

Do Southern Africa's Dominant-Party Systems Affect Popular Attitudes?

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**COMPULSORY DECLARATION**

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## **Abstract**

Among the most distinctive features of Southern African politics is the region's preponderance of one-party dominant systems. Considerable effort has been made to explain the unusual phenomenon with some analysts emphasizing the potential of such imbalances of power to undermine the effectiveness of a democracy's institutions. However, political science has only just begun to study the repercussions the status quo may have for political culture in the region. Using survey data collected across the continent, this paper shifts the focus to this unexplored link between dominance and culture, aiming to shed some light on the relationship by studying the effect dominant party systems have on three specific political attitudes in Africa: demand for democracy, evaluation of the supply of democracy, and pluralism.

The academic literature on Southern Africa's dominant party systems has produced a theoretical distinction between two types of dominance. On the one hand is simple dominance, characterized only by long-term electoral success by a single party. On the other hand is dominance by parties who emerged from national liberation movements. Some analysts have argued that the ideological orientation of liberation parties and their unique claim to the right to rule renders them incompatible with essential features of democracy. This paper investigates the possibility that these distinct varieties of dominance have distinct effects on political attitudes.

The results of the analyses conducted here offer strong evidence that dominant party systems do have implications for mass attitudes. Further, this research finds strong support for the argument that the nature of a party's dominance matters, as means comparisons and regression analyses showed that the effects of dominance on popular attitudes were considerably stronger in systems where the dominant party was descended from a national liberation movement.

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## *Chapter 1: Introduction*

### *I. Research Problem and Significance*

Democracy's emergence in Southern Africa was a long time in coming. Late decolonization in Angola and Mozambique and stubborn white minority rule in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe forced the region down a winding and difficult path toward liberation and inclusive government. Even after its eventual and incremental arrival, the region's collective experience with democracy has been distinctive. Perhaps the single most unusual characteristic of national politics in these countries is that elections have not yet produced a single transfer of executive authority between parties.

Political scientists typically regard this sort of one-party dominance (OPD) as a rare state of affairs,<sup>1</sup> but even following more than half a century of study of dominant party systems across the globe, the discipline has not yet produced a consensus on the causes or effects of these outlier party systems. This failure is, at least in part, a product of substantial disagreements within the literature. Foundational works on the topic of OPD fundamentally disagree on matters as essential as what exactly constitutes "dominance" and whether or not OPD countries, however defined, should be eligible for designation as democratic.<sup>2</sup>

One trait the scholarly contributions on OPD do share is a focus on finding and describing the ways by which OPD systems emerge and are sustained. The most influential investigations of the phenomenon have found that factors like success in the politicization of state resources,<sup>3</sup> macroeconomic conditions, and even simple dumb luck<sup>4</sup> are important in

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<sup>1</sup> T.J. Pempel, *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 1.

<sup>2</sup> Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 27.

<sup>3</sup> Kenneth Greene, "The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance," *Comparative Political Studies*, (43: 2010), 808.

<sup>4</sup> Pempel, 335.

explaining how, upon occasion, parties just do not lose elections. Some of these pieces of work also considered the institutional ramifications of protracted rule by a single party.<sup>5</sup>

The ascendance of liberation parties like the ANC in South Africa over the course of the last two-plus decades has sparked interest in the study of OPD in the context of Southern Africa. One of the most interesting developments in the research to-date has been the articulation of a theoretical distinction between the handful OPD systems in which the dominant party is closely associated with that country's national liberation movement (NLM) and systems in which the dominant party is not. The distinction is rooted in party ideology. Roger Southall offers a concise cross-national description of the unique ideological character of liberation parties, arguing that the ruling parties in Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe all "[espouse] monopoly power of the liberation" and believe that their right to govern is guaranteed indefinitely by their central role in their nation's history.<sup>6</sup>

There has also been research on the consequences that single-party dominance may be having on Southern Africa's political systems. For example, Anthony Butler analyzed the impacts of ANC dominance in South Africa and argued that the party's staying power has likely had both positive and negative effects on the country's democratic institutions.<sup>7</sup> However, the literature has yet to fully explore the implications the region's dominant party systems may have for political culture; the effect that living in a dominant-party system is having on popular attitudes remains unknown. Further, no effort has been made to measure the potential discrete effects of living in a political system that is dominated by a liberation party.

An investigation of the effects OPD party system types have on popular attitudes in

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<sup>5</sup> Giliomee and Simkins, *The Awkward Embrace: One-Party Domination and Democracy*, (Reading: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999), xvii.

<sup>6</sup> Roger Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa*, (Pietermaritzburg: KwaZulu-Natal University Press, 2013), 343.

<sup>7</sup> Anthony Butler, "Considerations on the Erosion of One-Party Dominance," *Representation*, (45:2009), 164.

Southern Africa will yield findings that supplement existing explanations of how and why OPD systems exist and persist. In addition, knowledge of the relationship between types of party systems and attitudes will shed light on the implications OPD party systems may have for the bigger questions of democratic consolidation in the region.

## ***II. Research Question***

To the extent that one-party dominant systems erode democracy, is the impact felt only through the behavior of elites, or do such systems also (re)shape the attitudes of ordinary citizens? Further, does dominance by former liberation movements have its own added effect?

## ***III. State of Knowledge***

There is virtually no scholarship that has focused on investigating the effect OPD and NLM party-dominant party systems have on popular political attitudes. Instead, much of the research on OPD has attempted to explain how such unusual systems come to be and identify the reasons the systems are able to persist in the face of circumstances that typically produce transfers of power in other democracies. Little attention has been paid to systematically investigating the relationship between party systems and political culture in general or specific attitudes in particular. However, much has been written about other kinds of impacts OPD may have on the political systems. In addition, the literature has produced a theoretical distinction between types of OPD systems that is especially important to future work on the phenomenon in Southern Africa and shapes the approach taken in this analysis.

### ***A. The Consequences of One-Party Dominant Party Systems***

The study of party systems types was pioneered by Maurice Duverger, whose best-known contribution to political science is his eponymous “law” that elegantly connects a

political system's institutions with the number of parties it is likely to support.<sup>8</sup> Years later Giovanni Sartori coined the term "predominant party system," providing analysts with a theoretical basis from which to begin empirical research of the rare phenomenon that is OPD.<sup>9</sup>

Among the first and most prominent cross-national investigations of OPD systems was T.J. Pempel's *Uncommon Democracies*. Pempel's volume examined dominance in the cases of Israel, Japan, Sweden, and Italy. In contrast to this paper, Pempel's analysis focused mostly on identifying the causes of OPD across seemingly different cases. However, one of the most important factors Pempel argues is behind dominant parties' success is, in effect, also a product of dominance. Dominant parties' persistence, Pempel suggests, is partly explained by the parties' ability to find ways to "reshape the country's politics and society...[allowing] the dominant party to remake the country in its own image..." helping the party cement a long-term electoral advantage.<sup>10</sup> For Pempel, "remaking" refers to the potential for a dominant party to use "public policy choices to...shift the ideological balance in society."<sup>11</sup> The author cites the Swedish Social Democratic Party's use of policy to produce a massive increase in the number of union members in post-WWII Sweden as an example of a dominant party using its control of the instruments of government to establish ideological hegemony by growing its base of supporters and "isolate its enemies."<sup>12</sup>

Pempel is far from the only analyst who has concluded dominant party systems have important implications for societies. In their 1999 edition, Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins argue that OPD enables and perhaps even causes antidemocratic behavior among

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<sup>8</sup> Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, (London: Methuen & Co, 1959), 217.

<sup>9</sup> Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 192.

<sup>10</sup> Pempel, 336.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 352.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 352-3.

elites actors within political systems. When parties do not face a realistic threat of losing power, dominant parties are freer to take steps to consolidate their power in ways that undermine the effectiveness of democratic institutions.<sup>13</sup> Implicit in their argument that dominance constitutes a state of insulation from shifts in the electorate is the belief that popular support for dominant parties is not contingent upon their delivery of political goods. In other words, in their description of the impacts of OPD on institutions, Giliomee and Simkins make an important and testable assumption about mass attitudes in OPD party systems.

There are also findings in research outside the narrow scope of the study OPD that address questions similar to the one posed in this paper. Research on party systems of sub-Saharan Africa in general has shown evidence that a country's party system may in fact have a measurable effect on levels of democracy. A 2005 study by Kuenzi and Lambright found a modest positive association between an index measuring the competitiveness of a country's party system<sup>14</sup> and that country's Polity rating.<sup>15</sup> A later study on the party systems of sub-Saharan Africa from Basedau reached a similar conclusion, albeit even more tentatively, suggesting that "moderate fragmentation" in party systems<sup>16</sup> has a weak but significant positive relationship with liberal democracy as measured by Freedom House ratings.<sup>17</sup> Work like this supports the contention that party systems indeed have measurable consequences for institutions but the implications for popular attitudes remain unexplored.

### ***B. The One-Party Dominant Party Systems of Southern Africa and Their Effects***

Collectively, the countries of Southern Africa violate the literature's expectation that

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<sup>13</sup> Giliomee, 350.

<sup>14</sup> Competitiveness measured using seat-total volatility and fractionalization indices.

<sup>15</sup> Michelle Kuenzi and Gina Lambright, "Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation in Africa's Electoral Regimes," *Party Politics*, (11:2005), 436; 439.

<sup>16</sup> Gero Erdmann and Matthias Basedau, "Party systems in Africa: Problems of categorising and explaining party systems," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* (26:2008), 118.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 133.

dominant-party systems are unusual. In academic writing, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe are among the countries frequently described as currently having OPD party systems. Before the emergence of the Patriotic Front (PF) in 2011, Zambia was also often regarded as a OPD system and future studies might add Angola to the list of OPD countries if the MPLA continues to post large margins of victory at the ballot box. In contrast to Pempel's explanation of OPD, the large number of cases of dominant-party systems in Southern Africa is not the result of the chance confluence of structural circumstance, party capacity, and luck. Rather, the region's historical experience with settler colonialism is at the heart of many of its cases of OPD. In much of Southern Africa, electoral democracy was the culmination of national liberation movements (NLMs). Leading struggle organizations became parties and the broad coalitions they had built over the preceding decades became overwhelming and lasting voting blocs. Indeed, this particular path to dominance distinguishes OPD as it exists in much of Southern Africa from examples of the phenomenon elsewhere.

The distinction may not be a mere historical one; a number of scholars of the region's politics have contended that liberation party dominance in Southern Africa is made special by an underlying "liberation" ideology which shapes the parties and, potentially, the political systems themselves. Southall, writing about NLM party-rule in Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, argues that "the ideology of the [national democratic revolution] sits uneasily with democracy...because it ultimately espouses the monopoly power of the liberation movement as the vehicle of social progress: history without end!"<sup>18</sup> NLM parties possess an "ambiguity" towards democracy, "welcoming [it] whilst espousing, in much ideology and practice, its contradiction."<sup>19</sup> Other observers have given similar accounts of liberation ideology. In her analysis of the ANC in South Africa, Nicola de Jager says the ANC

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<sup>18</sup> Southall, 343.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 343.

considers itself the “vanguard” of a “national project of transformation,” a position which places the party “beyond scrutiny, and those that dare criticize them are labelled [by the ANC] as being ‘anti-transformation.’”<sup>20</sup> In Namibia, du Pisani emphasizes SWAPO’s “founding myth,” which holds that the party is the nation’s “repository and custodian of democracy.”<sup>21</sup> Annemie Britz and Josephat Tshuma maintain that Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF believes it possesses the right to remain in power forever after succeeding in overthrowing the Ian Smith regime.<sup>22</sup> ZANU-PF’s past as a liberation movement, they argue, directly “led to the development of...distinctly anti-democratic political culture within the organisation.”<sup>23</sup> In each of these instances, researchers consistently argue that, for liberation movement parties in Southern Africa “the capture of state power marks...something similar to Francis Fukuyama’s ‘the end of history,’” and they believe they have earned the right to remain in power forever.<sup>24</sup>

The potential consequences of this kind of ideology-infused dominance are being explored with particular focus on its ramifications for the vitality of democratic institutions. While the bulk of the literature concerns the negative effects of NLM party-dominance, there have been those who suggest that dominant-party systems have played a positive role in the consolidation of democracy.<sup>25</sup> Anthony Butler observed that the ANC’s freedom from fear of losing power enabled them to “enforce an unpopular but necessary program of economic stabilization” that they could have ill-afforded to pursue in a more competitive party

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<sup>20</sup>Nicola de Jager, “South Africa: A Democracy in the Balance” in *Friend or Foe?: Dominant Party Systems in Southern Africa*, ed. Nicola de Jager and Pierre du Toit (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2013), 157-158.

<sup>21</sup> Andre du Pisani, “The Politics and Resource Endowment of Party Dominance in Namibia: The Past as the Present and the Future?” in *Friend or Foe?: The Dominant Party Systems of Southern Africa*, ed. Nicola de Jager and Pierre du Toit (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2013), 136.

<sup>22</sup> Annemie Britz and Josephat Tshuma, “Heroes Fall, Oppressors Rise: Democratic Decay and Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe,” in *Friend or Foe?: Dominant Party Systems in Southern Africa*, ed. Nicola de Jager and Pierre du Toit (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2013), 184.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 185.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 184.

<sup>25</sup> Butler, 159.

system.<sup>26</sup> He also suggests the party's promotion of non-racialism played a pivotal role in preventing an escalation of racial and ethnic conflict in the country. Butler concisely summed up the literature's ambivalence toward OPD in Southern Africa, concluding "liberation movement domination has been a necessary condition for the entrenchment of democratic practices and institutions, but it has also at the same time been a threat to them."<sup>27</sup>

This "threat" to democratic institutions has been the subject of much of the research on the effects of liberation party dominance, but analysts have not yet produced a cross-national account of how the threat would be realized. However, there have been some case-specific findings.

In South Africa, Karen Ferree argues that the ANC has sustained its dominance by successfully delegitimizing opposition parties. The party, drawing on its hard-earned liberation credibility, has framed its opponents as racially exclusive, essentially characterizing them as counterrevolutionary by associating them with parties from the country's apartheid-era.<sup>28</sup> The party's effort has largely succeeded in convincing many South Africa voters that they do not have a viable, inclusive alternative to the incumbent party, undermining elections' potential to serve as a check on the ANC.<sup>29</sup> In short, the ANC has worked to ensure that the country's elections remain referenda on the project of national liberation and this approach to campaigning is largely consistent with liberation ideology as it is described above; opposition to the liberation party is conflated with opposition to liberation.

In Namibia, du Pisani describes the similar effect of liberation party dominance has had on the character of elections. Like the ANC in South Africa, SWAPO has used its

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 163.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 169.

<sup>28</sup> Karen Ferree, *Framing the Race in South Africa: The Political Origins of Racial Census Elections*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 118.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 52.

“discursive hegemony” in the country’s politics to capitalize on the party’s “narrative [that] connects [it] powerfully to the ushering in of a new political order,” maintaining that the party and the post-apartheid government “share a moral and historic assignation” that the party’s opponents can never match.<sup>30</sup>

Liberation party dominance has had more severe consequences in Zimbabwe. In the South African or Namibian cases, opposition parties, as marginalized and overmatched as they are, have been allowed to operate freely and their defeats are come as the result of fairly contested elections. This is not the case in Zimbabwe where ZANU-PF regards its political opponents as its “political enemies”<sup>31</sup> and has used violent force to protect their grip on power.

### *C. Summary of Findings in the Literature*

Political science has not begun to explore the potential relationship between dominant-party systems and important popular attitudes like support for democracy and pluralism. However, a number of influential researchers have shown that party systems do have other kinds of ramifications for political systems. In Africa specifically, recent work has suggested that the historical experience of national liberation in Southern Africa yielded governing parties with enormous popular support as well as unique, deeply held ideas about their mandate. Analysts like Southall argue that elements of liberation ideology are at odds with the constraints on power that are essential to democracy, and even where elections are contested freely, dominant liberation parties have used their preeminent discursive position to marginalize opposition parties, casting them as fundamentally opposed to the project of national liberation. In the case of Zimbabwe, where electoral support for the liberation party has eroded significantly, this incongruence between ideology and democracy’s institutions

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 136.

<sup>31</sup> Britz, 178.

has resulted in substantial “democratic decay.”<sup>32</sup>

Important questions remain unaddressed. For one, the work on dominant-party systems in Southern Africa assumes that voters accept or agree with liberation parties’ claims that opposition parties are not viable alternatives to the incumbent party. However, it is not clear if dominant liberation parties are convincing voters that *these* opposition parties are counterrevolutionary or instead that *any* opposition to the governing party is intrinsically counterrevolutionary. In addition, the literature stresses the potential harm dominance poses to institutions. However, outside Zimbabwe such damage hasn’t materialized, with NLM party-dominant states like Namibia and South Africa routinely earning some of the continent’s highest ratings on measures of democracy.

The fact that hypothetical harms haven’t come to be does not necessarily mean that dominance by liberation parties is inconsequential. Indeed the field’s preoccupation with hypotheticals might be leaving some of the cultural impacts of NLM party-dominance that have come to pass mostly unexplored. For instance, does living in a political system where opposition is perpetually weak and portrayed as being on the wrong side of history affect voters’ attitudes about democracy and political opposition? This research will attempt to offer preliminary answers to some of these attitude-related questions.

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 171.

## ***Chapter 2: Research Design***

This chapter will proceed in five sections. It will begin with an overview of the overall argument made in the paper and a brief discussion of how the argument emerges from existing work on OPD. The second section will articulate the core, testable hypotheses within the argument. Next, the chapter will define some key concepts that have important implications for case selection and classification. The fourth section of this chapter explains how abstract concepts in the paper's argument will be operationalized, explaining the variable selection and creation process. The fifth and final section of the chapter will outline the statistical methods that are employed to test the paper's hypotheses.

### ***I. Argument***

This paper argues that Southern Africa's dominant-party systems have shaped popular attitudes in the region and, further, it argues that NLM party-dominant systems have their own distinguishable effects. These effects are realized in two main ways.

First, the nature of a country's party system largely makes an important contribution to shaping its institutional landscape, which is likely to affect peoples' appraisals of their country's political system. A party system, or the distribution of power between parties in a political system, determines whether or not certain checks on power are meaningful; indeed a two-thirds majority vote threshold to pass legislation matters little when one party controls three-quarters of the seats in the legislature. In dominant-party systems, those close to the governing party are likely to be quite satisfied with the status quo and not especially interested in imposing or protecting limitations on the ruling party's authority. On the other side, the opposition groups in society that are on the outside of government looking in are likely to feel vulnerable, powerless, and frustrated with their semi-permanent place at the periphery of power. I expect that the people in this position are more likely to express greater

commitment to checks on the ruling party's power and protections for the rights of opposition.

Second, the character of dominant parties, themselves, determines the nature of OPD's effects on attitudes. In this paper I argue that, because of the ruling parties' ideological commitments, NLM party-dominant systems will have their own unique effects on popular attitudes. Supporters of liberation parties are likely to exhibit some level of commitment to core tenets of liberation ideology. They are more likely to conflate democracy, national liberation, and liberation party-government than are non-supporters of such parties, and because of this they are likely to be less tolerant of activity perceived as opposing the incumbent party. Meanwhile, the liberation party's opponents are likely to feel marginalized and under threat, both because of their small size and because the dominant party persistently characterizes them as anti-liberation. As a result, opponents of liberation parties will express high levels of commitment to democratic checks on power and pluralism.

## ***II. Hypothesis***

The existing literature on single party-dominant systems provides some basis according to which Southern Africa's party systems can be distinguished and broken down into three simple types or categories (fig. 2.4). For one, there are competitive systems in which elections produce regular transfers of power between parties. Second, there are dominant-party systems, defined differently by different analysts. The third and final type is dominant-party systems in which the dominant party has its roots as a leading liberation organization. This last type of party system is informed by recent work on the party politics of Southern Africa which emphasize the impacts that liberation parties' histories and ideology have had on the way in which they've governed.

This paper will test the relationships each of these three party system types has with three dependent variables: demand for democracy, supply of democracy, and support for

pluralism. In addition to examining overall aggregate levels on each variable (fig. 2.1), the analysis will investigate the distribution of attitudes within each party system type by comparing the aggregate levels on each variable among supporters of winning and losing parties within each category (fig. 2.2).

The first type of the three party system types will be referred to as competitive multi-party (CMP). CMP systems feature regular transfer of power between parties and close elections; it is the kind of system democracy is expected to produce under typical circumstances. This paper

hypothesizes that CMP party systems will feature the highest aggregate levels on all three variables. I do not expect there to be a disparity in levels between those who support winning parties versus those who support losing parties in CMP systems.

Fig. 2.1  
*Hypotheses: Relative Aggregate Levels on Selected Variables*

	<i>Competitive Multi-Party</i>	<i>One-Party Dominant</i>	<i>NLM-Party Dominant</i>
<i>Demand for Democracy</i>	Highest	Middle	Lowest
<i>Supply of Democracy</i>	High	High	High
<i>Pluralism</i>	Highest	Middle	Lowest

OPD is the second category of party system. These systems are distinguished by extended electoral dominance by a single party and are relatively rare under normal conditions. Here, I anticipate lower aggregate levels on each of the variables compared to CMP parties. Further, I expect to find that supporters of winning parties exhibit higher evaluations of the supply of democracy in their country than do supporters of losing parties.

Fig. 2.2  
*Hypotheses: Relative Aggregate Levels on Selected Variables Between Supporters and Non-Supporters of Winning Parties Within Party-System Types*

	<i>Competitive Multi-Party:</i>		<i>One-Party Dominant:</i>		<i>NLM-Party Dominant:</i>	
	<i>Winners</i>	<i>Losers</i>	<i>Winners</i>	<i>Losers</i>	<i>Winners</i>	<i>Losers</i>
<i>Demand for Democracy</i>	Even	Even	Even	Even	Lower	Higher
<i>Supply of Democracy</i>	Even	Even	Higher	Lower	Higher	Lower
<i>Pluralism</i>	Even	Even	Even	Even	Lower	Higher

The third type of party system in sub-Saharan Africa is NLM party-dominant. These systems are identical to OPD systems but the dominant party is descendant of a NLM organization. These party systems are expected to deliver the lowest aggregate levels on each of the three dependent variables. This analysis is also expected to show significant gaps in the levels on each variable between supporters of winning and losing parties, with winners displaying lower demand for democracy and support for pluralism but higher supply of democracy.

### ***III. Definitions and Case Selection***

As was noted in the preceding chapter, political science has not reached a consensus regarding some the most central concepts related to OPD party systems. This section will offer definitions for these concepts as they are important to framing this analysis in terms of case selection and categorization. The implications of the definitions that have been settled upon will also be reviewed.

#### ***A. Defining “Democracy”***

On its own, a single party achieving long-term rule can be easily understood; there is no use reviewing the ways in which parties in autocratic governments use the law, police, and

military to impose their will. OPD systems are made interesting by the fact that long-term rule is combined with important features of democracy. That considered, when it comes to defining democracy one must not throw the proverbial baby out with the bathwater; in an analysis that is geographically constrained to a region populated with relatively young democracies it is easy to be too restrictive in setting a threshold for level of democracy and forfeit key insights.

With this in mind, this paper sets what many scholars of party systems would argue is a low threshold for democracy in the context of the study of OPD. In order to be included in this analysis, countries need only hold regular, meaningful elections and allow opposition parties to exist and operate. This standard ensures that all theoretically salient cases are kept in the study while uninteresting examples of OPD (i.e. Swaziland) are not.

This paper does not deny that variation in the level of democracy may predict levels in the dependent variables concerned. In order to control for its possible effects, democracy as measured by Polity rating will be used as a control variable in statistical analyses that are described later in the chapter.

### ***B. Defining and Measuring “Dominance”***

Fig. 2.3						
<i>Constructing the Dominance Index</i>						
Consecutive Elections Won*	+	Mean Margin of Victory (Popular Vote)*	-	Mean Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties**	=	Dominance Index Rating
* -Data for the first round of voting in presidential elections is used in countries that directly elect a president. In countries that do not, data for lower house elections is used.						
** - Calculated for lower houses						

An essential characteristic of OPD is that dominant parties wield unmatched political influence and power in the country that they govern. In order to measure the effect of OPD

party systems it is necessary to first settle upon the precise definition of “dominance” to be used and discuss its ramifications for the inclusion of cases. Like level of democracy, “political dominance” is tricky to measure and previous studies of OPD have differed in their approach to doing so. In this paper I will not attempt to craft a novel and universally superior measure of political dominance; instead, my more modest aim is to provide a reasonable basis by which to differentiate and classify the countries of Africa in terms of the extent to which their political systems are dominated by a single political party. I attempt to do this by developing a Dominance Index that incorporates the three main elements of dominance (figure 2.3). Countries’ scores on this index is one major determinant of their categorization in this paper’s party system typology. As noted, there are three elements to OPD. First, dominance implies a temporal dimension; dominant parties are those that consistently win elections and retain control over crucial parts of government. To account for this, part of this paper’s Dominance Index is the number of consecutive elections a party has won.

Fig. 2.4

*Countries Included in Afrobarometer Round 4 (2008) Classified According to Party System*

Party System	Country	Governing Party (2008)	Year Party Won Government	Governing Party Descendant of NLM?	Consecutive Elections Won	Average Margin of Victory****	Average ENPP Index Score (Lower House)	Dominance Index Score
NLM Party-Dominant	Zimbabwe <sup>^</sup>	ZANU-PF	1980	Yes	5	34%	1.81	3.53
	Namibia	SWAPO	1994	Yes	3	63%	1.68	1.95
	South Africa	ANC	1994	Yes	3	52%	2.11	1.41
	Mozambique	FRELIMO	1994	Yes	3	19%	1.99	1.20
One-Party Dominant	Botswana	BDP	1965	No	9	45%	1.41	8.04
	Zambia	MMPD	1991	No	4	32%	2.14	2.18
	Tanzania	CCM	1995	No	3	53%	1.4	2.13
	Nigeria	PDP	1999	No	3	35%	2.12	1.23
	Lesotho	LCD	1998	No	3	32%	2.11	1.21
Competitive Multi-Party	Senegal	PDS	2000	No	2	15%	1.54	0.61
	Madagascar	TIM	2001	No	2	24%	1.82	0.42
	Ghana	NPP	2000	No	2	57%	2.15	0.42
	Kenya	PNU	2002	No	2	17%	2.6	-0.43
	Malawi	DPP	2004	No	1	78%	4.38	-2.61
	Liberia	UP	2006	No	1	-85%	7.59	-7.44
	Mali*	N/A	2002	No	2	30%	N/A	N/A
	Benin*	N/A	2006	No	1	12%	N/A	N/A
Excluded	Burkina Faso**	CDP	1987	No	3	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Uganda***	NRM	1986	No	3	N/A	N/A	N/A

\* - Head of state was not formally affiliated with a political party

\*\* - President Campaoré came to power as the result of a coup and the country's largest opposition parties boycotted the 1991, 1998, and 2005 presidential elections. For these reasons, electoral performance is not a suitable indicator of dominance Burkina Faso is excluded from the analysis.

\*\*\*- Party politics were reintroduced in Uganda following a 2005 referendum. While President Museveni has governed since 1986, the country's unique circumstances with regard to party politics make it a poor candidate in which to study OPD.

<sup>^</sup> - The margin of victory for the widely-boycotted presidential election of 1996 is not included in calculating any of these figures

Notes: "Control of government" refers to occupation of the office considered head of state. "Consecutive elections won" refers to the number of general elections across which the governing party has retained control of the office considered head of state and garnered at least a plurality of the popular vote. In countries where the head of state is a ceremonial position, occupation of the office considered head of government will be used to determine which party is governing.

Sources: ENPP data - Gallagher, Michael, 2014. Election indices dataset at

[http://www.tcd.ie/Political\\_Science/staff/michael\\_gallagher/EISystems/index.php](http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/EISystems/index.php), accessed [11/22/2014]. Election data - African Elections Database at <http://africanelections.tripod.com/>, accessed [9/10/2014].

To be considered the “winner” of an election, a party must have earned a plurality of the popular vote and gained or retained control of the office of head of state. In countries in which the office of head of state is filled by a monarch or nonpartisan ceremonial figure, the party that control the office of head of government will be used to determine which party has won the election and controls government.

In addition to duration, dominant parties are unrivaled in their power to set and carry out their agendas. This component of dominance is partly reflected in the selection of control of the office of head of state in determining control of government, as political figureheads like presidents and premiers do enjoy a measure of agenda-setting power not enjoyed by opposition parties who tend not to. Of course outside dictatorships, executives require at least some sort of approval or support from a legislature. To take into account the ability of dominant parties to single-handedly implement their agendas, the Dominance Index subtracts from each country’s score the mean value of Laakso and Taagepera’s Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (ENPP)<sup>33</sup> over the duration of their control of government. Countries in which parties have near-total control of the legislature will have smaller ENPP values, subtracting very little from their overall Dominance Index score. Countries in which winning parties fall short of a majority and are forced to govern in coalition will have higher ENPP values, lowering their dominance rating.

The third and measure of dominance concerns is margin of victory. The size of the gap between the winning and next-closest party is an important measure of dominance because so much of the theory of OPD emphasizes the importance of dominant parties’ lack of fear of electoral defeat. Larger margins of victory are likely to embolden a party in this manner where narrower ones are less likely to produce such a feeling of invulnerability. The average margin of victory (as a fraction of one) a country’s governing party has enjoyed over

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<sup>33</sup> Marrku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, ““Effective” Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe,” *Comparative Political Studies*, (12:1979).

the duration of its rule will be added in producing its Dominance Index rating.

Finally, how should total scores on this index be interpreted in terms of informing a country's classification as either dominant or non non-dominant? As acknowledged above, this index is imperfect and effective use of it to differentiate between party system types requires careful consideration of how exactly the index takes measurements of the characteristic of dominance and produces a value. The best way to explore this area is with examples.

Consider for instance the fictitious case of "Country A." Its ruling party has won only a single consecutive election but did so by a massive 50% of the vote. As a result, its lower house had an ENPP score of only 1.5. Prima facie, Country A would not be regarded as an example of OPD as it the ruling party has not maintained power over any length of time. Using this index, Country A's overall dominance rating adds up to zero. In short, this example shows that, in terms of this index, a truly OPD system should, at a minimum, produce a positive score. Imagine, however, that Country A's governing party had won the popular vote by 75% in the last election, reducing the ENPP score to 1.25. While Country A still falls short of a conventional, time-oriented definition OPD, the country's dominance rating rises to .50. This is to say that achieving a positive dominance score is not sufficient to argue that particular case is OPD. It is necessary to implement a score threshold substantially higher than zero. For this paper, countries that receive Dominance Index ratings greater than 1 are classified as dominant party systems. In order to receive a score of 1 or higher, a country will need to have a ruling party that has won, at an absolute minimum, two consecutive elections, regardless of ENPP (which will of course always subtract at least 1.00 from a country's score on the index). Those systems that meet the standard and are governed by a liberation party will be classified as NLM party-dominant. Countries that receive a Dominance Index rating of less than 1 are classified as CMP systems.

### ***C. Defining “National Liberation Movement Party”***

As noted in the review of the literature, researchers of OPD in Southern Africa have collectively identified a variety of OPD in the region that is referred to herein as NLM party-dominance. In order to compare the potential effects of NLM party-dominant systems on popular attitudes with those of other types of party system, the standard by which NLM party-dominant systems are distinguished from other OPD systems must be clear. To start, an NLM party-dominant system must first meet all the requirements necessary to be considered OPD as outlined in the preceding section. From that point, whether or not a country’s party system is NLM party-dominant depends upon the history of both the party and the country it governs.

Although colonial and settler domination of African politics eroded quickly in the wake of World War II, the so-called “winds of change” failed to reach much of the southern part of the continent where Portugal and white minority communities clung to absolute power in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, South-West Africa, and South Africa. In this paper, the term “NLM” refers to the popular, nationalist-oriented social movements that rebelled against these remnant colonial and white minority regimes in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Invariably, these broad-based movements were led by a small number of vanguard organizations. These organizations organized and mobilized their countries’ masses, led armed resistances, and acted as the faces of the movements both domestically and to the international community. In South Africa, the most notable such organization was the ANC, with the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) being a less prominent example. In Zimbabwe, ZANU and ZAPU are the most prominent examples. An NLM party is one that is descendant of a prominent of such an organization. Thus, a country is regarded as NLM party-dominant if it meets the criteria to be classified as a OPD system and the governing party is continuation or descendant of a prominent liberation organization.

#### ***IV. Variables***

##### ***A. Dependent Variables:***

This analysis will compare the levels of three dependent variables: demand for democracy, supply of democracy, support for pluralism. The development and construction of each variable is discussed below with additional details available in fig. 2.5.

##### ***1. Demand for Democracy:***

The first dependent variable in this analysis is demand for democracy. Democratic demand (or democratic legitimacy) measures popular belief that democracy both is the best available form of government. The variable is included here because it is widely thought to be a critically important attitudinal factor for producing stable democracy.<sup>34</sup>

Transforming the idea of demand for democracy into a workable dependent variable is possible using survey data. In this analysis, demand for democracy is measured using an index of the same name that was first developed and employed by Mattes Bratton.<sup>35</sup> The authors argue that a measure of demand for democracy should not only include measures of abstract support for democracy but also support for democracy in relation to possible alternatives to democratic government.<sup>36</sup>

The index is constructed from a battery of four items included in the Afrobarometer survey (see: fig. 2.5). The first of the four items that comprise the demand for democracy index respondents the degree to which they prefer democracy to alternatives in the abstract. The item, which was originally developed and used by the Latinobarometro, provides respondents with three statements about democracy. Each statement represents a different level of support for democratic government ranging from total support for democracy and complete intolerance for any other kind of regime to at one end of the spectrum to total

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<sup>34</sup> Larry Diamond, *Political Culture*

<sup>35</sup> Mattes, R., Bratton, M., "Learning about Democracy in Africa: Awareness, Performance, and Experience," *American Journal of Political Science*, (51:2007), 204.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 193.

indifference regarding regime type at the other. Respondents are then asked which of the three statements is most similar to their own view of democracy. Those who refuse to answer or “don’t know” are excluded from the analysis.

The responses are coded for inclusion into the demand for democracy index by ranking each of the three statements in terms of the relative level of enthusiasm for democracy it indicates. A value of 2 is given to respondents who express complete support for democracy while a value of 1 is given to those respondents who express partial support for democracy (i.e., suggest that non-democratic government is “sometimes preferable”). Those who report believing that regime type simply does not matter to them are given a value of zero for the item.

The second, third, and fourth items used in the demand for democracy index are a series of related items designed to elicit respondents’ attitudes toward democracy in relation to real-world alternative regime-types. Respondents are told to indicate the degree to which they would approve or disapprove of the following regime types along a Likert Scale ranging from strongly approve to strongly disapprove. The first in this series of three items, Afrobarometer item Q29a, asks how approving the respondent would be of a political system in which only one party was permitted to hold office. The second item inquires about approval of the possibility of rule by the military. The third and final alternative regime type asked about in the series asks about approval or disapproval of rule by a single person. The appropriateness of the use of these four items for a single index has been verified by factor and reliability analyses which can be reviewed in full in the appendices.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> See results for these analyses in Appendix 1.

## ***2. Supply of Democracy***

The supply of democracy is designed to measure the extent to which a respondent believes their country is a democracy. It is developed using an Afrobarometer item which asks respondents to rate the level of democracy in their country on a Likert-like scale from “not at all democratic” to “a full democracy.” The five possible responses are coded with a value from 0 to 4, where higher values indicate a more generous evaluation of the country’s level of democracy.

## ***3. Support for Pluralism***

The support for pluralism variable is constructed as an index composed of a series of nine Afrobarometer items which can be viewed in fig. 2.5. The related items all ask respondents about their views of how the political system ought to function, with particular focus on the normative role of various political offices as well as opposition parties and the press. The use of these items as an index is supported by factor and reliability analyses. Additional information about each item as well as the analyses that justify their use as an index can be viewed in Appendix 1.

## ***B. Independent Variables***

### ***1. Party system type***

The most theoretically important independent variable in this study is party system-type. The way by which this variable is constructed was discussed in this chapter’s earlier discussion of key definitions and concepts (section III). Refer to figure 2.4 for additional information regarding the categorization of cases.

### ***2. Winner/Loser***

This analysis also examines the differences in attitudes exhibited by supporters and opponents of the governing party. This variable is constructed using two Afrobarometer items which ask respondents if they are “close to” a political party and, if so, which political

party it is. This variable classifies respondents into one of three categories. Respondents who report being close to the country's governing party are coded into the "winner" category. Respondents who report being close to any other party are coded into the "loser" category. People who refuse to respond to either question or report that they are not close to a political party are coded as being "unaffiliated."

### ***3. Control Variables:***

This analysis incorporates four control variables in an effort to determine if party systems have an effect on the aforementioned dependent variables over and above the effects explained by the factors that are generally considered to shape them.

#### ***i. Democracy (Polity Ratings)***

This analysis uses Polity's country ratings for 2008, the year the attitudinal data was collected, as a control variable. Democracy is included as a control because, in contrast to other research on OPD, this analysis chooses to set a low threshold for democracy as far as case selection is concerned. This decision has the effect of creating more variance among the included cases than typically exists in this kind of research, so to ensure that any differences in mass attitudes that are uncovered are in fact the result of party system, level of democracy will be a control.

Fig. 2.5			
Dependent Variables	Type of Measure	Concept	Item Details
Demand for Democracy	Index	Support for Democracy	Question: Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have. Responses:
		Rejection of Alternatives to Democracy	Questions: There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives: Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office? The army comes in to govern the country? Elections and Parliament/National Assembly are abolished so that the President/Prime Minister can decide everything?
Supply of Democracy	Item	Extent of Democracy	Question: In your opinion how much of a democracy is [your country] today?
Pluralism	Index	Importance of Elections	Question: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2. Statement 1: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections. Statement 2: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this Responses:
		Political Parties: Divisive vs. Needed	Responses: Statement 1: Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in [Ghana/Kenya/etc.]. Statement 2: Many political parties are needed to make sure that [Ghanaians/Kenyans/etc.] have real choices in who governs them.
		President: Monitored by Parliament vs. Free to Act	Responses: Statement 1: Parliament should ensure that the President explains to it on a regular basis how his/her government spends taxpayers' money. Statement 2: The President should be able to devote his/her full attention to developing the country rather than wasting time justifying his actions.
		Opposition Parties: Should Mostly Scrutinize vs. Mostly Cooperate	Responses: Statement 1: Opposition parties should regularly examine and criticize government policies and actions. Statement 2: Opposition parties should concentrate on cooperating with government and helping it develop the country.
		Media: Critical vs. Should Avoid Negative Reporting	Responses: Statement 1: The news media should constantly investigate and report on corruption and the mistakes made by the government. Statement 2: Too much reporting on negative events, like corruption, only harms the country.
		Parliament Makes Laws vs. President Does	Responses: Statement 1: Members of Parliament represent the people; therefore they should make laws for this country, even if the President does not agree. Statement 2: Since the President represents all of us, he/she should pass laws without worrying about what Parliament thinks.
		President: Free to Act vs. Subject to Law, Courts	Responses: Statement 1: Since the President was elected to lead the country, he/she should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong. Statement 2: The President must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he/she thinks they are wrong.
		President: Two-term Limit vs. No Term Limit	Responses: Statement 1: The Constitution should limit the president to serving a maximum of two terms in office. Statement 2: There should be no constitutional limit on how long the president can serve.
		Government Needs Time to Deal with Problems vs. Try New Form of Government	Responses: Statement 1: Our present system of elected government should be given more time to deal with inherited problems. Statement 2: If our present system cannot produce results soon, we should try another form of government.

Fig. 2.5 (continued)			
Independent Variables	Type of Measure	Item Details	
<b>Party System Type</b>			
OPD System	Dummy	Respondent lives in a country with a one-party dominant party system (fig. 2.4)	
NLM-Party Dominant System	Dummy	Respondent lives in a country with an NLM-party dominant party system (fig. 2.4)	
<b>Social Structure</b>			
Gender	Item	Respondent's gender	
Age	Item	Respondent's age	
Rural/Urban	Item	Area in which respondent is interviewed	
Education	Item	Question:	What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Lived Poverty	Index	Questions:	Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: Enough food to eat? Enough clean water for home use? Medicines or medical treatment? Enough fuel to cook your food? A cash income?
<b>Partisanship</b>			
Close to Winning	Item	Questions:	Do you feel close to any particular political party? (If yes) Which party is that?

### ***ii. Lived poverty***

The lived poverty variable is an index designed to account for variation in material conditions. Additional information concerning the construction of this variable is available for review in fig. 2.5.

### ***iii. Education***

The education control variable is a measure of the highest level of education a respondent has completed. This analysis uses an Afrobarometer item described in fig. 2.5.

### ***iv. Urban/Rural***

This analysis controls for urban versus rural residency by including an Afrobarometer item that indicates whether a respondent was interviewed in the polling organization's urban or rural primary sampling unit.

## ***V. Methodology***

This section will offer an overview of the statistical tests and procedures that are used to test this paper's hypotheses. The analysis employs three basic tests. The first two are designed to compare popular attitudes across different kinds of party systems. The second test concerns the distribution of attitudes within party system types, aggregating the data by party association. The third and final test will measure the ability of party system type to predict change in the selected dependent variables even while controlling for other potentially important factors.

### ***A. Comparing Attitudes Across Party System Types***

The analysis will compare the mean levels of demand for democracy, supply of democracy, and support for pluralism across each of the three party system types identified above.

#### ***1. Conducting the Analysis:***

SPSS will be used to conduct a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test and a

measure of effect size ( $\eta$ ). The party system variable will be input as the factor while each of the dependent variables will be entered as dependents.

## ***2. Evaluating the Results:***

Findings that reveal pattern of attitudes across party system types that are both consistent with the hypotheses set out section II or this chapter and statistically significant would support this paper's broader contention that party systems have shaped mass attitudes in Southern Africa.

### ***B. Comparing Attitudes Within Party System Types: Winners versus Losers***

This test compares the distribution of attitudes within each party system type. Specifically, it is designed to determine if there is a statistically significant difference in the level of demand for democracy, supply of democracy, or support for pluralism between supporters of the winning and losing parties' in their country's last election.

#### ***1. Conducting the Analysis:***

As in the preceding test, SPSS will be used to conduct a one-way ANOVA and produce a measure of effect size ( $\eta$ ). This time, however, a separate ANOVA will be performed for each of the three party system types and the winner/loser party affiliation variable will serve as the factor. As before, demand for democracy, supply of democracy, and support for pluralism will be included as dependent variables.

#### ***2. Evaluating the Results:***

The results of this test will be compared with the hypotheses laid out in figure 2.3. If the tests reveals a pattern consistent with those patterns and the differences are shown to be significantly significant, the findings will support the hypothesis. If the relative levels on the dependent variables are not aligned with the paper's expectations or differences in means fall short of statistical significance, the null hypothesis will not have been falsified.

### ***C. Multiple Linear Regressions***

This series of tests is designed to determine if the relationship between party system and the three dependent variables are spurious by controlling for the influence of other potential explanatory factors that could falsify this paper's core hypotheses.

#### ***1. Conducting the Analysis:***

This series of regressions will be conducted using SPSS. In each test, one of the three dependent variables (demand for democracy, supply of democracy, support for pluralism) will be entered as the dependent variable. The two party system dummy variables measuring the effects of OPD and NLM party-dominant systems, respectively, will be entered as independent variables along with the demographic variables which serve as controls.

#### ***2. Evaluating the Results:***

Interpreting the results of the regressions will be straightforward. If the introduction of control variables reduces the explanatory power of party system to below significance, the hypothesis is falsified. If, however, the regressions show the party system variable remains a significant predictor of change in the dependent variable, the analysis supports the argument that party systems do have an independent effect on these attitudes.

### *Chapter 3: Research Findings*

The third chapter of this paper will begin with a brief descriptive overview of the values for the selected variables across the included cases. Next, the results of the statistical analyses concerning the relationship between these variables and party system type will be reviewed.

#### *I. Descriptive Statistics*

Fig. 3.1			
<i>Descriptive Statistics</i>			
	Mean	Std. Error	N
Demand for Democracy	2.75	.01	19931
Supply of Democracy	2.84	.01	20408
Pluralism	2.53	.00	19396
Lived Poverty	1.29	.01	22475
Education	3.35	.03	22818
Level of Democracy (Polity)	5.74	.02	22818

Before delving into comparisons of means and regression analysis it is useful to establish a bit of context by first looking at some of the raw descriptive data. Figure 3.1 lists the mean and standard deviation for seven of the key variables used in this analysis. The mean score for demand for democracy, measured here by an index on which scores range from 0 to 3.5, is nearly 2.75 with the bulk of respondents scoring within .74 points of that score. On supply of democracy, measured here on a scale from 1 to 4, the mean score is 2.84, the equivalent of a respondent reporting her or his country is a “flawed” democracy. The score seems to suggest that many Africans are very sober in their assessments of the quality of democracy in their countries. The mean score on the support for pluralism index used in this paper (which runs from 0 to 4) is 2.53. The table lists mean scores on three independent

variables. On the lived poverty index, the mean score was 1.29 out of a possible 4, while the mean score on level of education was 3.35, where a score of 3 indicates completion of primary education. Regarding education, however, responses were widely dispersed with a standard deviation 4.16. The level of democracy variable, which is a country's Polity score for 2008, had a mean of 5.74 on a scale of -10 to 10. As in the case of the education variable, there was significant dispersion as the standard deviation was 3.2.

Figure 3.2 offers an overview of the bivariate relationships between each of the seven variables discussed above as well as the two dummy party system variables. While there are lots of statistically significant bivariate correlations between the variables, the data reveals there are no problems due to multicollinearity.

Fig. 3.2				
<i>Correlations Between Key Variables</i>				
		Demand for Democracy	Supply of Democracy	Pluralism
Lived Poverty	Pearson Correlation	-.049**	-.098**	-0.007
	N	19667	20127	19138
Education	Pearson Correlation	.061**	-.057**	.034**
	N	19931	20408	19396
Urban or Rural	Pearson Correlation	-.066**	.039**	-.054**
	N	19931	20408	19396
Level of Democracy	Pearson Correlation	-0.012	.143**	-.111**
	N	19931	20408	19396
Dummy: OPD System	Pearson Correlation	.048**	-.031**	-.062**
	N	19931	20408	19396
Dummy: NLM-Party	Pearson Correlation	-.154**	-.046**	-.161**
	N	19931	20408	19396
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).				
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).				

## II. Comparing Levels of Key Attitudes

### A. Across Party-System Types

#### 1. Demand for Democracy

Fig. 3.3			
<i>Means Comparison Report - Demand for Democracy</i>			
Party System Type	Mean	N	Std. Error of the Mean
CMP Systems	2.8281	8241	.01
OPD Systems	2.7978	6511	.01
NLM Party-Dominant Systems	2.5557	5179	.01
Total	2.7474	18857	.01
<i>Eta: .155</i>			

Before conducting this test, I hypothesized that the mean level demand for democracy would be highest in competitive democracies, lower in countries with OPD party systems, and lowest in countries with party systems that are dominated by liberation parties.

This analysis reveals that, indeed, demand for democracy is highest in competitive party systems at a raw mean score of 2.83 on the scale used here. Following closely behind CMP systems are countries with OPD systems where the mean level of demand for democracy score is just under 2.8 out of a possible 3.5. There is a much larger gap between the mean level of demand for democracy in OPD systems and demand in NLM party-dominant systems, where the average score on the index is nearly 10% lower than in competitive systems. Further, scores varied more widely in NLM party-dominant systems than in either CMP or OPD systems, with a standard deviation nearly 20% greater than among scores for CMP systems and more than 11% greater than OPD systems. Figure 3.4

shows that these differences of means between groups are indeed statistically significant at the  $p < .001$  level. The size of the effect as measured by eta is .155 (fig. 3.3).

Fig. 3.4						
<i>Multiple Comparisons</i>						
Dependent Variable: Demand for Democracy						
Tukey HSD						
(I) Party System Type	(J) Party System Type	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Lower Bound	Upper Bound
CMP Systems	OPD Systems	.03*	.01	.03	.00	.06
	NLM Party-Dominant Systems	.27*	.01	.00	.24	.30
OPD Systems	CMP Systems	-.03*	.01	.03	-.06	.00
	NLM Party-Dominant Systems	.24*	.01	.00	.21	.27
NLM Party-Dominant Systems	CMP Systems	-.27*	.01	.00	-.30	-.24
	OPD Systems	-.24*	.01	.00	-.27	-.21

\* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

## 2. Supply of Democracy

Fig. 3.5			
<i>Means Comparison: Report - Supply of Democracy</i>			
Party System Type	Mean	N	Std. Error of Mean
CMP Systems	2.93	8252	.01
OPD Systems	2.8	6633	.01
NLM Party-Dominant Systems	2.77	5523	.01
Total	2.84	20408	.01
<i>Eta: .072</i>			

In chapter two I predicted that, in each of the three party system types, I would find roughly equivalent assessments of the level of democracy. In competitive systems, I expected that closer elections and periodic transfers of power would result in high evaluations of the supply of democracy. Conversely, in both OPD and NLM party-dominant systems I suspected that the widespread appeal of the governing party would generate generous assessments of a country's level of democracy.

Respondents across each of the three types of party systems appear to have moderated views on the quality of their country's democracy as mean levels on the supply of democracy variable fail to surpass a score of 3 (indicating a "flawed" democracy on a 1-4 scale) in any of the party system types. Still, as was the case for mean levels of demand for democracy, those people residing in CMP systems offered higher evaluations of the supply of democracy than respondents living in either OPD or NLM party-dominant party systems. The party system with the next-highest mean score on the variable is OPD, where the average score is .16 points lower on the scale being used. Respondents in NLM party-dominant systems were offered the least favorable evaluations of the extent of democracy in their countries, although the gap between scores in those systems and the mean score in OPD systems was less than

one-fifth the size of the gap between OPD and competitive systems. These differences in means are statistically significant at the  $p < .001$  level. However, the effect size is small with an eta value of .072.

Fig. 3.6						
<i>Multiple Comparisons</i>						
Dependent Variable: Supply of Democracy						
Tukey HSD						
(I) Party System Type	(J) Party System Type	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound      Upper Bound	
CMP Systems	OPD Systems	.12*	.02	.000	.09	.16
	NLM Party-Dominant Systems	.15*	.02	.000	.11	.19
OPD Systems	CMP Systems	-.12*	.02	.000	-.16	-.09
	NLM Party-Dominant Systems	.03	.02	.213	-.01	.07
NLM Party-Dominant Systems	CMP Systems	-.15*	.02	.000	-.19	-.11
	OPD Systems	-0.03	.02	.213	-.07	.01

\* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

### 3. Support for Pluralism

In this paper's second chapter I hypothesized that respondents living in countries with CMP systems would express the highest level of support for pluralism. In addition, I expected people in NLM party-dominant systems to offer the lowest level of support for pluralism, thinking that members of societies led by liberation parties may, through some kind of unknown socialization process, possess the same beliefs and understanding of national history that scholars like Southall argue characterize the ideology of the liberation

parties themselves.<sup>38</sup> Finally, I expected this test to show that OPD systems lie in between these two extremes.

Fig. 3.7			
<i>Means Comparison: Report - Pluralism</i>			
Party System Type	Mean	N	Std. Error of the Mean
CMP Systems	2.6853	8238	.01
OPD Systems	2.4737	6208	.01
NLM Party-Dominant Systems	2.3527	4950	.01
Total	2.5327	19396	.00
<i>Eta: .212</i>			

The mean score on the support for pluralism index was highest in CMP systems at just under 2.69, approximately the midpoint on the 0 to 4 scale developed for use in this paper. Respondents living in OPD systems exhibited the second highest mean level of support for pluralism while respondents in NLM party-dominant systems produced the lowest mean score for support for pluralism at approximately 2.35, just above the midpoint on the scale. As in the instances of the two preceding means comparisons, these differences between groups proved to be statistically significant at the  $p < .001$  level. The eta of .212 shows a considerable effect size.

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<sup>38</sup> Southall, 343.

Fig. 3.8						
<i>Multiple Comparisons</i>						
Dependent Variable: Pluralism						
Tukey HSD						
(I) Party System Type	(J) Party System Type	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Lower Bound	Upper Bound
CMP Systems	OPD Systems	.21*	.01	.000	.19	.24
	NLM Party-Dominant Systems	.33*	.01	.000	.31	.36
OPD Systems	CMP Systems	-.21*	.01	.000	-.24	-.19
	NLM Party-Dominant Systems	.12*	.01	.000	.09	.15
NLM Party-Dominant Systems	CMP Systems	-.33*	.01	.000	-.36	-.31
	OPD Systems	-.12*	.01	.000	-.15	-.09

\* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

## ***B. Within Types of Party Systems: Winners versus Losers***

### **1. Demand for Democracy**

I hypothesized that, in NLM party-dominant party systems, individuals affiliated with governing parties would express lower levels of demand for democracy than would those people who support losing parties. Further, I suspected that partisanship would not have a strong effect on the variable in countries with either CMP or OPD party systems.

This analysis shows that, in all three party system types concerned here, partisanship and demand for democracy are indeed related at a statistically significant level. In CMP systems, respondents who reported any partisan affiliation whatsoever expressed higher levels of demand for democracy than did their unaffiliated peers. Those respondents who reported an affiliation with the governing party in particular exhibited the highest demand for democracy. The effect of partisanship in CMP systems is small with an eta of .046.

Fig. 3.9						
<i>Means Comparisons: Demand for Democracy (Partisanship)</i>						
Party System		Mean*	N	Std. Error of the Mean	Sig.	Eta
CMP	Winners	.07	2831	.01	.000	.046
	Losers	.03	1723	.02		
OPD	Winners	.02	2477	.01	.000	.087
	Losers	.16	1437	.02		
NLM-Party Dominant	Winners	-.09	2298	.02	.001	.052
	Losers	-.04	616	.03		

\*Score relative to that of respondents who do not report a partisan affiliation

Likewise, those respondents living in countries with OPD systems who reported a partisan affiliation of any kind did, on average, express greater support for democracy than those respondents who reported no affiliation. However, unlike in CMP systems, those people close to the losing party reported the highest mean level of demand for democracy. As was before, the effect of partisanship was small with an eta of .087.

Something different is taking place in NLM party-dominant systems. There, partisanship of any kind was associated with slightly lower levels of demand for democracy. Furthermore, it was those respondents who claim to be strong supporters of the dominant governing party that expressed the lowest mean level of demand for democracy. Still, as was true of the two other types of party systems, the effect size proved small at an eta of .052.

## 2. Supply of Democracy

As laid out in chapter two, I expected to find that partisanship would prove related to how individuals living in OPD and NLM party-dominant systems evaluated the supply of democracy in their country. I anticipated that, in both system types, winners would be more generous in their assessments and that losers would describe their system as less democratic.

Fig. 3.10						
<i>Means Comparisons: Supply of Democracy (Partisanship)</i>						
Party System		Mean*	N	Std. Error of the Mean	Sig.	Eta
CMP	Winners	.11	2836	.02	.000	.075
	Losers	.06	1755	.02		
OPD	Winners	.65	2506	.02	.000	.309
	Losers	.15	1481	.02		
NLM-Party Dominant	Winners	.24	22491	.02	.000	.116
	Losers	.12	648	.04		

\*Mean score relative to unaffiliated respondents

In all the three types of party systems partisanship of all kinds was shown to be related to higher evaluations of the supply of democracy in one's country. Additionally, respondents in all three party system types that claimed an affiliation with winning parties expressed higher evaluations of the supply of democracy than did the respondents reporting either a closeness with losing parties or no partisan affiliation whatsoever.

In CMP and NLM party-dominant systems, the relationship was weak with eta values at .075 and .116 respectively. The effect of partisanship on evaluations of the supply of democracy was much more pronounced in OPD systems where the effect size as measured by eta was .309.

### 3. Support for Pluralism

Fig. 3.11						
<i>Means Comparisons: Pluralism (Partisanship)</i>						
Party System		Mean*	N	Std. Error of the Mean	Sig.	Eta
CMP	Winners	.03	2820	.01	.000	.055
	Losers	.09	1723	.01		
OPD	Winners	.08	2376	.01	.000	.076
	Losers	.12	1383	.02		
NLM-Party Dominant	Winners	.00	2199	.01	.806	.010
	Losers	.02	570	.03		

\*Mean score relative to unaffiliated respondents

I hypothesized that levels of support for pluralism would be close to even across parties in CMP and OPD systems but widely disparate in NLM party-dominant systems. Specifically, I expected to find that supporters of losing parties in NLM party-dominant systems would exhibit higher level of support relative to the supporters of the dominant liberation party.

The results show that, in both CMP and OPD systems, partisan affiliation appears to be related to levels of support for pluralism with respondents affiliated with any party reporting higher levels than their non-affiliated peers. In both cases those respondents affiliated with losing parties scored highest on the support for pluralism index, but the effect sizes were very small at an eta of .055 in CMP systems and .076 in OPD systems. In contrast, the analysis revealed no statistically significant relationship between partisanship of any kind and support for pluralism in NLM party-dominant systems.

### III. Multiple Linear Regression

The next series of tests aims to determine if the relationships between party systems and key attitudinal variables revealed in the preceding means comparisons hold up while accounting for other potential explanatory factors. Figure 3.12 shows the order and way by which the variables were entered in each regression analysis. The first test looks at demand for democracy as the dependent variable while the second and third examine supply of democracy and pluralism, respectively.

#### 1. Demand for Democracy

Fig. 3.12				
<i>Model Summary (Demand for Democracy)</i>				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.202 <sup>d</sup>	.041	.040	.72
a. Predictors: (Constant), Urban or Rural, Lived Poverty, Education, Level of Democracy (Polity),				

The first regression model concerns demand for democracy and the overall model manages to account for 4% of the variation in the variable, attaining significance at the  $p < .001$  level (fig. 3.12). The coefficients table (fig. 3.13) shows that, even with the inclusion of all the control variables, each party system dummy variable remains a statistically significant predictor of levels of demand for democracy. The NLM party-dominant system dummy variable produces, in absolute terms, the largest beta value at  $-.200$ . In contrast, the OPD system dummy is shown to have a weaker relationship with the dependent variable with a beta of  $-.052$ .

Fig. 3.13						
<i>Coefficients (Demand for Democracy)</i>						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	3.11	.03		120.13	.000
	Lived Poverty	-.04	.01	-.05	-6.95	.000
	Education	.01	.00	.07	9.49	.000
	Urban or Rural	-.11	.01	-.07	-9.86	.000
	Level of Democracy	-.01	.00	-.06	-7.91	.000
	Dummy: OPD System	-.08	.01	-.05	-6.41	.000
	Dummy: NLM-Party Dominant	-.34	.01	-.20	-24.81	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Demand for Democracy

## 2. Supply of Democracy

Fig. 3.14				
<i>Model Summary</i>				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.185 <sup>d</sup>	.034	.034	.923

a. Predictors: (Constant), Urban or Rural, Lived Poverty, Education, Level of Democracy (Polity),

The second regression model suggests that party system type offers little value in terms of predicting change in popular assessments of the supply of democracy in a given country. Figure 3.26 shows that, even with demographic variables, the overall model manages to explain only 3% of the variance in evaluations of the supply of democracy. A subsequent block-wise regression analysis in which the two party system dummy variables are entered independently and after all other controls revealed that they combine to contribute almost nothing to the overall strength of the model.

The coefficients table (figure 3.15) shows that the OPD system dummy variable is the only one included in the model that fails to achieve significance. Additionally, the variables with the largest beta values are preexisting level of democracy and lived poverty at .123 and -.096, respectively. On the other hand, while the NLM party-dominant system dummy variable is a statistically significant predictor of change in respondents' evaluations of the supply of democracy in their country, its beta value is the smallest among the significant variables at -.033.

Fig. 3.15						
<i>Coefficients<sup>a</sup></i>						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.67	.033		82.14	.000
	Lived Poverty	-.10	.007	-.096	-13.38	.000
	Education	-.01	.002	-.056	-7.84	.000
	Urban or Rural	.10	.014	.053	7.35	.000
	Level of Democracy	.04	.002	.123	16.49	.000
	Dummy: OPD System	-.02	.016	-.011	-1.34	.181
	Dummy: NLM-Party Dominant	-.07	.017	-.033	-4.09	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Supply of Democracy

### 3. Support for Pluralism

Fig. 3.16				
<i>Model Summary</i>				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.307 <sup>d</sup>	.094	.094	.62
a. Predictors: (Constant), Urban or Rural, Lived Poverty, Education, Level of Democracy (Polity),				

This regression model proved considerably more effective at explaining change in levels of support for pluralism than either of the two preceding dependent variables, managing to account for more than 9% of variation in levels of support for pluralism. Furthermore, where the party system dummy variables contributed less than .03 to the R square values in the regression analyses concerning demand for and supply of democracy, a follow-up block-wise regression for this model showed that the dummies combined to account for nearly 8% of the 9.4% of variance explained by this model. The NLM party-dominant system dummy alone nearly quadrupled the explanatory power of the model when it was introduced in the final block.

Table 3.17 further illustrates the importance of the NLM party-dominant system dummy variable. At -.303, its beta value is the largest of any variable included in the model. The OPD system variable produced the second largest beta value at -.235, followed closely by the level of formal democracy variable. The three demographic controls included in the model produced the smallest beta values. The only variable with a positive beta was level of education.

Fig. 3.17						
<i>Coefficients<sup>a</sup></i>						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	3.19	.022		141.78	.000
	Lived Poverty	-.03	.005	-.041	-5.75	.000
	Education	.01	.001	.054	7.59	.000
	Urban or Rural	-.12	.009	-.086	-12.08	.000
	Level of Democracy (Polity)	-.04	.001	-.216	-29.02	.000
	Dummy: OPD System	-.33	.011	-.235	-29.45	.000
	Dummy: NLM-Party Dominant System	-.46	.012	-.303	-38.15	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Pluralism

## ***Chapter 4: Discussion***

This paper is an attempt to provide preliminary answers to two questions. The first question asks what effects Southern Africa's dominant party systems may have on popular attitudes across the region. Secondly, do OPD systems in which the dominant party is a descendent of a national liberation movement have their own distinguishable effects on mass attitudes? The second chapter laid out some expectations rooted in existing scholarship on the subject, highlighted by several core hypotheses, and the third provided the results of various statistical analyses designed to produce some clarity. The fourth and final chapter of this dissertation seeks to tie it all together and will consider the implications this paper's results have with regard to these questions and evaluate those hypotheses. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the broader significance these findings may have for future investigations of dominant party systems and their relationships with mass attitudes.

### ***I. Prolonged Dominance by Single Parties Impacts Popular Attitudes***

The data offers compelling evidence in support of the claim that dominant party systems are related to popular attitudes. However, the results from the third chapter also suggest that the relationship is just one part of a much broader network of factors that produce the attitudinal landscapes of Southern Africa's societies. In short, the answer to the first research question behind this dissertation is a qualified "yes." For two of the three attitudinal variables highlighted in this research, both the means comparisons and the linear regression models provide strong and clear evidence that political attitudes are shaped in part by the kind of party system in which a respondent lives.

Figures 3.3 and 3.6 concisely illustrate the effect party systems have on demand for democracy. The differences across party system types, while small in absolute terms, are all statistically significant. As can be seen in figure 3.5, the effect size ( $\eta^2$ ) of the party system

variable is .024, meaning approximately 2.4% of variation in level of demand for democracy is explained by the kind of party system in which one resides.

The importance of party system type in the bigger picture of explaining variance in demand for democracy party system type was further supported by the results of the linear regression analysis conducted in this paper. The test showed that demographic variables and the pre-existing level of formal democracy combined to account for less than 1% of variance while the party system dummies more than quadrupled the model's R-squared from .009 to .040 (figure 3.27). The fact that the bulk of that increase was derived from the inclusion of the dummy variable for NLM party-dominant systems in the fourth block of the model will be discussed further in the following section.

Dominant party systems were shown to have a more pronounced impact on a country's level of support for pluralism. The results of means comparisons in figures 3.11 and 3.14 show that support for pluralism is substantially lower in those countries dominated by single parties than in societies with competitive party systems and the effect size of party system type on support for pluralism was nearly twice that for demand for democracy (fig. 3.13). The results of the regression analysis corroborate that result as figures 3.31 and 3.32 show the model's overall R-squared jump to .094 with the inclusion of the two party system dummies, an increase of .077 over the model when it consisted of only demographic controls and pre-existing level of democracy. Collectively, these analyses support the contention that there is in fact a disparity in support for pluralism across party system types and that the existence of these disparities is partly attributable to the party systems and not simply some sort of underlying demographic factor.

The evidence regarding the potential effects of dominance on popular evaluations of the extent of democracy was by far the least compelling among the three attitudinal variables studied here. The cross-system means comparisons revealed statistically significant disparity in

the mean evaluation of the supply of democracy between CMP systems and both OPD and NLM party-dominant systems (fig. 3.10) but no such difference between the two varieties of dominant-party systems. Further, the effect size of party system type came to be .005, much lower than for either demand for democracy or support for pluralism. The regression analysis for supply of democracy underscores the irrelevance of party system type for evaluations of the supply of democracy. Figure 3.29 shows that both party system type dummy variables combine to contribute a mere .001 increase to the model's overall R-squared. However, the fact that this analysis includes so many respondents means that even a difference as miniscule as .001 registers as statistically significant.

These results are largely consistent with the hypotheses laid out in chapter two. Both demand for democracy and support for pluralism did in fact prove to be highest in CMP systems and lowest in NLM party-dominant systems. The story is a little more complex with regard to interpreting the results for supply of democracy. On the one hand, there are statistically significant disparities in the aggregate means across the party system types. However, the regression analysis seems to clearly indicate that the inclusion of basic control variables eliminates the bulk of the difference.

Fig. 4.1  
*Hypotheses Revisited: Relative Aggregate Levels on Selected Variables*

	<i>Competitive Multi-Party</i>		<i>One-Party Dominant</i>		<i>NLM-Party Dominant</i>	
	Expectation	Actual Value	Expectation	Actual Value	Expectation	Actual Value
<i>Demand for Democracy*</i>	Highest	2.83	Middle	2.80	Lowest	2.56
<i>Supply of Democracy</i>	High	2.93	High	2.80	High	2.77
<i>Pluralism*</i>	Highest	2.69	Middle	2.47	Lowest	2.35

\* - Indicates that scores for this variable are consistent with expectations

## *II. The Nature of Dominance Matters*

The results of the means comparison tests reviewed in the third chapter also suggest that the nature of a party's dominance does in fact have a unique and discernable effect on popular attitudes in a given country. Put differently, the results of this study lend support to the argument that the theoretical distinction between OPD and dominance by parties descended from NLMs appears to have implications for popular attitudes.

The differing impacts of OPD and NLM-party dominance are visible in the aggregate levels of demand for democracy. In terms of the raw scale used in the demand for democracy index, the gap between the mean in OPD systems and NLM party-dominant systems is approximately eight times larger than the gap between OPD and CMP systems (fig 3.3). In the regression model, adding the OPD system dummy variable in the third block of independent variables increased the R-squared of the overall model by .002. In contrast, including the NLM-party dummy in the fourth and final block raised the R-squared by .030 (fig. 3.27). These pieces of data support the argument that dominance alone and dominance by NLM parties have distinct effects on popular demand for democracy.

The pattern is similar with regard to aggregate levels of support for pluralism. As before, there is a statistically significant difference in means between OPD and NLM party-dominant systems (fig. 3.14) with the latter producing the lower mean level on the variable. The regression analysis also helps clarify the different impacts of these two kinds of dominant party systems. The third block of independent variables, which consists only of the OPD dummy, contributed .008 to the R-squared of the overall model. The subsequent addition of the NLM party-dominant system dummy added an additional .069 beyond what was supplied from demographics, democracy, and the OPD dummy.

Supply of democracy was an exception. These statistical tests failed to detect any substantial impact of party system type (dominant or competitive) on popular evaluations of

the supply of democracy. This result is basically consistent with what was hypothesized in chapter two.

### ***III. One's Relationship to the Dominant Party Matters***

This analysis gives reason to believe that attitudes in OPD systems may be affected by an individual's position in relation to the party in power. In other words, the extent to which a person demands democracy, exhibits support for pluralism, and evaluates the quality of democracy in her or his country is, in part, a product of their relationship with the dominant party. However, the exact nature of this relationship remains unclear and additional research is needed in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of the role partisanship plays in shaping mass attitudes in dominant party systems.

The data reveals attitudinal disparities between those associated with winning and losing parties exists across all three party system types examined here, competitive systems included. However, the pattern in which these disparities emerged and their varying sizes are inconsistent with the hypotheses articulated in figure 2.2.

First consider the results concerning mean levels of demand for democracy. To begin, the effect size as measured in terms of eta failed to surpass .09 in any party system type, meaning that partisanship is failing to account for even 1% of the variation in respondents' level of demand for democracy in the context of any of the systems. To the extent that party systems do have an effect, the results bear out the expectation that losers in NLM party-dominant systems would have the highest level of demand for democracy. However, in violation of this paper's initial expectations, losers expressing higher demand for democracy wasn't unique to NLM party-dominant systems. Indeed the effect size of partisanship was larger in the context of OPD systems where the hypothesis anticipated roughly equivalent evaluations. This being acknowledged, these differences are miniscule and contribute little to any explanation of attitude formation.

Fig. 4.2  
*Hypotheses Revisited: Relative Aggregate Levels on Selected Variables Between Supporters and Non-Supporters of Winning Parties Within Party-System Types (Relative to non-affiliated respondents)*

	<i>Competitive Multi-Party:</i>		<i>One-Party Dominant:</i>		<i>NLM-Party Dominant:</i>	
	<i>Winners</i>	<i>Losers</i>	<i>Winners</i>	<i>Losers</i>	<i>Winners</i>	<i>Losers</i>
<i>Demand for Democracy</i>	Even	Even	Even	Even	Lower	Higher
<i>Supply of Democracy</i>	Even	Even	Higher	Lower	Higher	Lower
<i>Pluralism</i>	Even	Even	Even	Even	Lower	Higher
<i>Actual Outcomes</i>						
	<i>Competitive Multi-Party:</i>		<i>One-Party Dominant:</i>		<i>NLM-Party Dominant:</i>	
	<i>Winners</i>	<i>Losers</i>	<i>Winners</i>	<i>Losers</i>	<i>Winners</i>	<i>Losers</i>
<i>Demand for Democracy</i>	.07	.03	.02	.16	-.09	-.04
<i>Supply of Democracy</i>	.11	.06	.65	.15	.24	.12
<i>Pluralism</i>	.03	.09	.08	.12	-.00*	.02*

\*- Indicates that mean difference was not significant

The findings with regard to evaluations of the supply of democracy were somewhat clearer and more in-line with my hypotheses. The data revealed the pattern of disparities that had been anticipated in chapter two in both OPD and NLM party-dominant systems with respondents close to winning parties expressing the most favorable view of their country's democracy. As expected, the gap between winners and losers was narrowest in competitive systems. The effect sizes were also much larger than they were for demand for democracy reaching an eta at .309 in OPD systems and .116 in NLM party-dominant systems (fig. 3.10).

Perhaps the most surprising results were for support for pluralism, where the paper's hypotheses were shown to be completely misguided. In CMP and OPD systems the expectation was that there would be no meaningful difference in levels of support for pluralism between supporters and opponents of the governing party. As it turned out, the data showed statistically significant differences in means in both those systems and no such

difference in NLM party-dominant systems, where I hypothesized such a difference would be most stark.

#### ***IV. Possible Implications for Future Research***

The fact that the body of literature on the discrete effects of different kinds of dominant party systems on political attitudes in Southern Africa is still emerging has been noted throughout this paper. This work offers reason to believe that the relationship merits further attention and provides two primary pieces of direction for future inquiries.

Firstly, this analysis does not show a clear or theoretically obvious pattern in the differences in attitudes expressed by respondents affiliated with winning and losing parties in dominant systems that is distinct from the patterns that are found within competitive systems. This finding suggests that dominant party systems are not shaping attitudes by somehow transforming or distorting the institutional landscape. Put differently, the experience or prospect of long-time access to or absence from political power does not appear to be a primary driver of attitudinal disparities in the collection of countries studied here. Consequently, it seems unlikely that a rational choice-centric explanation that emphasizes the way long-term power imbalances shape incentives is perhaps not the most promising direction to go from here. Instead it might be worth investigating the potential for parties to be socializing voters and instilling in their supporters certain attitudes.

The second key takeaway is that the results of these statistical tests seem to indicate that, of the three party systems types studied here, it is the effect of NLM-party dominance that has the most powerful effect of the three party systems on popular attitudes. In the cases of both demand for democracy and support for pluralism, the NLM dummy variable quadrupled the power of the models. Future research might consider focusing on this more potent connection.

## Appendix 1: Validity and Reliability of Dependent Variables

### A. Demand for Democracy

<i>Demand for Democracy</i>																		
	Pooled	Benin	Botswana	Ghana	Kenya	Lesotho	Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Mozambique	Namibia	Nigeria	Senegal	South Africa	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe
Q29a: Reject One-Party Rule	.563	.490	.577	.496	.552	.504	.398	.678	.602	.637	.666	.679	.580	.762	.692	.411	.483	.594
Q29b: Reject Military Rule	.606	.530	.684	.394	.681	.620	.559	.335	.471	.656	.649	.823	.587	.485	.737	.683	.592	.579
Q29c: Reject One-Man Rule	.745	.834	.692	.691	.705	.540	.732	.685	.633	.740	.692	.743	.804	.742	.798	.718	.724	.706
Q30: Support for Democracy	.235	.139	.129	.235	.123	.151	.195	.173	.259	.399	.122	.216	.256	.126	.185	.134	.303	.235
Eigenvalue	1.889	1.781	1.870	1.626	1.854	1.649	1.679	1.676	1.732	1.552	1.358	1.737	1.393	1.383	1.693	1.168	1.199	1.242
Variance Explained (%)	32.376	30.858	32.397	23.333	32.011	23.842	26.124	26.784	26.295	38.797	33.955	43.419	34.831	34.571	42.316	29.209	29.973	31.060
Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha)	.620	.571	.590	.500	.580	.517	.523	.505	.556	.698	.627	.716	.642	.584	.707	.519	.578	.606
N=	19931	1116	1146	1085	1002	1044	1110	800	1094	1156	888	1101	2168	878	2131	1074	1079	1059
* - The validity of the Demand for Democracy Index is tested by employing factor analysis using Maximum-Likelihood extraction and Direct Oblimin rotation while reliability is tested using Cronbach's Alpha.																		

## B. Pluralism

<i>Pluralism</i>																		
	Pooled	Benin	Botswana	Ghana	Kenya	Lesotho	Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Mozambique	Namibia	Nigeria	Senegal	South Africa	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe
Q31: Choose Leaders through Elections	.493	.384	.117	.205	.169	.254	.038	1.000	1.032	.556	.353	-.035	.235	-.008	.450	.024	.190	.099
Q32: Political Parties: Divisive vs Needed	.210	.011	-.044	.033	.047	-.060	-.040	-.047	.020	.090	.124	-.069	-.039	.058	.078	.036	-.105	-.018
Q33: President: Monitored by Parliament vs Free to Act	.377	.448	.068	.058	.741	.335	.281	.086	.093	.530	.393	1.003	.268	.215	.255	-.031	.025	.009
Q34: Opposition Parties: Scrutinize vs Cooperate	.207	.245	-.017	.039	.740	.223	.107	-.002	-.033	.260	.294	.084	.212	.808	.009	-.071	-.019	-.100
Q35: Media: Critical vs Avoids Negative Reporting	.437	.626	-.028	.059	.282	.380	.420	-.003	.035	.547	.402	.037	.481	.281	.013	.031	.010	-.011
Q36: Parliament Makes Laws vs President Does	.467	.623	.096	-.107	.214	.588	.536	.100	.021	.644	.440	.041	.481	.154	.155	.102	-.019	.014
Q37: President: Free to Act vs Subject to Law, Courts	.136	.156	.010	.008	.011	.059	.184	.078	-.019	.089	.053	.056	.083	-.069	-.120	1.001	.016	-.031
Q38: President: Two-term Limit vs No Term Limit	.427	.254	.086	.089	.189	.455	.216	-.064	.021	.375	.362	-.028	.298	.016	.357	.026	-.030	.075
Q39: Government Needs Time to Deal with Problems vs Try New Form of Government	.229	.236	.999	.999	.046	.008	.055	.055	.195	.063	.038	.028	.006	-.068	.445	-.037	.996	1.005
Eigenvalue	1.134	1.135	1.059	1.080	1.291	.984	.783	1.025	1.173	1.521	.887	1.014	.982	1.152	.890	1.076	1.041	1.034
Variance Explained (%)	12.597	14.817	11.523	11.888	20.790	19.693	19.191	17.829	20.493	24.454	19.110	16.866	21.331	25.493	20.938	20.937	18.955	24.773
Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha)	.645	.571	.590	.500	.580	.517	.523	.505	.556	.698	.627	.716	.642	.584	.707	.519	.578	.606
N=	11690	1116	1146	1085	1002	1044	1110	800	1094	1156	888	1101	2168	878	2131	1074	1079	1059

\* - The validity of the Pluralism Index is tested by employing factor analysis using Maximum-Likelihood extraction and Direct Oblimin rotation while reliability is tested using Cronbach's Alpha.

## Appendix 2: Validity and Reliability of Independent Variable

### A. Lived Poverty

<i>Lived Poverty</i>																		
	Pooled	Benin	Botswana	Ghana	Kenya	Lesotho	Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi	Mali	Mozambique	Namibia	Nigeria	Senegal	South Africa	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe
Q8a: How Often Without Food	.682	.606	.647	.653	.650	.582	.499	.727	.490	.587	.687	.792	.718	.730	.740	.545	.715	.496
Q8b: How Often Without Water	.593	.554	.550	.695	.629	.455	.721	.454	.642	.519	.593	.707	.772	.573	.627	.594	.438	.619
Q8c: How Often Without Medical Care	.735	.835	.612	.732	.795	.484	.690	.718	.744	.687	.660	.740	.767	.825	.700	.700	.645	.563
Q8d: How Often Without Cooking Fuel	.592	.417	.708	.727	.557	.516	.558	.463	.573	.509	.630	.665	.795	.581	.822	.610	.316	.531
Q8d: How Often Without Cash Income	.615	.646	.718	.612	.591	.568	.266	.741	.305	.486	.478	.607	.753	.663	.666	.593	.667	.476
Eigenvalue	2.086	1.961	2.113	2.349	2.110	1.369	1.504	2.014	1.627	1.581	1.886	2.485	2.900	2.320	2.549	1.863	1.651	1.453
Variance Explained (%)	53.168	50.351	53.654	57.467	53.285	41.773	32.543	40.282	32.549	31.611	37.723	49.691	58.000	46.394	50.975	37.253	33.028	29.067
Reliability (Cronbach's)	.777	.745	.781	.808	.778	.648	.643	.757	.685	.692	.737	.825	.873	.804	.833	.743	.690	.621
N=	22475	1190	1181	1174	1097	1184	1175	1335	1177	1218	1172	1194	2266	1176	2378	1192	1185	1181
* - The validity of the Lived Poverty Index is tested by employing factor analysis using Maximum-Likelihood extraction and Direct Oblimin rotation while reliability is tested using Cronbach's Alpha.																		

### Appendix 3: Variables in the Analyses

#### A. Dependent Variables

Dependent Variables	Type of Measure	Description or Afrobarometer Item Number	Construct Loading
Demand for Democracy	Index	Afrobarometer items:	
		Support for democracy (Q30)	.563
		Reject one-party rule (Q29A)	.606
		Reject military rule (Q29B)	.745
		Reject one-man rule (Q29C)	.235
Supply of Democracy	Item	Afrobarometer Item Q42	
Pluralism	Index	Afrobarometer items:	
		Choose Leaders through Elections (Q31)	.493
		Political Parties: Divisive vs Needed (Q32)	.210
		President: Monitored by Parliament vs Free to Act (Q33)	.377
		Opposition Parties: Scrutinize vs Cooperate (Q34)	.207
		Media: Critical vs Avoids Negative Reporting (Q35)	.437
		Parliament Makes Laws vs President Does (Q36)	.467
		President: Free to Act vs Subject to Law, Courts (Q37)	.136
		President: Two-term Limit vs No Term Limit (Q38)	.427
		Government Needs Time to Deal with Problems vs Try New Form of Government (Q39)	.229

## B. Independent Variables

Independent Variables	Type of Measure	Description or Afrobarometer Item Number	Construct Loading
<i><b>Party System Type</b></i>			
OPD System	Dummy	Respondent lives in a country with a one-party dominant party system	
NLM-Party Dominant System	Dummy	Respondent lives in a country with an NLM-party dominant party system	
<i><b>Social Structure</b></i>			
Gender	Item	Respondent's gender	
Age	Item	Respondent's age	
Rural/Urban	Item	Area in which respondent is interviewed	
Education	Item	Level of education attained by respondent (Q89)	
Lived Poverty	Index	Frequency with which one is forced to do without material goods	
		Single factor explaining 53.168% of the variance	
		Access to food (Q8A)	.682
		Access to water (Q8B)	.593
		Access to medicine (Q8C)	.735
		Access to cooking fuel (Q8D)	.592
		Access to cash income (Q8E)	.615
<i><b>Partisanship</b></i>			
Close to Winning Party or Losing Party?	Item	Constructed using Afrobarometer items Q85 and Q86. Respondents coded as affiliated with winning party, losing party, or nonpartisan	

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