

Arab Political Movements in Israel: Different Ideologies and Disparate Rhetoric

Mouad Khateb

Student no.: KHTMOA001

A dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of the degree of
Master of Philosophy in Rhetoric Studies

Department of Private Law
University of Cape Town

Supervised by Distinguished Professor Philippe-Joseph Salazar

Centre for Rhetoric Studies (CRhS)

ICEQ@Hotmail.co.uk

For Graduation in December 2020

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature:

Signed by candidate

 Date: 18.06.2020

The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.

Abstract

Arab Palestinians in Israel live under highly complex circumstances. In 1948, when they became Israeli citizens, they found themselves facing challenges at different levels: national, social, political, financial, educational, as well as the very challenge of existence. The Palestinian community in Israel underwent various stages of development and witnessed major events under the new Israeli rule, bringing about fundamental changes in their lives, their attitudes, and consequently, their rhetoric. Arab politicians, particularly those who represent Arab Palestinians in the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament), often find themselves compelled to adjust the approach and rhetoric they use to address the Arab public. They do it not only to satisfy the Arab public's expectations, but also to adapt to the ever-changing Israeli political atmosphere and to avoid conflict with the Jewish public, the majority of whom, as polls indicate, are not happy about Arab representation in the Israeli Knesset.

Discussion of the rhetoric used by the Arab parties in Israel that represent the Palestinian people who before 1948 were a majority and after that year became a minority that suffers inequality, oppression, and discrimination, is important in order to understand how argumentation and methods of persuasion are influenced by the kind of circumstances that national minorities like Palestinians in Israel experience.

This thesis will examine the rhetoric used by the main Arab political movements in Israel when addressing several key issues that are currently the subject of heated debate and are expected to have remarkable effects on Arabs and their lives as non-Jews in the Israeli state. These issues are: Arab representation in the Israeli Parliament, recognition of Israel as a "Jewish State", and National Service for Arabs. The largest part of the research will focus on the Arab representation in the Knesset, being the most controversial topic among the Arab minority in Israel, and which also determines to a great extent the positions of the parties on other issues.

After reviewing the position of each party/political movement on each of these topics, I intend to analyze the rhetoric each of them uses to defend their position or promote it to gain the support of the public, especially during parliamentary elections. Is the rhetoric of Arab parties in Israel coherent and harmonious as it represents a Palestinian minority dealing with Israeli policies as a collective entity, or does each of the parties have a unique rhetoric of its own, based on its ideology and agendas? What are the arguments that these parties use to justify their views, and how do they present these arguments? Are the arguments used by each party from the deliberative branch of rhetoric, the forensic, or the epideictic? Do Arab politicians mostly use *ethos*, *pathos*, or *logos* to persuade the audience and gain their support?

This thesis will answer these questions by analyzing the parties' publications and official statements and political charters, and it will show that the positions, the rhetoric, and the argumentation of the different Arab parties are far from being homogeneous, and are highly influenced by their ideological background.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincerest appreciation and gratitude...

To my supervisor Distinguished Professor Philippe-Joseph Salazar, for his patience, support, guidance, and for the great opportunities he offered me that helped me develop my academic skills and future career during and after I finished my studies, and for the incredibly enriching classes and meetings with the fellow students, that I extremely enjoyed.

... To my family for the unlimited support they offered, and especially to my mother who kept me in her prayers, and my father who took great care of our garden while we were in South Africa.

... To the brothers and sisters in South Africa who hosted us, supported us, and helped us overcome many obstacles that we faced.

... To the staff at the Centre for Rhetoric Studies and the postgraduate administration office who were very helpful and assistive.

... To the A W Mellon Foundation, whose funding was vital for the completion of this thesis.

And to everyone who supported me, directly or indirectly; your valuable contribution I will sure never forget.

Yours faithfully,

Mouad Khateb

Arab Political Movements in Israel: Different Ideologies and Disparate Rhetoric

Table of Contents

Abstract _____	2
1. Introduction _____	5
1.1 Thesis structure _____	2
1.2 Methodology _____	2
2 Historical Background _____	4
3 Arab political parties in Israel _____	7
3.1 The Arab-Jewish Communist movement in Israel _____	9
3.2 The Islamic Movement _____	14
3.3 The Nationalist Movement _____	25
3.4 Summary of the differences between Arab political movements in Israel _____	30
4 The Rhetoric of Arab Political Parties in Israel _____	32
4.1 Rhetoric for/against Arab representation in the Israeli Parliament _____	32
4.2 Rhetoric Against The Recognition of Israel as a “Jewish State” _____	82
4.3 Rhetoric Against The Integration of Arabs into the National Service _____	107
5 Conclusions _____	127
6 References _____	129
Print works _____	129
Electronic Resources _____	132
Charts and Tables _____	135

1. Introduction

This research covers the period from 1948 up until August 2013 and uses data from that period only.

Despite being citizens of Israel and holding Israeli passports, most Arabs in Israel consider themselves Palestinian rather than Israeli. For Arab politicians, particularly those who are members of the Israeli parliament (the Knesset), this is a sensitive issue when standing before the other members of the Knesset, who are mostly Jews, and speaking about even more sensitive topics, such as discrimination against Arabs in the Jewish state. Are they thus Palestinians, and if they are, how can they sit as members in the Israeli Knesset, and how can a Palestinian address members of the Israeli parliament? If they are not, how can they claim they are Palestinians when addressing the Arab Palestinian public? The conflicting components of the identity of Arabs in Israel and the complex reality in which they live gives rise to differences in their attitudes and positions on different issues that affect them directly, consequently resulting in differences in the rhetoric used by the different Arab political parties that do not share the same ideological background or aspirations. The sensitivity is therefore not limited merely to speeches Arab members of parliament (MPs) have to give in the Knesset, but is applicable to the whole range of rhetorical devices and approaches each political party / movement adopts in its dealings with the public and the government.

Discussing this topic is interesting as it sheds some light on the rhetoric used in one of the world's most volatile hotspots. Rhetoric has been a major player in the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially in recent years as each side invests huge efforts to attempt to win the support of the international community and the people of other countries. Winning the world's sympathy could create pressure resulting in a change that military action might not be able to achieve; the apartheid regime in South Africa, which ended after international pressure and isolation, is a good example of that.

Following a thorough examination, I have found no research of investigation into this topic. It is therefore essential to survey the political rhetoric of Palestinians in Israel and the way rhetoric is used and persuasion achieved; this topic is both complex and fraught with ambiguities. It is important to study the rhetoric that is used to persuade a non-supportive audience, as well as an audience that considers the speaker an enemy who

should be expelled from the country. Many right-wing Jewish politicians, like Effi Eitam, have explicitly said that Arab Palestinians in Israel are “a cancer and a ticking bomb.”¹

It is therefore interesting to investigate how and by what means Arab politicians present themselves and their ideas in a way that can appeal to the audience, and how they rhetorically formulate and demonstrate their attitudes regarding the issues of debate they address in public speeches, interviews, and articles.

My argument is that the position of the political Arab parties in Israel and the general Arab public regarding the various key issues that affect their present and shape their future is far from coherent, and that each party or political movement positions itself in relation to these issues based on its ideology and political agenda. I also argue that all parties, under different circumstances and for different reasons, utilize all of Aristotle’s different rhetorical appeals, and do not exclusively use one or two of them. Furthermore, and due to the complexity of the Arab-Israeli conflict and it being an ongoing struggle with implications extending from the past to the future, I claim that with respect to the rhetorical domains - forensic, deliberative, and epideictic - Arab parties in Israel tend to use arguments from all the domains and not focus only on one of them.

List of abbreviations:

NIM: Northern Islamic Movement

UAL: United Arab List

SIM: Southern Islamic Movement

NCL: New Communist List

DFPE: Democratic Front for Peace and Equality

ADP: Arab Democratic Party

NDA: National Democratic Assembly

PLP: Progressive List for Peace

CPI: Communist Party of Israel

ILP: Israeli Labor Party

¹ Shavit, A. (2002, March 20). "Dear God, this is Effi", *Haaretz*. Retrieved from <http://www.haaretz.com/dear-god-this-is-effi-1.49866>. Accessed on 15.7.2013.

1.1 Thesis structure

Section Two –historical and political review. In this section I will summarize the modern history of Palestine and the current conditions of Palestinian Arabs who became citizens of Israel following the Israeli occupation in 1948.

Section Three - Arab political movements/parties in Israel. This section will survey the Arab parties in Israel, their origins, ideologies, different stages of development, and current position in the political balance of power. A distinction will be made between parties that participate in the Israeli parliamentary elections, and those that abstain, for various reasons, the main one being ideological.

Section Four – The rhetoric of Arab political parties in Israel. Section four constitutes the bulk of this thesis, and it includes analysis of the rhetoric of each political movement / party and their homogeneous or heterogeneous attitudes on several key issues that affect the Arab minority in Israel. These issues are: Arab representation in the Knesset (Israeli parliament), the recognition of Israel as a “Jewish State”, and the incorporation of Arabs in the National Service . It will also include an analysis of written, audio, and visual content produced by these parties, their representatives, and their media wings in an attempt to unveil their rhetoric and the approach behind it. Content analyzed will consist of general periodical publications such as party newspapers, as well as public private or partisan newspapers and internet news websites.

Section five is the last section and it will contain the final remarks and conclusions.

1.2 Methodology

My analysis of the rhetoric, arguments and method of argumentation of each party is largely based on Aristotle’s rhetorical appeals: *ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos*. Through analysis of the arguments, I intend to draw conclusions on whether or not a party that adopts a specific ideology has a tendency to use one of these specific appeals as its primary tool of argument. Does each party tend to focus on one particular appeal in argumentation, or does it use them selectively depending on the context?

Each party’s set of arguments will then be discussed in light of Aristotle’s three branches or registers of rhetoric:

1. Judicial (or "forensic") oratory;
2. Epideictic ("ceremonial" or "demonstrative") oratory; and
3. Deliberative (or "legislative") oratory.

Classifying the arguments in relation to these three categories helps us acquire a better understanding of the parties, their rhetoric, and how their ideologies or religious affiliations shape their arguments and methods of argumentation. It is true that other classifications exist, such as the Five Canons of Rhetoric by Cierco and Quintilian². However, Aristotle's division is helpful to the analysis of the rhetoric of Palestinian parties and political rhetoric in general, as it focuses on persuasion and the art of effective argumentation, which is what politics is about.

Data that will be used in this thesis consists of:

- Video recordings collected from websites affiliated to politicians or their political parties; the website of the Knesset; the Israeli Broadcasting Authority; and other video sharing services like YouTube.
- Audio: from radio interviews taken from Hebrew radio stations or from the (only) Arabic radio station "Al-Shams".
- Print articles and newspaper interviews will also be used, taken from party periodicals or other independent media publications.

² Richard Nordquist. "What Are the Five Canons of Rhetoric?". <<http://grammar.about.com/od/qaaboutrhetoric/f/What-Are-The-Five-Canons-Of-Rhetoric.htm>>. Accessed: 14.5.2012.

2 Historical Background

Palestine is surrounded by Arab countries: Lebanon and Syria to the north, Jordan to the east, Egypt to the south, and the Mediterranean Sea to the west. The location of Palestine is unique in that not only is it the birthplace of Judaism and Christianity and where Prophet Muhammad ascended to meet his Creator, but it also connects Africa, Asia, and the Arabian Peninsula, and has throughout history been a key venue for commerce, religions and politics.

This is why Palestine was –and still is- the center of conflict between empires, nations, and religions. It was conquered numerous times by different peoples including the Canaanites, Ancient Israelites, Babylonians, Assyrians, Greeks, Persians, Romans, Byzantines, Muslim Arabs, Crusaders, Ayyubids, Ottomans, the British and recently Zionist Israelis.

Brief history of Palestine

The following summary of the modern history of Palestine is based on an extensive encyclopedic entry entitled “Modern Palestine” in Microsoft Student 2008³.

Muslim armies from Arabia conquered Palestine in the first half of the seventh century. By the end of the seventh century, most people in Palestine had embraced Islam and a strong process of Arabization, linguistically and culturally, was underway. In 1099, Crusaders from Western Europe captured Jerusalem and established a Christian kingdom there, but a century later it was recaptured by the Muslim leader Saladin, whose rule of Palestine was succeeded by the Muslim Mamluks. In 1517, the Ottomans conquered Palestine as well as the whole Levantine area; Palestine remained within the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I, during which the Ottomans allied with Germany and Austria, and were eventually defeated. The Ottoman Empire collapsed, allowing Britain to control Palestine under a “mandate”, a provision of the newly-formed League of Nations. As previously promised in the Balfour Declaration in which Arthur Balfour, the British foreign secretary, promised Jews a national home in Palestine, on May 15, 1948 the last British troops sailed out of Haifa, one day after Zionist leaders proclaimed the establishment of an Israeli state in Palestine. This resulted in wide-scale attacks by the heavily-armed Zionist Haganah and Stern militias against Palestinians who, having nothing but a few old

³ “Palestine”. Microsoft Encarta Student, [DVD], 2007.

rifles could not fight back. At the peak of the Palestinian Cataclysm ('Nakba'), the massacres, such as the slaughter of 256 unarmed civilians in Deir Yassin in April 1948, as well as the systematic cleansing and demolition of villages and towns, left tens of thousands dead and a whole nation of civilians terrorized. Forcible expulsion caused 700,000 Palestinians to flee to other parts of Palestine or to neighboring Arab countries. At the end of the war, Israel controlled more than three-quarters of the land area of Palestine, and only 160,000 Palestinian Arabs remained in the Israeli-held area. They were later called "Arab Israelis" by the Israeli government. They were given Israeli passports and plans were set up to Judaize them linguistically and culturally.

Despite the Palestinians' status as citizens, they were subject to martial law between 1948 and 1966. During this period, they were persecuted, huge areas of their lands annexed, and massacres were committed against them, such as the Kafr Qasim massacre: On October 29, 1956, forty-eight unarmed farmers - men, women, and children - returned to the village of Kafr Qasim, unaware of a curfew that had been imposed that afternoon. They were shot to death near the village⁴. After martial law ended, Arab Palestinians in Israel were able to communicate with other Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Their living conditions improved and, despite still being subject to the security system that controlled the country, new opportunities were available to them and they could seek higher education, better jobs, and stronger political involvement. Arabs started to occupy important positions, such as the head of the local council, and even as members of parliament. Yet the Israeli state's attitude towards Arab citizens was still largely influenced by the anti-Arab mentality, and Arabs were considered an enemy that must be treated as such, as stated in the now declassified Israel King Document of 1976.⁵ This attitude led to clashes between the state and its Arab citizens who defied discrimination and oppression. On March 30, 1976, Israeli security forces killed six Arab citizens after protests against the demolition of Arab houses, and the expropriation of what remained of their land. Palestinians annually commemorate 30th of March as the Land Day.

In 1982, a new High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel was founded, which is an extra-parliamentary organization in which all Arab political parties are represented. The members of the Committee, which facilitates deliberations on matters of general concern to the Arab public, also include

⁴ Abu Jabir, I. (2006). *Palestinian Society in Israel*. Centre for Contemporary Studies, p. 11.

⁵ Abu Jabir, 2006, *Ibid*, p. 13.

Arab Knesset members, mayors of Arab towns, and representatives of other bodies concerned with preserving the Arab identity, culture, heritage, as well as Arab lands and properties⁶.

Although during the First Intifada in 1987, Palestinians in Israel showed great sympathy and support for Palestinians in the Palestinian Territories, the Second Intifada (“*Intifadat al-Aqsa*” - the uprising for the Aqsa Mosque) marked a turning point in the relationship between Palestinian Arabs and the Israeli state. On September 28, 2000, Ariel Sharon, leader of the right-wing Likud Party, and his 1000-strong force provocatively marched on the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, the holiest Muslim site in Palestine and third holiest for all Muslims. This triggered protests across all Palestinian cities and towns, and all Arab towns inside Israel. Israeli security forces used live ammunition to repel the protests, which led to the deaths of over three thousand Palestinians, including thirteen citizens of Israel⁷. The Arab community in Israel felt stunned, not only because of the state’s suppressive treatment of the peaceful protests, but also because none of the policemen who were responsible for the killing were indicted, which the Arab public considered an endorsement of the use of lethal force against unarmed peaceful Arab protesters⁸. These developments led to a very high and unprecedented boycott rate in the 2001 Knesset elections, when approximately 82% of the total Arab voters abstained from participating in the elections⁹.

Today, Palestinian citizens of Israel are much more aware of their past, their present and their future. Their relationship with the state is largely dominated and shaped by clashes of all types: political, cultural, religious, demographic, and linguistic.

⁶ Abu Jabir, 2006, Ibid, p. 13.

⁷ Btselem:

<http://old.btselem.org/statistics/english/Casualties.asp?sD=29&sM=09&sY=2000&eD=15&eM=1&eY=2005&filterby=event&oferet_stat=before> Accessed: 14.11.2012.

⁸ Adalah. Summary of the Findings and Conclusions of Adalah’s ‘The Accused’ Report, 2006, <<http://adalah.org/features/october2000/accused-s-en.pdf>>. Accessed: 04.12.2012.

⁹ Abu Jabir, 2006, Ibid, p. 18.

3 Arab political parties in Israel

Arab society in Israel is a mixture of people of different faiths, and of different origins. Therefore, any discussion of the key issues among the Arab public, and especially among the political and intellectual elite, must take into consideration the ideological (and sometimes religious) affiliations of each of the political movements. Before listing the Arab parties active in Israel today, it should be pointed out that researchers (like Ghanim & Mustafa 2009) divide the history of Arab political activism in Israel into three stages: before the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948 (under the British Mandate); after the establishment of Israel in 1948 where Palestinians remained under martial law; and the period since martial law ended in 1966 until the present. This thesis is concerned with the period after martial law, because under it Arab political organization was illegal. The Land Movement, a nationalist movement that sought to form a political body to represent Arabs and their nationalist aspirations, was outlawed and its members were imprisoned. The only party that was active under martial law was the Communist Party, mainly because it was formed by Israeli Jews, some of whom had actually fought against Arabs in the 1948 war, such as Ephraim Sneh who was a member of the Haganah (a Zionist militia before 1948), and later the commander of an Elite Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) unit in 1978¹⁰.

In the current post-martial law era, it is easy to recognize four main Arab political movements active in Israel: (1) the Communist Arab-Jewish movement, (2) Islamic movement, (3) the nationalist movement, and (4) the Arab-Israeli movement. The history, ideology and current position in the balance of power of each movement will be discussed in detail in the following pages.

It is also important to mention that the three main movements differ from each other not only in their ideology but also in their view on the relationship with the Israeli state. So Lotfi, for instance, explains that the Islamic Movement emphasizes the Arab community's need for self-reliance in the form of a civil society that independently meets its cultural, social, religious, and linguistic needs as far as is possible, without relying on the state and its various organs. The Communist Party holds a completely different view, and it advocates merging with the Israeli community while seeking justice and equal rights for all citizens, Arabs and Jews. The National Democratic Assembly NDA calls for it to be "a state for all its

¹⁰ See <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/sneh.html>

citizens”, where Arabs enjoy equal and full citizenship rights while still having the right to preserve their cultural and social identity.

The fourth movement refers to Arab politicians who are members of Zionist parties in Israel, who usually consider themselves more Israeli than Arab. These are mostly Druze Arabs (however, not the Syrian Druze from the Golan Heights) who serve in the Israeli Army. Their concerns differ to those of the general Arab Palestinian public in Israel. Additionally, due to the very small size of this group (thus the invalidity of the term “movement” here) and its insignificance in a discussion about Arab Palestinian rhetoric in Israel, it will be excluded in this research insofar as the issue is the rhetoric of the Arab public and their political parties, not Arabs in Zionist parties.

Political representation is a tool to present citizens’ interests and demands in the public sphere. It is what gives people the ability to influence the policies that govern the country they live in, and the polity that rules it. Under normal circumstances, political parties give the people access to the political process and allow them to be a part of policymaking. If people are denied such access (as in the case under dictatorial regimes), a feeling of resentment will prevail, that may develop into disorder and insurgency. This is why political representation and mobilization are important for the proper functioning of democratic states.

As Arab Palestinians in Israel are a national minority, they have sought to fulfil their aspirations in parliament through national minority parties. However, due to the historical context in which the Israeli state was created, namely, the wars it fought with Arab nations before and after it was established, Arabs in Israel are looked on as part of the “enemy”, and therefore the social, political, and cultural conditions in the country are influenced by this serious national cleavage.

For this reason, in the case of the Arab minority in Israel, people are divided on whether or not they should have a representation in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. This topic will be discussed in detail in the following chapters. However, one of the reasons why many Arab Palestinians in Israel boycott the elections and the Knesset is that participating in the elections and the representation of some Arab parties in the Knesset gives the impression that the Israeli government gives Arabs political access and allows them to take part in the political process. However, these Arab MPs have for decades failed to achieve any significant influence, not only on foreign policy, but also, as research shows, even in internal affairs, including the conditions of Arabs as an ethnic minority facing many serious threats from the Zionist majority. The Political Observer by the Mada Research Centre, in its 11th edition (2011), summarizes

many new racist laws that target the Arab minority, and concludes that the Arab blocs in the Knesset have failed to abort even one of these laws¹¹.

In the following chapters, the rhetoric of the different Arab political movements will be analyzed. I will draw comparisons between them and their attitudes and views, their rhetoric, arguments, and the way they present these arguments. But before that, I shall first introduce these parties, review their history, and summarize their views and achievements.

3.1 The Arab-Jewish Communist movement in Israel

Communist ideology in Israel is represented by the Communist Party of Israel (CPI - abbreviated as “Maki” in Hebrew) and Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality-DFPE) which is CPI's parliamentary party¹² and thus the two names would be used interchangeable throughout. CPI/DFPE is one of the three major political movements representing Arabs in Israel today. The Communists, as is evident from their principles which I shall present later on, consider Zionism the primary reason for inequality towards Arab citizens. They demand the recognition of Arabs as a national minority and seek to achieve change and fulfil the interests of the Arab public through partnership and joint action with Jewish activists or movements that support the Arab struggle. For this reason, Communists do not agree with Arabs being organized into Arab-only blocs for fear of that being seen as an anti-Jewish approach, which may harm the interests of Arabs. One very recent example is the famous Communist singer Amal Morkus, who openly rejected the call for Palestinians to build their own institutions in Israel as a means of cultural independence in a television debate with nationalists, stating: “but we already have institutions in Israel, do you want to create a state inside the state?”¹³ Leaders of this movement do not see a contradiction between being Palestinian in nationality, and Israeli in citizenship. Communists support establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel within the 1967 borders.

¹¹ Shhadi, M. (2011, December). Israel and the Palestinian Minority. *Mada elcarmel*. Retrieved from <<http://mada-research.org/blog/2012/05/19/pmr-issue-16-2011/>>

¹² DFPE when first established included other parties alongside CPI, but today DFPE is composed solely of CPI.

¹³ Ehna TV (T.V producer), (2013). The Sectarian Discourse (video). *Palestine from the inside*. Retrieved from <http://www.ehna.tv/Media/11-1696>>.

History of the Communist Party of Israel (CPI) and Hadash

The Communist Party of Israel was founded in 1948, following the recognition of the new Israeli state by the Soviet Union immediately after its establishment was declared¹⁴. Later on, disagreements within the CPI emerged between the mainly Jewish faction, which was pro-Zionist, and the primarily Arab faction, which opposed Zionism and saw it as a nationalistic movement serving imperialist interests. Additionally, the pro-Zionist faction supported the Six Day War in 1967 that Israel initiated against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, while the other faction considered it an unprovoked attack¹⁵. The result was a division in CPI/Maki, where the anti-Zionist division split and formed a new party called the “New Communist List” (NCL- abbreviated as “Rakach” in Hebrew), which included Arab Knesset members and Jewish anti-Zionist Knesset member Meir Valner. CPI became weaker especially after it did not win any seats in the seventh parliamentary elections in 1969¹⁶, and its supporters shifted their support to the NCL especially after the latter formed Hadash in 1977. The NCL, on the other hand, managed to expand its supporters base and many Arab Palestinians joined the party, which adopted their national aspirations and raised the banner of equal rights and the anti-Zionist struggle.

3.1.1 Hadash

On March 15, 1977, the NCL parliamentary group was named “Hadash – Democratic Front for Peace and Equality” (DFPE), in preparation for the 1977 Knesset elections¹⁷. Other groups and individual activists, including some members of the Israeli Black Panthers, who all opposed martial law and the annexation of Arab lands and sought equal rights for all, joined the new Hadash umbrella party. Since then, the NCL has run for election under Hadash, and many consider the two as one body, as the NCL is actually the creator and backbone of Hadash. On its website, NCL (today renamed CPI, after the original CPI of 1948 ended) states:

We offer a common way, on the basis of a minimalist platform, for all Israelis who would agree to walk with us part of the way. This was our intention in establishing, in 1977, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE - "Hadash"/"Aljabha"), which we view as a true Jewish-

¹⁴ Israeli Knesset website.(n.d). *Israel Communist Party (Maki)*. Retrieved from <http://www.knesset.gov.il/faction/eng/FactionPage_eng.asp?PG=72. >.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Abu Jabir, 2006, Ibid, p. 91.

¹⁷ DFPE's page in Wikipedia. <<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hadash>>. Accessed: 05.12.2013

*Arabic political partnership. We put our efforts for it to be strengthened, developed and expanded*¹⁸.

NCL, especially under Hadash, gained remarkable support in the elections in the following years, in the eighth, ninth, and tenth Knesset elections in 1973, 1977, and 1981 respectively, when it won the majority of Arab votes. In the eleventh elections, more than half of the total Arab votes went to the Hadash Party¹⁹. The success of the New Communist List in the public sphere was a result of it being represented in the Knesset on the one hand, and being in the opposition, where it was able to counter Israeli domestic and foreign policies, and demand justice and equality for Palestinians. It also called for Palestinian refugees to be granted the right of return, a halt to the annexation of Palestinian lands, making peace with neighboring Arab countries, and the implementation of the second part of the UN 1947 Partition plan, which stipulated the establishment of an independent Palestinian state²⁰. Hadash attracted Arab academics in Arab villages and cities and managed to win people's support in local elections. It achieved remarkable success in the city of Nazareth where the city council has been controlled by representatives of the party since 1975. This was one of the reasons that gave rise to Hadash, as leaders of the Party interpreted success in local elections as a potential success at the regional level too, including the Knesset elections. Another reason that motivated the establishment of Hadash, according to Benyamin Neuberger, was the Party's need to expand its supporters base among Arabs. This could be accomplished not through the activism of the NCL which was more popular among Jews, but through a new body with an Arab nationalist approach similar to that of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, who was very popular and won the sympathy of Palestinians and all Arab nations during the 1970s²¹. In 1989, NCL (Rakach) changed its name back to the name of the original Communist Party it split from (CPI – Maki), after that party ceased to exist²². This meant that the old NCL, the new CPI, is henceforth the only Communist party in Israel, and has remained a part of Hadash.

However, parties and movements that were a part of the Democratic Front alongside the CPI left Hadash under the claim that “the Party [CPI] imposes its agendas and plans on the Front”²³. Other reasons were

¹⁸ CPI official website: <http://maki.org.il/en/documents/11096-the-founding-principles-of-the-communist-party-of-israel>

¹⁹ Ghanim, A. & Mohammad, M. (2009). *Palestinians in Israel: Indigenous Group Politics in the Jewish State*. Ramallah: Madar. (in Arabic)

²⁰ Abu Jabir, 2006, Ibid, p. 88.

²¹ Neuberger 1998, in Abu Jabir, 2006, p. 89.

²² Israeli Knesset website. *Israel Communist Party (Maki)*. Retrieved from http://www.knesset.gov.il/faction/eng/FactionPage_eng.asp?PG=72>

²³ Abu Jabir, 2006, Ibid, p. 93.

the claim that the CPI was pushing towards entering coalitions with other rival Arab parties, which was interpreted by Jewish components of the Front, such as the Black Panthers, as a nationalist-based coalition. According to Abu Jabir, these developments raised questions and debates among the Communists about the Jewish-Arab partnership that was once considered the core of the Democratic Front Party for Peace and Equality and about its advantages; especially that following the departure of the Black Panthers and Shasi movements, the CPI was left as the sole constituent of the Front. This practice of singling-out other parties led to the resignation of many of the Front's members and leaders alike who objected to this practice, and those who did not resign were dismissed by both the CPI and the Front. The result was an increasingly weak Front and Party, which was reflected in the 1992 Knesset elections when its share of the parliament seats dropped to 3 seats compared to 4 in the 1988 elections. This forced the CPI to unite with other parties in the following elections to stay in the Knesset, like Balad (the National Democratic Assembly – NDA) and the Arabic Movement for Change. Clearly, the emergence of these Arab political parties who competed with the Front for Arab votes meant a further decrease in the latter's power and popularity.

The rank of the Front in the partisan balance of power has been relatively stable over the past decade. In the most recent Knesset elections held on January 22, 2013, the Front won 113,610 votes which is approximately 25% of the total Arab vote (448,920 votes)²⁴, noting that some communist and left-wing Jews vote for the Front too, as opposed to the two other Arab parties whose votes come exclusively from Arab voters.

In conclusion, it can be said that Hadash and the Communist Party of Israel are strongly interconnected, with many “shared” leaders.

Before delving into the rhetoric used by Hadash, I shall first present the party's principles. The following excerpts are from Hadash's official English page²⁵:

The basic principles of Hadash as a broad leftist movement included the unique demand for the evacuation of all the territories which were occupied in June 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel – a claim that other movements began supporting only in later years. The principles stressed subjects such as workers' rights, social justice, opposition to

²⁴ Ghanadri,S. (2013, February 12). *Summary of the Arab Parties' Achievements in the 19th Elections*. Panet news website. Retrieved from <<http://www.panet.co.il/online/articles/63/68/S-643967,63,68.html>>

²⁵ DFPE's website: <<http://hadash.org.il/english/>>. Accessed on: 5.5.2013.

privatization, democratic liberties and human rights, equality for the Arab minority, ethnic groups, women, and the protection of the environment and the disarmament of mass destruction weapons. In the present elections there is still no other party which presents all these demands in its platform.

It was (and still is) a socialist movement in a capitalist state; a movement which fights against every manifestation of racism and discrimination; a movement which supports women's rights in a patriarchal male chauvinist society; a peace movement which objects to the occupation and fights for a just peace which will prevent wars; a movement of environmental justice in an area which is being polluted by real estate moguls who gradually take control over it; the only movement which demands the demilitarization of Israel and the whole Middle East and the abolition of nuclear and chemical weapons.

From the above lines, it can be inferred that Hadash's focus is mainly on social justice, human and workers' rights, equality for Arabs in Israel and Arab women in Arab communities. Hadash seems to be concerned about the environment as well, unlike Communist parties in the Arab world. However, other than environmental activism, and despite the differences in the political objectives that vary according to the political situation in each country, Hadash's charter and objectives are similar to those of all Communist movements in the Arab world. The charter of the Iraqi Communist Party, for instance, states:

The Iraqi Communist Party has stood, and will always stand, against all forms of tyrannical ruling, political authoritarianism, ethnic, religious, or sectarian discrimination, discrimination against women, and depravation of individuals or public rights²⁶.

The discussions in section 3 will review the actual political practice and rhetoric that CPI and Hadash apply in light of these views and principles.

²⁶ Iraqi Communist Party's website: <<http://www.iraqicp.com/2010-12-30-11-06-41/19795-2012-06-11-18-10-09.html>>
Accessed on: 5.5.2013.

3.2 The Islamic Movement

Historical Background: Roots of the Islamic Movement in Historic Palestine:

In practice, the term "Islamic Movement" or "Islamic Awakening" is associated with the birth of Islam and emergence of the Islamic *Dawa* (Call). It is a movement that maintains Islam as a religion and wants to establish this religion in people's hearts.

Palestine experienced a religious revival in response to Jewish migration. In the pages of *Al-Manar*, Rashid Reda, the student of Mohamed Abdu warned his people against the imminent Zionist threat to Palestine, which seeks to occupy it²⁷. The Public Islamic Conference was held in Jerusalem in 1931 and approved the construction of the Al-Aqsa Islamic University and the establishment of a large economic company to save Palestine²⁸. We can say that the conflict that emerged early over the land of Palestine between the Zionist plan and the Palestinian people was led by proponents of the Islamic awakening. Hajj Amin al-Husseini, who led the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC), and played a significant role in rallying the crowds, may have been obsessed with the complete defense of the Palestinian territories. Mosques played a major role in confrontations and were a starting point for many of the anti-Zionists' activities.²⁹

The middle class and elite were severely hampered as a result of the 1948 Nakba ("Catastrophe" in Arabic), leading to the destruction of the civil sphere for the Palestinian community and a cultural and intellectual decline as well as the destruction of the economic structure of the Palestinian people³⁰.

As a result of this new situation, endowments, sacred sites, mosques and Sufi lodges were destroyed and scholars, teachers, Quran tutors, Sharia judges and all those who played an important role in people's lives migrated or were killed³¹. Things became even worse when the Arab minority came under military rule between 1961 and 1965. During military rule, the Arab minority, and Muslims in particular, were detached from the global Islamic body. No Islamic institution or group was established during this

²⁷ Sakhnini, Palestine State, page 80.

²⁸ Tayseer Jabara, *Jame'at al-Najah* (University of Success) magazine, 1 (31), 2000, p.147.

²⁹ Al-Shanqiti. K. (1940, January 27). Role of the Palestinian Civil Resistance. *Al-Karmil newspaper*. P. 35.

³⁰ Maher, A.S. (1988). *Socioeconomic History of Palestine*. Dar Ibn Khaldun, 1st edition, pp. 115-116.

³¹ The only one who remained from the judges after the Nakba was Judge/Taher Al Tabri, the *mufti* (Islamic Scholar) of Tabriya.

period, except for the Sufi movements that continued to exist in Arab villages and cities such as Nazareth and mixed cities such as Acre. Followers maintained mosques and continued prayers.

Post-1967 Islamic Movement:

After the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967³², communication and exploration of the other side of Palestinian society took place for the first time since 1948, and Palestinians who remained in Israel could now communicate with other Palestinian people. Islamic books appeared in Arab markets in 1969 and the 1970s, which constituted the beginnings of an Islamic revival in Arab towns. Signs of a return to the Islamic religion started to emerge among some workers who mingled at work in Israeli cities with Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Additionally, some educated young people would attend prayers, especially the Friday prayer, and would listen to lessons and sermons in Palestinian cities near Arab villages such as Tulkarm, Qalqilya and Jenin, and seek to learn their religion. People became familiar with some of the Islamic personalities who would visit Arab villages and towns to preach and communicate with the people³³. In this period, the name of Sheikh Abdullah Nimer Darwish emerged as a preacher and speaker around whom many enthusiastic young men gathered who sought to serve Islam through their understanding of Islam at the time as a religion and way of life³⁴. In the 1970s, the Islamic Movement emerged under the name *Usrat al-Jihad* ("The Family of Jihad"). This was considered the first stage of the Islamic Movement's existence. This stage ended with the arrests of all Family of Jihad members led by Sheikh Abdullah Nimer Darwish. It is a stage better described as one of political immaturity, characterized by spontaneous action, a divergence in judgment and denial of other methods. After this period and once they were released from prison, the Islamic Movement emerged as the "Muslim Youth". This stage was characterized by social activism and care for the concerns of society, hence the emergence of Zakat (a form of charity paid for specific properties and livestock) committees, charity foundations and voluntary Islamic camps as well as theatre, Islamic song troupes and Islamic art festivals. It became clear that the Islamic Movement in its new form was penetrating the inner parts of Palestinian society throughout the entire country. The Movement had campaigns and tours in Negev, in southern Palestine, Lower Galilee and Galilee, and during this period, it built hundreds of mosques in different towns³⁵. This mosque renaissance largely helped the growth and spread of the Islamic message

³² The military rule was lifted off the Arab villages in 1966 and the West Bank and Gaza Strip were occupied in 1967 where a military rule took over.

³³ "The Islamic women work in Umm al-Fahim city", Um-Al-Fahim, Center for Contemporary Studies, (No date), p. 4.

³⁴ The Islamic Movement inside the Green Line, *International Affairs*, Um-Al-Fahim, Center for Contemporary Studies, 1995.

³⁵ The number of mosques in the country reached 250 mosques until 2000 with an increase of 170 mosques within 15 years, Ibid.

and formed the spearhead of the Da'wah (Islamic preaching) that helped to establish Islamic thought in people's hearts and minds. During this period, a national leadership was formed that led the Islamic work march in the country and played the role of the main guide of this work. In some towns, work transformed into a systematic work while it just starting to take shape in other regions. This stage lasted until the arrests at the beginning of the 1990s when disputes started occurring within the Islamic Movement with regard its participation in the parliamentary elections. The Oslo Agreement was one of the issues that accelerated the dispute in addition to the role played by the Israeli media and research centers in emphasizing this dispute and portraying there to be two wings to the Islamic Movement, a conservative wing and a moderate one³⁶. This in turn escalated the crisis within the Islamic Movement which started to surface in the early 1990s. These disputes tackled dimensions that were more profound than the Knesset issue, which is considered the straw that broke the camel's back. Therefore, we can describe the evolution of the Islamic Movement within the Green Line since 1967 until the schism as having two phases: the first phase is the emergence and advancement that started in 1969 and took shape between 1972 and 1973, becoming institutionalized in the mid-1970s. This movement was characterized at the time by spontaneous activity and practical immaturity and ended, as mentioned, with the arrest of Family of Jihad members in the early 1980s. The second phase followed the arrests in 1981 and continued until the early 1990s. This phase can be divided into two sections so that the first stage formed what was known as the "Muslim Youth", marked by the presence of some Islamic leaders in prisons and detention center, and the end of the Family of Jihad stage when many of this organization's affiliates abandoned the logic of force and jihad and continued civil society work through the establishment of associations, foundations and committees and focused on the religious affairs of Muslims in the country. It can be said that this stage, labelled by some as the Muslim Youth period, between 1981-1985, followed by the released from prison of some leaders when the early organization of the Islamic Movement started to crystallize, succeeded in forcing its presence quickly onto the local scene. This led to its success making Muslims regain confidence in their religion and recover trust and support for Islam. It also raised the level of the sense and awareness of being Muslim and a part of the Muslim community worldwide³⁷. Evidence of the success of the Islamic Movement's boost to Islam among Muslims since its emergence is provided in the *Journal of the New East* (in Hebrew: "המזרח החדש") in its 1965 edition, which stated that it conducted a survey among Muslims to examine religious practice (the relationship between Muslims

³⁶ Rekhes, E. (2003) . *Islamic Fundamentalism beyond the Green Line: relationship between the Islamic movements in Israel and the Islamic movements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip*. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, translation, Political Perspective Center for Studies and Investments.,

³⁷ Shafie, B. M. (1993). *Towards Mature Islamic Movement*., Edition 1/1993, Wahbi Bookstore. pp 30-32,

and their religion, page 85). In a survey it conducted in 1963, it found that about 5-15% of Muslim Arab youth at the time observed Friday prayers, whereas other surveys conducted years later showed that Muslim observation of the Friday prayer was closer to 42-62%. This of course is mainly attributed to the positive role of the Islamic Movement.

The third phase stretches from the mid-1980s until the schism in 1996. This stage was characterized by the expanding scale of institutional work, the spread of Islamic organizations, entry into local politics and the start of divergent statements made by Islamic Movement leaders about local political issues, and especially in relation to parliamentary participation. This led to the division of the Islamic Movement.

The beginning of the fourth stage of the Islamic Movement's evolution was March 29, 1996, with a split between the first group which continued to call itself the Islamic Movement and affirmed this name in its statements and notices; the second group which called itself the Shura Council which aimed at achieving constitutional status and legality (*Shura* means consultation, and the Shura Council is tantamount to the Islamic Movement's parliament). This division was ultimately and fundamentally escalated by Hammad Abu D'aabes' charter describing the other branch of the Islamic Movement led by Sheikh Ra'ed Salah and Sheikh Kamal Khatib as the "corrective turnabout (الانقلابية التصحيحية)" movement³⁸. In return, Sheikh Kamal Khatib wrote a series of articles titled "Rectification of Methodology" in June and July 1996 meaning that the division in the Islamic Movement was finalized in mid-1996, giving way to two movements. The first, we mentioned, held to the title of the Shura Council and the second was under the name of the Islamic Movement.

That year witnessed the beginning of the Israeli crackdown on the Islamic Movement led by Sheikh Ra'ed Salah with its Islamic Relief and Orphan and Prisoner associations shut down on April 11, 1996³⁹, i.e. nearly one month before the parliamentary elections. The Supreme Court ruled to keep the relief association closed⁴⁰. This shutting down was preceded by a heavy investigation of the director of the relief committee, Dr. Sulaiman Ahmad, former president of Umm al-Fahm municipality⁴¹. The Israeli police recommended putting the relief work leaders on trial.⁴²

³⁸ Abu- Daabes, H. (n.d), Our case between boldness of the incitation invokers and politeness of right owners. *Almethak newspaper*, P.3 No date ,

³⁹[Editor], Kul al-Arab newspaper, 13/4/1996.

⁴⁰ [Editor], Sawt al-Haq wal Huriyya (Voice of Reason and Freedom), 16/8/1996.

⁴¹ Ibid, 23/8/1996.

⁴² [Editor], Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper, 13/8/1996.

Since its emergence, the Islamic current represented by the Islamic Movement proposed crystallized stances towards matters relating to Palestinians in Israel. The Islamic movement is similar to the other movements in several aspects but also retains its own unique features. The main features that distinguish it are:

- 1) **Religious Arab-Muslim Based Organization:** Advocates of the movement support a national Arab organization and favor organization based on Islamic principles. They are divided among themselves with regard to participation in Knesset elections.
- 2) **Islamic Identity as a Central Goal:** In tackling the subject of Palestinian identity in Israel, the Islamic movement stresses the Islamic component of this identity and believes that enhancing and focusing on this identity as a central goal should be naturally sought after without ignoring the components of Palestinian identity in Israel in light of them also being Palestinian Arabs and nationals of Israel.
- 3) **Hard line:** This movement that matured in the mid-1980s emerged in light of the new reality of Palestinians in Israel, which allowed its spokespeople to put forth their requests to the Jewish authorities and majority in an inflexible tone that was uncompromising in many cases on issues relating to Palestinians in Israel, both domestic and foreign issues. Moreover, they did not hesitate to demand that Palestinians do not compromise in working for their future and they sought to put that into action.

In the following pages we will survey the evolution of both branches of the Islamic Movement. For easier reference, the term "parliamentary branch" will be used to refer to the Southern Islamic Movement (SIM) that participates in the Israeli parliament; while the term "extra-parliamentary branch" will be used to refer to the Northern Islamic Movement (NIM) that does not participate in the Israeli parliament, and boycotts its elections.

3.2.1 Northern (extra-parliamentary) Branch of the Islamic Movement

In the period that followed the split of the Islamic Movement in 1996, several features that distinguished the extra-parliamentary Islamic Movement can be identified that made it expand continuously in size, beginning with the rejection of many of its followers of participation in the 1996 elections⁴³. Perhaps the

⁴³ [Editor], Sawt al-Haq wal Huriyya (Voice of Reason and Freedom), Interview with Sheikh Kamal Khateeb, 1/4/1996.

“*Al-Aqsa in Danger*” (مهرجان الأقصى) mass rally in 1996 and the rectification of methodology initiative in the preaching and institutionalized work helped primarily on reinforcing the Islamic Movement among the Muslim public in the country and constituted a fertile land for progress.

The main dimensions of this work were:

1- Restructuring how preaching was carried out the various towns, especially after the Consolidated List which included the Movement gained four seats (despite that opinion polls gave the Islamic Movement alone 4-5 seats⁴⁴, confirming that a large section of the Movement’s members respected the decision not to participate). This pushed the Islamic Movement to set up practical plans to enhance and promote the Islamic preaching work in the towns and enhance the organizational work.

Later, the Shura Council established a group of institutions such as the Regional Relief Association, the Islamic Endowment Development Association, Regional Student Committee and the *al-Mithaq* (the Charter) newspaper. After that, they called themselves “the Islamic Movement inside the Green Line” (pre-1948)⁴⁵.

2- Building a relationship with the various sectors of the society and political parties through its representative agencies and charity associations. This communication has resulted in an understanding of the people's concerns which has led the Islamic Movement to put its words into actions and making its propositions a reality, such as: 1. The Da'wah and Tableegh Department (reminding people of the importance of practicing religion and applying it in daily life); 2. The People's Action and Gain Department (in the Islamic camps and Islamic endowment camps and voluntary work); 3. The Social and Behavioral Action Department (family reform committees, Zakat committees to aid needy families, medical clinics and media branches such as *Ishraqa* women’s magazine); 4. Economic Action Department (projects encouraging economic independence and business development projects based on the notion of a self-reliant society that was introduced by Sheikh Ra'ed Salah and implemented by the Movement); 5. The Institutional Action Department; 6. Political Action Department⁽⁴⁶⁾ (local political work in the local authorities and regional departments such as the High Follow-up Committee representing all the Arab parties, and other political movements that share the social, educational and cultural aspirations of the movement, reinforcing national Palestinian identity and Arab-Islamic identity).

⁴⁴ [Editor], Sawt al-Haq wal Huriyya (Voice of Reason and Freedom), 26/1/1996.

⁴⁵ See "About Us at" at <<http://www.almithaq.com>>. Accessed: 02.4.2012.

⁴⁶ *Reality of Literature of the Islamic Movement* (unpublished), Center for Contemporary Studies, 2000.

Since its second launch, the Islamic Movement considered the need to penetrate social groups and regarded the abovementioned departments as mechanisms that could connect it to the public and as the best tool to present Islam.

It appears that this success of the Islamic Movement was met with suspicion by the Israeli authorities and the media alike. Consequently, it was not long until the vilification of the Islamic Movement began in the mass media and by political and security figures like Alec Ron, Gideon Ezra, Yisrael Katz and many others from the left and right wings alike. Some ministers invoked considerable incitement against the Islamic Movement and its president Sheikh Ra'ed Salah. The official and media incitement machine against the Islamic Movement did not stop, and its leadership headed by Sheikh Salah became convinced that it would only be a matter of time before the Movement's leaders were arrested and its organizations shut down⁴⁷.

The government's crackdown on the Islamic Movement and the incitement against it, which began rising steadily in 1996, aimed to pressurize it to make compromises and ease its tone on fundamental issues. For the Movement, it meant that each step taken against it was not a step backward but rather political and methodological lessons for what was to come⁴⁸.

This provocation campaign was a preamble to the arrest of the Islamic Movement's leaders. It aimed to make the Arab masses feel vulnerable and targeted, hence, they had to leave or avoid the Islamic Movement⁴⁹. That is why Israel waited for the right moment to arrest Sheikh Ra'ed Salah and the Movement's members. It used international, regional and local circumstances to make the arrest with the aim of concealing his political role and his movement's firm stances concerning the Al-Aqsa Mosque and its continuous stress that the Al-Aqsa is in danger. Even the Hebrew press and the *Shabak* (the Israeli internal intelligence service) stressed that⁵⁰. It led the Movement to carry out projects to revive the Islamic *waqf* (endowment), the social charter project and the self-reliant society project, demonstrating an interest in and addressing the day-to-day life and concerns of the Arab minority. Clearly, the Islamic Movement did not stop its march because of the arrest of its leaders and did not change its media rhetoric

⁴⁷ Interview with Sheikh Ra'ed Salah on IslamOnline on 19/1/2003.

⁴⁸ *Prospective Future of the Islamic Movement Between Government Planning and Internal Perceptiveness*, Center for Contemporary Studies, 2000, p. 4.

⁴⁹ *Methodology of Confronting the Islamic Movement reaching unlawfulness*, page 4. Center for Contemporary Studies.

⁵⁰ See Haaretz newspaper, Thursday 1.1.2004.

or religious discourse. On the contrary, it is clear that its standing among the public improved because of the communication of its leaders with the Arab community leaders in general⁵¹.

Conclusion

The Islamic Movement has undergone several stages in its formation as with any other political movement. With each stage, it has gained more experience and has used this experience to the benefit of its core beliefs, as well as benefiting from the experiences of others. The Islamic Movement has worked and progressed keeping its religious/lawful vision in sight. By setting with this as its basis, the Islamic Movement expanded the scale of its preaching as well as its educational, media, political and social work to be consistent with the preaching. It is clear that the Islamic Movement understands and interacts with the people on the street. The statements of the Islamic Movement following the Iraq War may be clear-cut evidence on the Movement's concern for the public and its interaction with them⁵². This is also evident from the systematic communication with the wider masses and the Movement's endeavor to put the self-reliant society project into action, the special attention given to the Al-Aqsa Mosque by the Islamic Movement and its care for endowments and holy places and its focus on their spiritual, religious, and national dimensions. This is in addition to the Movement's keenness to create a new Arab character in the country that combines timeless social and religious values and social solidarity. Moreover, the political stances of the Islamic Movement were clear on issues concerning the Arab public and it took a firm stance refusing to relinquish the right of return, striking or dividing the Al-Aqsa Mosque or breaking the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967 into small pieces and transforming it into cantons. It also refused to be involved in the Israeli Knesset and turned down parliamentary participation as it is clear that the Movement understands the people's concerns and is certain that parliament is not the mechanism to solve their problems⁵³. The Islamic Movement also made progress on social, political and housing issues. The movement's leadership considers this success the reason for the systematic incitation against the Movement since 1995, the arrest of Sheikh Ra'ed Salah, president of the Islamic Movement, and his imprisonment together with other members between 2003 and 2005. This incitement against the Movement is explained by the sheikh himself in a series of articles that he wrote in *Sawt al-Haq wal Huriyya* (Voice of Reason and Freedom) aimed at forcing the Movement to change its position.

⁵¹ A poll conducted by the Center for Contemporary Studies on 31/8/2003 revealed that 85.9% consider what happened religious persecution whereas 49.3% indicated that arrest will significantly affect the momentum for struggle of the Arab masses.

⁵² See graph no. (1) under the title "This is Notification to the People" 27/9/2002 and see graph no. (2) 21/1/2003.

⁵³ Interview of IslamOnline with Sheikh Ra'ed Salah about the Knesset and its role on 19/1/2003.

However, the leaders of the Movement who were arrested stressed that it is a movement of associations and committees and its organization abides by the laws of the state. It is not a movement spearheaded by an individual that ceases to exist if he is persecuted or imprisoned.

3.2.2 Southern (parliamentary) Branch of the Islamic Movement⁵⁴

Since 1996, the Movement of Sheikh Darwish participated in parliamentary elections in 1999, 2003, and 2006 in a coalition called the United Arab List (UAL) together with the Arab Democratic Party and three other smaller Arab parties. Of the total 120 parliamentary seats, the UAL gained 5 seats, 2 seats, and 4 seats in those election years respectively.⁵⁵ The leaders of the Movement of Sheikh Darwish who support participation in the Knesset and who emphasize the necessity of integration into the Israeli state and society, also stress the paradox of their situation as an indigenous minority. They demonstrate concern that, despite holding citizenship, they do not “belong” to the nation of the state in which they hold citizenship and in whose parliament they serve as elected representatives. Both Sheikh Kamel Rayan (interview), who today holds the position of Deputy Manager of the Union of Local Authorities in Israel, and Member of Knesset Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsour (interview), admitted that they were disappointed with their inability to make any changes to the political system after having joined the Knesset. Both stated that now, with hindsight, they did not think that their presence in parliament had made much of a difference for their constituency. However, they both consider it important to keep their parliamentary positions and to continue to voice their opinions and protests.

The pragmatic perspective of the Movement of Sheikh Darwish is evident in the reply of Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsour (interview). When asked about the main goals of the Islamic Movement in Israel, he said:

Let me answer this question in an ironic way. Once, a journalist asked me: “What do you, as an Islamist and a leader of the Islamic Movement, think about creating an Islamic state within the state of Israel?” Maybe he expected me to say “No,” directly. I said to him, “Yes, but on one condition. If I wake in the morning and switch on the radio and hear that 75% of the Jews embraced Islam. Only in those circumstances might I think of having an Islamic state inside of Israel.” So, it is a naïve idea to think about creating an Islamic state or looking forward to having an Islamic state

⁵⁴ During the writing of this chapter, numerous attempts were made to retrieve information about the evolution of the Southern Islamic Movement from leaders and members in it. However, our attempts were met with failure when everyone we contacted in the Southern Movement showed no interest in providing such information. Therefore, the information in this part (2.2.2) is based on a paper written by Dr. Tilda Rozmer: Forthcoming in *Political Islam: Context versus Ideology*, Edited by Khaled Hroub, Saqi Books.

⁵⁵ Knesset website: <http://www.knesset.gov.il>

inside Israel. Because we are aware of the limitations – we are aware of the realities on the ground. We are aware of the fact that we are a part of the Israeli Jewish state. The vast majority of the inhabitants of this state are Jews. The Israeli State was established to be the aspiration of the Jewish people in the entire world, especially those who immigrated to this part of the world – they created the state and they want to live in a Jewish state. We are aware of this fact, but regardless of this fact, we want to be a part of this state, but not a part of the identity of this state.

Sheikh Darwish, who heads the other branch of the Movement, is reported as speaking of coexistence in Israeli media, such as in response to riots in Acre in October 2008, which was sparked when a Palestinian citizen drove through a Jewish neighborhood on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. Following the riots, Sheikh Darwish himself participated in the Peace Sukkah⁵⁶ which was set up in Acre as a venue for its Jewish and Arab residents to meet and seek understanding. Sheikh Darwish made the following address in Hebrew to the people present and to the press:⁵⁷

Bless all those who have come here to help and strengthen the coexistence in Acre, but those who have come from outside Acre – whether they be big or small, bearded or not – those who have only come to incite and come between the residents are an unwelcome presence in this city. We have learned from you, Acre, how to live together.

However, from interviews with other leaders of the Movement of Sheikh Darwish, coexistence is expressed to be an aspiration, but they do not describe the present relations between Jews and Palestinian in Israel as constituting coexistence.

When considering the different attitudes towards the Israeli state and its institutions, as expressed by leaders of the two branches of the Movement, the repressive treatment of the Movement of Sheikh Salah must be taken into consideration. Sheikh Salah and his Movement has been closely monitored by the Israeli authorities and the Sheikh was imprisoned in May 2003 charged with supporting “terrorism” due to fundraising for charities in the West Bank linked with Hamas.⁵⁸ Sheikh Salah was released in July

⁵⁶ A *sukkha* is a hut built as part of the Jewish holiday Sukkot to commemorate the wandering of Moses in the Sinai desert.

⁵⁷ *Ynet*, 15.10.2008, “Hundreds gather at Akko 'Peace Sukkah’”, by Hagai Einav.

⁵⁸ Dakwar, J., 2007, “The Islamic Movement Inside Israel, an Interview with Shaykh Ra’id Salah”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 2 (Winter), pp. 66-76, p. 67.

2005. Recently, in autumn 2008, the offices of the Movement in Um al-Fahm were closed and documents and computers confiscated by Israeli police due to suspicion of cooperation with Hamas.⁵⁹

In sum, whereas the religious goals of the two branches of the Islamic Movement are presented as being the same, (i.e. to protect the holy sites and to revive observance of Islam among Palestinian Muslims), their political responses to Israeli policies and to the predicament of Palestinian citizens as a minority group sometimes differ. In broad terms, the Movement of Sheikh Salah advocates autonomy, or a self-reliant society as described by Sheikh Khatib above, whereas the Movement of Sheikh Darwish advocates participation in the state and the advancement of a multicultural society. These differences are evident in the strategies and approaches chosen by the two branches.

Sheikh Sarsour (interview) of the Movement of Sheikh Darwish identified three main challenges facing Palestinians in Israel that all are directly connected with relations with the state and/or its Jewish citizens:

1. Israelization/Zionization (i.e. the pacification of Palestinian citizens and their assimilation into Israeli society and culture through education and language, and by denying them their own religious and cultural institutions);
2. The threat of population transfer;
3. Violence against Palestinians by state agencies and by Jewish citizens.

All interviewees raised these issues, but with different emphasis and attitudes concerning how to act towards the Israeli state and its Jewish citizens. Addressing the first challenge of Israelization and Zionization, Sheikh Sarsour (interview) relates the strategies employed by the Movement for developing a Palestinian Muslim identity, including strengthening the attachment of the Muslim population inside Israel to their cultural roots and national history. He emphasized that, as Palestinian citizens of Israel, they do not wish to be the target of the Israelization and Zionization policies that their population has been exposed to since 1948. Rather, they want to be active citizens whose citizenship is acknowledged for its civic value. They have no interest in becoming part of the Israeli Jewish Zionist identity.

⁵⁹ “Police close Islamic institute suspected of aiding Hamas”, *Ha’aretz*, 24.08.2008, by Ashkenazi, E., and Stern, Y.

Apart from that, the achievements of the Southern Islamic Movement that is currently lead by Sheikh Hammad Abu Daabes, will be discussed in chapter 4.1

3.3 The Nationalist Movement

The Arab nationalist movement in Israel today is mainly represented by the Nationalist Democratic Assembly (NDA). Before the NDA, the banner of Arab nationalism was raised by the Abnaa' al-Balad ("children of the homeland") movement, but due to internal divisions and the emergence of new political powers, Abnaa' al-Balad slowly shrank and many of its members joined other parties, particularly the new NDA. Given the internal split that divided the movement into two branches, one led by Raja Igbariah and the other led by Muhammad Kana'nah, the fact that many of its senior members joined other parties, and that it is an extra-parliamentary movement that boycotts the Knesset elections for ideological reasons, Abnaa al-Balad is currently a small movement that has little influence in the political sphere. Thus, our analysis of the nationalist movement will focus on the new, energetic Nationalist Democratic Assembly whose power has been steadily growing since its establishment in 1996.

3.3.1 The Nationalist Democratic Assembly - NDA

The Nationalist Democratic Assembly (NDA) was formed in 1996 bringing together many political and intellectual movements that had been active in the past in Palestinian cities and towns such as the Abnaa al-Balad (People of the Homeland) movement. The NDA was founded by Azmi Bishara along with former members of the Progressive Movement and a number of local organizations such as the Progressive Socialist Party, which was established in Al-Maghar village in Galilee, the al-Ansar movement in Umm al-Fahm, the Al-Nahda movement in Al-Tiba and the Abnaa Al-Tira movement, as well as activists in the Palestinian community.

The development of the NDA cannot be separated in any way from the political experiences of Arab parties inside the 48 territories, beginning with Land Day, then Abnaa al-Balad, the Communist Front, the Progressive Movement, followed by the emergence of the NDA. Although there were forerunners in the movement, the NDA emerged in a different political context, that of the 1990s, which marked the beginning of the political settlement process and attempts at the Israelization of the Palestinian community, accompanied by or as a result of the settlement process itself. This context explains many of

the components of the NDA at the organizational and ideological levels. As an organization, the coming together was clear when the Abnaa el-Balad movement joined forces with Balad (either as part of the organizational structure of NDA or as an ally), and when figures from Abnaa el-Balad and the Arab Students Front joined the NDA in leadership positions. On the ideological axis, the coming together is seen through the attempt to merge or reconcile (successfully or otherwise) citizenship and national identity; collective rights and the state with all its citizens; and the internal organization of the community and participation in the Knesset.

The bylaws of the party, which were approved at the fourth conference in 2004 stated that, "The Nationalist Democratic Assembly was established with the aim of reshaping the nationalist movement inside Israel into one party that seeks to preserve the national identity of Arab citizens in Israel ..." ⁶⁰

The NDA emphasizes the struggle to transform the state of Israel into a democracy for all its citizens and advocates that Palestinians must have cultural autonomy (the right of the minority to manage its own affairs, such as education). It also seeks to combine nationality and democracy by combining national identity and equal citizenship. These features are significant in the National Democratic Declaration presented at the third party conference in 1999 where it states, "... The Nationalist Democratic Assembly proposed the scheme of a state for all its citizens with cultural autonomy, rebutting the claims that Arabs in Israel have only two options: integration or separation. The Assembly has shown that Arab citizens have more than these two options." ⁶¹

The NDA tried to combine citizenship and national identity, one of the major concepts upon which it established its organization and ideology. The NDA was the organizational expression of this concept, born as a result of prior political and organizational experiences. Before the NDA, the Progressive Movement tried to find means of expressing this but failed to.

The NDA and Bishara tried to find a harmony between day-to-day and civil issues that fall under citizenship and stressed upon by the Communist Front and CPI, and the nationalist and national sense of belonging as stressed by Abnaa el-Balad and the Land Movement. Azmi Bishara recognized the problem that the nationalist movement faces in the 48 territories (Israel). He says, "The matter we are discussing deals in fact with the possibility of building a Palestinian national movement while holding Israeli citizenship. It is not easy to answer this question at all as the Arab community is not separate from the

⁶⁰ Ghanim and Mustafa, *Ibid*, p. 176.

⁶¹ Ghanim and Mustafa, *Ibid*, p. 180.

structure of Israeli society and there is no autonomous Arab economy inside the 1948 borders. Additionally, there is no political action outside the framework of citizenship."⁶²

The NDA presented a structural model for a political organization that has played an important role in developing a political rhetoric and creating an ideological influence within society, without this reflecting on its political dominance. This is unlike the Communist Front (DFPE) which is still dominant politically through its participation and representation in the elections for the local authorities, the Knesset, Histadrut (General Federation of Laborers) and some trade unions and Arab students committees, although its ideological influence has declined over the past decade.

The NDA ran for elections for the first time jointly with the DFPE in 1996 and won fourth place. In the 1999 elections, the NDA ran on a joint platform with the Arab Movement for Change headed by Ahmad Tibi. They won two seats. In 2003, the party ran for the parliamentary elections by itself and won three seats (Azmi Bishara, Jamal Zahalka and Wasil Taha). In the last elections held in 2006, Balad won three seats in Parliament.

Balad started as an elite party that drew in many Arab intellectuals and academics. It formed an alliance with the Communist DFPE in 1996 under one list, which was an unavoidable electoral choice for the two parties in light of the high voting rates expected in the 1992 elections (about 50% of Arabs voted for Zionist parties). At the time, the Arab parties did not realize the political implications moving to direct elections in the elections of the prime minister.

The NDA turned into an ideological political movement after these elections but Ghanim and Mustafa argue that it started to lose its elite academic and intellectual figures' support and at the same time expanded its popular base. An alliance with the Arab Movement for Change headed by Ahmad Tibi was a decisive point in the party's history, leading many of its elite and activists to leave the party in protest, on principle on the one hand and the way this decision was made on the other. The breakdown in the alliance between the two parties immediately after the elections did not remedy the damage done to the party. Not only did the party fail to see the principled and political error it made in the alliance, but also failed to assess the electoral importance of this alliance. Key figures in the NDA claimed it would have been able to win two seats even without an alliance with the Arab Movement for Change. Ghanim and

⁶² Ibid, p. 177.

Mustafa claim that the NDA suffered the consequences of that step, which nevertheless led to greater democratization within the party⁶³.

In 2007, the Assembly bid farewell to its president Azmi Bishara, as he left the country to settle in Doha, where he established the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. Before he left, Bishara faced charges of money laundering and contact with a foreign agent. Bishara's subsequent absence and his presence abroad may have created, a dual leadership, internal and external; however, it is not yet clear the extent to which Bishara's absence from the internal political scene has impacted the party's work.. The truth is that the organizational structure of the party and its constitution allowed the party to escape the dilemma of having to elect a president because there is no such post in the NDA as "Party President", which is usually given to Bishara symbolically and not constitutionally. The party's General Assembly elects the central committee, which in turn elects members of the political department. There is the party secretary and the head of the parliamentary list. This keeps Bishara as party President because of the important role he played in its formation and in establishing its ideology.

Since Bishara's departure, the NDA's conferences have been held without him. The conferences have approved a number of decisions and plans to move to a new stage in his absence. This is a challenge for the party, to prove that the NDA is not limited to Bishara and that Bishara is not limited it. Although the party maintains and affirms this approach, it cannot be denied that the political and ideological communication between the NDA and the Arab World takes place through Bishara himself. Bishara is a political leader and an intellectual known for his books and writings in the Arab World. The Israeli experience gave new dimensions to Bishara's nationalist ideology that helped him stand out among the Arab nationalists. Being a member of the Knesset has helped to break many of the barriers facing Arab intellectuals due to the political reality in which they live. Ghanim and Mustafa believe that the election of the NDA's central committee at its 2008 conference led to the exclusion of personalities affiliated with civil society institutions, which means, according to them, that the Assembly wishes to exclude activists from its central committee and instead give an opportunity to young or new blood to work within the party's organization.

Ghanim and Mustafa also believe that a more liberal and less nationalist current emerged within the Assembly that adopts western liberal principles without paying heed to Arab cultural idiosyncrasies. They argue that this internal movement is contributing to increasingly and unwittingly isolating the

⁶³ Ibid, p. 178.

Assembly from the community. Perhaps the departure of Abnaa el-Balad and some of the nationalist movement figures has weakened those adopting the Arab cultural nationalist approach in the party against those adopting the liberal approach. Indeed, the NDA tends to adopt a more liberal approach, reflected in the activism of the NDA's youth groups that aim to promote principles that may not be welcomed enthusiastically by the largely conservative Palestinian society. Yet we cannot assume that this has weakened the party.

Ghanim and Mustafa argue that the challenge the Assembly faces is not restricted to its organization, which was approved by its last conference, such as reserving one in every three seats in the Assembly's list for Knesset elections for women. There is also the intellectual challenge, namely giving up on its ideology to come closer to the day-to-day issues the people face and maintain their collective identity through the idiosyncrasies of Arab culture⁶⁴.

The Assembly believes it is capable of addressing these challenges and continuing its political and ideological activity on the Palestinian scene inside the 48 territories despite the absence of Azmi Bishara. The party's leaders believe that the Assembly could once again embody Arab political rhetoric and become a major influential factor on the content of that rhetoric. Jamal Zahalka, an NDA Knesset member, says that the Assembly, "put three challenges to the Hebrew State that it could not accept, and thus decided to get rid of it. These challenges were democracy, Palestinian nationality and communication with the Arab world and its concerns. Perhaps the party's major intellectual contribution was linking the nationalistic and democratic challenge even though it has made significant contributions to each issue separately. When the party drafted its ideas in the form of an integrated political project and penetrated the political action scene, this led to a real change in the political rhetoric of Palestinians inside the 1948 territories and its impact was wider than the framework of the National Democratic Assembly so much that even political rivals started imitating it and reiterating its ideas."⁶⁵

In the last elections in 2013, the NDA won 3 seats (out of 11 seats that the Arab parties won altogether), which is the same number of seats the NDA won in previous elections. Yet an examination of the NDA's achievements in parliamentary elections since 1999 shows an increase in the vote for the NDA, and the percentage it received of the total Arab vote. The following table by Rohana (2010) shows the increase in the NDA's influence since 1999.

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 179.

⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 180.

Figure 1: The rise of NDE's influence between 1999 and 2013

Year	National Democratic Assembly		United Arab List		DFPE	
	% of total Arab vote	Votes	% of total Arab vote	Votes	% of total Arab vote	Votes
1999	16.8	66,103	30.6	114,810	21.3	87,022
2003	20.0	71,299	18.0	65,551	26.0	93,819
2006	20.2	72,066	27.4	94,786	24.3	86,092
2009	22.2	83,739	30.3	113,954	29.6	112,130
2013	22.0	97,030	31.0	138,450	24.0	113,439

3.4 Summary of the differences between Arab political movements in Israel

Figure 2: Summary of the active Arab political parties in Israel and their ideologies

Political party/movement/assembly	Ideology	Remarks
Islamic Movement	Islamic	It adopts "Islam is the Solution" as a slogan to solve all the problems of society. The Islamic Movement believes that Islam as a religion and way of life and all resulting schemes are sufficient to solve all problems arising in society or problems it faces on an ongoing basis. Therefore, the Islamic Movement was born as a civic mobilization to solve problems of the society under the oppression and prosecution exercised by the Israeli institution.
Nationalist Democratic Assembly (NDA)	Secular	The Assembly has a secular identity, using the nationalist project as a tool to solve Palestine's problems. It believes in nationalism and democracy. It sees nationalism as a movement formed through cultural heritage, but that it is not only a phenomenon associated with language, as the era of Arab nationalism is not like the era of the Arabic language; nationalism in its current

		<p>form is a political and cultural movement that seeks to create an Arab sovereign nation. From the Assembly's perspective, nationalism is not an ideological chauvinistic doctrine but a modern Arab political and cultural project. The Assembly believes that through nationalism, a position should be taken based on a historical identity and call for a state for all citizens with full equality. The Assembly does not believe in linking rights and duties and consider them two separate parts of democratic citizenship.</p>
<p>The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash)</p>	<p>Secular</p>	<p>The Front was established in early 1977 following a resolution by the Communist Party. The Front's platform had eight points: 1. Israeli/Palestinian and Israeli/Arab peace; 2. Protecting workers' rights; 3. Equality for the Arab population; 4. Eradicating ethnic discrimination in all areas; 5. Protecting democratic freedoms, eradicating discrimination, struggling against fascism and eradicating all forms of religious coercion; 6. Protecting women's rights; 7. Demilitarization of weapons of mass destruction; 8. Protecting the environment.</p> <p>The Communist Party is the backbone of Hadash. Hadash considers peace to be a central cause. By achieving peace, better chances for equality will emerge for the Arab community. Hadash calls for the recognition of the Arab population as a minority by virtue of a law that was drafted especially on this matter and revokes all laws of a discriminatory nature, protection of the rights of the Arab population and an end to land grabbing endorsed by the law. At the twenty second convention of the Communist Party, it was said, "... we have struggled and shall continue struggling for the full national rights of the Arab population in Israel until Israel is a state for all its citizens".⁶⁶</p>

⁶⁶ Convention 22 of the Communist Party, page 58, 1993.

4 The Rhetoric of Arab Political Parties in Israel

As I demonstrated in the previous section, Arab political parties in Israel have adopted different, and sometimes contrasting ideologies. I will therefore argue that even though they belong to the same ethnic minority, share the same experiences of the past and the present, and are treated by the Israeli state in the same way, which they collectively agree is racist and discriminatory, these parties often hold dissimilar views regarding key issues affecting the Arab population in Israel as well as regional issues. I further argue that multiple motivations drive consensus within these parties on specific issues. Each party also uses a specific rhetoric, which is mostly shaped by its ideology but is also influenced by certain developments specially as is the case with the more pragmatic parties like Hadash.

Aristotle's three rhetorical appeals and three divisions will be used to analyze the attitude of each party on the five issues proposed for discussion earlier in chapter 1.2 on methodology. Each argument will be presented using quotations by party leaders from press media release, speeches and statements made at public gatherings and demonstrations, from television interviews, newspaper articles, and other publications. The methodology, that is, how I intend to use these resources and rhetorical tools in my analysis, has been explained in the introductory chapter to this thesis. The next few pages will focus on the first issue: Arab representation in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset.

4.1 Rhetoric for/against Arab representation in the Israeli Parliament

Before discussing the rhetoric of 'participation or boycott', it is essential to summarize the history of Arab political activism within the Israeli political system.

Until 1965, Arab representation in the Knesset took two forms: through the Communist Party of Israel (CPI) and, through what Ghanim calls 'satellite lists.' He defines this as 'lists that Jewish Zionist parties set up to capture Arab votes [a phenomenon that lasted from 1949 until 1981 when the last of the satellite lists disappeared]'⁶⁷. These lists were far from influential and were dependent on the 'mother' Zionist parties. They were only active at election time in order to mobilize Arabs to vote for Zionist parties.

⁶⁷ As'ad Ghanim. *The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel 1948 - 2000 ; a Political Study*, 2001, SUNY Press, p. 39.

Although the CPI and its successor, the New Communist List (NCL), won parliamentary seats prior to 1977, it had no significant influence on the political scene. Kenig points to the reasons for this: ‘the governing party was in a dominant and pivotal position and could easily build several center-based coalitions. Thus, the NCL was irrelevant to the coalition game. Second, the NCL’s ideological stance placed it in a double extreme position - its Marxist rhetoric and its anti-Zionist messages prevented it from effectively participating in the political process.’⁶⁸

As explained earlier in chapter 3.1 about the evolution of the Communist party, in 1977 the Party merged with the Black Panthers; a movement that was exclusively Jewish [compared to the CPI which had both Arab and Jewish members], and Hadash [also known as the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality] was born. Hadash won fifty per cent of the total Arab votes in 1977, but still could not make any significant changes as it was excluded from the coalition led by the dominant Jewish, Zionist parties who perceived its positions as ‘radical’.

In 1984, a new non-Communist Jewish-Arab party emerged - the Progressive List for Peace (PLP). According to Abd El Rahman, the PLP demanded equal rights for Arab citizens and stressed the national aspirations and Palestinian identity of the Arab minority in Israel.⁶⁹ In the 1984 elections, which the PLP participated in for the first time, it received eighteen per cent of the total Arab votes. This translated into two seats in the Knesset. The following elections of 1988 saw a drop in the PLP’s popularity, possibly because its list included a Jewish army general⁷⁰, which clearly did not appeal to many Arab voters. Additionally, the 1988 elections saw the emergence of a new party - the Arab Democratic Party (ADP), which for the first time was a party that was completely Arab. This had a profound effect on the Arab political sphere. Kenig believes that the ADP attracted those who wanted to express their Arab identity yet refrained from voting for the NCL because of ‘its radical socio-economic stance’. Since all Arab parties formed after NCL managed to attract significant support, it seems many Arab voters prefer a party

68 Ofir Kenig, "The Political Representation of Israel’s Arab Minorities: The Challenge of Marginality and the Dilemma of Influence versus Protest", *Inter-Disciplinary Net 3rd Global Conference*, 2007, Department of Political Science, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Israel Democracy Institute. <<http://inter-disciplinary.net/ati/diversity/pluralism/pl3/Kenig%20paper.pdf>>

69 Sherihan Abd El Rahman, *The Political Mobilization of the Arab Minority in Israel: Shifts in Political Demands and Activities*, 2010, College of Arts and Sciences CUREJ - College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal University of Pennsylvania University of Pennsylvania, p. 29.
<<http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1144&context=curej>>. Accessed on 9.7.2013

70 Ibid.

like the ADP that stresses Arab identity, rather than one, exemplified by the NCL, that cannot because it is composed of both Arab and Jewish members. The rhetoric of the NCL, as noted earlier, does not seem to describe the conflict as one between Arabs and Jews, but as one between a capitalist regime and an oppressed labor force. In the 1988 elections, the ADP won one seat in the Knesset, which for the first time, was an entirely Arab seat.

In 1992, the ADP won two seats, which was considered a success. Mostafa and Ghanim explain this success by pointing to the ADP's emphasis on tackling the day-to-day concerns of the Arab community in Israel, while still showing concern for the Palestinian issue. They believe that the party also avoided touching on the Jewish identity of the Zionist state. Apparently, this helped it uphold a good relationship with the state and maintain the possibility of entering a coalition with Jewish parties⁷¹. The ADP therefore emphasized the need for Arab parties to be part of the ruling coalition in order to have the chance of influencing in favor of the Arab minority. It is for this reason that the party maintained its promotion of a united Arab list, both in the 1996 and 1999 elections, when the united list that included the ADP, the Southern Islamic Movement, and other independent candidates, won four and five seats in the Knesset respectively.

The ADP became weaker however, with the 1996 emergence of the parliamentary [Southern] branch of the Islamic Movement and the new National Democratic Assembly (NDA). Since then, it has only won a single seat under the United Arab List, which comprises the ADP and the Southern Islamic Movement.

It must be noted that in the 1992 elections, the Arab parties won five seats [Hadash 3, ADP 2] and there were hopes that they would be included in a coalition with the Israeli Labor Party (ILP) which is considered center-left, but is still Zionist. Yitzhak Rabin nevertheless declared that he would not consider them an integral part of the forthcoming coalition⁷². As such, despite the ADP's declared interest in joining an ILP-led coalition [since the founder of the ADP, Abdul Wahab Darawsha, is himself a former ILP member], the ILP did not regard non-Zionist Arab parties to be suitable partners in a political coalition.

Kenig describes the next stage, from 1996 to the present, as that of 'radicalization, fragmentation, and increased representation'. Kenig believes that this radicalization was influenced by the abortion of the

71 Mostafa and Ghanim 2009, p. 175.

72 Kenig, Ofir 2007 Ibid.

peace process with the Palestinian Authority, and the events of October 2000. This refers to the killing of thirteen Israeli Arab citizens by the Israeli police force. They had been protesting ‘Ariel Sharon’s desecration of the Al-Aqsa mosque’ when he entered the mosque accompanied by more than a thousand security personnel. This was a massive show of power that provoked large-scale violent clashes in Israel and the Palestinian territories⁷³. The second Intifada that followed the Al-Aqsa events, coupled with the murder of hundreds of Palestinian citizens by Israeli security forces and rising discrimination against the Arab citizens of Israel, undoubtedly intensified Arab resentment towards the Israeli authorities.

In light of these developments, all Arab parties called for a boycott of the next parliamentary elections in 2001; the result was a very low Arab voting rate of nineteen per cent⁷⁴. This election brought Ariel Sharon of the right-wing Likud Party, to power. The result indicated that the more powerful and aggressive politician was most likely more appealing to the Jewish public, with images of Sharon surrounded by hundreds of bodyguards and Border Guards still fresh. This further bolstered the sense of distrust and indignation felt by Arabs towards the Israeli public, the authorities and the policies.

Since the 2001 elections, the rate of Arabs voting in parliamentary elections has been in decline [see Figure 3]. Hadash, the IDP, the NDA, as well as the Southern [parliamentary] branch of the Islamic Movement all displayed critical attitudes towards Israel’s discriminatory policies. The extra-parliamentary Islamic Movement also started to use terms such as ‘the Israeli establishment’ instead of ‘the Israeli State’ so as not to lend any legitimacy to the Zionist state. The different parties started to speak out publicly against attempts at the ‘Judaization’ of Arab areas in Israel. They also spoke against the state’s alleged plans to distort Arab Palestinian identity and its cultural components through Israelization in order to cut relations between Palestinian citizens in Israel and their fellow Arabs in the Arab world. Azmi Bishara, for instance, warned that ‘Israelization’ might be a model to end discussion on the ‘Palestinian issue’ in all countries that have a Palestinian [refugee] minority. He therefore stresses the importance of preserving the different components of the Palestinian identity.

73 Kenig, Ofir, Ibid.

74 Abd El Rahman, Ibid, p. 32.

Figure 3: rate of Arab votes in Israeli parliamentary elections⁷⁵

Election year	Rate of Arab vote (%)	Total vote rate (%)	Boycott rate (%)
1949	79	86.9	21
1951	86	75.1	14
1955	90	82.8	10
1959	85	81.6	15
1961	83	81.6	17
1965	82	83	18
1969	80	81.7	20
1973	73	78.6	28
1977	74	79.2	26
1981	68	78.5	32
1984	72	79.8	28
1988	74	79.7	26
1992	70	77.4	30
1996*	78	79.3	22
1999*	75	78.7	25
2001**	19	62.3	81
2003	62	67.8	38
2006	56	63.2	44
2009	53	85	48


⁷⁵ Based on data provided in Taha, pp. 2013: 29, and Mostafa and Ghanim, pp. 2009: 226.

* In 1996, for the first time the Prime Minister was elected in a separate ballot from the other members of Knesset. This was repeated in 1999, as all Prime Ministerial elections were held simultaneously alongside Knesset elections.

** In 2001 only Prime Ministerial elections were held, without parliamentary elections, following the resignation of the then Prime Minister, Ehud Barak.

Indeed, there has been an increase in the representation of Arabs in the Israeli parliament [see figure two], however this has not been reflected in improvements in the conditions of Arabs in Israel. This is yet another reason that the attitudes of Arab parties have tended to be more radical. Kenig points out that for the first time, two Arab politicians were appointed as ministers: Salih Tarif (2001) and Ghalib Majadle (2007). Tarif and Majadle are both members of the ILP Zionist party however, and are therefore likely to share its Zionist views, which the Arab parties consider ‘racist’. As such, considering them ‘Arab’ in the context of the collective Arab-Palestinian struggle against the Zionist state is a matter of debate.

Figure 4 - Arab members of the Israeli parliament (Knesset)⁷⁶



⁷⁶ Kenig, Ofir, 2007, Ibid,

Despite Arab representation in the Knesset, all parties and politicians agree that there is racial discrimination in Israel's relationship with Arabs. MP Ahmad Tibi, one of the most active Knesset members, states that 'Israel is indeed a democratic Jewish state – democratic towards Jews and Jewish towards Arabs'⁷⁷. Researcher Yusuf Jabareen claims that although there are laws that forbid discrimination based on race, ethnicity or religion, there are also many laws that create clear inequality between Arabs and Jews. Jabareen presents a series of laws that are discriminatory against Arabs and are intended to solely serve the interests of the Jewish majority⁷⁸.

Figure 3 shows that almost half of the Arab population in Israel oppose participation in parliamentary elections or does not believe it has contributed to improving their conditions. Despite the failure of Arab parliamentary members to change this reality and stop the passage of discriminatory laws, Arab parties are still involved in the political game. Since the outset in fact, some parties have chosen to be a part of the Knesset. Not all Arab political movements in Israel participate in the Knesset elections however, and some have decided that the Knesset does not serve the interests of Palestinians in Israel. As such, Arab representation in the Knesset could even have negative implications for the Arab minority in Israel.

In the following pages, I will review the rhetoric that is used by each of the parties to back its position for or against participation in the Israeli parliament. I will base my analysis of their arguments on Aristotle's rhetorical principles, which I elaborated on in chapter 1.2. As in chapter 4.1.3, conclusions will be drawn about the collective rhetoric of Arab parties concerning participation in the Knesset: is it consistent or divergent?

In the next section (3.1.1), I will first provide an overview of the way in which each party deals with the Israeli state: through recognition or denial. Then (in 3.1.2) I will analyze the stances of the parties on representation in the Knesset, which is largely based on their views presented in 3.1.1.

77 Ben Porat, S. (2009, December 22). Conversations with Ahmad Tiede. *Harretz*. Tel aviv. P. 71

78 Jabareen, Y. (2010). The constitutional status of the Arab minority in Israel: a new proposal to order. *State and society*. Issue 7. Pp (107-112). (In Hebrew).

4.1.1 The Arab parties' Position on Israel's legitimacy and right to exist

A discussion of the parties' positions with regard to participation in the Israeli parliamentary elections should start with an overview of the relationship between each party and the Israeli state. Investigating the way that each party perceives Israel and its legitimacy is vital because it largely determines many of their political stances, including whether or not to participate in the Knesset. Thus, the first question is whether Arab parties approve of or reject the founding of the Israeli state following the Palestinian Nakba in 1948, on Palestinian land that was under the British mandate? Do Jewish people [as a national collective] have the right to self-determination in Palestine?

In Israel, the nationalist and communist Arab movements usually address these questions. It seems that the Islamist groups, represented by the Islamic Movement, seldom consider these questions, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter. This does not imply that the Islamist movement deems the events of the 1948 Nakba unimportant; instead, it understands these events from a broader perspective. The Islamic Movement places the occupation of Palestine into the larger context of the collapse of the Islamic Ottoman Empire that ruled the area of Palestine. This led to the division of its territories and the fall of Palestine under the British mandate. Thus, unlike the Communists and Nationalists, the Islamists do not perceive of the conflict as a recent one between Arabs and Jews, but as part of the history of the Middle East, and the earlier Islamic rule of the region.

Hence, while the Communists perceive the conflict as a clash between a colonizing capitalist power and the middle class, and nationalists view it as a conflict between the Zionist national movement and Arab nationalism, Islamists primarily view it as a religious conflict. This view is strengthened in light of the current vigorous process of Judaization targeting Jerusalem and its holy sites, which is one of the reasons the Islamic Movement stresses the importance of the Islamic component of Palestinian identity. These aspects will be dealt with in the following pages.

4.1.1.1 The view of the Communist party

In 1947, the Communists resolved the question of whether Jews should have the right to self-determination in Palestine, when the Soviet Union declared its support for the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine (Resolution 181). The Communist movement, represented by two parties before 1948; one Arab and one Jewish, committed to this Soviet position, and thus supported the Jewish right to self-

determination on Palestinian land⁷⁹. Retrospectively, Communists still back their support of the partition plan. According to Issam Makhoul, the prominent Communist leader and former MP representing DFPE, the mistake was the way the plan was implemented by Israel. He claims that according to the plan, the new Israeli state was supposed to have an Arab minority constituting forty-five per cent of the total Israeli population, who would have lived inside the borders of the new state. But according to him, Israel interpreted the name 'Jewish State' as 'Jewish-only state'. This was fulfilled by the ethnic cleansing operations carried out by Jewish forces during and after the 1948 war, which aimed to rid the new state of its Arab population that lived in territories allocated to this new state. Makhoul believes that the Israeli state considered Arab citizens a threat to the state's Jewish character, which led it to ethnically cleanse them, and then subject the few that remained to military law⁸⁰.

It can be noted however, that the leaders of the Communist Party speak about Communist support for the partition plan in a remorseful tone. Muhammad Barakih, for instance, states that 'the partition plan wasn't fair to Palestinians - the native inhabitants of the land and its majority- but it was important to secure the living necessities for them, especially in light of the plots of the Zionist movement and the British support it enjoyed.'⁸¹ Makhoul further claims that some of the Arab leaders of the Communist Party's at the time were initially against accepting the partition plan but had to accept it because the majority of the leadership did, and they had to abide by the official position of the Soviet Union⁸². Ayman Odeh, current secretary of the Communist Party, states that the partition plan they supported stated that all citizens in the new state; Arabs and Jews, would be treated equally and enjoy full citizenship, based on the fact that they both live on the same land. As Odeh states, it transpired that full citizenship was granted only to those who belong to the Jewish nation, which is a complete contrast to that which was stated in the partition plan they agreed to⁸³.

79_Mjali, N. (2009). Position of Arab representation to Partition: Crime and Punishment, in Rot Gabizon (Ed.). *Sixty Years to November 1947 - The Partition Resolution Environment: Sources and Studies*. Jerusalem, p. 71

80 Makhoul, E. (2009). Two states: the solution and those who deny. In Tamar Gojanski and Anjelka taym (eds.). *For Against! Israeli Communist Party 2009-1919: essays and posters*. Tel Aviv. Pp. 38-39

81 Barakih, M. (2007, December). Upholding the principle of partition and two-state slogan means adhering to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Alhewar Almotmadin website. Retrieved from <http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=118592>

82 Ibid.

83 Odeh, Ayman. (publication date not in source). Aljabha, Particularly Now. Aljabha official website. Accessed on 01.08.2013. <<http://www.aljabha.org/?i=68071&f=aljabha-alan.htm>>

To sum up, Communists do not oppose Jews having the right to self-determination in Palestine. They express reservation on how this right was fulfilled, and believe that despite their support of this right, its fulfilment must not undermine the rights of Arab citizens in the country.

This view determines the position of the Communist movement with regard to the ultimate solution to the conflict. It supports two states for two peoples instead of one state for two peoples [advocated by nationalists]. The Communists' advocacy of two states, one for Palestinians and one for Jews [in which Israeli Arabs would still live], is based on their recognition of the Jewish right to self-determination and to a state in the area of historic Palestine. This topic will be discussed in detail in section 3.3.

4.1.1.2 The view of the Nationalist movement

Palestinian nationalists in Israel seem to adopt two different views regarding the Jewish right to self-determination in Palestine [which means their right to have a state of their own, on Palestinian land]. One group accepts it, but with certain conditions. This position is represented in the Haifa Declaration published by Mada al-Carmel, a Haifa-based think tank unofficially affiliated with the National Democratic Assembly. This think tank 'generates and provides information, critical analysis, and diverse perspectives on the social and political life and history of Palestinians, with particular attention to Palestinians within Israel's 1948 boundaries.'⁸⁴ The most important points in the Haifa Declaration include the recognition of the right of the 'Israeli Jewish people to self-determination, and to live alongside the Palestinians and other peoples of the region, in peace, dignity, and safety'. At the same time, it called on Israel to admit its responsibility for the Nakba of 1948 and for all the consequential suffering that befell the Palestinian people⁸⁵. This recognition of the Israeli right to self-determination drives the concept of a bi-national state as a means to transform Israel into a more tolerant, less racist state in which Arabs and Jews can live together without discrimination. Such recognition is not granted merely for pragmatic reasons, namely, that Israel is an existing reality, and there is no choice but to recognize it. There is another fundamental reason for it. Some nationalists principally recognize the right of Jews to Palestine, even though it differs from the Palestinians' right to Palestine in that the Jewish

84 "About" page in Mada's official website. Accessed on: 01.08.2013. <<http://mada-research.org/en/about/>>.

85 Haifa Declaration, Mada Al-Carmel (2007), 12. Accessed on 02.08.2013 <<http://mada-research.org/files/2007/09/haifaarabic.pdf>>.

right is ‘an acquired right’, not an ‘indigenous right’, as in the case of Palestinians⁸⁶. Bishara states that recognising an Israeli state does not mean acknowledging the Zionist narrative that led to the establishment of this state⁸⁷. This statement is important in that it argues against the core idea of Zionism, which aims to create a national home for Jews in Palestine. Those that adopt this view accordingly recognize the right of Palestine’s Jews to live in Palestine, but not the entire Jewish nation from around the world.

Not all nationalists adopted the Haifa Declaration, however. Many opposed it, and even harshly criticized it as an attempt to ‘Israelize’ the Arab public. Many of those who oppose it claim that Jews migrated to Palestine within the framework of the Zionist colonial movement, which brought misery to the Arabs, the native inhabitants of this land. Nakhlih, for instance, states that the concept of ‘self-determination’ must be based on a natural relationship between the residents of a country and their land. Therefore, the right of Arabs to self-determination stems from them being the indigenous people of Palestine. This right serves to strengthen their connection to their land. On the other hand, Nakhlih concludes that the connection between the Jewish majority [which was not a majority until the Israeli state was established] and the land is artificial and meaningless, which makes the framework of ‘a Jewish state’ invalid and unacceptable.⁸⁸

Nakhlih’s view summarizes the position of some nationalists, especially the Abnaa al-Balad Movement, who do not recognize the right of the Jewish people to a state in Palestine, and call for the ‘liberation of Palestine’. This is unlike the NDA, which calls for one non-Zionist state for the two peoples. Nonetheless, the extra-parliamentary Abnaa al-Balad is a small movement, with a very small support base compared to the much larger NDA. For this reason, any discussion in this study about the Arab nationalist current in Israel and its approaches and attitudes will refer to the NDA, unless otherwise stated, as it is the dominant nationalist movement in Israel.

86 Rouhana, Nadim. Reconciliation in the Enduring National Conflicts. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Institute for Palestinian Studies, 2004, volume 15. Pp. 72-73

87 Jamal, A. (N.D). *Studies in the writings of Azmi Bishara*. PP 89-90

88 Mada elcarmel.(2007). *Haifa Declaration*. P. 12

4.1.1.3 The view of the Islamic Movement

Under Islamic law, Jews [followers of the Jewish religion] are considered a religious group, not a national group. In a state that follows Islamic law, they would be treated as ‘people of the book’, which is a special status reserved for Christians and Jews. Followers of these two religions who live in a dominantly Muslim country are allowed, under Islamic law, to practice their religions. They must not be compelled to change their religion or embrace Islam⁸⁹. The fact that Jews are considered a religious group means that the Islamic current does not recognize their right to have their own state in Palestine. Furthermore, Palestine is part of the former Islamic empire and is at the heart of the Middle East, which is mainly inhabited by Muslims. Historically, Jews had the right to live in Palestine and in all parts of the Islamic State. They did not have the right to create their own state or have sovereignty over a Muslim land, particularly following a violent occupation of land, such as the Zionist occupation in 1948. Islamists nevertheless acknowledge the Israeli state as the status quo and admit the possibility of a new reality in which a Jewish national group can accomplish its right to self-determination in Palestine.

Some researchers argue that the relation between the southern parliamentary branch of the Islamic Movement and the Israeli state greatly differs from the relation between the northern extra-parliamentary branch and the state. Elie Rekhess, for example, claims that the views of the southern branch represented by its founder, Sheikh Abdullah Nimer Darwish, can be understood as accepting the right of Israel to exist⁹⁰. Frisch goes even further to claim that to some extent, Darwish recognized the Jewish identity of the state⁹¹. It should be mentioned that Darwish’s views were considered by some, including some of his followers, to be too pacifist.⁹² This was especially true after he was released from an Israeli prison. It is possible that this is the reason that following his replacement by MP Ibrahim Sarsour, who headed the movement from 1999 until 2011, he no longer occupied an important position in the southern Movement.

Chapter two reviewed the history of the Islamic Movement in Israel and its division in 1996, when the Southern branch decided to participate in the Knesset elections, while the Northern branch declared that

89 Islam Today website. <<http://en.islamtoday.net/artshow-262-3441.htm>>. Accessed on 21.8.2013.

90 Elie Rekhess, *The Islamic Movement in Israel and its Relation to the Political Islam in the West Bank*, in Rot Gbizon and Dafna Hakar, *The Arab-Israeli Gap*, 2000, Jerusalem, The Israeli Institute for Democracy, p. 295.

91 Frisch, Hillel (2011). *‘Israel’s Security and Its Arab Citizens’*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 95.

92 In this interview, Darwish responds to accusations that his positions are excessively pacifist. Accessed on 18.6.2013. <<http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/pages/d41e56fc-8a0b-451b-a0aa-a3c9fb7bf132>>

the Islamic Movement must not participate. One aspect of the discussion that preceded and followed the division was whether a Jewish sovereignty on Palestine [that had been part of the Muslim Empire until WWI] should be tolerated. Each of the branches of the Islamic Movement has a different answer to this question, as is expected. This reflects its ideology and therefore its practice, as will be illustrated.

Israel's legitimacy in the eyes of the Southern [parliamentary] Islamic Movement

One of the main reasons for the split of the Islamic Movement was internal divergence over the critical issues that had started to emerge. While the northern Islamic Movement demonstrated opposition to the Islamic Movement's representation in the Knesset, the southern branch considered such representation to be permissible under Islamic law. It provided arguments to support its position that this would help address the interests of Muslims and Arabs in the state. Both positions within the Movement stem from the way each side views the Israeli state, and the Jewish right to self-determination in Palestine.

Statements by Sheikh Abdullah Nimer Darwish, the founder of the Islamic Movement, represent the approach of the southern branch, with which he sided after the split. In 1992, Darwish stated 'loudly, and publicly, we declare that we recognize the state of Israel; its symbols, including the flag and the Star of David; we shall carry it in our pockets wherever we go'.⁹³ This recognition also motivated participation in the Knesset. Sheikh Sarsour, former leader of the Southern Islamic Movement and head of its parliamentary bloc, stated that the participation of his movement in the Knesset elections aims to prove that the movement is not separatist, but actually aspires to merge into the state⁹⁴. One of the Southern Islamic Movement's Knesset members; Masoud Ghanayim, tried to reconcile the Islamic character of the Movement and its political involvement in a non-Muslim country. In an interview with him, Ghanayim said: 'we live in a reality, which is the state of Israel, and we are its citizens. Yes, we have our distinct identity as Arabs, Palestinians, and Muslims, of which we are proud. We preserve our identity within the boundaries of Israeli citizenship. I am convinced that Islam as a religion allows us to be realistic, and for that reason, we are entitled to enter the Knesset in order to preserve our identity, our lands, and roots,

93 Ibid.

94 Sarsour, I. (2005). The Islamic movement and the country. In Yitzhak reitar (ed), *Dilemmas in Jewish - Arab relations*. Shokan Jerusalem and tel aviv. Pp 240-245

without being assimilated into the other.⁹⁵ The other branch of the Islamic Movement totally rejects this view of acceptance, and even recognition of the Israeli state and its existence.

It can accordingly be seen that the Southern Islamic Movement recognizes the Israeli state and to an extent considers it a legitimate entity that must not necessarily be treated with hostility.

Israel's legitimacy in the eyes of the Northern [extra-parliamentary] Islamic Movement

The Northern Islamic Movement's stance concerning the legitimacy of the Israeli state seems to derive from the stance of Muslim scholars who dominate Sharia [Islamic law] studies in the Muslim world. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a very distinguished scholar, has contributed significantly to the development of the relatively new field of Islamic studies dealing with minorities [Fiqh al-Aqalliyat]. According to his doctrine, Muslim minorities in non-Muslim countries can take part in the political process if it serves their interests and in a way that does not threaten their Muslim identity. The southern parliamentary branch of the Islamic Movement relied on this doctrine to justify its participation in the Knesset, and in contrast, the northern branch did not. Instead, it relied on the fatwa of Sheikh Qaradawi himself, stating that unlike other countries; Israel is a 'foreign element' [kayan dakheel] in the Middle East. Muslim participation in the Knesset therefore can be seen as a recognition of this state and its right to exist in the region.

Mordechai Kedar claims that the publications of the Northern Islamic Movement infer that the state of Israel has the status of 'a foreign occupation'. It is illegitimate for three reasons: firstly, from a religious perspective, Islam is the 'religion of righteousness' and Judaism is the 'religion of falsehood'. Secondly, in the eyes of the leaders of the Northern Movement, there is no 'Jewish nation' that can be defined as such; there are Jewish communities that have lived in different countries. Therefore, there is no logical reason to create a new state and call it 'the state of the Jewish people', and the Zionist movement is simply a coalition between the Zionist elites and the colonial powers. Thirdly, before falling under the British mandate, the land of Palestine was part of the Muslim [Ottoman] empire, and therefore it is a Waqf [Muslim property] land that cannot be taken by non-Muslims. The Israeli state is thus an

95 Interview with Masoud Ganyem, 2010, February, 18, <<http://www.beer-almksor.com/ViewArticle.aspx?Nid=6884&CatsID=2>>.

illegitimate state. Kedar claims that these are the three reasons the Northern Islamic Movement does not recognize Israel. He concludes that Israel is an illegitimate country in its eyes and must be combated⁹⁶.

It appears as though only Kedar's third justification is relevant. The question of the 'right vs. false' religion is not actually present in the Islamic Movement's view concerning the Israeli State. Rather, as the vast majority of Palestinians are Muslim, the Islamic Movement would accept Islamic rule over Palestine [such as Ottoman rule, which some nationalists considered an 'occupation'] and not non-Islamic rule, such as under a Christian or Jewish state.

In addition, the question of the Jewish people as a 'nation' or not, is irrelevant for the Islamic Movement [and arguably for all Muslims], and the most important issue is the fact that Jewish Zionist groups, who later established a Jewish state on their land, occupied Palestine. This is critical, and less or no regard is given to whether the Jewish community can or cannot be called a 'nation'. Thus, Kedar's third explanation echoes the Northern movement's rejection of having a Muslim land ruled by non-Muslims.

Leaders of the NIM seem to recognize Israel but only in the sense that it is an existing reality. They do not believe that the Islamic Movement can merge with Israeli society. Sheikh Kamal Khatib, vice chairman of the NIM stated: 'I admit that we live in Israel, but we will not agree to be assimilated into the Israeli reality; not mentally, politically or culturally. The Israeli entity does not represent us at all.'

⁹⁷From other public speeches, it can be inferred that the leaders of the NIM do not recognize the right of Israel to exist, and its actual existence is regarded as a temporary situation that is unlawful and unacceptable. In an interview with Khatib in 2012, he demonstrated a firm stance, stating: 'we as Palestinians believe that we are the rightful owners of the land, and that Israel and Israelis are only temporary occupiers.'⁹⁸ Sheikh Salah expressed a similar stance in February 2011, during a mass gathering that was held under the title 'The Palestinian Principles' in the city of Baqa al-Gharbiya, in which representative leaders of all parties took part. Sheikh Salah stated: 'we tell all oppressors, learn from the ones who preceded you: many have tried to expel us from our land. The oppressors are all gone, and we have remained steadfast in our land.'⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Mordechai Kedar, *Muslim minorities*, 2001, pp. 119- 122.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 66.

⁹⁸ Al-Furqan newspaper, 2.6.2012, p. 26.

⁹⁹ Panorama newspaper, 4.2.2011.

In conclusion, most of the main Arab political parties in Israel acknowledge the existence of the Israeli state and its right to exist, with some reservations by the Nationalist movement. The NIM, which is considered by many to be the largest Arab political entity in Israel, is an exception, as it seems to reject the Israeli state and its existence and considers it a ‘temporary occupation’. The attitude of each of the parties determines their position concerning participation or boycott of parliamentary elections. While the communists and nationalists participate in the elections, the Islamic Movement is divided: its southern branch takes part in the elections, while the northern branch abstains. The specific reasons for these attitudes will be dealt with in the following pages.

4.1.2 The Arab parties’ Position and Rhetoric for / against Participation in the Knesset

The Arab parties are divided on whether the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel must be represented in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. Each party, with its supporters' base, tries to persuade the general Arab public to adopt its view for or against such representation. The discourse used by the parties usually involves discussion of advantages versus disadvantages. It also concerns a discussion of the moral aspect of participating in the Knesset, given that the Knesset is an extension of the Zionist state that was established on the ruins of the Palestinian towns and villages, and is the legislative authority that passes laws that are defined by Arabs themselves as ‘racist and discriminatory’.

Statistics (as in Figure 3) show that there is a decline in the voting rate among Arabs, and a decrease in the interest in political parties and parliamentary participation. Researchers like Abd al-Rahman observe that this disinterest is a ‘direct result of the inability and inefficiency of parliamentary processes to make practical changes in the daily lives of the Arab minority, who are underprivileged socio-economically, politically, and legally’³⁵. The view that the Arab representatives in the Knesset are unable to significantly improve the lives of Arab citizens is a motivating factor in the boycott of the Knesset and its elections by some of the Arab political parties in Israel, most notable among them being the Northern Islamic Movement (NIM). The following pages will review the rhetoric used by the NIM and its arguments against participation, and will also examine the arguments of the Arab parties who participate in the Knesset elections, including the Southern Islamic Movement, the Communist Party of Israel, and the Nationalist Democratic Assembly.

4.1.2.1 The Position of the Northern Islamic Movement (NIM) on representation in the Knesset

In terms of representation in the Knesset, the position of the NIM is remarkably different from the SIM. Analysis of the literature produced by the NIM reveals both practical and ideological motivations for this position.

On a **practical** level, leaders of the NIM hold that Arab citizens do not benefit from participation in Knesset elections. The Knesset therefore cannot be considered a body that actually represents their interests. Sheikh Ra'ed Salah, the head of the NIM and a prominent figure in the Arab and Muslim world, affirms this view. In November 2002, when other Arab parties were attempting to convince Arab citizens to vote in the sixteenth Knesset elections, Sheikh Salah stated:

Concerning the position Arab members fill in the Knesset, it can be concluded that from day one the Knesset has been functioning solely as a platform to complain. Arab members of the Knesset have tried their best to fulfil their roles successfully, but the grounds upon which the Knesset was established prevents this...The Knesset is still failing them and preventing them from accomplishing anything. The Knesset is the highest institution of a state that defines itself as the state of the Jewish people, which implies that it does not care about our concerns. It is therefore failing us. Ultimately, it is part of the Zionist movement that doesn't recognize us, neither as a national minority nor as citizens who deserve equal rights. Therefore, the Knesset is not an institution for us Arab Palestinians in Israel. ¹⁰⁰

On another occasion, Sheikh Salah claimed that 'Israel as a state cannot improve its relationship with Arab citizens as long as it continues to entrench itself in its Jewish character. First and foremost, this is the state of Jews, especially as the security factor determines the state of its relations with the Arab minority'.¹⁰¹

From the **ideological** perspective, the leaders of the NIM believe that Islamic representation in the Knesset is unacceptable as the Knesset is an institution based on the sovereignty of the Jewish people, for their right to self-determination or sovereignty. This contradicts Islamic law, which states that the Jewish

¹⁰⁰ Raed. S. (2002, November 29). We and the elections. *Sawt elhak walhoriya*.

¹⁰¹ Salah, R, (2000). *The experiment of the Islamic movement in the 20 century*. Paper presented in a conference in Gaza.

people are a religious group and not a national group. Since the 1990s, Sheikh Salah has declared a clear ideological position that forbids participation in the Knesset from a theological point of view. He stated that ‘the Knesset represents a legislative system that clashes with God’s orders’¹⁰². Some researchers, including Tal and Abu-Raya, explain that the leaders of the NIM oppose participation in the Knesset because it would entail having to swear allegiance to a secular, non-Islamic state, and to its symbols and objectives. Furthermore, this is a state regarded as an enemy to Muslims. Furthermore, such a swear of allegiance, according to Tal and Abu-Raya, would mean the recognition of Israel as a Jewish national state, and a recognition of the Jewish right to self-determination on the land of Palestine. The Islamic Movement considers Palestine a Waqf land.¹⁰³

It is important to note that the NIM’s boycott of parliamentary elections is not a form of political protest. NIM’s decision to abstain from nominating its members as parliamentary members and from voting is a matter of principle and is not due to temporary conditions or urgent developments. These ‘principles’ are best demonstrated in the NIM’s latest press release, circulated before the last Knesset elections held in January 2013. The Movement summarized its position as follows:

1. The Knesset is one of the pillars of the Zionist movement, and it was shaped in such a way that it only serves Arabs by providing a ‘platform to complain’ at best.
2. Thus, Arab representation in the Knesset has not aided the improvement of the conditions of Palestinian Arabs in Israel since the state was established; we still suffer from racial discrimination and religious prejudice as policies that determine how the state deals with us.
3. Our past experiences with the Israeli Establishment [Israel] show that it treats us as if we are staying here temporarily and it may expel us from our land at any given moment if provided the opportunity. Therefore, staying here is a strategy that depends on the extent of our steadfastness in holding onto our land, houses, and sacred sites. Additionally, it is about building our own institutions and supporting our local Arab municipalities, directly electing the High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens, and not being lured by the Knesset illusion.

102 Rubin-Peled, Alisa (2001). ‘Towards Autonomy? The Islamist Movement’s Quest for Control of Islamic Institutions in Israel.’ *The Middle East Journal*, volume 55, no. 3, 385.

103 Tal and Nahman, *The Islamic Movement in Israel, Strategic Update* (Hebrew), 2 (4), 2000, pp. 8-12.

4. Evidence shows that Arab presence in the Knesset has been used by the Israeli Establishment to whitewash its crimes against us and against Palestinian people, and against Arab and Muslim countries.
5. Thus, the Islamic Movement calls on all its members and supporters, as well as the whole public in the Palestinian interior [Israel] to consider all these factors when taking a decision with regard to Knesset elections. Firstly to please Allah, to show the true face of the Israeli Establishment, and to support our Palestinian people in general and the people of Gaza in particular, and finally to satisfy our conscience in accordance with our religious understanding and our nationalist sense¹⁰⁴.

The NIM justifies its position against participation in the Knesset with these explanations, taken from one of its press releases. In fact, these are the main guiding lines that leaders and members of the Movement follow when discussing this matter. Sheikh Kamal Khatib, vice chair of NIM, upholds these 'guidelines' in stating:

The Knesset is one aspect of the Zionist plan and it serves Arab Palestinians in nothing more than allowing them to cry out their complaints. Assessing the record of Arab Knesset members and their parties from day one shows that the Knesset has done us no justice nor granted us our rights, and since the Nakba, we have been suffering. Furthermore, it has been evident that the Israeli establishment has used Arab Knesset members as a mask to hide its crimes against our people and other Arab and Muslim nations.¹⁰⁵

Abdulhakim Mufeed, a journalist and member of the NIM's political bureau reaffirms this by stating: '...but with regard to real influence on [Israel's] policies and laws, we can see that things are deteriorating, due to the fact that the scene is dominated by the [Jewish] majority and by the Israeli establishment – the Knesset - which in essence was founded to serve the interests of this Jewish majority more than anyone else'¹⁰⁶.

104 A press release by the Islamic Movement. (2012). 'The position of the Islamic Movement concerning the Knesset elections', 06 December. <<http://www.panet.co.il/online/articles/88/89/S-621755,88,89.html>>.

105 Khatib, Sheikh Kamal. 'Don't make us reveal what's concealed'. <<http://www.yaffa48.com/?mod=articles&ID=8532>>. Accessed on 27.3.2013

106 An interview with Mufeed. <<http://almnar.co.il/?mod=print&ID=6183>>. Accessed on 8.11.2012

Based on these clearly consistent statements, the motivation that drives the NIM's opposition to an Arab participation in the Knesset can be summarized as follows:

1. The way the Knesset works does not enable Arab members to achieve any significant improvement in the status of Arab citizens.
2. Arabs must pursue their interests through independent institutions that cater for their national, social, educational, and financial needs, without relying on the state or its apparatus, such as the Knesset.
3. Israel takes advantage of Arab representation in the Knesset to affirm its claims that it is a democratic country, while racial discrimination against Arabs on a daily basis proves the contrary.
4. The NIM's alternatives to the Knesset are its institutions and NGOs founded and run by Arab Palestinians in Israel. These institutions serve them and meet their needs.

It is striking that most of these justifications provide practical reasons to reject participation in the Knesset. One would expect an 'Islamic Movement' to also give religious explanations based on certain Holy Scriptures or religious principles. The NIM however, presents a pragmatic position and focuses on the fact that Arab parliamentary parties could not achieve anything within the Knesset and that their presence there merely serves the 'Establishment' itself, as Israel uses them to celebrate its purported democracy to the international media. The Islamic Movement seems to focus on interests rather than principles. As such, if these interests can be addressed successfully, there should be no objection to participation. If the NIM simply rejects Arab representation in the Knesset because it has not been beneficial to Arabs, then it is logical to assume that if the Knesset becomes beneficial and Arabs could make certain achievements through it, then the NIM's position would switch from rejecting participation to endorsing it.

In reality however, the NIM abstains from participating in the Knesset not only because it does not help improve the lives of Arabs, but also because it contradicts its core belief that Non-Muslims, let alone an 'occupying' state, as it defines Israel, must not rule Muslims. Chapter 3.2.3 discussed the reasons for NIM's refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish state. This is based on the fact that Israel is regarded as an anti-Islamic system, as it was founded on the ruins of the Islamic Ottoman Empire that ruled the region before Israel was established. It has also fought with all the neighboring Muslim countries in the Middle East. The chapter also demonstrated that the Islamic Movement refrains from expressing this view publicly in order to avoid what Powell and Neiva call the 'Pharisee effect', which refers to party's that

come across as too radical or like religious fanatics. Therefore, the NIM adopts a more balanced attitude and focuses on the practical reasons for rejecting participation in the Knesset, and avoids talking about the religious reasons, such as stating that Israel is an anti-Islamic or anti-Muslim country.

Another reason the Islamic Movement might be intentionally avoiding religious rhetoric concerning this topic is that it wants its position to also be acceptable to non-Muslims. Among the Arab citizens who constitute twenty per cent of the total Israeli population, nine per cent or 158 thousand, are Christian¹⁰⁷. The Islamic Movement would logically attempt to make its positions and the connected motivations appealing to all sectors of the Arab community in Israel. Providing religious reasons for positions on non-religious topics such as participation in the Knesset might not be persuasive for non-Muslims who do not believe in the religious principles of Islam. Therefore, wherever possible, the Islamic Movement resorts to extra-religious justifications to appeal to the entire Arab community irrespective of their religious or sectarian affiliations. Additionally, participation in the Knesset is a matter of debate among Muslims themselves. There are groups of Muslims, like the SIM, who consider participation in the Knesset permissible under Islamic law, as shown in in the previous section 3.1.1. This affirms the assumption proposed earlier in this section that the NIM is often pragmatic in presenting its views and motivations to the public.

It must be noted that the Islamic Movement usually relates to the fact that the Knesset is ‘part of the Zionist plan’ as illustrated in the first item of the press release quoted above. This serves to remind the Arab Palestinian people that the Knesset was established only after the Zionist occupation of Palestine in 1948. It is therefore an establishment founded on the ruins of Palestinian towns and villages, and their seized lands. Leaders of the Islamic Movement, including Sheikh Ra'ed Salah, repeat the slogan ‘The Knesset is in an extension to the Zionist plan’¹⁰⁸. These leaders indicate that participation in the Knesset elections means recognising it and acknowledging the historical circumstances that led to its foundation, namely the Zionist occupation and the violence that accompanied it. Yet in its public press releases, the Islamic movement does not give special weight to this argument, which is arguably because undermining the legitimacy of the Knesset –the Israeli parliament- is similar to undermining the legitimacy of the

107 Calam Christian website. 2.9.2013. <<http://www.calam1.org/a/8302>>. Accessed on 04.3.2012.

108 Salah, Ra'ed: ‘The Knesset is an extension to the Zionist Plan’. Accessed on 11.2.2013. <<http://www.pls48.net/?mod=articles&ID=1156304>>

Israeli state itself. This can be considered a violation of certain Israeli laws that criminalise attempts to delegitimise Israel, its institutions or symbols¹⁰⁹.

Rhetorical analysis

In light of Aristotle's three branches of rhetoric, analysis of the arguments presented above against participation in the Knesset reveals strong use of deliberative rhetoric.

In Aristotle's Rhetoric, according to Ruth CA Higgins, 'the deliberative rhetoric must exhort or persuade his audience his speech is addressed to a judge of the future, and its end is to promote the good and avoid the harmful. Deliberative rhetoric concerns contingencies within human control. The deliberative orator addresses topics such as war and peace, national defense, trade and legislation, in order to assess what is harmful and beneficial. Accordingly, he must grasp the relationships between various means and the ends of expedience and happiness'.¹¹⁰ This describes NIM's arguments precisely, as presented above, to persuade people not to vote. It is remarkable that the NIM does not explicitly call people to boycott the elections [as a general practice, not only in the press release quoted above], but it repeatedly reminds people of the reasons they should not participate in the parliamentary elections [by claiming that participation didn't contribute to improving conditions of Arabs, and worse, is used to mask Israel's crimes]. In deliberative terms, it is therefore a call to take an inactive action, by not taking the action of voting. At the same time, it is a call to take an active action, by building independent institutions and NGOs that would satisfy their needs without having to rely on the Knesset that in any case, won't be fair in its dealing with Arabs. In Higgins terms, the NIM is trying to avoid the harmful [the shortcomings of participation in the Knesset], and is attempting to promote the positive [building a self-reliant society with its independent institutions]. It is about 'expedience and happiness' that the NIM believes is achievable not by fighting for representation in the Knesset, but rather by acquiring a type of autonomy and independence from the authorities of the Israeli state. NIM believes that these authorities not only fail to improve the lives of Arabs, but even oppress and discriminate against them.

Most of the arguments that the NIM uses to back its position concerning participation in the Knesset are from the deliberative register, and accordingly touch on advantages versus disadvantages. This is not

109 New law bills that criminalise attempts to undermine Israel's character as a Jewish and a democratic state were either proposed or passed. See report on these laws and similar laws that were considered 'racist' by human rights groups such as Adalah, on Adalah's website. Accessed on 9.3.2013. <<http://www.adalah.org/upfiles/Inequality%20Report%20Arabic.pdf>>

110 Ruth Higgins, 'The Empty Eloquence of Fools': Rhetoric in Classical Greece' in About.com. Accessed on 09.11.2012. <<http://grammar.about.com/od/d/g/delibterm.htm>>.

surprising, given that the main argument around participation in the Knesset is linked to this notion. The parties that participate in the Knesset claim they do so to improve the conditions of the Arab minority, while those abstaining claim that they do so because participation isn't in the interest of Arabs.

The NIM also uses a forensic argument to justify its position when it repeatedly reminds the audience or readers that 'the Knesset is an extension of the Zionist plan'. This claim touches on the past; it evaluates it and draws a link between past experiences and the present. It is a reminder of the crime that was committed in 1948, and of the tragic experiences that befell Palestinian people at the hand of the Zionist occupation of Palestine, the result of which was the establishment of the Israeli state and its parliament, the Knesset. The NIM hopes that this reminder of the 'perpetrator of the crime' as claimed by the NIM, and linking the crime to the Knesset, deters people from voting in the Knesset elections.

With regards to the other essential elements in Aristotle's rhetoric, namely the three appeals of persuasion: ethos, pathos, and logos, it can be said that the NIM promotes its views concerning the Knesset using arguments that are mostly logos-based. An examination of the claims made by the NIM's leaders including those expressed in its press releases, show that the NIM does not rely on pathos as much as the other parties do. In practice, the NIM can make a pathos-based claim, such as reminding Palestinians that the Knesset is actually the parliament of the occupation force that occupied their land in 1948. Some anti-Knesset activists say this and make the connection that it is therefore morally unacceptable for Palestinians to be members in it. The NIM refrains from using such claims; possibly since logos is the most powerful of all appeals. Pathos, or the NIM's attempts to evoke emotions, may not work for all because of the diversity within the Palestinian community in Israel. It is therefore possible that logos is a more guaranteed method and is a stronger persuasion tool for a non-homogeneous community like the Palestinian minority in Israel.

Ethos might nevertheless be present in the fourth argument. This claims that Palestinians in Israel should, wherever possible, be self-reliant. By doing so through Arab-run institutions and NGOs, they can care for the needs and interests that the state cannot or does not want to care for, including their national and cultural needs. The Islamic Movement in general, and the NIM in particular, is known for its network of organizations that work locally and regionally in Israel. These cover many of the needs of the citizens: health service facilities, educational centers and libraries, schools and kindergartens, institutions for preparation for higher academic studies, family welfare and social work services, religious colleges, economic development and funds for supporting new businesses, human rights organizations, research

centers, and media (websites, newspapers, magazines in different fields), among others. The unmatched experience of the Islamic Movement in this field, which actually filled countless gaps left by the government and helped Palestinians in Israel in many ways, would be appealing to the audience that believes that the NIM knows how to serve the interests of the people best. Since the central matter is advantage vs. disadvantage, the NIM's advocacy of a self-reliant society as opposed to a state-reliant one [participation in the Knesset as one of its manifestations] could be appealing to the audience given the proven experience the NIM has in this area. It is accordingly an 'extrinsic pathos' where the rhetor [the NIM] has an established credibility, and the audience [the Arab community in Israel] finds its arguments and views trustworthy based on the NIM's experience and knowledge.

To summarize, the NIM opposes participation in the Knesset primarily because it believes that the Israeli authorities exploit Arab representation in the Knesset to promote its alleged democracy and justice towards the Arab citizens [by claiming that the mere presence of Arab members in the Knesset indicates Israel's democracy]. The NIM also believes that such participation did not improve the lives of Palestinians, and statistics support this claim.

Edward P.J. Corbett and Robert J. Connors explain that deliberative rhetoric is concerned with 'what we should choose or what we should avoid'¹¹¹. This is very true in the case of the NIM, as primarily it has deliberative arguments about this. The NIM believes that the Arab community should avoid being part of the Knesset and should rather choose to build its own institutions instead of relying on the institutions of the government with its biased and discriminatory attitude towards Arabs.

4.1.2.2 The Position of the SIM on representation in the Knesset

In chapter 2.2 we summarized the development of the Islamic Movement and its split in 1996 that resulted in two branches of the Movement: the Southern Islamic Movement (SIM), that participates in the elections of the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, and has members in it; and the Northern (NIM), which chooses to boycott the elections and has no representation in the Knesset. The previous section reviewed the position of the NIM and the rhetoric it uses to justify its position. Similarly, this section intends to summarize the arguments that the SIM uses to support its position and will analyze these arguments based on the components of rhetoric set by Aristotle.

¹¹¹ Connors, Robert J, Corbett, Edward P.J (1999). 'Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student'. 4th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The aim is to begin by examining the literature produced by the SIM leaders; most remarkable among them being Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsour, who is very active within the SIM-led parliamentary bloc [The United Arab List] and is a prominent leader in the SIM. He was its chairman until 2010.

In an article published online¹¹², Sarsour addressed the general public and listed three reasons that he thinks Arabs must cast their vote in the Knesset elections:

- 1- By voting, you express your eagerness to take part in shaping the present and the future of the Arab public in this land, and of bolstering its power against the Israeli parties and government.
- 2- You decrease the chances of the Israeli radical right winning a majority in the next Knesset. Not doing so would simply mean allowing this radical right to rule the country and lead it in a path that contradicts our interest as an Arab community and as a Palestinian people under occupation.
- 3- You confuse those radical parties, and hinder their plans to entrench racism and enmity towards us in the interior [Israel] and towards our people in the Palestinian territories.

In another statement by the SIM leader Masoud Ghanayim and a current Knesset member, he said:

In my capacity as a Knesset member, I have served the people as much as I could, and I have used all the parliamentary resources that I could to resolve the problems our Arab community faces, and to stop the discrimination against it. I also served the people in my city Sakhnin, on different issues such as expanding the town's territorial area. I used my position as a Knesset member to emphasize the discrimination and marginalization that we are suffering as Arab Palestinians in this state. In order to continue providing this service, we urge everybody to go and vote on the elections day, and not to leave the stage for the Zionist parties.

Another motif that the SIM, and in fact all Arab parliamentary parties seem to repeat each time the Knesset topic is raised, is the claim that ‘every uncast Arab vote goes to the radical far-right Israeli parties who show flagrant enmity towards Arabs, and we must not allow them to take control and determine our fate in this land’. Sarsour from the SIM made this claim¹¹³, as did Jamal Zahalka from

112 Sarsour, Sheikh .AlMakan website. <<http://www.almakan.co.il/?mod=articles&ID=34908>>. Accessed on 4.4.2013.

113 In a press conference, Accessed on 17.5.2013: <<http://www.methak.org/ar/?articles=topic&topic=18896>>.

BALAD¹¹⁴, and Muhammad Barakih from the CPI¹¹⁵. Sarsour goes as far as accusing the boycotters of ‘supporting the radical right-wing Zionist parties’¹¹⁶. Nevertheless, these parties collectively fail to explain the way in which the far-right parties will benefit from the uncast votes of Arab citizens. Not only do those parties fail to provide facts to support their claim, but they repeat and express it in a way that makes Arab citizens who choose to boycott the elections seem responsible for any potential shortcomings should the far-right control the government, whether or not the boycotters are actually responsible. Moreover, extra-parliamentary Arab parties like the NIM and the nationalist Abnaa al-Balad, criticise this claim on the basis that it makes it look as if there is a difference between the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ in Israeli politics. They claim that when it comes to Arabs, Palestinians, and their rights, there is no difference between Zionist left-wing parties and Zionist right-wing parties, and that wars or offensive operations against the Arab countries or against the Palestinians were in most cases initiated under a government led by ‘left-wing’ parties. Examples include the two Israeli offensive operations on the Palestinian region of Gaza [in 2008 and 2012] that left hundreds dead, which took place when Ehud Barak; the leader of the left-wing Avodah (labor) party was the minister of defense. Another is the second Palestinian Intifada (uprising) that broke out when Barak was prime minister, during which thousands of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and Israeli security forces killed dozens of Arab Palestinians in Israel. The Israeli-Arab 1967 war between Israel and the Arab countries Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan broke out under Prime Minister Levi Eshkol who was a prominent leader in the Mapai party (left-wing labor party)¹¹⁷. In any case, threatening the Arab community with the ‘rise of the right’ is another argument that Arab parties use, including the SIM, to urge people to vote. Indeed, there's no difference in the way Arabs are treated by the right or left Zionist parties.

In a public gathering that aimed to promote the SIM-led United Arab List and mobilise votes in the Arab city of Sakhnin, Sheikh Ali Abu-Raya, one of the SIM's leaders stated: ‘politics is an integral part of Islam, and is one aspect of our multifaceted activism as an Islamic Movement. Through politics, we aid

114 In a public meeting, Accessed on 17.5.2013: <<http://www.alarab.net/Article/509319>>.

115 In one of CPI's party gatherings, Accessed on 17.5.2013: <<http://www.panet.co.il/online/articles/88/89/S-637202,88,89.html>>.

116 In the official website of SIM. Accessed on 14.7.2013. <<http://www.methak.org/ar/?articles=topic&topic=18881>>

117 "Levy Eshkol", Wikipedia.< http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levi_Eshkol >

and support our people, to help them be steadfast on our land. There is no dirty politics or good politics. There are good politicians or bad politicians'¹¹⁸.

This short yet powerful statement serves two purposes: firstly, it reassures Islamist members of the SIM that politics, including Israeli politics, does not contradict Islam or Islamic teachings. The speaker, Abu-Raya, felt it important to stress that, given the skepticism of the party's members about political activism within the Knesset. Many consider it to be contradictory to Islam [which is the idea that drives the NIM's boycott of the Knesset elections]. Abu-Raya therefore, reassured them that politics is an 'integral part of Islam'. Secondly, Abu-Raya emphasized that the SIM takes advantage of the Israeli political system [represented by the Knesset] to improve the lives of Palestinian people in Israel, and to support their steadfastness and resistance. He justifies participation in the Knesset; an act that some SIM members may regard unfavorably, with the claim that it is in the benefit of Arab citizens. Lastly, Abu-Raya reasserts that politics in itself is not inherently problematic, but the way it is used by the 'dirty' politicians can be. On the other hand, he states that it can be used for good.

Leader in the SIM, Advocate Abdulmalik Dahamshi, was an active Knesset member between 1996 and 2006. On the eve of the 2013 elections he released a statement that listed some of what he called 'achievements' of the United Arab List [the parliamentary bloc that includes several parties led by SIM]:

We took every opportunity to influence Israeli policy, and many significant achievements were made for our people in the interior [Israel] through our parliamentary work. We also managed to impose our Arab and Islamic presence everywhere. Chief among these achievements is the cancellation of the "property tax" that has caused suffering in particular to Arab citizens, forcing them to sell their properties under the pretext of this tax, after they were annexed by the state... Our Arab community is standing at a critical and historical crossroads that will determine whether we are going to be influential and impose our will, or be the victims of oppressive Israeli policies that target our subsistence and our fair struggle for rights and a decent life. The Zionist parties, despite their differences, are united in fighting us and trying to put an end to our presence in this land, and we have to sweepingly move them out of our towns and cities. I call on the Arab citizens of Israel to go and cast their ballots, specifically to the United Arab List.¹¹⁹

118 Southern Islamic Movement's official website. <<http://www.methak.org/ar/?articles=topic&topic=18915>>.

119 Dahamshi, (2013) 19 January 2013. Accessed 22.8.2013. <<http://eltira.org/Neweltirasite/art.php?id=33051>>.

The arguments presented by the SIM leaders can be summarized in the following:

- Voting for the Arab parties who represent the Arab minority makes them stronger, which in turn strengthens the Arab minority.
- Based on the SIM's claim, a stronger Arab representation means a weaker Zionist right-wing representation in the Knesset, and consequently lowers chances of right-wing extremist Jewish parties targeting the Arab minority.
- Representation in the Knesset is important to voice the needs and demands of the Arab minority.
- Such representation is important to service the Arab public in Israel and fulfil their needs.

Rhetorical analysis

From these and other statements by leaders of the SIM, it is apparent that the party focuses on utility: participation in the Knesset is regarded as important to protect the rights of Arab citizens, to bolster their steadfastness, and to support their hold to their lands.

Clearly, the position of the SIM that Arabs must be represented in the Israeli Knesset is driven by utility and interest. The leaders of the SIM believe that the Knesset is important in the Arab struggle for rights, and promotes its activism through the Knesset as greatly benefiting, and having the potential to greatly benefit the Arab community in Israel. Utility and benefit are essential in every Arab parliamentary party in Israel, since the Arab struggle is not only about values and recognition of national, cultural, religious or linguistic heritage. It is also about tangible, basic needs, which is a domain in which Arab citizens in Israel feel they are discriminated against.

The second argument presented above [the fear that stronger Arab representation would cause a weaker right-wing representation – regardless of the validity of this argument].is also deliberative as it relates to interest and benefits. It may initially appear that the fear only concerns values, namely that a stronger right-wing Jewish current in the Knesset would cause the radicalization of the Knesset and its attitudes towards the far right. But in fact, it also regards the fear that a stronger right-wing movement in the Knesset would mean a stronger threat to the Arab presence and future in the country. This would be a threat to Arab citizens' rights and even their lives given that, as previously demonstrated in the introduction, prominent right-wing leaders in the Knesset have loudly voiced their belief that Arabs are a cancer that must be cleansed.

In discussion of the rhetoric of the SIM, it is important to note that it focuses on the utility or advantage of participating in the Knesset, in the same way that the NIM uses it to justify boycotting the Knesset. The difference between the two is that the SIM claim that Arab representation in the Knesset can help protect the rights of Arabs, fulfil their needs, and improve their lives; and the NIM claim that any accomplishments obtained through the Knesset are minor and insignificant compared to the experiences and demands of the Arab minority. For this reason, leaders of the NIM state that based on the minimal achievements that Arab Knesset members can achieve through the Knesset, it only functions for Arabs as a complaining platform, not as an effective tool for improving their lives. According to its leaders whom were quoted above, the NIM also believes that the mere presence of Arabs in the Knesset and the insignificant ‘achievements’ they make, are used by Israel to mask its crimes against Palestinians in Israel, in the West Bank, and in Gaza. It highlights them in the media to support the Israeli claims that Israel is the ‘oasis of democracy in the Middle East’.

Sheikh Hamad Abu Daabes, the current leader of the SIM who replaced Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsour in 2010, echoed the claim that the ‘achievements’ of Arab Knesset members are minor or insignificant. Since coming to position, Abu Daabes made serious efforts to reunite the two branches of the Islamic Movement, which was split in 1996 following internal disparities on several issues, particularly participation in the Knesset. In an article that discussed Arab representation in the Knesset and re-unification of the Movement, Abu Daabes stated:

Arab citizens are a minority composing approximately twenty per cent of the population, and their votes are scattered. In fact, Arab representation does not exceed ten per cent of the total Knesset mandates. Surely, this means that Arabs will never be able to change the character of this racist state, which favors Jewish citizens in all aspects of life. Furthermore, the small percentage of Arab members in the Knesset will never manage to end the Israeli occupation or liberate the Al-Aqsa mosque or the West bank, or any other parts of our homeland. Thus, evaluation of the parliamentary situation demonstrates that that the [Muslim and Arab] nation cannot use this channel in a significant way to rescue the Palestinian people, liberate their lands and return their refugees.¹²⁰

120 Methak, official SIM website. Accessed on 27.2.2013. <<http://www.methak.org/ar/?articles=topic&topic=18736>>.

This statement was made in the context of Sheikh Abu Daabes's attempts to converge the views within the Islamic Movement as a first step towards re-unification, however it shows that the current leader of the SIM is convinced that despite what other Knesset-enthusiasts say, Arabs can only achieve limited gains through the Knesset. This is in accordance with the claims of the leaders of the NIM.

On the scale of Aristotle's three appeals of rhetoric; ethos, pathos, and logos, it can be concluded that the SIM leaders make significant use of logos-based arguments to support their decision to participate in the Knesset. On urging people to vote for them in the Knesset elections with the main focus on the benefits for Arab citizens, the leaders of the SIM must convince the voters of the importance of being represented in the Knesset. Again, in the deliberative rhetoric, it is important to prove that such representation is going to be useful and would improve the lives of the Arab voters. The rhetoric to the Arab public is simple: if their interest can be fulfilled through the Knesset the legislative authority in the Israeli state, then they must be part of it and voice their demands through it.

Based on this logic, doing the opposite and boycotting the Knesset would mean that no one would care for the needs of Arabs. They would therefore end up disadvantaged by being deprived of their rights. For instance, Knesset member Sarsour stated:

With the help of all Arab parties, we have set a target of at least sixty to sixty-five per cent voter turnout. This is possible and will mean strengthening the Arab powers in the Knesset, which will be reflected positively on the conditions of the Arab community. It is thus important to reinforce the Arab voice in the Knesset, the guardian of the Arabs interest in Israel.¹²¹

The rhetoric of the SIM also uses ethos, which refers to the ability of the rhetor to establish credibility by emphasizing the party's experience, skills, and qualifications, and their eligibility to fill the position. The words of the former Knesset member of the SIM; Abdumalik Dahamshi, demonstrates a significant amount of ethos. He says:

We took every chance we could to influence Israeli policy, and through our parliamentary work we made many significant achievements for our people in the interior [Israel]. We also managed to impose our Arab and Islamic presence everywhere.

121 Interview with Al-Arab magazine. Accessed on 27.2.2013. <<http://www.alarab.net/Article/508817>>.

This is a strong speech charged with ethos that Dahamshi followed by mentioning some of the achievements of his party, the UAL. Dahamshi calls on people to vote for the Arab parties, and to vote particularly for the UAL. He gives reasons as to why Arabs must vote [to counter the growing anti-Arab current in the Knesset], and why they must vote specifically for the UAL [due to its ability to make significant improvements to the lives of the Arab citizens in Israel].

Clearly, it is not sufficient to only use logos in calling people to vote in the Knesset elections. Examples of these are claims that ‘the Knesset is the tool through which your lives can be improved, and therefore our presence in the Knesset is beneficial for you’. If a party like the SIM has been in the Knesset for decades, it is also essential to make use of ethos and highlight the credibility of the party or its candidates. The competence and expertise would ultimately be necessary to realize its promises to improve the lives of Arab citizens and defend their rights. People would expect a party with a long history in the Knesset to have achieved some substantial accomplishments that would highlight their eligibility to be elected. Therefore, it is not enough to simply claim that voting is crucial, or that voting for a certain party is important. It is also important to prove such claims by presenting evidence that voting will be beneficial for the Arab public and that it is in the best interest of Arabs to choose that specific party, owing to its proven experience and noteworthy accomplishments attained through the Knesset. The SIM does that.

4.1.2.3 The Position of the Nationalist Democratic Assembly (NDA) on representation in the Knesset

As demonstrated in chapter 2, the National Democratic Assembly is an Arab political movement that stresses Arab nationalism as the core component of the identity of Arab citizens in Israel. While Islamists prioritize the Muslim identity, and Communists put the Communist affiliation first, the NDA prioritizes the Arab identity, with its cultural, social, and linguistic values. Despite embracing Arab nationalism, which is considered by many to be genuinely contradictory with the Knesset and the values it is established upon, the NDA is one of the Arab parties that endorse participation in the Knesset. In doing so, it has managed to maintain stable power in the past decade.

In light of the opposition to Arab participation in the Knesset by certain political powers, the NDA feels obligated to defend its position and prove the importance of Arab representation in the Knesset. In order to do so, it uses different arguments and rhetorical devices.

In an opening article published in the first bulletin *The Voice of the NDA*, circulated by the NDA in preparation for the 2013 elections, Jamal Zahalka, a Knesset member representing the NDA, wrote:

The NDA has engaged the parliamentary work in order to service the people and handle the daily issues they face. Through this work, the NDA also seeks to introduce its ideological principals on all topics. The NDA has stood out with its dedication to the cause of the public and the responsibilities that the people have laid on its shoulders. It has bravely presented its anti-Zionist political program and its standpoints have angered many racist people in the Knesset. The NDA follows up people's issues on different aspects including education, labor, agriculture, industry, transportation, land allocation, housing, and health services, among others. That is all insufficient however, as the most important role of an opposition member in a parliamentary system is opposition to, and abortion of, racist policies, laws, and procedures by the government or its parties¹²².

This statement by Zahalka highlights two important aspects of the NDA's view of the parliamentary work within the Knesset. Firstly, the NDA, like the other parties, considers Arab representation in the Knesset an important gateway to obtaining the rights of Arabs and to fulfilling their interests. Secondly, the NDA deems it important to be in the Knesset to present and promote its political views, and simultaneously oppose the political views of the Zionist parties.

Like the SIM whose position concerning the Knesset was analyzed earlier in this paper, the NDA endorses Arab representation in the Knesset on the basis that it is vital for the Arab minority. Both, as well as the Communist Party, believe that albeit being the legislative body that creates laws that discriminate against Arabs, the Knesset can be instrumental in improving the lives of Arabs. The Arab citizens in Israel complain about the injustice and inequality that they experience. The discrimination against them by the government, specifically regarding allocation of budgets and lands, in addition to what they call the government's attempts to obliterate their cultural and national identity, are included in these experiences¹²³. The NDA declares that it is important to enter the Knesset to counter these

122 *The Voice of the NDA* (2012), 4. <<http://arabs48.com/Public/images/first-nashra-16pages-newblack.pdf>>.

123 This report discusses curricula for Arab schools in Israel in which essential events in the Arab and Palestinian history were intentionally omitted, and 'Zionist values' were adopted instead by Israel. Accessed on 03.08.2013. <<http://felesteen.ps/details/news/81397>>.

discriminatory practices by the government. In doing so, it can promote the interests of the Arab community and address its concerns through utilizing the power of the Knesset as a legislative body.

Remarkable in the rhetoric of the NDA is that its leaders do not differentiate between the political and the daily material needs of the people as it considers these to be intertwined. This was clear in the statements by Knesset member Zahalka, and is clear in the following, written by Knesset member Haneen Zoabi, the second candidate in the NDA's list for the 2013 elections:

Under a racist regime, people's daily issues are political issues. The details of our daily lives are a result of the racism and discrimination by the authority that defines itself as a Jewish state. Detaching the daily life concerns from the political action is intended to blind us to seeing that our daily material issues are part of a political reality that cannot be changed without political struggle. It is a detachment that serves to make us realize the difficulty of our condition, but without knowing how to change it¹²⁴.

The other aspect of the NDA's parliamentary work is its view that the Knesset functions as the place in which Arab politicians can express their political and ideological opinions in front of the Zionist parties that get 'angry' in response, as Zahalka said. From that quotation it seemed as if the NDA gives more weight to vocalizing its ideological views before the Zionist parties than to the Arab public. This is reinforced by the fact that the NDA, in Zahalka's words, estimate that opposing 'racist laws' is the most important action that a parliamentary member in the Knesset can do. 'The most important role of an opposition member in a parliamentary system is to practice opposition, and attempt to abort all racist policies, laws and procedure by the government or its parties'. The importance of 'opposing' is highlighted even more strongly in other parts of NDA's bulletins. These exalt NDA's 'achievements' in stopping, or even attempting to stop 'racist laws'. This is regarded as much more important than actively engaging in the legislative process and working towards passing laws, not just opposing them.

In The Voice of the NDA, the party highlighted the number of 'racist laws' that it had voted against. It also emphasized a number of counter laws that it had proposed, namely laws aimed at cancelling racist bills proposed by right wing parties. Among the many actions that the NDA mentioned in this regard, were the following:

124 The Voice of the NDA (2012), 2. <<http://arabs48.com/Public/images/nashra-women-16-B.pdf>.

- The NDA proposes thirteen laws to cancel racist legislations.
- A conference in the Knesset to counter the flood of racist laws was initiated by the NDA.
- Zahalka: The NDA has spearheaded the struggle against the racist laws, and it has initiated actions within and outside the Knesset to stop the series of racist and anti-Arab laws. We couldn't stop them all, but we have definitely contributed to preventing the approval of many of them. We must be aware of this remarkable achievement and its importance in defending people's rights.¹²⁵

All of these examples confirm the suggestion that the NDA gives significant weight to the act of opposing laws that they deem to be against the interest of the Arab minority. In Zahalka's words, this may even be the most important work that a [Arab] parliamentary member can do.

The position expressed by the leadership of the NDA that opposition is the most important aspect of a Knesset member's activism cannot be taken out of context. The Israeli Knesset is an arena in which Arabs constitute a tiny minority. They cannot pass any laws that directly influence Arab citizens and their status in the Zionist state. In fact, Arab Knesset members can voice their support and even recruit the support of the majority for the animal rights bill, but not for a law that aims to enhance the lives of Arabs or reverse the discrimination that they experience. The leaders of the NDA, the CPI, and the SIM are all aware of the very slim chances they have in the Knesset game, and yet they play by its rules, hoping that the little that they achieve will help reduce their people's hardships. Accordingly, opposition might not be the game-changing practice, but leaders of the NDA believe that in the case of Arabs in Israel who are a minority that depend on the state, it can be helpful.

Ms. Haneen Zoabi wrote in the fourth NDA promotional bulletin:

We do not beg for leftovers, we demand rights, our rights.

We are here before the [Israeli] state, whoever came to us must recognize us, recognize our existence on our land, and our standing in our homeland.

We Participate in the Knesset elections to say our words, to transform complaints into an undertaking of change

He who considers himself the land owner does not make complaints, but creates change and supports a political party that works towards claiming his rights

The NDA is a struggle party,

¹²⁵ The Voice of the NDA, 1 January 2013, 4-5. <http://arabs48.com/Public/images/first-nashra-16pages-newblack.pdf>

The NDA represents all groups within the Palestinian people, without compulsion or exclusion... Together we will make the NDA victorious¹²⁶

This remarkable statement reveals three important points. Firstly, Zoabi echoes her colleague Zahalka's assertion that participation in the Knesset is essential in the pursuit for rights. Zoabi stresses however, that Arab citizens are worthy of these rights not out of the generosity of the state but because Arabs are the 'landowners who were there before the state'. Secondly, Zoabi confirms Zahalka's idea that the Knesset is an important platform for Arab citizens to voice themselves, especially in opposition to issues that they disagree with and feel affect them. Thirdly, Zoabi talks about 'transforming complaints into change' through the Knesset, and states that 'a landowner does not complain, he creates change'. This could be a hint at the Arab parties who boycott the Knesset, whom Zoabi accuses of 'complaining' but not 'creating change' by actively engaging in the Knesset's work. Lastly, Zoabi concludes with the importance of supporting her party; the NDA, in order to put these ideas into effect.

The sixth candidate in the NDA's list for the 2013 elections was Heba Yazbak, the second female candidate in the NDA's list, after Zoabi. She wrote:

The NDA enters the next elections with a list that includes the highest number of women ever, with plans to handle various issues that it is passionately working on in order to improve the status of women. The NDA continues to challenge the racist political system. This means standing against the racist regime and raising our voice, and in this case, the confrontation and raising our voice means casting the vote. We do not enter the Knesset because we trust it, but we enter it to confront the system and to represent the voices of our people. In this case, political participation is not only a right but also a duty, and it is our duty as women to also participate and influence.¹²⁷

This quotation reaffirms the NDA's view presented by the other NDA leaders discussed earlier. Yazbak fuses political and daily concerns, specifically social issues such as the status of women. She proposes that 'challenging the racist political system' is a gateway to improving their status. This echoes Knesset member Zoabi's statement that political struggle against the Israeli government goes hand in hand with other non-political struggles, like the fight for daily material necessities or social change. Like Zahalka

126 The Voice of the NDA, 4 January 2013: 2. <<http://arabs48.com/Public/images/120-nashra-16pages.pdf>>

127 The Voice of the NDA, 3 January 2013: 2. <<http://arabs48.com/Public/images/second-nashra-16pages-B.pdf>>

and Zoabi, Yazbak stresses that the NDA is capable of leading the struggle in all its forms, whether political, material, social, educational, and so forth.

In discussing the NDA's rhetoric, it is necessary to talk about a rhetorical 'phenomenon' that was the matter of debate in the months that preceded the last Knesset elections of January 2013. The NDA used what some called 'the rhetoric of intimidation' in order to win the votes of the Arab citizens. The NDA's rhetoric focused on the right-wing Zionist parties, and on key figures in these parties known for their blatant anti-Arab positions and statements. These include Avigdor Lieberman, Baruch Marzel, and Michael Ben-Ari. The NDA utilized those figures and their radical attitudes, and vehemently warned against allowing them a position in the government. In doing so, the NDA pleaded with people to vote for it to prevent this outcome.

An example of this is a poster that appeared in print and as web banners, displaying close-up photos of Lieberman, Marzel, and Ben-Ari masked in a dark color. Underneath, it read: 'Our people want to scrap the racists'¹²⁸.

Another poster featured a quotation by Michael Ben-Ari that said: 'we must encourage Arab migration from Israel. This has to be the plan, the objective'. Under the quotation it was written in large font: 'to whom are you leaving this situation? It needs the NDA'¹²⁹, hinting at the needs of Arabs to vote, and to vote for the NDA to rid them of these 'racists'.

Figure 5: NDE's slogan: Scrapping the racists!



¹²⁸ The Voice of the NDA 1 January 2013,1. <<http://arabs48.com/Public/images/first-nashra-16pages-newblack.pdf>>

¹²⁹ The Voice of the NDA 1 January 2013, 3. <<http://arabs48.com/Public/images/first-nashra-16pages-newblack.pdf>>

In a promotional video¹³⁰ that the NDA released on the eve of the 2013 Knesset elections, animated figures of famous radical right-wing people appeared, singing sarcastic songs that depicted what the NDA considered 'racist, Anti-Arab statements'. The title of the video was We Will Not Leave the Arena for Them; another affirmation that the NDA had set a goal to fight the 'racists', and that Arab voters should vote and support that goal by voting for the NDA.

In Rhetoric, Aristotle discusses torture and the compulsion that's attached to it, which sometimes leads to the victim giving false evidence in order to avoid more torture. He says:

Those under compulsion are as likely to give false evidence as true evidence, some being ready to endure everything rather than tell the truth, while others being equally ready to make false charges against others, in the hope of sooner being released from torture¹³¹.

There is a clear difference between torture and intimidation; while torture is physical, intimidation is psychological. There could, however, be a similarity between voting due to intimidation, and admitting to the crime under compulsion. Similarly to the way a person who didn't commit a crime admits to having done it out of fear of torture, some voters who did not actually want to vote did so out of fear of being responsible for the 'rise of the right'. As such, this intimidation by the NDA and the other parliamentary parties manifest in a depiction of the boycott movement as a supporter of the extremist right-wing parties. Therefore, many will vote to avoid being in the position of unintentionally supporting the right and being classified as 'Jewish right supporters'. This is especially likely given that some pro-Knesset Arab writers explicitly accused the boycotters of increasing the power of the right-wing Jewish parties.¹³² Those voters may have been intimidated into believing that if they do not vote, they will contribute to the rise of the 'racists' who want to expel and kill Arabs.

Whether or not this 'rhetoric of intimidation' actually works in mobilizing votes for the NDA is irrelevant to this paper. However, what is of interest is that it is a card that the NDA repeatedly plays during and after election periods.

130 On Youtube. < <http://youtu.be/wOHsrzmDwZI>>.

131 Aristotle, *Rhetoric*. Online version translated by J.H. Freese.
<<http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng1:1.15.26>>

132 Like the article by Izzat Farah. Accessed on 23.9.2013. 'Boycotting the elections means voting for the right'. <<http://www.alarab.net/Article/503105>>.

The arguments that the NDA uses to justify its pro-Knesset position can be summarized in the following:

1. Arab representation in the Knesset is important in order to represent the Arab minority, pursue its interests and its material, social, educational, cultural, and other needs.
2. Participating in the Knesset is essential in having the Arab voice heard. It is one of the pillars of political struggle against racist laws and in countering racist legislative procedures.
3. Only complaining without trying to make a change through the Knesset is futile.
4. The political views of the Arab parties must be introduced to the public, and the Knesset is the right place for that.
5. If Arabs are not represented in the Knesset, the right-wing parties will take over and the results will be catastrophic for Arabs.

Rhetorical analysis

With Aristotle's rhetorical classifications in mind, arguments in the deliberative axis, relating to the future, are identified. This is expected, given that the rhetoric under discussion is the rhetoric used for the elections, and the elections will have implications on the future. It will therefore influence people's lives, and most of the arguments are accordingly deliberative.

Arguments one and two assume that if the Arab minority wants to achieve its goals, fulfil its interests, and improve its social, educational, cultural, and economical status and conditions, it must be part of the Knesset. They further propose that since laws are legislated in the Knesset, including laws that Arabs define as racist and discriminatory, it is important to be in the Knesset in order to counter attempts to pass such laws and accordingly defend the Arab public.

The argument of point three is that if Arabs aim to be in control of their situation and conditions, they must not only complain, but must play a more active role by engaging in the work of the Knesset. They must utilize the Knesset's platform to tackle the issues that the Arabic minority is facing.

Argument four states that it is in the interest of the Arab community to have its voice heard in the Knesset. In doing so, its demands would be exposed to the Knesset and the legislators, as well as the collective Arab public in Israel. The first step towards the fulfilment of the demands is the presentation of the demands to the legislators. Presenting them to the public [through the Knesset's Channel 33] serves to raise awareness of Arab people regarding the challenges that it encounters or is going to encounter in the future.

Argument five takes the concept of ‘interest’ to another level, as it uses the ‘rhetoric of intimidation’ to warn against the right-wing Zionist parties. The argument states that Arabs face genuine threats in the scenario that sees the right-wing parties taking control of the government. It is thus critical that Arab citizens vote for the Arab parties in order to increase Arab representation in the Knesset and prevent the right from forming a right-dominated government. The interest in this case is not to promote legislation that benefits the Arabs, but rather to oppose legislations that would harm them and have negative consequences on their future in their homeland.

These arguments relate to the question of the interest of Arabs in Israel. The pro-Knesset parties, like the NDA, claim that participating in the Knesset is important in pursuing Arab interests and in claiming their rights. Using Higgin's words cited in 3.1.2.1, these arguments are an accurate demonstration of Aristotle's deliberative rhetoric, in that they promote the good [arguments 1, 3 and 4] and avoid the harmful [arguments 2 and 5].

These arguments are exclusively logos-based in light of the three rhetorical proofs set by Aristotle. The logic behind the NDA's arguments presented above, to justify participation in the Knesset, is simple. It follows that it is important for Arabs to have representatives in the Knesset for two reasons: to promote legislation that benefit Arabs, and to hinder legislation that harms them. It is logos-based as much as deliberative, in that it is about logical reasoning concerning that which is beneficial and that which is harmful for the Arab minority. The deliberative arguments suggest that logically, Arabs must be represented in the Knesset to fulfil their interests, whether political, economic, social, religious, educational, and so forth. This is no different from the rhetoric used by the other parties to explain their attitudes towards Knesset representation. Even the majority of NIM's arguments against representation in the Knesset used deliberative, logos-based arguments.

4.1.2.4 The Position of the Communist Party of Israel (CPI) represented by the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE)

DFPE's support of Arab representation in the Knesset is very well documented in a study specifically focused on this topic, written by Ayman Odeh, the current secretary of the DFPE. The main arguments presented by Odeh, as well as some counterarguments to refute the arguments of parties opposing Arab participation in the Knesset, follow.

1. Parliamentary activism is not the only arena in which Arabs can struggle for rights; indeed, popular struggle is even more important, but this doesn't mean we can't utilize the parliament for the sake of resolving our main issues.
2. Boycotting parliament does not aid in delegitimizing the Knesset. As long as the Arab citizens continue to hold Israeli passports and IDs, and run for the local municipalities' elections, we can't claim that Israel is an illegitimate country.
3. For a nation that struggles for national and civil rights, it is pointless to abandon the most influential political platform in the country. Even if it only serves as a 'platform for complaints' as the boycott supporters' claim, should we refrain from voicing our call for truth and justice before an oppressive ruler?
4. The elections provide the best opportunity for the politicization of the Arab people in Israel, as activists in large numbers are mobilized during the elections to raise awareness on political issues. The public is also much more willing to take part in political events and forums at the time of elections. This political mobilization in preparation for the elections has significantly contributed to the politicization of the Arab minority, especially during the martial law.
5. It is not true that the Arab representatives in the Knesset have not been able to accomplish any tangible achievements. In the period between 2006 and 2009 alone, twenty laws were passed that were proposed by Arab members.

Other leaders of the DFPE and CPI echo these ideas. For instance, Issam Makhoul, a CPI leader and a former Knesset member, stated in an open meeting:

We do not believe that the parliamentary work is an alternative to the popular struggle and activism, but an extension to it. Thus our electoral battle and our appeal to the people does not aim to only convince the people to vote for us, but is also an invitation to them to take part in our battle to achieve change and confront oppression, discrimination, racism, occupation, settlements, and war.¹³³

Ibrahim Assadi, a communist writer, wrote in an article that was published in the DFPE's website:

One month from now, the nineteenth Knesset elections will be held at a time when we are hearing radical voices provoking Arab citizens. They are calling on them to deprive their right of

133 DFPE's website. Accessed on 18.8.2013: <<http://www.aljabha.org/index.asp?i=73559>>.

citizenship and exclude themselves from any process that entails making a crucial decision about the issues that concern every citizen. Do we allow ourselves to support racist attitudes by boycotting [the elections]? Do we boycott the parliamentary elections, which is regarded as one of the simplest forms of active citizenship? Which rights can we demand after relinquishing our principal rights in [participating in] the parliamentary elections?¹³⁴

In another quotation that reaffirms the position shared by the DFPE and other parliamentary parties, Assadi speaks about participation in the Knesset as vital for the struggle for rights:

We are the ones who have a cause; we are the victims of the policies of racial discrimination and national oppression, causing our poverty, educational regression, and relegation of our people to industrial zones. These are all reason enough for us to unite in our struggle to take what is ours from the ruling regime.¹³⁵

Lastly, Assadi warns against the way in which he foresees the negative implications of boycotting the Knesset:

If we boycott the Knesset, you shouldn't be surprised at the reaction of the extremists against us, the intensification of the regulations of oppression, and the increase in calls to deprive us of the citizenship, which we have elected to abandon. I do not want to predict, as everybody knows what the non-citizens suffer in Israel or in other countries in the world. And whoever doesn't know can look at the residents of East Jerusalem or the Sudanese refugees [in Israel] who were either deprived of citizenship or are seeking to obtain it.¹³⁶

Dov Khenin is one of the DFPE's Jewish leaders and a current Knesset member representing the DFPE. In a speech he gave during a promotional meeting in one of the Arab villages in the Galilee, Khenin emphasized the material aspect of the DFPE's parliamentary work. He said:

I am standing before you today after we managed to enter the Knesset in the last term with significant public support from north to south, and with fifty parliamentary accomplishments [successful moves in the Knesset, like proposing new bills or blocking bills that are considered

134 Assadi, Ibrahim. Accessed on 10.8.2013. 'Boycotting the Knesset Elections is Cutting our link with Citizenship'.

135 DFPE's official website. <<http://www.aljabha.org/index.asp?i=73564>>.

136 Ibid.

discriminatory towards Arabs], which we are going to double in our next parliamentary term. The DFPE is the warm house for our people; you vote for the DFPE because you are confident that this party seeks nothing but to support its people and promote its cause. When we say DFPE, we declare that we stand against the fascist right; we declare that we are in the arena; taking part in the protests and in the strikes to obtain social justice and equality, and we confront the right-wing government that seeks to ignite war and destroy every chance for peace. We are the ones who attained peaceful coexistence, and we are working; Arabs and Jews, men and women, to achieve peace and live in dignity.¹³⁷

In the context of discussing these parties' position concerning participation in the Knesset, it would be unfair to compare this pathos-charged quote with the previous quotes by leaders of the other parties. This speech by Khenin does not particularly aim to convince people to just participate in the Knesset elections, which is the case with the quotes presented by leaders of the other parties. Instead, Khenin's speech aims to convince people to specifically vote for his party, the DFPE. This statement is nevertheless useful in that it shows the way in which leaders of the DFPE convince people to vote through promoting the party. Namely, if the DFPE could achieve the accomplishments in the Knesset, could confront the fascist right, and largely enhance the lives of the Arab citizens, as Khenin claims, then of course participation in the Knesset is better than boycotting. Khenin's speech therefore serves two purposes: convincing boycotters to vote, and persuading people who usually vote, to vote specifically for the DFPE.

In the same promotional meeting, one DFPE youth leader, Alaa Sa'ada, used what was earlier termed the 'rhetoric of intimidation', namely, cautioning the audience against what could happen if the Arab voters boycott the elections and allow the 'right-wing extremists' to control the government. He stated:

The existence of this racist government makes it mandatory that we, the general public; including Arab and Jewish youth, declare a firm stance against the right, in support of a just peace, equality, and social justice. Hence, we disapprove of the defeatist attitudes and voices that are calling for boycott, as this serves no one but the [Jewish] right. We all want to vote to practice a right and a

137 A speech by Dov Hanin. 6 January 2013. Accessed on. 10.8.2013. < <http://www.aljabha.org/index.asp?i=73660>>

duty, and we will vote for the DFPE, to wipe the right out and resist its racism against the minority.¹³⁸

Finally, it seems that this ‘rhetoric of intimidation’ used by the DFPE and the CPI comes from the person who occupies the highest positions in their hierarchy. The following is a very unambiguous and strong statement by the top leader of the DFPE and CPI, Knesset member Muhammad Barakih:

If Netanyahu [the leader of the right-wing Likud party] is back in government, such a government would be a threat to life, health, economy, and all other [life] aspects. The DFPE is not going to allow that, as today we are in a more difficult situation, as they [the right-wing parties controlling the government] are threatening to attack Iran, which would come at our expense. It doesn't amaze me to hear voices that are discouraging our people from voting. This is a government that will bring harm upon your life, your house, your family, and you say that you don't care about politics. What logic is that? Whoever doesn't vote, votes for the right, therefore we must fight the government that want the Arabs not to cast their vote... Voting must bring down this horrendous monster and its crimes¹³⁹.

The way in which Barakih uses specific words in order to intimidate is clear. Phrases like ‘threat to life, health, economy’ or ‘this horrendous monster’, that Barakih used to describe the right-led government, are examples of the way that he attempts to arouse fear of the right in the hearts of his audience. Barakih played on this fear in an attempt to convince people to vote for the Arab parties. Repeatedly reminding people about the ‘threat’ of the ‘horrendous monster’ that is the Jewish right-wing parties, is one of the main arguments in the DFPE and CPI's rhetoric endorsing participation in the Knesset.

Barakih does not only employ intimidation, however. It was remarkable that during the last elections held on January 22, 2013, the Arab parties resorted to a completely different tone in their attempts to convince Arab citizens to vote. Leaders of the Arab parties suddenly switched from threatening Arabs with the right-wing parties, to appealing to those who didn't vote to head to the polling stations and vote for any Arab party. Muhammad Barakih was among those who thought that if threatening didn't work, begging could. Hours before the polling stations closed, Barakih released the following short statement:

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid.

Polls based on actual vote statistics indicate that there is a real possibility of overthrowing Netanyahu and Lieberman. I therefore appeal to all Arab citizens who have not yet voted, to head instantly to the ballots to cast their votes and strengthen our weight in the new equation, to prevent a situation whereby the right stays in power. If we don't make a move at this critical moment, we will never forgive ourselves should this happen.¹⁴⁰

After using strong words such as 'threat' and 'horrendous monster', Barakih uses 'I appeal' and 'forgive ourselves'. The DFPE was not the only party to change its tone on the day of the elections. All Arab parliamentary parties went on an appealing frenzy, and utilized every possible opportunity to transmit their appeals to the people, via internet websites, mobile SMS messages, paid radio broadcasts, and even the mosque minarets that are used to call people to prayer. Party members were also sent to the houses of citizens to beg them to come and vote¹⁴¹.

This change of tone on the day of elections was motivated by the fear that the Arab parties had of a low voting rate among Arab citizens. This would mean that some Arab parties might not have received enough votes to be in the Knesset. Since every vote counts in this case, the parties had no choice but to struggle for each additional vote they could secure.

Such change did not make the argument any different. In both cases [when using the rhetoric of intimidation, or the rhetoric of appealing], the Arab parties tried to alert the Arab citizens to the extremist right-wing Zionist parties that would control the country if the Arab parties did not get enough votes. These parties therefore didn't transparently say that if the Arab voter turnout were low, they would be excluded from the next parliament. Rather, they said that if it was low, the 'horrendous monster' represented by the right is going to take control of the country. Therefore, both intimidation and appeal served one purpose, which was to inflict fear in people's hearts, to pressure them to cast a vote that would prevent right-wing control of the next government.

The arguments provided by the DFPE in support of Arab representation in the Knesset can be summarized in the following:

140 Barakih, Muhammad. DFPE official Facebook page. Accessed on 18.8.2013.
<<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=191960277613509>>.

141 As testified by many observers, including the journalist Abdulhakim Mufeed. Accessed on 18.8.2013.
<<http://www.pls48.net/?mod=articles&ID=1156873>>.

1. Political action through the Knesset, alongside the popular struggle, is necessary to improve the lives of Arab citizens in Israel.
2. Arab representation in the Knesset is crucial to prevent the right-wing ‘racist’ Zionist parties from constituting a majority and controlling the government and state, which would allow them to oppress Arab citizens even more.
3. The Knesset elections are a great opportunity for the politicization of the Arab community in Israel, and for mobilizing it in the struggle for rights, justice, and equality.
4. Voicing Arab demands through the Knesset is very important, even if it was only considered a ‘platform for complaints’; after all, complaining is one part of the struggle for rights.

Counterarguments to participation in the Knesset used by the DFPE and CPI leaders include:

1. Voting in the Knesset elections is a core element of active citizenship. Abandoning it is like abandoning citizenship, and if Arabs abandon it, they can't demand citizen rights afterwards.
2. Boycotting the Knesset election doesn't really aid in delegitimizing the Israeli state, as simply carrying Israeli IDs and passports is an acknowledgement of Israel's legitimacy.
3. Contrary to what the pro-boycott parties say, Arab Knesset members could actually accomplish a lot through the Knesset that alleviates some of the suffering of the Arab people and increases their quality of life.

Rhetorical analysis

Similar to the other parties, all of the arguments presented by the DFPE in favor of participation in the Knesset are deliberative arguments. This also applies to the counter arguments that the party uses to refute the claims of the Arab parties who oppose participation in the Knesset. Deliberative rhetoric [which is also called ‘political rhetoric’ since it is greatly used by politicians] concerns what is to come, and is used to convince the audience to either do or not do a certain action. This is based on what the rhetor believes is in the interest of that audience. Deliberative rhetoric is therefore about utility, efficiency and the benefit of the audience. The arguments of the DFPE above deal with what is beneficial for the Arab minority in Israel. These arguments and counterarguments, presented by leaders of the DFPE and CPI, serve to convince the Arab citizens of Israel that voting in the Knesset elections, and being represented there, is vital for their future, for their lives, their families, education, financial status, and social welfare. They claim that Arab members in the Knesset are able to pass laws that help to enhance the lives of Arabs, and at the same time block laws that would harm Arab citizens and threaten their and their families' future. To prove that, political leaders of DFPE /CPI remind the people about ‘the fifty

achievements that the Arab Knesset members have already achieved'. This is aimed at confirming their theory that Arab representation in the Knesset is not to be compromised.

Deliberative rhetoric is also about what's not beneficial for the people. It is clear in one of the counter arguments presented above, that leaders of the DFPE, assured Arab citizens that giving up the right to vote, which is a principal component of citizenship, is akin to giving up citizenship itself. This is not positive, as it would entail nullifying the demands of the Arab citizens for rights and equality.

In terms of the three rhetorical appeals set by Aristotle, it seems that the DFPE/CPI use a variety of arguments that are based on ethos, pathos, and logos.

Ethos is strongly evident in arguments that the DFPE/CPI leaders and activists use to persuade people to vote for them, not just in the Knesset elections. Ethos is also present in rhetoric that the Arab political parties employ to convince Arab citizens to vote in general. An argument that utilizes ethos is exemplified by Dov Khenin's statement, which started by reminding the audience that contrary to claims by anti-Knesset parties, Arab Knesset members accomplished fifty achievements in the last Knesset term alone (2006-2009). As a Knesset member and having supposedly contributed to these achievements, Khenin established his credibility before the audience as a person whose word is to be trusted. Accordingly, he claims that he took part in improving the lives of Arabs, and therefore assures them that Arab participation in the Knesset can undoubtedly improve their lives.

Pathos, or the arousal of emotions, is clearly used in what was earlier called the 'rhetoric of intimidation'. Many DFPE/CPI leaders spoke about the threat of the right-wing Jewish parties, and in doing so, intimidated the Arab citizens into casting their votes, warning them against the possibility that these parties would control the government and steer it towards more oppression and discrimination against the Arab minority. The DFPE/CPI, and other parties resorted to the solution that they believed could persuade people to vote; the attempt to instill fear in people. As the Arab parties wanted, Arab citizens that become afraid enough of the potential of the right-wing parties to dominate the government will not only vote, but will vote for the Arab parties.

Ethos in rhetoric is the orator's ability to evoke the emotions of the audience, but not only through fear. Using words like Barak's 'I appeal to you', imploring people to vote via radio broadcasts and mosque speakers, and pleading with them to rush to the polling stations before they close, was the last solution to the very low vote rate problem. After the threat of the right extremists failed, the Arab parties thought

that they could overcome the problem by begging people to vote. In the last hours before the polling stations closed, almost every leader of the DFPE, including Barakih¹⁴², Sweid¹⁴³, Odeh¹⁴⁴, and the spokesman¹⁴⁵ of the party, released a statement asking people to immediately leave what they were doing, and go to the stations to vote.

Assadi, the DFPE youth leader who was quoted above, also made significant use of pathos to convince people to vote. Assadi specifically tried to evoke the sense of revenge in the hearts of his audience against the 'racist' regime that is discriminating against them in all aspects of life. In doing so, he urges them to unite; under the DFPE of course, and to struggle to reclaim what is theirs from the government. Encouraging a sense of victimhood is very likely to entice action by the audience against the victimizer, who in this case, is the government. Based on the DFPE's recommendation, the correct form of retaliation by taking back what is lawfully theirs, would be voting for the Arab parties in the Knesset.

Another blatant pathos-charged attempt at persuasion was witnessed in the city of Umm Al-Fahm in which DFPE activists appealed to local residents to vote for its candidate and Umm Al-Fahm resident, Afu Agbariah. In a politically unconventional move, DFPE activists held large, printed banners with Agbariah's pictures on them. The posters read: 'To those who possess morals and principals and whose conscience is alert, the respected residents of our town are worthy of your vote more than your fellow resident of Um Al-Fahm'¹⁴⁶. In the Arab world, it is well known that family and tribal bonds are very strong. Similarly, in a village or town, people prefer to support fellow citizens rather than someone from another town. The DFPE tried to take advantage of this sense of 'town patriotism', and attempted to convince residents of Um Al-Fahim to vote for Agbariah, their fellow resident. His supposed eligibility was therefore not based on experience or qualification. In the event that every other persuasion method failed, the parties hoped that this would work.

142 DFPE official Facebook page. Accessed on 12.8.2013. <<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=191745680968302>>.

143 DFPE official Facebook page. Accessed on 12.8.2013. <<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=191760414300162>>.

144 DFPE official Facebook page. Accessed on 12.8.2013. <<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=191795350963335>>.

145 DFPE official Facebook page. Accessed on 12.8.2013. <<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=191872170955653>>.

146 DFPE fan page. Accessed on 12.8.2013. <<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=390127664413960>>.

Logos is also present in the arguments of the DFPE as a persuasion strategy of cause and consequence, as a warning against right-wing parties. They repeatedly warned Arabs of the consequences of not voting. They were especially fearful of a stronger right considering the rising popularity of these radical Jewish parties in the past decade. Furthermore, this increase in the power of the right-wing parties would consequently create a weaker Arab front. This would significantly decrease the opportunity to hinder or block racist bills that would likely be passed by the radical parties controlling the government. The DFPE therefore claims that Arab citizens refraining from voting for the Arab parties would likely cause a significant power imbalance that would be damaging for them.

Figure 6: DFPE persuasion technique. 'Vote for your fellow resident of Um Al-Fahm'.



4.1.3 Conclusions

Chapter 4.1 reviewed the position of the three largest Arab parties in Israel on Israel's right to exist and on participation in the Knesset. The Knesset is the parliament of the Israeli state, established after the Zionist occupation of Palestine in 1948, marked in Palestinian historical narratives as the 'Nakba day', meaning 'catastrophe'. This analysis unveils a critical aspect of the relationship between the Israeli state and its Arab citizens, the majority of whom define themselves as Palestinian, not Israeli. Discussing this matter is important in the study of the rhetoric of Arab political parties in the state of Israel, a place where the lives of Arab Palestinians are influenced by many complicated, and sometimes conflictive, considerations.

The analysis included a review of the way in which the different Arab parties perceive and articulate Israel's legitimacy. It revealed that the attitudes of the Arab parties towards the Knesset, and their decisions on whether to partake or boycott the Knesset elections, is largely determined by their belief of how legitimate Israel is. Analysis revealed that the parties that partake in the Knesset elections accept Israel's legitimacy fully or partly, whereas the one party that seems to not recognize Israel's legitimacy and its right to exist on Palestinian land, is the one that boycotts the Knesset elections.

Analysis revealed different arguments used by the parties to defend their position, whether for or against. The parties that support Arab participation in the Knesset, particularly the NDA and the DFPE, share many arguments. Both claim that Arabs must be represented in the Knesset to pass laws that would improve their lives, and hinder laws that would make their lives worse. Both declare that being in the Knesset is important in order to prevent the extremist right-wing Jewish parties from taking over the government. Arabs were never part of the government though; even when the parties considered to be 'left' in Israel formed it. Both parties also claim that simply resorting to complaints will not improve anything, and Arabs must rather take an active part. They maintain that this can take the form of engagement in the Knesset and its work, in blocking the passing of racist and discriminatory laws. The arguments of the NIM, which is the main political party that opposes Arab participation in the Knesset, and some argue is the largest Arab party in Israel, usually counter the pro-Knesset parties. The NIM claims that despite any accomplishments that the Arab parties in the Knesset claim they managed to attain, they could not make any tangible change regarding the serious issues facing the Arab minority in Israel. These include discrimination in land and budget allocation, in education, social services, ethnic rights, and ending the racist attitude that Arabs experience in many of the governmental intuitions and services.

While NIM uses forensic rhetoric in opposing participation, stating that the Knesset is the parliament of what once was a group of Zionist military groups that occupied the Palestinian lands and later solidified into a state, most of the arguments used by both sides - for or against Arab participation in the Knesset elections - are rhetorically deliberative. They are concerned with the future, and deal with advantages versus disadvantages. More specifically, they present participation in the Knesset as an advantageous move that would improve the lives of the Arab citizens in Israel, secure their rights and fulfil their needs; or as a disadvantageous move in that it would harm the interests of Arab citizens, or at least not improve their lives, while being utilized to whitewash the Israeli government in the eyes of the international community.

In their argumentation, each party employs various rhetorical appeals set by Aristotle. Ethos used by both writers and speakers hinted at their eligibility, and their opinions trusted regarding Knesset representation. I also found logos in many arguments that draw conclusions, via logical strategies like cause and consequence, about Knesset representation. I noted the extensive use of pathos whereby the rhetors (whether orators or writers) attempted to evoke the emotions of the audience or the readers in the hope that they would be emotionally aroused, and thus more willing to accept arguments. Arab party leaders did a good job in this regard, by attempting, in different circumstances, to arouse fear, enthusiasm, rage, or pity in Arab citizens. This would have served in their attempts to persuade them to vote in the elections.

Understandably, the rhetoric and arguments used by each party is determined by its ideology, which determines its position. It was obvious though, that despite the significant ideological gap between the NDA and the CPI, they shared many of the arguments in support of Arab representation in the Knesset. This is explained by the fact that these two are, after all, Arab parties. Their members and leaders are Arab, and therefore they support the interests of the Arab minority. They speak the same language, including the struggle language, against what Arabs consider to be an oppressive and racist regime.

4.2 Rhetoric Against The Recognition of Israel as a “Jewish State”

The political and academic spheres in Israel have been occupied in recent years with discussion about the concept of a “Jewish Nation State”. Since he was elected prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu has continuously called for Palestinians to accept Israel as a Jewish state as a condition for negotiations to resume. Netanyahu is not alone; many analysts claim that the most important sentence in Obama’s speech during his “historic” visit to Palestine, last April, was “Palestinians must recognize that Israel will be a Jewish state”¹⁴⁷. Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority publicly expressed objection to recognize Israel as a Jewish state¹⁴⁸. Such recognition does not mean that Israel is currently not a Jewish state, as Israel has been functioning as a Jewish state, for the Jewish people, since it was established, and Arabs who tolerated this first, started to feel that it is translated into discrimination against them, and started challenging the nature of this state. For this reason, Yuval Diskin, the chairman of the Shabak (Israel’s General Security Service) declared that attempts to remove the Jewish nature of the state are “a strategic threat” and that the Shabak will abort all attempts to change it, even democratically¹⁴⁹. What is new in this respect is that Israel now demands that the Palestinian Authority officially recognize it as a Jewish State. So, while Israel is in practice Jewish, and its Jewish citizens have first priority at all levels, it now wants official acknowledgement from the Palestinians and Arab countries, that it has the right to be a “Jewish State”.

The reasons why Palestinians or Arabs reject the concept of a “Jewish State” have been illustrated no better than in an article by Professor Sari Nusseibeh¹⁵⁰, where they can be summarized as:

1. A state cannot be a “modern and democratic” state if defined by one ethnicity or one religion.
2. If “Jewish” in a “Jewish state” refers to Judaism, it would be a theocracy; if it refers to the ethnicity, it would be an apartheid state. In both cases, it is far from being a democratic state.
3. More than 20 percent of Israel’s citizens are Arabs, and the state being “Jewish” automatically means the alienation of Arabs in their own native land and reducing them to second-class citizens or even later stripping them of their citizenship and displacing them.

¹⁴⁷ <<http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/03/22/obama-s-demand-of-jewish-state-recognition.html>>. Accessed: 12.8.2013.

¹⁴⁸ <<http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4114446,00.html>>

¹⁴⁹ Muhanad Mostafa, "Transfer Projects and the Jewish State", *Tenth Intellectual Conference*, in Haaretz 16.3.2007.

¹⁵⁰ <<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/09/201192614417586774.html>> Accessed: 12.8.2013.

4. Recognizing a “Jewish State” means that any Jewish person, anywhere in the world, is entitled to full citizenship rights, while Palestinians who were actually born in that land would in practice be non-citizens with no rights.
5. It would mean giving up the rights of 7 million Palestinian refugees in the diaspora, victims of the Israeli occupation in 1948, to repatriation or compensation.
6. Recognizing a “Jewish State” that purports to complete the annexation of the whole of Jerusalem means “completely ignoring the fact that Jerusalem is as holy to 2.2 billion Christians and 1.6 billion Muslims, as it is to 15-20 million Jews worldwide”.

Professor Nusseibeh concludes:

In short, recognition of Israel as a "Jewish State" in Israel is not the same as, say, recognition of Greece today as a "Christian State". It entails, in the Old Testament itself, a Covenant between God and a Chosen People regarding a Promised Land that should be taken by force at the expense of the other inhabitants of the land and of non-Jews¹⁵¹.

However, what do the Arab parties in Israel say about the country they live in being officially recognized as a “Jewish State”? In the following pages, I shall discuss the position of the Arab political parties and the Arabic public they represent on the notion of a “Jewish Nation State”. What does such a concept mean to the Arab public in Israel? If Arabs oppose it, is this for ideological or pragmatic reasons? What are the alternative definitions of the state that Arabs may accept? Answering these questions will clarify the picture regarding this matter.

According to the Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel, by Professor Sami Smooha, the number of Arabs willing to accept a definition of the state as “Jewish and democratic” is in decline. The Index shows that the percentage of Arabs who agreed that the “Israel that exists within the Green line has the right to exist as a Jewish democratic state in which Arabs and Jews live” decreased from 65.6% in 2003 to 51.6% in 2009¹⁵². Another opinion poll that was carried out in August 2009 shows that the percentage of Arabs who agreed to the statement “Israel has to stop being a Jewish state and must become one state for the two peoples” was 95.5%¹⁵³.

¹⁵¹ Ibid

¹⁵² Smooha, *Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2003-2009*, p. 19.

¹⁵³ Ghanim & Mustafa, 2009, *Ibid*, p. 118.

Understandably, Arab politicians have the same attitude. In September 2010 when the resumption of negotiations was declared between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA), Knesset member Ahmad Tibi stated that Israel's demand to be recognized by the Palestinians as a Jewish state was illegitimate. He said it is unlikely that Abu Mazin (Mahmoud Abbas, the PA's head) would sign a treaty that includes such recognition, for it might endanger the status of Arab Palestinians in Israel, and void the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland¹⁵⁴.

The position of the Islamic movement is not different. At its 2009 mass meeting held annually under the slogan "the Al-Aqsa is in danger", Sheikh Kamal Khatib, deputy chair of the extra-parliamentary branch of the Movement, warned the PA negotiators that they are not authorized to decide on behalf of the Palestinian people regarding the recognition of Israel as a Jewish State¹⁵⁵.

Dr. Jamal Zahalka, a Knesset member and one of the leaders of the National Democratic Assembly (NDA), openly attacked Yasser Abd Rabbo, one of the PA negotiators, after news spread that the latter showed readiness to recognize Israel as a Jewish State within the framework of the peace negotiations between Israel and the PA. Zahalka called for the dismissal of Abd Rabbo and claimed that he has no right to waive the rights of Palestinians in Israel or the rights of Palestinian refugees¹⁵⁶.

Muhammad Barakih, chairman of Hadash, the Communist Party's parliamentary bloc, claimed that the definition of "Jewish State" grants legitimacy to Israel functioning as an "immigrant state" welcoming all Jewish people around the world to be citizens in it, but on the other hand undermining the legitimacy of the native people's citizenships¹⁵⁷.

In addition to the reasons why such recognition should not happen according to Professor Nusseibeh quoted above, what seems to motivate the opposition of Palestinian Arabs in Israel to official recognition of Israel as a Jewish State is the fact that they already feel oppressed and discriminated against even without such a definition being officially recognized, which raises concerns that things may get even worse if Israel wins the recognition it seeks. The Or Commission¹⁵⁸ found that the Arab minority in Israel

¹⁵⁴ Ahmad Tibi, "Pressing Netanyahu is the key to success in Mideast peace talks." Los Angeles Times, 3 September 2010

¹⁵⁵ Panorama paper, October 1, 2010.

¹⁵⁶ Alarab news website, October 13, 2010. <http://www.alarab.net/Article/334903>. It should be mentioned that later, Abd Rabbo denied having made such a statement, and said, "We cannot recognize Israel as a Jewish State". See Kul al-Arab paper, 15 October 2010.

¹⁵⁷ In Arabic: **Dawlat al-Muhajireen**. Muhammad Barakih, "Haq al-'Awda: Bayna Yahidiyat al-dawla wa-sahyanat al-makan". Haqq al-Awda, no. 17 (May 2006), pp. 7.

¹⁵⁸ About Or Commission from Wikipedia: "The Or Commission was a panel of inquiry appointed by the Israeli government to investigate the events of October 2000 at the beginning of the Second Intifada in which 12 Arab citizens of Israel and

suffers clear discrimination and inequality, and it presented individuals who testified to the unfair treatment Arabs receive from the government and its various bodies in all matters, including land distribution, budgets, employment, living conditions, as well as the prejudiced treatment they experience in educational, social, cultural, political, and religious spheres¹⁵⁹. The High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel is an NGO that represents Arabs in Israel on the national level, whose members are chairpersons or deputy chairpersons of the different Arab parties. It plays a role in liaising between the different parties and facilitates collaboration between them and joint action on issues Arabs face in Israel¹⁶⁰. Its chairman, Muhammad Zaidan, stated that accepting Israel as a Jewish State might mean the annexation of what is left of Arab lands and allocating them to Jewish citizens. Worse than that, according to Zaidan, the Israeli state may force Arabs to undergo another episode of displacement and even transfer, since Israel would, as a Jewish State, feel entitled to do what it wishes in the territories it controls within the boundaries of the Green Line¹⁶¹.

To sum up, Arab citizens of Israel are not content with Israel being recognized as a Jewish State due to fears this may empower Israel to further oppress Palestinians inside Israel, and would mean the end of Palestinian refugees' hopes of returning to their homeland.

4.2.1 Rhetoric of CPI & DFPE - the Communist Party of Israel and the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality

Although Arab Communists in Israel define their (mostly Arab) party as "Israeli", they too deny the definition of the Jewish State and oppose recognition of Israel as such. Ayman Odeh, secretary-general of Hadash, stated:

A "Jewish state" means degrading our status, and in the worst case is a threat to our existence; it means terminating the Palestinian refugees' right to return, legitimizing "population exchange", adopting the official Zionist narrative, and it makes Israel, not the Palestinian people,

one Palestinian were killed by Israeli police amidst several demonstrations". <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Or_Commission>. Accessed on 28.5.2013.

¹⁵⁹ From the official summary of the Or Commission's findings, on Sikkuy, accessed on 28.5.2013. <www.sikkuy.org.il/english/2004/OfficialSummary.pdf>

¹⁶⁰ More on The High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel : <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_Follow-Up_Committee_for_Arab_Citizens_of_Israel>.

¹⁶¹ Interview with Muhammad Zaidan: Repercussions of recognizing Israel as a Jewish State, in Jadal no.5 (Haifa: Mada al-Carmel, December 2009). <[http://jadal.mada-research.org/UserFiles/file/Jadal_PDF/jadal5-heb/interview_with_zidan-final\[1\]\[1\].pdf](http://jadal.mada-research.org/UserFiles/file/Jadal_PDF/jadal5-heb/interview_with_zidan-final[1][1].pdf)> accessed on 11.12.2010.

the victim who needs to secure its national rights. For these reasons, we reject the Israeli approach of “a Jewish State”. ¹⁶²

In the same spirit, Muhammad Barakih, the head of Hadash’s parliamentary bloc, in a speech he gave to an Arab audience in the Arab city of Nazareth stated:

The concept of “a Jewish State” is a knife that threatens our mere existence, this is not a legal matter, it is an existential matter for all Palestinians whether in Israel or in the diaspora. How did Israel become a Jewish State? The answer is that it displaced the Palestinian people from their homeland and welcomed Jews from other countries based on Zionist principles. Are we, the victims, requested to recognize and acknowledge a concept like that? ¹⁶³

What is the rhetoric that leaders of Hadash and the CPI use to present their view on the concept of a Jewish State? Using Aristotle’s terms, it can be said that both *ethos* and *pathos* are used in the above citations. Firstly, we notice the repeated use of the term “victims” in the first two paragraphs above. In Ayman Odeh’s statement, he hints that “we are the victims who need to secure their national rights”, not the Jewish people. The victim vs. victimizer analogy is often used in an attempt to stir the emotions of the audience and persuade them to accept the speaker’s view. In this case, it is used by Mr. Odeh to affirm that demanding recognition of Israel as a Jewish State implies that Israel is the “victim” appealing for recognition of its national rights and aspirations, while the reality is that the Palestinian people, whose lands were occupied by the Zionist forces, are the true victims who were and are still being deprived of their rights despite being the native inhabitants.

Similarly, and more strongly, Barakih uses the same technique, the victim vs. the victimizer analogy, to delegitimize Israel’s insistence on being recognized as a Jewish State, when he says: “*Are we, the victims, requested to recognize and acknowledge a concept like that?*” Barakih spoke about how Palestinians were expelled from their land and forced to become refugees in other countries, while Jews, who never lived in that land, were welcomed by the Zionist movement to the Israeli state simply because they are Jews. The description of the image of expulsion, displacement, and refugees aims to win the sympathy of the audience, and asserting that Palestinians are victims is another representation of how emotions, *pathos* are used to make the audience more accepting and supportive of the speaker’s position.

¹⁶² Ayman Odeh’s blog < http://aymanodeh.blogspot.com/2011/06/blog-post_6792.html > accessed on 30.5.2013.

¹⁶³ A speech by Muhammad Barakih. < <http://felesteen.ps/details/news/79290/بركة-يهودية-الدولة-خنجر-موجه-نحو-صدرنا> >. accessed on 30.5.2013.

what Palestinian supporters wanted to hear, that he is against recognizing Israel as a Jewish State, but at the same time, stated what his Jewish supporters wanted to hear, that this is not a call to delegitimize Israel as a state and the Jewish people's right to have a state of their own.

The arguments presented by the CPI against recognizing Israel as a Jewish State can be summarized as follows:

- 1- It would mean the acknowledgment of the official ZN narrative (that it was “a land without a people for a people without a land” and there was no Palestinian “nation” when Jews arrived).
- 2- It would mean admitting that Israel is the victim, not the Palestinians, which in turn entails accepting what Israel (or the Zionist gangs that ravaged Palestinian villages and killed or expelled its residents before Israel's official political entities were formed) has done to the Palestinians.
- 3- It would mean degrading the status of Arab citizens of Israel for being non-Jewish.
- 4- It would mean ending the Palestinian refugees' right of return.
- 5- It may motivate the Israeli state to implement its population exchange plans and remove Arabs who do not belong to the “Jewish” class from their lands.

The first two arguments are forensic, insofar as they deal with the past and with events that took place then but whose effects extend into the present. They relate to a law that was broken, and from the viewpoint of Palestinians, a crime that was committed against them, perpetrated unarguably by the Zionist movement. Palestinians claim that if they agree to recognize Israel as a Jewish State, they would also automatically agree to switch the roles of the victim and victimizer who broke the law. For Palestinians, there is a forensic value to the Nakba of 1948, which was the demolition, displacement and forced migration caused by Israeli occupation. Palestinians would not agree to have this value changed, which would happen if they agreed to Israel's recognition as a Jewish state.

On the other hand, it could be said that arguments 3, 4 and 5 also operate at a deliberative level inasmuch as they create a scenario for the future: they outline what could happen if Israel's attempts to be recognized as a Jewish State are met with success. These arguments warn against the likelihood that Israel may further degrade the status of Arab citizens who do not fall under the “Jewish” category in the “Jewish State”. It is feared that if Arabs are not Jews in the new State of Jews, the argument assumes, it is likely that they will be deprived of the citizen's rights and be treated as a lower-class citizens. Noting that

Palestinians in Israel claim that they are already treated as sub-class citizens, which is confirmed by statistical data done by independent research centers¹⁶⁵.

Similarly, raising the issue of refugees, who were forced to leave their land and settle in a foreign, sometimes hostile, environment in what they thought would be a temporary situation is another deliberative argument. The poor conditions of Palestinian refugees, especially in neighboring Arab countries which today accommodate millions of them, is a reminder of their need to return to their homeland at some stage in the near future. This is supposed to be an essential component of any final resolution between Israel and the Palestinians. This argument warns that refugees will not be allowed to return to their homeland because if the Jewish State is established as such, as non-Jews, they will not have the right to settle in the country. It should be noted that even presently no Arab or a Palestinian who was not born in Israel may be an Israeli citizen. Palestinians argue that recognizing Israel as a Jewish State would eliminate any possible hope that Palestinian refugees or some of them may be allowed to return.

Finally, existing Arab citizens of Israel face the threat of being displaced again under the pretext of “the need for a population exchange”. Some Israeli leading figures explicitly state that “transfer” could be a solution to the “Arab threat in Israel”¹⁶⁶. This idea has been raised quite a lot in recent years as part of negotiations on illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank, concerning which some propose that Jewish settlers move into dominantly Arab areas in Israel whose Arab residents, in turn, can move to the West Bank, which means losing their citizenship and, more importantly, their lands. Perhaps the best context for the implementation of such an idea is Israel as a Jewish State, whose priority in terms of resources and land allocation would be to Jews. Therefore, a deliberation about the purposefulness of the population exchange plan is the essence of this argument. It shows that such a future scenario which is likely to take place if Israel is indeed recognized as a Jewish State, is totally opposed to the interests of Arab citizens in Israel, and for that reason it must not be accepted.

To sum up, it can be said that if *deliberative* is about utility or interest, namely, which condition or solution is better for the Arab-Palestinian community in Israel, then the above deliberative arguments

¹⁶⁵ Adalah, The Inequality Report. < http://adalah.org/upfiles/2011/Adalah_The_Inequality_Report_March_2011.pdf>. Accessed on 12.3.2013.

¹⁶⁶ Avigdor Liberman repeatedly stated that transfer is a good solution to the problem of "disloyal" Arabs. < <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/racist-attacks-against-arabs-increase-in-israel-a-903529.html>>. Accessed on 2.5.2013.

suggesting scenarios demonstrating that recognizing Israel as a Jewish State is certainly not in the interest of this community, therefore, their interest demands there to be no agreement to such recognition.

Next, I will discuss the rhetoric used by the other two political streams when addressing the same topic of a Jewish State.

4.2.2 Rhetoric of NDA - the National Democratic Assembly

The National Democratic Assembly (NDA) shares the position as the CPI in opposing recognition of Israel as a Jewish State, albeit for slightly different reasons. Knesset member Ms. Hanin Zoabi who represents the NDA in the Knesset, believes that the Israeli state, by redefining democracy and restricting it to cover only those who fall under the definition of “Jewish”, aims to restrict the Arab political nationalist movement and exclude its members from spheres of influence. Zoabi claims that Israel did not do this previously as it did not feel threatened by what Zoabi calls “the old struggle for peace and equality”, hinting at the rhetoric of the Communist Party, the NDA’s main rival, which nationalists such as Zoabi criticize as being too “integrationist”. On that basis, Zoabi claims that “Israel cannot fight those who use democratic means, and the solution is therefore to re-define “democracy” to turn means that were once considered democratic into being undemocratic or even illegal. Arab activists would then be looked at as a threat to the country and its security”¹⁶⁷.

Azmi Bishara¹⁶⁸, the renowned Palestinian intellectual who played a major role in forming the NDA in 1996, offers another perspective on such recognition that indirectly relates to the debate of who has the right to Palestinian land. He says¹⁶⁹:

Recognizing Israel as a Jewish state has another end, which is taking recognition of Israel as a fact on the ground to another stage, of recognizing Zionism. Namely, recognizing that the Zionist movement was right, and Arabs and Palestinians were wrong when they didn't accept the conflict as being a conflict between two sides who had equal rights in the same land. The “historic Jewish right” to the land is more capable of being fulfilled due to the current balance of power. Palestinians [if they agree to recognize Israel as such] will end up only recognizing a historic

¹⁶⁷ Hanin Zoubi, “Recognizing Israel as a Mechanism to Criminalize Palestinian Political Activism”. <<http://www.arabs48.com/?mod=articles&ID=763352/2>> accessed on 6.4.2013

¹⁶⁸ Currently lives in Doha after charges of money laundering and contact with foreign agents were laid against him in Israel

¹⁶⁹ Azmi Bishara, “Last but Not Least- Recognizing Israel as a Jewish State”. Published on Arabs48.net <<http://www.arabs48.com/?mod=articles&ID=757321/4>> accessed on 7.6.2013.

Jewish right over it, and an unfulfilled temporary Palestinian right, conditioned by Zionist consent.

Bishara then proposes how Arabs should respond to the Israeli request to recognize Israel as a Jewish State, saying:

The answer is not referring to the past or intimidation by the threat of expulsion of Arabs who remain in their land [what is now Israel]. Arabs were in fact already expelled before when the Jewish state declared its independence and launched attacks to occupy Palestine and displace most of its inhabitants. The response is therefore to hold on to the right of return on the one hand and rejecting Zionism and its legitimacy on the other. This is a political stance; it is a political and an educational process at the same time.

Dr. Jamal Zahalka, an NDA member of the Knesset provides examples of how recognizing Israel as a Jewish State can further add to the oppression Palestinians are suffering. Commenting on the new “citizenship” law that prevents any Israeli Arab man who is married to a Palestinian woman from the West Bank bringing his family to live in Israel, Dr. Zahalka said:

What is most important about the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision is that it approved the legality of the racist “citizenship” law based on Israel being a Jewish state. The court clearly ruled that preserving the Jewish State means depriving the Palestinian citizen of a very basic right which is forming a family. The court blatantly said, “if you want to get married, leave the country”. The court’s decision and its circumstances completely undermine the legitimacy of recognizing Israel as a Jewish state, and it affirms the reality to the countries of the world, that recognizing it as a Jewish State means automatically recognizing its racism. This is the true meaning of the Israeli court’s decision.¹⁷⁰

In summarizing the arguments the NDA uses to back its position of opposing the recognition of Israel as a Jewish State, the following arguments stand out:

- 1- It would mean recognizing the legitimacy of the ZN movement and its occupation of Palestine, displacing its people and seizing their lands.
- 2- It would also mean recognition of the alleged historic Jewish right in Palestine.

¹⁷⁰ Jamal Zahalka. The Last Illusion About Preserving Israeli’s Jewish State”. < <http://www.ahlan.co.il/article3626.html>> accessed on 8.6.2013

- 3- If Israel is recognized as a Jewish state, there will be no room for anti-Zionist political activism.
- 4- It would mean the recognition and acceptance of Israel's racism against its Arab citizens.

If we consider these arguments with the different rhetorical registers in mind, it could be said that the first two arguments are forensic, while the third and fourth are deliberative. The first two arguments relate to the past. The first one, the claim that recognizing Israel as a Jewish State would mean accepting the ZN movement, its narrative, and its justifications for the occupation of Palestine in 1948 and the surrounding circumstance: the displacement of Palestinians, massacres against them and demolition of their houses; this clearly relates to the past, although its effects are still felt to this day. Reminding the target audience about the past in the Palestinian context with its atrocities and hardships is forensic in that it is an evaluation and assessment of the past. Such an evaluation is concluded with a remark about the perpetrator who, in forensic terms, broke the law. Such a reference to the past, recalling the catastrophic events that Palestinians experienced at the hands of the ZN movement, aims to emphasize the fact that this movement which occupied Palestine and displaced its people under the pretext of fulfilling the prophecy of the Jewish "chosen people" who ought to inhabit "the land without people for the people without a land", cannot be given further acknowledgement and recognition.

The second argument against recognizing Israel is because this entails recognition of the alleged "Jewish right in Palestine" is also forensic. It is an assessment of the present in light of the past. The Zionist movement claims that the land of Israel was promised to them, and it is their destiny to come back to the land they once inhabited but were forced out of. Arab political leaders argue that if Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state, that would mean acceptance that Jews actually have the right to control the land, and their return to it in 1948 (albeit a violent return) was justified not because they have the right to live in Palestine like everyone else, but because it is *historically* their land, and therefore it is their right to do what they will in that land, including expelling its non-Jewish inhabitants, as Palestinians fear might happen if such recognition is granted. Hence, this is a forensic argument in the sense that it is an assessment of what could happen if that claim from the past is fulfilled in the present.

The third argument made by the NDA leaders is that if Israel achieves recognition as a Jewish state, there would be no room for anti-Zionist activism in the country, and the state would crack down on Arab political parties especially those with Arab-nationalist agendas, like the NDA. It is deliberative in that Ms. Zoabi discussed something that is non-existent and warns against allowing it to become a reality in the future. Deliberation of this point, considering the anticipated negative consequences and laying them

out for the reader / listener aims to secure their support in the struggle against such recognition. It is therefore deliberative in that it relates to the future in an attempt to prevent something from happening in the present.

While the first two arguments could be said to be forensic, and the third deliberative, I may suggest that the fourth argument is a value people experience in the present time, and therefore it is epideictic. Discussing the racist attitude that Arabs in Israel claim they face from the state is a discussion of values that collectively influence the (Arab) community in the present. The epideictic value of this claim is that racism is not a good thing, we must fight it and not support it or back it up by agreeing to recognize Israel as a Jewish state, which in reality is acceptance of Israel's racism towards the Arab community. It is also epideictic in that racism is an idea that is common to the politicians and to the audience, especially in the present time where news headlines are always occupied with news items about the many new and genuinely racist laws that are being discussed in the Knesset, as Mr. Zahalka of NDA, quoted above, points out.

Given the complexity of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it might not be surprising to find that the arguments used by Palestinians relate to all three appeals of rhetoric: forensic, deliberative, and epideictic. The debate has to relate to the past (what Palestinians consider an occupation of their land and the calamities that have befallen them as a result of this occupation), and also to the future (the attempts to find a viable solution that would be agreeable to both sides and safeguard the rights of Palestinians). It should also touch on the values that prevail in the present day that play a role in formulating people's attitudes and views and are therefore important for consideration. Hence, such a debate and any discussion that relates to this topic would understandably incorporate the three types of rhetoric already mentioned.

The four arguments by the NDA, discussed above all seem to be based on Aristotle's *logos* appeal of rhetoric. They all draw a line between a cause and a consequence. If recognition is granted, it would mean the recognition of the occupation's legitimacy and the alleged Jewish historic right in Palestine, it would mean compromising anti-Zionist political activism, and legitimizing Israel's racism against the Arab citizens. This cause and effect relationship is about *logos* more than anything else.

4.2.3 Rhetoric of the Islamic Movement

Chapter 2.2 dealt with the Islamic movement, the circumstances of its formation in the 1970s, and the reasons behind its division in the 1990s, primarily due to an internal difference over representation in the Knesset. However, both branches of the Islamic Movement (the, Southern, parliamentary branch and the Northern, extra-parliamentary) seem to share the same negative position on the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.

4.2.3.1 SIM - Southern (Parliamentary) branch of the Islamic Movement

The position of the Southern (parliamentary) branch of the Islamic Movement concerning recognition of Israel as a Jewish State is consistent with that of the other Arab parties. Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsour, an eloquent speaker, is the head of the movement, the head of its parliamentary bloc, and its spokesperson. He is active in the media and social media spheres, always commenting on developments and events that concern the Arab community in Israel, issuing press releases that he writes himself, on almost every occasion. In an article about the recognition of Israel as a Jewish State, Sarsour provided reasons why Arabs, and especially Muslims, should reject such recognition; these are similar to those presented by the CPI and NDA mentioned in previous pages. Yet being an Islamist, he offers an additional, completely different motivation, from a religious point of view, which the other parties disregard as they are liberal movements. In this article, Sarsour provides the reasons why such recognition should not be granted and also sets the context, explaining why he thinks the Israeli government has been placing more and more pressure on Palestinian negotiators to officially recognize it as a Jewish State.

*Netanyahu insists on this condition, concerning the Jewish identity of the state, for two reasons that make him the winner in both cases whether one or both of them are realized. The first is to disrupt the peace negotiations since he knows that the Palestinians will not agree to it, especially while illegal Israeli settlements are being expanded in the West Bank and Jerusalem; and the second is that Israel will score a number of goals should the Palestinians agree to such recognition, among them the termination of the refugees' right of return, threatening the future of the native Palestinian community and turning it into an endangered minority facing transfer and expulsion from its homeland; repudiating the Palestinian narrative and acknowledging the Zionist narrative; and legalizing racism against Palestinians in Israel...*¹⁷¹

¹⁷¹ "How to address the Jewish character of the state particularly at this stage?"
<<http://maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=329186>> Accessed on 19.6.2013.

Then Sarsour presents his core, religious motivation for rejecting such recognition, based on Quranic verses. The Quran is considered by Muslims as the most important source of Islamic teachings, followed by the Prophet Muhammad's deeds and sayings. The Quran contains numerous legal rules related to all aspects of a Muslim's life: religion, politics, economy, social life, marriage, inheritance, contracts, war, and other important matters. In fact, some researchers classify all verses of the Quran into two types: informative and juristic. Sarsour, who is also a religious scholar and a teacher of religion, makes sure he uses a religious argument that is also juristic. The following argument is based on one verse of the Quran that Sarsour presents for both types of audiences: Muslims and non-Muslims. To Muslims, he explains that this is an essential principle in the Quran, and due to its religious nature and being an order from Allah, a word of truth, it must be followed. But to non-Muslims, he also explains the juristic dimension of the Quranic verse and explains the logical explanation behind that juristic argument.

There is no scope to impose an idea or an ideology that represents one party on those who do not embrace this idea or doctrine, let alone believe in what is contrary to it, religiously, ethnically, and nationally... Allah is clear on this, in the Holy Quran: "There is no compulsion in religion. Verily, the right path has become distinct from the wrong path", and if the principle we believe in is "there is no compulsion in religion", despite the weight and importance religion has, it is obvious that there should be no compulsion in less important and less critical matters. Earlier I mentioned why we oppose recognizing Israel as a Jewish State for political reasons, but I would like to add another, more important reason, which is the religious motivation. The principle of al-Walaa' and al-Baraa' is essential in the Islamic religion.

Sarsour refers to the principle of *al-walaa'* and *al-baraa'*, which should be explained first. According to Islamic literature, Al-Walaa' – allegiance and sincere love and help for Allaah, and for His Prophets, and for the Believers and everything that pleases him whether an act, a deed, an individual, or a group; whereas al-Baraa' is dissociation from what displeases him whether an act, a deed or an individual or a group¹⁷²– in this case, the Jewish people, as Sarsour believes.

From this passage, we see Sarsour employing a religious principle to justify his opposition for recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, but more importantly, he also attempts to reinforce his opinion by attempting to undermine a strong counter-argument against his. Sarsour says: as religious Muslims, we cannot agree to

¹⁷² Interpretation of Sheikh Muhammed Saeed al-Qahtani. "Al-Walaa wal Baraa'. P.5. < <http://www.islamicemirate.com/E-Books/alWalaawalBaraaI.pdf>>. Accessed: 05.12.2013.

recognize Israel as a Jewish state, because –being citizens in it- it is like swearing allegiance to this state. Sarsour believes that this (declaring allegiance to a Jewish Israel) is problematic for Muslims since it negates an essential Islamic principle, that of “*Walaa’ and al-Baraa’*”. Recognizing Jewish Israel –in the eyes of Sarsour- is an act of allegiance to non-Muslims, which contradicts that Islamic principle of “Allegiance and Dissociation” and therefore it cannot be accepted.

Then Sarsour defends his argument against a likely counter-argument: if the Islamic Movement or Muslims cannot show loyalty to non-Muslims, how can they live and co-exist with non-Muslims, such as Jews, Christians, Druze, Bahai’ and other denominations whose followers are also citizens of Israel? Or how can they be part of a society which they do not consider as deserving of their loyalty?

Sarsour responds to this as follows. Speaking about *Walaa’ and al-Baraa’*, he says:

...but its actual practice bears the question: how then can we co-exist with non-Muslims in one society, which is not ruled by Muslims? The answer is also found in the Quran: Human beings, We created you all from a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes so that you may know one another. Verily the noblest of you in the sight of Allah is the most God-fearing of you“(13) (49:13)”. The relationship between the different nations is thus of a civic nature in essence, which allows every group to preserve its religious and cultural identity, while still converging around the same civic system that secures order in the society in a way that guarantees the necessities of “partners” and fulfils their interests. This is the model that Islam and Muslims implemented for the fifteen centuries of the Muslim State’s lifespan.

Sarsour’s argument here is clear: he says that yes, religious differences exist, and the allegiance vs. dissociation formula must be followed, but at the same time, Allah states in the Quran that all people are equal in His eyes and that they must communicate with each other, despite their differences. Sarsour therefore differentiates between the religious, and the civic: we are religiously different, but we are from one mother and one father, and can live and co-exist in one society, while preserving our cultural and religious values. Sarsour speaks about the “religious and cultural identity”, to remind us that yes, we can co-exist to fulfil our “interests”, but that does not mean we must give up our religious and cultural traditions and beliefs.

Lastly, Sarsour provides a counter-argument that he derives from a fact well-known to the public, against recognizing Israel as a Jewish state. Sarsour says:

It should be also noted that this problem [religious differences that makes recognizing Israel as a Jewish State not possible] exists even among Jews themselves. It is inexplicable that Israel is demanding the Arab, whether a Muslim or a Christian, to recognize its Jewish identity, while Jews themselves have not yet come to an agreement on the definition of “Jewish”. So ultra-orthodox Jews reject Judaism as practiced by the Israeli leftists or seculars, to the extent that the party “Yahdut Ha-Torah” rejects the title “minister” due to the religious belief that Israel is not yet a religiously legitimate establishment [they believe the Messiah should have come first before the Jewish state is established] and their participation in it is driven by interest only. Furthermore, there is an aggressive struggle among religious Jews themselves around the same issue: Orthodox, conservative, and reformist Jews each have their own view of the type of Judaism that must constitute the religion of the state, and this heated debate is well known in Israel and foreign countries. How then, can we accept Israeli attempts to force us to swear allegiance to it when we believe in something that is contradictory to it, not only for political but also for religious reasons?¹⁷³

Sarsour utilizes the internal discrepancies among the Jews of Israel over which version of Judaism (conservative, liberal, orthodox, etc.) must be adopted as the official religion of the State, as an argument against recognizing Israel as a Jewish State. He reminds us that Jews themselves are divided when it comes to the relationship between Judaism and the state, and specifically, the question of which Jewish sect must dominate. If certain Jewish sects want the Israeli state to follow their own Jewish doctrine, and will not recognize the state if it adopts the doctrine of another sect, how can other groups, like Arabs who are not even Jewish, agree to grant such recognition? Sarsour therefore uses an argument that some Jewish groups use against recognizing one form or another of the “Jewish State”, to back his position of why non-Jewish groups should not recognize Israel as a Jewish State.

The above citations show that Sarsour and his Parliamentary Islamic Movement reject recognizing Israel as a Jewish State for the same reasons the other Arab parties do, but also with a religious motivation which is, according to Sarsour, that if Israel becomes officially “Jewish”, it would be compulsory for

¹⁷³ Ibid.

Muslims to dissociate from it because it is not considered god-pleasing state, as it adopts a religion that does not acknowledge the prophethood of Muhammad, and Muslims cannot swear allegiance to such a state. The political/national reasons Sarsour provides are the same reasons I discussed earlier in my analysis of the arguments of the NDA and CPI (terminating the right of return, legalizing racism, threatening the Arab presence in Israel, and undermining the Palestinian narrative). They also fall under the same registers (forensic, epideictic, deliberative), and hence there is no need to repeat the analysis again. More focus should be directed at the singular attitude of the Islamic Movement: its religious motivation.

Whether or not such a definition of “*Wala’ and Baraa’*” (allegiance vs. dissociation) is correct and whether it is indeed applicable in this context might be a matter of debate. However, Sarsour’s argument is sufficient to see that as a religious movement, his party looks at the matter not only from a political perspective but a religious perspective too. Sarsour putting the religious element even before other reasons and calling it “the most important” is unsurprising, given that all supporters of the Islamic Movement are religiously inclined people, and his argumentation must take that into consideration. Religious people usually seek answers, solutions, and guidance from the religion they follow, and such a position by the Islamic movement must also be backed by religious literature¹⁷⁴.

Like most verses that carry a legislative value that influence the daily lives of Muslims, the principle of allegiance vs. dissociation is not merely a tool used in sermonizing, but constitutes a rule that Muslims must follow, whether or not they are ruled by a Muslim ruler. Therefore, Muslims, according to Sarsour’s interpretation, must abide by this rule and refrain from showing allegiance to Israel, by recognizing it as a Jewish State.

In the discussion of registers of rhetoric, one can safely say that this is an epideictic rhetorical argumentation. Religion is all about the values believers learn from their holy scriptures and prophetic teachings. In our case, such values are common and shared by the orator, Sarsour, and the audience, his movement’s supporters. The orator is aware of the importance of such religious values in the lives and thinking of his followers, and makes sure he addresses the issue at hand also from a religious point of view. It is important for the speaker to meet the expectations of his audience when addressing a matter of

¹⁷⁴ In fact, leaders of the parliamentary branch of the Islamic Movement used an interpretation of verses of the Quran to justify their decision to participate in the Knesset, which was necessary when the extra-parliamentary branch claimed that such participation is against Islam. This was discussed in detail in chapter 3.2

debate, and present his idea or view in a way that takes these values into consideration. If it is a religious audience, the argument must be religiously appealing enough for the audience to accept it. Sarsour's argument shows that he is aware of that, which is evident in the quotations above, taken from an article read by followers and members of his Islamic movement, who are all followers of Islam.

Argumentation based on religion or religious concepts are usually spiritual, and they are therefore pathos based, speaking to people's emotions. In some circumstances, an orator may focus on words that evoke emotions to cause the audience to overlook logos and to judge his words logically. An emotionally charged speech will overshadow logos and logical thinking, keeping the audience's minds occupied and unable to reason with the speaker's words. The stronger the emotional appeal is, the more control the speaker has over his audience. But in the case of Sarsour and the arguments he presents to back his position, pathos-based argumentation is not a strategy he uses to evade logos or to restrict the audience's thinking and keep it under control. Sarsour does not even need that because he has already made sure he has provided logical arguments even before presenting his spiritual, emotionally appealing, pathos-based ones. Sarsour first gave the factual evidence of why the recognition of Israel by the Palestinians will bring harm upon them, and then he presented his additional religious reasons that are important for a large part of his audience to whom religion – and not only Palestinian nationality- is a very important component of their identity. Therefore, we see that Sarsour took care to make his position convincing not only for his (religious) audience but also for those who are not necessarily religious, or even follow a different religion, by using logos-based arguments.

Although Sarsour's argument is based on a religious principle, it still has a logos basis too. It is based on the fact that the mostly Muslim Palestinians, as a unique group with its unique beliefs and way of life, cannot agree to swear loyalty to a non-Muslim entity. This combination of pathos and logos-based arguments is important to make one's line of argumentation persuasive enough, and the political/national arguments Sarsour presented (quoted in the first citation above) contribute to making his position more appealing.

Finally, it must be noted that providing non-religious arguments alongside the religious one is important to avoid what Powell and Neiva call "the Pharisee effect". They claim that if the orator is viewed by the audience as a politician who advocates a religious value, the support he enjoys is likely to increase. Whereas, if the politician goes too far and is overt in his religious appeal, a "boomerang effect" can occur, which means the audience will react negatively. Thus, they say "political speeches which use

religious strategies must do so without going so far that the speaker is labelled a religious fanatic”¹⁷⁵. Sarsour avoids that, and instead gives a balanced position that he justifies with both religious and non-religious arguments, to make his message appeal to a broader audience, not just Muslims or practicing Muslims.

4.2.3.2 NIM - Northern (Extra-parliamentary) branch of the Islamic Movement

In section 3.1, I showed how, and for which reasons the extra-parliamentary branch of the Islamic Movement abstains from participating in the Knesset elections. I showed that for the leaders of this branch, the legitimacy of the Israeli state itself is in question, and so one of the reasons why it boycotts parliament is that running for its elections grants it legitimacy and acknowledgement.

Discussion on whether Arab Palestinians in Israel should or should not agree to recognize Israel as a Jewish state involves the same argument on legitimacy. If this Movement does not recognize Israel itself as a legitimate political establishment in the first place, the question of recognizing it as a Jewish State is irrelevant, and that’s exactly what one learns from this Movement’s reaction –or more precisely, the lack of it- to this issue.

Despite the growing tension around this issue over the past few years, there has not been a single press release by the Northern Islamic Movement on Israel’s demand to be officially recognized as a Jewish State. The Movement monitors the debates, the Israeli political sphere and activity within the legislative system, and comments on almost every matter that is of interest to the Arab community, but it seems to avoid addressing the idea of a Jewish State and dismisses it entirely. I found very few references to this issue by leaders of the Northern Movement that present its stance. One item is a statement by Sheikh Ra’ed Salah, the head of the Movement and a prominent figure in the Arab and Islamic world, quoted in a news report. In a Friday sermon, Sheikh Salah stated:

The occupation authorities’ attempt to force Palestinians to recognize a Jewish State through pressure and houses demolitions will not succeed. I say to the Israeli establishment, you have

¹⁷⁵ Larry Powell and Eduardo Neiva, The Pharisee Effect: When Religious Appeals in Politics Go Too Far, *Journal of Communication and Religion*, 2006, Religious Speech Communication Association, pp. 70-102.

been trying to impose such recognition through legal claims, but we are clear: we will not recognize the state as a Jewish State.

*Do whatever you want, and destroy what you want; we will not compromise our Arab and Muslim cultural identity.*¹⁷⁶

Sheikh Salah does not provide arguments or try to justify his position. For him and his movement, the question of recognizing Israel's Jewish status is irrelevant because the status of the state itself is in question. That is why, in this statement and in fact in all public statements by Salah, he never mentions the "Israeli State" or "country"; he always uses a periphrastic term, "The Israeli establishment" (*al-mo'assasa al-isra'iliya* المؤسسة الإسرائيلية) to refer to the Israeli government and its parliament. The periphrase is a coded term: it allows the subject to be mentioned without being named. It appears in written publications or articles and demonstrates a clear refusal to recognize Israel as a state. This was discussed in detail in section 3.1. However, what is of importance here is the rhetorical construction used by Sheikh Ra'ed Salah and his movement: the lack of an argument seems to be an argument in itself, and the lack of rhetoric is itself rhetoric. We consider Sheikh Salah's approach of refraining from commenting on the topic of recognizing Israel as a Jewish State is as discussing Israel's identity conveys implicit recognition of it as a state, which the Northern Movement seems to oppose. Sheikh Salah dismisses the topic altogether and does not give much attention to the question of whether or not the Israeli state has the right to exist as a Jewish State, because for him and his movement, the question is rather whether or not the Israeli state itself -Jewish or not- has the right to exist.

Another area where this rhetorical maneuver can be witnessed is Sheikh Salah's use of the term "The Israeli injustice" when referring to the Israeli government and legal system, particularly in his talks about the court cases brought against him for his alleged "role in inciting violence in the Al-Aqsa mosque". In an interview with Al-Mayadeen TV channel, Salah says: "The Israeli injustice that's persecuting me and my people is under my feet, whether it was political, social, or legal persecution"¹⁷⁷. In such a wording, Salah not avoided mentioning or recognizing Israel as a state, but also used "injustice" instead of "state" to reaffirm his beliefs that the whole Israeli system was built on injustice and aggression towards Palestinians.

¹⁷⁶ In Masress news website < <http://www.masress.com/alshaab/18158>> accessed on 26.6.2013

¹⁷⁷ In Al-Mayadeen TV channel's website < <https://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/1379414>>. Accessed 10.2.2013.

In another article by Sheikh Ra'ed Salah, entitled “The Jewish State and Us¹⁷⁸”, Sheikh Salah speaks about everything except his Movement’s position on it. He resorts to a specific argumentative strategy: putting arguments in the mouth of his enemy, using their logos for his own purposes. He states facts and quotes Israeli researchers who claim that Israel is collapsing from within, and that many of its Jewish citizens are leaving the country and moving to live in the west. He also cites Israeli academics like Professor Shlomo Sand of Tel Aviv University, who according to Salah, does not even recognize such a thing as a “Jewish nation” and states that “The Jewish nation is an imaginative concept and a myth that was invented to create the State of Israel¹⁷⁹”. Salah concludes¹⁸⁰ that article by stating that:

- 1- The concept of a Jewish State is an act of colonization.
- 2- It targets us, Palestinians, and threatens to displace us from our land.
- 3- There are many indications that this project will fail sooner or later.

Sheikh Salah only says why he thinks the “project” of a Jewish State will fail, primarily because Israel is on the brink of collapse, as he claims, quoting scholars who mention reverse migration from Israel, corruption among politicians, and the lack of security. But again, he never provides any substantial argument as to why this “project” must be rejected. This reaffirms my suggestion that the Northern Movement considers this question irrelevant when the state itself is in question, which is confirmed by our analysis in the section about the Islamic movement in previous discussion on representation in the Knesset.

Another reason why we believe the Islamic Movement tends to ignore discussion of the topic of recognizing Israel as a Jewish State is to avoid the “Pharisee Effect”, addressed in the previous section. Powell and Neiva state that if the orator goes too far in using religion in politics, the “Pharisee effect” will occur, where the effect would be unexpectedly negative on the targeted audience. Explaining this requires us to first remember that recognizing Israel does not go hand in hand with believing in the idea of the Islamic State. Like all Islamic Movements in the Arab world, the Northern, extra-parliamentary Movement believes that Islamic rule in the form of an Islamic Caliphate will return to dominate the whole region, including the Palestine. This obviously means no Israeli State will exist in that area, because a Jewish State cannot exist inside the Islamic Caliphate. In order for the Islamic Caliphate to

¹⁷⁸ The Palestinian Interior and the Concept of Jewish State, *Tenth Intellectual Conference*, Centre for Contemporary Studies, 2010, p.7.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 8.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid , p. 13.

exist, Israel must first cease to exist, and some believe that due to Israel's colonial imposition as an occupation force, this may only be achieved through violent conflict. Belief in the Islamic State means the de-legitimization of Israel, or simply not recognizing it as an independent state.

This idea that Islamic movements around the world believe in has been a reason to attack these movements, including the Islamic Movement in Israel. This predictable conflict, the clash between Muslims and Arabs on the one side and the Israeli State on the other, is too radical to be addressed publicly by an Israeli citizen like Sheikh Ra'ed Salah and his Movement's members. Not only the Israeli State, but many Arab citizens of Israel who are not affiliated with Salah's movement might see this talk about conflict leading to the return of the Caliphate as radical. For this reason, Sheikh Salah as a public figure, seems to avoid discussing this topic to evade the risk of sounding like a "religious fanatic" which Powell and Neiva (quoted in section 3.2.2) believe is the result of going too far into religion in political discourse.

To summarize, perhaps one reason why the Islamic Movement may avoid talking about recognizing Israel as a Jewish State is that doing so signifies implicit recognition of Israel itself, which the Movement avoids and for that reason uses the term "Israeli Establishment" rather than "state". Additionally, talking about the Caliphate entails talking about Israel's [possibly violent] departure, which might be viewed as radical by some, and lead to labelling the Islamic Movement and its members as "religious fanatics". In other words, discussing recognition of Israel as a Jewish state means implicit acceptance of Israel as a state. Accepting Israel's statehood contradicts the belief in the return of the Caliphate. The Caliphate's return would only be possible in an Israel-free region. Therefore, discussing the Caliphate would unavoidably involve discussing Israel's disappearance, most probably after a violent conflict, which makes it a sensitive and radical discussion that may lead to the labelling of those who take part in it as "religious fanatics". This is why the Islamic Movement often avoids talking about recognizing Israel as a Jewish state and does not relate to it, since it can cause the "Pharisee effect" and damage its reputation.

Yet if we want to go a bit deeper, we would be able to find out the undeclared position of the extra-parliamentary Northern Islamic Movement regarding recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.

Mr. Abdulhakim Mofid, who is not one of the main leaders of the Islamic Movement, but a member of the political bureau of the Islamic Movement (the highest political entity), addressed the topic in a conference that was held at the University of London. He claimed that the idea of a "Jewish State" is not new, but it is being intensely discussed by Israeli leaders these days within the framework of a new

political context that they aspire to create. Mofid believes that this topic is receiving more and more focus in light of [Israel's] denial of its Palestinian citizens, as a group that has its own identity and uniqueness which cannot go hand in hand with the concepts of "Jewish" or "Israeli", as well as contradicting them in many ways.

Mofid added:

Agreeing to recognize Israel as a Jewish State means the disintegration of Palestinians in Israel as a group that has its own culture, identity, and heritage; Israel, by demanding its recognition as a Jewish State in reality also demands them to abandon their identity when they are requested to embrace values the state has failed to impose on Jews themselves, like the flag, the national anthem, civil and military service.

Through this plan of a Jewish State, the Israeli government demands Israelis, namely Jews, to act like Jews, due to the failure to formulate a distinct Israeli identity. At the same time, it demands Arabs act like Israelis, by embracing these Israeli national values and practicing them.¹⁸¹

Mofid also discussed the foreseeable risks of recognizing Israel as a Jewish State by Palestinian officials and Arab leaders. He believes that such recognition would entail the cancellation of the right of return, since Israel has stressed through its officials that this recognition is recognition of Israel as a country for Jews and Jews alone. Mofid draws attention to a statement by Tzipi Livni the former foreign minister and leader of Kadima Party, who, according to Mofid, stated that "recognizing Israel as a Jewish State means that Israel is a state for Jews and Palestine is a country for Palestinians", which Mofid interprets as a reference to the idea of the transfer of Arab citizens in Israel to territories controlled by the Palestinian Authority¹⁸², an idea that is apparently still on the agenda of some Israeli leaders.

Earlier in this section I suggested that the Northern Islamic Movement seems to ignore this issue (recognizing Israel as a Jewish State) altogether, due to its belief that recognition of Israel itself is a matter of debate, let alone recognition of its identity. That is why leaders of the movement show no interest in the topic and rarely, if ever, address it, and that is why the Northern Movement boycotts Parliamentary elections, partly because participating implies recognizing the state and its right to exist. Therefore, as a journalist, Mofid addresses the topic as a researcher, and not as a leader of the Northern Islamic Movement. It cannot be said that his involvement in a discussion about it contradicts the position

¹⁸¹ Interview with Andulhakim Mufid <<http://www.pls48.net/default.asp?id=59558>>.

¹⁸² Ibid.

of the Northern Movement that I proposed earlier. However, his comments on it are useful in stating his and his movement's denial of recognizing Israel as a Jewish State, although the movement's leaders do not address it.

4.2.4 Conclusions

To conclude this section about the position of Arab parties in Israel on recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, it is possible to state that Arab parties entirely reject and under no circumstances agree to official recognition of Israel as a Jewish State. This argument seems to be driven by motivations that can be classified in three groups: pragmatic (epideictic), ideological or moral (forensic), and theoretical (deliberative).

Among the pragmatic or practical reasons for this rejection are the claims that such recognition would genuinely contradict the concept of “democracy” which Israel prides itself on being: “the only democracy in the Middle East”. Jewish people would be favored in budgets, resources, welfare and public services, land allocation, development, and employment. It would threaten the status of Arabs as citizens and, since they are not Jewish, make them even lower than second-class citizens. Racism and inequality against them will intensify, and discrimination will reach even higher levels. Democracy, justice, equality, racism, discrimination, citizenship are all values, hence the category of *epideictic* rhetoric applies to this set of arguments against recognizing Israel as a Jewish state.

Secondly, there are ideological or moral motivations that stem from the historical context in which the Israeli state was established, that resulted in the displacement of Palestinians and the destruction of their villages, properties, culture, and their collective identity as a Palestinian people. Agreeing to recognize Israel as a Jewish State means undermining the Palestinian narrative and adopting the Zionist narrative, that there was no “people” in Palestine, and that Arabs are the ones who started the violence, and that they willingly left their lands because they did not want to live with Jews (and not as a result of massacres committed against them, as Arab politicians suggest). Admitting the suffering and the horrendous events Palestinians had to undergo following the Zionist occupation is considered by Arabs to be a moral obligation. Denying that it happened means denial of the whole Palestinian narrative of the struggle and the occupation of their land.

This judicial or forensic register of arguments, namely accusing one party and defending the other, and stressing moral obligations or violations, is therefore used to back the stance of Arab political parties in disapproving such recognition of Israel as a Jewish State.

Lastly, deliberative arguments are used as well by Arab parties and politicians to outline the future and theorize what could happen if such recognition is granted. Deliberative rhetoric is about persuading the audience to take or to not take some action. In this case, these parties are encouraging the audience, the public, and officials, to agree not to recognize Israel as a Jewish State by advising them about “things to come” as Aristotle states. Should Israel be recognized as a Jewish State, it would mean the cancellation of the Palestinian refugees’ right of return to their homeland in the future; the future degradation of Arab citizenship and consequently depriving them of their rights; curbing Arab political activism; and the threat of forced displacement of Arab citizens in Israel (transfer) under the slogan of “population exchange”.

All these likely scenarios are theories that Arabs fear may become a reality in the future if Israel wins the recognition it demands as a Jewish State, and they use them as arguments against such recognition.

4.3 Rhetoric Against The Integration of Arabs into the National Service

The topic of National Service has been widely discussed in Israel in the past decade. In particular, the political atmosphere among the Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel has been occupied with discussions on this topic and how to fight the imposition of the National Service on the Arab citizens of Israel.

Originally, the National Service was created to allow religious Jewish citizens, especially women who did not want to join the Israeli army for religious reasons, to serve their country by doing voluntary work in one of several fields including the education system, medical centers, police system, and so forth. In the past decade, however, the Israeli authorities have been trying to impose the National Service on the Arab citizens. Their argument is that Arabs receive equal rights like Jewish citizens, and therefore they must offer duties like them; and since they do not serve in the army, they must at least perform the National Service to be eligible for equal rights. Arabs oppose the idea of being required to do the National Service for different reasons that will be dealt with in the following pages. But unlike the two issues we discussed in chapters 3.1 and 3.2, there seems to be a consensus among the Arab movements in Israel on the need to resist the attempts to make National Service obligatory for Arabs. The next chapter will cover the position of each of the major parties in this regard and survey their arguments against it and the rhetoric used to support these arguments.

4.3.1 What is National Service

The National Service (*Sherut Leumi* in Hebrew) is an alternative voluntary service for those who are exempt from military service in the Israeli forces and who still wish to serve the community¹⁸³. The majority of those who receive exemption from the obligatory military service are religious Jewish men and women who abstain from entering the army due to their inability to fulfil their religious commandments there, such as the dress code in the case of women and studying Torah in the case of men. According to the Volunteer Association, the body recognized by the Israeli authorities to recruit volunteers and enroll them in voluntary projects within the frame of National Service, the service is

¹⁸³ Website of the official National Service association: Volunteer Association. < <http://www.sherut-leumi.co.il/about.aspx>> Accessed on: 15.11.2013.

suitable for "People who have *ptur* (exemption) from the army, irrespective of the reason for exemption".¹⁸⁴

In the very beginning, the obligatory National Service law was promulgated in 1953 to solve the issue of Jewish women refusing to join the army. Then the law stated that such women can do a National Service of twenty-four months instead. However, Jewish spiritual leaders mobilized against making the service compulsory, and as a result the bill was revised and the service was made optional in 1979, and what remained was a decision by the government to start the endorsement of the law, which never actually happened until now. In the same period, the national insurance law was revised to grant women who complete National Service the same privileges given to female soldiers in the army¹⁸⁵.

As for Arab citizens, in July 1954 the Israeli Defense Minister declared that Arab men are obliged to serve in the Israeli military. However, the law was later revised to include only Druze Arabs due to doubts about Arabs' loyalty to the Israeli state. The Arab community was then considered a security risk and a hostile element in the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict; and hence the idea of the Arabs' service in the Israeli defense forces was not present in the political debate in Israel, primarily due to security considerations.¹⁸⁶

When the right-wing Zionist current first rose to power in 1977, National Service began to be discussed as an alternative for military service for Arabs, albeit without being compulsory. Moshe Sharon, then the prime minister's advisor on Arab affairs, demanded that Arabs between 18-35 years old serve in the National Service as a condition for being accepted into higher education institutes and governmental jobs.

After Sharon came Binyamin Gur-Aryeh who occupied the same position as an advisor on Arab affairs. He revived the debate and called for exempting the Arabs from obligatory military service and rather allowing them to voluntarily serve in the army if they wish and creating a framework for their National Service.¹⁸⁷ Aryeh summarized the arguments of both camps, those for and against making the National Service compulsory for Arabs. According to Aryeh, the basis for the arguments against it are: Arabs'

¹⁸⁴ What is Sherut Leumi. The Volunteer Association official website. < <http://www.sherut-leumi.co.il/article.aspx?id=61>>. Accessed on 12.11.2013

¹⁸⁵ Muhannad Mustafa. National Service and Palestinians in Israel. Um al-Fahim. Center for Contemporary Studies. 2006. P. 11.

¹⁸⁶ Kimmerling, B. & Migdal, J. Palestinians: The Making of a People. New York, The Free Press. 1993.

¹⁸⁷ Atallah Mansour and Uzi Benziman. Dayareh Mishneh [Sub-Tenants]: Israeli Arabs and the Israeli Policy Towards Them. Jerusalem. Keter Publishing House, 1992. Pp. 115-125.

opposition to the plan; financing issues; enacting a law for Arabs only is discriminatory against Arabs; allowing Arabs to serve would make them equal to the Druze in terms of rights, despite being unequal in terms of duties; and creating high expectations among Arabs that the state won't be able to fulfil. Aryeh summarized the arguments of those who support the plan as: decreasing the Arabs' feeling of alienation in the Israeli primarily Jewish society and enabling the Arabs to show their loyalty to the Israeli state.¹⁸⁸

However, no serious attempts were made to integrate the Arab youth into the National Service until Ariel Sharon came to power in 2001, when he formed a special committee composed of national security specialists whose task was to set a practical plan for including the Palestinians in Israel into the National Service. In one of his key speeches that he gave at the Hertzelia Conference of 2003, Sharon said: "it is the duty of us all to design the Jewish and democratic state of Israel; a state where burden and rights are shared by means of performing the National Service". In December of the same year, Sharon met with the chairmen of the Arab local municipalities and stressed the need for Arabs to be part of the National Service.¹⁸⁹ One of the major reasons why Sharon considered it very important to integrate Arabs in the National Service has to do with the events of 2001 that followed Sharon's unorthodox entry into the al-Aqsa mosque accompanied by hundreds of security members, which Arabs considered a desecratory act of provocation, and led to the emergence of the 2nd Intifada. Afterwards Palestinians in Israel joined the protests, and like their brethren in the West Bank and Gaza, their protests were also violently broken up and a number of Palestinian Israeli citizens were killed by the Israeli police forces. As a result, the Or committee was formed, which aimed at investigating the reasons why Palestinian citizens of Israel revolted. Another committee, called the Lapid committee was tasked with researching the Or committee's reports and releasing its recommendations based on these reports. One of the recommendations by this committee was to integrate Arabs into the National Service to strengthen their relation with and guarantee their loyalty to the Israeli state and its symbols.¹⁹⁰

The last in the series of special committees whose objective was to integrate Arabs into the National Service is called the Ivri committee, which was appointed by then Minister of Public Security Shaul Mofaz. In February 2005, the Ivri committee (officially called "The Committee for the Creation of National-Civil Service"), released its recommendations to MP Ariel Sharon, which included:

- 1- Making National Service mandatory for Arabs, not voluntary.

¹⁸⁸ Mansour and Binziman. Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Muhannad Mustafa. National Service and Palestinians in Israel. Ibid. P. 24.

¹⁹⁰ Mustafa, Ibid. P. 26.

2- Linking it to rights, meaning that whoever doesn't serve will have no rights at all.¹⁹¹

These recommendations were submitted to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Welfare, and the Minister of Defense. Leaders and intellectuals of the Arab public in Israel harshly criticized the report and the recommendations, and some said that "it is a military report written by military personnel, and despite its use of civil terms, it deals with the topic purely from a military point of view".¹⁹²

In August 2007, the Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu declared that it had adopted the report by the Ivri Committee and approved the establishment of a National Service administration to recruit youths who are exempt from the military service. It did not, however, declare that the service would be mandatory. It was also announced that the administration of the service, which had been carried out by the National Security Council in the past, would be carried out by the Prime Minister's Office in order to dispel fears among the Arab public that it would be run by the Israeli army or the Ministry of Defense.¹⁹³

Yet thanks to the strong and continued campaigns against the National Service by the Arab activists, parties, and NGO's inside Israel, the number of Arabs serving in the National Service remained very low. According to the National Service Administration, by October 10, 2010, only 1300 Arab citizens had performed a National Service,¹⁹⁴ which is even challenged by prominent campaigners against the National Service like Baladna Youth organization, which stated that the numbers published by the Administration are inflated, and the actual percentage of Arabs serving in the National Service does not exceed 1% of the total Arab population.¹⁹⁵

The latest development concerning the National Service took place in July 2013, when a new ministerial committee was appointed by the Israeli government called the "Ministerial Committee for the Matter of Equal Burden of Military and Civilian National Service", or as it is called "The Perry Committee" since it's lead by the Minister of Science and Technology, Yaakov Perry (also formerly the chairmen of the

¹⁹¹ Mustafa, Ibid. P. 26.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Gov't approves establishment of National Service administration. Aug 19, 2007. Haaretz. <<http://www.haaretz.com/news/gov-t-approves-establishment-of-national-service-administration-1.227739>>. Accessed on 24.11.2013.

¹⁹⁴ Jerusalem Post. 10/10/2010. <<http://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Number-of-Arab-sector-national-service-volunteers-grows>>. Accessed on 23.11.2013.

¹⁹⁵ Baldana: "only 1% percent of Arabs do National Service". 19/10/2010. Al-Shams news website. <<http://www.ashams.com/art/15563/%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%A7:%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9>>. Accessed on 22/11/2013.

Israeli General Security Service (Shabak), which strengthens the Arab opposition to the National Service). This committee's task was not planning or theorizing, as was the case with the previous committees related to the National Service, but rather more of an executive task. Perry declared that the committee would work "to create real equality in 'carrying the burden'".¹⁹⁶ Primarily, the committee was formed to draft legislation that would increase Jewish ultra-orthodox (Hareidi) participation in the National Service since many of them received exemption from military service in order to study at the *Yeshivas* (religious Torah circles).¹⁹⁷ But many Israeli officials said that the legislation would also aim to include Arab citizens in the would-be mandatory service. Danny Danon, a member of the Knesset and who currently serves as Deputy Minister of Defense in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, stated that: "The issue is not only Hareidi IDF service. The Committee should also recommend requiring Israeli Arabs to spend some years of National Service in hospitals, schools, or the fire department and encourage their loyalty to the State before academic studies".¹⁹⁸

The formation of this committee and its declared objective of legislating the National Service as the first step towards enforcing it as a mandatory alternative for those exempt from the army service, was strongly condemned by Arab leaders and unions, including the National Union for Arab Pupils' Parents, which released a statement calling for the refusal of this committee and its decisions, and the mobilization against it and its activities that "aim at taming the Arab pupils and distorting their Arab and Palestinian identities".¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁶ Arutz Sheva news website. "C'tee for Bringing Hareidi, Arab Men to 'Share Burden'". 4/7/2013. < <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/166840#.Uqp29PQW2So>>. Accessed: 24.11.2013.

¹⁹⁷ Haaretz. "Israel's new IDF draft law: Fewer ultra-Orthodox conscripts, longer service for women". 23/6/2013. < <http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/1.525650#.UqqAV9ncr9Y>>. Accessed: 24.11.2013.

¹⁹⁸ Arutz Sheva news website. "Danon: Perry Committee should Focus on Israeli Arabs". < <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/Flash.aspx/267756>>. Accessed: 24.11.2013.

¹⁹⁹ Arabs48 news website. "The National Union: We will not allow imposing the National Service on our children". 25/6/2013. < <http://www.arabs48.com/?mod=articles&ID=100622>>. Accessed: 24.11.2013.

4.3.2 The Arab parties' Position and Rhetoric on National Service for Arabs

In the previous chapters, we discussed the Arab parties in Israel and the division among them concerning the topics of Israel's Jewish character and Arab representation in the Knesset. However, when it comes to Arab participation in National Service, there appears to be a consensus against it and a warning to Arab youth against joining the army. Many Arabs see National Service as a lighter version of service in the Israeli Army, which they reject outright. Arabs claim that the Israeli Defense Forces are the same forces that occupy the lands of their compatriots in the 1967 Palestinian lands, and the same forces that commit massacres and wars against them. For this reason and others, Arabs in Israel find it difficult to integrate into the Israeli army. When it comes to National Service, Arab Palestinians believe that National Service is just the first step towards military service, and that the government aims to "tame" Arabs and "Judaize" them and their identity to psychologically prepare them to join the military service.

The motivations for rejecting the National Service by the Arab public and its political parties are the topic of the following pages. The analysis will follow the same pattern we used in the previous chapters. The arguments of each party against the National Service will be presented, which will be followed by an analysis of these arguments in light of the party's ideological background and Aristotle's classifications of rhetorical devices and rhetorical appeals. Since the arguments of all four major Arab parties in Israel against the National Service are similar, their discussion in light of Aristotle's rhetorical elements will be discussed as one unit rather than separately as in the previous chapters.

4.3.2.1 The position of the Northern Islamic Movement

Sheikh Ra'ed Salah, chairman of the Northern Islamic Movement stated, in an article he published about National Service:

What matters to the Israeli establishment²⁰⁰ is that National Service starts in the Arab sector. It does not matter what name it calls itself or to which department it belongs: it can belong to the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, or the Ministry of Culture and Sports. National service might first belong to the Ministry of Health, and later may be affiliated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then the

²⁰⁰ Sheikh Salah uses the term "Israeli establishment" to refer to the Israeli state to avoid giving it recognition. More on this in chapter 3.1

Ministry of Public Security, and then the Ministry of Defense, the Israeli army, and the military service.²⁰¹

Sheikh Salah was hinting at the fact that National Service started under the Ministry of Defense (as explained in chapter 3.4.1), and when the people in its administration realized that this would deter Arabs from joining, they transferred it for it to be run by the Prime Minister's office.

In an article about National Service published by the Islamic Movement's research center in Um Al-Fahim, the writers summarized the Islamic Movement's reasons for opposing National Service. These are:

- 1- **It is the first step towards Arabs serving in the Israeli army.** The Islamic Movement argues that those who complete National Service are treated like those who complete military service in terms of age, incentives and privileges, recognition and certification. In the Movement's view, this confirms that the Israeli authorities, through National Service, seek to infiltrate the Arab community and influence it from within²⁰².
- 2- **An attempt to Israelize Arab youth.** The Islamic Movement holds that an Arab who serves in the state's offices will grow more attached to the state and to symbols of the state. This, according to the Movement, will gradually replace Palestinian elements of identity and make volunteers more Israeli than Palestinian, which is a major threat to the Palestinian collective identity and presence, in that such people would stop sympathizing with other Palestinians (just as Arabs who serve in the Israeli army do), and will not take part in the struggle for rights and social justice against the state²⁰³.
- 3- **A gate to moral corruption.** The Islamic Movement believes the integration of Arab youth into Israeli society will expose them to new values and principles, many of which contradict the Arab and Islamic moral and cultural values of the Palestinian people, and absorb them into the idea of coexistence and integration with the other, without ensuring equality with this other. The Islamic Movement fears that Arab youths who serve are vulnerable to being brainwashed and their religious morals, and national values corrupted; they may even be recruited by the security agencies as collaborators in the Arab sector.²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ Ra'ed Salah. The Mistake of the Smart – National Service for Arabs. 16.3.2012
<<http://www.rozana.co.il/wiki/article.asp?article=34403>>. Accessed on 25.11.2013

²⁰² Abu Jabir, Ibid. 40.

²⁰³ Abu Jabir, Ibid. 42.

²⁰⁴ Ibid, p. 43.

- 4- **Arabs to do not feel a sense of belonging to the Israeli state.** The Islamic Movement stresses that Arab Palestinians in Israel do not feel that the state, its symbols and the principles of its leaders represent them, and in fact contradict what they believe. For example, the national anthem, Hatikva, calls on Jews to return to the land of Zion, a return that took shape in the 1948 Nakba that resulted in the killing of thousands of Palestinians and the displacement of hundreds of thousands. Furthermore, the Movement argue that the symbols used in official emblems everywhere do not relate to their national, cultural or religious identities, like the Star of David, the *menorah* (seven-branched candelabra), as well as the flag, and public holidays, which makes Arabs feel even more alienated in this country which they are required to serve²⁰⁵.
- 5- **Arabs will not receive their rights even if they serve.** The Islamic Movement argues that in modern democratic states, rights are not conditional upon fulfilling duties, and Arabs must not be required to perform National Service to receive their basic rights. Additionally, the Movement holds that even if Arab Palestinians agreed to perform National Service, this will never improve their conditions, as even Druze citizens who serve in the Israeli army and appear to be fully integrated in the state's security and police systems, suffer discrimination and inequality. Lastly, the Islamic Movement emphasizes that Palestinians in Israel do not only demand ordinary citizenship rights but rights that relate to them being a minority in an occupied land, such as the right of return. Thus, the Movement rejects the idea of duties for rights altogether²⁰⁶.
- 6- **Performing National Service is recognition of a state that is still oppressing Palestinians.** The Islamic Movement argues that serving in governmental and state institutions is recognition of this state and its authority. The Movement claims that Israel does not deserve such recognition because it is still subjecting Arab Palestinians to oppression, treating them in a cruel and unfair manner and depriving them of freedoms and rights: demolishing their homes and annexing their lands, not recognizing many Arab villages that existed long before the establishment of the state, discrimination in budgets allocated to Arab villages and towns, as well as in employment, services, and humiliating treatment of Arabs in ports, airports, markets, and checkpoints²⁰⁷.

The Islamic Movement stresses that a very clear indicator that National Service is just one step away from recruiting Arabs into the Israeli military, is the fact that throughout their development, the activities of the different committees that have dealt with enlisting Arabs into National Service, have always been

²⁰⁵ Ibid, p. 44.

²⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 45.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

supervised and coordinated by non-civil institutes, chief among them being the Israeli National Security Council (NSC). Indeed, on the website of the NCS, under the subtitle of "National Service Ivri Committee", it is stated that:

The Ivri Committee consolidated recommendations for the enlistment of youths that are not recruited into the IDF and / or National Service. The interim recommendations of the Committee were presented to the Prime Minister. The NSC is a permanent member of the Committee and coordinated its operations.²⁰⁸

The NSC is a major security institution that is defined as "the Prime Minister and the Government's staff forum advising on national security issues".²⁰⁹ This probably explains the concerns of the Islamic Movement and other Arab parties in Israel relating to the acceptance of a service that is labelled "civil" but is coordinated and managed by staff from the defense and security fields.

It is clear that the Islamic Movement strongly opposes the integration of Arabs in National Service, and it does not do so without offering an alternative. The Movement is known for its "self-reliant project" (*Mashro'a al-mojtama' al-'islami*) in which the Movement promotes a solution for many of the problems the Arab minority in Israel faces due to what the Movement considers discriminatory and unfair treatment by the Israeli state. The idea is that Arabs in Israel build their own institutional infrastructure, whenever that is possible, instead of waiting for the government to fulfil its responsibilities towards them. This project has translated into private schools and colleges, medical centers, economic development and consultation, and other facilities that the Movement has actually created to fill the gap created by the government's failure to provide Arabs with necessary services. The Islamic Movement sees that a self-reliant society is also the answer to the issue of National Service. While the Movement opposes integration into the Jewish state's system, it encourages the youth to do voluntary work within the framework of a non-governmental body that is created and run solely by Arabs. On this point, advocate Zahi Nujaidat, spokesperson of the Movement stated at an anti-National Service conference:

The Islamic Movement runs many voluntary projects throughout the year such as the Negev Aid Project where we carry out many voluntary construction and renovation projects of schools, houses, mosques, roads and kindergartens. This is part of the Islamic Movement's project for a

²⁰⁸ Israeli National Security Council's website. < <http://www.nsc.gov.il/NSCWeb/TemplatesEnglish/ActivitiesEN.aspx>>. Accessed on 22.11.2013.

²⁰⁹ NSC's official website. < <http://www.nsc.gov.il/NSCWeb/TemplatesEnglish/AboutEN.aspx?firstLevel=true>>. Accessed on 04.12.2013

Self-Reliant Society which we hope to be able to complete in order to fulfil our aspiration and build one united and strong society.²¹⁰

4.3.2.2 The position of the Southern Islamic Movement

The position of the Southern branch of the Islamic Movement is identical to that of the Northern branch. In a lecture that was given as part of an anti-National Service campaign by the Southern Movement, Knesset member Masoud Ghanayim said:

Our opposition to Arab integration into National Service stems from the doubts we have about its objectives, especially as the Ministry of Defense is its incubator, as well as the principles upon which it is founded, particularly "sharing the burden", and "rights for duties". We are a national minority that has suffered and is still suffering injustice and discrimination; we had been deprived of the resource of our lands which have been seized from us, so what burden do we need to carry? Rights should be given with no regard to responsibilities, and we pay all the taxes we are required to pay anyway. As for service in the army, we are not the only ones who reject forcing us to join the army; the state itself does not want us there, and they know why"²¹¹

Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsour, a Knesset member representing the Southern Islamic Movement and the former chairman of its parliamentary party released a statement that indicates a position similar to that of his colleague Ghanayim, and that of the Northern Movement. The following excerpts taken from the statement²¹² reveal his views on the matter.

- 1- Volunteering without doubt has great value in our Arab and Muslim culture, and this can be the basis for forming a framework to fulfil this value, but without linking it to the government's framework which we utterly reject, whether National Service is voluntary, or mandatory as the Minister of Defense wants.
- 2- It is clear that this law, in addition to the threat that it poses to the Arab and Islamic identity of our youth and the clear plan to tame them, will not contribute to any tangible improvement in the quality of life of Arabs or the equality that we have been demanding since the establishment of the state.

²¹⁰ Zahi Nujaidat in a conference in the town of Kofor Kanna. Alarab news website. June 8, 2013.

<<http://www.alarab.net/Article/540600>>. Accessed on 02.12.2013.

²¹¹ Masoud Ghanayim. Al-Arab news website. < <http://www.alarab.net/Article/470107>>. June 8, 2013.

²¹² Ibrahim Sarsour. The National Service law is a blatant attempt at challenging our Arab principles. March 20, 2012 <<http://www.alarab.net/Article/443914>>. Accessed on 02.12.2013.

- 3- We cannot accept this law [the proposed National Service law] since it will mean that basic individual and collective rights will become conditional on this law, which contradicts international conventions and logical thought.
- 4- We see a great example in the Arab Druze citizens who do not do National Service but rather military service, sacrificing their blood and souls for the sake of the state of Israel, and yet these sacrifices are completely ignored by consecutive governments, and the Druze are still suffering the discrimination and inequality we suffer from.

These views are the exact same views expressed by the Northern Islamic Movement, as was shown earlier in this chapter. This is expected, given that both parties share the same ideological background. But what might be unexpected is that the other parties, the Communist Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, and the nationalist National Democratic Assembly, hold the same views, with slight differences in their reasoning, as we shall see in the following pages.

4.3.2.3 The position of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality

The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE), the political party under which the Communist Party operates, has been active against National Service for Arabs since it was proposed for the first time. Ayman Odeh, the secretary of DFPE and the chairman of the Committee Against National Service, which is a sub-committee under the High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens in Israel, wrote many publications and participated in numerous campaigns and conferences against National Service. The following are extracts from articles he has written and had published online by major Arabic news outlets in Israel.

- 1- National service for Arabs aims to deprive Arabs of their national rights as the inhabitants of this land long before the Israeli state was established.
- 2- It also aims to strip the Arab youth of their culture, language, and to undermine their sense of belonging to the Palestinian land and the Arab nation.
- 3- The "rewards" promised to Arab youth who complete National Service are nothing but illusionary, as anyone can get a job instead of doing National Service, and he will earn much more than he would earn from the Service, and without sacrificing his national, cultural, and even moral values and principles²¹³.

²¹³ Published on Alarab news website. 15.3.2011 <<http://www.alarab.net/Article/363481>>. Accessed: 03.12.2013

- 4- National service would increase unemployment among youth, as the capitalists or businessmen and directors of organizations would invite National Service "servers" and pay them NIS 600-700 a month rather than hire workers and employees and pay them a full salary.
- 5- We support volunteering, but not politicized volunteering. We rejected the decision to impose National Service on us by the Lapid Committee which treated National Service as a first step towards integrating Arabs in the police and the military service. We fought against the scheme since 2005 when it was initiated by the Ministry of Defense, and we oppose creating committees like Lapid and Ivri to discuss the need to make National Service mandatory for Arabs without even consulting us and with no Arab participation in these discussions. They discussed the matter with the Hareidi Jews for thirty years, and they are refraining from discussing it with us even for one day.
- 6- They talk about "sharing the burden" and our response is that we are citizens who pay taxes while we cannot choose how these taxes are spent. We say that we are the owners of this land whose resources have been looted by the state. The state has to compensate us, not make demands from us. The state is guilty, indebted, and the one who has to pay²¹⁴.

These views expressed by Mr. Odeh are echoed by the chairman of the DFPE, Muhammad Barakih. In an interview about the 2012 bill to impose National Service on Arabs published on the internet, Barakih said:

It does not make sense that Israel declares itself a Jewish state then demands Arabs defend its borders and the aggressive policy of its government. This is utterly unacceptable: not yesterday, not today, and not tomorrow. Arab youth are not offered on Netanyahu's market for recruitment to the military, National Service, or anything else. If Israel wants to treat us as equals, it should first fix the historical injustice we suffered because of it, and reach a just peace with the Palestinian people.²¹⁵

In another press release, Barakih said:

²¹⁴ Ayman Odeh. "We will challenge the law of mandatory National Service". Published on Alarab news website. 29.6.2012 <<http://www.alarab.net/Article/468563>>. Accessed: 03.12.2013.

²¹⁵ Al-Sha'b newspaper. Interview with Muhammad Barakih. 30.4.2012. <<http://elshaab.org/thread.php?ID=22575>>. Accessed 02.12.2013.

The state should approach the Arab public with clean hands and stop attempts to pass new racist laws every week. Any talk about equality must be preceded by the abolition of all racist laws and legislation that have been enacted over the years.²¹⁶

4.3.2.4 The position of the National Democratic Assembly

In an official press release by the secretariat of the National Democratic Assembly (NDA), the following was said concerning national service.

- 1- The NDA states that the true intention behind the recruitment [of Arabs] for National Service is not simply to "serve society" but rather to pave the way towards recruitment in the police and military, as stated in the report by the Lapid Committee commissioned to implement the recommendations of the Or Committee. The report advised "the government to encourage the idea of forming an official national and civil service that Israeli citizens exempt from the army could perform voluntarily by volunteering in their community. The government would also work to increase the number of volunteers from the Arab sector in the police and army".
- 2- The NDA stresses its absolute rejection of the National Service project, as this project mainly aims to distort the national identity of Arab youth and create a generation that is alienated from its identity, history, and people.
- 3- The NDA believes that this project also aims to impose new rules for the political game, by linking natural rights with duties, while completely ignoring the policy of political and economic oppression of Arabs practiced by governmental institutions. It also ignores the policy of expatriation and land confiscation especially in the Naqab (Negev), and it ignores the increase in racism both among the [Jewish] people and the political system in Israel.
- 4- The NDA points out that the project does not really aim to serve the Arab community but is a political scheme that aims to suppress the Arab community and silence its political demands. Furthermore, the places where [Arab] volunteers would be used were chosen by the National Service Administration, and do not necessarily have anything to do with the Arab community. One example of that is when Arab volunteers in the National Service were asked to go to the

²¹⁶ Alzaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations. Interview with Muhammad Barakih. 08/05/2012 <<http://www.alzaytouna.net/permalink/15860.html>>. Accessed 02.12.2013.

Naqab area in the south to help various Israeli institutions during the offensive on the Gaza Strip, which killed 170 Gaza citizens, including thirty-seven children²¹⁷.

The position of the NDA leaders is no different. Dr. Jamal Zahalka, the Knesset member representing the NDA came under harsh criticism from Jewish members of the Knesset because of the views he expressed regarding National Service during a meeting of the Knesset education committee. Zahalka said:

Politicians in Israel, who claim that National Service is good for Arabs, are the same politicians who oppose every bill that is in the interest of Arabs. They are the same people who seek to enact racist and fascist laws. The more an Israeli politician is hostile to Arabs, the stronger his support for National Service for Arabs is. This is clear evidence that National Service is not in the interest of the Arab people".²¹⁸

Zahalka also said that the National Service for Arabs Bill was initiated by the Ministry of Public Security and was later transferred to the Prime Minister's office, but this does not change its reality as a security plan created to enlist Arab youth in Israeli institutions and detach them from their national affiliation and Arab identity. Zahalka said, "any Arab citizen who falls into the trap of National Service is a failure to us as leaders, and it must motivate us to work harder to prevent that from happening again. We are concerned about the social implications that these youths will have to endure. They have fallen victims to deceit"²¹⁹.

4.3.2.5 Analysis of the Arab arguments against National Service

Before delving into rhetorical analysis, I will first summarize the arguments that all Arab parties use against National Service for Arab citizens.

- 1- Arabs are doubtful about the real intentions behind National Service for Arabs, since the National Service project was first created by the Ivri Committee whose chairperson was David Ivry, former General in the Israeli Air Force and the director of the Israeli National Security Council. Moreover, the Ivri Committee was appointed by the then Minister of Defense Shaul Mofaz. These facts as seen by Arabs as evidence that National Service for Arabs is in reality far from being

²¹⁷ Press release by NDA published on Al-Quds news website. 05.12.2012. <http://www.qudsnet.com/news/View/232454>>. Accessed: 14.12.2013.

²¹⁸ Alarab news website. 07.06.2011. <<http://www.alarab.net/Article/376879>>. Accessed: 03.12.2013

²¹⁹ Ibid.

merely a civil program for volunteering and that it aims to "Israelize" Arab youth until they are ready to serve in the Israeli army.

- 2- Arabs cannot serve a state whose principles and symbols contradict theirs. Moreover, Arabs cannot serve a state that is oppressing them and their Palestinian compatriots in the occupied lands, still confiscating their lands and depriving them of their basic rights.
- 3- Performing National Service in the state's institutions is showing loyalty to this state, the same state that demolishes Arab homes and the same institutions that discriminate against Arabs in budgets and services.
- 4- The concept of "sharing the burden" which suggests that Arabs must serve in return for their rights is invalid since rights must not be dependent on duties, especially in the case of Palestinians in Israel whose land was occupied, their houses demolished, and their resources annexed.
- 5- The Arab minority should seek to create its own volunteering programs where the youth will serve the Arab community, as part of a larger project to build a self-reliant society.
- 6- Serving in Jewish society will also expose Arab youth to new values that contradict their beliefs and principles, which might lead to cultural deviance and moral corruption.
- 7- Arabs are deprived of their rights, and they will not receive these rights and no justice will be done to them even if they agree to perform National Service, because Druze Arabs who serve in the Israeli army also suffer discrimination and inequality.
- 8- The rewards promised to Arabs who perform National Service are worthless as one can get a normal job and earn much more than what he/she would get from national service.
- 9- National Service means cheap labor for some employers and directors of organizations who can recruit attendants instead of hiring workers, which would increase the rate of unemployment among Arab youth.
- 10- Volunteering in Israeli institutions as part of a program that was not set by Arabs but rather by specialists in security and military shows that National Service is meant to "brainwash" and "tame" Arab youth and strip them of their national Palestinian and Arab identity.
- 11- National Service is promoted as an act of "volunteering" while in reality volunteers are paid monthly. This distorts the concept of real volunteering which is serving the community without anticipating a reward or compensation.

The reasons for rejecting national service are similar among all Arab parties in Israel, with some differences as a result of the ideological background of each party. It is noticeable that each party uses

terms from its own vocabulary. Thus, the Islamic Movement warns that national service, where Arab youths serve in the Jewish sector, is a threat to the Muslim identity of these youths.

The Communist Party represented by the DFPE, warns that it would be exploited by capitalists and businessmen who will use it as a source of cheap labor which would increase unemployment among the youth.

The Nationalist NDA fears that being integrated in the National Service and assimilation in Jewish society is a major threat to the Arab and Palestinian national identity of Arab youth.

The ideological views of each party are reflected in their arguments against National Service, but to a much less extent compared to their arguments concerning the two topics discussed in chapters 3.1 and 3.2. This is explained by the Arab consensus rejecting National Service. Since the arguments that justify their positions are similar, so are their positions against it.

Rhetorical Analysis

Based on Aristotle, argumentation that relates to the future, and focuses on the good that must be sought and the bad that must be ignored, falls under the deliberative branch of rhetoric. On the other hand, forensic rhetoric speaks about the past and points out guilt or wrongdoing and who committed it. Lastly, epideictic rhetoric is concerned with praise or blame, and that is why it is also called ceremonial rhetoric²²⁰, but modern rhetoricians have expanded its definition to also include shared values²²¹.

In our discussion on National Service and the argumentation by the Arab parties for or against it, we expect to find forensic arguments that relate to the past and involve references to the injustice that was done and point out who has done it, which the orators use to argue for or against National Service. The debate around National Service would also include discussion of its advantage and disadvantages, which serves to reach a conclusion on whether it is good for Arabs in Israel or not. These would be, in Aristotelian terms, arguments in the deliberative axis. In 3.1.2.1, we quoted Higgins who said: "...the deliberative rhetoric must exhort or persuade his audience his speech is addressed to a judge of the future, and its end is to promote the good and avoid the harmful". This description explains with great accuracy what the Arab parties are trying to do concerning National Service. They all agree that National

²²⁰ Richard Norquist. "Epideictic rhetoric". <<http://grammar.about.com/od/e/g/epideicticterm.htm>>. Accessed: 04.12.2013.

²²¹ See Zosha Stuckey, " Epideictic Rhetoric and the Reinvention of Disability: A Study of Ceremony at the New York State Asylum for Idiots". In *Present Tense: A Journal of Rhetoric in Society*. 2012. < <http://www.presenttensejournal.org/volume-2/epideictic-rhetoric-and-the-reinvention-of-disability-a-study-of-the-opening-and-closing-ceremonies-at-the-new-york-state-asylum-for-idiots/>>. Accessed: 05.12.2013.

Service, whether voluntary or mandatory, is going to be harmful for the Arab Palestinian minority in Israel, and they are attempting to persuade Arab youth not to take that path, by demonstrating its merits and detriments. It is a deliberation about the future, how it will be for Arabs in Israel should they decide to accept National Service or reject it

If we review the eleven arguments that the Arab parties use to undermine National Service and deter Arab youth from joining it, we find that arguments 1 - 4 are forensic, while arguments 5 – 11 are deliberative. Forensic arguments remind the audience or the readers that the National Service plan for Arabs comes in a historical context of oppression, deprivation of rights, and attempts to suppress the Arab people in Israel and "tame" them. These arguments relate to the history of the state, the history of National Service itself and how it came into being, and also relate to concepts associated with national service that make it impossible for Arabs to accept it, like "sharing the burden". Argument 1 states that Arabs cannot accept National Service because it was created by military people who have a solid history of violence against the Palestinian people and their Arab brothers. Similarly, argument 2 expresses lack of enthusiasm to serve a state that was established on the ruins of Palestinian towns and villages, and which still discriminates against them in all aspects of life. Argument 3 shows refusal by Arabs to show loyalty to the state by serving in its institutions, while the state is not loyal to them. Argument 4 is refusal to "share the burden" because, according to Arabs and Arab politicians, rights must not be conditioned upon duties, especially in the case of Palestinians, whose rights and resources were annexed by the Israeli state.

Arguments 5 – 11 are deliberative in that they are concerned with the future, and they deal with what is in the interest of Arabs in the future regarding National Service. In essence, these arguments explain why accepting National Service will bring harm upon Arabs as individuals and as a group, and they propose better alternatives to National Service. These arguments warn that National Service will be used to "brainwash" and "tame" Arab youth and will distort their Arab and Palestinian identity; it will also morally corrupt them; Arabs will not be treated equally even if they serve; financially, the rewards will not be worth it; National Service will increase unemployment rate in the Arab sector; paid volunteering in the National Service will undermine the real meaning of volunteering; and finally, Arabs should seek to create their own volunteering schemes that suit their needs and do not compromise their national principles, and their Arab identity and culture as Palestinians.

Some of the arguments discussed above also have an epideictic aspect. Arguments 2, 3, and 4 talk about the shared values of Arabs in Israel, and state that Arab youth who perform National Service in the state's

institutions that adopt the state's principles, symbols, and set of values, are likely to be influenced by these values and symbols. The arguments also relate to the concepts of "loyalty" and "sharing the burden". The risk, according to Arab leaders and activists, is that these values might replace the Arab and Palestinian values of the Arab youth in Israel, which is considered a threat to all Arab people in Israel who are a minority that seeks to protect its culture and identity, and fight integration and assimilation. Epideictic is about shared values, and Arabs leaders believe that the shared values of the Arab Palestinians in Israel are threatened by National Service, which adopts and promotes other values, often contradictory to what Arabs believe and embrace.

With regards to the three rhetorical appeals set by Aristotle, we can see that the arguments are either based on *logos* or *pathos*. Arguments 2, 3, and 4 try to appeal to the audience's emotions. They are a reminder of the past and the hardships that Palestinians suffered at the hands of the Israeli state and its former military men who are now responsible for National Service. Evoking the emotions of the audience and causing it to feel that the pain and misery that they and their ancestors have suffered was caused by people, some of whom are now managing National Service, is probably a good idea to deter people from joining it. Similarly, the state is still discriminating against Arabs and depriving them of their natural rights, not to mention demolishing their houses and confiscating their lands; it is not deserving of their loyalty by serving in its institutions, particularly as its symbols and principles, like the "Jewish State" and the Tikvah (Israeli National Anthem), contradict theirs.

On the other hand, arguments 1, and 5 - 11 are arguments that employ logic to appeal to the audience. So in 5, the argument is that since Arabs feel discriminated against, and the government's National Service scheme for volunteering does not suit them, logically, they should seek to develop their own scheme for volunteering and serving the community, if indeed they are interested in promoting the idea of volunteering in their community. In 6, the argument is that if the Arab youth spends much time within the Jewish community to do National Service there, it is logical to assume that he is going to be vulnerable to being influenced by them and might adopt their lifestyle and even their language, values, and views, which is of concern to the Arab public and Arab leaders. Concerning the rewards, argument 8 explains that a volunteer who joins the National Service for the rewards will not really benefit from them, since getting any other normal job will earn him much more than what he would earn from the Service. Lastly, in 11, the argument is that real volunteering is unpaid voluntary work done for the sake of the community and out of true conviction that an individual should take part in improving the conditions of the community he lives in, and sacrifice some of his time and maybe money to do so. It is logical to assume

that if voluntary work becomes normally associated with getting paid, that threatens the real action of volunteering which should be done without expecting a reward for it, and it might become the norm that "voluntary work" should be compensated with money or any kind of reward.

In these arguments, different rhetorical devices are employed. We see exemplification where Zahalka from the NDA gave the example of the Arab National Service volunteers who were asked by the directors to go to the Naqab area in the South to assist during the Israeli offensive against Gaza. Zahalka did that to show that National Service would threaten the Arab youth's principles and sense of belonging to the Palestinian people, when they assist the Israeli government at times of war with their Palestinian brothers.

Another device is comparison and contrast. All Arab parties talked about the Arab Druze who serve in the Israeli military, and they compared their poor conditions to show that the situation for Druze who serve is the same for Arabs who do not serve, which means that doing National Service will not improve things. An analogy is present here too. Arab politicians draw analogies between what Druze are promised because they are given the highest-ranking military service, and what Arabs are promised to be given if they perform the lower ranking National Service. This reveals that the Druze, who serve in the military, suffer the same inequality and discrimination in resources and budgets which leads to the conclusion that the conditions of Arabs will not improve, and they will still be deprived of their rights and freedoms even if they accept National Service.

In conclusion, the rhetorical argumentation used by the Arab leaders and activists against National Service are varied and versatile. While forensic rhetoric is used to remind Arab youth that the state and the men in charge who want them to join the National Service are the ones responsible for the calamities that have befallen the Palestinian people in the past; deliberative rhetoric is used to convince the youth about what should be done in the future to serve their own and their people's interests.

It is remarkable that Arab politicians, who address the public and especially the youth and warn against the National Service, do not only talk about the collective level but also the personal level. Namely, the arguments summarized above touch on the reasons why National Service should be avoided for the sake of the Arab people collectively, but also for the person involved individually. The arguments did not only relate to collective issues like rights or duties and shared values, but also personal issues like rewards.

Unlike the two topics we discussed in chapters 3.1 and 3.2, the rhetoric and arguments used by the different Arab parties concerning National Service are very similar. It can be said that the reason behind

this is that the other two topics (recognition of Israel as a Jewish State, and participation in the Knesset) have aspects to them that are influenced by the ideology that each party embraces. So while the NDA perceive the conflict as a conflict between the Zionist movement and the Arab-Palestinian nationalist movement, the Islamic Movement sees it largely as a religious conflict between the Jewish people and the Muslim nation, and the DFPE sees it as a conflict between an imperialist colonial power against the colonized people., Those ideological differences influence certain aspects in each party's position on the other two topics, but not on the topic of National Service. That is to say, if we take participation in the Knesset as an example, we find that the Islamic Movement deals with it not only from a nationalist point of view, but a religious perspective too. Similarly, the Communist Party deals with the topic of recognizing Israel as a Jewish State not only from a nationalist perspective, but a communist one too, which is why its arguments against it are different from the arguments of the NDA and the Islamic Movement. On the other hand, the arguments of all three parties concerning National Service seem to be mostly of a nationalist nature rather than religious or class-related. This reaffirms that the positions of the parties on the different matter is influenced by its ideology more than anything else.

5 Conclusions

Based on the period between 1948 and 2013, this thesis analyzed the rhetoric that is used by the major Arab parties in Israel to back their positions on key issues that the Arab minority in Israel is currently dealing with. The parties involved are the two branches of the Islamist Islamic Movement (the parliamentary and the extra parliamentary); the nationalist National Democratic Assembly, and the communist Democratic Front for Peace and Equality.

While every chapter in this thesis ended in a concluding section that summarized the whole chapter, additional findings that relate to the research in general can be noted.

The research reveals a relatively disparate rhetoric, different arguments, and varied methods of persuasion practiced by the different Arab parties, even when dealing with topics concerning which the positions of all parties are similar.

We found that the Islamic Movement's attitudes are largely influenced by its Islamist ideology, and that its views on the conflict are affected by religious motivations and interpretations. The same applies to the NDA and the DFPE, each with its own ideology, intellectuals and considerations. When ideological elements are involved, the positions of the three parties are very likely to be different, and when these elements are absent, the positions are mostly identical, as is the case with the three party's position on the National Service for Arabs.

In a similar fashion, the reason why there is a disagreement and different positions between the two branches of the Islamic movement concerning the first two topics, is that these two topics directly relate to participation in the Knesset, which was the major reason behind the split of the Movement in the first place. On the other hand, the third topic, the National Service for Arabs, has nothing to do with the state or recognizing it by Arabs, and therefore the two branches share the exact same views and even have the same explanations for these views.

When it comes to Aristotle's elements of rhetoric, we found that the arguments presented by the different parties employ different rhetorical devices and appeals and fall under the different rhetorical categories. The comprehensive use of rhetorical argumentation that largely complies with Aristotle's classifications reflects awareness among the Arab political movement in Israel of the importance of using rhetoric not only for political gain, but also within the context of struggle against injustice and inequality.

The reason why we found that most arguments are logos-based, is that in our analysis we had to rely on arguments that appeared in materials that were published in newspapers, magazines, or internet website. In other words, we relied on statements that were intended for and accessible to the general public, as opposed to statements and arguments expressed in closed meetings attended only by members of the party, which are likely to be different from what is declared publicly. Arguments intended for the general public can be different from arguments presented to a specific audience with specific expectations and needs like the members or supporters of a specific party. Such "public" argumentation needs to appeal to everyone, and to guarantee that, perhaps ethos and pathos should be avoided because our assumption is that the efficiency of these kinds of arguments is highly dependent on the type of such audience, and they are most effective when they are tailored for the specific audience to be addressed. While ethos and pathos may work for a specific audience, they may not work for another, and may even create a "boomerang" effect²²², where the audience will react negatively. Hence, logos or logical reasoning is the safest to use when addressing a general audience without having a direct contact with it, as is the case with statements, articles, radio shows or TV interviews read or seen by the general public.

This thesis shows that despite being one national minority that shares the same past, present, and future, the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel is far from being politically homogenous. It is evident that the ideological principles each party holds greatly shape its rhetoric and arguments and set it apart from the other parties in many ways.

The thesis can serve as the basis for further studies on the Arab Palestinian minority in Israel. Now that it is evident that the rhetoric of the Arab minority is very diverse, it is important to carry out a follow-up study that would deal with the question of what contributes to such great political division within the very small Arab Palestinian minority in Israel. A question that I hope to be answered soon by fellow researchers of rhetoric.

²²² More on "boomerang effect" see chapter 3.2.3

6 References

Print works

1. Abu- Daabes, H. (n.d). Our case between boldness of the incitation invokers and politeness of rightful owners. Almethak newspaper, P.3.
2. Abu Jabir, Ibrahim. 2006. Arab Society in Israel. Israel, Umm Al-Fahim: Center for Contemporary Studies.
3. Al-Shanqitim, K. (1940, January 27). Role of the Palestinian Civil Resistance. Al-Karmil newspaper.
4. Ben Porat, S. 2009. Conversations with Ahmad Tiebe. Tel Aviv: Harretz newspaper. P. 71. December 22.
5. Center for Contemporary Studies (n.d.). Methodology of Confronting the Islamic Movement reaching unlawfulness, page 4.
6. Center for Contemporary Studies. (n.d). The Islamic women's work in Umm al-Fahim city. Um-Al-Fahim, Israel.
7. Center for Contemporary Studies. 1995. The Islamic Movement inside the Green Line. Um-Al-Fahim, Israel.
8. Center for Contemporary Studies. 2000. Prospective Future of the Islamic Movement Between Government Planning and Internal Perceptiveness.
9. Corbett, E. & Connors, Robert. 1999. Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, 4th ed. Oxford Univ. Press.
10. Dakwar, J. 2007. The Islamic Movement Inside Israel, an Interview with Shaykh Ra'id Salah. Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. XXXVI, No. 2 (Winter), pp. 66-76, p. 67.
11. Frisch, Hillel. 2011. Israel's Security and Its Arab Citizens, New York: Cambridge University Press.

12. Ghanim, A. & Mostafa, M. 2009. *Palestinians in Israel: Indigenous Group Politics in the Jewish State*. Ramallah: Madar (in Arabic).
13. Ghanim, As'ad. 2001. *The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel: 1948 - 2000; a Political Study*. New York: SUNY Press.
14. Higgins, Ruth. 2008. *The Empty Eloquence of Fools: Rhetoric in Classical Greece. Rediscovering Rhetoric: Law, Language, and the Practice of Persuasion*. Ed. by Justin T. Gleeson and Ruth Higgins. Federation Press.
15. Jabara, Tayseer. 2000. *Jame'at al-Najah (University of Success) magazine*, 1 (31).
16. Jabereen, Y. (2010). *The constitutional status of the Arab minority in Israel: a new proposal to order*. *State and Society*. Issue 7 (In Hebrew).
17. Jamal, A. (n.d). *Studies in the writings of Azmi Bishara*. PP 89-90
18. Kedar, Mordechai. 2001. *Muslim minorities*.
19. Khateb, Mouad. 2010. *Palestinian rhetoric*. *African Yearbook of Rhetoric*. 4 (3). Center for Media Studies, University of Cape Town.
20. Kimmerling, B. & Migdal, J. 1993. *Palestinians: The Making of a People*. New York: The Free Press.
21. Maher, A.S. 1988. *Socioeconomic History of Palestine*. Dar Ibn Khaldun, 1st edition.
22. Makhol, E. 2009. *Two states: the solution and those who deny*. In Tamar Gojanski and Anjelka taym (eds.). *For Against! Israeli Communist Party 2009-1919: essays and posters*. Tel Aviv.
23. Mansour, Atallah and Benziman, Uzi. 1992. *Dayareh Mishneh [Sub-Tenants]: Israeli Arabs and the Israeli Policy Towards Them*. Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House.
24. Mjali, N. 2009. *Position of Arab representation to Partition: Crime and Punishment*, in Rot Gabizon (Ed.). *Sixty Years to November 1947 - The Partition Resolution Environment: Sources and Studies*. Jerusalem.
25. Mustafa, Mohannad. 2006. *National Service and Palestinians in Israel*. Um al-Fahim, Israel: Center for Contemporary Studies.

26. Powell, Larry and Neiva, Eduardo. 2006. The Pharisee Effect: When Religious Appeals in Politics Go Too Far. *Journal of Communication and Religion*. Religious Speech Communication Association.
27. Rekhes, E. 2003. Islamic Fundamentalism beyond the Green Line: relationship between the Islamic movements in Israel and the Islamic movements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
28. Rekhess, Elie. 2000. The Islamic Movement in Israel and its Relation to the Political Islam in the West Bank, in Rot Gbizon and Dafna Hakar, *The Arab-Israeli Gap*. Jerusalem: The Israeli Institute for Democracy.
29. Rouhana, Nadim. 2004. Reconciliation in the Enduring National Conflicts. *Journal of Palestine Studies*. Institute for Palestinian Studies, volume 15.
30. Rubin-Peled, Alisa .2001. Towards Autonomy? The Islamist Movement's Quest for Control of Islamic Institutions in Israel. *The Middle East Journal*, volume 55, no. 3, 385.
31. Sarsor, I. 2005. The Islamic Movement and the Country. In Yitzhak Reitar (ed), *Dilemmas in Jewish - Arab relations*. Shokan Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.
32. Shafie, B. M. 1993. *Towards Mature Islamic Movement*. Edition 1/1993. Wahbi Bookstore.
33. Taha, Majdi. 2013. An examination of the Israeli Knesset Elections – between participation, boycott, and civic mobilization. Israel, Umm Al-Fahim: Center for Contemporary Studies.
34. Tal and Nahman. 2000. The Islamic Movement in Israel. *Strategic Update*. 2 (4). (in Hebrew)
35. Tibi, Ahmad. 2010. Pressing Netanyahu is the key to success in Mideast peace talks. *Los Angeles Times*. 3 September.

Electronic Resources

“Palestine”. *Microsoft Encarta Student* [DVD], 2007.

Abd El Rahman, Sherihan. 2010. The Political Mobilization of the Arab Minority in Israel: Shifts in Political Demands and Activities. *CUREJ - College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal*. University of Pennsylvania, College of Arts and Sciences.

<<http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1144&context=curej>> accessed on 9.7.2013.

Adalah. 2006. *Summary of the Findings and Conclusions of Adalah's 'The Accused' Report*. October 2006. <<http://adalah.org/features/october2000/accused-s-en.pdf>>. Accessed on 5.7.2013.

Adalah. *The Inequality Report*.

<http://adalah.org/upfiles/2011/Adalah_The_Inequality_Report_March_2011.pdf>. Accessed on 12.3.2013.

Alzaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations. 2012. *Interview with Muhammad Barakih*. 5 August. <<http://www.alzaytouna.net/permalink/15860.html>>. Accessed 02.12.2013.

An interview with Mufeed. <<http://almnar.co.il/?mod=print&ID=6183>>. Accessed on 8.11.2012.

Aristotle. *Rhetoric*. Online version translated by J.H. Freese.

<<http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng1:1.15.26>>

Ayman Odeh's blog http://aymanodeh.blogspot.com/2011/06/blog-post_6792.html. Accessed on 30.5.2013

Azmi Bishara. *Last but Not Least- Recognizing Israel as a Jewish State*. Arabs48.net news website <<http://www.arabs48.com/?mod=articles&ID=757321/4>> accessed on 7.6.2013.

Barakih, M. (2007, December). *Upholding the principle of partition and two-state slogan means adhering to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state*. Alhewar Almotmadin website <http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=118592>>.

Calam Christian website. 2.9.2013. <<http://www.calam1.org/a/8302>>.

CPI official website: <http://maki.org.il>>

DFPE's official website. <<http://www.aljabha.org>>.

Ehna TV (T.V producer). 2013. The Sectarian Discourse (video). *Palestine from the inside*. <<http://www.ehna.tv/Media/11-1696>>. Accessed 18.06.2013.

Ghanadri,S. (2013, February 12). *Summary of the Arab Parties' Achievements in the 19th Elections*. Panet news website. <<http://www.panet.co.il/online/articles/63/68/S-643967,63,68.html>>. Accessed on 28.5.2013.

Interpretation of Sheikh Muhammed Saeed al-Qahtani. *Al-Walaa wal Baraa'* P.5. <<http://www.islamicemirate.com/E-Books/alWalaawalBaraa1.pdf>>. Accessed 05.12.2013.

Iraqi Communist Party's website: <<http://www.iraqicp.com/>>.

Islam Today website. <<http://en.islamtoday.net/artshow-262-3441.htm>>. Accessed on 21.8.2013.

Israeli Knesset website. <http://www.knesset.gov.il>>

Jamal Zahalka. *The Last Illusion About Preserving Israeli's Jewish State*. <<http://www.ahlan.co.il/article3626.html>> accessed on 8.6.2013.

Kenig, Ofir. 2007. *The Political Representation of Israel's Arab Minorities: The Challenge of Marginality and the Dilemma of Influence versus Protest*. Israel: Inter-Disciplinary Net 3rd Global Conference, Department of Political Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and The Israel Democracy Institute. < <http://inter-disciplinary.net/ati/diversity/pluralism/pl3/Kenig%20paper.pdf>> accessed on 9.7.2013.

Khatib, Kamal. *Don't make us reveal what's concealed*. <<http://www.yaffa48.com/?mod=articles&ID=8532>>. Accessed on 27.3.2013.

Levy Eshkol", Wikipedia.< http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levi_Eshkol >

Mada Al-Carmel. 2007. *Haifa Declaration*. Accessed on 02.08.2013. <<http://mada-research.org/files/2007/09/haifaarabic.pdf>>.

Mada's official website. "About" page. Accessed: 01.08.2013. <<http://mada-research.org/en/about/>>.

Mustafa, Mohannad. 2007. "Transfer Projects and the Jewish State", *Tenth Intellectual Conference*, in Haaretz 16.3.2007. <<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/09/201192614417586774.html>> Accessed: 12.8.2013.

NDA's media arm and news website: <http://arabs48.com>>

NIM's media arm and news website (no longer active since the ban in 2017): <http://www.pls48.net/>

Nordquist, Richard. *Epideictic rhetoric*. <<http://grammar.about.com/od/e/g/epideicticterm.htm>>. Accessed: 04.12.2013.

Nordquist, Richard. *What Are the Five Canons of Rhetoric?*. <<http://grammar.about.com/od/qaaboutrhetoric/f/What-Are-The-Five-Canons-Of-Rhetoric.htm>>. Accessed: 14.5.2012.

Odeh, Ayman. (n.d.). *Aljabha, Particularly Now*. Aljabha official website. Accessed 01.08.2013. <<http://www.aljabha.org/?i=68071&f=aljabha-alan.htm>>.

Salah, Ra'ed: 'The Knesset is an extension to the Zionist Plan'. Accessed on 11.2.2013. <<http://www.pls48.net/?mod=articles&ID=1156304>>.

Shavit, A. 2002. *Dear God, this is Effi*. Haaretz. 20 March. <<http://www.haaretz.com/dear-god-this-is-effi-1.49866>. Accessed on 15.7.2013> Accessed on 19.7.2013.

Shhadi, M. (2011, December). Israel and the Palestinian Minority. *Mada El-Carmel*. <<http://mada-research.org/blog/2012/05/19/pmr-issue-16-2011/>>

Sikkuy organization. *Official summary of the Or Commission's findings*. <www.sikkuy.org.il/english/2004/OfficialSummary.pdf>. Accessed on 28.5.2013

SIM's official newspaper *Al-Methak*: <http://www.methak.org/> >.

Smooha, S. 2010. Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2003-2009. Israel: Haifa University. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264875701_Index_of_Arab-Jewish_Relations_in_Israel_2003-2009>. Accessed on 20.5.2013.

Stuckey, Zosha. Epideictic Rhetoric and the Reinvention of Disability: A Study of Ceremony at the New York State Asylum for Idiots. *Present Tense: A Journal of Rhetoric in Society*. 2012.

<<http://www.presenttensejournal.org/volume-2/epideictic-rhetoric-and-the-reinvention-of-disability-a-study-of-the-opening-and-closing-ceremonies-at-the-new-york-state-asylum-for-idiot/>>. Accessed: 05.12.2013.

Website of the official National Service association: Volunteer Association. < <http://www.sherut-leumi.co.il/about.aspx>> Accessed on: 15.11.2013.

Wikipedia. *The High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel*.

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_Follow-Up_Committee_for_Arab_Citizens_of_Israel>.

Figures and Tables

Figure 1: The rise of NDE's influence between 1999 and 2013.

Figure 2: Summary of the active Arab political parties in Israel and their ideologies

Figure 3: Rate of Arab votes in Israeli parliamentary elections

Figure 4: Arab members of the Israeli parliament (Knesset)

Figure 5: NDE's slogan: Scrapping the racists !

Figure 6: DFPE persuasion technique. 'Vote for your fellow resident of Um Al-Fahm'.