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**Many Paths to Democracy: A Critique of Casper and Taylor's
Theoretical Model Through the South African Lens**

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Abstract

In 1994, South Africa held national elections that, for the first time, were open to voters of all races. Prior to this event, however, most political analysts would have considered the possibility of a peaceful transition unlikely. This is because most contemporary transition theory advocates strategies of compromise and elite pact-making. In apartheid South Africa, the prospects for such a resolution appeared poor. But what if compromise is not always the best path to democracy? Gretchen Casper and Michelle M. Taylor (1996) offer one theoretical approach that concludes just that. By focussing its attention on the process of transition and the interaction between the various actors involved, Casper and Taylor find that highly charged negotiations more often result in effective, consolidated democracy. Consequently, this paper examines, applies, and critiques their approach through the South African case. What we find is that their model appears theoretically sound, and can be successfully applied to the South African case, but fails to capture the complexities of the post-transition experience in South Africa. But, in many ways, the South African case is an unusual one, and is not easily explained by any contemporary theory. As such, this failure is not completely due to weaknesses in the model. Consequently, we conclude that there are clearly benefits to utilizing their approach, and the conclusions drawn from their model may yet yield some important theory, but the model cannot be considered complete, despite their unique focus.

Introduction

In 1994, South Africa held national elections that, for the first time, were open to voters of all races. In an overwhelming victory for democracy, these voters selected Nelson Mandela and the ANC to open the new era of South African politics. However, up until just before those elections, many political scientists from around the world considered the peaceful realization of this event unlikely or, in some cases, even impossible. The long history of apartheid, they said, created irreparable divisions, not only racially, but also socioeconomically. Instead of the relatively smooth and peaceful transition from National Party control to ANC control, most theorists would have predicted a revolution, or uprising, to violently dismantle almost fifty years of institutionalized inequality. No one predicted, however, that 1994 would see FW deKlerk and Nelson Mandela (each with Nobel Peace Prizes) lead South Africa out of the darkness of oppression and into the light of democracy.

But now, almost ten years later, we can look back at the events that have shaped South Africa anew, and make some tentative conclusions about the country's path to democracy. To do this, however, we must also place South Africa's transition in a global context. In what ways do other countries' experiences help us to understand South Africa's? In what ways does South Africa's transition help us to better understand the nature of democratic transition in general?

The process of democratization has been defined and studied in many ways over the years. Some theorists have focused on institutions and state structures, some on development and economic policy. Others have approached the topic from a class-struggle perspective, and still others from a game theoretical approach. Many of these theorists offered lasting contributions to transition theory; others have fallen from memory. Because of this diversity of opinion and of success, it is important to consider the merits and weaknesses of various theoretical approaches in continually building the body of knowledge and framework on which other theorists can build. This paper will test one such theoretical approach, offered by Gretchen Casper and Michelle Taylor (1996), in an attempt to determine its usefulness and applicability for future transition study.

While Casper and Taylor do certainly utilize elements from many different transition theorists in developing their own approach, their work represents a fundamental shift in the way transitions are viewed. While much of the dominant theory nowadays does focus on the processes of transition, and the interplay between the various actors in negotiations, most of these theorists also refuse to totally discount institutions, political structures, and socioeconomic factors. Casper and Taylor, however, relegate those factors to a secondary status, asserting that they only matter insofar as they influence the dynamic between three key actors: the Defender (who is most often the old regime, though not necessarily), the Challenger

(the key actor or actors pushing for regime change), and the Mass Public. As such, Casper and Taylor focus on the process of transition as an object of study in itself.

Because of this approach, they identify several resultant hypotheses that are particularly illuminating when extended to the South African case, which was not one of their original case studies. Most notably, Casper and Taylor assert that strategies of compromise are not necessarily the best way to approach negotiations for democratic transition. This is very much at odds with much of the popular transition theory, including the work of O'Donnell and Schmitter, Terry Kari, Juan Linz, Dankwart Rustow, etc. Similarly, their research seems to indicate that it is the timing of elite-pacts—rather than simply the existence of pacts—that is most important to the democratization process. This, too, has important ramifications for the South African case.

As such, this study will utilize Casper and Taylor's theoretical model as a heuristic framework, illuminating aspects and elements of the South African case that may be missed by conventional transition theory. Consequently, the first chapter will lay out their theoretical model, and then compare and contrast the various elements of this model to contemporary theory on democratization. This will be useful in highlighting both the areas of similarity, and of departure, from said theory.

The second chapter will be an application of the South African case to Casper and Taylor's model, presenting a largely configurative study that is already coded to the theoretical framework from the first chapter. It is here that many of the overlooked aspects of the South African transition will be revealed in a new light. Likewise, this chapter will also demonstrate that Casper and Taylor's model can be extended to the South African case, which (as was mentioned) was not part of their original study.

The final chapter will be a discussion and evaluation of the elements of the "illuminated" South African case, and of Casper and Taylor's model in general. I will evaluate at what points their theory falls short, and at what points it succeeds. This chapter will also offer alternative theoretical explanations for elements of the South African transition that are not sufficiently explained by any current theory on democratization, as well as suggestions for improving Casper and Taylor's model in future studies.

Chapter 1: Theory Review

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This portion of the paper will review the structure and theoretical basis for Casper and Taylor's model of regime change. As such, the first part of this section will provide an overview of Casper and Taylor's approach. However, because Casper and Taylor obviously did not approach the crafting of their model without first determining what aspects of existing transition theory were most useful and necessary, it will then become necessary to familiarize ourselves with other existing theory on democratic transition. Through this exercise, the similarities and differences between Casper and Taylor's model and the approaches of other theorists will become obvious.

This exercise will prove most helpful in illuminating Casper and Taylor's unique contribution to the body of literature. Put simply, the strength of Casper and Taylor's theoretical approach is certainly in the depth with which they probe the processes of negotiation and the interaction between actors and their preferences. More than any other prominent transition theorist, Casper and Taylor utilize the **transition process** as an object of study in itself. Consequently, this focus yields several key insights, which Casper and Taylor utilize in developing a more general framework for the study of democratic transitions.

What Casper and Taylor ultimately identify are three modal paths that most frequently result in the three potential outcomes of the regime choice process. That is to say, transitions that result in Continued Authoritarianism most often follow a certain path of negotiation and interaction. The same is true, Casper and Taylor argue, for countries that install democracy, and for those that install democracy and move toward consolidation. Thus, what we find is that the process of negotiation that marks a regime choice influences that country's chances of successfully installing and consolidating democracy. Amongst prominent transition theorists, only Alfred Stepan is willing to acknowledge this connection as explicitly as Casper and Taylor, but he refrains from citing specific examples.

That Casper and Taylor build a study around this point is not necessarily a stunning development, but some of the aspects of these paths do diverge in important ways from the dominant literature. For example, while many theorists study the influence of pacts, particularly elite pacts, on the transition process, Casper and Taylor's research reveals that the substance of said pacts are not the only influential aspect of the area of study. In reality, **when** the pacts are made can influence the path and success of the transition just as much as the substance. It is this attention to the timing of pacts (rather than simply the existence of pacts) that separates Casper and Taylor from many of the other transition theorists mentioned here.

Likewise, the same attention to timing can also be extended to liberalization. While many theorists, most notably O'Donnell and Schmitter, examine the role that liberalization (as undertaken by the regime in power) plays in the transition process, Casper and Taylor would also claim that the timing of this

liberalization is key.¹ In many cases, liberalization is enough to diffuse a conflict. However, it is the timing of—and motivation for—this liberalization that is crucial to its prospects for success.

Perhaps even more important, though, is the hypothesis of Casper and Taylor that elite compromise—long thought to be the best and safest path to democracy—may in fact be detrimental to the consolidation of democracy in the long term. Again, though, it is the timing of this compromise that determines whether it will be beneficial. So as we can see, that Casper and Taylor choose to focus more on the process of transition, rather than the structures, institutions, or actors, is crucial to understanding their contribution.

But before we get too far ahead of ourselves, let us turn to the theory. In the following section, I will lay out Casper and Taylor's theoretical model in a fairly straightforward manner, echoing the manner in which it is presented in their study. Immediately afterward, I will present overviews of several key transition theorists, highlighting important similarities and differences with Casper and Taylor's model wherever useful. The bulk of the rigorous evaluation of Casper and Taylor's approach will take place in the final chapter of this paper, when the usefulness of their model can be analyzed not only in relation to the other theoretical models presented here, but also in the context of the case study that makes up the second chapter.

Casper and Taylor

Casper and Taylor's book, Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, focuses on the democratization process across a range of countries selected cross-regionally. Democratization, in the context of this study, they define as "a multistage process that entails a transition away from authoritarianism, the installation of a democratic regime, and its consolidation."¹ However, they recognize and note that not all countries that embark upon democratization ultimately reach a consolidated democracy. Some, they state, fall back into authoritarianism, either in the form of the original regime, or with a new regime. Others successfully complete the transition away from authoritarianism to democracy, but the installed democracy does not consolidate. And then there are those countries that successfully go through the entire process, installing and consolidating a new democratic regime. From these experiences, Casper and Taylor posit that the kind of transition from authoritarianism that a country undertakes can affect that country's chances of moving toward consolidation.

¹ Casper and Taylor, 1996: 4

The Process of Democratization

Thus, Casper and Taylor consider the process of democratization primarily as a two-stage affair, with the first stage being the successful transition away from authoritarianism to democracy. For their theoretical framework, then, the end of this first stage is marked by the “conscious adoption of democratic rules”², utilizing only a very minimal procedural definition of democracy (as put forth by Dahl and echoed by many others over the years). The second stage, the consolidation of an installed democracy, is more complex and subjective. It essentially consists of the continuing removal of vestiges of the authoritarian regime, encouraging compliance with the new rules of the game, and making sure that the various institutions of the state (including, and especially, the military) are all on board.

Using these basic theoretical concepts, Casper and Taylor focus first on the shifts to democracy, considering different kinds of transitions and the reasons for these various transitions. They emphasize that transitions to democracy are anything but uniform. There are, they state, differences at every stage of the process, with different actors who all have different motivations. They also note the role of social institutions, such as the military or the church, and the effect that they can have on a transition, either successful or not. This exercise, it seems, is mainly a way to emphasize the diverse nature of transitions, so that they can then focus on what elements are shared.

What Casper and Taylor find is that regardless of the particulars of these various transitions, all share certain similar characteristics: 1) That in all cases, there is negotiation between various actors, each of whom have certain preferences for various outcomes and scenarios; 2) That any transition requires the participation of public, either in support of the transition, in opposition to it, or some combination of support and opposition; and 3) While the aforementioned negotiations are often dominated by elites, the regime itself also plays a role. This last similarity essentially echoes Skocpol’s argument that the state must be considered an autonomous actor, with similarly autonomous preferences and motivations.

Casper and Taylor approach transitions to democracy by focussing on the process itself, choosing not to center their arguments on institutions, leaders, or the previous regime. Indeed, they would argue that all of those things are extremely important, but ultimately secondary to the process itself. Thus, the strength of Casper and Taylor’s theoretical approach is certainly in the depth with which they probe the processes of negotiation and the interaction between actors and their preferences. In this sense, Casper and Taylor utilize concepts of game theory and rational choice in their approach, which they state guide them “in developing a generalizable model of regime choice negotiations and to help us interpret the path dependence of the process.”³ By path dependence, they simply mean that decisions and moves earlier in

² Rustow in *Ibid.*, 9

³ Casper and Taylor, 1996: 16

the process will necessarily effect and constrain the available options and moves later in the process.

"...[T]his approach facilitates systematic cross-national comparison of a large number of cases by imposing order on a very complex process and helping us to understand how selected factors interact over the course of the process to produce different outcomes."⁴

However, while elements of game theory do play a significant and necessary role in their approach, Casper and Taylor also note that their use of game theoretical concepts is potentially problematic because of various limitations and criticisms of game theory. "However, though problems such as a lack of exact information about actors' preferences, an unknown endpoint for the negotiations, and potentially fluid rules of the game make the regime choice process challenging for the actors, they do not make game theoretical concepts inapplicable."⁵ They counter these potential problems by emphasizing that game theory is useful as a guide, but not a strict approach. As such, they do not utilize such concepts as subgames and/or nested games, which are almost certainly present in all cases, instead choosing to subsume these elements under the broad heading of "actors' preferences". This they accomplish by utilizing detailed, configurative studies of each of the countries' transitions and translating the subgames and associated contextual factors into information that they utilize in determining their actors' preferences. In this sense, Casper and Taylor utilize a simplified, condensed form of game theory to develop their model for regime choice (transition to democracy) negotiations:

Game theory is often criticized as unrealistic for its assumption that actors' preferences are unchanging. However, if we clarify the difference between 'preferences over outcomes' and 'strategies,' the static nature of preferences ceases to be problematic. Actors have preferences over the possible outcomes of the regime choice process, and their goal is to obtain their most preferred outcome or something close to it. We assume this preference remains the same throughout the regime choice process. Strategies, on the other hand, are how actors try to obtain their preferred outcome; actors can change their strategy as they gain information that alters their assessment of the best possible outcome they are likely to obtain.⁶

Regime Choice

The majority of the book (and, correspondingly, the majority of this paper), then, deals with this first phase of democratization, the transition to democracy, hereon out referred to by Casper and Taylor's preferred phrase, "regime choice". From the configurative studies, which were compiled by researchers using numerous outside sources from country experts, Casper and Taylor coded the regime choice processes for twenty-four countries, selected cross-regionally. They also made sure to include an

⁴ Ibid., 17

⁵ Ibid., 18

⁶ Ibid., 17

(approximately) equal number of cases for each of their three possible outcomes: return to authoritarian, democratic installation, democratic installation and apparent consolidation.

For their model, Casper and Taylor provide a simplified, path dependent set of options, which are, they claim, general enough to fit all of the country cases. Thus, all of the cases can be coded for the same model, and compared directly. In this model, Casper and Taylor have condensed the relevant actors down to three key players: the Defender (who is most often the old regime, though not necessarily), the Challenger (the key actor or actors pushing for regime change), and the Mass Public (who are not necessarily part of the negotiations, but who indicate their preferences through various outlets such as demonstrations, strikes, or elections). Each of these key actors has preferences and a most preferred outcome of the regime process, and will act on those preferences based on their perception of their relative strength and chances for success. In all the included cases, the preference of at least one of the actors was a democratic regime.

However, it is necessary at this time to note that in Casper and Taylor's model, the preferences expressed by the different actors are, in fact, collective preferences. For example, in their model, the preference of the Challenger may be for a majoritarian democracy. However, the Challenger is not one person, or even necessarily one organization. It is possible, and even likely, that the Challenger actor is in fact a coalition of groups and/or individuals, each with their own slightly different preferences. What is ultimately presented as the "Challenger's preferences" must take these potentially diverse preferences into account, and provide something akin to an aggregate, or dominant, viewpoint.

Casper and Taylor then identify the three stages of the regime choice process: the Critical Juncture stage, where things start happening; the Sorting Out Stage, where actors identify themselves and put forth initial proposals; and the Deal Cutting Stage, where actors negotiate the specifics of the new regime. A successful completion of these three stages will result in an installed democracy, but does not necessarily mean that the new regime will move toward consolidation. To more easily display their model, Casper and Taylor also introduce a path diagram (see Figure A). This diagram/model allow Casper and Taylor (and us) to identify same or similar paths across regime changes that are substantially more complex. Again, this model is condensed and simplified to facilitate cross-national comparison.

Prospects for Consolidation

Another area of Casper and Taylor's theoretical framework that requires some explanation is their criteria for determining whether a country that has installed a democratic regime through the regime choice process (described above) is likely to move toward consolidation. For this determination, Casper and Taylor utilize two approaches. First, they look at the Freedom House rankings for each of the countries in

Figure A




Fig. 2.1. Path diagram of actor interactions in the regime choice process.

their study, beginning with the year of their transition. Freedom House is an independent company that scores countries' political freedoms and civil liberties on a yearly basis, publishing their scores to facilitate just such a broad, cross-national comparison (see Appendix A for included Freedom House Methodology). By summing the two provided scores for each country, Casper and Taylor can loosely group the countries into three groups: Free, Partially Free, and Not Free. After completing the regime choice process, those countries that fall into the Not Free category are classified as having Continued Authoritarian regimes. Those countries that are Partially Free are considered to have installed democracy, but have not shown sufficient signs of consolidation. The remaining countries, those grouped in the Free category, are classified by Casper and Taylor as installed democracies which show signs of consolidation.

Obviously, the use of these Freedom House rankings will be inexact, since the criteria used by Freedom House and the criteria used by Casper and Taylor overlap but do not necessarily utilize all the same factors and determinants. However, they attempt to account for this by including a subjective measure of countries' freedoms based on the configurative reports mentioned above. Thus, they state that if there is disagreement between Freedom House's scoring of a country's freedoms and their own studies from country experts, they will follow the configurative studies rather than Freedom House.

Three Modal Paths

Without giving too detailed a review of their findings and resultant hypotheses, what Casper and Taylor ultimately identify are three modal paths that most frequently result in the three potential outcomes of the regime choice process. That is to say, transitions that result in Continued Authoritarianism most often follow a certain path of negotiation and interaction. The same is true, Casper and Taylor argue, for countries that install democracy, and for those that install democracy and move toward consolidation. Thus, what we find is that the process of negotiation that marks a regime choice influences that country's chances of successfully installing and consolidating democracy.

The three modal paths identified by Casper and Taylor (see Figure B) are the "Extreme Conflict Path", which results in continued authoritarianism, the "Compromise Path", which most often results in an installed democracy, and the "Intense Negotiation Path", which most often results in an installed and consolidating democracy. It is important to note at this point that the particular features of each modal path are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Often times, similar features will manifest themselves to varying degrees in more than one path. It is the timing of these features and degree to which they are present that ultimately determines the modal path.

More specifically, the "Extreme Conflict Path" is characterized first by diverging initial preferences, effectively setting the stage for "highly conflictual negotiations." Because the stakes of the negotiations in

Figure B




Fig. 4.1. The "extreme conflict path" to continued authoritarianism.

Fig. 5.1. The "compromise path" to democratic installation.

Fig. 6.1. The "intense negotiation path" to consolidating democracy.

these cases are essentially winner-take-all (that is to say, the winner will gain complete control over the country to the exclusion of its competitor), “there is little to no common ground for compromise.”

But diverging initial preferences does not necessarily signify that a particular country will follow this path. Where the “Extreme Conflict Path” differs most substantially from the other paths is in the Defender’s response to Mass Public cues regarding regime choice:

In sum, where democracy was the outcome, the actions of the Mass Public enhanced the bargaining position of the democratic actor by causing the Defender to negatively reassess its chances of holding onto power, and simultaneously moving the Challenger to reassess its situation positively. Where the process had an authoritarian outcome, however, the Defender did not concede. Instead of revising its expectations and changing its strategy, the Defender continued to perceive that it could hold onto power, and so stood firm against the clearly demonstrated popular opposition to its continued rule.⁷

Thus we see that the key characteristic of this particular path is that “[t]he Defender in these cases is not willing to negotiate.”⁸ Essentially, that indicates that the Defender believes that other mechanisms or bases of support exist that can be (and often are) used to overwhelm or repress the popular support rallying against it. These other mechanisms, as we’ve seen, can be anything from the military or secret police, to economic penalties, to religious edicts, or even a consolidation of popular support on the Defender’s side. However, as Casper and Taylor note, the Defender is not always correct in its assumptions, which leads to the Defender being overwhelmed by the popular support against it. Of course, as Casper and Taylor note, “that ‘information’ is not revealed until later in the process... when it’s no longer possible for the Defender to make concessions from an apparent position of strength.”⁹

The “Compromise Path” is in many ways the opposite of the “Extreme Conflict Path.” There are three key characteristics of this path: 1) A willingness on the part of the Defender to engage in negotiations and compromise, 2) A recognition and acceptance on the part of the Defender to cues from the Mass Public, and 3) A necessary imposition of rules that dictate the future path of negotiations between the actors.

First, and perhaps most importantly, the Defender in these cases recognizes that its best strategy is to negotiate and attempt to maintain some level of influence in the next regime through compromise: “[W]hile the Defender did not necessarily want to exit, it realized that given its perceived bargaining position it might have to step down because it was unlikely to be able to force the Challenger to concede. The Defender therefore tried to win guarantees of continued influence in the new regime during the negotiations, rather than to hold onto power outright.”¹⁰ Thus, the actors’ initial preferences are convergent

⁷ Ibid.,75.

⁸ Ibid.,60.

⁹ Ibid.,60.

¹⁰ Ibid.,104.

in favor of regime change or restructuring, and both actors must find the ground on which they can agree. Usually in these cases the major negotiating points revolve around either the timing of the transition or the type of democracy to be installed.¹¹

Second, while in the “Extreme Conflict Path” the Defender chooses to ignore cues from the Mass Public, in the “Compromise Path” the Defender recognizes and acquiesces (to varying degrees) to mass support for the Challenger. “The option of having influence in the new government rather than maintaining power outright began to appear more desirable, because the Defender recognized that opposing the people would require widespread repression.”¹² However, because the Defender has—in most cases—already realized by this point that the smartest move is to negotiate their exit from power, this recognition and evaluation of mass support seems more useful in determining the relative bargaining strengths of the participants than as a key aspect of this path. This will be discussed in more detail later, though.

The final key aspect of the “Compromise Path” identified by Casper and Taylor “is that the Defender imposes (or attempts to impose) rules to constrain negotiations as part of a facilitating strategy.”¹³ “Rules can be complex orchestrations of the transition process, such as a timetable or *cronograma*, which stipulates exactly what type of activities—forming parties, writing a constitution, holding elections—will happen, when and how. Alternatively, the Defender may restrict participation in the process, permitting certain parties to form or certain political actors to return to the country to campaign while excluding others. A third type of constraint consists in calling for elections at a time the Defender thinks will be to its own advantage.”¹⁴ This is a particularly interesting point because it is an aspect of transitions that is often overlooked in institutional studies.

The final modal path noted by Casper and Taylor is the “Intense Negotiation Path”, which is the path that most often results in a consolidating democracy in their model. Examples of countries that followed this path would be Chile, Poland, and South Korea (amongst others). There are three key characteristics of this particular path. As with the other modal paths, the first concerns the initial orientation of the parties in question. In this case, as with the “Extreme Conflict Path,” the Defender and the Challenger’s initial preferences are divergent, meaning that “the level of conflict runs high, and the competing actors must overcome substantial differences in order to succeed in negotiating democracy.”¹⁵

However, in these cases, unlike both of the previous modal paths, the Defender responds to cues from the Mass Public not by immediately roadblocking (ignoring) or acquiescing, but by resisting for some period of time before eventually giving in. This allows for the Challenger to reassess its own chances of

¹¹ Ibid., 103.

¹² Ibid., 113.

¹³ Ibid., 120.

¹⁴ Ibid., 121.

reaching its most preferred outcome, so that when bargaining begins, all parties involved are aware of the Challenger's relative strength and Defender's relative weakness. "The Challenger then presses for its most preferred outcome, or at least something close to it, and becomes less willing to make concessions to get the Defender to exit."¹⁶

One such concession that the Challenger does not make in the "Intense Negotiation Path" is allowing the Defender to dictate rules for negotiation. Because the relative bargaining strengths of the actors forced the Defender to switch from a roadblocking strategy to a facilitating strategy, it is necessarily the case that the Defender is no longer in position to place restrictions on the negotiations. Thus, it is forced to negotiate "the best deal possible given its perceived bargaining position" and steps down.¹⁷

These modal paths represent a fundamental shift in thinking from many other transition theorists, and seem somewhat counter-intuitive. This is because Casper and Taylor's results indicate that a country that embarks upon a transition where the Defender (the incumbent regime) initially shows a preference for aiding in the regime change actually has less of a chance of consolidating the installed democracy than a country where the Challenger and Defender initially have strong disagreements and obstacles. Put more simply, the most successful transitions (those where democracy is installed and consolidates) are ones where the previous regime did not initially indicate a willingness to transfer power. As we will see below, much of the dominant literature implies that strategies of compromise are the best path to democracy, but from Casper and Taylor's results, this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, Casper and Taylor's assertions will be proven further by the application of their model to the South African case, which will occur in the next chapter.

Other Theoretical Models

To further illuminate this last point, though, as well as other key similarities and differences between Casper and Taylor's approach and the approaches of other transition theorists, it is necessary to now turn to the current dominant literature.

Dankwart Rustow

Dankwart Rustow, in a seminal article published in 1970, offers a theoretical model for transitions to democracy that clearly informs future models, including Casper and Taylor's. While his model is developed primarily from research on Sweden and Turkey, Rustow asks that "[l]ike any...construct, [his

¹⁵ Ibid.,135.

¹⁶ Ibid.,137.

model] must be judged initially by its internal coherence and plausibility but ultimately by its fruitfulness in suggesting hypotheses applicable to a wider variety of other empirical cases.”¹⁸ Because his model has clearly been influential, one can make the assumption that it has proved satisfactorily applicable.

The “Background Condition”

The most crucial point of his theoretical approach is certainly his required “Background Condition” for transitions to democracy: national unity. This, he states, “simply means that the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to.”¹⁹ For example, for a transition to democracy to occur in, say, Brazil, the majority of citizens within the defined national boundaries must think of themselves as Brazilians. The process or timing of this prerequisite makes no difference, Rustow claims. It need only precede all the other phases of democratization.

The Preparatory Phase

After this precondition has been met, the process moves on to the “Preparatory Phase.” This, Rustow indicates, is “set off by a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle. “Such a struggle is likely to begin as the result of the emergence of a new elite that arouses a depressed and previously leaderless social group into concerted action.”²⁰ The details and particulars of this struggle vary according to time period and country, and no two countries will undergo the same experience, but the results will often be similar. “The serious and prolonged nature of the struggle is likely to force the protagonists to rally around two banners. Hence polarization, rather than pluralism, is the hallmark of this preparatory phase.”²¹

This phase, we see, has several elements in common with Casper and Taylor’s “Critical Juncture” and “Sorting Out” stages, though with slightly different emphases. Both clearly indicate the presence of a prolonged struggle that ultimately leads to the separation into two camps (or primary actors). From there, both actors must find ground to interact, otherwise the process ends. This is shown clearly on Casper and Taylor’s path diagram, and echoed in Rustow: “...[A]n apparent evolution toward democracy may be deflected, and at no time more easily than during the preparatory phase.”²²

¹⁷ Ibid., 139.

¹⁸ Rustow, 1970: 350.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., 352.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., 355.

The Decision Phase

The preparatory phase is followed by what Rustow calls the "Decision Phase." "What concludes the preparatory phase is a deliberate decision on the part of political leaders to accept the existence of diversity in unity and, to that end, to institutionalize some crucial aspect of democratic procedure."²³ This key move, Rustow claims, is usually led by a small circle of leaders who negotiate the details and implementation of said shift in the rules. However, the motivations for the change in policy may remain numerous and undefined, as might the extent to which the shift signals a true break with the previous regime. Indeed, "the democratic content of the decision may be incidental to other substantive issues."²⁴

Furthermore, the above decision, while a necessary step for the transition process, does not necessarily represent a clear victory for the advocates of democracy. "[I]n so far as it is a genuine compromise it will seem second-best to all major parties involved—it certainly will not represent any agreement on fundamentals. ... [E]ven on procedures there are likely to be continuing differences of preference."²⁵ An example of such a decision may be the two major parties (or actors) agreeing to have an election in which all legal citizens may vote. Such an agreement makes no mention of the election process, format of ballot, or indeed even the structure of government on which the people will be voting. It is simply a basic agreement that leads to the institutionalization of a democratic procedure. The remainder of the decision phase is working on the details of this decision, and the additional decisions that must necessarily follow. As one can see, this vaguely reflects Casper and Taylor's "Deal Cutting Stage," where agreements and compromises are made, and the details worked out by specialists on both sides.

The Habituation Phase

The final stage of Rustow's transition model is the 'Habituation Phase.' It is during this stage that all the "rules of the game" become institutionalized and accepted, both by politicians and the citizenry at large. This last stage essentially represents the final phases of Casper and Taylor's "Deal Cutting Stage," plus the following consolidation. Essentially, the transition is complete for Rustow when all the actors within a given populace (those who fit under the original condition of "national unity") accept the democratic rules as the "only game in town." While this seems to represent a much simpler definition of consolidation than is used by Casper and Taylor (as well as other transition theorists), it is only simpler in that it is more vague. Other theorists may not consider a democracy consolidated until there has been alternation in electoral politics, or until the democratic institutions demonstrate an ability to react and respond to different political climates. This is not necessarily inconsistent with Rustow's final phase.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., 357

Rather, it is just that he refrains from assigning any specific criteria to consolidation (or habituation), whereas other theorists feel the need to.

Karl and Schmitter

Unlike Rustow, Terry Karl and Phillipe Schmitter ultimately reject the notion that there are any prerequisites to transitions. In their 1991 article in the *International Social Science Journal*, Karl and Schmitter instead recommend that the focus of transition study should instead be “a more modest effort to develop a contingently sensitive understanding of the variety of circumstance under which they may emerge.”²⁶ Furthermore, Karl and Schmitter assert that “what the literature has considered in the past to be the preconditions for democracy may be better conceived in the future as the outcomes of different types of democracy.”²⁷ This represents a fundamental shift from the ideas and models developed by such authors as Seymour Martin Lipset, who have sought to understand the connection between the process of democratization in particular countries, and those same countries’ level of economic development. While such a correlation is certainly present, attempts to prove a causal relationship have thus far fallen short, prompting Karl and Schmitter (much like Casper and Taylor) to bring their analytical focus to the process itself (though not to the same degree that Casper and Taylor do).

Karl and Schmitter assert that the process of democratization should be approached “as a complex historical process with analytically distinct, if empirically overlapping, stages of transition, consolidation, persistence and, eventually, deconsolidation.”²⁸ They also believe, however, that “different sets of actors with different followings, preferences, calculations, resources, and time horizons come to the forefront during these successive stages.”²⁹ This differs with the model that is the focus of this paper in that Casper and Taylor choose to focus on one set of actors throughout their study, which presumably covers the transition, consolidation, and some aspects of the persistence phases noted by Karl and Schmitter. That they do not take into account that different actors may play different roles at different stages of the transition is potentially a crucial shortcoming of Casper and Taylor’s approach, and is one that cannot easily be “explained away” by their broad use of “actors’ preferences” and their configurative studies. This will be covered in more detail later in the paper, though.

That potentially crucial difference notwithstanding, Karl and Schmitter appear to agree with Casper and Taylor’s broad approach. Indeed, Karl and Schmitter argue for relegating structural factors to a secondary role behind actors’ decisions, stating that “the decisions made by various actors respond to, and

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Karl and Schmitter, 1991: 270.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., 271.

are conditioned by, socioeconomic structures and political institutions already present, or existing in people's memories."³⁰ As such, Casper and Taylor are taking these structural factors into account in much the same way that Karl and Schmitter would prescribe: by examining the ways that they interact with key actors' preferences and making broad assumptions as to how those preferences will effect the negotiation process.

Rather than developing a path-dependent, step-by-step model of transition, however, Karl and Schmitter instead offer a two-dimensional spectrum as their model (see Figure C). Like Casper and Taylor, Karl and Schmitter determine where various countries fall on this spectrum by examining the preferences, strategy, and orientation (mass or elite) of the primary actors. From this, Karl and Schmitter then make broad conclusions about what kinds of transitions produce what kinds of results, and make comparisons between contemporary transitions to democracy and some historical examples.

Without delving too deeply into the different tentative conclusions drawn by Karl and Schmitter, let us review some key ideas may be helpful in further contextualizing Casper and Taylor's approach. First, Karl and Schmitter note that "[t]he modes that have most often resulted in the implantation of some type of political democracy are 'transitions from above'"³¹. This not only justifies Casper and Taylor's focus on elite actors (rather than large organizations or mass movements), but also their focus on negotiated transitions, which make up almost two-thirds of their cases.

Second, Karl and Schmitter conclude that a common feature of "democracies that have endured for a respectable length of time [after their transition]" is that they seem to have "relatively strong elite actors who engage in strategies of compromise."³² This also lines up with Casper and Taylor's conclusions regarding pacts and the likelihood of an installed democracy, but whereas Karl and Schmitter seem to stop at democracy's installation, Casper and Taylor take their analysis a step further to include the likelihood of consolidation. As such, it seems likely that they would agree with Karl and Schmitter's conclusions regarding the presence of a post-compromise stable democracy, but would also note that strategies of compromise sometimes undermine *consolidated* democracy, depending on when along the path they occur. It is this attention to the timing of pacts (rather than simply the existence of pacts) that separates Casper and Taylor from many of the other transition theorists mentioned here.



²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., 280

³² Ibid., 281

Figure C



* These countries either did not then become or have not yet become democracies

O'Donnell and Schmitter

Closely related to Karl and Schmitter's approach, in part because it forms much of the foundation for modern transition theory, is the monumental four-volume work edited by Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillipe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. In these volumes, O'Donnell and Schmitter et al probe the causes and trends of the "third wave"³³ of democratization, focusing on cases in Latin America and Southern Europe. As the conclusions that they draw make up an entire volume of their series, it is not practical to explore all of their ideas and reasoning. However, a few key similarities and differences are helpful in our review.

The Critical Juncture

Similar to Casper and Taylor's model, the starting point for O'Donnell and Schmitter is a critical juncture. However, whereas Casper and Taylor make no specific demands on the nature of this critical juncture, O'Donnell and Schmitter hold that the starting point of a transition must manifest itself through a serious internal division in the ruling elite. Such a division creates what amounts to two camps within the ruling elite. Depending on what theorists one chooses to cite, these two camps are referred to as hard-liners and soft-liners, reformers and stand-patters, or any number of variations that amount to the same thing. Essentially, there ends up being one faction that wishes to maintain the current level of control through constant or increased repression, and one group that holds that the future of the regime must be found through reform or liberalization. It is usually this latter group that—assuming it prevails over the hard-liners—ends up negotiating the details of the regime change.

This seems an opportune point to highlight a crucial distinction in terminology: the relationship between democratization and liberalization. Democratization, in most cases, and certainly in the case of this paper, means regime change. It means, as Casper and Taylor state, "a multistage process that entails a transition away from authoritarianism, the installation of a democratic regime, and its consolidation."³⁴ Liberalization, on the other hand, simply means democratic reform without an accompanying regime change. Liberalization may, in many cases, represent the disintegration of an authoritarian regime, but until democracy is institutionalized, the process cannot be labeled democratization.

This distinction is crucial, especially for O'Donnell and Schmitter, who note that liberalization is often the first option of an authoritarian regime facing significant organized opposition. In many cases, liberalization is enough to diffuse a conflict (or even to mollify the international community). However, it is the timing of—and motivation for—this liberalization that is crucial to its prospects for success.

³³ Huntington's term

³⁴ Casper and Taylor, 1996: 4

“[O’Donnell and Schmitter] observe that regimes often miss golden opportunities to liberalize during economic booms and only do so when they are going through some crisis. From this one can infer that political liberalization in this analytical framework is an elite response rather than an elite initiative.”³⁵ So again, as with Karl and Schmitter and their notions of pacts, we find mention of the importance of the timing of key elements of the transition. However, O’Donnell and Schmitter refrain from delving further into such processes. As was mentioned before, that Casper and Taylor choose to is significant.

Linz (and Stepan)

Juan Linz offers a few helpful insights as well, primarily in his review of Alfred Stepan’s ten paths to democracy, and in his contribution to a definition of consolidation. Let us briefly examine the review of Stepan first, before turning our attention to matters of consolidation.

Review of Stepan

The first of the ten paths offered by Stepan are 1) internal restoration after external occupation (e.g. post-WWII Denmark), 2) internal democratic reformulation after external liberation (e.g. post-WWII France and Greece), and 3) externally monitored installation (e.g. post-WWII Germany). “The first three paths in Stepan’s list of alternatives are grouped together by virtue of their connection to international war and external intervention.”³⁶ For the purposes of this study, these alternatives are not really helpful to us in determining the differences with or genesis of Casper and Taylor’s approach.

The next three alternatives offered by Stepan consider “types of transition in which authoritarian powers make the move toward democracy.”³⁷ These are: 1) transformation led from within the authoritarian regime, 2) transition initiated by the military as government, and 3) extrication led by the military as an institution. These alternatives are more in line with the cases examined by Casper and Taylor, most significantly informing our consideration of the actors’ initial preferences. In the first two of these alternatives, the initial impetus for regime change comes from within the regime (be it government or military), thus indicating that most of these cases would show up under Casper and Taylor’s analysis as those transitions with converging initial preferences.

The other important feature of these alternatives, as Linz points out, is the important role that the military plays. This reaffirms the strong connection between authoritarian regimes and military leadership. “Social scientists speculate about whether there is a direct connection between different types of authoritarian regimes and the paths to democracy they navigate. Such speculation is short-lived, because

³⁵ Giliomee, 1995: 83.

³⁶ Linz, 1990: 148.

the answer seems to be that there is not such a direct connection... However, one feature of the process that does seem to shape outcomes significantly is the relative importance of bureaucratic-military forces in the outgoing authoritarian regimes."³⁸ Thus, Linz (and Stepan) offer at least one structural element that, they claim, significantly influences transition path.

Casper and Taylor do not directly confront the military as a significant structural dilemma, however. We must assume that any such consideration takes place during their review of configurative studies, but that they do not explicitly deal with the problems that may arise from such an omission is a crucial weakness of their model. This problem will be dealt with in more detail in the final chapter, however.

The final four paths to democracy offered by Stepan "are determined by the different roles of the opposition."³⁹ In the first two, "the opposition forces play the major role, whether [1]) society as a whole expels the authoritarian regime or [2]) through a pact of political parties in opposition with or without consociational elements."⁴⁰ The final two paths are more bloody solutions: 1) violent revolt or 2) revolutionary war. Again, those paths highlighted in this final grouping also coincide with Casper and Taylor's countries with diverging preferences. However, it is significant to point out once again that the paths offered by Stepan (and Linz) only represent successful transitions to democracy, whereas Casper and Taylor include the possibility of failure. Thus, Stepan's list must be considered most informative as a guide, not as a strict analysis of available paths to democracy. Linz echoes this caution, noting that "his list is merely an analytical simplification of a more complex reality, often involving a mixture of paths, some tried simultaneously and others tried sequentially."⁴¹

What is crucial about Stepan's model, though, is that it makes similar assumptions to Casper and Taylor's model: "[Stepan] points out that to follow one or the other path leads to different types of democracies, processes of socioeconomic change, and probabilities of stability of the resulting regimes."⁴² What he refrains from doing, however, is trying to utilize these paths with reference to the different countries that followed them, and offering a commentary on when and how often these paths do lead to democracy, and what kind of democracy was installed. This is the step that Casper and Taylor make, for better or for worse.

³⁷ Ibid., 149.

³⁸ Ibid., 154.

³⁹ Ibid., 149.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., 148.

⁴² Ibid., 149.

Democratic Consolidation

When it comes to consolidation, Linz seems to agree with the fundamentals of Rustow's habituation phase. Thus, Linz's conception of consolidation is "one in which none of the major political actors, parties, or organized interests, forces, or institutions consider that there is any alternative to democratic processes to gain power, and that no political institution or group has a claim to veto the action of democratically elected decision makers."⁴³ This essentially echoes Rustow's conditions that democracy must be considered the 'only game in town'.

Both authors, however, imply a dichotomous grouping for countries that are consolidating; that is, that countries are either consolidated or not. Indeed, such a characterization seems to be the norm. This conflicts with Casper and Taylor's use of Freedom House rankings to some degree. By using the numerical scale developed by Freedom House, Casper and Taylor can not only group their cases into a similar dichotomy by setting a cut-off point for what scores represent a consolidated democracy and which do not, but they can also locate countries on a spectrum of consolidation. This has the added benefit of allowing Casper and Taylor to develop specific hypotheses based on more informed and accurate representation of a country's success at consolidation. That they choose not to, however, should be considered significant.

Adler and Webster

Glenn Adler and Eddie Webster offer a very different approach to transition theory. Instead of focusing solely on the process of transition, as have most of the theorists mentioned here, Adler and Webster choose to focus more on structural factors. However, why their contributions are especially helpful is because their specific area of focus is the South African case, to which we will apply Casper and Taylor in the next chapter.

Structural Factors

While most transition theory in the last twenty years has relegated structural concerns to the background, Adler and Webster maintain that such factors cannot be divorced from any analysis. Their approach, therefore, falls more in line with the contributions of Seymour Martin Lipset, for whom "[d]emocracy is related to the state of economic development. The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy."⁴⁴

Adler and Webster focus on compromises, but more between political and economic interests than between the various political actors (unless those political actors represent, to some degree, the interests of

⁴³ Ibid., 158.

⁴⁴ Lipset in Giliomee, 1995: 98.

economic elites). Adler and Webster argue “that a transition from authoritarianism to democracy must involve an economic pact between elites on both sides that leaves the fundamental structures of capitalist society in place, thereby ensuring the loyalty of the propertied classes.”⁴⁵ This assertion essentially creates a set of requisites for democracy; without these certain economic conditions, the prospects for sustained democracy virtually non-existent.

Consequently, while the focus in their analysis continue to be the same kind of pacts that are also central to process-oriented analysis, theorists such as Adler and Webster (and Lipset) insist on keeping structural factors at the forefront. “Pacts are means towards institutionalizing democracy, whether they emerge or hold is linked to the probabilities associated with the presence or absence of [democratic requisites]. It is not necessary to make an ‘either/or’ choice between the study of democratic conditions and pact-building as they are complementary.”⁴⁶

Similarly, Adler and Webster thus conceive of the process of pact-building not so much as the dynamic interplay of actors and their preferences; but as a set of conditions under which compromises are likely or desirable:

First, the parties have to enter a situation of stalemate in which no one party is able to achieve its objectives. Second, the stalemate has to lead to a situation where the costs of not compromising begin to outweigh the perceived gains to be realized by standing fast. Third, the parties must have access to—or be in a position to create—institutional arrangements that allow bargained agreements to be reached. Fourth, organizations must be able to represent their constituencies effectively and be able to mobilize and restrain followers according to the organization’s strategic and tactical vision. Fifth, it is imperative that individuals are willing to risk making strategic choices that may break with their organization’s prior commitments. Finally, the international context must be conducive to the settlement or, at a minimum, does not serve to affirm the parties’ unwillingness to compromise.⁴⁷

Cohen

Stephen Cohen offers another useful approach, though his is geared more toward the process of conflict resolution than democratic transition. However, the similarities with Casper and Taylor are illuminating nonetheless. In his conception, “the process of conflict resolution is a cumulative ladder of four rungs: (1) begrudging acceptance of the adversary as an unavoidable fact, (2) mutual recognition in a legal context, (3) interaction with the other as fully equal in status, and (4) partnership in a common postconflict environment in which defined roles are shared.”⁴⁸

What is interesting, however, is that the steps to conflict resolution are much the same as the steps to democratic installation, indicating that similar obstacles, at least from a psychological point of view,

⁴⁵ Webster and Adler, 1999: 348.

⁴⁶ Lipset in Giliomee, 1995: 102.

⁴⁷ Webster and Adler, 1999: 373.

⁴⁸ Cohen (1991) in Adam, 1993: 60.

must be overcome in both cases. As one can see, these first three “rungs” correspond fairly closely to Casper and Taylor’s notions of the Critical Juncture Stage, the Sorting Out Stage, and the Deal Cutting Stage. This leaves only the post-transition consolidation to equate to Cohen’s “partnership.” This correlation reinforces Casper and Taylor’s insistence that the structural factors, such as previous regime or economic hardship, can be overlooked to some degree. While those factors may provide additional impetus or explanation for regime change (or even constitute the only impetus), the process has “a life of its own” that is independent from structural concerns.

Barber

An interesting side note is offered by Simon Barber, who discusses the weapons that an actor (specifically the Defender, for Casper and Taylor) has in the course of negotiations. Barber believes that (at least initially), the intransigence of one’s opponent provides that actor with the room to attack. That is to say, “[a]n opponent who asks so little in return for relinquishing his monopoly of power is almost too easy. How, if you are the [Challenger] or its ‘formations,’ can you mobilize against an enemy that suddenly turns out to be so reasonable that he is willing to treat all your demands as negotiable?”⁴⁹

The implications for Casper and Taylor’s model are obvious. Clearly, given their path diagram, the source of support for a given actor (but more importantly, for the Challenger) is the amorphous “Mass Public.” Without mass support, the Challenger is doomed to fail, just as the Defender is essentially doomed to failure (or violent conflict) when the mass support is clearly in the Challenger’s favor. What Barber indicates, however, is that mass support can be co-opted, to some degree, by playing the part of “the good guy.” By agreeing to a Challenger’s negotiating points, a Defender is not necessarily agreeing to the outcome of those negotiations, but is removing the options that the Challenger has for rallying support behind its stance. Without a clear target, the masses have no clear enemy, and without a clear enemy, they have nothing to rally against. This would seem to indicate that the actions of the Mass Public actor are never truly **in favor** of one actor or another, but are always, to some degree, **against** an opponent.

Similarly, the notion of “playing the good guy” also seems to agree with Casper and Taylor’s findings regarding the role of initial preferences for the installation and consolidation of democracy. If we assume that a given authoritarian Defender has realized that democracy is virtually inevitable, Barber’s conclusions would indicate that a facilitating strategy is the best course of action for that Defender. If we consider this with respect to Casper and Taylor’s “diverging” and “converging” preferences, it makes perfect sense that a Defender with converging preferences ultimately leads to a less-consolidated democracy because the Challenger is deprived of his ability to rally support against said Defender.

Consequently, the Defender is in a stronger position relative to where he would be, and is thus able to more successfully negotiate the form of the future regime, maintaining some influence.

Theory Summary

Thus we see that Casper and Taylor's theoretical model certainly draws from elements of the dominant theory dealing with transitions to democracy. However, it is Casper and Taylor's unique focus on the process of transition as their object of study that illuminates the potential shortcomings in much of this literature. By directly confronting the choices that actors must make at different stages of the process, and recognizing the path-dependant nature of these choices, Casper and Taylor draw much more explicit links between the process of democratization and the potential outcomes. Structures, institutions, and the actors themselves are only important insofar as they influence the timing and outcomes of a few crucial stages of the process.

However, as the discussion to this point has been largely theoretical and abstract in nature, let us now turn to more concrete arguments. Rather than relying on other authors to determine the usefulness of Casper and Taylor's model, we should instead demonstrate its utility by applying the model to a recent, and particularly tricky, case.

⁴⁹ Barber (1990) in Adam, 1993: 63.

Chapter 2: Case Study

University of Cape Town

The primary goal of this enterprise is to determine whether Casper and Taylor's theoretical framework and transition model apply to a country not included in their original study, namely South Africa.⁵⁰ As such, this case study will attempt to mirror the configurative studies utilized by Casper and Taylor in developing their model. However, rather than translating a longer case study into their theoretical model, coding the actions and preferences of the various actors, this case study will combine the two exercises. In the interest of more completely illuminating the important aspects of the South African transition brought out by Casper and Taylor's model, I will instead present a shorter configurative study that is already coded to the various steps of the regime choice and consolidation processes. In this sense, Casper and Taylor's model will be utilized as a heuristic framework, exposing elements of the transition which may be overlooked in straightforward configurative studies, or through the lenses of other theorists. In some cases, other theorists mentioned in the previous chapter will be utilized, but only insofar as they confirm (or refute) Casper and Taylor's approach.

What we find in the application of Casper and Taylor's model, though, is that the details of South Africa's transition do not line up with expectations. Based on Casper and Taylor's path diagram, the transition in South Africa followed the "Compromise Path." Consequently, the specifics of South Africa's transition and Casper and Taylor's model would suggest that South Africa would install democracy, but that democracy would not consolidate due to intransigent elements of the previous regime. However, based on Freedom House rankings and configurative evidence, it would seem that South Africa is undergoing democratic consolidation. As such, we find that while South Africa maps very well to the path diagram put forth by Casper and Taylor, and Casper and Taylor's model is helpful in illuminating certain aspects of the transition to democracy, the model ultimately fails to capture the nature of the South African transitional experience.

Before getting too far ahead of ourselves, though, let's turn to the application of Casper and Taylor's theoretical model. This will be accomplished by first lining up Casper and Taylor's stages of regime change with the analogous events in South Africa's transition. From this, we can determine which, if any, of the modal paths South Africa followed. Finally, we can test the conclusions put forth by Casper and Taylor for the path taken with the actual circumstances of South Africa's transition.

⁵⁰ While South Africa had successfully installed democracy at the time Casper and Taylor's study was published, there was not yet enough data to determine their level of consolidation or whether the democracy would even last.

The Critical Juncture stage

The Critical Juncture Stage, for Casper and Taylor, represents the watershed moment in a particular country that “signals to potential Challengers that there is an opportunity to devise a new political system because the authoritarian regime has been weakened.”⁵¹ These junctures can be caused by any number of reasons, ranging from strikes and demonstrations to international events to a decline in economic performance. “If the authoritarian leader...is able to act preemptively and shore up support or regain control over the regime before any Challengers are able to form, then the democratization process stops at this stage.”⁵² However, if not, then the process continues on to the next stage, where the actors identify themselves and begin to indicate their preferences.

In the case of South Africa, different theorists usually place this Critical Juncture somewhere between 1976 and the late-1980s. Ralph Lawrence falls amongst those theorists who trace apartheid’s fall back to the late-1970s, when Portugal withdrew from Mozambique and Angola, thus signaling apartheid’s failure as “a part of the subcontinental system.”⁵³ In 1976, the Soweto protests and subsequent crackdown triggered widespread riots and unrest, “harden[ing] local resistance and world rejection, and forc[ing] a bewildered and defiant government onto the defensive.”⁵⁴ In tandem with economic concerns about the viability of apartheid in its existing form, this unrest prompted then-prime minister Vorster to launch three commissions of enquiry to “[take] the pulse of apartheid,” eventually resulting in many of the first concessions to South Africa’s black “citizens.”⁵⁵

This easing of apartheid structures continued throughout the remainder of the 1970s and into the early 1980s, despite Vorster being replaced by PW Botha in 1978. Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1979), and Ciskei (1981) ultimately followed the Transkei into “independence,” while at the same time, the NP government pushed forward “authoritarian corporatism” as its revised strategy for “retain[ing] and refin[ing] apartheid in ever more hostile circumstances.”⁵⁶ Finally, the NP went forward with its plans to co-opt the Coloured and Indian populations by altering the constitution and creating the ill-fated tricameral parliament in 1983. These moves, according to Lawrence, foretold the end of not only the National Party’s monopoly on power, but also apartheid’s reign in South Africa.

For Timothy Sisk, the Critical Juncture was almost certainly the widespread unrest that swept over the country in the mid-1980s, triggered by a slow liberalization of apartheid laws and the increasing strength of the trade union movement (amongst other factors). “This era saw the most widespread and

⁵¹ Casper and Taylor, 1996: 23

⁵² *Ibid.*, 24

⁵³ Lawrence in Friedman and Atkinson, 1994: 1

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 2

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 3

intense uprising in the cycle of revolt and repression.”⁵⁷ Mass demonstrations, strikes, and violence indicated to the government that the situation was gradually slipping from their control. Though the ANC remained a banned organization, ANC leadership in exile continued to wage war with the apartheid regime through a campaign of sabotage and violence carried out by Umkhonto we Siswe (the ANC’s military wing, MK). With the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983, an association of six hundred community groups, trade unions, and churches who “coalesced around the principles of Charterism,” the development of “locally grounded anti-apartheid organizations” reached its apex.⁵⁸

T.R.H. Davenport also links this tumultuous mid-1980s period with the decision to pursue negotiations, but refrains from pointing to any single act or trend. Rather, Davenport states that by the time that “negotiations began during the late 1980s between the ANC and Mandela on one hand, and the Botha and deKlerk governments on the other, it seemed clear that...[t]here had to be either a stiffening of authoritarian control...or a real break with the past.”⁵⁹ This crucial choice, we can see, follows closely with the implied conditions of Casper and Taylor’s “Critical Juncture Stage,” but also indicates that perhaps the NP government might have chosen to crackdown further. That they chose not to has potentially far reaching implications for the NP’s bargaining position in the upcoming stages, but that will be discussed in more detail later in this paper.

“The African National Congress (ANC) and the other black liberation movements had no doubt that a total break was required—hence their escalation of the conflict during P.W. Botha’s period of office; but the ANC itself came to see that it did not have the muscle, after years of guerilla conflict, to force the change. Nor did it have the kinds of insight needed to turn the economy around. To its credit, it came to admit this. All of which helps to explain why, despite the distance that separated the government from the ANC leadership, de Klerk and Mandela found it necessary to hang together, tangled in a web which they were powerless to unravel.”⁶⁰

One final consideration in determining the beginning of the Critical Juncture stage is that the late 1980s also saw the fall of communism across Eastern Europe. This collapse “deprived the ANC of moral and material support,” thus signaling that it was not only the NP government that was facing a difficult set of circumstances. ANC discussions with the Soviets clearly indicated that “they [the Soviets] were more interested in a quiet life abroad than in exporting revolution.”⁶¹ The de Klerk government recognized that catching the ANC then, at a moment of relative weakness, would be key to gaining the upper hand, at least in the early rounds of negotiation.

⁵⁷ Sisk, 1995: 63

⁵⁸ Ibid., 64

⁵⁹ Davenport, 1998: 51

⁶⁰ Davenport, 51

Thus, in total we see that, in tandem with sanctions and other international pressures, the South African government was unable to deal effectively with the increasing domestic issues. This, combined with their own set of difficult circumstances, signaled to anti-apartheid leaders that the time was right to press for more substantial structural changes. The creation of the UDF marked the first appearance of a nationwide Challenger since the banning of the ANC and other parties two decades before. These groups would continue to coalesce to later form the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), the group through which many of the initial negotiations would take place.

The Sorting Out stage

“Sorting Out is the second stage of the regime choice process, during which three events occur. One, a Challenger identifies itself. Two, the Defender and Challenger make initial proposals about the type of regime they would install. Three, the Mass Public responds to these proposals. On the basis of the Mass Public’s responses, the Defender and Challenger can then make an initial assessment of their relative bargaining positions.”⁶²

In South Africa’s case, the primary Challenger to the apartheid regime—the ANC—had actually identified itself long before the Critical Juncture stage illustrated above. Because the government was able to “successfully” outlaw the organization in the 1960s, the Challenger had been forced to carry out its opposition to the regime from exile. However, the ANC maintained a continued presence in the country through the campaign of sabotage and violence waged by Umkhonto we Siswe (MK), and through the legitimate action of the UDF and MDM, which identified with the ANC’s long-held position in favor of universal suffrage for all of South Africa’s citizens, regardless of race.

The initial proposals for both the Challenger and the Defender were offered in the late 1980s, when the regime began secret talks with Nelson Mandela while he was still in prison. The National Party recognized that the ANC commanded widespread popular support, and thus initially attempted to persuade the ANC (via Mandela) to abandon the armed struggle and its partnership with the SACP.⁶³ Such actions the regime considered prerequisites to future negotiation, but Mandela refused to consider any offers before the government was willing to discuss “the future of South Africa—as equals”⁶⁴

The South African government later put forth proposals in the form “group rights” reform, where the government would agree to consider no “group” as having different rights than any other group. This

⁶¹ Lawrence, 8

⁶² Casper and Taylor, 1996: 25

⁶³ Sisk, 1995: 76

⁶⁴ Ibid.

proposal was quickly and formally rejected by the ANC in the Harare Declaration in 1989. In this document, the ANC reaffirmed their initial proposal (and indeed, their long-standing goal) of universal voting rights and simple majoritarianism.⁶⁵ Also included in this declaration, though, was a statement expressing the ANC's willingness to negotiate with the apartheid regime, should circumstances provide such an opportunity. Thus we find that "...leaders of both the ANC and the government recognized by the late 1980s that their maximalist demands could not be met."⁶⁶ This paved the way for future negotiations.

The response of the Mass Public to the actors' initial proposals was quick and decisively in favor of the ANC's position, as the principles of the Harare Declaration "were subsequently adopted by the Non-aligned Movement in September 1989, the UN General Assembly in December 1989, and the Congress for a Democratic Future, held by the MDM in the same month."⁶⁷ Shortly after these events, in February 1990, de Klerk made his famous speech, unbanning the ANC and other organizations, and arranging for the release of political prisoners, signifying the regime's recognition of the ANC's popular support and willingness to open negotiations. Two weeks later, the ANC met and agreed to open direct talks with the de Klerk government.

A remarkable feature of this stage was the willingness on the part of both sides—but especially the ANC—to "[l]et bygones be bygones" (in the words of Nelson Mandela). It would have been very easy to clog these initial discussions and expression of preferences with all sorts of apologies, calls for justice, and bitter words. Both sides, however, recognized that to reach the next stage, to reach the actual negotiations, certain issues would have to be put aside until the more substantial, structural concerns had been hammered out.

However, it is important to note that the opening of negotiations did not represent a willingness to transfer power on the part of the National Party. As de Klerk himself said in the *Cape Times* in April 1990, "those who arrogantly equate the concept of the new South Africa to a takeover of power, the message needs to be transmitted loudly and clearly that the new South Africa will not fall prey to a section of the population at the expense of the rest." Rather, de Klerk stated that his constituency was "not prepared to bow out apologetically from the stage of history."

Indeed, amongst the Afrikaner policy planners, "[t]here was no perception of defeat or outside coercion, no admission that a new policy had to be adopted in order for South Africa to reenter the world economy... On the contrary, self-confidence reigned supreme among [those planners], who congratulated themselves for grasping a unique opportunity to exploit the end of the cold war."⁶⁸ Thus we see that most

⁶⁵ Ibid., 80

⁶⁶ Herbst, 1997: 598

⁶⁷ Sisk, 1995: 80

⁶⁸ Adam, 1993: 44

of the National Party leaders entered negotiations fully expecting a power-sharing arrangement of some sort, built mainly on existing structures.

The Deal Cutting stage

This was the longest and most complex stage of the regime choice process, and was a stage that saw the Defender open negotiations with not only the ANC, but also other parties pushing for reform. Casper and Taylor define the Deal Cutting Stage as the time when “[t]he Defender and Challenger take turns making and countering proposals concerning the specifics of the regime to be set up, and thus about the distribution of political spoils under the new system.”⁶⁹ In the case of South Africa, this stage covered the period from early 1990, when the Defender and Challenger opened negotiations and began setting up the “rules” of the negotiation process, to April 1994, when the country’s first democratic election of the modern era was held.

Obviously all of the events and negotiations cannot be covered in this case study; such an endeavor could and has filled an entire book. However, to illustrate the give and take of this stage, some of the more major events and aspects of negotiation will be included in this section.

Early Moves

Early on in the Deal Cutting Stage, both the Defender and Challenger made conscious and overt gestures to attempt to sway the Mass Public in support of their proposals. The first such gesture occurred in April 1990, when the ANC formalized its historic alliance with COSATU and the SACP. This move cannot necessarily be considered a surprise move, as the organizations had a long history of cooperation and coordination. However, the alliance (which continues still) indicated that the ANC’s long period of exile and illegality did not significantly erode their support amongst the working class and urban poor. The alliance was an important gesture for the ANC not only in terms of shoring up this support and improving their organizational capabilities, but also in demonstrating to the Defender that it was in control of the segments of the population that were historically more likely to engage in mass anti-government action.

Shortly afterward, the National Party responded (along with the Inkatha Freedom Party) by opening their party membership to all races. This move was made in an attempt to court voters from both the African and Coloured communities who were skeptical about the ANC’s preferences and agenda, a plan which eventually paid off for the NP. However, whether intentional or not, the move also helped trigger an increase in violence between ANC and IFP supporters, whose animosity toward each other can be traced

back to the early 1980s. This not only fragmented the support of the African community, but also discouraged continued public support by both sides by creating an environment of perpetual fear. As we will see, these tensions continued throughout the negotiations.

Economic Concerns

High on that list of tensions was the uncertainty surrounding the ANC's economic agenda. Because of the ANC's partnership with COSATU and the SACP, and because redistribution was sure to be a major economic issue for the new South Africa, business interests and the government were naturally cautious about what the future would hold. However, this issue turned out to be a much smaller concern than originally thought, as the ANC refused to expound a thorough, socialist agenda. Rather, their Discussion Document of Economic Policy (1990) "hinted at a 'mixed economy' with an active role for state managers."⁷⁰ Later, the ANC was "persuaded to accept class co-operation and the need to seek solutions within the existing institutional framework" which "would reassure South Africa's free-market lobby and provide inducements to actual and potential overseas investors."⁷¹

These changes from the ANC's long-standing support of a socialist economic agenda were certainly meant to facilitate continued negotiations, as "[t]he adoption of a doctrinaire socialist economic agenda so soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc in eastern Europe would have done much to discredit the ANC in business and political circles within and beyond South African borders."⁷² While some resistance from the ANC's alliance partners might have been expected at the economic concessions to these outside interests, "[t]he SACP and COSATU...saw the value of short-term policy sacrifices for the benefit of the ANC-led tripartite 'bloc'."⁷³

The Negotiations Heat Up

As the Defender and Challenger continued negotiations into 1991, there began more significant posturing and reassessment of preferences on both sides. In March 1991, the ANC released a comprehensive paper, titled "Constitutional Principles and Structures for a Democratic South Africa," detailing their preferences for the new regime. Shortly afterward, perhaps buoyed by their perceptions of public support, the ANC put an ultimatum to the NP regime, calling for reduced levels of violence before continued talks. "The government was operating in circumstances more unpredictable than those to which it was accustomed. The ANC, fearful of being sucked into perilous compromises, broke ties with the

⁶⁹ Casper and Taylor, 1996: 29

⁷⁰ Spitz, 2000: 17

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

government in May 1991, citing its alleged complicity in the prevailing political violence.”⁷⁴ Ultimately, the ANC’s position was validated, as reports surfaced that indicate that there was a partnership between elements of the South African Security Forces and the IFP to facilitate continued violence in the hope of derailing the negotiations. The result for Casper and Taylor’s model is that the Defender’s bargaining position was weakened due to the loss of support from the “Inkathagate” scandal, and they were forced to make some concessions to bring the ANC back to the table (which they did for the National Peace Accord in September 1991).

This was an extremely difficult time for negotiations, though, as both sides began to realize that their preferred courses of events were not unfolding as they had envisioned. “The government wanted to extend the limits of corporatism by broadening it to all significant interests. It wanted a slow and deliberate process towards a tightly woven grand consensus on democratic rule shaped by power sharing. Again, the quest for predictability and control underwrote its approach. By contrast, the ANC wanted to move swiftly to governance settled by a popular mandate from the entire citizenry—an elected constituent assembly, not the government’s multiparty conference.”⁷⁵

CODESA

The actors would ultimately compromise on a multi-party event, labeled the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). Beginning in December 1991, 19 delegations met to discuss the future of South Africa and, just as importantly to most of the delegations, in whose hands the power would rest. At least early on, the convention seemed to raise more questions than it answered, and while the debates were often animated and contentious, the atmosphere was one of hope and compromise.⁷⁶

In March 1992, the NP regime reasserted itself as the legitimate Defender as de Klerk’s white-only referendum demonstrated overwhelming support for negotiations, thus dealing a significant blow to more hard-line elements in the regime. As we will see, though, those elements later chose to reassert themselves as a potential second Challenger in the regime choice process.

While the CODESA talks produced some successful working groups to help design the future path of transition negotiation, the CODESA II talks deadlocked in May 1992, resulting in another withdrawal by the ANC. This forced the Defender to initiate secret negotiations with some of the extremist parties (the PAC, CP) in an attempt to bring them back to the table, an endeavor that proved successful. At the same

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Lawrence, 1994: 9

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 10

time, however, the ANC reasserted its popular support by calling for and carrying out a successful strike with COSATU, its labor union ally.

However, as Ralph Lawrence is careful to note, "CODESA left two fundamental matters unresolved."⁷⁷ The first was simply how to deal with the historical legacies (and resultant fundamental roadblocks) that both actors had to confront before they could truly find common ground for agreement(s). "For the ANC, the NP's vision meant a compromise with the old order it was sworn to abolish; for the NP, the ANC's meant exclusion from government."⁷⁸ The second issue was how much power various actors should wield. Though the de Klerk government had continued to run the country "in corporatist fashion" at the CODESA talks, the prospects for a turnover of power were high enough to force the NP to devolve power to lower tiers of government.⁷⁹ The tricky part then became, from the NP's point of view, convincing the ANC that a strong central government was not their best course of action as well (as this might have dire consequences for the white minority). As both of these issues dealt mainly with the relationship between the ANC and NP, it was clear that the two actors would need to hammer out certain key details.

The Bisho massacre of 7 September 1992 provided additional impetus and, indeed, indicated the need for bilateral talks between the ANC and government. Similarly, for Casper and Taylor's model, these negotiations reaffirmed the actors' position as legitimate Challenger and Defender, respectively. Ultimately, the result of these talks was the September 1992 Record of Understanding, which "chart[ed] the basic path of further transition."⁸⁰

A Convergence of Preferences

At this point, the negotiations reached a critical nexus, as the preferences of the Defender and Challenger began to converge somewhat. Both actors, at this point, realized that they did not have the ability to push through their most preferred paths of transition without the cooperation of the other. It is at this time that SACP leader Joe Slovo, who was also a trusted advisor of the ANC, published "Negotiation: A Strategic Perspective," which for the first time offered the possibility that the ANC and its allies would consider elements of power-sharing in the post-transitional regime. This was a significant step because it signaled that compromise on some of the "big issues" was possible. The ANC had already agreed to the multi-party talks mentioned above, which they had originally called for after the first election. By yielding

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Sisk, 1995: 302

on both this issue and then the power-sharing, the ANC risked alienating certain elements of its own popular support, as well as pushing the anti-negotiation parties into a more confrontational position.

While the gamble appeared to pay off for the Challenger in that the ANC did not lose significant popular support, it arguably did lead to the creation of another actor, also considered a Challenger in Casper and Taylor's model (though this point is a matter of some debate and will be dealt with later). In October 1992, shortly after Slovo's article was published, the IFP, homeland leaders, and white right-wing groups formed a loose alliance rejecting the path of negotiation. This alliance called themselves the Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG), and opposed (for various reasons) the convergence of ANC-government preferences. Later on in process, many of the same groups also reasserted their position(s) in the form of the Freedom Alliance, but in either situation, their action came too late and did not carry enough popular support to derail the talks.

Even more than the Bisho massacre, though, the assassination of popular SACP (and former MK) leader Chris Hani by a Polish immigrant who was conspiring with the CP in April 1993 introduced a new sense of urgency to the negotiations. "So popular was Hani both outside and inside the circles in which he moved that the danger of widespread public violence was immediate."⁸¹ The talks appeared on the point of collapse, and may have had it not been for the ANC's "skillful handling of the crisis."⁸² Thus, the event that might have destroyed the chances for a unified, democratic South Africa instead "galvanized the negotiations process...[and] generated momentum towards the setting of an election date."⁸³

Despite protests from the IFP and its COSAG allies, the Multiparty Negotiating Process (MPNP) made significant progress toward the transition of power, agreeing on an election date in June 1993 and the first draft of an interim constitution only a month later. Though sporadic and disturbing violence continued, the MPNP were able to conclude the final power-sharing elements and adopt the interim constitution in late 1993, setting the stage for the historic elections in April 1994.

What path was taken?

Turning to Casper and Taylor's model, then, we find that the regime choice process in South Africa in fact followed the Compromise Path to an installed democracy. Let us consider the steps one at a time, though, to illuminate the key elements.

⁸¹ Davenport, 1998: 17

⁸² Spitz, 2000: 37

⁸³ Ibid. ~

Actors' Preferences

Ultimately, the key decisions start with the actors' original preferences. If we consider the South African example a strictly two-actor affair, with the ANC playing the role of the only Challenger and the NP government playing the role of the Defender, then Casper and Taylor's definitions of convergent and divergent preferences necessitate that we consider the South African actors convergent. As one actor's (the ANC's) most preferred outcome was a democracy and the other's (the NP's) was a controlled democracy with itself at the head, Casper and Taylor indicate that "[w]e consider a 'democracy-controlled democracy' pairing as convergent because if a controlled democracy is installed, the actor who preferred democracy will still have some points of access, albeit fewer than under a true democracy."⁸⁴

If, however, other competing actors, such as the IFP and right-wing hardliners within (or outside of) the regime, are considered a third significant actor (a second Challenger), then Casper and Taylor mandate that the actors' preferences must be considered divergent: "Preferences are divergent in three actor cases if one actor prefers democracy, the second a controlled democracy, and the third authoritarianism; or if one prefers democracy while the other two want either a controlled democracy or an authoritarian regime."⁸⁵ Because the right-wing actors mentioned above preferred outcomes ranging from controlled democracy to continued apartheid to secession, it is the case that no longer could the relevant actors' preferences be considered convergent. However, it is important to note that the groups comprising COSAG differed greatly in their visions for the future of South Africa, and were united not under a common philosophy, but rather, were united against the ANC and the government forging the path of the transition without their input.

This uncertainty about the nature of actors' preferences will be discussed further in the analysis of Casper and Taylor's theoretical approach, but for the purposes of this case study, ultimately it must be concluded that the actors' preferences were convergent. This selection is justified because of the concessions that the ANC made at the very end of the negotiation process to bring the IFP and Freedom Front on board for elections.⁸⁶ These concessions essentially centered on matters of international mediation, secession, and the Afrikaner *volkstaat*, which, important as they were to the involved groups, were unlikely to radically change the course of the transition. Since the ANC was concerned about the potential violence and difficulties that could be caused by IFP- and FF-supporters, the last-minute concessions can be seen as an attempt to placate an actor who perhaps had the mass support to derail the first elections. Thus, while that actor must be considered a significant player in the process, the two-actor scenario mentioned above must still be utilized as the correct interpretation of Casper and Taylor's theory.

⁸⁴ Casper and Taylor, 1996: 48

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 49

The Sorting Out stage

After taking those initial preferences into account, South Africa appears to have followed the steps of both the Compromise Path and the Intense Negotiation Path. These steps are illustrated by the path diagram of actor interactions. The Challenger (the ANC) did not back down after the expression of these initial preferences, nor did the Defender. Clearly the Mass Public was in support of the ANC position, as shown by their ability to mobilize seemingly at will (see above review of the events). However, incidents of violence and protest do show that obviously the popular support was not unanimously in favor of the ANC. For the purposes of this analysis, however, we must take the aggregate popular opinion throughout South Africa as pro-Challenger.

The Deal Cutting stage

Buoyed by this support, the ANC maintained its challenge, choosing not to compromise early on some of the NP government's early offers and provisos (most notably the disarming of the MK). Again, it seems, the popular support was clearly in favor of the Challenger. These signs finally convinced the Defender to switch gears and pursue a facilitating strategy, again supported by the Mass Public. This brought the actors to the final interaction, decided primarily by the Challenger.

Aside the actors' initial preferences, the only other difference between the Compromise Path and the Intense Negotiation Path is the final step in Casper and Taylor's model. The Challenger's last "act" in the Compromise Path is, predictably, compromise, while the final step in the Intense Negotiation Path is another act of resistance to force the capitulation of the Defender. In the South African case, the Challenger's concessions to some of the fringe groups (or regional groups in the case of the IFP), combined with the concessions made to the Defender throughout the Deal Cutting stage, also signify that the ANC's last step in the process must be considered a compromise (see Figure D). The Government of National Unity, agreed upon in the multi-party talks, represented a significant concession to the Defender, and a virtual abandonment of its initial preference for simple majoritarianism.

Prospects for consolidation

Thus we find that South Africa's regime choice process most closely mirrors the transitions in Brazil, Nigeria, the Sudan, and Turkey. However, unlike those countries, South Africa's post-transitional experience seems to indicate that the democracy that was installed seems to be consolidating. A review of the Freedom House data for South Africa reveals scores well within the "Free" range, signifying a

⁸⁶ Sisk, 1995: 295-7

Figure D




Fig. 2.1. Path diagram of actor interactions in the regime choice process.

consolidating democracy (See Table 1). However, Casper and Taylor definitely indicate that the path taken should most likely result in an installed democracy that is not consolidating. What accounts for this potential discrepancy?

To resolve this issue, it is necessary to turn to configurative evidence. At the heart of Casper and Taylor's theory behind installed democracies that are not consolidating is the assumption that a compromise will leave too many elements of the previous regime in power, thus stalling or halting any further efforts at democratization. Since those elements of the former regime will protect their own interests and power against reform (and the potential loss of this power), what remains are actually vestiges of authoritarianism imbedded in a newly democratic system.

In the case of the countries mentioned above, these vestiges took the form of a continued military presence in the government (as Linz predicted), and a degree of military autonomy from the state that indicated that the military viewed its role not just as the security apparatus of the government. As it happened, in fact, both the Sudan and Nigeria regressed back to authoritarianism shortly after their transitions to democracy, due in large part to the actions of their militaries.

This was not the case in South Africa, however. It is true that the negotiated settlement between the Challenger and Defender left room for the continued presence of the National Party and other, more conservative elements in the new government. This, in fact, was confirmed with the 1994 elections, when the NP took approximately twenty percent of the vote, thus granting them places in the cabinet (along with the ANC, who polled just over 62%, and the IFP, who polled approximately 10%).⁸⁷ At this point, the power-sharing agreements were mandated by the interim constitution, and the NP leader (de Klerk) took his place as a deputy president (along with Thabo Mbeki) behind Nelson Mandela. However, in 1996 the NP decided to withdraw from the GNU, preferring instead to play an oppositional role in the new government. This move, however, helped to remove the elements of the previous regime from the new government, in essence completing a more thorough ANC victory than was actually won at the negotiating table.

Another element of the transition that made consolidation more likely was the smooth combination of military forces. As was mentioned above, the most likely cause of an aborted transition, either in the negotiation or consolidation phase, is a disgruntled military apparatus that tries to take things into its own hands. With the fairly high levels of tension between the South African Defense Force (SADF) and the MK throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the stage was certainly set for difficulties to arise. "Indeed, in the period immediately before negotiations began, both sides had been preparing to gear up

⁸⁷ Sisk, 1995: 298

their onslaught on each other.”⁸⁸ As such, “striking a compromise between the military and the new order was...central to a successful transition.”⁸⁹

Luckily for both parties, the military aspect of the transition was fairly painless. The credit for this certainly could be extended to the political parties involved, but in large part lies with the respective military apparatuses. The efforts of both the SADF and the MK to create conditions conducive to a smooth transition, both within their forces and between each other, was certainly a crucial element of South Africa’s ability to move toward consolidation.

The military aspect of the transition was purposefully left for later in the process, primarily because “SAG needed to know that it alone would control the military until it was reasonably certain of the outcome of the transition, and that meant that military negotiations had to be held over until the very last.”⁹⁰ However, what is fascinating is that “when negotiations began, they were initiated by the military, not the politicians.”⁹¹ This was crucial to the atmosphere of negotiations that would follow. The SADF had benefited greatly from the Botha era, expanding both in size and political influence, and early indications from them seemed to reveal an unwillingness to accept elements of the MK into the existing force. However, this proved to be not the case, and in fact, “[b]y preparing to meet the MK, the SADF was making a fundamental concession: it was implicitly recognizing MK as a fighting formation, and implying that it would be incorporated, and not merely absorbed, into the military.”⁹²

However, this concession did not arise from out of the blue. Rather, it was facilitated by the MK’s willingness to upgrade their own forces, which they had begun to do several years earlier. Furthermore, the countries that the ANC had chosen to provide support in upgrading MK—India and Zimbabwe—were more in line with the British-style training regimen of the SADF, and signaled a break with the ANC’s former partnerships with eastern bloc countries. The SADF recognized these efforts, and noted the “‘slow shift’ in MK from a ‘political’ orientation ‘towards a greater concentration on being soldiers’.”⁹³

These moves on both sides indicated a willingness to work together to make the military transition a smooth one, and undoubtedly served their purpose. The negotiations and incorporation of MK into SADF have not been without their problems, but given the difficulties that have arisen in other countries attempting to perform similar moves, those problems have been relatively minor. As such, the stability of the new South African Defense Forces has been an overwhelmingly positive element of the transition, and appears to have diffused any of the concerns that might have led to situations similar to Nigeria or Sudan.

⁸⁸ Shaw in Friedman and Atkinson, 1994: 228

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 236

⁹¹ Ibid., 237

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

Thus, the military aspect of the transition was not only a victory for negotiations, but also seems to be a victory for consolidation as well.⁹⁴

Summary of Case

We see, then, that Casper and Taylor's model **does extend** to the South African case in a satisfactory manner, but the conclusions drawn from that application **do not extend** to the South African case. This is somewhat problematic. Whereas South Africa follows one of Casper and Taylor's modal paths—the "Compromise Path"—its experience with consolidation (post-regime change) makes it an exception to Casper and Taylor's trends. As we have seen, the unique circumstances of South Africa's post-transition experience create a situation that more accurately reflects the post-transition experience of a country that followed the "Intense Negotiation Path." However, there is no mechanism in Casper and Taylor's model to account for such a scenario. Consequently, while the theoretical basis for their model remains sound and intact, the model itself seems ripe for some improvements. It is this notion that takes us to the next chapter.

⁹⁴ See Appendix B for more on recent consolidation.

Chapter 3: Discussion and Evaluation

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As we saw in the previous chapter, the theoretical basis for the model for democratic transition put forth by Casper and Taylor appears fundamentally sound, but the model itself is not without its flaws. This chapter will discuss the many points both for and against their model, and where applicable, offer alternatives and/or constructive criticism for future studies.

In evaluating the performance and flexibility of Casper and Taylor's theoretical model, both strengths and weaknesses are easily observable. First and foremost, however, we must examine its failure to manage the complexities of the South African case to determine whether the problems are indicative of larger, more general, shortcomings. What we find, however, is that the specific circumstances surrounding the South African case make it a problematic case on which to apply any model. There are several reasons why this may be the case, ranging from South Africa's colonial experience, to the vast socioeconomic cleavages that have led to it being characterized as a "divided society." Each of these will be examined in turn.

After evaluating Casper and Taylor's model vis a vis the South African case, we can then turn to a more general evaluation, highlighting specific strengths and weaknesses. Certainly their model has shown itself to be flexible and easily applicable to a wide range of countries and situations, and this must not be overlooked. However, its use of a basic three-actor model and the uncertain role of various structural factors are potentially extremely problematic, and must be dealt with in detail.

South Africa

One difficulty that I found in extending Casper and Taylor's theory to the South African case is that it may very well have been that the path South Africa followed made it more likely that they would install a democracy that did not consolidate, as Casper and Taylor's model predicted. However, changes that occurred **after** the regime choice process meant that South Africa was able to move toward consolidation. However, there is no mechanism in Casper and Taylor's approach to account for such possibilities. While they indicate that a review of the configurative studies (including those covering the time period post-regime choice) is a standard part of their study of potential consolidation, there is no indication of how they might categorize countries which followed the same path in the model (like South Africa and Sudan, for example), but ended up in two different categories post-transition. What, if any, ramifications are there for their model?

It may be, however, that South Africa is not a useful case to explore through Casper and Taylor. Heribert Adam, for example, suggests that South Africa transition from authoritarian rule cannot be considered in the same realm as those transitional countries included in the studies of O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986). Perhaps the same possibility must also be considered with regard to

Casper and Taylor? Adam gives four reasons why he believes that South Africa must be considered an exception.

First, “although South Africa is no longer a colonial problem, it has a colonial history.”⁹⁵ This, according to Adam, means that South Africa must be considered a settler state, where “colonial relations prevail, even though the settlers have become natives.”⁹⁶ Such a relationship would obviously create a very different power dynamic, certainly for negotiations and the interplay between the actors, but even more dramatically in South Africa’s degree of economic interdependence. In colonial relations, the fruits of labor directly benefit an external colonizer and the government is meant to be largely administrative. However, in a settler relationship, the economic arrangement benefits the settler group within the same country, but the government must deal with internal problems on a much larger scale.

Second, though not unrelated, Adam agrees with the opinion of theorists like Arend Lijphart and Donald Horowitz, who believe that South Africa constituted a “divided society.” However, South Africa was different from other divided societies (e.g. Northern Ireland, Israel, or Nigeria) in that different ethnic groups were imposed on the population **by the state**, and those ethnic groups were granted different and varying rights and privileges. However, the different groups were so geographically interspersed and economically interdependent that a centripetal force was created that required these oft-antagonistic groups (though that antagonism was also often artificial and state-sponsored) to cling together for their own economic and social well-being.

Third, the vast “socioeconomic cleavages—largely coinciding with race—gives processes of liberalization and democratization a sharp edge of class warfare.”⁹⁷ This, Adam states, necessitates that any such processes of liberalization and democratization must also include elements of equalization, or redistribution. However, it is also important that this redistribution not take on a radical form, which might disrupt the existing (in the early 1990s) economic system to the point of negating the political and social reform. This claim has been echoed by other theorists as well. Weffort, for example, “argues that it is not possible to consolidate a political democracy if there is a contradiction between an institutional system based on the political equality of citizens and a society characterized by extreme inequalities or a process of growing social inequality.”⁹⁸

Lastly, South Africa differs greatly from other transitions to democracy in that, in some sense, the country has “always had a functioning democracy, albeit restricted to whites.”⁹⁹ This, claims Adam, radically changes the steps that must be taken. Instead of “creating democratic institutions from scratch,”

⁹⁵ Adam, 1993: 15

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 16

⁹⁸ Giliomee, 1995: 102.

as had to be done in many of the formerly-authoritarian regimes covered by O'Donnell et al., South Africa's dilemma was "extending democracy and political equality to all citizens."¹⁰⁰ Whereas this condition may not directly influence the process of regime change, one would expect that its influence on consolidation would be considerable.

Indeed, it may very well be the case that South Africa's transition does not easily fit into Casper and Taylor's model because of its remarkable and unique history. Adam seems to suggest that the reasons mentioned above would make it less likely that South Africa experience a successful transition to democracy, and that very well may be the case. However, what Adam does not address, but what we must consider now, is whether or not these unique conditions made it more likely for South Africa to consolidate an installed democracy.

Consider, if you will, Casper and Taylor's reasoning for why a country following the "Compromise Path"—as South Africa did—would be less likely to consolidate democracy. Most significantly, in the vast majority of the "Compromise Path" cases, the compromise in question allowed for elements of the previous regime to continue, rather than being replaced. Usually, a post-transition government of this nature would face continued conflict and resultant compromise between the various political forces vying for power (including the vestiges of the authoritarian regime). However, in the South African case, because it can be considered a "divided society," the various political and economic forces who would usually compete with each other for power were instead allied against the previous regime (be it on a racial or class basis). Whereas in other countries, elements of the previous regime may be able to influence policy decisions in their favor by taking advantage of the fluid, post-transition power dynamic, in South Africa that power dynamic was unified against them.

Put in more concrete terms, had South Africa not been a "divided society," the elements of the NP government that remained in power might have competed with the other political parties with none holding an appreciable advantage over the others. In this scenario, consolidation might have been as unlikely as Casper and Taylor's model predicts. However, because the country was divided in such a manner that it allowed anti-NP voters to rally together under one banner (the ANC), the NP elements that were part of the new government faced an overwhelming, united opposition. This situation, in essence, handcuffed these vestiges of the previous regime and often left them virtually powerless. One could argue, in fact, that this is why the NP pulled out of the GNU in 1996.

Similarly, as Adam also points out, South Africa already had a functioning democracy and capitalist system. As such, these "vestiges of the previous regime" were not necessarily anti-democratic.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

Once the NP and business interests received assurances from the ANC (with COSATU and the SACP) that the post-transition South Africa would not attempt a socialist experiment¹⁰¹, the goals of the two groups became very much the same. As such, any debate or competition in the post-transition government would likely not be over substantive issues related to the installation of democracy or a new economic system, but rather on the methodology and timing of already-agreed-upon pursuits. “[I]n both continents [Africa and South America] the new structures...entail the blending of democratic institutions with those from a recent authoritarian past. ...The key question in both continents is whether actors in such ‘hybrid situations’ will regard these compromises with the past as a potential liability for democracy or as a potential strength.”¹⁰² In South Africa’s case, it may very well be the case that these compromises represented an unqualified strength, thus helping to explain South Africa’s success in a scenario that would otherwise point to less promising results.

The Role of Compromise

This brings us once again to the role that compromise plays in the democratization process. As I have stated before, one of the more interesting conclusions to come out of Casper and Taylor’s study is the notion that compromise—long thought to be the preferred path for democratic installation—might not be the best option for regime change. But what are the practical and theoretical arguments behind this assertion? There seem to be two levels of arguments for why this appears to be the case.

The first is the more superficial, and has been used at various points in this paper already. Specifically, compromise during the negotiations allows for elements of the authoritarian regime to bargain for a continued presence in the new regime. This, put simply, creates “pockets” of authoritarianism in an otherwise democratic regime which work against the efforts of democracy. Authoritarian elements retain their ability to create, change, or destroy policy by utilizing the same, or similar, tactics as they would have during the previous regime. This essentially creates a situation in which the new regime is attempting to consolidate democracy, but has to work against itself in some respects. Ultimately, such a scenario delays or prevents the consolidation of democracy, and may even lead to the reintroduction of an authoritarian regime (particularly if the elements in question are military or security forces).

The second reason essentially echoes the first, but from a more theoretical, rather than functional, point of view. Utilizing Adam Przeworski’s notions on the nature of democracy, we must consider that compromise cannot ever really be a part of effective democracy. Put simply, “[u]nder democracy, no

¹⁰¹ Despite COSATU’s continued calls for one.

¹⁰² Giliomee, 1995: 102.

substantive compromises can be guaranteed.”¹⁰³ The key element of democracy, says Przeworski, is institutionalized uncertainty; no actor ever really knows what the future will be because all issues are (sometimes indirectly) subject to a review and vote. When actors decide beforehand what the form or structure of a given democratic regime will look like, such a decision already goes against the nature of democracy. “Democratic compromise cannot be substantive compromise; it can only be a contingent institutional compromise. It is within the nature of democracy that no one’s interests can be guaranteed...”¹⁰⁴

It is in this sense that Przeworski relies on institutions to carry out any necessary compromise, since there certainly are situations when compromise is necessary for the survival or existence of democracy, despite the inherent contradictions. This, says Przeworski, is managed by the manipulation of probabilities through relevant institutions. “What is possible are institutional agreements, that is, compromises about the institutions that shape prior probabilities of the realization of group-specific interests. If a peaceful transition to democracy is to be possible, the first problem to be solved is how to institutionalize uncertainty without threatening the interests of those who can still reverse this process. The solutions to the democratic compromise consist of institutions.”¹⁰⁵ In one sense, this is very much what the Defender and Challenger managed to do in South Africa, negotiating the creation of the Government of National Unity (GNU). The GNU, particularly with regard to the executive structures, did not make any guarantees about the final form of the government, but did utilize probabilities (in the form of polling data) to ensure that all the relevant actors would feel comfortable about their chances in the new regime.

Other Strengths and Weaknesses

The most obvious strength of Casper and Taylor’s approach is its flexibility. Their approach of reducing the relevant players down to three main actors, and charting the actors’ path along a general model makes cross-national comparison significantly easier. As the focus of their theoretical model is the process itself, controlling for institutions, economic factors, leadership, and international context becomes largely irrelevant. As was shown earlier, this approach in many ways mirrors the methods of much of the prominent modern transition theory, including the works of O’Donnell and Schmitter, Linz and Stepan, etc. While many theorists have questioned and will continue to question the practicality of ignoring structural or institutional factors, it seems obvious from Casper and Taylor’s study (as well as the works of the other theorists mentioned above) that actors and their interactions are more important, at least during the regime change negotiations.

¹⁰³ Przeworski in O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 60.

¹⁰⁴ Przeworski in O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 59.

Of course, this opens up a whole new arena for questioning. Heribert Adam, Adam Przeworski, Glenn Adler and Eddie Webster (among others) have discussed the role of various institutional arrangements, primarily economic, in a country's ability to consolidate democracy. Similarly, both Rustow and Lipset have written on the prerequisites for transitions to democracy (admittedly, in very different ways), and their impact on the transition process. It may very well be that structural/institutional factors play a significant role in both the periods immediately before transition, and after (during consolidation), but not during the actual regime change period. To my knowledge, though, this is not something that has been considered in depth by any of the prominent theorists.

Along these lines, one must also recall the arguments of Linz (and Stepan) regarding the role of the military during the consolidation period. "...[O]ne feature of the process that does seem to shape outcomes significantly is the relative importance of bureaucratic-military forces in the outgoing authoritarian regimes."¹⁰⁶ Thus, Linz offer at least one structural element that, they claim, significantly influences transition path. Casper and Taylor do not directly confront the military as a significant structural dilemma, however. As such, it may very well be that Casper and Taylor's insistence on focusing on the actors and process constitutes both a strength and a weakness, depending on what stage of the transition one is exploring.

The Path Diagram

A second strength of their approach must be the ease with which it can be conveyed to its audience. Their path diagram and simplified actors are not only easily grasped, but also demonstrate the path dependence of the entire process. Even if one is not an expert on a given country or region, the general structure of the regime choice process in that country can be conveyed extremely easily. Through this approach, the relevance of actors' preferences and most preferred outcome can be more quickly evaluated at various points in the process, as can the support of the mass public (which often sends out mixed signals). Obviously negotiations are significantly more complex than any standardized path diagram could possibly convey, but the question is not whether the path diagram can map perfectly to any given transition; rather, what is most important is whether a given process of regime change can easily map to their model. Given the ease with which I was able to extend it to the South African case (not to mention the twenty-five or so other cases originally studied by Casper and Taylor), clearly their path diagram must be considered useful.

¹⁰⁵ Przeworski in O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 60.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 154.

Closely related to the last strength, though, is potentially the most damning weakness of the study: its degree of simplicity. In many ways, Casper and Taylor's approach can be considered too general. The focus of their study is intended to be the process of democratization, and the interplay between various actors, their preferences, and the mass public. However, surely there are structural factors (nature of previous regime, for example, or level of economic development) which influence the actors' respective abilities to bargain, compromise, bluff, and even negotiate. Certainly this was the case in South Africa, where the "divided" nature of society (and thus, of party politics) led to vastly different bargaining positions for the major actors. These are details which are no doubt covered in the configurative studies, but whose place in the final model is unclear. Supposedly all such factors should be subsumed under the vague category of "actors' preferences," but this is problematic for readers attempting to discern the applicability of the theoretical approach (such as myself).

Manipulation of Cases

Also, the fact that Casper and Taylor include failed cases of transition is significant, as many transition theorists choose only successful cases for their comparison. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Linz and Stepan, and Samuel Huntington are all guilty of this approach. This ultimately means that cases are being chosen based on a dependent variable (success of transition), thus obscuring any relevant causes which might be illuminated by failed transitions. Obviously, since approximately a third of Casper and Taylor's cases fail in their bids for regime change, many of the reasons and factors for that failure can be explored. This is also extremely helpful for their conscious selection of cases from a range of different regions, as regional factors that might cause transitional failure are thus controlled for.

One must also wonder, though, if the applicability of their model is at all distorted by the conscious manipulation of these cases. Most importantly, one must confront the possibility that Casper and Taylor only selected cases that fit their model and path diagram. More specifically, one must ask if they chose the countries that they did because those countries completed the full range of interactions between the actors. For example, that Casper and Taylor chose to include so-called "failed" transitions, or transitions that resulted in continued authoritarianism, is certainly a positive, but it is interesting that all of those "failed transitions" completed the full course of interactions highlighted in Casper and Taylor's model. That is to say, there were no aborted transitions. There were no examples of transitions that started, went a couple of steps, and then fell apart, even though such a course is included as a possibility on Casper and Taylor's path diagram. There spring to mind three possible conclusions: 1) either this course of events is rare, and Casper and Taylor did not deem it necessary to include any of the cases, 2) this course of events is possible, but has never occurred, or 3) Casper and Taylor were more interested in cases that they could fit

into their model, and as such, did not consider any cases that might fall outside. The first two possibilities are relatively insignificant for any evaluation, but the third is potentially more problematic.

Configurative Studies

Lastly, the fact that the details of all of Casper and Taylor's cases are ultimately based on configurative studies compiled from country experts helps to overcome many of the fears that their theoretical model is too general. Because the simplification of the regime choice process by definition obscures many of the interesting and relevant details of the process, the "behind-the-scenes" case studies provide necessary contextual information for more effective coding and classification. Conversely, after coding a country's specific regime choice process, the simplified model can then be re-extended to the configurative study, potentially illuminating significant details that were obscured by other contextual factors in the initial reading.

However, Casper and Taylor's criteria for reducing the configurative studies down to their simplified, component actors is also unclear. For example, we saw earlier how the nature of South Africa's path would be vastly different if one considered the scenario a three-actor affair as opposed to a two-actor affair. Casper and Taylor provide no guidelines for when elite coalitions are to be considered separate actors, and what ramifications such an inclusion has for the rest of the study. Could there, for example, be a situation in which there were three Challengers? How about two Defenders? Because most negotiated regime choice experiences have shown that they can be reduced down to two actors does not mean this will always be the case, and such exceptions require some explanation.

The "Mass Public"

Similarly, one very difficult problem for Casper and Taylor is their decision to include the "Mass Public" actor in their model. While both the Defender and Challenger experience various levels of popular support for their agendas, both of those actors are groups of organized elites with definite plans that can be easily distinguished from other groups.

Casper and Taylor's definition of the Mass Public actor is helpful in resolving some of the ambiguity that accompanies the term, but it calls to question other issues that remain unresolved. Casper and Taylor state that "[t]he Mass Public can be made up of several different groups, which do not all have to support the same actor. ... However, in the vast majority of our cases, though various mass public subgroups may have mobilized in different fashions, the message they sent was the same. ... Thus, in our

model the Mass Public's impact on how the Defender and Challenger perceive their relative bargaining positions is presented as if one mass actor supported one elite coalition or the people remained neutral."¹⁰⁷

When the "Mass Public" is brought into the negotiations, however, several problems arise. First, where the line is drawn between various actors becomes nebulous and fluid when one tries to encompass the preferences and actions of large group of non-elites. For example, in the South African case, one might make the argument that much of the ANC's mass support was mobilized through COSATU, the trade union organization with an historic alliance with the ANC. However, at what point must we consider elites within COSATU actually part of the Challenger? The preferences of COSATU leaders informed and influenced the agenda and strength of the ANC in its struggle, backed up by the potential popular support that COSATU elites could bring to the table via their own organization.

This is problematic for Casper and Taylor's distinctions because the temptation then is to group key elites under the heading of Challenger and relegate the "mindless masses" to the background, which is indeed what most theorists have done. In fact, it is very much at the heart of most elite-driven transition theory. But CT decide not to do so, instead granting these masses a key role in their theoretical approach. At every step of the process, the actions and preferences of the Mass Public are weighed and categorized, and their influences on the process decided.

But there remain several problems. First, CT's conception of the Mass Public is not, in fact, necessarily the aggregate opinions and preferences of the entire population minus the elites who have already found their way into other roles. Rather, the preferences of the Mass Public seems to be only a reflection of the active, organized, vocal elements of the population who throw their support behind one elite actors or the other. And obviously both of the actors have a certain segment of the population behind their claim, or else they would not be able to claim legitimacy as an elite actor themselves. In this sense, these elements of the public are organized by elites for that very purpose. So really, when one gauges the actions and reactions of the "mass public", one is actually gauging an elite actor's ability to mobilize, organize, and demonstrate popular support for its own preferences at any given stage.

This creates many other problems that have to be taken into account. If, then, this third actor, the "Mass Public", is really just the ability of the Challenger and Defender to mobilize, then the implied relationship between democracy and the process of democratization is weakened. Mass support, in this case, does not necessarily indicate majority support, or even plurality support. It simply indicates the willingness and ability of certain elites to organize a certain sub-population to demonstrate on their behalf. Similarly, it also assumes that the support of the mass public or mass publics can be turned on and off like a light switch, which is obviously not the case. Once a given mass population is given free rein to

¹⁰⁷ Casper and Taylor, 1996: 20

demonstrate and indicate their preferences, it is very difficult to draw in those reins, unless the elites have exceptional organization and discipline.

The Defender and Challenger do not know with certainty the regime preferences of the Mass Public. However, the Mass Public provides information about the type of regime it will support when it reacts to (i.e., supports or opposes) the proposals and counterproposals of the Defender and Challenger. While such demonstrations of support and opposition do not reveal the exact type of regime the Mass Public wants, they do provide information about what kind of regime would have popular support, and what governing arrangements would require the suppression of public opposition.¹⁰⁸

However, Casper and Taylor's explanation skirts over the more difficult underlying question: How can one tell exactly what the Mass Public does want? The group is too large and nebulous to come to a consensus (except in extraordinary circumstances), and the demonstrations of support and opposition are simply that. Given a choice between two options, a given group can choose which of the options it prefers, but that preference need not have any relationship to their actual preferred outcome (for example, selecting between two evils). And those who abstain in Casper and Taylor's model are not discounted, but rather thrown in with the more vocal and visible segment of the mass public, thus making it to appear as though the undecided are simply a silent majority (which, granted, in some cases they are).

Freedom House Rankings

Another weakness of Casper and Taylor's approach is their use of Freedom House rankings. While it is a novel and useful approach in some respects, the connection between the consolidation of democracy and Freedom House rankings is never clearly established. Intuitively they seem to make some sense, but beyond that, the reader is asked to take a leap of faith. Furthermore, the focus on a country's rankings immediately post-transition may be somewhat misleading, as there is no set time frame for how quickly a democracy **should** consolidate after the installation of democracy. In many cases, consolidation that occurs too quickly may destabilize the political situation, and thus can be considered a negative element. Similarly, by focusing only on a country's post-transition number, there is no consideration for the degree of change. For example, which is a more successful/promising regime change: a country that moves from a 14 to a 6 (which is still considered only partially free, and would be lumped under an installed, but not consolidating democracy), or a country that moves from an 8 to a 4 (which would be

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

considered to be consolidating)?¹⁰⁹ These problems are not unrelated to a consideration of the nature of the previous regime, which Casper and Taylor definitely choose not to explore.

Factors to Consider

Shifting gears slightly, Casper and Taylor seem to assume that the same factors (actors' preferences, role of the mass public, level of negotiation) are important at every stage of the transition. While it may very well be true that institutional factors are not crucial to the understanding of negotiations (or, at the very least, not as important as other factors), those same factors may eclipse the rational choice/game theoretical approach in later stages. This was briefly mentioned above. Put more simply, what is important at one stage of the transition may not be important at another. Casper and Taylor seem to approach their cases, though, as if the same factors carry the same importance, regardless of when they are considered. Thus must be considered a potentially crippling weakness of their study, though more focused research would have to be done to confirm this speculation.

Summary of Evaluation

Taking into account the many strengths and weaknesses of Casper and Taylor's approach, as well as my own experience utilizing their model for the South African case, I must conclude that their theory is both flexible and useful in determining the potential effects of the regime-choice process on a country's prospects for consolidated democracy. However, their theoretical model should probably not be used on its own, but rather in conjunction with other theory. The conclusions that can be drawn from their model are certainly useful, but do not always stand up to scrutiny when considered alone. Combined with theory that takes into account institutional factors, or that controls for structural/economic differences amongst cases, Casper and Taylor's analysis of the processes of regime choice could be even more enlightening. As such, their approach fails to hit the mark as far as the South African case is concerned, but certainly may be a part of future studies that do work.

¹⁰⁹ Please note that Casper and Taylor only utilize one number in their Freedom House review. That number is the sum of the two rankings provided by Freedom House. See Table I for the separate rankings of all the countries covered in their study plus South Africa.

Conclusion

From the included theory review, case study, and evaluation, it is clear that Casper and Taylor's theoretical model is potentially useful, but nonetheless problematic.

A review of contemporary transition theory clearly indicates that Casper and Taylor's model utilizes significant elements of the dominant theory. However, their unique combination of path dependence and rational choice, along with their definite focus on the process of transition as their object of study, represents a fundamental shift in the way we look at the process of democratization. As such, this unique perspective offers us a new way of looking at various cases of democratic transition, particularly when we extend this model to the South African case.

As we have seen, though, while the model does extend to the South African case in a satisfactory manner, it is not without minor controversy. Casper and Taylor's approach does offer us the chance to view the South African transition from a fresh perspective, and helps to simplify the complex interactions between the various actors. At the same time, however, the conclusions that Casper and Taylor would offer from the modal path followed by South Africa are inconsistent with the realities of the country's democratic consolidation. Consequently, the analysis of this application must also include a consideration of the nature of South Africa's political transition to determine from whence the discrepancy arises.

Because the theoretical basis for Casper and Taylor's model is a simplified process of regime choice, followed by a brief examination of prospects for consolidation, its flexibility and applicability have to be considered strengths. However, the theory is often overly vague in too many ways to make it very useful. Casper and Taylor's reliance on (absent) configurative studies, "actors' preferences", and the three actor model bring to mind as many potential problems as potential utilities, and as such, the model clearly requires some modification. However, as far as the South African case is concerned, the model's failure to accurately predict South Africa's post-transition political climate cannot be totally attributed to the aforementioned weaknesses in their approach.

I would therefore recommend that Casper and Taylor's theoretical model be used only in conjunction with a more rigorous selection of cases, and/or as an element of a larger theoretical approach. In this way, their focus on the process of transition—and the insight that this focus grants us—can be utilized to the benefit of transition theory in general.

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Appendix A. Freedom House Methodology

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Survey Methodology

Since its inception in the 1970s, Freedom House's Freedom in the World survey has provided an annual evaluation of political rights and civil liberties throughout the world. The Survey attempts to judge all countries and territories by a single standard and to emphasize the importance of democracy and freedom. At a minimum, a democracy is a political system in which the people choose their authoritative leaders freely from among competing groups and individuals who were not designated by the government. Freedom represents the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other centers of potential domination.

The *Survey* rates countries and territories based on real world situations caused by state and nongovernmental factors, rather than on governmental intentions or legislation alone. Freedom House does not rate governments per se, but rather the rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals in each country or territory. The Survey does not base its judgment solely on the political conditions in a country or territory (i.e., war, terrorism, etc.), but by the effect which these conditions have on freedom.

Freedom House does not maintain a culture-bound view of democracy. The Survey demonstrates that, in addition to countries in Europe and the Americas, there are free states with varying forms of democracy functioning among people of all races and religions in Africa, the Pacific, and Asia. In some Pacific islands, free countries can have political systems based on competing family groups and personalities rather than on European- or American-style political parties. In recent years, there has been a proliferation of democracies in developing countries, and the Survey reflects their growing numbers. To reach its conclusions, the Survey team employs a broad range of international sources of information, including both foreign and domestic news reports, NGO publications, think tank and academic analyses, and individual professional contacts.

Definitions and categories of the Survey

The *Survey's* understanding of freedom encompasses two general sets of characteristics grouped under political rights and civil liberties. Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, which is the system by which the polity chooses authoritative policy makers and attempts to make binding decisions affecting the national, regional, or local community. In a free society, this represents the right of all adults to vote and compete for public office, and for elected representatives to have a decisive vote on public policies. Civil liberties include the freedoms to develop views, institutions, and personal autonomy apart from the state.

The *Survey* employs two series of checklists, one for questions regarding political rights and one for civil liberties, and assigns each country or territory considered a numerical rating for each category. The political rights and civil liberties ratings are then averaged and used to assign each country and territory to an overall status of "Free," "Partly Free," or "Not Free." (See the section below, "Rating System for Political Rights and Civil Liberties," for a detailed description of the *Survey's* methodology.)

Freedom House rates both independent countries and their territories. For the purposes of the *Survey*, countries are defined as internationally recognized independent states whose governments are

resident within their officially claimed borders. In the case of Cyprus, two sets of ratings are provided, as there are two governments on that divided island. This does not imply that Freedom House endorses Cypriot division. We note only that neither the predominantly Greek Republic of Cyprus, nor the Turkish-occupied, predominantly Turkish territory of the Republic of Northern Cyprus, is the de facto government for the entire island. This year, East Timor moved from the disputed territory to country category following the region's successful referendum on independence in August 1999. The referendum, which was widely recognized by the international community, led to East Timor being placed under United Nations administration during its transition to full sovereignty.

Freedom House divides territories into two categories: related territories and disputed territories. Related territories consist mostly of colonies, protectorates, and island dependencies of sovereign states which are in some relation of dependency to that state and whose relationship is not currently in serious legal or political dispute. Puerto Rico, Hong Kong, and French Guiana are three examples of related territories. Since most related territories have a broad range of civil liberties and some form of self-government, a higher proportion of them have the "Free" designation than do independent countries. Disputed territories represent areas within internationally recognized sovereign states which are usually dominated by a minority ethnic group and whose status is in serious political or violent dispute. This group also includes territories whose incorporation into nation-states is not universally recognized. In some cases, the issue of dispute is the desire of the majority of the population of that territory to secede from the sovereign state and either form an independent country or become part of a neighboring state. Tibet, Kashmir, and Abkhazia are examples falling within this category.

Freedom House assigns only designations of "Free," "Partly Free," and "Not Free" for the eight related territories with populations under 5,000, designated as "microterritories," without corresponding category numbers. However, the same methodology is used to determine the status of these territories as for larger territories and independent states. The microterritories in the Survey are Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Rapanui (Easter Island), Falkland Islands, Niue, Norfolk Island, Pitcairn Islands, Svalbard, and Tokelau. The Survey excludes from its consideration uninhabited territories and such entities as the U.S.-owned Johnston Atoll, which has only a transient military population and no native inhabitants.

Political Rights Checklist

1. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free and fair elections?
2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
3. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and honest tabulation of ballots?
4. Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power?
5. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?
6. Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?

7. Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?
8. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process?

Additional discretionary Political Rights questions:

- A. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for consultation with the people, encourage discussion of policy, and allow the right to petition the ruler?
- B. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?

To answer the political rights questions, Freedom House considers the extent to which the system offers the voter the chance to make a free choice among candidates, and to what extent the candidates are chosen independently of the state. Freedom House recognizes that formal electoral procedures are not the only factors that determine the real distribution of power. In many Latin American countries, for example, the military retains a significant political role, and in Morocco the king maintains considerable power over the elected politicians. The more that people suffer under such domination by unelected forces, the less chance the country has of receiving credit for self-determination in our Survey.

The Civil Liberties Checklist

A. Freedom of Expression and Belief

1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: in cases where the media are state-controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the Survey gives the system credit.)
2. Are there free religious institutions and is there free private and public religious expression?

B. Association and Organizational Rights

1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?
2. Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? (Note: this includes political parties, civic organizations, ad hoc issue groups, etc.)
3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?

C. Rule of Law and Human Rights

1. Is there an independent judiciary?
2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Is the population treated equally under the law? Are police under direct civilian control?

3. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies? (Note: freedom from war and insurgencies enhances the liberties in a free society, but the absence of wars and insurgencies does not in and of itself make a not free society free.)
4. Is there freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption?

D. Personal Autonomy and Economic Rights

1. Is there open and free private discussion?
2. Is there personal autonomy? Does the state control travel, choice of residence, or choice of employment? Is there freedom from indoctrination and excessive dependency on the state?
3. Are property rights secure? Do citizens have the right to establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, or organized crime?
4. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family?
5. Is there equality of opportunity, including freedom from exploitation by or dependency on landlords, employers, union leaders, bureaucrats, or other types of obstacles to a share of legitimate economic gains?

When analyzing the civil liberties checklist, Freedom House does not mistake constitutional guarantees of human rights for those rights in practice. For states and territories with small populations, particularly tiny island nations, the absence of trade unions and other types of association is not necessarily viewed as a negative situation unless the government or other centers of domination are deliberately blocking their formation or operation. In some cases, the small size of these countries and territories may result in a lack of sufficient institutional complexity to make them fully comparable to larger countries. The question of equality of opportunity also implies a free choice of employment and education. Extreme inequality of opportunity prevents disadvantaged individuals from enjoying full exercise of civil liberties. Typically, very poor countries and territories lack both opportunities for economic advancement and other liberties on this checklist. The question on extreme government indifference and corruption is included to highlight that the human rights of a country's residents suffer when governments ignore the social and economic welfare of large sectors of the population. Government corruption can pervert the political process and hamper the development of a free economy.

Rating System for Political Rights and Civil Liberties

The *Survey* rates political rights and civil liberties separately on a seven-category scale, 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. A country is assigned to a particular numerical category based on responses to the checklist and the judgments of the Survey team at Freedom House. According to the methodology, the team assigns initial ratings to countries by awarding from 0 to 4 raw points per checklist item, depending on the comparative rights or liberties present. (In the Surveys completed from 1989-90 through 1992-93, the methodology allowed for a less nuanced range of 0 to 2 raw points per

question.) The only exception to the addition of 0 to 4 raw points per checklist item is additional discretionary question B in the political rights checklist, for which 1 to 4 raw points are subtracted depending on the severity of the situation. The highest possible score for political rights is 32 points, based on up to 4 points for each of eight questions. The highest possible score for civil liberties is 56 points, based on up to 4 points for each of fourteen questions.

After placing countries in initial categories based on checklist points, the Survey team makes minor adjustments to account for factors such as extreme violence, whose intensity may not be reflected in answering the checklist questions. These exceptions aside, the results of the checklist system reflect real world situations and allow for the placement of countries and territories into their respective categories.

Freedom House assigns upward or downward trend arrows to countries and territories to indicate general positive or negative trends that may not be apparent from the ratings. Such trends may or may not be reflected in raw points, depending on the circumstances in each country or territory. A country cannot receive both a numerical ratings change and a trend arrow in the same year, nor can it receive trend arrows in the same direction in two successive years. Distinct from the trend arrows which appear before the name of a country above its respective country report, the triangles located next to the political rights and civil liberties ratings (see accompanying tables of comparative measures of freedom for countries and related and disputed territories) indicate changes in those ratings caused by real world events since the last Survey.

Without a well-developed civil society, it is difficult, if not impossible, to have an atmosphere supportive of democracy. A society that does not have free individual and group expression in nonpolitical matters is not likely to make an exception for political ones. There is no country in the Survey with a rating of 6 or 7 for civil liberties and, at the same time, a rating of 1 or 2 for political rights. Almost without exception in the Survey, countries and territories have ratings in political rights and civil liberties that are within two ratings numbers of each other.

Category No.	Raw Points
1	28-32
2	23-27
3	19-22
4	14-18
5	10-13
6	5-9
7	0-4

Category No.	Raw Points
1	50-56
2	42-49
3	34-41
4	26-33
5	17-25
6	9-16
7	0-8

Explanation of Political Rights and Civil Liberties Ratings

Political Rights

Countries and territories which receive a rating of 1 for political rights come closest to the ideals suggested by the checklist questions, beginning with free and fair elections. Those who are elected rule, there are competitive parties or other political groupings, and the opposition plays an important role and has actual power. Citizens enjoy self-determination or an extremely high degree of autonomy (in the case of territories), and minority groups have reasonable self-government or can participate in the government through informal consensus. With the exception of such entities as tiny island states, these countries and territories have decentralized political power and free subnational elections.

Countries and territories rated 2 in political rights are less free than those rated 1. Such factors as gross political corruption, violence, political discrimination against minorities, and foreign or military influence on politics may be present and weaken the quality of democracy.

The same conditions which undermine freedom in countries and territories with a rating of 2 may also weaken political rights in those with a rating of 3, 4, or 5. Other damaging elements can include civil war, heavy military involvement in politics, lingering royal power, unfair elections, and one-party dominance. However, states and territories in these categories may still enjoy some elements of political rights, including the freedom to organize quasi-political groups, reasonably free referenda, or other significant means of popular influence on government.

Countries and territories with political rights rated 6 have systems ruled by military juntas, one-party dictatorships, religious hierarchies, or autocrats. These regimes may allow only a minimal manifestation of political rights, such as competitive local elections or some degree of representation or autonomy for minorities. Some countries and territories rated 6 are in the early or aborted stages of democratic transition. A few states are traditional monarchies that mitigate their relative lack of political rights through the use of consultation with their subjects, toleration of political discussion, and acceptance of public petitions.

For countries and territories with a rating of 7, political rights are absent or virtually nonexistent due to the extremely oppressive nature of the regime or severe oppression in combination with civil war. States and territories in this group may also be marked by extreme violence or warlord rule which dominates political power in the absence of an authoritative, functioning central government.

Civil Liberties

Countries and territories which receive a rating of 1 come closest to the ideals expressed in the civil liberties checklist, including freedom of expression, assembly, association, and religion. They are distinguished by an established and generally equitable system of rule of law and are comparatively free of extreme government indifference and corruption. Countries and territories with this rating enjoy free economic activity and tend to strive for equality of opportunity.

States and territories with a rating of 2 have deficiencies in three or four aspects of civil liberties, but are still relatively free.

Countries and territories which have received a rating of 3, 4, or 5 range from those that are in at least partial compliance with virtually all checklist standards to those with a combination of high or medium scores for some questions and low or very low scores on other questions. The level of oppression increases at each successive rating level, particularly in the areas of censorship, political terror, and the

prevention of free association. There are also many cases in which groups opposed to the state engage in political terror that undermines other freedoms. Therefore, a poor rating for a country is not necessarily a comment on the intentions of the government, but may reflect real restrictions on liberty caused by nongovernmental terror.

Countries and territories rated 6 are characterized by a few partial rights, such as some religious and social freedoms, some highly restricted private business activity, and relatively free private discussion. In general, people in these states and territories experience severely restricted expression and association, and there are almost always political prisoners and other manifestations of political terror.

States and territories with a rating of 7 have virtually no freedom. An overwhelming and justified fear of repression characterizes these societies.

Free, Partly Free, Not Free

The Survey assigns each country and territory the status of "Free," "Partly Free," or "Not Free" by averaging their political rights and civil liberties ratings. Those whose ratings average 1-2.5 are generally considered "Free," 3-5.5 "Partly Free," and 5.5-7 "Not Free." The dividing line between "Partly Free" and "Not Free" usually falls within the group whose ratings numbers average 5.5. For example, countries that receive a rating of 6 for political rights and 5 for civil liberties, or a 5 for political rights and a 6 for civil liberties, could be either "Partly Free" or "Not Free." The total number of raw points is the definitive factor which determines the final status. Countries and territories with combined raw scores of 0-30 points are "Not Free," 31-59 points are "Partly Free," and 60-88 are "Free." Based on raw points, this year there is one unusual case: Mali's ratings average 3.0, but it is "Free."

It should be emphasized that the "Free," "Partly Free," and "Not Free" labels are highly simplified terms that each cover a broad third of the available raw points. Therefore, countries and territories within each category, especially those at either end of each category, can have quite different human rights situations. In order to see the distinctions within each category, one should examine a country or territory's political rights and civil liberties ratings.

The differences in raw points between countries in the three broad categories represent distinctions in the real world. There are obstacles which "Partly Free" countries must overcome before they can be called "Free," just as there are impediments which prevent "Not Free" countries from being called "Partly Free." Countries at the lowest rung of the "Free" category (2 in political rights and 3 in civil liberties, or 3 in political rights and 2 in civil liberties) differ from those at the upper end of the "Partly Free" group (e.g., 3 for both political rights and civil liberties). Typically, there is more violence and/or military influence on politics at 3, 3 than at 2, 3.

The distinction between the least bad "Not Free" countries and the least free "Partly Free" may be less obvious than the gap between "Partly Free" and "Free," but at "Partly Free," there is at least one additional factor that keeps a country from being assigned to the "Not Free" category. For example, Lebanon, which was rated 6, 5 "Partly Free" in 1994, was rated 6, 5, but "Not Free," in 1995 after its legislature unilaterally extended the incumbent president's term indefinitely. Though not sufficient to drop the country's political rights rating to 7, there was enough of a drop in raw points to change its category.

Freedom House does not view democracy as a static concept, and the Survey recognizes that a democratic country does not necessarily belong in our category of "Free" states. A democracy can lose freedom and become merely "Partly Free." Sri Lanka and Colombia are examples of such "Partly Free"

democracies. In other cases, countries that replaced military regimes with elected governments can have less than complete transitions to liberal democracy. Guatemala fits the description of this kind of “Partly Free” democracy. Some scholars use the term “semi-democracy” or “formal democracy,” instead of “Partly Free” democracy, to refer to countries that are democratic in form but less than free in substance.

The designation “Free” does not mean that a country enjoys perfect freedom or lacks serious problems. As an institution which advocates human rights, Freedom House remains concerned about a variety of social problems and civil liberties questions in the U.S. and other countries that the Survey places in the “Free” category. An improvement in a country’s rating does not mean that human rights campaigns should cease. On the contrary, the findings of the Survey should be regarded as a means to encourage improvements in the political rights and civil liberties conditions in all countries.

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Appendix B. Further Evidence of Consolidation

It also appears as though further political consolidation has occurred since the initial elections. With the final constitution, the ANC was able to remove the mandated power-sharing, instead making the cabinet posts discretionary. And currently, legislation is on the table to allow for the defection of MPs across party lines without losing their position, thus creating a mechanism whereby MPs need not conform to party doctrine. These changes in policy mirror recommendations made by Courtney Jung and Ian Shapiro in a 1995 article criticizing the decision to follow a PR, party list system instead of the majoritarian approach initially favored by the ANC.¹¹⁰ While their arguments are largely structural, the theoretical basis for them is fairly convincing, and seems to indicate consolidation in the South African government post-1994.

Along similar lines, a task team was appointed in 2002 to examine the possibility of election reforms. One of the crucial issues appears to be the current party system, which “gives party bosses maximum control over the choice of party candidates, limiting the chances of ‘independents’ succeeding.”¹¹¹ Such changes would allow for more legitimate challenges to the ANC’s current electoral dominance. As such, however, the ANC is unlikely to change the system in the near term, though prospects for change in the future appear relatively strong.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ Jung and Shapiro, 1995: 270

¹¹¹ *The Sunday Independent*, 29/9/2002, pg.1

¹¹² *Ibid.*

Table 1: Freedom House

Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972-73 to 2000-01

Year	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Country																										
Afghan.	13	13	13	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	12	14	14	14	12	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14
Angola	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	14	14	12	12	12	12	12	12
Argent.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	4	4	3	3	3	3	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	5	3
Bolivia	-	-	10	8	6	12	12	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	5	4	4	4	4
Brazil	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	6	5	4	4	5	4	5	5	5	7	6	6	6	7	7	7	6
Chile	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	4	4
Greece	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Hondur.	-	-	-	-	-	7	6	5	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	5	5	6	6
Hungary	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Iran	-	-	-	11	11	10	12	12	12	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	12	13	13	13	13	13	12	12	12
Kenya	-	-	10	10	9	9	9	10	10	11	11	11	12	12	12	12	12	9	11	12	13	13	12	11	11	11
Liberia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	10	10	10	11	14	13	13	12	13	13	13	9	9	9	11
Nigeria	-	-	-	8	5	5	5	5	5	12	12	12	11	10	11	10	9	9	12	13	14	13	13	10	7	8
Philip.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	4	5	5	6	6	6	7	7	6	5	5	5	5	5
Poland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3
Portug.	8	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Romania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	10	8	8	7	7	5	4	4	4	4
S Korea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Spain	-	8	4	5	4	5	5	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Sudan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	9	9	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14
S Africa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	3	3	3	3	3	3
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	8	8	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	8	10	10	9	9	9	9
Uganda	-	-	-	-	12	10	10	10	9	9	9	9	9	10	10	11	12	11	11	11	10	9	8	8	8	10
Uruguay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	3	3	3	2