

THE JAMESON RAID:

FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE COMPLICITY
OF THE COLONIAL OFFICE

With particular reference to the
Graham Bower Papers

A THESIS PRESENTED FOR THE DEGREE OF M.A.

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by

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BIBLIOGRAPHY.

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BR. SEL. COM. REP.

SECOND REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BRITISH
SOUTH AFRICA - 1897

CAPE. COM. REP.

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE - REPORT ON THE JAMESON RAID - 1896

BOWER REMINISCENCES OF SIXTEEN YEARS IN SOUTH AFRICA - 1880-
1896; BY SIR GRAHAM BOWER

WALKER HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA - ERIC A. WALKER

GARVIN THE LIFE OF JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN - BY J.L. GARVIN,
VOLUME 3 - [1934]

HOLE THE JAMESON RAID - BY HUGH MARSHALL HOLE - [1930]

HEADLAM CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE VOLUME VIII
CH. XXI (B) "THE JAMESON RAID" - BY CECIL HEADLAM.

Foreword

Men who must, at the time of the Raid, have been pretty well aware of the true facts have evinced a marked disinclination to commit themselves upon this question of a Colonial office complicity.

Hence the importance of the Graham Bower Papers - for Bower who was, undoubtedly, in a position to have an inside knowledge of events gives a most definite answer to the question. "Were the Colonial Secretary and the High Commissioner implicated in the Jameson Raid plot?" Moreover his answer, which is in the affirmative, does not seem unreasonable, when viewed in the light of already existing evidence - and, in the light of the blatant ineptitude of the Select Committee which acquitted Chamberlain and Sir Hercules Robinson.

CH. I. What detracts from the force of Bower's indictment is his justifiable but all-absorbing grievance against the Colonial Office. Therefore it has been considered essential to establish, at the outset, that he was, above all things, an upright and honest man.

CH. II. The vital role of Rhodes inevitably obtrudes upon a discussion of any aspect of the Jameson Raid; so, for the sake of clarity the "official" version of this role is described as succinctly as possible. Much labour has gone into debunking the manner in which the House of Commons Committee, conducted its Enquiry; in order to show that this Committee, far from genuinely trying to find out the truth, did its utmost to prevent the discovery of the truth - and, in order to create, in this way, a suitably suspicious atmosphere for the presentation of Bower's case against the Colonial Office.

CH. III. Bower's testimony is dealt with in fairly great detail and, wherever possible, is supported and supplemented, mainly by the interesting communications which passed between Rhodes and his agents and between Chamberlain and his Under-Secretaries, during the period August to December, 1895. Relevant evidence

given before the House of Commons' Committee is also examined, in particular, the incredible interpretations which Rhodes' agents Flora Shaw and Harris placed upon their cables. When stating evidence, the actual wording, even the exact punctuation, is most important and, in many instances no attempt has been made to paraphrase Bower's words, or the contents of telegrams, letters and despatches.

CH. 1V. The final chapter represents a determined, though perhaps unsuccessful, effort to sum up the evidence as objectively as possible and, to this end, Bower's testimony has been stripped of all important and unimportant ~~im~~bellishments such as his interesting interpretation of the first phase of the Kruger-Chamberlain issue, and his description of the remarkable difference between Sir Hercules' pre-Raid and post-Raid estimations of Chamberlain. Moreover- it is taken for granted that criticism of the House of Commons Enquiry has been sufficiently exhaustive to warrant the assumption that statements made in defence ~~of~~ the Colonial Office, at the Enquiry, were not necessarily accurate. Therefore, in the summing up, the Proceedings and Report ~~of~~ the House of Commons Committee are disregarded and the evidence is weighed purely on its own merits.

CHAPTER 1.

Bower Accuses the Government of The Union of South Africa Testimony

The Jameson Raid was an abortive attempt to over-throw the government of Paul Kruger.

By the end of 1895, British annexations to the North, the East and the West had all but completed the encirclement of the Transvaal, but Kruger, with the tacit approval of the Kaiser, was still holding his own, in spite of Clause IV of the London Convention. This shrewd, but bigoted old man, his very "Dopper" tenacity of purpose well sustained by the immense riches of the Witwatersrand and by the acumen of Dr. Leyds, was not only the chief obstacle to Cecil Rhodes great ambition - a United South Africa, but a hindrance to Joseph Chamberlain's pursuance of an active Imperialist policy in Southern Africa, and a menace to the big profits of

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1. J.G. Macdonald - Rhodes, A Life - [1927] - 61 - 119 ff
Vindex - Cecil Rhodes - His Political Life and Speeches - 60 ff
J. v.d. Poel - Railways and Customs Policies in S. Africa - [1933]
48-51
 2. S.G. Millin - Rhodes [1933] - 260 -
Walker - - 449
Hale - - 39 - 41
W.L. Langer - The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 2 vols - [1935] - Vol 11
p 219.
 3. J. v.d. Poel - 70 - 71; 76 - 81
W.L. Langer - Vol 11, 213 - 216
 4. G. Eybers - Select Constitutional Documents, 1795 - 1910 - [1918]
469
 5. J. Hays Hammond - An Autobiography [1935] - 219 ff
 6. J. v.d. Poel - 74 - 75
Vindex 132 ff, 241
 7. E.A. Walker - Lord de Villiers and his Times - [1925] - p 261
Garvin - 3
W. L. Langer - 224

the Johannesburg magnates, of whom Rhodes was one.⁸

The plan of which the Raid disaster was^{the} unexpected outcome centred about the growing Uitlander agitation on the Rand for redress of their political, economic and social grievances, and the conversion of this purely constitutional agitation into a revolution.⁹ An armed force was to hold itself in readiness, on the border, to back up the artificially instigated revolt and to uphold the High Commissioners arbitration, and, furthermore, to ensure that the revolutionaries did not attempt to set upon¹⁰ independent Uitlander Republic.

In its initial stages this plan of Rhodes and his fellow conspirators met with fair success. The British South Africa Company acquired a strip of territory along the Transvaal border¹¹ and a force under Dr. Jameson and Sir John Willoughby was assembled at Pitsani.¹² On the Rand, the rejection by the Volksraad of a monster petition,

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8. Hole - 31 - 32
R.I. Lovell - The Struggle for South Africa, 1875 - 1899 - 1934
291 - 2
Walker - 447
Hole - 27 - 30
J.P. Fitzpatrick - The Transvaal from within - [1899] - 51
9. G. Eybers - 448 - 495
Walker - 441
S.G. Millin - 247
C. Leonard - The Political Situation in South Africa, 1885 - 1895
[1903] - 23 - 38, 52, 54, 138 - 139
M. Nathan - Paul Kruger - His Life and Times [1941] - 186 - 247 - 8
270, 281, 297.
10. Br. Sel. Com. Rep. - Leonard - 7998 ff
Bower - 232
11. Hole - Ch. VI
12. Hole - 7 - 10, Ch. 11.

for the franchise¹³ and the Drifts crisis¹⁴ gave considerable impetus to the anti-government agitation which the money of Rhodes and Beit was helping to foment.¹⁵

A date was fixed for the rising - December 28th; from the viewpoint of the Republican Government, a most opportune date, for Pretoria would be crowded with armed Boers who had come in for the Christmas Nagmaal. But for many reasons - wanted^f an able leader, the indifference of large sections of the working class, inefficient revolutionary technique, general unpreparedness and an irreconcilable difference of opinion as to whether the revolt should be carried out under the Vierkleur¹⁶ or the Union Jack - the revolution "fizzled out" and ~~the~~ Jameson who had been fidgeting impatiently, on the border, took the indefensible step of trying to precipitate a rising by marching his force into the Transvaal.¹⁷ He carried with him a "covering" letter of invitation calling upon him to come to the aid of the women and children ^{of}

13.	J. Fitzpatrick -	400
	<u>Nathan</u>	- 323
14.	J. v.d. Poel -	836
	<u>Walker</u>	- 451
15.	<u>Hale</u>	- 51
	J. Hays Hammond -	320 - 321
	Br. Sel. Com. Rep. - Leonard -	7893
16.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep. - Leonard -	7936, 7954, 7958 - 7963
17.	S.G. Millin -	115
	Walker -	440
	L. Phillips - Some Reminiscences -	144 - 147
	J. Hays Hammond -	341 - 349

Johannesburg who were at the mercy of the Boers. This he had, with much forethought, acquired - Undated - from the Reform Committee, some five weeks before.
18

When Jameson surrendered to General Cronje, at Doornkoop, this letter (it had been dated December 20th) and copious correspondence in connection with the Raid conspiracy, together with the necessary code-books were found in Major Robert White's black "trommel"
19

The Jameson Raid ended all hopes of federation in South Africa, for many years, and - in spite of having occasioned two criminal trials and two parliamentary enquiries, in spite of Blue Books and Green Books and a mass of contemporary literature - remains probably the most controversial episode in South African history; one, to this day, partly shrouded in mystery, the subject of much speculation and bitter dispute and, moreover, one about which a no less authoritative work than Prof. E.A. Walker's History of South Africa could not be more non-committal.

The most provocative aspect of the Raid is the part played by the Colonial Office in the

18. BR. SEL. COM. REP. - Leonard - 7874 - 7945

19. HOLE - 45 - 48

whole miserable affair. Were Chamberlain and his colleagues implicated?; and, if so, to what extent? The Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons appointed to investigate the circumstances of the Raid completely exonerated the Colonial Office and its chief representative at the Cape - Sir Hercules Robinson.²⁰ However W.L. Langer in his Diplomacy at Imperialism²¹ and Cecil Headlam in his chapter on the Jameson Raid,²² in the Cambridge History of the British Empire, are not as convinced of the innocence of the Colonial Secretary, and are frankly skeptical of the innocence of the High Commissioner. Now, fifty years after the Raid, we find, on examining the papers of Sir Graham Bower, an indictment of the Colonial Office which is particularly thorough going.

Bower - the Imperial Secretary at the Cape, in 1895, was undoubtedly in a position to have an inside knowledge of events, during the months before and after the Raid. He was not only in the confidence of Rhodes,²³ but also of officials at the Colonial Office such as Sir Robert Meade and Edward Fairfield whom he saw constantly, during his two visits to England,²⁴ during 1896. Bower's chief, Sir Hercules Robinson had, in 1889, retired as High Commissioner, only to be, to all intents and purposes, resurrected by Rhodes and Lord Ripon²⁵ in January 1895. Rhodes, after six years of Sir Henry Loch, was a little weary of being thwarted and Sir Hercules might be doddering, but he was, at least, a kindred spirit. Not that

20. Br. Sel. Com. Rep. - pp xii - xiii
21. W.L. Langer - 225 - 226
22. Headlam - 559 - 561
23. Bower - 208 ff
24. Bower - 289 ff
25. Hale - 42 - 43
Headlam - 558

the old man was senile - far from it, but he was seventy-two years old and suffering from advanced cardiac degeneration and was therefore most dependent upon his Imperial Secretary. In fact, he had agreed to accept another term of office, only upon the condition that Bower, who was then due ^{for} promotion, remained at the Cape and took over all the administrative work attached to the High Commissioners's Office.²⁶ Under those circumstances, even a less astute Imperial Secretary than Bower, would have been conscious of any subtle undercurrents in the High Commissioner's Office.

In his evidence before the House of Commons Select Committee, Bower admitted his fore-knowledge of Rhodes' plans.²⁷ He was then overdue for promotion and there had been talk of the Governship of Newfoundland, but, at the conclusion of the Raid Enquiry, he was forced to resign from the Colonial Service.²⁸ A year later, the Colonial Office saw fit to re-employ him, but would not promote him. In fact, he was demoted and had to spend his remaining years, in the Colonial Service, as Imperial Secretary, on the obscure little island of Mauritius, where, no doubt, there was a great deal of time to brood upon the injustices which had been meted out to him.

Reading Bower's Reminiscences and his Letters, one is acutely aware both that he considers himself to have been most unfairly treated by the Colonial Office and

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20. Bower - 196
27. Br. Select. Com. Rep. - Bower - 2502 ff
28. He was at that time the Senior K.C.M.G. in the Colonial Service.

that he is determined to provide for posterity an adequate justification of his conduct. But this is no reason for considering the Graham Bower Papers unworthy of careful study, for one is just as acutely aware that his obvious bias is very largely offset by his fundamental honesty and uprightness.

There is no denying Bower's refusal to accept the tenets by which the House of Commons Committee conducted it's Enquiry; rather than take advantage of the numerous loopholes offered to witnesses, he acknowledged his complicity in the Raid plot and, by so doing, took more than a fair share of the blame. Due credit for this is given ^{to him} by Sir James Rose-Innes in a letter of 14th July, 1897.

My dear Bower,

What a relief it must be to you to have the report concluded at last, even though the Committee has taken full advantage of your generous resolve to take upon yourself, blame which belongs to others and not to you.

The real truth will only be known inside a small circle, but you will always have the satisfaction which attaches to unselfish and honourable action, under very trying circumstances.....

In September of the following year, Lord Grey who had been one of the "key-men" at the London end of the conspiracy wrote to Bower in the same vein.

29. Bower Letters - 14 - 7 - 97
30. Bower Letters - Sir J. Rose-Innes to Bower
Sept, 1898 -
Lord Grey to Bower.

Lord Grey to Bower..... "My first letter, on coming back, must be to congratulate you on your return to active work and to express my very sincere hope that Mauritius may be the stepping stone to other Governorships.

I think you know, without my putting it on paper, how greatly I have sympathised with you and Lady Bower for all you have been called upon to suffer. Knowing as I do all the circumstances, I cannot refrain from saying that I admire and respect you for the way in which you have, under great trial, consistently behaved."

Bower's strict moral code pervades the Reminiscences. We find Rhodes' solicitor, Hawksley, questioning him about certain communications between Chamberlain and Sir Hercules Robinson and provoking this indignant outburst. "I thought he must be mad, that no sane person could possibly ask a public officer for official and secret information."³¹

He had, moreover, very decided ideas as to where his duty lay and, galling though the role of scape-goat might be, he remained firm to these principles. On Feb. 28th 1898, he wrote to J.X. Merriman from Cambridge.³²

There are very few men now living who know the secret which it has been my duty to guard, and they, like myself, are bound to keep silent..... The question is, what was my duty and I have no

31. Bower - 293
32. J.X. Merrimen Letters - No. 14 of 1898

"hesitation in saying that it was to keep the peace in South Africa. For sixteen years, I have struggled to promote peace and goodwill between the two races often against long odds."

Bower never wavered in his firm conviction that the only worthwhile future for South Africa lay in the development of a better understanding between Dutch and English and, to this end, he was prepared to make considerable personal sacrifice. This is well brought out in connection with J.H. Hofmeyer's biography of "Onze Jan" in which Bower is accused of deliberately delaying the High Commissioner's Proclamation denouncing Jameson's action. ³³ In a letter of the 28th February, 1915 written from Balliol College, Oxford, Hofmeyer says that the opinions in the biography on the "delayed proclamation" are those of his uncle, that he is quite willing to accept Bower's assurances that the accusations are unjust - and will publish Bower's version of the episode. However, Bower refused the offer on the grounds that Anglo-Dutch relations in South Africa were already strained to the point of rebellion and to re-open the Raid controversies would only make matters worse. ³⁴

It should also be borne in mind that, on Bower's stipulation, his papers remained sealed until January 1st, 1946, in order that racial bitterness in

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33. J.H. Hofmeyer and F.W. Reitz - The Life of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyer [1913] - 490 - 491
34. Bower Correspondence in connection with "delayed Proclamation" of 31st December, 1895 - 28-2-15 - Hofmeyer to Bower
2-3-15 - Bower to Hofmeyer

35

South Africa should have ample time to die down. Thus, however great his determination to clear himself, in the interests of South Africa, he delayed the presentation of his "apologia" for 13 years.

In this analysis of the extent to which the Colonial Office was implicated in the Jameson Raid plot, use has been made of relevant material in the Graham Bower Papers. Bower's case against the Colonial Office seems a sound one, but his testimony cannot be objective, therefore it is of the utmost importance that he be accepted as a man of great integrity.

35. Extract from Cape Times of Saturday, May 10th 1946.

"The only interruption of any volume to which to-day's debate gave rise was when Mr. M. Kentridge (U.P. Troyville) questioned the Nationalists' quality of mercy, and a chorus answered him "The Jameson Raid."

CHAPTER 11.

April. 1896
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Immediately after the conviction, at Pretoria, of the ¹ leaders of the Reform Committee, the Transvaal Government, in its second Greenbook of that year, made public the evidence relating to the Jameson Raid plot which had been collected by the State Attorney's Department - in particular, extracts both from Lionel Phillips' private letter book and Major Robert White's diary, some letters from Jameson's captured "portefeuille" and, in spite of the fact that communication between Johannesburg Pitsani and Cape Town had been very brisk, the almost complete series of "inter-colonial telegrams" connected with the ² conspiracy.

All copies of these telegrams in the possession of the Cape Town Office ^{of} the British South Africa Company had been ³ destroyed, early in January; but copies of a number of them were found in Robert White's trunk, the bulk of the remainder being supplied by the Transvaal Telegraph Department and, a few, for which the Transvaal Government specifically asked by ⁴ the Cape Telegraph Department.

The most enlightening of these telegrams were published ⁵ in the London Times of May 1st 1896, causing a great stir. It was clear to all that Rhodes, the multi-millionaire Prime Minister of the Cape Colony and the dominating personality on the Boards of three great companies - De Beers, the British South Africa Company, and the Goldfields of

1. Hole	-	260 - 266
2. S.G. Millin	-	272
3. Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Harris 6243 - 6248
4. Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Harris 6468 - 6469
5. Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Beit 9456

South Africa Limited - had been the power behind the conspiracy, the organisation of which he had controlled through his brother Frank in Johannesburg and Jameson at Pitsani. Moreover, the Chartered Company, in which much English capital was invested, appeared to be deeply involved in the plot - and there was the immediate fear that it's charter would be revoked.

Two telegrams, in particular, must have provoked heated discussion. The telegram from Frank Rhodes to "Charter"
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Cape Town on 21st December, 1895.

Please inform C.J. Rhodes it is stated that the Chairman will not leave unless special letter inviting him; definite assurance has been given by all of us, that, on day of flotation you and he will leave; there must be no departure from this as many subscribers have agreed to take shares on this assurance.it was agreed.....that you are responsible for Chairman's departure.

And the telegram sent to Jameson on Boxing Day by his
7
brother Sam who was a leading member of the Reform Committee.

It is absolutely necessary to postpone flotation through unforeseen circumstances.....and, until we have C.J. Rhodes' absolute pledge authority of Imperial Government will not be insisted upon,

6. Cape Com. Rep. - Appendix A. No. 64
7. Cape Com. Rep. - Appendix A. No. 72

Was the "Chairman" perhaps the High Commissioner? and why was the "Imperial Government" interfering in a conspiracy about which, presumeably, it knew nothing?

Both the Cape House of Assembly and the British House of Commons appointed Select Committees to investigate "the incursion into the South African Republic".

June, 1896 The Select Committee of the House of Assembly was concerned with the various aspects of the Raid only "as affecting this Colony"; and attempt to investigate the possible complicity of the Colonial Office was, naturally, outside its competence.

Messrs Rose-Innes, Merriman, Schreiner and their fellow-members found it very difficult to conduct a satisfactory Enquiry. Apart from the extreme difficulty ^{of} wringing evidence ⁸ from the employees of De Beers and the B.S.A. Company, the Committee was unable to examine the two most important witnesses - Rhodes and Harris. Rhodes was coping with the Matabele, and though notified of the Enquiry, did not submit a statement. Harris, who was in England gave the imminence ^{of} ⁹ the House of Commons Enquiry, as his excuse for not returning.

Act No. 4. ¹⁰ of 1896 enabled the Committee to procure from the Telegraph Department ^{of} the Cape of Good Hope the few "inter-colonial" telegrams which had not yet been

8. Cape. Com. Rep.	-	pviij par. 2.
9. Cape. Com. Rep.	-	pviij par. 5.
Hale.	-	272
10. Cape. Com. Rep.	-	pviij par. 4.

on any account to take action"¹⁵ This latter finding does seem to give point to W.P. Schreiner's assertion that "Dr. Jameson in doing what he did, thought he was rightly interpreting the wish if not the order of his chief"¹⁶; in other words that the responsibility for the actual Raid fiasco did not rest solely with Jameson.

But Rhodes, did not "wish" Jameson to march into the Transvaal except in support of a rising on the Rand. Even Rhodes - not withstanding his unorthodox ethical values - must have been able to appreciate the essential difference between a "dash" to the aid of the women and children of Johannesburg and an unprovoked incursion.

The absence of a personal order from Rhodes to Jameson either on the 26th, the 27th or the 28th December, when he was aware that Uitlander revolutionary enthusiasm was abating rapidly, does not signify. For Rhodes, at that stage of his career, whether from indifferent health or the multiplicity of his interests, appears to have been incapable of giving his personal attention to any matter of detail - however important.¹⁷

Jameson sent two telegrams confirming his intention of "making his own flotation with aid of letter"¹⁸

The first was handed in, at Pitsani, at

15. Cape. Com. Rep.	-	p. xxiii par 44
16. Cape. Com. Rep.	-	Schreiner 2544
17. B. Williams - "Rhodes"		265
18. Cape. Com. Rep.	-	Appendix CC No. 06365

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5.p.m. on the 28th of December and sent out for delivery in Cape Town, fifty - six minutes later; but, unfortunately, the Chartered Company's office was already closed. The second telegram was handed in, at Pitsani, at 9.5 a.m. on December 29th,²⁰ both telegrams being collected by Stevens - the Assistant-Secretary of the B.S.A. Company - between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m.²¹

Rhodes drafted the reply to Jameson - the well-known telegram from "Unbegangen" ending "on no account must you move, I must strongly object to such a course!"²² Every effort was made to send this on the Sunday (December 29th), but Mafeking had been "dismissed". Stevens tried again on the Monday morning,²³ but by then the telegraph wire has been cut.

Rhodes, once it became obvious that his original plan had been wrecked, did his level best with Jameson's version of it. When communication was restored, at noon on Monday (December 30th), he made no attempt to stop Jameson; though a dispatch rider sent by the Resident Commissioner at Mafeking did succeed in overtaking the invading force and presenting a quite unavailing "order to retire"²⁴ from the High Commissioner. On the same day, Harris was ordered to cable the famous "letter of invitation" to Flora

19. Cape. Com. Rep.	-	Appendix CC No. 07529
20. Cape. Com. Rep.	-	Appendix CC No. 00034
21. Cape. Com. Rep.	-	p xxi par. 36
22. Cape. Com. Rep.	-	Stevens 346, 2886
23. Cape. Com. Rep.	-	Tasker 2751 - 2762
24. Hole	-	pxxi par 36 168 - 169

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Shaw for insertion in the "Times"; moreover, on that Monday,

Miss Shaw received another very interesting cable from

"F. R. Harris ²⁶ to C.J. Rhodes, Premier."

Cape Town,
30th Dec, 1875.

Inform Chamberlain that I shall get through all right if he supports me, but he must not send cables like he sent to High Commissioner in South Africa. To-day the crux is - I will win and South Africa will belong to England.

Did Rhodes who authorised this cable have reasonable grounds for expecting "support" from the Colonial Office?

The Select Committee ^{of} the British House of Commons "appointed to enquire into the origin and circumstances of the incursion into the South African Republic" adopted, unreservedly, the Report ²⁷ of the Cape House of Assembly; though this Committee, after cross-examining Rhodes and most of the leading supporters of the Raid plot, was able, in it's own report, to present the case against Rhodes more fully. Nor was it's condemnation unjust:- "Mr. Rhodes occupied a great position in South Africa and, beyond all other persons should have been careful to abstain from such a course of action as that which he adopted..... whatever justification there might have been for action on the part of the people of Johannesburg, there was none for

25. Br. Sel. Com. Rep. - Appendix 16 No. 1557
26. Br. Sel. Com. Rep. - Appendix 16 No. 1556
27. Br. Sel. Com. Rep. - p iv

the conduct of a person in Mr. Rhodes' position....."

Furthermore, the Committee severely censured both Sir Graham Bower and Newton, the Resident Commissioner of Bechuanaland for withholding from the High Commissioner their fore-knowledge of Rhodes' plans.

Bower's most important evidence at the Enquiry, had been briefly as follows:- Rhodes had told him that he was arranging for a force on the Transvaal border in readiness for the anticipated Uitlander revolt; he (Bower) had not informed Sir Hercules of Rhodes' confidence.

(a) because he had given his word not to do so.

(b) because he thought that before any definite action was taken Rhodes himself would consult the High Commissioner.

(c) because he considered an Uitlander outbreak a very remote possibility, as he had heard through his own private grapevine that the Transvaal government was spending money in Johannesburg most effectively "in dividing things"

In the Reminiscences, he is rather more explicit upon this last point "About December 7th (1895), I received news from Mr. Lewis Mitchell, the manager of the Standard Bank, that the Transvaal Government had sent £50,000 in secret service money to Johannesburg; and, a few days later, I learnt that the money was being spent in detaching the Labour leaders from the Capitalists and being spent successfully."

The chief task before the Select Committee of the House of Commons was, however, to answer the

28. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - p xvi
 29. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - p xvi
 Newton was also forced to resign from the Colonial Service; He was later re-employed and demoted as Colonial Secretary of Honduras.
 30. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - Bower 2503 - 2521; 2769; 2852 - 2853
 31. Bower - 20

Vindication of Joseph Chamberlain was almost as unanimous -
Newton, it is true did venture to say that Rhodes had
"led him to believe that the Imperial authorities would not
be averse to any movement in Johannesburg; but he was the
only dissentient; for Harris and Willoughby expressed
themselves satisfied that any suspicions which they might
have entertained regarding the possible fore-knowledge of the
Colonial Office were unfounded. Rhodes, Jameson, Flora Shaw,
and Beit were asked whether they had had any communication
with the Colonial Office regarding the Jameson plan or whether
from any source the Colonial Office had been give any
indication which should have forwarned it of the plan - and
the answer was in each case a firm "no"

But not much significance can be attached to these
denials, even though the witnesses were on oath; for a thorough
examination both of the personnel of the Committee and of it's
proceedings reveals a very bogus Enquiry.

The House of Commons Committee which was appointed on
the 11th August, 1896 but did not commence work till February
of the following year consisted of fifteen members. The
Chairman was W.L. Jackson - Member of Parliament for Leeds -
who, according to Stead, had "a certain

39.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Newton - 4783
40.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Harris - 8506 - 8512
41.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Willoughby - 5780 - 5808
42.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Rhodes - 1424 - 1426
43.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Jameson - 5663
44.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Flora Shaw - 9638
45.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Beit - 9080 - 9081

question:- was the Colonial Office and/or it's chief representative at the Cape implicated in the Jameson Raid plot and, if so, to what extent? For at the beginning of 1897, this aspect of the Jameson Raid was till a complete mystery and, above all others, needed a thorough investigation.

The Committee's Report states: "Neither the Secretary of State for the Colonies, nor any of the officials of the Colonial Office received any information which gave them or should have given them fore-knowledge of the plot, during its development³²" and futhermore "there is no evidence, whatever, that the High Commissioner had the slightest knowledge of the plot or of the intended use of an armed force within the Transvaal. Both of which were purposely concealed from³³ him."

To all intents and purposes a most satisfactory answer; and moreover, an answer supported by the evidence of the witnesses who appeared before the Committee.

Throughout the Enquiry not so much as a breath of suspicion attached itself to the name of the High Commissioner.
34 35 36 37 38
Rhodes, Bower, Beit, Jameson and Newton stated quite definitely that Sir Hercules did not know of the Raid plot, while Schreiner, Phillips, Leonard and Frank Rhodes, by the very manner in which they tendered their evidence, implied that Sir Hercules had been deliberately misled by the conspirators. The

32.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	pxvi
33.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	pxll
34.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Rhodes - 96 - 97, 264 - 267
35.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Bower 2521
36.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Beit - 9102 - 9106
37.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Jameson : 4598
38.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Newton : 4649

reputation for business capacity and average Yorkshire
46
shrewdness"

Government members on the Committee were Joseph Chamberlain
Sir Michael Hicks - Beach - the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Sir Richard Webster - the Attorney - General, Sir William
Hart-Dyke, John L. Wharton, J.C. Bigham and George Wyndham.

Bower was in England, when the Committee was ^{being} formed,
and this is his comment - "There was competition amongst
Ministerialists for the honour of a seat amongst the nine. One
M.P. assured me that Chamberlain would find him quite loyal,
if he were chosen. I mentioned his name to Fairfield, but
he thought there were others who showed greater wisdom in
their loyalty."
47

Representing the Opposition on the Committee were
Sir William Harcourt - leader of the Parliamentary Opposition -
who before he entered Parliament had had one of the highest
reputations and largest incomes ever earned at the Parliamentary
Bar, Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman; Sydney Buxton - an ex-Under
Secretary for the Colonies, John Ellis, Edmund Blake - a former
Canadian lawyer who had become an Irish Nationalist Member of
Parliament, and Henry Labouchere who had for many years been a
bitter opponent of Rhodes "the Empire - Jerry-builder" ⁴⁸ and of
the B.S.A. Company "a gambling establishment

46. Review of Reviews of 18th June, 1897 - Article entitled
"Hushed Up! or the Scandal at Westminster."

47. Bower letters - 11 - 5 - 06 - Bower to Sir M. ~~Cave~~ ^{Cave} (his "apologia") p. 87

48. Hesketh Pearson - The Life and Character of Henry Labouchere
(1936) p. 279.

with the Union Jack flying over it.⁴⁹ Rhodes he considered
"a mere vulgar promoter and the figurehead ^f of a gang of
astute Hebrew financiers"⁵⁰ - and did not hesitate to say so
either in Parliament or in his publication "Truth."

What strikes one immediately about this Committee which
was to determine whether or not the Colonial Office knew
of the preparations to ensure a successful insurrection on the
Rand - was that Chamberlain himself sat on it. In normal
circumstances, the Colonial Secretary would take an active part
in investigating an incident which occurred in one of the
Colonies; but, in this instance, Chamberlain stood in the
position of an accused party and should have refused to act
on the Committee. The Colonial Secretary's right hand man, during
the Enquiry, was George Wyndham who, in the Autumn of the
previous year, ^{latter} being appointed to the Committee, had
visited South Africa and stayed with Rhodes at Groote Schuur.

Moreover, these fifteen men, who so unhesitatingly
dismissed the charges against Chamberlain and the High Commissioner,
did not deem it necessary to first submit them to a thorough
cross-examination.⁵¹ Lord Rosmead was said to be too ill and he
was exculpated without having uttered one syllable in the
witness box. Nor was a statement of his read;

49. H. Pearson - p. 276
50. H. Pearson - p. 280
51. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - pxxxvi - Proceedings of 2nd July,
1097

merely two telegrams - one of February 24th 1897,⁵² stating that the guarantee that he would mediate upon the outbreak of an Uitlander revolt was given "without my knowledge or authority",⁵³ and one of the 11th March 1897, denying any fore-knowledge of the relations between the police, on the border, and the unrest of the Rand.

Chamberlain entered the witness-box twice, but only very briefly. His first appearance, on April 30th,⁵⁴ was apparently for the sole purpose of weakening certain evidence of Harris which had just been presented - evidence to the effect that he had, in Chamberlain's presence, hinted at the real reason why Rhodes wanted troops on the border. Harris had no sooner made his statement, before the Committee, than Chamberlain appealed for permission to give his version of the interview at the Colonial Office. Having done so and answered a question put to him by Labouchere,⁵⁵ he left the witness-stand.

In the concluding sessions of the Enquiry, after all the evidence had been taken, Chamberlain again signified his wish to make a statement. This time with the obvious intention of summing up the case for the Colonial Office and of trying to establish that Fairfield - Assistant - Under - Secretary for the Colonies, at the time of the Raid - to whom Harris allegedly had spoken "openly" of the ultimate destiny of the force at Pitsani

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52. Br. Sel. Com. Rep. - Page 59
53. Br. Sel. Com. Rep. - Page 149
54. The Committee had then been sitting every Tuesday and Friday for ten weeks.
55. Br. Sel. Com. Rep. - Pages 336 - 339

had been very deaf and so could not have heard the disclosure⁵⁶

By the time the Enquiry took place - more than a year after the Raid - both Fairfield and Sir Robert Meade - the permanent Under-Secretary for the Colonies, at the time of the Raid - had died. However, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary Lord Selborne followed Chamberlain in the witness-box and, in his eagerness to support his chief, proceeded, on one point, to flatly contradict him.

Sir William Harcourt, when cross-examining Beit had quoted - at some length - from a despatch of Chamberlain dated 4th February, 1896, laying stress on this paragraph:- "There were indeed rumours from time to time that violent measures were in contemplation but these rumours were continually falsified by the event; so that, in the long run, the opinion gained ground that the Uitlanders did not mean to risk a collision with the Government."⁵⁷ But Lord Selbornes testimony was rather different "I was in the most constant communication with Mr. Chamberlain, Sir Robert Meade and Mr. Fairfield, throughout the autumn of 1895, and I believe I knew absolutely everything that passed in the Colonial Office, at that time. We believed that a bona-fide spontaneous revolution was about to occur in Johannesburg. It might be delayed for a year, or possibly two years, on the other hand, it might occur in a few weeks."⁵⁸

Yet not one member of the Committee commented upon this

56.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Pages 498 - 500
57.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Beit 9006 - 9014
58.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Selborne 9596

discrepancy in viewpoint of the Colonial Secretary and his Under-Secretary.

Not only did Chamberlain, by tendering evidence of such a fragmentary nature, in no way give the Committee a lead in genuinely investigating the question of Colonial Office complicity, but he did not place at the disposal of the Committee all documentary evidence in the possession of the Colonial Office which might have had a bearing on the Raid:-

1. Any documents from the files of the Late Liberal administration which dealt with the growing Uitlander unrest. e.g. Memoranda by Lord Ripon; communications between Lord Ripon and Sir Henry Loch.

2. Telegrams and despatches between the Colonial Office and the High Commissioner at the Cape, with the replies received, during the period August 1895 to February 1896.

3. Memoranda made by Chamberlain or by officials at the Colonial Office, during interviews with Harris or any other of Rhodes' agents.

4. All relevant letters between Chamberlain and his Under-Secretaries — one such letter was produced at the Enquiry, that was written by Fairfield on November 4th, 1895; and it was of particular interest, not only because of the most extraordinary interpretation[^] was placed upon it by Chamberlain, (this will be discussed in the next chapter), but also because it gave every indication of being one of a series.

5. All correspondence between the Colonial Office and

Rhodes' agents; in particular all the correspondence between Hawksley and the Colonial Office regarding the cables which passed between Harris and Rhodes, during August, September, October and November of 1895. In June 1896, these communications were sent to the Colonial Office for "confidential perusal and return"; but the only correspondence in connection with them *which* was read before the Committee consisted of two letters *of* early February, 1896, when the Colonial Office was first made aware of their existence. The second of these letters - that from Hawksley to Fairfield *of* February 5th 1896 ought to have evoked a reply, but a copy of such a reply was certainly not forthcoming.

The Committee made not the slightest attempt to obtain all these very essential documents from the Colonial Office; nor did it persevere in its efforts to secure the Harris - Rhodes cables.

A fairly detailed examination of the evidence upon these cables is worthwhile.

The first time that specific mention was made of them was, on February 19th, by Sir William Harcourt, during his cross-examination of Rhodes.

Q. "I observe in the evidence upon the telegrams that Mr. Stevens says there are a great number of telegrams that passed at this time that were not put in at the Cape Enquiry, because they were in England with Dr. Harris. Now have you any objection to these telegrams being produced.....A. "I consider that they were of a confidential nature and should not be produced.⁵⁹

On February 26th Rhodes - in a particular uncommunicative mood - was again questioned upon the cables; on this occasion by Blake:

Q. "Have you these communications or copies of them under your control?" A. "I have not got them with me"

Q. "Do you know where they are?" A. "I am not aware where they are at present."

Q. "Have you made an Enquiry for them?" A. "No I have not. With regard to this matter, I must only say that I consider they were confidential communications.".....

Q. "As to these communications received from Dr. Harris, when you were at Cape Town and you were in England, what has become of them?" A. "I have not got the communications from Dr. Harris with me."

Q. "You mean you have not brought them to England?"

A. "No."

Q. "So that the cable company would be the only means of getting them?"

A. "I do not say that."

Q. "Are you aware of any other means of getting the communications from Dr. Harris than the Cable Company?"

A. "That I cannot answer."60

Well might Labouchere, in his minority report deprecate the fact that "witnesses refused to make a clean breast of all they knew."
61

Nevertheless, the Colonial Secretary was just as loth to confide in the Committee, for it was only at the twentieth

60. Br. Sel. Com. Rep

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Rhodes - 980 - 991

61. Br. Sel. Com. Rep

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pxivi - Labouchere's Draft Report
par. 2.

session of the Enquiry that Chamberlain, in answer to a question of Labouchere; admitted that the Colonial Office had had an opportunity of examining the cables in June of the previous year.⁶²

As soon as Chamberlain left the witness-stand, Sir William Harcourt proceeded to cross-question Harris, whose evidence the Colonial Secretary had interrupted; but he knew nothing.

- Q. "What became of the telegrams from England."
- A. "They were handed by me to Mr. Rhodes. I have not them".....
- Q. "Were these telegrams shown to anybody at the Colonial Office?"
- A. "Not to my knowledge".....
- Q. "Were these telegrams ever in the hands of Mr. Hawksley?"
- A. "That I cannot say."⁶³

The Committee did, at that stage, call upon the Eastern Telegraph Company for copies of the cables. Well over a year had elapsed since Harris' visit to England, but luckily some of the cables had not been destroyed, owing to a delay in completing the necessary book-keeping. Nevertheless, all those sent before October 31st 1895 and those which, although sent after that date, had gone via Durban had been destroyed.⁶⁴

On May 18th, Harris admitted before the Committee that the series of cables supplied by the Telegraph Company was incomplete; but he was most vague as to where the missing cables were, when he had last seen them, or who had shown them to him.⁶⁵

Hawksley - who for the past fourteen months had had a full set of the cables in his safe-

62. Chamberlain had the cablegrams in his possession for at least ten days.
 Br. Sel. Com. Rep - Chamberlain 6224 - 6227
 63. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - Harris 6251 - 6265
 64. Br. Sel. Com. Rep pL - Labouchere's Draft Report - par. 33

65. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - Harris 8262 - 8278

keeping - was thereupon requested by the Committee to produce them. However, acting on instructions given by Rhodes, before his departure for Rhodesia, he refused to do so. He reminded the Committee that, when Rhodes was before it, no proceedings has been taken against him for the production of the cables; on the contrary, his plea that they were confidential and therefore should not be handed over had been accepted unreservedly. He admitted that these cables indicated Colonial Office approval of Rhodes' plans and that Rhodes had made use of them in promoting his conspiracy. A statement quite inconsistent with Rhodes' evidence that he had neither directly or indirectly told "anyone" that Chamberlain⁶⁷ knew anything about the plot." Furthermore, Hawksley, gave in evidence that, on Rhodes instructions, he had informed the Colonial Office of the use which had been made of the cables and that, some four months later, the cables themselves had been sent to Chamberlain. He also read his letter to Fairfield of February 5th, 1896

My dear Fairfield - I thought I had better follow your example and so told Rhodes of my talks with you. Grey, I understood, has never cabled anything to South Africa and so the information given to people in Johannesburg has all been oral. I think, therefore, perhaps enough has been done and we may leave matters at this point. You know, and I do not, what has passed between the High Commissioner or his secretary and the Colonial Office. As I hope I made clear to you, there is not the slightest intention to make any use whatever of confidential

66.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Hawksley	8727
67.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Rhodes	1424
68.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Hawksley	8730 - 8745

communications. If you can hurry up the publication of the despatch about the Uitlander⁷⁰ it would do much good.

It is surprising that Hawksley was allowed to read the entire letter; perhaps the committee members were so taken aback that they were speechless. The first one to recover was Chamberlain and his outraged comment was "The witness is volunteering information, he has not been asked any question as⁷¹ to this." However, largely due to the efforts of Mr. Bigham, Hawksley was not asked a single question upon this letter.

A knowledge of the import of all the Harris-Rhodes cables was undoubtedly essential to a proper Enquiry. Yet Chamberlain who had actually read the cables and possibly made some notes on them would vouchsafe no more than that "those that were not produced are very similar in character to those that have been⁷² produced." Moreover, when Labouchere and Blake pressed for a further effort to obtain the cables, their motion was defeated⁷³ by twelve votes to two.

In its Report, the Committee submitted that, if the cables could have assisted Rhodes in his defence, he would have produced them⁷⁴ - which is tantamount to stating that Rhodes, having used the cables to convey the impression that his plans were approved by the Colonial Office, was now withholding them,

70.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Page 462
71.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Hawksley - 8753
72.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Chamberlain - 9565
73.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	p.xxxiv Proceedings of 1st June, 1897
74.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	p. xv

because he knew they did not justify the representations which he had based upon them.

Jackson and his colleagues further excused themselves for not pursuing the matter on the grounds:-

A. That they "did not consider a knowledge of the telegrams in any way essential to the completion of the Enquiry" which not only points to a very biased attitude, but also reflects rather badly on the efficiency of the Committee, and

B. That Rhodes was the "person against whom proceedings should properly be taken for the production of the cables" and the delay involved would have prevented the Committee from reporting to the House of Commons, before the end of the session; but this does not alter the fact that all the evidence should have been examined and that proceedings could have been taken against Hawksley for the production of the cables.

While the most obvious examples of the ineptitude of the Select Committee are its acquittal of Chamberlain and Sir Hercules Robinson without thorough cross-examination and its failure to insist upon the production of possibly vital documentary evidence, there are many other adverse criticisms to be made of the manner in which the Enquiry was conducted, as, for instance, the most prefatory cross-examination of Hawksley.

Rhodes' solicitor, apart from being a comparatively willing witness, was also an important one. He had custody of all the cablegrams between Harris and Rhodes and had conducted all the

correspondence regarding them with the Colonial Office; he had, moreover, been a personal friend of Fairfield and been present on at least one of the occasions when Harris, according to his evidence, spoke openly to Fairfield of Rhodes' intentions regarding the force on the border. Harris stated before the Committee that, during his stay in London, he saw Hawksley constantly and very often consulted him before cabling Rhodes. Yet, even though he appeared three times before the Committee, Hawksley was barely cross-questioned. In particular - no attempt was made to cross-question him either upon his letter to Fairfield of February 5th, or upon the interview between Harris and Fairfield. He was asked what had occasioned his despatch to the Colonial Office of the Harris-Rhodes cables, at least four months after his original intimation to Fairfield at their existence; but Bigham would not allow this question to be answered and, immediately afterwards, the Chairman ordered the room to be cleared.

In his Draft Report, Labouchere comments that "witnesses from the War Office were not examined." In fact, he was only at the instigation of Labouchere that Sir John Willoughby's letter to the War Office which should have been amongst the documents laid on the Table, at the commencement of the Enquiry, was eventually produced. This letter - a vain attempt to save the commissions of Willoughby's officers - affirmed the "honest and bona fide belief" at the time of the Raid "that the steps were

76.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Harris - 8584
77.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Harris - 8240
78.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Hawksley - 8755
79.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	p. xiv - Labouchere's Draft Report par. 2.

taken with the knowledge and assent of the Imperial Authorities.⁸⁰
But neither the Adjutant-General nor the Secretary of State for War were questioned as to why they had not accepted this plea.

Willoughby, when examined upon this letter, by Sir William Harcourt, simply refused to answer, giving, as the reason for his virtual defiance of the Committee, that he could not abuse Jameson's confidence.⁸¹ However, Jameson himself was recalled and questioned. He smoothed matters over by stating that the assurances given by Willoughby and himself to the officers must have been based partly on their knowledge that, once the revolt broke out, the High Commissioner would be called upon to arbitrate - and partly upon their complete confidence⁸² that the inroad would be successful. He admitted that the use in the letter, ~~of~~⁸³ the words "Imperial Authorities" was unfortunate, but the actual drafting of the letter had been done by Hawksley.⁸³ Furthermore Jameson declared most emphatically, that never had he told his officers or anyone else that he had the support of the Imperial Government - "it would have been quite idiotic if I had done so and absolutely untrue."⁸⁴

But not one of the officers was summoned to give the Committee his version of the grounds upon which his commission⁸⁵ had been guaranteed by Jameson and Willoughby. Nor was any attempt⁸⁵ to find out from officials at the War Office whether Hawksley, when submitting Willoughby's letter to them, had used

80. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - Page 306
81. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - Willoughby - 5634 - 5639
82. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - Jameson - 5661
83. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - Jameson - 5660
84. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - Jameson - 5663
85. Reviewed Reviews - August 1897 - "The White-washing of Mr. Chamberlain."

the cablegrams in his custody to back up the statements of his clients.

A very valuable witness would have been Lord Grey, a Director of the Chartered Company, at the time of the Raid, who had, since, replaced Jameson as administrator of Matabeleland.

Harris admitted having discussed the Jameson plan with Grey, furthermore, certain telegrams indicated that he was assisting Harris in negotiating for the transfer of the Protectorate:-

A telegram from Harris to Rhodes of 2nd November, 1895.

Confidential, Early Grey held an interview with J. Chamberlain; I have seen native chiefs.....
J. Chamberlain will put pressure on them to settle.....

And another from Harris to Rhodes of 4th November, 1895.

Registered address of Earl Grey is Gothical London. You must register this on your side at once.

Moreover, Grey, the friend and associate of Harris, was also a friend of Chamberlain and had been present at the interview with the Colonial Secretary, when Harris made his "guarded allusion" to Rhodes' plans. Yet Grey was allowed to remain, undisturbed, in Bulawayo.

Flora Shaw - the Colonial Correspondent on the "London Times" who knew all about the Jameson plan and whom Harris had

86.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Harris 8283 - 8284
87.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Appendix 14 lll No. 2.
88.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Appendix 14 lll No. 5.
89.	Garvin	-	37
90.	P.R. Botha	-	Die Staatkundige Ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek onder Kruger en Leyds (1925) - 421

supplied with the private telegraphic code ⁹² of the Chartered Company was summoned before the Committee almost as an after-⁹³ thought and then only as a result of agitation by Labouchere. This near omission is particularly interesting in view of the fact that Miss Shaw was not only able to communicate in code with Rhodes, but was also persona grata at the Colonial Office - to the extent of calling there two or three times a week to discuss Colonial affairs.⁹⁴ The attitude of Committee members towards the witness was the acme of chivalry - even Labouchere, though possibly he was merely stunned by her eloquence, because in his report he remarks acidly "The relations of Miss Shaw with certain directors of the Chartered Company with Mr. Harris and with the Colonial/^{Office} ⁹⁵ were peculiar."

Miss Shaw was questioned as to the number of cables which had passed between Rhodes and herself, She remembered that she had sent Rhodes three cables,⁹⁶ but could only remember receiving one from him "a purely formal cable with nothing in it."

The Committee did, however, at that late stage, call upon the Eastern Telegraph Company for these cables; and, at it's last session before drafting the Report, examined Miss Shaw upon them - but there were two cables from Rhodes and neither

91.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Harris	8591 - 8593
92.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Harris	8260
93.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Page	457
94.	W.T. Stead - Joseph Chamberlain	-	Conspirator? or Statesman?	
95.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	p. lx -	Labouchere's draft report - par 19
96.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Shaw	- 8837
97.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Shaw	- 8847

was "purely formal." The good lady, in her eagerness to atone for her lapse of memory, then confidently that, according to her household accounts, there was yet another cable - one which she had sent to Rhodes on January 1st, 1896, but which the Cable Company had been unable to produce.⁹⁸

Not only were important cables which should have been laid on the table, at the commencement of the Enquiry, only called for half-way through, and at the end, but witnesses who should have been examined on this evidence were allowed to leave England. Rhodes returned to Rhodesia on April 3rd, 1897 and the Committee was unable to question him either on the Rhodes-Harris cables or on the Rhodes-Shaw cables. Harris was also permitted to disappear. He went abroad and "his address could not be obtained" when, at the last moment, his testimony was needed in connection with a cable sent in Rhodes' name, but which its recipient Flora Shaw declared to be a product of the fertile imagination of Harris.⁹⁹

The foregoing criticisms have been specific to particular aspects of the Enquiry; those which follow pertain to the Enquiry as a whole.

The predominant impression gained, on examining the way in

98. Br. Sel. Com. Rep. - Shaw - 9603; 9618-9619
99. W.T. Stead - Joseph Chamberlain - Conspirator? or Statesman?
Br. Sel. Com. Rep. - Page 535

which Committee members conducted their cross-examinations, on considering the nature of their questions is that they were not genuinely investigating the possibility of Colonial Office complicity in the Raid plot.

The examination of Rhodes occupied five and half sessions and he was asked some 2121 questions upon every conceivable sidelight of the Uillander movement and of the Raid itself; upon his own political philosophy and upon the subtleties of Cape and Transvaal politics; but only Labouchere tried to question him upon the actual subject matter of the cables from Harris and Miss Shaw and, when he objected ^{to answering} on the grounds that his answers would involve "third parties" whom the Committee ought to examine in person, not even Sir William Harcourt protested. ¹⁰⁰

When cross-examining Bower, both Harcourt and Labouchere barked back, time and again, to the import of his conversation with Rhodes, on that morning in October; yet not once did either of them ask whether Rhodes' confidences had included an assurance that the Colonial Office knew and approved of his plans.

W.P. Schreiner who had not the remotest connection with the Raid was asked 1283 questions on the state of the South African Colonies; while Beit whose complicity in the Raid plot had been established by the Transvaal Greenbook No. 2 was asked 378 questions and Maquire, the close friend of Rhodes who sat on the

Board of the Chartered Company as his proxy, was asked 240 questions. On the testimony of Harris, both Beit and Maquire had been in ¹⁰¹ his confidence, during the weeks he was negotiating for the jumping-off ground. He could not recall their presence at any of his interviews with Fairfield but admitted that it was "within the knowledge of these gentlemen that I spoke ¹⁰² openly to Mr. Fairfield." Moreover, the telegrams to Rhodes had been seen by either Beit or Maquire — or both of them — before being sent off. Yet their examination^s compared with that of Schreiner ~~were~~ cursory in the extreme. The Committee was most interested in the exact instructions Beit had given ¹⁰⁴ Phillips regarding the financing of the Uitlander revolt, but not in the least concerned whether his communications to Phillips had conveyed the impression that the schemes of the conspirators had Colonial Office approval.

Witnesses were questioned at length on the iniquities of Kruger's Government; the real and fancied grievances of the Uitlanders; the most intimate details of Rand mining economy (the last topic being of special interest to Labouchere) while, in contrast, ^{for} the possible knowledge of the Colonial Office received very scanty attention. As the mother of J.X. Merriman commented indignantly "The committee might have been instituted ¹⁰⁵ solely for the investigation of Transvaal affairs."

101.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Harris: 6513-6516; 6609-6611
102.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Harris: 8687 -8696
103.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Harris: 8240
104.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Beit: 8974ff; 9030ff
105.	J. X. Merriman Letters	-	No. 18 of 1897

What is so significant is that both Government and Opposition members of the House of Commons Committee were equally responsible for the fact that it was - in the words of Sir Edward Cooke of the Daily News - a veritable "Committee of No-Enquiry." Not that Labouchere, Sir William Harcourt or Blake did not, on occasion, venture a pertinent question; what they did not do was protest when the witness was prevented from answering, either by the interruption of another committee member, or by the cry that the room must be cleared; or, for that matter, when a reluctant witness claimed that a question was one of confidence and should not be pressed or refused to make a disclosure because a "third party" was involved.

It was not considered in the least irregular when Chamberlain, in the course of his cross-examination of Bower, asked: "....." is Mr. Rhodes willing that you should state what happened which he stated to you in confidence." ¹⁰⁰ Why did not that astute barrister Sir William Harcourt oppose this extraordinary ruling upon the giving of evidence?

Labouchere might offer the excuse that witnesses "refused to make a clean breast of all they knew" but the onus was on the Committee to press for frank disclosures and this it failed

signally to do. All the "it may have beens" and the "it may not have beens": the amazing lapses of memory, which were accepted with the utmost composure.

With the appearance of Hawksley in the witness-box, the Committee abandoned almost all pretence of being conscientious or impartial. Even Labouchere, though he did procure the appearance of Miss Shaw, in the witness box, accepted the inevitable. This does not lose sight of the fact that, but for Labouchere, the Enquiry might have been a complete farce, nevertheless the vigour with which, in the early stages of the Enquiry, he set about finding out the truth, was, in its latter sessions, largely devoted to impugning the alleged "stock-jobbing" motives of Harris and Beit.

It is also perfectly true that neither Labouchere nor Blake supported Sir William Harcourt's Draft report which the Committee finally adopted, on 13th July, 1897. Blake withdrew from the Committee in protest against the non-production of the "Hawksley" cables, and Labouchere, of course, submitted a separate report. This received one vote - his own. The final paragraph of this report expresses, with a delicacy one would not have thought Labouchere possessed, "regret" that the Committee failed to conduct a proper Enquiry.

".....the committee regrets that the alleged complicity of the Colonial Office has not been probed to the bottom, because the slightest appearance of any indisposition to do this by your committee may lead some persons erroneously to suppose that there

may be some truth in the statements of witnesses connected with the Jameson plan that the secret aims of Mr. Rhodes were more or less clearly revealed to Mr. Chamberlain and to Mr. Fairfield....."

What Labouchere describes as "erroneous suppositions" were certainly well to the fore in the contemporary press, as these extracts indicate:—

Westminster Gazette of June 11th 1897:

Fortified by unctuous rectitude and an unsuspecting disposition the Committee was unsparing of white-wash.

Review of Reviews (London) of August, 1897.

So far as the world outside England is concerned the attempt to palm off, as the verdict of an impartial tribunal, this foregone conclusion of a packed committee has already been a conspicuous failure.

Le Temps.

The course pursued by the Committee is in itself an avowal.

Moscow Gazette.

This scandalous and disgraceful shame of an investigation by the South African committee.

Review of Reviews (New York.)

Mr. Rhodes position is enviable in comparison with that of the British Colonial Office, the hypocritical conduct, which is rendered all the more conspicuous by the white-washing of the Committee.¹⁰⁷

And without doubt, the Select Committee's vindication of the Colonial Office was quite unjustifiable; for, not merely was the personnel of the Committee unsatisfactory, in view of the nature of the Enquiry; but it by no means examined all the evidence which might have a bearing upon the question of Colonial Office complicity and made no attempt to deal adequately or convincingly with such evidence as was produced.

CHAPTER 111.

Case against the Colonial Office, 1895-1896

1895-1896 where

The fact that the Select Committee of the House of Commons did not honestly investigate the extent of Colonial Office complicity in the Jameson Raid points to there being a genuine necessity to "whitewash" Chamberlain and Sir Hercules Robinson - and, according to Sir Graham Bower, there was such a necessity for both the Colonial Secretary and his Chief representative at the Cape were fully aware of what Rhodes was up to.

Bower does not draw any clear distinction between the two aspects of the plot; viz the stationing of the force at Pitsani - and the instigation of a revolt on the Rand. He assumes that those who possessed foreknowledge of Rhodes' plans knew, not only of his intention that the force, on the Transvaal border, should ensure a successful Uitlander revolt, but also of his close association with the Reform Committee which was organising that revolt.

By the end of October 1895, the Jameson Raid conspiracy was well under way. At the end of May, Beit had come out from England and Rhodes had discussed with him ways and means ¹ - whereupon Beit departed for the Rand and communed with Phillips, Leonard and the other members of the Reform Committee ². Jameson, meanwhile, was ³ organising a Volunteer Corps in Rhodesia. On the return of Beit to the Cape, Rhodes and he brooded upon their scheme and, on July 14th, he returned to England. ⁴

1. Br. Sel. Com. Rep.
2. Br. Sel. Com. Rep.
3. ~~Home~~ Com. Rep.
4. Br. Sel. Com. Rep.

Beit: 8957 ff., 8964
Beit: 8965 - 8972
44 ff.
Beit: 8979

On July 27th - less than a month after the Unionist Government had been installed - Harris arrived in London to secure from Chamberlain the fulfillment of Lord Ripon's promise to transfer the Bechuanaland Protectorate to the rule of the B.S.A. Company. This would not only enable the railway to be extended Northwards from Mafeking, but would give Rhodes a base on the Transvaal border; moreover, the withdrawal of Imperial control from Bechuanaland would mean the disbanding of the Bechuanaland Border Police who would be welcome recruits to Jameson's force.

About the 16th or 17th of October - Rhodes, Phillips, Hammond, Frank Rhodes (who, on the great day at the rising, was to be Office Commanding the Uitlanders) and Leonard met at Groote Schuur. It was agreed that, at some convenient date, the Uitlanders would revolt, seize the Pretoria arsenal and the ammunitions from there; then retire upon Johannesburg and hold the town. Jameson would be on the border with a force and, upon the outbreak of the revolt, would, march in to assist the Uitlanders against the Boers; while the High Commissioner, as soon as the worst of the shooting was over, would depart for Pretoria to act as mediator.

It was at this stage that Rhodes confided in Bower, not

5. Headlam	-	558 - 559
Hule	-	36 - 37
6. Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Leonard: 7989 - 7991; 7998
Fitzpatrick	-	Phillips: 7314 - 7318.
		97

the details of the conspiracy, but its most important features.

One morning - fairly late in October - he came into Bower's office and told him that, he was arranging for a force on the Transvaal border in readiness for the anticipated Uitlander revolt. He assured Bower that Chamberlain knew of his plans.⁷

Bower realised to just what extent Rhodes - the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony - was compromising his position; his "connection with the Uitlander rising was so obvious". But "with Chamberlain at his back I could not oppose him I felt, however, that Rhodes must tell the High Commissioner, confidentially."⁸

Rhodes did not require much persuasion, the High Commissioner, in the role of mediator, was such an integral part of the plot that it was hardly practical not to confide in him; in fact, Frank Rhodes had refused to leave for Johannesburg, until Sir Hercules had been told.⁹

Bower "conducted Rhodes to the High Commissioner's office and left the two men alone together."¹⁰

The High Commissioner did not, however, discuss this conversation with his Imperial Secretary and, on the following day, when Bower began to discuss generally the trouble on the Rand, he was cut

7	Bower	-	208
8	Bower	-	208 - 209
9	Bower Letters	-	"Apologia" to Omanney ; 32
	Headlam	-	560
10	Bower	-	209

short with the remark "The less you and I have to do with these damned conspiracies of Rhodes and Chamberlain the better."¹¹

According to Rhodes his attitude on the previous day, had been the same. "After I had told him everything, the only questions he put to me were "Is Beit in it?" and "Have you told Bower?" He then said "I dont want to hear anything more about it.""

Dec. 11th 1905 In a letter written from Mauritius to Sir Montague O'Malley - Permanent Under-Secretary for the Colonies - Bower says that Lionel Phillips, Jameson and Beit discussed their plans with the High Commissioner.¹³ All three certainly had ample opportunity for doing so. Phillips was in Cape Town, during the latter part of October, and, at least during part of November;¹⁴ Jameson spent most of November in Cape Town,¹⁵ while Beit arrived from England, on December 17th¹⁶, and was staying at Groote Schuur, when the Raid took place.

In the Reminiscences, Bower confirms that Sir Hercules saw Phillips and Jameson, in November.

"Sir Hercules told me 'Phillips says they are getting plenty of arms, but he had better not tell me how they are coming in.'

Jameson years afterward told me that, in his interview with Sir Hercules, he took care to satisfy himself that the High Commissioner knew everything."¹⁷

Bower did not, however, at any time prior to the Raid, discuss

11	Bower	-		210
12	Bower	-		340
13	Bower Letters	-	11.12.'05 - Bower to Sir Montague O'Malley.	
14	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Phillips	6999 - 7004
15	Cape Com. Rep.	-		pages xii - xiii
16	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Beit	9093
17	Bower	-		214 - 215

the conspiracy with the High Commissioner; for he knew that Rhodes himself had told Sir Hercules everything and that, while the High Commissioner's conscience would permit him to accept information from Rhodes as 'private and confidential', information from Bower would have to be regarded as 'official'¹⁸

But what concerns us is that, from the start, Bower did not feel unduly ~~convinced~~ about Rhodes' confidence, because Rhodes had also confided in his chief - the High Commissioner - and, moreover, that both Sir Hercules and Bower had been assured by Rhodes that Chamberlain knew and approved of his plans.

In order to find out upon what grounds Rhodes based this assertion, it is necessary to examine, in some detail, the successive stages of Harris' negotiations for the incorporation of Bechuanaland Protectorate within Charterland.

Chamberlain's biographer - J.L. Garvin notes that Harris took part in discussions in the Colonial Secretary's office, on four different occasions - August 1st, August 20th, September 5th and November 6th.¹⁹

On August 1st, Harris was introduced to Chamberlain by Earl Grey; Lord Selborne, Sir Robert Meade and Mr. Fairfield were also present.²⁰

Harris, in his evidence before the Select Committee, stated "At that interview, I entered necessarily at great length into all the questions of the late Governments promise, of Khama's opposition, the necessity for the railway and other matters

18	Bower	-	217
19	Garvin	-	36
20	Garvin	-	37

pertinent to the transfer; Mr Chamberlain expressed a keen interest in the policy of railway extension, but regretted his inability to consider the question of an immediate transfer of the Protectorate. In addition to these complex and intricate questions, it was present to my mind that, in the event of a rising at Johannesburg, Mr Rhodes wished to be in a position to render assistance with the police forces of the B.S.A. Company should certain eventualities arise. I made no explicit statement to that effect, but I referred to the unrest at Johannesburg and added a guarded allusion to the desirability of there being a police force near the border. Mr Chamberlain at once demurred to the turn the conversion had taken." ²¹

Nevertheless, before Chamberlain "demurred" the "guarded allusion" had been made.

Immediately after Harris' statement Chamberlain testified that "if such an allusion was made, I did not understand it, at all events as referring to anything which has subsequently taken place"; ²² in other words he did not "understand" it was "referring" to Jameson's raid. But Harris' attempted disclosure had absolutely no bearing upon an unprovoked incursion into the Transvaal.....what he was trying to do was to give the Colonial Secretary some inkling of Rhodes' plans to secure a successful Uitlander revolt; ^{of} which plans Chamberlain's friend Lord Grey was already aware.

18th May, 1897 On his third appearance, in the witness box, in reply to a question of Blake, Harris defined his "guarded allusion" as

a statement to the effect that "we shall be on the border; and and if a rising takes place, in Johannesburg, of course we should not stand by and see them tightly pressed." - but he accepted that his words either had not been heard by the Colonial Secretary or else had conveyed absolutely nothing.

Nevertheless these words of Harris were far too explicit for the Colonial Secretary's taste and, on the second of his two brief appearances in the witness box, he declared "I am convinced that Dr Harris is mistaken in supposing that he used the words which he suggested or gave to Mr Blake in that answer. And I would point out to the Committee that that would not have been a guarded allusion at all....."

In any case, I certainly never had any allusion of a definite kind which could have aroused my suspicions."

But, whatever the evidence given upon this interview almost two years after it occurred, on the day following the interview, Harris stated in a cable to Rhodes:-

.....we, decided therefore to inform Secretary of State for colonies guardedly reason why we wished to have base at Gaborones and advisable our presence in Protectorate. Secretary of State for Colonies heartily in sympathy with C.O. Rhodes' policy.

1st June 1897

2nd Aug. 1897

23. Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Harris	8506 - 8511
24. Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Chamberlain	- 9557
25. Garvin	-		- 110

This is one of the cables which the Committee of Enquiry did not insist upon examining. According to Garvin who seems to have had access to all the Chamberlain Papers, there were seven of these "missing cables"; he quotes - not the cables themselves which ²⁶unfortunate - but excerpts from them and notes made of them, while the dossier was at the Colonial Office. ²⁷The existence at this data, is particularly interesting in view of Chamberlain's complete inability, at the Enquiry, to give a definite answer upon the subject matter of the "missing" cables. ²⁸

On August 13th 1895 Harris sent off to Rhodes the second of the "missing" cables:-

Chamberlain will do anything to assist except hand over to the administration Protectorate provided he officially does not know of your plan. He does consider Rhodes' ingenuity resource can overcome any difficulty caused by refusal Protectorate now.

Chamberlain's diffidence regarding the transfer of the Protectorates is understandable in view of the prominence given in the Press to the three chiefs - Khama, Sebele, Bathoen - who, under the guidance of two missionaries, were on their way to England to protest against the encroachment of the Chartered Company on Bechuana territory. ³⁰

There is no available account of Harris' visits to the

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26. Garvin - Life of Joseph Chamberlain (1934) Vol. 1. Preface.
27. Garvin - 110
28. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - Chamberlain - 9569
29. Garvin - 110
30. Hole - 51,- 54; 63

Colonial Office on August 20th and on September 5th. However, a cable to Rhodes of August 21st ("missing" cable number three) contained this sentence:-³¹

You are aware Chamberlain states Dr. Jameson's plan must not be mentioned to him.

while, on September 6th, he considered himself justified in going up to Scotland for a month.³²

Sept, 1895
Five days later, Chamberlain had changed his mind as to the fate of the Protectorate, because he suggested to Chiefs Khama, Sebele and Bathoen that they come to terms with the Board of the B.S.A. Company to whom the Protectorate - apart from the necessary native reserves - would be handled over.³³

The Colonial Secretary spent the following seven weeks, on the Continent, from where, he granted to the Chartered Company administrative rights over a small strip of territory - North of Mafeking and suitable as jumping -off ground - which had been ceded to Rhodes by the Chiefs Ikaaning and Montsioa - two Bechuana chiefs who had not accompanied the deputation to England.³⁴

On October 19th, 1895, orders were issued to detachments of the Rhodesian Police to move down from Bulawayo to Pitsani.³⁵ If this date given by Hule is accurate, then it was probably on

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|-----|------------------------|--------------------|--------|
| 31. | Garvin | - | 110 |
| 32. | Garvin | - | 40 |
| 33. | Blue Book C 7962, 1896 | - Nos. 21, 22, 26. | |
| | Br. Sel. Com. Rep | - Chamberlain 6223 | |
| 34. | Blue Book C 7962, 1896 | - No. 32 | |
| | Blue Book C 7962, 1896 | - No. 24 enclosure | No. 2. |

October 18th that Rhodes made his disclosures to Bower. For, on the following day, after Sir Hercules had refused to discuss with Bower "these damned conspiracies of Rhodes and Chamberlain" he authorised him to allow "the troops to move down from Bulawayo." To further corroborate this date there is the fact the Frank Rhodes - who had made his departure for the Rand contingent upon the High Commissioner being informed of this plot - left for Johannesburg on October 20th 1895.

36

37

The crisis caused by President Kruger's proclamation closing the Vaal River drifts against overseas goods, imported through the Cape Colony, at the end of October. *brought Chamberlain hurrying back from Spain*

Then followed a spate of telegrams from Harris to Rhodes with reference to the transfer of the Protectorate. On November 2nd, Harris cabled:-

38

Confidential. Early Grey held an interview with J. Chamberlain. We have seen Native chiefs; decline our proposal but we hope they will make counter proposal. J. Chamberlain will put pressure upon them to settle.

39

Two days later he sent this bulletin:-
J. Chamberlain he does not return to London until tomorrow.

ov
5

4 Nov,
1895

35. Hale	-	64
36. Bower	-	210
37. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Frank Rhodes 5102
38. Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Appendix 14 lll No. 2.
39. Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Appendix 14 lll No. 7

I have spoken openly to E. Fairfield and I have accepted, if Colonial Office will transfer to us balance Protectorate with Police 7th November we will agree to any liberal police reserves to native chiefs.....

As regards the date mentioned by Harris-November 7th - Rhodes appears to have stressed that November 7th was to be the latest date for the acquisition of the Police.⁴⁰

When Labouchere has trying to elicit from a very reluctant Harris some details of his "open" conversation with Fairfield, Chamberlain signified that he wished to read a letter from Fairfield, written to him, at Birmingham, immediately after the⁴¹ conversation had taken place.

Fairfield to Chamberlain - November 4th - You will see that events are moving rapidly in South Africa - Rhodes, having accepted the responsibilities imposed on him, is naturally very keen to get the Protectorate question settled and had been telegraphing all day to this end.....Rhodes wants you then to authorise the Bechuanaland Border Police to enlist with the Company.....Rhodes.....wants to get our people off the scene as this ugly row is pending with the Transvaal. That I think is also our interest.....I do, not think there can be any doubt but that the Transvaal will

40. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - Harris 8520 ff
41. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - pages 448 - 449

give way on the immediate question of the drifts, but that will not end the political "unrest."

1 May
397

Chamberlain, when reading this letter, at the Enquiry, interpreted the "ugly row" as the dispute with Kruger over the closing of the drifts; but Fairfield apparently considers that the Transvaal will give way on the drifts question, so the words "ugly row" and "unrest" must refer to some other contingency. Moreover, why should Imperial troops be hurried off the scene, unless events connected with the ugly row are likely to compromise Her Majesty's Government. The drift crisis could result only in an official war; in which case the removal of Imperial Troops would be to the reverse of "our interest."

Harris, moreover, when questioned upon this letter proved rather unco-operative. He had spoken "more openly" to Fairfield than the letter implied, in fact he had "mentioned" to him that "one of the reasons why Mr Rhodes was anxious to get the Protectorate was that he considered it imperative to have a British force, on the borders, so that, in the event of disturbances taking place at Johannesburg, he could be in a position, if he deemed it right, to use that force in connection with it."⁴²

It is perfectly true, as Labouchere's draft report points out, that, in his letter, Fairfield does not state that Harris made such a communication to him; but what are the "responsibilities" accepted by Rhodes? R.I. Lovell in his book "The Struggle for

South Africa" - considers that the "responsibilities" are those⁴³ accepted by Rhodes in connection with the drifts ultimatum. But, then again, what have such responsibilities to do with getting the Protectorate question settled? It seems more logical that the responsibilities are connected with the "ugly row" - with the "political unrest" which is moving rapidly to a climax; but we still have no indication as to the nature of the responsibilities, except that they involve an immediate settlement of the Protectorate question. Of course, if this letter had been any more explicit Chamberlain is hardly likely to have produced it, at the Enquiry.

There is another interesting communication dated November 4th -⁴⁴
the cable from Harris to Rhodes ending:-

..... I have already sent Flora to convince J. Chamberlain support Times newspaper and, if you can telegraph course you wish Times to adopt now with regard to Transvaal, Flora will act.

At the Enquiry, Labouchere suggested to Harris that he render this cable slightly more intelligible: Harris:- "Provided the settlement was a fair one in Miss Shaw's opinion she would support the policy of the Protectorate being handed over to the Chartered⁴⁵ Company."

This is his explanation of the first part of the sentence;

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43. R.I. Lovell - The Struggle for South Africa - 1875 - 1899
(1934) : 324 - 325
44. Br. Sel. Com. Rep. - Appendix 14 111 : No. 6
45. Br. Sel. Com. Rep. - 1 Harris : 8606

as regards the second part, he had previously stated in reply to a question of Harcourt, that it referred to the drifts question:- "It was known that the Transvaal was acting in a way very hostile to British interests. Miss Shaw wished for accurate information in order that she might support British and Colonial interests."⁴⁶

Neither of these explanations of Harris is very convincing, Chamberlain had decided, before going abroad to hand over the Protectorate to the Chartered Company; it only remained to hurry up the actual transfer. So Flora Shaw was convincing the Colonial Secretary (of) support (of) Times newspaper at a rather late stage of the Protectorate negotiations.

It was also a little late to be asking for information on the drifts question; for the previous day (November 3rd), Sir Hercules Robinson had telegraphed to Pretoria Chamberlain's ultimatum "that the recent action of the South African Republic is a breach of Article XIII of the London Convention"; and Kruger⁴⁷ was about to re-open the drifts.

However, this is the first indication of the possible role of Flora Shaw - that of intermediary between the Colonial Office and the conspirators. Although, when questioned upon this cable, she implied to the committee that it would have been entirely beneath her dignity to assist Harris in his dealings with the Colonial Office.⁴⁸

Miss Shaw was, of course, fully aware of the "Jameson plan",

46. Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Harris: 8302
47. Garvin	-	42 - 42
48. Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Shaw: 8819

at the beginning of November 1895. At this point, it is of interest to note that she told the Committee that all she understood by the "Jameson plan" was that Dr Jameson would have a force ready which could be called upon by the High Commissioner, in case he had to interfere in the quarrel between the Uitlanders and the Boers; but that Garvin quotes a conversation with Miss Shaw in which she gives the following version of Harris' confidence:- "The trouble in Johannesburg must break out; we must be ready to go in to the help of the Uitlanders, if need be."

Miss Shaw is mentioned ^{again} in a cable ^{of} November 5th:-

Harris to Rhodes - We have seen E. Fairfield, Hon. R.H. Meade, Colonel Gould Adams⁵³ and we have agreed to what land we give native chiefs. Secretary of State for Colonies holds an interview with us tomorrow.....native chiefs they will be present and, if they are satisfied, Secretary of State for Colonies he will grant B.S.A. Company balance Protectorate with police. We reported your letter to A. Beit during August to these and Flora. We have these solved.

Harris stated before the Committee, that the letter from Rhodes to Beit during August dealt solely with Rhodes' views regarding the Protectorate; Fairfield, Gould-Adams and Flora Shaw were told the gist of the letter, and he was under impression

49. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - Harris: 8581-8583
 50. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - Shaw: 8875 - 8876
 51. Garvin - 82 - 83
 52. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - Appendix 14 lll: No. 8
 53. Gould-Adams had been O.C. the Bech. Border Police during Matabele War of 1893. See Cambridge History of Brit. Empire Vol 8, 537 - 8

that Sir Robert Meade had also been informed, but this was
not the case.⁵⁴

Though why, on the day before the Protectorate was due,
to be handed over it should be necessary for "we" i.e. Harris,
Beit, Maguire and possibly Hawksley to assure Rhodes of the⁵⁵
"solid" support of Flora Shaw, Gould-Adams and Fairfield in
connection with the transfer of the Protectorate, it is
difficult to understand. Moreover, as Labouchere was careful
to point out at least one of the three, viz Miss Shaw, presumeably,
knew all about Rhodes' plot.⁵⁶

On November 6th, Harris was present at the Colonial Office,
when the final settlement was made between the Bechuana chiefs
and the Chartered Company, all territory to the East of the
proposed railway line being handed over to the Company.⁵⁷ The
following day, Sir Hercules Robinson was informed of the transfer
and authorised to allow the Bechuanaland Border Police to enrol⁵⁸
in the service of the B.S.A. Company.

But the Colonial-Secretary had struck a fairly hard bargain,
for the Chartered Company forfeited the £200,000 promised by the
Liberal Government as a subsidy for the railway, and Harris had
to concede very large tracts of land as native reserves.

Rhodes was not pleased with the boundary lines drawn by
Chamberlain:-

54.	Br. Sel. Com. Repv	-	Harris: 8221
55.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Harris: 8240 - 8241; 8257
56.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Harris: 8624
57.	Garvin	-	: 50
	Hole	-	: 65 - 67
58.	Blue Book C 7962, 1896	-	No. 36

November 12th Rhodes to Harris - It is humiliating to be utterly beaten by these niggers.

November 15th Rhodes to Harris - Settlement is a scandal.⁵⁹

rch 5ⁿ 1897 In his examination of Rhodes before the Committee of Enquiry, Chamberlain led him over all the details of finance connected with the session of the Bechuanaland Protectorate - to justify, on the score of the excellent bargain he had made, his entrusting a commercial Company with the responsibilities of maintaining the frontier against an independent State - a state, moreover, with whom Great Britain had a few days previously, been on the verge of war.⁶⁰

Rhodes admitted that the Colonial Office had saved the cost of the Border Police amounting to nearly £60,000 per year:-

Chamberlain thereupon asked "We also saved did we not..... a sum of £200,000 which he had been promised you by my predecessor as a subsidy to the railway?"

Rhodes: "Yes, you made a most excellent bargain."

Chamberlain: "And perhaps you were the more ready to make a good bargain because you had some other views?"⁶¹

Rhodes: "I am afraid you took advantage, of them."

W.T. Stead considers this Rhodes' one lapse, during his five and half days before the Committee; for how could

59. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - Appendix 14 lll No. 17 and 20
60. Hole 66
61. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - RHodes: 2046 - 2048

Chamberlain have taken advantage of those "other views" of Rhodes, if he had been unaware of them.
62

Bower records the arrival, late in October, or early in November ~~of~~ the first communication between Chamberlain and Sir Hercules concerning a possible revolt on the Rand:- "a fairly long private letter" written from San Sebastian in Spain asking for an expression of Sir Hercules' views on arising at Johannesburg. "with or without assistance from outside"
63

The High Commissioner asked Bower to draw up a memorandum upon which to base a suitable answer. This was not the first time that Bower had been asked to draw up a memorandum on the Uitlander situation. When in England in January, 1895, he had warned Fairfield and Meade of the extreme probability of a rising on the Rand and at Fairfield's request had written down, his views on the matter.
64
Hence his memorandum for Sir Hercules was practically a repetition of the one written in Fairfield's room.

It stated "that a rising was probable; that I thought it would be prejudicial to British interests, if a cosmopolitan republic were formed; and that nine out of ten of the Johannesburgers would be against the British Flag or anything that would bring them under the hated rule of the Colonial Office. I also referred to the High Commissioner ordering a cessation of hostilities

62.	W.T. Stead	-	Joseph Chamberlain: Conspirator or Statesman?
63.	Bower	-	211
64.	Bower	-	194 - 195

and going up as arbitrator."

Sir Hercules discussed Chamberlains letter and Bower's memorandum with Rhodes." "The result of this discussion with Rhodes was that amendments were made in my proposal reply. I do not remember then all, but their tendency was to make things more explicit and less vague." Bower recollects that "it was stated that the High Commissioner would do his best for the British flag, but had not much hope of success..... it was proposed also to hold a plebiscite by order of the High Commissioner for the election of a Transvaal constituent assembly." 65

Bower's version of the reply to Chamberlain is wholly corroborated by the actual State Paper "from the High Commissioner to the Colonial Secretary" which is quoted in full by Garvin who wonders whether the document, in the High Commissioner's name, "was not drafted by his able Secretary Sir Graham Bower." 66

Rhodes was in agreement with the opinions embodied in the State Paper to Chamberlain. He knew that among the Uitlanders there was a marked lack of appreciation of the Colonial Office; moreover his most immediate ambition - a loose economic federation among the South African States.- 67 was dependant upon the overthrow of Kruger and the elimination of J.B. Robinson; not upon forcing Imperial control on the Johannesburg revolutionaries. Nevertheless, the revolutionary movement, on the Rand, finally collapsed because of a persistent 68

65.	Bower	-	212 - 214
66.	Garvin	-	59 - 62
67.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Phillips 7318 ff
68	Bower	-	232

rumour that Jameson's force - with the full approval of Rhodes -
69
would march in under the Union Jack. What could have been behind
this rumour?

On November 5th - the day before the Protectorate was finally
ceded to the Chartered Company - Harris called Rhodes (this com-
70
munication being number 6 of the "missing" telegrams):

We have stated positive that results Dr. Jameson's plan in-
clude British Flag. Is this correct?

Nov. 6th
895 On the following day Rhodes replied:-
71

As to the English Flag they must very much misunderstand me
at home. I, of course, would not risk everything as I am doing
except for the British Flag.

Sir William Harcourt cross-examined Harris very thoroughly
upon this cable, in order to stress the questionable integrity of
a man who could state that he was risking everything for the Brit-
ish Flag, in spite of a definite undertaking with the Reform Com-
72
mittee that the revolt would take place under the Union Jack. But
no attempt was made to find out from Harris whom, in England,
Rhodes had been assuring that "he would not risk everything, except
for the British Flag."

Nov. 26th
95 Three days before leaving on his return voyage to the Cape,

69	Hole	-	124 - 133
	Fitzpatrick	-	101 - 102
70	Garvin	-	111
71	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	- Appendix 14 - 111	No. 9
		Harris - 8319 ff.	
72	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	- Frank Rhodes - 5335 ff.	
		Leonard - 7998 ff.	
		Phillips - 6828 ff.	

Harris cabled Rhodes, very agitatedly:-

..... from information received know there is great danger Phillips Leonard they can or may be doing business without assistance from B.S.A. Company and also indepently British Flag. It would have serious effect on your position here. I say this confidential.⁷³

To what extent this cable was motivated by Harris' concern about the price of his Chartered shares, it is impossible to say; but he is very definite that to act independently of the British Flag, would seriously impair Rhodes' position in England. Someone, with great influence, might not merely withdraw his support, but might actually thwart Rhodes 'coup d'emain' - and it is difficult to see whom - bar Chamberlain - could have been sufficiently powerful to do this.

Moreover, according to Bower, the view expressed in Sir Hercules' State Paper "that nine out of ten Englishmen" were not in favour of the British Flag, did not make much impression on the Colonial Secretary. For, on December 6th, ^acypher telegram was received from Chamberlain - marked private and personal - which approved of the High Commissioner's proposals as contained in the State Paper "but went on to say that, if the Johannesburgers would

agree to accept the British Flag, they would be allowed to elect their own Governor."⁷⁴

In the light of the Colonial Secretary's insistence upon a Union Jack, Bower makes an interesting comment:- "Shipping returns for Cape Town showed, during the latter part of 1895, an excess of 1,100 of arrivals over departures. Furthermore, ships were also arriving, once a month, at Durban from Australia bringing each 500 Australians - almost all Socialists."⁷⁵

Dec. 3rd 1895 Three days before the arrival of Chamberlain's cypher telegram to Sir Hercules, Jameson, while at Mafeking arranging the details of the transfer of the Bechuanaland Police, had told F.J. Newton - the newly-appointed Resident Commissioner of what remained of the Protectorate - his real reason for enduring the fly-ridden heat of Pitsani.⁷⁶ This secret must have weighed heavily, for Newton seized the first opportunity of going down to Cape Town to lay matters before the High Commissioner. Bower explained to Sir Hercules the cause of Newton's anxiety, but the interview was refused: "The whole thing is piracy; I know nothing about it; I won't see Newton."⁷⁷

Dec. 1895 Bower then asked Rhodes to allay Newton's fears - which he did. Moreover, Gould-Adams had just arrived back from England and Bower states that "Newton also saw Gould-Adams who had seen

74	Bower	-	220
75	Bower	-	219
76	Hale	-	103 - 105
77	Bower	-	227 - 228

Mr. Fairfield in London and discussed the whole thing with him." ⁷⁸

This statement of Bower surely implies some communication between Gould-Adams and Harris with regard to the "Jameson plan"; yet Harris declared upon oath that "Colonel Gould-Adams had no information from me with regard to any matter connected with the Enquiry, except the details of the transfer of the Protectorate." ⁷⁹

When giving evidence before the House of Commons Committee, Bower described his interview with Rhodes regarding Newton, but carefully omitted its more interesting aspects; ⁸⁰ for this interview had occasioned a fresh burst of confidence from Rhodes: "He showed me a telegram he had had from Lord Grey and Mr Maguire. The telegram reported an interview with Fairfield telling them to hurry up on account of approaching trouble with Venezuela. He also showed me a letter from Miss Shaw telling him that all the leaders were with him." Rhodes also informed Bower that "Chamberlain had told him he was to postpone his 'fireworks' ⁸¹ until at least a fortnight after the transfer of the Crown Colony."

Bower insisted that Rhodes show the Grey-Maguire telegram to Sir Hercules; and Rhodes did so, for, on the following day, ^{hand} Bower saw him/the High Commissioner a 'flimsy piece of paper' which he felt positive was the Grey-Maguire ⁸² communication

Regarding the communications from his agents which Rhodes discussed with Bower — the Grey-Maguire telegram was not

78.	Bower	-		239	
79.	Br. Sel. Com Rep	-	Harris	8222	
80.	Br. Sel. Com Rep	-	Bower	2639	ff
81.	Bower	-		231	- 232
82.	Bower	-	231;	234	- 235

produced, at the Enquiry, - nor has it been published since, but
 Garvin admits that it was sent off on December 20th, ⁸³ There are
 two very similar cables from Flora Shaw which conform to
 Bower's discription - one of the 12th December and one of
 the 17th December. Not only do these indicate the approval of
 the Colonial Office, but they contain a definite warning not to
 delay. ⁸⁴ The cable containing the message from Chamberlain is the
 last of the "missing" series and was sent off by Harris on
 November 7th ⁸⁵ - (the day after the Protectorate had been handed
 over):-

"Secretary of Colonies says you must allow decent interval
 and delay fireworks for a fortnight.

For Harris, a fairly explicit cable and one which would
 have created a most delicate situation if produced, at the Enquiry.

However, Bower's statements are best supplemented by
 taking events and communications in their proper sequence, bearing
 in mind, when examining the evidence, that Miss Shaw stated
 at the Enquiry, that she did not know that Rhodes was taking an
 active part in the Uitlander movement; ⁸⁶ and that Chamberlain, in
 his despatch of 4th February 1896, stated that "in the long run
 the opinion had gained ground that the Uitlanders did not mean
 to risk a collision with the government." ⁸⁷

83.	Garvin	-	73 - 74
84.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Appendix 16 Nos. 164 - 106
85.	Garvin	-	111
86.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Shaw 9726
87.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Beit 9013

First, in the chain of evidence, is a cable of December 12th from Flora Shaw to Rhodes:-
88

Delay dangerous; sympathy now complete; but will depend very much upon action before European Powers given time (to) enter a protest which as European situation considered serious might paralyse government.

The European situation does not appear to have been particularly dangerous on December 12th, 1895; for Miss Shaw, in her evidence, merely stated that, when she sent that particular cable "things on the continent looked uncomfortable."
89

However, the exigencies of the New Imperialism were inevitably incompatible with sustained Anglo-French/cordiality and, it should also be noted that, at this time, there was increasing friction between England and America owing to the Venezuela - British Guiana boundary dispute.
91

Miss Shaw, when examined on this cable, was very voluble indeed; the following being a fair example "I meant the sympathy here was, I thought, complete with the grievances of the Johannesburgers; that is to say the I though it was understood that they really were suffering very considerable grievance and that there would be a sympathy with the English movement in Johannesburg."
92

88.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Appendix 16 No. 164
89.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Shaw 9655
90.	Cooke and Stickney - Readings in European International Relations (1931) 32, 34, 36.	-	
91.	Garvin	-	65 - 66
92.	Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Shaw 9633

The Committee was, however, most forbearing and eventually its patience was rewarded by the assurance that the views expressed in the cable were entirely her own: "I never at anytime gave the Colonial Office any intimation about the plan and I never, at any-time, received from the Colonial Office any intimation about the plan."⁹³

It was, of course, due to this cable of Miss Shaw that Jameson's urgent message to Rhodes of December 12th, 1895!⁹⁴—

.....let J.H. Hammond inform weak partners more delay more danger

Was relayed to Frank Rhodes with the addition :-⁹⁵

.....the London Times also cabled confidentially to effect that postponement of meeting would be a most unwise course.

On December 9th, Chamberlain had gone up to Birmingham, but his under-secretaries kept him well posted. On the 16th, Meade wrote concerning an interview between Flora Shaw and Dr. Leyds who had since left for the Continent; while Fairfield who had been sounding Rochfort Maguire reported that nothing would occur in Johannesburg

93 Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Shaw	: 9638
94 Cape Com. Rep.	-	Appendix A No.	49
95 Cape Com. Rep.	-	Appendix A.No.	52

before the New Year but "Maguire will know more in a few days and will see me again.....!"

Dr. Harris will be at the Cape tomorrow or the next day and developments of the situation are likely to follow." ⁹⁶

Dec. 1895 The following day, Flora Shaw cabled Rhodes:- ⁹⁷

Held an interview with Secretary Transvaal, left here Saturday for Hague, Berlin, Paris; fear in negotiations with these parties. Chamberlain sound in case of interference European Powers, but have special reason to believe wishes you must do it immediately.

In reply to the Hon. W.L. Jackson's tactful questioning, Miss Shaw explained that the reference, in the cable, to the Colonial Secretary had been considered "desirable", because, when Chamberlain took office, it had been suggested he was a little ⁹⁸ Englander. But she did not explain the connection between Chamberlain's potentialities as an Empire-builder and Dr. Leyds' negotiations on the Continent.

Regarding the last twelve words of the cable, Miss Shaw stated that "One of the under-secretaries - Mr. Fairfield - in the course of a hypothetical conversation had said 'Well, if the Johannesburgers are going to rise, it is hoped they will do so soon'....."

96	Garwin	-	69 - 71
97	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Appendix 16 No. 106
98	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Shaw : 9646

and I, having the special knowledge in my own mind that the rising was going to take place, felt that it gave me right to say to them that I believed that they had better do it, immediately." ⁹⁹

The Committee accepted unreservedly, that Fairfield's conversation with Miss Shaw had been just idle chatter. But, his purely hypothetical interest in the Uitlander unrest is hardly compatible with his close association with Rhodes' agent Maguire.

ec. On Wednesday, December 18th, came the publication of President Cleveland's announcement that the United States had constituted herself the well-armed arbiter of the boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana. ¹⁰⁰

Whereupon Meade wrote to his chief:- ¹⁰¹

I propose to hold over the telegram to Robinson as to Dr. Leyds's supposed intrigues, till I hear again from you, as, when you directed it to be sent, you had not seen President Cleveland's message. Perhaps as we shall have to face German opposition you may wish the Uitlander movement to be postponed for a year or so. Fairfield thinks he could get this done through Maguire, without compromising you. He thinks there are not many of the important men who are heartily in favour of this movement, though, if rushed by Rhodes,

99 Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Shaw : 9652 - 9656
100 Garvin	-	67 - 68
101 Garvin	-	71

they will no doubt join actively.

102

Chamberlain replied the same day:-

.....It must be noted that the American affair cannot become serious for some time.....
Now, as to the Transvaal, might it not come off just as the critical time, if it is postponed now? The longer it is delayed the more chance there is of foreign intervention.....

It seems to me that either it should come at once or be postponed for a year or two at least.....
if Fairfield can make the situation clear to Maguire I should like him to do so; then the responsibility must rest with Rhodes and we had better abstain even from giving advice.

cc Fairfield saw Maguire and learnt that, according to recent bulletins from South Africa "Johannesburg would begin to move in about ten days. It is now too late to deter action for a year." So he told Rhodes' agent that the sooner the revolt took place the better.

103

The cable from Maguire and Grey arrived at Groote Schuur late on December 20th. Beit was staying with Rhodes, having

102. Garvin	-	72
103. Garvin	-	73

There is an interesting postscript to this letter from Fairfield to Chamberlain "Maguire says that South African values have now reached a (downward) point at which it is thought by the best authorities in this City that the news of a row can have no other than a favourable effect."

arrived at the Cape, together with Harris, three days previously.

Dec, On December 21st Jameson received this heartening message from
5 104
Harris:-

A. Beit has telegraphed Lionel Phillips urging instant flotation new Company. I have telegraphed also Col. F.W. Rhodes same effect.....

Bower strongly disapproved of this importunity, particularly as the warning enthusiasm of the Uitlanders was becoming apparent even to Rhodes. "I told Rhodes 'We are weakening our future position by hurrying them now. We are making ourselves partisans not arbitrators' Rhodes became angry and said I was disloyal to my chief Chamberlain who was hurrying him up."
105

An indication of wavering purpose is the cable from Frank Rhodes requiring assurance from his brother that the "Chairman" would "accompany him on day of flotation."
106 Bower makes no mention of this cable, but it was established at the Enquiry that the word "Chairman" referred to the High Commissioner, though both Rhodes and Beit stated in evidence that the necessary assurances had been sent to the Reform Committee without first consulting Sir Hercules,
108 been However, it has been seen from the Reminiscences that Sir Hercules was as much in Rhodes' confidence as Bower was

104. Cape. Com. Rep	-	Appendix A: No. 66
105. Bower	-	232 - 233
106. Cape, Com. Rep	-	Appendix A. No. 64
107. Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Rhodes: 252

108. Br. Sel. Com. Rep	-	Rhodes: 267 Beit 9102 - 9107
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and also that he was in communication with Chamberlain as to his course of action in the event of an Uitlander rising "with or without assistance from outside." — the correspondence, the existence of which was suggested, in the letter to Fairfield, which Hawksley read at the Enquiry:-
109

You know and I do not what has passed between the High Commissioner or his Secretary and the Colonial Office.

Dec,
5 Bower records the arrival of further instructions to Sir Hercules from Chamberlain in a cypher telegram which arrived late on Thursday December 26th — by which time Leonard and Hamilton were well on their way to Cape Town to postpone the revolution indefinitely and Heany and Holden were hurrying to Jameson with the Reform Committee's strict instructions not to budge from Pitsani.
110
111

Bower apparently remembered only the main points of the cable which are as follows:-
112

1. Dr. Leyds had gone to Berlin.
2. 2000 men were being sent to South Africa on the "pretext" of Ashanti.
113

-
- | | | | |
|------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|
| 109. | Br. Sel. Com. Rep | the - | Page 462 |
| 110. | Hamilton was editor of | Johannesburg "Star" the principal | |
| | organ of the Uitlanders. | | |
| 111. | Hole | - | Pages 132 - 135 |
| 112. | Bower | - | 240 - 241 |
| 113. | Ashanti being on the Gold Coast. | | |

117

That same day Harris cabled Jameson:-

Lionel Phillips telegraphed to A. Beit the following message - it is absolutely necessary to delay floating, if foreign subscribers insist on floating without delay anticipate complete failure.

Presumably the phraseology is that of Phillips not Harris; and that when Phillips said "foreign subscribers" he meant "foreign subscribers"; that is supporters outside South Africa, e.g. Maguire or the insistent Miss Shaw who had telegraphed that Chamberlain wished it done immediately. At the Enquiry, Harcourt asked Rhodes whether he thought the "foreign subscribers" might be himself and Beit. Rhodes shrugged his shoulders and said "I should think so" ¹¹⁸

On Sunday December 29th, the High Commissioner informed Chamberlain of the collapse of the Uitlander revolt in a cable which reached him, at Birmingham, towards the evening. ¹¹⁹

But, in certain London circles, Uitlander ineffectuality had been the chief topic of conversation for the previous two days. ¹²⁰

On Friday, December 27th, Harris had cabled Flora Shaw:-

Everything is postponed, until after 6th January. We are ready, but divisions at Johannesburg, and, on the Friday evening,

117	Cape Com. Rep.	-	Appendix A	-	No. 80
118	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Rhodes	-	310 - 312
119	Blue Book C 7933, 1896	-		-	No. 3
120	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Appendix 16	-	No. 914

and, on the Friday evening,

Fairfield had met Hawksley "who said that he and his friends were being much chaffed in the city about the fizzle of their revolution" and who, moreover, "was concerned that Jameson might manipulate a revolution". Fairfield's letter reporting this news to Chamberlain arrived, on Sunday morning. ¹²¹

At 5.30 on the Sunday afternoon the Colonial Secretary called

29th

122

Dec. Sir Hercules Robinson:-

(strictly confidential) It has been suggested, although I do not think it probable, that an endeavour might be made to force matters to a head at Johannesburg by some-one in the service of the Company advancing from the Bechuanaland Protectorate with Police. Were this to be done, I should have to take action under Articles 22 and 8 of the Charter. Therefore, if necessary, remind Rhodes of these articles and that he would not have my support and point out the consequences which would follow.

This cable is No. 2 of Blue Book C7933 and that from the High Commissioner to Chamberlain ~~is~~ above is No. 3. In the same letter to Omanney of 11th December, 1905. Bower refers him to the originals of these cables, as he says the Blue Book versions are rather different. ¹²³

121	Garvin	-	83
122	Blue Book C7933, 1896	-	No. 2
123	Bower Letters	- 11 + 12 : 05 -	Bower to Sir M. Omanney.

At the Enquiry, Chamberlain admitted that his cable warning Sir Hercules that, in the event, of an unprovoked incursion into the Transvaal, Rhodes need expect no support had been occasioned by certain forebodings of Fairfield. But he ascribed these to an article in - of all things - a financial newspaper.¹²⁴

It would naturally have been rather unwise to state the true source of Fairfield's information; for the less that was revealed, at the Enquiry, of the constant communication, during the weeks prior to the Raid, between the Colonial office and Maguire and Hawksley — the better.

Maguire, it should be noted, told the Committee that "he was not kept informed" ^p of events in South Africa.¹²⁵ But as has been seen from the letters between Fairfield and Meade and Chamberlain, he was kept very well informed either through direct communication with Rhodes and the Reform Committee or through cables via the firm of Wehrner Beit.

It was from this firm that Flora Shaw, on the afternoon of Monday, December 30th, heard the news that Jameson had crossed the border. She told the House of Commons Committee that she had reported this information to the Colonial Office, with all possible speed, but was most emphatic that this was the only occasion on which she had conveyed information to the Colonial office about the "Jameson plan".¹²⁶

Meade immediately informed Chamberlain who had telegraphed

124	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Chamberlain	:	9561
125	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Maguire	:	9365
126	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Shaw	:	8878 ff.

127

Sir Hercules:-

Your telegram received, are you sure that Jameson has not moved in consequence of collapse.

Some two hours later, Chamberlain received from Sir Hercules the official intimation of the Jameson Raid.

The High Commissioner had been told ^{of} the inroad by Bower early that morning (30th December) and had apparently received the news quite phlegmatically with the remark: "But perhaps Chamberlain has sent him in - or may approve his going. He is such an extraordinary fellow."
128

Dec.
15

Late on December 31st Miss Shaw received the well-known cable from Rhodes:-
129

Inform Chamberlain that I shall get through all right if he supports me; but he must not send cable like he sent to High Commissioner in South Africa. Today the crux is, I will win and South Africa will belong to England.

Rhodes, when he sent off this cable, had not seen Chamberlain's communication to Sir Hercules of Sunday, December 29th; but Bower had sent a note containing a rather free version of it to Groote Schuur.
130 This is given in the Appendix to Blue Book C8063 of 1896, but not commented upon, in the Reminiscences.

127	Blue Book	C7933, 1896	-	No. 4
128	Bower		-	247 - 248
129	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.		-	Appendix 16 No. 1556
130	Blue Book	C8063, 1896	-	Appendix No. 10

This cable from Rhodes was one of those of whose existence Miss Shaw had completely forgotten, when she first appeared before the Committee of Enquiry. However she, very simply and efficiently, disposed of attempts to question her upon it by stating that, as she was convinced it had originated with Harris, and not with Rhodes, she had completely disregarded it. Harris, of course, had conveniently disappeared and could not be questioned upon this cable.

But, it was obvious that, whatever the outcome of the Raid, Chamberlain could not support Jameson. Earlier on December 31st, he had written to the Prime Minister - Lord Salisbury:-

..... This is a flagrant piece of filibustering for which there is no justification that I can see..... If it were supported by us, it would justify the accusation by Germany and other powers that, having 'first attempted to get up a revolution in a friendly state and having failed, we had then assented to an act of aggression..... It is worth noting that I have no confidence that the force now sent is strong enough to beat the Boers.

In other words, not only did considerations of foreign policy call for repudiation of Jameson, but also considerations based upon an appreciation of Boer prowess in guerilla warfare. Yet,

131 Br. Sel. Com. Rep. - Shaw : 9675; 9743
132 Garvin - 90

at the Enquiry, Chamberlain advanced in his defence that, when the Raid took place, he had denounced it and done what he could to stop it, even though "all the information tendered to us was to the effect that, if we would hold our hand, the Raid would succeed."¹³³

Dec. 5 That same day (December 31st), the Reform Committee, with belated initiative, prepared for a possible Boer attack on Johannesburg;¹³⁴ Bower and Hofmeyr drafted the High Commissioner's proclamation condemning Jameson's action in the name of the Queen¹³⁵ and Rhodes, still bent on doing his best with the wreck of his carefully laid plans, telegraphed Flora Shaw:-¹³⁶

Unless you can make Chamberlain instruct the High Commissioner to proceed at once to Johannesburg, the whole position is lost. High Commissioner would receive splendid reception and still turn position to England's advantage, but must be instructed by cable immediately. The instructions must be specific as he is weak and will take no responsibility.

This is the second of the cables whose existence slipped Miss Shaw's memory. It is interesting that these two cables are the only ones sent her by Rhodes and that they both assume that she is a trusted intermediary between himself and the Colonial office.

133	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Chamberlain :	9559
134	Hole	-		207 ff.
135	Blue Book C8063 , 1896	-	Appendix :	No. 34
136	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Appendix 16 :	No. 1887

When questioned on this communication, Miss Shaw said she had taken no steps whatever upon receiving it, because the Colonial office was already pursuing the course of action advocated by Rhodes.¹³⁷

On January 1st, Chamberlain cabled Sir Hercules Robinson that he should "intimate to Kruger his intention of proceeding to Pretoria as peace-maker"¹³⁸ and the High Commissioner and Bower prepared to leave the following day.

Miss Shaw on January 1st sent a cable to Rhodes, regarding the contents of which she was most vague: "something to the effect that Chamberlain was very angry;" but which cost her £2.15.0.¹³⁹ Furthermore, on Harris' instructions, she published the "letter of invitation" in the New Year's Day issue of the "Times."¹⁴⁰ But, while Jameson's gallent attempt to save the Uitlander women and children was being cheered in the London streets, his column was advancing upon Krugersdorp under the watchful eye of several companies of Boers.

In his discussion of events after the surrender at Doornkop Bower lays further charges against Chamberlain and Sir Hercules Robinson:— both the Colonial Secretary and the High Commissioner were implicated in the Raid plot; yet the former, after attempting unsuccessfully to prevent an Enquiry into the Raid, contrived by careful prearrangement to render it ineffective; while the latter not only took refuge in denial, but adopted the attitude that he had been deceived by those whom he trusted.

137	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Shaw	:	9758
138	Blue Book C7933, 1896	-		:	No. 24
139	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Shaw	:	9618; 9690
140	Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	-	Appendix 16	:	Nos. 1557 & 1687
	Cape Com. Rep.	-	Appendix A	:	Page Liif

The first phase of the Kruger - Chamberlain issue is interpreted by Bower as a determined effort on Chamberlain's part to prevent an investigation into the circumstances of the Raid - and an equally determined effort on the part of Kruger to force an investigation. Biased as this interpretation probably is, it, nevertheless, deserves consideration. For, however importunate the demands for an Enquiry on the part of the Radicals and Liberals in England ¹⁴¹ and the Afrikaner Party in the Cape Colony, ¹⁴² the chief agitator was undoubtedly the Transvaal government, either directly - or indirectly through the money which Dr. Leyds was spending so effectively in Berlin and Paris. ¹⁴³ The Transvaal had the advantage of being the injured party and Kruger, his mind fixed on the abrogation of Clause IV *of* the London Convention, was determined to press that advantage to the utmost, particularly as he himself was pretty well convinced there had been collusion between Rhodes and Chamberlain.

Bower states "Kruger had good reason to believe that Chamberlain was in it and, if he could establish the fact, he could repudiate the Convention and backed by Germany, the Free State and the Cape Dutch challenge England." ¹⁴⁴

It is Bower's opinion that Chamberlain was undecided just how to *lurk* an Enquiry; "whether by promoting a war or in securing a state extreme fraternisation. His ultimata therefore

141 I. Colvin : Life of Jameson (1923) 2 vols. : Vol. 11 161
142 F.W. Reitz : A Century of Wrong (1900) : 47
143 Bower Letters : 11.5.06 : His "apologia" to Omanney : 73-74
144 Cambridge History of British Empire : Vol. VIII : 564-567
Bower : 299

alternated with inquiries after the health of Mrs. Kruger." ¹⁴⁵

The Colonial Secretary's despatches, during the first months of 1896, ~~do not, in fact,~~ present a very co-ordinated policy as regards the Transvaal. He certainly seems eager to keep the Boer-Uitlander quarrel alive. In the very cable deprecating Jameson's actions - his first despatch to Kruger, since the official news of the Raid - he draws attention to the need for Uitlander reform; which is hardly tactful. ¹⁴⁶ However, a few weeks later, we find him ¹⁴⁷ suggesting that Kruger visit England, presumably hoping that, in return for certain concessions - concessions which will not include the abrogation of Clause 1V - the Transvaal President will waive an Enquiry into the Raid.

On January 18th 1896, Chamberlain telegraphed to Sir Hercules ¹⁴⁸ Robinson at Pretoria:-

..... that the majority of the population (of Johannesburg) is composed of Uitlanders and that complete exclusion from any share in the Government is an admitted grievance which is publicly recognised.....

¹⁴⁹
On January 15th he telegraphed again:-

There can be no settlement until the questions raised..... are disposed of. The people of Johannesburg laid down their arms

145	Bower	-	:	263
	Garvin	-	:	130
146	Transvaal Greenbook No. 1, 1896		:	Page 8
	P.R. Botha	-	:	381
147	Transvaal Greenbook No. 1, 1896		:	Page 60
148	Blue Book C7933, 1896		:	No. 140
149	Blue Book C7933, 1896		:	No. 153

in the belief that reasonable concessions would be arranged by your intervention; and until these are granted, or are definitely promised to you by the President, the root cause of the recent disturbances will remain.....

Bower stresses the tense atmosphere in the Transvaal capital, during the weeks immediately after the Raid — far more intractable than Kruger himself were his commandants who urged war even after the disarming of the Uitlanders; and he appears convinced that Chamberlain would not have chosen this seemingly inopportune time to press for Uitlander reform, if he had been averse to the prospect of an immediate Anglo-Boer war.

"Sir Hercules, when I pointed out that Chamberlain's policy meant war, urged that he was only a Post Office; but I argued that he was more than a Post Office, with the result that he snubbed Chamberlain."

On January 27th Chamberlain - possibly a little chastened by the "snubbing" - instructed the High Commissioner to give Kruger "in the name of Her Majesty's Government a cordial invitation to visit England."

Yet a fortnight later he incurred acute Transvaal displeasure by publishing - prematurely - a long despatch to President Kruger which, apart from dealing exhaustively

150 Bower - : 260 - 261
 151 Bower - : 264
 152 Blue Book C8063, 1896 : No. 3
 153 In London Gazette of Feb. 7th 1896.

Feb
1896

ly with Uitlander grievances suggested "Home Rule for the Rand." Days before Kruger actually received the despatch, it was being widely discussed in Pretoria.

Bower remarks acidly "This was described as a departure in the New Diplomacy. It was certainly a new departure, not only in diplomatic methods, but in the ordinary rules of courtesy."

However, Kruger was not prepared to visit England and certainly not prepared to forego an Enquiry without a guarantee that the vital Clause IV would be repeated. But on this point Chamberlain remained obdurate; so negotiations for the visit to England never got beyond the tentative stage and, on the return of Dr. Leyds from Europe, early in April, finally fell through; for Leyds, says Bower, was, if anything, even more convinced than Kruger that Transvaal interests could best be served by pressing for an Enquiry.

To what extent this conviction was based on the mutterings of the friends and relatives of the imprisoned Uitlander leaders - or of the prisoners themselves - it is impossible to say.

154	Blue Book C7933, 1896	-	Pages 83 - 91
	Garvin	-	128 - 130
	Bower	-	278 - 278
155	Bower	-	278
156	Bower	-	284
	Cambridge History of the British Empire Vol. VIII	-	568-569

At the meeting at Groote Schuur in October 1895, Rhodes presumably told Hammond, Phillips and the rest what he told Bower, a few days later - viz. that Chamberlain approved of his plans. We know that Rhodes used the cables from Harris to promote his conspiracy; so, obviously, among those who saw then were the Uitlander leaders. Beit was, unfortunately not asked at the Enquiry to what extent he had communication with Phillips, while in England, and what the nature of these communications had been.

There is also the telegram sent by Garrett - the Editor of the Cape Times - to the Johannesburg Star:-
157

January 1st - You must expect and not misunderstand a proclamation putting Jameson formally in the wrong. Imperial authorities have no other course; don't let this weaken or divide you. This is merely for your information.

In other words - do not regard the proclamation as a breach of faith on the part of the Colonial Secretary; it is a mere matter of form. According to Garrett's evidence, before the Cape Committee of Enquiry, this telegram was sent off, after consultation with Leonard ¹⁵⁸ Bower ~~not~~ after consultation with Sir Graham Bower ¹⁵⁸

However, there can be very little doubt that, during the weeks prior to the Raid, the Uitlanders were under the impression

157 Cape Com. Rep. - Appendix A - No. 92
158 Cape Com. Rep. - Garrett - 1240 - 1260

that the conspiracy had Chamberlain's support — and that the majority of them considered such support an excellent thing, provided it stopped short of forcing the British Flag upon them. There can be just as little doubt that, during the weeks after the Raid, Johannesburg was alive with rumours of Colonial Office complicity in the plot.

P.R. Botha states, in his "Staatkundige Ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek onder Kruger en Leyds":- "Die mense in die Transvaal was oortuig, dat die Engelse regering kennis gehad het ~~van~~ die invalspanne." ¹⁵⁹

Bower assures us that "one of the Reformers, not a leader, whose name I prefer not to give 'peached' to the Transvaal government. That is he implicated Chamberlain but not Sir Hercules." ¹⁶⁰

At all events, by the end of April 1896, Kruger and Leyds were more determined than ever, that there must be an Enquiry.

Bower left for England, at the end of March 1896. While in London, he saw Jameson who was awaiting trial; and was assured that the "Hawksley" cables (i.e. the cables between Harris and Rhodes) would not be produced at the trial. ¹⁶¹

159	P.R. Botha	-	407
160	Bower Letters : 11.5.06.	His "apologra" to Omanney :	80
161	Bower	-	292

This is particularly interesting in view of a statement in the biography of Sir Edward Clarke K.C. who was briefed to defend Jameson: "Clarke had formed the opinion from the secret documents put before him in the Jameson case that the British Government was involved in the attempt."¹⁶²

Clarke himself says in his biography "I had been shown all the messages and letters which had passed between London and South Africa; and between Johannesburg, Cape Town and Pitsani. But I received definite instructions that no question was to be asked, or any fact elicited that might suggest that any department or official of the British Government knew of the preparations for the enterprise, or was directly or indirectly responsible for it."¹⁶³

The Attorney-General could give Sir William Clarke instructions as to the manner in which he conducted Jameson's defence; but no-one could stifle the rumours which, during the months before the Trial-at-Bar became increasingly persistent - rumours to the effect that Rhodes' supporters could prove the complicity of the Colonial Office - rumours which Stead's "Review of Reviews" by no means discouraged.

On that visit to England, Bower also took due note of the astonishing rapport between Chamberlain and Sir William Harcourt. which indicated Chamberlain's careful preparations

162 D. Walker-Smith & E. Clarke - Life of Sir Edward Clarke
(1939) : 264
163 Sir Edward Clarke K.C. - The Story of My Life (1919)
: 327 - 328

for the now almost inevitable Enquiry. ¹⁶⁴

Harcourt seems, from the start, to have been prepared not to press for any disclosures as to the part played by the Colonial Office in the Raid plot, provided he could secure a "thorough-going and unanimous condemnation of Rhodes." ¹⁶⁵ But, at the conclusion of the Enquiry, not content with the very thorough condemnation in the Committee's Report, he apparently kept up his tirades against Rhodes and those who assisted him in his "Empire-jerry-building projects" and those who were his black-mailing agents. For, almost three years after the Enquiry, Hawksley wrote this very indignant letter to Lewis Michell ¹⁶⁶ — Rhodes' banker.

24th February, 1900. Will you read carefully in the Times of last Wednesday - the 21st instant - the report of the Debate in the House of Commons. See particularly Sir William Harcourt's speech..... Sir William Harcourt in calling Rhodes agents blackmailers and contending that they sent cables knowing they were false is, I half expect, trying to goad us into publishing the cables and my subsequent correspondence with the Colonial Office..... You know Rhodes - that he doesn't care about this Minister or that, but would not embarrass or smirch Her Majesty's or England's fine name by owning that the troops were brought down, in order to aid the Transvaal revolutionaries with

164 Bower - 289; 293
165 A.G. Gardiner - Life of Sir William Harcourt (1923) 2 Vols:
Vol. 11 423 - 432
166 Amongst Photostat copies of Rhodes' Letters in Government Archives.

the knowledge and sanction of Mr. Chamberlain. It was said, in the Report of 1897, and is now repeated that though the cables implied knowledge or complicity, in fact they did not represent the truth The question I ask myself is this - when Rhodes comes to England as he will, and takes part in English politics will this Committee Report and this condemnation be a bar to his joining say Lord Rosebery's Cabinet?¹⁶⁷..... I am half inclined to publish everything on my own responsibility and don't think Rhodes would really be sorry.....

^{Begin of June}
¹⁸⁹⁶ Only a few weeks after his return to the Cape, Bower again sailed for England, on this occasion accompanying Sir Hercules who was going over for health reasons.

^{29th}
^{May,}
¹⁸⁹⁶ Under normal circumstances it was obviously not sound policy for both the High Commissioner and the Imperial Secretary to be away at the same time; but the Cape Committee of Enquiry had just been appointed and there was the fear that Bower might be called upon to give evidence. This fear was strengthened by the fact that Sir James Sivewright had made a speech in the Cape House of Assembly in which he, to all intents and purposes, accused Chamberlain of complicity in the Raid Plot though, as Bower is careful to

167 Lord Rosebery was still, at that time, the unofficial leader of the Liberal Imperialists.

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point out, "he exonerated Sir Hercules as all did."

Sir Hercules' health having become worse, on the voyage home, he took to his bed upon arrival and Chamberlain had, perforce to visit him at his hotel. Bower says of this interview: " I do not know what passed but Chamberlain who previously had been 'dangerous as an enemy - untrustworthy as a friend and fatal as a colleague' suddenly became 'a very nice fellow - a really able man with lots of pluck!'"¹⁶⁹

By this time Hawksley had allowed the vital dossier of cables out of his possession. Bower who was constantly seeing either Meade or Fairfield describes the impact on the Colonial Office of Sir Richard Webster's verdict that - even though most of the cables might with some ingenuity be ^{satisfactorily} accounted for - the Grey-Maguire communication in correlation with the correspondence between Chamberlain and Fairfield was damning evidence.¹⁷⁰

The chief concern of the Colonial Office was that the Cape Committee of Enquiry might make a determined effort to get possession of these cables. At one stage the likelihood of this was considered so great that there was talk of Chamberlain resigning; but fortunately Stevens of the Chartered Company had had the perspicacity to send the Company's cypher books to Matabeleland - well

168	Bower	-	302
169	Bower	-	303
170	Bower	-	304

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outside the jurisdiction of the Cape Colony.

Bower also tells of a "cypher cable message" which was sent to the acting Imperial Secretary at the Cape. The reply came to him in cypher and was handed over to the Colonial Office. Whatever the import of the reply - an assurance that the Cape Committee could not obtain the Harris-Rhodes cables - or merely that the Committee would not touch upon the question of Colonial Office complicity - Chamberlain did not resign.¹⁷²

This is Garvin's rather more pallid version of Chamberlain's offer to resign upon reading the "Hawksley" cables: "He felt it his duty to tender his resignation to the Prime Minister. Lord Salisbury did not dream of entertaining that offer. The Government was prepared to stand or fall with the Colonial Minister."¹⁷³

Subsequent conversations, at the Colonial Office, with Chamberlain, Meade and Fairfield made Bower realise that the Colonial Secretary now felt sufficiently secure "to carry things with a high hand;" that he would certainly not admit his complicity and that, if by some means the agents of the South African Republic thwarted his efforts to suppress all incriminating evidence,¹⁷⁴ he would go to war.

"A White Book had been compiled (No. 518 African) dated July 1896 and entitled 'The Case against the South African Republic.'

171	Bower	-	304
172	Bower	-	305
173	Garvin	-	113
174	Bower	-	315

This White Book was a very long indictment of the Transvaal and was prepared as a brief for a war agitation in case of
175
exposé."

Towards the middle of August Sir Hercules - rather less dropsical as a result of the ministrations of the physicians - and Bower returned to the Cape.

The House of Commons Committee had, by then, been appointed and the Enquiry was scheduled for February of the following year. George Wyndham - a member of this Committee was another passenger on the ship. He was on his way to Rhodes to secure a promise that the "Hawksley" cables would ^{be} suppressed; in exchange Chamberlain would guarantee the Charter of the
176
B.S.A. Company.

One cannot imagine Wyndham having much difficulty in persuading Rhodes to withhold the "Hawksley" cables. Rhodes was aware that an exposé of the Colonial Office would, in all probability, bring about the downfall of Salisbury's Ministry and that the Chartered Company would fare ill at the hands of the Liberal Government headed by Harcourt.

175.	Bower	-	316
176.	Bower	-	313

The same fear for the safety of the Company which lent fervour to Rhodes' denials of Colonial Office complicity enabled Hawksley - the Company's solicitor - to, sacrifice, with fairly good grace, the reputations of Rhodes, Jameson and Willoughby to the national interest. Though there were times when, in spite of the Company, his eagerness to win the case for his clients outweighed his patriotism; as for instance his efforts to get information from Bower about the correspondence between Sir Hercules and Chamberlain. Moreover, it was Hawksley who drafted the letter which Willoughby sent to the War Office — the letter which, affirmed the "honest and bona fide belief" that Her Majesty's Government knew and approved — and Hawksley, at the Enquiry, was so eager to put in a good word for Rhodes that the Committee could not hustle him out of the witness box quickly enough.

However, the letters stolen from Hawksley's office which were published in the Indépendance Belge on 5th January 1900 show that, both before and during the Enquiry, Hawksley, acting in the interests of the Company, co-operated very satisfactorily with the Colonial Office and with the Select Committee.

Although very little notice has been taken of this correspondence there have never been any queries as to its authenticity. The "Morning Leader" leaflet in which these letters were originally published in England, is printed as an appendix to W.J. Stead's pamphlet "Joseph Chamberlain - Conspirator? or Statesman?" The following two letters are among the most interesting:-

Goldsmith Building,
Temple.
7th August, 1897.

Dear Mr. Hawksley - Can Mr. Charles Leonard come down to the House of Commons at 5 O'clock. The Committee meet (privately) at 4.30; and I could see Mr. Leonard immediately after the meeting breaks up. - John C. Bigham.

2nd April, 1895.

Hawksley to Rt. Hon. W.L. Jackson - I send you a memo about Sir John Willoughby. Will you put the points in this memo to him and also the two first paragraphs in the enclosed print... I am giving Mr. Nicholson further prints for circulation among the Committee.

In all fairness to Chamberlain it must be said that he was appreciative of the way in which the "Rhodes Group" co-operated throughout the travesty of an Enquiry. In a speech in the House of Commons on July 26th - a speech which Garvin describes as a "feat of frankness and trenchancy" - he paid tribute to Rhodes

as a "man of honour", a statesman" who has done the greatest service to the British Empire, but who has made one gigantic mistake"; and ended by assuring the House that "the Govern-¹⁷⁷ment did not intend to abolish the Charter" Thus he succeeded in removing the sting from Harcourt's "thoroughgoing condemnation of Rhodes" or in the words of A.G. Gardiner: "effectually torpedoed the report of which he was the signatory and reduced the Raid Enquiry to derision."¹⁷⁸

More interesting than the letters from the stolen "Hawksley dossier" are certain communications which Bower received from Fairfield and Meade on his return to the Cape.

The letter from Meade is dated 19th October, 1896:-¹⁷⁹

My dear Bower - Thanks for your cypher note. The Holloway officers have been allowed to resign. They urged that they acted "bona fide" in the belief that the steps taken with the knowledge and assent of the Imperial authorities and that they were informed by Dr. Jameson that this was the case. Dr. Jameson has also written to the Colonel of the Blues to say that he acted on "the telegrams now in the possession of Mr. Hawksley" which were shown to the officers. These two letters were communicated to the

177	Garvin	-	121 - 125
178	A.G. Gardiner	-	436
179	Bower Letters	: 19.10.96. :	Sir Robert Meade to Bower.

~~to the~~ Adjutant-General who calmly proposed to send a Staff Officer to the prison to hold and Enquiry.

The important query here is - had Jameson, before he decided to invade the Transvaal, seen or been told of the Grey-Maguire cable with it's rather explicit instructions from the Colonial Office?; for "the cables now in the possession of Mr Hawksley" did apparently include the Grey-Maguire communication.

It is very difficult to find justification for his action in ~~the~~ cables from Harris to Rhodes. They indicate approval only of the "Jameson plan." which was essentially a plot to ensure a successful revolt on the Rand - but was not a plot to make a "lawless foray " into the South African Republic.

However, Meades' letter, shows that the War Office did make an attempt to investigate the question of Colonial Office complicity in the Raid, but that it was effectively quashed by Chamberlain.

Oct, At the end of October, there was a letter from Fairfield:-
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Dear Bower,

You will know, by this time, of Stead's announcement that he is going to turn the whole story of the Harris-Rhodes cables into a Xmas number. Everyone is talking of it and the thing will now, of course, come out. I think we are all rather glad it has come to this. Nothing could be worse than the system under which Rhodes' partisans were able to go into raptures

their own patriotic silences. Whilst all the time spreading their own version of the matter far and wide.

Fairfield the very efficient, if rather, colourless, Civil Servant seems a little tired of being the subject of gossip in the London Clubs, while, as a luke-warm Imperialist, he is probably quite unconcerned about the fate of the Salisbury Ministry. So put an end to all the gossip; let "the whole thing come out"; publish the Harris-Rhodes cables and, above all, publish the correspondence between Chamberlain (at Birmingham) and Fairfield and Meade — and establish that the Colonial Office officials in their dealings with Rhodes agents were merely acting under the orders of the Colonial Secretary. ¹⁸¹

However, a week or a fortnight later, Bower received a "broken-hearted letter from Fairfield which he entreated me to burn". In this letter Fairfield said that "he would have to conform his evidence to that of the others" or else Chamberlain would repudiate him and that the correspondence between Chamberlain, Fairfield and Meade during December, 1895 would be suppressed. ¹⁸²

In his letter to Omanney of 11th December, 1905 Bower refers to this letter from Fairfield and to the fact that he burnt it as requested. ¹⁸³

181.	R.I. Lovell	—	323
	Bower	-	327 - 328
182	Bower	-	329
	Bower Letters	: 11.12.05. - Bower to Sir M. Omanney	

If Chamberlain had hopes of still being able to shelve the Enquiry, they were dashed by the publication at Christmas time of "The History of the Mystery" - Stead's version of Chamberlain's part in the Jameson Raid plot, in the guise of a rather dreary late-Victorian fantasy.

By the time, Parliament re-opened in February, the chief topic of conversation - in the lobbies of the House of Commons, in White's Club, in the newspaper offices and most certainly in the Embassies - was whether or not Joseph Chamberlain had "indeed been in it up to the neck." Yet the astonishing fact is that those who considered Chamberlain guilty were, nevertheless, quite prepared to acquit his chief agent at the Cape - Sir Hercules Robinson; and this was the case not only in England, but also at the Cape, as has been noted in connection with Sir James Sivewright's speech, and in the Transvaal. P.R. Botha states: "Rhodes, Bower, Newton en andere het agter die Hoë Kommissaris se rug om gewerk en hulle handlangers laat verstaan dat Sir Hercules die voorgenome opstand goedkeur en steun; wat seker nie die geval was nie." 184

So it seems that not even Dr. Leyds attached any special significance to the "Chairman" telegram. Nor apparently did the note which Bower wrote Sir Hercules, very early on December 30th

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1895 occasion any comment.

Dear Sir Hercules - Could you come into town early? There is, I fear, bad news from Jameson. He seems to have disobeyed Rhodes and taken the bit between his teeth.

It was not suggested that this communication would hardly have been intelligible to a sleep-befuddled Sir Hercules at 6.a.m. in the morning, if he was under the impression that Jameson was at Pitsani for the sole purpose of guarding a still non-existent railway.

For that was the High Commissioner's story--Rhodes his trusted friend had grossly deceived him; not once, during the weeks prior to the Raid had he given any reason for the force at Pitsani - bar the guarding of the railway; not once had he hinted ^{at} any connection between this force, and the Uitlander unrest.

No-one doubted his word - "all sympathised with the dying old man who complained that he had been tricked and deceived." Even Sauer's Party rallied around him, for here was an opportunity ¹⁸⁶ of imputing to Rhodes yet another perfidy.

Sir Hercules' strength, of course, lay in the assurances of both Rhodes and Bower that they would protect him. Bower states that, when the High Commissioner and he returned from Pretoria on January 10th, 1896 there was a note from Rhodes who had sailed for England, the previous day, warning him "that he had

185. Blue Book C 8063, 1896
186. Bower

- Appendix No. 1.
- 286; 301.

defended Sir Hercules, at the Cape, and would do so in England." ¹⁸⁷

Rhodes' defence of Sir Hercules was to admit that he had discussed with him the possibilities of an Uitlander revolt and suggested that, in the event of such a revolt, it might be necessary for him to mediate ; but to deny that he had ever told ~~the High Commission~~ that he was encouraging the Uitlanders to revolt or to what use he intended putting Jameson's force. ¹⁸⁸

At the end of March, just before Bower sailed for England, Sir Hercules discussed with him "what line he would take in England respecting the question of previous knowledge."

" I told him that I had connected the troops with Johannesburg and was not going to abuse Rhodes behind his back.

Sir Hercules got out the correspondence which was in his private letterbook and said "There is nothing here about the troops"..... He also said he had never discussed the subject with me and I had no right to say he had done so.

I admitted that I had not discussed the question, but had believed he was doing so with Rhodes, as he always shut me up.

He said "If you say you connected the troops with Johannesburg, no-one will believe that you did not discuss it with me. It is not fair to me to take that line." ¹⁸⁹ apparently

This, of course, is just what did not occur for people were [^]

187. Bower	-	271
188. Br. Sel. Com. Rep.	- Rhodes : 261 - 270; 673	- 680
189. Bower	-	286 - 287

quite ready to believe that Bower had purposely withheld from Sir Hercules the disclosures made to him by Rhodes.

In October, 1896, Bower, at the request of the Colonial Office submitted an official account of his momentous interview with Rhodes twelve months before.¹⁹⁰ A copy of this statement is among the Bower letters - with a note in Bower's handwriting to the effect that portions of it were dictated by Sir Hercules.¹⁹¹

It seems that the following paragraph in particular was insisted upon by the High Commissioner:- "The Governor did not as was his usual practice when he received important intelligence make any mention to me ^{of} such a disclosure by Mr Rhodes and it is clear that Mr Rhodes omitted to tell him what he said to me. This Mr Rhodes voluntarily stated in a conversation that took place in my room after the Raid, saying, he was glad he had kept the governor out of it."¹⁹²

This paragraph has been rather well thought out it provides complete official exoneration for the High Commissioner, without demanding from Bower the supreme sacrifice - viz an admission, in black and white, that he had deliberately deceived his chief. One feels compelled to admit that Sir Hercules - in spite of his advanced age and his dropsy - was the only efficient conspirator of them all.

Bower was ordered home, late in December. Before he left,

190. Bower - B 18
191. Bower Letters : 3.11.96 - Bower's official statement
to Colonial Secretary
192. Bower 324

Sir Hercules, again went over his position regarding fore-knowledge of the conspiracy. " I told him that, so far as I was concerned, I could say quite truthfully that I had not discussed with him ¹⁹³ what the troops were intended to do and would say so."

On his return to England, Bower saw George Wyndham who told him that Chamberlain had no intention of producing at the Enquiry the cypher correspondence between himself and the High Commissioner and ¹⁹⁴ that the Committee would not ask for it.

Bower also visited Meade who was ill. Meade assured him the Committee was not the "formidable thing the world thought it was. Chamberlain and Harcourt were excellent friends and understood each ¹⁹⁵ other."

However, when the Enquiry took place, Harcourt had, at least, to put up a show of formidability. He did not have much success with Rhodes who apparently drunk stout and munched sandwiches and answered ¹⁹⁶ questions quite, imperturbably; but Bower - somewhat agitated and unhappy in his role of scapegoat - was "badgered and baited and c ¹⁹⁷ confused 'til he hardly knew where he was." What little semblance of poise remained when Harcourt had finished with him was completely shattered, when Labouchere who, at that stage, was still imbued with

193.	Bower	-	331 - 332
194.	Bower	-	334
195.	Bower	-	333
196.	Garvin	-	119

197.	Bower	-	344
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a deadly keenness, proceeded to call him a liar.

Bower might have argued that by misrepresenting the truth he was ruining his own career in order to save the reputations of others; and moreover that he had been warned not to tell the truth. For had not Wyndham told him, that all correspondence and conversations which implicated Chamberlain and Sir Hercules in the conspiracy must be considered as confidential; if he should, inadvertently or otherwise, divulge anything "Old Rosmead will be carried into the box in his bandages like the dying ^{Chatham} 199 and will give you the lie. He will be backed by Chamberlain."

CHAPTER IV.

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Before summing up the evidence, three things must be made clear.

Firstly - By the time Chamberlain took office, the Transvaal was looming very large as a potential danger to British supremacy in South Africa. Not only was Kruger's anti-British, pro-German policy becoming increasingly detrimental to British prestige and to the advancement of the New Imperialism;¹ but his persistent refusal to grant the Uitlanders the economic and political freedom they desired might, in the near future, provoke a revolt which, if Great Britain were not very careful, would result in the establishment of an Independent Uitlander Republic, hostile to British interests.² Sir Henry Loch, when in July 1894, he ordered the Bechuanaland Police to concentrate, at Mafeking, in case the commandeering crisis resulted in an outbreak, on the Rand was,³ presumeably providing for these same contingencies - viz.

(a) that Germany might need a convincing demonstration that Great Britain would brook no interference in South Africa and

(b) that Uitlander impetuosity might require a little curbing - and Thirteen months later the situation in the Transvaal was considerably more acute; Kruger and the Kaiser were in closer ac-⁴ cord and the Uitlanders were becoming increasingly rebellious;⁵ so it was as important to Chamberlain as to Rhodes that Kruger's government be overthrown - and probably of even greater importance to Chamberlain than to Rhodes that this be achieved under - if not direct - at least indirect^{British} auspices.

1.	L. Wolf - Life of the First Marquis of Ripon (1921)	2 Vols: Vol. 11 - 230
	Langer -	219; 247
2.	L. Wolf -	227
	Bower -	232
3.	Scoble and Abercrombie - The Rise and Fall of Krugerism :121ff	
	Headlam -	556
4.	Walker -	449
	P.R. Botha -	469 - 470
5.	Fitzpatrick -	51

Secondly - While Bower has been, to date, Chamberlain's severest critic, his most enthusiastic protagonist has been J.L. Garvin.

Bower draws a sharp distinction between the Raid and the Raid plot. It never for a moment occurs to him that anyone bar Jameson was implicated in the former; but he contends that Chamberlain was implicated in Rhodes' plot to overthrow Kruger.

Garvin, although he is very clear on certain points: viz. that Chamberlain was a noble soul; that Rhodes was a "Colossus" with feet of clay; that Jameson was a "Stock-exchange" hero; that Harris would have been more at home under a damp stone; that Flora Shaw was an "admirable" woman; that Hawksley was a black-mailer - and so forth, does not make it clear that he appreciates the essential difference between the Jameson Plan and the Jameson Raid. Perhaps he considers the Raid an integral part of Rhodes' original plan for his vindication of Chamberlain consists merely of exonerating him from complicity in the actual Raid.

He quotes Chamberlain as stating to Meade: "My case is that, while I knew all about the revolution, I knew nothing of anything so mad as Jameson's Raid."⁶

He quotes Chamberlain as stating to Flora Shaw: "The fact is, I can hardly say what I knew and what I did not. I did not want to know too much. Of course, I knew of the preparations, the precautions, in view of the expected trouble in Johannesburg, but I never could have imagined that Jameson would take the bit between his teeth."⁷

6. Garvin
7. Garvin

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According to Garvin, the issue as regards the Pitsani force was as follows:- either Jameson was occupying a convenient position both to guard the railway, and to march in and support the High Commissioner's arbitration, should Sir Hercules call upon him; or he was preparing to make a raid on a friendly state.⁸ Therefore, because Chamberlain had no foreknowledge of the actual Raid, he was also unaware of Rhodes' real reasons for wanting the Protectorate. Garvin does not discuss that the intention was that Jameson should march in and ensure the success of an Uitlander rising; and that it was this fact which Harris was instructed to confide in Chamberlain.

It will be remembered that the Report of the House of Commons Committee condemned Rhodes as the instigator of the plot and Bower for his complicity in the plot; but stated that neither Chamberlain nor Sir Hercules Robinson were made aware of the plot during its development. Garvin quotes this paragraph from the Committee's Report - yet, at no stage, does he make clear exactly what the plot was, nor does he prove that Chamberlain was unaware of it.

Thirdly - Chamberlain obviously could not support an unprovoked incursion into the Transvaal such as Jameson's Raid;¹⁰ but his denunciation of Jameson is no criterion for the fact that he did not know and approve of Rhodes' plans to secure a successful

8. Garvin	-	36: 75; 76; 111
9. Garvin	-	121
10. P.R. Botha	-	410

revolt on the Rand.

The first point in the summing up is - That it would appear that, when Chamberlain handed over the Bechuanaland Protectorate to the Chartered Company he did not unwittingly give Rhodes what he wanted i.e. the section of Bechuanaland which borders on the Transvaal and the Border Police, when he wanted it i.e. by November 7th; but that he was aware of Rhodes' intention to use the force on the Transvaal border to support an Uitlander revolt.

To briefly recapitulate: Harris, after his first representation to the Colonial Office for the transfer of the Protectorate, telegraphs Rhodes that Chamberlain is "heartily in sympathy", "will do anything to assist"; provided "he officially does not know of the plan"; but cannot promise an immediate transfer. However Chamberlain interviews Khama Sebele and Bathoen, informs them that the Protectorate will ^{be} incorporated within Charterland and advises them to discuss adequate reserves etc with the B.S.A. Company. He then departs for the Continent, from where he grants Rhodes administrative rights over a strip of territory sufficient for a "jumping-off ground" and writes a confidential letter to Sir Hercules Robinson asking his opinion of the possibility of an Uitlander revolt "with or without assistance from outside" Upon his return, he is interviewed by Grey whom we know is in the plot; Harris has a heart to heart talk with Fairfield; Rhodes is assured that as regards Meade, Fairfield and Flora Shaw "we have these solid"; and, within the time limit set by Rhodes, the session of the Protectorate and the consequent disbanding of the Police is an accomplished fact and Rhodes receives

a cable to the effect that "the Secretary for the Colonies says you must allow decent interval and delay fireworks for a fortnight."

Chamberlain's refusal to settle the Protectorate question immediately does not, as Garvin considers, "clearly prove that he was an obstacle not an accomplice"¹⁰. He was bound to give the Bechuanā chiefs an opportunity of laying their case before him; and, at his first interview with the chiefs, he left them in no doubt as to what was to be the ultimate destiny of the Protectorate. Nor are his disagreements with Rhodes in connection with the details of the transfer settlement any indication that he had no foreknowledge of the plot. In fact, as Stead points out, it is far more likely that Chamberlain, knowing how vital it was that the Protectorate should be handed over at a given date, siezed the opportunity to drive a hard bargain. But, even if, as Garvin contends, these two aspects of the negotiations indicate "lack of cordiality" between Rhodes and Chamberlain, they are far outweighed by other considerations.

It is very hard to believe that the Colonial Office, in the autumn of 1895, would have paid absolutely no attention to a "guarded allusion" to the desirability of having troupes on the Transvaal border. Chamberlain knew that a revolt was brewing on the Rand. Even Garvin admits "that all the information of the Colonial Office pointed to an eruption at Johannesburg."¹² So we

10. Garvin	-	40
11. Garvin	-	51
12. Garvin	-	48

can safely disregard the statement, in Chamberlain's despatch of February 1896, to the effect that "in the long run the opinion gained ground that the Uitlanders did not mean to risk a collision with the government;" and take for granted that Chamberlain was most concerned about the situation on the Rand and, therefore, would hardly have been completely impervious to the hints of Rhodes agents, even though, as R.I. Lovell affirms, Harris was "the sort of man one snubs on sight."¹³

Furthermore the most reasonable interpretation of the cables sent by Harris to Rhodes in connection with the negotiations for the protectorate - particularly the cables which were withheld at the Enquiry - is that Chamberlain knew and approved of Rhodes' real purpose for wanting a force at Pitsani.

Garvin, however, disagrees with this: "Chamberlain handed over the border-strip and the police with the sole purpose of promoting the railway "though" he no doubt recognised that the new force to be formed, at Pitsani, might serve as first aid should intervention by the British Government become necessary."¹⁴ But Harris actually mentioned the words "Jameson plan":- on August 21st he called "You are aware Chamberlain states Dr. Jameson's plan must not be mentioned to him"; and again on November 5th" We have stated positive that results Dr. Jameson's plan include British Flag" and the essence of the Jameson plan was not that the force on

13. R.I. Lovell
14. Garvin

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on the border be there merely to support the High Commissioner's arbitration, in case of an Uitlander revolt; but that it should march in and actively assist the Uitlanders in overthrowing the government.

According to Bower, Rhodes, as a result of the cables from Harris, was definitely under the impression that Chamberlain knew and approved of the plot; so either Harris was deliberately misleading Rhodes - and it is difficult to see what his motive could have been - or else Chamberlain did, in fact, know.

The most interesting of all the Harris-Rhodes telegrams, is mentioned by Bower. viz. the Colonial Secretary's message that in order to ensure a "decent interval" the "fireworks" must be delayed for a fortnight." To Rhodes and Bower this meant a warning from Chamberlain that the connection between the transfer of the Protectorate and the rising against the Transvaal government must not appear too blatant; and one would be very hard put to interpret it in any other way. However, Garvin's version is that the reference to "fireworks" was a jest on Chamberlain's part which¹⁵ "was turned into a calculated message behind his back."

The question of the integrity of Harris is, of course, a most important one. Garvin talks about the "highly-coloured summaries"

of conversations at the Colonial Office, sent by Harris to Rhodes ¹⁶ -
Lovell quotes Hammond of the Reform Committee as declaring that
Harris was an "unmitigated liar". ¹⁷ But it is very difficult to
find anyone remotely connected with the Raid conspiracy who did
not have an infinite capacity for distorting the truth, except
possibly Bower, when confronted by Labouchere.

The fact remains that, if Harris was deceiving Rhodes, then
so were Maguire, Beit and Hawksley, for Harris consulted them
either individually or collectively before sending off the cables;
moreover Maguire and Hawksley were actually present, at certain of
Harris' consultations with Chamberlain's Secretaries.

Admittedly, the Colonial Secretary seems to have had very
little direct communication with Harris, Hawksley and Maguire,
preferring to use Fairfield and Lord Grey as middlemen. But, if
Chamberlain, when he departed for his vacation, knew nothing of
what his friend Lord Grey knew - of what Hawksley, the great
friend of Fairfield knew, then why did he write the High Commission-
er from San Sebastian, asking his opinion on an Uitlander revolt

16. Garvin	-	39
17. Lovell	-	330

"with or without assistance from outside"; and why did he, within a week of returning, hand over the Protectorate when, owing to the unrest in the Transvaal, there could be no more inopportune moment for withdrawing the Imperial Police from the Bechuanaland border.?

The evidence may not be considered overwhelming; but it must be remembered that the "Hawksley" cables provided sufficient testimony to convince Sir Edward Clarke of the complicity of the Colonial Office and, until the Harris-Rhodes cables are refuted, the assumption that Chamberlain did not hand over the Protectorate unwittingly seems a justifiable one.

The second point in the summing up is that the appearance of the "British Flag" as an unwelcome factor, in the plans of the Uitlanders, suggests Colonial Office complicity in the Raid plot.

If only Rhodes and his henchmen had been concerned in the plot, the "flag" question would not have arisen, for Rhodes, as has been seen, would never, at any stage of the conspiracy, have attempted to force the Union Jack upon the Uitlanders.

However on November 5th Harris called Rhodes: "We have stated positive that results Dr. Jameson's plan included British Flag? Is this correct?"

And Rhodes replied: "As to the British flag they must very

much misunderstand me at home. I, of course, would not risk everything as I am doing except for the English flag."

Again, a few days before leaving England, Harris called a warning "that to do business independently of British flag would have serious effect on your position here."

The most obvious implication is that an assurance regarding the British flag would have been required only by the Colonial Office — and, moreover, that Rhodes who was perfectly aware that the Uitlanders did not want the Union Jack would have given such an assurance only to some-one whose support he badly needed, some-one who was in a position to thwart his plans viz. the Colonial Secretary.

It will also be remembered that, in a cypher message to Sir Hercules of December 6th, 1895, Chamberlain offered the Uitlanders the right to elect their own governor, provided they hoisted the British flag; in spite of Sir Hercules' statement in his State-Paper of November 4th that nine out of ten Uitlanders did not want Colonial Office rule.

Here again, the evidence is not completely irrefutable; But the "flag" rumours arose out of assurances which Rhodes and Harris gave to some-one "in the know" and it is difficult to see whom — bar Chamberlain — that could have been.

The third point in the summing up is that the correspondence conducted by members of the Colonial Office, during the weeks immediately before the Raid, yields fairly strong circumstantial evidence indicative of fore-knowledge of the Raid plot.

I have spoken openly to E. Fairfield and I have accepted, if Colonial Office will transfer to us balance Protectorate with Police 7th November we will agree to any liberal police reserves to native chiefs.....

As regards the date mentioned by Harris-November 7th - Rhodes appears to have stressed that November 7th was to be the latest date for the acquisition of the Police.⁴⁰

When Labouchere has trying to elicit from a very reluctant Harris some details of his "open" conversation with Fairfield, Chamberlain signified that he wished to read a letter from Fairfield, written to him, at Birmingham, immediately after the conversation had taken place.⁴¹

Fairfield to Chamberlain - November 4th - You will see that events are moving rapidly in South Africa - Rhodes, having accepted the responsibilities imposed on him, is naturally very keen to get the Protectorate question settled and had been telegraphing all day to this end.....Rhodes wants you then to authorise the Bechuanaland Border Police to enlist with the Company.....Rhodes.....wants to get our people off the scene as this ugly row is pending with the Transvaal. That I think is also our interest.....I do, not think there can be any doubt but that the Transvaal will

40. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - Harris 8520 ff
41. Br. Sel. Com. Rep - pages 448 - 449

progress.

Twelve hours before Leonard and Hammond arrived in Cape Town to inform Rhodes that the Uitlander revolt had "fizzled out", Fairfield received the same information from Hawksley with the additional piece of news that Jameson might manipulate a revolution. In this connection, it is well to recall that the news of the actual Raid came to the Colonial Office via Flora Shaw who had obtained it, at Beit's London Office.

Like most of the documentary evidence pertaining to the Raid, these letters are far from explicit, but Chamberlain certainly considered them sufficiently so to warrant being withheld at the Enquiry; and, undoubtedly the close accord between the London end of the conspiracy and Fairfield does suggest complicity, in spite of the fact that the latter was deaf.

Chamberlain, as was seen in connection with the Bechuanaland Protectorate negotiations, preferred to have no direct dealings with Rhodes' agents. Meade wrote on December 18th "..... if the movement is to be postponed, it must be done at once. Fairfield is confident he could do this without compromising you, should you wish it to be done."

Chamberlain - at Birmingham - might not have been in such close touch with the conspiracy as was Rhodes - at Cape Town. Nevertheless, a few hours before Jameson's troops crossed the Transvaal border, he called Sir Hercules to the effect that he could not support an unprovoked Raid into the Transvaal.

So we have the following situation:- the Colonial Office knows that an Uitlander revolt might break out, at any moment;

it accepts that Rhodes is the power behind the Reform Committee; it makes a point of being in constant communication with Rhodes' agents - yet Garvin apparently considers that "it could not begin to guess at Rhodes' plans," the obvious comment being, that apart from appearing rather incredible, this opinion does not reflect very highly on the acumen of Messrs Chamberlain, Fairfield and Meade.

The fourth point in the summing up is that the correspondence between Rhodes and his agents, during December, 1895 provides fairly strong testimony to the effect that the Colonial Office was implicated in the Raid plot.

What Labouchere calls the "remarkable" cables between Flora Shaw and Rhodes have only one logical interpretation viz that Rhodes' plans had the support of the Colonial Office, but that the Colonial Secretary wished them carried into effect as soon as possible.

There is the cable of December 12th: "Delay dangerous sympathy now complete, but will depend very much upon action before European powers given time (to) enter a protest which as European situation considered serious might paralyse Government" And the cable of December 17th ".....Chamberlain sound in case of interference European Powers but have special reason to believe wishes you must do it immediately."

It will be remembered that, at the interview of December 22nd Rhodes told Bower that he had had a cable from Miss Shaw saying that "the leaders were with him." The same argument applies

here, as in the case of the Harris-Rhodes cables - either Flora Shaw was deliberately deceiving Rhodes, or else the Colonial Office did not know of the plot.

It seems, therefore, that when Rhodes cabled Flora Shaw, on December 30th, 1895: "Inform Chamberlain that I shall get through all right if he supports me", he had some justification for expecting support from the Colonial Secretary: There were the cables from Harris assuring him that Chamberlain knew and approved and, no doubt, the reassurances of Harris and Beit, when they returned to the Cape and the assurances of Gould-Adams who had discussed the plot with Fairfield. There were the cables from Flora Shaw, and there was the Grey-Maguire telegram.

The Reminiscences and Garvin's "Life of Chamberlain" provide ample evidence that this cable did exist, that it was, in fact sent off, on December 20th, by Grey and Maguire who reported an interview with Fairfield who had stated that, on account of the situation in Venezuela the Uitlander revolt should be "hurried up."

Chamberlain's instructions had, of course, been that the revolt should either be postponed for two years or else take place immediately; and Fairfield, on hearing from Maguire that the situation, on the Rand, was such that the revolt could not be postponed, had told him that the sooner it took place the better.

So from Chamberlain's viewpoint the telegram does not present the issue quite fairly. Never-the-less, the Colonial Office sent to Rhodes, through his agents, a message whose obvious import was that the revolt must be brought to a head - in other words the Colonial Office not only knew that Rhodes was

trying to instigate a revolt on the Rand, but it was urging him on. And Bower states that when, in June 1896, Sir Richard Webster examined the "Hawksley" cables, he considered that the Grey-Maguire telegram was "damning evidence", particularly when read in conjunction with the letters between Chamberlain and his Under-Secretaries.

The fifth point in the summing up is that there do not seem to be any grounds for considering that Rhodes and Harris might have deliberately tried to implicate Chamberlain, in the plot, in order to cover themselves.

If such an attempt was made, it involved the deception not only of Bower and Sir Hercules Robinson, but also of the leaders of the Reform Committee, Jameson and, according to Meade's letter to Bower, Jameson's officers; and it is very hard to believe that this widespread conviction that the Colonial Office was supporting the plot could have been occasioned by a mere tissue of lies on the part of Harris and Rhodes.

Moreover, this attempt of Rhodes and Harris to implicate Chamberlain in the plot and to deceive the conspirators in South Africa must have had the connivance of Beit, Maguire and Hawksley who knew all about the contents of the Harris-Rhodes cables. and who were present at certain of Harris' consultations at the Colonial Office. The deception must also have had the connivance of Flora Shaw the import of whose cables is somewhat similar to that of the Harris-Rhodes cables, and the

connivance of Gould-Adams. For there is Bower's statement that Gould-Adams saw Fairfield in London, while the negotiations for the Protectorate were being carried on and that he "having discussed the whole matter with Fairfield" was able to assure Newton of the foreknowledge and approval of the Colonial Office. Furthermore, Hawksley, four years after the Raid, was still keeping up the deception, when he wrote to Michell stating most positively "that the troops, were brought down in order to aid the Transvaal revolutionaries with the knowledge and sanction of Mr Chamberlain."

All of which reduces the conspiracy to rather unmanageably fantastic proportions. We have in addition certain other factors to consider:- the assurances of Bower that Rhodes sincerely believed Chamberlain knew and approved of his plans; the letters to Bower from Lord Grey and Sir James Rose-Innes which state that Bower has taken the blame which rightly attaches to others; the fact that all the important evidence was suppressed at the House of Commons Enquiry; Fairfield's very interesting letter to Bower in which he says that "he will have to conform his evidence to the rest, or else Chamberlain will repudiate him"; the fact that the attempt by the War Office to investigate the question of Colonial Office complicity was prevented; the close accord between the Colonial Office and Rhodes' agents during the weeks immediately before the Raid and the fact that Rhodes received a message from the Colonial Office that the revolt on the Rand must take place as soon as possible.

These considerations combine to render decidedly untenable the theory that a deliberate attempt was made to implicate the

unsuspecting Colonial Secretary in the Raid plot.

The final point in the summing up is that it would appear that Sir Hercules Robinson - the chief representative at the Cape of the Colonial Office had foreknowledge of the plot.

Apart from the "Chairman" telegram; Blue Books and Green Books supply no evidence, whatsoever against Sir Hercules, but it has been noted that W.L. Langer and Cecil Headlam both seem to think that he was implicated in the Raid plot.

Langer states: "There is no reason to suppose that Robinson the friend of Rhodes was not fully initiated into the whole ¹⁸ scheme" but he does not support his statement. Headlam; fortunately, censures the High Commissioner in less vague terms. He, moreover, informs us in a footnote that "The events of those critical days have given rise to violent controversy and to the suppression or mutilation of some of the evidence. The account in the text is based on the statement of some of those most intimately concerned whose evidence ¹⁹ is, as yet, unpublished."

The most important evidence, however, is supplied by Bower, who states very plainly that Rhodes, Lionel Phillips and Jameson discussed their plans with Sir Hercules. Rhodes, on that morning in October, after he had confided in Bower, went into Sir Hercules' office and told him what he was planning to do - not only had Bower advised him to do this, but his brother Frank had refused to leave for Johannesburg, until the High Commissioner was informed of the conspiracy.

Headlam agrees upon this point "Rhodes told the High Commissioner

18. Langer	-	226
19. Headlam	-	561

himself; for only on this condition would Colonel Frank Rhodes consent to proceed to Johannesburg to take charge of military operations²⁰"

Bower, of course, was not present at Rhodes' interview with the High Commissioner and, on the following day Sir Hercules refused to discuss "these damned conspiracies of Rhodes and Chamberlain"; but Rhodes afterwards assured Bower "that he had told the High Commissioner everything."

Jameson, according to Bower, interviewed the High Commissioner, early in November. Again Bower was not present, but was afterwards told by Jameson that, at his interview with Sir Hercules, "he had taken care to satisfy himself that the High Commissioner knew everything."

In support of this point Headlam quotes a paragraph from an article by Jameson published in the National Review of September 1933: "Rosmead (i.e. Robinson) had agreed to take action, once we were there. He knew every detail of the arrangements. The night before I left for Mafeking.....we went over the ground of our joint action again."²¹

Bower states equally plainly that Sir Hercules was shown the Grey-Maguire cable. When, on December 22nd, he was given this cable to read, he told Rhodes that the High Commissioner must be informed of it; and, on the following day, he saw, Rhodes hand Sir Hercules a 'flimsy piece of paper' which he did not doubt

20. Headlam - 560
21. Headlam - 561

was the Grey-Maguire communication.

Moreover, by this date, Sir Hercules had received two communications from Chamberlain on the subject of an Uitlander outbreak - the confidential letter which arrived, late in October 1895, asking his opinion on the possibility of an Uitlander revolt "with or without assistance from outside;" and the cable of December 6th offering the Uitlanders the freedom to choose their own Governor, provided they would hoist the British flag. While, three days later; (26th December), there was a cable from Chamberlain, giving the High Commissioner certain instructions as to his course of action, when the revolt broke out: "He was to consult the Secretary of state for the Colonies before issuing a proclamation; and he was to consult his ministers before going up to Pretoria."

Bower also mentions certain confidential communications between Sir Hercules and Chamberlain, some of which presumeably were shown to him, as he states that "he did not consider himself justified in making use of correspondence which was shown to him only in a private capacity."

Furthermore it has been pointed out that the note which Bower wrote Sir Hercules, informing him of Jameson's raid would hardly have been intelligible to someone ignorant of the plot.

What detracts from the force of Bower's case against the High Commissioner is that he himself neither discussed the conspiracy with Sir Hercules, nor heard Jameson, Rhodes or Phillips discuss the conspiracy with Sir Hercules. Besides, however convinced he might have been that the 'filmy piece of paper' was the Grey-Maguire telegram he either did not or could

not verify the fact.

Nevertheless, during the weeks prior to the Raid, Bower did not experience a single qualm as to his own foreknowledge of the plot, because he was convinced that his chief Sir Hercules has also been told, but that he did not want what would have been tantamount to an official discussion on the matter with his Imperial Secretary. That Rhodes and Jameson were not telling the truth when they assured Bower of Sir Hercules foreknowledge of the plot is very hard to believe. The High Commissioner's mediation, at the critical moment, was such an integral part of their plans that it is inconceivable that they would have attempted to carry this plan into effect without first discussing it with him, just as it is inconceivable that Chamberlain, knowing of the plot, would not have had some correspondence about it with Sir Hercules.

Admittedly, the evidence which had been dealt with does not provide positive proof in the shape of a signed statement by the High Commissioner and the Colonial Secretary to the effect that they had been aware of the plot; or a letter to Chamberlain from someone with an impeccable reputation, such as Lord Grey, stating "Rhodes suggests that a well organised Uitlander rising aided by troops ~~of~~ the B.S.A. Company could successfully overthrow Kruger - do you approve?" and Chamberlain's reply expressing his unqualified approval and conveying his blessing; or a first hand account by Bower ~~of~~ an interview with the Colonial Secretary, at which Chamberlain declares "Of course I

knew of Rhodes plans, but I have no intention of publicly admitting the fact. If you are stupid enough to tell the truth, you will have to take the consequences."

But, nevertheless, the communications between Rhodes and his agents - Harris, Flora Shaw, Grey and Maguire - prior to the Raid, the most important of which were suppressed at the Enquiry, and ~~the~~ correspondence between Chamberlain and his Under-Secretaries, prior to the Raid which was also suppressed at the Enquiry provide sufficiently strong evidence to support Bower's contention that Chamberlain knew it, approved of — and to a certain extent encouraged the Jameson Raid plot. Nor does there seem any reason to doubt that Sir Hercules Robinson was fully aware of the plot and of the role which he was to play in it.

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