



Competition and Cooperation on the Nile River: A Contemporary Analysis of Ethiopian –
Egyptian Relations

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Abstract:

In the past decade, Ethiopia has seen unprecedented economic growth as a result of its efforts to eradicate poverty through sustainable development. Ethiopia's recent construction of the 6,000 MW Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam along the Blue Nile, a major tributary to the transboundary Nile River, supports these efforts. Despite objections from Ethiopia's downstream riparian, Egypt, construction has continued, indicating that as Ethiopia establishes itself as a rising power in the Horn of Africa, Egyptian hegemony will be increasingly challenged. Ethiopia's quest for energy sufficiency to support its development is disrupting the region's historic balance of power as well as relations among the Nile Basin countries. In particular, relations between Ethiopia and Egypt have become increasingly complex. This thesis will argue that the shifting balance of power has provided for the development of a gesellschaft society that will continue to support regional stability.

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Introduction

In 1991, the socialist regime that had dominated Ethiopian political life for nearly 20 years was overthrown by a coalition of rebel forces and replaced by a federal system of governance under the auspices of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Under the previous regime, Ethiopia had suffered civil unrest, border conflicts, economic decline, and devastating famine. With the success of the EPRDF came internal stability and border security, providing conditions conducive for a renewed focus on tackling poverty and spurring the economy. Labor, resources, and finances could now be allocated to support domestic development initiatives rather than towards security efforts.¹ As a result, by 2015 Ethiopia had experienced a decade-long economic growth rate of around 11 percent, a 40 percent drop in its poverty rate, a 10 percent decline in urban unemployment, and was close to achieving universal primary education, all while maintaining a relatively low rate of income inequality.²

Fueling this development has been the Government of Ethiopia's (GOE) commitment "to generat[ing] power exclusively from clean... renewable resources"³ by tapping into its reserves of solar (4-6 kWh/m² per day), wind (1,350 GW m/s), geothermal (7,000 MW potential), and hydroelectric power (45,000 MW).⁴ If properly harnessed, Ethiopia would secure enough power to electrify its country and export additional energy to its neighbors. While projects continue

¹ Between 2001 and 2012, Ethiopia's military spending decreased by over 50 percent; as of 2012 it amounted to 0.8

² Amanda Lenhardt et al., *One foot on the ground, one food in the air: Ethiopia's delivery on an ambitious development agenda* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2015). Available at: <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9917.pdf> [accessed January 29, 2016].

³ FDRE, *Ethiopia's Climate-Resilient Green Economy: green economy strategy*. Addis Ababa: FDRE, 2011), 81 Available at: <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/ethiopia/docs/Ethiopia%20CRGE.pdf> [Accessed April 22, 2016].

⁴ Dereje Derbew, "Ethiopia's Renewable Energy Power Potential and Development Opportunities," (PowerPoint presented at the African Clean Energy Conference, Abu Dhabi, UAE, June 22, 2013). Available at: https://irena.org/DocumentDownloads/events/2013/July/Africa%20CEC%20session%203_Ministry%20of%20Water%20and%20Energy%20Ethiopia_Beyene_220613.pdf [accessed June 29, 2016].

throughout the country to utilize each of the aforementioned resources, it is the GOE's construction of a 6,000 MW hydroelectric dam, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) along the Blue Nile, a major tributary to the transboundary Nile River, which is receiving the most attention.

The construction of dams along transboundary rivers is neither new nor unique. However, the length of the Nile (just under 7,000 kilometers), the number of countries it flows through (10), the expected capacity of the GERD (6,000 MW), and the population within the Nile basin (238 million and growing), significantly dwarf other transboundary river systems.⁵ Adding to the situation's complexity is the hydraulic makeup of the region itself. Not only does 84 percent of the Nile's water originate in one country, Ethiopia, but the extreme aridity of downstream states has resulted in their near dependence on the Nile for the majority of their freshwater needs.⁶ In particular, Egypt receives 97 percent of its fresh water from the Nile and any disruption to its flow could have hazardous consequences.⁷ As a result of such dependency, Egypt has, over the years, come to monopolize its control over Nile management and the advent of the GERD is representative of the first time Egypt's dominance has been seriously tested.

⁵ For example: At a length of 2,334 kilometers, the Colorado River flows through seven different states and two countries, the United States and Mexico, and supports over 33 million people. Over 16 dams line the River on the US side and one on the Mexican side providing for irrigation, diversions, and a hydroelectric generating capacity of 4,178 MW (In: Aaron Thiel, "Climate Change Impacts on Hydropower in the Colorado River Basin," Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, Madison, Center for Water Policy, 2013. Available at: http://uwm.edu/centerforwaterpolicy/wp-content/uploads/sites/170/2013/10/Colorado_Energy_Final.pdf); the Zambezi River, with a length of about 3,000 kilometers, flows through six countries, meets the basic needs of around 30 million people, and houses two hydroelectric stations: the upstream Kariba Dam along the Zimbabwe-Zambia border generates 1,626 MW while the Cahora Bassa Dam in Mozambique generates 2,075 MW (In: "Senegal River Basin," World Water Assessment Program, UNESCO http://webworld.unesco.org/water/wwap/case_studies/senegal_river/); and The Senegal River represents another international river system: it flows through four countries, supports a basin population of 3.5 million, and has both an irrigation dam and a 200 MW hydroelectric facility (In: The World Bank, "Mali, Mauritania, Senegal: The Senegal River Basin Authority," available at: http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00819C/WEB/PDF/CASE_-49.PDF [accessed April 15, 2016].)

⁶ Ana Elisa Cascao, "Changing Power Relations in the Nile River Basin: Unilateralism vs. Cooperation?" *Water Alternatives* 2 (2009): 253.

⁷ Magdy Hefny and Salah El-Din Amer, "Egypt and the Nile Basin," *Aquatic Sciences* 67 (2005): 42

Colonial era treaties codifying Nile water use have given Egypt unparalleled access to the Nile and Egypt's influence in the global arena have enabled it to block Ethiopian efforts at securing international funding for Nile-related projects. For example, Ethiopia's request for an African Development Bank loan in the 1990s to support a water works project was blocked by Egypt⁸ and more recently Egypt successfully prevented Ethiopia from accessing international financing for construction of the GERD.⁹ The importance of the Nile to Egypt was again demonstrated in 2013 when Egypt proposed military action against its upstream riparian over the GERD.¹⁰ However, Egyptian efforts to thwart Ethiopia's plans have thus far proven unsuccessful and as of September 2016 reports surfaced indicating that the GERD is more than 50 percent complete.¹¹

Ethiopia's announcement of the GERD and its continued construction despite funding impediments and downstream objections are indicative of the increasing challenge that Ethiopia poses to Egyptian hegemony as Ethiopia establishes itself as a rising power within the region. Ethiopia's focus on energy sufficiency to drive its internal development is disrupting the region's historic balance of power as well as relations between the Nile Basin countries. In particular, Ethiopian –Egyptian relations have become progressively more complex and understanding this dynamic is increasingly pertinent to ensuring regional stability.

⁸ See: FDRE. MOFED, *Rural Development Policy and Strategies* (Addis Ababa: MOFED Economic Policy and Planning Department, 2003), 28. Available at: http://gafspfund.org/sites/gafspfund.org/files/Documents/Ethiopia_4_of_6_ARD%20policy.pdf [accessed March 12, 2016] and Zareen Iqbal, "Africa's Waning Waters: Dispute over the Nile," *International Institute for Justice and Development* June 27, 2010. Available at: <http://iijd.org/news/entry/africas-waning-waters-dispute-over-the-nile> [accessed February 8, 2016].

⁹ William Davison, "Ethiopians Rally Olympic-Style, Chip in on Bonds for Dam," *Bloomberg*, May 12, 2015, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-12/ethiopians-rally-olympic-style-chip-in-on-bonds-for-dam>

¹⁰ BBC, "Egyptian warning over Ethiopian Nile dam," *BBC*, June 10, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22850124>

¹¹ Dana Sanchez, "What Strained Relations? Tanzania is Fourth African Country To Buy Electricity From Ethiopia," *AFK Insider*, August 29, 2016, <http://afkinsider.com/131941/tanzania-is-fourth-african-country-to-buy-electricity-from-ethiopia/>

Research Design and Limitations

Studying rising powers is neither new nor unique; it has been a core element of international relations studies since Kautilya Arthashastra advised the Indian King Chandragupta Maurya around 300 B.C.E. Thus, analyzing the rise of Ethiopian power and its subsequent effects on relations with its riparian counterparts is a continuation in these studies. The question that must be addressed, then, is how to best explain this situation. Rather than applying the dominant neorealist paradigm, Ethiopian-Egyptian relations will be explained by the English School of Thought's (EST) conception of a *gesellschaft* society's development. As such, this thesis will be a theoretical case study and qualitative analysis of Ethiopian-Egyptian relations. Ethiopia's growth has coincided with an increasingly complacent Egypt and while the conditions may be ripe for conflict between the two countries, the opposite is occurring. Ethiopia and Egypt have begun the transition from players interacting in an international system to partners collaborating in an international society.

Theoretical and practical limitations are surely inherent in any discussion of this nature. Firstly, the decision to apply the EST rather than the theory of hydro-hegemony allows for a more nuanced discussion that focuses on more than power relations and water security. In the past, such a theory did prove accurate (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006) in explaining Ethiopian-Egyptian relations along the Nile; however, relations have evolved and such explanations only provide a limited understanding of current affairs. Practically, the authoritarian nature of the countries in this study suggests access to information is not always readily available and media sources may be incomplete or biased. Additionally, while the contemporary nature of this topic makes for an exciting and relevant case study, the volatility of international relations is

inherently limiting. Lastly, the qualitative nature of this research is intrinsically more subjective than the structured and measured approach to research that quantitative studies provide.

This analysis of Ethiopian-Egyptian relations will proceed as follows: Section One will offer a discussion on international relations theories where the null and alternate hypotheses will be identified and will conclude by reintroducing the current issue impacting Ethiopian-Egyptian relations. Section Two will discuss the Nile River and the effect of the colonial period on both Egypt and Ethiopia as well as on Nile management. Section Three provides a review of each country's contemporary histories, domestic and foreign policies, and their respective uses of the Nile River. This section will conclude with a review of contemporary efforts at Nile management. Section Four will discuss the GERD, its expected impact on downstream countries, the role that the recent drought has played in exacerbating tensions, and how the two countries have reacted to this development. Section Five will offer an analysis of Ethiopian-Egyptian relations. Ultimately, this thesis will contribute to discussions on order in international relations, add to the literature on the EST, and support the idea that there exists a middle ground between an international society and anarchy.

Section One: Theoretical Considerations

To explain Ethiopian-Egyptian relations using neorealism, the dominant international relations theory, would be to assert that the change in Ethiopia's power relative to its riparian counterparts is sufficient to explain changes in regional relations. Regional relations would be the result of states acting in their own self-interest to protect themselves from hostile actions of other states. However, the parsimonious nature of such an explanation does not address the intricacies inherent in Ethiopian-Egyptian relations. Instead, contemporary relations are better explained through a multifaceted framework inclusive of normative considerations. The concept of an international society, with tacitly agreed upon norms and values supported by various institutions, more thoroughly explains the maintenance of order between the two countries. Thus, two theories of order in international relations apply: structural/neo-realism, or the more rationalist tradition found in the English School of Thought.

As such, the null hypothesis will be explained through Kenneth Waltz's theory of structural, or neo-, realism: the impact of Ethiopia's rise on regional relations can be explained as a function of the international system in which it operates. The alternate hypothesis will be explained through the English School of Thought and the concept of an international society. Accordingly, this thesis maintains that the impact of Ethiopia's rise on regional relations can be most appropriately explained through the idea of an international society. What follows is a review of these two perspectives on the occurrence of order in international relations.

The Realist Tradition

Intellectual Precursors

With its roots in Thucydides' account of *The Peloponnesian War* in 431 B.C.E., the realist tradition is arguably the longest running and most prominent school of thought in international relations theory. In the search to understand the outbreak of the war between Athens and the historically dominant Sparta, Thucydides' claimed that it was the "growth of the Athenian power, which [put] the Lacedaemonians into fear [that] necessitated the war."¹² The self-interested but rational desire of Athens to grow its empire disrupted the historic balance of power. With Sparta's own security threatened, the only feasible reaction to ensuring Spartan survival was via the use of force in self-defense.

By the 16th century, Niccoló Machiavelli had successfully disseminated the idea that "ambition or fear and the security dilemma [were] sufficient to justify" imperialist objectives, or preemptive war.¹³ To guarantee state survival, then, "the international environment not only justifies but demands... [that] nothing... [is left] to chance."¹⁴ Explaining states' actions through power politics and self-interest continues throughout the progression of realist discourse.

Writing in the 17th century on the state of nature in domestic politics, Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* argued for a strong state authority to mitigate the chaotic and anarchic society in which the self-interested man operates. Acceptance of a political authority to govern the state would offer protection, stability, and regulation, and provide the foundation for a moral society.

¹² Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 1.23. Available at: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Thuc.+1.23&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0247> [accessed February 23, 2016].

¹³ Steven Forde, "Varieties of Realism: Thucydides and Machiavelli," *The Journal of Politics* 54 (1992): 377.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 378.

Without such authority individuals would necessarily be prepared to protect themselves against threatening actions.¹⁵

To realists, once a state comes into existence, it operates much like men in Hobbes's state of nature. The individual drive for security and power dominates states' actions; however, since states are considered the highest entity, no supranational element exists to regulate behavior. Thus, states operate independently in an anarchic world. Though states may engage in international treaties and choose to uphold certain obligations, this "prove[s] ineffective in restraining the struggle for power... [as] states will interpret them to their own advantage, and so international law will be obeyed or ignored according to the interests of the states affected."¹⁶

20th Century Classical Realism

Though realism waned during the interwar years of the 20th century, it gained popularity after World War II. As such, 20th century classical realists perceived international "politics as [the] conflict of interests and a struggle for power, and... seek peace by trying to recognize common group and individual interests rather than by moralizing."¹⁷ They considered human nature and the desire for power key factors in international relations.¹⁸

Rejecting the utopian idea of universal morality based on a harmony of interests applicable to all society, E.H. Carr (1939)¹⁹ used the notion of relativity to assert that "the interests of a given party always determine what this party regards as moral principles, and hence, these principles are not universal."²⁰ Supranational institutions, international law, and

¹⁵ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (United Kingdom: Green Dragon in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1651) XIII, 3. Available at: <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm> [accessed February 20, 2016].

¹⁶ Julian W. Korab-Karpowicz, "Political Realism in International Relations," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2013 Edition). Available at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/realism-intl-relations/> [accessed February 22, 2016].

¹⁷ Korab-Karpowicz

¹⁸ Joseph Nye, "Review: Neorealism and Neoliberalism," *World Politics* 40 (1988): 241.

¹⁹ E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (London: MacMillan and Co., 1939), 77.

²⁰ Korab-Karpowicz

“universal” norms could never be accepted globally since they would simply be a reflection of the most powerful. The inability of the international system to create an organized, supranational power is both the result of and results in a system of states each with their own needs, interests, and conceptions of morality. Mutual cooperation and understanding become difficult.

Building on Carr, Hans Morgenthau asserted that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power,” and whatever the goal – religious, economic, social, etc. – it is realized through this competition for power.²¹ His emphasis on power as both the defining feature and end goal of international relations is reminiscent of the Hobbesian perspective of human nature and mankind’s insatiable appetite for power in an anarchical world. For Morgenthau, realism’s fundamental principles were as follows:

- International politics is governed by objective laws rooted in human nature;
- A state’s interest is defined in terms of power and can change overtime;
- States are aware of but not driven by the moral significance of political action; instead, states act prudently and weigh the consequences of alternative action;
- There are no universal moral laws that govern all states; and,
- Politics is an autonomous sphere where actions of a state are rational, calculated, and separate from moral, and other, considerations.²²

The growth of international institutions, non-governmental organizations, and multinational corporations in the 1970s, though, challenged Morgenthau’s emphasis on the state as the unitary actor in international decision-making.²³ Furthermore, by “basing international politics on human nature’s drive for power, ... Morgenthau [was unable to] adequately account

²¹ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973), 27.

²² Morgenthau, 4-15.

²³ Korab-Karpowicz

for variation,” and his theory was further criticized.²⁴ While contemporary realists maintain that a balance of power is necessary to avoid conflict, there remains a variety of perspectives in regards to the degree of influence different factors have on such a balance.²⁵ In an attempt to provide a more accurate framework of state behavior, Kenneth Waltz developed the structural, or neorealist, school of thought.

Neorealism

In his *Man, the State and War* Waltz classified the causes of war at various levels. Theories focused on individual or national level causes were considered ‘reductionist’ and insufficient in explaining relations whereas those focused on international level causes were ‘systemic’ and more applicable.²⁶ According to Waltz, international and domestic structures have three defining characteristics: ordering principles, differentiation of functions among members, and distribution of capabilities.²⁷ The ordering principle – hierarchy or anarchy – informs the other characteristics. In the international structure the ordering principle is anarchy, states are functionally similar, differentiated only by their capabilities, and are the key “units whose interactions form the structure of international political systems.”²⁸

States’ capabilities, informed by their respective level of power, determine the degree of structural constraints they face and define system-wide interactions. Though norms, values, individuals, and domestic processes are recognized factors, they remain inadequate for neorealist explanations of international relations. It is the anarchic, self-help structure of international politics that limits the cooperation of states but supports a balance of power. Since states are

²⁴ Nye, 241.

²⁵ Harry Stephan, *Two-Level Games* (South Africa: Stephan Phillips (Pty) Ltd, 1998), 5.

²⁶ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 18.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 88-89.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 95-97. The ordering principles of international structures differ from the domestic realm. In domestic structures the organizing principle is hierarchy, members are functionally differentiated, and vary in the extent of their capabilities.

apprehensive of interdependence and specialization as it may result in vulnerabilities and dependence, “considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest,” and interdependence is obstructed.²⁹ While anarchy may create conditions unfavorable for interstate cooperation (inequality and insecurity) it nevertheless allows for a system that is self-preserving and stable. Anarchy supports the balance of power amongst states.

Though a state’s primary concern is survival, it still seeks to maintain its position relative to others. This can be done internally by increasing economic and military capabilities, and/or externally by strengthening its alliances or weakening others.³⁰ Both measures are taken to constrain the dominant state while preserving its own existence. Thus, systemic level factors corroborate Waltz’s conviction that “the balance of power is not so much imposed by statesmen on events as it is imposed by events on statesmen.”³¹

Whereas classical realists consider power both a means to an end and an end itself, neorealists understand state security as the end, with power as the means. To ensure state survival the distribution of power and power politics become influential in a state’s behavior.³² Waltz ultimately concludes that the “permissive cause of war is the condition of anarchy in the international political system of states, whereas the efficient causes of any given war can be found at other levels of analysis.”³³

Neorealism provides a parsimonious framework for analyzing and categorizing various causes of war and its focus on the balance of power as a system tendency rather than as generated by elements within the state has inspired debate amongst scholars. For example, John Ruggie claims that Waltz’s explanation of structural realism as the basis for explaining

²⁹ Ibid., 105-107.

³⁰ Ibid., 118.

³¹ Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 209.

³² Korab-Karpowicz

³³ Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, *International Relations Theory* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987): 42.

international outcomes is insufficient in that it does not accurately address change in the international system.³⁴ Additionally, Kapstein recognizes that the “reactions of states to the international system are processed through some form of domestic intermediation”³⁵ and as such, it is necessary to understand the impact that political structures, bureaucracies, and leadership qualities have in shaping international relations. What follows are efforts at strengthening neorealism in regards to the two aforementioned critiques.³⁶

Alternative Explanations of Change

Robert Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic war provides an alternative explanation of change in international relations. According to Gilpin, stability exists as long as the distribution of power in the international system is asymmetric, instability occurs when a declining power is confronted by a rising power. As the declining hegemon takes measures to maintain its position and control over the rules of the game, the likelihood of conflict increases.³⁷

Since an international system is established by states to advance a particular set of interests, the resulting structure often reflects the dominant actor’s preferences. Diminishing returns and increasing costs associated with hegemony results in a disjuncture between the components of the international system and the state’s capacity to maintain the status quo becomes difficult to sustain. Simultaneously, a weaker state’s focus on internal growth enables it to confront the vulnerable hegemon and rearrange the international system to suit its own preferences. Hegemonic war occurs during the periods of disequilibrium resulting from friction

³⁴ John Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis,” *World Politics* 35 (1982), 261-85.

³⁵ Ethan B. Kapstein, “Review: Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Relations,” *International Organization* 49 (1995), 754.

³⁶ For additional critiques of neorealism, see Robert Keohane, *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) and William Wohlforth, “Gilpinian Realism and International Relations,” *International Relations*, 25 (2011): 499-511.

³⁷ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

between the existing status quo and “a rising state[s] attempt to change the rules of the international system.”³⁸

Using economic and sociological theory to inform his assumptions, Gilpin claims that political actors gauge the costs and benefits associated with advancing their own interests; attempts at change are made when conditions are most conducive.³⁹ Through an assessment of the probability of security threats, states choose from a variety of strategies to support their particular interests at any given moment. Thus, the international system changes overtime because variations in economic, technological, and other developments influence states’ interests and power, and thus states’ capabilities and position in the world.⁴⁰

As explained through Wohlforth’s possibility – probability dichotomy of conflict, the rationalization inherent in cost-benefit analyses differentiates Gilpin from Waltz considerably. Whereas Waltz assumes that “states are conditioned by the mere *possibility* of conflict, ... Gilpin assumes... states make decisions based on the *probability* of conflict.”⁴¹ Whereas Waltz sees all states at all times seeking to maximize their security or to maintain or increase their power relative to other states, Gilpin argues that states seek to increase their power only when the costs of doing so are lower than the expected benefits.⁴² Thus, the international and domestic environments that states operate in guide their action. The recognition by Gilpin that ideas, institutions, and domestic politics play a role in international politics is further testament to the assumption that states make decisions based on the probability of conflict rather than the neorealist emphasis on its possibility. How states perceive situations will be discussed separately.

³⁸ Ibid., 185-187.

³⁹ Ibid., 10 – 11.

⁴⁰ Gilpin

⁴¹ William Wohlforth, “Gilpinian Realism and International Relations,” *International Relations* 25 (2011): 503.

⁴² Gilpin, 10.

First and Second Levels of Analysis

While the balance of power can explain the feasibility of an attempted disruption to the international system, the domestic arrangements of states provide incentives or disincentives for engagement.⁴³ Therefore, understanding first and second level factors will address the second criticism of Waltz – the lack of importance given to non-systemic factors. The first level of analysis maintains that man’s “selfishness [and] misdirected aggressive impulses... [are] the primary causes of war.”⁴⁴ Thus, the solution is to educate and enlighten man and to divert his energy away from conflict. However, since “everything is related to human nature, to explain anything one must consider more than [simply] human nature,” and therefore, Waltz addresses the second image of international relations – the internal organization of the state.⁴⁵

If the domestic structure of states is responsible for disrupting order in the international system, then it must also change to provide for peace. However, the idea that “good states mean peace in the world, is an extremely doubtful proposition” and such a statement is not necessarily wrong, claims Waltz, but incomplete.⁴⁶ States’ make up and preferences are often secondary to the international system since power politics and uncertainty compel states to pursue second and third best strategies based upon what they do know, which is a reflection of the environment in which they operate.⁴⁷

Neorealists consider the first and second images to be unsatisfactory though not unimportant in explaining international relations. While reductionist factors are necessary in order to understand “the forces that determine policy, [it is] the third image [that makes it

⁴³ For additional explanation see Gilpin, Chapter 2.

⁴⁴ Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 98.

⁴⁵ Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, 99.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 100.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 60-67, 93-97.

possible] to assess their importance or predict their results.”⁴⁸ As a result, Waltz does not expand on the first two levels and instead focuses on the role of the international structure. Thus, scholars have sought to reincorporate the man and state in such discussions.

In *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, a compilation of case studies and articles focusing on the domestic sources of international relations, Rosecrance and Stein argue that

“domestic groups, social ideas, the character of constitutions, economic constraints, ... historical social tendencies, and domestic political pressures play an important... role in the selection of a grand strategy and, therefore, in the prospects for international conflict and cooperation.”⁴⁹

Ruling party strength, cohesiveness, and the nature of the domestic society are important factors that can determine international relations decisions. They conclude that balance within the international system “may be as much determined by [states’] domestic orientations as by their international power, ... [and] the existence of asymmetry in domestic and economic positions within opposing countries sometimes helps to explain why war breaks out.”⁵⁰

Andrew Moravcsik compartmentalizes domestic sources of international relations into society-centered influencers, state-centered influencers, and the influence of state-society relations. The first emphasizes pressure from “domestic social groups through legislatures, interest groups, elections, and public opinion” whereas the state-centered approach stresses “the administrative and decision-making apparatus of the executive branch.”⁵¹ State-society theories

⁴⁸ Ibid., 108.

⁴⁹ Richard Rosecrance, and Arthur A. Stein, “Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy,” in *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*. ed. by Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein. (New York: Cornell University Press: 1993), 5.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 21.

⁵¹ Andrew Moravcsik, “Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining” in *Double-Edged Diplomacy*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam (California: University of California Press, 1993), 6.

locate causes in representative, educational, and administrative institutions that link the state and society.⁵²

Brandon Kinne's poliheuristic research on foreign policy decision making of non-democratic regimes reiterates the importance of domestic level factors in international relations. Whereas in democracies society and institutions influence leadership decisions, Kinne concludes that in an autocracy, leaders' values and decisions are often influenced by relationships with various individual military and political guarantors.⁵³

Due to linkages between domestic influencers and state decision makers, separating out domestic social pressures and the role of ideology becomes difficult to do. As John Mueller argues through his analysis of the Cold War, ideological differences between the superpowers "emanate[d] from domestic politics... [likewise] the key element in the demise of the Cold War derived from changes in ideas."⁵⁴ Michael Howard even claims that "those who are not willing to fight in order to protect and if possible extend the political and social structures which were created to preserve their cultural values, will see those values wither and die."⁵⁵

Samuel Huntington (1992 and 1996), recognizing the decline of ideological differences with the end of the Cold War, hypothesized that rather than an ideological divide, "the fault lines between civilizations [would] be the battle lines of the future."⁵⁶ Cultural differences are in their highest form articulated via civilizations, and as the world becomes more connected, the fundamental differences inherent in cultures and civilizations become more acute. Prior to

⁵² Ibid., 6.

⁵³ Brandon Kinne, "Decision Making in Autocratic Regimes: A Poliheuristic Perspective," *International Studies Perspectives* 6 (2005): 114-128.

⁵⁴ John Mueller, "The Impact of Ideas on Grand Strategy," in *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, ed. by Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein. (New York: Cornell University Press: 1993), 48 and 53.

⁵⁵ Michael Howard, "Ideology and International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 15 (1989): 6.

⁵⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72 (1993): 22-49.

Huntington's formative piece, Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba (1963 and 1989) investigated the role that culture had on a political system. They found that

“the development of a stable and effective democratic government depends upon more than the structures of government and politics: it depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process – upon the political culture.”⁵⁷

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's *War and Reason* evaluates whether states engage in conflict because of external pressures that weigh on their existence, leaving them little choice but to go to war, or because of the weight of domestic political pressures.⁵⁸ Through an international interactions game model, they conclude that “rational actors with complete information about the risks associated with the use of force will either maintain the status quo or seek a negotiated settlement, ... [and] if war arises from a crisis it must be because of factors located at the unit level, since structural pressures generate a status quo preference.”⁵⁹ Domestic political forces acting irrationally are considered able to pressure a state to engage in conflict.

Graham Allison's 1971 *Essence of Decision Making* focuses on the impact that the structure of a domestic political system has on international relations. With the Cuban Missile Crisis as his case study, Allison identifies various analytical 'lenses' for explaining international events. Though all models seek to explain state action, his core observation is that states were treated as if they “were centrally coordinated, purposive individuals, ... [and] this simplification... obscures the persistently neglected fact of bureaucracy: the ‘maker’ of government policy is not one calculating decision-maker but is rather a conglomerate of larger

⁵⁷ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (USA: Princeton University Press, 1963), 498.

⁵⁸ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

⁵⁹ Ethan B. Kapstein, “Review: Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Relations,” *International Organization* 49 (1995): 760.

organizations and political actors.”⁶⁰ Allison’s bureaucratic model takes into account the domestic make up of a state and concludes that:

“government decisions and actions result from a political process, ... [and] what moves the chess pieces is ...the power and skill of proponents and opponents of the action in question.”⁶¹

In Jeffrey Checkel’s more contemporary review of constructivist work concerned with “reductionist factors,” two assumptions emerge. The first considers the environment that states act in as both social and material with structures “given meaning only by the social context through which they are interpreted.”⁶² The second assumes that these environmental characteristics provide actors with ways of understanding interests, and through the interaction of “agents and structures, ... state interests emerge from and are endogenous to interaction with structures.”⁶³ For constructivists, it is necessary to consider the impact of societal and environmental factors on international relations.

The process of decision-making – cost-benefit analysis, gauging windows of opportunity, and assessing environments – is clearly impacted by both external and internal factors. Historical considerations, economic growth, and technology all influence perception and decision-making.⁶⁴ Likewise, external factors are largely calculated by and understood through states’ and leaders’ perceptions of their environments. Therefore, while the structures of the domestic and international systems play a role in international relations, so do characteristics of state leadership and first level factors.

⁶⁰ Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision Making* (USA: HarperCollins Publishers, 1971), 3. See Chapter 1 for an explanation of the rational actor model; Chapter 3 for the organizational framework; and Chapter 5 for the bureaucratic/governmental model of analysis.

⁶¹ Allison, 145.

⁶² Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Review: The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” *World Politics* 50 (1998): 325-326.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 326.

⁶⁴ Gilpin. For additional information on perception in international relations see: Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976).

Robert Jervis is one of the original scholars to study the role that the first level of analysis (man/leadership) had on international relations. His 1976 *Perception and Misperception in International Relations* claims that states, through observation and history, develop beliefs about other actors that inform their understanding of how the other will behave in certain circumstances. This process creates an image that is not always based on fully accurate information and actions may be unintentionally misinterpreted. Thus, “views about [a state’s] specific characteristics are linked through the third factor, ... the actor’s beliefs about the other’s interests and intentions.”⁶⁵ Though misperception can be mitigated, “people underestimate the impact of established beliefs and predispositions” and changing ingrained ideas is a necessarily slow process.⁶⁶

Oran Young and Richard Snyder have also contributed to the study of the relationship between leadership and international relations. Young’s work on institutional bargaining identified different leadership types, with each classification exhibiting different negotiating tactics and outcomes.⁶⁷ Snyder’s study on motivational analysis distinguished “in order to” motives and “because of” motives of decision-makers. The former occur when decision-makers seek to accomplish an objective of the state whereas the latter are “unconscious or semiconscious motives [that] arise out of the previous life experience of the decision-makers, and which predispose or impel them toward certain kinds of policy.”⁶⁸ Personal histories and attitudes of policymakers allow for a more complete understanding of international decision-making and relations.

⁶⁵ Jervis, 122.

⁶⁶ Jervis, 410.

⁶⁷ Oran R. Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society,” *International Organization* 45 (1991): 281 – 308.

⁶⁸ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1981), 475.

Charles Kupchan (1994) expands on these studies with the idea of the strategic culture of decision-makers. Beliefs about national security and the perception of a state's current environment directs leaders into certain situations; divergence from such a decision is rarely possible because of the effort it took to get there. Kupchan further identifies responses of rising or declining states to their perceived level of vulnerability.⁶⁹ Like Snyder and Jervis before him, Kupchan recognizes the role that perception has on the strategic culture and its ultimate impact on international relations decisions.⁷⁰

As Jervis concludes, it is "impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to decision-makers' beliefs about the world and their images of others."⁷¹ Therefore, to fully understand decision-making in international relations one must understand the context that states and decision-makers operate in, their respective and joint histories, and the amount and accuracy of available information. Despite research supporting first and second level analyses to provide a more nuanced explanation of international relations, the neorealist focus on structural causes continues to dominate discussions. Neorealism's core assumptions can be expressed as follows: states are rational, unitary actors that operate within an anarchic, international system and are thus the key units of analysis. State survival and security, defined via the quest for

⁶⁹ Kupchan's vulnerability – response relationships are as follows: (1) Facing low vulnerability, a declining state will engage in "timely balancing," (2) Facing low vulnerability, a rising state will engage in "paced imperial growth," (3) Facing high vulnerability, a declining state will be overly cooperative and succumb to "strategic exposure," (4) Facing high vulnerability, a rising state will expand to the point of encirclement in both core and periphery, (5) Facing high vulnerability, a declining state will be cooperative in the core but expansionist in the periphery, and (6): Facing high vulnerability, a rising state will be overly competitive in both the core and periphery. In: Richard Rosecrance, "Overextension, Vulnerability, and Conflict: The "Goldilocks Problem" in International Strategy (A Review Essay)." *International Security* 19 (1995): 150-151.

⁷⁰ For additional information on strategic culture see: Allistair Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security* 14 (1995): 32-64.

⁷¹ Jervis, 28.

power, are the most important issues concerning states.⁷² This thesis will take the neorealist paradigm as its null hypothesis

The English School of Thought

The alternate hypothesis will be drawn from the less prominent English School of Thought (EST) that provides a more nuanced way of thinking about international relations. Although similarities can be drawn between the EST and the idealists of the early 20th century, the EST accepts the basic tenets of realism.⁷³ The key difference between these two subcategories of realism is the stabilizing force of international relations. For neorealists, order is possible because of the formation of power balances amongst states with shifts in such a balance able to result in conflict. Writers in the EST acknowledge that the balance of power is an important factor in explaining order in international relations but order is *also* sustained by international law, war, diplomacy, and great state powers.⁷⁴ The EST's alternative explanation of stability and order, with an emphasis on an international society, offers a more compelling and complete framework for analyzing international relations.

Intellectual Precursors

Writing in the 17th century, Hugo Grotius contributed greatly to the emergence of the study of international law and the idea of an international society as he sought to understand the relationship between self-preservation of the state and the needs of the wider human society.⁷⁵ The international society that Grotius envisioned was the idea “that states and rulers [we]re

⁷² Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, *International Relations Theory* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987).

⁷³ Barry Buzan, “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School,” *International Organization* 47 (1993).

⁷⁴ Richard Little, *The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 128.

⁷⁵ Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, “Introduction: Grotian Thought in International Relations,” in *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, ed. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 25.

bound by rules and form[ed] a society or community with one another,” and thus law and conflict could be reconciled.⁷⁶ Though Grotius acknowledged that states existed in an anarchical world, anarchy was considered conducive to the creation of an international society since humans and states alike constituted “part of the great society of all mankind.”⁷⁷ As states interact with each other, mutual recognition of inherent normative considerations results in the “acceptance of the requirements of coexistence and cooperation in a society of states.”⁷⁸

It is the recognition of norms and their benefits to states’ existence that encourages submission to supranational, though perhaps not codified, law. Despite the utopian facade, it is the self-interested nature of the state that drives acceptance of international norms. As scholar Michael Donelan argues, “a Grotian state does not seek in its foreign policies to determine international issues for the common good because that is the purpose of its existence, [but rather because the] grounds for doing so [are] in its own interests.”⁷⁹ Ultimately, Grotius proposed that it is not power politics that constrain state behavior, but rather “the triumph of a universal set of principles.”⁸⁰

The 18th century German philosopher Christian Wolff significantly influenced subsequent scholars with his work on the law of nations and how to limit state behavior. Like those before him, Wolff considered the state to be a moral person and held that once this state as a moral person was created, “it had its own conscience that was not [refutable] on the basis of another

⁷⁶ Hedley Bull, “The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations,” in *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, ed. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 71.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 72.

⁷⁸ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 27.

⁷⁹ Michael Donelan, “Grotius and the Image of War,” *Millennium*, 12 (1983): 241.

⁸⁰ Theodore Christov, “Liberal internationalism revisited: Grotius, Vattel, and the International order of states,” *The European Legacy* 10 (2005): 563

person's conscientious injunctions.”⁸¹ Wolff considered state action much like a realist would: actions are taken in the interest of that state and its inhabitants, despite possible objections by other actors. However, the existence of necessary and voluntary laws of nations ensures states respect citizens outside its borders.⁸² Given the self-interested nature of the state, following rules becomes uncertain and Wolff advocated for a *civitas maxima*, or person of international standing, to act as an external regulator of state conduct.⁸³ According to Wolff, order amongst states would exist as a result of a *civitas maxima* or supranational individual monitoring international relations.

Building on both Wolff and Grotius, Vattel's 1758 *The Law of Nations* provided a framework to guide statesmen in their interactions whilst allowing for the sovereignty and independence intrinsic to the state apparatus. A key tenet of *The Law of Nations* was his explanation of the most “effective means [for states to] maintain peace and stability while enjoying their freedom.”⁸⁴ Vattel argued that sovereign states were of the highest importance and the state's primary duty, similar to mankind's, was the quest for self-perfection. Since a state must first “attend to its own best interests... [its] duty to itself must take precedence over its duties to others.”⁸⁵ Due to the primacy of the state, Vattel believed in the existence of a society of states that voluntarily accepted supranational principles. Vattel argued that though the state is self-interested, it is also moral. A state's morality drives it to accept the voluntary law of nations to regulate its behavior, resulting in the formation of a society of states:

⁸¹ Ben Holland, “The moral person of the state: Emer de Vattel and the foundations of international legal order,” *History of European Ideas* 37 (2011): 441.

⁸² Wolff first differentiates between perfect and imperfect duties, perfect duties being those duties that promote self and/or state perfection whereas imperfect duties arise in obligation contracted with other states. A necessary law of nature refers the former whereas a voluntary law to the latter. Voluntary laws are further split between stipulative law, or formal treaties, and customary law, or tacit consent. In: Ben Holland, “The moral person of the state: Emer de Vattel and the foundations of international legal order,” *History of European Ideas* 37 (2011): 441-442.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 442

⁸⁴ Christov, 570.

⁸⁵ Holland, 444.

“since all nations must recognize that the rules of the voluntary law are essential to the society of nations as it actually exists, it is presumed that nations have given their consent to them.”⁸⁶

It is the presumed consent of states to the voluntary law of nature that allows them to coexist and limits interference with state liberty and self-interested pursuits. Vattel considered self-interest exhibited through trade and commercial interests as crucial for the maintenance of order within the international system.⁸⁷ Trade became not only “an expression of mutual assistance among nations, [but] also an indispensable factor in the preservation of states.”⁸⁸

Trade induces cooperation through increased interactions and in turn supports a balance of power. “The continual attention of sovereigns to every occurrence, the constant residence of ministers, and the perpetual negotiations,” all increase inter-state collaboration.⁸⁹ Furthermore, trade can act as a factor in determining the balance of power. When a state becomes overwhelmingly powerful – whether benign or belligerent – others are able to coordinate trade policies to obstruct the continued growth of said hegemon.⁹⁰ For a state to develop, maximize its strengths, and achieve its goals, cooperation through international trade and observing associated rules and regulations, is more in line with state interest than conflict and non-cooperation.

While the above individuals are closely involved with the Grotian tradition, they also accept the main premises of realism: states are the primary, unitary actors acting rationally in an anarchic world. Where realists identify order in the balance of power amongst states realized via states’ continual search for power and survival, the intellectual precursors to the EST scholars

⁸⁶ Emmerich De Vattel, *The Law of Nations* (1758), 17-21. Quoted in Carolina Kenny, “Classics of Strategy and Diplomacy,” accessed February 20, 2016, <http://www.classicsofstrategy.com/2015/08/law-of-nations-vattel-1758.html#73>

⁸⁷ “Emmerich de Vattel, *The Law of Nations* (1758),” *Classics of Strategy and Diplomacy*, accessed February 20, 2016, <http://www.classicsofstrategy.com/2015/08/law-of-nations-vattel-1758.html#73>

⁸⁸ Isaac Nakhimovsky, “Vattel’s Theory of the International Order: Commerce and the Balance of Power in the *Law of Nations*,” *History of European Ideas* 33 (2007): 163.

⁸⁹ Holland, 444.

⁹⁰ Nakhimovsky, 165.

advocate more cooperative and comprehensive explanations. Grotius believed universal principles could explain a balance of power; Wolff saw the need for a *civitas maxima*; and Vattel concluded that through cooperation and international trade, agreed upon principles would form an international society to support such a balance. The original scholars of the EST thus provide for a middle ground between realism and idealism.

The English School of Thought

While the Grotian school of thought lost prominence throughout most of the 19th century, it returned to the field of international relations in the 20th century articulated via the EST. Despite its unique position in international relations, “representing a tradition of thought distinct from realism and liberalism [yet] able to combine elements of both and put them into historical context,” the EST is often understudied.⁹¹ Elegantly summarized in Hidemi Suganami’s analysis of the EST, its main tenet is that:

“despite the formally anarchical, or decentralized structure, the modern world of states has evolved rules and practices that govern their interrelations, and that therefore, substantively, the interactions of states exhibit a remarkable degree of order.”⁹²

Dissatisfied with realist explanations of international relations EST scholar Martin Wight undertook an historical analysis to explore “concept[s] across the history of the international system... [to better understand] the modern European-generated international society.”⁹³ His analysis identified three international relations traditions present throughout history: the Machiavellian, or realist, tradition that emphasized international anarchy, the Grotian, or rationalist, that stressed international cooperation, and the Kantian, or revolutionist, that focused

⁹¹ Buzan, *From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School*, 328.

⁹² Hidemi Suganami, “British Institutionalists, or the English School, 20 Years On,” *International Relations* 17 (2003): 257.

⁹³ Buzan, *From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School*, 329.

more on a supranational community of mankind.⁹⁴ Subsequently, the Grotian school of thought became the primary framework on which the EST evolved as it was “better able to accommodate complexity because it [is] itself a compromise that made concessions to both the Machiavellian and Kantian points of view.”⁹⁵ The EST accepts the existence of an international system, an international society, and a world society, each with its own factors impacting international relations. Its core focus remains on the development of an international society.⁹⁶ By merging elements of realist and liberal thought, EST scholars believe that the creation and existence of an international society best explains the maintenance of order in an anarchic world.

According to Hedley Bull, an international/state system exists when “there is interaction between [states] sufficient to make the behavior of each a necessary element in the calculations of the other,” often developing before an international society.⁹⁷ The state system can elevate to a society as tacit or explicit acknowledgements of common values and interests to regulate actions and order develop. An international society comes into existence once states become “conscious of certain common interests and common values, [thus] form[ing] a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.”⁹⁸ The political system of both an international system and society is anarchy, with the sovereignty and autonomy of states the basis for relations amongst them. A world society differs from both a system and a society as it is primarily concerned with units at the individual rather than state level: “a world society... rest[s] on

⁹⁴ Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions* (London: Leicester University Press, 1991).

⁹⁵ Hedley Bull, “Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations: The Second Martin Wight Memorial Lecture,” *International Studies* 2 (1976): 107.

⁹⁶ Balkan Devlen, Patrick James, and Ozgur Ozdamar, “The English School, International Relations, and Progress,” *International Studies Review* 7 (2005).

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁹⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 13.

common norms, rules, and identities held by individuals across the system.”⁹⁹ The EST is concerned with the more attainable and rational international society than with the more idealistic world society. Unfortunately neither Wight nor Bull fully explain the point at which an international system becomes an international society though the different views of each become clear when seeking to explain how the transition can occur.

At this point, it is helpful to discuss Robert Keohane’s *After Hegemony*. Whereas many neorealist scholars – in particular Gilpin and the theory of hegemonic war – consider an eroding hegemony to provide the conditions for conflict, Keohane believes that while “nonhegemonic cooperation is difficult, ... states do have complementary interests, which make certain forms of cooperation potentially beneficial.”¹⁰⁰ Though he does not focus on normative values or the creation of an international society, he cites examples where eroding hegemony is met by a “demand for international regimes” to guide state action and through interactions within these institutions there develops the potential to “create the basis for decentralized enforcement founded on the principle of reciprocity.”¹⁰¹ Situations of hegemonic decline may provide the conditions suitable for an international society’s development.

How an international society can develop, on the other hand, is best articulated through Ferdinand Tönnies’ 1887 conception of *gemeinschaft* or *gesellschaft* associations.¹⁰² As a result of the transition from rural to urban contexts prevalent in the 19th century, and in particular Tönnies’ witness of the “influence of rationalism as the old rural culture of his native province... had to submit to the inroads of mechanization and commercialization,” he sought to understand

⁹⁹ Buzan, *From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School*, 339.

¹⁰⁰ Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984) 244.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 244-245.

¹⁰² Buzan, *From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School*.

how societies form and where they were headed.¹⁰³ Faced with this rural – urban dichotomy, Tönnies concluded that “all kinds of association in which *natural* will predominates [is] *Gemeinschaft*, [and] all those which are formed and fundamentally conditioned by *rational* will, [is] *Gesellschaft*”¹⁰⁴ (author’s emphasis). The former, commonly translated to ‘community,’ has its roots in traditional, rural societies and associated values whereas the latter, translated as ‘society,’ emanates from more capitalist, modern and urban developments. Where *gemeinschaft* is associated with common ways of life, common beliefs, concentrated ties, frequent interaction, distance from centers of power, and emotional bonds, *gesellschaft* is associated with dissimilar ways of life, dissimilar beliefs, infrequent interaction, proximity to centers of power, and regulated competition.¹⁰⁵ *Gemeinschaft* is representative of the more innate, traditional, close communities and *gesellschaft* the more modern and constructed civil society with less intimate interactions.¹⁰⁶

These concepts serve as an interesting point of differentiation for two of the EST’s original scholars. Wight takes the perspective that “societies grow rather than [are] made,” and thus considers communities to be organic developments bonded by common sentiment and similar cultural value.¹⁰⁷ The more functional approach to understanding societies, the concept of

¹⁰³ Ferdinand Tönnies, [1887] *Community and Association (Gemeinschaft und Gesselschaft)*. (Translated by Charles P. Loomis. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1955): Translator’s Introduction, x.

¹⁰⁴ Ferdinand Tönnies, [1887] *Community and Association (Gemeinschaft und Gesselschaft)*. (Translated by Charles P. Loomis. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1955): 17.

¹⁰⁵ Steven Brint, “Gemeinschaft Revisited: A Critique and Reconstruction of the Community Concept,” *Sociological Theory* 19 (2001): 2-3.

¹⁰⁶ For more on *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*, see: Steven Brint, “Gemeinschaft Revisited: A Critique and Reconstruction of the Community Concept,” *Sociological Theory* 19 (2001): 1-23 for an overview of Tönnies and Durkheim’s ideas of community development and Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Graham, “Planet of the Durkheimians: Where Community, Authority, and Sacredness Are Foundations of Morality,” *Perspectives on Justice and Morality* 2008 (371-401) for a comparison of Tönnies, Durkheim and Weber.

¹⁰⁷ Buzan, *From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School*, 333.

gesellschaft, is more often applied by Bull who believes societies can be “constructed rather than [only] sentimental and traditional; ... [they] can be made by acts of will.”¹⁰⁸

A critique of the gesellschaft conception of international societies, the lack of a preexisting “common identity that is [considered] central to the concept of society,” is addressed by more contemporary EST scholars and focuses on the concept of like and unlike units.¹⁰⁹ For like units, interaction makes them more similar and it “becomes easier for each to accept that the other members of the system are in some important sense the same type of entity as itself.”¹¹⁰ The existence of commonalities between different states enables a more fluid transition to a society like structure. Gemeinschaft societies tend to flourish amongst like units. Unlike units, on the other hand, are able to form a community precisely because of their dissimilarities. Since they seek survival, unlike units accept rules that “legitimize the differentiation of units and establish the distribution of rights and responsibilities among functionally differentiated actors.”¹¹¹ Rationality dictates that accepting mutually agreed upon rules will ensure their existence and upon interaction, unlike units can form gesellschaft communities. Furthermore, “in the absence of a central authority, implicit social choice procedures have arisen in the international system... [to] regulate how the actors’ preferences are aggregated into outcomes.”¹¹² At some point during these interactions, the goals and identities of each unlike state converge and the common identity that many argue is characteristic of more fully developed international societies may emerge.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 335.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 336.

¹¹² John D. Morrow, “Social Choice and System Structure in World Politics,” *World Politics* 41 (1988): 79.

¹¹³ Buzan, *From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School*, 336.

Whilst neorealism understands socialization as a result of the international structure forcing states to comply through power politics, threats, and promises, others maintain that socialization results from the superiority of normative ideals. For example, John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan explain socialization within a hegemonic system through the acquiescence of weaker states to the substantive beliefs and normative ideals of the more powerful hegemonic power and proceed to identify conditions most conducive for its occurrence.¹¹⁴ Alexander Wendt's structural idealism considers ideas to be superior to neorealism's material incentives as the causal mechanism of socialization.¹¹⁵ Still others (Schimmelfennig, 2000; Kelley, 2004) write on the influence that institutions and membership in internationalization organizations have on socialization due to the existence of more extensive and codified rules.¹¹⁶ The impact of material or normative factors on socialization does not have to be an either/or situation; socialization is often "triggered by coercion and material inducements, [while] the process of socialization can lead to outcomes that are not explicable simply in terms of the exercise of coercive power."¹¹⁷ Arguably, the process of socialization is best explained through the EST and various normative ideals while neorealism and coercion are better suited to explain how and why it begins.

Regardless of the theories of socialization and community development, Bull maintains that an international society has actually always existed in the modern international system since at "no stage can it be said that...the common interests of states, [the] common rules accepted and

¹¹⁴ John G. Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization* 44 (1990): 283-315.

¹¹⁵ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 33.

¹¹⁶ See: Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment," *European Journal of International Relations* 6 (2000): 109 – 39 and Judith Kelley, "International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership and Socialization by International Institutions," *International Organization* 58 (2004): 425 – 457.

¹¹⁷ John G. Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization* 44 (1990): 315.

[the] common institutions worked by them, has ceased to exert an influence.”¹¹⁸ In its most elementary form, examples of this include mutual state respect for sovereignty, willingness to uphold agreements, and acceptance of the limitations of violence. Importantly, these ‘rules’ are not enforced by a *civitas maxima*; instead, they are realized by the individual interests and actions of sovereign states. In those instances where conflict occurs, nullifying the idea of an international society, Bull proclaims that it is simply the case of “each side treating the other as outside the framework of any common society.”¹¹⁹

Once an international society comes into being, relations amongst states are guided by legal and moral considerations. However, the role that the balance of power plays in restraining state actions remains important. While the mainstream realist sees a balance of power formed as a response to states’ quests to maximize their relative power position, Bull sees the balance formed and preserved through conscious, collective efforts by states to display self-restraint as well as to restrain others. The preservation of the balance of power is a:

“conscious goal of the system as a whole, ... [thus] impl[ying] the possibility of collaboration among states in promoting the common objective of preserving the balance, ... [and] oppos[ing] preponderance throughout all the reaches of the system.”¹²⁰

Along with diplomacy, international law, and war, the balance of power becomes an additional “expression of the element of collaboration among states.”¹²¹ Thus, Bull identifies three key characteristics of order in international relations from which an international society is formed: the existence of sovereign states, the interaction between them, and a degree of

¹¹⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 42.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*,

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 106.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 74.

acceptance of common rules and institutions.¹²² As Richard Little summarizes, the creation of an international society based on

“an institutional balance of power not only presupposes that all states wish to preserve their own autonomy, but also that they acknowledge a common interest in maintaining the essential characteristics of the society within which they operate.”¹²³

First and Second Levels of Analysis

Whereas neorealism reduces the impact of the first and second levels of analyses on international relations, the EST does not. While Bull explicitly recognizes that the state is “chiefly responsible for performing the functions of helping to make the rules effective,”¹²⁴ cultural and domestic factors also play a role in the development of an international society. A *gemeinschaft* form of international society surely makes for an easier and less turbulent transition to an international society; however, where similarities are nonexistent a *gesellschaft* international society can still develop. Therefore, in the creation of international societies certain types of second level domestic factors may be sufficient but not necessary for the initial phases of an international society’s development.

After the initial stages, the acceptance of tacitly agreed upon rules becomes dependent upon joint recognition and voluntary submission of states to societal norms and institutions. The formulation, acceptance, and enforcement of international societal rules are further communicated through “classical acts of diplomacy.”¹²⁵ According to the EST, at this point the structural and cultural components of a state become important factors to look at in regards to the feasibility of an international society’s development.

¹²² Ibid., 233.

¹²³ Richard Little, *The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 135.

¹²⁴ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 71.

¹²⁵ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 71-73.

While the impact of second level domestic factors in an international society varies, the role of leadership and first level factors is more tangible. A lack of common culture to bond states implies that norms develop “functionally from the logic of anarchy, ... [and] as ruling elites recognize the permanence and importance of the economic and strategic interdependence among their states they ... begin to work out rules.”¹²⁶ EST scholars explicitly maintain that “leaders [will] realize the disadvantages of permanent chaos if international relations remain[s] wholly unregulated... [and thus] the idea of mutual self-interest will push [them] into pursuing common objectives.”¹²⁷ The desire for the “limitation of violence resulting in death or bodily harm, the keeping of promises, and the stabilization of possession by rules of property,” are considered “to be the common goals of all social life,” and thus constant goals sought after by all states.¹²⁸ While support of decision makers and the elite to create an international society is important, subjective and irregular leadership ideologies are less impactful on order than the superior goal of state existence.

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman provide an interesting parallel to the EST as they believe irrational political forces may pressure states into conflict. Both recognize that the nature of the international system is anarchic and further imply that it is the condition of anarchy that can enable cooperation. The view that the system perpetuates the status quo implies that the decisions that impact on war and peace must therefore be located in domestic politics. Just as the irrationality of domestic level actors may result in conflict, it is reasonable to conclude that the rationality of domestic actors can result in cooperation.

¹²⁶ Buzan, *From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School*, 334.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 335.

¹²⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 19.

Thus, while the anarchic structure of the international realm enables competition and cooperation, it also provides the boundaries for an international society. To view international society through an idealist lens would minimize state autonomy and pervert the EST's core ideals. As such, Bull and Jackson caution against the establishment of rules enabling interference in a state's domestic situation and see the limits of an international society's development:

“[T]he society of sovereign states is better off focusing on the minimum goal of the orderly coexistence of sovereign states and that straining this society with too high an ideal, such as, in particular, the universal enjoyment of human rights through its international guarantee and protection, is destined to have negative side-effects.”¹²⁹

The creation of an “ideology of internationalism” is further cautioned against by Michael Howard who contends that the formation of “a system of cultural values transcending national boundaries, is possible for a highly-educated minority, but in making such progress that minority is in danger of distancing itself from the mass of its fellow countrymen, if not of losing touch with them altogether.”¹³⁰ These reservations are arguably what constrain the EST to focusing primarily on an international, rather than world, society.

Bull's view of the balance of power in international relations has received limited attention over the years, in part due to Waltz's (1979) systemic and parsimonious approach to international relations that emerged shortly after *The Anarchical Society's* 1977 publication. However, more contemporary scholars have built on Bull's approach to an international society. An area that has emerged as a key issue for subsequent EST scholars is the distinction between

¹²⁹ Hidemi Suganami, “The English School in a Nutshell,” *Ritsumeikan Review of International Studies* 9 (2010): 25-26.

¹³⁰ Howard, 8.

an international system and an international society, with the emerging consensus that the distinction should be discarded.¹³¹

James (1993) argues that like an international system, within an international society states take each other's behavior into account as they formulate their actions and thus, Bull has created a false dichotomy. Therefore, the idea of an international system should be dispensed and more attention should be placed on the societal dimension.¹³² Jackson (2000) believes that such a dichotomy could be better articulated via the distinction of instrumental and non-instrumental behavior. The former is "based on strategic conceptions of self-interest that necessarily take the actions of the other into consideration... [whereas the latter] is based on legal and moral obligations that necessarily embrace the legitimate interests of others who will be affected by this behavior."¹³³

Despite these distinctions, Bull's updated work (2002) continues to differentiate between an international system and international society. Whilst he determines that a balance of power can exist in an international system, such a systemic balance will materialize "quite fortuitously, in the absence of any belief that it serves common interests, or any attempt to regulate or institutionalize it."¹³⁴ Perhaps it is Bull's recognition that in order for a state to survive "any sovereign has to satisfy domestic interests"¹³⁵ and thus the formation of a systemic balance may presuppose the formulation of an international society. Even when two sides fiercely oppose each other and deny they are part of a common international society, such a concept "does not disappear so much as go underground, where it continues to influence the practice of states."¹³⁶

¹³¹ Little, 140.

¹³² Alan James, "System or Society," *Review of International Studies* 19 (1993): 269-288.

¹³³ Little, 141.

¹³⁴ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 2002), 63.

¹³⁵ Little, 143.

¹³⁶ Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 40.

An international society in its purest form will not occur overnight; however, an international society in its primitive form is both feasible and desirable if maintaining order is the objective.

Contemporary scholars have also expressed interest in the creation, existence and importance of regional international societies.¹³⁷ For classical EST scholars, the only regional society of importance was Europe and the global international society was considered a consequence of its expansion. In seeking to understand the breadth and depth of a society's development, two distinct streams have emerged within the EST. The *pluralist* strand is more realist, focused on minimalist rules, and "stress[es] the conduct of states within anarchy, but... still note[s] that states cooperate, despite the existence of self-interest."¹³⁸ The *solidarist* view, on the other hand, focuses on the "total interplay of states, non-state actors, and individuals, while carrying the sense that all the actors in the system are conscious of their interconnectedness and share some important values."¹³⁹

Interest in regional societies has arguably grown from the recognition that "the contemporary global international society is a 'thin' one in the sense that it is pluralistic and heterogeneous. Within the bounds of that society, there exist several 'more thickly developed' 'regional clusters' in which the solidarist elements of international society are developed to a greater degree."¹⁴⁰ While the thick, solidarist strand is more closely related to *gemeinschaft* societies, the expansion of regional international societies may incorporate members that are

¹³⁷ For example, see: Schouenborg, Laust, *The Scandinavian International Society: Primary Institutions and Binding Forces, 1815-2010* (Routledge: London, 2012) and Aalto, Pami, "Russia's Quest for International Society and the Prospects for Regional-Level International Societies," *International Relations* 21 (2007): 459-478.

¹³⁸ Robert W. Murray, "Introduction." in *System, Society & the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations*, edited by Robert Murray (Bristol: E-International Relations, 2013), 2. Available at: <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/05/08/the-english-and-the-study-of-sub-global-international-societies/> [accessed February 2, 2016].

¹³⁹ Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 64.

¹⁴⁰ Yannis Stivachtis, "The English School and the Study of Sub-global International Societies," in *System, Society & the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations*, ed. by Robert Murray (Bristol: E-International Relations, 2013), 43. Available at: <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/05/08/the-english-and-the-study-of-sub-global-international-societies/> [accessed February 2, 2016].

culturally dissimilar, and thus contribute to a *gesellschaft* society's development. To this end, various standards and normative conditions have come to complement rather than contradict the traditional, cultural notion of *gemeinschaft*. By more fully appreciating the concept of regional international societies, contemporary EST scholars have attempted to explain the uneven and precarious development of an international society.

In order to explain how the rise of Ethiopia is impacting on regional relations, this thesis will offer support to the English School of Thought's conception of an international society rather than Kenneth Waltz's neorealist explanation's exclusive focus on systemic factors. To Waltz and likeminded neorealists "the fact that there is nothing in the international system to prevent war works as the permissive cause that underlines every particular war and produces an efficient cause of some wars."¹⁴¹ For EST, the development of an international society within an anarchic international system deters states from engaging in war. While there are clear benefits of the simplicity of neorealism to explain international relations, perhaps inherent in such a one-dimensional explanation is the loss of value and insightfulness provided by a more holistic approach afforded by the EST.

From the above theoretical discussion, null and alternate hypotheses have emerged to explain how Ethiopia is being accommodated by Egypt. The null hypothesis, neorealism, claims that in an attempt to maintain its hegemonic position, Egypt will respond aggressively to a rising Ethiopia. The alternate hypothesis, derived from the English School of Thought, claims that the two countries are entering into an international society whereby each state's self-interested desire for security will encourage cooperation in order to navigate the region's new dynamics.

¹⁴¹ Hidemi Suganami, "Understanding *Man, the State, and War*," *International Relations* 23 (2009): 376.

The Issue

In the midst of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, Ethiopia announced plans for the construction of a 6,000 MW Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) along the Blue Nile, the major tributary to the Nile River. Such an initiative forms part of Ethiopia's green development strategy and the amount of energy generated would not only help satisfy the growing demand for electricity within the country, but also provide Ethiopia with a source of revenue through the export of electricity regionally.¹⁴² The GERD is thus representative of the government's ongoing mission to eradicate poverty, its newer goal of sustainable development, and of Ethiopia's intention to exercise its rights and utilize its river resources, an action that until now it has been incapable of doing.¹⁴³

While for Ethiopia the "GERD has become a symbol of Ethiopian nationalism or 'renaissance,'" for Egypt, which relies on the Nile for 97 percent of its fresh water, the GERD represents a threat to its very existence.¹⁴⁴ Egypt has already surpassed the water scarcity threshold value of 1,000 cubic meters per person, per year: its per capita annual supply is now estimated at 600 cubic meters per person,¹⁴⁵ and its population is expected to grow from today's 90 million to 150 million people by 2050, further stressing its water supply.¹⁴⁶ The construction of the GERD has only heightened Egypt's anxieties over its allocated water supply.

¹⁴² Huiyi Chen and Ashok Swain, "The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Evaluating Its Sustainability Standard and Geopolitical Significance," *Energy Development Frontier* 3 (2014): 12-14.

¹⁴³ Meles Zenawi, Speech delivered to mark the official commencement of the Millennium Dam project, April 2, 2011, <http://hornaffairs.com/en/2011/04/02/ethiopia-great-dam-on-nile-launched/>

¹⁴⁴ Dalia Abdelhady et al., "The Nile and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Is There a Meeting Point between Nationalism and Hydrosolidarity?" *Journal of Contemporary Water Research & Education* 55 (2015): 73.

¹⁴⁵ Brian Rohan, "Egypt looks to avert water crisis driven by demand, waste," *Associated Press*, April 26, 2016, <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/476db2e5769344c48997d41eb319bf64/egypt-looks-avert-water-crisis-driven-demand-waste>

¹⁴⁶ Arab Republic of Egypt. Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, *Water Scarcity in Egypt* (Cairo: Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, 2014), 1. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.eg/SiteCollectionDocuments/Egypt%20Water%20Resources%20Paper_2014.pdf [accessed March 16, 2016].

The GERD is neither Ethiopia's first hydroelectric power plant nor is this the first time Egypt's water fears have surfaced. Ethiopia's 2002 Water Development Strategy included a range of short-listed hydropower projects, and throughout the first decade of the 2000s Ethiopia constructed multiple, smaller hydroelectric dams within its borders.¹⁴⁷ Even these smaller projects were met with resistance by Egypt and leaked emails from Stratfor Global Intelligence in 2010 indicate the willingness of Egyptian authorities to engage militarily to ensure Egypt's water supply remains unharmed. According to the emails, Egypt asked Sudan to build an airbase "to accommodate Egyptian commandos who might be sent to Ethiopia to destroy water facilities on the Blue Nile."¹⁴⁸ However, Sudan has since begun to support Ethiopia as seen with its 2013 official approval of the GERD¹⁴⁹ and a subsequent Stratfor report (2013) indicates that any military response – sabotage or bombardment – by Egypt "will be risky at best and will also come with severe international consequences."¹⁵⁰

Though there have been no reports to date of attempts to destroy the GERD, the above emphasizes the importance of the Nile to Egypt and the measures Egypt may take to ensure that the Nile's flow into Egypt remains unobstructed. Such rhetoric reinforces the gravity of water, the centrality of the Nile in Ethiopian-Egyptian relations, the importance of reaching an agreement on the GERD, and the necessity for codifying Nile management policies. The fact that language has become less belligerent (post-2013) and both countries have signed a Declaration

¹⁴⁷ Rawia Tawfik, "Revisiting Hydro-hegemony from a Benefit-Sharing Perspective: The Case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam" *German Development Institute* (Discussion Paper) Issue 5 (2015): 16. Available at: <http://scholar.cu.edu.eg/?q=rawia-tawfik/publications/revisiting-hydro-hegemony-benefit-sharing-perspective-case-grand-ethiopian>

¹⁴⁸ Michael B. Kelley, and Robert Johnson, "STRATFOR: Egypt is Prepared to Bomb All of Ethiopia's Nile Dams," *Business Insider*, October 13, 2012, <http://www.businessinsider.com/hacked-stratfor-emails-egypt-could-take-military-action-to-protect-its-stake-in-the-nile-2012-10>

¹⁴⁹ Mina Michel Samaan, "The Win-Win-Win Scenario in the Blue Nile's Hydropolitical Game: Application on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam" (Forschungsberichte des Instituts für Sozialwissenschaften Nr. 11, May 2014), 11. Available at: <http://ulrich-menzel.de/forschungsberichte/Blaue%20Reihe113.pdf> [accessed June 2, 2016].

¹⁵⁰ "Egypt's Limited Military Options to Stop an Ethiopian Dam Project," *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, June 10, 2013, <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/egypts-limited-military-options-stop-ethiopian-dam-project>

of Principles (2015), jointly commissioned impact studies (2016), and continue to hold regular meetings to discuss GERD related issues (ongoing), indicate that Ethiopia and Egypt are moving towards a cooperative rather than conflicting relationship. In order to better understand this evolution of Ethiopian-Egyptian relations, Sections Two and Three will provide an historical platform from which the current situation can be thoroughly analyzed.

Section Two: The Nile and the Colonial Era

Geography of the Nile

The Nile River is located in the northeastern region of Africa, stretches some 6,695 kilometers and has a basin covering about 3.2 million square kilometers and eleven countries.¹⁵¹

The Nile's main tributaries are the White Nile, the Blue Nile (Abbay), and the seasonal Atbara River (Tekeze). The tributaries of the White Nile flow through the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda,

Uganda, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Sudan;

those of the Blue Nile originate in Ethiopia.

The Atbara meanders along Ethiopia's border with Eritrea and, upon all three joining together in Sudan to form the main Nile River, flows

north through into Egypt and exits into the Mediterranean.¹⁵² Sudan and Egypt comprise

the downstream countries whilst Ethiopia, due to its significant contribution of water to the

main Nile, is considered the core upstream country.



Source: Africanwater.org, 2016

The White Nile begins its course in the mountains of Rwanda and Burundi and, with an estimated flow of 26 BCMs¹⁵³, supplies about 14 percent of the Nile River's water. The White Nile's main tributaries, Bahr el Jabal and Bahr el Ghazal, join near Malakal, South Sudan and are

¹⁵¹ Wossenu Abteu and Assefa M. Melesse, "The Nile River Basin," in *Nile River Basin: Ecohydrological Challenges, Climate Change and Hydropolitics*, ed. by Assefa M. Melesse, W. Abteu, and S. G. Setegen (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2014), 7-16.

¹⁵² "The Nile Basin," Natural Resources Management and Environment Department, accessed March 14, 2016, <http://www.fao.org/docrep/w4347e/w4347e0k.htm>.

¹⁵³ BCM = Billion Cubic Meters, a common unit of measurement for large quantities of water and gas.

met by the Sobat (Baro-Akobo) River that originates in Ethiopia. As the White Nile meanders through Southern Sudan it is exposed to intense evaporation in the marshes of the Sudd region where about 50 percent of the water provided by the Bahr el Jabal is lost through evaporation and seepage.¹⁵⁴

Ethiopia's rivers supply around 86 percent (71 BCMs) of the total annual flow of the main Nile River.¹⁵⁵ Of this, roughly 59 percent (48 BCMs) comes from the Blue Nile, 13 percent (11 BCMs) from the Atbara, and 14 percent (12 BCMs) from the Sobat.¹⁵⁶ The Blue Nile, the largest tributary to the Nile, begins in Lake Tana, flows through the Ethiopian highlands and west to enter Sudan.¹⁵⁷

While the Nile's tributaries originate in the tropical climates of Ethiopia and Burundi, it flows through the swamps, savannahs, and deserts of South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt.¹⁵⁸ Unlike most great rivers, "half of [the Nile's] course flows through countries with no effective rainfall – [in fact], almost all of the water of the Nile is generated on an area covering only 20 percent of the basin."¹⁵⁹ Rainfall in the basin is extremely uneven: though the mean annual rainfall is 1,423mm,¹⁶⁰ Ethiopia receives an average of 1125mm of rainfall per annum while Sudan and Egypt receive an average of 500mm and 15mm respectively.¹⁶¹ Due to this lack of rainfall, roughly 77 percent of Sudan's and 97 percent of Egypt's freshwater resources originate outside

¹⁵⁴ Abtew and Melesse, 16.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 1.

¹⁵⁶ Karen Conniff et. al., "Nile water and agriculture: past, present and future," in *The Nile River Basin: Water, Agriculture, Governance and Livelihoods*, ed. by Seleshi B. Awulachew, Cladimir Smakhtin, David Molden and Don Peden (USA: Routledge, 2012), 7.

¹⁵⁷ Haggai Erlich, *The Cross and the River: Ethiopia, Egypt and the Nile* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002.), 1.

¹⁵⁸ Abtew and Melesse, 7-16.

¹⁵⁹ Diana Rizzolio Karyabwite, *UNEP Project GNV0011, Water Sharing in the Nile River Valley* (Geneva: UNEP/DEWA/GRID, 2000), 10 -11.

¹⁶⁰ Abtew and Melesse, 13-15.

¹⁶¹ "The Nile Basin," FAO, accessed March 14, 2016, <http://www.fao.org/docrep/w4347e/w4347e0k.htm>

their borders.¹⁶² The high climatic diversity amongst the various riparian states creates a unique situation as the aridity of downstream countries' results in their near dependence on the Nile.

Any act that threatens the flow of the Nile is therefore often perceived as a hostile action.

In addition to the basin's overall climatic diversity, the Blue Nile is also unique due to "the high seasonal variability in rainfall on the Ethiopian plateau, the source of the river."¹⁶³

Though rainfall in Ethiopia is spatially and temporally diverse, the rains that impact on the Nile fall from June through September.¹⁶⁴ During this time the region receives approximately 70 percent of its total precipitation, resulting in a situation where the maximum runoff is almost 60 times greater than its minimum; this heavy and concentrated rainy season contributes to the Nile's erratic flow.¹⁶⁵

For Ethiopia, the intensity of the rains cause significant erosion, which, augmented by Ethiopia's mountainous terrain and traditional agricultural practices, reduce forest cover and result in even greater hydraulic variability.¹⁶⁶ For Egypt, this sporadic rainfall resulted in the annual flooding along the Nile's banks in Egypt, contributing to rich soil and crop cultivation, as

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Yacob Arsano and Imeru Tamrat, "Ethiopia and the Eastern Nile Basin," *Aquatic Sciences* 67 (2005): 16.

¹⁶⁴ Ethiopia is divided into four spatially diverse rainfall regions: the highest mean annual rainfall occurs in the southwestern highlands (more than 2,700mm), and then decreases in the north (>200 mm), northeast (>100mm), and the southeast (>200mm). Temporally, Ethiopia is divided into three main rainfall regimes: mono-modal (single peak) rainfall in the southwestern and western areas, and two bi-modal regimes, one in the central, eastern and northeastern regions and the other in the southern and southeastern regions. The former impacts most on the Blue Nile and is defined by two rainy seasons, the Belg (smaller rains from February to May) and the Kiremt (big rains from June to September). The latter is in the southern and southeastern area, with rainy seasons from September to November and March to May. In: The World Bank. Agriculture and Rural Development Department, "Ethiopia: Managing Water Resource to Maximize Sustainable Growth," (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2006): 7. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWRD/Resources/Ethiopia_final_text_and_cover.pdf [accessed April 12, 2016].

¹⁶⁵ Arsano and Tamrat, 16.

¹⁶⁶ The World Bank. Agriculture and Rural Development Department, *Ethiopia-Managing Water Resources to Maximize Sustainable Growth* (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank Group, 2006), xii. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWRD/Resources/Ethiopia_final_text_and_cover.pdf [accessed April 12, 2016].

well as periods of sustained drought.¹⁶⁷ The environmental and climatic diversity of the main Nile riparians, coupled with contemporary factors to be discussed later, contributes to the intricate and complicated relations between Egypt and Ethiopia.

Ethiopia and the Colonial Period¹⁶⁸

Prior to formal Ethiopian unity in the late 19th century, the country was characterized by internal decentralization, with rival leaders advancing their own agendas, and external threats to its ill-defined borders. Prior to European engagement on the continent, Ethiopia's primary threat was the Egyptians who, as an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire, by 1820 had successfully taken control of Sudan and were seeking continued southerly expansion to gain control of the greater Nile region.¹⁶⁹ To secure modern weaponry for its defense, contact with and trade between Ethiopian rulers and foreigners expanded. Particular emphasis was placed on acquiring firearms and preserving those trade routes and areas, which best accommodated such arms trade. Taking advantage of its Christian culture – Ethiopia had been predominantly Christian since 330 C.E.¹⁷⁰ – Ethiopia welcomed missionaries into its territory with the knowledge that doing so would offer greater potential “for gaining foreign support and arms,”¹⁷¹ to defend against hostile actors.

The increased arms allowed for greater defense both externally and internally and by the late 1800s, Ethiopia had consolidated into two main areas: the north ruled by King Yohannes, and the south by Emperor Menelik.¹⁷² Such consolidation proved vital for Ethiopian security and

¹⁶⁷ The construction of Egypt's Aswan High Dam in 1970, to be discussed in greater depth later, helped to control these irregular flows.

¹⁶⁸ For more reading on the Ethiopian colonial history, see: Sven Rubenson, *The Survival of Ethiopian Independence* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, Ltd., 1976).

¹⁶⁹ Ashok Swain, “Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt: The Nile River Dispute,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 35 (1997): 676.

¹⁷⁰ Andrew Carlson, “Who Owns the Nile? Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia's History-Changing Dam,” *Origins* 6 (2013).

¹⁷¹ Paul B. Henze, *Layers of Time* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 125.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 119.

independence as the Egyptians, under the Khedive Ismail, engaged in a “series of military expeditions... [to] annex to Egypt all the geographical areas of the basin... to make the Nile an Egyptian river.”¹⁷³ Interestingly, though Ethiopia was essentially divided into two territories, Yohannes and Menelik kept the vision of an independent Ethiopia at the forefront of their decisions. Thus, by “engaging in diplomacy to defend the country... [and] work[ing] together... to contain the zeal of missionaries and foreign adventurers,” they were able to successfully obstruct Egyptian advances; by the end of the century Egypt had been denied full control over the Nile basin.¹⁷⁴

By this time, the scramble for Africa had begun and Ethiopia’s threat had shifted from the Egyptians in the west and north to the Italians in the east. Seeking to penetrate deeper into the African continent, the Italians advanced inland into Ethiopian territory. However, by 1896, in the decisive Battle of Adwa, the Ethiopians defeated the European power.¹⁷⁵ As such, Ethiopia entered the 20th century as a globally recognized independent and unified nation.

Egypt and the Colonial Period

During the 19th century, under the influence of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt sought to extend its reach into the Nile Basin region and modernize its economy.¹⁷⁶ By expanding into Sudan, Egypt was able to occupy most of the White Nile valley and subsequently developed irrigation canals, dams, and barrages to mitigate dependence on the Nile’s floods, “ma[king]

¹⁷³ Daniel Kendie, “Egypt and the Hydro-Politics of the Blue Nile River,” *Northeast African Studies* 6 (1999): 141-146.

¹⁷⁴ Henze, *Layers of Time*, 146.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 168-172.

¹⁷⁶ For additional reading on Muhammed Ali, and the Egyptian and Ottoman Empires, see: Afaf Lutfi Sayyid-Marsot, *The Reign of Muhammad Ali* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984); for Egyptian colonial history under the British, see: Robert Tignor, *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2015); for a more widespread history, see: Afaf Lutfi Sayyid-Marsot, *A Short History of Modern Egypt* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985) and Robert Tignore, *Egypt: A Short History* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011).

possible the introduction of cotton as a major export crop.”¹⁷⁷ Seeking to continue this process of modernization, Egypt entered into agreements with European powers for the construction of the Suez Canal. However, soon after the Canal’s completion in 1869, a near bankrupt Egypt was faced with internal rebellions that threatened not only the cohesion of the country but the stability of British trade and European banks that held Egyptian debt. In an effort to diffuse Egypt’s political and economic crisis and maintain its own economic growth, in 1882 the British invaded and occupied Egypt and Egyptian controlled Sudan.¹⁷⁸

Just as the Italians had threatened Ethiopia’s independence, the French had begun encroaching into the British-controlled Sudan. The attempt to spread French influence into the Sudan and the Upper Nile coincided with British efforts to consolidate control over the Nile Basin and by 1898 the two great powers met at Fashoda in the southern part of the Sudan. Ultimately, the French surrender at Fashoda in the Upper Nile¹⁷⁹ solidified British control of Egypt and Sudan; control of the Nile’s flow would follow shortly thereafter.

Agreements on the Nile (1900-1959)

The involvement of European powers in African affairs was accompanied by British efforts to codify Nile allocation and management policies to secure its interests in the region. Despite Ethiopia’s independent status, it was largely omitted from Nile-related arrangements and Nile agreements disproportionately benefited downstream countries. As Tvedt (2010) states, the British, seeking to “secure more water for Egypt in order to increase agricultural production” and ensure an unobstructed flow of the Nile, engaged in treaties that “curtail[ed] [other powers’]

¹⁷⁷ Erlich, 60-61.

¹⁷⁸ Henze, *Layers of Time*, 148.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 174. For additional information on the Fashoda crisis see: Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa: The White Man’s Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876-1912* (London: Abacus, 1992); Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis, *France and Britain in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule* (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1971); and Morrison Beall Giffen, *Fashoda, the Incident and its Diplomatic Setting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930).

influence and institute[ed] a regime of ‘non-interference’ with the hydraulic integrity of the river system.”¹⁸⁰ Under colonial Britain’s rule two treaties stand out, the 1902 agreement and the 1929 agreement; as newly independent countries, the 1959 agreement carried the most weight.

In 1902 Britain, acting on behalf of Egypt and Sudan, entered into an agreement with Ethiopia to regulate the Nile; however, Ethiopia has since dismissed its legality. Firstly, colonial era treaties are often deemed illegitimate¹⁸¹ and secondly, a mistranslation between the English and Amharic versions stipulated that Ethiopia “was ‘not to construct or allow to be constructed any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana or the Sobat, which would arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile.’”¹⁸² In the Amharic version, ‘arrest’ was translated as ‘stop,’ thus the Ethiopians had agreed not to *stop* rather than *arrest* the flow of the Nile.

The 1929 agreement between Egypt and the British government, on behalf of Sudan and the Lake Victoria riparians, put into place water-sharing policies. The agreement allocated 48 BCMs to Egypt while Sudan was assured 4 BCMs. Not only was Ethiopia excluded from the negotiations, but the agreement also stipulated that any water development projects taken up by the East African countries had to first be approved by Egypt and Sudan.¹⁸³

Shortly after the independence of both Egypt and Sudan, in 1953 and 1956 respectively, the two countries negotiated the 1959 agreement to redistribute the Nile’s water. Egypt would receive 55.5 BCMs and Sudan 18.5 BCMs; an additional 10 BCMs was allocated to account for the evaporation and seepage losses from Egypt’s Aswan High Dam. The agreement also ensured that “both countries... would not negotiate with any third party over the Nile water before they

¹⁸⁰ Terje Tvedt, “About the Importance of Studying the Modern History of the Countries of the Nile Basin in a Nile Perspective,” in *The River Nile in the Post-Colonial Age*, ed. by Terje Tvedt. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2010: 4.

¹⁸¹ Jon Lie, “Supporting the Nile Basin Initiative: a political analysis ‘beyond the river,’” *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs* (2010): 7.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ashok Swain, “Challenges for water sharing in the Nile basin: changing geo-politics and changing climate,” *Hydrological Sciences Journal* 56 (2011): 690.

had developed a common position.”¹⁸⁴ Upstream countries were neither consulted nor included and to this day Ethiopia does not accept its legitimacy.¹⁸⁵

Summary

For Ethiopia, the 19th century was marked by a continual need to secure its borders from hostile forces; for Egypt, this period was defined by territorial expansion. As colonial forces sought to codify Nile management in the 20th century, Ethiopia was either taken advantage of or disregarded altogether while Egypt gained the upper hand. The power dynamics amongst Nile Basin states, defined by an Egyptian hegemony that has persisted until recently, was thus clearly established and solidified in the early 20th century.

At the theoretical level, Egypt’s territorial expansion and quest for Nile control support the neorealist argument that in an anarchical society states operate autonomously and for their own self-interest. Egyptian power, backed by the British, trumped any desire for genuine cooperation with its upstream counterpart. Focused on securing its borders and lacking significant support from European powers, Ethiopia was in no position to meaningfully dispute Egyptian claims. Even the most basic characteristics of an international society – respect for sovereignty, upholding agreements, and limitations of violence – were nonexistent during the colonial era. Ethiopian – Egyptian relations were thus informed by security and economic interests manifested through ensuring power imbalances. As a result, Egypt and Ethiopia remained outside of any societal development.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 690.

¹⁸⁵ Dale Whittington, John Waterbury, and Marc Jeuland, “The Grand Renaissance Dam and prospects for cooperation on the Eastern Nile,” *Water Policy* 16 (2014): 596.

Section Three: Contemporary History

As will be shown, Egyptian and Ethiopian policies in the latter half of the 20th reinforced the power dynamics that had formed during the colonial period and access to the Nile continued to play a major role in domestic and foreign policies. Egypt's pan-Arab outlook, its decision to construct the Aswan High Dam, and its support for Eritrean independence from Ethiopia only intensified the differences between the two countries. Relations continued to deteriorate with Ethiopia's break from the "sixteen-centuries-old institutionalized affiliation of Ethiopian Christianity with the Egyptian Coptic Church in 1959, ... [its decision to make] African diplomacy [its] major sphere of political interest,"¹⁸⁶ and its 1957 partnership with its "American ally to launch a major study of the water resources of the Blue Nile for irrigation and hydroelectric power."¹⁸⁷ Despite the importance of the Nile to both countries, their respective policies and projects over the years have severely fractured relations. Understanding the more recent histories of each country and their relationship with the Nile will help inform the current dynamics between Ethiopia and Egypt.

Contemporary Egypt

When Egypt's revolutionary regime led by Abdel Nasser came to power in the mid-1950s, new interpretations of culture, religion, and society also emerged. In addition to the rise of Westernization in the region, the cultural affinity between Egypt and Arab states also contributed to Nasser's belief that "the Arab region [w]as Egypt's natural sphere of influence and leadership and therefore the main space for an active Egyptian foreign policy."¹⁸⁸ Thus, Egypt

¹⁸⁶ Haggai Erlich and Israel Gershoni, "Introduction," in *The Nile: Histories, Cultures, Myths*, ed. by Haggai Erlich and Israel Gershoni (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 3.

¹⁸⁷ Robert Collins, "In Search of the Nile Waters, 1900-2000," in *The Nile: Histories, Cultures, Myths*, ed. by Haggai Erlich and Israel Gershoni (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000) 258-259.

¹⁸⁸ Ali Hillal Dessouki, "Regional Leadership: Balancing off Costs and Dividends in the Foreign Policy of Egypt," in *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenges of Globalization*, edited by B. Korany and A. Hillal Dessouki. (Egypt: The American University in Cairo Press, 2008), 179.

under Nasser was defined by efforts to strengthen pan-Arab rather than pan-African unity.¹⁸⁹

This marked a significant break “from the modern concept of Nile Valley unity which had motivated Egyptian nationalism from the late nineteenth century, and [the] reorient[ation of] his politics on Arab nationalism and the regional politics of the Fertile Crescent” widened the gap between the two riparians.¹⁹⁰

Nasser’s pan-Arab efforts were manifested both diplomatically and militarily. By promoting the establishment of the Organization of the Arab Front and the short-lived United Arab Republic with Syria in 1958, Nasser sought to strengthen inter-Arab cooperation.¹⁹¹

Egyptian support for Palestinian efforts against Israel and engagement in multiple wars with and “rhetoric of aggressiveness towards Israel,” further highlight the importance of the pan-Arab identity in Egyptian foreign policies.¹⁹²

Importantly, Nasser’s pan-Arab position was a core factor in Egypt’s support for the Eritrean independence movement in Ethiopia throughout the 1960s, a position that remains a point of contention between the two countries. Prior to the revolutionary regime’s ascent to power, Egypt supported the United Nations’ 1950 decision to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia. However, by 1960, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) had established an office in Cairo and Egypt’s “overt and covert role in the creation of the ELF [became] fairly obvious.”¹⁹³ Part of Egypt’s decision to support Eritrea was the cultural affinity Nasser felt with the “Arab and

¹⁸⁹ Lamis Andoni, “The resurrection of pan-Arabism,” *Al Jazeera*, February 11, 2011, http://www.rikcoolsaet.be/files/art_wr/Al%20Jazeera%20110211.pdf

¹⁹⁰ Erlich and Gershoni, *Introduction*, 3.

¹⁹¹ Peter Johnson, “Egypt Under Nasser,” *MERIP Reports* 10 (1972): 5.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁹³ Kendie, 141-155.

overwhelmingly Muslim” country.¹⁹⁴ Providing sanctuary to the revolutionaries fighting “against Ethiopia’s imperial legitimacy further alienated Ethiopians and Egyptians.”¹⁹⁵

In addition to the cultural connection Nasser saw with Eritrea, Egyptian support for Eritrean insurgents has also been considered an articulation of Egyptian fears of upstream developments along the Blue Nile. As Daniel Kendie hypothesizes, “by promoting the Eritrean insurrection, Egypt made sure that Ethiopia would divert both its efforts and its resources into quelling the Eritrean uprising, resources which could have been utilized [to] tap the waters of the Blue Nile.”¹⁹⁶ In the case of Eritrea, Ethiopian-Egyptian relations and disagreements over the Nile were being played out behind the façade of religious and cultural affinity.

Nasser’s decision to construct the Aswan High Dam (AHD) and the associated Lake Nasser with over-year storage capacity is further testament to a culture of fear within Egypt that developed from its dependence on the Nile. As Egypt considers any threat to the Nile a threat to its very existence, scholars (Abdo, 2004; Cascao, 2009; Monsef et. al., 2015) have stipulated that Lake Nasser and the AHD are representative of measures taken in the name of Egyptian national security, with Lake Nasser providing Egypt with a greater degree of “freedom from foreign control over the water.”¹⁹⁷ With a total storage capacity of roughly 169 BCMs per year while the flow of the Nile at Aswan is estimated at around 84 BCMs, the AHD allows for a degree of flexibility and security in regards to water availability.¹⁹⁸

The 1959 Agreement that resulted from the AHD’s construction is also symbolic of Egypt’s quest to secure more water. For Egypt to construct the dam “an agreement on the

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 141-155.

¹⁹⁵ Haggai Erlich and Israel Gershoni, “Conclusion: Historical Legacies and Present Concerns,” in *The Nile: Histories, Cultures, Myths*, ed. by Haggai Erlich and Israel Gershoni. (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000) 270.

¹⁹⁶ Kendie, 141-156.

¹⁹⁷ Mohammed Abdo, “The Nile Question: The Accords on the Water of the Nile and Their Implications on Cooperative Schemes in the Basin,” *Perceptions* Summer (2004): 47.

¹⁹⁸ Ana Elisa Cascao, *Changing Power Relations in the Nile River Basin: Unilateralism vs. Cooperation?*, 247.

allocation of the Nile waters and to the compensation payable to the people... in the Sudan, whose lands would be submerged by the reservoir of the High Dam, had to be reached.”¹⁹⁹ Sudanese objection to the AHD²⁰⁰ was met by Egyptian opposition for the construction of the Sudanese Roseires Dam on the Blue Nile, prompting Sudan to withdraw from the 1929 Agreement on the Nile.²⁰¹ Once an Egyptian supported military junta took over power in the Sudan in 1958, however, the new Sudanese government reversed its stance and supported the AHD’s construction.²⁰² Soon thereafter the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, designating 55.5 BCMs of water to Egypt and 18.5 BCMs for Sudan, was drawn up between the two countries to officially replace the 1929 agreement. Ethiopia was not consulted.

The implications of Egypt’s decision to build the AHD were multifold. Firstly, the nationalization of the strategically located Suez Canal to support the AHD’s financing²⁰³ resulted in the Suez-Sinai War with Egypt fighting against the British, French and Israelis.²⁰⁴ Domestically, the nationalization marked the beginning of strong state involvement in the Egyptian economy and its subsequent decline. Most importantly, the issues surrounding the AHD’s construction solidified the Egyptian-Sudanese alliance on Nile management and ruptured relations with Ethiopia. In a show of defiance, Ethiopia severed its longstanding connection with the Egyptian Coptic Church, the most pronounced cultural connection between the two countries.²⁰⁵

¹⁹⁹ I.H. Abdalla, “The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement in Sudanese-Egyptian Relations,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 7 (1971): 329.

²⁰⁰ Sudanese rejection to the large AHD was based on the recommendation by hydraulic experts that the construction of multiple, smaller dams along the Nile would better maximize the River’s resources. In: I.H. Abdalla, “The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement in Sudanese-Egyptian Relations,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 7 (1971): 329.

²⁰¹ Swain, *Challenges for water sharing in the Nile basin: changing geo-politics and changing climate*, 690.

²⁰² Abdalla, 336.

²⁰³ For more information on planning and funding of the AHD, see: Joachim Joesten, “Nasser’s Daring Dream: The Aswan High Dam,” *The World Today* 16 (1960): 55-63.

²⁰⁴ Johnson, 7.

²⁰⁵ Christianity has played a major role in connecting Egypt and Ethiopia beginning around 300 C.E. when the Ethiopian Church became an extension of the Coptic Church of Egypt. Egyptian monks played a critical role in

Following the AHD's completion in 1970, Nasser was succeeded by Anwar al-Sadat who quickly implemented policies in stark contrast to his predecessor. As the costs associated with Nasser's pan-Arab foreign policy materialized and became increasingly unsustainable, two major shifts occurred. Firstly, Sadat implemented more laissez faire policies of *infitah* ("open door") to reinvigorate the economy, representing a shift towards the West and away from the Soviet alliance characteristic of Nasser's regime.²⁰⁶ Through liberalization and global integration, "cooperation with international economic institutions [increased and] ... private and foreign capital and foreign military and economic aid" into the country rose.²⁰⁷

The second shift was the move away from Nasser's pan-Arab identity and foreign policy. Instead of defining Egypt's foreign policy through pan-Arab relations, Sadat attempted to "forg[e] a more distinctive Egyptian national identity... [and] prioritize[d] Egypt's national interests over broader pan-Arab considerations."²⁰⁸ As a result, relations that Nasser had forged with Arab countries became secondary to those policies that would more significantly benefit the country. To gain support for the new Egyptian identity, Sadat focused on cultivating relations with Egyptian Islamists and subsequently released incarcerated members of the Muslim Brotherhood²⁰⁹ and a strong pan-Islamist dialogue emerged.²¹⁰

spreading the religion and establishing churches throughout Ethiopia and reciprocal acts of sanctuary and support were given and received by both countries. By the WWII occupation of Ethiopia by Italy, the Egyptian Coptic Church was influential in convincing Egypt to support Ethiopia's sovereignty and independence by establishing the Committee for the Defense of Ethiopia in 1935. While Ethiopia, for the first time, obtained complete control over its Church after occupation, it opted to retain its affiliation with the Egyptian Coptic Church in a show of goodwill and brotherhood. For additional information, see: Haggai Erlich, *The Cross and the River: Ethiopia, Egypt and the Nile* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002)

²⁰⁶ Marie-Christine Aulas, "Sadat's Egypt: A Balance Sheet," *Middle East Research and Information Project* 12 (1982).

²⁰⁷ Davut Ates, "Economic Liberalization and Changes in Fundamentalism: The Case of Egypt," *Middle East Policy* 7 (2005): 134.

²⁰⁸ Robert Danin, "Sadat's Legacy and Egypt Today," *Council on Foreign Relations*, November 18, 2011, <http://blogs.cfr.org/danin/2011/11/18/sadat%E2%80%99s-legacy-and-egypt-today/> [accessed August 14, 2016].

²⁰⁹ Curtis R. Ryan, "Political Strategies and Regime Survival in Egypt," *Journal of Third World Studies* 18 (2001): 30.

Despite *infatih*, benefits failed to materialize and as the cost of basic necessities rose *infatih* became increasingly unpopular. As support for Sadat declined, opposition groups began to mobilize against the government.²¹¹ Though Sadat responded to opposition activities by jailing activists, intellectuals, and leaders of both secular and Islamic groups, he was unable to secure his hold on power, culminating in his 1981 assassination.²¹²

Hosni Mubarak, Sadat's successor, assumed and retained the presidency for the next 30 years. During this time, Mubarak managed to "fully reintegrat[e] Egypt into the Arab world... [and] restor[e] severed diplomatic relations," in particular with the Gulf states, despite continuing to align with the West and maintaining neutral relations with Israel.²¹³ Like his predecessors, his foreign policy was primarily focused on the Middle East rather than Africa.

Politically, Mubarak freed political prisoners, relaxed media censorship, and permitted the establishment of civic society organizations.²¹⁴ By 1987 opposition parties held 20 percent of seats in parliaments, the number of nongovernmental organizations increased, and forums for debate were established.²¹⁵ Economically, he implemented a Five Year Plan in the early 1980s similar to the unpopular *infatih* policies of Sadat. Public sector investment increased and policies supporting the industrial sector were implemented.²¹⁶ However, by the 1990s Egypt's balance of payments deficit was widening and IMF structural adjustment policies were adapted to "reduce public spending, liberalize the private sector, and improve [the] functioning of the financial

²¹⁰ Elizabeth Iskander Monier and Annette Ranko, "The Fall of the Muslim Brotherhood: Implications for Egypt," *Middle Eastern Policy* 20 (2013): 111-123.

²¹¹ Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Egypt under Sadat: Elites, Power Structure, and Political Change in a Post-Populist State," *Social Problems* 28 (1981): 462.

²¹² Aulas

²¹³ Gamal Hassan, "A revolution without a revolutionary foreign policy," *Adelphi Series* 55 (2015): 154.

²¹⁴ K.V. Nagarajan, "Egypt's Political Economy and the Downfall of the Mubarak Regime," *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 3 (2013): 29.

²¹⁵ Jason Brownlee, "The Decline of Pluralism in Mubarak's Egypt," *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2002): 6-7.

²¹⁶ Nagarajan, 29.

markets.”²¹⁷ Though these policies may have successfully addressed macroeconomic issues, they did little to boost the productivity of the Egyptian economy and the reforms had poor social and economic effects on the Egyptian public.²¹⁸

Fearing increased opposition strength, political parties with a religious ground were banned, new regulations for NGOs were implemented, and “the freedoms that opposition activists [had previously] enjoyed” were reduced.²¹⁹ Authoritarianism was further entrenched in the 2000s with heavy restrictions placed on the press and the increased manipulation and monitoring of academic and religious freedoms.²²⁰ By 2007 the Constitution was amended in such a way that analysts claimed it infringed on human rights, limited political competition, and kept power concentrated in the ruling party.²²¹ Thus, while Mubarak had strengthened Egypt’s position internationally, his failure to do so domestically was met with the 2011 Arab Spring movement calling for his resignation.

Following Mubarak, Mohammed Morsi, supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected President in 2012. The Brotherhood’s control in government was invariably short; by 2013 the public, dissatisfied with the Brotherhood’s “failure to deliver on promises to do away with authoritarianism, put Egypt on a path towards democracy, or to implement a program of social justice,” took to the streets in protest.²²² Almost immediately the army drove the Brotherhood from power.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 30.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 31-33.

²¹⁹ Jason Brownlee, “The Decline of Pluralism in Mubarak’s Egypt,” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2002): 6-7.

²²⁰ “Leading Change Across the Mediterranean: Egypt,” Center for Applied Policy Research, accessed April 11, 2016, <http://www.cap-lmu.de/english/projects/middleeast/egypt.php>

²²¹ For a detailed analysis on the 2007 revisions see: Nathan Brown, Michele Dunne and Amr Hamzawy, “Egypt’s Controversial Constitutional Amendments,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007. Available at:

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/egypt_constitution_webcommentary01.pdf

²²² Elizabeth Iskander Monier and Annette Ranko, “The Fall of the Muslim Brotherhood: Implications for Egypt,” *Middle Eastern Policy* 20 (2013): 116.

The military regime subsequently “outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood, started drafting a new constitution, ... curbed media freedom,” and scheduled elections for 2014 which General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi won.²²³ The al-Sisi regime has continued along an authoritarian route, has suppressed most opposition forces, and has followed Mubarak-era foreign policy initiatives. Egypt’s economy has not yet fully recovered from the aftermath of the Arab Spring and its foreign reserves have fallen from \$36 billion in 2011 to around \$16 billion in March 2016.²²⁴ Though Egypt recorded a 4.2 percent GDP growth rate in 2015, increasing from post-Arab Spring levels of 2.1 percent, its GDP remains below pre-revolutionary levels of 5.1 percent.²²⁵

Egypt relies heavily on its Arab partners for financial and economic support: not only did Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates commit \$12 billion to Egypt immediately following its economic collapse, but by “the June 2014/2015 annual period, Arab countries increased FDI by 52 percent to \$2.3 billion.”²²⁶ By April 2016 Egypt’s economic situation contributed to the ‘return’ of two strategic islands to Saudi Arabia in exchange for continued investment, thus bringing in much needed foreign currency.²²⁷ Securing Egypt’s economic and political stability was further illustrated in its restoration of diplomatic ties with Israel and subsequent increase in bilateral and intelligence coordination in early 2016.²²⁸

Though it is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyze Egypt’s relations with its Middle Eastern counterparts, the above is indicative of the fact that Egyptian-Arab partnerships remain

²²³ Gawdat Bahgat, “Egypt in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring: What Lies Ahead?” in *Conflict Trends* (USA: ACCORD, 2015), 4.

²²⁴ Omar Mawji, “Saudi Arabia Comes to the Rescue of the Egyptian Economy,” *Geopolitical Monitor*. April 25, 2016, <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/saudi-arabia-comes-to-the-rescue-of-the-egyptian-economy/>

²²⁵ “World Factbook,” CIA, accessed August 1, 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html>

²²⁶ Mawji

²²⁷ Declan Walsh, “Egypt Gives Saudi Arabia 2 Islands in a Show of Gratitude,” *New York Times*, April 10, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/11/world/middleeast/egypt-gives-saudi-arabia-2-islands-in-a-show-of-gratitude.html?_r=0

²²⁸ Menna Zaki, “Who is Egypt’s ‘Enemy’ Today? How Egyptians See Relations with Israel,” *Egyptian Streets*, May 7, 2016, <http://egyptianstreets.com/2016/05/07/who-is-egypts-enemy-today-how-egyptians-see-relations-with-israel/>

crucial to Egypt's economic growth and stability. Its reliance on external actors to support its growth signify that its resources are tight and therefore fostering cooperative rather than aggressive international relations is the more sustainable option. As will be discussed in Section Four, post-2013 Egypt has continued this collaborative approach in regards to Nile River relations and is becoming increasingly active in its engagement with its African counterparts.

Egypt and the Nile

As the historian Barbara Watterson notes, "the Nile has played a vital part in the creation of Egypt"²²⁹ and for centuries it has been considered the "source of all [Egyptian] life."²³⁰ The Nile's annual flooding created a lush delta suitable for farming despite any real rainfall, thus sustaining the development of Egyptian civilization. Today, roughly 95 percent of Egypt's population lives within the fertile Nile Valley, an area that constitutes only 5 percent of Egypt's mostly arid territory.²³¹

Amidst Egypt's recent political and economic transitions, water security has emerged as a paramount concern. Currently, Egypt uses about 79 BCMs of fresh water annually and in order to sustain a growing population this will necessarily increase. As it has done for centuries, Egypt relies heavily on the Nile for freshwater and thus, Egypt understands any upstream development on the Nile as a potential threat to its freshwater supply.

To reduce the impact of the Nile's erratic flow and maintain a degree of security over its water resources, Egypt constructed the AHD and its over-year reservoir, Lake Nasser, in the 1970s. This has enabled a degree of security against water shortages and flooding as well as

²²⁹ Barbara Watterson, *The Egyptians* (Wiley-Blackwell, 1998), 7-8. quoted in Joshua J. Mark, "Nile." *Ancient History Encyclopedia*. Last modified September 02, 2009. Available at: <http://www.ancient.eu/nile/> [accessed March 16, 2016].

²³⁰ Joshua J. Mark, "Nile." *Ancient History Encyclopedia*. Last modified September 02, 2009. Available at: <http://www.ancient.eu/nile/> [accessed March 16, 2016].

²³¹ "Egypt Facts," *National Geographic*, accessed May 11, 2016, <http://travel.nationalgeographic.com/travel/countries/egypt-facts/>

providing for irrigation and hydroelectric generation capabilities.²³² Lake Nasser is one of the largest artificially created lakes in the world with a total surface area of about 6,500 square kilometers and a length of 500 kilometers. The reservoir spans across two countries: Lake Nasser in Egypt has a length of 350 kilometers, and Lake Nubia in Sudan has a length of 150 kilometers. The average depth is 25 meters, with a maximum depth of 90 meters.²³³

The annual flow of the Nile at the AHD is around 84.5 BCM though the reservoir has a holding capacity estimated between 156 BCM²³⁴ and 169 BCM.²³⁵ The normal water level is between 165 and 175 meters above sea level (asl)²³⁶ with storage highest from August to October, corresponding to Ethiopia's rainy season.²³⁷ The lowest recorded water level was 153 meters asl in 1988 and the highest was 182 meters in 1999; Egypt's Toshka Flood Escape is able to divert water out of the main reservoir in situations of flooding.²³⁸

According to Egypt's Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI), over 95 percent of Egypt's water requirements are satisfied by the Nile as only an estimated 1 BCM of rainfall can be properly utilized. Alternative freshwater resources such as groundwater, desalination, and treated domestic sewage, remain insignificant due to quantity or feasibility, reinforcing Egypt's dependence upon the Nile. While there is an estimated 40,000 BCMs of deep groundwater in Egypt's Western Desert and Sinai aquifers, due to extraction obstacles only about 2 BCMs is used.²³⁹ Egypt has several desalination plants along the coast but further use is

²³² Joachim Joesten, "Nasser's Daring Dream: The Aswan High Dam," *The World Today* 16 (1960): 61.

²³³ Mohammed Hassan, "Evaporation estimation for Lake Nasser based on remote sensing technology," *Ain Shams Engineering Journal* 4 (2013): 593-594.

²³⁴ Emad Elba, Dalia Farghaly, and Brigitte Urban, "Modeling High Aswan Dam Reservoir Morphology Using Remote Sensing to Reduce Evaporation," *International Journal of Geosciences* 5 (2015): 156.

²³⁵ Cascao, 247.

²³⁶ Erlich, 2.

²³⁷ Hassan, *Evaporation estimation for Lake Nasser based on remote sensing technology*, 449.

²³⁸ Hesham Abd-El Monsef, Scot E. Smith, and Kamal Darwish, 1880. N.B.: Erlich, *The Cross and the River: Ethiopia, Egypt and the Nile*, 2 states 153 meters as the lowest level, also in 1988.

²³⁹ Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, 3-4.

dependent upon technological developments to reduce the cost. Treated domestic sewage provides less than 0.3 BCMs.²⁴⁰

The MWRI notes a gap of about 20 BCMs per year between water availability and water usage which is supplemented from recycled drainage water that gets pumped back into the Nile's system.²⁴¹ It is also reported that Sudan only utilizes two-thirds of its Nile water allocation and Egypt "tops up its official entitlement by taking the other third."²⁴² Egypt's increasing demand for water, estimated by the MWRI to rise by about 15 BCMs per year in this decade, and the fact that it already consumes more than its designated 55.5 BCMs from the Nile, highlights the importance of ensuring the Nile's flow into Egypt remains unobstructed.²⁴³

Water in Egypt serves four primary functions: municipal consumption, industrial use, hydropower generation, and agricultural production. In 2013, municipal water requirements were estimated at 10 BCMs, the industrial sector required about 2.5 BCMs per annum, and the AHD's 2,100 MW hydropower generating capacity continues to provide Egypt with 11 percent of its power needs. Despite these uses, the dam's main function is to control the Nile's flow through the over-year storage capacity of Lake Nasser and provide for the agricultural sector.²⁴⁴

Lake Nasser's over-year storage enabled perennial irrigation and the cultivation of three crop seasons,²⁴⁵ resulting in an agricultural sector that now requires 85 percent of available fresh water.²⁴⁶ Despite increased agricultural production, Egypt remains "a substantial net food

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ For more information on drainage use in Egypt, see Jessica Barnes, "Mixing waters: The reuse of agricultural drainage water in Egypt." *Geoforum* 57 (2014): 181 – 191.

²⁴² Fred Pearce, "On the River Nile, a Move to Avert a Conflict Over Water," *Yale Environment 360 Report* March 12, 2015. Available at: http://e360.yale.edu/feature/on_the_river_nile_a_move_to_avert_a_conflict_over_water/2855/ [accessed May 3, 2016].

²⁴³ Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, 3-4.

²⁴⁴ Egyptian Electric Utility and Consumer Protection Regulatory Agency, accessed March 16, 2016, http://egyptera.org/en/elec_gen_egy.aspx

²⁴⁵ Hesham Abd-El Monsef, Scot E. Smith, and Kamal Darwish, 1877.

²⁴⁶ CIA, "World Factbook."

importer.”²⁴⁷ Furthermore, the agricultural industry only employs 29 percent of the population and constitutes only 14 percent of its GDP as compared to the service sector at rates of 47 percent and 46 percent respectively.²⁴⁸

Egypt’s water situation is further stressed by its need to accommodate a growing population. Having risen to 90 million people in 2014 from 60 million in 1994,²⁴⁹ the MWRI expects its population to reach between 120 – 150 million by 2050.²⁵⁰ As a result, the government is engaged in horizontal expansion programs that anticipate the reclamation of 1.3 million hectares of desert by 2030.²⁵¹ One such project, the New Valley Project that began in 1997 to “reclaim half a million acres of desert... and develop and extend agricultural production,”²⁵² will require the use of an additional 5 BCMs of water to support the irrigation of 25,000 cubic hectares and 3 million people.²⁵³ Fortunately, these projects must follow new water management regulations to reduce waste. It is also reported that 90 percent of water for these developments will be sourced from groundwater resources and 10 percent from nonconventional sources such as treated wastewater and agricultural drainage.²⁵⁴

While the over-year storage of Lake Nasser enables Egypt to mitigate the effects of seasonal rain variability, Egypt remains vulnerable to interdecadal variability. The drought of the 1980s reinforced this vulnerability when lack of rainfall in Ethiopia reduced the water level at AHD to 153 meters by early June 1988. According to Erlich (2002),

²⁴⁷ “Egypt,” FAO, accessed June 30, 2016, <http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4632e/y4632e0c.htm>

²⁴⁸ CIA, “World Factbook.”

²⁴⁹ Hala Youssef, Magued Osman, and Farzaneh Roudi-Fahimi, *Responding to Rapid Population Growth in Egypt* (Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, 2014). Available at: <http://www.prb.org/Publications/Reports/2014/egypt-rapid-population-growth.aspx> [accessed March 30, 2016].

²⁵⁰ Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, 1.

²⁵¹ FAO, “Egypt.”

²⁵² “Toshka-Project – Mubarak Pumping Station/Egypt,” Water Technology, accessed April 14, 2016, <http://www.water-technology.net/projects/mubarak/>

²⁵³ Conniff et al., 18.

²⁵⁴ FAO, “Egypt.”

“had the rains in Ethiopia continued to fail for another two months, the water would have dropped to 147 meters, halting the massive production of hydroelectric power from the Aswan Dam... [and] the amount of water then left in Lake Nasser would have been sufficient for [only] six more months of irrigation.”²⁵⁵

Whilst the rains fell in August 1988, the situation prompted the government to develop “emergency plans to counter further drought conditions, including the reduction in the annual releases from the AHD through more efficient regulation [and the] extension of the irrigation system’s winter closure period.”²⁵⁶

Importantly, of the roughly 85 BCMs that arrive annually at the AHD, the Egyptian and Sudanese governments estimate that 15.4 BCMs, or 27 percent of the flow, is lost due to evaporation that results from the reservoir’s location in a hyper-arid region.²⁵⁷ An additional 1 BCM of water is lost annually from seepage.²⁵⁸ In a country defined by water scarcity, these losses are significant. As a result, experts have proposed solutions to mitigate water loss and the government has implemented and researched water saving options.

Regarding evaporation rates, for example, the creation of a canal at the midpoint of the reservoir to circumvent secondary channels and reduce the affected surface area from 512km² to 96km² has been researched.²⁵⁹ The elimination of additional khors (water ravines), along Lake Nasser to reduce surface area and evaporation rates have also been proposed.²⁶⁰ A less invasive proposal is the utilization of continuously floating plastic covers over the Lake to “reduce over

²⁵⁵ Erlich, 2.

²⁵⁶ Shardul Agrawala et al., *Development and Climate Change in Egypt: Focus on Coastal Resources and the Nile* (France: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2004), 45.

²⁵⁷ Mohammed Hassan, “Evaporation estimation for Lake Nasser based on remote sensing technology,” *Ain Shams Engineering Journal* 4 (2013): 462.

²⁵⁸ M. Elsawwaf, J. Feyen, O. Batelaan, and M. Bakr, “Groundwater-surface water interaction in Lake Nasser, Southern Egypt,” *Hydrological Processes* 28 (2014): 414.

²⁵⁹ Hesham Abd-El Monsef, Scot E. Smith, and Kamal Darwish, “Impacts of the Aswan High Dam After 50 Years,” *Water Resource Management* 29 (2015): 1881.

²⁶⁰ Emad Elba, Dalia Farghaly, and Brigitte Urban, “Modeling High Aswan Dam Reservoir Morphology Using Remote Sensing to Reduce Evaporation,” *International Journal of Geosciences* 5 (2015): 156-169.

96% of evaporation losses.”²⁶¹ It is unclear to what extent these options have been seriously considered by the Egyptian and Sudanese governments.

Efforts to conserve water have also focused on treating and reusing drainage and sewage water; in 2013 it was estimated that the total amount of reused water was 13 BCM.²⁶² To increase the availability of freshwater from brackish water, Nasr and Sewilam (2015) find that “fertilizer-drawn forward osmosis is a valid option... as it can make irrigation water available at lower energy than currently available technologies.”²⁶³ Yousif (2011) has proposed the creation of pipelines to pump water from the Nile that would normally flow directly into the Mediterranean Sea into irrigation systems in the Western Desert to reduce water loss.²⁶⁴

As mentioned, desalination in Egypt remains a relatively insignificant source of freshwater due to treatment costs. However, in March 2015 the Egyptian government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with RWL Water & Orascom Construction Limited, a desalination and water reuse company, for the feasibility study of a desalination plant. If constructed, the plant would provide 80,000 meters³ per day of potable water.²⁶⁵ Additionally, researchers (Naim et. al., 2015) have developed a cost-effective desalination technology using locally sourced materials and a pilot project for the technology is expected.²⁶⁶

A 2014 study commissioned by the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) at the request of the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency found that shifting to a green

²⁶¹ Ibid., 157.

²⁶² Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, Egypt, *Water Scarcity in Egypt*.

²⁶³ Peter Nasr and Hani Sweilam, “The potential of groundwater desalination using forward osmosis for irrigation in Egypt,” *Clean Technology Environmental Policy* 17 (2015): 1883-1895.

²⁶⁴ M. Yousif, “Exploitation of the Wasted Nile Water in the Mediterranean Sea,” *European Water* 33 (2011): 29-32.

²⁶⁵ Samantha Kelman, “RWL Water Announces an 80,000 Cubic Meter per Day Desalination Study Agreement with the Egyptian Government,” *RWL Water Press Release*, March 20, 2015, <https://www.rwlwater.com/rwl-water-announces-an-80000-cubic-meter-per-day-desalination-study-agreement-with-the-egyptian-government/>

²⁶⁶ Rasha Dewedar, “Egyptian method filters seawater in minutes,” *Phys.org*, September 10, 2015 <http://phys.org/news/2015-09-egyptian-method-filters-seawater-minutes.html>

economy has the potential to save Egypt over US \$2 billion and may “reduce water consumption... [by] 40 percent.”²⁶⁷ Furthermore, it finds that investing in water saving equipment and engaging in more sustainable agricultural practices can save Egypt 23 BCMs of water annually.²⁶⁸ The report suggests shifting from flood irrigation to drip irrigation, investing in modern irrigation technologies, reducing rice and sugar cane cultivation areas (huge water consumers), and increasing long term investment in desalination and treated wastewater to support water security. The desire on behalf of the Egyptian government to engage in such research is indicative of Egypt’s realization that water insecurity is becoming a sure thing while the Nile’s consistent flow is not.

Egypt is now faced with a growing population in an increasingly water scarce environment. While efforts are being made to reduce water waste and utilize alternate sources of freshwater, receiving its allocated 55.5 BCM of water from the Nile remains critical to meeting national water demands. Thus, it is not surprising that when developments along the Nile are proposed, Egypt’s water security fears are heightened.

Contemporary Ethiopia

Though Ethiopia was the only African state to avoid colonization, “maintaining its territorial integrity... [and] establishing [its] legitimacy... as a viable nation-state” remained the twin concerns of ruling regimes throughout the 20th century.²⁶⁹ As a result, regimes have sought to complement domestic efforts at securing the acquiescence of numerous ethnic groups with

²⁶⁷ UNEP News Centre, “Egypt to Save Over US \$2.4 Billion Annually, Cut CO2 Emissions by 13%, Water Consumption by 40% and Create 8 Million New Jobs, Through Transition to Green Economy,” March 5, 2015, <http://www.unep.org/newscentre/Default.aspx?DocumentID=26788&ArticleID=34795&l=en>

²⁶⁸ UNEP, “Green Economy Scoping Study: Egypt” (Nairobi: UNEP, November 2014), 60. http://new.unep.org/greeneconomy/Portals/88/documents/GE_EGYPT_SCOP_STUDY_FINAL_10FEB_WITHOUT_COVER.pdf

²⁶⁹ Edmond J. Keller, “The Politics of State Survival: Continuity and Change in Ethiopian Foreign Policy,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 489 (1987): 77.

foreign policies focusing on strategic military and diplomatic alliances to secure its borders.²⁷⁰

The almost 20 years of civil war diminished previous efforts at economic development; however, the unprecedented economic growth that has accompanied the past two decades of peace and stability have resulted in an Ethiopia eager to establish itself as a major player within the region.

Ethiopia: 1930 - 1974

The history of contemporary Ethiopia begins with the reign of Haile Selassie from 1930 - 1974 during which Ethiopia was a constitutional monarchy.²⁷¹ Upon assuming the throne, Selassie sought to create “a stronger, more modern bureaucratic empire with unquestioned respect in the world community.”²⁷² While these efforts were interrupted as a result of the Italian occupation of Ethiopia from 1936-1941, these years spent in exile in Great Britain proved critical in the formation and implementation of Selassie’s modernization efforts.

To strengthen the economy, Selassie instituted a ‘modernization from above’ approach to development that shifted Ethiopia from a feudal system to an industrial economy with a centralized state. Economic policies that stressed infrastructure development, the manufacturing industry, and a commercialized agriculture for purposes of import-substitution were subsequently implemented.²⁷³ Selassie abolished medieval practices, jumpstarted the newspaper industry, built new commercial establishments, hospitals, and schools, and sent “promising young men to Europe and America for higher education.”²⁷⁴

To strengthen Ethiopian border security, Selassie strategically employed diplomatic measures, developed great power alliances, and focused on military advancements. Through active participation in the League of Nations, he secured British military support against the

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Ibid., 69.

²⁷² Ibid., 81.

²⁷³ Edmond J. Keller, *Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People’s Republic*, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 127.

²⁷⁴ Henze, *Layers of Time*, 203-204.

Italians during their occupation of the country and, recognizing the strength of international institutions, later engaged the United Nations in 1952 to broker an agreement regarding the attrition of Eritrea into its borders. In addition to diplomatic measures, Ethiopia strengthened and modernized its military through partnering with the United States for assistance in military training in exchange for anti-communist support both within the continent and abroad.²⁷⁵

Though Selassie embraced and accepted elements of the Western world for Ethiopia's development, his policies were also strongly guided by the pan-Africanist ideology. Just as Egypt had sought to influence the Arab world, Ethiopia focused on extending its influence into the African one. By supporting the independence of African countries and establishing the Organization of African Unity, Ethiopia not only gained prestige on the continent, but Selassie had "ensured that Ethiopia's territorial integrity would not be questioned by other African states."²⁷⁶

Despite securing its borders, achieving a GDP growth rate of 4 percent, and averaging a per capita growth rate of 1.5 percent, the costs associated with large-scale government involvement in the country's economic growth drew attention and resources away from other areas and "necessarily led to [the] disappointing performance [of] the delivery of social services."²⁷⁷ Thus, a "profound result of Ethiopia's development strategy during this period (1950-1974) was the sharpening of social contradictions, ... [and the emergence of] capitalist classes... side-by-side with feudal classes."²⁷⁸ Efforts at economic development and modernization had resulted in economic inequality and rising discontent with the government.

²⁷⁵ Keller, *The Politics of State Survival: Continuity and Change in Ethiopian Foreign Policy*, 81-82.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 83.

²⁷⁷ Keller, *Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic*, 105.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 128.

The advent of an educated elite and growing student base dissatisfied with the lack of substantive changes resulted in the emergence of a revolutionary spirit within the country. With the University as a venue to discuss political, economic, social, and cultural issues, the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) of the 1960s emerged as an urban initiative concerned with the plight of the rural, peasant masses.²⁷⁹ Contrary to Selassie's embrace of capitalism, the ESM identified with and promoted Marxist solutions to social injustice, poverty, and inequality, and as such called not simply for a new leader, but for a new form of governance.²⁸⁰ As its appeal grew, its membership base expanded to include labor unions and teachers and the movement began to permeate the rural communities.

The growing domestic unrest of the 1960s was exacerbated by two events that occurred early in the following decade. In 1973, Ethiopia was hit by both a devastating famine in the north, the result of drought, and rising petroleum prices, the result of the global oil crisis.²⁸¹ Both issues were aggravated by poor government policies: the government actively denied the famine and, refusing to absorb the cost increase associated with the oil embargo, raised the price of petroleum products.²⁸² Such responses only strengthened the anti-Selassie movement.

The 1974 coup that eventually overthrew Selassie, however, was not necessarily the result of the ESM; in fact, the relationship between the military and the civilian population remained loose throughout its existence. Instead, the 1974 coup was made possible only through the power and organizational capacity of the Derg ('committee') organization that had developed

²⁷⁹ Ibid., 177.

²⁸⁰ For a critical analysis of the Eurocentric Marxist paradigm in Ethiopia from 1961-1991 see: Teshale Tibebe, "Modernity, Eurocentrism, and radical politics in Ethiopia, 1961-1991," *African Identities* 6 (2008): 345-371. Tibebe provides detail around the two main perspectives of the ESM and argues that Marxism in Ethiopia was episodic for two reasons: firstly, the lack of time between its acceptance as an ideological guide – 1969 – and the revolution – 1974 – impeded its full development; and secondly, was the limited availability of Marxist literature. Tibebe further discusses the three stages of ideology that the Derg regime went through in its first two years of existence: Ethiopia *Teqdam*, Ethiopian Socialism and Scientific Socialism.

²⁸¹ Henze, *Layers of Time*, 283.

²⁸² Keller, *Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic*, 170-171.

out of the military.²⁸³ Selassie's relations with the military had been tense since the abortive coup of 1960²⁸⁴ and by the early months of 1974 relations had severely deteriorated with grievances growing and objections to the ostentatious consumption of the politico-administrative class and nobility increasing. In the build up to the coup, the Derg strengthened connections with radical intellectuals, began a systematic publicity campaign to discredit the regime, gradually dismantled public institutions, and weakened the civilian government.²⁸⁵ Almost 3,000 years of Emperor rule in Ethiopia came to a close in September of 1974.

Ethiopia: 1974-1991

The Derg regime was led by Mengistu Haile Maryam and remained in power until 1991 when opposition forces defeated it. While the revolutionary movement grew from Marxism, the revolution's executors were committed to Soviet style socialism, and upon taking control the Derg imposed a "centralized and hierarchical Soviet model," remained disconnected from Ethiopian civilians and the ESM, and violently oppressing dissenting views.²⁸⁶ As such, the era of the Derg was dark and violent, with "battles between the Derg forces and [insurgent groups leaving] tens of thousands of mostly young people dead, and as many injured and maimed, while others fled and were forced into exile."²⁸⁷

²⁸³ Paulos Milkias, *Haile Selassie, Western Education and Political Revolution in Ethiopia* (New York: Cambria Press, 2006).

²⁸⁴ In 1960 while Selassie was in Brazil, the Imperial Bodyguard overtook the imperial palace while rebels secured control of most of the capitol. They declared a new government to address Ethiopia's economic "backwardness." The coup was short lived as the pro-Selassie forces within the Army drove out the Imperial Bodyguard and rebels. Selassie had strategically kept these two groups separate from each other both in terms of military capabilities and geographic locations so when the Imperial Bodyguard had dissented, the Army acted as a countervailing force. For an analysis of the 1960 coup, see: Christopher Clapham, "The Ethiopian Coup d'Etat of December 1960," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 6 (1968): 495-507.

²⁸⁵ Keller, *Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic*, 186-187.

²⁸⁶ Christopher Clapham, "Ethiopian Development: The Politics of Emulation," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 44 (2006): 114.

²⁸⁷ Jon Abbink, "The Ethiopian Revolution after 40 Years (1974-2014): Plan B in Progress?" *Journal of Developing Societies* 31 (2015): 334.

The regime's populist agenda was articulated through the nationalization of land, the establishment of state farms and agricultural producer cooperatives, and a policy of villagisation.²⁸⁸ Economically, the effects of this socialist economic system that was implemented from 1974/75 – 1989/90 were significant: GDP decelerated from 4 percent under Selassie to 2.3 percent, with per capita growth at -0.4 percent.²⁸⁹

Politically, the effects of the nationalization efforts, refusal to return to civilian rule, and the Derg's deviation from purer forms of Marxist ideology contributed to the development of multiple nationalist and separatist opposition groups early on.²⁹⁰ For example, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party and the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement were representative of more nationalist, "elitist, authoritarian, and multiethnic Marxist groups" whereas the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) were more separatist and regional in nature.²⁹¹ The most formidable of these groups, and the eventual successor to the Derg, was the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF).

Founded in 1975, the TPLF emerged from the ESM of the 1960s with the formation of the Tigrayan University Students' Association (TUSA) in the early 1970s. TUSA functioned in both the capital and the northern Tigray region where it established supplementary educational programs, developmental projects, and raised political awareness on problems and solutions within Tigray.²⁹² Within TUSA, a more politically focused group established the Tigrayan National Organization (TNO) in 1974 with the aim of self-determination for the region within a

²⁸⁸ Clapham, *Ethiopian Development: The Politics of Emulation*, 115.

²⁸⁹ Alemayehu Geda, "The political economy of growth in Ethiopia," in *The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa: 1960-2000* edited by Benno J. Ndulu et. al., Volume 2 (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 119.

²⁹⁰ For more information on the various liberation movements in Ethiopia during the Derg era, see chapter 8 in Christopher Clapham, *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

²⁹¹ Paul B. Henze, "A Political Success Story," *Journal of Democracy* 9 (1998): 43.

²⁹² Aregawi Berhe, "The Origins of the Tigray People's Liberation Front," *African Affairs* 103 (2004): 577.

poly-ethnic and democratic Ethiopia.²⁹³ By 1975 the TNO had created the TPLF, an armed political organization, and began its 16-year struggle against the Derg.

Early on, the TPLF recognized the strategic role ideology would have in the movement. Originally based on a Marxist-Leninist approach to the liberation of the masses, the Derg's relaxation of the ideology's original values encouraged the TPLF to adopt a more anti-revisionist position. The promotion of the more rigid Maoism in the late 1970s represented a tactical shift to gain the support of rural groups as its focus was on the peasant, rather than the proletariat, as the source of the revolution.²⁹⁴

Complementing its efforts to extend TPLF membership base were its efforts to form alliances with other ethnic and insurgent groups in order to strengthen and consolidate opposition military capacity. To do so, the TPLF shifted its ideology once more to the Albanian model of rigid Marxism-Leninism.²⁹⁵ With the Derg in the Soviet sphere of influence, the TPLF had distanced itself from the ruling regime yet continued its alignment with a socialist force. Finally, by 1985, the Marxist Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT) led by Meles Zenawi was created as the movement's "ideological organ."²⁹⁶

As the TPLF extended throughout Ethiopia, it implemented a system of liaison officers and grassroots political organizations to further mobilize and retain close relations with rural populations. Government-like structures were established and "led by cadres under the control of

²⁹³ As documented by TPLF founding member, Aregawi Berhe in: Aregawi Berhe, "The Origins of the Tigray People's Liberation Front," *African Affairs* 103 (2004): 569-192, the TPLF evolved from the Tigrayan National Organization (TNO) and as such adopted the TNO's founding guidelines, of which one maintained that "the strategy of the movement [was] formation of a democratic Ethiopia in which the equality of all nationalities is respected." However, while the idea of self-determination was the TPLF's goal, in the mid-1970s elements of the TPLF promoted a more secessionist viewpoint, advocating for the independence of Tigray. Due to the position's lack of support and increasing criticism around it, the position was dropped by 1978 and the TPLF reverted back to its original stance of self-determination *within* Ethiopia.

²⁹⁴ Jean-Nicholas Bach, "Abyotawi democracy: neither revolutionary nor democratic, a critical review of EPRDF's conception of revolutionary democracy in post-1991 Ethiopia," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 5 (2011): 642.

²⁹⁵ Alemante G. Selassie, "Ethiopia: Problems and Prospects for Democracy," *William and Mary Bill of Rights* 1 (1992): 211.

²⁹⁶ Bach, 642.

the TPLF leadership, [which was] increasingly driven by the [Marxist] vanguard and an exceptionally small group of decision makers.”²⁹⁷ The support, partnerships, and alliances that the TPLF acquired as a result of ideological changes and political outreach proved crucial in the defeat of the Derg. By the late 1980s, the TPLF had formed the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPRDF), a “coalition of insurgent forces led by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front.”²⁹⁸ As a result, the Derg continued to suffer losses and after almost 16 years of civil war, was defeated by the EPRDF led by Meles Zenawi in 1991.

Domestically, the country was devastated and Selassie’s efforts to establish a modern Ethiopia with international stature had been all but reversed. Globally, the Cold War had come to a close and with it the decreasing popularity of Marxism-Leninism and associated Soviet financial support. The new EPRDF regime thus “abandoned dogmatic Marxism”²⁹⁹ and adopted new political and economic ideologies, beginning the transition into an ethnic federation guided by an ideology of “revolutionary democracy.”³⁰⁰

Ethiopia: 1991-2001

Upon defeating the Derg in 1991 the EPRDF coalition established a transitional government inclusive of more than 25 political groups.³⁰¹ Ethiopia transitioned from a centralized unitary system to a decentralized ethnically based federalism to allow for self-rule and create ‘unity from diversity.’³⁰² The coalition created a democratic constitution that established a multi-party system with national elections and two houses of parliament,

²⁹⁷ Sarah Vaughan, “Revolutionary democratic state-building: party, state and people in the EPRDF’s Ethiopia,” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 5 (2011): 626.

²⁹⁸ John W. Harbeson, “Ethiopia’s Extended Transition,” *Journal of Democracy* 16 (2005): 147.

²⁹⁹ Henze, *A Political Success Story*, 43.

³⁰⁰ Vaughan, 619-640.

³⁰¹ Bach, 642.

³⁰² Beresa Abera Jebena, “Ethnic Federalism and Democratic Development in Ethiopia: Some Points of Contradiction,” *International Journal of Political Science and Development* 3 (2015): 291.

recognized basic rights for its citizens, and allowed for the secession of ethnic regions.³⁰³ With the adoption of its Constitution in 1995, Ethiopia officially became the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia under the leadership of Zenawi and the EPRDF.

Shortly after, the Tigrayan minority within the EPRDF strengthened its hold on political affairs and immediately sought to dominate the new government.³⁰⁴ Despite implementing democratic and liberal policies the Tigrayan regime maintained that *revolutionary* democracy “had to be firmly grasped if Ethiopia was to embark on sustainable economic development.”³⁰⁵ In a revolutionary democracy, democracy is established through revolutionary means with the masses guided by a vanguard elite.³⁰⁶ Within Ethiopia, the EPRDF acts as the vanguard party that will guide Ethiopia into maturity. According to Bach (2011) Ethiopia represents a unique case in that its revolutionary democracy began after the fall of communism and has come to coexist with the establishment of liberal institutions.³⁰⁷

The new regime, in a move away from the Derg’s socialist policies, also began to shift Ethiopia towards becoming a free market economy by adapting neoliberal Structural Adjustment Programs from 1993-1996 in an attempt to restore economic growth, reduce poverty, and spur development.³⁰⁸ Efforts were made to encourage private investment and promote the

³⁰³ FDRE, *Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia* (Addis Ababa: Ministry of Ethiopia, 1995). Available at: http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/Ethiopian_Constitution.html [accessed February 2, 2016].

³⁰⁴ John Young, “Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia,” *Review of African Political Economy* 23 (1996): 532.

³⁰⁵ Berhe Aregawi, *A Political History of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (1975-1991)* (Los Angeles: Tsehai Publishers, 2009), 190.

³⁰⁶ The core tenets of a revolutionary democracy are that it “prioritizes group rights over individual rights, advocates for [a] strong, interventionist government and [has] a dominant political party that stays in power for a period long enough to facilitate socio-economic transformation.” In: Muktar M. Omer, “The New Trajectory of Totalitarian Thinking,” 17 January 2013, <http://ecadforum.com/blog/revolutionary-democracy-in-ethiopia/>

³⁰⁷ Bach, 642.

³⁰⁸ African Development Bank, Operations Evaluation Department (OPEV), “Ethiopia: Structural Adjustment Programme, Project Performance Evaluation Report” (Cote d’Ivoire: OPEV, 2000). Available at: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Evaluation-Reports-_Shared-With-OPEV_/05092255-EN-ETHIOPIA-STRUCTURAL-ADJUSTMENT-PROGRAMME.PDF [accessed April 3, 2016].

participation of the private sector³⁰⁹ by liberalizing the investment code, limiting the role of the state, and diversifying exports.³¹⁰ As a result, the period from 1992 through 2000 saw a real GDP growth rate of 5.6 percent and a per capita GDP rate of 2.6 percent.³¹¹ As Bach (2011) argues, “the main symbols of [Ethiopia’s] post-1991 regime, ... [economic liberalization], the constitution, multi-party democracy, and the electoral process,” satisfied international demands for democracy and liberalism while the EPRDF’s commitment to a centralized and hierarchical structure revealed its autocratic nature and its manipulation of the political and economic spheres.³¹²

Ethiopia: 2001-Present

By the turn of the century economic growth had slowed and the ruling EPRDF had fractured.³¹³ As will be discussed further, the regime began to reject liberal economic policies and an alternative model of economic growth based on the developmental state projects of some East Asian countries³¹⁴ was subsequently adapted.³¹⁵ Similar to a revolutionary democracy, in a

³⁰⁹ Sarah Vaughan and Kjetil Tronvoll, *The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life*, Sida Studies 10 (Stockholm: SIDA, 2003) 73-74.

³¹⁰ Mulu Gebreeyesus, “Industrial policy and development in Ethiopia: Evolution and present experimentation,” (Washington, DC: The African Growth Initiative, The Brookings Institution, 2013), 8-9. (Working paper No. 6), Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/L2C_WP6_Gebreeyesus-1.pdf [accessed March 23, 2016].

³¹¹ Geda, 119.

³¹² Bach, 644.

³¹³ See: Paulos Milkias, “Ethiopia, the TPLF, and Roots of the 2001 Political Tremor,” *International Conference on African Development Archives Paper 4* (2001): 1-31, available at:

http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&context=africancenter_icad_archive for a discussion on the events leading up to the 2001 split within the EPRDF. Amongst other factors, the split was the result of differences regarding how to deal with Eritrean aggression into Ethiopian-held lands and the subsequent peace arrangement suggested by the OAU and the US. While the opposition, made up of Tigray nationalists known as the Tekeste-Siye group, argued against the agreement claiming it infringed on Ethiopia’s national sovereignty, Meles supported it, mostly to ensure that Ethiopia would not fall victim to international sanctions. The Tekeste-Siye group was officially expelled in 2001 after disagreements between the two groups over corruption and anti-democratic behavior of the TPLF.

³¹⁴ With high government involvement and supportive public policies, China, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, and Vietnam all experience rapid economic growth and socio-economic change over a period of 30 years. They went from being poor agrarian societies in the 1960s to producers of high technology and high value-added goods by the 1990s. For a detailed comparison of Ethiopia with these East Asian countries, see: International Monetary Fund, *The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Selected Issues Paper, IMF Country Report No.*

developmental state the government is tasked with “bring[ing] this free market to ‘maturity,’” and closely engages and monitors the private sector to ensure that rent-seeking behaviors do not occur, a common occurrence “in this initial phase of the market.”³¹⁶

This shift was accompanied by the government’s dual commitment to poverty reduction and rapid economic development. As articulated in Ethiopia’s 2002 Foreign Affairs and National Strategy document, poverty was recognized as the greatest threat to Ethiopian security and survival:³¹⁷

“Rapid development is not merely important in raising the standard of living of the people, but also a guarantee of national survival... If we do not realize our goals... our country will be exposed to great instability and even collapse and our very own security, and indeed survival, will be at stake.”³¹⁸

Thus, poverty became Ethiopia’s existential threat and rapid development the solution. By framing poverty as an existential threat only to be solved through the guidance of the EPRDF, Zenawi essentially ‘securitized development’ to justify the increasingly autocratic actions characteristic of developmental states. Since “the securitization of a public issue gives credence to the [government’s] immediate need for wider powers and mobilization of resources towards combatting a perceived existential threat,” a strong, authoritarian government is warranted.³¹⁹ While normally such an issue is articulated in the form of external threats, by the early 2000s Ethiopia had lacked any serious, prolonged border threats and had remained

14/304 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2014) Available at: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14304.pdf> [accessed February 23, 2016].

³¹⁵ Fana Gebresenbet, “Securitization of development in Ethiopia: discourse and politics of developmentalism,” *Review of African Political Economy* 41 (2014): S64-S74.

³¹⁶ René Lefort, “Free market economy, ‘developmental state’ and party-state hegemony in Ethiopia: the case of the ‘model farmers,’” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 50 (2012): 683.

³¹⁷ FDRE Ministry of Information, *Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy*, (Addis Ababa: Ministry of Information, 2002), 1. Available at: http://www.lawethiopia.com/images/Policy_documents/foreign_policy_english.pdf [accessed March 12, 2016].

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 1-6.

³¹⁹ Gebresenbet, S64-S74.

relatively free from the civil unrest characteristic of its pre-1991 history. Thus, extreme or authoritarian measures taken by the EPRDF became validated on the basis that they fight an existential threat, ensuring the security and sovereignty of Ethiopia.

This was readily apparent after the 2005 parliamentary elections when the EPRDF interpreted its significant loss of votes as “‘protest votes’ and the post-election violence as ‘a small but sufficient’ indicator of what might happen if the developmental mission is not pursued efficiently.”³²⁰ In the run up to the elections, contending parties were able to freely campaign, host rallies, and disseminate ideas, leading Ethiopians to believe that such “unprecedented... openness” would result in the ability to change the status quo and increase political discourse.³²¹ When opposition groups’ representation in parliament increased from 12 seats to 161, at a voter turnout of about 82 percent, the EPRDF’s commitment to democratic elections disappeared; its control was not guaranteed.³²²

The EPRDF interpreted its losses and the post-election violence as a population upset with lack of economic – rather than political – opportunity and responded by “further entrench[ing] developmentalism,” claiming that only through “rapid development that benefits all sectors of the population” would a peaceful and advanced Ethiopia emerge.³²³ Expressed further in his 2006 monograph, “African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings,” Zenawi reiterated that neoliberal economic development policies had proven incapable of bringing about adequate growth to both the African continent and Ethiopia and that a paradigm shift to the democratic developmental state with heavy state involvement, as seen in Asia, was

³²⁰ Gebresenbet, S70.

³²¹ Lovise Aalen and Kjetil Tronvoll, “The End of Democracy? Curtailing Political and Civil Rights in Ethiopia,” *Review of African Political Economy* 120 (2009): 195.

³²² John W. Harbeson, “Ethiopia’s Extended Transition.” *Journal of Democracy* 16 (2005): 149-150.

³²³ Gebresenbet, S70.

the best option for economic growth.³²⁴ Zenawi had utilized the economy to explain the regime's shift away from neoliberalism. As Gebresenbet (2014) concludes, in line with the

“appraisal that ‘the economy determines everything,’ ... [economic development and] the eradication of poverty [became] the paramount challenge[s] the EPRDF and the state [decided] to focus on,” improve upon, and vocalize.³²⁵

Accompanying the post-2005 emphasis on the developmental state was the gradual closing of democratic freedoms, the implementation of new, repressive legislation, and government sponsored political mobilization efforts to connect rural areas with the ruling EPRDF. The “closing of political space and the criminalization of dissent” after the 2005 elections has only become more pronounced: in 2010, opposition parties failed to win more than one of the 547 seats in Parliament, and by 2015, not even one.³²⁶ The GOE has thus maintained an extremely influential and large role in the political and economic affairs of the country.

For the EPRDF “the ‘developmental state’ [became the] only way [to] achieve revolutionary democracy and economic development, ... [and] in the process, democracy [became] a secondary objective.”³²⁷ Until the GOE believes the Ethiopian economy has evolved from its infancy and may compete freely, the EPRDF will continue to act as the country's vanguard. The necessity of the EPRDF's leadership for guiding Ethiopia to a situation of maturity is succinctly stated in the opening of the EPRDF Statute of 2010:

“In order to enable people to rally behind the objectives of revolutionary democracy and to struggle for their accomplishment, EPRDF is expected to play the role of a vanguard by bracing up its

³²⁴ Meles Zenawi, “African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings,” *Unpublished manuscript, last modified April 2006*, available at: http://africanidea.org/m_zenawi_aug_9_2006.pdf [accessed April 7, 2016].

³²⁵ Gebresenbet, S66-S67.

³²⁶ Leonardo R. Arriola and Terrence Lyons, “The 100% Election,” *Journal of Democracy* 27 (2016): 81 and 76.

³²⁷ Bach, 650.

organizational capacity to lead the people in their efforts to raise their consciousness and organize themselves.”³²⁸

However, Ethiopians are beginning to question the authenticity of the government’s actions and its commitment to the Constitution. Beginning in 2014 protests erupted in the Oromia region of Ethiopia over the government’s plan to develop Oromia farmland in order to accommodate developmental and urban expansion plans. As the Ethiopia Human Right’s Project reports, the protests were also representative of questions of “constitutionalism, representation, and human rights” since the Oromo, despite representing one third of Ethiopia’s population, are increasingly marginalized as the government becomes ever more authoritarian and controlled by the Tigrayan dominated EPRDF.³²⁹ The demonstrations have been met by repressive government forces and upwards of 250 people have been killed since mid-November.³³⁰

Just as in the post-2005 environment, the GOE continues to explain unrest as the result of economic underdevelopment, unemployment, and poverty.³³¹ In a March 2016 interview, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn understood the Oromia protests as the byproduct of the government’s failure to adequately address the issue of unemployment. Rather than consider the protests as emanating from political grievances, Hailemariam stated the opposite:

³²⁸ EPRDF. *EPRDF Statute / Draft*, 1. quoted in Jean-Nicholas Bach, “Abyotawi democracy: neither revolutionary nor democratic, a critical review of EPRDF’s conception of revolutionary democracy in post-1991 Ethiopia,” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 5 (2011): 649.

³²⁹ Ethiopia Human Rights Project, *Oromo Protests – 100 Days of Public Protest* (Nairobi, Kenya: Ethiopia Human Rights Project, March 2016) <http://ehrp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/EHRP-OromoProtests-100-Days-of-Public-Protests.pdf>

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ In late 2015 the Qemant ethnic group in the Amhara region protested for recognition as a group with constitutional rights, this was met by the dispatching of federal security forces; in March 2016, the Konso people in southern Ethiopia protested against the decision by the government to remove their right to self-rule, this was met by incarcerations as well as the arrests of Konso leaders on the basis of maladministration and corruption. See William Davison, “Stop the killing!: farmland development scheme sparks fatal clashes in Ethiopia,” *The Guardian*, December 18, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/dec/18/ethiopia-romia-farmland-development-fatal-clashes>

“[t]he root cause of protests in this country is not politics. It is having so many young people who are unemployed... We have lagged in Oromia in creating jobs and in some [other] parts of the country as well... If we address those issues (unemployment and lack of good governance), I think this kind of thing is not so much a problem.”³³²

By securitizing development the government has been able to ensure its hold on power and implement top down policies that are increasingly at odds with the decentralized nature of an ethnic federation.

Economic Growth

By the early 2000s Ethiopia had replaced the dominant neoliberal economic paradigm with a multidimensional approach to economic development that promoted agriculture and industrial development accompanied by strong government investment in public infrastructure projects. Since implementing this unique approach to development, the country has experienced rapid economic growth, significant social improvements, and is on track to reaching its broader goal of becoming a lower middle-income country by 2025.³³³

Economically, Ethiopia maintained a real GDP growth average of 10.9 percent from 2004-2014, significantly greater than the 4.5 percent the previous decade and 1 percent under the Derg military regime.³³⁴ Social improvements can be seen with the poverty rate decline from 63 percent to 37 percent between 1995 and 2011, a 10 percent decline in urban unemployment from 1993 to 2011, and increased access to education at the primary, secondary, and university

³³² Reed Kramer, “Ethiopia: We Want ‘Equitable, Broad-Based Growth’ – Prime Minister Hailemariam,” *All Africa*, March 1, 2016, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201603010001.html>

³³³ The World Bank, *Ethiopia’s Great Run: The Growth Acceleration and How to Pace It, 2004-2014* (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank Group, 2016). Available at: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/693561467988949839/pdf/99399-REVISED-PUBLIC-thiopia-Economic-Update-2-11-16-web.pdf> [accessed March 12, 2016].

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.

levels.³³⁵ As a result of its policies, Ethiopia remains one of the only countries to have “attained most of the Millennium Development Goals.”³³⁶

To achieve the above, the EPRDF initially focused on the agricultural sector via its policy of Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) but this has since become supported by additional efforts aimed at structural transformation, each with the overall goal of poverty eradication.³³⁷ More recent initiatives stress the development of its energy sector with a commitment to sustainable, green development. As such, harnessing the Nile River and increasing public infrastructure investment have become key economic strategies; by the mid-2000s these strategies had become tangible developments.

In November 2002 Ethiopia formulated the Rural Development Policy and Strategies (RDPS) document, one of the first government documents to concretely outline strategies for accelerated broad-based economic growth to enable Ethiopia to integrate globally. Important for this discussion of riparian relations, the RDPS explicitly states that:

“the development and proper utilization of our water resources is the third pillar on which our objective of accelerated and sustainable agricultural development is based.”³³⁸

Ethiopia recognizes that thus far it has been unable to exploit the Nile due to a number of political and economic factors while its downstream counterparts have benefited tremendously:

“Sudan and Egypt, particularly Egypt, make extensive use of the waters of the Nile... and fear that their interests will be jeopardized if Ethiopia steps up her use of the Nile. In this regard, the main protagonist is Egypt and with her allies has more or less succeeded

³³⁵ Amanda Lenhardt et al., *One foot on the ground, one food in the air: Ethiopia's delivery on an ambitious development agenda* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2015).

³³⁶ The World Bank Group, *Ethiopia's Great Run: The Growth Acceleration and How to Pace It, 2004-2014*, xii.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

³³⁸ FDRE. MOFED, *Rural Development Policy and Strategies* (Addis Ababa: MOFED Economic Policy and Planning Department, 2003), 41. Available at: http://gafspfund.org/sites/gafspfund.org/files/Documents/Ethiopia_4_of_6_ARD%20policy.pdf [accessed March 12, 2016].

in virtually blocking foreign loans and grants to Ethiopia destined for the development of our water resources.”³³⁹

The RDPS recognizes the need to invest in water development projects using Ethiopia’s own resources as well as encouraging private investment and as such, has designed “master plans... for [Ethiopia’s] major rivers... [that] encourage private investors to build hydroelectric dams.”³⁴⁰

In conjunction with the RDPS, the 2002/03-2004/05 Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) took a four-pronged approach to fight poverty and ensure sustainable development by emphasizing ADLI, justice system and civil service reform, decentralization, and public and private sector capacity building. During the SDPRP period hydropower reconnaissance studies and feasibility studies were planned at a total of 13 sites as part of the first phase of its 15-year water sector development program.³⁴¹ Thus, it is evident that water resources management and utilization has been a cornerstone of the EPRDF’s economic development policies.

The 2005/06-2009/10 Plan of Action for Sustainable Development and Eradication of Poverty (PASDEP) continued the above objectives and focused on developing the urban and industrial sectors.³⁴² A major element of the PASDEP was the launch of the large-scale rural ‘Universal Electrification Access Program’ (UAEP) and the recognition that “electricity is essential both as an input into the growth of the modern sector...[and] as an essential ingredient of rural... and social... transformation.”³⁴³ In order to extend electricity to “about 50% of the

³³⁹ Ibid., 28.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., 29.

³⁴¹ FDRE. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED), *Ethiopia: Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme (SDPRP)* (Addis Ababa: MOFED, 2002), 108-109. Available at: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/073102.pdf> [accessed March 10, 2016].

³⁴² Gebreeyesus, 9.

³⁴³ FDRE. MOFED, *Ethiopia: Building on Progress, A Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP)* (Addis Ababa: MOFED, 2006), 137. Available at: <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy->

country within five years” the PASDEP proposed “the construction of 11 hydroelectric power generating stations with a total capacity of 4,091 MW... [as well as] wind generating plants.”³⁴⁴

The Tana Beles hydropower plant constructed along the Tekeze tributary, which provides the Nile with 13 percent of its annual flow, and the Gilgel Gibe II power station along the Omo River, are two such projects.³⁴⁵

Building on the PASDEP, the 2010/11 – 2014/15 First Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP I) positioned the agricultural sector as the major driver of growth but increased investment to infrastructure development, a recognized growth enhancing sector, as well as to the industrial sector, a source of foreign exchange and job creation.³⁴⁶ Ethiopia’s 2011 Climate –Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) strategy was introduced with the aim of achieving middle-income status by 2025 in a climate-resilient green economy. Under the GTP I, investment in renewable energy projects was profound and multiple hydroelectric (GERD, GIBE III, and DAWA III) and wind power projects (Ashegoda, Adama No. I and II) were initiated, a trend that continues into the GTP II.³⁴⁷

The GTP II covers the 2015/16-2019/20 period and focuses on the post-2015 sustainable development goals,³⁴⁸ rapid industrialization, and structural transformation, to become a lower middle-income country by 2025.³⁴⁹ Furthermore, it emphasizes the development of industrial

Documents/Plan_for_Accelerated_and_Sustained_%28PASDEP%29_final_July_2007_Volume_I_3.pdf [accessed March 11, 2016].

³⁴⁴ Ibid., 137-138.

³⁴⁵ Tawfik, 16.

³⁴⁶ FDRE. MOFED, *Growth and Transformation Plan 2010/11-2014/15* (Addis Ababa: MOFED, 2010). Available at: <http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/eth144893.pdf> [accessed March 14, 2016].

³⁴⁷ FDRE. National Planning Commission, *The Second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II) (2015/16-2019/20) (Draft)* (Addis Ababa: Ministry of Ethiopia, 2015), 10. Available at: <https://www.africaintelligence.com/c/dc/LOI/1415/GTP-II.pdf> [accessed May 22, 2016].

³⁴⁸ See: UNDP, *Sustainable Development Goals*. Available at:

<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sdgoverview/post-2015-development-agenda.html>

³⁴⁹ FDRE, National Planning Commission, 16.

hubs and urbanization to “turn cities into engines of growth.”³⁵⁰ To meet the needs of a growing economy, the GTP II seeks to “increase [the] national energy generation, transmission and distribution capacity to fully satisfy domestic energy demand with production surplus ready for export market... [through] hydropower, wind power, geothermal power, [and] solar power.”³⁵¹

Thus, while the EPRDF’s approach to economic development is multidimensional, it has clearly focused on investing in and developing its energy sector. It is this quest for renewable energy to support Ethiopia’s economic development that is greatly impacting relations with Egypt and may prove to be the source of either conflict or cooperation. Prior to discussing this, it is first important to understand the efforts at Nile Basin management that began with the advent of decolonization on the continent.

Contemporary Efforts at Nile Management

For most of the colonial and immediate post-colonial periods, agreements on the Nile involved Great Britain, Egypt and Sudan; other riparians were readily excluded. By the 1960s, though, efforts at developing institutional frameworks for the Nile Basin region had become inclusive of the other riparians. However, reevaluating the 1959 Agreement that codified water allocation quantities remained outside of these efforts and the Agreement continued to dictate water allocation quantities.

The first Basin-wide project was the Hydromet study in 1967 conducted in order to understand the dramatic rise of water levels in the equatorial lakes in the 1960s. To support Hydromet’s mission of studying, analyzing, and disseminating meteorological information on the region, the “World Meteorological Organization, with Egyptian backing, under[took] a survey of

³⁵⁰ Ibid., 27 and 38.

³⁵¹ Ibid., 32-33.

rainfall in the affected regions of the upper Nile.”³⁵² Hydromet members included Egypt, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda; Ethiopia only joined as observing member in 1971. Ethiopia remained apprehensive due to the location of Hydromet’s headquarters in Entebbe, Uganda, where the Egyptians had retained considerable influence since the 1949 Owen Falls agreement.³⁵³ This agreement allowed for a resident Egyptian engineer to ensure Egyptian interests were considered in regards to management of Lake Victoria, the Lake from which the White Nile flows.³⁵⁴ Despite 25 years of existence, no projects became operational and Hydromet had little “substantive impact on harmonizing the upstream-downstream polarization of interests.”³⁵⁵

In 1983 Egypt initiated the Undugu organization to encourage basin-wide cooperation of the Nile. Undugu was intended as a platform for discussions on the Nile, agricultural, and resource development, as well as to promote economic, technical, and scientific cooperation amongst its members. Egypt, Sudan, Uganda, the DRC, and the CAR were the original signatories, later joined by Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania; Ethiopia and Kenya maintained observer statuses. Despite Egyptian enthusiasm for the organization, Egypt continued to develop

³⁵² John Waterbury, *The Nile Basin: National Determinants of Collective Action* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000) 77.

³⁵³ Signed between Great Britain, acting on behalf of Uganda, and Egypt, the Owen Falls Agreements “provided for the participation of Egypt in the construction of the Owen Falls Dam, and the use of Lake Victoria as a storage reservoir of water for Egypt... it [provided for] a Resident Egyptian Engineer at the Dam to ensure that the interests of Egypt were taken into account. To this day (2001), an Egyptian Engineer is still resident at the Dam.” Egypt was consulted on an upstream project as a result of the 1929 agreement stipulating that any development on the Nile by an upstream country must be approved by the downstream countries. In: Burnside, *Bujagali Project Hydropower Facility EIA, Appendix B.1: History of Riparian Agreements Respecting the River Nile*, (Uganda: Burnside, 2001). Available at: <http://www.bujagali-energy.com/docs/HPPWEBVersion/HPP%20SEA.Appendix%20B.pdf> [accessed March 23, 2016].

³⁵⁴ Waterbury, 77.

³⁵⁵ Arsano, *Ethiopia and the Nile*, 214.

irrigation and land reclamation projects without consulting Undugu members thus reinforcing hegemonic fears. Eventually Undugu was disbanded in the early 1990s.³⁵⁶

Despite another lackluster attempt at establishing regional organizations, a shift towards more meaningful cooperation occurred in the final decade of the 20th century with the establishment of the Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile (TECCONILE) and a Framework for Cooperation between Ethiopia and Egypt. In 1992 TECCONILE, was formed with support from international organizations including the World Bank, United Nations Development Program, the Canadian International Development Agency and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations³⁵⁷ and was “aimed at building the capacity and techniques required [for member states] to manage the basin’s water resources.”³⁵⁸ Member states included Egypt, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and the DRC with Ethiopia and Kenya again remaining as observers.

Unlike before, though, Ethiopia took a more active role and centered its participation on the idea that a framework for cooperation based on principles of equitable use must be agreed upon prior to any action plans.³⁵⁹ Two important factors likely contributed to Ethiopia’s unprecedented engagement in the regional organization. Firstly, Ethiopia was no longer engaged in civil war, enabling the new government to focus on its position in regional affairs. Secondly, the end of the Cold War meant a realignment within the global environment, and “if [Ethiopia wanted to] try to get back into an international arena, ...it was necessary to attract “foreign

³⁵⁶ Dereje Z. Mekonnen, “The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement Negotiations and the Adoption of a ‘Water Security’ Paradigm: Flight into Obscurity or a Logical Cul-de-sac?” *The European Journal of International Law* 21 (2010): 426.

³⁵⁷ Waterbury, 78.

³⁵⁸ Honest Prosper Ngowi, “Unlocking Economic Growth and Development Potential: The Nile Basin Approach in Tanzania,” in *The River Nile in the Post-Colonial Age*, edited by Terje Tvedt (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2010), 67.

³⁵⁹ Waterbury, 79.

private investment and favorable treatment from the World Bank.”³⁶⁰ Taking an active regional role would attract the attention of international institutions.

Shortly after TECCONILE came into existence, the Egyptian President Mubarak and Ethiopian Prime Minister Zenawi signed the 1993 “Framework for General Cooperation between the Arab Republic of Egypt and Ethiopia.” Both countries reaffirmed their commitments to peaceful settlement of disputes, to work towards a framework for effective cooperation, and to “refrain from engaging in any activity related to the Nile waters that may cause appreciable harm to the interests of the other party.”³⁶¹ This agreement represented the first bilateral framework for cooperation between the two countries and while it did not address water allocation issues, it did address the common interest that both countries had in developing the Nile basin.

Both the 1993 Framework and Ethiopia’s insistence for the establishment of agreed upon principles, contributed to the development of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) and the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) that grew out of TECCONILE.³⁶² These NBI and CFA remain important today and are representative of a shift in the substance of interstate riparian relations as they, “for the first time, brought onto the cooperative agenda the fundamental issue of equitable (re)allocation of the Nile waters.”³⁶³ While Hydromet and Undungu have been considered attempts by the downstream countries to prolong the status quo – Egyptian dominance and uneven water allocation specifications –TECCONILE paved the way for more meaningful regional cooperation. By the turn of the century, new dynamics for Nile management were beginning to form.

³⁶⁰ Waterbury, 78.

³⁶¹ Arab Republic of Egypt and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, *Framework for General Cooperation between the Arab Republic of Egypt and Ethiopia* (Cairo, Egypt: Arab Republic of Egypt and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1993). Available at: <http://gis.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/521ENG.pdf> [accessed April 29, 2016].

³⁶² Mekonnen, 427.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, 427.

Established in 1999, the NBI includes eleven countries: the ten riparian states (Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, DRC, Burundi, Tanzania and Rwanda) and Eritrea as an observer. The NBI is a regional intergovernmental partnership that seeks to achieve socio-economic development through the equitable use of the Nile River water resources and to ensure cooperation and joint management of the Nile.³⁶⁴ Member states have continuously worked on the CFA, an agreement on the legal principles of the Nile, to replace earlier treaties, in particular the 1959 Agreement between Sudan and Egypt. Ultimately, the CFA would disband the NBI and establish a permanent River Nile Basin Commission.

After almost ten years of negotiations, the CFA was submitted for ratification; however, whilst all the upstream countries have signed, Egypt and Sudan remain reluctant to do so, disagreeing with the language regarding water security. The CFA stipulates that riparians will work together “not to *significantly* affect the water security of any other Nile Basin State;” Egypt and Sudan prefer it to state that actions taken by riparians would “not... *adversely* affect the water security and *current uses and rights* of any Nile Basin State.”³⁶⁵ The refusal by Sudan and Egypt to concede is further testament to the intimate relationship that downstream states place on water supply and state existence. However, the fact that all other riparians have signed “reflects changes in the balance of geopolitical powers in the region... [with] Egypt’s historical hegemonic position... [increasingly] challenged by emerging regional powers such as Ethiopia.”³⁶⁶

³⁶⁴ “About Nile Basin Initiative,” Nile Basin Initiative, accessed March 17, 2016, <http://www.nilebasin.org/index.php/about-us/nile-basin-initiative>

³⁶⁵ Mekonnen, 428.

³⁶⁶ Michael Hammond, “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Blue Nile: Implications for transboundary water governance,” *Global Water Forum Discussion Paper 1307* (2013): 3.

To address the unique concerns and challenges of the entire region, the NBI is supported by a Secretariat and area-specific subunits.³⁶⁷ Relevant here is that the Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office (ENTRO), which is limited to the main Eastern Nile countries, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Egypt, is based in Ethiopia, and acts as the executive arm of the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Programme (ENSAP). Due to the distinctive hydraulic, topographic, and environmental features of the Eastern Nile tributaries and the historical, demographic, geographical, and economic features unique to these countries, a separate initiative focused on Eastern Nile specific issues is appropriate.³⁶⁸ Currently, ENTRO is executing seven projects across member countries and developing a joint multipurpose program to conduct various economic, social, and environmental sustainability studies.³⁶⁹ Each project has seen the participation and cooperation by member countries.

In addition to Ethiopia's engagement in Nile Basin politics, it is important to briefly address the increasingly active role Ethiopia is playing on the continent. As a landlocked country in the unstable Horn of Africa region has necessarily meant that Ethiopia "is more affected by regional issues than any other state in" the area and as such, Ethiopia has taken measures to ensure regional stability and development.³⁷⁰ For example, by 2011 Ethiopia became the largest African troop contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, supporting only those missions in Africa, most notably the UN mission to its northern neighbor, Somalia.³⁷¹ Additionally, Addis Ababa is the seat of both the African Union and certain Nile Basin organizational departments.

³⁶⁷ In addition to ENTRO, the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program Coordination Unit (NELSAP-CU) includes the southern Basin countries, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, and downstream Egypt and Sudan.

³⁶⁸ "Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office," Nile Basin Initiative, accessed May 10, 2016, <http://entroportal.nilebasin.org/Pages/about.aspx>

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ Berouk Mesfin, "Ethiopia's Role and Foreign Policy in the Horn of Africa," *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 6 (2012): 90.

³⁷¹ "Peacekeeping Contributor Profile," Providing for Peacekeeping, accessed May 9, 2016, <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-ethiopia/>

Thus, while Ethiopia's role in foreign and regional affairs in the 20th century was limited, the 21st century has seen an increasingly engaged and active Ethiopia.

Summary

The above section has provided an overview of the colonial and 21st century histories of Ethiopia and Egypt as well as an understanding of the more contemporary political and economic developments within each country. During the 20th century, Egypt secured its historic quest for dominance over the Nile and strengthened its pan-Arab ideology, distancing itself from its upstream riparian. Selassie's modernization efforts could have enabled Ethiopia to counter Egyptian hegemony and assert its riparian rights but as the country fell into a prolonged civil war its ability to do so diminished. Ethiopia's turbulent domestic conditions translated into weak foreign policies, ensuring Egypt's veto power on Nile developments would not be threatened. With no threat to its hegemony, Egypt had little incentive to focus on reducing water waste or to source alternate freshwater, and efforts at Nile management were feeble at best.

As Ethiopia emerged from civil war and strengthened internally, it simultaneously became more vocal on Nile issues. Throughout the 1990s Ethiopia supported efforts to more equitably manage and use the Nile and by the 2000s it began to actively pursue Nile development projects. In the midst of the Arab Spring and Egypt's domestic instability, Ethiopia embarked on the construction of the continent's largest hydroelectric power plant along the Blue Nile. Pursuing this project at a time when funding obstacles could be overcome and when its greatest critic was preoccupied represents Ethiopia's strategic and calculated nature.

As Egyptian-Ethiopian relations entered the 21st century, the foundations for a gesellschaft society's development were lacking considerably. However, Egypt's increased focus on water scarcity in recent years may very well be representative of the changing nature of its

relationship with both Ethiopia and freshwater and the recognition that it must share the resource. The past and recent histories of Ethiopia and Egypt establish the impact that domestic environments have on a state's international relations and vice versa. Furthermore, they demonstrate that the two countries are moving in opposite directions: as Egypt's power and influence has declined, Ethiopia's has risen. Egypt's hegemonic decline offers the opportunity for Ethiopian-Egyptian relations to result in Gilpin's theory of hegemonic war, in line with realism, or to support Keohane's theory of nonhegemonic cooperation, in line with the EST. The GERD has become the critical issue that can steer relations into either direction.

Section Four: The GERD and Drought

If the AHD was the cornerstone of Nasser's presidency in Egypt, then the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is intended to be Meles Zenawi's. The 6,000 MW hydroelectric dam is the epitome of the leadership's economic development policies emphasizing poverty eradication and sustainable development through renewable energy. The GERD is located on the Blue Nile River, 45km east of Ethiopia's border with Sudan and 750km northwest of Addis Ababa, in the Beneshangul-Gumuz region of Ethiopia.³⁷² It will contain a main dam with a length of 1,780 meters and height of 145 meters, and a saddle dam of 4,800 meters in length and 45 meters in height.³⁷³ There will be an estimated total storage volume of 74 BCMs, of which 59 BCMs will be active and 15 BCMs, dead storage.³⁷⁴ The catchment area is estimated at 172,250km².³⁷⁵ With an installed capacity estimated at 6,000 MW per year able to provide 15,692 GWh energy annually, the GERD dwarfs the other large dams located downstream along the Nile: the Merowe Dam in Sudan has an installed capacity of 1,250 MW and the Aswan High Dam in Egypt has a capacity of 2,100 MW. The expected project cost is \$4.8 billion that Ethiopia

³⁷² Tesfa Belachew, "Benefit of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP) for Sudan and Egypt," *EIPSA Communicating Article: Energy, Water, Environment & Economic* (Discussion Paper), 2013: 4, Available at: http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/19305/1/Belachew_Tesfa_Articles_EIPSA_6_Dec_2013-Uni.pdf [accessed June 12, 2016].

³⁷³ "About Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam," Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation, accessed April 7, 2016, <http://www.eepco.gov.et/abouttheproject.php?pid=1>

³⁷⁴ The US National Weather Service defines active storage as "the total amount of reservoir capacity normally available for release from a reservoir below the maximum storage level. It is the total or reservoir capacity minus the inactive storage capacity... [and] Inactive, [or 'dead'] storage as "the portion of capacity below which the reservoir is not normally drawn, and which is provided for sedimentation, recreation, fish and wildlife, aesthetic reasons, or for the creation of a minimum controlled operational or power head. From: National Weather Service, "Glossary of Hydrologic Terms," Available at: http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/hod/SHManual/SHMan014_glossary.htm [accessed July 2, 2016].

³⁷⁵ International Panel of Experts (IPoE) on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP), *Final Report* (International Panel of Experts: Addis Ababa, 2013), 8. Available at: https://www.internationalrivers.org/sites/default/files/attached-files/international_panel_of_experts_for_ethiopian_renaissance_dam-_final_report_1.pdf [accessed February 8, 2016].

is financing through taxes, donations, and the sale of government bonds.³⁷⁶ Italian construction company Salini Impreglio SpA is the project's construction and engineering head with Addis-Ababa-based Orchid Business Group, an infrastructure, construction, and logistics, company also involved.³⁷⁷

According to McCartney et al., location of the GERD was based on a variety of studies over the years that investigated potential hydropower sites along the Blue Nile. Four main locations, each with generating capacities under 2,000 MW, were recommended in the original USBR study and subsequent studies were based on those recommendations.³⁷⁸ According to the Ethiopian Ministry of Water, studies indicated that a 1,200 MW dam at the Border location would be “well suited to the development of a dam of moderate height of some 80 meters, ... [as] higher levels would appear to require extensive saddle dams to contain the reservoir.”³⁷⁹ A subsequent 2013 study (Jeuland and Whittington, 2013) assessing the economic value of various dam constructions within Ethiopia confirmed that a series of smaller dams cascading along the Blue Nile would have been more advantageous than a larger one at Border.³⁸⁰ However, the proposed 1,200 MW dam at Border with a reservoir capacity of 14 BCMs became the 6,000 MW GERD with a capacity of 74 BCMs, significantly greater than the initial recommendation.

³⁷⁶ Kingsley Ighobor, and Busani Bafana, “Financing Africa’s Massive Projects,” *Africa Renewal* December (2014). Available online: <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2014/financing-africa%E2%80%99s-massive-projects> [accessed February 2, 2016].

³⁷⁷ William Davison, “The Shadow Over Ethiopia’s Construction Boom,” *Bloomberg*, March 21, 2016, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-21/evictions-unrest-cast-shadow-over-ethiopia-s-construction-boom>

³⁷⁸ Matthew P. McCartney et al., “Simulating current and future resources development in the Blue Nile River Basin,” in *The Nile River Basin: Water, Agriculture, Governance and Livelihoods*, edited by Seleshi B. Awulachew, Cladimir Smakhtin, David Molden and Don Peden (USA: Routledge, 2012), 282. From upstream to downstream the recommended locations were Karadobi (1,600 MW), Mabil (1,200 MW), Mandaya (1,620 MW) and Border (1,400 MW).

³⁷⁹ FDRE, Ministry of Water and Energy, “Border and Mendaya Projects, 2007” available at: <http://www.mowr.gov.et/index.php?pagenum=4.3&pagehgt=1000px&ContentID=55> [accessed April 22, 2016.]

³⁸⁰ Marc Jeuland and Dale Whittington, “Water Resources Planning under Climate Change: A ‘Real Options’ Application to Investment Planning in the Blue Nile,” *Environment for Development, Discussion Paper Series*, March 2013, 1-54.

Feasibility studies for the GERD were not circulated prior to the construction's commencement and almost immediately after its announcement, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt agreed to form an International Panel of Experts (IPoE) to analyze the design and construction of the dam.³⁸¹ By 2013 the panel concluded that the “documents sent to [it] were basic and incomplete... [and a] comprehensive, additional study of the dam's impacts should be conducted.”³⁸² Importantly, preliminary findings presented to the IPoE in August 2011 to assess the impact of the potential fill times on Egypt and Sudan found that:

“water supply in Egypt will not be affected during first filling of the GERD, given wet or average years, although power generation at the [AHD] will be decreased by about 6 percent due to the general lower water levels in Lake Nasser. Should the first filling occur during dry years, the [AHD] will reach the minimum operating level during at least 4 consecutive years which would significantly impact on water supply to Egypt and cause the loss of power generation at [AHD] for extended periods.”³⁸³

This finding is particularly relevant since, just after construction began, Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa region experienced one of its worst droughts in 30 years.³⁸⁴ At almost the same time a 2012 US AID study indicated that areas within Ethiopia had experienced a rainfall decline of between 15 – 20 percent between the mid-1970s and late 2000s; the area which the GERD is

³⁸¹ The IPoE Final Report was based on project documents submitted by the GoE from May 2012 – May 2013, six regular meetings and four field visits to the GERD project site. The IPoE established a geotechnical expert group to do a verification study regarding geotechnical issues on the basis of geotechnical documents provided by the GoE and project site visit. The IPoE consisted of ten members: two experts from each country (Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia) and four international experts in dam engineering, water resources planning & hydrological modeling, environment, and socio-economics. (International Panel of Experts (IPoE) on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP), *Final Report* (International Panel of Experts: Addis Ababa, 2013), 1-3. Available at: https://www.internationalrivers.org/sites/default/files/attached-files/international_panel_of_experts_for_ethiopian_renaissance_dam_final_report_1.pdf [accessed February 8, 2016].

³⁸² Samaan, 10.

³⁸³ International Panel of Experts (IPoE) on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP), 36.

³⁸⁴ “Visiting drought-hit region of Ethiopia, Ban urges support to Government-led humanitarian efforts,” UN News Centre, January 31, 2016, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53132#.VzBJSNfEfNF>
For more an in depth analysis of drought and precipitation tendencies in Ethiopia, see: Ellen Viste, Diriba Korecha, and Asgeir Sorteberg, “Recent drought and precipitation tendencies in Ethiopia,” *Theoretical and Applied Climatology* 112 (2013): 535-551.

located had experienced a standardized precipitation index (SPI)³⁸⁵ decline of -0.6 for the 2000-2011 period when compared to the years 1960-1989.³⁸⁶ The announcement of the GERD and the decision to continue construction during a major drought and reports of declining rainfall are indicative of the regime's unflinching commitment to its economic growth and development initiatives.

Despite the severity of the recent drought, rain has returned to the region and parts of Ethiopia are now experiencing the post-El Nino effects of heavy rainfall. In June 2016, the Greater Horn of Africa Climate Outlook Forum reported that it was anticipating an above normal rainy season (June through September) for the central and northern regions of Ethiopia.³⁸⁷ Not only does this present environmental and humanitarian problems for the region but it highlights the increasingly unpredictable rainfall schedule.

Given the historical variability and importance of rainfall in the region, the fact that the GERD's reservoir filling plan, if it exists, has not yet been disseminated is exceptionally worrisome.³⁸⁸ The impoundment process necessarily impacts the flow of the river and thus the amount of water available to downstream countries. Quicker fill rates will result in a more significant reduction in the flow and visa versa.³⁸⁹ If the impounding country intends to benefit financially from the sale of electricity, as is the case here, a rapid impoundment may be more appealing.

³⁸⁵ The SPI is a tool that monitors drought by measuring rainfall at given stations and takes into consideration the cumulative probability of given rainfall: the lower the number, the drier the year and visa versa.

³⁸⁶ US AID, *A Climate Trend Analysis of Ethiopia* (Washington, DC: US AID, 2012). Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/A%20Climate%20Trend%20Analysis%20of%20Ethiopia.pdf> [accessed April 22, 2016].

³⁸⁷ FDRE, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Preparing for post-El Nino impact in Ethiopia and the Greater Horn of Africa," available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.et/-/preparing-for-post-el-nino-impact-in-ethiopia-and-the-greater-horn-of-africa> [accessed June 30, 2016].

³⁸⁸ Ying Zhang, Paul Block, Michael Hammond, and Andrew King, "Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam: Implications for Downstream Riparian Countries," *Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management* 141 (2015): 05015002-1 – 05015002-10.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

In place of joint government sponsored assessments currently available, various independent studies analyzing the impact of the GERD's impoundment have emerged. There seems to be agreement (Mulat and Moges, 2014; Zhang, 2015; ENTRO, 2015) that if an appropriate filling schedule is followed that takes into consideration current and future climate projections, "there is no significant harm expected from the dam."³⁹⁰ As Whittington et al. (2014) succinctly conclude, there remains caution for the filling schedule, and if the dam was to be filled during a sequence of years in which both the Nile flow and AHD water level was low, then Egypt's ability to extract a sufficient amount of water would be jeopardized.³⁹¹

Unfortunately, the official impoundment time for the GERD remains ambiguous. For example, one report (ECC, 2016) indicates 10 years is likely while another (Halawa, 2016) claims 5-7 years. While an Ethiopian electrical power expert claimed that the initial design of the dam indicated a July 2016 start date for the filling of the GERD, as of August 2016 filling has yet to begin.³⁹² Thus, though there will be short term consequences of the GERD's filling on Egypt's water supply in all scenarios, upon system recovery Egypt's water level will remain above the AHD's operating level. Regardless, the ambiguity surrounding GERD's impoundment remains at the heart of Egyptian concerns.

Despite the relative decrease in flow, benefits from the GERD to its downstream neighbors have been consistently reiterated. The GERD's regulation of water will mitigate drought and flood and contribute to the removal of silt and sedimentation that has inhibited the capacity downstream countries' reservoirs. Furthermore, year round regulation will allow for

³⁹⁰ Zelalem Tesfaye, Azeb Mersha, Kevin Wheeler, "Reservoir Filling Options Assessment for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam using a probabilistic approach," available at: http://www.scidev.net/filemanager/root/site_assets/docs/reservoir_filling_options_assessment_for_the_great_ethiopian_ren_dam_data.pdf [accessed May 10, 2016].

³⁹¹ Dale Whittington, John Waterbury, and Marc Jeuland, "The Grand Renaissance Dam and prospects for cooperation on the Eastern Nile," *Water Policy* 16 (2014): 600.

³⁹² Ayah Aman, "Potential solutions to Egypt-Ethiopia dam dispute remain murky," *Al-monitor*, January 11, 2016, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/01/egypt-ethiopia-renaissance-dam-dispute-negotiations.html#>

increased agricultural production in both Sudan and Egypt.³⁹³ Though the GERD will incur some evaporation losses, these will be offset by decreased evaporation losses at AHD. Flooding in Sudan is expected to decrease while its hydropower generation will increase since its seasonal storage dams will be able to operate at higher levels throughout the year.³⁹⁴

The GOE has made it clear through various economic development strategies that harnessing the Nile is pertinent to Ethiopia's development. In the GERD's April 2011 inauguration speech, former Ethiopian Prime Minister Zenawi reiterated that the dam will support Ethiopia's quest "to fight poverty in our own country" and discussed its benefits to neighboring countries, emphasizing that "it shows no malice to any of our neighbors."³⁹⁵ Justifiably, Egypt's willingness to trust and support Ethiopia on this venture has been enigmatic and its position on the GERD has frequently altered between cooperative and belligerent.

In the months after the GERD's announcement, Egypt's interim Prime Minister Essam Sharaf recognized Ethiopia's right to develop and noted that the dam may benefit the entire region and could "be a path for development and construction between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt."³⁹⁶ The subsequent Morsi regime also began with more cooperative tones. Not only did Morsi downplay Ethiopia's announcement for diverting the Blue Nile but a "spokesman for the Egyptian presidency, Omar Amer, confirmed that the quantities of the Nile water received by Egypt 'will not be adversely affected' by the construction of the GERD or the diversion of the Nile."³⁹⁷

³⁹³ Belachew

³⁹⁴ Whittington, Waterbury, and Jeuland, 600.

³⁹⁵ Meles Zenawi, "Speech delivered to mark the official commencement of the Millennium Dam project," *Horn Affairs*, April 2, 2011, <http://hornaffairs.com/en/2011/04/02/ethiopia-great-dam-on-nile-launched/>

³⁹⁶ Al-Jazeera. "Egypt and Ethiopia to review Nile river dam," *Al-Jazeera*, September 17, 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/09/2011917132445980153.html>

³⁹⁷ Ahmad Mustafa, "Ethiopian Dam Project Raises Fears of Water Deficit in Egypt," *Al-Monitor*, May 30, 2013, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/05/egyptian-concerns-mount-over-water-deficit.html#>

However, the public, the media, and various Egyptian political parties and parliamentary representatives saw the GERD as a threat, increased anti-Morsi rhetoric, and took efforts to portray his regime as incompetent. As Lawson (2016) displays, the radical Islamic Part of Light engaged in belligerent rhetoric and aligned with other parties to pressure the government into changing its position on the dam.³⁹⁸ Morsi eventually succumbed to domestic pressures and formally proclaimed that “Egypt’s water security cannot be violated in any way,” that “all options” are available, and that “if [the Nile] diminishes by one drop then our blood is the alternative.”³⁹⁹ Members of Morsi’s government were filmed threatening the dam’s sabotage. Egypt’s post-Morsi interim government continued to act aggressively, engaging in a “campaign to convince foreign powers to exert pressure on Addis Ababa to alter its policies.”⁴⁰⁰

Since al-Sisi came to power in 2014, Egypt has adapted a more conciliatory framework and has engaged in numerous tripartite talks on the dam. Following the IPoE report, the Water Ministers of Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan agreed to form the Tripartite National Committee (TNC) in 2014, composed of four members from each country, to conduct additional studies.⁴⁰¹ An important milestone of the TNC was achieved in March 2015 when the countries signed the Declaration of Principles concerning the GERD’s construction and the Nile’s water sharing arrangements.⁴⁰² From the TNC’s initial meeting in September 2014 to the present (August 2016), 11 official meetings and various discussions on the sidelines of regional and international

³⁹⁸ Fred Lawson, “Egypt, Ethiopia and the Nile River: The Continuing Dispute,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 27 (2016): 109-112.

³⁹⁹ Tom Perry and Alastair MacDonald, “Egypt ‘war’ talk raises Ethiopia Nile dam stakes,” *Reuters*, June 10, 2013 <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-egypt-nile-war-idUSBRE95911020130610>

⁴⁰⁰ Lawson, 116.

⁴⁰¹ Horn Affairs, “Briefing: 1st meeting of Tripartite National Committee on Renaissance Dam,” *Horn Affairs*, September 29, 2014, <http://hornaffairs.com/en/2014/09/29/briefing-1st-meeting-of-tripartite-national-committee-on-renaissance-dam/>

⁴⁰² Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, and the Republic of the Sudan. *Declaration of Principles*. Khartoum: The Republic of the Sudan, 2015. Available at: <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/125941.aspx> [accessed March 16, 2016].

forums have been held. By early 2016 agreements commissioning companies to undertake environmental, hydraulic, and country impact studies were concluded.

Additionally, in March 2016, after photos of low water levels in Egypt's Nile sparked fears of possible negative repercussions from the GERD, Egypt's Ministry of Irrigation issued a report claiming that "the drop in the water level has nothing to do with the Ethiopian dam" and is a result of seasonal irrigation.⁴⁰³ In August 2016, the Water Ministers of each country engaged in World Bank sponsored talks on the GERD in regards to transboundary river management practices.⁴⁰⁴ Efforts at cooperation have replaced the Morsi regime's aggressiveness.

While work at the leadership level to induce dialogue and cooperation has occurred, and knowledge of the GERD in Ethiopia has been widespread since its inauguration, efforts are just now being made to seriously bring the media on board to better educate the publics of affected countries. In July 2016 journalists from Ethiopia, Egypt, Sudan, and South Sudan attended a Stockholm International Water Institute training course in Ethiopia to improve their understanding on Nile issues and challenges, water management, and "the technical, legal, [and] economic perspectives" about the GERD in order to "clear long-standing confusion."⁴⁰⁵ Engaging media partners from the basin's major countries is indicative of each regime's desire to foster understanding at all levels.

Summary

Northeastern Africa is very clearly experiencing a shift in the historic balance of power with such change most pronounced by Egypt's inability to stop the construction of Ethiopia's

⁴⁰³ Daily News Egypt, "Ministry of Irrigation assures drop in river level unrelated to GERD," *Daily News Egypt*, March 12, 2016, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2016/03/12/ministry-of-irrigation-assures-drop-in-river-level-unrelated-to-gerd/>

⁴⁰⁴ Menan Khater, "World Bank facilitates talks between Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia," *Daily News Egypt*, August 14, 2016, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2016/08/14/world-bank-facilitates-talks-egypt-sudan-ethiopia/>

⁴⁰⁵ Tesfa-Alem Tekle, "Nile Basin journalists trained on water issues," *Sudan Tribune*, August 2, 2016, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article59809>

GERD. What this section has demonstrated is that thus far the GERD has encouraged cooperation, not conflict, between Egypt and Ethiopia. Despite uncertainties, solutions are found not through acts of force but through continued negotiations. Theoretically, Egypt's response to Ethiopia supports the idea that hegemonic decline and associated destabilization periods can be conducive to non-hegemonic cooperation.

The importance of first and second level actors – in addition to systemic ones – in international relations decisions has also become clear. Morsi, operating in the immediate post-Arab Spring environment, quickly succumbed to domestic pressures to more aggressively object to Ethiopia's ambitions. Al-Sisi has responded differently. Faced with a rising Ethiopia, al-Sisi's Egypt has recognized that in the face of a shifting balance of power, Egypt's interests are best preserved via conciliation rather than hard power. Enjoying the support of the military and operating in an increasingly autocratic manner, al-Sisi has engaged in negotiations and has actively sought to change the public's perception of the GERD through media education and press releases.

The GERD has refocused Egypt's attention to its southern, African riparian and in doing so has provided the conditions for a *gesellschaft* society to develop between relatively unlike units. Therefore, neorealism becomes less valuable in explaining Ethiopian-Egyptian relations. Instead, the emergence of an international society as advocated by EST provides for a more accurate framework for understanding the maintenance of order in Ethiopian-Egyptian relations

Section Five: Analysis

The evolving relationship between Ethiopia and Egypt thus makes for an interesting addition to international relations discourse. For centuries the countries have been bound together by the Nile River and such a connection will only become more intimate in the future. Ethiopia's continued construction of the GERD despite Egyptian objections is testament to Ethiopia's nationalistic vigor and developmental success and Egypt's simultaneously faltering hegemony. The GERD has become the symbol of the shifting balance of power and has emerged as the catalyst for either conflict or cooperation between the two countries. Egypt can either respond to Ethiopia firmly through the exhibition of hard power in an attempt to maintain its hegemony, or accommodate the rising power and accept that the status quo is no longer sustainable.

Historically, Ethiopian-Egyptian relations were readily explained through a neorealist lens. Even now, the GERD's construction uncertainties, the history of mistrust, and the belligerent rhetoric of Egypt's previous regime towards Ethiopia create conditions suitable for conflict. The recent drought has further heightened Egypt's deeply engrained water scarcity fears. According to neorealism the existing hegemon, Egypt, would respond to Ethiopia's development through the use of hard power to ensure its own dominance and mitigate an existential threat – damage to its primary freshwater source. Egypt's use of hard power would be an articulation of its own self-interest and since states operate in an anarchic arena, there would be nothing to deter or prevent Egyptian aggression.

As this thesis has shown, such a paradigm does not accurately explain current Ethiopian-Egyptian relations. The idea of a fully functioning international society where intrinsic normative values acts as the deterrence for military action, though, is equally inadequate. Such a theory

assumes cooperation as a result of inherent values shared by both countries. As is clear from historical and contemporary relations, this is not applicable. Instead, understanding that Ethiopian-Egyptian relations are operating in the early stages of an international society's development via a *gesellschaft* community provides for a more accurate theoretical explanation to current relations. Counter to Gilpin's assertion that disruptions in the balance of power will result in conflict, the transitory period has provided an opening for a *gesellschaft* community to emerge.

An international society can form in two main ways. A *gemeinschaft* community develops through the recognition of intangible norms inherent within different communities and is more solidarist, with high levels of meaningful interactions. A *gesellschaft* community, on the other hand, forms out of functionality and has more pluralist, thinner levels of interaction. Whereas the former focuses on the interplay of a variety of intrinsic norms, the latter rests on a more basic foundation focusing on the role that minimalist rules and state sovereignty have on international relations.

While Ethiopia and Egypt have been, are, and will remain inextricably linked by the Nile River, the political and cultural differences of each country are great enough to ensure that they are *not* appropriate examples of the *gemeinschaft* development of societies. Egypt is a majority Islamic country and has actively formed ties with Arab countries whereas Ethiopia is majority Christian and has focused on developing relations with its African counterparts. The core cultural connection between the two countries, Christianity, was broken in 1959 and is only just beginning to mend itself.

Interestingly, as Tom Keating (2013) observes, "often the pressures for solidarist values emanate from dominant powers with less regard for the concerns of lesser powers, ... [and as

such,] support for a more pluralist international society is understandable.”⁴⁰⁶ This was surely the case throughout the Cold War when Nile management projects were initiated by Egypt and met with skepticism by Ethiopia. Egypt’s exclusion of upstream countries in Nile accords and unilateral developments along the Nile have contributed to the mistrust. As a result, solidarity amongst these two riparians is weak at best; instead, functionality is currently driving them towards a *gesellschaft* society. Therefore, the application of a *gesellschaft* community’s development aligned with ‘thinner,’ pluralist characteristics rather than the ‘thicker,’ solidarist *gemeinschaft* community, more accurately explains the current state of Ethiopian-Egyptian affairs and provides the platform for a meaningful relationship to develop.

While Stivachtis (2013) claims the solidarist position is often stronger first in regional relations, the situation here provides evidence against this. The presence of a precious resource – the Nile – has created friction within the region for centuries. As such, Ethiopian-Egyptian relations are more representative of the unlike, rather than like, units that Barry Buzan (1993) details in his explanation of *gesellschaft* societies. A state’s primary goal in developing its domestic and international relations is its own survival and, as Grotius wrote, it is the desire to survive rather than support the common good that encourages states to accept agreed upon rules. Here, what separates the EST from neorealism is that the EST builds on the self-interested nature of states and identifies the mutual desire for existence as the bridge between unlike units.⁴⁰⁷ Thus, self-interest unites unlike units. Despite differences, functionality and rationality enables the acceptance of the other and dictates cooperative measures between them.

⁴⁰⁶ Tom Keating, “Pluralism and International Society,” in *System, Society & the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations*, ed. by Robert W. Murray, (Bristol: E-International Relations, 2013), 60. Available at: <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/05/15/pluralism-and-international-society/>

⁴⁰⁷ Buzan, *From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School*, 335.

For Ethiopia, existence has become defined by its ability to eradicate poverty and harnessing the Nile is crucial for this. For Egypt, existence is also dependent upon the Nile and is defined by the ability to access the river's water. What complicates the relationship is not the will to survive, but the similar means by which each country seeks survival.

Ethiopia's initiation of the IPoE, the development of the TNC, and Ethiopia's continued articulation of GERD's benefits to downstream countries are representative of Ethiopia's desire to assuage Egypt's fears and work with the downstream country towards a mutually beneficial outcome. That Ethiopia has delayed past negotiations, will continue with the GERD's construction during impact studies, and has yet to disclose information on filling times, raises questions regarding the sincerity of Ethiopia's cooperation.

While Egypt attempted to obstruct the GERD's construction via blocking funding and threatening military action, it was unsuccessful. Despite the GERD's uncertainties, Egypt has not followed through with its threats. Egypt's domestic environment and the fragile post-Arab Spring recovery have surely contributed to its recognition that its needs will be best satisfied through constructive dialogue.

The unity of the upstream countries in regards to more equitable Nile River management and utilization, as displayed through the NBI, the CFA, and Sudan's increasing alliance with Ethiopia – a break from traditional alignment with Egypt – further indicate that Egypt's influence is weakening. Combined with the Declaration of Principles, the commissioning of impact studies, and the decline in hostile threats, increased interactions between the two countries since 2013 imply that Egypt will not attempt to prolong its inevitable decline. Egypt's recent cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Israel and its 2014 return to the Pan-African Parliament after

a three-year hiatus are strategic measures that further indicate its desire to strengthen relations both on and off the continent as its hegemony erodes.⁴⁰⁸

Regional stability and each country's security will be better assured by Egypt's peaceful accommodation of its upstream riparian. Though Ethiopia is primarily concerned with its domestic development and Egypt is just as committed to its own security, each country's existence is enhanced through cooperation. While the decision to cooperate is out of self-interest, accepting rather than fighting the changing balance of power has created an environment conducive for the establishment of a *gesellschaft* society to develop. Through interactions, governing elites will become more inclined to establish tangible rules and institutions to formally guide relations. In the process, values will begin to penetrate both populations, planting the seeds for a more fully developed international society to grow.

Therefore, the role of first and second level actors cannot be downplayed, as neorealism asserts. As Lawson (2016) demonstrated, Morsi's regime was pressured by various political parties to respond aggressively to Ethiopia, representing the influence of these actors in Egypt's foreign policy. The strength that domestic players have is testament to both the lack of a *gemeinschaft* society having developed and to the difficulty that the two states face in moving beyond the initial stages of a *gesellschaft* one.

Alternatively, al-Sisi seems to be placing regional cooperation above domestic pressures for unilateral responses. Despite resistance from various domestic groups within Egypt, the current regime has actively engaged with Ethiopia to find mutually beneficial outcomes. As a result, cooperation on non-GERD elements has also increased. In February 2016 it was reported that Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia had "agreed to create a common fund for the implementation of

⁴⁰⁸ Walaa Hussein, "Egypt hopes to make the most of its return to pan-African group," *Al-Monitor*, May 24, 2016, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/egypt-return-african-union-pan-african-parliament-sisi.html>

development projects, ... decided to form three political, economic, and social-cultural committees, ... [and to] enhance intelligence and security cooperation.”⁴⁰⁹ By August 2016 the *Daily News Egypt* had reported that “Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia... have moved to a new cooperative phase... [and] events are coming up to further boost this cooperation.”⁴¹⁰ The GERD has clearly increased interactions within the region and in doing so has provided a tangible platform from which a *gesellschaft* community can evolve.

Further testament to Egypt’s acceptance of its declining hegemony is articulated via its recent efforts to understand and mitigate water loss. Egypt’s precarious water security situation is now driven by population growth, climate change, *and* Ethiopian Nile developments. Realizing its Nile water quota is not certain, Egypt has engaged with international institutions, increased the cost of water, explored alternate sources of water, and adapted new water saving legislation.⁴¹¹ With its hegemony no longer guaranteed, the pace at which Egypt must deal with water scarcity issues has increased.

Within Ethiopia as well, first and second level actors are important determinants of its foreign policy. The EPRDF’s repeated commitment to poverty eradication and economic development is certainly driving its international relations. The regime’s solid belief that protests and discontent are merely a byproduct of poverty to be solved by economic development is illustrative of its unwavering commitment to developmental democracy and the party’s vanguard status. On the other hand, the fact that Ethiopia reversed its capital expansion plans in response to protests indicates that the regime does take into consideration, however minimally, domestic

⁴⁰⁹ Sudan Tribune, “Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan agree to enhance cooperation,” *Sudan Tribune*, February 21, 2016, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article58075>

⁴¹⁰ Daily News Egypt, “Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia have surpassed disputes over GERD: Sudanese FM,” *Daily News Egypt*, August 30, 2016, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2016/08/28/egypt-sudan-ethiopia-surpassed-disputes-gerd-sudanese-fm/>

⁴¹¹ Brian Rohan, “Egypt looks to avert water crisis driven by demand, waste,” *Associated Press*, April 26, 2016, <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/476db2e5769344c48997d41eb319bf64/egypt-looks-avert-water-crisis-driven-demand-waste>

factions. Perhaps this can be explained as the government's attempt at maintaining a façade of democracy in an increasingly authoritarian environment. Regardless, the ERPDF remains committed to its development policies, underlining the importance of ideology for the regime.

The leaderships of both countries, the EPRDF in Ethiopia and al-Sisi's regime in Egypt, seem to have embraced the flexibility inherent in non-democratic regimes. For Ethiopia, this means the ability to implement and continue development initiatives despite public resistance. In Egypt, this means embracing dialogue and complacency in regards to Nile developments. Whilst freedom from public accountability may support the transcendence of norms over boundaries amongst an elite few, if norms cannot penetrate the public, a regime's security is jeopardized. Lack of public engagement could easily disrupt and reverse any progress made by governing elites.⁴¹² The fact that Ethiopia and Egypt have courted the media to promote 'responsible' reporting on the GERD and water security implies that a *gesellschaft* society has begun at the elite level and is now actively being promoted amidst the public level.

It seems that the relations between Ethiopia and Egypt are transitioning from international system to international society. Whilst each country surely takes the behavior of the other into consideration, a characteristic of international systems, there is movement towards a more sensitive relationship bound by a set of mutually agreed upon rules, a characteristic of international societies. Though a regional society is still in its infancy, interstate agreements, cooperation, and dialogue on the Nile, GERD, and in other areas support the notion that a *gesellschaft* society is developing. Applicable here is Keating's (2013) conclusion that "the pluralist cornerstone, one that respects and protects state sovereignty even as it acknowledges the

⁴¹² Howard

enhanced concern for rights or the shifting demands for a more integrated global economy, remains a critical foundation for international society.”⁴¹³

Clearly, both states are acting in their own self-interest: Ethiopia’s actions are representative of its desire for economic development while Egypt’s are ultimately guided by its desire for water security. Ethiopia and Egypt are thus examples of rational states operating in an anarchical world. However, Ethiopia’s rise is not being countered by Egyptian aggression but instead by the understanding that the costs of cooperation outweigh the benefits of conflict.

National self-interest is contributing towards the development of a more cooperative and inclusive framework that may become the platform upon which a regional society can emerge. Order is thus best explained as the emergence of a functional, *gesellschaft* society. Perhaps, then, the null hypothesis of neorealism may be better suited in its explanation of why each country came to the negotiation table whereas the alternate hypothesis, found within the EST, is more applicable in its explanation of why each country remains seated there.

⁴¹³ Keating, 60.

Conclusion

Over the years, the relationship between Ethiopia and Egypt has become defined by their respective relationship with the Nile, with each country considering the Nile the resource from which their existence depends. For Ethiopia, harnessing the Nile is an articulation of its green economic development strategy to eradicate poverty, its existential threat. For Egypt, the continued use of the Nile for 97 percent of its freshwater is likewise necessary for Egyptian survival. As Ethiopia continues to develop, Egypt's historic monopoly is increasingly contested and Egypt must now reevaluate the mechanisms through which it engages with its upstream riparian. Egypt can respond to Ethiopia's growth either through hostile actions or through engagement; as of August 2016, it seems as if Egypt is committed to the latter.

Therefore, dialogue between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Nile River is about more than negotiating a scarce resource crucial for each state's security. Instead, it is a negotiation over the transference of power within the region. During this period of uncertainty, Ethiopian-Egyptian relations have not resulted in conflict, as Gilpin's theory of hegemonic war hypothesizes. Instead, Ethiopian-Egyptian relations have become an example of Keohane's theory of non-hegemonic cooperation and have demonstrated how such transitory times can support the development of a *gesellschaft* community.

After an in depth historical review of Ethiopia and Egypt, their relations with the Nile River, and a more thorough understanding of the contemporary situation, it becomes clear that neorealism's parsimonious framework does not accurately explain the maintenance of order in contemporary Ethiopian-Egyptian relations. While the most applicable theoretical framework is found within the EST, it is not the notion of an international society; instead, Ethiopian-Egyptian affairs can be best understood as operating within the early stages of a *gesellschaft* community's

development. This case study is evidence that there is a middle ground between anarchy and community, that the two environments are not mutually exclusive, and that an international society can develop amongst dissimilar units. The application of the EST to a non-European context, where its core focus has been, further strengthens the school's credibility as a viable alternative to the neorealist school of thought.

As this thesis has shown, periods of destabilization and uncertainty can, in fact, induce cooperation, have peaceful outcomes, and create more robust interstate relations. The ability of Ethiopia and Egypt to continue working together to ensure that their national security goals are realized will be a test of not only the ability to smoothly transition into a new geopolitical realm but also the sustainability of the *gesellschaft* society that has thus far emerged. Ethiopia's GERD has therefore become the basis from which a more fully developed regional society, where states are constrained not by fear of the other but by normative values articulated via institutional arrangements, can flourish.

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