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**Human Insecurity in Nigeria: A case study of Boko Haram from 2009-2019**

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**A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award  
of the degree of  
Master of Social Science: International Relations**

**JOY CHIOMA IDU (IDXJOY001)**

**Department of Political Studies**

**Faculty of the Humanities**

**University of Cape Town**

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## Compulsory Declaration

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This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature: Idu.J.C

Date: 24/07/2019

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## Dedication

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This thesis is dedicated to my late parents, Mr and Mrs Idu, who brought me into this world and laid a solid foundation for me to be able to embark on this life's journey.

## Abstract

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Human security is an essential aspect of human rights, as it is necessary for every human to feel secured in their community, and country at large. However, human security is frequently threatened by conflict, especially in Africa. Adding to the different challenges that most African states face, conflict contributes immensely towards destabilizing human security. As such, this thesis addresses the destabilized human security situation in Nigeria, by examining the implication of the Boko Haram insurgency. The effects of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, ranges from political, economic, social, cultural, to environmental. These insecurities have led to the destabilisation of the country and its economy. Although human security is broad, this thesis focuses on the political and socio-economic implications of the Boko Haram insurgency. This includes, but not limited to, poverty and illiteracy, unemployment, poor healthcare service, displacement, national insecurity, and political instability. The thesis argues that the Nigerian government has been unable to defeat the insurgent group due to the increasing rate of corruption in the country, which in turn leads to lack of adequate human and material resources need to win the group.

In conducting this research, a literature-based methodology was employed, where secondary data, in the form of books, newspapers, online articles/journals, and reports, that have been written on the topic, were critically analysed to draw up adequate information on the activities of Boko Haram and its implications on the human security of the country.

## List of Acronyms

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ART	Anti-Retroviral Treatment
AU	African Union
AUNCDP	African Union Non-Aggressive and Common Defence Pact
FAOUN	Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
MAN	Manufacturers Association of Nigeria
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNTFHS	United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security
USD	United States Dollar

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1. Background

It is important to briefly understand the situation in Nigeria that helped breed terrorism in the country. Few years after the gaining of their independence, Nigeria began to experience economic instability, political frustration, ethnic conflicts and religious crisis began to negatively affect the people. As Addaney (2016) argued, the economic instability in the country led to increased poverty rate, of which the northerners were more vulnerable to. The increasing rate of poverty was exacerbated when the Igbos, then known as the Biafrans, decided to break away from Nigeria; an act caused by both economic instability and ethnic crisis (Ordu, 2017). Between 1967 to 1970, the Biafrans fought against the Nigerian government and northerners in the bid to breakout of the country, this war further exacerbated the economic instability in the country, which, although the war ended since 1970, its effect socio-economic and political remained continued to divide the country. The level of frustration that the people were experiencing as a result of the economic crisis, ethnic conflicts, political suppression made it easy for terrorism to be founded and thrive in the country.

Moving years forward, with all the different issues Nigeria was experiencing, its political pillars were destroyed, thus made it a breeding ground for terrorism. Terrorism has also led to increased human rights violations. There have been reports of children being abducted by militant groups, raping of girls and women, destruction of properties, continual displacement and increased poverty in the country. Resulting from this has been the increased rate of human insecurity in parts of Nigeria, especially in the northern region where terrorist groups are most dominant and tend to thrive.

Terrorism has increasingly become a major concern for the international community. It is a critical issue on the security agenda of international organisations such as the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN). The trend of terrorism in Africa has grown since the early 2000s, and this has increased insecurity on the continent, making human insecurity a major issue of concern in Africa. There is a need to first understand what terrorism is, which some scholars have defined as 'small' war (Held, 2003). Just as there are different types of war, there

are different types of terrorism, though many tend to generalise the term. Terrorism varies based on the motives of the group. The variations include: political terrorism, social terrorism, and economic terrorism, but all these different types usually have a similar effect on the society (Held, 2003). Terrorism always leads to human insecurity, be it in the political, social, economic, or cultural aspects. Such is the case in contemporary Nigeria whereby the insurgency of Boko Haram Sect threats have led to high levels of displacement and increased poverty, which in turn lead to human insecurity. Accordingly, the thesis explores the various ways in which Boko Haram negatively impacts on Nigerian social life.

Boko Haram is an Islamic extremist group in Nigeria, which emerged around 2002. The term Boko Haram means “*western education is forbidden*” (Shuaibu & Salleh, 2015). Although the group started off as a charity group, which ‘educated’ people willing to learn about Islamic education and gave arms to those they preached to, it has now become a major terrorist group in Nigeria, whose incursions have spread to Cameroon and Niger. Its insurgency has led to the loss of many lives, destruction of schools and government infrastructure (Shuaibu & Salleh, 2015). Boko Haram’s activities are negatively affecting Nigeria; causing political and economic instability, specifically, in the north-east region. By its activities, Boko Haram undermines human security.

Human security is a broad concept encapsulating various components, including food, personal, environment, etc. This thesis, however, focuses mainly on the socio-economic and political aspects of human insecurity. It examines the impact of Boko Haram on the political stability of Nigeria based on the reality that there is evidence of increased political instability due to terrorist activities by Boko Haram. Terrorism has affected Nigeria’s economic strength due to loss of investments and a decrease in entrepreneurship levels. Due to the violent terrorist attacks, foreign investors situated in the northern part of the country have been forced to leave. The security risks associated with the attacks led many to abandon their businesses and to relocate, while some have lost their businesses due to attacks, thus affecting their ability to work. The socio-economic and political effects of Boko Haram’s insurgency have affected the Nigerian people, and this can only be rectified if Boko Haram is defeated.

## **1.2. Statement of problem**

For over a decade, human security in Nigeria continues to be negatively affected, as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency in the country. Boko Haram has embarked on countless kidnappings of school children and women, destroying school buildings and government institutions, shop looting, as well as bombing marketplaces, farmyards and villages in northern parts of the country. Not only are they a huge threat to the country, their activities are costing the country socially, economically and politically, both at the local and international levels.

## **1.3. Research question**

How is Boko Haram's insurgency in Nigeria affecting the socio-economic and political aspects of human security in the country?

## **1.4. Conceptual framework**

The conceptual framework of this thesis is human security.

Akokpari (2007) defines human Security as the “security of the people”, living a secured life in their own country, with a government that makes sure that its citizens have access to basic needs, without fear or forceful external interventions. Akokpari (2007) also conceptualised human security in line with the United Nations (UN) definition: “being free from fear, having the freedom to ‘want’ and to take actions and make decisions by one’s self”. In order for citizens to be able to attain these freedoms, the government needs to create an avenue that is non-discriminatory and one which aids citizens to overcome economic, health, environmental, personal, community, and political insecurities.

## **1.5. Research design**

This thesis is a library-based study; the researcher conducted analysis of different publications, news articles, and books on the Boko Haram insurgency. Being a project which focuses on the socio-economic and political aspects of human insecurity, the study analysed works that discuss aspects of human insecurity. The library-based thesis highlights criticisms, different interpretations, and evaluations drawn from a range of selected articles. This style of research design enabled the writer to make evidence-based conclusions, based on concrete scholarly discourse on the impact of Boko Haram's insurgency on Nigeria's socio-economic and political aspects of human insecurity.

## **1.6. Methodology**

Academic articles and media reports were drawn from online resources, including J-Stor and Google scholar, while books, newspapers and government articles were sourced from the University of Cape Town (UCT) library's resources. The study was qualitative in nature since it did not involve the gathering of non-numeric data.

The researcher expected to incur challenges such as: not finding current publications that address the human security implications of the Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria. The most current book publication on the topic is from 2016. Although it is not too far back, it does not address the current state of affairs in Nigeria and how Boko Haram's insurgency is currently affecting the country's socio-economic and political human security. It is noteworthy that this challenge also created, for the researcher, the opportunity to fill in gaps in existing literature on the topic.

## **1.7. Research ethics**

The thesis is mainly a critique and review of several sources of literature on the topic in question. As such it did not require ethical clearance since no data would be derived from human interaction processes.

## **1.8. Synopses of chapters**

Chapter two focuses on the conceptual framework; it discusses the different understandings of human security, using a definition provided by the African Union Non-Aggressive and Common Defence Pact (AUNCDP). The section also defines different components of human security, namely: personal, economic, political, food, environmental, community, and health security. The chapter also provides insight into the different causes of human insecurity and alludes to debates around the concept.

Chapter three looks at the emergence of the Boko Haram group, from its early years in 2002 to its violent re-emergence in 2009. In addition, it discusses the insurgency of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The Nigerian government's intervention in response to the Boko Haram insurgency is also explored in the chapter. The section also highlights the limitations of the government's intervention in defeating Boko Haram.

Chapter four looks at the implications of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. It focuses specifically on the socio-economic and political aspects of human security. As such, it discusses the socio-economic and political implications of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

Chapter five provides a brief summary of the thesis. It also provides recommendations for further research.

## Chapter 2

### **Conceptual Framework: Human Security**

The researcher employed a human security centred conceptual framework. Human security remain a global concept, and it seeks to shift focus from the state to the wellbeing of the people. This chapter explains the concept by highlighting the competing definitions, sources or causes of human (in)security, as well as some of its leading intellectual criticisms.

#### **2.1. What is human security?**

Prior to the introduction of the concept of human security, the state was the focus of security in international relations (Akokpari, 2007). Any security matter was centred around the state and its wellbeing. However, after the Cold War, the focus started to shift away from the state to the people. As presented by the late former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, “the prevention of conflict begins and ends with the protection of human life and the promotion of human development” (Franche and Ebata, 2004:12). The effect of the Cold War was so intense that world leaders saw the need for an intervention, hence Annan’s statement. According to him, conflict could be prevented if human security becomes a major aspect of focus of the international community. Hence, the shift to human security.

There was a paradigm shift from a realist viewpoint to a liberal viewpoint. As Annan posited that the concept of security had for long been interpreted narrowly, as the security of countries against external influence and aggression (UNDP, 1994). His assertion is a realist idea, which has always been the nature of the international community, whereby states tend to focus on protecting their territories and national interests, while neglecting the security of the people. While based on the liberalist viewpoint, the people matter more, and as such should be the focus of the international community (Slaughter, 2011). Seeing that the world is becoming more liberal, human security has gone beyond just states’ interests to focusing on the security of the people. For example, by considering food, economic, health, environmental, personal, community and political factors as determinants of human security.

Countries now consider the affairs of the people and how to ensure that their insecurity is minimized at all costs. Since the end of Cold War, the UN has adopted human security as a guiding concept for the international community. The organization believes that it is useful in

assisting “member states in identifying and addressing widespread and crosscutting challenges to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their people, [as it ] calls for people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people” (United Nations, 2018). With the shift from state to people, more states are becoming welfare states. It is, however, arguable that, regardless of this shift, the national security of states is still a major focus in international relations. Also, increasing conflicts in the international community are making it difficult for human security to be achieved, especially in developing countries.

Before diving deeper into the different understandings of the definition of human security, the different components of the concept will be discussed. According to the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report, threats to human security are seen in the various areas, economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (UNDP, 1994).

- a. Economic security: provides people with the means to access employment which will enable them to earn secure basic needs (UNDP, 1994; Tadjbakhsh, 2005; Akokpari, 2007). Citizens are expected to cater for themselves, without being dependent on the government, therefore it is important that they have access to employment in order for them to earn and sustain their livelihoods. In most developing countries, access to employment is a major challenge as there seems to be fewer jobs available for the numbers of people seeking employment opportunities. Economic security is expected to eradicate poverty, in the long run.
- b. Food security: is having physical and economic access to food and a balanced diet (UNDP, 1994; Gomez and Gasper, 2013). To have food security, one needs to have economic security in order to acquire food and provide for oneself, with the right nutrients to sustain them.
- c. Health security: Akokpari defines this as having “access to health facilities, medical care and basic drugs, protection from all forms of communicable and non-communicable diseases” (2007:9). In this case, government needs to build and maintain functional healthcare facilities for its people. All citizens should have access to these facilities, and adequate numbers of well trained professionals should be employed into the health sector. In most developing countries, access to healthcare is a challenge, and there are high rates of poor health services, due to poorly trained medical professionals. This in turn leads to high death rates and increasing spread of diseases.

- d. Environmental security: includes making sure that natural resources are protected and that they are used in sustainable ways, to ensure that future generations' access to them is not compromised (Tadjbakhsh, 2005; UNDP, 1994). Environmental insecurity leads to health issues higher rates of pollution. It is important that governments enforce laws, rules and regulations which will protect the environment and natural resources from being exploited and damaged by current generations.
- e. Personal security: "this means freedom from physical violence caused either by the state, groups or individuals" (UNDP, 1994; Akokpari, 2007:9). Most definitions of human security seem to focus more on this type of security because of the notion that human security is a focus on people. States need to make sure that their citizens are protected from physical violence and that they have the freedom to access their wants, make decisions and take actions free from coercion and with freedom from fear. It is, however unfortunate that most states have not been able to attain this particular form of security, which is arguably one of the most important types of human security.
- f. Community security: having the freedom to belong to any community without being harassed, intimidated or faced with violence (Tadjbakhsh, 2005; Akokpari, 2007). This type of security, if attained, will enable families to stay united, and it could reduce cases of racial, ethnic and religious violence.
- g. Political security: being able to have the freedom to hold personal political views, ideologies, and parties, and having the freedom to express those views (UNDP, 1994; Tadjbakhsh, 2005; Akokpari, 2007). This type of security is also one of the major types of human security, and one that has contributed to human insecurity over the years. Political division continues to divide the people, causing conflicts and the violation of human rights, which in turn affects a country's ability to attain human security for its people.

This thesis suggests that conflict is one of the central threats to human security. Some observers believe that conflict can be avoided, which means that human security can be attained (Cilliers, 2004). The late former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, is one of those who posited that conflict is evitable; this he conveyed by emphasising that, "for too long, conflict in Africa has been seen as inevitable or intractable, or both. It is neither. Conflict in Africa, as everywhere, is caused by human action, and can be ended by human action" (Cilliers, 2004:1). Since conflict is a result of human actions, it is possible for it to be avoided by redressing the actions which led to the conflict. This is because, the existence of conflict hinders the attainment of human

security, due to the constant and increased violation of human rights that occur during periods of violent conflict. Human security considerations need to be prioritised in order to achieve positive growth and development in any country. This is so because human security enhances citizens' potential to become economically progressive. There are various definitions of human security. The following subsection discuss different authors' conceptualisation of the concept of human security.

Although there are various definitions of human security, this study applied the definition provided by the Africa Union Non-Aggressive and Common Defence Pact (AUNCDP). This is so because the definition puts into perspective, most, if not all the different aspects of the concept. The AUNCDP defines human security, within the African context, to mean:

The security of the individual in terms of satisfaction of his/her basic needs. It also includes the creation of social, economic, political, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival and dignity of the individual, the protection of and respect for human rights, good governance, and the guarantee for each individuals of opportunities and choices for his/her full development (AUNCDP, 2005:5).

One can argue that, the above definition, puts into consideration broader aspects of security, which other definitions did not consider. It addresses individuals' access and satisfaction of basic needs, the need for a friendly political, social and military environment, respect for human rights, et cetera. It is important to consider basic human rights in the attainment of human security. Unlike the AUNCDP's (2005) definition, others consider human security as the freedom from physical hurt, threats, injury and abuse (Cilliers, 2004). This is not to say, one definition is more accurate than the other; there are different dimensions to understanding the concept. Human security encompasses all the above mentioned because "conditions of abject poverty or powerlessness are not quantitatively different from vulnerability to physical violence during conflict" (Cilliers, 2004:8). Human security should not take a specific focus; rather it should take into consideration all factors that make people insecure in their communities. Human security goes beyond the state's interest, or individual interests. Rather it focuses on the security of the whole, the individual, local communities, states, and the international community at large. In addition, the systems in place, within a country, which further perpetuate violence and marginalize certain groups, should be considered when devising strategies for the achievement of human security (Gomez and Gasper, 2013). Those systems/structures need to be addressed within the human security concept, in order to bring

about total human security for the people. The political-social systems that prevent citizens, groups, and states from being able to access their freedom, hinder human security.

Furthermore, another angle of understanding human security, which seems to collapse all definitions is the “freedom from fears, freedom from want, and freedom to take actions on one’s own behalf” (Akokpari, 2007:11). ‘Freedom from fear’ is being free from conflict/violence or any factor that causes physical harm. While ‘freedom from want’ is being free from hunger or poverty. It also entails being able to take actions without fear or external pressure. However, it is almost impossible for one to be able to take actions without any form of external pressure or influence, nor is it totally possible for one to have full access to their wants nor live totally without fear. This particular definition is therefore problematic and too generic (John, 2014). To further understand this definition, on the notion of ‘freedom from fear’, it becomes challenging, seeing that absolute freedom is not attainable. Also, there have been questions about the notion of fear, inquiring what exactly constitutes as fear, and fear from what (Kettemann, 2006)? The argument that this definition is too general can be traced to the fact that it did not give details on the type(s) of fear. As Morgan (2009) argues, fear comes in different types; there is emotional, physical, mental, and psychological fear. Does being free from mental, psychological or emotional fear mean one’s human security is intact? Does being free from physical fear translate to human security? Finally, how can these freedoms from fear and want, as well as to take action, be quantified or measured? Human security should therefore be seen as a framework used to achieve a greater end (Henk, 2005). Seeing human security as a means to an end will serve as a strategy for freedom from fear and want to be achieved, rather than seeing human security as standalone entity that is to be attained on its own.

Moving forward, unlike the collapsed version, the AUNCDP’s (2005) definition of human security covers the individual/personal, local/community, national, regional, and international aspects. Although individual security is founded on the freedom from abuses, injuries, physical hurt, and threats, sometimes factors such as diseases, environmental contamination, and hunger, tend to be of more importance in attaining individual security (Cilliers, 2004). Establishing the fact that human security is focused on the people, individual human rights need to be put in place or addressed. Until global leaders understand this point, human security will not be fully achieved.

It is a myth to think that total human security is attainable. This is because of the increasing levels of violence, decline in standard of living, economic instability, and environmental degradation, to mention a few. Africa continues to be one of the continents with increasing rates of violence; where the state is unable to monopolize force, terrorism thrives and continues to grow on the continent (Cilliers, 2004). With this, human security remains a far-fetched goal on the continent. It is worth noting that South Africa is said to be the first African country to subscribe to the contemporary definition of human security, thus making it a welfare state. This, however, does not mean that it has been able to achieve complete human security. Nevertheless, compared to most African states, the government of South Africa has been able to provide its people with some level of personal security (Cilliers, 2004).

To conclude, regardless of the different understandings of human security, it still remains a pursuit for the rights of the people. Be it the right to good healthcare, clean environment, freedom of political ideologies, right to access food and employment, freedom from fear, and the right to belong to any chosen community, they are all geared towards the people, not the state.

## **2.2. Causes of human insecurity**

There are many causes of human insecurity. However, for this thesis, the following causes will be discussed: poverty and economic instability, political actions and social instability, food and environmental issues, and terrorism.

Human insecurity can be seen from the perspective of the lack and/or absence of human economic, social, political rights, etc. In this case, Ogege (2013) sheds light on the opposite of security, that is insecurity, defined as the inability of a nation to provide basic needs for its people, protect and develop itself without constant external interventions, and whatever tendencies that might undermine a nation's cohesion, values, properties and the lives of its people. Therefore, human insecurity is the lack of measures to achieve freedom and rights of the individuals within the state (Ogege, 2013). Whereby, this affects their ability to go about their daily lives in peace, and/or without fear of harmful disruption of their properties and lives (Piazza, 2006). In many cases, human insecurity has led to the forced migration of people, in search of better living standards, and to free oneself from the violence within their society.

### ***2.2.1. Poverty and Economic Instability***

Poverty and insecurity are cyclical, which makes it difficult to determine which one leads to the other (Akokpatri, 2007). Increasing poverty and economic instability have always negatively affected human security, especially on the African continent. More than 70% of world's population live in poverty thus preventing about half of the world's population from accessing basic human rights (Shah, 2013). The UNDP report of 2005 indicated that Africa suffers the most as about 40% of its population falls below the poverty line (UNDP, 2005; Akopkari, 2007). About 40% of Africans are economically vulnerable and unstable and they lack basic rights and access to good healthcare, educational and social rights because of their economic disadvantage. Poverty has been said to make people vulnerable by denying them their rights, which is the case with most Africans living below the poverty line (Shah, 2013).

Poverty and economic instability, although they are not exactly the same, can be used interchangeably. This is because, for example, in the case of South Africa, economic instability has led to a sharp increase in income gaps which has affected the poverty rate in the country (Shah, 2013). This has further affected food security in the country, where nearly 26% of the people suffer from hunger on a daily basis (Oxford, 2018). The country's economic instability is linked to its poverty rate, and vice versa. Poverty makes it difficult for people to have access to good education and balanced diets. This is because those who are mostly affected lack the funds to access quality education, which further marginalizes them (Knight, 2013). When one does not access quality education, such a person is not able to gain the necessary skills needed for them to venture into the job market. As such, they are not able to access jobs that will earn them enough to elevate them from poverty. This therefore affects their access to balanced diets and food in general. This, in essence, leads to persistent cycles of poverty throughout one's life. As Akopkari (2007) argued, poverty tends to be inherited, because of its cyclical nature. Families living in poverty, not having enough resources to send their children to quality schools or to provide them with a balanced diet, end up with malnourished children without basic skills for quality employment. This therefore means that, such an individual will have to settle for menial jobs, hence low incomes and persistent poverty (Shah, 2013). Also, when parents do not leave behind any property for their children, as a result of poverty, they are unable to fall back on to something to keep them going. And, given their low-skilled nature, they are forced to fend within their means, thus keeping them in the poverty zone.

Furthermore, when government is unable to provide its people with the needed access to quality education, citizens become insecure and they lack the freedom to access their basic rights (Tadjbakhsh, 2005). Not having the monetary freedom to access one's rights, including quality education and healthcare, contributes immensely to human insecurity. Although one can argue that government is not totally responsible for providing human security for its people, it however plays a major role in it. The state should be able to provide: state owned quality schools, employment opportunities, state owned quality healthcare services, as well as subsidized and affordable food supplies that are accessible to the general public (Piazza, 2006; Shah, 2013). In so doing, the government will be able to mitigate the lack of access to quality skilled jobs for its people, which in turn will reduce poverty in the country. Also, having access to quality education could empower some to become entrepreneurial and build their own wealth.

Finally, the economic instability of a country intensifies the poverty rate of such country. A state need to make sure that it stabilizes its economy, protects local businesses from international ones, and endeavours to thrive internationally (Piazza, 2006). This will have the positive effect of reducing poverty thereby increasing the levels of human security within states. Apart from poverty and economic instability, political actions and instability also contribute to human insecurity.

### ***2.2.2. Political action and social instability***

In most societies where human insecurity is rife, people are usually mistreated by political leaders. Political actions play a major role in shaping the way people feel, they either feel secure or insecure. And in this case, when political leaders put their own interests above those of the people, it causes the people to lose faith in them. Corruption is a prevailing element that affects human security (Akopkari, 2007). For example, African countries are known for their high levels of human insecurity and corruption, which are both interlinked. Most African political leaders violate the human rights of their people and they abuse public offices for their own benefit, which negatively impacts on human security (Smith-Bingham, 2016). When citizens lack freedom of speech or expression, they begin to lose their human rights and security. They then begin to develop fear of the system and government, hence some of them may be forced to migrate in an effort to regain their security. This is so because, in some cases, people who speak against the government are arrested. The constant violation of human rights by the

government makes it difficult for the people to freely live their daily lives (Piazza, 2006). Human security therefore becomes an issue because political leaders would rather protect their own interests, rather than to protect their people's human rights.

Social instability, on the other hand, is not only a factor which leads to human insecurity; it is also a threat to economic growth and political order (Knight, 2013). Social instability is when social justice is not in place, thus leading to the increase in social problems, while limiting social progress (Knight, 2013). Social instability can be caused by various factors, including: inequality, insecurity and poverty, just to name a few, and these tends to lead to unemployment, illiteracy, etc (Knight, 2013). As indicated above, poverty plays a major role in causing human insecurity, which is seen here to be one of the major causes of social instability. Hence citizens lack the freedom to social benefits and justice, and they are not able to access basic healthcare, education and social services, which in turn affects their standard and quality of good living. Not having the security of social justice and not being confident in the state to provide one with appropriate social representation and justice in the country, affects the level of security for individuals within the state. In Africa, more than 20,000 children die on a daily basis, due to the lack of basic social services which are required in order to keep them alive. In most cases, they are quietly removed and not recorded to the increasing rate of deaths caused by lack of governmental provision of social services (Shah, 2013).

Furthermore, although linked to political instability, lack of political participation and/or government's refusal to grant citizens free and fair political participation, continues to affect human security, where those who stand against the government's corrupt actions are usually made to pay direly for it. As seen in most African countries, the one time that citizens have to participate in political events, is usually during voting processes, which are in most cases usually interrupted by governmental officials. Voters' lives and freedom are put to risk (Smith-Bingham, 2016). Not having the freedom to vote, and not being given the opportunity to make decisions of who should legitimately lead a country, affects citizens in that, they are forced to live with whoever goes into power, even when the leader in question is not providing them with their necessary human security needs. When people are unhappy with the state of the country, the political leaders and their governance of the country, the way they live, their economy etc., they tend to feel insecure and lose trust in the system, thus robbing them of their human security. In some cases, sections of society can incite rebellion/revolution, in the bid to free themselves from the system and conditions of human insecurity.

Conflicts are known for their ability to cause inhuman insecurity due to increased levels of violence and the loss of faith in the system by the people. Folarin defines conflict as having disagreement and/or hostility towards another person, or between two or more people (Folarin, 2015). It can either be verbal or physical, and has been argued to be inevitable. Considering the fact that conflict is inevitable, in politics it occurs when rival parties stand against each other, with each intending to eliminate the other. Akokapri (2017) lists the following as effects of conflict on human security: it causes grave sufferings on people, especially women, children and elderly, leads to the creation of child soldiers, and it generates refugees and internally displaced persons.

During armed conflict, those who are mostly affected are women, children and the elderly, due to their already vulnerable positions in society. They are usually unable to defend themselves, or actively engage in the fight to further their own interest. As a result, they are the ones that bear the brunt of the conflict. Where women and girls are constantly subjected to rape as a weapon of war, they are made to live in fear and they endure life-long trauma as a result of their war experiences, which makes it difficult for them to feel secure. A case example is that of the Rwandan genocide whereby the Tutsi and Hutu fought against each other and women and girls were used as a 'scapegoat', to relay animosity between rivals (Smith, 2004). Given the harmful effects of rape, human insecurity in the country rose to levels higher than had ever been recorded.

During conflict people become forcefully displaced from their places of residence, thus making it challenging for them to access their human rights, therefore their human security is affected. As Akopkari (2007) posits that the rate of conflict in African states had spawned large number of refugees by 1992. For example, in Somalia there were about "870,000 refugees, 850,000 in Ethiopia, 670,000 in Liberia, 400,000 in Angola and 270,000 in Sudan" (2007:25). Due to the bombings and destroying of homes and resources, people are forced to relocate, seeing that their homes are no longer existent and the society has become dangerous to live in, they leave to find places of refuge. Over the years, refugee camps have been built in order to accommodate those who have been displaced from their homes. Not having a safe place to stay when one's properties and home have been destroyed by bombings and fights, their human security is lost.

### ***2.2.3. Food and Environmental Issues***

Other causes of human insecurity are food and environmental issues. Food insecurity continues to negatively impact on human security (Akopkari, 2007). Food crisis is a major threat to human security in third world countries, especially in Africa. According to UNICEF (2006), about 28 percent of children in Africa are underweight, as a result of malnutrition derived from the food crisis that the continent is currently experiencing. Food insecurity remains a challenge hence global efforts to eradicate hunger. The latest Global Food Policy report, released in 2018, showed that malnutrition is on the rise (CNBC Africa News, 2019).

Malnutrition affects one's ability to function normally, which means that such a person is neither able to actively participate in their society, nor access their human rights. In children, for example, with the high rate of malnutrition amongst them, they are unable to function well in schools and their bodies are prone to sickness (UNICEF, 2019). It is difficult to provide medical help to someone who is suffering from malnutrition because the body needs food before it can respond to medication. Finally, the food crisis contributes to the increasing number of deaths in Africa, whereby rising hunger and malnutrition levels continue to affect the living standards of the people, thus putting them at risk of mortality (Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations, 2019). It is important that the food crisis is addressed in order for human security to be achieved. Only then can people be empowered to face risks and overcome challenges when their lives are not threatened by malnutrition. As the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the UN (FAO) posits, "food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life" (FAO, 2016:1). Sometimes, food may be available but it will not be affordable to the people, due to high prices and poverty.

The state of the environment also plays a role in determining whether or not the soil is fertile for food cultivation. Therefore, environmental crises also have an impact on food production and human security. In order for agricultural produce to be supplied, the nature of the environment plays a major. As argued by Akokpari (2007), environmental factors such as floods and droughts contribute to food crisis in Africa. When there are floods, agricultural produce is unable to thrive because it gets washed away, or the soil becomes too weak to hold it in the ground. Worse still, the nutrients of the soil would have been lost and diluted by the excess water. On the other hand, during drought seasons the soil becomes too dry to allow

plants to grow, which will lead to the killing of the planted seeds. However, when there is a balanced environmental state, plants can grow normally, and be cultivated to provide food for the people. Unfortunately, in Sub-Saharan Africa and northern parts of Africa, flooding and drought, constantly affect agricultural production, which causes food crisis, thus human security is not achieved (Akokpari, 2007). Environmental crisis characterised by climate change, land degradation, and the mismanagement of natural resources, hamper human security (Foster, 2005).

It is worth noting that environmental challenges such as the foregoing are more prevalent in countries affected by conflicts (Conflict and Environmental Observatory, 2019). For example, in the case of southern Iraq, water contamination has been a major issue, because of its scarcity and mismanagement due to poor administration in the context of war, over 110 000 people have been affected (Conflict and Environmental Observatory, 2019). Since 2015, there has been record of over 2 000 cases of socio-environmental conflicts, where environmental degradation and resource scarcity are causing conflict and forced migration. This makes human security challenging to attain because water contamination, climate change, land degradation, etc. are factors that violate human rights, which, in some cases, lays the foundation for conflict to erupt, and vice versa.

#### ***2.2.4. Terrorism***

The term spans from the word terror, which can be defined as the deliberate use of intimidation, violence and fear to further an agenda. Smith gives a more detailed definition of terror as “violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm, [...] designed to coerce others into taking actions they would otherwise not undertake, or to refrain from taking actions that they desire to take” (Okumu and Botha, 2009: 85). The definition of terrorism is, however, somewhat general, seeing that in some cases, groups fighting for the good for the people, for the freedom and rights of the civilians have been labelled as terrorist. For example, in South Africa, during the Apartheid era, the African National Congress (ANC) party leaders were labelled as terrorists by the Apartheid government and the international community, in a bid to silence them, even though they were fighting for the good of the people (Waxman, 2018). Also, in the case of the Biafran war, the Nigerian government labelled the Biafran fighters as terrorists because they protested against the unequal distribution of the country’s oil resources (Akwagyiram, 2017). In essence, leaders have used the term ‘terrorist’ to further their own agenda. This is not to deviate from the impact of terrorism on human

security. It is a fact that, regardless of the situation, terrorism has caused and continues to cause great human insecurity challenges.

Terrorism usually spans from extremists views, which in most cases, are Islamic extremists, that have spiralled into groups willing to go to any lengths to frighten people and/or government into doing carrying out the extremists' goals. Over the years, terrorism has increased within states and internationally. Some of the contemporary trends have been classified as state-sponsored terrorism, meaning that there is increased human insecurity. For example, in Afghanistan, counter-terrorism strategies have contributed to the rate at which human insecurity is rising (Akopkari, 2007). This is so because the international community's use of military means to fight against militant groups there has led to an increase in civilian casualties, seeing that in fighting terrorism, it is difficult to distinguish between those working for and/or are terrorist, from mere civilians.

In cases such as the above cites, the lives of the people become inevitably endangered, not only in the hands of the terrorist groups, but also in the hands of those fighting against the terrorists. Finally, the adverse effects of terrorism on lives, properties, infrastructure etc., make it difficult for people to feel secure. In most cases, some are forced to migrate, while others are forcefully displaced from their homes. which in turn increases human insecurity.

In conclusion, conflict and violence, social instability and political actions, and poverty and economic instability are core causes of human insecurity. It is important to note that all above mentioned causes of human insecurity are interlinked - they all interact with each other. When a society is struck by conflict and violence, the level of human security drops drastically. For instance: people are displaced from their homes, many are subjected to suffering, women and girls are raped as a weapon of war, and some children are forcefully abducted and trained to become child soldiers. In addition to the aforementioned negative effects, people stop trusting the system, fear increases, and their freedoms or rights are taken or lost in the process. Just as conflict causes displacement, suffering and the creation of child soldiers, it also leads to increased rates of poverty and economic instability which then leads to human insecurity. Poverty rates tend to increase in conflict ridden areas; the economic stability of states in conflict becomes volatile and unstable – the conflict persists. Finally, political actions and social instability cause and exacerbate conflict. Most conflicts emanate from: political rivalry (for

power and status), as well as bad governance and political decisions which inspire rebellion or revolt. Further to that due to social injustice, conflict may erupt. Terrorism is one of the major causes of human insecurity because of its goal of implanting fear and forcefully causing people to give up their human rights in the society, in order to forge the goals of the terrorist groups.

### **2.3. Human (In)Security in Nigeria**

Since the independence of Nigeria, insecurity has been an issue, where different governments have tried to prioritize security of the country, however, have not been as successful as expected. With the different threats to Nigeria's security, Boko Haram stands at its centre, where its activities are further threatening security of the people and the country at large. As Kalu, *et al* (2018) argues in their article, human security in Nigeria spans from problems like the militancy in the Niger-Delta, rampaging kidnaping in the South-east, armed robbery, ritual killings and Boko Haram insurgencies, of which the later continues to pose severe human security threat to the country. This section aims to interrogate the conceptual framework of human security in the Nigerian context, with specific focus on economic security, food security, and political security. Nigeria continues to suffer from human insecurity, which spans from food, environmental, health, political, personal, community, and economic security. However, for the purpose of this section, only three will be discussed.

As discussed above, economic security is the provision of economic needs of the people, which entrains employment security, in order for them to have a source of income to fend for themselves and their family. In Nigeria, however, economic security is far from being attained, and this remains one of the most security difficulties that is vexing the people. This is contrary to the global record that Nigeria is the economic giant of Africa, where it is believed that it is enriched in its economic strength (Kalu, *et al*, 2018; Otolorin, 2017). In reality, the people are staved of employment, which affects their ability to economically cater for themselves, and government does little to nothing in making sure its citizens are cared for. As have been argued by Kayode, *et al* (2014), the country's wealth is concentrated on the top 10% elites, while the other 90% suffer the stings of economic instability. This disparity and economic insecurity in Nigeria continues to affect the country's growth and development, and further open up the country to other forms of insecurities, internally and externally. And, as of 2019, Nigeria was declared one of the African countries with fast growing poverty rate (United Nations, 2019), which further supports the argument that it is unable to provide its people with economic security. Economic insecurity in Nigeria plays a major role in the emergence of insurgent

groups, and the continued surge of conflict in the country. With rising poverty in the country, food insecurity has become another major issue depriving the attainment of human security in Nigeria.

According to UNDP (1994), having physical and economic access to food and a balanced diet brings about food security, unfortunately, Nigeria is lacking in this regard. Agricultural production is one of the country's major source of revenue, which amounts to about 40% of its GDP (FAO, 2020). Even though the country ranks 93<sup>rd</sup> out of 117 countries on the Global Hunger Index in 2019 (Global Hunger Index, 2019), the figures are disappointing considering the fact that one of the country's major source of revenue is agriculture. This increasing hunger rates can be attributed to the perpetual violence that the country continues to face over the years.

Food insecurity is usually a result of armed violence and forced displacement, while some are due to lost incomes or depletion of household savings (United Nations, 2019). Of which in the case of Nigeria, one can argue that it is mostly due to violent conflict, forced displacement and loss of income. Since the gaining of independence, Nigeria has witnessed several violent conflicts, which have affected its supply and access to food. From religious and ethnic conflicts, to disasters, such as flooding and droughts, to economic crisis (Otaha, 2013), all these have contributed to the rising food insecurity in Nigeria. And, to top it up, over the years, the country's focus on food production has shifted to oil production and more importation of food, which has further made cost of food to rise, thus making it more difficult for the people to access basic balanced diets (Otaha, 2013). While food insecurity in Nigeria continues to negatively affect human security in the country, political insecurity also stands at the heart of it.

For decades, Nigeria has been known for its constant political unrest, which ranges from ethnic and religious conflicts, kidnapping, violent rebel activities, rigging of votes, political conflicts, etc. These unrests have caused devastating political instability in the country, and to top it all, there is the emergence of Boko Haram and other violent insurgent groups (Otaha, 2013). As known, that the concept of political security is to have the freedom to hold personal political views, ideologies, parties and freedom to express those views (UNDP, 1994), this is, unfortunately, not the case in Nigeria. Political unrest in the country has made it difficult for the people to freely hold political views which are not influenced or enforced by political elites. In most cases, violence is used to suppress people from freely expressing and making

independent political decisions. This is constantly seen in the continued violence that the country experiences during elections. Where people are violently threatened to vote against their choice of candidate, and/or people being threatened from going to vote, votes getting burned up and even people getting killed in the process (Adibe, 2014). Political violence in Nigeria has become a constant occurrence, and a breeding ground for violent insurgent groups to emerge. With political violence at the frontline of Nigeria's conflict situation, political insecurity will continue until something is done about it.

To summarize, it is important to note that, all the factors in human security contribute to the insecurity state in Nigeria, however, for the purpose of this study, only the above mentioned factors are discussed. All factors of human security are intertwined, so does economic, food and political security, in the Nigerian context. This being that, economic security is needed for food security to be achieved. While, the lack of political stability tends to negatively affect economic and food security. To have access to adequate food, the Nigerian people need to have the economic means to do so, like employment and sources of income, and to have these, freedom of political views and ideologies are necessary. As such, in the absence of all these, human insecurity continues to be in the rise.

#### **2.4. Debates around Human Security**

The term human security is one which has sparked a spate of debates over the years, with most questioning its clarity due to its abstract and imprecise nature. Although some have argued that it is forward-thinking, synergistic and adaptable to the work of the United Nations (UNDP, 2005), others believe it is too abstract and not relevant, hence it needs to be more specific and direct (John, 2014; Khong, 2001; Paris, 2001). This section will discuss key debates about the concept by focusing on its ambiguity, misuse by political leaders, and its relevance. It is noteworthy that, on the other hand, there is the argument that it provides a holistic approach to security.

The ambiguity of human security can be likened to that of 'sustainable development', where, although everyone seems to be for it, few actually understand what it means, while very few people know how to achieve it (Paris, 2001; John, 2014). The term can be argued to be analytically weak, seeing that it hardly gives a good analysis of an event within its scope, and many political leaders do not understand what it entails. For example, the former special representative to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Haiti, and the chair of the UN Panel on Peacekeeping,

Lakhdar Brahimi, once mentioned that he did not use the word, 'human security', because he does not know what it exactly means and worries that someone might contradict him without him being able to support his understanding (John, 2014). Also, the fact that human security encompasses everything, it becomes difficult to distinguish anything. As argued by Khong (2001) and Paris (2001), nothing will be done, as there is not a particular aspect of focus. For Paris (2001), the concept is too inclusive and expansive, such that it makes room for irregular discomforts. Also, it will be difficult for policy-makers to allocate resources across all seven broad aspects of human security. Seeing that they overlap, the already scarce resources will further incur allocation problems (Khong, 2001).

Also, some other critiques have argued that human security has only been used by political leaders to further their own political agenda, within the international community (John, 2014; Paris, 2001). Political leaders use the term human security in a bid to win international recognition, status and power, as well as to entice private aid and development agencies which advance human security interests (Paris, 2001). Also, these leaders perceive the provision of human security as a competition in the international community. In the process of doing that, those who are really marginalized and in need of human security are further marginalized and excluded from the equation. In the process of furthering their own interests, the concept leads to the disempowering of already weak and underdeveloped states (Duffield and Waddell, 2004). In terms of development and security, there is a division between the states that are able to provide their people with human security (developed states) and those that are unable to do so (undeveloped states). When powerful states are able to freely intervene in smaller or weaker states, this disempowers the latter and its citizens, seeing that they are unable to hold the former to account, for the violation of human rights during the times they were providing 'human security' vis-à-vis 'intervention' (John, 2014).

The usefulness of the concept of human security is heavily contested. To begin with, the researcher questions the notion behind using human beings solely as the symbol of security. This is because the actions and personality of human beings are constantly changing, as such, this uncertainty affects the ability for a fixed application of human security to be implemented. So, how useful is a concept which is based on uncertain and constantly changing group? The usefulness of human security in academic research, is contested by Paris (2001) who contends that the concept is young and subject to change because what is considered a security threat now, might not be the same in the near future. On the other hand (Henk, 2005:91) questioned

the usefulness of human security by enquiring how a concept still so undefined and contested, could really have much utility. Although the author argues in favour of human security, his question remains a point of critique, inspiring debates amongst scholars and analysts alike, particularly those who do not consider it relevant or useful.

On the other hand, there is a key argument that seems to support the concept of human security. The supposition is that, the utility of the concept is “to broaden our understanding of security beyond the narrow military-related agenda emphasised by traditional approaches to security” (Ewen, 2007:183). For instance, the phrase ‘freedom from want’ has added a non-military, physical issue to the agenda of human security, because the word ‘want’ encompasses issues such as poverty, underdevelopment and disease. As such, human security becomes focused directly on people, unlike how the subject of security used to be focused on the military and states. The people-centred concept suggests that security should focus on the social development of the people; not just on military concerns, but also on economic and political aspects.

In addition, unlike the critics who argue that the human security aspects are too broad, proponents of human security argue rather, that the adding of the seven components of human security make it more inclusive and human based. Hence the needs of people are catered for on the basis of food, environment, health, personal, political, community and economic security (UNDP, 1994). Thus, human security is more holistic and people-centred. Ewen (2007) argues that human security does not only provide a holistic approach to security issues, it also draws on “different specialisms, together in the quest to understand better the interconnections between diverse aspects of human insecurity, and it may also bolster co-operation between international agencies in the fields of security, development and human rights” (Ewen, 2007:184).

In conclusion, although the concept of human security came with the intention to further human development and growth, it is important to note the great amount of scepticism accompanying its conceptualisation. It is evident that human security focuses on the people, as compared to the state. However, the fact that the state remains the guarantor must not be neglected; it still holds high power over the security of the people. Furthermore, as earlier discussed, states can use the human security concept to further their own self-interests thus creating more problems, especially when weaker states continue to be exploited to benefit of powerful states. The

adoption of human security has so far not reflected much of a positive impact in terms of changing the behaviour of states; nor has it influenced major positive effects on the lives of the most vulnerable, whom the concept should be aiding. This is not to say human security is of no use, it is, however, not as impactful as it is expected to be.

## Chapter 3

### **Boko Haram in Nigeria**

Religious extremism has always brought about violence in the society. People tend to go to any lengths to defend their religious beliefs, which has led to wars in the past. Furthermore, extremist groups may end up terrorising people. In the case of Nigeria, religious extremism manifested itself in the ‘holy war’ which was led by Usman dan Fodio in 1804 (Harvard Divinity School, 2019), inspired the creation of Boko Haram, and has led to countless small religious conflicts over the years. Boko Haram started off as a charity group before developing into a terrorist group, as was described by the international community post 2009. The sect claims to have been sent by its god, to purge the society of western education and interference. Since its violent emergence in 2009, Boko Haram has embarked on countless bloody attacks in the country, especially in the northern part. This chapter discusses how the jihadist group was formed, the different insurgencies it has launched and what the government of Nigeria has been doing to counter the sect’s attacks. The emergence of Boko Haram remains a controversial topic in contemporary history.

#### **3.1. Emergence of Boko Haram**

There are many controversial explanations of how Boko Haram emerged in northern Nigeria. Although this article focuses more on the narrative that the sect began as a charity group, it briefly outlines the political conspiracy narratives, amongst many other narratives.

One of the many narratives on Boko Haram’s emergence is the political conspiracy (Adibe, 2014). In this narrative, some have argued that the group was created by politicians who were against former president, Goodluck Jonathan’s rule. These group of thinkers believe that some northern politicians sponsored the creation of the Boko Haram group in the northern part of the country, to disrupt president Jonathan’s administration (Egbeleke, 2013). After the sudden death of former president Yar’Adua in 2010, Jonathan took over as president, before he was democratically elected in 2011. With the ethnic and religious dynamics of the country, Jonathan being a Christian and a southerner, northern politicians were said to be against his rule because they considered the ruling of the country to be their birth right (Adibe, 2014). As such, they planned with some youths, sponsored them to terrorise the people, while the politicians often cited the attacks as a portrayal of President Jonathan’s inability to run the

country (Hasan, 2017). The group grew stronger, making them now difficult to defeat. This argument would have been accurate if Boko Haram began its insurgency from 2010, after president Jonathan came into power but the sect has been in operation since 2002, which does not align with former president Jonathan's tenure.

Another view is that, Jonathan sponsored Boko Haram in order to either mobilise support from Christians and Southerners, or to make sure that the sect's insurgency weakened and depopulated the northern part of the country ahead the 2015 elections (Adibe, 2014). This narrative suggests that Jonathan sponsored Boko Haram in order to make Islam look bad, and to make sure that by the time the 2015 election was undertaken, the population in the north would have reduced. This is because, during elections, the votes from the northerners are usually high, and they tend to support any northern candidate. So, if their population had reduced by then, it meant that president Jonathan had a better chance of winning against Buhari, who is a northerner. Unfortunately, Boko Haram's insurgency did not have any positive effect on Jonathan's administration nor his 2015 election performance, seeing that Buhari defeated him by 2.5 million votes (BBC News, 2015). Noteworthy is that Boko Haram has not been able to destroy the image of Islam because some of its insurgents target fellow Muslims. Thus one ponders the question of what could be their real agenda, considering the fact that they are attacking people regardless of their ethnic and religious backgrounds? Unfortunately, foregoing arguments do not correspond with either the activities of or the timing of creation of Boko Haram. Furthermore, there is not enough evidence to support the claims, which made it difficult to assert or apply them to this study. As such, this thesis argues from a historical perspective of the emergence of Boko Haram.

Boko Haram was initially created as a charity group in the northern part of Nigeria (Shuaibu & Salleh, 2015). The group's aim was to spreading Islamic teachings, while providing the people with arms, specifically those who listened to their preaching. However, it gradually developed into a violent group, which believed that Islamic culture is the superior religion, thus should be embraced by all (Kagu *et al*, 2019). The group also believes that western education is a sin, and should be abolished from the country. This section details the development of the jihadist group from a harmless humanitarian group to a violent organ now terrorising the country.

Boko Haram was once referred to as *Yusuffiya*, named after its founder, Mohammed Yusuf. It was established in its hold in Borno state in 1992, but only became popular from 2001 (Bintube, 2015). In the 1990s, there was a group called the *Izalatulbidi'awaikamatul sunna*, of which Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, was a member of. Yusuf was considered one of the extremists of the group. He had suggested that the group embarked on a jihad to purge the 'unholy' people, but the suggestions was rejected by the group (Bintube, 2015). As a result, he led a breakaway from the group, taking with him those who agreed with his beliefs to form what is now known as the Boko Haram group. Although the sect started off as a charity, non-violent group, it is arguable that it always had violent intentions, seeing that the founder was an extremist who wanted to launch a jihad in the northern part of Nigeria. Also, it is safe to say that its launch of charity arms was a strategy for recruiting people before actually launching its violent intentions.

After leaving the *Izalatulbidi'awaikamatul sunna* sect, Yusuf targeted youths who were socially excluded, unemployed and deprived in the society, seeing that they were easier to indoctrinate and manipulate (Shuaibu and Salleh, 2015). The group was able to use the socio-economic disadvantage of northern Nigeria to its benefit. It is important to note that the economic gap between the southern and northern part of the country is wide, where by 2018 there was about 27% poverty gap between both regions (Dapel, 2018). As such, the jihadist group was able to use this to their advantage, recruiting young members because of their extremely low level of education and unemployment (Addaney, 2016). So to them, joining the group meant a way out of unemployment and poverty.

The group changed its name from *Yusuffiya* to *ahalulsunnahwaljamahijirah*, and then withdrew from society to go underground where it trained and launched mini, non-significant attacks on police stations in the area. It also created a base in the Kannamma village of Yobe state. During this time, the group was not yet known, nationally; in fact, it was only known in the village, and was not considered a threat then (Bintube, 2015). This, however, gradually changed when, in 2002, things took a turn around for the group.

By 2002, the group had changed its name to Boko Haram, which means 'western education is forbidden', and it began to actively launch attacks on the people (Addaney, 2016). Also, for them, 'western education' reminds them of how the colonial masters used education to cause divisions amongst the northerners. The aristocratic class were allowed to have access to it, while the commoner classes were excluded, thus yielding animosity and distrust between

traditionally educated commoners and western-educated elites (Perouse de Montclos, 2016). It was the distrust and divide that the group used to its advantage, and this is reflected in its insurgency; it attacks those within the privileged sector of western education. As opined by Kagu et.al. (2019), the introduction of the western education system in Nigeria, brought about the ‘upgrading’ and/or shift away from the country’s basic values, to a more globalised knowledge system. However, for Yusuf, this was considered a ‘sin’ because of the division it caused in the society. Due to British rule, the western style of education provided opportunities for the people to be enlightened, and not to be easily manipulated, which, for the jihadist group, meant it was not going to be able to establish a conservative Islamic environment in the region.

With the few recruits the group had, in December 2003, it started launching open attacks on government buildings and police stations, continuing to wreak havoc on small communities like Yunusari, Borsari, Damaturu, Tarmuwa and Geidam in Yobe state (Perouse de Montclos, 2016; Addaney, 2016). With its violent acts becoming unbearable, the government had to intervene, leading the group to go into hiding, only to resurface even stronger and angrier in 2005. Between 2005 and 2009, the group continued to launch small attacks on the people. However, the 2009 attacks marked a major turning point of the group.

Finally, in 2009, the Nigerian security forces and Boko Haram clashed, after the jihadist group had returned from its hiding, and Yusuf, the founder, had returned from self-imposed exile in Saudi Arabia (Addaney, 2016; Comolli, 2015). Due to the countless small attacks that the group were launching on the government, the police were employed to confront the group and this confrontation led to a deadly conflict which led to the arrest of Yusuf, in 2009, and his killing in 2010 (Campbell, 2014; Comolli, 2015; Addaney, 2016). Yusuf’s death caused a huge outcry from the group which then withdrew to regroup and strengthen themselves, and returned in 2010. After Yusuf’s death, the police paraded his body on national TV, and the government publicly celebrated victory over the jihadist group, not knowing that it was regrouping to come back far worse than it had been before.

### **3.2. The Boko Haram insurgency**

As already stated, Boko Haram started off as a charity non-violent group, that was looking out for the welfare of the people in the society. However, it gradually evolved into a violent group, turning into a full grown insurgent group in Nigeria.

The killing of Yusuf in 2010 was a major blunder, but the government, not knowing this, celebrated it as a victory. It is common knowledge that, killing a terrorist leader does not end terrorism. Rather, it produces angrier followers who are willing to go any lengths just to retaliate. Such was the case with Yusuf; after he was arrested, he confidently boasted of the plans the group had and that they would execute them, with or without him (Akinola, 2015) and that is exactly what happened. In the same year, the group started re-grouping, re-strategizing, and increase in membership. It also embarked on its first successful prison break in Bauchi. More than 700 prisoners were freed, and made to join the group, which led to the drastic increase in its membership (Shuaibu, *et.al*, 2015).

Also, not less than a month after Yusuf was killed, the jihadist group chose another leader, Abubakar Shekau (Akinola, 2015). Shekau published an interview where he outlined the new direction of the group and listed the demands the group wanted from the government. That particular step officially launched the group into full scale violent attacks, attracting widespread attention nationally and from the international community, which when alerted defined Boko Haram as a terrorist group. In addition to the prison break, the group tried to exhibit their power by carrying out another attack in 2011. It targeted the United Nations (UN) headquarters in Abuja, where it launched a vehicle-borne IED explosion (Thurston, 2017). The attack resulted in the death of more than 15 individuals, with countless injured, most of them being staff members and civilians (Adelaja and George, 2019). Ladbury et al. (2016) stated that, in order to reduce the impact of Boko Haram's attacking tendencies, the United States (US) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) planned to sit down for negotiations with them. However, at that time, the popular argument was that Boko Haram was already gaining the support of al-Qaeda, from Niger, where it had already gained some control (Ladbury et al., 2016). The group was bent on getting revenge on the government for the death of their founder, so this intensified their insurgency. Azumah (2015) stated that, after the death of Yusuf the only motto of Boko Haram was not to make the religion pure but also to take revenge for the killing of Yusuf by the militants.

In 2012, the group launched another attack which took over 100 lives in Kano state (Oboh, 2012). This particular attack is one of the deadliest attacks the group has ever launched in the country. In the spirit of the New Year, the people of Kano state did not know what was coming. As such, no one was prepared for the attack, which is why its impact was huge. The jihadist group detonated several bombs and opened fire on people, in large commercial places,

hospitals and police stations (Shuaibu and Salleh, 2015; Oboh, 2012). Similarly, in 2014, suicide bombers were deployed to bomb police stations, marketplaces, places of worship, and hospitals in Kano again. It was also reported that a ten year old girl would have detonated a bomb she was wearing, in Kastina, if she was not discovered early enough. The jihadist group used young girls in this particular attack, which showed the extreme lengths it was willing to go, just to terrorise the people. Also, in the attack, the sect opened fire on worshipers who were said to be Muslims, at the mosque (Shuaibu and Salleh, 2015). This raised the question of what and who exactly their fight is against? Seeing that it attacks people from its own religious group. Finally, the 2012 and 2014 attacks led to the deaths of over 200 people, with over 300 being injured (Nicholas, 2014). Not knowing exactly where the bombs were coming from, people scattered everywhere, as they ran for safety. The girls that were used in the 2014 suicide bombings were some of the girls the jihadist group had kidnapped earlier that year.

In 2013, due to the increasing insurgence of the group, the government declared a state of emergency in the affected states of Yobe, Adamawa and Borno, in order to curb the attacks (Blanchard, 2014). However, this only made the attacks worse because between 2013 and 2014, the sect's insurgency had taken over 5000 lives. In 2014, the sect changed its strategy and started kidnapping children, women, religious leaders, etc. (Bintube, 2015; Shuaibu and Salleh, 2015).

Bombing is one of Boko Haram's major insurgent tactics; it has undertaken countless bombings of villages, schools, government buildings, commercial institutions, worship centres etc. There are also records of them bombing churches and mosques. In 2018, the group bombed a catholic church in Kaya, Madagali, in Adamawa state, during an attack on the village, by the insurgent group (Catholic News Agency, 2018). The catholic church was one of the over 20 buildings that were bombed by the group on the day. The Nigerian security forces were able to intervene, even though their intervention was already late. One of the Boko Haram members was killed in the intervention.

The group had embarked on a kidnapping spree, where political and religious leaders were kidnapped. Some were never seen again, while others returned after the payment of ransom (Akinbi, 2015; Shuaibu and Salleh, 2015). However, in 2014, the group undertook a major kidnapping which left the whole world shocked, and till date, the kidnapped girls are all yet to be returned. On the 14<sup>th</sup> of April 2014, the group stormed a girls school in Chibok, Borno state,

and kidnapped nearly 300 school girls from a government school (BBC News, 2017; Mbah, 2019; Shuaibu and Salleh, 2015). The schoolgirls were forcefully loaded onto a truck which the jihadist group drove away on the night of the incident. Not even the presence of school teachers could stop the group from executing their plan. It is sad to say that, till date, 112 girls are yet to be returned by the sect, and the government seems to have given up on its promise to make sure the girls are returned. Just like the 2014 kidnapping, the jihadist group carried out another one in 2018, in Dapchi town (Signe, 2018) where over 100 girls were kidnapped from their school.

In 2015 the group launched another attack in Baga, in Borno state. The attack was a deadly massacre, which led to the deaths of over 2000 people (Shuaibu and Salleh, 2015). The group captured and seized a military base in northern Nigeria, and embarked on a killing spree, resulting in the most deadly massacre ever recorded in the sect's insurgency. The Nigerian security forces did not seem to learn from the attack, because in 2018, a similar attack was carried out at the army bases in northeast Nigeria (Campbell, 2018). In mid-November 2018, the jihadist group attacked a military base in Metele, killing over a hundred soldiers and looting their weapons, food and clothing. Neither the government nor the military forces were able to launch a counter the attack. The attack came as a surprise because the main report on the case came from the videos that soldiers who had survived it recorded and circulated. The general public was made aware of the incident only through the videos that were posted on social media. Again, Boko Haram had demonstrated its growing strength, suggesting that it is now more unlikely to be defeated by the national security force of Nigeria.

Again, in June 2019, another attack was launched by Boko Haram, on the Nigerian army, in Borno state (BusinessDay News, 2019). The sect launched an attack on the military bases in Borno state, where they successfully seized three military personnel and stole weapons. This operation was conducted from the 31<sup>st</sup> of May to the 2<sup>nd</sup> of June. The three-day attack was carried out in four different military bases in the northeast of Nigeria (SABCNews, 2019). On the Friday of the attack, the sect stormed a military base in the town of Dikwa, but was unsuccessful in taking over the base, as they were repelled by the army (Business Day News, 2019). In a similar fashion, they attacked another military base in the town of Marte, on Saturday, where they were able to take over. In an intensive fight, Boko Haram successfully pushed out the troops from the base, and took over their weapons (Press TV News, 2019). After ransacking the place, they stole all their weapons, and then set the place on fire, making it

difficult for the soldiers to return. In their third attack, Boko Haram attacked a base in Kirenowa village where they stole weapons and forced the soldiers to evacuate before going into hiding in Dikwa (Business Day News, 2019).

Finally, from their hiding in Lake Chad, another attack was launched on another military base in Dalwa village, on Sunday 2<sup>nd</sup> of June (SABCNews, 2019). Since the emergence of Boko Haram, one of their strategies is to attack military bases in the northeast part of the country. In all attacks, the Nigerian soldiers were not able to defend themselves against the sect because they lacked adequate skills and strategies to challenge Boko Haram.

To conclude, Boko Haram's insurgency has led to the deaths of countless people, and many have been displaced, injured/disabled in the attacks. Furthermore, the security of the country has been highly compromised by acts and threats of terror. Since its violent emergency in 2002, it has plunged the country into instability, and has greatly affected human security.

### **3.3. Government response to the Boko Haram insurgency**

As Yusuf (2019) stated, the random, yet consistent attacks by Boko Haram on the people have led to high tensions and brought about threats to safety in the country. To address the issues, the government took some initiative in trying to suppress the growth of Boko Haram. However, the initiatives have been unable to control or defeat the jihadist group. Over the years, the government has tried the following, in their bid to defeat and/or control the jihadist group: re-allocation of financial budget for military upgrades, dialogue and declaring states of emergency, calling for international assistance, and military expedition.

One of the first approaches the government tried to use to end the Boko Haram insurgency, was to suggest dialogue, but this was unsuccessful (Akinbi, 2015). During former president Jonathan's tenure, he called upon the leader of the sect, and asked for a scheduled date to meet for negotiations. Jonathan even promised to provide amnesty to all Boko Haram members if they willingly laid down their arms (Akinbi, 2015). This particular government intervention was already foreseen to be ineffective because negotiating with terrorists has never been a good idea. While in the case of Boko Haram, agreeing to lay down their arms would have led to greater challenges, seeing that the group had multiple identities, and seemed to easily change its leadership. In the words of Akinbi, (2015:42), that would have made "rapprochement

elusive”. Since dialogue never worked out, the Nigerian government embarked on other, more aggressive, interventions. As dialogue never worked for the government, from 2012 to end of 2013, the government decided to call for a state of emergency (Akinbi, 2015; Blanchard, 2014). Still under the administration of president Jonathan, a state of emergency was declared in Borno in early 2012. It was then extended to Adamawa and Yobe states in 2013. The state of emergency was established in order to control and/or limit the impact of the jihadist group on the people. However, that did not make much of a difference because the group continued to carry out attacks in the region thus more lives were lost.

Furthermore, the Nigerian government has increased its financial efforts to combat the jihadist group. In 2014, the government increased the national military budget spending, which made it possible for the military to purchase more weapons, armoured vehicles, and other needed counter-terrorist materials (Aghedo and Osumah, 2015). The increase of funds was inspired by Boko Haram’s kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls. The government was made to realize that the group would go to any lengths to terrorise the people. Also, the international attention surrounding the kidnappings forced the government to intensify its intervention. Unfortunately, even after the increased military funding, the national security force was still unable to stand against the jihadist group. The military still had no chance against Boko Haram due to the misuse of the funds. There was lack of support to buy the needed weapons, more than 50% of the funds budgeted for the national security force were not accounted for and political leaders in charge of the funds rather used it for their own interests (Ogbuehl, 2018; Aghedo and Osumah, 2015). This has not only made it difficult for the government to defeat the jihadist group, but also caused many soldiers to lose their lives during fight against Boko Haram.

Although there is the worry of misuse of funds, Ogunnubi (2019) has argued that the Nigerian government has made some progress in the fight against Boko Haram. The government has employed over a hundred more people into the national security force and in 2018 it approved over 1million US dollars (USD) budget for the improvement of the national defence system (Ogunnubi, 2019). After the Dapchi kidnapping of schoolgirls, the government saw another need for increase in funds for the fight against Boko Haram. Also, military personnel sent to fight against the jihadist group have complained that they are no match for the group, seeing that the sect is better equipped than the security force. Ten years have passed since the violent emergence of the group in 2008, yet the Nigerian security force has not been able to acquire

military materials and devise strategies needed to combat the jihadist group even with all the international assistance that has been coming into the country.

The government of Nigeria has also been able to respond to the Boko Haram insurgency by calling for international assistance. After the Chibok incident, which drew international attention, the US, under the auspice of the United Nations (UN) also intervened in the matter (Amusan and Ejoke, 2017). The US provided the Nigerian government with experts to help train military personnel on counter-terrorist attacks. The US was also able to provide the government with financial aid to help enhance its technological skills and adequately cater for the soldiers fighting against the jihadist group (Addaney, 2016). This is because, it was believed that the soldiers were not able to fight well due to the lack of adequate care, which was affecting their stability and focus. Although the US's intervention brought about some hope for the Nigerian people, the jihadist group seemed to be more than prepared, as their insurgency neither reduced nor stopped following US counter-terrorism assistance. As Salisu and Saleh (2019) argued, the performance and thinking process of Boko Haram is quite advanced. As such, the only way to defeat them is not through the acquisition of advanced weaponries, but rather, by understanding how it thinks. Of which their argument was proven true, because when the US was assisting the Nigerian government to help defeat the jihadist group, the group was busy re-strategizing. Boko Haram was developing their networks, and devising ways to destroy the communication system of the country, in order to decentralise the system and make its attacks easier (Suleiman and Aminul Karim 2015). This was seen in their subsequent bombings and attempted attacks on government facilities, commercial businesses and police stations, especially in the Kano attack of 2014.

In addition to the US' intervention, the governments of Chad, Cameroon, Benin and Niger also decided to intervene in the fight against Boko Haram, as the insurgent group was extending into their boarders (Stevenson et al, 2017). In order to assist, they contributed military personnel, over 3000 military personnel were sent to Nigeria to fight against the jihadist group. Also, Cameroon, Chad and Niger provided their territory for the housing of displaced people affected by the insurgency (Omole, et.al., 2015). Over hundred thousand people have been displaced by the insurgency which has led to the increasing rate of refugees fleeing the country. With the influx of refugees into those countries, Boko Haram began to spread, as some of its members penetrate into those territories disguised as refugees, to attack and disrupt the refugee

camps. This has resulted in the government of Cameroon deciding to return some refugees back to Nigeria.

The United Kingdom (UK) also joined in assisting the Nigerian government to fight the Boko Haram insurgency. In 2017, the UK government provided financial support for soldiers' skills development and counter-terrorism training (Stevenson et al, 2017). It gave financial aid of over two hundred and fifty million dollars, and sent forty British troops to join the Nigerian soldiers in direct combat with Boko Haram (Stevenson et al, 2017). Other countries that assisted were China, which provided technological assistant and Canada, which provided experts (Sampson, 2016; Stevenson et al, 2017). International assistance has afforded the Nigerian government some advantage in the fight against Boko Haram. It has not defeated the group, but has provided hope for the government of Nigeria.

Another way the Nigerian government has been responding to the Boko Haram insurgency is through military expedition. The government's main response to Boko Haram is by waging military war against the group. Even before the group became actively violent in 2009, the government has always used military means to fight the group (Akinbi, 2015; Addaney, 2016). Since the Jonathan administration, Nigerian soldiers have always been sent to wage fights against the jihadist group. In 2009, Nigerian military personnel clashed with the group, leading to the killing of over hundred Boko Haram members and the capturing of the sect's founder, Yusuf (Shuaibu & Salleh, 2015). That particular military expedition made the government believe that it had defeated the jihadist group, yet this made the jihadists even angrier and stronger. With small scale military expeditions, by the Nigerian security force, against Boko Haram in 2015, after the election into power of Muhammadu Buhari, the headquarters of the military was moved from Abuja to Maiduguri, and the appointment of new military leadership was implemented (Felter, 2018). This was in order to make the military more efficient in its fight against the jihadist group. Also, seeing that Boko Haram's hideout base is in Sambisa forest, Nigerian soldiers have waged fights against them countless times in the forest. In April 2019, the Nigerian Air Force attacked the jihadist group in the Bula Korege area of the forest, in Borno state (Aluko, 2019). It was claimed that the jihadist group was holding a meeting in the forest when the bombing happened. According to the chief officer of the attack, the attack led to the killing of over hundred members of the group, with some of the sect's vehicles and weapons being destroyed (Aluko, 2019; NAF Aircraft Destroys Vehicles, Neutralizes Terrorists at Suspected Workshop in Sambisa Forest, 2019). This was similar to the 2016

Sambisa forest military expedition by the Nigerian security force, which also led to the killing of Boko Haram members in the forest.

Finally, on the 10<sup>th</sup> of June, 2019, a report was released by the army director of public relations, Colonel Sagir Musa, indicating that nine Boko Haram social media influencers had been killed (Yusuf, 2019; Toromade, 2019). The director claimed that the army rounded up the sect's media personnel, who were running the group's media platform, which is used to recruit new members and spread the group's doctrine. Although this was a success for the Nigerian security force, it is also safe to question the significance of the killing of those members. This is because the Nigerian government has been known to exaggerate the success and impact its interventions in dealing with Boko Haram insurgency.

To conclude, although the Nigerian government has made some progress with the fight against Boko Haram, it has however not been able to defeat or end the group's insurgency in the country. With the help of other countries, the country has been able to hold back the jihadist group from total control of the northern part of Nigeria. The government's responses to Boko Haram's insurgency have been through increasing the military financial budget, requesting for dialogue with the jihadist group, declaring states of emergency, calling for international assistance and military expedition. During the early days of incumbent president, Muhammadu Buhari's first term (2015-2018), he emphasised that defeating Boko Haram was part of his mandate. However, he failed to deliver on that promise. Seeing that the government has paid little to no attention to the recent resurgence of the jihadist group, the latter is gaining more ground in the country, and spreading into neighbouring countries such as Chad and Cameroon.

## Chapter 4

### **Implications of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria**

As indicated in the previous chapter, Boko Haram insurgency has evolved over the years, by becoming more radical and dangerous. The sect's insurgency continues to cause havoc, especially in the northern part of the country. Living standards have dropped drastically, and people have lost their properties, their loved ones, and human security in general. Northern Nigeria is now considered one of the most unsafe and economically disadvantaged parts of Nigeria (Famulusi, 2019). The continued bombings and attacks by Boko Haram have had negative socio-economic and political implications. On that note, this chapter will focus extensively on the socio-economic and political implications of the Boko Haram insurgency. The socio-economic and political effects that will be addressed in this chapter, include: poverty and illiteracy, unemployment, poor healthcare, displacement, national insecurity, corruption and political instability.

#### **4.1. Socio-economic Implications**

Since Boko Haram became violent, more than 9 years ago, the Nigerian government is yet to successfully defeat the group and provide adequate protection for its people, against its attacks. Boko Haram's continued insurgency is making it difficult for the country to recover socially and economically from past damages. The Nigerian people no longer feel safe in their own country, especially those living in the northern part. The sect's terror attacks, which include: kidnappings, bombings, looting, and killing of people, continue to cost the country, and the socio-economic state of the northern people has dropped drastically (Awojobi, 2014; Dele, 2018). For this study, the discussion of the socio-economic implications of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria will be based on the following issues: poverty and illiteracy, unemployment, poor healthcare and displacement of the north-east people of Nigeria.

##### ***4.1.1. Poverty and Illiteracy***

To begin with, a brief definition will aid in understanding in this section. Poverty is derived from the Latin word, 'poor', which means to lack a certain amount of material possession and money (Ngbea and Achunike, 2014). A more detained definition of poverty comes from the UN's definition, which states that poverty is a "denial of choice and opportunities, a violation of human dignity, [which deprives one the] basic capacity [needed] to participate effectively

in society” (United Nations, 2011:2). It is disheartening to know that more than half of the world’s population live in this state; the inability to actively participate in one’s society due to lack of basic recourses.

Poverty is a major social problem in Nigeria, especially in the northern part of the country. Despite the country’s economic strength and growth in recent years, more than half of the population still lives below one dollar a day (Ngbea and Achunike, 2014; Familusi, 2019). Seeing that Nigeria is considered as one of the strongest economies on the continent, it becomes questionable how more than half of its population suffers from poverty. This is because most of its wealth is concentrated in the hands of few economic elite class members, who are business tycoons, politicians, celebrities, etc. “*The largest African economy*” title that Nigeria has been bequeathed has not stopped it from being named one of the countries with the highest poverty rates in the world (Danaan, 2018). Nigeria is considered the largest producer of crude oil in Africa, with its agricultural sector booming and contributing to its economic growth. However, poverty continues to loom in the country. As argued by Ngbea and Achunike (2014), Nigeria’s agricultural sector contributes about 45% to its GDP, yet the country continues to import most of its food. For example, in 2018, the country’s domestic rice production was estimated at 3.7 million metric tons, but about 5 million metric tons were imported in addition to that (Nzeka, 2018). Such high agricultural imports can be attributed to the large population of Nigeria, hence its food deficit.

To top it all, the increasing in Boko Haram insurgency has increased the rate of poverty in Nigeria, especially in the northern part of the country. Since the active operation of Boko Haram began in 2002, poverty rates increased drastically. By 2012, it was estimated that, over 60 million people were living on less than 1 USD a day in Nigeria (Portal, 2012). As at January 2019, over 91 million people were living in extreme poverty in Nigeria (The World Bank, 2019; Okogba, 2019). Considering the fact that the northern part of Nigeria is the bedrock of the country’s production of rice and livestock, the continued Boko Haram attacks in the region have affected the locals’ ability to continue to produce these foods. For example, there has been a decline in grain production from 6.9 million hectares in 2017 to 3.8 million hectares in 2018 (Nzeka, 2018). In most Boko Haram attacks, villages are looted, agricultural produce is stolen by Boko Haram invaders, and livestock are forcefully taken from their owners (Dele, 2018; Awojobi, 2014). For example, in September 2018, a Boko Haram group attacked three small villages in Bornu state. It attacked Dala-Melari, Fuguri and Femari villages, where it violently

forced villagers to give up their food and livestock, and burnt down people's houses and farm yards (Punch News Nigeria, 2018). The attack left at least 7 people dead, and more than 100 people homeless, with no more sources of livelihood, seeing that their farm produce and livestock were looted (Punch News Nigeria, 2018). This is not the only instance of looting carried out by Boko Haram. Sometime in March 2019, another looting took place in Adamawa state, where insurgents looted a bank and some shops around the bank. Fortunately, the state police were able to counter-attack, which led to the killing of some of the bandits (Aluko, 2019). Those who escaped were only able to get away with the food they had looted, because those with the money were caught and apprehended by members of the Nigerian police force who responded to an alert about the attack. Boko Haram activities do not only affect production, they have also led to more poverty within the region, seeing that people continue to lose their sources of livelihood/income (Dele, 2018; Familusi, 2019).

Noting that the northern part of Nigeria was already known for its high poverty rate, the increase of the Boko Haram insurgency has made the situation worse. The effect of the Boko Haram insurgency on poverty continues to increase, with issues like poor nutrition, lack of access to quality education and healthcare, increased crime amongst youths, etc. causing human insecurity (Ikpe, 2017). Due to the lootings and destroying of farms, the northerners are left to settle for the little food remaining. Also, in most cases, the little food left for the people is of minimum nutritional value, which further leads to malnutrition and diet related diseases. For example, Adamawa, Yobe and Borno, currently the most affected states by the Boko Haram insurgency, recorded the highest malnutrition rates in Nigeria (UNICEF, 2018). Due to the continued attacks and threats by Boko Haram, in the above mentioned states, the food deficit is on the rise. As such, people lack adequate access to balanced diets and have no access to adequate food to keep them going. As compared to other states in the country, in the northern states, especially Yobe, Adamawa and Bornu states, children are suffering from severe/acute malnutrition (UNICEF, 2018), with little signs of hope for assistance from the government.

Finally, to make it worse, many International Organizations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that used to be in the north have all left for fear of their lives (Ikpe, 2017). This is because, not only does the sect target their organisations, it could also kidnap their personnel for ransom, in a bid to continue to make money to support its cause. The rate of kidnappings in the northern part of Nigeria has increased over the years, with foreigners topping the list of targets. As such, the fact that foreign businesses and organisations are leaving

the north, has also affected the region's economic strength. Their relocation has increased poverty rates in the process, given the negative effect on job creation and availability of opportunities (Ikpe, 2017). International businesses contributed immensely to livelihoods in the northern part of Nigeria because of the employment they provided, which meant that the people would have sources of income to access quality living standards and pay for services such as healthcare and education etc. Not only was international businesses affected in northern parts, Nigeria at large has suffered a great loss of foreign direct investment (FDI) due to the country's political instability (Tochukwu, 2013). In 2013, it was recorded that there was a drop of about 21.3 percent in the country's FDI inflows (Tochukwu, 2013). Seeing that FDI has some significant impact on Nigeria's economic strength, the drop in its inflow, over the years is affecting the country's growth. For example, by the fourth quarter of 2012, FDI was over 3000 USD million, however, this has dropped drastically, where in 2018 it was at about 300 USD million (Trading Economics, 2019).

Poverty and illiteracy, as effects of Boko Haram insurgency in the northern part of Nigeria, are interlinked. Illiteracy is a product of poverty, and vice versa. In northern Nigeria, not only is the rate of poverty higher, compared to other parts of the country, illiteracy rates also top the chart in the region (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). UNICEF (2019) reported that more than 60% of children in northern part of Nigeria, especially in Adamawa, Yobe and Bornu, suffer from illiteracy due to the continued Boko Haram attacks in those states. In northern Nigeria, the standard of education is not as strong as in other parts of the country because of the region's immense focus on agricultural production and livestock farming. However, since the establishment of Boko Haram, and their continued attacks in the region, many school buildings have been destroyed. As a result, there are less schools to go around. One of the Boko Haram strategies is to bomb schools, because it believes that western education is negatively influencing the people, and also making it difficult for it to continue to recruit into its sect. So for Boko Haram, bombing schools provides an opportunity for the group to expand, since less schools mean more youths available to manipulate. The bombing of schools has also created severe fears in the hearts. Parents are scared to send their children to school, for fear of them being killed or kidnapped while there (Signe, 2018). Some parents would rather home-school their children, of which, in most cases, the parents are not academically capable to do so. Thus, they pass down their 'illiteracy' in the process. Also, when more students are out of school due to the fear of being killed or kidnapped, they are deprived of the opportunity to learn, which then increases their illiteracy resulting in poor literacy rates in the region.

Boko Haram's most prominent argument is that, western 'education is a sin', as its name Boko Haram translates, hence it campaigns against education and enlightenment. This has been evident in its activities, through the kidnapping of students and the destruction of schools and educational facilities (Signe, 2018). It is widely known that education is a powerful weapon. The sect is also aware of that, which is why it is doing everything it can to make sure that it destroys the influence of education within its jurisdiction, a case example being the major kidnappings carried out by the sect in the Chibok school girls case of 2014. The militant group stormed a female school and kidnapped 276 girls from the school, without the government or the police being able to stop them (BBC News, 2017; Mbah, 2019). This event inspired a global movement whereby millions of people from all over the world urged the government to help return the girls. However, more than 5 years later, more than 100 of the girls are yet to return. This is after around 111 girls escaped from Boko Haram zone. This particular kidnapping stirred fear in the lives of the people, which led to parents withdrawing their female children from schools. Some were married off at very young ages, while others were home schooled. Not up to 5 years after the kidnapping, a similar incident occurred in 2018, in the Dapchi town, in northern Nigeria, where more than 100 schoolgirls went missing on the 19<sup>th</sup> of February (Signe, 2018). The Nigerian military force embarked on the mission to free the girls, 2 were killed, 76 freed, and the remaining are yet to be found nor released (The Guardian News, 2018).

Finally, Boko Haram's kidnapping strategy is aimed at ensuring that education is not sought after by the northern people, so as to maintain illiteracy. This is in order to make it easy for the people to be manipulated into supporting the group's ideologies and goals (Ebonyi, 2019). They apply this strategy because, to them, education is a source of enlightenment, and both, a motivation for ending extremism and as well as a strategy for combating terrorism. As such, it makes sense for the group to set out to prevent this from happening, by destroying educational facilities and kidnapping students. This strategy has thus led to the increase in illiteracy in the region. Also, it further prevents people from accessing better living standards, thus increasing the rate of poverty. There is the view that when someone is poor, uneducated and unemployed, s/he becomes an easy target for manipulation. This holds true because Boko Haram targets poor, educated and unemployed persons in their recruitment exercises.

#### ***4.1.2. Unemployment***

Increasing unemployment in the north-east part of Nigeria is another effect of the Boko Haram insurgency in the country (Ikpe, 2017). As argued earlier, poverty and illiteracy are interlinked. Unemployment can be added to the double crisis, hence the triple scourge of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. It can be argued that the Boko Haram sect is aware of this link, and as such, makes use of strategies that would affect all three elements. Boko Haram's bombing of educational facilities, its looting strategies and destruction of sources of income, affect employment opportunities in the region (Ikpe, 2017). Not having the right educational skills needed to secure quality jobs means no source of living, hence the high unemployment rate. Not having the financial means to access quality education affects one's ability to secure quality jobs, which in turn will deepen unemployment (Akokpari, 2007). Not having schools to attend, seeing that the sect has been destroying schools in the region and causing some to abandon school due to fear means not having the skills to make one employable. As argued by Tochukwu (2013) and Ikpe (2017), there has been loss of businesses, especially foreign investors, because of the threat of Boko Haram, as a result of acts of kidnapping and bombings in the area. As such, job availability has dropped drastically in the region. The drastic decrease in job availability, plus the increasing population size of the north-east, have made employment difficult to find in the region. There are now more people than there are employment opportunities because of the continued insurgency of Boko Haram.

According to Trading Economics (2019), Nigeria's unemployment rate increased over the year, by the end of 2018, it had reached 23.1%, of which over 50% of it stems from the northern part of the country. In 2010, a survey was carried out by the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN), to determine the durability of both, international and local manufacturing companies in the country (Okafor, 2011). It was discovered that more than 100 firms in the northern region had shut down due to many factors, of which terrorism threat was one of them (Okafor, 2011). The fact that the northern part of Nigeria is now unsafe for companies, contributes to economic decline. Not only were company buildings being destroyed, businesses began to suffer sales-deficits. This is because the rate at which people patronized them dropped, and the fear of Boko Haram was growing. In towns and villages, severely affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, businesses have closed down, banks have reduced their operating hours, and markets have also been drastically affected, thereby making it difficult for people to freely access such facilities (Othman, *et.al*, 2015). The Boko Haram insurgency has cost the north-east people socio-

economically, thus it will take the government longer to elevate the region from the ruins, even after the eradication of the militant group, in the future.

Finally, the high unemployment rate in the northern part of the country can further be attributed to the growing population therein, which is also linked to the poor healthcare facilities, which do not have resources to provide awareness about or to give family planning assistance to the people (Adekola, *et.al*, 2016). Boko Haram's bombing of healthcare facilities in the region also make it difficult for the northern people to access contraceptives or family planning education. As such, overpopulation is becoming an issue in the region. This leads us to the socio-economic implications of the sect's insurgency on healthcare services in the northern part of Nigeria.

#### **4.1.3. Poor Healthcare**

In its bid to destabilize the system in northern Nigeria, Boko Haram's insurgency has also affected the healthcare sector, with a number of doctors having left the state in search of safer work environments. As a result, the threat of the jihadist group has led to the loss of quality doctors in the region (Chukwurah, *et.al*, 2015). The loss of these doctors has affected healthcare services in the region. For example, due to the relocation of doctors and lack of healthcare resources, in 2013, there was an outbreak of polio, where more than 50% of the cases were recorded in Borno and Yobe (Omole, *et.al*, 2015). In addition to not having the right resources to combat the outbreak the situation was worsened by the continued attacks that the sect carried out in the region. In the case of Adamawa, there was an outbreak of diarrhoea, of which there were more than 50 cases per week, with no adequate medical resources to combat it (Omole, *et.al*, 2015). The water facilities in the region have been contaminated during attacks by Boko Haram; in some cases, the militant group deliberately contaminated the water in order to prevent people from having access to it (Adekola, *et.al*, 2016).

In 2015, there was a measles outbreak in northern Nigeria, with over 100 cases recorded in less than a week (Adekola, *et.al*, 2016; Omole, *et.al*, 2015). In addition to the aforementioned health issues, severe acute malnutrition continues to rampage the northern region, making it even more difficult for the people to curb the health crisis. Not having balanced diets aggravates any type of sickness, of which in the case of northern Nigeria, the food-deficit created by Boko Haram, is one of the factors that continues to aggravate disease outbreaks.

Furthermore, the Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in high rates of refugees. This has added onto the problems faced by the already overstretched health delivery system in the camps (Omole, *et.al*, 2015; Dele, 2019). Also, due to the unsanitary and risky behaviours of both, refugees and the officials at the camps, diseases are easily spread. As Awojobi (2014) argued, the Boko Haram insurgency has made it difficult for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) treatment to be distributed in the region. Even though the rate of HIV recorded in the north-eastern part of Nigeria is at 1.1%, being the second lowest in the whole country, the region is deprived of access to treatment (Avert.org, 2019; UNAIDS, 2019). Borno state used to be the front-runner in antiretroviral treatment (ART) coverage for the north-eastern region. However, due to the Boko Haram insurgency, there was a drop in ART coverage from 41.2% to 18%, between 2013 and 2016 (Avert.org, 2019). This decline has affected the number of people accessing the treatment.

#### ***4.1.4. Displacement***

The Boko Haram insurgency has led to the displacement of countless numbers of people in the northern part of Nigeria. One of the major implications of the sect's insurgency is the rise in displaced persons and creation of refugee debacles in the northern part of the country (Omilusi, 2016). Since the emergence of Boko Haram in 2002, and its hard dive into violent attacks against the northern people in 2009, there has been a massive record of displacement. As of October 2015, the numbers of displaced people in the region was at 1.9 million, and this figure has doubled over the past years; by 2019, it was at over 3 million people (Abdulazeez, 2016; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2019). Following the sect's kidnapping of the Chibok school girls in 2014, its attack on neighbouring villages in the same year and in 2015, the rate of displaced people rose across some states in the northern region of Nigeria. As recorded, over a million people were displaced from their homes in Maiduguri, which was meant to be considered the safest part of Borno state, yet was affected by Boko Haram's activities (Abdulazeez, 2016). Also, in 2015, about 144 000 people were internally displaced in Yobe state and about a hundred and thirty five thousand people were displaced in Adamawa state (Abdulazeez, 2016). Displacement weighs heavily on the economy of northern Nigerian. There are fewer people in the region, to carry out daily socio-economic activities, because homes were either abandoned out of fear of the sect or destroyed by the insurgent group. Furthermore, where farmyards are looted of produce and livestock, people flee. The losses also

make it difficult for the people to return to their homes and villages after the attacks because there will be no livelihood incentive to return to.

Displacement led to an increase in refugees from northern Nigeria to parts of central and west Africa; many of them were forced to go into hiding in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2019). As at January 2019, over hundred thousand refugees were housed in Cameroon, more than fifty thousand of them in Chad and about two hundred thousand in Niger (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2019). This is a huge increase, compared to the numbers of refugees recorded in 2015; there were about hundred and seventy thousand refugees across all three countries (Abdulazeez, 2016). The increase since 2015 is therefore more than hundred percent in less than five years. This is because, over the past five years, the Boko Haram insurgency has worsened. There have committed more cases of bombings, looting, rape and kidnapping, and this has resulted in the forced displacement of the people from affected regions.

It is important to note that Cameroon, Chad and Niger do not have the economic strength that Nigeria has, as such the flooding of refugees into their countries has caused major economic problems for them (Dauda, 2014). Although displacement has attracted humanitarian assistance over the years, the refugee camp conditions are poor, as indicated for example, by reports of outbreaks of diseases and shortage of food and basic supplies therein (Solomon, 2016). In Cameroon, for example, the camp was opened in 2013, and the population there has grown by more than 200% from its initial start-up size and intended capacity (Solomon, 2016). Seeing that the government is not capacitated to run and maintain the camp, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) took over the responsibility of maintaining the camp, in collaboration with the government of Cameroon (Solomon, 2016; Dauda, 2014). UNHCR is responsible for providing food, tents, medical assistance, clothing and basic needs at the camp, but the influx of refugees into the camp has posed difficulties for them. They are struggling to provide adequate resources and this has negatively affected camp conditions for refugees (Solomon, 2016). Due to lack of resources in the camps in 2015, Cameroon and Chad were forced to start sending some refugees back to Nigeria, thus posing greater challenges for the returnees, seeing that the region's they had fled remained under threat of attacks and there was no available safe housing for them in Nigeria (Abdulazeez, 2016). Those who were returned became internally displaced within the northern part of the country.

Finally, coupled with the fact that Boko Haram activities caused the displacement of people and the creation of refugees, the group also carries out attacks on refugee camps thus further complicating the human insecurity problem (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2019). As of 2015, new arrivals from northern Nigeria were placed under heavy scrutiny at refugee reception centres due to the fact that some refugees were associated with the insurgent group. Already plagued with the implications of their attack, the camps became less safe due to potential attacks by insurgents. The insurgent group loot humanitarian camps and destroy some of their resources in order to force people to flee from there as well (Abdulazeez, 2016). This, in essence, causes a huge socio-economic burden for the refugees' host countries and Nigeria.

To conclude, the Boko Haram insurgency, not only leads to negative socio-economic issues effects, the socio-economic implications also promote the growth of Boko Haram. This is so because the northern part of Nigeria is already facing several socio-economic challenges and Boko Haram insurgency has tripled the challenges therein. Boko Haram, being aware of the socio-economic state of the north, used this factor to their advantage by brainwashing the people into supporting it. For those who are not educated enough to see that it is a dangerous group, they can be brainwashed into joining the sect. Also, because of the high levels of poverty in the north, Boko Haram was able to lay its foundation there, at the beginning, when it started off as a charity organisation for the people, before shooting into a terrorist group. The Boko Haram insurgency has led to the increase in levels of unemployment, poverty, bad healthcare services and displacement of people in northern Nigeria. Due to threats posed by the sect, key services have been affected: schools have been destroyed, hospitals are experiencing shortages of health personnel due to their relocation to safer states, foreign investors have fled due to the threat of attacks, recreational parks have been abandoned, and there are fewer patrons for hotel businesses etc. These and other challenges have further created an atmosphere of political instability in the country.

#### **4.2. Political Implications**

This section discusses the political implications of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. It will do so by focusing on the following political implications: national insecurity, corruption and political instability. The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has political implications which have impeded the country's national development and growth, and tarnished its international reputation. Over the years, the Nigeria has lost its international strength, and

nationally, political instability has become the order of the day, due to the presence and activities of Boko Haram. The jihadist group continues to pose a threat to Nigeria's security system since its violent emergence in 2009 (Shuaibu, *et.al*, 2015). Their strategies which include increased cases of: bombing, kidnapping, looting, raping, etc. are costing the country its peace and security, both nationally and regionally.

#### ***4.2.1. National Insecurity***

National insecurity has become Nigeria's daily vice since the violent emergence of the group in 2009. Boko Haram has carried out deadly killings of religious and political leaders, of which, in some cases, it publicly owned up to it without remorse (Shuaibu, *et.al*, 2015). The insurgent group has also been targeting ordinary Christians and Muslims. This makes it difficult to determine who it is really targeting, seeing that it is also killing people from its own religious group. In 2016, Modu Bukar, a local leader of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, was killed in Potiskum, a north-eastern city in Nigeria, right in front of the mosque where he had just finished observing his evening prayers (Abubakar, 2018). Although there are different explanations to his killing. One prevailing argument was that he was killed by a member of the Boko Haram group. Bukar was one of the Islamic religious leaders who did not agree with the teachings and beliefs of the militant group, and in some instances, he had been said to have spoken against their doctrines to his congregation (Imams Online, 2019; The Economist, 2018). Also, he did not hold the strong beliefs of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, and as such was considered a threat to the continued spread of Boko Haram ideologies. This would explain why he was targeted and killed by a group member. In a case like that, where people are being targeted because of their counter Boko Haram ideologies, many Nigerians are scared to speak against the sect, for the fear of being targeted next. Also, not knowing who exactly is working for or with what sect, speaking against them means putting one's life at risk so, many desist from doing that. The people are faced with high levels of insecurity, as no one seems safe.

Also, currently Christians who live in the northern part of the country live in fear of their lives because some of the attacks laid by the group are against Christians. In April of 2019, there was a door-to-door attack against Christians in the north, where the sect members went to people's homes, killing anyone who identified as Christians (Lowry, 2019). About around 8pm on the 29<sup>th</sup> of April 2019, Boko Haram fighters raided a village in Adamawa state which hosts a large following of Christianity in the community of Kuda. By the time they ended their raid

that night, over 25 Christians had been killed (Lowry, 2019). Families lost loved ones, while some were forced to flee because their lives were at more risk at the hands of Boko Haram. One particular family, a day after the attack had happened, was about to bury their lost loved one, when another attack was launched on them. The horror of having to bury a loved one, and then to be attacked in the process, is very disturbing. To think that the national security force was unable to assist or provide the needed protection for the people, makes matters worse. Communities prone to Boko Haram attacks in most northern states, are losing their stability because people are fleeing, to free themselves from the Boko Haram insurgency.

The strategic spread of members of Boko Haram now poses more threat to the people. One argument has it that some of the group's members are disguising themselves as ordinary citizens to 'flee' to other parts of the country and neighbouring countries, where they continue laying their attacks and spreading Boko Haram control in the country (Abdulazeez, 2016). This makes it difficult for the national security force to accurately distinguish between members of the group and civilians.

Furthermore, the Boko Haram insurgency has led to the collapse of the country's national security (Shehu, 2015; Shuaibu, *et.al*, 2015). There have been attacks on police buildings and other government security institutions, which makes it even more frightening seeing that the sect is able to stage attacks against government's security infrastructure and yet have not been defeated by the government. Boko Haram attacks have further exposed the weakness of the Nigerian security system, because till date, state security forces have not been able to defeat the militant group. One of the major attacks that exposed the weakness in the national security force took place in 2010. In 2010, Boko Haram launched a prison break, where it broke into a prison in Bauchi and freed over 700 inmate without the police being able to stop it (Shuaibu, *et.al*, 2015). The event was very alarming and revealed the weak nature of the country's security sector. It also reflected the group's capacity to undermine national security. Thus Nigeria plunged into a deep security crisis, seeing that even the national security structures were not exempt from attacks by Boko Haram, besides being unable to provide protection for the people. Also, the attack showed how capable and powerful Boko Haram is, compared to the national security sector of the country. To make matters worse, in 2011, the group attacked the United Nations headquarters in Abuja, where more than fifteen people were killed and over sixty people were injured (Thurston, 2017). To think that they were able to attack such a highly

respected international organization, and still get away with it, revealed, not only their strength, but their dangerous nature and disregard for powerful international organizations.

Another incident that showed that the Nigerian national security sector is weak and unable to protect its people was one which occurred in 2014 whereby “some of the battlefield soldiers fighting the group in Maiduguri attempted a mutiny by firing off their commanding officer. The soldiers had complained that the insurgents outgun them as a result of more sophisticated weapons used by the sect members.” (Shuaibu, *et.al*, 2015: 259). It is devastating to think that Nigerian soldiers did not have better weapons to fight against the militant group. The fact that the soldiers even got to the point of not obeying their commanding officer due to the fear of being defeated by Boko Haram, puts the national security of Nigeria in jeopardy. Also, the rate of corruption in the country was further revealed by this incident, because the government was said to have pumped in billions of naira into fighting against the insurgent group, but there seems to be little to show for it (Ogbuehl, 2018).

#### ***4.2.2. Corruption and Political Instability***

Boko Haram is feeding off the already existing corruption in Nigeria, which has affected the country’s ranking on international indices, and this is contributing to political instability. For a better understanding, corruption can be defined as the misuse of public and entrusted power for private benefit (Jimoh, *et al*, 2017). Although there are many other definitions, this particular one fits directly into the case in question. It is true that Nigeria has always been known for its high rate of corruption. However, since the aggressive emergence of Boko Haram and its continued attacks, corrupt activities within the political system in the country have increased (Ogbuehl, 2018). Between 2009 and 2018, Nigeria moved from 134 to 144 on the least corrupt countries index, from a total of 180 countries, with a score of 27 out of 100, where 0 is highly corrupt (Transparency International, 2018; Trading Economics, 2019). Since the violent emergence of Boko Haram in 2009, the country has moved up the corruption index rank, with the score of 27/100, as at 2018.

Moving forward, the Boko Haram insurgency has been worsened by corrupt political activities. In recent years, the government has claimed to have pumped in millions of naira into the fight against the sect’s insurgency but little to no changes have been witnessed. This can be attributed to the fact that the funds are being misused and squandered by those put in charge of it. As

argued by Shuaibu, *et al* (2015), the Nigerian security force lacks major weaponries needed to combat Boko Haram; in fact, Boko Haram possesses more and better weapons as compared to the Nigerian military. This raises the question of where the funds the government claims have been allocated to combat Boko Haram, have gone to? Why is it that, till date, the national security forces are yet to win the fight against Boko Haram, and why is there no trace of the funds said to have been pumped into the fight? This is because politicians are using the issue of the Boko Haram insurgency to acquire more funds into their own accounts (Hashimu and Ancell, 2017). And, in a case where the country's corruption rate was already high, Boko Haram makes it even easier for exploitation to prevail.

In addition, since the emergence of Boko Haram, political leaders have strategically used the promised to silence Boko Haram as a campaign strategy during election periods, even though they hardly do anything about it after they have been put into power. For example, president Buhari has always fed off from the threats of Boko Haram and the fears of the people, to further his own political agenda (Orji, 2019). In the 2015 election, the president focused his campaign on defeating Boko Haram; he promised that if he was elected he would make sure the militant group was defeated before the end of his tenure. This strategy worked out well for him, seeing that he defeated former president Jonathan, with over two point five million votes difference (BBC News, 2015). However, after the end of that tenure, Boko Haram has rather become more powerful, even far stronger than the national security forces. Till date, the president is still yet to achieve his promise to the people, by defeating the insurgent group. Also, even in those affected states, governors have been using the people's fear for Boko Haram to further their election agenda, and in the end they do not make the effort to actually keep to their campaign promises (Ogbuehl, 2018). On several occasions, the president has publicly claimed that the national security force has defeated Boko Haram, knowing very well that his pronouncements were far from the truth (Ogbuehl, 2018). This shows the level of corruption that the country breeds, and also how difficult it will be for the government to actually defeat the jihadist group. Not only have politicians used the fear of Boko Haram to further their own political agenda, there have been some claims that some of them are supporting the group. This was particularly argued by Ogbuehl (2018:368), when the author said that "government blamed some members of its cabinet for sabotaging its efforts, with the claims that Boko-Haram had successfully infiltrated all organs and arms of government; the army also accused some of the officers of its woes and many failures based on allegations of leakage of sensitive information to the sect." One might argue that this claim was not proven, but it is important to know that

the Nigerian Army and the Defence headquarters found more than ten of its senior military officers guilty of the offence, after they were tried (Ogbuehl, 2018). Boko Haram's ability to co-opt political figures into indirectly working for them reveals the level of corruption that has crept into the political system of the country.

Finally, there is a claim that, military officials are benefiting from the fight against Boko Haram, and as such are not as willing as they should be to defeat and put an end to Boko Haram (Jimoh, *et al*, 2017). Transparency International has accused the Nigerian military force of creating fake contracts for the fight against Boko Haram, in order to defraud the government and gain personal funds (Jimoh, *et al*, 2017). This is one of the reasons why the fight against the militant group has been difficult, and yet to be won. For the military force, using the threat of the Boko Haram insurgency to further their own financial interests is more paramount than defeating the group. This the military force make sure that the fight against Boko Haram is not won, so that they can continue to benefit from it. This has further created political implications for the country because its political status remains relatively unstable.

The country has become more politically unstable since the violent emergence of Boko Haram in 2009. The insurgency of the group has drastically increased social injustice and discrimination based on ethnicity and religion, in the country (Raji and Wahab, 2016). The fact that Boko Haram stems from an Islamic background and from the northern part of the country, means that many people now see Muslims in a negative light hence, in some instances they are treated with suspicion and distrust. Considering that Nigeria has always been divided on ethnic and religious lines, this has heightened already existent tensions thus discrimination along those lines is now more prevalent (Ogundiya, 2016). This has affected the political strength of the country, as the government has lost its ability to address the challenges of the people.

Finally, in the cases of the 2015 and 2019 elections, for example, the government postponed elections from their initial dates citing claims that there were some logistical challenges that needed to be addressed in order to avoid violence during the election (Blanchard, 2015; Dibi-Ike, 2019). However, after the said postponements, electoral periods were still marked by violence. The government was unable to maintain a stable political atmosphere, even after postponing the election in order to provide the citizens with the needed security and political stability. Even though the election was termed successful by the government, there were some northern states that experienced violence at the hands of Boko Haram during the phase. For

example, during the 2015 elections, Boko Haram disrupted voting processes in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, leading to the deaths of some civilians (Blanchard, 2015). The reality that the government did not learn from that occurrence, such that four years later, elections were still violent and threatened by the Boko Haram insurgency shows the weakness of the administration, against the jihadist group (Amaza, 2019).

To conclude, Boko Haram has shown itself to be an insurgent group that is difficult to defeat, while the government of Nigeria has shown that it is weak and unable to be able to defeat the group. Since the violent emergence of Boko Haram in 2009, the group's insurgency in the country has costed Nigeria its political stability, integrity and national security. From 2009 to date, Nigeria has been suffering from the drastic increase in national insecurity, corruption and political instability, which have had an adverse effect on national development. The national security force's inability to defeat Boko Haram, even with all the funds and international assistance that have been provided can be attributed to corruption. Military officials are using the jihadist group to enrich their personal accounts. For Boko Haram to be defeated, there is a lot that the government needs to change within its system. Before then, the sect will continue to grow and terrorise the country.

## Chapter 5

### Conclusion and Recommendation

#### *5.1. Conclusion*

Human security goes beyond the absence of conflict. The concept encompasses seven broad aspects, including economic, health, food, environmental, personal, political and community security. Each of these components is required for the attainment of human security. In some cases each serves as a condition for the existence of the other. For example, health security is informed by adequate food supply which is in turn dependant on a sustainable environment. Therefore in order to achieve human security, all of the above components must exist.

Majorly, this research project finds that Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has costed the country its human security. Although, Nigeria was already experiencing economic and political instability, between 2009 and 2019, the insurgent group's activities have further exacerbated the situation, which has resulted in the severe violation of human security of the people. Also, it finds that the government of Nigeria lacks the capacity to defeat Boko Haram, not only due to its limited human and resource capital, but also because of the increasing corruption rate in the country. Finally,

In arriving to the above findings, this thesis used Boko Haram's insurgency to evaluate human security risks in Nigeria, from two aspects: socio-economic and political perspectives. It began by detailing the background of the emergence of Boko Haram. The thesis argues that the sect started off as a charity organisation before transforming into a violent terrorist group. Another school of thought is based on political conspiracy which argues that the group is traced to the political agenda of northern politicians, and President Jonathan's administration. Unfortunately, due to lack of compelling evidence and the fact that the date of the emergence of Boko Haram and its insurgency does not correlate with the time president Jonathan came power, this study therefore looked at how the group grew from a charity based organisation to a violent terrorist formation. The main position of Boko Haram is its hatred of western education. In addition, the group exploited the advantage of already existing socio-economic challenges in the northern part of Nigeria, to facilitate its rise.

As well, the thesis noted that the Nigerian government's response to Boko Haram has been inadequate. Accordingly, the government has failed to defeat the sect, more than fifteen years since its emergence. Boko Haram grew stronger and stronger as the government showed an incapacity to defeat it. Boko Haram's access to and use of sophisticated weapons gives little indication of the Nigerian government's ability to eventually defeat it.

Finally, to answer the research question on the human security implications of the Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria, the thesis looked at the socio-economic and political implications of its activities. It asserts that Boko Haram's insurgency continues to negatively affect Nigeria's socio-economic and political stability. Boko Haram is considered a militant group that has been terrorising the country since its emergence in 2002, especially in the northern part of the country. As a result of the sect's insurgency in the country, poverty increased over the years, especially in the north-eastern part. Also, due to the continued bombing of school buildings and kidnapping of school children, the rate of illiteracy has doubled in the northern region. This is because there are fewer quality schools left and people are dropping out due to the fear of being kidnapped. The Boko Haram insurgency has further increased the rate of refugees and displaced persons in the country. And, to top that up, the country's political and national security have been jeopardized, which means no one is safe. The national security forces are constantly targeted by Boko Haram, and in most cases, they are defeated by the sect. This is due to the fact that the Nigerian security forces lack adequate resources needed to defeat Boko Haram. Nigeria will continue to be socio-economically and politically affected by the insurgency of Boko Haram if the government does not begin to make strides towards countering Boko Haram threats and attacks.

In summary, this thesis has been able to determine the socio-economic and political implications of Boko Haram's insurgency for human security in Nigeria. To be able to defeat Boko Haram, the Nigerian government needs to change its counter-terrorism strategies. In most cases, governments tend to settle for military responses to terrorism, which always backfires. In the process, Boko Haram became even stronger and angrier. Therefore, the government of Nigeria needs to focus more on dealing with corruption within the military sector and the socio-economic issues that are fuelling Boko Haram's growth in the country.

## **5.2. Recommendations and Further Research**

Since the emergence of Boko Haram, the Nigerian government has been unable to defeat them. The socio-economic and political implications of Boko Haram's insurgency will have negative lasting effects if not stopped now. The government needs to start trying out approaches other than the usual military response. This section will look at some strategies that the Nigerian government needs to put in place in order to defeat Boko Haram. These include: undergoing anti-corruption training of military officials, addressing socio-economic challenges, implementing a bottom-up approach, providing an intensive training program for the national security force, and increasing international assistance.

One of the major strategies needed to defeat Boko Haram is for government of Nigeria to implement a compulsory anti-corruption training for military officials handling the funds and any matter related to the fight against Boko Haram. The increasing rate of corruption in the Nigerian military continues to benefit Boko Haram insurgent group. As such, the jihadist group is yet to be defeated because of the continued misuse of the funds allocated for the fight against the group (Ogbuehl, 2018). Many political and military officials in the country are more concerned with enriching themselves from the funds being pumped into the fight against Boko Haram. As Solomon (2017) reported, Nigeria has lost over \$15 billion in fraudulent activities by the military, in the fight against Boko Haram, where money has disappeared through the payment of 'ghost soldiers' and procurement of fraudulent arms deals. Therefore, military officials need to be trained on how to make adequate use of those funds, and to be encouraged to report any corrupt dealings within the sector. Also, the government needs to be transparent in its activities with the military sector, as this will provide a system of accountability within the government and military sector. Lastly, it is important that any form of financial assistance pumped into the fight against Boko Haram is well monitored directly by donor agents. This will limit the misuse of funds by corrupt politicians who are put in charge of those funds. Addressing corruption is one of the most important strategy in defeating Boko Haram because it spills over to other parts, seeing that corruption remains a driver of insecurity and hinders progress (Solomon, 2017).

Another major step the Nigerian government needs to take is addressing the socio-economic issues that are plaguing the northern part of the country (Shuaibu, *et.al*, 2015; Akinbo, 2015). As proven, Boko Haram is thriving in the region due to the high rate of unemployment, high illiteracy rate due to lack of educational opportunities, high rate of poverty, etc. Seeing that

these issues laid the foundation for Boko Haram, addressing them will mean destroying that foundation that makes its insurgency possible. As Akinbi (2015) stated, there is the need for the Nigerian government to address the poverty issue that is looming in the northeast part of the country. For most youths in the area, joining and supporting Boko Haram elevates them economically because the sect provides them with food and financial assistance. Being unemployed means having enough time to do nothing, which makes them join the jihadist group in order to feel they are no longer jobless. Also, it is easier for an uneducated person to be manipulated, which is why majority of the jihadist group members are illiterate. So, if the Nigerian government is serious about defeating Boko Haram in the country, it needs to start by eradicating the high unemployment amongst youths, poverty, and illiteracy in the northeast part of the country.

After Boko Haram has been defeated, it is important for the Nigerian government to initiate the building of new schools and vocational training centres in the region in order to replace the ones that have been destroyed (Shuaibu, *et.al*, 2015). Having more accessible quality schools means more enlightenment, which will help prevent the re-emergence and support of Boko Haram. In addition to that, those unable to attend schools can be given the opportunity to acquire vocational skills to enable them to engage in income generating activities. Having a source of income, as well as being busy will make it difficult for them to have the time to consider supporting or to rekindle their support for Boko Haram. Finally, these schools and vocational centres need to be subsidised by the Nigerian government to ensure affordable access. Teachers at these proposed facilities need to be well trained, paid and provided with good working conditions to make all aspects of their work enjoyable.

Boko Haram continues to thrive in these areas because of the socio-economic issues that work to their advantage. Once these issues are addressed and measures are put in place to make sure terrorism does not re-emerge in the region, only then can the government's counter-terrorism strategy yield positive outcomes.

Moving forward, for the government to defeat Boko Haram it has to implement a bottom-top approach in dealing with the issue. Locals should be actively involved in the fight against the jihadist group, not just treating them as a separate entity. The Nigerian government and its military forces need the assistance of the locals, considering that they are more equipped with contextual knowhow and information on how some of them are recruited by Boko Haram.

They will be able to give better information on what the sect is up to, who the real members are and even how to navigate the area to capture and arrest them. As Olojo (2018) argued, the national security forces are always guilty of human right violations on the locals, in their fight against Boko Haram. Instead of carrying the locals along in their fight against the group, the militia abuse them, thus making it difficult for the people to trust or cooperate with them. It has been opined that locals would rather support the Boko Haram sect members instead of the national security force because of the high human right violations they face at their hands (Waddington, 2014).

Apart from actively involving locals, the government also needs to consider partnering with some NGOs in their fight against the jihadist sect (Akinbi, 2015). In most cases, the locals are more trusting of NGOs than they are of governmental officials. This means that those NGOs will be able to connect better with the locals in finding better locally supportive ways to defeat the sect. The national security forces are still unable to connect with nor gain support of the local people because of the human right violations they consistently commit against them. In that regard, the Nigerian security forces needs more training on human rights violations and community engagement.

The Nigerian government needs to institute an intensive high level anti-corruption and military training program for the national security forces. It is a much needed strategy if the government wants to defeat Boko Haram. Nigerian soldiers are known, globally, for their human right violations during battles, and this can be attributed to the poor training they are given when enrolling into service (Olojo, 2018; Waddington, 2014). They need to be trained on how to treat women and children when in battle, because there have been cases of them abusing and violating these vulnerable groups. If they begin to treat the local people with respect and not suspicion, then will there be a possible cooperation between them, thus making it easier and more possible to defeat Boko Haram. The president needs to pay more attention to strengthening the Nigerian “Join Task Force in the area of intelligence gathering, effective surveillance, and security strategies” (Akinbi, 2015). In so doing they would be able to gather accurate information on the group, to know when to attack and when to retreat. This will help give them an upper hand against the Boko Haram insurgents, thereby minimizing casualties.

It is very apparent that the Nigerian government lacks both, financial and human resources to defeat Boko Haram. As such, there is a need for increased international assistance. International

assistance from African Union (AU) and UN is needed to enable the government to defeat Boko Haram. As also stated by Leroux (2016), supports from the US and Europe will go a long way in making sure that the Boko Haram insurgency is defeated. There is the need for the international community to assist the Nigerian government in administering anti-terrorism training for the national security force. As previously stated, Nigeria's military lacks the skills needed to fight against terrorism, and they are known for always violating human rights during combat. As such, more highly skilled international experts need to be sent to help train them in order to make it easier for Boko Haram to be defeated. To mitigate any violation of human rights by both national and international forces, there should be the implementation of mechanism to monitor and detect human rights violations.

Also, the Nigerian government lacks the financial capacity to provide necessary military resources needed for the fight against Boko Haram. As such, there is the need for the international community to donate to the Nigerian government in order to remedy the lack of military resources required to defeat the Boko Haram insurgency. Lastly, those who have been displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency need long-term humanitarian assistance, which the Nigerian government does not have the capacity to provide (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Therefore, the international community should increase its humanitarian assistance through long-term strategies which would ensure sustainable livelihoods for the displaced.

To conclude, the use of military strategy in countering Boko Haram's insurgency in Nigeria would produce positive outcomes once the government begins to focus on human (in)security factors that allow the sect to thrive. The Nigerian government could defeat Boko Haram if it is able to gather support from the local people. That is a major requisite element in defeating the sect. In addition, gathering should be complemented by addressing the socio-economic challenges facing the region and making sure that their human rights are not violated. Without international assistance, the Nigerian government will not be able to defeat Boko Haram because it lacks the necessary resources and expertise needed to end the insurgency.

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