

19

**LEGACIES OF VIOLENCE: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF TWO
CASE STUDIES BASED ON INTERVIEWS WITH PERPETRATORS
OF A “NECKLACE” MURDER
AND WITH EUGENE DE KOCK**

By

Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela

Thesis Presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Cape Town

November 1999

The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.

Kubazali bam,
u-Nobantu no-Tukela

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In 1998/1999 I was privileged to be a peace fellow at the Bunting Institute at Harvard University where I wrote this dissertation. I am grateful to Jean and Joseph Sullivan, for whom the Peace Fellowship was named, for their generous gift made through the Bunting Institute. I am also grateful for the financial support I received through Irish Aid, which enabled me to complete my research in South Africa. Special thanks are also due to the Radcliffe Research Partnership Programme for providing me with two research assistants, Olivia Hall (who helped with translating articles in German) and Xiao Wu. I am indebted to many people in the township of Mlungisi who contributed to this study. I also extend my thanks to Eugene de Kock for allowing me to use my interviews with him for the study. My understanding of this study has been enriched especially by his willingness to participate in the interviews and his openness. There are no adequate means to acknowledge my indebtedness to him.

I wish to thank Don Foster, my advisor, who encouraged, stimulated and moved me with his comments as I developed my ideas on this work and throughout my writing of the dissertation. Leo Kamin has gone beyond the call of friendship in giving me support through the most difficult times of this research. I am so deeply indebted to both him and his wife Marie Claire for believing in me. Mamphela Ramphele, mentor, sister and friend, has been a great source of inspiration. I will always remember her commitment to excellence and leading by example. I am grateful to Popana Msengi (Sis' Pops) for holding my hand in my lonely days as a young clinical psychologist. To Peter Parker, former director of the Rhodes Psychology Clinic, for holding the door open for me. To Rita Brock, Herbert Kelman, Martha Minow, for making sure my foot was

in. To Robbie Apfel and Bennett Simon for the stimulating and enriching discussions. My sisters Maud and Nomonde for their friendship, love and support, and for being surrogate mothers to my son. To my brother Ngoza for being that vital cord of connection with home. Rachel Rapperport and Samson Munn carried most of the burden of moving and settling in during the American summer when I was writing the final chapters. I am grateful for their friendship. To my sister fellows at the Bunting Institute, my home away from home, for sustaining me throughout the preparation and writing of this dissertation, especially Lynn Andrea Stein and Jill Reynolds. Cheryl de la Rey does not know it, but she inspired me to reach the finish line. Last but not least, to my parents, my only role models. My greatest debt is to them for their hard work throughout the years and laying the groundwork to help me get to this point, in spite of apartheid. Finally, my son Bahle, who has felt “sad and alone.” I have no words to acknowledge my own sadness for what seems like a lifetime away from him while writing this dissertation.

model that explains the relationship between collective identity in a crowd and personal identity factors that emerge in a crowd.

The second section of the dissertation demonstrates an original approach to understanding crowd violence. I use a range of social psychological perspectives of collective behaviour, weaving in psychoanalytic group theory to explain those dynamics in the group that are inexplicable in a social cognitive theoretical context. I argue that social psychological theories on their own cannot adequately explain what goes on in a violent crowd and that psychoanalytic explanations are better suited to account for some of the complexities of crowd violence.

The third section of the dissertation illuminates further the importance of a perspective that incorporates both social and psychoanalytic factors. Interviews conducted with Eugene de Kock are critically examined to explore this approach to understanding violence. This section ends with an examination of the concept of remorse using data from both case studies presented in the dissertation. In conclusion the dissertation identifies gaps in the study and makes recommendations for further research.

3.2 Frustration Aggression Theory	34-36
3.3 Relative Deprivation	36-39
4. The Intrapsychic Challenge	39-40
4.1 Psychoanalytically Based Theories of Violence	40
4.1.1 Identification with the Aggressor	41-42
4.1.2 Shame and Violence	42
4.2 Kleinian Theory and Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Groups	43
4.3 The Idea of the Unconscious in Groups	44
4.3.1 Elliot Jaques and Unconscious Processes in Groups	44-45
4.3.2 The Authoritarian Personality and the Workings of the Unconscious in the Social Sphere	45-46
4.4 Perspectives Based on Perpetrator Studies	46-47
4.4.1 The Banality of Evil	47-48
4.4.2 Numbing and Doubling	48-50
4.4.3 Obedience to Authority	50-54
5. The Study of Collective Violence	54-55
5.1 The Social Identity Theory	55
5.2 Questions Raised By and Some Problems with the Social Identity Theory	56
5.2.1 The Question of Similarity of Identity	56-57
5.2.2 The Language of Limits	57-58

III. HISTORY OF CROWD PSYCHOLOGY IN SOUTH AFRICA AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON CROWD VIOLENCE

1. Introduction	59
1.1 Major Political Milestones and Landmarks of Political Violence	59-60
1.2 Expert Testimony in South African Courts	60
1.2.1 Establishing Mitigating Circumstances for Collective Action	61
1.2.2 Racism, Expert Testimony in South African Courts from the 1960s	62-64
1.2.3 The Doctrine of Common Purpose	64-65
1.3 Beginnings of Crowd Psychology Discourse in South Africa	66-69
2. Defining "Collective Violence"	69
2.1 A Common Ground for "Group" and "Crowd"	69-70
2.2 The "Invisible Group"	70-71
2.3 A Comment on how the Term "Crowd" has been Used	71
3. The Roots of Crowd Psychology	72
3.1 The Absurdity of Le Bon's Ideas	72-74
3.1 The Influence of a Bad Theory on Policy Makers	74-75
3.2.1 Other Followers of Le Bon	75-76
3.1.2 From Le Bon to Deindividuation	76-77
3.2 The Influence of Deindividuation in South African Crowd Psychology	78
3.3 A Search for a Liberal Theory	79
3.3.1 From Deindividuation to Social Identity Theory	79-80
3.3.1.1 Categorisation	80-83
3.3.1.2 Self-Categorisation and the Link with Inter-Group Violence	83-86
3.3.2 Salience of Violence and Dehumanisation of the Out-Group	86-87

1.2 The “Spectacle” of Nosipho’s Burning Body	135-138
2. Dehumanisation and the Creation of Otherness in Collective Violence	138-141
3. From Rational Individuality to Irrational Collectivity:	
Transformation of Self	141-142
3.1 The First Stage of Transformation: Splitting and Projection	142-145
3.2 The Second Stage of Transformation: Blurring of Boundaries	145-147
3.3 The Third Stage: Struggle with Reclaiming the Self	148-151
3.4 Can the Relationship between Nosipho and the Crowd be Considered an Intergroup Encounter?	151-154
4. The Application of the Social Identity Model to the Mlungisi Case Study	155-156
4.1 Development of Salience in the Mlungisi Crowd	156-159
4.1.2 From Flogging to Necklace: A Shift Engendered by a Search for Self-Esteem	159-162
4.1.2.1 Why Murder?	163-164
4.1.3 Self-Categorisation Process in the Mlungisi Incident	164-168
4.2 The Issue of Personal Identity	169
4.2.1 Dis-Identification as a Group Member	169-170
4.2.2 The Rational/Irrational Debate	170-173
5. Dynamics of Personal Identity and the Three-Phase Model	173
5.1 The Option of Escape	173-177
5.2 The Option to Speak Out	177-178
5.3 The Compliant Group Member	178-180
6. The “Solitude” of Withdrawal	180
6.1 Exposure to Violence	180-182
6.2 The Public Face of Violence	182-183
 VII. EUGENE DE KOCK: APARTHEID’S CRUSADER	
1. Introduction	184-187
1.1 De Kock as Apartheid’s Valued Killing Machine	188-189
1.2 The Morality of Apartheid	189-196
1.2.1 Apartheid’s Crusader	196
1.2.2 The Tension Between true Morality and the Corrupt Superego Morality	197-199
1.3 The Influence of Army Training	199-206
2. Eugene de Kock’s Silence about his Childhood Past	206-209
2.1 Inferences Drawn from De Kock’s Childhood: Identification with the Aggressor	209-210
2.2 The “Shame” Link in de Kock’s Life of Violence	210-212
2.2.1 Vlakplaas as Reconstruction of Home: A Base for Reclaiming the Identity Lost in Shame	212-214
2.2.2 Repetition of Violent Behaviour: The Concept of Shame as Explanation	214-217
2.3 Failure of Mentalisation	217-218
2.3.1 Understanding the Killing of Maponya as Failure of Mentalisation	218-219
2.3.2 Failure of Mentalisation or Professionalism?	

police and army were deployed in the township. In addition, the commandos were mobilised to support the efforts to break the consumer boycott. Chidester (1991) describes the commandos as a system where civil and military functions came together “as white settlers formed a citizens army to enforce their common political, social, and economic interests against indigenous opposition” (Chidester, 1991, p. 92). To strengthen the force of the commandos, coloured commandos were established, which was an event of historical significance since by definition the commando system was formed from white citizens. In the course of these events several clashes between the police and the residents of Mlungisi occurred, which resulted in a number of deaths attributed to police shootings. The worst reported case of police violence was a massacre of fourteen people who were killed when the police and army tried to break a meeting that was held in a church building (see Chapter 4). Other deaths in the township were a result of necklace killings by marshals. Marshals were usually self-appointed young men, who were responsible for identifying dissenters, strike breakers and those believed to be police informers.

On the 8th December 1985 a group of marshals fetched Nosipho Zamela from her home to face accusations that she had an affair with a policeman. Initially it was decided that Nosipho would be flogged, which was the punishment normally given to people who broke rules of the consumer boycott. However, there was a shift from this position after a series of events in which the small group of accusers was joined by a crowd. It was then decided that Nosipho would be “necklaced.” The following section deals with the events that preceded the burning and killing of Nosipho Zamela.

displacement, resettlement and dispossession are part of black people's historical consciousness in South Africa. One person I interviewed remembered:

We were always nothing in their [white city officials] eyes. Just nothing – to be sent here and there whenever they pleased. Now I ask you, how can you ever be secure in the knowledge that this is home? You can be woken in the night, told you don't live here, because you don't have this or the other piece of paper ... They told us Mafu's eviction was legal. What's legal about throwing an old man out in the cold? (Interview, 1994).

What was at issue was not the question whether or not the eviction followed a legal process. The issue was the treatment of an elderly man with the indignity that the Mlungisi residents had come to expect. Another factor that made the issue of eviction central in the Mlungisi campaign is that one of the black councillors moved into Mr Mafu's house after reportedly paying a deposit of R100, presumably to buy the house. So in addition to the legal issues involved in the eviction, there was also the issue of corruption and what seemed to be the removal of a resident in order to find housing for a councillor. "Besides," said one man challenging the claim that the evictions were legal, "what do they mean by 'legal?' They storm in our homes, kick us in our sleep, arrest our children simply for being in their homes – is that legal, too?" The following grievances will show clearly that the demand for reinstatement of the evicted people to their homes was also a metaphor for the demand for restoration of dignity.

The issue of the eviction of Mr Mafu took an interesting turn when, as a last bid attempt to stop the boycott, a group of businessmen led by Bert Strauss, who owns a large business shopping complex in Queenstown, undertook to reinstate Mr Mafu in his home. They also sought to renovate the house he had been evicted from "as a gesture of goodwill." This, of course, made a mockery of the legal

2.1.3 Third Demand: Installation of Private Toilets and Fresh Water Taps on Individual Sites

The idea of a struggle around toilets may sound mundane. However, the issue of public toilets in Mlungisi was the battleground upon which political struggle was launched. Being forced to be public about a function that is essentially private was considered a lifelong insult to the dignity of most residents I interviewed. The issue of the public toilets then was a dehumanising experience where the pain of humiliation was collectively shared (Punamaki, 1990). As one schoolteacher said, "For all my life, every time I go to those toilets a little part of my dignity chips away" (Interview, 1990). One's world then became not a private matter, but a publicly experienced grief described by the Salvadorian social psychologist Ignacio Martin-Baró (1988; Martin-Baró, Aron, & Corne, 1994) as the psychosocial traumatic process.

The communal lavatories in Mlungisi were in the form of latrines dug out in the ground and over which one had to squat. Sewerage often overflowed into the streets, particularly during weekends when most people were in their homes. The communal toilets were built between streets, with two or three of them serving at least two streets. The frequent overflow problem in the toilets meant that even the limited number of toilets could not adequately serve all the homes in Mlungisi. Concern about toilets was not only a sanitation problem, but was also a security one. The toilets were sites of destruction and terror where victims were attacked on their way to or from the lavatories at night. Incidents of rape, muggings and murder were not uncommon.

Police constantly raided people's homes for lodgers' permits and these raids were usually timed to take place at the start of a weekend, so that those arrested would spend an entire weekend in prison for "trespassing" in their own homes. This extreme harassment and humiliation went on for years. It was a form of violence that terrorised the community and took away from them a significant degree of control of their lives and the lives of their children. Needless to say, if parents have no control over what happens to their children, they lose their power as protectors of their children and they lose their voice of discipline on their children. One cannot understand the deafening silence of parents in the community of Mlungisi during the many necklace murders that took place in this township without understanding the role that years of police abuse played in the disintegration of very basic family values.

It cost an average person R1.00 to obtain a lodger's permit, but the main issue in the lodger's permits struggle had nothing to do with money. Lodgers' permits were hated primarily because they denied residents their basic right to a home. They were also a source of general anxiety for families, because of the constant threat of being awoken during police raids. Many people lost their homes after they were seized by the municipality since they held better-paying jobs outside Queenstown. One woman who worked as a nurse in East London related her story of her failed attempt to reclaim her home after she was declared a non-resident simply because she spent most days outside Queenstown because of her job. It would seem, therefore, that the lodgers' permit was much more than a mechanism to control black people's residential mobility; it was about controlling their economic mobility as well.

Queenstown Chamber of Commerce, the business community distributed pamphlets in the township from a light aircraft urging Mlungisi residents to end the boycott. The pamphlets read:

Stop the boycott! Why is the proud Xhosa nation being bullied by a radical minority? Blacks and Whites in this region have always worked together. If you harm the economy, the following will happen ...

The pamphlet then listed things that could hurt blacks ranging from loss of jobs to starving children and to failure to pay furniture and car bills. It continued:

Stand up and stand together for your rights. You want to buy – we want to serve ... Peaceful negotiation – not violent confrontation. We support: ... (c) Stopping forced removals. (d) The retention and upgrading of Mlungisi into an acceptable residential area. Consumer boycotts lead to suffering! Stop the boycott now – it's enough!

It was interesting how the white business community was evoking ideas of nationalism (“the proud Xhosa”) and how they had appropriated the language used in the struggle against injustices – “Stand up for your rights!” – to advance their own agenda. What is more interesting about the pamphlet is that it even lists “stopping forced removals,” which was not part of the list of demands handed over to the municipality. They were appropriating the black agenda and evoking issues and language they knew touched black people’s lives – for their own economic gain. It was clear that the business community was beginning to bleed, to use an unfortunate metaphor. From the point of view of Mlungisi residents, they had transformed their suffering – sacrificing the little they had to preserve their dignity – into the suffering of white business in Queenstown. By the end of August the local newspaper reported that “twenty-five establishments have suffered a drop of between eighty and ninety five percent in turnover and the remainder have experienced significant losses.”²

² *The Representative*, 30 August, 1985.

revolution.”⁵ The idea of dismissing grievances on the basis that they are “political” is interesting, as if there is something about being black and living in a township that might not be political.

Reports of police killings run by *The Representative* frequently used language that concealed the hand of the police in the violence, referring to police killings only as events that took place “during violence” or “during unrest” and masking police brutality with expressions like “police action.” This “abstract and sanitised language of ... technical neutrality” (Posel, 1989, p.11) clearly served the interests of the police and the powers that be rather than the function of accurate reporting of events. An illustration of this is an editorial comment on the Mlungisi Massacre to which I referred earlier. The police had a “dangerous and untenable task to perform” said the editorial:

To them has fallen the duty of attempting to preserve law and order in the Queenstown area in the face of a determined bid ... to bring about a complete breakdown in law and order by using terrorist tactics designed to intimidate the whole of the Queenstown community. It is quite clear ... that violence remains the aim of the Mlungisi militants, and that those who have the duty of upholding law and order will have to remain on the alert and be prepared to act when necessary with such force as may be necessary.⁶

The report portrays the police as killing out of necessity thereby depicting the victims as the authors of their fate in the massacre. This kind of defence of the police helped perpetuate the propaganda that the police were acting in the interest of law and order.

⁵ *The Representative*, 17 January, 1986.

⁶ *The Representative*, 13 December, 1985.

3.1 Highlights in Family Background

De Kock was brought up with strong Afrikaner nationalism. His father, who was “strongly anticommunist” (de Kock interview, 1997), was a magistrate and member of the *Broederbond*. The *Broederbond* was a secret organisation based on Afrikaner nationalism whose membership included high ranking apartheid government officials, professionals and influential people from all sectors of Afrikaner society, including judges and people from the business sector. The *Broederbond* probably has no equivalent in history. Both the Communist Party and the Nazi Party bare some similarity to the organisation, but these two parties were not secret, and membership was proudly and publicly declared. The secrecy of the *Broederbond* makes it one of the most sinister organisations during apartheid rule, because it is difficult to know to what extent its functioning affected people’s lives.

De Kock’s father was an alcoholic who was abusive (see Chapter 7) if not physically, emotionally. He refused to talk in any meaningful way about his childhood and said in avoiding the subject, “there is still a lot of trauma there.” His reluctance to discuss his childhood made it difficult to explore further the trauma he was referring to. However inferences about his early childhood trauma can be drawn from other sources of evidence. For example, he reported that he stuttered severely as a child, which is an indication of serious childhood emotional problems. In the book he wrote with Jeremy Gordin (1998) *A Long*

covert operations, who also applied for amnesty from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for the murders and bombings that were committed under his orders. Given the obvious official backing of de Kock's activities, the dissertation will examine his behaviour both in the context of his personal familial background and his official role under apartheid.

4. Motivation for Study and why I Chose the Two Case Studies

I approach this material with a level of "vested interest" and fully mindful of those aspects of my personal life – a childhood and adult life under apartheid – that may have a bearing on how I view the material in the study. At the same time, it is these aspects of my personal history that profoundly influenced me to conduct the study. I started looking into the world of perpetrators when I worked with human rights lawyers in the late 1980s preparing psychological profiles on young black activists charged by the state for the murder of people believed to be police informers. Their world was my world: households in black townships struggling with depravity, familiar faces and young people full of idealism, wanting to change history. I came to know them and their families personally and found their world of brutality incompatible with the individuals I had come to know. But I also found patterns in their lives that helped me begin to map out some understanding of how it was possible for them to participate in crowds that brutally murdered their neighbours. Looking into that world I saw a mirror, a similar reflection in the opposite political camp and in the man most highly accused, and perceived to embody apartheid's gruesome past – Eugene de Kock. The two case studies then were selected because of the extremes they have come to represent on both sides of the political conflict.

- ◆ Why did their acts of violence persist in the context of a community or society of moral others?
- ◆ What theoretical models can explain efficiently the violent behaviour of crowds and that of individuals?

The enquiry that follows in the next chapters is intended to evoke discussion on at least three issues: (a) the efficacy of certain established theoretical perspectives on violence, especially collective violence (b) the normalisation of violence by oppressive regimes and how this impacts on society, and (c) some critical questions about the role of bystanders in atrocities.

5.1 Method of Investigation

I have chosen the qualitative approach for the analysis of the data, a decision influenced by several proponents of the qualitative approach, such as Robson (1993) and Weiss (1994). The qualitative approach was most appropriate since the study is aimed at capturing the respondents' experiences and the meaning of these experiences from their perspective. I also draw from the interpretative phenomenological method, which approaches data from different levels (Smith (1995a; 1995b). I have also used insights from other dissertations, for example the approach taken by Swartz (1989):

The entire dissertation is informed by an alternative to an empiricist notion that theory, method, results and discussion are conceptually separable. . . .The conclusions I draw come not from the data but from the way I have permitted the data to [unfold]. Theory and method, then, are [discussed throughout the work] (Swartz, 1989, p.8-9).

5.1.1 Interviews

Extensive and in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with 8 respondents in the Mlungisi case study and with Eugene de Kock. Consistent with the use of “multiple sources of evidence” proposed by Yin (1994, p.13) my interviews in Mlungisi included other respondents whose data was not intended for direct use in the analysis. This allowed for important documentation for review of the data (Padula & Miller, 1999). As mentioned earlier, the first phase of the interviews in the Mlungisi case study was in 1989 and in 1990. The second phase was at the end of 1994 and beginning of 1995 when I returned to Mlungisi to pursue research for the present study and to identify other respondents. Finally, I returned to Mlungisi in 1997 and 1998 following a slight shift in my original focus in the study. The issue of remorse was not explored in the original interviews with the Mlungisi sample and only became relevant after I had extensively canvassed this phenomenon in the de Kock material. The interviews with Eugene de Kock were conducted during 1997 and 1998 over a period of seven months. The extended period of interviews in the case studies allowed for corroboration of the respondents’ stories.

Interviews are the essence of qualitative analysis and are intended to convey vividly the dimensions of a social phenomenon or an individual’s life (Glesne & Peshkin,). Qualitative interviews provide a great deal of information about the phenomenon studied in a way that a quantitative study cannot do. They help establish an understanding of the full story of the case study as opposed to simple answers to the standardised questions (Weiss, 1994) that are a key characteristic of quantitative research. Weiss (1994) is critical of the quantitative method and

the more “silent” responses such as body language, and to preserve some of the nuances that would be lost if the notes were left for too long. Transcripts of the interviews were analysed using the qualitative method of analysis (Weiss, 1994) and where appropriate, the nuances interpreted along with the analysis of the interview data.

5.1.3 Analytical Framework

This study employs a range of theoretical frameworks to guide the analysis. I have accomplished this through an extensive literature review and singled out some specific theories, specifying some aspects in these theories, which I then used to focus the research questions. More specifically the social identity theory and a range of psychoanalytically based theories provide the theoretical foundation for the study.

Weiss (1994) points out that because the fuller response obtained by the qualitative method of analysis cannot be easily categorised, their analysis will rely heavily on interpretation, summary, and integration. “The findings of the qualitative study will be supported more by quotations and case descriptions than by tables or statistical measures” (Weis, 1994, p.3). This is the way I have interpreted the depth of the material in the dissertation drawing from the range of theoretical perspectives presented.

6. General Comment on Violence in South Africa

Events of the 1980s in South African townships largely have been presented in the media and in scholarly articles as "riots" or simply as "unrest" (Howe, 1985; Schlemmer, 1997). Describing events in the townships in this way tends to focus more on images of violent lawlessness and gratuitous behaviour by irrational "mobs" on a rampage, rather than a turn in the anti-apartheid struggle that launched the country into an irreversible process that would end apartheid rule. This way of approaching anti-apartheid violence obscures the failure of the apartheid government to correct its course when it could have done so without the loss of so many lives. Designations like "riot" and "unrest" downplay both the outrage felt by those who fought apartheid over the endless injustices inflicted upon them and the deliberate strategies – albeit extremely violent – of an organisation that was determined to launch the country into an irreversible process that would ultimately dismantle apartheid rule.

Apartheid strategies were no less violent than those used in the resistance against it. In fact, the strategies used by apartheid were much more organised and systematic, not only in terms of the official arsenal and official structures of the police and army, but also through a range of covert and dirty war operations that fell under the military and security police departments. Many writers hid this violence from scrutiny by focusing on anti-apartheid violence, and by doing so, projecting government repressive measures as a legitimate response. Kane Berman's (1993) work for example, seemed to take a balanced approach in his presentation of the facts about violence in South Africa, but betrayed an underlying bias typical of the "black-on-black" perspective. His descriptions are loaded with images of "the conflict among black people" (p.31), "militant youth", and "gangs of youths . . . and of activists throwing petrol bombs at the police" (p.33). These descriptions of the

perspectives of victims who were on the receiving end of the violence of the respondents in the study. In Chapter 9 I summarise my main thoughts on the study and point out some of its strengths and weaknesses. The chapter concludes with highlighting a number of important issues to consider for future research

In spite of the vast material written on the subject of violence and atrocities – aggression, family violence, criminal violence, crowd violence, collective violence, genocide etc. – no single theory has succeeded adequately to explain this vexed topic. Theories that seem to address the subject conclusively in one era have their validity questioned with the development of new ideas in a later period. For every new theory developed there is a loophole that discredits it. From reading the literature it seems that theories are never discarded, but continue to be revisited, revised, criticised, or embraced in a continuing dialogue and search for new insights. I join the debate with this dissertation and examine the two case studies described in the previous chapter.

2. Overview of Literature

The chapter may be conceptualised in terms of three sections. The first section addresses the early theoretical views on violence and aggression. The second section deals with theories based on the psychoanalytic orientation. The third section discusses theoretical approaches developed from observations of, or direct interviews with perpetrators of atrocities. The fourth and fifth sections briefly cover research on collective violence and bystanders.

2.1 A Brief Review of Violence Research in South Africa

The application of certain theories of violence to the study of violence in South Africa is fraught with a lot of framing problems. In this section I highlight some of these problems and draw from studies of violence done in South Africa. Not all studies of South African incidents of violence have been framed by bias (Colman, 1991a; 1991b; Foster & Durrheim, 1998). But others have continued

⁸ The *American Psychologist*, June 1998, dedicated a special issue to the subject.

(TRC) that clearly showed the state's hidden hand in the PAC-ANC conflict in the Eastern Cape; the IFP-ANC conflict in KZN; and the crisis between the "witdoeke" and "comrades" (ANC supporters) in the Western Cape. So in understanding violence during apartheid South Africa, theories have to take into account these subtleties and the role of the state in political conflict the country.

Studies that seem to offer solutions to the problem of violence also reveal this lack of the component of official/state influences. Oloruntimehin (1996) for instance is silent about institutional influences in his "rehabilitation" ideas for violent youth in South Africa's black townships. In contrast to this silence American scholars have been quite outspoken about the state's role in the history of violence in that country. Foster & Durrheim (1998) quote the Kerner report of 1968 on the state of violence in America to have concluded that mainstream (white) American society and white institutions – i.e. institutions that enjoyed government support – were "deeply implicated" in the violence of the sixties that spread throughout major black inner cities. Grimshaw (1963; 1969a; 1969b) shares a similar sentiment in his analysis of the 1960s uprisings in the United States. Yet most major studies of violence in South Africa, particularly the series published by the Human Sciences Research Council – with the notable exception of one or two contributors – for example Foster & Durrheim (1998) – are silent about the direct and indirect role played by the state in South African violence.

A typical example of this silence in the HSRC series on violence is in Nomoyi and Schurink's (1998) analysis of "necklace" violence. They quote an interviewee who describes a scene in which a policeman is burnt to death while other policemen watch and "keep a low profile" (p.157), which

in a politically turbulent time in South Africa –with witchcraft projects political violence as a “black thing” and reinforces the stereotype of the savage black: their violence is a cultural thing. This is misguided, at best. At worst it is racist.

I question the link between collective violence committed by black people and witchcraft for another reason. If black violence and especially necklacing derives from the practice of witchcraft, how are we to account conceptually for the burning of bodies committed by white security police under apartheid, as was revealed at public hearings of the TRC? Finally, when victims of necklacing have been called “witches,” I do not think this should be taken literally to mean that the victims are believed to have been involved in witchcraft. Rather, it is a metaphoric reference to the notion of evil and the perceived capacity that the accused individual has to bring about calamity to a community. “Witchcraft” then may just be a metaphor for what police collaborators do in the realm of the unseen as “specialists of evil” (Ashforth, 1996), i.e. doing something that is perceived as disturbing a community’s stability and bringing about its destruction.

White people in other parts of the world who have engaged in burning black bodies have been motivated by this same idea: annihilating people believed to be dangerous to the community. Extreme brutality is not a black thing. Claiming that it is racialises brutality. If we adopt simple explanations of the brutal phenomena of violence on the basis of “culture,” how would the brutality of lynching of blacks by white Southerners in the United States be defined?⁹ I believe a useful analogy is that of the development of fundamentalist ideas in a society going through the pain of

⁹ An example that illustrates my point well is that of a case in which I was called to testify at the Durban Supreme Court in 1991 on the “necklacing” of Vusi Phiri, a young ANC student activist, who miraculously survived third and fourth degree burns over 40% of his body. In a thick forest in the rural village of Nazareth in KwaZulu/Natal four

(1961) describes to human beings' deep-seated capacity "for outraged uncontrolled bitter and bloody violence" (p. 870).

Most of the early thinking on violence and aggression was heavily influenced by the Freudian drive/instinct theory that had no connection with the social world. This notion of the causal links of violence as detached from social reality and simply "uncontrollable" did not last, and was soon replaced by other theories that began to recognise the influence of external factors in violent behaviour.

3.2 Frustration Aggression Theory

The theory of frustration aggression (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939) identified "strains" in the social environment that contribute to the development of violent behaviour. Referred to as the Yale group, Dollard et al. (1939) hypothesised that aggression is induced by frustration, which arises when there is interference with certain goals. Borrowing from the psychoanalytic concept of displacement, Dollard et al. explained that aggression is not always directed at the source of the frustration to which it is causally linked, but sometimes targets others who are less dangerous than the source of the frustration. This aspect of the frustration aggression theory soon became a basis for understanding the practice of lynching in the American South (Hovland & Sears, 1940; Peretti & Singletary, 1981). These studies conclude that blacks, viewed as less powerful in the social strata, became targets for the more powerful white group.

questions that the theory fails to address. For example, how does the theory stand up to the question of organised state violence? It does not. Nor can the theory explain why certain targets are chosen for aggression, such as the destruction of inanimate objects on the one hand (buildings, vehicles) and the destruction of human life on the other.

When frustration aggression theory is applied in the South African context, several questions arise. One of these concerns the idea of “interference with a goal,” which is central in the frustration aggression theory. The notion of “interference with goal” fails to provide a comprehensive explanation for the 1980s violence in South Africa. For instance, many incidents of necklace burning were less a result of frustration in terms of the frustration aggression, which were cycles of revenge attacks following police shootings and massacres of black protesters. Equally, massive aggression by the police against black people cannot be interpreted as a result of frustration aggression. Violence in South Africa evolved as a result of a myriad of factors pertaining to both sides of the political conflict: the police, as official organs of the state were executing the policies of the apartheid government, which was threatened mainly by black opposition. On the most part, violence in black areas throughout the country was driven, through political organisations, by the clear goals of the liberation movement to make the country ungovernable, but it was also a consequence of police action. Frustration aggression theory fails to capture these complex factors.

3.3 Relative Deprivation

Relative deprivation theory is closely related to the frustration aggression hypothesis. But relative deprivation takes on an inter-group significance (Runciman, 1966). Referred to by Foster &

people in power. For example, numerous retrospective studies in America have used the theory to explain the behaviour of “rioting” blacks. Yet this theory cannot be used to analyse retrospectively the behaviour of white American slave masters when they forcefully and violently fought against the abolition of slavery. Similarly, relative deprivation can hardly be used to explain the behaviour of the police in South Africa. Instead, the theory perpetuates the stereotypes of apartheid’s propaganda by focusing analysis only on the “black masses,” implicitly casting blacks as the people who are “prone to riot.” There is no denying the fact that black people in South Africa were (and continue to be) deprived under apartheid. But the idea that people become involved in collective and violent action because of their economic or educational standing relative to others has been disputed by several writers (Ladner et al., 1981; McPhail, 1971; 1994; Miller et al., 1977). McPhail makes this point more explicitly:

There is no compelling reason to accept the inference that persons are more impetuous because of their youth, more daring because of their gender, more disenchanted because of their race, or less rational because of their educational level (McPhail, 1971, p. 1069).

Some have pointed out the failure of relative deprivation to address the question of motivation (Gurney & Tierney, 1982). This raises the critical issue of the relationship between individual and group dynamics, an issue that this dissertation will address. Skocpol (1976) maintains a sceptical position regarding the debate over individual and social dimensions of collective behaviour and expresses doubt that “any” general theory of collective violence is possible. I differ with this extreme view and in the dissertation I try to close the theoretical gap created by the separation of the individual and group phenomena in collective violence studies. I share the view that social phenomena cannot be explained in terms of individual psychology just as much as they cannot be

illustration of how psychological processes are inferred in the analysis of data on perpetrators. Some of the data in this dissertation falls in the category of unobservable elements of behaviour and will require analysis primarily through methods used in clinical assessment and diagnosis.

4.1 Psychoanalytically Based Theories of Violence

The psychoanalytic perspective has been divided on the relative importance of inborn versus environmental components of aggression and violence. Departing slightly from the Freudian instinct model, object relations theory considers aggressive behaviour to be a consequence of internalised negative affects gathered from relationships with the external objective world. These negative affects then become the drive that determines aggression (Kernberg, 1976, 1991). Thus, object relations theory sees aggression as part of the normal interaction between individuals and the environment. Others see environmental influences to be part of the individual's pathological and faulty interactions (Meissner et al., 1987; Winnicott, 1965). It is clear from this material that the distinction between intrinsic and environmental factors within the psychoanalytic discipline raises similar questions as those associated with the individual/social debate in collective violence studies. Throughout the dissertation the critical relationship between intrinsic and external factors will be addressed, but will be more focused in the de Kock case study, which will be presented in Chapter 7.

experience therefore can be seen as an attempt at mastery and integration of the traumatic (Herman, 1992). The theory of identification with the aggressor was first identified in childhood, but current discourse on the subject is almost exclusively on adults (Blum, 1987; Caffaro, 1995; Larson, 1994; Hirsch, 1996).

4.1.2 Shame and Violence

Current discourse on trauma has recast the theory of identification with the aggressor into the shame hypothesis, which draws a link between early experiences of shame and acts of violence in later life. This body of literature (Campbell, 1995; Dutton & Gollant, 1995; Gilligan, 1996; Lisak, 1995; Maddok, 1995; Wallace & Nosko, 1993; Weille, 1998; Woelz-Stirling, 1998) shows that the experience of helplessness, powerlessness, and trauma in early childhood are inextricably woven with a violent lifestyle in adulthood. Chapter 7 deals with the concept of shame in greater detail. In the next section I turn to the psychoanalytic perspectives on groups.

4.3 The Idea of the Unconscious in Groups

Psychoanalytic group theories derive from the Kleinian ideas of Alfred Bion (1972) and Elliot Jaques (1990). Their basic argument is that the projection of unwanted parts of the self becomes accentuated in a group, i.e. by their very nature groups trigger the process of projective identification. The group then becomes an organ into which group members *externalise* or project all unwanted feelings, taking on a life of its own. Consequently, there is a reduction of self-awareness at the individual level and a decline in the power of reasoning and judgement.

4.3.1 Elliot Jaques and Unconscious Processes in Groups

Jaques (1955; 1990) in his application of the Kleinian concept of primitive anxiety in relationships that occur in a group context suggests that in adulthood primitive anxiety can potentially develop into full-blown psychotic anxiety. He argues that it is in the structure of organisations, formal institutions and groups that the recurrence of primordial anxieties is reinforced (Jaques, 1955). He concludes that individuals in the group unconsciously use the group as a defence against psychotic anxiety. "In this sense" says Jaques, "individuals may be thought of as externalising those impulses and internal objects that would otherwise give rise to psychotic anxiety, and *pooling them in the life of the social [groups to which they belong]*" (1955, p.479, italics added). This results in what he terms the "phantasy social relationships." This application of the concept of projective identification corresponds to the central thesis in Kleinian projective identification. According to Kleinian theory, in splitting and projective identification the ego goes through a process of depersonalisation, ego depletion, and a lowering of the ability to think rationally. These processes lead to a reduction of a

Adorno et al.'s (1950) theory of the authoritarian personality has been applied in studies examining the roots of Afrikaner conservatism in South Africa. For example Altemeyer (1988) traces the roots of Afrikaner conservatism to a set of socially constructed norms and attitudes. Consistent with Adorno et al.'s (1950) thesis, he found that right wing authoritarianism among Afrikaners is responsible for the disdainful treatment of those in the lower rung of society. In another South African study Duckitt (quoted in Foster, 1998b) came up with measures that showed Afrikaners and members of the ruling National Party to have higher scores than the English and members of the opposition Democratic Party. Although the authoritarian personality hypothesis was widely acclaimed and continues to be used by scholars, it seems to have had limited application in the study of major incidents of violence. It has also not been without its critics (Bauman, 1989). It has succeeded to explain certain negative attitudes in social relationships, such as prejudice, racism, and general hostility towards members of an out-group perceived as inferior. But this success has not translated into questions that concern violent conflict.

4.4 Perspectives Based on Perpetrator Studies

The interviews in this study raise many difficult questions, not least the question how the central events in the lives of subjects studied can throw light on their later perpetrator lives. How much is what perpetrators are a product of their personal identity? How much of it is a function of their historical and political identity? Where is the point at which unique personal experience meets collective political constructions? These are some of the questions that will

confront what we would normally wish to avoid. Who are these people who commit indescribable unspeakable acts? Why have they taken on the role of murderers? What goes on in their minds? Understanding of these questions will be deepened if new ways of investigating the problem of atrocities are developed, rather than reliance on labels that tell us little, if anything at all, about the complexities of extremely violent individuals. Understanding politically motivated brutality, its precursors, and what maintains them both at the individual and at the societal level is part of truth discovery. This is the essence of this dissertation.

4.4.2 Numbing and Doubling

A brief overview of some of the theories advanced to understand perpetrators' actions is given here. Lifton (1986) in his study of Nazi doctors, refers to the mechanism of "doubling" and argues that the moral selves of Nazi perpetrators were destroyed through what he terms the development of the "extermination self" in Nazi Germany. Psychic numbing, a term developed by Lifton (1967), refers to the perpetrator's emotional and mental status, which takes over whenever perpetrators are in their abusive mode. Lifton (1983, 1986), elaborates on his earlier concept of psychic numbing and "psychic closing off" (Lifton, 1967). He suggests that the mechanism of numbing combines the processes of derealization and disavowal, which are unconscious processes that protect perpetrators from confronting the real consequences of their actions. Lifton (1986) then argues that through doubling perpetrators employ certain psychologically distancing mechanisms to enable them to have a different interpretation of reality to the one their actions demand. He defines doubling as "numbed habituation" and the division of the self into two, "so that a part-self acts as an entire self,"

remorseful about their behaviour. The distance they have from the group disentangles them from all the meanings associated with being part of that group and they are able clearly to see the wrongfulness or the immoral quality of their actions.

The question of morality as far as it concerns perpetrators raises important questions. Are perpetrators ever confronted with the question of morality in the same way as when we face difficult decisions? In other words, do they ever face a moral dilemma in the conduct of their dark operations? Our notions of right and wrong require us to stop and reflect on the choices we have to make whenever we are challenged with tasks that make us uncomfortable. We debate the moral dilemmas we face and act accordingly, whether in the end we *choose* the right or the wrong thing. Do perpetrators confront the question of choice in the same way? The following theoretical perspective offers some answers to this question.

4.4.3 Obedience to Authority

Milgram's (1974) studies suggest that perpetrators do not necessarily reflect on the task at hand through a process of moral examination. Instead, they are motivated by obedience to authority. Milgram conducted a series of experiments in which he found that two-thirds of subjects ordered to inflict increasing levels of electrical shocks to "learners" – who were confederates – complied with the order. Based on several variations of the original experiment, during which the subjects' position of distance and contact in relation to the learners was changed, Milgram found an overwhelming degree of compliance among subjects. Compliance was at the highest (close to 100%) level when the subjects' role was only as a helper to an experimenter administering the shocks, and lowest

direct surveillance many policemen did not comply with orders when not directly supervised; they mitigated their behavior when they could do so without personal risk but were unable to refuse participation in the battalion's killing operations openly" (Browning, 1992, p. 176).

Some scholars agree with Milgram (1974) only partially. Nissani (1990) accepts Milgram's conclusions, but is critical of Milgram's failure to address the question of the underlying causes of obedience. Some hold the view that the behaviour of perpetrators has very little to do with obedience. Rather, perpetrators enjoy killing and relish the power and control they have and the fear they command. This view is implicit in Kelman & Hamilton (1989) and Kelman (1995). The problem, they propose, is that perpetrators come to see themselves as professionals and as a unique group of specialists and so their acts of violence are redefined as part of their professional pursuits. Others have been critical of the obedience hypothesis and have questioned its relevance to the real world. Glass (1998) for instance claims that Milgram's experiments "lack credibility" as a comprehensive explanation for serious atrocities. Here he articulates his critical stance, which is less on the theoretical substance than on the generalisability of Milgram's experiments:

The scientific precision of Stanley Milgram's experiments, their clearly limited goals, the laboratory's artificiality, beggars comparison with the brutal quality of the actions of the Holocaust. To try to find analogous behavioural properties between the laboratory and the death camps is a dubious analytical proposition. Indeed, such an explanatory parallel is a shift of such momentous and qualitative magnitude that to make generalisations from the Milgram's scientific artifice to the gas chambers ignores the radically transgressive properties of the Holocaust (Glass, 1998, p.75).

The divergent views on the theory of obedience to authority illustrate an important point in the research on violence in general and politically motivated mass murders and atrocities in particular.

the line of obedience? The reason for this, argues Milgram (1974) can be traced to the sheer power of authority. This means that the view that the average person when faced with murderous and destructive orders from authority will refuse to obey these orders is erroneous. He considers this erroneous perception to be central in the misgivings about his research: "Underlying the criticism of the experiment is an alternative model of human nature, one holding that when confronted with a choice between hurting others and complying with authority, normal people reject authority" (Milgram, 1974, p. 169). This statement has serious implications for it suggests that in a range of possibilities the majority of people will not speak out against atrocities. What then is the function of our exercise in searching for explanations (in order to be able to prevent these things) if human nature is doomed to silence? I will return to this question in my conclusion chapter and address it in the context of my discussion on bystanders.

5. The Study of Collective Violence

Numerous attempts have been made in the diverse professions within human sciences to explain collective violence. In the field of social psychology studies on collective violence have privileged the inter-group dimension of collective violence arguing that individual factors are irrelevant when violence is committed with the backdrop of groups (Foster, 1991; Foster & Durrheim, 1998; Reicher, 1982; 1984a; 1984b; Smelser, 1962). The following section looks briefly at one of the major theories of collective violence and comments on some of the problems that will be discussed in later chapters in the dissertation.

5.2. Questions Raised by and Some Problems with the Social Identity Model

The application of social identity theory to groups is premised upon several assumptions that call for critical examination. One of these concerns the uniformity of social identity, which has been used to explain collective acts of violence in crowds. Another concept that has come to be associated with the application of social identity to crowd violence is the notion of “limits” (Reicher, 1984a; 1987), which suggests that violence in crowds is characterised by limits of behaviour. Both of these assertions are examined in the following section.

5.2.1 The Question of Similarity of Identity

Uniformity of social identity raises the question whether the concept of shared identity is assumed from observing crowd behaviour from a distance rather than through direct interviews with participants. Insights gained from the present study suggest that there may be other processes taking place in a crowd other than individuals embracing a common social identity. There are very few critics of the notion of a common identity. Those who have questioned the idea of uniformity of identity in crowds have argued that such claims are made simply because there is no information concerning what individuals were actually doing or not doing in a crowd. In the absence of this information, “one is tempted to slip into metaphors,” as Beck (1972, p. 115) puts it.

There are other theorists who have alluded to this idea of uniformity in a crowd. For example, Smelser’s (1962) notion of a “generalized belief” among group members leaves no room for individual variation. Canetti (1966) stresses the position of uniformity of identity even stronger:

implication of the concept of limits, which is central to the application of social identity theory in collective violence will be explored in the dissertation. The discussion will look at the tension between the idea of “limits” and acts that are designed to hurt, and often kill others.

in other continents as well. For example, in Europe the subject of crowds made its way into the discipline of social psychology via the great political revolution in France and the industrial revolution in England. The post-war era has also been identified as an important landmark in the development of a social psychology of crowds in Europe (Doise, 1982; Jaspers, 1980; Tajfel, 1972). In America, it was not until the eruption of violent demonstrations throughout the country during the civil rights movement that a vigorous interest in the study of crowds and collective violence evolved. It is important to note that in all these regions, from Europe to the United States and to South Africa, these violent upheavals – in other words crowds – influenced the development of democratic ideals and led to a rethink of political processes.

1.2 Expert Testimony in South African Courts

Long before forensic experts were giving psychological testimony in the 1980s Alan Paton, called by lawyers representing Nelson Mandela and others in the Rivonia trial, had used arguments similar to those presented by social psychologists in the 1980s. In the following brief section I look at the events that brought into academic focus the phenomenon of crowds in South Africa and trace the origins of this focus to the landmark trial that saw Nelson Mandela and other ANC stalwarts serving most of their lifetime in prison.

1.2.2 Racism and Expert Testimony in South African Courts from the 1960s

The historical role of the South African courts as enforcer of apartheid laws and its failure to treat blacks equally with whites is well-documented (Higginbotham Jr, 1990). This is not surprising given that all judges and prosecutors in South Africa were white for more than eight decades since the creation of South Africa's Supreme Court. The racial composition of the decision makers in the law led President Nelson Mandela to raise a question about the potential injustice the system carried:

[W]hat is this rigid colour-bar in the administration of justice? Why is it that in this courtroom I face a White magistrate, confronted by a White prosecutor, and escorted into the dock by a White orderly? Can anyone honestly and seriously suggest that in this type of atmosphere the scales of justice are evenly balanced? (Mandela, 1963, p. 83)

The “scales of justice” were later to be presented in clear measure to Mandela by a magistrate whom he had requested that he recuse himself due to the racist attitude of his court and to potentially unjust proceedings. “After all is said and done” the magistrate said refusing Mandela's request, “there is only one Court today and that is the White Man's Court. There is no other Court” (cited in Pillay, 1988). The magistrate's statement was not only important for the symbolism it carried, but also for the tone it set for subsequent attitudes against black accused in South Africa's courts, particularly those charged with furthering the aims of the liberation movement.

police at TRC hearings, particularly that of Jeff Benzien, a torturer who demonstrated his infamous “wet bag” method of torture vindicated Foster and silenced many deniers.

especially black people who were anti-government, were dangerous. These extra-punitive measures adopted by the courts in their dealing with black opposition to government remained a public frame of interpretation for mainstream (white) society and increased their tolerance for the often obvious brutality against black people. This left unquestioned in the years following the 1960s the conditions that made black political experience and the articulation of that experience through violence historically possible. The role that psychologists in the courts took upon themselves was in part to explain these historical influences. The psychologists who dared to work with legal defence teams on cases that involved state offences usually were those who aligned themselves with ideas of human rights. Thus, their goal was also ideologically motivated. But frequently their participation in the courts was rendered irrelevant by judges who dismissed any social psychological testimony on behalf of people accused of politically motivated offences. Instead, by the 1980s, the focus was on how to make the courts more efficient in dealing with violence-related anti-apartheid activism and that efficiency was reflected in strict sentencing practises, which often meant death sentences.

1.2.3 The Doctrine of Common Purpose

During the youth resistance period that emerged after the 1976 Soweto crisis the identity of the South African court system as an implementing arm of state policy once again became clear. By the 1980s the courts had resurrected the doctrine of *common purpose* to prosecute individuals who participated at different levels in politically motivated violence committed by groups of people. It is interesting to note that the issue of collective behaviour raises different questions from those raised by psychologists. The common purpose doctrine was used not so much out of recognition of the forces that operate in a crowd. Rather, it was a legal standard used to attribute guilt to individual

¹¹ Court Records.

1.3 Beginnings of Crowd Psychology Discourse in South Africa

How can psychologists map the web of tension between the individual and the crowd to understand what gives rise to brutality in collective violence? In response to this challenge psychology experts stood the intent of common purpose on its head by advancing the concept of *deindividuation* as extenuation for defendants charged with offences committed in the context of collective violence. Not only were the debates on the various explanatory theories of collective behaviour brought into public focus. They also heightened interests among academics in the legal and psychological fields. A small team of indefatigable psychologists and other social scientists in South Africa (Don Foster, Andrew Dawes and Boet Kotze, to name a few) including some overseas psychologists (for example Andrew Colman) had begun to craft "an entirely new class of extenuating circumstances" (Colman, 1991a). In response, some judges – most notably Mr Justice Jensen – started not only to treat expert psychological testimony as admissible evidence but also to formulate sentencing decisions in light of it. Judge Jensen's stance in *State vs Gqeba and Others* was all the more significant for several reasons.¹²

Firstly, similar social psychological evidence presented by Don Foster in an earlier trial of the *State vs Gqeba* case was rejected by another judge. Secondly, in the subsequent retrial presided over by Judge Jensen the state prosecutor had canvassed the court to disregard the evidence presented by a group of social scientists, including myself, so that the psychologists' testimony would suffer the same fate that befell many other psychological testimonies in South African courtrooms. For instance, after I had presented to the court the psychological profiles of the individuals accused in

¹² Some of the individuals in the present study were the accused in this court case. I do not deal with the merits of the legal case in this study.

social psychological theories in South African courts in its historical context by offering evidence of trials prior to Judge Jensen's case in which social psychological testimony was given. To be sure, Judge Jensen's judgement was a world apart from the general attitude of the courts at the time. But it came a little too late to have any real influence in the courts and his lenient sentence lost its landmark significance. With the release of President Nelson Mandela in February 1990, the unbanning of political organisations, and the return of leaders of the liberation movement from exile, the language of courtroom (in)justice was replaced by the language of negotiations: indemnity and amnesty.

As I have pointed out in the preceding section, the involvement of psychologists in political trials in South African courts was a developmental process. The use of deindividuation was only partially successful, but of critical importance was the choice of this explanatory model by psychologists – which was simultaneously embraced by human rights lawyers – as a theoretical model that could best be used to lessen the sentence of anti-apartheid activists accused of crowd-related violence. As Foster & Durrheim (1998) inform us, expert witnesses in South Africa faced the dilemma of using a not-so-popular theory in modern social psychology at the risk of portraying accused individuals and their crowds as mindless mobs. The theory of deindividuation clearly brought some controversy into the practice of the new field of “political” forensic psychology in South Africa. It carried a subtext of subtler implications by projecting a particular paradigm of human action that is excessively narrow, individualistic, and reductionistic, in spite of its belated but luminous accomplishments in the courtroom. These subtleties in the theory of deindividuation have been traced by most theorists of crowd violence to the early beginnings of crowd psychology and to the influential though much criticised work of Gustav Le Bon, which was first published in 1895 and reprinted and translated in

The numerical criterion is not reliable in distinguishing between what constitutes a crowd and what constitutes a group. This dissertation will use the terms crowd and group interchangeably to refer to individuals in physical proximity to one another drawn together by some purpose and who engage in public behaviour that is manifestly collective. When the behaviour is aggressive, destructive, and involves multiple acts of violence or a single act of violence directed at human beings or at inanimate objects, the behaviour can be described as “collective violence.”

2.2 The “Invisible Group”

The dissertation will also recognise the existence of “invisible groups” – i.e., whose behaviour cannot be discerned in public – who may be joined to the public group or crowd by common purpose and a shared identification. An “invisible group” has relevance for an individual if his or her self-definition is consistent with the category identification of the group. The “invisible group” can also influence the behaviour of an individual so that his or her behaviour is representative of the ideological characteristics of the group. This understanding of group allows for the analysis of behaviour such as Eugene de Kock’s as group behaviour since his role is representative of a group. As Harrington & Miller (1993) have suggested, if roles known mutually between individuals and their groups are invoked then the behaviour of the individual is being cast in group terms. Farr & Moscovici, (1984) and Harrington & Miller (1993) have described the behaviour of individuals who may be acting in isolation, but as part of a group. According to Harrington & Miller (1993) a social representation criterion “allows one to define a situation as intergroup if the positional or ideological relationship among participants *differs* as a result of the social status or roles conferred by group membership” (1993, p. 156).

insights to the field of collective violence. In spite of the recognition he has received as the “seminal theorist” (King, 1990) of crowd psychology, Le Bon has suffered considerable criticism for his conservative and “anti-democratic” (Currie & Skolnick, 1972) views on crowds. My own view is that the countless criticisms of Le Bon’s work fail to illuminate the true absurdity of the ideas that permeate his writings on crowds.

3.1 The Absurdity of Le Bon’s Ideas

Le Bon’s (1960) *The Crowd* reads like a disdainful treatise not only against crowds, but also against modern society and political processes in general. He attributes crowds with some of the worst human characteristics that can be imagined such as the “disappearance of brain activity” a “gathering of imbeciles” and a collection of barbarians who are prepared “to decimate themselves” (1960, pp. 29, 32-33). His portrayal of social and political life, to which he extends his definition of “crowd,” as essentially psychopathological rests on his central thesis of the crowd as an unconscious entity. According to this view, individuals cease to be rational beings once they are in a crowd, and instead become automatons capable of descending to the level of “bloodthirsty” savagery. Three elements can be pointed out as the main tenets of Le Bon’s view of crowds. Firstly, loss of consciousness for acts carried out, which he associates with the “paralysis” of brain activity due to the hypnotic effect of the crowd. “The conscious personality has entirely vanished” he goes on to say, “will and discernment are lost” (1960, p.31).

The second element concerns the role of the unconscious, which he says takes over when the individual “becomes the slave of all the unconscious activities of his spinal cord” (p. 31) – a

3.1 The Influence of a Bad Theory on Policy Makers

Le Bon's (1960) illiberal psychology and his ideas on the art of social control became a mainstay of fascist ideology. Mussolini "lavishly praised him" (King, 1990, p.220) and Hitler extensively paraphrased his ideas in *Mein Kampf* (King, 1990; McLelland, 1989). A critical question raised by Le Bon's work is whether there should be some kind of research "censor board" that examines conservative and potentially destructive scholarly ideas before they can permeate public and academic discourse.

By depicting crowds as mindless vagrants and social misfits Le Bon tried to focus his readers' attention on at least three issues: 1. By its very nature – being "unconscious," "irrational," and "automatic" – the behaviour of crowds is beyond understanding. 2. What motivates crowds and their main objective is sheer destruction. 3. Crowd behaviour is about self-annihilation. The consequence of these ideas was to silence any effort at real understanding of the underlying issues in crowds crowd behaviour.

The gloomy picture of crowds painted by Le Bon leads to a fourth point that is implicit in his theory of crowds. Since the crowd behaves in an irrational, unconscious, and savage manner, then the behaviour of those involved in crowd control – no matter how destructive these measures are – must be justified. Spiegel (1969) makes an apt comment concerning attempts to control crowd behaviour on campuses. Investigators cannot raise questions about the "irrational" and "unconscious" motivations of students "without also probing the behavior of faculties and administration in a

to “the silly and outrageous” demands of Negro students than to the “usually highly moral claims” of white students, (Arendt, 1970, p. 19). Black Power was used to express Negro grievances and to “instigate irrational ‘black rage,’” declares Arendt (p. 65). This racially charged undertone comes up in Le Bon’s writings, and is articulated when he makes reference to “the hereditary instincts” of crowds belonging to other races (1960, p. 19). As in Le Bon’s sweeping dismissal of crowds Arendt (1970) does not provide any evidence showing that “Negro” crowds consisted of students who were under-qualified. Nor has Arendt been able to show how she arrived at the conclusion that black students’ violence at universities was motivated only by a need to lower standards. Her perspective is consistent with the distaste for crowds portrayed in Le Bon’s analysis although the two come from different theoretical persuasions.

3.1.2 From Le Bon to Deindividuation

The term deindividuation was first used by Festinger (1952) and Festinger and his colleagues (1952), who considered the phenomenon to be a function of individuals’ perception of themselves in the crowd and also a function of the perceptions of those outside the crowd. These two components, public awareness and self-awareness, are central in deindividuation and describe what happens when individuals lose social restraint in crowds. Zimbardo (1970) then developed the concept of deindividuation a little further and identified several situational factors that were responsible for the reduction of self-awareness in a crowd. These included the size of the group, level of arousal, anonymity, group cohesiveness, and diffusion of responsibility. Zimbardo referred to these factors as “input variables,” and postulated that these “inputs” might account for reduced individual identity (deindividuation).

South African psychologists who were expert witnesses in the courts found themselves trapped in the same theoretical assumptions that were associated with Le Bon's work. They were caught in a paradox: using deindividuation argument to mitigate sentence in political trials and by so doing unwittingly rendering, at least from a theoretical point of view, anti-apartheid activism to be meaningless rampage motivated by irrational elements. The end of the era of political trials ushered in the freedom for psychologists to pioneer a process of examination of social psychology perspectives on crowds without the constraint of their role as experts to the courts.

3.3 A Search for a Liberal Theory

Unlike the early European and American pioneers of crowd psychology who had strong conservative views on crowds, South African pioneers of crowd psychology were motivated by liberal political agendas. Once the political climate allowed for a rethinking of crowd psychology in South Africa social psychologists became concerned with reconciling their liberal views with the academic process of searching for a theory of crowds that would be applicable in the South African situation. The challenge to reconcile democratic ideals with appropriate social psychology theories marked the second historical moment in South African crowd psychology and the social identity theory emerged as the theory of choice.

3.3.1 From Deindividuation to Social Identity Theory

Social identity theory incorporates a very broad range of constructs and it is constantly being examined with new concepts emerging, as illustrated in the latest publication *Social Identity and*

Categorisation is a way of orienting individuals in relation to others around them and in relation to the categories with which they identify. Tajfel & Turner (1986) emphasise the ordering role that categorisation plays in social groups: “[Social categories] do not merely systematise the world; they also provide a system of orientation for *self-reference*: they create and define the individual’s place in society” (p. 16). Tajfel (in Hogg & Abrams, 1990) articulates this process as the pursuit of “positively valued distinctiveness from other groups” (p. 30). Tied with the process of categorisation is the idea that individuals desire positive self-esteem and that they tend to elevate the in-group evaluation in order to increase self-esteem as members of the group.

The need for positive self-evaluation through comparing oneself with others was first specified by Festinger’s (1954) in his social comparison theory. It was elaborated in social identity theory through the incorporation of constructs such as accentuation (Tajfel, 1957; 1959; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963) and stereotyping (Condor, 1990; Ehrlich, 1973; Tajfel & Forgas 1981). Accentuation describes the process through which differences between the in-group and out-group are exaggerated while in-group members are perceived to be similar to one another. More importantly, this perception of in-group similarity and out-group differentiation has been found in several studies (e.g. Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984; 1985; Tajfel & Turner; 1979; Turner, Sachdev & Hogg, 1983) to foster intergroup discrimination. The process also draws a sharp distinction between the in-group and out-group in a way that assigns favourable attributes to the in-group, enhancing the in-group’s collective positive self-esteem (Crocker et al. 1994).

social identification – one that turns the focus on individual cognitive processes. The issue that concerns me here is how these individual and cognitively constructed meanings and configurations of the social world are translated into collective behaviour and into inter-group violence.

If individuals are (cognitively) active agents in building their self-esteem, and hence their social identity, how do individual dynamics play themselves out in inter-group violence? In the following section I will examine this issue and begin to address the question how social identity theory can be enhanced in order to provide a more complete explanation of crowd violence.

3.3.1.2 Self-categorisation and the Link with Inter-group Violence

Some writers have questioned whether the need for self-esteem is the only motivational factor involved in social identity theory (Abrams & Hogg 1988; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; 1993). This has led others to shift to a new conceptual focus and to propose “uncertainty reduction” as a concept that can more adequately explain categorisation and social identity process (Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Mullin, 1998). It is important to note that writers who have advanced the uncertainty reduction hypothesis do not reject the centrality of the self-esteem concept. But they see this new concept as one of a range of possible mechanisms that are involved in processes associated with social identity. An important question raised by the self-esteem hypothesis concerns how we can make sense of the seeming contradiction between a concept that is clearly individualistic and a theory that claims to be social in its orientation. Self-categorisation clarifies this seemingly contradictory relationship.

evaluative processes that precede self-categorisation can only be in relation to some specific social phenomenon relevant to the individual at the time.

Thus, a set of characteristic features become relevant for the individual as a frame of reference upon which such evaluation will take place. Social identity theory calls the presence of these characteristic features “salience,” what Hogg & Mullin (1999) have termed “consensually valued resources or symbols.” These salient features both foster and are fostered by in-group/out-group differentiation. For example, the reaction to the recent shooting to death of a black man, Amadou Diallo, by a group of white policemen from the New York Police Department was predicated upon race as a salient feature¹³. In contrast, the mass killing of twelve white students and one black by two white boys at a predominantly white school in Littleton, a suburb in Colorado, did not trigger any public reaction that could be described in racial terms. Instead, the main “out-group” blamed for the incident was the American group responsible for promoting the sale of firearms through public shows and other forms of publicity, the National Rifle Association (NRA). The white student killers did not have any potentially relevant characteristics to become an out-group in a white community in which the killings occurred. But it is reasonable to assume that had the killers been black the public outcry would have carried serious racial overtones and the NRA would not have been the primary target of public attack. However, in the incident involving the white policemen, there are socio-historical issues that hinge on race, making race a relevant social category in that context.

¹³ Amadou Diallo, a street vendor from Guinea, was killed Feb. 4 1999 outside his apartment in the Bronx, in New York City, when four white police officers fired 41 shots, striking him 19 times and making the young black immigrant a national symbol of American police brutality against inner city blacks.

3.3.2 Salience of Violence and Dehumanisation of the Out-group

I would like to make a few points here about the salience of violence and the devaluation of the out-group. Firstly, dehumanising the out-group helps “numb” the emotions of in-group members and enables them to participate in violence without flinching. Engaging in moral discourse with the out-group is therefore avoided. There exists an identified enemy, argues Levine (1996), “a not-us persona, a decontextualized other who does not emanate from or symbolically represent the community” of human beings (Levine, 1996, p.25). Glass (1997) refers to this process as “deadening the space between one’s own consensual understandings and the other’s physical presence” (Glass, 1997, p.24).

It is a relatively complex psychological process to make the other not there; to make the other’s embodied self invisible through various methods of dissociation and distancing. ... This kind of operation on the [other] is violent ... because the unacknowledged body ceases to possess human qualities and therefore exists outside any moral universe of care (Glass, 1997, p. 25).

The second thing that has to be pointed out about dehumanisation that leads to violence in inter-group conflict is that the violence itself becomes a numbing mechanism. Thus, violence is used to avoid confronting the trauma that may have been triggered in memory. This is consistent with findings that link acts of violence to earlier traumatic experience. This has been established as one of the important causal links in studies of individual perpetrators. But, because the framing of crowd violence studies has traditionally not dealt with an individual focus, this link cannot be used as explanation for crowd violence. As will be demonstrated in this dissertation, the

The categorisation process, notes Tajfel (1969), is “an assimilation of knowledge of the stereotypic characteristics” of the categories so identified. The “stereotypic characteristics” of race are clear, so are those of gender and ethnicity. But stereotyping someone as an *impimpi* is less clear and is sometimes determined by symbolic constructs that often lack substantiation. That is to say, the process of attributing characteristics to the in-group and out-group in a politically charged and violent social landscape occurs on the basis of symbols rather than “stereotypic characteristics.”

The salience of violence brings about an eruption of symbols in which the very act of violence is undertaken in ways that are laden with symbolic acts and roles. What is salient then – the violence – is both part of the participants’ real experience, but is also generated through symbols. The Mlungisi case study is particularly important in this sense because it demonstrates how a neighbour, somebody who was “one of us,” is transformed to become a politicised landscape, a battlefield that represents the rupture of all the things that once had meaning. I will argue in the dissertation (Chapter 6) that Nosipho Zamela did not belong to the out-group per se but symbolised the out-group and through the violent association with the out-group became *it*.

3.3.3 Social Identity and the Individual

Most people who have been involved in crowds can testify to what Bauman’s (1989) refers to as the “sucking power” of the system. Hardin (1995) describes this phenomenon of being “sucked in” by a crowd as the “moment of rapture” (p. 3) that leads us to do things that are “not in our interest.” He illustrates his point by citing events following the Rodney King trial in 1992 in Los

negotiate these conflicting identification processes? In the following section I propose a model that can help address this question.

4. A Three-Phase Approach to Understand the Shift from Social to Personal Identity

I wish to propose a three-phase model that describes the kinds of behaviours that are likely to be pursued by individuals when personal identity in a violent crowd becomes salient.¹⁴ These three phases are *escape*, *speaking out*, and *compliance/withdrawal*. These three phases provide a framework that broadens the analytical levels of collective behaviour (and this is illustrated in Chapter 6), and they are discussed in more detail in the following section.

4.1 Escape

Social identity theory describes how personal identity is replaced by the group's identity through the process of self-categorisation. The theory of deindividuation explains how individuals become "carried away" by the intensity of a violent group or crowd and how they come to lose their restraint. Both theories use different approaches to explain how individuals come to assume an identity that is not personal in a crowd, which places them right in the centre of a crowd as part of it. 'Escape' highlights just the opposite effect – i.e., a feeling of being outside the group – and comes about when an individual *chooses* not to participate in the violent behaviour of a crowd or group, resulting in the individual leaving the crowd.

¹⁴ This has been inspired by views expressed by Albert Hirschman (1970) in his discussion of corporate organisations his book, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

When a group member succeeds in finding a way out of the group's violent action it is an easy way out for it avoids confronting some of the difficult questions raised by making the choice to leave. An alternative to escape, which is an option that entails a much higher risk than escape, is "speaking out."

4.2 Speaking Out

Since social identity is linked to the need for positive self-esteem, it seems logical to assume that individual members will identify with and behave according to the group's prototype as a way of winning the group's approval and gaining self-esteem within the group. This suggests that people in groups prefer to feel good about their membership in a group and will engage in behaviour that will enhance these good feelings rather than behaviour that is likely to cause anxiety.

However, a person who does not depend much on the group's approval for a favourable evaluation of his or her self-esteem could take the liberty to do something that challenges the group's perceived solidarity. Speaking out to voice opposition to the violence of one's group is likely to come from such a person. An individual group member with high status within the group will be less driven than others are to denigrate members of an out-group Hamner (1992) and more likely to be the voice of reason.

Leaders of crowds that have cast their identity in terms of violence are not usually the source of the voice of reason. Besides, violent crowds tend not to have people designated as leaders as such. Those who speak out in a crowd therefore are likely to be extraordinary people whose moral sense

Kressel (1996) argues that conformity rates drop off very sharply and dissenters become much more expressive only when they have supporters in the group. But usually dissenters feel isolated in a crowd and there is no encouragement to expose their minority view. Consequently, they end up participating in the violence, sometimes demonstrating greater support for the group's behaviour than others who might not have stopped for a reflective moment. This is done either by being compliant, or by reasserting their position of loyalty (i.e. conformity) to avoid punitive exclusion from the group. Kressel (1996) refers to these two positions – compliance and conformity – as the state of psychological passivity and activity respectively, (i.e. a state of “submission” and a state of “initiative”). In violent acts where individuals are acting under pressure “individuals ... may go along simply because they cannot bear the thought of standing up to their peers and disagreeing” (Kessel, 1996, p.260).

Hogg & Abrams (1993) allude to fear in their discussion of motivations for normative behaviour. They refer to the “*coercive power*” of the group, which is “the power to criticize, derogate, threaten, punish or *enforce laws and regulations for which there are penalties attached for non-compliance*” (Hogg & Abrams, 1993, p. 180, italics added). In this sense, it is not group membership per se that confers identity, but a variety of group strategies used to force the individual to fall in line with the group's identity.

I find the distinction between compliance and conformity very useful for the purposes of the present study. Indeed, words associated with conformity are different from words associated with compliance. Conformity means: harmony, uniformity and homogeneity, while compliance is described in words such as obedience, submission, and acquiescence. The conceptual differences


characteristics of the self as a unique individual. Hogg & Abrams (1993) have described this motivational pressure to conform as stemming from a need “to reconcile the cognitive inconsistency by redefining self in terms of the group-defined self” (p. 178). Drawing from traditional theories of conformity from earlier well-known social psychological studies (Asch, 1952; 1956; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Kelley, 1952), and from more recent examination of the conformity concept (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner, Hogg et al., 1989), Hogg & Abrams (1993) look at conformity and compliance in terms of two processes.

The first is the process defined as normative influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Kelley, 1955; Schneider, 1976) which results from an individual’s need for acceptance and social approval. Normative influence, which is particularly relevant for understanding how fear influences behaviour in a group, is associated with the need to avoid censure or punishment by the group. There is no internal change in this case (Hogg & Abrams, 1993). In other words, there is no internalisation of the group’s beliefs and attitudes. Normative influence then explains what is involved in compliance.

The second process described by Hogg & Abrams (1993) is informational influence, a product of the famous Asch (1952; 1956) experiments, which were repeated in other studies (Festinger, Riecken, & Schacter, 1964; Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1975) and confirmed in more recent experiments (Nissani, 1989a; 1989b). Essentially, these studies underscore the fact that under certain circumstances, individuals can discard reasonable beliefs and adopt more absurd ones in spite of evidence to the contrary. In the Nissani experiments subjects who had Ph.D.s in natural sciences were required to study and evaluate an instruction manual in which one of the items was

who might not have directly participated in the murders, but through the encouragement they provided in the singing and dancing, were a critical part of the process.

Fig. 1 Dynamics of Personal Identity



4.4 A Graphic Representation of the Three-Phase Model

The three phases: escape, speaking out and compliance/withdrawal should not be thought of as three rigid and separate entities working in opposition to each other. The analogy that best describes their relationship to one another and to the crowd is that of planets evolving around the

societal institutions and the society as a whole participate in symbols that increasingly reduce the humanity of the victimised group, increasing the possibility that members of society will become complacent in systemic abuses.

5.1 Black Bystanders of Atrocities

The problem of bystanders in crowds requires us to shift the lenses from the traditional focus on the dominant and privileged group in society to the collective silence of the oppressed group in the face of atrocities committed in their communities. This point is clearly borne out in Magona (1998a) who puts the blame for the murder of the white American student, Amy Biehl, by young black PAC activists squarely in the lap of South African society, but especially black society. “All South Africans killed Amy Biehl,” proclaims Magona (1998b). White hatred of black people in South Africa resulted in the legalised bigotry of apartheid, argues Magona. Black’s hatred of whites may not have achieved such institutionalised status, but that is not to say it does not exist. Magona demonstrates a remarkable grasp of the politics of inter-group dynamics in South Africa, and it is useful to quote at length her conclusions in the opinion pages of the New York Times:

[Black hatred of whites] is abundant in black folklore: it can be found in our jokes, in our stories, in the songs and oral histories of black townships... And the carelessness with which we talk about white people in a far from flattering light in the presence of very young children ensures that these negative sentiments will be ingrained in them. ... Black South Africans may feel that they have a right to this hatred, that the country’s history justifies it.... And the recent war cries during the toi-toi days near apartheid’s end – Amabhulu azizinja! Amabhulu azizinja! Boers are dogs! Boers are dogs! – are variations of an old theme ... (Magona, 1998b).

against apartheid's injustices, and there has been some debates over whether the majority of white people did not know, did not want to know or knew but simply did not care.

Pollard (1997) argues that this distinction between how much or how little and whether people knew about atrocities is irrelevant. The fact is that people "wilfully" destroy their capacity to recognise the injustices around them, and this is as complicit as when one has definite knowledge of these injustices (Pollard, 1997). Although I do not focus specifically on bystanders in the dissertation, the role of bystanders is implicitly revealed through the analyses of the two case studies that will be presented in the next chapters.

Liebertson & Silverman (1965a; 1965b) looked at the relationship between police and inner city blacks in the United States and found that in those areas most affected by protests and demonstrations the police generally were not playing a protective role for blacks. Similar findings linking race and police brutality in the United States are made by Snyder (1979), who concludes that “by far the most typical precipitating incident” in collective violence is some encounter between white police and residents in a ghetto ((Snyder, 1979, p.46). This connection between police action and race was also implicit in some British studies (Murji, 1985; Reicher, 1984a) and studies in South Africa (Brogden & Shearing, 1994).

An interesting point that should be noted about the police studies done in the American inner cities, South African black townships, and in London’s poor and black areas is that in the British studies no lethal violence was reported, whereas the American and South African studies report several fatalities. I will not pursue this difference in the extent of brutality in these countries, except to mention Reiner’s (1980) observations. Reiner traces the sources of this difference to the roots of policing in these countries. He points out that British police originated in common law, whereas in countries where police violence is worst, such as in the United States, police institutions are controlled by democratic political processes. The notion of a “democratic” political system that produces police brutality has a ring of irony in it since democratic systems of the 20th century count among the most notorious governments to have produced gross human rights violations, South Africa among them.

In light of the preceding discussion on police violence, I will present an illustration of police violence as part of a chain of events that were critical in the Mlungisi incident.

Duduza township, one of the townships in the Johannesburg area. Skosana was murdered at the funeral of victims of a booby trap set up by security police. A third example is that of the burning of a soldier of the Ciskei army on 23 August 1985, which occurred at the funeral of Victoria Mxenge, well-known lawyer and activist who was murdered by the death squads of apartheid security forces. “The Mlungisi Massacre,” described in the following section, can also be seen in this causal light.

2.2.1 The Mlungisi Massacre

The Mlungisi Massacre involved the shooting of Mlungisi residents inside a church hall while they were holding a meeting to receive a report-back by their leaders from a meeting they held with authorities of the municipality and with members of the white business community. At the meeting they held with representatives from the municipality and from the white business community, the Mlungisi leaders were given an ultimatum: By 12 noon on November 17 the boycott must be called off. A meeting was called on November 17 to convey this order to the residents of Mlungisi and was scheduled to start at 10 a.m. But, as is usually the case with community meetings called on a weekend, people only started streaming in after 11 a.m. Army trucks and personnel surrounded the church as soon as the meeting started. The chair of the meeting had barely delivered his opening remarks when a voice announced over a loud hailer that the meeting had to disperse in five minutes, by which time the consumer boycott should be called off. The order was ignored. Moments thereafter, teargas was fired into the church and a stampede followed during which people tried to escape. Police vehicles followed the stream of people running, shooting at random with bird shot, teargas and real ammunition.

One may indeed pose the question in respect of many other similar incidents where black peaceful marchers were massacred. If the police saw as threat the political leadership of Mlungisi, why was the shooting directed at the audience who posed no threat to the well-armed police and army? If the leaders were "dangerous," why were there no reports of police casualties? I came across many stories of people who were not even present at the meeting, but who were shot in their homes. Mrs M. bitterly described how her breast was grazed by a bullet as she sat inside her living room and how her daughter whom she was holding, has shrapnel lodged in her vagina as a result of the hail of gunfire that followed residents as they scattered in fright.

Another account of the incident comes from one of the UDF leaders from a nearby coloured township who was involved with other UDF leaders in Mlungisi to try and resolve the tensions that had arisen as a result of some coloured support of the police and army. He was arrested on the day of the

We were at the charge office. We could hear them talking over their walkie-talkies. We heard reports coming over the radio. They were shouting all over the place, and we could hear the shouting, like frantic communication between the control & policemen in Mlungisi. At some stage they were shouting, they were shouting "we're running out of ammunition" -- something like that. We saw them moving boxes of ammunition actually to be sent to Mlungisi. And at some stage we heard them calling for sharp-point ammunition. And you know, you can imagine how we felt. We couldn't even storm those people with our bare hands. It was terrible.

In the aftermath fourteen people were killed and many injured. The state had once again settled matters using violence, echoing Sharpeville, Soweto, and Uitenhage. Three of the victims who died

these emotions were at play in Mlungisi, when the final night vigil for the eleven dead was held, Nosipho Zamela was seen being dropped off from an army truck in front of the house where the vigil was held. Soon thereafter a rumour started circulating that she was “sleeping with Inkatha,” which was a reference to the police who were patrolling the streets of Mlungisi and who were believed to be Zulu-speaking. I will elaborate on the effect of this rumour in the events that ensued in the next chapter.

The funeral of the eleven victims was attended by 20, 000 people and attracted UDF leaders from all over the country, leaders of the white anti-apartheid women’s organisation and leaders of the opposition Progressive Federal Party. Television and newspaper reporters representing overseas networks and journalists came in a significant number of chartered aircraft to cover the event. At the end of the day’s proceedings, the rumour had become a full-fledged fact that Nosipho was having an affair with a policeman and that she had “sold herself” to the system.

Whether or not Nosipho had an affair with a Zulu policeman is not central in this study. What I have often wondered was whether the policemen who dropped her off at the vigil house did so deliberately to deliver her to the lion’s den. The strategies used by the police at the time were very crude, and most were designed to shift the focus from their own brutality to “black-on-black” violence. They were known to set up individuals by driving around with them in the township, and then release them while arresting others, giving the impression that it was these individuals who identified the people arrested. Therefore, we cannot ignore the possibility that the fate that befell Nosipho was a maliciously calculated strategy to have an incident of “black-on-black” violence, although I did not pursue this question in my interviews.

Nosipho was then taken to a place called "Golden," so called because it was the only street lamp in the entire township in Mlungisi. The light was installed not for the convenience of the residents, but to improve night visibility for the security police. The name "Golden" seems was a sarcastic reference to apartheid's monitoring system. It made the township glow and was also an expensive item.

The songs sung as the crowd converged on the spot where the necklace burning was to take place all symbolised the annihilation of something other than human. Here are some lines from these songs: "*mayifeinja* [let the dog die]," "*makafe umthengisi* [let the one who has sold her own die]." "*Siza kuzitshisa ezi zinja zika Le Grange* [We are going to burn these dogs of Le Grange's – the minister of police at the time]." Nosipho burnt to death and her body was taken by the police not long after the crowd had dispersed. She had been "adorned" with the burning "necklace" under the glow of "Golden," created by the system that she was accused of consorting with. She died under the official glare of a repressive system. This was true both figuratively and literally. The police were known to watch necklace burnings from a distance and only appeared when the smoke had died down to take pictures or videos and to remove the body to the mortuary.

4. Effects of Nosipho's Murder on the Family and Responses by the Leaders

Nosipho funeral was attended only by her mother and a few relatives and was held almost in secrecy in the very early hours of a Saturday morning. Her mother left Mlungisi and the place that was home all her life, taking her family with her to live in the nearby township of Sada. The case of Nosipho's burning prompted a disciplinary hearing called by the leaders of political organisation in

CHAPTER 5

ASSEMBLY PROCESS: ANALYSING ANTECEDENTS TO CROWD VIOLENCE

1. Introduction

Major theories used in the past to explain collective violence have been refuted, as the literature review in chapters 2 and 3 shows. Despite findings refuting the relevance of these theoretical constructs, scholars have repeatedly returned to and revived these explanations, challenging the findings that question their relevance (Myers, 1994). These theories continue to be attractive to scholars interested in understanding crowd phenomena partly because the process of disproving a theory's relevance goes back and forth with that of proving its relevance. Another reason is simply the fact that "it is very difficult to abandon old explanations" (McPhail, 1994, p. 5).

The aim of this chapter is to explore an alternative approach to the analysis of crowd violence. There are two things I want to do in this discussion. First, I provide a theoretical context for the analysis of the antecedent events that led to the murder of Nosipho Zamela. Secondly, I examine the gathering process of the crowd in the Mlungisi incident, carefully looking at how the information about Nosipho's behaviour was spread and the language used in the accusations levelled at her. The analysis focuses on three main aspects of this process: how rumour functions as a mobilising force, an interpretation of the label "impimpi," and the dehumanising features of the language used against Nosipho such as sexual imagery and other hateful statements.

Given the partition of intrapsychic events, interaction between individual and society, at each higher level, the levels of potential *reductive explanation* increase. Processes are thus constrained by laws at lower levels and explanation is not complete until such links are specified. ... The point is that analysis of process often occurs at the next level down, which, in turn, can be related to lower levels. ... The test of a theory is how well it explains (Harrington & Miller, 1993, p. 151).

Secondly, I draw from is McPhail & Miller's (1973) notion of the "assembling process." McPhail & Miller (1973) analyse various cues of communication that account for the assembling process before the outbreak of collective behaviour occurs. He looks at two types of assemblies, what he calls "periodic assemblies" – i.e., fairly routine gatherings such as a group of filmgoers or a group of workers – and "non-periodic assemblies" – e.g. rallies and demonstrations. The concern of the dissertation is with the latter group.

McPhail & Miller (1973) then describe different variations of "sources of instructions" that precede non-periodic assembling, and focus on the following three phases. First, how information about the gathering is circulated. Second, the use of verbal and non-verbal cues to attract people to the location of the assemblage, and thirdly, the relationship between proximity and access to where the action is, what the authors refer to as "fortuitous proximity to an event" (McPhail & Miller, 1973, p. 726).

you heard. What you thought was: Thank God it's not me – Yes I suppose you are right in saying that this means the truthfulness of the accusation was not always clear. In fact, it was hard to establish. But the fact remains you didn't want to question anything lest this is turned against you. So the best way was just to repeat what you heard, and run with your life (Interview with Mandla, December 1994).

The image portrayed in this statement, 'repeating what one heard and running with one's life' is an interesting one. It is an image of a community gripped by fear. What is being suggested here is that questioning a rumour was futile, because this could be turned against the person doing the questioning. A rumour suggesting that someone is collaborating with the police, i.e., that he/she is an "impimpi" therefore served two functions: The first was to label through rumour one who was perceived to have broken the code of behaviour in order to mark them for punishment. Secondly, the rumour served as a source of survival and solidarity for the community: survival through unquestioning acceptance of the rumour and solidarity through the creation of a common enemy in the person accused, i.e. misdirected revenge.

2.1.2 The Mobilising Power of Rumour

The spreading of the information about Nosipho being on a police truck can be compared to the spread of rumour, where action based on the rumour requires no prior knowledge of concrete facts. I will define rumour in this case as unconfirmed scandalous information about an individual. This definition does not imply any judgment about the truthfulness or falseness of the rumour, but simply that it is information that is accepted without concern about its validity. The following excerpts

Just think about it, it was not just for the eleven we were mourning. We had buried many of our dead by that time, all killed by the police. Everyone started talking about what we had heard, and you could see people were angry. We couldn't do anything about it right then. Did I see her that evening? No I didn't see her. But people said she was around and I knew we would sort her out the following day – No not like that. We were not going to “necklace” her. This “necklace” thing was never part of the plan at all (Interview with Themba, December 1994)

It must be noted that what is described here occurred on the same evening as what was described in the first excerpt. However, when the subject refers to “the three of us,” this three does not include the group described by Mandla in the previous statement. What is striking about this observation is that in this evening of mourning, such a parallel but active event, the circulation of a rumour, can be taking place in the midst of collective mourning. One wonders about the energy that drives this communication of the rumour. Murji (1985) has referred to the process that takes place in the circulation of a rumour as a social “subsystem.” I want briefly to explore this notion of a rumour as a social subsystem and to examine how this process provided the framework for the exclusion of Nosipho as an outsider and as an ‘other,’ setting in motion the steps towards her ultimate murder.

When the story of Nosipho in a police truck broke out, many people at the night vigil immediately took it as fact. Some did so out of fear, as the first statements above indicates. But from reports in a number of the interviews, many were outraged. I will show in the following discussion that the circulation of the rumour among the people gathered for the vigil also filled a special need.

protection of the community with whom she once had a commonly shared sense of values and moral obligations.

2.2 Labelling of Nosipho as “Impimpi”

In this section I am going to discuss the function served by the label “impimpi.” Hilberg (1985) has argued that the stage of defining a victim as an ‘other’ is the first and an essential step in the path towards the destruction of the victim. Bauman (1989) then suggests that such definitions split the population into “the marked and the unmarked” (p. 191). Those that are marked are the ones who are excluded from society’s moral obligations. By the very act of being so defined, they are targeted for “special” treatment: “what is proper in relation to ‘ordinary’ people must not necessarily be proper” in relation to those targeted, (Bauman, 1989, p. 191). The following statement from an interview with Sonny, one of the marshals, clearly shows the first stages of this exclusion process in the Mlungisi case study:

Well, I’ll tell you this. At the time if someone said there is so and so with the police, no questions were asked. That person was [labelled] an impimpi straight away. You can’t be in a police car unless you are an impimpi. What did she expect people to think? Although I wasn’t hot on the idea that Nosipho must be burnt, but I personally knew that this is the way it would end (Interview with Sonny, December, 1994).

This statement illustrates the irrational way in which people became identified as impimpi, and since the label was tantamount to signing someone’s death sentence, it also tells us how people devalued life as their own lives were valued so poorly. The

was made to label Nosipho an *impimpi*, everyone aware of the deeper significance of the label. Those at the gathering embraced the rumour and by so doing shared in the perception of Nosipho as an *impimpi*, the guilty one, and the one who “sells” her own people. “Once the allocation of guilt is implied to be equivalent to the location of causes,” (Bauman, 1989, p. xii), i.e. once the link was made between Nosipho’s alleged police collaboration and the police killings in the township, the legitimacy of punishing her could not be in doubt. Wittingly or unwittingly, those who were part of the gathering of mourners, who were instrumental in the intensification of the rumour concerning Nosipho’s alleged sexual and political misdemeanours, were drawn into the events that followed and could not stand in judgement against them. Their silence and complicity in what was to happen to Nosipho was a function of what Bauman (1989) calls “the neutralization of the moral urge” (p. 184), which resulted from the distancing that the label *impimpi* imposed.

2.3 A Lexicon of Hatred

There are certain words whose meaning carries dehumanising elements, so that when they are used to define others they are immediately placed in the category of the less human. Take for example the expression “the enemy.” In addition to the obvious and negative connotations of “enemy,” the expression is intended to avoid personalising the other by using the collective “the” to reduce their human features. Everything personal and individual is erased. The aggression against this depersonalised and dehumanised other is in effect against something abstract, the embodiment of evil. In the following

Some claimed that they were going to give her a chance to respond to the allegations before deciding whether she was going to be punished. But these claims were often inconsistent with some of their views concerning their impressions about Nosipho's alleged affair with a policeman. My sense was that the questioning of Nosipho had very little to do with trying to establish the truth of the allegations. Rather, it was to amass more evidence concerning her alleged guilt, as the following excerpt from the interview with David shows:

The reason we went to her home that morning was to ask her some questions. She was seen on a hippo [police truck] and she had to tell us what she got from that. She couldn't be on the hippo for no reason. If the police gave her money, we wanted to know. We knew why she was there, but we wanted to hear it from her (Interview with David, December 1994).

Mandla was more specific about what it is they knew to be the reasons for Nosipho's being on the police truck: "If you see a girl with the police, it's obvious why she's there. The problem with Nosipho is that she didn't do it secretly, but she was daringly open about it. Now she had to answer for it," (Interview, December 1994). In the following statement, Vuyo continues along the same theme of accusations:

What was clear to us was that she was sleeping with these policemen. Some of the girls here in the township were doing that. These policemen gave them money – Of course they gave them money! We knew this. We didn't need proof. In any case, Nosipho didn't deny it. ... I think Nosipho was unfortunate. Although we all knew she couldn't be a police spy, she was walking with this label written [symbolically] on her back: *Uyimpimpi Nosipho* [Nosipho you are a police spy]. So we knew we had to discipline her (Interview, December 1994).

language used to distance her from those who eventually participated in her brutalisation and murder. The link between the subordination faced by women in many societies, and issues relating to gender and other socially defined meanings has been cogently pointed out by Mohanty (1991) and by Spelman (1988).

2.4 Assembling to Haul Nosipho from Home

Empirical studies in the field of collective violence have revealed the complexity and the differentiation of behaviour in collective violence (Abudu et al., 1972; Rossi, et al., 1974). The work of McPhail (1971; 1994) charts a useful strategy in terms of breaking these complex phenomena of violent crowds into small pieces. In the above section, I have looked at rumour and certain aspects of language as significant antecedents in Nosipho's murder. Here I will examine the final stages in the "assembling process" that set in motion the murderous incident. I will try to address the question raised by McPhail (1971; 1994) about collective violence: Under what circumstances and by what processes do people converge on the area where collective violence develops?

Several writers (Abu Stark et al., 1974; Burbeck et al., 1978; Kerner, 1968) have found that the majority of crowd incidents occur in high density areas. The setting of the Mlungisi township and the route that the marshals followed on their way to Nosipho's house was conducive to assembling and mobilising people to join them on their way to Nosipho's home.

Nosipho was not going to be necklaced. But, I mean, once you are called an impimpi, everyone knows what will happen. ... She was not one [an impimpi]. She couldn't be because she was not active or anything like that, like the way these people who are sellouts are. You never saw her at meetings. She was just not that type. All of us knew she wasn't, but then she got herself into a police truck, and the label stuck on her. That's why that morning everyone followed us. (Interview with Yanga, December, 1994).

This statement is a sad comment on how events in a crowd can escalate and get out of control causing loss of life. The next chapter explores this process in more detail, and looks at the dynamics of collective behaviour within a violent crowd.

individual dynamics within the violent crowd. The overall question addressed in this chapter is not so much why Nosipho was burnt, but how the relationships in the crowd that murdered her were configured.

1.1 The Construction of a Victim's Depersonalised Image: A sudden Occurrence or a Gradual and Unfolding Process?

The incident of the murder of Nosipho raises the question regarding how it was possible for people to murder someone they had grown up with and whose family was their neighbour. In Chapter 5, I pointed to the defocusing strategies that distance a victim from the realm of humanity shared by others. The question that has to be asked is at what point does the shift from someone who is one of the group to someone who is an “other” occur? Where is the moment when Nosipho ceases to be “one of us” and instead becomes an enemy upon whom agony must be inflicted? Was there an instant shift in the way that she was perceived, which started the moment she was spotted on the police truck? Could it be that the single act of being on the police truck produced immediate hatred for her, enough to murder her? I explore these questions in this section and argue that far from being instantaneous, as suggested by the responses in the interviews, findings have suggested a more gradual process in the dehumanisation of others. The following statements by people who were marshals and subjects in the focus group of the study seem to suggest otherwise:

Nosipho was a spectacle on top of that hippo – No I didn't see her with my own eyes, but the police dropped her off in full view of everyone else. She was clearly on the side of the enemy, and forced us to see her as such. She put herself in that position before we did, and so decided the

with 'Inkatha' she made herself an enemy (Interview with Themba, January 1995).

In the previous chapter the construction of Nosipho's depersonalised image was discussed in the context of rumour and the language of hatred hurled at her. If we examine closely the way the rumour was spread (see Chapter 5), we can see how the rumour took a life of its own and became a catalyst in the events that followed, placing Nosipho on a collision course with her own people. This supports the idea of a gradual shift from the category of friend to foe, rather than the suddenness suggested by the statements above.

The political and emotional significance that became an essential part of the mourning of the eleven victims of the police shooting helped to foster the creation of sharp categories that divided the world into two opposite camps: those who were "for us" and those who were "against us." These categories were not merely circumscribed around the events of the night vigil for the eleven victims, but were derived from various references long before the Mlungisi Massacre, and were reinforced after its occurrence. Some of these categories were specific to the community of Mlungisi (the shared experience of police harassment over the years, and therefore the hatred of police; the anti-white/anti-establishment sentiment, which in part led to the consumer boycott). Other categories of differentiation were shared by the majority of black people in the country (anti-state sentiment because of institutionalised racism and the oppressive laws of apartheid). These categories then were salient at the night vigil of the eleven victims killed in the Mlungisi Massacre.

the crowd of people gathered, Nosipho's burning body was observed with this same attitude – a spectacle to be disdainfully distanced from the rest of “the people”.

There is no question that the burning body was understood for what it was, i.e. everyone present at the scene of the necklace clearly understood that the consequences of burning Nosipho's body would be her death. But, what Nosipho was *going through* was not sufficiently appreciated to translate into feelings of empathy for her. They saw the flames, her helpless struggle as she faded into the inevitable silence and into death. But they did not see her pain. Part of the problem lay with the language used to describe what was happening, the language of “the spectacle.” There is a difference between necklacing and killing. Even if the two mean the same thing, the negation of the event of murder by designating a seemingly innocent term obscures the pain experienced by another. The furiously burning tyre around Nosipho's neck becomes not an object of destruction, but a necklace adorning her body. She is not in pain, but is “frying,” which is one of the things that was said in the crowd: “*Makaqhotse!*” (Let her fry!). It is this choice “not to see” that enables people in a necklace crowd to watch this act of destruction *par excellence* until the victim disintegrates into nothingness.

Elaine Scarry (1985) painstakingly but eloquently brings out this “not seeing” attitude of those who perpetrate atrocities. In her analysis of “the body in pain,” she presents a rare approach to an understanding of politically motivated forms of terror and violence. She discusses an all too familiar violation of the body, torture, and dissects its meaning for the tortured victim and for the torturer, beginning with what she terms “the nomenclature of torture”(Scarry, 1985, p. 44). The special language designed to negate not only the pain of the victim but the very act of torture is

murder, and the misappropriation of her pain was not unlike that so clearly illuminated by Scarry.

2. Dehumanisation and the Creation of Otherness in Collective Violence

Elaine Scarry's (1985) work elegantly elaborates on the vast body of literature on dehumanisation of victims. She offers a rich interpretation of what has been described by Lifton (1986) as "the repudiation of the meaning of reality" (1986) and by Glass (1997) "the delusional organisation of reality"). I have suggested in this dissertation that this treatment of "the other" in ways that attempt to obliterate their humanness in collective violence is not adequately explained by social psychology theories of crowds. For example, the creation of "otherness" in the inter-group perspective of social identity theory, i.e. the process of assigning negative attributes to an out-group, does not rise to the level of an efficient explanation for how others become dehumanised in a violent crowd. Let me explain this a bit more clearly.

Tajfel (1969; 1981) and other adherents of the social identity theory (Condor, 1990; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Turner, 1985) have explained the process through which an out-group is assigned negative attributes as a function of stereotyping. The process of assigning negative impulses to an out-group may strike us as useful conceptualisation of the notion of dehumanisation. But the two processes differ in important ways. Firstly, stereotypes are based on social and physical categories (Reicher, 1984a) that may be accentuated or attenuated, depending on whether the perceiver is judging in-group or out-group characteristics (Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 1986; Turner, 1982). For example, in Reicher's (1984a;

It was interesting how Menzi in the statement above still tried to make Nosipho “invisible” in his recall of the events. There was a pause before he said the word “*thing*”, which suggests either some censoring of memory during the interview, or an attempt to reconstruct the image of Nosipho as he saw her when he was in the crowd that murdered her. He could, of course, have just been trying to make a point to demonstrate what his mental state at the time was. Whatever the function served by the reference to “thing” was during the interview, it was clear that this was the imagery that operated at the time of the killing of Nosipho. This brings us to the second point I want to make about dehumanisation.

When the category of “otherness” has consequences in which there is a breakdown in the values that govern ethical morality and the respect for human life, the construction of these categories is mediated by processes that affect the ability to make rational judgement. Reicher (1984a; 1987; 1996) is probably one of a very few scholars who have interpreted crowd behaviour in terms of social identity theory by applying this model to the analysis of actual crowd violence. His rich and pioneering work has been endorsed by several scholars in the field (Foster, 1990; Foster & Durrheim; 1999). However, the findings in the present study are at variance with those made by Reicher in his studies, particularly the issue of rational judgement and purposive behaviour, which he advocates as the bedrock of crowd process.

Perhaps the question to raise here is not whether Reicher’s approach accurately reflects what happens in a violent crowd. Rather, the question should be under what circumstances can crowds (or rather individuals in crowds) be characterised as displaying irrational behaviour and under what circumstances will their behaviour be characterised as fully rational, creative and

being to one whose rational judgement dissipates. The first stage of transformation is part of a mechanism that protects the ego from being overwhelmed by extremely threatening anxiety that is typically evoked in a violent crowd. This is characterised by the defence mechanisms of splitting and projection that are described in psychoanalytic group theory. The second level of transformation results from the breakdown of the boundaries between self and others. The final stage consists of reclaiming the parts of the self that have been split off.

3.1 The First Stage of Transformation: Splitting and Projection

The theory of deindividuation describes a process by which individuals in collective violence lose their rational and realistic judgement. But the theory fails to illuminate the mechanism by which the loss of these functions comes about. The psychoanalytic group theory can be usefully applied in this regard.

I suggest that instead of a loss of self and a loss of individual identity, there is an alteration of ego functioning which results from the stirring up of certain impulses triggered by the very nature of a violent crowd. "Regression," therefore, is not merely a primitive state that can only be seen as the source of the basest instincts of human nature. Rather, it is explicable in terms of an essential process triggered to protect the ego from being overwhelmed by something it cannot cope with. The psychoanalytic perspective of groups holds that it is in the nature of groups or crowds that certain threatening impulses are stirred up, which then triggers an unconsciously regressive reaction. This involves a process of denying, disowning and splitting off these threatening impulses. They are then projected into the group or the crowd, and individual members

is the essence of what happens in crowds. Projective identification then is the framework for understanding how individuals in a group come to embody a group's identity. These projective identification phenomena do not only affect the self, but affect the group as well, since the group is the external object into which spit off and unwanted parts of the self are thrust.

Two things about this process are significant. First is the redefinition of the self. Projective identification leaves the self less aware of its completeness as a result of splitting. This outcome, which affects the rational and reflective functions both at the individual and at the group level, has erroneously been described in deindividuation theory as "loss" of self.

Second is the reconstruction of identity both at the group level and at the individual level. Individual group members come to embody the group's identity through reintroduction of the projected parts in what Jaques (1955; 1990) calls introjective identification. The group itself experiences some dynamism since it serves as container for all unwanted elements of individual group members. Containment of individuals' fears and anxieties has been found to serve an important function in groups that are going through political turmoil (Barbalet, 1995). The redefinition of identities for individuals and for the group does not necessarily yield a clear picture. Rather, it is a confused representation, evoked by the disintegrative effects of projective identification on the ego (Agazarian & Carter, 1994) and leads to another consequence of projective identification: a blurring of boundaries, which will be discussed in the next section. Before I turn my attention to this discussion, let us look at the following excerpts to illustrate what could be interpreted as splitting in violent group action:

dissonant components in the encounter between the self and the crowd. And because of the processes of projective and introjective identification, the self-crowd boundaries and the boundaries established within normal social and moral categories are seriously threatened. This breakdown of boundaries in violent crowds has been articulated by other writers (Cohen, 1996; Henricson-Cullberg, 1984; 1998; Weatherill, 1995), with some relating it specifically to the violation of moral rules in the South African context (Noyes, 1998).

What does the blurring of boundaries mean in practical terms and in terms of crowd process? I want to propose that one of the ways in which the breakdown of boundaries manifests itself in a crowd is through the experience of anonymity, which is a decrease in self-awareness and in the awareness of others. Deindividuation theory wants us to believe that anonymity is a construct that can be manipulated: covering subjects in an experiment with cloaks or hiding their eyes behind dark glasses. My view of anonymity is that it is not something that can be manipulated, and far from being based on physical features of visibility and non-visibility (of self and others), anonymity happens at a deeply unconscious level. Let us examine this notion of anonymity in the context of the following sample of responses:

I was confused for many days after Nosipho's death. You know what the funny thing is? I could not even say whom I was with there, who stood next to me and all that. Very strange, mob spirit...! (Interview with Toko, December 1994).

I can remember clearly the guys I was with when we were going up the first time. But I lose track now in my mind concerning the time when we were at the Golden [where Nosipho was burnt]. Remember that there was a lot of confusion – chaos. So I can't tell you if I remember anyone in particular. (Interview, Themba, December 1994)

3.3 The Third Stage: Struggle with Reclaiming the Self

Since the group serves as container of threatening and unwanted parts of the self, once individual group members are out of the containing environment of the group, they are confronted with these phenomena in a way that becomes challenging to the ego. In a sense, once out of the group, group members are challenged to "reclaim" their projected parts, not as part of the identity of the group, but as part of their own characteristics. The hatred, aggression, and brutality no longer belong to "the group," but return to haunt the self. Bion (1962) suggests that these negative phenomena are triggered in the group for the first time and Jaques (1955; 1990) has persuasively argued that the social group is used precisely to escape from the perpetually anxiety-provoking (to the ego) unpleasant impulses. This is why when these impulses surface, i.e. when they are brought to one's awareness, they cause extreme discomfort (Menzies Lyth, 1960). The statements about the experience of "not self" presented in the preceding sections could be understood in terms of what has been described as "foreign" (deeply unconscious) material (Menzies Lyth, 1960) that become activated for the first time in a group or crowd (Bion, 1972). The main challenge faced by the ego when the unpleasant impulses surface, is how to integrate these "foreign" elements and reclaim them as part of the self.

For many people, participating in the murder of someone, particularly the murder of a neighbour who could have been a friend, would certainly arouse a lack of trust in one's sense of humanity and raise questions concerning one's core values. So perhaps this is what the metaphor of the arousal of phenomena "quite foreign" to one's emotional life represents. It is not often that people murder their neighbours and friends. Hence, some of the respondents in the case study of

Yanga, whom I tracked down to a township in Port Elizabeth through the help of his family, was a handsome and well-groomed young man when I first met him in 1989. Now he had the face of an older man, dishevelled and with the markings of an alcoholic. At first, when he heard what I had come to see him for, he refused to speak to me. But eventually he agreed to an interview. He insisted on speaking about other necklace incidents (“because I trust you my sister. You won’t do me down [turn me in] even if you are the truth commission”):

... I can say that what happened those days – not just this thing [the murder of Nosipho] – I’ve spent all this time trying to forget about it. We were wild and angry. But the things that we saw done to people ... the things that we sometimes did ... I don’t want to talk about it anymore. No, I don’t want to talk about it... [and he gestured with his hand implying that I leave him and actually left for another room, leaving me with my tape recorder notebook and pen]. (Interview with Yanga, April 1997).

There are three possible reasons likely to constrain psychological integration, and why the past experience of violence has left its mark even after so many years. First, the relationships the individuals had may not have provided the appropriate environment they needed fully to integrate their past. For instance, the subject of necklace incidents was something of a taboo when I returned to speak to people in Mlungisi in 1994 and I was told that people did not talk about this part of their past among themselves. The silencing of an event so major in the lives of those who participated deprived them the opportunity to deal with it, making them vulnerable to a range of psychological symptoms, which manifest themselves in self-destructive behaviour, such as drinking. Judith Herman (1992) eloquently discusses similar psychological consequences associated with the lack of social support given to another group of perpetrators of violence, Vietnam War soldiers, after their return from the war.

violence, which is directed at an individual or his property primarily because of his association with a particular social category. Other writers (Nieburg, 1972; Sterba, 1969) have stressed the idea of the “symbolic status” of individual victims who are targeted by association with a social category.

This is a point I made earlier in the dissertation (see Chapter 3): if an individual evokes the same conflict dynamic that exists between an in-group and an out-group, because of certain norms the individual shares with the out-group, then the relationship with the individual can be considered as inter-group conflict (Harrington & Miller, 1993). Let me approach the question of Nosipho’s symbolic out-group membership status differently. Did Nosipho represent a group in the sense that is meant in social identity theory? In other words, did she self-identify herself with the group with which she was associated?

Tajfel and Turner (1986) have argued that social groups or categories “provide a system of orientation for *self-reference* [and] create and define the individual’s place in society” (p. 179-180). This definition of the social group is even more relevant when our subject of discussion concerns political organisation and collective behaviour that occurs as a result of it.

I believe that for the notion of inter-group violence to make sense within the social identity model, the principles that apply to the in-group should equally apply to the out-group. For example, members of the police force believed government and the policies of confrontation of opponents of the state allowed them a system and structure of self-reference. Most of them believed in what they were doing and identified with their role as members of the police force.

favourable comparisons that can be made between the ingroup and some relevant outgroup” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p.16). This definition makes two points implicit. First, that the out-group will have a *negative* social identity, and second, that through its own social identity, the out-group membership will have the same emotional significance for the individuals who belong to it as the social identity of the in-group has for its own members. This point is borne out in the conceptualisation of the self-concept in social identity theory:

[Social identity is] that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership (Tajfel, 1978, p.33).

The point I am trying to make here is that it would be misleading to consider Nosipho to represent a “group” to the extent that is intended by these definitions presented here. As the definition above shows, social identity is imbued with emotional significance for individuals who share a particular identity unique to the social group to which they belong. It is doubtful that Nosipho – or any police informer for that matter, real or imagined – actually identified with being an informer in the sense of self-defining herself and embracing a social identity that set her apart from the Mlungisi residents as such. I use as my premise, therefore, the understanding that Nosipho represented an out-group, but that this out-group was only symbolic in the minds of the crowd that murdered her.

It is difficult to assess what might have been Nosipho's motives for agreeing to identify others and then failing to fulfil this commitment, particularly in light of the anger she had clearly generated by her actions. What I gleaned from insinuations made by various people during the interviews, is that she and a relative (who later died in an unrelated stabbing incident) were both involved with the police. My interview with Nosipho's mother confirmed that the crowd had returned to Nosipho's home looking for the relative, who had to hide to avoid suffering Nosipho's fate. Nosipho's failure to identify other women "culprits" triggered an angry reaction, particularly from the marshals and from many in the crowd. The first call for her to be burnt came in the course of the apparently aimless search in the township for other women who had slept with the police. I explore this phase of the development of events in the Mlungisi incident as a process that illustrate the marshals' desire for a boost in their self-esteem.

Finally, I will explore the path along which the decision to have Nosipho burnt was reached using the concept of self-categorisation. These three themes – salience of social categories, the need for positive self-esteem, and self-categorisation – will guide the application of social identity theory to the Mlungisi case study. In the last part of the chapter, I will demonstrate points where personal identity became salient in the crowd and how individual crowd participants negotiated the tension between personal and social identity.

4.1 Development of Salience in the Mlungisi Crowd

The nature of the night vigil for the victims of the Mlungisi Massacre where the rumour about Nosipho's behaviour first surfaced determined the salience of in-group perceptions. People were

The rumour about Nosipho in the circumstances of the vigil was an important trigger and a powerful sign for rallying a community that was already primed to the categorisation phenomena. This “trigger” effect of the rumour can be seen in the context of three important factors offered by Oakes, Haslam & Turner (1994) that determine the salience of social category: 1. The degree to which subjects already identify with the in-group; 2. The salience of the relevant social category in the setting; and 3. The importance and relevance of the comparative dimension to in-group identity (cited in Vescio, Hewstone, Crisp & Rubin, 1999). Reicher (1984b) has also demonstrated the influence of these factors and shown how membership of and identification with a group increases the salience of social identity along relevant dimensions.

How salience of social category comes about in the Mlungisi incident is clear in the way the conversation about Nosipho’s “story” develops (see Chapter 5). Constant references by the subjects in the study to “the community” and “the people” are made, which evoke the strong distinctions and differentiation that characterise inter-group behaviour and clearly establish the line between the in- and out-group. The significant part of salient identification is that it regulates the behaviour of individuals through identification with the in-group, and in terms of the categories which include the self and which do not (Abrams, 1990; Turner, 1982). Two fundamental components may be highlighted in this process. One is identification (Kelly, 1989; Reicher, 1984a; Turner, 1980). Reicher (1984a) illustrates the centrality of identification and argues that it is a powerful conceptual tool for understanding crowd behaviour:

The concept of identification ...[maintains that] a crowd is a form of social group in the sense of a set of individuals who perceive themselves as members of a common social category, or to put it another way, adopt a common *social* identification (Reicher, 1984a, p.4).

[T]he correspondence between self-esteem measures and self-enhancing behaviours suggests that self-esteem measures may be capturing the wrong construct ...: the motive to present a positive attitude towards self rather than genuine self-esteem (Farnham, Greenwald and Banaji, 1999, p.231).

This suggests that the underlying motive in the shift from flogging to necklacing Nosipho may have been the need for positive attitude, rather than the need to aspire to genuine self-esteem. However, these concepts can be used interchangeably since a positive attitude towards self enhances one's self-esteem. Thus, underlying the marshals' demonstration of power and strength in their treatment was a need for a positive attitude towards self, which instilled positive self-esteem. Getting Nosipho not only to confess her offences, but to name others as well was going to be the point of triumph for the marshals. But by eluding them and not coming up with the names, Nosipho was taking away their sense of conquest and this had a negative effect on the enhancement of their self-esteem.. The following accounts by the marshals convey the link between the need for self-esteem and Nosipho's behaviour:

Well at the time we saw that she was treating us like her fools. We were going up and down the streets for nothing.... At that point we thought that here is this girl. She has slept with the police, and yet she was making all of us look like fools. (Interview with Vuyo, December 1994)

The thing that really made me angry was that she was marching us up and down the streets for nothing. We were beginning to look like fools. She was the one who was being marched, not us. But we were the ones who were looking like fools (Interview with Menzi, December 1994).

What we really hated with the whole thing is that we were the fools now, and she seemed not to care. I mean, I'm sure she was scared, but she did not seem to be taking us seriously. Then we thought she has no respect and had no sense of the gravity of what she had done. She doesn't take us

being challenged by a woman who is seen as intransigent. *Thus, self-image may be contextualised in the gender category of maleness, as well as in the context of the political dimension.* What this suggests is that multiple identities may be salient at any given time in an inter-group situation.

Arcuri & Cadinu (1997) claim that the process of acquiring positive self-esteem involves a bias towards confirming information about a social category and a tendency to disregard inconsistent information. The shouts of “*Makatshiswe!* [She must be burnt!]” and the call for Nosipho to be burnt demonstrated a lack of tolerance for anything that would alter the perception of inter-group differentiation. In other words, confirming that Nosipho and others were sleeping with the police would prove the validity of the claims made about Nosipho’s behaviour and reinforce her perception as an out-group member.

In an inter-group context, the achievement or maintenance of power over an out-group in itself “will be a potent source of self-esteem” (Hogg & Abrams, 1990, p.45). I am arguing therefore that the shift from flogging, to the extreme position of the necklace, was part of the marshals’ attempt to engage in self-enhancing behaviour by a show of strength and power over and against their victim. The formulation is captured in Codol’s (1984) insights:

The conception of oneself as the origin of certain effects, the feeling that one can influence things and people, the ability to guide or master; at least to some extent, the event in the surrounding world – all this is directly associated with a positive self-image (Codol, 1984, cited in Hogg & Abrams, 1990, p.45).

differentiation was established, the outcome of the behaviour of the crowd was then predicated upon violent acts. In section 3.3.2 of Chapter 3 I offer an extensive discussion on the violence path in inter-group situations. I make the point that if violence is a salient social category then inter-group behaviour will be defined by this violence. Thus, the fact that the violence of the crowd in Mlungisi took the form of extreme and murderous behaviour was in part a mirror of the murderous behaviour of the police.

4.1.3 Self-Categorisation Process in the Mlungisi Incident

The social identity approach to crowds (Reicher, 1984a; 1987; 1996) and to group processes in general (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Hogg & Abrams, 1988) is based on the assumption that self-concept is determined by social category and shared identity within social groups. People shape their social selves in terms of the categories that are salient in the groups to which they belong (Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). In other words, social identity is internalised and evaluated as part of *self*-evaluation (Hogg & Mullin, 1999) so that there is a shift in self-perception from personal to group identity (Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994). In this sense then, the group or crowd becomes part of the self. The notion of “self-conception as a group member” (Abrams & Hogg, 1990, p.2) highlights several dimensions of what it *means* psychologically to perceive oneself as a group member: (a) A group member will start behaving not as an individual, but in terms of his/her self-definition as part of a collective. (b). There is a reciprocal relationship between how the self is perceived and how the individual perceives the group. (c) In other words, the individual’s cognitive plane is mediated by the social category upon which group identity is based. Self-categorisation theory sums up what happens in

not influence the behaviour of their members? This question will be partially addressed at a later stage in the chapter.

What can the behaviour of the subjects in the present study tell us about themselves in relation to the crowd in which Nosipho was killed? What is revealed by their statements in terms of their social self-concept at the time? The following excerpts clearly illustrate how social self-categorisation was brought into play in the subjects:

An impimpi is an agent of the state. When we trailed Nosipho from corner to corner in the location [township], we did so because we believed she had betrayed us. We were feeling angry. We were feeling that she should pay for what she had done. ... I don't understand what you mean when you ask what I personally felt. I felt what everyone was feeling! (Interview, with Menzi, January 1995)

Me at first I wasn't sure about what was happening. For instance I didn't know if Nosipho was going to be burnt or not, I wasn't very active as a marshal so I just followed the crowd. Now I'll tell you the truth, after she had changed from N's dress, and it was clear she was going to be burnt, I experienced this rise in spirits [*umoya* – emotions] and we were all excited. It was like a team that had won a big match. By this time I was with the crowd, and Nosipho was on the other side. You should not forget that our people were dying in Mlungisi, and we had buried a *klomp* of them the previous day. A boy I went to school with who was sitting next to me when he was shot by the police was one of those buried. It could have been me in that coffin. At the time I felt that we were doing what was right to revenge our dead and to revenge our lives [the kind of life we lived] (Interview with Mandla, January 1995).

One of the interesting points about this statement concerns the use of the word “*umoya*,” which came up a significant number of times in the data and was used to describe the participants' emotions at the time of the crowd incident. This idea of a driving force from within, “*umoya*” is not consistent with a deliberate, clear, and purposeful intention. It suggests an emotionally driven

associated with the police put their lives in danger, and that's their choice. Our business was to demonstrate unity against the police. There were many others in that crowd who felt the same way, because they know what life has been like here. I doubt if there's anyone who'll tell you that at the time they had doubts about what we were doing. Maybe you shouldn't interview just us [who appeared in court]. Everybody will tell you ... (Interview, Menzi, January 1995)

It is interesting that in this statement the conflict is articulated as a conflict with the police. In fact, during the interview not once did the subject mention Nosipho by name. It was a clear avoidance, characterised by collectivising her plight as "people who associated with the police" or simply focusing on what the crowd was doing, as if Nosipho were irrelevant. One of the questions in the interview concerned the respondents' memory of Nosipho's burning body. When I asked Menzi how he remembered Nosipho he started talking about her family, how his mother went to the same church as her (Nosipho's) mother, and how he knew her sister and other children in Nosipho's family. Menzi is the one who had earlier described Nosipho as this "...thing," (see section 2 in this chapter).

There are features relevant to the process of self-categorisation in Menzi's statement above. One of these concerns how Menzi takes the uniformity of goals among the participants in the crowd for granted. Accentuation of similarities among members of the same group is one of the basic mechanisms of social self-categorisation. It has been argued that the perception of shared group membership is a powerful tool of persuasion and influence (Haslam, McGarty & Turner, 1996). Those perceived to share a group membership are persuasive because they validate self-relevant aspects of reality (Haslam et al., 1996), what Marques, Abrams, Paez & Martinez-Taboada, (1998) have described as the legitimisation of in-group norms.

happens in a group is an abandonment of the reflective capacity of individuals. By this I do not intend to align myself with deindividuation and other illiberal theories as such. I simply wish to point out some of the insights I have gained in this study, which is that the mechanisms that direct rational behaviour are often not present in a crowd situation. But when they are present, i.e. when an individual in a crowd somehow retains his/her reflective capacity, then this often leads to dis-identification with the group. By the very nature of a crowd, individuals in a crowd are not as reflective as they may be outside of it. I am not arguing that the crowd itself is the factor influencing the quality of reflection. The emotional content of the inter-group conflict may affect social identified group members to a lesser or greater extent as any emotionally charged situation would affect individuals acting on their own. However, this is not a topic the dissertation seeks to resolve, but some comments on the subject may be useful to guide the discussion.

4.2.2 The Rational/Irrational Debate in Crowds

The social identity approach to crowds lays emphasis on the shift from a personal to a social identity. This has become the main distinguishing feature between the conservative approaches to crowd behaviour, such as deindividuation, and the more liberal approach of social identity theory. The theory has been usefully applied to understand incidents of crowd violence (Reicher, 1984a; 1987; 1996). Although the application of social identity theory is not without problems (see Chapter 2), I have found the theory useful in unravelling some of the complexities of crowd behaviour.

in the encounter. The rational explanation that we can venture for the black psychologist's behaviour is that it can best be understood in terms of social identity processes. His/her judgement can be understood as being mediated by her/his perception concerning the social categories black-white. But the judgement may be based on irrational assumption and the white lawyer who evoked the race category may be someone who is forceful about issues he/she feels passionately about.

Social identity theory has emerged as an alternative model to the reductionistic analysis of crowd behaviour, which is epitomised in the deindividuation theory. The theory claims to avoid individualistic notions of behaviour and the issue of irrationality that has typically characterised notions of crowd behaviour in these perspectives. But social identity theory has discarded some phenomena identified in these perspectives which in the view of this dissertation still operate in crowd contexts. I hold the view that there is nothing "rational" with a crowd burning another human being who is a neighbour – even given the fact that the neighbour was suspected and accused of being a police informer. But this by no means negates the fact that the social identity theory is an analytically more useful option than other social psychological theories of crowds.

Individuals identify with their social groups because of a variety of historical and political reasons. But, individuals are also capable of "losing it" in a crowd, because of the complex emotions evoked, and also because when emotions are heightened in a potentially aggressive or violent context people often claim that they "can't think straight." All the respondents in the study – including those who admitted to having wilfully encouraged the murderous treatment of Nosipho – repeatedly used the phrase "at the time." This suggests that there was something about

stages of the gathering of the crowd than later. I will illustrate this point with examples from the interviews.

Sindiwe was not one of marshals although she supported the consumer boycott of white-owned shops in Queenstown. She explained that she identified with the goals of the struggle in the township at the time and was present at most meetings discussing the grievances of the people of Mlungisi. She hated the police and if there had been a way of keeping them out of Mlungisi township, she would have given her all to ensure that they left and never came back. But, she said, “necklacing Nosipho or anyone else in the township left a wound that will never heal and is a black mark against the community” (Interview, April 1997). This is why when some people in the crowd started shouting that Nosipho must be burnt she quietly left the crowd:

I went back home because I saw the writing on the wall, and I did not want to be party to that. I joined the crowd on the way up to Nosipho’s house the first time [See “assembly process”, Ch. 5]. I was okay with her being flogged because I also didn’t understand how she could do something like this after what we had all been going through. Nosipho was still one of us. She just needed proper counselling because she was so naïve. We had a very strong organisation. We were succeeding with the boycott and the whites were feeling it. Burning Nosipho did not add anything to our success. Instead, it took away something, and I simply did not want to be part of that (Interview, April 1997).

Sindiwe did not seem to have had any conflict with the idea of escaping what was to come. As I suggested earlier, this probably had to do with the fact that she left before she could become absorbed in the group process. The following statements from three of the marshals in the study illustrate the forces that are brought to bare on an individual contemplating escape from the crowd:

At that point [when Nosipho was given the tyre] I was desperate to get out. But how am I to get out? I couldn't. We had an argument with the other marshals. We were trying to stop the necklace but someone said that we are informers like Nosipho, and that we should burn in her place. So we were quiet. I was just afraid of what could happen, the police and all that. But I was more afraid of what could happen to me here [in the township]. We were the ones who had started this and so everyone knew this and saw us going up and down with Nosipho. I knew we would be in trouble. But when everyone started getting excited about burning Nosipho, I think I forgot about my reservations about it and started to help direct things a bit.

The thought to escape came briefly. I was just worried that we were the ones who fetched Nosipho from her home and the responsibility of her death would be on our shoulders. But when you are in the mayhem of a mob you do what everybody else is doing. Otherwise you'll be the next target.

We see in these statements a mixture of the phenomenon of fear and the adoption of the group's prototype. The issue of how fear mediates behaviour in crowds was addressed in Chapter 3. What we can note here is that the respondents perceived themselves as being in the minority and did not want to be unpopular in the midst of an "excited" crowd. The word "excited" was mentioned frequently in the interviews and it was explained to me that this was not a reference to being happy as such:

I think that it was excitement because we were doing something. We were *toyi-toying* and our spirits were high. I don't think I can say we were happy. We were just involved in some energy-generating activity. And of course the fact that Nosipho was considered an enemy of the people had something to do with it.

When you are *toyi-toying* you are excited because your body is active. How can I put it? You can't be happy when you are *toyi-toying* like that, not like being happy. But at the same time there was something celebratory that pulled you back to the group even if you were thinking of escaping.

Gerard, 1955; Kelly, 1955; Schneider, 1976) (see Chapter 3) has also been used to explain the kind of behaviour that results from a need to avoid punishment by the group. But sometimes even when people start off with dissenting views, their adoption of the group's position may be due to "true subjective change" (Abrams, 1990; Abrams & Hogg, 1990). In such cases, the motive for change depends on the need for consistency between the separate cognitive aspects of the self (Abrams & Hogg, 1993; Aronson, 1990), the group self and those characteristics of the self that are unique to the individual. The shift towards conformity then is part of a need "to reconcile cognitive inconsistency by redefining the self in terms of a group-defined self" (Hogg & Abrams, 1993, p.170).

5.3 The Compliant Group Member

The subject of the compliant group member takes us back to the question of the different behaviour outcomes that may be revealed with a closer look at what happens inside a crowd. It has been argued that individuals identify with the in-group and act according to group norms as a result of the salience of the positive aspects of group membership. This has also been a measure of the strength of a group (Jetten, Spears & Manstead, 1997; Koch, 1995). However, disidentification with one's group (Huici, Ros, Hopkins, et al., 1997) measures the salience of personal identity. What are the mediating cognitive processes at play when an individual disidentifies with the group's prototype? The following excerpts from my interviews with Xola illustrate the complexity involved in the confluence of social and personal identity:

represented for him a positive reference group and also exposed him publicly, he returned to the group. But his personal identity was still salient (How would *I* live with it?), so he retreated to the periphery of the group in withdrawal.

6. The “Solitude” of Withdrawal

In Chapter 3 I asked whether the fact that no one in Mlungisi raised their voice loud enough to stop the necklace carnage had anything to do with the many necklace incidents that had taken place in the township. In this final section of the chapter, I explore the issue of exposure to violence briefly. I also look at the question of the public face of violence, i.e., the performance part of violence and raise the question of whether these acts are public influences and to what extent others will/not be able to stop them.

6.1 Exposure to Violence

What was the impact of other incidents of necklace violence in Mlungisi and of the publicity of many others around the country? The issue of the effect of exposure to violence is a difficult one to assess. It is also a complicated one to use analytically in trying to understand violence. This is especially true of black communities in South Africa. Minority communities elsewhere tend to be the ones exposed to multiple forms of violence and this is precisely because of their social circumstances.

prurient images but the acceptance of a degraded environment that devalues everything ...” (Denby, 1996, p.48), and may I add, including the self. This interpretation, linking exposure to violence to the breakdown of empathy for others is quite profound and devoid of the bland interpretations that simply suggest that where there is economic depravity there is greater exposure to violence and therefore more violence.

6.2 The Public Face of Violence

The behaviour that has been discussed in this chapter can be described as neither spontaneous in its genesis, uniform in its content, nor showing limits in the way it was executed. Does the fact that it is behaviour that has elements of a public performance have anything to do with these factors? Individuals interviewed described an event in which people were dancing singing and poking fun at the victim while she was being consumed by flames. If we consider this scenario for a moment – people dancing and singing around a burning human being – the image we have is that of an act where participants are playing a role. It has elements of surrealism. How does social identity theory deal with this issue of public performance and crowd violence? How does the fact of social identity play itself out in the context of a public and extremely violent public “performance?” Emler & Hopkins (1990) have alluded to the need to pursue these questions:

We suggest that social identities are not just subjective categorisations which then lead individuals to feel or believe certain things, i.e. they are not primarily cognitive phenomena. They are also and perhaps fundamentally, public claims and commitments They result in performances before an audience, self-presentations aimed at persuading others to award or concede the social identity claimed (Emler & Hopkins, 1990,123-124).

Chapter 7

EUGENE DE KOCK: APARTHEID'S CRUSADER

1. Introduction

The previous chapter highlights the complex challenges we face when dealing with crowd analysis, particularly violent crowds. The study of individuals who commit atrocities presents us with even greater challenges than the ones that face us when we deal with crowds. This chapter clarifies these challenges and demonstrates and attempts to explain the confluence of psychic life and social factors in the violent behaviour of a single perpetrator of atrocities, Eugene de Kock. The analysis of de Kock's behaviour will be based on three psychoanalytic models of aggression and violence. The first is identification with the aggressor. The second is the psychology of shame. Lastly, de Kock's behaviour will be analysed using as context the concept of mentalisation. I will suggest in my analysis that each of these perspectives by themselves do not rise to a level of explanation that can adequately address the different issues brought out by the data in the de Kock case study. I will argue that the three perspectives can be usefully applied together to complement each other. Finally, I apply the object-relations concept of splitting to explain some striking aspects in de Kock's behaviour.

I want to start my discussion by looking at two major perspectives on violence, which are still accepted in professional circles and have been popularised to various degrees in 20th century public life. Although I presented some of the following comments earlier, they bear repetition

Equally lacking in explanatory power is Hannah Arendt (1994) amorphous (psychologically speaking) use of the construct of “evil” as explanation for atrocities. Like Freud, she situates violence in that intrinsic part of human nature, the banality of evil. Arendt’s highly respected work on Adolf Eichmann has come to represent one of the most favoured perspectives on atrocities. How else can we explain the carnage, the butchery and wholesale killing that we have witnessed in recent years in Rwanda, Kosovo and in Somalia, to name but a few? Yet in spite of the remarkable influence her work has had, the notion of banality of evil presents us with more questions than answers. Instead of explaining what the roots of violence and destruction are and under what circumstances in the good-evil continuum the evil extreme will dominate, her hypothesis tells us very little.

From the point of view of psychological argument the notion of “evil” in understanding the psychic roots of destruction is unhelpful. Many writers speaking on the subject of atrocities have commented about the “ordinariness” of these horrible deeds. To say that they are “ordinary” merely states that they are explicable simply by reference to human nature (Rosenbaum, 1999). As I have intimated in previous chapters, there is nothing ordinary about brutality. What is ordinary about the men (and women) who commit atrocities is that they are part of the wider society and they are human beings like all of us. They are “not ordinary” precisely because certain “extra”-ordinary circumstances in their personal lives and in their social lives make them susceptible to or vulnerable to committing these deeds. To say that if we were in their shoes we would find ourselves in similar situations still does not make the deeds normal or ordinary. I suggest that it is human weakness and fear that is normal and ordinary, not the deeds. This is why the pursuit of understanding perpetrators sometimes evokes so much anxiety, because we

1.1 De Kock as Apartheid's Valued Killing Machine

The two goals in de Kock's behaviour, one unconscious – whose source can be traced to early childhood traumatic experience – and the other conscious, i.e., defined by the rules that make the behaviour official and professional, complement each other. The fact that his behaviour may have been mediated by unconscious motivations does not reduce the significance of the authority behind his actions. Kelman & Hamilton (1989) and Kelman (1995) argue that the overriding factor is that atrocities committed in the context of authority are crimes of obedience. In Chapter 2 I tried to elaborate on the idea of obedience and pointed out that obedience often comes with personally held beliefs concerning orders issued by authority. So, too, with de Kock. His mission was to destroy Communism, but he was doing this under the auspices of his superiors in the government.

What is interesting about de Kock's appointment to head a security unit of covert operations in Vlakplaas is that he was not qualified to be in the security police. To join a security department one had to have special qualification. It was clear then that his appointment to Vlakplaas was calculated to yield similar destruction to the one he had commanded through his leadership in the notorious *Koevoet* unit. Here are de Kock's own observations about this:

I was not a security policeman long enough. I didn't have even a security police, well I didn't even have the course. They didn't, I never even had a security police course, which they required of everybody before they can join a security police. I was effectively a cross-border machine and that is what they wanted. Yes war we could make, that is what they wanted.

responsible for conscience, self-reflection and the ego ideal (Freud, 1933). The time of the onset of the superego and conscience is debatable (Gould, 1972), and in general the concepts of conscience and superego have been used interchangeably in psychoanalytic writing. Some writers in the field are in agreement that there is a subtle difference between the concepts of conscience and superego, and that this difference is a function of the time of onset of the two concepts (Hartmann & Loewenstein, 1962; Sagan, 1988; Shabad, 1988).

The idea that formation of conscience predates the superego is supported by several writers (Gould, 1972; Hartmann & Loewenstein, 1962; Shabad, 1988). Shabad (1988) points out that the conscience becomes the universal and deeply personal “ethical guidepost” for human behaviour. Distinguishing between the roles played by conscience and the superego in the development of morality, he associates conscience with the experience of being loved as a child and suggests that the standards of morality internalised as a result of this experience are introjected at an early stage of ego development. In contrast, Shabad (1988) claims, the superego is imposed in response to fear, and is formed from the rules of right and wrong that a child learns during his/her social/cultural development. In this sense then, the superego can be perceived as more extrinsic, more “superficial” than the deeply ingrained conscience that preceded its formation. Sagan (1988) comprehensively explains the significance of this:

Of crucial importance for the nature of the superego is the fact that it appears very late in the child's life – between the fourth and sixth year ... Whether or not the components of the superego, especially conscience and ego ideal, exist before the birth of the superego is an enormously important question. If a three-year-old child already has the beginnings of a conscience, which is destined to be pre-empted and controlled by a superego that will appear roughly two years later, then it is not impossible that certain basic conflicts may develop between conscience and the

Killing another human being (except in wars), for example, is something that is considered to be corrupt and odious by most people.¹⁶ This sense of morality enables us to be compassionate and feel empathy for others (see discussion on remorse in Chapter 8). On the other hand, the development of superego morality is not founded on “universal” standards as such, i.e. those standards that are intrinsic to the *normal* (loving, caring parenting that is believed to come naturally even with most animals) nurturing of a child common to most human beings. The morality engendered by the superego is introjected not from positive experiences associated with pleasurable experiences of nurturing, but from the negative experience of fear of punishment by a parent or other authority figure that may be represented internally or may be real in the child’s environment. Introjection of superego attributes, psychoanalysts inform us, is regarded as a transfer of authority from the real object to its internal representation (Sandler, 1960).

There are two observations that can be made here. The first one concerns what we know about authority, which is that the teachings of external parental structure can go either way and present us with what Sagan (1988) has referred to as “a blessing and a curse” (Sagan, 1988, p.7). There are parental figures that serve for the child as models for ideal moral aims, i.e. the virtuous aspects of the parents. There are others who are punitive and who instill fear of punishment in the child, so that what is internalised is not a basic orientation to universally held moral values, but a fear associated with whether taking action (a) is more likely than action (b) to bring about the wrath of the parent or society, whatever the relevant real or fantasied object is.

¹⁶ The Geneva Conventions were formulated on the basis of this universal notion of morality. Although some of these principles have been contested as vague and governments throughout the world have gone ahead and violated them, the concept of “wilful killing” is unambiguous. Yet in South Africa (and elsewhere) many massacres of

sanctioned this behaviour toward the other. Rooted in the strong racist ideology of apartheid, the dehumanisation of de Kock's enemies was something that was shared by his "invisible" group, his leaders and the majority of white society. The values that de Kock had internalised concerning the treatment of the enemies of the state – a diet he was fed with in his early childhood – were shared by his superiors at the highest government level (Gordin, 1998) and by the majority of white society. This is the "moral" zeal that propelled de Kock in his murderous operations. Eugene de Kock angrily captures the idea of shared perception with white society in the following excerpt from the interviews:

[W]hite society did nothing. They had a good life. They were quite happy with what they got and now they are not so happy with who made it happen. I mean how many whites really did vote against the National Party ... The whites say they didn't know, but did they want to know? As long as they were now safe and they had their nice houses and their second cars and their third cars and their swimming pools and kids at good government schools and university. They had no problem with cross border raids. Cross border raids were so well published; why did they never question this?

In summary, then, the Nazi's used all the trappings of the superego to promote genocide: purifying, healing, curing; oath, community, the *Volk*, ... sacrifice, idealism and morality. The mechanism of the superego makes it possible to use almost any virtue in the most horrible of human projects. If the superego, man's "higher nature," is so susceptible to corruption, can it possibly be the moral instrument in the psyche? (p.13).

What this tells us is that if violence against a particular group is portrayed as a moral ideal, shared by the larger society and sanctioned by those in power, then it is likely – at least for the average person – to be incorporated as part of her/his psychological repertoire of what is morally acceptable.

1.2.1 Apartheid's Crusader

One of the things that struck me in trying to understand the "moral" influences in de Kock's life of violence was his description of himself as "a crusader." His response to the question of how he saw his role during apartheid was given without any pause or reflection. The idealism of Crusaders during the Inquisition is something that is well documented in history. They destroyed lives, slaying everyone who was not a Christian with unmatched zeal, all to "purify" the world. Likewise, when de Kock described his role as that of a crusader, he saw his role as a moral commitment to rid the country of "subversives." The language that was used for these operations: "to take out", "to eliminate", or "to remove from society" is very consistent with this cleansing and purifying mission of crusaders. Indeed, the fight against communism that de Kock was involved in was explicitly defined as the war against the anti-Christ, giving it an added moral urge. But the essential point about this is that the approach to destruction was constructed in terms that defined such destructive acts as moral responsibility and service to one's country.

split between their corrupt superego morality and the ability to be human only to their own. But this should remain the subject for another discussion. I simply want to point out here that the tension I refer to concerns the conflict that arises as a result of the commission of acts that are at variance with one's voice of conscience, and there seems to have been moments when this was true in de Kock's case.

Sagan (1988) argues that human beings' capacity for critical moral reflection resides in the conscience. He maintains that the foundation of conscience, morality and basic human values is the love and nurturing in early mother-child relationships, and that "the adequacy of nurturing is one of the most important factors in the development of the moral capacity," (Sagan, 1988, p.160) because it is the only effective defence against destructive inclinations such as identification with the aggressor. Children's identification with the loving parent is revealed in their ability to care for others, i.e. giving back love in return for love received. A major reason for these positively charged experiences in childhood, which have mostly been associated with a mother's love, "is that these generate an elemental capacity for empathy and remorse-anxiety" (Gould, 1972, p.232). I wish to argue here that the source of de Kock's remorse (which is discussed in Chapter 8) is his mother's nurturing, whose memory still seemed to warm him. A conversation about his mother in one interview revealed a sense of longing in him that was clearly evident in the manner in which he described the bond with her. He reminded me of Eric Fromm's description of a mother's love as "the home...nature, soil, the ocean" (Fromm, 1963, p.41).

activism inside the country was recast as a war that was fought at “the border.” When apartheid failed to silence black opposition outside South Africa, the war was brought to the black townships and the carnage inside the country began. Eugene de Kock’s “work” fell under this official and destructive project to rid South Africa of opponents to the system of apartheid. In this section, I explore his modus operandi in his killing operations and draw links between the way he conducted himself in these operations and his training as a soldier. His use of militaristic symbols to describe his operations clearly suggested the link between his training and the acts of violent aggression he was involved in. The following excerpt illustrates this point:

Something envelopes you during that action time. In that three or four minutes, which seem like a lifetime, everything happens in milliseconds. There you are – like, become automatic. Then the training takes over: the one goes to the left, another one goes to the right. Is there a shadow coming? Is there a new light source under the door? Is somebody switching on the light? No, rather move over there, that's a priority target now. Go for this one, he is armed – Everything is like automatic. But afterwards it is like – it is like you are – well I personally was totally, totally drained, mentally but even physically. ... When you are psyched up, or hyped up, your training takes over, and also your fear.

One of the things that struck me was his oblique reference to his killing operation as “action time.” Language is crucial in military training, for through language behaviour that would normally be repulsive is given euphemistic meaning to make it more palatable. More importantly, this kind of language is an important mechanism that forms part of the psychological strategies that help distance the individual from the real effects of his behaviour. Referring to victims as “targets” is consistent with this militaristic construction of

fear and shame and as Gilligan (1996) himself points out, what is enjoyed by people who are violent is the feeling of being in control and instilling fear. In other words, converting the internal weakness of fear and shame into the bravado of power and strength.

I explored the themes of fear with de Kock, not only his own, but his ability to recognise it in his victims. Sereny (1995) points out that Stangl, the commander of a camp in Auschwitz, could not remember the millions of victims he ordered to be murdered *as people*. This suggests that he would have been unable to discern signs of emotional responses in the faces of his victims. The following excerpt from the interviews with de Kock illustrates the opposite:

In that second or two seconds, you sometimes see the other person's face. I can see some of the faces today still, the shock, the fear, the desperation, the look of: this is it! ... no, you see the people. It's real. I mean, this person is alive, you can see the fear – But you are on automatic because your training takes over. You don't allow yourself to think of the faces you see.

It was difficult to establish what the faces meant for de Kock. It could be argued that recognising the fear in his victims was fulfilment of his plan and that he *desired* to see the fear in their faces. But this would imply that he derived pleasure from seeing the fear in his victims' faces and would be consistent with sadistic motivation. However, as I will make clear in the analysis, I could find little in the data that could confirm this view. It seems that there were several

I pointed out earlier that one of the most remarkable features of a system that sanctions atrocities is that the issue of moral conflict very rarely ever arises. “[T]he probability that the moral oddity of one’s action will ever be ... made into a painful moral dilemma” shrinks to a considerable level (Bauman, 1989, p.159). In the bureaucracy of a violently abusive system, the moral concerns of a perpetrator are less about the plight of the victim than they are about the success in the job to be done. Eugene de Kock alludes to this in the preceding excerpt when he talks about concerns to get his men back alive. The operation is more about killing quickly with precision and with no casualties. This professional outlook to a sanctioned murderous and secret operation is captured by Bauman:

It does not matter that much how the ‘targets’ of action fare and feel. It does matter, however, how smartly and effectively the actor fulfils whatever he has been told to fulfil by his superiors (Bauman, 1989, p.159).

I found that asking the perpetrators to imagine themselves in an operation and to describe their behaviour and feelings in a killing mission often revealed the excitement and power they felt in their murderous missions. Eugene de Kock sometimes showed a sense of pride about being a specialist in counter-insurgency. One perpetrator who was a bodyguard of one of the leaders in the Inkatha Freedom Party started re-enacting a scene in which he murdered ANC activists by using hand gestures and body movements. It was clear that the

violence. “The men on the border” were actively supported by the white society at several levels: through the media, the church and through encouraging (via the school cadet system) participation in the army. De Kock was not without encouragement, the most direct and concrete form of which were the medals he was awarded by his superiors.

There are other influences that are important in de Kock’s story of violence. In the following sections I will explore the link between de Kock’s actions and his childhood experiences. It is, however, necessary to first deal with his silences about his childhood, since he did not explicitly spell out the picture of his early childhood experiences during the interviews.

2. Eugene de Kock’s Silence About his Childhood Past

Evidence from my interview and from the book written by Jeremy Gordin (1998) suggests that the relationship that de Kock had with his father may have been abusive, if not physically, then it was emotionally abusive. Eugene de Kock reported that his father was an alcoholic. Alcoholism has been associated with violence and abuse toward spouse and children. It was hard to scratch the surface of the issue of his father’s treatment of the family. It seemed to me that de Kock was trying to be protective of his father and the emotional abuse I suspected he suffered at his hands. This tendency to be protective of an abusive parent is not unusual and has been found with abused children, as well as with adults facing murder charges for killing their abusive parents. Mones (1991) discusses this problem in the context of boys who had killed their father or stepfather. He observes that they did not want to talk about the abuse and instead would defend the parent who was abusive to them. This has also been confirmed by Gilligan (1996), who

brother had with him in glowing terms, remembering how his father taught them how to handle a gun. But a “closer approximation” of the truth came when I asked him about his childhood. He refused to discuss his childhood, and only said “there is still a lot of trauma there.” But perhaps the most revealing clue to his early trauma is to be found, surprisingly, in the rules that he set for his team of men before they went on a killing operation. He insisted that young children be spared the impact of these operations.

I will elaborate on this later on in the chapter. Another indication that de Kock’s childhood may have been fraught with emotional problems is the fact that he stuttered severely as a child. Stuttering that develops in early childhood can be linked to emotional problems in the family environment. The secondary consequences of stuttering are even more critical in the emotional life of a growing child since his or her social relationships are defined by her/his challenged communication skills. De Kock did not speak directly about the stuttering, and only gave a glimpse (in a somewhat confused and concealed manner) of what it meant to suffer from this condition. This tendency to avoid speaking explicitly about it was another indication of the shame and embarrassment he probably still feels about it:

My whole life was one [a struggle]. If it wasn't sort of a physical disability on the one side, then you had to compete out of your league with others at school, academically, etc. And you were actually behind but you had to keep up and then not even keep up but you had to get ahead. And I don't know maybe if I went to school two years later I would have done better academically. I don't know. I think personally that I was, well, at a maximum or at least two years after them. Everybody wants a young Einstein, if he can go to university when he is two years old then, fine, you know. That's how well, how now the

with the aggressor (which was discussed at length in Chapter 3) is a psychological process in which a child incorporates the aggressive behaviour (or its attributes) of a parent or other caretaker. The child then takes on the role of the aggressor either in reality or in fantasy, finding an object upon which to act out its aggression. Identification with the aggressor shifts the unpleasant helplessness of being on the receiving end of aggression to the activity of the powerful and controlling role of aggressor (Maddock, 1995). More specifically, identification with the aggressor is an attempt by the ego to be active where it was passive and helpless (Blum, 1987). While the phenomenon of identification with the aggressor was first identified in children, several writers have shown strong links between adult patterns of violence and early experiences of abuse.

The concept of identification with the aggressor begins to unravel for us the link between the cycles of violence in abusive relationships and early childhood trauma. But the theory does not adequately explain the unconscious motivation involved in the process of identification with the aggressor. I will draw from two other theoretical explanations to elaborate on my hypothesis of the link between de Kock's violence and his early childhood experiences. The first part of the next discussion will be based on the psychology of shame and the second part on the concept of mentalisation.

2.2 The "Shame" Link in de Kock's Life of Violence

Dutton & Golant (1995) and Gilligan (1996) argue that an abusive father at an early stage of a child's development is the source of violence in adult males. Dutton (1994, cited in Dutton &

1990). The violence then becomes a way of regaining control over one's identity (Katz, 1991). When a father tells his son that he is no good, it teaches him to be worthless: "anything a father does to imbue a sense of shame has important lifelong ramifications for his son (Dutton & Golant, 1995, pp.84-85).

What this suggests is that lacking a positive sense of who they are, through their violence, these men are trying to create a world in which they will feel worthwhile and respected. The zeal with which de Kock threw himself in his role as "crusader" of apartheid clearly suggest this desire to be respected. In fact the term "crusader," which is his term, is apt. In our conversations, he made clear what I would interpret as his pioneering mission in the Namibian bush, establishing the most notorious brutal and feared unit in the South African army. It was probably because of the "failed success" of this military project that de Kock was appointed to head Vlakplaas, which gave him immense authority throughout the country. Since all the security branches in the country, including those in the homelands, turned to Vlakplaas for their master plans of murder, this would have given de Kock the sense of worth that has been observed to be so essential to counterbalance feelings of humiliation.

2.2.1 Vlakplaas as Reconstruction of Home: A Base for Reclaiming the Identity Lost in Shame

Vlakplaas provided the perfect base from which de Kock could act out his aggression, both through direct involvement in violence and through the vicarious experience of violence perpetuated against the enemies of the state by his men. Vlakplaas could be seen as representing

promotion. What complicates the picture in the de Kock case study is that his unconscious “mission”, i.e. to reclaim his identity and reconstruct a sense of self, was infused with the subtle meanings in apartheid’s own political mission – the threat of humiliation engendered by the ANC’s military operations. De Kock’s need to reconstruct selfhood was then fused with the need to affirm collective selfhood identity and nationalism. In terms of the psychology of shame, the apartheid machinery’s (army, security and police) increasingly aggressive tactics in the 1980s, encapsulated in the creation of Vlakplaas and its covert operations, can be seen as a reaction to threats to collective identity and to white, but especially Afrikaner nationalism. The extremely destructive desperation of the “drastic” measures sanctioned at the highest level of apartheid authority, which in reality was *carte blanche* to commit murder against those perceived to be the state’s enemies, reflected this sense of being threatened.²¹

2.2.2 Repetition of Violent Behaviour: The Concept of Shame as Explanation

The paradox in the theory of identification with the aggressor lies in the fact that in order to defend against the overwhelming feelings from the memory of the behaviour that caused trauma, the victim identifies with the one who caused the trauma and repeats the violent behaviour. Through the repetition of the behaviour that induced trauma, the victim tries to achieve the mastery of the feelings that the memory of the trauma evokes. What this theory is not clear on is how and why the aggressive behaviour is repeated over and over again. The psychology of shame clarifies this issue and suggests that the repetitive behaviour in these individuals provides

²¹ I am not expressing an original idea here. Some scholars of the Holocaust point to the causes of this extreme tragedy as the humiliation that Germany suffered in WWI, which culminated in further humiliation in the Treaty of Versailles (Stierlin, 1976). The Germans’ violent extremes, which the preeminent theologian of the Holocaust, Emil

psychological explanation is concerned, is about an array of factors that can come close to addressing the *meaning* of de Kock's behaviour in the event of the murder of Maponya. In the context of the legal injunction, when and if the act is found to have been "politically motivated," the amnesty committee will proceed and test whether the act was "proportional" to the political motive or not. These explanations will add to our understanding of the decision-making process of the committee, but will tell us little or nothing about the psychological significance of the brutality with which this and other officially sanctioned acts were executed.

While the circumstances that led to the murder of Maponya are clear in terms of the line of command – General Le Roux authorised his abduction and interrogation by the Vlakplaas unit, and he himself argued that Maponya "signed his own death warrant" by refusing to reveal his brother's whereabouts – there is a psychological dimension that needs to be explored.²² This should capture the complexity of the nature of violence, and how sometimes the political context can provoke and set the stage for the expression of deeply embedded psychological issues at the individual level. Maponya's refusal to "co-operate" during his interrogation could be interpreted as an act of disregard for de Kock's authority at Vlakplaas, and a sign of defiance on Maponya's part. Eugene de Kock, as a person who relished his role of control and record of success, is likely to have felt a deeply psychological sense of failure. His reaction then can be seen as an attempt to defend the humiliated self (see previous discussion, Section 2).

²² It is interesting that although the abduction and interrogation of Maponya was clearly an operation approved by Le Roux, when the question of the killing of Maponya was raised, to protect the identity of the Vlakplaas men involved in his abduction, torture, and interrogation, Le Roux washed his hands off of the matter, and at the amnesty hearing (July 12, 1999) defended himself by saying "it was not my problem"!

Fonagy & Target (1995) consider an adequate capacity for mentalisation to be a crucial part of the development of a child's psychological self. Mentalisation is the child's appreciation of the mental foundations of human behaviour and depends on the child's awareness of the psychological world of his caregivers. If a parent reflects on a child's self-expressions inappropriately, i.e. in a manner that fails to provide the holding (Winnicott, 1971) or containment (Bion, 1962) of these expressions, then the child's own reflective process (capacity for mentalisation) is impaired (Fonagy & Target, 1995). This results in a fragile psychological self. This has been found to be the case with children who are exposed to physical or emotional abuse. They lack the capacity for mentalisation, i.e. to see others as intentional human beings whose behaviour is driven by thoughts, feelings and desires. The crucial link between the development of a fragile self at this stage and extremely violent behaviour in adulthood can be formulated as follows. The diminished capacity to mentalise, in other words to picture the mental states of the other, "reduces inhibition of aggression by representing the victim as devoid of thoughts, feelings and the capacity for real suffering" (Fonagy & Target, 1995).

2.3.1 Understanding the Killing of Maponya as Failure of Mentalisation

I completely agree with Fonagy & Target's (1995) formulation. For how else can we explain the "senseless" aggression in Maponya's murder? The concept of failure of mentalisation helps us understand the mechanism involved in dehumanisation of the victim, which is the case in many atrocities. Let us picture the scene of murder, with de Kock standing over Maponya and violently hitting him with a spade "to ensure that he was dead", his colleague shooting him at close range.

The second thing that struck me was the implicit self-praise in the way de Kock described how he was asked to plan the killing of Nyanda. He was remembering an event in which he had brutally killed people, yet he had a kind of self-laudatory tone. This suggests the different fragments of personality that I pointed out earlier. A part of him carried the professional pride that he was the one to be consulted by top generals in the police and security to solve counter-insurgency problems. He explained that he was a “novice” concerning how the ANC worked, “I knew everything about SWAPO. But I didn't have much on the ANC. I mean I was now learning because it was a different type of war, and I was picking up very fast,” he said. In general, de Kock impressed me as someone who is driven and motivated to succeed in tasks he set for himself. When I asked him why he thought he was the one chosen to head Vlakplaas, he replied that he thought it was “a willingness which was attached to a national pride” and that he was known as someone who will pursue his goal: “In my experience I'm not one to stop until I reach my goal,” de Kock said.

There was indeed a level at which he regarded his role as a professional responsibility, and he seemed to take pride in the fact that he was better than others at it, as is evident here:

The Ermelo and the Piet Retief Security Branch [in Natal] had been trying to get Zwelibanzi Nyanda ... They were trying to get to them for the past year and a half. And they already had two attempts and they missed and then in the third attempt they attacked the wrong house. Joe Mamasela was right in the front of that operation. And then the first time they took me with, that was the night we were able to get hold of them and then pin them in the house. I knew then why all the other operations didn't work.

that, it would need someone who knows something about special effects.
Maybe they'll do that some day ...

It is this element of the surreal that makes me believe that the explanation of reduced capacity to mentalise is plausible. The surrealistic imagery in this excerpt suggests not only reduced capacity for mentalisation, but also the perception of his victim as less real. I suggest that de Kock might have experienced *himself* as less real, as if he and his victim were floating into a surrealistic motion picture. This view is consistent with the concept of derealisation hypothesised by Lifton (1986), which Lifton described as an absence of awareness of one's surrounding and of oneself.

2.4 De Kock's Reaction to Humiliation by his Former Bosses

I have tried to show how the psychology of shame can be used to understand the cycles of aggression in identification with the aggressor. The concept of the failure of mentalisation takes this process a step further and helps us understand the mechanism that allows perpetrators who have a history of shame and humiliation to be out of control and commit apparently inexplicable acts of violence. There is something else that the concept illuminates for us in de Kock's behaviour. Eugene de Kock's verbal lashings out at his former superiors have been the subject of many articles in the media.²³ His disclosures in public have even been a favourite subject of South Africa's pre-eminent cartoonist, pen-named "Zapiro." To argue that de Kock is disclosing all the secrets of apartheid, exposing those who gave him orders because he feels let down by them, is only half the story. The full picture of what is going on can be understood if we interpret his experience of being let down as an experience of public shame and humiliation.

²³ In a forthcoming publication I have referred to de Kock as "master of full disclosure."

d'être for apartheid's missions against them. The repetition of acts of violence on de Kock's part should also be seen in this context.

3. Manifestations of Splitting and Projective Identification in de Kock's Behaviour

In this section I focus on the Kleinian object relations concepts of projective identification and splitting (Klein, 1946) within the personality. I want first to describe the mechanism and then explore its application in the de Kock case study.

Object relations theory describes how an infant's fantasies of aggression towards the good object (breast) lead to persecutory anxiety about this aggression turning against the self. Splitting of the good and bad objects then occurs, in order to project the aggressive impulses into the bad object, keeping the good internal object separate. But the infant soon realises that the good and bad objects are one and the same. Guilt for having harmed the loved object, which is now seen to possess both good and bad characteristics, sets in. Melanie Klein (1946) refers to these two positions as the paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position, respectively. Like most processes that drive psychic life, these processes are part of our development and operate in adulthood as well.

The Kleinian perspective of aggression therefore sees projective identification as being central in violence. Projective identification describes a process whereby parts of the self are split off and projected into objects which then become identified with the projected parts of the self (Harris, 1965). In incidents of extreme violence, bad part objects are split off and expelled from the self

the skin. He put all his smelly clothes in a plastic bag together with the towel he used after he had showered, and threw them in the garbage bin.

It is significant that the distress he experienced was evoked by his return home, the place where he rejoined the group with whom he shared the same moral ethical framework. The dramatic moment of taking off his clothes and leaving them on the floor in his living room captures the intensity of his feelings of distress. He felt this unbearable smell creeping up on him, and so associated it with his clothing. His clothes then became a symbol of all that was unwanted, and he threw them away in a gesture that symbolised the rejection of the perpetrator who had just committed a murder.

Eugene de Kock's behaviour is a classic illustration of the Kleinian mechanism of splitting. The feelings of persecution, which are in evidence in his removal of his clothes and in taking multiple showers, are consistent with the paranoid element in the paranoid-schizoid position. One can only imagine the sense of disintegration and chaos in him as a result of the experience.

I would ascribe this experience to three things. First, to the sense of guilt evoked by his return home. I suggest that de Kock even at that time possessed innate good impulses, probably from the nurturing from his mother, but these were overwhelmed by the power of the humiliation I believe he suffered from his father. In Chapter 8, I show how this guilt matures into feelings of remorse and a need to make reparation for the harm he caused, which is associated with the depressive position and the struggle for integration after the chaos of splitting and projective identification. Secondly, the nature of the splitting in this incident shows a strong denial of the

3.2 The General's Handshake and the Bloodied Hands

The incident that I shall describe here throws some light on the persistence of the forces that served to perpetuate de Kock's denial. De Kock had gone to a police general's home to report the outcome of one of the murderous operations that were assigned to his unit early one morning. General Johan Coetzee, then Commissioner of Police, in apparent jest remarked that he would not shake de Kock's hand because it was full of blood. Eugene de Kock was very upset by this remark and he looked at his hands, turning them around to see if there was any blood in them. In relating the incident, he said:

We got to his house [General Coetzee's house] so early in the morning with senior officers, brigadiers and colonels. He actually comes out in his night-gown, which is very, very – it's strange to see a general in a night-gown in the first place – and he shakes everybody's hands because they are reporting directly back to him, and when he comes to me he says 'I'm not sure if I should shake your hand. Your hands are full of blood.' So I actually ...looked at my hands, because you know, you try and wash as much of yourself after an operation like that. As we left to get to the car, I asked the squadron leader [who was driving] why did this man say this, and he said no, he was just joking. So I asked, but why didn't he laugh? When we got to the car, I examined my hands again, but there was no blood on them.

This genuine perplexity at the suggestion that he had bloody hands, as if the General's comment were to be taken literally, is a clear illustration of unconscious defences at work, whereby the "bloody" part of the self was split off. Ironically, the metaphor of "blood in your hands," if he recognised it for what it was, should have brought the reality of what he had done home. His concrete interpretation of the general's remark was yet another example of unconscious splitting

²⁴ I wish to thank Marcus Johns for pointing this out to me.

Eugene de Kock described an incident during one of his cross-border raids, which I later confirmed, where he had to cease fire between himself and an opponent, because there was a child running up and down the passage. It is interesting to point out that he was “saved” from completing an act of violence by a child. It is clear that he was committed to not harming children; the question remains as to why he felt so strongly about it. Does this tell us that de Kock had some moral principles in tact even in the midst of a murderous operation? Or is there something else more subtle than this?

Eugene de Kock would, of course, favour the idea that he was acting according to moral principles and according to humanitarian considerations that you cannot harm the helpless. But I want to suggest that something deeper is happening here. Far from being motivated by moral concerns for the safety of a helpless child in an operation, his concerns were part of his deeper struggle with his own childhood trauma. Confronting children in such situations evoked in him memories of his own helplessness as a child, and protecting children was out of a need to protect his own traumatic helplessness.²⁵ In other words, it was more a psychological process than it was a moral process. Even so, that he can identify with another human being and have empathy at this level is totally inconsistent with the picture of one deriving sadistic pleasure from his operations. Deriving sadistic enjoyment would classify him as antisocial personality disorder (Geberth & Turco, 1997; Stevens, 1996). But as I have suggested, I do not believe de Kock is a candidate for the diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder. However, it is not easy to assess whether there were times when he did derive pleasure from seeing the suffering of his enemies. A clinical diagnosis is supposed to give us a general picture about what is going on with an

²⁵ This formulation comes from discussions following a lecture I gave to the Boston Psychoanalytic Society in March 1998. I am grateful for many other contributions made by its members who were present at that meeting.

antecedents in the psychoanalytic formulation are located in and are also traceable to childhood experiences. If we look at development as an evolving process that is determined by the impact of significant relationships we encounter at the personal and social levels, then in terms of our conceptualisation of what drives behaviour, the distinction between the personal and political may be superficial. When it comes down to it, distinct lines of differentiation are not always clear. We may find for example, that de Kock's father's family was traumatised through hardship and humiliation in British camps in the Anglo-Boer War or that his own father was abusive, and he may then have repeated the cycles of abuse in his own children. Where then does the causal link begin, or end? Evidence suggests that de Kock was a loving parent and protective towards his two sons. But he was violent in other ways and the political context within which his violent aggression was manifested sanctioned and in fact encouraged his violence. At this level, de Kock was identifying with the collective goals set up by the political structure within which he functioned.

The collective experience of the Mlungisi group had an impact at a personal level for each individual. How historical processes were played out on a personal level depends largely on the personal histories of the individuals concerned. The way that the relationship between the collective and the personal is constructed will have an effect on how identity is projected. Groups, of course, have a different fervour and identity at a group level is not the same as identity at an individual level. In a political context, a group's actions have a personal meaning for each of the individuals participating in the action, partly because the political is also the personal. Every action in politically charged struggles also seems to be about identity. Every

Chapter 8

REMORSE AND FORGIVENESS

1. Introduction

Why do some families of victims come to forgive an act of the greatest tragedy such as murder? What do they see in the perpetrator that drives them to forgive him rather than avenge the horror of his deeds? The encounters that led to forgiveness between first generation perpetrators and family members of their victims through South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission are unprecedented in the history of atrocities in the 20th century. What can account for this outcome? Is it because victims did what they thought they were expected to do and offered forgiveness to perpetrators, in the spirit of national reconciliation? Or, since the majority of victims who came to the TRC were black, is it because "black people forgive easily," as some have claimed?

This chapter examines an important component of the process of forgiveness: the expression of remorse by perpetrators. I explore the phenomenon of remorse in the context of the case studies in the dissertation, and look closely at what happens when perpetrators express remorse and what happens when they do not. I examine the question why some perpetrators feel remorseful while others do not and analyse the responses of victims to perpetrators' expressions of remorse. The chapter will also try to understand what victims mean by forgiveness when it is granted, and the factors that may be attendant when forgiveness is not granted.

First, the scenes of perpetrators breaking down in public and apologising are unprecedented in our knowledge of how perpetrators conduct themselves in the aftermath of atrocities. Secondly, to my knowledge, offers of forgiveness by victims in these contexts equally have no precedents in history. In my search for examples of forgiveness I found only a few that can help deepen our understanding on the dilemma of forgiveness and what is involved when forgiveness is granted (see Lomax, 1995; Prejean, 1993; Wiesenthal, 1976).

1.2 Does an Apology Mean Remorse?

Very few perpetrators who came to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission showed remorse for their acts. Some rationalized their acts arguing that victims brought the brutality upon themselves by choosing violence and that the atrocities they committed were in the pursuit of law and order. The criteria essential for the granting of amnesty neither required perpetrators to apologise nor that they be remorseful for their deeds. It stands to reason then that those who cared to apologise to their victims were more likely to be driven by other needs other than seeking points for their amnesty applications.

But, if we bear in mind the studies that show leniency for perpetrators who were remorseful (Kennedy & Magagna, 1994; Kleinke et al., 1992) we should not be too quick to assume that all those who apologised had no ulterior motives and that they expressed their apologies only for noble reasons. Findings regarding this bear this out (Moore, 1988), and sometimes an apology is expressed without the feeling of genuineness. The challenge therefore is to figure out when remorse is genuine and when it is not. It is unclear whether this differentiation between genuine and non-

include shifts in the individual's internal and external relational worlds. Secondly, far from being a condition to be cured, remorse is an important step towards psychic reparation for both perpetrator and victim and has deep significance for the way a victim relates to the perpetrator and to traumatic memory. Furthermore, projection and remorse should not be seen as mutually exclusive processes, but rather as reciprocal processes that complement each other.

Remorse has been defined as a kind of painful awakening to a reality that has been denied (Ross, 1998; Shabad, 1988; Studzinski, 1988). Ross (1998) defines remorse as a process "that involves an appreciation, both cognitively and emotionally, of the wrongfulness of the act." (Ross, 1998, p.167). Shabad (1988) characterises remorse as "the echo of inner truth." He alludes to the work of Otto Rank (1936) outlined in his book *Will therapy and truth and reality*, and suggests that remorse is a "gradual stripping away of denial and other protective illusions" (Shabad, 1988, p.114). Drawing from its Latin roots *remordeo* or "backbite," Shabad concludes that remorse is "the backbite of conscience" (Shabad, 1988, p.117). Studzinski (1988) uses a similar metaphor to illustrate the aetiology of feelings of remorse and suggests that remorse comes about because "a morsel of the past has resurfaced and must be bitten again" (p.210). Remorse therefore is 'seeing' reality as it really is. The painful awakening to this reality has been articulated by Studzinski (1988) as facing one's reality in a way that can be "a shocking exposure to the truth of life and of the self" (p.208).

It is clear from these definitions that the drama of remorse can play havoc with the self. Because of the painful feelings that come with remorse the ego is likely to put up blocks to avoid confronting the threatening reality about the self. This avoidance was clear in the

a mature type of guilt where the individual at once acknowledges psychological responsibility for his/her feelings and takes responsibility for his/her actions. But, because psychological acknowledgement (the “bite of conscience” Shabad, 1988) is too much to bear, instead of the guilt becoming transformed into remorse, the threatening emotions are projected outwards in the form of blame on the victim. Here is another illustration of this projection:

I feel bad about what happened to Nosipho, I’ve always felt bad about it, especially because I was there and did nothing to stop it. Instead, I did the opposite. So ja, I would apologise to Nosipho’s mother if there were a chance to do it. But I wouldn’t go out of my way to apologise alone. You must remember that everybody was angry with Nosipho for what she did. So it’s not as if I am personally responsible [for her death]. Everyone who was there at Golden did this thing. So I can’t apologise for my part because I was not alone in my part. (Interview with Toko, January 1998).

Shabad (1988) points out that sometimes the attempt to ward off feelings of remorse fails and the failure to successfully project these threatening emotions may result in aggressive behaviour:

When such desperate attempts to escape fail, as they inevitable must – for how can one successfully run away from oneself – a person may resort to aggression in order to finally silence the relentless echo of inner truth ... Aggression is thus the most extreme and destructive manifestation of the flight from remorse (Shabad, 1988, p.124).

I want to suggest that the aggression that symbolises escape from the self or a retreat from reality can sometimes be turned inwards, as in self-destructive behaviour. The circumstances of one of the respondents in the Mlungisi case study, Yanga, who at first

When people feel guilty about something they have a painful awareness of responsibility for an act, real or imagined, without necessarily openly and consciously acknowledging this responsibility. In fact, guilt often comes with denial because of fear of superego punishment. The fearfulness is linked to the origins of superego formation during which the ideas of right and wrong are *punitively* taught and internalised in early childhood. Through a process of self-criticism and pursuit of the ego ideal (Freud, 1961), i.e. a superego consistent with one's cultural values, the superego becomes an internal source of deterrence and self-condemnation, or acts as a punitive aftermath (Gould, 1972). Guilt therefore is associated with fear and behaviour that results from guilt, such as denial, and derives from fear of punishment.

On the other hand, remorse can be linked to much more positive experiences than guilt is. It arises from a potential for empathy that is born out of positive affective early human relationships (Gould, 1988). Remorse therefore is concerned with the victim, while guilt is concerned with the self. Unlike in guilt, where responsibility may not necessarily be acknowledged, that is to say denied, remorse is the process that acknowledges this responsibility for acts carried out. Such acknowledgement of responsibility has sometimes presented as strong identification with the victim (Kennedy & Magagna, 1994), and this is the subject to which I now turn.

the lost loved one and leads to internalisation of the other in the self. This process has been spelt out in detail in other studies (Krupp, 1965; Loewald, 1962; Malinak et al., 1979).

Hoyt (1983) points out this subtle similarity between remorse and melancholy and stresses the identification component in remorse. He argues that although feelings of remorse are painful the ego clings to them "*as a defense against having to give up the Other, who ... may be unconsciously experienced as part of the self,*" (Hoyt, 1983, p.437). A perpetrator then may "cling" to remorse symbolically to make the victim part of the self, in other words to re-humanise the victim he had dehumanised through his actions. He identifies with the victim's pain in a way that becomes the self's desperate act of undoing the deed.

A vivid illustration of this notion of identification in remorse can be seen in the following description from my interview with de Kock. The first interview I had with him followed his first appearance at a TRC public hearing. At this hearing he had asked to have a private meeting with the widows of two of his victims that were killed in the Motherwell Bombing.²⁶ When I asked him to tell me about the meeting with the two women, Pearl and Doreen, his face immediately dropped. He shifted his eyes uncomfortably and his mouth quivered. Tears welled up in his eyes. As he started to speak his hand trembled and he became visibly distressed. With a breaking voice he said

²⁶ The incident was named for Motherwell police station in Port Elizabeth, to which it was linked. As head of the covert operations unit at Vlakplaas, De Kock, in consultation with the head of security and the security department in Port Elizabeth, had masterminded the plan to have three black policemen blown up. The idea was to silence them from disclosing details of the killing of Matthew Goniwe and three others.

3. Forgiveness of the Perpetrator

Many questions come to mind when a perpetrator shows remorse. How can we accurately assess remorse? What did Eugene de Kock's expression of remorse mean? Was it a strategy to embellish his amnesty application, or did asking the family members of his victims for forgiveness have a more profound meaning for him? These questions will be addressed in the following pages. But first, I want to address some general issues concerning remorse, forgiveness and reconciliation.

3.1 What is Forgiveness?

When a perpetrator asks for forgiveness the process is as much for atonement as it is about giving back to the victim what was lost when the victim was harmed. Thus, forgiveness is a two-way process. It is supposed to restore something in both the perpetrator and victim. Forgiveness happens when both victim and perpetrator are able to share a common idiom of humanity, a sense of *human* relationship between them. This is probably the most crucial starting point in the encounter between victims and perpetrators. Laub (1991) articulates this point well in his account of the experience of a survivor of the Holocaust who witnessed some of the worst atrocities during the war and lost many members of her family. At the end of the war, explains Laub, she participates in the hunting down and killing of Nazi collaborators. But when a German youth is captured and brought to her for her to take revenge, she ends up caring for him cleaning and covering his wounds before handing him over to the POW Group. When asked why she did that, she replied, "How could I kill him – he looked into my face and I looked into his" (Laub, 1991, p. 85).

sincerity of an apology, and what causes perpetrators of atrocities to feel sorry for the terrible deeds they committed.

3.1.1 The Question of the Sincerity of an Apology

Forgiveness may have little to do with what the perpetrator does or says (Freedman & Enright 1996). Is it therefore the case that the two women who offered de Kock their forgiveness were motivated less by the question of the sincerity of his apology than their own need simply to *hear* the apology?

I want to argue that often victims are eager for a semblance of normality in their lives and to be relieved of the burden of anger, hatred and uncertainty evoked by the memory of their trauma. The perpetrator's apology provides an escape from the emotional burden of a hateful and painful past. The point is that there is nothing magical about the perpetrator's words. The simple words "I'm sorry" cannot restore a victim's emotional life after the tragedy of murder. The significance of a perpetrator's apology is in its being a turning around, a beginning.

A dramatic illustration of the idea of an apology as beginning comes from an encounter between a young teenage boy, Tshidiso Motatsi, and Paul van Vuuren, who murdered both Motatsi's parents when he was a little boy. Paul van Vuuren applied for amnesty for the murder of Motatsi's parents. He faced Motatsi in what appeared to be an extremely poor attempt at an apology. Yet Motatsi's response to this apparent lack of sincerity was a genuine sense of relief: "Today is my day. The man who killed my mother and my father came to me and said 'I'm sorry...'" The perpetrator's apology

know in the end it is: 'How are we going to do this?' There's no moment of pause..." (Interview, 1997).

Studzinski (1988) notes that it is a dramatic turn of events that force a review of one's life. It is only when the individual perpetrator is free of the protective and pressure-inducing characteristics of the group "that the truthful echoes of conscience have a chance to rise to the surface and a heartfelt 'I'm sorry' can be heard" (Shabad, 1988, p.126).

3.1.2.1 Undoing the Deed: The Healing Power of Remorse

Several important observations can be made from the encounter between a victim and a remorseful perpetrator. Firstly, when a perpetrator asks for forgiveness and shows genuine remorse, the apology has the potential to bring about mutual healing for both the victim and the perpetrator. The remorse is both a real and a symbolic act of undoing the harm the perpetrator has caused the victim. It acts as the key that unlocks the pain and sorrow in order for the victim to move on. Secondly, the encounter represents the turning of the tables where the power now lies in the hands of the victim: to grant or not to grant forgiveness that the perpetrator desires. Granting the forgiveness places the victim at a higher moral level than the perpetrator: treating the perpetrator with humanity, which the perpetrator was not able to do when he committed his atrocious act for which he now seeks forgiveness. Therefore, when victims grant forgiveness, it is partly to be on a different moral plane than that from which the perpetrator had operated. Thirdly, expressing a sincere apology restores an important aspect of being human in the perpetrator and therefore is a critical event in the perpetrator's re-entry into the realm of

mental processes that take place in these instances, and what does it take for us to reach this level of what can best be described as empathy with another? It can be argued that victims are seeking emotional relief, and that the act of forgiving lightens the burden of pain and anger. But we need to understand the mediating processes that take place in order for forgiveness to be granted. What processes are responsible for the shift from all the negative feelings associated with the loss of a loved one to an embrace of the perpetrator's apology?

Segal's (1973) conception of projective identification as representing forms of empathy offers a helpful guide. In projective identification and introjective identification there is something in the other that is felt to be part of the self, and something in the self that is felt to belong to the other. Empathy is about feeling *with* (identifying with) and *responding* to the pain of the other. There is a reciprocal emotional process that occurs between two people, one asking for empathy and another one offering it. This shared emotional process is what seems to be taking place between a perpetrator who pleads for forgiveness and a victim who offers such forgiveness. The two women widowed after their husbands died in the Motherwell Bombing needed to hear de Kock's genuine apology as much as de Kock needed to hear their forgiveness. When I conveyed the message of forgiveness to de Kock from the two women his reaction confirmed how important it was for him to hear their positive response to his apology. He said excitedly, almost like a little boy after hearing good news:

Well I'm stunned because I didn't know. They were crying so much and it wasn't something for just for the moment. It was raw like when a child cries because it really hurts. You know that is what they always say: heart-sore. That I could see yes. *Eg, eg beslis*. It was raw (Interview, April 1998).

aggressors will frequently feel the backbite of conscience, for in committing such harm, these individuals have not held true to the memory of their own suffering (Shabad, 1988, p.118).

If we look closely at the last part of these comments, the author makes implicit reference to identification with the aggressor: those who inflict pain upon others have themselves experienced pain and suffering at some point in their lives. The notion of “keeping faith” with oneself in the context of remorse is an interesting one, and makes one wonder to what extent earlier suffering and knowledge of what pain is like influences the expression of remorse. This is a subject for a separate study and can deepen our understanding of the aftermath of violence not only from the victim’s perspective but also from the perpetrator’s as well.

Let me return to the idea of remorse as the perpetrator’s cry to be admitted into the world of moral humanity. Much of what was happening in the interviews with de Kock was about this desperation to rejoin the ranks of a society in which he had become an outcast. It was interesting to observe how when I asked him challenging questions about his past, he tried to return to the story of his meeting with the two women who offered him forgiveness. His encounter with Pearl and Doreen, widows of his victims, and the emotional way in which he related the account of this meeting in my interview with him stood out as an event through which his human side surfaced. It was a special vignette for him to keep on returning to, not just to convince me of the human side lurking behind his caricatured image of “Prime Evil.” It was also important for *him* as well – it was as if he had re-found his humanity. Whenever he felt overwhelmed by discussion of the details of his murderous past he kept on returning to this vignette of the encounter with the two widows. The experience validated his sense of being human, and made him feel part of the human universe.

4. Differences in the Expression of Remorse in the Two case Studies

Why were these feelings associated with remorse not as strong among the marshals of Mlungisi as they were for de Kock? There is probably a myriad of factors that may be relevant to this question. These may differ from individual to individual, but a few can be identified. Firstly, the respondents in the Mlungisi case study had not become outcasts in their community as a result of their participation in the killing of Nosipho. In fact, when they were released from prison there was some kind of welcoming ceremony for them, which made them feel like heroes. So through the welcoming gesture of the community it seemed that what they had done was not recognised as bad. Although it was clear in my interviews that many people in Mlungisi were embarrassed by the bloody past which was orchestrated in part by the marshals, and in part condoned by the residents of Mlungisi, nobody openly talked about the past in negative terms. The marshals are therefore left to face the ghosts of their murderous past without the community so much as acknowledging that there was such a past.

Secondly, the psychological confusion that comes with this is that on the one hand they are murderers, which is something their conscience tells them. On the other hand, they have this memory of themselves as heroes, which can still falsely be maintained through the silencing of the other voice. Feelings of remorse are inconsistent with the bravado of heroism. But, as Shabad (1988) pointedly says, how can one successfully run away from oneself? They then have to engage various mechanisms to keep the feelings of remorse at bay including self-destructive tendencies. The final point I want to make about the differences in the experience of remorse in

Moreover, because the victims were neighbours, perpetrators daily have to deal with the reality of their brutality. Yet they can still escape from this reality by hiding behind the ambivalence of their position in the community. The result is that this neither gives them an opportunity to resolve the internal conflict connected to their past, nor does it give victims a chance to deal with their pain.

5. Nosipho's Mother and the Continuing Pain of her Trauma

The families of victims in the de Kock case study had received his apology and conveyed messages of forgiveness. But Nosipho's mother had had no such encounter with the men accused in the murder of her daughter. Yet she knows who they are and knows their families. I had prepared questions for an interview in which I would address the question of how she was coping with living in the same community with people who were involved in the murder of her daughter. It became very clear to me that the trauma of her daughter's death was still very much on the surface, so much so that I could not pursue the interview. When I approached her, tears started welling up in her eyes and shaking her head slowly she said: "That chapter is closed my child – it is closed." (Interview, January 1998).

I mentioned earlier that Mrs Zamela, Nosipho's mother, could not begin the process of working through her pain because of the extent of silence in the community about what happened to her daughter. Additionally, none of the perpetrators had approached her to apologise. I could not explore whether in fact this was desirable from Mrs Zamela's perspective. Her tears seemed to come from an infinitely deep sadness. They belied her response of a "closed chapter." It was

7. Is forgiveness “a Black Thing”?

Did Pearl and Doreen forgive de Kock “easily”? Is there something about their being black that predisposed them to granting forgiveness to a man responsible for the murder of their husbands and many others? In this section I want to make some brief comments concerning the question whether black people forgive easily or not. First, it is important to mention that there are examples from the TRC where people from different racial and religious groups granted forgiveness to perpetrators. However, having said that, the question still needs to be addressed since it has come up in conversations about forgiveness. The following comments should not be seen to take away the preceding discussion in the chapter, but should be seen as part of the discussion and argument on a topic that is as complex as forgiveness is.

There are factors that are intrinsic in the relational structure of traditional black life, which I think continue to influence perspectives among some black people. This traditional perspective holds that a person needs others to become human (*umntu ngumntu ngabanye abantu*) and this is something that is rarely denied in traditional African settings when someone begs for it. I think that the commitment “to make an ‘other’ human” (*ukumenz’umntu*) among black people supersedes the commitment of some religious groups, such as Christians, to forgive. This is intrinsic in the culture and embodies the very definition of humanity, *ubuntu*. Forgiving then might be an extension of this very high degree of embracing humanity or showing another what it is to be human. Steve Biko, long before the era of negotiations, truth and reconciliation, declared that it is up to black people to restore the quality of humanity to South Africa: “In time we shall be in a position to bestow upon South Africa the greatest gift possible – a more human face” (Biko, 1996, p.98).

The TRC's Amnesty Committee is in the process of considering de Kock's application for amnesty. He may be granted amnesty for some of the crimes for which he has been serving his prison sentence. It is probably hard for some people to imagine that someone with his record can be pardoned for the crimes he committed. Many other perpetrators who have committed similar atrocities as de Kock have already received amnesty. The difference is that many of those perpetrators showed no signs of remorse, or of regret for that matter. And here lies my reservation about the amnesty process and the idea of *political* pardoning. What is the moral basis for pardoning perpetrators who have no regrets for what they have done? Apology and remorse did not form part of the requirements for amnesty. This has enabled some perpetrators to treat victims with disregard at public hearings.

We normally assume that when there is no punishment then there is a breakdown of law. If amnesty were to be granted because there is acknowledgement of wrongdoing – not just an inventory of political crimes committed – and some indication of change of heart, then amnesty could be viewed as part of justice. Unfortunately, attitudes cannot be legislated and perhaps the absence of a clause that requires perpetrators to apologise has made it easier to assess with some measure of certainty the sincerity of those who did ask for forgiveness from their victims. A perpetrator's genuine apology can have a powerful healing effect on the victim and on the victim's journey with her or his trauma. Through his empathic grief (Gorelick, 1988) the perpetrator mourns the loss he has caused and so acknowledges the pain that the victim suffered. For the family members of a victim this is an important sign through which they can find a language to talk about their trauma. This is what Nosipho's mother has been denied. Doreen and Pearl, only two of the many families left traumatised by de Kock's activities, have had their moment of relief and communicated their

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSIONS

1. Introduction

In this dissertation, I have tried to unravel the complexities of violent behaviour and to propose some theoretical formulations based on my findings. In the following pages I explore where my analysis takes us in the context of previous studies, and I look at some of the strengths and weaknesses of my study.

1.1 The Problem of Understanding

Christopher Browning (1992) ended his investigation of the case of the Reserve Police Battalion 101 in his book *Ordinary Men* with the following words:

This story of ordinary men is not the story of all men. The reserve policemen faced choices, and most of them committed terrible deeds. But those who killed cannot be absolved by the notion that anyone in the same situation would have done as they did. For even among them, some refused to kill and others stopped killing. Human responsibility *is ultimately an individual matter*. (Browning, 1992, p.188, italics added).

At the same time, however, Browning noted, the collective behaviour of the reserve policemen in their merciless murder of Polish Jews had deeply disturbing implications. He posed this question: if the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 could become murderers under conditions of “incessant propagandizing” (p.184), bureaucratisation of killing, executing official policy,

circumstances that we have found to have mediated his behaviour? Many authors, particularly those writing on the Holocaust, have raised questions about the issue of understanding perpetrators. Fackenheim (cited in McRobert, 1989 and in Rosenbaum, 1998) for example, has come up with the concept of a “double move,” which is “to seek an explanation but also to resist explanation” (quoted in Rosenbaum, 1998, p.395). Rosenbaum elaborates on the significance of this paradox:

[This means] not to resist all or any inquiry, not to resist thought, but to resist the misleading exculpatory corollaries of explanation. To resist the way explanation can become evasion or consolation, ... by shifting responsibility from [the perpetrator] to faceless abstractions, inexorable forces, or irresistible compulsions that gave him no choice or made his choice irrelevant (Rosenbaum, 1998, p.195).

These writers draw our attention to the ever-present problem inherent in trying to understand the motivation behind atrocities. In trying to understand, invariably our explanations interlock with sympathy for the perpetrator. Part of the pull towards sympathy, rather than antipathy is the fact that in the final analysis perpetrators are humans like us. Part of the magnetism also comes from our role as thinking, language-making creatures. In other words, we believe that the dynamism of language can help us in the search for explanations of the grim destruction that fills the pages of history. Not so, argues Claude Lanzmann (1991) in his campaign against efforts to understand Hitler, referring to such efforts as “the obscenity of understanding.” All attempts at understanding represent for him “[w]hat I have called the obscenity of the very project of understanding” (Landzmann, 1991, p.480).

label in its application to de Kock, I believe the evidence in this dissertation overwhelmingly concludes that the label is misguided. To repeat, my purpose is not to exonerate him from the detestable deeds, rather, the investigation in this dissertation has been conducted with a view to map out the complex path that led to the atrocities he committed. It is one thing to know what happened, but it is another to understand how it happened. There is another challenge beyond understanding and that is to figure out what lessons can be learned from all of this. This is the challenge I hope that this study has stimulated.

2. Collective Violence and Theoretical Conclusions

In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 I presented an extensive literature review and highlighted the shortcomings of some of the dominant concepts used in the discourse on collective violence. In particular, I was critical of the frustration aggression theory and the theory of relative deprivation. One of the intrinsic flaws of frustration aggression theory is its emphasis on the learning aspects of aggression (Dahlberg, 1996; Moses, 1999; Vig, 1998; Williams et al. 1998), which implicitly blames the victims of human rights abuses for their collective protest. Yet this claim has been contradicted in some studies (Barker, 1999).

At the same time, the theory of relative deprivation has been hailed as a “winner” (Carter, 1986a) by some studies. In addition to the other problems I mentioned earlier in the dissertation, another problem with the application of the theory of relative deprivation is that the notion of “comparison” and similarity between groups, which is central in the theory, does not always apply in situations of violence in South Africa. It has been found (Carter, 1983; 1986a; 1986b;

only describes what happens in a crowd, the description is a valid observation of what sometimes happens in a violent crowd. I understand the phenomenon described as de-individuation – a state of feeling as if one has lost oneself (which in essence one has) – to be explicable only in psychoanalytic terms. Psychoanalytic group theory points out that it is in the nature of crowds that they provide some kind of receptacle for all the threatening impulses that are projected by group members.

I have found the social identity theory to be particularly compelling as a theory that can more effectively than others explain the social cognitive factors in the case study of collective violence presented in this dissertation. But, as I have shown, social identity theory has not been able to explain some of the critical issues that concern the place of individual dynamics in collective behaviour. I have tried to address this problem using the model described in Chapter 3 and illustrated in Fig.1. I was able not only to explain what happened collectively in the necklace incident of the murder of Nosipho Zamela, but also what happened to the people interviewed at the individual level. Although I cannot generalise my findings as such, I feel I can justifiably propose the model I present on page 98 as a more general statement and a “minitheory” (Weiss, 1994, p.179).

3. Perpetrator Studies and Conclusions on the de Kock Case Study

Two main streams of thought have emerged from recent studies of perpetrators of political and criminal violence. The first leans strongly towards a view that blames societal conditions for violence. The second stream of thought locates the roots of violence in familial relationships and

[I]t is possible to argue that some people are violent *and* mentally ill, but it is no longer defensible to argue that people are violent *because* they are mentally ill (Rhodes, 1999, p.321)

I want to suggest that the wellsprings of violence are not as clear-cut as Rhodes (1999) would have us believe. Many theories have been suggested and many models developed to answer the question: why? But none of them on their own have been able to answer this vexing question. In contrast to these views, Gilligan (1992) makes it his mission to show just the opposite of what Rhodes (1999) and Athens (1992) have argued, and takes the extreme position of advocating for an approach that will reduce the blameworthiness of perpetrators of violent acts. He is highly critical of laws that execute extreme forms of punishment without an attempt to understand (i.e. to appreciate the *meaning* of) the brutal and serious crimes committed in violent crime.

Let me approach the discussion from another angle. It is a kind of consolation prize to assume that those who get involved in merciless violence are suffering from one or another kind of mental aberration. But to suggest that individuals *choose* violence and therefore ought to carry the burden of responsibility simplifies the problems. Equally, to claim that because of “the tragic flaw of civilization” (Gilligan, 1996, p.245) the law has no place in executing tough justice to violent individuals is a bit of an extreme view. That individuals – violent or otherwise – are products of the deep structure of civilisation and that there is something built in our society – family and social institutions – that produces violence cannot be contested. But this does not mean that our perception of their blameworthiness should be reduced. It is a difficult balance to recognise the role of structural factors while holding individuals accountable for the choices they make.

that ultimately fostered the creation of a “monster” in de Kock, to use a traditional and clichéd term. The monster was created by the social values legitimated by the privileged white society and sanctioned by a government that protected white privilege. The many positions he held under apartheid – from being head of the brutal Koevoet unit in Namibia to being head of the covert operations unit at Vlakplaas – all of which demanded extreme violence, attest to this sanctioning and encouragement of a life of violence. It could be argued that de Kock could have resisted, i.e. chosen not to commit his atrocities, but given his personal past and the fact that he was “violently coached” (to paraphrase Rhodes, 1999) by a government and a dominant white society that valued him, could he have functioned otherwise?

4. The Question of Choice

The subject of bystanders and of perpetrators of politically motivated atrocities share some assumptions, one of which is the issue of the social construction of responsibility. This draws our attention to the practical (how) and normative (moral) dimensions of that process. The question of responsibility is one that has been posed by Orlando Patterson (1999) in his book *Rituals of Blood*. Patterson (1999) poses the question in the context of the history of slavery in the United States. He suggests that what is needed is a process of negotiating responsibility for the past and future of race relations in America, which he says is about knowing the pain. A question that comes to mind is why this responsibility is not exercised *at the time* atrocities are committed. This question has implications on the issue of choice both at the level of the direct perpetrators of atrocities and of bystanders.

The power of apartheid lies in the hierarchies of power that were established to keep blacks fixed in “their place.” It is these hierarchies and alliances of power among whites that enable white people to enforce dominance over blacks and perpetuate (rather than to make the choice to reverse this) their exclusion from the mainstream culture in all structures of society. Therefore, the networks that operated to humiliate, subordinate, and exclude black people did not rest solely on the institution of apartheid. They became an institution in themselves. The post-apartheid record and subtle racism among some white people makes that very clear. It is a violence of a different kind, and shows us how entrenched white domination is in our society. The fires of the 1980s in South Africa were mutually reinforced by the desire to maintain this domination on one side of the conflict, and the desire to overcome it on the other. Understanding how individuals from both sides of the conflict became so violent in the process was the goal of the work I have presented in this dissertation. Along with the continuing efforts to find explanations for violence, the challenge is to find ways in which people can be encouraged to speak out against potentially destructive tendencies in society, including policies of our government.

5. Strengths, Weaknesses and Directions for Future Research:

5.1 The Strengths of the Study

One of the strengths of the study is its focus on the police and systematically demonstrating how the actions of the police can be linked to collective violence. Previous studies of violence in South Africa have only cast a cursory eye at the direct role of the police in collective violence in the townships. Another unique feature of the study is the focus on intensive interviews with

It also shows the importance and achievements of the TRC process where victims were given a chance to tell their stories and perpetrators an opportunity to examine their respective individual roles in the atrocities of the past. One of the questions raised by my examination of remorse in Chapter 8 is whether victims were better off before they told their stories than they were after telling their stories. Were the two women who forgave de Kock better off, or was Nosipho Zamela's mother better off? The question can be applied more broadly and we can ask whether remembering benefits societies that suffered trauma more than forgetting. This is not an easy question to answer, but I think it depends on *how* the past is remembered. If the memory is kept alive in order to kindle and cultivate old hatreds and resentments, then it is likely to culminate in hateful vengeance. But if memory is kept alive in order to transcend hateful emotions, to free oneself or one's society from the burden of hatred, then remembering has the power to heal.

5.2 Limitations of the Study

One of the problems with this study is that only one subject from apartheid atrocities has been studied. Focusing on de Kock may cause us to lose sight of the larger truth. But I have tried in my analysis to put his violent and brutal behaviour in its proper context, i.e. weaving in the personal with the political and the social. There are some aspects of the study I could not explore because I had to narrow the study to a manageable substantive frame, given space considerations. I will discuss these unexplored aspects of the study in terms of the gaps that I perceive as need for future research.

rage in political violence? This is important in the research on politically motivated violence where gender is rarely, if at all, addressed.

5.2.2 Collective Violence as Ritual

One of the questions I had hoped to explore was to what extent the necklace murder of Nosipho was a ritualised event collectively shared to cleanse the community of the “evil” in its midst. Several writers (Beers, 1992; Bergesen, 1977; Parkin, 1992; Patterson, 1998) have eloquently demonstrated the role of ritual in collective violence using the religious perspective. My thoughts, however, were to approach this question not from the point of view of ritual as a religious process, but rather to treat ritual as a political process that evolves as part of the transformation that a community goes through during times of struggle. This is an area that must be explored in studies of collective violence.

- Allport, G. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Cambridge: Addison Wesley.
- Altermeyer, B. (1988). *Enemies of freedom*. San Fransisco: Jessey-Bass.
- Améry, J., (1980). *At the mind's limits: Contemplation by a survivor on Auschwitz and its realities*. Trans. S. Rosenfeld and S. P. Rosenfeld. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Arcuri, L. & Cadinu, M. R. (1997). Cognitive and affective factors in the development and maintenance of biased intergroup relations. *Swiss Journal of Psychology (Schweizerische Zeitschrift Fuer Psychologie)*, 56, 145-155.
- Arendt, H. (1970). *On violence*. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company.
- Arendt, H. (1973). *The origins of totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
- Arendt, H. (1994) *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Arnold, T. E. (1987). *The violence formula: Why people lend sympathy and support to terrorism*. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books.
- Aronson, E. (1969). The theory of cognitive dissonance: A current perspective, in L. Berkowitz (ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology*, pp. 1-34. New York: Academic Press.
- Asch, S. (1952). Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgements. In H. Guetzow (ed.) *Groups, leadership and man*. Pittsburgh: Carnegie Publishers.
- Asch, S. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity: A minority of one against a unanimous majority. *Psychological Monographs*, 70, 1-70.

- Berkowitz, L. (1974). Some determinants of impulsive aggression: the role of mediated associations with reinforcements of aggression. *Psychological Review*, 81, 165-176.
- Bergesen, A., (1982). Race Riots of 1967: An Analysis of Police Violence in Detroit and Newark. *Journal of Black Studies*, 12, 261-274.
- Bergesen, A. (1977) Political Witch Hunts: The sacred and the subversive in cross-national perspective. *American Sociological Review*, 42, 220-233.
- Berkowitz, L., (1993). *Aggression: Its causes, consequences, and control*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
- Bies, R. J., and Tripp, T. M. (1996). Beyond distrust. "Getting even" and the need for revenge. In R. M. Kramer and T. R. Tyler (eds.), *Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and research*, pp. 246-260. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Biko, S. (1996). *I write what I like: A selection of his writings*. Randburg: Raven Press.
- Billig, M. (1985). Prejudice, categorisation and particularisation: From a perceptual to a rhetorical approach. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 15, 79-103.
- Billig, M. & Tajfel, H. (1973). Social categorisation and similarity in intergroup behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 3, 27-52.
- Bion, W. (1959). Attacks on linking. *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, 40, 308-315.
- Bion, W. (1962). A theory of thinking. *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, 43, 306-310.
- Bion, W. (1972). *Experiences in groups and other papers*. London: Tavistock Publications
1962

Canetti, E. (1966). *Crowds and power*. New York: Penguin Books.

Carter, G. (1983). *Explaining the severity of the 1960s black rioting*. Unpublished doctoral thesis, Columbia University.

Carter, G. L. (1986a). In the narrows of the 1960s U. S. black rioting. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 30, 115-127.

Carter, G. (1986b). "The 1960s black riots revisited." *Sociological Inquiry*, 56, 210-228.

Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1987). The blind man and the elephant: selective examination of the private-public literature gives rise to a faulty perception. *Journal of Personality*, 55, 525-541.

Chalk, F. (1997). Redefining genocide. In G. J. Andreopoulos (ed.), *Genocide: Conceptual and historical dimensions*, pp. 47-63. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Chidester, D. (1991). *Shots in the streets: Violence and religion in South Africa*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Coleman, J. S. (1986a). Social Theory, Social Research and a Theory of Action. *American Journal of Sociology*, 91, 1309-1335.

Coleman, J. S. (1986b). *Individual interests and collective action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Colman, A. (1991a) Crowd psychology in South African murder trials. *American Psychologist*, 46, 1071-1079.

Colman, A. (1991b). Psychological evidence in South African trials. *The Psychologist*, 4, 482-486.

- Deutsch, M. & Gerard, H. B. (1955). A study of normative and informational influences upon individual judgement. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 56, 5-18.
- Diener, E. (1977) Deindividuation: Causes and consequences. *Social Behavior and Personality*, 5, 143-155.
- Diener, E. (1980) Deindividuation: The absence of self-awareness and self-regulation in group members. In P. B. Paulus (Ed.), *The psychology of group influence*, pp. 209-241. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Dobson, E.(1985). Black funerals in Queenstown. Unpublished dissertation, Rhodes University.
- Doise, W. (1982). Report on the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 12, 105-111.
- Dollard, J., Doob, L. W., Miller, N. E., Mowrer, N. H., & Sears, R.R., (1969). *Frustration and aggression*. New York: Yale University Press.
- Duckitt, J. & Mphuthing, T., (1998). Group identification and intergroup attitudes: A longitudinal analysis in South Africa. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*. 74, 80-85.
- Dutton, G., & Golant, S. K. (1995). *The batterer: A psychological profile*. New York: Basic Books.
- Ehrlich, H. (1973). *The social psychology of prejudice*. New York: Wiley.
- Emler N. & Hopkins, N. (1990). Reputation, social identity and the self. In D. Abrams & M. Hogg (eds.), *Social identity theory: Constructive and critical advance*, pp.113-130.
- Erikson, E. (1959). *Ego development and historical change: Identity and the life cycle*. New York: International Universities Press.

Foster, D. (1990). Expert testimony on collective violence. In D. Hansson & D. van Zyl Smit (Eds.) *Towards justice? Crime and state control in South Africa*, pp. 154-172. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Foster, D. (1998a). Causes, motives and perspectives of perpetrators. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa report, vol. 5, pp. 259-303. Cape Town: Juta & Co. Ltd.

Foster, D. (1998b). Perpetrators of gross violations of human rights. Unpublished report submitted to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Foster, D., & Durrheim, K. (1998). Crowds, psychology and crowd control. In E. Bornman, R. van Eeden, & M. Wentzel (Eds.), *Violence in South Africa: A variety of perspectives* (pp 117-146).

Foster & Louw-Potgieter (1991). *Social psychology in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Lexicon Publishers.

Freedman, S. R., and Enright, R. D. (1996). Forgiveness as an intervention goal with incest survivors. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, 64, 983-992.

Freud, S. (1920). *Beyond the pleasure principle*. S. E., 18.

Freud, S. (1961). The ego and the id. S. E., vol. 14. London: Hogarth Press.

Freud, S. (1921). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. *Standard Edition, Volume 18*.

Freud, S. (1917). *Mourning and Melancholia*. S. E. 14.

Freud, S. (1933). *New introductory lectures in Psychoanalysis*. New York: Norton.

Freud, A. (1936). *The ego and the mechanisms of defense: The writings of Anna Freud, Vol. 2*. New York: International University Press.

Gobodo-Madikizela, P. (1998). The cry of apartheid's crusader: A psychoanalytic analysis of an encounter with Eugene de Kock. Unpublished paper presented at the International Conference for Psychoanalysis, April 1998, Cape Town.

Goldhagen, D. J. (1996). *Hitler's willing executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*. New York: Knopf.

Goldstein, R., Powers S.I., McCusker, J., and Lewis, B. F. (1996). Lack of remorse in antisocial personality disorder among drug abusers in residential treatment. *Journal of Personality Disorders*, 10, 321-334.

Gorelick, K. (1988). Wielder of many swords: Remorse and its transmutations. *Psychotherapy Patient*, 5, 219-234.

Gould, R. (1972). *Child studies through fantasy: Cognitive affective patterns in development*. New York: Quadrangle Books.

Grimshaw, A. D. (1963). Government and social violence: The complexity of guilt. *The Minnesota Review*, 3, 236-249.

Grimshaw, A. D. (1969a). *Racial violence in the United States*. Chicago: Aldine.

Grimshaw, A. D., (1969b). Three views of urban violence: Civil disturbance, racial revolt, class assault. In A. D. Grimshaw (ed.), *Racial violence in the United States*, pp.385-396. Chicago: Aldine.

Gurney, J. N. & Tierney, K. J. (1982). Relative deprivation and social movements: A critical look at twenty years of theory and research. *Sociological Quarterly*, 23, 33-47.

Gurr, T. (1968). Urban Disorder: Perspectives from the comparative study of civil strife. In L. H. Masotti and D. R. Bowen (eds.), *Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the urban community*, pp. 51-67 Beverly Hills: Sage Publications

about social cognition? Research on socially shared cognition in small groups, pp. 29-56. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Haslam, S. A., Turner, J. C., Oaks, P. J., McGarty, C. & Reynolds, K. J. (1998). The group as a basis for emergent stereotype consensus. In W. Stroebe and M. Hewstone (eds.), *European Review of Social Psychology*, Vol. 8, pp. 203-239. Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons Inc.

Heimann, P. (1952). Notes on the theory of the life and death instincts. In J. Riviere (ed), *Developments in psychoanalysis*, pp. 321-337. London: Hogarth Press.

Henricson-Cullberg, M., (1984). God as holding function--a religious conversion. *Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review*, 7, 184-194.

Herman, J. (1992). *Trauma and Recovery. The aftermath of violence – From domestic abuse to political terror*. New York: Basic Books.

Higginbotham, Jr, A. L. (1990). *The Federal courts, yesterday, today, and tomorrow. Speeches by A. Leon. Higginbotham Jr*. San Francisco: U.S. Northern District of California Historical Society.

Hilberg, R. (1985). *The destruction of the European Jews*. New York: Holmes.

Hinshelwood, R. D. (1989). *A dictionary of Kleinian thought*. London: Free Association Books.

Hirsch, M. (1996). Zwei Arten der Identifikation mit dem aggressor: Nach Ferenczi und Anna Freud. *Praxi der Kinderpsychologie und Kinderpsychiatrie*, 45, 198-205.

Hovland, C. I. & Sears, R. (1940). Minor studies of aggression: Correlation of lynchings with economic indices. *Journal of Psychology*, 9, 301-310.

Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1988). *Social identifications: A social psychology of intergroup relations and group processes*. London: Routledge.

Jenkins, R. (1992). *Social identity*. London: Routledge.

Jetten, J., Spears, R. & Manstead A. S. R. (1997). Strength of identification and intergroup differentiation: The influence of group norms. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 27, 603-609.

Juni, S. (1991). Remorse as a derivative psychoanalytic construct. *American Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 5, 71-81.

Kaarbo, J., & Beasley, R. K. (1999). A practical guide to the comparative case study method in political psychology. *Political Psychology*, 20, 369-391.

Kane-Berman, J. (1993). *Political violence in South Africa*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.

Karmiloff-Smith, A. & Inhelder, B. 1975). If you want to get ahead, get a theory. *Cognition*, 3, 195.

Katz, J. (1991). *Seductions of crime*. New York: Basic Books.

Kelley, H. H. (1952). Two functions of reference groups. In G. E. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb, & E. L. Hartely (eds.) *Readings in social psychology*, pp. 410-414. New York: Rinehart and Winston.

Kelly, C. (1989). Political identity and perceived intragroup homogeneity. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 28, 239-250.

Kelman, H. C. & Hamilton, V. L. (1989). *Crimes of obedience: Toward a social psychology of authority and responsibility*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kelman, H. C. (1995). The social context of torture: Policy process and authority structure. In R. D. Crelinsten, A. P. Schmid, (Eds) *The politics of pain: Torturers and their masters. Series on state violence, state terrorism, and human rights*, (pp. 19-34). Boulder: Westview Press.

- Kressel, N. J. (1996). *Mass hate: The global rise of genocide and terror*. New York & London: Plenum Press.
- Krupp, G. R. (1965). Identification as a defense against anxiety in coping with loss. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 46, 303-314.
- Landman, J. (1993). *Regret: The persistence of the possible*. New York: Oxford University Press..
- Landzmann, C. (1991). The obscenity of understanding: An evening with Claude Landzmann:. *American Imago*, 48,480-487.
- Larson, L. R. (1994). "Betrayal and repetition: Understanding aggression in sexually abused girls": Comment. *Clinical Social Work Journal*, 22, 331-332.
- Le Bon, G. (1960). *The Crowd: A study of the popular mind*. New York: The Viking Press.
- Levine, J. E., (1996). Oklahoma City: The storying of a disaster. *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, 67, pp. 21-38.
- Lieberson, S. & Silverman, C. J. (1965a). The precipitants and underlying conditions of race riots. *American Sociological Review*, Winter, 887-898.
- Lieberson, S. & Silverman, C. J. (1965b). *Police riots*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Lifton, R. (1967). *Death in life: Survivors of Hiroshima*. New York: Basic Books.
- Lifton, R. (1983). The doctors of Auschwitz: The biomedical vision. *The Psychohistory Review*, 11, 36-44.
- Lifton, R. J. (1986) *The Nazi doctors: Medical killing and the psychology of genocide*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers.

McPhail, C. (1994). The dark side of purpose: Individual and Collective Violence in Riots. *The Sociological Quartely*, 35, 1-30.

McPhail, C. & Miller, D. L. (1973). The assembling process: A theoretical and empirical examination. *American Sociological Review*, 38, 721-735.

McRobert, L. (1989). Emil Fackenheim and radical evil. *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 58, 325-339.

Maddock, J. (1995). The perpetrator/victim interaction pattern in sexual assault and abuse. *Nordisk Sexologi*, 13, 142-148.

Magona, S. (1998a). *Mother to Mother*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Magona, S. (1998b). Racial hatred in South Africa. *New York Times*, 14 August.

Marques, J., Abrams, D., Paez, D. & Martinez-Tboada, C. (1998). The role of categorization and in-group norms in judgements of groups and their members. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 75, 976-988.

Martin-Baró, I. (1988). Political violence and war as causes of psychosocial trauma in El Salvador. *Revista de Psicología de El Slavador*, 28, 123-141.

Martin-Baró, I, Aron, A. & Corne, S. (1994). *Writings for a liberation psychology*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Meissner, S. J., Rizzuto, A., Sashin, J. I. & Buie, D. H. (1987). A view of aggression in phobic states. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 56, 452-476.

Milgram, S. 1974. *Obedience to authority*. New York: Harper & Row.

Miller, A. (1990). *For your own good: Hidden cruelty in child-rearing and the roots of violence*. New York: Noonday Press.

Moses, A., (1999). Exposure to violence, depression, and hostility in a sample of inner city high school youth. *Journal of Adolescence*, 22, 21-32.

Muller, E. N. (1972). A test of a partial theory of potential for political violence. *American Political Science Review*, 66, 928-959.

Mohanty, C. (1991). Under Western eyes: Feminist scholarship and colonial discourses. In C. Mohanty, A. Russo, and L. Torres (eds.), *Third world women and the politics of feminism*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Murji, K., (1985). Observing the Brixton Riot. *New Society*, 74, 6-8

Myers, D. J. (1994) Racial rioting in the 1960s: An event history analysis of local conditions. *American Sociological Review*, 62, 94-112.

Nieburg H.L. (1962). "The threat of violence and social change" *American Political Science Review*, 56, 865-871.

Nierburg, H. L., (1972). Agonistics-rituals of conflict. In J. F. Short, Jr. & M. E. Wolfgang (eds.), *Collective violence*, pp. 82-99. Chicago: Aldine.

Nissani, M. (1989a). An experimental paradigm for the study of conceptual conservatism and change. *Psychological Reports*, 65, 19-24.

Nissani, M. (1989b). A hands-on instructional approach to the conceptual shift aspect of scientific discovery. *Journal of College Science Teaching*, 19, 105-107.

Nissani, M. (1990). A cognitive reinterpretation of Stanley Milgram's observations on obedience to authority. *American Psychologist*, pp. 1384-1385.

O'Shaughnessy, E. (1988). W.R. Bion's theory of thinking and new techniques in child analysis. In E. Bott Spillus (ed.), *Melanie Klein Today: Developments in theory and practice*, Vol.2, 177-190. New York: Routledge.

Otto Rank (1936) outlined in his book *Will therapy and truth and reality*. New York: Knopf.

Padula, M. A., and Miller, D. L. (1999). Understanding graduate women's reentry experiences: Case studies of four psychology doctoral students in a Midwestern university. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 23, pp. 327-343.

Parkin, D. (1992). Ritual as spatial direction and bodily division. In D. de Coppet (ed), *Understanding rituals*. London: Routledge.

Parsons, T. 1958. An approach to psychological theory in terms of the theory of action. In S. Koch (ed.) *A study of science*, pp. 612-711. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Parsons, T. 1960. Social strains in America. In T. Parsons (ed.), *Structure and process in modern societies*, pp. 226-247. Glencoe: Free Press.

Patterson, O. (1998). *Rituals of blood: Consequences of slavery in two American centuries*. Washington D.C.: Civitas Counterpoint.

Peretti, P. & Singletary, D., 1981. A theoretical-historical approach to black lynching. *Social Behavior and Personality*, 9, 227-230.

Pillay, N. (1988). *Political role of the South African judiciary*. Cambridge: Harvard Law School.

Pollard, M. (1997). *The other face of love: Dialogues with the prison experience of Albert Speer*. New York: Times Books.

Reicher, S. D. (1991) Politics of crowd psychology. *The Psychologist*, 4, 487-491.

Reicher, S. (1996). The battle of Westminster: Developing the social identity model of crowd behaviour in order to deal with the initiation and development of collective conflict. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 26, 115-134.

Reiner, R. (1980). Forces of Disorder: How the Police Control 'Riots'. *New Society*, 52, 51-54.

Rhodes, R. (1990). *A hole in the world*. New York: Knopf.

Rhodes, R. (1999). *Why they kill: The discoveries of a maverick criminologist*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Robinson D.T., Smith-Lovin & L. Tsoudis, O. (1994). Heinous crime or unfortunate accident? The effects of remorse on responses to mock criminal confessions. *Social Forces*, 73, 175-190.

Robson, C. (1993). *Real world research*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Rogers R. W. & Prentice-Dunn S. (1981). Deindividuation and anger-mediated interracial aggression: Unmasking regressive racism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 41, 63-73.

Rosenbaum, R. (1999). *Explaining Hitler: The search for the origins of his evil*. New York: Harper Perennial.

Ross, D. (1998). *Looking into the eyes of a killer: A psychiatrist's journey through the murderer's world*. New York: Plenum Trade.

Rossi, P. H., Berk, R. A., and Eidson, B. (1974). *The roots of urban discontent*. New York: Wiley.

Ruddick, S. (1989). *Maternal thinking: Toward a politics of peace*. New York: Ballantine.

Schlemmer, L. (1997). Political violence in South Africa: Can it be resolved? In A. Minnaar & M. Hough (Eds.), *Conflict, violence and conflict resolution: Where is South Africa heading*, (pp.1-17). Pretoria: Human Sciences research Council.

Schneider, D. J. (1976). *Social Psychology*.

Skocpol, T. (1976). France, Russia, China: A structural analysis of social revolutions. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 18, 175-210.

Shabad, P. (1988). Remorse: The echo of inner truth. *The Psychotherapy Patient*, 5, 113-133.

Segal, H. (1973). *Introduction to the work of Melanie Klein*. London: Hogarth.

Shaw, J. (1988). The usefulness of remorse. *Psychotherapy Patient*, 5, 77-82.

Short, J. F. Jr., & Wolfgang M. E. (1972). *Collective violence*. New York: Aldine-Atherton.

Smelser, N. J. (1962). *Theory of collective behaviour*. New York: Free Press.

Smith, J. A. (1995a) Qualitative methods, identity and transition to motherhood. *The Psychologist*, March, pp. 122-125.

Smith, J.A. (1995b). Bridging the divide between cognition and discourse: using interpretative phenomenological analysis in health psychology. *Psychology and Health*.

Solomon, R. C. (1978). *The passions*. New York: Anchor Press.

Snyder, D. (1979). Collective violence processes: Implications for disaggregated theory and research. In L. Kriesberg (ed), Greenwich, Connecticut: Jai Press Inc. *Research in social movements, conflicts and change: A research annual*

Stevens, B. F. (1996). The effects of sexual trauma on the self in clinical work. In B. Gerson (ed.), *The therapist as a person: Life crises, life choices, life experiences, and their effects on treatment*, pp. 183-206. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic press, Inc.

Stierlin, H. (1976). *Adolf Hitler: A family perspective*. New York: The Psychohistory Press.

Studzinski, R. (1988). Transcending a past: From remorse to reconciliation in the aging process. *The Psychotherapy Patient*, 5, 207-218.

Swartz, L. (1989) *Aspects of culture in South African psychiatry*. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Cape Town.

Tajfel, H. (1957). Value and the perceptual judgement of magnitude. *Psychological Review*, 64, 192-204.

Tajfel, H. (1959). Quantitative judgement in social perception. *British journal of psychology*, 50, 16-29.

Tajfel H. (1969). Cognitive aspects of prejudice. *Journal of Social Issues*, 25, 79-97.

Tajfel, H. (1972a). Some developments in European social psychology. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 2, 307-322.

Tajfel, H. (1972b). Experiments in a vacuum. In J. Israel and H. Tajfel (Eds.), *The context of social psychology: A critical assessment*. London: Academic Press.

Tajfel, H., (1978). *Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations*. London: Academic Press.

Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 33, 1-39.

Turner, J. C. (1985). Social categorisation and the self-concept: A social cognitive theory of group behaviour. In E. J. Lawler (ed.), *Advances in group processes: Theory and research*, vol. 2, pp. 77-122. Greenwich: JAI Press.

Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A., & McGarty, C. (1994). Self and collective: Cognition and social context. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 20, 454-463.

Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). *Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorisation theory*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Turner, J. C., Sachtev, I. & Hogg, M. (1983). Social categorisation, interpersonal attraction and group formation. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 22, 227-239.

Turner, C. W. & Simons, L. S. (1974). Effects of subject sophistication and apprehension evaluation on aggressive response to weapons. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 30, 341-348.

Verkuyten, M. and Nekuee, S. (1999). Ingroup bias: The effect of stereotyping, identification and group threat. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 29, 411-418.

Vescio, T. K., Hewstone, M., Crisp, R. J. and Rubin, J. M. (1999). Perceiving and responding to multiply categorizable individuals: Cognitive processes and affective intergroup bias. In D. Abrams and M. Hogg (eds.), *Social identity and social cognition*, pp. 111-140. Oxford: Blackwell.

Vig, S., (1996). Young children's exposure to community violence. *Journal of Early Intervention*, 20, 319-328.

Wallace, D. B. (1989). Studying the individual: The case study method and other genres. In D. B. Wallace H. E. Gruber, (eds.), , pp. 25-43. *Creative people at work: Twelve cognitive case studies*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wiesenthal, S. (1976). *The Sunflower*. New York: Schocher Books.

Woelz-Stirling, N. A., Kelaheer, M., Manderson, L., (1998). Power and the politics of abuse: Rethinking violence in Filipina-Australian marriages. *Health Care for Women International*. 19, 289-301.

Yin, R. (1994). *Case study research*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publishers.

Zimbardo, P. (1970). The human choice: Individuation, reason and order versus deindividuation, impulse and chaos. In W. J. Arnold & D. Levine (eds.), *Nebraska symposium on motivation*, pp. 237-307. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.