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**LIBERAL ETHICS**  
**IN**  
**SOUTH AFRICA**  
**SINCE 1948:**

**POWER, PRINCIPLE AND RESPONSIBLE ACTION**

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts in the Faculty of Social Science and Humanities, University of Cape Town.

**R.M. GODSELL**

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## INTRODUCTION

### 1. The Hypothesis Proposed

This dissertation examines a four part hypothesis:

- (a) that liberal ethics in South Africa, particularly since the victory of the (Afrikaner) National Party in 1948, have been characterised by a sense of political powerlessness;
- (b) that as a consequence of this powerlessness, these ethics have been more concerned with principle, motives, conscience and internal consistency than with the consequences of liberal action;
- (c) that this sense of powerlessness is not justified in the social and political environment of the 1980's; and therefore,
- (d) that liberals should review their ethical approach with a view to developing an ethic of responsible liberal action.

### 2. Some Terms Defined: Liberalism:

The intellectual origins of liberalism as a political philosophy are to be found in the work of the school of British Empiricists in the seventeenth century, most particularly John Locke's Two Treatises of Civil Government which appeared in 1690.

The Empiricists continued a process of philosophical renaissance commenced by Descartes.<sup>1</sup> In Locke's treatises, he attacks the divine right of kings,<sup>2</sup> asserts man as a naturally free, rational being,<sup>3</sup> and posits natural law and the fundamental equality of man under this law.<sup>4</sup>

In these theses are contained the essential strands of the fabric of liberalism as developed in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. It is interesting to note that Locke's theories also contain elements and contradictions later to be taken up by the major challenge to liberalism in the 19th and 20th centuries - Marxism.

Locke's views were to be both influential and further developed in the thought and actions of 18th century politicians and revolutionaries, of whom Thomas Jefferson serves as an outstanding example. They find their echo in the great pronouncements of the American revolution.

In the 19th Century, liberalism was redefined by the social transformation of the industrial revolution. In Britain, where this transformation began, the nature of the polity post the absolute monarch, that is, the balance of rights and obligations between citizen and government, was examined by men such as John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith.

From this analysis, emerged the notion of the limited role of government in regulating the economic affairs of its citizens, as well as a commitment to the market place as a regulator of reward. The belief that market forces are the most efficient and the most just source of value is built upon Locke's earlier notions of rationality. The market is anonymous and results in free exchange between free men.

Liberalism found organisational expression in England from the 17th century onwards in the political grouping known first as Whigs and later as liberals. This grouping, together with its alternative - the Tories, dominated English politics from 1680 until it was eclipsed by the newly emergent Labour Party in 1922. It is interesting to note that the oldest and strongest tenets of this grouping are a belief in representative government (as opposed to the exercise of power by the monarchy or an inherited aristocracy) and economic freedom and limited government (such as the commitment to free trade). The one can be said to be a legacy of Locke, the other of Adam Smith. Importantly, the support for representative government has more recently become synonymous with universal franchise or populist democracy.

We have earlier referred to the Renaissance origins of liberalism found in the philosophical revolution of Descartes. In Europe, as indeed in Britain and America, the impact of the religious Reformation should also be noted. Some authors have indeed credited Reformation thinkers with the creation of "politics" as we now know it, and also for creating the psychological pre-condition for the emergence of capitalism. In Europe, liberal philosophies were to be combined with the forces of nationalism from Napoleon onwards, and it was these twin forces which were to determine political geography throughout the nineteenth century.

It is difficult to trace the organisational incorporation of liberal ideas in the United States, as here liberal notions intermingled not only with nationalism, but also anti-colonialism, and the economic imperatives of what would, in today's terms, be regarded as a third world or developing nation. The liberal tradition cannot be associated with either of the major political parties which have dominated American politics in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Both parties have affirmed certain basic liberal values, and have from time to time confounded others.

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A number of forces conspired in the early twentieth century to diminish the force of liberal ideas. The First World War seemed to take British, American and European liberals by surprise and confound their faith both in free market forces (though it was precisely the absence of these which heightened national conflicts) and concepts such as the rule of law, the march of civilisation and "progress".

Internationalism, which seemed a natural extension of the notions of representative government within nation states, suffered a severe setback.

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The advent of mass industrialisation was brought about (and in turn gave momentum to) a concept of "social technology" - the idea that it was the role of authority and leadership in society not merely to regulate, but to redesign it. The Great Depression of 1929 and the early

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Thirties brought a new paradigm in economic policy - that of Keynesian economics, or the "managed" economy. The Roosevelt "New Deal" in the USA, Hitler's Gleichstaltung in Germany, and the post-war reconstruction in Britain and Europe all entrenched a model of the state not as policeman or judge, but as social engineer. Liberalism, with its notion of minimum government, maximum individual liberty and market forces seemed anachronistic.

More recently as both welfare capitalist and socialist experiments in modernisation have disappointed, there has been a resurgence in both political and economic liberal theory. A good example of this reconstructed, modern liberalism is to be found in Hayek's "The Constitution of Liberty".

The above gives a broad outline of liberalism's development.

Liberalism's arrival and growth in South Africa are discussed in Chapter One. What, however, of an operational definition? James Leatt has given a catalogue of values of the "liberal spirit" in South Africa. This catalogue serves as a useful definition of the term liberal as used in this dissertation:

- "(a) All men share a common humanity, differences between men are secondary.
- (b) Man is to be viewed optimistically, being naturally good, capable of and responsible for shaping his own destiny.

- (c) Each individual has the same dignity and should be granted the same basic human rights without regard to race, culture, sex, or creed. Discrimination is therefore to be excluded.
- (d) There should be freedom of thought and conscience, of speech and the press, of movement and association, from arbitrary arrest and undue interference in the personal life.
- (e) Each person should receive the benefits of education and equal opportunity in all spheres.
- (f) By man's efforts, society will progress towards greater social justice, economic prosperity, political stability and minimise his suffering. This progress ought to take place by evolutionary rather than revolutionary means.
- (g) In politics, the power of reason and compassion should prevail against biased and irrational attitudes and violent practices.
- (h) The individual is of supreme importance and his interests should not be overridden by the community. Likewise, the emphasis is on individual initiative rather than reliance on the community. The role of the state is to nurture this individualism.
- (i) Many liberals link individual freedoms with the emancipation of disadvantaged groups in society and with independence for the nation state.
- (j) Within the state, liberals maintain there should be a distribution of power between the legislature and the executive with an independent judiciary to check abuse of power as far as possible.
- (k) Most liberals believe that arbitrary and authoritarian government can best be prevented by a multi-party democracy in which ultimately every adult should have a voice and a vote whether in a unitary or federal state. But majority rule is no guarantee of liberty, the Rule of Law is necessary to protect the individual

and minorities. This can be safeguarded by a rigid constitution which includes a Bill of Rights and an independent judiciary." 19

### 3. Ethics

The Oxford Dictionary lists four adjectival and four substantive meanings for the term ethic:

#### adjectival:

- relating to morals;
- treating of moral questions, and of ethics as a science;
- characterised by "ethics";
- the dative (i.e. grammatical dative) used to imply that a person, other than the subject or object, has an indirect interest in the fact stated (this ethical dative is more frequently used in Greek now than in English).

#### substantive:

- the science of morals or scheme of moral science;
- the department of study concerned with the principles of human duty;
- the moral principles or system of a particular leader or school of thought, or the moral principles by which a person is guided, or the rules of conduct recognised in certain associations or departments of human life;
- in the wider sense, the whole field of moral science.

In its historical derivation, its oldest use (and one that most closely suits our purposes) is given as:

"The ethicke and politick consideration, with the end of well doing and not of well knowing only."

Sidney 1581

In its wider etymology, a line can be traced through the Greek word  $\beta$  Olkos whose meaning is given as character in the singular form and manners in the plural. Cicero translated this term as used by Aristotle with the term morale or moralis from which our English term moral is derived.

The link with the related Greek word ethos ( $\theta\omicron\omicron\omicron$ ) has been noted. It is interesting to note that this term is rendered by the Oxford Dictionary as "the prevalent tone or sentiment of a people or community; the genius of an institution or people, character, ideal excellence."

In French, the term is rendered as ethique, so maintaining its close link with the concept of manners and conduct. In German, ethik is again closely linked to the related concept of ethos.

Approached from a philosophical perspective, a similar range of meanings is evident.

"To the layman, the word 'ethics' suggests a set of standards by which a particular group or community decides to regulate its behaviour - " 20

And in the words of another philosopher, ethics is:

"The science of the ideal in human character and conduct." 21

A third offers three "different but related ways" in which the word is used in philosophy:

1. a general pattern or "way of life"
2. a set of rules of conduct or 'moral code'
3. enquiry about ways of life and rules of conduct." 22  
(original emphasis)

Finally, a fourth philosopher, whilst evading the definitional approach, makes a definitional observation, noting the intimate relationship between moral concept on the one hand and social concept on the other, as well as between philosophical analysis and social behaviour or consequence:

"... to possess a concept involves behaving or being able to behave in certain circumstances, ... is to alter behaviour. So the Athenians who condemned Socrates to death, the English Parliament which condemned Hobbe's Leviathan in 1666, and the Nazis who burned philosophical books were correct at least in their apprehension that philosophy can be subversive of established ways of behaving." 23

The above is quoted chiefly to assert the close link between concept and conduct, between thought and action.

Ethics when approached from the standpoint of Christian theology reveals an essentially similar picture. Hare notes a threefold series

of ethical questions, essentially similar to that given above.

John Murray defines Biblical ethics as being concerned with "the manner  
24  
of life which the Bible prescribes and approves."

The above definition raises one of the fundamental problems of ethics, namely the source of ethical norms. Here in philosophy and theology, both a continuum and tension are evident. The continuum may be described as between ethical objectivity, where the source of ethical norms is external to the actor - given, known and fixed, and ethical subjectivity or relativism, where the source of norms is to be found in the actor and his subjectively experienced world. In philosophy, Plato, Aristotle and Kant represent ethical objectivity in contrast to the Sophists, Existentialists and Utilitarians who stand closer to the subjectivity pole. The tension may be described as one between ethical certainty or universalism as opposed to ambiguity and situation specificity. Even those close to the ethical objectivity pole on the continuum described above are subject to uncertainty when two objective ethical norms clash in a particular situation.

In Christian theology a similar continuum and tension exist for although all Christian thinkers would agree that the source of ethical norms is man's knowledge of God there is disagreement about the nature of that knowledge.

Diversity arises firstly from the progressive nature of revelation. A progression is clearly evident in biblical prescriptions for "right living"<sup>25</sup> from the old testament to the new. Secondly, revelation is often ambiguous - so the ethical debate about war, justice, divorce, abortion continues with each side of the debate finding vindication in a part of God's revelation.

A final source of tension in Christian ethics is a third aspect of the nature of God's revelation. God reveals himself to man through the person of Jesus Christ. Therefore, revelation is not to be discovered primarily in codes or rules but in a person immanent in history.

These tensions are explored further in Chapter Two.

How then do we intend to use the word ethics in this dissertation?

by ethics we imply the way in which actors choose between morally significant courses of action.

In this sense, we are seeking a logic of decision-making when actors have to choose between courses of action which have significance in relation to the actors set of ultimate values, e.g. good, bad, just, unjust.

This meaning seems to fall well within the range of meanings and uses discussed above.

#### 4. Methodology

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the four point hypothesis outlined in Section One. The purpose of this section is to indicate how the examination was undertaken.

Several questions had to be addressed:

- What do we mean by liberal?
- What do we mean by ethics?
- How are liberals to be identified in the South African situation?
- How are we to gain access to liberal ethics?
- Are such ethics characterised by a sense of powerlessness?
- If so, has this sense of powerlessness led to an over emphasis on motive and principle and an under emphasis on action and consequence?
- And again, if this appears true, is both this sense of powerlessness, and the concentration on principle to which it leads, justified in South Africa's circumstances in the 1980's?
- And finally, if not, is an ethic of responsible liberal action possible, and if so, what would such an ethic look like?

Hopefully, we have provided at least operational meanings to the terms mentioned in the first two questions earlier in this introduction. We have identified liberals for our purposes here as white, English-speaking liberals. In so doing, we do not suggest that this group have a monopoly of liberal values, but merely that they are the primary standard bearers of liberalism in South Africa. This group has also been chosen because they have had access to political power in the past, but are now generally excluded from political power.

Without doubt the most difficult question was the fourth listed above - that of access to liberal ethics. Liberal ethics are clearly value pre-dispositions. Defined as we have here chosen they must also be seen in the context of liberal action.

An attempt has been made to gain access to liberal ethics phenomenologically. An attempt has been made to allow the data to speak for itself without super-imposing on it a framework such as that drawn commonly in the positivist approach to social research.

These attempts are made in Section Two, in three different ways:

- In Chapter Three, a review is undertaken of liberal literature. Little of analytical nature has been written on the subject of liberal ethics, or even liberalism per se in South Africa. Two important exceptions are Janet Robertson's

Liberalism in South Africa : 1948-1963 and Paul B. Rich's White Power and the Liberal Conscience : Racial Segregation and South African Liberalism.

Whereas both works have been invaluable to this investigation, they differ from what is attempted here in two important respects:

- \* the time periods differ significantly: 1948-1963 in Robertson's case, and 1921 to 1960 in Rich's case. In Rich's study, further, the emphasis is laid on the earlier period.
- \* their focus is not ethics or the ethical logic of liberals, but rather their beliefs and actions per se.

However, there is a rich historical, theoretical and especially biographical liberal literature.

- The second attempt to get close enough to liberalism to allow the data to speak for itself is the attempt in Chapter Four to review policy statements in three contrasting liberal organisation settings. In this Chapter, some 75 policy documents are reviewed.
- A third attempt is made in Chapter Five, through 14 structured interviews with liberal spokesman, discussing the 1983 Constitutional Referendum. Here, as elsewhere, data was selected for its significance, rather than for its representivity in a statistical or quantifiable sense.

One of the problems with a phenomenological approach to social science is the danger that this approach renders a welter of unordered "insights", and nothing more. This, together with the practical difficulty of gaining significant direct access, has often limited this perspective to small scale "micro" research. It has been argued elsewhere<sup>29</sup> that this lack of structure as well as the pure subjectivity of much "phenomenological" research has resulted from an incomplete and fundamentally flawed incorporation of Husserlian concepts. Both in an attempt to avoid this error, and to avoid the accusation of an unstructured floods of insights, Chapters One and Two attempt to survey ideal typical "ethics" as well as developing an ideal type of a "liberal ethics of responsible action". These ideal types at least help delineate what we are looking for, as well as introducing a supra-personal element in the research.<sup>30</sup>

It is certainly clear that phenomenological or qualitative or interpretative social research can be rigorous. Paul Ricoeur has, for example, drawn an analogy between text analysis and hermeneutics in social research. He constructs a model or paradigm comparing these two:

- If the object of text analysis is the written as opposed to the spoken word, then the object of the social sciences is Weber's sinnhaft orientiertes Verhalten, meaningfully oriented behaviour<sup>31</sup>

observed or recorded as opposed to experienced by the agent. Four critical differences emerge between both the word as spoken and the written word and the agent's action and the action observed;

- Whereas both the spoken word and the agent's action are unique events in time, the written word and observed action "escape" this uniqueness, become atemporal and, therefore, accessible at all other times;<sup>32</sup>
- Whereas the spoken word has a speaker, the written word "escapes" its writer and develops an independent existence.

"In the same way ... an action is detached from its agent and develops consequences of its own ... our deeds escape us and have effects which we did intend." 33

- Just as the written word has references which go beyond the immediate situation in which it was written, so the observed or recorded<sup>34</sup> act has a relevance which goes beyond the immediate or existential<sup>35</sup> situation in which it occurred.
- Finally, just as the written word is addressed to an infinite, open, future audience,<sup>36</sup> so too is the act observed.

This model enables Ricoeur to suggest that the relationship between the two archetypical processes of the natural and social sciences, respectively ERKLAREN, or explanation and VERSTEHEN, or understanding, is not, as Dilthey had it a dichotomous one, but rather a dialectical one.

Concretely, the social scientist guesses (as per Verstehen) the possible meanings of the action observed, <sup>37</sup> and then proceeds to attempt to validate his guesses as per Erklaren through a process of balancing probabilities.

Postulating this movement from understanding to explanation (and back again) creates a supra-subjective and, at least, contestable area of knowledge for the social sciences.

Whilst Ricoeur's model has not been followed in detail here, it does illustrate the author's attempt to capture a structure of meaning from the "data" examined in this dissertation.

##### 5. The Structure of the Dissertation

This introduction states the hypothesis, defines key terms and indicates methodology:

In Section One:

- Chapter One surveys ethical models in the twentieth century; whilst
- Chapter Two develops an ideal type of an ethics of responsible liberal action.

In Section Two:

- Chapter Three surveys liberal thought and action in the period 1948 - 1984;
- Chapter Four reviews policy statements in three liberal organisation settings; and
- Chapter Five examines liberal options and opinions with regard to the 1983 Constitutional Referendum, resulting from interviews with key liberal actors.

The Conclusion reviews the hypothesis and the evidence discussed and evaluates the extent to which the four propositions contained in the hypothesis have been demonstrated.

SECTION ONE

ETHICAL MODELS

CHAPTER ONE

ETHICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

"... successive orthodoxies of moral philosophy in English in the present century have been ... remarkably barren".

Mary Warnock

"... an ethic of ultimate ends (inner conviction) and an ethic responsibility are not absolute contrasts but rather supplements, which only in unison constitute a genuine man".

Max Weber

"We can merely ask ... that, all things considered, the evil that one inflicts be lesser than that which is being forestalled".

Simone de Beauvoir

"Perhaps we cannot prevent this world from being a world in which children are tortured. But we can reduce the number of tortured children".

Albert Camus

The purpose of this chapter is to develop a framework for the meaning which is to be attached to the concept ethical in subsequent discussion. This is attempted chiefly from a philosophical perspective firstly because this is the perspective most familiar to the writer; but also because this appears to be a useful approach to political ethics which is the essential subject of the thesis.

### 1. English Moral Philosophy

In the twentieth century English moral philosophy can be seen as a derivative of the rationalism of Descartes, and the empiricism of Locke, Berkely and Hume. Twentieth century writers developed a positivist philosophy which was to be vastly influential in the social sciences. As a broad school, most writers would be classified as linguistic analysts, for reasons which will become apparant all too quickly. How then was Ethics approached by this group of philosophers? The first, and often, seemingly, the only question to be addressed was the question: what is ethics?

We begin with G.E. Moore, the major spokesman for what has come to be known as the Intuitionism school.

"Ethics, Moore says, is concerned with, and may even be defined by, its characteristic concern with, the predicate 'good' and its converse 'bad'; and though this concern may take more than one form, the central question is what the predicate 'good' means or stands for." 1

What is good? Good is undefinable, says Moore:

"If I am asked 'what is good?' my answer is that good is good and that is the end of the matter." 2

Good is not an adjectival expression, it is rather "an assertion of substance." 3

From good we move to the concept of right. This Moore believes is definable, but only in relation to the undefinable good.

"the right course of action for any agent is, by definition, that course of action which will, as a matter of fact, produce the greatest amount of good in the circumstances." 4

5

Pritchard and Ross, developed Moore's work by adding another undefinable quality to Moore's undefinable good; the concept of duty. This like good cannot be experienced naturally (i.e. seen, smelt, etc.); nor can it be derived logically. It is knowable only in our intuition - hence the label intuitionism.

This does not get us very far. Moore, Pritchard and Ross have asserted that ethics and moral judgements are not judgements similar to the judgements we make in other areas of life. They do not arise out of experience (i.e. they are not empirical), nor can they be logically deduced. This tells us a little about what they are not.

Let us move then to our second 'school' - emotivism. Here, the philosopher Ayer,<sup>6</sup> noting the assertion of the Logical Positivists that there are only two kinds of propositions - tautologies (adjectival expressions) and empirically verifiable expressions - asserts that moral judgements are neither. What they do, in contrast, is to express<sup>7</sup> the feelings of the speaker.

Stevenson then proceeds to distinguish between belief (what one understands a proposition to imply) and attitudes (whether one agrees<sup>8</sup> with this proposition or not).

Thus he concludes:

"the 'major use' of ethical judgements is 'not to indicate facts, but to create an influence'"<sup>9</sup>

Ethics then could be defined according to the purpose of ethical discourse. We could detect the ethical by detecting the motive of the ethical speaker. "Are you trying to influence my actions?" we could ask.

Whilst this does illuminate a further, and indeed an important, component of ethics, it is still not very helpful. Further, it is not necessarily a general characteristic of ethics. As Warnock notes:

"moral advice may be given in entirely dispassionate terms"<sup>10</sup>

So to our third school: prescriptivism. This school continues the enquiry into what ethics is by continuing to ask what the ethical speaker is doing.

Urmson suggests that in making an ethical statement we are seeking to grade "things" in our world on a hierarchy of the good or the desired,<sup>11</sup> rather as a sorter grades apples into categories of different kinds.

<sup>12</sup>  
Hare argues that in making ethical statements the speaker is seeking not merely to influence others but to prescribe both to them and to himself<sup>13</sup> how they should act. Moral statements, then, are guidelines for actions or prescriptions (hence the name).

Both Urmson and Hare would agree that moral statements are neither empirically knowable, nor logically derived. Hare argues that all moral statements derive from or are based upon moral principles, to which individuals freely subscribe. Such moral principles are in an important sense beyond reason. Thus both Hare (and all the other English philosophers discussed here) assert the futility of ethical disputations - either you subscribe to the principle or you do not.

Having surveyed these three schools, there is much to commend Warnock's judgement that:

"successive orthodoxies of moral philosophy in English in the present century have been ... remarkably barren." 14

Why then did we bother with this survey? Firstly, because it provides an important starting point for the review of later schools, particularly the existentialist. Secondly, because it illustrates both the difficulty and failure of what we might very broadly term rationalist philosophy to deal with the problem of ethics. This failure has central significance when it is considered that political liberalism is a direct genetic descendant of this rationalist philosophy.

The rationalist seeks statements which are universal, unambiguous and not capable of contradiction, or logical inconsistency. Yet ethical choices seldom render up such qualities. Warnock in her concluding remarks notes five areas of difficulty in choosing the good as Moore would have us do:

- people disagree as to what constitutes human welfare;
- we must often 'weigh' the short against the long-term;
- often any one action will harm some and benefit others;
- sometimes an action will harm one individual in some ways and benefit him in others;
- finally, most often the information required to make the above assessments is partially or completely lacking.

This is the real world. Yet English rationalist philosophy often seems to defy common experience in order to satisfy reason.

2. Max Weber's Ethics of Responsibility

We turn now from English shores to Germany: to the man who is almost certainly the outstanding sociologist of our century.

Weber was born in 1864 into a home dominated by politics. His father, a jurist by training, was a prosperous politician active in local government (Berlin), regional affairs (Prussia) and in the new national assembly which resulted from Bismark's efforts to create a unified Germany. Weber Senior was a supporter of the National Liberals led by Bennigsen.

Weber Junior was bookish and learned from the beginning, writing, for example, an historical essay entitled "Concerning the Course of German History, with Special Regard to the Positions of Kaiser and Pope" at the age of 14. He was also subject to illness, contracting meningitis at the age of 4. Ill-health was to be his constant companion through his life.

A religious sceptic, Weber trained as a Jurist at Heidelberg. After practising law for a brief period, he pursued an academic career, returning to Heidelberg to take up a professorial appointment. Shortly after moving to Heidelberg, however, he suffered an attack on, or partial collapse of, his nervous system. This neurotic disorder was to be present until his death. Indeed as one biographer remarks, "his way of life from this time on seems to oscillate between neurotic collapse,

travel and work." <sup>16</sup> His travels took him through the length and breadth of Europe, to the United States in 1904, and to the East.

Although Weber constantly entered key political debates - for example, seeking (unsuccessfully) personally to persuade Ludendorff to offer "his head" in expiation of German war-deeds, and thus save the honour of the

<sup>17</sup> Nation, Weber himself declined political office repeatedly. During his lifetime his sympathies shifted from Monarchist to Progressive

<sup>18</sup> Liberal. In his widow's account he had sympathies for the social democrats, but believed because he could not share a workers lifestyle

<sup>19</sup> he could not authentically espouse their cause.

Aron, has suggested a contradiction in the fact that the man who advocated a politics of responsibility was himself never prepared to become directly involved in the political process.

"Weber refused to employ the means necessary to obtain political power. He was prepared, in the abstract, to calculate human reactions and to act in accordance with his calculations, but as a human being he refused to employ the means which he knew to be essential." <sup>20</sup>

Whether this criticism is justified is hard to judge. What opportunities were really available to Weber? Certainly his serious and chronic ill-health was a barrier. That Weber possessed both energy and courage is attested by the consistent forthrightness of his views (and

their prolific quality) as well as the direct interventions he did make, such as his attempts to have the Kaiser restrict German submarine activities during World War I; his efforts on behalf of 'black-listed' academic colleagues, and his espousal of the cause of constitutional reform.

However, it is Weber's thought rather than his actions which concern us here: in particular, his writings about ethics in the political process, as it was emerging in the early decades of this century. Weber's views on this subject are most lucidly set out in his lecture "Politics as a Vocation" given at Munich University in the shadow of the end of World War I, and the short-lived Bavarian (socialist) revolution. In the early part of this lecture, Weber describes the development of modern politics. We shall follow this description in outline as it is important in relation to his discussion of ethics.

Weber commences by defining the State as:

"a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory;" and

"the modern state is a compulsory association which organises domination." 21

Politics, therefore, "means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or within a

22  
state." It is of critical importance to Weber that all political action is based on the implicit or explicit, threatened or actual use of violence.

The modern state has emerged generically from the struggle between the Prince and the Estates (Aristocracy). In this long struggle which marks the beginning of the end of feudalism, a series of archetypical or modal political types emerge:

- Initially, the clergy whose value lies both in their link with the church, but also in their education;
- Then the literati. In the West, these are seen in the Renaissance advisers to the feudal Monarchs and rulers;
- Then the court nobility or gentry: not aristocrats, but men of standing, who derive their status from the role the Prince affords them in the affairs of state;
- Then the jurist, who in a state increasingly committed to the rational government of the affairs of men, are particularly well-suited to govern.
- And, finally the political professional, or the person who treated politics as a calling; who lived not only for politics but also from politics.

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This rise of this 'full-time' politician, or career politician was to be traced in the development of the political party as a social

institution. The party, of course, has its origin in the creation of representative assemblies of one kind or another.

In England, the creation of a representative assembly was followed by the formation of political clubs as well as relatively loose alliances amongst members of Parliament. Over time these solidified into parties in the sense of on-going associations. At first these were active really only at election time, and even then on a limited basis. However, particularly with the extension of the franchise in 1868, mass organisations became necessary, as did the caucus system. This led to the creation of the election agent and the whip. Now a party machine was necessary, and someone, of course, had to manage that machine.

In the United States, the emergence of relatively non-ideological parties led to a situation where the party machine was based largely on the spoils system. Here loyalty was bought with the promise of reward in the form of administrative office. This has led to the absence of a civil service tradition in the United States.

In Germany in contrast, politics is controlled by a well-trained civil service. Parliament is relatively unimportant, and the party system is ideological, but highly fragmented. The proportional representation system, Weber notes, has contributed to this.

Against this backdrop, Weber enters the field of ethics: "What kind of man must one be if he is to be allowed to put his hand on the wheel of history?"<sup>25</sup> Weber replies: three qualities are necessary:

- Passion, in the sense of a cause. This cause must be chosen as a subjective, value choice. Without this, politics makes no sense;
- Responsibility, for "The final result of political action often, no, even regularly, stands in completely inadequate and often even paradoxical relation to its original meaning";<sup>26</sup>
- A sense of proportion, which enables him to combine passion with responsibility.

These three qualities lead Weber to the distinction between the ethic of inner conviction and the ethic of responsibility. These ethics thus distinguished may be delineated as follows:

- The ethic of inner conviction is the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount: of 'pure' Christianity. It rejects all violence. It is concerned with individual motive and action not social consequence;
- The ethic of responsibility, in contrast, accepts what a later philosopher was to describe as the antinomies of action.<sup>27</sup> In terms of this ethic the political actor weighs the consequences of his actions, takes account of the real world and the deficiencies of the people on whom the good end result of the action is dependent.

It is clear from the above analysis that Weber's sympathies lie with the ethic of responsibility. Indeed his definition of politics as inevitably involving violence precludes the inner conviction purist by definition. Weber says as much:

"He who seeks the salvation of the souls, of his own and others, should not seek it along the avenue of politics, for the quite different tasks of politics can only be solved by violence." 28

However, this ethic of responsibility which Weber favours is not content-emptied utilitarianism or formless expediency. His own words again are the most eloquent advocates of the balance he seeks:

"If in these times ... politicians crop up en masse and pass the watchword, 'The world is stupid and base, not I', 'The responsibility for the consequences does not fall upon me but upon others whom I serve and whose stupidity or baseness I shall eradicate,' then I declare frankly that I would first enquire into the degree of inner poise backing this ethic of ultimate ends. I am under the impression that in nine out of ten cases I deal with windbags who do not fully realise what they take upon themselves but who intoxicate themselves with romantic sensations."

"From a human point of view, this is not very interesting nor does it move me profoundly. However, it is immensely moving when a mature man - no matter whether old or young in years - is aware of a responsibility for the consequences of his conduct and really feels such responsibility with heart and soul. He acts by following an ethic of responsibility and somewhere he reaches the point where he says: 'Here I stand, I can do no other.' ... Insofar as this is true, an ethic of ultimate ends (inner conviction) and an ethic of responsibility are not absolute contrasts but rather supplements, which only in unison constitute a genuine man - a man who can have the 'calling for politics'". 29

Weber ends his 1918 lecture by suggesting that the debate be continued in ten years hence. He then makes the chilling prediction:

"Not summer's bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness, no matter which group may triumph externally now." 30

Death spared him two years later from seeing just how right he was.

### 3. Existentialist Ethics: The Ethics of Ambiguity

Following our examination of English Moral Philosophy and Weberian Ethics, we turn now to what may be viewed as one of the major philosophical styles of the twentieth century.

The word style is used deliberately as an existentialist school is an impossible concept. One of the unifying theses of existentialist philosophies is their abhorrence of objectivism, or sets of prescriptions or codes or systems.

Initially, we are going to look at three existentialist writers:

Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre. Thereafter we shall take a more detailed look at the ethical approach of Simone de Beauvoir.

#### Kierkegaard

Kierkegaard in particular and existentialism in general may be seen as a response to, and a protest against, the rationalist philosophies dominant from the time of the Renaissance. Put differently, they mark

a move from what Van Peursen has characterised as the ontological phase  
31  
of man's culture to a functional phase.

Warnock observes that an essential characteristic of all existentialist writing is to be found in its purpose, this being to free the reader  
32  
from illusion. In particular, Kierkegaard wrote to free people from the illusion of objectivity. Warnock comments:

"Objectivity may be characterised in various ways. It shows itself in the tendency to accept rules governing both behaviour and thought. Thus, any subject matter which is bound by rules of evidence, or which can be properly taught in the classroom, is in the grip of objectivity." 33

Just as the English moral philosophers insisted that ethical propositions were different, in that they were neither experienced empirically, nor deduced logically, so Kierkegaard's entire philosophy is asserted to be different. If life is to be captured in eternal or absolute rules, then life is to be observed rather than lived. Truth, for Kierkegaard is fundamentally subjective. It can only be experienced and known subjectively. Indeed it can only be known when the subject goes to meet it in a leap of faith.

Kierkegaard's contribution then is to go beyond the merely rational and universal. It is to shift the focus from what is being said (the ontological perspective concerned with essence) to the how of what is being asked, answered and the answer's reception (the functional perspective; concerned with existence).

Heidegger

Heidegger replaces Kierkegaard's distinction between objective and subjective knowledge with another:

- authentic and inauthentic existence.

Heidegger is concerned then with existence and its nature, or with

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Existence and Time, as his major work is entitled. Man's existence is simultaneous actual, in the sense that it is enmeshed in a particular context of time and place, and it is potential in that man can transcend that particular context - he can change in a willed way both where he is and what he does. It is this tension between man's potential and actual existence which defines the authenticity or inauthenticity of his being.

Man lives authentically when he realises his potential existence by willed, chosen actions for which he takes full responsibility. So the ethical is that which I choose, that which I accept responsibility for.

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Sartre

The foundations of Kierkegaard and Heidegger bring us to the philosophical and literary writings of Jean Paul Sartre. They also bring us to an historical event which has had the utmost significance on twentieth century ethics - the Second World War.

This war, with the depths of evil which produced it - and which it produced - punctured both the idealism and optimism of ethicists and philosophers, dominant since the Renaissance. This optimism was the promise of rationalism. Man was a rational being. The universe was an orderly system replete with moral codes and natural laws merely awaiting discovery.

Who could believe this after the holocaust of World War II?

Universalism - as embodied politically in the League of Nations - and Rationalism lay in ruins.

It is against this background that Sartre developed his perspective. He firstly affirms the fundamental subjectivity of all knowledge. Any view of the world must be the view of someone. On the basis of Heidegger's actual and potential existence, Sartre builds his distinction between Beings-in-themselves such as material objects, and Beings-for-themselves such as people, who have both the freedom and the capacity to transcend their present existence and transform it at any moment in time.

This ability to transform my existence is the same as my capacity to act in the world. It is this ability to act (or to put it differently to change my present "being" ) which is the constitutive quality of my conscious existence. This ability to act is a desire to overcome or

change a fact (such as being cold) of present existence. It is my ability to project myself from a given present state to a wished future state.

Man is always free to transcend or change his present. He may not recognise this freedom. Indeed he may flee from it, for it is a terrible burden constantly demanding responsible choice, and choice which must be willed, and which cannot be derived from universal truths. To do so (i.e. to flee) is to live in bad faith. This is the equivalent of Heidegger's inauthentic existence, and to Kierkegaard's objectivity.

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What then of ethics? Sartre agrees with Kant, that ethical acts must be the result of choices freely made. He, however, disagrees that such choices can be made rationally in the sense of choosing that which is consistent with some pre-existing categorical imperative. For Sartre, man must choose freely, responsibly and subjectively, in the sense of making his choice in direct response to the situation he lives, rather than in conformity with some code. In Sartre's view, to live ethically, man must choose - constantly - in both full freedom and responsibility. But how does man exercise those choices that are of the very core of ethics, i.e. those choices which affect others? This surely is the very heart of morality.

The problem of "the other" is a major problem in Sartre's ethical perspective. In Being and Nothingness,<sup>37</sup> Sartre notes that our very consciousness is characterised (indeed constituted) by our attempts on the world, that is, our attempt to capture, control and change the reality around us - to "project" ourselves on to it. To the extent that that reality embraces other people, our relationship with them is characterised by this attempt to control. This attempt is of course reciprocal.

Indeed, Sartre goes further to argue that our highest relationships with others - i.e. our relationships with those whom we love - are characterised by this ever to be frustrated desire to free ourselves of them. This leads him to postulate three possible outcomes for a love relationship over time.

- Indifference (when we turn our attention away from the loved one to someone or something else);
- Masochism (when we surrender ourselves to the loved one);
- Sadism (when we demand and obtain this same surrender from the loved one).

No wonder his work was characterised as a philosophy of pessimism!

Again, what then of ethics?

"The possibility of acting must be realised in the context of a concrete situation, where the agent is surrounded by actual other people. The moral question for each man is, then, to what extent he can escape from the bonds of his particular situation, and how much responsibility he will take for creating, act by act, the world in which he lives." 38 (own emphasis)

Warnock concludes her survey of existentialist ethics with this epigrammatic observation:

"The only general law of ethics must be to avoid general laws." 39

#### Simone De Beauvoir

We have traced the foundations of existentialism in Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre. However, existentialist ethics receives its most developed and lucid treatment in a work of Simone De Beauvoir. The work, first published in 1948, and entitled "The Ethics of Ambiguity", addressed the fundamental ethical dilemma's of modern man in the most direct of ways. <sup>40</sup> The aim of this work is unlike Kierkegaard, not to evade illusion but to "assume" our fundamental ambiguity. <sup>41</sup>

She commences by making the point that without failure, there can be no ethics. This can be extended by saying that if what we had to do was easy or obvious, there would be no need for ethics. <sup>42</sup> Her second assertion is that there are no absolute values - no universal moral code. This immediately raises the Dostoiwesky problem "If God does not exist, everything is permitted." Not so, replies De Beauvoir. Indeed,

the very absence of an external source of justification creates the  
necessity for man to justify himself.<sup>43</sup> It does mean that man is free,  
and this is central to her conception of ethics.<sup>44</sup> The struggle  
between man's true existence in responsibly accepted freedom and his  
bondage in facticity is a theme which recurs throughout this work.<sup>45</sup>  
This provides De Beauvoir, and her reader, with a useful definition of  
ethics: "Ethics is the triumph of freedom over facticity."<sup>46</sup>

De Beauvoir then describes a series of retreats from freedom, which  
equate to Kierkegaard's objectivity, Heidegger's inauthenticity and  
Sartre's bad faith:

- the serious man, who avoids both ambiguity and responsibility  
through his unquestioned allegiance to something, such as the  
army, the "Revolution", economic growth, irrespective of the  
costs this thing demands.<sup>47</sup>
- the adventurer, who immerses himself in an activity without ever  
consciously choosing that activity's end ... "thereby (allowing)  
themselves to be collaborationists in '41 and communists in '45".  
The adventurer "thinks he can assert his own existence without  
taking into account others."<sup>48</sup><sup>49</sup>
- the passionate man, who adopts an object totally. We could call  
him the fanatic. The end is unquestioned and unexceptionable, and  
the means follow automatically.<sup>50</sup>
- The aesthetic, or detached observer: those who when the Germans  
entered Paris said "Let's try to take the point of view of

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history" . Here the present is sacrificed to some abstract and ideological past; or to some vague 'alles sal regkom' future.

Next De Beauvoir tackles the problem which Sartre half-addressed and failed to solve: the problem of the other. The other is central to ethics, for as she notes: "Man is never oppressed by things ... but

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... (by) other men" This being so to our concept of (individual) freedom, we must add the concept of the liberation (of others).

Freedom in its very nature must seek this liberation.:

"A freedom wills itself genuinely only by willing itself as an indefinite movement through the freedom of others."

and

"to be free is not to have the power to do anything you like; ... the existence of others as a freedom defines my situation and is even the condition of my own freedom." 53

This of course does not resolve the problem of the other; it merely recognises it. It is close to the classical liberal conception of individual freedom, where the individual is free to do anything provided he does not encroach on the freedom of others. The problem is that in the real world almost every human action impinges on the opportunities and interests of others. In a concrete situation this formulation becomes an absurdity. De Beauvoir recognises this absurdity and faces it directly. It leads her to describe the

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antinomies of action.

In seeking liberation (that is freedom for others as well as freedom for oneself), the liberator has to impinge on the freedom of the oppressor. Indeed the oppressor has to be oppressed. <sup>55</sup> This was one of the objections which the Southern States in the American union used to oppose the abolition of slavery. Abolition denied the Southern planter the freedom to own slaves. <sup>56</sup> But this is only the first antinomy. Not only is it necessary in seeking liberation to oppress (and often kill) the oppressor, but often:

"We are obliged to destroy not only the oppressor but also those who serve him, whether they do so out of ignorance or out of constraint." <sup>57</sup>

Thirdly, often freedoms have to be prioritised. From 1939 to 1945 the first task was to defeat Hitler and not to liberate colonies. So we may find ourselves opposing and even killing those whose cause we acknowledge to be just, but whose timing we believe is inappropriate. <sup>58</sup> Finally, in pursuing liberation we will be forced to sacrifice from amongst those on our side. Those "antinomies" attest the fact that "no action can be generated for man without its being immediately generated against man." <sup>59</sup> De Beauvoir argues that all ideologies, all governments, all parties seek to conceal this paradox. Fascist and Marxist ideology seek to do so by either denying individual existence altogether, as we have seen in an earlier section, or holding the individual in contempt. Then the sacrifice of an individual - of <sup>60</sup> whatever category - ceases to matter. In so doing these ideologies, <sup>61</sup> and the societies they control pay a high price.

Another way in which parties, authorities and movements seek to conceal the paradox and evade these antinomies is to justify the sacrifice on the basis of necessity:

"why this bloody revolution instead of slow reforms?  
... if only one way shows itself to be possible,  
if the unrolling of history is fatal, there is no  
longer any place for the anguish or choice, or for  
regret, or for outrage." 62

Yet another attempt to evade the fundamental antinomies of ethical acts is to be found in the justification of the Future. For centuries, religious doctrine has sought both justification and edification of present sacrifice and present suffering in some mystical or apocalyptic future time. In the rationalism of the 18th and 19th century, the concept of Progress came to replace this as an all embracing justification. Modern ideologies continue to justify present sacrifice on the basis of the promised better or even ideal tomorrow. 63

De Beauvoir rejects all these evasions. They are all forms of facticity. They do not resolve the antinomies of action. What then, to ask the Dostoivesky question, is to be done? Ambiguity is central to De Beauvoir's answer. This is not to be confused with the Sartrean concept of the absurd. This absurdity empties existence of all possibility of meaning and leads Sartre to condemn man as a "useless passion". 64 Ambiguity in contrast does not deny meaning, but merely asserts that meaning is never fixed, or given. It can never be

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assumed, but must be constantly "won". This then does not deny an ethics - though it does deny a given, universal code.

"Ethics does not furnish recipes any more than do science or art ... there must be a trial and a decision in each case." 66

"The fact is that no behaviour is ever authorised to begin with, and one of the concrete consequences of existentialist ethics is the rejection of all previous justifications which might be drawn from the civilisation the age, and the culture;" 67

This general proposition is illustrated as follows:

"Out of disappointment in love a young girl takes an overdose of pheno-barbital; in the morning friends find her dying, they call a doctor, she is saved; later on she becomes a happy mother of a family; her friends were right in considering her suicide as a hasty and heedless act and in putting her into a position to reject it or return to it freely. But in asylums, one sees melancholic patients who have tried to commit suicide twenty times, who devote their freedom to seeking the means of escaping their jailers and of putting an end to their intolerable anguish; the doctor who gives them a friendly pat on the shoulder is their tyrant and their torturer." 68

Though fundamentally committed to this ethics of contingency, De Beauvoir nevertheless affirms the individual as an end.

To conclude, let De Beauvoir speak for herself once more:

"We can merely ask that (ethical) decisions are not taken hastily and lightly, and that, all things considered, the evil that one inflicts be lesser than that which is being forestalled."

Existential ethics involves:

"... in each case, confronting the values realised with the values aimed at, and the meaning of the act with its context." 69

"... an action which waits to serve man ought to be careful not to forget him on the way." 70

4. Albert Camus: The Ethics of the Second Prize

Our fourth perspective is that offered by the life and writings of Albert Camus. Camus was born in 1913 in Algeria of a French father and Spanish mother. His schooling and university education took place in that country (Algeria). In 1940, he moved to Paris, joining the French Resistance in 1941. He served the Resistance as a journalist contributing the editorials of the underground publication Combat.

Camus is more writer and playwright than philosopher - though all of his literary works have a philosophical quality. His writings also include important works of non-fiction. In particular, two works examine the philosophical (and ethical) legitimacy of suicide<sup>71</sup> and of murder.<sup>72</sup> Camus was awarded the Nobel prize for Literature in 1957.<sup>73</sup> He was killed in a motor accident in France in 1960, at the age of 57.

In this section, we will not be examining Camus' major philosophical writings on suicide and murder, as these deal more with an intensely personal ethics: the response of the individual to reality as he experiences it. Instead, we wish to look more at his ethical writings

of a more directly political nature. <sup>74</sup> For this we are using a selection of essays spanning some twenty years of his life, selected <sup>75</sup> for publication in English by Camus in the last year of his life.

The essays cover a wide spectrum of Camus' political concerns:

- Nazi Germany;
- Spain;
- Algeria; and
- Hungary;

as areas of political conflict. They also covered his beliefs about certain concepts and ideas:

- freedom;
- justice;
- pessimism;
- courage; and
- the role of the artist.

We shall trace some of these concerns with both territories and ideas as they add an essential fourth dimension to our conception of ethics in this century.

### Freedom and Justice

Camus understood well the antinomies of ethical action. Having joined the Communist Party in Algeria in 1934, he parted company with the

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Marxists shortly after the war. Thereafter, he inhabited a barren no-man's land between the politics of the left and of the right. In this lonely, and generally thankless position, Camus was occupying an essentially liberal position.

In essence, Camus refused to sacrifice freedom on the altar of justice.

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He understood freedom in common with his fellow existentialists, as constituting the very essence of man as man. Camus did not see freedom

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in some ideal or absolute way. He also noted that:

"... freedom is not made up principally of privileges; it is made up especially of duties." 79

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It was these onerous duties that caused many to reject it. Freedom had to be chosen constantly by the individual. These repeated choices demanded that the individual choose often between bad alternatives.

Often it demanded a choice between ironic alternatives: to choose, as Camus often put it, neither to suffer terror, nor to inflict it.

Justice is a value honoured by Camus. Yet he notes its potential conflict with freedom. Indeed he notes:

"... the great event of the twentieth century was the foresaking of the values of freedom by the revolutionary movement, the progressive retreat of socialism based on freedom before the attacks of a Caesarian and military socialism." 81

Noting that after Marx freedom had been viewed as a bourgeois hoax, Camus asserts an error:

"For it should have been said merely that bourgeois freedom was a hoax - ... that bourgeois freedom was not freedom or, in the best of cases, was not yet freedom." 82

But this was not said. Rather:

"The contention was that we needed justice first and that we would come to freedom later on ... " 83

### Algeria

The antinomy between freedom and justice takes on a very concrete form in Camus' writings about Algeria. This is a country he knows well and to which he is deeply committed. He had encountered the realities of Arab poverty and injustice there in his youth. He is bound on the other hand to the French Algerian community by his mother and brother who continued to live there until his death. Torn between these two commitments, he walks a tightrope which could only be escaped by <sup>84</sup>eschewing the subject altogether. This he could not do.

So Camus was caught between the torture of the French authorities and the terror of the Arab rebels. He condemned both and persisted in seeking a third option which would reconcile the legitimate demands of the 9 million Arab inhabitants of Algeria and the 1,2 million French settlers, many of whose roots went back for more than a century. His efforts to do this raise parallels with the political dilemmas of South Africa which are altogether remarkable:

- We have already noted that Camus rejects the tactics of both torture and terror. He notes the terrible interaction of the two:

"To justify himself, each (that is both torturer and terrorist) relies on the other's crime." 85

Yet some way must be found to break this "infernal circle" of violence, for "... the question is not how to die separately but rather how to live together." 86

Thereafter Camus, in association with other French and Arab moderates appeals for a civilian truce, in which, for the duration of the fighting, the civilian population will not be the conscious target of either side. 87

- Camus persists in hoping for, and working towards a "third option", one which involved neither the defeat of the French authorities, nor of the Arab rebels, but a reconciliation of both the Arab and French inhabitants of Algeria:

"... the French in Algeria (who) if they have no right to oppress anyone, do have the right not to be oppressed themselves and to be their own masters in the land of their birth. There are other ways of re-establishing the necessary justice than substituting one injustice for another." 88

- In calling for this third way, Camus noted that a major obstacle was popular fatalism:

"I know that the great tragedies of history often fascinate men with approaching horror. Paralysed, they cannot make up their minds to do anything but wait. So they wait and one day the Gorgon devours them. ... They are too ready to believe that, after all, nothing but bloodshed makes progress and that stronger always progresses at the expense of the weaker." 89

- For the politics of the third way, Camus looks to the Swiss confederation, and a particular French/Algerian adaptation of it. 90  
This adaptation would certainly be labelled consociational today and involves a rejection of the principle of one-man, one-vote in a unitary state which principle derives, as Camus notes, from 1789 91 and which he notes "now deserves to be called Ancien Regime."

### Ethical Modesty

Camus is not a political campaigner blinded by the realities of his time. He is well aware that the causes he champions are unpopular (though he derives neither pleasure, nor justification from this fact). 92  
He is also well aware of the possibility of defeat, and of the debilitatory effects of defeat. 93 Camus is not able to overcome this defeat by recourse to some faith in another reality or some transcendent metaphysics. It is this defeat that creates the absurdity, isolation and alienation which are the mark of his novels and plays. 94  
Yet in the midst of this absurdity, neither suicide, nor murder is permitted to man.

What then can be hoped for? The ethics of the second prize:

"If, after all, men cannot always make history have a meaning, they can always act so that their own life has one." 95

In terms of man's political actions, this means that:

"Perhaps we cannot prevent this world from being a world in which children are tortured. But we can reduce the number of tortured children." 96

#### 5. Drawing Together The Threads

What then can we say about ethics in our century? Firstly, with the English moral philosophers, we must note that ethical options can be answered neither from pure experience, nor from pure reason. Whilst ethical debate is not outside experience or reason, it is not reducible to either of these. Ethics involves man in choices - choices which he alone can make and which he cannot subordinate either to fact, or to logic.

Secondly, we note with Weber that these choices can be approached from the perspective of conscience, or from the perspective of consequence. Responsible ethics must embrace both, holding in tension both inner conviction and an assessment of the consequences of one's actions in tension.

Thirdly, with De Beauvoir we must accept the antinomies of action, and the fundamental ambiguity of all ethical questions. These means, inter alia, that no ethical question can be considered outside of the unique set of historic circumstances in which it occurs.

Finally, with Camus we must note the further contradiction between freedom on the one hand and justice on the other: of the impossibility of reconciling perfectly the freedom of one group with justice for another. More importantly, we must accept an ethical modesty. Human society is such that we will not achieve the first prize we seek. And yet our ideals are not worthless. Our striving for their inevitably partial fulfilment is constitutive of our own authentic individual existence, and the only repository of hope for the survival of mankind.

CHAPTER TWO

DIETRICH BONHOEFFER'S ETHICAL MODEL

"Hitler's originality lay in his realisation that effective revolutions in modern circumstances are carried out with, and not against, the power of the State."

Allan Bullock

"There are no more private citizens."

Robert Ley

"Mutiny and revolution are words which do not exist in the vocabulary of a German Officer."

General Ludwig Beck

"Bring me certain evidence that England is prepared to go to war over Czechoslovakia and I will put an end to this regime."

General Ludwig Beck

"The ultimate responsible question is not how I might emerge from this affair heroically, but rather how the coming generation shall (best) live on."

Dietrich Bonhoeffer

In Chapter One we examined four twentieth century approaches to ethics. In this chapter we shall be looking at what the writer believes is a model of a liberal ethics of responsibility. This model is to be found in the thought and actions of Dietrich Bonhoeffer understood in the context of the military conspiracy against Adolf Hitler.

That a model of liberal ethics is seen in the context of Nazi Germany is not meant to suggest direct parallels between circumstances there and then and modern day South Africa. If parallels do exist, they are very broad in nature. Both societies have experienced deep, fundamental and even primordial conflict; both exhibit high degrees of injustice; both allow very limited and morally ambiguous avenues of ethical action. The German model is studied here, however, because it is a contemporary, concrete situation in which ethical actions can be matched against ethical propositions. In this respect, the direct participation of the ethical thinker, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, in the active military conspiracy to remove Hitler is particularly valuable.

In this chapter, we will firstly try to sketch the environment in which the conspiracy was conceived and developed; then we will sketch its nature and effect; finally we will examine Bonhoeffer's writing on ethics against this background.

1. Nazi Germany : 1933 to 1938

Germany is one of Europe's youngest nations and has enjoyed the most tempestuous of paths through its short history as a unified territory. It has been the centre (and also in the eyes of many, the cause) of the two wars modern man has designated as world wars.

Why is this so? One notable commentator, A J P Taylor, has asked and answered the question:

"I was anxious to discover why a nation so highly civilized in most ways should have failed to develop political balance." 2

His answer is given as follows:

"The key to Germany's past is to be found in her relations with her neighbours - predominantly defensive towards the West, always aggressive towards the East." 3

Germany, Taylor contends writing in 1946, has failed to find her proper place in Europe. Existing on the ethnic edge of "Western Europe", confronted by some two hundred and fifty million peoples of slavic race to the East, Germany's insecurity and consequent aggression is to be expected, he contends.  
4

As this is the case, Germany's division after the war is "the kindest policy towards the Germans themselves," for:

"A re-united Germany would cease to be free: either it would become a militaristic state in order to resume the march towards European domination, or its power would be compulsorily reduced by foreign intervention, if the former allies had the sense to come together again in time." 5

Taylor's view is quoted here not because the writer shares it, but because of its focus on the fundamental geo-political tension of Germany. It is a tension analagous to that of South Africa as the only white ruled territory on a predominantly black continent.

#### Germany in 1933

The events from the end of the second world war up until Hitler's assumption of office in 1933 are well-known. What is attempted here is a description of the society which created Hitler and which in turn he formed in the years of his peacetime administration.

A first important observation is that Hitler's accession to the highest political office in Germany was both constitutional and legitimate. Hitler at the time was the leader of the largest political party represented in the Reichstag. Hindenberg, the Reich's President under the (liberal) Weimar Constitution invited Hitler to attempt to form a government which would command a Parliamentary majority. Hitler succeeded in this through the coalitions he struck firstly with Hugenberg's Nationalists and secondly with the Catholic-oriented Centre Party. As Bullock notes:

"... Hitler's originality lay in his realization that effective revolutions in modern conditions are carried out with, and not against, the power of the State: the correct order of events was first to secure access to that power and then begin the revolution. Hitler never abandoned his cloak of legality; he recognised the enormous value of having the law on his side. Instead he turned the law inside out and made illegality legal." 7

The legitimacy of Hitler's coming to power and of his subsequent actions in dealing with his opponents was to pose important problems for the German resistance.

#### The Coming of the Totalitarian State:

##### Politics

It is important to describe Hitler's ever widening circle of control, as it was this increasingly centrally directed social reality which defined the options for those seeking to oppose him. The political process under the Weimar Republic can be described as vibrant and unhealthy. <sup>8</sup> Grunberger has suggested causes for the fundamental political instability of this period:

"... retarded unification (and therefore nationhood), capitalism maturing in a late feudal society and a national preference for KONFLIKTLOSE SYNTHESIS ..."

A full parliamentary democracy was more or less imposed on a defeated nation by its conquerors. Many of the leading figures of the new Republic were fundamentally unacceptable to large and influential groups within German society:

- FRIEDRICH EBERT, first Weimar President, was a Master Saddler and a Social Democrat ("vagabonds without a Fatherland" , as Bismarck had called them).<sup>9</sup>
- PREUSS, chief architect of the Weimar constitution, was Jewish, as was the first Foreign Minister, RATHENAU.

Notwithstanding the unpropitious beginning the Weimar period had its successes. There was a golden period in the late twenties.

Significant advances were achieved in the labour field.<sup>10</sup> There were also achievements in the field of economic development.<sup>11</sup> However, this progress was more than destroyed by the world economic depression commencing with the 1929 Wall Street crash.

What of the political process? Weimar politics were fragmented and fractious:

- on the LEFT deep divisions divided the Communists and the Social Democrats, divisions that were so deep that not even a massive common enemy (the Nazis) caused them to combine, even tactically.<sup>12</sup>
- the CENTRE of the political spectrum was dominated by the Catholic-oriented Centre Party, led at this time by BRUENING, but also included the People's Party.
- on the RIGHT two major groupings competed for support: HUGENBERG'S Nationalists and HITLER'S National Socialists.

When Hitler was invited to become Chancellor with the Nazis as supposed junior partner in a coalition with "independents" and the German Nationalists, he moved quickly to put an end to the multiparty political process. As Fest puts it, this took the form of "a dynamic programme of surprise attacks"<sup>13</sup> a sort of political blitzkrieg.

Hitler took office on 30th January 1933. On 1st February he read his "proclamation to the German People" setting out his intended programme, couched in terms of legality and replete with appeals for national unity. This proclamation, however, did include a vicious attack on Marxism.<sup>14</sup> Three days later the decree "For the Protection of the German People" was issued, allowing the Government to ban political meetings and newspapers. Two days later the Prussian Provincial Parliament was dissolved, with GOERING taking over the key Ministry of the Interior of this important Province, controlling Berlin. Now the police in this Province (and soon in others) co-operated with the paramilitary forces of the Right (SSSA and the Nationalists' Stahlhelm) and launched attack after attack on the Left. The campaign of both official and "street" harassment continued throughout the campaign for the election held on 5th March 1933. The Reichstag fire of the 28th February - just five days before this election - gave Hitler the opportunity he was seeking to move directly.<sup>15</sup> 4000 political functionaries (mostly Communist) were arrested that day, including all of that Party's Parliamentary representatives.<sup>16</sup> Two further emergency

decrees "for the protection of the people and the State" and "against betrayal of the German people and treasonous machinations" were issued.

These three decrees:

"... replaced a constitutional government by a permanent state of emergency. ... provided the legal basis for the regime ... provided the sham of a legal basis for persecution, totalitarian terrorism and the repression of the German resistance right up to 20th July 1944." 17

In the light of these most favourable circumstances the outcome of the March election was disappointing to Hitler. Whilst the Nazis won 288 seats, and the German Nationalist allies 52, the moderate Centre Party held its 73 seats, the Social Democrats 120 and the Communists retained 81 of a previous 100. Thus the combined opposition was a healthy 274 to the ruling coalition's 340. Clearly even more direct action was called for:

- On 26th May, the Communist Party was formerly proscribed. The newly-elected deputies had never even taken up their seats;
- On 22nd June, the Social Democrats were banned "as an enemy to the People and the State;"
- On 4th July, the (Bavarian) Peoples Party dissolved itself after its offices had been occupied a few days earlier, and its allied Centre Party did the same on July 5th.

This latter fact did not prevent the conclusion of the Concordat between Hitler and the Vatican just a few days later. Now that the

opponents had been dealt with it was the turn of Hitler's allies. On 21st June, the offices of the German Nationalist Party of Hugenberg were occupied and the Party dissolved itself one week later. On 14th July, Germany officially became a one Party State, when Hitler issued a decree declaring the National Socialists to be the only legal political formation. However both official and street harassment had rendered the decree almost redundant.

### The Economy

Hitler wasted no more time in smashing the independent institutions of the economy than he had in taking control of the political parties.

Fest's words describe the demise of the unions succinctly and starkly:

"When Hitler took over an old demand of the labour movement and declared 1st May a national holiday, the union leadership called upon the rank and file to participate in the demonstrations (organised by the State) ... They listened bitterly to the speeches of Nazi functionaries but were nevertheless forced to applaud ... This confusing experience contributed more than anything to the shattering of the will to resist of a movement numbering millions ... on 2nd May the SA and SS occupied union headquarters throughout Germany." 18

Employers organisations suffered the same fate during the month of May.

In place of these two forms of organisation vital to the management of a plural society the Nazis created the Labour Front, led by Robert Ley. This amazing organisation combined owners, managers and workers of all

kinds into a single organisation. This integration reflects the romantic desire for "konfliktlose synthesis" mentioned earlier. Former divisions were resolved into a single new distinction: within the enterprise there was a "leader" (normally the managing director, but sometimes joined by a leading worker) and the rest were "followers". This synthesis was part of the Nazis' programme of "Gleichschaltung", or the creation of an organic state. 19

The Labour Front was a pleni-potentiary economic octopus, everywhere active. Its internal organisation comprised a division into geographic areas (Reichsgruppe) and economic sectors (Fachsgruppe). It ran labour bureaux, controlled vocational guidance, technical training and trade testing. It also created and controlled the Labour Service. This at first voluntary and then compulsory service for the unemployed helped direct and control the flow of labour as determined by the economic goals of the regime.

A further major activity of the Labour Front was the Strength through Joy programme designed to provide for employees' leisure time. The "KRAFT DURCH FREUDE" (KdF) programme soon included subsidized theatre performances and concerts, exhibitions, sport, hiking groups, dances, folk dancing, films and adult education courses. 20

Yet its most publicised activity was that of a heavily subsidised tourist organisation promoting worker holidays.

All of these programmes had as their aim the control of the employee's every activity.

"Only sleep was a private affair. Ley wrote: 'There are no more private citizens. The time when anybody could do or not do what he pleased is past.'" 21

The Labour Front also propagated a Nazi work ethos. This ethos is captured partially by the slogans which abounded at the time:

ARBEIT ADELT - work ennobles; and ARBEIT MACHT FREI - work liberates.

The ethos aimed at a status equality between management and workers, between the skilled and the unskilled, between the "worker of the head and the hand." <sup>22</sup> The legal and State enforced distinction between blue and white collar employees was ignored. The holidays organised by the KdF were "one class" affairs attended by DIREKTOR and ARBEITER alike. A morning rally was advocated to avoid the necessity for some employees to punch clock cards whilst others did not. The rally of course also provided a good propoganda opportunity.

The National Organisation of Labour Act of 1934 dissolved all independent economic organisations such as unions and employer associations (already dissolved) and the Works Council. The central

unit of industrial relations (though the term hardly has meaning here) became the workshop community or BETRIEBSGEMEINSCHAFT, divided into the leader (BETRIEBSFUERHER) and his followers (GEFOLGSCHAFT); a VERTRAUENSRAT was elected to advise the leader; Reich Trustees of Labour were appointed to resolve conflict and direct economic planning, "Courts of honour" were created to prosecute those stepping out of line.

Capital fared little better than labour under the impact of Hitler's revolution after power. Although a petty bourgeoisie class of independent craftsmen and traders had been a critical base of support for the Nazis, they received little benefit from the new regime. After initial attacks on "big business" in the retail trade, i.e. the Department Store chains such as HERTIE and KARSTADT, and the co-operative movement, the Nazi state came to an accommodation with these big organisations, leaving the small trader in the lurch. In industry whilst many large companies benefitted significantly from the re-armament campaign, few achieved any real influence with the new power holders. As Schoenbaum comments:

"The voice of business lapsed quickly from a tone of expectation, to one of frustration, then shadowy allusion and finally to effective silence." 24

#### The Universities, The Church and The Army

The extent to which the National Socialists succeeded in gaining almost total control of both the political and economic dimensions of German

society has been described. In the area of education the Nazis found that they had well prepared soil. German universities have long enjoyed a complex relationship with nationalism and militarism, as is demonstrated by student shooting and duelling clubs. Laqueur has noted that the universities had never been "won" for the Weimar Republic. <sup>25</sup> Now they became easy prey for the New Order. As Gruenberger notes:

"With the onset of the depression student opinion showed itself twice as susceptible to the appeal of Nazism as public opinion in general. Early in 1931 about 60% of all undergraduates supported the Nazis' student organisation ... In that year anti-semitic riots erupted at the universities of Berlin, Cologne, Grafswald, Halle, Hamburg, Breslau, Kiel, Konigsberg, Munich and Vienna." 26

After the seizure of power the Nazi Student Organisation became the student body, and the teaching staff of the universities were similarly organised. What was taught at the universities now became subject to the imprimatur of the Party.

The Churches fared little better. Catholic subordination was ensured by the Concordat with Rome and pressure on that church's national leadership. The Protestant Church was infiltrated by "German Christians". This split the Church into a compliant half and a Confessing Church. The non-collaborationist Confessing Church, after many brave actions in which people such as Martin Niemoller and Dietrich Bonhoeffer featured prominently, was dissipated both by

internal divisions as well as by the conflicting pressures of its protest and pastoral duties. For the latter the Church was dependent, at least in some measure, on the State.<sup>27</sup>

We turn finally to the Army. This proved to be that area of social organisation that was most resistant to incorporation in the Nazi New Order. The Armed forces (and the Army in particular) were in a unique position. They enjoyed a tradition and degree of internal organisation and autonomy rivalled by no other social formation in pre-Hitler Germany. Furthermore, their continued effective existence was vital for Hitler.

The first challenge came from Ernst Rohm's STURM ABTEILUNG (SA) - the para-military wing of the Nazi Party. Rohm wanted an integration of the Army and the SA under his leadership. Hitler opposed this; both because he saw in Rohm a dangerous potential rival, and because he realised that continuing strife between the SA and the Army would weaken and delay his military dreams. Rohm was removed in the purge of SA leadership which took place on 30th June 1933. Hitler now promised the Army a monopoly on the right to bear arms - a promise never kept.<sup>28</sup> In return Hitler demanded total allegiance in the form of an oath of personal loyalty that every officer was required to swear to Hitler.

When military resistance to Hitler's war plans continued he next tried to bully the Army leadership into compliance. When this failed he removed successive waves of leadership, removing his first War Minister, Blomberg, on the pretext of an inappropriate marriage (which he had previously sanctioned); then his logical successor, Army Commander Fritsch, on a false charge of homosexuality. Hitler then took over the merged posts of War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

General Ludwig Beck continued the pattern of resistance to Hitler's plans, resigning as Chief of the Army in 1938, having failed to mobilise the Generals into common action against Hitler. Although replaced by the more compliant Kietel, the resistance to Hitler's will continued. Indeed the remarkable extent to which the Generals questioned and resisted Hitler created a war time situation in which the leadership of the organisation most vital to his war effort was the least loyal:

"The thorough process of Nazification to which (Hitler) had subjected the institutions of Germany, from the Reichstag to the Law Courts, from the trade unions to the universities, had destroyed, he believed, the basis for organised opposition. The process was not, however, complete ... It was natural, therefore, that those few Germans who ventured to think of taking action against Hitler should continue to look with expectation to the Army ..." 30

## 2. The Military Conspiracy Against Hitler

As the Nazi revolution embraced ever widening circles of German society the Army emerged as the only organisation able to maintain a meaningful degree of autonomy. For this reason it became a place of refuge for a number of Hitler's opponents.<sup>31</sup>

As has already been noted the Army was in no sense impregnable: it was long the object of Hitler's suspicion and scorn;<sup>32</sup> these suspicions were constantly encouraged and promoted by Heinrich Himmler's SS, who were locked in a mortal conflict with Military Intelligence (the Abwehr) throughout the period 1933 - 1944. A further threat to both the coherence and capacity of the opposition leadership in the Army was the Army's explosive expansion during this period. Army leadership at the Major General level and above numbered 44 in 1932, 275 in 1938 and over 1000 by 1943.<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, the opposition found key leadership support as well as vital organisational resources in the Army. Though both brave and often heroic resistance did occur in other areas of German society,<sup>34</sup> the Army-based conspiracy alone posed a real threat to the Regime.

What was the nature of this conspiracy? Who led it? What was its purpose? How did it act?

### The Conspiracy's Leaders

The key leadership was located in the Army's professional ranks. A large number of senior officers were involved by the time the conspiracy reached its climax in the 20th July 1944 assassination attempt. However, it is here worth sketching the backgrounds of a few of the leadership figures persistently involved from 1938 onwards.

General Ludwig Beck, army Chief-of-Staff until the Munich crisis of 1938, after which he resigned, was always a key element in the resistance plans, featuring prominently in the July 20th, 1944 attempt. Van Beck was not brought easily to active opposition to Hitler. In response to an early appeal to him to act against Hitler he replied: "Mutiny and revolution are words which do not exist in the vocabulary of a German Officer."<sup>35</sup> However, by late 1938 his attitudes had changed dramatically: "Bring me certain evidence that England is prepared to go to war over Czechoslovakia and I will put an end to this regime."<sup>36</sup>

Beck was a liberal in the sense that much of his strategic action flowed from a belief in the efficacy of reason and rational analysis.<sup>37</sup> He was also politically naive.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, his resignation in 1938 (flowing from what Weber would have identified as an ethic of inner conviction) significantly reduced the influence he could bring to bear on subsequent events.

Admiral Wilhelm Canaris was head of military intelligence from 1935 until 1944, at which time this organisation (the Abwehr) was absorbed by the SS. He had commanded a U-boat in the first world war with distinction. The son of a Westphalian industrialist, Canaris was politically conservative and also often indicated apparent enthusiasm for the Hitler regime. In fact, however, he was the very backbone of the resistance. Without him and his organisation of some 13 000 people the resistance would simply not have been viable.

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Dr Carl Goerdeler was the leading politician involved in the conspiracy. Trained as a jurist, Goerdeler served as a senior official in Bruening's administration, declining a Cabinet Post, however, in preference for his position as Lord Mayor of Leipzig. Bruening suggested Goerdeler as his successor. President Hindenberg instead chose von Papen, who in turn was followed by Hitler. After Hitler's access to power Goerdeler became a centre of resistance, refusing to fly the Swastika over the Leipzig City Hall and giving refuge to Jewish colleagues being attacked by the SA.

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Goerdeler's politics were also conservative. Though he resigned his membership of Hugenburg's German Nationalists (later Hitler's brief partners in power) he retained basically conservative views. He was well-known outside Germany and was the conspirator's choice to become Chancellor in the event of a successful coup in 1944.

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We describe only three leading figures here. We shall meet others later in this section. These three are good representatives of essential elements within the conspiracy: the Army Chief-of-Staffs, without whose active support a coup was unimaginable; the Abwehr, who provided the organisational engine house of the conspiracy, and the resources needed to plan and develop it; the civilian/political dimension important in foreign liaison and which would play a critical role in the new dispensation once Hitler had been removed.

#### Their Intentions

The intentions of those active in the conspiracy were very diverse, and changed over time. The conspiracy brought together some very strange bedfellows. Often its members were united more by negative than by positive goals. In the early activities a clear and overwhelming objective was to prevent the outbreak of a war thought by the Army to be unwinnable. This objective involved a terrible "catch 22" situation: - for Beck to motivate his colleagues to act against Hitler he had to persuade them that a major war was the inevitable outcome of Hitler's actions. The pattern of appeasement practised by the West throughout the 1930's militated very strongly against this. Chamberlain's Munich agreement in November was a fatal blow. Later the objective became to end the war on an honourable basis. This objective was also trapped in irony: whilst Germany was militarily

triumphant it seemed irrelevant; when the tide turned the Allied powers, perhaps understandably, wanted unconditional surrender.<sup>44</sup>

As the war developed a third type of objective emerged. This simply was to put an end to Hitler. This may be described as a moral rather than a strategic objective, well illustrated by General Franz Halder's contemplated, but never realised, attempts to murder Hitler himself by a single-handed and dramatic deed. Halder, who had succeeded Beck as Army Chief-of-Staff, carried a loaded pistol with him on several visits to Hitler in the Autumn of 1939 with the intention of shooting him. He repeated this behaviour in the summer of 1942, again without<sup>45</sup> consequence. This desire to destroy Hitler seems to have developed both out of a sense that he was the lynch pin whose removal would cause the Nazi State to fall (an almost certainly naive belief) as well as out of a slowly increasing abhorrence of the evil of his actions. The evidence of these actions abounded: from the open and brutal persecution of Nazi opponents in Germany during the 1930's, to the equally ruthless treatment of former allies (e.g. the SA) in the same decade, to the more secret (but still widely known within the Army) programmes of extermination, especially in captured territories such as<sup>46</sup> Poland. Events during the Polish campaign in the first months of the war revealed the bestiality of Nazi programmes in their fullness. One of the persistent activities of the resistance was to gather information<sup>47</sup> and documentation of such activities.

What of the conspiracy's political objectives? These seem particularly diverse, ranging from Christian Socialism to conservative German Nationalism. They are probably most usefully revealed in the various constitutions prepared by various opposition groupings in anticipation of a successful coup. Of the many plans produced, three deserve mention here:

- that of the former minister of finance and jurist, Dr. Johannes Popitz; 48
- that of Goerdeler; 49
- that of the Kreisau Group led by von Moltke and Gerstenmaier. 50

Whilst these three sets of proposals differ significantly, they also demonstrate some important common features: - all three sought both to undo and prevent a recurrence of the present Nazi abuse of power; - equally, however, none of these three had any appetite for a return to the republican multi-party democracy of Weimar; - instead all three have elements of what might be termed "organic democracy" where power was to be exercised by classes (Standen) or interest groups, rather than by individuals organised into political parties. Partly this preference for organic rather than individualistic democracy indicated a fear of a repeat of the ideological civil war of Weimar, but also it reflected the romantic hankering for the "konfliktlose synthesis" mentioned earlier; - this same hankering gave rise to the repeated contemplation of a restored monarchy, probably in constitutional form.

### The Actions of the Conspiracy

How did the conspirators act? Their actions were of necessity clothed in secrecy and because of their ultimate failure, our knowledge of them remains highly fragmentary. However, the two major attempts at a planned seizure of power are well-documented, as are some of the more individualistic assassination plots. It is these we shall briefly describe here.

### The 1938 Plan

Once it became clear that Hitler was indeed intent on a military occupation of Czechoslovakia, and that this further act of aggression would eventually drive the West into a state of war with Germany, a war which in the long run Germany could not win, planning began in earnest for a military coup.<sup>51</sup> The three major architects of the plan were:

- General Hans Oster, head of the Central Department of the Abwehr and one of Canaris' chief subordinates;
- Dr Hans Bernd Gisevius, a lawyer by training and former member of the Gestapo, but at this time a middle order official in the Department of the Interior, which department controlled the police;
- Hjalmar Schacht, a previous president of the Reichsbank and one time Minister of Finance in a Hitler Cabinet.

The plan had been commissioned by General Beck's successor as Army Chief-of-Staff, GENERAL HALDER. The moment war broke out General Von Witzleben, military commander of the Berlin defence district, would take control of key government posts in Berlin, arresting Hitler and his leading functionaries in the process. Hitler was then to be tried, accused both of a series of criminal acts as documented in Von Dohnanyi's "Chronicle of Shame" and of being mentally unfit to govern. 52  
The police in Berlin were involved in the plot. Everything was prepared in the greatest detail:

- first, securing all the police stations in Berlin;
- then, occupying radio, telephone and telex communication posts;
- then, seizing the Chancellery and also key ministries.

Plans were also fully developed for ensuring control of the provinces. 53

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As Fest comments:

"Thus everything was prepared, more thoroughly and with seemingly greater chances of success than ever again ... Halder had announced that the signal to strike would be given the moment Hitler issued the marching order against Czechoslovakia. Everyone was waiting."

Then came Chamberlain's Munich conference and the 'peaceful' resolution of the Czech question. This postponement of the inevitable struck a body blow to the conspiracy from which it was never fully to recover.

Walkure - July, 1944

From a year before the war began we move to within a year of its end and to a plot named Walkure. The four years between these two attempts were full of conspiratorial activity, including several failed assassination attempts. It was not until July 1944, however, that a plot on the scale of the 1938 attempt could be mounted.

That such a comprehensive plan was mounted for a second time is testament to the persistence and courage of the military based opposition. The Abwehr was under fierce attack now. Heydrich, head of the Gestapo's intelligence organisation had long campaigned for the incorporation of Canaris' Abwehr into his organisation and under his leadership. He had long believed the Abwehr to be a centre of treacherous activity. In April 1943, the Gestapo arrested three key agents of both the Abwehr and the resistance, von Dohnanyi, Mueller and Bonhoeffer. This weakened a key centre of the resistance, but the planning continued.

The July 1944 plan involved the assassination of Hitler. This was to be effected by Lt. Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg and was to be followed by a coup. For the latter purposes units of the Home Guard were to be used. Support for the plan was carefully canvassed in Home Guard units, and well as other military formations, throughout the

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Reich and occupied territories. As in 1938 the preparations were thorough. An alternative government was prepared; media broadcasts were ready.

Von Stauffenberg placed his bomb. Unlike several previous attempts, the bomb detonated. However, the conference which provided Von Stauffenberg with his opportunity was held in a barracks, rather than an underground bunker as had been planned. This dissipated the effects of the explosion. Hitler survived.

This need not have caused the plot to fail. Von Stauffenberg left Hitler's east German headquarters, Rastenburg, convinced that he had succeeded. He gave the signal to Berlin for Operation Walkure to begin. Incomprehensibly key figures in Berlin delayed. General Olbricht wanted confirmation that Hitler was actually dead. Two precious hours were lost.

Even after Von Stauffenberg arrived back in Berlin, the coup could still have succeeded but the will to act failed key troop commanders. Once the news of Hitler's survival reached Berlin the coup dissolved. Now instead of the conspirators arresting the loyalists the reverse occurred. Order was quickly re-established and the search for the traitors commenced. This search was ended only by the victory of the Allied powers some nine months later.

### The Assassination Attempts

Though not on the same scale as the two major attempts to seize power, a number of serious attempts to end Hitler's life were undertaken by members of the resistance.

We have already noted the intention of Heinz to kill Hitler during the course of the 1938 coup attempt.<sup>56</sup> One year later, Dr Erich Kordt, a senior official in the Foreign Affairs Department was to detonate a bomb in Hitler's presence on 17th November 1939. This became impossible because of attempts three days earlier by George Elser to kill Hitler in Munich.<sup>57</sup> In 1940 Gerstenmaier and Schulenberg<sup>58</sup> attempted to assassinate Hitler in Paris. In February 1943, Von Tresckow placed a bomb in an aircraft carrying Hitler, which bomb failed to detonate.<sup>59</sup> Later that same year Gersdorf attempted to kill Hitler with a bomb attached to his body at a military inspection. Hitler changed his schedule at the last moment and the attempt had to be aborted.<sup>60</sup>

### Consorting With The Enemy

In addition to the actions described above, members of the conspiracy sought to warn if not assist Germany's present or future enemies. Poland was warned of the date and place of its invasion, which warning was ignored. Similar warnings were given to Belgium and Holland.

Though less well documented, evidence does suggest that Canaris and his Abwehr acted to keep Spain out of the war, as well as to delay and discourage the intended invasion of Great Britain.

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### Why Did The Conspiracy Fail?

In the end the conspirators failed to achieve any of their major goals. One reason which may be emphatically rejected is that its members lacked serious intent. Of an almost certainly incomplete list of 154 persons who paid with their lives for their involvement in the 20th July 1944 coup attempt:

- 2 are Field Marshalls (Von Witzleben and Rommel);
- 13 are Generals;
- 29 are Colonels or Lieutenant Colonels;
- 9 are Majors.

These men clearly had serious intent, and paid the highest possible price.

Others have argued that the conspiracy lacked popular support: that it was peopled by intellectual staff officers, and that it lacked men of action to convert its intentions into deeds. This contention is at best partially true. Both the many assassination attempts as well as the two major attempted coups confound this argument. In the course of the "coup" plans, officers with direct troop commands were part of the

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conspiracy, such as Von Witzleben and Von Hase. "Line" support existed throughout Germany as well as in the occupied territories.

It is true that key figures were often disastrously indecisive: Beck before 1938; Halder in the pre-war months; Fromm and Ohlbricht in 1944. If some of the decisiveness demonstrated by the younger and more junior officers such as Von Stauffenberg, Schulenberg, Gersdorf and Von Tresckow had been matched by these key figures, events might have unfolded quite differently.

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Other historians have noted how unlucky the conspirators were: from the quite unanticipated Munich detente, to changed schedules, changed venues and failed fuses, their actions appeared to be dogged by ill-fortune.

However, a much more fundamental reason can be detected for their failure - and it lies in the area of both internal and international politics, or, to be more precise, in the interaction of these two areas.

"While throughout the European Resistance, national and moral duty coincided, in Germany, these norms clashed sharply and for a good many of those who opposed the regime the contradiction was insoluble." 64

This clash of duties led to dilemmas of a most concrete kind. In planning revolt how did one act against Hitler without acting against Germany? The removal of an evil leader was one thing, an act of national suicide or capitulation another.

This leads us directly to the international arena. From 1938 onwards, senior members of the conspiracy sought an understanding with the Allied powers that if Hitler were to be removed then a "peace with honour" would be possible. Sadly such an understanding was never achieved. Though Allied reservations are understandable in the context of the military events of the time, the failure to establish any serious liaison with an opposition group of this strength and significance must rank as one of this war's greatest missed opportunities. It gives rise to a series of "might have beens" that could have literally transformed the face of the twentieth century.

The critical years of lost opportunity were from 1938 to 1941. During this time a "Catch 22" situation existed. The Allies appear to have resolved not to take the conspiracy seriously until they actually did something (i.e. removed Hitler). Yet without the prospect of an honourable accommodation with the Allies in a post-Hitler situation Hitler's removal became at best a risky act and at worst some sort of act of absolution rather than a step towards a better political order in Germany.

Once the Soviet Union had been invaded and had joined the Allied Powers an "honourable accommodation" between non-Nazi Germany and the Allies became much more difficult for both the conspirators and the Allies.

From the British and American point of view any contact between themselves and the Conspirators now raised the possible fear from their Soviet partners of a separate peace. In Germany, there was much greater enthusiasm for a settlement with the West than there was for any accommodation including the East.

After the Allied conference in Casablanca in January 1943, where a policy of unconditional surrender was proclaimed, any hope of an honourable settlement vanished. That the resistance continued at all after this point bears eloquent testimony to the depth of courage of its members. Churchill and Roosevelt must, therefore, bear a measure of responsibility for the failure of the German resistance, and thereby the prolongation of the war.

### 3. Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Ethics

#### A family of opportunity

Dietrich Bonhoeffer was born in 1906 into a prominent Berlin family: Dietrich's father, Karl Bonhoeffer, was one of Germany's leading psychiatrists and the Director of a psychiatric hospital in Berlin. He had featured in the abortive 1938 coup attempt as the medical authority who was to find Hitler unfit to govern. His mother (Karl's wife) was a member of the illustrious von Hase family, and a cousin of General Paul von Hase who replaced von Witzleben in 1938 as the military commander

of Berlin. von Hase remained in this position until 1944, when he was centrally involved in the July attempted coup, and was executed thereafter. Of Dietrich's two brothers, Karl Friedrich was a professor of Physics, who was given the opportunity to leave Germany and work in the United States (at the same time as Dietrich left to go to the States in 1939). Both decided to return to Germany in July 1939 and shared the return boat trip. Klaus was the legal counsel of the German national airline and probably the member of the family with the earliest involvement in the resistance. He was an important member of the Wirmer, Bauer, van Halen and Harnack circle within the resistance. Surviving the collapse of the Abwehr in 1943, he was importantly involved in the July 1944 coup attempt, paying for this with his life.

Dietrich's three sisters further extended the opportunities for Dietrich to become involved in "Germany's destiny". Christine, the elder sister, married Hans von Dohnanyi, a lawyer employed first in the Ministry of the Interior, in which capacity he became involved in the trial of Chief of the Army General Fritsch. Here Dohnanyi met Canaris and transferred to the Abwehr where he played a pivotal role throughout the years of the resistance. <sup>65</sup> He was arrested with Dietrich in 1943 and executed in April 1943. Sabine, Dietrich's twin sister, married an academic lawyer, Gerhard Leibholz, whose combination of political activity and Jewish ancestry caused the couple to emigrate to Britain in 1938, where Leibholz took up a teaching post at Magdalen

College, Oxford and from which base he played a small, though not insignificant, role in the conspiracy's attempt to find Allied support. Finally, Susanne, Dietrich's younger sister, married theologian Walter Dress, who took over Martin Niemoller's Confessing Church in Dahelm, Berlin, after Niemoller's arrest and imprisonment. Ursula, the eldest sister, married Ruediger Schleicher, a lawyer employed in the Airforce legal department, who was also involved in the conspiracy. He was arrested after the failure of the July 1944 coup attempt and executed on 22nd April 1945.

Thus this one family lost two sons, two sons-in-law and had a daughter emigrate. The breadth and depth of the Bonhoeffer family involvement in "Germany's destiny" is an essential context within which Dietrich Bonhoeffer's ethics and actions must be viewed.

#### Apprenticeship For Resistance

To the opportunities inherent in the Bonhoeffer family, Dietrich added valuable activities of his own. Most valuable in this context were his international Church contacts. These international contacts began with the time Bonhoeffer spent in America from September 1930 to July 1931, attending the Union Theological Seminary in New York. This period produced some important American and European acquaintances: foremost amongst the American contacts was the theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr. Two key European friendships struck at this time were with the Swiss Erwin Sutz and the Frenchman Jean Lassere.

The next important step was Bonhoeffer's election as one of three youth secretaries of the World Alliance of Churches (predecessor to the World Council of Churches) at the Alliance's assembly held in Cambridge in September 1931. <sup>66</sup> This election was somewhat of a surprise to

Bonhoeffer as well as to his colleagues. It placed him on the Council of the World Alliance, allowing him to attend important Alliance meetings in Geneva (several times) and at Fano, Denmark, in 1934.

These activities provided the Conspiracy with its most important conduit to the Allied Powers: George Bell, the Bishop of Chichester. <sup>67</sup>

Bonhoeffer first met Bell at an Alliance meeting in Geneva in 1932.

Their friendship and collaboration continued to the end - Bell preached at a memorial service held for Bonhoeffer in 1945.

Bonhoeffer's links with Bell were strengthened through extensive contact during the period he spent in London as Pastor to two German communities in 1933/34. The third dimension of Bonhoeffer's

international contacts was his link with the Vatican. Here he played a <sup>68</sup> much less important role, acting as a second fiddle to Joseph Mueller.

### Bonhoeffer The Spy

When Bonhoeffer returned from his aborted second visit to America, he joined his brother-in-law, Hans von Dohnanyi, in the employ of the Abwehr, or military intelligence. He was employed as a V-Mann (Vertrauensmann) or agent. This move was known only to very few of his friends and colleagues.

Bonhoeffer's employment with the Abwehr served to prevent his conscription elsewhere and left him free to pursue some of his Confessing Church activities. More importantly however it was a clear and concrete act by means of which he became a member of the inner circle of the military conspiracy against Hitler. This decision was evident in both Bonhoeffer's actions and his writing. He gave the Hitler salute. He became critical of approaches of former friends and colleagues in the Confessing Church, criticising not only those who had made their peace with Hitler's regime, but also those committed to an "apocalyptic" form of opposition and protest.<sup>69</sup>

His active role in the conspiracy was a minor though not insignificant one.<sup>70</sup> Apart from his international liaison work Bonhoeffer's role within the conspiracy was that of philosopher, visionary and dedicated optimist. He was significantly involved in the planning which went on within the conspiracy for the post-Hitler Germany.<sup>71</sup>

Bonhoeffer's employment in the Abwehr created the opportunity for several acts of mercy, such as helping Jews to flee Germany. It was just such an act of mercy - or the currency infringement it involved - which occasioned his arrest in April 1943. Much more serious crimes were to cause his execution two years later - his active role in planning the Operation Walkure.

### Bonhoeffer's Ethics

Bonhoeffer's most important writing on ethics came in the last years of his life, from the time he entered the conspiracy in 1938 until his execution in 1945. The writings are in constant interaction with his action in the conspiracy. Bonhoeffer was a banned writer during the period, proscribed by law from publishing. When arrested much of his writing was seized, and has been lost. His prison writings are only partially preserved. Once in prison his ability to reflect on his and his comrades' actions in the conspiracy was severely limited. The cross references between thought and action became highly obscure. The ethical model we have then is fragmentary and incomplete. However, it is rich enough for our purposes here.

### Ethical Action In The Context Of History

The first building block in Bonhoeffer's model is the essential unity of ethics and action.

"It is evident that the only appropriate conduct of men before God is doing his will." 72

"The knowledge of good and evil seems to be the aim of all ethical reflection." 73

Yet for Bonhoeffer it is not knowledge he seeks but action. His

Christology demands a response, a deed. "The irreconcilable opposite

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of action is judgement." Man, his actions and the ethical

reflection which both precedes and flows from his actions, cannot

be detached from this historical context within which he exists at any given moment in time. Bonhoeffer's insistence on seeing ethical choice (between different courses of action) in the context of an historical situation leads him to reject universalism, and thus Kantian, but also rationalist, ethics. "... it is impossible to establish for all times and places what is good ..."

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This emphasis on historical context should not be mistaken for a form of situational or relativist ethics. The difference between Bonhoeffer and other modernists is his commitment to a source of ultimate value, set in his faith and his conception of God and Jesus Christ. These absolute beliefs, such as his belief in the sanctity of life, do have to be realised in concrete action. Nevertheless, they exist, and serve to differentiate him from approaches such as those of the existentialists. This difference is well illustrated by his discussion of the issues of euthanasia and suicide.

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#### Ethics In a World Come of Age

If the key question is not "what is good, now and forever" but rather "what must I do here and today", this question arises from Bonhoeffer's understanding of twentieth century man's contemporary world. The renaissance, the reformation and the consequent process of secularisation shattered the foundations of the "old world".

"The cult of reason, the deification of nature, faith in progress and a critical approach to civilization, the revolt of the bourgeoisie and the revolt of the masses, nationalism and anti-clericalism, the rights of man and dictatorial terror - all this together erupted chaotically as something new in the Western World." 79

And whilst these forces were recreating Western man's social reality:

"Emancipated reason acquired a mastery over creation and so led to the triumph of technical science. The age of technology is a genuine heritage of our Western History." 80

The French revolution is the dawn of the modern era. It is also the origin of modern conflict:

"Technology, mass movement and nationalism are the inheritance of the (French) revolution... yet at the same time (these three forces) are sharply opposed. The masses and nationalism are hostile to reason. Technology and the masses are hostile to nationalism. Nationalism and technology are hostile to the masses." 81

And in the new articles of faith of this new era, the seeds of decay are already evident:

"The emancipation of the masses leads to the reign of terror of the guillotine. Nationalism leads inevitably to war. The liberation of man as an absolute ideal leads only to mass self-destruction. At the end of the path which was first trodden in the French Revolution there is nihilism." 82

Notwithstanding these new conflicts and ironies Bonhoeffer welcomes this world come of age. He welcomes the liberation of reason, and the destruction of blind authority and unquestioned credos. He rejects, however, the nihilism or meaninglessness as proclaimed by Sartre which

has come in its wake. The value of man remains. In a world come of age this value has to be won again each day and in every situation. It cannot be assumed, nor defended as a general principle.

It is this context - the absence of universal, necessary, a priori or given structures of meaning - that requires man to create his own meaning. It was in this context that Bonhoeffer spoke about man living before God in a world without God; of religionless Christianity and the non-religious interpretation of biblical concepts. Far from exempting man from ethical responsibility - if God is dead, said Dostoevsky, everything is permitted - this world come of age creates a situation where man must take responsibility not only for his actions but also for the ethical goals and values which his actions seek to realise.  
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#### The Limits Of Reason

If Bonhoeffer rejoices in the world come of age, he also notes the limits of reason. We have already noted his criticism of relativist, utilitarian and situational ethics. The absence of pre-given moral codes does not exempt modern man from responsibility for choosing his own moral values. Bonhoeffer also notes the naivete of much rationalism:

- the extent to which it underestimates the powers of evil in the world;
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- its under-estimation of the role that power and interests play and its over-emphasis on rational analysis as a strategy for achieving desired objectives;

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"One is distressed by the failure of reasonable people to perceive either the depths of evil, and the depths of the holy. With the best intentions they believe that a little reason will suffice them to clamp together the parting timbers of the building. They are so blind in their desire to see justice done to both sides they are crushed between the two clashing forces and end by achieving nothing. Bitterly disappointed at the unreasonableness of the world, they see that their efforts must remain fruitless and they withdraw resignedly from the scene or yield unresisting to the stronger party." 86

These failures often cause the rationalist to retreat from concrete action into moral analysis:

"... the stubborn effort to prolong the discussion of the ethical beyond its proper time springs from an unsatisfied desire for an extension of influence on the part of those who possess effective opinions but who are themselves ineffectual in life ... a moralisation of life arises from fear of the fullness of everyday life and from an awareness of incapacity for life; it is a flight into a position from which one can only view life at a distance with an eye which is at the same time arrogant and envious." 87

### Responsible Action

Without doubt Bonhoeffer's most important contribution to the ethical debate is his concept of responsible action. This must be seen in the context of his rejection of the universal, in a world come of age, rejoicing in the emancipation of reason, but going beyond reason's limits.

"Since we are not concerned with the realization of an unrestricted principle, it is necessary in the given situation to observe, to weigh, to assess and to decide, always within the limitations of human knowledge in general. One must risk looking into the immediate future, one must devote earnest thought to the consequences of one's actions; and one must endeavour to examine one's own motives and one's own heart. One's task is not to turn the world upside down, but to do what is necessary at the given place and with a due consideration of reality. At the same time one must ask what are the actual possibilities; it is not always feasible to take the final step at once. Responsible action must try not to be blind." 88

Whilst the responsible actor is required to look to the likely consequences of his action he is not called upon to play God in the sense of delivering up a "final judgement" on the moral worth of his own or other's actions.

"When the deed is performed with a responsible weighing up of all the personal and objective circumstances ... then the deed is delivered up solely to God at the moment of its performance. Ultimate ignorance of one's own good and evil, and with it a complete reliance on grace, is an essential property of responsible historical action." 89

This limitation to responsibility (as to final consequences) is matched by a limitation as to one's own role and opportunity. That is it takes the responsibility of the other seriously. The question to be asked is what should I do, not what should he do, or what should we all do.

Responsible action involves an acceptance of guilt for the evil which exists in society.

"If any man tries to escape guilt in responsibility, he detaches himself from the ultimate reality of human existence and what is more he cuts himself off from the redeeming mystery of Christ's bearing guilt without sin, and he has no share in the divine justification which lies upon this event. He sets his own personal innocence above his responsibility for men, ... he is also blind to the fact that real innocence shows itself in a man's entering into the fellowship of guilt for the sake of other men." 91

Responsible action can find no guide in general principles or moral codes:

"It has not to decide simply between right and wrong, and between good and evil, but between right and right and wrong and wrong." 92

Responsible action implies tension between obedience (or duty) on the one hand and freedom on the other:

"To make obedience independent of freedom leads only to the Kantian ethic of duty, and to make freedom independent of obedience leads only to the ethic of irresponsible genius." 93

### Bonhoeffer's Model

#### Step One: Ethics Is About Action

Ethics is about how we act in the world not how we discuss, analyse or judge ourselves, others or our world.

Step Two: No Ready-Made Moral Codes

In concert to his twentieth century contemporaries de Beauvoir and Camus, Bonhoeffer rejects a deontological or universal approach to ethics, in which concrete choices are matched against a moral code. The values which must underlie a choice between morally significant alternative courses of action must be themselves chosen by the individual actor, who must take full responsibility for this choice.

Step Three: Emancipated Man In A World Come Of Age

By extension (and again in concert with de Beauvoir and Camus) twentieth century man is emancipated from previous external structures of moral authority such as the Church, the State, Nationality and concepts such as human nature. He lives in a world where intellect, the individual, reason and free choice have come of age. His responsibility to choose and to act cannot be rendered up to other institutions or forces in his world.

Step Four: Beyond Reason

Whilst reason and logic are important elements of modern man's world, and whilst they must form a part of his response to the world as he finds it, power, reality, evil are elements of at least equal weight.

Step Five: Neither Simply Motives Nor Consequences

"The question of good must not be reduced to an examination of the motives or consequences by applying to them some ready-made ethical yardstick ... just as the question of motivation of action is in the end lost in inextricable complexities of the past, so, too does the question of its consequences finally disappear from view in the mists of the future." 94

Step Six: Accepting Guilt

Because ethics is as much about acting as about judging a sense of personal innocence cannot be placed above an opportunity to act.

Step Seven: Combining Freedom And Duty

Ethical action results from the holding in tension of the sense of "I must" and "I choose to".

Step Eight: Acting Responsibly

One must be ready to act in a way which demonstrates a careful concern for the foreseeable consequences of one's action. This arises from weighing of alternative courses, an acceptance of half measures, compromise and guilt by association - though within the limits of personal integrity, and accepting responsibility for one's own actions, whilst not playing God.

Finally, some of the characteristics of ethically responsible action as drawn from both Bonhoeffer's writings and actions are:

- the ethically responsible actor retains his sense of humour and his ability to laugh at the world and for the world;<sup>96</sup>
- he does not lose his common humanity in the emotions of contempt or hatred;<sup>97</sup>
- he never loses his faith either in the ultimate triumph of the good, nor in God at work in history;<sup>98</sup>
- he is an optimist;<sup>99</sup>
- though loving life, yet death can "no longer take him by surprise";<sup>100</sup>
- also, though of necessity a witness to evil, an actor in ambiguous situations, made cynical "through many unbearable conflicts," he never loses his belief in himself as an instrument of God's will and purpose. He believes that he can still be used.<sup>101</sup>

S E C T I O N   T W O

LIBERALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1948

CHAPTER THREE

LIBERAL THOUGHT AND ACTION SINCE 1948: AN OVERVIEW

"The coming of the English ... opened the door peculiarly wide to the men of the Emancipation movement, the London Missionary Society..."

C.W. de Kiewet

"As Smuts was chiefly responsible for making the Constitution, he must bear a proportionate share of the blame for planning an omnipotent Parliament in the hands of the reactionary forces who found it a perfect instrument for their purpose."

Bernard Friedman

"The founders of the Liberal Party were without an adequate appreciation of the part that political power plays in politics."

Patrick Duncan

"I fear that, like many liberals in many countries, we were over-optimistic about the reasonableness of our fellow men."

Edgar Brookes

"The problem facing us is not only what the best 'solution' may be in theoretical terms, but also how the transition from the present political situations with its special difficulties and limitations, is to be achieved."

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Political Alternatives

This chapter constitutes the first of three attempts to examine liberal ethics in the light of the ethical models developed in the first section. Here this is attempted by means of a literature survey of liberal thought and action from the (Afrikaner) Nationalist victory in 1948.

Whilst liberal literature is extensive during this period, literature of an analytical nature is limited. The works of Robertson and Rich have been particularly helpful. Both of these authors, however, concentrate more heavily on earlier periods, as opposed to the last three decades which are this writer's concern.

Beyond the works of the above, a reasonably extensive literature has been consulted. Biographical and autobiographical material has been particularly helpful.

#### 1. Liberalism's Origins In South Africa

The role of liberalism in South Africa has been shaped by this country's colonial history.

For the first 150 years of colonial occupation, South Africa (or the Cape, more accurately) was ruled as a chartered company. It was neither a state, nor a colony. Conflicts about power, rights and duties were defined in the context, at first, of the Company versus its

servants, and later the company versus the relatively small group of free farmers.

The Napoleonic conquest of Holland and the creation of the Batavian Republic brought important constitutional and legal changes.<sup>1</sup> However, the rule of the Batavian Administrators at the Cape was very short.<sup>2</sup>

When the British assumed control of the Cape in 1806, the ideology of their government was characterised more by imperialism than liberalism. However, an important consequence of British control was the commencement in earnest of British evangelical and missionary activity. It was through this that liberal philosophies were brought most forcefully and effectively onto these shores.

The link between Judeo-Christian ethics, particularly in their post reformation understanding, and liberal political philosophy is well documented in societies outside South Africa. Calvin's Geneva was in many important respects a liberal state. Protestant ethics were strongly represented in both the American revolution as well as the subsequent political development of that country. In Europe Spinoza, a philosophical contemporary of Locke, based his demand for government by consent of the governed as his understanding and exegesis of scripture, even though his liberal/rational views led to his alienation from the Jewish faith.<sup>3</sup>

The activities particularly of the English missionaries were an important bridge between the revolutionary/reactionary, liberal/conservative political turmoil of the metropole, and the colonies. The British administration strongly promoted the activities of the missionaries. These intrepid explorers brought enlightened philosophies to the Cape shores. Central to these new philosophies was the concept of fundamental equality of all men, irrespective of race or "level of civilisation."<sup>4</sup> It is most difficult to deny the common humanity (and essential equality) of the objects of your own missionary endeavours. The difficulty is currently manifesting itself in the missionary offspring of the Dutch Reformed Church.

Of course, the fundamental equality of black and white inhabitants proclaimed by these liberal missionaries created a reaction amongst a part of the white settler society, and is normally cited as one of the key causes of the Great Trek, leading to the creation of the two Afrikaner Republics. The debate and struggle between the British-controlled colonies and the Afrikaner republics culminated in the National Convention and a Constitution for the new Union of South Africa, combining all four territories in a new central authority.

In a sense, this was a debate between liberalism and a form of feudalism; between a political philosophy which acknowledged the fundamental equality of all the territories' inhabitants under law and

policies whose very foundations were vested on the principle of no equality in church or state. It was a struggle between universalism and exclusivism.<sup>5</sup>

The struggle took its most concrete form in the debate about the nature of the franchise for this South Africa. Cape liberals argued for the extension of the non-racial, qualified franchise that had been a feature of that territory since the creation of representative government in 1856. Against this, the Transvaal and Orange Free State argued for a franchise limited to whites. Natal stood somewhere between these poles. The result was compromise which had historic consequences. In essence, the territories agreed to differ: the Cape was to retain its inclusive franchise while in the Transvaal and Free State retained their whites-only voters rolls, with Natal operating a franchise which was de jure non-racial, but de facto exclusivist.

Clearly this compromise between two radically different approaches to citizenship and government caused concern amongst some at the convention. The constitution which emerged had only two entrenched clauses: one guaranteed equality of treatment for South Africa's two official languages - English and Dutch; the other guaranteed the retention of the "Cape Franchise".<sup>6</sup>

Friedman in his critical biography of Jan Smuts has noted that Smuts, by failing to resolve this conflict at this time, compromised both the nation and himself in a way which was to haunt both. The compromise was also to characterise his long and illustrious subsequent career. He had failed to face up to the single most important issue of his  
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time.

So the liberal political heritage became enshrined in the conundrums of race. Locke had argued that the labouring classes were not capable of rational thought, and, therefore, could not be part of responsible government. Those political liberals, like Merriman, who took the Cape into the Union would have had to argue in the same way about all who were not white (outside the Cape) in South Africa.

## 2. Liberalism and Power in the Thirties and Forties

South Africa has never had a liberal government nor a liberal Prime Minister. The closest it has come to liberal leadership is the period during which Jan Hofmeyr was either deputy or Acting Prime Minister.

This extraordinary man who matriculated at the age of 12, held a variety of high offices normally at astonishingly young ages. At the age of 22, he became a professor, at 25 the Principal of what was soon to become the University of the Witwatersrand. At the age of 30, he

was made the Administrator of the Transvaal. He went to parliament at the age of 35, and soon became one of Smut's key advisors in the negotiations which led to the creation of the United Party in 1933 out of the previous National and South African parties.

Hertzog (leader of the new party) made Hofmeyr Minister of Education, the Interior and Public Health. In 1936, the portfolios of Mines and Labour replaced that of the Interior.

Despite Hofmeyr's increasing liberalism which clearly conflicted with the broad direction of the Government, Hertzog kept Hofmeyer in the Cabinet. In 1938, Hofmeyr left of his own accord, in protest at the appointment of A.P.J. Fourie as a Senator for Native Affairs. In 1939, he resigned from the United Party caucus in protest against the Asiatics (Transvaal Land and Trading) Bill. (The so-called 'Pegging Act').

World War Two split the government and parliament, and led to Smuts taking over the reins of power. Hofmeyr returned to the United Party ranks and to the cabinet, being appointed Minister of Finance and Education.

When Smuts was out of the country, which as a member of the British war cabinet and Allied High Command was more often than not, he generally

appointed Hofmeyr as Acting Prime Minister. This acting capacity was confirmed in 1948 when he was officially created Deputy Prime Minister.

That Hofmeyr was a liberal is beyond debate. His own views, and the judgements of both his friends and enemies confirm this. Hofmeyr's position of power often brought him into conflict with his liberal convictions, as well as those of his liberal fellows. The "crises of conscience" which took Hofmeyr out of the Cabinet, and then out of the caucus of his party have already been mentioned. Many other conflicts had to be confronted.

When the African Mine Workers Union struck in 1947, Hofmeyr had to turn down the plea of the Anglican Synod (amongst others) that they should be recognised and negotiated with, though his own views would almost certainly have endorsed this action.

When, in September of the same year, the police raided the offices of the Communist Party, the Congresses and the South Africa Legion, Hofmeyr said he was taken by surprise. When challenged by his liberal colleague, Leo Marquard, to get out of the United Party, and lead a true liberal movement he prevaricated, indicating he could do more from within the party in power.

Perhaps the most telling conflict of all came when Hofmeyr had to respond on behalf of the Smuts government to a resolution of the Native Representative Council calling for the immediate repeal of all discriminatory legislation. This Council had been created as a vehicle for the articulation of black aspirations when in 1936 blacks (Africans) were removed from the common roll franchise in the Cape and Natal. It was peopled by a prestigious group of intellectuals: Z.K. Matthews, Thema, Moroka.

Hofmeyr's negative, albeit apologetic, response led to the collapse of the council. As Paton comments, "How could one be simultaneously both  
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governor and crusader."

Increasingly, the very vehicle for Hofmeyer's influence, the United Party Government became at odds with his deeply held liberal values. His role as Smut's self-appointed successor made the situation worse.

"In my own mind, there is a growing unsettlement. It would be difficult for me, if Smuts were to fall away, to lead the United Party, without either doing violence to my conscience or taking a line which would split the party." 13

Hofmeyr consulted two close friends and advisors, John Cope and Edgar Brookes to whether it was better to compromise his conscience and save the party or the reverse. Cope counselled against compromise arguing in Paton's words again, that:

"the danger of a Nationalist accession was not as great as to justify a compromise, in any case, if the Nationalists were destined to get in the sooner the prospect was faced, the better," 14

Brookes took the opposite view. The Nationalist victory in the 1948 election, and Hofmeyr's death (preceding that of Smut's) rendered the dilemma academic. Thus South Africa lost her most powerful liberal politician.<sup>15</sup>

### 3. The Decade of Struggle: The Fifties

Smut's defeat took the nation (and the world) by surprise. It even surprised his successor. Yet the warning signals were there, and many have argued that Smuts was immensely inept in not seeing these and taking action to counter them.<sup>16</sup>

Friedman has argued that Smuts "had committed the unpardonable sin - power was within his grasp, but he let it slip through his fingers."<sup>17</sup> Smuts had failed to de-load rural constituencies, thus allowing his opponent to win a plurality of seats although Smuts obtained ten per cent more of the popular vote, indeed achieving an outright majority.

Friedman argues further that Smuts' failure to take the Nationalist campaign on race seriously, as was indicated by his failure to produce a clear and unambiguous "race policy" as an alternative to Apartheid, compounded his demise. His failure to reach even a transitory accommodation with the immensely moderate black leadership of his day likewise created the idea that there was no practical alternative to Apartheid.

Others have suggested that both before and after the election Smuts could have struck an alliance with Havenga's Afrikaner Party which in fact held the balance of power. But Smuts would not contemplate this, just as Hofmeyr would not contemplate taking electoral considerations into account in the formulation of his 1948 budget.

Thus the fragile access to power liberals had in the Thirties and Forties disappeared - and the decade of struggle commenced.

#### Nationalist Action

The Nationalists commenced their rule with a type of legislative blitzkrieg. Indeed, seldom can a new government have moved so quickly to transform so many areas of society so fundamentally.

Being people who understood power well, they began with the political:

- In 1948 (the year they came to office), they repealed legislation passed but not yet promulgated, which provided for communal representation for Indian South Africans in Parliament;
- In 1950 they turned to the question of the coloured Franchise. Significant numbers of coloureds enjoyed a common role franchise with whites in the Cape Province, with much smaller numbers in Natal. Given the precarious hold on power enjoyed by the Nationalists and the small chance of the coloureds supporting

them, these voters had to be removed. Thus commenced a constitutional crisis which was to last until 1956.

In the first move, the Nationalists simply introduced and passed through Parliament by a simple majority legislation stripping Cape and Natal coloureds of their common roll representation and providing instead some communal (separate roll) representation as well as a separate "coloured" council. This was struck down by the Supreme Court as conflicting with the 1910 Union Constitution which had provided that the coloured franchise could only be changed by a two-thirds majority of Parliament.

Undeterred, in 1952, Malan, the Nationalist Premier, introduced the High Court of Parliament Act which, in essence, enabled Parliament to overrule the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution. This too was opposed by the Court, and the government backed down.

If the courts were displaying a valiant devotion to constitutional process, however, the electorate was unmoved. In the General Election of 1953, the 1948 margin whereby the governing parties enjoyed a mere eight seat margin over their opponents, widened to thirty three seats.

Malan, however, still did not have the two-thirds majority he needed to disenfranchise the coloured voters. In 1954, Malan

retired and was replaced by an even more dogmatic racial separatist - Strijdom. In 1955, legislation was introduced to increase the size of the Senate from the forty eight members it presently comprised to eighty nine - the exact number needed to give the government its two-thirds majority. This time the courts lost their courage and in 1956 ruled that this device was constitutional. The common voters role thus became purely white.

- Africans had communal (separate roll) representation. The Nationalists moved more slowly, and initially in a different way, against the communal representatives of Africans in both the House of Assembly and the Senate. After the NP contested the 1948 elections for the African Representatives and was roundly defeated, legislation was introduced in 1950 providing for the Suppression of Communism Act. Amongst other provisions (including 90 days detention without trial) this legislation prohibited Communists as listed under this Act from taking seats in Parliament. The first person to fall foul of this provision was Mr Sam Kahn, a prominent member of the now proscribed South African Communist Party, who was elected by the African voters of the Transkei. His membership of Parliament was terminated in this way in 1952. Brian Bunting and the trade union leader, Ray Alexander, were to fall foul of the same provisions. An ironic situation was created in which African voters kept electing (white) representatives whom the Government and Parliament refused

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to accept. African representation was finally abolished altogether in 1960. (The Native Representative Council was abolished in 1950).

However, Nationalist segregationist activity was in no way limited to the political sphere:

- In 1948, they ordered the segregation of trains in the Western Cape, the only area in which coloured/white mixing was possible;
- In 1950, the Population Registration Act classified every South African into one of four race groups, splitting families and in the process attaching a dogmatic significance to race last seen in the legislation of Nazi Germany;
- In that same year, another cornerstone of Apartheid, the Group Areas Act, which zoned land by race, was put on the Statute Book;
- In 1953, the Government rejected the findings of its own commission of enquiry into trade union rights for blacks, and created instead, works committees.
- In 1954, the Government took control of black education, removing this from the hands of the Churches and the Provinces, and imposing an education which would prepare blacks for their proper station in South African society, in the form of Bantu Education;
- In 1956, the Government extended the pass system to black women;
- In the same year, it prohibited mixed trade unions and introduced statutory job reservation outside the mining industry;
- In 1958, against a background of tremendous black and liberal resistance to the measures described above, the Nationalists

increased their governing majority in the general election of that year from thirty three to fifty;

- Finally, in 1959 the Government enacted legislation to close the English-speaking universities to students who were not white.

This is by no means a complete catalogue of Nationalist actions during the Fifties aimed at producing an all-white South African reality, but it is indicative of the breadth and scope of their activities.

#### Black Response?

Black reaction was co-ordinated throughout the Fifties by the African National Congress (ANC). In 1949, the Congress, under its newly elected President-General, Dr James Moroka, formulated its Programme of Action. This programme demanded fundamental change, laying particular emphasis on the franchise. It also addressed itself to new methods: "Representations were done with. Demonstrations on a country-wide scale, strike action and civil disobedience were to replace words", as Luthuli put it.

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- On 26th June 1950 a one-day stayaway was staged to oppose the Group Areas and Suppression of Communism Bills.
- In May 1951 a strike protested the proposed removal of coloureds from the common roll.

- However, the major Defiance Campaign was launched in June 1952. This campaign was planned and executed jointly by both the African and Indian Congresses. This involved the deliberate breaking of Apartheid laws by Congress supporters, who intended to be arrested and go to jail. The campaign was initially very successful. Thousands of blacks, Indians, coloureds and a handful of whites went to jail. <sup>23</sup> However, in late October of that year a riot broke out in Port Elizabeth after a white policeman had fired shots in trying to arrest two alleged thieves. This was followed by riots in Johannesburg, Kimberley and East London. These riots broke the back of the Defiance Campaign. In Luthuli's view the government was involved in their instigation. <sup>24</sup>
- Government reaction to the Defiance Campaign was to strengthen public order legislation enabling them to outlaw meetings, marches and demonstrations and to take administrative actions against the leaders of the campaign. So ANC leaders such as Dr Njongwe and a little later Luthuli himself were issued with banning orders controlling both their movement and activities.
- In 1953 the Congress of Democrats was formed, uniting the ANC with the South African Indian Congress, the South African Coloured People's Party and the Congress of Trade Unions. This body planned and executed the Congress of the People which took place in Sophiatown in 1955 and they adopted the Freedom Charter, a document of continuing political significance.

- In August 1956 some twenty thousand women - the majority of whom were black - marched on the Union Buildings in Pretoria to protest the extension of the pass system to black women;<sup>25</sup>
- Again the Government responded, arresting fifty six South Africans of all races and charging them with High Treason. All were acquitted after a trial lasting several years;
- In 1957, the Alexandra Bus Boycott began, lasted several months, and resulted in a victory for the boycotters;
- In 1958 resistance campaigns amongst African women continued;
- In 1959 both the ANC and its breakaway Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) planned resistance campaigns.

### Liberal Dilemmas

It was against this avalanche of Afrikaner Nationalist action and (broadly speaking) African nationalist reaction that liberals had to chart their course.

### Parliamentary Politics

Inside the United Party, the liberal cause was not prospering. Jan Hofmeyr, was removed by his early death in 1948. The party staggered from defeat to defeat. Smuts died in 1950 and in a sense the party died with him. Neither of his successors, Strauss or Graaf, succeeded in re-establishing the national mandate Smuts had enjoyed for so long.

But it was not only leadership that the party lacked: it also lacked policies on the critical issues of the day.

The United Party was born out of the unification of Hertzog's National Party and the original South African Party of Botha and Smuts. These parties united essentially around the issues of English/Afrikaans relations as well as an uneasy compromise (broken by the war) on South Africa's relationship with Britain and the Commonwealth. The victory of the Nationalists in 1948 had brought the issue of black/white relations to the fore. The United Party had no clear answer to the Apartheid slogans and the Apartheid policies which dominated the Fifties. Separation, separation and more separation was what the Nationalists wanted. What did the United Party want? The Fifties did bring a new cadre of young able politicians who strengthened the liberal wing of the party. The 1953 election saw Helen Suzman, Zach de Beer, Bernard Friedman, Ray Swart enter parliament. They were joined by Colin Eglin in 1958.

This liberal wing came into increasing conflict with two groups of conservatives: firstly the "bloedsappe", mainly Afrikaans-speaking supporters drawn from rural areas in the Cape, Transvaal and Free State and dedicated to the increasingly forlorn task of reconquering these areas for Smut's old party; secondly the Natal English. This second group had a long history of maverick conservative behaviour.

It was a clash particularly with this second group which led thirteen members of the United Party caucus to resign from the party and form the Progressive Party under the leadership of Jan Steytler in 1959. Their fate will be discussed in the next section.

### Extra-Parliamentary Politics: The Liberal Party

The Liberal Party was formed in May 1953 in the face of the Nationalist's second successive General Election triumph. The Party, whose first leader, the Native Representative in Parliament for the Eastern Cape Constituency, Margaret Ballinger, was committed to a non-racial franchise on a common roll and the abolition of the colour bar in all areas of society. <sup>26</sup> The party was never to win a white Parliamentary seat though it was able to claim the allegiance of four <sup>27</sup> Native Representatives in Parliament.

From its beginnings, it was plagued with the tensions of white electoral politics on the one hand and the demands of South Africa's <sup>28</sup> larger society on the other. This tension caused the Party's first leader to remark much later that:

"Indeed, early in the history of the Party, the passion for justice which inspired it carried it a good deal further than even many of its first members were prepared to go ... and many of the more conservative liberals came to feel that there was still more to be done for their cause by working outside the Party, and even inside the official Opposition" <sup>29</sup>

Patrick Duncan, who was to join the Party two years later and to become one of its most prominent members commented in the year of its creation that its founders were "without an adequate appreciation of the part that political power plays in politics."<sup>30</sup>

If the Liberal Party suffered repeated rejection at the hands of the white electorate, its relations with the Congress of Democrats, the non-racial alliance of the ANC, SAIC and white "Democrats" was also conflict-ridden. The Party refused to attend the 1955 Congress of the People, inter alia, because of the role of white Communists in organising the Congress. As a Party committed to participating in the parliamentary process, it could not endorse the Defiance and Resistance campaigns, although its sympathies were clearly with these, and although some of its prominent members, such as Patrick Duncan, participated in them.

It was a multi-racial party, but the tension between the two target audiences, white and black, seemed to give pre-eminence to neither.

#### The Torch Commando

Another extra-parliamentary movement active in the liberal cause in the 1950's was the Torch Commando. This movement, founded essentially from

within the ranks of the United Party by one of World War II's most successful and famous fighter pilots, Sailor Malan was dedicated to the defence of the Constitution and particularly the Coloured Franchise. When the Nationalists succeeded in removing the coloureds from the Common Roll the organisation died.

#### The Black Sash

An organisation started for the same purpose but with a longer life was the Defence of the Constitution League, founded almost accidentally in 1958. This remarkable organisation of white women succeeded in collecting almost 100 000 signatures in opposition to the "packed senate" legislation. (See Rogers 1956 for an account of this). The failure of this petition to stop the removal of the Coloured Franchise did not deter the organisation, though towards the end of the decade its support had begun to dwindle.

#### 4. In The Wilderness: The Sixties

##### Sharpeville and the Republic

The Sixties opened with a series of dramatic events. Firstly, the Pan Africanist Congress led by Robert Sobukwe announced a "programme of positive action" aimed at the Pass laws, which was to commence on 21st March 1960. On that day, a large but unarmed and apparently friendly crowd of onlookers convened outside the Sharpeville Police Station near

Vereeniging. The crowd had gathered to watch a very small group of PAC supporters present themselves to the police without their passes, demanding to be arrested.

Shortly after midday, the police fired into the crowd (apparently in panic - no order was given to shoot). Sixty nine people were killed and eighty injured. This incident more or less ended the campaign in the Transvaal. In January, there was violence in the Cato Manor township outside Durban. The unrest continued in March in the black townships of Nyanga and Langa.

The State's response was swift and predictable. On 28th March, legislation was introduced in Parliament making both the ANC and the PAC illegal organisations. On 30th March, a state of emergency was proclaimed, which was to be lifted some six months later.

The second dramatic event occurred on 20th January when Strijdom's successor, H.F. Verwoerd, announced a referendum to test the now all-white voters roll as to whether the nation wished to become a Republic. The referendum occurred on 5th October and produced a modest majority for a Republic (52,82 per cent in favour to 47,9 per cent against). The results emphasised the strong regionality of South African politics. The pro-Republic vote enjoyed strong majorities in the provinces of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, a narrow majority in the Cape, and was roundly defeated in Natal.

Although Verwoerd had fought the referendum on the basis that the South African republic would remain in the British Commonwealth, this proved to be an impossibility. In the face of demands from the newly independent former British colonies (many themselves Republics) supported by Canada, that South Africa would either have to renounce Apartheid or lose her Commonwealth status, Verwoerd chose the latter. This was probably a relief for Verwoerd and certainly pleased many of his supporters, as his reception on his return to South Africa indicated.

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Likewise the judgement of the electorate was equally positive as the results of the October 1961 election indicated. This was the first early election called by the Nationalists - a phenomenon which was to become the pattern in later years - a sign of a party confident in power.

### The Liberal Response

How did the liberals respond to these dramatic events? In a sense, Sharpeville and the Referendum well symbolise a dilemma which has constantly confronted liberalism in South Africa. As we have noted earlier during the Fifties, black organisations turned their backs on the politics of petitions and deputations. Freedom would be won only by more courageous and dramatic action. In the late Fifties and early Sixties, this took the form of Ghandi-like passive or non-violent resistance - the orderly and non-violent defiance of the law.

This defiance posed liberals with a major dilemma. Their credo inclined them to support an acknowledgement of the law - even where they believed the laws concerned to be unjust. The fact that campaigns which commenced non-violently often ended in bloodshed also produced a liberal "distance" - a sympathy in principle, but a disapproval of the apparent consequences.

Equally difficult was the fact that if one was to support the Africanist organisations, one would have to make common purpose with uncomfortable allies. The main divide was between the ANC and its allied organisations such as the Congress of Democrats (or Chartists as they became known)<sup>33</sup> and the PAC (or Africanists). The Chartists appeared to many liberals to be heavily influenced by members of the former South African Communist Party. This was (and still is) a strongly Moscow-oriented Party with its own agenda of objectives. The Pan-Africanists on the other hand had split from the ANC to get away from white influence as much as from Communist influence. Many liberals perceived Sobukwe's PAC as black racist.<sup>34</sup> This split made the choice of allies difficult.<sup>35</sup> The referendum was, in its turn, an almost exclusively white affair. Black organisations showed an indifference to the relationship between South Africa and Britain. They had learnt through bitter experience from 1910 onwards that appeal to the British Crown and Parliament had little effect. It was, however, an issue of major concern for the white electorate. To the

extent that liberals shared this concern, they found themselves playing second fiddle to the main white opposition party, the United Party, in the campaign to oppose the Republic.

Liberals had to accept these two political approaches being comfortable with neither. Patrick Duncan, the National Organiser of the Liberal Party was to play an important, some would say vital, role in "managing" police and protester relations in the two marches undertaken by blacks in Cape Town in 1960. Duncan did this much more as an individual than as a representative of the Liberal Party, at least nationally. Furthermore, it can be argued that his more or less explicit association with the PAC cost him dearly in his (admittedly sporadic) attempts to win white support for himself and for the Liberal Party.

If the liberal relations with blacks remained uneasy, their relations with the white community remained characterised by rejection. This was evidenced by the fate of the newly-formed Progressive Party in the October 1961 General Election.

This Party was born with considerable promise. After all, its ranks included eleven members of the United Party caucus, including the leader of the United Party in the Cape Province, Jan Steytler. It won the support of the United Party's major financial backer and key

industrialist, Harry Oppenheimer, as well as the support of Smut's former Minister of Justice, Harry Lawrence. It also enjoyed considerable support from the English-language press.

However, the judgement of the electorate was negative. In the 1961 election, all but one of the eleven Prog MP's lost their seats. Whilst it is true that many of the defeats were by narrow margins (as was its one success), and that the Party mustered a very respectable 69 000 votes (in comparison to the Liberal total of 2 945 and the UP total of 302 875), the results were nonetheless disastrous. Many of the brightest and best of the Prog leadership had their political careers smashed and had to turn away from politics to build new careers. 37

The message of this defeat was not lost on the white electorate and in particular on the United Party, who now purged of their left proceeded vigorously in their attempts to imitate and emulate the Nationalists. Nor was the failure lost on the black community. These white liberals were nice people without power.

### The Quiescent Years

The middle Sixties were devoted to the continued repression of the populist African movements on the one hand, as well as the development of so-called "Positive Apartheid" on the other.

The legislation declaring both the PAC and ANC illegal organisations in 1960 forced a change of tactics amongst black resistors. Just as the Fifties witnessed a change from petitions to passive resistance, so too, the Sixties witnessed a change from passive resistance to sabotage.

A series of para-military underground organisations were created:

Umkhonto weSizwe from the ranks of ANC supporters, POQO from the ranks of the PAC, and the Africa Resistance Movement (ARM) from the ranks of (dissident) liberals. From 1961 onwards, a campaign of sabotage commenced. Sabotage was carefully defined by ANC leader, Nelson Mandela, in his speech before the Court of the Rivonia trial, <sup>38</sup> as the violent destruction of property without the loss of life. POQO was less emphatic in its disapproval of personal violence. Ironically, it was ARM, and in particular the almost-certainly idiosyncratic actions of liberal John Harris, that was responsible for the most dramatic act of violence in this period - the 1964 Johannesburg Station Bomb Blast.

This event, which killed a white woman and maimed a white child, polarised the white community and almost certainly destroyed any chances of electoral success the Liberal Party might ever have had. This occurred notwithstanding that Party's strong condemnation of all acts of violence.

This violent resistance occasioned, and in many white minds, justified increasingly draconian security legislation. 180 days detention replaced 90 days. More and more people were banned and detained. The descent into authoritarianism reached its height in 1967 with the adoption by Parliament of the Terrorism Act. This legislation provided for indefinite detention without trial, and also provided for an extraordinarily broad definition of terrorism and terrorist activities, introducing a type of thought crime into South African society.

On security issues, the United Party consistently sided with the Government, terrified no doubt of being portrayed by them as being soft on communism or soft of terrorism. The lone representative of the Progressive Party, Helen Suzman, on the other hand consistently opposed these measures. Indeed, it was her stand throughout this decade and into the next that won her a place in the hearts of many if not most black South Africans. It was the coincidence of issues of civil liberty and the well-being of populist African leaders, such as Nelson Mandela and Robert Sobukwe, as evidenced by Suzman's regular visits to these leaders incarcerated on Robben Island, that demonstrated the relevance of liberal values.

This, however, did not enhance the standing of the Progs at the hustings. The 1966 General Election, influenced as it was by Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence and Suzman and other

Prog leaders' controversial views thereon, saw the electoral fortunes of this party decline still further.

With regard to "Positive Apartheid" Dr Verwoerd had announced a programme in 1959 whereby black South Africans were to be provided with a process of constitutional development "in their own areas" - i.e. the Bantustans. These areas (the original 13,6 per cent of South Africa demarcated as black reserves in 1913 and 1936) were to be developed economically to the point where they would house and employ a majority of their "citizens". They were also to be developed constitutionally to a point of sovereign independence, whereupon they could join in a South African Commonwealth of Nations together with "white" South Africa. Those blacks in South Africa would be treated as temporary sojourners, like the Gastarbeiters in Germany and Switzerland. This was Verwoerd's "Positive Apartheid" programme or Separate Development.

If the increasingly violent and unlawful opposition of black organisations posed liberals one kind of problem, Verwoerd's "Positive Apartheid" posed another. The dilemma took the form of the question: is half a loaf better than nothing? Or, put differently, should one view the tiny footholds of power created by Separate Development as a platform to campaign for further change or a further step away from a common society? It was an issue of this nature which caused the Prog MP's to break away from the United Party (UP). It was the UP's refusal

to support additional transfer of land to the "Bantu homelands" that caused the long standing tensions to become a split.

It was these homelands which were to be developed into sovereign nation states, one for each of the eight major "ethnic" groups into which the ruling Nationalists divided that sixty seven per cent of the population that was black. <sup>40</sup> By this statistical/constitutional device, a country with a large black majority and small white, coloured and Asian minorities, became a constellation of minority groups.

In one of the many ambiguities of South African politics, this homelands policy came to be opposed by groups to the right and to the left of the government. Albert Hertzog, who split from the governing party in 1969 and formed the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP), opposed giving white-controlled land into black lands. In the late Sixties, the United Party began to oppose the homeland policy on the grounds that it was creating potential launching pads for a communist attack on South Africa. It displayed posters with a red, dripping hand reaching forth from the Bantustans. On the left, many black groups opposed the homelands because they were the symbols of black denationalisation in the land of their birth - South Africa. The liberals were often somewhere in between. Radical partition had long been an option which liberals had considered; Hoernle had discussed it repeatedly.

However, the greatest dilemma of the decade was without doubt introduced by the Improper Interference Act, introduced in 1967. This Act prohibited racially mixed political parties. Since the South African Communist Party, the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress had already been proscribed and the Congress of Democrats had disappeared, the dilemma existed for the two remaining multi-racial political organisations, the Liberal and Progressive Parties.

The Liberal Party decided in 1968 to disband rather than become uni-racial. This decision was sad but predictable. The majority or <sup>41</sup> near majority of its membership was black. Furthermore, it had never found a real place in "white" politics.

The decision for the Progs was more difficult. Although their representation in Parliament remained the lone voice of Helen Suzman throughout the Sixties, they nevertheless had built up and retained a national political machine, and had won a respectable share of the popular vote in the general elections of 1961 and 1967. Perhaps crucially, the Party had been founded by politicians committed to the political process, whereas the Liberals were led by writers, academics and clerics. Nevertheless, continued existence as a political party contesting white elections meant that the Party would have to shed its non-white membership. Though this was not as numerically significant as it was for the Liberals, it did contain significant leadership

figures. The youth movement of the party voted to disband (this formation of the party was particularly multi-racial) but the Party as a whole decided to continue as an all-white organisation. Conscience and consequence were forced into opposition.

As the decade drew to its close, liberals were a small battered contingent of nomads living in a hot and windy desert. Repeatedly rejected by the white electorate and increasingly uncomfortable with the tactics of black opposition, they clung to core liberal values. They were cheered by the occasional encouraging contact with the Western World, such as the visit in 1967 by Robert Kennedy. They were repeatedly subjected to abuse and threat not only from the Government, but from the white community at large. Many emigrated. Others drifted into apolitical roles. Yet a sufficient core - in a variety of organisations such as the Progressive Party, The Institute of Race Relations, The Christian Institute, The Council of Churches, The Black Sash, The National Union of South African Students, carried on in a kind of "internal exile."<sup>42</sup>

##### 5. Regrouping and Review: The Seventies

###### Parliamentary Politics

In 1970, John Vorster, Prime Minister since the assassination in Parliament of Dr Verwoerd, called an early election. Though the

Government lost some ground to the now very conservative United Party, again, only Helen Suzman was elected for the Progs.<sup>43</sup> The Party had been in the wilderness for a decade. How much longer could it survive?

In the year after its defeat it began a process of reorganisation and new direction. At its National Congress it changed leaders replacing its original leader, Dr Jan Steytler with Colin Eglin. Steytler was a man of remarkable courage. An Afrikaner farmer and medical doctor, he had been the Cape leader of the United Party at the time of the split in 1959. His decision to join the renegades was both a costly and courageous one. He was, however, more a prophet than a politician. Colin Eglin was a modern politician in every sense. He had studied and employed American electioneering techniques in his 1970 campaign in the Sea Point constituency, bringing him agonisingly close to victory.

Eglin moved quickly to revitalise the Party. He raised extra funds, appointed political staff with a new approach (including a former young liberal, Neil Ross, who is today widely recognised as South Africa's primary political professional). He sought to broaden the image of the party, adding new elements to its policy in areas less immediately threatening to the typical white voter.<sup>44</sup>

He began to travel widely (often with Suzman) and especially in Africa, being careful to claim that he travelled on the passport of the Progressive Party.

When Vorster called another early election in 1974, Eglin moved quietly to recruit celebrity candidates. He recruited an international rugby star (Gordon Waddell), a newspaper editor (Rene De Villiers), and a young charismatic Afrikaans academic (Van Zyl Slabbert). The 1974 campaign was run by the Progs on the quality of their candidates, rather than of their policies.

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It worked - no less than six Progs were returned to Parliament. This was the election which destroyed the United Party. The coup was complete when in a by-election just three months after the general election, Alex Boraine, a church leader, won a surprise victory and gained a seventh Prog seat.

A ferment was now taking place in the ranks of the United Party. A group of young turks, under the leadership of Harry Schwarz, had gained control of much of the party machine in the Transvaal. Eglin now worked feverishly to do a deal with this group of Reformists as they became known. A merger took place and the ranks of Progressive Reform members swelled to thirteen. A further merger was negotiated with what remained of liberal rump of the United Party and the name of the Progs changed again to the Progressive Federal Party or PFP.

Eglin's wheeling and dealing was no sign of political illiberalism. Indeed whilst he was busy strengthening the party, both by electoral

growth and acquisition, he also succeeded in modernising its policies, revising the blueprint laid down by the Party's Moltano Commission in 1960. This time Eglin appointed a Commission chaired by sociologist parliamentarian, Van Zyl Slabbert. This commission recommended the dropping of the Party's qualified franchise, and its replacement with a universal franchise in a consociational constitutional framework. This was a move to the left.

And yet in the next (early) election in 1977, the Progs continued to grow, gaining twenty four seats, and seventeen per cent of the popular vote, thus becoming the official opposition.

Just a few years later, Eglin was a victim of his own creation - the Superstar politician. He was replaced as leader by Van Zyl Slabbert. The Party's fortunes continued to prosper. In the next (early) election, it increased its number of seats to twenty seven and its share of the popular vote to nineteen per cent. A quarter of a million whites had voted for fundamental power sharing in this election.

### The Churches

What was happening to the Progs was also happening to other parts of the liberal community. In 1967, the English Protestant Churches had drafted a "Message to the people of South Africa". This message called on South African Christians (constituting the majority of every race group except the Indians) to reflect on the basic structures of South African society in the light of the demands of the Christian Gospel.

In 1969, the Churches launched the Study Project on Christianity on Apartheid Society (SPROCAS). This consisted of six Commissions who were charged with drawing up an alternative Christian vision for society in the areas of economics, education, law, politics, society and the church. The reports of this commission must constitute the most comprehensive statement of liberal value and liberal strategy ever developed in this society.<sup>46</sup> The political commission report is a most remarkable document.<sup>47</sup> It commences by endorsing and defining core Christian liberal values, namely equality, freedom, justice, love and responsibility. From these "primary ethical concepts" as the report calls them, it derives three key political ideals:

- the rule of law;
- guaranteed civil rights; and<sup>48</sup>
- effective political participation.

Next, the Commission Report calls into question a whole range of liberal holy cows. In discussing long-term goals and the problems of transition, it links ethical acceptability with practical feasibility, arguing that:

"The problem facing us is not only what the best 'solution' may be in theoretical terms, but also how the transition from the present political situation, with its special difficulties and limitations, is to be achieved." 49

Thirdly, it criticises what it calls liberal constitutionalism, arguing inter-alia that this body of political thought is inadequate in that:

- It is individualistic and atomistic, failing to take seriously the

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reality of groups;

- That it defines politics "in terms of a basic opposition between  
51  
the individual and the state";
- That it consequently ignores or underestimates the valency of  
group loyalties, and that the extension of the franchise to  
qualified individuals alone is too tenuous a way to build a  
52  
democratic government in a divided or plural society.

Finally (and crucially) the Report makes a set of proposals divided into a first stage of transitional proposals, and a second and more permanent stage. The proposals are discussed in some detail below both in order to show how significantly they depart from the more traditional liberal prescriptions, and also because they provide a very reliable basis for the evaluation of future liberal strategies to be suggested in the concluding chapter of this thesis.

#### Sprocas: The Political Proposals:

##### The First Stage

The proposals in this section are not predicated on a change in the existing political system.

In the socio-economic area, the Commission proposed the following:

- Education:

- \* increased total spending on education;

- \* the gradual equivalence of per capita spending by race group;
- \* official encouragement of private bursary schemes;
- \* special literacy and other "bridging" educational programmes;
- \* increased autonomy and desegregation of educational institutions.

- Economic Development:

- \* Increased industrial decentralisation and economic development in poor and over-populated areas, including the homelands;
- \* Regionally differentiated, annually adjusted minimum wages;
- \* Rate for the job;
- \* Maximum employment creation;
- \* Increased mobility and "a progressive revision of the system of influx control of Africans in order to provide full settlement rights";  
53
- \* Phasing out of the migrant labour system;
- \* Increased upward mobility for blacks;
- \* Increased participation for coloureds and Indians in trade unions;
- \* Expansion of works committees as a step towards trade union rights.
- \* Extension of these rights to blacks "at the earliest opportunity";  
54
- \* Reform of the collective bargaining and wage regulating machinery to cope with black needs;

- Social Security and Welfare:

- \* Extension of social services (housing, health, transport) and transfer of their control and administration to properly funded communal and regional authorities;
- \* Creation and extension of comprehensive and non-racial welfare programmes in areas such as medical aid, pensions and unemployment insurance;
- \* A progressive reform of ownership rights for blacks;
- \* Development of both freehold (individual) and communal tenure in the homelands;
- \* Non-racial access to land both in and outside the homelands;
- \* Occupation, lease and ownership rights for "qualified" urban blacks;
- \* Progressive creation of "open areas" outside existing group areas.

- In the political area, the Commission proposes:

- \* the co-operation of police and government in allowing public demonstrations;
- \* the recognition that dissenters should not be treated as common criminals;
- \* the reform of the current security laws by inter alia:
  - + narrowing key definitions such as sabotage and terrorism;
  - + appointing a Judicial Detention Review Board;
  - + restoring certain procedural rights to Security Law offenders;

- Ensuring the freedom of the Press by preventing State control or private monopolisation of the Press;
- Reforming of the censorship system by vesting it in independent boards representative of all population groups;
- Encouraging voluntary association by:
  - \* relaxing official enforcement of laws such as race classification and the Immorality Act;
  - \* decentralising decision-making on the desegregation of facilities;
  - \* desegregation of these facilities;
  - \* returning university autonomy;
- Encouraging public participation by:
  - \* making statutory bodies more representative of all population groups;
  - \* promoting "public collective bargaining";
  - \* involving public participation in the drafting and discussion of legislation;
- In the area of defence, the following are proposed:
  - \* the complete abolition or severe circumscription of compulsory military service;
  - \* the drastic reduction of the standing army or its increasing involvement in "domestic" programmes;
  - \* the progressive opening of defence training to all population groups.

- In the area of representative government, the following are proposed:

- \* Maximum devolution of power (including the right to levy taxes) to fully elected regional councils;
- \* Property, residential and 'citizenship' rights to be controlled by these councils, and to be racially inclusive at their discretion.

- Development Corporations should be responsible to these Regional Councils:

- \* That fully-elected local government bodies should be created for those race groups presently excluded, which bodies should have an independent financial competence;
- \* That communal councils for Indians and blacks in the "common area" (i.e. outside the homelands) be created;
- \* That these councils be recognised as the legitimate representatives and spokesmen for their respective groups;
- \* That they have the powers to control "matters mainly affecting the communal group: education, cultural affairs, health and welfare services, community development etc." <sup>55</sup>
- \* That they should have an independent fiscal competence;
- \* That regional planning and co-ordinating committees should be created representing all population and interest groups.

- The Commission then makes a series of proposals for what it calls

"Transitional Political Change" :

- \* that administrative positions in government be opened to persons other than whites;
- \* that the powers of those Government departments mainly serving one population group be increasingly controlled by the representative bodies of that Group;
- \* that wherever possible, government services should be functionally differentiated instead of being defined along racial lines;
- \* that ad hoc representative bodies should increasingly be given control over key national issues such as influx control;
- \* that the independence of the Judiciary should be strengthened;
- \* that political consultation and negotiation should become a regular feature of government;
- \* that a multi-racial consultative body should be created;
- \* that a round of constitutional conferences should be held;
- \* that a new National Convention should be called.

The Second Stage:

Here the Commission proposes:

- that a federal government responsible to a non-racial legislative assembly be created;

- that both civil liberties and minority rights be entrenched;
- that security legislation be reformed;
- that communal authorities be created for whites on lines similar to those created for other race groups;
- that the present prescriptive system of race classification be replaced with a voluntary system;
- that open Group areas be established;
- that all commercial centres of cities and town become 'Common Areas';
- that all state-funded services be desegregated;
- that locally and privately controlled services have the option to remain segregated.

These departures from traditional liberalism proved too much for two of the Commissioners.

Edgar Brookes (the long-time African Representative in the Senate) rejects the Group bias in the Report commenting:

"Those of us who have intimate African, Coloured and Indian friendships know well that there are no group differences which divide us as much as friendship and common humanity unite us." 56

Oscar Wolheim, the former Coloured Representative on the Cape Provincial Council, though he signs the report notes:

"I do not agree with the majority report in its trend to lay emphasis on the group especially where such groups are based on artificial lines of colour and not on common interest." 57

This more pragmatic review had an organisational effect in another area of society. In the late Sixties, liberal students at the English Language universities formed Wages Commissions in order to study the wages and working conditions of black workers. In the early Seventies, these students formed working associations with liberal trade unionists such as Harriet Bolton in Natal in order to create more permanent worker organisation. The 1973 Durban strikes gave impetus to this movement.

Of course, the re-emergence of black unions cannot be seen as a consequence of liberal action. In the first place, it was the actions and attitudes of black workers themselves who made this possible. Furthermore, many of the students who entered the movement and are making significant contributions operate more from a Neo-Marxist than a liberal perspective. But key liberals were and are involved in important support roles. Figures such as Schlemmer and Douwes Dekker represent a broadly liberal perspective, as do Francis Wilson and John Dugard.

Furthermore, the positive response (at least at the level of rhetoric) of industrialists such as Oppenheimer, Bloom and others helped to create a climate for the growth and consolidation of a black union movement.

CHAPTER FOUR

POLICIES - A LIBERAL DOCUMENTS REVIEW IN THREE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXTS

"... it is no longer a question of gathering facts ... now the problem of the Institute (of Race Relations) will be to discover sound methods and techniques of getting these accumulations of knowledge across to the generality of South Africans in a form which will convince them ..."

Dr Alfred Hoernle

"South Africa is an ethically plural, culturally diverse, racially manifold country in which the central political problem is that of group domination, the central economic problem one of structural inequality among groups of people and the central social problem one of segmentation and division."

Dr Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert

"We have to believe, and by our practice demonstrate, that the pursuit of business efficiency and the search for a free and just society are not contradictory objectives, but two aspects of the same thing."

Harry Oppenheimer

1. The Process of Documents Review

This chapter constitutes the second attempt to investigate liberal ethics in South Africa. The methodology described in the Introduction (pages 18 to 23) has again been attempted here:

- Firstly, an attempt to let the data speak for itself: this is done here by means of a review of some seventy five policy documents of two liberal organisations and one liberal individual;
- Secondly, the delineation of the structure of liberal ethics, as revealed by "confronting" the data with ideal-typical ethical models. Elements of the model developed from Dietrich Bonhoeffer's writings have been used here (pages 98 to 101).

Specifically, his conceptions of:

- ethics and action;
- reason, power and interests;
- responsible action;
- hope and optimism;

have been tested against the documents reviewed.

In addition, the use of both threats and promises in liberal advocacy has been examined.

2. The Organisations and Individuals Chosen

Two organisations and one individual have been selected for examination. In all three cases, the organisations and the individual

can be regarded as significant standard bearers of liberal values. They have also articulated and propagated liberal values in diverse arenas of social reality:

- The S.A. Institute of Race Relations has been a source of liberal analysis and commentary on South African affairs for over fifty years. Its modus operandi could be described as the politics of information and analysis;
- The Progressive Federal Party has been the voice of liberal values in the (all white) Parliament for two-and-a-half decades. Throughout that period, it has been in a role of political powerlessness, and its "politics" can be seen as the politics of opposition;
- Harry Oppenheimer and the business organisations he has led, has been the primary economic supporter of liberal values, organisations and activities in South Africa. Whilst the degree of political power available to him is a much debated and complex question, that he has been able exercise power or at least influence in this society for some twenty five years he has been at the helm of the Anglo American and De Beers groups of companies is beyond contest.

Of course, there are other liberal institutions (NUSAS, the Churches, the liberal media) who have helped shape liberal ethics. As in all research, it was necessary to select. In so doing, an attempt has been made to select three different organisational contexts:

- extra-parliamentary "lobby" politics (the Institute);
- parliamentary politics (the PFP); and
- the economy (Oppenheimer and Anglo).

They have been chosen precisely for the diversity of their contexts, though this complicates the application of common (Bonhoefferian) concepts.

### 3. The Institute of Race Relations

The Institute was founded in 1929 as the first national multi-racial organisation in South Africa, and one of this country's earliest national liberal associations. Its objectives as stated in the 1932 Constitution were:

"To work for peace, goodwill and practical co-operation between the various sections of the populations of South Africa.  
To initiate, support, assist and encourage investigations that may lead to greater knowledge and understanding of the racial groups and of the relations that subsist or should subsist between them."

The Institute's antecedents are to be found in the Native Welfare Societies established in the early years of the century, and the Joint Council Movement of the 1920's and 1930's. <sup>1</sup> Indeed, the Institute emerged as a national co-ordinator of the Joint Councils at the end of <sup>2</sup> the 1920's.

The direction and strategy pursued by the Institute has been most effectively captured in the words of one of its most distinguished members and office bearers, Ellen Hellmann:

"It (the Institute) believed in the pursuit of truth as a value in itself. It believed that the systematic seeking out of facts relating to the conditions which determine the quality of life of the disadvantaged groups in South Africa would increase public awareness and promote inter-racial understanding, an understanding without which there could be no peaceful future. It recognised the inherent worth and dignity of every human being and his right to the full development of his innate potential. It affirmed the values of democratic society, with its accepted rights and duties, together with respect for the rule of law and the safeguarding of individual liberty. It pledged itself to pay due regard to opposing views." 3

Given this credo the Institute has acted chiefly by means of rational analysis and research. The Annual Survey, published from 1947, has become a central reference work for all concerned with race relations and indeed South African affairs in general. Institute publications have a reputation for careful research and objective analysis which has enabled them to largely evade the South African censorship system. It has successfully developed the Parliamentary question system as valuable information source, and has become an important agency for comment to Commissions of Enquiry as well as for State investigative and regulatory bodies.

In addition to researching and propagating "the truth" in all aspects of social reality with a race-relations bearing, during the Seventies, in particular, the Institute has become initiator and sustainer of a number of "action programmes". Amongst the earliest were the Bureau of Literacy and the Institute's Youth Programme. There followed its Domestic Workers and Employers Project, the Education Information Centre, and the Human Awareness Programme. Most recently the Institute has become involved in a substantial famine relief programme, Operation Hunger.

The membership of the Institute has been overwhelmingly white and English speaking. Though to a somewhat lesser degree, this is also true of the Institute's leadership. Here the Institute has been remarkably fortunate in terms of the continuity of both its officers and office bearers. In the fifty five years of its existence, it has had five Directors, three serving long periods of office:

- J.D. Rheinalt Jones - eighteen years (1929 - 1947);
- Quinton Whyte - twenty three years (1947 - 1970);
- Fred van Wyk - twelve years (1970 - 1982).

Van Wyk was succeeded by John Rees, former General Secretary of the SA Council of Churches. His term of office ended with his prosecution on a charge of fraud in 1983. John Kane-Berman was appointed to replace in the same year. The Institute's Chief Researcher, first appointed in

1949, served for a remarkable twenty eight years. In the early years of the Institute, there was also a considerable consistency amongst its elected office bearers.

Though Institute membership has grown over the years, its resources, especially financial, have always been inadequate and precarious. It has experienced repeated financial crises and its continued existence has often been at stake.

Regrettably, this important liberal organisation lacks adequate historical record and evaluation. Ellen Hellman has written a short and largely uncritical history. More recently, Paul Rich devotes considerable attention to the Institute and its leading figures (especially in its pre-war years).

Rich's account, however, claims simultaneously too little and too much for the Institute itself and liberalism more generally. His definition of liberalism (given in his conclusion) is stated as follows:

"... political expression of a small body of white educationalists, philanthropists, missionaries and social workers who have been concerned to alleviate the harsh economic and social consequences of industrialisation in a racially divided society." 18

This definition is altogether too restrictive, both in respect of who  
has espoused liberal values,<sup>19</sup> as well as the context of liberal  
concerns.<sup>20</sup>

Rich concludes (correctly in this writer's view) that:

"... (liberalism) has been unsuccessful in translating  
(its values) into a political programme that had real  
impact on the body politic."

Instead, Rich maintains:

"... liberal political discourse from Union was  
increasingly defined by the alternative ideological  
concept of white settler segregationism ..."<sup>21</sup>

Further, Rich argues that liberalism has influenced these  
segregationist policies up to, but also after 1948, and is broadly  
responsible for the absence of "pure racism" or biological racism in  
this policy.<sup>22</sup>

These assertions are extensively based on Rich's analysis of the  
writings of key liberal figures in the 1920's and 1930's, especially  
Rheinalt-Jones, Hoernle and Edgar Brookes. Rich's treatment of  
Brookes well-illustrates the fragility of his argument. Rich makes  
several important references to Brookes early activities and writings.<sup>23</sup>  
At this point, Brookes was clearly an advocate of segregation and a  
supporter of Hertzog's Pact Government. However, at no stage in at  
least twenty five references he makes to Brookes, does he acknowledge  
Brookes' complete repudiation of these early activities.<sup>24</sup> The  
discontinuity of the early Brookes (during the Twenties) and the later

Brookes (Brookes from the Thirties onwards) is not only noted in Brookes' autobiography, but even more so by his actions and writings in the remaining five decades of his life. Perhaps the clearest indication of his subsequent repudiation of segregation, ethnicity, or what Rich calls the anthropological approach to liberalism is given in Brookes' repudiation of the Sprocas report on political alternatives.<sup>25</sup> In the light of these clear repudiations, Rich's continual referrals to these early writings is highly misleading.<sup>26</sup>

If Rich's contention that traditional liberal values had been "defined" by segregationist thinking is dubious, his consequential assertion that "anthropological" liberalism, in its turn, significantly influenced segregationist policy, is equally unconvincing.

Whilst a clear case can be made for the influence of Brookes, Rheinalt-Jones and others on the Smuts-Hofmeyr regime, it is very difficult to argue that this influence promoted, or even influenced segregation. In contrast, liberal figures opposed segregation repeatedly. After 1948, liberal influence on (indeed even access to) government policy was almost non-existent.

Both Rich and another historian of liberalism, Janet Robertson,<sup>27</sup> are correct in reflecting a confusion of liberal tactics, which often oscillated between an assertion of "pure" principle and the advocacy of

actions, which because of the realities of power, involved significant values compromise. In this respect, Robertson's description of liberal attitudes towards the United Party in the period 1948-1959 (and Rich's description of early periods, i.e. 1933-1948) are important.

Finally, Hellman in her assessment notes somewhat poignantly:

"The essence of the Institute's work, the striving to influence the minds of men, is by its very nature imponderable. Many of us believe that the effort has been meaningful ... One belief we all share: and that is the certainty that, given a different direction in the post-war years, South Africa would have progressed immeasurably further in realising the potential of her rich human and natural resources." 28

### Ethics and Action

One of the key elements in Bonhoeffer's conception of ethics as we have seen in an earlier Chapter <sup>29</sup> was his conviction of the identity of ethics and action: ethical choice is the choice of the deed. The deed is only chosen when it is executed. The Institute's objectives and activities are analytical by definition. The essence of this lies in the gathering and dissemination of information (not that this is not action!). This must give rise to the temptation to judge reality rather than participate in it. This danger was certainly recognised by Institute leaders throughout the decades:

"It may almost be said that now it is no longer a question of gathering facts, unravelling the skein of South Africa's problems. Rather now the problem of the Institute will be to discover sound methods and techniques of getting these accumulations of knowledge across to the generality of South Africans in a form which will convince them ..." 30

Ten years later O. D. Screiner observed the distinction between description and prescription and committed himself to the latter. In 1965, Archbishop Hurley returned to this theme, noting the disadvantages of the types of people who typically found themselves in Institute leadership positions in respect of what he termed "direct action":

"... academic and ecclesiastical persons are a little short on that instructive grasp of realities, that feel of the situation, that subconscious assessment of possibilities so necessary to the soldier, the policeman and the politician."

Hurley nevertheless notes that though ill-equipped for direct action the Institute must be sensitive to reality:

"... if we are to be teachers and guides we have got to give our teaching realistic and concrete expression." 32

The tension between analysis and action is ever present in the Institute's writings, and is reflected in the rather inspecific or even abstract way the Institute has sought to evaluate its own actions, as indicated in the Hellmann assessment quoted above.

The Role of Reason

We have noted Bonhoeffer's limits to reason. Whilst he welcomed a "world come of age", he warned against underestimating the role of factors other than reason, and in particular, of evil, power and interests.<sup>33</sup> We have noted above the centrality of rational analysis in the nature of the Institute's activities. This centrality is reflected in the Presidential Addresses studied.

"... we can stand firm by the vision that we have gained over the years by careful study and test experience, that the nature of human excellence common to the whole of humanity and the old ideal remains the same, 'a world of free minds in free societies'".<sup>34</sup>

and again:

"This involves unremitting efforts to educate White public opinion and also practical co-operation with the non-white leadership."<sup>35</sup>

However, Institute leadership has not been blind to the limits of reason:

"I do not have to be told that such an equitable sharing of power would be the wisest course and probably save a lot of misery and probably even bloodshed in the long run. I want to know how one gets this across to the people involved."<sup>36</sup>

and then, beginning to go beyond reason alone:

"Moral re-education involves not only the mind but also the emotions and, in fact, the emotions more than the mind. South Africa's crisis is, in fact, a crisis of love, and by what methods do you teach love?"<sup>37</sup>

Another President writes in a similar vein:

"Possibly the first thing to do is to accept the fact that, irrational or not, race prejudice exists and will not be eliminated by wishful thinking." 38

Another concedes the limits yet asserts reason's centrality:

"In the past, we in the Institute may have erred in thinking men and women more subject to persuasion by reason than they are. But to discount reason altogether is surely a counsel of despair." 39

Finally, one President concedes these limits, yet sees these in a context of circumstance:

"A long experience of public affairs has taught me that reason and persuasion have a less decisive influence on public opinion than the force of circumstance. This does not mean that reason is impotent; it means that men will not yield to reason until the pressure of circumstance opens their minds to its influence. Has that fateful moment not come?" 40

### The Role of Power

In going beyond the limits of reason Institute leadership have focussed on the role power plays in social reality. There is a clear and repeated indication of the role of power:

"In an utopian and rationally ordered world, there would be no need for a defensive or aggressive foreign policy. The people of one nation would not feel their very existence threatened by those of another; there would be enough fruits of the earth to satisfy all needs; and no one would want to go to war to compel others to become Christians or Muslims, Communists or Fascists. For the time being, however, the world is nationally, and not rationally, ordered ..." 41 (own emphasis)

Although in the early decades the Institute attempted a "non-political" approach to the issues of race in South Africa,<sup>42</sup> it increasingly realised that political power created the context within which racial interaction took place. This led the Institute to consider the realities of party politics:

"Party politics ... is in fact a harsh struggle for the possession of political power ... The successful party in this political power struggle is obliged by the logic of our democratic system to follow two quite simple but very fundamental rules - one, to implement or enforce by acts of Parliament the collective will of the party as embodied in the party programme, and two, to strengthen and consolidate its hold on the levers of political power by increasing its parliamentary representation." 43

Presidential addresses are replete with observations about the nature of political power. Often general truths about political power have been aptly applied to South African circumstances:

"The chief defence of liberty (in Europe) against arbitrary power lay in the balance of forces between corporate institutions and the state ... before Hitler could destroy liberty in Germany he had to undermine the great corporation institutions - the churches, the universities, trade associations, and local authorities."

"In the frontier societies that grew up in the colonies no dictator was required to undermine corporate institutions. In an environment in which rugged individualism was the most important quality necessary for survival, corporate institutions were disregarded or, at best, failed to strike deep roots." 44

One Hoernle Memorial Lecturer took the political analysis one step further speaking of Rhodesia, not South Africa:

"The dilemma is an agonising one - how to satisfy black aspirations without destroying white confidence ... The Problem is ... how to switch from white minority rule to black majority rule. Multi-racialism and non-discrimination are secondary issues ... Will moral considerations, moderation, common sense and humanism on both sides coat the pill's unpalatability and coax the whites into swallowing it, or will emotionalism and heroics take over? I wish I knew the answer - I hope for the one just as I fear the other." 45

Institute leaders took cold comfort from their analysis of political power. Their assessment led either to a retreat into the realm of dogged optimism, <sup>46</sup> or to an evacuation of the central ground, and a focus on "lesser" issues:

"Power lies with the White electorate. The White electorate by a majority of nine to one, or more, is violently opposed to participation of all races in a single society. ... Those who have it within their power to promote the moral change (which must precede a political change) have got to think this matter through. Should they continue to devote so much of their energy to opposing and criticising what seems so obviously wrong in the present regime, knowing that they have no alternative plan to offer with any hope of political acceptance? Or should they, like wise generals, realise when conventional strategy is futile and concentrate on something more subtle and consequently more difficult of conception, more exacting in execution and far less dramatic in immediate impact." 47.

#### Economic Interests

In addition to a political analysis, Institute leaders have focussed on the role of economic interests in shaping South African reality. However, references to this factor are surprisingly scarce - only seven direct references in the twenty seven documents, or 550 pages studied.

Of these seven references, furthermore, only two suggested the centrality of economic considerations:

"What actually precipitated the calling of the national convention to consider unification were the economic difficulties the four self-governing Colonies were experiencing in relation to the railways and custom duties." 48

and:

"In this country we are experiencing the repetition of an historic process. A primitive feudalism is being replaced by the system we describe as capitalism. This process is now far advanced. Our industrial revolution - a change in the method of production - has already to a large extent transformed the Africans from a primitive peasantry into an industrial working class. Our Black workers constitute a new emergent class who are acquiring economic power. They constitute the great bulk of our labour force. They hold the keys of production in their hands. They are becoming conscious of their vital role in our expanding economy. They are learning to use their economic power to enforce their claim to a larger share of the wealth to which they make an indispensable contribution. In due course they will learn to use their economic power to enforce their claim to political rights without which they are powerless to advance their interests or protect themselves against discriminatory legislation." 49

In contrast to the above analysis, two of the remaining five references  
50  
are incidental, and the final three assert the primacy of psychological and political factors over the economic.

"...we must conclude that both employer and labourer sub-consciously seek other than purely economic satisfaction from the relationship; that, in fact, the psychological relationship plays bigger part than it does in Europe ..." 51

and

"It is interesting to observe the difficulty which is being experienced in raising non-White wages ... If suitably qualified non-Whites had votes and, if, consequently, non-White workers had effective trade union support, a solution to the problem of raising non-White wages would certainly be found." 52

and again:

"It is when we are confronted with the problems of promoting the economic advance of the under-privileged that the importance of their lack of political rights becomes evident. Politicians have to sell their policies to a white electorate, and it is only when the interests of that electorate are seriously threatened that the privileged are likely voluntarily to abandon a protected position." 53

#### Of Optimism and Hope

A final dimension of Bonhoeffer's ethical model from which useful comparisons may be drawn lies in the area of future expectations, optimism and pessimism. Bonhoeffer's ethical thought and action was characterised by a combination of transcendent hope and practical optimism. The one element informed the other. His transcendent hope was based on a profound belief in what he termed "imminent justice":

"It is one of the most astounding, but nevertheless undeniable truths of experience that evil men show themselves, and often most surprisingly quickly, to be stupid and ineffective." 54

and also in his faith in a God active in the affairs of men:

"I believe that it is God's will to bring good out of every situation, even the most terrible. God can also do this. For this, however, he needs people." 55

Practical optimism is what Bonhoeffer describes as "a will for the future."<sup>56</sup> This "will" issued itself in practical plans. It was not just a blind faith that "alles sal regkom", but hope in a particular plan. Specific, serious plans characterised Bonhoeffer's activities from the moment he joined the conspiracy in 1938 until the failure of Walkure in July, 1944.

Institute writings are full of transcendent hope, but have few examples of practical optimism. The following words well represent the Institute's transcendent hope:

"For myself, I remain, in the face of all the odds, a prisoner of hope, because I believe in the end the people will make the right choice." 57

Such hope is certainly a necessary condition for effective action, but is it sufficient? A Hoernle Memorial lecturer offers a pithy warning about some basic attitudes towards South Africa's affairs:

"In trying to understand today's complex and turbulent Africa, a word of caution must be spoken against easy optimism, harsh scepticism and facile analogies." 58

In the absence of specific plans of action can optimism be anything other than "easy optimism"? Some of the words of Institute leaders are not encouraging:

"Perhaps it is already too late, but deep in my heart I do believe that if we start today and go forward in faith we shall overcome some day." 59

"We do not know that peaceful methods will win, but at least we do not know that they will fail." 60

"I don't know what will work best, but we must go on speaking out against oppression and injustice because silence will be taken as consent." 61

#### 4. The Progressive Federal Party

The second organisational setting in which liberal writings have been examined is that of the Progressive Federal Party. The activities of this party have been described in more detail in Chapter Three. 62 The Party was born when eleven United Party Members of Parliament resigned from that Party after its 1959 Central Conference and formed the Progressive Party (PP). Ten years later, in 1975, the Progressives 63 merged with a further United Party breakaway group, to form the Progressive Reform Party (PRP). 64 Two years later, another merger, took place to create the Progressive Federal Party (PFP). The PFP took over from the UP as official opposition in the 1977 election.

The documents studied here have consisted of the PP, PRP and PFP's chief speaker's contribution to the annual no confidence debate in Parliament from 1960 to 1984. For the first two years, the PP spokesman, was its first leader, Dr Jan Steytler. From 1962 to 1974, its standard bearer was its solitary representative, Mrs Helen Suzman. 65 From 1974, until 1979 its chief spokesman was its second national leader, Mr Colin Eglin. From 1980 until 1984, this became Dr Van Zyl 66 Slabbert, the Party's third national leader.

Of course, a Parliamentary no confidence speech is very different from a presidential address delivered at a Race Relations Annual Council meeting. It is by nature more adversarial, and fully steeped in both Parliamentary and party political conventions. Nevertheless, they contribute a source of value statements, and in these an indication of the ethics of this organisation can be found.

#### Of Ethics and Action

The role of an opposition party in a Parliament is one of analysis and critique. A government may be measured by its deeds, an opposition can be measured only by its statements of intent. The role of the representation of a liberal parliamentarian espousing the values of a fully democratic multi-racial society, yet elected by a white electorate is further complicated.

67

PFPP ethics have been further shaped by their minority party role for the first seventeen years of their existence. This minority role is pithily captured in Suzman's description of her position in the House in 1970.

"I have no confidence in the government; I have no respect for the Official Opposition; and I have no time for the Herstigtes." 68

Indeed the years between 1961 and 1974 can be characterised as years in the wilderness. Time and time again, the PFP spokesman was called upon to take a solitary stand in defence of liberal values - a stand which carried little hope of influencing events. During these years, Helen Suzman had no opportunity <sup>69</sup> to move her own amendment to the Official opposition's motion of no confidence. With the re-emergence of Progressive representation in some strength from 1974 onwards, the Party's spokesman was able to move an amendment to the motion of no confidence. From 1978 from which year the PFP became the official opposition, the motion was itself moved by PFP spokesmen.

The reasons offered by the PFP over time for their lack of confidence in the government are suggestive of the ethical basis of their critique. These reasons can be grouped as follows: <sup>70</sup>

- lack of effective leadership and the failure to provide clear policies (1961, 1974, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1984).
- failure to remove racial discrimination and the consequent exacerbation of race relations (1974, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1983).
- failure to involve all races in planning for SA's future (1979, 1980, 1981, 1983, 1984).
- economic ineptitude (1974, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1984).
- illiberal government, in the sense of the repression of dissent (1978, 1982).
- military and foreign affairs issues (1976, 1978, 1983 and 1984).

Equally interesting are those occasions when PFP spokesman urged specific proposals on the government. <sup>71</sup> These can be broadly grouped:

- perhaps the appeal most frequently made was that for negotiation, the sharing of political power and responsibility (1962, 1974, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984).
- the second most common appeal, especially prominent after 1977 is that for voluntary rather than prescribed group association and the linked concept of measures to prevent group domination (1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1984).
- a third common plea has been for the removal of discrimination (1974, 1977, 1982).
- a fourth has been the appeal for the removal of the political constraints on economic growth (1974, 1982, 1984).
- finally, a further repeated appeal was that for a return to the rule of law <sup>72</sup> (1980, 1981).

A third area in which the ethical premises and priorities of the PFP are revealed is to be found in descriptions of the PFP role. Here the most explicit outline of this role has been given by Dr Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert in the 1984 No Confidence Debate:

- "(i) keeping alive the idea of constitutional government and opposition alive;

- (ii) preventing racial polarisation and intergroup conflict;
- (iii) fighting for civil liberties and particularly re-establishing the rule of law in our land;
- (iv) speaking up for the underdog and underprivileged;
- (v) formulating viable constitutional alternatives for the dead-ends into which this Government so often leads us;  
and
- (vi) keeping this government on its toes and being a watchdog for corruption, unnecessary red tape and bureaucracy and looking after the public interest." 73

#### The Nature of Political Power

One would expect the leadership of a political party to display a well-developed sense of the realities of party political power. The PFP leadership do not disappoint in this respect. From the earliest time of its existence, it correctly identified the nature of South Africa's political problems:

"The Hon. the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development said 'Anybody who believes that the Bantu people will forever be subservient to other people in South Africa is living in a fool's paradise.' Therefore, the Nationalist Party advances the concept of Bantustan. Mr Speaker, we have no quarrel with the Nationalist Party ... in their search for a basis of non-discrimination on which political rights and privileges are accorded to the individuals in South Africa. But we reject completely the Bantustan cult because we believe it can never be brought into practice in South Africa." 74

This is Jan Steytler speaking in 1960. Twenty four years later, Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert gives a more academically sophisticated, but essentially similar definition on the problem.

"South Africa is an ethnically plural, culturally diverse, racially manifold country in which the central political problem is that of group domination, the central economic problem one of structural inequality among groups of people, and the central social problem one of segmentation and division." 75

There are also repeated instances in which PFP leaders demonstrate understanding of the political process. This is well-evidenced by Colin Eglin's analysis of South Africa's Angolan intervention in November/December 1975. He commences his critique by noting:

"... we do not cast doubt on the Government's intentions, or even its motives ..." 76

instead:

"... we say its judgement in this matter wrong ..." 77

for:

"... the Government has underestimated the extent to which South Africa's involvement could be used to cloud the issue of Russia's intervention..." 78

and:

"Secondly ... the Government overestimated Western European response to (this involvement)." 79

and thirdly:

"... the manner (of South Africa's involvement) determined and decided upon by the Government was not sufficient to produce either a military or political result ... the struggle for power in Angola still goes on ... and the probable result will be a MPLA victory." 80

This analysis clearly proceeds from a realpolitik perspective and arrives at conclusions which are both apposite and topical:

"... even at a time when we claimed that we were fighting the cause of the free world, we could not count on a single active participating ally in the West ..." 81

and, therefore,

"It is appropriate for us to seek to enter into formal treaty agreements for mutual assistance with South African states which share our desire to see that this part of Africa does not become the victim of big power politics or big power imperialism." 82

Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert has also repeatedly demonstrated the ability to employ realpolitik vocabulary for basic liberal values:

"When you use coercive control, you lose control on your society. Why? Because you stifle information. Any society that cannot act rationally on the available information to cope with the challenges and problems that confront it is in difficulty." 83

And this combination of realpolitik and liberal principle was often effectively combined to demonstrate the underlying dilemma of the present government:

"... being able to win an election is one thing; being able to govern a country properly is quite another ... Pressures come not only from those who have the vote, but also from those who do not have the vote." 84

This is Eglin speaking in 1978. Slabbert engaged the same sort of logic in his criticism of the new (1983) constitution:

"... the Government has ... built in a crisis of legitimacy into the new constitutional guidelines right from the outset ... Firstly, because the Government formulated its own set of proposals. Then it had them endorsed by its own party congresses. Subsequently, it tried to sell them to other interested parties. What are the dangers of such an approach? Firstly, it excludes parties from the initial bargaining process right from the outset. Secondly, the Government is then bound by the congresses to sell a policy rather than to negotiate in terms of a mandate." 85

Finally, it is Slabbert who coins a pithy yet essential insight about the problems of the current Prime Minister:

"He inherited a traditional party which has to meet modern demands." 86

#### The Force of Economic Interests

The documents reviewed also displayed a significant reliance on the nature of economic forces and interests, as a key determinant of political reality. Indeed this forms as one of the basic avenues of attack on Government policy.

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"I must say that to me it is astonishing that we should spend so much time discussing this imaginary South Africa consisting of Bantustan on the one hand and White South Africa on the other. The real South Africa is, always has been and always will be a multi-racial country. If all the apartheid legislation which has been put on the Statute Book over the past fourteen years can only achieve these things, that there are nearly 1 000 000 more Africans in the urban areas than Whites, more than three times as many Africans in the urban areas than there were ten years ago, and three times as many Africans as Whites employed in all the major industries in our

urban areas, and in only three of our principal cities do White outnumber Blacks, then I say we are wasting our time on pipe dreams discussing a South Africa consisting on the one hand of Bantustans and of White South Africans on the other. Nothing but nothing can possibly happen in the next fifteen years which can alter this." 88

PFP spokesmen have frequently noted the political constraints the policies of Apartheid have placed on South Africa's potential for economic growth. 89 They have sought to emphasise the coincidence in the area of the economy of liberal sentiment and group self-interest, as the following quotation indicates:

"I hope the Hon. the Prime Minister will have the courage to get off the back of the tiger that the Nationalist Party has been riding for the last twenty five years and that he will re-educate his own supporters to understand that white prosperity and non-white advancement are not mutually exclusive but that they are synonymous, that admitting the thousands of non-white persons who are banging at the doors of our economy, anxious, willing and able to be absorbed by the intensified demands of a sophisticated industrialised society, as the best guarantee for the continued full employment of white people in this country." 90

They have also warned of the dangers of the economic participation on the one hand and political exclusion on the other of blacks in South Africa. 91

They have not advanced a coherent or comprehensive economic philosophy or programme, in contrast to that of the government. Whilst clear on

certain aspects of economic policy, such as the need to remove racial discrimination in the economy and to give trade union rights to black workers,<sup>92</sup> PFP attitudes towards "free enterprise" and laissez faire economics has been both hesitant and critical, perhaps particularly since the advent of Slabbert's leadership.<sup>93</sup>

### Threat or Promise

Normally, in a multi-party political system, the central objective of a political party is to gain power. Such a political objective could never be realistically entertained by the PFP. A second common role for minority or small parties is to participate in the exercise of political power by becoming a coalition partner of a major party. Thus the Liberal Party in Britain formed the Lib-Lab pact in the late Seventies. Over a longer period, the FDP in Germany has participated in Government, occupying significant ministries,<sup>94</sup> first with the Social Democrats and currently with the Christian Democrats. Again, this prospect has never been available to the PFP both because the governing party has never been in need of a coalition partner,<sup>95</sup> and also because philosophies on what can be described as primordial political issues have been so divergent.

Such a situation creates a difficulty for a political party: neither in power, nor with the short or medium term prospect of coming to

power, or participating in a coalition. In such a situation, a party is forced to derive both its optimism and its role from long-term considerations.<sup>96</sup> They are also likely to see motivation (theirs and others) in the light of long-term considerations.

Against this background, it is not surprising that much PFP comment at the motivational level has been of this long-term motive. Most of it has also held the form of prediction of future negative events. A typical example is that of Steytler in 1961:

"... it should be apparent to everybody in South Africa that one extreme nationalism will stimulate other extreme nationalisms ... unless we take out the extremism in nationalism, whether that applies to Europeans or non-Europeans, a conflict between various nationalisms is inevitable in South Africa." 97

and Suzman in 1963:

"... no country can afford to have racial discrimination because racial discrimination breeds frustration and frustration breeds bitterness and eventually, it will breed a blood-bath in this country." 98

and again in 1965:

"Otherwise we are sewing a legacy of hatred which we may be able to weather but which I can assure the House our children will certainly not be able to weather." 99

and Eglin in 1977: (commenting on the Soweto riots and their aftermath)

"That decision to meet confrontation head-on by shooting and by banning was, I believe, a fateful one for all of us in South Africa because it changed confrontation into conflict. It incurred the risk of converting a protest movement into a revolutionary movement. ..." 100

and again in 1979:

"The harsh reality is that, seen against the broad sweep of history, the options for peaceful co-existence in South Africa are narrowing and the prospects for violence increasing." 101

and Slabbert in 1981:

"The sand in the hour-glass is rapidly running out and our children are watching us and wanting to know what we are doing." 102

The extent to which South Africa is a fundamentally unstable society on the road to a bloody revolution, as well as the wisdom or urging change on this basis will be reviewed in the conclusion.

PFP leaders have sought to motivate change by means of promise as well as (implied) threat, as indicated by Eglin, for example, in 1976:

"We on these benches will be discharged our responsibilities by being critical of the government ... but we will also support the Government every time it takes courage in its hands and does move away from discrimination." 103

and Slabbert, in 1980:

"I want to assure him (the Prime Minister) for every concrete step he takes to remove any form of statutory discrimination, he will have the overwhelming majority of people in this land behind him, supporting him, thriving on new hope and showing new enthusiasm for the cause of our country." 104

However, the threats outnumber the promises quite substantially in the documents reviewed.

3. Harry Oppenheimer and the Anglo American Corporation

The third area in which liberal writings are reviewed focuses on an individual rather than an organisation - although this individual must be seen in the context of an organisation. The Anglo American Corporation cannot itself be seen as a liberal organisation - at least not in the same way as Race Relations and the PFP are liberal organisations.

Whereas the primary purpose of the latter two organisations is the propagation of liberal values, that of Anglo American is the production of goods and provision of services, and thereby the generation of profits for its shareholders. However Anglo's leadership has been thoroughly dominated, through the sixty seven years of its existences, by the Oppenheimers, Sir Ernest and Harry. Their liberal values have had a profound influence on the way in which profits have been generated and distributed, and on the attendant social and political influences that have flowed from Anglo's business activities.

That Harry Oppenheimer is a liberal in the sense that this term is used in this thesis is beyond question. He describes himself in these terms. <sup>105</sup> His views and values conform closely to the tenets of liberalism as articulated by Leatt. <sup>106</sup> What gives especial interest to these liberal values and views is the leading role Harry Oppenheimer has played in the associated Anglo, De Beers and Minorco groups.

Over the twenty five years Oppenheimer has been chairman of Anglo its after tax attributable profits have risen from £5 254 546 in 1957 to R554 100 000 (or R800 200 000 on an equity accounting basis) in 1983. Anglo's market value in 1983 was R9.9 billion. It employs some 250 000 people producing roughly forty per cent of South Africa's gold and thirty per cent of her coal. Through the Anglo American Industrial Corporation it is engaged in a wide range of industrial, commercial and financial services activities. De Beers produces a significant part of the world's diamonds, and through the Central Selling Organisation markets eighty per cent of world diamonds. Its after tax profits have risen during the period of Oppenheimer's chairmanship from £17 739 048 to R530 200 000 in 1983. Minorco, the recently re-organised vehicle for the "greater group's" international business, in 1983 earned profits of some \$105 000 000, with a net asset value of \$2,6 billion, forty three per cent of which was deployed in Europe, thirty five per cent in North America and the balance in Africa, Asian and Australasia.

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All of this makes the Anglo/De Beers/Minorco grouping one of the world's largest mining and mineral trading groupings. It is certainly the largest business venture in South Africa, and indeed on the African continent. This has created for Oppenheimer areas of autonomous activity, which in turn create opportunities for direct and indirect social and political influence.

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The extent and nature of this influence is a matter of considerable dispute. Two of his recent fiercest critics have described Oppenheimer as "one of the worlds most powerful men." <sup>109</sup> Oppenheimer himself has consistently disputed the equation of size, wealth and power: the idea that top industrialists enjoy a degree of influence in which they can simply pick up the phone and influence/determine the course of political events. <sup>110</sup> Indeed he counts himself as a failure in the political arena. <sup>111</sup>

It would be hard to deny that an organisation as large as Anglo American did not exercise considerable influence over the social context of its operations. Power or influence? This describes the parameters of the debate. This debate has been be-devilled by the lack of clear meaning or definition of terms. <sup>112</sup> David Yudelman, in a well-researched, well-reasoned work argues that the state and capital have enjoyed a symbiotic, essentially co-operative relationship since the earliest phase of industrialisation. In terms of this relationship, the state and capital co-operated in order to incorporate a radical labour movement (white in the Twenties, black in the Eighties). This co-operation also involves state assistance with capital accumulation and capital assistance with achieving economic growth, and thereby creating/co-opting a labour elite.

This line of reasoning does not answer the question as to how much power, and in what form, capital is able to exercise. (Neither, incidentally does it suggest some contradiction between the values and actions of liberal capitalists. Indeed Yudelman argues this is the normal pattern of relationship between capital and the state in capitalist development). Yudelman, in his only specific references to Oppenheimer and Anglo notes the limitations which exist on their actions as well as strategies to overcome them. 113

The critics cited above discuss Oppenheimer's political influence in terms of his undeniably reformist, essentially liberal values.

"The Vorster regime may not be all that Oppenheimer would like it to be; it may not be moving as far or as fast towards reform as Oppenheimer or the Progressive Reform Party might want; but meanwhile it is guarding the stability of the country and as long as it does that, Oppenheimer is unlikely to make any serious attempt to displace it." 114

Rich argues firstly that "economic liberals" looked in the Sixties and Seventies not to party politics, but to the business sector, to advance their interests:

"The emergence of a Verligte or 'enlightened' wing of the National Party in the 1970's led to a new political alliance being formed between the elite of the English-speaking industrialists, led by Harry Oppenheimer of Anglo American." 115

Finally, the most extensive critical study of Anglo yet produced is regrettably silent on this issue. 116

A debate of such magnitude and complexity requires more analysis than is possible here. It cannot be simplistically resolved. All we can do here is pose some questions for further debate.

- Does the coincidence of some interests, such as social stability and economic conditions conducive to private enterprise constitute an alliance?
- How are the clear areas of difference, such as Oppenheimer's consistent support for opposition groups such as the PFP and Buthelezi's Inkatha to be explained?
- Can an alliance exist between parties who have a minimum of personal contact? Oppenheimer and Vorster did not meet in the thirteen years of Vorster's premiership.
- If Oppenheimer did wish to "displace" the Vorster regime (and he has given every indication he would prefer another government), how can he do so outside of the actions he has already taken?
- When people speak of the power of Anglo and Oppenheimer, to what type of power do they refer? And how do they perceive this power being exercised?

Certainly Anglo's socio-economic and political influence cannot be denied. Three distinct avenues of such influence can be identified:

- Firstly, the business activities of Anglo American and De Beers. These businesses have been prominent in raising black wages,

calling for labour reforms and abolishing racial discrimination in  
117  
the workplace;

- Secondly, the creation of The Urban Foundation in the wake of the 1976 riots which commenced in Soweto, as agency at first for the improvement of the quality of urban life, and more recently for  
118  
"structural reform" in South Africa;
- Thirdly, the provision of financial support for a wide range of  
119  
liberal activities and organisations.

The documents reviewed here are Oppenheimers twenty five Anglo American annual Chairman's Statements. Of interest is the articulation given to liberal values when discussing South Africa's economic, political and social problems.

#### The Identity of Ethics and Action

As with Bonhoeffer. Oppenheimer looks to the ethical content of action. The ethical consequences of business action feature as one of the most constant element in his thinking. When taking over the reins from his father in 1957 he quotes his father's 1954 dictum about Anglo's purpose:

"... to earn profits, but to earn them in such a way as to make a real and permanent contribution to the well-being of the people and to the development of Southern Africa." 120

In his own farewell speech to the staff of Anglo in December 1982 he said that in working for Anglo:

"...people must be able to feel that they are contributing to the establishment of better, fairer, more peaceful conditions in South Africa."

We have to believe, and by our practice demonstrate, that the pursuit of business efficiency and the search for a free and just society are not contradictory objectives, but two aspects of the same thing." 121

Oppenheimer repeatedly points to the social consequences of economic activities:

"In measuring the achievements behind the establishment of these mines one must not think only in terms of so much copper and so much profit. Townships had to be built, standards of public health and hygiene attained, roads, communications and railway extensions created in what was then a primitive area, and the Native population had to be trained to take its place in an industrial economy." 122

and again:

"The freedom of a country finds expression, not only through the activities of individuals, but through associations or teams. And business associations are of special importance because they generally dispose of the practical skill and material resources to carry through large projects. If such organisations do not actively respond to the needs of the community in which they work, there is no alternative but increased regulation of life by government agencies. So that it is not too much to say that a sense of responsibility in such matters on the part of private businessmen is part of the defence of freedom itself." 123

A further indication of Oppenheimer's perception of the possible and necessary identity of business and ethical or moral considerations is

given in a a remark he made when referring to the consequences of Sharpeville in 1960:

"The recent disturbances have affected these (capital) markets to a degree which is not generally appreciated in South Africa. Not only have they caused investors to fear for the safety of their holdings but they have evoked a wave of moral indignation against the present South African racial policies." 124

Oppenheimer again draws the consequences from moral positions in discussing the question of economic boycotts:

"I have little doubt that in practice the immediate effect of any such boycott would not be to cause the government to change course, but to tighten its control of the flow of blacks from rural areas to the towns for the reason that under-employment in rural areas is judged to be less likely to cause social unrest than massive unemployment in the cities. If a boycott did in the long run produce change in South Africa, it could only be violent change induced by the sufferings that it would have inflicted on black people. It is difficult to believe that any end could justify such means ..." 125

### Power and Reality

As with the PFP, Oppenheimer's writings repeatedly note the role that power plays in society. He makes repeated references to the political realities which define South Africa's political future options. White power is one of these realities:

"The union and the Rhodesians have comparatively large European populations with no other homes. They are determined to stay in Southern Africa and to create

conditions in which their children and grandchildren can stay there also. Any political approach which does not accept that fact is unrealistic and useless." 126

A second reality is:

"...that the question is not whether South Africa should be a multi-racial state, but rather how such a state should conduct its affairs." 127

In 1959 he posited a third "reality" which proved to be quite false:

"There has been some talk of eventual full independence for the African areas, but I do not believe that South Africans of any race or party would seriously contemplate the partition of the country." 128

When, by 1982, it had become clear that (at least internally) independant and self-governing states had emerged, Oppenheimer acknowledged this:

"This is the crux of the political debate as it has now evolved. Are blacks to be recognised and treated as South Africans? Or is the government going to insist that their nationality and allegiance should lie solely with the independant black states, or autonomous black territories which government policy has called into being? Plainly the government policy cannot now be reversed. It is far too late for that. But could it perhaps be accomodated, as the Buthelezi Commission suggests, within a wider South African federal system - one in which people of all races would enjoy an over-riding South African nationality, carry South African passports and come perhaps in time to feel a common South Africa patriotism." 129

#### Responsible Action

Oppenheimer displays concern with the consequences of action, as well as with the motives of the actors. Both allies and critics are called to take account of this:

- International Critics:

"No doubt there is much that is wrong in South Africa, and we would welcome the understanding and goodwill of the world outside to help us put it right. Too often we are met merely with indiscriminate condemnation, and thoughtless encouragement to every form of resistance to the existing system, without any clear idea of what should be put in its place." 130

- Government:

"Unless we can create conditions in which agitators are ineffective, not because of draconian legislation, but because people do not want to listen to them, the future of South Africa will be a gloomy one." 131

"This policy of separate development has, however, been even less successful than the Rhodesian policy of partnership, either in satisfying African political aspirations, or in mollifying overseas critics." 132

"It is no doubt the first duty of a Government to maintain order ... The full economic development of the country, however, will only be secured in circumstances in which the maintenance of law and order can be reconciled with freedom for the individual." 133

- Industry:

Here he comments on the argument which calls for low wages and full employment:

"In South African conditions such a policy would in practice be gravely unjust and dangerous for what it would involve is not a low wage structure for all workers, but a policy of maintaining high wages for whites and low wages for blacks." 134

Economic Forces

A completely consistent, and insistent, argument throughout the period under review, is that relating political consequence and economic development. The vital principle in this argument is succinctly stated as follows:

"... racial discrimination and free enterprise are basically incompatible, and ... failure to eradicate one will ultimately result in the destruction of the other." 135

This differs, it should be noted, from the economic determinism attributed to O'Dowd,<sup>136</sup> yet avers the importance of economic growth as a necessary though not sufficient condition for political progress and stability, and indeed vice versa.

In advocating "African advancement", Oppenheimer notes, it is fallacious to argue that this will take place at the expense of the white worker.<sup>137</sup> He also acknowledges that presently (written in 1976) many blacks are excluded from the free enterprise system and its benefits.<sup>138</sup>

Oppenheimer acknowledges also that the changes which must be made will have a cost:

"It will not be possible for all these changes to be made without affecting profits. In virtually none of our enterprises can increased costs be passed onto the consumer because for the most part we are selling at world or controlled prices. While we believe that improvements in productivity will flow from most of what we are doing, there can be no guarantee that in all cases they will fully offset the costs of increased wages, and in any event wages are generally being increased first while the improvements in productivity will only follow after an interval of time. I am confident, however, that shareholders will support us in our decision to embark on these policies in the belief that they are essential to the long-term interests of Group companies and indeed of South Africa." 139

Optimism

In contrast to many Race Relations and PF statements, Oppenheimer demonstrates an unambiguous optimism. Writing in the shadow of the events of Sharpeville in 1960 he says:

"It would be idle to pretend that Southern Africa is not subject to serious political risk. But there are very few parts of the world where there are not serious political risks of one kind or another. And in Southern Africa, in spite of all the problems and difficulties, there are solid grounds for optimism." 140

Twenty one years later his optimism was just as strong:

"Is it going to be possible to find a method of power sharing between all the peoples of South Africa on a fair and acceptable basis? I think it is clear that the government is honestly seeking such a solution: but it is equally clear that it has not yet found it. To do so needs courage, goodwill and faith such as has not been manifested by a previous South African government in my experience. But then perhaps South Africa as a whole has never been ripe for such change as new circumstance are now pressing upon us. In that last consideration there is, I believe, real ground for optimism." 141

Yet Oppenheimer makes it clear that the future cannot be approached with complacency, and will not be without trauma:

"We in South Africa are now embarking upon a period of change and development in our industrial structure, as our working people establish their bargaining positions and begin to assert their wishes. Older industrialised societies have all passed through this phase of development, and have usually experienced unrest and anxiety in the process. Here, we must accomplish the adjustment in an environment greatly

complicated by the questions of race and colour and by political attitudes, not only within South Africa, but elsewhere. It would be wrong to expect that we can do this without tension, but it would be an even greater mistake not to try." 142

### Threat or Promise

This optimism causes Oppenheimer to approach problem areas more from a perspective of promise rather than that of threat. Talking of the shortage of skilled workers, for example, he says:

"Leaders in all sections of industry are looking to the government to take appropriate steps to remedy the shortage of skilled labour, and I feel sure that with goodwill and common sense it can be done." 143

This positive approach has not meant that Oppenheimer has not been critical, even sharply critical, of the South African Government:

"Certainly it would be idle to pretend that significant progress has yet been made toward realising the hopes that were then (Carlton Conference) raised." 144

"Time is running dangerously short and if our problems are not faced now they will have to be faced in much aggravated form in the future." 145

"Nothing is more dangerous than half-hearted reform." 146

However, Oppenheimer consistently seeks to define his own role, and that of the Anglo American Group, in positive terms:

"The business community as a whole has in these circumstances a special contribution to make and

I believe that our Group in particular, with the wide experience it has gained in African countries and overseas, can play a significant part in helping to solve the problems with which South Africa is now faced." 147

CHAPTER FIVE

LIBERAL VOICES AND THE DILEMMA OF THE 1983 CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM

"Realistically one cannot expect the white population to accept a sudden transformation from their present dominant role to a politically impotent one."

Interview 13

"I know what they (liberals) should do, but I don't know what the consequences will be."

Interview 14

"Nobody has come up with a liberal strategy that will work. We have to go forward in faith doing what we can, where we can."

Interview 11

"Liberals don't plan strategically or effectively. Liberal values in themselves are not very powerful agents for organisation - mobilisation."

Interview 5

"The problem is our powerlessness."

Interview 12

This chapter examines how a group of South African liberals responded to a contemporary dilemma, the 1983 Constitutional Referendum. It is based on interviews conducted during September and October 1983 with fourteen individuals, each of whom may be regarded as a significant articulator of liberal values. The chapter constitutes a third attempt to explore the questions raised in this thesis:

- Are liberal ethics characterised by a sense of powerlessness?
- Has this led to a concentration on principle, motive and inner conviction rather than the consequences of action?
- How does this affect liberal action in a contemporary concrete dilemma?

From a methodological point of view, the chapter again seeks to combine two objectives:

- In a phenomenological sense, the need to get close to the data and allow this data to speak for itself; and
- the need to illuminate the results of this phenomenological experience through the application of ideal-type devices or techniques. Three of these are used here:
  - (a) the Cardijn "see, judge, act" sequences of ethical analysis (see page 198);
  - (b) concepts drawn from the first section of the thesis, and in particular from Bonhoeffer's model, such as optimism and pessimism, the role of reason, guilt, power and evil as well as ethical ambiguity (de Beauvoir) and ethical modesty (Camus);

(c) elements drawn from the thesis above, such as the concepts of powerlessness and an ethich of inner conviction (Weber) as opposed to consequences.

Hopefully, these ideal-types have been used to test, delineate and illuminate, and not to distort or constrain.

## 1. The Nature of the Research

1.1 Sample: Those interviewed were selected against a set of criteria.

### Whites

Firstly, as the dilemma in question posed problems most concretely for those who presently have the vote, only white liberals were interviewed for this chapter. This is in no way to suggest that only white South Africans are liberals. There is much evidence to suggest that liberalism is one of the two major ideologies of those opposing Afrikaner Nationalism, whether white, black, coloured or Indian. Positive ideological labels are not easy to apply to black political movements. Mobilisation has often occurred against specific measures (1913 Land Act, 1936 Hertzog Bills, Pass Laws, etc.). However, it is clear that liberal values as defined by Leatt, enjoyed great support from generation to generation amongst black leaders and that liberalism exercised considerable effect on organised black politics throughout South Africa's history. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the

history of black political organisation reveals a pattern of political liberalism and economic egalitarianism (though not necessarily socialism).<sup>7</sup>

Both the Bergstrasser and Buthelezi opinion research indicates significant black popular support for liberal values:

- strong support for the democratic process including the role of the opposition (but only a slight majority for multi-party democracy);<sup>8</sup>
- a rejection of all forms of racial discrimination, including a rejection of the tyranny of the majority;<sup>9</sup>
- support for the role of the courts, freedom of speech and the role of the press.<sup>10</sup>

#### English Speakers

Secondly, the group of liberals interviewed has been largely restricted to English speaking liberals. Again, this is not to suggest that liberalism is the exclusive preserve of the English speaking section of the white community. Some of South Africa's most outstanding liberals have come from an Afrikaans background: Jan Hofmeyr, Hoernle, Marquard, Jan Steytler for example. There has always been an important Afrikaans liberal tradition.<sup>11</sup>  
<sup>12</sup>

Furthermore, Afrikaner Nationalism has been importantly influenced by liberal values. Attempts have been made from time to time to seek a reconciliation or compromise between the group centered and

charismatic values of pure nationalism and the more universal and egalitarian values present in culture and theology. One of the most important such attempts is represented by Van Wyk Louw's

Liberale Nasionalisme which seeks an equilibrium between group

rights and human or individual rights. <sup>13</sup> Another attempt arose

out of the failed Cottoesloe Consultation. <sup>14</sup> More recently,

tensions between basically liberal values and Afrikaner

Nationalism have been evident at the Universities of Potchefstroom <sup>15</sup>

and Stellenbosch. <sup>16</sup> Finally, the 1982 split in the National Party

may be seen at least in some small part as a debate between an

exclusivist and universalist vision of society within that party. <sup>17</sup>

However, this thesis suggests that liberal ethics have been distorted and weakened by a prolonged exclusion from the exercise of power. Therefore, these interviews concentrate on the most clearly and unambiguously excluded group - the English speaking liberal. This exclusion was based in the early period of Nationalist rule as much on the fact that the English speaker belonged to the wrong language group as on a clash of ideas. This was an inevitable consequence of the rise of Afrikaner Nationalism. The National Party mobilised in the late Thirties and Forties around the concept of Afrikanerskap and of a political unity of all belonging to the Afrikaner Volk. No blurring of ethnic lines could be entertained at this time. This ethnic political mobilisation was emphatically coupled to a profoundly

18

illiberal ideology. English liberals were, therefore, disqualified on two scores.

#### Societal Roles

The group interviewed included liberals in a range of occupations and based in the three major metropolitan areas:

- The group included two present (Helen Suzman, Colin Eglin) progressive Members of Parliament; as well as three former MP's (Harry Oppenheimer, Zach De Beer and Rene De Villiers);
- It included two businessmen (Harry Oppenheimer and Zach De Beer);
- Two leading Churchmen (Archbishop Hurley and Rob Robertson);
- A former newspaper editor (Rene De Villiers);
- A writer and former leader of the Liberal Party (Alan Paton);
- The several times national leader of the Black Sash (Sheena Duncan);
- The director of the Human Awareness Programme (Marion Nell) and
- Four liberal academics: economist (Francis Wilson) law (Professors John Dugard and Tony Mathews) and Professor of Comparative African Government (David Welsh).

Six of those interviewed live and work in Johannesburg, four in Cape Town and four in Natal (Durban and Pietermaritzburg).

With the exception of Marion Nell, the interviewees are all in a mature phase of their careers. In retrospect, it would have been valuable to include more younger liberal spokesmen. The short time period during which these interviews had to be conducted made this difficult.

More detailed biographical sketches of the interviewees are provided in Annexure Two, pages 410-415.

## 1.2 The Nature of the Interview

The interviews were all conducted in the months of September and October 1983. This time period was chosen as it was the height of the Referendum campaign but before the outcome of the referendum was known.

The interviews had a duration of between forty five minutes and two-and a-half hours. This time was spent asking a series of six questions, three of which dealt with the Referendum, whilst the remaining three questions were of a more general nature. In both cases the "see, judge, act" methodology developed by Cardinal Cardijn, and used in the Young Christian Workers and Young Christian Students movements, was used. Interviewees were first asked to describe the new constitution and present day South Africa (how do you see it); then to pass judgement on it (how do you judge it) and then to advocate a course of action (what will you do about it).

Detailed notes of the responses were taken and a record of the interview was written up immediately after the interview.

Interviewees were promised that their remarks would not be attributed to them individually. Firstly, because the purpose of the interviews was to achieve a collective liberal view of both the Constitutional "reform" as well as change in South Africa in the 1980's. It was an attempt to find out how white English speaking liberals as a group viewed these questions. Secondly, because all of those interviewed hold important positions in organisations. Non-attribution allowed them to speak both more personally and more frankly.

These interviews (unattributed) are included in Annexure Two (pages 375-409). They are frequently quoted in the course of this chapter.

## 2. The Dilemma : The 1983 Constitutional Referendum

The Referendum held for white voters on 2nd November 1983 was to determine the degree of support for the Constitution of South Africa Act 1983, as debated and passed by Parliament in its second sitting of this same year. The question posed on the ballot paper was simply "Are you in favour of the implementation of the Constitution of South Africa Act of 1983 as considered by Parliament." The 1983 Constitution is an immensely complex document. As the Leader of the Official Opposition, the PFP, commented after the result was known, few people could have voted for its detailed proposals as these were not understood by 70 per cent of public representatives, let alone the electorate.

The authors of the new constitution argued in essence that its purpose was to provide a vehicle for participation for coloured and Indian South Africans, as well as to provide a new system of government not based on the Westminster "winner take all" system. To achieve this, the constitution provides for an ethnically constituted three chamber parliament on a 4:2:1 ratio for whites, coloureds and Indians respectively. It provides for a dualistic legislative and executive process of government with ethnic chambers and executive cabinets dealing with "own affairs" and "general affairs" being dealt with jointly. By way of moving away from Westminster, it provides for an indirectly elected Executive President with significant legislative influence as well as executive power, and for a system of legislative joint committees similar to aspects of the American Congressional system.

### The Campaign

South Africa's five white political parties took up positions as follows:

- The governing National Party (NP) - which received 56 per cent of the popular vote in the last general election - campaigned for a yes vote; The Conservative/Centrist opposition, New Republic Party (NRP) - which received seven per cent of the popular vote in 1981 - also campaigned for a "Yes" vote;

- To the left of the government, the official opposition, Progressive Federal Party (PFP) - receiving 21 per cent of the popular vote in 1981 - campaigned for a "No" vote;
  - To the right of the government, the reactionary Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) - which gained 14 per cent of the popular vote in the last general election - also campaigned for a "No" vote;
- Finally, the right of centre Conservative Party (CP), formed as the result of a defection of 18 of the NP's 131 members of parliament in 1982, campaigned for a "No" vote.

The major criticisms levelled at the new constitution by its opponents were:

20

from the left:

- that it provided no vehicle for participation for black South Africans, who constitute 70 per cent of the population, thereby avoiding SA's major political challenge;
- that it provided no real power sharing as whites retained real control through their permanent 4:2:1 majorities in the electoral college, (which elects the President) Parliament, and the President's Council (whose key function is to resolve conflict between the three ethnic chambers);
- that it entrenches rather than ameliorates ethnic conflict because it defines political power along ethnic lines (three separate

ethnic chambers, ethnically defined voters rolls, the ethnic divide between own and general affairs);

- that because of the excessive powers given to the President, it created a position of near dictatorship;
- and finally, that it was clumsy, complex and unworkable.

from the right:

- that by sharing power with people of colour, it meant the end of white South Africa;
- that power sharing with coloureds and Indians was an inevitable step towards power sharing with blacks;
- that it represented the end of white self-determination;
- that black and white interests in South Africa were so ultimately divergent that the constitution would be a formula for perpetual conflict and deadlock; and
- that it created a dictatorship and was the end of democracy.

The Government responded to these diverse criticisms as follows:

- that blacks were not being excluded from the process of constitutional development but merely from this constitution. The homeland policy already provided for political participation for blacks living outside "white" South Africa. It acknowledged that a political vacuum existed for blacks living permanently in "white" South Africa and appointed a cabinet committee to investigate this problem;

- that the new constitution was based on the principle of consensus decision making rather than majoritarian decision making and that in this way, it did provide for real power sharing and could function despite its seemingly complex structure;
- that the powers of the President were no more than the combination of the powers of the present State President and Prime Minister;
- that the constitution created parallel and co-ordinated structures for self-determination for each ethnic group as well as for co-responsibility as between groups.

Probably more significant than the debate as to detail (summarised above) were the symbols and feelings central to the debate. The Government and the NRP argued that this was a step in the right direction. It was neither complete nor perfect, but it nevertheless represented progress. The right wing opposition argued it was a first decisive step in the abdication of whites from their present position of power and a sort of roller coaster to majority rule. Remember Rhodesia was, therefore, probably their most effective campaign slogan. The left wing opposition dwelt most on the exclusion of blacks and thereby the exacerbation of black/white tensions as well as their fear of dictatorship. They, therefore, argued that the new constitution represented no real reform but rather a step in the wrong direction. They seemed early in the campaign to acknowledge the unpopularity of their stance by choosing as their campaign slogan "It takes guts to say No" and (in common with their right wing opponents) "don't be a yesman".

Few issues can have been as exhaustingly and comprehensively (though not necessarily logically!) debated in the relatively short history of South Africa as a united territory. Almost every conceivable interest group and organisation was drawn on the issue. Almost every angle - the new constitution and business, foreign investors, blacks, the Church, the economy, the student, etc. etc. - was explored.

Many traditionally united groupings were divided on this issue.

Whereas the English speaking Churches,<sup>21</sup> and universities,<sup>22</sup> and traditional liberal organisations such as the Black Sash,<sup>23</sup> and the Institute of Race Relations,<sup>24</sup> were uniformly opposed; the English language newspapers,<sup>25</sup> and the business community were deeply divided.<sup>26</sup>

The nature of the divided judgement was essentially as to whether this was a step in the right or the wrong direction. The black community was, not unsurprisingly, united in its opposition to the new constitution.<sup>27</sup> The coloured and Asian communities in contrast were<sup>28</sup> deeply divided.

A final note of confusion was contributed by an almost single-handed campaign of the liberal journal Frontline<sup>29</sup> for liberal opponents of the constitution to spoil their ballots, as well as a puzzling call from the largest English daily, the Johannesburg Star for liberal opponents to stay away from the ballot box.

The Results

The results produced a resounding majority for the Government and its allied NRP. At first glance, it would appear as if the electorate had voted according to party preferences as indicated in the 1981 elections:

|   | <u>1981<br/>Election</u> | <u>1983<br/>Referendum<br/>Outcome</u> |
|---|--------------------------|--|
| % of the popular vote in 1981 for 'yes' parties | 64,9%                    | 65,9%                                  |
| % of the popular vote in 1981 for 'no' parties  | 33,3%                    | 33,5%                                  |
| spoilt ballots                                  | 1,8%                     | 0,6%                                   |

However, this apparent coincidence conceals a substantial defection from the governing NP to the right wing No position, and a matching defection from the PFP to the Yes position. The nature of the defection is revealed when the results are compared in voting regions with varying degrees of support for the PFP in the 1981 election.

|                                 | 1981<br>NP/NRP<br>Vote | 1983<br>Yes<br>Vote |
|---------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|
| No PFP support (no candidate)   | 73,4%                  | 69,7%               |
| PFP less 10% of total vote      | 64,8%                  | 58,2%               |
| PFP between 10% and 25% of vote | 67,2%                  | 68,9%               |
| PFP more than 25% of vote       | 64,2%                  | 72,5%               |

It is also revealed by comparing the voting areas returning the highest "Yes" vote and those returning the lowest.

|                  |       |   |            |
|------------------|-------|---|------------|
| East London      | 77,9% | ) |            |
|                  |       | ) |            |
| Pietermaritzburg | 76,3% | ) |            |
|                  |       | ) |            |
| Cape Town        | 75,6% | ) | Strong PFP |
|                  |       | ) | Support    |
| Durban           | 73,6% | ) |            |

and

|             |       |   |          |
|-------------|-------|---|----------|
| Pretoria    | 57,1% | ) |          |
|             |       | ) |          |
| Roodepoort  | 56,8% | ) | Weak PFP |
|             |       | ) | Support  |
| Pietersburg | 47,4% | ) |          |

Finally, the "Yes" vote by province indicates the areas where the government did best and where it did worst:

|           |       |
|-----------|-------|
| Natal     | 73,0% |
| Cape      | 72,9% |
| OFS       | 64,5% |
| Transvaal | 61,0% |

Commentators noted that the PFP suffered a defection of between 30 per cent and 40 per cent of their 1981 support. <sup>30</sup> The extent of the defection is impossible to estimate with any accuracy, as it depends on the magnitude of right wing defection from the NP in PFP strongholds. What is clear is that substantial numbers of PFP voters "crossed the floor" to vote "Yes".

### 3. Seeing: The Origins of Constitutional Reform

When asked what the origins were of the current "reform" initiatives (and reform was purposely placed in inverted commas) interviewees produced a wide and widely disparate, set of responses.

Perhaps the most common thread was the feeling that reform did not arise from a genuine "change in heart" on the part of Afrikaner Nationalists:

"I'm fairly sure that these 'reforms' don't arise from a liberal tendency within Government." 31

"This means that the changes are negative and reluctant in nature. The idealism of old-fashioned Apartheid has played no role." 32

Reform was seen to be occurring within the straight-jacket of old objectives:

"The current reform initiatives were characterised by what many referred to as Old Cape Liberalism, but which could more accurately be described as old Cape racism. This was based on the unarticulated premise that coloureds and (by implication) Asians could be included in white society because they were like the whites, but blacks must be excluded." 33

and

"Change became imperative - however, it had to be change which gave the appearance of reform, without threatening the Nationalist's real grip on power." 34

and again

"P.W. (Botha) is trying to retreat in good order, whilst keep control." 35

Although all interviewees seemed agreed that change did not result from a change of heart, several did refer to which might be seen as endogenous origins, or put differently a changed pattern of Nationalist response:

"The major origin lies in the Afrikaner Nationalism's sense of 'konsekwentheid'. The coloureds and Indians were left out." 36

Another interviewee concurs, seeing as an important pressure:

"Afrikaner fundamentalism and the need to formulate complete solutions." 37

and another refers to endogenous causation:

"Disquiet in the Church, disquiet in the universities  
rebelliousness amongst the young, ..." 38

If Afrikaner Nationalism is not a prime or principal mover (indeed more of a limitation), what is? Seven areas of origin are described below, and the frequency with which they were cited is given below. This table must be seen only as a rough agenda of causation. Many areas lack precise definition. Frequently areas were cited tentatively. Furthermore, interviewees were not asked to select one, or even the major area of cause. Many cited several factors, often without weighing them. The table is not, therefore, an attempt at quantitative analysis but merely a summary of factors mentioned, and an indication of the most frequently cited.

|   |   |
|---|---|
| Military considerations   | 7 |
| Forces of an economic nature                                      | 7 |
| The desire to be part of the West                                 | 5 |
| Nationalist fundamentalism<br>(the desire for complete solutions) | 4 |
| Black protest actions   | 3 |
| Demographic forces/urbanisation                                   | 2 |
| Afrikaner dissidence  | 2 |

The factors mentioned most frequently then were military considerations, economic forces and the desire for good relations with the West.

### Military Factors

The context in which military factors occurred was more in the form of future threats rather than present considerations:

- "the military's desire not to fight on two fronts." <sup>39</sup>
- "the growing military threat ... " <sup>40</sup>
- "(Military leaders) made numerous statements indicating that South Africa's problem could not be resolved militarily." <sup>41</sup>
- "The costs of countering subversion are growing." <sup>42</sup>
- "Magnus Malan has noted the impossibility of fighting on two fronts." <sup>43</sup>

### Economic Forces

Economic forces were seen to be promoting a broader incorporation of blacks:

- that it had led to the abandonment of the goal of meaningful territorial separation; <sup>44</sup>
- that it had changed employer attitudes on issues such as influx control and the permanence of urban blacks; <sup>45</sup>
- that the coloureds were now where the Afrikaners were in the 1930's and that "the economic realities have changed creating a political need." <sup>46</sup>

Relations With the West

The desire to be part of the West is seen as leading to reform in that South Africa has taken note and reacted to international actions and pressures. As one interviewee put it:

"... South Africa's relations with the West had created some new legitimacy needs." 47

Another spoke of the need the Government might feel:

"to impress Washington and Bonn." 48

One of the most striking features of these views as to the origins of "reform" is the limited (indeed almost negligible) role attributed to the actions of non-Afrikaner nationalists inside South Africa. Only three interviewees mentioned black actions outside of the military arena, and only one saw these as the major cause of reform, and even then this action (Soweto 1976) was cited as the psychological turning point.<sup>49</sup>

The actions of white liberals receive no mention whatsoever. This confirms the sense of powerlessness so central to the thesis under consideration. Of course, liberals (both whites and blacks) and non-liberal black organisations (trade unions) have been active in promoting economic integration. However, the forces of economic integration are cited as impersonal forces, rather than the result of liberal action.

4. Judging - The New And Old Constitutions And Constitutional Ideals

In order to establish a benchmark for further judgement interviewees were asked to compare and contrast the proposed new constitution of 1983 with the present constitution (i.e. the Constitution Act of 1961).

Eight of the fourteen interviewees saw the new constitution as  
50  
unambiguously worse. Major reasons cited were as follows:

- the greater rigidity and inflexibility of the new constitution, in that it now enshrines aspects of apartheid society (e.g. the Population Registration Act) in the Constitution itself;  
51
- because it provides for "an excessive and frightening"  
52  
concentration of power, particular in the hands of the President: "it is an undemocratic constitution in the sense that it further erodes the balance of power between the individual and the State;"  
54
- because "it further entrenches and will further increase race group consciousness; ... it will divide functional activities (such as health) on a race group basis. This will increase conflict between groups defined around race over scarce resources;"  
55
- because it was fundamentally deficient in the process of its creation being "the work of a handful of individuals" rather than the outcome of a sustained and significant debate. It was, therefore, not a social contract in the Lockean sense of the term;  
56

- finally, because it is so complex as to be unworkable.

Five of the interviewees were ambivalent when making the comparison.

In the words of one of them:

"It is not possible to make a simple good/bad judgement. The new constitution is positive in that the issue of political rights for people who are not white is at least being addressed. Reform is on the agenda. However, it is bad in the way in which reform has been tackled." 58

This sentiment was echoed by several interviewees including some who judged the new constitution to be unambiguously worse:

"However, at least, the new constitution does legitimise the idea of the division of power." 59

Another ambivalent interviewee:

"It is better in the sense that it confers a symbolic equality of status on coloureds and Indians." 60

and another:

"... the sheer proximity of Government leaders to people of colour in the new deal will create a symbol of change." 61

and again:

"Still it is a gesture. Perhaps we're wrong in not recognising this as a significant gesture. It is the beginning of the end. Verwoerd understood that separation could only survive as absolute separation. Treurnicht also understands this." 62

and finally:

"... I cannot give a resounding no to the new constitution. The Afrikaners are now trying to get out of a fortress which they have been constructing for decades. They have made it almost impregnable. Now they find that not only can no-one get in, but also they cannot get out. The fortress has become a prison." 63

However, if the five "ambivalents" had some sympathy with at least a part of what the architects of the new constitution, and if they saw some positive features in the new plan, on balance, they judged it more negatively than positively.

"On balance, therefore, whilst it represents one or two steps forward, it represents many more backwards." 64

Only one of the fourteen saw the new constitution as "marginally better" than the present one. This interviewee argued as follows:

"The inclusion of coloureds and Indians in the formal political process cannot be dismissed as insignificant. On the other hand, it certainly does not qualify as real power sharing as their political actions will never be decisive. The coloureds and Indians will enjoy a sort of blackmail power. To the extent that the Nats really want this system to work, they will have to make concessions to ensure continued coloured and Indian co-operation. It is true, of course, that the major issue has not been addressed i.e. the political accommodation of blacks. They are excluded from the new constitution. However, they are excluded from the present one also." 65

### Constitutional Ideals

Having compared the proposed with the present constitution, interviewees were now asked to judge the proposed constitution in terms of their own constitutional ideals. This question produced three interesting areas of difference:

- individual versus group rights;
- the tension between universal ideals and South African realities;  
and
- the contrast between stressing the content of an ideal constitution and the way in which it was "made".

### Group versus Individual Rights

Of those who dealt expressly with this issue, four interviewees laid a clear emphasis on individual rather than group rights:

"We should move away from this group business entirely.

The sooner groups are not part of a constitution, the better." 66

"Group rights should not be entrenched. Group rights are really group interests, and do not require entrenchment." 67

"Whilst individual rights should form the basis, group rights could find expression in the form of the protection of language rights and the right to mother tongue education." 68

"It should not be necessary in an ideal situation to regulate group rights." 69

Five others indicated a constitutional role for groups:

"Liberals were correct to oppose the Government's obsession with the group, but wrong to give the group no place in their scheme of things." 70

"The individual is the key. However, I do not believe that you can have a universal franchise on the basis of equality. I do not want to swap one kind of tyranny for another. We need a process of checks and balances which can prevent group tyranny." 71

"The numbers should be constructed in a way that no one group should be able to govern alone." 72

"Groups should play a role - but self-defined (voluntary association) groups. The influence of minorities is as good a judge as any of a democracy." 73

"An ideal constitution would need to regulate group rights as well as individual rights in some way or another .... it is desirable that, at least in some areas, groups should be prevented from behaving in ways which other groups find quite intolerable." 74

#### Universal Ideals, South African Realities

Several interviewees noted the conflict between universal ideals and South African realities:

"Simple majoritarianism will never be accepted by those presently in power." 75

"An ideal constitution ... would have at least to offer the prospect of meaningful political power. Political participation could be limited or qualified." 76

"I don't know how much you have to fiddle with democracy in an unequal society (to prevent group tyranny)." 77

"Realistically one cannot expect the white population to accept a sudden transformation from their present dominant role to a politically impotent one." 78

Constitutional Content and Constitutional Process

79

"The process of making a constitution is as important as its content."

This sentiment is expressed and endorsed by six of the fourteen  
80

interviewees.

81

Others focussed more on content, though they would almost certainly endorse the sentiment expressed above. The contrast does reflect a tension between normative (or ontological) content as opposed to intersubjective (or existential) process.

Although only four of the fourteen interviewees made an explicit judgement of the proposed constitution in the light of the ideals they  
82

articulated in answer to this question, it can be reasonably construed that all would judge it very negatively. Where reference was made to group rights, to the need for compromise between ideal and reality, and the need for an incremental process, great care was generally taken to differentiate the "compromises" being discussed from  
83  
the shortcomings already noted in the proposed constitution.

Finally, it is interesting to note the degree of support that was indicated for either a consociational form of constitution, or for an evolutionary form of political participation such as is created by a qualified franchise. Six interviewees support the former, and two the latter. <sup>84</sup> A further two, <sup>85</sup> may be reasonably safely included as supporters of such a "compromise" constitution from answer to other questions, leaving only four of fourteen as universalist "hard liners". <sup>86</sup>

5. Acting - the Referendum Dilemma

Having judged the proposed new constitution, interviewees were now asked what liberals should do in the then imminent referendum. The interviewees were asked what liberals should do in the referendum and what the consequences of the advocated action would be.

There was complete unanimity as to the first part of the question.

Only one interviewee even mentioned an alternative:

"Whilst there is a good (intrinsic or moral) argument that can be made for spoiling one's ballot, there are good strategic reasons for not doing so." <sup>87</sup>

Although interviewees were not asked to provide reasons for the advocated action (as these had been examined in the questions relating to judging) several did offer reasons:

"For one, a liberal vote may lessen the degree of alienation felt by blacks. Secondly, a parliamentary system in order to function effectively requires a

degree of party loyalty. The PFP leadership had no option but to call for a 'No' vote. It is now vital that as much rank and file support for this call should be ensured." 88

"Firstly, because the constitution negates basic liberal ideas, and secondly, because the exclusion of blacks means that the momentum away from these ideals will be greater than the momentum towards them through the inclusion of coloureds and Indians." 89

"They should vote No, both for strategic and moral reasons." 90

The logic underlying the advocated action became clear as the interviewees discussed the consequences of a "No" vote. A number avoided the question of consequences altogether:

"I know what they should do, but I don't know what the consequences will be." 91

"From the point of view of strategy, as to which option will bring more change - I can't work this out. Therefore, the decision should be ethically based." 92

Others who did discuss consequences did so in a most negative way:

"As to results: nothing is going to happen for a long time. Nothing happens easily or quickly in this society." 93

"In essence, the 'No' vote is a vote of conscience. It will lead to no strategic advance. It will help liberals retain their integrity. PFP leaders will be able to continue to look black leaders in the face." 94

"Nobody has come up with a liberal strategy that will work. We have to go forward in faith, doing what we can where we can." 95

"The consequences will not be disastrous. If there is a 'No' majority, it will be claimed equally as a victory for the right and the left. It will also increase polarisation within the white community. There is likely to be no Constitutional movement for the next little while. A 'No' majority will, however, open up the debate." 96

"The practical consequences will be the status quo constitutionally, leaving the situation as it is now, providing for the possibility of change later." 97

A victorious "No" vote (a possibility which most of those interviewed regarded as unlikely) then is seen at best as a blocking move and at worst as a vote of conscience.

Some more specific discussion as to the consequences of a victorious "No" vote occurred around the impact of such a vote on the Nationalist government. All interviewees agreed such a vote would not bring the government down.<sup>98</sup> Many felt it would, however, change the direction and leadership within this party:

"A certain consequence of a 'No' vote will be Botha's replacement by De Klerk." 99

There was some disagreement and uncertainty as to both the significance and desirability of a shift in leadership from Botha to De Klerk:

"This is to be welcomed as De Klerk is both more intelligent and more rational than Botha. He also has his eye more on the main problem i.e. the blacks." 100

"... it makes little difference whether Botha or De Klerk is at the helm. The future does not revolve around personalities, but rather around pressures. The pressures will continue." 101

"Even if F.W. De Klerk takes over, it will take him no more than a few years to learn that he has to move to the left, mainly because of the demands of the economy." 102

"(De Klerk) is intellectually superior to P.W. Botha and doesn't have Botha's hang-up with the past (for instance, he will find it easier to talk to the PFP). De Klerk under the impact of a successful no vote would have to move left, as reconciliation with the right is an impossibility." 103

"It would be better to have a Cape Prime Minister (Botha/Heunis) than a Transvaal P.M. (De Klerk)." 104

"... in the longer term, he (Botha) is likely to be replaced by De Klerk. Is this a good thing? He's very 'behoudend'. Botha did go a little forward. Will De Klerk? I don't know. I certainly do not go along with the argument that says let's have the worst now, so that things can get better." 105

The uncertainty reflected above about what those interviewed agreed was the most likely consequence of the success of the action they advocated is why the 1983 constitutional referendum has to be called a dilemma. It is a choice with no clearly good or desirable option. As two interviewees noted:

"... voting 'Yes' is a blank cheque. And once traditional opposition voters have signed such a blank cheque once, they are likely to do so again. However, it is difficult to see how a fundamentally ambiguous 'No' victory would assist more rapid reform." 106

and

"If the 'Yes' vote is successful, this will result in the further alienation of the black people. If the 'No' vote succeeds, the Nats would swing to the right." 107

The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines a dilemma as "A form of argument involving an adversary in choice between two alternatives, both equally unfavourable to him ...". The 1983 Constitutional Referendum would seem to fit that definition well for the liberal voter.

#### 6. Towards An Ideal Future Society

The final two questions in the interview broadened the focus away from the 1983 constitutional referendum. The first question sought to explore what the future hopes or goals or ideals of interviewees were. The second asked about the strategies which those interviewed thought should be pursued to attain these goals.

#### Future Ideals

In the discussion of future ideals, the interviewees were asked to sketch their future ideal South Africa, and then to speculate on the role of both whites and liberal values in such a society.

#### Post-Apartheid Society

The vision which emerged was one of a non-racial liberal democracy with greater equality and more civil rights, but with many elements of present day South African preserved.

"This would be a non-racial, social democratic society where resources would be allocated according to the needs of the people. It would be governed by an interest-based multi-party democracy. Education would be universal and free. There would be no influx control and an equitable welfare system which was not economically crippling to maintain. The economy would be geared towards maximum employment. Individual rights would be guaranteed by a Bill of Rights. There would also be maximum decentralisation of power." 108

"(My ideal) is of a liberal democracy. It is of an economic order that is not socialist (in the East European/Chinese sense) as it seems clear that the socialist order cannot support freedom. However, it would also not be free enterprise. It would be a society aiming for a pluralisation of ownership, experimenting with new forms of economic control." 109

"As a mildly pink social democrat (a liberal socialist) I would like to see:

- the decentralisation of power;
- the entrenchment of individual rights;
- cultural diversity rather than cultural imperialism;
- experimental forms of economic partnership such as co-operatives;
- significant land reform;
- active measures to redistribute wealth by taking the energy of the people seriously, but without increasing State power." 110

### The Role of the Whites

This question coincided with the political dispensation envisaged. The prognosis for white participation ranged from very optimistic:

"Whites will have an absolutely crucial role in building this future. You just cannot have radical change without taking the white majority with you." 111

"Whites are likely to play a significant role in both the polity and the economy. We are not going to have simple majoritarianism." 112

"In such a (future) society, the white would play a very useful role as a citizen of a common society." 113

to the more limited, but nevertheless meaningful:

"The whites, whilst not playing a dominant and leading role, would nevertheless remain politically significant (unlike Zimbabwe) and should be meaningfully represented in the political partnerships which exist. This, however, will be determined by how the whites act during the period of transformation." 114

My ideal is:

"... A society in which whites really shared power with blacks, in a way in which white politicians and white voters still played a meaningful role in the political process." 115

to a significantly limited and indeed insecure role:

"... whites will have a great deal of political influence (indirect political power through their role in the economy) but little direct political power." 116

"There certainly can be no guarantees. Whites may well end up being politically irrelevant." 117

### The Role of Liberal Values

A liberal conception of both power and the State was implicit in all the conceptions of the future. However, the role of liberal values

was far from clear. Some interviewees merely affirmed the role these values would play:

"Liberal values will also be absolutely basic to this future society. We must recognise the rights and dignity of the individuals." 118

Others seemed to see these values in a sacrificial role:

"Ordinary biblical virtues should be the cornerstone: fair dealing, equity. However, human society being what it is, you cannot have a good society unless an element or group of its people are making sacrifices and not just demanding justice for themselves. Someone must be ready to take a "lower" place. This is the role of Christians in any society." 119

"A new society would be characterised in particular by two attributes:

- much more tolerance. It is the particular role of liberals to keep this tolerance alive;
- constitutionalism or power restrained by law. Again, it is the role of liberals to sell this idea. The whites in Zimbabwe failed to do this and they are now paying the price." 120

These are more admonitions than roles. Perhaps the clearest statements are linked to the nature and pace of change.

"The one hundred per cent moral view must be universal suffrage in a unitary society. The question is how do we achieve this?

The only way I can see this coming about is through violent revolution assisted from the outside. If we don't want this, then we will have to accept some sort of compromise - some form of confederal or federal society.

The task of fashioning a liberal society in this country will be a very daunting one. I'd settle for a very painful (and slow) evolution towards a better society. It will be more painful for the whites than the blacks. It will be particularly painful for the radicals who want it all at once." 121

However, this area leaves many questions:

- Who is going to create the liberal freedoms that are so cherished here? Whites are seen as playing a limited role. Are black liberal forces going to ensure civil liberty and "power restrained by law"? Where are these forces now?
- Why should a liberal democracy result here when the forces bringing change (as surveyed under 3) are military and economic? Neither of these are seen by those interviewed as being liberal in nature.
- Why should a liberal democracy result here, when the process of decolonisation has produced virtually no such societies elsewhere? 122
- Why should the pattern of Zimbabwe not repeat itself?

These are posed only as questions. They are not assertions. They are, however, sufficiently important questions to deserve answers.

#### Future Strategies

The final question asked was: "Starting from where we are now, how can such a society be achieved?" The answers given to this question are most distinctly characterised by:

- the lack of clearly formulated strategies;
- the lack of positive or initiative-taking strategies.

Four interviewees responded by merely describing the role future events were likely to take. Liberalism emerged from these descriptions in a basically passive role.

"The present half-hearted attempts at reform will collapse probably within a time frame of two- three years. The Government is most likely at that stage to move left, seeking an alliance with the PFP. This will require the PFP to make compromises. Should the Government stay where it is or even move right, change will most likely be brought about by a combination of increased black and foreign pressure. In this scenario, the PFP would have to entertain alliances with internal black groupings." 124

"If the actors see South Africa's problems not as those of colonialism or imperialism, i.e. the throwing off of some foreign and unacceptable ruling class, but rather in terms of Disraeli's two nations problem, then it should be possible to solve our problems relatively gradually and peacefully." 125

Another six interviewees gave a general description of the role liberals could and should play. No less than five of these seven, used the words to the effect of keeping alive basic liberal values.

Other aspects of the general role described were:

"They can also contribute to the build-up of pressure that will at least prevent the Nationalists from moving backwards. They can also assist change-oriented organisations to be more effective." 128

"Liberals should start where they are strongest i.e. in the economy, the Church, the Universities, the Private Schools, the Press. There is a case for situational ethics. Reform will not come overnight. Liberals will have to be prepared to settle for incremental gains which are steps in the right direction." 129

"... we must use Parliament, and also not be afraid to use extra-Parliamentary (but not extra-legal) activities as demonstrated by the Black Sash and Institute of Race Relations." 130

"You must do what is right, whether you can see the outcome or not. For example, in employing non-violent strategies, you cannot weigh or measure the outcomes. However, if violence is wrong, it is wrong whatever the consequences. I must do what I believe is right irrespective of the consequences." 131

Three of those interviewed did describe specific roles for liberals. They are what one might call "micro-roles" in that they operate at a small group level and are contingent on the activities of others:

"The most important role liberals can play in promoting real change is to teach: to teach civil disobedience, but also to teach self-reliance and independence. To equip all South Africans with basic problem solving skills which allow them to act responsibly and freely for themselves." 132

"For now, liberals should concentrate on the creation of non-government, grass roots, democratic organisations in the areas of worker organisation, health and education. Such organisations will contribute to the process of change as well as being consistent with the type of society likely to emerge here in the longer term." 133

"Liberals also have a role to play in doing what is often contemptuously referred to as ambulance work. But if there were no ambulances, the suffering in the world would be greatly increased." 134

Finally, three interviewees in particular engaged in some liberal self-criticism:

"... liberals must guard against purist interpretation of their own values. Full freedom is not possible in a society that has unresolved, fundamental conflict. To imagine a full Bill of Rights in such a society is just dreaming." 135

"Liberals, whether of a Christian, Jewish or humanist orientation, should give more attention to the problems of communicating their values to others i.e. those who do not think as they do.

I think that's a weakness of liberals: they assume that if one formulates a good consistent liberal proposition, that this proposition speaks for itself - that it needs no evangelisation or propagation." 136

"Liberals have paid too little attention to the ways of getting where we want to go." 137

#### Of Optimism and Pessimism

The group interviewed was basically pessimistic about the future and particularly pessimistic about the future role of liberals and, therefore, themselves:

"At times, one despairs of moving there (towards the ideal future). Can our problems be solved?" 138

"It is, therefore, hard to imagine a voluntary surrender of power and equally hard to imagine an involuntary seizure of power." 139

"However, one has to be pessimistic about the emergence of this campaign of disobedience on a scale large enough and in time. Non-violent resistance requires a great deal of self-sacrifice, discipline and organisation." 140

"One has to be pessimistic about the future liberal role, though there are grounds aplenty for optimism about the future. Liberals don't plan strategically or effectively. Liberal values in themselves are not very powerful agents for organisation or mobilisation." 141

"I am fatalistic. I don't see change coming without Zimbabwe-type conflict. I cannot see white South Africans sitting down to debate the real sharing of power." 142

"I am not optimistic in the short run. Nor will we ever achieve a full liberal democracy. However, I can't see a holocaust either. We have a reasonable chance of some sort of reasonable settlement." 143

"There will have to be a dramatic break with the past in one form or another. The Nationalists will not simply agree to give up power. Also this break may be a long time in coming, and it will involve lots of pain. In the meantime, there is likely to be an increase in guerilla activity and an increasing militarisation of our society." 144

"(I am) pessimistic at the moment. I see an increasing struggle between the two nationalisms. The tendency of the Government to excessively oppress its black opponents is provoking an ever more violent response." 145

Where a different note was struck, it was in a guarded, ambivalent or metaphysical (transcendant) way. Perhaps the most emphatic and positive statement made was this one:

146

"I am not pessimistic about the future."

Others were more circumspect:

"I have optimism for the long term. There will be lots of pain along the way. In the long run, the kind of society envisaged above must emerge: it is the only way a society such as South Africa can be run in the longer term." 147

"Are you optimistic or pessimistic?"

I'm like a yoyo. At times, I believe that we cannot possibly succeed. There is so much unreason around. Yet there is also plenty of goodwill around. I cannot see this society disintegrating. There is too much that is good. Things will carry on simmering. Life will become a little more brutish but not unbearable.

In the long term, I remain hopeful because of my belief in the innate goodness of man. I suppose this could be call a blind faith or even sentimentality." 148

"Would you characterise yourself as an optimist or a pessimist?"

Schizophrenic: whenever I indulge in human calculation I see no hope: but instinctively I cannot escape the attitude of Christian hope which we inherit from Israel." 149

"This (liberal action) is a seed - you may not see the fruit. This is based on a belief in the resurrection." 150

We close this section with words that offer some eminently practical advice:

"Liberals cannot give up hope. If one gives up hope then one should get out, or keep one's mouth shut." 151

7. An Initial Evaluation

The responses to the last two questions paint a picture of liberal hope and liberal strategy which is unattractive. Many of the hopes seem naive - for example, the hope of decentralised power in a new third world nation. They are certainly idealistic - the hope, for example,

of a comprehensive welfare system which would not be economically crippling. They seem to lack a sense of the trade-offs between present and past; between group interests and power; which are a part of the real world. Equally, and perhaps for this reason, they lack conviction. They lack conviction not because they are not desired, but because they are not necessarily hoped for in the sense of expected.

With regard to strategy, the picture is even bleaker. Responses here were generally vague. The roles described were carved out of a fabric of pessimism. Roles were contingent, reactive and indirect. The most concrete role described - teaching the values of non-violent resistance, creating grass roots organisation, and doing ambulance work - were all "micro-roles". They are, of course, valuable in themselves, but surely difficult to maintain in the absence of some broader framework, and some broader hope.

Throughout, one has a sense of diffidence. As the one interviewee commented bluntly: "The problem is our powerlessness."

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this conclusion is to determine whether the fourfold hypothesis stated in the Introduction has been confirmed or confounded by the evidence and discussion given in Chapters One to Five. Each part of this hypothesis is considered in turn in the four sections below:

1. Liberal Ethics and Powerlessness

In the Introduction (page 7) we asserted:

"that liberal ethics in South Africa, particularly since the victory of the (Afrikaner) National Party in 1948 have been characterised by a sense of political powerlessness;"

In Chapter Three, liberal thought and action are surveyed during the decades of the Fifties, Sixties and Seventies. The picture which emerges is one which often supports the sense of powerlessness suggested above. The apparent mutual exclusion of liberal principle and political power is evident in the career of South Africa's most politically powerful liberal, Jan Hofmeyr. Crises of conscience took him out of the United Party cabinet, and the party itself on two occasions in the 1930's. In his periods of acting premiership, power and principle were often in head on collision. Hofmeyr was also often under pressure from liberal colleagues to leave the government and lead a truly liberal party. On the other hand, he was blamed by party loyalists for the defeat of 1948.

Smuts, though by no means an unambiguous liberal in South African terms, is accused of letting power slip through his fingers, though this is probably as much attributable to an arrogant complacency as much as a sense of powerlessness. He is also accused of failing to act on a possibility to regain power.

The theme of powerlessness is taken up again in the founding of the Liberal Party in the mid-fifties. Here one of the party's most prominent leaders observes that its founders were:

"without an adequate appreciation of the part that political power plays in politics." 8

Indeed throughout the Fifties and Sixties, liberals (both within the Liberal party and outside it) were confronted with a dilemma constituted by their reactions to white nationalists on the one hand and black nationalists on the other. Liberal opposition to racial segregation on the one hand denied them any significant access to power as determined by the white political process. Liberal respect for the rule of law, and their rejection of violence, vitiated their sympathy and support for black nationalist groupings such as the ANC and the PAC. As these movements turned (often in response to white nationalist repression) from the tactics of petition to passive resistance and then sabotage, so liberal attitudes towards them became more and more complex. It was clear where the (Afrikaner) Nationalists stood, and

equally clear where organisations such as the ANC and PAC were moving.

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But what of the liberals?

A sense of powerlessness is also induced by the Nationalist legislative blitzkrieg, which commenced with their accession to power in 1948 and continued in full force until late in the 1960's. This legislative programme was combined by a programme of ruthless administrative action, which saw non-nationalists removed from almost all positions of power. The convenient diplomatic despatch of General Evered Poole, South Africa's most experienced soldier, in 1948 is but one early example of this. Similar removals were to take place in the SABC, CSIR and indeed in Government appointed positions across the society.

The continuing opposition of power and principle is well indicated by the passing of the Improper Interference Act. This made it impossible for liberal political organisations to act out their commitment to multi-racialism though non-racial membership clauses.

12

The sense of powerless isolation liberals felt in South Africa during the 1960's is well illustrated by their almost ecstatic response to the visit of Robert Kennedy to South Africa in 1967. As one Rand Daily Mail editorial noted, this visit reminded South African liberals that it was the (Afrikaner) nationalists and not themselves who were out of step with the times.

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However, the story of liberalism during these three decades cannot be characterised as one of unbroken defeatism and helplessness. Examples of liberal attempts to seize the initiative are indicated in the rebuilding of the PP (becoming in time the official opposition as the PFP);<sup>14</sup> as well as the SPROCAS programme within the Churches,<sup>15</sup> also the move into economic strategies which occurred in student organisations and led, through the formation of wages commissions, to an important renaissance in the black trade union movement.<sup>16</sup> All of these resurgences took place in the 1970's and this decade can be seen as a period of liberal regrouping and strategies review. This process generally required more pragmatic thinking, as was indicated by the SPROCAS embrace of feasibility as an important principle, as well as the pragmatic analysis of Rick Turner written in 1973 (The Present as History) and included in the 1980 edition of Turner's The Eye of the Needle.

If the 30 year period is viewed as a whole, however, the theme of powerlessness is clearly evident and indeed characteristic.

In the second attempt to explore liberal ethics in South Africa - the documents review described in Chapter Four - further evidence of a sense of powerlessness is recorded.

In the case of the Institute of Race Relations a contradiction is observed between the modus operandi of the Institute - the gathering and rational presentation of facts - on the one hand; and the nature of reality on the other.

"In the past, we in the Institute may have erred in thinking men and women are more subject to persuasion by reason than they are." observes one Institute President. 17

Another notes:

"A long experience of public affairs has taught me that reason and persuasion have a less decisive influence on public opinion than the force of circumstance." 18

The role that power plays in a society such as South Africa was clearly well understood by Institute leaders:

"The dilemma is an agonising one - how to satisfy black aspirations without destroying white confidence ... " 19

And, further:

"Power lies with the White electorate. The White electorate, by a majority of nine to one, or more, is violently opposed to participation of all races in a single society ... " 20

This acknowledgement of the realities of power led the last quoted President to recommend that the Institute attack more modest targets. It led others to evaluate the role of the Institute in very modest terms:

"The essence of the Institute's work, the striving to influence the minds of men, is by its very nature imponderable. Many of us believe that the effort has been meaningful ... " 21

Likewise, the goals set for the future are informed by a sense of powerlessness:

"We do not know that peaceful methods will win, but at least we do not know that they will fail." 22

In the case of the PFP, the powerlessness is of a clear structural form. This party has had to exist for a long period of time without ever being able to cherish the realistic prospect of coming to power, or even participating in a governing coalition. <sup>23</sup> This must create what can be described as a crisis of motivation. In the case of the PFP, this is evident in the repeated warnings of its leadership of the dire consequences which lie in store for South African society and its government. The following quotation is typical:

"The sand in the hour-glass is rapidly running out and our children are watching us and wanting to know what we are doing." 24

The situation of Harry Oppenheimer and the Anglo American Corporation is more complex than that of the two aforementioned organisations. Whereas these two first discussed bodies have clearly had to operate in a context of powerlessness, can this be said of Harry Oppenheimer and Anglo American?

At first glance, it would seem absurd to claim that an organisation as large as Anglo, and an individual as dominant within that organisation as Harry Oppenheimer is, suffered from powerlessness. Yet this is what Oppenheimer claims for himself in respect of politics and his liberal convictions. Interviewed on the occasion of his retirement as Chairman of Anglo American in November 1982, he claimed he had been a complete failure politically. Others have claimed that he is one of the most powerful men in the world.

As we noted in Chapter Four, the debate about the extent and nature of Oppenheimer's and Anglo's political power is not an easy one to call. All we have done is to list some of the questions we believe should be further researched. What cannot be disputed is that Oppenheimer, through Anglo has had opportunities for the exercise of considerable political influence. Some of these avenues for influence are indicated in Chapter Four. <sup>25</sup> In this respect, Oppenheimer and Anglo have been in a situation significantly different from other liberal organisations and this is indicated in the ethical perspectives revealed by the documents review.

Firstly, the identity of ethics and action advocated by Bonhoeffer is much more readily apparent in Oppenheimer's writings than that of the other two organisations. <sup>26</sup> Secondly, Oppenheimer alone of the three

organisations/individuals examined exhibits a manifest concern for  
responsible action. <sup>27</sup> Thirdly, his writings are characterised much 28  
more by the promise of a better future, than dire threats of apocalypse.  
Finally, he is more consistently optimistic than leaders in the other  
two liberal contexts. <sup>29</sup>

The third attempt to explore liberal ethics in South Africa takes the form of the fourteen interviews described in Chapter Five. These interviews with leading white English-speaking liberals centre around the dilemma of the 1983 Constitutional Referendum. These interviews provide some of the most dramatic evidence of powerlessness.

This evidence was provided firstly in the answers liberals gave to to the question: what has prompted the current reforms? A series of factors were cited. These have been grouped into seven areas in the discussion in Chapter Five. <sup>30</sup> The actions of white liberals themselves are not included in the factors forcing change. Even where areas of change (such as the processes of economic integration) are mentioned in which liberals have been active, they are described in impersonal or even trans-personal terms. They lie in the area described by a Race Relations President reported in Chapter Four as the "force of circumstance."

Secondly, when the interviews discuss what should be done about the new constitution, their replies are replete with a sense of powerlessness:

"I know what they should do, but I don't know what the consequences will be." 31

Ethics and strategies are often opposed:

"Whilst there is a good (intrinsic or moral) argument that can be made for spoiling one's ballot, there are good strategic reasons for not doing so." 32

and

"From the point of view of strategy, as to which option will bring more change - I can't work this out. Therefore, the decision should be ethically based." 33

Where consequences were envisaged following from the action recommended, these were seen as trivial, marginal or even non-existent.

"In essence, the no vote is a vote of conscience. It will lead to no strategic advance." 34

"The PFP leadership had no option but to call for a no vote. It is now vital that as much rank and file support for this call should be ensured." 35

"As to results: nothing is going to happen for a long time." 36

"Nobody has come up with a liberal strategy that will work." 37

"The consequences will not be disastrous." 38

"The practical consequences will be the status quo constitutionally ... " 39

A sense of powerlessness was evident in a third aspect of these interviews. Where interviewees were asked to describe the vision of a future ideal society, the role they envisaged for liberals and liberal values was a passive, extremely limited one.

Whilst many interviewees affirmed the basic rightness of liberal values, none described a role for such values in a future desired society. One interviewee acknowledged this lack explicitly:

"Liberals didn't plan strategically or effectively. Liberal values in themselves are not very powerful agents for organisation or mobilisation." 40

There was a similar lack of clarity about what liberals should do to achieve this desired future:

"You must do what is right; whether you can see the outcome or not." 41

was the most emphatic advice offered. Others were more self-critical:

"Liberals have paid too little attention to the ways of getting where we want to go." 42

Finally, powerlessness is revealed in the preponderance of pessimism over optimism. The most optimistic statement here was:

"I am not pessimistic about the future." 43

"I'm fatalistic. I don't see change coming without Zimbabwe style conflict." 44

"I'm not optimistic in the short-run." 45

"(I am) pessimistic at the moment." 46

"It is, therefore, hard to imagine a voluntary surrender of power and equally hard to imagine an involuntary seizure of power." 47

"Can our problems be solved?" 48

"However, one has to be pessimistic ... " 49

"One has to be pessimistic about the future liberal role ..." 50

In the attempts made in Chapters Three, Four and Five to get close to liberal perceptions of how they choose between morally significant courses of action, there is compelling evidence that these choices are repeatedly informed by a sense of personal powerlessness:

## 2. An Ethics of Inner Conviction

It was asserted, in the introduction, that as a consequence of the above discussed sense of powerlessness:

"(liberal) ethics have been more concerned with principle motives, conscience and internal consistency than with the consequences of liberal action;" 51

What do we mean by an ethics of principle, motive, conscience and internal consistency? We have used the word ethics to indicate the way in which actors choose between morally significant courses of action.

The review of Twentieth Century ethics attempted in Chapter One indicates a continuum of approaches. Our definition has identified choice as central to the practice of ethics. This immediately introduces a degree of indeterminacy uncomfortable for a rationalist derived ideology such as liberalism. As we have noted earlier:

"The rationalist seeks statements which are universal, unambiguous and not capable of contradiction, or logical inconsistency." 53

A dominant theme in all the twentieth century approaches to ethics surveyed in Chapter One is the fundamentally subjective nature of this choice. The English Moral Philosophers surveyed note that ethical judgements are different in both form and content from other types of judgements we make. They are neither derived from experience, nor deduced from logic. 54 In this sense, ethics go beyond pure reason. Weber notes that political ethics involve passion, responsibility and a sense of proportion. 55 Weber defines politics as a "means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or within a state." 56 Power is, therefore, another dimension in ethical choice.

57  
A major impact of the existentialist style or approach is the rejection of universal moral codes which can act as a sort of check-list to help man make ethical decisions, or as the existentialists would see it, to make these choices for him. As Sartre notes:

"The possibility of acting must be realised in the context of a concrete situation, where the agent is surrounded by actual other people." 58

and Warnock concludes:

"The only general law of ethics must be to avoid general laws." 59

De Beauvoir contributes the concept of the antimonies of action. Every action for man is simultaneously against man. She notes the maudlin realities of political action. In order to fight the oppressor, we must oppress the oppressor, and his often innocent collaborators and subordinates. Indeed we must often oppress our own comrades, and again often prioritise our causes, as all evil cannot be tackled at once. 60  
Such antimonies inevitably involve the actor in painful choice.

Camus continues this theme of difficult choice noting that often man is forced to choose not between good and evil, but between evil and evil. In this respect, he notes the conflict between freedom on the one hand and justice on the other. Again, in the context of Algeria, he notes the choice which confronts the actor between the tyranny of the colonial regime and the terror of those opposing it. 61  
Camus concludes that the only authentic response is to strike a balance between those conflicting demands. This will of necessity involve accepting modest objectives:

"Perhaps we cannot prevent this world from being a world in which children are tortured. But we can reduce the number of tortured children." 62

It is against this background that we use the concept of an ethics of inner conviction. This is Weber's ideal type. It is the ethic of absolute values, of the Sermon on the Mount; concerned with individual motives and not the social consequences of action. Weber contrasts this ideal type with what he terms the ethic of responsibility. In terms of this ethic, the actor weighs the consequences of his actions, takes account of realities and the deficiencies of the people on whom the good and result of the action is dependent.

What evidence did we find of a preponderance of the perspective or approach of inner conviction? As is suggested in the thesis, evidence of this ethical mode is closely linked with the evidence of powerlessness. Indeed often powerlessness seems a consequence of an ethical fixation with principle. At other times, the line of causation seems to work in the other direction.

Examples of a preponderance of an ethics of inner conviction drawn from the survey of liberal thought and action in Chapter Three are:

- the crises of conscience that took Hofmeyr first out of the cabinet and then out of the caucus of the United Party;

- Hofmeyr's refusal to use his 1948 budget to gain political advantage in the general election which the budget immediately preceded;<sup>64</sup>
- Hofmeyr's own appreciation of the conflict between his conscience and the exercise of power;<sup>65</sup>
- Paton's question: "How could one be simultaneously both governor and crusader."<sup>66</sup> This is reminiscent of Weber's words: "He who seeks salvation of the souls, of his own and others, should not seek it along the avenue of politics, for the quite different tasks of politics can only be solved by violence."<sup>67</sup>
- The long debate as to whether it was better to work within a relatively powerful vehicle, such as the United Party, or attempt to create a new vehicle such as the Liberal Party (1953) and the Progressive Party (1959);<sup>68</sup>
- The conscience-based decision of the Liberal Party to stay away from the 1955 Congress of the People, because of the role members of the Communist Party had played in organising this Congress;<sup>69</sup>
- The difficulty the Liberal Party had in responding both to the "positive apartheid" programme of the Government, launched in the late 1950's, as well as the passive resistance and then sabotage campaigns conducted by Black Political organisations in the 1950's and early Sixties. Both of these political initiatives transgressed aspects of liberalism's "universal code";<sup>70</sup>

- The dilemmas posed for multi-racial political parties, particularly the Liberal and Progressive Parties by the enactment of the Improper Interference Act; and the differing response of these two parties; and<sup>71</sup>
- Finally, the rejection of the SPROCAS political proposals by liberals Brookes and Wolheim because they conflicted with elements of the fundamental liberal credo.<sup>72</sup>

In the documents review in Chapter Four, examples of an ethics of inner conviction approach are to be found in the following:

- Hellman's characteristic of the influence of the Institute of Race Relations as "imponderable";<sup>73</sup>
- Archbishop Hurley's observation that Institute leadership was "a little short on that instructive grasp of realities, that subconscious assessment of possibilities so necessary to the soldier, the policeman and the politician."<sup>74</sup>
- Auerbach's statement:  
"I don't know what will work best, but we must go on speaking out against oppression and injustice because silence will be taken as consent."<sup>75</sup>
- In Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert's six roles for the PFP, as indicated in his 1984 no-confidence debate speech, four of the six roles are essentially inner conviction ones, namely:

- \* keeping alive the idea of constitutional government;
- \* fighting for civil liberties;
- \* speaking up for the underdog; and
- \* keeping the government on its toes.

76

In the series of interviews conducted with prominent liberals about the 1983 Constitutional Referendum, and reported in Chapter Five, the following evidence of an ethics of inner conviction is to be found:

- In the strong reliance liberals place in a general code of values and beliefs, as evidenced in their answers to the question about their ideal constitution;
- By the vagueness as to the consequences of the action advocated in the Referendum:

77

"I know what (liberals) should do, but I don't know what the consequences will be.

"From the point of view of strategy, as to which option will bring more change - I can't work this out."

"In essence, the no vote is a vote of conscience. It will lead to no strategic advance. It will help liberals retain their integrity. PFP leaders will be able to continue to look black leaders in the face."

"Nobody has come up with a liberal strategy that will work. We have to go forward in faith, doing what we can where we can." 78

- By a similar degree of vagueness with regard to liberal strategy:

"You must do what is right, whether you can see the outcome or not. For example, in employing non-

violent strategies, you cannot weigh or measure the outcomes. However, if violence is wrong, it is wrong whatever the consequences. I must do what I believe is right irrespective of the consequences."

"... liberals must guard against purist interruption of their own values ..."

"(liberals) assume that if one formulates a good consistent liberal proposition, that this proposition speaks for itself - that it needs no evangelisation or propagation."

"Liberals have paid too little attention to the ways of getting where we want to go." 79

These instances of an ethic of inner conviction approach are not cited as criticisms. It is not suggested that these approaches are necessarily wrong or inappropriate. Nor is it suggested that they alone characterise liberal ethics. The research reported in Chapters Three, Four and Five does contain evidence of approaches much closer to Weber's ethics of responsibility:

- Sprocas' combination of an ideal solution with the problems of the transition from the present;

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- In Chapter Five, there is evidence of a degree of pragmatism with regard to liberal ideals:

"Liberals were correct to oppose the Government's obsession with the group, but wrong to give the group no place in their scheme of things." 81

- In the same chapter, there are examples of what can be described as consequential liberal strategies, albeit stated in general terms:

"Liberals should start where they are strongest i.e. the economy, the Church, the Universities, the Private Schools, the Press. There is a case for situational ethics. Reform will not come overnight. Liberals will have to settle for incremental gains which are steps in the right direction." 82

Weber indeed did not claim that his two ideal types were mutually exclusive but instead argued that:

"... an ethic of ultimate ends (inner conviction) and an ethic of responsibility are not absolute contrasts but rather supplements, which only in unison constitute a genuine man ..." 83

What is argued here is that the strong preponderance of approach in S.A. liberal ethics is that of inner conviction. Further support to this contention is offered by Heribert Adam. <sup>84</sup> In a chapter entitled the failure of Liberalism, he lists eight possible explanations for this failure:

- religious;
- biological;
- philosophical;
- demographic;
- political;
- psychological;
- economic;
- historical;

In discussing the possible philosophical reasons for failure he notes, quoting Dickie-Clarke:

"... the liberal has tended to assume that too much of the world out there is fixed, amenable to logic, fundamentally rational and open to persuasion ..." 85

continuing with his own observation that:

"... liberal belief in the power of persuasion rests on the idealistic assumption that people will abandon their particularistic group interests in favour of a universal truth, morality or humanity." 86

In discussing possible political factors, Adam notes:

"The moralistic approach, in a polarised content of power with high stakes, points to the political reasons for the failure of liberalism." 87

Noting that what he terms a "smug disdain of some members of a world culture (liberals) for the parochialism of an unenlightened adversary is frequently accompanied by an almost masochistic glorification of 'creative suffering'". Adam concludes "No wonder then that the effectiveness of political action generally ranks lower than the affirmation of principle." 88

Further support for our contention, though of a more indirect nature, comes from an essay on the liberal-radical controversy over South

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African history. The author notes the tendency of liberal historians  
90  
to judge their subjects. He argues further that these (moral)  
judgements "have stemmed naturally from the fundamental liberal belief  
91  
in the possibility of reasoned progress." He continues to make a  
more specific criticism, writing about the Oxford History of South  
Africa:

"They (the editors and writers who are all liberals) tend  
to filter many of the very real complexities, unpreventable  
confusions, mutual misunderstandings, and other non-  
blameworthy and irreducible causes of conflict and lack  
of progress in South Africa through a liberal moral  
screen." 92

Such actions are thoroughly consistent with the ethics of inner  
conviction.

### 3. The Changed Circumstances of the 1980's

#### Myths, Realities and Options

The third dimension of our hypothesis suggested that: "this sense of  
powerlessness is not justified in the social and political environment  
of the 1980's." (Page 7).

In this section, we examine this claim by reviewing some old myth,  
current realities and new options.

The Myth of "Positive" Apartheid

A policy of white control over the levers of political power (and economic resources) has been the key feature of the governance of South Africa since the arrival of Van Riebeeck. This policy direction has enjoyed many labels: trusteeship, guardianship, white leadership and Apartheid. The labels (and the political movements creating them) denote both degrees of control, as well as options as to how this control should be exercised. At various times, attempts have been made both to legitimise (morally and politically), as well as to safeguard, this position of white control. We are concerned here with the key attempt to do this in the last three decades. It is this attempt which we call "Positive" Apartheid.

Malan won power in 1948 on the race policy of Apartheid or separation. This clearly implied a separate white nation, in which blacks would exercise no political rights. Just what was to be done to blacks was not clearly spelt out at this time. It was more than a decade later, in a rapidly changing international context, that the "positive" side of the policy of separation was spelt out. It was done at the time the introduction of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill, and in particular, in the words and visions of Dr Hendrik Verwoerd. Verwoerd correctly analysed the alternative race policies facing

South African as a policy of partnership (as advocated by the United Party), leading inevitably to a black dominated multi-racial society, and "giving the Bantu full rights to develop in their own areas."<sup>93</sup>

Whilst displaying a degree of probably deliberate vagueness about what "full rights" meant, Verwoerd indicated this would be determined by the "Bantu" themselves.<sup>94</sup> Nevertheless, Verwoerd clearly envisaged the possibility of full independence for "Bantu nations" and held out the vision of a commonwealth (or European Common Market) association of states, embracing white South Africa and these independent black states. He drew heavily on the comparison with the envisaged future for Bechuanaland in this regard.

There is every indication that Verwoerd was both serious and sincere in his vision for the creation of separate, viable and "real" black states.<sup>95</sup> It is equally clear writing in 1984 that this vision was based on a series of dangerous and costly myths.

The first of these myths Verwoerd stated most clearly in his 1959 speech:

"It is the ideal to retain political independence with economic interdependence."<sup>96</sup>

A second, and importantly related myth was:

"... Natives who then enter White South Africa (from the self-governing or independent Black states) to come and work here, if their labour is still needed, particularly in the cities, will be migrant labour generally speaking, although not migrant labour in the ordinary sense of the term, that is to say, labourers who come for periods of six months, a year or 18 months at a time. Large numbers of them will come and work and live here for a number of years as family units but will then be interchangeable. They will remain anchored in the homelands, and as they find uses and rewards in the developing Bantu areas for the skills which they have acquired in the White area in the meantime, they will return to the Bantu areas and reap the benefit of their knowledge there." 97

The above paragraph contains key elements of government policy with regard to influx control, urbanisation, urban housing, urban schooling and urban health care.

A third myth derives from Verwoerd's realpolitik observation, which in a South African context condemns the programme of "Positive Apartheid" to an unsuccessful end:

"... leadership in a democracy is not retained by the means of pious words. It depends on numbers, as anybody who has made a study of the history of any nation knows. In the final result, it is the force of numbers which predominates - high or low, poor or rich, Black or white ..."

This is the realpolitik reality and now the myth:

"... and, therefore, it is necessary to apply all our energies and to make sacrifices and to work hard in order to ensure that there will be a White part of South Africa, even though we must accept the presence of Coloureds, but where the Bantu population will not predominate in that community as part of that community." 98

Verwoerd goes on to use the Tomlinson Commission Report (though with doubtful accuracy) to predict that if the intended energies are applied and sacrifices made the number of blacks in "white" South African urban and peri-urban areas in the year 2000 will be approximately 2 500 000. In contrast, if the policies of the United Party are followed, this number would be 11 or 12 million. 99

The reason that the above quoted propositions are described as myths is indicated by what has happened in the 25 years since Verwoerd made these statements, and what is likely to happen in the 16 years which remain before the year 2000.

Currently some 50 per cent of South Africa's total population (including Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and BophuthaTswana) of 31 million are urbanised, and at least 40 per cent of the approximately 22 million blacks - or 10 million are urbanised - overwhelmingly in what used to be called "white" South Africa. Thus Verwoerd's prediction noted above that if the policies of positive apartheid were followed, the numbers of blacks in "white" South Africa would be approximately 2 500 000 had already been falsified fourfold by 1983.

These numbers (as Verwoerd noted above) are crucial. They have buried for all time the notion of a "white" South Africa (or a white/coloured and Indian South Africa). The Buthelezi Commission Report found that the 1980 census reported a black majority in every magisterial district in "white" Natal as well as "black" KwaZulu. This is almost certainly true of every magisterial district in the whole of South Africa. Blacks outnumber whites by a significant margin in all four provinces, even when the self-governing national states (non-independent homelands) and the four "independent" territories are excluded.

All trends into the future indicate these proportions increasing in favour of black South Africans. Indeed a consensus of predictions would see approximately 16 million South Africans urbanising in "white" South Africa between now (1984) and the year 2000, the vast majority of

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whom will be black. Thus the number of blacks in what Verwoerd called "peri-urban" areas of "white" South Africa will be double the figure he suggested would result from "liberal" United Party policies, and almost ten times his prediction consequent on Nationalist policies.

A final mythical quality of positive Apartheid needs to be noted. The ten homelands (four currently independent in the eyes of South Africa, but not of the international community) have not developed economies which in any sense can be called viable. Whilst these areas house 35,7 per cent of South Africa's population, they contribute a mere 3,4 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product. The central government (i.e. of "white" South Africa) provides massive subsidies for the public expenditure of both the "independent" and self-governing states, calculated by one source as 88 per cent of total public expenditure in the 1975 to 1980 period.

In the light of the above, one cannot but agree with the following conclusion:

"Whatever economic grounds may have existed for viewing separate development as a workable policy have thus evaporated ... For both black and white, the gap between illusion and reality, between promise and performance, has become too great to be ignored. The government, while continuing the policy of separate development, has begun to recognise the impossibility of creating ten viable homeland economies. Many urban and rural Africans will remain a permanent component of the

population of the common areas. And homeland self-government, or even independence, will not end the economic ties between the territories and the peoples of the former unitary state of South Africa. The homelands will continue to look at fundamental autonomy based on viable economies. Structurally, they will remain part of the South African system, their economic fortunes linked inextricably to South Africa." 106

### The Myth of Revolution

If the myth of "Positive" apartheid has been central to South African politics since at least 1959, so has the myth of revolution in the thought and actions of a wide range of groups in opposition to Afrikaner nationalism. Commentators and activists repeatedly imply, threaten and predict inexorable movement towards this apocalyptic event. As two internal commentators note:

"There have been five-minutes-to-midnight scenarios aplenty, either of the variety where a large-scale racial conflagration is seen as inevitable or where the problems of political and economic transition are tucked away into the residual category of some form of therapeutic revolutionary violence and justified in terms of a romantic utopian ideology." 107

At a more popular level, an American journalist (and chronicler of American involvement in Vietnam) entitled an article he wrote after a visit to South Africa "The Fire to Come".

It is not difficult to see why a belief in a revolutionary outcome to conflict in South Africa is so prevalent. At a rational level, it seems impossible that a society based on such massive and manifest injustice can continue to cohere. As Heribert Adam observes:

"The frequent prediction of revolution is based on elementary insights of political sociology. In South Africa domination is easily recognisable as direct personal exploitation. The rulers are not hidden behind a sophisticated ideology or an anonymous bureaucratic apparatus. On the contrary, they are definable as a precise group visible even to the most politically naive ... Consequently, there are few incentives for subordinates to identify with their rulers." 109

At an emotional (judgemental) level, an overwhelming sense of the rightness of the cause of black liberation leads many to predict its inevitable triumph:

"The complex combination of social forces present in black resistance have succeeded in igniting a conflagration which no amount of repression or incorporation will succeed in extinguishing." 110

How real is the possibility of revolution occurring in South Africa in the foreseeable future?

Skocpol has provided a contemporary review and critique of general theories of (social) revolutions. <sup>111</sup> She reviews four major "families" of revolutionary theories:

- Marxist;
- what she terms "aggregate-psychological" (Ted Gurr);
- "systems/value consensus" (Chalmers/Johnson);
- "political-conflict" (Charles Tilly).

Skocpol finds all four families deficient in some respects. In building an alternative approach she stresses three critical aspects:

- the need for structural analysis as opposed to the "voluntarist" approach of present paradigms;
- the need to situate revolutions in their international, world-historic contexts; and
- the need to see the state as an at least potentially autonomous structure and factor.

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Skocpol then proceeds to analyse in detail the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions. Her first conclusion is that a fundamental weakening; if not actual failure, of state power is a precondition for successful revolution. She quotes with approval, Katherine Charley:

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"no revolution will be won against a (domestic) modern army when that army is putting out its full strength against the insurrection." 114

In a second conclusion, Skocpol notes that:

"Wars and imperial intrusions were the midwives of the revolutionary crises, and the emergent revolutionary regimes consolidated state power not only amidst armed domestic conflicts but also in militarily threatening international circumstances." 115

In a third conclusion relevant here, Skocpol notes some characteristics common not only to the three cases states above but also to revolutions in Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Algeria, Cuba, Bolivia, Angola, Mocambique, Guinea-Bissau and Ethiopia:

"The occurred in predominantly agrarian countries, and they became possible only through the administrative - military breakdown of pre-existing states. Peasant revolts or mobilisation for guerilla warfare played a pivotal role in each revolutionary process. Furthermore, in everyone of the cases, organised revolutionary leadership (recruited from the ranks of previously marginal, educational elites) emerged or came to the fore during the revolutionary crises." 116

In a more specific application of revolutionary theory to South Africa, Calvin Woodward agrees with Skocpol that:

"... no revolution can succeed without the weakness of the conservative forces becoming manifest." 117

He lists other revolutionary signposts as:

- " - prolonged ... discontent among a significant portion of population;
- protracted emigration ... 'the desertion of the intellectuals';
- intensified and pervasive violent outbreaks;
- open conflict within the circle of powerholders; and
- state indecisiveness." 118

Woodward notes that the presence of all these indicators does not make  
119  
revolution inevitable, but merely possible. With regard to South  
African Woodward notes:

"There are no open indications of widespread discontent, the power elite evinces strength and confidence, and the use of force internally by the establishment has not significantly increased over recent years." 120

He, therefore, concludes:

"The general view is that not at least for the foreseeable future is it likely that the white establishment could be forcibly or violently be overthrown." 121

At a less theoretical level, two conservative American academics (Gann and Duignon) have sought to envisage just how a revolution might take place and to estimate the resources a successful revolutionary force would need to deploy. It is hard to find fault with the direction of their findings. These are:

- that in terms of conventional war, no power on the African continent, or elsewhere, is likely to be able or willing to deploy the at least 100 000 men, fully supported, that would be needed to seriously threaten the South African army; <sup>122</sup>
- that the liberation movements lack a committed mass following inside South Africa capable of fermenting revolt from within; <sup>123</sup>
- that non-violent approaches such as civil disobedience and industrial strikes are equally unlikely to succeed. (As unionisation of black workers continue, especially in key industries such as mining, the latter contention must be queried); <sup>124</sup>  
and finally,
- that though guerilla warfare could cause considerable discomfort to the present South African regime, it was highly unlikely to bring it to its knees. <sup>125</sup>

The conclusions of Gann and Duignon are broadly confirmed by other Americans operating from a quite different values perspective. These are the members of the Rockefeller Commission. <sup>126</sup> In a chapter which surveys the military balance between the present regime and its challengers, they conclude:

"There is little evidence on which to question the short-term survivability of white power in South Africa. Analogies drawn from Iran, Nicaragua, or elsewhere ignore the realities of power in South Africa and the severe obstacles facing prospective revolutionaries. Although 'revolutionary' is often used to describe the the South African situation, 'pre-revolutionary' would probably be more accurate and perhaps even that term stretches the facts." 127

This view is supported by a wide range of South African academics:

|              |                  |                     |          |
|--------------|------------------|---------------------|----------|
| 128          | 129              | 130                 |          |
| Rick Turner; | Heribert Adam;   | Slabbert and Welsh; | Lawrence |
| 131          | 132              |                     |          |
| Schlemmer;   | Herman Giliomee; | amongst others.     |          |

In asserting the present regime's fundamental stability, at least for the foreseeable future, we are not seeking to deny the extent of injustice it contains, nor to diminish the extent of suffering it imposes. Indeed the stability makes both the injustice and the suffering that much worse. Yet it is a maudlin lesson of history (both contemporary and ancient) that evil regimes can persist over very long periods of time, as with Franco's Spain.

Finally, the mythical nature of the revolutionary option renders discussion of its desirability hypothetical. Lest desirability should be implied from the above, it is important to note that revolution in South Africa would be on a huge scale involving the loss of millions of lives, and the destruction of a large part of society's fabric. The

future benefit justify such a present sacrifice would have to be both very certain and very significant. This writer cannot envisage a benefit big enough.

### The Reality of Economic Interdependence

Economic growth is changing the patterns of power and influence of black and white South Africans. That this is a major area of structural change is widely accepted. <sup>133</sup> Some of the distinctive aspects of these changed patterns will be highlighted here, in particular:

- quantitative changes;
- qualitative changes;
- changes in reward;
- changes in organisation.

Whilst the South African economy has long been dependent on black labour, the predominance of black workers is increasing significantly. Whereas in 1936, whites constituted 40,6 per cent of the manufacturing labour force, by 1976 this had dropped to 21,2 per cent. In the clothing and textile industries, the decline was much more dramatic: <sup>134</sup> 1936 - 62,0 per cent white; 1976 - 7,4 per cent white. In 1960, whites accounted for 47 per cent of those in the employ of the central <sup>135</sup> government. By 1977, this had dropped to 28 per cent. In 1980,

whites constituted the majority of the workforce only in the financial sector (72,8 per cent) and came close to majority in transport and communication (45,2 per cent). Elsewhere they formed the minority of the labour force: Electricity (36,7 per cent); Commerce (29,7 per cent); Services (24,1 per cent); Construction (22,6 per cent); Mining (11 per cent) and Agriculture (7,9 per cent).<sup>136</sup>

More significant than these quantitative changes are the changes of a qualitative nature. The "modern" sector of the economy is beginning to mature out of its predominate employment of unskilled workers. In the decade of the seventies, a dramatic shift took place in the nature of the labour force of the approximately 400 000 strong Iron, Steel and Engineering Industry.<sup>137</sup>

|                      | <u>1970</u> | <u>1980</u> |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Artisans             | 14%         | 13%         |
| Operators            | 14%         | 13%         |
| Semi-skilled workers | 21%         | 39%         |
| Labourers            | 51%         | 35%         |

Along with these changes in skill levels, so the sectoral pattern of employment have been changing. From 1970-1980, employment in Agriculture decreased by a massive 54 per cent (from 2 525 587 to

1 363 820) whilst the professional and technical workforce increased by 72 per cent (from 360 524 to 622 280); clerical workers increased by 48 per cent (from 559 684 to 828 800); and sales workers by 51 per cent (from 288 846 to 437 340). The economically active workforce as a whole increased by only 7 per cent over this period.

These trends are continuing. The current Government Economic Development Plan, which runs from 1978 to 1987 predicts an increase in annual demand for new apprentices of 9 000 (from 14 000 per annum currently to 23 000) and of technicians of 7 500 (from 2 000 per annum currently to 9 500).

The increasing skill levels of black workers correlates with our increasing black share of earned income. In Rand figures, this share has increased from 25 per cent of the total in 1970 to 40 per cent in 1980. The ratio of average black to white wages has also declined as the table below indicates:

| <u>Sector</u> | <u>1972</u> | <u>1982</u> |
|---------------|-------------|-------------|
| Mining        | 1:14        | 1:4         |
| Manufacturing | 1:6         | 1:3         |
| Electricity   | 1:4         | 1:3,6       |
| Construction  | 1:6,5       | 1:5,4       |

| <u>Sector</u>             | <u>1972</u> | <u>1980</u> |
|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Trade                     | 1:4,6       | 1:4         |
| Transport & Communication | 1:6         | 1:3,8       |
| Finance                   | 1:3,9       | 1:2,6       |
| Government service        | 1:6         | 1:3,9       |
| Total                     | 1:6,6       | 1:3,7       |

Finally, the changed skilled levels of black workers has been accompanied by (and certainly made possible) higher levels of worker organisations. Currently some 15 per cent of the relevant (i.e. domestic and agriculture labour excluded) black labour force is organised, or some 500 000 workers. Organisation levels are higher in key industries (e.g. metal, motor) and amongst larger companies.

Whereas the typical black worker of the 1950's was unskilled, unorganised and earned about one-sixth of the average white worker, the black worker of the 1980's and 1990's is skilled or semi-skilled, organised into powerful industrial unions, and earns no less than a third of the average white worker.

Consumption Interdependence

As the position of blacks in the workforce becomes more significant quantitatively as well as qualitatively so their role as consumers also increases. <sup>142</sup> Currently there are few markets in which the black as a consumer can be ignored. Our everyday experience tells us this:

- shops, especially in the major CBD's are increasingly oriented towards black as well as white needs;
- restaurants and hotels (in towns as well as cities) are now multi-racial as a rule, and uniraical by exception. Much of this desegregation has occurred through change of social convention, rather than change in law or regulation;
- advertising increasing project's non-racial lifestyles and non-racial wants.





Though of course this consumption interdependence does not mean a change in the power structure per se nevertheless it is true that a macro-power equilibrium must be based on micro-relationships of interdependence and rough power equilibrium. The world of the consumer provides one of those changing micro-patterns.

The Reality of International Interdependence

The pattern of South Africa's international relationships has changed dramatically since 1948. These changes can be broadly characterised as reflecting paradoxical trends of isolation on the one hand and interdependence of the other.

These changes are as much a product of events outside South Africa (and especially on the African continent) as events inside. The map on page 274 indicates the most important area of change : de-colonialisation. <sup>143</sup>

# THE COMING OF BLACK RULE IN AFRICA



BLACK RULED AREAS



In 1950 the only black-ruled countries were Egypt and Ethiopia. By 1980, the only white-ruled territories were South Africa and Namibia. These changes produced two decades of isolation, (in the Fifties and Sixties) as South Africa went from being a small, but valued, member of the Allied alliance, and its Prime Minister (Jan Smuts) a respected world citizen, to being one of the great pariah states of the world community. Whilst isolationism continued (and indeed grew) in the seventies and eighties, areas of interdependence also emerged. Some of these areas are highlighted below.

#### Military Interdependence

It seems ironical that the spread of black rule in Africa should have led to both the reality and perception of military interdependence. On South Africa's side, the key event was the fall of the Salazar regime in Portugal in 1974 and the subsequent rapid withdrawal of Portugal from its two colonies which border South Africa on her north-east and north-west flanks. This withdrawal led first to a period of military adventurism. South Africa deployed some 2 000 paramilitary members of the police force in Rhodesia (as it then was).<sup>144</sup> A second "adventure" of a more dramatic kind was South Africa's intervention in the Angolan civil war in 1977. Smaller scale raids were to follow into Lesotho and Mocambique.

The experience of the Angolan adventure in particular seems to have impressed on South Africa's political and military leadership that security for South Africa's borders would not be achieved through military prowess alone. The military raids always occurred at high political cost (internally as well as internationally). Their effect was always temporary. A policy of permanent military expansion was both undesirable and difficult. <sup>145</sup> Increasingly South Africa sought to combine military initiatives with diplomatic ones. Perhaps the first of these can be seen in Vorster's "Africa initiative" - the establishment of diplomatic relations with Malawi, secret visits to West African states, and most particularly Vorster's critical role in both the Kissinger and Carrington mediated attempts to resolve the Rhodesian conflict. Botha continued this policy and expanded it. The signing of the Nkomati Accord with Mocambique is the most recent and the most dramatic evidence of its effect.

On the part of black-ruled Africa, after the first heady years of independence, the new regimes realised their military fragility. There is clear evidence of the role of Mocambique's Machel in forcing Mugabe to accept the Lancaster House agreement:

"(Machel's) final message was blunt: Mugabe must accept the risk of Lancaster House and fight the elections. He didn't say it but the warning was implicit. Mugabe would have asylum in Mocambique if he refused, but no longer the bases for war." 146

This realism was to find an echo in Angola's talks with South Africa re Namibia, culminating in the Lusaka troop withdrawal agreement. A second echo is seen in the Nkomati Accord. Just as South Africa could not secure its borders through military adventures (alone) so black Africa could not challenge Pretoria militarily (head on).

This has created a situation where South Africa's bordering states have all agreed not to allow their territory to be used by the ANC for military purposes.<sup>147</sup> South Africa in its turn, has at least significantly de-escalated if not discontinued its direct and indirect military intervention in these territories.<sup>148</sup>

### Economic Interdependence

South Africa's economy is an extremely open one, in the sense that a large proportion of economic activity is dependent on world trade. Exports and imports combined account for almost half of total GDP.<sup>149</sup>

South Africa's major trading partners are:

- USA (16,9 per cent of two way trade in 1981);
- Japan (13,9 per cent);
- UK (13,6 per cent);
- West Germany (11,8 per cent);

followed by Switzerland and Italy.<sup>150</sup> Trade with Africa is of increasing importance, topping a one billion dollar mark in 1980.<sup>151</sup>

Investment and technology transfer links are as strong as the trade links. South Africa's need for both are totally evident. The country in return offers a specialised supplier and receiver market of significance to major western economies.

Those links create an interdependence such that just as South Africa and her neighbouring black-ruled states need each other militarily, so too do the West and South Africa (and increasingly black and white-ruled Southern Africa) need each other economically.

#### Psychological Interdependence

From the point of view of the present regime in South Africa perhaps the strongest interdependence of all is to be found at the psychological level. White South Africans (and especially those belonging to the political ruling class) enjoy a love/hate relationship with the rest of the world. It is a relationship almost adolescent in its nature. Convinced of being misunderstood, bitter about alleged double standards and hugely resentful of censure and advice, the worst fate for white South Africans vis-a-vis their fellow species is to be ignored.

As contact with the world community increases (through trade, communication, tourism, etc.) so the tension between resentment and a desire to be accepted grows. This certainly creates an interdependence and potentially, an area for reciprocal action/reaction. A negative example of this was the electioneering benefit John Vorster derived from the Carter Administration's policy of moral censure. The opposite can be argued (though controversially) with regard to the Reagan Administration policy of constructive engagement. Here movement on the Namibian issue, normalisation in relations with neighbouring states, a decrease in bannings and detentions, the acceptance of the Rikhoto decision as well as the reconsideration of the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill can all be cited as possible fruits of this policy.

The actual balance sheet is not the issue here. White South Africa does care what the rest of the world thinks about her. She is keen (within fairly narrow constraints) to improve her international relations.

### Political Options

In Chapter Three, we have noted that liberal political strategies have in the past been defined by Afrikaner Nationalist action and Black Nationalist reaction.

### Afrikaner Politics

Afrikaner Nationalism confronted liberalism in the Fifties and Sixties as a monolithic juggernaut. It was characterised by an almost total clarity of purpose. Two overriding goals were dominant:

- to ensure a white South Africa (racial separation in every possible sphere - "positive" Apartheid in the form of the Bantustan policy);
- to establish an Afrikaner republic.

It was also characterised by an unusually high degree of unity. Caucas feuds were few, and normally conducted in private. Leadership changed hands infrequently and (until recently) with little conflict. Two of the first three Nationalist Prime Ministers died in office, whilst the third retired voluntarily at the age of 82. <sup>152</sup> From 1948 until 1966, the NP was without rival in Afrikaner politics. Even after the Hertzog break in 1966, it was another 17 years before another Afrikaner oriented political party was to win a seat in Parliament. <sup>153</sup> Truly the <sup>154</sup> NP as represented, as Adam has described it, ethnic mobilisation.

What is the position of Afrikaner Nationalist politics today?

Certainly Afrikaner political unity has been broken. In the last general election (1981), a rival Afrikaner Party (HNP) gained 14 per

cent of the total vote or the votes of one at least in five Afrikaans voters. A further one in twenty voted for the PFP or NRP, creating a situation in which one out of four Afrikaans voters supported a party other than the NP. <sup>155</sup> Since 1981, the NP's position has been further eroded by the split (by far the most significant since 1948) of Andries Treurnicht's supporters and the formation of the CP. In four Transvaal by-elections in May 1983 (three of which were in admittedly conservative areas), the NP polled 46 per cent of the popular vote to the CP/HNP's 41 per cent (the balance constituted PFP/NRP support). The CP became the first party to the right of the NP to win a Parliamentary seat, a feat they were to repeat later that year.

Finally, the 1983 constitutional referendum indicated yet further erosion of the NP's traditional support base. This Referendum reflected new voter alliances. The largest "Yes" vote was recorded where English opposition voters were at their strongest:

|              |        |
|--------------|--------|
| Cape Town    | 75,29% |
| Durban       | 72,25% |
| Johannesburg | 68,45% |

and the smallest "Yes" vote was where this traditional opposition vote was weakest:

|             |        |
|-------------|--------|
| Pietersburg | 47,08% |
| Roodepoort  | 56,47% |
| Pretoria    | 56,96% |
| Kimberley   | 56,90% |

The table on page 283 suggests a new polarisation of white politics. No longer is the divide that between an exclusivist Afrikaner Nationalism and an inclusive English oriented party (NP versus UP), but between political groups essentially crystallised around attitudes to race.

If monolithic unity has been shattered, so too has the clarity of vision and certainty of purpose. In a sense this certainly has fallen victim to Afrikaner Nationalism's complete success in its one key objective (republiekwording) and complete failure in the other ("Positive" Apartheid).

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Adam, with one perspective on the "new politics" of Afrikaner  
nationalism, sees the old Apartheid "religion" <sup>157</sup> being replaced by  
what he terms "survival politics". Many liberal critics deride this  
change as purely semantic: Apartheid in new words. Whilst they are  
quite correct in asserting that the change does not amount to a

"surrender" of Afrikaner or white hegemony, they are quite wrong in suggesting it represents no change. Andries Treurnicht and the minimum of 400 000 (perhaps 500 000) Afrikaans voters who followed him in the Referendum understood this. Some quotations from a recent manifesto of the new nationalism, entitled "The Second (R)evolution" and written by Willem de Klerk 158 indicates just how significant the break with past dogma is. This work is subtitled: Afrikanerdom and the Crisis of Identity. De Klerk asserts that this crisis has been brought about by a process of questioning, inter alia:

"Questioning the one-sidedness of the policy of apartheid which finds its leitmotiv in the homelands, underlining in particular the failure of homeland development and the problem of the absorption of blacks who were supposed to go back to their homelands and border industries. Questioning the political rights of the urban blacks and the senselessness of shunting them back to the homelands to exercise these rights. Questioning the absurdity of rigid divisions in sport and in other unnecessary areas. Questioning coloured and Indian rights and citizenship. Questioning the statutory entrenchment of Apartheid and structural discrimination. Questioning the whole moral basis of the concept of Apartheid." 159

This process of questioning causes De Klerk to make a bold statement about Apartheid politics:

"All the barriers mentioned above have brought Afrikaners to the realisation that the concept of Apartheid as a political policy is doomed to failure." 160

He continues:

"This means that the fundamental laws of the old Apartheid dispensation will have to be repealed - this is an essential part of compromise politics." 161

De Klerk tries to give content to this term "compromise politics", though his attempt raises as many questions as it addresses:

"The philosophy of the new compromise-politics contains the following elements:

- The dispensation of nations is the political ideal, not confrontation between nations or their subjugation.
- The dispensation of nations cannot be attained through the concepts of a unitary state or separate nation states.
- The dispensation of nations is only possible by creating a nation concept which contains elements of both a unitary state and nation-states. All parties must be persuaded to agree to this compromise dispensation.
- The compromise formula is authority over own affairs and shared authority for all the peoples and groups in South Africa. This is called the politics of association.
- The unitary state as concept is recognised in this compromise in the participation on all levels of government, full participation on the communal level by all and the abolition of legal discrimination. Ethnicity as an enforced social separation would be largely abolished, except where group interests were the decisive factor. There would be joint citizenship and the sharing of public amenities, wherever desirable.
- The nation-state concept is recognised in this compromise because ethnicity as a political division is

is retained and territorial division as a political creed is abandoned. The point of departure is that population groups remain the basic bricks of politics and society and that group autonomy is retained by authority over own affairs. Own affairs can be decided in an on-going process of consultation, but basically this means that the sphere of existence of each group, their 'own' sphere, will be maintained by their own political structures, own living areas, education and establishments. However, the entrenchment of the own sphere also compromises by permitting a 'grey sphere' in living areas, education, etcetera, the right of choice to take party in the grey sphere will be acknowledged." 162

In the Eighties, Afrikaner unity has been replaced by Afrikaner diversity: the politics of conquest with its Verwoerdian certainty by the politics of survival with its De Klerkian fuddle.

### Black Politics

If a monolithic and single-minded Afrikaner Nationalism had severely circumscribed the options of liberal politics, so too had the absence of an effective black politics of reform.

The major standard bearer of black political aspirations, virtually from Union, had been the African National Congress. This organisation (only becoming a mass movement in the late Fifties) has progressed through a range of tactics and strategies:

- from petition (approximately the 1910's to the 1940's); 163
- to protest (1940's); 164
- to defiance (disobedience of racist laws - 1950's); 165
- to sabotage (destruction of property but not life, in exile in 1960's);
- to a more broadly guerilla war strategy in the 1980's. 166

Liberalism was often the object of petition particularly in the 1930's and 1940's. 167 Protest provided opportunities for collaboration, but

the defiance, sabotage and guerilla planes posed serious moral and practical dilemmas. 168 Protest and defiance (ambiguously) could be reconciled with a politics of reform, which was the boundary line of liberal tactics. Even defiance raised conflicts about the rule of law. In the Fifties, the working alliance between communists and the ANC posed further dilemmas, causing the Liberal Party to boycott the 1956 Klipspruit People's Congress.

A structural problem for black politics in this period was the lack of the resources which would make a politics of reform possible. In the absence of an American-type liberal constitution petition, protest and defiance were tactics of limited consequence. The absence of a

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disciplined mass membership base rendered civil disobedience campaign highly vulnerable to the reactions of a State which was both ready and able to repress. Importantly, Walshe has observed that the increasing industrialisation (and perhaps more accurately their proletarianisation).

"... had given the African masses a minimal but real stake in stable social conditions. It had also established their vulnerability to unemployment and the loss of meagre but real opportunities for economic advance which could not be recouped upon banishment to the rural areas. Congress, therefore, languished, being unable to prise reforms from the closed fist of Afrikaner Nationalism." 170

This absence of a black "politics of reform" contributed to liberal impotence in the Fifties and Sixties. Has the situation changed?

This question (as with so many about South African society and politics) cannot be answered easily or unambiguously. It is, however, possible to point to two important areas of change.

The first of these is the re-emergence and "coming of age" of black trade unions. Reborn in the early Seventies (with important impetus from the 1973 Durban strikes) and recognised by the State in 1979 (in one of the most important reversals of National Party policies in

almost four decades of rule) some 40 black and multi-racial unions now have a membership base of between 400 000 and 500 000. More importantly, they are "in business" as trade unions for the first time in South African history. They have been recognised by a wide grouping of employers, across a range of industries. They engage in collective bargaining, their shop stewards fight for the human dignity and fair treatment of black workers in the workplace. Almost all commentators from the ANC to the rightwing Conservative Party recognise their power. 171

A second new factor is the creation of the largest black political movement in South Africa's history, Inkatha Yenkululeko yeSizwe, led by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. In 1983 this movement claimed a membership base of some 750 000<sup>172</sup> of which at least one-third were fully paid-up. 173 Inkatha has not only mass membership but also an effective branch structure (2 000 branches in 1983), a vigorous Woman's Youth Brigade, and a "base" in the power structure through its role in the homeland government of KwaZulu. This latter fact has led critics to dismiss Inkatha as collaborationist, and its leader Buthelezi as a stooge.

Though these rhetorical dismissals are often heard, both inside South Africa and out, Buthelezi's base of support cannot be ignored. This is overwhelming amongst blacks in Natal and significant elsewhere in

174 South Africa. The Rockefeller Commission acknowledge him as "a  
175 force to be reckoned with." Lodge writing of Inkatha from a  
largely critical perspective notes:

"... Inkatha, despite its increasingly conscious rivalry  
with and antagonism towards the ANC is likely to expand  
its power and influence within urban African  
communities..." 176

Inkatha's power base (as with the unions) enable it to develop a  
politics of reform. Its occupation of a key homeland government  
together with its refusal to accept full "independence" has forced the  
South African government to seek alternative political solutions to the  
problem of black participation - alternatives, that is, to  
balkanisation. The present cabinet committee which is examining the  
political future of some 10 million "urban" blacks is a consequence of  
Buthelezi's politics. It is powerful enough to openly defy the  
government on at least certain issues. 177 Inkatha's opposition to  
178 certain government plans has led to their abandonment. Inkatha has  
formed alliances with other groups inside South Africa, as well as  
179 conducting vigorous relations abroad. Perhaps its most creative  
political action to date has been the Buthelezi Commission, which  
explored the political alternatives between Apartheid and one-man  
one-vote, in the context of Natal, but with relevance to all South  
Africa.

Other threads of a black politics of reform can be identified though in less certain form. One of these is the area of Black Local Government. Though the new local government bodies enjoy considerable constitutional power, their lack of an adequate financial base, as well as the dubious calibre and mandate of the present "generation" of elected councillors vitiates their impact. Mandate problems also undermine the coloured and Indian members of the new tricameral parliament, though this is at least mitigated in the case of the coloureds by the coherence and leadership of the totally dominate Labour Party.

Protest movements have not disappeared. Organisations which act more as the articulators and mobilisers of black aspirations and black anger have flourished in the Eighties. AZAPO, UDF and the NF all are significant actors. Both the quantity and quality of their support are impossible to determine definitively in the absence of some representative system which measures support in an organised way.

The significant change in the Eighties, however, is the expansion of the range of black strategies. Though long-term goals are common, strategies now span revolt, protest and reform. This creates new options for liberal action.

4. Towards an Ethics of Responsible Liberal Action

The fourth part of our hypothesis reads as follows: (Page 7)

"that liberals should review their ethical approach with a view to developing an ethic of responsible liberal action."

In Section Three of this conclusion we have argued that a series of forces have created a new set of options for liberals. Can these new options sustain a "new" ethic? Before examining this we must redefine the ethics of responsible (liberal) action.

This ethic is developed in Chapter Two, in the "model" we have derived from the thoughts and actions of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. We can briefly summarise this model as follows:

- such ethics are more concerned with action (the deed) than with judgement;
- these ethics can be guided by no pre-given moral code, but must make concrete choices in particular situations;
- the responsible actor must accept that he lives in a world come of age. He cannot surrender his judgement (nor his responsibility) to institutions or ideologies;

- in planning his action, his analysis must go beyond reason and take full cognisance of factors such as power, evil and reality;
- ethical judgements can be based neither solely on the consideration of motives, nor of consequences, but must hold both in tension;
- a responsible actor must accept his own guilt - it is impossible to act without an involvement in bad consequences;
- he must be ready to combine freedom and justice;
- finally, he must act in a way which demonstrates a careful concern for the foreseeable consequences of his action.

180

Is it possible to realise liberal values through such an ethic in South Africa in the 1980's? It will be argued by means of a series of illustrations drawn from different fields of liberal endeavour, that this is possible. In so doing, it is not suggested that such an ethic has been entirely lacking in liberal action in the past, but only that it has been under-emphasised.

181

The Sprocas series of reports described in Chapter Three, and especially the report of political alternatives, review liberal principles comprehensively and develop these into a much more

182  
realpolitik of programme. Rick Turner, in his postscript to his work The Eye of The Needle provided an analysis of South Africa's social dynamics out of which a series of organisational strategies could be developed. 183 This analysis of Turner constitutes a valuable bridge between the changes we have observed in Section Three of this conclusion and the strategies we wish to illustrate in this section. For this reason, we shall list some of Turner's more important insights:

- South Africa is as remarkably stable as it is grossly unequal; 184
- Industrialisation is creating a potential power base for a black proletariat; 185
- Separate development institutions provide a potential shelter for black political organisation, which when combined with the above 186 become a formidable change agent;
- White reactions are far from irrelevant; 187
- The three most likely responses of the present regime to pressures for change are:
  - \* radically improved development of the homelands;
  - \* the co-option of the black middle class;
  - \* a combination of the two which is remarkably accurate of present policies (and this was written in 1973!)

"... the attempt to integrate the two minority black communities, that is the 'coloured' community and the Indian community, into the white group, and at the same time speed up the development of the homelands, to make concessions, short of a sharing of political power, to the African urban middle class." 188

Of these three options, Turner observes three important points:

"First, none of them would radically alter the fact that South Africa is a highly unequal society. Second, nevertheless, any one of these strategies would make South Africa a much less harsh and a much more liveable society than it is at present. ... Third, although each of these strategies can be seen from the white perspective as an attempt to maintain power by playing on black divisions, there is no guarantee that any of these strategies would actually succeed." 189

Against the background of such an analysis can an ethics of responsible liberal action be illustrated? We shall examine a number of arenas for liberal action.

#### The Economy

This is without doubt the area of greatest liberal power and influence. In this area, three avenues of action can be identified:

- The democratisation of the workplace through the incorporation of emerging black unions in a process of joint decision-making both in collective bargaining and on a more microscopic scale (shop floor).

Such democratisation - a move towards management by consent - though it will not transfer political power will lead to a transfer of resources. This is a pre-condition for a shift in political power;

- The creation of lobbies for change. If issues are carefully selected, carefully researched and carefully propagated, business can lobby effectively for significant change. The Urban Foundation has already indicated this. Two of the most important and achievable (at least in part) areas for such lobby activities are influx control/urbanisation and the desegregation of training and education institutions (particularly at the tertiary level);
- Increasing black skills and leadership in the economy. Here black access to artisan skills is crucial. Access to managerial and other technical occupations is also important, again because it involves an increase of resources in black hands.

### The Media

The English language press has long espoused liberal values. These values have also, however, long been only part realised. In particular, against a background of changing social forces, a vital attitude shaping challenge awaits the press:

- Eroding racial prejudice. Such prejudice acts as a filter which can and does sway reaction to pressures for change. Blacks are too often presented in the English press as victims (so encouraging guilt) or rebels (so encouraging fear). They are too seldom presented as liberal values proclaim them: fellow human beings and fellow South Africans - including in their number - artisans, journalists, writers, doctors, etc. The press can help to project the "cross cutting cleavages" which now exist extensively in South African society.
  
- To undermine racial fear. White fear of apocalypse has been exacerbated by liberal moralism to the point where many whites believe armageddon inevitable, and black/white compromise impossible. Yet everyday South African society abounds with examples of black/white compromise and co-operation. A belief in the possibility of inter-racial compromise should be nurtured.
  
- Educating whites (in particular) to understand the changing realities of South Africa. Here industrial relations, education, urbanisation, consumerism all offer opportunities to reflect a new society replete with new options.

### The Universities

English language universities have long been the torch bearers of liberal values. What would an ethics of responsible action look like in this area?

- Relevant education for these universities. The graduates of these institutions are almost all destined for managerial and professional roles in society. Does university training in business administration, engineering, medicine, accountancy, etc. incorporate a conscious liberal ethic?
- A model of a non-racial social organisation: all English language universities now have sizeable black minorities. How successful they prove to be in effectively incorporating these minorities within the life and purpose of the university will be an important test case for other social formations.

### The Churches

The English language churches are the largest multi-racial organisations in South Africa. Though they have long proclaimed liberal values, these values have been again only partially practised. It is important to extend the degree of realisation not only to rebut the negative charge of hypocrisy, but because of enormous social influence this could bring to bear.

Areas for potential responsible action are:

- the breaking down of de facto racial barriers, particularly at the parish level;
- increased black/white interaction in common activities, creating new common roles;
- the extension of the churches role as an ethical agent in both the black and the white role. This role should explore the ethical (i.e. action-related) consequences of the christian faith for politicians, workers, managers, etc.

#### Political Parties/Groups

Here the single most important challenge is to create values coalitions across the colour bar around liberal values. Here the new constitutional dispensation, for all its flaws, offers new opportunities. It could conceivably increase the present level of liberal MP's from the current 15 per cent (27 out of 178) to over 40 per cent (147 out of 298).

The Buthelezi Commission is an example of a highly significant black/white joint action. So too was joint Inkatha/PFP protests about Ingwavuma and KaNgwane. The referendum alliance is also an example of such tactical co-operation.

It should be noted here that it is tactical co-operation and not the submergence of a white liberal identity and white liberal interests that would constitute responsible action. It has been argued that white liberals must choose constantly between white and black target audiences. Such a choice is false. Ability to attract further white support for liberal positions is now directly linked to the ability to demonstrate co-operation with black groupings.

The extent to which white liberals demonstrate their ability to bring liberals together qua liberals rather than as blacks or white, will over time, allow them to refute Turner's charge that they:

"remain whites first and liberals second." 190

The above merely sketches the outline of an ethics of responsible action in five areas. All need to be developed by actors in concrete situations. All will involve actors in difficult and ambiguous choice, often calling upon them to choose between evils, and to estimate balances of consequence.

Finally, we join with Weber in noting that a moment will come when consequence ceases to be an adequate guide for action. Some dilemmas are so fundamental that in order to preserve personal integrity, only a response of "principle" suffices. Then calculation ends and an intuitive "gut level" response takes over. In South Africa in the 1980's, however, liberals must first tread the road of responsible action before they can legitimately say with Weber "thus far and no further."

All the above examples imply no change in liberal values (as set out by Leatt in the Introduction, pages 11-13). These values remain as valid and vital as ever. They do, however, imply a revised ethic.

Instead of choosing to act (or declining to act) on the basis of an inner conviction alone, there is a need:

- to undertake a realistic survey of the situation:

What interest is being served by the situation I am seeking to change? Who can exercise what sort of power? (There will be a need to go beyond the rational in this exercise);

- to examine all the options:

All possible actions must be contemplated (how else is responsible choice possible?) These options must first be identified and only then judged and only then accepted or rejected.

- consequences must be weighed against conscience:

In choosing a line of action, an attempt must be made to anticipate its consequences. This exercise will always be hypothetical, and can never be totally precise. It is, however, never impossible. The act finally chosen must combine good consequences with good intentions.

Such a reconstructed ethic should enable liberals to greatly increase the impact of their beliefs on a changing South African society.

INTRODUCTION

NOTES

1. For Descartes' influence on Locke see Copleston 1964, Vol. 5, part 1, page 76.
2. Ibid, page 137.
3. Ibid, page 138.
4. Ibid, page 139.
5. For instance, Locke's labour theory of property re-emerges in Marx's labour theory of value (see Copleston, Op Cit, page 140). Furthermore, his division of society into those holding property who are capable of rational existence and, therefore, liberty and political rights pressages the Marxist bourgeois/proleteriat dichotomy. See MacPherson 1972, page 202.
6. Jefferson indicated that Locke was one of the "three greatest men the world has ever produced" along with Bacon on Newton, Mayo 1970, page 163; see also Peterson 1977, page 201. For a further example of Locke's influence on the early development of American liberalism, see the influencee of Locke on the Virginian constitution, Morison 1972, Vol. 1, page 358.
7. One source suggests a precise changeover at 1868 with Gladstone's accession to the Premiership. See Elliott 1973, page 507.
8. Ibid, page 283.
9. For example, the Whig government which pushed through the Reform Act of 1832 wished to "frustrate democracy by increasing the franchise". (Evans 1983, page 37) and see the words of Whig Prime Minister Grey "... there is no one more dedicated against annual parliaments, universal sufferage and the ballot than I am" quoted in Evans 1983, pages 36 and 37. At a much later time, it is the Whig resistance to the suffragettes which significantly accounts in the view of one author, for their final eclipse - see Dougerfield 1983, pages 132-194.
10. See Hale 1973, pages 304-310, for a wider discussion of this. See also Howard 1981, pages 13-23.
11. See in particular chapters one, five and seven of Walzer 1971.

12. As argued by Weber's Protestant ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber 1971). See also the thoughtful discussion of the claims and counterclaims for and against this thesis in Elton, G.R. 1979, pages 297-304.
13. See, for instance, Rude 1978, pages 296 and 297 and Granville 1978 for a discussion of the interaction of these two forces.
14. The Democratic Party was the first to emerge, in the late eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth century as led by Jefferson and being massively dominant for a large part of this period (particularly 1817 to 1825). When a group broke away to form the Republican Party, it was on the clearly illiberal principle of high tariffs. Another split took place in the 1850's when Northern Democrats united with the then Republican Party against slavery. In the twentieth century, it can be said (albeit in very crude terms) that the Democrats have emerged as the standard bearers of some political liberal doctrines, and the Republicans of some economic. However, differences of political values within US political parties are often as great as those between parties. See Elliot 1973, pages 125 and 397.
15. See Howard 1981, especially pages 52 to 72.
16. In this regard, the social engineering of Taylorism is particularly important. See Bertels 1977.
17. See Bertels 1977 and Hopkins, pages 474-477, for a description of the new town phenomenon in post war Britain.
18. His postscript "Why I am not a Conservative" is a particularly lucid account of the forces acting on liberal thinking in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Hayek 1976, pages 397-414.
19. Leatt 1978, pages 33 and 34. For an essentially similar catalogue of liberal values see Adam and Giliomee (1979), page 259.
20. Flew 1979, page 104.
21. Baldwin 1901, page 346.
22. Abelson and Nielsen 1967, Vol. 3, page 81. See the parallel with Flew's threefold typology:
  - critical ethics;
  - normative ethics;
  - meta-ethics.Flew 1979, pages 104 and 105.

23. MacIntyre 1967, pages 2 and 3. See also his comments about the value neutrality of philosophy on pages 4 and 5, and his linked social and philosophical analysis throughout this work, but stated most clearly in his concluding chapter.
24. Hare 1967, page 14.
25. Murray 1963, page 394.
26. Robertson 1971. See also Strongeways-Booth 1976 and Hocking 1971.
27. Rich, 1984.
28. Only the last part of Chapter 5, and the Conclusion deal with the post 1948 period.
29. See the survey of the reception of phenomenology into the social sciences in Godsell 1977 pages 19-25.
30. Ibid pages 25-31.
31. The term ideal type is used in a Weberian sense (see Gerth and Mills 1970, page 59 and Weber 1970, pages 323-325) but also in an incipiently Lebenweltlich sense (see Godsell 1977).
32. With regard to the observed act, this is why we say the act or event has "left its mark on time". Ricoeur 1979, page 83.
33. Ricoeur 1979, pages 83 and 84.
34. It is important to note here that the act is observed and recorded not merely by the social scientist, but by other actors both in the same space/ time context, and afterwards. So for example, the "attack" of the Indian shopkeeper on the African child which is now seen as an important trigger incident in the 1949 Durban riots, was then "recorded" by the groups active in the riots.
35. Ricoeur 1979, pages 85 and 86.
36. Ricoeur 1979, page 86.
37. It is important to note, as suggested above, that these meanings transcend the particular meaning attached by the agent of the action at the time of its commission.

CHAPTER ONE

NOTES

1. Warnock 1967, page 5.
2. Moore 1903, page 6.
3. Warnock 1967, page 6.
4. Ibid, page 7.
5. Pritchard 1949 and Ross 1930.
6. Ayer, A.J. Language, Truth and Logic 1936.
7. Warnock 1967, page 19.
8. Stevenson, C.L. Ethics and Language 1944.
9. Warnock 1967, page 24.
10. Ibid, page 27.
11. Urmson "On Grading" published in MIND, volume LIX page 145 onwards and quoted in M. Warnock 1960 pages 74-77.
12. Hare, R.M. The Language of Morals 1952 and Freedom and Reason 1963.
13. See particularly Hare's second book Freedom and Reason and his discussion as to whether an individual can subscribe to a moral principle without acting on it.
14. Warnock 1967, page 1.
15. Ibid, pages 69-70.
16. Gerth 1970, page 12.
17. The conversation is recorded of this exchange, and quoted in Gerth, 1970 pages 41 and 42, revealing of both men. It produces one of the most incisive descriptions of Weber's concept of a charismatic democracy.

"In a democracy the people choose a leader in whom they trust. Then the leader says, 'Now shut up and obey me!' People and party are then no longer free to interfere in his business."

Gerth 1970 page 42.

18. For an account of Weber's liberal position from another source see Gideon 1971, pages 190-193.
19. The Frau Weber's account as quoted in Gerth 1970, page 41. Note she calls him an individualist and suggests that this is one important reason for his distance from the socialists. This is also one of the reasons why what he has to say to liberals is so important.
20. Aron 1964, page 91.
21. Gerth 1970, pages 78, 82.
22. Ibid, page 78.
23. Weber here raises the interesting point that Roman law has significantly contributed to the pre-eminence of lawyers in the post feudal state. This Weber argues in turn results from the fact that "Roman jurisprudence is the product of a political structure arising from the city state ..." Gerth 1970, page 93.

Certainly the predominance of lawyers cannot be doubted in modern politics. Charlton 1974, page 115 has noted that in a 1954 study it was found that 56 per cent of the members of the U.S. House of Representatives, and 57 per cent of U.S. Senators were lawyers. In Canada, 33 per cent of that country's 17th Parliament, and 60 per cent of its Federal Cabinet Ministers were lawyers. In South Africa, 39 per cent of all cabinet members between 1910 and 1971 were lawyers, rather less than elsewhere, but most the largest single group (farmers followed with 13 per cent).

24. Ibid, page 114.
25. Ibid, page 115.
26. Weber gives a quite startling example of this in newly created Soviet Russia noting that: "the Soviets have preserved, or rather re-introduced, the highly paid enterpriser, the group wage, the Taylor system, military and workshop discipline, and a search for foreign

capital. Hence, in a word, the Soviets have been led to accept again absolutely all the things that Bolshevism had been fighting as bourgeois class institutions" in Gerth 1970, page 100.

That Weber was able to make this observation no more than a year after the revolution is amazing.

27. See Simone De Beauvoir in the section of Existentialist ethics on pages 45 to 56.
28. Gerth 1970, page 126.
29. Ibid, page 127.
30. Ibid pages 127-128.
31. Van Peursen 1974, see pages 78, 83.
32. Warnock M. 1967, pae 5.
33. Warnock 1967, page 6.
34. Martin Heidegger 1949.
35. Warnock M. 1967, page 15.
36. Ibid pages 34 and 35.
37. Ibid, page 50.
38. Ibid, page 56.
39. De Beauvoir was both an intellectual and personal colleague of Jean-Paul Sartre, though her work differs significantly from that of Sartre.
40. De Beauvoir 1948, page 9.
41. Ibid, page 10.
42. "It is not a matter of being right in the eyes of God, but of being right in (man's) own eyes" : Ibid page 14.
43. Ibid pages 16 and 17. This is closely linked to Bonhoeffer's concept of man "come of age".

44. So she argues that life imprisonment is the worst of all forms of punishment, as it preserves life without any possibility of freedom. Ibid page 31.
45. Ibid, page 214.
46. Ibid pages 49 to 50.
47. Ibid, page 59.
48. Ibid, page 61.
49. Ibid pages 63-73.
50. Ibid, page 76.
51. Ibid, page 81.
52. Ibid, pages 90, 91.
53. Ibid pages 96-115.
54. Ibid page 97.
55. Ibid page 90.
56. Ibid, page 98.
57. Ibid page 99 see also De Beauvoir's comment on the choice of targets: "the Arabian fellah is oppressed by the sheiks and the French and English administration: which of the two is to be combatted? The interest of the French proletariat are not the same as those of the natives in the colonies: which are to be served?" Ibid page 89.
58. Ibid page 100
59. Ibid page 103.
60. De Beauvoir notes that "a collectivist conception of man does not concede a valid existence to such sentiments as love, tenderness, and friendship." rather they create a sort of anonymous comradeship "in marching, in choral singing, in common work and struggle, all the others appear as the same, nobody ever does." Page 108.
61. Ibid, page 109.

62. "Others serenely think that the present dictatorship of a party with its lies and violence has no importance if, by means of it, the socialist State is realised: arbitrariness and crime will then disappear from the face of the earth." Ibid page 117.
63. Sartre 1957, page 615.
64. De Beauvoir 1948, page 129.
65. Ibid page 134.
66. Ibid page 142.
67. Ibid page 143.
68. Ibid page 152.
69. Ibid page 153.
70. Camus 1969.
71. Camus 1973.
72. For a fuller biographical sketch see Camus 1970.
73. Of course the distinction drawn here is more one of analysis than of substance. Clearly Camus' "political" writings find their foundations on his philosophical base. The Rebel is in any case an intensely political work. Its level of analysis is, however, more abstract than the texts used here.  
  
Camus' philosophy does have an assertive coherence and consistency. This is much more the case than the work of Jean-Paul Sartre.
74. Camus 1964.
75. See Camus' criticism of revolutionary politics in general in Camus 1973, pages 165-176; and of Marxism in particular as quoted in Macquarrie 1972, pages 18 and 139.
76. Camus specifically rejected this label for himself after his altercation with Sartre. However, there is sufficient that is common in his writings with that of others commonly regarded as Existentialists to justify extending that label to him.

77. Camus 1964, pages 69, 74.
78. Ibid page 71.
79. Ibid page 72.
80. Ibid page 67.
81. Ibid page 67.
82. Ibid page 67.
83. "In my case, if I am aware of the risk I run, in criticising the course of the rebellion, of justifying the most brazen instigator of the Algerian drama, I never cease fearing that, by pointing out the long series of French mistakes, I may, without running any risk myself, provide an excuse for the insane criminal who may throw his bomb into an innocent crowd that includes my family." Camus 1964, page 82.
84. Ibid page 84.
85. Ibid page 85.
86. Ibid pages 95-102.
87. There is a parallel here with Mandela's use of the term sabotage.
88. Ibid page 90.
89. Ibid page 101, 102.
90. Developed by Marc Lauriol at Algiers University.
91. Ibid page 109.
92. See his comment: "I have always thought that heroism and sacrifice were not enough to justify a cause." Camus 1964, page 73.
93. "When oppression wins out, as we all know here, those who nevertheless believe that their cause is just suffer from a sort of astonishment upon discovering the apparent impotence of justice." Camus 1964, page 73.
94. For example, see the character of Mersault in A Happy Death (Camus 1972) and as developed in The Outsider (Camus 1971) as well as The Plague (Camus 1972a) and Caligula and Cross Purpose (Camus 1968).

95. Ibid pages 77, 78.

96. Ibid page 52.

CHAPTER TWO

NOTES

1. Eberhard Bethge, Bonhoeffer's close friend and major interpreter, has noted several particular parallels:

- the system of informers;
- bannings and censorship;
- attacks on (parts of) the church;
- a common form of racism.

However he also notes some very important differences:

"No one is suggesting, of course, that the practice of white superiority in South Africa rests on a secret plan to destroy one whole section of the nation, as was the case with the racism practised under National Socialism. South Africa is not a totalitarian state in the NAZI sense, though to many it appears that way."

Bethge 1975, page 171; and:

"Certainly the Nationalists (in South Africa) are not against organised religion, nor would they easily tolerate the FUERHRERPRINZIP in their party or their church."

Bethge 1975, page 174.

Bethge made these comments after completing a study and lecture tour of South Africa.

2. Taylor 1979, page 7.
3. Ibid, page 8.
4. The image of Germany existing in a buffer zone between East and West, as Taylor saw it, has a contemporary parallel in the case of the present debate about nuclear disarmament. Either West Germany must accept junior partnership in the West's nuclear defence strategy, providing a territorial base for US nuclear missiles; or it must become a nuclear power in its own right, with all the historical dangers that suggests. Exactly the same could be said of East Germany with respect to the Soviet Union. The fear of a re-united Germany, shared by both East and West, attests the aptness of this buffer zone concept. This fear was well-described in a recent popular work of fiction, Donald James' "The Fall of the Russian Empire" as indicated in both East and West reaction to Bukansky's proposal of a reunited Germany. (James 1983).

5. Taylor 1979, page 10.
6. Hitler's National Socialists were never to achieve an outright majority at the polls, though the increase in their popular support in the late twenties and early thirties was impressive:

| <u>Election</u> | <u>% popular vote</u> | <u>Votes Gained</u> | <u>Seats Gained</u> |
|-----------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 1928            | 2,6%                  | 810 000             | 12                  |
| 1930            | 18,3%                 | 6 400 000           | 107                 |
| 1932            | 36,3%                 | 13 700 000          | 230                 |
| 1933            | 43,9%                 | 17 200 000          | 288                 |

After 1933 Hitler abolished the multi-party system, and the purpose of subsequent elections was to endorse his actions. Their results are the clearest possible evidence of the arrival of totalitarian rule:

1935 in favour of the National Socialists 98,8%  
1938 in favour of the National Socialists 99,1%

It is interesting to note that both Bullock 1967, and Fest 1974, comment that the 16 million or so votes that Hitler gained between 1928 and 1933 were gained from the Centre and Right, rather than from either the Communists or Social Democrats, whose fortunes improved in respect of the former and remained constant in respect of the latter.

7. Bullock 1967, page 257.
8. Grunberger 1977, page 13.
9. Quoted in Grunberger 1977, page 14.
10. Social security was improved; the collective bargaining process was promoted, with some 12 to 14 million workers covered by collective agreements; strikes decreased in the 1927 to 1930 period to something like half of their pre-war level. Part of this decrease was the result of increased government involvement in the settling of labour disputes - an involvement which was to cost the Weimar Republic dearly in the years of economic crisis, from 1930 to 1933. (See Grunberger 1977, pages 19 to 21). The registration of patents (a good index of entrepreneurship and innovation) doubled from their pre-war levels; bankruptcies halved; the agricultural sector declined (also a reliable index of economic development); the production of electricity increased by 50%. All of these indicators are quoted for the 1925-1930 period, which can be seen as a brief "golden age" for Weimar. (See Grunberger 1977, pages 17 and 18).

11. The depth of these divisions are indicated by the Social Democratic collaboration in the assassination of Socialist leader Rosa Luxembour. (Grunberger 1977, page 14). The cost of the division was not entirely lost on the intellectuals of the left and resulted in many attempts at reconciliation, all unsuccessful. (Laqueur 1977, page 64.)
12. It is interesting to not Bullock's comment:  

"In the 1930's there was no strong middle class liberal party in Germany - the lack of such a Party has more than once been one of the disasters of German political development."

(Bullock 1967, page 254).
13. Fest 1977, page 577.
14. "Fourteen years of Marxism (1919 to 1933) have ruined Germany; one year of Bolshevism would destroy her."  
Quoted in Fest 1977, page 577.
15. The controversy as to whether the Nazis instigated this event continues. Hitler's response to it is clear:  

"Now I have them!" he proclaimed in receiving news of the fire.  
Quoted in Fest 1977, page 588.
16. Fest 1977, page 591.
17. Bullock 1967, page 274.
18. Fest 1977, page 614.
19. This all important Nazis concept regretablely has no easy English translation. Literally the term means "co-ordinated". As used in the mid-thirties it implied much more than this - the dissolving of previous lines of autonomy and independent organisation and authority, and the creation in its place of an organic social order: a return from Gesellschaft to Gemeinschaft.
20. Schoenbaum 1967, page 104.
21. Ibid, page 107.
22. Ibid, page 76.

23. An exception to this was the giant I.G. Farben.  
See Grunberger 1977, pages 230-233 and Schoenbaum 1967,  
pages 128-129.
24. The Nazis enjoyed unusually good support amongst the teaching  
community: 14 per cent of all teachers belonged to the Party's  
leadership corps, in contrast with 6 per cent of civil servants.  
(Grunberger 1977, page 364.)
25. Laqueur 1977, pages 234-237.
26. Grunberger 1977, page 388. See also Fest 1970, pages 376 to 396.
27. For a more detailed account of the Church struggle see  
Grunberger 1977, pages 548-570; Chapter Two, "A Church of Integrity"  
(pages 61 - 77) in Bethge 1975; and Part Two: The Cost of Being a  
Christian (pages 127-582) in Bethge 1977.
28. Not only did the SA continue to exist in armed form, but the Schutz  
Staffeln (SS) of Heinrich Himmler was expanded, merged with the  
police, took over many SA officers and men and continued to pose a  
challenge to the Army up to and during the war, then in the form of  
the Waffen SS.
29. See the account of these linked removals in Fest 1977, pages 803-807.  
Also H.H.Kirst's fictionalised but highly accurate account in "The  
Affairs of the Generals" in Kirst 1967.
30. Bullock 1977, page 534.
31. Hoffmann cites this refuge seeking as one of the forms of "inward  
migration" which the opponents who did not leave Germany had recourse  
to. (Hoffmann 1974, page 37.)
32. An early indication of Hitler's attitude was given in one of Hitler's  
first war conferences, held on 21st November 1939. At this  
conference Hitler repeatedly criticised his Generals, causing his  
Army Chief-of-Staff, General von Brautisch to offer his resignation.  
Hitler rejected this, but indicated "he was not oblivious to 'the  
spirit of Zossen' prevailing in the Army, and he would stamp it out."  
(Irving 1977, page 59.)
33. See Hoffmann 1974, page 61. The repeated changes of command in that  
leadership were also a major problem. (Hoffmann 1974, page 134.)
34. See Hoffman's account of trade union and worker opposition -  
Hoffmann 1974, pages 35-40. Also Bethge's account of Church  
opposition in Bethge 1977, particularly pages 501-525.

35. Quoted in Hoffmann 1974, page 68.
36. Ibid, page 83.
37. Ibid, page 99.
38. See for example his simplistic political programme (Hoffman 1974, page 104) and his unrealistic proposal of a mass resignation by all members of the General Staff. (Hoffman 1974, page 107.)
39. Fuller biographies of Canaris - who must rank as one of the most complex and ethically important men of our century - can be found in the works of Colvin, 1973; Kahn 1980 (especially chapter 15); and Molloy Mason 1979 in English; as well as Abshagen 1950 and Brissaud 1979 in German.
40. See Colvin 1973, page 52.
41. Hoffmann 1977, page 75.
42. Hoffman 1977, page 435.
43. Ibid, page 125.
44. As Hoffmann trenchantly observes: "The situation would only become ripe (for acting against Hitler) when the catastrophe (predicted by the conspirators) actually happened. However, at this stage a coup would be altogether too late."
45. Hoffmann 1977, page 167.
46. See Irving's convincing documentation of the broad and general knowledge of the SS extermination activities as set out in page 12-16, 302-303, 329-332, 390-393, 601-602 in Irving 1977.
47. See the reference to Dohnanyi's "chronicle of shame" in Bethge 1967, page 576.
48. Hoffmann 1977, pages 236-240.
49. Ibid, pages 240-247.
50. Ibid, pages 247-254.
51. Beck's resignation on 18th August was a spur to the will to a direct revolt. Beck resigned once he had failed firstly to persuade Hitler from his military planes, and also to persuade the General staff to act collectively to oppose Hitler. In a sense the spur to revolt was the failure of the path of reason.

52. It is interesting to note that one of the actors in this plot, Heinz, former leader of the Stahlhelm, thought the idea of the arrest and trial unwise. He had secretly ordered his men, whose task it was to effect the arrest, to simply shoot Hitler.
53. For a detailed account of what Hoffman calls Halder's Coup plan see Hoffmann 1970, pages 109-129.
54. Fest 1977, page 836. For Fest's account of the Coup attempt see pages 834-841.
55. Hoffmann 1970, page 363.
56. Ibid, pages 301 and 302.
57. General Oster was to provide the explosive. This was impossible after the Elser attempt, Hoffmann 1970, pages 303-304. It is interesting to note that Ian Colvin, one of Canaris' biographers, believes that the Elser attempt was an SS planned operation (hence Hitler's life saving early departure from the Cellar.)
58. Hoffmann 1970, pages 306-307.
59. Ibid, pages 332-333.
60. Ibid, pages 324-325. Note the problem the conspirators experienced repeatedly with fuses, Hoffman 1970, page 324.
61. See Colvin's Chapters III, XI, XIV, XIX.
62. Fest 1977, page 1061 and Arnold - Forster 1981, page 261.
63. Captain Kaiser describes this indecisiveness on the part of the Generals Ohlbricht and Fromm: "The one wants to act when the command is given, the other to command when the deed is done." Hoffman 1970, page 352.
64. Fest 1977, page 1037.
65. In Hoffmann's definitive study Dohnanyi emerges as one of the handful of central characters in the resistance with as many references (42 in all) as Canaris and Beck.
66. F.W.T. Craske was elected Youth Secretary for the British Empire, the United States and the Far East; the Frenchman P.C. Toureille was elected for France, Latin America, the Balkans, Poland and Czechoslovakia; and Bonhoeffer for Germany, Northern Europe Hungary and Austria.

67. See Bethge 1967, pages 146 and 147.
68. See for example his trip to Rome in 1942 in Bethge 1967, pages 676 to 678.
69. Ibid, pages 589, 610, 696, 733, 734 and 737 for evidence of this transition.
70. A short account of this role has been attempted elsewhere in Godsell 1978, pages 440-443.
71. See Bethge's section "A Double Life", pages 587-590 in Bethge 1967. See also "Ten Years After" in Bonhoeffer 1980, pages 9-26.
72. Bonhoeffer 1965, page 43.
73. Ibid, page 17.
74. Ibid, page 43.
75. Ibid, page 72.  
The consistency of Bonhoeffer's thinking on this issue is worth observing here. In a sermon preached in February 1929 in Barcelona he said the following:

"...the concepts of 'good' and 'evil' exist only in the performance of an action, i.e. at any specific present, and hence any attempt to lay down principles is like trying to draw a bird in flight ..."

Bonhoeffer 1971, page 36.

and

"The Christian himself creates his standards of good and evil for himself. Only he can justify his own actions, just as only he can bear the responsibility."

Bonhoeffer 1971, page 40.

and

"...there cannot be ethics in a vacuum, as a principle; there cannot be good and evil as general ideas, but only as qualities of a will making a decision ... Bound up in the concrete decision, through God and In God, the Christian acts in the power of a man who has become free."

Bonhoeffer 1971, page 43.

76. See his rejection of the relativist approach (and utilitarianism) because of its failure to recognize the ultimate reality, God. Bonhoeffer 1965, page 192.
77. Bonhoeffer 1965, page 164:  
"The distinction between life that is worth living and life that is not worth living must sooner or later destroy life itself."
78. Ibid, page 168.
79. Ibid, page 97.
80. Ibid, page 99.
81. Ibid, page 101 and 102.
82. Ibid, page 102.
83. Ibid, pages 261 and 233.
84. Ibid, page 65.
85. Ibid, pages 264 and 265.
86. Ibid, pages 65 and 66.
87. Ibid, page 268.
88. Ibid, pages 233-234.
89. Ibid, page 234.
90. Ibid, page 234.
91. Ibid, page 241.  
See also here Kirst's analogy and parallel in Kirst 1965, especially pages 365-378.
92. Ibid, page 249.
93. Ibid, page 253.  
For a good dramatic account of this tension see Zuckmayer 1980.
94. Ibid, page 246.
95. Ibid, page 246.

96. Bonhoeffer 1980, page 251.
97. Bonhoeffer 1980, page 19. CHAPTER THREE

98. Ibid, page 19 and 20.

NOTES

99. Ibid, page 25.
100. Ibid, page 25.
1. Such as the abolition of the guilds, the removal of financial
101. Ibid, page 25; against Jews see Rude 1964 pages 219-220.
2. For the intentions and achievements of the three year Batavian rule at the Cape see De Kiewit 1978, pages 33-35.
3. See the preface to his Political Treatise Spinoza.
4. See Colenso "On Missions to the Zulus" in Colenso, page 221. This sense of evangelical egalitarianism led Colenso to break with his former colleague and collaborator Theophilus Shepstone, and also to be critical of the Anglo-Zulu war of 1879 and its aftermath. This conflict between liberal values and colonial practices was to characterize Church/State relations. See De Kiewit 1978, pages 43-48 and Keppel-Jones 1975 page 41 and 45. Also Leatt 1978, pages 38-39.
5. For a further description of this conflict see Van Jaarveldt 1974, pages 4-9.
6. For a detailed account of this debate see Hanlock 1967, pages 246-247.
7. In Friedman's account, Smuts actively diverted discussion of the "native" question during the convention. He was also a key figure in causing the constitution to opt for a unitary rather than a federal form. "Trust the people of South Africa", said General Smuts when he urged the National Convention to adopt a unitary and central constitution. "We must trust future South Africans, trust their wisdom" quoted in Friedman 1975, page 68. History was to pass hard judgement on this appeal.
8. For a more detailed biography see S.A. Dictionary of Biography, Vol. II pages 309-314.
9. See "On liberalism" published in "The Forum".
10. Paton 1965, pages 334-335.

11. Ibid, page 337.
12. Ibid, page 343.  
For a full account of this crucial event see pages 338-343.
13. Quoted in Ibid, page 356.
14. Ibid, page 351.
15. Ibid, pages 357-378.
16. See Paton 1980, page 309 and Malherbe 1981, page 282.
17. Friedman 1975, page 212.
18. Malherbe 1981, pages 366-369; this possibility was confirmed in private conversation with Harry Oppenheimer.
19. Paton 1965, page 369.
20. For a fuller account of the fate of the African Representatives see Ballinger 1969, pages 383-396.
21. See the report of the Botha Commission (1953) and the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953.
22. Luthuli 1961, page 99. See also Walshe 1971, pages 287-294 and Lodge 1983, pages 35 and 36.
23. By the end of the campaign, the number of resisters totalled 8 577 and the paid-up membership of the African National Congress from 7 000 to about 100 000. Walshe 1973, page 31.
24. Luthuli 1962, page 115.
25. For a description of this event see Luckhardt 1980, pages 301-303 and Lodge 1983, page 143-146.
26. Although initially on a qualified franchise - this was extended to a universal franchise in the 1954 Congress of the Party.
27. Margaret Ballinger and her husband, Messrs Stanford and Rubin. Ballinger 1969, page 403:

28. This tension is almost a hallmark of South African liberalism. Dr Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert made this the theme of his maiden speech in Parliament in 1974.  
Hansard 1974, Columns
29. Ballinger 1969, page 403.
30. Driver 1980, page 101.
- 31.
- |           | <u>Yes</u>     | <u>No</u>      |
|-----------|----------------|----------------|
| Transvaal | 406 632        | 325 041        |
| OFS       | 110 632        | 33 348         |
| Cape      | 271 418        | 269 784        |
| Natal     | 42 299         | 135 598        |
|           | <hr/>          | <hr/>          |
|           | <u>850 458</u> | <u>775 818</u> |
32. See Lacour-Gayet 1977, page 312.
33. After the Freedom Charter.
34. See Patrick Duncan's comment "The liberals ... must realise the very difficult position with Africans that African leaders get into when they become dependent on white support."  
Quoted in C.J. Driver 1980, page 166.
35. Again see Duncan's opposition to practical co-operating with Bunting and the Chartists during the anti-pass campaign. Driver 1980, page 176.
36. See Duncan's campaign in the Sea Point Provincial Council by-election in 1959. Driver 1980, pages 167-169.
37. For example De Beer lost his medical practice, Swart his legal partnership.
38. See Mandela's speech to the court in Cartey and Kitson 1970, page 327.
39. Their share of the popular vote fell from 8,6 per cent in 1961 to 3,1 per cent in 1966. Suzman remained the sole Prog representative. The Liberals fared even worse.

40. A ninth ethnic group, the Swazis, was added later. At present, however, the South African government is seeking to "cede" this group to neighbouring Swaziland.
41. See Adam 1979, page 260.
42. See Hoffman's use of the term as set out in the notes to Chapter Two, page 316.
43. Helen Suzman increased her majority from a marginal 711 votes to a safe 2 049. Colin Egline lost the Sea Point seat by 231 votes.
44. The prime example of this in his first years of leadership was his "New Deal for the Cities" - which was more of an urban planning policy than the traditional race politics of the Progs.
45. The predominant campaign slogan was "We have the leaders - you have the votes."
46. These Commissioners involved in their activities a formidable group of South African liberals. Just some of the more prominent names are listed here: Economics (Sprocas 1972): Douwes Dekker, Ngcobo, Richard Turner, Gideon Jacobs, Van Der Horst and Francis Wilson (who served as secretary). Society (Sprocas 1971): Buthelezi, Hammond-Tooke, Schlemmer, Slabbert, and Whisson. Law (Sprocas 1972A): Bhengu, Dugard (secretary), Kinghorn, Molteno, Unterhalter (chairman), Barend Van Niekerk and Ernie Wentzel. Education (Sprocas 1971A): Auerbach, Briggish, Hunter, Luyt, Malherbe, Kgware, Clive Nettleton.
47. This commission also comprised an impressive team: Tony Mathews (chairman), David Welsh (secretary), Rene De Villiers, Andre du Toit, Andre Hugo, Leo Marquard, Beyers Naude, Donald Woods amongst others.
48. See pages 8-12 in Sprocas 1973.
49. Andre du Toit, one of the commissioners, raises this problem in a much more recent publication (Du Toit 1982) linking it to Weber's distinction between an ethics of inner conviction and an ethics of responsibility, or as Du Toit describes it the morality of the political agent: pages 56 and 57.
50. Sprocas 1973, pages 13-20.
51. Ibid, page 128.

52. See the detailed criticism of the Molteno report, Sprocas 1973, pages 127-142.
53. Ibid, page 224.
54. Ibid, page 224.
55. Ibid, page 233.
56. Ibid, page 243.
57. Ibid, page 1.

CHAPTER FOUR

NOTES

1. The Native Welfare Societies were largely the creation of Charles T. Loram, the Chief inspector of Native Education in Natal. The Joint Councils arose out of a visit to South Africa of Dr Thomas Jesse Jones of the Phelps-Stokles Foundation and the West African Dr J.E.K. Aggrey. By 1931, some 30 Councils had been formed, and the number was to rise to 80 at the movement's zenith. See Hellmann 1979, pages 4-5.
2. It is interesting to note that the original finance for the Institute came from grants from two American Foundations, Phelps-Stokes and Carnegie. See Hellmann 1979, page 5.
3. Hellmann 1979, page 9. See the remarkable degree of convergence this statement contains with Leatt's catalogue of basic liberal values as quoted in the Introduction page 7.
4. Writing in 1979, Hellmann noted that only a single Institute publication, "Detention Without Trial in South Africa 1976-1977" had ever been banned: Hellmann 1979, page 15.
5. By 1976, the number of questions requested by the Institute had risen to 161.
6. See for instance Horner's role re Wage Board enquiries during the early to mid-1970's.
7. This programme was investigated by the Schlebush Commission, probably marking the all time low point in Institute/Government relationships.
8. This programme aimed to improve the working and living conditions of domestic servants, and improve their (normally white) employers. It has given rise to a trade union type organisation, the S A Domestic Workers Association (SADWA).
9. This provides guidance and placement information for black work seekers.
10. This was created to educate and prepare the white "centres of power" for change. It was spawned from an appeal made by Archbishop Hurley at the 1978 Institute Conference. Both EIC and HAP have subsequently become autonomous bodies.

11. See Hellmann 1979, page 8.
12. The Court found evidence of the negligent control of funds, but with no suggestion of self-benefit. A comparatively light fine constituted the sentence. This offence took place during Rees' term of office with the S A Council of Churches.
13. This was Muriell Horrell.
14. For example, Alfred Hoernle served as the Institute President for nine years; his wife, Winifred for seven; Edgar Brookes for four. Although the Presidency rotated normally on a two year cycle in the later stages, a hard core of elected officials remained remarkably constant.
15. See Hellman 1979, page 8 and 9. The Institute is currently in the grips of a severe financial crisis and is now trying to fund its activities out of membership fees by developing a new category of Corporate (business) membership. Unlike its conservative counterpart, SABRA, (and many similar bodies in Europe and North America), the Institute receives no funds from the Government.
16. Hellmann 1979.
17. Rich's work terminates with the formation of the Liberal Party in 1953, and only a part of his fifth chapter, and the conclusion, deal with post-war situation.
18. Rich 1984, page 123.
19. See Walsche 1971; Lodge 1983; Paton 1980 and Rich himself for the extensive liberal tradition amongst black South Africans.
20. See the evidence later in this chapter as well as elsewhere (Chapter Five for example) of liberal concern with political and civil rights.
21. Rich 1984, page 123.
22. See pages 124 and 125, Ibid.
23. See pages 27, 33, 43 and 62 amongst others (Ibid).
24. See Brookes' utterly explicit repudiation (indeed confession) in Chapter Two of his "A South African Pilgrimage" (Brookes 1977).
25. Given in the minority report in Sprocas 1973.

26. A particularly misleading reference is found on page 101, where Rich suggests that Whyte's takeover of the Institute in 1947 enabled Brookes to become more influential in the Institute, and in turn enabled Brookes to take-up "some of his earlier suggestions made on the Pact government between 1924 and 1926."
27. Robertson 1971 (Robertson covers a shorter period, namely 1948-1963).
28. Hellmann 1979, page 27.
29. See Chapter Two, pages 93 and 94, and again in page 99.
30. Dr Alfred Hoernle quoted in Rheinallt Jones 1953, page 1.
31. Schreiner 1963, page 3.
32. Hurley 1965, pages 4 and 5. It is interesting to note that this tension between thought and action is evident in the interviews which form the basis of Chapter Five. See Interview One.
33. See pages 95 and 96 in Chapter Two.
34. Mrs Winifred Hoernle in the 1949 Presidential Address, page 12.
35. Donald Molteno, in the 1949 Presidential Address, page 22.
36. Rene de Villiers in the 1981 Presidential Address, page 13.
37. Archbishop Hurley in the 1965 Presidential Address, page 15.
38. Leo Marquard, in the 1969 Presidential Address, page 22.
39. Sheila van der Horst, in the 1972 Presidential Address, page 22.
40. Bernard Friedman, in the 1975 Presidential Address, page 14.
41. Leo Marquard, in the 1969 Presidential Address, page 1.
42. Hellmann 1979, page 11.
43. I.D. MacCrone in the 1957 Presidential Address, page 3.
44. Leo Marquard in the 1957 Presidential Address, page 4.
45. Dr Hugh Ashton in the 1978 Hoernle Memorial Lecture, page 28.

46. See, for example, Dr Edgar Brookes in the 1963 Presidential Address, page 2.
47. Archbishop Hurley in the 1965 Presidential Address, page 14. In this quotation there are hints of de Beauvoir's Ethics of Ambiguity and Camus' Ethics of the Second Prize.
48. Donald Molteno QC, in the 1960 Presidential Address, page 5.
49. Dr Bernard Friedman, in the 1975 Presidential Address, pages 8-9.
50. Donald Molteno QC, in the 1960 Presidential Address, page 19, and O.D. Schreiner in the 1962 Presidential Address, page 20.
51. Leo Marquard in the 1957 Presidential Address, page 13.
52. O.D. Schreiner, in the 1962 Presidential Address, pages 10-11.
53. Sheila van der Horst, in the 1972 Presidential Address, page 16.
54. Bonhoeffer, 1980, page 17 (own translation).
55. Ibid, page 18 (own translation).
56. Ibid page 23 (own translation).
57. Rene de Villiers, in the 1981 Presidential Address, page 19.
58. Professor C.W. de Kiewiet, in the 1960 Hoernle Memorial Lecture, page 2.
59. Franz Auerbach, in the 1982 Presidential Address, page 17.
60. Dr Edgar Brookes, in the 1961 Presidential Address, page 2.
61. Franz Auerbach, in the 1983 Presidential Address, page 8.
62. See pages 128-138.
63. This group included the then Transvaal leader of the United Party, Mr Harry Schwartz.
64. This second group was led by the veteran maverick, Japie Basson, who was to be expelled from the Party in 1982 on joining the President's Council.

65. Parliament sat twice in this year.
66. In all, some 24 speeches, covering about 350 Hansard Columns or 125 000 words were reviewed.
67. The tensions of such a person have been excellently set out in Dr Van Zyl Slabbert's maiden speech, Hansard 1974, Columns 1180-1182.
68. Suzman, Hansard 1970, Column 202.
69. There was no point in moving on unseconded motion.
70. These reasons are largely drawn from the motives or amendments moved in the year 1960, 1961 and 1974 to 1984. They are, therefore, not comprehensive as Helen Suzman provided many reasons for a fundamental lack of confidence in government in her sole liberal vigil from 1962 to 1974.
71. Again, this is not a comprehensive list of all the proposals made, but only those that constitute a central theme in a no confidence speech.
72. Other specific proposals were made on particular issues such as common citizenship (1980, 1981); full rights for coloureds (1977); acceptance of the permanence of urban blacks (1977) and the redrawing of homeland boundaries.
73. Hansard 1984, Column 44.
74. Hansard 1960, Column 79.
75. Hansard 1984, Column 25.
76. Hansard 1976, Column 104.
77. Hansard 1976, Column 105.
78. Hansard 1976, Column 105.
79. Ibid, Column 105.
80. Ibid, Column 106.
81. Ibid, Column 107.
82. Ibid, IBID, Column 108.

83. Hansard 1982, Column 27.
84. Hansard 1978, Column 22, 23 and 24.
85. Hansard 1983, Column 36.
86. Hansard 1981, Column 33.
87. The other is the threat (implied or explicit) of violence and revolution.
88. Suzman in Hansard 1963, Column 104. See Eglin's comments in similar view in Hansard 1974, Column 125-128.
89. See for example Suzman's comments on the need for job regrading in Hansard 1967, Columns 137 and 138 and Slabbert's "plea to remove the outmoded political shackles from the performance of our economy" in Hansard 1984, Columns 26-28.
90. Suzman in Hansard 1970, Column 207.
91. For example, see Van Zyl Slabbert's reference to the work of the UCT Business School on black attitudes towards the free enterprise system in Hansard 1982, Columns 20 and 21.
92. On the later issue, see Suzman's position in 1973 in Hansard 1973, Column 149.
93. See for example Slabbert's caveat in the economic policy section of his 1984 No Confidence Motion:

"Anyone who sees in this appeal of mine a plea for indiscriminate laissez faire policies, free of discipline and restraint, simply has no appreciation of the enormity of the problem that confronts us."

Hansard 1984, Column 31.

Also his description of the central economic problem confronting South Africa as structural inequality.

94. Currently the FDP provides the important Ministers of Foreign and Economic Affairs.
95. Of course, the National Party did need a coalition partner in its first term of office, and found it in Paul Sauer's Afrikaner Party at a time when some (such as Malherbe) suggested that Sauer was as ready to form an alliance with Smuts' United Party. See Malherbe's letter to Smuts in Malherbe 1981 page 366-372. As Friedman comments "... he (Smuts) had committed the unpardonable sin in power was in his grasp, but he let it slip through his finger."

It is of course not impossible to imagine a future situation in which a centre-left coalition would be possible. Indeed PFP voters gave the government essential assistance in achieving its 1983 referendum victory.

96. See for example, Anna Starcke's interview with Colin Eglin in July 1978:

"At this point in time, a party which advocates a form of liberal multi-racialism is not one of the essential poles of power in South Africa ... So far our own efforts, together with historical development, have not yet coincided to crystallise an exciting new deal for the future. You can help to move people, but its events and history that cause them to start saying: 'let's rethink in a fundamental way.'"

Starke 1978, pages 94, 95.

97. Hansard 1961, Columns 102 and 103.
98. Hansard 1963, Column 107.
99. Hansard 1965, Column 200. See also Hansard 1971, Column 228 and 1972, Column 230.
100. Hansard 1977, Column 81. See also Hansard 1974, Column 131 and Hansard 1977, Column 86 and Hansard 1978, Column 30 and Hansard 1979, Column 46.
101. Hansard 1979, Column 24.
102. Hansard 1981, Column 39.
103. Hansard 1976, Column 109.
104. Hansard 1980, Column 40.
105. Starke 1978, page 148. Oppenheimer describes himself as an "old fashioned" Liberal.
106. See the discussion of Leatt's 11 core liberal values in the Introduction, pages 11 and 12.
107. These figures are drawn from the most recent annual reports of Minorco, De Beers and Anglo American.

108. For example, Fortune magazine has rated Anglo the largest foreign investor in the U.S. for several years running.
109. Lanning and Mueller in Africa Undermined, page 446.
110. See his comments in his interview with Starke, page 157: "Business people have no power in the sense implied. You can't, however large a business you may control, go on strike ... All the power of business people ... is limited to this: that you can, in business, do certain things which produce a whole series of data with which any government has to reckon in form its policy."
111. New York Times interview. ( See Oppenheimer, 1982a in the Bibliography).
112. Yudelman 1984.
113. The acquisition by Barlows, with Anglo assistance, of the Rand Mines group of companies is the example Yudelman gives on the growth constraint's Anglo perceived. The similar acquisition by Afrikaans capital interests of General Mining, again with Anglo assistance, as an attempt to reduce government hostility towards the mining industry.
114. Lanning and Mueller 1979, page 467.
115. Rich 1984, page 134.
116. See the author's own disclaimer: Innes 1984, page 15.
117. Anglo's role in raising black wages on the Gold Mines during the 1970's by some 600% nominal or 150% real illustrates the first area: Oppenheimer's call for the recognition of black unions and the reform of SA's labour laws in 1974, as well as Anglo's evidence to the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions illustrate the second: schemes such as the Cadet scheme, which aims at overcoming the barriers to blacks in management illustrates the third.
118. See the 1982 and 1983 Annual Reports of The Urban Foundation for an explanation of this shift of emphasis. This Foundation, representing an important coalition of English and Afrikaans business interests in active association with black urban communities, raised and expended some R40 million in donation funds, and another R40 million in foreign loans, in the first five years of its existence. In the area of lobbying it can count the following amongst its important achievements:

- the total reform of SA's housing policy (99-year lease, self-help housing schemes, the grand housing sale and the creation of Public Utility housing companies);
  - the reform of the black local government, as well as the Black Community Development Act, and perhaps most importantly, the blocking of the proposed Orderly Movement and Settlement of Persons Bill;
  - significantly influencing the de Lange investigation into education in South Africa.
119. Oppenheimer is the largest financial backer of the PFP and the Anglo and De Beers' Chairman's Fund is the largest source of philanthropic funding in South Africa. This fund expends currently about R16 million per annum on a wide range of educational, rural development and change-oriented activities and organisations.
120. Oppenheimer 1958, page 8.
121. Quoted in Relly 1983, page 9.
122. Oppenheimer 1958, page 5.
123. Quoted in the 1982 Urban Foundation Annual Report.
124. Oppenheimer 1960, page 3.
125. Oppenheimer 1978, page 2.
126. Oppenheimer 1959, page 3.
127. Oppenheimer 1959, page 4.
128. Oppenheimer 1959, page 4.
129. Oppenheimer 1982, page 4. See also Oppenheimer 1968, page 8.
130. Oppenheimer 1960, page 4. See also Oppenheimer 1964, page 6, and Oppenheimer 1978, page 2 on the consequences of economic boycotts.
131. Oppenheimer 1960, page 4.
132. Oppenheimer 1963, page 2.

133. Oppenheimer 1963, page 2.

134. Oppenheimer 1981, page 2. See also:

"More than ever, as a result of the vents of the past year, we see two primary responsibilities of business leadership as the development of healthy industrial relations, and a proper concern for the quality of life available to our employees outside the job situation."

Also Oppenheimer 1979, page 7, for an acceptance of management's failure to act as a non-racial employer.

135. Oppenheimer 1980, page 3.

136. As stated (inter alia) in O'Dowd published in Webster 1973, pages 19-35.

137. See Oppenheimer 1960, page 3. Note how Oppenheimer acknowledges the self-interest involved in the pursuit of growth. Also Oppenheimer 1962, page 3:

"Nevertheless the fact remains that economic growth and racial discrimination are in fundamental opposition to each other and that economic growth is an essential element in building a peaceful and just society."

Oppenheimer 1981, page 4.

138. Oppenheimer 1971, page 2.

139. Oppenheimer 1976, page 4.

140. Oppenheimer 1973, page 4.

141. Oppenheimer 1960, page 5.

142. Oppenheimer 1981, page 4.

143. Oppenheimer 1971, page 4.

144. Oppenheimer 1980, page 3.

145. Ibid, page 3.

146. Oppenheimer 1981, page 4.

147. Oppenheimer 1971, page 3.

CHAPTER FIVE

NOTES

1. See Section One of the Introduction, pages 11 and 12.
2. See Section Three of the Introduction, pages 18 to 23.
3. Marxism being the other.
4. As Leatt 1978, notes: "It is misleading to speak of the liberal tradition in South Africa as the preserve of English speaking whites, it includes Afrikaans and Blacks." Page 33.  
  
See Leatt's brief remarks about the liberal tradition amongst Afrikaners (page 36) and Blacks (pages 37 and 38).
5. As quoted in the Introduction, page 15. These values were often transmitted through the vehicle of the Church. They are clearly evident in the views and values of men such as Dr A.B. Xuma, Dr Moroka, Chief Albert Luthuli and more contemporaneously men such as Bishop Tutu, Bishop Zulu, Bishop Manas Buthelezi as well as Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. In the early days of the ANC, the African Methodist Episcopal Church played an important role in this respect. (See Walshe 1973, page 18).
6. For an early example of this, see the Joint Council Movement in the 1930's. The Liberal Party exercised considerable influence in the 1960's. See Lodge 1983, Walshe 1971. Individual liberals (Schlemmer, Natrass, Webb, etc.) have exercised considerable influence in respect of the actions and beliefs of the Inkatha Movement. The Buthelezi Commission Report bears eloquent witness to this and the role of liberal values.
7. See Walshe's comment about the influence of the liberals in contract to the Marxists. Walshe 1973 and 1971 as well as Lodge 1983. See also the language of the freedom charter as published in Luthuli 1978, pages 212-216.
8. Fredman, Nell and Randall 1983, page 116 and the Buthelezi Commission Report, Volume I, 1982, page 272.

9. Fredman, Nell and Randall 1983, pages 116 and 117 and the Buthelezi Commission Report, Volume I, pages 269-271.
10. Buthelezi Report, Volume I, page 273.
11. The exceptions are Zach De Beer and Rene De Villiers. Though both are mother tongue Afrikaners, both are long distanced from Afrikaner Nationalism and would probably be regarded more as liberal than verligte Afrikaners.
12. See Du Toit 1983, pages 86-88.
13. Van Wyk Louw 1971, especially pages 17-31.
14. This was a consultation of South African churches then belonging to the World Council of Churches, held in Johannesburg in 1960 and attended by the Dutch Reformed Church. The declaration arising from this consultation (See De Grucy 1983, pages 148-153, for the full text) affirmed racial equality, individual human rights, rejected the prohibiting of mixed marriages, affirmed rights of land ownership and political participation for all. Initially, the declaration received considerable support from the Afrikaans Churches. However, after a concerted campaign by Nationalist politicians (led by the then Prime Minister, H.F. Verwoerd) most recanted this support. (Villa-Vicencio, 1982, page 87).
15. In Potchefstroom, evidence is to be found in the theological journals Loog and Woord and Daad and the organisation Die Afrikaanse Kalvinistiese Beweeging. At a student level, the rebellion against the pro-Government Afrikaner Studentebond (ASB) began there, and the initial leadership for the rival (and liberal) POLSTU was drawn from Potchefstroom. For an example of a liberal credo from this origin, see the Koinonia Declaration 1977.
16. This has been well-illustrated by the debate, particularly that dealing with constitutional reform, between the reformist but still pro-Government verligtes such as Terreblanche and Esterhuysen and the liberal (oorbeligtes in the eyes of their opponents) such as Du Toit, Degenaar and Giliomee). See Du Toit's important paper No Chosen People 1981. Stellenbosch's disaffiliation from the ASB at an earlier time is also evidence of this.

17. In this respect, the debate about the preamble of the new Constitution with its references to the Almighty, the flag and the Anthem is particularly revealing. The Conservatives argued for a white South Africa, the Nationalists for a sort of shared South Africa.
18. See Adam and Gilomee 1979, pages 104-114 for an account of the process of ethnic mobilisation, as well as pages 196-257 for an account of how Afrikaner Nationalist politics works or worked.
19. Interview with Van Zyl Slabbert in the Rand Daily Mail of 3rd November 1983.
20. These arguments are most clearly set out in a speech given by Van Zyl Slabbert to a meeting of businessmen held in Johannesburg on 28th October 1983. (Slabbert 1983).
21. The Catholic Bishops Conference and the Methodists were perhaps the clearest in condemning the new constitution and advocating a "No" vote, but leading Anglicans, Presbyterians and Congregations echoed these sentiments as did the S.A. Council of Churches.
22. NUSAS collected an impressive 14 000 signatures at the four English language universities.
23. The Black Sash ran an active campaign of house meetings, pamphlets and car stickers against the constitution. See Black Sash 1983.
24. Although the Institute did not adopt a formal resolution on the issue, the speeches of its new director, John Kane-Berman, as well as of its recently elected President, Lawrie Schlemmer, and its new Chairman of the Executive Committee, Advocate Ernie Wentzel, made its position clear. See the October edition of Race Relations News.
25. Although a majority (Rand Daily Mail, Pretoria News, Sunday Express, Cape Times, Arus, Daily News, Natal Witness, Sunday Tribune) advocated a "No" vote, amongst the minority "Yes" vote endorsements were that of the largest Sunday newspaper in the country (the Sunday Times) and the most influential business weekly (the Financial Mail).

26. Harry Oppenheimer, the best known and most influential businessman advocated a "No" vote (see Oppenheimer, 1983), whilst his successor at Anglo American, Gavin Relly, appeared to favour a "Yes" vote, though he did no more than comment on foreign reaction (see Relly, 1983), as did the most prominent Natal businessman, Chris Saunders. A number of key figures remained silent (Mike Rosholt, Tony Bloom, Raymond Ackerman). Employer organisations did not adopt formal positions though the impression was created that the Government had received considerable support from Assocom and more limited support from the FCI.
27. From the ANC (which formally supported a "No" vote) to Inkatha, the UDF, the homeland leaders and the Black Chamber of Commerce, NAFCOC, the condemnation was universal.
28. The division was evident at a leadership level. The three formal Coloured political parties favoured a "Yes" vote. Coloured politicians active in both the UDF and as well as the looser National Forum campaigned against it. The Government created, partially elected S.A. Indian Council was prevaricating in favour, the Natal and Transvaal Indian Congresses emphatically against.
29. Denis Beckett did receive support from the Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg and from a few individuals elsewhere. However, the extent to which his third option was attacked throughout the country by NP, NRP, PFP, Black Sash and Race Relations speakers was an indication of how seriously the option was considered.
30. See Schlemmer quoted in the Sunday Times of 6th November 1983.
31. Interview 12, see also Interviews 4, 7, 9 and 10.
32. Interview 9, see also Interview 3.
33. Interview 6.
34. Interview 4.
35. Interview 10, see also Interview 12.
36. Interview 11.
37. Interview 7. See also Interview 12.
38. Interview 14.

39. Interview 2.
40. Interview 5.
41. Interview 6
42. Interview 12.
43. Interview 14.
44. Interview 1.
45. Interview 5.
46. Interview 8.
47. Interview 5.
48. Interview 8.
49. Interview 10.
50. See Interviews 12, 11, 10, 8, 6, 5, 4 and 3.
51. See Interviews 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11 and 12.
52. Interview 5.
53. Interview 11, also Interview 12.
54. Interview 8.
55. Interview 8. See also Interviews 10, 6 and 5.
56. Interview 6.
57. Interview 5.
58. Interview 1.
59. Interview 5.

60. Interview 11.
61. Interview 7.
62. Interview 9.
63. Interview 14.
64. Interview 11. See also Interview 7 and see the response of all five to the questions as to how liberals should vote in the referendum.
65. Interview 2. However, this interviewee endorsed a "No" vote, both in the course of the interview as well as publically.
66. Interview 10.
67. Interview 8.
68. Interview 4.
69. Interview 6.
70. Interview 12.
71. Interview 9.
72. Interview 7.
73. Interview 11.
74. Interview 2.
75. Interview 2.
76. Interview 1.
77. Interview 9.
78. Interview 13.
79. Interview 11.
80. Interviews 2, 3, 6, 11, 7 and 9.
81. See particularly Interviews 4,5, 8 and 12.

82. Interviews 14, 13, 5 and 3.
83. For example, see Interviews 11 and 12 for Group rights compromises and interviews 1 and 9 for limited democracy compromises.
84. Interviews 13, 12, 7, 11, 5 and 2 in the first case and interviews 1 and 9 in the second.
85. Interviews 3 and 14.
86. Interviews 10, 8, 6 and 4.
87. Interview 4.
88. Interview 2.
89. Interview 7.
90. Interview 5.
91. Interview 14.
92. Interview 10.
93. Interview 3.
94. Interview 6.
95. Interview 11.
96. Interview 8.
97. Interview 13.
98. See particularly Interviews 5, 7, 8 and 12.
99. Interview 3. See other comment on this in Interview 13, 12, 9, 8, 7, 5 and 4.
100. Interview 3.
101. Interview 4.
102. Interview 5.
103. Interview 7.

104. Interview 8.
105. Interview 9.
106. Interview 2.
107. Interview 14.
108. Interview 5.
109. Interview 11.
110. Interview 8.
111. Interview 9.
112. Interview 7.
113. Interview 13. See also Interviews 5 and 11.
114. Interview 1.
115. Interview 2.
116. Interview 8.
117. Interview 3.
118. Interview 9.
119. Interview 10.
120. Interview 12. See also Interview 4.
121. Interview 14.
122. Amongst African and third world nations, Botswana stands out as a shining example. However, it is a very small (some 900 000 people) homogenous (virtually all Batswana) nation. Furthermore, it is multi-party only in name. No change of government has yet occurred in its short independent history, and the opposition parties that do exist are not sufficiently large to threaten the government.
123. Interviews 1, 2, 3 and 6.
124. Interview 1.
125. Interview 2.

126. Interviews 5, 11, 7, 9, 10 and 12.
127. Interviews 5, 11, 9, 12, and 7.
128. Interview 5.
129. Interview 11. See also Interview 12.
130. Interview 9.
131. Interview 10.
132. Interview 4.
133. Interview 8.
134. Interview 14.
135. Interview 12.
136. Interview 13.
137. Interview 14.
138. Interview 2.
139. Interview 3.
140. Interview 4.
141. Interview 5.
142. Interview 6.
143. Interview 11.
144. Interview 8.
145. Interview 12.
146. Interview 7.
147. Interview 8.
148. Interview 9.

149. Interview 13.

150. Interview 10.

151. Interview 14.

152. Interview 12.

CONCLUSION

NOTES

1. See page 110.
2. See page 111.
3. See pages 111 and 112.
4. See Paton's (1965) description of the post-election UP caucus meeting (pages 389 and 390). See also Keppel-Jones (1975) page 199.
5. For example, as defined by Leatt pages 11-13.
6. See Friedman page 113.
7. This refers to the possibility of doing a deal with Havanga's Afrikaner Party as advocated by Malherbe and others (page 114).
8. Duncan, page 123.
9. For example, the newly-formed Progressive Party lost all but one of its eleven Parliamentary seats in the first general elections it contested (1961). It had to wait a further 13 years and three more general elections to break this single seat representation. The Liberal Party itself fared much worse, never even coming close to winning a white seat.
10. See pages 126-129.
11. Legislation implementing Nationalist policies, especially racial segregation and the assault on civil liberties, has continued in the 1970's and 1980's. However, in the last decade-and-a-half, many ambiguous measures, as well as undeniably positive and reformist measures (such as the labour reforms) have been mixed in with "negative" legislation.
12. See pages 134 and 135.
13. Rand Daily Mail, 14th October 1967.

14. See pages 136 to 138.
15. See pages 138 to 147.
16. See page 147. The activities of the Catholic-oriented YCW and YCS movements were also important in this respect. YCW and YCS have contributed a disproportionate part of the leadership particularly in the CUSA-affiliated black unions.
17. Sheila Van Der Horst, quoted on page 160.
18. Bernard Friedman, quoted on page 160.
19. Dr Hugh Ashton (Hoernle Memorial Lecture), quoted on page 162.
20. Archbishop Hurley, quoted on page 162.
21. Hellman, quoted on page 157.
22. Dr Edgar Brookes, quoted on page 165.
23. See this argument set out more fully on page 175.
24. These are the words of Van Zyl Slabbert in 1981. For a fuller statement of this argument, see pages 174-177.
25. See pages 182 and 183.
26. See pages 183 to 185.
27. See pages 186 and 187.
28. See pages 190 and 191.
29. See pages 189-198.
30. See page 29.
31. Interview 14, quoted on page 219.

32. Interview 4, quoted on page 218.
33. Interview 10, quoted on page 219.
34. Interview 6, quoted on page 219.
35. Interview 2, quoted on page 219.
36. Interview 3, quoted on page 219.
37. Interview 11, quoted on page 219.
38. Interview 8, quoted on page 220.
39. Interview 13, quoted on page 220.
40. Interview 5, quoted on page 229.
41. Interview 10, quoted on page 228.
42. Interview 14, quoted on page 220.
43. Interview 7, quoted on page 230.
44. Interview 6, quoted on page 230.
45. Interview 11, quoted on page 230.
46. Interview 12, quoted on page 230.
47. Interview 3, quoted on page 229.
48. Interview 2, quoted on page 229.
49. Interview 4, quoted on page 229.
50. Interview 5, quoted on page 229.
51. Quoted on page 7.
52. This usage is given on page 17. The discussion of the broad range of usages of the term "ethics", given on pages 13-18, indicates that this usage is well within the mainstream of both philosophical and theological tradition.

53. Chapter One, page 31.
54. See in particular Pritchard and Ross, as discussed on page 28.
55. See page 37.
56. Quoted on page 34.
57. One cannot speak of an existentialist school, for there is debate as to who can be called an existentialist, and what the term denotes.
58. Quoted on page 45.
59. Quoted on page 45.
60. See the discussion on pages 46-48.
61. See the discussion of these conflicts on pages 53-56.
62. Quoted on page 57.
63. See page 110.
64. See page 114.
65. See page 112 and note 13 in Chapter Three, page 323.
66. Quoted on page 112.
67. Quoted on page 38.
68. This debate has raged for a long time in South Africa politics. Hofmeyr was at the centre of it (see pages 111 and 112). It was a central debate in the liberal wing of the United Party throughout the 1950's. Indeed, the initial leader of the Liberal Party, the long-serving Native Representative, Margaret Balliinger, suggested in a speech at a Young Progressives Conference in 1970, that the "liberal" UP MP's had made a mistake in breaking away from that party in 1959.
69. See page 123. Also see C.J. Driver's (1980) references to Patrick Duncan's attitude to the Congress of the People, on pages 103, 122 and 159.
70. See pages 131 to 133 and 124 to 127.

71. See pages 133 and 134.
72. See page 146.
73. Quoted on page 157.
74. Quoted on page 158.
75. Quoted on page 166.
76. Quoted on pages 169 and 170.
77. See page 215.
78. Quoted on page 219.
79. Quoted on page 228 and 229.
80. Quoted on page 139.
81. Quoted on page 216. See other examples of pragmatism quoted on this page.
82. Quoted on page 227.
83. Quoted on page 26. See also page 252.
84. Adam and Giliomee 1979.
85. Ibid, page 266.
86. Ibid, page 266.
87. Ibid, page 268.
88. Ibid page 269.
89. Wright H.M. The Burden of the Present 1980.
90. Ibid, page 50.
91. Ibid, page 52.
92. Ibid, page 54.
93. Hansard 1959, column 3076.

94. See Hansard 1959, column 3076.
95. See for example Hansard 1959, column 6220.
96. Hansard 1959, column 6222.
97. Hansard 1959, column 6218.
98. Hansard 1959, columns 6223 and 6224.
99. Hansard 1959, column 6218.
100. Population estimates are for mid-1983 and are drawn from the Institute of Race Relations Survey for that year, page 99. The estimates of a minimum of 40 per cent Black urbanisation is based on the research done for the document prepared for the Barlow Rand Contact Group, entitled "Towards a Positive Urbanisation Strategy" (1984), and is confirmed by the research of the Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (BEPA) at the University of Pretoria.
101. In the area of "white" Natal as a whole, blacks outnumbered whites by a margin of more than 2:1 (1 240 689 blacks to 557 044 whites). Buthelezi Commission 1982, Volume 1, page 69.
102. Transvaal 5 644 000 blacks to 2 140 760 whites;  
Natal 1 358 120 to 496 560;  
Cape 1 569 040 to 1 183 980; and  
OFS 1 549 600 to 319 800.  
Race Relations 1983 Survey, page 99.
103. Lee and Godsell 1984.
104. S.A.I.R.R. Survey 1983, page 363. (1980 figures).
105. This excludes indirect subsidies in the areas of transport, posts, defence, etc. If these are included, the subsidy rises to 95 per cent.  
"Rockefeller" Report 1981, page 152.
106. "Rockefeller" Report, page 153 (i.e. Foreign Policy Study Foundation 1981).
107. Slabbert and Welsh 1979, page 2.  
See also the sub-title of the Rockefeller Report "Time Running Out"; also the sense of "end time" induced by the observation in the introduction to the Buthelezi Report that:

"... this may well be the last time in South African politics that a Black leadership group, with national and international credibility and significant following, reaches out to others with an invitation to explore the possibility of a creative and generally acceptable political compromise."

Buthelezi Report 1982,  
Volume 1, page 33.

108. David Halberston, Atlantic Monthly, November 1980.
109. Adam 1971, page 5
110. Lodge 1983, page 356.
111. Skocpol 1980.
112. Ibid, page 14.
113. Ibid, page 284 and 285.
114. Ibid, page 289.
115. Ibid, page 286.
116. Ibid, page 287.
117. Woodward 1983, page 11.
118. Ibid, page 8.
119. Ibid, page 8. See also Woodward's account of how revolution was avoided by constitutional reform in Britain, page 30.
120. Ibid, page 42.
121. Ibid, page 54.
122. In fact, the estimate of 100 000 is taken from a 1965 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace study. The number today would be considerably higher as would casualty estimates.
123. Gann and Duignon 1981, pages 195-199.
124. Ibid, pages 199-203.
125. Ibid, pages 203-209.

126. Its members were Franklin Thomas (President, Ford Foundation and Chairman); Robert C. Good and Alexander Heard (President and Chancellor respectively of Universities); Charles V. Hamilton and Ruth Simms Hamilton (University Professors); Peter McColough and J. Irwin Miller (business executives); Aileen Hernandy, Constance Hilliard and Alan Pifer (Foundation executives); and Howard D. Samuel (Labour leader).
127. Rockefeller Report (Foreign Policy Study Foundation) 1981, page 236.
128. See "The Present as History" published in Turner 1980, pages 100 and 149-152.
129. Adam 1971, page 15.
130. Slabert and Welsh 1979, page 2.
131. Schlemmer 1982, page 3. See also Giliomee 1984, pages 28-31 and Schlemmer 1983.
132. Giliomee 1982.
133. For example, it was nominated as one of the major causes of the current reform initiatives. See page 209.
134. Natrass 1981, page 174.
135. Natrass 1981, page 184.
136. 1983 National Manpower Commission Annual Report, page 214.
137. Seifsa Annual Report 1982.
138. NMC 1982 Report, page 216.
139. Nedbank 1984, page 34.
140. Natrass 1981, page 214.
141. NMC 1982 Annual Report, page 257.
142. See Natrass 1981, page 183.
143. Drawn from the maps presented on pages 121, 123, 125 and 129 (as adapted) of McEvedy 1980.
144. Martin D. and Johnson P. 1981, page 143.

145. Undesirable because it would only add more blacks to the population controlled by "white" South Africa. An analogy with Israel's position occurs here.
146. Smith D. and Simpson C. 1981, page 152. See also pages 135 and 141.
147. Formal non-aggression pacts exist in respect of Mocambique and Swaziland. However, Lesotho, Botswana and Zimbabwe have long followed this practice, which they have also reaffirmed recently in public.
148. "Radio Truth" is an example of some continuing interference, though direct South African government support has not been established.
149. In constant prices 48,3 per cent in the 1981-1982 period; 52,2 per cent in the 1976-1980 period, Nedbank 1984 page 115. See also Rockefeller 1981, page 137.
150. Nedbank 1984, page 121 and 129.
151. "Rockefeller" 1981, page 135.
152. Verwoerd and Strijdom died in office. Malan resigned in 1956, three years before he died. Vorster's was the first "forced" leadership change in the 36 years of Nationalist rule.
153. This was Andries Treurnicht's victory in the so-called battle of the Berge by-elections in May 1983.
154. Adam and Giliomee 1979, pages 61 to 82.
155. See Godsell 1981 for a more detailed analysis .
156. Adam and Giliomee 1979, pages 128 to 144.
157. Religion is used here in the sense of civil religion as developed by Moodie 1975.
158. De Klerk is unquestionably an authoritative government spokesman. He is editor of the government-supporting Sunday newspaper, Rapport, and frequent philosopher of the Botha regime.
159. De Klerk 1984, page 24.
160. Ibid, page 39.
161. Ibid, page 45.

162. Ibid, page 41.
163. See Walshe 1971, Chapters III, IV, V, VI and VII.
164. See Walshe 1971, Chapters XI and XII and Lodge 1983, Chapter I.
165. See Walshe 1971, Chapter XIV and Lodge 1983, Chapter II.
166. See Lodge 1983, Chapter XIII.
167. See the clash between Hofmeyr and the NRC Report on page 112.
168. See Driver 1980, page 172.
169. Both Walshe 1971 (page 403) and Lodge 1983 (page 75) put membership at its highest (at the end of the defiance campaign at 100 000). Though not inconsiderable, this high level was maintained for only a short time. Popular support for the ANC was much greater.
170. Walshe 1971, page 405.
171. See for example Lodge 1983, page 350.
172. Race Relations 1984, page 50.
173. Kane-Berman 1982, page 155.
174. Buthelezi Commission 1982, page 101 and pages 241-250. See also Nell 1983, page 120.
175. Rockefeller 1982, page 192.
176. Lodge 1983, page 352.
177. Two examples of this are Buthelezi's personal act of printing a copy of the Inkatha newspaper "The Nation" after that issue had been banned, and his defiance of the then Minister of Justice ban on Inkatha recruiting non-Zulu membership.
178. Two important examples of this are Buthelezi's rejection of the planned Black Advisory Council, as well as Inkatha's campaign against the planned cession of KanGwane and Ingwavuma to Swaziland.
179. It has even set up a foreign office in Amsterdam: See Race Relations 1984, page 51.
180. A fuller description of Bonhoeffer's "model" is given on pages 99-102.

181. For example, one interviewee in Chapter Five calls for precisely such an approach when he said:

"Liberals should start where they are strongest i.e. in the economy, the Church, the universities the private schools, the Press. There is a case for situational ethics."

Another example of a call for a change in liberal ethics is to be found in the speech of Harry Oppenheimer marking the 50th anniversary conference of the S.A. Institute of Race Relations, in which he said:

"We are at a stage at which all of us who seek peaceful evolutionary change in South Africa should review our strategies. What is needed is a change of emphasis away from the politics of protest towards a politics of power; and all liberal institutions ... must examine how they can become more directly and positively engaged in promoting and encouraging the process of change which is now underway."

Oppenheimer 1979A, page 7.

182. See pages 140 to 146.
183. Turner acknowledges that his postscript stops short of the development of new organisational strategy. See Turner 1980, page 99.
184. Ibid, page 100.
185. Ibid, page 120.
186. Ibid, page 129. In passing, it is worth noting Turner's percipient view of the precariousness of black consciousness organisations (page 128). SASO and BPC were banned in 1977. Though new bodies have arisen (AZASO and AZAPO), they are probably as fragile.
187. Ibid, page 138.
188. Ibid, page 135.
189. Ibid, page 136.
190. Ibid, page 138.

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ANNEXURE ONE : INTERVIEWS

INTERVIEW ONE

1. What are the origins of the present 'reforms' on the part of the South African government?

Social and economic pressures and forces in the society have built to a point where the notion of white superiority of some 30 years ago has been abandoned. Further these pressures, especially those of economic integration, have led to the abandonment (some ten years ago) of the goal of meaningful territorial separation.

2. How do you judge the proposed constitution in the light of the present constitution?

It is not possible to make a simple good/bad judgement. The new constitution is positive in that the issue of political rights for people who are not white is at least being addressed. Reform is on the agenda.

However, it is bad in the way in which reform has been tackled. Not only have the blacks been excluded, but coloureds and Indians have been offered no real power. If the government had offered coloureds and Indians even limited representation in the present parliament, even on a separate voters roll, this would have offered some real power as it would have enabled them to strike political alliances and affect the balance of power. Representation in separate houses on a fixed formula denies them this opportunity casting them in the role of a permanent, powerless minority.

3. How do you judge the proposed constitution against your ideal constitutional arrangement for South Africa?

An ideal constitution would not be based on race or "race loaded". It would have to affirm the citizenship of all South Africans and at least offer them the prospect of meaningful political power.

Political participation could be limited or qualified. The qualified franchise, provided qualifications are accessible to all over time, still represents one way of doing this.

4. What should liberals do in the referendum?

Vote no. The pressures which produced this attempt at reform will continue and indeed grow. At some time in the future this government, or another, will have to strike an alliance with liberal voters. At that time we will be able to secure real reform.

5. What is your vision of an ideal South African society?

In political terms, it would be a plural society. The whites, whilst not playing a dominant or leading role, would nevertheless remain politically significant (unlike Zimbabwe) and should be meaningfully represented in the political partnerships which exist. (This, however, will be determined by how the white act during the period of transformation).

Culturally the society is likely to have a pre-eminently English, western industrial culture. Whilst there is likely to be a shift away from some aspects of what may now be termed "white" culture, the cultural life of South Africa would continue much as before. An example of the shift that is possible would be the transfer of state subsidies from say PACT Opera and Ballet to The Market Theatre.

In social and education terms, patterns of racial settlement and separation are likely to persist for a time, but should be left open to natural change and development.

In economic terms, the most urgent priority post real power sharing would be the narrowing of the wealth/poverty gap. This would have to be achieved through taxation of one kind or another. However, the basic private enterprise economic approach should be retained.

In the civil service, a degree of affirmative action would be necessary to correct past discrimination against blacks. It is possible that a new black dominated government would go beyond reasonable corrective measures, peopling the civil service with friends and supporters. Liberals would have to resist this.

6. How can such a future society be achieved?

As noted before, the socio-economic pressures at work in society will continue and indeed intensify. The present half-hearted attempts at reform will collapse probably within a time frame of two to three years. The government is most likely at that stage to move left, seeking an alliance with the PFP. This will require the PFP to make compromises.

Should the government stay where it is or even move right, change will most likely be brought about by a combination of increased black and foreign pressure. In this scenario, the PFP would have to entertain alliances with internal black groupings.

INTERVIEW TWO

1. What is the origin of the present 'reform' initiatives?

The international isolation and censure of South Africa may well have played a much greater role in producing reform than is generally acknowledged.

A second factor of major significance is the military's desire not to fight on two fronts, and so hence their concern for reform.

2. Is the proposed new constitution better or worse than the present one?

Marginally better. The inclusion of coloureds and Indians in the formal political process cannot be dismissed as insignificant. On the other hand, it certainly does not qualify as real power sharing, as their political actions will never be decisive.

The coloureds and Indians will enjoy a kind of power, however, a sort of blackmail power. To the extent that the Nats really want this system to work they will have to make concessions to ensure coloured and Indian continued co-operation.

It is true of course that the major issue has not been addressed i.e. the political accommodation of the blacks. They are excluded from the new constitution - however, they are excluded from the present one also.

3. How would you compare and contrast the proposed constitution with your "ideal" constitution?

Firstly, the proposed constitution is complicated and crazy. It is far too complex - simply unworkable.

It has also been produced in a most peculiar way. The Union constitution was the result of serious negotiations over an extended period - real debate.

An ideal constitution would need to regulate group rights as well as individual rights, in some way or another. Simple majoritarianism will never be accepted by these presently in power. And indeed, it is desirable that at least in some areas, groups should be prevented from behaving in ways which other groups find quite intolerable.

An ideal constitution would certainly move away from racialism. However, group identity will continue to be a reality for as long as it is possible to see into the future. Because of this, again, certain actions of government should require a measure of support from all groups.

4. What should liberals do in the referendum?

Vote no. There are a number of reasons for this. For one, a liberal "no" vote may lessen the degree of alienation felt by blacks.

Secondly, a parliamentary system in order to function effectively requires a degree of party loyalty. The PFP leadership had no option but to call for a no vote. It is now vital that as much rank and file support for this call should be ensured.

Furthermore, voting yes is a blank cheque. And once traditional opposition voters have signed such a blank cheque, they are likely to do so again.

However, it is difficult to see how a fundamentally ambiguous no victory would assist more rapid reform.

5. What is the South Africa of the future which you would most like to see?

A society in which white really shared power with blacks, in a way in which white politicians and white voters still played a meaningful role in the political process. Preferably this role should not be defined around the issues of race, at least not solely about race.

Culturally, the society would not be that different. The predominant culture of the country is "white" western culture. This would continue.

Economically, the wealth gaps would have to be reduced - probably in a way which would mean that the whites had to live less well. However, there would be constraints on such a levelling down process - one could not proceed too far without putting the very nature of the country's wealth creating machine in jeopardy.

6. How can we best move towards such a society?

At times one despairs of moving there. Can our problems be solved?

If the actors see South Africa's problems not as those of colonialism or imperialism, i.e. the throwing off of some foreign and acceptable ruling class, but rather in terms of Disraeli's two nations problem, then it should be possible to solve relatively gradually and peacefully.

Real negotiation with the blacks will have to take place and continue for quite a long period of time. There is a significant moral pressure on the whites to change. Furthermore, a number of factors in the situation will continue to constrain the aspirations blacks can reasonably entertain. This should create an area for possible compromise and agreement.

INTERVIEW THREE

1. What is the origin of the present 'reform' initiatives?

Firstly, the pressures for economic integration - this produced the labour changes. Secondly, international pressures and actions. Thirdly, demographic forces such as the continuing urbanisation of blacks.

It should be noted that these are all forces outside the formal political process and in an important sense, independent of it.

These forces will also continue whatever happens in the formal political arena.

2. Is the proposed new constitution better or worse than the present one?

Worse.

Firstly, because it is much more rigid and inflexible. Whereas the present constitution can be altered by a simple majority in one house, the new constitution contains no less than 42 clauses where a concurrent majority in all three houses is required.

Secondly, it is worse because essential elements of Apartheid, such as the Population Registration Act are written into this constitution. It could not function without these elements. An example of this is the 4:2:1 ratio of representation according to race.

3. How would you compare and contrast the proposed constitution with your ideal constitution?

An ideal constitution should result from significant negotiations with all interested parties.

Secondly, if it was a mistake (as it certainly was) to exclude blacks in the 1910 constitution, it was much more serious to repeat such a mistake in the changed world environment of 1983.

4. What should liberals do in the referendum? And what will be the result of this action?

They should vote no.

As to the results: nothing is going to happen for a long time. Nothing happens easily or quickly in this society. A certain consequence of a No vote will be Botha's replacement by De Klerk. This is to be welcomed as De Klerk is both more intelligent and more rational than Botha. He also has his eye more on the main problem i.e. the blacks.

The pressures pushing in on the formal political system will grow and increase in intensity. Urban violence will increase. Black unions will grow and become more militant. Populist movements amongst blacks will increase.

In the end, all this may well result in a military government.

Notwithstanding all the increases in pressure, it is very hard to imagine the Afrikaner majority agreeing to relinquish power.

5. What is the South Africa of the future which you would most like to see?

There certainly can be no guarantees. Whites may well end up being politically irrelevant.

Will Opera and Ballet continue? Almost certainly - however, much more importantly will the street lights still work?

6. How is this future best to be achieved?

Is it to be achieved?

The forces described earlier will certainly lead to an extension of privilege - but will they lead to a sharing of power?

Thus far, change has been limited to those areas which do not pose a real threat to political power. This is likely to remain the pattern in the future.

Short of major power intervention, the present regime is also unchallengeable from a military point of view.

It is, therefore, hard to imagine a voluntary surrender of power and equally hard to imagine an involuntary seizure of power.

INTERVIEW FOUR

1. What is the origin of the present 'reform' initiatives?

Mounting pressure - both internally (within the black community) and externally (particularly from the Reagan Administration). Something had to be done - also because of the conflict between the internal ideals of the nationalists (e.g. white democracy) and their external actions (e.g. white domination).

Change became imperative - however, it had to be change which gave the appearance of reform, without threatening the Nationalists' real grasp on power.

2. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in relation to the present constitution?

The present constitution does not have to be changed in order to extend the franchise - you can merely alter the qualifications of voters, as was the case in the extension of the franchise to white women. You could also repeal all Apartheid laws by simple majority in a single house.

The present constitution is, therefore, a basis on which a democratic future could be built.

In contrast, the new constitution is a fundamentally illiberal document. It enshrines within it provisions cornerstones of Apartheid such as the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act. It also provides for the maximum concentration of power thus making a present white dictatorship and a future black dictatorship not only possible, but indeed likely.

3. How would you judge the proposed constitution in relation to your ideal constitution?

An ideal constitution should be based on three key elements:

- universal adult suffrage;
- an abolition of the homeland policy;
- the protection of the individual against any arbitrary state action.

Whilst individual rights should form the basis, group rights could find expression in the form of the protection of language rights and the right to mother tongue education.

Ideally, power should be decentralised to the absolutely maximum degree. Furthermore, any rights constitutionally guaranteed to individuals and/or groups should not be able to be exercised at the expense of other (such as exclusive neighbourhoods etc.).

4. What should liberals do in the referendum and what would be the consequences of their actions?

Whilst there is a good (intrinsic or moral) argument that can be made for spoiling on's ballot, there are good strategic reasons for not doing this.

Therefore, liberals should vote no.

A no vote provides the first real opportunity of defeating this government since 1953. A no vote will not be interpreted as right wing victory.

Furthermore, it makes little difference whether Botha or De Klerk are at the helm. The future does not revolve around personalities, but rather around pressures. These pressures will continue.

5. What is the South Africa you most hope for?

One in which (Micah 4/6) "every man shall sit under his own vine or fig tree undisturbed" - a society of maximum individual freedom.

This will be difficult because considerable state intervention will be necessary to sort out the mess left by Apartheid.

The chance of this liberal dream being realised is dependent on the present generation of liberal blacks and whites whose education was chiefly uncontaminated by either Bantu Education or CNE. If change takes place after this last liberal generation has vanished, liberals in a future majoritarian government will be condemned to the same gadfly role which they have played under the Nationalists.

6. How can this society best be achieved?

We are in a hurry for the reasons given above.

Non-violent disobedience or resistance is the most efficient and promising way of achieving change. Black subjugation is entirely dependent on their own co-operation. The withdrawal of this co-operation would bring society to a standstill. This will create deadlock, in which third party mediation would be required (maybe the EEC!)

The most important role liberals can play in promoting (real) change is to teach: to teach civil disobedience, but also to teach self-reliance and independence. To equip all South Africans with basic problem solving skills which allow them to act responsibly and freely for themselves.

However, one has to be pessimistic about the emergence of this campaign of disobedience of a scale large enough and in time. Non-violent resistance requires a great deal self-sacrifice, discipline and organisation.

INTERVIEW FIVE

1. What is the origin of the present 'reform' initiatives?

They arise from a combination of internal and external pressures.

Internally, the changed pattern of labour usage resulting from the move from primary to secondary industry. The increased power of workers that this change had produced has in turn changed employer attitudes on issues such as influx control and the permanence of urban blacks, as well as the need for structural reform in other areas. In addition, black actions such as the school, rent and bus boycotts as well as the increase in sabotage had contributed to changed white attitudes.

Externally, South Africa's relations with the West had created some new legitimacy needs. The threat of disinvestment has been a force of limited extent. The growing external military threat has also promoted reform.

2. How do you judge the proposed constitution in comparison with the present one?

It is worse for the following reasons:

- It is too rigidly structured, and it will therefore be difficult to widen it in order to incorporate more people;
- The powers of the executive President are excessive and frightening and exceed these of the present Prime Minister;
- The inclusion of the Coloured and Indians is fake as it offers them no real power they do not already possess;
- The new constitution is unworkable; it is too complex; distinctions between own and general affairs can never work;
- The 4:2:1 ratio built into the new constitution will make the future inclusion of blacks very difficult. Any such inclusion will be dependent on the further de-nationalisation of large groups of blacks.

However, at least the new constitution does legitimise the idea of the division of power.

3. How do you judge the present constitution in the light of your own constitutional ideals?

An ideal constitution would be based on consociational principles. It should be federal in nature and should also exhibit the following features:

- a common role universal franchise;
- proportional representation;
- a Bill of Rights protecting individual rights;
- it should provide for review by the Courts; and
- it should uphold the rule of law.

The proposed constitution has none of the above features.

4. What should liberals do in the referendum in order to obtain movement towards such an ideal constitution?  
And what will the consequences of such actions be?

They should vote no, both for strategic and moral reasons.

As to the consequences. If the "no" vote is victorious, the Government will not be able to implement the new constitution. P.W. Botha may lose power (but his government will not). The Nats will have to go back to the drawing board and redesign the constitution. In so doing, they will have to move left, both because of the continuing external pressures, also because the CP/NP split is now irreconcilable. Even if F.W. De Klerk takes over, it would take no more than a few years for him to 'learn' that he has to move left, mainly because of the demands of the economy.

5. What is your vision of an ideal South Africa?

This would be a non-racial, social democratic society where resources would be allocated according to the needs of the people. It would be governed by an interest-based multi-party democracy. Education would be universal and free. There would be no influx control and an equitable welfare system which was not economically crippling to maintain. The economy would be geared towards maximum employment.

Individual rights would be guaranteed by a Bill of Rights. There would also be maximum decentralisation of power.

There would be full racial integration. The role of whites in this future society would be similar to the role of the Jews in this society.

6. How can this best be achieved, starting from where we are now?

The present constitution should be rejected. This at least will keep options open.

Liberals will continue to have an important role in verbalising and keeping alive liberal values. They can also contribute to the build-up of pressure that will at least prevent the Nationalists from moving backwards. They can also assist change-oriented organisations to be more effective.

Liberal influence in the past has been seriously limited by the lack of an alternative liberal vision.

One has to be pessimistic about the future liberal role, though there are grounds aplenty for optimism about the future. Liberals don't plan strategically or effectively. Liberal values in themselves are not very powerful agents for organisation or mobilisation.

INTERVIEW SIX

1. What is the origin of the present 'reform' initiatives?

The major causes derive from military considerations and are recorded in comments of P.W. Botha (then Minister of Defence); Magnus Malan (Head of the Defence Force) and General Geldenhuys (Military Commander in Namibia). All three of these made numerous statements indicating that South Africa's problems could not be resolved militarily, but required a political solution; further that the battle was for the hearts and minds of South Africa's people; and that it was impossible to ask coloureds to serve on the border if they were not able to participate fully in society within these borders.

The current reform initiatives were characterised by what many referred to as Old Cape Liberalism, but which could more accurately be described as old Cape racism. This was based on the unarticulated promise that coloureds and (by implication) Asians could be included in white society because they were like the whites, but blacks must be excluded.

2. How do you judge the proposed constitution in terms of our present constitution?

The present 1961 constitution is really a re-affirmation of the 1910 union constitution. This union constitution was the result of an admittedly all white nation convention. As such it did represent a Social Contract in the Lockean sense.

The present constitution is also better than the proposed constitution in that it contains no explicitly racial provisions.

The proposed constitution is in no sense a social contract. It is not the outcome of sustained or significant debate - not even within the National Party, its Caucus and Congresses. Rather it is the work of a handful of individuals (Worral, De Crespigny, Heunis, Breytenbach and Rautenbach). It is structured along racial lines; and it is structured so as to ensure the continued dominance of a single party. It is really a constitution of the National Party, by the National Party but for all South Africa.

3. How would you compare and contrast the proposed constitution with your ideal constitution?

The process of making constitution is quite as important as its outcome. Any constitution which will really serve South Africa must be the outcome of real negotiations between all key groups in this society.

An ideal constitution would regulate the division and devolution of power and responsibility as between the branches and units of governments, and as between the State and individual citizens. It should not be necessary in an ideal situation to regulate group rights.

4. What should liberals do in the referendum to achieve positive movement?

Vote No.

A "no" vote will be an ambiguous left/right "no". However, blacks will be appreciative of the left no component. This will not persuade them that liberals are relevant, but it will act as a liberal sign of good faith.

As far as the Nats are concerned, a left "no" is going to be seen as unpatriotic and un-South African. The "no" vote will most likely lead to a re-alignment in (white) politics. It will have a serious effect on the fortunes of the PFP.

In essence, the "no" vote is a vote of conscience. It will lead to no strategic advance. It will help liberals retain their integrity. PFP leaders will be able to continue to look black leaders in the face.

5. What are your best hopes for South Africa?

Both the unitary state with universal franchise and radical partition are to be rejected. The ideal must lie somewhere between these.

It would take the form of a federation of sorts, which federation would have both a territorial and ethnic nature.

A possible model could be the United States with a populist lower house and a federalist upper house.

It should have a Bill of Rights, possibly backed by international guarantees.

6. How can these best hopes best be achieved?

I'm fatalistic. I don't see this change coming without Zimbabwe type conflict. I cannot see white South Africans sitting down to debate the real sharing of power.

What is clearly happening is the growing militarisation of South African society. Most liberal institutions (PFP, universities even Race Relations) have ducked the challenge of this growing militarism.

On a more optimistic note, liberalism is likely to survive this violent transition more effectively as liberals have been both more prominent and more tenacious in this society than was the case in Zimbabwe.

The role of liberals in the meantime is to keep alive a basic set of values until change comes.

INTERVIEW SEVEN

1. What is the origin of the present 'reform' initiatives currently taking place in South Africa?

The reform certainly does not arise out of some inner ferment within Afrikaner nationalism.

Rather it arises from the sum of pressures in the society such as:

- Afrikaner fundamentalism and the need to formulate complete solutions: example, with independence "taking care" of black aspirations, there was a need to resolve the Coloured problems: where did they fit in?
- The changes in the economy which commenced in the 1970's and are continuing in the 1980's are a very important pressure;
- The desire amongst whites to be part of the West is another source of pressure;
- Also, the incorporation of Afrikanerdom into wider society in South Africa has also contributed;
- The turmoil evident in the Afrikaans churches is another genesis of change.

2. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in the light of the present constitution?

On balance, the proposed constitution is worse than the present one, however, this view is dependent on the momentum one takes of the momentum one believes it will give to the political process. Whatever changes have been initiated over the last 12 years have come about within the framework of the present constitution.

The new constitution amounts to the formal exclusion of a major group in society. It also entrenches Apartheid legislation in a way which is not true of the present constitution.

However, the sheer proximity of government leaders to people of colour in the new deal will create a symbol of change. This effect will be seriously vitiated, however, by the polarisation of these leaders' supporters on a pro- and anti-Apartheid basis.

3. How do you judge the proposed constitution in the light of your ideal constitution?

An ideal (though possible) constitution should do the following:

- It should leave the door open for black participation, indeed, it should commence with a commitment to their inclusion, and should be accompanied by serious negotiations to this end;
- It should not institutionalise Apartheid;
- The numbers should be constructed in a way that no one group should be able to govern alone. This would produce a dynamic for further change and would make inter-racial consensus a political necessity.

4. What should liberals do in the referendum, and what will be the consequences of their action?

They should vote no; firstly because the constitution negates basic liberal ideas; and, secondly because the exclusion of blacks means that the momentum away from these ideals will be greater than the momentum towards them through the inclusion of coloureds and Indians.

As to the consequences: Botha and Heunis will lose the ability to govern and will have to be replaced. The most likely candidate for this is F.W. De Klerk. He is intellectually superior to P.W. Botha, and doesn't have Botha's hang-ups with the past (for instance, he will find it easier to talk with the PFP). De Klerk under the impact of a successful "no" would have to move left, as reconciliation with the right is an impossibility. The Nats will only be able to win support from the left. This will also help their alliance with the Coloureds.

5. What is your vision of an ideal South Africa?

Politically we would have to contend with what could be described as fragmented ethnicity, at least in the transitional period. Race would still be important, but it would no longer be the only line of cleavage.

In society, Apartheid in the sense of enforced separation will disappear (it's already on the skids).

In the economy, significant government intervention will be needed to correct the distortions of the existing order. However, this intervention should not be at the cost of private initiative. We may well have to slow down growth in order to achieve a fairer distribution of resources.

Whites are likely to play a significant role in both the polity and the economy. We are not going to have simple political majoritarianism.

The longer we delay the transition, the more economic intervention we are likely to experience.

6. How can such an ideal society best be achieved starting from where we are now?

Liberals require a dual strategy:

- On the one hand, they must hold onto the pure liberal ethics. This remains the yardstick for measuring liberal action;
- On the other hand, they must be ready to change roles from the resistors of reactionary politics, to the accelerators of the politics of reform. South Africa is now much more in the situation of the U.S. Civil Rights movement - liberals are now swimming with, rather than against, the current.

I am not pessimistic about the future.

INTERVIEW EIGHT

1. What is the origin of the present 'reform' initiatives currently taking place in South Africa?

I really don't know. I suppose there are two or three possibilities:

- The first is the need the Government may feel to show the West that we are moving in the right direction, to impress Washington and Bonn.

It is hard to know how important this is. It runs counter to the Jenkins thesis on the rise of the military establishment. It's really a Vorster/Pik Botha type reason;

- The second is the O'Dowd/Oppenheimer thesis about economic growth. The Coloured community is today in economic terms, where the Afrikaners were in the 1930's. The economic realities have changed creating a political need. The Government was faced with the alternative of either incorporation (ala Hertzog and Smuts) or separation (ala Malan and Verwoerd).
- A further related reason for change is the continued urbanisation of South African's people. Here it is important to note that the Coloured population is more than 90 per cent urbanised. In essence, the present reform policies should be seen as an urban-oriented policy. It may well be accompanied by much tougher influx control. The present reform policy is an "insider policy" which will only succeed to the extent that outsiders are kept out.
- A final factor could be that South Africa currently has a Cape Nationalist Prime Minister. Vorster would never have brought the Coloureds in.

2. How do you judge the nature of the proposed constitution in contrast to the present constitution?

The proposed constitution is worse, for the following reasons:

- Firstly, it explicitly excludes blacks. The system cannot now be reformed in order to include blacks. Balkinisation is now built into the constitution. The present constitution at least has a vision of a common country for all, even if political power is limited. The new constitution now excludes a large proportion of South Africa's inhabitants;

- Secondly, it increases the concentration of power in the hands of the President. It is an undemocratic constitution in the sense that it further erodes the balance of power between the individual and the State;
- Thirdly, it further entrenches and will further increase race group consciousness; it will divide functional activities (such as health) on a race group basis. This will increase the conflict between groups-defined around race-over scarce resources.

3. How do you judge the nature of the proposed constitution in contrast to your ideal constitution?

The features of an ideal constitution should include:

- public accountability of state officials, ensured by the ability to remove through elections, key state officials, as well as through a free flow of information;
- the independence of fundamental institutions, in particular, the Press and the judiciary, ensuring access to information and so power;
- the entrenchment of individual human rights: group rights, should not be entrenched. Group rights are really group interests, and do not require entrenchment;
- the maximum decentralisation of power both by geographic, economic and political regions.

4. What should liberals do in the referendum, and what will be the consequences of their actions?

They should vote no; firstly because the implementation of the new constitution would be a giant leap in the wrong direction.

The consequences will not be disastrous. If there is a "no" majority, it will be claimed equally as a victory for the right and the left. It will also increase polarisation within the white community. There is likely to be no constitutional movement for the next little while. A "no" majority will, however, open up the debate. Already the referendum has been the most widely, and the most non-rationally, debated issue for decades.

It is hard to see whether P.W. Botha will survive a "no" majority. He is a well-experienced political survivor. It would be better to have a Cape Prime Minister than a Transvaal P.M.

5. What is your vision of an ideal South Africa?

As a mildly pink social democrat (a liberal socialist?), I would like to see:

- the decentralisation of power;
- the entrenchment of individual rights;
- cultural diversity rather than cultural imperialism;
- experimental forms of economic partnership such as co-operatives;
- significant land reform;
- active measures to redistribute wealth, by taking the energy of the "people" seriously, but without increasing state power.

As to the role of whites: culture should become much more diverse. For example, the Cape Times should reflect the full diversity of Cape (such as the number of Cape Townians studying at Cairo University).

With regard to political power, whites will have a great deal of political influence (indirect political power through the role in the economy), but little direct political power.

6. How can this ideal society be achieved, starting from where we are now?

We require a multiple strategy. One of the exciting aspects of South Africa in the 1980's is the new opportunity for individuals to play a creative role.

There will have to be a dramatic break with the past in one form or another. The Nationalists will not simply agree to give up power. Also this break may be a long time in coming, and it will involve lots of pain. In the meantime, there is likely to be an increase in guerilla activity and an increasing militarisation of our society.

For now, liberals should concentrate on the creation of non-government, grass roots, democratic organisations in the areas of worker organisation, health and education. Such organisations will contribute to the process of change as well as being consistent with the type of society likely to emerge here in the longer term.

I have optimism for the long-term: there will be lots of pain along the way. In the long run, the kind of society envisaged above must emerge: it is the only way a society such as South Africa can be run in the longer term.

INTERVIEW NINE

1. What is the origin of the present 'reform' initiatives currently confronting the country?

They are the result of pressure; primarily outside pressure. Botha's security people and his army people have told him that they cannot hold the present situation. At best they can give the politicians the time to solve the country's problems. Reform is essential for stability.

This means that the changes are negative and reluctant in nature. The idealism of old-fashioned Apartheid has played no role.

2. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in relation to the present constitution?

There are areas in which there are considerable improvements. The fact that coloureds and Asians are being involved in the political process, however, reluctantly and inadequately, is positive. Indeed, it will be the Nationalists undoing.

However, the participation is terribly ersatz. Not many believe it can work in practice. It will satisfy no one except some of the Nationalists. They will not be able to sell it to the coloureds and Asians, at least not as a finished or final product. Yet they indicate that there is no chance of involving the blacks - at least not in this process.

Still it is a gesture. Perhaps we're wrong in not recognising this as a significant gesture. It is the beginning of the end. Verwoerd understood that separation could only survive as absolute separation. Treurnicht also understands this.

3. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in terms of your own constitutional ideals?

The individual is the key. However, I do not believe that you can have a universal franchise on the basis of equality. I do not want to swop one kind of tyranny for another.

We need a process of checks and balances which can prevent group tyranny. I don't know how much you have to fiddle with democracy in an unequal society to achieve this. Perhaps it is a qualified franchise combined with the real opportunity to achieve the qualifications that we need.

People must have a legitimate share in decision-making, and must perceive the process as fair. You can only make constitutions effectively if all the groups concerned are involved in their development. The aim must be government by consent.

4. What should liberals do in the referendum, and what will be the consequences of their actions?

If we had been given an option, we could have exercised it. As it is, we must say an emphatic "no". This is a move in the wrong direction. We're going to entrench some of the most important sources of race conflict. In so doing, we may be identified with the right. This doesn't worry me. We should do all in our power to make plain the nature of our opposition.

Consequences

A successful "no" vote will place the government under severe pressure. They say they'll stay in power, but will they be able to govern?

Botha will survive in the short-term, but in the longer term, he is likely to be replaced by De Klerk. Is this a good thing? He's very "behoudend". Botha did go a little forward. Will De Klerk? I don't know. I certainly do not go along with the argument that says let's have the worst now, so that things can get better more quickly.

In any event, it is really more important to get rid of the party, not just change leaders. But how to do this?

5. How would you describe your vision of an ideal South Africa?

Whites will have an absolutely crucial role in building this future. You just can't have radical change without taking the white majority with you.

Liberal values will also be absolutely basic to this future society. We must recognise the rights and dignity of the individual. Liberty consists in the freedom for the individual to do what he believes is right without encroaching on the freedom of others.

6. Starting from where we are now, how can such a society best be achieved?

Violence must be eliminated as an option. I was born and lived for the first 30 years of my life under the shadow of the Boer War. This

Liberals must hold firm to their basic beliefs. We have to keep on convincing people of the rightness of our causes. The sheer logic of our position must triumph in the end.

With regard to tactics and strategies, we must use Parliament and also not be afraid to use extra-Parliamentary (but not extra-legal) activities as demonstrated by the Black Sash and the Institute of Race Relations. There is no single strategy.

Also we must not become down-hearted or give into despair. This is exactly what the enemies of a free society want. And it leads either to the acceptance of violence or apathy.

Are you optimistic or pessimistic?

I'm like a yoyo. At times, I believe that we cannot possibly succeed. There is so much unreason around. Yet there is also plenty of goodwill around. I cannot see this society disintegrating. There is too much that is good.

Things will carry on simmering. Life will become a little more brutish, but not unbearable.

In the long-term, I remain hopeful because of my belief in the innate goodness of man. I suppose this could be called a blind faith or even a sentimentality.

INTERVIEW TEN

1. What is the origin of the current 'reform' initiatives with which the country is being confronted?

Soweto 1976 was the El Alamein of the black man's struggle for the control of this country. It is the psychological turning point for both black and white. Since then blacks have had confidence that their day is coming and that whites are in retreat. The whites realise that they have to give ground. P.W. is trying to retreat in good order, whilst keeping control.

2. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in relation to the present constitution?

I see it as worse. The new constitution takes what is a law (the Population Registration Act) and makes this the very essence of the constitution. That constitution cannot function without race classification. In order to reform, you will need not merely to change one law, but to amend the very constitution.

I can see that psychologically for the Afrikaner he may see it as a step towards the acceptance of other races and, therefore, the abandonment of pure Apartheid. But the Afrikaner is doing this because he wants to retain control of his future and his possessions. This is a false hope and it cannot work. Apartheid has run them into a cul-de-sac. They're not going to come out unscathed. None of us are going to come out unscathed.

3. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in relation to your own constitutional ideals?

We should move away from this Group business entirely. The sooner Groups are not part of a constitution the better. Voluntary association is OK, but it must not be built in as a factor. This I derive from my understanding of the Christian faith and what the Church must be as the Church.

4. What should liberals do in the referendum, and what will be the consequences of their actions?

(Note personal position re book of life).

They should say no. On an ethical and moral assessment one has to reject it. From the point of view of strategy, as to which option will bring more change - I can't work this out. Therefore, the decision should be ethically based.

5. Describe your ideal vision of a future S.A. society?

I don't work in terms of ultimate visions. Reality has to be discovered as we go along, and that discovery takes place in inter-action, day-by-day.

Race should not be a key factor in a future society.

Ordinary biblical virtues should be the cornerstone: fair dealing, equity. However, human society being what it is, you cannot have a good society unless an element or group of its people are making sacrifices and not just demanding justice for themselves. Someone must be ready to take a "lower" place. This is the role of Christians in any society.

6. Starting from where we are now, what can liberals do in order to best achieve this?

You must do what is right, whether you can see the outcome or not. For example, in employing non-violent strategies you cannot weigh or measure the outcomes. However, if violence is wrong, it is wrong, whatever the consequences. I must do what I believe is right irrespective of the consequences. This is positive because I am taking responsibility for what I can control, rather than saying the situation forces me to do something which I really think I should not be doing.

This is a seed - you may not see the fruit. This based on a belief in the resurrection.

INTERVIEW ELEVEN

1. What is the origin of the "reform" initiatives with which the country is being confronted?

The major origin lies in Afrikaner Nationalism's sense of "konsequentheid". The coloureds and Indians were left out: they were without a place in the plan. They needed to be incorporated without threatening Afrikaner power. A second and related origin was the desire to "bolster the barricades" against the black threat (see Grobbelaars PS in his letter to Treurnicht in Rees & Domminee's Broedertwis). Thirdly, by increasing non-black numbers, it also enables the safe incorporation of some urban and non-independent blacks. (See Koornhof's speech).

Giliomee has suggested that a Cape Nationalist sense of guilt about past Coloured treatment is at the root of these 'reforms'. However, I have seen little evidence for this. I am also sceptical about the role of overseas pressure - this may have served the role of a post-hoc rationalisation. One cannot be certain about the role conscription and the needs of the military have played in this.

2. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in relation to the present constitution?

It is better in the sense that it confers a symbolic equality of status on Coloureds and Indians. Also Weichers is probably correct that it prevents a move to the political right.

However, it is worse in a number of important ways:

- It is a symbolic entrenchment of the exclusion of blacks, and the politics of symbolism is very important;
- It is a sanctification of fundamental Apartheid principles;
- It is not reformist. It is the very antithesis of reform. It will make the already difficult issue of black/white settlement much more difficult.

On balance, therefore, whilst it represents one or two steps forward, it represents many more steps backwards. And it contains an irony. The more successful it is in its own terms, the greater disaster it will be for the society as a whole.

3. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in terms of your own constitutional ideals?

The process of making a constitution is as important as its content. All groups must be involved in this process.

A constitution should be democratic, in the sense of providing for universal political participation, civil rights and now majoritarian power sharing. Groups should play a role - but self-defined (voluntary association) groups. The influence of minorities is as good a judge as any a democracy.

4. What should liberals do in the referendum, and what will be the consequences of their actions?

They should vote no. As to the consequences: A deadlock (between right and centre within the governing party) is the most likely result. However, the exogenous pressures for reform will continue. This will eventually require the government to reach an understanding with the PFF as to what constitutes genuine reform.

Whilst the white right wing is not to be underestimated, the Humpty Dumpty of Afrikaner Nationalism cannot be reconstructed.

Nobody has come up with a liberal strategy that will work. We have to go forward in faith, doing what we can where we can.

5. What is your vision of an ideal S.A. future society?

It is of a liberal democracy (as described above). It is of an economic order that is not socialist (in the East European/Chinese sense), as it seems clear that Socialist order cannot support freedom. However, it would also not be free enterprise. It would be a society aiming for a pluralisation of ownership, experimenting with new forms of economic control.

Whites would remain as a vigorous and secure community. It would be inconsistent with my understanding of democracy if they were to be excluded from a meaningful share of power.

6. Starting from where we are now, what can liberals do to achieve this?

Liberals should start where they are strongest i.e. in the economy, the Church, the Universities, the Private Schools, the Press.

There is a case for "situational ethics". Reform will not come overnight. Liberals will have to be prepared to settle for incremental gains which are steps in the right direction.

They must also keep alive basic liberal values.

I am not optimistic in the short run. Nor will we ever achieve a full liberal democracy. However, I can't see the holocaust either. We have a reasonable chance of some sort of reasonable settlement.

INTERVIEW TWELVE

1. Why is the country currently being confronted with "reform" initiatives?

I'm fairly certain that these "reforms" don't arise from a liberal tendency within Government. The pressures outside and against Government policy are growing. The policy appears much less workable. The costs of countering subversion are growing. The policy is actually beginning to break down. Botha has realised he has to change, or face dramatically rising costs.

This may mean that he (Botha) has to listen to some of his critics. Vide the new status of the Institute of Race Relations since it predicted Soweto. However, the limits of "reform" have become very evident in Pen Kotze's Group Areas statement, and the backing this has received from Botha.

2. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in the light of the present one?

It's worse.

Firstly, because it provides for a greater centralisation of power. This is not desirable, even if it were in the interests of reform. Liberals have always believed in the fragmentation of power.

Secondly, because the exclusion of blacks (from the political process) has now been given a constitutional status.

3. How do you judge the proposed new constitution against your own constitutional ideals?

One of the mistakes liberals have made in the past has been to concentrate exclusively on individual rights. Liberals were correct to oppose the Government's obsession with the group, but wrong to give the group no place in their scheme of things.

An ideal constitution should have a consociational form. It should provide limited recognition of group rights. However, it is critical that these groups are voluntary and self-defined.

4. What should liberals do in the referendum, and what will be the consequences of their actions?

I don't think they can support it. One hopes that this will bring home the illiberal tendencies.

As to the consequences: that is, of a victorious "no" vote, the ruling Party's power would be diminished. This would not necessarily be a bad thing. It would not, however, bring the right wing into power.

The Government would be wrong to interpret a "no" as a vote for a more conservative policy, as it is now trying to persuade the electorate that a "no" vote is an illiberal vote.

Would P.W. Botha survive?

Whether he survives or not will depend on the re-alignment of forces which emerge. If he (Botha) looks left, he will survive. If he stands still (as he is threatening to do) he will fall victim to the forces of the right.

5. What is your vision of an ideal South African society?

A new society would be characterised in particular by two attributes:

- much more tolerance. It is the particular role of liberals to keep this tolerance alive;
- constitutionalism or power restrained by law. Again, it is the role of the liberals to sell this idea. The whites in Zimbabwe failed to do this and they are now paying the price.

6. Starting from where we are, what can liberals do to try to bring this ideal society about?

The problem is our powerlessness.

One should not assume that (liberal) ideas will be always unacceptable. We have to keep them alive with the climate changes. Keep them alive and then transmit them.

On the other hand, liberals must guard against purist interpretations of their own values. Full freedom is possible in a society that has unresolved, fundamental conflict. To not imagine a full bill of rights in such a society is just dreaming.

Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future?

Pessimistic at the moment. I see an increasing struggle between the two nationalisms. The tendency of the Government to excessively oppress its black opponents is provoking an ever more violent response.

INTERVIEW THIRTEEN

1. Why is the country currently being confronted with the present "reform" initiatives?

Firstly, the homeland policy was devised to "deal" with the political aspirations of blacks. The policy could not be applied to the Indians and coloureds. Hence, the new proposals. However, the extent of Indian and coloured incorporation will be limited by what Botha believes the political market can bear?

Secondly, the need to reinforce and bolster the white population has also produced these reforms. This need is especially promoted by the military and the security forces. Again the extent of coloured and Indian incorporation in a common (i.e. with the whites) society is extremely limited. This could expand as the Nationalists get more used to it.

2. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in terms of the present constitution?

I judge it to be worse: firstly: because I see it as the constitutional exclusion of the blacks from South Africa. It's part of the plan to get all the homelands to accept independence, so that there will then be no more black South Africans.

Secondly, at present the recognition given to coloureds and Indians is derisory and farcical. Some of the architects would like this to be expanded - but will this ever happen?

Thirdly, it's worse in that it places such enormous power in the hands of the President. It sets up a trend towards monarchical or authoritarian government.

Finally, it's worse because it simply cannot work.

3. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in terms of your constitutional ideals?

For me, the ideal would be something like the PFP constitution - something open-ended, allowing for future development. Realistically, one cannot expect the white population to accept a sudden transformation from their present dominant role to a politically impotent one.

Basic human rights should be entrenched: the right to work, education, freedom, etc. - but it should allow some flexibility in the very difficult area of political participation.

I don't see the proposed constitutions as having the flexibility and potential for future growth.

4. What should liberals do in the referendum, and what will be the consequences of their actions?

They should vote no. The practical consequences will be the status quo constitutionally, leaving the situation as it is now, providing for the possibility of change later. Such change would arise from black pressure exercise by unions or alliances such as the UDF and the National Forum. SA has been forced to yield on the issue of trade unions - maybe it can also be forced to yield on the issue of political participation.

Would P.W. Botha survive?

I can't assess this. I don't know what the feelings is in National Party circles. This Party has survived crises in the past. For example, it survived opposition to its plan to remove the coloureds from the Common Role.

5. What is your vision of a future ideal South African society?

As an ideal I would like to transcend the fact of group emotions. I would look forward to a democratic society where not only basic but also political and civic rights as is the case in the US constitution and Bill of Rights. I would like to see that sort of Charter here. A similar concern with the effective balancing of power between the executive, legislative and judicial arms of government. The independence of the judiciary is critical.

In such a society, the white would play a very useful role as citizens of a common society.

6. Starting from where we are now, what can liberals do to bring such a society about?

Liberals, whether of a Christian, Jewish or humanist orientation, should give more attention to the problems of communicating their values to others (i.e. those who do not think as they do).

I think that's the weakness of liberals: they assume that if one formulates a good, consistent liberal proposition, that this proposition speaks for itself - that it needs no evangelisation or propagation.

Would you characterise yourself as an optimist or a pessimist?

Schizophrenic: whenever I indulge in human calculation I see no hope; but instinctively I can't escape the attitude of Christian Hope which we inherit from Israel.

INTERVIEW FOURTEEN

1. Why is the country currently being confronted with "reform" initiatives?

Disquiet in the Church, disquiet in the universities, rebelliousness amongst the young, and this strange desire to be part of the West. I don't know just what part the military have played, but Magnus Malan has noted the impossibility of fighting on two fronts.

All this, and the continuing concern for the security and the survival of the Afrikaner.

2. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in terms of the present constitution?

Our present constitution means almost nothing. The 1910 Constitution entrenched the rights of English and Afrikaans. It also contained a "sort of" entrenchment of the Cape Franchise. However, Schreiner would not have seen it as an absolute entrenchment, and events proved him quite right.

This constitution (and here I am not making a moral judgement) does some things which the 1910 Constitution didn't. That constitution was purely and utterly devoted to white supremacy. That is exactly what Botha and Smuts intended it to be.

For this reason, I cannot give a resounding no to the new constitution. The Afrikaners are now trying to get out of the fortress which they have been constructing for decades. They have made it almost impregnable. Now they find that not only can no one get in, but also they cannot get out. The fortress has become a prison.

3. How do you judge the proposed new constitution in terms of your constitutional ideals?

If I am to judge the constitution morally, then it must be rejected. It gives coloureds and Indians a very limited participation, but at the price of excluding the blacks, and excluding the blacks on the most immoral grounds i.e. that their constitutional rights must be exercised via the Homelands.

4. What should liberals do in this referendum, and what will be the consequences of their actions?

I know what they should do, but I don't know what the consequences will be.

If the yes vote is successful this will result in the further alienation of the black people.

If the no vote succeeds the Nats would swing to the Right. I doubt if they can still re-unite with Treurnicht. I think the split has gone too far.

This entire initiative has been ill-judged, ill-made, ill-thought out.

History will have a very good question to answer: why did P.W. Botha split Afrikanerdom?

5. What is your vision of a future, ideal South African society?

The one hundred per cent moral view must be universal suffrage in a unitary society. The question is how do we achieve this?

The only way I can see this coming about is through violent revolution assisted from the outside. If we don't want this, then we will have to accept some sort of a compromise - some form of confederal or federal society.

The task of fashioning a liberal society in this country will be a very daunting one. I'd settle for a very painful evolution towards a better society. It will be more painful for the whites than for the blacks. It will be particularly painful for the radicals who want it all at once.

6. Starting from where we are now, what can liberals do to achieve such a society?

Liberals have paid too little attention to the ways of getting where we want to go.

The influence of liberal thinking on the Afrikaner himself has been more considerable than many people would think. There has been influence in the areas of the rule of law, of detention and the area of police action more generally.

Liberals also have a role to play in doing what is often contemptuously referred to as ambulance work. But if there were no ambulances, the suffering in the world would be greatly increased.

Liberals cannot give up hope. If one gives up hope, then he or she should get out, or keep their mouths shut.

ANNEXURE TWO  
SHORT BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON SOUTH AFRICAN LIBERALS  
INTERVIEWED FOR CHAPTER FOUR

Dr Zach De Beer (56)

Businessman and Politician

De Beer was born in Woodstock in the Cape in 1928. He trained at Cape Town University as a medical doctor. In 1953, he entered Parliament as the United Party member for Maitland, at the time one of the youngest MP's in the Parliament's history. He played a key role in the split with the UP and the formation of the Progressive Party. However, along with 10 of his 11 UP Parliamentary colleagues, he lost his seat in the 1961 General Election. He has played a key role in this Party, however, throughout its 23 year existence, returning to Parliament as its MP in the Transvaal constituency of Parktown in the period 1977 to 1980.

He joined Anglo American in 1965. In 1970, he moved to Lusaka to take over as chairman of Anglo American interest in Central Africa. He is currently chairman of the Anglo-associated construction conglomerate LTA, Anglo American Properties and Anglo American Life Insurance (currently merging with Southern Life).

Mr Rene De Villiers (74)

Journalist and Politician

De Villiers was born in Winburg in the Orange Free State in 1910 and educated at what is now the University of the Orange Free State and the London School of Economics.

De Villiers' career in journalism has included editing some of the most influential English dailly newspapers - The Friend in Bloemfontein (1949-1957), The Daily Press in Durban (1961) and The Star (1969-1970).

De Villiers entered Party Politics relatively late in his career being one of five Prog. MP's to be elected to keep Helen Suzman company in the 1974 elections. (He represented the Parktown Constituency from 1974 to 1977).

He is a distinguished author having contributed the chapter on Afrikaner Nationalism to the seminal Oxford University History of South Africa. In 1980/81, he served as the President of the Institute of Race Relations, following in the footsteps of his uncle Leo Marquard.

De Villiers has an honorary degree from Wits University.

Professor John Dugard (48)

Academic Lawyer

Dugard was born in Fort Beaufort in the Cape and educated at Stellenbosch, LSE and Cambridge.

Dugard lectured at Natal University before moving to Wits. He has specialised in the areas of constitutional law, international law and human rights. At Wits, he is the Director of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies.

He has taught at Princeton, Duke Law School and the University of California.

He is the author of Human Rights and the South African Legal Order. He served as President of the Institute of Race Relations in 1979 and 1980, and is a long-standing Executive member of that organisation.

Mrs Sheena Duncan

National President, The Black Sash

Duncan has been a key figure in The Black Sash organisation for much of its thirty year existence. The daughter of one of the founders of the organisation, Mrs Jean Sinclair, Duncan has served as its National President for repeated terms of office. This is the office she currently holds.

Duncan was importantly instrumental in the establishment of The Black Sash Pass Laws Advice Office in Johannesburg as well as the establishment of similar offices in other centres. She has served as the Director of the Johannesburg Advice Office, which currently handles some 20 000 cases per annum.

She has been at the forefront of Black Sash activity in resettlement areas. Apart from her work in the Black Sash, she is Chairman of the Human Awareness Programme, an Executive member of the Institute of Race Relations of long-standing, and an active member of the Anglican Church.

Mr Colin Eglin (59)

Politician

Eglin was born in Cape Town in 1925 and trained at that city's university as a Quantity Surveyor.

He entered Parliament in 1958 for the United Party, became a leadership figure in the new Progressive Party in 1960, losing his seat in 1961. In 1966, he became Chairman of that Party's National Executive and its leader in the period 1971 to 1979 (through two mergers). He returned to Parliament in the Sea Point constituency in 1974, serving as Leader of the Official Opposition in the period 1977-1979.

Archbishop Denis Hurley (69)

Religious Leader

Hurley was born in Pietermaritzburg and educated in Rome. Since 1951 he has served as the Catholic Archbishop of Durban. He is currently President of the Catholic Bishops Conference, and in this capacity, is his church's key spokesman on social, economic and political issues.

Outside of the Catholic Church, he has served as President of Race Relations (1975), creator and Trustee of the Human Awareness Programme, member of the Study Programme on Christianity in Apartheid Society (SPROCAS), and a member of the Buthelezi Commission.

Professor Tony Mathews (54)

Academic Lawyer

Mathews was born in Pretoria in 1930, and completed his university education at Natal University (Durban) and at Harvard. He has published a definitive study of South Africa's security legislation. Professor Mathews chaired the political commission of the Study project on Christianity in Apartheid Society (SPROCAS). He currently teaches law at Natal University, Pietermaritzburg Campus. He was an active member of the Liberal Party in Natal.

Miss Marion Nell

Director - Human Awareness Programme

Nell was born in Johannesburg and educated at that city's university. After working for the Union of Jewish Women, she joined the Institute of Race Relations in 1977 in order to launch the Human Awareness Programme. This programme which seeks to train, assist and advise organisations working for peaceful change in South Africa, is now independent of the Institute.

Mr Harry Oppenheimer (76)

Businessman and Politician

Oppenheimer was born in 1908 in Kimberley, son of the founder of the Anglo American Corporation, and educated at Oxford.

He represented the Kimberley City constituency for the United Party from 1948 to 1958, when on the death of his father, he took over the chairmanship of the Anglo American and De Beers Corporations. His interest and activity in politics has continued throughout his life. He has been a key supporter of the Progressive Party throughout its 23 year existence.

He was a key figure in the creation of The Urban Foundation, and has served as its chairman since its inception in 1977. He is Chancellor of the University of Cape Town and holds honorary doctorates from the Universities of Leeds, Rhodes, Natal and the Witwatersrand.

Mr Alan Paton (81)

Author and Politician

Paton was born in Pietermaritzburg in 1903 and educated at what is now the University of Natal. After a career in teaching, he wrote what has become one of the classics of the twentieth century, Cry, The Beloved Country in 1948. He has published prodigiously ever since.

He became leader of the Liberal Party in 1954 and remained in this position until that Party's dissolution in the face of the Improper Interference Act in 1968.

Paton holds honorary degrees from Yale, Harvard, Michigan, Kenyan College, Trent, Williamette, Edinburgh, Natal, Rhodes and the Witwatersrand.

Reverend Robert Robertson (58)

Religious Leader

Robertson was born in Johannesburg and trained as an engineer before entering the ministry of the Presbyterian Church. In that church, he has pioneered multi-racial congregations in both East London and Johannesburg. He currently holds the chairmanship of the (joint) committee on Church and Nation (Presbyterian) and Church and Society (Congregational), which committees these two denominations on social issues.

Robertson served as the national chairman of its Christian Institute (headed by Beyers Naude) until that organisation was declared illegal by the State in 1927.

Mrs Helen Suzman (67) Politician

Suzman was born in Germiston and educated at Wits, where she was also a part-time lecturer in Economics.

She entered Parliament for the United Party in the Transvaal Constituency of Houghton in 1953, and has represented that seat ever since. She was the only one of the 11 breakaway MP's who formed the Progressive Party in 1960 to retain her seat in the 1961 election. From 1961 to 1974, she was that Party's sole Parliamentary representative.

Suzman holds honorary degrees from Oxford, LSE, Harvard, Columbia, Smith College, Brandeis and Wits. She has twice been nominated for the Nobel Prize.

Professor David Welsh (47) Academic

Welsh was born in 1937 in Cape Town. He was educated at Cape Town and Oxford and is currently Associate Professor of Comparative African Government and Law at the University of Cape Town (UCT).

He has published extensively and co-authored with Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert on "South Africa's Options: Strategies for Sharing Power".

Welsh is a long-standing Executive member of Race Relations, and has stood (unsuccessfully) as a candidate for the PFP.

Professor Francis Wilson Academic Economist

Wilson was born in the Eastern Cape, the son of Professor Monica Wilson, one of the foremost Anthropologists this country has yet produced. He was educated at UCT and Oxford.

He is professor of economics at UCT, and director of the S.A. Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) of that University.

He has published prolifically, and his study "Migrant Labour in South Africa" is regarded as the definitive study in the area. He is currently conducting an investigation into Black Poverty in South Africa on behalf of The Carnegie Foundation.

He is editor of S.A. Outlook - one of the important liberal journals in this country.