fact and fable are sometimes difficult to disentangle in Portuguese accounts of the monomotapa. Barbosa gives a lively picture of the ruler living at times in his zimbabwe of thatched timber buildings, but having another capital six days' journey away. (28) Is this a reference to Great Zimbabwe, important ritually to the Karanga ruler as the capital of his ancestors, and now accessible to him after the collapse of the long changamiran war for visits considered vital at times of national distress? Although the distance between the northen Karanga capital and Great Zimbabwe greatly exceeded a six days' journey, one need not abandon this referebce as fanciful. Barros refers clearly in his passage about the ruins in Butua to wives of the monomotapa living in the great stone structures which were under the guardianship of a royal official, the symbacaio. (29) It seems that Great Zimbabwe after its collapse as an economic centre around the middle of the fifteenth century, continued to be an important ritual centre.

Certainly the monomotapan state depended largely for its cohesion on impressive ritual, resting on the belief in the necessity to appease the spirits of the dead, the vadzimu, and the important role of the chief in this duty. Every year as a test of allegiance, all fires in the kingdom were extinguished except the monomotapa's, and subordinate rulers were ordered to receive New Fire from his hearth. Anyone refusing invited

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(27) See Almada's remark in his letter of 26.vi.1516, already referred to, section 6, DPM IV p 290 about a white man similar to the Europeans of Sofala in Tonga country herding cattle and dressed like the locals.

(28) Barbosa, op. cit., (French version) fls 238 - 240, DPM V pp 374-376.

(29) Barros, op. cit., 1.10.1., RSEA VI p 111. The reference is to reports made to Vicente Pegado, captain of Sofala from 1531 to 1538.

annihilation at the hands of the sono, or commander-in-chief and his impi.(30)

At the capital, tribute arrived, borne by long caravans of porters who were never allowed to see the monarch. The monomotapas employed the device of seclusion to increase their prestige. Their ancestors had doubtless practised the same aloofness in the southern zimbabwe, where the tall parallel passages of the Great Enclosure and the walled ascent to the Acropolis speak eloquently of the 'hidden king', the type of ruler known in many African states who was considered so divine that no commoner might look upon him with impunity.(31) In the northern zimbabwe one sees a modified ritual of the 'hidden king', for this ruler was seen by some: by the envoys who were granted the privilege of a brief audience just before their porters moved off on the homeward journey.(32)

Dress and weapons showed the mixture of traditional African fashion and the influence of Muslim penetration. To the animal skins with tails swirling bravely in the dances were added the coloured cotton fabrics of western India. The monomotapa, however, for fear of being harmed by magic, continued to wear

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(30) Barbosa, op. cit., (Portuguese edition), 'Zimboache', DPM V pp 360-362. Sono occurs on a map of Duarte Lopes c 1590 (PMC III 386) and a similar word, Sonha in a like position on a map of a more reliable cartographer, João Teixeira I, 1630 (PMC IV 469 A). The location is given as south of the Sabi river and near the coast. The word appears in an account of the journeys of António Fernandes to Nyamunda in 1516, with a link between Barbosa's seemingly odd statement that the Sono's army included a large contingent of amazons: the official who met Fernandes with news from Nyamunda that supplies were unavailable was called sonadonhamunda, a combination of two titles, and the holder was a woman, perhaps a female chief. Almada in his letter of 1516 refers to osono as a male grandee of the monomotapa (DPM IV p 284). Whatever the truth of the sex of the sono, the tale of amazons in the monomotapa's army may not be without foundation in fact. Friar Lucas in his 'História de S. Dominic', Lisbon, 1767, 4.4.14, RSEA I p 376, records that the Karanga put women in the forefront of their battles as expendable buffers to take the first shock of combat. Monclaros, op. cit., 1569, RSEA III p 190 reports a similar practice in Monga armies using a vanguard of slaves.

(31) See H.A. Wieschhoff, The Zimbabwe-Monomotapa culture in S.E. Africa, Wisconsin, U.S.A., 1941, p 103.

(32) Barbosa, op. cit., (Portuguese version), 'Zimboache' DPM V p 360.

textiles manufactured for him in Africa itself. (33) To the assegais, bows and arrows of Africa were added large knives in gold-decorated sheaths, slung from coloured braids, suggesting the influence of the Muslim traders.(34)

Although the conflict between monomotapas and changamiras was the main struggle in the Shona world of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, it was not the only one, nor the one which mainly concerned the communities who met at Sofala. Rulers of the coastal plain rose and declined in the early sixteenth century, affected by the trade of Sofala, attempting to control it for their own benefit, and in turn affecting the lives of its people.

Moconde was the African ruler most directly concerned with the port from 1505 to 1515. From the availability of his impis, numbering thousands, to support the sheikh of Sofala in 1506, from the place-name Makonde close to Sofala (35) and the use of the name Moconde in Ndau greetings around Sofala today (36) it is likely that his headquarters were quite close to Sofala itself. His capital was variously known as Nangabe and Pandene and was reached by following the Sofala river which Moconde had to cross to reach the port. (37) His authority stretched from Sofala to the coast

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(33) Barros, op. cit. 1.10.1., RSEA VI p 114.

(34) Barbosa, op.cit., (Portuguese version) 'O grande reyno de Manamatapa' DPM V p 358 - 360.

(35) The name of a local river, communicated to the author by chief Makandara in 1970.

(36) See H.P. Junod, 'A contribution to the study of Ndau demography, totemism and history' in Bantu Studies, vol 8, 1934, p 24.

(37) (a) 'Nangabe' - in Figueroa, op.cit., titulo 12, McKenna p 49
(b) 'Pandene' - in Statement by clerks Sobrinho and Homem, 15.v.1512, already quoted, fl 3 v, DPM III p 240.
(c) Since the chief's area reached south to the Bazaruto Islands (DPM III p 240) and since chief Nyambia ruled contemporaneously between the Sofala and Pungwe rivers, if Moconde had to cross the Sofala (= Buzi) river to reach the port (see Barros, op.cit. 1.10.3., RSEA VI p 122) we may assume a position south of the Buzi and fairly close to Sofala for this chief's capital.

opposite Bazaruto Island. (38) His warriors went into battle with bows and arrows to the blowing of animal horn trumpets and the beating of drums, and added the novel touch of using incendiary arrows. (38) This chieftaincy fades from Portuguese records in 1515.

Contemporary with Moconde was Nyambia (Mhambia) who ruled territory reaching the coast at Bangoe, mouth of the Pungwe river about twenty-five miles north of Sofala. (39) From a reference in the Veloso account of the journeys of António Fernandes, it appears that this chief was feared by traders who suffered attacks on their caravans in his territory, possibly a reference to his attempts to make travellers pay for the privilege of crossing his lands or suffer seizure of goods in retaliation for not paying their dues. (40) The dues the chief levied are mentioned in an account of a foraging expedition conducted by Fernandes to Bangoe. (41) Reference to this ruler also ceases in 1515. (42)

It is significant that the year of the last reference to Moconde and Nyambia, 1515, is the year in which references begin to Nyamunda (Mhamunda or

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(38) Statement by the clerks, 15.v.1512 already quoted, fl 3 v, DPM III p 240

(38) Castanheda, op. cit., 2.29, RSBA V pp 336 - 337.

(39) The anonymous map in the style of Gaspar Viegas, c 1537, reproduced in MMC I 49 A, shows the Pungwe estuary as 'Bamguo'. The name still appears on Viconde de Sá da Bandeira's map of Zambezia e Sofala, 1861, Carta 1/4/47 in the Academia das Sciencias, Lisbon, as the area just north of the Pungwe mouth. A small area between Manga and Savane, near Beira today, still bears the name (personal investigation by the writer, not appearing on modern maps).

(40) 'Apontamentos' of Gaspar Veloso [1512], already quoted, fl 1, DPM III p 180.

(41) Expenditure Book of clerk Lopes, 1515, already quoted, fl 23 v, DPM IV p 148.

(42) Ibid, fl 5v, DPM IV p 50.

Inhamunda or Ynhamunda in Portuguese records), a chief who grew steadily in power on the coastal plain over the next thirteen years. The last reference to Nyambia, which is also the first to Nyamunda, records that the two were great enemies. (43) On the coastal plain was repeated the inland pattern of a struggle between two rival Karanga rulers, and it is clear that on the coast, by contrast with the coexistence which developed inland between the monomotapa and the changamira, Nyamunda won in the end, thrusting his rival Nyambia into complete obscurity. Nyamunda's capital lay five days' journey inland from the port of Nyambibe, south of Sofala. (44) According to oral tradition collected by Abraham, Nyamunda was closely connected with the Kiteve (Quiteve) dynasty (45) which became so dominant in the Sofalan hinterland in the second half of the century.

Nyamunda grew powerful at first by the help of the Portuguese at Sofala with whom he traded. (46) His first request for firearms and a European to operate them was denied by the captain of the port, but the chief eventually benefitted not only by official allocations of ammunition from Sofala but also by expert assistance from renegades. (47) By 1528, as has already been noted, Nyamunda had established a complete stranglehold over Sofala and was able to treat the Portuguese in very cavalier fashion, detaining their envoys

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(43) Clerk Lopes' Expenditure Book, 1515, already quoted, fl 22, DPM IV p 142.

(44) See Appendix 7.

(45) See 'The early political history of the kingdom of mwene mutapa' already quoted, p 84.

(46) Letter of D. António de Silveira [1528] already quoted, fls 8 & 8 v, DPM V pp 566 - 570.

(47) Ibid and letter of Almada, 26.vi.1516, already quoted, fls 6 & 6 v, DPM IV p 284.

indefinitely and murdering them if he chose to. (48)

We thus have the pattern of Moconde powerful near Sofala from 1505 to 1513, and Nyambia important between the lower Buzi and Pungwe rivers, both superceded by Nyamunda who extended from his capital near the middle Sabi until he controlled the entire coastal plain behind Sofala, from Sabi to Pungwe, he in turn fading from prominence with the rise in the second half of the century of Kiteve, ruling across the gold route between Sofala and Manica.

Sofala represented at the time of the Portuguese establishment a focus for both long distance and local trade. Gold was the most compelling long distance item, and the extent of this trade has already been discussed. (49) Control of the collection and traffic in gold was said to be in the hands of the monomotapa, (50) but other rulers acquired the power to offer gold to Sofala during the first third of the century, (51) and it is clear that an important element in the feuds that spanned 1500 between the monomotapa and the rulers he claimed as subordinates was control of gold and the goods for which it could be exchanged at Sofala. (52)

The exchange of imported cloth and beads for gold was a privilege of chieftainship eagerly sought and jealously contended by rival rulers, (53)

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(48) As for note 46 and see also p 75 of chapter III

(49) See appendix 2 and the comment on p 34 & 35.

(50) Alcaçova, letter to the king, 20.xi.1506, already quoted, fl 1v, DPM I p 390.

(51) e.g. Nyamunda's 1530 miticals mentioned by Almada, letter of 26.vi.1516, already quoted, sections 2 & 4, DPM IV p 278 & 284, and Unyaroto's 127½ miticals in clerk Lopes' Expenditure book of 1515, already mentioned, fls 15, 15 v & 16, DPM IV p 98, 100 & 104. Nyamunda's growing control of mining country is recorded by António de Silveira, letter [1528] already quoted, fl 3, DPM V p 568.

(52) e.g. the monomotapa's appeal to the captain of Sofala to deprive his rival Nyamunda of trade, in Silveira's letter quoted in note 51 supra at the same place.

(53) See note 52 supra and also Lopes' Expenditure Book of 1515, fl 22v, DPM IV p 142.

yet it was asserted by an early sixteenth century writer that gifts of cloth were the only means whereby traders could terminate wars in the interior. (54) Since trade was so bitterly contested, how could gifts do other than intensify the rivalry? The statement is probably a compressed description of a Swahili trade practice with African chiefs which the Portuguese also followed. African rulers demanded gifts in return for the right to trade in their area. In 1515, for instance, chief Nyambia required a kind of tariff on food purchased in his territory of Bangoe which amounted to approximately 7% of the purchase price. (55) Apart from a kind of customs payment to chiefs, the Portuguese followed a Muslim practice of giving presents to encourage custom at the feitoria. (56) The precise division, if one existed, between dues and presents, is impossible to draw, but a possible connection is suggested by the mention of the use of a cloth called carve, so close to the word used later for tribute in cloth, the curva, "to some Africans from monomotapa to establish peace and friendship with them". (57) From 1507 to 1512 no gifts to ensure trade are recorded, even though trade records for the period survive, and there is probably a close connection between the lack of priming the trade pump and the poor flow of gold into Sofala in this period.

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(54) Alcaçova, letter to the king, 20.xi.1506, already quoted, fl 2v, DPM I p 396. See also Almada's letter of 26.vi.1516, already quoted, section 7, DPM IV p 290.

(55) Computed from information in the Expenditure Book of clerk Lopes, 1515, already quoted, fl 31 v, DPM IV p 186 & 188, equivalent prices appearing on fls 28 & 30 v, DPM IV p 170 & 182.

(56) Compare, for example, the gifts prolifically proferred by Anaia in 1505 & 1506 with the statement by Barros, op. cit. 1.10.1., ASEA VI p 111 that the Moors loaded Africans and their wives with cloth and beads on credit, asking for gold to be produced on their return.

(57) Order from acting captain Manuel Fernandes to the king's treasurers, Sofala, 21.x.1506, TT, CC II, 11-150, DPM I p 686.

In 1513, following closely on the sending of António Fernandes on his first journey to the Karanga capital, a policy of giving regular presents to important rulers and sending them a token (temça) every six months, "as is the custom among them" was pursued. (58) By 1528 the custom of sending an envoy from Sofala whenever a new captain arrived was well established. (59) One must set beside dues or presents demanded by an established ruler the reverse procedure of gifts sent to Sofala to secure trade by an African ruler on the make, such as Nyamunda, dependent upon imported cloth to pay his army during his wars of expansion.

A more local trade for Sofala was that in ivory. (60) This trade was not associated in the sixteenth century with the slave trade as happened later in Tanzania, for the product was close enough to Sofala to require little porterage. Herds of elephants were to be observed quite close to the fort itself in the early period. (61) The chiefs nearest the feitoria involved themselves in the ivory trade. (62)

Supporting the gold and ivory trades were minor ones developed around the shores of south-east Africa and the offshore islands. Ambergris, in demand in the perfumeries of the east, (63) and pearls, with great possibilities (64) but inexpertly managed in contrast to the pearl fisheries of the Persian Gulf, (65) were both developed by Swahili communities on the Bazaruto group of islands.

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(58) Letter, factor Soares to the king, 30.vi.1513, already quoted, fl 1v, DPM III p 460.

(59) Letter, António de Silveira to the king, [1528] already quoted, fl 8, DPM V p 568 mentioning ambassadors to Nyamùnda "every three years".

(60) See chapter II p 42-47 and appendix 3.

(61) See Correa, op. cit., '1505', RSEA II p 13.

(62) e.g. Mycamdira next to Sofala, mentioned in Veloso, op.cit. [1512] fl 1, DPM III p 180; and Moconde, mentioned in Lopes' Expenditure Book of 1515, already quoted, fl 5 v, DPM IV p 50.

(63) See note on p 78 of chapter IV.

(64) See note 8 supra, in this chapter.

(65) Barbosa, op.cit. (Portuguese version) section 2, DPM V p 356.

An important facet of the early sixteenth century commerce centring on Sofala and hitherto little recognised is the cluster of local transactions in food, hospital and naval supplies to serve the feitoria garrison and crews. Salt, for instance, recognised as a vital element in trade elsewhere in Africa (66) was in constant demand. A combined garrison and crew of around ninety persons bought on average twenty-four bales of salt per month from African supoliers (67) at an approximate cost of a mitical a bale. How far inland the sixteenth century salt trade extended is not known, but centuries later Sofalan Africans are known to have been supplying their inland cousins as far away as Mount Selinda on the edge of the Rhodesian plateau, at a distance of approximately a hundred and fifty miles from Sofala. (68) A simple process of manufacture still remembered by older Africans at Sofala involved allowing salt-impregnated mud from the mangrove creeks to crystallize in clay pots. (69) This, considering the absence of rock salt on the coastal plain, is a method of recovery likely to have been employed in the sixteenth century.

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(66) Al Bekri, c 1067 mentions the salt trade in Ghana (see B. Davidson, The African Past, Penguin Books, 1964, p 81) and Es-Sa'di gives trade in salt and gold as a cause in the rise to prominence of the medieval city of Djenne on the Upper Niger (ibid p 102).

(67) Calculated from Salema's Receipt and Expenditure Book of 1516, already quoted, fls 70, 70 v & 72, DPM Iv p 488, 492 & 498: 360 bales in 15 months. Garrison size is given in appendix 4. For price, see Lopes' Expenditure Book of 1515, already quoted, fl 13, DPM IV p 88.

(68) Personal communication by chief Makandara to the author in June 1970. Similar information was conveyed to Mr Keith Rennie engaged in research on the Ndau of Mount Selinda regarding the salt trade of the 19th century between the plateau and the coast, and was kindly relayed by him to the author.

(69) Personal communication by Sr Ndongwe of Sofala to the author, 1969.

Pepper was sold in great quantities to the Swahili of Sofala who evidently retained their ancestral palate for high seasoning. The commodity, having a very stable value, was used on occasion as currency. (70)

Although meat and fish were easily obtainable at Sofala, cereals were often in short supply and further stocks had to be sought elsewhere. (71) Specialist requirements in the feitoria provided an outlet for local producers: charcoal for the blacksmith, (72) tallow for the gunners, (73) special foods, including honey for the sick, (74) and wax for the church candles. (75) Honey, collected by the Swahili of Kilwa from hives hung in the trees (76) may have been collected in the same way at Sofala. (77) Oxhides were bought to make bellows for the forge and clysters for administering enemas at the hospital. (78)

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(70) Salema's Expenditure Book, 1516, already quoted, fls 60 60 v, DPM IV p 452 - 453: 266½ lb. were bought in 21 months, and the exchange rate was usually 1 lb. pepper = ½ mitical (Lopes' Expenditure Book, 1515, already quoted, fls 8 v, 9, 14; DPM IV p 50, 68, 94).

(71) e.g. in February 1507, rice and maize were brought from Kilwa (Letter, Albuquerque to the king 6.ii.1507, TT, CC I 6 - 8, section 7, DPM II p 124). In March 1507, maize was shipped from Mozambique (Order, captain Pereira to king's treasurers, Sofala, 6.iii.1507, TT, CC II, 12 - 115, DPM II p 192). In April 1512, food was required from the Nucicas (Sazaruto) (Statement by clerks Sobrinho and Homem 15.v.1512, already quoted, fl 3 v, DPM III p 240). In 1515, cereals were imported from Mangoe (Lopes' Expenditure Book of 1515 already quoted, fl 12, DPM IV p 82).

(72) Lopes' Expenditure Book of 1515, fl 8 v, DPM IV p 54,. Cavão is incorrectly translated as 'coal'.

(73) Ibid, fl 3 v, DPM IV p 40

(74) Ibid, fls 4 v & 9, DPM IV p 46 & 66.

(75) Ibid, fl 6 v, DPM IV p 56.

(76) Descrição da viagem de D. Francisco de Almeida... pela costa oriental de África, / 1506 / Munich Library, Manuscrito de Valentim Fernandes, section 8, DPM I p 524

(77) Perão mentions honey produced in hives hung in trees near Sofala in the early nineteenth century. See Owen, Narrative of voyages, II p 414 - 415.

(78) Order from captain Fernandes to the kings' treasurers, Sofala, 15.i.1507, TT, CC II 12 - 50, DPM II p 44.

Shipping needs, apart from the purchase by Portuguese of local Swahili boats, (79) drew mainly from suppliers further north, Mozambique providing coir (80) for tackle and caulking, and Kilwa a waterproofing substance inaccurately referred to in translations as 'pitch', really a resinous gum. (81) The picture is one of ceaseless interlocking barter, at a long distance in gold, beads and cloth, at medium distance in ivory, pearls, ambergris, naval supplies and cereals, and local in a variety of meat, other foodstuffs, leather, tallow and wax.

Sofala had been a centre of trade for an unknown length of time before the Portuguese arrived. What difference did the arrival of the Europeans make? It is important to distinguish in considering this question, between economic and politico-social aspects, for they are often in marked contrast. Economically there was little change when the Portuguese took over power from the Swahili. The Europeans came to Sofala because trade had already been established there, and was rumoured to include a lucrative gold trade. (82) The most successful captains were those who utilized the same trading link as the Swahili: local merchants and inland agents. In this sense the Portuguese wrought no change but used a system already in existence. (83) Rulers such as Moconde and the monomotapa quickly accepted the new situation and maintained their trade connections with Sofala. (84) Some of the

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(79) Salema's Expenditure Book, 1515, already quoted, fls 44 v & 46, DPM IV p 424 & 434.

(80) Certificate by feitoria officials, Mozambique, 3.ii.1517, TT, CC II 62 - 48, DPM V, p 18.

(81) e.g. Acknowledgement from clerk of the caravel S. Maria da Ajuda, 22.ix.1506, TT, CC II, 11 - 128, DPM I p 680.
No coal tar or pitch was used before c 1665 according to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1961, vol 5, p 884. The use of resinous 'pitch' from trees along the coast south of Sofala is described by Ferao in the early nineteenth century. See Owen, op. cit. II p 414.

(82) See chapter I p 18 - 20.

(83) Almada, letter of 26.vi.1516, already quoted, section 4 & 5, DPM IV p 282 - 290.

(84) Order, captain Fernandes to the kings' treasurers, Sofala, 30.xii.1506, TT, CC II, 13 - 133, DPM I p 763; Order, captain Enes to the king's treasurers, Sofala, 19.v.1506, TT, CC II, 11 - 12, DPM I p 506.

Swahili merchants continued to trade under the new masters of the port, drawing their stocks from the feitoria and peddling the wares for gold which was eventually paid into the Portuguese coffers. One of the first to do this was the sheikh's favourite of 1506, Jacote, who was quick to see advantage to himself in supporting the Portuguese and who was probably in a delicate position in Sofala as favourite to a very old sheikh who was opposed by a powerful group under Menga Yusaf, and member, too of a minority Muslim sect. (85)

The entry of the Portuguese into the Indian Ocean has been called by one commentator, "from the African point of view... an unrelieved disaster." (86) However true this may be of the destruction of Swahili settlements north of the Zambezi, the historian would find it difficult to support regarding Soafala. In the first place, for approximately eleven years before the European establishment a civil war had been in progress in the hinterland between the monomotapa and the changamira dynasties disrupting the flow of trade into Sofala. (87) Thus the newcomers arrived at a time of near trade- vacuum, and from accounts of the buildings of Swahili Sofala there is certainly no evidence on which to base a picture of splendour there. (88)

Secondly the sheikh of Sofala had previous to 1515 freed himself from the dominance of Kilwa (89) and no one can predict how successful he would have been in producing an era of prosperity at Sofala had the Portuguese not come. The evidence points to an imminent power struggle

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(85) Barros, op. cit., 1.10.3., RSEA VI p 122.

(86) Basil Davidson, The African Past, Penguin ed. 1964 p 129

(87) Alcaçova, letter to the king, 20.xi.1506, already quoted, fls 1 v & 2 v, DPM I p 392 & 394

(88) See introductory chapter p 11 & 12.

(89) Alcaçova, letter to the king, 20.xi.1506, already quoted, fl 3 v, DPM I p 398.

in the little Swahili community which the Portuguese arrival merely precipitated. Furthermore, the sheikh was heavily dependent on the goodwill of chief Moconde, (90) and his independence was to this extent a fiction.

Two economic changes were the direct result of the Portuguese arrival, one a very temporary one in 1506 and the other extending over a quarter century. The sale of looted goods from the north drew trade back which had been badly interrupted by the changamiran wars. (91) Thus temporarily the newcomers restored a flagging trade and some Swahili benefitted - Yacote, for instance, whose case has already been mentioned. (92) Secondly, the Portuguese arrival accelerated an economic process already in being in 1506, one which in a quarter century spelt the doom of Sofala as a gold port. Alcaçova mentioned in 1506 that a proportion of the gold trade, small but significant, was flowing through Angoxa, the Swahili entrepot north of Quelimane, taking the commerce of the Zambezi. In an effort to preserve their livelihood the Swahili merchants intensified the Zambezi-Angoxa flow which eventually drained Sofala dry. (93)

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(90) See chapter I, p 28.

(91) See chapter I, pp 29 - 30.

(92) See p 95 supra.

(93) See chapter III pp 68 - 72.

Politically and socially, the coming of the Portuguese wrought immediate and permanent changes. An uneasy peace was followed by the challenge in which the old sheikh Yusuf lost his life, and the election of a more compliant successor was brought about by the Portuguese. (94) At intervals only did the Portuguese exploit one of the finest resources in existence at Sofala: the commercial expertise acquired by the Swahili. (95) Too frequently officials in blind adherence to either crusade or private trade motives tried to expel a community which for generations had developed trade links with the interior. (96) In spite of the seeming strength of Portuguese Sofala, there is evidence to suggest a very tenuous hold indeed. After the brief attack of 1506, the only instance in its entire history when the fort was under siege, a fireproof stone complex was begun and the newcomers looked quite secure. Close to an anchorage, therefore capable of replenishment or rescue by sea, and with a water tank holding a year's supply for a normal garrison, (97) the Portuguese appeared to be in a stronger position than the Swahili had ever enjoyed. But true power lay with the African rulers and twice between 1506 and 1528 Portuguese presence at Sofala was close to obliteration. In the second instance, the crisis

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(94) Barros, op. cit. 1.10.3., RSEA VI p 125

(95) Captains who gained Swahili cooperation were Anaia, at first, see chapter 1 p 25 -27; Lemos, 1509, see letter, factor Diogo Vaz, Mozambique, 4.ix.1509, TT, CC I, 8 - 41, section 2, DPM II p 380; (despite harsh opinions he expressed about the Moors when he arrived in S.E. Africa - see letter, Duarte de Lemos to the king, Mozambique, 30.ix.1508, TT, CC I 7 - 47, section 14, DPM II p296) Miranda, 1512 - 1515, see draft letter of Captain Miranda to the king, [1514] TT, CC Fragmentos, m 22, section 1, DPM III p 520, Tavora, 1515 - 1518, see letter, captain Távora to the king, Mozambique, 20.ix.1517, TT, CC I, 22 - 85, section 5, DPM V p 202.

(96) Officials who deeply offended the Swahili were: captain Abreu, 1507, see Carneiro's summary of letters by captain Saldanha, 1511 already quoted, item 16, DPM III p 18, (Vasco Gomez = Abreu); factor Perestrelo, c 1510, see Statement of clerks Sobrinho & Homem, 15.v.1512, already quoted, DPM III p 234 - 248; and captain Almeida, 1525-1528, see António de Silveira's letter of c 1528, already quoted, section 5, DPM V p 556.

(97) Statement of clerks Sobrinho & Homem, 15.v.1512, fl 5, DPM III p 242.

was prolonged for ten years and the Portuguese were eventually forced to admit stalemate by moving their attention to the Cuama route. (98)

The practice of executing or exiling sheikhs perpetuated friction until Swahili and Portuguese, both competing for a trade too often at the mercy of the coastal plain rulers, needing each others' cooperation and seldom practising it, reduced Sofala to a pathetic backwater. (99)

The Sofala Swahili once masters of a potentially rich trade were left with only minor outlets: peddling goods in the interior when Portuguese officials were imaginative enough to allow it, (100) illicit trade, (101) supplying food for the garrison, (102) and making cloth from cotton scraps. (103) True, there are records of Portuguese honouring loyal Swahili (104) but some officials preferred the ordinary African peasant to the mouro orrado: the former was no competition in trade and content to work for a ration of millet. (105) The difference

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(98) See the story of the Maulide-Moconde plot in ibid, DPM III p 234-248; and the account of the effects of the rise of Nyamunda in chapter III p 74-75.

(99) See note 97 supra.

(100) e.g. Miranda, see draft letter of captain Miranda [1514] already quoted, section 1, DPM III p 520.

(101) The 1530 regimento for Sofala already referred to, fls 6 v & 7, DPM VI p 320 comments that almadias approach trade ships out at sea to attempt illegal trade.

(102) e.g. Mofomede Acem supplying honey, see Lopes' Expenditure Book of 1515, already quoted, fl 3, DPM IV p 38; and 'Moorish' merchants bringing millet, see ibid, fl 35 v, DPM IV p 204.

(103) Barbosa, op. cit., (Portuguese version) section 3, DPM V p 358.

(104) e.g. Order, captain Fernandes to the king's treasurers, 12.ix.1506, IT, CC II, 11 - 117, DPM I p 666; Lopes' Expenditure Book of 1515, already quoted, fl 29, 29 v & 35 v, DPM IV p 174, 176 & 204.

(105) Letter, Duarte de Lemos to the king, 30.ix.1508, already quoted, section 14, DPM II p 296.

in religion, too, even though the crusading motive was seldom strong enough to compete with trading interests, (106) was sufficient to prevent any thorough rapport between the two communities which remained quite distinct to the closing years of the century. (107)

One important factor preventing real understanding was the short term of office of Portuguese officials, a three year tour of duty being quite insufficient for learning the local language and customs. Hardly any Portuguese documents of the sixteenth century, apart from the remarkable book of Santos, contain any local words, and until the advent of priests such as André Fernandes, Monclaro and Santos, who obviously spent much time researching into local language and customs, the only Portuguese who acquired any grip on the local tongues were of the lowliest social stations (108) and probably mostly illiterate.

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(106) The 1530 regimento for Sofala, already referred to, fl 39 v, DPM VI p 410, recommends preferential treatment of Christian slaves. For a probable earlier reference to the same policy, see draft letter of captain Miranda [1514] already quoted, item 3, DPM III p 522, where the damaged text seems to have this implication.

(107) See Santos, op. cit., l.18., RSEA VII pp 38 - 40.

(108) Fernandes, carpenter/interpreter, was a degredado until c 1516 (see Sofala wage roll for December 1516, TT, CC II, 66-69, fl 3 v, DPM IV p 570, where for the first time he is shown clear of the degredado section. The latest wage roll for Sofala extant to include Fernandes shows him still on the bottom of the social scale, despite his great services to the feitoria. (Wage roll for June 1518, TT, CC II, 75-182, fl 7, DPM V p 516.) Slaves were sometimes bought for their skill in interpreting - see letter from Sebastião de Sousa to the king, Mozambique, 17.ix.1521, TT, CC I, 27-54, section 1, DPM VI p 64.

The Swahili merchants of 1505, distinct from the rest of the African portion of Sofala, survived the Portuguese takeover: the sheikh and some of the Muslim heirarchy were still identifiable in 1515. (109) To one observer in 1518, however, there was a notable change in the standard of living of some of the Swahili. Some had had to turn to cottage crafts: "as a new development, the Moors manufacture many cotton cloths, much of the material being locally grown; they spin and weave it into white cloth and since they are either ignorant of dyeing or from lack of dyes, they shred blue-coloured textiles from Cambay ... and they work the thread into their weave, producing a coloured cloth which is sold for a good sum of gold. Such was the remedy they had to adopt after they lost their trade to our people." (110)

The Swahili rulers who accommodated themselves to the Portuguese retained some show of authority, (111) and the link with the most powerful African ruler of the hinterland was still very much alive in 1526, when the chief proclaimed that only the Moors of Sofala had his permission to trade across his territory. (112) The Portuguese still had officials who complained that the Swahili should be expelled so that direct links with African gold producers might be revived, (113) but the Europeans were neither convinced nor strong enough to follow such extreme injunctions.

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(109) Lopes' Expenditure Book of 1515, already quoted, fl 16, refers to the sharif, fl 29 v to the sheikh's warden, fl 20, to the imam; see DPM IV pp 104, 176 & 128.

(110) Barbosa, op. cit., (Portuguese version) section 3, 'Reino de Cofalla' DPM V p 358.

(111) Incomplete receipt and expenditure book of storekeeper Matoso, [post 1522] TT, CC III, 8-6, DPM VI p 88 records the giving of a banner of used cloth to the sheikh, as the captain was in the habit of doing.

(112) Letter, D. Lopo de Almeida to the king, Sofala, 27.viii.1527, TT, CC I, 35-57, fl 1, DPM VI p 276.

(113) Ibid, fl 2, DPM VI p 278.

APPENDICES 6 'The non-Muslim people of sixteenth century Sofala' and 7 'The location of chief Nyamunda in the early sixteenth century' appear at the end of the text.

CHAPTER V TRADE IN SOFALA AND ITS HINTERLAND 1530 - 1595

Although a span of sixty-five years may appear too wide for a single survey of the trade in south-east Africa, there is both excuse and justification for attempting it. Sparseness of extant documents for the period provides the excuse: whereas the thirty-two years from 1497 to 1529 can offer 482 manuscripts, the next hundred years' manuscripts are unlikely to exceed 120. (1) There is justification in examining the wide sweep since it contains a single historic process in south-east Africa - the progressive exploitation of the Cuama route to the gold of the Rhodesian plateau. Its themes are continuous - a constant suspected official trade deficit contrasting sharply with evidence for a quite lucrative private trade, a move by private endeavour from an impoverished and strangled Sofala to the richer and more readily responsive main artery of south-east African trade, the Cuama, punctuated by the dramatic attempts at conversion by Fr. Silveira and conquest by captains Baretto and Homem.

A previous chapter has examined the gradual encirclement of Sofala by the ruler of the coastal plain, Nyamunda. (2) Although there were times during the expansion of this chief's power when the trade of Sofala was quite healthy, a serious crisis arose in 1529 when inland commerce with the post

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(1) The 482 figure represents the manuscripts printed in DPM vols I - VI. Vol VI contains 9 further manuscripts to 1537, and the author examined 82 unpublished ones to 1596 in Lisbon.

(2) See chapter III, esp. pp 74 - 75.

came to an abrupt halt. (3) It was not only the burgeoning might of Nyamunda over the gold routes and some of the areas of production that precipitated the crisis. António Fernandes, who achieved such outstanding success in preserving good relations between Nyamunda and Portuguese Sofala was now dead; his skills in language and diplomacy developed over twenty years of service in east Africa were virtually irreplaceable. (4) The impasse prompted the incoming captain in 1528 to make two important recommendations: that the Portuguese should establish firm control of the Cuama mouth to eliminate the Muslim trade which flourished in the river, and that the captain's term of office be extended to six years to afford opportunity to revive the flagging commercial fortunes of the Portuguese in south-east Africa. (5) A subsequent captain, Vicente Pegado appears to have benefitted from the second recommendation; the proposer's term of office remained at the usual triennium. How soon after Silveira's recommendation that firm control be established at the Cuama mouth did the Portuguese penetrate the great river?

Some history books contain the statement that Portuguese Sena was established in 1531. (6) The claim seems to originate in this century with

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(3) Letter, António da Silveira [1528] already quoted, fl 8, DPM V p 568.

(4) Report, Afonso Mexia, Comptroller of the treasury in India, to the king, Cochin, 15.xii.1527, TT,CC II, 145-147, fl 5, DPM VI p 288. The auditor was examining books for 1522 - 1525 and mentions a sum of money "taken from António Fernandes, deceased, to replace an amount owed by him to a Moor for trade goods given to him in the feitoria."

(5) Letter, António da Silveira to the king [1528] already quoted, fl 7 v, DPM V p 566.

(6) e.g. J. Duffy, Portugal in Africa, Penguin Books 1962, p 83.

Sidney Welch, but there is no extant document to support it. (7) The first reference, in fact, to Portuguese Sena does not occur until 1561, although it is clear that development requiring two to three decades must have preceded that date. (8) Tete, approximately 150 miles beyond Sena, had also been established by the same time and both were centres of tiny Portuguese communities dominating large slave settlements providing porterage to the Karanga goldfields. Sena had grown near Inhamior, capital of an African chief subject to the monomotapa, (9) and probably in similar fashion to Sofala, for Swahili traders occupied the same site. (10) The same letter of 1561 affords a brief glimpse of one of the most intriguing characters in the story of Portuguese penetration, António Caiado, who made himself indispensible to the monomotapa and who, under the title of 'Captain of the Gates' lived at Chatucuy, close to the Karanga capital. (11)

References previous to 1561 show Portuguese activity in the Cuama from around 1540 when an ivory trading post was opened, but whether at the

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(7) S.R. Welch, South Africa under John III 1521 - 1557, Cape Town, 1946, p 80 and note 223. A complete conspiracy of silence regarding this event prevails not only in documents but also in the pages of the sixteenth century chroniclers, Barros, Couto and Castanheda. Welch attributes this to concentration on events in India, but since other events around this date on the east coast of Africa are mentioned in the chronicles the excuse cannot be accounted a very secure one.

(8) See Luiz Froes, 'Da viagem do Padre Dom Gonçalo ao reino do manomotapa ... ' Goa, 15.xii.1561, in LSEA II p 118. Sena is described as a large town with ten to fifteen Portuguese settlers, some Indian Christians and a slave population of 500. The first map reference to Sena occurs in Bartolomeu Velho's third chart in a group of four dated 1561, forming a planisphere, original in Biblioteca Academia di Belle Arti, Firenze (PMC II plate 203).

(9) Almost certainly the capital, by a great river, called Inharouro in Almada's account of journeys by António Fernandes (see Almada's letter of 26.vi.1516, section 5, DPM IV p 286. Traders had subsequent to Fernandes' visit come to Sofala - see Order, captain Távora to factor Salema, Sofala, 27.xi.1517, TT, CC II, 72-100, DPM V p 310; and Lopes' Expenditure Book of 1515, already quoted, fls 15, 15 v & 16 for May & June, 1515, DPM IV p 98, 100 & 104.

(10) Monclaro, op. cit., 'Do grande Rio Cuama', RSEA III p 175.

(11) As for note 8 supra.

river estuary or approximately 150 miles upstream at Sena is not known. (12) The Sena position would have been far more advantageous than any station on the delta where so many mouths had to be checked for unlicensed trade. At Sena one post would serve for customs and licensed trade. The date is certainly appropriate to allow for two decades of growth to the establishment described in 1561.

Froes calls the Portuguese inhabitants 'settlers' (portugueses de assento') meaning casados or time-expired soldiers who stayed overseas and married frican wives. Two references previous to 1561 make it clear that the penetration was official: one document mentions participation in the trade by one who within a year received the captaincy of Sofala, João de Sepúlveda. (13) The other is a letter of application for a share in the Cuama trade recently opened; it was addressed to the king. (14) By describing the activity as official it must not be assumed that the authorities in Lisbon were always kept informed of the progress of trade or the profits which accrued: a point which will be returned to later in this chapter.

Although no evidence can be produced for captain Pegado's involvement in the Cuama penetration, (15) two remarks seem appropriate. His

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(12) Letter, Gonçalo Pinto de Sousa, groom of the chamber, to the king, Goa, 15.xi.1545, TT, CC I, 77-11, which mentions a port opened four or five years before in the Cuama River to which the captain of Mozambique each year sends a fusta with trade goods to buy ivory. The letter from D. Estevão da Gama to the king, Goa, 11.xi.1540, TT, CC I, 68-76 mentions ships sent to trade in a river reached before Sofala [i.e. between Sofala and Mozambique island] where J. de Sepúlveda used to go, who became captain of Sofala in 1541.

(13) Ibid

(14) As for note 12 supra

(15) Pegado's regimento - that for Sofala for 1530 - is extant; his contract, unfortunately, is not, but oblique reference made to it later may be construed as implying that his area of responsibility included the Rivers of Cuama, referred to as the 'conquest of the mines of Manamatapa.' See letter, king to viceroy, Lisbon, 20.iii.1591, fol 179 v, AHU, ECU, códice 281, fols 179 v - 180.

extended term of office, from 1531 to 1538, would allow him greater scope than any other of the previous captains to increase Portuguese influence in his area. Further, the improvement to Sofalan trade under his rule, if the Nyamunda situation still obtained, can only be accounted for by postulating the tapping of a new trade route to the goldfields of Rhodesia, circumventing the coastal blockade, that is, by use of the Cuama river.

What of the trade itself? Five years before this period began there was a serious trade deficit. In captain Diogo de Sepúlveda's triennium (1522 - 1525) 9,476 miticals' worth of trade was transacted. The expenses of the establishment, however, were 24,621 miticals. (16) Two years later a captain emphasised that "such great expense as that of Sofala cannot be borne unless a great profit is made." (17) It is no suprise, therefore, to read in the 1530 regimento for Sofala amendments and additions to previous regulations designed to increase the revenue of the station. Posts of captain and factor were for the first time in the history of the feitoria (apart from acting appointments) combined. (18) Savage penalties were prescribed for smugglers (19) and a system of payments for informers added. (20) Africans were to be encouraged to come direct

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(16) See audit statements in Report by Afonso Mexia, comptroller of the India treasury to the king, Cochin, 15.xii.1527, TT, CCII, 145, 147, DPM VI p 230 - 290. Calculations based on 1516/1517 documents give for a garrison of 60 and combined crews of 42 an annual wage bill of 6,301 miticals (see appendix 4). Compared with the annual average in Sepúlveda's day of 8,307 m, even though some ivory payments are included, a significant rise in costs is seen.

(17) Letter, D.Lopo de Almeida to the king, 27.viii.1527, already quoted, fl 2, DPM VI p 278

(18) Sofala regimento of 1530 already quoted, fl 2 v, DPM VI p 306

(19) Ibid, fls 7 v, 12 v & 13, 14 & 14 v; DPM VI p 322, 336 & 338 & 342.

(20) Ibid, fls 13, 30 v & 37 v; DPM VI p 338, 384 & 404

to the feitoria, rather than receive trade goods through the Swahili middlemen. (21) Trade delegations were to be welcomed and any cause of offence, even to the insistence on disarming merchants before they entered the fort, to be avoided. (22) Adjustment of the gold scales to ensure the highest profit the market would bear was to be so arranged that the customers were not aware of the procedure which would undoubtedly upset them. (23) Ivory was declared a royal monopoly. (24)

All in vain. It is clear from general correspondence throughout the period, even though precise trade documents are almost entirely lacking, that the official revenue of Sofala seldom satisfied the treasury. Only two documents out of the eighty or so extant from 1537 to 1596 betray any optimism about the revenue of the entrepôt. (25) One indication of the dissatisfaction of Lisbon is the series of changes in fiscal policy made during this period. In 1530, for instance, ivory was declared an exclusively royal trade. (26) In 1562, 5% of the Sofala and Mozambique

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(21) Sofala regimento of 1530 already quoted, fl 20, DPM VI p 362.

(22) Ibid, fl 12, DPM VI p 336.

(23) Ibid, fl 31, DPM VI p 386.

(24) Ibid, fl 32, DPM VI p 390.

(25) (a) Letter, D. Estevão da Gama to the king, Goa, 11.xi.1540, TT, CC I 68-76, in which the viceroy remarks that Sofala's trade had been healthy in Pegado's time (1531 - 1538) but had slumped again.

(b) King to viceroy, Lisbon, 7.iii.1595, AHU, ECU, códice 281, fls 337-8, in which the king congratulates the viceroy on his wise choice in appointing experienced men under whom the trade of Sofala and the Rivers of Cuama had increased.

(26) See note 24, supra.

ivory trade was ceded to the captain in return for his subscribing 5% of the capital costs. (27) In the same year an incentive system was offered to the Sofalan officials: ½% of the revenue to the captain and ½% shared between the factor and the clerks of Sofala's total revenue. (28) Experiment was made in the trade policy towrds the Rivers of Cuama, but soon abandonned: in 1593 open trade was allowed; in 1595 the general trade position there was pronounced healthy, but in the same year open trade was said to harm the treasury and in the next year was revoked. (29)

A tendency may be observed in official policy to allow little freedom of action. For instance, the offer of private trade opportunities in 1590 to a joint stock company of Mozambique residents may appear enlightened in a mercantilist age until one examines the areas in which licensed trade was to be allowed: from Cabo dos Correntes south to the Cape, where no established trading entrepots existed, the coast opposite Mozambique, which suffered from the same disadvantage, the Melinde coast and Cabo Delgado, where Swahili trade still reigned and Turkish attacks threatened, and Madagascar, tried already and found unfruitful. (30) If one reads the account by Santos of the years 1592 - 1593 (31) one realizes that open trade in the Cuama was granted closely following the Zimba attacks on Sena and Tete! The Crown was not giving great concessions whenever it departed from its policiy of strictly controlled royal or licensed trade.

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(27) Grant from queen to captain Fernao Martins Freire of Sofala, Lisbon, 13.iii.1562, RSEA V p 256.

(28) Grant from king to captain Freire of Sofala, Lisbon, 29.i.1562, RSEA V p 251.

(29) (a) King to viceroy, Lisbon, 31.iii.1593, AHU, ECU, código 281, fols 238 - 239 v.
(b) King to viceroy, Lisbon, 7.iii.1595, AHU, ECU, código 281, fols 337 - 338.
(c) King to viceroy, Lisbon, 7.iii.1595, RSEA V pp 276 - 277.
(d) King to viceroy, Lisbon, 9.iii.1596, RSEA V p 278.

(30) Order, governor of India, Goa, 14.xi.1590, RSEA V pp 266 - 267.

(31) Santos, op. cit., 2.18 & 2.19, RSEA VII pp 109 - 114. Chapter 19 gives the date (p 112) - "Isto foi no anno de 1592."

Statistics and even hints as to the volume of the gold trade in the documents of this period are pitifully few. Pegado's trade (1531 - 1538) was said to be good, which may be taken to imply a revenue at least equalling or just exceeding the cost of maintenance , of around 8,000 miticals per annum. (32) No other direct reference to trade figures appears until 1556, when in the middle of his four years' term (1554 - 1558) captain Sousa recorded having sent 1,500 cruzados (= approx. 1,170 m) to India, which if it represents a two year period's trade is reminiscent of the nadir reached in 1518 - 1519 by factor Brito. (33) An oblique reference to a possible annual revenue of 20,000 m may be noted in a royal letter of 1562. (34) Finally, from 1586 comes the opinion of a friar who spent a year in Monomotapa, that leasing the trade of that kingdom to the captain of Sofala for 50,000 cruzados a year (approx. 41,666 m) was foolish, for the captain made far more and the treasury lost heavily by such a contract. (35)

While allowing for clerical exaggeration in the last statement, one must admit that trade in one important commodity at least, reached a new peak in this period: ivory. Unfortunately only one official reference to the amount of trade is extant. In 1540 the viceroy records 268 quintals of ivory reaching India in one year from Sofala. (36) This almost doubles the amount traded by factor Brito in the previous record year of 1518, (37)

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(32) See p 105 and note 16.

(33) Letter, D. Diogo de Sousa to the king, Mozambique, 22.xi.1556, TT, CC I, 100-1, and taking Livermore's conversion for the 1500 cruzado as 390 reis and the mitical as 500 reis. (See Livermore, A history of Portugal, Cambridge, 1947, p 479.)

(34) Grant by king to captain Freire of Sofala, Lisbon, 29.i.1562, RSEA V p 251.

(35) Notes for king by Friar Azevedo, c 1586 (datable by the mention of D. Jorge de Menezes, captain of Sofala, 1596 - 1589) RSEA IV, p 33.

(36) Letter, D. Estevão da Gama to king, Goa, 11.xi.1540, TT, CC I, 68-76. 67 bars were sent, the bar being approx. 4 quintals.

(37) Letter, factor Brito to the king, 8.viii.1519, already quoted, section 2, DPM VI p 14 gives the total for his factorship, 1519 - 1521, as 140 quintals.

and surely represents the difference made by the increasing control over the Cuama trade. Permission was granted in 1599 for the captain of Sofala to send 400 quintals a year to India to dispose of to anyone, (38) which gives the impression that the volume was still rising.

In view of the evidence, admittedly sparse, that there was still trade potential in Sofala and much more in the Rivers of Cuama, a number of questions present themselves. Firstly, why didn't the treasury benefit more spectacularly? The answer to this lies in the device of the trade ship which although it increased the volume of Sofala's trade, reduced the profitability of it. António da Silveira just prior to assuming office as captain of Sofala and Mozambique, drew the king's attention to the effect of this caravel, conveying goods direct between Cambay and Sofala rather than via the intermediate port of Mozambique, on Sofala's trade. (39) The vessel with its crew of thirty-four cost the exchequer a million reis a year, claimed Silveira. (40) An incentive in the form of ½% of the ivory he sold and the cloth he bought was granted to the captain. Although an extra consignment of trade goods reached the port in this way, the effect was to create a glut and deprive the feitoria of control over prices. Silveira notes how eagerly the Swahili awaited the ship, preferring to trade with it than with the captain's store, since prices were much lower. (41) Two years later, Joao de Freitas gave details to the king of the decrease in prices occasioned by the trade ship: Cambay cloth and beads had dropped to between three-fifths and a half of their previous prices. (42) Despite the evident detrimental effect of this expedient it was still in use ten years later. (43)

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(38) Broer, viceroy to captain Pantaliao de Sá of Sofala, Goa, 4.xii.1599, HMA V p 249.

(39) Letter, António da Silveira, c 1528, already quoted, fls 6 & 6 v, DPM V p 560.

(40) Approx. 2,000 m, roughly a quarter of the garrison cost of Sofala - see note 16 supra.

(41) As for note 39, supra.

(42) Information from Jordao de Freitas to king, Goa, 17.ix.1530, TT, Gavetas XX, 10-26, DPM VI p 424- 432.

(43) Letter, D. Estevão da Gama to king, Goa, 11.xi.1540, already quoted.

A second factor affecting the quantity of gold arriving at Sofala was the state of the hinterland. There is, however, only one reference in the entire period to this aspect, in contrast to the wealth of information in the period 1505 - 1529 when the Karanga civil wars in the interior were the favourite excuse for poor trading years. (44)

The third and by far the most important reason for lack of royal benefit from Sofalan trade lies in the prevalent carelessness of so many officials towards their duty as opposed to their interests. António de Silveira's letter of c 1528 is a serious indictment of the scandalous negligence of previous captains. When due allowance has been made for the well known habit of murmuraçao among aspirants to posts in the Estado da Índia, denigrating the occupants of posts to which they aspired, the impression is still of a fabric grossly neglected. The trade store was badly damaged and water flowed through it; the granary was ruined; the church was unusable and the captain's suite in sore need of repair, while the wall flattened by the 1516 cyclone had still not been satisfactorily restored. (45) The same letter notes the discontent in the fort due to non-payment of millet rations, and unaccountable absences of the entire garrison from the fort. (46) Regarding absences without leave, the 1530 regimento contains a curious admission that discipline was difficult to maintain in calling for musters not daily, or even weekly, but monthly to check attendance in the fort, which in view of the tiny size of the garrison seems very odd. (47)

The audit on the Diogo de Sepúlveda accounts (1522 - 1525) show that captains were neglecting to check the quantity of gold in the coffers by reweighing, which in Mina, claimed the auditors, had produced sufficient to

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(44) Letter, captain Sepúlveda to king, Mozambique, 10.viii.1542, TT, CC I, 72-87. The captain regrets that due to a two year war between the monomotapa and his rivals, no African traders have visited the feitoria.

(45) Letter, António da Silveira, c 1528, already quoted, fls 5 v & 6, DPM V p 358; cf letter, provost Almada, 26.vi.1516 already quoted, section 3, DPM IV p 280.

(46) Silveira's letter, c 1528, fl 2, DPM V p 544.

(47) 1530 regimento for Sofala, already quoted, fl 17 v, DPM VI p 350.

pay the captain and residents. (48) The regimento of 1530 called for this abuse to be checked. (49) Other major malpractices spotted in the same audit were the selling of goods through the Swahili without a careful record being kept, and entering mecanicos on the register at a higher salary than they were qualified to receive. (50)

For the all-pervading devotion to private trade in south-east Africa in this period there is more evidence than for any other facet of life. Ivory was sent to Bacaim rather than to Goa, for instance, in order to avoid the customs post and sell in the open market. In the scramble for quick riches, young elephants were killed for tusks which were quite small: this would bring lesser returns and at the same time diminish the herds around Sofala. (51) Eight hundred "great merchants" flocked to Sofala during one month of 1548, claimed a conscientious factor, providing temptations for private trade on a lavish scale. One official made 2,000 mitigals in the short period, and only one official paid any customs on the transactions. (52) In 1552, the viceroy reported that Sofala's captain was dealing in contraband, including ivory, and that his clerk also was involved. (53) A second feitoria, unofficial, was in use on an island

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(48) Report, Afonso Mexia, 15.xii.1527, already quoted, section 4, DPM VI p 286.

(49) 1530 regimento, already quoted, fl 44, DPM VI pp 418 - 420.

(50) Mexia's report, fl 4 v, DPM VI p 286. Mecanicos included men-at-arms, barber/surgeons and blacksmiths, to name but a few; see Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, London, 1969, p 318. A great financial gulf separated noble and non-noble residents overseas: see the 1530 regimento, fls 34 v & 35, DPM VI p 396. The trick of falsifying the register in this way was known earlier: see captain Pereira's Enquiry, 25.ii.1507, / Sofala / TT, CC II 12-98, fl 2 v, DPM II p 174, accusing captain Fernandes of drawing pay for slaves entered falsely on the fort roll under "nomes honradas".

(51) Letter, viceroy to king, Goa, 11.xi.1540, TT, CC I 68-76.

(52) Letter, factor of Sofala to king, Goa, 4.xi.1548, TT, CC I, 81-75.

(53) Letter, viceroy to queen, Cochin, 27.i.1552, TT, Gavetas 15.19.38.

at the Sofala river mouth to enable the captain to cheat the treasury, wrote Joao Gamava to the king in 1555. (54) No doubt visiting inspectors could be shown the official feitoria without suspecting that hidden in the mangrove thickets of a nearby island lay a second for use when the coast was clear. From 1562 attempts to prevent the scandal of private trade by the captain give way to acceptance of it by farming out the Cuama trade to him at an annual lease of 50,000 cruzados. (55) Perhaps the hand of the captain who benefitted by such a trade monopoly may be seen in the withdrawal of the privilege of open trade in the Rivers in 1596, after a mere three year trial.

Confirmation that not only the captain and his principal officers were involved in recouping themselves during their triennia, comes in a document of 1540 which shows earnings by private trade of a number of quite humble members of the Sofala community. Rui Diaz, a sailor, gained 37½ miticals by his trade, the clerk made 61½, and another sailor who evidently had the Midas touch, amassed 101 miticals. (56)

Another question which arises is this: since it was quite evidently the Cuama sector of the south-east African coast which showed the greatest commercial growth rate in this period, and since this area could have been much more conveniently administered from the superior port of Mozambique, why did the king not cut his losses and order the abandonment of the expensive and progressively more isolated port of Sofala? A precedent for such a solution existed in the dismantling of Kilwa in 1512 when it was known to

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(54) Letter, Joao Gamava to king, Mozambique, 8.xi.1555, TT, CC I 97-12. The island of Nafamed Joao mentioned by Gamava corresponds with the island of Inhasanto on which the rich Moor who was a great friend of the Portuguese lived, and whose shrine-tomb was burnt by Santos. See Santos, op. cit., 3.7. NSEA VII p 163. The Gamava letter hints at the circumstances in which the Moor became so rich.

(55) Queeh to viceroy, Lisbon, 13.iii.1562, NSEA V p 254, in which all the official Cuama trade is granted to the captain and the viceroy forbidden to send any ship from India to the Rivers. The cost of the lease is given in 'Information for the king', by Friar Azevedo, c 1596, NSEA IV p 33.

(56) Anonymous inventory of effects of deceased persons of Mozambique & Sofala, (place not stated) 16.vi.1540, TT, CC II, 232-59.

be redundant to the system of coastal stations. (57)

It might be contended that Sofala was far healthier than Mozambique: the numbers of men who died at Mozambique gave it an unenviable reputation compared with Sofala which one visitor described as "as healthy as Sintra", the royal hilltop resort above Lisbon. (58) One must remember, however, that whereas Mozambique was the first Indian Ocean port to receive the weary, scurvy-stricken seafarers of whom a large proportion died on the island, Sofala received only the toughened survivors. From the health point of view, the coral island of Mozambique was likely to be far healthier than the mosquito-infested flats of Sofala.

There is no evidence in this period of any move to dismantle Sofala, such as was recommended to the king in 1652. (59) The only proposals for improvements at Sofala concerned the advisibility of reducing the over-expensive establishment. (60) Indeed, royal policy in the later sixteenth century, far from considering any reduction in the number of east African stations, gave approval for increasing them. From 1542 on, accounts of renewed Turkish activity on the Malindi coast prompted the

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(57) It had been proposed as early as 1506 by the viceroy that Kilwa be replaced by a haven at Mozambique (see summary of letters from the viceroy and other officials in India to the king, no place stated, 27.xii.1506, TT, Gavetas XX, 4-15, fl 2, DPM I p 764). The feitoria was dismantled in 1512 (see note 5 in chapter III).

(58) For mortality at Mozambique, see Boxer, op. cit., 1969, p 218. The Sintra remark is in Lemos' letter of 30.ix.1508, already quoted, section II, DPM II p 294.

(59) See the report of a meeting of the principal residents in Mozambique under the chairmanship of the captain, dated 3.v.1652, repsoduced on microfilm - Boletim da Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa, vols 20 - 22 of 1962, doc 378, in which the question of whether to destroy Sofala and erect a new fort at Quelimane is discussed. See also the letter, king to viceroy, Lisbon, 6.ii.1652, reproduced on microfilm, ibid. doc 377, in which the king forbids the dismantling of Sofala before full discussion has taken place in Lisbon in the presence of experienced persons [from east Africa].

(60) See letter, factor Soares to king, 30.vi.1513, already quoted, fl 2, DPM III p 464, where the factor complains that the post of provost is quite unnecessary, and Silveira's letter of c 1528, fls 4 v & 5, DPM VI pp 554 & 560, which also treats of redundant posts.

reopening of a Portuguese fort in the area, this time sited at Mombasa. (61) Sofala, though so often in danger of complete strangulation by hostile land forces, was still the gold port for the Manica plateau and the centre for collection of ivory and a group of minor products like rhino horn, turtle shell, ambergris and pearls. (62)

Three officials had to be in complete agreement, moreover, if Sofala were to be abandoned: the captain, the viceroy and the king himself. The king had only to receive the usual optimistic despatch from an aspirant to the captaincy, such as that of Silveira in 1528, to be encouraged to persevere with a feitoria which normally made no profit. He was furthermore aware of the increasing threats to Portuguese presence in south-east Africa as the period progressed, from foreign ships eager for plunder. (63) To hold Sofala, expensive as it was, would at least deny its use to others.

But the viceroy and king hoped by effecting reforms to make Sofala a more economic or even a lucrative post. As abuses were noted, amendments were made to the regimento for the captain, and orders (by their repetition, it must be admitted, mainly honoured in the breach) given for compliance with royal instructions. (64)

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(61) (a) Letter, João de Sepúlveda to king, Mozambique, 10.viii.1542, already quoted.
(b) King to viceroy, Lisbon, 6.ii.1589, AHU, ECU, códice 281, fls 11-16, fl 11.
(c) King to viceroy, Lisbon, 18.i.1592, AHU, ECU, códice 281, fls 192-203, fl 194 v.
(d) King to viceroy, Lisbon, 1.iii.1594, AHU, ECU, códice 281, fls 242-254, fl 249 v.
(e) King to viceroy, Lisbon, 24.ii.1595, AHU, ECU, fls 303-308, fl 303.

(62) Santos, op. cit., 1.2., RSEA VII pp 3 - 4.

(63) See Silveira's letter of c. 1528, section 2, DPM V p 544, regarding a French corsair in Mozambique, and reference in note 61 supra to Turkish activity on the Malindi coast.

(64) See the preamble to the 1530 regimento already referred to, DPM VI p 304, which mentions revisions, and the following documents which assert that the Sofala regimento is not being followed:
(a) King to viceroy, Lisbon, 6.ii.1589, AHU, ECU, códice 281, fl 180;
(b) King to viceroy, Lisbon, 20.iii.1591, AHU, ECU, códice 281, fl 190;
(c) King to viceroy, Lisbon, 31.iii.1593, AHU, ECU, códice 281, fl 238.

The chief stumbling block to any improvement was undoubtedly the captain himself, in only annual communication with Lisbon, secure in his three-year tenure, and for whom Sofala and its growing trade potential with the Cuama hinterland was an opportunity to enrich himself. Examples throughout the period of abuse of privilege by captains have already been given (65) It is pertinent to add that there may be significance in the progressive drying-up of documents concerning the trade of Sofala and the Rivers of Cuama as the sixteenth century advances and gives way to the seventeenth. The usual excuse for the shortage of extant manuscripts is the devastation of earthquake, fire and flood around the Torre de Tombo archives in the Lisbon of 1755. (66) While admitting the destruction and long-term dislocation produced by the cataclysm of Pombal's time, one must comment that natural disasters are hardly selective in what they annihilate, and one is tempted to enquire whether there were not in fact fewer trade documents being produced as the period progressed. There are, for instance, in this period, no full ledgers by the feitoria clerk such as Lopes and Salema produced, (67) nor are wage and maintenance registers for Sofala extant in this entire period. (68) The account of the audit on the books of António Rico show that falsification and carelessness were in evidence in

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(65) See pages 110-- 112 supra.

(66) See Axelson, S.E. Africa, 1488 - 1530, pp 190 - 191.

(67) Expenditure books of Lopes and Salema, already quoted, which occupy two-thirds of the entire 1515 - 1516 volume of DPM reproductions.

(68) The remark applies to both Lisbon and the Coa archives: the last wage and maintenance sheet extant for a century is for June 1518, reproduced in DPM V pp 483 - 520.

the 1522 - 1525 period. (69) In fact a very strong impression emerges from the study of original sources that there is a close connection between the growth of private trade over a widening area by captains and other officials, and the progressive lack of trade documentation in this period.

For a combination of reasons, one may conclude, mainly reluctance by the king to relinquish a station with promise of further wealth and whose loss would be the enemy's advantage, and desire by the captain to retain a cover for private trade, Portuguese Sofala, which might have yielded place entirely to Mozambique, survived to the end of the century and beyond.

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(69) Report from Afonso Mexia, Cochin, 15.xii.1527, already quoted, section 4, DPM VI p 286: "And they ordered goods to be sold through the agency of the Moors without giving a good account of it." Compare this situation with the meticulous records kept by Lopes and Salema in 1515 - 1517. The Mexia MS mentions three further abuses: falsification of wage records, lack of records concerning tribute from Kilwa and Lamu, and misappropriation of the ivory profits.

CHAPTER VI AFRICAN KINGDOMS AND PEOPLES IN THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY

The period between the pinnacle of Nyamunda's power in 1528 and the opening of the Jesuit missions at Inhambane in 1560 is almost totally devoid of information regarding African kingdoms of the south-east. What little there is will be introduced at appropriate places in this account which deals with African rulers and peoples, and their relations with the Portuguese from 1560 to 1595 when Santos ended his major mission in Sofala. With the advent of the Jesuits to the chief of Tonga, there begins a spate of Portuguese writing on the indigenous peoples of south-east Africa. Letters from Jesuits and Dominicans, accounts of the mission and martyrdom of Fr. Silveira and the avenging campaigns of Barreto and Homem, together with Couto's continuation of the chronicle of Barros, provide a quite detailed picture of the Karanga states and their neighbours. (1) The writing is full of sociological and linguistic interest, even in an author as scornful of the primitive heathens he considered the Africans to be, as Monclaro: all the better witness for his antipathy.

The centre of the Karanga kingdoms was still in the area where António Fernandes had seen the monomotapa surrounding his village with dry stone work close to Mount Fura half a century before. (2) His trade with the Portuguese of Sofala had been almost totally blocked by the coastal ruler Nyamunda, whose role was later assumed by the Kiteve (Quiteve). Reference towards the middle of the century is made to continuous wars with rivals which interrupted for two years the monomotapa's trade with Sofala. (3) The monomotapa's outlet was thus mainly by the Zambezi river route and until

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(1) See map 'African chiefdoms of the Sofalan hinterland c 1560' at the end of this chapter.

(2) See note 28 of chapter III on the present state of knowledge regarding the whereabouts of the Karanga capital of the sixteenth century.

(3) Letter, João de Sepúlveda to king, Mozambique, 16.vii.1542, TT, CC I 72-87, fl 1 v.

the growing contacts there between 1531 and 1560, Muslim merchants conducted his trade. (4)

Santos declared that accounts of the magnificence of this ruler were often extravegant, and pointed out that he lived in sample state, carrying the kinds of weapon any African would. (5) Although he was referred to as the greatest of all south-east African chiefs, probably on account of his mineral resources and religious prestige, he was in decline by the second half of the century. The trappings of theocratic majesty remained, however. Sons of neighbouring chiefs were brought up at his court to discourage rebellion by their fathers (a device Sepúlveda's letter of 1542, just referred to, showed to be singularly unsuccessful). The ruler was approached only after a series of intermediaries had been seen (6) and then only with the extravegant deference demanded by oriental monarchs, and with a gift, however poor. (7) Handclapping preceded the interviews and much time was consumed in prolonged protocol. (8) His quarters were absolutely sacrosanct except to the royal family, not even tributary chiefs being allowed inside. (9) He had a vast number of queens, the title including close relatives as well as true wives, the important ones having official duties to perform such as interviewing suppliants, and, according to later evidence, ruling particular areas for the monomotapa. (10) An

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(4) Fr. Silveira's mission exposed not only resident Muslims exerting great influence over the young monomotapa, but also the presence of the sheikh of Mozambique, a direct Muslim link with Indian Ocean commerce. See Froes, op. cit., in RSEA II p 111.

(5) Santos, op. cit., 2.15, RSEA VII pp 101 & 103.

(6) Intermediaries included the Captain of the Gates and queens who interceded for Muslims or Portuguese: see Santos, op. cit., 2.9; 2.15, RSEA VII pp 88; 103 - 104.

(7) For Europeans interviews cost cloth, for Africans, a cow or goat, and in the case of the poorest, a sack of earth or bundle of thatching grass. Ibid, p 104.

(8) Couto, op. cit., 9.23, RSEA VI p 321.

(9) Bernard de Cienfuegas, Life of the blessed father Gonzalo de Silveira priest of the Society of Jesus, martyred at Monomotapa, a city in Caffraria, trans. from Latin into Spanish, Madrid, 1614, typescript by C.J. Cruddas, 1931, in possession of Professor Axelson, Bk II, ch XI, p 39 of the typescript.

(10) Santos, op. cit. 2.15, RSEA VII pp 103 - 104 and António Bocarro, A Decada, MS 1631, pub. Lisbon 1876, ch 123, RSEA III p 268.

elab rate list o officials at court indicates a long history of political development. (11) Embassies consisted of groups of nobles and porters under the direction of a senior court official, one regular assignment to such a group being to collect the curva or regular due for the privilege of trading in the monomotapa's domains, failure to pay being met with the empata or war designed to recoup the ruler for loss of revenue. (12)

Although the monomotapa was no longer the 'hidden king' of former times, (13) the awe produced by fear of magic was still very powerful. Nyangas with their hakata or divining bones (14) were able to insist on absolute respect for their prognostications, and in upholding their own power supported that of the ruler too. (15) Much of the description supplied for the fertility rituals of the Kiteve must apply equally to the monomotapa society from which they derived. (16)

Under the captaincy of the Sono or commander-in-chief, the monomotapa could field a large army to suppress rebellion. (17) A serious drawback, however, was the constant shortage of food in Karanga lands, drawing campaigns to an abrupt halt when plundered fodder ran out. One writer claims that no campaign could exceed three days, an exaggeration possibly, but an indication that wars in Karanga territory consisted of long series of very brief campaigns with returns to the home bases between engagements. (18) Straw animal emblems mounted on long poles were used to rally warriors to

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(11) Barros, op. cit., 1.10.1., RSEA VI p 115.

(12) Monclaro, op. cit., in RSEA III pp 195 - 196. On the curva see note 44 in chapter III and on the empata, note 11 in chapter IV.

(13) See p 85 of chapter IV.

(14) Hakata is the modern Shona form of the word; Santos used a very similar word: chakata (op. cit., 1.14, RSEA VII p 30).

(15) Monclaro, op. cit., in RSEA III p 174 - the ordeal of having to swim crocodile-infested rivers. Barros, op. cit., 1.10.1., RSEA VI p 115 adds information on a bark poison ordeal.

(16) See description later in this chapter, pp 128 - 129

(17) See Dois, op. cit., 2.10, RSEA III p 56 and note 30 in chapter IV.

(18) Monclaro, op. cit., RSEA III p 180.

their leaders, indicating an organisation beyond a general levy. (19) Weapons were bows and arrows, knives, light throwing spears and knobkerries. A notable omission in accounts of the Karanga is shields, whereas across the Zambezi two types were in use. (20) The implication may be that warfare was restricted to the futile projecting of arrows and spears from a distance which Shaka so despised later as inconclusive.

Karanga warriors did not impress observers with their qualities of determination: they were no match for neighbouring peoples in the Zambezi valley and were quite terrified of the Zimbas, not only on account of their ferocity but also because of their habit of marching to battle with human limbs as iron rations. (21) It was thus not only the superior technology of the Portuguese which led to their being invited to fight the battles of the monomotapa: the very indifferent quality of his own troops was also a factor in the situation.

By contrast the Mongas, neighbours of the monomotapa between Sena and Tete, were very efficient in war. Their sorcerers inspired the soldiers with the belief that they were invulnerable even to the firearms of the Portuguese, but the captains did not rely solely on the encouragement of witchcraft to stiffen morale. They organised advance in a formation made famous two centuries later by Shaka, the head and horns pattern which presented attack in depth at the centre while encircling prongs were extended to prevent the enemy from escaping: the Monga aim was destruction of the opponent. (22)

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(19) Monclaro, op. cit., RSEA III p 180.

(20) Couto, op. cit., 10.14, & 11.17 respectively (RSEA VI pp 340 & 353) mentions large shields covering the body used by the Ambios and Cabires, and light shields used by the Zimbas.

(21) See note 37 in chapter III.

(22) Monclaro, op. cit., RSEA III pp 190 - 191. It is tempting to assume an ethnic connection between the Mongas of the sixteenth century and the Zulus of the eighteenth because of this feature of warfare, but this must remain speculative until further evidence can be led.

The fighting men were unequal to the task of preserving the territorial integrity of the over-extended Karanga state in the later sixteenth century. Portuguese chroniclers relate the story of the voluntary fission into four entities on the death of a monomotapa who willed 'provinces' to his sons. The Karanga heartland, known as Monomotapa, centred around Mount Fura and extended a long finger to the coast along the south shore of the Zambezi river boundary. Manica, ruled by Chikanga (or 'Chiputo') spread along the highland edge between the present Vila de Manica and Mount Selinda areas. Two coastal kingdoms were granted to the other heirs, the Kiteve, ruling within the Manica plateau edge, the coast, and the rivers Tendanculo (Pungwe) and Sofala (Buzi) and Sedanda, whose realm stretched southwards from the Buzi river. (23)

Creating four independent kingdoms with natural boundaries might have been expected to ensure a period of peaceful development. Three factors combined to prevent it: the continuance of petty inter-Karanga warfare, the increasing penetration of the Portuguese on both a private and an official scale, and natural disasters of alarming proportions on the northern border. One might be tempted to assume that the three factors operated in just this order of severity: there is reason to believe, however, that in the period under review the reverse order is the correct one.

A series of calamities struck the people north of the Zambezi in the last quarter of the century. Santos gives the opening date of 1589 for what he terms an invasion of Zimba warriors, horrifying their southern neighbours by their human meat-markets, drinking from human skulls and carrying human joints as campaign rations, sweeping inexorably down to the coast. (24) It is evident in an association of statements in Ethiópia

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(23) Couto, op. cit., 9.25, RSEA VI p. 338 & Santos, op. cit., 2.1. & 2.10, RSEA VII p. 90 - 92.

(24) See note 37 to chapter III. The Zimbas should not be dismissed as savage barbarians without a glance at the speed with which they were able to adapt Portuguese military architecture so successfully that they could withstand siege artillery for a number of years. They may well have been as advanced in some spheres as the Karanga and thrown out of a settled state by the natural disasters mentioned above.

Oriental, however, that the 'invasion' was associated with and probably the result of two natural disasters: a two-year plague of locusts which devastated gardens and palm groves, and a famine so severe that Africans sold themselves and their families into slavery to survive. Adding to the misery was an epidemic of smallpox. (25)

Couto records two previous eruptions of violence north of the Zambezi, by the Ambios and the Cabires in 1570. (26) Although he does not give the clues that Santos provides for the underlying causes of the Zimba campaigns, he mentions the same association of warfare and cannibalism which suggests famine as a root cause. It is likely, therefore, that natural disasters succeeded by widespread human violence were recurring sixteenth century events north of the Zambezi.

One would expect such large-scale and prolonged turmoil to involve the Karanga states south of the river, but the evidence of Couto and Santos does not support a picture of widespread contagion. The broad river which the monomotapa termed 'the divider' (27) evidently acted as a protective barrier forcing marauding bands to move eastwards to the coast. The only known Karanga involvement occurred in 1592 when one Zimba chief called for support from his southern neighbours, and the Portuguese captains of Sena and Tete led African levies to disaster against a cunning and determined foe. (28)

Note 24, continued. Edward Alpers in Aspects of Central African History, ed. T. Ranger, London, 1968, pp 21 - 22 argues that the Zimba spilled out from a Lundu state in Malawi.

(25) Santos, op. cit., 2.12, RSEA VII pp 132 - 133. One is reminded of other migrations prompted by failure of resources in south central Africa: the Karanga move from Guruuswa to the Bande, for example (see W.P. Abraham, 'The early political history of the kingdom of Mwene Mutapa' in Historians in Tropical Africa, Salisbury, Rhodesia, 1962, p 62. A somewhat similar explanation has recently been given for the difiqane usually attributed mainly to the personality of Shaka: see Shula Marks' essay 'The rise of the Zulu kingdom' in The middle age of African history, ed. R. Oliver, OUP 1967, esp pp 85 - 86.

(26) Couto, op. cit., 10.14, RSEA VI p 340.

(27) Santos, op. cit., 2.10., RSEA VII p 91.

(28) Santos, op. cit., 2.15., RSEA VII pp 109 - 111.

Portuguese penetration along the Zambezi valley increased warfare on the Karanga side, however, and proved more upsetting than the natural disasters to the north. From approximately 1550 to 1570 an unknown Portuguese seeking vengeance on folk across the Zambezi allied himself with the Mongas and in the course of his campaign helped them to expand their strip of territory from thirty to two hundred leagues along the river. (29) One can only guess at the influence of this conflict on the disasters which followed north of the river from 1570 on, but on the Karanga side the continued strife ensured that the monomotapa had a rapidly expanding state on his northern flank blocking any expansion towards the great river trade highway. Such Portuguese involvement in African quarrels was contrary to declared royal policy in the pre-Sebastian era, (30) but it afforded opportunity for the official imperial drive of 1571 when Barreto's offer of attack on behalf of the monomotapa against the Mongas was readily accepted. Portuguese infiltration along the Zambezi valley, beginning in the 1530s and gathering momentum in the second half of the century, was clearly a threat to the authority of the monomotapa and he recognised it by forbidding the exposure of rich gold mines which would excite the cupidity of the Europeans. (31)

It would be quite unjust, however, to lay the blame for the decline of the monomotapan kingdom, or for that matter, the Zimba eruptions, solely at the door of the Portuguese. (32) Portuguese presence, for one thing,

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(29) Monclaro, op. cit., RSEA III p 189.

(30) See the 1530 regimento for Sofala, already quoted, fl 24, DPM VI pp 368 - 370, requiring that the captain does not leave the fort to wage war, even to assist a friendly ruler.

(31) Santos, op. cit., 2.13., RSEA VII p 97.

(32) Alpers, op. cit., falls into just this trap in his statements that it was in the 1570s that Portuguese activity in the Zambezi valley intensified, and that this was directly related to the Zimba migration and wars (p 21). He thus ignores Couto's mention of similar upheavals ten years earlier in the Zambezi valley (see note 20 supra). The truth is that displacement and warfare along the shores of the Zambezi was endemic and merely exacerbated by Portuguese involvement.

was freely accepted by the ruler for the skills the newcomers could offer. The freelance trader and diplomat, António Caiado, was retained for life by the monomotapa who found his translation services and ability to screen foreigners clamouring for concessions a great convenience. (33) Other Portuguese, private individuals (34) and officials, (35) received land grants and powers of local chiefs from the ruler who saw in them buttresses to his own authority. We have here one of the roots of the prazo systems which developed later in Mozambique.

The history of fission in the Karanga body politic in the Portuguese period is a continuation of an endemic state noted at the end of the fifteenth century, before the arrival of the first caravels in the Mozambique channel. (36) Not only did ambitious rulers of Karanga provinces oppose the monomotapa as in the case of the first changamira and later the chikanga of Manica, but they also opposed one another, as in the case of Nyamunda and Nyambia, and later the kiteve and the chikanga. The underlying cause of dissention seems to have been competition for trade, first Muslim then Portuguese. (37)

The second half of the century saw a continuation of attempts by Karanga rulers of the coastal plain to control the trade routes to the gold plateau

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(33) Documentary evidence about this undoubtedly interesting character in Portugues penetration of the mid sixteenth century, is disappointingly thin. His letter of 1561 or thereabouts from Monomotapa to a friend in another part of the country is reproduced in RSEA II pp 99 - 101. Beyond that we have as the only contemporary reference, Froes, op. cit., RSEA II pp 104 - 115.

(34) Such as Gomes Coelho at Tete. See Froes, op. cit., RSEA II p 108.

(35) Such as the captains of Sena and Tete. See Santos, op. cit., 2.17, RSEA VII pp 106 - 107.

(36) Alcaçova, op. cit., 1506, fls 1 v - 2 v, DPM I pp 390 - 394.

(37) See chapter IV note 26 for a 1527 reference to payment of African armies in cloth.

and prevent direct contact between the monomotapa and the Europeans. Where first Nyamunda had for a decade and a half before 1530 spread his grip north and east to encompass Sofala. it was now the kiteve with whom the Portuguese had to deal. Envoys of this ruler visited the port every three years to receive the curva, or payment of two hundred lengths of cloth, without which access across the coastal plain was denied. (38) Documentary evidence is unfortunately completely lacking to link Nyamunda with the kiteve, but oral tradition points to a family connection. (39) The centres from which the rulers operated at periods served by documentary evidence place them far apart, however, and the family connection of oral tradition may amount to no more than an indication of the general ties which bound members of the far-flung Karanga families. (40) What happened in the four-fold division of the Karanga territories is clear enough: the coastal plain, all ruled formerly by Nyamunda, split in the second half of the century into two kingdoms: Sedanda in the south and Kiteve in the north.

Portuguese writers of the last quater of the century devote much space to descriptions of the kiteve, one of whose zimbabwes lay beside the Sofala river (Buzi) and another on the route taken by Homem and his army to Manica. (41) His territory was bounded to the west by the edge of the Manica highlands, to the south by the river Sofala (Buzi), to the north by the Tendanculo (Pungwe) river and to the east by the Indian Ocean. Unlike Nyamunda, this ruler did not

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(38) See Santos' colourful description, op. cit., l.18., RSEA VII pp 38 - 40.

(39) Abraham, op. cit., 1962, p 84.

(40) Nyamunda, as is argued in Appendix 7, had his capital well south-west of Sofala at a location at present impossible to determine.

(41) See map of Joao Teixeira I, 1630, Library of Congress, Washington, reproduced in PMC IV 469 A. Schofield has suggested that there were three capitals of the kiteve: Ussema, three days' journey from Sofala, another at two days' march from Manica - the one Homem destroyed - probably on the Revue river, and Mangahé. See 'The journeys of António Fernandes - some footnotes' in Trans. of the Rhodesian Scientific Association, vol 42, March 1949, p 85.

possess gold resources within his boundaries, which seems to indicate Manican expansion at the expense of the former Nyamundan conquests. (42) He did, however, have mountains in his country, for it was in a mountain necropolis that the kiteves were buried. (43) Court structure and society may be taken as mainly reflecting the monomotapan from which earlier in the century power had been derived. (44) Despite curtailment in territory, the kiteve was almost as powerful a ruler as the monomotapa himself. It is true that he lacked mineral resources possessed by the monomotapa, but he was able to insist on similar customs charges. Every three years the curva from Sofala, customs payments graded in favour of the Portuguese rather than African merchants, and tribute in grain from the surrounding farms were received. His ability to insist on the curva is evidence that in the normal military situation, that is with Sofala's garrison standing at around sixty, the kiteve was as powerful as Nyamunda had been. He succumbed very quickly, however, to the full-scale armed attack by Homem. (45)

In addition to revenue derived from commerce the ruler was enriched and his authority enhanced by reserving to himself the most important and therefore the most lucrative litigation. Fees were divided between judge and plaintiff, the accused paying the costs of the trial. (46) Poison ordeals as part of the process of justice link the kiteve with a practice reported from the Dande kingdom to the south and the monomotapa. (47) He

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(42) Couto, op. cit., 9.24, RSEA VI p 337 mentions the lack of gold.

(43) Santos, op. cit., 1.8., RSEA VII p 15.

(44) Couto, op. cit., 9.25, RSEA VI p 338 gives the undated division into four parts of the original monomotapan kingdom. One divergent custom was the result of a reaction between the kiteve and the monomotapa. Santos records (op. cit., 2.16, RSEA VII pp 104 - 105) that the ndoto shell, worn as royal insignia by the monomotapa, was for that reason rejected by the kiteve who hated its wearer.

(45) See note 38 supra for the Santos reference to the curva. Couto, op cit., 9.24, RSEA VI p 335, describes Homem's attack.

(46) Santos, op. cit., 1.13, RSEA VII p 27.

(47) Santos lists three ordeals: lucassa (poison cup), xoca (red-hot axe blade) and calao (emetic): op. cit., 1.11, RSEA VII pp 22-24. Of letter, André Fernandes to the Brothers in Portugal, Inhambane, 5.xii.1562, Academia das Sciencias, M. Azul, fls 388v-392v, which at 390v has a description of the Tonga area ordeals by poison. Cf also note 15 supra.

was able to ensure a strong successor by selecting the most competent heir from claimants whose natural right to succeed ranged through sons, from eldest to youngest, and then brothers. (48) In disputed succession, however, presumably where the kiteve died before his choice was known, the royal wives exerted great influence. Like the monomotapa, the Teve ruler had a great number, including close relatives occupying official positions at court, as well as true wives. (49)

At the court terror and pomp were combined to buttress the authority of the ruler. A permanent bodyguard of two to three hundred men struck terror into all subjects by continually calling for victims to execute. (50) Less frightening, but making assaults upon European ears at times beyond their capacity to endure, were the praise-makers, musicians and dancers. (51)

Of great importance in upholding the status of the kiteve were rituals no doubt inherited from the monomotapa. He was the 'great lion', and only at his massive baitues was this animal, which represented him, allowed to be killed. (52) Witchcraft was not allowed to dominate the ruler: like Shaka two centuries later, the kiteve preferred wisely to control witchcraft himself, executing or enslaving those who attempted to defy him by going

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(48) The great weakness, extending as far back as the memory serves, in Shona succession has been the lateral system which provides a series of elderly brother rulers in turn instead of vital young heirs.

(49) Santos, op. cit., 1.5, RSEA VII p 9.

(50) Reminiscent of a similar situation prevailing later at Dingane's capital.

(51) Santos, op. cit., 1.11, RSEA VII p p 20 - 22

(52) (a) Beliefs in lions being the hosts of dead rulers are as old as Meroe and survive in living memory among the Shona of Mtoko: see J.T. Bent, The ruined cities of Mashonaland, London, 1892, pp 286 - 291.

(b) The method of hunting Santos describes involved vast sweeps by thousands of archers and beaters with dogs, a device natural to the great open plateau from which the Karanga had spread. Strongly contrasting with it is the method of hunting elephant around Inhambane later to be described in this chapter, natural to forest folk. See Santos, op. cit., 1.12, RSEA VII pp 26 - 27.

into private practice. (53) So thoroughly was the kiteve master of the superstitions of his folk that he declared that he was discontinuing the custom required of his ancestors of committing suicide at the first sign of physical decay such as grey hair or rotting teeth. (54)

Like his ancestral counterparts at Great Zimbabwe, this ruler was to a certain extent the 'hidden king'. Commoners seeking audience had to veil their faces from sight of him by crawling into and out of his presence, and his person was displayed only for a moment by the raising of a curtain before the end of the interview. (55) When he appeared out of doors with his nobles at the great September feast of the new moon in the mountain necropolis, his face was hidden by a beadwork fringe. (56)

The kiteve shared with the other Karanga peoples belief in personal survival in the form of vadzimu or ancestral spirits. (57) At the September festival (58) whose purpose was clearly to promote the health and fertility of the kingdom, the king and his nobles engaged in mock battles (59) with much drinking of pombe, culminating in two to three days' communing with

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(53) Santos, op. cit., 1.14, RSEA VII p 30.

(54) Ibid 1.7, RSEA VII p 13.

(55) Ibid 1.5, RSEA VII p 10. Cf a similar proceeding reported of interviews with Prester John, whose foot alone was visible beneath a silk screen: see Barros, op. cit., 1.3.4, RSEA VI p2.

(56) William Fagg has suggested that the lines scored on the faces of many Benin bronze masks represent not tribal scarification but the effect of a face seen through a deep fringe, probably meant to disguise that the king had a mouth like his subjects. See F. Willett, Ife in the history of W. African sculpture, London, 1967, p 23.

(57) Santos uses the word mozimo, close in Portuguese pronunciation to modern Shona Mudzimu, plural: vadzimu. Op. cit., 1.9, RSEA VII p 18.

(58) Santos, op. cit., 1.8, RSEA VII p 15. The significance of the month, different from that chosen by the Nguni people for their feast of the firstfruits, is that September sees the advent of the first rains and would therefore be the appropriate time for rituals to ensure plenty.

(59) Santos uses the word pemberer in the passage referred to in note 58. The modern Shona equivalent is kupembera, 'to rejoice' (ku is the Shona infinitive particle).

the spirits of dead rulers, and in particular by spirit possession of one of the nobles, with the mudzimu of the most recently deceased kiteve. In slight ways, differences between the Mount Darwin community and the Teve one were appearing. The reaction of the kiteve against the wearing of the ndoro shell, favourite badge of authority of his rival the monomotapa, has already been mentioned. Hair horn styles, a prominent feature of fashion with the ruler and his subjects seem to have been an influence from coastal peoples, for they are reported among both the Dande and Macua peoples, but not of the Karanga of the monomotapan plateau. (60)

One of the most interesting sidelights upon the history of later sixteenth century states in south-east Africa is afforded by the very detailed Jesuit descriptions (matching those of Santos for the Teve) given in 1560 - 1562 of 'Tonga', the hinterland of Inhambane. It is necessary here only to examine the principal features of this Karanga-ruled kingdom and distinguish those which mark it off from the others in the group of south-east African states.

The ruling folk were Karanga, who brought superior skills in warfare, sufficient to enable them to dominate the earlier coastal people, and reflected in war dances in which solo and chorus performers set their animal

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(60) André Fernandes, letter to Luiz Froes, 25,vi.1560, Inhambane, AJA 49-IV-50, fl 192 v compares the horned hair styles around him with those of pictured devils, and suggests the wearers as fit models for scenes of hell on the retable. Santos, op. cit., 2.22, RSEA VII p 120 describes Macua hair horns. Ibid, 1.12, RSEA VII p 25 contains the information that the style was regulated by rank among the Teve: only the ruler could sport four horns on his head; his subjects were restricted to three or less. Among the Inhambane folk and the Macua there were no such restrictions. The hair style of the Macuas was associated with another diagnostic feature of fashion: lip boring.

tail skirts whirling in a fine flurry.[61] Great stamina was exhibited by couriers who could trot along the trails for days and nights almost without rest.[62] Two of the three methods of hunting elephants showed remarkable courage in the Karanga hunters. One of these involved catching the elephant dozing after a good meal, hamstringing it and stabbing it in the stomach.[63] The other was for the hunters to divide into two sections, one driving the elephants into the narrow game trails in thick forest, the other ambushing them and hacking at their hams. When one was brought down, the hunters converged on it, despatched it with spears, kept the trunk for the king, ivory to trade, and gorged themselves on the meat. The craft was hereditary, the father branding his son as soon as he had shown skill in the dangerous pursuit.[64]

Customs payments and litigation fees in elaborate series, beginning with the 'mouth', a gift to open negotiations, provided revenue for the ruler in the Teve state. This chief too showed great respect for his ngangas who were the first to be consulted in cases of death or disease and whose commands, based on the results of their divining, were followed implicitly.[65] As in the rest of the Karanga world, the vadzimu were reverenced and placated in time of trouble, but at the coast a fusion of two cultures may be glimpsed

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(61) André Fernandes, letter 5.xii.1562, already quoted, fol 389 v.

(62) See letter, André Fernandes to the Fathers and Brothers in Goa, Otongue, 25.vi.1560, in RSEA II pp 78 - 80. The king of Tonga's couriers imposed immense strain on Fr. Fernandes on his first visit to the capital, for he felt obliged, for prestige, to try to keep up with their apparently tireless efforts.

(63) See letters, André Fernandes, (a) to Luiz Froes, 25.vi.1560, already quoted, fls 192 & 192 v; (b) to the Brothers and Fathers in Portugal, Goa, 5.xii.1562, AS, M. Azul, 12, fl 338 v.

(64) Letter, André Fernandes to Luiz Froes, 25.vi.1560, already quoted, fl 192.

(65) Divining dice of wax-filled shells rather than the inland form of decorate bone tablets were used, and livers of rats and chickens also employed. The name for the poisoned water ordeal recorded in 1562, motio is close in Portuguese pronunciation to the modern Shona term, mutevo. See letter, André Fernandes to the Brothers and Fathers in Portugal, 5.xii.1562, already quoted, fls 389 v & 390 v.

in the use of another word for Muzimo: nacibo, Arabic term for fortune or fate today. The chief, as with the Teve, held responsibility for procuring from the ancestral shades the favours of nature. He was able, his people believed, to produce or withold the rain which meant plenty or famine. (66) Royal wives here, too, exerted at times a critical influence on affairs of state. (67)

The most interesting information provided by the Jesuit letters of 1560 - 1562, however, concerns the subject people who preceded the Karanga to the coast, the Tonga. Here for the first time in Portuguese records we have clear distinctions made between the two strata of African society (apart from Muslim and non-Muslim): the Karanga overlords and the Tonga subjects who were in many ways distinct from their conquerors. (68) They spoke a quite

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(66) See letter, André Fernandes to the Fathers and Brothers in Portugal, Inhambane, 5.xii.1562, already referred to, fl 391.

(67) See Santos, op. cit., 1.6, ASEA VII pp 11 - 12, recounting how the wives of a deceased ruler of Sedanda refused to recognise an heir because of his lameness.

(68) See letter, André Fernandes to the Father Provincial inIndia, 24.vi.1560, already quoted, fl 195 v, where the king, his court and his village are referred to as Karanga, and a distinction drawn between them and the Botongas who are circumcised and drink more heavily. The Botongas were on the coast at Inhambane, the capital of the Karangas some distance inland. Quite when the conquest took place is unknown, possibly during the Changamiran wars. Indeed, one important section of the Mdau near the Sabi is called the Mashonga, and the name is close enough to suggest that the mother of Changamire I was not simply a despised slave woman as the usual account has it, but a subject woman of the coastal Shanga clan which would give Changamire a following on the coast around the Sabi mouth.
'Tonga' is a term which the Karanga evidently applied indiscriminately to the folk on the edges of their expansion, that is to conquered peoples, for it embraces groups speaking quite different languages, such as the Zambezi valley Tonga and the Inhambane Tonga. One interpretation of the significance of the name Matonga applied to a forest which between the Buzi and the Pungwe appears to contain no Tonga today, emerged during the author's investigations at Nova Sambone in 1970. An Mdau informant considered that this was the type of refuge which would be sought by the subject peoples (Tonowa = 'ruled') seeking to escape the conquerors.

different language.[69] They practiced circumcision, having acquired this, but evidently no other Muslim customs, from the Moors.[70] Although regarded by some as more primitive than the Karanga, they had among them gifted instrument-makers and musicians in whom ocean-borne contacts had drawn out talents far in advance of those in the rest of Bantu Africa.[71]

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(69) Fr. Silveira, having learnt Tonga at Inhambane in 1560 had to spend two months learning Karanga at Sena in preparation for his mission to the monomotapa. See Froes, op. cit., in Lusitania II, p 106.

(70) Letter, Fr. Silveira to Goa College, Mozambique, 9.viii.1560, BNP Fundo Geral 4534, fl 289.

(71) The classical description of the timbila xylophones of Inhambane and their orchestral use in praise of the chiefs, giving rise to counterpoint (rather than the much simpler form of solo and chorus with percussive accompaniment prevalent in the rest of Bantu Africa) occurs in André Fernandes' letter to the Brothers and Fathers in Portugal, 5.xii.1562, already referred to. The argument in favour of the Tonga of the Inhambane area having developed such instruments and music, rather than the Karanga, runs thus: (1) The simple form of the hardwood xylophone (such as the 'pit' xylophone) occurs elsewhere in central Africa - James Horneli, Indonesian influence on east African culture' in Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 64, 1934, pp 305 - 332 discusses the contacts but brings in far-fetched parallels such as Malatali and Javanese buildings. A.M. Jones, Africa and Indonesia: the evidence of the xylophone and other musical and cultural factors, Leiden, 1964, gives a far more rational and detailed examination, suggesting from the distinctions between simple and sophisticated forms of the xylophone and their African distribution that Indonesian influence came in waves of colonisation spread possibly over four or five centuries, Ibn Batuta having mentioned a xylophone at Mali in c 1352 (op. cit., p 222). Only at Inhambane in the mid sixteenth century do we know of the elaborate form of both instrument and orchestral music.
(2) Instrumental music in concert can develop only where social conditions are congenial and material available for instrument-making. Patronage and encouragement by rulers of a class able to devote itself to the craft and art were essential, and required a century or so to develop near the hardwood forests of the coastal plain.
(3) Karanga rulers, however, had arrived in Tongaland, the hinterland of Inhambane, in living memory according to the 1560 accounts, and had conquered the Tonga. The timbila is not described in inland accounts, and has not appeared as a surviving Karanga instrument as has the small mbira.
(4) There were Tonga chiefs left ruling in the immediate hinterland of Inhambane - Silveira baptised some on his way to embark for Mozambique and the monomotapa - these were the remnant of chiefs under whom the astonishing development must have taken place.

The connections between the Inhambane Tonga and the other non-Karanga peoples of the sixteenth century from Mozambique Island south, is very imperfectly known. 'Tonga' are not mentioned in Sofala, for instance, but it is quite likely that pre-Karanga folk of the Inhambane type preceded the Karanga there too: their characteristic instrument, the hardwood timbila is described there by Santos. (72) Similar country, affording the same kind of life as the Inhambane area provided for river and sea fishermen would attract the same folk to Sofala. The presence at Sofala of another non-Karanga, non-Muslim folk has already been mentioned, characterized by women who bored the upper lip in several places and whose connections seem to be with the Macua of the Zambezi delta. (73) The possibility of Inhambane Tonga there adds another human dimension to a port which shows more clearly and compactly than any other on the east coast the convergence of so many and varied influences which have moulded the history of south-east Africa and holds out promise of rich dividends in further archaeological and ethnohistoric investigation.

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(72) Santos, op. cit., 1.10, RSEA VII pp 20 - 21, describes both the large hardwood timbila and the small iron-tongued mbira at Sofala.

(73) See p 82.


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Mansovo R.
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(Salis.)
18
Arroenha R.
Botongas
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Cuama R.
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BUTUA
or TOROA
Macuas
9
Angoxa
MANHICA
QUITEVE
Tendanculo R.
(Pungwe)
Tebe R.
(Buzi)
20
Sofala R.
(Buzi)
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INDIAN OCEAN
Mambone
or Sabea R. (Save)
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SEDANDA
Botongas
Inhambane
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Cabo dos Correntes
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APPENDIX I

WHO WERE THE MOORS OF PORTUGUESE SIXTEENTH CENTURY WRITINGS ON S.E. AFRICA ?

There is constant reference in Portuguese writings of the sixteenth century to the mouros of east Africa. No study seems to have been made about what the term meant, and the following note is an attempt to analyse the various references appropriate to this thesis.

Portuguese coming to east Africa around the turn of the fifteenth century, and Castilians who accompanied them, knew the Moors of Iberia and north Africa both by repute and very often by personal contact. These Moors were a mixture of racial types, fundamentally Berber, and distinguished by religion and language. (A brief summary of the variety of Muslim peoples in these areas appears in W.C. Atkinson's History of Spain and Portugal, Penguin Books, 1965, ch 4, 'Irruption from Africa'.) Portuguese who had served on the Guinea coast would have had opportunity to see negroid Muslims, whom they also termed mouros.

Members of Gama's first voyage into the Indian Ocean drew upon these experiences when they classified the inhabitants of the eastern seaboard of Africa. At Quelimane " we were approached by two nobles of this land so proud that they despised all we offered them. One wore on his head a hood decorated with bands of silk; the other wore one of green satin. " (Descriçao da viagem de Vasco da Gama, pelo costa de Moçambique, 1498, in Alvaro Velho's Diário da viagem de Vasco da Gama, Porto, 1956, DPH I p 14.) The anonymous author of the journal claims that the Portuguese and the traders conversed by signs about the trade Quelimane enjoyed in goods conveyed from a distant country in large ships like Gama's. Barros, however, has other information: the Portuguese were very excited at Quelimane because among the inhabitants, similar mainly in skin-colour and head-formation to the Guinea folk, were mulattos (homens fulos) "who appeared to be a mixture of Negro and Moor. Some noticed the language of

the Algarve, which a sailor named Fernao Martins knew. The other language peculiar to the country [i.e. a Bantu tongue] none of us spoke. Cama therefore deduced that these Negroes with pigmentation and language of the Arabs could talk with the Moors just as the Negroes of Jalof could with the Azenégues. The majority wore blue-dyed cotton fabric, and some burnouses and silk garments, some even camel-hair cloaks." (Barros, op.cit.1.4.3.) From the wealth of detail Barros produces here, it seems certain that he used some source independent of the author of the 'Descricao'. Recognition of the new people was particularly by dress, skin-colour and language, marking them off from the Hottentot and Bantu folk already encountered.

Góis (op. cit., 1.35) follows the 'Descricao' in his brief account: important men wore "longer and broader cloths than the commoners. One had on his head a burnouse with piping and a fringe of silk, the other a mantle of green satin." There is so far a close literal resemblance between the two accounts. Góis then adds that a youth was met who spoke Arabic. Castanheda's account is very similar to that of Góis (op. cit.1.4).

At Mozambique Island, Cama and his men come across folk who "have skin of a russet colour ... of the Muhammedan sect and who speak like Moors." Two new features enter the 1498 account of Mozambique. The traders were more richly dressed: "All wear burnouses with silk stripes decorated with gold thread." And "some white Moors" were in port with products of the east in their holds: clove, pepper, ginger and precious stones. The language of the merchants was identified by a sailor who had been a captive of the Moors as Arabic. The local merchants took the Portuguese by their appearance to be Turks. ('Descriçao', section 13, DPE I p 18.) The white Moors in the account refer either to sailors from the Persian Gulf or Muslims from western Indian ports. (On the scruples which prevented Hindus from taking to the sea, see Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, p 45.)

Barros (op. cit., 1.4.3.) must again have used a different source, for he gives interesting additional detail. Many of the boats in the harbour were the coastal zambucos, (see note 28 of chapter II) using palm-matting sails and oars, with sewn rather than nailed construction. One of these vessels conveyed white merchants to Gama's ships, merchants who wore burnouses in the fashion of the Moors of Africa, that is of north Africa rather than 'Ethiopia'. One who came aboard "began to ask questions in the tongue of the Algarve ... The Moor who was speaking was a native of the kingdom of Fez." Góis and Castanheda (op. cit., 1.35 and 1.5. respectively) give briefer accounts, adding, however, that the traders carried broad-bladed Moorish swords and hide bucklers. They were recognised as Moors by their speech, very close to that of the Algarve.

The Mozambique evidence of 1498 is thus recognition of Moors, apart from visiting 'white Moors', by dress, even richer than that observed at Quelimane, and most positively by speech. The only white-skinned folk were visitors; the local communities were therefore Arabic Africans, or Swahili.*

How did the Sofalan Muslim community fit into this context? The earliest detailed information is contained in the eyewitness account of Figueroa. At Chiloane (Figueroa, op. cit. tit. 6) about thirty miles south of Sofala, Anaia's men found "rich Moorish Africans who do not practise circumcision as the Moors or Jews do." The inference seems to be a Swahili community on the island long enough to forget a prime requisite of Islam.

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* M. Whiteley, in Swahili, the rise of a national language, London, 1969, comments that although Ibn Battuta used the term Sawahil, presumably in a geographic sense, referring to the coastal strip between Mombasa and Kilwa, the Portuguese never employed it. Their equivalent was mouro. Since Moor has a much wider connotation, the word Swahili is preferred in this thesis to refer to an east coast African trader, descended from a mixture of non-Muslim African and Muslim parents, however remotely, and speaking some Arabic.

From his rather thin description of the event, Figueroa does not appear to have been present at the meeting of Anaia and Yusuf. He records simply that all the Sofalan people were black (tit. 9) and that the 'king' of Sofala sat on a silken carpet (tit. 8). Later he mentions Cid Yacote, the favourite, and other traders, calling them Moors.

Alcaçova, first clerk of the Sofala feitoria, gives the following portrait of Sofala's Muslims: "The king of Sofala ... was a Moor, and all the people in Sofala are Moors. Some Africans (cafres) live around them, but not with them." (Letter to the king, 1506, already quoted, 3, DPM I p 396.)

Barbosa (op. cit., sections 1 to 3, DPM V pp 354 - 358) writing in 1518, avers that no Moors of Arabia, Persia or the Indies, that is no light-skinned Moors, lived south of Cape Correntes. On the Uciquas Grandes, or Bazaruto group, however, there were"villages of Moors trading with folk on the mainland, and even se ving them, and around these Uciquas is found much amber [i.e. ambergris - see note 8 in chapter IV] which these Moors collect and sell elsewhere, as well as small seedpearl." Of Sofala itself, Barbosa adds, "These Moors speak some Arabic and are ruled by a Moorish king ... The Moors of Sofala are black men, some of them lighter-coloured, and they use the language of the land, which is that of the heathen" [i.e. the language of the non-muslim Africans]. Descriptions of Moorish clothing similar to that already noted from the accounts of Portuguese voyages to Quelimane and Mozambique are included in Barbosa, who notes that prior to the Portuguese arrival, these Moors held the monopoly of the gold and ivory trade at Sofala.

Chroniclers of the mid century contribute detail from other sources available to them. Barros (op. cit., 1.9.6.) estimates the size of the sheikh's village as containing a thousand folk, which is close enough to Alcaçova's contemporary eyewitness account of two villages of four hundred each in 1506 (letter to the king, already quoted, 3, DPM I p 396). The houses of the Swahili merchants were of lath and clay, the sheikh's being larger than the rest. This should be contrasted with accounts of the multi-storeyed

stone houses of Kilwa, Mombasa and Malindi mentioned by Barbosa.(op. cit., sections 3 - 10, DPB V pp 364 - 370). Yusuf, according to Barros, was homen de cor baça, bem apessoada ("a very handsome swarthy man") who gave audience on a silk couch (op. cit., 1.9.6.).

Góis (op. cit., 2.9.) repeats Barros' statement about the size of the sheikh's village, giving the name as Sagoe, and adding that the merchants who lived there traded gold with Kilwa, Mombasa and Malindi. The sheikh was robust and swarthy (baço) and had with him in his palace a hundred swarthy Moors, naked from the waist up, with silk nether garments and turbans, naked scimitars with gold-decorated ivory handles in their belts, carrying branches of coral (ambar - obviously neither ambergris nor amber this time) and seated on three-legged stools with kaross-covered seats. The sheikh kept at his side a sheaf of assegais.

Castanheda's evidence (op. cit., 2.10.) is essentially that of Góis but with one interesting difference: Castanheda writes unequivocally that the blind old sheikh of Sofala was homo preto - a black man. Yacote was evidently of the same colour, for he is described as cafre e mouro.

Little information emerges in Portuguese accounts about the government of the Swahili groups. Barros, using the Kilwa Chronicle, (op. cit., 1.10.2.) records that the sultans of Kilwa appointed the governors of Sofala, and that Yusuf assumed independence from his Kilwa overlords before the Portuguese arrived. The assumption of independence had already been mentioned in Alcaçova's letter of 1506 (fl 3 v, DPB I p 398). Castanheda (op. cit., 2.11.) implies that the sheikh had limitations on his rights regarding land allocation in the Sofala area, for he was prepared to buy land for the Portuguese to build their feitoria.

The concordant statements of the various sources about the east African Moors may be summarized as follows. From the Bazaruto islands northward, groups of resident merchants were marked off from their African neighbours by their dress, ocean trade, and above all by their use, partial only in some cases, of Arabic similar to that used in south-west Portugal. There

were distinctions within this series of communities. Three northerly ports advertised the opulence of the Muslim traders by mortared stone houses, some multi-storeyed; by contrast the dwellings of the Sofalan merchants were of lath and clay, typical materials of the huts of the east African Iron ge folk.

Distinctions by elaboration of dress, ornaments and weapons were also present. Only the Swahili of Sofala and some of those of Mozambique, out of the southern sector of the Muslim coast, are described as using scimitars. The sheikh of Sofala used African rather than oriental weapons, which accords well with Castanheda's statement that he was black.

The only light-skinned people in the accounts of the east African coastal Muslims from Mozambique south, are those visiting the port of Mozambique. Many chroniclers use the word baço to indicate a distinction within the dark-skinned group. The word means literally 'opaque' and was used by Camoes to describe the Moors of north Africa (Os lusiadas, Lisbon, 1572, canto 10, line 100). For Góis (op. cit., 1.35.) the people of the Cape of Good Hope are a little more baço than the Guinea folk in the account of Gama's first voyage, that is they are lighter-skinned.

The predominance of dark-skinned Muslim traders from Mozambique to Bazarûto agrees well with the tale in the Kilwa Chronicle (Barros, op. cit., 1.10.2.) that marriages occurred annually between Sofalan women and Moorish traders from Mogadishu, and later between Sofalan women and Moorish men from Kilwa. The date of the establishment of Muslim trade at the present Sofala is not known, but Mas'udi mentions trade in a Sofala (which may relate to any low-lying coast from Sena to the Sabi mouth) in 926 A.D. It is likely, then, that the trading area between the Zambezi and the Sabi rivers had been receiving influxes not of light-skinned Muslims, but of dark-skinned Islamic folk from the Mogadishu and Kilwa areas for half a millenium which would produce little if any change in the features of the Sofalan people, but would lead to the formation of a new community of merchant families trading,

through the intermediacy of larger Muslim ports in the north, with Cambay. (For a discussion of the process at Kilwa, see N. Chittick's 'Kilwa' in Azania, vol 1, OUP 1966.)

A further distinction between the northern and southern Swahili lies in the employment of writing in Kilwa, as witnessed in the Kilwa Chronicle, and its apparent absence at Sofala. The only statement on the subject of whether or not writing existed at Sofala by a sixteenth century chronicler is in Correa (op. cit., 'D. Vasco da Gama, 1502'). Referring to the agreement reached by Gama with the sheikh, he adds that the Muslim ruler "confirmed his undertaking by touching right hands with all the people, this being their only way of sealing a bond since they have no knowledge of writing." This may seem a strange statement about a Muslim community, and a trading community at that, but it is quite possible for a group which lay on the very edge of the Islamic world, and whose inclusion into that world had come not by constant contact with educated Muslims, but by a process constantly filtered through the mesh of largely unlettered Africa.

Before leaving the subject, it is necessary to glance at two other usages of the word mouro which at first appear quite strange. Three references occur in documents of 1506 to "a Moorish king who lives up-river on the border of the Kaffir countr ." (Order from captain Anaia to the king's treasurers, [Sofala] 13.i.1506, 19.v.1506, and 25.vii.1506, TT, CC II 10-100, 11-23 and 11-92, DPM I pp 370, 508 - 510 and 614.) All three references are probably to the same ruler, and peace was being cemented with him after the combined attacks on the feitoria, sealed by gifts of cloth. The third reference gives the ruler's name as Maxandyra (or in modern Shona, Mashandira). There is a possible cross reference to this ruler in a name on the list of chiefs met by António Fernandes on his first extended journey around 1511. Next to Sofala on his way to the goldfields, he met a chief called Mycamdira. (Notebook of Gaspar Veloso, sent to the king [1512] TT, Cartas dos vicereis, 162, DPM III p 130). His land contained only foodstuffs and ivory, which indicates the coastal plain. A chief in the Sofala area today bears the name Makandara, which

might well be the same clan. It is likely, therefore, that it was a local chief, much nearer to Sofala than Moconde, who was being called 'Moorish' in the captain's account book.

A similar usage may be observed with regard to Nyamunda, powerful ruler of the Sofalan hinterland, referred to by captain Távora as a Moor (letter to the king [1513] TT, Cartas dos vicereis, 143, GAV VI p 4). Nyamunda was, according to E.P. Abraham, a Karanga, that is a Shona-speaking African and not a Muslim (see Historians in tropical Africa, University College of Rhodesia, 1962, pp 65 - 67 and note 47). It will be shown in Appendix 7 that we can be more precise than that, and relate Nyamunda to his people, now known as the Ndau.

To complete the references to inland African rulers as 'Moors' we have Monclaros in 1569 referring to the king of Manica as "half Moor, half Gizard." ('Relaçao da viaçem q fizerao os p^es da Companhia de Jesus ... no anno 1569' BNP, Département des Manuscrits Portugais, fl 241.)

Are Anaia, Távora and Monclaros simply careless in their usage of the term mouro, equating it with their more usual cafre or gentio for the Karanga peoples of the hinterland, for it is quite clear that they are all referring in these cases to ordinary African rulers, not to Muslim traders? This may be so, but there is a sense in which these references point to a fact in the sociological situation of early Portuguese south-east Africa: the close relations existing between Swahili traders and African chiefs inland. Sometimes the influence of the Muslims appears as a surface one. Barbosa notes, for instance, that in the capital of the monomotapa "the nobles ... carry swords in wooden scabbards decorated with gold or other metals, slung from bands of painted cloth ... with tassels ... they wear these to create an impression; in their hands they carry bows and spears." (Op. cit., section 4.) Unless this is completely fanciful description, it represents an adoption, perhaps, of some of the Muslim mystique in the form of more elaborate weapons. The same argument for a surface influence may be made

for the adoption of silk and cotton garments by the non-Muslim African nobility, and may have justified the use of the word mouro.

With inland rulers, the word may have a deeper significance. Chikanga, ruling Manica with its gold supplies, would be sought by both Portuguese and Swahili, and the description "half Moor" may indicate a Karanga ruler who keeps both options open until it is clear which side was winning the trade war. The earliest references to the "Moorish king living up-river" from Sofala could have a similar significance, sharpened in this case by the fact that this close neighbour of the Sofalan Swahili would first respond to Yusuf's appeal for forces to attack the Portuguese (the appeal was directed to Moconde, it is true, but a closer and less powerful chief could hardly remain neutral) and thus justify the description of a rei mouro from a captain who was not distinguishing, as his clerk Alcaçova was, between the Swahili traders who formed a quite distinct community, and the other Africans who lived around them.

There is evidence also for the application of the term mouro referring to inland rulers in a genetic sense. Relations between the Swahili merchants of the coast and the hinterland rulers was at times of an intimate nature, admitting Muslim African blood into the royal house. In 1511, for example, sheikh Maulide of Sofala slipped into Moconde's capital and proceeded "to marry some chief's daughters ... to gain support." (Statement by clerks Sobrinho and Homem, Sofala, 15.iv.1512, TT, CC II 31-59, (4), DPM III p 240.) Since this is simply an extension inland of what had been happening on the coast in the course of trade, the process was probably not at all uncommon, and the term 'Moor' or 'half Moor' takes on a new significance pregnant with possibility for reinterpretation of the S.E. African Iron Age. Would it be too fanciful to suggest, for instance, that the word mwenemutapa, interpreted as 'master raider' and referring to Mutota's campaigns in the Dande, might in fact have been mwenye mutapa, meaning 'the Swahili raider'? The point made by Caton-Thompson (G. Caton-Thompson, Zimbabwe Culture, OUP, 1931, p 101) that the conical tower of Great Zimbabwe showed possible

Arabic influence may indicate influence not only of visiting traders, but of traders settling, marrying, and becoming thoroughly integrated into Karanga society at a level where the extraneous influence could exert its maximum effect. The remark by Alcaçova that the word for chief justice or governor in the monomotapan heirarchy was amir (letter to the king, 1506, already quoted, 1 v, DPM 1 p 392) was not just the result of collecting information via the Swahili, for he also comments that the word was incorporated into the title of the Karanga rebel, Changamire. There is a strong possibility that Changamire was truly 'half Moor', for the first element in his name connects him with the area just north of the lower Sabi, where the Ndau sib bear the name Mashanga, an area where Muslim trading influence may well have been strong.

We have no proof of integration between Swahili and inland African chiefly families apart from the clear reference in shiekh Maulide's case, but there are sufficient hints of such a process to warrant further research into this field.

APPENDIX 2

SOFALA'S GOLD TRADE FROM EXTANT DOCUMENTS, COMPARED WITH ESTIMATES BY AXELSON AND LOBATO, AND GARRISON COSTS

A from Axelson's S.E. Africa, 1488 - 1530

Date	Detail and Amount
To end of 1506	Factor received only 592½ m
June to Nov. 1506	Cunha's ship to India carried 4,000 m perhaps including prize gold
1506 - 7	Cochin factor received 956½ oz = 5739 m
1507 - 13	Factor Vaz traded 1,713,570½ r = 3427.1 m
1508 - 9	Factor Pessoa (served 20 months) traded 5,806,068 r = 11,612 m *
1509 - 12	Captain Saldanha took 9,000 m (private gold traded at Sofala also received in India)
Oct. 1512 - June 1513	Factor Soares traded 6,500 to 7,000 m
1518 - 19	Factor Brito took only 800 m

* This period is included in the term of office of factor Vaz. is the gold counted twice?

5 from Lobato's A expansao portuguesa em Mocambique de 1498 a 1530

Date	Detail and Amount
1506 - 7	Fernandes took 20,000 m *
1507	Tavares took 8,100 m
1509 - 12	Saldanha took 9,000 m (+ 2,000 m contraband)
1513 - 14	Miranda took 20,000 m
1516 - 18	Salema took 12,500 m
1518 - 22	In the only eleven months served by documents on the gold trade, factor Brito took 800 m
1522 - 25	Rico took 26,850 m by trade, and to this should be added 26,490 m for expenses = 53,340
1525 - 30	No figures available

* Lobato rounds off the figure of royal trade to 10,000m and then adds his estimate of an equivaleht amount of private trade - hardly a very scientific procedure. In view of Albuquerque's complaint of 20.xii.1510 that 30,000 m of gold from Sofala reached India in private hands, however, the conjecture of 10,000 m of private trade in one year may not be unreasonable. It will emerge in the discussion to follow that one can not rely on expenses such as wages always being met by the treasury.

Although Lobato gives detail on a period not covered by the much earlier Axelson survey of the gold trade, his assessments are often based on a false assumption: that all wages in the feitoria were paid in gold, and that this amount can be added to the trade total. There is evidence that payment was sometimes in kind, which renders suspect assessments based on Lobato's assumption. (1) Wages were sometimes paid very much in arrears, too, and on one occasion this is said to be due to lack of trade. (2) Maintenance was only occasionally paid in gold; (3) at other times payment of it was in grain which was normally bought with cloth and beads. (4)

In the entry concerning Kilwa, Lobato's arithmetic appears to be at fault. The trade figure of 9,737,784 r at 467r per mitical (5) amounts to 20,852 m and not Lobato's 26,850. His conversion for the expenses figure is also inaccurate.

So many essential documents are missing that no estimate can pretend to be complete. The next table shows what the extant documents support.

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(1) e.g. see the Register of people who took corn etc. against their wages, 20.viii.1509, [Cochin] TT, Núcleo Antigo, m 128, doc 595, DPM II p 354.

(2) e.g. letter, captain Fogaça to king, Kilwa, 22.xii.1506, TT, Gavetas XV, 12-19, item 6, DPM I p 760.

Report from Afonso Nexia, comptroller of the Treasury in India, to king, Cochin, 15.xii.1527, TT, CC II, 145-147, item 3, DPM VI p 284.

(3) Maintenance roll for June, July & August 1506, Sofala, 1.ix.1506, TT, CC II 11-38, 2nd doc., DPM I pp 632 - 652.

(4) e.g. Maintenance roll for November 1510, Sofala, 1.xi.1510, TT, CC II, 233-122, DPM II pp 536 - 544.

(5) Acknowledgement issued by clerk Figueiredo, [Mozambique] 1.vii.1518, TT, CC II, 76-6, DPM V p 526 gives the rate of exchange.

C from the extant documents 1506 - 1525

Date	Detail and Amount		
(May 1506	Cold trade begins with advent of monomotapa's envoys (1))		
1506, June - Aug.	Small payments	26½ m	(2)
Aug.	Maintenance in gold	361½	(3)
Aug.- Nov.	Small payments	48	(4)
Nov.	Sent to India (may include prize gold of which 1/5 was reserved to the king)	4,000	(5)
Nov. - Dec.	Small payments	80	(6)
Dec.	Maintenance in gold	365½	(7)
Dec.	"Received by Manuel Fernandes"	592½	(8)
	8 months' total	5,553 m	

(1) See order from captain Anaia, Sofala, 19.v.1506, TT, CC II, 11-12, DPM I p 506.

(2) (a) Order from Captain Fernandes, Sofala, June 1506, TT, CC II, 11-32, DPM I p 550.
(b) Ditto, 28.vi.1506, TT, CC II, 11-48, DPM I, pp 564 - 566.
(c) Ditto, 28.vi.1506, TT, CC II, 11-49, DPM I pp 568 - 570.
(d) Order, captain Fernandes, Sofala, 25.viii.1506, TT, CC II, 11-87, DPM I p 608.

(3) Maintenance roll for June, July & August, Sofala, 1.ix.1506, TT, CC II, 11-38, 2nd doc., sections 2 & 4, DPM I pp 648 & 650.

(4) (a) Order, captain Fernandes, Sofala, 13,ix.1506, TT, CC II, 11-118, DPM I p 668.
(b) Order, captain Fernandes, Sofala, 28.x.1506, TT, CC II, 11-157, DPM I pp 688 - 690.
(c) Ditto, 2.xi.1506, TT, CC II, 11-170, DPM I p 694.
(d) Ditto, 4.xi.1506, TT, CC II, 11-171, DPM I p 696.
(e) Ditto, 17.xi.1506, TT, CC II, 11-179, DPM I p 700.

(5) (a) Ditto, 21.xi.1506, TT, CC II, 11-183, DPM I p 704.
(b) Discharge cert. for Pero Carneiro, factor of the nao Santiago, Almeirim, 28.iv.1510, TT, Chanc. de D. Manuel, liv. 15, fl 130 v, DPM I p 364. See DPM I p 248 for the king's 1/5.

(6) (a) Order, captain Fernandes, Sofala, 23.xi.1506, TT, CC II, 11-187, DPM I p 714.
(b) Ditto, 30.xii.1506, TT, CC II, 13-134, DPM I p 772.

(7) Maintenance roll for September, October & November, Sofala, 2.xii.1506, TT, CC II, 11-38, 3rd doc., DPM I pp 724 - 740.

(8) Discharge cert. for captain Fernandes, Santarém, 8.i.1511, TT, Chanc. de D. Manuel, liv. 41, fl 38 v, DPM I pp 784 - 786.

Date	Detail and Amount		
1507	Cochin factor received 7,259½ m in coin (contos) and 5,679½ m in raw gold. Second amount leaves beyond 4,000 m entered above a balance of	1,679½ m	(9)
Jan.- Feb.	Small payments	121	(10)
Feb.	Maintenance in gold	377½	(11)
March	Small payments	62	(12)
"	Yacote's trading etc.	390	(13)
"	To nine merchants for nine slaves	70	(14)
	3 months' total	2,700 m	

(April 1507 to January 1510 maintenance lists missing

1510 to 1512, maintenance payments no longer in gold)

October, 1512 Perestrelo left ..... 2,000 m (15)

(October 1512 to June 1513, Soares traded 6,500 to 7,000 m, included in total below (16)

1512 - 1514 Soares' total trade ..... 25,028 m (17)

(9) Discharge cert., factor Moreno, Almeirim, 15.xii.1509, TT, Chanc. de D. Manuel, liv. 3, fls 17 - 17 v, DPM II p 14.

(10) (a) Order, captain Fernandes, Sofala, 1507, TT, CC II, 12-30, DPM II p 6
(b) Ditto, 30.i.1507, TT, CC II 12-79, DPM II p 104.
(c) Ditto, 30.i.1507, TT, CC II 12-80, DPM II p 108.
(d) Ditto, 7.ii.1507, TT, CC II 12-88, DPM II p 130.

(11) Maintenance roll for December 1506 & January & February 1507, Sofala, 24.ii.1507, TT, CC II 11-38, DPM II pp 146 - 164.

(12) (a) Order, captain Pereira, Sofala, 5.iii.1507, TT, CC II 12-110, DPM II p 184
(b) Ditto, 5.iii.1507, TT, CC II 12-111, DPM II pp 186 - 188.
(c) Ditto, 6.iii.1507, TT, CC II,12-115, DPM II p 192.

(13) Inventory of clerk Delfim Soares, [Sofala] 25.iii.1507, TT, CC II, 12-128, fl 5 v, DPM II p 212.

(14) Ditto, fls 5 & 5 v, DPM II p 212.

(15) Letter, factor Soares to king, Sofala, 30.vi.1513, TT, CC I, 18-27, fl 2, DPM III p 462.

(16) Ditto, fl 1, DPM III pp 458 - 460.

(17) Letter of discharge, heirs of factor Soares of Sofala, Lisbon, 27.vi.1521, TT, Chanc. de D. Manuel, liv. 39, fls 86 - 86 v, DPM III p 512.

Date	Detail and Amount			
1515	Clerk Lopes in nine months recorded	....	5,812½ m	(18)
Dec 1515	Nyamunda sent	....	500 m	(19)
Jan 1516	Nyamunda sent	....	1,000 m	(20)
Aug 1516 to Dec 1518.	Factors Diaz and Salema took	....	11,817¾ m	(21)
Sept 1518 to March 1519	Factor Brito took	....	552½ m	(22)
	(The 3,000 m received from his predecessor is included in Salema's trade above. (23))			
March to Aug. 8, 1519	Factor Brito estimated his trade at	....	250 m	(24)
1522 - 1525	Factor Rico took	....	20,852 m	(25)

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No further financial documents for the period 1506 - 1528 are extant.

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(18) Expenditure book, clerk Lopes, [Sofala, 1.i.1515] TT, Núcleo Antigo, m 167, doc. 303, DPM IV pp 24 - 208.

(19) Letter, captain Almada to king, 26.vi.1516, already quoted, fl 2, DPM IV p 278.

(20) Ditto, fls 6 v & 7, DPM IV pp 284 - 286.

(21) Incomplete receipt and expenditure book, factor Salema, [26.viii.1516] TT, Núcleo Antigo, m 167, doc 306, fls 352, DPM IV pp 296 - 500.

(22) Letter, factor Brito to king, Sofala, 8.viii.1519, TT, CC I 25-7, section 3, DPM VI p 14.

(23) Ibid.

(24) Ibid.

(25) Report from Afonso Mexia, Comptroller of the Treasury of India, to king, Cochin, 15.xii.1527, TT, CC II 145-147, section 3, DPM VI p 284.

To summarize, the gold trade for which documentation is extant is as follows:

5,553 m	3 months of	1506
2,700	3 months of	1507
2,000		1512
25,028		1513 - 1514
5,812½	9 months of	1515
500		1515
1,000		1516
11,818¾		1516 - 1518
552½	8 months of	1518 - 1519
250	5 months of	1519
20,852		1522 - 1525
76,866¾ m	TOTAL	1506 - 1525

AVERAGE p.a. 4,003m

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D Sofala Garrison Costs

The earliest garrison for which sufficient information is available for estimating annual costs is the 1516 - 1517 one, much smaller than the original since the bulk of the construction team, surplus men-at-arms, one priest and one clerk had been cut from the establishment.

G A R R I S O N

Official	Annual wage in 000 reis	Annual Maint. in 000 reis	No. x cost	Combined total
captain-major	350	24	374	374
provost	150	18	168	168
factor	120	15	135	135
feitoria clerk	70	12	82	82
storekeeper	40	12	52	52
physician	40	12	52	52
gaoler (meirinho)	40	12	52	52
vicar	30	9 *	39	39
chaplain	30	9	39	39
constable of bombadiers	30 +	9	39	39
blacksmith	25	9	34	34
carpenters, rate A	25	9	2 x 34	68
carpenters, rate B	20	9	29	29
caulkers	25	9	2 x 34	68
stores clerk	25	9	34	34
masons	25	9	2 x 34	68
barber	20	9	29	29
cooper	20	9	29	29
gunstock-maker	20	9	29	29
captain's men	20	9	12 x 29	348
provost's men	20	9	6 x 29	174
factor's men	20	9	4 x 29	116
gaoler's man	20	9	29	29
feitoria clerk's man	20	9	29	29
men-at-arms, rate A	20	9	3 x 29	87
ditto rate B	10	9	19	19
bombadiers	16.8	9	2 x 25.8	51.6
physician's slave	15	9	24	24
freedman negro man-at-arms	10	9	19	19
residents and wards	20	9	5 x 29	145
degredados	-	9	5 x 9	45
			TOTAL	2,467.6

* All maintenance at 9,000 r adjusted to 12,000r w.e.f. March 1517

\+ Approximated from 29.16.

SHIP'S [illegible]

Official	Annual wage * in 000 reis	No. x cost	Combined total
master pilot	43.2	43.2	43.2
captain	42	42	42
small coravel master	14.4	14.4	14.4
seamen	12	14x 12	168
bombadiers	12	2 x 12	24
stewards	12	2 x 12	24
clerk	9.6	9.6	9.6
ship's boys (mostly Negro)	8	16 x 8	128
captain's men	8.4	4 x 8.4	25.6
		TOTAL	478.8
		ADD CARRIAGE TOTAL	2,467.6
		TOTAL FOR CARRIAGE & CREWS	2,946.4 milreis
		at 467 r per mitical =	6,301 miticals

* [illegible]

For the 1506 garrison, one must add the following:
1 chaplain at 39 milreis, 4 f. clerk's men x 29 = 116, 1 f. clerk at 82, 1 storekeeper's man at 29, 1 storekeeper's clerk at 34, 1 gaoler's man at 29, 1 armoury keeper at 34, 1 armoury keeper's man at 29, 21 men-at-arms x 29 = 609, 1 cobbler at 29, 1 wine measurer at 29, 2 interpreters at 29 = 58, 1 porter at 29, 1 blacksmith at 34, 4 carpenters x 29 = 116, 7 masons/ quarrymen x 29 = 203, 5 bombadiers x 29 = 145, 3 women x 29 = 87, 1 degredada at 9.

Total: 1750 milreis, which at 467 r per mitical (since we are computing in 1516 exchange rates) = 3,757 miticals, giving a grand total cost for 1506 of 10,058 miticals p.a.

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* No maintenance was paid to anyone aboard a royal vessel.

NOTE: the sources used for the calculations in 'C' are as follows:

for 1516 - 17 garrison: (a) Sofala wage & maintenance roll, 30.ix.1516, TT, CC II 66-67, DPM IV pp 510 - 534.
(b) Mutilated ditto, 31.xii.1516, TT, CC II 66-69, DPM IV pp 560 - 578.
(c) Sofala wage & maintenance roll, 31.iii.1517, TT, CC II 68-141, DPM V pp 52 - 98.

for 1517 crews: (a) Sofala wage roll, 31.iii.1517, TT, CC II 68-142, DPM V pp 100 - 130.
(b) Ditto, 30.ix.1517, TT, CC II 71-143, DPM V pp 252-272.

for additional personnel of the 1506 garrison: Sofala maintenance roll, 1.iii.1506, TT, CC II 10-130, DPM I pp 424 -442.

APPENDIX 3

SOFALA'S IVORY TRADE 1506 - 1519

Date	Detail and mount		
1506	acting captain Fernandes in 1 year took 45 faraç.	or 10½ quin.	(1)
1509	factor Pessoa in 20 months took	76 q.	(2)
1513	factor Soares in 8 months took	40 q.	(3)
1514	factor Soares, in addition to the above, took	41 q.	(4)
1515	clerk Lopes in 9 months took	11 q.	(5)
1517	provost Almada in an unspecified period took	68 q.	(6)
1518	captain Tavora in an unspecified period took	92 q.	(7)
1518-1519	factor Brito in 1 year was able to send to India (estimating his trade as 140 q.)	150 q.	(8)
	TOTAL, 1506-19	488½ q.	

(1) Order, captain Fernandes to the king's treasurers, Sofala, 22.xi.1506, TT, CC II, 11-186, DPM I p 708

(2) Letter of discharge for factor Pessoa of Sofala, Lisbon, 16.vii.1532, TT, Chanc. de João III, liv 18, fls 108v-109, DPM II, p 390

(3) Letter, factor Soares to the king, Sofala, 30.vi.1513, TT, CC I, 18-27, fl 3v, DPM III p 468

(4) Letter of discharge for heirs of factor Soares of Sofala, Lisbon, 27.vi.1521, TT, Chanc. de Manuel, liv 39, fls 86-86v, DPM III p 516

(5) Expenditure book of clerk Lopes, 1515, already quoted, DPM IV, pp 24-208

(6) Order from provost Almada to factor Salema, Sofala, 4.viii.1517, TT, CC II, 71-12, DPM V p 178

(7) Order from captain Tavora to factor Salema, Sofala, 16.vi.1518, TT, CC II, 75-148, DPM V p 478

(8) Letter, factor Brito to the king, Sofala, 8.vii.1519, TT, CC I, 25-7, items 2 & 6, DPM VI p 14 & 18.

APPENDIX 4

SIZE OF SOFALA GARRISON AND CREWS 1506 - 1518

(From wage and maintenance lists)









KEY

G - garrison

C - crews

S - captain in Sofala

M - captain in Mozambique

APPENDIX 5

THE TRUE DATE OF D. ANTÓNIO DA SILVEIRA'S LETTER (TT, Cartas dos vicereis da Índia No. 13)

Reproduced in vol. V of Documentos sobre os portuqueses em Moçambique as document 73, is a long letter, undated, by D. António da Silveira to the king of Portugal. Page 3 of the MS mentions a date: June 15 [1]516, stated to be twenty-five months previous to the writing of the letter. On this detail the editors assign the presumptive date of "post 1518" to the document (DPM V p 538). A number of references in the letter, however, make it quite certain that this date is ten years too early.

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Dom Lopo, mentioned four times (pp 538, 558/& 572) is part of the name of the captain of Sofala and Mozambique from 1525 to 1528, Dom Lopo d'Almeida. (See Costa Mendes' Catálogo dos capitaes de Moçambique, Mozambique, 1892.) A passage on fl 9 of the MS refers clearly to the end of this official's term of office: "Tanto que cheguey a Moçambique, paartio loguo hum navio em que vim, que he ho do trato pera Dom Lopo se viir tomaar sua embarcam e me entreguar estas fortalezas [de Sofala e Moçambique] o tempo que acabava ... n naam he em sua maao alargaar Sofala." (DPM V p 572) The writer is complaining that although he has presented his papers proving his title to succeed to the post of captain of Sofala and Mozambique, and although it does not lie "in the hands" of Almeida "to stretch out his appointment" beyond the three year term laid down, Almeida is refusing to hand over command. The list of captains shows that D. António da Silveira did in fact succeed in 1528 to the capitania of Sofala and Mozambique. (See Costa Mendes, op. cit.)

An additional fix appears in the opening sentence of the letter: "Presentey na Índia ao governador Lopo Vaaz huum alvara que tenho de Vosa Alteza ..." (DPM V 538). The name mentioned is that of the sixth governor of India, Lopo Vás de Sampaio, who ruled from 1526 to 1529. (See José F. Ferreira Martins' Crónica dos vice-reis e governadores da India, Nova Goa, 1919, vol 1.)

It is quite certain, therefore, that the letter was written in 1528, just before the writer assumed office as captain of Sofala and Mozambique, and that the date 1516 in the text is a clerical slip for 1526. The document is vital for correct understanding of the circumstance which led to Portuguese efforts in the early 1530s to penetrate the Cuama trade route, for which other documentation is so very scant. The letter is also of prime importance in the story of the rise to power of the African ruler of the Sofala hinterland, Nyamunda.

APPENDIX 6

THE NON - MUSLIM AFRICAN PEOPLE OF SIXTEENTH CENTURY SOFALA

The present African people of Sofala are Ndau whose language is of the Shona group with dialectic differences marking them off from the Ndau furthest away from them around Mount Selinda, close to the Rhodesia-Mozambique border at the tip of the Chimanimani mountains. They have been disturbed scarcely at all by the difaqane during which Shoshangane and his successors ravaged the coastal plains to the south. Chief Makandara of Sofala, now 75 years old, told the author in June 1970 that in the remembered history of his Ndau people no raiding Shangaans ever settled at Sofala, and that the Ndau survived easily by running off or sheltering in the fort during raids. S^r Trindade of Beira, born in 1893, whose father was the last officer in command of Sofala fort, gave the author additional detail on this in 1969. The danger alarm was given by a small African boy whose duty was to climb a palm tree and drum to warn the villagers: one rhythm was reserved for lions, another for raiding Shangaans.

A Shona tongue spoken in Sofala can be traced back to the 1580s when Santos was priest there. In Ethiópia Oriental, one can read over twenty still quite recognisable Shona words: mbira, a musical instrument, parapara, a sable, murqy, a witch and sazu, a honey-guide (bird) to give a few examples.

No prominent movement of African people into or out of Sofala is recorded between 1505 and the 1580s, and one may therefore be sure that the vast majority of the early sixteenth century African people of Sofala were of the same type as Santos describes, with the same language. It seems certain also that the important chiefdom close to Sofala in 1505 was that of the same Shona-speaking folk, for the name Moconde (that of the chief who tried to sack the first Portuguese fort) is part of a greeting of the Shava clan of the Ndau today. (See H.P. Junod, 'A contribution to the study of Ndau demography, totemism and history' in Bantu Studies, vol 8, 1934, p 24.)

There are a number of links with the past demonstrating that Moconde was a very close neighbour of Sofala, and that he was Karanga, that is part of the widespread Shona-speaking family. Alcaçova recounts in 1506 that the Karanga ruler held authority over the Africans at Sofala (letter to the king, 20.xi.1506, already quoted, fl 1, DPM I p 390). In appealing to chief Moconde for assistance, sheikh Yusuf referred to the same connection by calling on Moconde to attack on behalf of his master the monomotapa. (Barros, Da Ásia, 1.10.3., RSEA VI pp 121 - 122.) A place name close to Sofala, reported before the difaqane had gathered enough momentum to create dislocations in the Sofalan hinterland was recorded as Makonde. (See 'Account of the Portuguese possessions within the captaincy of the Rios de Senna' in Owen's Narrative of voyages, 1833, vol 2, p 409.) Chief Makandara identified the area by disclosing to the author in 1970 the name of a river within half a mile of the site of the old Muslim area of Sofala as the Rio Makonde.

No name can be assigned to the sixteenth century Shona groups near Sofala apart from Karanga, however, for the name Ndau is as yet known only in a recent context (although Abraham, in personal communication with the author, has stated he believes it is equivalent to mondoro, meaning 'lion' and came into eastern Shona from an alien Bantu source). According to H.P. Junod, the word is Zulu-Ngoni in origin, and thus from the difaqane period of the 1820s on, and was the Ngoni version of what a man of this language group said as he approached his chief: "Ndau we, ndau we" meaning "Room please, room please". (See H.P. Junod, op. cit., p 17.)

In their own account of their origin, the Ndau claim to have come to the coast as fragments of a Rozvi host. (See Dora Earthy, 'The vaNdau of Sofala' in Africa IV No 2, 1931, p 225.) If we accept Abraham's reconstruction of the changamira story (Historians in Tropical Africa, 1962, pp 64 - 66) the possibility of Ndau ancestors arriving with Rozvi in the fifteenth century fits in well. There is always, however, suspicion that the Ndau historian is here trying to establish a quite fictitious link with the Shona group which became so powerful inland.

An archaeological pointer exists which seems to strengthen the case for Rozvi connections: a significant proportion of African pottery on an eroding old land surface at Sofala undisturbed by tidal activity and datable from its imports to a period from the mid fifteenth to the mid sixteenth century (1971 investigations at Nova Mambone suggest strongly the first fifty years of this period) is a distinctive red and black incised ware. Caton-Thompson and Schofield both regarded polychrome band and panel ware, with which the Sofalan examples may be connected, as Rozvi. (See A. Robinson's Khami Ruins, CUP, 1959, p 32.) Robinson himself, it is true, detects an earlier Sotho ancestry to such pottery, noting a tradition that Humbe potters made polychrome pottery for the Rozvi, possibly as tribute. The connections between Ndau and Rozvi must, it seems, remain for the present an interesting conjecture which fuller understanding of the ceramics of Iron Age south-east Africa may clarify in future.

APPENDIX 7

THE LOCATION OF CHIEF NYAMUNDA IN THE EARLY SIXTEENTH CENTURY

Hugh Tracey in António Fernandes, 1940, places Nyamunda's chieftaincy between the Buzi and the Pungwe, that is, north of Sofala. (See his map opposite p 89.) Professor Axelson, on p 146 of S.E. Africa, 1488 - 1530, agrees with Tracey. Tracey's Portuguese editor, however, Caetano Montez, in a footnote to p 36, points out that Nyamunda's chieftaincy should be shown south of the Buzi river, at five days' journey (probably about sixty miles, for as Alcaçova wrote, Africans journeyed only up to midday (see his letter of 1506, already quoted, fl i v, DPM I p 390) and laden, slowed by hazards, twelve miles a day would be a fair average) from the mouth of the Corongoza river. All the evidence supports Caetano Montez.

If Fernandes had been setting out for country between the Buzi and the Pungwe when he went to visit chief Nyamunda, he need not have sailed to another port. He would have travelled inland from Sofala itself, up the Sofala river, taking the Revue branch, towards the Manica highlands. This, however, was the territory of Nyambia, and north of this area lay Unyaroro, already visited by Fernandes. (See Almada's letter of 26.vi.1516, already quoted, section 5, DPM IV p 286 for Fernandes' visit to 'Cunharouro' c 1514, and section 4, DPM IV p 282 for the sequence of his visits to Nyamunda, the monomotapa and Unyaroro.) Fernandes must in fact, have sailed south, and the port at which he disembarked may well be the village at the mouth of the Corongoza river named by the Ndau of Sofala today, Nyambibe (personal communication by S^{r} Ndongwe, a seventy-seven year old Ndau of Sofala, in 1969 to the author).

This geographic placing of Nyamunda is supported by the location of the sonadonhamunda whom Fernandes met on disembarcation before setting out for the capital - see note on p. 85.

The name Nyamunda is perpetuated in an area south-west of Espungabera, on the southern tip of the Chimanimani range, and is a frequently occurring sib name of the modern Ndau, often associated with the name Nkomo, in the Danda region - the coastal plain south of Sofala. (See Von Günther Spannaus, 'Das Häuptlingwesen der Ndau in Südostafrika' in Beiträge fur Volkerkunde, Veröffentlichungen, vol 1, 1961, p 631.)

According to traditions collected by Miss Corinne Armstrong, researching into Ndau history at Chikore, 1970, Nyamunda is identified with the important chief Mucupe, one of the Danda chiefs in southern Mozambique. Nyamunda is used as a praise name for Mucupe and several of his 'children', now independent chiefs. Mucupe is said to be the 'son' of Mutema, important ritual chief in the Rhodesian Ndau territory. *

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* I am most grateful to Miss Armstrong for allowing me to include these details from her as yet unpublished work on the vaNdau.

APPENDIX 8

MEASURES, WEIGHTS AND VALUES IN 16th CENTURY SOFALA

A - LENGTH

The league varied in measurements we can trust, between 2.5 and 3.75 statute miles. Santos [1] gives the distance between the Luabo mouth of the Zambezi and Sena (150 statute miles) as 60 leagues, for instance. His league is thus 2.5 miles. Brito(2) gives the distance between Sofala and Chiluane (30 statute miles) as 8 leagues. For him, the league is 3.75 miles.[3] Augur [4] gives the distance between Sofala and Mozambique (500 miles) as 190 leagues. Here the league is 2.63 miles.

One must expect discrepancies both from lack of knowledge of the interior, where navigational methods of computing distance couldn't be used, and also from the impossibility of gauging accurately east to west distances, which needed accurate longitude calculations. The chronometer, on which the fixing of longitude depends, was not perfected until the eighteenth century, so reasonable accuracy is to be ex ected only in sixteenth century estimates of latitude distance, for which the instruments were adequate.

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(1) Ethiópia Oriental, 2.2, (BSGA VII p 72).

(2) Letter to king, 8.viii.1519, TT, CC I, 28-7, DPM VI p 12, where Quiloane is wrongly translated as Kilwa, incidentally.

(3) This is exactly the standard adopted by Boxer in Four centuries of Portuguese expansion, p 10.

(4) Conquest of the Indies tit. 18, DPM III p 614.

The contrast between reasonable accuracy in north to south measurement and massive error in east to west is well illustrated in Barbosa. His statement of distance between Sofala and the Cuama (150 miles) as 40 leagues (1) gives the same equivalent as Brito - 3.75 miles. His east to west estimate of the distance between Cape Correntes and Madagascar (500 miles) of 70 leagues gives the impossible figure of 7.14 miles per league. (2)

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Cloth Measure (from Encyclopoedia Portuguesa Brasileira)

Covado = 3 palms or 66 cms

Vara = 1 metre 10 cms

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(1) 'Descriçao da situaçao .... de alguns lugares de África', section 5, DPM V p 362.

(2) Ibid, section 11, DPM V p 378.

B - WEIGHT [1] 1554

			Equivalents from 1868 publication
1 bar	= 20 faraçolas	= 4 quintais, 28 lb [2]	= 247.96 kg
1 bar (ivory)		= 4 quintais, 10½ lb	= 239.8275 kg
1 faraçola	= 15 manos	= 27 arrateis (lb)	= 12.393 kg
1 fardo (millet)	= 10 alqueires [3]	= 25 panjas	= 5.52 litres
1 alqueire			= .552 litre
1 panja	= 8 conjas		= .69 litre

1 quintal = 128 arrateis (lbs) 1517 [4]

1 arratel = 2 marks = 16 oz 1517 [5]

1 almude = 16 to 25 litres dry capacity [6]

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(1) First six items from António Nunes, Livro dos pesos medidos e moedas, 1554, published Lisbon, 1868, HSEA II pp 449 - 454.

(2) The pound is here the Portuguese pound or arratel = 16½ oz. English.

(3) The alqueire varied widely throughout Portuguese dominions. In Sofala, according to Nunez, the value was .552 litres; in Lisbon it was worth 13.8 litres, according to the Encyclopedia Portuguesa Brasileira.

(4) Order from Fernao de Alcaçova, Mozambique, 24.viii.1517, TT, CC II, 71-53, fl 4, DHM V p 186.

(5) Ibid.

(6) From Encyclopedia Portuguesa Brasileira.

C - LIQUID CAPACITY (1)

1 almude = 12 canadas

(1 canada = 14 decilitres Lisbon)

1 panella = 6 canadas

1 tonel = 2 pipes = 840 litres = 50 almudes (2)

1 almude = 12 canadas = 48 quartilhos

(averaged 20 litres, liquid)

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D - COINAGE

mitical (3) = ·155 oz

1 mitical = 500 reais (1505 - 1516) (3)

= 467 reais (1516 +) (4)

1 mark = 47½ miticals (1518) (5)

1 cruzado = 390 reais (1500) (6)

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(1) From Encyclopoedia Portuguesa Brasileira .

(2) The pipa was a barrel used for wine, oil, and sometimes dry storage - see Morais' Dictionary .

(3) See note 21 of chapter I .

(4) Mutilated pay and maintenance sheet, Sofala [1516] TT, CC II 65-88, DPM IV p 272.

(5) Acknowledgement issued by Jorge de Figueiredo, [Mozambique] 1.vii.1518, TT, CC II, 76-6, DPM V p 526.

(6) Livermore, op. cit., p 479, based on J. Lúcio de Azevedo, Épocas de Portugal económico, Lisbon, 1929, pp 487 - 489.

APPENDIX 9

ARCHAEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS AT SOFALA AND NOVA MAMBONE 1969 - 1971

In 1969 and 1970, the writer, with assistance from staff and students of the University of Rhodesia and financial support from the Gulbenkian Foundation, conducted archaeological and ethnohistoric investigations at Sofala. The locations examined on the northern horn of Sofala Bay are shown in two appended plans. In addition many African homesteads in Sofala and between Sofala and the Umtali-Beira road were visited for comparative pottery studies, and the oldest folk at Sofala, including chief Makandara, interviewed.

The main aim was to establish the site of the 15th and early 16th century capital of sheikh Yusuf, the whereabouts of which are known within fairly precise limits from statements in Alcaçova and Castanheda: half a league from the fort (which has always stood on the same site and whose ruins survive), up river (that is, north-west of the fort) and beside a mangrove-fringed creek. A circle of radius 1.87 miles [1] drawn with the fort as centre inscribes less than 25% land surface and more than 75% sea. The sea bottom is shifting sand dune, giving little chance of success for underwater investigation; on land, excavation reaches a water table at up to ten feet in depth; salt is known to upset C^{14} analysis. Here are three hazards which allowed slim hope to our expeditions: but by contrast the ceramic evidence was prolific. The main beach, extending from slightly north-east of the fort ruins to the tomb of Mwenye Mukuru to the north-west, produces a new crop of pottery at each scouring of the tide, ranging from late15th century celadon to early 20th century Titian ware, together with previous to our investigations undatable African potsherds which must span a similar range. This rich lode was sampled and fully sketched and reported, giving a corpus of information on Sofalan pottery and beads on which future investigations may be based.

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(1) Half the greatest reasonably reliable distance for the 16th century league - see p 162.

Both expeditions failed to uncover structure in situ, despite plentiful evidence of the nearness of it, which is hardly surprising not only in view of the short duration of each visit, but also considering the known nature of Yusuf's capital and the geomorphology of Sofala. The buildings were of impermanent pole and daga, sacked by Moconde, burnt by Anai and abandonned by Yusuf's successor. The shore close to them has been in constant process of capture by the tide, a quarter mile wide strip having been eroded in little over a century, and such change reported from the early 16th century itself. Erosion by sea and annual inundation by river would leave little of pole and daga structure other than a few hard-baked fragments surviving a fire. It would, however, leave pottery and beads, the indelible fingerprints of the past.

In a creek, clear of ocean destruction but eroded annually by floods, the writer found in 1968 an earth bank with pottery extruding from its crumbling edges, corresponding to pottery fragments lying on the creek floor below. The position of the site corresponded closely with the descriptions by Alcaçova and Castanheda of the location of Yusuf's capital. Furthermore, a tomb, assigned by oral tradition to around the year 1500 (probably the tomb of Yusuf himself) lay close by. Excavation was concentrated here in 1969. Fragments of hut daga with clear imprints of poles were found, showing the proximity of ruined buildings. The earliest Sofalan bead occurred here, a green, wound glass variety, similar to an example recovered from Acropolis midden A_3 at Great Zimbabwe by Caton-Thompson. In Garlake's revision of the terminus ad quem for the Zimbabwe cultures, this may be dated pre 1450. Further north, the wound beads are said to have disappeared before the 16th century. (2)

No weight of argument can rest on the evidence of a single bead, of course, but the ceramic evidence from the creek indicates the earliest site so far known at Sofala: there was a preponderance of early Chinese imports there, celadon and early 16th century blue and white porcelain, and a complete absence of any late blue and white or European imitations of

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(2) W.N. Van der Sleen, A handbook on beads, Liège, 1967, p 38.

Chinese wares (sometimes referred to as 'Delft'). The African sherds, too, formed a fairly unique collection in contrast with examples collected on the main beach. Apart from flat-bottomed bowls which clearly reflect the influence of imported Chinese shapes upon African design, the two typical African genres at Sofala are the pedestal-based bowl and the raised-pattern shallow pot. The latter has been long forgotten at Sofala - an old Ndau potter-woman thought this might be Tonga work. The pedestal-based bowl, however, is a surviving form, used as a versatile vessel which can serve as lid to a cooking pot and then bowl for offering relish, and in this form, the type is distributed from the homesteads of the lower Buzi to those of Bazaruto Island, at which latter place, indeed, there are Tonga potters making this style of bowl. The old Swahili sites of north Madagascar show the same type of ceramic. Possible connections with the Rozvi were noted in the frequent occurence of black and red metallic polish on the bowls.

The investigations were baulked of their main objectives - to find remains of structure in situ from Yusuf's Sofala, and to date African pottery by C_{14} analysis. The expeditions have, however, it may be fairly claimed, made an important contribution to the understanding of the sequence of African pottery on the southern coast of Mozambique, relations of these ceramic traditions with those of the modern Ndau, direct descendants of the Shona-speaking inhabitants of Santos' day, and parallels existing with African wares on the other side of the Mozambique Channel on the old Swahili sites of Malagasy such as Vohémar. It was important, too, to demonstrate that there is stability of location in the Sofalan pottery middens and survival of some old surface, despite the depredations of flood and tide.

The surprising statistic to emerge from the investigations is that out of about 500 artifacts collected from the surface or excavated, less than 1% can receive a pre-1500 date. Pre-Yusuf Sofala may, it is true, lie under a sea which over a millenium drove the settlements steadily inland: such

a situation is probably impossible to prove or disprove. If earlier Sofalas are not on the present Sofala's seabed, however, one must look elsewhere for them. It is quite possible, for instance, that the Sofala of Mas'udi's time, tapping the gold distributed from the developing centre of Great Zimbabwe, lay at the mouth of the Sabi rather than at that of the old Buzi. The Sabi would afford a useful access line to Great Zimbabwe, and the Sabi mouth was therefore made the target for investigation in 1971.

In May/June of 1971, the author and an Ndau-speaking African assistant, Mr Mukanganwe, spent ten days in the Nova Mambone area at the mouth of the Save (Sabi) river. The object was to visit presumed sites of old settlements mentioned in accounts by Lereno Barradas and François Balsan, (3) and in particular to report on evidence of artifacts betraying the date of such locations. (See appended maps.)

Half the period was spent in wide-ranging search by almadia (4) of the estuary with its islands and eroding banks, which produced very slight ceramic traces. Then Sr Mandima led us across five miles of difficult mangrove swamp to an abandoned bay at the edge of Muringare Forest. Oral tradition from 92 year old Sr Mawonera affirmed that it was to Muringare Bay that the large pangayos (5) from India and Quelimane came, bringing as many as 70 vaMwenye. (6) The site produced abundant evidence in a foot-thick shell midden (mostly conus, oyster and small clams) - fragments of pole and

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(3) L. Barradas, 'A primitiva Mambone e suas imediaçoes', Monumenta 3, 1967, pp 20 - 33.

F. Balsan, 'Ancient gold routes of the Monomotapan kingdom', Geographical Journal 136:2, June 1970, pp 240 - 246.

(4) See note 28 of chapter II.

(5) Pangayo - the 16th century Portuguese word for the large river craft which plied the Zambezi.

(6) At both Sofala and Nova Mambone, the Ndau mean by 'vaMwenye' those who are not Portuguese and not Ndau - the Muslims in fact.

daga huts, raised pattern pottery identical with the Sofalan wares of this type, spindle whorls, snapped cane-glass beads, copper beads and a bangle fragment. A very brief excavation was made: two 4' x 4' trenches being sunk through the shell midden down to the water table, reached at 4'. The beads included no clearly post-1500 examples, that is bichrome, moulded, or hexagonal royal blue - the favourite bead of the modern Ndau. The pottery was homogeneous throughout the four feet of depth, and included some fragments bearing affinities to Zimbabwe 3 beaker ware, and other pieces which would not appear out of place in a Zimbabwe 4 context - well made, heavily graphited, rolled-rim pottery. (7) A fragment of bowl decorated with cross-hatch incisions, shell impressions and haematite polish is identical with examples from Sofala creek excavations and may connect with 13th century Coro Park and Harari ware.

The Sabi mouth expedition, although it too, produced no structure *in situ*, and apart from trade beads, no imports, has given a strong support for dating the pottery of the Sofalan Muslim site to pre 1500, and holds out promise of rich dividends from a prolonged investigation.

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(7) R. Summers *et alia*, *Zimbabwe excavations, 1958*, Cambridge, 1961, pp 201 - 225.


creek
Rio Munye Mukuru
Rio Mandevo ia
20°10'
Tomb of Abdurraman
tomb beach
sb
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
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27
SOFALA BAY
mangrove mud
sand dry at very low tide
SOFALA FORT RUINS & RUBBLE FIELD
mn
tn
12° 25 W 1969
20°10'6"
0 200 400 500 800 1000
feet
34° 45'1"
34° 45'6"
RWD 1969
fort ruin

SOFALA POTTERY LOCATIONS



KEY

mangrove / coconut groves

unstippled land: salt creeks / pans

A Main Beach

B Tomb Beach

C 'Creek'

D 'Ndongwe's Creek'

E Nova Sofala Road area

rwd



THE RIVER SAVE



THE SAVE MOUTH

MURINGARI BAY EXCAVATION





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S. Vicente

Livro 10, fol. 85 A 19th century copy of a fragment which appears to date to 1545, urging that slaves of Moors should be sold only to Christians.

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DIRAS, Sr.A.F.	Custodian of the Muslim saint's Tomb, Sofala.
FORTUNE, G.	Professor of African Languages, University of Rhodesia.
FREITAS d'ANDRADE, Dr E.	Translator of the printed document series, Lisbon.

GONCALVES,

Sr J. de S.	78 year old retired marceneiro of Sofala.
KAHARI, G.	Lecturer in African Languages, University of Rhodesia.
LOBATO, Sr A.	University of Lourenço Marques and Monuments Commission of Mozambique.
MACORRE, Sr J.	An Ndau of Machanga and later of Sofala.
MAKANDANGA, Chief J.	80 year old chief of Sofala area.
MACHAVA, Sa. S.	66 year old potter of Sofala.
NASOMBEMBE, Mrs.	94 year old Ndau of Chikore.
MAVONERA, Sr C.	32 year old Ndau of Nova Mambone.
MUKANGANWE, K.G.	Research scholar, working on the Ndau dialects, University of Rhodesia.
MURAVIRA, Sa. A.	Tonga potter from Nyamashasha, near Inhambane.
NDONGWE, Sr F.	77 year old Ndau of Sofala.
RENNIE, K.	Research scholar studying the Ndau of Mt. Selinda, Rhodesia.
SILVA-REGO, P^e	Co-editor of the printed document series, Lisbon.
TIVANI, Sr J.	60 year old fisherman of Sofala.
TAIMLADE, Sr	78 year old retired soldier of Beira, whose father was the last Commandant of Sofala Fort.

MAPS

Portugaliae Monumenta Cartographica, Lisbon, 1960.
Maps particularly useful for the study of Sofala and the rivers of Cuama are as follows:

1. Anónimo, attributed to Diogo Ribeiro, 1529, PMC I 39
   Ribeiro, a Portuguese cartographer in the service of Charles V of Spain, 1525-1533, translated Barbosa and made charts and instruments for Magellan.
   On this map note Sofala with its shoal and island, the Bucicas islands (Bazaruto), the Rio de Bons Sinais (Quelimane) and Angoxa, north of the Zambezi.

2. Anónimo, attributed to Gaspar Viegas, c. 1537, PMC I 49 A
   Viegas, born in Lisbon in 1500, sailed to Goa in 1538.
   The map shows Quiloamo island (Chiluane), Sofala with island and shoal, Mangue (Mungwe mouth), the Cuama mouth and associated islands, and the river Angoja, north of the Zambezi.

3. Map of 1561, Bartolomeu Velho, PMC II 203
Bartolomeu Velho is known to have been born in Lisbon, but his date of birth is unknown. By 1567 his cartographic skill had attracted the King of France to draw him into his service, revealing to the discomfiture of the Portuguese, the geographic secrets of their overseas possessions. He died, possibly executed through Portuguese influence, in France, in 1568. This is the first map known to offer such inland information. In addition to the coastal features in 1. and 2. above, Sena appears on the Zambezi, Mozimba and Mombara north of the great river, Baroe, between Pungwe and Buzi, and Sono, south of Manhica.

4. Map of 1568, Diogo Homem, PMC II 137
Hardly any biographical details are known of this map-maker. The 1568 map presents only coastal information, but with additional detail at the Cuama delta. Angoxa appears north of the Zambezi.

5. Map of 1571, Fernão Vaz Dourado, PMC III 281
Dourado, born in India of a noble and scholarly family, fought at the 1546 siege of Diu. Only the coast and rivers receive his attention. From south to north the catalogue reads:
Bazaruta (in exaggerated southerly latitude), Quileme (Chiluane) Soeffalla with a large island, Bangue (Pungwe mouth), Sacamechango (earliest referenceto a name of a district north of Beira, Savane), João Baneta island, Cacellos (estuary) and Cuama river with great detail of the delta.

6. Map of 1580, Fernão Vaz Dourado, PMC III 322
As for 5. above, with the addition of Xena (Sena) on the Cuama and slight differences in the Cuama delta configuration. Angoxa is shown north of the Zambezi.

7. Map of c. 1590, Duarte Lopes, PMC III 386
Lopes was a Jewish cartographer. The increase in inland information may reflect a possible Portuguese crossing of Africa from west to east. His coastal detail is sparse and inaccurate, which supports the poor opinion held by Santos of this cartographer (see chapter III of this thesis, note 8). Angoxa is shown south of Sofala, Sofala is placed on a tributary of the Zambezi whose delta is grossly expanded, Quilimane appears inland. The suspicion of general inaccuracy is most frustrating, for Monomotapa, Quitecuj, Baroe, Butua, Toroa, Zimbaoe, and liberal sprinklings of gold and silber mines are all here, as well as a tantalising reference to the Malemba in Angola.

8. Map of 1630, João Teixeira I, PMC IV 469 A & B
João Teixeira I is recognised as the greatest of 17th century Portuguese cartographers. Far more precise inland detail now appears, matching that of the coast: Quiteve and his Zimbabwe, Luanze, Manica, Masapa, Chicova, Sena, Tete, Luputa, Batonga, Bororo, are all shown. The Rucicas islands receive the modern name of Bazaruto, and far more accurate location, and the river Sabi occurs as "Sabea" (469 A). On 469 B, Bambarare, destined to become the great trade fair and Portuguese administrative centre for Monomotapa, is shown, but in exaggerated south latitude due to the extension of its river approach.

9. Map of 1649, João Teixeira I, PMC IV 513
Most interesting for its inset plan of Sofala, with the island of Inhassanto, the fort protected by its two river arms, the colonia which developed north and east of it (Teixeira's orientation on the inset is 90° too far easterly) and the anchorages close to the fort.

10. Map of 1665, João Teixeira II, PMC V 557 B
Grandson of João Teixeira I, this namesake rivalled the reputation of his predecessor. The contribution this map makes is to our understanding of the relative positions of the Shona kingdoms: Manamatapa, Quiteve and Sedanda appear, together with new fragmentations of the Karanga states in northern Mashonaland: Chicova, Sacumbe and Inhabazoe (Mazoe). Butua appears, too far to the west, and Manapa distorted southwards, as in the example quoted in no. 8 above. The Nompas are noted in the angle between the Zambezi and Luenya rivers.