Ethnic identity in a "Homogeneous" Nation State

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Contents

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis: *Ethnic Identity in a "Homogeneous" nation State* is my original work and has never been submitted in part or whole to any institution for assessment or award for any degree. Quotations and references have been attributed to their authors or sources.

DEDICATION

Dedicated to One, Kelebogile and Gaatsalelwe (son, daughter and my mother respectively) for their endurances during the four-year period I was studying in Cape Town.

AND

To Boikhutso and Seiso (my father and brother respectively) who passed away before I started my studies while my two sisters Sejelo and Magdaline passed away while I was studying. May their souls rest in peace.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis adopts a two thronged approach to explore the two components of the common wisdom in Botswana. Firstly, it tests the claim by the common wisdom that Botswana is inherently homogeneous. That 90% of the population either speaks Setswana or belongs to Setswana speaking tribes. Secondly, it tests the fact that this perceived homogeneity connect to the country's democratic, economic and political success. The study uses existing Afrobarometer survey data drawn from Rounds 1 (1999), 2 (2003) and 3 (2005) Afrobarometer survey data to test both claims about Botswana's homogeneity thesis. The findings of this study reveal that the first part of the common wisdom is confirmed especially when using language "spoken most at home."However, it is disconfirmed when using "home language." It is also shown that when using tribe (a putatively objective) and social identity (a more subjective) dimension of ethnicity, the level of ethnic diversity in Botswana is much higher than the common wisdom suggests. This is more apparent when language and tribe are broken down according to district and rural-urban location. It seems that minority groups are distributed across and also concentrated in certain parts of the country. With regard to the second part of the common wisdom, the results point out that difference in language, tribe and social identity exist. However, these are not politicized and not aligned with key political factors of national identity, interpersonal trust, political participation, voting and government legitimacy. There are no important politically relevant cleavages structures in Botswana. This study concludes by proposing that, it may be this lack of politicization of identity, rather than the putative homogeneity of the country, that accounts for Botswana's record of development and democracy.

1.INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The study of ethnic identity in stable and unstable political systems has in recent years occupied centre stage in the academic analysis of both developed and emerging democracies (Horowitz 1991; Glickman 1995; Mozaffar 1995; Jones 1997; Mattes 1999; Scarritt & Mozaffar 1999; McClure 2001; Young 2002; Bannon, Miguel & Posner; Posner 2004a; Posner 2004b; Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005). It has also captured the attention of researchers interested in the study of democratic governance who focus on the relationship between ethnic identity and the key indicators such as national identity, interpersonal trust, political participation, voting and legitimacy (Pye & Verba 1965; Nie & Verba 1975; Dalton & Wattenberg 1993; Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005).

In this study, I explore the common wisdom that Botswana is one of the few ethnically homogeneous nation states in Africa. I also examine the extent to which the key political indicators of national identity, interpersonal trust, political participation, voting and legitimacy run parallel to language (a more objective), tribal affiliation (a putatively objective) and social identity (a more subjective) dimension of ethnic identity.

As a stable democracy for almost five decades, Botswana provides an excellent setting for the study of ethnic identity. The choice of my topic: *Ethnic Identity in a "Homogeneous" Nation State* is motivated by the desire to subject the claim that Botswana is ethnically homogeneous to empirical study. I draw from several theories and models that seek to explain the influence of key indicators such as ethnic identity, national identity, interpersonal trust, social identity, political participation, voting and legitimacy on political attitudes and behaviors. I also draw on rational choice theory (Pye & Verba 1965; Dalton & Wattenberg 1993; Glickman 1995; Mozaffar 1995) and the theories of political and civic culture (Pye & Verba 1965)

1.2 Research Problem

A scholarly consensus, both within and outside the country, claims that Botswana is a homogeneous nation state, in fact one of a handful of true nation states on the continent (Hartland-Thunberg 1978; Picard 1987; Easterly & Levin 1997; Young 2002; Norris & Mattes 2003; Solway 2004). It claims that it is this homogeneity which is responsible for its exceptional record of democratic stability and economic growth (Easterly & Levin 1997; Samatar 1997, 1999; Temple 1999; Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg 2003; Taylor 2003; Bannon, Miguel & Posner 2004)[1]. This study seeks to subject both claims to empirical test.

According to Young (2002), along with Lesotho and Swaziland, Botswana, is one of the few countries in Africa that consists of a single ethnic group, thus making it homogeneous. It is generally thought that such social homogeneity, and the political consensus it brings are conducive to stable democratic environment (Mattes 1999). Scholars of Botswana routinely stress its common culture, language and descent (Berman 1998). Hartland-Thunberg[2] for example, perceives Botswana as a tranquil and harmonious society consisting of eight main tribes, with a common language, namely, Setswana. Easterly and Levine (1997) conclude that Botswana is the least fractionalized and fragmented country in Africa with an Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation (ELF) score[3] of .057. In contrast, Tanzania, Zambia, South Africa and Nigeria are the most fractionalized and ethnically heterogeneous countries with scores of .650, .751, .856 and .87 respectively (Easterly & Levine 1997; Norris & Mattes 2003).

The notion of a homogeneous society connotes a single bounded, internal sameness and the absence of polarization, division and fragmentation of a culturally

[1] The literature cited here employed indices of ethnic fractionalization to account for outcomes such as economic growth. In other words, ethnic diversity is frequently used as a proxy for the salience of ethnic identity (Bannon, Miguel & Posner 2004)

[2] Hartland-Thunberg categorically listed the eight 'major' tribes and did not mention the existence of other tribes not listed in the Botswana Constitution. The eight tribes are: Bakgatla, Bakwena, Bamalete, Bamangwato, Bangwaketse, Barolong, Batawana and Batlokwa. Incidentally these are all Tswana tribes.

[3] The Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country belong to different Ethnolinguistic groups. The more groups there are, the higher ELF score (Easterly & Levine 1997; Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg 2003; Bannon, Miguel & Posner 2004; Posner 2004)

homogeneous ethnic group (Berman 1998; Stranfield 1993). It is further claimed that this similarity in culture translates into commonality of interest and agreement on social identity and, especially, national identity. The literature on ethnicity tends to emphasize the 'exceptionality' of Botswana within the wider context of sub-Saharan Africa (Easterly & Levine 1997; Samatar 1997, 1999; Solway 2002). In contrast to many of Africa's deeply divided societies where ethnic conflict is at the centre of politics, Botswana's politics is characterized by relative peace, stable democracy and economic growth largely seen as the 'African Miracle' similar to the 'growth miracle' of Japan and South Korea (Easterly & Levin 1997; Temple 1999; Taylor 2003). It is argued that both democratic stability and economic growth are the result of a considerably less heterogeneous and more culturally tolerant political and social environment prevalent in the country (Hyden, Olowu & Ogendo 2000). This is consistent with Arend Lijphart's (cited in Mattes 1999) claim that social homogeneity, political consensus and a small population size are prerequisites for a conducive and stable democracy.

Botswana is also said to have one of the highest rates of economic growth in Africa, which has surpassed all expectations for a Third World country. In 1966 (at the time of independence), Botswana's per capita GDP income was approximately US $ 80. By 1987, it had risen to US $ 1 050, higher than sub-Saharan Africa average of US $ 330 (Republic of Botswana 1991). And by 1999 the per capita GDP income was more than US $ 6000 (Taylor 2003). It is widely claimed that this phenomenal growth and economic success is largely the result of the homogeneity of its population (Hartland-Thunberg 1978; Picard 1987; Harvey & Lewis 1990; Easterly & Levine 1997; Samatar 1999; Temple 1999; Solway 2002; Taylor 2003; Bannon, Miguel & Posner 2004). Werbner (2002: 680) aptly captures this in his remark that "ethnic homogeneity is, admittedly, a part of Botswana's wider reputation for being an exceptional country in Africa."

The central goal of this study is to test the adequacy of the two claims noted above, paying particular attention to the dynamics of homogeneity and common culture. According to Horowitz (1985), a comprehensive measurement and conceptualization

of ethnicity[4] will entail the use of both objective and subjective indicators of ethnic identity. In Botswana, the more putatively objective indicators commonly used to measure ethnic identity are language and the number of tribes or ethnic groups. Admittedly, language has and continues to provide the basis for ethnic identity and self-perception, but determining the complete inventory of languages spoken in any country is difficult. This is due to both problems arising from generic linguistic classifications and failures to distinguish between languages and dialects. Furthermore, languages and language identities may constantly change due to shifts in societal attitudes, wholesale borrowing as one community comes into contact with another, or the incentives people have to speak a particular language and ties to social class and education (Constable & Simons 2000).

The official designation of Setswana as the national language and the common use of *"Batswana"* (to refer to all citizens in the country irrespective of their ethnic group), is problematic because it obscures the existence of other languages. Such labelling characterizes the whole population as *'Batswana'* regardless of their ethnic origin and cultural descent (Andersson & Janson 1997). In fact, other equally important objective indicators of ethnicity such as the distribution of cultural traits, cultural boundary definitions, religion and race are rarely used as reference points by scholars of Botswana. Similarly, subjective indicators such as social identity, group consciousness and the existence of cultural associations are rarely invoked by scholars when analysing ethnic identity in Botswana. This study therefore seeks to highlight the complexities of the homogeneity thesis by posing the following research question(s):

1. To what extent can Botswana be adequately characterized as ethnically homogeneous across three different dimensions (two objective and one subjective): a) language b) tribal affiliation and c) social identity?

[4] According to Young (2002), definitions and conceptualization of ethnicity vary considerably but converge around three core elements namely: (i) shared cultural properties such as language; a sense of shared historical experience; and shared cultural practices (ii) cultural consciousness, collective awareness and shared ancestry (iii) cultural boundaries.
Ethnicity is both a complex concept and a social construction. And it is important to make a clear distinction between ethnicity and other types of social identity such as religion, race, nationalism, gender and class. However, in this study *ethnic identity* and *ethnicity* are used interchangeably and taken as synonymous (for example see Glickman 1995:9)

2. To what extent do any observed differences in language, tribal affiliation or social identity correlate with the key political factors of national identity, interpersonal trust, political participation, voting and government legitimacy?

In sum, I put forward two main arguments in this study. First, the use of tribal affiliation (a putatively objective dimension) and social identity (a more subjective dimension) find a higher level of ethnic diversity in Botswana than is claimed by the proponents of the common wisdom. Second, differences in language, tribal affiliation and social identity rarely correlate with the key political factors of national identity, interpersonal trust, political participation, voting and government legitimacy. Thus, Botswana is characterized by far higher levels of social identity than generally thought. Yet few of these lines of differences do not appear to be politicized. Perhaps it is this lack of politicization that is unique about Botswana and what explains its economic and political success, not its actual level of homogeneity or heterogeneity.

1.3 Significance of the Study

Theoretically, this study calls for: (1) revising conventional understandings of the ethnic and cultural composition of Botswana and; (2) revising theoretical understandings of how social cleavages translate into political attitudes and behaviours, and thus shape democracy. It also seeks to inform policy debates and provide a basis for effective policy development. Several problems in Botswana's politics result from the emphasis on homogeneity. For example, linguistic minorities feel that some sections of the country's Constitution are discriminatory since the Constitution only lists Setswana speaking groups as the principal tribes in the country**.** For example, the old Sections 77, 78 and 79 of the Constitution of Botswana provide for eight *ex-officio* members of the House of Chiefs from the Bakgatla, Bakwena, Bamalete, Bamangwato, Bangwaketse, Barolong, Batawana and Batlokwa tribes. Members from the non-Setswana speaking tribes are assigned a specially elected status and not even listed in the Constitution (Republic of Botswana 2000).[5] Most international scholars writing on Botswana have largely ignored these issues.

[5] The recent (2005) amendments of Sections 77, 78 and 79 of the Constitution of Botswana (in line with the recommendations of the Balopi Commission of Inquiry: 2000), have been criticized by linguistic minorities for failure to make them tribally neutral.

Politically, policy-makers, planners and implementers need to articulate policies and social programmes that are informed by public opinion and grounded on empirical evidence. For example, the results of this study should help formulate a new national language policy that is reflective of the actual linguistic and cultural plurality of the country. Currently, the national language policy is a series of disjointed practices that place exclusive emphasis on Setswana. The findings should also help in the review of a nation-building strategy, and make it more inclusive and accommodative of the interests and wishes of minority groups, amidst growing murmurs of dissatisfaction from this section of Botswana's population. This is crucial if Botswana is to avoid the ethnic conflict and ethno-violence that have occurred in other parts of Africa.

1.4 Methodology

This study uses existing Afrobarometer survey data from Botswana drawn from Rounds 1 (1999), 2 (2003) and 3 (2005) to answer the descriptive and explanatory research questions outlined in Section 1.2 above. The descriptive and explanatory hypotheses are tested at the micro-level analysis (e.g. Section 3.2, Chapter 3) through descriptive statistics such as percentages and cross tabulations and the use of inferential statistics such as Cramer's V, one-way ANOVA and Tukey's B test. The null hypotheses are either accepted or rejected using the typical level ($p < 0.05$) statistical significance (e.g. Section 3.5, Chapter 3).

1.5 Outline of the Study

Chapter 2 builds a theoretical foundation for the research by reviewing the relevant literature to identify and answer research issues. The chapter examines the common wisdom which sees Botswana as ethnically homogeneous and links this homogeneity to the country's democratic success (e.g. Easterly & Levine 1997; Temple 1999; Solway 2002; Norris & Mattes 2003).

Several techniques developed in the past ten years to measure aspects and dimensions of ethnic identity are explored. These include the ethnic fractionalization measures used to account for economic growth in developing countries (e.g. Easterly & Levine 1997; Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg (2003), and the studies

by Scarritt & Mozaffar (1999); Bannon, Miguel & Posner (2004); Mattes (2004) and Fedderke, Luiz & de Kadt (2008) which not only provide a critique of the commonly used Ethno-Linguistic measures but also posit alternative and more progressive ethnic fractionalization measures.

Finally, Chapter 2 advances the following descriptive and explanatory hypotheses:

> ***Hypothesis 1:*** *Linguistically, Botswana is less homogeneous than what the common wisdom suggests.*
>
> ***Hypothesis 2:*** *In terms of tribal affiliation, the level of heterogeneity in Botswana is higher than the common wisdom suggests.*
>
> ***Hypothesis 3:*** *Using a more subjective measure of social identity, Botswana will be more heterogeneous than common wisdom suggests.*
>
> ***Hypothesis 4:*** *I expect to find a weak relationship between language/tribal affiliation and national identity.*
>
> ***Hypothesis 5:*** *There will be a strong relationship between language/tribal affiliation and interpersonal trust.*
>
> ***Hypothesis 6:*** *There would be a strong relationship between language/tribal affiliation, political participation and voting.*
>
> ***Hypothesis 7:*** *There will be a strong relationship between language/tribal affiliation and government legitimacy.*
>
> ***Hypothesis 8:*** *There will be a weak relationship between the type of social identity and the level of national identity.*
>
> ***Hypothesis 9:*** *There will be a weak relationship between the type of social identity and interpersonal trust.*
>
> ***Hypothesis 10:*** *There will be a strong relationship between the type of social identity, political participation and voting.*
>
> ***Hypothesis 11:*** *There will be a strong relationship between the type of social identity and government legitimacy.*

To answer the research questions highlighted in section 1.2 above, in Chapter 3, I outline the methodology used in this study. This is done by providing the description and justification of the research design and methods used in this study. Focus is also on the operationalization of constructs used to measure the hypothesized relationship

between the independent and dependent variables. Finally, Chapter 3 focuses on the data analysis in particular, the selection, description and justification of the descriptive and inferential statistics used in this study.

In Chapter 4, I examine and empirically test the extent to which Botswana can be adequately characterized as ethnically homogeneous using language (a more objective marker of ethnic identity) and tribal affiliation (a putatively objective marker of ethnic identity). I also examine the extent to which Botswana can be characterized as ethnically homogeneous when using social identity, a more subjective marker of ethnic identity. The chapter ends by summarizing the research results. These reveal that when using language 'spoken most at home,' the common wisdom is confirmed. But when using 'home language,' breakdown by district and rural-urban location, the level of heterogeneity is much higher hence the common wisdom needs revising. The results also reveal that minority languages are also concentrated in certain parts of the country. The use of tribe (a putatively objective) and social identity (a more objective) dimensions, the level of diversity is higher at the national, district level and in terms of rural-urban breakdown. In short, these results are not consistent with the common wisdom.

Chapter 5 highlights the nature of the relationship between language and key political factors. This is done by juxtaposing and cross tabulating language and key political factors such as national identity, interpersonal trust, political participation, voting and government legitimacy. In short, it reveals that in Botswana, tribal diversity tribal differences exist and these do not appear to influence political attitudes and behaviours.

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Chapter 6 looks at the nature of the relationship between tribal affiliation and key political factors. In short, it reveals mixed results. For example, some of the results reveal a strong and statistically significant relationship between tribal affiliation and national identity. Mixed and contradictory results are also observed with respect to the relationship between tribal affiliation, political participation and voting. For example, these results range from weak to moderately strong and statistically significant relationship. Finally, the relationship between tribal affiliation and interpersonal trust and tribal affiliation and government legitimacy is observed to be weak.

In Chapter 7, I explore the nature of the relationship between social identity and key political factors. It uses a more subjective marker of ethnic identity to uncover the levels of social identity cleavages in Botswana. The results reveal that important lines of divisions along social identity do exist. But these do not appear to influence and shape important political behaviours and attitudes in any significant way.

In Chapter 8, I start by providing an overview of the analysis of the results reported in Chapters 4 through to 7. Several threads emerge from this chapter. Firstly when using language, (a more objective dimension of ethnic identity), Botswana appears to be ethnically homogeneous thus confirming the common wisdom. However, when using tribal affiliation (a putatively objective dimension) and social identity (a more subjective dimension), the level of ethnic heterogeneity is much higher than anticipated by the proponents of the common wisdom. Secondly, this study reveals the existence of differences along language, tribe and social identity dimensions. Perhaps, the most crucial aspect of the findings is that these lines of divisions do not seem to have any meaningful and political consequences on political behaviours and attitudes in Botswana.

Finally, Chapter 8 concludes by making reference to the implications of this study for theory and directions for future research. As I stated earlier, I put forward two main arguments in this study. First, the use of tribal affiliation (a putatively objective dimension) and social identity (a more subjective dimension) find a higher level of ethnic diversity in Botswana than is claimed by the proponents of the common wisdom. Second, differences in language, tribal affiliation and social identity rarely correlate with the key political factors of national identity, interpersonal trust, political participation, voting and government legitimacy. Thus, Botswana is characterized by far higher levels of social identity than generally thought. Yet few of these lines of differences do not appear to be politicized. Perhaps it is this lack of politicization that is unique about Botswana and what explains its economic and political success, not its actual level of homogeneity or heterogeneity.

2. THEORETICAL ISSUES AND APPROACHES

2.1 Introduction

Whereas the previous chapter outlined the background to the research, identified the research problem, explored the justification for the research, and provided an introductory overview of methodology and the outline of the thesis. This chapter seeks to build a theoretical foundation of this research by reviewing the relevant literature and identifying pertinent research issues. The chapter is organised around four major topics: the common wisdom and state of our knowledge; the measurement of ethnic identity; conceptualization and measurement issues; the relationship between ethnic identity and electoral systems; and my hypotheses and models.

2.2 The Common Wisdom and State of Knowledge

There are two manifestations of the common wisdom on Botswana that are sometimes explicit, but more often implicit. That is, (1) sees Botswana as ethnically homogeneous and (2) this homogeneity connects to the country's economic and democratic success (Easterly & Levine 1997; Temple 1999; Solway 2002; Norris & Mattes 2003). In Botswana, ethnicity is largely conceptualized in "objective" and "primordial" terms. That is, ethnic groups are seen as fixed, internally homogeneous and one-dimensional (Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo 2003; Mooko 2006)[6]. Such a simplistic approach equates ethnicity to tribe and language while ignoring other subjective dimensions such as social identity. Yet, more recent research traditions reveal that modern African ethnicity is a social construction, perpetually in creation (Vail 1989; Anderson 1991; Berman 1998; Mattes 1999; Young 2002; Berman, Eyoh & Kymlicka 2004). Other approaches to ethnicity such as 'constructivism', 'instrumentalism' and 'rational choice' have not been systematically applied to Botswana despite the fact that these approaches have persuasively shown that ethnic

[6] According to Mooko (2006:15) in his discussion of the threat of death of minority languages in Botswana, "Language, by nature, is a mark of group identity." This postulation underscores language as one out of the many markers of identity such as race, religion, gender and region. On the other hand, empirical evidence from past studies has revealed that language might not be the only or even the most significant criterion associated with group identity (Sachdev & Bourhis 1990).

groups are often fluid, internally fragmented and multidimensional (Berman 1998; Young 2002; Chandra 2005).

Previous studies of ethnicity in Botswana consistently adopt a primordial perspective to understanding ethnic identity, tracing its historical evolution, ethnic composition, and the challenges and struggles of ethnic minorities to be accorded equal status conferred to Setswana speaking language and tribal groups by the national Constitution. Most studies also focus on the tensions and confrontations between ethnic majorities and minorities (Schapera 1952; Somolekae 1988; van Binsbergen 1988-1992, 1994-2002; Holm & Molutsi 1989; Wylie 1991; van Waarden 1991; Mazonde 1998, 2002; Nyati-Ramahobo 1993, 2002; Solway 1994, 2002, 2004; Smieja 1999; Werbner 2002). In addition, the work by Batibo & Smieja (2000) is a descriptive attempt to not only provide facts about the state and future trends of minority languages, but also to link information and data about the languages of Botswana that are otherwise scattered in various academic writings. Empirical surveys also concentrate on language shift (i.e. abandoning one's language and adoption of a different language other than one's mother tongue) and death (i.e. extinction), as well as socio-linguistic issues regarding the minority languages of Botswana (Andersson & Janson 1997; Smieja 1999; Batibo & Tsonope 2000; Hasselbring 2000; Mazonde 2002; Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo 2003; Selolwane 2004; Mooko 2006).

While this literature is an invaluable part of the study of ethnic politics and ethnicity in Botswana, there are some caveats relating to their sources of data. Various scholars use different and contradictory figures that are not easy to reconcile. This is due to the lack of standardized and reliable data on the country's linguistic and tribal composition. According to Solway (2002), the 1946 population census conducted during the colonial period is the last census to record variables of 'ethnic' identity such as tribe, sub-tribe or language. Thus Picard (1987), for example, *estimates* that approximately 80% of the population is Setswana speaking. Similarly, Nyati-Ramahobo (1999) acknowledges the 80% figure, but *asserts* that Setswana as a national language is spoken by about 90% of the population either as a mother tongue or as a national language. She also *suggests* that minority languages make about 15% of the population while 5% is made up of other racial groups. Andersson and Janson

(1997) also acknowledge the 80% figure but *estimate* the proportion of Setswana speakers as varying from approximately 70% to 90% of the total population.[7]

As can be observed from the above arguments, descriptions and the operationalization of the common wisdom is riddled with uncertainties. This is largely due to the absence of definite figures with respect to the share of the population speaking the country's major language, Setswana. The proportion of the population believed to speak Setswana ranges from 70% to 90%. This lack of specificity makes it difficult to pin down a quantitative threshold that allows for unambiguous operationalization and definition of the common wisdom. In order to navigate around this problem, I start by conceptualizing and then move on to the operationalization of the term "homogeneous." According to the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, a homogeneous group consists of "people that all the same or all of the same type" (Hornby 2005: 717).

Consistent with this definition, the literature on ethnicity (as I outline earlier), defines the term homogeneous as meaning single bounded, internal sameness and absence of politicization, division and fragmentation of a cultural ethnic group (Berman 1998; Stranfield 1993). Hartland-Thunberg's (1978: 3) conceptual definition implies a "tranquil, soft-spoken harmonious society." In Botswana's context it means that "Batswana are in fact, eight main tribes, all of which speak the same language, Setswana."

Having conceptualized homogeneous society, I now put the numbers to the operationalization of the common wisdom in Botswana. First, I explore several options including taking the lowest, average or highest figure as the threshold for a common understanding of the homogeneity thesis. In addition, I also carryout an exhaustive literature search for books, academic articles and newspaper articles that describe the ethnic composition of Botswana. After careful consideration, I fix the

[7] Nyati-Ramahobo used the following sources to justify her figures and estimates: Obondo-Okoyo 1986; Language Use Project: Botswana 1995. While Picard's estimates and breakdown of the population were taken from Richard P. Stevens. 1975. *Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Botswana.* * The 1975 edition of this dictionary has been replaced by a completely new edition authored by: Morton, F. et al. 1989. *Historical Dictionary of Botswana.* The Scarecrow Press: London. On a different note Solway (2002) argued that the claim that the Tswana constituted the majority of the population is a contentious issue.

quantitative threshold of the common wisdom at the upper limit of 90%. Such an approach allows this investigator to quantify and empirically test the hypotheses underlying the common wisdom. I consider the choice of 90% to be theoretically defensible but at the same time not ruling out important drawbacks associated with such a choice. Bratton & Mattes (2007) and Posner (2004b) provide detailed discussion on possible alternatives to explore when dealing with measurement and special problems. For example, conventionally, 'don't knows' and 'refused to answer' responses might be moved to the middle of the likert-type of ordinal scale during the recoding of data particularly when with attitudes and behaviours. Variables dealing with factual information like voting might be moved to the lower end of the likert-type scale. In the next section, I move away from the debates on the common wisdom and focus attention on our state of knowledge.

One recent study of the status of language use and knowledge in Botswana (Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo 2003), and another on the threat of minority language death (Mooko 2006) are worth reviewing for the purpose of this study. Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo's study examines language use and language knowledge using Botswana's 2001 Population and Housing Census. This finding reveals Setswana as the language reported to be most frequently used (78%) at home by the sampled respondents. However, although this is an important finding as it is not consistent with the common wisdom's claim, that Botswana is ethnically homogeneous, there are several caveats to be noted concerning Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo's understanding and conceptualization of ethnicity. Firstly, they display a weak conceptualization of ethnicity. The authors tend to ignore the broader interpretation of ethnicity which includes among other things social identity, gender, religion and tribal affiliation. Secondly, while Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo (2003) correctly make the claim that language rights are human rights they fail to address the debate on the political significance of language rights as human rights.

Thirdly, Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo's (2003) criticism of the census questionnaire's use of the phrases *'language spoken most at home', 'home, and' 'most often'* lacks credibility. In fact, their criticism fails to take into account the theoretical debates surrounding the phrasing of language questions in censuses. Although the phrasing of language questions is often problematic and controversial, it is

nevertheless widely accepted that the phrasing *'language spoken most at home'* is generally in order (see Kertzer & Dominique 2002:26-35). Fourthly, Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo (2003) take issue with the fact that the enumerators are instructed to code Setswana as 02 and English as 03 while 'other language' is specified and written in the un-shaded area. This observation reveals the authors' misconception of the coding of nominal or categorical variables. The coding of nominal variables such as Setswana and English does not necessarily imply ranking or that one variable is more *superior* to the other**.**

Finally, Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo (2003) take issue with the finding that 59% of the respondents report that Setswana is frequently used in the North-West district. These authors consider 59% to be too high a figure to represent the proportion of the respondents who report Setswana as their home language. They imply that this figure is unrealistically high given that the North West district is generally considered a 'melting pot' in the context of Botswana's ethnic composition. They further contend the number of respondents who report speaking Setswana is high due to the corresponding reduction in the number of non-Setswana in the district. For example, Herero (non-Setswana) communities were recently voluntarily repatriated to Namibia. The inferences and explanation offered by Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo (2003) are not supported by the available data and amount to 'reading between the lines.' The number of the Herero who were repatriated to Namibia is too small and insignificant to effect any meaningful change on the overall pattern of the results of Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo's (2003) study. For example in 2002, a tripartite agreement, signed by the governments of Botswana and Namibia and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees provide for the voluntary repatriation of about seven hundred people. (http://www.panapress.com/paysindexlat.asp?codepays=eng0368page=25)

Mooko's (2006) study seeks to investigate and suggest measures to deal with the threat of minority language death in Botswana. This study is an invaluable contribution to the understanding of issues of ethnicity, and the status of minority languages in Botswana in particular. However, several limitations can be identified. First, the study is largely descriptive, lacking a strong empirical basis on which to situate the claim that minority languages are not only endangered but also face the prospects of extinction. The problem of lack of definite figures concerning the size of

language and tribal groups is well documented in Botswana. Notwithstanding, the author relies heavily on language figures based on *estimates* by Nyati-Ramahobo (2000), Andersson & Janson (1997); Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo (2003) all of which themselves lack a strong empirical foundation. In addition, there is no indication of how Mooko's (2006) claim of minority language death threat, is subjected to a rigorous empirical test. This is despite the availability of existing data sets such as Afrobarometer survey data covering the period of 1999 to the present.

Finally, Mooko's (2006:115) claim that "language, by its nature, *is a* mark of group identity" is problematic. This claim ignores the existence of other markers of group identity such as tribal affiliation and gender. Similarly, the claim ignores more subjective dimensions of ethnicity such as social identity and religion. Thus the study adopts a primordialist approach to the understanding of cultural identity hence its emphasis on the preservation of threatened languages and cultures. There is no indication that Mooko's study considers the possibility of the re-construction of threatened languages, an alternative option consistent with constructivist and instrumentalist approaches to the study of languages and culture. These approaches recognize that "ethnic groups are... social constructions with histories of expansion and contraction, amalgamation and division" (Posner 2004b). This means that ethnic groups can grow and shrink, emerge and disappear. The underlying argument is not to dispute the importance of language *per se;* but to underscore the temptation of examining language in isolation of other dimensions of ethnic identity.

In summary, the shortcomings arising from Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo's (2003) and Mooko's (2006) studies call for further empirical study to interrogate the relationship between language and ethnic identity in Botswana. Such a study needs to go beyond the use of census data since these are not always reliable sources of data because of their inherent weaknesses. In censuses, there is the tendency to assign people to a single category thus implying the sharing of a common identity. Kertzer & Dominique (2002: 10) remind us of the possibility that "identities being by definition subjectively determined, their conceptual representation in any census can only reflect subjective process." The existence of Afrobarometer survey data collected since 1999 to the present provides the basis for embarking on such as study.

Furthermore, there exists extensive body of literature by Botswana and African scholarship which adequately explore themes and issues of ethnicity. More specifically such scholarship examines issues such as the: exclusion of minority languages from the mainstream domains of everyday life in post colonial Africa; nation-building projects based on hegemonic and assimilationist policies and; subordination of ethnic minorities and the related political consequences[8].

2.3 Conceptualization and Measurement Issues

Over the past ten years, several new techniques have been developed to measure aspects and dimensions of ethnic identity. Early research on economic growth and ethnic diversity employed indices of ethnic fractionalization (Easterly & Levine 1997; Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg 2003). In contrast, Bannon, Miguel & Posner (2004:11) have criticized the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF), arguing that the:

> ...assumption underlying this approach has it exactly backwards. It turns out that the more diverse a country is, the less salient ethnicity is for its citizens...At very low levels of diversity, ethnicity will also be salient for the simple reason that everyone is a member of the same group. But as ethnic diversity increases from very lower levels to the middle of the range, ethnicity will become more and more salient, as minority groups begin to challenge the dominant group for power.

In the light of the above argument, Bannon, Miguel & Posner's (2004) study is crucial as it is one of the few studies to employ a *'superior'*, direct measurement of the salience of ethnicity. In contrast to past measurement studies, their study utilizes comparative techniques in examining survey data from more than 14 000 respondents in nine African countries (Botswana included). However, Bannon, Miguel & Posner's (2004) study presents two shortcomings. Firstly, it contains inaccurate information with respect to the operationalization and categorization of *'sub-tribes'* in Botswana. For example, these researchers suggest that "in Botswana, where approximately 80 percent of the country's population is Setswana, ethnic responses are in terms of sub-

[8] Some of the emerging key African scholarship on ethnicity include: Ndhlovu, F. 2009. *The Politics of Language and Nation Building in Zimbabwe*. Hochfeldstrasse: Peter Lang; Kamwendo, G. H. 2006. "No Easy Walk to Linguistic Freedom: A Critique of Indigenous Languages in South Africa." *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 15 (1): 53-70; Adegbija, E. 1994. *Language Attitudes i Sub-Saharan Africa: A socio-Linguistic Overview.* Clevedon: Multilingual Matters

tribes i.e. Mongwato, Mokweme [sic], Mokgatla, and so forth" (Bannon, Miguel & Posner 2004:4). The categorization of *Mongwato, Mokwena* or *Mokgatla* as *'sub-tribes'* is inaccurate and out of context. Historically, the examples cited above are tribes in their own right and not *'sub-tribes'*. These are the tribes that the common wisdom regards as the 'major' or principal tribes. In Botswana *'sub-tribes'* often refer to subordinate tribal/language groups (i.e. ethnic minorities like *Bakalanga* and *Wayeyi*) and has derogatory connotations (Schapera 1952; Morton, Murray & Ramsay 1989; Andersson & Janson 1997; Bennett 2006). In fact, none of the minority tribes are given as examples in the list of *'sub-tribes'* provided by these researchers. Incidentally, Posner (2004b:851) in a separate study highlights the "grouping" problem where clearly distinct ethnographic and political groups are collapsed into a single category leading to the result that "an important cleavage is hidden from the view." Ironically, Bannon, Miguel & Posner (2004) appear to have fallen in the same trap observed by Posner (2004b).

Secondly, while the use and value of comparative studies cannot be overemphasized, it is equally important to examine the political salience of ethnicity at the micro-level. Such an approach will help in filling in the gap that is otherwise overlooked by comparative studies. This is the void that this particular study seeks to fill. I cross tabulate data on language, tribal affiliation and social identity (independent variables) with other micro level variables that measure national identity, interpersonal trust, political participation and government legitimacy.

Additionally, Posner (2004b) developed a new fractionalization index for Africa called the Politically Relevant Ethnic Group (PREG) measure. This new fractionalization measure is intended to augment the shortfalls associated with the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) developed by Easterly & Levine (1997). Posner (2004b) maintains that ELF measures are largely inappropriate because they do not reflect the political groups "that are actually doing the competition over policy" but rather tend to reflect the political groups that the ethnographer identifies as distinct cultural groups (Posner 2004b:853). For example, ELF measures suggest a strong link between ethnic heterogeneity and diversity in Africa, as explaining slow economic growth performance or "growth tragedy." In contrast, PREG is based on counting politically relevant groups. Specifically, PREG is found to do a much better job of

accounting for the policy-mediated effects of ethnic diversity on economic growth than ELF measures.

Fedderke, Luiz & de Kadt's (2008) critique of the existing ethno-linguistic fractionalization indices used in most growth studies is illuminating. In short, they observe that studies that rely on ethno-linguistic measures such as those of Easterly & Levine (1997) often assume primordial explanations, that is, ethno-linguistic fractionalization is conceived as constant over time. Such an analysis, does not take into account the fact that fractionalization changes with corresponding changes in economic growth and performance. Similarly, such growth studies do not investigate why change occurs where it does. Fedderke, Luiz & de Kadt (2008) highlight the critical nature of issues of measurement, accuracy, appropriate construction and interpretation of fractionalization indices. They suggest the "need to move beyond the consideration of static measures with wide geographical sweep" (Fedderke, Luiz & de Kadt 2008: 294). Furthermore, the way forward lies in the possibility that the use of "time series data for individual country case studies may be a fruitful new route for social scientists interested in the development prospects of developing countries" (Fedderke, Luiz & de Kadt:302). This approach can be facilitated through the use of societal and political indicators such as linguistic, religious, and racial fractionalization measures.

2.4 Ethnic Identity and Electoral Systems

Studies by Scarritt & Mozaffar (1999), Bannon, Miguel & Posner (2004), and Mattes (2004) call for the revision of the common wisdom. The first two studies in particular, examine and use new sets of data, different indicators and fractionalization indices to measure social identity in Botswana. The Mattes study on the other hand provides a theoretical framework for understanding the linkage between social identity and national identity in African politics.

Scarritt & Mozaffar's (1999) study is illuminating as it highlights the link between ethnicity and electoral systems. They present a comprehensive data set on ethno-political groups in fourteen African countries, including Botswana. Their study involve the examination and utilization of the available Minorities at Risk (MAR) and

Black Africa Handbook (BAH) data sets, to create their own coding of ethnopolitical groups[9]. They recognize that individuals possess multiple group membership and that similarly, countries contain multiple dimensions of ethnic cleavages. This realization led Scarritt & Mozaffar to develop multiple measures of ethnic diversity for each country. Their data set provides up to three different enumerations of ethnic systems, namely: countries that constitute a "national dichotomy;" those at the "middle level of aggregation" and those at the "lower level of aggregation" (Posner 2004b:852). Their measurement takes into account and incorporate potentially relevant spatial information about the spatial distribution of groups across the country (Mozaffar, Scarritt & Galaich (2003). This provides an alternative measurement to Easterly & Levine's Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index.[10] In clear contrast to the common wisdom they find the existence of ethnopolitical cleavages at the middle level of aggregation in Botswana.

Notwithstanding its contribution, Scarritt & Mozaffar's study make an oversight in the categorization and classification of Botswana's ethnopolitical groups. For example, the Ngwato are inaccurately coded as representing the majority in what the researchers call "Bamangwato reserve," instead of the current and correct geographical description of "Central District." And to use the label "Bamangwato reserve," (a colonial title) in 1999 is an oversight not consistent with the current academic discourse on issues of ethnic identities in Botswana. Besides, it is generally believed that the Ngwato only constitutes a small fraction of the ethnic groups found in the district (Morton, Murray & Ramsay 1989; Parsons 1999; Solway 2002; 2004; Selolwane 2004; Bennett 2006; Mooko 2006)[11].

[9] For more details on MAR refer to: Gurr, R. Ted. 1993. *Minorities At Risk. A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts.* Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. For details on BAH refer to: Morrison, Donald et al., 1972, 1989. *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook*. New York: Free Press.

[10] Easterly and Levine's (1997) Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization measure (ELF) has been the subject of academic scrutiny because of its underlying assumptions. For example, it suggests that Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization is constant over time and does not appear to change with economic growth. For more information see: Fedderke and Luiz (2005). Posner (2004) also argues that the ELF measure is inappropriate for testing the hypothesis that links ethnic diversity and economic growth in Africa.

[11] In fact, the Central District has always consisted of multi-ethnic groups including the Ngwato. According to Schapera (1952), about four-fifth of the Ngwato tribe consisted of what were originally foreign people. In Botswana, members of a tribe sometimes differed in customs and languages. Generally, tribes differed considerably in terms of ethnic composition and the degree of cultural homogeneity. It is suggested that in Botswana *'ethnic minorities'* if taken together were more likely to constitute the majority.

Similarly, it is inaccurate to suggest that the Kalanga are only concentrated in the north-eastern part of the country. In fact the Kalanga are also found in much of the Central District. Basarwa (Bushmen) are also inaccurately coded as concentrated in one region whereas they live in almost all parts of the country (Morton, Murray & Ramsay 1989; Parsons 1999; Solway 2002; 2004; Selolwane 2004; Bennett 2006; Mooko 2006). Other minority language groups whose status and size can be equated to the Yei, Kgalagadi and San such as Subiya, Tswapong, Birwa and so forth are omitted without any justification. Furthermore, the Balete are coded twice as '*Melete*' and '*Lete'* (sic) despite the fact that this is one and the same group.[12]

In spite of the shortcomings cited above, the country coding generated by Scarritt & Mozaffar provides an indispensable data set for measuring ethnicity. It highlights the fact that ethnopolitical cleavages and divisions are more complex than suggested by common wisdom. Yet it is evident that large, cross-national data sets such as the ones used to construct BAH and MAH are unable to capture the intricacies that ethnicity analysis requires at the micro-level. This therefore calls for a separate study that focuses on a micro-level analysis of ethnic identity in Botswana.

Perhaps, the most significant challenge to the common wisdom comes from the Afrobarometer survey data on social identity as utilized by Bannon, Miguel & Posner (2004). Their study is one the first (together with that of Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005) to use Afrobarometer survey data to examine ethnic identity in nine African countries including Botswana. This study adopts a comparative approach to illuminate social identity to dispel myths about the salience, origins and subjective nature of self and ethnic identifications in Africa. Their findings reveal that Africans generally identify themselves "first and foremost" in ethnic terms. Bannon, Miguel & Posner's (2004) study is also significant in this regard as it suggests that social identities in Botswana are reasonably diverse.

The study by Mattes (2004) poses and answers the question of why social identity is politically important and salient in African politics despite the global effects of

[12] See the country coding for Botswana in Scarritt & Mozaffar (1999). Without going into details of written Setswana orthography and spelling which are problematic, the word 'Lete' is singular while 'Balete' is plural and not 'Melete' as shown in the country coding.

modernization and globalization. This study focuses on South Africa to find out the actual state of social identity; whether there are any tangible shifts in identity and; the extent to which identity is necessarily dominated by racial and ethnic loyalties or other forms of identification. It is nevertheless relevant to a study of Botswana. The empirical evidence from Mattes reveals that while racial and ethnic loyalties are still an important source of identity, South Africans simultaneously exhibit extremely high levels of national identity. These findings undoubtedly provide some basis for understanding the association between social identity and national identity in Botswana's politics. It suggests the possibility that people in Botswana, may identify themselves in tribal and linguistic terms, while at the same time maintaining allegiance to the nation state.

In brief, what is important at this juncture is to take the cue from these studies and examine the extent to which Botswana can be characterized as ethnically homogenous using social identity as a subjective measurement. Furthermore, no one has yet examined how language, tribal affiliation or social identities correspond to political attitudes and behaviours..

2.5 Hypotheses and Models

The next two sections examine my descriptive and explanatory hypotheses together with their corresponding logic, models and theories.

2.5.1 Descriptive Hypotheses

This section unpacks the following descriptive research question: To what extent can Botswana be adequately characterized as ethnically homogeneous across three different dimensions: a) language b) tribal affiliation and c) social identity? In order to do that the following descriptive hypotheses are examined:

2.5.1.1 Language: A More Objective Dimension of Ethnic Identity

Hypothesis 1: Linguistically, Botswana is less homogeneous than what the common wisdom suggests.

Once we use appropriate data I expect to find a greater diversity in the use of languages in Botswana than what the common wisdom suggests. Currently in Botswana, there is a growing scholarly debate about multiculturalism. The debate revolves around issues of the Balopi Commission of Inquiry and constitutional amendments to sections 77, 78 and 79 that are perceived to be discriminatory by ethnic minorities. Sections 77, 78 and 79 of Botswana's Constitution are perceived to be discriminatory and promoting inequalities by members of minority language groups and tribes (van Binsbergen 1994-2002; Republic of Botswana 2000; Batibo & Smieja 2000; Nyati-Ramahobo 2002; Solway 2002, 2004; Werbner 2002). The Presidential Commission of Inquiry (dubbed *Balopi Commission* i.e. named after its convener, Patrick Balopi, formerly a cabinet minister and the Speaker of the National Assembly) was instituted in mid-2000 with the view of making the said sections of the constitution 'tribally neutral' (Republic of Botswana 2000; Nyati-Ramahobo 2002; Solway 2002, 2004; Werbner 2002). The commission was set up at a time when there was widespread discontent and powerful debate on minorities (Mazonde 2002).

In the follow-up to the *Balopi Commission* of Inquiry, battle lines were drawn in the ensuing debates between rival cultural groups claiming to protect their specific interests (Republic of Botswana 2000; 2000a); Nyati-Ramahobo 2002; Solway 2002, 2004; Werbner 2002). On the one hand was *Pitso Ya Batswana* (literally translated to mean 'the call of Batswana') whose membership comprise mainly majority language groups and tribes who feel that Sections 77 to 79 of Botswana's Constitution is not discriminatory. Minority language groups and tribes, on the opposite side feel that these sections are discriminatory. These include among others: the *Society for the Promotion of Ikalanga Language* (SPIL, formed in 1981) and *Kamanakao Association* i.e. meaning 'their remnants' or Revival and formed in 1995 by the Wayeyi speakers to revitalize and preserve the Yei culture (van Binsbergen 1994-2002; Batibo & Smieja 2000; Trewby & Fitchat 2000; Nyati-Ramahobo 2002; Solway 2002, 2004; Werbner 2002; Selolwane 2004; Mooko 2006[13]). According to Solway (2002:723), "with few exceptions, the founders and leaders of these

[13] Other cultural groups formed by members of minority language groups and tribes included: Otjira Tjomitanda (Herero Youth Organization) and Batswapong Cultural Association (started by Batswapong civil servants and lawyers). See Solway (2002, 2004).

organizations are young people, educated, urban-based and hold valued formal sector employment. Several are associated with the University of Botswana."

As a result of the Balopi Commission and subsequent debates surrounding the constitutional amendments of the said sections, I expect to find greater awareness by ethnic minorities concerning the need to promote, preserve and conserve their language and tribal identities. More than ever before, ethnic minorities are increasingly organizing themselves through the formation of cultural organizations such as the First People of the Kalahari, RETENG (national umbrella body formed to coordinate the activities of ethnic minority groups and associations in the country), and Society for the Promotion of Ikalanga Language (SPIL) and Kamanakao Association (cultural groups of the people belonging to the Wayeyi and Bakalanga respectively). Furthermore, these cultural organizations also stage annual cultural festivals whose main purpose is also to promote their indigenous languages, tribal and cultural identities. In fact, while these groups claim to be concerned with cultural matters and issues, there is no doubt that some of their activities have in actual fact intended and unintended political consequences (van Binsbergen 1994-2002; Nyati-Ramahobo 2002; Solway 2002, 2004; Werbner 2002; Selolwane 2004; Mooko 2006).

My prediction above is somewhat consistent with past studies that reveal that language is one of the crucial markers of social identification and categorization. In other words, it is not only a symbol of but also an important and salient dimension of ethnic identity, thus valued by its users and speakers. (Abrams & Hogg 1990). Several competing explanations are worth highlighting. One competing explanation is that in some instance, language groups may be reluctant to publicly identify with their indigenous language for fear of stigmatization. Instead they may prefer to identify with the majority language group (Dorian 1999; Fishman 1991, 1999). Alternatively, people may also be reluctant to identify themselves in terms of their indigenous language because of the fact that most languages of the world today, are in danger of extinction, since schools, government administration and business are conducted in a majority language despite the multilingual nature of most societies (Dorian 1999; Fishman 1999; Mooko 2006).

5.2.1.2 Tribal affiliation: A Putatively Objective Dimension of Ethnic Identity

Hypothesis 2: In terms of tribal affiliation, the level of heterogeneity in Botswana is higher than what common wisdom suggests.

The common wisdom is based on the notion of Botswana as consisting of eight major Tswana tribes leaving out non-Tswana speaking tribes (Hartland-Thunberg 1978). In contrast, I expect to find a relatively high level of heterogeneity, that is, affiliation to many more tribes than suggested by the common wisdom. The expectation is that the common wisdom is inadequate since it is primarily occupied with only one of the many markers of ethnic identity, namely, language. Yet when one examines the language-tribe nexus in the Botswana context, it is intricate and mutually inclusive. In other words, there is no way in which one can talk about language without necessarily implying the tribal dimension or vice versa. For example, Tribal names are preceded with the prefix **Mo**- (for example **Mo**ngwato used to refer to a person who speaks **Se**ngwato that is a dialect of Setswana language) while language names are preceded by the prefix **Se**- (for example **Se**kalaka language is used to refer to a person whose tribal affiliation is Kalanga that is, **Mo**kalaka). My logic is also partially premised on the assumption that in Africa:

> Parochial ethnic loyalties were merely cultural ghosts lingering on into the present...destined to disappear in the face of the social, economic and political changes that were everywhere at work...'modernization' would do the job...ethnic loyalties would fade away...Ethnicity, however, failed to cooperate with its many would-be pall-bearers (Vail 1989: 1-2).

In other words, self-identification, deep-seated allegiance and attachment with tribal affiliation remain one of the most salient markers of ethnic identity (Galkina 2004).

2.5.1.3 Social Identity: A More Subjective Dimension of Ethnic Identity

Hypothesis 3: Using a subjective measure of social identity, Botswana is more heterogeneous than the common wisdom suggests.

I expect to find a multiplicity of social identities co-existing amongst and across the various social identity groups. In contrast to my prediction, the common wisdom revolves around the use of language and tribe, as the only primordial attribute and

traditional marker of ethnic identity. It seldom uses more subjective dimensions such as religion, gender and occupation. More specifically, I expect to find that many people in Botswana identify themselves using other ethnic labels (besides language) such as tribe, sub-tribe, clan, and social categories related to kinship such as region, class or gender. My prediction is that once we use more subjective markers, Botswana is relatively more heterogeneous than the common wisdom wants us to believe. I predict this hypothesis to be supported because people's social identities, perceptions of themselves and who they are continually shaped by forces of modernization. In particular, as a result of the increase in the pace of industrialization and literacy rates, people are more likely to be cognitively aware of their self-identifications and use these as primary forms of social identity.

My logic is also consistent with past studies that reveal that generally individuals possess multiple group memberships and similarly, countries also contain multiple dimensions of cleavages such as ethnicity, religion, language, gender and region. In fact, these dimensions reflect on the one hand, the willingness of individuals to claim multiple affiliations, on the other hand, the country's diversity on a particular dimension in question (Mattes 1999; Mozaffar, Scarritt & Galaich 2003; Bannon, Miguel & Posner 2004; Posner 2004a, 2004b). Past studies also widely assume that plural societies are generally characterized by a multiplicity of social identities (Mattes 1999).

Finally, the above descriptive arguments only go as far as demonstrating the existence of diverse languages, tribes and social identities in Botswana. If ethnic homogeneity leads to political stability, the question that remains to be answered is what do the findings of diversity mean politically? In fact, I expect to find that the key indicators of support for Botswana's democracy (such as national identity, interpersonal trust, legitimacy, political participation and voting) are structured along the newly discovered identity cleavages. The next section focuses on the explanatory research question and hypotheses.

2.5.2 Explanatory Hypotheses

This section extends and integrates prior research in the exploration of the following descriptive research question: To what extent do differences in language or social identity correlate with national identity, interpersonal trust, legitimacy, political participation and voting? In order to do that, the following explanatory hypotheses are explored in detail:

2.5.2.1 Relationship between Language, Tribal Affiliation[14] and National Identity

Hypothesis 4: I expect to find no relationship between both language and tribal affiliation on the one hand and national identity on the other. More specifically, I expect to find that people who belong to linguistic/tribal minority groups are equally patriotic as those who belong to majority language/tribal groups.

The common wisdom depicts Batswana as one happy, homogeneous and loyal people. I expect that people who belong to linguistic/tribal minorities will display equal levels of patriotism as other citizens. I expect this prediction to be true given the absence of secessionist sentiments on the part of ethnic minorities. Ethnic minorities (with the notable exception of Basarwa) are not necessarily economically marginalized particularly in terms of resource and land distribution and allocation. Although ethnic minorities are dissatisfied with perceived discrimination embedded in some pieces of legislation such as the Tribal Territories Act and the corresponding naming of some of the District Council (e.g. Kweneng District Council and Kgatleng District Council named after Bakwena and Bakgatla respectively that is, two of the Tswana principal tribes) and Lands Boards (e.g. Ngwato Land Board and Tawana Land Board named after the Bangwato and Batawana respectively that two of the Tswana principal tribes) after some of the major Tswana tribes, the reality on the ground is that resource and land allocation is done more equitably. That is every citizen of Botswana stand equal chance to be allocated land anywhere in the country without any regard to ethnicity. In fact, the distribution of social services is informed by the national principles of Economic Development, Unity, Self-reliance and "Botho" (i.e. respect for one's self

[14] In Section 2.5.2, language and tribal affiliation are juxtaposed since these are both objective dimensions of ethnic identity

and other people). This perhaps partly explains why Botswana appears to be an "exceptional" nation state in Africa.

The above prediction is consistent with the theoretical claim by Solway (2002, 2004) who contends that in Botswana, minority language and tribal groups do not challenge national citizenship but seek to embrace it in addition to maintaining ethnic-based loyalties and attachments. According to Solway (2004:138), ethnic minorities "... desire to claim their particularistic identities not instead of, but in addition to, Botswana citizenship...."

In fact, prior studies also reveal that it is possible for feelings of national identity, fragmentation, tensions and divisive tendencies within the nation state to coexist side by side with the local identities such as ethnic or tribal group affiliation (Tajfel 1984; Vail 1989; Glickman 1995; Scarritt & Mozaffar 1999; Solway 2002, 2004; Young 2002: Bannon, Miguel & Posner 2004). According to Pye & Verba (1965:534), it is logical that "individuals develop a multiple set of loyalties when loyalties on various levels are believed not to be in conflict." They further posit that, the existence of multiple loyalties is promoted where democratic governance, provides an environment conducive for the creation of a stable political culture. In other words, the existence of multiple loyalties does not always and necessarily lead to ethnic fractionalization.

Previous studies also offer alternative explanations to the relationship between language/tribal affiliation and national identity in Africa. Ethnic identities are extremely fluid, that is, the boundaries and contents of ethnicity changes from time to time since they are not wholly primordial identities (Glickman 1995:8). More specifically, language is perceived to be a fluctuating marker of ethnic identity and at the same time provides a privileged means of social, economic and political mobility (Kertzer & Dominique 2002). To this extent, the study by Oakes (2001) also makes the same observation by stating that the relationship between language and national identity is neither static, nor predictable but rather varies over time even within the same country.

The second alternative explanation is that the primordial approach can help us explain why members of minority tribes appear to simultaneously maintain strong emotions and attachments to both their ethnic groups and the nation state. According to this approach, the construction of national identities is often associated with ethnic and national attachments (Tajfel 1984; Jones 1997; Young 2002). Glickman (1995) also highlights the importance of primordialism in shaping ethnic identity, tribal affiliation and construction of ethnic sentiments. In other words, national identity is thus intricately linked to ethnic identity, a more powerful force that does not easily disappear as predicted by critics of the primordial approach. In fact, Glickman's theoretical proposition is consistent with Bannon, Miguel & Posner's (2004) empirical finding of the multidimensionality of ethnicity and the possibility that individuals may possess multiple identities at any one time. Scarritt & Mozaffar (1999) also observes the existence of multiple levels of ethnic cleavages among multiplicity of groups in virtually every African country.

The third alternative explanation is the role of language as an instrument of communication and a symbolic marker of ethnic identity (Oakes 2001). There are many factors that can be used to explain the role language plays in the construction of national identity. Such factors include economic considerations, level of education and urbanization (Glickman 1995; Oakes 2001; Bannon, Miguel & Posner 2004; Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005).

5.2.2.2 Relationship between Language, Tribal Affiliation and Interpersonal Trust

Hypothesis 5: There is a strong relationship between language and tribal affiliation, and interpersonal trust. More specifically I expect to find that people who belong to minority language/tribal groups will be more likely to have higher levels of interpersonal trust compared to their majority counterparts.

I expect that people who belong to minority language/tribal groups will have higher levels of interpersonal trust because ethnically they are used to having to assimilate and integrate into the dominant culture. In contrast, people who belong to the majority language/Tswana groups are less likely to trust out-groups since their ethnic personality is mirrored and reflected in the country's name. In other words, they do

not have the incentive to assimilate into the culture of the ethnic 'other.' Furthermore, the expectation is that members of minority language groups and tribes will be too trusting owing to their historical experience and the fact that in the past they had and continue to assimilate and integrate into the dominant Tswana culture (Morton, Murray & Ramsay 1989; Wylie 1991; Molutsi 1998; Batibo & Smieja 2000; Nyati-Ramahobo 2002; Solway 2002, 2004; Selolwane 2004). I predict that past historical experiences naturally make the minority language groups and tribes more enduring, more tolerant and forgiving. In contrast, members of majority language groups and tribes are expected to be less trusting due to the fact that their ethnic personality is mirrored and reflected in the country's name, Botswana (Andersson & Janson 1997; Batibo & Smieja 2000), thus they have no incentive to assimilate into the culture of minority language groups and tribes. Besides, they do not have painful memories from the past that are more likely to make them more tolerate of people who are seemingly different to them. Their primary concern is to maintain the status quo and the dominant social status.

In Botswana the following example serves to partially explain why ethnic majority are less likely to trust than their minority counterparts. It is common practice for members of ethnic majority to use phrases like *Moratshwana/Meratshwana* (sub-tribe/sub-tribes or inferior tribes) and prefix *Le-* and *Ma-* to refer to members of minority language groups and tribes. Conversely, the phrases *Morafe/Merafe* (tribe/tribes) and the prefix *Mo-* (singular) and *Ba-* (plural) were used in reference to majority language groups and tribes (Moilwa 1975; Werbner 2002).[15] The use such forms of identification and description amount to what Sachdev and Bourhis (1990) though not specifically referring to Botswana's context call devalorization and stigmatization of minority languages and tribes.

The persistence of the above perceptions of ethnic minorities by their majority counterparts stems from the past historical events and experiences relating to Botswana's ethnic politics. These generally point to the subordination and subjugation

[15] In Botswana, there is the tendency (by members of majority language groups and tribes) to: label members of minority language groups and tribes as *Meratshwana* and label the majority counterparts as *Merafe;* it is also common to say for example ***Le****kalaka* instead of ***Mo****kalaka*; ***Ma****kalaka i*nstead of ***Ba****kalaka*/***Ba****kalanga.* The use of phrases like *Meratshwana* and the prefix ***Le-*** and ***Ma-*** not only conveys derogatory connotations but is also dehumanizing

of minority language groups and tribes by their majority counterparts and this is well documented (Andersson & Janson 1997; van Binsbergen 1994-2002; Batibo & Smieja 2000; Trewby & Fitchat 2000; Solway 2002, 2004; Nyati-Ramahobo 2002; Werbner 2002; Bennett 2006). In line with this logic Pye & Verba (1965:8) also remind us that political culture is rooted in public events and experiences and that non-political belief – such as feelings of basic distrust and suspicion, can have overriding implications for human relations thus giving credence to the role of past historical events in shaping political attitudes and behaviours.

2.5.2.3 Relationship between Language/Tribal Affiliation and Political Participation

Hypothesis 6: There will be a strong relationship between language/tribal affiliation, political participation and voting. More specifically, members of minority language/tribal groups are more likely to engage in civic and voluntary organizations than their majority counterparts. In terms of voting, more specifically minority language speakers/tribes are less likely to vote than their majority language counterparts.

I expect members of minority language/tribal groups to play an active part in civic and voluntary associations, as a way of circumventing their perceived marginalized status in a society, whose political institutions are dominated and permeated by Tswana cultures, attitudes and behaviours (Solway 2002, 2004; Werbner 2002; Selolwane 2004; Mooko 2006). I expect increased civic participation by ethnic minorities to be a deliberate strategy that allows them not only to socially integrate but at the same time influence importance decision-making processes from within the polity. Thus, by actively participating in civic and voluntary associations, members of minority language and tribal groups would invariably be adopting positive strategies, meant to re-define their status in comparison to the out-groups (Abrams & Hogg 1990). Thus, by actively participating in civic and voluntary associations, members of minority language and tribal groups would invariably be adopting positive strategies, meant to re-define their status in comparison to the out-groups (Abrams & Hogg 1990). The achievement of this goal will be much easier if members of ethnic minority groups are equally active as members of majorities. Below, I demonstrate the benefits and consequences likely to be derived as a result of increased civic

participation by ethnic minorities. The benefits of civic political participation in Botswana, is aptly captured by Nyati-Ramahobo (coordinator of the Kamanakao Association), when she explains her role in:

> ... In the Association's campaign... As coordinator... I myself influenced certain reactions from government. At first, because I am a woman, they acted as if the association was weak, in ways women are supposed to be, and as if government could quietly undermine its activities until it died a natural death. Breaking the silence, the government began to pay serious attention when the matter was already in court... The perceived weakness turned out to be an actual strength, because being ignored and dismissed as a 'dreamer' meant that I, and in turn the association, had space to forge ahead with our activities at our own pace. Moreover, being a Dean of the Faculty of Education at the University of Botswana meant that I... had resources to communicate with the membership (Nyati-Ramahobo 2002:690).

In fact, Kamanakao Association is not the only civil society organization that took the Botswana Government to court. The First People of the Kalahari (of course with the moral and financial support of Survival International) also took Government to court, in what is acclaimed as a landmark court case in the legal history of Botswana. The First People of the Kalahari took the Government to court to protest what they perceived as forced removal of Basarwa communities from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve *(CKGR)*. Although the Government denied using force, preferring to use the term, re-location, the High Court judgement and ruling on the case at the close of 2006, up-held the perception of forced removal of the Basarwa from their ancestral lands, and ordered that they be allowed to return to the CKGR.

Turning to voting, firstly, I expect to find a strong relationship between language/tribal affiliation and voting, because, the minority vote cannot change the status quo as long as the electoral process is premised on the principle of the 'winner takes all' or 'first past the post'. In other words, it does not make any difference whether or not the minority language speakers/tribes vote. I expect voting to have different incentives for minority groups than civic participation because it is a multi-staged process that involves a series of steps. For example, for one to vote, one first needs to be motivated. Secondly, one has to take the decision to vote. Thirdly, the decision to vote has to be followed by going through the registration processes. In the context of Botswana, the registration process has its own challenges. For example, according to Selolwane (2004), in Botswana, voter turnout, especially among

members of minority language groups and tribes, has to be understood in the light of voter registration, education and information dissemination procedures. The official media such as *The Daily News*, the two radio stations and Botswana Television, tend to overlook minority language groups and tribes, most of which are non-Setswana linguistic groups and tribes. Fourth, voting procedures among other things entail possession of a valid registration card, a valid national identity card (dubbed *Omang* i.e. 'who are you'?), and potential voters have to walk or travel to register at a designated polling station or the nearest Registration Offices, or District Administration Offices where they are available. Other forms of identification documents like driver's licences and passports are not accepted, despite the fact that possession of a valid *Omang* is a prerequisite for obtaining these documents. Besides, the issuing of *Omang* and passports is the responsibility of the same line ministry.

Finally, once the registration hurdle is overcome, the focus is then on turning out to vote on an election day. The Election Day is usually set several years and months after the registration. For ethnic minorities the intervening period and the Election Day poses yet another set of challenges in particular the official language policy where Setswana and English are designated as the national and official languages respectively. Given this policy, I generally expect minority groups to feel that their languages are not officially accommodated in the public sphere thus marginalized. My prediction is that because of this discontent, ethnic minorities are more likely to abstain from voting and or alternatively vote for the opposition parties as way of demonstrating their dissatisfaction with the prevailing political processes. This prediction is consistent with the study by Selolwane (2004) that, in Botswana, some people were cynical about voting especially when they fail to see the beneficial consequences that are likely to flow out of the entire electoral process.

The above viewpoint is consistent with the theoretical proposition, that, political institutions and institutional variables such as electoral formula matter significantly (Mozaffar 1995; The Independent Electoral Commission 2002; Kuenzi & Lambright 2007). For example, the study by Dalton & Wattenberg (1993), reveal that voter registration systems and electoral procedures, do impact on voter turnout and more specifically on the decision to or not to vote. In addition, Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi (2005), observe that, too often, potential voters are more likely to be hindered

from participating in the electoral processes, due to problems of complying with cumbersome registration procedures.

In sum, my prediction is consistent with theoretical position adopted by scholars of political participation, that it is both a multidimensional and multifarious process (Nie & Verba 1975; Dalton & Wattenberg 1993; Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005). Political participation is invariably affected by a number of interlocking and complex factors, hence, seemingly difficult to accurately predict and predetermine. In connection with the complex nature of political participation, Nie & Verba (1975:7) remind us that, "... the citizenry is not divided simply into gladiators and non-gladiators. Rather, there are many types of gladiators in different acts with different motives and different consequences." Thus competing models and theories have been formulated to account for factors that can persuasively be used to explain political participation both as an independent and a dependent variable (Nie & Pye 1975). Besides, political participation can have a wide range of meanings. For example, it can be used to refer to political orientations (such as attitudes and beliefs) or political activities (Nie & Pye 1975; Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005).

2.5.2.4 Relationship between Language/Tribal Affiliation and Government Legitimacy

Hypothesis 7: There will be a strong relationship between language/tribal affiliation and government legitimacy. More specifically, minority language/tribal groups will be less likely to see the political regime as legitimate as majority language/tribal groups.

I expect the above hypothesis to be true, because in the past, members of minority language/tribal groups have been badly treated as subordinates by the Tswana language and tribal groups (Nyati-Ramahobo 2002; Werbner 2002). Furthermore, members of minority language and tribal groups are also referred to as- *Meratshwana*-meaning 'half' or sub-tribes. The use *of Setswana* phrases that are derogatory and prejudiced amount to what Sachdev & Bourhis's (1990) understanding is devalorization and stigmatisation of minority languages. In addition, as observed earlier, minority languages/tribes are marginalized and excluded from use in the public spheres, education and courts (Moilwa 1975; Werbner 2002).

We can also use *Tswana* proverbs to understand my prediction outlined above. *Tswana* proverbs influence political behaviours and attitudes that people generally have towards their political leaders. The following *Tswana* proverbs are more likely to impact on how Batswana (irrespective of ethnic identity) in general view government legitimacy: *"Kgosi ke modingwana, ga e sebjwe"* [The chief is a little god, no evil must be spoken of him]; *"Bogosi boa tsaleloa, gabo loeloe"* [Man should be born for kinship, not fight for it]; *"Foko ja kgosi le ageloa mosako"* [Always build a fence around the chief ward] (Wylie 1991). These *Tswana* proverbs are politically significant, both in terms of literal translations and how they relate to issues of government legitimacy, and democratic governance in general. In other words, the proverbs are more likely to influence political behaviour and actions, since these are deeply rooted and embedded in social and political fabric and structure of Botswana society. The political consequence of Tswana proverbs is that these serve to highlight tolerance levels demonstrated towards the traditional and modern political leadership. Furthermore, one of the factors that condition ethnic politics in Botswana is that, "the *Tswana* culture pervade most of the country in that an overwhelming majority (around 80 percent) belong to one of the eight major *Tswana* ethnic groups" (Molutsi 1992:87).

Consistent with my predictions that are highlighted above, past studies also reveal that there is always lack of legitimacy among some segments in society, with those people who share a common identity being more likely to identify with government political incumbents (Mattes 1999). And that people who are subjected to political subjugation are more likely to reject government legitimacy (Useem & Useem 1979; Mattes 1999**).**

2.5.2.5 Relationship between Social Identity and National Identity

Hypothesis 8: There will be a weak relationship between the type of social identity and the level of national identity. More specifically Batswana who think of themselves in terms of majority and minority language/tribal/ethnic group are more likely to attach equal amount of loyalty to the nation state.

In using a more subjective dimension of identity, I expect a weak relationship between the types of social identity and the level of national identity because, people tend to accept that they are citizens of the country in which they live and at the same time maintain loyalty to their ethnic group. The logic of this expectation is that first and foremost Batswana will use national identity as a primary form of social identification. This implies that other forms of social identifications like language, tribe or religion will be subordinate to national identity.

This logic is consistent with previous research on social identity that emphasises its multi-dimensional nature. In other words, social identity is an interlocking, overlapping and multiple layered phenomena (Vail 1989; Young 2002; Bannon, Miguel & Posner 2004; Posner 2004a). According to Young (2002:23) ethnic self-awareness should not be perceived as standing in contradiction to national identity but:

> ... a sense of involvement, concern and pride can be derived from one's knowledge of sharing a social category membership with others, even without necessarily having close personal relationships with knowing or having any material personal interest in their outcome (Abrams & Hogg 1990:3).

As Mattes (1999:157) rightly postulates people are more likely to "define themselves in terms of the groups to which they belong, rather than the larger political community, or nation, in which they live" It appears from past studies that granting citizenship in particular and national identity in general, is somewhat a contested issue and depends so much on one's type of social identity. This contentious relationship between social identity and national identity is consistent with the tradition of social constructivism that theorizes that:

> ...National identity is not pre-given, but is largely constructed and produced by people as they develop and express their understandings of situations, events and other people as they arise. The impression of contingency deviates from opposed tendency which treats national identity as homogenous, determined phenomenon (Fevre & Thompson 1999:45).

Although Fevre & Thompson (1999) are specifically making reference to the Welsh national identity, there is no doubt, that their theoretical and conceptual framework is universally applicable, in the literature on social identity and national identity. This

view is also consistent with Tajfel's (1984) thesis that, nations are cultural and historical givens imposed upon us by socialization and social consensus.

Furthermore, there are some differences with respect to the type of social identity and the level of national identity. Such differences are expected considering that they are variable factors that predispose some individuals to identify themselves in ethnic terms more than others (Verba 1965; Bannon, Miguel & Posner 2004; Mattes 2004)[16]. Differences in social identification can also be explained using social identity theory and the associated self-categorization theory. Accordingly:

> ... Self-conception reflects a variable process of self-categorization, the cognitive grouping of the self as identical to some class of stimuli in contrast to some other stimuli. As is the case with all systems of natural categories... self-categorizations can exist at different levels of abstractions related to class inclusion. That is, a given self-category (e.g. "scientists") is seen as more abstract than another (e.g. "biologist") to the extent that it can contain the other, but the other cannot contain it: all biologists are scientists, but not all scientists are biologists (Oakes, Haslam & Reynolds 1999:58).

That is, self-identification and self-categorization are not only dynamic processes, but also dependent on the nature of social group relations in a given context and particular time. In fact, social group identities and national identity are found to be intricately bound together and not mutually exclusive, as previously suggested (Pye & Verba 1965; Tajfel 1984; Scarritt & Mozaffar 1999; Banks & Banks 2001; Mattes 2004; Kamwangamalu 2007), a view consistent with what Southall (1970 cited in Young 2002) terms interlocking and overlapping nature of multiple identities.

2.5.2.6 Relationship between Social Identity and Interpersonal trust

Hypothesis 9: There will be a weak relationship between the type of social identity and interpersonal trust. More specifically Batswana who think of themselves in terms of both majority and minority language/tribal/ethnic group are equally likely to discriminate members of out-groups.

[16] According to Bannon, Miguel & Posner (2004), in line with modernization theory, the following factors predispose some individuals to identify themselves in ethnic terms more than others: exposure to education, employment in non-traditional sectors and political competition.

I expect a weak relationship between the type of social identity and interpersonal trust. This is due to the fact that, there is the tendency for all people to judge and evaluate their group more favourably than other groups, thus, giving rise to stereotyping, social prejudice and ethnocentrism (Tajfel 1984; Robinson 1996). The observation of this investigator is that in Botswana stereotyping and social prejudice are more endemic among both majority and minority language/tribal/ethnic groups. For example, it is common (as observed earlier) for members of ethnic majority to refer to their minority counterparts using derogatory terms such *moratshwana* and or *meratshwana*. In the same breadth it is quite common for instance, for the Bakalanga (one of the minority tribal/language group) to refer to the Basarwa (also an ethnic minority group) as *barwa* (meaning outsiders), a term that has negative connotations as well.

My conjecture as outlined above is consistent with Tajfel's (1984) proposition that generally people share some collective perception of themselves as a distinct social entity of "us" as opposed to "them." That is, the perception of in-group and out-group homogeneity. In other words, people are more likely to be tolerant and develop strong negative feelings towards members of out-groups (Abrams & Hogg 1990; Mattes 1999; Banks & Banks 2001). People's views and treatment of others is tightly linked to the assessment of themselves and their group (Mattes 1999:166). The more strongly people identify with a sub national group, the more likely they will develop strong negative feelings towards out-groups, or are less likely to tolerate members of out-groups (Mattes 1999:168).

2.5.2.7 Relationship between Social Identity, Political Participation and voting

Hypothesis 10: There will be a strong relationship between the type of social identity, political participation and voting. More specifically, the level of civic political participation will be the same for minority and majority language/tribal/ethnic groups. In terms of voting, more specifically those people who think of themselves in terms of numerically larger social identity groups are more likely to vote than the numerically smaller groups.

I expect to find the same levels of civic political participation irrespective of the type of social identity in political activities. This is due to the perception and the belief that - - *ntwa kgolo ke ya molomo* and or- - *mmualebe o bua la gagwe.*[17]. These are Setswana proverbs that emphasize the desirability to solve problems peacefully, amicably and diplomatically. More specifically, I expect to find that ethnic minorities are as politically active as members of the majority. As stated earlier, increased civic participation has enormous benefits for ethnic minorities. It is more likely to lead to increased full social integration in decision-making processes. It also has the potential to allow ethnic minorities to assert their rights in promoting group interests in spheres of economics, politics and ethno-cultural issues.

Looking at voting, I expect it to be an exception compared to civic participation. As stated earlier and for the same logic, I expect that members of minority groups are markedly less likely to vote in national elections. In addition, I predict that in Botswana, ethnic mobilization is generally weak to an extent that it can lead to significant increase in ethnic voting patterns. This is because I expect to find that ethno-political groups are not yet politicized. However, this does not imply that ethnic minorities are not a dissatisfied lot. As observed earlier, ethnic minorities perceive some sections of the Botswana Constitution as discriminatory (despite recent amendments). It is worth noting that the struggle by ethnic minorities is motivated by mild demands. It entails demands that are cultural in nature such as for policy changes, targeted constitutional amendments and the right of schooling in non-titular languages. This is not a demand for autonomy but rather for recognition and accommodation in what is perceived as a plural and multi-ethnic nation state.

2.5.2 .8 Relationship between Social Identity and Government Legitimacy

Hypothesis11: There will be a strong relationship between the type of social identity and the level of legitimacy of government. More specifically, people who think of themselves as members of minority/language/tribal/ethnic groups are less likely to see the political system as legitimate.

[17] *Ntwa kgolo ke ya molomo* is a Setswana proverb which means that 'verbal war' is more desirable than the physical one. While *mmualebe o bua la gagwe means that in any discussion all opinions are welcome.*

I expect people who think of themselves in terms of numerically smaller social groups, to perceive government institutions less favourably than majority social identity groups. This is because as observed earlier, self identified minorities feel marginalized particularly by the government language policy that gives special status to Setswana and English as the national and official languages respectively. In particular, I expect minority groups to resent the adoption of policies that promote cultural assimilation at the expense of their indigenous language and cultures. Such policies also help to entrench the supremacy of Setswana that is the language of the ruling class (Mooko 2006). This expectation is somewhat consistent with the hypothesis by Mattes (1999) that the more likely a person identify with a sub national group the more likely he/she will reject the perceived legitimacy of the political incumbents.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 identified the research question(s) and theoretical issues and perspectives pertinent to this study. In Chapter 3, I describe the methodology used to investigate them. An introduction to the methodology was provided in Section 1.4 of Chapter 1. This chapter aims to build on that introduction and provides assurance that appropriate procedures are followed. The Chapter is organised around four major topics: the description and justification of research design and methods used in this study, operationalization of constructs (i.e. independent and dependent variables) to measure hypothesized relationship and issues around; data analysis and limitations of the study.

3.2 Research Design and Methods

This research draws on Afrobarometer survey data to answer descriptive and explanatory research questions. That is: (i) the extent to which Botswana can be considered ethnically homogeneous when using language, tribal affiliation and social identity; (ii) and whether any observed differences in language, tribal affiliation or social identity correlate with the key political factors of national identity, interpersonal trust, political participation, voting and legitimacy of government. The descriptive and explanatory hypotheses are tested using existing Afrobarometer survey data collected across Botswana during Rounds 1 (November-December 1999), 2 (2003) and 3 (May-June 2005).[18] The research draws on survey data from 1200 respondents (from each of the three Rounds) who are voting age, e.g. 18 and above. Half of the respondents were women and the other half were men (http://www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.2pdf). This sample size was big enough to allow for the interpretation of the results to be generalised to the larger population (Johnson & Joslyn 1999)

[18] In Botswana the national population and housing census data does not capture information on tribal affiliation. The 1946 census conducted during the colonial period was the last to record tribal affiliation (Parsons 1999; Solway 2002, 2004).

(file://E:\Crosstabs%20Measures%20for%20Nominal%20Data.htm).

I use the Afrobarometer data sets for a number of reasons. First, these are preferred because they employ reliable and standardized survey questionnaires to probe citizen's political attitudes, behaviours and public opinions in African countries. The Afrobarometer is a series of comparative national surveys that, among other things measure the political orientations of the ordinary Africans using face-to-face interviews (The Afrobarometer Network 2006). Additionally, the use of survey research allows for the study of a range of human attitudes that previously have been virtually impossible to observe. Secondly, Afrobarometer surveys use standardized sets of instruments developed over a long period of time by established authorities. Furthermore, the surveys are based on probability sample representing the adult population 18 years and above (www.afrobarometer.org; The Afrobarometer Network 2006). In addition, they have been piloted, applied to several African studies hence tested in terms of validity and reliability (The Afrobarometer Network 2006).

Thirdly, these are nationally representative samples drawn through a multi-stage stratified, clustered sampling procedures, with sample sizes sufficient to yield a margin of sampling error of +/-3% at the 95% confidence level. Details of questionnaire design, accuracy, validity, reliability and sampling framework are available at www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.2pdf. Lastly, the use of existing Afrobarometer data sets is consistent with the emerging practices and trends, in quantitative social research literature. Stranfield & Dennis (1993) note that the use of existing data sets and secondary data sets enable researchers to tap into the vast logic of inquiry, technical store of knowledge. In this regard, Afrobarometer data sets are increasingly used by a number of researchers including: Norris & Mattes (2003); Bannon, Miguel & Posner 2004; Mattes (2004); Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi (2005); and Bratton & Mattes (2007). It is to the examination of the operational definitions of constructs, as used in this study to measure the hypothesized relationships that I now turn.

3.3 Measurement of Independent Variables

This section deals with the operational definitions and measurement of the following independent variables: language; tribal affiliation; and social identity.

3.3.1 Language

Languages, dialects and accents provide one putatively objective dimension of ethnicity and a means of differentiating ethnic or tribal groups. This is tangible and audible, that is a system of sounds and movements made by the human body and decoded by the listener's auditory system that one can hear (Mattes 1999; Ovando 2001). Language, is a marker of ethnic identity, and "... not only has real function as the glue which holds a culture together but also has a symbolic role vis-a-vis the larger community or state" (Hannum 1996: 459). As a cognitive aspect, language also acts as a tool for the expression of thought and an instrument of communicating information, values, attitudes, skills and aspirations—a system of signs and symbols that have socially determined meaning (Beebe & Giles 1984; Abrams & Hogg 1990; Andersson & Janson 1997; Batibo & Smieja 2000; Oakes 2001; Ovando 2001; Kertzer & Dominique 2002; Mazonde 2002; Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo 2003; Mooko 2006). The following Afrobarometer questions are used to measure language in nominal terms: What language do you speak most at home? (Round 1, question 111); Which Botswana language is your home language? (Round 2, question 83 and Round 3 question 3)

3.3.1.2 Majority/Minority Languages

Today the issue demographic size and numbers often translates into struggle for power particularly between majority and minority groups. The goal of this 'war' of numbers is to increase the economic and political power of an ethnic group relative to other groups. Increase in relative population size may translate into an increase in political power and hopefully enhanced political representation in decision-making processes (Bookman 1997). Botswana's ethno-political landscape is not immune to the relative struggle between demographic size and political power. For example, Nyati-Ramahobo (2002) posits that in a number of Botswana's districts, the majority language/tribal groups that are recognized by the constitution are actually a numerical minority.

In Botswana the label majority and minority languages often denotes numerical strength and significance (Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo 2003). The labels of

majority versus minority language groups are also problematic. In this study, I use the conventional understanding of these labels. The majority language groups are the *eight tribes* listed in Section 78 of the Botswana's *original* Constitution: Bakgatla, Bakwena, Bamalete, Bamangwato, Bangwaketse, Barolong, Batawana and Batlokwa. These are all Setswana speakers. Minority language groups are mainly non-Setswana speakers (with a few Setswana speaking groups included) and these are not listed in the *original* Constitution. These are Bakalanga, Bakgalagadi, Basarwa, Basubiya, Bayeyi, Hambukushu and OvaHerero. The Setswana speaking groups referred to as minority include Babirwa, Bakhurutshe, Bakgatla-ba ga Mmanaana and Batswapong (Andersson & Janson 1997; Batibo & Tsonope 2000; Batibo & Smieja 2000; Mazonde 2002; Hasselbring 2000; Mooko 2006). The consequence of this demographic arrangement is that political power lies with the Setswana speaking groups that is the *eight tribes* listed in Section 78 of the Botswana's *original* constitution. This means that the minority language groups are politically marginalized.

Besides the actual responses to the actual language questions, I also use majority language group to refer to the *eight* Setswana speaking tribes that are listed in the original constitution of Botswana. In other words, in terms of the demographic size versus political power nexus, these are the core and politically influential group. Minority language groups refer to both non-Setswana and Setswana speaking tribes not listed in the *original* constitution. These are politically marginalized and in the periphery.

3.3.2 Tribal Affiliation

Tribal affiliation is another putatively objective dimension of ethnicity and refers to an ethnic group, tribe or tribal group. Tribe is a political entity (Bennett 2006) and a tangible, visible, physical characteristics and a form of cleavage (Morton, Murray & Ramsay 1989; Mattes 1999). In Botswana the term 'tribe' has different uses. It can refer to a multi-ethnic political unit or an ethnic identity. The use of tribe can also imply single and mutually-exclusive 'tribal' identities (Bennett 2002). The Setswana term, Morafe (plural: Merafe) is used to refer to tribe. In contrast to other parts of

Africa, the use of the word tribe in Botswana is not seen as pejorative, and is thus used frequently in face to face interactions (Morton, Murray & Ramsay 1989).

Tribe as a variable is measured using the following Afrobarometer question (Round 3 question 79) yielding nominal categorical data: What is your tribe?

3.3.2.1 Majority/Minority Tribes

I start by locating the conceptualization and operationalization of majority/minority tribe in the context of the debate around demographic size and political power. As pointed out earlier, the problematic nature of sheer demographic size and political power once again comes to the fore. Demographic size also implies political legitimacy to partake in political decision-making processes and to express ethnic demands in a more organized fashion. Size affects participation and influences the right to make demands on the political system. This means that groups that are of insufficient size may even lack recognition within the nation state (Bookman 1997; 2002)

In this study, the use of majority tribe denotes numerical strength and significance (Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo 2003. In other words, the numerically superior members of the population (i.e. tribal majorities), speak major or dominant languages. These are the *eight tribes* listed in Section 78 of Botswana's Constitution (*original*): Bakgatla, Bakwena, Bamalete, Bamangwato, Bangwaketse, Barolong, Batawana and Batlokwa (Republic of Botswana (*undated*)[19]; Andersson & Janson 1997; Hasselbring 2000; Republic of Botswana 2000; Chebanne & Nyati-Ramahobo 2003; Solway 2004; Mooko 2006). These are the Setswana speaking language groups (as seen earlier). They are the core group and wield political power and influence. Minority tribes not listed in the original constitution of Botswana. Minority tribes are mainly non-Tswana speaking although there are a few Setswana speaking tribes in this

[19] Sections 77, 78 and 79 of the Botswana Constitution have been reviewed in 2005 with the view to making them tribally neutral. This was in line with the recommendations of the Balopi Commission of Inquiry's report of 2000 and the subsequent adoption of Government White Paper No. 2 of 2002 as approved by the National Assembly. However, people who belong to linguistic and tribal minorities feel that the issue of neutrality has not been adequately addressed by the constitutional amendments since other pieces of legislation that are perceived to be discriminatory such as the Tribal Territories Act have been left intact.

category. The non-Tswana speaking minority tribes include: Bakalanga, Bakgalagadi, Basarwa, Basubiya, Bayeyi, Hambukushu and OvaHerero. Setswana speaking minority tribes are: Babirwa, Bakhurutshe, Bakgatla-ba-ga Mmanaana and Batswapong (Schapera 1952; Morton, Murray & Ramsay 1989; Andersson & Janson 1997; Batibo & Tsonope 2000; Hasselbring 2000; Nyati-Ramahobo 2002; Solway 2004; Bennett 2006; Mooko 2006). As stated earlier these are politically marginalized, peripheral without any political influence.

3.3.3 Social Identity

I use Social identity in contrast to language and tribe to understand the complex nature of social identification in Botswana. It is a far more subjective dimension of ethnicity. According to Tajfel (1978; 1984), social identity is that part of a person's self-concept which derives from his or her knowledge of membership of a social group, together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership. In other words, it is based on how people define themselves that is, their collective perception of themselves as a distinct social entity of "us" as opposed to "them". For example, people may identify themselves using different forms of social affiliations such as gender, nationality, race, religion, class, occupation, language, tribe, political party and so forth (Tajfel & Turner 1979; Mattes 1999; Mattes 2002; Burgess 2002; Bannon, Miguel & Posner 2004). Social identity is measured using the nominal variable We have spoken to many people in Botswana and they have all described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, religion, race, and others describe themselves in economic terms such as working class, middle class, or farmer. Besides being a citizen of Botswana which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost? (Question 82 & 54 Round 1 & 2).

3.4 Analysis of Descriptive Hypotheses

I used micro-level analysis to test the descriptive hypotheses. In other words, the individual citizen is the unit of analysis. For purpose of analyzing Round 1 data, on the *language(s) spoken most at home*, the following were coded as: majority language(s) [*Setswana*]; minority languages [Sesotho, Afrikaans, Chewa, Damara, Ndebele, Otjiherero, Silozi, Shona and Zulu]; other languages [English, German and

other category]. Round 1 & 3 data on social identity was coded thus: majority languages/tribal groups were recoded as *political majority*; minority languages/tribal groups as *political minority* and responses like religion, occupation/class, race and don't differentiate myself were coded as *'other'* category.

Turning to the analysis of Round 2 data, the following *home language(s)* were coded as minority: Sekalanga, Sesarwa, Sesobeya, Sekgalagadi, Seherero, Sembukushu and Seyei; Setswana as majority while English, French, Portuguese and Kiswahili were coded as *'other'* category. Whereas for Round 2, broad social identity categories like language/tribe/ethnic group, national identity and the 'other' category included race religion and occupation.

For Round 3, Setswana was coded as the majority language while Sesarwa, Sekgalagadi, Sesobea, Sekalanga, Seherero, Sembukushu, Sebirwa, Sengologa and Seyei were coded as minority languages. With respect to tribal affiliation variable, the following were coded as majority tribes: Mokwena, Mongwato, and Mongwaketse. While minority tribes included: Mokalanga, Mokgalagadi, Moyei, Herero, Mosarwa, Mosobeya and Mokgalagadi. While the social identity variable, was recorded into primary social identity groups such as nationality, language and tribe.

As I pointed out earlier, the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary defines the term homogeneous as referring to "people that all the same or all of the same type" (Hornby 2005: 717). In this study I take the common wisdom as referring to the proportion of the population that belongs to eight major tribes and or speaks the country's major language, Setswana. It posits that 90% of the population belongs to Tswana tribes and considers Setswana as the language "spoken most at home."

Finally, the descriptive hypotheses were tested using univariate statistics such as frequency distribution, percentages and range. These statistical procedures were considered appropriate for dealing with descriptive hypotheses (one variable).

3.5 Measurement of Dependent Variables

In order to examine the second aspect of the common wisdom, that Botswana has no politically relevant identity structures, I now need to test whether the as-of-yet under-appreciated diversity of Botswana that I expect to find actually matters politically? To do this I use the following dependent variables to test the extent to which these observed differences align with national identity, interpersonal trust, political participation, voting and the legitimacy of government. The idea is to test whether differences in language, tribal affiliation and social identity are politicized. This may be a factor that possibly helps to explain Botswana's exceptionality as one of the few politically and economically successful nation states in Africa.

3.5.1 National Identity

Researchers disagree over the definition, measurement and expected political consequences of national identity. In other words, research is generally marred by confusing array of terms associated with national identity like patriotism, national loyalty, love, pride and deep affection for one's nation state (Dowley & Silver 2004; Mattes 1999; 2004; Huddy & Khatib 2007). In this study, I adopt a conceptualization of national identity that is grounded in social identity theory. A social identity is typically defined as awareness of one's objective membership in the group and a psychological sense of group attachment (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel & Turner 1979). Consistent with this definition, I draw on Huddy & Khatib's (2007) definition of national identity as a subjective or internalized sense of belonging to the nation and measure it with questions that typically assess social identities.

Specifically, national identity is measured by establishing whether or not the respondents are proud of their national citizenship. This is done through the use of the following questions: It makes you proud to be called a citizen of Botswana; You would want your children to think of themselves as citizens of Botswana; All people who were born in this country, regardless of what group they belong to, should be treated as equal citizens of Botswana; It is desirable to create one united nation out of all the different groups who live in Botswana (Questions 83e, f, g & h, Round1); You

had to choose between being a Motswana and being a.... which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to? (Question 57, Round 2); and let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Motswana and being a____ which of these two groups do you feel strongly attached to? (Question 82, Round 3).

3.5.2 Interpersonal Trust

Interpersonal trust is a fundamental element of social and political trust. It is an interdisciplinary concept that can be difficult to define, has several dimensions like social, economic, political, cultural and religious implications. People objectively and subjectively perceive, conceptualize and interpret trust differently. Specifically trust refers to a set of political beliefs, values, behavioural orientations and attitudes shaped by life experiences and political socialization. These trusting values, norms and behavioural orientations underlie the system of mutual security, cooperation, restraint, accommodation and acceptance of others and tolerance of differences (Diamond 1994). In this study, I take political and social trust meaning political moderation and accommodation styles of political behaviour. It is facilitated by structural patterns of social interaction at the mass level and implies:

> ...tolerance for opposing political beliefs and positions, and for social and cultural differences... a sense of trust in other political actors and in the social environment; a willingness to compromise, springing from intrinsic belief in the necessity and desirability of compromise; a certain civility of political discourse and respect for other views (Diamond 1994: 10)

Consistent with this definition, I use the following questions to measure trust: Most people can be trusted/ you can't be too careful (Question 43, Round 1); Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people? (Questions 83, Round 3); How much do you trust each of the following types of people? People from your own ethnic group (Questions 84c, Round 3); how much do you trust Batswana from other ethnic groups? (Question 84d, Round 3).

3.5.3 Political Participation

We can identify two forms of political participation that is conventional and non-conventional forms of involvement. Conventional political participation refers to the extent to which citizens are interested, actively discuss, and attend political and public meetings, election rallies and party campaigns. It also involves voting and communal contacting and working for a political party or candidate. Non-conventional participation involves actively taking part in mass actions such as protest marches, boycotts, strikes or demonstrations (Pye & Verba 1965; Nie & Verba 1975; Branson 1994; Bratton & Van De Walle 1997; Mattes 1999; Norris 2002a & b; Putnam 2002; Dowley & Silver 2004; Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005).

I use the following questions to measure conventional participation: In the past year have you contacted a government or political party official about some important problem or to give them your views (Question, 33, Round 1); here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: attend a community meeting (Question 25b, Round 2); join others to raise an issue (Question 25c, Round 2); attend a community meeting (Question 31, Round 3); and got together with others to raise an issue? (Question 31b, Round 3). Non-conventional participation is measured using the following question: attend a demonstration or protest march (Question 25d & 31c Round 2 & 3 respectively).

3.5.4 Voting

Voting refers to electoral behaviour (act of voting or not voting), electoral turnout or voter turnout. It is an aspect of political participation and as an electoral process includes registration, casting a vote, taking part in local and national elections, possession of valid voter registration documents and membership to a given political party (Branson 1994; Bratton & Van De Walle 1997; Mattes 1999; Norris 2002a & b; Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005). In this study, voting is treated as a separate variable from political participation, because of its uniqueness. As Dalton (2002:33) notes in the discussion of the modes of political participation, "we often equate

political participation with the act of voting. But if you view politics from the citizen's perspective, participation is not limited to voting..."

Voting is measured using the following questions: With regard to the most recent…national elections, which statement is true for you? (Question 89 & 30, Round 1 & 3).

3.5.5 Government Legitimacy

Legitimacy is the sense that the occupants of government institutions have the right to make binding decisions, and that people ought to obey these decisions whether or not they agree with them, or whether they happen to support the incumbents who make those decisions (Diamond 1994). John Stuart Mill succinctly sums this definition when he says that:

> The people for whom the form of government is intended must be willing to accept it; or at least not so unwilling as to oppose an insurmountable obstacle to its establishment. They must be willing and be able to do what is necessary to keep it standing. And they must be willing and able to do what it requires of them to enable it to fulfil its purpose. The word "do" is to be understood as including forbearances as well as acts (Cited in Diamond 1994: 11).

This conceptualization is also similar, to Easton's (1975: 451) operationalization of legitimacy as "the conviction that it is right and proper ... to obey the authorities and abide by the requirements of the regime." However, Easton (1975: 453-56) makes a qualification to the effect that, a distinction has to be made between "legitimacy *per se* from compliance attitudes and behaviour." In addition, Lamb (2005) notes that legitimacy is a specific value that individuals and groups ascribe to things that they believed should be supported and sustained. In other words, to claim that something is legitimate is to give moral support or normative reason to obey, support or refrain from opposing it. Legitimacy of government is measured using the following questions: Which of the following statements is closet to your view? Our government has the right to make decisions that all people have to abide by whether or not they agree with them (Question 61, Round 1); A) It is important to obey the government in power no matter who you voted for B) .It is not necessary to obey the laws of a government that I did not vote for (Question 49, Round 3).

3.6 Analysis of Explanatory Hypotheses

I also used micro-level analysis to test explanatory hypotheses. The analysis involved recoding of both the independent and dependent variables. For example: don't knows, refused and missing data were recoded as system missing. Whereas No's and never were recoded as middle categories (e.g. Bratton & Mattes 2007). Initially, ordinal variable in a likert-type of scale were recoded as follows: Agree and very strongly Agree responses were collapsed into a single category which was re-labelled: *Agree*. Old value labels like Disagree and Strongly Disagree were also collapsed into a singe category which was re-labelled *Disagree*. Neither Agree/Nor Disagree responses were re-labelled as *Not Sure*. Political participation and voting variables like: *contacting a government or political party official and discussing politics* were simply collapsed into *yes* and *no* categories. Variables dealing with interpersonal trust were recoded in terms of *no trust, moderate trust and great trust*. National identity variables like *choosing between being a Motswana and being a...* were either collapsed into *Yes/No* responses or *Agree, Not Sure or Disagree.* And legitimacy of government variables like *obeying laws* of government in power were recoded into *Always, Not Sure and Unnecessary.* The decision to reduce 5 point scale to 3 point scale was informed by the use of nominal level measurement which does not require ranking or ordering of variables.

The second stage of the analysis involved recoding of the dependent variables into a five point, four point and three point likert type scales. 'Don't knows' and 'refused to answer' responses were moved to the middle of the scale especially the variables dealing with attitudes while those not dealing with attitudes like voting were moved to the lower end of the recode scale. Basically, the testing of the dependent variables on both dichotomous and ordinal scales does not reveal any significant shift in the nature of the association. At first glance, using Cramer's V without controlling for a third variable (like the case is when using regression or multivariate analysis) may seem superficial. On the contrary, these simple statistics powerfully demonstrate the general lack of strong association between the key political factors explored in this study. Therefore there is no need to use more complex statistics such as regression or multivariate analysis.

Testing explanatory hypotheses involved reading data files, selecting cases, and recoding responses into new categories, re-labelling value labels and finally interpreting the results (e.g. Green & Salkind 2003). The explanatory hypotheses were further tested through the use of bivariate statistics such as cross-tabulation, and Cramer's V tests. The Cramer's V statistic was preferred because it is frequently used when dealing with nominal and categorical measures of association. It has the advantage over the chi-square since it is capable of not only establishing the existence or lack of relationship, but also the strength of such a relationship.

The Cramer's V also has an advantage over other nominal measures of strength of association such as Lamda and Gamma. In fact, unlike Lamda, the value of Cramer's V is not dependent on which variable is designated as the dependent variable. Similarly, the use of Gamma is limited to the measurement of relationships between ordinal variables (Fraenkel & Wallen 1996; Arsham 1994-2009). In addition, inferential statistics such as, the One-way ANOVA tests, were used to discern the nature of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables.

One-way ANOVA was helpful in illuminating 'between sample differences' and 'within sample differences' among the means (Greogory 1978:160). After obtaining a statistically significant F-test from the analysis of One-way ANOVA, the Post-Hoc (in particular Tukey's B test), a comparison technique, was used to determine which of the Means in the sample contributed to the effect that is, the groups that were particularly different from each other (Arsham 1994-2009). The Null hypothesis was either rejected or accepted using the typical levels of statistical significance ($p < 0.05$).

3.6 Limitations

The main limitation of this study stems from the fact that the Afrobarometer questionnaire was translated from English into the national language, Setswana, for interview purposes. It is possible that the use of Setswana might have posed communication problems for non-Setswana speakers. An additional caveat identified by Bannon, Miguel and Posner (2004), is equally relevant to this study—as they draw on data from the Afrobarometer surveys. As Bannon, Miguel and Posner (2004)

rightly observe, questions 82 and 54 (Round 1 & 2 respectively), from which the dependent variable i.e. social identity, is constructed explicitly bars respondents from describing themselves in terms of nationality—the questions ask respondents-*besides being a—which specific group do you feel you belong*. The question wording is bound to create confusion, since the possibility that the respondents might have considered national identity cannot be ruled out. In fact some of the respondents did identify themselves in terms of nationality—this is why in the coding, a separate category (for the purpose of analysis in this study), was created to accommodate such eventuality. Other Studies (for example Norris 2002a & b; Bratton and Mattes 2007) also acknowledge the possibility for question wording to cause confusion among respondents.

The other methodological limitation is that the Excel and SPSS formats of the data sets (including code book) for Round 2 of the Afrobarometer survey do not have listings of primary social identity groups. Instead, these formats only provide broad social identity categories, particularly with respect to language and tribe (ethnic group). These were combined into a single category labelled, language/tribe/ethnic group thus hindering the analytical process.

3.7 Ethical Consideration

Finally, since this study relied on the use of existing data sets, that is, Rounds 1 (1999), 2 (2003) and 3 (2005) of the Afrobarometer survey—this did not pose any ethical problems and dilemmas.

4. DIMENSIONS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 4 tests the first part of the common wisdom that claims Botswana is homogeneous ethnically. It bases this claim mainly on estimates of linguistic diversity that approximately 90% of Batswana share a common language (i.e. Setswana). Specifically, the chapter examines the extent to which Botswana can be considered as homogeneous using language, tribal affiliation and social identity. It is organized around the presentation and interpretation of the results in relation to the research problem and descriptive hypotheses. In order to examine the patterns, the descriptive results are further disaggregated according to district and rural-urban location.

4.2 Language: An Objective Dimension

This section uses descriptive statistics to examine the extent to which Botswana can be adequately characterized as homogeneous, using language, a more objective dimension of ethnic identity. It does this by testing the common wisdom which claims that 90% of Batswana speak Setswana. I use Rounds 1 (1999), 2 (2003) and 3 (2005) Afrobarometer survey data to test the common wisdom.

Round 1 asks respondents about the language that is "spoken most at home." The respondent's answers are summarized in Table 4.1. *Almost all* of the respondents (96 percent) say that Setswana is the language "spoken most at home." Round 2 ask an apparently slightly different question about respondent's "home language" but which find quite different results. The respondent's answers are summarized in Table 4.1. *Most* of the respondents (79 percent) identify Setswana as the "home language," but a sizeable (21%) consider minority languages as their "home language." More specifically, four and 11 percent of the respondents consider Sekgalagadi and Sekalanga respectively, (i.e. two of the minority languages) as the "home language." Round 3 also asked the respondents to indicate their "home language," and the respondent's answers are summarized in Table 4.1. Again, *most* of the respondents (79) identify Setswana as their home language, while a significant (23%) number of respondents consider minority languages as their "home language." Specifically, four

and nine percent of the respondents identify Sekgalagadi and Sekalanga respectively as the "home languages."

Table 4.1: Language (s) Spoken Most at Home /Home Language (s) (1999-2005) in Percent

Language(s)	Round 1 (1999): Language(s) Spoken Most at Home	Round 2 (2003): Home Language(s)	Round 3 (2005): Home Language(s)
Majority Language:			
Setswana	96	79	79
Languages Minority:			
Sekalanga	NA	11	9
Sekgalagadi	NA	4	4
Sembukushu	NA	2	2
Sebirwa	NA	NA	2
Sesarwa	NA	1	2
Sesobea	NA	1	1
Seyei	NA	1	1
Sengologa	NA	NA	1
Otjiherero/Seherero	<1	1	1
Afrikaans	<1	NA	NA
Kiswahili	<2	NA	NA
Chewa	<1	NA	NA
Damara	<1	NA	NA
Ndebele	<1	NA	NA
Sesotho	<1	NA	NA
Shona	<1	NA	NA
Silozi	<1	NA	NA
Zulu	<1	Na	NA
Sub Total:	8	21	23
Other			
English	1	<1	NA
German	<1	NA	NA
French	NA	<1	NA
Portuguese	NA	<1	NA
Other	<1	<1	NA
Sub Total	2	2	-

Missing Data	1	NA	NA

NB: NA denotes Not Applicable < denotes less than
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 1, 2 & 3)

Round 1 result reveal the predominance of Setswana as the language "spoken most at home." But while Round 1 results are consistent with the common wisdom's suggestion that 90% of Batswana speak a common language, thus disconfirming the prediction (Hypothesis 1) that linguistically, Botswana is less homogeneous than the common wisdom suggests. However, Round 2 & 3 results reveal that in using "home language," the level of heterogeneity is slightly higher than the common wisdom wants us to believe.

To address Hypothesis 1 further, I seek to find out whether Botswana's minority languages are concentrated in certain parts of the country (such as rural areas or in peripheral regions) or they are evenly spread across the country? I breakdown, language into district and rural/urban location and the results are summarized in Tables 4.2a & b.

Table 4.2a: Breakdown of Language by District in Botswana (1999- 2005)

Language(s)	District Location	Round 1:1999 (Percent): Spoken Most at Home	Round 2:2003 (Percent): Home Language(s)	Round 3:2005 (Percent): Home Language(s)
Majority Language(s):				
Setswana	Central	97	79	76
	Francistown	94	59	75
	Gaborone	90	84	88
	Jwaneng	94	63	88
	Selebi-Phikwe	97	NA	97
	South East	97	88	97
	Lobatse	97	96	96
	Kgalagadi	91	47	35
	Kweneng	99	90	92
	Ghanzi	NA	21	13
	Southern	NA	92	91
	Orapa	NA	88	NA
	North East	NA	56	38
	North-West/Ngamiland	NA	52	52
	Kgatleng	NA	NA	98
	Chobe	NA	NA	56
Minority Languages:				
Sekalanga	Southern	NA	2	NA
	Kweneng	NA	3	3
	Lobatse	NA	4	4
	Ghanzi	NA	4	NA
	North-West/Ngamiland	NA	4	1
	Gaborone	NA	11	10
	Orapa	NA	13	NA
	Selebi-Phikwe	13	NA	NA
	South East	NA	13	NA
	Central	NA	18	14
	Jwaneng	NA	25	NA
	Francistown	NA	31	25
	North East	NA	41	63

	Kgalagadi	NA	NA	3
Sekgalagadi	Central	NA	<1	<1
	Francistown	NA	2	NA
	Gaborone	NA	2	1
	Ghanzi	NA	58	50
	Jwaneng	NA	NA	13
	Kgalagadi	NA	44	56
	Kweneng	NA	4	4
	Southern	NA	6	1
	North-West/Ngamiland	NA	5	2
Seherero/Otjiherero	Central	<1	NA	<1
	Gaborone	NA	1	NA
	Ghanzi	NA	4	NA
	Jwaneng	NA	13	NA
	North-West/Ngamiland	NA	4	8
	Kgatleng	NA	NA	2
Sesarwa	Central	NA	1	2
	Francistown	NA	2	NA
	Ghanzi	NA	NA	25
	Selebi-Phikwe	NA	NA	3
	South East	NA	NA	3
	Kgalagadi	NA	3	NA
	Kweneng	NA	1	NA
	North-West/Ngamiland	NA	NA	3
	Chobe	NA	NA	38
Sebirwa	Central	NA	NA	7
	Kweneng	NA	NA	1
Sesobeya	Central	NA	<1	<1
	Francistown	NA	2	NA
	North-West/Ngamiland	NA	6	NA
	Chobe	NA	NA	6
Seyei	Central	NA	NA	<1
	North-West/Ngamiland	NA	13	NA
Sembukushu	Central	NA	<1	NA
	Ghanzi	NA	4	NA
	North-West/Ngamiland	NA	16	24
Sengologa	Ghanzi	NA	NA	13
	Kgalagadi	NA	NA	6
Afrikaans	Ghanzi	NA	8	NA
	Kgalagadi	2	NA	NA
	North-East	NA	3	NA
	North-West/Ngamiland	NA	1	NA

NB: NA denotes Not Applicable *< denotes less than*
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 1, 2 & 3)

Table 4.1a shows the breakdown of language by district in Botswana. Disaggregating Round 1(1999) results by district reveal that most of the respondents say that Setswana is the language that is "spoken most at home." For example in all the sampled districts, 90% or more of the respondents identify Setswana as "spoken most at home." Round 2 results presents a slightly different picture. First, Setswana is consistently regarded as the "home language" across all the sampled districts. Second, in 3 out of the 13 sampled districts, 90% or more of the respondents consider Setswana as the language "spoken most at home." In the other sampled districts, the frequencies for Setswana are lower than 90% and the lowest figure of 21% reported in the Ghanzi district. Round 3 results for majority language are somewhat similar to those obtained in Round 2. Six of the districts have frequencies of more than 90% consistent with the common wisdom. The remaining 9 districts have frequencies that

are less than 90%. The lowest frequency for Setswana as the "home language" is 13% reported in the Ghanzi district.

Specifically, Table 4.1a presents the breakdown of minority languages by district. Round 1 results show that, the distribution of minority language groups appears to be isolated in certain parts of the country. For example, two percent of the respondents in the Kgalagadi District identified Afrikaans as the language "spoken most at home." In the Selebi-Phikwe administrative district, 13% of the sampled respondents say that Sekalanga is the language that is "spoken most at home." In contrast, Round 2 results reveal widespread distribution of minority language groups and the greatest concentration is in several districts. Sekalanga is considered the "home language" in the following districts: Gaborone (11%); Central (18%); Jwaneng (25%); South East (13%); Francistown (31%) and North East (41%). Sekgalagadi is considered the home language in the following districts: Kgalagadi (44%) and Ghanzi (58%). Seyei (13%) and Otjiherero (13%) are considered as "home languages" in Jwaneng and North West/Ngamiland Districts. Lastly Sembukushu (16%) is identified as the home language in North West/Ngamiland District.

Similarly, Round 3 results reflect a wide distribution of minority languages across the country as well as concentration in certain districts in the country. Sekalanga is considered the "home language" in the following districts: Gaborone (10%); Central (14%); Francistown (25%) and North East (63%). Sekgalagadi is considered the home language in Jwaneng (13%); Ghanzi (50%) and Kgalagadi (56%). Sesarwa is identified as the home language in Chobe (28%) and Ghanzi (25%) districts. Sengologa (13%) and Sembukushu (24%) are identified as home languages in Ghanzi and North West/Ngamiland Districts respectively.

Table 4.1b: Distribution of Minority Languages by District in Percent (1999- 2005)

District	Round 1: Minority Language(s) Spoken Most at Home	Round 2: Minority Home Language(s)	Round 3: Minority Home Language(s)
Central	<1	21	25
Francistown	-	37	25
Gaborone	-	14	11
Jwaneng	-	38	13
Selebi-Phikwe	13	-	3
South East	-	13	3
Lobatse	-	-	4
Kgalagadi	2	47	65
Kweneng	-	8	8
Ghanzi	-	78	88
Southern	-	8	1
Orapa	-	13	-
North East	-	44	63
North West/Ngamiland	-	33	14
Kgatleng	-	-	2
Chobe	-	-	44

Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey data (Round 1, 2 & 3)

Table 4.1b presents the summary of the distribution of minority languages by district. Round1 results show that the distribution of minority languages is isolated in certain parts of the country. For example, 13% of the sampled respondents in the Selebi-Phikwe administrative District identified minority languages as "spoken most at home." In contrast, Round 2 results reveal widespread distribution and greatest concentration of minority languages in the following districts: Gaborone (14%); North West/Ngamiland (33%); Orapa (13%); Jwaneng (38%); South East (13%); Francistown (37%); North East (44%); Kgalagadi (47%) and Ghanzi (78%). Similarly, Round 3 results reflect a wide distribution and concentration of minority languages across the country. These are as follows: Gaborone (11%); Central (25%); North West/Ngamiland (24%); Ghanzi (88%); Francistown (25%); Chobe (44%); North East (63%); Kgatleng (14%); Jwaneng (13%) and Kgalagadi (65%).

These results have two important implications. First, Round 1 results with respect to language "spoken most at home," in particular, are consistent with the common wisdom that posits that 90% of Botswana's population speaks Setswana. Secondly, Round 1 results disconfirm Hypothesis 1 that predicts that linguistically Botswana is less homogeneous than the common wisdom wants us to believe. However, Round 2

& 3 results regarding the "home language" are not consistent with the common wisdom. They reveal that lines of cleavages along the language dimension do exist in Botswana. In addition, in some instances the distribution of minority languages across the districts appears to be concentrated but at the same time more widespread than is generally anticipated.

A further disaggregation of the results in Rounds 1, 2 & 3 by urban-rural location as summarized in Table 4.3 reveal the predominance of Setswana as the language spoken most at home/home language in the country. For example, in Round 1 (1999), 94% compared to 98% of the respondents in urban and rural areas respectively, identify Setswana as the language spoken most at home. This is consistent with the common wisdom. The breakdown for minority language groups for Round 1 is somewhat sketchy. Possibly this is because districts like Ghanzi, North East, Kgalagadi and North West/Ngamiland (refer to Table 4.2) that have a sizeable proportion on minority language speakers are not part of the 1999 survey sample.

Table 4.3: Breakdown of Language by Rural/Urban Location in Botswana (1999- 2005)

Language(s) Spoken Most at Home? Home Language(s)	Rural/Urban Location	Round 1:1999 (Percent)	Round 2:2003 (Percent)	Round 3:2005 (Percent)
Majority Language(s)				
Setswana	Urban	94	85	88
	Rural	98	73	73
Minority Languages				
Sekalanga	Urban	NA	9	7
	Rural	NA	13	11
Sekgalagadi	Urban	NA	2	2
	Rural	NA	6	5
Seherero/Otjiherero	Urban	NA	1	1
	Rural	<1	1	1
Sesarwa	Urban	NA	<1	<1
	Rural	NA	1	3
Sebirwa	Urban	NA	NA	<1
	Rural	NA	NA	4
Sesobeya	Urban	NA	<1	1
	Rural	NA	1	<1
Seyei	Urban	NA	1	<1
	Rural	NA	2	1
Sembukushu	Urban	NA	1	<1
	Rural	NA	2	3
Sengologa	Urban	NA	NA	<1
	Rural	NA	NA	1
Afrikaans	Urban	NA	NA	NA
	Rural	<1	NA	NA
Sub Total: Minority Languages	Urban	-	15	14
	Rural	1	26	29

NB: NA denotes Not Applicable *< denotes less than*
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 1, 2 & 3)

In spite of this apparent sampling limitation, Round 2 & 3 results reveal that on the whole minority languages are evenly distributed between rural (26 & 29 %) and urban

(14 & 15%) areas. However, there is a possibility that minority language groups are more likely to be concentrated in rural than urban areas. This is reflected in the distribution of two of the most significant minority languages that is Sekalanga and Sekgalagadi. For example, the proportion for Sekalanga speakers is 7% and 9% (Round 3 & 2 respectively) for urban areas. In contrast, the proportion for rural areas is 11% and 13% (Round 3 & 2 respectively). Similarly, Sekgalagadi is reportedly spoken by 2 percent of the respondents (in Round 2 & 3 respectively) in urban areas compared to 5% and 6% (Round 3 & 2 respectively) in rural areas.

In conclusion, Round 1 results generally reveal the predominance of Setswana as the "language spoken most at home" in both rural and urban areas. Rounds 2 & 3 also reflect the dominance of Setswana as the home language, but at the same time show a sizeable percentage of respondents (relative to Botswana's population of close to two million) who identify minority languages such as Sekalanga and Sekgalagadi as their "home languages."

4.3 Tribal Affiliation: An Objective Dimension

In Round 3, respondents are asked to indicate their tribe, and the respondent's answers are summarized in Table 4.4. These results reveal that the respondents (members of majority and minority tribes) generally, cite their respective tribal affiliation. For example, the frequencies for the significant majority tribes are as follows: Mongwato (16%), Mokgatla, Mokwena and Mongwaketse (9% each). Similarly the frequencies for the significant minority tribes are as follows: Mokalanga (15%), Mokgalagadi & Motswapong (7% each) and Mmirwa (4%).

Table 4.4: Tribal Affiliation in Botswana in Percent

Tribal Affiliation	Afrobarometer, Round 3: 2005
Majority Tribes:	
Mongwato	16
Mokgatla	9
Mokwena	9
Mongwaketse	9
Molete	4
Morolong	3
Motawana	2
Mokhurutshe	1
Motlokwa	1
Sub-Total	54
Minority Tribes:	
Mokalanga	15
Mokgalagadi	7

Motswapong	7
Mmirwa	4
Mohurutshe	2
Mombukushu	2
Mosarwa	2
Moherero	1
Mosobea	1
Monajwa	<1
Sub-Total	42
Motswana Only	3
Refused	<1

NB: < denotes less than
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 3)

On the whole, 42% compared to 54% of minority and majority tribes respectively use their tribal affiliation as a primary form of ethnic identification. These figures disprove the common wisdom's suggestion that Botswana consists primarily of Setswana speaking tribes. Thus the results lend support to Hypothesis 2 where it I predict that the level of tribal affiliation is higher than what the common wisdom suggests.

Having established that tribal affiliation in Botswana is much more diverse than the 90% level of homogeneity proposed by the common wisdom, it is now important to find out: whether or not the heterogeneity revealed by the nationwide frequencies is evenly spread across the country? Or is Botswana rather made up of a series of internally homogeneous areas which create heterogeneity across the larger political unit of Botswana? To do this, I look at the breakdown of tribal affiliation by district and rural/urban location.

Firstly, Table 4.5a shows that majority tribes are evenly spread across the districts. However, their frequencies are much lower than the 90% suggested by the common wisdom. Secondly, minority tribes are equally spread across the various districts in the country. However, some of the minority tribes are concentrated in certain districts. For example, respondents who cite Mokalanga as their tribe are concentrated in the following districts: Lobatse (8%), Selebi-Phikwe & Gaborone (13% each), Central (25%) and Francistown (50%). Similarly, tribes such as Motswapong, Mmirwa and Mokgalagadi are more concentrated in some districts than others.

Table 4.5a: Breakdown of Tribal Affiliation by District in Botswana in Percent

Tribal Affiliation	District Location	Round 3 (2005)
Majority Tribes		
Mongwato	Central	34
	Lobatse	4
	Francistown	21
	Selebi-Phikwe	6
	South East	5
	Kweneng	4
	Gaborone	20
Mokhurutshe	Central	4
	Francistown	2
	Gaborone	1
Mokwena	Central	2
	Lobatse	8
	Jwaneng	13
	Francistown	2
	Selebi-Phikwe	3
	South East	3
	Kweneng	47
	Gaborone	7
Mokgatla	Central	1
	Lobatse	17
	Francistown	2
	Selebi-Phikwe	3
	South East	3
	Kweneng	11
	Gaborone	15
Mongwaketse	Central	1
	Lobatse	33
	Jwaneng	50
	Francistown	2
	Selebi-Phikwe	16
	South East	13
	Kweneng	2
	Gaborone	7
Morolong	Central	1
	Lobatse	8
	Francistown	2
	Selebi-Phikwe	6
	Kweneng	<1
	Gaborone	7
Motawana	Central	1
	Francistown	5
Motlokwa	Central	<1
	Selebi-Phikwe	19
	South East	15
Molete	Francistown	2
	South East	45
	Kweneng	10
	Gaborone	6
Minority Tribes		
Mokalanga	Central	25
	Lobatse	8
	Francistown	50
	Selebi-Phikwe	13
	South East	3
	Kweneng	5
	Gaborone	13
Motswapong	Central	14
	Jwaneng	13
	Francistown	7
	Selebi-Phikwe	28
	South East	3
	Kweneng	2
	Gaborone	7
Mmirwa	Central	8
	Francistown	4
	Selebi-Phikwe	16
	South East	3
	Gaborone	4

Mosarwa	Central	3
	Kweneng	1
Mohurutshe	Central	2
	South East	3
	Kweneng	4
	Gaborone	6
Mokgalagadi	Central	2
	Jwaneng	25
	South East	3
	Gaborone	4
Monajwa	Central	1
Motalaote	Central	1
	Francistown	2
Moherero	Kweneng	1
	Gaborone	1

NB: < denotes less than Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 3)

Table 4.5b presents the summary of the distribution of minority tribes by district. It shows that the greatest concentration of minority tribes is in the following districts: Central (56%); Francistown (63%); Gaborone (35%); Selebi-Phikwe (57%); South East (15%) and Kweneng (13%). These findings disconfirm the common wisdom that largely sees Botswana as homogeneous and consisting of people of the same type.

Table 4.5b: Distribution of Minority Tribes by District in Percent (2005)

District	Round 3: Minority Tribes
Central	56
Francistown	63
Gaborone	35
Jwaneng	38
Selebi-Phikwe	57
South East	15
Lobatse	8
Kweneng	13

Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey data (Round 3)

Table 4.6 show that in terms of rural/urban breakdown, majority tribes are more likely to be found in urban than rural areas. This pattern is reflected in the figures reported for the following significant majority tribes. These are: Mongwato (Urban 21% and Rural 12%), Mokgatla, Mokwena and Mongwaketse (Urban 11% and Rural 8% each). Generally, there are no significant differences with respect to the rural/urban distribution of minority tribes. The only notable exception is the respondents who cite Mokgalagadi as their tribe. These are more likely to be concentrated in rural (10%) than urban (3%) areas. On the whole, 36% and 49% of the respondents who belong to majority and minority tribes are more likely to be found in urban and rural areas respectively.

Table 4.6: Breakdown of Tribal Affiliation by Rural/Urban Location in Botswana (Round 3, 2005)

Tribal Affiliation	Rural/Urban Location	Percent
Majority Tribes		
Mongwato	Urban	21
	Rural	12
Mokgatla	Urban	11
	Rural	8
Mokwena	Urban	11
	Rural	8
Mongwaketse	Urban	11
	Rural	8
Morolong	Urban	3
	Rural	3
Molete	Urban	3
	Rural	5
Motlokwa	Urban	1
	Rural	-
Motawana	Urban	2
	Rural	1
Mokhurutshe	Urban	-
	Rural	2
Minority Tribes		
Mokalanga	Urban	14
	Rural	16
Motswapong	Urban	7
	Rural	7
Mokgalagadi	Urban	3
	Rural	10
Mmirwa	Urban	3
	Rural	4
Mohurutshe	Urban	2
	Rural	2
Moyei	Urban	2
	Rural	2
Moherero	Urban	1
	Rural	1
Mombukushu	Urban	1
	Rural	3
Mosarwa	Urban	1
	Rural	3
Mosobea	Urban	1
	Rural	-
Motalaote	Urban	<1
	Rural	<1
Monajwa	Urban	-
	Rural	<1
Sub Total: Minority Tribes	Urban	36
	Rural	49

NB: < denotes less than Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 3)

In conclusion, the specific results presented in Table 4.4 together with the disaggregation of tribal affiliation, according to districts and rural-urban location (Tables 4.5 & 4.6), reveal the propensity of the respondents to identify themselves more in terms of their respective tribal affiliations, rather than other forms of ethnic identification. In addition, the distribution of minority tribes across the districts appears to be more widespread although they are some districts where these are concentrated. In terms of rural/urban distribution, minority tribes appear to be evenly

distributed. Overall, these results are thus consistent with Hypothesis 2, where I predict that in terms of tribal affiliation, the level of heterogeneity in Botswana is higher than what the common wisdom suggests. In other words, these results do not support the common wisdom that perceives Botswana as consisting of 90% of the population belonging to majority tribes.

4.4 Social Identity: A Subjective Dimension

In Round 1, Afrobarometer the respondents are asked "Besides being a citizen of Botswana which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?" The respondents' answers are summarized in Table 4.7. These results reveal that 44% of the respondents think of themselves primarily in terms of majority language(s)/tribe (s) dimension. A more or less equal number of 49% think of themselves in terms of minority language(s)/tribe(s). Very few of the respondents think of themselves in terms of: nationality i.e. Motswana (2%), Religion (2%), Race (3%), and Class & Occupation (3%). Based on the breakdown of language/tribe by district and rural/urban location as reflected in Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.5 and 4.6, I can safely conclude that people who think of themselves in terms of minority language and tribal groups are evenly spread across the country. At the same time their distribution tends to be concentrated in certain districts more than others. Generally, this particular group also appears to be evenly distributed in terms of rural/urban location.

Table 4.7: Social Identity in Botswana (1999)

Primary Social Identity	Round 1: 1999 (in Percent)
Nationality:	
Motswana	2
Majority Language (s)/Tribe (S)	
Mongwato	26
Mokgatla	7
Motlokwa	3
Mongwaketse	3
Morolong	2
Mokwena	1
Molete	1
Motawana	<1
Setswana/Tswana	<1
Sub-Total	44
Minority Language (s)/Tribe (s)	
Kalanga	9
Mohurutshe	6
Motswapong	4
Mokgalagadi	2
Motalaote	2
Mongologa	2
Mmirwa	2
Motlhware	1

Motlhaping	1
Morotsi	1
Mokaa	1
Damara	1
Ndebele	1
Yei	<1
Herero/Otjiherero	1
Mosarwa	<1
Mosobeya	<1
Mombukushu	<1
Zezuru	<1
Motloung	<1
Mophaleng	<1
Chisena	<1
Sesotho	<1
Sepedi	<1
Xhosa	<1
Zulu	<1
Sub-Total	49
Religion	
Christian	1
Religious	<1
Muslim	<1
Sub-Total	2
Race	
Race	2
White	<1
Coloured	<1
Indian	<1
African	<1
Sub-Total	3
Class & Occupation	
Middle Class	1
Working Class	1
Farmer	1
Poor/Low Class	<1
Worker	<1
Businessman	<1
Student	<1
Professional	<1
Farmer-Worker	<1
Sub-Total	3
Age-Related	
Young Person	<1
Region	
Moroka	<1
Don't' Differentiate Self	1
Missing	<1

NB: < denotes less than Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 3)

Round 2 also asks the respondents "Besides being a citizen of Botswana which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?" The respondent's answers are summarized in Table 4.8). These results reveal that, the respondents generally identify themselves using various forms of ethnic identification such as: nationality; language/tribe/ethnic group; religion; race; class; occupation; age, gender, political party and region. For example, Table 4.8 reveals that a substantial number (42%) of respondents cite national identity as their primary social identity category. In addition, 27% of the respondents cite language/tribe/ethnic group as their social identity category. A small proportion of the respondents think of themselves in terms

of religion (8%), class and occupation (6% each). As pointed earlier, it is not possible to disaggregate Round 2 data on social identity into specific language and tribal groups since these are not reflected in the data set as well as the code book.

Table 4.8: Breakdown of Social Identity by Category in Botswana

Social Identity Category	Round 2: 2003 (in Percent)
Won't Differentiate/National identity	42
Language/Tribe/Ethnic Group	27
Religion	8
Class	6
Occupation	6
Gender	2
Political Party Identity	1
Age-Related	1
Race	<1
Region	<1
Individual/Personal	<1
African/West African/Pan African	<1
Other	1
Don't Know	5
Refused	<1

NB: < denotes less than Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 3)

In short, Rounds 1 & 2 Afrobarometer survey data with respect to social identity generally support Hypothesis 3, where I predict that in using a more subjective measure of social identity, Botswana is more heterogeneous than common wisdom suggests.

5. LANGUAGE AND KEY POLITICAL FACTORS

5.1 Introduction

I start this chapter, by recapping the hypotheses tested in Chapter 4. In Hypothesis 1, I expect higher levels of heterogeneity in using language as a more objective dimension of ethnic identity. In Hypothesis 2 & 3, I also predict to find high levels of heterogeneity when using tribe (a putatively objective) and social identity (a more subjective) dimension of identity. These hypotheses are based on the common wisdom which suggests that Botswana is ethnically homogeneous and that 90% of the population speaks Setswana or belong to Setswana speaking tribes. Chapter 4 demonstrates that the common wisdom is generally supported when language is used as a marker of ethnic identity. Analysis of Round 2 & 3 data reveal, the level of linguistic homogeneity is not as high as is suggested by the common wisdom. In fact, minority language/tribal groups appear to constitute a sizeable proportion of Botswana's total population. In addition it appears that minority language/tribal groups are not only widely distributed across the districts but are also in some instances concentrated in certain parts of the country. In using tribe and social identity, I also demonstrate lack of support for the common wisdom's prediction i.e. 90% level of homogeneity.

In the next three chapters I test the second part of the common wisdom about Botswana, that it has few politically relevant and divisive cleavage structures. This will involve examining the link between diversity and democratic stability as suggested by scholars of democratic governance. I use the dependent variables to explore the argument that since Botswana is moderately heterogeneous, it has no politically divisive cleavages. The variables that I use are: national identity, interpersonal trust, political participation, voting and government legitimacy. Firstly, I select these dependent variables because these have never being used to explore political attitudes and behaviors in the context of Botswana.

National identity is relevant as it allows me to tap into people's subjective and objective psychological sense of attachment to their nation state (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel

& Turner 1979: Huddy & Khatib 2007). Interpersonal trust as a fundamental element of social and political trust will help to explain trusting attitudes beliefs, values, behavioral orientations shaped by political socialization processes (Diamond 1994). Political participation helps to unpack the extent to which citizens actively take part in conventional and non-conventional forms of political involvement (Pye & Verba 1965: Nie & Verba 1975; Bratton & Van De Walle 1997; Mattes 1999; Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005). Finally, Government legitimacy reflects the extent to which citizens are aware of the need to abide by the decisions of those who are in authority irrespective of whether or not they agree with them or have voted into power the political incumbents (Easton 1975; Diamond 1994).

5.2 Language and National Identity

This section uses descriptive and inferential statistics to examine the strength of the relationship between language (independent variable), and national identity (dependent variable). It uses Rounds 1 (1999), 2 (2003) & 3 (2005) of the Afrobarometer survey data.

Using Round 1 data, I measure the level of national identity in Botswana with three batteries of questions. The results are presented in Table 5.1 and reveal that Batswana still have strong emotions often associated with national attachments. For instance, all (100%) the respondents who are coded as members of minority language group and 96% of their majority counterparts say it makes them "proud" to be called citizens of Botswana. Asked if they want their "children to think of themselves as citizens of Botswana," all (100%) the respondents who are coded as minority language group say yes. Almost all (96%) of their majority counterparts also answer in the affirmative. Similarly, a high (89% and 94%) number of Afrobarometer respondents coded as majority and minority language groups feel that "all people who are born in this country, regardless of what group they belong to, should be treated as equal citizens of Botswana." Finally, almost all (86% and 94%) the respondents who are coded as majority and minority language group respectively feel that "it is desirable to create one united nation out of all the different groups who live in the country."

Overall, these results are consistent with the second part of the common wisdom that suggests that at the moment Botswana does not have any politically divisive cleavage structures. In other words, majority-minority language distinctions do not appear to make any meaningful differences on national identity sentiments. Thus Batswana (irrespective of their language group) still hold a high sense of citizenship and national identity. This means that these findings do not support Hypothesis 4, where I expect to find that people who belong to linguistic minority groups are less likely to be patriotic than their majority counterparts.

Table 5.1: Relationship between Language and National Identity (1999-2005)[20]

Dependent Variables		Independent Variable: Language Spoken Most at Home/Home Language(s)			
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics		**Majority Language**	**Minority Language**	**Other**	**Total (n)**
National Identity					
1999					
It makes you proud to be called a citizen of Botswana					
Yes		96	100	94	1132
No		4	.0	6	48
Total		100	100	100	
n		1145	18	17	1180
You want your children to think of themselves as citizens of Botswana					
Yes		96	100	100	1129
No		4	.0	.0	43
Total		100	100	100	
n		1138	17	17	1172
All people who were born in this country, regardless of what group they belong to, should be treated as equal citizens of Botswana					
Yes		89	94	94	1046
No		12	6	6	133
Total		100	100	100	
n		1144	18	17	1179
It is desirable to create one united nation out of all the different groups who live in the country					
Yes		86	94	82	1009
No		14	6	18	162
Total		100	100	100	
n		1136	18	17	1171
2003					
You had to choose being a Motswana and being a…					
National Identity		25	26	35	305
Group Identity		75	74	65	895
Total		100	100	100	
n		944	236	20	1200
2005					
You had to choose being a Motswana and being a…					
National identity		86	77	100	1010
Group Identity		14	23	.0	190
Total		100	100	100	
n		949	250	1	1200

PANEL B: Inferential Statistics	

[20] In the crosstabulation tables, I use collapsed dichotomous variables to present the data in an easy and straightforward manner. However the tables showing the Cramer's V scores reflect the statistical analysis based on the ordinal likert-type five-point, four-point or three-point scale of the dependent variables.

Dependent Variable: National Identity	Independent Variable: Language: Cramer's V
1999	
It makes you proud to be called a citizen of Botswana	.036
You want your children to think of themselves as citizens of Botswana	.026
All people who were born in this country, regardless of what group they belong to, should be treated as equal citizens of Botswana	.037
It is desirable to create one united nation out of all the\different groups who live in the country	.050
2003	
Choose between being a Motswana and being a…..	.060
2005	
Choose between being a Motswana and being a…..	.140**

** Statistically significant at $p < 0.01$ * Statistically significant at $p < 0.05$
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Rounds 1, 2 & 3)

In Round 2, I measure national identity using the question that asks the respondents what they would choose, national identity or group identity. Table 5.1 provides evidence that national identity is less frequent than group identity for majority and minority language groups. For example, very few (25% and 26%) of the respondents who are coded as majority and minority language groups respectively say they would choose national identity. In contrast, three quarters (74% and 75%) of minority and majority members respectively say they would choose group identity. Round 3 reveals higher levels of national attachments than group identity for minority and majority language groups. This is despite the fact that the respondents are asked the same question as in Round 2. The import of these findings also presented in Table 5.1 is that they are no differences in the manner in which the two language groups perceive national identity. For example, 77% and 86% of the respondents who are coded as minority and majority language groups respectively say they would choose national identity rather than group identity.

Cramer's V tests (Rounds 1, 2 & 3) are used to discern the strength of the relationship between language and national identity. Table 5.1 reveals very weak and one moderate (.140) statistically significant relationship between language and national identity. The moderate score should be taken with caution since it may be driven by the single respondent who is coded as the "Other" language category. These Cramer's V scores are consistent with the frequencies reflected in Table 5.1 and point to the fact

that Botswana does not yet have any politically relevant cleavages that are aligned with national loyalty and sentiments.

Basically, the findings for Round 1, 2 & 3 support the second part of the common wisdom and reconfirm the absence of politically relevant cleavage structures in Botswana. In other words, these findings do not support Hypothesis 4, where I predict low levels of patriotism among members of minority language groups.

5.3 Language and Interpersonal Trust

In Round 1, interpersonal trust is measured by asking respondents whether or not they would say "people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful with people? Very low levels of trust are reported as reflected in Table 5.2. For instance, 14% and 17% of the respondents coded as majority and minority language group say that people can be trusted. In Round 3, I use a set of three questions to measure interpersonal trust. As Table 5.2 shows, two of the observed attitudes reveal generally high levels of interpersonal trust among both members of majority and minority language groups. The third observation reveals very low but comparable levels of trust among the two language groups. Specifically, 68% and 71% of majority and minority groups respectively say that they trust people from their own ethnic group. Furthermore, 64% and 65% of minority and majority groups say they trust Batswana from other ethnic groups. Asked if they would say that "most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people," very (5% and 6%) of minority and majority agree with the statement.

Table 5.2: Relationship between Language and Interpersonal Trust (1999 & 2005)

Dependent Variables		Independent Variable: Language Spoken Most at Home/Home Language(s)			
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics		**Majority Language**	**Minority Language**	**Other**	**Total (n)**
Interpersonal Trust **1999**					
Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?					
Yes		14	17	26	165
No		86	83	74	1020
Total		100	100.0	100	
n		1148	18	19	1185
2005					
Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people?					
Yes		6	5	.0	71
No		94	95	100	1129
Total		100	100	100	
n		949	250	1	1200
How much do you trust people from your own ethnic group?					
Trust		71	68	.0	781
No Trust		29	32	100	419
Total		100.0	100	100	
n		949	250	1	1200
How much do you trust Batswana from other ethnic groups?					
Trust		65	64	.0	781
No Trust		35	36	100	419
Total		100	100	100	
n		949	250	1	1200

PANEL B: Inferential Statistics	
Dependent Variables: Interpersonal Trust	Independent Variable: Language Cramer's V
1999	
Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?	.041
2005	
Most people can be trusted/must be very careful	.023
Trust people from your own ethnic group/tribe	.045
Trust Batswana from other ethnic groups	.075

** Statistically significant at $p < 0.01$ * Statistically significant at $p < 0.05$

Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 1 & 3)

Next, I use Cramer's V tests to establish the strength of the relationship between language and interpersonal trust. Table 5.2 reveals very weak relationship between language and interpersonal trust. The scores are consistent with the frequencies which also show comparable levels of trust for both minority and majority language groups.

All these (Round 1 & 3) results point in the same direction that is; trusting attitudes are the same for both members of minority and majority language groups. This means that the majority-minority language distinction does not appear to influence trusting behavior and attitudes among members of minority and majority language groups. In other words, these findings do not support Hypothesis 5, where I predict that members of minority group are more likely to display higher levels of trust than their majority counterparts.

5.4 Language, Political Participation and Voting

In Round 1, six questions are used to measure conventional forms of political participation. The results are summarized in Table 5.3 and generally reveal low levels of political participation by both members of majority and minority language groups. For example, 22% and 28% of the respondents coded as minority and majority language groups respectively say they participated with others to address an important problem affecting the community or nation. Next, 39% and 40% of minority and majority group report to have attended an election rally in the past year. Only 6% percent each report has written a letter to a newspaper. Very few (10% and 11%) of majority and minority members say they worked for a political candidate or party officially. Lastly, 9% majority and none of minority members report to have contacted a government official or party official about some important problem. And the same applies to discussion of political matters when they get together with their friends.

Table 5.3: Relationship between Language, Political Participation and Voting (1999-2005)

Dependent Variables		Independent Variable: Language Spoken Most at Home/Home Language(s)			
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics		**Majority Language**	**Minority Language**	**Other**	**Total (n)**
Interpersonal Trust					
1999					
Participate with others to address an important problem affecting the community or nation (other than an election)					
Yes		28	22	42	328
No		72	78	58	855
Total		100	100	100	
n		1146	18	19	1183
Attend an election rally?					
Yes		40	39	32	472
No		60	61	68	715
Total		100	100	100	
n		1150	18	19	1187
Work for a political candidate or party					
Yes		10	11	11	123
No		90	89	90	1063
Total		100	100	100	
n		1149	18	19	1186
Write a letter to a newspaper					
Yes		6	6	21	69
No		79	94	94	1118
Total		100	100	100	
n		1150	18	19	1187
In the past year, have you contacted a government official or party official about some important problem?					
Yes		9	.0	11	105
No		91	100	90	1075
Total		100	100	100	
n		1150	18	19	1187
When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters?					
Yes		52	47	79	610
No		48	53	21	558
Total		100	100	100	
n		1132	17	19	1168
With regard to the most recent, 1999 elections, which statement is true?					
Voted		55	50	18	643
Did Not Vote		45	50	82	538
Total		100	100	100	
n		1146	18	17	1181
2003					
Have you discussed politics with friends or neighbours in the past year?					
Yes		49	44	50	770
No		51	56	50	430
Total		100	100	100	
n		944	236	20	1200
Have you attended a community meeting during the past year?					
Yes		68	71	50	770
No		37	29	50	430
Total		100	100	100	
n		944	236	20	1200
Have you got together with others to raise an issue during the past year?					
Yes		67	70	60	805
No		33	31	40	395
Total		100	100	100	
n		944	236	20	1200
Have you attended a demonstration or protest march during the past year?					
Yes		18	19	15	219
No		82	81	85	981
Total		100	100	100	
n		944	236	20	1200
2005					
Have you attended a community meeting during the past					

year?					
Yes		69	78	.0	853
No		30	22	100	347
Total		100	100	100	
n		949	250	1	1200
Have you got together with others to raise an issue in the past year?					
Yes		56	60	.0	685
No		44	40	100	515
Total		100	100	100	
n		949	250	1	1200

PANEL B: Inferential Statistics		
Dependent Variables: Political Participation and Voting	Independent Variable: Language Cramer's V	
1999		
Participate with others to address an important problem affecting the community or nation (other than an election)	.048	
Attend an election rally?	.037	
Work for apolitical candidate or party	.040	
Write a letter to a newspaper	.081*	
In the past year, have you contacted a government official about some important problem?	.038	
When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters?	.068*	
With regard to the most recent, 1999 elections, which statement is true?	.080	
	2003	**2004**
Discussed politics with friends or neighbors	.049	NA
Attended a community meeting	.065	.072
Raised an issue	.065	.040
Attended demonstration/protest march	.036	.047
Voted or not in 2004 national elections	NA	.070

** Statistically significant at $p < 0.01$ * Statistically significant at $p < 0.05$
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Rounds 1, 2 & 3)

Regarding Round 2, three questions asked are based on conventional while the fourth is on non-conventional participation. First, respondents are asked if they have discussed politics with friends or neighbors in the past year. Close to half (49%) and 44% of members of majority and minority say that they have done so. Asked if they have attended a community meeting in the past year, 63% and 71% of majority and minority members agree. And 67% and 70% of members of majority and minority language groups say that they get together with others to raise an issue. Finally, in terms of non-conventional participation, only 18% and 19% of members of majority and minority language group report to have attended a demonstration or protest march during the past year.

In Round 3, I use two questions to measure conventional and one to measure nonconventional form of participation. A higher number (69% and 78%) of respondents coded as majority and minority language group respectively say they

have attended a community meeting in the past year. More than half (56%) and 60% of those coded as majority and minority respectively day they have raised an issue when they get together with others. Regarding non-conventional form of participation, 18% and 20% of majority and minority language group say they attended a demonstration or protest march in the past year.

Although voting is one of the conventional forms of political participation, in this study, I treat it as a separate variable because of its uniqueness. As stated earlier, compared to other forms of conventional participation, voting is a complex and multistage process. It involves a series of steps such as registration, political mobilization and turnout to cast a vote on a polling day (Dalton & Wattenberg 1993; Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005). In Round 1, voting is measured by asking respondents whether or not they voted in the 1999 elections. More than half (55%) and half (50%) of the respondents coded as majority and minority language group respectively, say that they voted in 1999. In Round 3, respondents are asked if they voted or not with regard to the 2004 national elections. Most (66% and 74%) of the respondents coded majority and minority group as members respectively, report to have voted in 2004.

The findings reported above reveal that the minority-majority language distinction does not appear to induce any significant influence on voter turnout. In other words, voting patterns for both minority and majority language groups are more or less the same. Thus, these findings do not support Hypothesis 6 where I predict that members of minority are less likely to vote than the majority group.

The Cramer's V tests used to determine the strength of the relationship between language and political participation reveal weak relationship between these two variables. As Table 5.3 shows the Cramer's V scores are generally weak. These set of scores underpin the fact that there are no significant differences in terms of political involvement for both members of minority and majority language groups.

Taken together, Round 1, 2 & 3 results reveal similarities in the levels and patterns of civic involvement and unconventional participation by both members of majority and minority language groups. It appears majority-minority language dichotomy does not

in any way results in differences with respect to the levels and the nature of political participation (including voting) in Botswana. This invariably means that these findings are not consistent with Hypothesis 6. That is, the expectation to find that members of minority language groups are more likely to engage in civic activities than their majority counterparts.

5.5 Language and Government Legitimacy

In Round 1, government legitimacy is measured by asking respondents whether or not their government "has the right to make decisions that all people have to abide by whether or not they agree with them." The responses are summarized in Table 5.4. Half (50%) and 37% of the respondents coded as minority and majority language group respectively, agree with the statement. These findings are interesting as they reveal some differences in terms of the level of trust in political incumbents by majority and minority language groups. Members of minority language group appear to have slightly more faith than the majority group. This is an important finding although caution should be exercised given the small number (18) of respondents coded as minority language group.

Table 5 4: Relationship between Language and Government Legitimacy (1999 & 2005)

Dependent Variables		Independent Variable: Language Spoken Most at Home/Home Language(s)			
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics		**Majority Language**	**Minority Language**	**Other**	**Total (n)**
Government Legitimacy **1999**					
Our government has the right to make decisions that all people have to abide by whether or not they agree with them					
Yes		37	50	63	444
No		63	50	58	744
Total		100	100.0	100	
n		1151	18	19	1188
2005					
It is important to obey the government in power no matter who you voted for/it is not necessary to obey laws of government that I did not vote for					
Yes		90	90	.0	1074
No		10	10	100	126
Total		100	100	100	
n		949	250	1	1200

PANEL B: Inferential Statistics	
Dependent Variables: Government Legitimacy	Independent Variable: Language Cramer's V
1999	
Our government has the right to make decisions that all people have to abide by whether or not they agree with them	.063
2005	
Obey government in power/Not necessary to obey laws	.048

** Statistically significant at $p < 0.01$ * Statistically significant at $p < 0.05$

Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 1 & 3)

Round 3 asks respondents whether or not "it is important to obey the government in power no matter who you voted for/it is not necessary to obey laws of government that I did not vote for."Most (90% each) of the respondents coded as majority and minority language group, agree with the statement.

Like with previous variables, I use Cramer's V test to discern the strength of the relationship between language and legitimacy of government. Table 5.4 reveals weak relationship between language and government legitimacy. Again minority versus majority language differences do not seem to affect trusting attitudes.

Overall, the findings of Round 1 (to a small extent) and Round 2 reveal that majority-minority language distinction does not appear to influence attitudes towards government legitimacy. This means that Hypothesis 7 is not supported. Specifically, I expect that members of minority language group will be less likely to see the political regime as legitimate as their majority counterparts.

6. TRIBAL AFFILIATION AND KEY POLITICAL FACTORS

6.1 Introduction

The findings presented in Chapter 4 generally do not support the first part of the common wisdom especially with regard to the level of tribal diversity. As highlighted in that chapter, the common wisdom suggests that Botswana consists primarily of Setswana speaking tribes. However, the findings reveal that the level of heterogeneity is much higher than the 90% threshold proposed by the common wisdom. In fact, the breakdown of tribal affiliation by district reveals that minority tribes are not only widely spread across the country but are also in some instances concentrated in certain parts of the country.

In Chapter 6, I proceed by first asking: whether or not the diversity revealed with respect to tribal affiliation has any political consequences, in terms of politically divisive cleavages? I then use the same dependent variables (as used in Chapter 5) to test the second part of the common wisdom. That is, the argument that Botswana does not have politically relevant lines of ethnic divisions.

6.2 Tribal Affiliation and National Identity

I use Round 3 to measure the level of national identity in Botswana. Respondents are asked what choice they would make given national identity and group identity. Their responses are summarized in Table 6.1. Most (82% and 91%) of the respondents coded as minority and majority tribes respectively, say they would choose national identity.

This means they are no substantial differences in the way in which the two tribal groups perceive national identity. Thus, majority-minority tribal differences do not seem to influence national attachments and sentiments in any meaningfully way. In this case, Hypothesis 4 is not supported. My expectation is that minority tribes are less likely to be patriotic than minority tribes.

Cramer's V test is used to determine the magnitude of the relationship between tribal affiliation and national identity. Table 6.1 reveals a very strong and statistically significant relationship (Cramer's V scores .440) between tribal affiliation and national identity. This high score is not very helpful when examined against the frequencies reflected in the same table. It appears to be driven by the fact that there is only one respondent who is coded as the "Other" language category.

Table 6.1: Relationship between Tribal Affiliation National Identity (2005)

Dependent Variables	Independent Variable: Tribal Affiliation			
	Majority Tribe	Minority Tribe	Motswana Only	Total (*n*)
National Identity				
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics				
You had to choose being a Motswana and being a…				
National identity	91	82	.0	*1010*
Group Identity	9.	18	100	*189*
Total	100.	100	100	
n	*652*	*508*	*39*	*1199*

PANEL B: Inferential Statistics

	Independent Variable: Tribal Affiliation (Cramer's V)
Dependent Variable: National Identity	
Choose between being a Motswana and being a…..	.440**

*** Statistically significant at p < 0.01 * Statistically significant at p < 0.05*

Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 3)

6.3 Tribal Affiliation and Interpersonal Trust

A total of three questions are used to measure interpersonal trust. The results are presented in Table 6.2. First, respondents are asked to say whether or not "most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people? Very few of the respondents (6% each) from minority and majority tribes agree with the statement. Asked how much they trust people from their own groups, 70% and 72% of majority and minority tribes respectively say yes. Lastly, when asked "how much they trust Batswana from other ethnic groups," the responses are substantial. For example, 65% and 66% of the respondents who are coded as majority and minority tribes respectively, say that they trust Batswana from other ethnic groups.

Table 6.2: Relationship between Tribal Affiliation and Interpersonal Trust (2005)

Dependent Variables	Independent Variable: Tribal Affiliation			
	Majority Tribe	Minority Tribe	Motswana Only	Total (*n*)
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics				
Interpersonal Trust				
Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people?				
Yes	6	6	3	*71*
No	94	94	97	*1128*
Total	100	100	100	
n	*652*	*508*	*39*	*1199*
How much do you trust people from your own ethnic group?				
Trust	70	72	64	*845*
No Trust	30	28	36	*354*
Total	100	100	100	
N	*652*	*508*	*39*	*1199*
How much do you trust Batswana from other ethnic groups?				
Trust	65	66	64	*781*
No Trust	35	34	36	*418*
Total	100	100	100	
N	*652*	*508*	*39*	*1199*

PANEL B: Inferential Statistics

	Independent Variable: Tribal Affiliation (Cramer's V)
Dependent Variable: Interpersonal Trust	
Most people can be trusted/must be very careful	.067
Trust people from your own ethnic group/tribe	.080
Trust Batswana from other ethnic groups	.070

*** Statistically significant at p < 0.01 * Statistically significant at p < 0.05*
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 3)

Next, Cramer's V tests are used to establish the strength of the relationship between tribal affiliation and interpersonal trust. Table 6.2 reveals weak relationship between tribal affiliation and interpersonal trust. In other words, tribal differences do not seem to influence trusting attitudes.

Finally, apart from the fact that the responses to one of the questions asked demonstrate very low levels of trust for both tribal groups, nevertheless, their levels of trust are generally comparable. The two groups seem to display more or less the same levels of trusting behavior. Hence, the minority-majority tribal distinction does not appear to differ along tribal affiliation dimension. This means that Hypothesis 5 is not supported since I expect to find that members of majority tribes are more likely to display low trusting attitudes than minority tribes.

6.4 Tribal Affiliation, Political Participation and Voting

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Two questions based on conventional and one on non-conventional political activity is used to measure political participation. The responses are summarized in Table 6.3. Asked if they attended a community meeting in the past year, 69% and 73% of the respondents coded as majority and minority tribes respectively, say they have done so. When asked if they had raised an issue when they get together with others, more than half (56% and 57%) of the respondents coded as minority and majority tribes respectively, responded in the affirmative. Asked about their involvement in non-conventional participation, few (15% and 20%) of the respondents coded as majority and minority tribes respectively, say that they attended a demonstration or protest march in the past year.

With regard to voting, respondents are asked whether or not they voted in 2004 national elections. Table 6.3 reveals that most (67% each) of the respondents belonging to minority and majority tribes, report that they voted. Voter turnout for both tribes is comparable. Thus minority-majority tribal distinctions do not appear to influence voter turnout. Hence, Hypothesis 5 is not supported where I predict that in terms of voting, minority tribes are less likely to vote than majority tribes.

Table 6.3: Relationship between Tribal Affiliation, Political Participation and Voting (2005)

Dependent Variables	Independent Variable: Tribal Affiliation			
	Majority Tribe	Minority Tribe	Motswana Only	Total (*n*)
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics				
Political Participation				
Have you attended a community meeting during the past year?				
Yes	69	73	74	*852*
No	31	27	26	*347*
Total	100	100	100	
N	*652*	*508*	*39*	*1199*
Have you got together with others to raise an issue in the past year?				
Yes	57	56	82	685
No	43	44	18	514
Total	100	100	100	
N	652	508	39	1199
Have you attended a demonstration or protest march during the past year?				
Yes	15	20	44	219
No	85	80	56	980
Total	100	100	100	
N	652	508	39	1199
With regard to the most recent, 2004 national elections, which statement is true for you?				
Voted	67	67	77	807
Did not Vote	33	33	23	392
Total	100	100	100	
N	652	508	39	1199

PANEL B: Inferential Statistics

	Independent Variable: Tribal Affiliation (Cramer's V)
Dependent Variable: Political Participation	
1. Attended a community meeting	.055
2. Raised an issue	.091**
3. Attended demonstration/protest march	.106**
4. Voted or not in 2004 national elections	.072

*** Statistically significant at p < 0.01 * Statistically significant at p < 0.05*
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 3)

I then use Cramer's V tests to establish the strength of the relationship between tribal affiliation and political participation. According to Table 6.3, two of the relationships are weak; one is weak yet statistically significant and another strong and statistically significant. Taken together, these scores demonstrate the fact that differences do exist in terms of the extent to which members of majority and minority tribes engage in political activities. However, these differences are moderate and do not translate into significant politically relevant cleavages.

On the whole, first they are some disparities (for both groups though) in the levels of conventional and non-conventional forms of political participation. Second, conventional and non-conventional participation levels for minority and majority tribes are similar. That is, majority-minority tribal distinctions do not seem to run parallel to the levels of political participation. These results are not consistent with Hypothesis 6 where I predict that members of minority tribes are more likely to engage in civic activities than majority tribes.

6.5 Tribal Affiliation and Government Legitimacy

In measuring government legitimacy, Afrobarometer respondents are asked if "it is important to obey the government in power no matter who you voted for/it is not necessary to obey laws of a government that I did not vote for." The responses are summarized in Table 6.4. Most (90% each) of the respondents coded as majority and minority tribes, agree with the statement. In other words, both groups attach the same levels of faith and trust on political incumbents.

Table 6.4: Relationship between Tribal Affiliation and Government Legitimacy (2005)

Dependent Variables	Independent Variable: Tribal Affiliation			
	Majority Tribe	Minority Tribe	Motswana Only	Total (*n*)
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics				
Legitimacy of Government				
It is important to obey the government in power no matter who you voted for/It is not necessary to obey laws of government that I did not vote for				
Yes	90	90	74	1073
No	10	10	26	126
Total	100	100	100	
n	652	508	39	1199

PANEL B: Inferential Statistics

	Independent Variable: Tribal Affiliation (Cramer's V)
Dependent Variable: Legitimacy of Government	
Obey government in power / Not necessary to obey laws	.114**

*** Statistically significant at p < 0.01 * Statistically significant at p < 0.05*
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 3)

Cramer's V test is used to discern the strength of the relationship between tribal affiliation and legitimacy of government. Table 6.4 reveals a strong and statistically significant relationship (Cramer's V scores of .114, for obeying government in

power/not necessary to obey laws. Generally, members of minority and majority tribes perceive government legitimacy in more or less the same manner.

Lastly, these findings imply that majority-minority tribal differences do not influence Batswana's attitudes towards the political leadership. Finally, Hypothesis 7 is not supported, where I expect that minority tribes will be less likely to see the political regime as legitimate as majority tribes.

7. SOCIAL IDENITY AND KEY POLITICAL FACTORS

7.1 Introduction

Chapter 4 revealed high levels of diversity when using social identity, a more subjective marker of ethnic identity. In contrast, the common wisdom posits that 90% of Botswana's population is ethnically homogenous. I tested the common wisdom and found that more or less the same (44% and 49%) proportion of the respondents think of themselves in terms of majority and minority language/tribe respectively. It is also demonstrated that few of the respondents think of themselves in terms of religion, race or class/occupation. This implies that generally the level of heterogeneity in Botswana is higher than anticipated by the common wisdom.

Chapter 7 builds on these findings to explore the second part of the common wisdom regarding political cleavage in Botswana. But first, I test whether the diversity found with regard to social identity has any political consequences, in terms of politically divisive cleavages. Like in Chapters 5 & 6, I use the same set of dependent variables to test the arguments about political cleavages in Botswana. The only difference is that in this chapter, I use social identity which I consider to be more subjective than other markers of ethnic identity such as language and tribal affiliation.

7.2 Social Identity and National Identity

This section presents the results of Round 1 & 2 separately because as I pointed earlier these measure the relationship between social identity and the dependent variables in a somewhat different ways. For example, for Round 1 data it is possible to breakdown language into minority and majority language/tribe categories. This process is not possible because of the broad categories (language/tribe) used. Even the codebook does not provide for the breakdown of language and tribe into minority and majority social groups. However, Round 3 results deserve inclusion in the analysis since they are

relevant to my general hypotheses. In contrast, Round 1 results are more relevant to the specific hypotheses.

Firstly, in Round 1, four batteries of questions are used to explore the relationship between social identity and national identity. The results are summarized in Table 7.1. First, respondents are asked whether or not it makes them proud to be called citizens of Botswana. Almost all (97% each) of the respondents who think of themselves in terms of minority and majority language/tribe say that it makes them proud. Second, respondents are asked if they want their children to think of themselves as citizens of Botswana. A very high (97% and 98%) of respondents who think of themselves in terms of majority and minority social group agree with the statement. Third, respondents are asked if they want "all children who were born in this country regardless of what group they belong to, should be treated as equal citizens of Botswana." An overwhelming (88% and 89%) number of respondents, who think of themselves in terms of majority and minority social group respectively, agree with the statement. A similarly high proportion of respondents from both groups say that "it is desirable to create one united out of all the different groups who live in Botswana."

Table 7.1. Relationship between Social Identity and National Identity (1999)

Dependent Variables:	Independent Variable: Social Identity			
	Majority Language/tribe	Minority Language/Tribe	Other	Total *(n)*
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics				
National Identity				
It makes you proud to be called a citizen of Botswana				
Yes	97	97	92	*1110*
No	3	3	8	*46*
Total	100	100	100	
N	*725*	*264*	*167*	*1156*
You want your children to think of themselves as citizens of Botswana				
Yes	97	98	92	1107
No	3	2	9	42
Total	100	100	100	
N	*723*	*262*	*164*	*1149*
All children who were born in this country regardless of what group they belong to, should be treated as equal citizens of Botswana				
Yes				
No	88	90	89	1023
Total	12	10	11	132
N	100	100	100	
	725	*264*	*166*	*1155*
It is desirable to create one united nation out of all the different groups who live in Botswana				

Yes	86	89	84	988
No	15	11	16	159
Total	100	100	100	
N	*719*	*262*	*166*	*1147*

PANEL B: INFERENTIAL STATISTICS (1999)

	Independent Variable: Social Identity (Cramer's V)
Dependent Variable: National Identity	
It makes you proud to be called a citizen of Botswana	.092*
You want your children to think of themselves as citizens of Botswana	.099**
All children who were born in this country regardless of what group they belong to, should be treated as equal citizens of Botswana	.054
It is desirable to create one united nation out of all the different groups who live in Botswana	.046

*** Statistically significant at p < 0.01* * *statistically significant at p < 0.05*
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 1)

I then use a set of four Cramer's V to discern the magnitude of the relationship between social identity and national identity. Table 7.1 reveals two weak and two moderately weak yet statistically significant relationships. Examined alongside the frequencies of the crosstabulation between social identity and national identity (also presented in Table 7.1), these results, underpin the fact that generally social identity differences do not seem to run parallel to national attachments and sentiments in Botswana.

Secondly, Round 3 asks the respondents what they would choose, national identity or group identity. The results are summarized in Table 7.2. These reveal that 47% of the respondents who think of themselves in terms of language/tribe say that they are more likely to choose national identity than group identity. These results are consistent with the general aspect of Hypothesis 8, where I predict a weak relationship between social identity and national identity.

Table 7.2. Relationship between Social Identity and National Identity (2003)

Dependent Variables	Independent Variable: Social Identity			
	Language/Tribe	Motswana Only	Other	Total (*n*)
National Identity				
You had to choose being a Motswana and being a…				
National identity	47	.0	42	*305*
Group Identity	53	100	58	*891*
Total	100	100	100	
n	*328*	*507*	*361*	*1196*

Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 2)

In sum, using Round 1 results in particular, they appears to be no differences in the manner in which people who think of themselves in terms of majority and minority language/tribe perceive national identity. The social distinctions between Batswana who think of themselves in terms of majority and minority language/tribe do not appear to correspond with national attachments and sentiments. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 8, where I predict that Batswana who think of themselves in terms of majority and minority language/tribe/ethnic group are more likely to attach equal amount of loyalty to the nation state.

7.3 Social Identity and Interpersonal Trust

Round 1 measures interpersonal trust by asking that: "would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" The results are presented in Table 7.3. These reveal very low levels of trust for both groups. For example, only 14% of respondents who think of themselves in terms of minority and majority language/tribe respectively, say they agree with the statement. Cramer's V test is used to determine the magnitude of the relationship between social identity and interpersonal trust. Table 7.3 reveals a very weak relationship (Cramer's V score of .033) between these two variables.

Table 7.3: Relationship between Social Identity and Interpersonal Trust in Percent (1999)

Dependent Variables		Independent Variable: Social Identity			
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics		Majority Language/Tribe	Minority Language/Tribe	Other	Total (n)
Interpersonal Trust 1999					
Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?					
Yes		14	14	14	160
No		86	86	87	1000
Total		100	100	100	
n		724	260	173	1160
PANEL B: Inferential Statistics					
Dependent Variable: Interpersonal Trust		Independent Variable: Language: Cramer's V			
Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?		.033			

*** Statistically significant at p < 0.01* * *statistically significant at p < 0.05*
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 1)

It can thus be concluded that the distinction between majority-minority language/tribe does not matter politically. These findings support Hypothesis 9, where I predict that

Batswana who think of themselves in terms of both majority and minority language/tribal/ethnic group are equally likely to discriminate members of out-groups.

7.4 Social Identity, Political Participation and Voting

In all six batteries of questions are used to measure conventional forms of political participation in Round 1. Generally, participation levels are low. First, respondents are asked whether or not they have contacted a government official or party official about some important problem in the past year. Very few (5% and 9%) of the respondents who think of themselves in terms of minority and majority language/tribe respectively report to have made political contact. And the same applies to writing a letter to a newspaper. When asked if they have worked for a political candidate, 10% and 11% of majority and minority social group respectively say that they have done so. Asked if they participated with others to address an important problem affecting the community, 24% and 28% of minority and majority social identity group say that they did. Few (37% and 43%) of the respondent who think of themselves in terms of majority and minority social group respectively, report to have attended an election rally in the past year. Lastly, half (50% and 51%) of the respondents belonging to minority and majority social groups respectively, say that they discuss political matters when they get together with friends.

Table 7.4: Relationship between Social Identity, Political Participation and Voting in Percent (1999)

Dependent Variables		Independent Variable: Social Identity			
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics		Majority Language/Tribe	Minority Language/Tribe	Other	Total (n)
Political Participation and Voting 1999					
In the past year, have you contacted a government official or political party official about some important problem?					
Yes		9	5	13	102
No		91	95	87	1053
Total		100	100	100	
n		722	263	170	1180
When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters?					
Yes		51	50	62	598
No		49	50	38	545
Total		100	100	100	
n		715	259	170	1143
Have you engaged in this activity or not? Participate with others to address an important problem affecting the community or nation (other than an election)					
		28	24	32	319
Yes		72	76	68	839
No		100	100	100	

Total n		715	262	172	1143
Have you engaged in this activity or not? Attend an election rally?					
Yes		37	43	46	464
No		63	57	54	698
Total		100	100	100	
n		725	264	173	1162
Have you engaged in this activity or not? Work for a political candidate?					
Yes		10	12	10	122
No		90	88	90	1039
Total		100	100	100	
n		725	263	173	1161
Have you engaged in this activity or not? Write a letter to a newspaper?					
Yes		6	5	10	69
No		94	95	90	1093
Total		100	100	100	
n		726	263	173	1162
Voting					
With regard to the recent, 1999 national elections, which statement is true for you?					
Voted		56	51	52	632
Did Not Vote		44	48	48	524
Total		100	100	100	
n		724	261	171	1156

PANEL B: Inferential Statistics

	Independent variable: Social Identity
Dependent Variable: Political Participation	
Contacted government official or political party official	.082*
Got together with friends to discuss political matters	.082
Participated with others to address an important problem affecting the community (other than an election)	.048
Attended an election rally	.045
Worked for a political candidate	.062
Wrote a letter to a newspaper	.056
Voted or not in the 1999 national elections	.038

*** Statistically significant at p < 0.01 * statistically significant at p < 0.05*
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 1)

Voting (in Round 1) is measured by asking the respondents whether or not they voted in the 1999 national elections. The results are presented in Table 7.4. In fact, slightly more than half of the respondents who think of themselves in terms of minority language tribe say that they voted. More than half (56%) of majority social group also report to have voted in the 1999 elections. These results generally show that majority-minority language/tribe distinction does not matter politically. Voter turnout patterns for both social groups are comparable. The findings are not consistent with Hypothesis 10, where I predict that members who think of themselves in terms of majority language/tribe are more likely to vote than their minority counterparts.

In order to ascertain whether to confirm or disconfirm Hypothesis 10, seven Cramer's V tests are used to discern the relationship between social identity and political participation. Table 7.4 reveals moderately weak, yet statistically significant relationship for: contacting government or party official (Cramer's V score of .082); discussion of political matters (Cramer's V score of .082) and attendance of election rally (Cramer's V score of .045); and participation in addressing an important problem (Cramer's V score of .048). The other three Cramer's V scores (.062 for working for a political candidate, .056 for writing a letter to a newspaper and .038 for voting), reveal weak relationship between social identity and political participation.

In Round 2, four questions are used to measure conventional forms while one is used to measure non-conventional political participation. The results are summarized in Table 7.5. When asked if they discussed politics with neighbors in the past year, more (57%) and 42% of the respondents who think of themselves in terms of language/tribe say they agree. Three quarter (71%) say that they attended a community meeting. Another three quarter (71%) of respondents report to raise an issue when they get together with others. When asked about participation in non-conventional activities, very few (12%) of the respondents say that they attended a demonstration or protest march in the past year.

Lastly, a substantial (65%) of respondents who think of themselves in terms of language/tribe say that they voted in 2004. On the whole Round 2 results are somewhat consistent with the general Hypothesis 10 made with respect to the relationship between social identity, political participation and voting. I make a prediction of a strong relationship between the type of social identity, political participation and voting. Although these results are not very helpful in testing the argument about the second part of the common wisdom, yet at the same time, they demonstrate the possible link between language/tribe dimension and the dependent variables explored thus far. However, this is an area that falls outside the scope of this particular study.

Table 7.5. Relationship between Social Identity and National Identity (2003)

Dependent Variables	Independent Variable: Social Identity			
	Language/Tribe	Motswana Only	Other	Total (*n*)
Political Participation				
Have you discussed politics with neighbours during the past year?				
Yes	57	42	49	*575*
No	43	58	51	*621*
Total	100	100	100	
N	*328*	*507*	*361*	*1196*
Have you attended a community meeting during the past year?				
Yes	71	63	60	*767*
No	29	37	40	*429*
Total	100	100	*100*	
N	*328*	*507*	361	*1196*
Have you got together with others to raise an issue during the past year?				
Yes	71	66	66	*803*
No	29	34	35	*393*
Total	100	100	100	
N	*328*	*507*	*361*	*1196*
Have you attended a demonstration or protest march during the past year?				
Yes	12	20	21	*218*
No	88	80	79	*978*
Total	100	100	*100*	
N	*328*	*507*	361	*1196*
With regard to the most recent, 2004 national elections, which statement is true for you?				
Voted	66	74	.0	*808*
Did not Vote	34	26	100	*392*
Total	100	100	*100*	
N	*949*	*250*	1	*1200*

Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 2)

In conclusion, Round 1 results in particular, reveal variations in the frequencies of political participation across the various forms of conventional political activities. In spite of these variations, participation levels for respondents who think of themselves in terms of minority and majority language/tribe are comparable. Both social groups display more or less the same amount of political participation in each of the categories that are measured. In short, majority-minority language/tribe distinctions do not appear to correspond with the levels of political participation. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 10, where I predict the level of civic political participation will be the same for both minority and majority language/tribal groups.

7.5 Social Identity and Government Legitimacy

Round 1 measures government legitimacy by asking if the "government has the right to make decisions that all people have to abide by whether or not they agree with them."

The results are presented in Table 7.6. These reveal low (35% and 37%) levels of government legitimacy for the respondents who think of themselves in terms of minority and majority language/tribe respectively. Cramer's V test is used to establish the strength of the relationship between social identity and government legitimacy. Table 7.6 reveals a weak relationship (Cramer's V score of .073) between social identity and government legitimacy.

Table 7.6: Relationship between Social Identity and Government Legitimacy in Percent (1999)

Dependent Variables		Independent Variable: Social Identity			
PANEL A: Descriptive Statistics		Majority Language/tribe	Minority Language/Tribe	Other	Total (n)
Government Legitimacy 1999					
Our government has the right to make decisions that all people have to abide by whether or not they agree with them					
Yes		37	35	41	432
No		63	65	59	731
Total		100	100	100	
n		727	264	172	1163

PANEL B: Inferential Statistics (1999)

	Independent Variable: Legitimacy of Government (Cramer's V)
Dependent Variable: Legitimacy of Government	
Government has right to make decisions that all have to abide by whether or not they agree with them	.073

*** Statistically significant at p < 0.01 * Statistically significant at p < 0.05*
Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 1)

Round 2 asks a slightly different question measuring government legitimacy. It asks respondents whether or not "it is important to obey the government in power no matter who you voted for/it is not necessary to obey laws of government that I did not vote for." The results are summarized in Table 7.7. Most (90%) of the respondents who think of themselves in terms of language/tribe agree with the statement. These results are consistent with the general (Hypothesis 11) prediction that they will be a strong relationship between the type of social identity and the level of government legitimacy.

Table 7.7. Relationship between Social Identity and Government Legitimacy (2003)

Dependent Variables	Independent Variable: Social Identity			
	Language/Tribe	Motswana Only	Other	Total (*n*)
Legitimacy of Government				
It is important to obey the government in power no matter who you voted for/It is not necessary to obey laws of government that I did not vote for				
Yes	90	90	.0	*1074*
No	10	10	100	*126*

Total	100	100	100	
n	*949*	*250*	*1*	*1200*

Source: Analysis of Afrobarometer Survey Data (Round 2)

Specifically, Round 1 results reveal that there are no substantial differences in the way in which respondents who think of themselves in terms of minority-majority language/tribe perceive government legitimacy. Finally, these findings are not consistent with Hypothesis 11, where I predict that people who think of themselves in terms of minority social groups are less likely to see the political system as legitimate.

In conclusion, Chapter 7 demonstrates that, the selected dependent variables (i.e. national identity, interpersonal trust, political participation, voting and government legitimacy) do not translate into politically meaningful and relevant cleavage structures in Botswana. Majority-minority social identity differences do not run parallel to political behaviours and attitudes. Both members of majority and minority language/tribes display similar patterns of attitudes in terms of national loyalty, social and political trust, conventional and unconventional forms of political involvement and faith in the political regime.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

8.1 Summary of Main Findings

Chapter 4 demonstrates that Botswana is not as nearly homogeneous as the first aspect of the common wisdom suggests, especially if one moves beyond language and looks at other indicators such as tribe and social identity. With regard to language, a more objective dimension of ethnicity, Round 1 findings reveal the predominance (90% and above) of Setswana as the language "spoken most at home" in Botswana. Thus the first part of the common wisdom is disconfirmed. Yet in spite of the predominance of Setswana, especially using Round 2 & 3 which asks about the "home language," the results are somewhat different. The proportion of the respondents who use Setswana as the "home language" drops to 79%, a figure that falls far short when compared to 90% suggested by the common wisdom. In fact, 21% and 23% of the respondents sampled in Round 2 & 3 respectively report to use minority languages as their "home language." In fact, the breakdown of language by districts and rural-urban divide reveals that some of the minority languages like Sekalanga and Sekgalagadi are widely spread across the country. And at the same time minority language groups appear to be concentrated in certain parts of the country. In short, the common wisdom is supported when one uses language 'spoken most at home" and is not supported when one uses "home language."

In terms of tribal affiliation, a putatively objective dimension of ethnic identity, the results reveal that the level of diversity in Botswana is much higher than that contemplated by the common wisdom. In fact, the disaggregation of tribal affiliation according to district and urban-rural location reveals widespread distribution of minority tribes across the country. These are not simply tucked away in remote and peripheral areas.

The use of social identity, a more subjective dimension of ethnic identity, reveals that the level of heterogeneity in Botswana is much higher than the common wisdom wants us to believe. People who think of themselves in terms of "minority" languages or tribes are widely spread across the country.

Chapters 5 to 7 show that potential cleavages along minority-majority language divisions, minority-majority tribal affiliation and minority-majority social groupings do not make much difference across a series of important political attitudes and behaviors. That is there are few politically divisive cleavage lines at least in terms of language, tribe and social identity. These lines of cleavages do not seem to correspond to national identity, interpersonal trust, political participation, voting and government legitimacy. The existing cleavages do not appear to have been politicized. Thus, the second part, and perhaps the more implicit part of the common wisdom about Botswana appears to be correct.

8.2 Implications for Theory and Future Research

Several implications for theory arise out of this study. The results reveal that Botswana is ethnically more diverse than the common wisdom suggests. This is particularly true once tribal affiliation (a putatively objective dimension) and social identity (a more subjective dimension) are used as markers of ethnic identity. Minority groups do not appear to hold different political attitudes to majority groups. The crucial question that arises then is: why are the many observed differences in language, tribe, or in social identity not marked by important value, attitudinal or behavioral differences? The answer to this question would seem to lie at the basis of Botswana's exceptionality, not its absolute levels of homogeneity.

The following factors may possibly explain why political cleavages in Botswana are not yet politicized. First, there seems to be an absence of political entrepreneurs. The 'ethnic card' effect is not yet visible in Botswana's politics. Even political parties are inclusive and all embracing in their quest to campaign for political and state power. Second, Botswana's economic growth and the prudent use and equitable distribution of national wealth and this means ethnic minorities have little reason to be dissatisfied with the performance of the political regime.

The small population size, widespread distribution and concentration of minority groups in certain parts of the country makes difficult for them to forge alliances along political relevant cleavage structures. In terms of political campaigns, the ruling

Botswana Democratic Party has traditionally used inclusive strategies thus moves away from ethnic appeals and political mobilization. For the time being Setswana plays the role of lingua franca thus forms the basis for unifying political attitudes and behaviors in Botswana. However, differences in the "minority" and "majority" group perceptions of languages spoken most at home and home language are apparent. These may lead to rising demand for "home language" education by minority groups. In future, opposition parties may see minority groups as the basis for ethnic political mobilization.

Finally, the lack of observed politicization of Botswana's identity cleavages should not be taken for granted. Ignoring issues of unequal distribution of political power, rising levels of poverty, escalating income inequalities and high unemployment rates may be counterproductive in the long run. These issues if not adequately tackled, may provide a seedbed for political instability and ethnic-based politics. Evidence already exists to support this insinuation. According to Solway (2002: 713), the Botswana case presents a paradox - - prosperity and "yet despite these realities, we see the rapid and increasingly vociferous rise of ethnically based consciousness and demands." The establishment of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (commonly known as 'the Balopi Commission'), in 2000, is indicative of the fact that Botswana's ethnic politics is gradually being politicized. Its establishment was the result of a combination of complex factors that had permeated Botswana's political landscape since independence in 1966.

A number of probable factors can be used to explain why the government eventually gave into the demands to review Sections 77, 78 & 79 of Botswana's constitution that was adopted at the independence. First, these sections were perceived to be discriminatory in that they listed the eight principal Tswana tribes and language groups but were silent on the existence of the non-Tswana groups. Second, ethnic minorities largely perceived the constitution as not only imposed by the colonial administration in concert with ethnic majorities but also as an instrument of subordinating them thus perpetuating inequalities particularly with respect to tribal land ownership. For example, the constitution provides for Tribal Territories under the custodianship of the eight Tswana tribes. Theoretically, every Motswana is entitled to own land anywhere in the country. But in reality the custody of the land rests with the main land boards most

of which are named after the eight Tswana tribes—for example, Ngwato Landboard (named after Bangwato), Tawana Landboard (named after Batawana) and Kweneng Landboard (named after Bakwena). Thirdly, the marginalizations of ethnic minority languages from use in public forums such government offices, education and the judiciary complicates the relative uneasiness between ethnic minorities and majorities. It is against this background and a result of the mounting pressure and dissatisfaction by ethnic minorities that the government was eventually forced to establish the Balopi Commission of inquiry in 2000. The government embarked on a narrow mandate for the commission to focus specifically on making Sections 76,77 & 78 tribally neutral and making the composition of the House of Chiefs more broad to embrace ethnic minorities. Yet the demands and expectations of ethnic minorities were and are still much broader. In fact, there is a perception that the recommendations of the Balopi Commission, the subsequent adoption of the Government White Paper and the amendments effected do not go far enough to address the key issues raised by ethnic minorities. In the short term, ethnic minorities have settled for the compromise but the politicization of ethnicity is likely to become more salient and persistent and create a wedge between ethnic groups if Botswana's policies of nation building remain less accommodative in character thus undermining peaceful co-existence between the various ethnic groups and democratic governance in general.

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