# Politics of Pride:

# Why do people participate in civil society in South Africa?

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COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

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# Abstract

Civil society in South Africa is generally celebrated as a space for action to promote social justice, either through organisations that play the role of "watchdog", or through mobilisation by the poor themselves around their own concerns. However, civil society can reflect and reproduce many of the pathologies and injustices of the wider society. Sometimes it works to benefit a specific ethnic group or political group, and also reflects some unsatisfactory aspects of culture to which the constituents of civil society belong. In this study, both qualitative and quantitative analyses show that the associational activities and social movements in Cape Town reflect some kind of pathologies or injustices of the wider society. The qualitative analysis focuses on the 'toilet war', which took place throughout 2010 in Khayelitsha, Cape Town. It surely has an aspect of "service delivery protest", where the poor and the marginalised undertake protest action to express their grievances for the improvement of service delivery. Nevertheless, the data shows that the "poorest of the poor" are actually excluded and deserted by democracy within the community, the partisan purpose, and the rage against the legacy of apartheid. Ironically, democratic and participatory processes of decision-making in the small community contribute toward ignoring the voices of the poorest of the poor, who are still the minority there. The partisan purpose and the rage against racism restrict the interest of the poorest of the poor, too. Also there is a subtle but critical disjuncture between the "commander" of the 'toilet war' and its followers, which makes it more difficult to ensure the civil rights of the poorest of the poor. On the other hand, the quantitative analysis shows that participation in associational activities and protests is not correlated so much to incomes and grievances. Rather, variables such as race, political attitudes, and psychological resources are more correlated with participation. This is particularly true with associational activities like being a member of community-based groups or attending community meetings. Cape Town has a substantial overlap amongst race, income and grievances, but the regression analyses indicate that race still has significant correlation with participation in civil society. Opposed to the general expectation for civil society in South Africa, participation in civil society is not always the channel for the poor to express their grievances. Although further research should be conducted on why black people are more likely to participate in civil society than other races, this study disputes the general romantic notion of civil society in South Africa.

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## Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| AEC | Anti-Eviction Campaign |
| ANC | African National Congress |
| ANCYL | African National Congress Youth League |
| ARVs | Anti-Retroviral Medications |
| CAS | Cape Area Study |
| CBO | Community-Based Organisations |
| COSATU | Congress of South African Trade Unions |
| DA | Democratic Alliance |
| DLG | Developmental Local Government |
| GEAR | Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy |
| IDPs | Integrated Development Plans |
| MPAEC | Mandela Park Anti-Eviction Campaign |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisations |
| NPI | Neighbourhood Problems Index |
| NPO | Non-Profit Organisations |
| PGI | Political Grievances Index |
| RDP | Reconstruction and Development Programme |
| SAHRC | South Africa Human Rights Commission |
| SANCO | South African National Civics Organisation |
| SDGI | Service Delivery Grievances Index |
| SECC | Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee |

| | |
|---|---|
| SJC | Social Justice Coalition |
| TAC | Treatment Action Campaign |
| WCAEC | Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign |

# Introduction

Civil society in South Africa is generally celebrated as a space for action to promote social justice, either through organisations that play the role of "watchdog", or through mobilisation by the poor themselves around their own concerns. However, civil society can reflect and reproduce many of the pathologies and injustices of the wider society. Sometimes it works to benefit a specific ethnic group or political group, and also reflects some unsatisfactory aspects of culture to which the constituents of civil society belong. There are some examples of civil society which are not necessarily working purely for the poor and the marginalised. This provokes a possibility that the real voices of the poor and the marginalised are ignored because of these pathologies and injustices. Taking as a case study the South African city of Cape Town, this thesis empirically examines whether some kind of pathologies and injustices are reflected in civil society. Are the associational activities and protest actions reflecting the real voices of the poor and marginalised in Cape Town? If so, how effective are they in influencing the policy making and implementation? If not, how are their voices ignored or suppressed?



The term "civil society" has a broad and diverse definition so we need to conceptualise which specific aspects we mean by civil society in this study. Chapter 1 reviews some of the enormous literature about civil society in general and argues what kind of concept should be applied to this study. We discuss civil society in a broad context first, and then focus on the situations in South Africa. We also discuss the context of Cape Town and the research framework and methodology of this study. The pathologies and injustices which civil society can reflect and reproduce from the wider society are also discussed. These arguments help us to understand how civil society is recognised in South Africa, and to consider possible problems of the cases investigated in the following chapters.

Chapter 2 and 3 qualitatively analyse why people participate in associational activities and protests. Throughout 2010, there has been great controversy over toilets which the City of Cape Town provided in the Makhaza area of Khayelitsha. This conflict started as a small

protest in a specific area in Khayelitsha, but escalated to the point where it developed into a series of "service delivery protests" in Khayelitsha as a whole by the middle of November 2010. Chapter 2 chronologically describes the details of this 'toilet war', mainly from the articles in the media. Based on the narrative in Chapter 2 and the fieldwork I conducted in Makhaza, Chapter 3 analyses the reasons why the people or organisations get involved in the 'toilet war', and how decisions are made within civil society. The 'toilet war' is commonly considered to be "service delivery protest", which is generally expected as a role of civil society in South Africa. However, although some stakeholders try to protect the civil rights of the Makhaza residents, others prevent them from doing. This case reveals one aspect of how the voices of the poorest of the poor are ignored and suppressed in civil society.

Chapter 4 quantitatively analyses the correlates of participation in associational activities and protests, so that we can infer why people participate. I use the Cape Area Study (CAS) 2005, which was conducted by the Centre for Social Science Research at the University of Cape Town in 2005, as the source of data. I examine the correlation between some possible motivations to participate (income, demographic backgrounds, grievances with service delivery, grievances relating to the neighbourhood, political attitude, attitude towards neighbourhood, and psychological resources) and actual participation, so as to assess the relative importance of these different motivations. The analyses show that the variables such as identities and political attitudes are more related to the participation in civil society, rather than the variables like incomes and grievances. This is not explicitly displaying the fact that civil society in Cape Town does not reflect the voices of the poor and marginalised, but at least we can doubt the assumption that civil society represents the interests of them.

Both qualitative and quantitative analyses show that civil society in Cape Town reflects some pathologies or injustices of the wider society. In the case of the 'toilet war', the "poorest of the poor" are actually excluded and deserted by democracy within the community, the partisan purpose, and the rage against the legacy of apartheid. Also there is a subtle but critical disjuncture between the "commander" of the 'toilet war' and its followers, which makes it more difficult to ensure the civil rights of the poorest of the poor. On the other hand, the quantitative analysis shows that variables such as race, political attitudes, and psychological resources are more correlated with participation than grievances and incomes

are. This is particularly true with associational activities like being a member of community-based groups or attending community meetings. Cape Town has a substantial overlap amongst race, income and grievances, but the regression analyses indicate that race still has significant correlation with participation in civil society. Opposed to the general expectation of civil society in South Africa, participation in civil society is not always the channel for the poor to express their grievances. This study disputes the general romantic notion of civil society in South Africa.

# Chapter I – Civil Society in Africa, South Africa and Cape Town

## What is Civil Society?

These days we can find the term used very often in debates about governance as well as development, but the definition is becoming broader and broader and the concept more and more ambiguous. The idea of civil society appeared in conjunction with the development of the "modern state". In various countries in Europe around A.D. 1500-1800, two main developments took place: firstly, the state had to detach itself from the church and became more powerful in its own right; secondly, the rise of powerful states produced increasingly "strident" claims for a measure of social autonomy and personal liberty, which had to be protected against the state (Atkinson, 1996:287-8). Then civil society, which mentions the sphere of "non-state" and "non-family" social life, was gradually produced, and it includes a wide array of organisations, such as scientific and literary organisations, sports clubs, private schools, publishers, manufacturing enterprises, and churches. In the last few decades, distinctly modern kinds of association called "non-governmental organisations (NGOs)", "community-based organisations (CBOs)" and "voluntary non-profit organisations" have become prominent members of civil society. Atkinson (1996) considers "the enthusiasm for civil society" to be "a strong sentiment of 'anti-statism'", that is, "disillusionment with parliamentary democracy, the welfare state, and the alienation engendered by vast government bureaucracies" (*ibid.*). For her, civil society is a means to protest against the state and protect people's interest from the state.



Whilst some researchers like Atkinson regard the key character of civil society as anti-statist, others illustrate civil society from different perspectives. Foley and Edwards (1996) make a distinction between two broad versions of the civil society argument and call them "Civil Society I" and "Civil Society II" (Foley & Edwards, 1996:39). "Civil Society I" places an emphasis on "the ability of associational life in general and the habits of association in particular to foster patterns of civility in the actions of citizens in a democratic polity", while

"Civil Society II" puts special emphasis on civil society "as a sphere of action that is independent of the state and that is capable —precisely for this reason— of energizing resistance to a tyrannical regime" (*ibid.*). From this perspective, the anti-statist approach towards civil society can be categorised in "Civil Society II", which favours strong and independent civil society.

On the other hand, De Wet (2010) employs Gramsci and seeks for the definition that is "the mixture of collegial and antagonistic relations" between the state and civil society (De Wet, 2010:3). He doubts that a radical separation between the state and civil society can be made, and thus civil society can be seen to constitute the space "between" the state apparatus and individuals or families (*ibid.*). Pillay (1996) also sees Gramsci's argument as useful and describes a different role of civil society from the anti-statist one, saying "once the working class captured state power, that power would be bolstered by '...a sturdy structure of civil society'" (Pillay, 1996:340). For them, civil society is not always anti-statist but also can collaborate with the state at times, and even could be a support for the state power in a certain situation. At this stage, civil society functions as a promoter of democracy in a democratic society, which is referred to as "Civil Society I", rather than "resistance to a tyrannical regime" (Foley & Edwards, 1996:39). In short, "Civil Society I" is related to stabilisation of democracy, whilst "Civil Society II" is primarily involved with transition to democracy. This approach looks at civil society in relation to democracy, and as Kaplan (1994) notes, "much of the debate regarding civil society centres around the relationship it should have with the state", and "civil society is 'a crucial element' in a democratic society" (Kaplan, 1994:2).



Although discussions so far more or less associate civil society with the state or democracy, there is yet another perspective on civil society, especially in the context of Africa. The Nigerian scholar Peter Ekeh asserts that civil society "has an elaborate usage in Western history" and that there exists the danger "of misapplying Western political constructs to African circumstances" (Ekeh, 1992:188). According to him, although civil society in Africa is conventionally said to be weak, argument of the dynamics of civil society in Africa should be "without purpose outside its potential relationship with democracy" because democracy itself has "a weak base in Africa" (Ekeh, 1992:196). He identifies two public realms in African society, "the civic public" and "the primordial public", the former referring to the

realm "operating on amoral codes of behaviour and using apparatus of the formal state", and the latter referring to the realm "whose value-premises are moral, binding together members of the same natural and assumed kinship (including ethnic) groupings" (Ekeh, 1992:192-193). The existence of "the primordial public" in Africa makes "a dramatic difference between Europe and Africa in the conception of civil society" (Ekeh, 1992:197). One could recognise "a vast array of institutions and associations of civil society" in Africa if you include "the primordial public" in civil society, even though it does not necessarily mean that "they will be useful for the rise of democracy" (*ibid.*).

Also, Kasfir (1998) criticises the conventional notion of civil society for "being shaped to serve the goal of better governance, particularly democratic reform, rather than a deeper understanding of the relationship between social formations, the associations that represent them and the state" (Kasfir, 1998:1). He insists on necessity of expanding a concept of civil society to the one which is "less prescriptive", "does not import so many Western models" and "captures more of the social issues in which Africans are engaged" whether they are "civic or not" (Kasfir, 1998:17). Moreover, such anthropologists as Comaroff and Comaroff (1999), Garland (1999) and Karlstrom (1999) maintain that linking civil society only to "Western democracies" and pointing out the weakness of the "Western" civil society in Africa are a false point of view derived from "Eurocentrism" (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1999:16-17; Endo, 2000:153; Garland, 1999; Karlstrom, 1999).



Ekeh's another contribution is division of "means" and "ends" of civil society. He sets four types of civil society in accordance with its means and ends (Table 1.1). He analyses the case of Nigeria and explains each of associations, so here I briefly summarise what each category refers to. "Civic public associations" use "resources from the civic public realm and their general goals are to advance the welfare of the civic public or of their members functioning in it" (Ekeh, 1992:201). Formal NPOs fall into this category. "Deviant civic associations" also try to advance the welfare within the civic public realm, but enhance "their power holdings by employing tools and means that the state cannot control" (Ekeh, 1992:203). Some kind of secret society can be in there. "Primordial public associations" serve "the public interests of unique primordial (usually ethnic) groupings in Africa" and "exploit the resources of the state-related civic public realm" (Ekeh, 1992:205). Lastly, "indigenous development

associations" covers "a broad spectrum of organizations that seek to use their own resources, from an exclusive membership based on certain criteria of indigenous organisations, to secure their common welfare" (Ekeh, 1992:206-207). The latter two are not seeking for democracy as such, but incorporated in civil society in Africa. This categorisation not only diversifies our view on the roles of civil society, but also enables us to pay attention to the participants or constituents in civil society. Seeing civil society only in relation to the state or democracy more or less focuses on the roles of civil society, such as whether it promotes democracy or not, or whether it protests against the state or not. Ekeh's categorisation can make it possible to examine what kind of means or what kind of people are mobilised in civil society for the particular purposes.

***Table 1.1: Ekeh's Categorisation of Civil Society***

| Ends / Means | Civic public | Primordial public |
|---|---|---|
| Civic public | Civic public associations | Primordial public associations |
| Primordial public | Deviant civic associations | Indigenous development associations |

Source: Ekeh (1992)



Beginning from the anti-statist approach towards civil society, we discuss civil society in relation to the state or democracy, as well as referred to the African circumstances. The anti-statist view of civil society can fall into the argument of "Civil Society II", and the so-called "African Civil Society" seems to be the broadest definition, which encompasses "Civil Society I" and "Civil Society II" altogether. Even though many researchers postulate that civil society should be a promoter of democracy, the concept of "African Civil Society" poses that civil society is not necessarily to be connected to democracy in Africa. In Africa, where the state, the economy and society are all different compared to early Europe, the purposes and means can be different as well. Also, this view enables us to look at the inner mechanism of civil society, not only focuses on its roles or functions in a society. South Africa is a country of Africa needless to say, but it has highly westernised aspects in terms of its historical and socio-economic context, and has a strong base on democracy now. What kind of perspective should we use for the analysis of civil society in South Africa? The next section focuses on the South African context of civil society.

## Context of South Africa

Civil society in South Africa is no less diverse than its population is, and especially the history of segregation, i.e. apartheid, makes it more complicated. According to Habib (2005), South African civil society used to have two faces under apartheid: "white civil society" and "black civil society" (Habib, 2005:672)[1]. Whilst "white civil society" established "collegiate relations" with the state, the majority of "black civil society" adopted "an adversarial mode of engagement" (*ibid.*). This dichotomous existence of two civil societies reflected racial segregation and exclusion under apartheid, and their power balance had changed as liberation and democratisation were happening. Until the 1980s, "pro-apartheid" or "pro-business" white civil society dominated South African society (Habib, 2005:674). As the 1970s approached, "anti-apartheid" black civil society began to make their presence felt, and during the 1980s "black civil society" transcended "white civil society" within a few years, whereas "white civil society" began to distance themselves from the apartheid regime (Habib, 2005:672-675). After 1994, "the racial divide" of civil society "has all but disappeared", and non-profit organisations (NPOs) "have profoundly influenced the emergence, shape and nature" of civil society in South Africa and South African society as a whole (Habib, 2005:672; Swilling & Russell, 2002:3). The government committed itself to the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which provided NPOs with a central role in development (Swilling & Russell, 2002:4). In 1996, the RDP was replaced with "a neo-liberal macro-economic programme" known as the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR), which defined central roles "for the for-profit private sector in economic growth and service delivery" and "for the non-profit sector in poverty alleviation" (*ibid.*). Now civil society in South Africa has "adversarial and collegiate relations" with the state, that is to say, the twin roles for "watchdog" and "service delivery" for the poor[2] (Habib, 2005:672; Swilling & Russell, 2002:5).



[1] Since he notes that "black civil society" was based on "Black Consciousness Movement (BMC)", it includes groups organised by other racial categories than black Africans (Habib, 2005:674). Also, there must have been some organisations by white people which are against apartheid, but they are not included in "white civil society" by its definition. I will use the terms 'black', 'white', 'coloured' and 'Asians/Indians' throughout the thesis but this does not imply that I agree with such racial classifications. These are however the official terms in use by the government.

[2] Atkinson (1996) notes that the ANC government has not yet settled down to a uniform, systematic relationship with civil society and illustrates how different government departments are responding in

The South African context of civil society indicates that both "Civil Society I" and "Civil Society II" have consistently coexisted in South African civil society. Whether it is "white civil society" or "black civil society" under apartheid, or whether it is a role of "watchdog" or "service delivery" under democracy, civil society in South Africa has existed in strong association with the state. Although "white civil society" may not have promoted democracy, when you look only at "white society" under apartheid, it was "the ability of associational life", which has "the positive effects of association for governance" over white people, and can be regarded as "Civil Society I" (Foley & Edwards, 1996:39). Also, even though the contemporary South African government is democratic one, the role of "watchdog" can be categorised into "Civil Society II", as it serves "as a counterweight to the state" (*ibid.*). "Black civil society" is typically in "Civil Society II", and the role of the delivery of services falls into "Civil Society I" without a doubt. We can say that South African society has always held both aspects of "Civil Society I" and "Civil Society II" throughout apartheid and post-apartheid. On the other hand, in the Ekeh's four types of civil society, "white civil society" can be categorised into "primordial public associations". They took the forms of official organisations under the apartheid regime, but only served the interests of white people. "Black civil society" is in-between "deviant civic associations" and "indigenous development associations" because whilst anti-apartheid organisations were banned until liberation, "black civil society" informally fought to overthrow the apartheid government outside the state's control. Whether they are categorised in "deviant civic associations" or in "indigenous development associations" depends on whether one considers they fought for "democracy" or for "black people", and this is why they are "in-between" them. In post-apartheid democratic South Africa, most organs of civil society are theoretically working in the realm of "civic public", since they serve the interests of the poor or the marginalised regardless of race[3].



widely different ways to civil society with different outcomes (Atkinson, 1996:310). But still, current roles of civil society in South Africa can converge on "watchdog" and "service delivery" (see De Wet, 2010; Habib, 2005; Swelling & Russell, 2002).

[3] Of course there are always some exceptions. For example, some people include "gangs" in civil society, and they are not necessarily working in the realm of "civic public". However, in this study I exclude gangs from civil society since they are out of the argument on politics.

To examine civil society in post-apartheid South Africa, we have to see both means and ends of them. As discussed above, major roles of civil society in post-apartheid South Africa are "watchdog" and "service delivery" (De Wet, 2010; Habib, 2005; Swelling & Russell, 2002). How does civil society in South Africa try to achieve these goals? Habib (2005) again describes the situations well:

> On the one end of the spectrum is a powerful set of formal service related NGOs that, as a result of the more enabling environment created by the democratic regime, have entered partnerships with or subcontracted to the state. These organizations have more engaged and collegiate relations with the state. On the other end of the spectrum is a group of community-based structures that actively challenge and oppose what they perceive as the implementation of neoliberalism. These organizations, whose activists covet the status of social movements, also have an explicit relationship with the state. This relationship, depending on the organization and the issue area, hovers somewhere between adversarialism and engagement, and sometimes involves both […] But even when engaging the state, this is of a qualitatively different kind to that of the formal NGOs. The latter has a relationship with the state that is largely defined by its subcontractual role, whereas the former is on a relatively more even footing, engaging the state in an attempt to persuade it through lobbying, court action, and even outright resistance (Habib, 2005:685-656).



This quotation explains that "formal NGOs" play a role of "service delivery" along with the state, whilst "a group of community-based structures" play a role of "watchdog", often taking a form of "social movements". This means that most of "service delivery" by civil society is done in the form of "civic public associations" in Ekeh's categorisation, but it is not sure which associations "watchdog" falls into, until we scrutinise how it is conducted.

Although social movements (or protest action) define South African civil society especially as a means of "watchdog", they have different characteristics from time to time. Ngwane (2010) well examines the trends and causes of protest action in South Africa. He argues that

protest politics has been playing a crucial role since apartheid era until now – "People took to the streets, either in marches, demonstrations or the erection of barricades, with the aim of winning political, economic or social demands" (Ngwane, 2010). According to him, there are three waves of protests in post-apartheid era. The first wave took place immediately after liberation, and it was involved in expressing dissatisfaction with "service delivery", namely, municipal services, housing, roads, etc. The second wave took hold of the country from around 2000 organised by "new social movements", such as Anti-Privatisation Forum, Treatment Action Campaign, Jubilee South Africa, Landless Peoples Movement, Abahlali baseMjondolo and other organisations. The background to the second wave is "the increasing deterioration in living standards experienced by the working class as neoliberal policy started to bite" (*ibid.*). The last wave of mass action is the current one from around 2005 which consists of local community uprising and militant national strikes. They tend to have broad support and involve a big section of the community, they are often violent and disruptive, and their demands are related to the provision of basic services, the accountability of councillors and corruption. These local uprisings are often called "service delivery protests", and this last wave of protests has been steadily increasing and spreading to new areas until now. It is asserted that these are "modes of political engagement that help ordinary people to challenge vested interest in order to win their demands and satisfy their needs" (*ibid.*).



Ballard, Habib and Valodia (2006) also argue that "the most obvious tangible effect of social movements on the political landscape of this country is that they represent the interests of the poor and marginalised, and apply pressure on the government to pay greater attention to the welfare of these groups" (Ballard, Habib & Valodia, 2006:413). For them, a key function of social movements is that "they offer the poor a means of exercising power, and are thus 'an avenue for marginalised people and those concerned about their interests to impact on material distribution, and social exclusion, and to claim a certain degree of influence and power over the state itself'" (*ibid.*; Seekings & Matisonn, 2005:7). Therefore social movements and protest action "can actually strengthen democracy by ensuring that the voice of the weak, the downtrodden and the excluded is heard", rather than "undermine the democratic project by explicitly challenging, through extra-institutional action, a legitimate democratically elected government" (Ngwane, 2010; Ballard et al., 2006:412).

These arguments on social movements and protest action suggest that the role of "watchdog" by South African civil society should be also for the sake of the "civic public realm", as is the case of "service delivery". However, although they play a role of "watchdog" for the poor and the marginalised regardless of their race, their means are not necessarily formal and are often out of state's control. This indicates that the role of "watchdog" by South African civil society fall into either "civic public associations" or "deviant civic associations" in Ekeh's categorisation. At any rate, politically and theoretically, civil society in South Africa no longer serves "primordial public" as it used to do under the apartheid regime. This tendency is supposed to be conspicuous in urban area like Cape Town, where "democracy is said to have been undermined by 'neo-liberal' municipal policies" (Seekings & Matisonn, 2005:2-3). The next section examines the situation in Cape Town.



## Cape Town Politics

The post-apartheid national policies such as the RDP and GEAR have large influence on urban policy-making and practice. Smith and Vawda (2003) argue how the local authorities and public participation have been reinforced in service delivery in Cape Town after transition to democracy. The RDP and GEAR have produced the idea of "Developmental Local Government (DLG)" for addressing economic growth and poverty eradication (Smith & Vawda, 2003:28). The DLG is committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and to improve the quality of their lives, and cultivates citizens through participation in service delivery, good governance, democratising development, and fostering economic growth. The mechanisms such as the RDP forums and Ward forums were built to promote public participation. The RDP forums are said to have served as a bridging, transitional arrangement between the first national democratic elections in 1994 and the local government elections in 1996 in Cape Town. Longstanding civic umbrella organisations, like the South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO) formed a critical element of the community-based organisations that fed into the RDP forums. The RDP forums were "flawed" since it became questionable if conventional civic organisations like SANCO represented the public interests

and if there was clarity about their accountability to a political system (Smith & Vawda, 2003:32).

After 1996, the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) were developed to build the capacity of elected local councillors to represent the public interest to enhance its accountability. Democratically elected local councillors themselves are considered to be the most effective representatives of the public interest, and residents are supposed to communicate with their ward councillors in the Ward forums to reflect their needs and opinions. However, the Ward forums serve "in an advisory and guidance capacity only", and as Staniland (2008) notes, these policies actually serve to undermine civil society empowerment whilst they seek to promote it (City of Cape Town, 2010; Staniland, 2008). He asserts that "the fact that civil society is placed in a subordinate position in its relationship with political society and that political society dominates the distribution and administration of local government resources creates the possibility for patronage and ties many residents and civil society organisations to elected politicians, causing them to refrain from voicing discontent" (Staniland, 2008:34). Also, the influence of neo-liberalism restricts the mechanisms of public participation and causes the decline of civil society. According to McDonald and Smith (2004), the regular employment of private-sector consultants by Cape Town policy-makers provokes "power imbalances", and private consulting firms have "effectively replaced the role of civil society" in the restructuring of local government in Cape Town and have served to reinforce neo-liberal policy leanings (McDonald & Smith, 2004:1480). This makes elected local councillors powerless in policy-making. Even if they effectively represented the public interests, they could not really reflect them in the policies. Indeed, public participation is "only effective in changing how government operates if the mechanisms within the bureaucracy are set up to implement such changes", and local councillors do not hold power to change or make decisions beyond the national framework of neo-liberalism (Smith & Vawda, 2003:33).

Against the hegemonic nature of this neo-liberalism, Capetonians have shown their opinions beyond the legitimate way of public participation. Amongst famous social movements based in Cape Town are the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (WCAEC). Both of them were established around 2000 and they are categorised into "new social movements" which we saw in Ngwane's argument. The TAC,

which is actually a national organisation founded in Cape Town, is "a movement that campaigns for affordable treatment for people living with HIV and AIDS", which is now world-famous and nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize (Friedman & Mottiar, 2006:23). Using tactics of formal (the courts of law) and informal (the mass mobilisation) means, it effectively won access to anti-retroviral medication (ARVs) for people infected with HIV and AIDS. Besides this "watchdog" role, The TAC also play a role of "service delivery" by helping the government roll out ARVs and offering HIV/AIDS education (Treatment Action Campaign, 2010). On the other hand, the WCAEC is "a movement of community organisations from poor, marginalised areas of Cape Town", which consists of people sharing "threats and experiences of eviction and water disconnections, discontent with state policies of cost recovery on public services, and dissatisfaction with local political representation" (Oldfield & Stokke, 2006:111). Housing issue is one of the most visible expressions of the tension between public participation and neo-liberalism in post-apartheid South Africa, and the WCAEC is fighting through direct action, legal challenges, mass mobilisation and popular education, organisation capacity building, and democratising communities (Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, 2010). You can see that the WCAEC also uses the combination of formal and informal means to protest and plays both roles of "watchdog" and "service delivery" like the TAC.



Whilst the TAC is a national organisation, and campaigns worldwide, the WCAEC is a much more local body, bringing together under its "umbrella" over 10 community organisations, crisis committees, and concerned residents movements (*ibid.*). In South African townships these "community-based groups" have often been operated under civic organisations, called "civics" (Staniland, 2008:38). Civics were popular, radically democratic community organisations that had played a key role in resistance to apartheid, and SANCO was formed as an umbrella body of civics (Desai & Pithouse, 2003). However after democratisation in 1994, it is plausibly said that civics were "demobilised" and thus they "declined" (Desai & Pithouse, 2003; Seekings, 1996: Seekings, 1998, Seekings, 2000; Staniland, 2008). As discussed above, whilst the capacity of democratically elected local councillors and local governments were increased, SANCO has become marginalised and lost influence. Indeed, SANCO has been in a close relationship with the African National Congress (ANC), which transformed "from a liberation movement to a political party" (Seekings, 1998:1). After the ANC became the ruling party SANCO is working "as either a faction within the ANC

Alliance or as a *de facto* party", "failing to represent peoples' interests to local government", and even "defending the councillors and government to a discontented populace" (Seekings, 2000:223; Staniland, 2008:41). We can say that since SANCO has virtually ceased from acting as a watchdog, alternatives such as the WCAEC were demanded and established to fill a vacancy for a player of "watchdog".

However, it is not correct to say that the importance and presence of SANCO have completely vanished in local communities in the South African cities. Zuern (2006) asserts that SANCO "maintains a significant though weak presence as a national body with local branches in South Africa today" (Zuern, 2006:181). The arguments of the decline of SANCO are based on the "static understanding of political opportunity and interpretation of civil society as necessarily oppositional", and they "fatally simplified the complex interactions between state and civil society actors" (Zuern, 2006:197). Her point is that although its roles and objectives may be scattered and contradicted, SANCO still rigidly stands upon the elusive, porous and contextual boundaries of state-civil society interactions. Similarly, Cherry, Jones, and Seekings (2000) note the continued significance of SANCO through the research on associational activity in two townships (Guguletu in Cape Town and Kwazakele in Port Elizabeth). They affirm that although now SANCO "achieved a key goal, i.e. representative democracy at the local level", "there remains a high level of involvement in civic organization, especially at the level of street committees, and political parties" (Cherry, Jones & Seekings, 2000:903). Civic organisations (or branches of SANCO) have complex relationships with local structures – street committees – that exist in most parts of townships, and performing a range of tasks including dispute settlement and some policing, limited service provision and the representation of residents. The survey data proves that there continues to be a high level of popular engagement with broadly representative and accountable civic structures in South Africa's African township (Cherry et al., 2000).

In fact, this "locality" has an important meaning to South Africans. Bekker, Leilde, Cornelissen and Horstmeier (2000) and Cornelissen and Horstmeier (2002) examine the social and political construction of new identities in post-apartheid South Africa, focusing on the analysis of the Western Cape Province. They argue that the end of apartheid has brought about the need for new identities to be created among South Africans, and for South Africans

to forge a new relationship with their society and country, where racial and ethnic identities used to be imposed institutionally under apartheid. Although provincial leaders claimed that a new "provincial identity" was emerging in the post-apartheid Western Cape, the qualitative data reveals no meaningful provincial identity and weak national identity held amongst the residents (Bekker et al., 2000:233). The "top-down" efforts to construct new, "non-racial identity" in the Western Cape seem to be complex and interminable despite the use of media, symbols and election campaign, and former "racial" constructs still persist (Cornelissen & Horstmeier, 2002:79). Shared meanings are drawn from language, from class and most strikingly from common locality, and local issues and local government are significantly important to residents. Race is an integral part of their identity as well, especially under specific circumstances: "in the presence of ignorance and extended racialised socialisation, in the presence of marginalisation and lack of alternative sources of pride and self-esteem, and in the presence of enduring economic deprivation" (Bekker et al., 2000:234). Considering the continued hardship of their living conditions, black people are considered to have a particularly strong sense of identity with their race.



Discussion so far suggests that the national neo-liberal policies have a striking influence on the context of the social structures and civil society in the post-apartheid South African cities. Against the issues caused by market-oriented policy implementation and decentralisation, people do protest through formal and informal means. Presupposed players of these protests are the poor and the marginalised, and they can be said to belong either to "civic public associations" or "deviant civic associations" in this sense, in accordance with their ways of protests. These urban protests are part of "watchdog" role by civil society, and the instances of the TAC and the WCAEC tell us that the same organisation can play both roles of "watchdog" and "service delivery". In the case of "service delivery", they are also working for the sake of the poor and the marginalised, thus civil society in Cape Town exists in the "civic public realm" in Ekeh's argument. This is in line with the theoretical presumption of the roles of civil society at the national level. However, when we take into consideration the roles of SANCO and the strong presence of locality, the situation becomes complicated. The legacy of apartheid like racial identity still persists at the local community level, and power taking by the ANC makes things even more complex. Although SANCO used to represent the interests of local communities during apartheid, now it entered "political society", and still has significant meaning to residents. At the same time, locality and race are the major

components of people's identity. When we look at civil society at local community level, it is assumed that people are not necessarily involved in civil society purely because of their "grievances" or "poorness", i.e. for the sake of civic public. Then, what are the primary reasons for participation in civil society?

## Research Framework and Methodology

Within the context of post-apartheid South Africa, civil society is often argued in relation to state, especially how it can contribute to development and improvement of people's living conditions. After democratisation, civil society is mainly assigned the roles of "watchdog" and "service delivery", and this is conspicuous in the city like Cape Town, where neo-liberal policy implementation is dominant. Neo-liberal policies reinforce the role of "service delivery" by civil society, which eventually strengthen the role of "watchdog" by civil society through protests or social movements. Neo-liberalism causes fatal flaws in improving people's living situations, and the poor and the marginalised take formal and informal measures to express their grievances. Civil society in South Africa is generally celebrated as a space for action to promote social justice, either through containing the power of elites (through organisations that play the role of "watchdog") or through mobilisation by the poor themselves around their own concerns.



However, civil society can reflect and reproduce many of the pathologies and injustices of the wider society. When we look at the argument of "African Civil Society" by Ekeh, civil society is not always associated with state or democracy. Those who work for the "primordial public" realm seek only for the interests of the people in the same kinship including ethnic groups. Indeed, under the apartheid regime, South African civil society was divided into "white civil society" and "black civil society", which sought only for the interests of their own race and excluded those of the others. When we closely look at the post-apartheid situations at the local community level of Cape Town, we could still see a possibility that people are not necessarily participating in civil society because of their grievances. It is difficult to separate SANCO from politics after democratisation, and people might participate

in associational activities just because they are interested in local issues or due to their racial identity. If we scrutinise each case of associational activities or protest action, it would not actually be for the sake of the poor or the marginalised as the literature of post-apartheid South African civil society often suggests. It could be for the purpose of politics, race, or local communities which they belong to. Indeed, what Ekeh argues as "primordial public" reflects the brutal Nigerian civil war, and puts an emphasis on ethnic sectionalism. The associations categorised into "primordial public associations" or "indigenous development associations" in Nigeria are working only for the poor in the same ethnic group, and may even be hostile to the poor in the different ethnic groups (Ekeh, 1992:205-7).

Ethnic sectionalism is a good example of the pathologies and injustices which civil society can reproduce out of the wider society. Pointer (2004) gives us another example. She considers the way that the representation of a social movement serves as a contested space of power, focusing on the case of the Mandela Park Anti-Eviction Campaign (MPAEC) in Khayelitsha. Some aspects of the operation of MPAEC are examined, and it is revealed that the techniques of control by a centralised and hierarchical "old left" (of which MPAEC is fairly characteristic) are not qualitatively much different from the mechanisms of control used by the state (Pointer, 2004:291). One major point she made is that there is no representation of women in MPAEC and in the WCAEC as well, in spite of the existing literature on "new social movements" often celebrating the role of women. This reflects the common culture, especially Xhosa culture in this context, of the oppression of women by men.



One more example of the pathologies which civil society can possess is shown by Egan and Wafer (2006). They take the case of the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) and recognise disjuncture between its base and leadership. The leadership of the SECC tends to understand their role as "providing localised resistance to the ideology of 'cost recovery' and neo-liberal policies in South Africa", and "turned the electricity crisis into a political issue" (Egan & Wafer, 2006:60). However, at the branch level, the SECC members do not see themselves as part of general resistance to neo-liberalism or the vanguard of a populist new left alternative to the ANC. As a matter of fact, the majority of the SECC are middle-aged to elderly women with poor education, which is seldom reflected in its elected leadership profile.

Whereas the rank-and-file are mainly concerned about their actual material grievances, the leaders give the political meaning to their movements for the partisan reason.

These are the examples of civil society, which is not necessarily working purely for the poor and the marginalised. There is a possibility that the real voices of the poor and the marginalised are ignored because of these pathologies and injustices. From the next chapter, I qualitatively and quantitatively examine whether we can find the other primary motivations to participate in civil society than grievances or poorness of people. As qualitative research, I analyse a case of the 'toilet war', which happened in Khayelitsha throughout 2010. What is relevant with this case is that this is in line with the current trend of protests which Ngwane argued – local community uprising associated with militant national strikes. Although I did not conduct research on strikes since it requires another set of research, a nation-wide strike did happen in South Africa just after the World Cup 2010, and the case of the 'toilet war' is one of the significant local community uprisings happening often in South Africa. Also it has happened in the largest township in Cape Town, Khayelitsha, which still have strong legacy of apartheid such as SANCO, poor and marginalised black population, and strong presence of local communities. I analyse articles on the case in media, and also conducted fieldwork in the questioned site in Khayelitsha, interviewing people there, asking why they are participating in protests and if not why they are not participating. Mainly semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted, and observations of some community meetings have been done as well. 17 interviews were conducted in total, and most of the interviewees in Makhaza were chosen by snowball sampling. The list of interviews is presented at the end of references.



To avoid criticism that the 'toilet war' is just an exception, I also analyse quantitative data. I use the Cape Area Study (CAS) 2005, which was conducted by the Centre for Social Science Research at the University of Cape Town in 2005. CAS 2005 is relevant for this study because it covers the samples not only in Khayelitsha but also in the Cape Town Metropolis as a whole. The year 2005 is also within the same trend of protests as the case of the 'toilet war', and the African National Congress was the ruling party both in Cape Town and in the Western Cape Province, which is now replaced by the Democratic Alliance (DA). Comparing different years when the different political party dominates is useful for looking at political incentive to participate in civil society. I prepare different sets of motivations to participate

such as politics, race, psychological resources, grievances and poorness, and test which would be primary through regression analyses. Both in qualitative and quantitative analyses, I focus not only on protest action but also associational activities such as community meetings and community organisations. Through these analyses, we can see that people are not always involved in civil society because of their grievances or poorness.

# Chapter II – Narrative of the 'Toilet War'

## Makhaza in Khayelitsha

Disputes over toilets in the Makhaza area of Khayelitsha hit the headlines of several newspapers at the beginning of 2010. Makhaza, which means "cold" in Zulu (not in isiXhosa), is located at the east edge of Khayelitsha, and administratively it falls into Ward 95, Sub-council 10 (Charlotte Maxeke), in the City of Cape Town (City of Cape Town, 2010). Khayelitsha, which means "new home" in isiXhosa, is situated approximately 35 kilometres from the Cape Town city centre. It is part of the City of Cape Town's South East Region, and commonly known as Cape Town's "poverty trap" (City of Cape Town, 2006a:11). It is difficult to get the accurate demographics of Khayelitsha, but the City of Cape Town (2006a, 2006b) and the Western Cape Province (2006) provide relatively credible demographic data of Khayelitsha as of 2005. According to the official report by the Western Cape Province (2006), Khayelitsha was home to approximately 407,000 people in 2005 (Western Cape Province, 2006:72). A large majority (65%) of the population were younger than 30 years old, and the population had more females (56%) than males (44%) (City of Cape Town, 2006a:12). Approximately 70% of the adult population in Khayelitsha were economically active[4], but only about 25% of the adult population were employed while 46% of the adult population were not employed even though they were economically active (City of Cape Town, 2006a:17). In other words, unemployment was widespread. More than half of the population came from the rural area of the Eastern Cape, looking for a job opportunity (City of Cape Town, 2006a:14-15). The average monthly household income in 2005 was R1,606 for a mean household size of four persons per household, and the standard deviation of the mean household income was R1,296 (City of Cape Town, 2006a:20). From this figures you can infer that more than half of the population in Khayelitsha had incomes below what the

[4] Economically active population refers to all persons available for work but excludes those under the age of 15 years old, students, scholars, housewives or homemakers, retired people, pensioners, disabled persons or others who are permanently unable to work (City of Cape Town, 2006a).

city defines as “the poverty line”, which is R1,600 per month, per household (City of Cape Town, 2005).

It is far more difficult to get the relevant demographic data of Makhaza, so here I show a brief overview of Ward 95, which comprises Kuyasa and Nkanini, as well as Makhaza (City of Cape Town, 2010). According to the Western Cape Province (2006), the total population of Ward 95 was about 18,500 in 2005, and it was the only ward with a gender gap in favour of males, 60% males and 40% females (Western Cape Province, 2006:47). The report also shows that Ward 95 had a ratio of 68:32 for formal versus informal houses, and especially for Makhaza, Skuse and Cousins (2007) describe it as “a mix of formal brick houses and informal shacks” (Western Cape Province, 2006:50; Skuse & Cousins, 2007:982). The majority of the population are also from the Eastern Cape like the residents of Khayelitsha as a whole (Western Cape Province, 2006:48). There is no available data of the current income situations in Ward 95 or in Makhaza, but the City of Cape Town (2006b) shows, from the South African national census 2001, that the residents in Ward 95 gain relatively average income, compared to the other wards in Khayelitsha (City of Cape Town, 2006b). Gavin Silber, the co-ordinator of an NGO called the Social Justice Coalition (SJC), illustrates that “Makhaza is not one of the worst informal areas in Khayelitsha. [...] Despite being unquestionably impoverished, Makhaza has roads and is not as densely populated as other areas” (Silber, 2010, February 3). As far as I observed Makhaza during my fieldwork, I also have the same kind of sense. There is a big shopping centre and a big private high school at the central part of Makhaza, so it does not seem to be the worst place in Khayelitsha. I will illustrate the details of my fieldwork in the next chapter.

***Map 1: Location of Khayelitsha in the Cape Peninsula***




***Map 2: Location of Makhaza in Khayelitsha (pointed by A)***




Source for Map 1 & 2: Google Maps

| *Table 2.1: The 'Cast List' of the 'Toilet War' (organisations alphabetical, persons chronological order)* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Organisation** | **Post** | **Name** | **Party** |
| ANC | Provincial Task Team Leader | Membathisi Mdladlana | ANC |
| | Human Settlements Deputy Minister | Zoe Kota | ANC |
| | Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs Minister | Sicelo Shiceka | ANC |
| ANCYL (Dullah Omar branch) | Regional Deputy Secretary | Chumile Sali | ANC |
| | Regional Treasurer | Andile Lili | ANC |
| | Regional Secretary | Loyiso Nkohla | ANC |
| City of Cape Town | Mayor | Dan Plato | DA |
| | Councillor of Sub-council 10 | Stuart Pringle | DA |
| | Manager for New Housing | Herman Steyn | -- |
| | Mayor Committee member for Housing | Shehaam Sims | DA |
| | Councillor of Ward 95 | Nolufefe Gexa | ANC |
| Darrow Pre-Cast | Owner | Jeff Franciscus | ANC |
| Western Cape Province | Premier | Helen Zille | DA |
| SAHRC | Chairperson | Lawrence Mushwana | -- |
| SANCO | Chairperson in Kuyasa | Nuluvo Lime | -- |
| | National President | Ruth Bhengu | -- |
| Social Justice Coalition (SJC) | Co-ordinator | Gavin Silber | -- |
| Ward 95 Development Forum | Chairperson | Andile Lili | ANC |



## Beginning of the Story (End of January – Mid-March 2010)

There is a strong political contest between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Democratic Alliance (DA) within the City of Cape Town as well as within the Western Cape Province, and the 'toilet war' should be understood within this political context. After 1994 the ANC has governed at the national level and in almost all provinces and municipalities. The DA emerged as the largest opposition party. The DA won the municipal elections in 2006 in Cape Town and the provincial elections in 2009 in the Western Cape. There has therefore been intense competition between the ANC and the DA in Cape Town.

The first article of the 'toilet war' appeared on 20 January 2010, when the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) accused the city authorities of human rights violations for failing to provide walls for temporary toilets around Makhaza in Khayelitsha. The ANCYL officially asked the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) to intervene and punish the City Council for "taking away residents' rights to dignity and respect" (Solomons,

2010, January 20). Chumile Sali, the ANCYL deputy secretary of the Dullah Omar branch, said, "The city had violated the constitution by providing toilets without walls, so denying people their right to privacy" (*ibid.*). In his letter to the SAHRC chairperson, Lawrence Mushwana, Sali wrote that residents had to cover themselves with blankets when using their toilets, and said:

> The conditions to which residents are subjected are tantamount to crimes against humanity. Our plea to the SAHRC is to compel the City Council to build toilet walls to ensure the rights, dignity, privacy and freedom of residents of Ward 95 are protected, to charge the council with violations of human rights – and to take it to task for disregarding the constitution and the Bill of Rights (Hartley, 2010, January 21).

Andile Lili, the chairperson of the Ward 95 Development Forum and also the ANCYL treasurer of the Dullar Omar branch, blamed the city too and said, "You won't see this in coloured or white areas. It's as if black don't contribute to the city. If the council does not respond positively we will make this ungovernable. We'll destroy council property. Yes, it is breaking the law, but what you see here undermines our democracy" (*ibid.*). ANC and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) immediately added their criticism and blamed DA in the Western Cape for "being concerned only with the interests of their predominantly white and coloured electorate while neglecting the needs of the black community" (Kalipa, 2010, January 24).

However, the Mayor of Cape Town, Dan Plato (from the DA), responded that the open toilets were an arrangement the residents had agreed to and said that each household was responsible for building their own enclosures (Hartley, 2010, January 21). According to him, the city's new housing department initiated the installation of 1250 toilets in Town 2 and Makhaza (*ibid.*). The city initially installed the concrete enclosed toilets on a ratio, one toilet for five plots, as this is only a temporary measure until the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) houses are built. These toilets were "rejected by the community" and after negotiations, it was agreed that the city would provide one toilet per family and the community would build their own enclosures (*ibid.*). Also, the DA chairperson of Sub-council 10 (Charlotte Maxeke), Stuart Pringle, said that the ANCYL is "politicking" when it accuses the City Council of not building walls around toilets in the Makhaza area of Khayelitsha since the claims of rights violations were baseless (Hartley, 2010, January 25).

He asserted that the city and residents had agreed three years ago that the municipality would install open-air toilets, which residents themselves would enclose (*ibid.*). He continued, "It [the ANCYL] does create the impression they are more interested in scoring political points than helping to promote service delivery. [...] We had a community meeting last Wednesday but nobody raised this matter. [...] This is purely political" (*ibid.*).

The City Council manager for new housing, Herman Steyn, said that the city would go to the place and look if there is a way they could help them with "second-hand building materials" (Hartley, 2010, January 21). Then on 25 January, about two hours before an SAHRC investigator arrived, the city workers started to erect wood and iron enclosures on site (Van der Fort, 2010, January 26). With them was the mayoral committee (Mayco) member for housing, Shehaam Sims, who said that the mayor sent her (*ibid.*). However, leaders from the Ward 95 Development Forum stopped them from erecting enclosures because they "were not consulted and did not want the city to erect zinc sheets around the toilets" (*ibid.*). On 28 January, the Premier of the Western Cape, Helen Zille, contributed an article to *Cape Times*, saying that the agreement arose out of "a valid public-private partnership between the city and a community", and that "[e]very issue will be given a 'race' twist" in the run-up to the election (Zille, 2010, January 28).

The article on 27 January in *The Times* gives us the chronological facts since 2007. The DA-led government in Cape Town began a process of upgrading the 222 unserviced shack settlements in 2007 around Cape Town, including Makhaza (Mnqasela, 2010, January 27). The budget allowed for one flush toilet for every five families, which was in line with the national "norm" for the upgrading of the unserviced shack settlements (*ibid.*). The city initially planned to build 300 fully working and covered toilets for the Makhaza community, but in the process of discussing the project, the community requested that each family should have its own toilet (*ibid.*). The ANC councillor of Ward 95, Nolufefe Gexa, supported this request, and it was agreed that the city would stretch the budget so that each family could have its own toilet while families would construct their own enclosures (*ibid.*). Then the city completed installing the 1316 toilets instead of building completely the initial 300 communal toilets by the end of 2009, and the residents successfully enclosed 1265 toilets while 51 families could not afford it (*ibid.*). There is no official evidence that the agreement between the city and the community exists, which both the city and the community admitted, but considering the fact that almost all of the households successfully enclosed their toilets,

"there is little denying of the agreement", Hartley told me during the interview with me (A. Hartley, personal communication, 31 August 2010). And given that I found quite a few communal concrete-covered toilets during my fieldwork in Makhaza, this 2007 project was not the first attempt to build communal toilets in this area. The city had already built some communal toilets before 2007, and then the community rejected the 2007 project of building more communal toilets. This is consistent with what Plato said above.

While the ANC supporters and the DA supporters kept criticising each other, the issue was gradually developing into the broader arguments on poor service delivery and "the right to basic sanitation" for the South African people as a whole (Silber, 2010, February 3). Gavin Silber, the co-ordinator of an NGO called the Social Justice Coalition (SJC), stated like this:

> What has been overlooked, however, is that these rights are denied to millions in South Africa on a daily basis. [...] The protracted absence of the basic services that many of us take for granted and the failure to acknowledge this deficit has resulted in the normalisation of suffering, and the routine violation of basic human rights. [...] we have a duty to hold the incumbent city and provincial government accountable in ensuring that norms and standards are maintained. The Water Service Act (108 of 2007) notes how everyone has the right to "basic sanitation" [...] it states that the municipality or local council is responsible for ensuring access to water services: that local government has failed to take responsibility for this incident must be strongly condemned. We must, however, also acknowledge that this is not an isolated case and certainly not limited to the DA's term of government. It should not be used as ammunition of mudslinging, but rather as an opportunity to initiate dialogue and action on an issue that has been neglected for too long (*ibid.*).

The SJC was organised in 2008 "by a diverse group of individuals from the Cape Town community who had come together in the Civil Society response to the xenophobia crisis" (Social Justice Coalition, 2011). It is based in Khayelitsha and forms a movement to protest against the failure of the government regarding service delivery, accountability and the failure of governments at all levels to implement the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution. The SJC has, like other pro-poor non-government organisations, used the Constitution and courts to hold the government to account. Regarding the toilet issue, it organised several direct actions and has been at the forefront of a campaign focused on the delivery of clean

and safe toilets to the residents of informal settlements in Khayelitsha (Social Justice Coalition, 2010a). At the time, they tried to draw attention to sanitation standards in townships and encouraged people "to see an issue which is seldom discussed (given its private nature), but fundamentally important to one's daily routine, making mainstream headline news" (*ibid.*). Their intension was to prompt debate around "the complex issue of delivery of sanitation services", and "the broader issue of improving service delivery" through better consultation with communities (*ibid.*). After the SJC took part in the issue, Helen Zille "changed tack" and "apologised for the unenclosed toilets debacle" (Warner, 2010, May 17). However, despite her apology, the issue did not calm down and big collision was brought out at the end of May.

## Kill the Boer! Kill the Farmer! (End of May – Beginning of June 2010)

On 24 May, Dan Plato personally supervised the erection of 51 enclosures, but shortly before the last enclosure was erected, the ANCYL and the Ward 95 Development Forum members began demolishing them (Hartley, 2010, May 25). They told residents to join them and while some of them participated, others watched in shock or tried to stop the destruction (*ibid.*). Some of the residents tried to save their enclosures, but were told by the members of the ANCYL and the Ward 95 Development Forum that "the community had rejected the corrugated enclosures and wanted concrete ones" (*ibid.*). Plato said that he made an agreement with the ANCYL and the Ward 95 Development Forum that open toilets would be enclosed by the city (*ibid.*). He also went from house to house and interviewed each household to get residents' permission for enclosures, and then residents signed an agreement (*ibid.*). According to Chumile Sali, Plato "created the impression" that the enclosures would be concrete ones, and he asked the residents only two questions during the interviews: 1) Do you want the city to enclose your toilet? 2) Do you want the city to offer you the materials? (C. Sali, personal communication, 23 October 2010). There was no mention of the enclosing materials, and Andile Lili insisted that nobody told the residents what materials would be used (Hartley, 2010, May 25). The residents once signed the agreement, but at the community meeting after the agreement, the community decided to reject the enclosures if they were not concrete ones (*ibid.*). Plato blamed the ANCYL, saying, "Ninety-nine percent agreed they

want this. […] The ANCYL don't respect the wishes of the broader community. They are not truthful" (*ibid.*). In return, the ANCYL vowed to make Cape Town "ungovernable" and warned that council property would be vandalised or destroyed because the city had failed to provide proper services in informal settlements (Hartley & Mtyala, 2010, May 26). "This is not a joke. We are serious", said the executive member of the ANCYL Dullah Omar branch, Loyiso Nkohla (*ibid.*).

Then, a violent confrontation sparked. Shortly before dawn on 31 May, the City Council sent contract staff to Makhaza, escorted by about 50 heavily armed Metro Police officers, and they smashed the remaining open toilets and loaded them on to trucks (Hartley & Ndenze, 2010, June 1). This surprising action by the city reportedly incensed the Makhaza residents, who "responded by barricading the streets with burning tyres" and confront the police officers (*ibid.*). The police fired rubber bullets and a woman was injured after the police officers and residents traded blows during one of the stand-offs (*ibid.*). Hartley and Ndenze (2010) reported that this confrontation saw "racism accusations" levelled against the DA-led council, since the residents chanted "kill the boer, kill the farmer" as they toyi-toyied[5] and hurled insults at the police (*ibid.*). Tempers temporarily calmed when the ANC provincial task team leader Membathisi Mdladlana and the Human Settlements Deputy Minister Zoe Kota arrived (*ibid.*). After he saw where toilets had been removed, Mdladlana said that the ANC supported the ANCYL's campaign for better sanitation, saying about violent protests and burning tyres, "We will never stop our people from engaging in struggle as long as it is disciplined" (*ibid.*).



On the next day, this single protest over toilet enclosures in Makhaza evolved into the big protests throughout Khayelitsha against poor services (Hartley & Mtyala, 2010, June 2). The residents again started burning tyres in Baden Powell Drive in the evening on 31 May, and then it spread to Mew Way, close to N2 freeway, Walter Sisulu Drive in Makhaza and an area near the R300 highway (*ibid.*). In the morning on 1 June, passing vehicles on the N2 freeway were pelted with stones as residents of Taiwan informal settlement in Site C protested along Mew Way and burned rubbish in the street (*ibid.*). While the N2 freeway was

[5] "Toyi-toyi" means "strike" or "protest" in the local language in South Africa (Mr. R, personal communication, 15 October 2010).

closed intermittently as the police tried to restore order, about 60 residents of Makhaza marched to Baden Powell Drive joined by Nkanini residents (*ibid.*). They burned tyres, forcing motorists to turn away, and burning barricades were erected in Walter Sisulu Drive (*ibid.*). By the noon on 1 June, several fires extinguished earlier had been restarted, a pall of black smoke hung over Khayelitsha (*ibid.*). The police fired rubber bullets as well as stun grenades and 32 people were in the police custody, which caused another marching by the protesters to the Harare police station, calling for the release of the detained people (*ibid.*). In a scene reminiscent of anti-apartheid protests, the residents were singing "Senzeni na Senzeni na?" (What have we done, what have we done?) during their protests (*ibid.*).

From these articles, we can say that the series of violent protest action is led by the ANCYL. But not only the ANCYL, but also the South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO) in other area than Makhaza warned that demonstrations would continue in other townships over a lack of electricity and poor sanitation (Hartley & Pietersen, 2010, June 3). SANCO chairperson in Kuyasa, Nuluvo Lime said, "We are not going to stop until we get decent services. Our children are getting sick" (*ibid.*). Also, the residents of Ndlovini[6] area in Khayelitsha took the streets in the morning on 2 June, demonstrating against insufficient toilets, housing issues and minimal economic development (Jassiem, Makinana & Prince, 2010, June 2). One of the residents said that the people of Ndlovini had not been protesting in solidarity with their Makhaza counterparts, and that Ndlovini protest was not political but a cry for the city to install adequate services in their area (*ibid.*). The resident said, "This protest was not organised by any organisation. It was the community who came together and decided to protest to bring attention to their plight" (*ibid.*). Even outside Khayelitsha, at the north of Cape Town, 140 kilometres up the N1 highway to De Doorns, a refugee rights group accused Helen Zille of leaving 300 displaced Zimbabweans in a camp without a single toilet (Majavu, 2010, June 3). The protests spread even to a refugee camp around Cape Town. While the SJC strongly condemned the ANCYL for being too violent, it continued to accuse the city of not ensuring human rights of residents in Khayelitsha (Social Justice Coalition, 2010b).



[6] Ndlovini, also called Monwabisi Park, is an informal settlement situated near Khayelitsha cemetery (Levy & Poswa, 2006:7).

## Findings by the SAHRC and Legal Action by Residents (After Mid-June 2010)

On 11 June, the SAHRC finally published the report on this case, in response to the plea made by the ANCYL in January. The report concludes that the city violated "the right to dignity" as envisaged by section 10 of the Constitution by not enclosing the toilets (South African Human Rights Commission, 2010:9). It says that the city's project to provide flush toilets for all residents was "reasonable" and "commendable" considering it tried to avoid the impact of budget limitations and to achieve the facilitation of access to sewage systems to all in the community (South African Human Rights Commission, 2010:7). However, the "manner" in which the project was implemented was "not reasonable" because no provision was made for "those who were unemployed and poor", and issues of access for "those who with disability" and issues of safety for "those most vulnerable to violence" do not seem to have featured in the planning and implementation of this project (South African Human Rights Commission, 2010:8). The report also refers to the alleged actions by the community of removing the corrugated metal sheets the city provided on 30 May as it "cannot be condoned" but it has to be said that "given the high rate of crime in the area in question, corrugated iron sheeting cannot be regarded as adequate or safe enclosures (*ibid.*). It is recommended that the city should re-install the 51 toilets and adequately enclose them immediately with more durable structures, as well as ensure proper lighting (South African Human Rights Commission, 2010:9).



After the report published by the SAHRC, Helen Zille, Dan Plato, the ANCYL, and the Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs Minister Sicelo Shiceka held a meeting on 24 June (Hartley, 2010, June 25). When one of the ANCYL members, Loyiso Nkohla, insulted Zille and Plato, they "stormed out" of the meeting and negotiation broke off (*ibid.*).

While the solution to the conflict could not be found, on 27 June SANCO invited a Paarl company called the Darrow Pre-Cast to help solve the problem (Hartley, 2010, June 28). SANCO arranged for the company to train people in Makhaza how to manufacture pre-cast toilet structures, and the owner of the company, Jeff Franciscus, said that he would donate the first 100 toilet structures produced during the skill training period to people most in need in

the area (*ibid.*). The president of the national SANCO Ruth Bhengu said, "Service delivery does not mean only to provide a toilet. It has to have a community development component, particularly in poor areas where people are unskilled and unemployable. As Sanco [*sic*], we are also interested in the empowerment of people and we inculcate the culture of responsibility" (*ibid.*). The toilet issue seemed to head for a peaceful end with this plan, but the process has been postponed since Franciscus faced two unrelated summonses in connection with thousands of Rands owed to business people and also had two complaints of fraud and theft lodged against him (Hartley, 2010, August 3). Also, the city did not allow him to build a factory there because the land had to be reasoned and took a long time to do it (A. Hartley, personal communication, 31 August 2010).

On 24 August, a lawyer was employed to take legal action against the City Council, and the issue was brought up for trial and the case is still under trial at the time of writing this thesis (January 2011), as well as violent protest action keep going on in Khayelitsha from time to time (Hartley, 2010, August 25).

The interesting point of this case is that the issue has two distinctive aspects: politicking by the ANCYL and protest against poor services by communities. Indeed, various intensions by the DA, the ANCYL, communities, NGOs, and a private company, are complicatedly interlacing. One thing you have to bear in mind is that Andile Lili wears 'two hats': he is chairperson of the Ward 95 Development Forum and at the same time a member of the ANCYL. This means that the opinions of the Ward 95 Development Forum might reflect those of the ANCYL. Indeed, because the narrative above is gained mostly from newspapers, the terms such as "communities" or "residents" are too vague to figure out who represents what. The next chapter analyses in detail who are involved in and who are not, and examines the pathologies and injustices of civil society reflected in this case.

# Chapter III – Analysing the 'Toilet War'

## Introduction

My research field is called Zone 14, one of the small sections in Makhaza. There are about 300 households in Zone 14, all of which are shack settlements. The residents came from either Silvertown (SST) or Town 2, nearby Zone 14. In 2006, the City Council built basic infrastructures such as roads, electricity and communal toilets (one for every five households) in Zone 14, so as to encourage some residents from Silvertown and Town 2 to immigrate due to overcrowding there. Then people moved in and built their own shacks. Most of the residents who could not afford to enclose their own toilets are concentrated in Zone 14, and this is the place where the rampage started. I walked around this area by myself once or twice a week from September 2010 to January 2011, talking to and asking the residents about the issue. I also attended a couple of community meetings.



## The 'Toilet War' for the Civil Rights

The 'toilet war' reflects an aspect of civil society in South Africa, which is generally celebrated as a space for action to promote social justice. The typical example is the SJC. As seen in the former chapter, they have organised several demonstrations and released some articles in public regarding this issue. What is outstanding regarding their role is that they developed the issue into the broader arguments on poor service delivery and the "right to basic sanitation" for South Africans as a whole (Silber, 2010, February 3). They proclaimed that this kind of humiliating situation is not unique to Makhaza or the DA-led government, and that millions of South Africans are suffering from the same kind of problems. Their action is for the poor and the marginalised in South Africa, with an emphasis on the residents of Makhaza.

The SAHRC is another example of an organisation working for civil rights. In response to the plea made by the ANCYL, they concluded that the city violated "the right to dignity" as envisaged by section 10 of the Constitution by not enclosing the toilets (South African Human Rights Commission, 2010:9). They also admit that the city's project to provide flush toilets for all residents beyond the "national norm", one toilet for every five households, was reasonable and commendable. Nevertheless, they accused the city because no consideration was made for those who were unemployed and poor, those who suffer with a disability, and those most vulnerable to violence. Their concern is also the protection of human rights, and they require the city to re-install the 51 toilets and adequately enclose them immediately with more durable structures, as well as ensure proper lighting.

Although ultimately it did not play a successful role in the case, the Darrow Pre-Cast, a company arranged for training the unemployed in Makhaza and offering pre-cast toilet structures, seems to be another example. The owner of the company, Jeff Franciscus, said, "We stated categorically that we want to employ only those people who are unemployed. We also made it clear we do not want any political involvement" (Hartley, 2010, June 28). His business model included setting up a pre-cast factory in Makhaza, where the demand was high as it reduced transportation costs. It was going to give employees a 49 percent stake in the factory on condition that they were equipped to sustain the factory and run the business successfully on their own (*ibid.*). If their plan was accepted and implemented, the toilet issue could have been resolved in a peaceful way. As a private company their primary objective should have been to make a profit, but their plan in fact was to create jobs for the poor and the unemployed around Makhaza.

Despite these attempts to ensure the civil rights of the residents in Zone 14, other aspects of civil society interfered with securing the human rights and dignity of "the poorest of the poor" there. The "community", the ANCYL and the Ward 95 Development Forum refused and destroyed the corrugated enclosures which the city built, and the City Council finally demolished the open toilets themselves. Why did that happen? Who is this "community"?

Why is the ANCYL involved in this issue? Why are they not representing the interests of those who could not afford their enclosures?

## The 'Toilet War' for the Community

Firstly, we examine the general decision-making process in Zone 14, where there are three types of community meetings: regular SANCO leaders meetings, regular Street Committee meetings and irregular general meetings (V. Magxabhela, personal communication, 23 October 2010). SANCO has a strong presence in Zone 14, and when the residents mention "community leaders", it usually means 15 members of SANCO in Zone 14. Leaders meetings are held once a week and only 15 SANCO members are allowed to attend. The meetings deal with issues specifically in Zone 14, and they are closed to the public. When I observed one of the leaders meetings for a short time, they did not tell me what they were going to discuss since they discuss their "personal issues" in Zone 14 (Anonymous, personal communication, 14 November 2010). I asked a couple of questions regarding the toilet issues, but was forced to leave the meeting after that.

The Street Committees play a subordinate role to SANCO in Zone 14. To be precise, the residents firstly formed the Street Committees and they were integrated into SANCO (V. Magxabhela, personal communication, 23 October 2010). The SANCO members are also the leaders of each Street Committee, all of which hold weekly meetings as well. The Street Committees are based on each street in Zone 14, and when there is an issue between residents the Street Committees will deal with it first. If the Street Committees cannot resolve the issue, then they take the matter to SANCO. There are several sections in the Street Committees such as housing, education, health, security, and they deal with those kinds of issues respectively. The residents also consult with the Street Committees in order to get permission to sell their shack or land.

General meetings are held when necessary. I did not have a chance to attend any of the general meetings, but their topics include security, a "naughty boy" in Zone 14, etc. (Lulu, personal communication, 13 November 2010). The residents are informed about the meetings by a car making announcements with a loud speaker beforehand. They can vote only when they elect the leaders and chairpersons for the Street Committees or SANCO in Zone 14, which happens every two years, but otherwise they just discuss issues by talking (Lulu, personal communication, 15 January 2011; V. Magxabhela, personal communication, 29 September 2010). It is not compulsory for the residents to attend the general meetings. In fact, they often miss the meetings because they "go to church" or they are "busy with their work" (Lulu, personal communication, 13 November 2010; Mandi, personal communication, 20 October 2010; Shepard, personal communication, 29 September 2010). Moreover, considering one resident's statement that she does not have to go to the meetings because her husband usually goes there and can tell her what is going on, the general meetings are rather the place for announcement to the residents than the place for decision-making by the residents (Lulu, person communication, 7 November 2010).

As you can see, Zone 14 usually has a very hierarchical, but systematic, democratic structure of associational activities. Indeed, they even organise a self-patrol organisation by themselves and 83 members patrol Zone 14 every hour from 21:00 to 02:00 every night (David, personal communication, 7 November 2010; V. Magxabhela, personal communication, 23 October 2010). One possible reason for their strong association is that most of the residents moved into Zone 14 from the same area (Silvertown and Town 2, which are close to each other) at the same time in 2006. One resident told me that they knew each other before they moved in (Lulu, personal communication, 15 January 2011). Thus it is unlikely that the ANCYL has carried out a series of action against the will of residents in Zone 14. In fact, when I attended one of the SANCO leaders meetings, they all agreed that "in the media it looked like the ANCYL was agitating the community but it was the decision of the entire community" (Anonymous, personal communication, 14 November 2010). The leaders are democratically elected by the residents in Zone 14, and the residents have opportunities to discuss the issues with the leaders directly. Also, 15 SANCO members reflect the general profiles of the residents in Zone 14: males and females are equally balanced, not well-educated, not fluent in English, and middle-aged.

However, ironically, this systematic, participatory and democratic structure of decision-making process in Zone 14 marginalises "the poorest of the poor", who are supposed to be protected by civil society. Civil society in Zone 14 reflects one of the injustices of democracy itself: "ignorance of the minority". The poorest of the poor in Zone 14, who could not afford their toilet enclosures, are marginalised not only from the policy-making level in the City Council, but also from the decision-making level in the community. They wanted the enclosure even if it was zinc, but their voice was oppressed and ignored by the community. An article shows how the destruction of the enclosures provided by the city was against the will of the residents who did not have their enclosures.

> A tearful resident, who refused to give her name as she feared intimidation, said: "It was humiliating to use the toilet when people see you. There is covering now, but look at this (destruction). It is not what I want." Resident Phillip Bayapeli and his wife tried in vain to save their enclosure, but were told the community had rejected the corrugated enclosures and wanted concrete ones (Hartley, 2010, May 25).

One of the SANCO members in Zone 14 also told me that the residents wanted the enclosures even if they were made from zinc. He enclosed his own toilet by himself and helped to break down the zinc wall with the ANCYL, but said:

> I want it [the enclosure offered by the city] for my people. Young ladies have to cover themselves with blanket [when they use the open toilets]. Someone has no roof so they have to cover themselves with blanket when it is raining (V. Magxabhela, personal communication, 29 September 2010).

His wish was not realised because he was the only one who wanted the corrugated enclosures which the city offered. When I walked around Zone 14, I found no households which enclosed their toilets with a concrete structure. This is not surprising given that all the

households in Zone 14 are actually shack settlements. Indeed, almost every household in Zone 14 enclosed their toilets with corrugated walls. Nonetheless, nobody could do anything against the decision, which had democratically been made by the community leaders.

## The 'Toilet War' for the Partisan

The decisions over the toilet issue themselves were more or less legitimate in terms of the decision-making process in Zone 14. Therefore, the question is: even though some residents kept suffering, why did the SANCO members make such decisions? There was overwhelming intervention by the ANCYL. To be precise, the toilet issue was virtually entrusted by SANCO in Zone 14 to the ANCYL, especially to Andile Lili and Chumile Sali. When I talked with the chairperson of SANCO in Zone 14, he said, "They [Lili and Sali] know everything about toilet problems. They will report me everything. They are good guys. They are in charge of that thing" (Tolo, personal communication, 20 November 2010). Although the community leaders in Zone 14 may be the SANCO members, the "commander" of the 'toilet war' is the ANCYL. And the ANCYL and the residents in Zone 14 respectively have their own purposes to get involved in the 'toilet war'. Firstly we look at the "partisan" purposes of the ANCYL.



The presence of the ANCYL in Zone 14 is partial and specialised in the toilet issue. One of the SANCO members in Zone 14 said, "They do not always come to the community meeting. They come only when they have something to say" (V. Magxabhela, personal communication, 29 September 2010). Indeed, neither Lili nor Sali is a member of the SANCO or a leader of the Street Committee, and Sali had not even lived in Khayelitsha until the beginning of 2010 (C. Sali, personal communication, 23 October 2010). He moved into Lili's shack in Zone 14 after the 'toilet war' started. They met each other through the ANCYL. The majority of the residents in Zone 14 are not well-educated, but Sali is currently studying law at the University of the Western Cape. He is the one who wrote the plea to the SAHRC, which is invoking the discourse of constitutional jurisprudence. This skewed presence of the ANCYL in Zone 14 already tells how politicised the toilet issue is.

The ANCYL allegedly appealed to the SAHRC to intervene and punish the City Council for the sake of the Makhaza residents' "rights to dignity and respect" (Solomons, 2010, January 20). However, their incentive is not purely for the Makhaza residents' dignity and respect. They frame another plot: to paint a picture of bad governance by the DA. It was strange from the beginning that the ANCYL, not the Ward 95 Development Forum or SANCO in Zone 14, directly lodged the complaint to the SAHRC. The Ward 95 Development Forum is supposed to represent the interests of residents in Ward 95 and communicate with the ward councillor, but the chairperson of the forum, Andile Lili, is also a member of the ANCYL. As Hartley told me during my interview, the forum is "for ANCYL" (A. Hartley, personal communication, 31 August 2010). In fact, before the ANCYL sent the plea to the SAHRC, the forum did not bring the issue to the sub-council meeting via the ward councillor there. As Stuart Pringle, the chairperson of Sub-Council 10 said, "We had a community meeting [sub-council meeting] last Wednesday and nobody raised this matter" (Hartley, 2010, January 25). The forum as well as the ANCYL did not use the participatory processes of decision-making to express the residents' grievances up to the government. The toilet problems would not necessarily have been resolved even if they had undertaken a legitimate procedure. But by going straight to the SAHRC, the ANCYL attracted public attention and created a picture of bad governance by the DA.



I also heard an interesting story about the Darrow Pre-Cast. Whilst both Hartley and Sali told me that the city did not allow the company to carry out its plan, one of the SANCO members told me that the ANCYL was also against the plan (A. Hartley, personal communication, 31 August 2010; V. Magxabhela, personal communication, 23 October 2010; C. Sali, personal communication, 23 October 2010). He said:

> Youth League is actually refusing the Paarl company to do so because they assume the company would charge a lot of money after installing concrete structure to the community, and the community then would not afford it. They also want the City to install the concrete structure, because it is what the city should do. I think they just want to accuse DA. The other day, when eTV was here to investigate the toilet issues,

> they only defended their [ANCYL] side (V. Magxabhela, personal communication, 23 October 2010).

What he was trying to explain is that the ANCYL does not say anything disadvantageous about themselves in public, such as the fact that they were refusing the Darrow Pre-Cast. Whilst they kept saying that "this is not about politics but human rights and dignity", the ANCYL actually left the Makhaza residents' human rights and dignity violated by refusing and destroying the enclosures which the city provided (A. Lili, personal communication, 13 November 2010; C. Sali, personal communication, 23 October 2010). What the ANCYL was doing was just an attempt to make the city build concrete enclosures, without seeking any alternatives. This is because the ANCYL wanted to keep criticising the DA for bad governance.

The statements of the members of the ANCYL also reveal their true aim. They only accuse the DA of bad governance, and never criticise the system of service delivery or neo-liberalism in South Africa. When I interviewed Lili, he said, "The DA-led city and the Western Cape are such an arrogant government ever. If they keep doing like that, all the local municipalities will turn out to be chaos next January. We ANCYL have a capacity" (A. Lili, personal communication, 13 November 2010). Loyiso Nkohla also said that "it was typical of the DA-run city to look after the interests of their predominantly white and coloured electorate while neglecting the needs of the black community" (Kalipa, 2010, January 25). "Divide and rule is what the DA are doing", said Nkohla. (*ibid.*). They do not criticise the ideology or systems behind the issues but accuse only one political party. This is not usual amongst the general protests or social movements in South Africa, which were overviewed in Chapter 1. The ANCYL surely have partisan purposes in their mind.

The ANCYL seems to be less interested in participatory processes of decision-making or even the welfare of the poor, and more interested in scoring political points against the DA. However, the residents in Zone 14, especially the SANCO members, are not necessarily protesting just to accuse the DA. In this sense, there is disjuncture between the leadership of the 'toilet war' and its followers. This is what Egan and Wafer (2006) recognised between

leadership and its base in the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee. Since the commander of the 'toilet war', the ANCYL, always tries to politick and make the DA-led city compensate, it is difficult for the residents in Zone 14 to seek for an alternative way of getting the enclosures.

## The 'Toilet War' for the Pride

The residents in Zone 14 were furious about the very fact that they were given toilets without enclosures. It is true that they were angry at what the DA had done, but their claim is not necessarily condemning the DA. Rather, they were fighting for black people, who have been suffering oppression through decades of apartheid and continue to do so even now. The statement from the chairperson of SANCO in Zone 14 illustrates this well. With tears of wrath, he said to me:

> I don't want to talk about that. It is too much for me. You know Nelson Mandela? When Nelson Mandela was released and became the president, we were promised that kind of things would never never never never never happen again. But look at this toilet. I can show you, this is not for human. I'm telling you. You know coloured? White people, coloured people, never use this kind of toilet. I am for the ANC. I cannot change it. If I want to leave the ANC, I cannot do that (Tolo, personal communication, 13 November 2010).

Also when I attended the SANCO leaders meeting, I heard the same kind of things. They told me that all the SANCO members were there when Zone 14 residents were destroying the corrugated enclosures which the city built. One of the members said, "The community did not agree to those open toilets. White people never use these kinds of toilets" (Anonymous, personal communication, 14 November 2010). Their object of anger is rather white people or racism itself than the DA, a mere political party. For the residents in Zone 14, the fact that the non-ANC government built the open toilets for black people invokes what happened to them in the past. To them, the 'toilet war' is not about politics or community, but about black

people, who are still fighting against the ghost of apartheid. When they refer to the ANC, it is not just a political party, but a "liberation movement" with which they fought against apartheid (Seekings, 1998:1). Indeed, it is SANCO which arranged the Darrow Pre-Cast to manufacture concrete structures for the Makhaza residents. When the owner of the company got into trouble, they tried to organise another company to undertake the task, one of the SANCO members in Zone 14 told me (V. Magxabhela, personal communication, 29 September 2010). For them, the enclosures do not necessarily come from the city, since their aim is not to paint a picture of bad governance by the DA. Their only aim is to overcome the racism in South Africa and recover their pride as black people.

However, it is not racism behind the provision of open toilets. It is neo-liberalism spread in South African policies that made it happen. The city's project to provide open toilets to be enclosed by the residents, which Helen Zille called "a valid public-private partnership between the city and a community", is a tricky one (Zille, 2010, January 28). As we discussed in Chapter 1, the real public participation is actually undermined and civil society is placed in a subordinate position to political society under the recent neo-liberal policies being implemented in South Africa. This toilet issue is not an exception, and reflects the flaw of neo-liberal policies. And the fact that the DA is in a ruling position in the City Council and in the Western Cape makes the situation more complicated and reminiscent of apartheid.



When I interviewed Nolufefe Gexa, the councillor of Ward 95, she told me how the city's project was top-down and how little she could do for her constituency. She attends the meetings of Sub-Council 10 (Charlotte Maxeke) once a month, which consists of five wards including Ward 95. Her job is to represent the interests of Ward 95 and to give her constituency feedback of the meetings. The Ward 95 Development Forum takes place once a week, and she is called for other meetings with the residents when necessary. Asked about open toilets, she answered:

> Of course people did not agree and I did not agree either. But I could not do anything. I just report back what the city said during the meeting. The city just wants development to happen by making open toilets, but I disagreed. I am a better

> councillor. But I am not a decision maker or on implementation side, so I cannot do anything. The city officials just come and make toilets without enclosures (N. Gexa, personal communication, 15 November 2010).

What she said gives a vivid description of "top-down" mechanism of policy implementation in Cape Town. Indeed, when I observed one of the Sub-Council 10 meetings in November, I came across a similar situation. At that time, the city officials presented their plan, which intended to charge informal traders tariffs for taking public spaces for their business. The chairperson, Stuart Pringle, emphasised the importance of discussing tariffs. He said, "This is an important issue. The city is charging your communities. This is obviously public participation process" (S. Pringle, personal communication, 15 November 2010). After a brief explanation by Pringle, a report by the city officials on their research about the situations of informal traders in Sub-Council 10 and the reasonable rate of tariffs followed. Gexa raised a strong objection to this plan, saying, "People cannot pay the money. We must not charge them money" (N. Gexa, personal communication, 15 November 2010). Then Pringle answered, "I can agree with the principle, but then where is the money coming from? Given the report by the officials, affordability issue is taken into account. Do you recommend other wards should pay for it? We can do that if you want. It is not impossible" (S Pringle, personal communication, 15 November 2010). Then Gexa answered, "I cannot agree as a councillor, as the Ward 95 Development Forum, but I cannot do anything" (N. Gexa, personal communication, 15 November 2010).



Of course, complaints are inevitable when the government tries to charge taxes or tariffs, but the case above is a good example of the practice of cost recovery caused by neo-liberal policies. The city officials tried to justify the plan by using the term "public participation", but the truth is that the residents are charged money without being involved in decision-making. Although the city officials might have conducted research on the affordability of tariffs on informal traders, it was only sampled investigation and "the poorest of the poor" will not be able to afford it, as was the case with the open toilet issue. We can easily conjecture what happened when the city introduced their plan to build the open toilets.

Even though the shift to neo-liberalism was actually made by the ANC, together with the "explicit and very 'bullish' neo-liberal position" by the DA, whose leader is a white lady, the toilet issue causes disputes concerning racism amongst the residents in Khayelitsha (McDonald & Smith, 2004:1473). Some ANCYL members also called the DA racist, but this was more part of a wider strategy to undermine the DA for partisan purposes than level any serious accusations of racism. The strong emergence of "black consciousness" amongst the residents in Zone 14 is in line with the discussion in Chapter 1. Race is still an integral part of identity for the people in the Western Cape, especially under specific circumstances: "in the presence of ignorance and extended racialised socialisation, in the presence of marginalisation and lack of alternative sources of pride and self-esteem, and in the presence of enduring economic deprivation" (Bekker et al., 2000:234). This may not exactly be the same as "black civil society" or "ethnic sectionalism", for they do not necessarily exclude and attack the interests of other races. Nevertheless, the persistence of their "black consciousness" caused the decision to demand concrete rather than corrugated structures for their toilets, which in turn left the human rights and dignity of "the poorest of the poor" in Zone 14 violated. In addition, their rage against racism drove the protests in to becoming much more violent than the demonstrations organised by the SJC.



## Conclusion

Protests for civil rights in South Africa represent only one aspect of the 'toilet war'. There are people working to maintain the civil rights of the poor and marginalised, but there are others who are more concerned with issues of politics or pride in their identity as black South Africans. But the end result remains that the "poorest of the poor" are still deserted by democracy within the community, the partisan purpose, and the rage against the legacy of apartheid. Ironically, democratic and participatory processes of decision-making in the small community contribute toward ignoring the voices of the poorest of the poor, who are still the minority there. The partisan purpose and the rage against racism restrict the interest of the poorest of the poor, too. We also find a subtle but critical difference between the ANCYL, who commands the 'toilet war', and the residents in Zone 14, who follow them. Since it is difficult to separate the ANC from the anti-apartheid movements, it is not easy to tell whether

the residents in Zone14 are for the ANC as a political party or as an anti-apartheid apparatus. Yet, whilst the ANCYL aims to portrait a picture which shows bad governance by the DA, the residents in Zone 14 are fighting against the racism from which they suffered in the past. This disjuncture makes it difficult to seek for the alternative to making the city provide the concrete enclosures. At any rate, whether it is associational activities like community meetings or direct action like protests, civil society can reflect and reproduce many of the pathologies and social injustices in the wider society.

# Chapter IV – Quantitative Analysis of the Cape Area Study 2005

## Introduction

Using the survey data, this chapter identifies the correlates of participation in civil society so that we can infer why people participate. Specifically, I examine the correlation between some possible motivations to participate (income, demographic backgrounds, grievances with service delivery, grievances relating to the neighbourhood, political attitude, attitude towards neighbourhood, and psychological resources) and actual participation, so as to assess the relative importance of these different motivations. Firstly the distribution of grievances, including by race and class, is considered using descriptive statistics. As we reviewed in Chapter 1, income and grievances are considered to be the general motivation to participate in civil society in South Africa, so this descriptive analysis is important. Then I use regression analysis to examine the relationships between different categories of motivations and participation.



## Set the Variables

The Cape Area Study 2005 (CAS 2005) is a survey of aspects of "diversity and inequality" in the South African city of Cape Town (Seekings, Jooste, Langer, & Maughan-Brown, 2005:5). Sampling was designed to generate a representative sample of 1200 adults spread across metropolitan Cape Town (Seekings et al., 2005:16). The representativeness of the realised sample is not even, so weights are needed if the results are to be adjusted so that they are more representative of the overall population.

Using CAS 2005, three variables are selected or constructed as measures of people's participation in civil society[7]: D1.1_C – whether a respondent is a member or involved in a community-based group, e.g. neighbourhood watch or street committee; D39 – whether a respondent attended a community meeting during the past year; and a composite variable of D42, D44 and D45 – whether a respondent attended one of a demonstration, protest march, a boycott or a strike (which are collectively referred to as "protests") during the past year. Regarding a community-based group, only those who have membership are selected. Respondents who answered in D1.2_C "take part in activities but not a member" are excluded, in order to distinguish the difference between membership of organisation and mere participation in a community meeting or protests (the same thing applies to D1.1_A and D1.1_B, i.e. participation in a religious organisation and in a political party, which are used as explanatory variables later).

In CAS 2005, 11% (N=124) of the sample have membership of a community-based group, 33% (N=391) attended a community meeting and 14% (N=167) joined at least one of the protests during the past year (these data are exclusive of people who answered "Don't know"). Attending a community meeting is the most popular form of participation, according to CAS 2005 data.

As explanatory variables, several groups of variables are selected from CAS 2005. There are so many possible variables regarded as reasons for participation in civil society that the variables having no significant bivariate relationship with dependent variables are omitted. This is the case unless there are good reasons to believe that we need to control for them or they are of general interest. Also, if one variable is correlated with another variable, the more relevant variable is selected.

First of all, grievances and income are crucial explanatory variables in this analysis since those are generally considered as strong reasons for people to participate in protests in South Africa. Ngwane (2010) acknowledges two possible causes of protests: an economic factor,

[7] All the variables used in this chapter are shown in Appendix 1.

which is retrieved from the existence of "service delivery" problems attributed to the weaknesses of local government; and a political factor, which comes from poor governance and a deficient democracy (Ngwane, 2010). CAS 2005 contains a wide range of possible variables for grievances, and three groups of grievances are defined in accordance with Ngwane's argument. One group is grievances about service delivery by the government (C28-C31, C33-C36, G23), another is grievances over the performance of politicians (C10-11, C41-42), and the other is grievances over problems in the neighbourhood (D22.1-6, C32), although Ngwane has not mentioned the impact of the latter in protests. If Ngwane's argument is true, it is assumed that these variables have a strong correlation with dependent variables, especially with the variable for protests.

There are five ways of measuring income status of the respondents in CAS 2005. The respondents were asked how rich or poor they were, "relative to other people in South Africa" (B7). They were also asked which social class they think they are in, their monthly individual income, as well as monthly household income (F6, G16, G21). B7 (which I call "relative income") is asked in a scale of 0 to 10 but to compare with other income variables, five categories are set for this variable. Since the N of monthly individual income is too small (N=478, excluding "Don't know") to be used in a proper analysis, only monthly household income (N=947, excluding "Don't know") will be included. In addition, CAS 2005 calculates neighbourhood income on the basis of data on household incomes from the Population Census 2001, at the level of the local government ward. Neighbourhoods included in CAS 2005 sample can be divided into five neighbourhood income quintiles (NIQ), and a higher NIQ number represents richer NIQ. Seekings and Matisonn (2006) show that NIQ is in proportion to respondents' self-recognition of their relative income, as well as to self-reported social class. That is, the richer their NIQ is, the richer they categorise themselves. You can see that there is also a proportionate relationship between NIQ and monthly household income from Table 4.1. As with NIQ's relationships with relative income and social class, the higher the respondents' monthly household income is, the richer their neighbourhood income quintiles become. One note is that in NIQ 1 the most frequent monthly household income category is R1001-3000, not the poorest one, R0-1000. Figures 4.1-4 are histograms of each income variable. Although the frequency of "upper class" in social class is very small and NIQ is differently distributed from other variables, I use these variables as they are and compare the difference of results by each income variable.

| *Table 4.1: Monthly Household Income, by Neighbourhood Income Quintiles* | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | NIQ1 | NIQ2 | NIQ3 | NIQ4 | NIQ5 | Total |
| R0 - 1,000 | 36% | 26% | 13% | 13% | 1% | 20% |
| R1,001 - 3,000 | 43% | 38% | 25% | 25% | 11% | 30% |
| R3,001 - 5,000 | 17% | 26% | 27% | 25% | 19% | 22% |
| R5,001 - 10,000 | 3% | 9% | 30% | 27% | 28% | 18% |
| More than R10,000 | 1% | 1% | 5% | 10% | 41% | 10% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Notes: Answers "Refused" and "Don't know" were excluded.<br>Source: CAS 2005 | | | | | | |




*Figure 4.1: Histogram of Relative Income*




*Figure 4.2: Histogram of Social Class*




*Figure 4.3: Histogram of Monthly Household Income*




*Figure 4.4: Histogram of NIQ*

Political attitudes and religious attitudes are selected as other explanatory variables. It is important to see if political and religious attitudes are alternative or complementary to civil society. Political attitudes consist of the variables asking whether respondents think politics is "very important" (B3.4), whether they participate in a political party (D1.1_B), whether they pay attention to what is happening in government and politics "most of the time" (C2), and an index of how often the respondents voted in the national elections and the elections for the Cape Town City Council (C26 and C45). There is only one variable for religious attitudes that has significant relationship with dependent variables, that is, whether they participate in a religious organisation (D1.1_A). As stated before, regarding participation in a political party and a religious organisation, the respondents who do not have membership are excluded from analysis. Another group of explanatory variables is psychological resources. The selected variables are those who feel they are "totally in control" or "mostly in control" over what happens in their lives (B2.2), whether they "strongly agree" with the statement "If you had to, you would be able to get together with other people and make elected leaders listen" (C20), and those who think they can influence decisions taken by the Cape Town City Council "a lot" (C22). The causality of dependent variables and psychological resources is uncertain because these could be the consequence – not the cause – of participation in civil society. However, these psychological resources are important when you examine what civil society means for people, hence they are included.

Finally, several variables for demographics and attitudes towards neighbourhood are chosen. Variables for demographics are gender (G4), race (F5)[8], age (G3), education (G6), whether the respondent is head of household or not (G1), whether the respondent is working or not (G11), and living length in the neighbourhood[9] (D16). As far as a community-based group or a community meeting is concerned, how long people reside in the same neighbourhood can be considered as one of the important factors in participation. Also, whether or not the head of a household is related to responsibility or power, which could be another factor in participation too. Working status has two sides – whether one has time for participation and whether one has grievances. If one is working, he or she might not have time to participate,

[8] This is the report how people were or would have been classified under apartheid, and Asians/Indians and others are excluded because their sample number is too small.

[9] From now it is simply referred as "living length".

and considering the high unemployment rate in South Africa, it can be assumed that those who have a job have fewer grievances than those who are not working. People who are not working may have more grievances in their lives and also more time to take part in civil society.

Attitudes towards neighbourhood can play an important role when a community-based group and a community meeting are concerned. The variables chosen are those asking whether respondents think the neighbourhood in which they live is "very important" (B3.7) and an index for how much respondents agree with the sentiment "most people who live in this neighbourhood can be trusted" (D.13). It is assumed that the more important a person considers his or her neighbourhood and the more one trusts his or her neighbours, the higher the rate of participation in community activities can be.

Using these explanatory variables, simple tabulation can tell us many things about dependent variables. Also, the relationship amongst the explanatory variables should be sought for. Before moving onto regression analysis, let's take a close look at the variables.



## Descriptive Analysis on Participation in Civil Society

Now using the descriptive analysis we look at who is participating in civil society. CAS 2005 asked the following questions about the racial and cultural composition of the civil society organisations in which people participated.

> D5.1 Do most members of this group come from the same neighbourhood or do they come from different neighbourhoods?
>
> D5.2 Do most members of this group have about the same income or do they have very different incomes?
>
> D5.3 Do most members of this group have the same education or do they have different educations?

D5.4 Are most members of this group in the same racial or population group, or do they come from different racial / population groups?

These questions are useful to look at whether people are participating in cross-cultural, cross-class, and cross-racial organisations or not. Table 4.2 reveals that most members of organisations have different incomes and educations, but one-third of the respondents answered they were from the same neighbourhood, and half the respondents answered they were from the same racial/population group. In any organisation, and regardless of respondents' race, more or less half the respondents answered they were from the same race. This fact already shows that people are not participating in civil society purely because of their grievances or poorness.



***Table 4.2 Composition of the civil society organisations***

| | The same | Different | Don't know |
|---|---|---|---|
| Neighbourhood | 32% | 67% | 1% |
| Incomes | 8% | 86% | 6% |
| Educations | 7% | 89% | 4% |
| Racial/population groups | 49% | 50% | 1% |

Source: CAS 2005, D5.1-4

***Table 4.3: Tabulations of Community-based Group, Community Meeting and Protests***

| | | Community-based group | | Community meeting | | Protests | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Community-based group | No | - | - | 94% | 78% | 91% | 79% |
| | Yes | - | - | 6% | 22% | 9% | 21% |
| | Total | - | - | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Community meeting | No | 72% | 35% | - | - | 72% | 40% |
| | Yes | 28% | 65% | - | - | 28% | 60% |
| | Total | 100% | 100% | - | - | 100% | 100% |
| Protests | No | 88% | 72% | 92% | 74% | - | - |
| | Yes | 12% | 28% | 8% | 26% | - | - |
| | Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | - | - |
| Total | | 89% | 11% | 67% | 33% | 86% | 14% |

Notes: Answers "Refused" and "Don't know" were excluded. The variable for community-based group consists of respondents who participate in the group AND are members of the group.
Source: CAS 2005

Table 4.3 shows that there is a high correlation amongst those three variables. In particular, more than half of those who have membership in a community-based group, as well as more than half of those who joined protests, attended a community meeting during the past year (the values highlighted). All the three variables are correlated with one another, and attending a community meeting seems to be the most popular form of participation amongst them. This is not surprising because one can assume that it is the members of a community-based group who organise a community meeting, and that people should have a community meeting before they carry out protests to discuss the logistics of their action.

***Table 4.4: Participation in Civil Society, by Demographics***

| | Community-based group | Community meeting | Protests |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gender: | | | |
| -Male | 11% | 30% | 15% |
| -Female | 10% | 34% | 13% |
| Race: | | | |
| -Black | 19% | 49% | 18% |
| -Coloured | 4% | 24% | 16% |
| -White | 8% | 22% | 4% |
| Head of household or not | | | |
| -Head | 13% | 36% | 14% |
| -Not head | 7% | 26% | 14% |
| Working status | | | |
| -Working (full/part time) | 13% | 31% | 16% |
| -Not working | 9% | 33% | 12% |
| Living length in the neighbourhood | | | |
| -Less than a year | 13% | 29% | 5% |
| -1 to 5 years | 10% | 35% | 11% |
| -6 to 10 years | 9% | 35% | 14% |
| -More than 10 years | 12% | 32% | 16% |
| -Since birth | 7% | 31% | 20% |
| Total | 11% | 33% | 14% |

Notes: Results are weighted data. Answers "Refused" and "Don't know" were excluded. Race was defined as how the respondent reports he/she was or would have been classified under apartheid. Indian/Asian and others were omitted because the N was too small.
Source: CAS 2005

Table 4.4 shows the relationship between dependent variables and demographics. There is a subtle gender gap in participation. Whilst males are more likely to join community-based group and protests, females are more likely to attend a community meeting. Black people are most active in terms of participation in any activities, but when it comes to protests coloured people are as active as black people, whilst they are least likely to be members of a community-based group. Heads of household attend community meetings significantly more than community-based group or protests, their attendance of which is almost identical. What is distinctive is the result with working status. Initially, I assumed that people who have a job have fewer grievances and do not have time either, so that they are less likely to participate in civil society. However, the result shows more people with a job take part in a community-based group and protests than those who are unemployed. Community meetings are attended equally by the employed and unemployed. There is no significant relationship between living length and a community-based group or a community meeting, but as far as protests are concerned, it seems that the longer people live in the same neighbourhood, the more often they join protests.

Figures 4.5-10 show the predicted (fitted) probability and mean values of each dependent variable by age and by education. You can see that the relationship is not linear when you compare the scattered mean values with the lined predicted probability. Participation first rises and then falls with age. Regarding completed level of education, only a community meeting has significant relationship with education. It can be assumed that people with higher education have fewer grievances so are less likely to participate, but it is not clear why only a community meeting has this tendency.










***Figure 4.5 (Above Left): Predicted Probability and Mean Values of Community-based Group by Age***

***Figure 4.6 (Above Right): Predicted Probability and Mean Values of Community Meeting by Age***

***Figure 4.7 (Left): Predicted Probability and Mean Values of Protests by Age***










***Figure 4.8 (Above Left): Predicted Probability and Mean Values of Community-based Group by Education***

***Figure 4.9 (Above Right): Predicted Probability and Mean Values of Community Meeting by Education***

***Figure 4.10 (Left): Predicted Probability and Mean Values of Protests by Education***

Now we take a look at participation in civil society based on people's incomes. Table 4.5 shows the percentage of people participating in each activity within each income category. More or less monthly household income and NIQ show a pattern that the poorer people are, the more often they partake in activities, which is in line with my hypothesis. Self-assessed incomes – relative income and social class – are difficult to interpret, and especially relative income seems to have no explainable pattern of relationship with any activities. A community meeting has an obvious relationship with social class: the lower their social class is, the more they attend a community meeting.

| *Table 4.5: Participation in Civil Society, by Incomes* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Community-based group | Community meeting | Protests |
| Self evaluation of richness relative to other South Africans (relative income) | | | |
| 0 - 2 (very poor) | 15% | 43% | 16% |
| 3 - 4 (poor) | 8% | 30% | 15% |
| 5 (average) | 9% | 28% | 12% |
| 6 - 7 (rich) | 11% | 37% | 16% |
| 8 - 10 (very rich) | 19% | 32% | 19% |
| Self classification of social class | | | |
| Lower class | 16% | 44% | 14% |
| Working class | 10% | 32% | 19% |
| Middle class | 7% | 26% | 8% |
| Upper class | 16% | 16% | 16% |
| Monthly household income | | | |
| R0 - 1,000 (poorest) | 15% | 50% | 17% |
| R1,001 - 3,000 (poor) | 14% | 39% | 14% |
| R3,001 - 5,000 (average) | 10% | 28% | 15% |
| R5,001 - 10,000 (rich) | 10% | 24% | 15% |
| More than R10,000 (richest) | 13% | 28% | 8% |
| Neighbourhood income quintiles (NIQ) | | | |
| NIQ1 (poorest) | 19% | 46% | 19% |
| NIQ2 (poor) | 12% | 35% | 20% |
| NIQ3 (average) | 7% | 28% | 17% |
| NIQ4 (rich) | 4% | 30% | 9% |
| NIQ5 (richest) | 10% | 20% | 4% |
| Total | 11% | 33% | 14% |
| Notes: Results are weighted data. Answers "Refused" and "Don't know" were excluded.<br>Source: CAS 2005 | | | |



These data show the possibility that demographics, especially race, and absolute incomes, i.e. monthly household income and NIQ, can be highly but unevenly correlated with dependent variables. We have to bear in mind that Cape Town has a distinctive and substantive overlap between race and income: the black minority is “overwhelmingly poor”, and the white minority is “overwhelmingly affluent”, whilst the coloured people “spans the range from poor to rich” (Seekings & Matisonn, 2006:6). The next section examines whether this fact is reflected in CAS 2005, and also how grievances are related to race and incomes in the dataset.

## Race, Incomes, and Grievances

| *Table 4.6: Racial Composition of Income Variables* | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Black | Coloured | White | Total |
| Self evaluation of richness relative to other South Africans (relative income) | | | | |
| 0 - 2 (very poor) | 63% | 32% | 5% | 100% |
| 3 - 4 (poor) | 33% | 51% | 16% | 100% |
| 5 (average) | 26% | 49% | 25% | 100% |
| 6 - 7 (rich) | 30% | 25% | 45% | 100% |
| 8 - 10 (very rich) | 37% | 28% | 35% | 100% |
| Self classification of social class | | | | |
| Lower class | 75% | 24% | 1% | 100% |
| Working class | 29% | 54% | 17% | 100% |
| Middle class | 14% | 41% | 45% | 100% |
| Upper class | 18% | 23% | 59% | 100% |
| Monthly household income | | | | |
| R0 - 1,000 (poorest) | 69% | 29% | 2% | 100% |
| R1,001 - 3,000 (poor) | 59% | 37% | 4% | 100% |
| R3,001 - 5,000 (average) | 36% | 48% | 16% | 100% |
| R5,001 - 10,000 (rich) | 8% | 57% | 35% | 100% |
| More than R10,000 (richest) | 6% | 28% | 66% | 100% |
| Neighbourhood income quintiles (NIQ) | | | | |
| NIQ1 (most poor) | 84% | 15% | 1% | 100% |
| NIQ2 (poor) | 47% | 53% | 0% | 100% |
| NIQ3 (average) | 13% | 87% | 0% | 100% |
| NIQ4 (rich) | 11% | 58% | 31% | 100% |
| NIQ5 (most rich) | 12% | 8% | 80% | 100% |
| Total | 33% | 45% | 22% | 100% |

Notes: Answers "Refused" and "Don't know" were excluded. Race was defined as how the respondent reports he/she was or would have been classified under apartheid. Indian/Asian and others were omitted because the N was too small.
Source: CAS 2005



Table 4.6 shows the racial composition of each income variable. The data are in line with general common knowledge about Cape Town: black people are concentrated in poorer categories, white people are in richer categories, and coloured people are around the middle. The NIQ, especially, shows an intensive pattern of this fact. Relative income shows a weaker relationship with race compared to other income variables. More black people consider themselves to be richer, whilst more white people consider themselves to be poorer. This means that black people do not regard themselves as poor as much as white people do, in spite of the actual income difference between them. This implies white people are more likely to take it for granted that they can enjoy a high standard of living, whilst black people are

more likely to appreciate the fact that "Cape Town's poor are not poor in national terms" (Seekings & Matisonn, 2006:6). In any event, we can conclude that CAS 2005 reflects the general fact that there is a relationship between race and incomes in Cape Town.

The next question, then, is how are grievances related to race and incomes? From what we have investigated so far, you could easily assume that poorer people, who are overwhelmingly black, can have more grievances than richer people, that is, the majority of white people. Table 4.7 displays the weighted data of grievances by race. Overall, black people have the most grievances amongst them as expected, but some variables have opposite patterns. For instance, white people are most dissatisfied with the minibus taxi, bus and train services, and with the performance of the Mayor Nomaindia Mfeketo. They are followed by coloured people. The ANC was unusually in power in the City Council when CAS 2005 was conducted, so this might have affected the assessment of the Mayor by white people (even though this is not reflected in the assessment of the Provincial Premier Ebrahim Rasool). When you look at coloured people, they are distinctively dissatisfied with their cars being broken into or stolen, poor recreational facilities or roads, police, and the performance of the President Thabo Mbeki. Regarding political grievances, we cannot say that black people have specifically more grievances than coloured or white people. Their grievances are concentrated on neighbourhood problems or government service delivery, and notably more than half of black people do not have any flush toilet in their houses, whilst almost all coloured people and white people have at least one. When you look at the Pearson's chi-squared probability, there is no significant relationship with public health clinics or hospitals, as well as with the Premier. This suggests that there should be no difference in having grievances against the above two variables among race.

| *Table 4.7: Grievances, by Race* | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Black | Coloured | White | Pearson chi2 probability |
| Neighbourhood problems | | | | |
| -Drunks, vagrants or beggars | 76% | 63% | 49% | 0.00 |
| -Homes broken into | 71% | 64% | 52% | 0.00 |
| -Cars broken into or stolen | 54% | 61% | 52% | 0.03 |
| -Poor recreational facilities or roads | 31% | 55% | 15% | 0.00 |
| -Gangs | 62% | 36% | 5% | 0.00 |
| -Noisy neighbours or parties | 78% | 45% | 20% | 0.00 |
| -Minibus taxi | 37% | 59% | 81% | 0.00 |
| Dissatisfaction with government service delivery | | | | |
| -Electricity | 39% | 16% | 6% | 0.00 |
| -Water | 36% | 14% | 11% | 0.00 |
| -Public health clinics or hospitals | 59% | 59% | 55% | 0.50 |
| -Bus and train | 39% | 49% | 68% | 0.00 |
| -Police | 35% | 51% | 28% | 0.00 |
| -Road repairs and construction | 45% | 40% | 29% | 0.00 |
| -Housing | 63% | 56% | 40% | 0.00 |
| -Refuse collection | 43% | 14% | 10% | 0.00 |
| -No flush toilet in house | 57% | 1% | 0% | 0.00 |
| Political grievances | | | | |
| -President Mbeki performs badly | 10% | 19% | 13% | 0.00 |
| -Premier Rasool performs badly | 6% | 7% | 9% | 0.28 |
| -Mayor Mfeketo performs badly | 7% | 8% | 18% | 0.00 |
| -Ward councillor performs badly | 27% | 30% | 9% | 0.00 |
| Total | 33% | 45% | 22% | 100% |

Notes: Results are weighted data. Answers "Refused" and "Don't know" were excluded. Race was defined as how the respondent reports he/she was or would have been classified under apartheid. Indian/Asian and others were omitted because the N was too small.
Source: CAS 2005



Table 4.8-11 report weighted data of grievances by each of the income variables. Although there is a small difference amongst the results by each income variable, the data show similar kinds of result as were seen in the data of grievances by race. Generally, the poorer people are, the more grievances they have. Richer people, most of whom are white, are more likely to complain about transport. People in the middle income categories, most of whom are coloured, are more likely to have problems with cars being broken into or stolen, poor recreational facilities or roads, and police. One remarkable thing is that political grievances tend to have no significant relationship with income variables, according to each of Pearson's chi-squared probabilities. Even though some of them are significantly related with one or

more of those income variables, the relationship with income variables does not seem to be as strong as the relationship with race. This implies that race still plays a key role in politics of post-apartheid South Africa, at least for Capetonians. But when it comes to the performance of ward councillors, who are directly involved in government service delivery, incomes are more important to explain peoples' assessment of them. Finally, there is the case of people who have no flush toilet in their houses yet do not consider themselves to be poor. This demonstrates the point that people do not define their overall standard of wealth based on whether or not there is a flush toilet in their home.

These results so far show that there is a significant relationship between race and incomes in CAS 2005. Also, grievances are highly correlated with both race and incomes. However, the pattern of relationship between race and grievances and between incomes and grievances are more or less similar, so we cannot tell which have more influence on grievances. We can say that political grievances are more likely to be related with race than with income, but still we need to control race and incomes altogether, as well as grievances, to see why people get involved in civil society. Now, using regression analysis, we shall examine the reasons for people's participation in civil society.

| *Table 4.8: Grievances, by Relative Income* | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Very poor 0 - 2 | Poor 3 - 4 | Average 5 | Rich 6 – 7 | Very rich 8 - 10 | Pearson chi2 probability |
| Neighbourhood problems | | | | | | |
| -Drunks, vagrants or beggars | 71% | 69% | 62% | 60% | 47% | 0.00 |
| -Homes broken into | 74% | 66% | 60% | 61% | 44% | 0.00 |
| -Cars broken into or stolen | 57% | 65% | 56% | 53% | 28% | 0.00 |
| -Poor recreational facilities or roads | 48% | 44% | 38% | 16% | 23% | 0.00 |
| -Gangs | 56% | 34% | 36% | 19% | 28% | 0.00 |
| -Noisy neighbours or parties | 64% | 55% | 48% | 42% | 38% | 0.00 |
| -Minibus taxi | 53% | 55% | 52% | 54% | 48% | 0.86 |
| Dissatisfaction with government service delivery | | | | | | |
| -Electricity | 40% | 23% | 15% | 14% | 21% | 0.00 |
| -Water | 34% | 22% | 17% | 16% | 22% | 0.00 |
| -Public health clinics or hospitals | 66% | 63% | 51% | 58% | 47% | 0.00 |
| -Bus and train | 48% | 54% | 43% | 53% | 44% | 0.04 |
| -Police | 41% | 48% | 37% | 36% | 30% | 0.02 |
| -Road repairs and construction | 48% | 45% | 37% | 26% | 34% | 0.00 |
| -Housing | 67% | 60% | 48% | 56% | 47% | 0.00 |
| -Refuse collection | 36% | 24% | 18% | 23% | 15% | 0.00 |
| -No flush toilet in house | 37% | 22% | 14% | 15% | 22% | 0.00 |
| Political grievances | | | | | | |
| -President Mbeki performs badly | 14% | 14% | 15% | 12% | 14% | 0.94 |
| -Premier Rasool performs badly | 6% | 8% | 8% | 4% | 2% | 0.43 |
| -Mayor Mfeketo performs badly | 8% | 9% | 10% | 12% | 8% | 0.90 |
| -Ward councillor performs badly | 33% | 33% | 19% | 15% | 8% | 0.00 |
| Total | 20% | 22% | 40% | 13% | 5% | 100% |

Notes: Results are weighted data. Answers "Refused" and "Don't know" were excluded.
Source: CAS 2005

| *Table 4.9: Grievances, by Self Classification of Social Class* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Lower class | Working class | Middle class | Upper class | Pearson chi2 probability |
| Neighbourhood problems | | | | | |
| -Drunks, vagrants or beggars | 75% | 62% | 57% | 79% | 0.00 |
| -Homes broken into | 68% | 64% | 57% | 72% | 0.02 |
| -Cars broken into or stolen | 54% | 59% | 53% | 53% | 0.29 |
| -Poor recreational facilities or roads | 40% | 42% | 31% | 17% | 0.00 |
| -Gangs | 63% | 33% | 21% | 27% | 0.00 |
| -Noisy neighbours or parties | 73% | 51% | 37% | 21% | 0.00 |
| -Minibus taxi | 40% | 57% | 61% | 53% | 0.00 |
| Dissatisfaction with government service delivery | | | | | |
| -Electricity | 39% | 19% | 12% | 16% | 0.00 |
| -Water | 37% | 17% | 15% | 21% | 0.00 |
| -Public health clinics or hospitals | 58% | 61% | 55% | 67% | 0.37 |
| -Bus and train | 37% | 50% | 55% | 67% | 0.00 |
| -Police | 32% | 47% | 36% | 42% | 0.00 |
| -Road repairs and construction | 44% | 41% | 32% | 35% | 0.01 |
| -Housing | 61% | 56% | 51% | 44% | 0.03 |
| -Refuse collection | 39% | 19% | 16% | 16% | 0.00 |
| -No flush toilet in house | 48% | 17% | 5% | 11% | 0.00 |
| Political grievances | | | | | |
| -President Mbeki performs badly | 14% | 14% | 13% | 50% | 0.00 |
| -Premier Rasool performs badly | 6% | 6% | 8% | 24% | 0.04 |
| -Mayor Mfeketo performs badly | 7% | 8% | 14% | 27% | 0.02 |
| -Ward councillor performs badly | 25% | 26% | 20% | 25% | 0.60 |
| Total | 27% | 39% | 32% | 2% | 100% |
| Notes: Results are weighted data. Answers "Refused" and "Don't know" were excluded.<br>Source: CAS 2005 | | | | | |

| *Table 4.10: Grievances, by Monthly Household Income* | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | R0 - 1,000 | R1,001 - 3,000 | R3,001 - 5,000 | R5,001 - 10,000 | More than R10,000 | Pearson chi2 probability |
| Neighbourhood problems | | | | | | |
| -Drunks, vagrants or beggars | 81% | 72% | 60% | 62% | 50% | 0.00 |
| -Homes broken into | 67% | 70% | 64% | 65% | 68% | 0.64 |
| -Cars broken into or stolen | 54% | 61% | 59% | 63% | 58% | 0.53 |
| -Poor recreational facilities or roads | 39% | 41% | 42% | 40% | 23% | 0.02 |
| -Gangs | 63% | 57% | 42% | 22% | 7% | 0.00 |
| -Noisy neighbours or parties | 73% | 68% | 55% | 36% | 25% | 0.00 |
| -Minibus taxi | 37% | 48% | 53% | 64% | 76% | 0.00 |
| Dissatisfaction with government service delivery | | | | | | |
| -Electricity | 36% | 34% | 20% | 12% | 5% | 0.00 |
| -Water | 34% | 29% | 20% | 12% | 9% | 0.00 |
| -Public health clinics or hospitals | 54% | 60% | 55% | 63% | 61% | 0.45 |
| -Bus and train | 37% | 44% | 50% | 55% | 71% | 0.00 |
| -Police | 34% | 42% | 34% | 46% | 37% | 0.07 |
| -Road repairs and construction | 46% | 47% | 38% | 39% | 30% | 0.02 |
| -Housing | 65% | 64% | 52% | 49% | 41% | 0.00 |
| -Refuse collection | 38% | 32% | 21% | 13% | 13% | 0.00 |
| -No flush toilet in house | 45% | 38% | 17% | 2% | 0% | 0.00 |
| Political grievances | | | | | | |
| -President Mbeki performs badly | 18% | 13% | 15% | 14% | 11% | 0.47 |
| -Premier Rasool performs badly | 10% | 6% | 8% | 5% | 8% | 0.48 |
| -Mayor Mfeketo performs badly | 10% | 12% | 6% | 9% | 15% | 0.35 |
| -Ward councillor performs badly | 26% | 32% | 24% | 11% | 10% | 0.00 |
| Total | 20% | 30% | 22% | 18% | 10% | 100% |

Notes: Results are weighted data. Answers "Refused" and "Don't know" were excluded.
Source: CAS 2005

| *Table 4.11: Grievances, by Neighbourhood Income Quintiles* | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | NIQ1 | NIQ2 | NIQ3 | NIQ4 | NIQ5 | Pearson chi2 probability |
| Neighbourhood problems | | | | | | |
| -Drunks, vagrants or beggars | 78% | 68% | 65% | 61% | 45% | 0.00 |
| -Homes broken into | 77% | 61% | 66% | 63% | 48% | 0.00 |
| -Cars broken into or stolen | 59% | 52% | 58% | 63% | 46% | 0.00 |
| -Poor recreational facilities or roads | 37% | 43% | 50% | 49% | 11% | 0.00 |
| -Gangs | 63% | 53% | 37% | 30% | 5% | 0.00 |
| -Noisy neighbours or parties | 78% | 55% | 48% | 47% | 21% | 0.00 |
| -Minibus taxi | 36% | 50% | 62% | 63% | 65% | 0.00 |
| Dissatisfaction with government service delivery | | | | | | |
| -Electricity | 41% | 19% | 24% | 17% | 6% | 0.00 |
| -Water | 34% | 19% | 18% | 20% | 12% | 0.00 |
| -Public health clinics or hospitals | 57% | 63% | 61% | 57% | 51% | 0.14 |
| -Bus and train | 38% | 44% | 52% | 52% | 59% | 0.00 |
| -Police | 39% | 38% | 58% | 40% | 26% | 0.00 |
| -Road repairs and construction | 51% | 39% | 43% | 34% | 27% | 0.00 |
| -Housing | 68% | 54% | 61% | 51% | 37% | 0.00 |
| -Refuse collection | 44% | 18% | 21% | 15% | 12% | 0.00 |
| -No flush toilet in house | 56% | 14% | 11% | 8% | 3% | 0.00 |
| Political grievances | | | | | | |
| -President Mbeki performs badly | 12% | 12% | 25% | 10% | 13% | 0.00 |
| -Premier Rasool performs badly | 6% | 9% | 9% | 5% | 7% | 0.55 |
| -Mayor Mfeketo performs badly | 8% | 8% | 8% | 9% | 16% | 0.11 |
| -Ward councillor performs badly | 26% | 22% | 41% | 17% | 15% | 0.00 |
| Total | 26% | 18% | 18% | 19% | 19% | 100% |
| Notes: Results are weighted data. Answers "Refused" and "Don't know" were excluded.<br>Source: CAS 2005 | | | | | | |



## Regression Analysis on Participation in Civil Society

Multiple probit regression models are run for three dependent variables: a community-based group, a community meeting, and protests. Firstly, models are tested without any income variables, and then the effects of each income variable are inspected. To avoid the problem of collinearity, indices are constructed for each group of grievances, which I call the Neighbourhood Problems Index (NPI; values 0 to 7), the Service Delivery Grievances Index (SDGI; values 0 to 9), and the Political Grievances Index (PGI; values 0 to 4). Variables for

grievances are not statistically correlated to one another, but conditional correlations are thought to exist. However, when we look at histograms of each index (Figures 4.11-13), even though the distribution of NPI and SDGI are more or less acceptable to use in analysis, it is not eligible to use PGI, given its highly skewed distribution. So, instead of PGI, a composite variable is used to measure grievances against politics. Since most variables used are dummy variables, probit regression is used for the analysis. In most cases, variables are omitted from the models if they are of no importance. Some are included despite there being no significant relationship with the dependent variable, if there are good reasons to believe that we need to control for them or they are of general interest. Correlation coefficients of explanatory variables are shown in Appendix 2.










***Figure 4.11 (Above Left): Histogram of Neighbourhood Problems Index (NPI)***

***Figure 4.12 (Above Right): Histogram of Service Delivery Grievances Index (SDGI)***

***Figure 4.13 (Left): Histogram of Political Grievances Index (PGI)***

| *Table 4.12: Probit Regression Models without Income Variables* | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Community-based group | | Community meeting | | Protests | |
| | 'dprobit' coefficient | Std error | 'dprobit' coefficient | Std error | 'dprobit' coefficient | Std error |
| Demographics | | | | | | |
| Female | Not sig | | Not sig | | Not sig | |
| Black | .08*** | .03 | .12*** | .05 | Not sig | |
| Coloured | Not sig | | Not sig | | .10** | .04 |
| Age | <.01*** | <.01 | Not sig | | Not sig | |
| No work | -.05*** | .02 | Not sig | | Not sig | |
| Living length (values from 1 to 5) | Not sig | | Not sig | | .03** | .01 |
| Attitude towards neighbourhood | | | | | | |
| Neighbours can be trusted (values from 1 to 5) | .02** | .01 | Not sig | | Not sig | |
| Political attitudes | | | | | | |
| Politics is important | Not sig | | Not sig | | Not sig | |
| Political party | .09** | .05 | .25*** | .07 | Not sig | |
| Pay attention to politics | Not sig | | .11*** | .04 | Not sig | |
| Vote (values from 0 to 2) | Not sig | | .07*** | .03 | Not sig | |
| Religious attitude | | | | | | |
| Religious organisation | Not sig | | .12*** | .04 | .06** | .02 |
| Psychological resources | | | | | | |
| Can get together and make elected leaders listen | .14*** | .05 | Not sig | | .07** | .04 |
| Can influence decisions by the city a lot | .06** | .03 | Not sig | | Not sig | |
| High control in life | .06*** | .01 | Not sig | | Not sig | |
| Grievances | | | | | | |
| Neighbourhood problems (values from 0 to 7) | .01** | <.01 | Not sig | | .02*** | .01 |
| Service delivery grievances (values from 0 to 9) | Not sig | | Not sig | | .01*** | <.01 |
| Political grievance (composite) | Not sig | | Not sig | | Not sig | |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.29 | | 0.15 | | 0.11 | |
| N | 728 | | 788 | | 851 | |
| Notes: Significance shown at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) or 10% level (*). "Not sig" denotes not significant at 10% level, therefore unreported. | | | | | | |



Table 4.12 shows the results of multivariate 'dprobit' regression models on each dependent variable without any income variables. Each dependent variable is correlated with different groups of explanatory variables. A community-based group is more correlated with psychological resources, whilst a community meeting is more correlated with political attitudes. Protests are the only variable that correlated with both neighbourhood problems and service delivery grievances, even though the coefficients are not so large. Black people generally participate more often in civil society than white or coloured people, except for protests.

What is distinctive about a community-based group is its high correlation with the variables for psychological resources. The causality is not clear, but we can say that being a member of a community meeting has something to do with people's confidence and positive mindset. People who are members of a community-based group believe that they have influence on the government, and that they have control over their lives. The same kind of thing can be said about protests, even though only one variable of psychological resources is correlated with them.

A community meeting is not related with any psychological resources or grievances, but is highly correlated with political attitudes and religious attitude. We can assume that whether people attend a community meeting is the matter of their behavioural patterns, and those who attend a community meeting can be regarded as "active black", who are also likely to join a political party, a religious organisation, as well as go to vote frequently. Otherwise, a community meeting can be highly politicised activity, considering the high coefficient of "political party".

What is interesting about protests is their correlation with coloured people and with living length. Whilst other dependent variables are only correlated with black people, protests are correlated with coloured people. This could be related with the fact that more coloured people are employed than black people in Cape Town. If they are working, the opportunities to join a strike or a boycott should increase. Protests have no correlation with any political attitudes, and they are not related with political grievances either. This means protests are more likely to be carried out for expressing their grievances, not for politicking. Again, a religious organisation is complementary to protests.

Now, what happens if we add income variables to these models? Tables 4.13-15 show that the models continue to produce different results for the three dependent variables when we include income variables also. The highest categories are dropped from each income variable, which means the coefficients reported are relative to the richest.

The first striking result is that participation in a community-based group is negatively correlated with monthly household income. This means that poorer people are less likely to join a community-based group, controlling race and other variables. This could be the reason why it is negatively correlated with people who are not working. Now we can see that black people who have a job and are not amongst the most poor are more likely to be a member of a community-based group. What should be concerning is that the N of the result with monthly household income is overwhelmingly small and that there is no correlation with NIQ, but still it is correlated with two categories of relative income. Other variables than incomes show almost the same results as models without incomes, and it is not overstatement to say that being a member of a community-based group is associated with the people's confidence in their lives or self-reliance in their role in society.

The results of a community meeting did not change very much from Table 4.12. Even though monthly household income negated an effect of "being black", the N is very small and other income variables do not show any similar patterns. It is safer just to say that "active black" are likely to attend a community meeting, or a community meeting is highly politicised activity.

Another remarkable notion can be made for the results with protests. Although only NIQ1 is correlated with protests, the effect of race disappeared when income variables were added, and the effect of "politics is important" turned out to be significant. This fact poses a possibility that protests might not be pure expression of people's grievances but somehow can be related to politics. Also, the coefficients of the variable "can get together and make elected leaders listen" are increased, so protests can also be related to people's confidence or self-reliance in their role in society.

The effect of incomes are not as strong as expected, whilst "being black" is an important reason for being part of a community-based group and a community meeting. Conversely, a community-based group is more "pro-non-poor", and highly correlated with psychological resources. A community meeting has almost no significant relationship with grievances or incomes, but is highly related to political attitudes and religious attitudes. This indicates that a

community meeting is a highly politicised activity or for "active black" people. Protests are only correlated with NIQ1, but the disappearance of the effects of race implies that protests are more related to income than race. Grievances consistently play an important role in protests, and psychological resources have also positively related with protests. In any model, political attitudes are always one of the key explanatory variables, and this testifies that civil society exists in association with politics.

## Conclusion

Overall, CAS 2005 shows that participation in civil society is not correlated that much to incomes and grievances. Participation in civil society is not necessarily the channel for the poor to express their grievances. Rather, variables such as race, political attitudes, and psychological resources are more correlated with participation. This is particularly true with associational activities like community-based groups and community meetings. Cape Town is said to have a substantial overlap between race and income, and the descriptive statistics show that CAS 2005 reflects this fact. Also, CAS 2005 indicates that grievances are more or less overlapped with race and incomes too. Yet, when regression analyses are conducted, race still has significant correlation with participation in civil society. This is in line with the discussion in Chapter 1 on the persistence of racial identity in the Western Cape. Indeed, when asked the racial composition of the organisations they were participating in, half the respondents answered they were from the same racial group. Black people are most likely to participate in associational activities, and one can assume that this is because black people have more organisational resources and traditions of association and defiance. This could be the evidence for ethnic sectionalism of civil society, which works only for black people, but more study is required to confirm the truth. Political attitudes are also consistently correlated with participation in civil society. As the qualitative data portrayed in the former chapter, CAS 2005 also shows the importance of politics in civil society. From these quantitative data, we can infer that civil society could reflect and reproduce many of racialised or politicised views or prejudice, even though civil society in South Africa is generally celebrated as a space for action to promote social justice.

| *Table 4.13: Probit Regressions on Community-based Group with Income Variables* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model A | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Relative income | | | | | |
| 0 - 2 (very poor) | - | Not sig | - | - | - |
| 3 - 4 (poor) | - | -.07 (.02)*** | - | - | - |
| 5 (average) | - | -.06 (.03)** | - | - | - |
| 6 - 7 (rich) | - | Not sig | - | - | - |
| Self-reported Social class | | | | | |
| Lower class | - | - | Not sig | - | - |
| Working class | - | - | Not sig | - | - |
| Middle class | - | - | Not sig | - | - |
| Monthly household income | | | | | |
| R0 - 1,000 | - | - | - | -.07 (.02)** | - |
| R1,001 - 3,000 | - | - | - | -.08 (.03)*** | - |
| R3,001 - R5,000 | - | - | - | -.07 (.02)** | - |
| R5,001 - 10,000 | - | - | - | Not sig | - |
| Neighbour income quintile | | | | | |
| NIQ1 | - | - | - | - | Not sig |
| NIQ2 | - | - | - | - | Not sig |
| NIQ3 | - | - | - | - | Not sig |
| NIQ4 | - | - | - | - | Not sig |
| Demographics | | | | | |
| Female | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig |
| Black | .09 (.03)*** | .08 (.03)*** | .08 (.03)*** | .13 (.04)*** | .08 (.03)*** |
| Age | <.01 (<.01)*** | <.01 (<.01)*** | <.01 (<.01)*** | <.01 (<.01)*** | <.01 (<.01)*** |
| No work | -.05 (.02)*** | -.05 (.02)*** | -.05 (.02)** | Not sig | -.04 (.02)** |
| Attitude towards neighbourhood | | | | | |
| Neighbours can be trusted (values from 1 to 5) | .02 (.01)*** | .02 (.01)*** | .02 (.01)** | Not sig | .02 (.01)** |
| Political attitudes | | | | | |
| Political party | .15 (.05)*** | .14 (.05)*** | .17 (.06)*** | .18 (.06)*** | .15 (.05)*** |
| Psychological resources | | | | | |
| Can get together and make elected leaders listen | .17 (.04)*** | .15 (.04)*** | .18 (.05)*** | .20 (.05)*** | .18 (.05)*** |
| Can influence decisions by the city a lot | .07 (.03)*** | .06 (.03)** | .07 (.03)** | .07 (.04)** | .07 (.03)*** |
| High control in life | .06 (.01)*** | .06 (.01)*** | .06 (.01)*** | .07 (.02)*** | .06 (.01)*** |
| Grievances | | | | | |
| Neighbourhood problems (values from 0 to 7) | .01 (<.01)** | .01 (<.01)*** | .01 (<.01)** | Not sig | .01 (<.01)*** |
| Service delivery grievances (values from 0 to 9) | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig |
| Political grievances (composite) | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.27 | 0.28 | 0.27 |
| N | 849 | 845 | 835 | 680 | 849 |

Notes: These are all 'dprobit' regressions, and the coefficients reported are dF/dx. Standard errors in brackets. Significance shown at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) or 10% level (*). "Not sig" denotes not significant at 10% level, therefore unreported.

| *Table 4.14: Probit Regressions on Community Meeting with Income Variables* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model B | Model 5 | Model 6 | Model 7 | Model 8 |
| Relative income | | | | | |
| 0 - 2 (very poor) | - | Not sig | - | - | - |
| 3 - 4 (poor) | - | Not sig | - | - | - |
| 5 (average) | - | Not sig | - | - | - |
| 6 - 7 (rich) | - | Not sig | - | - | - |
| Self-reported Social class | | | | | |
| Lower class | - | - | Not sig | - | - |
| Working class | - | - | Not sig | - | - |
| Middle class | - | - | Not sig | - | - |
| Monthly household income | | | | | |
| R0 - 1,000 | - | - | - | .23 (.08)*** | - |
| R1,001 - 3,000 | - | - | - | Not sig | - |
| R3,001 - R5,000 | - | - | - | Not sig | - |
| R5,001 - 10,000 | - | - | - | Not sig | - |
| Neighbour income quintile | | | | | |
| NIQ1 | - | - | - | - | Not sig |
| NIQ2 | - | - | - | - | Not sig |
| NIQ3 | - | - | - | - | Not sig |
| NIQ4 | - | - | - | - | .14 (.06)** |
| Demographics | | | | | |
| Female | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig |
| Black | .12 (.04)*** | .13 (.04)*** | .11 (.04)*** | Not sig | .11 (.05)** |
| Political attitudes | | | | | |
| Political party | .25 (.07)*** | .26 (.07)*** | .25 (.07)*** | .26 (.07)*** | .26 (.07)*** |
| Pay attention to politics | .13 (.04)*** | .13 (.04)*** | .13 (.04)*** | .14 (.05)*** | .14 (.04)*** |
| Vote (values from 0 to 2) | .09 (.02)*** | .09 (.02)*** | .10 (.02)*** | .11 (.03)*** | .09 (.02)*** |
| Religious attitude | | | | | |
| Religious organisation | .12 (.03)*** | .12 (.03)*** | .11 (.03)*** | .12 (.04)*** | .12 (.03)*** |
| Grievances | | | | | |
| Neighbourhood problems (values from 0 to 7) | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig |
| Service delivery grievances (values from 0 to 9) | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig |
| Political grievances (composite) | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.12 |
| N | 865 | 862 | 847 | 680 | 865 |
| Notes: These are all 'dprobit' regressions, and the coefficients reported are dF/dx. Standard errors in brackets. Significance shown at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) or 10% level (*). "Not sig" denotes not significant at 10% level, therefore unreported. | | | | | |

| *Table 4.15: Probit Regressions on Protest action with Income Variables* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model C | Model 9 | Model 10 | Model 11 | Model 12 |
| Relative income | | | | | |
| Very poor (0-2) | - | Not sig | - | - | - |
| Poor (3-4) | - | Not sig | - | - | - |
| Average (5) | - | Not sig | - | - | - |
| Rich (6-7) | - | Not sig | - | - | - |
| Self-reported Social class | | | | | |
| Lower class | - | - | Not sig | - | - |
| Working class | - | - | Not sig | - | - |
| Middle class | - | - | Not sig | - | - |
| Monthly household income | | | | | |
| R0 - 1,000 | - | - | - | Not sig | - |
| R1,001 - 3,000 | - | - | - | Not sig | - |
| R3,001 - R5,000 | - | - | - | Not sig | - |
| R5,001 - 10,000 | - | - | - | Not sig | - |
| Neighbour income quintile | | | | | |
| NIQ1 | - | - | - | - | .17 (.09)** |
| NIQ2 | - | - | - | - | Not sig |
| NIQ3 | - | - | - | - | Not sig |
| NIQ4 | - | - | - | - | Not sig |
| Demographics | | | | | |
| Female | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig |
| Black | .09 (.04)** | .09 (.04)** | .11 (.05)** | Not sig | Not sig |
| Coloured | .10 (.04)*** | .11 (.04)*** | .09 (.04)** | Not sig | Not sig |
| Living length (values from 1 to 5) | .03 (.01)** | .03 (.01)** | .03 (.01)** | .03 (.01)** | .03 (.01)** |
| Political attitudes | | | | | |
| Politics is important | .06 (.03)** | .06 (.03)** | .07 (.03)** | .07 (.04)** | .06 (.03)** |
| Religious attitude | | | | | |
| Religious organisation | .06 (.02)*** | .06 (.02)*** | .06 (.02)** | .08 (.03)*** | .07 (.02)*** |
| Psychological resources | | | | | |
| Can get together and make elected leaders listen | .09 (.04)*** | .09 (.04)*** | .09 (.04)*** | .09 (.04)** | .09 (.04)*** |
| Grievances | | | | | |
| Neighbourhood problems (values from 0 to 7) | .02 (.01)*** | .02 (.01)*** | .02 (.01)*** | Not sig | .02 (.01)*** |
| Service delivery grievances (values from 0 to 9) | .02 (<.01)*** | .01 (<.01)*** | .01 (<.01)*** | .01 (<.01)*** | .01 (<.01)*** |
| Political grievances (composite) | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig | Not sig |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.13 |
| N | 864 | 859 | 851 | 685 | 864 |

Notes: These are all 'dprobit' regressions, and the coefficients reported are dF/dx. Standard errors in brackets. Significance shown at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) or 10% level (*). "Not sig" denotes not significant at 10% level, therefore unreported.

## Conclusion

Civil society is often parochial, because it is usually local and rooted in grass-roots issues and participation. Sometimes it works to benefit a specific ethnic group or political group, and also reflects some unsatisfactory aspects of culture to which the constituents of civil society belong. Both qualitative and quantitative data in this study show that the associational activities and social movements in Cape Town reflect some of the pathologies or injustices of the wider society. The 'toilet war' surely has an aspect of "service delivery protest", where the poor and the marginalised undertake protest action to express their grievances for the improvement of service delivery. Nevertheless, the data shows that the "poorest of the poor" are actually excluded and deserted by democracy within the community, the partisan purpose, and the rage against the legacy of apartheid. Ironically enough, they are marginalised because democracy works so well that the voices of the majority are heard in the small community. The political conspiracy and the pride of black people also blind the residents to the poorest in the community.

On the other hand, the quantitative analysis shows that participation in associational activities and protests is more correlated with variables such as race, political attitudes, and psychological resources than incomes or grievances. This is particularly true with associational activities like being a member of community-based groups or attending community meetings. From the results we can infer that people do not necessarily participate in civil society because of their grievances or poorness. High correlation with race and politics implies that associational activities and protests are racially and politically biased. There are several possible reasons why black people are more actively involved in civil society than other races. They could have more resources and opportunity to associate with each other, or share the tradition of defiance. The legacy of apartheid might make the bond amongst black people strong. The situation would be different in other parts of South Africa, and more research should be conducted on that matter.

Even when civil society is parochial, it should not lead to conflict if it does not exclude the interests of others. Nonetheless, in the context of post-apartheid South Africa and in some discourse of development, it is taken for granted too often that "community" or "civil society" represents the interests of the poor entirely and works as a safety net for them. We always have to examine whose interests each part of civil society represents. Civil society is only one part of society, and it can reflect and reproduce many of the pathologies and injustices in the wider society. Policy makers should not justify their policies only because the "community" or "civil society" agreed with them. You have to carefully watch the structures of the community and civil society, and make sure that the poorest of the poor, who are the most vulnerable and need to be helped, are taken into account. Especially under the recent neo-liberal policies implemented in South Africa, the government thoughtlessly entrusts its tasks to the private sector such as NPOs, companies and even citizens, without looking at the interests of the poorest of the poor. We must bear in mind that they can easily be marginalised and deserted even in civil society.

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# Appendix 1: Pictures of the 'Toilet War' (for Chapter 2 & 3)

*Open Toilet in Makhaza, Khayelitsha (Courtesy Independent Newspapers)*

*Residents Breaking Down the Corrugated Enclosures Provided by the City Council (Courtesy Independent Newspapers)*

***Rampage by the Makhaza Residents 1 (Courtesy Independent Newspapers)***


***Rampage by the Makhaza Residents 2 (Courtesy Independent Newspapers)***

## Appendix 2: List of variables (for Chapter 4)

| Variables | Frequency | Percentage | Question No. |
|---|---|---|---|
| A member of community-based groups | 124 | 11% | D1.1_C & D1.2_C |
| Attended community meetings | 391 | 33% | D39 |
| Attended protest action | 167 | 14% | D42, D44 & D45 |
| Female | 739 | 62% | G4 |
| Black Africans | 408 | 36% | F5 |
| Coloured | 478 | 42% | F5 |
| White | 252 | 22% | F5 |
| Head of household | 771 | 65% | G1 |
| Not working | 629 | 53% | G11 |
| Living length (less than a year) | 61 | 5% | D16 |
| Living length (1 to 5 years) | 226 | 19% | D16 |
| Living length (6 to 10 years) | 224 | 19% | D16 |
| Living length (more than 10 years) | 627 | 52% | D16 |
| Living length (since birth) | 63 | 5% | D16 |
| Neighbourhood is "very important" | 802 | 67% | B3.7 |
| Neighbourhood can be trusted 1 | 56 | 5% | D13 |
| Neighbourhood can be trusted 2 | 247 | 22% | D13 |
| Neighbourhood can be trusted 3 | 262 | 23% | D13 |
| Neighbourhood can be trusted 4 | 447 | 39% | D13 |
| Neighbourhood can be trusted 5 | 125 | 11% | D13 |
| Politics is "very important" | 241 | 20% | B3.4 |
| A member of political parties | 96 | 8% | D1.1_B & D1.2_B |
| Pay attention to politics "most of the time" | 273 | 24% | C2 |
| Vote index 0 | 331 | 29% | C26 & C45 |
| Vote index 1 | 396 | 34% | C26 & C45 |
| Vote index 2 | 432 | 37% | C26 & C45 |
| Religion is "very important" | 1037 | 87% | B3.9 |
| A member of religious organisations | 648 | 59% | D1.1_A & D1.2_A |
| Can get together and make elected leaders listen | 141 | 13% | C20 |
| Can influence decisions by the city "a lot" | 167 | 16% | C22 |
| High control in life | 1032 | 85% | B2.2 |
| Drunks, vagrants or beggars | 759 | 64% | D22.1 |
| Homes broken into | 746 | 64% | D22.2 |
| Cars broken into or stolen | 651 | 56% | D22.3 |
| Poor recreational facilities or roads | 430 | 38% | D22.4 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gangs | 323 | 36% | D22.5 |
| Noisy neighbours or parties | 613 | 51% | D22.6 |
| Minibus taxi | 548 | 53% | C32 |
| Electricity | 264 | 22% | C28 |
| Water | 257 | 22% | C29 |
| Public health clinics or hospitals | 657 | 58% | C30 |
| Bus and train | 493 | 48% | C31 |
| Police | 456 | 40% | C33 |
| Road repairs and construction | 458 | 39% | C34 |
| Housing | 637 | 55% | C35 |
| Refuse collection | 272 | 23% | C36 |
| No flush toilet in house | 250 | 21% | G23 |
| President Mbeki performs badly | 158 | 14% | C10 |
| Premier Rasool performs badly | 60 | 7% | C11 |
| Mayor Mfeketo performs badly | 70 | 10% | C41 |
| Ward councillor performs badly | 134 | 24% | C42 |
| Source: CAS 2005 | | | |








"15" represents people who studied in a higher education with Matric.

## Appendix 3: Correlation coefficients of explanatory variables (for Chapter 4)

1. Except for income variables

| | female | black | coloured | age | nowork | living | neight~t | polimp | politi~p | attent~n | religi~s | together | influe~e | highco~l | NPI | SDGI | comPG |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| female | 1.0000 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| black | 0.0581 | 1.0000 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| coloured | -0.0261 | -0.6339 | 1.0000 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| age | -0.0048 | -0.3056 | 0.0426 | 1.0000 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| nowork | 0.1202 | 0.1423 | -0.0612 | 0.1313 | 1.0000 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| living | 0.0528 | -0.2641 | 0.2560 | 0.2018 | 0.0385 | 1.0000 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| neightrust | -0.0343 | 0.0962 | -0.2994 | 0.1173 | -0.0238 | -0.0870 | 1.0000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| polimp | -0.0750 | 0.1759 | -0.1002 | 0.0870 | 0.0313 | -0.0276 | 0.0265 | 1.0000 | | | | | | | | | |
| politicalp | -0.0314 | 0.2686 | -0.1594 | 0.0158 | 0.0113 | -0.0311 | 0.0831 | 0.2304 | 1.0000 | | | | | | | | |
| attention | -0.1050 | 0.0130 | -0.0644 | 0.1184 | -0.0588 | 0.0362 | 0.0419 | 0.2530 | 0.0864 | 1.0000 | | | | | | | |
| religious | 0.1080 | 0.1327 | -0.0106 | 0.0649 | -0.0005 | -0.0158 | 0.0275 | 0.1112 | 0.1851 | 0.0550 | 1.0000 | | | | | | |
| together | -0.0298 | 0.1136 | -0.0218 | -0.0109 | -0.0457 | 0.0180 | -0.0748 | 0.2325 | -0.0272 | 0.1132 | 0.0892 | 1.0000 | | | | | |
| influence | -0.0215 | 0.3059 | -0.1545 | -0.0344 | 0.0654 | -0.0448 | 0.0739 | 0.3268 | 0.1041 | 0.1385 | 0.1288 | 0.2411 | 1.0000 | | | | |
| highcontrol | 0.0124 | -0.1026 | 0.0319 | 0.0458 | -0.0599 | -0.0243 | 0.0934 | -0.0137 | -0.0394 | -0.0150 | -0.0552 | -0.0083 | -0.0132 | 1.0000 | | | |
| NPI | -0.0104 | 0.1901 | 0.0711 | -0.1768 | -0.0328 | 0.0435 | -0.1820 | 0.0026 | 0.1592 | -0.0516 | 0.1219 | 0.0144 | -0.0493 | -0.0874 | 1.0000 | | |
| SDGI | 0.0496 | 0.2965 | -0.0950 | -0.1786 | -0.0279 | -0.1293 | -0.0268 | 0.0608 | 0.1208 | 0.0397 | 0.0696 | 0.0660 | 0.0578 | -0.1157 | 0.3945 | 1.0000 | |
| comPG | 0.0230 | -0.0126 | 0.0195 | 0.0879 | 0.0429 | 0.0409 | -0.0643 | 0.0478 | 0.1121 | 0.0327 | 0.1198 | 0.1064 | -0.0410 | -0.0042 | 0.0729 | 0.1594 | 1.0000 |

2. Income variables and grievances

| | black | coloured | relinc~1 | relinc~2 | lower | working | mhhinc~1 | mhhinc~2 | NIQ1 | NIQ2 | NPI | SDGI | PGI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| black | 1.0000 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| coloured | -0.7001 | 1.0000 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| relincome1 | 0.2577 | -0.1256 | 1.0000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| relincome2 | -0.0426 | 0.0902 | -0.3012 | 1.0000 | | | | | | | | | |
| lower | 0.4555 | -0.2305 | 0.3630 | -0.0136 | 1.0000 | | | | | | | | |
| working | -0.1067 | 0.2161 | -0.1254 | 0.1360 | -0.5348 | 1.0000 | | | | | | | |
| mhhincome1 | 0.2840 | -0.1271 | 0.1899 | -0.1046 | 0.2915 | -0.2108 | 1.0000 | | | | | | |
| mhhincome2 | 0.2225 | -0.0316 | 0.1160 | 0.1573 | 0.2116 | 0.0131 | -0.3431 | 1.0000 | | | | | |
| NIQ1 | 0.5664 | -0.3541 | 0.2626 | -0.0598 | 0.3825 | -0.1390 | 0.2581 | 0.1737 | 1.0000 | | | | |
| NIQ2 | 0.1338 | 0.0280 | -0.0193 | 0.0494 | 0.0455 | 0.0558 | 0.0688 | 0.0822 | -0.3085 | 1.0000 | | | |
| NPI | 0.1362 | 0.0643 | 0.1573 | 0.0320 | 0.1089 | 0.0529 | 0.0529 | 0.1053 | 0.1315 | 0.0628 | 1.0000 | | |
| SDGI | 0.3031 | -0.1563 | 0.2305 | 0.0490 | 0.1820 | -0.0157 | 0.1056 | 0.1377 | 0.2685 | -0.0690 | 0.3322 | 1.0000 | |
| PGI | 0.0382 | -0.0293 | 0.0505 | 0.0292 | 0.0233 | -0.0408 | 0.0735 | 0.0399 | 0.0090 | 0.0229 | 0.0602 | 0.1777 | 1.0000 |