

The Use and Abuse of Genealogy
Genealogical Critique from Nietzsche to Said

By

Veeran Naicker (NCKEE001)

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of Master of Social Science in Religious Studies

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University of Cape Town

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Name	Veeran Naicker		
Student No:	NCKVEE001		
Tel numbers:	021 6744 861 ; 0825214897		
Email address:	Veeran1611@gmail.com		
Word count		No. of pages	166
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Abstract

This thesis traces the use and abuse of genealogy, from Friedrich Nietzsche to Edward Said. After elucidating Nietzsche and Michel Foucault's coherent configuration of the genealogical method in their own philosophical projects, it critically deconstructs and rejects the claim that the post-colonial thinker in Edward Said's book '*Orientalism*' is a genealogy in a similar sense to Nietzsche and Foucault. The rejection of Said's texts and *Orientalism*'s status as a genealogical history is premised on a critical analysis of Said's misreading and negation of key Nietzschean and Foucauldian concepts such as power, discourse and the body. Following a rejection of the post-colonial appropriation of genealogy, this thesis concludes by suggesting some revisions for a more coherent deployment of genealogy in post-colonial theory through a closer reading of the relationship between the body and power, with regard to the question of subjectification.

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Part 1: The Use of Genealogy

Introduction

Thesis problem

A general definition of post-colonial theory states that it, "...deals with the effects of colonialism or colonization on culture and societies".¹ Post-colonial theorists not only survey the effects of colonization on those that were formerly colonized, but provide active critiques of the residue, or rather continuation of colonial domination as it figures itself in the present social, political and economic lives of the 'Others' of colonial Europe. If we take these descriptions as accurate, post-colonial critique would not only attempt to deconstruct colonial truth claims, but also provide those who were silenced by colonial violence with the capacity to speak for and represent themselves.² While the first post-colonial theorist to covet the name 'post-colonial' was Gayatri Spivak in 1990,³ the movement has a far longer ancestry. Edward Said is considered one of the forefathers of post-colonial theory because of the impact of his first major work, *Orientalism*. In the course of the reception of the book, it has become commonplace in postcolonial theory to accept Said's text as embodying a coherent critical method-- called genealogy-- that allows the theorist to unmask, through an historical analysis, relationships of power and domination in colonial and post-colonial societies that were previously considered natural.⁴ To provide some context; genealogy, a method created by the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, is a particular brand of historical philosophy whose mode of deconstructive analysis of traditional truth claims depends on a particular relation between concepts. In this thesis, I argue that the only inheritor and practitioner of a truly Nietzschean version of genealogy is Michel Foucault. Omitting the differences between the two thinkers for now, with regard to the manner in which they deploy their concepts differently as Nietzschean philosophers or genealogists, both have conceptualised power as a positive system in the sense that it engenders a reality that is perspectively apprehended by human beings to be true, and therefore produces and determines subjective forms of

¹ Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, *Post-colonial Studies: The Key Concepts*, (New York: Routledge, 2001), 186

² Gayatri Chakraborty Spivak, *Outside the Teaching Machine* (London: Routledge, 1993), 35

³ Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, *Post-colonial Studies*, 186

⁴ These are a list of thinkers in the post-colonial academy who still consider Edward Said a genealogist, William Hart, 'Edward Said and the Religious effects of Culture', (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 69; See Spanos, 'Edward Said: A Legacy', 45; and Rehnur Sazzad, 'Hatoum, Said and Foucault : Resistance through revealing the Power/Knowledge Nexus', in , *Post-colonial Text*, Vol 4, No 2 (2008); See also, Robert Young, 'White Mythologies', (Routledge, New York, 2004), 169

experience.⁵ The historical study of how power produces different forms of subjects outside the intentional control of human beings is what, in Nietzschean terms, is called a genealogical history or genealogy.

One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that's to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. And this is what I would call genealogy.⁶

While the intellectual and political relations between Marxism, Freudian psychoanalysis and post-colonial theory have been acknowledged,⁷ the relationship between few contemporary thinkers have traced the relationship between Nietzsche, Foucault and the use of Said's work in any depth or with a critical eye.⁸ This thesis attempts to rectify some of these oversights and makes the claim that the relationship between these thinkers and concepts is far from contiguous and clear. In fact, the use of genealogy as found in Edward Said's work constitutes a break in the genealogical method that was bequeathed to us through Nietzsche and Foucault. My argument is that Said's *Orientalism* is not a genealogy. Its status as a model of genealogy is rather an abuse of the very Nietzschean concepts that designate the ontological and historiographical context of a genealogical study. I also claim that this misuse of genealogy is a hindrance to the advancement of critique in post-colonial theory. Contrary to claims that *Orientalism* was a successful genealogy, I argue that Said's revisions of Nietzsche and Foucault's methods lacked not only a correct application of genealogy, but an inner coherence that both rob it of critical import, which I consider Nietzsche and Foucault's genealogies to hold. Indeed, *Orientalism* was ineffective from the standpoint of those genealogies. Its status as a work of literary criticism must be brought under question because Said continued to be afflicted by the problem of an East-West binary, which he claims to overcome in *Orientalism*.⁹ I argue that if Said's text becomes an authoritative standard for genealogical history, then post-colonial theory will continue to misuse certain forms of inquiry, not knowing that they are ineffective and incoherent. I suggest a far more traditional application of Nietzsche and Foucault's insights which could benefit post-colonial studies.

⁵ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Translated by Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 27-28

⁶ Michel Foucault, Truth and Power, in, *Michel Foucault: 'Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings: 1972-1977*, (eds) Colin Gordon (New York, Pantheon, 1980), 117

⁷ For Marx See, Neil Lazarus and Rashmi Varma, *Marxism and Post-colonial Studies*, in , *Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism*, (eds) Jacques Bidet and Stathis Kouvelakis, (Boston: Brill, 2008), 309 ; For Freud see Mrinalini. Greedharry, *Postcolonial Theory and Psychoanalysis: from Uneasy Engagements to Effective Critique*,(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008),

⁸ Paul Bove, *Mendacious innocents, or, the modern genealogist as conscientious intellectual: Nietzsche, Foucault, Said Boundary Vol 2* , (1981); Hart, Said and the Religious Effects of Culture, 115-142

⁹ Edward Said, *Orientalism: Western conceptions of the Orient*, (London: Penguin Books, 1978), 25

Genealogy, Methodology, Concepts

For Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, the beginning of each philosophy commences with the creation of a set of concepts.¹⁰ These concepts correlate, co-ordinate and dissect with one another, responding to a conjunction of specific problems implicated in the lived experience of the philosopher.¹¹ Nietzsche introduced power, the will to nothingness, the will to truth, force (both active and reactive), *ressentiment*, and bad conscience, as concepts that perform specific operations in relation to the diagnostic problems he had beset for himself as a critical cultural physician of natural values at the end of the nineteenth century. He created these for the purpose of reevaluating the state of Western values and socio-political relations. These problems, which afflicted Nietzsche's philosophical experience, were beset by a particular attitude that had facilitated the direction of philosophical investigations of the time. According to Michel Foucault, philosophers after Immanuel Kant were concerned with or gripped by the question of who we are; a question directed at the very constitution of the rational human agents at the birth of the modern period.¹² According to Foucault, Kant was concerned with the present moment as means by which human beings could reflect and transform themselves as human beings encompassed with a practical rational agency and freedom.¹³ Foucault is correct in his analysis of the temporal moment in Nietzsche; genealogy is not simply a method that looks to the past. Nietzsche's method, embodying the Kantian attitude, is designed to diagnose the present for the purpose of engendering radical change in the future-- it is a transformative method.

In this thesis, I will show that despite Foucault's alterations to genealogy, the fundamental relationship between a history of power and the production of objective concepts, which allows one to trace a historically-produced subjectivity, still holds an inner coherence. Thus, my argument is that Foucault reframed Nietzsche's conceptual armature in such a manner that he was able to deploy genealogy effectively in accordance with several concepts that demarcated his own archaeological historiography and the political problems that afflicted the European populace of which he considered himself to be a part. In this thesis, my first task is to provide a descriptive analysis of how Nietzsche and Foucault have developed genealogy as a critical historical methodology in their own distinct ways as histories of

¹⁰ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press; 1994), 40

¹¹ *Ibid* 18

¹² Michel Foucault, *What is Enlightenment*, in, *The Foucault Reader*, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York, Pantheon Books, 1984), 34

¹³ *Ibid*

subjectivity for the purposes of inciting personal and social transformation. Nietzsche, for example, is not a genealogist of the subject, but of the intersubjective will of a cultural populace. Foucault does not look at one subject, but many human beings who are produced as individualized subjects through the historical operations of two apparatuses in modern society, imprisonment and the confessional.¹⁴

Thesis Plan

In Chapter 1, I explain how genealogy is used as a historical method by Nietzsche in relation to his philosophical project, and how this is centralized in his clarificatory text, *On the Genealogy of Morals*. In Chapter 2, I describe the different genealogical approach of Foucault and demonstrate how he remains within a somewhat revised, yet Nietzschean, understanding of genealogy.

In Chapter 3, I turn to the use of genealogy in postcolonial theory. This chapter will have two purposes. First, to demonstrate the methodological difference between what I will call a Nietzschean genealogical project and a postcolonial project as found in the work of Edward Said. Secondly, I hope to suggest ways in which genealogy can be re-applied to the postcolonial field which repair Said's potentially crucial errors. While his title as genealogist is accepted uncritically amongst certain post-colonial theorists, I will show that Said's analytic deployment of concepts does not correlate to a coherent use of the genealogical method as an historical process that leads to the constitution of the present. Said's conception of power is derived from Karl Marx, and more specifically; Antonio Gramsci. On a Nietzschean account, it is a repressive form of power, which does not operate as producing truthful relations that determine subjectivity.¹⁵ Without this conceptual pre-requisite, I argue that Said cannot account for how the present is constituted through a process of power relations. Said's text does not adequately study the constitution of a subject or provide grounds for any form of subjectification, which is the central concern of his genealogy. Lastly, Said's text, like Nietzsche and Foucault's genealogies, was conceived as a work intended to induce a transformation in the writer; to attain a consciousness critical enough to overcome the obstacle at the heart of his work: the East/West binary division of reality. If his revisions to the genealogical method allowed him to overcome the racist binary division of

¹⁴Michel Foucault, *Confessions of the Flesh*, in, *Michel Foucault: 'Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings: 1972-1977*(New York, Pantheon, 1980), 194-196

¹⁵ David Couzens Hoy, *Power Repression, Progress: Foucault, Lukes and the Frankfurt School*, in, *Foucault: A critical Reader*, edited by David Couzens Hoy, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 125-131

reality that he so despises, then it would be indisputable that his method had coherence, even if it was not a genealogy. However, Said's project fails on his own terms because he is unable to overcome the East/ West binary that characterizes the racist colonial perspective of the Orientalist scholar. Said's revisions to the genealogical method are unsuccessful. Since this is the case, there are no grounds for post-colonial theory to claim that Said's revisions are acceptable under the name of genealogy. On this basis, I will conclude with a set of recommendations for future work in post-colonial studies to practice genealogy coherently.

Chapter 1: Nietzsche and the Birth of Genealogy

Introduction

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was born on the 15th of October 1844 in Rocken, situated in Saxony, a province in the former Kingdom of Prussia.¹⁶ Of all Nietzsche's texts, most commentators agree that *On the Genealogy of Morals* is his most important contribution to philosophy as a whole.¹⁷ Not only has genealogy been essential in understanding Nietzsche's own work, but as a particular form of historiographical practice, genealogy has acquired the status of a critical method in the wider academic field, most notably in post-structural and post-colonial studies. Despite this consensus, I argue that genealogy has been poorly understood in post-colonial studies. I will demonstrate in subsequent chapters that a modified form of critique, particularly in Said's post-colonial genealogy, transforms Nietzsche's method in pivotal ways, resulting in a historiographical method which rejects Nietzschean foundations. That is; the ontology developed by Nietzsche and the Nietzschean ontological analytics developed and deployed effectively in two genealogical studies by Foucault. After looking at the failure of Said's post-colonial genealogy, I suggest that future genealogists would do well with a closer application of Nietzsche and Foucault's insights. In order to understand the transformation of Nietzsche's genealogy in postcolonial thought, I will first rehearse Nietzsche's critical genealogical method and detail the process by which he seeks to overcome traditional metaphysics and its association with a Platonic cosmology.

The Kantian Question in Nietzschean Genealogy

According to Todd May, the traditional practice of genealogy was a historical method by which one could, "trace one's ancestors, to follow backwards (or forwards) the kinship lines that yield oneself, one's siblings, one's children".¹⁸ Nietzsche did not use genealogy in this manner. The sense and the direction he took genealogy is revolutionary. From his very first books Nietzsche was concerned with who we are. That is, how we have become who we are through an historical process. This is the central concern in his genealogy.

¹⁶ Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ*, (Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1974), 22

¹⁷ Keith Ansell Pearson, *Chapter Nine: On the Genealogy of Morality*, in, *Introductions to Nietzsche*, edited by Robert Pippin(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2012), 199 ; Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Translated by Hugh Tomlinson, (The Athlone Press: London; 1983), 3

¹⁸ Todd May, *The Philosophy of Foucault*(Chesham, Acumen, 2006) , 63

According to the French theorist Michel Foucault, a concern for the present arises with Kant.

Kant asked the question, ‘*Was ist Aufklärung?*’ That is, what is our own actuality, what is happening around us, what is our present? It seems to me that philosophy acquired a new dimension here. Moreover, it opened up a certain task that philosophy had ignored or didn't know even existed beforehand, and that is to tell us who we are, what our present is, what that is, today.¹⁹

According to Foucault, Kant's paper is special because it is the first piece of philosophy to “reflect on the present” in a new manner.²⁰ Unlike his earlier writings, Kant does not relate the present moment to a teleological process. Instead, he focuses on the present moment alone.²¹ For Foucault, he does not describe who we are in terms of any teleological or ontological metaphysic. Rather, he thinks about who we are in negative terms-- in terms of a way out.²² For Kant, the present state of who we are is a “self-incurred minority”, which “is the incapacity to use one's intelligence without the guidance of another”.²³ One can overcome the status of minority and attain enlightenment, or maturity through the free use of one's public reason.²⁴ Public reason and freedom are not defined ontologically. Kant's position in “What is Enlightenment?” is thus indicative of a straightforward liberal approach.

According to Andrius Bielskis, it is commonplace for liberal thinkers after Descartes to adopt a deontological approach to the human subject. In order to validate their views on self-determination, Bielskis claims, modern thinkers rebel against the notion of a teleological cosmic order in order to avoid the notion that the will may be determined by laws of nature.²⁵ It is thus possible to understand the philosophical reasons regarding what Andrew Bowie calls the tension between Kant's strictly teleological notions of history, as well as the ability for subjects to use their freedom in historically situated circumstances such as modernity.²⁶

¹⁹ Michel Foucault, *What our Present is*, in, *The Politics of Truth*, edited by Sylvere Lotringer, (Los Angeles, Semiotexte, 2007), 129-130

²⁰ Michel Foucault, *What is Enlightenment*, in, *The Foucault Reader*, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York, Pantheon Books, 1984), 34

²¹ Ibid 34

²² Ibid 34

²³ Immanuel Kant, On The Question: *What is Enlightenment?*, in, *Basic Writings of Kant*, ed. Allen W. Wood (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 135

²⁴ Ibid 136

²⁵ Andrius Bilskis, *Towards a Post-modern understanding of the Political: From Genealogy to Hermeneutics*, (Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 8

²⁶ Andrew Bowie, *Introduction to German Philosophy: From Kant to Habermas*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 33-34

Nietzsche's Genealogy: A Contextual Introduction

According to Foucault, the Kantian attitude towards who we are is also Nietzsche's question.²⁷ Yet Nietzsche's genealogical response to this question is in no way liberal or democratic.²⁸ This is important because Nietzsche, unlike Kant or Hegel, is not concerned with revising the present moment within the framework of hegemonic cultural valuations. He considers his project a critique of his age, of current values.²⁹ Like Kant, Nietzsche's reflection towards the present moment was one in which a collectivity could transform themselves through a critical engagement with the present moment. As a genealogist, Nietzsche is concerned with bringing our values as determinants of who we are under radical critique. In his early work, Nietzsche never considers who we are in metaphysical or ontological terms. In his more mature work--most importantly his genealogy-- he addresses who we are, or "we [the] knowers" in terms of an ontological (or rather cosmological) system that undergirds his philosophy of value. Nietzsche's ontological system, "the will to power", is the means by which he attempts to radically revise the nature of philosophy, away from neo-Platonic dualistic ontologies that have determined philosophical debates about human values in terms of the best or good life, since Plato. Nietzsche's genealogy played a functional diagnostic role in his work in relation to his general project, "the revaluation of all values", a project where he tried to set the ground for a revaluation of Western, Platonic values, as a means of transformation.³⁰ This subversive project relies on an ontological vision of the natural world and the will to power that destabilizes all forms of valuation that considers human beings as transcendent and objectively true. In Nietzsche's philosophy, one cannot account for present existence and his historical portrayal of human values without the productive ontological force of the will to power. In this Chapter, when I present Nietzsche's genealogy, I will first pay close attention to his ontological system and the relation it has to his deconstructive philosophy of value as cultural physician. It is incredibly important to understand Nietzsche's entire historical philosophy of value, because it is a pre-requisite to an understanding of his genealogy, since he wrote *On the Genealogy of Morals* as a clarification of his prior work. After explicating how Nietzsche uses genealogy, I will attend to how

²⁷ Michel Foucault, *What our Present is, in, 'The Politics of Truth'*, edited by Sylvere Lotringer, (Los Angeles, Semiotexte, 2007), 130

²⁸ Anthony K Jensen, *Anti-Politicality and Agon in Nietzsche's Philology*, in, *Nietzsche, Power and Politics: Rethinking Nietzsche's Legacy for Political Thought*, Edited by Herman Siemans and Vasti Roodt, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter; 2008), 342-343

²⁹ Deleuze, *Nietzsche*, 1

³⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to power*, Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R.J Hollingdale, (New York: Random house Inc, 1968), 4 (aphorism 4-Preface)

Nietzsche uses it before concluding the chapter with the role genealogy has played in relation to Nietzsche's overall project, which is the revaluation of all values.

Section 1: Nietzsche's Ontology/ Cosmology of Valuing Life

Section 2: Nietzsche's Concerns in the Genealogy

Section 3: The role Nietzsche's Genealogy plays in relation to the Revaluation of Values

Section 1: Nietzsche's cosmology/ontology of Values

Naturalism: Aesthetic and Psychological

For the better part of nearly two decades, Friedrich Nietzsche has been referred to as a naturalist by contemporary philosophers.³¹ Brian Leiter has claimed that Nietzsche's naturalism leads him into philosophical communion with thinkers who stress a relationship between a natural vision of the world, and the corresponding methodological presets of modern scientific epistemology. Despite the affinities between naturalism and modern science, I strongly suggest that Nietzsche did not endorse a form of methodological scientific naturalism congruent with the deployment of naturalized methodologies in the work of Hume and Leibniz, as argued by Leiter.³² I do agree that, central to Nietzsche's naturalistic vision of the world, unlike that of neo-Platonic religious traditions, he does not propose that human beings have a divine origin, but are the result of a natural process.³³ For Nietzsche, human beings were born from the torturous process in which they left the natural world and entered into a social network of relations, creating an internal sphere of experience called bad conscience.

These semi-animals well adapted to the wilderness, to war, to prowling to adventure: suddenly all their instincts were disvalued and 'suspended'...In this new world they no longer possessed their former guides, their regulating, unconscious and infallible drives... All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward-this is what I call the internalization of man: thus he developed what was later called his ; soul'. The entire inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquired breadth, depth and height, in the same measure

³¹ Ashley Woodward, *Understanding Nietzscheanism*, (Durham: Acumen Publishing, 2011), 209-210 ; Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche On Morality*, (London: Routledge, 2002), 2-3; Christopher Cox, *Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation*, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1999), 3; Christa Davis Acampora, *Naturalism and Nietzsche's Moral Psychology*, in, *A Companion to Nietzsche*, edited by Keith Ansell Pearson, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 314

³² Leiter, *Nietzsche On Morality*, 6

³³ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Daybreak: Thoughts on the prejudices of Morality*, Translated by R.J Hollingdale(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1997), 32 (aphorism 49)

that outward discharge was inhibited... All those instincts of wild free prowling man turned backwards against man himself. Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, destruction-all this turned against the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of the 'bad conscience'.³⁴

Nietzsche regards "bad conscience" as the primary human condition, as, "man's suffering of man, of himself-the result of a forcible sundering from his animal past".³⁵ It is this condition, the internal life of man that is at the centre of Nietzsche's naturalistic "animal psychology".³⁶ The reason Nietzsche is opposed to the mechanical models of modern natural science is that they are unable to make sense of the existence of human suffering (what Richard Schacht has been calling sensibility) and how the "creation of meaning" is related to human suffering.³⁷ Nonetheless, Nietzsche's naturalism, however idiosyncratic it may be, excludes him from conforming to a theological stance that a single will is the metaphysical essence of the world.³⁸ Instead of the Schopenhauerian dictum that he used to formulate his position on human suffering in *The Birth of Tragedy*, in his mature period he views such an internal experience, or "bad conscience", as being effectuated within a "higher organic system",³⁹ what he calls the will to power.

This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms itself... This world is the will to power-and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power-and nothing besides!⁴⁰

The Becoming of the Body and the Will to Power as Naturalized Suffering

What is essential to Nietzsche's psychological understanding of human "bad conscience" is that it manifests in different conditions of life that are biological, cultural and historical.⁴¹ He is a historical philosopher of the body.⁴² In Nietzsche's thought, at one level our drives refer

³⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On The Genealogy of Morals*, in, Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*, Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R.J Hollingdale, (New York: Random Inc; 1989), 84-85(Essay 2 section 16)

³⁵ Ibid 85 (Essay 2 section 16)

³⁶ Ibid 140 (Essay 2 section 20)

³⁷ Richard Schacht, Chapter 10: *Nietzsche, Naturalism and Normativity*, in , *Nietzsche: Naturalism, Normativity*, Edited by Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 244

³⁸ Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity*, 292

³⁹ Christa Davis Acampora, *Naturalism and Nietzsche's Moral Psychology*, 314

⁴⁰ Nietzsche, *The Will to power*, 550 (aphorism 1067)

⁴¹ Schacht, *Chapter 10: Nietzsche, Naturalism and Normativity*, 242

⁴² Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science: The Joyful Wisdom*, Translated by Josephine Nauckhoff (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 4-5 (aphorism 2-Preface to 1886 edition) ; Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 271(aphorism 492)

to our brute animal desires,⁴³ but at another, more important level, it is our drives that engender meaning through imposing a set of metaphorical interpretations.⁴⁴ As we move over to how Nietzsche asserts a new understanding of the human animal, as opposed to the Aristotelian conception of the human being as a rational animal, it will become apparent that in his thinking, meaning systems have relations to historically-situated bodies that have been produced through power relations. As a result, the relation between his psychological and aesthetic naturalism becomes clearer. First, Nietzsche opposed the Enlightenment understanding of the human subject as an autonomous rational consciousness. “The subject is only a fiction: the ego of which one speaks when one censures egoism does not exist at all”.⁴⁵ We are easily fooled, Nietzsche tells us, when we consider our intellect sovereign to, and able to control our drives.⁴⁶ He does not afford consciousness the capacity of freedom over natural laws that it has been given since Descartes.⁴⁷ Consciousness for Nietzsche is a natural organ like any other, but it is weak organ⁴⁸ and one that has developed late in human history, for the purposes of communication and security for weaker human beings.⁴⁹ Instead of reason ordering the drives or desires like in Plato, conscious thought is produced through relations between the drives.⁵⁰ Nietzsche is not claiming that we are completely unconscious. When, under the normative framework of rational conscious subjectivity, we presuppose that our mind is rightfully contending with a particular violent drive. This presupposition actually alludes to the fact that one drive is complaining about the interpretive desiring faculties of another.⁵¹ Our bodies are a composition of a set of conflicting drives that all seek domination over one another,⁵² with one drive normally seeking to order the unity of the others.⁵³ We are therefore never free from our desires, which always inform the way we act.

But anyone who considers the basic drives of man to see to what extent they may have been at play just here as inspiring spirits (or demons and kobolds) will find that all of them have done philosophy at some time-and that every single one of them would like only too well to represent just itself as the

⁴³ Peter Sedgwick, *Nietzsche: The Key concepts* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 40 - 41

⁴⁴ Sarah Kofman, *Nietzsche and Metaphor*, Translated by Duncan Large (London, The Athlone Press, 1993), 118

⁴⁵ Nietzsche, *The Will to power*, 199 (aphorism 370)

⁴⁶ Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, 64 (aphorism 109)

⁴⁷ Tilman Borche, *The Epistemological Shift from Descartes to Nietzsche*, in, *Nietzsche: Theories of Knowledge, Critical Theory: Nietzsche and the Sciences 1*, Edited by Babette Babich and Robert Cohen, (Kluweracademic publishers, 1999, Ebook) 56-58

⁴⁸ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 37 (aphorism 11)

⁴⁹ Ibid 211-214 (aphorism 354)

⁵⁰ Richard Schacht, *Nietzsche*, (New York: Routledge; 2002), 85

⁵¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, 64-65

⁵² Ibid

⁵³ Ibid

ultimate purpose of existence and the legitimate master of all the other drives. For every drive wants to be master.⁵⁴

So for Nietzsche, a drive is more than just a vicious upwelling of desire, it constitutes "a disposition that manifests itself by informing an agent's perception... generating an evaluative orientation... and thereby bringing... about that the agent's action, conscious reflection, and thought takes place in the service of a goal of which the agent is ignorant."⁵⁵

Nietzsche claims that the systems of meaning we create in terms of our religious myths, the knowledge we produce and the way we come to value some practices more than others are a result of a particular configuration of these drives.⁵⁶ Moreover, the bodily drives we have do not have an ahistorical essential relation to human nature.⁵⁷ Drives develop and disintegrate in accordance with historical processes, going through various modifications in accordance with regimes of cultural "breeding and taming".⁵⁸ While human beings may suffer as sensuous beings, the manner in which they do and the manner in which they come to terms by creating systems of meaning both depend on the historically and culturally specific constitution of our bodily drives. This is how Nietzsche's aesthetic naturalism in his psychology of natural human bodily forms and metaphorical art is produced in accordance with a healthy relation between the ways the drives function. According to Sarah Kofman,

Metaphor is the proper insofar [as] it is a unique appropriation of the world... But the proper does not belong to a specific social class... the proper describes a certain structure of the soul, a specific hierarchy between the drives, a certain relation of forces.⁵⁹

For Nietzsche, the supposedly objective system of meaning created by each culture is a set of metaphors which designate the cultural experiences of a particular type of bad conscience. It is only through the intense complexities of human life, the desire to live,⁶⁰ communicate, and the creation of memory that the metaphorical nature of human meaning is forgotten. The body's history is a process of becoming, and as it changes so does the relationship between suffering and meaning. Nietzsche's ontology of becoming is the dynamic flux of all things:

⁵⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Towards a Prelude of a Philosophy of the Future*, Translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 13-14

⁵⁵ Christopher Janaway, *Chapter 8: Nietzsche on Morality, Drives and Human Greatness*, in, *Nietzsche: Naturalism, Normativity*, Edited by Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 187

⁵⁶ Kofman, *Nietzsche and Metaphor*, 118

⁵⁷ Janaway, *Chapter 8: Nietzsche on Morality, Drives and Human Greatness*, 189

⁵⁸ *Ibid* 189

⁵⁹ Kofman, *Nietzsche and Metaphor*, 118

⁶⁰ Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 112 (aphorism 110)

nothing from human values to the human body, remain constant⁶¹. On this point, Brian Lightbody correctly argues that,

The body's structures are only quasi-real; they are neither permanent nor absolute because other constructions of power are actively interpreting the body according to their respective agendas/needs.⁶²

The philosophical concept that Nietzsche uses to explain the becoming of the human body, in all its different psychological and ontological manifestations and of life in general, is his organic system-- the will to power. It is the notion of the will to power that allows Nietzsche to conceptualize the development and growth of the human body in a manner that is external to positivist conceptions of the biological body.

All psychology so far has got stuck in moral prejudices and fears; it has not dared to descend into the depths. To understand it as morphology and the doctrine of the development of the will to power, as I do.⁶³

The Will to Power and Becoming: A critique of Western Ontology

When Nietzsche uses the term power, he is not referring to a position of power, or even a subject, which, as a neutral substratum, wills or desires more power.⁶⁴ Contrary to the Marxist vision of power that encapsulated political theory until Foucault, Nietzsche does not conceive of the will to power as a political theory, in which one collectively oppresses another through various forms of structural violence, but rather as a natural reality that is "psychological, aesthetic and political".⁶⁵ Moreover, as a conception of ontological naturalization, the will to power must be read as a critique of the mechanical models that constitute Western historical philosophy and science. Nietzsche conceives of power as a "power relationship between two forces".⁶⁶ For Nietzsche, each organic body is a manifestation of natural or genetic forces.⁶⁷ It is by means of the movements of each body⁶⁸ that forces are exerted upon one another in a constant rearrangement of changing, conflicting relations.⁶⁹ Force, or indeed the will to power, exists to overcome what resists it.⁷⁰ What

⁶¹ Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy History, 88-89

⁶² Brian Lightbody, *Philosophical Genealogy: Volume 2: An Epistemological Reconstruction of Nietzsche and Foucault's Method*, (New York: Peter Laing Publishing;2011), 1

⁶³ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 31 (aphorism 23)

⁶⁴ Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, (London, The Athlone Press, 1983), xi

⁶⁵ Robert Pippin, *Nietzsche, Psychology and First Philosophy*, (London: The Chicago University Press, 2010), 2 (my emphasis)

⁶⁶ Nietzsche, *The Will to power*, 336 (aphorism 631)

⁶⁷ Ibid 340 (aphorism 636)

⁶⁸ Ibid 340 (aphorism 636)

⁶⁹ Ibid 346 (aphorism 656)

Nietzsche is fundamentally trying to achieve with the will to power is to conceptualize chaotic violent processes of organic change in motion without anything being moved through a cause and effect relation.⁷¹ Nietzsche thus promotes a nominalism that prioritizes manifest change in the form of a non-perceivable perception to the traditional Aristotelian relationship between subject, predicate and causation that have continued to influence empirical enquiry until the development of modern science.⁷²

The separation of doer and deed...⁷³ Two successive states, the one 'cause', the other 'effect': this is false. The first has nothing to effect; the second has been effected by nothing⁷⁴...It is mythology to think that forces obey a law...⁷⁵ It is a question of struggle between two elements of unequal power: a new arrangement of forces is achieved according to the measure of power of each of them...⁷⁶ The absolute establishment of power relations: the stronger becomes master of the weaker...⁷⁷ It is a question not of succession, but of interpenetration, a process in which the individual successive moments are not related to each other as cause and effect.⁷⁸

For Aristotle, following Plato, rational inquiry or logic attends to the essence of things.⁷⁹ Reflecting critically on the latter's theory of forms, the former claimed that the essence of an entity is its substance.⁸⁰ Aristotle further argued that each entity, whether it is a rock or a human body, possesses a particular essence or substance, constituted by the essential attributes, or elements which inhere in that thing.⁸¹ In Aristotelian logic, each proposition is rational on the basis that it has a subject which pertains to the substance of a thing, and a predicate which corresponds to its attributes.⁸² So, a rational proposition, in Platonic philosophy for example, could claim that the human body is a source of appetite and desire.⁸³

In an Aristotelian reading of Plato's conception of the body as an entity, appetites or desires are considered to be attributes that inhere, or are rather immanent to, the essential

⁷⁰ Lawrence Hatab, *Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality: An Introduction*, (New York, Cambridge University press, 2008) , 12

⁷¹ Nietzsche , *The Will to Power*, 281 (aphorism 520) , 283-284 (aphorism 523)

⁷² Babette Babich, *Nietzsche's Critical Theory: The Culture of Science as Art*, in, *Nietzsche: Theories of Knowledge, Critical Theory: Nietzsche and the Sciences I*, Edited by Babette Babich and Robert Cohen, (Kluweracademic publishers:Ebook; 1999), 1-2

⁷³ Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 336(aphorism 631)

⁷⁴ Ibid 336(aphorism 633)

⁷⁵ Ibid 336 (aphorism 629)

⁷⁶ Ibid 337 (aphorism 633)

⁷⁷ Ibid 337 (aphorism 630)

⁷⁸ Ibid 336(aphorism 631)

⁷⁹ Aristotle, *The Metaphysics*, Translated by Hugh Lawson-Tancred, (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 32-25

⁸⁰ Ibid 126-127

⁸¹ Ibid 117-118, 126-127; Roger Scruton, *A Short History of Modern philosophy*, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 17

⁸² Ibid

⁸³ Plato, *The Republic*, Translated by Desmond Lee (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 150-151

substantiality of the body. Plato's consequent conception of the body as an immoral prison of the rational capacities the soul in the attainment of the true knowledge of things⁸⁴ fed into conceptions of the body in Christian theology.⁸⁵ However, the Augustinian depiction of the body (substance) as an imprisoning source of carnality and sin (attributes), would give way to the modern biological conception of the body as a developmental, if not evolutionary, organic structure whose functions and needs were causatively premised on its adaptation (attributes) to a changing environment.⁸⁶ Aristotelian philosophy on this very basis suggested that while substances may endure, their attributes change through relations of causation.⁸⁷ Some of these attributes will prove to be historical accidents, not truly inhering in the essence of a being.⁸⁸ However, far from being a completely nominalist approach, Aristotle's neo-Platonic thesis relies on a distinction that there are always a set of elements what will continue to be essential to the thing. That is, each being has a potentiality to attain its substantial actuality.⁸⁹ This is of course the angle that Kant took in his metahistorical portrayal of rationality as the essence of man.⁹⁰ For Foucault, in Nietzsche's understanding of change, no entity has a stable essence. For Foucault, this determines the way Nietzsche rejects the notion of traditional history, on the basis that there are no *a priori* truths that serve as a grounding point for man's relations with the world, including himself.

Nothing in man-not even his body-is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men. The traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically dismantled.⁹¹

Nietzsche's critique of the rationalist and theological positions, which he considers to have filtrated right down to the way we perceive things in the present, even determining our political relationships, is embodied in a refutation of modern Aristotelian categories, paying special attention to the manner in which the subject/predicate relation, under the guise of Christianity, has given birth to superstitions of the atomistic soul, or subject of knowledge as the ground of meaning and reason.⁹² In a critique of who we are, Nietzsche does not view the relationship between truth, reason, the subject, causation and God to be mere givens but

⁸⁴ Scruton, *History of Modern Philosophy*, 14-15

⁸⁵ Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 5 (aphorism 2-Preface to the second edition)

⁸⁶ Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*, Translated by Alan Sheridan, (New York: Routledge, 2010), 389

⁸⁷ Aristotle, *The Metaphysics*, 115

⁸⁸ Ibid 150

⁸⁹ Ibid 272-277

⁹⁰ Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings*, Translated by Quentin Skinner(Cambridge, University of Cambridge Press, 1991), 52

⁹¹ Foucault, '*Nietzsche, Genealogy History*', 88-89

⁹² Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 20-21, 24, 28-29 (aphorisms 12, 17, 21)

interpretive and evaluative constructs produced through conflicting relations of forces that determine sensibilities, or bad consciences. The way we perspectively apprehend reality is mediated by a metaphorical linguistic structure, which through a historical process has hardened into supposedly rational concepts that we deem to be true.⁹³ Nietzsche thus conceives of human beings as maintaining an active and passive relation to the creation of meaning, in which we are fundamentally affective beings.⁹⁴ There are always limits to our knowledge, but these change in accordance with the changing configuration of our bodily drives over time. Nietzsche conceives that the rationalist tendency to permit otherwise is simply part of the mythological structure that rationality has taken since Plato, which has allowed a particular form of bad conscience to exist.⁹⁵ As a genealogical physician of who we are, Nietzsche will come to diagnose this form of existence in its historical specificity. However, we can only understand Nietzsche's move as a genealogist if we look at the relation between meaning, creation, value, becoming and the health of the willing body.

Thus for Nietzsche, he cannot see flux of becoming. Through time our eyes have come to perceive causal relations between atomistic identities in consecutive moments in accordance with a presupposed linear sequence that has been inculcated through a historico-grammatical order.⁹⁶ This is essential to Nietzsche's anti-Cartesian epistemology and anti-Platonist ontology. He endorses a form of nominalism where we may create linguistic interpretations, but the human body and its consciousness are not autonomous, but operate in relation to the signs that constitute any linguistic formation.⁹⁷ Moreover, the sensuous nature of apprehension as configured by the drives is prioritized over the calculative nature of rational consciousness. So what we as rational agents consider to be effects of a causal sequence, is actually our bodies standing in an interpretive relationship to a realm of metaphorical appearances that have hardened into a conceptual schema of meaning an accumulated chaotic process inculcated through the very nature of the will to power, overpowering and resistance, birth and death, and growth and disintegration.⁹⁸

⁹³ Kofman, *Nietzsche and Metaphor*, 43

⁹⁴ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 62

⁹⁵ Catherine Zuckert, *Postmodern Plato's : Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, Strauss, Derrida*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 14

⁹⁶ Charles Scott, *The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger*, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 24-28

⁹⁷ Lawrence Hatab, *Nietzsche on Consciousness and language*, in , *Nietzsche's Therapeutic Teaching For Individuals and Culture* Edited by Horst Hutter and Eli Friedland , (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 193

⁹⁸ Nietzsche, *The Will to power*, 359-360 (aphorism 678)

Suffering, Becoming and Myth

The total character of the World, by contrast, is for all eternity chaos, not in a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, organization, form, beauty, wisdom and whatever else our aesthetic anthropomorphisms are called...Let us beware of attributing to it heartlessness or unreason or their opposites, it is neither perfect, nor beautiful, nor noble, nor does it want to become any of things; in no ways does it strive to imitate man.⁹⁹

Nietzsche is at minimum the “perfect nihilist”.¹⁰⁰ Nihilism means that there is no intrinsic meaning in the world, nor is there to the suffering that we experience in life. In being a perfect nihilist, Nietzsche is attempting to invert what he considers to be the system of Platonism that has defined the philosophical tradition’s teleological distinction regarding the relationship between metaphysics, morality, reason and human history until Kant and Hegel.¹⁰¹ Nietzsche’s anti-Platonic philosophy is premised on a critique of absolutes on the basis of a historically specific critique. “Everything has evolved; there are no eternal facts, as there are likewise no eternal truths. Therefore historical philosophizing is henceforth necessary”.¹⁰² Roger Scruton describes the Platonic notion of truth which Nietzsche is opposed to:

From Plato and the neo-Platonic tradition the medievals inherited a cosmology which justified both the belief in transcendent reality, and at the same time presented an elevated picture of our ability to gain access to it. Plato had argued that the truth of this world is not revealed to ordinary sense perception, but to reason alone; that [the] truths of reason are necessary, eternal, as we should *a priori*; that through the cultivation of reason man can come to understand himself, God, the world as things are, freed from the shadowy overcast of experience. The neo-Platonists developed the cosmology of Plato’s Timaeus into a theory of creation, according to which the entire world emanates from the intellectual light of God’s self-contemplation.¹⁰³

Nietzsche, a young student of theology, would come to pronounce Christianity as, “Platonism for the people”.¹⁰⁴ Nietzsche’s critique of the tradition hitherto is premised on a positive valuation of a transcendent realm in this dualistic vision, which denigrates the materiality of the sensuous world, the Platonic, “metaphysician’s faith in opposite values”.¹⁰⁵ He is of course aware of the historical developments in the tradition. For Nietzsche, the Kantian

⁹⁹ Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 109(aphorism 109)

¹⁰⁰ Nietzsche, *The Will to power*, 3, (aphorism 3)

¹⁰¹ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 19

¹⁰² Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human all Too Human*, Translated by Helen Zimmern, (New York: Prometheus Books; 2009), 22 (aphorism 2)

¹⁰³ Scruton, *A History of Modern Philosophy*, 14-15

¹⁰⁴ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 2 (Preface)

¹⁰⁵ Ibid 9-11 (aphorism 2)

critique in particular was radical insofar as it denied human beings the capacity of attaining the absolute truth of reality.¹⁰⁶ Kant critiqued the idea of an essential world of ready-made essences, theologically decreed, to which our minds had to conform.¹⁰⁷ Kant instead changed the situation radically by rather claiming that the world of manifest data had to conform to the operations of our mind in order for us to make sense of the world through conceptual schemes.¹⁰⁸ By searching for transcendental, or the conditions of possibility for the operations of reason, Kant was suggesting that there are certain rules pertaining to the ordering of our cognitive faculties, which place a limit on what any rational agent can know.¹⁰⁹ Nietzsche considered the Kantian critique of the self-positing rational subject as the commencement of the deconstruction of the theological ground of philosophy.¹¹⁰ Kant claimed that since the rational subject does not have access to an absolute sphere of meaning, man cannot speculate on the nature of God, the universe or freedom.¹¹¹

Nietzsche praised Kant's critique, but his philosophy gains direction from what he considers Kant's conformism.¹¹² In this light, Kant still held that a *noumenal* realm existed, one that continued to affect and structure the realm of appearance, as well as our freedom as rational moral agents.¹¹³ Within this *noumenal* realm, Kant also left space for God and faith as something immune to rational criticism or speculative reason, which altogether constituted a Platonism to which Nietzsche's entire philosophy is opposed.¹¹⁴ For Nietzsche, the will to power ontological system is a materialist vision of reality which rejects any form of the Kantian *noumenal* realm or any deeper reality underlying what we see.¹¹⁵ Nietzsche's epistemological view that all human meaning is fundamentally a historical interpretation of a historically produced body, or a "system of forces" in a conflictual and affective relationship with other bodies offers a break from traditional rationalism. It also decentres the autonomy of the human agent by pointing out that meaning occurs through an unconscious relationship between the drives. Nietzsche's historical focus on the relationship between the body and history led him to adopt a position which he knew, and affirmed to be an antithetical stance

¹⁰⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, Translated by William A Haussman, (New York: Barnes and Noble; 2006), 76

¹⁰⁷ Bowie, *Introduction to German Philosophy*, 14

¹⁰⁸ Ibid 20-24

¹⁰⁹ Ibid 17

¹¹⁰ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 16-19 (aphorisms 10 & 11)

¹¹¹ Immanuel Kant, *Second Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason*, in, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Translated by J.M.D Meiklejohn, (Hazleton: Electronic Classis Series, 2003), 19

¹¹² Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 9-11, 53-56 (aphorism 2 & 44)

¹¹³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 19 ; Bowie, *Introduction to German Philosophy*, 17

¹¹⁴ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 9-11 (aphorism 2)

¹¹⁵ Ibid 301 (aphorism 555)

on philosophy hitherto. “History is nothing but the belief in the senses. Moral: denial of all that believes in the senses, of all the rest of mankind: all that is mere ‘people’. Be a philosopher, be a mummy”.¹¹⁶ Nietzsche’s historical philosophy of the body is subversively radical. It allows him to reject any vision of history, whether theological or scientific, because he believes such notions to be constructs of human interpretations that originate in historico-physiological contexts. The idea that the world will redeem humans through an historical process is a human invention, to which Nietzsche considers the will to power to be oblivious. For Nietzsche, becoming is a pure chaos that follows no laws or regularity, but is a circularity of time,¹¹⁷ with no beginning or end.¹¹⁸

In accordance with this chaotic flow that follows no systemic laws, Nietzsche promulgates a neo-Kantianism that only distinguishes an apparent realm of existence with no (Schopenhauerian) substantive reality undergirding the suffering of a single human culture. In fact, Nietzsche goes so far as to claim that no culture has a stable essence. For Nietzsche, all meaning, qualities and values which human beings have come to consider as objective are the historically produced aesthetic creations of human beings.¹¹⁹ “Man designated himself as the creature that measures values, evaluates, and measures, as the valuating animal as such.”¹²⁰ Thus, there is no single objective truth or set of objective facts¹²¹ external to the fictional interpretive evaluations of humankind. For Nietzsche, there is thus only a realm of appearances in the form of metaphorical errors, which human beings require to live.¹²²

Appearance is an arranged and simplified world, at which our practical instincts have been at work; it is perfectly true for us; that is to say, we live, we are able to live in it: proof of its truth for us—the world, apart from our condition of living in it, the world that we have not reduced to our being, our logic and psychological prejudices, does not exist as a world in-itself; it is essentially a world of relationships; under different conditions it has a differing aspect from every point.¹²³

Nietzsche, in contrast to the Platonic notion that there is an ahistorical true reality, believes that all reality is perspectival, and illusory. Nietzsche’s artistic metaphysics holds that all

¹¹⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, in *Twilight of the Idols and The Antichrist*, translated by R J Hollingdale, (New York: Penguin Books, 2003),45

¹¹⁷ Paul S Loeb, *Suicide, Meaning and Redemption*, in *Nietzsche: Time and History*, Edited by Manuel Dries (New York: Walter De Gruyter, 2008), 185

¹¹⁸ Nietzsche, *The Will to power*, 377-378 (aphorism 708)

¹¹⁹ Ibid 3, (aphorism 3)

¹²⁰ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 70 (Essay 2, Section 8)

¹²¹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 85 (aphorism 108)-my emphasis

¹²² Nietzsche, *The Will to power*, 306 (aphorism 568)

¹²³ Ibid 306 (aphorism 568)

meaning-- science and religion included-- are ultimately a set of aesthetic forms.¹²⁴ In contrast to the Aristotelian and Platonic image of man as a rational being, he considers art to be man's metaphysical activity proper;¹²⁵ the creation of illusory systems that deceive as to our existence as natural beings that allow us to live a mortal existence. "Only as an aesthetic phenomenon is existence justified eternally".¹²⁶ Nietzsche thus changes philosophy's disposition from a rational pursuit of metaphysical truth to a psychological analysis of human aesthetics that informs his entire mature philosophy and genealogical method. The essence of Nietzsche's aesthetic naturalism, myth, or religion, is directly related to the horrors of human psychological life, suffering/bad conscience:

It is only a horizon encompassed with myths that rounds off the unity of a social movement...The mythical figures have to be the visibly omnipresent genii, under the care of which the young soul grows to maturity.¹²⁷

Mythic Religion and the Cosmology of the Return

For Nietzsche, it is only through the aesthetic influence of myth that human beings have made sense of their lives collectively, articulating a lived horizon under which the individual can be freed from "random roving",¹²⁸ as the course from youth to maturity is assured within a meaningful context. This religious focus is a direct repudiation of Kant's notion of maturity. Nietzsche, in contrast to other Enlightenment notions, is claiming that religion provides a structure for human suffering that rationality cannot simply replace, or better. However, Nietzsche's philosophy of religion that informs his critique of Christianity and modern rationalism in his genealogy is premised on his hierarchical framing of different religions in relation to his philosophy of value. What is important to understand about Nietzsche's philosophy of value in his genealogy is how he differentiates his position on suffering from the myths of other religions.¹²⁹ For Nietzsche there is no ultimate reality beyond the affective condition induced by cyclical becoming. Unlike what he sees to be an element similar to Schopenhauer and the non-pantheistic religions, (especially Western Platonism), because life, constituted as the will to power and the human suffering that comes with it is "all there is", it

¹²⁴ Bowie, *Aesthetics and subjectivity*, 290 ; Babette Babich, *Nietzsche's "Gay Science"*, in , *A Companion to Nietzsche*, edited by Keith Ansell Pearson, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 103

¹²⁵ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, xxi

¹²⁶ Ibid xxii

¹²⁷ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 99

¹²⁸ Ibid 99

¹²⁹ Young, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Religion*, 106-107

is not something to be denigrated or negated but rather affirmed.¹³⁰ This spirit of life affirmation in aesthetic myth is the ground of Nietzsche's Dionysian religious spirit, which he artfully describes in the form of an 'aesthetic natural cosmology',¹³¹ called the eternal return. The return is the becoming or flux of the will to power. Martin Heidegger describes this relation aptly. If the will to power is the essence of what is for Nietzsche the eternal return, it is the endless existence or becoming of what is.¹³² The cosmology of the eternal return is embodied for Nietzsche by the affirmative spirit of his God Dionysus:

What if some me day or night a demon were to steal into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: 'This life as you now live it and have lived it you will have to live once again and innumerable times again, and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every sigh and everything small and great in your life must return to you, all in the same succession and sequence-even this spider and this moonlight between the trees and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of time is turned over and over again with it, and you with it, speck of dust!' Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you experienced a tremendous moment when you when would have answered him: 'You are a God and I have never heard anything more divine'.¹³³

Nietzsche's religious impulse is oriented towards the deification of life, of the eternity of all that is.¹³⁴ The eternal return is a life-affirming cosmology. If one can affirm life, Dionysus appears as a God. If one cannot, like the Western tradition that has devalued the world's appearance in favour of a transcendent reality, then Dionysus appears as a demon. Nietzsche depicts Dionysus as the Greek God of intoxication, fertility and the decimation of personal boundaries in the *The Birth of Tragedy*¹³⁵. More profoundly, Dionysus, as the symbol of fertility, expounds Nietzsche's view that all growth, beauty (meaning), change and suffering are effectuated through a natural process.¹³⁶ In Nietzsche's religious philosophy Dionysian worship is constituted as a natural artistic spirit of creative life affirmation.¹³⁷ Nietzsche's Dionysian religion is thus not premised on a transcendent God, but a Dionysian faith in life, or *amor fati*, (Latin for, 'a love of fate'), that takes the form of creative affirmation of all that

¹³⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Hommo: How One Becomes What One is*, Translated by Anthony Ludivici (New York: Dover Publications, 2004), 143

¹³¹ Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche's Philosophy and true religion, A companion to Nietzsche*(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007) , 142-143

¹³² Nietzsche, *Ecce Hommo*, 119

¹³³ Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 194-195 (aphorism 341)

¹³⁴ Lampert, *Nietzsche's Philosophy and true religion*, 142-143

¹³⁵ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 1-2

¹³⁶ Nietzsche, *Ecce Hommo*, 64-65

¹³⁷ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 236 (aphorism 295)

is, was and will be.¹³⁸ To look into the terrors of existence and one's own fate with love as a form of affirmation is what Nietzsche endorses as the Dionysian spirit.

The most self-loving soul, in whom all things have their rise, their ebb and flow..., But this is the very idea of Dionysus...how can he who has the hardest and terrible grasp of reality and who has the most 'abysmal thoughts', nevertheless avoid conceiving these things as objections to existence, or even as objections to the eternal recurrence of existence?-how is it that on the contrary he finds reasons being himself the eternal affirmation of all things, 'the tremendous and unlimited saying of Yea and Amen'? ...'into every abyss do I bear the benediction of my Yea to Life'...But this, once more, is precisely the idea of Dionysus.¹³⁹

Nietzsche's Naturalization of Value: Affirmative Tragic Myth

Affirming life is not agreeing with all that is. Rather, it is accepting and glorifying the current state of things. For Nietzsche, one affirms by creating values.¹⁴⁰ Nietzsche's focal point for his theory of life-affirming values is his reading of pre-Socratic Greek tragedy. He considers this culture to have created the healthiest values.¹⁴¹ It is these values which Nietzsche wants to communicate to his readers for the revaluation of all values. Nietzsche's philosophy of tragedy thus always stands in relation to his genealogical diagnosis, a point which I will clarify later in this chapter. For Nietzsche, the tragic creation of value in these cultures was the province of the tragic poet.¹⁴² The tragic poet, embodying a fundamentally Dionysian spirit towards the contradictions of pre-Socratic Hellenic life, created artistic or Apollonian illusions, and individuated, apparent forms that attempt to redeem the harsh nature of human experience.¹⁴³ Within the historical context that the 'tragic' Greeks lived in, their poets created values which beautified the historical contradictions which afflicted their very existence:

Affirmation of life even in its strangest and sternest problems, the will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility through the sacrifice of its highest types- that is what I called the called Dionysian, that is what I recognized as the bridge to the psychology of the tragic poet.¹⁴⁴

All values are for Nietzsche historical,¹⁴⁵ and thus it is best that we see what he means before encountering the two forms of value-- both moral and nihilist-- that make up his philosophy

¹³⁸ Lampert, *Nietzsche's Philosophy and True religion*, 144

¹³⁹ Nietzsche, *Ecce Hommo*, 119

¹⁴⁰ Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Translated by RJ Hollingdale (London: Penguin Group, 2001), 214-232

¹⁴¹ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 120

¹⁴² Ibid 92-93

¹⁴³ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 16

¹⁴⁴ Nietzsche, *Twilight*, 121

of historical value before encountering his genealogy. It was in the tragic poetry of Homer and Aeschylus that “all life rests on appearance, art, illusion, optics, necessity of perspective and error”,¹⁴⁶ was for Nietzsche best encapsulated. The tragic poet or ‘artist God’ is a fundamentally higher or noble type of being precisely because he can harness his own sensibility (suffering). That is, he can intensify suffering into a creative force¹⁴⁷ which affirms life.

The Genealogist as a Cultural Physician of Health and Sickness

It is important that we understand Nietzsche’s philosophy of value, and its relation to tragedy with regard to his perception of the historical life of the human body and social body. As a genealogical philosopher of values, Nietzsche is a cultural physician.¹⁴⁸ Nietzsche, the cultural physician, approaches the values of a culture as a doctor would approach the health of a particular body.¹⁴⁹ Nietzsche is thus, “someone who has pursued the task of pursuing the total health of a people”.¹⁵⁰ In his late genealogical period, he is concerned with the cultural health of modern Europe. As a cultural physician, he attends to the will of a particular body produced through certain cultural (forces) conditions, and in that particular culture itself, as a modality of forces as a bodily organism.¹⁵¹ The struggle for any cultural organism to constitute itself, as an arrangement or union of smaller bodies is a bodily phenomenon, and as an arrangement of forces also composed, and are reciprocally determined by a “collective will”:¹⁵²

A species comes to be, a type becomes fixed and strong, through the long fight with essentially constant unfavourable conditions...Even the body within which individuals treat each other as equals, as suggested before-and this happens in every healthy aristocracy-if it is a living and not a dying body, has to do to other bodies what the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other: it will have to be an incarnate win to power, it will strive to grow, spread, seize and become predominant-not from any morality or immorality but because it is living and because life simply is will to power.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁵ Ibid 45

¹⁴⁶ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, xxii

¹⁴⁷ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 220-221 (aphorism 270)

¹⁴⁸ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 75 ;

¹⁴⁹ Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy History', 88-89

¹⁵⁰ Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 6 (aphorism 2-Preface)

¹⁵¹ Nandita Biswas-Mellamphy. *The Three Stigmata of Friedrich Nietzsche: Political Physiology in the Age of Nihilism* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 34

¹⁵² Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 332-333 (aphorism 619)

¹⁵³ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 210-212 (aphorism 262)

For Nietzsche, the willing body, (both individual and social) is thus the site of spiritual and biological existence,¹⁵⁴ which as a physician he diagnosis as being psychologically ‘healthy’ or ‘sick’ in relation to the manner in which the will responds to the “worth of existence”, or the pathos of becoming with regard to the spiritual, or what Nietzsche considers to be the ‘psychological’ strength of its will.¹⁵⁵ The will is bodily experienced as a set of sensations (suffering as bad conscience) that occur through a temporal process.¹⁵⁶ It is the will, as a form- producing force that ‘creates’ our mythological evaluations and architectural creations. Nietzsche conceives of these cultural creations as the “effects (sensations) of the will”,¹⁵⁷ which is the will’s “ ruling interpretation and thought”.¹⁵⁸ Nietzsche diagnoses a cultural organism by evaluating its effects as ‘symptoms’ that reflect a deeper judgement on the part of the psychological strength of a will towards the value of lived existence.¹⁵⁹ What is of central importance to Nietzsche’s diagnostic judgment is the manner in which that culture, and the aesthetic quality of its practices (as the effects of a bodily will) affirm or deny the locus of its inextricable suffering; the natural body of the drives. Thus it is not life in itself that is being valued, for the absurdities of life cannot have values in themselves,¹⁶⁰ but in the establishment of values, a particular type of ascent (active) or descent (reactive) is evaluated.¹⁶¹ Judgements that affirm life reflect a set of symptoms associated with the bodily will of a healthy type.¹⁶² Those that devalue life, and wish for an end to suffering are symptomatic of an unhealthy or sick type:

I formulate a principle. All naturalism in morality, that is all healthy morality, is dominated by an instinct of life-some commandment of life is fulfilled through a certain cannon of “shall” and “shall not”, some hindrance and hostile element on life’s road is thereby removed. Anti-Natural morality, that is, virtually every morality that has hitherto been taught, revered and preached, turns on the contrary precisely against the instincts of life-it is a now secret, now loud and impudent condemnation of those instincts...A condemnation of life by the living is after all no more than the symptom of a certain kind of life...Condemnation of life is only a value judgement on the part of life-of what life? Of what kind of life...of declining, debilitated, weary, condemned life.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁴ Biswas-Mellamphy. *"The Three Stigmata of Friedrich Nietzsche, 12-13, 43-44*

¹⁵⁵ Lawrence Hatab, *Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals*, 15-16

¹⁵⁶ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 25 (aphorism 19)

¹⁵⁷ Ibid 86 (aphorism 117),

¹⁵⁸ Ibid 25 (aphorism 19)

¹⁵⁹ Nietzsche, *Ecce Hommo*, 99-101

¹⁶⁰ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 40

¹⁶¹ Ibid 55

¹⁶² Ibid

¹⁶³ Ibid

A healthy body is not only an affirmation of bodily life, but also a social organism that functions as a healthy body would-- an organic unity that seeks to extend and grow.¹⁶⁴ In Nietzsche's natural history of values, the creation of originary human aristocracies came about through the enslavement of a tribe of 'animal men' by smaller but far more powerful warrior tribes.¹⁶⁵ Unlike modern political philosophy that took its direction from Hobbes, Nietzsche is opposed to social contract theory,¹⁶⁶ and rather contended it was the animal drives of these warrior tribes that allowed them to conquer weaker beings as a pliant slave labour force, essentially constituting the creation of social communities or 'states'.¹⁶⁷

Nobles, Slaves and a Critique of the Social Contract

I employed the word "stat": it is obvious what is meant—some pack of blond beasts of prey a conqueror and master race which, organized for war and with the ability to organize, unhesitatingly lays its terrible claws upon a populace perhaps tremendously superior in numbers but still formless and nomad. That is after all how the "state" began on earth: I think that sentimentalism which would have it begin with a "contract" has been disposed of. He who can command he who is by nature "master," he who is violent in act and bearing--what has he to do with contracts.¹⁶⁸

The initial hierarchical ordering of society commences through an organizational process that Nietzsche refers to as the "morality of mores".¹⁶⁹ The morality of mores, or master morality, are for Nietzsche, the first set of social-- and more importantly, religious'-- customary laws which come to have value for human beings with regard to a process of breeding and selection.¹⁷⁰ These societies existed not only for more power, but more importantly to create higher types of human beings.¹⁷¹ Within this early form of human organization, the masters approach their herd of slaves with the purpose of inculcating a debt memory, as the initial social creditors and lawgivers, and thus the first contractual relationship for Nietzsche, between debtor and creditor is a power relationship.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Anti-Christ*, in, *Twilight of the Idols and The Antichrist*, translated by R J Hollingdale, (New York: Penguin Books, 2003)127 (aphorism 2)

¹⁶⁵ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 86 (Essay 2; section 16)

¹⁶⁶ Keith Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political thinker*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 121

¹⁶⁷ Nietzsche, *On The Genealogy of Morals*, 86 (Essay 2; section 16)

¹⁶⁸ Ibid

¹⁶⁹ Ibid 59 (Essay 2; section 2)

¹⁷⁰ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 67-70

¹⁷¹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 201-202 (aphorism 257)

¹⁷² Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 70 (essay 2 section 8)

This power relationship is a violent and bloody process referred to in *On the Genealogy of Morals* as “mnemotechnics”.¹⁷³ This is Nietzsche’s principle, that the master’s exerted force (which is painful) is used to create a memory. For Nietzsche, the debt memory created in this process distinguishes what Nietzsche calls the “bad” as “dutiful, but more importantly calculable subjects”.¹⁷⁴ The exploitation, brutality and suppression of those strange slaves, and “the right of the masters”,¹⁷⁵ provides a labouring foundation to society, a set of lower castes which would perform the lower functions a society requires in the way a body does.¹⁷⁶ The desire and acts of killing by vicious torture, and the rawest animal drives are still allowed full autonomy against other cultures in the form of “open massacres”,¹⁷⁷ yet within the “pale confines of their society”,¹⁷⁸ such acts are instituted to develop in the slaves a sense of allegiance, a debt which makes them useful to their masters.

The pliant labour force that the slaves are never truly enters the sphere of aristocratic values. While their formation as obedient labourers characterizes a set of qualities which are embodied through a set of learnt customs proves to be useful to the flourishing of the higher parts of the social body, they are too physically weak. That is, they are “common, cowardly or unlucky”,¹⁷⁹ to allow a social body to overcome the very set of unfavourable conditions that would allow it to constitute itself. This common perception of the slave class was reflected in the primary metaphors the by which the nobility used to distinguish them. The German word, *schlecht*, for example, means ‘bad’, but it also can denote ‘plain’ or ‘simple’.¹⁸⁰ The slaves never enter the sphere of noble valuation. ‘Bad’ is a mere afterthought, and in some sense the signified pity, on the part of the nobles towards the slaves, rather than contempt.¹⁸¹ What the slaves do is allow the castes within society to excel. ‘Good’ is always assigned to the noble warrior rank of men, of value in itself, affirming it.

The poets, of course being the natural allies of the warrior caste,¹⁸² valued the traits and qualities on the basis of their success for the community, which had been decried by the

¹⁷³ Ibid 61 (essay 2 section 3)

¹⁷⁴ Ibid 58-63)(Essay 2 section 2-4)

¹⁷⁵ Ibid 65 (Essay 2 section 5)

¹⁷⁶ Nietzsche, *Anti-Christ*, 191 (Aphorism 57)

¹⁷⁷ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 40 (Essay 1 section 11)

¹⁷⁸ Ibid

¹⁷⁹ Ibid 30 (Essay 1; section 5)

¹⁸⁰ Ibid 28 (Essay 1 section 4)

¹⁸¹ Ibid 38-39 (Essay 1 section 11)

¹⁸² Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 208-209 (aphorism 261)

warrior caste.¹⁸³ The pre-Socratic Greek nobility for example, whose mouthpiece was the poet, Theognis referred to them as “truthful”, the etymological root of which is *ethlos* (who one is).¹⁸⁴ Moreover, the term ‘good’ also refers to warriors of other rival aristocracies, who as sources of danger and fear, drive noble warrior types to become stronger, furthering the advancement of higher types of men.¹⁸⁵

Nietzsche’s key point regarding the formation of values in early aristocratic society is that the manner in which the masters sublimated their raw drives with regard to their relations with their equals, and redeployed them to advance the life of their community was of real value. Value was “first applied to human beings and only derivatively and at a later period applied to ACTIONS”.¹⁸⁶ ‘Good’ only referred to a self-imposed rank put on by an aristocratic group of men, whose warrior strength meant their virtues and qualities were of inherent value to the community.¹⁸⁷ These traits, being of value, meant that those who possessed them were thus afforded a rank. This form of valuation led to a form of cultural organization. Although the masters would view each other with “mutual jealousy, suspicion and rage”, and their desire to avenge, steal and murder was unforgiving,¹⁸⁸ they sublimated these raw drives by means of *agons*,¹⁸⁹ or “contests of opposition”,¹⁹⁰ creating more sophisticated cultural pursuits in military and philosophical-aesthetic forms that strengthened opposing participants, that is; members of the knightly nobility, instead of allowing those natural drives the chance of “destroying the other”.¹⁹¹ Thus by means of various *agons*, the Greeks harnessed their natural drives into bodily forms of excellence in the form of qualities that would translate into valuable consequences for the community to grow stronger, while at the same time making sure that those in the society measured their power through contests in a reciprocal structure, which would perpetuate a growth of power that allowed unified (not chaotic) oppression.¹⁹²

¹⁸³ Daniel Ahern, *The Smile of Tragedy, Nietzsche and the Art of Virtue*, (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 2012), 22

¹⁸⁴ Ibid 29 (Essay 1 section 5)

¹⁸⁵ Ibid 122 (Essay 3 section 14)

¹⁸⁶ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 205 (aphorism 260)

¹⁸⁷ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 27-28 (Essay 1 section 4)

¹⁸⁸ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 206 (aphorism 260)

¹⁸⁹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Homers Contest*, in, *The Nietzsche Reader*, Edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson and Duncan Large, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 98 & 108

¹⁹⁰ Hatab, Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality, 13

¹⁹¹ Ibid 14

¹⁹² Ibid

Nietzsche and the Affirmative use of the Gods

In Nietzsche's reading of religious traditions, the only reason a society believes itself to exist is due to the tremendous force of the virtues of their first ancestors.¹⁹³ This inculcates a sense of debt, or the first form of bad conscience.¹⁹⁴ The early tribes showed their allegiance, that is; they paid their debt to their ancestors through following their laws and customs,¹⁹⁵ and of course, through war. These customs were what repressed the satisfaction of the animal drives through the creation of social relations that were the unconscious doing of the first political masters-- the ancestors. The stronger a society becomes, the more powerful they believe their ancestors to be, until those ancestors become gods.¹⁹⁶ According to Nietzsche, this is the origin of religion.¹⁹⁷ Nietzsche thus interprets the Homeric creation of the Olympian gods as the earliest ancestors of the pre-Socratic Greeks, whose heroic physical qualities are now deemed to be of the highest values.¹⁹⁸ When the acts of the warriors result in failure according to the religious standards of the community, or damage the social organism itself, the intentions of the nobility-- that is, their guilt-- was never brought into question.¹⁹⁹ The time of master morality, or the morality of mores, is considered by Nietzsche to be the pre-moral period of humankind.²⁰⁰ Yet despite the lack of guilt, it must be understood that for Nietzsche, even the nobility would have to abide by certain customs, however severe for society to function.²⁰¹

Even the masters were not immune from the customary straightjacket that would eventually make man calculable. It was the masters who were the debtors, and since it was they who moulded their slaves through a violent process of *mnemotechnics*, they retained a natural power of active forgetting.²⁰² The condition of active forgetting is embodied for Nietzsche in the poetic mythology of the 'tragic' Greeks. If an act of a nobleman had negative consequences in such a society it would be blamed on a god, not on the free intentions of the nobility.²⁰³ 'He must have been deluded by a 'god', they concluded finally...This expedient

¹⁹³ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 70 (Essay 2 section 8)

¹⁹⁴ Ibid ;87 (Essay 2 section 17)Christopher Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2007), 134

¹⁹⁵ Ibid 89 (Essay 2 section 19)

¹⁹⁶ Ibid

¹⁹⁷ Ibid

¹⁹⁸ Ibid 69 (Essay 2 section 7)

¹⁹⁹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 43-45 (aphorism 32)

²⁰⁰ Ibid

²⁰¹ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 61 (Essay 2 section 3)

²⁰² Ibid 39 (Essay 1 section 11)

²⁰³ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 44 (aphorism 32)

is typical of the Greeks”²⁰⁴. An example of this in Greek tragedy is in Homer’s epic poem *The Iliad*, when the father of Olympus Zeus is portrayed tricking Agamemnon into a disastrous act of war,²⁰⁵ but whenever Achilles or Odysseus perform an act of advantageous consequence, the value is attributed to him, the man-- not the intention or the act that is valued, but the qualities associated with the man and caste.²⁰⁶ The principle for Nietzsche here is that the gods themselves, in the metaphorical systems that distinguished pre-Socratic aristocratic society, are of fundamental importance in the creation of noble, psychologically healthy values. These did not negate the dangers and existential suffering brought about by violent drives of the body, since the gods took the guilt that the acts would have had on the perpetrator and brought negative consequences upon the community.²⁰⁷

Nietzsche thus praised the health of ‘tragic’ Greek culture for the manner in which the sensual, warlike and other impulses of the body were deified and praised, not as a reason for judgement as guilt. Of course bad conscience would still afflict the aristocratic masters in terms of the customary laws to which they had to abide, but tragic art had the ability of deceiving them as to horror of their situation as “natural beings”.²⁰⁸ This is central to what Nietzsche considers to be a life-affirming form of valuation. The tragic poets were aware of the inevitable dangers that the life of pure physicality-- that of the warrior caste-- would face, and as a result of which, ultimately perish. That is, the highest warrior types, who developed the warlike virtues the aristocratic society required for survival, would perish precisely because of those virtues:

The strong races decimate each other, through war, thirst for power, adventurousness, the strong affects-wastefulness (strength is no longer hoarded, spiritual disturbance arises from an excess of tension arises through excessive tension); their existence is costly; in brief-they ruin one another...They are the races that squander. ‘Duration’ as such has no value: one might well prefer a shorter but more valuable existence for the species.²⁰⁹

The internal contradiction and absurdity that afflicted aristocratic life was that the morality of mores/ good/ bad systems that existed to breed the highest types that were paramount to the further advancement and existence of society. This would also lead to their demise, or their destruction, due to the very instinctual nature of the aristocratic warring life. Daniel Ahern

²⁰⁴ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 94 (Essay 2 section 23)

²⁰⁵ Homer, *The Iliad*, Translated by Martin Hammond ,(London: Penguin Group;1987), 19-21

²⁰⁶ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 205 (aphorism 260)

²⁰⁷ Nietzsche, *On The Genealogy of Morals*, 94 (Essay 2 section 23)

²⁰⁸ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 26

²⁰⁹ Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 462-463 (aphorism 864)

correctly points out in a similar light that “both the tragic poets and pre-Socratics ’testify to the Hellenic nature as a pessimism of strength’ that affirmed the intimacy of destruction and creation”.²¹⁰ Nietzsche’s Dionysian spirit affirms the contradiction as a fundamental part of life.²¹¹ The tragic life-affirming task is to have the strength to value the social imbrication of destruction and creation. It is not to seek their removal through valuing a stable form of life, but to deceive a community as to their desirability and honour. This is precisely why Nietzsche considered these tragic poets to be his highest types, because they encapsulated the fundamentally Dionysian insight and spirit of affirming the absurdities of a bodily warrior existence by means of the Apollonian illusions of epic poetry.²¹² Essentially, artists by nature need to affirm these contradictions; they are the only means by which they and their communities are able to live with suffering:

[Artists] always need at the very least protection, a prop, an established authority: artists never stand apart; standing alone is contrary to their deepest instincts.²¹³

Nietzsche’s claim here is that all artists require the protection of the higher castes on society, yet they do not seek to leave or stand apart from their society. This is why they support the authority of the ruling caste, who they understand to be of real value to the community.²¹⁴ While we have already seen that the poets required the protection of the warriors to survive, the warriors (and therefore the slaves) would certainly need the poets to beautify the horrific absurdities of existence:

The order of castes, order of rank, only formulates the supreme order of life itself; the separation of the three types is necessary for the preservation of society, for making possible higher and higher types.²¹⁵

Essentially, the claim being made is that artists always seek to advance the strength of their social body by valuing the virtues of a warrior caste, and *agonic* forms of excellence are permitted by the dense foundation of labour provided by the slaves. For Nietzsche, this is the central feature of aristocratic societies. They are unified bodily forms that constitute a greater, “active or healthy will to power”, a social organism which seeks to grow and extend

²¹⁰ Ahern, *Smile of Tragedy*, 24

²¹¹ Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 109

²¹² Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 13

²¹³ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 102 (Essay 3 section 5)

²¹⁴ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 208-209 (aphorism 261)

²¹⁵ Nietzsche, *The Anti-Christ*, 190-191 (aphorism 57)

its power.²¹⁶ Through their poet's deification of the inevitable suffering brought about by natural life, the aristocratic society could function as a healthy organism:

Bravery and composure in the face of a powerful enemy, great hardship, a problem that arouses aversion –it is this victorious condition which the tragic artist singles out, which he glorifies. In the face of tragedy the warlike in the soul celebrates its saturnalias; whoever is accustomed to suffering, whoever seeks out suffering, the heroic man extols his existence by means of tragedy—for him alone does the tragic artist pour this draft of sweetest cruelty.²¹⁷

This is the most important part of Nietzsche's reading of tragedy. The suffering of man was not condemned but glorified as a festival for the gods. Suffering itself was not seen from the perspective of the sufferer, but from the being who took joy in causing it.²¹⁸ "To be able to live the Greeks had, from direct necessity, to create these Gods".²¹⁹ Thus, the same could apply, and seem even more beautiful and life-enticing, when a noble mortal warrior such as Diomedes could wound an immortal god, Aphrodite.²²⁰ The poets beautified the inevitable sacrifice of their highest types as being part of a cosmological struggle between the gods, and as a specifically heroic act, a good death that is of value to overall advancement and strength of the community.²²¹ By valuing the good heroic death, the poets do not entice the warriors to die, but to live and die and with glory. It was not their glorious death that gained respect, but their desire to continue to battle, and to strive for the survival and advancement their communities amongst the gods whose virtues were of the highest value.²²² What must be understood through all of this is that the sacrifice of the highest type was inconsequential. It is in the nature of all human societies to fall under the swathes of becoming. Tragic poetry glorifies this through valuing the warrior instincts of the life-affirming warrior caste, whose hero in attempting to attain absolute heroic individuality trespasses against the "eternal contradictions" of becoming and suffers death.²²³

²¹⁶ Ibid 127 (aphorism 1)

²¹⁷ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 92-93

²¹⁸ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 68-69 (Essay 2 section 7)

²¹⁹ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 10

²²⁰ Homer, *The Iliad*, 76

²²¹ Ahern, *The Smile of Tragedy*, 22

²²² Ahern, *The Smile of Tragedy*, 23

²²³ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 38

Nietzsche's Naturalization of Value: Life Negating Morality

Christian Morality and the Creation of Soul

The second historical form of valuation in Nietzsche's philosophy is what he calls "moral valuation". It has, Nietzsche argues, been the dominant form of valuation hitherto:

The sign of a period that one may be called moral in the narrower sense. It involves the first attempt at self-knowledge. Instead of the consequences, the origin: indeed a reversal of perspective! Surely, a reversal achieved only after long struggles and vacillations. To be sure, a calamitous new superstition, an odd narrowness of interpretation, thus become dominant: the origin of an action was interpreted in the most definite sense as origin in an intention,- one came to agree that the value of an action lay in the value of the intention. The intention as the whole origin and prehistory of an action-almost to the present day this prejudice dominated moral praise, blame, judgment, and philosophy on earth. ²²⁴

Moral valuation is not a noble form of life-affirming valuation, which "always springs out of its own demands".²²⁵ The moral form of valuation emerges; Nietzsche argues, as a reversal of the noble life-affirming evaluation system, good versus bad.²²⁶ The moral evaluation system, good, versus evil is for Nietzsche nothing other than the Christian religion.²²⁷ With Nietzsche's historical turn to Christianity, he turns his physician's eye to Europe, the locus of his concern as a genealogist. Christianity, instead of focusing on the success or failure of a particular act in relation to the growth of the social organism, (the moral form of valuation) values a deed on the basis of the intention of the doer. It is the moral form of valuation which Nietzsche sees as the antithesis to his ontology of force and becoming:

Popular morality also separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum behind the strong man...But there is no such substratum; there is no being behind doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed.²²⁸

Moral valuation emerges from the oppressed-- the ascetic priests and their herd, the slaves of nobility.²²⁹ They are both 'physiologically sick' from a degenerate type of life which lacks a healthy desire for natural life. In Nietzsche's thinking, for this reason alone they can understand each other. However, the ascetic priest, for Nietzsche is a higher type than the slave,²³⁰ and takes up the position as the shepherd of the flock, or the protector of the herd.

²²⁴ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 44 (aphorism 32)

²²⁵ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 37 (Essay 1 section 10)

²²⁶ Ibid 34 (Essay 1 section 7)

²²⁷ Ibid 35 (Essay 1 section 9)

²²⁸ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 45 (Essay 1 section 13)

²²⁹ Ibid 38 (Essay 1 section 10)

²³⁰ Ibid 31 (Essay 1 section 6)

“The ascetic ideal springs from the protective instinct of a degenerating life which tries by all means to sustain itself and to fight for its existence”.²³¹ In Nietzsche’s historical symptomatology, the priest is a symptom of anarchy in the social body because he turns against the order of healthy functioning to protect its lower functions-- the sick. Unlike the artist, the priest does not stand with his society; he desires his own autonomy from the herd. In order to attain his own form of power (over suffering), the priest seeks freedom outside the confines of the social. For the early aristocratic cultures, the Christian priest’s instinct for freedom under the confines of custom seemed deeply immoral, even evil.²³² This is the essence of what Nietzsche conceives to be the, “herd organization of Christianity”, which as we can see disobeys the law of a healthy form of life. The ascetic is:

Both trusted and feared by the sick, so as to be their support, resistance, prop, compulsion, taskmaster, tyrant, and god. He has to defend his herd-against whom? Against the healthy, of course, and also against envy of the healthy; he must be the natural opponent and despiser of all rude, stormy, unbridled, hard, violent beast-of-prey health and might.²³³

Nietzsche considers the Christian moral evaluation to be an ascetic ideal. In his mature thought, the ascetic faith in the absolute value of truth, which is embodied in illusory ascetic ideals, constitutes the manner in which the priests’ life-negating or reactive will to power is exercised.²³⁴

That which constrains these men, however, this unconditional will to truth, is faith in the ascetic ideal itself, even if as an unconscious imperative-don’t be deceived about that -it is the faith in a metaphysical value, the absolute value of truth, sanctioned and guaranteed by this ideal alone (it stands or falls with this ideal).²³⁵

The ascetic’s faith in truth here, for Nietzsche, is that truthful knowledge about the nature of existence can remedy the suffering caused by the flux of natural life.²³⁶ In contradistinction to noble morality, slave morality views the intentional value of one’s actions, and therefore oneself, is established on the basis of the lack of harm, or usefulness to the mass or herd of human beings. Slave morality therefore tames the beast in the animal human. It is a degenerative form that power, which by making man ‘good’, creates a weak and tame

²³¹ Ibid 120 (Essay 3 section 13)

²³² Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, 29-30 (aphorism 42)

²³³ Ibid 126 (Essay 3 section 15)

²³⁴ Ibid 116 (Essay 3 section 11)

²³⁵ Ibid 154 (Essay 3 section 21)

²³⁶ Ibid 160 (Essay 2 section 27)

creature.²³⁷ In Nietzsche's reading of the Christian tradition, what becomes valued is the 'good' of one's soul as the negation of one's bodily desires, which Nietzsche sees as weakness, mediocrity and obedience, which Christianity depicts as one's very human essence (the soul).²³⁸

The subject (or, to use a more popular expression, the soul) has perhaps been believed in hitherto more firmly than anything else on earth because it makes the majority of mortals, the weak and oppressed of every kind, the sublime self-deception that interprets weakness as freedom, and their being thus-and thus a merit.²³⁹

The Negation of Natural Life

The common distinguishing factor of a sick will is to not only find it suffering contemptibly, but to find a truthful cause for that suffering in order to remove it.²⁴⁰ This is the revengeful manner in which the slaves, under the influence of the priests, come to view the nobility, and eventually their own bodily existence and life in this world. The masters, by virtue of their healthy desire to overpower resistances and elevate themselves become the very mark of a dangerous evil soul:

Here is the place for the origin of that famous opposition of 'good' and 'evil': into evil one's feelings project power and dangerousness. A certain terribleness, subtlety, and strength that does not permit contempt to develop. According to slave morality, those who are 'evil' thus inspire fear; according to master morality it is precisely those who are 'good' that inspire, and wish to inspire, fear.²⁴¹

The ascetic priestly castes and the other herd of slaves were too physically weak to overpower their evil' masters, so the Christian priest created slave morality.²⁴² Yet slave morality must not be considered a mere survival mechanism. Nietzsche considers the inversion of noble values to be the most dangerous and hostile form of "spiritual revenge".²⁴³ Nietzsche argues that in order to wage war against the nobility the Christian priest ingeniously inverted the noble value system "by creating an 'imaginary revenge',²⁴⁴ in the form of an eternal afterlife where one would either be eternally rewarded, or eternally punished in accordance with the prescriptive adherence to the values of Christian morality.

²³⁷ Ibid 66 (Essay 2 section 7)

²³⁸ Ibid 33 (Essay 1 section 6)

²³⁹ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 46 (Essay 1 section 13)

²⁴⁰ Ibid 127 (Essay 3 section 15)

²⁴¹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 207, (aphorism 260)

²⁴² Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 37 (Essay 1 section 10)

²⁴³ Ibid 34 (Essay 1 section 7)

²⁴⁴ Ibid 36 (Essay 1 section 10)

Natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds...compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge...slave morality says no to what is “outside”, what is ‘different’, what is ‘not itself’; and this no is its creative deed...slave morality always first needs a hostile external world’...For this was alone was appropriate to a priestly people...to hang on to this inversion with their teeth of the most abysmal hatred (the hatred of impotence, saying ‘the wretched alone are the good; the poor, impotent, lowly alone are the good; the suffering, deprived, sickly, ugly alone are pious, alone are blessed by God, blessedness is for them alone-and you-the powerful and noble, are on the contrary the evil, the cruel. The lustful, the insatiable, the godless to all eternity, the unblessed the, the accursed, the damned’).²⁴⁵

In Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, the creative act of valuing life is to negate it, which is a form of saying no to life and all things of this worldly value.²⁴⁶ Moreover, the negation of life as a form of evaluation occurs simultaneously with the fictional creation of an evil Other that represents all forms of socio-religious difference as a danger to the herd. Christian morality, in Nietzsche’s thought, is not only a condemnation of human nature, but of the very impulse of natural life. The noble mode of valuation exemplifies this healthy animality as it opposes another creature only to “affirm and grow more spontaneously”.²⁴⁷ This for Nietzsche is the phylogenetic nature of all biological life. Natural life develops through processes of diversification from no foundational origin.²⁴⁸ Slave morality as an anti-natural force distinguishes all natural impulses as inherently evil, and as something to tamed and inhibited from exercising its nature:

For an ascetic life is a self-contradiction... that of an insatiable instinct and power-will that wants to become master not over something in life but over life itself, over its most profound, powerful and basic conditions; here an attempt is made to employ force to block up the wells of force; here physiological well-being itself is viewed askance, and especially the outward expression of this wellbeing, beauty and joy.²⁴⁹

The Christian priest, under the guise of the will to truth created an imaginary realm-- the eternal realm created by God as the realm of true existence, while the natural world he created that we live in becomes a world of appearance, only the suffering shadow of the eternal realm of God. The Christian priest “thereby affirms another world than that of life, nature, and history; and insofar as he affirms this ‘other world,’ does this not mean that he has

²⁴⁵ Ibid 33-34(Essay 1 section 7)

²⁴⁶ Ibid 121-125 (Essay 3 section 14) ; Lawrence Hatab, *Why Would Master Morality Surrender its Power, in, Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals: A Critical Guide*, Edited by Simon May (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 201

²⁴⁷ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 37 (Essay 1 section 10)

²⁴⁸ Keith Ansell Pearson, *Virid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and the Transhuman Condition*, (Oxon, Routledge, 1997), 25, 93, 134

²⁴⁹ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 118 (Essay 3 Section 11)

to deny its antithesis, this world, our world?”²⁵⁰ As the protector of the herd, the priest is not only concerned with warring against the healthy forces of human nature, but making sure those natural forces don’t break out within the herd.²⁵¹ Nietzsche’s contention is that the Christian distinction of the soul as the object of theological value, by virtue of its free-willed intentions is the fictional creation of a degenerate weak form of life. This makes being weak, cowardly and mediocre valuable traits as a form of control. As Simon May aptly puts it, “suffering is a path to God, in whose realm, death, loss and transience are abolished...it is punishment for disobeying him. And of course, in traditional theodicy, suffering and evil are the price to be paid for the blessing of metaphysically ‘free will’”.²⁵² Like all religions, Nietzsche argues that Christian morality operates via a system of debt, a superstitious repayment to the original ancestors that founded the security of their future progeny.²⁵³ He wants his readers to be aware of the very new meaning Christianity gives to debt, and the manner in which this changes the nature of a European’s bad conscience through the creation of free will.²⁵⁴ Christianity changes the debt relation by the priest’s creation of Original Sin.²⁵⁵ In theological mythology, man inherited his intrinsic sin by means of his primal ancestor, in the form of Adam’s disobedience to the laws of God.²⁵⁶ Nietzsche argues that Christianity proposed that man’s very nature was the cause of his suffering, and therefore the very reason for evil.²⁵⁷

We think of the prima causa of man, the beginning of the human race, its primal ancestor who is from now on burdened with a curse (‘Adam’, ‘Original Sin’, ‘unfreedom of the will’, or of nature from whose womb mankind arose and into whom the principle of evil is projected from now on (‘the diabolizing of nature’), or of existence in general.²⁵⁸

In Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, because man’s very nature is cursed he is unable to redeem his own debt; the Christian priest ingeniously claimed that to save man from his debt, “God himself makes payment to himself”.²⁵⁹ His will may be free, but he is naturally prone to sin, that is; enacting his desires. By invoking God as his own creditor and debtor, Nietzsche is drawing upon the Christian portrayal of Jesus sacrificing himself for the sins of man to God,

²⁵⁰ Ibid 152 (Essay 3; Section 24)

²⁵¹ Ibid 126- 127 (Essay 3 section 15)

²⁵² Simon May, *Why Nietzsche is in the Morality Game*, in Nietzsche’s *On the Genealogy of Morals: A Critical Guide*, Edited by Simon May (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 83

²⁵³ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Ibid 91 (Essay 2 section 21)

²⁵⁴ Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness*, 134-135

²⁵⁵ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 92 (Essay 2 section 21)

²⁵⁶ Ibid

²⁵⁷ Ibid

²⁵⁸ Ibid

²⁵⁹ Ibid

and paying the human debt incurred through Original Sin. “Man from has become redeemable from man himself-the creditor scarifying his debtor out of love”.²⁶⁰ The ascetic priest that is the target of Nietzsche’s critique is not Jesus, but Paul²⁶¹ and his progeny: “There was only one Christian and he died on the cross”.²⁶² In Nietzsche’s reading, Paul’s genius was to “supernaturalize” Jesus as both the son of God and God himself, as opposed to his image as the creation of *all* higher men. For Nietzsche, Pauline Christianity depicted Jesus’ death as God atoning for man’s sin; human beings can be redeemed from suffering by obeying the moral prescriptions laid out by God.²⁶³ For Nietzsche, the omnipotent and omnipresent Christian God as the redemption of human is simply nothing more than antithesis and destruction of natural life,²⁶⁴ and the anthropomorphized embodiment of the virtuous qualities of the weak promulgated by Christian ascetics for the purposes of political control.

Disobedience of God, that is to say of the priest, of the ‘law’, now acquires the name ‘sin’, the means of becoming reconciled with God are, as is only to be expected, means by which subjection to the priest is more thoroughly guaranteed: the priest alone redeems...From a psychological point of view, ‘sins’ are indispensable in any society organized by priests, they are actually levellers of power.²⁶⁵

Bad conscience is given a new form by the will of the Christian priest: guilt. Under the influence of the priest, Nietzsche claims the Christian sinner “reinterprets these animal instincts themselves as a form of guilt before God (as hostility, rebellion insurrection against the ‘Lord’”,²⁶⁶ That is, as intentional evil. The direction of bad conscience and suffering now turn inward. In Nietzsche’s reading of Christianity, suffering is contemptible, as instrumental penance is for eternal bliss and revengeful, eternal punishment of another. From the point of view of the sufferer, the individual is the recipient of suffering.²⁶⁷ In order to exist, one therefore has to negate oneself at every moment because God is the omnipresent of moral judge judgement. One cannot enact these desires, as they are always perceived in terms of their guilt as a sin in the view of an omniscient God. Nietzsche’s argument is that the priest God uses is an organizing and torturous principle meant to tame man, by making him negate his natural instincts to the point of physiological sickness.

²⁶⁰ Ibid

²⁶¹ Nietzsche, *The Anti-Christ*, 192-194 (aphorism 58) ; Christa Davis Acampora, *Contesting Nietzsche*, (London: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 112

²⁶² Nietzsche, *The Anti-Christ*,

²⁶³ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Ibid 91 (Essay 2 section 21)

²⁶⁴ Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, 140 (aphorism 18)

²⁶⁵ Ibid 150 (aphorism 26)

²⁶⁶ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 92 (Essay 2 section 22)

²⁶⁷ Ibid

He had become a 'sinner', he was in a cage, one had imprisoned him behind nothing but sheer terrifying concepts...There he lay now, sick, miserable filled with ill will towards himself; full of hatred for the impulses towards life, full of suspicion of all that was strong and happy. In short, a 'Christian'....In physiological terms: in this struggle with the beast, making it sick can be the only way of making it weak. This the church understood: it corrupted the human being, it weakened him, but it claimed to have improved him.²⁶⁸

Nietzsche's Naturalization of Value: Nihilism

A Dead God

Nietzsche's third and last historical diagnosis of natural values is that of his own present; he is dealing with 'who we are'. His focus on nihilism is what undergirds his diagnostic and historical work in genealogy. His diagnosis of modern European modern culture is that it is a nihilistic period,²⁶⁹ which followed a great event: the death of God.²⁷⁰

The greatest recent event, that God is dead; that the belief in the Christian God has become unbelievable-is already starting to cover its shadow over Europe...What this event really means-and now, that this faith, leaned on it, grown on it,- for example, our entire European morality,²⁷¹ ...an opposition between the world until which at now we were are home with our venerations, and which made it possible for us to endure life and another world that we ourselves are, a relentless fundamental suspicion concerning ourselves that is steadily gaining worse and more control over us Europeans and that could easily confront coming generations with the terrible Either/Or:-Either abolish your venerations- or yourselves!! The latter would be nihilism; but would not the former also be nihilism? That is our question mark.²⁷²

Nihilism has been brought to purview due to the impending consequences of the death of God. Modern democratic societies are distinguished by a political movement called secularism in which religion is relegated to the private sphere. Legal and economic legislation are now administrated by public sphere no longer ordered by theological, but rational principles.²⁷³ Power is no longer in the hands of a theocratic monarchy, but supposedly follows the herd principles of justice and equal rights for all. The first paradox for Nietzsche is that Christian morality still governs modern society, but without the theological psychology of guilt that accompanies it. Before detailing the details of Nietzsche's

²⁶⁸ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 67

²⁶⁹ Nietzsche, *The Will to power*, 3 (aphorism 2)

²⁷⁰ Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 119-120 (aphorism 125)

²⁷¹ Ibid 199 (aphorism 343)

²⁷² Ibid

²⁷³ Jurgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, Translated by Frederick Lawrence, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers LTD, 1998), 1-3

psychological diagnosis of this seemingly social phenomenon, I want to frame Nietzsche's diagnosis. Nietzsche's claim about nihilism must not be misread; it is not an agent's choice but the inescapable historical condition of modern Europe:

What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what can no longer be described differently: the advent of nihilism.²⁷⁴

The reason Nietzsche can diagnose nihilism is because he has already gone through the experience of it.²⁷⁵ Like Kant, Nietzsche does not separate himself from social modes of existence in his present moment. He is diagnosing it as a psychological state that has afflicted him, but will soon spread throughout Europe. Nietzsche considers nihilism to be a transitional pathological stage to a period in the future²⁷⁶ when he will be long dead, and when a revaluation of values will take place²⁷⁷ which will constitute the creation of a great aristocratic life-affirming social organism. "Only from my time and after me will politics on a large scale exist on Earth".²⁷⁸ Nietzsche's concern is with providing a therapeutic to his diagnosis of nihilism, which will allow a revaluator to create life-affirming values that shape the future of great politics. In dealing with his present, it is not instructive to be caught up with, or immediately overcome by nihilism, since Nietzsche is foretelling a two-hundred year period and he claims the problems of nihilism that face the present will be encountered by future generations. "To sacrifice God for nothingness-this paradoxical mystery of the ultimate cruelty has been reserved for the rising generation".²⁷⁹ Thus, to reiterate, *what* is important to Nietzsche's response to the Kantian question of 'who we are', is clarifying the consequences of nihilism diagnostically for future scholars who will be devastated by it. Nietzsche is diagnostically addressing these problems to future free spirits who are the very antithesis of 'modern men'. That is; men of democratic herd ideals, who will bring about the revaluation.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁴ Nietzsche, *The Will to power*, 3 (aphorism 2)

²⁷⁵ Ibid (aphorism 3)

²⁷⁶ Ibid 14 (aphorism 13)

²⁷⁷ Ibid 3-4 (aphorism 4)

²⁷⁸ Nietzsche, *Ecce Hommo*, 132

²⁷⁹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 67,(aphorism 55)

²⁸⁰ Ibid 53-56 (aphorism 44)

Forms of Nihilism

The first sense given to nihilism is that since the eternal world in which the valued of this world are gone, the world has become valueless.²⁸¹ The second sense of nihilism that is important is inextricable from the first; the nihilist condition of the body.²⁸² What the ascetic priest does that is of value, and the reason Nietzsche affords Christianity acclaim, is that he still gave human beings a reason to live. Christianity gave the weak a reason and meaning for living but its moral venerations were negations of natural drives.²⁸³ The negation of the instincts caused such torture that man could no longer bear it. Modern man can no longer bear the *pain* of the Christian God as an omnipresent witness, and this is why he kills him:

He always saw me: I wanted revenge on such a witness – or no longer live myself. The god who saw everything, even human beings: this god had to die! Human beings cannot bear that such a witness lives.²⁸⁴

Negating the bodily instincts disaggregated the natural unity of a healthy human body,²⁸⁵ which made the human body too psychologically and physiologically weak to affirm even such a degenerate form of existence. “So-called Holiness-holiness is itself merely a symptom syndrome of the impoverished, enervated, incurably corrupted body”.²⁸⁶ The European body became so sickened through the self-laceration of guilt, that it lost its healthy unity that allowed it to create beautiful illusions. In this ugliness, Nietzsche is referring to a degenerate form of life that can no longer create beautiful illusions that mythically centre life.²⁸⁷

The second sense of nihilism, the anarchic disordering of the body as a state of psychological pathology, engenders a sense of despair in modern European man that will allow him to see the world as meaningless and valueless. The third sense of nihilism that is important to Nietzsche’s diagnosis is that the anarchic disaggregation of the body is replicated in the very ordering of the social body-- the Christian instinct for the individual’s eternal peace is transposed into the very ordering of statist society.²⁸⁸ The third sense of nihilism is that there

²⁸¹ Woodward, *Understanding Nietzscheanism* 6; Bernard Reginster, *The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche On Overcoming Nihilism*, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), 23; Nietzsche, *The Will to power*, 2 (Preface), 10-11

²⁸² Wolfgang Muller-Lauter, *Nihilism as Will to Nothingness*, in , *Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals*, Edited by Christa Davis Acampora, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2006), location 5249

²⁸³ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 118 (Essay 3 section 11)

²⁸⁴ Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 216

²⁸⁵ Wolfgang Muller-Lauter, *Nihilism as Will to Nothingness*, location 5249

²⁸⁶ Nietzsche, *Anti-Christ*, 180 (aphorism 51)

²⁸⁷ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 90

²⁸⁸ Nietzsche, *Zarathustra*, 76

is no order or central unity to the cultural organism,²⁸⁹ there is no meaningful horizon that holds a people together. Yet it is the very Christian community whose will to truth that has brought about this victory and the disintegration of the body that has led to this current predicament. Once this class perspectival interprets that the mythological illusion is a reason for suffering, religious mythology in accordance with its ugly condition, and its root, man's natural religious or artistic impulse,²⁹⁰ the very key to the justification of existence becomes a source of negation and condemnation. This is tantamount, in Nietzsche's thinking to the very nihilistic condemnation and revenge of all present and future existence:

There is nothing more terrible than a barbaric slave class, who have learned to regard their existence as an injustice, and now prepare to take vengeance, not only for themselves but for all future generations. In the face of such threatening storms, who dares to appeal with confident spirit to our pale and exhausted religions, which even in their foundations have degenerated into scholastic religions?-so that myth, the necessary prerequisite of every religion, is already paralyzed everywhere, and even in this domain the optimistic spirit-which we have designated as the annihilating germ of society-has attained the mastery.²⁹¹

This is why the death of God, for Nietzsche, needs to be understood. The scholarly analysis of religion does not justify myth; it historicizes it and robs the believer of the horizon which hitherto had allowed them to make sense of the entirety of existence. The death of God signifies the collapse of the whole Western Onto-theological system of meaning.²⁹² This means that the very mythological meaning that Europe has given to all existence for two millennia is without foundation.²⁹³ The Christian myth, the otherworldly set of illusions that has held the Christian herd and social organism to their existence and life, their moral direction forward, acting as a bridge to another existence, is deracinated by means of the rational historical scientific interpretations of the will to truth. Keith Ansell-Pearson and Christa Acampora argue, "In this respect, atheism is something of a modern disaster for Nietzsche simply because humankind is left empty, unable to satisfy its artistic instinct and devotes all its energies to an entirely secular culture with no aspiration."²⁹⁴ According to Nietzsche, with the creation of slave morality, and its imaginary revenge and guilt, the priests have conquered the nobility; the former slaves are now the masters:

²⁸⁹ Woodward, *Understanding Nietzscheanism*, 9-14

²⁹⁰ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 6

²⁹¹ *Ibid* 76

²⁹² David Allison, *Reading the New Nietzsche*, (Delhi: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2007), 91-92

²⁹³ *Ibid* 92

²⁹⁴ Keith Ansell-Pearson and Christa Acampora, *Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil: A readers Guide*, (London, Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), 86

The slave revolt in morality: that revolt which has a history of two thousand years behind it and which we no longer see because it has been victorious,²⁹⁵ ...The over-all degeneration of man down to what today appears to the socialist dolts and flatheads as their 'man of the future' as their ideal-this degeneration and diminution of man into the perfect herd animal (Of, as they say, to the man of the 'free society'), this animalization of man into the dwarf animal of equal rights and claims, is possible there is no doubt of it.²⁹⁶

Nietzsche argues that modern man now attempts to create a heaven on earth by means of herd political institutions which assure all forces and impulses are directed in its directionless favour. After lacerating his body with guilt, modern man has become squeamish at the very sight of suffering, yet suffering is only the means by which man has been able to create values. The very social ground of modern man is a nihilistic danger to the psychological health of the future creator:

You want, if possible-and there is no more insane if possible -to abolish suffering. And we? It really seems that we would rather have it higher and worse than ever. Well-being as you understand it-that is no goal, that seems to us an end, a state that soon makes man ridiculous and contemptible that makes his destruction desirable. The discipline of suffering, of great suffering-do you not know that only this discipline has created all enhancements of man so far?²⁹⁷

For Nietzsche, modern morality and its political branches still continue to create the perfect good human being. When the tragic nihilism immanent to the history of this endeavour makes sense to human beings, the meaninglessness of who they are will set in, along with anarchy. The son of the God's killer is the last man who will wade into passive nihilism, living his days out meaninglessly in an endless series of hedonistic and barbaric exploits.²⁹⁸ When man is faced with this terror, Nietzsche is aware that nihilism has become suicidal. The revaluation of values, the creation of new values, as Nietzsche sees it, would overturn the suicidal condition that has confronted the last man. The key to Nietzsche's revaluation of nihilism is that, "one only demystifies to mystify better".²⁹⁹ In all situations of human cultural disaster, Nietzsche considers the weak able to attain social security but unable to further the advance in human society in a manner that evil, creative life-affirming types have.³⁰⁰ Yet the conditions of modern society do not permit the formation of such an evil artist type, who for

²⁹⁵ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 34 (Essay 1 section 7)

²⁹⁶ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 118 (aphorism 203)

²⁹⁷ Ibid 153-154 (aphorism 225)

²⁹⁸ Gilles Deleuze, *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life*, Translated by Ann Boyman (New York, Urzone Inc, 2001), 69-73

²⁹⁹ Pierre Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, Translated by Daniel Smith (London, The Athlone Press, 1997), 132

³⁰⁰ Nietzsche, *Gay science*, 32 (aphorism 4)

Nietzsche is the next tragic poet.³⁰¹ The good are simply bent on continuing to make man mediocre, weak and normal. They are rational and continue to calculate their advantage and security.³⁰² The noble evil life-affirming types, in an egalitarian society have no support or prop from which to sacrifice and suffer in order to create. Their difference, their passion and innocence, will be seen by the mediocre as mad and evil. Thus noble spirits are most likely to fall victim to their impulses, and in their task.³⁰³ Nietzsche's priestly mouthpiece, Zarathustra, the priest of the future revaluator, passes this judgement:

Zarathustra calls 'the good', now 'the last men', and anon 'the beginning of the end'; and above all he considers them the most detrimental kind of men, because they secure their existence at the cost of the Truth and the Cost of the future. The good-they cannot create; they are ever the beginning of the end. They crucify him who writeth new values on new tables; they sacrifice unto themselves the future; they crucify the whole future of humanity.³⁰⁴

Section 2: Nietzsche's Genealogical Concerns

Clarification

It is essential to have covered the history of Nietzsche's philosophy of value before dealing with his concerns in the genealogy. This is the only way to appreciate how he uses genealogy as a historical method to diagnose in the present.³⁰⁵ In his time, Nietzsche had relatively few readers, and even fewer supporters. After a promising early career Nietzsche's philosophical thought had proved to be uninfluential and unpopular.³⁰⁶ One of the reasons Nietzsche himself gave for this was that he had not been understood, and thus he sought to use the genealogy as a means of clarification.³⁰⁷ He disclosed this information to his close friend Peter Gast, in a letter written shortly after the text's completion:

I have at once vehemently exploited these better days and written a small polemical pamphlet which, I think, sharply focuses the problem of my last book; everybody has complained that I am 'not understood,' and the approximately one hundred copies which have been sold have made it quite

³⁰¹ *Ecce Hommo*, 137

³⁰² Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 30-31 (aphorism 3)

³⁰³ *Ibid*

³⁰⁴ Nietzsche, *Ecce Hommo*, 136

³⁰⁵ Nandita Biswas Mellamphy, *Nietzsche's Experimental Ontology: Political Physiology in the Age of Nihilism*, in, *'Nietzsche's Therapeutic Teaching For Individuals and Culture'* Edited by Horst Hutter and Eli Friedland, (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 213-214

³⁰⁶ Anthony K Jensen, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of History*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 75-80

³⁰⁷ Keith Ansell Pearson, *Chapter Nine: On the Genealogy of Morality*, in *Introductions to Nietzsche*, edited by Robert Pippin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012),

obvious to me that I am not understood... -- and this in my forty-third year, after I have published fifteen books!³⁰⁸

Nietzsche's writing Style

While Nietzsche has written an entire philosophy that inverts a two-thousand year tradition of Platonism,³⁰⁹ reinstating the illusory quality of art which redeems existence and appearance over the relation between reason, knowledge and virtue,³¹⁰ he still considers himself a philosopher.³¹¹ Nietzsche considers the history of Western philosophy, following Plato to be an ascetic ideal.³¹² Philosophy since Plato, under the guise of the will to truth negated both the impulses of the body and becoming (life),³¹³ through systematizing or controlling it, which is symptomatic of a particular type of life. For Nietzsche, becoming is irreducible to any such totality.³¹⁴ The major reason Nietzsche is claiming "he is not understood" is due to his own writing style, which is also his formidable philosophical technique. Nietzsche's style of writing from *Human all too Human* (1878) to *Beyond Good and Evil* resists the philosopher's will to truth, in order to systematize his philosophy into a coherent whole. Nietzsche wrote in aphorisms, which is a style of producing a multiplicity of short segments that would at times follow, and other times not, a propositional sequence. His aphorisms followed no singular law of reasoning, but set insights that were contradictory.³¹⁵ With this style of writing Nietzsche was trying to communicate the suffering he experienced via the perspectival apprehensive core of human existence(s), and the meaningless vicissitudes of the return. "To communicate a state of inner tension of pathos by means of signs, including the tempo of these signs-that is the meaning of style".³¹⁶ By trying to communicate this experience, he was attempting to tear apart philosophers of ascetic ideals by constantly eluding to their desire to understand, negate and control 'sensuous existence'. Deleuze refers to this technique as decoding; a means by which systems of mythical meaning located in the human subject are deracinated from their foundations.³¹⁷ However, the stylistic attempt to elude reductive and dogmatic systematization that would reduce his philosophy to a systemic

³⁰⁸ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Selected letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*, (The University of Chicago: Hackett Publishing, 1996), 269,

³⁰⁹ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 111

³¹⁰ Ibid 57-58

³¹¹ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 16 (Preface section 2)

³¹² Ibid 108 (Essay 3 section 8)

³¹³ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 1-3 (Preface)

³¹⁴ Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 546 (aphorism 1062)

³¹⁵ Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher*, 85, 216

³¹⁶ Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 63

³¹⁷ Gilles Deleuze, *Nomadic Thought*, in, *Deserts Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974*, Translated by Michael Taormina (Los Angeles: Semiotexte; 2004), 252-253

set of propositions generated various problems with regard to thinkers understanding Nietzsche's arguments.

When one visits his/her physician in modern times, it is generally presupposed that the physician will diagnose one's sickness and communicate this. As a physician who desired the reevaluation, or a healthier time with new concepts and new values,³¹⁸ Nietzsche was therefore forced to communicate his diagnosis of modernity in a manner that could be understood. Nietzsche was also aware that as a philosopher, he would be forced to consecrate his diagnosis in a conceptual framework dictated by the will to truth. While he may have inverted Platonism, as a physician he still required "that we godless metaphysicians, still take our fire, too, from the thousand year faith, the Christian faith that was also Plato's faith, that God is divine, that truth is divine".³¹⁹ Nietzsche wrote *On the Genealogy of Morals* in traditional academic style to clarify the problems his subversive writing style created, and notwithstanding his epistemological perspectivism, to communicate his diagnosis to his free spirits after they had misunderstood his claims in *Beyond Good and Evil*. In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche clarifies his philosophy in terms of its two key facets, through distinguishing genealogy as his historical methodology and form of philosophical inquiry as a cultural physician. He 'uses':

1. Genealogy as a historical method;
2. Genealogy as an historical method that diagnoses the present.

Clarification of the History of the Will: Nietzsche's Methodology

Nietzsche's philosophical method has always been that of a genealogist.³²⁰ Nietzsche did not want genealogy as a historical method to be mistaken, so he explicitly differentiated it from Darwin's theory of evolution as a naturalized history:³²¹

The entire history of a thing, an organ, a custom can in this way be a continuous sign-chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations whose causes do not even have to be related to one another, but on the contrary, in some cases succeed and alternate with another in a purely chance fashion. The evolution of

³¹⁸ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 67

³¹⁹ Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 201 (aphorism 344)

³²⁰ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 3

³²¹ Dirk Johnson, *Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 134

a thing, a custom, an organ is by no means a progresses to a goal, even less a logical progresses by the shortest route and with the smallest expenditure of force.³²²

Nietzsche's genealogical historiography does not trace the formation of the present through a linear series of causally related moments. The historical formation of any present thing for Nietzsche follows no real law, but is governed by the chaotic formative force of the will to power.³²³ For Nietzsche, the position of modern Darwinists, that man offered a progress of his ancestors, was not a universal truth, but a modern perspectival disposition.³²⁴ Nietzsche argues that modern progressive philosophical models of history, like those found in Kant and Hegel, follow a Christian Platonic line of thinking.³²⁵ He opposes his genealogical form of historiography to modern teleological models of historiographical inquiry. For Nietzsche, modern historians follow this philosophical tendency, a typical example of which is the English psychologists denigrated in the first chapter of *On the Genealogy of Morals* for practicing a form of historiography that is "unhistorical".³²⁶ For Nietzsche these English psychologists abstract the meaning and the value of the concept, of 'good'.³²⁷ They treat their particular moral interpretation as an objective fact that transcends the various cultural interpretations that have amalgamated through different historical processes.³²⁸ Nietzsche claims that his historical method possesses an "historical spirit" that the historiography of his time does not.³²⁹ In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche opposes genealogy as his historical method to mechanical models that seek causal principles for historical change and development:

I emphasize this major point of the historical method all the more because it is in fundamental opposition to the now prevalent instinct and taste which would rather be reconciled even to the absolute fortuitousness, even the mechanistic senselessness of all events to the theory that in all events a will to power is operating... Thus, the essence of life, the will to power, is ignored; one overlooks the essential priority of the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive form giving forces that give new interpretations and directions.³³⁰

³²² Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 77-78 (Essay 2, section 12)

³²³ Anthony K Jensen, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of History*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 174

³²⁴ Nietzsche, *The Anti-Christ*, 128 (aphorism 4)

³²⁵ Scruton, *A History of Modern Philosophy*, 196

³²⁶ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 25 (Essay 1 section 2)

³²⁷ Ibid

³²⁸ Ibid

³²⁹ Ibid

³³⁰ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 78- 79(Essay 2 section 13)

Nietzsche's genealogical method in *On the Genealogy of Morals* is not a linear history that represents a past reality.³³¹ Nietzsche is not a conventional historian.³³² Rather, Nietzsche's genealogy is an anti-realist mode of historiography because he artfully interprets and values how different metaphorical historical interpretations of the real are generated by the relations that constitute the will to power.³³³ Instead of attempting to disclose a truthful reality, Nietzsche's reticence towards the will to truth allows him to deploy genealogy as a form of art;³³⁴ but one could still perhaps claim that genealogical history certainly has its own form of methodological rigour.³³⁵ Genealogy therefore allows Nietzsche to track how different systems of meaning and valuations are generated by the active or reactive form of the will to power, while still maintaining a critical distance from those creations as being real.³³⁶ Nietzsche therefore disturbs the reader's perception of what is real, which makes human beings realize that their values are not transcendent but chance outcomes of a set of processes that may have been otherwise.³³⁷ It foreshadows post-structural historiography as a diachronic tracing,³³⁸ of 'moral etymology', or metaphors that are constitutive of a 'historic-diagnostic type', reducible to either a life-affirming or life-negating form of the will to power.³³⁹ Nietzsche's genealogical tracking of the will to power is therefore a perspectival history.³⁴⁰ He traces the perspectives from which certain valuations are made. In the noble system of good versus bad, valuing is oriented by an active perspectival affirmation of the self (good), where in the good versus evil system, the value positing eye is inverted as a reaction. The Other is valued first negatively (evil), from which the value of the self is derived (good).

Genealogy is a history of power relations. To be more precise, it is a history of the will to power. Therefore, it is also a history of the body, and (vice-versa) whenever Nietzsche has been diagnosing the values of a particular bodily type, this mode of historiography must still be considered a genealogy of the will to power; "Our drives", though multifaceted in their particular aims to interpret the past in certain ways, "are reducible to the will to power".³⁴¹ In

³³¹ Anthony K Jensen, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of History*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 157-160

³³² Ibid 118

³³³ Ibid 142-143

³³⁴ Ibid 198-199

³³⁵ Ibid

³³⁶ Ibid 176

³³⁷ Foucault, *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, 81

³³⁸ Woodward, *Understanding Nietzscheanism*, 71-73

³³⁹ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 51-52

³⁴⁰ Jensen, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of History*, 176

³⁴¹ Ibid 175

tracking the historical relations immanent to form-producing forces of the will to power, Nietzsche is also communicating to his reader how different metaphorical evaluations of reality are a product of a particular historical configuration of the drives. As a historical study, genealogy uncovers how the original status of these moral concepts as metaphors has been forgotten. Their constitution as concepts reflects the dominance of a degenerate type distinguished by an ascetic, life-denying form of power that has hardened these sensuous concepts by means of the will to truth. Genealogy, as a mode of tracing the relations between forces is also a history of the degeneration of the body, as encapsulated in language:

Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task is to show a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history's destruction of the body.³⁴²

Clarification of the History of the Willing Body

In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche introduces two new concepts, namely; resentment and bad conscience. These two concepts were deployed to clarify Nietzsche's historical psychology of the body. While the third essay is Nietzsche's deep historical interrogation into the meaning (s) of ascetic ideals,³⁴³ an interpretation of the first aphorism of the third essay illustrates that in the other two essays Nietzsche propounds a historically situated analysis of the formation of bad conscience (essay 2), and resentment (essay 1) as elements of the human bodily condition.

Bad Conscience

I have explained what Nietzsche means by the phrase 'bad conscience'. His creation of the concept allows him to clarify the difference between human suffering and animal existence, which he had meditated on in *Untimely Meditations*. For Nietzsche, 'bad conscience' is a historical condition, and in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche traces the two different forms that bad conscience has taken; bad conscience as debt and bad conscience as guilt. In this sense, the creation of the concept of bad conscience as a specifically historically mediated condition that discloses a particular type of human suffering allowed Nietzsche to

³⁴² Michel Foucault, *Nietzsche, Genealogy History*, 148

³⁴³ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 97

clarify how human suffering is thoroughly bodily and historical, and how present experience is brought about via the past.³⁴⁴

In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche uncovers how the first and second forms of bad conscience have led to the constitution of the modern man.³⁴⁵ What modern men call their ‘moral conscience’ Nietzsche claims is not free will or even the voice of God, but rather a ‘social straightjacket’ that has made man calculable.³⁴⁶ What we call conscience is therefore a product of memory (mnemotechnics) and guilt, where the negation of one’s drives or desires is structured by a mnemonic device that has learnt to react in accordance with punishment or reward (e.g., I promise I will not).³⁴⁷ Modern man must never be understood as a higher type of being, but rather a degenerate form that Nietzsche seeks to overcome.³⁴⁸ Thus, Nietzsche clarifies the relation between his historical philosophy and work as a cultural physician by explaining how the constitution of the present occurred through the relations of the will to power in the past. The will to power itself has a history, and for Nietzsche, “genealogy is the history of how the relations of the power of the past give birth to the actuality of the will in the present”³⁴⁹. Thus, when Nietzsche traces the will, he traces it as a process that determines and is reciprocally determined by the conflictual relations between forces,³⁵⁰ not any stable unified entity. A central issue in Nietzsche’s scholarship is how the nobles eventually fell to the slaves; that is, how the gregarious man was created. Commentators have often ignored Nietzsche’s methodological principle of the will in their analysis of the formation of the ‘gregarious sick’ modern body.³⁵¹ For Nietzsche, the power relations between bodies are not distinguished by the effects of mechanical principles, but rather the relation between will and will. This is why Nietzsche’s *On the Genealogy of Morals* needs to be read alongside his other texts, and vice versa:

Will, of course, can affect only ‘will’-and not ‘matter’ (not ‘nerves’ for example). In short, one has to risk the hypothesis whether will does not affect will wherever ,effects are recognized-and whether all

³⁴⁴ Tracy Strong, *Genealogy, The Will to Power, and the Problem of the Past, in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals: Critical Essays*, Edited by Christa Davis Acampora,(Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2006) , location 2425

³⁴⁵ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, (Essay 2 section 2) , 58

³⁴⁶ Nietzsche, *Ecce Hommo*, 117

³⁴⁷ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 62 (Essay 2 section 3)

³⁴⁸ Christa Davis Acampora, ‘On Sovereignty and Overhumanity’, in ‘*Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals: Critical Essays*’ (eds) Christa Davis Acampora,(Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2006) , location 3859

³⁴⁹ Strong, ‘Genealogy, The Will to Power, location 2425

³⁵⁰ Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 332-333 (aphorism 619)

³⁵¹ Lawrence Hatab, *Why Would Master Morality Surrender its Power, in, Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals: A Critical Guide*, Edited by Simon May (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011),

mechanical occurrences are not, insofar as a force is active in them, will force, effects of will³⁵²...in real life it is only a matter of strong and weak wills.³⁵³

In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche explains that the ascetic priest left the confines of society so to repress his natural drives for “his own kind of happiness”. For Nietzsche, the priest therefore seemed to have conquered suffering, and his anti-nature was seen by the nobility characteristics as a strong will. “They sensed the superior force that sought to test itself in such a conquest, the strength of the will in which they recognized and honoured their own strength and delight in dominion.”³⁵⁴ All men came to bow to the priest out of fear as he represented that beyond the natural world, and it was in these priestly societies that the priests took to making men sick by making them feel guilty about their nature. In Nietzsche, there is no free will. The will to power is always exercised as a command; “you are guilty!”, but he who commands must also obey; “I am also guilty”. This is central to every effect of the will that Nietzsche will diagnose as symptomatic of either health or sickness. In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche clarifies his historical method by explaining that the psychological process of European man becomes sick in terms of the metaphysics of the willing body. The second form of bad conscience afflicts the health of the willing body, by making it feel guilty about its nature. This process of course cannot be dissociated from the morality of mores, which over thousands of years, gave man a memory.³⁵⁵ This present condition of the will is what Nietzsche calls the will to nothingness. Nietzsche is therefore tracing the “memory of the will”.³⁵⁶ The history of the will is also the history of the body, a principle of Nietzsche’s genealogical historiography of the body as psychological ground of existence.³⁵⁷

Ressentiment

What Nietzsche wants to communicate to his readers is that as a psychological and physiological state, “it [ressentiment] is in one particular interpretation, the Christian moral one, that nihilism is rooted [in]”.³⁵⁸ In the first essay of, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche’s task was to describe the psychology of Christianity and its priest,³⁵⁹ and how they

³⁵² Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 65 (aphorism 51)

³⁵³ Ibid 29 (aphorism 21)

³⁵⁴ Ibid 65 (aphorism 51)

³⁵⁵ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 64 (Essay 2 section 5)

³⁵⁶ Bernard Reginster, *The Genealogy of Guilt, in, Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals: A Critical Guide*, Edited by Simon May (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 58

³⁵⁷ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 93 (Essay 3 section 23)

³⁵⁸ Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 7 (aphorism 1)

³⁵⁹ Nietzsche, *Ecce Hommo*, 117-118

emerged out the spirit of resentment.³⁶⁰ The inversion of the values of good versus bad, to good versus evil, occurs when resentment becomes creative.³⁶¹ In the third essay, Nietzsche explains how the Christian priest “diverts the course of resentment” from being exercised within the social relations of the herd, to an internal relationship that the individual takes up towards himself. The inward turn of resentment is the root of Christian moral interpretation, Original Sin and its relation the good and evil soul. Resentment is “a desire to deaden pain with the affects”.³⁶² Most Nietzschean scholarship continues to deal with resentment as a spirit of revenge, but do not go far enough to explain the physiological nature of resentment.³⁶³ Nietzsche conceives of it as the dominant body drive that motivates the Christian moral interpretation and is the reason for its demise, in the form of the death of God. The problem of understanding modernity as a fundamentally Christian interpretation of the world is due to ignorance and the dominant drive of them both-- resentment.

On the psychological problem of Christianity –The driving force is: resentment, the popular uprising, the revolt of the underprivileged...Herein [lays] psychological difficulty that has hampered the understanding of Christianity: the drive that created it forces one to fight against it as a matter of principle. Only as a peace and innocence party has this insurrectionary movement any possibility of success, it must conquer through an extreme mildness, softness; it grasps this by instinct- Masterstroke: to deny and condemn the drive whose expression one is, continually to display by word and deed , the antithesis of this drive.³⁶⁴

Resentment is the drive which, in attempting to deaden pain or suffering, has led to equalization of man and the death of God. The real enemy of the genealogy is the modern constitution of resentment in the form of modern science and egalitarian politics. The latter are bodily evaluations, driven by a dominant drive resentment that changes the tacit perception of one’s sin, un-grounding it, “so that we [are] straying ever further from the sun”.³⁶⁵ The drive resentment is central to Nietzsche’s above-mentioned diagnosis of nihilism; it is the drive resentment that has become dominant at the expense of the health of the body and its disaggregation into nothingness without direction, a “homeless world

³⁶⁰ Ibid

³⁶¹ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, 36 (Essay 1 section 10)

³⁶² Ibid 127 (Essay 3 section 15)

³⁶³ R. Jay Wallace Resentment, *Value, and Self-Vindication: Making Sense of Nietzsche’s Slave Revolt*. in, *Nietzsche and Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); P.J.E Kail, *Genealogy and the Genealogy*, in *Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality, Cambridge Critical Guides*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011), 229 ; Peter Poellner, *Resentment and Morality*, in, *Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality, Cambridge Critical Guides*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011),

³⁶⁴ Nietzsche, *The Will to power*, 109 (aphorism 179)

³⁶⁵ Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* , 119-120 (aphorism 125)

without meaning”.³⁶⁶ As a drive it certainly is a spirit of revenge, but it must be conceived as a spirit of revenge of the weak and the degenerate against life itself. "And when the Christian condemns, calumniates, and befouls the ‘world’, he does so from the same instinct from which the socialist worker befouls society”.³⁶⁷ It is only through overcoming resentment that the moral sickness of nihilism can be overcome for future generations. It is the only means by which Nietzsche was himself able to see through nihilism. A key part of Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the body is the understanding and overcoming of resentment, something he traces through the history of the body in *On the Genealogy of Morals*:

Freedom from resentment and the understanding of the nature of resentment, who knows very much after all I am indebted to my long illness for these two things.³⁶⁸

Clarification of the Present

A Creative History of the Present

With regard to Nietzsche clarifying his position towards the Kantian question of who we are, he addresses his contemporary philosophers, “we knowers”³⁶⁹ in an intellectual spirit that he formulated earlier in his career. For Nietzsche, historical studies are only of value if they advance life.³⁷⁰ In the same essay, he argues “the unhistorical and the historical are necessary in equal measure for the health of an individual, of a people and of a culture”.³⁷¹ Nietzsche, while being critical of the will to truth is not opposed to intellectualism, and as a form of science, but not the nihilistic consequences of positivist science.³⁷² The German term Nietzsche used to describe these forms of scientific positivism, the methodological, natural and social sciences, as well as theology and economics is *Wissenschaft*.³⁷³ This form of science which values critique above all is something that we have seen Nietzsche is already opposed to.³⁷⁴ Nietzsche’s “life affirming science” is a philosophy of the future,³⁷⁵ which he refers to as a “*frohliche Wissenschaft*” or ‘gay science’, which is embodied in an historical

³⁶⁶ Muller-Lauter, *Nihilism as Will to Nothingness*, loc 5249

³⁶⁷ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 98

³⁶⁸ Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 20

³⁶⁹ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 15 (Preface section 1)

³⁷⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*, in, *The Untimely Meditations*, Translated by R.J Hollingdale, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) ,66

³⁷¹ Ibid 63

³⁷² Babette Babich. “Nietzsche’s Philology and Nietzsche’s Science: On The ‘Problem of Science’ and ‘Fröhliche Wissenschaft.’. In Pascale Hummel (ed.), *Metaphilology: Histories and Languages of Philology* (. Paris: *Philologicum*, 2009), 164

³⁷³ Ibid 164-165

³⁷⁴ Ibid 164

³⁷⁵ Ibid 176

diagnostic approach to his genealogy.³⁷⁶ In opposition to traditional science, the gay scientist, while still endorsing a strict historical method in his genealogy, does not endorse truth, but rather looks at truths as aesthetic forms of illusion with regard to the value, affirming or negating; they have for life--³⁷⁷ that is, the revaluation. In tracking the will to power to the present, Nietzsche's genealogical method is artistic and reconstructive, redeploying three historico-aesthetic techniques he described in an earlier essay for future philological studies, "Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life".³⁷⁸

The techniques he uses in his genealogy are now redeployed in terms of his valuation of the past values of various forms of the will to power. As a "monumentalistic historian",³⁷⁹ he looks at the acts and deeds of great figures in the past with regard to the value they have in the present. The best example of this in Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals*, is his affirmation of Homer's aesthetics with regard to the noble uses of the gods for the future, and the normative reinstatement of the good versus bad value system as essential to the revaluation of all values.³⁸⁰ The second form of history that Nietzsche practices in his genealogy is "*antiquarian history*", which surveys the value certain customs and forms of morality may have for the present and future.³⁸¹ This is a more conservative use of historical writing. Despite his vicious critique of the Christian priest, he wants the philosopher artist of the future to have the highest intellectual standards. Nietzsche considers these intellectual standards to be the creation of the priests. "Human history would be altogether a too stupid thing without the spirit that the impotent have introduced into it".³⁸² Nietzsche spends part of the third essay as well as part of the first and second explaining how certain priestly practices have led to the highest intellectual standards and the creation of art.³⁸³ Nietzsche expresses that the future artist must nurse his procreative impulse, or his artistic instinct, by being careful with regard to sexual practices. Although Nietzsche is no ascetic, he prescribes as truly valuable "a healthy sensuality".³⁸⁴

Nietzsche's claim that the healthy existence of a people rests on the unhistorical is incredibly important to understanding his genealogical historiography. The health of a period thus also

³⁷⁶ Ibid

³⁷⁷ Ibid

³⁷⁸ Christa Davis Acampora, *Contesting Nietzsche*, see especially pages 38-41

³⁷⁹ Nietzsche, *On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*, , 68

³⁸⁰ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 55 (Essay 1 section 17)

³⁸¹ Nietzsche, *On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*, , 70-71

³⁸² Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 33 (Essay 1 section 7)

³⁸³ Ibid 110 (Essay 3 section 8)

³⁸⁴ Ibid 100 (Essay 3 section 3)

rests on a third, critical use of history, which negates the influence of the other two forms of history from being too influential. In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche uses his critical historical method to negate the value that ascetic ideals, the denial of nature and the will to truth have, for the present and future, revaluation. Nietzsche thus uses genealogy as an artistically-driven historical diagnosis of the present for the revaluation of values.³⁸⁵

Nietzsche's Diagnosis: Symptoms of the Will to Nothingness, Herd Politics and Science

As mentioned earlier, Nietzsche is a cultural physician that diagnoses effects of a cultural will as symptoms of a healthy or sick type of life. It is under the influence of the dominant drive, or resentment, that the will to nothingness emerges.³⁸⁶ With resentment morality, the will to nothingness engenders the disaggregation of the body, the destruction of a meaningful horizon for sociality and denial of suffering.³⁸⁷ In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, he clarifies his diagnosis of nihilism by communicating to his present and future readers the will of nihilism, which is also their will, or the will to nothingness:

Let us dare to grasp it—a will to nothingness, an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions of life; but it is and remains a will... And, to repeat in conclusion what I said at the beginning: man would rather will nothingness than not will³⁸⁸.

With regard to his diagnosis, Nietzsche gives a list of the effects and symptoms of the ascetic will to nothingness which he had already mentioned in other texts. In the last essay, he attacks modern scientism as a symptom of the will to nothingness. “No! Don’t come to me with science as the natural antagonist of the ascetic ideal”.³⁸⁹ The task of modern science, Nietzsche posits, is to remove as much pain as possible.³⁹⁰ By existing to eliminate suffering, and having no higher values, Nietzsche sees science as the Platonic accumulation of rational knowledge eliminating sources of suffering that makes man a creative and mythological creature. In the second essay, he reaffirms democratic and socialist politics as another symptom of the will to nothingness. He writes:

³⁸⁵ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 96 (Essay 2 section 24)

³⁸⁶ Wolfgang Muller-Lauter, *Nihilism as Will to Nothingness*, location 5249

³⁸⁷ Ibid (my emphasis)

³⁸⁸ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 163 (Essay 3 section 28)

³⁸⁹ Ibid 153 (Essay 3 section 25)

³⁹⁰ Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 37-38 (aphorism 12)

That every will must consider every other will its equal-would be a principle hostile to life. An agent of the dissolution and destruction of man, an attempt to assassinate the future of man, a sign of weariness, a secret path to nothingness.³⁹¹

In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche's argument is that the two symptoms of modern nihilism-- positivist science and herd politics-- are the reasons why there is, and (for a while) will be, nothing left to fear in man. These are rooted in the Christian moral interpretation of the world which has now become a desire for nothingness. In communicating his diagnosis, Nietzsche wants the reader to understand what type of life his present human condition, or who we are, is under the influence of the will to nothingness. The sight of man does not arouse fear, which we know is an elevating and productive force, but weariness, sickness and depression. "What is nihilism today if it is not that, we are weary of man?"³⁹² The will to nothingness has made the sight of man nauseating and is the source of such nausea. It is nausea; Nietzsche argues that it is cultural and existential spirit, symptomatic of a body whose drives have lost any form of organic unity and all creative power. Thus, Nietzsche uses genealogy as an historical method that uncovers the past relations of the will to power in order to diagnose a present existential condition. This is Nietzsche's genealogical response to the Kantian question of who we are.

Section 3: Nietzsche's Genealogy in Relation to Revaluation

Following his historical method, with the diagnosis of the will to nothingness, Nietzsche is fundamentally communicating that he diagnoses who we are, or who one is, in terms of a composition of forces.³⁹³ Genealogy is always a creative history of the will to power. The physiology of modern man, his bad conscience and resentment, are manifestations of particular forces which constitute and are collectively reciprocally determined by the will to nothingness. For Nietzsche, nihilism is:

The danger of dangers... Tremendous forces have been unleashed; but they conflict with each other; they annihilate each other... Nihilism represents a pathological transitional stage... whether the productive forces are not yet strong enough, or whether decadence still hesitates and has not yet invented its remedies.³⁹⁴

³⁹¹ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 76 (Essay 2 section 11)

³⁹² Ibid 44 (Essay 1 section 12)

³⁹³ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, x

³⁹⁴ Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 14 (aphorism 13)

For Nietzsche, the revaluation can only occur when active life-affirming forces have become dominant, when these productive forces have been unleashed³⁹⁵. The key to this transformation to the revaluation of values in Nietzsche's thought is his doctrine of the eternal return. Nietzsche's cosmological vision of the eternal return is also his therapeutic, his "yes-saying task", to his diagnosis and destruction of modern values, or his "no-saying task":

After the Yes-saying part of my task had been solved, the turn had come for the No-saying, No-doing part: the revaluation of our values so far, the Great War – conjuring up a day of decision. This included the slow search for those related to me, those who, prompted by strength, would offer me their hands for destroying.³⁹⁶

Nietzsche's therapeutic, the eternal recurrence, is characterized by the idea of reaffirming life as a painful process, an active pathos of breeding and selection.³⁹⁷ The recurrence as a doctrine is also a therapeutic in the form of "a mechanism of mutation that reorganizes forces within a system".³⁹⁸ Yet this transmutation in the constitution of forces is inextricable from a self-destructive existential project on the part of Nietzsche's free spirits, the future revaluators. The transformation that Nietzsche desires, which would constitute the transition to the revaluator, is not the Darwinist fantasy of the *Übermensch*, but the rather the creation of new tragic poets.³⁹⁹ This current composition of our modern system we must remember constitutes a nihilist physiology,⁴⁰⁰ a complete anarchy of the bodily ordering of the individual and society. The danger that Nietzsche forecasts to his free spirits, is the "passive nihilism",⁴⁰¹ which is taking shape around Europe, is the greatest danger to a revaluation. Passive nihilism is characterized by the continual decline of power of the spirit of man, the process by which he continues to dwarf himself with the reactive nature of modern science and egalitarian politics. This is the difference between Nietzsche's diagnosis and what he (Nietzsche) sees as that of the priest. When the Christian priest saw his flock suffering, he poisoned the world by making suffering contemptuous and instrumental.⁴⁰² Nietzsche's therapeutic is to affirm the meaningless condition modern Europe has found itself in. To

³⁹⁵ Ibid

³⁹⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo: How One becomes what One is* (New York: Dover Publications, 2004),

³⁹⁷ Nandita Biswas Mellamphy, *Nietzsche's Experimental Ontology: Political Physiology in the Age of Nihilism*, in, *'Nietzsche's Therapeutic Teaching For Individuals and Culture*, Edited by Horst Hutter and Eli Friedland, (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 213

³⁹⁸ Ibid 213 (my emphasis)

³⁹⁹ Nietzsche, *Birth of Tragedy*, 108-113

⁴⁰⁰ Muller Launer, *Nihilism as Will to Nothingness*, loc 5279

⁴⁰¹ Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 17 (aphorism 22)

⁴⁰² Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 126 (Essay 3 Section 15)

affirm this nothingness, but wanting to grow out of it is a self-relational therapeutic form of re-creation-- that of the fundamental health of the willing spirit of a human being:

Nihilism. It is ambiguous: A. Nihilism as a sign of increased power of the spirit: as active nihilism. B. Nihilism as decline and recession of the power of the spirit: as passive nihilism.⁴⁰³

For Nietzsche, the affirmation of the eternal return is always an affirmation of nihilism. Remember, his claim is as if one had to affirm the consequences of the return, that is, “*if the thought gained power over you it would transform and possibly crush you*”.⁴⁰⁴ In accordance with Nietzsche’s naturalist psychology, the affirmation of life is the province of only the highest types.⁴⁰⁵ A close reader of Nietzsche must notice that he claims that he gives the genealogical diagnosis of the will to nothingness to those who had already offered their hands for destruction. One will therefore need to be able to affirm his/her Dionysian fate *amor fati*, as encapsulated in Nietzsche’s genealogy of who we are, and in facing and destroying their consequences, will still be able to affirm the present and future.⁴⁰⁶ Nietzsche’s test of the return is a process of active nihilism, in which one encounters oneself at the end of a process of decline, one that is meaningless and contradictory. The free spirits of the future, in affirming their fate, affirm the nihilistic tragedy of their Dionysian soul, its return and meaninglessness. In that sense, even their negation of the priest is also an affirmation of the role his poison has in the creation of the modern men of Europe.

Thus, as we can see, affirming the return might be one thing, but Nietzsche is asking his free spirits to affirm the meaninglessness of their own return, and the historical contradictions of their own resentment-rooted Christian nihilistic existence. For Keith Ansell Pearson, the fate that we therefore have to affirm is ourselves, which is “our greatest weight”.⁴⁰⁷ Moreover, Nietzsche commands in his Dionysian spirit that free spirits have to affirm that the current predicament of their souls, and nihilistic pathology, is the self-incurred fate of the European Christian human, but also as creators to affirm one’s freedom from Christian torture and the will to nothingness. The eternal return, for those who take it up, effectuates a

⁴⁰³ Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 17 (aphorism 22)

⁴⁰⁴ Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 194-195 (aphorism 341)

⁴⁰⁵ Keith Ansell Pearson, *A Dionysian Drama on the Fate of the Soul*, in , *Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals*, Edited by Christa Davis Acampora, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2006), location 987

⁴⁰⁶ Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 54

⁴⁰⁷ Keith Ansell Pearson, *A Dionysian Drama on the Fate of the Soul*, location 955

change in the relations of forces through an affirmation of nihilism, or active nihilism.⁴⁰⁸ When one affirms one's fate, one is affirming the fated consequences of one's nihilistic past, as well as the contradictory task of destroying those values. Yet through this process of destruction, only those spirits that are strong and innocent enough, who are able to intensify this destructive suffering into a reason for joy and happiness, will be able to create values. Nietzsche's question, "how well disposed would you have to be to life?", is therefore a question of selection and breeding which only the highest noble spirits would be able to answer yes to. Nietzsche's genealogical diagnosis of the fated production of the will to nothingness as all one has been, is and will be indissociable from his therapeutic, the eternal return.

⁴⁰⁸ Nandita Biswas Mellamphy, *Nietzsche's Experimental Ontology: Political Physiology in the Age of Nihilism*, in, *Nietzsche's Therapeutic Teaching For Individuals and Culture*, Edited by Horst Hutter and Eli Friedland, (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 213

Chapter 2: Michel Foucault's use of Genealogy

Introduction

In this Chapter I elucidate the manner in which Michel Foucault used genealogy. My argument is that Foucault is the only inheritor of an authentic Nietzschean genealogy. While Foucault's radical historiography changed the way thinkers in the contemporary academy view genealogical historiography, my claim is that the very form Foucault gives genealogy is grounded in a Nietzschean framework. In order to fully appreciate the way Foucault uses genealogy as a Nietzschean, it is very important to understand how he revises the genealogical method by tracing the relationship between Heidegger and Nietzsche in his work. In section 1, "Foucault's Ontological and Historical Frameworks", I will briefly describe the manner in which Foucault begins his philosophical career as a Heideggerian archaeologist. Thereafter, I will explain the Nietzschean inspired switch that informs Foucault's use of genealogy, the way he reads the events that constitute May 1968 as the death of the subject, and the consequence of the Nietzsche's death of God. After this preliminary framing, in the remainder of section 1 I pay attention to the Nietzschean and Heideggerian ontological metaphysics that inform Foucault's genealogical works, *Discipline and Punish*, and *The History of Sexuality: Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge*. This task consists of an analysis of the manner in which Foucault, contra Nietzsche, provides a historical and anti-elitist account of power relations that are constituted around the anti-statist political resistance that characterized May 1968. In his genealogies, Foucault's framework combined this Nietzschean notion of power as an informal process with the Heideggerian notion of the episteme that was central to his archaeological work. He did this in order to create a new concept. The apparatus, which served as the central concept in Foucault's genealogies, was created as a historical framework for subjectification. I suggest Heidegger's relationship to Foucault is, moreover, one that extends to the latter's understanding of the subject, and his role as a physician, albeit one of Heideggerian possibilities. Since Foucault never simply applied metaphysical systems, I therefore explicate the manner in which he traces the history of two apparatuses, imprisonment and the confessional, in *Discipline and Punish*, *The History of Sexuality: Volume 1*, and *The Will to Knowledge*, respectively. After providing a thorough explanation of the ontological and methodological frameworks that frame his work, in section 2, I will provide coherence to my claims regarding Foucault's ontological frameworks, by elucidating the three ways in which Foucault used genealogy:

1. Genealogy as the anarchist practice of a strategic intellectual;
2. A historical framework for the production of subjectivity;
3. An aesthetic ontology of who we are for the purpose of resistance.

Following this section, which reduces Foucault's rich historical content to the analytic and political roles it played in his work as a genealogist, I will conclude the chapter with section 3, which consists of a brief exposition of the role genealogy played in Foucault's philosophical career. The reason this last task is important is because in Foucauldian scholarship, there are a multiplicity of positions which contradict each other. That is, there is confusion over the relationship between Foucault's different modes of research and their relation to his overall position. Drawing on Foucault's reflections, my claim in this final section that there is no continuity or overall insight that undergirds Foucault's work, and that his genealogical period is studied in its specificity.

Section 1: Foucault's Ontological and Historical Frameworks

Foucault's Ontological Sources: Heidegger and Nietzsche

Foucault conceived his relation to Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) in an oppositional manner to the dominant strands within French thought at the time. "One had to be on familiar terms with Marx, not let one's dreams stray too far from Freud. And one had to treat sign-systems-the signifier-with the greatest respect"⁴⁰⁹. While Foucault certainly does have a relation to these modes of thought-- Marxism, Psychoanalysis and structuralism,⁴¹⁰ my claim is that Foucault is a Nietzschean *and* Heideggerian post-structural genealogist, and his comments below should be taken with the utmost intellectual seriousness:

For me Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher...My entire philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger. I nevertheless recognize that Nietzsche outweighed him. These are the two fundamental experiences I have had I had tried to read Nietzsche in the fifties but

⁴⁰⁹ Michel Foucault, *Preface to Anti-Oedipus*, in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, (United States of America: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), xiii

⁴¹⁰ For Foucault's relation to Marxism see Chapter Three, *The History of the Present: Marx through Foucault*, in Simon Choat, *Marx through Post-structuralism*, (New York: Continuum Books, 2010) ; For Foucault's relation to Psychoanalysis see Derek Hook, *Foucault, Psychology and the analytics of Power*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010) ; For Structuralism see Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus, 'Michel Foucault, *Beyond structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983),

Nietzsche alone did not appeal to me - whereas Nietzsche and Heidegger: that was a philosophical shock! ...these are nevertheless the two authors I have read the most.⁴¹¹

Omitting Foucault's relation to these thinkers, Nietzsche and Heidegger, is a practice that has attained normality in the study of Foucault. Gayatri Spivak has rightly argued that Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow have democratized Foucault.⁴¹² For Francois Cusset, this approach is not rare; it is indicative of the presentation of Foucault's thought in the United States.⁴¹³ Wendy Brown is an example of a scholar who has presented Foucault in the most haphazard and politically appropriative manner. In her book, *Politics out of History*, Brown posits that Foucault is not an anarchist, but a thinker that can be compliant with liberalism.⁴¹⁴ In her opinion, Foucault's genealogical work has no direct relation to the riots of 1968 and can therefore be divorced from them.⁴¹⁵ It is precisely this thin reading of Foucault, of which Brown is only a symptom, which I want to contest. I contend that Foucault does not use genealogy for reform, but anarchist revolution.⁴¹⁶ Colin Koopman, another reader of genealogy, has even claimed that Foucault is not a subversive Nietzschean.⁴¹⁷ Koopman has cast Foucault as a neo-Kantian and even gone so far as to claim that he is not opposed to disciplinary power.⁴¹⁸ The reason I find this a problem is because such a misreading of Foucault completely compromises an appreciation of the manner in which he uses genealogy.⁴¹⁹ Foucault's historiographical forms of analysis in his genealogical period are ungraspable without a brief analysis of his archaeological period, yet the two are different to the third period, the "technologies of the self".⁴²⁰ While Foucault is still certainly influenced by Nietzsche in his archaeological period,⁴²¹ Heidegger is still the dominant influence.

⁴¹¹ Michel Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Writings and other Interviews: 1977-1984*, (London, Routledge, 1990), 250

⁴¹² Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *More on Power Knowledge*, in, *The Spivak Reader*, Edited by Donna Landry and Gerald Maclean, (London: Routledge, 1996), 159

⁴¹³ Francois Cusset, 'French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze & Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life of the United States', Translated by Jeff Fort, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 1-13

⁴¹⁴ Wendy Brown, *Politics Out of History*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), 94-95

⁴¹⁵ Ibid 119

⁴¹⁶ Jon Rajchman, Nietzsche, *Foucault and the Anarchism of Power*, in, *Semiotexte: Nietzsche's Return*, Edited by Sylvere Lotringer, (New York: Semiotexte, 1977), ; Jon Simons, *Power, Resistance, Freedom*, in, *Foucault: A Companion*, edited by Falzon, O' Leary and Sawicki (Sussex, Blackwell Publishing, 2013),

⁴¹⁷ Colin Koopman, *Genealogy as critique; Foucault and the problems of Modernity*, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2013), 93

⁴¹⁸ Ibid 96

⁴¹⁹ Arnold Davidson, *Archaeology , Genealogy, Ethics*, in , *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, edited by David Couzens Hoy, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 225-227

⁴²⁰ Michel Foucault, *The Subject and Power*, in, Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus, 'Michel Foucault, *Beyond structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 207-208

⁴²¹ Alan Schrift, *Nietzsche's French legacy: A Genealogy of Post-structuralism*, (London, Routledge, 1995), 37

Foucault's Take-up of Heideggerian Themes: The Episteme as Historical World

While it is not possible to fully articulate the influence of Heidegger on Foucault, there are three major areas that deeply affect Foucault's work: (1) Heidegger's attempt to transform the question of rational knowledge and truth to truths that work at a deep ontological level often prior to consciousness, knowledge and visible history.⁴²² (2) How a new understanding of truth affects the understanding of human (particularly Cartesian) subjectivity as a practical engagement with the world in the form of possibilities, specifically in the genealogical period.⁴²³ (3) How both ontological truth and subjectivity operate in accordance with the Heideggerian notion of the episteme, but not being.⁴²⁴

In his archaeological period, Foucault drew on Heideggerian principles in his three historical periods; The Renaissance (1500-1650); the Classical period (1650-1780); and the Modern period (1780-1950). In his 1966 publication, *The Order of Things*, Foucault elucidated his Heideggerian framework for the analysis he was undertaking as practicing scholarship in the discipline of the history of ideas. The term he used in *The Order of Things* to elucidate the epistemological unity of a historical epoch was the Heideggerian term, *episteme*. For Heidegger:

From the earliest times until Plato the word *techne* is linked with the word *episteme*. Both words are terms for knowing in the widest sense. They mean to be entirely at home in something, to understand and be expert in it. Such a knowing provides an opening up. As an opening up it is revealing.⁴²⁵

Heidegger's notion of epistemic knowledge is a form of knowledge that is both tacit of one's possibilities in the world, and a correlated specific technical knowledge that derives from the rules governed by the unveiling of these historically factual possibilities by "being to the open", or clearing.⁴²⁶ For knowing to occur at all in any epoch, the human being has to-- and more importantly for Heidegger, and consequently Foucault-- tacitly accept a set of rules that

⁴²² Michael Schwartz, *Epistemes and the History of Being*, in *Critical Encounters: Foucault and Heidegger*, edited by Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), ; Babette Babich, *A Philosophical Shock: Foucault reading Heidegger*, reading Nietzsche, in *Foucault's Legacy*, Edited by GC Prado (London: Continuum Publishers; 2009), 25-29

⁴²³ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008) 311-315; Ladelle McWhorter, *Subjecting Dasein*, in *Critical Encounters: Foucault and Heidegger*, edited by Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003) ; Foucault, *Subject and Power*, 220-221 ; Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, Translated by Sean Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2006), 94

⁴²⁴ Schwartz, *Epistemes and the History of Being*,

⁴²⁵ Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology*, in *Heidegger; Basic Writings*, Edited By David Farrel Krell, (New York : Routledge, 2008), 222

⁴²⁶ Martin Heidegger, *The Origin of the work of Art*, in *Heidegger; Basic Writings*, Edited By David Farrel Krell, (New York : Routledge, 2008), 112-113

are enshrined in linguistic conventions that govern the meaningful relationships of a historical people. Foucault however never resorts to such strong Heideggarian terminology. For Michael Schwartz, Foucault "...takes up Heidegger's retrieval of ancient episteme as a knowing that reveals, only to recast it so that episteme is now construed as the historical conditions of knowledge that exhibit the mode of being of order, with this order coming forth via the a priori of resemblance".⁴²⁷

In every culture, between the use of what one may call the ordering codes and reflections upon order itself, there is the pure experience of its order and modes of being...What I am trying to bring to light is the epistemological field, the episteme in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational and objective forms, grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history that is not of growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility...It is evident that my present study is, in a sense, an echo of my undertaking to write a history of madness in the Classical age; it has the same articulations in time, taking the renaissance as my starting point, then encountering, at the beginning of my nineteenth century, just as my history of madness did, the threshold of a modernity we have not left behind.⁴²⁸

The episteme is Foucault's philosophical and historical relocation of the Heideggarian opening, or clearing, in which particular modalities of being are disclosed.⁴²⁹ For Heidegger, the possibilities in the world which constitute the way individuals make sense of their undertakings in the world, and how it relates them to others is only made intelligible within the confines of a system of meaning that is inextricably linguistic and historical. Moving away from Heideggarian existential themes, Foucault deploys the epistemological object by using the idea of conditions. These are familiar to us in Kant's formulation of the condition for the possibility of knowledge, which in a much wider sense is answering the question, what are the conditions for the possibility of order or a field of knowledge as a whole? While I consider that there is a strong Kantian influence here, Foucault has warned that the episteme must not be misunderstood as a Kantian category.⁴³⁰ In this way and learning from Heidegger, Foucault conceptualizes knowledge as not being confined to a subject's understanding or a subject's ability to make judgments. What can be established as knowledge of particular objects by subjects is premised on a particular set of linguistic rules immanent to the ordering of each historical period. For Foucault, this *a priori* Heideggarian episteme:

⁴²⁷ Schwartz, *Epistemes and the History of Being*, 167

⁴²⁸ Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*, xxvi

⁴²⁹ Schwartz, *Epistemes and the History of Being*, 167

⁴³⁰ Thomas Flynn, *Foucault's Mapping of History*, in *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, Edited by Gary Gutting (New York: Cambridge University Press; 2005), 33

...is what, in a given period, delimits in the totality of experience a field of knowledge, defines the mode of being of the objects that appear in that field, provides man's everyday perception with theoretical powers, and defines the conditions in which he can sustain a discourse about things that is recognized to be true.⁴³¹

The three epistemes that Foucault describes in *The Order of Things* each dealt with a particular form of presencing that corresponded to the nature of, and relations between sign(s); there is resemblance, representation and the transcendental doublet all constituting positivist logic which map on to the Renaissance, the Classical and the Modern periods respectively. The idea which Foucault adopts from Heidegger is that it is the *episteme* that governs and limits human epistemological and social possibilities within a time frame, rather than the time period itself consecrating relevance and relations between humans and objects. The form of presencing that took place in the Renaissance, as "resemblance",⁴³² forms the basis from which Foucault traces the Classical and Modern epistemes that have grounded the relations of knowing, meaning and the modes of being immanent to Western society until the present day. In *The Order of Things*, the Renaissance episteme and resemblance as both the function and content, or presencing of the sign,⁴³³ gave way to the Classical episteme, and the order of representation. In the Classical episteme, thought itself and the things in the world are no longer divorced from language or representation.⁴³⁴ The representative function of language is embodied in the change of the constitution of the sign. "From the seventeenth century... the arrangement of signs was to become binary... as the connection of a significant and a signified".⁴³⁵ With this epistemic switch, Foucault claims "one began to ask how a sign could be linked to what it signified".⁴³⁶ The new distinction of the sign signalled a change in the very experience of the world. Language had lost its primary function.⁴³⁷ "Before this language of language", Foucault writes, "it is the thing itself that appears, in its own characters, but within the reality that has been patterned from the very outset by the name".⁴³⁸ Now part of the task for all scholars was to establish the meaning of things. That is, what a sign has signified, with recourse to its place in a tabulated system of identity and differences in accordance with the principles of mathesis and taxonomia that ran through several

⁴³¹ Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 172

⁴³² Ibid

⁴³³ Alan Sheridan, *The Will To Truth*, (USA: Routledge, 2005), 50-51

⁴³⁴ Sheridan, *Will to Truth*, 51

⁴³⁵ Foucault, *Order of Things*, 46

⁴³⁶ Ibid 47

⁴³⁷ Schrift, *The Will to Truth*,

⁴³⁸ Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 142

discourses such as natural history, general grammar and an analysis of wealth.⁴³⁹ Yet throughout this period, the function of language and thought as representational went unquestioned.⁴⁴⁰ What this fundamentally meant for Foucault was that scholars never asked on what basis representations and language operated.⁴⁴¹

Foucault's position on epochal language differentiates him from Heidegger.⁴⁴² Heidegger adopted a philosophical stance, where on the basis of a philosopher's attunement to an ontologico-historical grounding force of being, some room was made for the philosopher's creativity and agency. Foucault negates this position. As an archaeologist he posits that the subject is a function of discourse that is not a product or determinately influenced by a grand tradition.⁴⁴³ All thinkers are bound by the same rules. Philosophy functions in accordance with the rules of episteme, like any other regional science.⁴⁴⁴ Foucault's deployment of the episteme as a tool of analysis relies on Heidegger, but ultimately breaks with philosophy, and more importantly; the prejudice assumed by philosophy as a superior discipline that creates intellectuals critical enough to see through their very constitution.⁴⁴⁵ So for Foucault, although the classical episteme transforms into a modern one with the great philosopher Kant's questioning of representation, this is part of a greater rift that is occurring "*under our feet*":⁴⁴⁶

Kant in his Logic, when to his traditional trilogy of questions he added an ultimate one: the three critical questions (What can I know? What must I do? What am I permitted to hope?) then found themselves referred to a fourth, and inscribed, as it were, 'to its account': Was ist der Mensch?... The concern it has for man, which it lays claim to not only in its discourse but in its pathos, the care with which it attempts to define him as a living being, an individual at work, or a speaking subject.⁴⁴⁷

For Foucault, after the Kantian critique the radical reflection on language by language ceases to be a problem of real concern.⁴⁴⁸ While language could never be divorced from thought in a network of representations, language now simply operates functionally in accordance with the historical rules *a priori* that govern modernity in order to represent the positivist essence

⁴³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid 260-263

⁴⁴¹ Ibid 370

⁴⁴² Schwartz, *Epistemes and the History of Being*, 174

⁴⁴³ Ibid

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid 175-176

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid

⁴⁴⁶ Foucault, *The Order of Things*, xxvi

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid 371

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid 370

of the human being as an object of knowledge.⁴⁴⁹ The epistemic shift that now governs modern thought is the knowledge of the positivity of the finite human being, or creature that necessitates representation.⁴⁵⁰ The switch to the question of the essence of man, and Foucault's strong opposition to the *a priori* principle that grounds knowledge, seems odd in his archaeological period which was characterized by a strong focus on language. In spite of this, in his genealogical period he makes clear his post-structural contention regarding the transcendental doublet as a principle of epistemic structuration presupposes not a problem of linguistic elitism, but a political problem regarding subjectification called "dividing practices".⁴⁵¹

Foucault's presentation of the positivism of this period is of course inextricable from the Heideggerian view of the modern subject as the ground of absolute knowledge.⁴⁵² The historical *a priori* that governs the modern Western episteme is man as a transcendental doublet.⁴⁵³ Man is both a subject and a scientific object of knowledge.⁴⁵⁴ The difference that characterizes the modern episteme is that of presencing, which is viewed in its positivity.⁴⁵⁵ According to Foucault, for a subject of knowledge to conceptualize an object in terms of its positivity, or a positive ahistorical essence in relation to a discourse of objective truth, is to tacitly understand the object of discourse (s) as an objective condition of a set of discursive rules that govern perceptual outlooks of those scholars who work, speak and write in a particular field.⁴⁵⁶

This true discourse finds its foundation and model in the empirical truth whose genesis in history and nature it retraces so that one has an analysis of the positivist type (the truth of the object determines the truth of the discourse that describes its formation)⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid 369

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid 371

⁴⁵¹ Foucault, *The Subject and Power*, 208-209

⁴⁵² See Heidegger, *Modern Science, Metaphysics, Mathematics*, in, *Heidegger; Basic Writings*, Edited By David Farrell Krell, (New York : Routledge, 2008), 206

⁴⁵³ Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 366

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid 375

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid 375, 378

⁴⁵⁶ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Translated A.M Sheridan Smith (Oxon; Routledge Classics, 2002), 71

⁴⁵⁷ Foucault, *The Order of things*, 349

The Episteme: Discourse and Objects

Despite his break with Heidegger over the issue of philosophy, Foucault was influenced by the German thinker into his genealogical period. Like Heidegger, Foucault views the creation of the objects in a particular episteme and the discourses that constitute them to be independent of the control of human beings or human agency.⁴⁵⁸ We can thus see how Foucault utilises the conditional aspects of the episteme and its discursive constitution to limit the possibilities governing a subject's experience of the world.⁴⁵⁹ According to Jürgen Habermas, this theme in Foucault's work extends into his genealogical period, and is politically motivated.⁴⁶⁰ In modern thought, Marx most notably created a distinction between knowledge and ideology. For Habermas, Marx and Freud's rationalism allowed them to distinguish an agentive role for the subject, and create an authentic space for humanist discourse in opposition to illusory and repressive systems of meaning that support social oppression.⁴⁶¹ Habermas correctly views Foucault as negating the modern humanist impulse. Indeed, his postmodern/post-structuralist negation of universals and turn to language constitute a subversive Nietzschean position.⁴⁶² While the critique will turn on power, Foucault's epistemic historicizing is premised on negating the idea that the rational subject can be neutral and objective in any inquiry, a theme which ran through *Madness and Civilization*.⁴⁶³ This of course raises the question of whether Foucault and Heidegger are able to give an account of historical *a priori*s that structure experience. Foucault did rewire agency or creativity within his discursive schema with the idea that certain thinkers, like Freud and Marx, are subjects of discursivity. These subjects have the ability to engender new discourses, or ways of seeing and speaking.⁴⁶⁴ However, these creators will simply engender a new set of discursive rules. For Foucault, no consciousness is sovereign to discursive ordering.⁴⁶⁵ If the subject is governed by rules as Foucault claims, what status can his archaeological historiography have if the author/enunciative modality are bound to discursive

⁴⁵⁸ Rabinow and Dreyfus, *Beyond structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 79

⁴⁵⁹ Linda Martin Alcoff, *Foucault's Normative Epistemology*, in, *Foucault: A Companion*, edited by Falzon, O'Leary and Sawicki (Sussex, Blackwell Publishing, 2013), 209

⁴⁶⁰ Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, 282

⁴⁶¹ Ibid 282-283

⁴⁶² Ibid 278

⁴⁶³ Michel Foucault, *Truth and Power*, in, Michel Foucault: *'Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings: 1972-1977*(New York, Pantheon, 1980), 109

⁴⁶⁴ Foucault, *What is an Author*, in, *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984: Volume 2: Aesthetics, Ethics and Methodology*, edited by James Faubion (New York, The New Press, 1998),210-212

⁴⁶⁵ Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 69-70

rules external to his control? Foucault as an archaeologist would seem to maintain a critical distance from his sources, material and discursive formations, claiming to simply describe the latter in their positivity. Still, the question remains as to whether the archaeologist can approach his material accurately, or if his conscious perception of all things is bound by discursive rules. Laclau and Mouffe, for example, claim it is the constitution of objects within the discursive formation that designate the conditions of lived experience for speaking and writing subjects. The subject cannot interpret any object outside its discursive constitution:

The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought... An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists... What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition.⁴⁶⁶

Thus, Foucault's claim is that humans can only theorise, see and perceive within a particular discursive formation.⁴⁶⁷ We will therefore have to leave the question regarding whether his explanation can ever account for the historical structures he describes accurately. I have now concluded that Foucault, like Heidegger does not conceive of knowledge in the traditional rationalist sense. There is a critical difference between the two, and such difference is in part relatable to Foucault's French heritage. Foucault wants us to think of discursive formations as a form of knowledge that is different to the one we normally conceive of. Foucault uses two French terms, *connaissance* and *savoir* which are generally translated into English as the singular term knowledge. In French, *connaissance* refers to a particular discipline or branch of knowledge (such as psychiatry) and *savoir* refers to the entirety of all branches of knowledge. Foucault radically reconceives both these terms so that together, we may be able to conceive of the rules that constitute relations of what can be considered 'knowledge' outside the domain of an intentional, free willed knowledge producing subject. Foucault writes:

By *connaissance* I mean the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it. *Savoir* refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or that type of object to be given to *connaissance* and for this or that enunciation to be formulated.⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶⁶ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe: *Hegemony and Social Strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics*(New York: Verso; 2001), 105

⁴⁶⁶ Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 108

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid 137

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid 16

The philosophical unit of the discursive formation that is central to Foucault's notion of knowledge as relations is the statement. It is the level of the statement at which enunciative modality or subject, the objects and concepts of discourse coalesce.⁴⁶⁹ For Foucault, the issue is not a presupposed natural world of objects which exist prior to our naming them, but an object itself can only be spoken or written about as an object according to discursive conditions of emergence. Foucault explains this by claiming that these discursive conditions occur at the limit of discourse. By 'limit', Foucault is not referring to a point that constrains discourse, forcing certain forms upon it.⁴⁷⁰ The limit is the relations themselves: the rules of regularity of the statements that constitute a discursive formation are neither interior (like secondary relations) nor external to the discursive formation:

They have probably found it difficult enough to recognize that their history, their economics, their social practices, the language (*langue*) that they speak, the mythology of their ancestors, even the stories that they were told in their childhood, are governed by rules that are not all given to their consciousness; they can hardly agree to being dispossessed in addition of that discourse in which they wish to be able to say immediately and directly what they think, believe, or imagine; they prefer to deny that discourse is a complex, differentiated practice, governed by analysable rules and transformations.⁴⁷¹

The way man is seen in the modern period, Foucault argues, is due to the discursive relations, not the rational subject's access to the objective truth of human nature. The way in which man is understood objectively as an object in the modern episteme and so studied is through modalities which are viewed as intrinsic to his empirical, not transcendental being.⁴⁷² It is not that Foucault is directly negating Kant here, but rather he is describing how man has been viewed in modernity in accordance with the presuppositions of man as a living, speaking and labouring being that constitutes the epistemic ordering of modernity.⁴⁷³ These modes; language, life and labour are embodied in the discourses of linguistics, biology and economics respectively.⁴⁷⁴ These three sciences, or discourses, are inextricably linked to Foucault's genealogical critique of the modern human sciences of psychology and sociology, as well as to the production of the modern subject and world. The notion of life as an objective modality of man's being is specific to modernity, as classical thought, in the form

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid; Deleuze, *Foucault*, 9

⁴⁷⁰ Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 108

⁴⁷¹ Ibid 221

⁴⁷² Foucault, *The Order of things*, 347

⁴⁷³ Ibid

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid

of natural history had no concept of life but only living beings.⁴⁷⁵ Biology, focused on the functions specific to the life of man as an organic structure and in accordance with an environment, both natural and cultural, is an attempt to study the “possibility of finding norms of adjustment”.⁴⁷⁶ Economics is the study of how the history of man’s needs and desires lead him into conflictual relations, from which he established particular rules for the benefit of himself and/or others.⁴⁷⁷ The study of linguistics focuses on the meaning made by human beings, and how the signifiatory practices are articulated in the form of various cultural systems.⁴⁷⁸ In the final Chapters of *Order of Things*, Foucault elucidates the emergence of the human sciences, which lack any scientific credibility as merely derivative discourses of the primary models; discourses of biology, economics and linguistics.⁴⁷⁹

Psychology is fundamentally a study of man in terms of functions and norms (functions and norms which can, in a secondary fashion, be interpreted on the basis of conflicts and significations, rules and systems); sociology is fundamentally a study of man in terms of rules and conflicts... lastly, the study of literature and myth is essentially the province of an analysis of significations and signifying systems, but we all know that this analysis may be carried out in terms of functional coherence or of conflicts and rules.⁴⁸⁰

The Beginning of Genealogy: Foucault’s turn from Heidegger to Nietzsche: Power, God and the Death of the Subject

In 1970, Foucault pointed out that he would be embarking on a new method called genealogy.⁴⁸¹ His turn to Nietzsche signifies the switch from archaeology to genealogy. In 1971, in *Theatrum Philosophicum* he alludes to an entire philosophical development with regard to his change from archaeological to his genealogical period. This meant an analytic switch from using Nietzschean themes instead of Heideggarian ones as frameworks for analysis. Foucault claims that his philosophy is moving away from a “philosophy of representation - of the original, the first time, resemblance, imitation, faithfulness”.⁴⁸² Heidegger’s philosophy of Being had come to represent an old theology, and in its place Foucault noted he was moving towards a philosophy that constitutes a “dance of masks...A

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid

⁴⁷⁶ Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 389

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid 390

⁴⁸¹ Michel Foucault, *The Order of Discourse*, in *Untying the Text: A Post-structuralist reader*, Edited by Robert Young, (Routledge, London, 1981), 73

⁴⁸² Michel Foucault, *Theatrum Philosophicum*, in, *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984: Volume 2: Aesthetics, Ethics and Methodology*, edited by James Faubion (New York, The New Press, 1998), 348

dead God and sodomy are the thresholds of the new metaphysical ellipse”.⁴⁸³ In his genealogical philosophy, Foucault welcomes a new Nietzschean philosophy in which atheist transgression is opposed to the new metaphysical order.⁴⁸⁴ It is this move to the Nietzsche’s death of God thesis which characterizes Foucault’s Nietzschean aesthetic mystification of the May 1968 revolts. This would inform his whole use of the genealogical method. In 1973, in his lecture “Truth and Juridical forms”, Foucault makes this theme in his thinking explicit. In his lecture, he proposed that there were two fundamental events in the history of Western knowledge; the first is the death of God. The consequence of the death of God is the “fundamental rupture of the relation between knowledge and the known thing”; since Descartes had invoked God on epistemological grounds.⁴⁸⁵ Thus, Foucault’s conception of Nietzsche’s death of God is an implicit take up of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche.⁴⁸⁶ This is a questionable reading of Nietzsche, for which nihilism was an oncoming wave about to sweep over Europe from the late 1900s. I posit, however, that this is simply Foucault reading Nietzsche and Heidegger in relation to one another for his own benefit.⁴⁸⁷

Foucault argues that the conclusion of that event would darken our minds to the extent that we totally de-deify nature.⁴⁸⁸ The death of God would therefore “rupture the continuity between knowledge and the instincts”, which would lead to the disappearance of “the subject in its unity and sovereignty”.⁴⁸⁹ Normatively in the Western tradition, the subject (for Foucault, instincts) is configured in such a manner that it has natural access to knowledge, which from a Nietzschean perspective is pure fantasy. The death of God de-deifies the subject’s notion of himself. The consequence of de-deification would of course result in the death of the unified subject’s self-knowledge, the subject’s relation to itself, and “the relationship between the body and truth”.⁴⁹⁰ The revolt against the politics of identity in the struggles of May 1968 is, in Foucault’s Nietzschean thinking, congruent with the death of the subject. Todd May reports:

Students at the university at Nanterre go on strike to protest their administration's temporary closing of the university in the wake of demands for ‘anti-imperialist’ study. These strikes are soon followed by

⁴⁸³ Ibid 348-349

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid

⁴⁸⁵ Michel Foucault, *Truth and Juridical Forms*, in, *Essential Works of Michel Foucault Volume 3: Power*, Edited by James Faubion, (New York: The New Press, 1997), 7

⁴⁸⁶ Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology*, Translated by William Lovitt, (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977), 82-83

⁴⁸⁷ Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture*, 250

⁴⁸⁸ Foucault, *Truth and Juridical forms*, 12

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid 12

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid 12

workers' strikes, and intersection of these strikes brings together, at least temporarily, two sections of the French population that are traditionally separate from each other... it looks for a brief period as though President de Gaulle's government might fall. It would be the first revolution in modern Western Europe, succeeding where the revolts of 1848 and 1871 fail.⁴⁹¹

At the time, 1968 looked like it would open a door to a new beginning. Foucault and Deleuze were central in portraying the awakening of an anarchist revolution as a massive event.⁴⁹² For these thinkers, May 1968 opened up new politically subversive questions about “the culture of everyday life, prisons, mental health institutions, sexuality, gender and the family”⁴⁹³ that either befuddled or outraged the FCP. The very core of political life, that is-- ‘who we are’ as political subjects were-- for Foucault was being questioned through resistance. He makes this clear in his paper, “Genealogy and Social Criticism”:

A certain fragility has been discovered in the very bedrock of existence - even, and perhaps above all, in those aspects of it that are most familiar, most solid and most intimately related to our bodies and to our everyday behaviour.⁴⁹⁴

Thus, these struggles were anarchic, but Foucault’s Nietzschean claim is that their very existence was opposed to the manner in which the intersection of power and knowledge had come to have a hold on their lives:

They are anarchistic strugglesThey are an opposition to the effects of power which are linked with knowledge... What is questioned is the way in which knowledge circulates and functions, its relations to power... all these present struggles revolve around the question: Who are we? They are a refusal of these abstractions, of economic and ideological state violence, which ignore who we are individually, and also a refusal of a scientific or administrative inquisition which determines who one is.⁴⁹⁵

Foucault’s focus on resistance relates to a fundamental methodological feature in his genealogical method, which he explicates in his paper, “The Subject and Power”. He suggests that it is easier to study power relations from looking at the forms of resistance which emerge in opposition to power.⁴⁹⁶ This is because in Foucault’s ontological analytic of power relations, where there is power, there is always the possibility of resistance, an outlet of

⁴⁹¹ May, *The Philosophy of Foucault*, 61

⁴⁹² Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, *Intellectuals and power*, in, *Language, Counter-memory, Practice : Selected essays and Interviews*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977),

⁴⁹³ Steven Seidman, *Contested Knowledge-Social Theory Today*, (Oxford, Wiley Blackwell publishing, 2004), 167

⁴⁹⁴ Michel Foucault, *Chapter 2: Genealogy and Social Criticism*, in ‘The Postmodern Turn: New Perspectives on Social theory’ edited by Steven Seidman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 42

⁴⁹⁵ Foucault, *Subject and Power*, 212

⁴⁹⁶ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Volume 1-The Will to Knowledge*, Translated by Robert Hurley, (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 95

forces exterior to strategic relations of domination.⁴⁹⁷ Foucault does not only use the Nietzschean ‘de-deification’ to mystically explain the happenings of May 1968, but also the transversal struggles that have appeared across Western society. The revolts of May 1968 constitute the death of the subject in Foucault’s reading because the subject-object relation that characterizes the modern world engendered by exercise of pastoral power has been demystified. Foucault reads these forms of resistance as human beings directly refuting the role of scientific knowledge in their lives.⁴⁹⁸ Foucault here is not pointing out that those resisting are constituted by resentment. Foucault was quite clear that resistance should not be conflated with reactive force.⁴⁹⁹ In Foucault’s thought, resistance rather constitutes a mode of freedom that allows us to change the circumstantial power relations that have constituted who we are.⁵⁰⁰ However, following Nietzsche’s metaphysics, Foucault’s understanding of resistance does not correspond to any transcendent or redemptive role in an historical narrative, but is rather conceived in terms of a philosophy of energy and force-- that is, bodies.⁵⁰¹ The anarchic resistance towards knowledge does not follow any dialectical pattern of change, but as a reversal in the relations in the forces which manifest as resistant bodily actions.⁵⁰² The transversal struggles are thus conceived as an event, one which follows as the culmination a bodily modality, following effects of the death of God.

Foucault’s Nietzschean theory of Power

In his genealogies, Foucault presupposes and relates to the death and the subject in terms of an event of resistance, (in May 1968) to his study of the “form of power which makes individuals subjects... a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to”.⁵⁰³ Foucault’s historical analysis of power is Nietzschean. While the two forms of power he studies in the modern period are disciplinary and bio-power, they have a common source in Christianity that indicates a Nietzschean disposition:

It has often been said that Christianity brought into being a code of ethics... Less emphasis is usually placed on the fact that it proposed and spread new power relations throughout the ancient world...it postulates in principle that certain individuals can, by their religious quality, serve others not as princes, magistrates, prophets, fortune-tellers, benefactors, educationalists, and so on but as pastors.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid 95

⁴⁹⁸ Foucault, *The Subject and Power*, 215

⁴⁹⁹ Foucault, *Power and Strategies*, in, *Michel Foucault: ‘Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings: 1972-1977*(New York, Pantheon, 1980), 138

⁵⁰⁰ Joanna Oksala, *Foucault on Freedom*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2007), 126-129

⁵⁰¹ Foucault, *Power and Strategies*, 138

⁵⁰² Oskala, *Foucault on Freedom*, 128-231

⁵⁰³ Foucault, *The Subject and Power*, 212

However, this word designates a very special form of power... It is a form of power whose ultimate aim is to assure individual salvation in the next world...It is a form of power which does not look after just the whole community but each individual in particular, during his entire life...Finally, this form of power cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people's minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets... It implies knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it.⁵⁰⁴

In his genealogy, Nietzsche had reduced Christian morality to a form of reactive or life denying power.⁵⁰⁵ He had also called this form of power “slave morality” to distinguish it as the organization of the all weaker herd types.⁵⁰⁶ Foucault has taken up this form of power as pastoral power, and he replicates Nietzsche’s ideas in the sense that pastoral power is defined by the relation of a pastor to the salvation of his flock, and the capacity of the former to manipulate and direct the conscience of the latter. However much Foucault may shadow Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis of the priest’s relation to bad conscience, he formulates the modern production of subjectivity in accordance with the change that he decrees to have occurred in pastoral power in the course of Western history:

An important phenomenon took place around the eighteenth century-it was a new distribution, a new organization of this kind of individualizing power. I don't think that we should consider the "modern state" as an entity which was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very existence, but, on the contrary, as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form and submitted to a set of very specific patterns. In a way, we can see the state as a modern matrix of individualization or a new form of pastoral power.⁵⁰⁷

Foucault’s above argument must be read alongside the Nietzschean death of god thesis and his self-proclaimed philosophy of masks.⁵⁰⁸ Foucault’s argument regarding the masks and death of God is indebted to Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche. Michael Mahon argues that since Foucault was sceptical of Nietzsche’s relationship between force and psychological interiority, he is closer as a theorist of force to Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, than Nietzsche himself.⁵⁰⁹

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid 215

⁵⁰⁵ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 51

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid 64-56

⁵⁰⁷ Foucault, *The Subject and Power*, 215

⁵⁰⁸ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 6

⁵⁰⁹ Michael Mahon, *Foucault’s Nietzschean Genealogy: Truth Power and the Subject*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 3

In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*; Deleuze develops a systematic Nietzschean ontology. I suggest that this undergirds Foucault's deployment of a philosophy of masks. Deleuze went further than Nietzsche in elaborating a natural theory of forces with particular quantities and qualities, namely active and reactive.⁵¹⁰ In Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche, "the object itself is force, the expression of force",⁵¹¹ a principle that applies to the entire biological and political world, since "every relationship of forces constitutes a body-whether chemical, biological, social or political."⁵¹² Deleuze configured the will as the force of reciprocal determination between forces. The will is thus both determined in accordance with a changing relation of forces, and determines the manner in which forces relate to one another in a continuum of motion with no primary cause.⁵¹³ In Deleuze's interpretation the quality of forces is reducible to the primary evaluative quality of the will. The will is either affirmative or negative in accordance with the dominant state of forces, if they are active or reactive forces dominating, respectively.⁵¹⁴ All meaning and value is imposed through the interpretive relationship between forces in accordance with the valuing force of the will.⁵¹⁵ Taking up Nietzsche's thesis, Deleuze diagnosed the Christian religion, and its modern nihilist derivatives as constitutive of a base or slave type that is determined by the dominance of reactive forces.⁵¹⁶ Deleuze explained the relationship between the ascetic ideal (Christianity), and modern philosophy in terms of a "masked relation" in accordance with a theory of forces. Deleuze's centralized the role of the genealogist, as someone who can interpret the relationship between forces, and therefore masks:

Philosophy itself does not throw off its ascetic mask as it grows up: in a way it must believe in this mask, it can only conquer its mask by giving it a new sense which finally expresses its true anti-religious force. We see that the art of interpreting must also be an art of piercing masks, of discovering the one that masks himself, why he does it and the point of keeping up the mask while it is being reshaped...The difference in the origin does not appear at the origin – except perhaps to a particularly practised eye...the eye of the genealogist.⁵¹⁷

Foucault claims the effects of a theologically-centred pastoral power may have disappeared, but they have transformed into new relations of power. As Deleuze pointed out in his reading of Nietzsche, in order for a being to grow and survive and overpower in accordance with the

⁵¹⁰ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 42

⁵¹¹ Ibid 3

⁵¹² Ibid 40

⁵¹³ Ibid 27-28

⁵¹⁴ Ibid 40

⁵¹⁵ Ibid 50-52

⁵¹⁶ Ibid 65

⁵¹⁷ Ibid 5

nature of the will to power, it generally masks itself through concealing the interpretations of dominant forces via dominant forces as its own. The patterns of pastoral power coalesce to creatively integrate a set of multiplicities in the form of individualized bodies that constitute a formal macro-political structure called the state. Foucault's claim, contra to psychological theories of human normality or essence is that our particular historical subjectivity is inextricably linked to the political organization of society.⁵¹⁸ Nietzsche's claim regarding nihilism was that European human beings' relation to the eternal salvation of heaven was reconfigured in terms of the ordering of socio-political life by power relations. Foucault takes this claim and extends to an historical account of power relations in modern Europe:

It was no longer a question of leading people to their salvation in the next world but rather ensuring it in this world... in this context, the word 'salvation' takes on different meanings: health, well-being (that is, sufficient wealth, standard of living), security, protection against accidents.⁵¹⁹

Foucault is extending a Nietzschean philosophy of masks, with regard to pastoral or reactive power, to a host of subject positions; doctors, psychiatrists, educationalists and health professionals. The subject's position that determines the strategic exercise of bio and disciplinary power are masked in their relations of domination over their flock in terms of individualizing moral principles and scientific objectivity. These are metaphysically grounded in the will to truth of pastoral power.⁵²⁰ Foucault, as a genealogist, reads the existence of the human sciences and the humanism they practice to be a masked pastoral power relation that seeks to produce individualized subjects as a mode of social control:

Each individualizing 'tactic' which characterized a series of powers: those of the family, medicine, psychiatry, education, and employers.⁵²¹

Foucault's Genealogical move from Nietzsche: Power as Mechanics

In his genealogical period, Foucault, like Nietzsche and Deleuze, promulgates a materialist metaphysics where the body is both the bearer of forces, and specifically conditioned and constituted by the historical configuration of power relations.⁵²² In taking up Nietzschean power, Foucault views power as positive, inculcated in the body's will to produce discursive

⁵¹⁸ Chloe Taylor, *The Culture of Confession from Augustine to Foucault: A Genealogy of the Confessing Animal*, (New York: Routledge, 2009), 134-135

⁵¹⁹ Foucault, *The Subject and Power*, 215

⁵²⁰ Ibid

⁵²¹ Ibid

⁵²² Deleuze, *Foucault*, 60

regimes of truth.⁵²³ Power creates objects of discourse, new modes of sight, or things for subjects to see, and new things to say or for subjects to talk about-- that is, knowledge as *savoir*.⁵²⁴ For Foucault, it is in the very nature of power as a form of mythological (mythos) mystification to hide its rational series of objectives and aims⁵²⁵ which are outside the control of autonomous rational subjects.⁵²⁶ For this reason, in the history of the Western philosophical tradition since Plato, Foucault argues that we have deceived to the extent that power, discursive knowledge and our conception of what is true are intricately related.⁵²⁷

Foucault's position of knowledge is a Nietzschean one. Unlike Platonic rationalism, knowledge is not conceived as natural faculty.⁵²⁸ For Foucault and Nietzsche it is produced from the instincts as an imposition on the essence of reality, which is "chaos".⁵²⁹ "The will to know composes illusions, fabricates lies, accumulates errors."⁵³⁰ For Foucault, this will includes both normative knowledge (*connaissance*) and his conception of discursive knowledge (*savoir*).⁵³¹ Thus, Foucault, following Nietzsche's insights is launching a philosophical critique of the foundational notions of truth, reason and the soul, from which philosophical debates have derived from Plato, Aristotle and Christianity.⁵³² While Nietzsche shifted the focus towards health, Foucault is deploying this critique of foundations in his genealogies to change social and subjective relations. While genealogy is certainly curative in Foucault, he does not rely on ahistorical qualities like Nietzsche. Thus, Foucault, like Nietzsche, conceives as foundation the productive capacity of power and the body as a relation between natural forces.⁵³³ But unlike Nietzsche, this is not in terms of quanta or qualities.⁵³⁴ Foucault's notion of power/knowledge is immanently strategical. Foucault, studies a mode of power as a strategic rationality:

⁵²³ Foucault, *The History of Sexuality Volume 1*, 57

⁵²⁴ Ibid

⁵²⁵ Ibid95

⁵²⁶ Ibid 94-95

⁵²⁷ Foucault, *The Order of Discourse*, 54-55

⁵²⁸ Fujita, Kojiro. *Force and Knowledge: Foucault's Reading of Nietzsche*, in, *Foucault Studies* No16 (2013),128 ; See also Richard Rorty, *Foucault and Epistemology*, in, *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, edited by David Couzens Hoy, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 46

⁵²⁹ Foucault, *Truth and Juridical forms*, 9

⁵³⁰ Michel Foucault: *Lectures on the Will to Know: College De France 1970-1971* , Translated by Graham Burchell, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 197

⁵³¹ Ibid 197

⁵³² Lightbody, *Philosophical Genealogy*, 124

⁵³³ Kojiro, *Force and Knowledge*, 126

⁵³⁴ Schrift, *Nietzsche's French legacy*, 43

...it is the moving substrate of force relations, which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power...power is not an institution, nor is it a structure, neither is it a strength that we are endowed with. It is the name given to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.⁵³⁵

Colin Gordon argues that there may be agents in “strategic positions” who enforce the series of calculated aims and objectives that are a constitutive of a strategy, but there is “no programmer”.⁵³⁶ In *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault studies disciplinary and biological power as respective strategic rationalities that have constituted human beings as subjects from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries respectively, to the present. Following the very nature of pastoral power, these two forms of power coalesce to constitute the worldly salvation of the flock. This occurs through a process of subordination, exclusion and if possible correction of all social dangers and abnormalities on the basis of a rationality that defines the normative and productive model of the modern rational subject within its population.⁵³⁷ Disciplinary and biopower work together to create a docile and obedient subject population, but one that is also healthy, skilled and productive enough to contribute to the benefit of a capitalist state. For Foucault, power is not exercised by a class, but its positive results are obtained through the way in which a strategy locks certain groups together, inculcating relations of domination.⁵³⁸ In this sense, there “are two meanings of the word ‘subject’: subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge.”⁵³⁹ In Foucault’s genealogies, each form of power does not generate a particular type of subjectivity, but the two operate through a set of “concrete relationships”,⁵⁴⁰ that reciprocally enforce one another by orienting the body, individual and social through a set of dividing practices:

The first to be formed-it seems-centred on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integrations into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of power that characterized the disciplines...The second, formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued with the great mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological

⁵³⁵ Foucault, *The History of Sexuality Volume 1*, 95

⁵³⁶ Colin Gordon, *Afterward to Power/Knowledge*, in, *Michel Foucault: ‘Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings: 1972-1977*(New York, Pantheon, 1980), 251

⁵³⁷ Derek Hook, *Foucault, Psychology and the analytics of Power*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010) 21-24

⁵³⁸ Foucault, *The Subject and Power*, 226

⁵³⁹ Ibid 212

⁵⁴⁰ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, 140

processes...Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a bio politics of population.⁵⁴¹

With this focus on the relationship from power/knowledge to its mechanistic relation to the individual and social body, it is evident that Foucault moves from Nietzsche's organic cosmology of power to an analysis of power as a strategic mechanistic process that is inscribed in the natural world. Nietzsche of course was opposed to all mechanical models. Foucault conceives the two forms of power to be a bio-polar technology that operates mechanistically. It is this mechanistic process which Foucault refers to as an apparatus that produces an intersubjective modal subject-object (knowledge) relation of different bodies (*savoir*), that characterizes the framework and form of analysis that Foucault undertakes in his genealogical work:

Perhaps the equivocal nature of the term 'conduct' is one of the best aids for coming to terms with the specificity of power relations. For to "conduct" is at the same time to 'lead' others (according to mechanisms of coercion which are, to varying degrees, strict) and a way of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities.⁵⁴²

The Apparatus as the Historical Technology of Power in Foucault's Genealogy

I understand by the term 'apparatus' a sort of-shall we say formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function...the apparatus is essentially of a strategic nature, which means assuming that it is a matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either developing them in a particular direction...The apparatus is thus always inscribed in a play of power, but it is also always linked to certain coordinates of knowledge which issue from it but, to an equal degree, condition it. This is what the apparatus consists in: strategies of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge.⁵⁴³

The notion of an apparatus is what distinguishes Foucault's genealogical study from the synchronic approach of French structuralism.⁵⁴⁴ That is, Foucault's genealogies did not just study a "time slice", or "look at relations between things at a particular time".⁵⁴⁵ The notion of an "apparatus" enabled Foucault to not so much uncover the genesis of particular structures,⁵⁴⁶ but rather explain how mutually supporting diachronic strategies of power and

⁵⁴¹ Ibid 139

⁵⁴² Foucault, *The Subject and Power*, 220-221

⁵⁴³ Foucault, *Confession of the Flesh*, in, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings: 1972-1977* (New York, Pantheon, 1980), 195, 196

⁵⁴⁴ Woodward, *Understanding Nietzscheanism*, 68

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid, 68

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid 68

knowledge-- the strategic function of an apparatus-- could emerge in response to an urgent need. The apparatus does not preclude the episteme, which I suggest continues to be the central Heideggerian concept in Foucault's genealogical period:

What I should like to do now is to try and show that what I call an apparatus is a much more general case of the episteme; or rather, that the episteme is a specifically discursive apparatus, whereas the apparatus in its general form is both discursive and non-discursive, its elements being much more heterogeneous... I would define the episteme retrospectively as the strategic apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within.⁵⁴⁷

The episteme becomes the principle of discursive cohesion, which as types of knowledge is supported by strategic relations between forces. In Foucault's genealogical thought in the mid-1970s, he understood the terms 'governance' and 'government' as the strategic functions of an apparatus, and as forms of technology. Foucault did not understand technology in the sense usually attributed to it, but as "practical rationality governed by a conscious goal".⁵⁴⁸ The goal is informed or premised on the urgent need to which an apparatus responds to. According to Marco Altamirano, Foucault understands 'technology' as something that surpasses the traditional distinction between the 'natural' and the 'artificial',⁵⁴⁹ and that we must see the 'technological' act of governing as a mechanistic process that will allow one to transform a present need or problem into a future solution that is useful.⁵⁵⁰ The reason that an apparatus emerges is due to an urgent need, and the manner in which it responds, "as its strategic function" is an "activity of pure governance" that tries "to obtain an effect that is more or less immediate".⁵⁵¹ The effects that the apparatus produces are subjects, which may or may not be useful⁵⁵² in relation to the urgent need that has developed. An apparatus, as Agamben notes, can be understood in a technological sense insofar as it "as it [is] a piece of machinery", in which the mutually supporting strategies operate mechanistically to govern human beings so that they are produced as useful subjects through a historical period.

⁵⁴⁷ Foucault, *Confessions of the Flesh*, 197

⁵⁴⁸ Michel Foucault, 'Power', Edited by J Faubion and P Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 2000), 364

⁵⁴⁹ Marco Altamirano, *Three Concepts for Crossing the Nature-Artifice Divide, Technology, Milieu, and Machine*, in *Foucault Studies*, (2014) No. 17, 11-14,

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid 15

⁵⁵¹ Ibid 8

⁵⁵² Ibid 12

Discipline and Punish: Foucault's Ontological and Historical Framework

The Urgent Need of Disciplinary Power

The two technologies of power-knowledge or apparatuses that Foucault describes in his genealogies are imprisonment and the confessional. Imprisonment is the apparatus of disciplinary power,⁵⁵³ while the confessional is the apparatus of sexuality.⁵⁵⁴ The urgent need for governance that informs the strategic deployment of disciplinary power occurs because of problems that emerged during the unrest and revolution in the seventeenth and eighteenth century within relations among sovereign powers in France and Europe. Foucault explains that the public torture of the 'condemned'--that is, he who had broken one of the sovereign laws-- had a juridico-political political function:

The public execution then, has a politico-juridical function. It is a ceremonial by which a momentarily injured sovereignty is reconstituted. It restores that sovereignty by manifesting it at its most spectacular. The public execution, however hasty and every day, belong to a whole great series of rituals in which power is eclipsed and restored.⁵⁵⁵

The violence meted out during the torture and executions was a means by which the sovereign could use force that far exceeded the act of the crime against the condemned in order to exact terror from the public attending the execution.⁵⁵⁶ According to Foucault, it was by terrorizing the public in this fashion that the sovereign not only nullified the danger represented by that crime while at the same time representing his own power as invincible, but more importantly, intimidating the public so as to deter crime.⁵⁵⁷ It is for this reason that the executions were public.⁵⁵⁸ According to Foucault the ambivalent functionality of the political ritual of the public execution was that the sovereign's use of force terrorized the public (detering them from crime) but also turned that terrorized public against the condemned, aligning the public as the obedient subjects of the sovereign. Through this political ritual the temporarily injured sovereign reconstituted his power, his unquestioned power over his subjects; this was the juridico-political function of the public execution.

⁵⁵³ Foucault, *Confessions of the Flesh*, 195

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid 195, 216

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid 48

⁵⁵⁶ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 50

⁵⁵⁷ Michel Foucault, *Abnormal: Lectures at the College de France 1974-1975*, Translated by Graham Burchell (London, Verso, 2003), location 1437-1440

⁵⁵⁸ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 56

There are several problems that led to the demise of the juridico-political function of public torture as a mode of punishment. The first problem was the change in crime. Foucault notes that “[by] the end of the seventeenth century...one observes a considerable diminution in murders and generally speaking, in physical acts of aggression; offences against property seem to take over from crimes of violence.”⁵⁵⁹ While crime against property was less violent and dangerous, it still had a higher rate of repetition, and in the years after the revolution, the French economy became based on private property. These changes in so-called criminal practices are quite obviously a contentious issue, since within the political landscape of France in that period, criminal practices were supported not only against the falling sovereign, but also the newly installed bourgeoisie. Foucault writes:

...to make of the punishment and repression of illegalities a regular function, co-extensive with society; not to punish less, but to punish better; to punish with a more attenuated severity perhaps, but in order to punish with more universality and necessity; to insert the power to punish more deeply into the social body.⁵⁶⁰

Strategic Subjectification in a Carceral World

Imprisonment is the apparatus that emerges in relation to this urgent need. As Alan Sheridan suggests, the penal theory behind the prison was a sign of the bourgeoisie fear of the working class. It was a means for controlling prisoners: or rather those who were rebelling against new classist laws could be locked away.⁵⁶¹ Prison was also attractive to reformers because it was through incarceration that knowledge (*savoir*) could be gained to prevent further crime by studying the behaviour of those incarcerated. It was through methods of incarceration that the forces of modern penal reform were able to make man a criminal, an object of discourse. It was the nature of this knowledge that had a strategic function proper. As Foucault notes:

...a whole corpus of individualizing knowledge was being organized that took as its field of reference not so much the crime committed (at least in isolation), but the potentiality of danger that lies hidden in an individual and which is manifested in his observed everyday conduct.⁵⁶²

Prison could be used as a means to rehabilitate criminals. Reformers believed that by subtly disciplining the body and mind of the prisoner in prison, they could reach and correct his soul.⁵⁶³ For Foucault, the corrective capacity of incarceration as a disciplinary strategy that

⁵⁵⁹ May, *The Philosophy of Foucault*, 75

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid 82

⁵⁶¹ Sheridan, *The Will To Truth*, 158-159

⁵⁶² Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 26

⁵⁶³ Ibid 125

prevented further crime was attractive to reformers because it held the capacity to create an obedient subject.⁵⁶⁴ The obedient subject was the “individual subjected to rules, orders, an authority that is exercised continually around him and upon him, and which he must allow to function automatically in him”.⁵⁶⁵ This is why the prison is so important for Foucault; it is “where one can witness the entry of disciplinary forces”.⁵⁶⁶ Inherent to this corrective and disciplinary process was the supervision and recording of individual behaviour, “by the development of knowledge of individuals”.⁵⁶⁷ The knowledge to be attained from criminals could only be attained if they were always visible,⁵⁶⁸ reversing the darkness of the dungeon, and if every hour of their time could be controlled.⁵⁶⁹

Obedient subjects would be useful effects in relation to a strategic rationalization of the imprisonment apparatus that was consecrated around the idea of deterring criminal or revolutionary acts against a newly installed property class. Although prison was attractive to reformers because it had this capacity, it failed to eliminate crime.⁵⁷⁰ But the failure of prisons, according to Foucault is perhaps what has led to its continued existence. It produced a delinquent class. The class of delinquents were created, or for Foucault, “fabricated”⁵⁷¹ in prison, and were more politically useful than the class of political rebels. Delinquents were not only a less-dangerous political subject that could be used to report on the behaviour of much more dangerous inmates, but could also be made to act on behalf of social authorities,⁵⁷² to infiltrate “political parties and workers’ associations, in breaking strikes and quelling riots”.⁵⁷³ But the creation of this delinquent class of subjects had a much more strategic advantage. It made delinquency or the delinquent an “object of knowledge”.⁵⁷⁴ Foucault explains that after being made an object of knowledge, the delinquent as a particular type of subject was completely abstracted and reified from the offense he had committed (the actual illegality), so as to show that the delinquent was a real type of person that “moved behind illegalities”.⁵⁷⁵ For Alan Sheridan, the creation of this class of delinquents provided an

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid 128

⁵⁶⁵ ibid 128-129

⁵⁶⁶ Tony Schirato, Geoff Danaher and Jen Webb, *Understanding Foucault* (London: Allen and Unwin, 2012), 80

⁵⁶⁷ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 125

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid 201

⁵⁶⁹ Ibid 6-7

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid 277

⁵⁷¹ Ibid 278

⁵⁷² Ibid 280

⁵⁷³ Sheridan, *The Will To Truth*, 159

⁵⁷⁴ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 277

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid 277

excuse for the disciplinary mechanisms to be used outside of prison, as the criminal, or crime came to be comprehended as a “departure from the norm and a sickness to be cured”.⁵⁷⁶ Prison was a failure, psychologists and legal specialists would argue, because delinquency or rather the ‘abnormality’ immanent in particular individuals had already taken hold of them. While normal (obedient) individuals were supposedly alright, there were many abnormal individuals who were in need of constant supervision and care. Schirato, Danaher and Webb illustrate, that “the prison provided a model for the rest of society. In its dense web of disciplinary coercions, the prison developed and used procedures that, with modification, could be adopted in other fields”.⁵⁷⁷ The notion of delinquency, and more importantly its underlying substratum, abnormality, or the ‘anomaly’, now provided the grounds to extend disciplinary mechanisms outside prison walls. This is why Foucault argues the level at which it was deemed acceptable to punish was lowered and universalized:

...it was no longer the offense, the attack on the common interest, it was the departure from the norm, the anomaly; it was this that haunted the school, the court, the asylum or the prison...Replacing the adversary of the sovereign the social enemy was transformed into a deviant, who brought with him the multiple danger of disorder, crime and madness. The carceral network linked, through innumerable relations, the two long, multiple series of the punitive and the abnormal.⁵⁷⁸

It is by turning to the strategic function of the apparatus, ‘the panopticon’, which enables the reader to understand how the carceral disciplinary network is formed, and how the strategic function of this apparatus operates.⁵⁷⁹ It is through the disciplinary program of the panopticon that individual subjects are created as they exact the power of normalization on themselves. For Foucault, the panopticon is a historical reality consisting of particular disciplinary methods which have been “implemented in hospitals, workshops, schools prison”,⁵⁸⁰ which constitute an objective world of possibilities. The panopticon is thus neither pure knowledge (just a design), nor power (the institutional acts characterizing the designs implementation), but by nature their imbrication, deployed as a process of technological rationalization. Panoptic power operates by means of a mechanism where objectification created by discipline working on the body is at the same time a mechanism which creates a self-conscious state of subjection-- it determines who we are:

⁵⁷⁶ Sheridan, *The Will To Truth*, 160

⁵⁷⁷ Schirato, Danaher and Webb, *Understanding Foucault* , 80

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid 299-300

⁵⁷⁹ Alan Schrift, *Discipline and Punish*, in, *Foucault; A Companion*, edited by Falzon, O’ Leary and Sawicki(Sussex, Blackwell Publishing, 2013), 145

⁵⁸⁰ Ibid 205

First the hospital, then the school, then later, the workshop were not simply “reordered” by the disciplines; they became, thanks to them, apparatuses such that any mechanism of objectification could be used in them as an instrument of subjection.⁵⁸¹

It is in the nature of panopticism as strategic function that a soul is produced by means of the internalization of the body’s objectification, which may be referred to as panoptic subjectification. The body can only be objectified if it is subjugated in a spatial arrangement-- specifically the panoptic arrangement-- where the body is placed in an individuated cell, and is visible to the supervisor in the above tower. This relationship is applied differently throughout modern institutions, yet the panopticon’s design can account for all these different applications. This is why “in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a school boy” would come exact the power of normalization on themselves.⁵⁸² In Foucault’s analysis of Bentham’s panopticon the supervisor can see the body-object, but the body-object cannot see the supervisor. This relation of visibility that characterizes the power relation (and strategic function of an anonymous apparatus) of disciplinary modernity between the judge of normality and object of knowledge is applied differently throughout modern institutional life. Foucault writes:

Disciplinary power, on the other hand, is exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it imposes; at the same time it imposes on whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility. In discipline it is the subjects who have to be seen...It is the fact of constantly being seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection.⁵⁸³

This, in the thought of Foucault is a relation of power which is an act that constrains those of another.⁵⁸⁴ Moreover this act of power is always constituted by the relation of visibility and corresponding disciplinary techniques of objectification in the panoptic program, whether in the prison, school or hospital. It is a power relation because the gaze and techniques constrain the act of other subjects according to the measurement of the norm through a constant process of examination . Foucault posits that that it is through this constant examination process (being observed, punished and rewarded) by which the pupil “or any subject”, learns about their own visibility and internalizes the power relation that characterizes their own constraints and objectification that produces the modern soul.⁵⁸⁵ He thus internalizes what were hitherto

⁵⁸¹ Ibid 205

⁵⁸² Ibid 200

⁵⁸³ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 187

⁵⁸⁴ Foucault, *The Subject and Power*; 220-221 ;See also Deleuze, *Foucault*, 25

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid 187

external constraints that were exacted on his body with the intention of normalizing his behaviour (making him docile). Foucault writes:

He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself, he inscribes himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection.⁵⁸⁶

Foucault has claimed that he wrote a genealogy of normalization instead of normality.⁵⁸⁷ Psychology as Foucault understands it is predicated on an analysis of a descending individuality in relation to the norm. The status of the norm, Foucault tells us, is that “the calculable man” has taken the place of the “memorable man”,⁵⁸⁸ - which was the ascending notion of individuality that proliferated before modernity. “All the sciences, analyses of practices employing the root- psycho- have their origin in this historical reversal in the ‘processes of individualization’”.⁵⁸⁹ This descending individuality is an abnormal individuality or rather; in modernity abnormality is individuality. Nonetheless, what is essential is that the abnormal are not excluded like the Lepers of the Renaissance.⁵⁹⁰ Instead, they are still subjugated as objects of knowledge, and subjected to disciplinary processes that try to arrest, correct and normalize their abnormal condition. While there may be anomalies in relation to the norm, these human beings will still be subject to the control and dependence of some psycho professional in an institution which forms part of the carceral network of possible relations.

Ontological and Historical Metaphysics in the History of Sexuality

A concatenation of Forces: The urgent Need of Bio-power as the Birth of Psychoanalysis

While Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish* is a fully fledged historical genealogy,⁵⁹¹ *The History of Sexuality: Volume I* is considered by Todd May to be a “programmatic methodological” treatise that lays the ground for a future “genealogical study of sexuality... but was never completed”.⁵⁹² Thus, in this text, he does not write the entire history of an apparatus producing subjects. However, Foucault explicates the relationship between disciplinary and bio-power in terms of the production of sexual identities that characterizes

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid 202-203

⁵⁸⁷ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 308

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid 193

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid 193

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid 199

⁵⁹¹ May, *The Philosophy of Foucault*, 67

⁵⁹² Ibid

the very normalization of society in accordance with the confessional as the apparatus that responds to an urgent need. Bio-power, as a power exercised over the life of the social body, is not a power that attempts to reconstitute a sovereign relationship. Foucault's claims that instead wars are being waged on behalf of a sovereign, who "exercised his right of life only by exercising his right to kill" his subjects and others as a "deduction of forces", they:

...are now waged on behalf of the existence of everyone...It is as managers as managers of life and survival, of bodies and race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the question of survival...The principle underlying the tactics of battle-that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living-has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population.⁵⁹³

The urgent need is framed by the principle of survival of a statist organization on the basis of its biological existence. The relations of bio-power therefore work to increase the forces of a population, to strengthen it to avoid destruction, constituting the worldly salvation of the flock. In the concluding chapter of *The History of Sexuality: Volume 1*, Foucault explains this change in power relations in terms of a layered transformation "from a symbolics of blood to an analytics of sexuality".⁵⁹⁴ This transformation, Foucault suggests, led to the birth of modern racism. The meaning tied to the symbolism of blood which distinguished the mythical ground of sovereign power was reformulated in biological terms.⁵⁹⁵ This is where the strategic interventions that politicized the settlement of the nation, "at the level of the body, conduct and everyday life, received their colour and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of blood and ensuring the triumph of the race".⁵⁹⁶ For Foucault, disciplinary and bio-power enforce one another in the form of the confessional apparatus, over the question of the individual's sex, which links the sexual normalization of individualization and the regulation of a biological race-species:

Sexuality was on the side of the norm... perfecting the species inclined the whole problem toward an extremely exacting administration of sex (the art of determining good marriages, of inducing the desired fertilities, of ensuring the health and longevity of children).⁵⁹⁷

⁵⁹³ Foucault, *History of Sexuality: Volume 1*, 137

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid 148

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid 147

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid 149

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid 144

Disciplinary power works on each individual body, for the purpose of distributing “effects around a norm”,⁵⁹⁸ in which the “true sex” of each individual determines its intrinsic value and utility within a national economy of politicized life. Foucault’s strong claim in his last genealogy is that human beings do not have a sexual-- that is, essential-- nature, but rather modern sexuality has been strategically produced by the confessional apparatus. Foucault’s genealogical history of the modern sexualized and normalized subject does not simply oppose, but instead seeks to allocate the archaeological or epistemic grounds of psychoanalysis, as a constructivist position on human sexuality with material consequences in a lived modern world.⁵⁹⁹ While Foucault hardly mentions psychoanalysis in *The History of Sexuality Volume 1*, he considers it to be an extension of other discursive forms which exercise the psy-function, positivist psychology and psychiatry.⁶⁰⁰

The notion of sex made it possible to group together, in an artificial unity, anatomical elements, biological functions, conducts and sensations, and pleasures, and it enabled one to make use of their fictitious unity as a causal principle, an omnipresent meaning, a secret to be discovered everywhere: sex was thus able to serve as a unique signifier and a universal signified. Further by presenting itself in a unitary fashion, as anatomy and lack, as function and latency, as instinct and meaning, it was able to mark a line of contact between a knowledge of human sexuality and the biological sciences of reproduction...by virtue of this same proximity, some of the contents of biology and physiology were able to serve as principle for human normality. Finally the notion of sex made it possible to invert the representations of relationships of power to sexuality, causing the latter to appear, not in its essential and positive relationship to power, but being rooted in a specific and irreducible agency it tries to dominate; thus the idea of sex makes it possible to evade ‘what gives power its power’; it enables one to conceive power solely as law and taboo.⁶⁰¹

It was at the junction of sex that a discourse on the reality on the nature of human normality and abnormality, which was biological and causatively and derivatively psychological, was produced. Psychoanalysis, in compliance with the Western onto-theological tradition had defined desire in an essentialist sense, as lacking.⁶⁰² While Foucault does focus on Lacanian psychoanalysis, the schematic critique of *The History of Sexuality* and Lacanian psychoanalysis draws its historical trajectory from the foundational insights made by one of Foucault’s masters of suspicion, Sigmund Freud.⁶⁰³ Traditional Freudian psychoanalysis

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid 172; See also Mark G E Kelly, *Foucault’s History of Sexuality Volume 1, The Will to Knowledge An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide*, (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press), 91

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid 45

⁶⁰¹ Foucault, *History of Sexuality Volume 1*.154

⁶⁰² Ibid 68

⁶⁰³ Taylor, *The Culture of Confession from Augustine to Foucault*, 128

posits an inextricable and essentialist relationship between “the process of civilization and the libidinal development of the individual”.⁶⁰⁴ For Freud and his progeny, our aggressive anti-social desires are primarily sexual, or libidinal, which are located in the unconscious, or the id.⁶⁰⁵ He argued that it is this very erotic impulse (Eros) which draws human beings together to form a civilization, not a rational social contract.⁶⁰⁶ Our rational selves, which are delimited by the boundaries of the unitary individuated ego are not autonomous to the desires of the id, but rather are structured by them, in accordance with ethical commitments historically instituted through the social super-ego.⁶⁰⁷ For Freud, our unconscious desires are formed in the primary social organization, the family.⁶⁰⁸ He argued in conformity with the masculine solipsism of his time that within this primary social organ, male children come to view their mothers as the first objects of sexual desire. In this light, the male child and the father come to view each other as sources of hate, competition and jealousy. Indeed, Freudian Psychoanalysis goes so far as to posit that this oppositional contempt, the death drive (*Ananke*), which defines masculine socio-individual development, can manifest in an extreme desire to injure and kill.⁶⁰⁹ Freud however argues that historically, when the sons of a family acted aggressively toward the father, they were damaged psychologically, due to the remorse and guilt they felt for the deed.⁶¹⁰

Drawing on the tragic epic of Oedipus Rex, Freud diagnoses the sexual condition that is constitutive of human normality as developing through the oedipal complex that distinguishes familial relations,⁶¹¹ in which human beings are incontrovertibly heterosexual.⁶¹² What one desires in terms of the oedipal complex are objects (the mother) external to oneself. That is; the male subject always begins in a relation to a lack of the objects it desires, and the relations governing subject-object relations are instituted by repressive prohibitions of the super-ego.⁶¹³ Freudian psychoanalysis therefore conceives of desire as a lack occupying a relation to power that is primarily repressive.⁶¹⁴ To act instinctually in a manner that

⁶⁰⁴ Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, Translated by David McClintock,(London : Penguin Books, 2004), 43

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid 3

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid 61-62

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid 86-87

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid 45-46

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid 88

⁶¹⁰ Ibid 88-89

⁶¹¹ Sigmund Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, Translated by James Strachey, (London: Pelican Books, 1973), 382

⁶¹² Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble : Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, (London: Routledge, 1990), 57-66

⁶¹³ Freud, *Civilizations and its Discontents*, 81-82 ;

⁶¹⁴ Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Volume 1*, 81-83

transgresses the codifications is what is generally experienced physiologically as pleasure.⁶¹⁵ Yet for Freud, some of these pleasures could follow a healthy pattern, while others are symptomatic of unhealthy neurotic individuals.⁶¹⁶ Freud and subsequent psychoanalysts were concerned with treating sexual abnormalities, or neurotic cases, in whose constitutions the effects of primary repression in childhood had curbed the normal development of the ego.⁶¹⁷ In Foucault's writings he praises psychoanalysis for uncovering the unconscious forces of human organization, yet critiques it for recoding the bio-political strategies of the state.⁶¹⁸ While psychoanalysis may have found processes far more powerful to rationality in the development of bio-social organisms, it concluded that the natural sexuality that characterized the normative development of the human ego could only exist within the province of the nuclear family. Abnormalities could only be treated and corrected through the confessional relation between the analyser and analysand, in which the familial structure acted as a polarity between; 1) illness and repression, which through the course of therapy, became a structure of; 2) reintegrated normality.⁶¹⁹ Psychoanalysis, in the form of the confessional apparatus responded to an urgent need that afflicted each racial state, which was the manner in which each of their citizens used their sex.⁶²⁰

The Confessional apparatus and Sexual normalization

Foucault locates the confessional as the central technique for producing sexual identities in the West from the dawn of Christianity to modern times.⁶²¹ "The confessional was, and still remains, the general standard governing the true discourse on sex. It has undergone a considerable transformation however".⁶²² In modernity, the function of the Christian confessional is redeployed, and exercised within the intersubjective relations that constitute a power strategy of panopticon normalization. The confessional is no longer characterized as a ritual within a specific local setting. Instead, "it spread; it has been employed in a whole series of relationships: children and parents, students and educators, patients and psychiatrists, delinquents and experts".⁶²³ Foucault's argument is that the dissemination of the confessional from a localized technique to a fully-fledged apparatus, inculcated in a

⁶¹⁵ George Bataille, *Eroticism*, Translated by Mary Dalwood (London: Penguin Classics, 2001), 34, 47, 200

⁶¹⁶ Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, 368-370

⁶¹⁷ Ibid

⁶¹⁸ Schrift, *Nietzsche's French legacy*, 35

⁶¹⁹ Taylor, *The Culture of Confession*, 139

⁶²⁰ Foucault, *History of Sexuality Volume 1*, 26

⁶²¹ Ibid 62

⁶²² Ibid63

⁶²³ Ibid 63

concrete disciplinary strategy of normalization, is only plausible with the aid of psychoanalytic discourse.

Power, Foucault argues, does not stand in a repressive position in relation to desire and pleasure, but rather a position that is totally productive.⁶²⁴ The confessional produces individualizing sexualities on the basis of four strategies which seek to normalize the population in accordance with the need to create a heterosexual population that affirmed a statist principle of survival. The first strategy, “the hysterization of women’s bodies”, naturalized the role of women as mothers and therefore part of the family.⁶²⁵ Sex was considered to belong to both men and women, but only belongs in a positive sense to men. On the other hand, sex was seen to be lacking in women, “but at the same time as that which constitutes the woman’s body, ordering it wholly in terms of its functions of reproduction and keeping it in constant agitation through the effects of that very function”.⁶²⁶ According to the delimitation of female functions, modern power and knowledge (*savoir*) conferred upon women the biological and moral status and functions of the mother, the essential caregiver of the family. But this was also the pathological source of reproduction and hysteric agitation, whose uncontrollable energies always hold the threat of a social meltdown. Thus, Foucault’s claim is that the pathological sex that was deemed intrinsic to a woman’s sexual being gave a reason for the placing of female bodies in a communicative and controlling relationship between the family cell and the corrective faculties of the social body.⁶²⁷ Foucault portrays the second and third strategies attending to the sexual-- that is, procreative-- normalization of a racial population. The second strategy, the sexualisation of children, created children as “sexed objects of knowledge” on the basis of the dividing line of puberty and menstruation.⁶²⁸ Although children were considered “pre-sexual beings”, Foucault’s claim is that in psychological and clinical discourse, the sexuality of children posed both moral and political dangers to the hetero-normative familial ordering of society.⁶²⁹ Thus, the confessional apparatus effectuated a series of power relations where parents, doctors and psychologists⁶³⁰ would carefully supervise, take charge, and doctor the course of children’s sexuality to the point where it crossed over to the third strategy. The third strategy, “the socialization of procreative behaviour”, consisted of a set of political and economic tactics

⁶²⁴ Ibid 62

⁶²⁵ Ibid 104

⁶²⁶ Ibid 153

⁶²⁷ Ibid 153

⁶²⁸ Ibid 105

⁶²⁹ Ibid 104

⁶³⁰ Ibid 105

whereby a discourse on the “responsibility of couples towards the health of the social body” was generated.⁶³¹ It was this strategy that ordered sexuality on the basis of a racial nation state. Hitlerite eugenics, Foucault posits, was simply a more brutal racial ordering of society,⁶³² as it followed a mechanism that was totally active in liberal democracies,⁶³³ and in the racialization of class enemies in communist states.⁶³⁴ Lastly, the fourth strategy, “a psychiatrization of perverse pleasure” deals with the strategic interventions on the basis of sexual abnormality or deviance of individuals, who possess a sexuality that is Other to the normal heterosexual.

All these strategies, exercised through the vocal apparatus of the confessional, produce sexualized individuals. Freud, and his psychoanalytic progeny, believed the only means by which individuals could overcome their repression would be through talking about their experiences in a manner mediated by a psychoanalytic professional. Foucault’s claim is that in the historical West, there has always been a discourse on truth and sex, which in modernity has come to characterize the very truth and liberation of the normal individual. There is no innate complex of desires that produce homo, hetero or any other form of sexuality. I argue that for Foucault, while there are certainly corrective measures in place in the carceral network, to deal with supposedly ‘abnormal’ perversities, the purpose of such procedures was “not the exclusion of these thousand aberrant sexualities, but the specification, the regional solidification of each one of them. The strategy behind this dissemination was to strew reality with them, and incorporate them into the individual”.⁶³⁵ Within the confines of the confessional dictum, under the constraints of the psychoanalytic analyser- analysand relationship, a process of subjectification commences where the subject comes to accept his or her sexuality as the truth.

For us, it is the confession that truth and sex are joined, through the obligatory and exhaustive expression of an individual secret. But this time it is truth that serves as a medium for sex and its manifestations. The confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement; it also is a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship, for one does not confess without the presence (or virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority who requires the confession, prescribes it and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console and reconcile; a ritual in which the truth is corroborated by the obstacles of

⁶³¹ Ibid 104

⁶³² Michel Foucault, *Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975-1976*, Translated by David Macey, (New York, Picador, 1997),83

⁶³³ Ibid

⁶³⁴ Ibid

⁶³⁵ Ibid 44

resistance it had to surmount in order to be formulated; and finally, a ritual in which expression alone, independently of its external consequences, produces intrinsic modifications in the person who articulates it.⁶³⁶

Following his epistemic principle of the human being as a transcendental doublet, Foucault's claim is that each object of discourse is also a subject of a confessional statement. The panoptic principle constituted strategic relations in the surveillance of human objects by human subjects, producing written case files on the ranked normality of individuals as objects. This corresponded to rewarding normal and punishing abnormal standards as a mechanism of subjectification which augmented a form of self-relation where individuals would instead internalize surveillance by tacitly policing their actions in accordance with a set of prescriptive sexual norms as a modal characteristic of their very being. Foucault sees this as a dividing practice. In his genealogies of the modern subject, disciplinary and bio-power relations as a mode of domination becomes less physically violent than sovereign power relations, but domination becomes regulated and consequentially internalized. This is what Foucault means when he claims that the subject becomes divided within themselves.

Thus, for Foucault, the panoptic and confessional complex, are two apparatuses which coalesce to ensure and constitute the continued existence of the modern state. These produce "the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the Malthusian couple and the perverse adult",⁶³⁷ as objects of a discursive order, which, in their conceptual specificities constitute subjective figures.⁶³⁸ Foucault conceives of these individualized objectivities as anchorage points for the derivative discursive concepts which constitute individualized subjectivities: the abnormal woman who does not desire marriage, prisoners, the homosexual as a species; 'lesbian or gay', the passive man, the virile woman, the paedophile, schoolboys and schoolgirls. I suggest that what is of fundamental importance to Foucault's analytic is that the agents of confessional and panoptic domination, as subjects of knowledge who exercise the psy-function of modern apparatuses, are bound as perceptual agents who exercise their own self-policing functions, or normal behaviour, by acting in accordance with the rules of discursive formations concomitant with the strategic rational tactics of panoptic imprisonment and the confessional. I am further suggesting that the normalizing relation that the pastors of normality adapt to the objective signification that each sexualized identity effectuates as an object and concept of discourse is a modal rule which constitutes minor

⁶³⁶ Ibid 61-62

⁶³⁷ Ibid

⁶³⁸ Foucault, *Theatrum Philosophicum*, 356

tactics in the overall strategical rationalization of statist society. Parents, teachers, psychologists, sociologists, lawyers and politicians are professional subjects of knowledge who are indissociable from a control of life through the normalization of their own sexualisation. Foucault's neo-Heideggerian claim is that an everyday world of subjective life has been ordered by the normalization of a population's sex. The everyday possibilities of each individual as a sexual subject and transcendental doublet in a carceral world are characterized by its proximity to normative and abnormal standards of sexuality. For Foucault, sex thus has a role which is:

...more practical than theoretical. It is through sex-in fact, an imaginary point determined by the deployment of sexuality-that each individual has to pass in order to have access to his own intelligibility (seeing that it is both the hidden aspect and the generative principle of meaning, to the whole of his body (since it is a real and threatened part of it, while symbolically constituting the whole), to his identity (since it joins the force of the singularity of a history⁶³⁹).

Section 2: Foucault's Use of Genealogy

Foucault uses the genealogical method in three ways:

1. Genealogy as the anarchist Practice of a strategic intellectual;
2. An historical framework for the production of subjectivity;
3. An aesthetic ontology of who we are for the purpose of resistance.

1. The Anarchist Practice of a strategic intellectual

Since Kant, intellectuals have conceived of theory as occupying a dominant role in relation to socio-political practice.⁶⁴⁰ For Kant, a scholar would formulate a scheme of representation which would be grounded by a set of foundational or 'truthful' principles to guide action, or practice morally.⁶⁴¹ Foucault and his interlocutor Deleuze argued that the representative, neo-Kantian intellectual did not operate in opposition to power, but rather his very Platonic foundational universalism maintained that particular system.⁶⁴² He occupied a pastoral

⁶³⁹ Ibid 155-156

⁶⁴⁰ Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, *Intellectuals and power*, In , *Language, Counter-memory , Practice' : Selected essays and Interviews*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 206 Kant, *Political Writings*, 61-64

⁶⁴¹ Foucault and Deleuze, *Intellectuals and Power*, 207

⁶⁴² Ibid 207

relation to his flock which perpetuated and recoded the functioning of a statist apparatus.⁶⁴³ Foucault distinguishes himself from universal intellectuals as a strategic intellectual in line with the events of May 1968.⁶⁴⁴ As a strategic intellectual, Foucault does not seek to impose a new version of truth, but instead produces theory as a form of action, that is; theoretical action, that forms a relay between the obstacles met by the transversal struggles configured around the central moments of May 1968. He writes:

The intellectual no longer has to play the role of an advisor. The project, tactics and goals to be adopted are a matter for those who do the fighting. What the intellectual can do is to provide instruments of analysis, and at present this is the historian's essential role. What's effectively needed is a ramified, penetrative perception of the present, one that makes it possible to locate lines of weakness, strong points, positions where the instances of power have secured and implanted themselves by a system of organisation dating back over 150 years. In other words, a topological and geological survey of the battlefield - that is the intellectual's role.⁶⁴⁵

Thus, Foucault uses genealogy, as an historical diagnosis of the present, and as an historical ontology of who we are as a means to overcome the obstacles that afflict those attempting to resist the power relations that constitute the organization of statist society.⁶⁴⁶ As I mentioned earlier, Foucault creatively interpreted the event of May, 1968, and the transversal struggles that accompanied it as an event he called “the death of the subject”, which he argued in Nietzschean terms was a consequence of the the death of God.⁶⁴⁷

Foucault uses genealogy to uncover the process of subject construction in order to make the human beings he is writing for aware of the continued domination they face at the hands of the apparatuses that engender sexualisation and normalization. The transversal struggles, that is; the form of resistance that Foucault is concerned with is premised on a correlative social and subjective domination, in which the subject becomes divided within himself, fortifying his social domination in a statist apparatus. Following this logic, Foucault deploys the genealogical method to configure how power has constituted both material domination within modern society and a deeper subjection. This with regard to forms of subjectivity that determine possible modes of being that constitute an ontology of the modern world. He is

⁶⁴³ Ibid 208; See also Deleuze, *Nomadic Thought*, 252-256

⁶⁴⁴ Gary Gutting, *French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 263

⁶⁴⁵ Foucault, *Body Power*, in, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, Colin Gordon, ed. (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1980), 62

⁶⁴⁶ Michel Foucault, *What is Enlightenment*, in, *The Foucault Reader*, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York, Pantheon Books, 1984), ; Foucault, *The Subject and Power*, 215

⁶⁴⁷ Foucault, *Truth and Juridical Forms*, 6-8

keen on distinguishing this very subject and its role as a deeper form of subjection that supports and is beneficial to worldly conditions determined by statist rule, for the very purpose of providing a route of both forms of domination.

The problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state and from the state's institutions but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization which is linked to the state.⁶⁴⁸

For Foucault, in order to create new ways of life as a mode of resistance, subjects must be aware of their actual constitution as subjects in the form of dividing practices, as well as the relations of power that continue to engender them as obstacles to further practices. Foucault's genealogical history of the present is not a Nietzschean diagnosis of life-affirming and denying symptoms, but is rather concerned with a political diagnosis of the subjective and correlative institutional obstacles, to form a relay towards further practices of revolution.

2.An Historical Framework for the Production of Subjectivity and Truth

Foucault was part of a generation of burgeoning young scholars who disposed their philosophies in opposition to the French Hegelian tradition, who had grown to prominence in the middle of the twentieth century.⁶⁴⁹ Foucault, alongside Deleuze and questionably Jacques Derrida, tried to “free themselves once and for all from that tradition”.⁶⁵⁰ These thinkers were opposed to universal and totalitarian histories that constituted Hegelianism, Kantianism and Marxism.⁶⁵¹ Encompassed in this post-modern incredulity towards old historical metanarratives,⁶⁵² Foucault framed archaeological historiography as being opposed to totalitarian or ‘total’ history which would reduce all plurality and discontinuity. He considers himself a general historian, who promotes discontinuity in the face of universal continuous metanarratives.⁶⁵³

⁶⁴⁸ Foucault, *The Subject and Power*, 216

⁶⁴⁹ Judith Butler, *Subjects of desire: Hegelian reflections in twentieth-century France* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1987), 175-230

⁶⁵⁰ Bruce Baugh, *French Hegel: From Surrealism to Post-structuralism*, (New York: Routledge, 2003), 147

⁶⁵¹ Ibid

⁶⁵² See Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Post-Modern Condition*, in *The Postmodern Turn: New Perspectives on Social theory*, edited by Steven Seidman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 28

⁶⁵³ Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, *Postmodern Theory*, (London, Macmillan Press, 1991), 40-45

A total description draws all phenomena around a single centre –a principle, a meaning, a spirit, a world-view, an overall shape...the theme of a total history begins to disappear, and we begin to see something very different that will be called general history.⁶⁵⁴

The historical framework that Foucault uses to trace a history of the production of subjectivity outside the control of any human agent or teleological unity is an historical study of an apparatus. The historical study of an apparatus is therefore what Foucault refers to as his genealogical method. The notion of an apparatus enabled Foucault to not so much uncover the genesis of particular structures,⁶⁵⁵ but rather explain how mutually supportive diachronic strategies of power relations and discursive knowledge configured around the unit of the episteme, and exercised “the strategic function of an apparatus” could emerge in response to an urgent need. In his genealogies, Foucault studied historical formations, or apparatuses that arose, as Agamben notes rather carefully, as, “a pure activity of governance devoid of any foundation in being”.⁶⁵⁶ The apparatus, having no foundation in any historical process, allows Foucault to recapitulate the archaeological focus on historical discontinuity in his genealogical method without the methodological errors of autonomous discourse theorized in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*,⁶⁵⁷ and the epistemic structuralism of the *Order of Things* and *Madness and Civilization*.⁶⁵⁸

In his genealogies of modernity, Foucault portrays the emergence of subjective life as being produced through a set of discontinuous technological processes, without any transhistorical foundation premised on the philosophical positions of onto-theological metaphysics. Foucault’s claim is that the subject positions do not characterize our human nature, since we can seek to create new forms of subjectivity.⁶⁵⁹ Foucauldian genealogy is premised on a negation of human nature. For Michael Clifford, Foucault’s, “Genealogical critique, in fact, challenges the metaphysics of essence, which posits a substantive given subject”.⁶⁶⁰

Moreover, Foucault’s genealogical method is premised on the notion that our subjectivities are produced through the historicity of groundless apparatuses, and therefore an epistemic *a priori* structuring of discourses which regulate the way speaking subjects perceive the world. For Foucault, our concepts of the norm, and more importantly; the notion of sex from which

⁶⁵⁴ Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 12, 11

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid 68

⁶⁵⁶ Giorgio Agamben, *What is an Apparatus and other Essays*, Translated by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford, Stanford University press, 2009), 11

⁶⁵⁷ Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Foucault*, 79-92

⁶⁵⁸ Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, Translated by Alan Bass (Cornwall, Routledge Classics, 2009), 69

⁶⁵⁹ Foucault, *The Subject and Power*, 216

⁶⁶⁰ Michael Clifford, *Political Genealogy after Foucault: Savage Identities*, (London: Routledge, 2001), 6

it derives, are not trans-historical idealities from which we derive the truth of our human nature, but rather historical constructs that produce ‘who we are’ with no truth value.⁶⁶¹ For Foucault, genealogy is a method that traces how power and knowledge apparatuses produce individuals that are also the transcendental doublets, concepts and strategic impulsive of discourses⁶⁶² through an informal historical process, engendered by an urgent need that has come to constitute a world of truthful relations between human beings. For Foucault, genealogy as a method therefore conveys that those values and epistemic systems of truth that have ordered modernity are not the neutral or objective results of a trans-rational historical process, but rather a set of interpretive errors that have hardened into valuable truths through a series of dominations and power relations. For Foucault, by deracinating an entire regime of truth as the ordering-force of society inculcated through a meaningless and informal process, genealogy is an effective history.⁶⁶³ That is, genealogy is a textual device that is deployed or used for a practical, not theoretical effect:

The initial result is that we can understand those who resemble us as completely determined systems and as representative of diverse cultures, that is to say, as necessary and capable of modification. And in return, we are able to separate the phases of our own evolution and consider them individually. The purpose of history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation. It does not seek to define our unique threshold of emergence, the homeland to which metaphysicians promise a return; it seeks to make visible all of those discontinuities that cross us.⁶⁶⁴

4) An Ontology of Who we are for the Purpose of Resistance

At the very beginning of the first Chapter, I pointed out that Nietzsche’s genealogy responded to the Kantian question of who we are, which for Foucault characterized the Enlightenment attitude to philosophy. Foucault includes his own philosophy as embodying this attitude, yet his take on it, or response to the Kantian question in his genealogies, is Heideggarian. While his historiographical method of tracing power relations is Nietzschean, Foucault’s response to who we are is premised on the notion of *savior* (discourse) which belies a disposition that is fundamentally Heideggarian.⁶⁶⁵ Foucault’s genealogical method moves from Nietzsche’s organic cosmological conception of power, to an analysis of power as a strategic mechanistic process inscribed in nature. This produces a Heideggarian world as a carceral network, as a

⁶⁶¹ Foucault, *History of Sexuality Volume 1*, 151-152; Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 95

⁶⁶² Foucault, *Truth and Juridical Norms*, 3-4

⁶⁶³ Foucault, *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, 93

⁶⁶⁴ *Ibid* 94-95

⁶⁶⁵ Stuart Elden, *Genealogy as Historical Ontology*, in, *Critical Encounters: Foucault and Heidegger*, edited by Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 196-199

combination of disciplinary and bio-power relations to the discursive ordering faculty of the episteme ordered via the notion of a human being as a transcendental doublet possessing an essence. This informal process of power relations therefore produces an episteme which provides a set of intersubjective modal subject-object (*savoir*) discursive relations that limit the subjective possibilities of knowing human bodies, characterizing a historico-ontological world. Deleuze describes this relationship in Foucault's work perfectly, despite his mistaken use of the term Being, for which I would supplant an episteme, or power relation that configures the modalities of plastic bodies.

If knowledge (*savoir*) is constituted by two forms, how a subject could display any intentionality towards an object, since each form has its own objects and subjects? ... Knowledge is Being, the first figure of Being...From epistemology to strategy. This is another reason why there is no 'savage' experience, since battles imply a strategy and any experience is caught up in relations of power. This is the second figure of Being...power-Being, as opposed to knowledge Being...It is the informal forces or power relations that set up relations between the two forms of formed knowledge.⁶⁶⁶

Foucault's genealogical historiography is not a form of historical sociology.⁶⁶⁷ It is rather a historical ontology of who we are.⁶⁶⁸ An historical ontology of who we is a history of the informal process by which power relations produce an episteme constitutive of an *a priori* that orders discursive relations of knowledge (*savior*) that conjoin human beings intersubjective possibilities in a historico-ontological carceral world.⁶⁶⁹

While the question of historical ontology in Foucault's writing has been rightly analyzed, its relation to social science has not been treated sufficiently. In Nietzsche's genealogy, he had to resort to a conceptual and academic schema to communicate his diagnosis of the present. Moreover, Nietzsche used genealogy as a form of historiography that was artful and reconstructive. Foucault, like Nietzsche, uses genealogy as an historical deracination of a traditional regime of truth and a diagnosis of the present. Moreover, Foucault uses genealogy as an historical diagnosis of the present so as to ascertain the historico-statist limits that condition who we are, so as to overcome those limits to reinvent ourselves. Foucault's historiography therefore runs into the same danger that afflicts Nietzsche's; how to critique of

⁶⁶⁶ Deleuze, *Foucault*, 92

⁶⁶⁷ Elden, *Genealogy as Historical Ontology*, 188-189

⁶⁶⁸ Foucault, *What is Enlightenment* ; Foucault, *Subject and Power*, 220-221

⁶⁶⁹ *Ibid* 220-221

the rational notions of truth and knowledge, and still communicate one's position to his readers.⁶⁷⁰ This is an especially important issue in Foucauldian scholarship.

To frame the problem exactly, Foucault, in opposition to the will to truth, argues that he has never written anything but fictions.⁶⁷¹ He posits that his genealogy does not hold the status of a science,⁶⁷² but still claims that he has written the history of a political reality.⁶⁷³ The problem can be solved through a closer reading of Foucault's relation to Heidegger's conception of the clearing-- truth. For Heidegger, great art possesses the capacity of disclosing the truth of Being's disclosure of existential possibilities into the open region of the clearing. Art is the aesthetics of *aletheia*, a portrayal of the factual historical horizon of intelligible meaning that distinguishes the experiential truth of human beings in the world. For Heidegger, art is therefore a work that is revealing of existential truth, which in Foucault's analysis is a political reality:

The essence of art, on which the artwork and the artist depend, is the setting-itself-into-work of truth. It is due to arts poetic essence that, in the midst of beings, art breaks open an open place, in whose openness everything is other than usual. By virtue of the projection set into the work of the unconcealment of beings, which casts itself towards us, everything ordinary and hitherto existing becomes an unbeing. This unbeing has lost the capacity to give Being as a measure. The curious fact here is that the work in no way effects existing beings by causal connections. The working of a work does not consist in the taking effect of a cause. It lies in a change, happening from out of the work, in the unconcealment of beings, of Being.⁶⁷⁴

Foucault's genealogies follow the change incited by the transversal struggles that took place in Europe surrounding the event of May 1968. As an historical ontology, Foucault uses genealogy to supplement these anarchistic struggles with an artistic portrayal of open regions or clearings within a carceral network that are brought about through a set of strategically conditioned micro-dominations, or power relations. In his book, *Foucault*, Deleuze compared Foucault's work in his genealogies to that of a cartographer. As a cartographer, Foucault is considered to have stressed the role of the visual in his histories in a manner no different than that of an artist.⁶⁷⁵ From the painting by Vasquez, to the sovereign relation of power that

⁶⁷⁰ Alasdair MacIntyre, *Three rival versions of Moral Inquiry, Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and Tradition, (United states of America, University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 207-210*

⁶⁷¹ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, in, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, Colin Gordon, ed. (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1980), 193

⁶⁷² Foucault, *Genealogy and Social Criticism*, 42

⁶⁷³ Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, 193

⁶⁷⁴ *Ibid* 127-128

⁶⁷⁵ Deleuze, *Foucault*, 21-22

permitted the decapitation of Damians the regicide,⁶⁷⁶ to the depiction of the open regions of a democratic world resembling prisons;⁶⁷⁷ Foucault is intent on visually elucidating the existential historicity of individualized subjects. For Deleuze, “analysis and illustration”⁶⁷⁸ are inextricably linked in Foucault’s work, with regard to an analytics of power and the subjectification of the body.⁶⁷⁹ In his genealogical analysis of the carceral world, Foucault analytically illustrates, through written paintings, a set of open regions engendered by power relations as dominations that distinguish the capabilities of who we are: schools, juvenile centres, asylums, prisons, clinics, hospitals, military barracks and factories; he uses an aesthetic history to cross the bounds of fiction and existential reality as truth, qua Heidegger’s notion. For Foucault, within the confines of factories, workhouses and prisons, “reality happens”.⁶⁸⁰

The purpose then, following the change happening outside the work in the transversal anarchistic struggles, is to revoke the experienced of subjugated knowledge. This is done via a counter memory that was produced and suppressed through power relations, through an illustrative form of writing that traces a memory of dominations as a political reality of possibilities, for the tactical purpose of situating such open regions as to overturn them.⁶⁸¹ Foucault therefore uses genealogy as a militant cartographer who is producing of a map of power relations for the purpose of supplementing resistance to them, while additionally deconstructing the manner in which those power relations have produced relations of truth that determine our behaviour. Foucault is an effective historian because his method allows him to master a technology of the will to power that has historically, until the present, governed, who we are, in such a way as to supplement forces of resistance for possible future change, or chance.⁶⁸²

They were concerned with a historical knowledge of struggles. In the specialised areas of erudition as in the disqualified, popular knowledge there lay the memory of hostile encounters which even up to this day have been confined to the margins of knowledge. What emerges out of this is something one might call a genealogy, or rather a multiplicity of genealogical researches, a painstaking rediscovery of struggles together with the rude memory of their conflicts. Let us give the term genealogy to the union

⁶⁷⁶ Ibid 22

⁶⁷⁷ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 228

⁶⁷⁸ Foucault, *Deleuze*, 22

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid

⁶⁸⁰ Foucault and Deleuze, *Intellectuals and Power*, 212

⁶⁸¹ Foucault, *Body/Power*, 62

⁶⁸² Foucault, *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, 89

of erudite knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today.⁶⁸³

Section 3: Genealogy in relation to Foucault's project

Foucault had of course, proposed that there were three modalities of genealogy that have led to the constitution of human beings as subjects, in modernity:

Three domains of genealogy are possible. First, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to how we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second an historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others. Third, an historical ontology of ourselves in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents.⁶⁸⁴

In the course of writing a genealogy of ethics, Foucault came across difficulties that led him to abandon the project. = Therefore, in my reading of Foucault, the *History of Sexuality: Volume 1* signifies the end of a methodological period,⁶⁸⁵ which as we can see, clearly includes archaeology.⁶⁸⁶ In his later years, Foucault adopted a new method, in which he sought to reconfigure the processes and relationships with which human beings constituted themselves as subjects. However, the interesting alterations that marked the methodological problematizations that distinguished the “technologies of the self”,⁶⁸⁷ in Foucault's later years, gave birth to certain remarks. These were no doubt related to the discoveries he made in his new books, which contradicted his earlier genealogical work. Suddenly, the anarchist-theorist who was opposed to the idea of a theorist advancing a theoretical dictum that would dictate politico-moral practice made the startling claim that:

The historical ontology of ourselves must turn away from all projects that claim to be global or radical. In fact we know from experience that the claim to escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions. I prefer the very specific transformations that have proved to be possible in the last twenty years in a certain number of areas that concern our ways of being and thinking, relations to authority, relations between the sexes, the way in which we perceive insanity or illness; I prefer even these partial transformations that have been

⁶⁸³Foucault, *Genealogy and Social Criticism*, 42

⁶⁸⁴ Michel Foucault, *Afterword: On the Genealogy of Ethics*, in, Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus, ‘Michel Foucault, Beyond structuralism and Hermeneutics’ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 237

⁶⁸⁵ Richard A Lynch, *Chapter 6: Reading the History of Sexuality*, 163; See also Davidson, *Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics*, 230

⁶⁸⁶ Best and Kellner, *Postmodern Theory*, 46; Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault: *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 104

⁶⁸⁷ Foucault, *Subject and Power*, 208-209

made in the correlation of historical analysis and the practical attitude, to the programs for a new man that the worst political systems have repeated throughout the twentieth century.⁶⁸⁸

Instead of a structure of agency-relation, Foucault replaces a power/subjectivity/resistance model. Foucault's critique of the essentialist conceptions of sex and sexuality that has distinguished modern notions of human normality is indissociable from a form of resistance in which "the body and its pleasures" occupy the central rallying point.⁶⁸⁹ However, Butler has pointed out that Foucault's earlier and later work on the body both offer insights that are contradictory.⁶⁹⁰ This corresponds not only to his views on the body, but the entire communicative content of Foucault's work.⁶⁹¹ For a thinker who once claimed that everything is discourse, and that one is always at the mercy of the mystifying effects of power relations, it would be awfully contradictory to claim that we are now free without the altering the relations of power that have that constituted us. Thus, I am in agreement with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Foucault that last two volumes of *The History of Sexuality* were not meant as alternatives to his earlier deconstructive genealogies.⁶⁹² Nonetheless, I am aware that Foucault's later works on the mastery of the self as the ethical conundrum⁶⁹³ altered his theoretical disposition. I would go as far as to suggest that the claim that "we must write a critical historical ontology of ourselves" in *What is Enlightenment*, may be addressed to a different, albeit academic audience as opposed to *Intellectuals and Power* after the revolts in France had settled at the turn of the 1980s. Taking this into account, I would like to suggest, in conclusion, that the freedom Foucault espouses is neither noumenal nor pragmatic,⁶⁹⁴ but rather a constitutive affective plasticity that permits us the capacity to change who we are through resistance, so that we may become otherwise.⁶⁹⁵ However, even the notion of becoming otherwise engenders certain problems with regard to the reading of Foucault, and the place of his genealogical critique of his overall project. In 1972 Foucault claimed that the individual is only a product of power, and promoted the deconstitution of the lines of the constitution of the subject into a set of revolutionary "groupuscules".⁶⁹⁶ Several

⁶⁸⁸ Foucault, *What is Enlightenment*, 46-47

⁶⁸⁹ Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, 157

⁶⁹⁰ Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 94

⁶⁹¹ May, *Philosophy of Foucault*, 1

⁶⁹² Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *More Reflections on Power Knowledge*, in, *The Spivak Reader*, (eds) Donna Landry and Gerald Maclean, (New York: Routledge, 1996), 158-160

⁶⁹³ Richard A Lynch, *Reading the History of Sexuality Volume 1*, 163

⁶⁹⁴ Todd May, *Foucault's Conception of Freedom*, in, *Foucault: Key Concepts*, Edited by Diana Taylor, (Durham, Acumen, 2011), 71-75

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid 76-80; Deleuze, Foucault, 74

⁶⁹⁶ Foucault and Deleuze, *Intellectuals and Power*, 206

years later he sought to ascertain another form of subjectivity.⁶⁹⁷ Even when he moves against his former position regarding partial transformations in the paper “The Subject and Power”, towards an anarchist refusal and the state,⁶⁹⁸ he still proffers the demand for the creation of new subjectivities. However, as I understand it, freedom is only tangible as a form of resistance that untangles power relations, setting up a line of flight exterior to two statist apparatuses that would lead to the formation of new relations of forces, what Deleuze calls “the outside”.⁶⁹⁹

I do not want to end this Chapter with an analysis of subjectivity and freedom and its paradoxical relationship to power and force relations that constitute, out of human control, who we are. What I do want to conclude with is a refusal of attempts of Foucault’s readers to try and create continuity between disparate textual exercises. It is of course arguable that Foucault attempted to do this to some degree, under the notion of the subject.⁷⁰⁰ Yet despite this, my claim is that Foucault is a thinker who contradicts himself, not because he is an inadequate philosopher, but rather a thinker that does not espouse the traditional view of the author. Foucault’s early work stressed the author’s functionality in relation to a discursive field.⁷⁰¹ The subject was not decried any metaphysical autonomy and unity but as Foucault argued, rather occupied a set of positions as an enunciative modality(ies) in a field of regulative statements that conjoined the subject’s relation to itself and the other as the historico-ontological level of intersubjective capability. Certain subjects, Foucault argued, are founders of discursivity,⁷⁰² thinkers who transgressed the hold of prior discursive regimes, through the creation of new ones.⁷⁰³ For Foucault, the very act of writing was never a reductive, but a transgressive exercise in which the functional subject of discourse crosses his or her own limits of constitution.⁷⁰⁴ In that sense, Foucault’s anarchic-genealogical politics are best left to the historical set of events, and the transversal struggles that brought them into being. We should not attempt to create relations of continuity in his work, and to himself, against his own wishes. Foucault is a thinker that does not answer to discontinuity and contradiction; he promotes it as a path to political and personal transgression.

⁶⁹⁷ Foucault, *Subject and Power*, 216

⁶⁹⁸ Deleuze, *Foucault*, 74 ; Deleuze, *Nomadic Thought*, 255

⁶⁹⁹ Foucault, *The Subject and Power* ; Deleuze, *Foucault*, 74

⁷⁰⁰ Foucault, *Subject and Power*, 208-209

⁷⁰¹ Foucault, *What is an Author*, in, *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984: Volume 2: Aesthetics, Ethics and Methodology*, edited by James Faubion (New York, The New Press, 1998),210-212 ; Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 99-118

⁷⁰² Foucault, *What is Author*, 206

⁷⁰³ Ibid 211

⁷⁰⁴ Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 19

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Chapter Three: Edward Said and the Abuse of Genealogy

Introduction

In this Chapter I will embark on an analysis of the post-colonial abuse of the genealogical method, a method which I have recently shown to have been created by Friedrich Nietzsche and deployed effectively by Michel Foucault. Within the disciplinary context of post-colonial theory, Edward Said is considered to have written a genealogy called *Orientalism*, and has the esteemed title of being a ‘genealogist’. Several post-colonial theorists have mistakenly labelled Edward Said’s creation of an analytic method, which he has called *an* “intellectual genealogy”,⁷⁰⁵ to be a correct extension and application of Foucauldian and Nietzschean genealogy. I argue that this is a misunderstanding of the correct methodological use of genealogy within post-colonial theory. For the scholar William Spanos:

Not unlike the genealogy of the modern disciplinary society in Foucault’s ‘Discipline and Punish’, Said’s genealogy ‘Orientalism’ is structured in terms of an apparent sharp contrast between the power relations of a pre-modern past and that of modernity.⁷⁰⁶

More problematically, within this field of academic criticism and activism, the relation of Said’s genealogy to the work of Nietzsche and Foucault is also far from being assured. There is a certain degree of confusion with regard to what type of genealogy Said has written. While Spanos may argue that the genealogy of Said is Foucauldian, William Hart for example, considers Said to be a Nietzschean, not Foucauldian genealogy:

Thus, to say that Said’s genealogy ‘deviates’ from Foucault’s genealogies is to say that it is more like the genealogies of Nietzsche. Both Nietzsche and Said are more interested in the distinctive signatures of individual authors – which is not a methodological mistake but a difference in methodological accent – than they are in the constitutive powers of anonymous discourses.⁷⁰⁷

Hart goes on to say that, “this makes Said much more like Nietzsche than Nietzsche’s supposed heir Michel Foucault”.⁷⁰⁸ In the face of this interdisciplinary confusion, I would like to put forward a position that is the radical. The purpose of this chapter is to exhibit that the post-colonial appropriation of genealogy, via Said and his followers has not only turned genealogy into a social science methodology, but in doing so has robbed genealogy of its potential for post-colonial studies. In order for me to have a claim regarding the future of

⁷⁰⁵ Said, *Orientalism*, 24

⁷⁰⁶ William A Spanos, *Edward Said: A Legacy*, (Illinois, University of Illinois Press; 2009), 73

⁷⁰⁷ Hart, *Said and the Religious effects of Culture*), 69

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid 142

post-colonial genealogy, I will first need to coherently show why the work of Said is not a genealogy methodologically in the same sense as the genealogists whose work I have just elucidated, Nietzsche and Foucault. What Said outlined as his central problem of Orientalist discourse in *Orientalism* not only challenged the colonial and neo-colonial essentialized representation of the Eastern ‘Other’, but in challenging that representation attacked the very binary division of reality that grounded the ‘West’s’ perception of itself, and its identity. This is the central problem of *Orientalism*.⁷⁰⁹

For Orientalism was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between (Europe, the West, ‘us’) and the strange (the Orient, the East, ‘them’). This vision in a sense created and then served the two worlds thus conceived.⁷¹⁰

In *Orientalism*, Said’s central aim is premised on overcoming an epistemology that ontologizes a binary vision of human reality; that binary of Western modern, rational civility contra Eastern primitive, mystical barbarity. I will explain these terms in the course of the analysis, but it is important to set out exactly what Said does, as an intellectual genealogist, in *Orientalism*. The link between Said’s outlook in *Orientalism* and the genealogical outlook of Nietzsche and Foucault is often considered to be a shared sceptical attitude towards knowledge in general, and a desire to overcome the authoritative and dogmatic theological and scientific knowledge has had over living beings in particular:

I hope to have shown my reader that the answer to Orientalism is not Occidentalism. No ‘former’ Oriental will be comforted by the thought that having been an Oriental himself he is likely – too likely – to study new ‘Orientals’-or ‘Occidentals’- of his own making, it is in being a remainder of the seductive degradation of knowledge, of any knowledge, anywhere at time.⁷¹¹

Said’s project in *Orientalism* is the manner in which the personal dimension of the text is imbricated, and on principle never dissociable from the text’s central problem, which is overcoming the binary essentialist framework that, in his opinion, splits the world into West and East, Occident (European) and Orient (Asian). This is due to what is referred among Saidian scholars as the paradox of Said’s identity. For Pat Ahluwalia and Bill Ashcroft, in Said, “we find a person located in a tangle of cultural and theoretical contradictions:

⁷⁰⁹ Daniel Varisco, *Reading Orientalism’: Said and the Unsaid*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 250-266, 290-303

⁷⁰⁹ Edward Said, *Representations of an Intellectual; The Reith Lectures*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), see 94-100; See also, Gyan Prakash, *Orientalism now, in, History and Theory* (1995), See also Pat Ahluwalia and Bill Ashcroft, *Edward Said*, (London: Routledge, 2001), 112

⁷¹⁰ Said, *Orientalism*, 43

⁷¹¹ Ibid 328

contradictions between his Westernised persona and political concern.”⁷¹² It is this contradiction that marks one of the most important passages in the book. Said makes explicit to the reader that in writing *Orientalism*, he “never lost hold of the cultural reality of, the personal involvement of been constituted as ‘an Oriental.’”⁷¹³ Thus, when Said is writing the intellectual genealogy of colonial power and Orientalist discourse, he is also tracking a historical inventory of racist stereotypes of the Orient, and traces from antiquity to the present. Thus, who Said is operates at both elements of the binary. He too has entered the tradition of the Orientalist scholar who is latently racist in creating the Orient and as a created Oriental who, in accordance with the view of Orientalist scholars, would have required moral conversion in order to correct his intrinsic racial or essential abnormality. By recounting the inventory of traces that constitute this experience conditioned by hegemonic consent, Said hopes to attain a critical consciousness that extinguishes this opposition, since it would allow him to see past the hegemonic constraints of both social constructs. Therefore, my critique of Said’s genealogy, and what most academic critiques miss, is that despite Said’s epistemological mistakes-- since he wrote the text as both an intellectual, and an ‘Oriental’-- Said’s text is still considered a genealogy because it traces all the dehumanizing representations of the Orient all the way back to antiquity. Thus, Said traces the experiential reality of not only being dominated and denied autonomy, but also the feeling that one’s “uniquely punishing destiny”⁷¹⁴ is reducible to the degenerate racial characteristics of an Oriental. In order to correct this abnormality, one needs to consent to the hegemonic principles of Western rationality.

It is in ignorance of Said’s existential project by Western academics that has *allowed* post-colonial theorists to continue to claim that *Orientalism* is a genealogy. It is in terms of this existential or experiential project that Orientalism shares an important commonality with Nietzschean genealogy. Nietzschean thought seeks to free the life of living beings from the negative constraints of what appears to be a natural system of scientific or theological truth. For many scholars, just by showing colonial discourse to be constructed, Said had liberated them from the existential torture of having to identify with a stereotype produced by the racism immanent to colonial practice. This is what a very subtle thinker, Dennis Porter points out when he suggests that despite its numerous epistemological errors, *Orientalism* is a very

⁷¹² Ahluwalia and Ashcroft, *Edward Said*, 5

⁷¹³ Said, *Orientalism*, 26

⁷¹⁴ *Ibid* 27

important book.⁷¹⁵ Said's success is of course, awarded on the perception that he did overcome the binary racialized vision of reality, since his text was articulated from the perspective of an "Orientalized experience".⁷¹⁶ Therefore, he overcomes the problems outlined in *Orientalism* directly regarding racial objectification and essentialization.⁷¹⁷ For these thinkers, Said has as a result overcome his own diagnosis of "latent Orientalism",⁷¹⁸ or the definitive structural characteristic of Orientalist discourse (which I will discuss shortly). While it is evident that Said couldn't overcome this binary racialized latent structure in *Orientalism*, due to his overtly racist portrayal of all Europeans,⁷¹⁹ Said claims to draw on this critical sense as a means of speaking the truth to power, thereby overcoming the racial and essentializing division of human reality in the series of interviews published as *Representations of an Intellectual*.⁷²⁰ When he changes his position to "speaking the truth to power",⁷²¹ Said distinguishes his move by drawing upon the same "critical consciousness"⁷²² that the writing of *Orientalism* was intended to produce.⁷²³ My contention is that, contrary to Said's supporters, that in *Representations of the Intellectual*, Said does not overcome a binary racialized view of reality, but reconstructs it. His binaries simply manifest,⁷²⁴ differently.

While Said seemingly embodies a critical disposition towards epistemological neutrality in general like the genealogists, my claim is that *Orientalism* is not a genealogy because of its stance towards truth and its metaphysical analytic, which does not correspond to the power and force ontology that connects the research of Nietzsche and Foucault. There have been a number of thinkers who have previously made these points; however, it has not been taken as a central failing in the field of post-colonial studies. One of the thinkers that addressed the problem of the Nietzschean content in Said's text as a Nietzschean genealogy shortly after its appearance in 1981 was the scholar Paul Bove. Bove responded to Said's text shortly after its publication in 1981. For Bove, Said shared a commonality with Nietzsche and Foucault insofar as his history in *Orientalism* decimated a history of truth.⁷²⁵ Nonetheless, he argued

⁷¹⁵ Dennis Porter, *Orientalism and its Problems*, in, *The Politics of Theory*, (eds) Francis Barker, (Essex; Colchester, 1983), 150

⁷¹⁶ Said, *Orientalism*, 71

⁷¹⁷ Ibid 71

⁷¹⁸ Ibid 203

⁷¹⁹ Ibid 204

⁷²⁰ Said, *Representations of an Intellectual*, 23, 86

⁷²¹ Ibid 9-13

⁷²² Said, *Orientalism*, 24

⁷²³ See Edward Said, *The World, The text and the Critic*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 15-16

⁷²⁴ Said, *Orientalism*, 204

⁷²⁵ Paul Bove, *Mendacious innocents, or, the modern genealogist as conscientious intellectual: Nietzsche, Foucault, Said* *Boundary Vol 2*, (1981), 370

that because Said attempted to “replace one regime of truth with another”, he did not have a critical standpoint that characterized a genealogist.⁷²⁶ In this I will show how Said’s miscomprehension and revision of Foucauldian genealogy leads to a failed project. After elucidating how Said’s methodological revisions do not correspond to the structure of a genealogy, I will detail that his own exercise fails to the extent that his thought leads to a re-establishment of dehumanizing binary system on the basis of a secular/religious divide, a division that he paid due attention to overcoming in *Orientalism*. Moreover, the search for a science, or a true account of colonial affairs would, in my reading, overstep and transform the genealogical method into a caricature of Nietzsche’s original intent. As we have uncovered, genealogy does not have the hold status of a science, since it tracks how a regime of truth constrains and sickens the life of the body through an historical analysis of the present. This tracking in the Nietzschean and Foucauldian reading does not reaffirm another truth, but instead denies the impulse of the will to truth, with regard to the lived condition of the experiential body. In this very light, Bove pointed out that Said’s concern with truth was the distinguishing factor in denying Said as a genealogist. In order to demonstrate Said’s failure to overcome the binary and racial characteristics of his thinking, this section will disengage Said’s ontological analytic in *Orientalism* from the organic cosmology that frames Nietzsche’s aestheticism in *On the Genealogy of Morals*. More importantly, this disengagement will also be done from Foucault’s power and knowledge relation in his notion of the apparatus in his genealogies, since it is the one of the methods that Said claims to be employing. It also includes an explication of how Said’s history is not a post-structural genealogical diagnosis, but written as a structuralist linear history. This consists of three interrelated tasks:

1. To locate Said’s conception of power in Gramsci’s Marxism rather than Nietzsche’s genealogy;
2. To describe Said as a structuralist and not as a post-structuralist;
3. To demonstrate how Said’s structuralist conception of discourse contradicts the principle of discourse and therefore power and knowledge.

Once I have shown all three faulty of elements of Said’s methodology, I will be able to conclude that Said lacks the ontological and thus historical framework for a Foucauldian or Nietzschean genealogy. *Orientalism*, as already stated, is an intellectual genealogy that traces

⁷²⁶ Ibid 373, 378

the experience of being stereotypically othered. When one critiques a piece of writing that deals with the experience of being othered one cannot simply fault that experience of it on epistemological grounds, but one must respond to that experience ethically by attempting, as Deleuze says of Nietzsche as a genealogist, to “rock in the same boat”.⁷²⁷ My response to Said is also premised on the fact that like him, my concern is also for those dehumanized by colonization. If Said’s text is a failure with regard to its own project, yet is seen to be effective and an authoritative standard for post-colonial genealogy, then it is essential for the future of the post-colonial project that I show it as a failure here. In the second part of this chapter, by delving deep into Said’s concern towards his present reality in terms of who one is-- that is, his own reframing of the genealogical position towards the Kantian attitude regarding who we are-- I indicate how Said cannot account for such an experience, and show how the constitution of such experience is grounded not as Said thinks, through hegemonic consent to stereotyping, but rather a genealogical framework of subjectification. For me to illustrate my point within the framework of dealing with a tortured post-colonial subject condition, I draw on Homi Bhabha and Frantz Fanon. Thus, after showing how Said’s *Orientalism* does not have the framework of a genealogy, and “rocking with” Said’s concerns in the third section of this chapter, I will then consider his weaknesses and show how, in *Speaking the Truth to Power*, he still cannot overcome the Orientalist frameworks he was trying to overcome on the basis of not using a genealogical framework that would deal with his own subjectification.

Section 1: Said’s Ontological Framework

Power

In *Orientalism*, Said claims he employs Foucault’s notion of a discourse, as described by the latter in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and in *Discipline and Punish*, to identify the discourse in *Orientalism*.⁷²⁸ Notwithstanding the fact that Foucault’s books under question typify completely different approaches, archaeology and genealogy respectively, when Said is referring to the nexus of power and knowledge,⁷²⁹ he is speaking of Orientalism and

⁷²⁷ Deleuze, *Nomadic Thought*, 255

⁷²⁸ Said, *Orientalism*, 3

⁷²⁹ Ibid 27

modern imperialistic political power. I argue that the difference between Nietzschean and Foucauldian power and Said's theory is that power in the latter has been poorly understood.⁷³⁰ The Nietzschean ontology of force was revolutionary insofar as it was able to theorize how power operated in society without relying on the traditional substantive models used by political theory.⁷³¹ In the Nietzschean ontologies that I described in Chapter 1, power is not something that merely exists in reality; it is not a substance or a form. In Nietzschean thought, power engenders the real. The object is produced by power,⁷³² or is an expression of force.⁷³³ Most importantly, in the Nietzschean cosmology of power, the exercise of power, or a quanta of strength is never conditioned by a neutral substratum that acts on the basis of its own volition.⁷³⁴

In Foucault's genealogical histories, the model of power and knowledge that constitutes an apparatus, the same one Said is said to be deploying, are forces that affect each other which are not exercised in terms of quanta or strength, but in terms of a rational strategy. Yet, within Foucault's model, although a strategy of power may give birth to a situated form of class domination, the difference is that power is never exercised as a top-down oppressive structure, but rather such domination in the form of the state, or law, is rather the terminal effect or consequence of power relations. Thus, for Foucault, power is never exercised:

From the choice or a decision of an individual subject; let us not look for the headquarters that preside over its rationality... the rationality of power is characterized by tactics that are quite often at the restricted level where they are inscribed.⁷³⁵

Said has conceptualized power completely differently. For him, there is a "neutral substratum" that chooses whether to exercise its strength or not. Orientalism does not simply correspond to the raw exercise of power, but "it is, rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, to incorporate what is manifestly different."⁷³⁶ Power for Said in *Orientalism*, is political power that exists objectively in an already presupposed reality, one in which it is evident that Said cannot escape the West/East binary. Power still interestingly possesses the potential to engender discourses such as

⁷³⁰ Hart, *Edward Said and the Religious effects of Culture*, 135-141, Mustapha Marrouchi, *Edward Said at the Limits* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 100

⁷³¹ Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 53

⁷³² Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 194

⁷³³ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 6

⁷³⁴ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, essay 1, section 13

⁷³⁵ Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, 95

⁷³⁶ Said, *Orientalism*, 12

Orientalism, thereby “engendering limits on thought”.⁷³⁷ The political power that Said is concerned with in *Orientalism* and that produces its discourse,⁷³⁸ is the power of the colonial West. Orientalism is:

A Western style for dominating, structuring and having authority over the Orient...,⁷³⁹ There are Westerners, and there are Orientals. The former dominate; and the latter must be dominated; which usually means having their land occupied; their internal affairs rigidly controlled, their blood and treasure put at the disposal of one or another Western power.⁷⁴⁰

This is not a material form that force relations have taken. Edward Said is not a post-structuralist Foucauldian or Nietzschean but a modern Gramscian structuralist.⁷⁴¹ What I mean is that Said is not a theorist of force, and therefore not a Nietzschean theorist of power. In Said’s analysis in *Orientalism*, political structural power is not uniform, but structures the experiences of human agents in different yet complementary ways. Political or colonial power constitutes the structural base from which other power structures operate. Thus, while Said’s analysis of power is political, the manner in which political power engenders the discourse of Orientalism is not a simple causation, but produced through an intersection with the different structural forms of power. Said argues that the discursive formation of Orientalism “is produced and exists in an uneven exchange”,⁷⁴² with four forms of power. He writes:

Power political (as with a colonial or imperial), power intellectual, (as with reigning sciences like comparative linguistics and anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas about what ‘we’ do and what ‘they’ cannot do or understand as ‘we’ do).⁷⁴³

Since these four forms of power operate in relation to each other, I want to see how they function before claiming whether that power is intentional, and therefore not the relations of power that ground genealogy as its historical framework.

Edward Said’s Conceptualization of Power/Knowledge

⁷³⁷ Ibid

⁷³⁸ Ibid 6

⁷³⁹ Ibid 3

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid 36

⁷⁴¹ Jan Selby, *Edward W. Said: Truth, justice and nationalism*, in, *Interventions Vol 8*, no. 1 (2006), 41

⁷⁴² Said, *Orientalism*, 12

⁷⁴³ Ibid 12

Said argues that the seat of power shifts west from about the 16th century from Islam,⁷⁴⁴ to its current location in the contemporary United States of America, Said's present reality.⁷⁴⁵ The shift in power in the 16th century to Europe provides Said with an historical framework for Western power engendering the discourse of Orientalism:

The period of immense advance in the institutions and content of Orientalism coincides exactly with the period of unparalleled European expansion; from 1815 to 1914 European direct colonial dominion expanded from about 35 percent of the earth's surface to about 85 percent of it. Every continent was affected, none more so than Africa and Asia.⁷⁴⁶

In one of the most famous passages in *Orientalism*, Said interrogated former British Prime Minister, Arthur James Balfour's 1910 speech to the House of Commons, in terms of the power and knowledge relation that characterized Orientalist discourse.⁷⁴⁷ Addressing the House of Commons, Balfour's speech dealt with the problems, 'we' the British have in Egypt⁷⁴⁸. Said convincingly shows how Balfour's argument was premised on dividing human reality, on the basis of a binary logic in which Europeans are considered superior to all "subject races".⁷⁴⁹ In Said's argument, Balfour was comfortably seated within a discursive tradition. In his speech, Balfour argued that the inferior civilized races lacked the knowledge to govern their own affairs adequately.⁷⁵⁰ Balfour claimed to have superior knowledge of the entire East, a geographical province which, he claimed, both historically and at the time of his speech lacked the capacity for self-governance. He argued that there was only a history of despotism in the East. Balfour claimed that European nation states, as members of an enlightened civilization it was the responsibility of Europeans to look out for the best for their less-enlightened counterparts.⁷⁵¹

In Said's thought, it is the strength,⁷⁵² of political power that engenders the discursive construction of the Orient. The fact that Said conceives of power as strength means that his theory of power is closer to Nietzsche's (quanta of force), than Foucault, despite Said's proposal in *Orientalism*, that he is closer to the latter.⁷⁵³ Thus, Said argues that they who create and have knowledge of a human being in this dehumanizing manner is tantamount to

⁷⁴⁴ Ibid 205

⁷⁴⁵ Ibid 25

⁷⁴⁶ Ibid 41

⁷⁴⁷ Ibid 31

⁷⁴⁸ Ibid 31

⁷⁴⁹ Ibid 37

⁷⁵⁰ Ibid 33

⁷⁵¹ Ibid 37

⁷⁵² Ibid 40

⁷⁵³ Ibid 3, 8, 12

“authoritatively dominating it”.⁷⁵⁴ The creation of the Orient endorses the idea of European superiority,⁷⁵⁵ which for Said, was what colonial administrators used to justify the further exercise of political power:

Knowledge of the Orient is directly translated into activity, and the results give rise to new actions in the Orient...The Orientalist has now become a figure of Oriental history, indistinguishable, its shaper, its characteristic sign of the West.⁷⁵⁶

Orientalism is less about the realities of colonization than the strength of Western cultural discourse within the West,⁷⁵⁷ a strength that Said claims is not to be confused with the effects of a traditional superstructure.⁷⁵⁸ In *Orientalism*, Said is less a Nietzschean than a closet Marxist. His intellectual genealogy of the relations between discourse Orientalism and political power is a self-confessed Gramscian project. Therefore, the reader of Said must not be confused by Said’s claim that he is deploying a Foucauldian methodology, which would logically derive from a Nietzschean ontology of power. Said’s conception of power, and the ontological location discourse he fulfils in his analytic of Western scholarship, is rather premised on Marxian and Gramscian principles.

Said’s Marxian Background

Antonio Gramsci was an Italian Social theorist and revolutionary who drew and developed ideas from the Marxist tradition. Karl Marx, a German philosopher and economic sociologist proposed that the driving forces in history were not found in the realm of ideas but rather in the material forces of production, constituting the structural relationship by which human beings labour on their surroundings i.e. nature, transforming the very structure of the world and their place in it.⁷⁵⁹ Marx called his theory of history and society “historical materialism”.⁷⁶⁰ Marx viewed historical development as being generated by a dialectical relationship between economic forces, or classes. He considered a class to be a collectivity

⁷⁵⁴ Ibid 32

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid39-40

⁷⁵⁶ Ibid 238

⁷⁵⁷ Ibid 25

⁷⁵⁸ Ibid 25

⁷⁵⁹ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Excerpts from the German Ideology*, in, *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Basic Writings on politics and Philosophy*, (Eds) Lewis, S Feuer (New York: The Fontana Library, 1976), 290

⁷⁶⁰ Friedrich Engels, *On Historical Materialism*, in, *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, (Eds) Lewis, S Feuer ,(New York: The Fontana Library, 1976), 96

sharing a common relation to the means of material production that characterized any social configuration. The history of man was constituted by the history of class struggle:⁷⁶¹

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian Oppressor and oppressed, stood in a constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight that ended either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large or in the ruin of the contending classes.⁷⁶²

For Marx, the material relations of production are a primary level of human existence, a level that he calls “the base”, which structures all other activity in the cultural sphere of “legal, educational, artistic and political activities”.⁷⁶³ He argues that the “totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure”.⁷⁶⁴ The cultural sphere, or the superstructure, is the realm of ideas of what we have come to call conscious or cultural life. In Marx’s view, the domains of ideas, or the ideologies that proliferate around the cultural superstructure, are the ideas of the ruling class.⁷⁶⁵ The ideologies of the cultural superstructure legitimize the material structure of society. The materiality of economic life and conception of an ideological consciousness are not only interwoven, but support one another in terms of the maintenance of class domination. However, for Marx the relationship between the base and the superstructure, between material activity and conscious ideas, are a one way street. The economic base determines the ideological constitution of the superstructure, but not the other way around. For Marx:

We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life processes we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and the echoes of this life process... Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing with material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this, their existence, their thinking, and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness but consciousness by life.⁷⁶⁶

⁷⁶¹ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, in, *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Basic Writings on politics and Philosophy*, (Eds) Lewis, S Feuer ,(New York: The Fontana Library, 1976), 48

⁷⁶² Ibid 49

⁷⁶³ Steve Jones, *Antonio Gramsci*, (Oxon: Routledge, 2007) , 28

⁷⁶⁴ Karl Marx, *The German Ideology* , in, *Marx and Religion*, (Eds) John Raines, (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 2002), 109

⁷⁶⁵ Ibid

⁷⁶⁶ Marx, *The German Ideology*, 288

In *Orientalism*, Said eschews Marx's traditional base superstructure model, instead privileging Gramsci's concept of hegemony.⁷⁶⁷ The Gramscian critique of Marx was premised on the fact that culture (ideas) had no influence on the base, or the political economy. In contrast to the economic determinism of most Marxists, Gramsci sought to establish a more coherent relationship between base and superstructure, or political and civil society respectively.⁷⁶⁸ For Gramsci, this relation was not a way of causation but one of mutual reinforcement, an intricate relationship that he designated with the term "historical bloc".⁷⁶⁹ Since Gramsci's writings are not only playful and elliptical but dense, I will briefly cover the content necessary to express Said's Gramscian outlook in *Orientalism*:

1. According to Antonio Gramsci, civil society consists of everyday or private institutions,⁷⁷⁰ like the church,⁷⁷¹ the family, and the media and sports teams.⁷⁷² Political society on the other hand refers to the political institutions of the bourgeois class, that legally enforce discipline in order ensure the consent of their subservient population, which Gramsci refers to as a form of rule by domination.⁷⁷³
2. In opposition to those who saw civil society as a-political, Gramsci argued that because "*civil society blurred the distinction between political and everyday life*", it should be conceptualized as a form of "coercive power".⁷⁷⁴ Gramsci's point is that our civil institutions generate cultural ideologies and values that people come to conform are both natural and desirable. These cultural values and dominant ideologies are coercive; they often come to be accepted without question. Hegemony, Gramsci argued, is a form of coercive power constitutes the function of civil society.⁷⁷⁵
3. For Gramsci, the political agents that constitute a dominant social group are no different in being coerced by normative hegemonic cultural standards.⁷⁷⁶ The actors in political society come to exercise disciplinary domination on the lower classes, or

⁷⁶⁷ Said, *Orientalism*, 6-7

⁷⁶⁸ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks: Volume 1*, Edited and Translated by Quentin Hore and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, (London: Elecbook; 1999) , 506

⁷⁶⁹ Jones, *Gramsci*, 130

⁷⁷⁰ Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, (London: Elecbook; 1999), 508

⁷⁷¹ Ibid 506

⁷⁷² Jones, *Gramsci*, 49

⁷⁷³ Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 353; Jones, *Gramsci* , 52

⁷⁷⁴ Ibid 506

⁷⁷⁵ Jones, *Gramsci*, 52

⁷⁷⁶ Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 501

subaltern groups, in terms of those hegemonic cultural standards generated by civil institutions.⁷⁷⁷

4. For Gramsci, the political agents that constitute a dominant social group are no different in being coerced by normative hegemonic cultural standards.⁷⁷⁸ The actors in political society come to exercise disciplinary domination on the lower classes, or subaltern groups in terms of those hegemonic cultural standards generated by civil institutions.⁷⁷⁹
5. The hegemonic ideals of civil society come to play a direct role in the structure of political domination. Lower classes come to consent with the hegemony of the historical bloc, as hegemony as a fundamentally Marxist thesis is also “material and economic”.⁷⁸⁰ For Gramsci, The ideas that constitute cultural hegemony are disseminated throughout the sphere of social relations, creating not only health benefits and provisions for ‘holidaying’, but also multiple spheres for social recreation.⁷⁸¹ The bourgeoisie not only come to win the hearts of lower classes, but through coercive power, the lower classes come to believe that they are living freely, or governing themselves⁷⁸² in the process of consenting to dominant practices. With regard the interrelation between the civil society and political society, it is important what role agency has in Gramsci’s work. I argue that while Gramsci relies on a fairly stable capitalist form of economic structuration in his analysis, his reformulation of a traditional Marxist base, or superstructure schema into a set of less structured practices that constitute the intricate and complex relation between civil and political society is premised on explicating the agentive and unifying role that hegemony plays in a class leading well in a capitalist society. Therefore, Gramsci is never clear on whether coercion or consent is more of a priority, but instead rather on distinguishing how they are unified through cultural hegemony. Instead of the mechanistic priority of a Marxian base, Gramsci’s favour unified relations of reciprocal determination. For Barry Smart,

⁷⁷⁷ Jones, *Gramsci*, 48

⁷⁷⁸ Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 501

⁷⁷⁹ Jones, *Antonio Gramsci*, 47

⁷⁸⁰ *Ibid* 48

⁷⁸¹ *Ibid* 48

⁷⁸² *Ibid* 48

Hegemony contributes to or constitutes a form of social cohesion not through force and coercion, nor necessarily through consent, but most effectively by way of practices, techniques...cultural practices which cultivate behaviours and beliefs, tastes and desires, and needs as seemingly natural qualities, and properties.⁷⁸³

6. Thus, when the lower classes and upper classes come to adopt hegemonic ideals, the relations they maintain with the civil society have economic repercussions. Partaking in hegemonic activities are always economic exercises, and although funding such exercises costs the bourgeoisie at first,⁷⁸⁴ they generate surplus value which eventually benefits the bourgeoisie, and therefore the strength of political and civil society.⁷⁸⁵ Thus, despite Gramsci's notion that "we are all conformists",⁷⁸⁶ power still operates in terms of a positionality premised on the leadership of the bourgeoisie in a democratic society where the relations of civil and political society are ordered in accordance with an acculturating force of bourgeois hegemony. In Gramsci's political thought, one has to lead to take power, but after a social group has taken it as a position, one has to lead well to keep it.⁷⁸⁷ According to Gilles Deleuze, this conception of power would still be slavish in the Nietzschean sense, since it is conceptualized as an object of representation, a position that a will desires.⁷⁸⁸ At this point, Said's Gramscian theory of power must be conceived as antithetical to power relations that allow one to frame a Nietzschean genealogy.
7. To conclude, Gramsci argued that while democratic societies operate by consent and coercion; if human actors no longer coerced by cultural hegemony, or no longer consent to an authority of rule, political society will step into assure complicity of the lower classes by force. In that sense, while the hegemonic political power that the bourgeoisie class exercises over subordinate classes in modern democratic society operates coercively to deal with the masses who might not consent, in times of crisis the state apparatus will resort to violence to retain its desired order.⁷⁸⁹

⁷⁸³ Barry Smart, *The Politics of Truth and Problem of Hegemony*, in, *The Foucault Reader*, Edited by David Couzens Hoy, (New York: Blackwell, 1986), 160

⁷⁸⁴ Jones, *Gramsci*, 51

⁷⁸⁵ Ibid 50

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid 48

⁷⁸⁷ Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 58

⁷⁸⁸ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, xx-xii

⁷⁸⁹ Jones, *Gramsci*, 53; Stuart Hall, *Gramsci and Us*, in, *Marxism Today*; (London: June 1987), no page numbers

Gramsci's notion of hegemony is a central analytic tool in Said's intellectual genealogy of the discourse in *Orientalism*. While Marx came under critique in the book as a racist Orientalist whose Western politics of historicism clashed with his humanistic concern for the suffering of the oppressed,⁷⁹⁰ Gramsci does not. The reason, Said claims, is that Marx's politics of historicism win out over his humanism.⁷⁹¹ Said identifies the opposite in Gramsci. It is worth noting that Gramsci gives grounds for this reversal when, as early as 1911, he speaks out against colonial powers when he identifies with an anti-colonial struggle over the unity of historical progress being led by the West.⁷⁹² Moreover, it was Gramsci that claimed since the world had through colonization been assimilated into the process of Western thought despite the values of specific cultures, in the current historical climate they happen to be elements of a Western process.⁷⁹³ For Gramsci, the subordination of local values to a unifying process tied to Western domination was constitutive of a global or expansive Western hegemony, where the colonized would come to consent Western culture.⁷⁹⁴ For Said, it would seem that Gramsci's analysis is philosophically sufficient to explain worldwide cultural domination.⁷⁹⁵ He conceives of *Orientalism* as a hegemonic discourse.⁷⁹⁶ For Said, this is why thinkers in political society, such as Balfour and Cromer, adhere to the hegemonic discursive stereotypes of the Orient that were generated by the activities of thinkers in the cultural institutions of civil society, by writers like Flaubert or Lane. The implications of Said's argument are huge; he is claiming that the advances of European political society into the Orient are to a degree, hegemonically conditioned by actors consenting to set of dominant cultural ideas about the Orient that exist in the civil sphere of dominant culture. Said is arguing that political advances of Europe or "us", are effectively brought about by the consent to a uniform set of ideas, and that it is contrary to the theoretical standpoint of traditional Marxism. For Said, intellectual ideas influence not only political power, but the perceptual encounter between Orient and Occident:

What they shared...was the kind of intellectual power I have been calling Orientalism. In a sense Orientalism is a library or archive of information commonly and, in some of its aspects, unanimously held. What bound the archive together was a family of ideas and a unifying set of values proven to be

⁷⁹⁰ Said, *Orientalism*, 153

⁷⁹¹ Ibid 154

⁷⁹² Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Political Writings: 1910-1920*, (London: Lawrence and Wishard, 1977), 59-61

⁷⁹³ Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 765

⁷⁹⁴ Ibid 765-766

⁷⁹⁵ Said, *Orientalism*, 7

⁷⁹⁶ Ibid 7

effective⁷⁹⁷...To say simply that Orientalism was a rationalization of colonial rule is to ignore the extent to which colonial rule was justified in advance by Orientalism, rather than after the fact.⁷⁹⁸

Said on Language, Discourse, Representation

It should now be apparent to the reader that Said does not follow a Nietzschean or rather Foucauldian conception of power as he previously claimed. Said does not conceive of power as an ontological relationship between forces, but rather a form of Gramscian political power that is imbricated in the Western cultural governance of colonized populations. We can now begin to see whether Said has problematically, even incoherently applied the Foucauldian notion of discourse correctly. For Said, the process by which the Orient is othered-- that is, the dehumanizing binary vision of reality-- is predicated on Western historicism. Said's claim is that the politics of historicism generally denote that the unity of an epistemological epoch that governs us is always considered from the perspective of the West.⁷⁹⁹ He claims the West views itself as the "maker of contemporary history". That is, a theatre with Europe as its stage. In Said's argument, by being the Other of European history, the Orient was not created by but also for Europe:

The idea of representation is a theatrical one: the Orient is the stage on which the whole of the East is confined. On this stage will appear figures whose role is to represent the larger whole from which they emanate. The Orient seems to be, not an unlimited extension beyond the familiar European world, but rather a closed field, a theatrical field fixed to Europe.⁸⁰⁰

We have reached not only one of the central issues in *Orientalism*, the a-historical essentialization of the Orient in relation to the West's progress, but one of the major problems that many theorists in the history of the post-colonial theory have raised: the essentializing dehumanization of the colonized Other. The Orient is the essentialized object of the discourse of Orientalism. To conceptualize the Orient in terms of a philosophy of representation, Said infuses Ferdinand de Saussure's structural linguistics with Foucauldian discursive theory. In Saussure's structural studies of semiology, he argued that what we traditionally distinguish as phenomena manifest to sensory perception (our senses) as "linguistic signs".⁸⁰¹ Saussure's structural semiology challenged the dominance of phenomenological theory that grounded

⁷⁹⁷ Ibid 41

⁷⁹⁸ Ibid 39

⁷⁹⁹ Said, *Orientalism Reconsidered*, in , *Cultural Critique*, No 1, (August, 1985), 101

⁸⁰⁰ Said, *Orientalism*, 63

⁸⁰¹ Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in general linguistics*, Edited by Charles Balley and Albert Secheye, Translated by Wade Baskin,(New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1915), 67

epistemological certainty on an abstract consciousness.⁸⁰² He conceived of a linguistic sign as an inextricable combination between a sound image and a concept,⁸⁰³ which “imprints itself psychologically on our senses”.⁸⁰⁴ With this massive claim, Saussure is suggesting that a linguistic sign imposes itself psychologically in the sense that the meaning or concept (signified) is understood cognitively at the same time that the sound is heard, or the image is seen (signifier) as “united by means of an associative bond in the brain”.⁸⁰⁵ To not cause any confusion, let me simplify.

A *signifier* can refer to any image, picture, graph, text, etc. It is most importantly a written symbol.⁸⁰⁶ But it also refers to any sound that can be heard. Saussure’s theory of semiotics constitutes an analysis of social communication, which he calls the “social crystallization of language”.⁸⁰⁷ The signified is the meaning that is attached is the *signifier*. For Saussure, the association between the sensory input and meaning is made by the brain. Physiologically speaking, for that imprint to get to the brain, the sign must first enter sensory perception. For Saussure, the mental act of understanding signification is a “receptive process in everything that goes from the ear of the listener to his associative centre is passive”.⁸⁰⁸ Saussure’s revolutionary move at the time was to claim that as communicative agents, we don’t simply react to noises or sounds, but tacitly respond to the sounds of doors closing, people talking to us, and the whistle of the nearing train. Saussure’s conception of not only language and meaning, but of sociality is grounded in a cognitivist standpoint. The associative faculty of the brain, that which assures the sensory impressions of sound and images and a cognitive grasp of meaning, is what constitutes the organization of language as a system, “a social fact.”⁸⁰⁹ In *Orientalism*, although Said universalizes representation as the function of the sign, he only takes up Saussure’s theory of language to a point. For Saussure, language is conceived as:

⁸⁰² Gary Gutting, *French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 215-218

⁸⁰³ de Saussure, *Course in general linguistics*, 15

⁸⁰⁴ Ibid 68

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid 65-66

⁸⁰⁶ Ibid 70

⁸⁰⁷ Ibid 13

⁸⁰⁸ Ibid

⁸⁰⁹ Ibid

A self-contained whole and a principle of classification. As soon as we give language first place among the facts of speech, we introduce a natural order into a mass that lends itself to no other classification.⁸¹⁰

Language (*langue*) is an important element of “human speech (language)”.⁸¹¹ For Saussure, the study of human speech is immensely complicated. It lacks a principle of systemic unity because speech is both individual and social.⁸¹² The actual act of speaking is executive (*parole*), in the sense that the individual executes an act of speech⁸¹³ that is never totally reducible to language (*langue*). Language (*langue*) as a classificatory system could then be said to be the rules that govern all speech acts, but may only come into play in concrete situations, where real speech occurs.⁸¹⁴ Thus, the only manner in which those rules could come about, for Saussure, is through the positive or the quality of speech that can instantiate those rules, which further structure social relations. Speech, in Saussure’s argument is first and foremost a wilful act,⁸¹⁵ a form of cognitive activity that induces the evolution of language (*langue*).⁸¹⁶ It is this active and perhaps subtle quality of speech in Saussure’s thinking that represents a danger to Said’s universalizing portrayal of Orientalism as a closed European discursive power –system. Keeping in mind that Orientalism as a form of intellectual and hegemonic power is first and foremost a textual tradition. Foucault’s notion of the object of a discursive formation is what allows Said to overcome the problems that speech might cause with regard to the evolution of the discourse in *Orientalism*. In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault defined a discursive formation in a manner more suitable to Said’s aims:

The rules of formation operate not only in the mind or consciousness of individuals, but in discourse itself; they operate therefore, according to a sort of uniform anonymity, on all individuals who undertake to speak in this discursive field.⁸¹⁷

The rules that are immanent to a discursive formation,⁸¹⁸ that is; the statements that are a part of it are also the rules or laws that govern it.⁸¹⁹ The rules of a discursive formation, Foucault pointed out; operate on the phenomena,⁸²⁰ the objects of discourse:

⁸¹⁰ Ibid 9

⁸¹¹ Ibid 13

⁸¹² Ibid 11-12

⁸¹³ Ibid 13

⁸¹⁴ Terence Hawkes, *Structuralism and Semiotics*, (London: Routledge; 2003), 14

⁸¹⁵ de Saussure, *Course in general linguistics*, 19

⁸¹⁶ Ibid 21

⁸¹⁷ Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 69 -70

⁸¹⁸ Ibid 70

*The least statement — the most discreet or the most banal — puts into operation a whole set of rules in accordance with which its object, its modality, the concepts that it employs, and the strategy of which it is a part, are formed.*⁸²¹

Thus, while phenomena exist, our experiences of such phenomena as subjects are ordered by the discursive identity that a phenomenon is given as an object within a formation.⁸²² In *Orientalism*, Said argues that the manner in which the object Orient has been represented in the textual tradition of Orientalism provides it with a “discursive identity” that acts a set of perceptual rules for the experience of the Orient by the European Occident:

The Orient, in short, existed as a set of values attached, not to its modern realities, but a series of valorized contacts it had had with a distant European past. This is a pure example of the textual schematic attitude I have been referring to.⁸²³

The Orient and Occident: The Essence of the power Knowledge Relation

We are now at a point to examine the Orient and why Said’s account of it made such an impact on post-colonial thought. After I have explained the power and knowledge and its historical relation that has tied Said to Foucault, we can move on by looking at Said’s concerns as a genealogist, which forms the second part of my diagnosis. Before Said’s sources for theorizing about language, I pointed out that in opposing colonialism; Said drew attention to the Western politics of historicism. According to Said, modern Europe considered itself to be the “theatrical stage of history”,⁸²⁴ the central constituting force behind civilizational and of course, epistemological progress.⁸²⁵ Said points out that a crucial element in Europe’s perception of itself was the centrality it drew to its own rationality, responsible for advances made in the Newtonian science,⁸²⁶ and the philological decipherment of ancient languages.⁸²⁷ It is important to note that the notion of rationality is not only fundamental to the distinction of the Orient, but the manner in which Europe created its own identity in relation to racial Others:

⁸¹⁹ Ibid 121

⁸²⁰ Ibid 163

⁸²¹ Ibid 163

⁸²² Laclau and Mouffe: *Hegemony and Social Strategy*, 105; Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 108; Rabinow and Dreyfus, *Michel Foucault, Beyond structuralism and Hermeneutics* , 80-81

⁸²³ Said, *Orientalism* ,85

⁸²⁴ Ibid 63

⁸²⁵ Ibid 63

⁸²⁶ Ibid 46

⁸²⁷ Ibid 149

The rational, hence autonomous and equal subjects of the Enlightenment project turn out, perhaps unsurprisingly, to be exclusively white, male, European⁸²⁸ ... This defining of humanity in relation to rationality clearly prefaces modernity's emphasis on rational capacity as a crucial differentia of racial groups.⁸²⁹

The Others of the European subjects, were the objects of colonial and Orientalist discourse. In opposition to the European, the Orient is denied “the very possibility of development, transformation, [and] human movement”⁸³⁰ portrayed as primitive, mystical and “sexually licentious”.⁸³¹

Drawing on Foucault's notion of the textual creation of reality, in *Orientalism*, Said argues the discursive creation of the fictional object, the Orient as an idea,⁸³² engenders a politicized geographical reality.⁸³³ It is an essential part of Said's argument that a vision of reality that is not only bound to Orientals (people) but includes geography of the Orient as a political site. “Geography was essential to the material underpinning for knowledge about the Orient”.⁸³⁴ For Said, it is the “imaginary geography” of European Orientalist discourse that separates the European Occident (us), from the Asian Orient (them).⁸³⁵ The power of Orientalist discourse generates an idea or vision of reality in the form of a politicized racial geography. The Orient does not only refer to living beings, but an imaginative geography in which the Orient is a stage that represents all the people of the East, from the Arabs to the Japanese. This is what Deleuze means when he claims that Foucault's revolutionary move was to turn epistemology in ontology, so that one doesn't know what one sees, but rather sees what one knows. For Said, the hegemonic discourse of Orientalism inculcates an entire vision of reality, in which the Orient is of central importance:

An Oriental man was first an Orient and only second a man. Such a radical typing was naturally reinforced by sciences (or discourses as I prefer to call them) that took a backward and downward direction towards the species category, which was also supposed to be an ontogenic explanation for every member of the species⁸³⁶ ... Theses of Oriental backwardness degeneracy, inequality with the West most associated with ideas about the biological basis of racial inequality.⁸³⁷

⁸²⁸ David Theo Goldberg, *Modernity, Race and Morality*, in, *Cultural Critique* (Spring 1993, No 24), 208

⁸²⁹ Ibid 201

⁸³⁰ Said, *Orientalism*, 56

⁸³¹ Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, (London: Routledge, New York, 1994), 66

⁸³² Said, *Orientalism*, 149

⁸³³ Ibid 53

⁸³⁴ Said, *Orientalism*, 216

⁸³⁵ Ibid 42

⁸³⁶ Ibid 231

⁸³⁷ Ibid 206

The Orient comes to be represented by a set of fixed ideas.⁸³⁸ The idea of fixing the Orient on the basis of cultural and historically racial difference is not something distinct to *Orientalism*, but part of all colonial discursive constructions of Otherness.⁸³⁹ Homi Bhabha refers to the creation of the colonized in terms of this “fixity”, to explain what Said distinguishes as the stereotypical representation of the Orient in hegemonic discourse:

Fixity, as the sign of cultural/historical/racial difference in the discourse of colonialism, is a paradoxical mode of representation: it connotes rigidity and an unchanging order as well as disorder, degeneracy and daemonic repetition. Likewise the stereotype, which is its major discursive strategy, is a form of knowledge and identification that vacillates between what is always 'in place', already known, and something that must be anxiously repeated.⁸⁴⁰

In *Orientalism*, the Western, colonial power, or knowledge nexus that creates the Orient, fixes the relation between the signifier and signified.⁸⁴¹ Said is a huge figure in the critical rebuttal to, and critique of essentialism, by means of his notion of the Orient as a stereotype.⁸⁴² In post-colonial critiques of colonial discourse, stereotyping is premised on naturalizing racial difference on the basis of opposition to the Western subjective as the essence of human civilization and progress.⁸⁴³ The practice of racial othering in colonial discourse was meant to split human groups into racial types that were considered naturally different from the European self, the subject of history.⁸⁴⁴ The essence in essentialism in colonial discourse conceives non-European races at the species level with a set of characteristics that are innate or fixed.⁸⁴⁵ It is these characteristics which make up a racial essence, a set of “natural qualities that are beyond history”.⁸⁴⁶

In the first Chapter of *Orientalism*, “Knowing the ‘Oriental’”, Said shows how the colonial production of the essentialized or stereotypical image of the Orient augmented the colonial relationship between them on the basis of the Orient’s objectification. A vital part of Said’s argument is that the Occident does not have an identity prior to the creation of the Orient, but attains its identity in relation to this construction. The Occident’s own superior characteristics

⁸³⁸ Ibid 208

⁸³⁹ Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 66

⁸⁴⁰ Ibid 66

⁸⁴¹ Stuart Hall, *The Spectacle of the Other, in, 'Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader*, (London: Sage Publications, 2001), 334

⁸⁴² Said, *Orientalism*, 27

⁸⁴³ Ibid 40

⁸⁴⁴ Hall, *Spectacle of the Other*, 335

⁸⁴⁵ Ibid 334

⁸⁴⁶ Ibid 336-337

are not independent to the Orient, but conceived in terms of a dialectical opposition.⁸⁴⁷ It is this relation for Said which characterized the hegemonic intellectual power of *Orientalism*, “that justified colonization in advance”.⁸⁴⁸

If the essence of Orientalism is the ineradicable distinction between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority, then we must be prepared to note how in its development and subsequent history Orientalism deepened and even hardened the distinction,⁸⁴⁹... So far as the West was concerned during the nineteenth and twentieth century, an assumption has been made that the Orient and everything in it was, if not patently inferior to, then in need of corrective study by the West.⁸⁵⁰

The racial typology immanent to the discourse of *Orientalism*, distinguished a set of characteristics common to all people from the East on the basis of biological classification. In *Orientalism*, Said clearly invokes the Foucauldian themes of normality, irrationality and corrective study that typified Foucault’s analysis of strategies of normalization, to explain how the biological relation between colonizing Occident and colonized Orient is perceived.⁸⁵¹ The Orient is not only an “object to be mastered”, but the colonial dehumanizing relationship is justified by the portrayal of the Orient as inferior, requiring correction in the form of guidance, and civilization. Said’s brutal point is that “the ‘natural’ European drive to conquer and enslave the racial Other assumed accordingly the force of a moral imperative”.⁸⁵² Therefore, in the course of European colonization of the East, the depiction of an essentialized Orient,⁸⁵³ which was characterized in terms of a dehumanizing paternal relation to the colonist, served a perceptual model to depict “all Orientals as a phenomenon possessing regular characteristics”,⁸⁵⁴ which Said argues, ultimately proved effective for colonial objectives.

In Foucault’s famous text, the *Archaeology of Knowledge*, he distinguishes the discursive formation of objects in terms of an anonymous set of regulatory rules that impacted on subjects,⁸⁵⁵ which he distinguished at a pre-conceptual level.⁸⁵⁶ It is these “discursive regularities and constraints that have made possible the heterogeneous multiplicity of

⁸⁴⁷ Said, *Orientalism*, 72

⁸⁴⁸ Ibid 40

⁸⁴⁹ Ibid 42

⁸⁵⁰ Ibid 40-41

⁸⁵¹ Ibid 207

⁸⁵² Goldberg, *Modernity, Race and Morality*, 204; Hall, *Spectacle of the Other*, 334

⁸⁵³ Said, *Orientalism*, 48

⁸⁵⁴ Ibid 42

⁸⁵⁵ Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 69-70

⁸⁵⁶ Ibid 70

concepts”.⁸⁵⁷ In *Orientalism*, The Orient is an object from which a multiplicity of racial concepts, such as Arab, Chinese, Hindu, Muslims, and Semite derive. Said’s important point is that while there may be slight differences in the ways these different so-called Orientals are perceived, in accordance with the principles of Foucauldian epistemology, they all still possess regular characteristics in accordance with the positivist constitution of the Orient at the pre-conceptual level of a discursive formation. This is how the textual attitude operates in Said’s intellectual genealogy of *Orientalism* in terms of combining the Saussurian and the Foucauldian object. This through the essential singularity designated to the different conceptual variants, i.e.; Islam, Chinese, Arab, and Indian that are reducible to the Orient.

Said’s Anti-Genealogical Structuralism

Said’s textualism, in terms of his theory of discourse, is profoundly structuralist. This causes another tension in Said’s genealogy. Said is again conflating Foucauldian or Nietzschean ‘anti-science’ with models of scientific accuracy.⁸⁵⁸ In symbolic structuralism, if one wants to look at how shifts of meaning occur, one has to look at the “varying degrees of shifts in the relationship between the signified and the signifier”.⁸⁵⁹ Structuralists who were interested in symbolic structures of signification like Said practice a form of scientific enquiry called “structural linguistics”. Saussure differentiates between two types of structural linguistics, synchronic linguistics and diachronic linguistics.⁸⁶⁰ While Said’s analysis in *Orientalism* is a history which certainly has diachronic elements, I argue that it should best be conceived as synchronic hegemonic discourse. I will explain my position in an examination of Said’s history in the next section, but first I want to clarify my point that *Orientalism* should be conceived as synchronic. In symbolic structuralism, synchronic linguistics generally study a structure as “an ahistorical time slice”,⁸⁶¹ not looking at the processes of change that constitute levels of meaning, but rather what Saussure refers to as a “language state”⁸⁶². He writes,

A language-state is not a point but rather a certain span of time during which the sum of the modifications that have supervened is minimal.⁸⁶³

⁸⁵⁷ Ibid 70

⁸⁵⁸ Woodward, *Understanding Nietzscheanism*, 68

⁸⁵⁹ de Saussure, *Course in general linguistics*, 78

⁸⁶⁰ Ibid 99-100

⁸⁶¹ Woodward, *Understanding Nietzscheanism*, 68

⁸⁶² de Saussure, *Course in general linguistics*, 101

⁸⁶³ Ibid 101

Said has not just written about a certain span of time, but articulated an intellectual genealogy of Orientalist discourse that dates back to antiquity.⁸⁶⁴ His history would therefore be closer to what Saussure calls diachronic, or evolutionary linguistics.⁸⁶⁵ This is because in accordance with his Foucauldian reliance on the episteme he would be covering several forms of linguistic communication. That is; he explains the genesis of different time slices that constitute meaningful linguistic formations, Renaissance, Classical and Modern epistemes respectively. However, despite the changing portrayal the West affords itself, we must remember that regardless of the span of time that Said describes in *Orientalism*, what would, in a Saussurian sense, be called the modifications in the representations of the Orient, have certainly been absolutely minimal. This Said argued, was due to the textual attitude that characterized the Occident's experience of the Orient, so that the Orient "became a phenomenon possessing regular characteristics".⁸⁶⁶ This textual attitude is of course what distinguishes the hegemonic discourse of *Orientalism*, as a static structural "system of synchronic essentialism".⁸⁶⁷

In *Orientalism*, Said calls these small transformations in the Western representation of the Orient, "manifest Orientalism".⁸⁶⁸ This, as I said, is framed as diachronous, an issue I will treat in the next section. Now I want to finalize that the reader takes conceptions of the structural quality of Orientalist discourse as a synchronic system to be Said's own. To illustrate my point, I first want to point out that in accordance with Said's Gramscian disposition, the formal elements that together characterize the internal logic of rule of transformation of Orientalism are the four forms of Western power that constitute it as the West's hegemonic discourse and power, "the reciprocal relations that produce Orientalism through an uneven exchange." I argue that for Said, "Western power political, moral, cultural and intellectual" structure the perceptual relations of Occidental superiority and Oriental inferiority by the creation Orientalism (power and knowledge) as a hegemonic discourse that produces an illusory vision of reality. In French structuralism, a structure is conceived as having a central organizing principle.⁸⁶⁹ It is this organizing principle which Jacques Derrida has called the "presence" or "play of the structure"⁸⁷⁰ its "transcendental signified".⁸⁷¹ Thus

⁸⁶⁴ Said, *Orientalism*, 58

⁸⁶⁵ de Saussure, *Course in general Linguistics*, 101

⁸⁶⁶ Said, *Orientalism*,

⁸⁶⁷ Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*,

⁸⁶⁸ Said, *Orientalism*, 206

⁸⁶⁹ Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 353

⁸⁷⁰ *Ibid* 354

⁸⁷¹ *Ibid* 352

far, we have seen that the organizing principle of Orientalism is Western power as conceived by Said in Gramscian terms. However, the organizing principle for Said is actually something historically prior to the formation of Orientalism as a hegemonic discourse. For Said, I suggest that this organizing principle creates Orientalist discourse, but has the capacity to escape the structural power of the hegemonic discourse, Orientalism.⁸⁷²

In *Orientalism*, “latent Orientalism” is the transcendental signified, or the organizing principle of Orientalist discourse. The racist condition that infects each Orientalist scholar, “latent Orientalism”,⁸⁷³ is what up until now; I have been calling the ‘textual attitude’ by which the Occident comes to deal with the Orient that has been ahistorically essentialized. Said writes, “It is therefore correct that every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist and totally ethnocentric.”⁸⁷⁴ Said’s claim that a European could only say racist things about the Orient (which he of course claimed was synonymous with dominating the Orient), of course brought him under severe criticism from Western scholars. Nevertheless, Said’s move was backed up by a Foucauldian principle. His argument is that the textual depiction of the Orient as an essentialized primitive stereotype⁸⁷⁵ operated as a perceptual rule in the mind of the colonist, when he would encounter any Oriental.⁸⁷⁶ By using this principle Said could hold the claim that the identity of the author of the text can never be dissociated from the interests of empire.⁸⁷⁷ However, within the structuralist methodology that Said is using in *Orientalism*, the central organizing principle escapes structuration itself. Said was no longer claiming that the discursive rules constituting *Orientalism* are the reason why the Orient is portrayed in a racist fashion by the Occident (textual attitude). Instead, Said makes the more nonsensical claim that latent Orientalism constitutes an intentional disposition of a free subject. It is on the basis of this intentionality as a structuring principle of the discourse Orientalism that Said breaks with Foucault:

My contention is that Orientalism is fundamentally a political doctrine willed over the Orient because the orient because the Orient was weaker than the West,⁸⁷⁸ ...it not only creates but also maintains; it is,

⁸⁷² Ibid 352

⁸⁷³ Said, *Orientalism*, 206

⁸⁷⁴ Ibid 204

⁸⁷⁵ Ibid 58

⁸⁷⁶ Ibid 58

⁸⁷⁷ Ibid 10

⁸⁷⁸ Ibid 204

rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate what is manifestly different (or alternative an novel world.⁸⁷⁹

It is at this point, after a long digression and analysis, that I can claim that in no way does Edward Said share the ontological framework of a genealogist. The power of the West in Orientalism is intentional. In Nietzsche and Foucault, power is always a relationship between forces. In Nietzsche especially, power is exerted as multiplicity of unconscious drives which are historically constituted. And I could also ask at this point, if power is a transhistorical condition that is structural to the degree that it effectuates an intentional disposition in the minds of European scholars, can Said consider the exercise of power as blameworthy? The fact that latent Orientalism is a trans-historical intentional condition which is also the root of power means that Said's notion of power as intentionality does not allow him to trace latent Orientalism in the present. It is clear that he presupposes such a distinction prior to analysis, and presupposes the fact that the only form of power is the West, a principle that could be derived that with no analysis or thought really whatsoever. What Said's critique really amounts to, and offers absolutely no advance from Foucault, as Homi Bhabha points out, is simply just a theoretical simplification, in no ways even equal to the erudition of a genealogist:

The division/correlation structure of manifest and latent Orientalism leads to the effectivity of the concept of discourse being undermined by what could be called the polarities of intentionality...The productivity of Foucault's concept of power/knowledge lies in its refusal of an epistemology which opposes essence appearance, ideology/science... There is always/in Said, the suggestion that colonial power and discourse is possessed entirely by the coloniser, which is a historical and theoretical simplification.⁸⁸⁰

History of a Discourse: Religion, Race

In *Orientalism*, the intellectual power of European Orientalism as a hegemonic discourse transcends Foucauldian episodic historicism, which Dennis Porter rightly notes, absurdly correlates the "intentions of Alexander of Greece with Jimmy Carter".⁸⁸¹ He does however narrow his study to the analyses of the British and French with regard to what we will shortly see to be an analysis of present reality, American Orientalism. It is very important to note therefore, that even Said's *Orientalism* is not a genealogy; it is a history of the present. With this covered, we can assess Said's depiction of "Orientalism as a history of an imperial

⁸⁷⁹ Ibid 12

⁸⁸⁰ Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 71-72

⁸⁸¹ Porter, *Orientalism and its Problems*, 152

discourse” with supposedly diachronic elements.⁸⁸² Said claims the diachronic elements of the history of Orientalism are the slight differences in the representations of the Orient.⁸⁸³ For Said, all the representative knowledge of the Orient, in the Western colonial frameworks of “languages, literatures, history and sociology”,⁸⁸⁴ is “manifest Orientalism”.⁸⁸⁵ For example, by “manifest Orientalism”, Said is referring to the changes we see in the depiction of the essentialized Orient, from Flaubert’s description of the Egyptian female dancer Kachek Hanem in terms of “exotic passive sensuality”,⁸⁸⁶ that would be the essentialized standard for the European male perception of Eastern women,⁸⁸⁷ to the more recent depiction of the prophet Muhammad in the Danish cartoon in 2005. However, in Said’s thinking, these differences are simply different manifestations of the same racist idea; Orientalism is latent in the sense that depictions of the Orient, while changing to a degree, remain racist and essentialist.⁸⁸⁸ Despite the pressure that the historical relationship, or narrative, between the Occident and Orient creates in Orientalist discourse, the manner in which the relation is conceived still constitutes an unequal polarity with a single scheme of structuration which means the linguistic modifications that have occurred are minimal. Despite the diachronic pressures, Said’s history of Orientalist discourse is still synchronic,⁸⁸⁹ and thus different to that of a genealogy.

Said and Christianity

Said’s principle of structural organization, latent Orientalism seems at first glance to be based on the notion of race. The Occident is of course, generally portrayed as racially white.⁸⁹⁰ However, this historically would be nonsense. According to the famous critical race theorist and philosopher, David Theo Goldberg:

The first thing to notice is that race is a morally irrelevant category in the Greek social formation but on empirical grounds not normative ones. There are no exactly racial exclusions in the classical Greek social formation, for there is no racial conception of the social subject. And while things are more complex, I want to suggest that this is also the case for the medieval experience... While the first

⁸⁸² Said, *Orientalism*, 240

⁸⁸³ Ibid 207

⁸⁸⁴ Ibid 206

⁸⁸⁵ Ibid 206

⁸⁸⁶ Ibid 187

⁸⁸⁷ Ibid 190

⁸⁸⁸ Ibid 206

⁸⁸⁹ Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 71

⁸⁹⁰ Said, *Orientalism*, 206

recorded reference to the notion of Europe as a collective 'we' is in papal letters of the mid-fifteenth century, the first recorded English usage of race occurs in 1508.⁸⁹¹

Said's argument, as I have understood it, doesn't contradict Goldberg's. Othering in Said's analysis in *Orientalism* is not only based on race but more importantly, on religion.⁸⁹² The initial fear of the Orient was based for Said on a religious division between Christianity and Islam. While modern Orientalism, or the modern West had secularized its frontiers, and European man was seen as a secular creator, "a man who made new worlds as the gods once did",⁸⁹³ Said posits that the modern and present Orientalism is:

...a set of structures inherited from the past, secularized, redisposed and reformed by structures such as philology, which in turn were naturalized, modernized and laicized substitutes for (or versions of) Christian supernaturalism..⁸⁹⁴

Said has thus stressed a continuity between modern Oriental discourse (science) and Christian Orientalism on the basis of European power and a discourse that in the West has the status of "scientific truth".⁸⁹⁵ The truth of the Orient for modern European society, argues Said, is not to be found in the Orient, but the dominant representative frameworks of European Orientalists.⁸⁹⁶ To explain the nature of this relation to domination, he invokes Nietzsche's will to power and will to truth. For Said, the silence of the Orient, and the reason why they could not represent themselves,⁸⁹⁷ was due "to the West's great cultural strength... The domination of reality by vision is no more than a will to power, a will to truth and interpretation."⁸⁹⁸ In Nietzsche's thought, what undergirded the relation between Christianity and modern science was an ascetic will to truth. Nietzsche emphasised that ascetic will to truth of Christianity generated a worldview that may be best described as a reductive and totalitarian teleology:

The ascetic idea has an aim-this goal is, putting it generally, that all other interest of human life should be measured by its standards...it believes that nothing powerful exists in the world that has not first got to receive from 'it' a meaning, a right to exist, a value, as being an instrument in its work, a way and means to its end, one end.⁸⁹⁹

⁸⁹¹ Goldberg, *Modernity, Race and Morality*, 208

⁸⁹² Said, *Orientalism*, 119-121

⁸⁹³ Ibid 121

⁸⁹⁴ Ibid 122

⁸⁹⁵ Said, *Orientalism*, 46

⁸⁹⁶ Ibid 46

⁸⁹⁷ Ibid 283

⁸⁹⁸ Ibid 240

⁸⁹⁹ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 146 (essay 3, section 23)

I have already mentioned that in *Orientalism*, Said critiqued the historical West to its present heart in the United States of America as portraying itself as the stage of history, and as the centre of human civilization; the Orient was something for the Occident. With regard to secularisation of Orientalism, Said claims that the old Christian “religious patterns of human history and destiny” were far from absent.⁹⁰⁰ Moreover, for Nietzsche, the reductive teleology of the ascetic will to truth was oppositional. In *Orientalism*, Said carefully exhibits how Christianity conceives itself completely relationally to Islam. Said conveyed how for Christian Orientalists, Islam or any other part of the Orient for that matter, was never conceived in its own terms. Said explains how the European Romantics simply saw the Orient as part of their spiritual regeneration.⁹⁰¹ Not dissimilarly, for the French Orientalist Louis Massignon, “Islam was a systematic rejection of Christian incarnation”.⁹⁰²

With regard to Islam and the Islamic territories, for example, Britain felt that it had legitimate interests as a Christian power, to safeguard. A complex apparatus for tending these interests developed.⁹⁰³

For Said, it would clearly not be an overstatement to claim that the relationship between Orientalism and colonization is indissociable from a Christian theological standpoint. Through Nietzsche, he reads Christianity as a form of moral power that constitutes the hegemonic function of Orientalist discourse. According to Said, in a critique that recalls Nietzsche’s thought, the idea that the “Christian restructures the experience of the Occident”, is premised on the fear that the “Arabs and Islam will take over the world”,⁹⁰⁴ which dates back to the memory of conquering Islamic armies in Europe. Said has clearly been influenced by Nietzsche in his critique of Christianity in *Orientalism*. He even refers to the Ottoman (e.g. Muslim) man as “*the sick man of Europe*”⁹⁰⁵ Islam was not only misrepresented as illusory, but also made to seem evil,⁹⁰⁶ sexually perverted, that is; inherently sinful. The Islamic prophet Muhammad was grossly distorted by Christian Orientalists, at times derogatorily represented, and at times mistakenly placed as the centrepiece of the Islamic tradition.⁹⁰⁷ While Said’s major focus in *Orientalism* was to discuss the misrepresentation of Islam,⁹⁰⁸ he exhibited how the same standpoint is inculcated in anti-Semitism.⁹⁰⁹ It is these

⁹⁰⁰ Said, *Orientalism*, 121

⁹⁰¹ Ibid 113

⁹⁰² Ibid 104

⁹⁰³ Ibid 100

⁹⁰⁴ Ibid 287, 205

⁹⁰⁵ Ibid 238

⁹⁰⁶ Ibid 101

⁹⁰⁷ Ibid 102

⁹⁰⁸ Ibid 26

two religions, Islam and Judaism, Said is arguing, who have felt the brunt of Christian moral violence in the historical west.⁹¹⁰

After tracing the imbrications between the intellectual history of French and British Orientalism and colonialism, Said turns to the present state of Orientalism in the United States of America in the final part of the book, "*Orientalism Now*". In the closing pages of the book, Said's argument really becomes forceful insofar as he can show the detrimental consequences of the textual attitude. He forcefully exhibits to the reader that the synchronic, essentialized portrayal of the Orient has not changed in two hundred years. He writes:

Books and articles are regularly published on Islam and the Arabs that represent absolutely no change over the virulent anti-Islamic polemics of the Middle ages and the renaissance...In newsreels or newspapers, the Arab is always shown in large numbers. No individuality, no personal characteristics or experiences.⁹¹¹

However, this is where the relationship between Nietzsche and Said truly ends. While Said is comfortable using Nietzsche's notions of power to disregard European truth claims, he doesn't raise the question of ascetic ideals with regard to the question of the connection between Christian theological and Modern scientific Orientalism. When Said does invoke Nietzsche's notion of language as metaphor, he does so instrumentally to discredit the scientific status that the discourse of Orientalism has been given in the historical West.⁹¹² Said instead confesses that Nietzsche's view of knowledge is "nihilistic for us".⁹¹³ What Said means is that such a view of knowledge is not valuable for the current political disposition, which he later sums up as speaking the truth to power.

Section 2: The Concern of the Genealogist

Knowledge of the Present

⁹⁰⁹ Ibid 27-28

⁹¹⁰ Ibid 234

⁹¹¹ Ibid 287

⁹¹² Ibid 203

⁹¹³ Ibid 203

For a book that critiques the Western academy with real force, Said's *Orientalism*, has all the appearance of a European or Western text.⁹¹⁴ This is not a mistake on Said's part. *Orientalism*, is not a text about the real geographical Orient, but the present reality of 'Orients', like Said who lived in the confines of Western racist hegemony. An essential difference between Edward Said's *Orientalism* from that of the works of Nietzsche and Foucault is that Said changes the Kantian attitude characterizing Nietzschean genealogy from a diagnosis of 'who we are' in the present moment to the question of 'who one is' in terms of an identity claim. Said presupposes his identity as a secular scholar and an Oriental in relation to the substantive notion of power prior to his genealogical study. Despite the complexity of Said's analysis, he conceives of himself as a sovereign subject that stands in opposition to power. His analysis therefore does not correlate with the structure of a Nietzschean genealogy, since Said places himself in intellectual opposition to the nature of power. In Nietzschean genealogical method, "in all events the will to power is operating".⁹¹⁵ To oppose power with critical consciousness is contrary to the critical methodological principle that informs genealogical history. An oppositional logic for Nietzsche was tantamount to the life-denying power of the ascetic ideal, and thus the totalitarian province of Western onto-theological metaphysics. Said is not a traditional genealogist, but rather a member of the Western scientific ascetic tradition. One of his key concerns which led him to write *Orientalism* "was to be able to distinguish between a pure and political knowledge".⁹¹⁶ Therefore, the condition that Said is trying to overcome is clearly latent Orientalism. A critical consciousness would be one that is not inherently racist, one that has not been tied down to hegemonic ideology, and can therefore overcome Orientalist essentialism. I will turn to how problematic Said's notion of pure knowledge is shortly. Said's problem with regard to establishing a pure knowledge of critique is his acceptance that his perspective of his surroundings has been affected by Western imperialism and Orientalism:

My own experiences of these matters are in part what made me write this book. The life of an Arab Palestinian in the West, particularly in America is disheartening. There exists here an unanimous consensus that politically he does not exist and almost unanimous consensus that politically he does not exist, and when he does it is either as a nuisance or as an Oriental. The web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, dehumanizing ideology holding in the Arab or the Muslim is very

⁹¹⁴ Aijez Ahmed, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures*, (New York: Verso, 2000), 159-162

⁹¹⁵ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Essay 2, Section 12

⁹¹⁶ Said, *Orientalism*, 24

strong indeed, and it is this web which every Palestinian has to come to feel as his uniquely punishing destiny.⁹¹⁷

The Absence of Subjectification in Said's Orientalism

Said's work in *Orientalism* is a deeply personal interrogation into how he has been given a discursive identity as an Oriental, and to what degree he, like others represented as Orientals had been conditioned by such a misrepresentation. The key difference between Said and our other two genealogists is that Said seems to have reasoned that by writing *Orientalism*, he would overcome those dominating frameworks, and attain a critical consciousness. In order to attain the starting point of critical elaboration, the scholar first needs to be self-reflexive by investigating the historical processes that have so far "deposited an infinity of traces" in oneself.⁹¹⁸ Said's anti-Foucauldian and thus anti-Nietzschean position is premised on his modernist position regarding a sovereign consciousness as the ground of epistemology, a consciousness that would no longer be speculative once it had uncovered the history of material relations that informed our ideological present.⁹¹⁹ While Foucault would claim that there is no consciousness prior to discourse,⁹²⁰ he certainly would not posit that discourse reflects things in themselves. Foucault is quite clear that discourse is a "violence we do to things".⁹²¹ Said's argument is quite different:

In many ways my study of Orientalism has been an attempt to inventory the traces upon me, the Oriental subject, of the culture whose domination has been so powerful a factor in the life of all Orientals.⁹²²

While he claims that he never "lost hold of the cultural reality of being an Oriental", in investigating the inventory of racist traces that have been imposed on him, Said's claim is always grounded and perhaps even presupposed by a critical consciousness. He admits to having this privileged foresight in advance. My disagreement with Said is not about a "real ahistorical Oriental essence".⁹²³ I want to point out that even if Said's focus is not the geographical Orient, but his world in his intellectual genealogy, he never provides a principle for how he experienced the cultural reality of being an Oriental, or how one comes to feel that the destiny he has is that of the Orient. He does, by virtue of the hegemonic nature of

⁹¹⁷ Ibid 25

⁹¹⁸ Ibid 27

⁹¹⁹ Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, 279

⁹²⁰ Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 70

⁹²¹ Foucault, *The Order of Discourse*, 55-56

⁹²² Said, *Orientalism*, 27

⁹²³ Ibid 273

Orientalist discourse, explain the manner in which the intellectual power of Oriental discourse comes to exercise itself on the consciousness of the scholar:

Orientalism's power and effectiveness which everywhere remind the reader that henceforth in order to get at the Orient he must pass through the learned grids and codes of the Orientalist...As a discipline representing institutionalized Western knowledge of the Orient, Orientalism thus comes to exert a three-way force, on the Orient, on the Orientalist, and the Western consumer of Orientalism...The Orient is Orientalized, a process that not only marks the Orient as the province of the Orientalist but also forces the initiated Western reader to accept Orientalist codifications (like d'Herbelot's alphabetized *Bibliothèque*) as the true Orient. Truth in short, becomes a learned judgement, not of the material itself, which in time seems to owe even its existence to the Orientalist.⁹²⁴

Indeed in this very piece of writing, Said is describing what *he* came up against in the process of writing his intellectual genealogy, in terms of his *own* lived experience. This is what Said's supporters are really emphasizing when they talk about Orientalism being an experiential genealogy. Said wrote *Orientalism* from the perspective of a historically produced experience, with the paradox of being of a Western academic, and a racially abused Oriental. The paradox of identity that we have seen in Said does not refer completely, I argue, to an internal confusion. Said was deeply aware of this tension throughout his writings, yet my point is that he never takes it seriously enough. By means of his reading, he knew that that joy he took in classical music and Western literature was consecrated through the blood spilt during colonization, that of not only his ancestors, but the very people he wrote for. In this very light a few years earlier he writes:

This European opulence is literally scandalous, for it has been founded on slavery, it has been nourished with the blood of slaves and it comes directly from the soil and from the subsoil of that underdeveloped world. The wellbeing and progress of Europe have been built up with the sweat and the dead bodies of Negroes, Arabs, Indians and the yellow races.⁹²⁵

Said traced the manner in which the Orient has been presented by hegemonic power of Orientalist discourse to its uninitiated learners from Western antiquity to the present. The paradox of Said's identity, as a Western academic and an Oriental would mean that in the process of his lived experience he would have to come across, work against, and been identified via a stereotype that was always perceived as a political or sexual threat, and always as inherently inferior. By being an Oriental within the academy, uncovering the

⁹²⁴ Ibid 67

⁹²⁵ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Translated by Richard Wilcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 58

present discloses to the reader the manner in which Said, and by implication generations of Orientals, had to experience-- being misrepresented in a demeaning and dehumanizing essentialism that has its own genealogy. Thus, the point that I am making is that Said's intellectual genealogy of Orientalism constitutes a double-bind of also being a history of the infinity of traces (or, representations of the Orient) that have led to who Said is. Thus, the torturous condition that follows Said around is the observation effect that is induced by Said's identity paradox, wherein the rational theorist and literary critic comes across Edward Said the Oriental. The colonial relationship of corrective domination that the Occident exercises on the texts about the Orient would be dramatized within Said's own experiential life and intellectual learning. So in *Orientalism*, the purpose of overcoming Orientalist discourse is of course to move past the essentialist binary framework of West/East racism, but at a deeper personal level, it would permit Said to overcome the pain of the cultural reality, by which he looked at himself as an Oriental in terms of a Western corrective rationality:

However painful it may be for me to accept this conclusion, I am obliged to state it: For the black man there is only one destiny. And it is white.⁹²⁶

I have quoted Fanon here because Said really does not flesh out the problems that he as a subject is grappling with in *Orientalism*. The real problem with Said's genealogy is that he never deals with experience that is created, or the life of the subject convincingly in terms of a condition that a genealogist would normally deal with. What I mean is that Said does not take the subjective experience of being orientalized seriously. In that sense, because Fanon takes the historical process that leads to colonized experience seriously, I consider Fanon to be more of a genealogist of the intersubjective present. Said, writing *Orientalism* in 1978 is clearly still facing the existential consequences of being taught that one is and will be treated like a colonial stereotype. Moreover, like Fanon, the manner in which Said tries to move past such a stereotypical image is through the critical methods afforded to him by Western rationality. Yet it was precisely on the basis of this, the basis of the copula is,⁹²⁷ in an ontological sense that scholars like Fanon and Said were represented as members of essentialized races, which were naturally different and inferior. Both the radical criticism of Fanon and Said operates in a bind insofar as their historicity⁹²⁸ meant that even the thought of liberation as a rational humanism reifies the stereotypical relation between the Enlightenment

⁹²⁶ Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, Translated by Charles lam Markmann (London: Pluto Books, 2006), 4

⁹²⁷ Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 71; Said, *Orientalism*, 72

⁹²⁸ Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 84

colonizers who brought reason and civility to the colonized, on the basis that the latter's customs were not only an illusory religion, but primitive and stereotypical. Thus, the problem that afflicts the personal, or experiential dimension of Said's is that even his oppositionality, in my reading of him, he operates on the basis of latent, corrective Orientalism (or even cultural racism) that will reify a binary vision of reality that he diagnosed in *Orientalism*.

In a Foucauldian genealogy, the one that Spanos claims Foucault has taken to its full potential, power is not only repressive like it is in Orientalism, but produces reality via the creation of the soul. What is vital in the creation of reality in a genealogy-- that is; the epistemological principle that establishes the way reality comes is to be perceived, is the body. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault wrote the genealogy of the disciplinary or normal subject. He exhibited how a "micro-physics",⁹²⁹ of disciplinary power exercised as punitive mechanisms that proliferated through the everyday life of the carceral network mastered the forces of the human body, composing the body's forces in such a manner that it became docile (obedient),⁹³⁰ and useful (in relation to capitalist and social production). In Foucault's genealogy, the subject that had been normalized does not consciously adhere to the norms of society on the basis of an intentionality that is sovereign to material processes. Through its genealogical production, the subject's intentionality is normalized. The subjectivity (reality) of the disciplinary subject is distinguished by a 'self-regulating consciousness' that tacitly polices the possibilities of bodily life in accordance with the normative constraints of disciplinary society.⁹³¹ All Orientalism is really about at the end of the day is, as Homi Bhabha correctly posits, a means of overcoming a negative identity or stereotype. This is not a genealogical task, but a real post-colonial genealogist would see:

That the point of intervention should shift from the identification of images as positive or negative, to an understanding of the processes of subjectification.⁹³²

It becomes seriously questionable how *Orientalism* can be a genealogy if there is no concept of the body or another receptive vessel that challenges the epistemic force of the intentional rational subject. If there is no body in *Orientalism*, how can Said in the genealogical sense explain how a depository of traces can induce the experiential reality of being an Oriental? He may of course, as the immigrant in exile who enjoys so-called high culture, also conceptualize his writing of *Orientalism* as a strategy to distinguish between politics and

⁹²⁹ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 219

⁹³⁰ Ibid 136-138

⁹³¹ Hook, *Foucault, Psychology and the Psycho-analytics of power*, 21-24

⁹³² Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 72

culture.⁹³³ But for a Nietzschean theorist of force and bodily subjectification, such a principle that focuses on hegemony or ideology is nonsensical. When Said talks about a cultural reality of political imperialism, surely the experience of being beaten is physical and not that of an abstract consciousness? I cannot comprehend how in a contemporary political analysis of colonialism, how the evidence of a fight, a bruising, lashings, torture or rape-- all the scars of colonial power relations-- do not manifest in corporeal instances that infect the subject relation to itself and others, as Fanon pointed out so poignantly.⁹³⁴ It for this very reason, within the post-colonial climate of dealing with how particular subjective experiences are generated, that I consider genealogies which focus on the body to be profitable. I am wary of explanations that detail the formation of our subjectivities similarly through linguistic formations of meaning. Since Marxist critical theory has attempted to focus, in a materialist sense, on the life processes of men, and in my opinion genealogy takes this disposition further than Hegelian, Marxist or Heideggerian methods by focusing on the plasticity of the living body. Nietzsche, in this very light showed us that the memory is created through violence, both corporeal and linguistic.

Said has told us nothing about what this reality is, and how relations of power have constituted those who perceive reality, as well as the inextricable relations between the two. Said has provided a description of stereotyping in Orientalist discourse, but has not provided an analytic diagnosis of the bodily experience of being stereotyped. Said's concern was not that of a genealogist that seeks a healthier existence for the body, not to decentre a regime of truth in order to replace it with another. In *Orientalism* his concern was not that of a genealogical physician but rather that of a secular intellectual overcoming the epistemological frameworks that had afflicted not only his cultural reality but also the politicized state of intellectualized scholarship. Writing *Orientalism* would allow Said to attain the conscious standpoint of critical elaboration. The process and the very gesture of writing *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* would allow him to decode those Orientalist codes that were exercised on him as an Oriental, an Orientalist, and an uninitiated Western reader. Since the problem here is only Gramscian consent, he presupposed that writing *Orientalism* would permit overcoming the hegemony of Orientalist discourse that afflicts those living in the Western world.⁹³⁵

⁹³³ Harry Harootunian. *Conjunctural Traces: Said's "Inventory"*, *Critical Inquiry* 31, no. 2 (2005), 433-434

⁹³⁴ Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, See Chapter 5, Colonial War and Mental Disorders, 170-235

⁹³⁵ Ahluwalia and Ashcroft, 'Edward Said', 45

A Knowledge of history, a recognition of the importance of social circumstance, an analytical capacity for making distinctions: these trouble the quasi-religious authority of being comfortably at home among one's people, supported by known powers and acceptable values, protected against the outside world.⁹³⁶

Section 3: Social Science and Consciousness

The Failure of the Secular Intellectual

Fifteen years after *Orientalism* was published, Said delivered a lecture that he titled "Speaking the Truth to Power". The lecture was published alongside with his other 1993 "Reith lectures", as part of "Representations of the Intellectual". These lectures mark an important moment in Said's intellectual career because he makes evident in them that power is no longer synonymous with the European man:

I think it is true to say that the critique of objectivity and authority did perform a positive service by underlining how, in the secular world, human beings construct their truths, and that for example, the so-called objective truth of the white man's superiority built and maintained by the classical European colonial empires, also rested on a violent subjugation of African and Asian peoples, who, it is equally true, fought that particularly imposed 'truth' in order to provide an independent order of their own. And so now everyone comes forward with new and often violently opposed views of the world, one hears endless talk about Judeo-Christian values, Afrocentric values, Muslim Truths, Eastern truths, Western Truths, each providing a complete program for excluding all others.⁹³⁷

Said reduces religious truth claims to social constructions that allow a particular authority to maintain order, and excludes those other claims that are contrary to their own. For Said, religion and colonialism may not follow the same logic, but they share a common ground in the social construction of systems of illusory meaning that maintain the authority of a specific collectivity. Therefore, despite the change in his position, he still keeps his central position that intellectuals have an antithetical relation to power. In opposition to repressive power, the intellectual is someone that is set apart from the masses, insofar as it is the intellectual that is "able to speak the truth to power"⁹³⁸ Power is now reducible to authority or authorities in a general sense, that of a tradition or nation. It is still repressive however; not positive in the sense of Nietzsche and Foucault. However, the first sign that Said has not overcome the binaries of Orientalism is that he portrays religion as socially constructed and dogmatic and

⁹³⁶ Ibid 45; Said, *The World, The text and the Critic*, 15-16

⁹³⁷ Said, *Representations of an Intellectual*, 91

⁹³⁸ Ibid 8

secular criticism as objective and neutral. “The true intellectual is the secular being”⁹³⁹ The criticism of the secular intellectual, for Said is a universal and rational set of principles that supersede the values of “one’s race, or people, or religion”.⁹⁴⁰ In the thought of Said, secular criticism is one and the same thing as speaking the truth to power.

For Said, these universal values are premised by “peace, reconciliation, [and] abatement of suffering”.⁹⁴¹ His critique of religion on the basis of moral principles that are both secular and universal is hard to correlate with his defence of Islam. In fact, by invoking secularism’s moral universality in terms of its orientation towards the removal of suffering, Said has made a moral and epistemological distinction between secularism and religion, true and false, ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’. This problem is exacerbated when Said claims that “One of the main intellectual activities of our century has been the questioning, not to say undermining of authority.”⁹⁴² Said’s emphasis on the twentieth century, in terms of advances made by secular intellectuals seems to contradict his earlier comment that his work denies the form of universal historicism that is driven and unified by the empire of the West. In his defence, he could of course be including himself in a group of post-colonial intellectuals that have questioned authority. But isn’t it the empire that drives the historicity of this epistemological framework from which universal secular criticism the same Western empire that Said critiqued in *Orientalism Reconsidered*? Indeed, Said does invoke a thinker that is not European to make his claim; Salman Rushdie. First, Said defends Rushdie’s novel, *The Satanic Verses* because to ban it would be damning to rights of writers everywhere.⁹⁴³ Rushdie’s novel, as is well known, caused outrage due to the derogatory portrayal of the Muslim prophet, Muhammad. Yet, Said’s defence of the novel is not based on free speech. For Said, the secular individual has a responsibility:

Indeed I would go so far as to say that the intellectual must be involved in a lifelong dispute with all guardians of sacred vision or text...The intellectual only has secular means to work with; revelation and inspiration, while perfectly feasible as modes for understanding in private life, are even disasters and even barbaric when put to use by theoretically minded men and women.⁹⁴⁴

Said has claimed that the values he proposes are those of a liberal humanism for all, yet this statement is difficult to swallow, sixteen years earlier in his seminal text, *Orientalism*, he

⁹³⁹ Ibid 120

⁹⁴⁰ Ibid 88

⁹⁴¹ Ibid 99-100

⁹⁴² Ibid 90

⁹⁴³ Ibid 89

⁹⁴⁴ Said, *Representations of an Intellectual*, 88

critiqued European scholars for equating political change with modernization, and for distinguishing a dehumanizing binary division of reality between Western rationality and Eastern primitive mysticism on the basis of an epistemological historicism. I want to make it clear that Said has not reified this definition on the basis of essentialist human types at the biological level. That the secular intellectual's universal duty, and task, Said says, is to fight the exclusionary guardians every step of the way,⁹⁴⁵ is for me incredibly problematic, because he is reifying what he claimed earlier were the secular frameworks "given birth to by a Christian theological depiction of human history and existence".⁹⁴⁶ Is it not quite clear that Said is constrained by the same Christian existential paradigms as those Orientalists that he called racist and Eurocentric sixteen years earlier when he invokes the "secular intellectual's universal duty and task"⁹⁴⁷ to fight against those sacred guardians, whose practices he claims as barbaric? Overcoming this binary division of human reality was a major factor in why Said wrote *Orientalism*, and his supposed success. However, it is now clear that he has now reified the two central elements of essentialism:

1. The first was that the modern secular West had centralized itself as the as driving force of world history and civilization, on the basis of a racial categorization that distinguished it, the self, or the Occident, in binary terms from the Orient.
2. The second is that despite the fact that he identified the stereotype of Orientalist discourse, he seems to reify the same binaries, which as a web of racist stereotypes imposed on him the cultural reality of being an Oriental as "his uniquely punishing destiny".⁹⁴⁸ If this is the case, then Said has not been able to overcome the experiential reality of being an Oriental, and therefore his method and work were not successful in analysing and overcoming that condition. Said's project, and so-called genealogy on its terms could only be a failure. Clearly, Said's position in *Representations of an Intellectual*, which he describes as the position of a rational and conscious individual, is not an advancement over the dehumanizing frameworks that divided human reality into an 'us' and 'them', since he redeploys it on the basis of a secular intellectualism and liberalism towards an inherently repressive and mystical religious force.

⁹⁴⁵ Ibid 89

⁹⁴⁶ Said, *Orientalism*, 121

⁹⁴⁷ Said, *Representations of an Intellectual*, 90

⁹⁴⁸ Said, *Orientalism*, 27

At the end of *Orientalism*, Said made a very good point that simply ignoring conceptual binaries is not reducible to criticism because there are material forces that bring these ideological divisions into play.⁹⁴⁹ My critique acknowledges this, yet I must reiterate: how can Said claim to have a critical consciousness when he has continued to reify colonialist stereotypes regarding human degeneracy, a practice he called ‘latent Orientalism’ all the way back in *Orientalism*? Robert Young, in his gargantuan creation, *White Mythologies*, is not so uncritical when it comes to Said. Moreover, Young is correct when he claims that the reason this is, is because Said presupposed what was to be critiqued, and more importantly presupposed his own experience as the grounds of critique. Writing an inventory of who one is, as solipsistic venture is clearly an inadequate means to diagnosing and overcoming the constraints of a present reality:

The question, however, is whether the category of experience, together with that of a ‘critical consciousness’, both of which derive from traditions that have undergone detailed critical interrogation in the twentieth century, can be used in an unproblematical way...Is not ‘experience’ itself always experienced, analysed and given meaning through forms of knowledge... It cannot be posited as prior to knowledge as such. Said’s difficulty is that his ethical and theoretical values are all so deeply involved in the history of the culture that he criticizes, that they undermine his claims.⁹⁵⁰

Thus, Said fails to overcome the epistemological frameworks that haunt his genealogy, because he cannot overcome his oppositional thinking that constitutes Marxism, not genealogical Nietzscheanism. When we see the Saidian tautology, whereby resisting, or speaking the truth to power, he reaffirms some of the basic essentialist principles supposedly engendered by that form of power itself, it is no longer a question of identification but subjectification. Subjectification is clearly important not only to Said, but I can argue now, to the future of post-colonial genealogy. This is because, as Young points out, Said’s presupposition and connection of a critical consciousness proved not only ideological but ineffective. If they are not prior to knowledge as Young points out, then I suggest the position that one should take is a genealogical one. How else could one, with what I have just explicated, account for how power and knowledge (*savoir*) create experiences that Said has presupposed?

We can say that if no original free and savage experience lies behind knowledge, as phenomenology would have it, it is because seeing and speaking are always already caught up within power relations

⁹⁴⁹ Ibid 327

⁹⁵⁰ Robert Young, *White Mythologies*(Routledge, New York, 2004),176

which they presuppose and actualize⁹⁵¹...This is Foucault's major achievement, the conversion of phenomenology into epistemology. For seeing and speaking means knowing (*savoir*)...Everything is knowledge, and this is the first reason why there is no savage experience, there is nothing beneath of prior to knowledge⁹⁵²

It is the study of subjectification in a Foucauldian sense, or rather a *Nietzschean genealogy*, to use my own term, that Said's own best critic, Homi Bhabha has deemed essential. Moreover, in conclusion, it was Bhabha that pointed out that when Said backtracked from the Foucauldian notion of the apparatus; his text lost its pioneering value.⁹⁵³ If Said had not backtracked, and his work remained pioneering for post-colonial studies, would that text not be a genealogy? Thus, if we are going to embark on a genealogical study of the post-colonial subject in the future to liberate ourselves in what Foucault says is liberation in the truest sense of the word, it should be quite clear that Said's conceptual and ontological commitments not should not form the premise for such an important endeavour.

⁹⁵¹ Deleuze, *Foucault*, 69

⁹⁵² *Ibid* 90

⁹⁵³ Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 72

Conclusion

In the first Chapter of this thesis, I provided a descriptive analysis of Nietzsche's genealogical method. After explicating Nietzsche's self-appointed task as a cultural physician of natural values, I elucidated how Nietzsche used the genealogical methodology as a historical diagnosis of the present. This constituted a prior interrogation of Nietzsche's ontological metaphysics, in the form of an analysis of the becoming of the will to power, and its relation to tragic life affirmative--that is, healthy-- or moral life-denying sick values which could be diagnosed in terms of the body, both individual and social. Nietzsche, after tracing a history of the will to power to the present, diagnosed the interpretive and evaluative status of man as being reciprocally determined by a will to nothingness. For the cultural physician Nietzsche, the human body that was the manifestation of the will to nothingness was a nihilistic, gregarious and sickly creature.⁹⁵⁴ Nietzsche's claim was that this form of man had lost its healthy bodily unity, individual and social, which led to him being plagued by the decline of the highest values, but without the active strength to create new values. I also explained that Nietzsche's genealogical method, as a tracing of the will to power, was an active element of all his mature work. In his genealogy, Nietzsche's tracing of the will to power was also a history of the body. Drawing on Nietzsche's collection of letters, I argued that he wrote *On the Genealogy of Morals*, as a clarification of his prior work that followed the conceptual and communicative schema of an academic essay, because of his elliptical, metaphorical,⁹⁵⁵ and enigmatic aphoristic philosophical style.⁹⁵⁶

In the second Chapter, I was concerned with the manner in which Michel Foucault used genealogy as a Nietzschean form of historiography. This concern led to me to focus on the local and supplementary strategic nature of Foucault's genealogical histories of the modern subject in relation to the transversal, anarchic struggles that afflicted Europe over the course of twenty years, of which the central point was May 1968.⁹⁵⁷ In my analysis of Foucault's work, I pointed out that Foucault interpreted these struggles in terms of a Nietzschean framework. Foucault reflected on May of 1968, and the anarchistic struggles around it as the second event of epistemological history, that followed the consequence of the death of

⁹⁵⁴ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 118 (aphorism 203)

⁹⁵⁵ Nietzsche, *Selected Letters of Nietzsche*, 269

⁹⁵⁶ Macintyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry*, 43-49

⁹⁵⁷ May, *Philosophy of Foucault*, 61 (my emphasis)

God.⁹⁵⁸ Nonetheless, Foucault was concerned with writing genealogies, not as a further imposition of truth, but rather as a form of theoretical practice, that formed a relay between different forms of resistance as an event.⁹⁵⁹ In his genealogies, Foucault's, diagnosis of the present attended to two problems for the purpose of furthering anarchic resistance.⁹⁶⁰ The first problem was power relations. In this Chapter I paid attention to the manner in which Foucault altered Nietzsche's foundational concept of power relations. Dropping the quantitative and qualitative elements of Nietzsche's distinction of power, Foucault reconceived power relations as a relation of forces, constituted by a rationalistic strategy immanent to itself, a strategy that would order to social relations. The second problem, the forms of subjectivity that have been produced through the relations of power that characterize modern society, was related to the first. In his genealogical work, Foucault combined power relations with the Heideggerian notion of the episteme, to create a mechanistic and technological framework for the production of various sexualized human individuated subjectivities in a neo-Heideggerian carceral world of possibilities.⁹⁶¹ By illustrating a set of open regions, or Heideggerian clearings, Foucault's genealogies, as a historical ontology of the present, responded to the Kantian question or attitude, of 'who we are', as a form of written aesthetics, fictions, of anti-science, still holding the function of Heideggerian existential truth.⁹⁶² For Foucault, it was power that had ontologically ordered subjective and social relations, and diagnosing of the aims and intentions of power, and the subjects it had produced as a set of open possibilities, was the central aim of his genealogies for the purposes of resistance against power and the present state of subjectivity.

Foucault used genealogy, like Nietzsche as a means to critique to linear, teleological version of history.⁹⁶³ Unlike Nietzsche however, Foucault's notion of time does not follow a cyclical modality, but rather places emphasis of the discontinuity of all historical processes, which are never reducible to a single principle, such as the eternal return.⁹⁶⁴ Additionally, Foucault deployed his genealogical methodology, as a diagnosis of an intersubjective present, as a means of critiquing the notion of human nature, especially the relationships created in modernity between sexuality, normalization and the rational subject's access to objective

⁹⁵⁸ Foucault, *Truth and Juridical Forms*, 7

⁹⁵⁹ Deleuze and Foucault, *Intellectuals and Power*, 206

⁹⁶⁰ Foucault, *The Subject and Power*, 211; Deleuze and Foucault, *Intellectuals and Power*, 206, 214

⁹⁶¹ Foucault, *The Subject and Power*, 220-221; Deleuze, Foucault, 84 ; See also Stuart Elden, *Genealogy as Historical Ontology*.

⁹⁶² Foucault, *What is Enlightenment*, 46-47 ; Heidegger, *Origin of the Work of Art*, 117-119; Deleuze, *Foucault*, 94 (my emphasis)

⁹⁶³ Foucault, *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, 77

⁹⁶⁴ Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 9-18

truth.⁹⁶⁵ In my reading, Foucault deployed genealogy effectively in a manner that paid its traditional debt to an originary Nietzschean ontological framework, despite a radically revised methodology that took into account the historicist existential thought of Martin Heidegger.⁹⁶⁶

In the second part of this thesis, following an analysis of the creation and correct use of genealogy, I delved into the state of the genealogical methodology in the post-colonial enclave, as it has been established in the book, *Orientalism*, by Edward Said. In the third Chapter (and the second part of this thesis), “Edward Said’s abuse of Genealogy”, I conveyed that Said is not a genealogist in the manner of Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault, for three reasons:

1. Power as historical framework: First, I pointed out that contrary to appearances, Said does not conceive of power in the same manner that Nietzsche and Foucault do. In this sense, I argued that because of his conception of power, Said lacks the historical framework that would be sufficient for genealogical historiography. In Nietzsche’s mature genealogical period, he understood power as an ontology of biological or genetic forces that served as an historical framework for the production of the modern will that constituted the present moment, and the will to nothingness.⁹⁶⁷ In Foucault’s genealogies, power relations still occupy an ontological role in the production of the subject through the mechanistic historical framework of an apparatus.⁹⁶⁸ In *Orientalism*, although Said claimed that he was deploying Foucault’s notion of power and knowledge, i.e. an apparatus, he mistakenly conceived power as a Gramscian form of political and intellectual power that had the capacity to engender discourses.⁹⁶⁹ Said mistakenly conceived of power as a structuralist hegemony, where latent Orientalism was analytically deployed as both a transcendental signified of a synchronic system of hegemonic discourse and a European will to dominate the Other, the constructed Orient.⁹⁷⁰

⁹⁶⁵ Clifford, *Political Genealogy After Foucault*, 6-8

⁹⁶⁶ Deleuze, Foucault, ; *Stuart Elden, Genealogy as Historical Ontology*, 197-198 ; Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Being and Power*, 1-30

⁹⁶⁷ Muller Launer, *Nihilism as Will to Nothingness*, loc 5279

⁹⁶⁸ Agamben, *What is An Apparatus*, 11

⁹⁶⁹ Said, *Orientalism*, 3

⁹⁷⁰ *Ibid* 36

Said's historiography does not follow a diachronic tracing of systems of discourses, constituted by an historical *a priori* epistemic principle which is always engendered by particular relations of power. As Foucault traced the birth of an apparatus from the decline of another system of power, he traced two differentially organized systems of human relations and meaning via a diachronic history.⁹⁷¹ In *Orientalism*, Said argued in the Gramscian sense that this form of political power was consecrated around the intellectual power of Western academics that gave birth to a system of discourse, which he called *Orientalism*. According to Said, Orientalism was a universal discourse that divided human history into two polarized and essentialized forms of historical and geographical existence.⁹⁷² The first, following the modern invocation of Christian identitarian themes was the construction of and on behalf of the Western European human being and Europe as a sphere of rationality and moral civility, as well as holding the capacity for technological and political development.⁹⁷³ The second sphere was the constructed Orient, or the East, which spanned from the Middle East to Asia, which Said argued to be an antithetical and fictional representation on behalf and in relation to the West or Occident.⁹⁷⁴ In contrast to the rational Occident, Said argued the Orient was fictionally stereotyped as inferior, sexually barbarous, and populated by mystically-driven human beings. While Said suggested that all manifest representations of the Orient, under the pressure of history, gained a diachronous aspect, his universalist representation of Orientalism does not follow the post-structuralist principle of a diachronic history of power and knowledge, consecrated around a moment of discontinuity in the urgent need that the apparatus responds to, but a closed synchronic system ordered by a textual attitude which gives direction to, and is nonsensically engendered by European domination and racism, which Said seemingly diagnosed as latent Orientalism.⁹⁷⁵

2. An inadequate response to the Kantian attitude with regard to subjectification. The second problem followed from the first. In Nietzsche and Foucault's genealogies, power was conceived as a relation between forces with a positive capacity. In Nietzschean genealogical analysis, power is not repressive because it engenders our

⁹⁷¹ Woodward, *Understanding Nietzscheanism*, 63, 90

⁹⁷² Said, *Orientalism*, 36, 38, 49

⁹⁷³ Ibid 45

⁹⁷⁴ Ibid 63

⁹⁷⁵ Ibid 204

perspectival apprehension of the real.⁹⁷⁶ While at first Said seems to conceive of power positively, as a means of engendering the discourse on Orientalism, his conception of power is repressive. Moreover, in relation to this problem, Said wrote *Orientalism* as an intellectual genealogy of who one is.⁹⁷⁷ Said's Orientalism does not, like the Nietzsche and Foucault, use a history of power to trace a present state of existence that constitutes a human collective. He changes the focus to a more personal and existential dimension, yet his existential focus does not correspond to a positive form of subjectification,⁹⁷⁸ nor does it produce, through reciprocal determination, a form of the will that is symptomatic of a particular form of existence. Unlike Nietzsche and Foucault, Said does not write a history of the body's positive relationship to power. It is a closer application of this relationship, as being deployed in an historical analysis of historical power relations that produced subjective forms of experience, which I deem essential to the revision of genealogical method in the post-colonial academy.

Said's Gramscian motivation for writing *Orientalism* was to write an historical study of the illusory traces that constitute the hegemonic nature of the discursive formation of Orientalism.⁹⁷⁹ Through writing this study, Said, following Gramsci's philosophical insights, hoped to attain a critical consciousness that would allow him to gain mastery over the illusory quality of the hegemonic discourse of Orientalism.⁹⁸⁰ For Said, there is therefore a universal reality that belies the repressive functions of political power. He therefore believes in the ontological status of an ahistorical truth that the genealogists Nietzsche and Foucault do not commit to. His intellectual genealogy is therefore incorrectly perceived, by a few post-colonial scholars, to follow the methodological and historical framework of a post-structuralist genealogy. He does not use power in accordance with Nietzschean methodological historiography, which is most notable in the instance that he does not use genealogy to uncover a particular form of experience engendered by a colonial power apparatus.⁹⁸¹ For a post-colonial genealogy to consecrate itself efficiently as a methodology, it will require a closer adherence to a conceptualization of power that is positive, not negative in the Gramscian sense.

⁹⁷⁶ Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 301-302 (aphorism 556) ; Foucault, *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, 88-89

⁹⁷⁷ Said, *Orientalism*, 24

⁹⁷⁸ Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 67

⁹⁷⁹ Said, *Orientalism*, 25

⁹⁸⁰ Ibid

⁹⁸¹ Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 70

3. If Said's methodological revisions had produced a work which had been successful, and he had attained a critical consciousness, then I would have consequently backtracked and claimed that he could still use genealogy effectively because he would have used genealogy as an historical method that is transformative.⁹⁸² However, when Said claimed to speak under the premise of a critical consciousness, he did not surpass the illusory binary vision of reality which he so detested, and wrote *Orientalism* to overcome this.⁹⁸³ By rejecting the original Nietzschean foundations of the power and the body, he failed to produce a method that has the capacity to transform a historically produced subjectivity. In Chapter Three, I conveyed this problem in Said's work. Faced with the dilemma that followed the reception of Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses*, Said enunciated a statement which, especially when his criticism is taken into account, fits neatly into the discourse of Orientalism. William Hart, a great reader of Said, who even mistakenly went as far as to postulate that Said is a better genealogist than Foucault, was forced to pull the trigger over Said's very apparent latent Orientalism.⁹⁸⁴

Said Orientalizes religion at the very point that he rescues Islam from Orientalism. The Orientalist-inspired othering that Said criticizes looks much like his religious–secular distinction, which resembles if not mimes the East–West distinction...The religious–secular distinction is Said's Orientalism, the way he produces otherness for his own uses. My point is that, in arguing against binary, dualistic, and Manichaeic thinking where East and West are concerned, he reproduces such thinking elsewhere. Religion and secularism are East and West in Said's imaginative geography. It is from the perspective of an enlightened, rational, nondogmatic, secular (European!) consciousness that Said looks down and judges religious consciousness as constitutively and irremediably lacking.⁹⁸⁵

Said had never conceived in *Orientalism* that the Orient was a form of experience that been produced through colonial relations.⁹⁸⁶ He has been critiqued for never dealing with an analysis of subjectification, which the great post-colonial scholar Homi Bhabha has always deemed necessary.⁹⁸⁷ Said's recapitulation of the Orientalist binary with regard to the religious and secular divide robs his prior methodological work of real critical import. Said's

⁹⁸² Spanos, *Edward Said, A Legacy*, 70-105

⁹⁸³ Said, *Representations of an Intellectual*, 8

⁹⁸⁴ Said, *Orientalism*, 25, 45

⁹⁸⁵ Hart, *Said and the Religious Effects of Culture*, 87

⁹⁸⁶ Balagangadhara, S. N., and Marianne Keppens, 'Reconceptualizing the postcolonial project: Beyond the strictures and structures of Orientalism', *Interventions* 11, no. 1 (2009), 60

⁹⁸⁷ *Ibid* 60

reformulation of genealogy on Gramscian grounds, that is-- social science methods-- does not provide him with a transformative alternative to, or a way of overcoming the colonial consciousness that his project sought to overcome.⁹⁸⁸ As Robert Young has suggested, it is Said's experience itself, one that assumes critical neutrality, which needs to be investigated.⁹⁸⁹ I have argued, in a fashion similar to Young, in agreement with Bhabha that this is the case precisely because he omitted an analysis of subjectification. That is, a genealogical analysis of the historical process whereby an apparatus engenders subjective forms of experience through its relationship with the body for the purpose of effectively transforming that relationship.⁹⁹⁰ In this thesis, I have provided a descriptive analysis of the manner in which Nietzsche and Foucault have used genealogy, so as to show the inadequacy of Said's methodological revisions, and suggest to theorists working in the post-colonial academy that a post-colonial genealogy requires a closer application of Nietzsche and Foucault's work on power and the body.

⁹⁸⁸ Ibid

⁹⁸⁹ Young, *White Mythologies*, 134, 136

⁹⁹⁰ Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 71

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