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**WHITE
POWER
IN**

**ANGOLA
AND
NAMIBIA**





THE KUNENE RIVER HYDRO-ELECTRIC SCHEMES



WHITE POWER IN ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA:
THE KUNENE RIVER HYDRO-ELECTRIC SCHEMES.
A STUDY IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT.

RENFREW CHRISTIE

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SONS OF THE IMMIGRATING SPIRIT OF MONEY

Upon this earth we hear dispraise of money
Yet, without it, earth is very cold
And it can be warm and friendly
Suddenly through the power of gold
Everything that seemed so hard to bear
In a gleaming golden glow is cloaked,
Sun is melting what was frozen,
Every man fulfills his hopes!
Rosy beams light the horizon,
Look on high: the chimney smokes!
Yes, all at once this world seems quite a different one,
Higher beats the heart, the glance sweeps wider,
Richer are the meals and clothes are finer,
Man himself becomes another man.

Ah, how very sorely they're mistaken,
They who think that money doesn't count.
Fruitfulness turns into famine
When the kindly stream gives out.
Each one starts to yell and grab it where he can.
Even were it not so hard to live
He who doesn't hunger yet is fearful,
Every heart is empty now of love.
Father, Mother, Brother - cross and tearful!
See, the chimney smokes no more above!
Thick displeasing fog about us furled,
All is filled with hatred now and striving.
None will be the horse, all would be riding
And the world becomes an icy world.

So it goes with all that's great and worthy.
In this world it's quickly spoiled indeed,
For when feet are bare and bellies empty
Love of virtue always turns to greed.
Gold, not greatness is what people need.
Poverty of soul puts out our hopes.
Good plus money, too, is what it takes
To keep man virtuous without a slip.
He whom crime's already given breaks
Looks up on high: the chimney smokes!
Faith in ~~the~~ man race again grows bright.
Man is noble, good, so on and so forth.
Sentiment awakes. Need dimmed its light.
Faster beats the heart. The glance sweeps wider.
We know who the horse is, who the rider.
And once more it's clear that right is right.

Bertold Brecht.

"One cannot create a kind of 'Tennessee Valley Authority' for the Danube Basin without thereby determining beforehand for many years to come the relative rate of progress of the different races inhabiting the area, or without subordinating all their individual aspirations and wishes to this task".

von Hayek, 1944 : 168.

CHAPTER ONE.

INTRODUCTION.

In Leo Marquard's view, water and power are the two chief economic requirements of the Southern African region:

"to fulfil those needs, flood waters must be controlled for irrigation, and, in the process, harnessed to produce cheap industrial power" (1)

Many other authorities concur in this analysis. Thus the German geographer Jürgen Bähr writes:

"The economic development of South West Africa is greatly handicapped by the lack of water and by the lack of every source of energy" (2)

This work essays a political understanding of these two chief economic requirements, in the belief that political conflict has its roots in an economic base, that consists not only in social classes, but also in the particular geographical and technological infrastructural development of a region. For example, the nature of railway development in colonial Africa had long-lasting particular political and economic effects. Similarly the nature of a hydro-electric scheme has wide implications.

The Government of Portugal and the Government of the Republic of South Africa, who are, respectively, the rulers of Angola and the illegal occupiers of Namibia, as I will show, agreed in 1964 and 1969 to develop the resources of the Kunene river basin.(3) The river forms much of the boundary between Angola and Namibia. Portugal and South Africa are developing the river in a particular way. I will argue that this particular way of developing the river benefits some of the people concerned, far more than others. I will show that if the plans succeed, a colonial region will be modernised, further to facilitate large capital accumulation in the hands of the few.

Consultation with the people of Angola and Namibia has been lacking. Their specific approval has certainly not been obtained, for there is minimal formal or informal inclusion of these people in the decision-making processes which affect them. Further, the legitimacy of both governments is not derived from universal adult franchise in their respective metropolises.

It is small wonder, therefore, that the dams and powerlines are being erected in the midst of what South Africa's leaders call a "low intensity war" (4), in which people nevertheless die high-intensity deaths. Both structural and physical violence are seen to be necessary by one grouping, to impose their rule, while the "armed struggle for liberation", as it is termed, is seen by another grouping to be necessary.

This paper will examine the Kunene river hydro-electric schemes, in their historical, legal, military, strategic, technological, economic and political contexts, in order to bring greater understanding of the society and its conflicts. The schemes will be seen in a relatively loose theoretical framework, involving concepts of modernisation, development and underdevelopment, colonialism, and imperialism, together with capital accumulation and violence in the struggle between social groupings.

The region is not well researched: the lower reaches of the Kunene river are among the least known of any in Africa. Further, many thoughts on energy and water remain mere pipe-dreams, throughout the world. Further still, the Southern African war prevents much crucial information from being obtained or published. Therefore this work is a first note on the subject: it is not the last word in its field.

Hegel's Axiom of Internal Relations states that the relations by which terms are related are an integral part of the terms they relate (5). This underlies not only conceptual structures of reality, and linguistic systems, but also physical, economic and political systems. It is an extraordinarily useful axiom of general systems theory. Energy and water are among the most persuasive of all the systems by which mankind is related. Hence they are in and of mankind, an essential part of the process of his polity.

The politics of water in a dry region are so obvious as often to be taken for granted by the political sciences; we have needed the fossil-fuel crisis of the current decade to remind us of the politics of energy distribution. The energy and the water systems of "White" Southern Africa are an integral part of that society, yet they have too often been ignored or simplistically treated in political studies of the area. This work is an attempt to redress the balance: it is written with a passionate belief in the totality of human existence and enterprise.

Hence, many "disciplines" will be used, from poetry to military science to hydrology. In essence, however, this is a study in political economy, a study of who might benefit and to what extent, by a particular planned infrastructural allocation of scarce resources.

Regarding the terminological tangle, the word "Namibia" is used in preference to "South West Africa", and the descriptions "Ovamboland" or "the Northern areas" are used in preference to "Ovambo" and "Okavango", wherever the context allows for this. The Northern peoples patently prefer the term "Ovamboland" to "Ovambo". However, when Dirk Mudge, M.E.C., proudly asserts that he is a born and bred "Suidwester", it would be arrant nonsense to call him a Namibian.

Generally, however, "Namibia" is used, following the example set by the United Nations, and by the British Government in their White Paper, Command 4363, of May 1970. This usage is supported by the spirit of the 1971 'World Court' ruling. In contrast to John Dugard's approach, "Namibia" here does imply a judgement on the status of the territory, and on the unlawful occupation by the South African regime (6). This is done because I accept the validity of Danziger's remark:

"where the ubiquity of social conflict excludes the possibility of non-committment, the intellectual stance corresponding to it would simply become another version of the "status-quo" ideology" (7)

As this is being written, there is rioting in Luanda and reports of fighting between the MPLA and the ^NFLA: the future of Angola is exceedingly uncertain. Therefore this paper will concentrate on the Namibian aspects, but Angola is retained in the title not only because there is some information available, but also because most authorities stress the stupidity of conceiving of river basin development in anything less than the totality. This work reviews events up to July 1974: Occurrences thereafter can be recorded only partially, at best.

Research for this dissertation involved over five thousand kilometres of travelling in Southern Africa, the use of material in five languages, German, Afrikaans, English, Kwan-yama and Portuguese, and work in eight libraries; the South African Library; the Jagger Library of the University of Cape Town; the Gubbins Collection and the Wartenweiler Library of the University of the Witwatersrand; the South West African Archives in Windhoek; the Library of the South West African Administration; and the Libraries of the South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, and the South West African Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft, in Windhoek.

In a number of cases the documents used were the only copies available in Southern Africa. I express my particular gratitude, therefore, to the librarians and others concerned. I also thank those who assisted with translations, either during interviews, or of written work, and I particularly thank Deborah Budlender, Lonka Murray and Antonia von Stiernhelm for their help in this way.

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I am particularly grateful to officials of the SWA Administration for their cordiality and co-operation. All strategic information on Namibia is confidential, and while I must record that no official in any way broke that confidentiality, nevertheless within the bounds of what was permissible, the officials of the SWA Administration were very generous.

The material available on Namibia is voluminous: Heinrich Stengels' "Bibliographie Wasserwirtschaft in Südwestafrika" (1974) runs to 514 titles, while Richard Logan's geographical bibliography lists 2009 items, and John Dugard, giving only "standard works in a highly selective bibliography" (8) records over 500 names. None the less, the area is 'under researched', and political studies of the infrastructure are well-nigh non-existent. The bibliography given comprises works consulted in the preparation of the dissertation, rather than all those potentially relevant.

The following is inscribed on the arches of the Central Government Buildings, New Delhi:

"Queen Victoria said, 'in their prosperity will be our strength,
in their contentment, our security,
and in their gratitude, our best reward' (9).

This dissertation will measure the Kunene schemes against Her Majesty's imperial teaching.

NOTES: CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION.

1. Marquard, 1971 : 107
2. Jürgen Bähr, April 1971 : 86
3. Republic of South Africa : Treaty Series 7/1964, Treaty Series 1/1969
4. Republic of South Africa : Defence White Paper WPD 1973 : 2
5. Beer, 1966 : 242
6. c.f. Dugard, 1973 : xi n, and Landis, 1973
7. van den Berghe, 1965 : 12
8. Dugard, 1973 : 543
9. Gaitskell, 1959 : frontispiece

CHAPTER TWO.

THE LEGALITY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S PRESENCE IN NAMIBIA.

Increased accumulation, in Johannesburg, London and New York, of the profits made from the extraction of Namibia's raw materials, depends on power and water from the Kunene River schemes, as will be shown below. The legality of these profits, and the legality of South Africa's plans for the Kunene River, depend on the lawfulness or otherwise of South Africa's presence in the territory, over which South Africa was given a mandate, as a "sacred trust of civilisation", by the League of Nations after the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.

The Peace Conferences of Europe, be they in Paris or Vienna, would seem either to create or to ignore as many problems as they might solve. One eminent historian has claimed that the 1919 Treaty of Versailles caused the Second World War, "as much as one event causes another" (1). A more tragic indictment of a Peace Conference would be difficult to find. This century's pre-eminent Western economist, writing what has been called "one of the finest pieces of polemic in the English language" (2), condemned the treaty as "an act of wickedness and folly" (3).

However, whatever the results in Europe, the Treaty had long-lasting and unhappy consequences for the people of one ex-colony of the Kaiser, that land first named "South West Africa" by the explorer Andersson (4) in 1861, and now known by the nations of the world as Namibia (5). This chapter will examine some aspects of the political and legal wrangle which followed the decision that

"A mandate should be conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa to administer the territory aforementioned" (6).

A.J.P. Taylor gives a cynical view of the Paris proceedings:

"The fate of the German colonies had also been settled, mainly on the insistence of the British Dominions. South Africa and Australia refused to surrender the territories which they had conquered - German South West Africa and New Guinea. Lloyd George derived malicious amusement from the way in which the spokesmen of these two democratic countries, supposedly unspotted with European wickedness, defied Wilson on old-fashioned imperialist lines. Mandates were hastily invented to save appearances, and the British themselves took German East Africa, and some miscellaneous territory in West Africa, as their share" (7).

These themes, of South African imperialism defying those statesmen who wished to create a "good" international order, and of the resulting shabby compromise being shrouded in high-sounding words which may or may not have meaning, run through the paper pribble-prabble which lawyers now call "The South West Africa / Namibia Dispute". The world's Judges have deliberated upon it often and at length, while copious screeds have been written, but the two themes remain, right through to the Secretary-General Waldheim's visit to the territory in 1972.

John Dugard, from the plethora of relevant documents, has produced an excellent and meticulously-researched 581-page volume of writings on this "international cause célèbre of the century" (8). His work should be read in the original: I will attempt neither to summarise nor to compete, but will give the bare political and legal facts, followed by an assessment of the present situation.

Imperialism in Southern Africa was no new phenomenon in 1919. The sub-continent had been divided by Shaka, by Portugal, by Germany, by Britain and by the Boers. Yet South Africa has never been monolithically imperialist, as this conversation between Cecil Rhodes and Paul Kruger in 1890 demonstrates:

"Rhodes: We must work together. I know the Republic"

wants a seaport. You must have Delagoa Bay.

Kruger: How can we work together there? The harbour belongs to the Portuguese, and they wont hand it over.

Rhodes: Then we must simply take it.

Kruger: I can't take away other people's property. If the Portuguese wont sell the harbour, I wouldn't take it even if you gave it to me, for ill-gotten gains are accursed" (9).

Smuts had no such scruples about ill-gotten gains when he conquered German South West Africa, and nor did the Germans when they took it from its people. By 1919 the imperialist aims of some South Africans were clear. A.T. Hennessy, Secretary of the Unionist Party in South Africa, wrote to Patrick Duncan about Botha's plans for the Peace Conference as follows:

"I have some pretty good inside information as to Botha's plans. He expects to come back with German South West, Rhodesia, and perhaps a long-lease of Delagoa Bay" (10).

At the Peace Conference Smuts and Botha confronted Wilson, and an ambiguous compromise resulted. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations established a Mandates System with wording "ambiguous enough to satisfy annexationists and internationalists simultaneously"(11). Thus Smuts and Botha achieved ~~their~~ goals, and yet had conceded one crucial point: civilisation could call those who exercised its 'sacred trusts' to account for their actions. South Africa did not annex the territory, but accepted a Mandate, on behalf of civilisation, to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory" (12). Smuts conceded this with his customary skill, and addressed the Peace Conference as follows:

"If you give your sanction to our work you will demonstrate that world public opinion is in favour of the ultimate self-government of all peoples, without distinction as to race, religion, or colour, or previous condition of servitude. It provides for a careful supervision and scrutiny as to the way in which the mandates are exercised" (13).

In the following twenty years pressures arose repeatedly in South Africa for the inclusion of the territory as a Fifth Province of the Union, and South Africa's own "South West Africa Commission" found that South Africa was not doing all that it might in the exercise of its 'sacred trust'.

"It is on the constructive side of the government that Native Administration is not entirely satisfactory, i.e. in regard to those functions which go beyond the bare necessities of government and the maintenance of law and order.....Education is defective and medical services for the Natives, primitive and inadequate. In the North very little is done for the improvement of their daily lives" (14).

South Africa has however, claimed that the Permanent Mandates Commission was completely satisfied with her administration of the territory. By contrast, J. Marina, in a thesis for Edinburgh University, has shown that South Africa was more heavily criticised for her administration of the territory than any other mandatory power administering mandated territories (15).

By 1946 Smuts was prepared to try again for annexation or incorporation (16), and this time "consulted" what were known as the "Non-White" inhabitants, through their "tribal leaders", claiming the following results: (17)

For: 208,850 Against: 33,520 Not Consulted: 56,790

This "consultation" was heavily criticised, and the General Assembly did not accede to Smut's request, recommending instead that the territory be placed under trusteeship, which South Africa refused. With the coming to power of the Nationalists, reports on the territory were no longer submitted to the United Nations. A deadlock was reached, and the political conflict was channelled into legal argument, leading to the involvement of the International Court of Justice, which has given its Opinion four times, in 1950, 1955, 1956 and 1971, and its Judgement twice, in 1962 and 1966.

In 1950 the Court gave its opinion by 12 votes to 2 that South Africa had obligations internationally under the mandate, notwithstanding the demise of the League, but that South Africa was not obliged to place the territory under the UN Trusteeship system. Further, South Africa had no power to modify unilaterally the international status of the territory, but had to act with the consent of the United Nations. South Africa rejected the opinion.

In 1955, following the conflict over the procedure to be followed at the General Assembly in dealing with the territory, the Court unanimously gave its opinion that the voting procedure proposed by the General Assembly was correct. "South Africa rejects this opinion on the grounds that it was premised on the unacceptable 1950 opinion" (18).

In 1956, the General Assembly, lacking reports on the territory from South Africa, asked the Court whether oral hearings from petitioners could be permitted, again in terms of the 1950 Opinion. The Court gave its Opinion, by eight votes to five, that such hearings would be consistent with the 1950 Opinion. The oral hearings took place, and the U.N. "Committee on South West Africa" concluded, in 1957, that the policies pursued by South Africa were contrary to the mandate (19).

In 1962, after Ethiopia and Liberia had again brought the questions of the territory's status before the ICJ, the Court, by eight votes to seven, rejected South Africa's four preliminary objections, and held that the Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the merits of the dispute. Four years of written and oral debate ensued on the merits of the case. In 1966 the Court gave a Judgement. The Court of 1962 had been changed by intervening elections, and in addition three judges did not participate, because of death, recusal and illness. The 1966

This brought the Security Council into the dispute for the first time. In a unanimous resolution it noted the relevant Resolutions of the General Assembly, and the trial "...being held under arbitrary laws whose application has been illegally extended to the Territory...." (21). Thus the Security Council tacitly endorsed Resolution 2145 (xxi) of the General Assembly, which had terminated the Mandate.

In June of 1968 the General Assembly resolved that the territory should be known as Namibia, and set out duties for the re-named "Council for Namibia", in the latter's attempts to take control of the territory from South Africa.

In March 1969 the Security Council, by thirteen votes to none with two abstentions, expressly recognised the termination by the General Assembly of the Mandate, and considered that South Africa's presence in the territory was illegal (22). This was reaffirmed in Resolutions 269 and 276, while in Resolution 284 the Security Council asked the International Court of Justice for an opinion on

"the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)".

The composition of the Court had again altered, although not, this time, during a hearing. In 1971, the Court gave its Opinion

"by thirteen votes to two,
(1) that, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to the occupation of the territory;

by eleven votes to four
(2) that States Members of the United Nations are under obligation to recognise the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to such presence and Administration;

- (3) That it is incumbent upon States which are not Members of the United Nations to give assistance, within the scope of subparagraph (2) above, in the action which has been taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia" (23).

Thus in terms of decisions of the world's General Assembly, and Security Council, and Court of Justice, South Africa's occupation and control of Namibia are illegal. More particularly, the fragmentation of the territory into separate ethnic "nations" by South Africa is illegal, and the Kunene river schemes are illegal.

South Africa is refusing to obey the law, having gone before the International Court of Justice, and lost her case.

South Africa has rejected the Opinion, on political and legal grounds. This rejection has been considered in a recent publication of the S.A. Institute of International Affairs, by Professor John Dugard and Advocate E.M. Grosskopf, S.C.(24). Dugard examines in detail the accusations levelled at the Court by Mr. Vorster and Mr. Justice van Wyk, that the Court used an unacceptable, "mumbo-jumbo", illegal form of reasoning, and that the Court was deliberately "packed". Grosskopf queries the reasoning used in four of the Court's major findings, on whether the Council of the League of Nations had the power to revoke the Mandate, whether the General Assembly has the power to do what it purported to in Resolution 2145 (xxi), whether the Security Council was acting within its powers, and finally he queries the conclusion of the Court that apartheid constituted a breach of the Mandate and a violation of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The most obvious replies to these charges of "mumbo-jumbo legal reasoning", and of "court packing" are brief. It ill becomes positivist upholders of law, order and firm government to ignore and reject a court's final opinion no matter how illogical that opinion may seem. Further, it ill becomes a

government, whose present electoral strength is the result of a disenfranchisement of coloured voters, achieved only after the Appeal Court had been enlarged from five to eleven judges, to complain about "court-packing".

However, the objections to the 1971 Opinion, must be examined in turn. As to "court-packing" Dugard shows "that the 1971 Court is no different from previous courts" (25). It complies with its statute in consisting of "juriconsults of recognised competence", from the major legal systems and main forms of civilisation. What better arbiters of civilisations 'sacred trust'? Grosskopf makes great play of Dugard's concession, that the Court, in rejecting South Africa's applications as to composition, had used a narrow and literal interpretation of the Statute. However, Grosskopf ignores Dugard's next sentence:

"With the knowledge of hindsight, one can safely say that even if these applications had been upheld, the Opinion on the merits would not have been materially different" (27).

Grosskopf makes four major charges against the Court, and, having the advantage of a reading of Dugard's paper, reiterates them in an addendum.

Grosskopf first challenges the Courts' finding concerning the ability of the League of Nations to revoke the Mandate. The question was whether the C-mandates, under which the territory fell, were so close to annexation as to be irrevocable, or whether the right to international supervision carried the corollary of revocation in the event of breach.

Prima facie, law requires teeth if it is to be law and not mere moral exhortation. The mandate instruments are silent on revocation. However, can one believe that the authors of

the systems were so insincere in their high-sounding words that they conceived of Mandates with no teeth, with no ultimate sanction? Did Smuts's "careful supervision and scrutiny in which mandates are exercised" (quoted above) have no method of enforcement, no ultimate penalty for abuse of the mandate? These are not the words of the "internationalist" Wilson, they are those of the "annexationist" Smuts from South Africa. Smuts later was to draft the Preamble to the United Nations Charter. Are we to believe that on both these occasions his words were nothing but pious patter? Ought we not, in determining his intentions, to take the ordinary meaning of his words?

The Court in 1971 invoked the customary legal rule that a treaty, saving an express indication to the contrary, is revocable in the event of an important breach. This is a common method of interpretation, for if a statute is silent on a point, the common law is held to apply.

In attempting to show that revocation was not among the intentions of the authors of the system, Grosskopf takes a technical procedural point, claiming that the Council of the League of Nations would not have been able to revoke a mandate, because the relevant Member would have to be represented, and could therefore prevent the unanimity required by the procedures of the Council. The Court rejects this suggestion, claiming that obviously the agreement of a wrongdoer to the sanction to be applied to him could not be required (28).

Both Grosskopf and Dugard note that the Court had previously affirmed this requirement for unanimity, but Dugard remarks that on these previous occasions the Court had merely assumed its applicability, without a finding being necessary. Further, Judge De Castro, in a Separate Opinion, found that the purpose of the unanimity rule was the protection of State's sovereignty,

but that it was inapplicable to the mandates system as a state's sovereignty was not in question (29).

Smuts certainly envisaged revocation where necessary. The 1971 Opinion quotes Smuts writing in 1918:

"In case of any flagrant and prolonged abuse of this trust the population concerned should be able to appeal for redress to the League, who should in a proper case exert its authority to the full, even to the extent of removing the mandate and entrusting it to some other state if necessary" (30).

It is surely not conceivable that Smuts meant the League to be prevented by the unanimity rule from ever removing a mandate.

The second and third objections raised by Grosskopf relate to the powers of the General Assembly and Security Council, to do what they purported to do. Resolutions of the General Assembly are normally only recommendatory rather than binding. However, the Court seems to find that Resolution 2145 (xxi) derives binding legal force from confirmation by the Security Council. The Court has read the powers and duties of both bodies very widely, no doubt on the premise given above, that the law should have teeth if it is to be law and not prayer.

It is here that the divergence between South African attitudes and the Court's attitudes can best be seen: Dugard conceives of a conflict between legal ideologies, between positivism and teleological, natural or sociological theories of law. The Court has used wide interpretations of the various statutes, in the teleological belief that the high-sounding

words of the authors of the 'sacred trust of civilisation' should have meaning in practice. South Africa has argued for narrow interpretations, for a limited, muzzled version of international law. The one doctrine sees a close link between international law and morality, the other sees the two concepts as being very distinct from each other. The Court has chosen, in effect, to pay heed to the high principles expressed by those who drafted the law, and to interpret the law in that light. In my opinion this is a correct approach, for, as a bitter opponent of the legality of Resolution 2145 (xxi), Professor Marinus Wiechers, has written:

"Law does still provide the best and most acceptable means of solving an international dispute. At the same time law affords the most solid basis on which states can conduct their foreign relations with other states. Seen in that light, international law is not merely a set of rules which can be applied mechanically; it must be realised that international law also serves as a vehicle for conveying and giving expression to philosophical and moral values" (31).

The final major objection raised by Advocate Grosskopf concerns the merits of the case, and the Court's finding in that regard. Grosskopf maintains that, having declined to hear South African factual evidence on whether "Separate Development" constituted a breach of the Mandate, and having then ruled that South Africa's refusal to submit reports on the territory to the United Nations constituted sufficient grounds for revocation, the Court should not have devoted space to a discussion of the alleged iniquities of Apartheid, and should not have reached the conclusion that Apartheid constituted a violation of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations. He concludes that the Court produced a propaganda piece dressed up as a legal opinion.

John Dugard, by contrast, maintains that the Court should not have given an opinion on Apartheid, because the Court had found that it was for a political body, the General Assembly, to determine whether the Mandate had been violated. Once the General Assembly had done so, there was no need for the Court to do so of its own accord.

What is of note, however, is that both Dugard and Grosskopf deem the finding about Separate Development's incompatibility with the United Nations Charter to be irrelevant. They see it as an obiter dictum on which evidence had not been taken. It thus does not detract markedly from the Court's major finding that South Africa's presence in Namibia is illegal and that she should withdraw.

However, concerning the Court's remarks on apartheid in the territory, it must be noted that South Africa's ready willingness to give evidence as to the "facts" is worthless so long as her opponents do not have equal access to the "facts", or indeed so long as there is no free political debate and no free black press in the territory. So long as South Africa's more Draconian political laws, such as the Terrorism Act, are extended to the territory, so long will the "facts" of the situation be hidden. Guided tours for the Secretary-General of the United Nations are no substitute: such tours are remarkable for what the Secretary-General does not see.

An example of the usual restrictions on information about the territory can be found in the "PERMIT TO ENTER NATIVE AREAS OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA" issued by the authorities, which includes the following:

"..Lodging by whites with coloured or natives is not permitted. Under no circumstances may a permit holder interfere with the domestic affairs of the native.

No trading whatsoever with the natives in the Native areas may be undertaken.

No kraals and/or the Ruacana Falls may be visited without written permission. The behaviour of the

permit holder in dealings with the natives where necessary must at all times be worthy.

No agitation may be started and the administration of the Government or any of its officials may not be criticised. It is strictly prohibited to shoot or interfere with wild animals or game and no places of concealment at waterholes for photography or any other purpose may be constructed. The taking of photographs for publication purposes; for instance, cinema distribution, television, newspapers and magazines, is prohibited.....

If a permit holder enters native areas as a guest of permanent European residents he may only travel in the area or leave public roads in the company of his hosts... The wearing of ultra-mini skirts or shorts by women in the Native Areas is prohibited" ..(32).

The Ruacana Falls are, of course, the site of the major power plant in the Kunene scheme. The document demonstrates the usual limitations placed on access to the "facts" of the situation. The weakness of South Africa's version of the facts was adequately demonstrated in late 1971/early 1972. South Africa published a book on "Owambo", which, in its section on the migrant labour system, gives the impression of satisfactory system, with some minor defects. Attempts were being made to cure the defects, but on balance the system was "beneficial to the general economy" (33). Within a few weeks of the book's publication, the Owambo migrant labourers staged a general strike on a huge scale - precisely because the migrant labour system was unsatisfactory. South Africa's "facts" are thus questionable.

The other major arguments as to the "facts" concerns the plebiscite offered by South Africa in 1971. John Dugard is correct in persistently maintaining that a free plebiscite would be the best available way of solving the dispute. However, perhaps Judge Zafrulla Khan of the Court is correct in maintaining that South Africa should withdraw before a free plebiscite could be held, for South Africa's powers of influencing a plebiscite are great. The question is probably academic,

for South Africa is highly unlikely to agree to all the requirements, such as freedom for political prisoners, which Dugard lists, and nor is she likely to risk a free plebiscite after the fiasco of the "Owambo Legislative Assembly" elections in August 1973, where a boycott campaign was so successful that only thirteen-hundred (1300) people voted, which represented 2.5% of the registered voters, and even less of those eligible for a vote (34).

In short, it was submitted that South Africa had contravened the spirit and the letter of the Mandate given to her to administer the territory as a 'sacred trust of civilisation', and the world Court has in due course declared South Africa's occupation of the territory to be illegal. From this it flows that her activities in the territory are illegal, and that the Kunene river scheme is illegal, as is the fragmentation of the territory into separate "nations".

The legal debate is voluminous, and has been covered very briefly here. The arguments for South Africa, as advanced by Advocate Gosskopf and others, have been considered, and some reasons given for their rejection. Be that as it may, the International Court of Justice has given its Opinion, and that should be conclusive for such firm upholders of law and order as the South African government.

However, the case has moved back into the political and military spheres, for South Africa has rejected the Opinion, and, as the Africa Institute, Pretoria, solemnly and tersely notes,

"South West Africa's defence is integrated into that of South Africa" (35).

The implication of this will be examined in the following chapter.

NOTES. CHAPTER TWO: THE LEGALITY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S PRESENCE
IN NAMIBIA.

1. A.J.P. Taylor, 1961 : 19
2. R.F. Harrod, 1951 : 298, writing of J.M. Keynes's
"The Economic Consequences of the Peace".
3. Ibid : 303
4. C.J. Andersson, 1861, and see H. Vedder, (1936) 1966 : 321.
5. U.N. General Assembly : Resolution 2372 (xxii), 1968.
6. League of Nations, SWA Mandate, Preamble (1920), in
Dugard, 1973 : 72.
7. A.J.P. Taylor, (1965), 1970 : 181.
8. Dugard, 1973 : xi.
9. Warhurst, 1962 : 115.
10. Letter, 1919, from A.T. Hennessy to Patrick Duncan, now
in the Patrick Duncan Collection (BC 294 D 282) of the
Jagger Library, University of Cape Town.
11. Dugard, 1973 : 66, quoting S. Slonim, "The Origins of
the South West Africa Dispute: The Versailles Peace
Conference and the Creation of the Mandates System."
12. League of Nations, SWA Mandate, 1920, in Dugard, 1973:73
13. Dugard, 1973 : 67, note 90.
14. Union of South Africa, UG 26 - 1936, quoted in Goldblatt,
1971 : 234.
15. Karina, J. : Masters' Dissertation, Edinburgh University
(Abstract). *date*
16. See the speech by Eric Louw, in Dugard, 1973 : 103, on
the question of "Annexation" or "Incorporation".
17. Dugard, 1973 : 109.
18. Ibid : 191.
19. Ibid : 198.
20. Ibid : 293.
21. Ibid : 422 (U.N. Security Council Resolution 245)
22. Ibid : 439 (U.N. Security Council Resolution 264)
23. Ibid : 481 (ICJ Reports, 1971)
24. Dugard and Grosskopf, 1974
25. Ibid : 24.
26. Ibid : 31.
27. Ibid : 24.
28. ICJ Opinion, 1971 : Clause 101.

29. Dugard and Grosskopf, 1974 : 20 and 11.
30. ICJ Opinion, 1971 : Clause 100.
31. Dugard and Grosskopf, 1974 : 9; Introduction by M. Wiechers.
32. S.W.A. - Department of Bantu Administration and Development,
1974 : 2, 3.
33. Republic of South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs,
1971 : 21.
34. Kotze, 1973 : 283.
35. Africa Institute, 1970 : 20.

CHAPTER THREE

MILITARY AND STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE. (1)

The Prime Minister of South Africa, the Honourable B.J. Vorster, Member of Parliament for Nigel and Gran Maestro de la Orden Nacional de Merito de Paraguay, has promised the "Owambo Executive Council" that the Kunene project would be zealously defended (2). To this and other ends, South Africa is arming rapidly and massively. Popular movements of Angola and Namibia, such as UNITA, SWAPO, and the MPLA, have condemned the Kunene schemes and aim to prevent their completion (3). This chapter will examine aspects of the military conflict, together with the structural violence by which domination is maintained in Namibia.

Tables One and Two show South African military expenditure, which expands astoundingly. She now spends in one year what she spent in five years in the nineteen-sixties. In ten years from 1960 military spending increased by 800% (4) but in fifteen years from 1960 it has increased by over 1700%. This is at current prices, for an inflation index of military prices is not available, but in real terms there has been vast military growth. What was adequate to cope with African nationalism at the time of the Sharpeville killings, when the ANC and the PAC were reaching their prime in South Africa (so far), is but a tiny fraction of what South Africa thinks she needs now.

Wars are expensive, and are financed by South Africa from profits achieved at the expense of just returns to black labour. The proportion of the national wealth devoted to guns is increasing. At current prices from 1950 to 1965, military spending averaged only 1.23% of the GDP (5). By 1974/1975, military expenditure is 13.51% of the state's spending, and 3.8% of the GNP. These percentages are still low by world standards, however. Canada from 1962 to 1967 spent on defence between 16.6% and 22.6% of her state budget, Tanzanian spending

ranged from 14.3% to 17.6% from 1963 to 1969, and in the United Kingdom the range was from 13.7% to 16.8% from 1962 to 1967 (6).

TABLE ONE. (7).

SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE ESTIMATES IN MILLIONS OF RAND 1960 - 1973.

1960/61	R 44 M	
1961/62	72	
1962/63	120	
1963/64	157	
1964/65	210	
1965/66	230	
1966/67	256	
1968/69	253	
1969/70	272	
1970/71	257	
1971/72	317	(Budgeted)
1972/73	R344 M	(Budgeted)
(at current prices)		

TABLE TWO. (8).

SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE ESTIMATES IN RANDBS. 1973 to 1975.

	1973/1974	1974/1975
Current Account	R 492,232,000	R 704,776,000
Capital Account (Military Family Housing)	11,343,000	18,598,000
Armcor Ltd. (Credit and Share purchases)	23,121,000	10,496,000
Autonomous State Institutions (eg. Armaments Board)	15,362,000	19,596,000
<u>TOTAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURE</u>	<u>R 542,058,000</u>	<u>R 753,466,000</u>
<u>TOTAL STATE EXPENDITURE</u>	<u>R4494,167,000</u>	<u>R5573,089,000</u>
<u>% OF STATE EXPENDITURE</u>	<u>12.06%</u>	<u>13.51%</u>
<u>% OF G.N.P. (9)</u>	<u>2.9%</u>	<u>3.8%</u>
(at current prices)		

It has been suggested that the 1974/75 budget is extraordinary, in that it takes advantage of the current buoyant financial position to buy now what would otherwise have been bought later under the ten-year armaments plan (10). The bulk of the defence budget is reported to have been completed in November 1973, so that it is supposedly not a response to the coup in Portugal in 1974. Certainly the Republic experienced a comfortable real growth rate of its Gross Domestic Product of 4.1% in 1973, while greatly improved prices for gold, maize, wool and other exports resulted in a 9% real growth in the Gross National Product compared with 4.1% for the previous year (11). There was thus unusual wealth available.

Ostensibly the 1974/75 military budget aims to use part of this "windfall" wealth, and therefore future defence budgets should be correspondingly smaller. However, one fears that abnormally high expenditure in 1974 could mean greater growth, by future defence budgets merely being kept at their originally planned levels. The windfall growth in GNP from mining and farming prices might instead have been used more directly for black mineworkers and farm labourers.

Enormous South African military expansion has meant the creation of a large state-controlled armaments industry. The military-industrial complex is capable of producing a vast range of modern weapons, not least the French Mirage F I fighter, a devastating weapon due for production in large quantities by 1977, which will make military defeat of South Africa far more difficult.

The South African factories presently manufacture an armoured personell carrier, two versions of the French Panhard armoured car, and a 90mm gun. The Minister of Defence has recently announced plans to produce battle tanks in South Africa - a production feat which has not even been attempted in Israel, a state whose very existence has so deomonstrably depended on tanks. The South African war machine is becoming huge and versatile (12).

However, the regime's defence depends more on the loyalty, neutrality or, at least, demoralisation of the black people, than on technological superiority. Therefore police and security force expenditures must also be considered, and they too are increasing rapidly. As one parliamentarian put it, the annual cost of sleeping soundly at night is now a record R891 million! (13).

This militarism is a part of a world trend: in 1967 the world spent on arms three times what it spent on health, and forty percent more than its education spending (14). However, South Africa's military growth is disproportionately high for Africa. In 1960 she accounted for 20% of Africa's military spending, but in 1968 she spent 36.3% of the total spent by African countries (15). She is expanding her forces more rapidly than the African bloc is.

One result is a regional arms race that retards African development. Instead of investing for development, a small country like Zambia buys sophisticated Rapier missile Air defence systems. Could a better example be found to demonstrate Hegel's Axiom given above? (16) The relations between South Africa and Africa are an integral part of each, and the development of both is stunted thereby.

Ali Mazrui and A. Gingyera - Pincywa have commented

"Southern Africa is not a dormant target waiting to be attacked and to defend itself against freedom fighters. It poses challenges of its own, beyond its borders - challenges that form an important rationale for military expenditures in neighbouring states, especially Zambia and Tanzania. The regional arms race between Southern Africa and free Africa is leading to a diversion of Zambia's and Tanzania's resources away from development and towards more sophisticated deterrents" (17).

However, this regional arms race is negligible in global terms. Hoagland (18) has shown that only six countries (America, Britain, France, Russia, China and West Germany) account for some 85% of the world's military spending, while the remaining 130 countries account for merely 15%. The super-powers can change any African military situation overnight in many ways, as was demonstrated in the recent war of the Day of Atonement.

General Spinoia has emphasised the point, claiming that despite their rhetoric, the "communist bloc" did not wish to end the conflict in Portuguese Africa.

"The Soviet Union is fully aware that when it wanted to it could provoke an uncontrollable deterioration in the situation of Portugal Overseas.....Even today the communists prefer their protagonists to be martyrs, not policemen" (19).

He suggests three reasons for the Soviet Union's action, political prudence in refraining from forcing the West to choose between the new countries of Africa and the Portuguese; convenience in avoiding the need for large aid to newly independent areas; and global strategy in not eliminating the centres of tension by which communist ideology might be spread.

Similarly, despite Western rhetorical dislike of apartheid, the West's actions exhibit more complex motivation. NATO authorised the Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic to plan for contingencies outside the NATO area, and one SACALANT official disclosed plans "designed to go to the aid of our potential allies in Southern Africa if the need should arise", although another claimed that the interest was only in the sea route around the Cape (20). The United States has allegedly supplied military defoliants in large quantities to white regimes in Southern Africa, and has reportedly decided to sell

helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft to South Africa.

South Africa's "internal security" operations depend on Belgian small-arms and on French helicopters, armoured-cars and fighter-bombers, most of which are built under license in South Africa. More crucially, they depend on British Bedford's and Land-Rovers. In 1973 the Defence Department reported that while truck bodies and trailers were being made entirely locally, truck components were still being imported to a large extent (22). Even under a Labour Government the Royal Navy carries out exercises with the South African fleet, and it is not known whether the supply of truck components has been stopped. Thus rhetorical opposition to apartheid is translated into military co-operation with the South African forces.

The West is not monolithic, and different groups say and do different things. In such a situation prediction as to future behaviour is difficult, especially if the West in effect is hedging its bets, backing both the Vorster government and the guerilla movements.

However, Western investment in apartheid may be crucial. South Africa's enormous increase in defence spending since 1960 is in part an exercise, prompted by the huge capital outflow after the Sharpeville killings, to convince foreign investors of the security of their assets in the country. Western investors insure their profits from the apartheid system by military assistance, in turn.

The South African war bears some comparison with the Vietnam war, and with the war on Laos and Cambodia, for even after Nixon, United States decision-making on war does not seem too radically altered. Walter Goldstein has argued very convincingly that a refusal to change the basic structures and procedures of the American political system will lead almost inevitably to another Vietnam-style war (23). It will not

require a para . id President who secretly records his own intimate conversations, for one should remember that the Vietnam war was planned by the liberal advisers of liberal Presidents, and given solid backing by the military-industrial complex, which still exists. The institution of one man, Henry Kissinger, as a world peace-maker, is no guarantee against such a war if its causes are fundamental. Hoagland is among many writers who list racial confrontation in Southern Africa as a conflict area for the 1970's (24). Western investment in apartheid, coupled to Western political systems of decision-making about war, can lead to Western support for apartheid in an escalated Southern African war. The support may be open or secret, by governments or by military and industrial interest-groups, for Western profits from cheap black labour in Southern Africa are very high.

Nevertheless, the South Africans seem to be planning at most for Western neutrality: there is a tone of loneliness in their official plans. They face the possibility of a majority-ruled hostile Angola and Mocambique, together with a growing war in the rebel British Colony of Southern Rhodesia, which colony will have about 90% of its borders surrounded by potentially hostile states. South African military planners see their problem as follows:

"THE THREAT" (25).

"It is common knowledge that for the past two decades or more our country has been the whipping boy on the international scene. We must endure attacks on many fronts; the motives of our enemies differ, but to all of them our country's government is the immediate object of their attacks. There are clearly identifiable courses in their strategy against us. These embrace:

(a) Efforts to isolate the Republic of South Africa from the rest of the world community, for example by the imposition of economic boycotts, by persistent unfavourable propaganda, boycotts and demonstrations in the spheres of sport and art and even in those of science and culture;

Without wishing to deny the enormity of the threat facing the Minister, one must point out that the only monolithic organisation in absolute control of all the means available to its states would be a Supreme Deity. However, the South African Defence Force is convinced of the support of the Almighty.

"the Chaplain has a message to convey - the message of the Bible, the Soldiers firmest anchor" (28).

This analysis of increasing militarism in South Africa, displayed by the remarks of the Minister of Defence and by the growing military expenditure, is given further support by the "ATTITUDE SURVEY OF STUDENTS AND NATIONS" shown in Table Three. Five thousand students in different nations were surveyed, and a "compulsion-comparison factor" was established. A rank/order comparison of students' and nations attitudes and behaviours was prepared, in terms of the categories of conservatism, militarism, nationalism, religiosity and compassion. By comparison with fourteen other countries the survey found "white" South African students and their nation to be extremely militaristic and lacking in compassion, as defined by the authors.

Table Three.....

TABLE 3: MILITARISM AND COMPASSION.

RANK ORDER SCORES OF STUDENTS AND NATIONS (29).

NATION	STUDENT ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR					NATIONAL
	CONSERVATISM	MILITARISM	RELIGIOUSITY	NATIONALISM	COMPASSION	ATTITUDE AND BEHAVIOUR COMPASSION
Denmark	4	14	14	13	1	2
Netherlands	9	13	7	14	2	4
United Kingdom	10	11	10	11	3	8
Yugoslavia	14	6	9	10	4	7
Sweden	3	12	11	12	5	1
Canada	7	8	13	7	6	3
Czechoslovakia	11	10	5	9	7	11
U. S. A.	2	9	12	6	8	9
Finland	6	4	6	8	9	5
Ceylon	13	5	4	1	10	10
Australia	5	3	8	5	11	6
Brazil	8	7	2	3	12	13
India	12	2	3	2	13	12
South Africa (Whites)	1	1	1	4	14	14

Sample Size: 5,000

$r = .74$, significant at the .01 level of confidence.

The survey does not attempt to distinguish between English- and Afrikaans-speaking students, and it must be queried whether a single poll of so small a sample can adequately ascertain the attitudes of people in fourteen countries, speaking many languages, but the results do perhaps give a statistical description of white South African attitudes compared to those of other countries. As a further table prepared by Alcock and Eckhardt shows, in Amnesty International's Reported Incidence of Torture by Nation, South Africa falls in the category of nations where

torture is widespread and encouraged (30). Again, this information must be treated with some reservations, for nations do not give publicity to the torture they use. In short, however, there is evidence of a rapidly-arming highly militaristic group in South Africa, whose methods deviate from the Queensbury and Geneva rules for conflict.

The strategy of this group has been clearly stated:

"Our posture is defensive and not offensive. Defence however, cannot be merely passive; our policy demands a measure of retaliatory capability".

"The main task of the Defence Force is to ensure within its capabilities and the terms of Government policy that the Government will have the time and freedom of action needed to develop its internal and foreign policies..

Departmental strategic policy of the Defence Force is aimed at preventing crises rather than seeking solutions when matters have come to a head. Prevention includes the deterrent element, preparedness and presence in the threatened sphere".

"The Defence Force must at all times be able to assist the S.A. Police in preserving internal order" (31).

The stress is laid on the importance of buying time in which the government can carry out its plans for Southern Africa, notably the creation of separate nations based on the old 'tribal' divisions of the people of the region. "Separate development" is dealt with more fully below with regard to Namibia, but it must be noted that the RSADF sees itself as necessary in gaining time to achieve "separate development".

General Spínola sees a similar role for his army:

"To the armed forces therefore only belongs the duty of creating and maintaining for the necessary length of time - naturally not very long - those conditions of security which will allow of finding those political and social solutions which are the only ones which can put an end to the conflict" (32).

This importance of time in the Southern African case has also been stressed by Bromberger in his important criticism of Johnstone's article, "White Prosperity and White Supremacy in South Africa Today". Bromberger (33) emphasises what he calls the "intertemporal aspects of social choice", or more simply, the value people place on the future gains compared to current satisfactions. In the strategic field, to what extent are some South African's buying time in which to re-structure the region so as to ensure a survival of a form of their life-style, and to what extent are they merely maximising present satisfaction at the expense of future loss? In both cases the military is used to prevent the imposition of the "enemy's" will upon them, but the purpose differs.

Bromberger suggests that the average "white" South African, "Naas Rautenbach", if asked about the thirty-year future, will say, "That's not my worries".

"He probably has a high rate of time-preference within his lifetime and a one-lifetime planning horizon.....There is evidence that South Africa is exhibiting this form of intertemporal behaviour. While there are.....clearly official planners with somewhat longer time-horizons than he has, it may not be incorrect to think of white South Africans overall as discounting the future heavily" (34).

Thus, while the official planners may see the Defence Force's role as buying the time needed to create Separate Development, others may see it as allowing time in which to enjoy the abundant fruits of the present system, and a third group may wish both to create a stable future and to enjoy the present luxury. This becomes especially important in Namibia, in the field of mineral extraction. For the planners, the Defence Force buys time to achieve stable separation in Namibia. For the white mineworker, the defence force protects his present enormously inflated standard of living, and the future is only envisaged in terms of kragdadigheid. For the white mine-owners, the Defence Force protects enormous present profits made by the rapid depletion of the territory's minerals using very lowly-paid black labour, (35) and also allows time

for a negotiated future settlement based on federalism or qualified franchise, in which the mine-owners will still be able to make a (slightly smaller) profit. From all three groups the "West" still draws its raw materials at low prices, and is hence prepared to tolerate the situation, despite rhetorical denunciations of Apartheid. The Defence Force, on the borders and backing up the police, provides the threatened or actual violence whereby the system has survived so far.

Can the RSADF win its civil war in Southern Africa or, more especially, in Namibia? General Spínola asserts that "a purely military victory is not possible" (35). Lewis Gann, by contrast, writes that there is "no hope for violent liberation in Southern Africa" (36). The General has much combat and command experience; Gann is a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institute for War and Peace. Gann wrote in 1972, and has already been proved wrong in the case of Portugal Overseas, where the present decolonisation is clearly a result of the "war of liberation". Gann may yet be proved wrong in other areas too, especially in those areas where the terrain is suitable for guerilla operations, such as much of Southern Rhodesia, and Northern Namibia. At least one authority, C. Petersen, has stressed the vulnerability of Ovamboland, which has very few white inhabitants, and thick sub-tropical bush (38). Thus, Gann's dogmatic denial of any "hope" of violent liberation must be more carefully examined, especially for some areas.

Jean Baechler (39) has drawn on the extensively-documented French counter-revolutionary wars in Indo-China and Algeria to produce a strategic assessment of such wars which may shed some light on the Southern African conflict, especially in Namibia, whose white settler society is similar in some ways to that in Algeria. He gives a framework, based on von Clausewitz's classic (40).

War is a duel between two protagonists, with two grand strategies, either the attack (to win the war) or the defence (to avoid losing the war), and is the continuation of politics by other means. To these classical maxims, Baechler adds features applying to revolutionary war.

Each of the protagonists has three features to be examined: the combatant forces, domestic politics, and the attitude of the international community. Political occurrences in any of the three spheres may affect the war more directly than in conventional war. Political dynamics are thus more important in revolutionary wars than in conventional wars. This means that especially in revolutionary wars the political goal must determine the military objective. The defence, seeking not to lose, is superior to the attack, in such wars. Finally, the opposing strategies are dialectically linked: one should not sneer at the strategy of one's opponents (as the French did to their cost).

The insurrection's political goals are sovereignty and legitimacy. It seeks decolonisation and the re-conquering of national identity; it seeks the possibility of freely choosing a place in the international system. Baechler writes:

"What is probable is that the longer and harsher the war, the more extremist the regime which will finally take over from the colonists" (41).

This is a sad note for Southern Africa, whose leaders are arming for a long battle. The Namibian insurrection fits Baechler's framework: its political goal is independence, sovereignty and de-colonisation.

For the insurrection, Baechler maintains, the conquest of the people by its opponents will result in the people's support for the insurrection, or at least neutrality. The

insurrection should seek to convert neutrality to active support, especially by political training, and by popular programs such as demands for land reform. Both these occur in the Namibian case, where leaders leave the territory for training, and where opposition to land apartheid is the paramount political tactic.

The international environment is equally important: the insurrection seeks to destroy alliances made by the colonists internationally, and to influence world opinion against the colonists, while seeking direct help. Again the Namibian case is in point: world opinion is actively lobbied, and direct help received, as much from the constitutional monarchies of Scandinavia and Europe as from America or the "East".

If the political goal is legitimate sovereignty and decolonisation, the military strategy is to destroy the enemy's moral and material centre of gravity, which might lie, as with Charles XII or Gustavus Adolphus, in the Army, or given a revolutionary war, in the national will to fight. The strategy of the insurgents is to turn into a majority the group that supports negotiation and peace. In the Namibian case this means convincing the occupiers that a long war would be more expensive than negotiation. The strategy is that of defence, for the insurgents seek not to lose, not to be destroyed. To this end they follow the classical maxims, retreating before superior forces, attacking only when sure of absolute superiority, never engaging all their strength in a single battle, and breaking off combat if losses are excessive. The strategy of attack (such as the battle at Dien Bien Phu) is not currently applicable in Namibia by the insurrection, for they do not have sufficient strength. The grand strategy is the destruction of the

colonist's will to fight for the territory, and the means is a long protracted war.

The strategy for the occupiers can be seen in the same framework. The political goal is a particular reform of the society so as to protect the income and life-style of the ruling group, and so as to satisfy or control the aspirations of other groups. The goal in Namibia is thus the fragmentation of the country into separate "nations", in which process the living standards of the ruling "nation" may not fall. However, this political goal is by no means totally accepted by the ruling groups in Namibia or South Africa, and other goals exist, from baaskap to federalism (42). The ruling groups have internal political tensions, and are divided or divisible. This weakness has perhaps not yet been fully exploited by the insurrection.

For the occupiers, the enemy's centre of gravity is the people of the territory. Thus, short of genocide, which would have huge international ramifications, the occupier's military strategy must be to win or to neutralise the population. Baechler lists several methods: the occupiers are using all simultaneously, excepting rapid genocide. The first method is to win hearts and minds, which is accurately shortened to WHAM! This involves actual or promised economic and political reform; skillful propaganda; sensitive, responsive administration; and highly-trained, tactful soldiering. The South African forces recently announced their intention to use this method in Namibia: its efficacy will be considered below. The method has the disadvantage of alienating those supporters of the occupation who categorically oppose reform.

The second military strategy for the occupiers is a large-scale mobilisation of the people, the elimination of potential enemies, and the atomisation or demoralisation of the population, which is packed into armoured hamlets or aldeamentos, as in

Southern Rhodesia, Portugal Overseas, Vietnam, and Algeria. South Africa's re-settlement camps, such as Dimbaza, are perhaps a non-military version of this method. It is a method that has seldom been militarily successful, and offers excellent opportunities for the opposing forces. Further, it is unlikely to aid a WHAM campaign.

The third military strategy is the use of the cleavages which might divide the population, be they ethnic, linguistic or religious cleavages. This is obviously used in Namibia, for both separate development and federalism are sophisticated political versions of this strategy. The common bonds linking the groups in the territory are presently very strong, however.

Within these strategies, various military tactics are available: the war of movement, the war of territorial security, counter-guerilla war, and the war of annihilation.

The war of annihilation has been used before in Namibia: the Herero population was reduced by the Germans from 80,000 to 15, 130 in 1904 to 1905, in such a war (43). Baechler writes: "on the whole it was impossible for France to resort to such extremes. However, a totalitarian regime with hegemonial power might not hesitate to do so" (44).

The war of territorial security, usually linked to the strategy of atomisation (above) involves garrisons guarding limited areas, having recourse to rapid re-inforcement. Such a war requires vast numbers of troops, which leads to political difficulties for the occupier.

The classical war of movement, in World War II style, involves huge mechanised attacks. In revolutionary warfare such methods are generally foolhardy: the enemy merely disappears, and receives propaganda opportunities from the inevitable "mistakes" of huge attacks.

The counter-guerilla war has proved very effective. It involves small professional bands of soldiers using guerilla tactics to choose and destroy guerilla bands. The bands are

self-sufficient, and licensed to use extreme methods; they have one advantage over the guerilla, which is air support. The method was very successful in Malaysia under the British, and, using the "style-para", the Casbah of Algiers was cleaned out in six months (45). South Africa probably envisages using this method. Al Venter remarks about the Republic's "Parabats",

"Tough and relentless, they are trained to operate with an almost automatic fury" (46).

However, the method has disadvantages, especially in Namibia. The extreme methods used would mean harmful international propaganda, and a strengthening of those at home who wish to negotiate peace. These methods preclude any winning of hearts, preclude easy political solutions, and invite United Nations intervention, especially if the counter-guerilla band crosses the border in chasing its foe. Counter-guerilla military "victory" can mean political defeat.

Baechler, writing about successful revolutionary wars, concludes that it is difficult for a revolutionary war not to succeed. The various strategies and tactics of the occupiers, outlined above, all have exploitable weaknesses. Baechler writes:

"All the insurrection needs is not to lose militarily in order eventually to win politically. Because of the strategic defensive advantages of the insurgents, the established authorities cannot win a counter-revolutionary war; they can only lose the war or pervert their political ideals" (47).

Spinola agrees in part:

"The forces of the law and order can always lose a subversive war, but they will never win one, for the simple reason that the construction of victory does not lie in their sphere" (48).

Thus Baechler argues that political victory is inevitable for the insurgents if they do not lose militarily, while Spinola claims that victory can only be achieved politically,

not militarily, by the occupiers. I would avoid any suggestion of inevitability, for such things have no time limit, but on balance a military and political victory in Namibia, in the long run, is very difficult for South Africa to achieve. To do so, she must maintain her national will to fight a long, expensive and bloody war, she must win the population or totally destroy the insurgents, she must make separate development or federation work in Namibia, and this must be done in such a way as not to disturb the high standard of living of the ruling group, on whose support the regime depends. A tall order!

The military leaders may see the benefit of a WHAM campaign (49) but can they implement it, as they recently attempted in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel? The racialism of their troops probably mitigates against a successful WHAM campaign, as is shown by the "Guide for the South African Army on how to treat Bantu" issued to troops in the Transvaal;

"Every tribe has its totem, usually an animal, the best known being a baboon, blue ape, fish or kudu. Avoid the bad habit of abusing a Bantu as an ape or baboon, or saying his mouth is like a crocodile, because one of these animals can be his totem, and this is a gross insult to him.....

The Bantu is also a person, an entity with a name and surname. If it is known to you, call him by his name and surname and add Mister (-----), particularly if you are in his Homeland.....

If a hand is extended to you for greeting, take it. Your hand will not change colour".

When I asked a meeting of Namibian migrant labourers and students whether South Africa could win the hearts and minds of the Northern peoples of Namibia, the reply was polite laughter. The meeting stressed its hatred of war and violence, and pointed out that the WHAM campaign arose from a desire to win the war, not to alter the social system.

However, whatever the outcome of the military conflict, be it "inevitable" victory or defeat, the purpose here has been more to show the actual and latent military violence which maintains the system in the territory, as well as to show the potential for conflagration. The Kunene schemes are in the firing line, are important to a political victory for South Africa, and will, if completed, assist in large capital accumulation in Johannesburg, London and New York. The linkage between capital accumulation and violence, traced for South Africa by Legassick (51), can be seen in Namibia. It should be recalled that the South African occupation is illegal (52), and it must be questioned whether General S.L.A. Marshall of the United States, who testified so eloquently at the World Court in 1965, that the territory was "less militarised than any of its size he had ever seen", (53) could undertake a tour of the country today and still give the same evidence.

The tanks of the military may lumber threateningly by, but the society they defend is supported more subtly and effectively by another weapon: the structural violence of the migratory contract labour and pass-law systems, allied to the political control resulting from legislation such as the Terrorism Act, Number 83 of 1967.

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of Kwazulu has described a similar system, operating in South Africa, as follows:

"The migratory labour system is destroying my people. Families are not just living apart, but also growing apart in different cultures. Zulus now have to maintain two households on a wage that would be laughable to any other race group" (54).

The social disruptions and devastation caused by the system have been documented (55), but they could never be completely described, for language has its limitations. Helen Suzman's speech on her Private Member's Motion to abolish the system, made in 1972, is an excellent summary of the damage and demoralisation achieved by the system; (56)

there is no need of extensive elaboration here. A South African Cabinet Member (before joining the Cabinet) once said of the system:

"It is not possible to ensure any stability in a society which struggles for social existence, which cannot find a basis for any permanent relations at all" (57).

The 1971/1972 mass Ovambo strike bears adequate testimony to the existence of this structural violence in Namibia: they struck not only for higher wages, but because of the whole oppressive system, which split their families, prevented their free movement, or association, and prevented any labour mobility (58). Marginal "changes" resulted, but fundamentally the system is the same as before.

The territory's largest single employer is the Tsumeb Corporation Limited, whose profits averaged R12,900,000 per year in the decade to 1972. American Metal Climax Incorporated (AMAX) are large shareholders in the Tsumeb Corporation, and reported in 1974 on the labour regulations in the territory:-

"There are a number of laws which affect employment in the mining industry.....These regulations require that mining employees in nearly every position of senior responsibility, such as mine managers, mine captains, mechanical and electrical engineers, surveyors, shift-bosses, onsetters (cagers), and hoist drivers (for conveyance of men), must be white. The regulations effectively limit black employees to unskilled, semi-skilled service and clerical positions" (59).

To this structural violence of poverty, travel restrictions, and broken families, must be added the direct violence of fierce political control. The Bishops of the Churches of Ovamboland were asked by the authorities why the young and educated people were fleeing the country in 1974. They gave a number of reasons, among them the following:-

"The oppressive powers of the police have caused grievances among Ovambos and all South West African people. Those who oppose the inhuman constitution are being flogged,

tortured with electric shocks, detained for long periods without trial and the conditions of imprisonment are inhumane" (60).

To summarise: South Africa is illegally occupying Namibia, and intends to back that occupation with vast military might. The population is being fragmented, atomised and demoralised, even to the extent of naked public floggings being imposed on political leaders.

Military and structural violence are essential to the system, but attempts are simultaneously made to win hearts and minds and to achieve "separate development", or at least some form of self-determination.

One Namibian, whose doctoral dissertation concerned the German colonisation of the territory, was recently made Bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Windhoek. He summed up the situation:

"The brutal, bloody colonialism of the Germans has been replaced by a brutal bloody new colonialism of the South African government" (61).

NOTES. CHAPTER THREE. MILITARY AND STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE.

1. Military information in this work is taken only from published sources available in Southern Africa.
2. Clive Cowley, 30/8/1972.
3. W.C.C. 1971 : Appendices.
4. K. Grundy, 1973 : 215.
5. C. Legum, (ed) 1973 : C223.
6. D. Carney, 1971 : 26.
7. From Grundy, 1973 : 217.
8. Prepared from "Republic of South Africa: Statistical Survey 1974" (RSA - WPB 1974).
9. Financial Mail, Johannesburg, 23/8/1974.
10. Ibid.
11. Republic of South Africa: "Statistical Survey 1974".
12. Cape Times, 17/9/1974: "SA is on the Way to Building War Tanks".
13. Vause Raw, M.P. Cape Times 23/8/1974: "UP Backs Defence Budget".
14. F. Arkhurst, 1972 : 18.
15. Adapted from F. Arkhurst, 1972 : 17.
16. See Page 3 Above.
17. A. Gingyera - Pincywa and Ali Mazrui, 1970 : 33.
18. Ibid : 39.
19. Spinola, 1974 : 53 - 54.
20. New York Post, 10/5/1974.
21. Ibid.
22. Republic of South Africa: Defence White Paper, 1973 (RSA - WPB 1973) : 18.
23. Goldstein, 1971 : 96.
24. Hoagland, 1971 : 138.
25. Republic of South Africa : Defence White Paper 1973 : 4.

26. Ibid, Preface by P.W. Botha : 2.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid : 24.
29. Alcock and Eckhardt, 1974 : "Table Three".
30. Ibid : "Table Five".
31. Republic of South Africa : Defence White Paper, 1973 : 25
(Emphasis added).
32. Spinola, 1974 : 20.
33. Bromberger, 1972 : 73, 74.
34. Ibid.
35. Ovambo Wage Rates are Discussed in Financial Mail, 2/3/1973
: 49; M. Kooy, 1973 : 92 -94; and more
recently in Dissent, 1974.
36. Spinola, 1974 : 20.
37. L. Gann, 1972 : 19.
38. C. Petersen, 1972 : 299.
39. Baechler, 1971 : 74. The words "insurgent" and "insurrection"
are Baechler's terms.
40. C. von Clausewitz, 1832, ed A. Rapoport, 1971.
41. Baechler, 1971 : 76.
42. See, for example, Bryan O'Lynn, 1974.
43. Union of South Africa : Report on the Natives of SWA, 1918 :
34 - 35.
44. Baechler, 1971 : 93.
45. Ibid : 91.
46. Al Venter, 1974 : 45.
47. Baechler, 1971 : 94.
48. Spinola, 1974 : 20.
49. See, for example, Lt. General Fraser, 1970.
50. Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 14/7/1974 : "Soldiers told How
to Treat Blacks"
51. M. Legassick, 1974.
52. See Chapter Two, Above.

53. Report from South Africa, January 1966.
54. Quoted in Hansard, 25/2/1972 : 1904.
55. See, for example, R. Voipio, 1971, and F. Wilson, 1972 (a),
1972 (b).
56. Hansard 25/2/1972 : 1902 - 1916.
57. Ibid : 1916.
58. See the Strikers Demands, listed in M. Kooy, 1973 : 99.
59. AMAX, 1974 : 6.
60. Rand Daily Mail, 16/8/1974 - "Why Ovambos are Quitting
the Homeland".
61. Dr. J.L. de vries, Bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church, interview with the Writer,
July, 1974.

CHAPTER FOUR.

HISTORY, GEOGRAPHY AND APARTHEID ECONOMICS.



To understand "separate development" in Namibia we must look briefly at the climate, soils, topography, vegetation, mineral resources and economy of the territory, in an historical context. We will see that a major problem facing the "separate developers" is that of obtaining three commodities, which the ruling groups lack, and doing so in such a way that the ruling groups continue to rule, no matter how indirectly. The three missing commodities are labour, water and energy. Map I shows the territory and its planned division into "separate nations".

Namibia is a warm, dry country, sparsely populated by some seven-hundred thousand people (1). Including the South African enclave at Walvis Bay, it is 824,269 square kilometres in extent, which is roughly the size of Nigeria, or of Britain and France taken together. It therefore has a very low population density, of less than one person per square kilometre (2).


The territory straddles the Southern tropic. Its three major perennial rivers, the Kunene, the Okavango and the Orange, form the boundaries with South Africa and Angola. These rivers mainly drain the South African and Angolan highlands, not Namibia. The territory's remaining boundaries are the Atlantic Ocean, which joins the mouths of the Kunene and Orange rivers; the parallel of latitude $17^{\circ} 23' .73''$ S, which joins the Kunene river at the Ruacana falls to the Okavango river; the meridians 21° E and 20° E, stepped along the parallel 22° S, which join the Caprivi Zipfel to the Orange River; and finally the borders of the Caprivi Zipfel, a finger-like extension of Namibia across Northern Botswana to touch Zambia and Southern Rhodesia.

As is obvious, these boundaries were politically drawn by European imperialists, and bear little relation to geo-

MAP I.
SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT IN NAMIBIA
(AFRICA INSTITUTE 1970 : 1)




MAP II.
(I.C.J. Pleadings 1966 Volume 2 : 292)




MAP III.

KÜPPEN- CLASSIFICATION OF NAMIBIAN CLIMATE


(Barnard, 1965a : 74)




MAP IV. (Wellington 1967: 35)




MAP V. (Wellington 1967: 35).



MAP VI. (Wellington 1967 : 37)



MAP VII. (Wellington 1967 : 132)



graphical or local human factors. Thus the Cuvelai river, and its non-perennial system of drainage by Oshanas into the Etosha Pan, are split in two by the Angolan border, as is the Kwanyama tribe of the Ovambo people, who draw their water from the Cuvelai drainage system (3). We see that "separate development", in allocating land, must cope with this uncomfortable historical division, which is repeated throughout Africa. Further, the use of the perennial rivers as boundaries has greatly complicated modern water and river basin development, and disputes arose over both the Orange (4) and the Kunene (5).

These boundaries enclose three major topographical areas: the Namib desert, between the coast and the great escarpment; the central plateau, running from the Baynes Mountains in the North to the Fish River canyon and Karasberge in the South; and the monotonous plains of the Kalahari basin in the North and East. The Central plateau is romantically called the "land between two deserts". Map II shows the topographical areas.

These three topographical areas have climatic divisions. Geographers classify climatic regions using a system called the Köppen-classification, named after its designer. Map III shows a Köppen-classification of Namibian climate by W.S. Barnard. An essentially similar map was included in South Africa's "Counter-Memorial" to the International Court of Justice in 1966 (6). A climatic region is defined as an area having approximately uniform conditions of rainfall, winds, temperature and sunshine. Barnard's Köppen-classification for Namibia is as follows: (7).

TABLE FOUR

DESCRIPTION	CLASSIFICATION	% OF TOTAL AREA
Cool coastal desert of the Namib	BWkln	7%
Cool desert of the Central Plateau	BWkw	3%
Cool desert of the Southern Plateau	BWKx'	1%
Warm desert of the Inner Namib	BWht'w	23%
Warm desert of Namaland	BWhw	12%
Transitional desert of the Eastern Kaokoveld	BWngw	4%
Transitional desert of the Orange River Valley	BWnx'	3%
Semi-desert of Damaraland	BShw	20%
Cool Central Highland semi-desert	BSkw	1%
Warm sub-tropical steppes of N and N.E.	BShgw	26%

KEY:	DESCRIPTION	CATEGORY
B	Dry Zone	CLIMATIC ZONE
W	Desert	AND
S	Semi-desert or steppes	TYPE
h	Mean annual temperature over 18°C	TEMPERATURE
k	Mean annual temperature below 18°C	
g	Maximum monthly temperature in early Summer	
t'	Maximum monthly temperature in Autumn	
l	All monthly means between 22°C and 10°C	
w	Summer rainfall	PRECIPITATION
x'	Rain seldom at any time of the year	
n	Coastal mists	

This climate is the result of Namibia's position on the African continent. Her coast is washed by the Benguela Current flowing northwards from the very cold South Atlantic regions. The winds on the Coast circulate around the South Atlantic high, and blow from the South or South East. These cold winds, blowing over a cold current off-shore bring little rain, but they cause mist banks on the coast, and cool the coastal Namib desert.

Temperature increases generally from South to North towards the tropical areas, and from East to West towards the interior of the continent. Temperature is affected by latitude, however, and very high temperatures are recorded in the low-lying Orange river valley, in the South, while more moder-

ate temperatures occur much further North, on the Central Plateau.

Maps IV and V show the mean annual rainfall and the rainfall reliability. Rain is brought by two streams of air, flowing towards the Kalahari summer low, meeting at the inter-tropical front over the North-Eastern corner of the territory. The North-Easterly winds bring rain from the wet tropical belt, while the South Easterly winds move across the continent from the Indian Ocean. Both air-streams pass over large areas of high ground before reaching Namibia, and are nearly dry on arrival.

Rainfall is therefore generally low and unreliable, increasing to the North and East away from the almost totally dry Namib coastal regions. Rainfall reliability also increases to the North and East, and on the coast rainfall may vary by as much as an 80% deviation from the mean annual rainfall. The result is that the only perennial rivers crossing Namibia do not originate within the territory, evaporation is high, groundwater is hard to come by, and there are severe periodic droughts. Water is therefore a problem.

Soils and climate interact in determining the types of vegetation which in turn affects agriculture. There are two basic types of vegetation in Namibia, those of the dry West and South, and those of the wetter, hotter North-east. Climate relegates cultivation to the status of a minor industry. Stock-farming is the major agricultural occupation. The best stock-farming land is the hard-veld of the Central Plateau. The Namib is obviously useless for stock-farming, while the Kalahari sandveld in the East is waterless, and the hotter, wetter North, with exceptions, is unhealthy and unsuitable.

Map I shows the division of Namibia into separate "nations", Maps VI and VII show the areas presently used for livestock farming, and the land allocations existing before the "whites"

had entrenched their rule by putting down the 1904 - 1905 rebellions. A comparison of Maps VI, VII and I will show very clearly that the ruling groups, in their "separate nations" plan, have taken for their "nation" most of the best farming land, displacing the Herero, particularly, to the dreaded Kalahari sandveld. The resulting allocation of land has been examined in detail by one eminent geographer (8) who shows that average "white" rural family controls 2008 hectares while an average "black" rural family has 68 hectares. This thirty-to-one ratio is exacerbated by qualitative differences: the "white" areas usually have sufficient ground water while many of the "homeland" areas do not.

The land was not freely given: it was violently taken, and we have seen above that the present arrangement is maintained both by the threat of military violence and by the structural violence of the contract labour and pass-law systems. The original conquest was by the Germans, and was resisted in fierce and bloody rebellions, culminating in the genocide of 1904 - 1905.

German rule in Africa in the 19th century was marked by an imperial viciousness perhaps rivalled only by Muhamed Ali's conscription of the Egyptian fellahin to conquer the Sudan, and by Leopold of the Belgians in extracting wealth from the Congo. Hendrik Witbooi, leader of one rebellion, wrote in 1892 to the British magistrate at Walvis Bay about "the German", as follows:

"he has already beaten our people to death for debt. It is not just and right to beat people to death for that. He flogs people in a shameful and cruel manner. We stupid and unintelligent people, for so he thinks us to be, we have never yet punished a human being in such a cruel and improper way, for he stretches people on their backs and flogs them on the stomach and even between the legs, be they male or female, so Your Honour can understand that no-one can survive such a punishment" (9).

The 1904 to 1905 annihilation was documented by the Union Government in 1918 after their conquest of the Germans. This report (10) is far more than an imperial power justifying its actions by the misdeeds of another imperial power: it is a sickening history of cruelty, right up to 1915. In 1914, some 46,719 strokes were officially inflicted on 2,787 people, an average of 17 lashes each, for "crimes" such as "being cheeky" "refusing to obey orders" or "being lazy and not working well" (11).

The genocide in the 1904 to 1905 rebellions and their aftermath is shown in Table Five, which illustrates the results of Dr. Karl Dove's maxim, "leniency towards the natives is cruelty towards the whites".

TABLE FIVE: POPULATION ESTIMATES (12).

PEOPLE	ESTIMATES BY LEUTWIN, 1894 AND SCHWABE, 1903.	1911 CENSUS	DECEASED
HERERO	80,000	15,130	64,870
HOTENTOTS	20,000	9,781	10,219
BERGDAMARA	30,000	12,831	17,169
TOTALS	130,000	37,742	92,258

Some whites died in the rebellions. Table Six gives an English translation of the plaque on the equestrian statue which dominates Windhoek today. This perfectly-maintained monument is perhaps the second most macabre in the whole territory today.

TABLE SIX : PLAQUE ON WINDHOEK MONUMENT (13)

IN HONORARY MEMORY OF THE BRAVE GERMAN SOLDIERS WHO GAVE THEIR LIFE FOR KAISER AND REICH FOR THE DELIVERY AND PRESERVATION OF THIS LAND DURING THE HERERO AND HOTTENTOT RISINGS, 1903 TO 1907, AND DURING THE KALAHARI EXPEDITION OF 1908

IN HONORARY MEMORY ALSO OF THE GERMAN CITIZENS WHO WERE SACRIFICED BY THE NATIVES IN THEIR REBELLION.

THOSE WHO FELL, THOSE WHO DISAPPEARED, AND THOSE WHO PERISHED, THOSE WHO WERE WOUNDED AND THOSE WHO DIED FROM SICKNESS:-

SOLDIERS	100	OFFICERS
	254	NCO's
	118	CAVALRY MEN
MARINES	7	OFFICERS
	13	NCO's
	72	MEN

THOSE KILLED IN THE UPRISINGS:-

119 MEN	4 WOMEN	1 CHILD
---------	---------	---------

South Africa after accepting the mandate, was faced by a series of rebellions mostly relating to land and "white" rule. Chief Manduma of the Ovambo was killed in 1922 and a subsequent Chief was exiled in 1932. The Rehebothers were forced into submission in 1925, and the Bondelswarts uprising was viciously crushed in 1922, by an Administrator "determined to inflict a severe and lasting lesson", (in his words) (14).

However, the most macabre monument in Namibia today to German rule is not the equestrian statue in honour of 1,730 Germans who died while 92,258 "natives" were killed. It is the land allocation system which was inherited from the Germans by South Africa, violently enforced during the later rebellions, and which is being entrenched today, with minor variations, by the plan for "separate nations". Wellington writes of this land allocation system:

".....the Union Government's policy was crystal clear. So far as the land was concerned the best must be kept for the whites; for the Natives the worst was good enough..... The adoption of a sound land policy which would be just to the Natives was surely of the utmost importance for the fulfillment of the sacred trust. Failure in this at the very beginning was not merely a blunder, it was moral turpitude" (15).

This division of land has produced the gross maldistribution of Namibia's wealth that we see today. The Namibian economy is based on primary industry. It produces raw materials for export and home use, while secondary manufacturing industry is small, as are tertiary service industries. The major primary production sectors are pastoral farming, fishing, and mining.

We have seen, above, that the best farming lands were taken by the ruling group. Fishing is likewise kept away from the ruled group in their separate nations. Map I shows that the few ports are in "white" areas, and that no "homeland" has any access to the sea. Modern communications, be they by ship,

air, road or rail, are also in "white" hands, and routes are planned to serve "white" strategic and economic interests.

Aside from the ports, the barren coastal Namib areas would generally not be a loss to a "homeland", and the Namib's population would be negligible, plan or no plan. However, the Namib has one item of enormous value: diamonds. These, on land and on beds offshore, are also kept firmly in the control of the ruling group.

Apart from diamonds, the other large source of revenue is base mineral mining. The Ovambo peoples, and even the Ovahimba of the harsh Kaokoveld, have been smelting and trading in iron and copper since they moved into the region, which has been estimated by Vedder to have occurred in about 1550, long before the "White" man penetrated the area (16). The Ovambo mined copper at Tsumeb, and obtained iron from various places, notably in what is now Southern Angola. The Ovambo still mine at Tsumeb, but they do it now as contract workers for the benefit of the ruling groups, in Southern Africa, in Europe and in America.

Map XIV on page 106 shows the major mineral developments in Namibia: with very few exceptions they fall outside the "homelands". The Tsumeb copper, lead and zinc mines are a very clear case of a colonial or imperial group exploiting resources which had anciently been the preserve of a local group.

Wellington (17) remarks that the territory has a long list of base minerals, some of which are in the "homeland" areas, such as a large haematite iron-ore deposit in the forbidding and inaccessible Kaokoveld. Generally, however, economically exploitable deposits are in the areas taken by the ruling groups.

In short, the territory's three major production factors, pastoral farming, fishing and mining, have been retained in

the area taken by the ruling groups. The settlement pattern, violently imposed on Namibia by the Germans, has been entrenched by the South Africans, by the division of the people into "separate nations" in "homelands" which are but remnants of the lands which the people previously used.

There are three crucial factors which do not lie in the hands of the ruling groups. The mines, the farms and fisheries need large quantities of power, water and labour before they can produce profit. The small but growing secondary industry, and the growing industrial and administrative towns also need these three factors. The achievement of the twin goals, of separation, and of economic prosperity for the ruling groups, depends on a solution being found to the problems of energy, water and labour. For the economy to expand, these problems must be solved.

Namibia has no known important coal or oil deposits, and these fuels must be imported. The only other source of power is hydro-electricity, which can come only from the three major perennial rivers. Two of these are in "homelands", and the third is not very suited for the production of hydro-electricity in most of its lower reaches, although some development is planned. Thus to find the power needed for the mines, the South African occupation must import coal for thermal power stations, or the waters of the Northern rivers must be harnessed. The planned South African solution is discussed in a separate chapter below.

Namibia has been blessed by some dedicated and imaginative water engineers, serving black and white alike. There is now generally sufficient ground-water or other water for the white farms to get by. However, the growth of new mines, and of the industrial and administrative towns, is beginning to overtax the available water supplies. Accordingly the South African occupation plans to bring water over long distances from the Fish River tributary of the Orange River in the South, and from

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the two Northern rivers, which are, of course, in "homeland" regions. These plans are discussed in a chapter below.

The third problem is labour, which is needed by fisheries, farms, towns and mines alike. The solution has developed over many years, and is simple but painful. Too many people are crowded onto land too small to support them. This forces them to take jobs outside their "homelands".

However, they may not, in general, live permanently where they work. They must migrate temporarily on a contract, and return again to their homeland. The worker's family may generally not accompany him. A complex system of laws surrounds the labour market and is strictly enforced. The result is the migrant labour system, whose effects were discussed above. In effect, it provides a cheap solution to the third problem facing "separate development".

The fact that a "homeland" may be too small and poor to support its people is not, of course, the only reason why workers migrate. There are a number of reasons, the desire for city life being among them. However, the need to earn a living is the obvious prime cause. One authority, in a doctoral thesis, has established that "Ovambo" can economically support 25,599 farm units. There are, however, 59,520 family units, leaving a surplus of 33,920 families who must find a living some how (18). Thus, the labour problem is solved cheaply.

For an understanding of the attitude to the migrant on the mines, where conditions are perhaps slightly better than on the farms, we turn to H.C. Eedes, "These Contracted Ovambo Workers Live Well" (19).

"A radio address system is in operation, and this assists the Compound Officers in summoning and locating labourers required in the offices. It is also used for providing light

recorded music during the day. Flood-lights have been installed in the enclosure of the compound, and at the most suitable points, and the whole compound can be suitably lit....The Native labourers are given a great amount of freedom in the compound in their off-shift time. They may do carpentry work, repair bicycles, infact do anything useful which will keep them out od mischief. They may also apply for passes to leave the compound for the purpose of visiting in the town. These passes are usually granted".

The above requires no comment. Sedes was writing in 1955, and some attitudes may have changed slightly, but several authorities agree that even the 1971 strikes made few fundamental changes to the system (20).

This chapter has considered aspects of the economy, geography and history of Namibia, to show that the land allocation to the "separate nations", proposed and implemented under "separate development", is grossly skewed in favour of the ruling occupying groups. The three resulting problems for the ruling groups are labour, water and power. The labour "solution" has been briefly considered. Before discussing the planned "solutions" to the water and power problems, South African economic strategy planning for the whole of Southern Africa must be examined.

NOTES: CHAPTER FOUR. HISTORY, GEOGRAPHY and APARTHEID ECONOMICS

1. 1960 Estimate of population : 526,004 (Wellington) 1967 : 130)
1966 Estimate : 610,000 (Africa Institute, 1970 : 5)
1970 Estimate : 746,328 (Financial Mail, 2/3/1973)
2. For descriptions of Namibia, see ICJ Pleadings, Volume II, 1966 : 289; Wellington, 1967 : 1; Afrika Instituut, 1970 : 3, and Financial Mail, Supplement, 2/3/1973.
3. See Map IX and Maps of the Ovulalai drainage system in H. Stengel, 1962 : 378, H. Eggers, 1969 : 25, and Wellington, 1967 : 19.
4. See SWA Annual, 1952 and Barnard, 1965(b) : 56, re the dispute over the Orange River.
5. Discussed below, Chapter Six.
6. ICJ Pleadings, Volume II, 1966 : 299.
7. Adapted from Barnard, 1965(a) : 74 ff.
8. Wellington, 1967 : 415.
9. Quoted in Wellington, 1967 : 179.
10. Union of South Africa, 1918.
11. Ibid : 113.
12. Ibid : 34 - 35.
13. Transcribed by the writer from the Equestrian Statue, Windhoek, and Translated by D. Budlender.
14. Gottschalk, 1973 : 38, quoting UG 30 - 1922, paragraph 42.
15. Wellington, 1967 : 407 - 408.
16. On Ovambo and Ovahimba mining, see Wellington, 1967 : 142, and S. Davis, 1964 : 31 - 38, see also Vedder, 1938, 1968 : 157, for the date of Ovambo migration.
17. Wellington, 1967 : 113 - 114.
18. See Kritzinger, Ph D. Thesis : 395.
19. H.C. Eddes, 1955, SWA Annual.
20. Ruaha Voipio, John Kane-Berman, and Bishop de Vries have all recently expressed this view since the strikes. See also Financial Mail, 2/3/1973 : 50.

CHAPTER FIVE.

STRATEGIC ECONOMIC PLANNING BY SOUTH AFRICA.

In February 1974, the Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, envisaged a Southern African economic power bloc of sovereign independent states, unlinked politically or constitutionally, in which every state could realise its own aspirations without being instructed by another on internal affairs. Mutual economic interdependence would bind these states together into a power bloc which would be a bulwark against communism. The ultimate aim of the communists was not Mozambique, Angola or Rhodesia, but rather it was South Africa, and control of the sea route in the event of a conventional war. Mr. Vorster rejected any idea of federation, for all time: the solution was black independent states in South and Southern Africa. In a federation every person and state would sacrifice sovereignty: this would not occur in Mr. Vorster's economic bloc of independent states (1).

"Political independence and economic interdependence" is an old theme of South African planning for Southern Africa. This chapter will examine some South African strategic economic thinking for the sub-continent. Several authors make the easy generalization that South African planning is monolithic. To separate the various planners and interest groups is very difficult when the real planning is not done publicly. There are, however, discernable different groups planning for Southern Africa, such as the National Party, or the large mining and industrial groups like the Anglo-American Corporation Limited. Each group has some power over Southern Africa's future. The groups do not always act in concert. Thus South African planners are not monolithic, although the State has the upper hand in many cases. I will attempt to differentiate, where the information is available, but generally the sum of the plans is given.

Since the introduction in this century of conscious scientific State economic planning, debate has occurred about its effect on group and individual freedom. This debate is perhaps more important in the increasingly interdependent states of today than it was originally.

The inimitable Barbara Wooton wrote a simple pragmatic book in 1944, called "Freedom Under Planning". She set out her safeguards for freedom, under the mild "socialist" economic planning which she advocated. For Wooton, the goal is that the resources of the State are a common possession managed on behalf of all, by the representatives of all, for the benefit of all. Within this, the justification of planning is that

"by conscious collective decision of economic priorities our frustrations are diminished and our freedom enlarged: we have more opportunity, to do what we want to do". (page 23).

To achieve this, objectives that are for the benefit of all must be ascertained, and continuously pursued by those who have the duty of making decisions for the benefit of all and on behalf of all. She suggests methods of ensuring that this occurs.

Passionate opposition to state planning in 1944 came from F. von Hayek, in his fascinating polemic called "The Road to Serfdom". He advocates free competition under a type of laissez-faire liberal state firmly controlled by the Rule of Law. Socialist and National Socialist planning, in his view, led to serfdom; free individual competition and open markets were preferable.

At the other extreme were the Soviet economists, pre-eminent amongst whom was Preobrazhensky, writing somewhat earlier. To them, freedom was a relative concept, linked with the freedom of the proletariat to achieve socialism in one or more countries. Freedom without planning was not freedom, for freedom without planning meant grinding poverty, and it meant wage slavery to a capitalist class. Poverty also meant the vulnerability of the proletarian revolution to intervention by foreign capitalist powers. Freedom thus required planning.

Today most states have economic planning, be it central socialist planning or state and corporate planning in a "mixed" economy. World organizations make fumbling attempts at rudimentary planning. African states have plans, many of which fail, because African and "Third World" states are seldom permitted to control their own destinies. ("Political independence and economic dependence" operates at a world level too.) States form blocs to raise commodity prices like that of oil, while multinationals are accused of conspiring with State spies to bring down governments, as in the case of the allegations concerning the ITT, the CIA, and Allendé in Chile. All these are a far cry from the economic safeguards for freedom envisaged by von Hayek, or Wootton, or Preobrazhensky.

'Freedom' under South African planning is even harder to find, however. The economy is planned and owned in large measure by the state or by the very large corporations. The economic system is overlaid by a net of "racial" or "ethnic" boundaries. Much legislation, such as the Physical Planning Act, dictates the location of industry or raises barriers to entry into markets. A large section of the labour force is oligopsonistically employed. The private sector teems with oligopolies. Marketing boards dominate agricultural production and marketing. A tiny minority of adults may vote for the central government. Para-statal corporations have a large share of the economy, for example ISCOR, ARMSCOR, ESCOM, IDC, SWAWEK and the BIC. The state plans not only at a "macro-economic" but also at a "micro-economic" level. The state manipulates the labour market, and labour mobility is strictly controlled.

The Rule of Law, as von Hayek defined it, is now dead in South Africa, if it ever existed.

In addition, South Africa plans not only for herself, and for her captive, Namibia, but also for other neighbouring states. The chief of the Mines Labour Organisation states bluntly that the industry's policy is "to encourage interdependence among the countries of Southern Africa"(2). Mr. Vorster envisages "politically independent" states, which none

the less somehow form a "bulwark" against communism" (3).

In short, South African planning would be anathema to von Hayek, to Footon, or to Preobrazhensky, for it transgresses all ~~three~~ concepts of freedom, those of free-enterprise capitalism, or mild "socialism", or of Marxist socialism.

One Pretoria authority has commented on South Africa's relations with its neighbours, as follows:

"Few people can seriously believe that sovereign independent states' international relations are determined by motives other than self-interest. The question is only whether this self-interest is enlightened or not" (4).

I will treat below of whether South Africa's motives are enlightened self-interest, or plain self-interest. Regional development is agreed by many authorities to be generally good: interdependence is generally to be encouraged (5). However, in each case one must study who designs and controls the development, what the nature of the development is, and who benefits by it. It is in these terms that South Africa's "enlightened self-interest" must be evaluated.

The major economic factors linking Southern African states include monetary, customs and tariffs agreements; water; power; labour; technological skill; direct investment; export credits; tourism; and trade in raw materials, finished goods or services. The political linkages range from common interest to open or covert manipulation. Military relations range from alliance to potential or actual conflict. In all these fields South Africa has significant power.

These inter-relationships are dynamic. The linkages change, as can be seen in the problem for southern Rhodesia in finding routes to the sea after the Spinoza coup and the Zambian border closure. A detailed examination of Southern

Africa would be untenably lengthy here: Bowman (6) and Grundy (7) should be consulted as should Leistner (8), who gives an ingenuous South African reply to critics. Leistner suggests that South Africa's approach is "humdrum", and "highly pragmatic", having "no grand design for the economic future", and is "lacking in visionary schemes". Be that as it may, Defence Minister P.W. Botha emphasises the interaction and interdependence of South Africa's military, foreign and internal policies (9).

One authority, J.E. Spence, takes this further. He writes:

The structure of power in South Africa as it has been elaborated over the past two decades suggests in some respects the notion of a garrison-state, in which the civil and military instruments of coercion have been fused together to inhibit in advance any threat to its integrity.....Basically the (foreign) policy rests on the assumption that the territories of Southern Africa constitute a regional system which in economic terms is dominated by South Africa" (10).

South Africa does have an integrated policy for Southern Africa. Dr. Verwoerd wanted a common market for the region (11). Mr. Vorster wants an economic bloc of politically independent states to stave off "communism". All the linkages cannot be examined here. I will deal only with the water and power relationships.

South African planners envisage economic interdependence, resulting from water and power systems stretching from the Cape to Zaïre. They see South African skills as being a key factor in creating these systems. Mr. Vorster sees this interdependence as a way to save the sub-continent from "communism", as he defines it.

The previous Chief Engineer, Planning, of the Department of Irrigation, Dr. D.F. Kokot, argues that rivers bind South Africa to her neighbours, and that these rivers will play a very important role in the relationships between Southern African states. He lists possible and actual projects on the Zambezi, the Ovango, the Kunene, the Limpopo, the Komati, the Krokodil, the upper Orange, the Kwando, and others, in which South Africa

can play a part. He concludes:

"So is die Republiek en sy buurstate onderling ten nouste deur riviere en rivierstelsels verbind. Namate die vraag na water en elektriese krag toeneem, sal die band belangriker word. Daarom is dit van die opperste belang dat Suid Afrika aktief sal streef na 'n gesonde en vriendskaplike verhouding met sy buurstate...." (12).

As another example, H.J. Quinton writes in the South African Mining and Engineering Journal:

"In December 1969 Dr. H. Olivier, Chairman of L.T.A., foresaw the emergence of an electricity common market grid to link the whole Southern African region.....It is not beyond the realms of possibility to visualise a Southern African common market for water" (13).

South Africa's leading water engineer, Professor Midgeley of the University of the Witwatersrand, writes:

"There is little doubt that throughout the Southern African sub-continent larger and larger quantities of water will have to be conveyed over greater distances" (14).

However, in another article he shows that South Africa is not being entirely altruistic in assisting her neighbours' river developments:-

"By the year 2000 the water needs of irrigation in South Africa will have risen from 265 cumec to 480 cumec. ("Cumec" - cubic metres per second). Urban and industrial needs will rise from 53 cumec to 530 cumec.....The total demand of 1010 cumec exceeds the estimated safe yield from all sources" (15).

He shows that the power demand in South Africa is expected to increase eight times, requiring a total capacity of over sixty thousand megawatts. The bulk of this must come from thermal stations on the Transvaal coalfields: he predicts that these coalfields will feed the greatest concentration of power-stations of any kind to be found anywhere in the world. Coal will have to be supplemented not only by nuclear energy but also by hydro-electricity, from all over Southern Africa. Midgeley envisages a 15000 MW sub-continental grid, drawing power from Wankie coal-field thermal stations and from hydro-electric plants on rivers such as the Kunene, Okavango and Zambezi. Finally he considers the possibility of a link to the

world giant: the Inga power plant on the Congo river, which could have a capacity in the region of 30,000 MW. (By comparison the Aswan high dam on the Nile has a planned capacity of 2,200 MW).

South Africa's buying power is seen by experts like Midgeley, and the I.D.C.'s van Eck (16), as the way to achieve this sub-continental water and power grid. Midgeley writes:

"(Because) the revenue to be derived from the sale of power to the Republic could, by the turn of the century, be R300 million per annum, it is hard to think of a better way for our neighbouring states to achieve economic take-off" (17).

We have seen above that the Republic is already spending over twice that amount per annum on her military forces. However, Dr. van Eck saw that the Republic's capital and buying power could finance river development in many of her neighbouring states. They could not achieve this development themselves. News/Check writes of this:

"It implies a closely knit Southern Africa, and it implies, too, a signal contribution by an outward-looking Republic to all the African countries clustered in the South. Malawi, Angola, Zambia, Rhodesia, and Mozambique can all benefit by South Africa being used as a first-stage buyer of power that they for the moment cannot consume. Later the Republic will not need that power, and they will use it more and more as their own requirements expand. In this way all the lands of Southern Africa will help each other to advance and out of mutual development mutual friendship must grow" (18).

The above plans were made in the sixties: they are being carried out today. Dr. Henry Oliver of L.T.A. Limited, a major engineering company controlled by the Anglo-American Corporation of S.A. Limited, said in September 1974 that the Pan-African power transmission grid was slowly becoming a fact:

"Such a grid can be in existence within a decade and will make possible the beneficial use in thermal stations of the coal reserves lying fallow in countries like Swaziland, Botswana and Rhodesia. The Zambian, Rhodesian and South African grids have been completed. The line linking Mozambique with the Republic has been completed. The Kunene scheme is proceeding and the transmission lines will come South and go North.

Zaire has recently let a contract for a high-voltage transmission line from Inga on the Congo river to Tunga Fungurumo near the Zambian-Rhodesia border. This line is similar to the Cabora Bassa-Pretoria link. The Shire River project (in Malawi) is barely 300 Km from Cabora Bassa".

Dr. Olivier stressed the irrigation potentials of these hydro-electric projects:

"By linking the resources of the wet North with those of the dry South, and I include capital resources, we could first make the entire region self-sufficient in food and basic items, and then proceed to become one of the biggest granaries or food-banks for the rest of the world.

The engineering, scientific, financial and managerial skills for the Pan-African grid are all available. It is a field in which South Africa, by virtue of her industrial and financial strength could and should make a major contribution if permitted" (19).

This is the crux. The Southern African sub-continent has great potential for development. Dr. Olivier's plans could be executed in a way that fairly and equally distributed Africa's wealth to all its inhabitants, that did not divide her people along "racial" or ethnic barriers, that gave equality of education and opportunity, and that used labour-intensive methods when full employment was lacking (20). Alternatively his plans could be executed to maintain the present system of large inequitable income-gaps, of racial exploitation (21), of unemployment, starvation, and education for serfdom. The question is who controls this Pan-African development, who controls the means of production and distribution?

P.W. Botha's military build-up shows that the South African ruling groups intend to control this development of South and Southern Africa. They may develop the region, but they will do so primarily for their own benefit, using direct rule, or using the subtle form of indirect rule known as Separate Development. Such is the nature of South African planning for Southern Africa: it foreshadows the creation of political "independence" and economic dependence, so as to perpetuate minority rule, no matter how indirect, and minority enjoyment of affluence.

It is in this context, of South African strategic planning, that the Kunene scheme must be examined, in the context of the creation of separate, politically independent nations to serve South African interests. The water and power infrastructure of Southern Africa is very important to the twin apartheid goals, which are separation, and the accumulation of riches by the ruling groups. If the military situation allows the completion of the Kunene project, it would make a great contribution to apartheid in Namibia and in the sub-continent.

In this chapter we have seen South African planning in the light of a debate on freedom under planning, and we have discussed the visionary Pan-African water and power schemes of the South African government and of the large mining-industrial groups. The schemes must be seen in the political context of Mr. Vorster's expressed method of saving the region from what he terms "communism". In the next chapter I will discuss the plan for the use of Kunene river water in Namibia. The Minister of Water Affairs said of this plan in 1969,

"It might even be the most ambitious water scheme on the continent of Africa" (22).

NOTES. CHAPTER FIVE: STRATEGIC ECONOMIC PLANNING BY SOUTH AFRICA.

1. Cape Times, 5/2/1974.
2. Cape Times, 27/9/1974.
3. Cape Times, 5/2/1974.
4. G.M. Leistner, 1972(b) : 32.
5. See L.P. Green and T.D. Fair, 1962, 1969, and R.H. Green, and A. Seidman, 1968, on the need for regional development.
6. L. Bowman, 1968.
7. K. Grundy, 1973 : Appendix.
8. Leistner, 1972(a) and 1972(b).
9. P.W. Botha, in RSA : WPD 1973 : 1.
10. Spence, 1970 : 26, 33.
11. Leistner, 1972(b) : 42.
12. Kokot, 1970 : 452.
13. Quinton, 1970.
14. Midgeley, 1969.
15. Midgeley, 1970 : 261 forward.
16. On Dr. van Eck's ideas for Southern Africa, See News/Check 9/9/1966.
17. Midgeley, 1970.
18. News/Check 9/9/1966 : 29.
19. Arg... 6/2/1974.
20. For an example of labour-intensive engineering, the three mile long, four-hundred-and-six-foot high Nagarjcnasagar Dam in India is being built of masonry, entirely by hand. See Norman Smith, 1971.
21. See Francis Wilson, 1972, for a discussion of exploitation in South Africa, on pages 140 forward.
22. The Star, 6/8/1969.

CHAPTER SIX.


THE WATER PLANS.

Over one million years ago, the Kunene river probably drained into the Etosha Pan (1). Today a sandstone scarp separates the Cuvelai river basin, which drains through Ovamboland towards the Etosha Pan, from the Kunene river, which has been 'captured' or 'beheaded', and drains to the Atlantic Ocean. Map VIII shows the drainage system in the region. To solve the water problem facing Separate Development in Namibia, the South Africans are using the Kunene to generate power to pump Kunene water over the sandstone scarp into Namibia (2).

This chapter will examine the geography and history of the Kunene river basin; the history of the plans for the river; the water problem in Ovamboland and in Namibia generally; the plans made in 1964 and in 1969; and the new plans announced in 1974.


The Kunene river drains a basin whose catchment area measures 106,500 square kilometres, of which only 14,100 square kilometres are in Namibia (3). The river is one thousand and fifty kilometres long, from its source on the Angolan Bihe Plateau near the town of Nova Lisboa, to its mouth on the Atlantic coast, some two hundred and thirty kilometres south of the Port of Mocamedes. The river flows 550km southwards from Nova Lisboa, then turns and flows 150km southwards to the Kazambua rapids and the Ruacana Falls, where it turns westwards to form the international boundary for the remainder of its course to the sea (4).

The river's source is on the great Angolan watershed, along which the Benguela railway is laid, and which is the source of several other major rivers, such as the Okavango, the Kwando, and the Zambezi: The river obtains most of its water from this watershed, which receives a high rainfall, in excess of 1500mm per annum. There are many rapids and falls in this initial stretch. On leaving the highland areas, at Matunto, the river



DRAINAGE MAP
OF
SOUTH WEST AFRICA
AND
SOUTHERN ANGOLA

1:4 500 000


 RIVERS 0-1955
 RAILWAYS 0-1955
 ROADS 0-1955

REP. of SOUTH AFRICA

meanders sluggishly across the flat Kalahari sands of its middle reaches, until it comes to the rapids and the Ruacana Falls, below Calueque. Thereafter it plunges rapidly to the sea through the marsh, broken Baynes mountains and the sands of the well-named Skeleton Coast. Rainfall in these lower reaches is only a few millimetres per annum, and evaporation is high. The river is therefore exotic to Namibia, and receives very little water from the territory.

The history of the river basin, especially in the south, is very poorly recorded, and there is scope for a modern historian to piece together the Portuguese material, the reports of other travellers, and local tradition, based on the pioneering work by Heinrich Vedder (5). Lack of space precludes a detailed analysis here, but some points may be mentioned.

The river's name derives from the Ovambo word "Okunene" meaning "the wide or right side" of the river. (That is, Southern Angola, as opposed to "Okaoko", meaning "the small, or left arm", whence the name "Kaokoveld" comes today) (6). The word "Okunene" would seem to have been misunderstood by an unknown Portuguese, who named the river "Kunene".

The earliest European information about the river and about Ovamboland comes from Andrew Battels, an Englishman taken prisoner by the Portuguese in 1589 in Brazil and brought to Angola, where he was captured by the cannibal Jagga tribe (7). He spent sixteen months with them in Southern Angola and Ovamboland, escaped from them and the Portuguese, and returned to England, where he wrote about his travels. The Portuguese called the area the "Kingdom of Mataman", but had little detailed knowledge about it until the nineteenth century, despite their slaving operations in the region. The Skeleton Coast, the fierce Jagga, and the Kwanyama warriors combined to prevent European penetration, but there are no doubt Americans

today whose forebears were Ovambo people from the Kunene basin.

The early Portuguese knowledge of the river is summarised in the 1854 reports on the overseas territories (8). Even at this time the question of the direction of the river's flow was not entirely certain.

In 1785 a Portuguese official had discovered a smooth, inscribed stone, near what today is the port of Mocamedes, on which stone travellers, from 1645 to 1770, had recorded their names. These inscriptions included the following:

"RIO CUNENE.

The Captain Jose da Rosa Alcobaca passed here on his way to the Cunene, in the frigate Nossa Senhorah da Nazareth, on the 4th January 1765" (9).

In 1787 Colonel Pinheiro de Laverda reported:

"The Cunene is the largest river from Zaïre to the Cape. Its source is in Candumbo, near Caconda" (10).

The Governor of Benguela reported in 1799:

"The Cunene river has its source in the Huambo; it passes through Galangue, Caconda, Quilengues, and flows into the sea at Cabo Negro, where it causes a rough sea" (11).

Not knowing this, the British claimed to discover the river, and named it the Nourse, in 1824. An English traveller, Morrell, wrote:

"The river Nourse, which was said to have been discovered in 1824 by L'Espiegl, was closed at the time we passed this part of the coast" (12).

The 1854 Portuguese reports continue:

"In 1824 the English warship Espiégle captained by Chapman discovered a river on the coast of Africa, whose mouth was at 17° 15' latitude S, and 11° 48' longitude E of Greenwich: he called it the Nourse river" (13).

In the 1850's, European travellers, such as Green, Smuts, Pereira, Dalton, Wahn and Rath, from the South (14) and Ladislau Magyar, from the North (15), visited Ovamboland and described the river. Andersson finally reached the river with Axel

Erikson in 1867, after several attempts, and died there. In 1854 Leal explored the mouth, where Portuguese vessels had often stopped, but it was not until the present century that the inhospitable lower course was explored by Europeans, for example by Baynes, in 1911, after whom the mountains were named.

The Europeans travelled through but did not stay in the southern Kunene basin or Ovamboland. To this day, with the exception of military expeditions, the area has had very few European inhabitants.

The Kwanyama tribe sporadically resisted German, Portuguese and South African penetration. In 1915 the Portuguese fought a bitter battle with Mandume, a 21 year old chief of the tribe, and forced him across the "border" with those of his people that had escaped what one observer had called "a veritable holocaust". The Portuguese took no prisoners.

South Africa, except for occasional military expeditions to enforce their rule, ruled very indirectly through the presence of three whites: Major Hahn and two assistants (17), aided by a Medical Officer at a later stage. Major Hahn had a fourteen man Native Police Force, called by the 1936 Commission "more messenger boys than policemen"(18). The German had no white officials in Ovamboland at all (19). The 1936 Commission came to the conclusion that indirect rule was by far the best form of government for Ovamboland (20).

They wrote:

"Contact with the Europeans has had a tendency to detribalise the Natives....." (21).

Even today there are few "white" officials in the area, and the people are ruled indirectly. In 1972 the "Ovambo Government Services" encompassed ten "white" officials and some thirty-eight Chiefs or other Ovambo officials, to govern 342,455 people in 53,300 square kilometres of land (22). It is not, of course, recorded how many policemen or soldiers assist them. "Separate Development", like "Indirect Rule" may require force on occasion.

Lack of "white" settlement does not, however, mean a lack of "white" influence. The industrial economy has penetrated to

the farthest corners of Southern Africa in its labour recruitment schemes. Pressure of increasing population on restricted land area has resulted in Ovambo people working in very large numbers on the farms and mines of the south. Even the small Ovahimba group of the remote and untamed Kaokoveld are not untouched: Davis reported a meeting with an Ovahimba in 1964, who spoke Fanagalo, the lingua-franca of the gold-mines, and who had been to the Witwatersrand (23).


Nor has the lack of "white" settlement meant that plans were not made for the Kunene river's water. As early as 1854 Brochado was urging the exploration of the river, which had such "a good climate and fertile banks" (24). By 1904, Ferdinand Cessert was arguing enthusiastically for a flooding of the Etosha Pan by a diversion of the Kunene. He went so far as to envisage ships travelling in canals from the Etosha Pan to the Okavango. He passionately argued the economic viability of this scheme in a series of articles in which he claimed that the country was slowly drying up, which was a problem far worse than that of the Herero uprisings at the time.

"With the Natives we can cope, but far worse will be the fight between whites around the drying water-holes" (25).

That day has not come to pass, but if the separate development economy is to grow for the benefit of Namibia's ruling groups, the water of the Northern rivers must be used: many authorities have seen Namibia's water solution in these terms over the years. In 1918 Professor Schwartz advocated a flooding of the Etosha; in 1927 Hudson Spence surveyed the Kunene and laid plans to divert the water, but these plans were stopped by the Portuguese on "economic grounds" (26). To understand the plans that finally found agreement, we must revert firstly to a Treaty of the Kaiser, and secondly to a study of the Ovahimba drainage system in Ovamboland.

MAP IX.

THE CUVELAI (Stengel 1963 : 74)



The German Imperial Government and the Kingdom of Portugal agreed in 1886 that the boundary between Angola and German South West Africa would follow the Kunene river from the Atlantic to the point where the river pierces the Serra Cana range, at those waterfalls which are south of Humbé. Although this seems clear enough, a dispute arose between the Germans, who claimed that the waterfalls referred to were the Kavale Rapids below Calueque (Latitude $17^{\circ} 17' S$), and the Portuguese, who claimed that the waterfalls referred to were the Ruacana Falls (Latitude $17^{\circ} 23' 23.73'' S$). The disputed area was a belt some 40km wide running from the Kunene to the Okavango across the territory of the Kwanyama Ovambo group, who had so fiercely resisted white rule. After the South African conquest of the territory, a joint boundary commission sat to find a solution. This commission made the obvious choice of the 120m drop at the Ruacana Falls as the spot referred to in the original treaty, and a provisional agreement was signed in 1920 (27). The old boundary is shown on Map X.

However this agreement was not ratified by the respective governments until 1926, and then hard bargaining resulted in an important compromise, on which today's schemes are based. South Africa agreed to the border being at Ruacana, but in exchange the Portuguese recognised the rights of the Ovambo people south of the border to a share of the Kunene's water. South Africa was given a usufruct for power generation from one half of the flow at Ruacana. South Africa was also given the right to a construction on Angolan soil, which would lead water to Ovamboland. The parties also agreed that a power-station at Ruacana, fed from a dam further upstream, could be built with or without Portuguese participation, provided a joint commission found it economical. This commission met in 1927 unsuccessfully. Portugal would not agree to a dam at Calueque higher than 4 metres, and negotiations broke down for thirty-five years. At this point we will consider the Cuvelai drainage system into Ovamboland.

Map IX is taken from Heinrich Stengel's study of the Cuvelai (28). I mentioned above that Namibia had been blessed

by great water engineers. Heinrich Stengel is among them, and he has been bringing water to man, animal and plant in Namibia for forty years, twenty-seven of those as an employee of the Department of Water Affairs. Today's water engineers have more sophisticated tools than he had originally, but they are no less imaginative, as we shall see.

Stengel's map shows the Cuvelai Basin lying between the Kunene Basin and the Okavango Basin. The rainfall of the Cuvelai Basin decreases sharply from North to South, from 1300mm per annum to 400mm per annum in Ovamboland. The wet upper regions are a confusion of water courses, but the major river is the Cuvelai, with its tributaries, the Mui-Mui and the Caundo. The Cuvelai drains southwards through a maze of rivers and grassed water-courses, called oshanas. At Lake Ossouk (or Oponono) it is joined by the oshana Etaka, which drains western Ovamboland, and which lies on the old course of the Kunene in ages gone by. This can be seen more clearly on Map X.

The Oshana Etaka pierces the sandstone scarp into the Kunene Basin at Calueque, called Eriksson's Drift on Map X. For many years it was thought that the Kunene flooded its banks into Ovamboland through this gap in the scarp, but the impossibility of this was eventually confirmed by surveys in 1926.

The Cuvelai system annually floods the oshanas of Ovamboland in a welcome inundation called the Efundja, on which the Ovambo agricultural economy depends. In flood times, the oshana provides fish which are caught and dried for food through the year. The floods refill the water holes for men and animals, and water the basic crops, which are nutritious types of millet and sorghum. The oshana system is drained from Lake Oponono through the Ekuma into the Etosha Pan, a dry endoreic lake.

The problem, however, is that the Efundja is highly unreliable, and can vary from very little water to heavy floods.

MAP XI.

(Wellington 1938 : 27)




Fig. 1. Portion of the Middle Kunene and Oshana Etaka, based on a survey by E. Hudson Spence. Heights in metres above sea-level, corrected by precise levelling carried out by the Surveyor General of South West Africa in 1937 and 1938. "M.Ch." 5 miles east of Olushandla, refers to Molola Chicola

Thirteen of the twenty years from 1941/42 to 1960/61 saw floods, but seven were dry (29). The Ovambo pastoralists depend on the Efundja, and as the shaded areas of Map X show, most of the people live near the Oshanas. Today seventy per cent of the population are estimated to live close to the main roads from Ondangua to Ruacana and Oshikango, shown on Map X (30).

The unreliability of the Efundja means repeated and destructive droughts. Two metres below the surface of most of Central Ovamboland lies a bitter brine underground lake: boreholes can therefore only be used to combat drought in the east and in a narrow belt in the west. For the remainder, the most populous area, there are only two solutions. Water must be conserved from the Efundja for use in dry periods, and water must be brought from the Kunene through the gap in the scarp. Map XI, drawn in 1938, shows the scarp gap at Calueque (Eriksson's Drift) between Olushandja and Molola Chicola. To conserve the water of the Efundja, an ingenious system of storage dams and canals was devised by the Department of Water Affairs, and was very successful. However, this was by no means enough: the Kunene had to be utilised.

By 1962, political and military factors were combining with increased economic demands, to bring the Portuguese and South Africans back to the negotiating table. The 1961 Angolan uprisings, and the subsequent war, together with the possibility of war in Mocambique, meant that the Portuguese wished to develop the Overseas Provinces, (in accordance perhaps with the strategy of economic reform described by Baechler in Chapter Three above). Mineral developments meant the beginning of the Angolan "boom". South Africa was under increasing United Nations pressure. Ovamboland needed water; mining and other development in Namibia generally, meant an increased demand for water. Dr. Verwoerd's policy of Separate Development implied development, which required water. Mines throughout the region needed power. Talks began in March 1962, and initial surveys were carried out.

In 1963 the blueprint for Separate Development in the territory, the Odendaal Commission Report (31), recommended a hydro-electric scheme for the Kunene. The territory needed water, and industrial development could only occur "if cheap power were available". "The Commission sees the generation of electricity on the Kunene as the most important contribution which the State could make towards the further development of South West Africa" (32).

One authority commented on this report and said that:

"The supply of water is probably essential for the success of the homelands" (33).

In 1964 a preliminary treaty was signed (34). This treaty envisaged collaboration between the two countries on rivers of mutual interest, and an initial agreement to exchange data, to consult each other, and to undertake joint study of plans, methods and financing. South Africa was to submit a plan for a diversion of the Kunene to Ovamboland. Portugal wanted a larger power plant to be erected at their existing dam at Matala, which could sell power to Namibia, but this was earmarked for further discussion. A hydro-electric scheme for the Kunene was agreed to in principle.

A previous manager of the South West Africa Water and Electricity Corporation (Pty) Limited, has described the formation in the next year, 1965, of SWAWEK:

"By a White Paper in 1965, the South African Government accepted practically all the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission.....and in particular agreed to the Industrial Development Corporation undertaking the financing of a private company formed in South West Africa under the title SWAWEK, with the object of turning to account.....the very considerable potential of the Kunene river" (35).

The negotiations with the Portuguese were protracted. Final agreement was not reached until South Africa refused to agree to its part in the Caborra Bassa scheme, which Portugal badly needed, unless the Kunene scheme was agreed to as well (36). The final negotiation took place in October 1968, and on 21st January 1969, a Treaty concerning the first phase of the Kunene

schemes was signed (37). On 19th September 1969 the Caborra Bassa treaty was signed (38). The notable difference between the two Treaties is the absence in the Kunene Treaty, of escape clauses in the event of "Force Majeure", which is widely defined in the Caborra Bassa Treaty to include strikes, wars, explosions, floods and blockades. Evidently the parties did not foresee a major threat for Kunene as they did for Caborra Bassa.

Before power can be generated, a river's flow must be regulated, especially when the annual variation is great, as with the Kunene. The 1969 agreement aimed to regulate the river by a large dam at Gové, high in the upper reaches from where most of the river's water came. The power plant at Matala could then be improved, although South Africa did not agree to buy power from Matala as the Portuguese had originally hoped (39). Water would be supplied for initial irrigation projects, for men and for animals in the middle reaches of the Kunene in Angola. A smaller dam at Calueque would give further control of the river immediately above the Ruacana, and would also allow up to six cumecs of water to be pumped across to Namibia to provide for:

"the supply of water for human and animal requirements in South West Africa and for initial irrigation in in Ovambo-land" (40).

Thus what had been in 1926 a recognition of the water rights of the Ovambo people south of the border, was converted into an agreement to supply water to all of Namibia.

Finally the Treaty envisaged a power station at the Ruacana Falls, fed through pressure tunnels from a diversion weir above the falls. The falls are 120 metres high (41) but the head of water from the diversion weir is 134 metres (42).


The financial and property rights agreed to in the Treaty take on increasing importance after the Lisbon coup and the

Angolan unrest. South Africa paid entirely for the Gové dam, one half as a loan and one half as a grant, the amount being of the order of eight million Rand. The loan is to be repaid over twenty years, at an interest of 5% per annum on the outstanding balance: that is, the loan is a "soft" one. In exchange for the financing of the dam, which is the property of the Portuguese Government, Portugal agreed not to use more than 50% of the regulated flow of the river.

The smaller dam at Calueque is to be paid for entirely by South Africa, who also paid the Portuguese Government R220,000 as compensation for the flooded land. No mention is made in the treaty of compensation to be paid to the local inhabitants, if any. South Africa credits Portugal with a royalty on one half of the flow used for power at Ruacana, at a royalty rate of 11c per kilowatt hour initially, calculated to pay off the loan from South Africa to Portugal, over 20 years. Once the loan has been paid off, the royalty rate shall be R0.05 per kilowatt hour on the energy generated by half the flow at Ruacana. In short, Portugal, in exchange for the Gové dam and the immovable parts of the Calueque dam, has purported to mortgage Angola's water for the next twenty years, and thereafter to accept the very low royalty of 5c per kilowatt hour.

The Calueque dam has a complicated system of controls. It is remotely controlled by the South Africans at Ruacana, who can adjust both the release of water to Ruacana and the amount pumped to Namibia. However, a duplicate control panel is installed at Calueque, so that a failure in the remote control system can be remedied, and so that a Portuguese Operating Authority can override the South Africans if they operate the dam in conflict with the agreement. The South Africans may appeal to the "Governado-Geral de Angola" in the event of a dispute; the Operating Authority may not interfere with the setting without instructions from the "Governado-Geral". As an uncontrolled or spurting dam could play havoc with the generation of power, it is small wonder that the "Owambo Government" announced on 1st October 1974 that it wished to regain the

MAP XII.



territory previously occupied by the Kwanyama Ovambo tribe (43). That territory is presumably drawn to include the Calueque dam, so essential to South Africa's power and water plans for Namibia. The boundary dispute "settled" in 1926 is perhaps not yet over.

To summarise the 1969 Treaty, illustrated by Map XII: a large dam fifty-eight metres high was to be built at Gové to regulate the flow; a small dam was to be built at Calueque, to enable water to be pumped to Namibia, and further to regulate the flow; a diversion weir and power station were to be built at Ruacana. South Africa was to pay for all these, one half of the Gové costs being a loan repayable over twenty years from the royalty on the Angolan share of the water at Ruacana. Portugal could use the regulated water above Calueque for energy generation especially at Matala, and for other purposes, provided she did not abstract more than 50% of the flow. Chapter Eight discusses the Portuguese plans.

The treaty was not between Angolan and Namibian or Ovambo people. Whether a future Angolan government will uphold the treaty remains to be seen, as does the question whether a future Angolan government will negotiate with the unlawful occupiers of Namibia. Angola has received two free dams and a regulated river, which is of great use, as will be seen in Chapter Eight. In exchange she has flooded areas of the river basin, and has mortgaged her water for twenty years, whereafter she may sell energy at a low rate. She has the potential strategic weapon of an uncontrolled or irregular river in her hands, although I do not have sufficient information to judge the effectiveness of this weapon.

The South Africans may have made a crucial mistake in refusing power from Matala, for there is no ongoing payment to Angola for the next twenty years. A future government of Angola will not have the economic incentive to negotiate that exists in the case of Caborra Bassa, unless the rulers of Namibia are prepared to re-negotiate the whole Treaty, offering some current

economic incentive other than royalties offset against loan repayments.

Table seven gives the capacities of the Matala, Gove and Calueque dams, by comparison with the large dams of the Orange River Development Project.

TABLE SEVEN (44).

DAM	GROSS STORAGE IN MILLION CUBIC METRES
GOVE	2,574
MATALA	60
CALUEQUE	475
HENDRIK VERWOERD	5,958
P.K. LE ROUX	3,185

It should be noted that the Treaty departs materially from the suggestions of the Odendaal Report. As the schemes have developed, modifications are made: care must therefore be exercised to deal with the current situation at any given moment.

The first phase of the scheme outlined in the Treaty is nearly complete. The crucial dam, at Gove, was completed in 1972 and its gates were first closed in March 1973 (45).

"The Calueque pump system was commissioned on 21st August, 1972 and water from the Kunene River reached Oshikati on 1st September, 1973. A total of 8,053,800 cubic metres of water has already been pumped" (46).

In 1970 an emergency pipeline of 157km was laid from Calueque to Oshikati in Ovamboland, consisting of two pipes capable of delivering 1 cumec each, to cope with the drought. With the commissioning of the full pump station at Calueque, using the Ovamboland canals, this pipeline is no longer needed,

and is being taken up (47).

Work on the Calueque dam itself is continuing, and is nearing completion. Draft tender documents were submitted to the Portuguese Authorities in 1972 for approval. The dam consists of a central concrete structure and long earth embankments (48). The Pretoria water engineering firm, Hydroconsults (Pty) Limited advertised for engineers to administer this contract in July 1974 (49). The contractors for this dam may by agreement only be South African or Portuguese firms. This qualification does not apply, it would seem, to the Ruacana power project. However, L.T.A. Limited is a major contractor. Work on the Ruacana weir and power plant is proceeding. A small plant was installed to power the Calueque pumping station. The full installation is due for completion by July 1977, although SWAVEK are attempting to achieve completion by May 1977 (50). By March 1973, the Department of Water Affairs had spent some R4½ million on behalf of SWAVEK on the Kunene project (51).

Having moved the water across the sandstone scarp into Namibia, where does it go? Presently it is used only in Ovambo-land, and less than 3 cumecs, of the 6 cumecs envisaged in the Treaty, is pumped across (52). The water is pumped to Oshikati by means of the Owambo Canal, where it is purified, and piped for domestic use to towns such as Ondongua and Onguediva. A pipeline is planned to supply the border post of Oshikango. The canal system is not yet complete: the Etaka canal is being reinforced. (The canals can be seen on Map X).

Apart from domestic water in the towns, some water is used for rural, human and animal consumption. Research farms have had good results from irrigation, but only using a highly sophisticated fertiliser system, ill suited to the needs of the Ovambo farmer (53). To judge by reports on the research station and agricultural college, given by Ovambo migrants in Windhoek, irrigated farming is unlikely to be widespread in Ovamboland for some time, for strong complaints were lodged about the conditions and teaching methods. The Ovambo Master Water plan of 1968 has had to be modified in the light of new knowledge on Ovamboland soils for irrigated farming (54).

Whatever the results of irrigated farming, water is provided for the towns and for man and beast in a pastoral countryside. The extent of this provision is uncertain, for migrants interviewed in Windhoek still spoke of digging and scratching for water. Attractive maps produced by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs must therefore be treated with care (55). On balance, the water engineers seem to be achieving much by bringing Kunene water to offset the droughts caused by the unreliability of the Efundja: there is little information available on the distribution of this water among the people of Ovamboland, however. If the "success" of a "homeland" depends on water, the potential, at least, exists in "Cwambo" for "success", in this respect.

It is in the "white" south that water is urgently needed, however. Increased demand comes primarily from mines, but also from the towns. The problem was seen officially in 1972 as follows:

"In South West Africa mining development has been accelerated in recent times. During the period 1954 to 1969, mining and related industries contributed between 28,6 and 44,6 per cent to the gross national product of the territory, and this sector maintained an average growth rate of 8,9 per cent during the fifteen years. Mines played a dominant role in starting up development in certain specific regions.... The claims that the mines made on the water resources of the Territory brought them into competition with the agricultural sector, and this in turn led to stricter legislation and greater state control. The policy has therefore been laid down that the Department is to act as bulk supplier of water to mines in order to ensure that the available supplies are distributed and used in the most beneficial way. Mines are also the only consumers who are obliged to pay the full costs of the water.....Revenue from water that will be supplied to mines in the future will increase considerably" (56).

An official report published in late September 1974 describes the problem and its planned solution (57).

"During the year reconnaissance work and investigation advanced to such an extent that it was possible to examine the long-term water source development of South West Africa.

The results that arose out of this broad planning were illuminating and showed that the pattern of water

source development which up to now has been able to meet the territory's water needs, will in the foreseeable future undergo a complete metamorphosis in order to be able to assure a sufficiency of water for continued development in the territory. A move has already been made away from local supply systems towards regional systems which can ultimately be integrated into a national network".

The report continues:

"This broad planning has been carried through to the year 2000 in respect of every catchment area in South West Africa and the analyses have in broad outline brought the following to light:

- i) Water shortages may occur in the central area of Namibia as early as 1977 and these water shortages cannot be relieved from local sources.
- ii) A bulk water system from the Northern boundary rivers will have to be put into operation by 1986 at the least in order to prevent serious water shortages in the Northern and Central areas of South West Africa.
- iii) Arising out of this, estimates have shown that the annual capital expenditure on water source development will have to rise sharply in the near future, and that there must be a considerable augmentation of the present available manpower in order to cope with the expected load of work....."

"Northern River Schemes:

Comprehensive route reconnaissances and cost analyses of alternative schemes and combinations of schemes were carried out with a view to the broad long-term planning of water source development for the whole of the territory, and proposed schemes on the basis of a master water plan for South West Africa were drawn up with a view to their approval in principle....." (58).

"The serious water shortage in Hereroland has been thoroughly examined along with a long-term water supply for the whole territory and is a strong argument in favour of a water network to import water from the Northern boundary rivers Southwards to the interior" (59).

A journalist summed up the problem in 1970:

"All our internal water resources will be exhausted by 1985" (60).


He was writing before the large expansion of mining in

Namibia in the seventies. The development of the Rössing uranium mine necessitated a sudden change in the water plans in the Western areas, and now many new mines, such as the copper mine at Otjihase near Windhoek, are creating a large demand for water.

Some of this demand can be met from the Kunene river. The flow of 6 cumecs, which may be drawn in terms of the 1969 Treaty, is equal to one half of the water flow used by the entire Witwatersrand industrial complex in 1968. Ovamboland today, despite the few small factories established by the Bantu Investment Corporation, cannot use anywhere near that amount of water, especially if the irrigation plans have encountered problems. The water is therefore to be taken South, in a flow of at least 3 cumecs. A further 6 cumecs from the river may be negotiated at a later stage (61), especially if the demand at Rössing increases.

On 24th July 1974, the Minister of Water Affairs, S.P. Botha, speaking at a National Party Congress in Windhoek, announced a 600 million Rand project to be completed over twenty-five years, to bring water southwards from the Kunene and Okavango, and northwards from the Fish River basin, to the central and western areas of the Territory. These are, of course, primarily the "white areas", and the areas of most urban, fishing and mining development. However, water is to be brought to "Black areas" as well, especially to the dry area allocated to the Herero people of Namibia.

Map XIII is prepared from interviews and newspaper reports (62). It shows the directions of the planned water supplies, but does NOT necessarily show the actual routes. The money is to be found by the South African treasury. R120 million would be spent to take water to Hereroland and Windhoek, R90 on a second Okavango phase, and R200 million to supply Swakopmund, Rössing and Walvis Bay with Kunene water. R100 million would be spent on bringing water Northwards from the Fish River, but this by itself could not meet the demand: hence the northern river projects were essential. Unless the plans were executed



PLANS TO BRING WATER FROM THE NORTHERN RIVERS TO WINDHOEK AND WALVIS BAY.

(Showing general direction but not necessarily actual routes.)

Windhoek would have an annual shortage of 29 million cubic metres of water, Hereroland would lack 6 million, and the West coast 31 million cubic metres. The Minister stressed that it was unrealistic to supply water only to one area, for example the white area, and not to the rest. He stressed the demands made by the developing mines (63). The reports are unclear, but a line may take water down the coast to the Walvis Bay area from a point further West on the Kunene, that is, on the international border (64).

These plans mean that Namibia's regions are being finally economically linked into a unit. If separate development is carried through, the separate politically independent states will be economically interdependent. The question of who benefits and by how much will be dealt with in Chapter Nine. The "white" areas are dependent on Angola and the northern "black" areas for water; the "black" areas presently depend on the "white" areas for employment. Mr. Vorster's strategy of economic interdependence to achieve his political goals may work: alternatively it may misfire, if the northern areas can deny the South water, power and labour, by political or military means.

This chapter has described the geography and history of the Kunene river, and of the plans to use its water in Namibia. It discussed water problems in Ovamboland and the steps taken to solve them. It showed that mining and urban growth in the "white" south and centre of Namibia have created huge demands for water, which can only be met from the northern rivers. The South Africans plan to develop the Territory as an economic unit, and are taking the wise and obvious step of using the Northern rivers to water the South. However, political separate development continues: the implications of this are discussed more fully below.

Mr. Dirk Mudge, Acting Administrator while I was in Windhoek, described the schemes as follows:

"The one contribution that Owambo and Kavango can make is water - we will assist them in distributing it to develop the whole territory" (65).

NOTES: CHAPTE. SIX: THE WATER PLANS.

1. Regarding the ancient course of the Kunene, see Barnard, 1966 : 90; Kanthack, 1921 : 327 - 328; and Wellington, 1938 : 29.
2. For a discussion of the sandstone scarp, See Wellington, 1938 : 28.
3. Figures from Midgeley, 1966 : 3. By contrast, Barnard, 1965(b) : 55, gives a drainage area of 128,000 square kilometres.
4. For a complete treatment of the hydrology of the river, see Midgeley, 1966, and Pitman and Midgeley, 1974.
5. Vedder, 1938, 1966.
6. Ibid : 133.
7. Ibid : 15.
8. Portugal, Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, 1854 : 129, translated for the writer by L. Murray, 1974.
9. Ibid : 130.
10. Ibid : 130.
11. Ibid : 130.
12. Petrie, ed., 1844.
13. Portugal, 1854 : 130.
14. See Vedder, 1938, (1968) and Andersson, 1856 (1967), 1861; 1875 (1969).
15. Portugal, 1854 : 131.
16. Goldblatt, 1971 : 215.
17. Goldblatt, 1971 : 215.

18. Union of South Africa, 1936 : UG 26/36 : 56.
19. Ibid : 59.
20. Ibid : 70.
21. Ibid : 72.
22. Owambo Regeringsdiens, 1972 : 11.
23. Davis, S and S, 1964.
24. Portugal, 1854 : 132.
25. Gessert, 1904, and Afrika Post, 1904.
26. See Stengel, 1962 : 370.
27. Kanthack, 1921 : 334.
28. Stengel, 1962, (1963) : 368 forward.
29. Ibid : 376.
30. Estimate by Director of Water Affairs, Interview July 1974.
31. Republic of South Africa, RP12/1964.
32. Lawrie, 1964 : 8, quoting RP12/1964.
33. Ibid : 8.
34. RSA : Treaty Series 7/64.
35. C.D. van Jaarsveld, 1971.
36. "W.M." , Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 12/10/1969.
37. RSA : Treaty Series 1/69.

38. RSA : Treaty Series 7/69.
39. "W.M.", Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 12/10/1969; See R.S.A. Treaty Series 1/69 : 23
40. RSA Treaty Series 1/69 : 5.
41. Midgeley, 1966 : Figure 2.
42. "W.M.", Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 12/10/1969.
43. Radio South Africa, 9 p.m. News, 1/10/1974.
44. Interview, Senior Hydrologist, Windhoek, July 1974.
45. Ibid.
46. Republic of South Africa : RP61/74 : 149.
47. Ibid : 141.
48. Republic of South Africa - Water Affairs Report, 71/72 : 139.
49. Sunday Times, 21/7/1974.
50. Interview, Administrative Manager, SWAVEK, July 1974.
51. RSA RP61/74.
52. Director of Water Affairs, Interview July 1974.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. RSA : Department of Foreign Affairs, 1971 : 18.
56. RSA : Water Affairs, 1972 : 126.
57. RSA : RP61/74 : 130 - 131.

58. Ibid : 133.
59. Ibid : 135.
60. Windhoek Advertiser, 30/12/1974.
61. Interview, Director of Water Affairs, July 1974.
62. Windhoek Advertiser, 24/7/1974.
63. Ibid.
64. Die Suidwester, 25/7/1974 : 3.
65. Dirk Hudge, M.E.C., Interview July 1974.

CHAPTER SEVEN.

THE POWER PLANS.

Electricity is a very expensive commodity in Namibia. It is presently provided from small and large thermal stations, using oil, whose spiralling costs are well known, or using coal brought by rail from the Transvaal. The coal costs R2.35 per unit at the pithead, and costs R9-00 per unit to transport: it is thus expensive on reaching Windhoek (1). Namibia's electricity system is highly subsidised from repeated loans: it is hoped that a break-even point will be reached by the year 2000 and the loans reduced thereafter. Until then SWAWEK is expected to run at a loss (2).


We saw above that the growth of the mining sector averaged 8.9% per annum over the fifteen years to 1969, and that it contributed up to 44.6% of the Gross National Product (3). Since 1968 economic statistics for the territory have been integrated with those of South Africa, and figures are not available, but the mining sector continues to expand rapidly. Mines demand great quantities of electricity. Hence the demand for electricity is escalating enormously. In 1967 it grew by 5% per annum; in 1972 the growth rate was 10%; it is even higher today (4). SWAWEK believes that "increasing mining and prospecting activities will intensify the demand in future years" (5).

SWAWEK was established to use the Kunene river to provide cheap power for Namibia. However, the demand for electricity grew so fast that a large thermal station had to be built to fill the gap before Ruacana was completed. Hence the van Eck station was built at Windhoek, and the first generator was commissioned on 5th June, 1972. The van Eck station will have a capacity of 90 Megawatts (MW) from three 30 MW generators. A national grid, shown by solid double lines on Map XIII, distributes the power to the major mining and

ANGOLA

MAP IV.
Electricity and Mining. (SWANEK 1972 : 3)

SÜDWESTAFRIKA



BRANDBERG

Uis

SÜDWESTAFRIKA

Omaruru Omburu

Okahandja

Matchless

VAN ECK

Windhoek Bismarck

Oamites


Rehoboth

Klein Aub

Rössing

Swakopmund

Walvisbaai Walvis Bay Walmund



SÜDWESTAFRIKA

- Uranium
Uran
Uraan ●
- Copper
Kupfer
Koper ♀
- Zinc
Zink
Sink ☒
- Tin
Zinn
Tin ▲
- Lead
Blei
Lood ▣
- Vanadium ◆

urban areas, which, as we have seen, are in the "white" sector. The present supply from all sources is in the region of 70 MW. Map XIV demonstrates very clearly the relationship between electricity demand and mining.

The broken double lines on Map XIV show the route of the line from Ruacana to the national grid. This route, presumably for strategic reasons, is no longer planned, as it was originally, to cross Ovamboland directly to Tsumeb. Indeed, the SWAWEK map gives no indication at all of a power line to Ovamboland. SWAWEK felt the cost would be too high for the "Ovambo Government", but a subsidised line may be installed in the future (6). Thus, although Ruacana is on Ovambo territory, Ovamboland will not initially benefit by its power, which will be taken to the "white" areas, while Ovamboland must use expensive small thermal plants.

Ruacana was planned to have five 80 MW generators, but the river's flow was discovered to be insufficient, and only four are now in the design: Ruacana will thus have a capacity of 320 MW. Three sets will be installed at first, and a fourth later. Thus by 1985 Namibia will have a power capacity of some 410 MW (7), in a grid owned by SWAWEK, which will sell power to the various separate "nations" (8).


The surprising fact is that this capacity will be fully used by 1985 if the forecasts are correct (9). This means an enormous sixfold growth of electricity consumption over ten years, mainly for mines, but also for fishing, and industrial development. The Rössing Uranium Mine, for example, will be a larger consumer. Such a growth in power consumption means a large growth in the Gross National Product. It is therefore understandable that South Africa does not publish separate statistics for Namibia: they would reveal Namibia's contribution to the South African economy. South Africa invests large amounts in the territory's economy and infrastructure, but this is a lucrative investment, more especially for the mineowners in Johannesburg, London and New York. This is discussed further in Chapter Nine.

MAP XV.

Potential Hydro-Electric

Sites.

(SWANEK 1972 : 2)



To meet growth in the demand for electricity after 1985, it was planned to create a further hydro-electric scheme on the lower Kunene river. Map XV shows the potential sites, with their estimated capacities, which were considered. However, experience at Ruacana may have shown the high cost and difficulty of erecting such stations on the inaccessible lower reaches; security and strategic considerations may be important. For whatever reason, it has been decided not to build further stations on the lower Kunene, but rather to link the Namibian grid to the South African grid run by Escom (10). A line will be built from the existing grid on the Orange River up to the grid in central Namibia. A power grid will then exist from Caborra Bassa in the East to Kunene and Calueque in the West, drawing power from sources like the Drakensberg scheme, the Orange River scheme, the Nuclear plant planned for the Cape, and the thermal stations of the Eastern Transvaal.

The Consolidated Diamond Mine at Oranjemund will also be linked into this grid. Escom will bring the power down the Orange, but as the works are on Namibian ground, SWAWEK will probably handle the final distribution of the power in Oranjemund (11).

Until the Escom link to Namibia is completed, however, mining and industrial growth can only occur using power from Ruacana, generated by a controlled flow of water from Gove and Calueque. Angola has a latent hold over the Namibian economy, although Dirk Mudge believes a smaller Kunene scheme could be carried on without Angolan co-operation (12). For the first 20 years Angola has no obvious incentive to co-operate with the South African regime: royalties are merely offset against a loan to which a new Angolan government may not feel committed.

Such themes are highly speculative, and the situation in the Kunene basin is fluid. However, this chapter has shown that Kunene power is to be delivered primarily to the white mining and industrial areas of Namibia, further increasing the economic interdependence for which Mr. Vorster hopes, and

solving the otherwise impossible problem of soaring demand for electricity. We will return to the relative benefits from the scheme in a chapter below, but the next chapter will discuss the Portuguese plans for the Kunene in Angola.

CHAPTER EIGHT.

THE ANGOLAN PLANS.

Experts stress that river basin development should be complete and integrated. For political and military reasons it seems at present that development of the Kunene basin will be skewed towards the needs of Namibia. This chapter will examine the plans drafted by the old Portuguese regime for the Kunene, and will attempt to assess the extent to which they have been or could be put into operation.

The Portuguese drafted very ambitious plans for the development of South-Eastern Angola, based on water and power from a series of large dams on the Kunene river. These schemes would take more than a generation to complete, and involved the settlement in Angola of more than 500,000 Portuguese, "living in good economical conditions", as one translation puts it (1). Power would be provided for the whole region, and particularly in the Cassinga mining developments; water would be provided for the irrigation of an eventual total of 147,700 hectares of land under crops, and water would be supplied to cattle-farms covering 347,000 hectares (2). When one compares these figures to those of the Vaal-Hartz irrigation scheme, one of the largest and most successful in South Africa, their size can be appreciated. The Vaal-Hartz scheme irrigates only 36,140 hectares of land for crops (3), compared to the 147,700 hectares mentioned above for the Kunene schemes. The Portuguese thus planned vast radical change for the economy of the basin. Such schemes would be very costly. A recent report of the U.N. Committee on Decolonisation estimates the cost at 640 million dollars (4). It is not true, however, that the South African government and South African firms are supplying all of this money, as the U.N. report claims. Under the 1969 agreement South Africa is to pay R8,125,000 for the Gove dam, R220,000 for the flooded land at Calueque, and the entire cost of building the small Calueque dam. At most the total South African payment to Portugal could not be above R15,000,000,

which is far less than the 640 million dollars needed. Further proof of this comes from the South African Statistical Survey (5) : the South African Government paid only R878,000 abroad for Kunene in 1973/74, and only R254,000 is budgeted for 1974/75. Thus in two years only R1,132,000 will be paid. The United Nations report is plainly wrong, as quoted by the United Nations magazine, Objective: Justice.

The United Nations report also claims that the Calueque project was completed in 1971. This is also untrue, as reference to World Council of Churches report of December 1971 will show (6). As was mentioned above, advertisements appeared in 1974 for engineers for the building of the Calueque dam (7).

The United Nations document is plainly wrong in a third important fact. It claims that the Matala power plant would supply electricity to Ovamboland. The 1969 treaty reads as follows:

"5.1 The provisions of the Agreement of 13th October 1964, referring to the construction of the power lines from Matala to the border between Angola and South West Africa and to the installation of a third generator at Matala are revoked, provided that this shall not preclude further negotiations should both parties be interested therein"

South Africa is not "interested therein", and no plans have been approved to bring power to Ovamboland from Matala. The United Nations committee should pay more attention to research, for each of the above facts could have been obtained from documents publicly available at the time the United Nations report was written. The question of South Africa's contribution to the Angolan plans is of particular importance, for 640 million dollars is not an amount that can easily be raised.

One of Portugal's major problems was, therefore, finance capital. South Africa was prepared to pay only for those items directly needed for its Namibian schemes. The Gove dam regulates the river, and is therefore essential. The Calueque dam diverts water for pumping to Namibia, and also gives better control of the river immediately above the power plant at Ruacana, which supplies power to Namibia. South Africa paid for these, and these were the first to be built. South

Africa would not even finance an irrigation network on the Angolan side at Calueque (9). General Spínola throughout his book, published before the coup de etat, emphasises the importance of the economic problems facing Portugal (10). The problem facing the old regime was its inability to finance the grandiose schemes needed to save 'Portugal in Africa'. South Africa made a contribution at Caborra Bassa, and a smaller one at Gove and Calueque, but too little to late for the purposes of the old regime.

The plans drafted by the Portuguese for the Kunene above the Calueque are shown on the Map XVI, and are listed in Table Eight....

TABLE EIGHT (11)

KUNENE HYDRO-ELECTRIC, IRRIGATION AND STOCK-FARMING SCHEMES

A.	HYDRO-ELECTRIC SCHEMES	WATER STORAGE	POWER CAPACITY
1.	GOVE	2,436 million cubic	25 MW
2.	JAMBIA-IA-OMA	1,240 metres	39
3.	CHIVONDUA	-----	15
4.	JAMBIA-IA-MINA	480	81.5
5.	KATALA	60	45.5
6.	MATUNTO	230	50
7.	CHISSOLA	360	6.5
8.	CARINGO	608	4
9.	GUNGUE	-----	4
10.	LUCUNDE	-----	6.5
11.	CAMBUNDI	404	14.5
12.	CATEMBULO	1,060	5
	TOTAL	6,878 Mm ³	297.5 MW

B.	IRRIGATION SCHEMES	AREA
1.	KATALA	3,000 hectares
2.	MATUNTO	92,800
3.	DON GOENA	19,200
4.	CATEMBULO	13,800
5.	CHIBIA	1,000
6.	COUVA DO LEAO	12,900
	TOTAL	147,700 hectares

C.	STOCK-FARMING (12)	AREA
1.	MATUNTO	87,000
2.	CATEMBULO	173,000
3.	COUVA DO LEAO	87,000
	TOTAL	347,000 hectares

The Portuguese also hoped to develop the power resources of the lower Kunene with the South Africans. The planned schemes below Calueque are shown on Map XV and listed in Table Nine.

TABLE NINE (13)

SCHEME	WATER STORAGE	CAPACITY
CALUEQUE	352 Mm ³	10 MW
JACAVALÉ	19	40
LUANDEGE	10	180
RUACANA	18	175
ONDORUSU	60	50
ZEBRA	80	40
EPUPA II	4,750	150
EPUPA I	1	50
BAYNES	250	160
MARIEN	720	180
MARTMAN	225	90
HOMBOLO	200	135
KCHA	55	50
TOTAL	6,740 Mm ³	1,310 MW

It will be noticed that the figures in Table Nine do not correspond exactly to the South African estimates. However, as the South Africans have decided against these schemes, it is unlikely that the dams will be built. They illustrate the river's potential for energy generation, which will not be used in the foreseeable future. This is a work-wide feature, for we presently use less than 5% of the planet's hydro-electric potential.

The Portuguese planners have published prolifically on all these development schemes and on farming in Southern Angola (14). I will not attempt a full review of all their works. Briefly, they are convinced of the economic viability of this huge scheme over some thirty years. The nomadic herds-men of the region would be regrouped, together with the present

crop-farmers, leaving space for settlement of Portuguese family units in large numbers, each unit having 20 hectares of irrigated land or 8,000 hectares of pasture. Power would be supplied for the huge mining industries of Cassinga, and for towns and ports such as Nova Lisboa, Sa Da Bandeira and Moçamedes, where industry would develop. It should be noted that the initial emphasis was on the primary extractive export industries like mining and cattle-ranching, which would earn foreign currency for Portugal.

The strategic implications of the scheme are obvious. Economic reform is on Baechler's list of classic counter-revolutionary methods (15), while the regrouping of the population is another (16). Settlement, from the mother country, of people loyal to the established order would make control of the countryside far easier. The existence of a power and water infrastructure would encourage foreign investment in the area, which would strengthen the likelihood of foreign military support, or, at least, neutrality. The economy, having raised the initial finance, would grow, and could more easily support the war effort. Development was a necessary factor for belief in Portugal's "civilising mission", and, in all, the projects would strengthen "Portugal Overseas".

The plans have not yet materialised, and it seems unlikely that they will do so now in their original form. Gove dam is finished, although the power plant has not yet been installed (17). In January 1974 a start was made on dams at Jamba-ia-Mina and Jamba-ia-Oma (18). It is not known how far they have progressed, and with the changes of power in Lisbon, together with the possibility of independence soon, the development of the river may be greatly altered. However, the extractive primary industries and foreign companies will continue to demand power and water, and some form of hydro-electric development may continue.

The scope exists for an integrated development of the whole region and river basin, rather than the strangely skewed

development that seems to be occurring in Angola and Namibia. The whole sub-continent could form an integrated economic unit with a democratic polity, in which primary production would not be for the export market, and in which a criterion for planners would be a more even distribution of resources and wealth. This aspect is discussed below, in the section on opportunity costs.

This chapter has briefly examined the grandiose plans of Portugal for the Kunene river basin. War and lack of finance has prevented fulfillment of these plans so far, but the river has been shown in a detailed studies to have enormous development potential, which may be achieved in time. The river basin's development to date is skewed, for only those projects serving South Africa's **interests** have been completed so far. Despite occurrences in Lisbon and **Luanda**, some form of river development is needed, and will probably continue, particularly if finance can be found. The opportunity costs of this particular method of development have been questioned, and will be discussed further in the next chapter, on Namibia.

NOTES. CHAPTER EIGHT: THE ANGOLAN PLANS

1. Bettencourt Moreno, 1967.
2. Ibid.
3. Gunthorp, 1973 : 44.
4. Report of U.N. Committee on Decolonisation : excerpts reprinted in "Objective : Justice" March 1974 : 36.
5. RSA WPB 1974.
6. Compare "Objective : Justice" March 1974 : 36 with WCC, 1971 : 17.
7. Sunday Times, 21/7/1974.
8. RSA Treaty Series 1/69 : 23
9. Senior Hydrologist, Interview, Windhoek July 1974.
10. Spinola, 1974.
11. Portugal, Ministerio do Ultramar, c1969 : 4.
12. Moreno, 1967; WCC 1971 : 20.
13. Portugal : Ministerio do Ultramar, 1969; Gois, 1969 : 105.
14. See Moreno, 1966, 1967, 1969(a), 1969(b); Pereira, 1967, Gois, 1967, 1969; Dinis, 1967; Dinis and Aguiar, 1968; Serra, 1967; Ministerio do Ultramar, c1969; and Machado Reya, 1973.
15. Baechler, 1971 : 88.
16. Ibid : 89.
17. SWANAN : Administrative Manager, Interview July 1974.
18. Interview, Director of Water Affairs, Windhoek, July 1974.

CHAPTER NINE.

WHO BENEFITS?

The Kunene schemes, if completed, will allocate two essential scarce resources in a particular way. Future governments will not be able to change this particular allocation easily or quickly. I will now consider the relative benefits for the groups involved. To assess the opportunity costs, I will compare the schemes to other possible methods of developing the region's scarce resources. The opinions held by people concerned will be recorded.

Only in a simplistic sense does everybody benefit by a water scheme. Obviously everybody may have access to some more or power. Obviously the region's economy may grow. At these simple levels, everybody may benefit. Adequately to assess "Who Benefits?", requires deeper questions, however.

The first crucial question is how much more water or power each group or individual is allocated, by comparison with the additional amounts allocated to other groups. The relative benefits must be measured, not merely the benefits.

Secondly one must see what is possible for each group to achieve with their new water and power, in a given situation. Water for one group for difficult low-profit irrigated farming is different from water for high-profit mining, in terms of economic benefits. This means that while the region's economy may grow, one must measure how that growth is distributed, geographically and financially.

Thirdly, one must not compare with what existed before, but with what might have been done in another way with an equal amount of labour, skill and finance. The opportunity costs must be included.

Finally the schemes must be measured in the totality. It is not enough to measure only financial or economic benefits. Military, strategic, political, educational and other social benefits must be measured as well, if we are to answer the question, "Who benefits?", completely.

Such a question cannot presently be answered rigorously and precisely. We do not have the necessary facts, like Gross National Product statistics or accurate measures of the distribution of wealth. We do not have a mathematical model which could predict the effects of a new water and power network on an economy like that in Namibia. Such a model belongs in the more complex realms of cybernetics, and even there is but a dream for the future. The effects may not ever be predictable with any accuracy even only in the economic field. In the totality, there is no agreed measurement of military, strategic, political, educational and other social benefits.

I will therefore attempt a general assesment here, for a precise measurement is not presently possible.

It is clear from the above chapters that the ruling groups will benefit primarily and massively from the Kunene schemes. We have seen that the best agricultural, fishing and mining areas are allocated to "whites", and that the Kunene schemes will bring water and power to these "white" areas in great quantities, to facilitate their development.

The ruled groups will benefit far less. In relative terms, and when opportunity costs are included, the ruled groups barely benefit at all. It is possible that irrigated farming will succeed in Ovamboland on a large scale in due course, although this is by no means certain. Certainly more water will be available for man and beast in a previously drought-stricken area. However, any schemes investing capital on the scale of that in the Kunene project ought to solve such a problem.

The costs for the ruled groups exceed the benefits. Not for the first time, South Africa's rulers are carrying out a hydro-electric scheme for strategic and ideological motives, as much as for economic benefit (1). The Kunene schemes will enable the rulers to entrench their presence in Namibia, to maintain the inequitable distribution of land and resources, to achieve "separate development" of politically "independent" ethnically divided "states", and to create economic ties between those states in such a way that the ruling groups continue to rule. "Separate development" does not benefit the people of Namibia : it is a sophisticated method of protecting the power and prosperity of the ruling groups. The Kunene schemes could solve two of the big problems facing "separate development", which are a lack of water and a lack of power in the "white" areas.

Clearly the ruling groups will be allocated more power than the ruled groups, and perhaps an equal amount of water, in the region of 3 cumeecs. There seems to be no indication so far that the Ovambo people will be paid a royalty on this power and water, taken from a river in their land, but this payment may occur in due course. Thus both groups get water and power, but the ruling group gets more than the ruled group, and does not presently pay for it, except in terms of capital investment. The ruling group, through SWAWEK, owns most of the scheme.

One Windhoek authority has analysed the project as follows; below his analysis supports the one given above:

"As a project designed to bring material progress to both races, Kunene will bolster the interdependence of White states and Black states-to-be, like Owambo.

It will also help create social and economic stability on S.W.A.'s Northern border, which is the frontline of the terrorist assault on the western part of White-ruled Southern Africa" (2).

The group that benefits the most, financially, is that group which profits by Namibia's mines. Mining expansion is enormous, and mining profits are high. Neither could be achieved without water and power. We have seen above that the mines are mainly in white areas, that their managers and other highly-paid staff must be white, and that no black man, therefore, may manage or own a mine in "white" Namibia. Wages and labour conditions were so bad that they recently resulted in a massive strike despite the absence of formal organisation. We have seen above that the strike produced no fundamental changes in the system of migrant labour for the mines, and that the migrant system is socially devastating. Water and power from the Kunene will enable Namibia's mine-owners and white mine-workers to continue amassing wealth from the migrant system.

Who owns Namibia's mines? Where do the profits go? The mines are generally not owned by Namibians, and much of the profit is remitted outside of the territory. The owners include American Metal Climax Incorporated; the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Limited; Charter Consolidated Limited, of the United Kingdom; Consolidated Gold Fields Limited; Falconbridge Nickel Mines Limited of Canada; General Mining/Federal Mynbou Beperk; the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa; ISCOR; Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company Limited; Metallgesellschaft AG of West Germany; Nesmont Mining Corporation; Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation Limited; and Union Corporation Limited (3). In short, many of the giant mining companies of the United States, Canada, West Germany, Britain and South Africa will profit by huge mining

expansion, made possible by Kunene water or power.

These high mining profits are not necessarily re-invested in the territory. The last available figures relate to 1962, in which year the Gross National Product was thirty per cent less than the Gross Domestic Product. Put another way, one third of the country's product accrued to foreign capital or labour. The Johannesburg Financial Mail suggests that this proportion has increased in the ensuing years. The gap between white and black income has also increased, according to the Financial Mail. In 1962 it was twenty-one to one, or R352 per annum per capita for whites, and R17 per capita for blacks in the homelands. The planned allocation of water and power in the Kunene scheme is unlikely to decrease that income gap.

Mineral are wasting assets: they are resources which should be carefully used. The Kunene river, with its water and power, will exist when the minerals are gone. When should Namibia's minerals be mined and by whom? What should be done with the wealth? Chief Clemens Kapuuo gave his answer in 1972, as follows:

"This country, which is our country, is being exploited by greedy entrepreneurs, robbed of its wealth, and rendered barren for the future. Our fear is that when freedom finally comes to this land, it will be returned with no minerals left. Thus you will see the one wonderful asset which we have for developing the land for the wellbeing of its peoples will have been taken away from us" (5).

Perhaps the greatest indictment of the Kunene scheme is that it will greatly speed up this process of exploiting Namibia's minerals, for the benefit of people other than Namibians. Obviously the minerals must be extracted over time, but their wealth should be used for the territory. Botswana is attempting to use its mineral wealth to build up its agriculture (and manufacturing industry, if possible) against the day when minerals are depleted. Namibia should do the same.

The mines are presently a spur to some other growth. For example, they process minerals, earning foreign exchange, as in the case where 10,000 tons of lead concentrate from Alaska was offloaded at Walvis Bay, for processing at Tsumeb, from where the lead ingots were shipped to the United States (6). However, this other growth is small: the economy is still dominated by primary extractive industries.

The other groups who benefit financially by the Kunene schemes are the owners and white workers of the fishing industry, and of the small, but growing, secondary manufacturing industries. These are, as we have seen, located mainly in "white" areas, and will be able to expand using power and water from Kunene.

It will be argued that the growth will mean employment for black workers, and this is conceded. However, there is no indication that, except perhaps in the long-term, growth will break the stranglehold which the white farmers and workers have on the polity and economy. Growth has probably led to an increase in the wage gap, rather than a decrease. The whites have shown great skill in expanding the economy in such a way that they retain power and prosperity in their hands. The Kunene schemes will probably assist them in this.

Another ruling group that is likely to benefit is the white farming community. We saw above that the growth of mining led to competition for water between mines and farms, according to official reports (7). The Kunene schemes will benefit the white farmers by reducing this competition for an essential resource. Without the schemes, perhaps Gessert's 1904 spectre of whites fighting around drying water-holes is not too fanciful after all.

The rulers of South Africa are highly unlikely to invest between R600 million and R800 million in Namibian infrastructure out of pure altruism. They see large strategic, political and economic benefits for the ruling groups in South Africa and in Namibia. The question must be asked, however, whether the money could not be better used in another way, in a way that

developed all of Southern Africa for the benefit not only of whites and their few black allies, but for all of the people of the region. Obviously the Kunene should be developed, but not in this way by these people.

To summarise: the ruling groups benefit by the Kunene schemes. The vast profits from mining are accumulated in Johannesburg, New York and London, while white mineworkers receive high returns and black mineworkers receive low returns. The white farmers no longer face competition from the mines for water. The fishing and secondary industries receive relatively cheap power and water. Black farmers and herdsmen receive water, but the problem of irrigated farming in the "homelands" has still to be solved. The Kunene schemes assist in achieving the political and strategic aims of the white ruling groups.

However, the Kunene schemes are a gamble. There is a point of view in Windhoek that believes too much is being done for the black people of Namibia, and that the schemes may be a mistake. It is possible that the northern regions, together with Angola, have been given a weapon by which they can hold the richer white areas to ransom. It may be possible to deny the South water, power and labour, all at once, and thereby to negotiate a more equitable distribution of land, resources and power. To do so requires organisation, which the ruling groups well know. Therefore, political leaders are suppressed, and stringent "emergency" regulations have been imposed on political activity.

Some examples of these regulations for "Owambo" are that meetings are prohibited unless authorised by the Native Commissioner in writing; individuals may be prohibited from attending any meeting; it is an offence to say or do anything which is likely to have the effect of undermining the authority of the State, the "Owambo Government", or individual officials; it is an offence to make an intimidating statement; to treat

a headman with disrespect; to boycott a meeting called by an official or headman, or to fail to obey a lawful order from a chief or headman. The Minister of Justice has complete legal power over entry, exit or presence in "Owambo". Persons suspected of committing any offence, or intending to do so, or having information relating to an offence, may be arrested without warrant, and held for interrogation until the authorities are satisfied that they have fully and truthfully answered all the questions put to them (8).

It is not surprising in these circumstances that "elections" are boycotted, for free political activity is impossible. If one adds to this the threat or use of violence, by the police or military forces, then effective use of the water, power and labour weapons becomes very difficult, although still possible.

To complete this assessment of who benefits, and by how much, by the Kunene projects, I will record some of the opinions given by different people involved.

Asked by a reporter what effect the change of Government in Portugal would have on the schemes, Mr. Pik Botha, a South African parliamentarian who is now Ambassador to the United Nations, replied as follows:

"We can only hope that no attempts will be made from any quarter to disrupt any progress in this regard. The people themselves will be deprived of benefits if any such attempt is made. This project will be of great benefit to the peoples of Angola and South West Africa" (9).

Mr. Dirk Mudge M.B.C., acting Administrator of the territory, holds a similar view, and told me (10):

"There should be one economic scheme for the whole of South West Africa, for we will always be

interdependent. Some non-white groups, however, are not yet prepared to co-operate, because they believe it is a trick on the part of the whites..... In South West Africa to solve all our problems we need a strong economy to support everybody, especially considering that a large percentage of the people is unskilled. The Kunene scheme is very important, for one just cannot develop these territories without water and electricity..... We need a strong economy to provide jobs in the southern sector for people from the native homelands. One cannot have a strong economy without infrastructure".

I asked Mr. Mudge to comment on the stand taken by SWAPO overseas against South Africa's presence in Namibia. He replied:

"They harm their own people. Inexperienced people like SWAPO leaders talk of independence for South West Africa. It is impossible without South Africa. The railways operate at a terrible loss, there is no separate monetary system, there are no separate institutions. No other organisation would invest millions in this underdeveloped territory. The National Convention agrees that whites have a role, for without whites the economy would be ruined. SWAPO don't really appreciate the problem. They think freedom is everything, but they don't know what freedom is....."

"Whatever the political system, we will have different groups. Most are not prepared to lose their identity. I know that because I have lived here. An Ovambo does not want to be called Herero. The Herero's and Damaras will not be prepared to accept that Ovambos rule the country, which would be the position in a unitary state....."

"The people must first learn to govern their own territory, to gain political experience. They must start from the bottom. It will take years to gain independence, but as a result of outside interference we are forced to do things faster than we would like. They should not become independent before they are able to accept responsibility....."

"SWAPO are against the Kunene scheme because they are not prepared to co-operate. They are doing their own people harm. This has nothing to do with separate development. The territory must be developed. Their opposition to government policy should not stand in the way of development.."

By contrast, Richard Wood, Bishop Suffragan of the Anglican Diocese of Damaraland, told me (11):

"The schemes are not being carried out in consultation with the people. These schemes take development at its European face value, and they imply that our needs can only

be met by a capitalist system.....However, one would be only too glad for regular water in the drought-stricken areas....

"Basically the plans have been made to generate power. Water is a bonus, but it is power that has encouraged South Africa to put in vast capital sums, sums which might otherwise have been used to enable the "homelands" to achieve viability"

"The plans represent an extrapolation of white hopes for the future of our country. A black person who has no appreciation of the technology can hardly conceive of what is involved, and can therefore have no effective say or part in it. Were it to be done truly benevolently one might say, 'go ahead', but the dice are loaded....."

"Do the people want to join the Western way of life? That is where money lies for the elite, but constructive schemes must be aimed at the village communities, before we have high capital outlay on technological development....."

"One cannot basically oppose bringing power and water - its like making food cheaper. However, we must fit it into the whole development picture, so that the political scheme involved must be benevolent and humanistic. For example, the Katatura Hospital is useful, but it represents an extension of white man's dominion. Blacks are not trained to staff it, for there are no black doctors there. We need paramedical, partially-trained staff in village health schemes, which are preventative rather than curative. It is, of course, still good to have a hospital, but the people are never consulted, and are given no training to use these things. Such projects become an exhibition of white man's domination, and he then expects thanks for it".

I asked Dr. J.L. de Vries, Namibian Bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, whether the Ovambo people would not want water from the Kunene schemes. He replied:

"The Ovambo are very anti-government. If any ethnic group were to oppose any particular government move, it would be the Ovambo. It is not that they do not want development, but that they are against schemes imposed from above. The country needs development, not as a military strategy, but as human development. The Ovambo would therefore say NO to the Kunene schemes. The people of Namibia do not want to be separate. We want to be one Namibia. Development should be for the whole of Namibia, but behind the schemes we think there lies only the security interests of the whites in the first instance. They may want to develop blacks, but only secondarily..... The Superintendent of the Katatura township, says that each ethnic group will build its own nest in the tree of South West Africa. I disagree: we will build one nest in Namibia. We are willing to live with the white man in the same tree, but not in separate nests....."

"All these schemes are not for the blackman but for the

privilege of the white man. If we look at these schemes, which ethnic group will benefit? We will only get the crumbs from the table of the white man. We are for development with co-operation of all the races, not development planned in Pretoria. We say to Pretoria, 'keep your development until we can decide...' They bring in great projects, but we are not willing any more only to receive. The whites must stay, but we should be co-workers".

"The whites build good roads, but we see them only as a military strategy, for easy movement of troops. The roads are a military policy. In the same way power and water are a military strategy".

"we feel that the system is run without consultation. We feel that we stand aside from the development of the country... We want to be free of white colonialism, we want to be partners, not slaves. We ask these things because Namibia belongs to us. We worked for it: every mineworker worked for the State or for the whites. We have a right to participate with the white in the development of the riches. The white fears the impact of the black when they share in the wealth of the country. We want to deal as partners, not merely get cents... The whites fear the time when all the black nations stand together. They will not be able to keep the black man down, with all their guns. Their policy is one of fear of unity. We are not for the homeland policy. It is the old DIVIDE ET IMPERA".

A man who had worked as a migrant for very many years told me (13):

"As far as I know, the younger generation will have many questions (about the Kunene projects). Firstly, the power goes to the white area. How can we then develop the economy of the Northern regions on an equal basis? We could use the power for other purposes. In the mines there is no good co-operation. There is the shuttle back and forth from the "homelands". Is it then possible to develop the economy?... The Ovambo ask, where is the water? Why do we not get the water? They promised there would be water everywhere in Ovamboland, but it has not happened".

I asked if separate development had divided the people. A student replied (14) :

"The answer comes from the practice. It has NOT succeeded. The work brought the people together years ago. They go together in the locations. My father is an Ovambo and my mother a Damara. It does not come from the government....There must be co-operation for all of South West Africa, not for one area. The time is ripe that South Africa should leave, and a new man should come to develop the land, as a class gets a new teacher. They say development is coming, but it does not come".

Another Namibian in Windhoek said (15) :

"We are against these schemes. They are not for the people of Namibia. They are for exploitation, not for anything else. The government talks as though the whole purpose is for the Ovambos - I am certain it is not....."

He summed up:

"Separate development has no place here....."

The above gives a range of the opinions held in Namibia in answer to the question, "Who Benefits?" I have given my own answer. In the final chapter that follows, I will consider some theoretical aspects of the schemes.

NOTES. CHAPTER NINE: WHO BENEFITS?

1. See, eg., Rubin and Warren, 1968 : 133; the Caborra Bassa project is another clear case.
2. Clive Cowley, The Argus, 30/8/1972.
3. Objective : Justice, June 1974, gives a list of mining interests on pages 16 - 20.
4. Financial Mail, 2/3/1973.
5. Letter quoted by Manchester Group, 1972.
6. Barclay's National Review, March 1973.
7. RSA, Water Affairs Report, 1972 : 126.
8. Horrell et alia, 1973 : 439, quoting Proclamations 17 and 26 of 1972.
9. Pik Botha M.P., unpublished interview, 26/6/1974.
10. Dirk Mudge, Interview, July 1974.
11. Richard Wood, Interview, July 1974.
12. Dr. J.L. de Vries, Interview, July 1974.
13. Meetings with Namibians, July 1974, translated from Kwanyama, German and Afrikaans.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.

CHAPTER TEN.

CONCLUSION:

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

I have discussed the Kunene schemes in some depth, showing that South Africa is illegally occupying her former mandated territory, and that she is arming mightily, to enforce her occupation. Land is divided in Namibia into "white" rich areas and "black" poor areas. South Africa wishes to create "nations" in each of these areas, so that her strategic plans for the whole region may be fulfilled.

I have shown, too, that the "white" rich areas need labour, water and power from the poor "black" areas. The Kunene schemes satisfy at least two of these needs. The schemes may satisfy the third need as well, if Ovamboland's economy is in fact "de-veloped" very slowly by the schemes, so that the Ovambos must seek employment in the "white" rich areas.

I have shown increasing internal and external, political and military conflict about the future of Namibia. Clearly the ruling groups will benefit by this schemes, economically and strategically. However, the schemes could be used against their designers, if water, labour and power were to be simultaneously withheld from the southern areas.

The schemes, if successful, will allow great (illegal) accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few people. This (illegal) accumulation of wealth is backed by, and in turn finances, massive force and structural violence.

Beneath any study of society there lies an analytic framework, which selects some data as relevant and ignores other data as irrelevant. In this initial exposition of new material which has previously received little publicity or deep analysis, I have found a relatively loose theoretical structure to be adequate.

My loose analytical framework suggests that political

conflict has an economic base, which includes the economy's infrastructure. This infrastructure is not necessarily a neutral factor in the political and economic conflict between groups in a society. Thus a developing country's infrastructure may be designed by those who rule, to serve their own economic and political interests.

However, the economic interdependence which is created thereby could be used against the rulers. Given awareness and organisation on the part of the ruled groups, it may be possible to turn the infrastructure against its designers. Accordingly, the ruling groups attempt to hamper or destroy awareness and organisation among the ruled groups, by the use of structural and physical violence.

The outcome of the conflict in any particular political economy of this type is not certain in the short or medium term, for in addition to the above there are other important variables. For example, where infrastructural domination is attempted in a colonial political economy, international factors may be crucial in determining the outcome, following what Spinoza calls the Law of the Internationalisation of National Problems (1). The ruled groups would be foolhardy, however, to depend on international factors solving their problems for them, especially where important foreign interests benefit by the particular colonial situation.

The above is one loose analytical framework by which the Kunene schemes can be understood. There are, however, several more rigorous bodies of theory which could be applied. The works of Eisenstadt on modernisation, Furnivall on colonial plural economy, A.G. Frank on underdevelopment, Marx on the struggle between classes, or Laclau on feudalism and capitalism, each have analytical models by which the schemes might be viewed. There are also extensive theories of war and conflict, going beyond what has been used here.

Rigorously to apply any one of the above possible models to the Kunene developments would require a further book. Such a book would probably spend as much space in refining the analytical model, as it would in describing the schemes.

However, elements of some of the more rigorous analytical models have been used in my exposition of the material on Kunene.

For example, Legassick argues that "the specific structures of labour control which have been developed in South Africa are increasingly functional to capital" (2). This relates especially to the growth of secondary industry, but is relevant to the whole economy. Extending this framework to Namibia, it is clear that as the economy grows, the accumulation of capital will require coercive structures to obtain labour, water and power for the "white" areas. Capitalist growth in the Namibian situation is suited by violent and authoritarian structures. The migrant system and the "Ovambo" emergency proclamations are not mere accidents: they are crucial tools whereby labour, power and water can be obtained cheaply from Ovamboland.

As another example of a possible application of a particular theorist's work to the Kunene scheme occurs in the case of Frank. Ovamboland can be seen as a satellite of the central "white" area, and Namibia is in turn a satellite of South Africa, and of London, New York or Paris. In this view Ovamboland is progressively underdeveloped by the removal of her water, power and labour to the metropole in the south. In turn Namibia is underdeveloped by the removal of her raw materials, produced by Ovambo water, energy and labour, to be processed and manufactured in South Africa, or Europe or America, where the wealth accumulates. This is a quick, simplistic application of Frank's model, but a more sophisticated lengthy analysis could be made in these terms. Frank sees the process as follows (3) :

"To extract the fruits of their labour through monopoly trade.....the metropolises destroyed and/or totally transformed the earlier viable social or economic systems of these societies, incorporated them into the metropolitan dominated world-wide capitalist system, and converted them into sources

for its own metropolitan capital accumulation and development. The resulting fate for these conquered, transformed or newly acquired established societies was and remains their decapitalisation, structurally generated unproductiveness, ever increasing misery for the masses, and, in a word, their underdevelopment".

Clearly the "white" areas are a sub-metropole for the northern satellites and Namibia is being rapidly decapitalised by the metropolises, South Africa, Europe and America. A Frankian analysis could thus be made of the Kunene projects.

This perception of centres and peripheries appears also in the non-Marxist tradition, for example in Eisenstadt's theory of Modernisation (4). For Eisenstadt, modernisation is historically the process of change towards those types of social, economic and political systems that have developed in western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth, and have then spread to other European countries as well as later to the South American, Asian and African continents (5).

Eisenstadt argues that modernisation, especially where it brings unbalanced change in colonial societies, precludes any freezing of "development". Devices to prevent development could not succeed for long (6). In this framework, the rulers of Namibia can only succeed in their aims if they in fact do create separate development. A simple indirect-rule tactic cannot last long, in Eisenstadt's view, for development has seldom been "frozen" for long. Thus only by achieving real political and economic development, in such a way that separate but economically linked "nations" emerge, can the rulers of Southern Africa continue to rule at least one prosperous part of Southern Africa.

If the Kunene schemes do bring economic and political development to Ovamboland, by changing the mode of agricultural production, by creating some secondary industry, and by creating reliable modernising political institutions, then the rulers of Namibia will have avoided the trap of trying to "freeze"

development in an indirectly-ruled state.

However, a neo-colonial analysis could then be applied, to show that the economic structures are so tied to the "mother" country or the "mother" region that the "newly-modernised" state must fulfil vast obligations to its "mother". In short, the process of modernisation under separate development could create neo-colonies in the peripheral areas, dominated economically by what Eisenstadt calls the centres, but still "politically independent".

Thus I have shown by simple examples that any one of a number of theoretical concepts could be rigorously applied to the Kunene river schemes, and to Separate Development in Namibia. In due course this may be done, for theoretical study of Namibian society is in its infancy.

To conclude: the Kunene schemes, if carried out, have the potential to entrench South African rule, or to be turned against it.

The ruling groups will perhaps find it much easier to rule and prosper with the schemes than without them, but the schemes are no guarantee against the eventual downfall of the ruling groups.

One Namibian, tried under South African law, said in court in April 1968:

"We believe that South Africa has a choice - either to live at peace with us or to subdue us by force. If you choose to crush us and impose your will on us then you will not only betray your trust, but you will live in security for only so long as your power is greater than ours. No South African will live at peace in South West Africa, for each will know that his security is based on force and that without force, he will face rejection by the people of South West Africa" (7).

NOTES. CHAPTER TEN. CONCLUSION: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

1. Spinola, 1974 : 34.
2. Legassick, 1974 : 13.
3. Frank, Quoted in Laclau, 1971 : 20 21.
4. Eisenstadt, 1966 : 116.
5. Ibid : 1
6. Ibid : III.
7. Toivo Herman Ja Toivo, April 1968, quoted in Wilson and Perrot, eds., 1972 : 598.

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