

**A NEO-INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
OF OPPOSITION STRUCTURES
IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT**

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Political democracy depends not only on the economic and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions.

-James March & Johan Olsen

ABSTRACT

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Title: A Neo-Institutional Analysis of Opposition Structures in the South African Parliament

South Africa's negotiated parliamentary system is a hybrid of political institutions based upon different models of democracy. Theoretically, there are two broad models from which South Africa's system draws its characteristics: consociational democracy, and majoritarian democracy. Both models of democracy bestow certain characteristics on the South African system which affect how opposition politics operate within the system.

Concern has been raised about the ability of opposition politics to function in, and contribute to, the operation of the South African Parliament. The many consociational characteristics of the South African system may have created opposition structures which are emaciated of their duties, rights and responsibilities. This concern prompted an investigation into the operation of the opposition structures of the South African Parliament.

The basis of the neo-Institutional analysis is the premise that the behaviour of actors within a system (in this case, Members of Parliament within Parliament) is shaped by the rules and structure of that system. As such, the opposition behaviour of

parties and individuals in the South African Parliament is shaped by the rules and structure of Parliament.

This paper first presents the theoretical considerations of a neo-Institutionalist examination. The theory is explored by examining the literature of rational choice theorists as well as Historical Institutionalists. Secondly, an examination is conducted of the different models of democracy—and the attributes which each contribute to the South African system. Within this section, the concept of opposition is developed. The analysis of the South African Parliamentary institutions of opposition is conducted by examining the two basic documents which proscribe the rules of procedure for the institutions of Parliament: the *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa* and the *Standing Rules of the National Assembly*. The theoretical expectations of behaviour are checked against the empirical reality of Parliamentary behaviour. This study examines data collected from the *Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard)* regarding individual and party participation in debate, questions and interpellations, committees, and Cabinet.

The data support the contention of the analysis that whether it is by virtue of the consociational nature of Cabinet, or the over-representation of smaller parties in National Assembly debate, opposition politics are an important part of the Parliamentary process in South Africa.

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INTRODUCTION

South Africa's parliamentary system is an interesting hybrid of political institutions based upon different models of democracy. It represents a blend of characteristics of the British style Westminster Parliamentary system and a co-operative consociational governing system.

The traditional Westminster parliamentary system is characterised by strict party discipline; a cabinet; a shadow cabinet; and, a rather sharp division in the chamber. The Westminster system operates under the majoritarian system of democracy where the majority rules, a minority opposes within the structures of Parliament, and minority rights are protected. The consociational system is characterised by a federal government structure with strong regional powers, as well as consultative power-sharing and negotiated policy development at the national legislative level.

In formulating South Africa's parliamentary hybrid, the negotiators and writers of the Interim Constitution have created an interesting situation vis-à-vis the status and nature of parliamentary opposition.

South Africa's parliamentary system is an eclectic combination of attributes from the dominant models of democratic governance. Under the current dispensation, there are no provisions for a formal institutionalised opposition. The South African government system is based upon a cabinet form of government, typical of the Westminster system; yet Cabinet procedure is constitutionally mandated to act in a consociational style. Additionally, the members of the cabinet are Members of Parliament who are responsible to the parliament for the performance and conduct of their portfolios. As such, cabinet ministers can be questioned in Parliament about their portfolios. South Africa's parliament, however, lacks the formal opposition structures which are traditionally used to challenge the government and hold the ministers accountable¹. There is no officially recognised opposition, no shadow cabinet, and no official recognition of the rights and responsibilities of the smaller parties.

This situation within the South African Parliament has led to some concern about the vitality of opposition politics in the new South Africa. Noted academics, such as Ian Shapiro, have commented on the possible detrimental effects that this lack of parliamentary structures may have on the operation of

¹ Such formal opposition structures include, but are not limited to, rights of participation in debate and a formal question period for Government Ministers.

parliamentary opposition in South Africa². A reading of South Africa's Interim Constitution could lead to the belief that opposition parties are emaciated of their powers and responsibilities. Such Constitutional provision as Section 43³ seemingly provide for extremely strict party discipline, which would limit the ability of individual members to cross the floor to challenge the policy of their party elite⁴. Additionally, the South African Constitution does not provide for any opposition structures. Theoretically, therefore, the existence of opposition in South Africa's parliament could be threatened.

The political institutions of the South Africa Parliament, on the other hand, may tell a different story. The rules of these institutions, the Constitution and the Standing Rules of Procedure, are what shape and define the actions of the actors who will operate within the institutions, the Members of Parliament. Therefore, a true reflection of the nature of opposition politics in the new South African Parliament should not come from institutional comparisons to other countries (or even past dispensations). Instead, a new analysis should be conducted on the institutions of the present system.

² See Ian Shapiro and Courtney Jung, *South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy and Opposition in Comparative Perspective* (Institution for Social and Policy Studies Working Paper No. 1052, Yale University, 1994).

³ Section 43(b) of the South African Constitution states: "A member of the National Assembly shall vacate his or her seat if he or she ceases to be a member of the party which nominated him or her as a member of the National Assembly" (Republic of South Africa, Minister of Constitutional Development *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill*, {B 212D-93 (GA)}, p. 26).

⁴ The term 'crossing the floor' is used to refer to the act of a Member of Parliament voting against his or her own party. The term describes the literal action (historical and occasionally present day) of a Member crossing the aisle, or the floor, to the other side of the chamber to vote with the opposing party.

Effectively, the question must be asked if the institutions of South Africa's Parliament, in and of themselves, allow for opposition, both in theory and in practice.

This essay will seek to answer the above stated question. It will examine, from a neo-institutionalist perspective, the nature of political opposition in the new South African parliament. In doing so, this essay will lay the neo-institutional foundation for analysis, and detail how the rules of the institutions of Parliament will influence the behaviours of the actors within the institutions. Then this essay will examine the different definitions and conceptualisations of political opposition which are offered by scholars of the subject.

The main body of this essay will examine the various institutions of the South African parliament, and analyse how the rules of these institutions shape the nature of the opposition. In operationalising the rules of the institutions of parliament, this essay will also formulate and examine some statistics about the actual practice of opposition politics in South Africa. Following this empirical analysis, this essay will compare South African opposition structures to the concepts of opposition which are examined in the third chapter. After examining how South Africa fits into a comparative analysis of opposition politics, the conclusion of this essay will show the important role of institutions in shaping the behaviour of opposition politics in South Africa and highlight the findings and contentions which are made.

CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS:
NEO-INSTITUTIONALISM

This paper will present an analysis of parliamentary opposition in South Africa from a neo-institutional perspective. In order to do so, it is first necessary to define the neo-institutionalist approach, and to present the theoretical framework.

The neo-institutional perspective is not new. Instead, it represents a rediscovery in economic and political studies of the affect on systems of law, contracts, hierarchies, standard operating procedures, professional codes and social norms. Institutionalism is an attempt to illuminate how political struggles “are mediated by the institutional setting in which [they] take place.”⁵ In analysing the institutional setting, generally neo-institutionalists work with a definition of institutions which includes both formal organisations

⁵G. John Ikenbery, “Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Economic Policy,” in G. John Ikenbery, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, eds., *The State and American Foreign Economic Policy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 222-3.

and informal rules and procedures that structure behaviour. In his book, *Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France*, Peter Hall sets forth a widely accepted definition of institutions which includes “the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standing operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy.”⁶

March and Olsen describe how institutions are fit into the analysis of politics within the neo-institutional framework. As they point out:

The ideas [of institutionalism] de-emphasise the dependence of the polity on society in favor of an interdependence between relatively autonomous social and political institutions; they de-emphasise the simple primacy of micro processes and efficient histories in favor of relatively complex processes and historical inefficiency; they de-emphasise metaphors of choice and allocative outcomes in favor of other logics of action and the centrality of meaning and symbolic action.⁷

It is important to note, however, that while institutions are important, the contention of Institutionalism is “that institutions constrain and refract politics but they are never the sole ‘cause’ of outcomes...Instead, they point to the ways that institutions structure [political] battles and in so doing, influence their outcomes.”⁸

⁶Peter Hall, *Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 19.

⁷James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” *American Political Science Review*, 78, no. 3 (Sept. 1994), p. 738.

⁸Sven Steinmo and Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds., *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 3.

Within the school of new or Neo-Institutionalism, there are two different approaches: rational choice Institutionalism and historical Institutionalism.⁹ Both approaches are concerned “with the question of how institutions shape political strategies and influence political outcomes.”¹⁰ However, the two approaches are based on different assumptions which have important effects on how politics and institutions are studied.

Rational choice scholars, such as Bates, Levi, North, and Shepsle,¹¹ examine the “strategic context”¹² that institutions impose on rational self-interested behaviour. When the rules (institutions) of rational choice games change, the actors within the system will change their behaviour in order to use the rules to maximise their own self-interest. As such, rational choice Institutionalism concentrates on political institutions because these institutions define and constrain the strategies of the actors within the system as these actors pursue their own interests.

Historical institutionalists, such as Berger, Hall, Katzenstein and Skocpol,¹³ generally find rational choice Institutionalism overly simplistic¹⁴ for

⁹The term “Historical Institutionalism” is borrowed from Theda Skocpol, and is widely used to distinguish this variant of institutionalism from rational choice institutionalism.

¹⁰Steinmo and Thelen, p. 7.

¹¹See Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Margaret Levi, *Of Rule and Revenue* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Robert H Bates, *Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Rural Kenya* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

¹²Steinmo and Thelen, p. 7.

¹³See Suzanne Berger’s “Introduction,” in Suzanne Berger, ed., *Organizing Interests in Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Peter Hall, *Governing*

two main reasons. On the one hand, historical institutionalists are sceptical about the ability of a political actor to be an all-knowing rational maximiser. Instead, political actors are viewed as rule-following “satisficers.”¹⁵ In other words, the view of historical Institutionalism is that people do not stop and examine every choice they make in their lives to figure which option would maximise their self interest. Instead, most actors, “most of the time, follow societally defined rules, even when so doing may not be directly in our self interests.”¹⁶

The second divergence between rational choice and historical Institutionalism focuses on the issue of preferences and preference formation. Rational choice institutionalists view preferences at the level of assumptions, an input variable that will effect the strategy chosen to maximise self interest. Historical institutionalist argue that “not just *strategies* but also the *goals* (original emphasis) actors pursue are shaped by the institutional context.”¹⁷ Historical Institutionalism, therefore, views preferences and preference

the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Peter Katzenstein’s “Introduction,” in *Between Power and Plenty* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1978); Theda Skocpol in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

¹⁴Steinmo and Thelen, p. 7.

¹⁵James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” *American Political Science Review* 78, no. 3 (Sept. 1984):734-49.

¹⁶Steinmo and Thelen, p. 8.

¹⁷Steinmo and Thelen, p. 8.

formation as an endogenous variable of the system whereas rational choice institutionalists view them as exogenous inputs.

This paper conducts its analysis from the Historical Institutional perspective. The Historical Institutional perspective is used to recognise that the rapid changes of South Africa's democratic transition must be seen as a catalyst for preference reformulation among South Africa's political actors. The transition in South Africa represents an adoption of new rules and institutions for the governance of the country. Such a radical shift from the apartheid policies of the past have helped to reshape the preferences of the major actors. Since these preferences are reshaped, they are endogenous variables and not exogenous givens. Recognising that the preferences of the actors have changed, Historical Institutionalism is the appropriate approach for this study.

Operationalising the institutional perspective for the analysis of opposition in the South African Parliament, therefore, requires the analysis of parliamentary institutions, and the rules thereof. This paper will present an analysis of opposition within three parliamentary institutions: 1) Cabinet; 2) the National Assembly; and, 3) parliamentary committees. In order to examine these institutions, the rules (or operating procedures) of these institutions must be analysed. The primary documents for the analysis of

these institutions, then, are the Interim Constitution for the Republic of South Africa and the Standing Rules for the National Assembly.

Using the institutional perspective will require analysing the behaviours of these actors within the institutions of Parliament. Consideration will also be given to the preferences and preference formation of the actors, and how the behaviour of the actors pursuing these preferences is affected by the institutions of Parliament.

CHAPTER III

THE CONCEPTS OF PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION

The concept and role of political opposition within democratic governance are issues which are increasingly being raised in South Africa as the rules and institutions of South Africa's new dispensation are being shaped. A cursory examination of the literature on democracy shows that there is a wide range of opinion on what forms political opposition may take, and also the relative importance of the opposition in creating 'democratic' rule.

This chapter will examine opinion of what constitutes an opposition, and how important that concept is within a democratic framework. Before any examination of the nature of opposition can be undertaken, it is important that the terms of reference and the definitions be explicit. This paper seeks to examine the role of opposition within the structures of government. Moreover, it seeks to limit the arena of such opposition to the legislative institutions. As such, this essay will examine parliamentary opposition at the national level.

Within this seemingly narrowly defined conceptualisation, there is a wide range of manoeuvrability.

At the theoretical level there is debate on the concept and role of political opposition. Opinions and conceptualisations of opposition structures range from the highly institutionalised and structured opposition politics of the British Westminster (majoritarian) system to the consociational models of cooperational democracy. The nature of political opposition, and the role it should play within the political dispensation is closely related to the democratic theory, and the model thereof, under which a system is operating. The conceptualisation of opposition, since it is tied to the model of democracy, ought to be examined within the overall democratic model.

There are two widely accepted models of democracy, from which the opposition conceptions were briefly described above. The first model is that of 'majoritarian' democracy, whereby the legislative majority governs and the legislative minority opposes. Such opposition is entrenched institutionally, and is charged with the proposal of policy alternatives for government policy, criticism of government programmes, and a watchdog function to insure governmental integrity. The second democratic model is the consociational model where the majority rules with the minority. Such government is based upon the achievement of consensus among elites and power-sharing. These

two democratic model conceptualisations confer with them two different views of opposition and its role. These two different conceptualisations are at the polar extremes of what Shapiro and Jung term the “coalition/opposition continuum.”¹⁸

At one end of the continuum is the model sketched by Shapiro and Jung of majoritarian rule. The functional concerns of such an opposition are threefold:

First, the provision of the institutional space for opposition is necessary to ensure that discontent and dissatisfaction can be directed at particular governments rather than at the democratic regime...second opposition institutions matter, if the peaceful turnover of power from one elected government to another is the *sine qua non* of democratic politics as Huntington suggests...Last, institutional arrangements that facilitate ‘loyal’ opposition perform important public-interest functions in democracies.¹⁹

At the other end of the continuum is Lijphart’s notion of consociational democracy. The principles of consociational democracy are a proportional electoral system, institutionally structured power-sharing and a system of mutual vetoes among elites,²⁰ or as Lijphart terms them, a “cartel of elites.”²¹

Lijphart writes that:

¹⁸Ian Shapiro and Courtney Jung, *South Africa’s Negotiated Transition: Democracy and Opposition in Comparative Perspective* (Institution for Social and Policy Studies Working Paper No. 1052, Yale University, 1994), pp. 6-7.

¹⁹Shapiro and Jung, pp 4-5. The reference to Huntington is from Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 267.

²⁰Shapiro and Jung, p. 6.

Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.²²

Furthermore, Lijphart contends that:

The essential characteristics of consociational democracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint effort by the elites to stabilize the system.²³

Between the two continuum extremes, there are a wide range of possible opposition structures. Interestingly, there is no 'standard' or typical opposition. Although Robert Dahl does not develop a typical form of opposition, it should be noted that he does contend that:

[T]he three great milestones in the development of democratic institutions [are] the right to participate in governmental decisions by casting a vote, the right to be represented, and the right of an organized opposition to appeal for votes against the government in elections and in parliament.²⁴

Although Dahl himself does set the wide ranged criteria above, he concludes his book by noting that within these criteria:

First there exist a great variety of different patterns of opposition in democratic systems. Second, patterns of opposition differ, among other characteristics, in concentration, competitiveness, relative decisiveness of site, distinctiveness, goals, and strategies.²⁵

²¹Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics*, Vol. 14, no. 2, (Jan. 1969), p. 222.

²²Lijphart, p. 216.

²³Lijphart, p. 213.

²⁴Robert Dahl, *Political Opposition in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. xi.

²⁵Dahl, p. 347.

Finally, on the issue of the specific nature of political opposition which fit specific models of democracy, Dahl states in his conclusion that:

To a question whether a standard pattern of opposition has developed in Western democracies, the answer is...a confident no.²⁶

Dahl's comments speak of the wide range of opposition possibilities between the two extremes on the opposition/coalition continuum. At the other end of the scale from Shapiro and Jung's majoritarian concept, is Arend Lijphart's concept of consociational democracy.

Lijphart's concept of consociational democracy is an attempt by elites of the system to provide for democratic stability. Lijphart contends that:

The essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint effort by elites to stabilize the system.²⁷

Giovani Sartori considers the opposition/coalition continuum in his book *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*. Remarking on the contribution of Lijphart's 'two models' of democracy, Sartori states:

[H]is [Lijphart's] argument in favor of the consociational type of democracy is both forceful and faultless in its claim that segmented and deeply divided societies cannot be based on

²⁶Dahl, 348.

²⁷Lijphart, p. 213.

majority rule; their option is to be either consociational or not to be democracies at all.²⁸

It would be difficult to argue that South Africa was not a deeply divided society with severe cleavages set upon socio-economic, ethnic and racial lines. As such, Lijphart's model of consociational democracy seems to fit well with the current dispensation.

Sartori's support for consociational democracy is based upon his own decision-making theory which considers the intensity of minorities in the decision making process. As such, Sartori notes that:

The theory of consociational democracy addresses...ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities that are not only large minorities but also *cleavage minorities* (original emphasis), I mean, minorities defined (and upheld) by a particular structure of cleavages, namely by cumulative, reinforcing, and, specifically, "isolative" cleavages.²⁹

Such cleavages are present in South Africa, which reinforces the need for consociational based democracy.

Sartori continues his assessment of majoritarian democracy and consociational democracy by commenting that:

[A]long a continuum whose polar ends are "always majoritarianism" or "never majoritarianism," the concrete democracies are likely to be all the more majoritarian the more they are consensual, homogeneous (culturally), and non-

²⁸Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited* (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1987), p. 238.

²⁹Sartori, p. 238.

segmented (in their structure of cleavages), all the less majoritarian (i.e., consociational) the less these characteristics obtain. Somewhat differently restated, while we always find a blend of majoritarian and non-majoritarian decision, the proportions vary, and vary in response to this rule of thumb: The greater the presence of intense minorities, the less a zero-sum governing is advisable and democratically feasible.³⁰

Sartori considers majoritarian democracy to be a zero-sum game. According to Sartori, majoritarian democracy is zero-sum in nature because of the confrontational decision making process between government and opposition where one side's win is the other side's loss.³¹ A consociational process, on the other hand, is a positive sum game where both sides can win through negotiated power-sharing decision making.

Within the two models of democracy, there are also different models of opposition. The 'majoritarian' model of democracy requires a highly structured opposition (such as Shapiro and Jung support) in order to appeal for votes against the government and to criticise and serve as a check on the government. The consociational model of democracy does not require such formalised structuring of opposition because the participation of opposition interests is implicit within the model.

³⁰Sartori, p. 240.

³¹This zero-sum is either the government policy being adopted (government wins), or the fall of the government as the result of a vote of non-confidence (opposition wins).

Within the South African context, the democratic model which is enshrined at the Cabinet level of government by the Constitution is the consociational model. As such there are no formal structures for opposition. The question to ask, then, is whether Shapiro and Jung's concern for institutionalised opposition in South Africa is warranted, or whether Lijphart's consociational model offers sufficient opposition participation.

The approach this paper will use to examining the above stated question is by looking at the three related reasons for the importance of opposition which are outlined by Shapiro and Jung, and to identify whether they may be accomplished under South Africa's consociational regime. This paper will return to an assessment of South Africa's Parliamentary ability to fulfil these requirement in Chapter VII, after the structures of opposition are examined.

CHAPTER IV

THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS OF OPPOSITION

In order to examine the institutions of South Africa's Parliament, it is necessary to examine the rules which govern the operation of these institutions. This paper will examine three institutions within the South African Parliamentary system: Cabinet; the National Assembly; and, Parliamentary Committees. For each of these institutions, the rules and procedures will be examined, and the theoretical capabilities of opposition politics will be analysed. There are two basic documents which proscribe the rules of procedure for the institutions of Parliament which are studied in this paper. The first document is the Interim Constitution; which details the

structure of Parliament and each institutions competencies. The second document is the Standing Rules of the National Assembly and for Joint Business and Proceedings of the National Assembly and the Senate; which details the procedural rules of these institutions. The first section of this chapter will examine the institutional structures, rules, and procedures which are provided in these two documents.

The second section of this chapter will examine the path of policy creation and formation within the Parliamentary structures. An analysis of the path of the policy through the institutions which are studied in this paper will enable a more complete understanding of how important the various institutions are within the overall area of policy formulation.

SECTION I

RULES AND PROCEDURES

Cabinet

The only rules and procedures for the operation of South Africa's Cabinet which have been publicly acknowledged are those which are provided

in the Interim Constitution and the Standing Rules for the National Assembly.

Section 88 of the Constitution describes the nature of the Cabinet:

88. (1) The Cabinet shall consist of the President, the Executive Deputy Presidents and not more than 27 Ministers appointed by the President in accordance with this section.

(2) A party holding at least 20 seats in the National Assembly and which has decided to participate in the government of national unity, shall be entitled to the allocation of one or more of the Cabinet portfolios in proportion to the number of seats held by it in the National Assembly relative to the number of seats held by the other participating parties.³²

In addition to the structure of Cabinet, and describing which parties are to be entitled to participate in Cabinet, the Constitution also mandates the procedure of Cabinet as follows:

89. (2) The Cabinet shall function in a manner which gives consideration to the consensus-seeking spirit underlying the concepts of a government of national unity as well as the need for effective government. ³³

Furthermore, the Constitution details the accountability of Ministers and Cabinet in Section 92, which states:

92. (1) A Minister shall be accountable individually both to the President and to Parliament for the administration of the portfolio entrusted to him or her, and all members of the Cabinet shall correspondingly be accountable collectively for the performance of the functions of the national government and for its policies.³⁴

³²Republic of South Africa, Minister of Constitutional Development, *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill*, [B 212D-93 (GA)], p. 54.

³³Republic of South Africa, *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill*, p. 54.

³⁴Republic of South Africa, *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill*, p. 54.

These Constitutional provisions for the structure and procedure of the Cabinet are the only public document which detail how Cabinet is to operate. The standing rules and operating procedure of Cabinet meetings are as secret as the deliberations and discussions which take place within those meetings. There are, however, a few procedural prescriptions for Ministers which are provided in the Standing Rules for The National Assembly.

The Standing Rules contain two references to Ministers. The first reference concerns time limits for speeches. According to Rule 93 (a):

93. (a) the President, an Executive Deputy President, the leader of the largest minority party and the member in charge of the business before a meeting, shall not be restricted in regard to the length of time they may speak.³⁵

Generally, the “member in charge of the business before a meeting” refers to the Minister in charge of the portfolio that the item under debate falls. This time limit, then, only applies to Ministers when they are speaking about bills which they bring before the house, and does not confer unlimited speaking times for other subject matters (which is the situation for the President, Executive Deputy Presidents, and the leader of the largest minority party (who happens also in this situation to be the Second Deputy President)).

³⁵Republic of South Africa, *Standing Rules for the National Assembly and for the Joint Business and Proceedings of the National Assembly and the Senate*, June 1994, p. 25.

The other reference to Cabinet Ministers in the Standing Rules concerns interpellations and questions. Under Rule 191:

191. (5) No interpellation or question may be addressed to any person other than a member of the Cabinet.³⁶

Question and interpellations, be they written or oral, can only be put to Cabinet members, and it is the responsibility of the Cabinet Minister to respond to these questions. The purpose of questions and interpellations is to assure accountability of Ministers to Parliament, which is provided for in Section 92 of the Constitution, as was described above.

The provisions for Cabinet which are detailed in the Constitution and the Standing Rules of the National Assembly set up a Cabinet which seems to be organised according to the Westminster Parliamentary system. The main characteristics are Ministers who are charged with the operation and supervision of portfolios, and who are responsible to both Cabinet and Parliament for the operation of their portfolios. The difference, and the dominant characteristic is the consociational nature of intra-Cabinet relations which is mandated by the Constitution. The Constitutionally mandated inclusion of minority parties which achieve a certain level of representation in the National Assembly creates a coalition style government even in the

³⁶ Republic of South Africa, *Standing Rules of the National Assembly*, p. 48.

absence of natural coalition forces. That is to say that small parties are not included (and accommodated) for the sake of achieving a parliamentary majority and securing the confidence of the government. On the contrary, the inclusion of smaller parties is unnatural and the coalition relationship is mandated by law (the Constitution) rather than necessity.

National Assembly

Like Cabinet, the Parliamentary institution of the National Assembly is structured by the Interim Constitution. Provisions of the constitution which may have an effect on the functioning of parliamentary opposition are Sections 43(b) and 67. Section 43(b) states:

43. (b) A member of the National Assembly shall vacate his or her seat if he or she ceases to be a member of the party which nominated him or her as a member of the National Assembly.³⁷

The provision for expulsion provided by this section of the constitution proscribes the Parliamentary action of 'crossing the floor' in support of a different political party. Additionally, this provision sets the foundation for absolute party control of its members in the National Assembly. If a caucus member steps out of line, theoretically, party membership can be withdrawn and that member could be removed from Parliament.

³⁷Republic of South Africa, *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill*, p. 26.

Section 67 of the Constitution provides for the transparency of Parliamentary structures, the National Assembly in particular. It states:

67. Sittings of the National Assembly or the Senate and joint sitting of the National Assembly and the Senate shall be held in public, and the public, including the media, shall have access to such sittings³⁸

Other procedures for the behaviour of Members of Parliament are described in the Standing Rules. Rules 93, 117, 152, and 191 all have possible implications on the ability of MPs and political parties to carry out opposition politics. Rule 93 provides that “members...may not speak for longer than 10 minutes at a time on a vote in the schedule.”³⁹ Rule 117 outlines the procedure for Divisions in the National Assembly. Rule 117 states:

117. (1) Whenever a question is put by the presiding officer, any member may, instead of demanding a division, inform the presiding officer that he or she wishes his or her opposition or that of the party to which he or she belongs to be formally recorded in the Minutes of Proceedings.

(2) The presiding officer may order that a division take place in the event of four or more members wishing to record their individual opposition.⁴⁰

Rule 152 concerns the addition of amendments by members to bills which are being considered. The Rule states:

152. (1) (a) A member may, after a bill has been placed on the Order paper for Second Reading but before this House has taken

³⁸Republic of South Africa, *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill*, p. 38.

³⁹Republic of South Africa, *Standing Rules for the National Assembly*, p. 25.

⁴⁰Republic of South Africa, *Standing Rules for the National Assembly*, p. 31.

a decision thereon, place amendments to the clauses of the bill on the Order Paper.

(b) A bill that has not been agreed to by the committee which considered it may not be amended under this Rule.⁴¹

Rules 191 to 202 concern the use of questions and interpellations in the National Assembly. Under the rules, notice must be given, and the questions and interpellations must be submitted beforehand. Additionally, the rules stipulate that a member may ask only two oral question per day (Rule 198 (2)), and only three written question per Parliamentary working week (Rule 201 (3)).

The rules and procedures which govern the National Assembly generally set the stage for debate (time limits), Ministerial questioning (questions and interpellations), amending power, and divisions.

Parliamentary Committees

The Constitution, in setting out the structures of Parliament, includes a provision for the establishment of committees. Section 58 of the Constitution states:

58. (1) The National Assembly of the Senate may make rules and orders in connection with the conduct of its business and proceeding, and the National Assembly and the Senate may make joint rules and orders in connection with the conduct of their joint business and proceedings, including rules and orders regulating-

⁴¹Republic of South Africa, *Standing Rules for the National Assembly*, p. 41.

- (a) the establishment, constitution, powers and functions, procedures and duration of committees of Parliament;
- (b) restrictions on access to such committees;
- (c) the competency of any such committee to perform or dispose of its business and proceedings at venues other than the Houses of Parliament...

(2) For the purposes of exercising its powers and performing its functions, any committee established under subsection (1)(a) shall have the power to summon persons to appear before it to give evidence on oath or affirmation and to produce any documents required by it, and to receive representations from interested persons.⁴²

Following the Constitutional provisions for the establishment of rules, the Standing Rules of the National Assembly contains extensive regulations for the establishment and procedures of committees. Rules 34 through 69 regulate committees. The primary rules which govern committees set the number of members that may sit on a committee, as well as the jurisdiction of committees. A significant rule which affects the operation of opposition is Rule 63 which states:

63. It shall not be competent for a select committee to present a minority report.⁴³

Since it is not possible for committees to present minority reports, the views and concerns of the minority members of committees will not be acknowledged

⁴²Republic of South Africa, *Constitution for the Republic of South Africa Bill*, p. 34.

⁴³Republic of South Africa, *Standing Rules for the National Assembly*, p. 21.

when the committee reports back to the National Assembly on its assessment of the bill under consideration.

There is a peculiar characteristic of the rules and procedures which govern the National Assembly and the Committees when they are compared to the rules of the Cabinet. While Cabinet is constitutionally mandated to “function in a manner which gives consideration to the consensus-seeking spirit underlying the concept of a government of national unity,”⁴⁴ there are no such provision for the behaviour and function of the National Assembly.

The three institutions of South Africa’s Parliament are governed by different sets of rules. In addition to the above noted discrepancy between the procedures of Cabinet and the National Assembly and committees, the noticeable trait of the South African dispensation is the lack of opposition structures. Not only is there no provision for opposition structures, but rules such as Section 43(b) of the Constitution which prevents members from crossing the floor and Rule 63 of the Standing Rules of the National Assembly which prohibits a minority committee report seem to seek to prevent opposition politics from forming at all. The non-provision of opposition structures is only exacerbated by the provision of rules which prevent other opposition manoeuvres.

⁴⁴Republic of South Africa, *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill*, p. 54.

The expectation for opposition politics, based upon a theoretical analysis of the rules and procedure which govern the institutions of Parliament, must be minimal at best. It seems as though there are two models of democracy functioning within the South African Parliamentary institutions. Lijphart's consociational model of democracy is firmly entrenched in Cabinet, both in form and function. However, there is a danger at the National Assembly and committee level where the constitutional mandated consociational behaviour is notably absent. The unique nature of a mandated, rather than natural, coalition style government at the Cabinet level is not continued through the other institutions of Parliament.⁴⁵ In the other two institutions which are examined, the majoritarian model of democratic rule is in effect, however without the necessary formal structures for opposition politics.

The opposition politics expected, the, varies by parliamentary institution. At the Cabinet level, Lijphart's consociational model of democracy is constitutionally entrenched. This creates minority party inclusion in decision making; a "cartel of elites." In the National Assembly, there are no

⁴⁵A natural coalition would be one where minorities parties are invited to join the government one of the dominant parties of Parliament. Natural coalitions are formed when no one party has a majority in Parliament, and so additional seats are required to insure the stability and confidence of the government. Natural coalition members are able to exert considerable leverage because their dissatisfaction with government policy could cause them to leave the government coalition, which may in turn cause the government to fall as the result of a vote of no-confidence.

formal opposition structures, yet the rules of procedure do allow for smaller party participation in debates and question period. Procedure at the committee level, similar to the National Assembly, operates under a majoritarian model of democracy. Prohibition of minority reports, and a lack of mandated co-operation, combined with under-representation of minority parties suggests that opposition politics will not be a large factor at the committee level. Since the National Assembly is the only institution where the smaller parties have some procedures which allow for their participation, it may be expected that they will use these procedures to their full potential.

SECTION II

PATH OF POLICY FORMULATION

The role of opposition politics may be observed by exploring the path of policy formation in Parliament from start to finish; and exploring the institutional role in policy formation.

Government policy is conceived at the Cabinet level. Bills and proposals are put forth by the relevant ministries for Cabinet approval. Therefore, opposition parties may play an important role in the shaping of proposals and

policies in the Cabinet. The consociational nature of Cabinet allows for power-sharing and consensus building in government policy proposals.

Once Cabinet has approved a draft proposal, the relevant Minister will submit the proposal to Parliament on the first reading of the Bill. During the first reading debate, the principles and processes of the proposal are briefly debated before the bill is referred to committee.

After the first reading, the bill is referred to a committee for report. After consideration and the creation of a committee report, the Bill is presented to the National Assembly for the second reading of the bill and the report of the committee. During the second reading of the bill, the entire National Assembly considers and debates the bill, as well as any amendments which the committee recommends. During this debate, members of the National Assembly are able to submit their own amendments to the bill under consideration. Following the second reading, and the debate the bill under consideration is referred back to the committee if there are any amendments which have been offered and accepted by the National Assembly. The committee is then responsible to consider the bill as well as the amendments, and to submit a report back to the National Assembly. Once the bill, as well as amendments, are considered by the committee and referred back to the National Assembly, the National Assembly votes to accept the second reading

of the bill. The process of sending amended versions of the bill back to the committee for consideration can only occur once.⁴⁶

The third reading of the bill is the final reading, and the members of the National Assembly vote to either pass or defeat the bill (no amendments may be made after the second reading is accepted). After the third reading of the Bill, if Parliament votes to pass the bill, it is sent to the President for assent.

Section 64 of the Constitution states:

64. (1) A Bill duly passed by Parliament in accordance with this Constitution shall be assented to by the President subject to section 82(1)(b).

It is unclear if the Presidential assent is to be undertaken with the same consideration as Cabinet procedure. If so, then it would be expected that the minority parties would be able to influence (to a degree) this final process of policy formation. This influence would allow for minority participation in the last 'veto point' of the process--an important consideration. If Presidential assent does not operate under the guise of Cabinet procedure, then the minority parties will be excluded from this last 'veto point,' and the President's

⁴⁶Rule 152 (7). Republic of South Africa, *Standing Rules for the National Assembly*, p. 41.

party (the majority ANC) can be expected to practice a freer hand in policy changes outside of Cabinet.

CHAPTER V
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S
INSTITUTIONS OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION

The institutional structure of South Africa's Parliament creates expectations, based upon theoretical operation, of certain patterns of participation of the political parties. The Interim Constitution fails to provide structures for opposition participation and expectations based solely on the Constitution (Shapiro and Jung) could discount opposition. However, there are other rules which regulate the behaviours in Parliament. In the National Assembly, the Standing Rules of Procedure allow minority parties to participate in debate and to submit questions. The interaction of these two 'set of rules' in addition to standards and norms of the Parliamentary system creates an institutional background of greater opposition (minority) party participation.

In order to compare theoretical expectations to empirical realities, statistics have been developed on National Assembly debate. These statistics seeks to establish the level of participation of the parties of Parliament in the National Assembly. Once established, comparisons can be made between theoretical expectations and empirical reality.

METHODOLOGY

For purposes of this paper, the Hansard transcripts of National Assembly debates were analysed. Numbers 1 through 7 of the Hansard, covering 9 May through 1 September 1994 are used.⁴⁷

Three attributes were measured from the Hansard: party size as of 1 September; number of questions asked per party as of 1 September; and, the number of columns of debate per party as of 1 September.

The party size as of 1 September is available on page 14 of Number 7 of the Hansard debates. The number of questions asked per party was calculated by indexing the sum of question asked by each member according to their political party.

⁴⁷Republic of South Africa, *Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard)*, First Session-First Parliament, Nos. 1-7.

The number of columns of debate per political party as of 1 September is calculated as the sum of the number of columns of debate for each party member. Debate is measured from the Hansard as follows:

- a.) the English version of the Hansard is used.
- b.) the text of each member's debate in the National Assembly is measured to the nearest .125 of a column in the Hansard volume.
- c.) for purposes of these measurements, only debates and speeches were used. Motions, the rulings of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker and interjections are not measured.
- d.) were speeches were delivered in languages other than English or Afrikaans, only the English translation is measured.

The raw data collected from these measurements is contained in Appendix A of this paper.

Cabinet information is recorded from page 1 of the Hansard Number 7.

Cabinet statistics are measured as follows:

- a.) measured as of 1 September 1994.
- b.) only full Ministers are counted, not deputy-ministers.
- c.) the two Executive Deputy Presidents and the President are counted.

Committee information is taken from a Parliamentary information package dated 1 October 1994. Two attributes are measured from the information package: the number of committee chairs per party; and, the number of committee seats per party. The number of seats per party is measured as follows:

- a.) only full members of committees are measured, not alternates.
- b.) sub-committees are not measured.

c.) if committee seats have been allocated to a party but are not filled, they are still counted as belonging to the allocated party.

STATISTICS

The percentage of party representation in the National Assembly is calculated as the number of seats held by a party divided by the total number of seats in the National Assembly (400). Accordingly, the representation of the parties in the National Assembly is as follows:

ACDP: 0.5%	ANC: 62.8%	DP: 1.8%	FF: 2.3%
IFP: 10.8%	NP: 20.5%	PAC: 1.3%	

The number of questions asked by each party of the National Assembly is calculated as the sum of questions asked by members from each party. This sum is determined by the index of questions in volume 7 of Hansard. The breakdown of questions per party is:

ACDP: 0	ANC: 60	DP: 63	FF: 5
IFP: 50	NP: 34	PAC: 8	

The percentage of total questions asked per party is calculated by taking the number of questions asked by each party and dividing that number by the total number of questions (220). The percentage breakdown of questions by party is:

ACDP: 0	ANC: 27.3%	DP: 28.6%	FF: 2.3%
IFP: 22.7%	NP: 15.5%	PAC: 3.6%	

The total debate columns of each party is calculated as the sum of the debate columns of all of the party's members. The total debate columns per political party are:

ACDP: 14.5	ANC: 1161.0	DP: 90.25	FF: 91.25
IFP: 221.125	NP: 476.25	PAC: 43.625	

The percentage of total debate per political party is calculated by dividing each individual party's debate total by the total number of measured debate columns in the National Assembly as of 1 September. The percentage breakdown of debate by party is:

ACDP: 0.7%	ANC: 55.4%	DP: 4.3%	FF: 4.3%
IFP: 10.5%	NP: 22.7%	PAC: 2.1%	

The number of committee chairs per party is calculated as the sum of individual chairs allocated per party. The number of committee chairs by party is:

ACDP: 0	ANC: 32	DP: 1	FF: 1	IFP: 1
	NP: 0	PAC: 0		

The percentage of committee chairs held by each party is calculated as the number of chairs held by each individual party divided by the total number of committee chairs (32). The percentage of committee chairs per party is:

ACDP: 0% ANC: 91.4% DP: 2.9% FF: 2.9%
IFP: 2.9% NP: 0% PAC: 0%

The total number of committee seats per party is the sum of the seats allocated to each party for each committee. The number of committee seats per party is:

ACDP: 13 ANC: 402 DP: 32 FF: 32 IFP: 54
NP: 131 PAC: 25

The percentage of committee seats held by each party is the sum of seats allocated to each individual party divided by the total number of committee seats (689). The percentage of committee seats held by each party is:

ACDP: 1.9% ANC: 58.3% DP: 4.6% FF: 4.6%
IFP: 7.8% NP: 19% PAC: 3.6%

The total number of Cabinet seats per party is the sum of the seats allocated to each party. The number of Cabinet seats for each party is:

ACDP: 0 ANC: 20 DP: 0 FF: 0
IFP: 3 NP: 7 PAC: 0

The percentage of Cabinet seats held by each party is the sum of Cabinet seats allocated to each individual party divided by the total number of Cabinet seats plus the President and two Executive Deputy Presidents (30).

The percentage of Cabinet seats held by each party is:

ACDP: 0%	ANC: 66.7%	DP: 0%	FF: 0%
IFP: 10%	NP: 23.3%	PAC: 0%	

CORRELATION

Once these statistics have been calculated, more sophisticated statistical analysis can be performed to learn more about the relations between party size and party performance. This paper will consider four correlations between two party attributes: party size and GNU participation; and two party behaviours: National Assembly debate participation and National Assembly question asking.

The formula for calculating the correlation is:

$$r = \frac{n \sum(xy) - (\sum x)(\sum y)}{\sqrt{n \sum(x^2) - (\sum x)^2} \sqrt{n \sum(y^2) - (\sum y)^2}}$$

where n is the number of data points.

The correlation statistics are calculated to take into consideration party size.

Correlation Results

Party Size & National Assembly Debate: -0.18

This results show that there is a weak negative correlation between party size and National Assembly debate participation. The larger the party size, the less National Assembly debate the party participated in (relative to the party's size). This correlation shows the propensity for smaller parties in the National Assembly to be over-represented in debates.

GNU Participation & National Assembly Debate: -0.82

This result shows that there is a strong negative correlation between membership in the GNU and proportional participation in National Assembly debates. As such, non-GNU membership shows a propensity for over-representation in National Assembly debate participation.

Party Size & Questions: -0.30

This result shows that there is a moderate negative correlation between party size and question asking (once party size is factored in). This negative correlation shows the propensity for smaller parties to ask an over-proportionate number of questions compared to their relative size.

GNU Participation & Questions: -0.40

This final correlation result shows a moderate/strong negative correlation between GNU participation and question asking. The propensity is, then, for non-GNU members to ask an over-proportionate share of questions.

GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION

The following ten pages show graphical representation of the statistics which have been developed. Figures 1 and 2 show pie and bar graph representations of Party Representation in Parliament and Party Participation in debate. Of significance is the empirical reality which shows that the DP, FF, NP, ACDP and PAC all have Parliamentary participation greater than their respective proportion of seats. Such a finding shows that the rules and procedures of the National Assembly allow for small party participation, in most cases at levels greater than their proportion of seats.

Figures 3 and 4 compare the percentage of seats in Parliament to the number and percentage of questions and interpellations for each party. In this case, the non-GNU parties all had over-proportionate question percentages (with the DP having the highest number) while the largest two partners in the GNU (the ANC and NP) had markedly less than proportionate question percentages. The IFP is the anomaly in this case, because it is a GNU

participant with an over-proportionate percentage of questions. Most of the IFP's questions can be attributed to one MP (Cassim), without whom the IFP falls into line with the other GNU parties.

Figures 5 and 6 show the distribution of committee chairs according to political party. Only the ANC, DP, FF, and IFP have committee chairs. The ANC dominance of committee chairs is considerably higher than its proportion of representation in the National Assembly. At the committee level it is obvious that the ANC is the dominant force.

Figures 7 and 8 show the distribution of committee seats among all of the parties in parliament. The distribution of committee seats favours the smaller parties, with the ANC, NP and IFP having lower proportional representation at the committee level than they have in the National Assembly.

Figures 9 and 10 show the distribution of Cabinet seats according to party. The distribution of Cabinet seats allows for a proportional representation of the GNU parties which is similar to the National Assembly representation of the three parties (although the IFP is slightly under-represented, which the NP and ANC are slightly over-represented).

Percentage of Debate By Party




Figure 1

Party Representation In Paliamment and in Debate




Figure 2

Interpellations and Questions by Party




Figure 3

Parties and Questions




Figure 4

Committee Chairs by Party




Figure 5

Committee Chairs and Parties




Figure 6

Committee Seats by Party




Figure 7

Committee Seats by Party




Figure 8



Party Representation in Cabinet




Figure 9

Cabinet Seats by Party




Figure 10

CHAPTER VI
REFLECTION ON EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF
THE ROLE OF OPPOSITION

This chapter will examine the effect of the rules and institutions examined in Section I of Chapter IV on three distinct aspects of opposition politics. Emphasis will be placed upon both the theoretical expectations of opposition behaviour and the empirical realities experienced in Parliament. The first aspect which will be examined is the opposition of the smaller parties in Parliament (those which are not participating in government) to the GNU. The actions of the four small parties which are represented in Parliament but are not participating in the GNU can serve as a indicator for the institutional structures in Parliament which allow for opposition involvement. The second type of opposition which will be examined is political opposition between parities of the GNU itself. Since the ANC is the dominant parity within government, the type of opposition this section will be

concerned with is National Party and Inkatha Freedom Party based opposition toward the ANC. The final type of opposition examined in this chapter will be opposition politics within individual party caucuses.

Using the foundations and structures of the three Parliamentary institutions of Cabinet, the National Assembly and Parliamentary Committees outlined in Section I of Chapter IV, this chapter will examine the effect of these rules and procedures on three aspects of Parliamentary opposition: opposition toward the Government of National Unity from the smaller parties; opposition between parties of the GNU; and, opposition within individual party caucuses.

GNU & Smaller Parties

The first aspect of political opposition which will be examined is the relationship between the government of national unity and the four small parties of Parliament. For the Freedom Front, the Democratic Party, the Pan Africanist Congress, and the African Christian Democratic Party, the rules and procedures of Cabinet are not very important as none of these parties has Cabinet level representation.

Secondly, as Shapiro and Jung point out, there are no formal rights and responsibilities for 'non-GNU' parties outlined in the Constitution. The Standing Rules of the National Assembly, however, do provide for the operation of some level

of opposition politics in the form of participation in debate and the fielding of questions and interpellations. Empirically, the four small parties of Parliament occupy 23 seats, or 5.75% of Parliament. Yet, these parties (despite the ten minute speech time limit) have been able to participate in 11.4% of the debate. A breakdown by party, of National Assembly debate, shows:

ACDP: 0.7% DP: 4.3% FF: 4.3% PAC: 2.1%

Questions and interpellations have also been used effectively by these four small parties. These four parties, which again occupy only 5.75% of Parliament, have been able to use the standing rules procedures to ask 34.5% of the questions and interpellations in Parliament.

At the committee level, these four small parties are also drastically proportionally outnumbered. Interestingly, the DP and FF MPs chair two committees, or 5.8% of the committees.

The party representation on committees is roughly proportional to their representation in Parliament, as well as mitigated by the ability of parties to allocate members from their limited ranks to the wide range of committee seats which may be available.⁴⁸ As such, the four smaller parties have 102 out of 689 committee seats (DP: 32, FF: 32, PAC: 25, ACDP: 32). Such small representation

⁴⁸In light of the fact that there are 34 committees with a total of 689 committee seats, it has been physically difficult for some of the smaller parties to participate on all of the committees that they have been allocated seats for because of the mere reality that the smaller parties do not have enough members to attend all of the committee meetings.

is further hampered by the standing rule restriction on minority reports from committees. As ANC MP Johannes H. de Lange points out “there are no constitutional rules for power-sharing in committees.”⁴⁹ Such an attitude on the part of members of the dominant party in Parliament and at the committee level does not bode well for the ability of the smaller parties to influence legislation in committees.

The operation of Parliamentary opposition for the four non-GNU parties, then, seems to be best in the National Assembly. Institutionally, this is logical. These four parties are not represented in Cabinet, so their influence there is minimal at best. In committees, there is a mixed bag effect. The DP and FF do have some small ability to agenda set and influence legislation in the two committees that they chair, but their Members are so vastly outnumbered that this ability may not operationalise itself. Furthermore, the actions of the ANC caucus, especially de Lange, would indicate that the spirit of consensus does not rule committees. Within the ordinary majority rule situation, these four small parties could quickly become a seriously marginalised minority.

In the National Assembly, however, these four parties (particularly the DP and FF) have been able to make themselves seen and heard. Although there are no

⁴⁹Chris Louw, “Back Bench Seizes the Cabinet Crown,” in *The Weekly Mail & Guardian*, Vol. 10, no. 34, p. 10.

formal opposition structures, the standing rules do provide for debate time and questioning opportunities for all members. These four smaller parties have done themselves well by setting a precedent for the disproportional use of National Assembly debate and questions by small parties. It is unlikely that the present situation in the National Assembly would be much changed even if there were formal structures for opposition party participation.

Opposition Between Parties of the GNU

The second aspect of opposition that will be examined is political opposition between parties of the Government of National Unity itself. As the ANC is the dominant party within the government, this section will examine NP and IFP opposition towards the ANC.

The party undergoing the sharpest crisis of identity and purpose is probably the National Party. The change from almost 40 years of government rule has not been easy, and the adjustment is still ongoing. As Executive Deputy President de Klerk states:

The question is posed: Can we effectively engage our partners in the Government of National Unity as our opponents, while co-operating with them in government?⁵⁰

⁵⁰Republic of South Africa, *Debates of The National Assembly (Hansard)*, First Session-First Parliament, No. 3, 1 to 5 August 1994, Column 678.

Institutionally, both the NP and the IFP have found that Cabinet is the arena where they are able to exert the most influence. During negotiations leading up to the creation of the Interim Constitution, the NP government sought to shape the governing structure so that it would have influence in the executive branch of government, and to create a structure which de-emphasised the legislative role in government policy creation. Although Cabinet dominance has been the situation for the outset, there have been deliberate moves, particularly by ANC caucus members, to use legislative means (such as committees) to shape policy. Whereas Cabinet must proceed within the 'spirit underlying national unity', no such prescriptions exist for the National Assembly and committees. Such a move towards the power of committees would have detrimental effects on the ability of both the NP and the IFP to influence policy.

Within Cabinet the NP has six seats plus one Executive Deputy President, and the IFP has three seats. This representation, along with the mandated spirit of national unity, allows the NP and IFP to exert considerable influence on policy direction. The situation within the National Assembly is somewhat different, if only because of the breakdown in numbers. The NP has participated in 22.7% of the debate (while holding only 20.5% of the seats. The corresponding numbers for the IFP are 10.5% of debate and 10.8% of seats. Perhaps the IFP (like the PAC and

ACDP) is under-represented in National Assembly debate more as a result of inexperience with parliamentary procedure than because of lack of opportunity.

Similarly, both the NP and IFP have asked 38.2% (NP: 15.5%, IFP: 22.7%) of questions and interpellations, which shows that the structures do exist for this form of opposition.

It is at the committee level that the NP and IFP are least effective, because of both the ANC majority and the lack of opposition structures at this level. Surprisingly, the IFP chairs one committee while the NP has none. The breakdown of committee chairs, then, demonstrates the disintegration of opposition structures the further one moves from cabinet. At the Cabinet level, the non-ANC parties have 33.3% of seats, within an atmosphere which mandates co-operation and consultation. In the National Assembly, non-ANC parties have 37.2% of the seats. The rules of procedure have created an institution in which these same non-ANC parties have been able to participate in 44.6% of the debate. At the committee level, however, there is 41.7% non ANC representation, 8.6% non-ANC chairs, and there is no mandated co-operation. Trends of the ANC caucus to use committees to put their own stamp on policy do not bode well for opposition interests.

Opposition within Party Caucuses

The third and final aspect of opposition which will be examined in this paper is intra-caucus political opposition. The caucuses of the small parties are too small to be considered (DP, FF, PAC, ACDP). The caucuses of the three parties which are participating in the GNU, on the other hand, help to provide interesting insight into the institutional structure of Parliament. Section 43 (b), which is highlighted above, creates the theoretical framework for strict party discipline. In actuality, however, we shall see that such discipline is not always the case.

Each of the three GNU parties have different caucus strains which have been created as a result of the GNU structure. The IFP, with --- seats and 10.8% of Parliament, is an important part of the GNU. The main problem confronting the IFP seems to be developing a balance between government support and self identity. The IFP shares this situation with the other minority party of the GNU, the NP.

An interesting situation which has developed within the IFP caucus threatens to create the first instance where section 43(b) is employed. IFP MP Lalitha Singh has been accused of lying about her university qualifications on her IFP membership forms.⁵¹ There have been repeated calls from within the IFP, and the IFP Parliamentary caucus, for her to submit her resignation, which she has so far

⁵¹Farouk Chothia, "Is IFP MP a graduate?," in *The Weekly Mail and Guardian*, Vol. 10, no. 25, (June 24-30, 1994), p. 12.

refused to do. It is speculated that if she does not resign, her party membership may be withdrawn, and with it her position as a MP.

The National Party caucus is the most organised and structured of the three GNU parties, which is probably the result of nearly 40 years of government rule. The opposition within the caucus, therefore is less a case of renegade MPs, and more an internal debate over the form and function of the National Party under the new dispensation. The party is faced with the dilemma of how to create its own identity while co-operating within the GNU, and at the same time functioning as an opposition to the ANC. The institutional structures of Parliament make the NP's position a difficult one, but there seems to be an emergence of a rhetorical split between the party elite and back-benchers. For political and rhetorical purposes, FW de Klerk leads the party elite in promoting co-operation and consultative governance. Back benchers, lead by Andrew Fourie, have used the National Assembly debates and question periods to criticise the ANC's proposals and policies. Such a split may help the NP to achieve both of its goals, while the party discipline of the caucus assures that the party will support the GNU as long as the leaders do.

The ANC is faced with its own unique situation. Its co-operation within the GNU is not the result of a natural coalition, but rather Constitutionally based. As such, there is concern within the ANC caucus that the small parties are wielding too much influence *vis-à-vis* their proportional strength. The shift of power to

parliamentary committees is the result of ANC caucus members who are seeking to move policy making to the caucus level and bring it away from the elite circles of Cabinet.

The ANC has also been the subject of its fair share of internal wrangling. Cyril Ramaphosa's 'Code of Conduct,' which had to be signed by all ANC MPs was based on ethical grounds. It also, however, contains clauses which Weekly Mail Parliamentary correspondent Chris Louw suggests:

is a strategic move by Ramaphosa to win back the initiative from both his cabinet colleagues and backbenchers in the ANC caucus who were planning to assert themselves through the parliamentary standing committees⁵²

Part of the code of conduct states that ANC MPs will not "attempt to make use of parliamentary structures to undermine organisational decisions and policies."⁵³

If the code is effective in establishing a further set of institutional rules at the ANC caucus level, this could obstruct plans to introduce private members bills. The code could also stem the flow of power to committees as it may obstruct plans to amend legislation substantially in committees as a way of sidelining Cabinet.

The basis for intra-caucus opposition, especially within the ANC and the NP, is a dissatisfaction on the part of some caucus members with the status quo. ANC

⁵²Chris Louw, "Behind the code lies Cyril's bid to win power," in *The Weekly Mail & Guardian*, Vol 10, no. 27, (Sept. 16-22, 1994), p. 6.

⁵³*Ibid.*

caucus members feel that the minority parties are too influential in government policy formulation. Additionally, some ANC caucus members are growing resentful of the top down nature of policy formulation which sees Cabinet (where the minority parties are more influential) submitting pre-formulated policies for what is perceived as rubber stamp approval. Within the NP, the debate surrounds the party's role within government and as opposition. Some caucus members feel that the NP is becoming too close to the ANC, and in the process is losing its own identity.

Both the ANC and the NP caucuses show similar cleavages. In both parties there are differences in opinion between the party elite and the caucus back-benchers. It could even be posited that the leaders of the NP and ANC share a common co-operative mentality whereas there is a tendency for the back-benchers to be more confrontational.

CHAPTER VII

**A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S
INSTITUTIONS OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION**

The realities of parliamentary opposition in the South African Parliament, then, are considerably different than the theoretical expectations (for example those outlined in Shapiro and Jung). This difference can be attributed to the institutions, and rules thereof, of the Parliament, and how these institutions and rules affect the behaviour of the actors within the system. This chapter will examine the operation of South Africa's parliamentary opposition structures within a comparative analysis with the theories of political opposition which were examined in Chapter 3. In doing so, this chapter will show that despite the lack of formalised constitutional opposition institutionalisation, opposition politics do exist and are effective in South Africa's Parliament.

Reflecting back on the results of Chapter V, this paper has detailed the channels through which opposition is operating in South Africa. As such, South

Africa's Parliamentary opposition has attributes from several of the available theoretical paradigms. The process and procedures in Cabinet fall within Lijphart's consociational model. The institutions of the National Assembly and Committees, however, can be more strongly identified under the majoritarian model of democracy. As such, this paper shall now return to the question which was asked above in Chapter III. The question which was asked, and which will now be examined, is whether Shapiro and Jung's concern for institutionalized opposition in South Africa is warranted, or whether Lijphart's consociational model offers sufficient opposition participation.

Reviewing Shapiro and Jung's three functional concerns of opposition this chapter of the paper will show that the functions of opposition identified by Shapiro and Jung are operationalised in South Africa's Parliament by virtue of the blending of different models of democracy which set the rules which govern the institutions of the South African Parliament.

The first function of the opposition identified by Shapiro is the "provision of the institutional space for opposition is necessary to ensure that discontent and dissatisfaction can be directed at particular governments rather than at the democratic regime."⁵⁴ Currently, many organs, both within and outside of

⁵⁴Ian Shapiro and Courtney Jung, *South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy and Opposition in Comparative Perspective*, (Institution for Social and Policy Studies Working Paper No. 1052, Yale University, 1994), p. 4.

government structures, make a point of differentiating between the ANC-led Government of National Unity (GNU) and the democratic regime in South Africa. Criticism and praise is generally focused on specific members of the government or towards specific parties. Even within parliament itself there are, albeit a limited number, parties and members who are not part of the GNU. These smaller parties in parliament which are not participating in the government also make the point perfectly clear that they are operating out side of the government, but within the governance structures of South Africa.

The over-proportional participation of smaller parties in the National Assembly debates show that there is even within the structures of governance strong identification and differentiation between the GNU and non-GNU parties. These smaller parties are operating within the regime and by virtue of doing so they are differentiating themselves from the government.

The second reason identified by Shapiro is that "Opposition institutions matter...if the peaceful turnover of power from one elected government to another is the *sine qua non* of democratic politics as Huntington suggests."⁵⁵ There are two issues which can be raised here. First, by participating openly in the governing process, the parties and members which are in the GNU do have "a whip system, a

⁵⁵Shapiro and Jung, p. 5. This passage is in reference to Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 267.

shadow cabinet, access to security briefings, and civil service support [which] are all necessary for an opposition to be, and to be perceived as, a realistic alternative to the government of the day.”⁵⁶ In the South African case, the NP and the IFP have a whip system. They do not have a shadow cabinet, but their participation in the Government provides them with access to security briefings. Additionally, the NP and IFP do not have civil service support, except in cases where one of their members head a state department.

The consociational model of democracy which prevails in Cabinet allows for the strong influence of minority (opposition) parties within the government itself. It remains to be seen, and indeed presents a challenge to each of the parties participating in the GNU, how the parties will be able to present themselves as realistic alternatives for the next election. This paper has outlined the identity problems and the operational problems which GNU membership places on the National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party. Within each of the two parties, however, there is recognition of the problem of opposition within co-operation, and the parties are attempting to ensure that they are perceived as parties which are separate from the ruling ANC for electoral purposes.

The second issue concerns those parties not participating in the GNU. Shapiro and Jung’s concern is well founded, considering that there are not

⁵⁶Shapiro and Jung, p. 5.

institutionalized constitutional provision for the participation of parties not in the government. It is reassuring to note that the rules and procedures which have been developed do allow for the participation in debates and questions of the small non-government parties. Such guidelines, which are entrenched in the Constitution and Standing Rules, shape the institution of the National Assembly in such a manner as to insure that smaller parties of Parliament are able to participate. The participation of these parties has in fact been over-proportional to their actual size, which is a welcome situation for opposition politics.

The final point raised by Shapiro is that the “existence of opposition institutions creates and empowers groups and individuals who have an interest in asking awkward questions, shining light in dark places, and exposing abuses of power”⁵⁷ Again, although this function is not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, we have seen its *de facto* practice. In the South African situation healthy debate within parliament has certainly occurred between members of the government and the smaller parties. Additionally, and perhaps surprisingly, we have seen serious debate between the members of the different parties which are in the government. There seems to be, at least presently, a high degree of calling for accountability. Question period has been well used by the small parties in Parliament, as the statistics outlined above show.

⁵⁷Shapiro and Jung, p. 6.

The three functions of opposition which are highlighted by Shapiro and Jung are certainly operational in the South African Parliament. This does not, however, mean that the concerns which were put forth were ill-placed. The mixture of consociational and majoritarian democracy in South Africa's parliamentary institutions allow for opposition politics of different types within the different institutions. In Cabinet, the consociational procedures are enshrined in the Constitution. In the National Assembly, the ability of the smaller parties to serve as opposition is the result of the Standing Rules of the National Assembly which can be amended by the Rules Committee which is ANC dominated. Additionally, there have been recent attempts and moves towards sidelining the consociational Cabinet procedures in favour of legislative means of policy shaping. These legislative means are dominated by one party, and one party only, the ANC. So, while opposition politics do currently function within the South African Parliament, their position therein is not necessarily secure. As such, the concerns which were put forth by Shapiro and Jung, while they can be temporarily allayed, are valid and the entrenchment of opposition structures is still a crucial issue.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper has examined the nature of opposition structures in the South African Parliament from a neo-institutional perspective. In doing so, it has examined the rules and procedures which define the rules under which the parliamentary actors must operate. Using the neo-institutional emphasis on how institutions shape the behaviour of the actors within institutional systems, this paper has shown how opposition politics operate within three Parliamentary institutions: Cabinet; the National Assembly, and Parliamentary committees.

Two democratic models were examined in this paper: majoritarianism and Lipjhart's notion of consociationalism. This paper has shown the peculiar situation of the South African Parliament whereby the different institutions are modelled according to different theories of democratic governance. The procedure of Cabinet is consociational, a characteristic which is enshrined by the Constitution. The

National Assembly and parliamentary committees, on the other hand, operate according to the majoritarian model of democratic governance. In this case, the concerns for the lack of opposition structures (raised by Shapiro and Jung) are valid for the National Assembly and committees. Although both of these institutions are operating under the majoritarian model of democracy, they both lack the necessary formal institutional structures for opposition politics.

The analysis of institutions for opposition within Parliament first considered the theoretical expectations for behaviour that the institutional rules would suggest. Subsequently, this paper presented an analysis of the empirical realities which exist in the South African Parliament. As was expected, opposition politics operate much considerably more than Shapiro and Jung would suggest. Within Cabinet, a consociational model of democracy includes substantial minority parties in the decision making process. In the National Assembly, the Standing Rules of Procedure allow for smaller party participation in debate and question period at levels greater than their proportional numbers. At the committee level, opposition politics is at its weakest. Although the larger parties are slightly under-represented, the committees operate under a majoritarian model of democracy. Additionally, such opposition structures as a minority committee report are prohibited.

The nature of opposition politics in parliament differs substantially from one institution to the next. The relative strength and effect of opposition differs as well.

Cabinet is the locus of the most significant opposition influence, due to its consociational model. As the focus of analysis moves away from Cabinet, the strength and effect of opposition influence decreases. In the National Assembly, there is significant participation by the smaller parties. This participation, however, is not as influential as that of the minority parties in Cabinet. And finally, in the parliamentary committees, opposition strength is at its nadir. The majoritarian model coupled with a lack of significant opposition structures marginalises the power of the opposition. Interestingly, as the analysis of institutions moves away from the consociationalism of Cabinet, the ability and strength of opposition politics weakens. This is perhaps the result of National Party concentration on Cabinet structures when it was negotiating for a consociational model of governance. By ignoring the roles of the National Assembly and committees in policy formulation, the National Party may have made a serious mistake in its failure to negotiate of structured institutionalized opposition.

Finally, although there are no formal structures of opposition within the South African Parliament, opposition politics do operate. By examining the institutions and the rules thereof, this paper has shown that whether it is by virtue of the consociational nature of Cabinet, or the over-representation of smaller parties in National Assembly debate opposition politics are an important part of the parliamentary process in South Africa.

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APPENDIX

Party	Name	Debate 1	Debate 2	Debate 3	Debate 4	Debate 5	Debate 6	Debate 7	Total Debate	Total Debate Columns	Percentage of Debate	Percentage of NA
ACDP	Green, L M	1.000	1.500	2.125	0.000	3.250	0.000	0.000	7.875			
ACDP	Meshoe, Rev K R J	1.000	1.250	1.625	1.625	0.000	0.000	1.125	6.625			
									14.500			
									0.007			
									0.005			
ANC	Adam, Ms. F	1.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.250			
ANC	Asmal, Prof A K	4.875	0.000	5.500	2.250	0.000	18.625	0.000	31.250			
ANC	Baloyi, Mrs S F	0.000	0.000	1.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.750			
ANC	Bengu, S M E	2.875	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.875			
ANC	Booi, M S	0.000	0.000	3.125	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.125			
ANC	Bunting, B P	0.000	0.000	3.000	3.750	0.000	2.750	0.000	9.500			
ANC	Carrim, Y I	0.000	0.000	2.375	0.000	4.250	2.375	0.000	9.000			
ANC	Chabane, O C	0.875	0.000	0.000	3.125	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.000			
ANC	Chalmers, Mrs J	2.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.500	0.000	0.000	4.500			
ANC	Chauke, P	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.625	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.625			
ANC	Chiba, L	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.375	0.000	0.000	2.375			
ANC	Coetzee, Ms M P	0.000	0.000	2.125	0.000	1.625	0.000	0.000	3.750			
ANC	Copelyn, J A	0.000	0.000	2.500	3.375	0.000	0.000	0.000	5.875			
ANC	Cronje, P C	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.250	0.000	0.000	3.250			
ANC	Cupido, Mrs P W	1.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.750			
ANC	Dalling, D J	2.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	5.625	0.000	7.875			
ANC	Davies, Dr R H	0.000	0.000	3.250	7.875	0.000	3.250	0.000	14.375			
ANC	De Lange, J H	0.000	3.625	5.250	0.000	0.000	11.250	0.000	20.125			
ANC	Dexter, P D	2.375	2.250	2.625	3.625	2.625	0.000	0.000	13.500			
ANC	Dingani, Z A	2.125	0.000	1.750	2.500	0.000	0.000	0.000	6.375			
ANC	Dlamini, C	0.000	0.000	2.250	0.000	2.000	0.000	0.000	4.250			
ANC	Dlamini, Ms B O	0.000	0.000	1.625	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.625			
ANC	DuToit, D C	1.500	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.875	3.375	0.000	6.750			
ANC	Ebrahim, E I	0.000	0.000	1.875	0.000	2.000	2.625	0.000	6.500			
ANC	Erwin, A	3.500	2.125	5.875	3.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	15.250			
ANC	Fani, L M	0.000	0.000	1.125	1.125	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.250			
ANC	Fankomo, F C	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.875	1.375	0.000	3.250			
ANC	Farisani, Dr T S	1.625	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.625			
ANC	Ferguson, Ms J	0.000	0.000	3.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.625	6.375			
ANC	Fihla, N B	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.000	2.000			
ANC	Fraser-Moleketi, Mrs G J	1.875	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.000	0.000	5.875			
ANC	Fredericks, G A	0.000	0.000	1.875	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.625	4.500			
ANC	Gandi, Ms E	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000			
ANC	George, M E	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.000	2.000			

Party	Name	Debate 1	Debate 2	Debate 3	Debate 4	Debate 5	Debate 6	Debate 7	Total Debate
ANC	Gininda, M S	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.500	0.000	1.500
ANC	Ginwala, Dr F N	Speaker							
ANC	Golding, M J	2.125	0.000	2.875	0.000	0.000	5.625	0.000	10.625
ANC	Goniwe, T M	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
ANC	Goosen, Rev A D	0.000	0.000	1.750	0.000	1.875	0.000	0.000	3.625
ANC	Gordhan, P J	2.000	0.000	3.625	0.000	3.375	4.625	0.000	13.625
ANC	Govender, Ms P	0.000	0.000	2.500	3.125	0.000	0.000	0.000	5.625
ANC	Gxowa, Mrs N B	0.000	0.000	1.500	1.625	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.125
ANC	Halaig, Ms F	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.375	0.000	1.625	0.000	4.000
ANC	Hanekom, D A	0.000	0.000	5.625	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	5.625
ANC	Hani, Mrs L	0.000	0.000	2.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.000
ANC	Hendrickse, P A C	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.250	0.000	2.250	0.000	2.500
ANC	Hofmeyr, W A	2.750	3.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.375	0.000	10.125
ANC	Hogan, Ms B A	0.000	0.000	3.125	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.125
ANC	Holomisa, B H	1.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	6.750	0.000	0.000	8.500
ANC	Holomisa, S P	1.500	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.750	2.375	0.000	5.625
ANC	Jana, Mr D P	1.750	0.000	2.625	0.000	1.625	3.500	0.000	9.500
ANC	Jassat, Dr E E	0.000	0.000	2.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.000
ANC	Jordaan, D A	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.250	0.000	0.000	2.375	5.625
ANC	Jordan, Dr P	3.875	12.375	0.000	12.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	28.250
ANC	Kasrils, R	2.000	0.000	0.000	5.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	7.000
ANC	Kathrada, A M	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.250	0.000	2.250
ANC	Kekana, N N	0.000	0.000	2.375	4.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	6.375
ANC	Kgositsile, Ms B	2.250	0.000	2.375	0.000	0.000	3.500	1.375	9.500
ANC	Khasu, M J	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.750	0.000	4.750
ANC	Koala, Mrs Z A	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.125	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.125
ANC	Kuzwayo, Dr N E K	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.875	0.000	1.875
ANC	Landers, L T	0.000	2.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.000
ANC	Leeuw, S J	0.000	0.000	1.250	1.625	0.000	1.625	0.000	4.500
ANC	Lekgoro, M K	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.375	2.000	0.000	0.000	3.375
ANC	Lockey, D	0.000	1.500	0.000	4.125	0.000	0.000	0.000	5.625
ANC	Loots, H G	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.500	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.500
ANC	Louw, S K	0.000	0.000	3.875	0.000	2.125	0.000	0.000	6.000
ANC	Love, Ms J Y	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	6.250	0.000	6.250
ANC	Mabandla, Mrs B S	1.625	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	6.000	0.000	7.625
ANC	Mabudafhasi, Mrs R J	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.750	2.250	0.000	4.000
ANC	Mabude, Mrs N	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.875	0.000	1.875
ANC	Mabuza, Mrs L	1.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.500	3.750
ANC	Macozoma, S J	0.000	2.625	2.500	6.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	11.375
ANC	Maduna, P M	0.000	0.375	0.000	3.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.125

Party	Name	Debate 1	Debate 2	Debate 3	Debate 4	Debate 5	Debate 6	Debate 7	Total Debate
ANC	Mafolo, M T	0.000	2.500	2.000	0.000	2.625	0.000	0.000	7.125
ANC	Maharaj, S R	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	22.625	0.000	0.000	22.625
ANC	Mahlalela, A F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.750	0.000	0.000	1.750
ANC	Mahlangu, M J	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.625	2.500	0.000	5.125
ANC	Mahlangu, Ms G L	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.000	0.000	0.000	2.000
ANC	Mahlangu, N J	0.000	0.000	5.125	0.000	0.000	3.250	0.000	8.375
ANC	Mahlangu, S J	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.500	0.000	1.500
ANC	Majola-Pikoli, Mrs N T	0.000	0.000	2.625	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.625
ANC	Makume, N J	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.250	0.000	0.000	3.250
ANC	Makwella, S P	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
ANC	Malebo, S M	0.000	0.000	1.750	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.750
ANC	Malumise, Ms M M	0.000	0.000	2.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.000
ANC	Mandela, Ms N W	0.000	0.000	0.000	6.000	0.000	0.000	10.000	16.000
ANC	Mandela, N R	7.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	11.250	0.000	0.000	18.250
ANC	Manie, M S	2.125	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.250	1.500	0.000	7.875
ANC	Manuel, T A	3.250	1.125	3.625	0.000	0.000	23.625	0.000	31.625
ANC	Mapisa-Nqakula, Ms N N	2.125	0.000	0.000	2.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.125
ANC	Marcus, Ms G	1.500	1.500	4.250	4.500	0.000	0.000	0.000	11.750
ANC	Marshoff, Mrs F B	0.000	0.000	1.625	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.625
ANC	Maseko, T M J	0.000	0.000	1.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.750
ANC	Mashamba, Mrs H J	0.000	0.000	3.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.000
ANC	Mashimbye, J N	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.375	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.375
ANC	Mayekiso, J M	0.000	0.000	3.500	0.000	0.000	2.500	0.000	6.000
ANC	Mayimele, Mrs H W	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.750	0.000	2.750
ANC	Mbeki, T M	0.000	0.000	4.875	3.625	0.000	0.000	0.000	8.500
ANC	Mboweni, T T	2.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.750	0.000	4.500
ANC	Mdladlana, M M S	0.000	1.375	0.000	2.875	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.250
ANC	Mifebe, M W	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.625	0.000	3.750	0.000	5.375
ANC	Mgidi, J S	0.000	0.000	2.125	2.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.875
ANC	Mkhathwa, Father S	0.000	0.000	1.750	0.000	0.000	1.875	0.000	3.625
ANC	Mkhwanazi, Mrs T R	1.125	0.000	0.000	3.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.375
ANC	Mlambo-Ngcuka, Ms P G	2.875	0.000	2.500	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	5.375
ANC	Mlangeni, A	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.125	0.000	1.750	4.875
ANC	Mnguni, L L A	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.125	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.125
ANC	Moatshe, Rev P	0.000	0.000	1.250	0.000	1.875	0.000	0.000	3.125
ANC	Modisenyane, L J	0.000	0.000	2.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.000
ANC	Modise, J	0.000	0.000	0.000	12.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	12.000
ANC	Moeti, S E	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.500	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.500
ANC	Mohamed, Prof I J	0.000	0.000	2.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.000	5.750
ANC	Mohlamonyane, G M	0.000	0.000	2.375	2.375	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.750

Party	Name	Debate 1	Debate 2	Debate 3	Debate 4	Debate 5	Debate 6	Debate 7	Total Debate
ANC	Mokaba, P R	2.375	0.000	0.000	0.000	8.125	0.000	0.000	10.500
ANC	Mokitlane, M C	0.000	0.000	1.250	2.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.250
ANC	Mokoena, D A	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.375	0.000	0.000	2.375
ANC	Mokoena, M L	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.875	2.875
ANC	Molekane, R S	0.000	0.000	2.750	2.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.750
ANC	Molewa, B G	0.000	0.000	2.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.000
ANC	Momberg, J H	2.000	4.500	3.125	2.625	0.000	0.000	2.125	14.375
ANC	Mompoti, Ms R S	1.500	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.500
ANC	Moosa, M V	4.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	5.375	5.000	0.000	14.625
ANC	Mosunkutu, E	0.000	0.000	1.375	0.000	0.000	1.625	0.000	3.000
ANC	Mpahlwa, M B	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.750
ANC	Msimang, M M T B	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.875	0.000	6.000	0.000	7.875
ANC	Mtintso, Ms T E	2.625	0.000	0.000	2.875	0.000	0.000	0.000	5.500
ANC	Mti, L M	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.875	0.000	0.000	1.875
ANC	Mufamadi, F S	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.250	0.000	0.000	3.250
ANC	Mushwana, G M	0.000	0.000	1.375	2.125	3.625	0.000	0.000	7.125
ANC	Myakayaka-Manzini, Ms	2.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.750	0.000	4.750
ANC	Naidoo, J	3.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	5.750	0.000	9.500
ANC	Nair, B	0.000	0.000	2.125	2.375	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.500
ANC	Ncinane, Z I	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.750	0.000	2.750
ANC	Ncube, Sister N Z	1.125	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.625	0.000	1.375	4.125
ANC	Nel, A C	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.750	0.000	2.750
ANC	Nel, A H	0.000	0.000	2.000	2.375	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.375
ANC	Ngwane, Ms L B	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.125	0.000	3.125
ANC	Ngwenya, Mrs M L	2.125	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.000	0.000	5.125
ANC	Nhlanhla, J M	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.250	0.000	0.000	2.250
ANC	Nhleko, N P	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.000	1.000	0.000	4.000
ANC	Niehaus, C G	1.875	0.000	2.750	0.000	2.625	2.000	0.000	9.250
ANC	Njobe, Mrs M A A	0.000	0.000	1.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.750
ANC	Nkadimeng, J K	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
ANC	Nkomo, Dr S A	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.875	0.875
ANC	Ntuli, Mrs B M	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.625	0.000	2.625
ANC	Nxumalo, S D	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.625	0.000	0.000	1.625
ANC	Nzimande, Dr B E	1.375	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.125	0.000	0.000	3.500
ANC	Nzo, A B	2.500	0.000	0.000	14.375	0.000	0.000	0.000	16.875
ANC	Olifant, D A A	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.625	5.250	1.875	0.000	8.750
ANC	Oliphant, G G	0.000	0.000	1.250	0.000	0.000	1.250	0.000	2.500
ANC	Omar, A M	4.250	3.000	4.000	0.000	0.000	36.250	0.000	47.500
ANC	Pahad, A G H	0.000	0.000	0.000	9.375	0.000	0.000	0.000	9.375
ANC	Pahad, Dr E G	0.000	0.000	2.500	0.000	0.000	3.250	1.250	7.000

Party	Name	Debate 1	Debate 2	Debate 3	Debate 4	Debate 5	Debate 6	Debate 7	Total Debate
ANC	Pandor, Mrs G N M	0.000	1.625	2.125	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.750
ANC	Peires, Prof J B	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.625	0.000	1.625
ANC	Phillips, Dr I M	0.000	0.000	3.125	3.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	6.125
ANC	Phohlela, S	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.875	0.000	0.000	1.875
ANC	Radebe, J T	2.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.750
ANC	Ramaphosa, C	0.000	0.000	5.625	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	5.625
ANC	Ramgobin, M	1.625	0.000	2.375	5.750	0.000	0.000	4.625	14.375
ANC	Ramusi, M C	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.250	0.000	1.000	0.000	2.250
ANC	Richards, I	0.000	1.250	0.000	2.375	1.375	0.000	0.000	5.000
ANC	Ripinga, Prof S S	2.375	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.000	0.000	4.375
ANC	Rockman, Lieut G	0.000	0.000	2.625	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.625
ANC	Routedge, Ms N C	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.500	0.000	0.000	2.500
ANC	Saloojee, Dr R A M	0.000	1.000	2.125	2.000	2.000	0.000	0.000	7.125
ANC	Saloojee, E	1.750	0.000	0.000	2.625	0.000	2.625	0.000	7.000
ANC	Seperepere, Mrs. M S	1.875	0.000	0.000	2.875	0.000	1.625	0.000	6.375
ANC	Serote, Dr M W	1.875	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.875	0.000	3.125	6.875
ANC	Sethema, Mrs B E E	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.500	0.000	2.500
ANC	Shilubana, Mrs T P	0.000	0.000	2.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.250
ANC	Shope, Mrs N G	2.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.250
ANC	Shope, Mrs N R	1.375	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.375
ANC	Sigcau, Ms S	2.625	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.625
ANC	Sikakane, M R	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.875	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.875
ANC	Sisulu, M V	0.000	1.375	2.875	3.500	0.000	0.000	0.000	7.750
ANC	Sisulu, Mrs N A	0.000	0.000	1.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.250
ANC	Skweyiya, Dr Z S T	0.000	0.000	7.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	7.000
ANC	Slovo, J	4.000	8.250	5.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	17.500
ANC	Sonjica, Ms B P	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.500	1.500
ANC	Stofile, Rev M A	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.375	2.375
ANC	Suttner, R S	2.125	0.000	0.000	4.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	6.375
ANC	Tambo, Mrs A F	1.500	1.750	0.000	2.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	6.000
ANC	Thabathe, Ms E	0.000	0.000	1.750	2.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.000
ANC	Tshabalala, Dr M E	1.875	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.125	0.000	0.000	4.000
ANC	Tsheole, Ms N M	0.000	0.000	1.875	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.750	3.625
ANC	Tshwete, S V	2.375	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	14.250	16.625
ANC	Turok, Ms M E	0.000	0.000	2.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.000
ANC	Van den Heever, R P Z	0.000	0.000	3.875	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.000	5.875
ANC	Van Eck, J	2.125	0.000	0.000	3.375	0.000	4.500	0.000	10.000
ANC	Verwoerd, Ms M	0.000	0.000	4.000	0.000	4.000	0.000	0.000	8.000
ANC	Vilakazi, B H	0.000	0.000	3.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.750
ANC	Viljoen, Mrs V	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.750	0.000	1.750

Party	Name	Debate 1	Debate 2	Debate 3	Debate 4	Debate 5	Debate 6	Debate 7	Total Debate
ANC	Xingwana, Ms L M	1.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.875	2.125	4.750	10.500
ANC	Yengeni, T S	2.875	0.000	0.000	3.875	2.500	0.000	0.000	9.250
ANC	Zitha, D A	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.250	0.000	0.000	1.250
ANC	Zitha, M C	0.000	0.000	1.875	2.125	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.000
ANC	Zuma, Ms N C D	2.750	0.000	4.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	7.500
									1161.000
									Percentage of Debate
									0.553
									Percentage of NA
									0.628
DP	Andrew, K M	2.250	2.125	4.375	2.000	0.000	1.875	0.000	12.625
DP	Eglin, C W	0.000	0.000	2.750	3.625	0.000	4.000	0.000	10.375
DP	Ellis, M J	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.625	1.625
DP	Gibson, D H M	0.000	3.875	2.500	2.875	3.125	0.000	0.000	12.375
DP	Jordaan, J A	0.000	3.875	2.125	0.000	1.500	6.625	2.500	16.625
DP	Leon, A J	2.625	2.375	3.000	0.000	5.750	9.500	0.000	23.250
DP	Smuts, Ms M	0.000	3.625	0.000	7.875	0.000	0.000	1.875	13.375
									90.250
									Total Debate Columns
									0.043
									Percentage of Debate
									0.018
									Percentage of NA
FF	Botha, Dr W J	0.000	2.250	5.500	6.875	0.000	2.500	0.000	17.125
FF	Botha, W A	0.000	3.750	0.000	2.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	6.000
FF	Chiole, J	0.000	1.750	0.000	0.000	5.500	0.000	3.750	11.000
FF	Grobbelaar, P W	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.875	0.000	0.875
FF	Groenewald, P J	0.000	3.625	0.000	0.750	2.000	5.875	0.000	12.250
FF	Louw, L	0.000	0.000	4.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	4.250
FF	Mulder, Dr C P	4.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.250	3.125	0.000	9.375
FF	Mulder, Dr P W A	0.000	2.250	0.000	6.750	0.000	3.125	0.000	12.125
FF	Viljoen, General C L	3.750	0.000	8.750	0.000	5.750	0.000	0.000	18.250
									91.250
									Total Debate Columns
									0.043
									Percentage of Debate
									0.023
									Percentage of NA
IFP	Abraham, Rev M	0.000	0.000	2.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.000
IFP	Ally, A	0.000	0.000	1.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.750
IFP	Bekker, H J	2.125	0.000	3.250	4.000	0.000	3.500	0.000	12.875
IFP	Biyela, B P	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.250	0.000	1.250
IFP	Buthlezi, Dr M G	5.000	5.500	6.875	21.625	0.000	4.250	0.000	43.250
IFP	Cassim, M F	0.000	7.250	2.000	0.000	1.875	0.000	4.750	15.875
IFP	Felgate, W S	1.375	0.000	2.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.625

Party	Name	Debate 1	Debate 2	Debate 3	Debate 4	Debate 5	Debate 6	Debate 7	Total Debate
IFP	Ferreira, E T	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.750
IFP	Gasa, Mrs. X F	1.500	1.250	0.000	0.000	1.875	0.000	0.000	4.625
IFP	Hlangwa, M W	0.000	0.000	1.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.750
IFP	Jiyane, Dr Z B	0.000	0.000	4.125	2.125	0.000	0.000	0.000	6.250
IFP	Khoza, T S	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.000
IFP	Madide, Dr D R	0.000	0.000	1.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.250
IFP	Mars, Mrs I	0.000	1.125	0.000	0.000	1.375	0.000	0.000	2.500
IFP	Mathews, V J	2.500	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.500	0.000	0.000	4.000
IFP	Mbongwe, R R	1.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.250
IFP	Mbuyazi, Mrs L R	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.750	0.000	1.750
IFP	Mentz, J H W	1.250	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.250
IFP	Mfayela, S B	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.625	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.625
IFP	Mncwango, M A	0.000	1.125	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.125
IFP	Msomi, M D	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	5.375	0.000	0.000	5.375
IFP	Mtshali, L P	1.000	0.000	1.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.750
IFP	Mzimela, Dr S E	3.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.750
IFP	Mzizi, M A	0.000	0.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.750	0.000	3.500
IFP	Ndlovu, V B	0.875	0.750	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.500	0.000	3.125
IFP	Neerahoo, H M	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.375	0.000	0.875	0.000	2.250
IFP	Ngubane, Dr B S	2.375	0.000	3.500	0.000	0.000	0.000	8.375	14.250
IFP	Ngubane, Prof H	0.000	1.625	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.500	0.000	3.125
IFP	Nzimande, Mrs B M	0.000	0.000	1.625	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.625	3.250
IFP	Rajoo, Dr K	1.750	0.000	1.750	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.500
IFP	Seaton, Mrs S A	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.625	4.875	0.000	7.500
IFP	Shandu, Mrs E E N	1.625	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.625
IFP	Skosane, B M	0.000	0.000	1.375	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.375
IFP	Slabbert, J H	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.000	0.000	0.000	2.000
IFP	Smith, P F	0.000	0.000	2.625	2.625	3.125	3.875	0.000	12.250
IFP	Van der Merwe, J H	0.000	2.500	0.000	2.375	2.625	5.500	0.000	13.000
IFP	Vilakazi, Mrs, J N	0.000	0.000	1.250	0.000	0.000	2.875	0.000	4.125
IFP	Vos, Ms S C	0.000	1.000	0.000	4.500	0.000	0.000	2.000	7.500
IFP	Woods, Dr G G	0.000	0.000	3.750	6.875	0.000	2.500	0.000	13.125
									221.125
									Total Debate Columns
									0.105
									Percentage of Debate
									0.108
									Percentage of NA
NP	Alant, Dr T G	2.000	2.125	3.625	6.375	0.000	0.000	0.000	14.125
NP	Albertyn, J T	0.000	3.125	0.000	0.000	2.750	0.000	0.000	5.875
NP	Applegyn, Dr M S	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.375	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.375
NP	Badenhorst, Mrs M J	0.000	0.000	2.250	0.000	2.500	0.000	0.000	4.750

<u>Party</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Debate 1</u>	<u>Debate 2</u>	<u>Debate 3</u>	<u>Debate 4</u>	<u>Debate 5</u>	<u>Debate 6</u>	<u>Debate 7</u>	<u>Total Debate</u>
		253.250	155.375	414.750	419.250	301.125	444.375	109.875	2098.000
									2098.000