"It's Now or Never for South African Women": A Case Study of The African National Congress' Adoption of a Quota for Women on their Party Lists in the South African Elections of 1994

by
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This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

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Abstract

Prior to 1994, women made up only 2.7% of the national legislature of South Africa. The first universal suffrage election in the country's history resulted in a tenfold increase in their presence to 27%. This extraordinary change in the gender demographics was due almost entirely to a quota implemented by the majority party, the African National Congress (ANC), in compiling both their national and provincial election lists.

This dissertation explains why the ANC leadership adopted this voluntary, one-third quota. It examines the factors known to impact the numbers of women elected to political office and the use of electoral quotas for women. It draws on secondary and some primary sources to chart the development of demands for the emancipation of women within the ANC, in the years leading up to the 1994 elections.

The paper argues that the two most important factors in the adoption of the quota were: 1 the electoral context of the 1994 elections and; 2 the demands made on the ANC from within the organisation. The electoral system, based on proportional representation, used in the elections of 1994 is widely held by political scientists to be the most favourable for the election of women. An additional electoral factor was the lack of previously existing ANC election lists. This absence of incumbents, which generally constitute a major impediment to the implementation of quotas, facilitated the adoption of a quota by political parties contesting the elections.

The second factor, demands for a quota from within the ANC and the ANC Women's League (ANCWL), was crucial. Quotas were not a natural

progression of an ingrained practice within the ANC, nor a foregone conclusion. The decision to use such a quota was internally controversial as was the belief in the importance of ensuring that women would hold powerful, decision-making positions within the ANC. ANC policy statements in the decades leading up to the transition show a clear commitment to the realisation of non-sexism within both South Africa and the organisation itself, its history also shows that these commitments were often undermined by inconsistencies in practice.

As the transition from apartheid to democracy approached, many ANC women and some men allies warned that women's liberation would not be a necessary or inevitable by-product of national liberation. They saw the transition as providing a window of opportunity to push for improvements in the status of women and were adamant that gender issues be given a higher priority within the organisation. They demanded that the ANC leadership provide a concrete policy that would guarantee women a substantial numerical presence in the constitution-writing body and the new government. Their power was bolstered by a transitional alliance of women's organisations that were able to constitute a women's constituency during South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy.

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Table of Contents

Appendixes

Bibliography

List of Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
ANCWL	African National Congress Women's League
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DP	Democratic Party
FSAW	Federation of South African Women
GAC	Gender Advisory Committee
MDM	Mass Democratic Movement
Mt'	Member of Parliament
MPNP	Multi-Party Negotiating Process
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe
NEC	National Executive Committee
NP	National Party
NWC	National Working Committee
PF	Patriotic Front
PR	Proportional Representation
SACP	South African Communist Party
UDF	United Democratic Front
UN	United Nations
WNC	Women's National Coalition

Independence Yes but not for Women?'

When I got home
from the war
I realized
our tradition had not changed
we were still second to men
being told
what to do

We had to wash and to cook
and to clean the house
we had to bear a child every year

When I risked my life
during the war
I thought
liberation was meant
for men and women...
indeed we got rid
of the white oppressor
but today I see
we women are still not free

We have to wash and to cook
and to clean the house
we have to bear a child every year!

But as a person cannot
walk with only one leg
this country cannot develop
without us!
We are Zimbabwe's second leg
we are needed
oh yes, we are!
Equality — dignity and love:
Equality!

Written by a group of Zimbabwean, ex-combatant women and printed in a South African periodical ("Independence yes" 1990:4).

Introduction

In 1994, when the first democratically elected national legislature in South Africa's history convened in Cape Town, the elected representatives mirrored the citizenry with unprecedented accuracy. The significant racial diversity was the most conspicuous change in the legislature's composition, but equally important was the tenfold increase of women from 2.7% to 27% (Commission on gender 2002: para. 8). Previously, the number of women in Parliament never exceeded 8 and was usually far lower (Geisler 2000: 606). Suddenly there were 111. This major change in the gender demographics of the legislature is due almost entirely to the African National Congress' (ANC) policy of using a one-third quota for women on both their national and provincial election lists (Ballington 1998: 20). This dissertation seeks to answer the question of why the ANC leadership adopted the quota system with a focus on the national level.

The adoption and implementation of this policy is relevant in study of both electoral and gender politics. The achievement of a one-third quota on party lists is significant for any political constituency as it increases their access to positions in government. Its adoption demonstrates the ability of a group to make an important political gain in a particular context. Times of transition provide an opportunity for groups that have been kept from power to challenge their exclusion (Hassim 1991: 67). The strategy used by advocates of the quota during South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy, and the factors that contributed to their success, are lessons for groups and factions around the world.

With this achievement ANC women members are part of a larger, global project of increasing women's access to political power. Sending such a relatively large number of women to Parliament was innovative not only on a national level, but also on an international level. After the elections the "New South Africa" compared remarkably well with other countries in terms of the presence of women in Parliament. Its ranking vaulted from 141' to t[h] in the world (Padayachee 1997: 1). The global average percentage of women in both houses of national legislatures is still a nominal 14.7%, bearing in mind that women constitute over 50% of the world's population (Inter-parliamentary union 2002: I). However, certain "enabling devices" and various policies that promote gender parity in government have garnered more interest and support in the last quarter century (Phillips 1998: 224). This dissertation aims to contribute to the information concerning the adoption and implementation of quotas for gender and those specifically for women.

Implicit in the topic is the assumption that the gender of elected representatives matters. The ongoing theoretical debates on gender and political representation are too involved to engage or summarise here. I will, however, briefly lay out the two arguments in support of gender parity (or at least the presence of one-third women) in elected assemblies that I find most compelling. The first argument is made on the basis of justice and the second argument revolves around issues of political interests.

The argument from the standpoint of justice simply holds that "it is patently and grotesquely unfair for men to monopolize representation" (Phillips 1995: 63). Women's presence in the governments that administrate, legislate and adjudicate their lives is

critically low around the world. Even the most minimal definitions of democracy require universal adult suffrage, which generally includes the right to stand for election. If there were no obstacles to women's participation in politics, one would assume that roughly half of the people elected to governments would be women. Instead, the consistently disproportionate percentage of women, as opposed to men, who hold positions of political influence indicate "intentional and structural discrimination" against women (Phillips 1998: 229). The factors that circumscribe the participation of women in electoral politics include the sexual division of labour, sex discrimination, intemalised sexism and "the structural assumption that workers and holders of political office are not responsible for the care of small children" (Okin 1998: 125). The result of these impediments is that women do not enjoy the same rights and opportunities that men do. This constitutes "a *prima facie* case for action" on the basis of justice (Phillips 1998: 229).

The second argument for women's increased presence holds that women have particular interests different from, and sometimes in conflict with, those of men, which are currently not being adequately represented [3]. This argument does not rely on all women having identical interests. The myth of a universal experience shared by women and thus producing common interests has been dispelled. It is now generally understood that women's interests, like men's, are varied. They differ according to their resources, environment and identities. "However," as Anne Marie Goetz argues "the fact that most

[2] Other arguments include, but are not limited to, assertions that women have a special relationship to politics that could enhance democracy, and the importance of having women legislators as role models for other women and girls (Phillips 1995).

To argue for an increase in women's presence from the standpoint of the representation of women's interests raises the contentious issue of accountability. Are women MPs accountable to more than their political parties? For a complete discussion of this issue see *The Politics of Presence* by Anne Phillips, 1995.

women, whatever their other circumstances, tend to be constrained in their life choices to a range of reproductive functions in the private sphere, and marginal positions in public arenas of the economy and politics, suggests that gender affects the way other social cleavages (class, etc.) are experienced, and hence generates specific interests" (Goetz 1998: 242).

However, a case does not need to be made for women having many interests in common with each other. What must be established is that women often have different interests than men. Women's interests are sometimes physiologically determined, such as ensuring that equal amounts of money are spent researching diseases that affect only one sex, but this is true in the minority of cases. Most often, women's interests result from social, cultural and economic determinants, which are not as objectively clear. Women are generally concentrated in low-paying jobs, are much less likely to own property, and "carry the primary responsibility for the unpaid work of caring for others" (Phillips 1998: 233). However, the category of "women" is so diverse that there can be no understanding of 'women's interests' that holds true for all women.

Anne Phillips argues that problems defining and agreeing on what is in women's interests can in fact strengthen the case for women's presence in government. "If women's interests were transparently obvious to any intelligent observer, there might be no particular case... for insisting on representatives who also happen to be women" (1998: 234). Additionally, participation in the political process itself can generate, clarify and refine interests. Therefore, along with the "actual content" of women's interests, the participation of women in government (not only as voters but as elected representatives)

is extremely important for the aggregation and articulation of their interests (Vincent L. 2001: 73).

The concern of justice is satisfied with the achievement of basically equal numbers of women and men in assemblies. At this point only Scandinavian countries come close to achieving gender parity. A 'critical minority' of 25 to 30 percent women, is thought by experts to be enough to affect the workings and agenda of an institution as well as represent `women's interests' in a adversarial style when necessary. However, not all women politicians are necessarily concerned with gender, in fact advocacy of women's interests is often a liability for them. Even when people are elected who prioritise gender issues there is often "institutionalised resistance to gender equality within the apparatus of governance" (Goetz 1998: 241). So, although we do not assume that by electing a few more women there will be a substantive difference in the work, culture and policy outcomes of a particular institution, it is nevertheless a beginning. The ANC quota has taken South Africa closer to gender parity in government and has achieved a 'critical minority.' While the primary focus of this dissertation remains the attainment of the quota, some of the issues arising from its implementation and prospects for the future will be discussed in the *Epilogue*.

Finally, before beginning discussion on increasing women's Parliamentary presence and representation as a constituency, it is important to address the "decline of Parliaments thesis". This thesis asks the question of how important Parliaments are in the current political context. Ironically, as the legislatures of the world become more representative, many are losing power relative to executives. Political scientist Michael Gallagher summarises: "If political decisions are made by governments after consultation

with the civil service and major interest groups, with parliaments reduced to the status of a minor actor in the policy-making process, then does it really matter what kind of people enter parliament and how they spend their time?" (1988: 276). In 1988, Gallagher makes two arguments for why the composition of Parliaments mattered at that time and they are both still relevant today.

The first argument holds that even if legislatures are less likely to be the initiators of policy, they significantly influence the actual legislation. Debate and decisions made in committee are very important in terms of the gender sensitivity and gender implications of draft legislation. The second argument is that, Parliaments are often the road to government. "Ministers are generally drawn from parliament, whether or not this is constitutionally essential, and even in some countries where being a minister is incompatible with being a member of parliament, as in France and the Netherlands, most ministers in recent governments have previously been deputies" (Ibid.).

Analysis of the composition of legislatures and reflection on the use of electoral quotas continue to be important and useful to the study of politics. Additionally, the South African Parliament does not appear to be "in decline". On the contrary, its powers have been widened in the "New" South Africa. There are almost twice as many standing committees as there were under the old regime, and legislators have "greater involvement" in policy matters and they can now "examine departments' budgets, and monitor, investigate and make recommendations" (Davis 1995: 7). The membership of the South African Parliament continues to be relevant and important.

My central argument is that while a combination of factors ultimately led to the adoption of the quota, two factors are particularly important. First, the electoral context

of the first free elections in South Africa was particularly conducive to the adoption of the quota. This is because the system was entirely new, which provided more flexibility than an established system generally does. Additionally, the fact that them were no incumbents (one of the most critical obstacles to the implementation of a quota) made the 1994 election a particularly opportune time to adopt a quota. Also, the proportional representation system is favourable for both the election of women and the use of electoral quotas. The second factor was that some individuals, mainly working through the ANC Women's League (ANCWL), forcefully demanded that the ANC leadership provide a concrete policy that would guarantee women a substantial numerical presence in the constitution writing body and the new government. Their power was bolstered by a transitional alliance of organisations able to constitute a women's constituency during the transition from apartheid to democracy.

Chapter 1 reviews the current literature on electoral systems, political parties and the use of quotas in terms of their impacts on the election of women. It identifies the electoral conditions most conducive to the election of women, but concludes that demands for an increase in women representatives are the most critical determinant in their election. Chapter 2 charts the development of demands for the emancipation of women within the African National Congress and ends with the issuing of the organisation's progressive statement on the emancipation of women in 1990. Chapter 3 tells the story of an internal quota for women proposed at the ANC's 48th National Conference in 1991. It was fiercely debated and ultimately defeated. This chapter establishes that the use of quotas for women was in fact very controversial within the ANC. Chapter 4 explains how the demand for a quota was ultimately met. It studies

how the ANC Women's League, with the backing of a coalition of women's organisations, was able to ensure that the ANC's regularly stated commitments to women's emancipation were actually put into practice. Chapter 5 describes the electoral system used in the 1994 elections, the ANC's nominating procedure and how the voluntary quota for women was eventually implemented.

CHAPTER ONE

The Election of Women

The 1994 elections were arguably the most important event in South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy. They were the first in the country's history in which every person had the opportunity to cast a vote, and the votes were all of equal value. Like all electoral systems, the one used in this election affected the actions of all political parties and impacted its outcome. The system had implications for all South Africans, including women. This chapter reviews the body of knowledge that identifies the factors and conditions that are known to facilitate, as well as those that inhibit, the election of women. It summarises what is known about the impacts of electoral systems, political parties and electoral quotas on the election of women.

Electoral Systems

Electoral systems (the methods and arrangements by which polities run their elections) vary significantly between states. They are developed to meet the specific needs of particular polities, reflecting the historical, social and political contexts in which they operate (Krennerich 1996: 18). Because electoral systems are the means by which political power is allocated, they are generally designed and amended to meet the needs or interests of those individuals and groups that are already in power. Thus, the processes by which electoral rules are chosen and modified should be understood as essentially political and as taking place in the context of a struggle to gain more, or entrench existing, power. Most electoral systems meet both the requirements of the country in

which they are used as well as the goals of the parties who choose, evaluate and reform them.

Electoral systems are not neutral. As one political scientist puts it, "they are the means used to exclude or include groups" (Rule 1994: 689). These groups include those of a minority ethnicity, religion, race and language. Women, though seldom if ever a minority, are one of the groups affected by electoral arrangements. The election of women is also affected by factors other than the electoral system. These include the political culture of a country and its political parties, the presence and relative strength of a women's movement, and the country's overall level of "development". Social barriers, including societal, economic, cultural, geographic and educational obstacles, often prevent women from even coming forward to stand for election. However, there is general consensus that electoral arrangements are a crucial determinant in the election of women (Hickman 1997; Jones 1998; Matland 1998; Matland & Taylor 1997; Rule 1994). The section hereunder offers a thumbnail sketch of electoral systems around the world and thereafter identifies the types or attributes that research has shown to be most conducive to the election of women.

The needs or "functional demands" of a polity largely determine the nature of its political system. Dieter Nohlen (Krennerich 1996: 16-17) has identified five categories of such demands: *representation, concentration, participation, simplicity* and *legitimacy*. Each of these requirements, which will be discussed in greater detail hereunder, must be met to some extent, but are emphasised differently in the respective electoral systems of countries, depending on their political, historical and social contexts and priorities. They are also often in tension with each other.

Representation demands that individuals who are elected accurately reflect the votes cast. This requirement is particularly important in divided societies where it is imperative that the citizenry feel that the outcome of elections is legitimate. Representation is in tension with the requirement of concentration, namely that there is enough consolidation of power in the hands of one party to ensure that the legislature can act decisively and does not become deadlocked by disagreements between parties and/or their representatives. Participation refers to voters' abilities to articulate preferences and it increases the complication of voting (i.e. being asked to choose both political parties and candidates, or to rank candidates). Increased participation can however lead to very complex systems, which may pose a problem for the condition of simplicity. The demand of simplicity is particularly important in societies that have high rates of illiteracy. Voters have to be able to understand the system. If they do not, and the process is confusing and inaccessible, there may be a problem of legitimacy. The requirement of legitimacy is paramount and can be in tension with any of the other functional demands. The most successful systems balance demands by fulfilling multiple functions well (Krennerich 1996: 16-17).

Electoral systems favour one of two basic types of representation, that is either *majority* or *proportional.* Majoritarian systems, commonly known as "first past the post" or "winner take all" systems, create a legislature that has a clear majority and so they emphasise concentration — and simplicity, at the cost of being less representative. For example, the United States emphasises concentration in its "winner take all" electoral system and representation is limited as a result. Representatives are elected from single member districts; therefore a candidate is able to win the only seat in a district if she

obtains even just one more vote than her opponent does. This leaves very little opportunity for the political diversity of an area to be accurately represented.

On the other hand, systems, which use proportional representation (PR), prioritise representation and they may lack the necessary concentration for effective decision-making. An example of this is Israel, where there has been a proliferation of "mini-parties", many of which win relatively small numbers of seats (Matland 1998: 80). This means that governments must be made up of a coalition of often dissimilar political parties. PR systems are commonly used in divided societies, where the legislature must reflect the society as closely as possible and where more descriptive or "mirror" representation is needed. Some "mixed systems" combine both principles in order to achieve the benefits of both, but in these systems one of the two is always dominant (Krennerich 1996: 7-8).

No electoral system will automatically result in more women being elected to public office. Rather, as a precursor, it is crucial for women to become effective political actors and to have strong women's movements that place demands on political parties and governments (Hickman 1997, Matland & Taylor 1997). Nevertheless, there are certain characteristics of political systems that can make them more responsive to these demands. The calls for more gender parity in elected office over the last 30 years in countries all over the world have been much more effective in countries which use a system of proportional representation than in those which operate on a majoritarian basis (Matland 1998: 77). This is borne out in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Percentage of Women MPs Across 24 National Legislatures 1945-1998[4]
Majoritarian (SMD) versus Proportional Representation (MMD) Systems

System/year	1945	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	1998
SMD	3.05	2.13	2.51	2.23	3.37	8.16	11.64
MMD	2.93	4.73	5.47	5.86	11.89	18.13	23.03

Marjoritarian or Single-Member District Systems (SMD):
Australia, Canada, France (1960 and beyond), Japan, New Zealand (1945-1990), United Kingdom, and United States.

Proportional Representation or Multimember District Systems (MMD):
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France (1945-1950), Greece*, Iceland, Ireland, Israel ♦, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand (1998 only), Norway, Portugal*, Spain*, Sweden, Switzerland and Germany (West Germany ♦ prior to 1990).

* Greece, Portugal and Spain became democratic in the 1970s and are therefore only included in the 1980, 1990, and 1998 calculations.
♦ Israel did not exist in 1945, and West Germany did not hold elections that year. They are therefore not included in the 1945 numbers. They are all included for all years following 1945.

Furthermore, studies done on countries which use mixed systems to elect members to the two houses of their national legislature (Australia, Japan and Germany) demonstrate that in the same national culture, the PR arrangement elected 3 to 10 times as many women as did majoritarian states (Rule 1994). Therefore, it is generally agreed that systems of proportional representation and mixed systems that lean toward PR are more conducive than majoritarian ones for the election of women (Jones 1998, Matland & Taylor 1997, Reynolds 1997, Rule 1994).

Note From *Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers* (p. 77), by Azza Karam, 1998, Stockholm: IDEA.

There are two key reasons why PR electoral systems are more conducive to the election of women, namely *district magnitude* and *contagion.* District magnitude refers to the numbers of representatives elected from each district. In PR systems, where legislators are elected from multi-member districts, higher district magnitude means that a party can expect to win more than one seat in each district. This results in higher *party magnitude* and encourages political parties to better balance their lists with candidates from different backgrounds and/or genders. This is not possible in majoritarian systems, where people are elected in single-member districts. "Ticket-balancing...ensures commitment to the list from all groups or factions within the party, and might broaden the list's appeal in the voters' eyes" (Gallagher 1988: 253). Women can be one of the groups from within the party demanding to be put in winnable positions on the list, especially when there is a women's branch of the party doing much of its work in that district (Matland 1998: 78). In other words, "party magnitude improves women's representation only if women are an effective political force with some power in the party" (Matland 1997: 193).

Finally, studies have shown that PR systems are more conducive to contagion than majoritarian ones. "Contagion theory suggests that traditional parties will feel pressured to nominate more women if one of their political rivals, usually a smaller party further to the left, starts to promote the representation of women" (Matland & Studlar 1996: 707). One such study was a comparison between the responses of a party in Norway (PR) and one in Canada (majoritarian) to pressure from other parties to promote more women candidates. "The Norwegian Labour Party increased the number of women in winnable positions in exactly those districts where they faced a serious challenge by

the Socialist Left, the first party to adopt quotas in Norway." There was no evidence of this in the Canadian case and it was concluded that the difference was due to their respective electoral systems (Matland 1998: 79). It is much easier for political parties to add women to lists in PR systems because they do not have to "pay the cost of denying a slot to [an] incumbent or male candidate in order to nominate a woman" (Ibid.). Therefore they can afford to be much more responsive to what is deemed electorally necessary or expedient.

Proportional representation systems are better for the election of women because of the aforementioned characteristics of high district magnitudes and the possibility of contagion. There are two additional factors within PR systems which have been shown to have an impact on the numbers of women elected, thereby making some PR systems better than others. These factors are *thresholds* of representation and whether party lists are *open* or *closed.*

All electoral systems have thresholds; Formal thresholds mandate that a party can only gain a seat in the legislature if it garners a certain percentage of the popular vote. Where there are no formal or legal thresholds, there are effective or *de facto* ones, which are dictated by features of the polity, such as the number of seats to be filled and the number of political parties contesting the election (Reynolds 1997: 88). Thresholds are not intrinsically favourable or unfavourable with regard to the election of women. And yet, in practice, higher thresholds tend to be more conducive to the election of women. This is because higher thresholds discourage the creation of "mini-parties" because they would have a very slim chance of gaining a significant number of seats. The problem that manifests when many little political parties contest an election, is that often they each

receive only enough votes to allow the first one or two people on their lists into the national legislature, and at this point in history the first people on any list are almost invariably men (Matland 1998: 80-81).

Most list PR systems in the world use closed lists. This means that the party establishes the order in which candidates appear on the list before the elections and that voters do not have the opportunity to show preference for any particular individual. Conversely, open lists allow voters to rank the candidates and thus to demote or strike names off the list (Matland 1998: 81, Reynolds 1997: 89). Whether lists are open or closed does not have an inherent impact on the election of women, however. Open lists can thus be positive for women in that they are more responsive to the preferences of voters and allow them to circumvent party "gatekeepers". Still, open lists can in some cases inhibit the election of women for the exact same reason. In Norway, where open lists are used at the local level, they have definitely hurt women (Matland 1998: 82). [5]

Closed party lists on the other hand appear to be better for the election of women candidates. This is because they allow for the nomination and election of people (such as women, or people belonging to a minority ethnic or linguistic group) who might find it difficult to be elected if the voters were given a chance to demote them (Reynolds 1997: 89). In other words, there is more opportunity for political parties to balance their tickets, if they are so inclined, by including candidates with characteristics that are generally

[5] Interestingly, some of the setback resulted from a backlash from a "women's coup" in the early 1970s. There was a very successful campaign to promote the election of women that encouraged voters to cross the names of men off electoral lists. This resulted in women's presence in the city councils of several key cities rising from between 15-20% to clear majorities! The women's ability to use the electoral structure to their advantage was celebrated by some people, however, it upset others (namely men) who retaliated through the ballot box. In the subsequent election, the numbers of women in Norwegian city councils fell dramatically. Experts speculate that their numbers continue to be smaller than they would be if the lists were closed (Matland 1998: 74).

under-represented in parliaments on their election lists. In these cases, however, their placement on the party lists is very important. There is a tendency among political parties engaged in list balancing to put under-represented candidates in low positions on the list or in "hopeless" seats rather than in "realistic" ones (Gallagher 1988: 255). However, this can be guarded against. Due to the fact that in closed list systems political parties remain accountable for the ultimate composition of their delegations, the order of the lists is relatively vulnerable to lobbying by members of under-represented groups.

As demonstrated by the above, a country's electoral system has a significant influence on the numbers of women elected to its government and can in fact provide institutional advantages to encourage their election. Compared to other factors, such as a society's political culture and "development", for instance, electoral arrangements are easily quantifiable, and can be changed with relative ease. In fact, with regard to the election of women, particular electoral systems and rules can in some ways compensate for unfavourable social conditions (Matland 1998: 75). For example, closed list PR systems with large multi-member districts have been shown to be the most favourable for the election of women (Jones 1998: 17). Multi-member districts require political parties to nominate more candidates for each district, thus providing the opportunity for greater ticket balancing. This means that in order to appease internal factions and widen their electoral appeal, parties will nominate candidates with a wider variety of characteristics than they would if they could only choose a small number. And, "as the number of empirical studies of women's representation has expanded, it has become increasingly clear that the nomination stage is crucial for women obtaining public elected office" (Matland & Taylor 1997: 192).

Political Parties and Nominations

Political parties have a tremendous amount of influence over the composition of elected government bodies. Even in electoral systems regarded as unfavourable for the election of women, political parties can ensure that women are in fact elected. This is because they determine, through their candidate recruitment and nomination processes, which individuals the voters have the option of electing. "Most studies of elections in established democracies suggest that voters primarily vote for the party label rather than for the individual candidates" (Matland 1998: 72). Thus, if a candidate is nominated by a major political party and is either put in a winnable race or has a high place on the party list, it is more than likely that she or he will be elected. Consequently, political party nominations constitute a pivotal factor in the election of women.

Every political party has its own procedures by which aspirants become candidates. The people who determine who gets the party nomination and therefore become candidates are called "gatekeepers." The party's structure, rules and norms determine who its gatekeepers are. The more *decentralised* a nomination process is, the more power the rank and file party members have over candidate nomination. Conversely, the more *centralised* the process is, the more likely that the gatekeepers are party leaders at the national level. In extremely centralised systems, decisions are made at the whim of the leader or in the proverbial smoke-filled room. An example of a very decentralised system is that used by political parties in the United States, where all the party members serve as gatekeepers in the primary elections. This gives all members of the political party a say in which candidate will get the party nomination. In contrast, in

the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, its internal faction leaders decide upon all nominations (Matland 1998: 67-70).

Often the nomination processes will be balanced between these two extremes. It is most common for the gatekeepers to be a subset of constituent party members, "either a constituency convention containing delegates from party branches or a smaller group such as a constituency committee" (Gallagher 1988: 240). However, it is also common in these processes for the national executive of a party to retain the power to veto nominations or to add people who have not been nominated (Ibid.: 242). The extent to which a party's nomination process is centralised or decentralised does not have an obvious impact on whether its gatekeepers nominate more women.

Another distinction that is made between nomination procedures within parties is that between more *bureaucratic* processes and those that are *patronage-oriented.* Bureaucratic methods are institutionalised, in other words, there are clear procedures by which aspirants are nominated and ranked. Patronage-oriented processes, which use unwritten methods and are generally very centralised, tend to keep power where it already exists. Bureaucratic systems enable groups and factions within the party to strategise and mobilise much more effectively in order to make sure that aspirants in their group will be nominated as candidates, and are therefore generally more favourable for the election of women (Matland 1998: 71).

Most political parties do not have formal eligibility requirements for aspirant candidates, and to the extent that they do, they are not particularly discriminatory (Gallagher 1988). They include characteristics such as the minimum length of time one must have been a member of the party, the maximum age of the candidate, and making a

person ineligible if they are already holding public office. In fact, in almost all political parties, gatekeepers enjoy a great deal of discretion when choosing candidates (Ibid.: 247-248). The characteristics most commonly used as criteria for candidate selection are an individual's track record within the party, his or her possession of a constituency and/or prominence in the community (Matland 1998: 71, Gallagher 1988: 248). Accordingly, party gatekeepers almost invariably select incumbents as candidates (Gallagher 1988: 249-250). When there are no incumbents, the aforementioned criteria are used. Other attributes that are valued, mainly have to do with an individual's electoral appeal, rather than their presumed *ability* to do the job or their political beliefs (Ibid.).

Because party incumbents and community leaders are less likely to be women than men (due to the societal context alluded to at the outset of this chapter) the criteria referred to above tend to hinder the nomination of women as candidates. Nevertheless, if the party were to be either encouraged by internal pressures or concerns of electoral advantage, or alternatively mandated by quotas, to actively recruit and groom women for political office (with the same energy that they already do men), these criteria would not in fact be an impediment to the nomination of women. In fact, one of the benefits of the quota system is that it forces political parties to actively recruit and groom women candidates (Dahlerup 1998: 102).

Bureaucratic nominating procedures appear to be the best for the election of women. This is because it is easier for factions and individuals within the party to strategise and lobby when there are written rules and when they can anticipate how the party gatekeepers will act. If a party is particularly centralised, then this pressure might

be exerted only on the leaders. However, because most nominating processes are decentralised to some extent, it may be best for people concerned with gender parity to apply pressure at all levels of political parties. Quotas for women are one of the mechanisms that people lobby their governments and political parties for.

Quotas for Women

Quotas are rules that require a group to consist of a targeted number or percentage of people with certain characteristics. Electoral quotas are one of the mechanisms used by governments and political parties to promote under-represented groups. They ensure that a certain number of people from these groups appear either as candidates for membership in representative governing bodies, or actually become members of these bodies. Quotas can be imposed on candidate lists or electoral outcomes, and are used to increase the presence of specific minority ethnic, occupational, religious, race, caste, and language groups. They are also used to promote the election of women. Women are of course members of all of the aforementioned groups and may therefore benefit from quotas for these groups as well. However, this dissertation is concerned specifically with the use of electoral quotas to promote the election of women as members of the under-represented category "women."

Individuals and organisations concerned with gender parity are increasingly identifying quotas as a practical way to begin establishing the equal representation of women in government. Quotas are very effective in that, if well implemented, they significantly affect the numbers of women in targeted bodies. They are also extremely efficient, as the electoral rules of a country tend to be much easier to change than its

political culture (Jones 1998: 5). Accordingly, political parties and governments in a growing number of countries around the world have implemented them (Dahlerup 1998: 96-104, Jones 1998: 4-5).

The aims of quotas for women are twofold. The first objective is to increase the numbers of women in elected positions, and the second is to ensure that they are not isolated in these bodies. The notion that one or two women can adequately represent women in all their diversity is no longer accepted. Nor is it thought possible for one or two women to exercise much influence over a group in which they make up only a few percent. Thus quotas are now generally put in place in an effort to create a "critical minority", wherein women constitute no less than 30% of a given body. This makes it possible for the individual women elected to reflect more accurately the communities that make up the polity that they represent and for which they legislate. It also opens up the possibility for women representatives from different and even from opposing political parties to work in coalition with each other on specific issues that may be ignored or opposed by their men counterparts. Interestingly, not all quotas that are meant to increase gender parity in elected bodies, are exclusively for women. For instance, the gender quotas, which are common in Scandinavian countries, require that nominees of both genders do not fall below a certain percent. Usually it is 30 or 40 percent[6] (Dahlerup 1998: 92).

[6] To date, these quotas have almost exclusively helped women. However, there are some unusual cases where gender-neutral quotas also help men in politics. An example is the Socialist People's Party in Denmark. In this party there are at least as many active women as men and so the quota can end up helping men (Dahlerup 1998: 93).

Types of electoral quotas for women

Electoral quotas for women fall into two basic categories: legal and voluntary. Legal quotas are those mandated by either the constitution or by statute. They can apply to the final outcome of elections, thereby requiring a certain percentage of an elected body to be comprised of women; alternatively, they may apply to political parties, requiring them to field a certain number of women candidates in an election. The first type of legal quotas, those that apply to the composition of legislatures, ultimately amount to reserved seats for women. For example, Uganda reserves a parliamentary seat from each of its districts for women and actually has separate elections to fill those seats (Goetz 1998: 250). In the Indian local municipal bodies, 33% of the seats are legally reserved for women (Dahlerup 1998: 97). Quotas for elected bodies are very hard to implement because their application almost always requires the ousting of incumbents; therefore it is much easier to introduce these quotas in a new political system where seats are not already filled (Ibid.). There are certainly incumbents in the majority of countries in the world and so in most contexts implementation takes some time. The Norwegian Labour Party, for example took 3 elections to meet the quota it had set for itself. Women were gradually moved up the party list as seats were vacated (Ibid.: 102-104).

The other types of legal quotas are those that require a given percentage of the candidates fielded by political parties to be women. These quotas are most likely to be used in PR electoral systems that elect their legislators from multi-member districts using party lists. Because this is the way that approximately two thirds of the world's countries elect their legislators (Jones 1998: 4), the terminology of party list systems is used in the discussion hereunder. Quotas applying to all political parties contesting elections have

been nationally legislated in Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Italy and Peru and are currently being considered in others (Jones 1998: 5). These quotas prove more binding than voluntary political party rules, because they are not optional and so are monitored and enforced by bureaucracies and judiciaries.

The second category of quotas, those voluntarily adopted by political parties themselves, are the most common type of quotas now used to increase the numbers of women in politics (Reynolds 1997: 97). They are used in the Scandinavian countries of Norway, Denmark and Sweden, countries that lead the world in the election of women (Dahlerup 1998: 100). They are also used by at least one major political party in many other countries, including France, Israel, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Spain and of course South Africa (Jones 1998: 4). These quotas are not legally binding, however. Therefore, if a political party fails to compile a list with the mandated number of women, it will still be accepted. This of course leaves more room for parties to make exceptions or to claim that they have done the best they could while not reaching the quota. However, because these types of quotas are invariably the result of pressure from sections or factions within the party, these interest groups will generally continue to monitor the implementation of quotas that they have persuaded the party to adopt. While this does not necessarily ensure the successful application of a quota, it does mean that a political party would have to contend with significant internal strife if it was to renege on its commitment to a quota.

Generally, parties that implement quotas in their nomination process use quotas for their internal leadership positions as well (Dahlerup 1998: 101). This is ideal because it ensures that women are being identified, trained and given the opportunity to develop

as leaders, in the same way that men are, in these parties in preparation for work as elected representatives.

One complication of such quotas is that most of these legislated quotas do not include instructions on the list positions of the women candidates. And, as previously noted, there is a tendency for political parties to relegate women, and people with under-represented characteristics such as minority ethnic, religious, race, caste, and language groups, to the lower part of the list. Therefore, it is common for most of the women candidates to end up in comparatively "hopeless" as opposed to "realistic" positions. Realistic positions are usually occupied, making the placement of a person benefiting from a quota a far more contentious issue. The lack of legislated requirements with regard to list placement is not simply an oversight, but represents another political battle yet to be won.

Argentina is an example of a country in which this problem has been solved by legislation. The 1991 *Ley de Cupos* (or "Law of Quotas"), requiring that at least 30% of the candidates on provincial lists be women, stipulates that these women be placed in electable positions (Jones 1998: 6, Reynolds 1997: 97). There are other examples of list placement rules put in place by political parties that voluntarily adopt quotas as well. For instance, the Swedish Social Democratic Party introduced the "every second [person] on the list a woman" principle in 1994 (Dahlerup 1998: 100). This means that the names on the list must alternate between men and women. Stipulations such as these reflect a stronger commitment to gender parity on the part of lawmakers and leaders of political parties.

One of the results of the introduction of quotas has been the aforementioned phenomenon of contagion; political parties will sometimes adopt policies initiated by other parties in order to stay competitive and popular with voters. In Norway for example the policy of voluntarily adopting gender quotas was clearly the result of contagion. "In 1977, only two parties with less than four per cent of the parliamentary seats had quotas. Today, five of the seven parties represented in parliament, with approximately 75 per cent of the seats combined, have officially adopted gender quotas" (Matland 1998: 79). Legal quotas have also been positively affected by contagion. In the six years after the adoption of the aforementioned national *Ley de Cupos* in Argentina, 21 of the 24 provinces of the country have voluntarily passed similar laws mandating quotas for women in provincial election lists (Jones 1998: 6-7). Contagion can in part be attributed to competitive contexts. Quotas for women and gender quotas adopted by political parties have all resulted from vigorous campaigning within these parties. However, the pressure has proved "particularly effective where parties were already worried about their electoral appeal" (Phillips 1995: 58-59).

Conclusion

In conclusion, then, as demonstrated above, women's election to national legislatures is affected by a combination of factors, namely electoral systems, the nominating processes of political parties and mechanisms such as quotas. The type of electoral system most conducive to the election of women is one based on the principle of proportional representation in which parties use closed lists. The more members are elected from a given district (or the higher the district magnitude), the better the chances that there will

be women among them. Higher district magnitude is important because it allows political parties greater opportunity to balance their lists. Political parties, in general, exert a great deal of power over the character or make-up of elected bodies, as they dictate which candidates voters can choose from, and often the order in which they will receive seats. Thus, if a political party prioritizes increasing the numbers of women in elected office and acts accordingly, then — logically — their numbers will increase.

While some electoral systems and political party structures are more conducive to the election of women, they do not in fact guarantee their election. Nevertheless, some of the literature suggests that electoral arrangements are the primary factor in the election of women (Rule 1994: 689). However, the majority of research also indicates that these arrangements are not sufficient and that it is crucial for women's movements and caucuses to place demands on electoral systems and political parties (Matland & Taylor 1997, Jones 1998, Hickman 1997). The reason why some electoral systems or political party structures are favorable to the election of women is because they can more easily respond to demands for increased women's representation. Accordingly, they are more responsive to demands for quotas. The next chapter moves more specifically into the South African context. It charts the development of the requisite demands for women's representation within the ANC. The electoral system used in the South African elections in 1994 will be discussed together with the ANC's nominating procedure and quota system in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER TWO

Development of Demands within the ANC for Women's Representation

Demands for more women in decision-making positions, shown to be a critical issue in the previous chapter, developed in the ANC over the course of its history. The organisation did not begin with women's emancipation as a priority, and women within the organisation did not always insist that it be one. This does not mean that South African women were politically uninvolved or passive. On the contrary, they have a long and militant history of political activism. Women have always participated in the ANC and were an integral sector in its struggle for national liberation. The Freedom Charter, adopted in 1955, committed the ANC to the pursuit of a free and democratic society that included equality between women and men. The goal of gender equality, though consistently articulated, was often treated as less pressing than those of racial and economic equality. In fact, many activists believed that women's oppression would end with "national liberation".

In the 1980s these views changed. Women's emancipation received much more attention and it became increasingly clear that it would not be a necessary by-product of the destruction of apartheid. Consequently, many ANC women, and some men, took up the issue with more urgency. In 1990, women secured a policy re-commitment to women's emancipation in the form of a statement issued by the ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC) (see Appendix A). Demands that the goal of gender equality get a higher priority peaked during South African's political transition. The

adoption of the quota for women on the ANC lists was one of the primary results of this pressure. This chapter charts the development of these demands within the ANC.

Women in the early ANC

The ANC[7] was founded in 1912 to fill the need for an organisation to represent the interests of Africans as a whole in the political sphere. Initially, however, its main concern was with voicing the "grievances and aspirations [of] the new African intellectuals" (Meli 1989: 36), and of some traditional leaders, who had adopted the liberal values espoused by the British government and, to a lesser extent, by the colonial regimes (Ginwala 1990a: 78). These values included the subordination of women, and so it is not surprising that the members of the early ANC (who came from patriarchal traditions themselves) did not embrace the idea of the equality of women and men. At its beginning, women were not accepted as full members of the ANC and the organisation's demands for the vote did not include the vote for women (Walker 1991: 26). The *de jure* exclusion of women, however, "contrasted with the participation of women in the deliberations, decision making and campaigns of the organisation (though not its leadership)" (Ginwala 1990a: 77). There is evidence that women were sent as delegates to Congress conferences where they addressed the assemblies, served on committees and actually voted on resolutions and offices (Ibid: 87).

Women were first invited to become full members of the ANC in 1941 as part of a revival and restructuring of the organisation (Ginwala 1990a: 90). In a paper on the history of women in the ANC, Dr. Frene Ginwala notes: "this new approach towards

[7] The African National Congress was called the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) until 1923.

women was not taken out of a conviction that women were equal to men" (Ginwala 1989: 3). Rather, women were identified as an area for increased membership and their inclusion promised to significantly strengthen and expand the organisation (Ibid). The ANC constitution was amended in 1943 to allow for women members and to create the ANC Women's League (ANCWL) (Ginwala 1990a: 91). After some debate "with the women calling for autonomy and the men wanting greater control" (Ibid.: 90), the ANCWL was established as an autonomous organisation with its own constitution, offices and members (Rantete 1998: 31). The League was the primary way that women were incorporated into the ANC until its banning in 1960.

The separate organisation of women has implications for women as a group as well as for individuals. Historian Cheryl Walker notes that by creating a Women's League the ANC acknowledged that women have different organisational needs then men. However, she argues that "by directing women into a separate body, the ANC was also perpetuating the existing sexual divisions within its organisation. This tended to reinforce stereotypes about 'women's role' and 'women's work' and subtly undermined the formal equality of the sexes that had been proclaimed" (Walker 1991: 90). The separate organisation of women, within a mixed gender group, can also contribute to the marginalisation or "ghettoisation" of gender issues. This allows for the business of the organisation to proceed as if gender does not affect it.

The Women's League was established in order to increase the numbers of women in the ANC and to better facilitate their participation in the struggle against racist domination. This did not necessarily include promoting women's participation in the leadership of the ANC itself, and in this the League was not very successful. The

benefits of grooming women for leadership in women-only contexts are well established, however women's separate organisation can also serve to limit them. Jill Winter's assertion that "women who assume leadership roles in these auxiliaries [women's wings or branches] find it difficult to enter the mainstream of the parent organisation or to participate in the larger decision-making structures" seems to have borne out in the case of the ANC (1993: 53). Although Lillian Ngoyi, the first woman to be elected to the ANC's NEC, was sent to that body in 1955, women have never enjoyed parity with men in terms of leadership and decision-making positions within the organisation (ANC 2000). For example, until 1991 there were never more than 3 women on the 35-member National Executive Committee of the ANC (Ibid.).

National Liberation and gender

The 1950s saw a burgeoning of political activity in South Africa. The National Party, campaigning on the platform of apartheid, won political control of the country in the elections of 1948 and quickly began legislating racial segregation. The ANC, along with many other existing organisations, was radicalised at this time and became much more activist in their resistance to racist domination. Members of the ANC Youth League were elected to lead the ANC, and they were more militant than their predecessors had been. They mounted the Defiance Campaign of 1952 and entered into the Congress Alliance with other anti-apartheid organisation [8]. The ANC and the Congress Alliance initiated the compilation of the Freedom Charter and in 1955 delegates from the allied

[8] The Congress Alliance consisted of the ANC, the Transvaal Indian Congress, the South African Coloured People's Organisation, the Congress of Democrats and the South African Council of Trade Unions (Meer 1988:71; Russell 1989: 204).

organisations joined many other South Africans at the Congress of the People held in Kliptown.

South African women continued in their tradition of participation in political organisations and activism. In 1954, woman activists established the Federation of South African Women (FSAW). The Federation, a coalition of women's organizations, was a precursor to the Women's National Coalition of the early 1990s. FSAW was unique at that time because it was a national organisation that brought many disparate women's groups together and was not "conceived of as an auxiliary to a male dominated body" (Geisler 2000: 608). The ANC Women's League was a major affiliate of the Federation. FSAW initiated and oversaw the compilation of a Women's Charter and in this way took up issues of importance to women that were overlooked or given only minimal support by the major, men[9]-dominated political organisations.

FSAW was invited to participate in the 1955 Congress of the People and brought "women's demands" to the meeting. These included a rejection of the proposed extension of passes to women, demands related to the needs generated by running a household in the Bantustans and the advocacy of women's control over their bodies and reproductive lives ("What women demand" 2002). The Freedom Charter took little from the women's demands (Walker 1991) but committed the ANC to struggle for a society free from sex-based discrimination. It declared "Every man and women shall have the right to vote for and stand as a candidate for all bodies which make law; All people shall be entitled to take part in the administration of the country; the rights of all people shall

[9] In this dissertation I use *woman* and *man,* rather than *female* and *male,* to discuss human relations.

be the same regardless of race, colour or sex" (Ottaway 1991: 67-68). The Freedom Charter remained the ANC's most important policy document until 1988.

From this time on, the ANC consistently held that "national liberation requires women's participation and that national liberation means women's liberation", and yet its relationship to gender has been complex and sometimes contradictory (Charman, de Swardt & Simons 1991: 40). The ANC fell short of adopting and implementing significant gender policies and often the raising of such issues within the organisation was denounced as divisive. Furthermore, as previously noted, women were often overlooked when it came to grooming individuals for leadership. The stated goal of non-sexism was not given the same attention as those of non-racialism and economic justice. Therefore, the varying forms of discrimination experienced by South African women as women, and the gender dynamics that perpetuated their oppression, lacked rigorous analysis. Accordingly, limited progress was made in the unlearning of sexism within the movement, and many ANC members, ironically both women and men, continued to operate using sexist norms.

Helen Joseph, a prominent anti-apartheid activist and one of the accused in the 1956 treason trial, recalls during an interview in the late 1980s that the FSAW did not prioritise implementation of the Women's Charter that they had compiled (Russell 1989: 202). Most of the organisations affiliated with the Federation were more concerned with the "general struggle". She recalls, "We firmly believed that when we got our freedom it would be universal freedom. I think we were very naïve about this, but don't forget feminism wasn't all that established in the 1950s." (Russell 1989: 206). She explained that the struggle for women's rights in South Africa had been taken up primarily *by* white

This is what happened in the ANC, and consequently the struggle for gender equality was not prioritised. Many women members of the ANC, out of fear of alienating men or, alternatively, confident that "liberation" would solve the problem of women's oppression, did not take up the question of women's rights (Ginwala 1989: 6). The ANC Women's League, and later the Women's Section [10] of the ANC, did not always provide leadership in this area and mostly continued to organise women for the campaigns of the parent organisation. At the same time, many South Africans, men and women of all races, objected to feminism and considered it to be an import from the West. Ginwala noted: "even among white, middle-class women there is hostility to feminism" (Daniels 1992a: 22). Those who did raise the issue of gender were chimed with being divisive or were sometimes told that they should leave the imported notions of "feminism" to western women.

Generally, gender was seen to affect only women, and it was thus their responsibility, rather than that of all people, to solve whatever problems they had. This perspective implied that the problems faced by the national movement or community could be understood and solved "without reference to power relations between women and men" (Enloe 1989: 62). This in fact facilitated the "not now, late?' argument that relies on an assumption that it is possible to liberate a nation without paying specific attention to women. Or, as Nigerian Morala Ogundipe-Leslie wrote in frustration: "Somehow, miraculously, you can liberate a country and later turn your attention to the women of that country" (1984: 503).

[10] The Women's League disbanded when the ANC went into exile and was later replaced by the Women's Section (Rantete 1998: 39).

Some women in the ANC believed however that the fact that women could not be fully free while living under apartheid was used as an excuse to ignore the issue of gender inequality. This is the case made by Frene Ginwala who argued, in a paper delivered to an ANC conference in Lusaka, that "a significant portion" of ANC members *"deliberately* misconstrue this [the aforementioned fact] to mean that the struggle for women's emancipation and equality should be delayed until after liberation" (Ginwala 1989: 6 emphasis added). Ginwala, and some others within the organisation, asserted that gender disparity and racial discrimination should be addressed simultaneously by the ANC.

During the 1980s women's emancipation was increasingly addressed internationally and within the ANC (Geisler 2000: 609). By 1990, many women within the ANC and its partners in the struggle had begun to pointedly raise the issue of women's emancipation. Their position — that women could never be free under apartheid — had not changed, but the political landscape had. Three factors contributed to the mounting demands of ANC women. The United Nations (UN) Decade for Women and the associated conferences was the first contributing factor. The second was the fact of ANC women witnessing the experiences of women in other successful liberation movements. Finally, there was the rising frustration of women within the ANC. They worked in a man-dominated organisation that had all the right rhetoric but fell short on implementation. Each of these factors will be discussed more fully hereunder.

The UN Decade for Women

In 1975 the United Nations announced a "Decade for Women" and spent the succeeding ten years focused on promoting women's literacy, economic development, health, political participation and more. The Decade facilitated increased awareness and communication between women around the world. One of its major accomplishments was that it brought about the creation of a myriad of women's organisations throughout Africa (Winter 1993: 47). These organisations played an important role in women's empowerment as they provide a space for women to come together to share their knowledge and to develop organizational and administrative skills that had historically been cultivated by men.

The UN Decade for Women also affected the debates and policies in existing organisations. Frene Ginwala reports that the slogan of the Decade "Equality, Development and Peace" generated questions, discussions and disagreements within the ANC. She notes that while there was general agreement on the need for development and peace for women, the issue of equality was more contentious (Ginwala 1989: 5). Nevertheless, the ANC had more than one women's conference while in exile and declared 1984 the year of the women of South Africa (Rantete 1998: 39). ANC President O.R. Tambo was a consistent advocate of women's emancipation. As early as 1955, had called for men ANC members to view women members as equal and help with "their many family and household burdens" in order to increase their opportunity to be politically active (Ginwala 1989: 3-4).

By the end of the Decade the conferences and discussions had had an impact on women in the ANC who "clearly articulated that women's emancipation was not just a

social issue but required political and economic power" (Geisler 2000: 610). At the 1985 UN World Conference on Women in Nairobi, the importance of the presence of women in 'decision-making% one of the "buzzwords" at the proceedings, was especially stressed. Many ANC women who attended this conference returned to the organisation intent on increasing their numbers in positions where they could make meaningful decisions (Daniels 1992a: 22).

In 1985, to mark the close of the UN Decade for Women, O.R. Tambo and Sam Nujoma, head of the major Namibian liberation organisation SWAPO, issued a joint statement to the women of South Africa and Namibia. In it they promised the women of their respective countries that they would not "consider our objectives achieved, our task completed, or our struggle at an end until the women of Namibia and South Africa are fully liberated" (Appendix A: 122). This statement implicitly acknowledges that some liberation struggles had stopped with the change of government to a 'liberated', `democratic' one and left women's status unchanged.

"We have learned from our sisters"

The liberation movements of sub-Saharan Africa shared a commitment to the creation of a just society in which people would live free from all forms of discrimination and exploitation. Stephanie Urdang makes a distinction between the African independence movements of the 1950s and 60s, which essentially sought self-determination, and the later movements for national "liberation". Liberation movements, which arose most notably in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia, had ideologies

that envisioned and promised a new social order. This generally included a commitment to the elimination of gender-based discrimination (Urdang 1995: 214).

The ANC was engaged in a struggle for national liberation. As Johannes Rantete, a South African scholar and government official, notes: "a major part of the ANC's struggle against apartheid had been its constant attempt to provide an alternative vision" (1998: 83). Its programme was not limited to a struggle *against* racial oligarchy and apartheid. The ANC was fighting for a different kind of society altogether. It is important to understand that the ANC, though unique in many ways, was one of several liberation organisations in sub-Saharan Africa. Comparisons can — and indeed were — made by some of its members between the ANC and other liberation organisations in the region. Thus, women in the ANC experienced problems with raising gender issues that were common to many national movements. They also witnessed the marginalisation of their counterparts and the sidelining of gender issues in their newly "liberated" neighbours.

The experiences of women in other successful liberation movements had a profound effect on ANC women in the period before South Africa's transition to democracy. This is reflected in the articles, interviews and conference papers of the time. For instance, an input paper delivered at a conference of South African women states: "Women in the external mission [the ANC in exile] learnt a lot from interaction with women of other countries; from observing how national independence does not automatically lead to women's emancipation" (Browns Farm 1991: 4). Similarly, Mavivi Manzini explained in 1989: "We have realized from observing the experiences of other struggles, even those of our neighbours in Zimbabwe and Angola, that the question of

women's liberation has to be addressed now, and not left to later when national liberation has been won" (Russell 1989: 128).

An ANC paper gives some credit to the UN Decade for Women for increasing women's understanding of sexism, but goes on to claim that the awareness of how much work actually remained to be done came "primarily [from] learning from our sisters in other liberation movements in Southern Africa - who fought 'side by side with their menfolk' in the anti-colonial struggle and were relegated to the homesheds come liberation" (ANC 2000: 3). Thandi Modise, MK veteran (interviewed during the time of negotiations) stated that "we have seen in other liberated countries with new constitutions how women have still been left behind, with no change in their positions as women. We want to see ourselves there, participating" (Daniels 1991: 24).

It is, from the existing literature, well established that women tend to lose out with the success of liberation movements. Dan Connell explains, in an article on Eritrea and South Africa, that "reaction to radical social change commonly surfaces after victorious national liberation struggles, and by now the particular back sliding that takes place on women's issues has been widely recognised" (1998: 189). History shows that women have always participated in revolutions and liberation movements. However, women's concerns and individual women leaders are often sidelined once "liberation" is achieved (Lorber 1994: 254; Horn 1992). Leaders in exile had seen how — even among organisations and movements that championed the cause of women's liberation — these issues were frequently sidelined when more powerful interests presented a challenge. They understood that a rhetorical commitment was not enough; they knew that they had

to make sure that there were specific mechanisms in place that ensured progress towards the goal of a non-sexist future.

ANC women learned two principal things from the experiences of their counterparts in other countries. First, they understood that women would not be automatically emancipated once national liberation had been achieved, and also that they might be expected to leave the political arena and go to the "homesheds" at that time (ANC 2000). This is of particular concern when, as in the case of South Africa, political and governmental positions are a widely sought after source of employment. Incidentally, it is fair to assume that some women battling to ensure women's presence in government were also concerned about being excluded from political employment in the new country as their counterparts elsewhere had been. The second lesson was that the time of transition provided them with a unique 'window of opportunity' that should not be missed. Changes in gender relations would be much harder once things settled down after the transition. As a Zimbabwean woman deputy minister recalls "[after independence] we did not get our act together, we should have really tried hard, because it is much better to push what you want during the transitional period, before you are starting, before people get used to certain ways, when you still have the fever of victory... we thought that we fought, that we won, and that is it" (Geisler 2000: 606).

To sum up, women ANC members learned through experience and observation that issues of gender inequality and women's oppression, which were placed on the back burner during the struggle for a democratic South Africa, would not be resolved with liberation. In fact, they understood that these issues would not necessarily even make the agenda. Consequently, many women saw it as their responsibility to obtain concrete

assurances that practical steps would be taken toward a non-sexist future. They saw the transition to democracy as providing an opportunity to push the issue of gender because there was so much at stake and in flux.

Frustration of Women in the ANC

David Bouchier reports that the phrase "women's liberation" was first coined by women in the American civil rights organisation SNCC to highlight their subjugation in an organisation working for "Black liberation" (Bouchier 1983). Bernice Johnson Reagon, also speaking about the American context, explains: "at some point, you cannot be fighting oppression and be oppressed and not feel it" (Reagon 1998: 248). Frene Ginwala was instrumental in securing the ANC quota for women. In tracing her political development in the context of the struggle against apartheid, she cites the debates leading up to the 1985 Nairobi Conference as being particularly significant. However, "most important in my development was that the ANC was putting forward advanced political positions on women but these were not being implemented" (Daniels 1992a: 22).

By the late 1980s, some women working in and with the ANC in exile were clearly frustrated. This was due in part to the lack of action taken to implement any of the progressive rhetoric of the organisation about gender, but also the often blatant discrimination they experienced as women. "Women who try to participate [in the struggle] fully, find their commitment stretched to breaking point through irritation and anger at not being taken seriously, and frustration at not being allowed to make a contribution that is commensurate with their ability" (Ginwala 1990b: 7). Often the exasperation of women working in the ANC is only alluded to, however some instances

are quite clear. For example, Ginwala remarks in a paper, "If only half the views expressed by women when they talk among themselves could be aired at meetings where our men are present!!!" (Ginwala 1989: 7). One is left with the impression that women in the ANC had many grievances, but the discussion of them was limited in large part to meetings attended only by women.

As previously noted, the Women's League was disbanded when the ANC went into exile in 1960. According to Mavivi Manzini, who worked in the Women's Section in Lusaka, "the ANC felt that there should only be one organization in exile, and that we should carry out our work collectively" (Russell 1989: 127). The Women's Section (WS), established in 1981 at the behest of NEC member Gertrude Shope (Rantete 1998: 39), was a much less autonomous entity than its predecessor had been. Its leadership was appointed by ANC leaders, rather than elected, and it was beholden to the ANC in terms of its budget. Furthermore, it had no seats on the NEC and therefore no institutionalised power within the ANC ("An auxiliary" 1991: 29). Ginwala summarised the limitations of the WS as follows: "The Women's Section has no political programmes of its own. Every programme adopted by the women has to be 'endorsed by the [ANC] NEC'. At the end of the day if such an endorsement comes about — it is with amendments which completely dilute and change the content of the women's demands" (Ginwala 1989: 6).

Mavivi Manzini, interviewed while still in exile, had more confidence in the Section's ability to affect change within the ANC and eventually South Africa (Russell 1989: 129). Nevertheless she expressed her frustrations with the attitudes toward gender expressed by some of her comrades within the ANC. For example, she tells of the exasperation of Section workers when members miss WS meetings because of domestic

responsibilities that could be delegated or shared. She related: "...they say, 'I have to cook first,' or 'There's nobody to remain with the child,' and yet their husband is there in the house.. - Our men think that our place is in the kitchen. Even when our president, Oliver Tambo, says women's place is in the battlefield, the men don't readily accept this in practice" (Russell 1989: 130).

Women were on the battlefield as soldiers in the ANC's armed wing *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK), or Spear of the Nation. In her dissertation on MK, Lynda Von den Steinen recounts how the experiences of women soldiers were very different than those of their men comrades. She writes that being a woman in MK was often "frustrating, painful and disappointing" (1999: 211). Women soldiers were under-utilised, faced discrimination in deployment[11] and were excluded, with few exceptions, from leadership positions in the military. There was widespread sexual harassment and abuse within the camps and women were often treated as less than equal to men. For example, they were held solely responsible if they contracted STDs (Von den Steinen 1999: 196-202) and if they became pregnant they were "immediately demobilised" (Ginwala 1989: 9).

MI women soldiers were required to join the ANC Women's Section called *Umzana,* or small house (Ibid.: 207). This involved weekly meetings at which women were taught about the contributions of women to the struggle against apartheid, issued supplies and given the space to discuss their concerns and "any problems they might be encountering" (Ibid.: 205-206). This last objective did not prove useful because the Women's Section had no formal power within the ANC and was unable to influence the

[11] After receiving the same training as men cadres, many women were directed to take positions as secretaries or given other non-combat assignments. This frustrated many soldiers who did not have the requisite skills for secretarial work and wanted to do what they had been trained to do (Von den Steinen 1999: 208-212).

policies and practices of MK. Many women ended up feeling that the meetings were pointless — outside of securing stockings, cosmetics and sanitary pads. (Ibid.). Some women also wondered why, if the role of women in the struggle was so important, were men not also required to study this history? (Ibid.: 206).

Not all women report having problems during their time in MK and many found their experience in the military empowering. Nevertheless, when women did face serious difficulties, there was no recourse outside of the formal chain of command. The leadership within the camps and the Security Department were generally less than sensitive to the situation of women and were often complicit in, if not perpetrating, abuse (Ibid.: 196-198). Women members of MK faced disproportionate challenges because of their gender and the Women's Section did not provide a way to make substantive changes in policy or practice. Papers presented at the National Consultative Conference in 1985, the Women's Conference in 1987 and the Seminar on Women and Children in a Future Constitutional Order in 1989 all register complaints about the treatment of women in MK (Ibid 1999: 205-208; Ginwala 1989: 7). In 1989, it was still reported that "the status of women in our army [is] deplorable" (Ginwala 1989: 7). Furthermore, it was reported that 'The active involvement of women in combat operations has been almost negligible," the contentious issue of deployment remained (Ibid.)".

There is evidence of the frustration of women in the ANC during the transition as well. In *The Rock* an ANC periodical, veteran ANC/SACP activist and leader Thenjiwe

[u] Discrimination in deployment was unfair and frustrating for women soldiers, as mentioned above, but was also a missed opportunity for the armed struggle. Von den Steinen notes that, in a patriarchal society such as the South African one, women are often underestimated and "above suspicion." This means that women underground operatives had the potential to be highly effective. She points to the story of a white women in Pretoria who would simply ask to *use* the toilet at police stations and, after gaining access, plant bombs in them. She further notes the limitless potential of Black women operatives posing as domestic workers in the homes of police officers and politicians (1999: 180-181).

Mtintso wrote: "Now is the time for our movement to decisively act for the interests of non-sexism, women's advancement and emancipation. They have to elevate this matter from the position it takes in agendas of — 'any other business' to a decisive position at the top. It should not be an issue to offer our leadership 'light moments' for giggles during discussion of their serious business" (1993: 17). ANC member Jessie Duane describes the difficulties faced by women who try to raise issues in "male filled rooms" in an "opinion" printed in an ANC periodical (1993: 29). She advocates women's increased participation in the ANC, but wryly notes "It may not change the character of the tasks women perform in the Head Office of the ANC, as secretaries and the rocks of Gibraltar for the busy men... but women will be speaking for themselves" (Duarte 1993: 30). She goes on to charge that "It is very clear that women have not been elected in large numbers into branch or regional structures of the ANC, on the basis that they do not merit these positions, and yet, very young males, inexperienced in life and organisation, are readily given space to develop in these structures" (Ibid.: 31). The overall tone of Duarte's piece is one of exasperation.

When the ANC Women's League was re-launched in 1990, it was clear that the organisation was to have two purposes. The first, categorically affirmed at the meetings leading up to the re-launch and the actual event, was the mobilisation and organisation of women into the ANC-led struggle for liberation. The second, and newer, mandate was to place gender issues on the agenda of the ANC. The League's "special task" was "to ensure that women's emancipation is an integral part of national liberation" ("An auxiliary" 1991: 29). Many women, some acting as members of the League and others as members of organisations allied with the ANC, took up the challenge.

Polities of Negotiation

Negotiation politics gave women a new opportunity to make demands. Beginning in 1986, key constituencies (business leaders, students and even the government) began meeting with the ANC-in-exile. The politics of resistance increasingly became a politics of negotiation (Albertyn 1994). This shift, together with the legalisation of the ANC in 1990, created a space in which women could take up issues such as challenging their exclusion from decision-making positions. As national liberation approached, women began to put more emphasis on the importance of ensuring that women not be sidelined in the imminent transfer of political power. Catherine Albertyn, a legal expert and gender analyst, argues that the shift in ANC policy as expressed by the 1990 Statement on the Emancipation of Women was due in part to pressure from within the organisation, but "was also made possible by the different political context afforded by the legality of the organisation and by the shift from liberation to negotiation politics" (Albertyn 1994: 49). The negotiations and time of transition is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, *How the Quota Demand was Met.*

The Malibongwe Conference in the Netherlands, hosted by the Dutch Anti-Apartheid organisation, brought South African women from inside the country together with those in exile. Women from other parts of the world also participated in the conference. Malibongwe "brought South African activists together with comrades from Cuba, the Philippines and the PLO. Their experiences, combined with those of women in South Africa's neighbouring states, have provided crucial insights for South African women activists" (Hassim 1991: 66). One of the foremost concerns of the organisers, as

stressed in the pre-conference literature, was "the danger that women's liberation could be subsumed under the concerns of the national liberation struggle" (Singh 1990: 23). Shireen Hassim, a South African academic, argued "in the wake of the Malibongwe Conference, women (at least within the ANC) have felt more confident about criticising the domination of the organisation by men and the marginalisation of women from decision-making" (Hassim 1991: 66). One example of this is the reaction to the Constitutional Guidelines.

The ANC's Constitutional Guidelines, adopted in 1988, sparked a great deal of controversy both because of its silence on the issue of gender and because the Constitutional Committee that authored the Guidelines was made up exclusively of men (Bealle 1990: 8). The Constitutional Guidelines was arguably the most important policy document since the Freedom Charter and surprisingly, it "paid even less attention to the situation of women than its predecessor" (Albertyn 1994: 46). At the demand of some women ANC members, an internal seminar was held to discuss the Guidelines in terms of gender. Lulu Gwagwa participated in this seminar and recalls: "criticism came from amongst the women and it was very openly articulated, criticism of the Committee itself and of the Guidelines. So women started saying, how do we amend the guidelines so that they deal with issues of gender? And the seminar came out of that" (Bealle 1990: 8). The NEC's Statement on the Emancipation of Women came out of this six-day seminar attended by women and men (Ibid.).

This statement [13], released May 2nd 1990 (see Appendix A), was a breakthrough in ANC policy. It articulated the ANC goal of the emancipation of women and committed

[13] Formally called the *Statement of the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress on the Emancipation of Women in South Africa,* adopted on 2 May 1990.

the organisation to the use of affirmative action for women. It declares: "The experience of other societies has shown that the emancipation of women is not a by-product of a struggle for democracy, national liberation or socialism. It has to be addressed in its own right within our organisation, the mass democratic movement and in the society as a whole" (Appendix A 1990: 126). The Statement also acknowledged that the oppression of women is not only a consequence of colonisation and white domination, but is perpetuated by culture and tradition as well. It reaffirmed the ANC's pledge to treat women's liberation as central to the national struggle and called for the ANC Women's League to initiate the project of a Women's Charter for South Africa. Furthermore, it called upon women to "take the lead in creating a non-sexist South Africa" and "must move the ANC and the MDM to adopt policies and forms of organisation that facilitate the participation of women" (Ibid.). This ANC statement encouraged women to organise "on the basis of their own *self-defined* interests" (Hassim 1991: 66).

Conclusion

As illustrated from the above, the demands for women's emancipation within the ANC developed over time. The ANC's prioritisation of the struggle against racial and economic oppression contributed to a marginalisation of the struggle for gender equity within the ANC. Issues specific to women were not fully integrated into the ANC's struggle and there was insufficient self analysis of its own organisational culture in terms of gender. In the mid-1980s, ANC women intensified their demands that women's emancipation be treated as central to the struggle for national liberation. One of the goals identified by those struggling for gender equality was women's increased presence in

decision-making positions. Advocates of gender equality secured a strong policy commitment from the ANC in the 1990 "Statement on the Emancipation of Women." This statement provided a valuable tool for women's advocates, working both within the ANC and outside of the organization. This is because they were able to hold the ANC accountable to the commitments made in the statement. Finally, it is important to see the demands made by women ANC members in the transition against the backdrop of their consistent and substantial contributions to both the ANC itself and to the general struggle for freedom in South Africa (Walker 1991). This history provided some of the leverage used by women ANC members when they made demands to be represented in the leadership of their organization and their country.

CHAPTER THREE

ANC Women Demand an Internal Quota

The growing demands of women within the ANC were voiced at the ANC's 48 ⁶ National Conference in July 1991. At this conference, entitled "Transfer of Power to the People for a Democratic Future", women within the organisation attempted to secure the 30% quota for women on the NEC of the ANC (Rantete 1998: 66).

The quota was not accepted by the Conference; however, its proposal and the debate that ensued constitute a major watershed for gender relations in the ANC. The Women's League put the issue of gender discrimination squarely on the agenda as part of the project of ensuring that the status of all women improve in the new South Africa. Also, the conference proceedings illustrate the actual status quo in the organisation *vis-a-vis* its collective understanding and prioritisation of women's emancipation, as well as the use of affirmative action to further that goal. In so doing, it highlighted the controversial nature of a gender quota at that time. Finally, the event is instructive in terms of understanding the subsequent activities of the ANCWL during negotiations and in the run-up to the elections in 1994. It was in every sense a turning point in women's struggle for emancipation within the ANC and for women in the new South Africa as a whole and will form the focus of the undermentioned discussion.

The NEC Quota Debate

One of the most important tasks of the ANC's 48th National Conference was the adoption of a new constitution for the organisation. When the ANC was banned in 1960, it became impossible to convene national conferences and its 1958 constitution was "suspended" while the organisation was in exile (Russell 1989: 128). The drafting of a new constitution gave the Women's League an opportunity to lobby for some mechanisms to promote the advancement of women within the organisation. They were answering the call issued in the Statement of the ANC NEC on the Emancipation of Women in South Africa to take the "lead in creating a non-sexist South Africa". The NEC statement went on to say that women "must move the ANC and the MDM [Mass Democratic Movement] to adopt policies and forms of organisation that facilitate the participation of women in the struggle that still lies before us" (Appendix A 1990: 88). Ironically, however, a proposal made by the ANC Women's League, that would require women to hold at least 30% of the 50 seats on the NEC, generated a "major debate at the conference" (Fine 1991: 20). This debate spanned two days of the total six days of the conference and was of major significance for issues of women's emancipation as well as democratic practice within the ANC (Rantete 1998: 42).

Some ANC members while still in exile had begun to debate quotas as a mechanism for increasing women's presence in leadership (Torok 1991: 9). The Women's Section had actually secured support "in principle" from the ANC leadership for a 30% quota in all of the ANC's internal structures (Geisler 2000: 611). The formal recommendation of a quota for women came out of the first conference of the newly re-launched ANC Women's League held in Kimberley in April 1991 (Rantete 1998: 40-41).

At this conference a resolution was taken to reject a proposal by the NEC, which would require at least 17% of the NEC seats to be held by women, in favour of a recommendation that as much as 30% be reserved (Rantete 1998: 78, Turok 1991: 76). This figure was informed by international research that holds that women must constitute a "critical minority" of 30-40% of a body for them to begin to be effectual and represented in legislatures and committees (Dahlerup 1998: 92). As indicated in the previous chapter, Women's League members had witnessed their counterparts in newly independent countries gain only token representation in the governments they had fought to bring to power (Russell 1989: 128). They were determined to prevent this from happening in South Africa. One way to guard against this was to ensure that women were well represented at all levels of decision-making within the ANC, in negotiations and ultimately in the new South African government.

The ANC NEC accepted the League's proposal for a quota that would require that a minimum of 30% of the 50 people directly elected to the NEC be women, and brought the proposal to the conference (Fine 1991: 20). Because this proposal related to the new ANC Constitution, it was first made in the Constitutional Commission. This step is where it first became clear that the proposal would not be easily accepted. The Commission in fact ended up suggesting to the conference that the quota be dropped (Turok 1991: 9). However, in reading the delegate report by Derrick Fine, who sat on the Constitutional Commission, it is clear that the decision to drop the quota was not generally agreed upon within that body and was in fact taken by only a few members, ostensibly for the sake of unity. Fine reports that, although the proposed amendment to the constitution had enjoyed consensus at the inter-regional preparatory conference, once

it was suggested at the national one it created much controversy. It generated many debates within the Commission, whose members were unable to reach a consensus. They decided that the issue would have to be put to the general conference for debate and decision, and then broke for lunch.

> Amazingly, after lunch the commission facilitators (Western Cape REC members Bulelani Ngcuka and Dullah Omar) bulldozed through a complete turnabout position that we should drop the 30% proposal and go to conference with a proposal that 'all structures of the ANC shall take steps to ensure that gender discrimination in our structures shall be adequately addressed'. Since a decision had been made before lunch, various Women's League reps were now conveniently no longer present. It was quite obvious that this was a thinly veiled attempt to diffuse the issue and prevent a major debate on the Conference floor.
>
> Thankfully, this attempt to avoid open debate failed miserably, even though cde [Comrade] Omar inaccurately presented the compromise as a consensus position! (Fine 1991: 21)

The attempt to drop the divisive issue was typical of how women's demands had been dealt with in the ANC in the past. Thandi Modise later said that a positive outcome of the incident was that women did not back down, but instead pressed the issue. "It was the first time that women stood up and said 'we want this discussed' (Daniels 1991: 24). Although some representatives from the Constitutional Commission had tried to avoid open debate on the quota issue and presented a compromise, delegates did not allow this to happen, and thus a spirited and at times mucous two-hour debate ensued. The

emphatic rejection of the attempt to put the issue of a gender quota aside demonstrates a revitalised commitment to the pursuit of women's advancement and an awareness that Mow is the time' for action.

"One after another women leaders, young and old, stood up to demand that the organisation honour its commitment to women" (Turok 1991: 9). Women and men spoke strongly in favour of the quota in the debate that ensued. Opponents maintained that gender should not be considered in the election of NEC members. The proponents laid out the basic arguments used for affirmative action. They spoke of the "social and structural constraints within the society which inhibited women's participation" in politics and the need to address them (Rantete 1998: 42). "The lobby against the quota was led by cde Tenor Lekota. Important contributions in favour of the quota came from cdes Thenjiwe Mtintso, Pat nom, Rader Asmal, Barbara Masekela, Geraldine Fraser and Ivy Matsepe" (Fine 1991: 21). Derrick Fine, who also spoke in support of the quota, recorded the major arguments made in the debate in his report which are quoted in full hereunder:

The main arguments against the quota were:

- It goes against the principle of merit and is tokenism;
- We must rather start at grassroots level and do lots of groundwork first;
- This is undemocratic and entrenches minority group rights;
- We need a 'strong National Exec';
- This issue is divisive and must wait until 'the people have power';
- People must be elected as ANC members not women;
- Affirmative action is okay but this is the wrong mechanism;
- This ignores 'cultural barriers'.

The main arguments for a quota were:

- It is not a case of affirmative action or merit — the one goes with the other;
- If a quota is not spelt out, strong women's representation will not happen;
- It's already been tried at grassroots level;
- It is symbolic to have a quota at national level;
- We need the quota at all levels, not one or the other;
- The ANC must be prepared to implement internally what it preaches publicly;
- Such a move would pave the way for a new democratic administration and for broader affirmative action;
- Women [in general society] are the majority not a minority group, but in this Conference it is the other way around.

(Fine 1991: 21-22)

Overall, the arguments made by both the proponents and the opponents of the quota were more about disagreement on the need for, and value of, women's inclusion in the leadership of the ANC than the specific mechanism of a quota to ensure that it in fact happen. Particular concern was expressed over the entrenchment of minority group rights. Though women were quick to point out that they are in fact in numerical majority, the idea of group rights or group interests was very unpopular. Some delegates may have felt that the issue was too close to what the NP government was advocating in terms of race.

Many of the arguments made against the quota revealed "men's opposition to women's political roles" (Rantete 1998: 42). Some of the statements appear to have been informed by prejudice. For example the argument, "we need a strong national exec" implies that an NEC with a membership of 30% women would probably be a weak body

and assumes that a national executive made up of men would necessarily be a competent and successful one.

Another concern was portrayed as an issue of the principle of merit. This was set up in opposition to "preference" and stated that members of the NEC should be elected by virtue of merit with no other considerations. According to a newspaper report: "most delegates... think that any quota system is abhorrent, and that leaders should be elected on merit alone" (Gevisser & Van Niekerk 1991: 4). This sentiment was proved to contain, at least in part, a gender bias. The very next constitutional proposal on the agenda at the conference called for reserved seats for a number of MK commanders on the NEC. This proposal was unanimously accepted. "Nobody objected on the basis of merit or democracy... The ease with which the conference agreed to create automatic posts for military commanders from the very male-dominated MK, contrasted starkly with the desperate resistance of delegates against a quota for women" (Horn 1991: 37).

By all accounts the debate proceedings were passionate and action-packed. While arguments were made on the conference floor, there was much caucusing amongst the leadership on the stage. After some time a new compromise position was put to the delegates. It was a stronger one than was initially offered by the Constitutional Commission and read: "In an endeavour to ensure that women are adequately represented in all decision-making structures, the ANC shall implement a programme of affirmative action. The method of such implementation shall be addressed in all structures immediately and on a continual basis, including the fixing of quotas, striving towards an initial minimum of 30%" (Fine 1991: 22). Surprisingly, according to Fine's report, WL President Gertrude Shope "then rejected the compromise which she had

appeared to be part of drawing up" (Ibid.). It was not clear what her justification was for this rejection, however it was clear once this compromise failed that the delegates would not reach an agreement.

"Amidst much confusion" Joe Slovo, head of the South African Communist Party, who had been "struggling" to chair the debate, brought the issue to a vote. The votes against the quota were taken first and it is estimated by delegates at the conference that a majority of hands were raised (Ibid., Turok 1991: 9). Then, an unidentified Women's League member announced from the floor that the League would abstain from the vote (Rantete 1998: 42, Fine 1991: 22). At this point Slovo "abandoned the chair to consult with ANC and ANCWL leadership" (Horn 1991: 37). While Slovo, Mandela, Shope and other leaders were in a huddle, "general chaos" reigned on the floor (Fine 1991: 22). Women began a song in support of the quota and drew many men into their toyi-toyi, including some that had just voted against the quota! (Rantete 1998: 42, Horn 1991: 37). This contradictory behaviour could have been a response to the intervention by the ANC leadership, which stopped the democratic process of the vote.

A break was called for supper, during which time the NEC had an emergency meeting. Also, all of the women delegates were invited to a women's caucus, which apparently proved inconclusive (Fine 1991: 23). The conference reconvened three hours later, and Nelson Mandela — then vice-president of the ANC — addressed the delegates. He noted that the issue of the quota for women was one of principle and one on which the conference was very divided. He requested therefore that the matter of the quota be abandoned for the sake of unity in order to allow the NECs of the ANC, ANCWL and ANC Youth League to work out a solution. Whatever agreement they came to would be

presented to the conference the next morning (Fine 1991: 23). Patrick "Terror" Lekota, and Andrew Maphetho in particular challenged this request. They objected on the grounds that "the conference was the most authoritative decision-making body, and called for the voting to continue" (Rantete 1998: 42). Lekota also charged that the Women's League was holding the conference to ransom and that this would set a dangerous precedent. Only after a personal appeal made by Mandela to Lekota, did he withdraw his objection (Fine 1991: 23).

Lekota's "challenge to the leadership's autocratic decision making" highlighted tensions that existed at the time between the leadership and the rank and file of the ANC (Rantete 1998: 42). Months later in an article regarding the conference, Pat Horn, a proponent of the quota, suggested that some of the moral high ground enjoyed by those in favour of the quota was lost with Mandela's request. She argued that when Mandela asked that the delegates, on behalf of the Women's League, allow the NECs to settle the issue instead of the conference, he was actually requesting a body with more authority to defer to a less representative one. Horn warned that "the women's emancipation struggle cannot afford to be perceived to be in opposition to the struggle for democratisation of South African society" (1991: 37).

The next morning, ANCWL President Gertrude Shope announced to the conference that the League had decided not to meet with the other NECs and would withdraw their proposal of the 30% quota. She explained that this decision was taken for the sake of unity. Shope apologised to the delegates for the delay that had been caused by the debate and "for the fact that the Women's League had not done enough grassroots education around the need for affirmative action before the Conference" (Fine 1991: 23).

Basically, she admitted that the WL had made an error in judgment. Then Baleka Kgositsile, Secretary of the ANC WL, read a statement to the delegates as follows:

> The ANC Women's League views with regret the developments that led to the adjournment of conference yesterday. Further we wish to underline that is in the interests of the unity of our movement at a critical time that we have decided to make this statement to conference.
>
> The significance of the debate and the gravity of the political lessons to be drawn from it cannot be overemphasised.
>
> It must be noted that the full meaning of the voting yesterday was not about whether or not women are going to be elected to the NEC of the ANC. It was about how much we understand and believe in the principle of affirmative action. The National Consultative Conference of December 1990 committed this movement to this whole principle. However, we need to revisit the matter by way of intensive political education around this method of intervention we will have to employ — not only in favour of women — but also in favour of millions of our black people who have been exploited and oppressed by apartheid tyranny.
>
> The political problem we have with the fact that the matter was taken to a vote is that the exercise constituted a fundamental deviation from a principled position. It implied the possibility of an outcome we would have lived to regret for many years to come in the history of the liberation struggle in this country.
>
> Thousands of women of all races look up to the African National Congress to bring profound change in this country. We have had the privilege to learn from many independent countries that this profound change can only be brought about by the employment of deliberate conscious mechanisms at branch, regional and national levels. Clearly there's a need to workshop these matters in our ranks in order that our

> next conference can be better prepared to lead this country to true liberation for all our people.
>
> The ANC Women's League will continue to work hard for the improvement of the status and promotion of our women. We will continue to see to it that the African National Congress and indeed the future South Africa becomes stronger and richer by not marginalising women.
>
> We believe we have made our point and cannot take the matter further at this juncture. Whatever the conclusion around the relevant sentence in the Draft Constitution, we will emerge stronger. Comrade Chair, we propose — for the sake of progress — that this matter be closed. (ANCWL 1991b)

Despite the fact that some people at the conference understood the statement to be an apology for bringing up the issue of a quota, it was not so (Horn 1991: 37). The League apologised only for neglecting to do enough groundwork to secure the support needed and prevent the fervent and time-consuming debate (Fine 1991: 23, Turok 1991: 9, Horn 1991: 37). Its statement pointed to the fact that the ANC had committed itself to the principle of affirmative action and reminded delegates that this was the same policy expected to be used for Black people. It also implied that it would be hypocritical for a person to support affirmative action for race but object to its use based on gender.

The emphasis in the statement on the "thousands of women of all races" who look to the ANC for change hinted at how much support the ANC could enjoy from women. It could also imply that, because the WL did not see the conference as providing enough leadership in the struggle for the "true liberation for all our people", these thousands of women might look to another organisation that did. The League announced that it would

step up efforts to educate and make sure that the ANC did provide leadership by not marginalising women. They left the issue because they could not take it further "at this juncture", which indicates an intention to bring it up at another one.

Though it was clearly a regrettable situation, many people noted the positive results of the debate. Gender oppression was highlighted for the first time, being exposed as a reality and rigorously debated. It also gave many women the opportunity to speak and be heard and it is asserted that the "consciousness" of some delegates was raised (Horn 1991: 37). In the end, 18% (9 out of 50) of the newly elected NEC members were women. Of the 126 candidates for election to the NEC, 30 were women (Fine 1991: 25).

Lessons Learned

The Women's League's statement asserted that the lessons to be gained from the debate could not be "overemphasised". They learned that they needed to do much more educating and lobbying on gender concerns at the grassroots level, that they needed a clear strategy when taking up issues and making proposals, and lastly that they needed political power. These realisations had significant impacts on the attitudes and actions of those concerned with the status of women within the ANC and South Africa as a whole.

"The most obvious lesson to be drawn from this experience" wrote Pat Horn, "is that women still have a substantial amount of work to do in order to popularise affirmative action programmes, and in creating an awareness among men and women activists of gender oppression and the need to fight against it" (1991: 37). Both the membership and leadership of the WL seem to have over-estimated the awareness of the ANC membership of gender oppression. "Contrary to their expectations, league members

discovered during the debate the extent to which ANC men, including the leadership, had been paying lip-service to women's concerns" (Rantete 1998: 42).

Any tension that ANC women felt between working for "national liberation" and "women's liberation" had usually resulted in the gender struggle losing out. Despite the NEC's Statement on the Emancipation of Women, when the Women's League was re-launched, it prioritised recruiting for the ANC over aggressively campaigning for women's emancipation (Hassim 1991: 67). The neglect of political education on the use of affirmative action for women was apparent. Even the endorsement of the leadership and the fact that it was in line with ANC policy were not enough to outweigh what Derrick Fine described as the "male chauvinism and traditional views" which remain "very deeply rooted in our membership" (1991: 24). It was clear that these attitudes needed to be challenged and changed at grassroots level if women were to enjoy equality with men in the ANC.

The second important lesson was the need for a clear strategy. The ANCWL's plan going into the conference appears to have been a reliance on the endorsement of the ANC leadership and some advocacy work on the part of League representatives. There did not seem to be a contingency plan. The most striking evidence of this was the fact that President Shope rejected a compromise resolution that was much stronger than the one that was finally incorporated into the new constitution." This might have been avoided if the quota advocates had been better prepared (although they probably could

[14] Shortly after the WL read its statement requesting that the matter be closed, the PWV region proposed a compromise resolution. It basically recommitted the ANC to the principle of non-sexism, called for steps to be taken to increase the representation of women, called for a national programme of affirmative action and encouraged all ANC structures to put gender issues on the agenda (Fine 1991:24). This resolution was accepted without discussion or objection and amounted to a recommitment to existing ANC policy.

not have anticipated how controversial the proposal for an NEC quota would be), and if they had been able to work more effectively in the women's caucus at the conference. Fine added that there was no forum provided for men who supported the quota to strategise on the issue (1991: 24).

The third major lesson from the debate was that women needed to gain political leverage, or power. Men — 83% men and 17% women — were the overwhelming majority at the conference and although the issue did not fall completely on gender lines, most men opposed it. Pat Horn, in her analysis of the issue, concluded that men should not be counted on in gender struggles. Indeed, women needed to have more than the mere 17% representation, which they had at that time (Rantete 1998: 42). "Not one member of the ANC NEC, which had accepted the proposal for a 30% quota, intervened in the debate to indicate the NEC's support for the issue... (The NEC) showed that it was prepared to blow in the wind on this issue. Next time this needs to be anticipated" (Horn 1991: 37). She maintained that it was "a strategic error to rely on the power of the NEC, or powerful individuals within it". She further argued that the League should instead focus on getting the support of the "more democratic (albeit more conservative) conference structures" (Ibid.). She maintains that women should welcome and encourage men's support of gender struggles, but should not depend on it. The experience in the conference proved that the acceptance of leadership is not enough.

The people working in the Women's League learned from this experience. After the national conference, the ANCWL membership intensified their work to "instill gender consciousness into the organisation at national and regional level" ("The policy guidelines" 1992: 11). They also agitated for the long awaited ANC Corumission on the

Emancipation of Women to be formed. It was finally created and, with its specific mandate to work on the emancipation of women, it did not have to prioritise differing objectives as had been the case for the ANCWL (Daniels 1992b: 22). Formation of the Commission put women's emancipation squarely on the agenda of the ANC proper. The issue was no longer being handled off in the Women's League. There were women and men on the Commission and gender was the concern of everyone, not just women.

The Women's League met before the 1992 National Policy Conference to discuss changes to the draft policy document and to strategise about how best to approach making them. They sent a sizable contingent to the conference and made sure that each commission had at least one member of their delegation in it who would raise their concerns and make recommendations. ANC women who came as part of regional delegations, not specifically as Women's League representatives, also helped by taking up or backing League proposals. There were daily caucus meetings at which women reported back from their respective commissions and, if necessary, new strategies were devised ("The policy guidelines" 1992: 11). Not only did these efforts bear fruit in terms of the content of the Policy Guidelines, but they also increased the awareness of gender issues among delegates. An ANC periodical reported: "So attuned did Conference become to terms like 'affirmative action' and 'gender consciousness' that at one point a delegate who suggested the word 'gender' was not really relevant in a particular context was booed" (Ibid.).

Conclusion

The content of the quota debate at the 48th ANC Conference and its outcome underscored the need for heightened awareness and understanding of sexism if there was to be gender equity among decision-makers within the organisation. The commitment made to the use of affirmative action for women in the ANC Statement on the Emancipation of Women, the support of the NEC and the attention brought to the issue in the lengthy debate proved insufficient to push through the quota policy at that time.

Pat Horn observed that the proportion of women elected mirrored the 17% presence of women at the conference. She suggested "women will never get 50% [presence on the NEC] until they are that percentage of the delegates" and advised gender advocates to step up work within the ANC, not just by lobbying the leadership, but also at the grassroots level. (Horn 1991: 37). It was clear that there was much work to be done if the membership of the ANC was to reach a point where they collectively considered women's political participation important and a priority. She did however, acknowledge that this would take a long time, and therefore concluded that affirmative action was needed to increase the numbers of women delegates. Seeing such lack of support among the rank and file, noting that the leadership would "blow in the wind" and understanding that the "window of opportunity would be missed" in the time it would take to "conscientise" the rank and file, quota advocates realised that they needed a new constituency to provide them with power. It was not until the Mafikeng Conference in 1997 that the ANC made a constitutional amendment to provide for a 30% gender quota in all structures (ANC 2000: 7).

Women felt let down — and moreover betrayed. Thandi Modise later commented: "there were men at the conference and in leadership positions who had previously spouted all the right *rhetoric,* but when it came to the quota debate at a conference, where the majority were men, they were the ones who influenced and swayed the debate to the disfavour of the women" (Daniels 1991: 25). The experience served to further radicalise those individuals who were concerned with gender parity within the organisation. It also demonstrated that advocates needed to develop new strategies in order to make the ANC statements about women's equality and emancipation a reality.

The debate showed how ready some members and leadership were to abandon an issue if it was not popular or if it divided the movement into gender-camps. According to Dale McKinley, this conference was particularly marked by a "reaffirmation of a united-front perspective" (McKinley 1997: 118). This is specifically played out in the quota debate. First with the attempt of some members of the Constitutional Commission to circumvent division within the ANC by dropping the quota proposal, then by leadership not allowing the vote on the proposal to continue, and finally, with the WL's withdrawing of the proposed quota for the sake of unity. However, things would change. Mandela, in his closing speech, stated that one of the most important debates of the conference had been that of the quota. This is because it dealt with a "fundamental principle" of the ANC and allied organisations. He concluded: "I can say with all confidence that after that debate, and after the women had demonstrated their intensity of feeling on this issue, the ANC will never be the same" (Fine 1991: 4, Turok 1991: 9). Many women left the conference determined that it not be.

CHAPTER FOUR

How the Quota Demand was met

The electoral quota adopted at the end of 1993 was different than the one debated at the 1991 conference. The differences between these two quotas, while significant, do not, on their own, account for the rejection of the first and the acceptance of the second. The quota-friendly electoral context provided by the elections was complemented by the fact that South Africa's political landscape had changed by late 1993. Women, in the time of transition, forced their way into the constitutional negotiations, made an impact on the outcome of a critical rights issue in the negotiations, and ensured that gender was a topic at least addressed by the major political parties in the run-up to the 1994 elections. South African women had successfully demonstrated power as a "women's constituency." In the run-up to the elections, a group of women within the ANC demanded that the leadership give more than lip-service to women's issues. They wanted concrete reasons why women should vote for the ANC. Their pressure was bolstered by the existence of a strong coalition of South African women.

ANC Women Consolidate their Power

The knowledge that policy does not necessarily translate into practice was reinforced for ANC women after the quota debate at the 48th Conference. It was clear that something more than a rhetorical commitment was needed in order to ensure that women would not

continue to be excluded from decision-making positions. In a discussion of the ANC's Statement on the Emancipation of Women, Frene Ginwala maintained:

> Statements like this one by the ANC have normative value. They set a commitment, but to actually have it implemented needs power. I mean politics is about power and women's liberation is about power. Unless we can empower women organisationally, we can't liberate ourselves (Bealle 1990: 14).

Ginwala envisioned a broad-based coalition of women's organisations that would "empower women." She explained:

> I believe we need an organisation to which we would bring all women, and women's organisations which do not necessarily subscribe to particular ANC positions. It could include issue based organisations, such as around abortion, or it could include religious women's organisations. I think eventually we have to bring them all together. The extent to which we are able to do that and that body is strong, will allow us to empower women. It will allow us to force decisions in our favour when it comes to the either or situation, in a budget debate or anything else (Ibid.).

The Women's National Coalition (WNC) filled this need. The Coalition was initiated by the ANC Women's League at a meeting of 40 women's organisations, just two months after the ANC's 48th Conference (Rantete 1998: 43). Its mandate was to co-ordinate the compilation of a Women's Charter (to be used in the drafting of South Africa's new constitution) and to ensure the participation of women in the transition to democracy

(Meintjes 1992: 17; Manicom 1996: 50). The WNC was formally launched in April 1992 and ultimately enjoyed a membership of "92 national organisations and 13 regional coalitions, covering most political parties, rural women's organisations, and religious and professional organisations" (Geisler 2000: 613).

The WNC was a locus of political power for women as a group during the transition's. Though many of the affiliated groups had disparate values and priorities, they were allied in their "fight against exclusion [from the political process] and for the legitimacy of their participation as women and their claims for equality" (Albertyn 1994: 50). "Experience elsewhere as well as in South Africa suggests that women organize and mobilize more effectively when there are short term, clear objectives" (Manicom 1996: 50). This exclusion presented a clear obstacle to be overcome and made it easier for women to organise across differences.

The size and diversity and strength of the WNC made it an invaluable alliance for women. It had the ability to speak for a large cross section of South African women, which provided power for women's advocates in the time of transition. The coalitions diversity also served as a constraint. Its internal differences required the organisation to remain non-political and prevented it from taking positions on potentially divisive issues (Geisler 2000: 615). After the elections, this diversity, the country's changed political climate and the withdrawal of some major members, including the ANCWL (Connell 1998: 199) rendered the WNC unsustainable.

[15] Many women's organisations were formed in the run-up to the election. The Women's Lobby, the Women's Alliance and even a women's political party called "Women's Rights and Peace Party" (Ballington 1998: 2, 16). However, the WNC was the most prominent and influential.

Women and Negotiations

Many ANC women members, particularly those in exile, learned a great deal through witnessing the experiences of other societies. They learned that the transition to democracy provided a "unique window of opportunity" in which women should "press harder and demand a future that is non-sexist" (Manzini 1992: 4). They saw the transition as an opportunity to lay the groundwork for radical change in the lives of South African women. However, they also appreciated that the transition posed the threat of further entrenching sexist norms. There was an understanding that once a new order had been established, it would be much more difficult to make changes to it. Shireen Hassim notes that the spaces created in times of transition, which allow excluded groups to challenge their exclusion, are "short-lived." And, "as structures are established and processes become increasingly rigidified, these spaces disappear and the marginalisation of women again becomes entrenched" (1991: 67). People in the ANC concerned with gender justice maintained that definitive progress should be made before the transition, "while the ANC and its allies are still on their own before they are swamped in a `government of national unity' that is likely to have all sorts of backward and chauvinistic elements" (Mtintso 1993: 17).

The media reflected this feeling and warned: "ground lost now in the fertile period of negotiation and constitution writing will not easily be regained. Doors not opened now will remain closed for a long time to come, as the plight of women in Zimbabwe and Namibia shows" ("The ultimate boys' game" 1993: 4). A Zimbabwean woman deputy minister recalls: "we did not get our act together, we should have really tried hard, because it is much better to push what you want during the transitional period,

before you are starting, before people get used to certain ways, when you still have the fever of victory... We thought that we fought, that we won, and that is it" (Geisler 2000: 606-607). In an ANC publication Thenjiwe Mtintso pointed out that in Namibia, despite the fact that there had always been a Women's Council similar to the ANC's Women's League, women were "conspicuously absent in the Constituent Assembly and there is now only one woman minister" (1993: 16).

The fears of being sidelined at the time of "liberation" which had been expressed by many women in the struggle were realised with the start of formal constitutional negotiations. The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), which opened in 1992, had a negligible number of women delegates. Less than 6% (23 out of 400) of the delegates with speaking and voting rights at the Convention were women (Geisler 2000: 613). Helen Suzman, a liberal political veteran from the Democratic Party and one of the few women delegates with speaking rights, brought attention to the extreme lack of women at the outset of the convention (Friedman 1993: 129). The other women delegates also took up the issue, as did women within the respective negotiating parties (Daniels 19926: 16). There were also an "unprecedented" number of protest letters sent to the Management Committee from individuals and groups in the general public (Albertyn 1994: 54).

The Women's League of the ANC was particularly vociferous in its criticism of the lack of women at CODESA. Despite the progressive Statement on the Emancipation of Women, the ANC's delegation was no exception to the general lack of women. Of the 20 ANC representatives active in CODESA's working groups only 3 were women and none of them had speaking rights in the plenary (Rantete 1998: 174; "League calls for"

1992: 3). There were still no formal mechanisms that ensured women had significant roles within the ANC or the negotiations. The League prevailed upon the ANC leadership to lobby for the addition of gender advisory groups to CODESA structures and to increase the number of women in its delegation. The League also sent written objections to CODESA's Management Committee ("Codesa forms gender" 1992: 16; Daniels 19926: 16). They argued that without the participation of gender experts and women, the people designing the country's future constitution would create a document that lacked gender sensitivity and overlooked a number of the specific needs of women. Not all women ANC leaders agreed with the WL's position. Cheryl Carolus, one of two women on the National Working Committee at the time, called the League's proposed inclusion of a gender advisory group a "short cut" ("Cheryl challenges" 1992: 3). She encouraged women within the ANC to work through the branches of the organization to get their mandate from the grass-roots level (Ibid.).

In response to the pressure, CODESA's Management Committee provided for the creation of the Gender Advisory Committee (GAC). The GAC's membership was restricted to women and its brief was to "examine CODESA's terms of reference and the minutes and decisions of the MC [Management Committee] and working groups to advise the convention on their 'gender implications' (Friedman 1993: 129). Despite the disadvantages of having many participants who were unfamiliar with the subject matter, some who did not even bother to attend meetings and very limited support from the major parties in CODESA (Ibid.: 131), the GAC's members were able to work together across partisan lines and produce a report. However, CODESA's collapse in mid 1992

[16] The NWC is a small executive within the NEC, which reports to that body, that does most of the day to day running of the ANC (Rantete 1998: 12).

prohibited the GAC from formally presenting its report. Observers and participants disagree about the Committee's achievements and impact, but "they do agree that, despite the symbolic importance of its appointment, its brief history shows how far the country's major political actors are from giving gender discrimination and equality sustained attention" (Ibid.: 135).

When negotiations recommenced in the form of the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP), the numbers of women participants were again extremely low (Albertyn 1994: 54). This was despite the outcry over CODESA's lack of women participants, the formation of the GAC and a plea on the part of the MPNP management that parties attending the talks make sure that their delegations included some women. Again, the blatant exclusion of women from the negotiations prompted protests and served to further galvanise efforts to demand their inclusion. Written objections poured in and a mass demonstration was held outside of the meeting venue in April 1993 (Manicom 1996: 46). The Negotiating Council finally, after rejecting a proposal made by the ANC's Cyril Ramaphosa (Manzini 1993: 17), called for a meeting of women representatives from the 26 parties, organisations and governments to discuss the lack of women. A suggestion made by representatives from the Inkatha Freedom Party Women's Brigade was taken up. Each delegation to the Negotiating Council was expanded to allow for an additional seat with full delegate status to be filled by a woman[17] (Albertyn 1994: 54-55). Eventually, at least one woman was added to each technical committee as well (Ibid.). At very least, the equal presence of women on the

[17] The caption of a photograph taken of the negotiators and printed in an ANC journal reads "Next to every delegate is a man — the changing face of multi-party negotiations" (Manzini 1993a: 17).

Negotiation Council (each delegation had two members) can be seen to have given credence to, and increased the legitimacy of the process.

Various factors worked against the abilities of the women delegates to impact the decisions made at the MPNP. They included: lack of experience with the highly-technical nature of the work and related jargon, exclusion from informal networks, and the fact that many important decisions were made in the Technical Committees or in closed bilateral talks between the ANC and the government (Ibid.). Nevertheless, there was at least one situation in which women delegates significantly affected the outcome of the negotiations. Chief Nonkonyana, a member of a traditional leader's delegation, took issue with the stipulation of gender equality in the Bill of Rights and proposed that customary law be excluded from its ambit". For the majority of South African women who live under customary law, accepting his proposed provision would have rendered their new constitutional right to gender equality potentially meaningless. It is not surprising that the traditional leaders made this appeal nor is it unexpected that most of the parties to the negotiations were not particularly troubled by it. What *is* surprising is that the ANC, an organisation that had long stood for "non-sexism" and that had recently published the Statement on the Emancipation of Women, did not dismiss it outright.

The issue prompted a rigorous and fairly bipartisan fight against a compromise that would have substantially weakened the Bill of Rights in the interim constitution (Ibid.: 57-59). Many women delegates, with very little support from their respective parties, opposed the proposed exclusion of customary law on the grounds that it would jeopardise the right to equality for all women. Working through the Women's Caucus of

[ER] Outside of the negotiations he expressed concern that his daughter, who was first born, would be able to challenge his son for the throne under the new Bill of Rights (Albertyn 1994: 58).

the MPNP they convinced some women delegates from other parties that were supporting the chiefs to cross over to their side. They also called on the WNC to put external pressure on the MPNP and for women's organisations to lodge statements opposing the exception. Princess Stella Sigcau, a traditional leader herself, had initially raised the controversial issue of customary law's oppression of women in the Negotiating Council ("The ultimate boys' game" 1993: 4). She also publicly supported the idea that gender equality should apply to women living under customary law. Accordingly, she refused to participate in the debate as she disagreed with her delegation, the Cape Traditional Leaders (Albertyn 1994: 58). A group of women from rural areas, likely to be subjected to customary law, also provided strategic support for women negotiators at the MPNP when they staged a protest outside of the negotiation venue against the entrenchment of customary law (Ibid.: 59; Manicom 1996: 52).

Moral pressure on this issue was applied to all parties, but was particularly directed at the ANC (Albertyn 1994: 59). Gender advocates saw that this was the time to hold the ANC accountable to their principles and point to the Statement on the Emancipation of Women as "ANC policy." The real breakthrough for this rights issue came when ANC women were finally able to convince the party to reject a compromise clause that had been presented to both sides, and to take the issue to bilateral meetings with the National Party (NP). At these meetings, the ANC was able to persuade the NP to reject the clause and it was thus left out of the constitution.

The *Negotiation News* proclaimed that as a result of "the consistent intervention of the handful of women in the Negotiating Council and on technical committees and a fledgling women's movement outside", the interim constitution did not give customary

law any exemption from the Bill of Rights ("Women give chagrined' 1993: 2). Advocates of gender equality secured commensurate commitments to race and gender equality both in the preamble to the constitution and in its principles; and all of the documents were written in gender neutral language. Though ambiguity remains regarding the interaction between customary law and the Bill of Rights, women prevented a customary law trump that both the ANC and the NP would have waved through (Albertyn 1994: 60-61; Geisler 2000: 614).

Judith Lorber, a gender theorist, contends that it is common after successful revolutions for the new governments in order to consolidate power to pursue relationships with groups that opposed the revolution. She argues that it is also common for commitments made to participant groups to be given up in order to secure the support of these anti-revolutionary forces and that this is particularly common in the case of commitments made to women (Lorber 1994: 279). This appears to be what happened in this instance in South Africa. The chiefs constituted an important source of political support, particularly in the rural areas, and would therefore be powerful allies in the election and the new government. This explains why the ANC did not immediately reject this clause excluding customary law (Albertyn 1994: 57). Political considerations seemed to have outweighed a commitment to human equality, and it proved particularly crucial that women were there and able to participate with full delegate status.

The outside pressure provided by the WNC and civil society may have had a limited effect on the negotiators due to the "technical and elitist nature of the MPNP" (Albertyn 1994: 59). According to Elsabe Wessels, a WNC monitor at the negotiations, the involvement of the WNC had tremendous political significance. Wessels argues that

before the WNC's involvement, "the delegations had not been conscious of any organized constituency of women, even within their own parties" (Ibid.). A group of women academics agreed and observed: "no other constituency had achieved such recognition women had during the negotiating process, and no single women's organisation had been able to achieve this kind of legitimacy for women's issues on its own" (Goetz 1998: 247).

By the close of the MPNP, though some delegates continued to trivialise women participants [19] and gender issues, there was an increased awareness of an organised women's constituency that could work together across party lines. Additionally, the presence of women delegates may have changed the way men at the MPNP perceived them. Democratic Party delegate Martheanne Finnemore conducted a survey among delegates of their impression of women members of negotiating teams. She found, among other things, that over the course of the negotiations, the percentage of delegates who supported the compulsory inclusion of women increased significantly ("Women winning hearts" 1993: 15).

"Women" as an election issue

In the years leading up to the transition, particularly once it was clear that there would be a new constitution, people concerned with gender equality began to discuss the future with a new urgency. The ANC Constitutional Committee and the Lawyers for Human Rights both held conferences in late 1990 that dealt solely with women's rights in the prospective constitution. The Gender Research Group hosted a conference on Women

[19] Some of the men delegates dubbed the women's caucus the "The Broomstick Brigade" ("Women winning hearts" 1993: 15).

and Gender in Southern Africa at the University of Natal in January 1991 (Hassim 1991: 66). Gender and women's rights enjoyed a higher profile within South Africa than it ever had to date.

At this point however, there was still no guarantee that women would hold decision-making positions in the new government; they were also not necessarily going to participate in drawing up the actual constitution. In an article entitled "It's now or never for South African women" Frene Ginwala wrote: "we have to start thinking about getting women into the constituent assembly or, whatever fmal constitution-making body is agreed [on]. If we elect a body dominated by patriarchal men, then all our efforts will be in vain" (Ginwala 1991). Ginwala's concern that women necessarily participate in writing the new constitution was, at least in part, based on interests. The experience of the "battle with the chiefs" at the MPNP highlighted, for many women, the danger of trusting even "progressive men" to write and ratify a constitution that would protect the rights of all South African citizens.

The issue of gender commanded unprecedented attention in the period leading up to the elections. "Suddenly, all the old men have woken up and realised that women are the majority in this country and that they need women's votes" commented ANC NEC member Cheryl Carolus (Gevisser 1994: 3). This awakening was intentional. South African women and men allies worked as individuals, within their respective parties and in coalition with each other to make sure that women engaged in voter education (Stuart 1992a, 1992b) and that gender issues were prominent in the 1994 election campaign. In an article addressing fellow ANC members, Thenjiwe Mtintso gave examples of

women's votes critically altering electoral outcomes in other parts of Africa, particularly Angola, and called upon women to use their power as voters (1993: 17).

The ANC, rather than simply expecting to get votes by virtue of being the foremost liberation organisation, campaigned with a strong programme of commitments to meeting the basic needs of all South Africans (Rantete 1998: 235). "Research by the ANC's Elections Commission identified women's issues as one of the four major areas, along with education, housing, and jobs, upon which its campaign should concentrate" (Goetz 1998: 247). The ANC was the most vocal political party in its commitment to the emancipation of women and was described as the champion of women's rights in the print and electronic media (Ballington 1998: 11).

In the months before the elections, however, more than one leader in the ANC and allied organisations publicly questioned whether the ANC deserved the "women's vote". In October 1993, Jenny Schreiner's article entitled "Women can vote you off that list" ran in *Mayibuye*, an ANC periodical. She declared, "we cannot support the view that women should vote for a party simply on the basis of what it *says* about women's rights" (1993: 32 emphasis added). Schreiner argued that women voters should be concerned with all of the policies of a given party and their gender implications.

Thenjiwe Mtintso, former MK soldier and head of the SACP gender desk, warned of losing the women's vote. "In the past the tendency for some of our leaders has been to respond to the question of gender oppression or women's issues with giggles or sniggers of '30 percent'. This is a joke they can afford no longer" (Mtintso 1993: 17). She cautioned that women would not vote at all if they did not receive adequate voter education and that they would not vote for the ANC if they were not shown a real, as

opposed to a rhetorical, commitment on its part to women's equality and empowerment. She challenged the ANC by asserting "The Women's League for its part should not end up with the promise of delivering the women's vote to the ANC. It has to let the ANC show cause why such a vote should be delivered at all" (Ibid.). She demanded "action not rhetoric" (Ibid.).

Other political parties also appealed to women as voters in the period leading up to the election. The Democratic Party (DP) dedicated a special section of their election manifesto to women's rights (Ballington 1998: 11). Also, its regulations for the nomination of candidates indicated that they anticipated electorate demand for Party lists that were "both non-racial and non-sexist" and planned to compile such lists (Ibid.: 13). The DP consistently maintained that while they strongly objected to quotas as a mechanism, they agreed with the promotion of women's participation in politics.

The National Party provided another indication of how important women's issues had become. Ironically, the NP, a party that had never advocated women's rights, took up the issue before the elections. In January 1993, just after objecting to the formation of the GAC as unnecessary, the NP-controlled government signed the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)[2°] (Manzini 1993: 14). In early February three draft bills were announced, which were intended to bring the country in line with the Convention (Masterson 1993). The bills dealt with the elimination of discrimination against women, equality of opportunity and the prevention of domestic violence.

[2°] The Convention was signed by the UN General Assembly in 1979.

One reason to think the proposal of this legislation was only done out of political expedience is that they were being considered by an outgoing Parliament with questionable authority. In the transitional period, all issues of national import were discussed in negotiations. The NP's apparent concern about women's rights as a political issue was questionable because of how they chose to approach the matter. The NP claimed that their bills were drafted in consultation with the public; however, in her dissertation on the topic Karen Masterson concluded that this consultation was only ceremonial. She found that attempts made by civil society and the public to participate in the drafting of this legislation were thwarted or ignored. Furthermore, the Parliamentary debate on the bills revealed archaic attitudes about gender on the part of the NP representatives. She concluded that the NP's sudden interest in women's rights appeared to be an attempt to change the image of the party domestically and internationally before the elections (Masterson 1993).

The ANC did not.miss the opportunity to criticise the legislation. Cyril Ramaphosa, COSATU leader and high ranking ANC official, questioned the sincerity of the NP in a speech that was later printed in an ANC women's periodical. He claimed: 'The presidents men want the women's vote in the coming elections" (1993: 10). Ramaphosa observed that the WNC (of which the NP was a member) was in an 18 month process of consulting all women in South Africa to put together a women's charter "so it is rather opportunistic of De Klerk and his lieutenants to try to whip up support from the women through their own bill of rights in a matter of .. days, not even weeks" (Ramaphosa 1993: 11).

Mavivi Manzini publicly noted that the laws themselves were absurd because they did not address the racial discrimination experienced by the vast majority of women. She wondered why the bills were introduced: "Is it an elections ploy to woo the 52 percent women voters? Is it a strategy to change the face of the Nationalist Party and the government? Is it to divide the women's movement by appeasing white-middle class women?" (1993b: 15). Perhaps it was an attempt to do all three. The apartheid government's signing of CEDAW suggests that the NP recognised the significance of gender in the election, particularly because the party had never taken up women's rights issues before. Once they had introduced the aforementioned legislation, they could claim to have handled the issue. Ms. Masango, an NP candidate for Parliament stated, "Yes, I think all laws discriminating against women must be scrapped, but the NP has done this already. Now women should stop fighting and go ahead and enjoy themselves" (Gevisser 1994: 3, 5).

Advocates of women's rights and gender equality were successful in that in the weeks preceding the elections, gender issues received an unprecedented amount of attention. "•Women's rights' are on just about every politician's lips these days" began one article (Van Zyl 1994: 10). Another was entitled "Women in Politics: Carpe Diem!" (Emslie 1994). The ANC ran numerous ads claiming to be the party of gender equality. Newspaper advertisements promised to guarantee women the right to ownership of houses and land (Ballington 1998: 9). The NP joined the fray by responding to ANC advertisements appealing to women voters. "In early March the ANC struck out with a double-page print ad featuring an image of micro-phones attached to a mop, with the text: Our plan will give women a much stronger voice.' Quick as a flash, the NP hit back

with the slogan, 'we women need more than just laws to protect us. We need a society that respects us'" (Gevisser 1994: 3).

Adoption of the Quota

On 10 November 1993, the ANCWL announced that the National Executive Committee of the ANC had accepted a NWC resolution to adopt a voluntary quota for women (see Appendix B). The ANC pledged that women would make up one-third of its national and provincial election lists. This was followed, on I December, by a press release issued by the newly established ANC Commission on the Emancipation of Women (see Appendix C).

The minutes of the NEC meeting, held in October 1993, at which the decision to use a quota for women was taken, are not available. Thus, the NEC's motivation and the extent to which the ANC leadership was concerned about domestic and international [21] public opinion are not clear. What *is* clear is that this was a particularly important election and the ANC would not have casually adopted such a consequential policy. The election was to determine the composition of a body that would write the new constitution for South Africa. For the ANC coalition, which barring exceptional circumstances was guaranteed a simple majority, a two-thirds majority would have been outstanding. A two-thirds vote was needed to ratify the constitution, and the closer the

[21] The ANC's leadership may have considered the organisation's international image as well as domestic one. The 1991 National Conference proceedings made it clear that the ANC was very dependent on foreign funding "particularly from Sweeden" (McKinley 1997: 119). Sweeden's Parliament boasts a member ship that is 40% women, *and* in 1994 the Swedish Social Democratic Party had adopted a policy of "every second person a woman" on their lists (Dahlerup 1998: 99).

ANC came to that percentage, the more leeway the organisation would have in determining the end product.

In this electoral situation, where there would be no electoral penalty or conflict with incumbents over adopting the quota, it appeared there was something to gain. Though many women voters would not choose the particular political party she voted for based on their policy on women *per se*, some would. This meant that the ANC, by demonstrating its commitment to promoting women, could potentially secure more votes without risking any. Furthermore, use of the quota for women had rhetorical value. The ANC could definitively declare itself to be the party for women and thus secure the moral high ground in terms of gender in the run-up to the election. As previously noted, the pressure needed in order to secure a quota is particularly effective when parties are concerned about their electoral appeal (Phillips 1995: 58-59). The ANC was sure to receive the majority of votes, and was fairly established as the party for women, however, some other political parties presented a challenge on the issue of women. For the five months of campaigning that followed the adoption of the quota, the ANC was able to definitively declare that they were the political party most committed to women.

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, there are two differences between the quota debated in 1991 and the one accepted in 1993. The first is that they pertain to different bodies. The adopted quota was for election lists, which had not been compiled, rather than for positions in the NEC that were filled. While the lack of incumbents generally makes the adoption of a quota less controversial, in this case it may not have had such an impact. When the ANC returned from exile "there were simply too many contenders" even for its internal leadership positions (Ottaway 1991: 70). In a context

where political office and government employment are two of a limited number of avenues to money and advancement, the ANC list positions were highly sought after. Returning ANC leaders (including those from MK), leaders in the MDM, SACP, COSATU, those from the Civics were all vying for list positions (Ibid.). The difference of the adopted quota being for a body that had no incumbents cannot account for its adoption.

The second difference was that the quota was adopted by the NEC and not put to the rank and file. Because the NEC had previously made a commitment to the mechanism, it could be assumed that the body adopted a quota as soon as it got the opportunity. However, there is no reason to think that the ANC's leadership would be less reluctant to take a decision openly opposed by the rank and file in 1993 than they had been at the 48th Conference. In fact, they might have been even more wary of alienating members with executive decisions. Throughout the negotiations and the transition process, the ANC leadership was criticised by its membership and allies for neglecting to consult and communicate with them sufficiently before making important decisions (Rantete 1998: 67-68; McKinley 1997). Though the NEC had approved the quota for its membership before the 1991 conference, none of its current members publicly supported the use of quotas for women during the conference debate. That quota for the NEC was rejected by a majority of delegates at the 1991 conference. Given the situation, it is unlikely that the NEC would adopt such a controversial policy without a mandate from the membership or significant pressure from a group of members.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Elections, ANC Nominations and the Quota

The elections in 1994 were arguably the most important component of South Africa's transition from authoritarian rule to multi-party democracy. They came after the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) agreed upon an Interim Constitution, which was passed by the outgoing South African Parliament in December 1993 in the form of a law. This 150-page document committed South Africa to "a social market economy; a unitary state with strong features of regionalism; national and provincial government; a multi-party cabinet; a president and deputy presidents; a bill of rights including a constitutional court; a decentralised police force and an integrated defense force" (Rantete 1998: 215-216). The Interim Constitution also provided for elections. The newly formed Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) would run them, in order to elect a "government of national unity." This body would then draft the final Constitution in accordance with a set of 34 Constitutional Principles agreed to by all parties to the negotiations.

"At midnight on 27 April 1994 the last, and perhaps most despised, colonial flag was lowered in Africa, heralding the end of 300 years of colonialism and four decades of apartheid" (Reynolds 1999: 67). On this day, which became known as "Freedom Day", the first democratic elections in South Africa began. They were the culmination of decades of struggle and years of negotiation for a democratic and egalitarian country. Political actors, including political parties active in the former government and previously

banned liberation organisations, contested the elections, as did quite a few smaller, newly created parties. The elections were remarkable for many reasons but perhaps particularly because they were the first ever in the country with universal, adult suffrage. The majority of the people who voted in these elections did so for the first time in their lives, and because the electoral system was completely new, even those people who *had* voted before 1994 were unfamiliar with the electoral arrangements used.

The South African electoral system and its significance for women

The most important of the 34 Constitutional Principles in terms of the structure of the electoral system is Principle VIII which provides:

> There shall be a representative government embracing multi-party democracy, regular elections, universal adult suffrage, a common voters' roll, and, in general, proportional representation (cited in De Ville and Steytler 1996: 2).

The principles as a whole reflect compromises made by both the ANC and the government in a series of bilateral meetings held from late 1992 into early 1993. The basic principle of representation that the system would be based on was a major point of contention. When negotiations began, the ANC advocated the use of a majoritarian electoral system as had historically been used in South Africa. It was, however, willing to move to a PR system, when the government gave up its insistence on legally entrenched power sharing. It had advocated a rotating presidency, but settled for a president from the majority party with a multi-party cabinet (Rantete 1998: 204-205).

It is clear that in the case of South Africa, which is a profoundly split polity, the functional demand of representation had to be prioritised over that of concentration. Although the ANC stood to benefit significantly if the majoritarian system was retained, they "realised that the disparities of a 'winner-take-all' electoral system would be fundamentally destabilizing in the long run for minority and majority interests" (Reynolds 1997: 69). For example, even with their geographic concentrations of support, it is probable that at least four of the smaller parties[22] that won multiple seats in Parliament would not have gained any if a majoritarian system had been used (Ibid.). This would have put a strain on the legitimacy of the government, as the preferred parties of many voters would not have been winners. Particularly because of the extreme difficulty of getting almost all of the political groups in South Africa to participate in the elections, the outcome needed to be as representative and as legitimate as possible in the eyes of South African citizens.

The use of a "pure" PR system also avoided the politically controversial issue of drawing district boundaries, and the time-consuming job of registering voters, both of which would have been needed for single member constituencies or those with lower district magnitudes (De Ville and Steytler 1996: 1). Given the highly charged national context of frequent and brutal political violence in much of the country, there was a sense of urgency and the view that the election and subsequent transfer of power needed to happen as soon as possible.

High rates of illiteracy and the fact that most South Africans were voting for their first time raised the importance of the functional demand of simplicity. Political parties

[21] The Freedom Front, the Democratic Party, the Pan-Africanist Congress and the African Christian Democratic Party (Reynolds 1997: 69).

were thus listed on the ballots with their name, party logo and the leader's picture. Voters were asked to choose one party and indicate their choice by putting an "X" next to it on the ballot. Because party lists were closed, voters did not have to rank candidates. Thus, the demand of simplicity ultimately took precedence over that of participation. Participation was, however, increased by the fact that there were two ballots, one for the national level and the other for the provincial.

The double ballots were a contentious issue in the negotiations. Until just months before the election the ANC insisted on the use of a single ballot for both the national and provincial elections. This would clearly have benefited the larger, nationally based parties. Pressure from the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the Democratic Party (DP), the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) and various business groups, combined with a need to convince the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) to participate, resulted in the ANC and the government agreeing to a double ballot. As anticipated, this decision had significant electoral outcomes. Many people split their national and provincial votes between two political parties. This seems to have particularly benefited the Freedom Front (FF) and the DP, both of which received more votes on the provincial ballots than on the national ones. This was at the expense of the National Party, which received 490,000 less votes at the provincial level than they did at the national level (Reynolds 1997: 69-70).

The election was carried out using a proportional representation system with lists, which meant that seats in the National Assembly and provincial legislatures were allocated to parties in direct proportion to their share of the vote. Parties were free to submit both a national and provincial list — as the ANC and DP did — or just the

provincial lists — which is what the NP opted to do (Ballington 1999: 18). The lists were closed so they had to be finalised and submitted before the voting began. There were no legal thresholds, but parties had to gain at least 20 seats in the National Assembly to qualify for a cabinet position (Ulf 1999: 820-822, Reynolds 1998: 67).

The electoral system used in South Africa in 1994 reflected its historical, social and political contexts. It met the functional demands of the polity, balanced the interests of the parties that negotiated its design and reflected the needs of the political transition in which the negotiations took place.

The literature suggests that the system used in the South African elections in 1994 was particularly conducive to the election of women. This is primarily due to the use of a PR electoral system with high district magnitude and closed lists. Closed lists are generally understood to benefit women as, when voters have the option of ranking candidates, they often demote women. Half of the National Assembly or Parliament was chosen from a national list and the other half from only 9 provincial lists, so the district magnitude was high. hi other words, half of the members were elected from a 200-member district and the other from large provincial districts. Party magnitude was expected to be high as well 2[3] According to the research on electoral systems presented in Chapter 1, this would encourage the political parties, particularly the larger ones, to balance their tickets or lists by promoting a range of candidates so as to appeal to as many voters as possible. However, as also indicated, party gatekeepers would balance tickets only when they felt it might increase their electoral appeal and/or if there was significant internal pressure to do so.

As this dissertation focuses specifically on the ANC, it does not closely consider the other political parties and the extent to which they might have understood the nomination of women candidates to be in their interest. It is interesting to note however, that only 13.5% or 20 out of 148 members of Parliament from opposition parties were women — in comparison with the 35.7% of the ANC delegation (Ballington 1999: 20). This has to do with the numbers and placement of women on their lists as well as the comparatively low party magnitude of most political parties. (See Appendix D for the gender breakdown of the election lists of the 7 parties that won seats in Parliament.)

As indicated in the conclusion of Chapter 1, *The Election of Women*, the electoral system can only provide an arrangement that is conducive to the election of women — it cannot guarantee it. Demands must be placed on the political parties in order to see a substantial increase in the numbers of women nominated and therefore elected. There are two reasons why the electoral system used in this election is particularly important in an examination of the ANC quota for women. Firstly, the system, in the same way that it was particularly amenable to the election of women, namely that it was a closed list PR system with high district magnitude, was also particularly friendly to the adoption of an electoral quota. Secondly, it was a "new" system with no incumbents. Because incumbents are one of the major stumbling blocks in the implementation of quotas, this was the perfect time to introduce one.

[23] The results of the election showed parry *magnitude* to be very high. Out of 400 Parliamentarians, the ANC received 252, the NP 82, the IFP 43. The next largest delegation was 9 from the FF (Ballingion 1998: 19).

ANC nominations and lists

When the ANC was unbanned in February 1990, it began to operate freely in South Africa for the first time in 30 years. Within a few short and busy years the ANC had to transform into a political party and compete in democratic elections. This meant developing new sets of strategies and procedures. The ANC was allied with other organisations that had been involved in the struggle against the apartheid government, most notably the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), and they thus contested the elections together.

The ANC's NEC established a "List Committee", consisting of representatives from the ANC and their allied organisations in order to manage the compilation of party lists for the election (Rantete 1998: 235). This Committee developed guidelines for the nomination process, created the nomination forms to be supplied to regional leadership and its responsibilities included assisting regions with their nomination conferences.

The criteria for nominations developed by the ANC were as follows:

A nominee must...

- Enjoy popularity, either nationally or in a particular region
- Possess leadership qualities
- Be a "principled person"
- Have a proven track record of service to the people
- Be skilled ["skill" was not to be equated with educational or professional qualifications]
- Be energetic, hard working and able to take initiative
- Be representative [part of a group with a constituency]

- There must be "special consideration in terms of gender to ensure that women are well represented on the lists"
- Be accountable to the ANC, regardless of what organisation the person came from

(ANC 1993b: 3-4)

The criteria contained in this list are in line with those of political parties throughout the world. This is particularly the case of the requirement of popularity with the electorate and a proven track record of service (Matland 1998: 71, Gallagher 1988: 248). Interestingly, the ANC did not require that nominees have a history of service to the ANC, but rather and more generally "to the people." Presumably this is due in part to the fact that the ANC was an illegal organisation, which had operated in exile for many years. To require that all nominees have a history with the organisation would rule many capable people out. However, once a person had accepted a nomination to one of the party's lists, they were required to be loyal specifically to the ANC. Another remarkable feature was highlighting the need for "gender balance" on the list. Internal instructions note, "we should recognise that 50.2% of the electorate are women and that there is a need for affirmative action" (ANC 1993b: 4). The nominating process began before the adoption of a quota for women, but at the initial stage already, it was done with the idea of affirmative action in mind.

The procedure used for nominations was very decentralised.[24] Names were accepted from any constitutional body of the ANC (i.e. branches or regions) and of all allied organisations. The nomination form simply required an indication of the type of

meeting it came from, a motivation for the nominee, the names and contact details of the "proposer" and at least four others who supported it (ANC 19936: 4). It was a very unique process in that a nominee could be anyone whom ANC members felt would provide leadership and represent them in the new government. The diversity of ideas about criteria for candidates within the membership was reflected in the initial lists that were compiled at regional level. Many of the people nominated were not even members of the ANC or its allied organisations (Rantete 1998: 236). The PWV region's provisional list for the national assembly clearly demonstrates this diversity; it contained people such as Miss South Africa, Jacqui Mofokeng, Wits University sociologist Jacklyn Cock and television personality Felicia Mabuza-Suttle (Ibid.).

ANC regional nominations conferences were convened in order to compile three lists: a list for the national legislature, a regional list for the national legislature and a list of candidates for the provincial legislature. The conferences, attended by delegates from the ANC and allied organisations, were structured so as to allow for the proposal of names with time for objections before the names were put to a vote (ANC 1993B: 6). These lists then had to be "cleaned up" and "ordered" before submission to the List Committee, which would in turn present them to the NEC. Faxes were sent out to all of the Regional Secretaries itemising what needed to be done to the lists. Cleaning up the lists included securing formal acceptances or withdrawals from nominees and ensuring that their names were on only one list. This was important because there were many people who had been voted onto both the regional lists to the National Assembly (NA) as well as the national list to the NA (ANC 1994a: 1).

[24] The process used for compiling the 1999 lists was also fairly decentralised. Nominations came from ANC branches followed by provincial list conferences. Again, the NEC made some changes, particularly

The ordering of the lists, which involved ticket balancing, was of heightened import because of the fact that the ANC was contesting the election in alliance with other organisations. Therefore, the factors taken into consideration were more than just the internal factions. Regional leadership was asked to analyse their lists in terms of the numbers and placement of names from COSATU, the ANC Youth League, "each race group" and the "relevant PF [Patriotic Front] / MDM [Mass Democratic Movement] organisations" and ensure that all were represented in the top 50% of the list (Ibid.: 1-2). Regional leadership was also encouraged to "think about the changes you think are politically necessary... Please list all your recommended changes with brief explanations / motivations for the NEC to decide upon. Please note that regions are not allowed to make these changes without an NEC decision" (Ibid.: 2).

The ANC balanced its lists in response to pressure within the alliance and the organisation itself. For example, complaints of under-representation on the lists from members of the Patriotic Front held up the finalisation of the list, while the list Committee made some alterations for them (Rantete 1998: 237). Also, a COSATU conference held during the time leading up to the elections proposed that all of their members who had been nominated to the ANC's lists to the National Assembly be placed within the top 51% of the names (ANC 1993B: 6). The COSATU proposal was not taken up, however these examples demonstrate that it was common for allied organisations or factions within the party to lobby for preference, as the ANCWL successfully did.

Lists from the region for the provincial legislatures were then sent, with the recommended changes, directly to the NEC. The two lists for the National Assembly were worked through and then brought to the National Nominations Conference on 15

to ensure that one third of the names were women (ANC Press Release 04/05/99).

January 1994. Around 500 members of the ANC and allied organisations attended this conference (Rantete 1998: 236). It followed the same format as the regional conferences had: proposal of the names, time for objections and debate, followed by a vote. The names were ranked on the list according to how many votes they received, and then submitted to the NEC for approval.

Party gatekeepers are often a subset of the constituent party members. In this case they were delegates at a nominations convention. It is also common for the national executive of the party to retain the right to veto or add names. Though the initial nominating procedures were very decentralised, the NEC reserved the right to make changes to the lists after they had been finalised by the National Nominations Conference. The NEC used this right and the final list involved the inclusion of some names that had not been nominated and the exclusion of some that had.

Two particularly controversial alterations were the addition ofJ.N. Reddy and D.S. Rajah, both of whom had been members of the House of Delegates[25]. This decision drew immediate criticism because, as participants in the apartheid government, these two had been considered long-time "collaborators" by the ANC and its membership. This is an example of centralised decision-making as this highly controversial, strategic decision to add these men to the ANC list was made by the NEC. People at the branch level of the organisation were not consulted and therefore left with the responsibility of explaining a decision to membership in which they had not participated. One critic wrote, "branches [of the ANC] are not impervious to reason and the main grouse today remains that the correctness of the decision is not the issue but, rather, the principle of consultation before decisions are taken" (Govender 1994: 35). Some individuals were dropped from the list

because they belonged to impartial organisations, and Winnie Mandela's position on the list was lowered from number 9 to 31 (Rantete 1998: 238).

The final ANC lists, released in late January 1994, "reflected South African society as a whole." The national list "included Robben Island prisoners, former exiles, former UDF activists, COSATU trade unionists, priests, former tricameral Parliament MP's, homeland leaders and a policeman" (Rantete 1998: 237). (See Appendix E for the ANC's list for the National Assembly).

The lists were drafted using a bureaucratic and decentralised process. A clear criterion was developed for nominees and it was circulated among ANC and coalition parties. Nominations were accepted from constitutional structures of the ANC and allied organisations. They were then proposed at regional conferences. There was an opportunity at these conferences for delegates to discuss and object to nominees before voting on the final names and their ranking on the list.

As noted in Chapter *I, The Election of Women,* bureaucratic nominating procedures are generally better for the nomination of candidates with under-represented characteristics, including women. This is because the procedures are explicitly set out, thereby creating an opportunity for groups within the party to strategize about how to increase their number of nominees. When political party rules are unwritten, the difficulty faced by less powerful groups within the party in their attempts to gain political power, is increased. However, it is possible that the benefits of the bureaucratic method used were not fully taken advantage of in the nominations preceding this election. In the run-up to the 27 April 1994 elections, there was not much opportunity for the strategising and mobilising required on a grass-roots level that would be essential to achieve a high

[75] Both withdrew their names from the list after it had been released.

number of women in winnable positions on the ANC lists. As can be seen in the next section, if a quota for women had not been used in ordering the ANC national list, there would have been a much smaller proportion of women elected to the National Assembly.

Therefore, the fact that the process was not completely decentralised had a substantial and positive impact on the nomination of women. The ANC procedures were centralised in that the NEC reserved and exercised the right to make alterations to the lists after their submission by the various nominations conferences. Similarly, the NEC also had the authority to adopt an electoral quota for women.

The ANC Quota

In October 1993, five months before the elections, the ANC announced its commitment to a one-third quota for women candidates on both its national and provincial election lists. This was a voluntary quota as there were no legal quotas mandated in South Africa. Out of the 19 political parties contesting the elections, the ANC was the only one to use a quota (Ballington 1998: 20). Although some other parties noted a need for women to be represented in government, most were vehemently opposed to the use of quotas as a mechanism to increase their numbers (Ibid.: 12). "Former NNP [26] MP, Pauline Cupido for example reports having been 'booed' when she suggested to the party executive that it reserve every fifth place on its 1999 electoral lists for women" (Vincent 2001: 83).

As stated earlier, the success of a quota is determined largely by its implementation. However, the two main problems for implementation of gender quotas experienced in Scandinavian countries, namely ousting incumbents and finding enough

[26] The National Party changed its name to the "New National Party" (NNP) in the run up to the 1999 elections.

women willing to run for political office, were not problems in these elections. It was a new party list so all of the positions were vacant. Although the list committee had to go far down the lists to promote women to winnable positions, they never ran out of possible candidates.[27]

Instructions on the actual application of the quota to the lists were detailed in a document faxed by Cyril Ramaphosa, then Secretary General of the ANC, to all of the Regional Secretaries entitled "Process of Finalising Provincial Lists." It explained that after "cleaning up" the lists, the provincial leaden must "order" them. Though this document gives specific instructions for the provincial lists, it notes that the same method had been used for applying the quota to the national list (ANC 1994: 1).

> We suggest it [application of the quota] be done in the following way. Using the PWV Provincial legislature list, which has 100 names as an example. For the top 50% or top 50 names we need 17 women. What we do is list the first 35 names as elected, from highest vote to lowest. Assume we get only 7 women in the top 35 names, we then need to ensure that in the remaining 15 names that make up the top 50% we include 10 more women. From the 51 s` name onwards we ensure every third name is a women. This will mean that number 53, 56, 59 etc will be women, ensuring that 17 women make up the bottom 50% of the list (ANC 1994: 1).

In the final national list there were 5 women in the first 35 and only 1 in the first 20 names (see Appendix E). The bulk of the women candidates in the first 100 names were

[27] However, the large numbers of women leaders who were elected to office left a vacuum in civil society and the organisations from which they came (Manicom 1996: 47).

bunched between numbers 86 and 98. Judging by the positions of women on the final list, it is clear that without the quota many less women would have made it to Parliament.

In comparison to experiences in other countries, it is remarkable that the ANC was able to meet their projected one-third quota without using a quota within the organisation itself This can perhaps be attributed to the large numbers of women politicised by, and active in, the struggle against apartheid at the time of the elections. It is also noteworthy that the quota was successfully applied to the lists without the quotas being "embedded in the selection and nomination process from the very start" (Dahlerup 1998: 101). Often, if left until after nominations are in, the target numbers of quota requirements are very difficult to reach. The fact that the ANC has an internal quota, adopted in 1997, and can now anticipate the quota from the start of nominations, bodes well for the increased success of this mechanism in the years to come.

Conclusion

The electoral system used in South Africa's 1994 elections was, according to the current literature, particularly conducive to the election of women. The current system has high district magnitude and members of Parliament represent either the country as a whole or an entire province. However, these electoral arrangements were agreed to more as a means to elect a representative body to draw up the new constitution than as a permanent system (Reynolds 1997: 70). In fact, the electoral system is up for review before the national elections in 2004 (Jayiya 1999: I). There is strong political pressure to change the electoral system. Recent reform debates advocate changing to a mixed system that combines representatives elected by single-member constituencies with representatives

elected from a list using the principle of proportional representation (Nohlen D., Krennerich M. & Thibaut B. 1999: 18). This is with the intention of increasing the accountability of individual members of Parliament to specific, geographic constituencies.

The literature suggests that such a change would initially have a negative impact on the numbers of women elected to Parliament, and may inhibit contagion. For this reason, people interested in gender equity in South Africa have followed and participated in the electoral system debate. The Commission on Gender Equality (CGE), a powerful women's lobby, has called for the South African government to legislate quotas for women. Barring the unlikely acceptance of this suggestion, the CGE has called upon all parties to "review their positions on quotas and adopt targets for ensuring gender parity in politics, including their own internal structures" (Jayiya 1999: 1).

The ANC, by using a one-third quota for their lists and implementing it in such a way as to ensure that 35.7% of their delegation to the National Assembly were women, is responsible for the unprecedented number of women elected to the South African legislatures in 1994.

Conclusion

Two factors proved particularly critical to the ANC's adoption of a quota system for women on their national and provincial lists. The first was the proportional representation electoral system used in the election. The second factor was the existence of demands made on the ANC leadership by women within the organisation.

The electoral system used in South Africa's 1994 elections was, based on electoral outcomes in other countries, very favourable for the election of women. It was a PR system with closed lists and high district magnitude. The membership of half of the National Assembly was chosen from a national list and the other half was drawn from only 9 provincial ones. This high district magnitude, coupled with the anticipation that a few political parties would do exceptionally well meant that party magnitude was expected to be very high. This encouraged political parties to balance their lists. Most importantly, the election was to determine the membership of an entirely new legislature and so there were no incumbents. Without the existence of incumbents, the issue of a quota is significantly less contentious in terms of its practical implementation. If a quota was ever to be adopted, this was arguably the best time.

As previously stated, an electoral system cannot in fact guarantee an increase in the election of women. Rather, it can only strengthen the ability of political parties to respond to demands placed upon them by factions within the party and external constituencies. Accordingly, "political systems are not likely to represent previously unrepresented groups until those groups develop a sense of their own interest and place

demands upon the system" (Sapiro 1998: 167). It is unquestionably easier to convince political party gatekeepers to nominate more women as candidates when the parties that have made public commitments to the promotion of women as political actors. In the South African context, where not all political parties have made such commitments, there is a large discrepancy in the numbers of women nominated and elected from each political party (see Appendix D). The fact that these varied election lists all originated in a specific society, using the same electoral system demonstrates the importance of party commitment as well as strong demands. Therefore, the demands placed on the ANC leadership by the ANC Women's League and ANC members constitute the second principal factor in the quota's adoption.

Some ANC members anticipated the backsliding on women's issues that they had witnessed with the success of other liberation movements. They wanted to secure some power for women as a (albeit very heterogeneous) group in the new government. They intensified their demands as the time of transition approached. They understood that it provided a `window of opportunity' to secure positive changes in the status of women and to better include them in political decision-making bodies. The realisation that the opportunity for progress on gender issues also held the risk of the entrenching and reinforcing gender inequality added a sense of urgency to their pressure for concrete commitments for women.

Gender advocates learned that they needed much more support at the debate of the proposed quota for women on the ANC NEC. The reaction of the majority of delegates at the ANC conference indicated that they thought that the struggle against gender oppression should be subordinated to the struggle for national liberation. In 1991,

quota advocates had the backing of the NEC when they entered the conference, but that did not prove to be enough. Statements and commitments are positive, but actual implementation requires real power. It was clear at the conference that the ANC's women members did not yet wield enough power. "Quotas for women are intended to give women more power. However, to introduce quotas against severe resistance, as was the case in Scandinavia, requires that women have already gained some power" (Dahlerup 1998: 96). In South Africa, too, within the ANC the issue of quotas for women was contentious and was also fiercely resisted. The ANC's women members thus increased their own political power by working in coalition with their countrywomen who were politically active in organisations other than the ANC.

The quota was adopted as a result of the power exercised by the Women's League, bolstered by the Women's National Coalition. Women also had "a mandate and leverage to impress their needs on the politicians negotiating the transition" because of the centrality of women's organisations to the struggle for democracy in South Africa (Goetz 1998: 245). They demonstrated a women's constituency and in this way made sure that gender issues were addressed in the campaign. The quota was hard-won and should be recognised as an appreciable accomplishment. It can appear to be a natural progression of policy given the fact that the ANC was rhetorically consistent with regard to its goal of "non-sexism" and its commitment to the use of affirmative action. However, the fierce debate in 1991 surrounding the proposed NEC quota and the intense and consistent lobbying required of ANC women to gain access to negotiations complicates this impression. The ANC's adoption of a voluntary quote system does not mean that women's problems of under-representation in South Africa are solved.

However, as Gisela Geisler states, South African women "managed to avoid the mistakes" of women "elsewhere in Africa, and they were included in decision-making processes in numbers too large to be easily reversed" (2000: 626).

Epilogue

The ANC first implemented its quota for women eight years ago. The party used the quota again in 1999 for its lists in the only national election since the first one. This time women made up 36% of its Parliamentary delegation (Feris 1999: 1). A woman currently still holds the position of Speaker of the National Assembly, and the number of women cabinet ministers increased from four appointments in 1994 to eight in 1999 (Ngubane 2000: 1). Some of these ministries are outside of those traditionally reserved for women.[28] South Africa, largely as a result of the ANC's promotion of women in government, has the second highest ranking in Africa and the eleventh in the world with regard to the presence of women in its national legislature (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2002). In addition, the "critical minority" of women in Parliament appears to have had certain policy outcomes. The lobbying of women parliamentarians was pivotal in the passage of legislation that increased the rights of South African women since 1994 (Vincent 2001: 75).

The topic of this dissertation raises many interesting questions about women in government, but its scope necessarily limited their discussion. In this epilogue I revisit the issues of justice and political interests named in the *Introduction.* Though the ANC quotas and the post-apartheid government of South Africa are less than a decade old, it is still possible to reflect on the quota. It is my hope that in looking at these issues we can

[28] Portfolios headed by women ministers include Foreign Affairs, the Public Service, Minerals and Energy, and Communications. The Deputy Minister of Defence is also a woman (Jacobs 2002: para. 2).

begin to assess the quota's impact. Moreover, it may help to raise questions about the prospects of women politicians and women's representation in the South African Parliament.

The justice-based argument for raising the number of women in political office requires parity between women and men. In South Africa, as in the rest of the world, this goal has not yet been achieved. While women constitute more than 50% of the South African population, their membership in the South African Parliament makes up only 29.5% (Jacobs 2002: para. 2). Nevertheless, by ensuring that membership is no longer totally monopolised by men, the quota has begun to satisfy the matter of justice.

There is disagreement as to whether there has been any measurable contagion as a result of the ANC quota. As outlined in Chapter I, *The Election of Women,* contagion theory holds that political parties will feel pressured to field more women candidates if one of their political rivals starts to promote the increased presence of women. Contagion has been identified in other contexts where the promotion of women candidates has become electorally expedient. To date there is only anecdotal evidence to suggest that the ANC's voluntary adoption of a quota for women has had this effect on other South African political parties. Democratic Party MP Dene Smuts noted that though her party did not use a quota in the 1999 elections, they had achieved a high percentage of women on their lists through "more informal pressure" (Ngubane 2000). Both the NP and IFP were reported to have "rushed around desperately to get women" after the ANC "set the tone by having one third women" (Geisler 2000: 623).

It is not likely that opposition parties will adopt quotas for women in the near future. Despite lobbying on the part of the CGE for all parties to adopt a 50% quota, no

other viable political party in South Africa has expressed an intention to adopt a quota, and some have publicly decried their use (Jayiya 2001: 1; Ballington 1998: 12-16). A 1997 report maintained that all political parties were "hoping to increase the number of women representatives in the next elections" (Padayachee 1997: 3). However, in the 1999 elections the number of women sent from all opposition parties combined only increased by one (Geisler 2000: 623). The relatively small numbers could be a result of the fact that their party magnitude is much lower than that of the ruling ANC. This means that a much smaller proportion of their lists are in fact sent to Parliament.

While the percentage of women in the South African Parliament is high (relative to the rest of the world), this does not mean that women MPs are able to participate in the institution on an equal footing with their counterparts who are men. Adjusting to Parliament posed challenges for all of the new MPs elected in 1994. Both women and men struggled with the institution's formality of procedure, legal jargon and demanding workload. Some women MPs thrived in this environment, but others had a more difficult time. In Parliament, an institution with an extreme bias in favour of men, women MPs had the added liability of their gender. For example, women MPs were excluded from the informal networks in which much of Parliamentary work happens (Goetz 1998: 253). Independent research, conducted on the new Parliament and published in 1997, indicated that many women members felt that their participation was inhibited. In fact, the results suggested that more than half of the women members were considering not returning because they did not feel that there was room for their voice (Padayachee 1997: 2).

Along with issues within Parliament, many women MPs struggled to balance the demands of their jobs with their outside responsibilities. Women Parliamentarians in

South Africa hold high-level government positions in a society that generally still expects women to take sole responsibility for domestic work. A conference of women MPs held in 1994 "concluded that in order to manage both their demanding career as parliamentarians and their demanding families, they would 'need wives' to cope" (Geisler 2000: 617).

Over the past eight years, the South African Parliament has become more "woman friendly" in response to the needs of its women members (Padayachee 1997: 3; Ngubane 2000). For instance, along with the construction of more toilets for women, the work hours and vacation schedule of Parliament was modified to better facilitate parenting, and on-site childcare is provided. Furthermore, some MPs have noticed a shift in attitude because of the relatively high numbers of women. They report that people in and around Parliament no longer express themselves in "overtly sexist ways" (Geisler 2000: 618). These changes notwithstanding, the assumption that men, not women, hold political offices persists. For example, even when dressed in colourful saris, the Speaker of the National Assembly Dr. Frene Ginwala must constantly remind some of her colleagues that she is a woman. One Member of Parliament seemed so accustomed to a man being Speaker that he referred to her as "Mr. Speaker" 34 times in just one speech (Geisler 2000: 618).

The future South African electoral system is being debated now (Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 2002), and there will almost certainly be a change. The Commission on Gender Equality (CGE) argued against moving away from the PR electoral system to one that is mixed, out of concern that the numbers of women elected will fall off sharply. Not only does the literature suggest that smaller districts are worse

for the election of women, but this has in fact been the experience at the local level in South Africa. There is a considerable discrepancy between the numbers of women elected in the purely PR elections (National 30% and Provincial 27.6%) and Local Government elected with a mixed system of PR and single representative wards (18%) (Jacobs 2002: para. I). All political parties in South Africa consider gender to be a liability in majoritarian ward elections (Geisler 2000: 623). Therefore, party gatekeepers will be less likely to put women candidates in these races. However, a switch to a mixed system, where some of the seats are single-member districts, would provide an opportunity for women who do hold these offices to raise some of their own political support in a district. In this way they would be less beholden to men-dominated party structures and could have the leverage of offering up their seats to the opposition.

Although the aforementioned study concluded that women MPs faced "disproportionate challenges which hindered their participation" (Padayachee 1997), many chose to continue to face these challenges. Women MPs from the ANC had a healthy return-rate of roughly 64% in the 1999 elections (Geisler 2000: 620). The numbers of women in the government of South Africa may continue to increase. South Africa is among the 14 countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) that signed the Gender and Development Declaration in 1997 (Ballington 2000: 1). In doing so, South Africa committed itself to the achievement of 30% women in political decision-making positions by 2005 (Ibid.).

The justice-based argument for the presence of women in legislatures should be applied to women's ability to participate and contribute on an equal footing with the men in these bodies. Insofar as women's capacity is limited by personal and structural

discrimination, the situation is patently unjust and must be changed. There is still substantial work to be done in order to achieve gender parity, justice and transformation in the South African Parliament. However, patterns of human relationships and the structure of institutions take time to change. The ANC quota, by ensuring a significant increase in the percentage of women in the institution, increased the 'justness' of the South African Parliament.

Despite the challenges faced by women MPs, they significantly impacted policy issues and outcomes (Geisler 2000: 620). The Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Act of 1996 and the Domestic Violence, Maintenance, and Recognition of Customary Marriages Acts all passed in 1998 are examples of legislation that increased the rights and autonomy of South African women (Vincent 2001: 75). The Women's Budget, which is an obligatory part of budgeting, ensures that economists take gender into consideration in the governments fiscal planning (Geisler 2000: 620). These accomplishments, all due to vigorous lobbying on the part of women MPs, demonstrate some progress in the representation of women's interests. The prospects of their increased representation are discussed below.

Electoral quotas, as stated previously, are mechanisms used to ensure the physical presence of women in legislatures. They do not automatically ensure that women's interests are adequately represented within government. This distinction points to the fact that increasing the numbers of women in a government does not guarantee policy outcomes that protect and advance the interests of its women citizens. Political scientist Virgin Sapiro reports: "we can now argue that it [women in positions of power] is a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient" (1998: 183). Furthermore, the question of

women's interests is complicated by the fact that there is considerable diversity among South African women. They are divided on the bases of culture, economics, geographic location, language, education and many more. Differences between women within the ANC itself can prove insurmountable at times. However, as argued in the *Introduction,* while acknowledging the impossibility of establishing a set of specific interests shared by all women at all times, there are many situations in which women do have interests in conflict with those of men. In these instances it is imperative that people within government take up the issues and concerns particular to women constituents and vigorously represent them.

Them are two mutually reinforcing requirements for the successful representation of a group's political interests in a democracy. The first requirement is that there are a significant number of people within the government who are willing to raise the issues of this group and fight for them. The second is the existence of an articulate and powerful constituency to place pressure on the government. These requirements, with regard to South Africa and to the ANC quota, are discussed below.

In situations where the interests of women conflict with those of men, it is imperative that some members of Parliament represent the interests of women. Historically, those who take up issues affecting women tend to be women themselves. This is borne out in the South African Parliament (Vincent 2001: 75). It follows that the quota, by increasing the number of women in Parliament, would strengthen the advocates of women's issues within Parliament. While this conclusion may prove to be true, the issue is not as straightforward as this. While the party list electoral system and quotas encourage the election of more women, the candidates so elected owe allegiance to the

political party that placed the candidate high on its list rather than to the electorate (Ibid.: 76). Also, once in Parliament, political party leaders determine everything from the committee to which a person is assigned, to speaking time on the floor of the Assembly. Representatives do not 'have clout' automatically and most do not have much power independent of their political party. The attitudes and policies of the party hierarchies are extremely important when it comes to the ability and motivation of women MPs, or men for that matter, to associate themselves with the interests of their women constituents.

The great importance of party leadership would not necessarily be bad for the representation of women's interests if party bosses were interested in gender issues. However, Louise Vincent, in a recent work on political opposition in South Africa, reports that this is generally not the case. In fact, the political party hierarchies in South Africa continue to be dominated by men who, "more often than not", treat women's issues raised in caucus with "a degree of patronising indulgence" and feminist politicians are "sometimes referred to by men, to much laughter in party caucuses, as 'that lot who went to Beijing"'[29] (Vincent 2001: 76-77). Not only does being identified with gender activism expose an individual to ridicule, but also "in a party political context where defence of women's interests is regarded as politically illegitimate, divisive or irrelevant, gender activism is seen as a high-risk activity" (Ibid.). Vincent observes that many women MPs in South Africa are the "breadwinners" in their families. Consequently,

[19] This is in reference to the 1995 United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing, China. By referring to women MPs who raise gender issues in this way, these men seem to suggest that the concerns these women Parliamentarians are speaking about do not come out of their own experience nor do they apply to women in South Africa. Rather, it is implied that women's rights are a concept imported by a group of extremists after taking a field trip overseas and that neither the issues nor their advocates should be taken seriously.

economics and the desire for job security may encourage women MPs to avoid disagreeing with party bosses on controversial gender issues.

Because of the built-in reliance on political parties that are currently dominated by men, the electoral arrangements generally considered to be the most conducive to the election of women could inhibit the robust representation of their interests. Vincent states that the majority of women MPs are not willing to be "overtly identified with the promotion of women's issues" because they fear being excluded from mainstream politics as a result. She concludes: "paradoxically, then, women can have access to power, as long as they do not indicate a preference for using it to promote women's interests in an adversarial manner" (Vincent 2001: 77).

The ANC quotas can actually exacerbate the bias against politicians who associate themselves with the advocacy of women's interests. Anna Balletbo, a member of the Spanish parliament, describes quotas as a "double-edged sword". She explains that "on the one hand, they oblige men to think about including women in decision-making, since men must create spaces for women. On the other hand, since it is men who are opening up these spaces, they will seek out women who they will be able to manage — women who will more easily accept the hegemony of men" (Dahlerup 1998: 95). There are some high-profile women leaders in South Africa who have a popular power base, proven track records and powerful allies within their political party. However, this is not true for the majority of the women on the ANC lists. Many who initially benefited from the quota did not have a great deal of national political clout. Accordingly, as argued above, they would probably be less likely to raise issues not supported by ANC leadership.

An articulate, powerful constituency is the second basic requirement for successful representation of any, in this case women's, interests in government. An explicit mandate from the electorate and civil society is essential for Parliamentarians who take up women's issues. Additionally, those who would not ordinarily be concerned with gender issues could be forced by the demands of the people to take them into consideration. As Suzanne Vos of the Inkatha Freedom Party put it: "once women leaders can produce their own visible, articulate, constituencies they have power" (Vincent 2001: 81). Ideally, a strong national women's movement could serve as a constituency, providing leverage for women in government, and to some extent it does. To date, women MPs introduced the legislation that has secured "greater autonomy and choice for women" with significant help from non-governmental organisations (Vincent 2001: 80). Similarly, "women MPs who have played a high profile role as gender activists in parliament have strong links with civil society and women's organisations outside parliament" (Ibid.: 81).

At present, there is not a powerful, independent, mass-based women's movement in South Africa. The Women's National Coalition no longer exists, there is a dearth of community-based women's organisations (when compared to their vitality in the 1980s) and the ANCWL, probably the largest women's formation in the country (Jacobs 2002: 7) is weakened and beholden to the ruling party.

When the WNC folded after the 1994 elections, most observers noted the Coalition's diversity and maintained that it had proved too disparate to be sustainable in the long term (Albertyn 1994; Geisler 2000; Manicom 1996; Goetz 1998). Also, the decision made by the WNC that members of national or provincial Parliaments could not

hold executive positions in the Coalition resulted in the resignation of the entire executive (Geisler 2000: 625). Some understood the WNC's closure to be politically motivated[30]. To date, no organisation has replaced the WNC at the national level.

Two shifts during the transitional period significantly weakened women's organising at the community level. The first was the reshuffling of community-based women's organisations upon the return of the ANC. Women ANC leaders and leaders from women's organisations active within South Africa met in Lusaka to discuss the return of the ANC (Ramgobin 1990: 21-22). It was decided that many anti-apartheid women's organisations in South Africa — of which most considered themselves to be the internal wing of the ANC (Connell 1998: 197-198) — would fold themselves into the ANC Women's League which would be re-launched. The disbanding of women's organisations 'on the ground' and the ANCWL's focus national politics diverted attention and leaders away from "building a grassroots-based democratic movement" [31] (Manicom 1996: 47).

The second shift was that of personnel away from the grassroots level. Ironically, the "mass-based women's movement that was the driving force behind South African women's move into Parliament" (Geisler 2000: 627) was substantially weakened when they left. "Community leaders were recruited at a rapid rate to make up for a shortage of politically-experienced women at the national level, leaving a huge gap on the ground"

[30] Some observers and participants have charged that the ANCWL purposefully caused the WNC to fold on purpose when they pulled out of the coalition because the League was "suspicious that other parties would use it to gain access to rural constituencies in the elections" (Connell 1998: 199).

[31] Marina Ottaway, writing on the prospects for democracy in South Africa, observes that the ANC was legalised before the country was 'liberated.' Therefore, as a liberation movement it needed to consolidate power to rival the government. The trend at this time was for all organisations affiliated with the Mass Democratic Movement to collapse themselves into the ANC (Ottaway 1991).

(Manicom 1996: 47). Though it may take some time, there is no reason to think that this gap cannot be filled.

The shortage of a wide variety of women's organisations operating in South Africa presents a challenge for a healthy democracy. The ANCWL is the largest women's formation in the country, however it remains "subordinated to the political imperatives of the ANC" (Connell 1995: 16), which is the ruling party. This clear conflict prevents the League from aggressively forwarding or defending women's interests. Baleka Kgositsile, then General Secretary of the ANCWL, asserted that the League's work toward the emancipation of women would be constrained once the ANC came to power (1993: 20). She argued that the League would have to become a fully independent organisation if it was to avoid "betraying" its constitutional commitments (Ibid.). This break did not happen. The ANCWL, which had been a very effective vehicle for progressive women's voices within the ANC in the early 1990s, lost its "sense of direction" after the 1994 elections (Geisler 2000: 615). This was exacerbated by the election of Winnie Madikizela-Mandela as the League's president at the 1993 National Conference (Geisler 2000: 616). Many members left the League, including a group of 11 ANCWL NEC members who resigned in 1997 as a result of President Madikizela-Mandela's "autocratic leadership style and concern with doubtful business ventures (Ibid.). The ANC Women's League leadership has been "decimated by political infighting" (Connell 1995: 16), it is in "financial disarray" (Vincent 2001: 82) and is no longer as relevant to current gender politics in South Africa.

The lack of a powerful women's movement presents a challenge to South Africans concerned with gender justice. A variety of women's organisations are needed

and the serious vacuum between women in the South African Parliament and the women `on the ground' must be filled (Geisler 2000: 627). It is crucial that grassroots women organise and articulate their interests because both women and men in Parliament do not automatically know the needs of their women constituents. Therefore, MPs must consistently consult their women constituents and continue to educate themselves about good practice in gender planning (Watson 1999).

The ANC quota increased the numbers of women members in the South African Parliament. However, in order for these numbers to matter in terms of the representation of women's interests, South African women will have to continue to generate and foster organisations that reflect their experiences, interests, circumstances and concerns. Grassroots, issue-based women's organisations are essential for a healthy democracy. The WNC was a transitional alliance that served its purpose. The interests of South African women may be too disparate for them to commit to a long term or permanent national coalition at this point. However, this does not prevent women from working together on specific policy issues. Concern about the pervasiveness and increase in violence against women has been particularly successful in fostering women's political activity in recent years. "The history of federations and alliances of women's groups in South Africa is a positive indication of the potential for continuing cooperation among a diversity of independent groups" (Winter 1993: 57).

The demand for women leaders on the national level, in large part due to the ANC quota, weakened grassroots organizations — particularly women's organisations. However, it also created space for a new generation of women leaders to 'cut their teeth' at the local level. Those women who left Parliament take with them a set of valuable new

skills and experiences that will enhance their work in other areas. The history of South African women's consistent, committed and courageous political activity bodes well for the future. There is every reason to believe that South African women and men are up for the challenge and will continue to make progress toward the practical equality of all people in their country.

Appendix A.

STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS ON THE EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN IN SOUTH AFRICA

May 2nd 1990

The African National Congress's commitment to eliminate racism, oppression and exploitation from our society cannot fail to address also the question of the emancipation of women.

The experience of other societies has shown that the emancipation of women is not a by-product of a struggle for democracy, national liberation or socialism. It has to be addressed in its own right within our organisation, the mass democratic movement and in the society as a whole.

The majority of South African women, who are black, are the most oppressed section of our people, suffering under a triple yoke of oppression. The liberation of women is central to our people's struggle for freedom.

In 1985 Presidents Sam Nujoma and Oliver Tambo made a joint pledge to the women of Namibia and South Africa that we would not "consider our objectives achieved, our task completed, or our struggle at an end until the women of Namibia and South Africa are fully liberated." We consider it long overdue that our organisation and the entire democratic movement establish principles and initiate practices which will guide us in fulfilling this pledge.

Accordingly, the ANC NEC submits for discussion our views on how to advance and ensure the emancipation and development of women in every sphere of our existence now and in the future.

To achieve genuine equality, our policies must be based on a real understanding of gender oppression and the way it manifests itself in our society. From such a base we will be able to work towards creating the necessary conditions for truly liberating women in the practical reality of our daily lives.

Gender oppression is everywhere rooted in a material base and is expressed in sociocultural traditions and attitudes all of which are supported and perpetuated by an ideology which subordinates women. In South Africa it is institutionalised and the laws as well as the customs and practices of all our people. Within our racially and ethnically divided society, all women have a lower status than men of the same group in both law and practice. And as with racism, the disadvantage imposed on them ranges across the political, economic, social, domestic, cultural and civil spheres.

The manipulation of gender relations has been an important feature of state control over, especially, the African people and the effects have impinged most harshly upon women. Their mobility has been rigidly controlled, and the unpaid labour of African women in the rural areas has underpinned the migrant labour system and subsidised the profits of the mining industry.

Within apartheid ideology African women have been perceived simply as the breeders of future generations of labour. With the creation of the bantustans large numbers have been confined to deteriorating rural environments, dependent on the commitment of absent breadwinners for small cash remittances. Many have been made the sole minder of the elderly, the disabled and the children. Women have carried the main load of responsibility for survival and generational reproduction even though they are often still subject to the legal authority of absent men who are removed from day to day decision making.

Centuries of women's subjugation have deprived and marginalised them in different ways. Nationally, women have the lowest levels of health, education and skills. The majority still bear the sole burden of domestic labour. Their contribution to the creation of our country's wealth is unrecognised and mostly unpaid. Women make up the majority of the unemployed, while those in waged work are channeled into the worst-paid lowest status jobs. Even white, but especially black, women do not participate fully in the decision and policy-making organs of our country.

Notwithstanding these oppressive conditions, women have made significant contributions to our liberation struggle. But, as is evident among the youth, the people's army and elsewhere in our ranks, we have to acknowledge that their full potential has not

been realised. We have not, as yet, fully integrated women's concerns and the emancipation of women into the practice of our liberation struggle.

The prevalence of patriarchal attitudes in South African society permeates our own organisations. The absence of sufficient numbers of women in our organisations, especially at decision-making levels, and the lack of a strong mass women's organisation has been to the detriment of our struggle. As a consequence the particular concerns of more than half of our people are hardly heard when we define our strategies and determine our tactics. President Tambo summed the problem up when he opened the ANC Women's Conference in 1981:

> `The struggle to conquer oppression in our country is the weaker for the traditionalist, conservative and primitive restraints imposed on women by man-dominated structures within our Movement, as also because of equally traditionalist attitudes of surrender and submission on the part of women.'

The realisation of our objective of a non-racial and democratic South Africa is dependent upon the extent to which we are able to address and mobilise all the people of South Africa: men and women.

ANC POLICY

In this new phase of open organisational 'legality', the ANC commits itself to the development and implementation of a wide range of policies for restructuring the organisation to meet the tasks of the day. In this we believe it imperative to address the inequalities women face in every aspect of our work. By adopting such an approach we will bring women in their millions into active participation in all forms of struggle and at all levels. In this process we will, at the same time facilitate their own upliftment and advance to freedom.

The NEC together with the NEWC is re-examining the functions of the ANC Women's Section as part of the overall restructuring of the ANC. We are determined to ensure that our pronouncements are consistent with our practices and that gender issues are integrated in all spheres of our movement.

We consider the formation of the ANC Women's League essential to fulfilling the tasks of mobilising and organising women into the liberation struggle.

As recommended by the 1987 ANC Women's Conference we are actively considering the appointment of a National Commission on the Emancipation of Women to sensitise, monitor, stimulate and report on the women's position.

Highest priority must be given to finding the means to facilitate women's participation in the struggle and within all the political, administrative and military sectors of the ANC from the grass roots though to the NEC.

Patterns of discrimination and inequality are not self-correcting. Rather, they tend to replicate themselves, as those already in leading positions acquire necessary experience and confidence and appear better equipped to bear responsibility. To break this cycle we need to take affirmative action within the ANC to supplement and reinforce education and advancement programs based on the principle of full equality.

The Department of Political Education has been instructed to embark on a systematic program of formal and informal education to promote an understanding of the origin and effects of gender oppression on our people. The ANC Educational Council has been asked to re-examine our education policy to ensure that its style and content is non-sexist and avoids gender-stereotyping.

THE DEMANDS OF THE STRUGGLE NOW AND IN A POST APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

Our policies have to address simultaneously the material base, the legal system, the political and other institutions and the ideological and cultural underpinnings of gender-oppression now and in the future. In this regard the NEC is giving urgent consideration to the recommendations of a recent internal Seminar which examined the formulation of national policy regarding the emancipation of women and the promotion of women's development in our country.

Among these recommendations are amendments to the ANC Constitutional Guidelines, including the categorisation of South Africa as an independent, united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist state. Laws, customs, traditions and practices which discriminate against women shall be held to be unconstitutional. Patriarchal rights,

especially but not only with regard to family, land and the economy need serious re-examination so that they are not entrenched or reinforced.

In the new South Africa women will not immediately have the education, skills and resources to claim the rights provided in the constitution and laws. It shall therefore be the duty of the state to take appropriate measures to ensure the principle of gender-equality. Equally, our legal system must be easily accessible, with a judiciary which is familiar with the experience and has the confidence of the least privileged sections of our people. Women's right to democratic participation in all decision making must be there in principle and in practice. These and other recommendations, which will be circulated in the Seminar's report should provide a basis for thorough discussion amongst the people so that we can adopt policies which will help create a society free of gender-oppression.

THE CHARTER OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Men and women alike bear the responsibility for eliminating gender-oppression. However, women must take the lead in creating a non-sexist South Africa. They must move the ANC and the MDM to adopt policies and forms of organisation that facilitate the participation of women in the struggle that still lies before us.

Women must lead the national debate for a Charter of Women's Rights which will elaborate and reinforce our new constitution, so that in their own voice women define the issues of greatest concern to them and establish procedures for ensuring that the rights claimed are made effective.

We call upon the ANC Women's League to initiate a campaign for the Charter involving all other structures of our organisation, the membership and supporters throughout South Africa. The campaign should involve millions of women directly in the process of determining how their rights would be protected in a new legal and constitutional order. Such an initiative will provide the opportunity to set an example of democracy in practice, and be a major agency for stimulating women to break the silence imposed on them.

Based upon the demands and needs of African women, the great majority and the most oppressed, it should draw in and represent the wishes of women from all sections of

South African society, and as such be an important step in preparing over half the population for MI citisenship and equality.

Although the principal themes of the Charter must be guided by women, men must be engaged in the process, so that we ensure that the Charter has the backing of the widest strata of society.

Although the dominant always find it difficult in the short term to give up age-old privileges and habits, in the long run they only stand to gain from living in a world in which the health, happiness and welfare of all is guaranteed.

Appendix B.

ANCWL Press Release Announcing the Adoption of a Quota

'ONE-THIRD WOMEN'S QUOTA"

We welcome the announcement by the ANC's national executive committee (NEC) that it has ratified a national working committee (NWC) resolution to include women in at least 33,3% of the ANC's elections list.

The ANCWL regards this as a victory for all women.

This issue of quotas was raised by the ANCWL at the first ANC national conference in Durban 1991, and was vehemently rejected by the men.

The Women's League strongly believes that without the participation of women in decision-making structures, issues of major concern to women cannot be effectively addressed. Because of the way gender oppression is entrenched in our society and because it permeates all aspects of life, there is a need to create special mechanisms which will redress this problem.

The argument that women do not have experience in government structures and parliament can only be dismissed with contempt. Men in the ANC also lack such experience. But we all have the experience of struggle.

We believe there are plenty of capable and competent women out there whose names can be added to the list.

We call upon women to join the ANC in their droves to enable us to have a wider choice of names to vote for at regional and national levels when we draw up our list for the April 1994 election.

Forward to a non-sexist South Africa!

Lindiwe Zulu Media Co-ordinator, ANCWL November 10 1993

(ANCWL 1993a)

Appendix C.

ANC Press Release Announcing the Adoption of a Quota

ANC LISTS FOR PARLIAMENT TO INCLUDE ONE-THIRD WOMEN PRESS STATEMENT BY THE ANC'S COMMISSION FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN[2]

The ANC's decision that its lists for the national and regional parliaments should include a minimum of one third women candidates reflects our commitment to non-sexism and the establishment of a genuine democracy. One of the legacies of apartheid and patriarchy has been the absence of women in public office, not least within the ANC itself. This situation is undemocratic and cannot be allowed to prevail in the new South Africa.

Experience around the world has shown that without intervention, historic patterns of disadvantage will only be eradicated after generations. Those in positions of power, whether whites or males, tend to see merit and competence only in their own image and hence are self perpetuating. Recognising that South Africa cannot afford to wait for decades before the full potential of all its citizens is released and contributes to the social political and economic development of our country, the ANC moved for the inclusion of a clause in the new constitution which would allow for affirmative action.

The forthcoming elections will lead to the establishment of Parliament and a constituent assembly as well as provincial parliaments. Their composition will have to differ significantly from the present institution. It is not to be sufficient, if we simply add large numbers of black men and a sprinkling of women. We also need to ensure that we are not bound by alleged standards of competence and qualifications which have brought our country to the brink of disaster.

To be representative these institutions will have to include more than lawyers, businessmen and academics. The skills and experience acquired as community, office and factory workers, living in informal settlements or surviving in the barren and degraded rural areas, as combatants of MK, or seasoned campaigners do not bring certificates of competence from institutions, but are necessary for serving the country.

All of these will have to be present in our new political institutions in order to ensure that they are truly democratic. If the ANC is to be true to its principles, it cannot wait to democratise after April 28th 1994. Democratic principle and practice require that we ensure that the lists of candidates we put forward reflect the ANC's commitment to non-sexism and full representativeness.

Issued by the ANC's Commission on the Emancipation of Women, 1 December 1993

[2] (ANC.1993a)

Appendix D: Comparison of women on party lists verses women represented in Parliament in the 1994 national election[1]

Political Party	National List	Women	% Women	Regional List	Women	% Women	Seats in Parliament	Women	% Women
African National Congress	183	59	32.2%	193	63	32.6%	252	90	35.7%
National Party	N / A	N / A	N / A	376	43	11.4%	82	9	11%
Inkatha Freedom Party	48	5	10.4%	113	18	15.9%	43	10	23.3%
Freedom Front	33	4	12%	89	7	7.8%	9	0	0
Democratic Party	200	62	31%	174	33	19%	7	1	14%
Pan-Africanist Congress	160	19	11.8%	190	23	12%	5	1	20%
African Christian Democratic Party	147	19	12.9%	166	16	9.6%	2	0	0
TOTAL							400	111	27%

Note: N / A = not applicable.

[1] It is important to note that the number of women on candidate lists is approximate. As only candidates' names – and not their titles or gender – appear on official published lists, the possibility of minimal error in determining women candidates does exist. The information is taken from final consolidated lists of candidates published in the *Government Gazette* (GN 409 of 1994).

From (Ballington 1998: 19).

Appendix E.

The ANC's nominations list for the national assembly

1. *Nelson Mandela*
2. *Cyril Ramaphosa*
3. *Thabo Mbeki*
4. *Joe Slovo*
5. *Pallo Jordan*
6. *Jay Naidoo*
7. *Ahmed Kathrada*
8. *Ronnie Kasrils*
9. *Sydney Mufamadi*
10. **Albertina Sisulu***
11. *Thozamile Botha*
12. *Steve Tshwete*
13. *Bantu Holomisa*
14. *Jeff Radebe*
15. *Dullah Omar*
16. *Popo Molefe*
17. *Mac Maharaj*
18. *Moses Mayekiso*
19. *Chris Dlamini*
20. *Trevor Manuel*
21. *Zola Skweyiya*
22. **Gertrude Shope**
23. *Kadar Asmal*
24. *Joe Modise*
25. *Arnold Stofile*
26. *Mohammed Valli Moosa*
27. *Peter Mokaba*
28. *John Nkadimeng*
29. *Essop Pahad*
30. *Raymond Sutmer*
31. **Winnie Mandela**
32. *Tito Mboweni*
33. **Thenjiwe Mthintso**
34. **Baleka Kgositsile**
35. *Blade Nzimande*
36. **Ruth Mompati**
37. *Aziz Pahad*
38. *Penuel Maduna*
39. *Billy Nair*
40. **Mavivi Manzini**
41. *Phillip Dexter*
42. *Prince James Mahlangu*
43. *Smangaliso Mkhatshwa*
44. *Alfred Nzo*
45. *Alec Erwin*
46. *Gregory Rockman*
47. **Gill Marcus**
48. *Jan van Eck*
49. **Thandi Modise**
50. *Shepard Mdladlana*
51. **Nkosazana Zuma**
52. **Nosiviwe Maphisa**
53. *Randall van der Heaver*
54. **Frene Ginwala**
55. *Joe Nhlanhla*
56. *Marcel Golding*
57. *Pravin Gordhan*
58. *Max Sisulu*

59. *Saki Macozoma*
60. *Tony Yengeni*
61. Geraldine Fraser
62. Jenny Schreiner
63. *Reginald September*
64. *Patekile Holomisa*
65. *Thomas Nkobi*
66. Bridgette Mabandla
67. *Dave Dolling*
68. Sister Bernard Ncube
69. *Andrew Mlangeni*
70. *Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim*
71. *Gabriel Ramushwana*
72. Adelaide Tambo
73. Barbara Hogan
74. *Sibusiso Bhengu*
75. *Rapulane Molekane*
76. *Kgabisi Mosunkutu*
77. Nozizwe Madlala
78. *Nelson Ramodike*
79. *Elijah Barayi*
80. *Jannie Momberg*
81. *Prince M. Zulu*
82. *Elias Motswaledi*
83. Dorothy Nyembe
84. *Derek Hanekom*
85. *Mbulelo Goniwe*
86. Melanie Verwoerd
87. Sankie Nkondo
88. Pregs Governder
89. Lydia Kompe
90. Ivy Gcina
91. Ela Gandhi
92. Joyce Mashamba
93. Phumzile Nqcuka
94. Ellen Khuzwayo
95. Hilda Ndude
96. Zou Kota
97. Lindiwe Sisulu
98. Feroza Adams
99. *James Stuart*
100. *Mnyamezeli Booi*
101. *K. Lekgoro*
102. Lindiwe Mabuza
103. *John Coperlyn*
104. *Mangesi Zitha*
105. Dipuo Peters
106. *Peter Hendrikse*
107. *Ismail Richards*
108. Ntombi Shope
109. *S. Moeti*
110. *Duma Nkosi*
111. Thoko Msane
112. *Zam Titus*
113. *N.J. Mahlangu*
114. Jennifer Ferguson
115. *M.J Mahlangu*
116. *Samuel Nxumalo*
117. Bongiwe Njobe
118. *JN. Reddy*
119. *Thabang Makwetla*
120. Manto Tshabalala
121. *Nkosinathi Nhleko*
122. *S.S. Ripinga*
123. P.T. Shilubane
124. *James Maseko*
125. *Llewellyn Landers*
126. Girlie Pikoli

127. *Brian Bunting*
128. *Diliza Mji*
129. Miriam Makeba
130. *Archie Gumede*
131. *Cassim Saloojee*
132. *Wally Serote*
133. *Mendi Msimang*
134. *Max Coleman*
135. *Bulelani Nqcuka*
136. *Curnick Ndlovu*
137. *Willie Hofmeyr*
138. *Josiah Jele*
139. *Mzwai Piliso*
140. *Moss Chikane*
141. *Aaron Motsoaledi*
142. *Alistair Sparks*
143. *Mkhuseli Jack*
144. *Firoz Cachalia*
145. *Salie Manie*
146 *Mewa Ramgobin*
147. *Jackie Selebi*
148. *Stan Sangweni*
149. *Henry Fazzie*
150. *John Samuels*
151. *Don Gumede*
152. *Mike Sutcliffe*
153. *Prince Madikizela*
154. *Lechesa Tsenoli*
155. *Rob Davies*
156. *Essop Jassat*
157. *Hassan Solomon*
158. Makhosazana Njobe
159. *Ismael Meer*
160. *Samson Ndou*
161. *Christmas Tinto*
162. Lulu Xingwana
163. *Ebrahim Rasool*
164. Amina Cachalia
165. *Tutor Ndamase*
166. *Colin Coleman*
167. Fatima Hajaij
168. Liz Abrahams
169. Bathabile Dlamini
170. Virginia Engel
171. *Danny Oliphant*
172. *Bheki Mkhize*
173. *Mossa Mocha*
174. *Ram Saloojee*
175. Jackie Cock
176. Nomatyala Hangana
177. Sue van der Merwe
178. Lynne Brown
179. N. Barn
180. Gertrude Fester
181. Beatie Hofmeyr
182. Thandi Shabangu
183. Thandi Zulu
184. Kamy Chetty
185. Desiree Finca
186. F.S. Baloyi
187. Elizabeth Langa
188. Farieda Mohamed
189. *C.TD. Marivate*
190. Nomsa S. Mtsweni
191. *Vusimuzi Mavimbela*
192. *D.S. Rajah*
193. Doris Ngobeni
194. *Rob Haswell*

195. *Jerry Ndou*

196. *Dennis Nkosi*

197. Lillian Baqwa

198. *George Sewpersadh*

199. Lindelwa Mabandla

200. *Billy Ramokgopa*

Note: From the Aline Sachs' collection at the Mayibuye Centre on which the gender of candidates was identified. The list is also in *The African National Congress and the negotiated settlement* in *South Africa* (pp. 293-294) by Johannes Rantete, 1998. There is one discrepancy between the lists. Rantete gave Maite Mohale as the candidate in the 200th place.

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

Appendix E.

The ANC's nominations list for the national assembly

I. Nelson Mandela
2. Cyril Ramaphosa
3. Thabo Mbeki
4. Joe Slow,
5. Palo Jordan
6. Jay Naidoo
7. Ahmed Kathrada
8. Ronnie Kasrils
9. Sydney Mufamadi
10. Albertina Sisulu*
11. Thozamile Botha
12. Steve Tshwete
13. Bantu Holomisa
14. Jeff Radebe
15. Dullah Omar
16. Popo Molefe
17. Mac Maharaj
18. Moses Mayekiso
19. Chris Dlamini
20. Trevor Manuel
21. Zola Skweyiya
22. Gertrude Shope
23. Kadar Asmal
24. Joe Modise
25. Arnold Stofile
26. Mohammed Valli Moosa
27. Peter Mokaba
28. John Nkadimeng
29. Essop Pahad
30. Raymond Suttner
31. Winnie Mandela
32. Tito Mboweni
33. Thenjiwe Mthintso
34. Baleka Kgositsile
35. Blade Nzimande
36. Ruth Mompati
37. Aziz Pahad
38. Penuel Maduna
39. Billy Nair
40. Mavivi Manzini
41. Phillip Dexter
42. Prince James Mahlangu
43. Smangaliso Mkhatshwa
44. Alfred Nzo
45. Alec Erwin
46. Gregory Rockman
47. Gill Marcus
48. Jan van Eck
49. Thandi Modise
50. Shepard Mdladlana
51. Nkosazana Zuma
52. Nosiviwe Maphisa
53. Randell van der Heever
54. Franc Ginwala
55. Joe Nhlanhla
56. Marcel Golding
57. Pravin Gordhan
58. Max Sisulu

59. Saki Macozoma
60. Tony Yengeni
61. Geraldine Fraser
62. Jenny Schreiner
63. Reginald September
64. Patekile Holomisa
65. Thomas Nkobi
66. Bridgette Mabandla
67. Dave Drilling
68. Sister Bernard Ncube
69. Andrew Mlangeni
70. Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim
71. Gabriel Ramushwana
72. Adelaide Tambo
73. Barbara Hogan
74. Sibusiso Bhengu
75. Rapulane Molekane
76. Kgabisi Mosunkutu
77. Nozizwe Madlala
78. Nelson Ramodike
79. Elijah Barayi
80. Jannie Momberg
81. Prince M Zulu
82. Elias Motswaledi
83. Dorothy Nyembe
84. Derek Hanekom
85. Mbulelo Goniwe
86. Melanie Verwoerd
87. Sankie Nkondo
88. Pregs Governder
89. Lydia Kompe
90. Ivy Gcina
91. Ela Gandhi
92. Joyce Mashamba
93. Phumzile Nqcuka
94. Ellen Khuzwayo
95. Hilda Ndude
96. Zou Kota
97. Lindiwe Sisulu
98. Feroza Adams
99. James Stuart
100. Mnyamezeli Booi
101. K. Lekgoro
102. Lindiwe Mabuza
103. John Coperlyn
104. Mangesi Zitha
105. Dipuo Peters
106. Peter Hendrikse
107. Ismail Richards
108. Ntombi Shope
109. S. Moeti
110. Duma Nkosi
111. Thoko Msane
112. Zam Titus
113. N.J. Mahlangu
114. Jennifer Ferguson
115. MI Mahlangu
116. Samuel Nxumalo
117. Bongiwe Njobe
118. J.N. Reddy
119. Thabang Makwetla
120. Manto Tshabalala
121. Nkosinathi Nhleko
122. S.S. Ripinga
123. P.T. Shilubane
124. James Maseko
125. Llewellyn Landers
126. Girlie Pikoli

127. *Brian Bunting*
128. *Diliza Mji*
129. Miriam Makeba
130. *Archie Gumede*
131. *Cassim Saloojee*
132. *Wally Serote*
133. *Men di Msimang*
134. *Max Coleman*
135. *Bulelani Nqcuka*
136. *Curnick Ndlovu*
137. *Willie Hofmeyr*
138. *Josiah Jele*
139. *Mzwai Piliso*
140. *Moss Chikane*
141. *Aaron Motsoaledi*
142. *Alistair Sparks*
143. *Mkhuseli Jack*
144. *Firoz Cachalia*
145. *Salle Manie*
146. *Mewa Ramgobin*
147. *Jackie Selebi*
148. *Stan Sangweni*
149. *Henry Fazzie*
150. *John Samuels*
151. *Don Gumede*
152. *Mike Sutcliffe*
153. *Prince Madikizela*
154. *Lechesa Tsenoli*
155. *Rob Davies*
156. *Essop Jassat*
157. *Hassan Solomon*
158. Makhosazana Njobe
159. *Ismael Meer*
160. *Samson Ndou*
161. *Christmas Tinto*
162. Lulu Xingwana
163. *Ebrahim Rasool*
164. Amina Cachalia
165. *Tutor Ndamase*
166. *Colin Coleman*
167. Fatima Hajaij
168. Liz Abrahams
169. Bathabile Dlamini
170. Virginia Engel
171. *Danny Oliphant*
172. *Bheki Mkhize*
173. *Mossa Moola*
174. *Ram Saloojee*
175. Jackie Cock
176. Nomatyala Hangana
177. Sue van der Merwe
178. Lynne Brown
179. N. Barn
180. Gertrude Fester
181. Beatie Hofmeyr
182. Thandi Shabangu
183. Thandi Zulu
184. Kamy Chetty
185. Desiree Finca
186. F.S. Baloyi
187. Elizabeth Langa
188. Farieda Mohamed
189. *C.T.D. Marivate*
190. Nomsa S. Mtsweni
191. *Vusimuzi Mavimbela*
192. *D.S. Rajah*
193. Doris Ngobeni
194. *Rob Haswell*

195. *Jerry Ndou*
196. *Dennis Nkosi*
197. Lillian Baqwa
198. *George Sewpersadh*
199. Lindelwa Mabandla
200. *Billy Ramokgopa*

Note: From the Albie Sachs' collection at the Mayibuye Centre on which the gender of candidates was identified. The list is also in *The African National Congress and the negotiated settlement in South Africa* (pp. 293-294) by Johannes Rantete, 1998. There is one discrepancy between the lists. Rantete gave Maite Mohale as the candidate in the 200th place.