African Democracy at a Crossroads – Structural Adjustment, economic crisis and political turbulence in Zimbabwe

By

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'Malibongwe igama likaNkulunkulu, Zita rake ngarikudziwe!'

ABSTRACT

This work investigates the changes in Zimbabwe's democratisation trajectory presented by the failure and adverse effects of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in that country. The broad discussion is based on the postulation that structural adjustment programmes with their neo-liberal economic foundations, as they have been articulated and implemented in Africa have undermined both development and democratisation on the continent. The study assesses literature around structural adjustment programmes in the continent, exploring its possible successes and definite failures. It also discusses the alternatives available to the continent in relation to the notions of good governance and its effects on development. A mapping of Zimbabwe's experience with adjustment serves as a case study from which several conclusions are drawn. Some of these conclusions are that the rigidity of adjustment programmes close out democratic processes and result in democracy being diminished as well as bypassing novel democratic opportunities. This situation for the African continent is worsened by the polarisation of an uneven global political economy which by virtue of inherent power relations, undermines Africa's economic integration. As such a new and radical move away from neo-liberalism towards a people-centred democratic, wealth creating developmental agenda is required for Zimbabwe's revitalisation.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIPA	Access to Information and Privacy Act
ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
FRELIMO	Liberation Front of Mozambique
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OGIL	Open General Import Licence
POSA	Public Order and Security Act
PRSPs	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
RF	Rhodesian Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZUM	Zimbabwe Unity Movement

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background Statement

Over the last six years, Zimbabwe has been described as oscillating between authoritarianism and democracy. The country has seen the simultaneous opening and closing of political space, the emergence of a significant post-nationalist opposition to the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party, collapse of the national economy, decline in health services and education and increase in prominence of the parallel economy.

Although all aspects of Zimbabwean life - political, social and economic - have been affected by the current crisis, it is important to note that the crisis is a manifestation of a process that started in the mid 1970s and gained momentum in the 1990s (Bond, 2007: 154/5). Under pressure from International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the Zimbabwean government adopted a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) known as ESAP – Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (Chakaodza, 1993: 54). Though aimed at economic liberalisation this strategy carried with it conditionalities for good governance - opening of political space, respect for human rights and the rule of law.

The 1990s have been described as a time of "increased marginalisation of Africa in the global system, collapse of national economies, escalation of internal war and civil strife, and democratic transition" (Osaghae, 1995: 183). In the 21st century, the global political economy is characterised by nation-states striving for democratic stability or peace where it is purported to not exist. Sub-Saharan African[1] countries have for the last few decades undergone efforts at democratisation resulting in varying levels of success (Diamond, 1988: 3). These efforts have been especially encouraged and financially sponsored by creditor institutions, international donor organisations (NGOs) as well as external nation-states while supported or resisted by African

[1] The terms sub-Saharan Africa and Africa are used interchangeably but denote reference to Africa south of the Sahara.

governments and civil societies within the democratising states (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997: 194).

The rhetoric of *"good governance"* pervades contemporary African politics. States in conflict, those moving towards peace, on the verge of armed violence or economic collapse are all faced with the challenge of achieving sustainable democracy. The abatement of the Cold War in the early 1990s serves as a significant moment in time at which to locate these challenges. The failure of communism meant that many African countries formerly aligned to the east and socialist states of the Soviet Union, China and Cuba found themselves without international military, economic and political support resulting in the toppling of many authoritarian leaders (Hentz, 2004: 145). This ideological shift coincided with global economic recession that led to a debt crisis especially felt in the Third World. The victors of the Cold War, western countries, financed the external debt of the affected states with loans administered through the Washington Consensus institutions (Adedeji, 1999: 522). These loans created opportunities for western countries to propagate liberal democracy to sub Saharan Africa and other regions. The exit of formerly authoritarian leaders from politics gave rise to the 'third-wave' of democracy on the continent. However, upon reflection of the seemingly optimistic start to the 1990s, it is clear that democracy in Africa is happening in "fits and starts" (Fomunyoh, 2001: 49).

That the 'third wave' of democratisation began, was stalled or continues in the African continent is debateable. How it is endogenously pursued is also questionable. That it is desired and promoted exogenously is certain, but what is of great interest is the extent to which the promotion of democracy from outside of African countries will lead to established systems. It is true that external financial assistance is not confined to democratic promotion. It also extends to enhancing security and ensuring stability in certain regions thus demonstrating the importance of monetary and other forms of help (Brown, 2005: 189). However, it is argued that democracy is best achieved when initiated and pursued from within a country. With less conditional assistance from external agents, African citizens will be better able to develop, manage and own their political systems.

Conversely, because Africa is arguably the poorest of the developing continents IFI assistance is largely dedicated to poverty alleviation and development (Akokpari, 2006: 6). These development strategies have translated into African states heavy reliance on IFIs while exacerbating the political, economic and social inadequacies with little room to deviate from the paths set by these organisations. This work argues that IFIs understand the solution to Africa's development issues in terms of a neo-liberal framework; essentially that neo-liberal economic reforms will redeem Africa out of its underdevelopment. In isolation, such policies are not wholly problematic, however, external creditors fund economic liberalisation policies and demand simultaneous political reforms. Hence, while IFIs and multilateral creditors promote democracy, their priority is economic reform. If economic reform is aimed at development it is necessary to pay close attention to the manner in which these policies hinder democracy and prevent democratic development (Akokpari, 2006: 8).

1.2 Objectives

While focusing on Zimbabwe as a case study this research project illuminates the nature of democratisation in Africa as hindered by forces external to the continent and explores the relevance of neo-liberalism as appropriate for development. By looking closely at ESAP in an attempt to isolate a group of external actors and specific conditionalities - both economic and political - the project will argue that despite support for the transformation of institutions by adopting transparent and accountable practices and personnel, financial support and conditions tied to external assistance for development and sometimes political reform undermines the processes of democracy and adversely affects its evolution. It will also be argued that the global political economy is a polarised system that excludes developing countries and serves to keep African states disadvantaged within it.

Taking advantage of novel political openings in Africa is crucial. Nevertheless, perhaps more crucial is the manner in which external actors, opposition parties, and civics engage in the process and respond appropriately to these opportunities. This work is relevant in that it emphasises the need for self evaluation by external actors involved in both development and democratisation work. Although

they finance and contribute to the growth of democracy and development, there is a need to assess the effects of their contribution and reshape their approaches. Furthermore, the paper attempts to move away from the rigid dichotomous debate that characterises Zimbabwe's crisis as: (i) purely a result of international sabotage and putting forward the ruling party as the sole representative of the nation, as advanced by the current governing regime and (ii) as solely caused by an authoritarian, corrupt, patrimonial, inefficient state, as propagated by critics of the government and commentators on the situation. The point is to present a nuanced argument that highlights the interface between structural adjustment (neo-liberal economics) and democracy.

1.3 Rationale for the Case of Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is an interesting case with which to test the hypothesis that a simplistic understanding of development solutions by creditor countries has diminished the prospects of democracy taking root in the country. Brown (2005: 184) argues that economic crises within a country produce popular discontent amongst the population, affecting even those of the population who may have been staunch supporters of an authoritarian regime. Such discontent then ushers in a climate amenable to economic and political liberalisation. He adds however, that paradoxically, these conditions that promote transition, if continual, fail to result in a lasting democracy. This is the case in Zimbabwe, where the ruling ZANU-PF regime internationally recognised as authoritarian, has implemented varying policies that limit the popular participation of citizens in politics as well as infringements upon their human rights.

Worthy of note is the link between external funding and its subsequent withdrawal based on allegations of human rights violations. These claims, though valid, blur the initial cause of withdrawal that was in response to: the commitment of Zimbabwean troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998, mass payouts to liberation struggle war veterans in the same year and the government's silent approval of invasions on white owned commercial farms followed by enactment of policy to nationalise and redistribute land (Landsberg, 2000:108). In other words, it was a punitive measure against the government's diversion from the stipulations of

the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) (Goldsmith, 2001: 416). This places emphasis on the overlap often ignored by IFIs and other observers of the economic and political with regard austerity measures.

As such the study is located in a critique of Structural Adjustment as determining development agendas in Africa, its links to democratisation and Zimbabwe's particular experience in this regard. External actors are generally identified as IFIs and other creditor agencies; these institutions personify the economic liberalisation efforts in the form of SAP. The discussion will also attempt to understand external action in relation to ties of the main opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and how these interlocking issues have contributed to the political and economic crisis in the country.

1.3.1 Zimbabwe's Democracy

Democratic indices in the 1990s recorded Zimbabwe as being a semi-democratic state or a one-party democracy distinguishing it from 'third wave' democracies. Bhebhe and Ranger (2001), Dashwood (2000) and Sithole (1988) debated the nature of Zimbabwe's democracy, but because of the advances in the economy, education, industry and agriculture at independence, there was general optimism concerning its entrenchment. A look at the country's international status in 2007, however, presents a different picture. The Freedom House index of freedom classifies Zimbabwe as *"not free"*, in other words having very low to non-existent levels of democracy, or as being an authoritarian system (Country Report: Zimbabwe, 2006).

Democratisation in Zimbabwe is at a crossroads, manifested in economic and political crisis. The crisis is also emphasised because the government of Zimbabwe has fallen out of favour with western countries. The reasons for this also serve as evidence of the crisis and democracy's dilemma. This is reflected in: increased repression of the state and associated violence around elections, the rigging of these, severe economic downturn characterised by hyper-inflation and resulting in untold adversity of the masses, state advocated land invasions accompanied by compromise of the rule of law and the mass emigration of millions of mostly skilled Zimbabweans into neighbouring countries and abroad (Lee, 2007: 119).

This study aims to show that the above events have served as instruments by which Zimbabwe's claim of being democratic has been tested and not necessarily failed. It will be argued that Zimbabwe is on a different democratic trajectory contrary to opinion that claims it has no chance of success, has failed, never existed or has been hijacked (Makumbe, 2002: 99), (Lloyd, 2002) and (Bush & Szeftel, 2002: 9). By examining Zimbabwe's experience with neo-liberal economic policies the study aims to show that economic conditionalities led to the breakdown of what was imagined to be a democracy and detracted from opportunities to capitalise on the political openings created by the policies' effects. A further postulation is that the current economic and political crisis, if strategically and imaginatively exploited by entities both within Zimbabwe and abroad, can result in an entrenchment of a democracy that serves the people of the country.

1.3.2 Economic and Political Liberalisation Efforts

The link between SAPs and democratisation is not direct but is one that requires investigation. SAPs have had adverse effects on African populations, especially the most vulnerable groups. African states have been forced to discontinue many social welfare programmes resulting in increased poverty and unemployment (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999: xii). This deprivation has caused public outcry against these policies. However, because the reforms are tied to debt financing, governments have seen fit to implement autocratic measures and repress public protest. During the ESAP years in Zimbabwe, students involved in demonstration against adjustment on the various tertiary institution campuses experienced this repression at the hands of state security agents, including being fired at with tear gas (Nhema, 2002: 131).

Unlike Ghana and Uganda, Zimbabwe's economic success with ESAP has been limited perhaps because of the varied political openings and opportunities that arguably existed prior to ESAP for civil society in general. Exploiting these while economic reform unfolded meant that the state lost political power and continuing with ESAP meant losing sovereignty to IFIs; showing what Bush and Szeftel (2002: 8) term "sovereignty and democracy in opposition". By eventually abandoning ESAP,

the Zimbabwean state regained sovereignty but at the expense of political liberalisation or rather forging a new democratic path.

1.3.3 International Involvement

The issue of sovereignty is further emphasised through Zimbabwe's international relationships. International engagement in the current Zimbabwean crisis has been characterised by backing of the opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), in an effort to see regime change in Zimbabwe while applying smart sanctions on key government officials in addition to withholding loans. The international world has also taken exception to the 'Fast Track' land policy implemented by the government in 2000. In this respect, the MDC joined forces, with external actors and white Zimbabwean farmers in admonishment of the government advocated 'land grabs'.

Though difficult to pinpoint, funding for the opposition MDC came from both within and outside the country (Zimbabwe: Galvanising Change, 2006: 16578C). Internal monetary support came mainly from white commercial farmers who stood to lose a great deal from the government's Land Reform policies. This endorsement of the MDC initially led to an unprecedented level of opposition support, a kind that had been unknown since soon after the country's independence. In the recent past, it has seemingly waned because of uncertainty over the MDC's allegiances (Bond & Manyanya, 2002: xiv) Thus, in terms of sustaining, strengthening or ushering in democracy, the perceived long term effects of external support has been a de-legitimation of the party in the eyes of ZANU-PF elite and most importantly in the hearts and souls of the masses who associate their suffering with external actors and barred access to wealth creation in the form of landownership (Dansereau, 2003: 173).

1.4 Research Question

How have conditionality packages hindered democracy and contributed to the current economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe?

1.5 Hypothesis

Conditionalities in the form of Structural Adjustment Programmes have hampered Zimbabwe's democracy because of the adverse effects of economic reform as well as the contradictory nature of economic and political liberalisation.

1.6 Methodology

This study is primarily descriptive with the methodology based on desk and library research. The work is reliant on secondary sources by way of books, journal articles, reports, working papers and Internet sources.

1.7 Synopsis

The study is separated into chapters. Chapter one provides a background to the study as well as delineating the objectives, research question and hypothesis. Chapter two addresses structural adjustment in Africa and interrogates the nature of the economic reform regimes, the extent of their success on the continent and neo-liberalism's relevance as a developmental agenda. The second section takes a glimpse into some literature on democracy - particularly in Africa - and associated notions of good governance, ideas of liberal democracy and most importantly the relationship between economic development – in the form of structural adjustment – and democratisation. Chapter three is a case study on Zimbabwe, beginning with a background to the case that includes discussion of: the land issue, the nature of the one party state and opposition politics, external relations and the current crisis. Through the lens of ESAP, this chapter also describes the political and economic effects of adjustment, identifies the political or democratic openings created by these effects and highlights some roots of the current crisis. It concludes that ESAP weakened democracy in Zimbabwe. Dedicated to recommendations and conclusions, chapter four posits the need for systemic change in the global political economy. It puts forward possibilities for the notion of 'African democracy' and suggests alternative models of development for Zimbabwe and the continent as a whole.

CHAPTER TWO
OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

2.1 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND AFRICA

2.1.1 Structural Adjustment or Neo-liberal Economic Reforms

SAPs are packages of neo-liberal economic reforms which are implemented by borrower governments in exchange for financial aid. As a grouping, these commitments to act are known as conditionalities (Akonor, 2006: 1). According to Akonor (2006:1) IFI conditionality consists of macroeconomic policy reform. These reforms typically aim to improve supply side efficiency and resource allocation by allowing the market freedom to determine prices, allow free market competition, remove state subsidies, privatise state owned businesses and float or devalue currency. They also as stimulate economic growth on the demand side by lowering tariffs, remove quotas and exchange controls. "Conditionality then, is a compensation mechanism that allows IFIs such as the IMF, to monitor behaviour and provide incentives for compliance with the policies that are part of its programmes" (Akonor, 2006: 2).

SAPs find their origin in the 'Washington Consensus', a term used to refer to Washington based and supported financial institutions that have since the 1970s endorsed and advanced neo-liberal and or free market approaches to mostly developing states' economic policies (Bond, 2002: 1). The Washington Consensus was initially expressed through economic, social and environmental policy, and though these are arrived at through specific political decision making processes, since the 1990s, the Washington Consensus became closely linked to policies and/ or conditions that openly directed political decision making.

Neo-liberal economic, social and environmental policies are derived from cost benefit analyses whose aims are to reach the most profitable outcome (Bond, 2002: 1). When these policies are applied to developing states or their statesmen have been convinced or coerced into implementing them, however, the beneficiaries of the

profits become questionable. Is it the reforming state that benefits – as a whole – or are benefits mainly for the institution providing financing for the reforms or the state associated to the institution? Lapeyre (2004: 5) and Cotton and Ramachandran (2003: 213) chalk it down to "a major global preoccupation to liberalise the economies of developing countries.

2.1.2 Africa's Success with SAPs

Adebayo Adedeji, the former Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), notes the reluctance of IFIs to recognise the need for exploring the social aspect of development policies for African states (Adedeji, 1999: 521). He credits the World Bank however, as having made paradigmatic shifts towards social issues. Adedeji states that SAPs have had dire effects on African economies, especially resulting in the increase and severity of poverty. As such SAPs in Africa, unlike in some Asian countries, have failed, resulting in the rigidifying of the nature of African economies (Adedeji, 1999: 522).

According to Adedeji (1999: 523/4) SAPs distorted African economic growth, in other words negative growth instead of high levels of growth, because of the overly competitive world markets that African states were required to compete in. An assumption made by IFIs in the heyday of SAPs was that growth was equal to reduction in or reversal of poverty, whereas, growth and poverty eradication proved to not be synonymous in Africa. Adedeji thus calls for a need to focus on these plights as well as inequality and inequity so as to reverse the erosion of the emergent African middle classes witnessed at the implementation of SAPs (Adedeji, 1999: 525).

An intricate part of the SAP cycle are the excessive amounts of foreign debt preventing African economies from moving forward. SAPs only succeed in increasing debt by deferring repayment until a much later time when usually the interest on initial loans far exceeds the principal. Despite all the fanfare surrounding the lobbying of G8 countries to forgive the debt of Third World countries, Adedeji (1999: 527) emphasises that lender countries and institutions force borrowers to repay, "creditor nations are determined, regardless of the consequences, to have the debt paid back".

These enforced repayments carry enormous social significance that is mostly ignored by lenders and in addition debt is wielded by creditor states as a major political instrument of power over African states.

Adedeji (1999: 527) conclusively observes that in order for SAP to have some meaning for the African continent, lessons need to be learnt from Asian countries and their experiences with SAP. The most important of these being to fully develop human resources in the continent and ensure the retention of highly skilled individuals; this retention can be ensured through increased public spending for those employed by the state, but also ensuring transparent processes in recruitment and hiring. Although seemingly in contradiction with the thinking behind SAPs, Adedeji (1999: 527) encourages increased state involvement in the economy.

Although the SAPs have not alleviated the poverty and inequality known in the continent it must also be borne in mind that the exact contribution of adjustment to the plight of African peoples is not certain (Eyoh & Sandbrook, 2001: 20).

2.1.3 Impediments to SAPs in Africa

The above concludes that SAPs have been unsuccessful in the continent simply based on the fact that they have not achieved their intended economic outcome. The greatest result of SAPs has been that economies have failed to adjust in ways that facilitate growth and changing the fortunes of African countries in the global economy. As such this has led to a rise in levels of inequality and poverty as well as adverse effects faced by the most vulnerable of society. The erosion of political liberties and abuse of human rights is another impact that SAPs have had on African populations and one in which this work is most concerned (Ndulo, 2003 :334).

Many evaluations of SAPs hypothesise that African governments failed at implementing SAPs because of their failure at governance. Weak, unaccountable, corrupt, inefficient and most of all, patrimonial, repressive and authoritarian governments have been blamed for the failure of SAPs. However, Bonny Ibhawoh (1999: 158) asserts that the link between reform policies, the necessities of the

authoritarian character of their implementation and the subsequent infringement on human rights and political liberties and participation have not been sufficiently considered. Though the era of SAPs as they were known in the 1980s and 1990s has been and gone, what Ibhawoh emphasises is the lack of this recognition in future policy making.

Ibhawoh (1999: 158) argues that SAPs created, or perhaps even in their new forms create, crises of legitimacy for African states and their incumbent regimes. These crises of legitimacy are often arrived at because the adverse effects of implementing SAPs were in many cases, as in Zimbabwe, felt in the immediate short term post implementation. Those most affected by the reform policies were the working and lower middle classes, so in the case of Zimbabwe these were, the rural dwellers, peasant farmers and low income earners in the urban areas (Chakaodza, 1993: 66). The various affected people then began to speak out and demonstrate against the ruling regimes, demanding there be a response to their plight. Because governments had no options but to carry out SAPs to the letter, they were most often unable to intervene in the market to ease the pressures for their populations. Instead, some of these already dictatorial and authoritarian governments resorted to even more repressive strategies so as to carry out reforms (Ibhawoh, 1999: 158).

A claim that IFIs deliberately supported "the authoritarian political actions of adjusting states would not be true (Ibhawoh, 1999: 58). However, that they turned a blind eye to state repression on demonstrating and protesting populations in many countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Zimbabwe, at the expense of rolling out reforms, is indisputable (Ibhawoh, 1999: 159). Furthermore, these types of state repression are contrary to the rhetoric of political liberalisation espoused, limitedly by IFIs but quite seriously by other funders and creditor organisations (Ibhawoh, 1999: 158). IFIs therefore implicitly encourage "authoritarianism and human rights violations by insisting on politically difficult conditionalities in the implementation of economic reforms" (Ibhawoh, 1999: 158). This encouragement, accompanied by vague admonitions in response to repression, merely leads to further repression and violation of the liberties and rights of citizens.

Unfortunately, once a culture of impunity has been established with no prospect of action taken against the offender, it is too late to respond at a later stage. The World Bank and IMF initiated SAP regime is a prime mechanism used in rigidifying the skewed power dynamics of the global political economy. When these institutions that represent the powerhouses of the global political economy do no act in ways they are expected, one then questions the sincerity in advocating and commitment to upholding human rights and democratic ideals and, whether these should be ideals African countries should be attempting to uphold.

African countries are expected to achieve and maintain certain democratic standards yet are subjected to undemocratic decision-making institutions in order to reach these. One of the problems arises because the implementation of SAPs requires that states deviate from a "long tradition of government intervention" in their economies (Ibhawoh, 1999: 159). Such deviation towards a redefined notion of government or governance takes away power from the state and puts it into the hands of the IFIs and other bodies. Within individual states, it becomes uncertain as to where the control of political power and hence sovereignty goes.

Ibhawoh (1999:160) makes this clear when he refers to two levels of authoritarianism in formulating and implementing SAP in Africa. The first is "international authoritarianism" practised by IFIs through their imposition of the cumbersome economic policies in return for assistance. On the second level is domestic authoritarianism practised by the incumbent regimes. It would seem that the latter could not happen as effectively without the former.

Some scholars argue that authoritarianism is necessary for effective implementation of SAP while others claim that SAPs result in authoritarian tendencies, or exacerbate where they already existed (Ibhawoh, 1999: 160). Whichever is the more true hypothesis, the fact remains that "adjustment's insistence on the termination of [the African state's] traditional popular and national basis which obliges it to resort to dictatorship"; this dictatorship is both during the time of reforms and has serious implications for the post-adjustment state (Ibhawoh, 1999: 161).

On the other hand Uganda and Tanzania are considered cases of successful adjustment. These Graham Harrison (2001: 672) refers to as selective cases to be considered as part of the post-conditionality regime. In such a regime the discussion on adjustment has to be taken beyond simply viewing relations between donor and lender institutions as representative of dichotomous interests. Rather, the interests and objectives of the states and creditors have been consolidated through the joint absorption of ideas pertaining to development and economic growth (Harrison, 2001: 661).

The importance of post-conditionality regimes is an emphasis on the fact that in some cases relationships with creditors are not solely based on the threat of punitive measures through sanction (Harrison, 2001: 658). In these post-conditionality regimes, there is an effort to divert the development discourse away from the political sphere and place it purely within the economic through establishing relationships and changing developmental ideology through certain economic ministries such as finance (Harrison, 2001: 668). As such creditors are integrated into policy making methods, thus taking away autonomy from the state. The emphasis here is that the post-conditionality regime moves away from broad and verbose macro-level policy dictates to more subtle micro-level directing. In so doing lenders guarantee policy outcomes representing supposedly mutual objectives of relevant state actors (Harrison, 2001: 671). This is necessitated because creditors have to be able to claim some benefit in adjustment (Harrison, 2001: 661).

Furthermore such a relationship is beneficial for the borrowing state. Despite the coercive nature of the conditionality regime, for finance ministers and experts with ideology contrary to their political counterparts, the potential of withdrawal of funding is removed from the political incumbents (Harrison, 2001: 668). This is not a sustainable position, as history has shown, eventually political buy in is necessary. It is necessary to ensure that other development aspects such as political, social, health and humanitarian are not sidelined in favour of economic reform or the sake of declaring adjustment successful. Also care must be taken to not allow political repression for the sake of economic adjustment. Even in Uganda, creditors and IFIs eventually had to insist that Museveni's no-party democracy be reconsidered (Harrison, 2001: 668). If there is no harmonisation between political incumbents and

economic adjustment objectives, there will be a negative relationship between donors, lenders and the state. Those who bear the brunt are the poor.

2.1.4 Beyond structural adjustment

Some Africanists argue that SAPs are an outdated issue and because in a sense they are no longer being implemented or discussed as potential aspects of developmental strategies, there is nothing new that can be added to the debate. In fact, there is no longer a debate. This argument is steeped in the notion that "sub-Saharan Africa is [not] locked within a regime of conditionality" (Harrison, 2001: 657). This, to an extent, is a valid assessment of the subject; however, when looking at the types of economic and developmental strategies proposed by development agencies, donor organisations and IFIs, it is imperative that one recognise the similarities in the proposals to that of SAPs. To realise that these policies and recommendations, though cloaked in different jargon and rhetoric, still outline very similar ideas to that of SAPs.

In this vein Nicolas van de Walle (2003) and others focus on the institutional context of African Development, post Structural Adjustment. In their work, van de Walle and colleagues address the new developmental dispensation ushered into the continent as a result of SAPs. Van de Walle (2003: 2) refers to non-governmental organisations that emerged as a result of increased creditor and donor funding that poured into various African states, alongside IFI loans. These NGOs he identifies as emerging to spearhead and propel development in the continent in a manner that calls the role of the state or its centrality into question. He posits that "the donor community has advanced a fairly idealised version of current evolution that suggests that a distinctly African model of development" has emerged and in such a model the role tends to assume an uninvolved role (van de Walle, 2003: 2). His general assessment of Africa post SAPs is founded on the premise that SAPs have not enabled African states and/ or economies to be self reliant and sufficient. As such, he notes the necessity to explore the effects of funding that will lead to African governments financing their specific development through their "own revenues" (van de Walle, 2003: 3).

Although van de Walle and others are not directly propagating neo-liberal economic policies through adjustment and reform as the developmental path for African states, they do clearly make the links between the two themes, development and adjustment, as well as tying the debate to issues of good governance and democratisation (van de Walle, 2003: 3). He emphasises the continued need for good governance through what he coins "democratisation of public life", suggesting that the calls for political liberalisation, made by IFIs and creditor donor organisations are yet to be heeded by African states (van de Walle, 2003: 3).

Arthur Goldsmith generally assesses the effect that SAPs had on the capability and capacity of the African state, or in his own words "state administrative capability" (Goldsmith, 2003: 183). Contrary to Washington and even Post Washington Consensus sentiment, Goldsmith (2003: 183) acknowledges that the African state has a critical role to play in development and points out that the "foreign aid establishment" can be partly blamed for the problems of African states. In his opinion however, this argument has been over stated and his paper focuses on the extent to which this notion can be held true. He describes how "IFIs and bilateral foreign assistance agencies stand accused of inadvertently encouraging a system of fragile, powerless states that trap the region in economic backwardness" that births authoritarian types of states (Goldsmith, 2003: 183).

The reason for the falsity of this argument is focused on administrative rather than economic outcomes, which reveal that African states, infact, have more capacity or capability than is often acknowledged (Goldsmith, 2003: 184). His survey of administrative outcomes in relation to amounts of foreign funding shows relatively little evidence that state capacity, across the region, has been eroded or diminished because of assistance. He, however, acknowledges that the long term impact of development assistance or aid is difficult to ascertain as there is a multitude of variables such as incorrect strategies implemented by states, conflicting ideas of IFIs and the lack of domestic accountability (Goldsmith, 2003: 205).

This work attempts to highlight a need to look beyond simply using aid as agreed by the various parties, but rather that there is a view to investing in the long term overhaul or change of systemic norms as opposed to a short or even long term

change of institutions. This will contribute to loan effectiveness and IFI policy reconsideration.

Cotton and Ramachandran (2003: 213) are of the opinion that economic structural adjustment reforms in response to pressures from IFIs and bilateral donors were generally unsuccessful. Their argument however does not lay blame at the feet of IFIs and multilateral donors and do not necessarily propose an alternative to SAPs, rather they appear to suggest more direct, refined and deliberate implementation of certain SAP policies and strategies. Their discussion revolves around the argument that the immediate source of African economic growth lies in foreign direct investment (FDI). This thesis is based on evidence that the global surge in FDI to developing countries experienced during the 1990s bypassed the continent (Cotton & Ramachandran, 2003: 214). This missed opportunity is blamed on the African states themselves and the cause directly identified as high risks faced by private investors because of the weaknesses in governance, or in other words, lack of good governance. These issues of governance do not affect foreign investors in isolation. The two authors identify local entrepreneurs and business communities as being significantly affected by the lack of transparency by the state, low quality of business specific laws, lack of policies and regulations that protect business, inefficiencies in implementing institutions and the inconsistencies in the rule of law and corruption (Cotton & Ramachandran, 2003: 218).

The above observations can be identified as part of the hangover of SAPs, generally calling for a reduced level of involvement in the economy by the state. Cotton and Ramachandran (2003: 217) suggest changes that need to be made in governance that would result in increased levels of and improved investment, thus leading to growth. In terms of transparency, and beneficial business laws, they point to the important roles of entrepreneurs and the local business community as pressure groups able to debate and suggest the formulation and implementation by the state of certain policy, as well as being able to contribute in investment terms to development.

As shall be noted in the case study, the Zimbabwean business community was very visibly vocal in lobbying the state against implementing ESAP though the failure or success of this lobbying is questionable and could be said led to the more

determined rolling out of IMF and World Bank proposed policy; to the detriment of this community that did not desire the policies that would supposedly benefit them.

Cotton and Ramachandran (2003: 217) further allude to the issues of ethnicity with regard weak governance and its effect on business related regulations. The main focus being that in African states, business communities are defined in terms of or identified as ethnic minorities. Though the point of this argument is somewhat unclear, what they seem to be purporting is that concentrating on minority control or dominance of the private sector detracts from the fact that this demographic can significantly contribute to development. This argument however, does not take into consideration the reality of the post-colonial African state or rather private sector. Owing to the extremely racialised nature of Africa's colonisation, the post-colonial private sector in the continent is dominated by ethnic minorities and mostly those not indigenous to the continent. Proffering an argument along the lines that reforms in governance should be made such that more freedoms are afforded to those minorities already in business, in ways that allow them to commandeer more of local economies and stand to accrue more wealth to a smaller section of the population, actually fails to make significant contributions to the type of development needed for the continent; development based on wealth creation.

Our case study makes this issue quite clear. That the issue of land reform and redistribution in Zimbabwe significantly contributed to the current crisis is indisputable. This pertinent matter rose out of the country's colonial history which left large tracks of arable land in the hands of the white minority of the population, resulting in the majority black and peasant population, dependent on subsistence farming, having little to no access to wealth creation, let alone for survival. Based on Cotton and Ramachandran's (2003: 218) arguments about the post-structural adjustment state, it would seem that they advocate continued ownership of resources by the incumbent minority groups as this group has the best expertise for investment and development. The resultant crisis in Zimbabwe makes it clear that indeed adjustment policies that seek to reinforce and not reverse colonial and post-colonial systems of underdevelopment, shows the error in this thinking.

It is true that there is a need to increase and improve investment opportunities in the region. What remains questionable is the group of individuals who benefit from these opportunities in such a way that engenders development and redemption out of poverty for the majority of populations in African states (Cotton & Ramachandran, 2003: 233). This brings to the fore some of the grey areas related to reduced government involvement in the economy where pertinent issues of population wide development can potentially be overlooked or ignored by private sector, IFIs and multilateral aid agencies.

2.1.5 Neo-liberalism as developmental agenda for African countries

2.1.5.1 The appropriateness of neo-liberalism

In conducting an overview of the literature on SAP with regard to Zimbabwe and perhaps African states as a whole, one notes a contradiction in deciding whether or not the decisions to undertake reforms are judged as good or bad. Such a judgement assists one in determining whether or not neo-liberalism in its entirety was/ is the right format of Africa's developmental agenda. Furthermore, such a determination would then assist one to place international actors, be they IFIs, foreign governments and international donor agencies, firmly within the causal explanation of Zimbabwe's current economic and political crisis and hence the collapse of democracy.

Indeed, it is impossible to make facile statements regarding good or bad, however, the majority of the literature faults governments, and more specifically the Zimbabwean government, for failing on SAP (or reversing SAP after it failed) with blame being attributed to incorrect implementation or lack of capacity (Mumvuma, Mujajati and Mufute, 2006: 242/53). In addition, much attention is paid to the timing and sequencing of SAP but in many instances this comes across as an admonition for implementing reforms to begin with. It would seem it is necessary for these commentators to put themselves out on a limb and state whether SAPs holistically are positive or negative, or whether they have been beneficial to the continent.

For an author like Akonor (2006: 5), his main concern with SAP or more specifically conditionality, is explaining the non-compliance of African governments to SAPs and or conditionality; the underlying assumption being that the problem does not lie with the SAPs but with the borrower governments. To an extent, he attributes this non-compliance to "domestic incapacities" as do Mumvuma et al (2006: 242/53) but his primary argument is based on the realist or rational choice thinking that states at the end will always act to maximise benefits, minimise costs and maintain control (Brown, 2005: 40).

These cost-benefit analyses though initially taking into consideration the entire population, where non-compliance kicks in is at the point where the political tenure of elites appears to be threatened. "Decision outcomes to comply with conditionality are based on a cost-benefit calculation by recipient countries" (Akonor, 2006: 5). Furthermore, despite attractive or beneficial incentives, as long as the longevity of political tenure of a regime is at stake, mechanisms that cause a government to comply with the conditions are limited in their power. As valid as these sentiments may be, it is however necessary to bear in mind that the role of IFIs in influencing recipient governments is not then null and void. On the contrary, though borrowing states maintain the power to renege on conditionality agreements, IFIs play a major role in the implementation of SAPs and have a responsibility to take potential outcomes into consideration.

Frederic Lapeyre (2004: 1) situates the discussion on structural adjustment within a globalisation paradigm and questions the two as developmental tools and directions for developing countries. He surmises that "economic globalisation" is a key feature of the lives of those he terms social and economic actors globally. He further proffers that SAPs need to move away from the one-path developmental model put forward by the Washington Consensus and that development policies "should reflect the diversity of socio-economic contexts and the specific conditions for a pro-poor and pro-social justice integration" of peoples around the world (Lapeyre, 2004: 1). His general argument being that globalisation has to be inclusive of developing states that currently exist on the margins of globalisation. Eyoh and Sandbrook (2001: 2) conversely advocate a more deliberate approach putting forward the argument that "globalisation itself needs to be reformed".

The role of politics and power is undeniable in economic policy and structural transformation; as such the global political economy must take cognisance and incorporate the effects of these issues. Although the renewed SAPs of the late 1990s had a pro-poor orientation, these did not alter the global political economic dynamics at all. In the case of Zimbabwe that had already adopted ESAP at the start of the decade, the most vulnerable groups in the country had already begun to be severely affected. As such, a general observation gleaned from Lapeyre's (2004: 11) work is that Bretton Woods policy packages (SAPs) have "fostered increasing inequalities within countries where they have been implemented. Not only did SAPs result in inequalities within countries, but also exacerbated global inequalities and deemed false the notion that the continent would benefit from globalisation through SAPs.

Other than increased levels of global inequality and poverty, neo-liberalism has also worked to erode many efforts towards fostering and increasing political participation. Although Lapeyre (2004: 15) does not necessarily introduce a new issue to the broader discussion on SAPs, the importance of this point lies in a call he makes for the reconsideration of "orthodox view of liberalisation as the main policy tool for growth" in developing countries. In his view it is imperative that a new development paradigm focus on poverty-reduction policies, participation and ownership in decision-making processes. Notably however, he does not recommend a move away from neo-liberalism as an ideology or paradigm for formulating economic policies; this is common to many authors outside of dependency theorists.

This begs a question of the extent to which Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) recently introduced by the IMF and World Bank will be successful. If as Lapeyre (2004: 18) and others like Mumvuma et al (2006: 261) correctly conclude that a problem of SAPs was lack of consultation and participation, it would be absolutely necessary that PRSPs amend this omission. Lapeyre (2004: 18) himself observes that although the logic behind PRSPs promotes country led and country owned policies, as a development assistance strategy they do not promote participation and the basic needs of the poor. The PRSPs though addressing economic growth and poverty reduction on a macro level lack by not addressing the basic needs of the poor (Lapeyre, 2004: 18). A second question is then whether there is room for

participation at all in development, given that reliance is placed on foreign assistance and aid.

Because development is not a "gradual or harmonious process" the potential for social conflict when faced with various aspects of development initiatives is high (Lapeyre, 2004: 18). Lapeyre emphasises the need for participatory processes and democratic regimes to ensure that concerns regarding risks of change are fully considered and addressed. These comments cannot be disputed, what must be clarified however are the individuals or groups of individuals that should take participation into cognisance. It is a postulation of this paper that more than the onus being solely on developing countries, the international donors and aid givers must seriously consider participation and consultation. "Participation [...] is essential to making systemic change more acceptable" (Lapeyre, 2004: 18) but this systemic change cannot be confined to the economic structure of an African country. Serious considerations are required for systemic change in the global political economy to ensure that all benefit from the phenomenon of the age, globalisation.

Furthermore, the harmonisation of IFI proposed policies that favour neo-liberalism with UN promoted Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as suggested by Lapeyre (2004: 21) is also dubious. Although it is true that considerations of humanity need to be attached to developmental policy, history has made it clear that IFIs do not support or fund development strategies that present alternatives to neo-liberalism; again the question of global political economic inequalities and power structures is highlighted. What Lapeyre (2004: 22) and others call for is the redesign of SAPs to move towards clearly defined human development goals such as the UN projected ones. Such a call is exceedingly problematic in nature. This is because although he does advocate "deep restructuring of the international architecture to improve global governance" and relieve the effects of the vulnerability of poor and weak countries, at no juncture does he question the veracity of claims that SAP and neo-liberalism are "crucial to good integration of developing and/ or African countries into the global political economy (Lapeyre, 2004: 23).

2.1.5.2 The shortcomings of neo-liberalism

The extent to which neo-liberalism can lead to "just development" is clearly excluded from the continued insistence on this ideology that shapes development strategy (Eyoh & Sandbrook, 2001: 1). Eyoh and Sandbrook (2001:3) loosely define just development as "sustained growth with a degree of equity". Like Lapeyre (2004), they note a move by IFIs away from "pure neo-liberalism" to a more pragmatic type that tries to put a human face to economic reform; basing their evaluation on the insufficiency at the Bank's efforts to broaden their development approaches.

Of great concern is the degree to which continuing along the path of neo-liberalism, whether pragmatic or pure, will fulfil Ibhawoh's prophecy of the reality of repressive and authoritarian states. Eyoh and Sandbrook (2001: 4) explain that pragmatic neo-liberalism bears noteworthy resemblance to the "Third Way" road map of development for key industrial countries in the global economy. This "Third Way" mainly focuses on supply-side activities of economies to enhance the capabilities or capacity of citizens, firms and national economies to contend in the worldwide market economy (Eyoh & Sandbrook, 2001: 4). Part of this "Third Way" encouraged by especially Britain and the US insists upon a more vigorous role for the state in economics and politics than that promulgated by the pure neo-liberalism of Reagan and Thatcher. Herein lie the contradictions of Western designed and initiated development policies for Africa. The call for state facilitated reform and political liberalisation do not seem to be simultaneously attainable.

There is a seeming obsession with democratising Africa according to the Western liberal model of democracy, the belief being that if even minimum standards of democracy are embraced, economic reform can take place. The type of democracy thus envisioned for Africa by IFIs and donor agencies is electoral democracy, with confidence being placed in the notion that a commitment to reform is guaranteed because potential beneficiaries would rally behind a reforming party and that interests founded on policy reforms will prevail (Eyoh & Sandbrook, 2001: 6). Furthermore there is a prevailing assumption that there is an acceptance by African policy makers and intellectuals that "economic nationalist ideology" is redundant and it is necessary

to reject any form of state-led development in favour of macro-economic stability (Eyoh & Sandbrook, 2001: 18).

Again it is clear that a problematic feature of initiating and formulating policies for the continent has not been considered. The nature of African governments and governing structures has to be taken into consideration, but not merely in such a way that identifies the problem and prescribes a solution, rather to identify and work with these governments to find suitable solutions. The issues of political support and patron-client relationships are paramount to African governments. So, though the experts within finance ministries and central banks may be supportive of neo-liberal policies and programmes, their political counter-parts and superiors may initially support but soon turn away from them, when they infringe and threaten their political tenure (Eyoh & Sandbrook, 2001: 8). As will be made clear in the following chapter, Mumvuma et al (2006: 241) note that this political expediency was a chief reason behind Zimbabwe's seeming indecision in committing to ESAP, non-compliance and eventual abandonment of ESAP. Furthermore, the government's continued efforts at implementing nationalistic economic policies and reform strategies belie the notion that state interference in the economy is an ill-favoured strategy".

One can with certainty conclude that neo-liberalism, in its current form, as a development agenda for Africa will not work. Though pragmatic neo-liberalism in the form of World Bank and IMF proposed PRSPs and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facilities have added a "human face" to development, the reality of amplified susceptibility and exclusion of the African peasantry will not abate (Eyoh & Sandbrook, 2001: 35). Eyoh and Sandbrook (2001: 36) refer to the neo-liberal complex to privatise and create individual based free markets in opposition to communal property rights and arrangements that ensure equality and prevent marginalisation. As long as IFIs, multi and bilateral donor agencies and African states themselves fail to imagine a way to incorporate characteristic features of African production practices neo-liberalism will fix the continent on the periphery of the global political economy.

Africa's democratic experience, the notion of good governance and the interface between western liberal democracy and SAPs is the subject of the next section.

2.2 African democracy – the issues

2.2.1 Defining democracy

A single universal definition of democracy has eluded many scholars of political science. As with concepts such as power and development, the concept of democracy has been interpreted to suit particular analyses and projects. Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 13) define democracy "as a form of political regime in which citizens choose, in competitive elections the occupants of the top political offices of the state". Villalon and Von Doepp (2005:2) define it as a system characterised by institutions that constrain the behaviour of political elites. This form of political regime is dependent on the observance of political freedoms and rights within a framework of varying civil liberties; these must exist prior to elections to then be able to claim that democracy exists and a new kind of political regime is in place.

Added definitions refer to democracy as being recognised in three ways: an acceptance of the "rules of the game" by all political contenders, existence of an electoral system and the "robustness" of a democratic system (Beetham, 1994: 160). This paper proffers an understanding of democracy – African democracy – as characterised by taking advantage of novel political openings resulting in increased political opportunities and not necessarily resulting in the establishment of new systems as literature on transitions and consolidation would suggest (Remmer, 1995: 104). As such many scholars on democracy omit a discussion of external conditions as "facilitating" or debilitating these opportunities. When considering the extent of funding made available for development and democracy promotion, the need to investigate external "facilitating conditions" becomes necessary (Beetham, 1994: 161).

2.2.2 Defining democracy in Africa

African transition into democracy, also considered part of the "third wave" were in the wake of what some Africanists considered the disappointment of liberation struggles (Saul, 2005: 257). The hard fought anti-colonial struggles failed to deliver

tangible results to Africans in general, save what Saul (2005: 257) refers to as "the very real achievement of overthrowing white minority rule".

On the other hand scholars such as Chabal (2002: 456) claim that transitions in Africa in the 1990s were overwhelmingly as a result of pressure from IFIs and donors for African states to implement certain political reforms; in most cases multi-party electoral democracy. He however does acknowledge the role played by discontented youth, movements within civil society which formed to challenge patrimonial states and calls for accountability and transparency in the state (Chabal, 2002: 457). Whereas Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 194) use many different factors to explain democratic experiments in Africa, their focus is on endogenous explanatory factors as opposed to exogenous or external factors. Their main focus is also to differentiate between the various causes and outcomes of African democratic projects.

The literature on Africa's democratic experiments however conflates democratic transition and consolidation issues, the overarching conclusion being that there are arguably three consolidated democracies in the continent, Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa (Diamond, 1999: xi). The rest of the countries have either reverted back to authoritarian rule after initial transition, are classified as pseudo-democracies, that is have not consolidated into a Western form of liberal democracy[2], or have remained at the beginning of the transition phase not having progressed beyond the "electoral democracy" phase.

Richard Sklar (1996: 5) cautions against considering this as evidence of the continent's failure to democratise and instead refers to it as "democracy in parts" because the meaning of democracy is "enriched by contributions from all cultures and nations. Classifications that distinguish country-wide systems by type as democratic, partially democratic, or less than democratic do not reveal the creative processes of democratic development", reveal the range of actors involved or acknowledge that

[2] **Western liberal democracy** refers to democracy crafted according to the cultural and institutional values of western society in which the freedoms of the individual citizen in relation to the state are heralded as being of primary importance. The term **pseudo-democracy** is used to explain systems of government that possess the external trappings of democracy, in the form perhaps of widely contested elections but where the donor funded finery of these democracies does not seep deeper into the fabric of society.

consolidation may be taking place. This paper is however concerned with democracy as a general concept.

Chabal's argument that focuses on explaining the way in which notions of liberal democracy have been interpreted and commandeered by the African state to suit systems of neo-patrimonialism is preferred here (Chabal, 2002: 456). It follows the logic that African elites responded to calls to democratise by simply adapting liberal democratic tenets to fit patronage systems. He posits that the patronage system of governance that determines the use of political and economic power is recognised as such by not only the state and consequent "big men" who are the patrons, but is also known and supported by clients who stand to benefit, or not, from the system. As such the population or clients will participate in a multi-party electoral democracy to the extent that an alternative to an incumbent regime promises significant benefit from their patronage (Chabal, 2002:459). Incumbent patrons, who are aware of this then, simply co-opt into their party any possible opposition, especially those that might pose a genuine threat to their tenure. "Winner-take-all elections" are not a viable option (Chabal, 2002: 460).

The literature is characterised by a sort of holding of breath in anticipation of many of the pseudo-democracies reverting to authoritarian rule. An investigation of African democracies in comparison to Latin American and Eastern European ones would reveal reversions to authoritarian rule and a seeming hanging in the balance of many states can be interpreted as part of the trajectory of African democratising processes (Lipset, 1994: 5). This is in opposition to outright failure or the way democratisation is imagined failed because of Western liberal democracy's ignoring "historical and socio-political continuities" of the continent; continuities between pre, colonial and post-colonial eras (Chabal, 2002: 452). Looking closely at these reveals that entities external to the continent have not changed their manner of interaction with the continent. Power is still defined and used in the same manner; a manner that extracts from the continent and fixes inequalities while also stipulating what is best for Africa (Chabal, 2002: 451). Claude Ake (1991: 41) notes that "the IMF and the World Bank are now more powerful in Africa than the former colonial masters".

2.2.3 Notions of "Good Governance" and Development

Good governance is understood by many in the creditor community as something that combines efficient (accomplishing tasks in the best and least costly way possible) and effective (doing the right things that citizens want done) service delivery while ensuring that "political corruption" is avoided and curbed in these processes (Goldsmith, 2003: 186). Goldsmith critiques such an understanding of "good governance" by stating that it is not always possible to achieve all three ingredients simultaneously, in other words it would be possible to achieve results in an extremely cost effective manner, but yet consultation with relevant parties, is omitted.

Furthermore good governance is now "closely linked to the consolidation of liberal democratic transitions" that have taken place. (Cotton and Ramachandran, 2003: 215). "Good governance" is berated as a misplaced and unnecessary moral judgement on recipient governments that emphasises uneven global political power relationships (Shivji, 2004: 3). Neo-liberalism and hence liberal notions of democracy do not take into account conceptions of power in governance and as such lock the discourse into a "moral paradigm" enabling those with power to manipulate those without.

The ability of IFIs to deem governance structures or systems of African states as 'good', 'bad' or 'evil' or to insist on good governance takes sovereignty away from states. Focus is removed from effective governance and systems that enable the people to be agents of change (Shivji, 2004: 3). No consideration is given to their efforts and they are seen as democracy being done to them and not by or for them. An alternative view of 'good governance' is therefore one that sees such political conditionalities as new avowals of imperial manipulation and control (Shivji, 2004: 5).

2.2.3.1 Liberal democracy as good governance?

As with neo-liberalism and its suitability for holistically informing a developmental agenda, it is necessary to question democracy, more specifically in its Western liberal garb, as a suitable choice for the continent. The response to this question is not

confined to a decision or outcome in terms of governance choices or structures but rather, the manner in which democracy and development then interact as distinct but inseparable processes. Moreover, by IFIs and creditor agencies insisting on good governance for financial assistance, development and democracy become twin processes (Akokpari, 2006: 6).

Many Africanists have commented on the inapt make-up of electoral democracy for the continent. As previously mentioned one reason is the failure to achieve a change of regime or elites and then revert to co-option of the opposition. A second reason is that where co-option and peaceful sharing amongst elites of state resources has not worked, conflict and competition over said resources and perhaps external aid results (Chabal, 2002: 450). Thus it is evidenced that elections or systems that do not change the understanding of processes, in and of themselves, do not lead to democracy and certainly not development. Chabal's (2002: 451) comment encapsulates this: "[e]lections, the measure of Western polities, have become in Africa one of the many instruments of factional mobilisation". In addition to conflict over resources, they also mobilise and exacerbate people along ethnic lines. The benefits then of any successes in development and economic growth only accrue to a chosen few, or those who are part of a certain faction.

Such a debate frequently leads to a discussion on institutions and the need for vibrant and robust ones in order for democracy to be called consolidated or viable. The nativity of such institutions is determined by the existence of an equally vibrant and independent civil society, politically wily and autonomous from the state (Chabal, 2002: 461). However, the formation of the type of institutions envisioned by ahistorical and asocial western liberal democracy is not possible (Shivji, 2004: 3). Africa has not yet, but has to, nurture institutions that re-imagine democracy and governance in terms of four features: the African individual (within community), the African state, African civil society and the neo-patrimonial system, however transformed and mutated by liberal democracy and liberal economics.

Though variations exist amongst African states, generalisations can be made based on shared histories of colonialism, SAPs and so forth. Firstly, the African individual as described by Chabal (2002: 452) behaves in accordance with her place

in the community. Such behaviour is therefore outside the formal legal or legal rational constitutional order. Secondly, the state in the continent is certainly not differentiated from society because of patronage systems that maintain the ties of elites to particular social groupings and communities. Thirdly these continued patron-client relationships govern the behaviour of elites who have simply become more adept at concealing overt exchanges in the liberal democratic compliant institutions they operate within (Chabal, 2002: 452). Lastly, the so-called bastion of hope for Africa's democratisation, civil society, is not self-standing. Because of neo-patrimonialism, even those who work within civil society maintain and rely on vertical links with people in their communities and those in government. There do not exist as there does in the West, horizontal relationships along professional or functional lines (Chabal, 2002: 452).

It remains to be said liberal democracy is not necessarily good governance; not for the continent at least. Therefore, an African conception and or version of democracy must be developed. Saul (2005), Ake (1994) and others all call for a 'social democracy' in the continent, which includes and is propelled by the majority and also considers their concerns of paramount importance. In such a social democracy, the people determine the elites that represent them and those that do not. With such a view, one begins to question more closely Thabo Mbeki's standpoint that the people of Zimbabwe will ultimately decide who they want in power. Perhaps it is for his critics to realise that the call Mbeki makes is not simply for 'free and fair' elections, but rather for Western powers to allow the self-determination of African peoples. If the people of Zimbabwe continue to vote the ZANU-PF regime into power, it is necessary to ponder the underlying structural causes that continue to make this so.

2.2.3.2 Good governance as a precondition of development

If 'good governance' is to be interpreted as donor funded Western liberal democracy then it is with a degree of certainty it can be said that good governance does not necessarily induce development. Good governance has to emerge from within African systems of governance and not be solely externally driven or owned. Ake (1991: 40) states that despite decades of foreign aid and development assistance, African

governments have been systematically "underdeveloping" their countries. He posits that as long as democracy or good governance is a prerequisite for funding, it will lead to underdevelopment or further marginalisation, through the "democratisation of disempowerment" (Ake, 1994: 8).

Democracy in Africa cannot lead to development because of the neo-patrimonial system and the relationships that the ordinary African person has with the state. So, even though the state may have access to resources for purposes of development, the multi-party electoral systems simply serve to heighten electoral competition over state power (Ake, 1994: 8). In such elections, Africans are only faced with a choice between various oppressors; thus voting for disempowerment. This issue of disempowerment is at multiple levels. As Ake explains, unless the systems of governance are changed, there can be no true democracy; the African is already disempowered. On a second level, the African is disempowered because of the lack of choice over economic policies. At this level, though democracy, consultation, transparency and accountability are touted by IFIs, the forums where austerity measures are discussed do not allow for vocalising public opinion. In fact, political leaders are urged to "muster the political will" to achieve the aims of SAP (Ake, 1994: 17). Essentially, being encouraged to use any means necessary, however painful, to achieve the desired end.

It is difficult to consider the end of the spectrum that would say democracy, in its Western liberal form, can lead to development; this of course being the IFI position. Akokpari (2006: 9/10) in his comparison of various developmental states notes that the version of development alongside democracy was unique to Western Europe, with one reason being the extended time over which both democracy and industrialisation took place. Secondly, the Asian developmental states have only recently begun to democratise, but have otherwise been dictatorial, authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states. The economic upliftment of the middle classes especially has led for new calls for political freedoms and less state involvement (Akokpari 2006: 11).

The success of the Asian developmental state however does not mean that this should be Africa's agenda, on the contrary. After independence many African states,

with approval from creditors, ignored democracy for the sake of development. As opposed to Asian states where democracy was not considered a possibility, African states were faced with this form of governance as a highly recommended option. Elites were however, able to circumvent this option by using the logic that democracy and the state resources that would have to be put towards fostering it, funding opposition parties and campaigns, would all "inhibit development". Hence given that development and empowering the people had been the basis of struggles for independence, this would be the most important issue on the post-colonial agenda.

2.2.4 Democracy and Economic Reform (SAPs)

2.2.4.1 Economic Development and Democratisation

While SAPs have evolved into alternative development structures such as PRSPs and the like, it is necessary to assess the contribution of economic reforms and adjustment in weakening democracy or concealing political openings. As noted earlier, the nature of African democracies is questionable. Nonetheless what is of importance is that the minimal standards required to identify a democracy, multi-party elections, are prevalent.

Comparativists Rose and Shin (2001: 331), Huntington (1975) and van de Walle (1997: 15) all discuss the importance of economic stability or developing "the institutions of a modern market economy" (Rose & Shin, 2001: 337). Given that Africa is already behind both in terms of development and democracy it begs the question should modernisation of institutions (economic or market reforms) be prioritised above political freedoms? Van de Walle (1997: 17) in his emphasis on "minimal economic stabilisation" to strengthen African democracies does not advocate stabilisation dependent on IFI dictated policies but rather "basic macroeconomic stabilisation" and a "semblance of fiscal balance". Of salience here is economic development's necessity for democracy; the question is whether it should be in the form of SAPs or rather neo-liberalism.

2.2.4.2 Politics and Structural Adjustment

As already determined, reforms are not confined to the economic realm but also to the political. Again, this is because of the patron-client relationships and political power dynamics that exist on the continent (Herbst, 1990: 949). This paper makes inference that IFIs in implementing SAPs failed to acknowledge this phenomenon and respond to it appropriately, and where they did, it was simply to slap on 'good governance' as a requirement and condition for loans. In other words there has been serious failure to comprehend the nature of African polities.

We refer to Herbst (1990: 950) to re-iterate the very real existence of neo-patrimonialism as the lens through which politics is seen and the basis of systems that govern politics. This particularly affects African politics because SAPs demand economic austerity from African governments requiring them to limit or cease from intervening in the economy. However, the experience of African governments in Sudan, Ghana, Nigeria and least of all Zimbabwe, to name a few, have been to illicit protest and demonstration by those of the population who are affected and are able to voice their disgruntlement (Ibhawoh, 1999: 160). In such instances, the systems of multi-party electoral democracy as well as the harsh economic reforms, threaten the tenure of incumbent regimes (Herbst, 1990: 951).

Faced with such threats, incumbent regimes respond to protesting citizens with repressive measures of varying degrees of severity. Such measures range from banning of protest marches and strike action, unleashing of security forces at protest events, harassment of opposition parties, especially those using the effects of SAPs as a platform for campaign and removing freedoms from the press and media. Essentially these threats on incumbents' tenure emphasise the effectiveness of patronage systems for elites. Economic reforms cannot threaten patronage systems over much. If they do, African governments will simply abandon them in some sort of effort to restore some benefits to the majority of the population (Akonor, 2006: 5).

A major shortcoming of SAPs, as we see in Zimbabwe, is that the poor people are the ones that suffered the most, further entrenching poverty into society (Chakaodza, 1993: 65). The ruling elite and other societal beneficiaries of ESAP in

Zimbabwe only abandoned ESAP when their tenure was threatened internally (Mumvuma et al, 2006: 260). Abandoning SAPs results in reversals of IFI and creditor sponsored financial commitments amidst an environment of prevailing poverty and externally approved - albeit benignly - repressive measures. Upon abandonment, states continue with repressive measures so as to achieve their aims; repression or anti-democratic measures which severely limit "the individual's ability to participate in political activities" are thus a result of SAPs (Ndulo, 2003: 367).

One can thus conclude that democratisation or political liberalisation is not the aim of SAP or economic reform. Creditors and IFIs are simply concerned with continuity of economic reform programmes and their projected outcomes despite democracy being undermined in the process (van de Walle, 1999: 30). Although we have concluded above that Africa needs to develop and democratise simultaneously, it is clear that in democratically evolving states, economic reforms implemented with little deliberation can severely impact on the ability to capitalise on political opening. Unless a viable system of government, and in Africa, one that sees the majority of peoples as important, reform and democracy cannot go hand in hand (van de Walle, 1999: 38). As long as adjustment represents development, the nature of political authority, weak capacity or perhaps reluctance of governments', and the relationships of states to international donors, will see the twin processes fail.

The next chapter takes the above discussion further by focusing on Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER THREE
CASE STUDY – ZIMBABWE

3.1 Zimbabwe

3.1.1 'Njambanja' – Crisis in Zimbabwe

'Njambanja', meaning chaos, disorder or general mess and mayhem, is the term commonly used amongst Zimbabweans to refer to the current situation in the country. Economically Zimbabwe has been in unconcealed decline since 1999 experiencing an overall decline in GDP of about 30% and currently standing at -5.7% (World Economic Outlook, 2007). Presently, the formerly thriving agricultural sector has experienced severe setbacks, both from natural and human induced causes. As such, agricultural exports that used to sustain the economy have declined. Manufacturing and industrial production have also declined and again exports are affected.

Unemployment levels are extremely high at 80%, and where there are jobs available, salaries cover the bare minimum of daily expenses for an average family (Aid agencies contemplate, 2007). Most importantly, the 'black' or parallel market has unofficially taken over from the Zimbabwe Reserve Bank (ZRB) as the determiner of inflation and foreign currency rates (Kanyenze, 2003: 9). Because there are no exports to generate foreign reserves, exporters would rather trade their little 'forex' earnings on the black market for a higher rate. In mid 2007, official rates were ZWD 250: USD 1 and approximately ZWD 250,000: USD 1 on the parallel market (How to stay alive, 2007). Inflation rates stood at 3,700% officially and unofficial estimates in August 2007 place it in the region of 13,000% (Munoz, 2007: 4). This has forced inflation and prices of general goods to soar. Currently official inflation is estimated at about 5000 percent whereas unofficial estimates put it in the region of 13 000 percent. This parallel market is not confined to monetary issues, it extends to general goods and commodities; anything can be traded and found on the black market including, some food stuffs like cooking oil and margarine, as well as petrol

which is virtually unavailable through normal channels of petrol stations (Aid agencies contemplate , 2007).

Zimbabwe is also in political crisis. Firstly, the rule of law has failed. There are claims that state security agents and judicial servants do not uphold the law and justice is not served (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2007: 9). Secondly, the government has implemented authoritarian and repressive measures against the population through limiting the right to meet in large groups and limits on press freedoms (Brett, 2004). Thirdly, is the supposed intimidation by ruling party youth militia of opposition MDC members attests to the fact that political freedoms have been garnished and that freedom of choice has been taken away from citizens (Raftopoulos et al, 2006: 12). Hence, given the topical nature of Zimbabwe's crisis, it is necessary to outline some of its explanations.

3.1.1.1 Explanations of the Crisis

Though referring to three similar explanations of Zimbabwe's crisis, an attempt will be made to underline the nuances that differentiate them. It is argued that the ruling ZANU-PF regime as self-styled custodians of the state turned it into an authoritarian entity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002: 101). This authoritarian state, ruling by repression and violence, has held onto the reins of power and emerged as the single and most legitimate representative of the state (Raftopoulos, 2004: xiii). The state has also been able to maintain its authority and hold on power through neo-patrimonialism and corruption. The control of resources, most especially land, is an example of this (Saul, 2005: 140). This linkages of the crisis to an authoritarian, patron-like and therefore corrupt state, suggests insincerity on the state's part with regard the populations needs and development in general.

Zimbabwe has also been projected as a failed or a very weak state (Brett, 2006: 9). The argument presupposes that the regime is no longer able to administer the state and oversee the running of the country efficiently or effectively (IMF Report, 2007: 1). According to this explanation the state is characterised as corrupt and patrimonial. The fundamental difference between the two explanations rests on the fact that at least the authoritarian state, though undemocratic and pursuing the

interests of elites, remains able to administer and run the state, even if in ways that are disapproved of by bystanders. The failed state on the other hand is unable to sustain itself and eventually will collapse resulting in private entities controlling service delivery (Rotberg, 2003: 5/6).

The third explanation for crisis is the personalised and dictatorial rule of President Robert Mugabe who is allegedly obsessed with being in power (Meredith, 2002: 123). Having appropriated patriotic history to present himself as the most legitimate liberator of the nation from the clutches of colonialism and thus as the only alternative for the nation, Mugabe has taken a hold of power and built the ruling party, regime, state institutions and nation around himself (Raftopoulos, 2004: xiii). Such a creation of the nation as his personal fiefdom has led to crisis, as it is unsustainable. Such personal rule has not allowed for the interests, needs and concerns of ordinary citizens to be taken into consideration.

3.1.1.2 Thesis explanation

Although the Zimbabwe crisis can be understood from varying standpoints, the study hypothesises that the IFI instituted ESAP regime greatly contributed towards manifesting the crisis. In particular ESAP hampered Zimbabwe's democracy because of the adverse effects of economic reform and the contradictory nature of economic and political liberalisation. In addition, neo-liberal economic reform was an ill thought out, ill suited and non-consultative development agenda for the country. As such this paper, albeit acknowledging the validity of some of the above claims, posits that a plausible explanation of the current political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe lies in the adoption and implementation of ESAP. By extrapolation therefore, part of the explanation for the current crisis lies in the rigidly dependent and one-sided relationships dictated by the global political economy. Though the domestic explanations of Zimbabwe's crisis are valid, in searching for a solution to the situation, a solution based on economic development and democratisation of a sort, the external international explanation is important.

Thus Zimbabwe's crisis is informed by a failure by external factors to sincerely commit to redressing issues of land ownership and thus wealth creation, the

covert encouragement of establishing a de-facto one party state, missing the opportunity to support the gap inadvertently by the move to a one-party state and the dependent relationship on western states in the form of IFIs for economic and development assistance. As such it is necessary to briefly understand the historical foundations of the land issue, the one-party state and opposition politics as well as external relations as outlined in the following section.

3.1.2 Zimbabwe's land issue

3.1.2.1 Land – a site of struggle

Issues of land ownership, relating to agriculture and subsistence farming present a focal point for Zimbabwe's history and provide a basis for explanation for the current political and economic crisis. Modern Zimbabwe was formed after 1890 when Cecil John Rhodes, Prime Minister of the British Cape Colony "sent whites to settle north of the Limpopo River" (Europa World, 2006). The land was the most valuable resource the settlers found and large areas of it were seized from the indigenous Shona and Ndebele occupants. This resulted in large amounts of land being controlled by a minority, under the name Southern Rhodesia.

In 1962 the Rhodesian Front (RF) was formed and demanded full independence from the United Kingdom. This ushered in a period of time referred to as the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) years. During this time, the white minority government headed by Ian Smith, entrenched the system of landownership that saw white Rhodesians own large tracts of arable land and blacks relegated to small, overcrowded communal areas that were difficult to cultivate (Moyo, 2002: 1). Because this group of people were dependent on land for survival, it meant that they could only farm the land for subsistence, while white farmers used their land to create and accumulate wealth.

Though the labour union based nationalist movements for independence had begun to agitate for change in the 1940s, land was an integral part of the full-fledged armed guerrilla war in the 1970s (Chikuhwa, 2004: 26/7). Many rural populations

were thus co-opted into the struggle and encouraged to fight on the basis that they would own land and grow wealthy from it as a result.

In 1979 the Lancaster House Agreement that formalised Zimbabwe as an independent state was signed. At these negotiations, a peace settlement was reached and an agreement regarding the running of the country established. Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) representatives vehemently opposed the terms of negotiation, while moderates like Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole were more amenable to them; especially the concessions given to white farmers to remain on their land (Chikuhwa, 2004: 247). The agreement entailed that the incumbent British government would provide funds for the new Zimbabwean government to purchase land from white landowners after a period of ten to fifteen years, on a willing buyer willing seller basis (Moyo, 2002: 4). Consequently, the Smith regime's constitution remained intact except for changing the name Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. This constitution preserved political and, more importantly economic power, for the white minority by protecting their property rights and monopoly in business (Chikuhwa, 2004: 34).

Since signing the Lancaster House Agreement it took almost twenty years for any genuine moves towards land redistribution. Moreover, the volatile way in which the issue came to the fore towards the close of 1998 as a national agenda makes it a very important issue in the discussion of Zimbabwe's developmental and democratic experiments (Moyo & Yeros, 2007: 112). The land in Zimbabwe is a site of struggle for both development and democracy because any external assistance for the former needs to consider the legacies of racialised land policies (Moore, 2001: 164). In the case of the latter, recognition that though land was fought for, rural populations need to begin to participate more in decisions taken concerning what will be done with the resource and how it will be distributed is needed.

3.1.2.2 Legacy of racialised land policy

Though the liberation struggle resulted in political independence and a black majority government, the racialised land policies of the colonial settler state set in place a system, which until today, has been the bane of the ruling party's existence. From its

independence until the start of the new millennium, Zimbabwe was considered the breadbasket of Africa and as travelling a different development path in relation to other post-colonial African states (Mills, 2007). However, because of the continued presence of the white landowner minority an unequal economic system, that benefited the white minority and new black elite persisted (Meredith, 2002: 120). So, though the country appeared to flourish, especially after independence, the supposed wealth did not translate into anything tangible for the majority of Zimbabweans living in in-arable rural areas. Thus one legacy of the racialised land policies is the continued poverty and unequal wealth system that kept the poor, poor (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006: 17).

A second legacy is the paradoxical division between rural and urban populations. A black migrant population developed in Zimbabwe owing to the need for labour in the urban areas but at the same time because of segregation policies as well as an attachment to the land, many people maintained rural homes or very strong ties to rural areas (Moyo, 2002: 13). The division is paradoxical because, as in many African countries, on the one hand there are people living in urban areas whose livelihoods are not dependent on the land. Yet, these same people have relatives, perhaps a spouse, child or parent, residing in the rural areas.

This has had vital implications for political support bases evidenced by the way in which the current regime has dealt with a population that has both urban and rural ties. A black middle class that has increasingly limited connections with rural Zimbabwe with each passing generation has emerged in the country (Moyo & Yeros, 2007: 113). In fact, this class existed even during the struggle for liberation and because the struggle was largely fought on the basis of owning land, the place of the black middle class in relation to a ruling regime that won independence on the above premise becomes questionable. It is therefore argued, that if the ruling regime does not view the middle classes as important most development oriented policies and programmes will be directed at the rural population, especially given that the independence regime inherited a largely agricultural economy.

The current diverse relations between urban and rural have enabled the state to maintain patron-client relationships. Ake (1994) and Chabal (2002) concur with the above assertion and would argue that by concentrating on the rural peasantry as its main support base, ZANU-PF is merely maintaining patronage relationships essential to preserve their tenure. As previously stated, Zimbabwe inherited a skewed economy after the Lancaster House agreement. This economy entrenched white minority benefit as well as that of a few black elites (Moyo, 2002: 7). The black majority was therefore confined to either being rural peasant farmers, or factory, farm or mine workers. Though some of the black middle class managed to take advantage of the change in regime and the seemingly new opportunities, these were a minority (Moyo, 2002: 7). Other individuals of colour who benefited were part of the inner circle of the ruling party or had been a part of the system during Ian Smith's rule.

The importance of the rural urban divide is related to the next section on opposition politics. A note to be made here is that the rural urban divide as a legacy of racialised land policy, has implications for democracy's evolution. The difficulty faced by opposition parties - especially one like the MDC that has posed such a threat to ZANU-PF - in penetrating rural constituencies, raises questions concerning democracy's transformation.

3.1.3 The One Party State and Opposition Politics

Focus on the above helps to explain ZANU's approach to challenges to its power. Soon after independence the majority ZANU party began to institute repressive measures against the ZAPU faction of government. ZAPU leadership and ex-combatants were accused of treasonous acts and plotting to overthrow the ruling ZANU government (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002: 115). A period of violence using the North Korean trained "Fifth Brigade" begun to exterminate any untold threat to the regime and many rural dwellers in Matabeleland and the West of the country were tortured and massacred (Sanders, Cousins and Moore, 2007). The result was widespread fear of the ruling regime, untold death and suffering of the population in the affected area as well as the exile or jailing of senior ZAPU officials on treason

charges. The overall outcome was a merger of the two parties into a defacto one-party state committed to a "Marxist-Leninist doctrine" (Saul, 2005: 134).

This co-option of the biggest opposition movement served to consolidate ZANU's power and was accompanied by absorbing all civil society movements including student's unions, labour unions – Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) - and other associations into the ranks of the ruling regime (Saul, 2005: 134). Funding as well as leadership and membership for the organisations was ascertained through the party and thus the state; there was no separation between the state and the ruling party. Since ZAPU's absorption and before the birth of MDC, Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) came close to being a semi-serious threat to the state.

Saul (2005: 135) states that though the move to a one-party state was intended to eliminate opposition to ZANU, their focus on regime generated civil society groups and their supporters meant that some space was opened for political debate; the press was also subject to more freedoms. As such in the late 1980s and early 1990s political debate intensified as students and workers were increasingly disgruntled with increased levels of poverty and unemployment; in addition, ESAP was being proposed and then implemented in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

With the advent of ESAP, the ZCTU, closely aligned to ZANU-PF, broke away from the relationship and began to agitate for changes. The adjustment programme was not working in their favour and they began to demand reversals in the efforts and a return to a people focused economic agenda (Chakaodza, 1993: 65). They were joined in their protests by university students and at times joined the separate protests and strikes of civil servants; though civil servants engaged in strike action, they were never openly part of anti-government activity (Chakaodza, 1993: 65). The action by civics, students and the unions was summarily thwarted by the authorities and thus began a rift between the ZCTU and ZANU-PF. It is from this rift that Morgan Tsvangirai, then leader of the union movement in partnership with other opposition groups, initiated the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC); since its inception it has enjoyed mostly urban support and some support from non-traditional ZANU-PF support bases (Brett, 2006: 15).

The crash of the Zimbabwe dollar in 1998 as well as the invasion of white farms by self-styled war veterans, gave the MDC the momentum it needed as threatening opposition to the ruling ZANU-PF (Bush & Szeftel, 2002: 7). Having derailed plans by the regime to implement a new constitution that awarded Mugabe a longer presidential term and allowed the government to seize land from white farmers, the MDC rose to prominence in the eyes of white farmers, the white minority and local and international business owners. The West, who had begun to show their disdain for Mugabe and the ruling ZANU-PF, also accepted the MDC as a viable alternative for Zimbabwe. When the MDC won almost 50 percent of seats in parliamentary elections in 2002, there was widespread hope that ZANU-PF and their land redistribution plans would be curtailed. Alas, other dynamics at play did not lead to this desired outcome (Lloyd, 2002: 224).

It is argued that the institution of a one-party state in the late 1980s though thwarting opposition on one hand, allowed for the opening up of political space and civil liberties on the other. The protest of civics, students and unionists bears testament to the fact that a new moment for democracy in Zimbabwe was emerging. Unfortunately, the insistence of IFIs for the state to implement ESAP at whatever cost, that is, repressive measures against agitators, meant that the window of opportunity for change was closed. Development was therefore being pursued at the expense of democracy.

3.1.4 External Relations

As with many other African countries, Zimbabwe is locked into intimate engagement with her former colonial master, the United Kingdom, while interacting with many others on the basis of financial and developmental assistance. Ties with Britain and the United States go back to the end of UDI and the beginning of independence at the Lancaster House negotiations in 1979. Though satisfactory, relations with western states were dependent and uneven. They were also constantly tested by the Zimbabwean government calls on the British to honour their promise to compensate and provide financing for the purchase of white owned land (Moyo, 2002: 8). These promises were not honoured in the manner that had been promised and when there

was a new British labour government in office, the agreement was reneged upon (Moyo, 2002: 8).

While Zimbabwe maintained close ties, however tenuous, with the British government throughout the 1980s, the government was forced to limit its association with former communist counterparts in the East (Saul, 2005: 135). Nonetheless, given the recent heightened tensions with the west the government has in the recent past increased relations with China, Malaysia, Cuba and the Soviet Union. These relationships have meant that while it is ostracised by the west, Zimbabwe still has alternative avenues for assistance.

Lastly, Zimbabwe's relationships with IFIs largely represent the desires and interests of their major shareholders. The relations between the country and these groups can be described as tenuous (IMF Staff Report, 2007: 5). Though Zimbabwe enjoyed favoured nation status in return for leaning away from Communism post Cold War, global recession changed the country's relationship with IFIs; to re-iterate Communism was no longer a threat and the West was no longer interested in placating semi-authoritarian states (Saul, 2005: 138). The following section describes these relationships thorough a discussion on ESAP.

3.2 Economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP)

3.2.1 Zimbabwe's Economic Context

Prior to officially implementing ESAP in 1991, Zimbabwe which had been a member of the World Bank and IMF since independence in 1980, devalued the Zimbabwe dollar by about 23% as a pre-condition for a loan (Chakaodza, 1993: 48). Though the post-independence economy performed well initially, the country's economy had experienced a fall in foreign reserves that had necessitated this borrowing. In March of 1983, the IMF granted Zimbabwe a loan (Chakaodza, 1993: 49). This loan and others to follow during the remainder of the 1980s firmly established Zimbabwe in the Bretton Woods Washington Consensus system and formed the foundation of her borrowing relationship with the former's institutions under SAPs.

3.2.2 Adopting ESAP

3.2.2.1 Domestic Politics of Adopting ESAP

Most critics of SAPs in Africa emphasise the lack of alternatives faced by adjusting governments at the time of implementing reforms. In Zimbabwe's case, the looming economic crisis characterised by high levels of foreign debt and exacerbated by drought meant that the government had to respond. Their response though based on many variables was primarily determined by external pressure to adhere to Western style neo-liberal economic policies. Other African states were doing or had done the same. By adopting the reforms they were able to cushion the blow, to some extent, of economic crisis. The important question here however is why the ruling elite, a government born out of a socialist type of guerrilla war, championing the merits of socialism, would abandon such a path to pursue capitalist and neo-liberal policies.

Mumvuma et al (2006: 237) suggest that reforms were very seriously considered by the ruling elite because of the threat of loss to their post independence positions and profits, in other words a change of the rules of the game because of economic downturn. This would, to an extent, explain the seeming contradiction of a radical shift in ideology, as well as the fact that the ruling elite also attributed the seeming change in ideology to external pressure as "the ruling ZANU-PF did not want to accept that there had been an ideological shift, as they argued that whatever policy reforms they were introducing were being forced on them by external forces given the crisis they were in" (Mumvuma et al, 2006: 241).

This debate around an ideological shift came to the fore especially because it was clear that there was major opposition to the notion of policy reform, especially from civil society and economically marginalised groups of Zimbabwean society; there was concern that the state had departed from the proclaimed path of socialism. In order to allay the fears of some members of society and those devoted to socialism, the ruling elite also stated that the reforms were temporary and should not be seen as a signal that socialism was dead. However, most such individuals were removed from

key positions in tertiary institutions and cabinet in order to see reform through (Mumvuma et al, 2006: 242).

Although there is some truth to the above claim, within reforming administrations there are always those Western trained individuals and experts in financial and economic ministries who are more than partial to the gospel of neo-liberal economics (Eyoh & Sandbrook, 2001: 8). Bernard Chidzero, Minister of Finance, was one such individual in the Zimbabwe government. His training and work experience in the West, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and close links to the IMF and World Bank Institutions explains his support for the reform packages (Bernard Chidzero).

Not having fought in the liberation struggle, he was viewed with suspicion by stoic socialist members of the party and as being an agent of the West "in some circles, the minister was seen as representing the World Bank and the IMF" (Mumvuma et al, 2006: 241). Chidzero was ultimately able to gain consensus or a semblance of it, in the party and this reveals that key players within ZANU circles had begun to see their interests diverge from the status quo and began to support policy reforms for whatever reasons (Mumvuma et al, 2006: 240). Added to which, opposition party ZUM had won a significant number of seats in parliamentary elections and threatened to affect the newly formed one-party state.

It has already been stated that the labour movements and other civics protested at the adoption of ESAP. It must be noted however, that initially the ZCTU had been in favour of reforms despite the fact that reforms would hit their members the hardest (Mumvuma et al, 2006: 240). The reason for this has already been explained in the previous section, that by instituting a one-party state, the regime controlled all associations and groupings of a political nature, or ones that could pose a political threat (Saul, 2005: 135).

3.2.2.2 International Politics of adopting ESAP

This issue of labour movements and weakening or silencing of civil society to the extent that firstly they were in support of reforms at all costs and secondly were not

consulted and so enabled the regime to unilaterally implement ESAP raises questions that point to the motives and role of external actors. Though Mumvuma et al (2006: 242/3) strongly favour an argument for adoption of neo-liberal reforms as internally triggered, it is necessary to consider why issues such as consultation by civil society organisations were not considered. Furthermore, in view of the fact that Zimbabwe as an African late reformer, along with Burundi and Tanzania, were required to incorporate "institutional and democratic" reform into their SAPs, it becomes evident that the decision and momentum to implement ESAP came to a large extent from outside the country.

This lack of consultation led to the implementation of ESAP in an environment where freedom of speech and other indices of good governance did not exist. The ruling ZANU elite were then able to continue and establish a system of governance upon this precedent. Again, it could be said that a crucial moment where Zimbabwe's democratisation trajectory could have been directed towards more openness, was missed. What is very important is the fact that the West, in the form of IFIs and other creditors, most especially the World Bank and the IMF colluded with the government to by-pass and ignore any democratic structures in order to ensure that ESAP was implemented at all costs. Indeed domestic explanations for deciding on ESAP exist, but whether these are more relevant than international ones simply obfuscates the view of pursuing development and democracy in the continent and the extent to which these processes are directed and dictated by outsiders.

3.2.3 Adjustment: ESAP

3.2.3.1 ESAP Phase I (1991 to 1995)

Although unveiled in different stages, ESAP essentially had two stages, the second of which was not completed. Phase 1 was characterised by general market reforms, monetary policy reforms amendments to labour laws and some initial cuts in fiscal spending (Mumvuma et al, 2006: 245). Market reforms were primarily aimed at reducing protectionist measures in the Zimbabwean economy. This was done by removing import tariffs on "selected inputs [and] moving them onto the Open General

Import Licence (OGIL)"; by the end of Phase 1 of ESAP OGIL had been replaced by an open import system, making it easy to import both input materials for production as well as finished products, mostly luxury goods (Mumvuma et al, 2006: 245). Another area of protectionism was price controls, ESAP entailed price deregulation to allow market determination. The rise in prices that followed deregulation and removal of import tariffs was supposed to be countered by increases in exports by producers. If producers were able to import inputs freely they would produce more a globally competitive standard, as such there would be no need for "export incentives" or subsidies (Gibbon, 1995:11).

In terms of monetary policy the two main reforms here were deregulation of interest rates and the exchange rate. As a result interest rates increased while exchange rates, now being determined by the market, also increased (Mumvuma et al, 2006: 245, Gibbon, 1995: 10). In addition protection of and restrictions to entrance into the "financial services and money markets" was reversed encouraging entrance of 'hot' money into the economy. The increase in interest rates as well as floating the currency led to high inflation rates.

A third aspect of Phase 1 reforms were amendments to labour laws that saw the elimination of a minimum wage, this scrapping of minimum wage was supposedly meant to facilitate and strengthen collective bargaining of all labourers and wage earners (Gibbon, 1995: 10). Again this would deregulate and reduce supply-side protection and allow for market determination of prices. Workers in the private sector however were not the only group of workers to be targeted by ESAP. The reforms aimed at adjusting fiscal policy to result in a complete and substantial reduction of public spending. The main targeted sections of fiscal spending were retrenchment of civil servants and cuts on housing, education and health, sectors in which tremendous progress had been made since independence (Gibbon, 1995: 11).

3.2.3.2 ESAP Phase II (1996 – 2000)

Despite the debated limited success of the first phase of ESAP government proceeded to roll out the second stage of ESAP. It was implemented under the auspices of an IMF/ World Bank 'go ahead' based on the Bank's Project Completion Report that

declared ESAP as "highly satisfactory" (Bond, 2001: 8). Despite some challenges that made achieving the desired outcome difficult – drought - the members of the Bank deemed the project's sustainability as likely (Bond, 2001: 8).

Phase 2 of ESAP dealt chiefly with fiscal policy issues, the biggest of which was privatisation of state owned enterprises. Along with reducing protectionist measures, the Bretton Woods Institutions insisted on privatisation to deal with inefficiency and profit erosion (Herbst, 1990: 950). Though this condition of reform had been suggested for the first phase, the government had been reluctant to do so and hence managed to divert the issue. They were then persuaded to adopt partial commercialisation of public enterprises (Chakaodza, 1993: 63; Mumvuma et al, 2006: 255). This issue was significantly difficult to negotiate with the ZANU-PF led government because of the growing calls for indigenisation of the economy alongside market reforms.

A second issue to mark Phase 2 of ESAP was the emergence of war veterans as a politically destabilising force with their demands for compensation and acknowledgement for liberation struggle involvement (Moyo, 2002: 5). Although this issue can be analysed as a result of or part of the impact of ESAP, it is a significant feature of Phase 2 as it highlights the tensions between patronage and relations with IFIs or donors. As such Mugabe's acquiescence was a contradiction to reform policy; awarding war veterans packages of Z$50 000 and monthly pensions of Z$2000 in direct opposition to fiscal austerity measures (Mumvuma, 2006: 258). In general, there was much detraction from ESAP objectives and very little of the implementation took place especially in Phase 2 and in 2001 President Mugabe announced that reforms were being terminated.

3.2.4 Adjusting to Adjustment - Impact of Reforms

3.2.4.1 Economic Impact

The results of market reforms and monetary policy simultaneously were primarily reflected in an increase in inflation. The deregulation of prices and foreign exchange

resulted in the Zimbabwe dollar losing close to 70% of its value in comparison to the US dollar (Bond & Manyanya, 2002: 60). In conjunction with the poor performance of manufacturing and exports owing to unfair competition on world markets, production inputs became very costly and these costs were passed onto the consumer. For example the cost of food increased by 516 % while medical care, transport and education went up by 300% (Dansereau, 2003: 181). The group that was most affected by these results were the poor, as Sachikonye (2002: 15) puts it the poor got poorer while the rich got richer.

As already mentioned, inflation increased from an average of 13.4% in the 1980 to 1990 period to 27.6% during 1991 to 1995. This was mirrored by soaring interest rates as a result of a more than 50% crash of the stock market (Bond & Manyanya, 2002: 60). The results were twofold. One was that local businesses found it difficult to obtain loans because of the heavy repayments and this meant that only those who were well connected were able to operate at high profits leading to monopolies in the market (Bond, 2001: 10). Another effect was on the Zimbabwean financial markets that were susceptible to 'hot money' being invested in the economy and then quickly withdrawn when large profits had been made. Owing to the lax laws introduced through ESAP, foreign investment with limited regulation meant such large amounts of liquidity flowed both in and out of the economy without any contribution to GDP (Dansereau, 2003: 181). In addition, because foreign exchange moved freely, those who did benefit from exports were able to keep money outside of the country and did not reinvest in the Zimbabwean economy; something ESAP was supposed to have guaranteed (Bond, 2001: 5).

The effect of revised labour laws to do away with a minimum wage was retrenchment of large proportions of the labour force; this affected both the private and public sector (Sachikonye, 1995: 109/10). Civil servants wages fell by 60% coupled with approximately 30 000 job losses. Overall unemployment rose from 35% to 45% as an additional effect of falling manufacturing (Dansereau, 2003: 181). In conjunction with cuts in fiscal spending in the areas of health, education and housing especially this meant that there was an increase of participants in the informal sector as well as a boost in basic entrepreneurs (Brand, Mupedziswa & Gumbo, 1995: 136). This sector was especially evident in an increase in informal settlements on the

outskirts of major cities and towns as well as the setting up of markets in the cities and high density suburbs.

Two interlinked impacts of ESAP are felt in the re-emergence of war veterans demanding compensation and the re-emergence of Land redistribution rhetoric. These features fall both within economic and political impacts of ESAP, economically because initially IFIs refused to acknowledge their existence as issues pertinent to development discourse in Zimbabwe; especially land redistribution (Moyo, 2002: 5). Thus when government decided to make the payouts to the 'war veterans' the IFIs reneged on ESAP loan agreements and put pressure on the state for repayment. In addition when the government began to make calls for land redistribution and began to enact the 1993 Land Designation Act, more loans did not materialise (Moyo, 2002: 5/6).

This highlights the gap between political motivations, not taken into consideration by IFIs and economic policy simply implemented. It also reveals the interesting tensions between rigid operations and policies of financial institutions and the fluidity of decision-making processes necessary for those in political office. Added to this is the nature of the terms that are a part of reforms and loans attached to them. These terms are characterised though intended to buffer the institution from poor economic and financial decisions by borrower governments simultaneously carry punitive measures for unfavourable political decisions to the governments represented by the IFIs shown in the IMF and World Bank's rapid reversal of loan agreements. Interestingly, Bond (2001: 6) suggests that fewer funds than were initially promised and agreed upon actually were given to the Zimbabwean government and further that it is still paying for ESAP today; because the programme was paid for by "mortgaging the future at a rate unparalleled in the country's history".

The simultaneous payouts to 'war veterans', failure of loans from the Bank and the IMF as well increased military spending in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) alongside already increasing inflation, led to more inflation and a crash of the Zimbabwean dollar on what was called 'black Friday' in November 2007 (Bond, 2007: 149). In response the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) pegged the currency to the US dollar as a stabilising action but there was no reprieve. The result of this as

described below is the re-emergence of a parallel economy with floated currency rates and the formal system pegging the rate at artificial levels (Kanyenze, 2003: 4).

It is evident that as a development agenda the neo-liberal economic reforms set out for Zimbabwe by the Bretton Woods system were incompatible with the state's overall aims. The greatest economic impact is the failure of the authors of ESAP to recognise the issue of indigenising the economy. As previously mentioned an aspect of the independence government's economic policy sidelined by ESAP was wealth creation as part of economic development. Though indigenisation and land redistribution have an undeniably political root, they are sites of struggle in Zimbabwe's development agenda (Moyo, 2002: 4).

3.2.4.2 Political Impact

Prior to ESAP's implementation, there had been disunity with government, ZANU-PF ranks, concerning pursuit of a neo-liberal path. Despite detractors successfully lobbying against Phase 2 of ESAP and causing its delay, eventually they were convinced of ESAP's merits. However, a split existed within the party and already existent factions became polarised into pro-reformers and anti-reformers (Mumvuma, 2006:257). This split within the party was evident of a lack of consensus on a developmental agenda for Zimbabwe and resulted in even some MPs resigning because of their disagreement with policy and its effect on the population (Sachikonye, 1995: 54).

The economic effects of reform outlined above affected the people in their daily survival. Consumers' purchasing power was significantly eroded alongside decreased access to public services (Brand et al, 1995: 136). Civil society organisations challenged government on these effects and because of pressure on government to implement ESAP, state-civil society relations collapsed (Mumvuma et al, 2006: 260). Strikes by public servants as well as food riots and other demonstrations organised by the ZCTU were engaged in by many Zimbabweans in protest against the dissatisfaction with reform. The most affected groups were students, workers, black entrepreneurs and civil servants. These groups' involvement in riots, strikes and mass stay-aways were reflective of urban populations turning their

support away from or beginning to demonstrate their lack of support for the ruling elite (Bond, 2001: 14 - 16).

In any political system it is expected that opposition political parties will challenge incumbent governments on unsatisfactory policies. Gibbon (1995: 11) however, points out a political impact of ESAP on Zimbabwe's democracy in that "the opposition parties which had emerged in the late 1980s, like those which had survived since 1980, were all firmly pro-economic liberalisation, and consequently suffered a partial loss of profile". Because opposition parties supported ESAP they were rendered incapable of campaigning around economic development issues and as such did not present a viable alternative to the ruling ZANU led government.

Mumvuma et al (2006: 256) describe the political mobilisation of civil society, and by inference the passivity of existing opposition parties, as "a political crisis that undermined the legitimacy of the ruling elite to properly govern the country". The result of this was the losers of ESAP organising themselves in resistance against the negative policies (Mumvuma et al, 2006: 254). Louder calls by these groups for an end to policy reforms were heard as well as general challenging of the political system, calls for the exposition of corrupt government officials and more transparency and accountability. Those defined by Mumvuma et al (2006: 254) as the losers of ESAP began to organise themselves in resistance against these negative policies.

The ZCTU ostensibly led this resistance and together with other civics in 1997/8, initiated a shift away from ZANU affiliation by mobilising students, urban workers and farm workers. In 1998/99 ZCTU and other civic organisations, most especially the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) organised a "Working People's Convention" in pursuit of 'broad-based movement for change' later giving birth to the opposition party the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC); part of these calls for change was the creation of a new constitution (Raftopoulos et al, 2006: 12).

Lastly, the political impact of ESAP was in terms of land redistribution, 'war veterans' politics and indigenisation issues. Calls for black economic empowerment and compensation by the 'war veterans' go back to the issue of a legitimacy crisis.

The exclusion from or the barriers to entrance into the economy revealed a section of ZANU-PF's potential and actual base, that had been neglected by ESAP. In order to recoup these support bases government pursued Black economic empowerment, coined 'Affirmative Action'. This merely served to exacerbate the racially skewed economic system, and contradicted ESAP as it served to destroy confidence of the minority white business population and foreign investors (Mumvuma et al, 2006: 256). As already stated, the 'war veterans' were compensated and so kept as a political support base while rural peasant farmers were co-opted by the revival of land redistribution rhetoric, all to show that the government was attempting to tread water and keep a balance between satisfying reform conditionalities and maintaining a client or support base.

3.2.5 ESAP & Current Crisis

3.2.5.1 Making the Links

The genesis of Zimbabwe's crisis has been located in many different circumstances. As mentioned above many arguments point to Mugabe as the primary cause, other arguments point to the ZANU-PF regime and the persistence of patron-client politics in Zimbabwe and others still, blame it on the lack of the rule of law, corruption and lack of transparency that accompanies a patronage system. An argument favoured in this work is one posited by commentators such as Bond (2001: 3; 2007: 149) and Manyanya (2002: 15). The two locate Zimbabwe's current crisis, at least economically, in the colonial era or UDI phase of Rhodesia. They present a thread that runs through from the debt crisis faced by the Rhodesian government in the mid 1970s, how it was inherited by the independence government at the beginning of the 1980s, how they responded to the increasing external and internal debt through various loans yet trying to balance this all with forging ahead with a socialist plan.

The crisis rooted in the economic fabric of the country continued to rear its ugly head towards the close of the decade and as already noted, the Zimbabwean ZANU-PF led government eventually agreed on neo-liberal economic reforms in the hopes of salvaging the economy, stabilising it and appeasing IFIs and other donors (Bond & Manyanya, 2002: xvi). Thus this paper argues that although the various

economic crises have contributed to the protracted and adverse economic crisis, neo-liberal reforms in the form of Economic Structural Adjustment (ESAP) particularly contribute to the current political crisis by way of eroding or redirecting the democracy's trajectory through its severely debilitating effects.

3.2.5.2 ESAP and Zimbabwe's Democracy

The current crisis is one that offers Zimbabweans no recourse to action politically and economically. High inflation rates, shortages of food, fuel and other basic commodities, lack of health care and other public goods have locked the majority of Zimbabweans into a paralysis of poverty. Politically, freedom of expression and the freedom to challenge the state through open and transparent structures have been rendered non-existent.

Part of the rationale of this work is that ESAP provided opportune moments to transform the Zimbabwean political system in such a way that would allow for economic development to become a substantive reality. Protest against adjustment in the form of food riots, student marches and civil servant strikes ushered in what many gladly embraced as a new dawn in which democracy, or at least political freedoms, could be more recognised in Zimbabwe. It makes sense that the Zimbabwean government's response to protest and political expression was one of repression; this was, and continues to be, the norm of dealing with challenge (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002: 101/4). As a regime criticised by many of its former supporters for not having delivered on independence promises, they resorted to varying tactics to maintain power and a semblance of authority over the population. So by whom and where was the opportunity missed to consolidate democracy?

The opportunity was clearly missed by the various groups opposing government both in the 1990s and after the government decided to depart from ESAP. These opposing groups – especially the ZCTU and the political party which grew out of it (MDC) and posed direct threats to the government - failed in that they could not forge a path that enunciated both a democratising and a developmental trajectory. An example of this is the 2000 constitutional referendum lost by ZANU-PF which revealed the precarious position of the party and a threat to its continued existence

(Raftopoulos et al, 2006: 13; Chikuhwa, 2004: 86/7); this was another significant groove in the nation's history that could have been exploited to full benefit and helped to usher in a new dispensation had the MDC and other civics involved in crafting the document not been so rigid as to their desired outcomes (Moyo & Yeros, 2007: 116). It can be argued that had a 'yes' vote been encouraged more political opening would have resulted in favour of opposition and Zimbabwean people centred democracy.

Granted it is difficult to claim that the MDC has completely failed as they have been the most vocal and most threatening opposition party to ZANU-PF for a long time. However, the ZCTU and other civics failed because they were manipulated by the regime. The MDC failed because though it took hold of the new political moment, it aligned itself to a neo-liberal and western agenda. Bond and Manyanya (2002: xiv) note that the MDC's failure to articulate an economic developmental agenda commensurate with the founding of a labour movement meant they closed the door on political opening, or as they coin it an end to an "exhausted nationalism". More so, Mumvuma et al (2006: 262) note that the MDC in its inception and engagement with the state failed to alleviate or divert conflict with the state from their supporters. Instead, the significant challenge that the MDC and their supporters represented to the ruling elite resulted in "additional pressure on the political leadership to adopt more populist policies and repressive measures, despite their long-term adverse consequences".

The MDC has partners in failure in the IMF and World Bank and other donors. The claim has been firmly made that by compelling governments to implement SAPs, IFIs bypass any consultative processes thus bringing question to their commitment to democracy. In the case of Zimbabwe however, failure is twofold. Through IMF and World Bank's insistence to continue with harmful ESAP and the expectation of the Zimbabwe government to see the process through to the end, they turned a blind eye and even encouraged repressive anti-democratic behaviour by the regime (Brett, 2004).

As such a firm foundation was set for repression and anti-democratic behaviour. When the international community now speak out against it, the regime is able to rebuff any claims by pointing to the 'interference' of the West through their

insistence upon economic reforms (Sachikonye, 2002: 17). The ZANU-PF have thus firmly established themselves as the only way to achieving at least economic development and alleviation out of poverty for the Zimbabwean people, though they are failing to achieve this. It is not, however, to claim that the ZANU-PF is not a suitable regime to lead Zimbabwe, but rather to show that the MDC, widely touted by foreign media as the saviour of Zimbabwe, is an equally poor, if not worse alternative (Raftopoulos, 2006: 212). Their alliance with neo-liberalism and their choices to seek refuge and assistance in the West, without considering the majority of the Zimbabwean people and their needs, deems them thus.

3.2.5.3 ESAP and the Current Crisis

The cornucopias of economic and political problems in Zimbabwe have had far reaching effects on the social and moral fabric of society. Economically, in addition to recent hyper inflation and price controls, whose effects have been mentioned, it is necessary to highlight the parallel or black market. This informal economy is associated with high inflation rates and is informed by the shortage and hoarding of foreign currency (Brett, 2004).

Though it experienced a surge during the ESAP years, there has been an even greater increase in its activity and a merger of some of these illegal activities with the informal sector. As such, any members of the Zimbabwean economy engaged in any form of business that generates foreign currency no longer have an incentive to keep these reserves in official and formal structures; this is not a situation unique to the current crisis but rather one that was birthed out of the 1980s economic climate and given a different and perhaps more lasting life line during the ESAP years (Sanders, Cousins and Moore, 2007). While foreign exchange was merely diverted from formal and state structures during the 1980s owing to strict RBZ controls, in the 1990s the effect of the IMF enforced reforms was to encourage individuals to bring money into the Bank but also make it possible to speculate and make readily available funds to those operating in the parallel market. In the post ESAP era, where the RBZ has revisited tight foreign exchange controls, the parallel market witnessed resurgence and in fact now controls the unofficial exchange rates as well as determines prices for fuel and other basic commodities (Brett, 2006: 16).

These economic circumstances have affected the Zimbabwean society in its entirety, albeit to differing extents. Many reports state that the inflation both official and unofficial will have reached levels that will collapse the economy entirely (Munoz, 2007: 4/5). What is clear is that while the economy is in dire straits the political atmosphere is severely affected. Some of these political problems expressed through government repression are: Firstly government policy on mass or large group gatherings without prior clearance from the authorities which has resulted in Zimbabweans being denied avenues to gather through the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) (Sachikonye, 2002: 18). This reveals another missed opportunity for manipulating openings.

Another is extreme limitations of freedom of the press. It is problematic that only state sponsored media has a primary place in communicating news. This has been achieved through Access to Information and Privacy Act (AIPA), a policy that could have been circumvented had IFIs sufficiently and timeously responded to state repression (Sachikonye, 2002: 18). On the part of the MDC their faults are founded in their appropriating the single voice of opposition, in effect replicating the tactics and characteristics of the ZANU-PF. Their factional divisions along ethnic and ideological lines and failure to rally around needs based as opposed to patronage based issues makes them no different from ZANU-PF (Moyo & Yeros, 2007: 117).

This paper argues that the replication of nationalist rhetoric, positioning themselves as the sole saviours of the nation from the patrimonial nationalism, affects freedom of the press. Many newspapers such as The Daily News rooted themselves in support of the MDC and so resulted in firstly a deviation from the ideals of communicating the views of the majority of Zimbabweans, propagating the pro-West sentiment of the MDC as well as creating a rigid dichotomy of voices as pro MDC or pro ZANU within the media. As such one can say that the ESAP manifested moment to reinvigorate the democratisation process in Zimbabwe was missed, if not ignored. Where ESAP presented adverse economic effects for the people, political opportunities were not capitalised on.

Elections are a third political consideration. Debates around the extent to which presidential and/ or parliamentary elections since 2000, were free and fair, have

contributed to the questioning of subsequent contestation in Zimbabwe. Such questioning is based on violence and intimidation mostly attributed to ruling party youths in the times leading up to and during elections (Bush & Szeftel, 2002: 8). It must be noted that such violence and intimidation is not only meted out by ruling party youth militias, it is well known that opposition MDC youth militias also partook and continue to partake in violent and intimidatory activities (Raftopoulos et al, 2006: 11).

Electoral issues are important because their endorsement is reflective of democracy. Elections affected by minimal disturbances are accepted by IFIs and other groups as a measure of democracy (Lipset, 1993: 431). A caveat is necessary here. Though elections in the 1990s were mostly accepted as free and fair, since parliamentary elections in 2001, the international community has begun to declare most elections not free and not fair with blame for this being placed on the ZANU regime (Bush & Szeftel, 2002: 10).

At this juncture it is necessary to question the sincerity and commitment to democracy of international actors. Despite their determination to see open contestation, it is important to understand that merely insisting on these minimum standards and throwing support behind the MDC does not equate to a renewed interest in political opening in Zimbabwe. Rather it is simply their support of an opposition that is partial to neo-liberal economic policies.

A fourth consideration is the crisis of legitimacy prevalent within the leadership of Zimbabwe (Lloyd, 2002: 223). It is true that the ZANU-PF as a party have a legislative majority as well as executive control. This guarantees the regime both power and authority over the population. Whether ZANU has legitimacy (rightful rule) is questionable. John Locke would claim that the ZANU regime through failing to deliver on its promises to the Zimbabwean people has broken its social contract and there is therefore a crisis of legitimacy (Moyo, 2002: 5; Spragens, 1997: 31). Thomas Hobbes on the other hand would claim that because the situation has not resulted in the people rising up in violent protest, the government has retained authority (the right to rule) over them (Spragens, 1997: 33). The government which is forceful and maintains and uses its power remains intact.

It is the contention of this paper, that despite calls to the contrary, the ZANU-PF led government is legitimate (Lloyd, 2002: 223). Despite being declared not free and not fair, elections have taken place and have resulted in ZANU-PF being selected as the rulers of the people. It must be added that despite international actors distaste for the incumbent regime, systems put in place and entrenched through their policies of economic and political reform have made Mugabe, his cabinet and the party the legitimate, albeit by default - representatives of the nation. Their legitimacy however, remains precarious and questioned; many of their actions are as a response to this.

It must be noted however that a crisis of legitimacy is not confined to the ruling elite but has also affected the opposition MDC. Evidence of this lies in the fact that the MDC's strength as the most seemingly viable opposition to a post-nationalist state is informed by its support from external agents and has already been discussed (Moore: 8). What is important to note in relation to ESAP is that had IFIs and other international actors been genuinely committed to supporting opposition and concerned about the majority of Zimbabweans, they would have been careful to support a party that had not only been closely affiliated but grown out of the ZANU-PF. The split of the MDC into two separate factions is merely evidence of the characteristics of the ruling party being inherent within the opposition (Moyo & Yeros, 2007: 116).

The best example of this is the failure of MDC leaders to rise above personal differences and issues of accumulating power to focus on entrenching democracy and offering viable political alternatives to the Zimbabwean public (Raftopoulos et al, 2006: 18). One can postulate that had the MDC had a genuine desire to see change come to Zimbabwe and every Zimbabwean have a right to decide on their representatives, they would have decided from the outset to participate in the 2006 Senate elections; again, an opportune moment to alter the political playing field was missed (Raftopoulos et al, 2006: 20/1).

Further, this crisis of legitimacy is most evident in the government's dealing with the informal sector and informal settlements. Though the genesis of the crisis of informal trade and settlement is in ESAP in the current crisis this issue has resurfaced. At the time when the informal sector was growing and emerging as a force to be

reckoned with, the state through municipal governments turned a blind eye to the increase of non-registered informal traders because of the realities of the effects of ESAP (Brand et al, 1995: 136).

'*Operation Murambatsvina*' also known as '*Operation Clean Up the Filth*' instituted by the government in 2005 is a direct result of this particular impact of structural adjustment in Zimbabwe; though perhaps with a more political dimension when it comes to its relation to democracy. The authorities' demolition of unregistered and illegal construction in the form of housing and businesses and markets was aimed at limiting the government's urban opposition (Moyo & Yeros, 2007: 113/115). Although deemed anti-democratic and a violation of human rights this move was a direct result of poverty exacerbating ESAP and the government was able to justify their action through their anti-imperial and nationalist rhetoric; this response to their legitimacy crisis worked to either silence or remove the threat of opposition in the urban centres.

The crisis of legitimacy as a result of ESAP and the accompanying poverty and fall in standards of living has also led to mass emigration from Zimbabwe to neighbouring Botswana, South Africa and Namibia as well as the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The large number of Zimbabweans fleeing the effects of economic adversity in their country presents democracy with a dilemma. There has been massive brain drain and the most likely section of the population to effectively bring about change, especially in terms of contributing to economic development and hence political change, are in the Diaspora. It is estimated that approximately five million Zimbabweans are living outside of Zimbabwe (Saunders, Cousins & Moore, 2007). In democracy's terms, this means the loss of at least five million Zimbabweans that are unable to vote and possibly act in such a way as to contribute to significant change in the country or to use their skills to changing the economy.

Lastly, MDC's affiliation and close relationship with international actors has probably represented the most pernicious effect on Zimbabwe's democracy (Bond & Manyanya, 2002: 82). These close ties represent an assault on democracy by de-legitimising it in the eyes of both the ruling elite as well as the population at large. By

virtue of its terrible outcomes, ESAP, as with SAPs in other African countries, had embedded a justifiable suspicion of entities external to the continent in the minds of the population (Bush & Szeftel, 2002: 12). Added to the general effects of ESAP is the belief that the West in the form of Britain the former colonial master, had been responsible for the plight of the people through colonialism as well as delaying and outright refusing to compensate white farmers for land and thus prevent Zimbabweans from creating wealth. It can be said that Zimbabwean people were very wary of neo-imperialism and the very real idea of continued control of their destinies by imperialist westerners as it had already happened twice with awful results (Bush and Szeftel, 2002: 12).

It therefore seems very odd that the MDC, having emerged from a movement that bemoaned the effects of neo-liberalism would forge alliances with agencies that represented these ideals and more (Moyo & Yeros, 2007: 116/7). The fact is that had the MDC actually wanted democracy to flourish or even have a chance in Zimbabwe, they would have firmly distanced themselves from the West. Instead, they have allowed themselves to be tried and found wanting when accused of cavorting with neo-imperialist Britain and America (Bond & Manyanya, 2002: xv). The MDC has thus inadvertently given added credence to Mugabe's tirades with regard the West and positioned him, through ZANU, as the African voice to remind the continent of the underhanded ways of the developed world.

It is not to dispute or deem dubious the sincerity of Mugabe's admonitions of the west, but simply to emphasise that these could be made in a way that prioritises and changes the plight of Zimbabweans. For the sake of continuing protest against SAPs and neo-liberalism, MDC should have distanced itself from the west in all ways possible. Again such comments are made so as to emphasise the missed opportunity, to not necessarily see ZANU defeated and MDC as the ruling party, but rather to usher in a time of vibrant political competition and participation by many sectors of Zimbabwean society.

Thus to conclude, despite declarations from various fronts that the Zimbabwean government did not correctly implement ESAP and did not comply with IMF/ World Bank stipulations for reform, evidence clearly shows the opposite as well

as reports by the IFIs to the contrary (Bond, 1999: 18). If any problems in ESAP's implementation existed, these were largely informed by the IFI's delay in making funds available for reform and hence development. Other problems that resulted in ESAP's failure are associated with the politics of reform. Because the economic effects of ESAP were negative and affected the greater majority of the population that represented the traditional power base of the ruling ZANU-PF and the reform instituting government, resistance to reforms began spelling out a crisis of legitimacy for the state.

Zimbabwe was not the first developing country to adopt and implement SAPs and neither will it be the last to implement neo-liberal economic reforms, even in their renewed modern day form. It is at this juncture that one draws attention to Bretton Woods' institutions failure to prepare for the harsh effects of ESAP on the most vulnerable groups in society and the possible compromises that would be made by the ruling elite so as to avoid losing political tenure. So, in spite of government's response in the form of repression to the crisis of legitimacy it remains that that the IFIs and donor community in general, by firstly turning a blind eye to the effects of ESAP and insisting on the programme's completion, as well as benignly tolerating and accepting government's repressive measures, acted to repress Zimbabwe's democracy, were party to violating Zimbabweans human rights and deprived the Zimbabwean population of viable development opportunities.

IFIs as well as the opposition MDC which emerged from the ESAP regime, ignored the moment of political change and in fact closed it by their silence (in the case of the former) and overplayed their hand and missed the opportunity to transform the political system (in the case of the latter). Sachikonye (2002: 18) rightfully states that "the politics of electioneering in Zimbabwe in the period 2000 – 2002 showed how increasingly authoritarian a regime under concerted opposition challenge can become. This repressive response grows the bigger the opposition challenge." Here it becomes evident that IFIs insistence and external actors' determination to direct political liberalisation resulted in closing the space for successful democratisation, or a change in Zimbabwe's democratisation trajectory.

The IMF and World Bank cannot institute or demand political liberalisation, it has to be grown from beneath, by individuals, Zimbabwean individuals. The MDC did not accurately anticipate the length of time it would take to achieve change, they did not and perhaps still do not have a long term view to change. One does not discount the possibility of a coup or a defeat of the ruling party in an election, it would still remain that the MDC would have not achieved the necessary change; a change that reflects the desires of the people and allows for the articulation of a beneficial development agenda. As such civil society and Zimbabweans at large are called upon to not become exhausted and continue to strive for such.

CHAPTER FOUR
RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSIONS

4.1 Inequalities in the global political economy - the effects of neo-liberalism

The broader basis of this project is that the nature of the global political economy does not allow for economically developing and politically transitional countries to achieve sufficient and sustainable results, in other words stable and competitive markets and vibrant established democracies. As such there is a desperate need for a redefining of the global political economic context in such a way that sees the continent benefit from globalisation. The work posits that there is no veracity to the liberal notion that the global economy is advantageous to all parties, there is insufficient evidence that developing economies have benefited from inclusion in the global economy (Gourevitch, 1978: 892).

Zimbabwe's experience with structural adjustment in the form of ESAP is evidence of the above. Interlocking economic and political effects of reform confirm it. One such effect discussed in the case study is the decline of the manufacturing industry soon after ESAP because of a failure to compete in unequal global markets (Dansereau, 2003: 181). The Zimbabwean government implemented reform under duress. By removing most barriers to trade they exposed the economy to the threat of decline. This paper has tried to show that this decline was not directly a result of ESAP, but rather was guaranteed by any decision to veer from ESAP's path that the government would take. The rapidly implemented and minimally debated policies added to the latent economic dilemmas of the 1970s Rhodesian government and served to weaken the flimsy foundation of the economy culminating in the modern day crisis.

That African countries (as well as other developing countries) themselves need to institute reforms and changes is indisputable, but why should they alone be the ones to change? Such requirements will only lead to the cementing of unequal global relations. Eyoh and Sandbrook (2001: 27) clearly state that African economies alone

cannot be expected to adjust so as to fit into the global economy but that global market forces need to adjust through firm commitments to international agreements that correspond to the needs of people globally and most especially Africans. Eyoh and Sandbrook (2001: 33) argue that the status quo is not a naturally arrived at outcome of technological change as many globalists would argue (Mcgrew, 2003: 23). Rather it is a constructed state arrived at through "negotiated inter-governmental agreements"; as such, reconstruction into a different state is possible.

However, in Zimbabwe, the ordinances of the global economic structures had failed to ward off economic and political calamity both during and after ESAP (Saul, 2005: 258). Thus it is necessary to make a call for a change in the global political economy. A core premise of this paper is as Gourevitch (1978:911) explains that "the international system is not only a consequence of domestic politics and structures" but more importantly, a source of them. In the case of Zimbabwe there was no alternative to this path, especially owing to the inheritance of a skewed economy and the Lancaster House agreement. Saul has sentiments that follow along these lines; he suggests that any emancipatory development in the continent must take place along a type of social revolutionary aspect (Saul, 2005: 257). The intensity of Zimbabwe's protracted crises necessitates this. Therefore, simply reforming Zimbabwe is not an option; a radical change, that extends to other African countries and then to a transformation of the global political economy, is crucial.

4.2 Revival of Zimbabwe's democracy

With the failures of ESAP, the Zimbabwean government that had dealt repressively with opposition parties and civil society groups faced a legitimacy crisis that resulted in the abandonment of SAPs in the country thus clearly showing the linkages between the economic and the political. This paper has touched on Zimbabwe's democracy. Highlighting that in the early 1990s, when the rest of the continent was going through the 'third wave' of democracy, Zimbabwe was largely considered democratic, albeit a defacto one party state.

The importance of this lies in the effect of the economic on the political and its relationship to current crisis in Zimbabwe. As already mentioned, ESAP's economic outcomes served as a simultaneous opening and closing of political space. This seeming contradiction should not be understood as claiming that SAPs have an element of positiveness, because they result in agitation for change. The opposite is true. Of significance is that while SAPs and other neo-liberal policies result in economic adversity, the extent to which the by-products of their implementation, such as the rise of civil society movements and the like should be recognised is great. IFIs and other creditors engaged in Zimbabwe should take cognisance of this.

Zimbabwe requires democracy to evolve in a direction that emphasises a development agenda and focuses on the greater good of the population. Lipset (1993: 432) states that "a free market needs democracy" and that a democracy needs a free market. It is clear that in many African cases economic development is lauded as being a precondition for democracy and the existence of a free market being an indication of economic development. This paper has attempted to show that "free market" or neo-liberal notions of development are not relevant to the African context. Therefore with regard democracy, Africa will need a social developmental market to support her social or people centred democracy. The term social democracy borrowed from Chabal (2002: 461) is used to simply emphasise the need for African political systems to allow for consultation with and participation of the people.

In Zimbabwe's context such a democracy will entail either a new generation in the ruling party (ZANU-PF) or the opposition party (MDC) to exploit the gaps left by the ruling party in the current crisis. It will also entail Zimbabwean civil society being pro-active as opposed to reactive to government, opposition or external actors' political machinations. Civil society at this point in Zimbabwe is the only group able to agitate for change in peaceful ways the effect of changing institutions and the very foundations of the political system, what Moyo and Yeros (2007: 117) describe as radicalising the state. This radicalising must maintain a developmental aim and steer clear of co-option by ruling versus opposition party politics as well as dependent donor support.

Zimbabwe requires less reliance on external (western) funding for its development. John Saul (2005: 262/3) suggests that such distancing is based on imagining "the radically possible" and would require a country like Zimbabwe in this "next liberation struggle" to take note and align itself to alternative groups. The danger here however, is that these alternatives can be worse than the ones before, the trick is thus to find alternative support that assists to lobby, fund raise and strategise for development in a way that does not exploit and make states dependent on it.

The crisis that currently besets the Zimbabwean people requires redress of both the economic and political systems. In Zimbabwe's context, as in any other African country, the requirement is for Zimbabweans to change the system themselves. This will entail identifying opportunities for wealth creation, sustainable wealth creation not the opportunistic looting currently taking place in the economy. An area where this is possible but requiring co-operation from various actors is the area of land redistribution (Moyo & Yeros, 2007: 117). Successful land redistribution will lead to Zimbabwean individuals coming to know and articulate their economic and political options, thus participating in their own democracy and development.

4.3 Final Remarks

This work has brought together discussion of African prospects of democracy and whether they are enabled, enhanced or hindered by neo-liberal economic policy reforms – structural adjustment programmes. It has questioned the prospect of successful development and hence democratisation under conditions of adjustment, postulating that SAPs have had limited success in the continent and in effect have done no favours for democracy. As seen in the Zimbabwe case, SAPs because of their adverse economic and social impact had an added political impact, part of which was exacerbating political rifts in the ruling party, ushering in political resistance and protest against government decisions to reform, rallying together of civil society and the labour union (ZCTU) as well as the birth of a threatening opposition party. This political effect has been summarised as presenting a new direction for Zimbabwe's democratic trajectory and an opportunity for a people-centred democracy of sorts to emerge. This opportunity however, has been consistently missed for firstly the reason

outlined above, that SAPs are intrinsically designed to make democracy fail because of the manner in which implementing governments are dictated to without consultation of the people. The second reason is that international actors, IFIs and their representative governments and donor agencies turn a blind eye to repressive measures taken by reforming governments, in their attempts to complete reforms. Inevitably reforms are abandoned and the state remains with an even greater external debt, reversals in development and the institutions of democracy are eroded as was the case in Zimbabwe.

Thus, development and democracy need to be engaged in differently; especially Zimbabwe where a new democratic trajectory needs to be interrogated and imagined.

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