A STUDY OF THE RELIGIO-POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ABDURRAHMAN WAHID

AGUSMAN ARMANSYAH / ARMAGU001

A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the
Degree of Master of Social Science

Faculty of Humanities
University of Cape Town
2005

COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cites and referenced.

Signature: Signed by candidate Date: 21-06-05

ABSTRACT

In this study, I examine the methodological foundations of neo-modernist thought in Indonesia, focussing, in particular, on the thought of the contemporary Islamic intellectual, Abdurrahman Wahid. In discussing this newly established form of Islamic thinking, I analyse the contentious issue of the relation between state and organized religion within the context of pre- and post-independence Indonesia. Abdurrahman argues, through the articulation of a socio-cultural approach, that the antagonistic relationship between state and Islam can be overcome.

By focussing on this controversial question and the methodology of Indonesian neo-modernist thinking, I examine the potential of Abdurrahman's religio-political thought to address the current predicament of the Muslim community in Indonesia. Abdurrahman's approach, which both attempts to reconcile the relationship between state and Islam and reinterpret Islamic teachings within the context of modern challenges, is, however, incapable of producing a genuine reconstruction of contemporary Islamic thought.

In illustrating this assertion, I employ the historicist understanding of the Islamic heritage – *al-Turāth* – in an attempt to contribute towards the development of an Islamic awakening discourse. I demonstrate that historical analyses can unearth the epistemological and ideological contents of the Islamic legacy, which has shaped the consciousness of the modern Muslim mind. It is concluded that the recovery of the greatness of Islamic civilization can only be achieved through a historicist understanding of the epistemological structure of the Islamic heritage.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study would have not been possible without the invaluable supervision and unceasing encouragement of my supervisor, Associate Professor Ali Mabrūk, who, in many different ways, has assisted in the overall organization of this study. More importantly, his insights have contributed enormously in shaping my ideas in the field of Islamic studies. Equally, I extend my sincere thanks to Professor Abdulkader Tayob, who gave me an opportunity to study at UCT. I would also like to express my great intellectual indebtedness to my teachers, for their advice and encouragement. My deepest gratitude also goes to my friends and colleagues, especially Wahbie Long and Somaya Abdullah, who have read and commented on this work, while Wendy Jane Isaacs-Martin and Shaheed Qasim read parts of the study. Thank you also to Abdul Qadir Riyadi, for his sincere friendship.

However, my study would never have been completed without the tremendous support and enormous forbearance of my family in Indonesia. I want to express my heartfelt appreciation for the unquestioning love and beautiful dispositions of my parents, H. Armansyah and Hj. Murni, as well as to my siblings, Doddy Hartono, Kak Linda, Hendra Cipta, Maria and Ricky Zulkarnaen for their unwavering support, and to Nina Sarah Husein for her enduring love, moral support and for being my best friend, which makes this life's journey colourful.

I also wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Uncle Dirk, a truly inspiring human being, for his fatherly manner and sincere hospitality, and the Survé family for their Ramadhān hospitality, which made my stay in South Africa enjoyable and unforgettable. Lastly, I thank Pak Sapto-Bu Mira, Pak Ichsan-Bu Yuk, Dita, Ladia and Lea, for their friendships and wonderful conversations, and Pak Wiza and Mbak Ninik, for their incredible hospitality and boundless generosity.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the state and religious organizations has been the outstanding debate among Muslims intellectuals in contemporary Indonesia. The study of the Prophet's life and the juristic, philosophical and political treatises of Islamic scholarship have all reinforced the notion, on which the legal-formalists have based their theorizing, that Islam does not recognize the separability between state and religion. The legal-formalists hold that Islam essentially encompasses every aspect of life and provides a painstaking system of rules and organizations responsible for the implementation of the Islamic sharī'a on this earth.

Nevertheless, despite the prevalent conceptualisation of Islam as 'religion and state,' Abdurrahman argues that Islam does not require an exclusively Islamic basis for the implementation of the sharī'a. Instead, the essential cause of Islam is best appreciated by considering the socio-cultural approach. Underlying this approach is the notion that the role of religion in the modern world must be limited to the realm of individual ethical values and moral behaviour. In so doing, Abdurrahman attempts to break the ideological deadlock between the earlier legal-formalists and the Muslim modernists in an effort to facilitate the establishment of socio-political pluralism and democracy.

With the increasing challenges of modern reality and Islam's encounter therewith, Abdurrahman also argues for the revitalization of Islamic thought in order to attend to the demands of the time. In the service of his own reformist efforts, he maintains unrelentingly that Islam stands in need of substantial reinterpretation. This entails the emancipation of Islamic thinking from the shackles of legal-formalism, which stands in opposition to the transformative agenda of the Islamic awakening discourse.

Seemingly, the unfettered approach of contextualized ijtihād is a necessary ingredient for the creative reinterpretation of Islamic teachings. Such an approach, Abdurrahman continues, will enhance the assertion of Islam in public domains. However, the method involved in the reinterpretation of Islam, he argues, requires a historical analysis of the development of the Islamic heritage – *al-Turāth*. He considers the heritage of Islam to be a meaningful legacy that is important for the reconstruction of contemporary Islamic thought.

Abdurrahman holds that the current social, political and cultural malaise that afflicts Islamic society is rooted in the ahistorical understanding of the Islamic heritage, upon which the legal-formalists have founded their approach. This, perhaps, is a compelling reason why great attention should be been paid to the study of Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thought in contemporary Indonesia.

On the contrary, however, scarce attention has been devoted to the analysis of Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thinking – this is, therefore, one of the problems that this study will address. It is by all means true that the idealistic approach of the legal-formalists is the very reason for its inability to solve current socio-political predicaments. But it must also be emphasized that, upon closer examination of Abdurrahman's thought, it is clear that he is equally guilty of having committed the very same ahistorical reading of the Islamic heritage of which he accuses the legal-formalists.

For instance, in Abdurrahman's articulation of the socio-cultural approach, which aims to establish a process of democratisation, he has ignored blatantly the complex historicity of democratic institutions in the West, failing to account for the historical development of those democratic organizations and their epistemological structures. In fact, his argument is simply that the prevailing structural injustices

within the Muslim community are rooted in the absence of democratic institutions. As a result, in order to establish democracy, he concludes naively that Muslim society must adopt the democratic apparatus of the West.

Moreover, Abdurrahman's reformulation of Sunnī religious thought also lacks a historical consciousness and is thus unable to comprehend the internal logic of the epistemological foundations of Islamic orthodoxy, which have shaped the modern consciousness of the Muslim mind. Indeed, if a genuine analytical reading were applied to the Islamic heritage, as Abdurrahman claims to have done, he would have been able to deconstruct the epistemological structure of the Islamic heritage, which would have provided the impetus for mobilising the Islamic awakening discourse and overcoming the intellectual, social and political stagnation of the Muslim community. Following, then, is a brief account of the main objectives of this study.

1. Aims and Objectives

This study offers an analysis of Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thinking within the framework of the modern Islamic awakening discourse. More specifically, it seeks to evaluate Abdurrahman's socio-cultural approach in so far as the latter engages the intricate relationship between the state and Islam within the context of changing social and political realities. The study also examines the viability of the methodological underpinnings that inform Abdurrahman's pursuit of the reconstruction of Islamic thought.

Through its analysis of Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thought, the study will attempt to demonstrate the inability of his project in addressing the social, political and cultural ills of Muslim society. It asserts that the root cause of this inability is the absence of a historical consciousness of the Islamic heritage. Since Abdurrahman

fails to offer a critical investigation of the historical development of the Islamic legacy, he is thus unable to disturb its ideological contents.

Accordingly, the study attempts to provide some answers regarding the manner in which a process of Islamic awakening may best be initiated. In particular, towards the resolution of the present civilizational crisis of Islam, it underscores the necessity of a historical analysis of the Islamic heritage.

2. Notes on Approach

In my analysis of Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thinking, I have drawn extensively upon the intellectual foundations and methodology of the contemporary Muslim scholar, Ali Mabrūk, in particular, his historical analysis of the Islamic heritage. While his approach has been articulated in relation to the study of Islamic theology, it has broader theoretical and methodological implications for the analysis of the Islamic awakening discourse[1] – including Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thought.

Mabrūk's historicist understanding of the Islamic heritage is premised upon the contention that the reformist efforts of Muslim discourse should begin with the conscious reading of history. This is not to say that contemporary Islamic thought has ignored completely the significance of Islamic history. Rather, as he argues, "in truth, the ahistoricity of this discourse does not in any way mean the absence of any notion of 'history,' but rather the absence of history as a framework of human action and progress and a form of human consciousness of the world; or history as a creative process coming forth from forms of existence that are more developed and effective. Therefore, what remains is a conception of history that dominates the discourse and which inculcates 'ahistoricity.'"[2]

Given the failure of Abdurrahman's approach in itself overcoming the phenomenon of ahistoricity, his critique of the currents of Islamic thought seems to focus on external factors that are responsible for the exacerbation of Muslim societal ills. In other words, the resolution of the Muslim predicament, for Abdurrahman, "cannot be lifted except by leaping from this location to a point outside."[3] As a result, his intellectual inclination towards ahistoricity inevitably leads him to draw upon foreign models.

Needless to say, through the adoption of foreign models, one not only ignores the objective circumstances of one's own reality, but also fails to appreciate the historicity of the borrowed models themselves. More acutely, the negation of one's own reality does not only imply a confession of its incompleteness, for, in this case, it carries a shocking corollary, too. That is, the denial of the historicity of a borrowed model amounts to an affirmation of the completeness – and therefore, sanctity – of a foreign reality.[4]

What underlies this imitative mechanism is an ideological reading that "takes its starting point from ideologies outside of the legacy (which are modern ideologies, of course), and then proceeds to formulate an interpretation of the legacy that justifies [this] ideology and supports, through [this] interpretation, attempts to impose the ideology upon reality."[5] Discrepancies between methodologies do not produce a multiplicity of readings – 'rather it only means a single reading mechanism diversifies and changes its orientations.' Crucially, then, there is no difference between the neo-modernist writings of Abdurrahman, on the one hand, and the legal-formalist approach, on the other, since both approaches are incapable of producing novel interpretations.

As far as the historicist approach is concerned, its point of departure is that a genuine understanding cannot be achieved unless Muslim scholars are able to analyse the epistemological, historical and ideological contents of the Islamic heritage that dominate the consciousness of the contemporary Muslim mind. As Mabrūk persuasively argues, "the awareness of the epistemological basis of the ahistoricity and the mechanism of its production upon which our contemporary discourse is based, is a necessary precondition to achieve the genuine concept of awakening, which would relinquish the current atavistic [ideological] repetition."[6] However, here lays the importance to adopt this approach in analyzing Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thinking.

It is my intention to make plain why Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thinking, in spite of its significant influence upon Islamic thought in Indonesia, is incapable of producing a new reading of the Islamic legacy. Central to this analysis is its focus on the ahistorical quality of Abdurrahman's understanding of the Islamic heritage, which, in turn, has led him to adopt foreign ideological models.

3. The Importance of the Study

This study attempts to contribute to the reconstruction of Islamic thought within contemporary Islamic awakening discourse in a number of ways. For, in spite of the vitality of Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thinking in modern Indonesia, his methodology remains limited. In so doing, this study interrogates the foundations of Abdurrahman's neo-modernist methodology.

In spite of the enthusiasm with which Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thinking has been received, there exists a dearth of studies that engage critically with his methodology. Instead, recent studies have uncritically embraced its conceptions and

apologetically romanticized its outlooks. Barton's[7] and Effendy's[8] works on neo-modernist thinking, in general and Abdurrahman's thought, in particular is less critical in its analysis. Their works merely examine Indonesian intellectual responses –neo-modernist thought– in dealing with modern development and current challenges. What is essentially absent in their works is substantiated engagement and critical reading of methodological apparatus, which inform neo-modernist thinking. It is the contention of this paper that such studies have proven unable to reckon meaningfully with Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thought and to critique the methodological underpinnings of his thought.

This study holds that the production of a historicist understanding of the Islamic legacy is of enormous importance. Accordingly, it makes use of such methodological tools as facilitate an illumination of the modern Islamic awakening discourse, including neo-modernist thought, thereby exposing its epistemological foundations. Moreover, this methodology attempts not only to unearth the ideological contents of the borrowed foreign models, but also sheds light upon the epistemological underpinnings of the Islamic heritage that have determined the consciousness of the Muslim mind.

4. A Brief Overview

The first chapter focuses on the contentious issue of the relationship between the state and Islam in pre- and post-independence Indonesia. This is followed by a summarized biography of Abdurrahman Wahid and his socio-cultural approach, which seeks to establish a relationship of a certain kind between the state and Islam in present-day Indonesia.

Chapter two begins by analysing historically the emergence of neo-modernist thinking in Indonesia. Thereafter, an exposition of the methodological underpinnings upon which Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thought is predicated, is offered.

In chapter three, it is demonstrated how Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thinking, in spite of its populist appeal, notably lacks a historicist understanding of the Islamic heritage and is, therefore, incapable of remedying the civilizational crisis with which Islamic thought continues to grapple. It is concluded that the emancipation of Muslims form their social, political and cultural malaise can only be achieved by rendering visible the epistemological (and historical) contexts within which the Islamic heritage emerged.

Endnotes

[1] Islamic awakening is a concerted effort to reinvigorate, revive and reform the traditional Muslim thought to appropriately deal with the modern demands in the globalizing world.

[2] Aslam Farouk-Alli's translation, Mabrūk, Alī. 2002, *'An al-Imāmah Wa al-Siyāsah Wa al-Khitāb al-Tārikhī Fi 'Ilm al-'Aqāid,* Markaz al-Qāhirah Li al-Dirāsāt Huqūq al-Insān, al-Qāhirah, p. 10.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Mabrūk, Alī. 1995, 'al-Lātārikhiyah...Azmat al-Khtāb al-Arabī al-Mu'āsir', In Mahmūd Amīn al-'Ālim, *Qodhāyā Fikriyah, al-Fikr al-'Arabī 'alā Mashārif al-Qarn al-Hādī Wa al-'Ishrīn: Ru'yah Tahlīliyah Wa Naqdiyah,* Qodhāyā Fikriyah Li an-Nashr Wa al-Tauzi', al-Qāhirah, p. 108.

[5] Aslam Farouk-Alli's translation, Mabrūk, *'An al-Imāmah Wa al-Siyāsah Wa al-Khitāb al-Tārikhī Fi 'Ilm al-'Aqāid,* p. 15.

[6] Mabrūk, Alī. 1995, 'al-Lātārikhiyah...Azmat al-Khtāb al-Arabī al-Mu'āsir', p. 109.

[7] Barton, Greg. 2002, *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid,* Equinox Publishing, Jakarta; Barton, Greg. 1997, 'Indonesia's Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual Ulama: The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in Neo-Modernist Thought', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations,* vol. 8, no. pp. 323-350; Barton, Greg. 1996, 'The Liberal, Progressive Roots of Abdurrahman Wahid's Thought', In Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (Eds), *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia,* Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, pp. 189-226; Barton, Greg. 1995, 'Neo-Modernism: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia', *Studia Islamika,* vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 3-75; Barton, Greg. 1994, 'The Impact of neo-Modernism on Indonesian Islamic Thought: The Emergence of a New Pluralism, In David Bourchier & John Legge (Eds), *Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s,* Monash University Press, Clayton, pp. 143-150.

[8] Effendy, Bahtiar. 1995, 'Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktek Politik Islam di Indonesia', *Prisma,* no. 5, pp. 3-28.

CHAPTER ONE
RELIGION AND STATE: ISLAMIC SOCIO-POLITICAL THINKING

Without it – *Pancasila*[1] – we will cease to be a state –**Abdurrahman Wahid**[2]

My aim is that Indonesian Muslims become a religious *ummah* that has far-reaching insights, able to understand others, emphasizing the sense of integral togetherness with all parties [and] highly respecting freedom as a means to democracy –**Abdurrahman Wahid**[3]

1. Introduction

The continued insurgence of institutionalised Islam upon the Indonesian political scene has been the point of reference upon which Abdurrahman has predicated his intellectual endeavour. The principal feature of his thought is its critical investigation of the pre-eminence of the 'legal-formalistic' interpretation of Islamic teachings, which ultimately seeks the inauguration of an exclusively sharī'a-based state.[4] While recognizing the fact that the overwhelming majority of Indonesians formally profess Islam, he is of the opinion that Indonesia does not necessarily require Islam as the foundational basis of that state. According to Abdurrahman, the existing state, as based on the principles of *Pancasila*, is both a suitable and feasible solution for the diverse contents of the Indonesian archipelago.

In this chapter I shall outline the political standpoints of certain Muslim intellectuals, from both pre- and post-independence Indonesia, who have ceaselessly striven to realize a holistic view of Islam as an established set of both religious and political doctrines. In so doing, the contentious matter that is the nature of the relationship between religion and state will prove central. Moreover, the role of Islam during the early Dutch colonial period (especially in the last quarter of the eighteenth century) will be considered in order to uncover the historical context of this debate. In the final analysis, I shall examine the intellectual underpinnings of Abdurrahman's theorizing, which vigorously asserts the theoretical ineffectiveness and de-historicized

vision of the legal-formalistic approach. In opposition to the legal-formalistic understanding of Islam, he advocates the socio-cultural reinterpretation of Islam in order to accommodate the extraordinary diversity within Indonesian culture as well as to meet the shifting demands of modern living.

2. Religion vis-à-vis State: Contemporary Islamic Thought in Indonesia

Before proceeding to the very question of religion and state, it is important to sketch briefly the early intellectual and political discourses that gave rise to the debate concerning the relationship between Islam and state. More specifically, I shall consider those intellectual and politico-historical discourses of the Dutch colonial era that account for the later development of the debate – a debate that continues to influence and be reflected in the discursive arenas of Indonesian Muslims.

2. 1 Indonesian Islam in the Dutch Colonial Era: A Historical Background

Islam is believed to have arrived at the islands of Indonesia in the early seventh century by way of the expanding spice trade.[5] In addition, the role of various Sufi orders equally play significant role in large-scale Islamization of the archipelago.[6] Geographically situated far from the fountainhead of Islam, the Islamization of the archipelago since the thirteenth century has been a gradual process, in the course of which the local traditions have been slowly altered, but without necessarily disappearing altogether. For example, the influences of Hindu and Buddhist civilizations – notably those of the Indian Shiva sect and Mahayana Buddhism – remain deeply embedded in the ritual practices of the community; the philosophy and belief systems of Javanese people continue to reflect elements of Hindu mythology and Buddhist thinking.[7]

Given the cultural and socio-political influences of Buddhism, Hinduism and Indian mystical practices, Indonesian Islam is less orthodox and, therefore, less Arabized. Indeed, as Geertz has concluded, "Indonesian Islam" was "cut off from its centers of orthodoxy at Mecca and Cairo, vegetated, another meandering tropical growth on an already overcrowded religious landscape."[8] Consequently, the early ascendancy of Hindu and Buddhist civilizations is often considered a crucial factor, and deemed partly responsible, for the delayed penetration of Islam in the archipelago.

Nonetheless, Indonesian Islam has been transformed to a significant degree, albeit slowly, over the past three-and-a-half centuries. "Apparently Islam became acceptable to the Malay-Indonesian people," according to Federspiel, "only when it appeared in a form that was familiar to them."[9] Meanwhile, Anderson asserts that the Islamization of the archipelago was never accomplished by military expediency or even religious missionaries; instead, the "penetration of Islam was more assimilative than revolutionary...Islam came to Java on the heels not of conquest but of trade."[10]

In spite of the embedded influences of the Hindu and Buddhist traditions, Benda argues that Indonesian Islam underwent a substantial transformation during the middle part of the nineteenth century. This change was attributable to the intensified contact of Indonesian Islam with the cradle of Islam through the channel of pilgrimage. It has steadily formed a new trend culminating in the emergence of a new pattern of religious reformism, which Benda described as the "expanding *santri* civilization."[11] This type of emerging civilization is often taken to represent the perceived need to purify Islam from the accretions of localized practices, animistic belief and ancestral veneration, along with an ardent plea for a return to the established sources of Islam. More significantly, this development led to the

formation of a new identity, which served as a rallying point against the injustices of Dutch colonialism and foreign domination. As Kroef has aptly put it, Islam has "provided a common cultural pendant to political aspirations, an ideology and philosophical rationale that heighten the sense of unity."[12]

Alerted to the increasing expansion of Islam in the archipelago, the early colonial administration of the Dutch East Indies considered it necessary to resort to certain measures in order to maintain their authority and control. Dutch authority was without doubt hostile towards institutionalized Islam and this inimical sentiment was characterized by an overt intolerance of both culture and creed. The fullest expression of Dutch apprehension is typified by a church edict to the municipality of Batavia regarding the social practices of 'pagans' on December 7th, 1643. As Widjojoatmodjo reports,

> The high officials should see to it [the preservation of the Christian creed]...and other pagans [Muslims and non-Christians] will be prohibited from having their services of pagan superstition and devil's worship...Also their devilish knowledge of fortune-telling should be forbidden, for in no Christian republic such a violation of God's Honor should be permitted...for it will only give joy to non-Christians and annoy the Christians.[13]

Moreover, this hostility was entrenched further by the restrictive manner in which Dutch authority dealt with the increasing number of Indonesian pilgrims to Mecca. The perceived Islamic influence upon Indonesian society was considered dangerous and Islam was henceforth labeled a formidable enemy of Dutch colonial rule. Sir Thomas Stanford Raffles argues, "every Arab from Mecca, as well as every Javanese, who had returned from a pilgrimage thither... rouse the country to rebellion... [it is

because of] the Mohammedan priests, generally by their intrigues and exhortations, that the native chiefs are stirred up to attack or massacre the Europeans, as infidels and intruders."[14] Well aware of the ever-expanding influence of institutional Islam, Dutch authority developed new political maneuvers, which were to provide the foundation upon which it was intended to curtail the practical significance of the Islamic presence in the public sphere.

Karel Frederik Holle (1829-1896) and Godard Arend Hazeu (1870-1929),[15] the respected Dutch Islamologists who were responsible for religious affairs in the archipelago, without doubt had an influential role in formulating the socio-political attitudes of the Dutch administration towards Islam in the archipelago. Nevertheless, it was in 1889 that the prominent Dutch orientalist, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936), in his capacity as an advisor on Arabian and Native Affairs of the Dutch East Indies, sought to provide an articulate exposition on how to dismantle the political significance of Indonesian Islam. Indeed, this concerted effort of Hurgronje was nothing but a continuation of the hostile Dutch presence in the archipelago.

Intellectually familiar with a wide range of Islamic disciplines, Hurgronje defined the Dutch policy toward Islam in terms of 'political reorientation' and hyped it as "a vision for the future evolution of Indonesian society in keeping with the best traditions of nineteenth century liberalism."[16] It seems fairly obvious that by 'the best traditions of nineteenth century liberalism' was undoubtedly meant the crude separation of religion from state, which was indeed the dominant discourse of Western liberalism at the time. Bowen explains that Hurgronje maintained the necessity to differentiate between "Islam as a set of requirements for worship, and Islam as a set of social, legal and political institutions. 'Islam as worship' resembled the European notions of religion current at the time, and was to be studied and

encouraged as a genuine source and means of piety. 'Islam as politics' was triply repellent: it contradicted European notions of what a liberal, civil society ought to be; it posed real and potential dangers to colonial domination; and [thus] it was seen to be 'foreign' [to the basic teachings of religion]."[17]

Limited importance was attached to organized religion in so far as its role in the public domain was concerned. Indeed, its role was purely one of moral guidance, with no credible function in the political realm. Religion, as far as Hurgronje's 'political reorientation' was concerned, was hence a matter of individual conviction that was to be kept strictly to the private domain; it was merely a mystical instrument, directed towards the perfection of the soul. At this juncture, it is sufficient to state that this political characterization of the divide between religion and state has, in the long run, continued to influence religio-political discourses upon the Indonesian political scene.

According to Hurgronje, in spite of the profound importance of Islam as a set of norms and values that informed the worldview of Indonesian Muslims, cultural practices and local customs, or *'ādat'*, had an influential impact upon the daily practices of Muslims in the archipelago. He claimed that the body of Islamic culture and, consequently, the religious practices of Indonesian Islam, was a resultant blend of the contemporary civilizations of Hinduism and Buddhism. He even went further, arguing that the "Qur'an and Sacred Tradition contained indeed some elements of a mystical attitude, and by Christian, Persian and Indian influences these germs were developed so as to bring pious souls into closer personal contact with God."[18]

Thus, he concluded that Muslims in general and Indonesian Muslims in particular, were not strict adherents of the textual and orthodox teachings of Islam as was frequently assumed, since the local customs were heavily embedded in their daily

practices. The case in point was the Islamic prescription of circumcision. Referring to the legal opinion of the Shafī'ī School, Hurgronje argued that

> [c]ircumcision is prescribed as a duty but [Islamic sharī'a] lays no more stress on this than on a thousand other obligations, which are universally neglected, and is very far from including it among the 'five pillars of Islam'. Yet it is an undoubted fact that in all Muhammadan countries laymen attach more weight to circumcision than to all the 'five pillars' taken together, and that even the religious teachers, although they are the champions of the teaching of the law, are nevertheless influenced to some degree by the popular belief in this respect.[19]

Indeed, he maintained that Indonesian Islam was likely to be nominal and syncretistic, which is "the unique blend of autochthonous animistic-pantheistic beliefs of the folk religions with Hindu-Indian religious and cultural traits and with the teachings of Mohammed."[20] Likewise, Acehenese Muslims, who were believed to have practiced proper Islam and its 'orthodox teaching', could not avoid the deviant local customs.[21] This is to say that, unlike orthodox Islam, Indonesian Islam has incorporated additional local animistic traditions and many mystical practices such as the local tradition of *slametan*.[22] Hurgronje's conclusion in his *'Islamic law and Custom'* is worthy of extensive quotation. He stated that

> [i]t is...not surprising that in all Muhammadan countries those whose religious learning goes beyond the 'two words' of the confession of faith, or who are in any sense exponents of the moral requirements of Islam, or who observe even a minimum of the ritual or other obligations of their religion,

> form but a small minority, whilst the great majority pursue their lives *in their half-pagan and wholly superstitious thoughts and practices*, only imperfectly clad in a few phrases and other outward and visible signs of Muhammadanism. Beside the indispensable and inevitable elements, of which without doubt *the domestic law is the most important in practice*, each nation adopts that portion of Islam which harmonises most with its character, its customs and its past history, and in doing so seeks involuntarily to preserve under the new regime as much as possible of its ancient lore.[23]

By emphasizing the distinction between Islamic law and the actual practices of Muslims, he implied that Islam as a set of religious norms and a system of values should be encouraged, while Islam as a political institution ought to be suppressed. In so doing, he wholeheartedly maintained that the norm of local customs had to prevail over the application of Islamic law proper. Needless to say, 'political reorientation' was undoubtedly Hurgronje's most significant achievement, since it aimed to relegate Islam to the periphery of social and political life. According to Benda, Hurgronje was the first Islamologist who acknowledged "both the importance of *adat*, or customary law, and the limitations which it imposed on the influence of Islam in the social and legal life of its Indonesian believers."[24]

In order to realize the political undertaking of the Dutch colonial administration, Hurgronje affirmed the need to assimilate native Indonesians into the modern tradition of Western scholarship, without which that mission would have come to naught. He posited that Dutch authority should "assume the moral duty of teaching [Indonesians] and of making them partners in our own [Western] culture and social life."[25] Equally, this intellectual and socio-cultural endeavor to allegedly empower Indonesians likely sought to legitimate the Dutch colonial presence in the

archipelago as well as to maintain their disassociation from the teachings of Islam. In so doing, the Dutch administration would no longer have been regarded as 'infidels' and 'intruders.'

By increasingly employing Western liberalism, Hurgronje assumed that the practical significance of living Islam was sure to diminish, while the superiority of Western culture would ultimately manifest itself. In due course, Islam would eventually vanish and the Qur'an would become a mere stockpile of ineffective ceremonial inscriptions. Accordingly, Hurgronje concluded that the Qur'an "has grown to be no more than a text-book of sacred music."[26] This typically feeble estimation of early Indonesian Islam has been corroborated elsewhere:

> Until the very end of the colonial period, the Dutch educational system was overtly anti-Islamic. Students in Dutch language schools were discouraged, if not actually prohibited, from acquiring more than a minimum understanding of Islam. They were taught that the "authentic" Indonesian culture was that of the pre-Islamic past, and that traditional Islamic learning was, as the great Dutch Orientalist Snouck Hurgronje so bluntly put it, "medieval rubbish which Islam has been dragging along in its wake for too long."[27]

One might argue that this view is especially anchored in the 'optimistic' notion of nineteenth century Western liberalism. Indeed, being extremely hostile to the religious dogma of the Catholic Church, the Western 'Renaissance' firmly believed in the power of human reason and progress. The increasing impact of liberalism in the West consequently replaced religion with the concept of self-subjectivity. As al-

Fārūqī has persuasively argued, "ethics and utility, rather than creed and piety became the criteria of human worth."[28]

What Hurgronje ultimately sought to establish was the superiority of the Western paradigm over Islam. This he attempted to demonstrate by alleging the cultural inability of Islam to provide rational answers for and feasible solutions to a preponderance of modern requirements, which he firmly believed was deeply rooted in the intellectual underpinnings of Islam. Thus, to be 'modern' necessarily required the emancipation of the self from the bond of religious dictations and the "narrow confines of the Islamic system," as Hurgronje vividly put it.

In light of the foregoing discussion, there can be little doubt that the development of socio-political discourse in the era of Dutch colonialism, which imposed the secular liberalism of the nineteenth century upon Indonesian Islam, had unquestionably far-reaching ramifications for the development of contemporary political discourse in Islam. Needless to say, prior to the attainment of political independence, the question of the relationship between religion and politics was keenly contested, which, in turn, has provoked a political debacle involving various Indonesian intellectuals. It is to the expression of political Islam, which is but a response to the secularization of Indonesian politics, that I now turn.

2. 2 Islam and State: The Legal-Formalistic View

The meeting of Indonesian Muslims with the cradle of Islamic scholarship by way of pilgrimage undoubtedly contributed to the formulation of an intellectual framework for Muslims in the archipelago. Additionally, the nineteenth century religious reformism of Muhammad Abduh, which constituted a certain rationalism or "Aqlijah" and asserted the equality of human beings under the sovereignty of God,[29] along with

the pan-Islamism of al-Afghānī, were equally influential factors in fostering a sentiment of universal brotherhood amongst the Muslims of the East Indies. Indeed, underlying the impetus towards religious reform lay the urgent task of returning to the fundamental teachings of the Qur'an and the historical example of the Prophet, in order to restore Islamic civilization to the glory it had once enjoyed before the onslaught of Western imperialism.[30]

However, as a result of the intensifying influence of the colonial legacy of Western liberalism in post-independence Indonesia, Indonesian intellectuals were soon divided into discrete ideological streams. It is fair to say that the dominant streams within Indonesian politics were represented by, on the one hand, those who sought to establish a unified state based on the principles of *Pancasila* and, on the other, those who sought to affirm the comprehensive view of Islam as both religion and state. For the former, the establishment of a national state based on the principles of *Pancasila* or *Civitas Terrena* while relegating religion to the rank of "the outsider"[31] is a necessary precondition for the preservation of the essential unity of the archipelago. Accordingly, they conclude that the Western model of nationalism is the only viable solution for appropriately dealing with political issues and represents a way forward to the building of a new, pluralistic Indonesia.[32] In stark contrast, some Muslim intellectuals have insisted that the establishment of a sharī'a-based state or *Civitas Dei* is integral to the populist struggle of Muslims and the survival of religion.

Historically speaking, the emergence of the debate concerning the puzzling question of religion and state in the Dutch East Indies was triggered by the crisis of the Caliphate in 1924. Mustafa Kemal Attatürk (1881-1939), who had been an ardent advocate of modernization, wholeheartedly adopted the vision of Western secularism as a necessary prerequisite for the modernization Turkey. Needless to say, this

dramatic event in the Islamic world gave birth to a new era in Islamic political analysis and determined the later development of the cultural and political discourses of Muslim intellectuals. The revival of political Islam in the archipelago in the early part of nineteenth century, without exception, reflected this institutional as well as intellectual crisis. The collapse of the caliphate was, in the words of R. A. Kern, a government official for native affairs in the East Indies, "a milestone in the Mohammedan movement in this country."[33]

In response to the crisis of the Caliphate, the first of the Indies All-Islam Congresses was held in order to address the crisis, and arrived at the reaffirmation of the ideological supremacy of the Muslim *ummah*. The sense of "Islamic unity," Bruinessen writes, "[m]eant not only unity of Indies Muslims but solidarity with the struggle of Muslims elsewhere as well. It was this attitude that made them responsive to the caliphate question."[34] Tjokroaminoto, a prominent leader of a Muslim organization in the East Indies, was of the view that Islam needed the institution of the Caliphate in order to ensure the implementation of Islamic law in every aspect of life – both religious and political.[35]

Thus, reacting against the increasing influence of Western domination in both its cultural and socio-political dimensions, Muslims in the East Indies addressed themselves to the imperative task of reconstructing their political doctrines in order to meet the challenges that colonialism had presented, while maintaining the distinctiveness of Islam as a political religion. The Indies All-Islam Congress, which was held in August 1925, unanimously arrived at the conclusion that it was necessary to form a Caliphate committee to deal with the crisis appropriately. This committee eventually adopted the model of a "*modernized caliphate, representative and elected,*"[36] and proposed the following resolutions:

> 1. There should be a caliphate council (*majlis khilāfa*), led by a president called caliph. 2. Members of the council will be: representatives of the Muslims of all countries, for a duration to be established by the council. 3. It has to be decided whether the competences of the council towards the Muslim world community will cover worldly as well as spiritual affairs or only the latter. 4. The president of the caliphate council (the caliph) will be elected by members. 5. The caliphate council should be established on independent Muslim soil, i.e., in Mecca. 6. The costs of the caliphate council will be jointly borne by Muslims, and will be divided among the various countries in accordance with their capacity.[37]

On the basis of what this congress concluded, it is clear that the concern for the future of the Caliphate was nothing less than a demonstration of the political relevance of Islam. Moreover, the congress affirmed the practical significance of affording political Islam a public presence, while maintaining that the application of sharī'a would never be satisfactorily served under the colonial regime. The congress concluded that the articulation of institutionalized Islam in the form of a sharīa-based state was a necessary prerequisite for the realization of the Islamic religio-political vision.[38]

However, after the demise of the Caliphate in 1924, the issue of the religion-state relationship continued to be a point of contention between Muslim and secular intellectuals in post-independence Indonesia. As is often conceived, the underlying concern of this debate, which has become known as the "Great Debate,"[39] centers on whether Indonesia should apply Islam as the sole basis of the state or whether it should employ the ideology of *Pancasila* instead.[40]

Muslim 'legal-formalists,' to borrow Abdurrahman's term, are of the view that Islam is more than a religion; it is a vision of a human society that inspires Muslims to political activity, and an institution that embraces the entire social and cultural structure of life in many parts of the Muslim world. Therefore, they tend to view the separation of religious life from political activity as detrimental to the true teachings of Islam. The proponents of this view claim that Islam constitutes 'religion and state' and, consequently, embraces all aspects of life. They also "emphasize the urgency of putting the sharī'a into practice. It is not only an ideal to be known and revered, but a law to be put into effect and obeyed."[41] In other words, they strive to assert both the implementation of Islamic law and authentic Islamic identity against the presumed superiority of the Western Weltanschauung. Al-'Awwā firmly argues that the realm of politics is an integral part of the inner teachings of the Islamic worldview, and he maintains that Islam simultaneously represents the embodiment of law and a complete system of life.[42]

However, the ideological and political interpretation of Islam within the context of Indonesian Islam has found its fullest expression in the accounts of Daud Beureu'eh, Kartosuwiryo and Kahar Muzakkar, who tirelessly propounded the case for a sharī'a-based state in Indonesia.[43] Beureu'eh, for example, explained that since Islam was a comprehensive way of life, the establishment of *Pancasila* – at the expense of sharī'a – as the ideological foundation of Indonesia contradicted this reality. He stated that

> [f]or us, the mention of principle of Belief in One God (in the *Pancasila*) is nothing more than a political manoeuvre. Belief in the One God is for us the very source of social life, and every single one of its directives must apply here on Indonesian soil. It is not possible for only some of these directives to

> apply while others do not, be this in criminal or civil affairs, in the question of religious worship, or in matters of everyday life. If the law of God does not apply (in its entirety), this means we are deviating from belief in the One God.[44]

Beureu'eh's account affirms the political dimension of Islam and advocates its full implementation. Consequently, it rejects the 'secular' ideology of Pancasila, which Beureu'eh believed ran contrary to the principal teachings of Islam. The creation of a religio-political Islamic state for the entire Indonesia was deemed a necessary precondition for the continued supremacy of Islamic sharī'a. For the contemporary Islamist, there can be little doubt in the argument that such political discourse sought to establish the absolute and infallible sovereignty of God and consequently reject the concept of a secular nation-state.

Moreover, the legal-formalists maintain that the struggle for the liberation of Indonesia could not be separated from the indispensable influence of Islamic sentiment. They add that since the Islamic factor was the essential one that brought about the independence of Indonesia, Islam – that is, Islamic sharī'a, which had been deliberately smothered in the era of foreign domination – should be recognized as the sole acceptable judicial norm of the country. They go further in arguing that the fulfillment of Indonesian independence lies in the eventual application of Islamic law in its totality, which is *the* 'integral part of the Islamic struggle.' The basis for this conclusion is that the overwhelming majority of Indonesians formally profess to follow Islam.[45] Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, a leader of an Islamic movement, described the subordination of Islamic sharī'a during the era of Dutch colonialism in the following terms:

> Very often we have heard voices stating that the sharī'a is an old-fashioned injunction, incompatible with the present...The major constraint of this was nothing but a deceitful trick imposed by the Dutch East Indies government, which had colonized our country, and always attempted to uproot the Islamic religion from its colony...Therefore, the sharī'a, which had been in operation in Indonesia, was gradually abolished and substituted with other regulations that the Dutch government liked.[46]

With the realization of Indonesian independence in 1945, Muslim legal-formalists insisted upon the creation of a sharī'a-based state and contended that the establishment of a state that was based upon the principles of *Pancasila* ran contrary to the common notion in Islamic thought that Islam was both 'religion and state.' Muhammad Natsir, the first Indonesian prime minister and an ardent Indonesian modernist, emphatically argued that Islam was the only acceptable foundation for the state and could not be replaced with *Pancasila* – an indefinite and fallible worldly ideology. He exclaimed that

> Panca Sila as a state philosophy is for us obscure and has nothing to say to the soul of Muslim community which already possesses a definite, clear, and complete ideology, one which burns in the hearts of the Indonesian people as a living inspiration and source of strength, namely Islam. To exchange the Islamic Ideology for Panca Sila is, for Muslims, like leaping from the solid into empty space, into a vacuum.[47]

The institutionalization of Islam that Muslims formalists sought, encountered severe criticism from secularly trained Indonesian intellectuals. The Dutch-trained secular

nationalists, for instance, appeared to view religion as being tied to the past and as being incapable of solving the modern challenges that face Indonesia. No wonder, therefore, that for them, the "best way to achieve independence and build a strong Indonesian state was to follow the secular trend of the West and confine religion to the areas of individual belief and worship."[48] Unsurprisingly, the introduction of Western education in Indonesia can be considered a crucial contributing factor towards the "gradual disassociation between religion and culture and consequently the gradual disintegration of the traditional Islamic outlook of which the ecclesiastics were the natural interpreters and guardians."[49]

Despite having been severely criticized, the tide of political Islam appears to have regained some currency within contemporary Indonesian politics. After the relatively peaceful deposition of Suharto's rule in May 1998, the movement for political Islam reemerged and reasserted the primacy of Islamic sharī'a and the distinctiveness of a single *ummah* as the cornerstone of Islamic identity.[50] This sentiment was fully elaborated in the account of Irfan S. Awwas, the chairman of the 2000 Mujahidin Congress that was held in Yogyakarta, who stated that the purpose of that meeting was about "ensuring that the Sharī'a is upheld by Muslims in Indonesia and the world...The main objective is the establishment of a khalifah or one leadership for all Muslims in the world, similar to that in the Prophet's era."[51]

By contrast, on the political landscape of contemporary Indonesia, Abdurrahman is a fierce critic of the legal-formalistic orientation. Rather, he unrelentingly seeks to emphasize the social and cultural reinterpretation of Islamic principles in order to address issues associated with modernity. However, before considering the theoretical foundations and intellectual frameworks that inform the

social and cultural orientation of Abdurrahman, a brief summary of the life of Abdurrahman Wahid is in order.

3. A Brief Outline of the Life of Abdurrahman Wahid[52]

Abdurrahman Wahid – or Gus Dur, as he is affectionately known – was born on September 7th, 1940, in Denanyar, a village in Jombang, Eastern Java, to a family that had distinguished itself for its great erudition in the Islamic tradition. His grandfather was K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari (1871-1947), who founded Nahdatul Ulama in 1926 (usually abbreviated as NU; lit. 'The awakening of Islamic scholars'), the largest traditional Islamic organization in Indonesia, as the counter-organization to Muhammadiyah,[53] which had been established in 1912. Threatened by the puritan Islamism of Muhammadiyah, the traditionalist *ulama* considered the establishment of NU as a social and cultural umbrella for traditional Islam to be a necessary prerequisite for maintaining their structural and institutional control of rural Javanese-based Indonesian Islam.[54]

Abdurrahman's family, doubtless, has enjoyed great reverence within Indonesian Islam, partly due to its role in protecting the traditional Islamic system from the strident criticism of the puritan-minded intellectuals. Indeed, the continued presence of NU in contemporary Indonesia is, as Nakamura writes, "a testimonial to the resilience, adaptability, and vitality of Islamic traditionalism in Indonesia."[55] Abdurrahman's father, K. H. Wahid Hasyim (1914-1953), was a highly respected scholar of Islam and was actively involved in the struggle against Dutch imperialism. On his maternal side, his mother, Hj. Sholelah, was the daughter of K.H. Bisri Syansuri (1886-1980), who co-founded NU and once served as the general chairman of the organization. Barton describes Syansuri as "not only an expert scholar of *fiqh*, or

Islamic jurisprudence, and a gifted educational administrator but also an able agriculturalist."[56]

The formative years of Abdurrahman's intellectual upbringing started in the *pesantren* – the traditionally structured system of the Islamic boarding school. Before joining formal school, under the tutelage of his grandfather, K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari, he started to learn the basic syntax of the Qur'an. By the age of five, he could read the Qur'an fluently and had mastered its grammar. Due to the appointment of his father as Minister of Religious Affairs in 1949, he was then exposed to the dynamic and urban life of Jakarta. Abdurrahman then learnt foreign languages – in particular, Dutch – under the supervision of the German revert, Willem Iskandar Bueller. It was through this friendship that Abdurrahman developed an interest in the great civilizations of the West and a passion for its classical music. Indeed, this intellectual baptism also sowed in him the seeds of progressive thinking and deliberative investigation, which later would have a significant impact on his thought.

In 1953, prior to the tragic and unexpected death of his father, Abdurrahman continued his schooling at Junior Economic High School SMEP in Yogyakarta. At the same time, he attended the *pesantren* in Krapyak and read Arabic under the supervision of K. H. Ali Ma'shum. Upon completion of his studies at SMEP in 1957, he attended the *pesantren* of Kiai Khudori in Tegalrejo between 1957 and 1959. He then stayed with his maternal grandfather, K.H. Bisri Syansuri, to further his studies in the sciences of speculative theology and jurisprudence. That stated, it must also be noted that Abdurrahman's intimate relationship with Kiai Khudori instilled in him a deep interest in mysticism, particularly the spiritual experiences of nine outstanding saints of Javanese Sufi lore, or *wali songo*. Between 1959 and 1963, he simultaneously studied and taught Islam at K.H. Wahab Chasbullah's *pesantren*.

However, it was in Yogyakarta that Abdurrahman initially began to satiate his voracious appetite for reading and expand his intellectual horizon. For a bibliophile like himself, reading had become an important part of his daily activities, so much so that he spent much of his time scouring the libraries of Jakarta and second-hand bookshops. In addition, his enthusiasm extended over movies, *wayang kulit*[57] and *cerita silat*, or 'pulp literature.' Moreover, his knowledge of Islamic literature and profound appreciation of modern Western methodology placed him in a position to engage with such critical issues as were afflicting Muslim society.

Upon completion of his education, Abdurrahman was eager to pursue further studies in Cairo at al-Azhar, the oldest Islamic University, and spent two years there from 1964 to 1966. Whilst undertaking his Cairean studies, he served as chairman of the Association of Indonesian Students of the Middle East from 1964 to 1970. However, the rote memorization of classical texts and the uncritical approach that prevailed at the University seemed to be stifle Abdurrahman, who constantly read a wide range of critical literature, Islamic and Western alike.[58] Despite his bitter experience of the didactic methods of al-Azhar, he opted to spend his time sitting in Cairo's libraries, catering to his own intellectual needs. Equally, the cosmopolitan life of Cairo fostered his interest in French movies, which were all the rage in Cairean cinemas. Interestingly, he also served as the head of the Jakarta Arts Council *(Dewan Kesenian Jakarta)* from 1982 to 1985. From 1986 to 1987, Abdurrahman was selected to chair the Council of Judges of the National Film Festival *(Ketua Dewan Juri Festival Film Indonesia)*, an unusual role for a scholar from a traditional Islamic institution.

In 1966, he left the city of a thousand minarets and spent four years at the University of Baghdad, where he attained a degree in Arabic literature. Historically,

Baghdad, as the cradle of the ancient civilization of Mesopotamia out of which the Judaeo-Christian and Islamic civilizations emerged, is widely recognized to have celebrated freedom of expression and dialogue regarding matters of religion and philosophy. Additionally, "Baghdad offered greater academic freedom and better rates of remuneration"[59] for Abdurrahman to develop his apparent intellectualism. The city provided optimistic and hopeful surroundings for the development of new ideas and lived up to Abdurrahman's expectations.

Upon his graduation from the University of Baghdad in 1970, Abdurrahman wanted to take up higher education at European universities. However, frustrated with the requirements of advanced studies in Europe, he instead spent twelve months informally studying the great social sciences of the West. He stayed in the Netherlands for six months, before traveling on to neighboring Germany, where he spent four months. He ended his sojourn in France, where he stayed for two months before returning to Indonesia on May 4, 1971, empty-handed.

Returning to Indonesia, Abdurrahman began his career as an essayist, regularly making contributions to Indonesian journals and newspapers. He then started a family and subsequently occupied a variety of positions in *pesantren* networks. In 1972, he was appointed as Dean of the Faculty of Theology in the Hasyim Asy'ari University. From 1974-1980, he occupied the position of secretary-general of Tebuireng *pesantren*. Eventually, he settled in Jakarta where he has chaired the *pesantren* of Ciganjur from 1978 until the present day. In 1979, he was selected *Katib Awal*, or First Secretary, of the Supreme Religious Body *(Syuriah)* of NU. In 1984, Abdurrahman, along with K.H. Achmad Siddiq, was elected to lead NU as the general chairman of the Executive Board *(Tanfidziah)* and the chairman of the Supreme Religious Board respectively. However, Abdurrahman's popularity with NU

followers led to his unanimous appointment as general chairman of the organization for three consecutive terms, which ended when he was democratically elected as Indonesia's fourth president in 1999.

Apart from these formal activities, Abdurrahman was also a regular contributor to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in particular, the Institute for Education, Economic and Social Research, or LP3ES (*Lembaga Pengkajian Pengetahuan, Pendidikan, Ekonomi dan Sosial*), sponsored by the Neumann Institute of Germany and the Ford Foundation of the U.S. The establishment of this non-coercive organization was initially intended to provide adequate answers to and viable solutions for the social ills that were afflicting the Muslim community by progressively articulating the themes of social justice, democracy and religio-political pluralism. Indeed, this organization has courted the finest Indonesian intellectuals from a variety of disciplines.

In 1980-1983 he was elected as the nominator for the Agha Khan Award for Islamic Architecture and as an advisor to the International Dialogue Foundation Project on Perspective Studies of Shari'ah and Secular Law at The Hague in 1994. Abdurrahman's significant contribution towards the promotion of religious pluralism in Indonesia earned him the Ramon Magsaysay Award (Asia's equivalent to the Nobel Prize) in 1993. As a result, since 1994, he has served as a member of the Presidential Board of the prestigious World Conference on Religion and Peace.[60] These national and international honours have transformed Abdurrahman into an intellectual of considerable stature in contemporary Indonesia, one worthy of reckoning. Consequently, his intellectual contribution towards the controversial issue of the relationship between religion and state will now be considered in order to assess its influence within the current Indonesian political set-up.

4. The Currents of Islamic Political Thought in Indonesia

It is generally held that the development of Indonesian Islam has, since the 1970s, experienced a religious revival of historically unprecedented proportions. This reinvigoration of Indonesian Islam is frequently associated with the emergence of intellectuals that are deeply concerned with the social and cultural reassertion of Islam in public life. This movement for reform has been referred to as the 'Renewal Movement of Religious Thought,' which "constitutes an attempt to reformulate in general terms the fundamental Islamic postulates regarding God, man and the physical world, and the manner of their relationship in the light of new political realities."[61] Amongst other things, the chief concern of this renewal movement centers on the means by which the role of Islam in the public realm may be promoted, without being trapped by a formalistic interpretation of Islam. Unlike the earlier puritan Islamists, whose sole focus was the creation of an exclusively sharī'a-based state, this emerging nucleus of Islamic intelligentsia is less interested in the concept of the religio-political state than it is in the advocacy of popular sovereignty, that is, the "tradition of pluralism, tolerance and social harmony."[62] Abdurrahman is an exponent of this orientation.

Abdurrahman takes the position that there are at least three views regarding the question of religion and state prevalent in Islamic political discourse. According to the first view, Islam constitutes both 'religion and state.' Irrespective of social and historical contexts, it emphasizes that, "Islamic doctrine is a priori superior to other doctrines, be they secular or religious... Islam is the solution to the social and religious malaise in human society... the Islamic doctrine, besides being theoretical, is also social and ideological... the overall purpose of Islam is to establish the true

Islamic society."[63] Such a conception demands the eventual establishment of an 'Islamic state,' in which Islamic sharī'a dictates both personal behavior and collective affairs. In striving towards the establishment of a distinctly Islamic *ummah*, it asserts, equally, the notion of an authentic Islamic identity.[64] In sum, it emphasizes the holistic nature of Islamic teaching and, in so doing, stresses the integration of religious and political systems. Abdurrahman classifies this orientation as the "confrontative"[65] approach. In other instances, he calls it the "legal-formalist" approach, contending that

> [p]olitical organization of an Islamic nature is necessary, in the form of a formal and independent entity such as an Islamic political party, or, if that is not possible, in the form of an Islamic caucus within existing political groups and the bureaucracy.[66]

Moreover, this approach demands the strict adherence to the cultural system of the Arabs, which is assumed to represent the pristine Islamic tradition, and therefore advocates the institutionalization of political Islam.[67]

The legal-formalist interpretation, however, suffers from several shortcomings. Firstly, having stressed the adherence to symbolic Arab culture, it ignores the reality that Islam is open to multiple interpretations.[68] According to Abdurrahman, the diverse interpretations of Islam can be clearly observed in the various manifestations of Islamic practices, which confirm the 'cosmopolitan' nature of the universal values of Islam.[69] Secondly, it appears to overlook various aspects involved in the process of the reapplication of Islamic teachings – be they social, cultural, political or economic, not to mention the specific context in which the perplexing question of the 'Islamic state' initially arose. In spite of his own

ambiguous conception of the 'Islamic state,' Abdurrahman argues that the legal-formalists have articulated it as an ideal model, instead of as a series of political events determined by human consciousness that found their expression in specific historical and cultural realities. Thirdly, it remains unconscious to the particularities of local histories and therefore fails to take into consideration the socio-cultural heritage of any given community.[70]

These criticisms are expressed cogently in the account of Majid Fakhry, who argues that the idea of introducing of Islam into the fabric of modern political life takes as its point of departure "the restoration of Islam in an unadulterated form, exactly as it was left by its founder thirteen centuries ago, as though no water had flowed under the bridge of history."[71] Moreover, it should also be noted that the early Medinese state "was based more on the moral authority of social conformity than the coercive power of the state in other human societies... [and that, therefore,] the model of the Prophet's state in Medina cannot be applied in the present context of any Muslim society. However one wishes to characterize that historical experience, the Prophet's state was a unique phenomenon that ended with his death."[72]

The second category of Islamic political thought in Indonesia can be termed the "facultative"[73] approach. According to Abdurrahman, this approach seeks to articulate Islamic principles by using a modern governmental apparatus, namely parliament, as a channel through which to express its religious aspirations. Unlike the former, it does not forcibly insist on imposing its religio-political vision, unless that has been constitutionally endorsed. This approach may also be defined as an "attempt to combine Islamic authenticity with adherence to the 'tried and proven' models for development drawn from the West."[74] It also seeks out Islamic legal precedents in order to legitimate modern organizations and institutions. Unsurprisingly, this

approach is equally incapable of epistemologically addressing the current malaise that afflicts Islamic socio-political thought. Instead, it has been "developed in a shallow and intellectually inadequate way," which "rarely if ever comes to grips with the fact that [for instance] dhimmi status is simply not the same as modern equality before the law."[75]

What these disparate approaches have managed to illustrate is the internal crisis that contemporary Islamic political thought faces, and which Islamic resources seem incapable of overcoming. What is clear is the failure of modern Islamic political theorizing to provide an adequate and feasible meeting-place for the reconciliation of Islamic ideals with modern political realities.

Hence, for Abdurrahman, the task that awaits political theorists is the reformulation of Islamic teaching in a manner that will enable it to appropriately meet the demands of the time while remaining faithful to the principles of Islam. This third category is the task of what he calls the "integrative"[76] approach, according to which the literal interpretation of Islamic sharī'a and the Islamization of politics is emphasized. However, as the proponent of the "integrative" approach, Abdurrahman firmly believes that in order to transcend the current political predicament, the socio-cultural approach is the plausible means by which an amicable relationship between Islam and state may best be established. Moreover, it will facilitate greater socio-cultural expression of Islam in a globalizing world. Abdurrahman holds that the integrative approach can concretize the themes of equality, social justice and democracy, which is necessary for a genuine transformation into a modern society.[77] It is, then, towards Abdurrahman's socio-cultural approach that this paper now turns.

5. From the Discontents of Legal-Formalism to the Socio-Cultural Reassertion

Contemporary Islamic thought in Indonesia has engaged with a range of religious, social and political issues in need of serious investigation, with certain intellectuals attempting to formulate viable Islamic solutions for the dire problems afflicting the Muslim community. The question regarding Islam and state, in particular, has been pursued relentlessly in order to bring the Islamic ideal and the politico-cultural realities of Indonesia into relation with one another.[78] As can be gleaned from the previous discussion, the debate has evoked varying responses from Muslim intellectuals. Indeed, disenchantment has been the result because of, on the one hand, the inadequacies of the legalistic view and, on the other, the 'cultural Islam' that is at best a token intellectual gesture. Abdurrahman, however, views the socio-cultural approach as being of enormous importance in concretizing the Islamic ideal in social life.

Recognizing the current socio-political malaise, Abdurrahman argues that "Muslims now face the dilemma of whether to continue with the status quo which upholds the dominance of religious laws and a rigid moral code accepted by Muslim communities everywhere, and thereby place greater impediments upon the development of humanity and individuality, or reinterpret the teachings of Islam in such a way that its fundamental values and ideals will be able to assist in the realization of humanity."[79]

That stated, Abdurrahman remains an ardent believer in the religion of Islam. While mindful of the importance of religious principles in creating a cohesive social system that will inform both individual and social conduct, he rejects the idea that Islam stands in need of formal institutionalization. Rather, as he sees it, Islam, as a

way of life, should be interpreted as an ethical and moral force in order to pursue an agenda of social transformation. Hefner terms such a conception a "civil" Islam "whose primary role in the life of nation is to serve as a source of ethical and cultural guidance."[80]

However, in order to bring the Islamic ideal into harmony with *Pancasila* so that it can play a constructive role in the social life of the nation, Abdurrahman argues that it must assume a socio-cultural orientation. He expresses

> [t]he need for a social framework for Islam in the development of a new Indonesian society. Social institutions have to be built to reflect Islam's concern for liberty, social justice and rule of law ... this socio-cultural approach in essence forms a cluster of activities which will contribute to the democratisation of Indonesia in the long run.[81]

Abdurrahman elucidates this approach by articulating the universal values of Islam, which, if understood correctly, will enable Islam to meet the challenges of the modern age. Central to this notion of a universal Islam are the matter of 'public interests,' the preservation of basic human needs, principles of justice, the rule of law, and equality, all of which are manifest in the teachings of Islamic monotheism, law and ethics.[82] For Abdurrahman, the overriding concern for humanity and the establishment of social justice are core Islamic preoccupations.

The concern for human dignity, Abdurrahman argues, is thoroughly reflected in the developed principles of Islamic sharī'a, which essentially attempts to preserve the five basic needs of human beings that will be explored in the following chapter. At this juncture, it is sufficient to state that the articulation of these principles, as Abdurrahman notes, is nothing but a reformulation of the religious themes of equality,

freedom and tolerance.[83] Moreover, he continues, on the basis of these virtues, Islam should be an inclusive faith that upholds democratic principles.

Abdurrahman believes that, throughout its historical evolution, Islam has exhibited significantly an attitude of openness towards existing civilizations. Indeed, the extent to which Islam accommodated a range of intellectual and cultural heritages meant that it accepted the presence of cultural differences. "The cosmopolitanism of Islamic civilization," Abdurrahman argues, "is manifest in several domains such as, the disappearance of racial boundaries, the vitality of cultural plurality and the political heterogeneity."[84] He adds, moreover, that the cosmopolitan character of Islam was even more prominent during the centuries when the religious life of Muslims was of an eclectic kind. More precisely, the tolerant disposition of Islam was especially apparent during its early historical development when theological differences where marked.

Indonesia has long been known for the extraordinary diversity of its people. Based on the historical evolution of Islam, Abdurrahman maintains that Islam should not form the exclusive ideological foundation of the Indonesian state. Given the inherent plurality of Indonesian culture, it is imperative to accept *Pancasila* as the sole foundation of the state. Hence, he contends that, for Indonesia, a "consciousness of nationality as the prime mover for the ideals of our life as a nation is something that has to be accepted as an absolute objective factor."[85] This will avert the disintegration of the archipelago and, hence, will maintain the collective integrity of Indonesia. As Purdy explains, the strength of *Pancasila* lies in "its ability to integrate a diverse population, its effectiveness as an overarching legitimising force, and its potential as a prophetic voice of inspiration as a country moves toward its national goals."[86]

In the articulation of his socio-cultural approach, Abdurrahman is critical of both legal-formalism and cultural Islam. He argues that, while stressing the need to interpret Islam in a manner that will concretise the principles commensurate with it, cultural Islam nevertheless has ended up merely transforming religiously instructed individual morality and "only results in a legal-formalistic attitude, so that modernism [of cultural Islam] tends to be a neo-conservatism in legal system. Moreover, its criticism towards traditionalism tends to overgeneralize its negative sides without any attempt to provide alternatives. Modernism drives people to full up all the roots they possess, and creates unending uncertainty."[87] Abdurrahman is discontented with its goal of merely establishing an Islamic ethic in individual life. He states that,

> [i]nstead of being satisfied by merely developing Muslims with 'good religious conduct', as espoused by the cultural approach, which is basically concerned with Muslims as individuals, the third approach sees the need for a social framework for Islam in the development of a new Indonesian society. Social institutions have to be built to reflect Islam's concerns for liberty, social justice and rule of law. Although cultural in its tendency of persuasive and educative ways instead of stressing the importance of legal Islamic norms, this approach differs from the cultural approach. We could call it a socio-cultural approach to Islam in Indonesia. Working within the framework of 'social experiments' such as community development, technology transfer and restoration of the natural environment, this third approach provides us with a good example of how Muslim activists could participate in democratisation of the society as a whole, without resorting to any formal political identity. Through NGO's, 'social organizations', such as religious organizations, movements to 'promote Islamic propagation' (*dakwah*), this socio-cultural approach in essence forms a cluster of

activities, which will contribute to the democratisation of Indonesia in the long run.[88]

Abdurrahman's socio-cultural approach, therefore, does not require the institutionalisation of Islam in the form of a political entity or an Islamic caucus within the existing bureaucracy. Instead, this approach posits the need to develop Islamic movements whose function it will be to demonstrate Islam's ability to reassert itself in the public realm and thereby reinforce the gradual process of democratic transformation in Indonesia. Additionally, it also seeks to bring about internal changes that are necessary for the transformation of existing structures. The implementation of this approach in the social life of the people will facilitate the realization of a democratic vision for and political pluralism in Indonesia.[89] Equally, Abdurrahman maintains, it will enable the integration of the 'Islamic agenda' with the 'national agenda,' the realization of a prosperous Indonesia and the creation of an Islamically informed society that will avoid the pitfalls of an overly literal interpretation of Islam.[90]

Recalling the extraordinary diversity of Indonesia – socially, religiously as well as culturally – Abdurrahman states that Islam must serve as a driving force in the development of the state, which suggests that it should not idealize itself as the only feasible system of social life. Instead, Islam should envisage its role to be that of an inspiration for national development that will facilitate the democratisation of society in terms of political diversity, gender relations and racial and cultural dynamics. Islam, therefore, should not to be taken to represent an alternative to *Pancasila* but, instead, should be regarded as a complementary factor alongside a range of other factors in the nation's life.[91] Abdurrahman posits that

> [t]he teachings of Islam –as a component in forming and giving content to our citizen's life in society– ought to have a role as a factor that is complementary to the other components, and not as a competitive factor that will have a disintegrative function in the life of the nation as a whole."[92]

He adds, therefore, that Indonesian Islam has to

> [g]ive Islam the function of an integrative force in the life of our people's nation and state. That is the direction in which the consciousness of the Islamic masses should be directed and developed by the Islamic movement in our country.[93]

However, the socio-cultural approach essentially belies the view that Islam should function in a concrete manner in the lives of the people, as opposed to functioning as a vehicle for the formalization of religion in the life of the state.[94] Elsewhere, Abdurrahman explains that "this approach asserts an attitude that aims to develop the views and the cultural elements... in order to establish civil society institutions in accordance with the avowed cultural insights. It necessitates the role of the culture that is capable of transforming the structure of society in the long run."[95]

Abdurrahman believes that the engagement of the socio-cultural approach with the issues that afflict the Muslim community is an essential factor in the enhancement of the Islamic presence in the world. He continues that, instead of being wooed by the mystique of the early golden age that is often invoked by the legal-formalistic vision, what is required is a critical engagement of the cultural legacy of Islam. Such an undertaking will enable Muslims to relate to unfolding modern

realities and, consequently, will reinforce the timeless relevance of the universal values of Islam.[96]

For Abdurrahman, the legal-formalist's idealization of early Islamic civilization is the most significant impediment as regards religious rejuvenation. This is a result of the inability of the legal-formalistic approach to appreciate the two kinds of Islam. He states that

> [t]he most important thing about Islam is that we have to differentiate between two kinds of Islam. The first one is the institution of Islam... second, the culture of Islam. If we cling to the institution of Islam, then we tend to defend it against whatever we see as a danger to it, so because of this we see now that many people are defending states, defending territories, defending everything institutional in the belief that they defend Islam. Well, in fact Islam lives... and lived through the centuries by projecting a certain culture.[97]

The socio-cultural approach is conscious of the need to articulate the social and cultural presence of Islam by appropriately reformulating Islamic principles. Abdurrahman contends that the greater social and cultural reassertion of Islam does not require an institutional structure. Rather, Islam should become aware of the inevitability of cultural differences, inescapable political heterogeneity and the challenges of global realities. He concludes that the chief function of Indonesian Islam in the life of the nation is thus to develop a nationalistic consciousness as "an absolute objective factor"[98] based on the vision of *Pancasila*.

It is important to note that the nationalistic vision of the Indonesian founding fathers has had an enormous influence upon Abdurrahman's thought. Recognizing their intellectual efforts, he states that "in terms of politics I was amazed by Bung

Karno for his national consciousness, and his unquestionable love for the nation. Bung Hatta for his democratic attitude...Syahrir for his far-reaching insights and Agus Salim and Tan Malaka for their sense of communality."[99] Sukarno, as the founding father of modern Indonesian nationalism, was mainly concerned with the essential unity of the archipelago. He was content with Indonesia becoming a unitary state based on the principles of *Pancasila*. In his memorial speech before the general assembly in 1946, he proclaimed that

> [w]e intend to establish a state 'all for all'. Neither for a single individual, nor for a group, neither for a group of nobles, nor a group of wealthy people – but 'all for all.'[100]

Like Sukarno, Abdurrahman is also of the view that the existing state of Indonesia, as based on *Pancasila*, is the only feasible solution that will accommodate the extraordinary diversity of the archipelago. He argues that the concept of a society is but "an outlook as a people in the sense of nation." "That something," he continues, "which Bung Karno always said was what was meant by Ernest Renan as the *raison d'etre* of a nation, was consciousness of having the same lot, the same destiny, as the members of one nation. It is that consciousness of being a nation that itself underlies the bonds of a nation"[101] – irrespective of prior dispositions, ideologies, faiths or cultures. He adds that

> NU adheres to a conception of nationalism that is *in accordance with the Pancasila* and the Constitution of 1945. NU has become the pioneer in ideological affairs. This is the case even though throughout the entire Islamic world there is still a problem between nationalism and Islam. All the

> Saudi writers consider nationalism a form of secularism. They do not yet understand that nationalism such as in Indonesia is not secular, but rather respects the role of religion.[102]

Equally, the intellectual legacy of his father, K. H. Wahid Hasyim, regarding the relationship between Islam and *Pancasila*, also had a significant effect on Abdurrahman's thought. In the context of the political debate that followed independence, Hasyim emphasized the necessity of establishing a unitary Indonesian state that would be based on the principles of *Pancasila*, rather than a sharī'a-based state. He argued that

> [o]ur past history has shown that we have not yet achieved unity. In the interests of this unity, which we most urgently require in our endeavour to establish our Indonesian State, in our minds the most important question is not, 'What ultimately shall be the place of Islam?' The important question should rather be, 'By what means shall we assure the place of religion in Free Indonesia?' I therefore once again repeat: What we need most of all at this time is the indissoluble unity of the nation.[103]

Furthermore, the NU Congress that was held in Banjarmasin, Borneo, in 1935, also had a significant bearing on the political writings of Abdurrahman. The question that was addressed at this meeting was whether Muslims had to defend the existing Dutch colonial administration from Japanese occupation. In his *Bughyat al-Mushtarsyidīn*, Sheikh Hasan al-Hadhrami argued that an Islamic kingdom had existed before on Indonesian soil. He continued that, since, under the rule of the Dutch up to the present day, Muslims had been allowed to observe the teachings of Islam without

restrictions, it was therefore imperative for them to defend the Dutch administration.[104] Indeed, an argument can be made that such legal reasoning promoted political pacifism in order to avert a crisis within the *ummah*; it affirmed the doctrine that *"any law is better than lawlessness"*[105] – even though the rule of the day was both illegitimate and despotic.

Unsurprisingly, this political attitude was, in the main, derived from Sunnī political thought. Feillard considers the political underpinnings of NU as encompassing a "primary concern for religious affairs, the Sunni tradition's characteristic fear of chaos, a fierce defence of Islamic law *(shari'ah)*, together with a readiness to compromise for the sake of national unity – these have been the constant themes of NU's political thinking since its founding."[106] The position expressed by the traditionalist Hanbalī jurist-consult, Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328), sheds further light on NU's political orientation:

> It is said: 'Sixty years with an unjust ruler are better than one night without a ruler'. And it is related of [the fourth Caliph] 'Alī, May God Be Satisfied With Him, to have said that: 'The people have no option but to have a rulership [*imārah*], whether pious or sinful'. People asked him: 'We understand the pious, but why bother for the sinful?' He said: '[Because] thanks to it, highways are kept secure, canonical penalties are applied, holy war is fought against the enemy, and spoils are collected.[107]

It is to be noted that Abdurrahman's socio-cultural approach does not promote the manifesto of political Islam. Instead, it attempts to develop processes that are commensurate with Islam and that will result in democratic transformation, civil liberty and socio-political pluralism, without which the universal values of Islam are

meaningless. He argues against the 'mythology of Islamic state,' contending that political thought in Islam does not offer a coherent concept of succession, nor does it elucidate an elaborate structure of the theory of state,[108] which resulted in an institutional void after the death of the Prophet.

This conclusion is consistent with that of 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq's (1888-1966) analysis of Islamic political thought:

> Islam did not determine a specific regime, nor did it impose on the Muslims a particular system according to the requirements of which they must be governed; rather it has allowed us absolute freedom to organize the state in accordance with the intellectual, social and economic conditions in which we are found, taking into consideration our social development and the requirements of the times.[109]

In keeping with his socio-cultural approach, Abdurrahman's estimation is that the literal and formalistic interpretation of political Islam does not comprehensively address the emerging requirements of modern times and, as such, cannot represent a solution to the current malaise of the Muslim community, which is characterized by social injustice and the absence of democratic foundations – these being the main issues confronting the Muslim mind today. For Abdurrahman, the socio-cultural approach represents nothing less than an articulation of Islam as "an inclusive, democratic, pluralistic force rather than an exclusive state ideology."[110]

Nonetheless, it can be argued that Abdurrahman's exposition of the socio-cultural approach is but a veiled attempt at affirming a soft version of secularisation, which seeks to interrogate such concepts as are deemed to have been falsely sacralized,[111] such as the idealization of the 'Islamic state.' In accordance with its

conventional definition – "the secularization thesis implies the privatisation of religion; its continuing operation in the public domain becomes confined to a lingering rhetorical invocation in support of conventional morality and human decency and dignity – as a cry of despair in the face of moral panic,"[112] – Abdurrahman claims that organized religion should serve only as an ethical and moral reference for social life:[113]

> In Indonesia, while we recognize that religion and politics are distinct, we believe that they still have functional relations that can help create good governance. Religion plays an important role in the private domain, whereas government affairs are administered according to the methods and institutions of modern and democratic states around the world.[114]

While it does not entirely divest religion of a potential role in the modern world, this passage clearly separates the domains of politics and religion in such a manner that religion is relegated to the periphery of social and political life. Indeed, as will be demonstrated, the problem with Abdurrahman's position is its de-historicized understanding of secularization.

One cannot dismiss the fact that the origins of secularisation are uniquely Christian, and that a hallmark of the European Middle Ages was ecclesiastical authority. Indeed, as Fregosi succinctly argues,

> [t]he secular society issue was, in fact, present in the very beginnings of Christianity which had to posit, in order to survive in the first centuries of its existence, the principle of the separation of faith and the city (which ran parallel with the distinction between the soul and the body). Christ's

> injunction of 'render unto Caesar' – which became extremely important in St Paul's writing – added a political dimension to Christianity and to the already dual nature of Christ.[115]

The secularisation of Christianity eventually crystallised in the forms of "an institutional arrangement, a structural differentiation and an ideational division of labour whereby the sacred is separated from the realm of power."[116] Hence, in terms of public policy, the domains that were traditionally held by ecclesiastical command were transferred to the dominion of secular authorities.[117] What appears to have escaped Abdurrahman has been noted by Keane:

> It is clear that the belief that the modern world is irreversibly destroying its religious foundations in favour of secularity is a child of mid-nineteenth-century Europe, while the concept of 'the secular'... is unique to European civilization.[118]

Unlike those early European societies in which clerical hegemony dominated, to speak of the secularization of other societies is simply inappropriate. More specifically, in the early part of its development, Islamic civilization recognized that the domains of the spiritual and the political were inseparable. However, it must be stressed that the legal rulings of the religious clerics, or *ulama*, are not binding on the Muslim *ummah*. Accordingly, as Manzoor has concluded, "the state [i.e. religious authority] as the locus and seat of sovereignty did not exist."[119] Abdurrahman's criticism of the legal-formalist orientation betrays an inability to appreciate the contemporary political resurgence of Islam. As Schwarz explains, "one of the most striking characteristics of the post-Soeharto era in Indonesia was the emergence of

Islam as a pivotal political player."[120] To be sure, Abdurrahman overlooks the fact that the "symbolism of Islamic devotionalism is not just symbolic, but the very basis for an ethical order."[121]

6. Conclusion

This chapter began with an examination of the evolution of political discourse in the era of Dutch colonialism. It was attempted to explain the response of Muslim legal-formalists, who ceaselessly strove for the establishment of a sharī'a-based Indonesian state. While severely suppressed, it is clear that the discourse of resurgent Islam features persistently on the intellectual and political landscapes of Indonesian Islam, which has not yet succumbed entirely to the dominant discourse of secularist politics.[122] Abdurrahman criticizes the legal-formalistic interpretation of Islam in favour of a socio-cultural approach that seeks to reinterpret Islam in accordance with modern requirements. This approach, which is sympathetic to the principles of *Pancasila*, seeks to accommodate the diversity of Indonesian society and, in so doing, maintain its essential unity.

Abdurrahman's socio-cultural approach is consistent with the thinking of secular intellectuals, especially since it emphasizes the role of religion as a mere inspiration and ethical force for socio-political life. Moreover, owing to the absence of an explicit theory of state, Abdurrahman, like other Muslim liberals, argues that Islam does not demand an exclusively Islamic foundation as the basis for a state. Indeed, his endorsement of *Pancasila* as the ideological foundation of the state is perhaps the prime example of Abdurrahman's secular inclinations. Ironically, his socio-cultural approach has led to a reification of the secularist agenda that is

oblivious to the latter's historical situatedness. We turn now to an examination of the methodological framework that underpins Abdurrahman's neo-modernist orientation.

Endnotes

[1] Read as Pan-cha-shi-la, it literally refers to the five principles upon which Indonesia is based. These principles are as follows: (1) Belief in the one and only God; (2) Just and civilised humanity; (3) The unity of Indonesia; (4) Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives; and (5) Social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.

[2] Abdurrahman's interview is cited in Ramage, Douglas E. 1995, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance*, London and New York, Routledge, p. 45.

[3] From an interview with the Indonesian journal, 'Editor,' in December 1990.

[4] I intentionally use the term 'sharī'a-based state' instead of 'Islamic state' to avoid the confusion that ensues when speaking of the ill-defined 'Islamic state.' Moreover, since it is apparent that the purpose of the Islamic struggle in Indonesia is to eventually establish an Indonesian state that is based exclusively on Islamic sharī'a, the use of the term 'sharī'a-based state' is, in my view, justifiable. For further information on the Islamic struggle in Indonesia, refer to B. J. Boland, 1982, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague. Boland examines the struggle of Islamic movements that relentlessly pursued the establishment of a sharī'a-based Indonesia.

[5] For a good introduction on the history of Islam in particular and Indonesia in general, see Legge, J. D. 1964, *Indonesia: Third Edition*, Prentice-Hall of Australia Pty Ltd, Sydney; Kratz, E. V. 1990, 'Islam in Indonesia', In Peter Clarke (Ed), *The World's Religions: Islam*, Routledge, London, pp.

[6] Various interpretations of the Islamization of the Malay-Indonesian archipelago can be referred to Alatas, Syed Farid. 1985, 'Notes on Various Theories Regarding the Islamization of the Malay Archipelago', *The Muslim World*, vol. 75, no. 3-4, pp. 162-175.

[7] Federspiel, Howard M. 2001, *Islam and Ideology in the Emerging Indonesian State: The Persatuan Islam (PERSIS), 1923 to 1957*, Brill, Leiden, Boston, Köln, p. 3.

[8] Geertz, Clifford. 1990. 'The Religion of Java', In Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, Yasmin Hussain (Eds), *Reading on Islam in Southeast Asia*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, p. 272.

[9] Ibid., p. 4.

[10] Anderson, Benedict. 1990, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, p. 68.

[11] Benda, Harry J. 1958, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*, W. van Hoeve Ltd, The Hague and Bandung, p. 14.

[12] Kroef, Justus van der 1958, 'The Role of Islam in Indonesian Nationalism and Politics', *The Western Political Quarterly*, vol. 11, no. 1, p. 36.

[13] Widjojoatmodjo, Raden Abdulkadir. 1942, 'Islam in the Netherlands East Indies', *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 55.

[14] Quoted in Steenbrink, Karel A. 1993, *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596-1950*, Translated by Jan Steenbrink and Henry Jansen, Rodopi, Amsterdam & Atlanta, p. 74.

[15] For a comprehensive study on K. F. Holle (1829-1896) and Godard Arend Hazeu (1870-1929), see Karel Steenbrink's 1993, 'Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596-1950' pp. 76-97.

[16] Benda, 1958, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*, p. 20.

[17] Bowen, John R. 1995, 'Western Studies of Southeast Asian Islam: Problem of Theory and Practice', *Studia Islamika*, vol. 2, no. 4, p. 74.

[18] Hurgronje, C. Snouck. 1970, *Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th Century: Daily Life, Customs and Learning the Moslims of the East-Indian-Archipelago*, E. J. Brill, Leiden, p. 160.

[19] Bousquet, B.-H and J. Schacht (Eds), 1957, *Selected Works of C. Snouck Hurgronje*, E. J. Brill, Leiden, p. 291.

[20] Kroef, 'The Role of Islam in Indonesian Nationalism and Politics', p. 34.

[21] Steenbrink, *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam*, p. 90.

[22] This practice was originally an Indian religious ritual that merged with the existing animistic Javanese tradition. Transformed into an Islamic practice by early Muslim missionaries, it has become an autochthonous tradition that continues to have a hold on Hindu-Buddhist oriented Muslims. This practice is often held in anticipation of a significant event or as a celebration of an important

occurrence in one's life, family and village. *Slametan* is always ceremonial in character and is imbued with religious significance.

[23] Emphasis added. Bousquet, B.-H and J. Schacht (Eds), *Selected Works of C. Snouck Hurgronje*, pp. 294-5.

[24] Benda, 1958, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*, p. 22.

[25] Quoted in Benda, 1958, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia, p. 344.

[26] Cited in Bowen, John R. 1995, 'Western Studies of Southeast Asian Islam, p. 76.

[27] Martin, Richard C, Mark Woodward and Dwi S. Atmaja. 1997, *Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu'tazilism From Medieval School to Modern Symbol*, Oneworld, Oxford, p. 140.

[28] Al-Fārūqī, I. R. 1986, 'Meta-Religion: Towards a Critical World Theology', *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 17.

[29] Anwar, H. Rosihan. 1971, *Pergerakan Islam dan Kebangsaan Indonesia*, P. T. Kartika Tama, Djakarta., p. 15.

[30] Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology in the Emerging Indonesian State*, p. 26.

[31] See McVey, Ruth. 1983, 'Faith as the Outsider: Islam in Indonesian Politics', In James P. Piscatori (Ed), *Islam in the Political Process*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 199-225.

[32] Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology in the Emerging Indonesian State*, p. 45.

[33] Cited in Bruinessen, Martin van. 1995, 'Muslims of the Dutch East Indies and the Caliphate Question', *Studia Islamika*, vol. 2, no. 3, p. 120.

[34] Ibid, pp. 125-6.

[35] Ibid, p. 129.

[36] Ibid, p. 131, emphasis in original.

[37] Quoted in Bruinessen, p. 131.

[38] Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. 1996, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, p. 81.

[39] Feith, Herbert. 1962, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, p. 354.

[40] Boland, B. J. 1990, 'The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia', In Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, Yasmin Hussain (Eds), *Reading on Islam in Southeast Asia*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, p. 138; Boland, B. J. 1982, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, p. 47.

[41] Shepard, William E. 1987. 'Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 19, no. 3, p. 315.

[42] Al-'Awwā, Dr. Muhammad Salīm. 1987. *Fī al-Nižām al-Siyāsī li al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah*, Dār al-Shurūq, Cairo, p. 20.

[43] See Boland, B. J. 1982, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague.

[44] Cited in Johns, Anthony H. 1987, 'Indonesia: Islam and Cultural Pluralism', In John L. Esposito (Ed), *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society*, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, p. 212.

[45] Ismail, Faisal. 1995, *Islam in Indonesian Politics: A Study of Muslim Response to and Acceptance of the Pancasila*, Ph D Dissertation. Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, P. 45.

[46] Cited in Ismail, Islam in Indonesian Politics, pp. 46-7.

[47] Quoted in Anshari, Saifuddin. 1990, 'Islam or the Panca Sila as the Basis of the State', In Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, Yasmin Hussain (Eds), *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia*, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, Singapore, p. 225.

[48] Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology in the Emerging Indonesian State*, p. 45.

[49] Fakhry, Majid. 1954, 'The Theocratic Idea of the Islamic State in Recent Controversies', *International Affairs*, vol. 30, no, 4, p. 460.

[50] Riddell, Peter G. 2002, 'The Diverse Voices of Political Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, vol. 13, no. 1, p. 71.

[51] Quoted in Riddell, p. 73; Azra, Azyumardi. 2001, 'Globalization of Indonesian Muslim Discourse: Contemporary Religio-Intellectual Connections Between Indonesia and the Middle East', In Johan Mueleman (Ed), *Islam in the Era of Globalization: Muslim Attitudes Toward Modernity and Identity*, INIS, Jakarta, pp. 31-50.

[52] This biographical sketch of Abdurrahman Wahid is largely drawn from Barton, Greg. 2002, *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid*, Jakarta, Equinox Publishing.

[53] Mitsuo, Nakamura. 1995, 'Nahdatul Ulama', In John L. Esposito (Ed), *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, vol. 3, p. 218.
[54] Anwar, *Pegerakan Islam dan Kebangsaan Indonesia*, p. 57.
[55] Mitsuo, 'Nahdatul Ulama', p. 218.
[56] Ibid, p. 40.
[57] *Wayang kulit* is a cultural performance expressing ancient Javanese philosophical values, notably those of Hindu-Buddhist religious traditions. Most of the stories are based on old Hindu-Javanese literature such as the tale of *Hikayat Seri Rama* – the story of Lord Rama based on the legendary story of Ramayana – as well as the *Hikayat Pandawa Jaya* – the story depicting victorious heroes based on the Sanskrit Mahabarata. Apparently, however, the latter story was derived from that of the old Javanese Bharatayudha.
[58] Barton, Greg. 1997, 'Indonesia's Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual *Ulama*: The Meting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in neo-Modernist Thought', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, vol. 8, no. p. 337.
[59] Ibid, p. 95.
[60] Ibid, p. 45.
[61] Hassan, M. Kamal. 1982, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia*, Percetakan Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, p. 89; Hassan, M. Kamal. 1987, 'The Response of Muslim Youth Organizations to Political Change: HMI in Indonesia and ABIM in Malaysia', In William R. Roff (Ed), *Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning: Comparative Studies of Muslim Discourse*, Croom Helm, London & Sydney, pp. 180-196.
[62] Sivan, Emmanuel. 2003, 'The Clash Within Islam', *Survival*, vol. 45, no. 1, p. 42.
[63] Abu-Rabi', Ibrahim M. 1991, 'Discourse, Power, and Ideology in Modern Islamic Revivalist Thought: Sayyid Quṭb', *The Muslim World*, vol. 81, no. 3-4, p. 293.
[64] Shepard, Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology, p. 315.
[65] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1999, *Gus Dur Menjawab Perubahan Zaman: Kumpulan Pemikiran K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid Presiden ke-4 Republik Indonesia*, Penerbit Harian Kompas, Jakarta, p. 23.
[66] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1994, 'Islam, Politics and Democracy in the 1950s and 1990s', In David Bourchier & John Legge. (Eds), *Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s*, Monash University Press, Clayton, p. 153.
[67] Syamsuddin, M. Din. 1995, 'Islamic Political Thought and Cultural Revival in Modern Indonesia', *Studia Islamika*, vol. 2, no. 4, p. 59; Azra, Prof. DR. Azyumardi. 2002, *Reposisi Hubungan Agama dan Negara: Merajut Kerukunan Antarumat*, Idris Thaha (Ed), Penerbit Buku Kompas, Jakarta.
[68] Effendy, Bahtiar. 1995, 'Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktek Politik Islam di Indonesia', *Prisma*, no. 5, p. 5.
[69] See Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1994, 'Universalisme Islam dan Kosmopolitanisme Peradaban Islam', In Budhy Munawar-Rachman (Ed), *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah*, Paramadina: Jakarta, pp. 545-552.
[70] Syamsuddin, 'Islamic Political thought and Cultural Revival in Indonesia', p. 59.
[71] Fakhry, 'The Theocratic Idea of the Islamic State in Recent Controversies', p. 462.
[72] An-Na'īm, Prof. Dr. Abdullah Ahmed. 2003, *Shari'a and Positive Legislation: Is an Islamic State Possible or Viable*, Public Lecture, January 4, 2003, Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, pp. 4-5.
[73] Wahid, *Gus Dur Menjawab Perubahan Zaman*, p. 23.
[74] Shepard, 'Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology', p. 325.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Wahid, *Gus Dur Manjawab Perubahan Zaman*, p. 23.
[77] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 2001, *Pergulatan Negara, Agaman dan Kebudayaan*, Desantara, Depok, p. 131.
[78] Syamsuddin, 'Islamic Political thought and Cultural Revival in Indonesia', p. 57.
[79] Wahid, Abdurrahman. *The Uniqueness of Man in Islam*, http://www.rghr.net/mainfile.php/2000/-34/, 04-04-2004.
[80] Hefner, Robert W. 1993, 'Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class', *Indonesia*, no. 56, p. 4.
[81] Wahid, 'Islam, Politics and Democracy in the 1950s and 1990s', p. 154.
[82] Wahid, 'Universalisme Islam dan Kosmopolitanisme Peradaban Islam', p. 545.
[83] Ibid, p. 546.
[84] Ibid, p. 549.
[85] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1985, 'The Islamic Masses in the Life of State and Nation', *Prisma*, 35, p. 9.

[86] Purdy, Susan S. 1982, 'The Civil Religion Thesis as it Applies to a Pluralistic Society: Pancasila Democracy in Indonesia (1945-1965)', *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 36, no. 2, p. 307.
[87] Quoted in Barton, Greg. 1995, 'Neo-Modernism: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia', *Studia Islamika*, vol. 2, no. 3, p. 55.
[88] Wahid, 'Islam, Politics and Democracy', p. 154.
[89] See, Casanova, Jose. 2001, 'Civil Society and Religion: Retrospective Reflections on Catholicism and Prospective Reflections on Islam', *Social Research*, vol. 68, no. 4, pp. 1041-1080.
[90] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1996, 'Islam, Pluralisme dan Demokratisasi', In Arief Afandi (Ed), *Islam, Demokrasi Atas Bawah*, Pustaka Pelajar, Yogyakarta, p. 116.
[91] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 'Pancasila dan Ajaran Agama, Tidak Saling Bertentangan', *Kompas*, Feb 01, 1984.
[92] Wahid, 'The Islamic Masses in the Life of State and Nation', p. 9.
[93] Ibid, p. 10.
[94] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 2002, *Islam dan Formalisme Ajarannya*, http://www.gusdur.net/indonesia/detail.asp?contentOID=278, 10/03/2004.
[95] Wahid, 'Islam, Pluralisme dan Demokratisasi', p. 116.
[96] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1981, *Muslim di Tengah Pergumulan*, Leppenas, Jakarta, p.13.
[97] World in Focus, *Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid*, http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/stories/s5511-41.htm, 04-05-2004.
[98] Wahid, 'The Islamic Masses in the Life of State and Nation', p. 9.
[99] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1998, *Tabayun Gus Dur: Pribumisasi Islam, Hak Minoritas, Reformasi Kultural*, Collected by M. Saleh Isre, Yogyakarta, LKiS, p. 167.
[100] A famous speech delivered before the Indonesian National Assembly on June 1st, 1946, entitled 'The Birth of Pancasila'. See Christie, Clive J. 1998, *Southeast Asia in the Twentieth Century: A Reader*, London, New York, I. B. Tauris Publishers, pp. 132-139.
[101] Wahid, 'The Islamic Masses in the Life of State and Nation', p. 7.
[102] Emphasis is in original. Quoted in Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance*, p. 53.
[103] Cited in Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation*, p. 189
[104] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1999, *Islam, Negara, dan Demokrasi: Himpunan Percikan Perenungan Gus Dur*, Collected by Imam Anshori Saleh, Jakarta, Penerbit Erlangga, p. 20.
[105] Emphasis is in original. Rahman, Fazlur. 1965, *Islamic Methodology in History*, Islamic research Institute, Islamabad, p. 88.
[106] Feillard, Andrée. 1997, 'Traditionalist Islam and the State in Indonesia: The Road to Legitimacy and Renewal', In Robert W. Hefner & Patricia Horvatich (Eds), *Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia*, University of Hawai'i Press, United States of America, p. 130; Fealy, Gregory John. 1998, *Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: A History of Nahdlatul Ulama, 1952-1967*, Department of History, Monash University.
[107] Quoted in Enayat, Hamid. 1982, *Modern Islamic Political Language*, Austin, Texas, The University of Texas, p. 12.
[108] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 'Negara Islam, Adakah Konsepnya?', *Kompas*, May 17, 2002, p. 5.
[109] Cited in Binder, Leonard. 1988. *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, p. 131.
[110] Esposito, John L and John O. Voll. 2001, 'Abdurrahman Wahid: Scholar-President', In *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 206.
[111] Hefner, Robert W. 1998, 'Secularization and Citizenship in Muslim Indonesia', In Paul Heelas (Ed), *Religion, Modernity and Postmodernity*, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts, p. 156.
[112] Wilson, Bryan R. 1985, 'Secularization: the Inherited Model', In Phillip E. Hammond (Ed), *The Sacred in a Secular Age*, University of California Press, Berkeley, p. 19.
[113] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 2001, 'Indonesia's Mild Secularism, *SAIS Review*, vol. 21, no. 2, p. 27.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Fregosi, Renée. 1989, 'From the Secular to the Politico-Religious: Reflections on *The Name of the Rose*', *Contemporary European Affairs*, vol. 2, no. 4, p. 21; Kennedy, Emmet. 2000, 'The Tangled History of Secularism', *Modern Age*, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 31-37.
[116] Manzoor, S. Parvez. 2000, 'Desacralising Secularism', In John L. Esposito and Azzam Tamimi (Eds), *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, Hurst & Company, London, p. 89.
[117] Wilson, Bryan R. 1987, 'Secularization', In Mircea Eliade (Ed), *The Encyclopaedia of Religion*, vol. 13, Macmillan, New York, p. 159. For a discussion of the secularisation of the European mind,

see Chadwick, Owen. 1975, *The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, London, New York, Melbourne.

[118] Keane, John. 2000, 'The Limits of Secularism', In John L. Esposito and Azzam Tamimi (Eds), *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, Hurst & Company, London, p. 29.

[119] Manzoor, Desacralizing Secularism, p. 90.

[120] Cited in Hassan, M. Kamal. 2003, 'The Influence of Mawdūdī's Thought on Muslims in Southeast Asia: A Brief Survey', *The Muslim World*, vol. 93, no. 3-4, p. 441.

[121] Hefner, Robert W. 1997, 'Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia', In Robert W. Hefner & Patricia Horvatich (Eds), *Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia*, University of Hawai'i Press, United States of America, pp. 75-127.

[122] The issue of the relationship between sharī'a and politics in Indonesia has been an intellectual conundrum in the archipelago. A comprehensive treatment of this issue can be found in the recent edited book of Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra, 2003, *Shar'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

CHAPTER TWO
REINTERPRETING ISLAM

The teaching of the Qur'an that life is a process of progressive creation necessitates that each generation, guided but unhampered by the work of its predecessors, should be permitted to solve its own problems –**Sir Muhammad Iqbal**[1]

I think the most important thing is that we want to free Islam from dogmatic structure...We just want Islam to be in the mainstream to be able to lead to every group and to the state. I think that is what is behind the idea of the new thought about Islam –**Abdurrahman Wahid**[2]

1. Introduction

The preoccupation of Islam with the immutability of Islamic sharī'a is undoubtedly derived from a common view shared by Muslims that Islam is a monolithic entity of religious principles and all-encompassing teaching for individual and social, profane and sacred. For Muslims, the 'unchangingness' constitutes an ideal and hence, a focal points for their perception of the existing realities and circumstances and also an assumption, which influences their entire worldview.[3] This given definable holistic perspective of Islamic teaching, which allows one to speak of the cohesive religious category, has resulted in the sweeping generalization of a singular all-pervading Islamic paradigm, which is in fact, an inadequate characterization of contemporary Islamic thought. As such, it does not reflect the varying realities of Islam that are far more complex and nuanced.

In response to the dominant representation of Islamic scholarship, Indonesian Islam has vigorously shown a distinctly new form of Islamic thinking that emphasizes an intellectual marriage between Islamic traditionalism and Western modernity. However, this bourgeoning approach has been frequently described as 'neo-modernism.'[4] While being intellectually conscious of the need to critically analyse the Islamic heritage in its entirety, this approach by no means aspires to replicate the historical example of the 'golden age.' Instead, it challenges the myth of monolithic

Islam and the idealization of Islamic past civilization. This newly established Islamic school seeks to combine the early spirit of Islamic modernism with an Islamically derived paradigm of historical Islam together with an analytical tool of modern methodology, to which this discussion is now directed.

2. The Rise of Neo-Modernism in Indonesia

The development of Islamic thought in the fifties and sixties Indonesian history has largely been characterized by stark differentiations between Islamic modernism and traditionalism. In Indonesian Islam, traditionalism has often been defined to describe the movement whose religious orientation is deeply imbued with the practices of Islamic mysticism, such as the pilgrimage to the tomb of Sufi saints. On the basis of this account, Indonesian traditionalism has in its religious activities been more adaptive and accommodative towards the devotional observances of Sufi culture, or at least open to the practices of 'folk Islam' or 'little tradition.'[5] However, NU being a custodian of traditional Islam and though explicitly advocating the beliefs and practices that are congruent with the established doctrine of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah and also consistent with one of the established four schools of Islamic jurisprudence,[6] it has nevertheless, been frequently accused of heterodoxy.

In contrast, enormously influenced with the tide of Middle East Islam reformism, the Muhammadiyah the leading movement of puritan Islamism was extremely adverse to this type of traditionalist culture and subsequently regarded it as an improver innovation. Muhammadiyah instead, promoted the reinvigoration of religious understanding through direct reference to the principled sources of Islam – Qur'an and Hadīth – as well as the exemplary practices of the Prophet in order "to avoid all elements of heresy, superstition, and idolatry."[7] However, this urgent task of

reforming Islam can be deemed as the rationalized vintage point of a the Protestant Ethic worldview as Peacock neatly explains,

> The reformists reject a ritualized, cyclical pattern of activity, and conception of time, they weed out the "garden of magic", and they affirm an ethic which systemizes life toward achievement of salvation and fulfilment of the prescriptions of a scripturally defined theology.[8]

Moreover, in terms of intellectual outlook, Muhammadiyah allegedly insisted on a more progressive application of fresh individual interpretation of Islamic texts or ijtihād rather than blindly accepting the legal opinions of any given early generations. Samson states, "reformist thought attempted to promote awareness of the need to master science and technology and to foster a belief in the power of individual initiative and self-determination rather than a blind acceptance of *takdir* [fate], which often served to rationalize inaction and a piously stagnant mode of life."[9]

The puritan Islamists perceived that the traditionalist practices of adulterated local tradition are deleterious to the pristine nature of Islamic ideals. However, the intellectual outlook of puritan Islamists is more concerned with the "Islamic doctrine and most especially the moral and social interpretation of it [and] the defence of Islam as a superior ethical code for modern humankind, as a workable social doctrine for modern society, and as a fertile source for modern culture."[10] At the same time, they firmly believed that the return to the principled systems of Islamic tenets would ultimately allow Islam greater cultural expression and as such, able to solve its current social and political impasse. Not withstanding this view, in practice "Indonesian modernists are hardly more likely to practice genuine *ijtihād* than their '*madzab* bound' compatriots."[11] In a nutshell, Islamic modernism can be defined as an effort

"to purify the religious heritage, to reinterpret some of its aspects and to fuse it with modern elements, in order to reinstitute the dignity of that heritage and establish its worth against foreign encroachment."[12] Dessouki further argues that Islamic modernism "questioned the authority of the medieval interpretations of Islam and advocated the exercise of *ijtihād*."[13]

This stark theoretical categorizations between traditionalism and modernism were then, intellectually inadequate and scholarly unintelligible especially to describe the newly well-established Islamic intellectualism, which shared less similarities in terms of conceptions and outlooks with Islamic traditionalism and modernism. This new approach of Islamic thought "represents a genuine attempt to combine progressive liberal ideals with deep religious faith."[14] Moreover, the principal preoccupation of neo-modernist thinking is to vigorously demonstrate the need to essentially wed Islamic scruples with modern analytical method.[15]

At this juncture, it also must be noted that the crude differentiations between Islamic modernism and traditionalism in Indonesia is deemed as, and partly responsible for the emergence of neo-modernist thinking in Indonesia. It is true that the Indonesian political landscape equally played a major role in the historical inception of this school. Crucially, then, an internal crisis of Islamic thought as well as the development of political circumstances is useful factors, which will provide a context in which to understand the changing aspirations of Muslim intellectuals.

It is note-worthy to point out that the evolving new school of Islamic thought clearly emerged in a time when Muslims in Indonesia painfully suffered from a sense of decline, intellectually, politically, socially, culturally as well as psychologically. More specifically, Indonesian Islam has severely experienced an internal identity crisis that emerged and arisen out of conflict between the Islamic primordial loyalties,

which require insoluble affirmation of Islam in every walk of life and the ideological aspiration of the ruling power[16] that demanded the unquestionable allegiance to *Pancasila*. These crises have been especially illustrated in terms of political defeat of Islamic ideology. Abdurrahman states,

> Islam, then, ceases at present to be the political ideology of the Muslims in Indonesia, as it was in the 1950s and 1960s. Similar to the fate of Socialism and Communism, Islam has now to subordinate itself to the 'national ideology' of Pancasila, and to be satisfied with merely becoming a 'political orientation.'[17]

Doubtless, Islamic politics had been marginalized from the broader national discourse especially in the final stage of Sukarno rule.[18] Towards the end of Sukarno tenure, the political climate of Indonesia had been in a state of social uproar and political instability. The rise of political Islam was allegedly considered as a contributing factor to the social and political insecurity, which culminated in the massacre of Communist participants. This incident claimed thousands of lives and subsequently brought about an endless turmoil of public order and the maelstrom of ethnic cruelty. This sequence of political chaos however, marked the turning point of Indonesian history and subsequently denoted the end of Sukarno's 'Old Order.'[19] With the eclipse of 'Old Order' rule, Muslim intellectuals were hopeful that Islam could regain its political supremacy. Thus, Muslims sought to foster an amicable alliance with Suharto's 'New Order'[20] regime hoping to realize greater political participation. This effort however, resulted in a dismal failure due to the ambivalent political attitude of 'New Order' government. While supporting the activism of organized religion, the government deliberately imposed an agenda of secularising politics, which only

allowed the fortification of Islamic spirituality. The government perceived the role of religion solely serving as

> [a] ground for public morality, a shield against Western liberalism, and an antidote to communism. Animated by this conviction, the New Order regime not only tolerated depoliticised forms of religion but encouraged their penetration into all corners of society.[21]

Amidst the subordination of political Islam and a malaise of Islamic thinking, Indonesian Islam has witnessed an unprecedented emergence of neo-modernist intellectuals who have ceaselessly attempted to reformulate the genuine effort to establish greater social and cultural reassertion of Islam in facing the challenges of modern requirements.[22] This renewal effort is nothing less than an endeavour to provide the essential foundations for regenerating the transformation of Islamic principles in the modern times. The underlying ingredient of its perspective is an in-depth appreciation of an unfettered approach to ijtihād, which when properly implemented, can appropriately meet the needs of the time. Indonesian neo-modernism argues that the reinvigoration of ijtihād in the modern time is of enormous importance as an intellectual prerequisite to contribute to the fulfilment of Islamic ideals in the public domain. Equally, it would help Islam to overcome the befallen social and political stagnancy of Muslims community. It states therefore that

> [i]jtihād or renewal ought to be a continuous process of original thinking based on the evaluation of social and historical phenomena, which from time to time, need to be reviewed in order to determine whether they are really erroneous. Ijtihād is a process such that misunderstanding of its problems

> will result in a bitter fruit –failure. Nevertheless it is still much lighter than the burden of social and historical stagnation brought about by absence of renewal.[23]

Differing considerably from the prevalent mode of both traditionalist whose rigid approach has impeded an agenda of reform and the 'revivalist' thinking whose aspiration to reinstitute a genuine unity of *ummah* under the single umbrella of Islamic state, Indonesian neo-modernists develop a particular approach, which involves the articulation of liberal democracy and political pluralism in order to foster a process of democratic transformation whereby institutional structure of an Islamic nature is an unfeasible solution to the diverse aspects of Indonesian compositions.[24] Abdurrahman accordingly argues, "[t]here is no need for a nation-state with Islamic law."[25] Moreover, assuming some continuity with the early intellectual modernism of Islam, the neo-modernists establish an express purpose of developing an effective progressive thinking seeking to regenerate the effectiveness of Islamic civilization in the globalizing world.

Although bitterly critical towards Islamic traditionalism as well as modernism, it must be noted that there emerges a close affinity between neo-modernism and Islamic traditionalism and modernism. Therefore, it should not be going too far to say that the typology of neo-modernism is questionable. Like the traditionalist, it essentially emphasizes the mere role of Islamic scholarship in reformulating their intellectual endeavours. Additionally, it equally shares a fundamental agreement with the Islamic modernism whose aspiration is to critically appropriate the tools of modern approach in order to advance the transformation of Islamic civilization meaningfully. In so doing, the neo-modernism appears more "selective and lacking in conceptual cohesion or methodology for the systematic interpretation of Islam."[26]

Equally, it lacks an "understanding of the Western culture and its dynamics" which "did not develop traditional Muslim thought from the inside to supply an adequate basis for the new values and institutions."[27]

In a nutshell, this mode of new thinking seeks to synthesize Western analytical methodologies and imbues it with the principles of Islamic paradigm.[28] In other words, while scholarly equipped with the Western educational method, they are also well versed in the discipline of Qur'an and sufficiently trained in the prophetic traditions as well as the classical Islamic scholarship.

Combining the essentials of Islamic scholarship with the best of modern methodology has to offer for the betterment of humankind, the Indonesian neo-modernist is likely to be progressive. The common tone of their intellectual endeavour is the commitment of an open attitude towards agenda of social change, modernity and socio-cultural reassertion.[29] However, central to Indonesian neo-modernists thought is an insistence on developing Islamic scholarship appropriate to the modern demands, without discarding the essentials of Islamic principles. Additionally, they "claim that the modern ideals of equality, freedom, and democracy are not uniquely Western values, but modern necessities compatible with, and even required by, Muslim ideals."[30]

They state that these earnest commitments, however, could have not been fulfilled unless fresh ijtihād or the reinterpretation of Islamic principles corresponding to the social and historical requirements of the time is creatively met in order to reveal the timeless relevance of Islamic teachings. In sum, the core element of neo-modernist thinking is the contextualized ijtihād, which is "a sincere openness and a rejection of dogmatism based upon an appreciation of pluralism."[31] Moreover, in the reformulation of Islamic principle, the context-based ijtihād is not content with the

established ijmā' or the prescribed consensus of past generations. Instead, they argue, in order to arrive at tangible answers for modern requirements, the contextual analysis of the texts should be pursued in which specific revelation occurs.[32]

Over the years, Abdurrahman has significantly contributed to the reformulation of Islamic discourse in Indonesia. Thus, to further understand the need to reinterpret Islam in accordance with the current requirements, he maintains that the articulation of context-based ijtihād is of tremendous importance in order to attend to modern demands and subsequently foster an agenda of progress and social transformation. Before proceeding to the core of the reinterpretation of Islam, the Islamic basis underlying Abdurrahman's thought is worth exploring.

3. The Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid: The Islamic Underpinnings

The most conspicuous Islamic ingredients underlying Abdurrahman's thought is the concept of Islamic universalism, the cosmopolitanism of Islamic civilization and the indigenisation of Islam or in his neologism *pribumisasi* Islam. The articulation of these concepts as far as he is concerned, is to attend to the current demands creatively and to significantly uphold the essential concern for human dignity, politico-religious pluralism and the contextualization of Islamic teachings.[33]

According to Abdurrahman, the conceptualisation of Islamic universalism is thoroughly reflected in the religious laws *(fiqh)*, Islamic monotheism *(tawhīd)* and its ethical concept *(akhlāq)*. Indeed, Islam's stress on these values aim at recapturing the established concern for the universal values of human dignity. He argues that

> [t]he principles of being equal before the law, of protection of society from despotic powers, of the maintenance of the rights of the weak and of the

limitation of the authority of political power, are reflections of Islamic concern with human dignity.[34]

The remarkable example of Islamic consideration for human dignity is further reaffirmed in the formulation of Islamic law to maintain the basic needs of human existence. It is a protection of five basic needs of human being or as the Islamic juristic literatures called it *al-Kulliyāt al-Khams* and they are as follows, (1) the protection of self from any unlawful violation; (2) the protection of personal conscience from enforced conversion; (3) the protection of family and the progeny; (4) the protection of personal possessions; and (5) the protection of an intellectual expression.[35]

In addition, the paramount importance of the universal values of Islam lies in its ability to absorb the cultural manifestations and the currents of existing civilizations such as Greek, Persian, and Judeo-Christian. Abdurrahman contends that this intellectual phenomenon of Islam, which represents an openness of Islamic attitude has led to the emergence of mutual and reciprocal interaction between civilizations, which in turn, has brought Islamic civilization to its peak accomplishment as *oikumene* as the great historian Arnold J. Toynbee put it. Abdurrahman deems this type of intellectual openness and readiness in a creative way to accept and interact with the existing civilizations as a cosmopolitanism of Islamic civilization.[36]

He even goes further holding that the cosmopolitan nature of Islamic civilization is illustrative in several manifestations, the most important of which are the disappearance of the boundary of primordialism and the vigorous assertion of cultural pluralism and political heterogeneity. Indeed, the example of theological

eclecticism of Islamic scholarship is possibly the best example in the armoury of Abdurrahman's view in order to demonstrate the vision of Islamic cosmopolitanism. He interprets the conflicting dogmatic opinions not so much as a theological dissension that has been allegedly considered as a contributing factor to the current Islamic social and political impasse. Instead, he appears to suggest that these theological differences represent the genuine illustration of the cosmopolitan nature of Islam.[37]

Moreover, the differing theological argumentations within the discipline of Islamic dogma is also useful in creating an internal dialogue that is beneficial for the development of Islamic discourse in facing the current challenges afflicting Muslim community. He further bemoans the institutionalisation of the Ash'arite doctrine as the only plausible and acceptable theological framework, which unfortunately has undermined the kind of contextualized personal deliberation and as such, diminished the cosmopolitan character of Islamic civilization.[38] However, he posits that the cosmopolitanism of Islamic civilization would be adequately achieved when the balance between the normative characteristic of Islam and the freedom of thought for Muslims and non-Muslims alike can be realized.

If anything, Abdurrahman's conceptual exposition of these concepts – universal values of Islam and the cosmopolitanism of Islamic civilization – is in fact, a description of a far-fetched ideal, the environment reflecting the socio-historical circumstance where non-Muslims are essentially regarded as second-class citizens. The status of *dhimmī* or a protected non-Muslims residing under the rule of Islamic authority is a conspicuous example of the inequality existing within Islamic sharī'a. The questions of male-female relationship and believer and unbeliever to mention but

a few have persisted in the prescribed Islamic law. However, "at the level of public policy, the treatment of non-Muslims was hardly an egalitarian one."[39] He admits that

> [i]t is very problematic for me until now, because it [poll tax] concerns the concept of *dhimmī*. To be frank I do not know what to do with it. It is there. But my belief and the very core of my own existence...reject *dhimmism* because, as an Indonesian and because of our national priorities, my main thinking is that I have to reject it. All citizens are equal...I do not know what to do with it. It is there, but I reject it.[40]

Increasingly difficult to accept the concept of *dhimmī*, Abdurrahman seems unable to overcome this form of differential treatment. As such, his attempt to rebuke the concept of *dhimmī* by affirming the essential equality of the people instead, results in an internal ambiguity of his thought.

Abdurrahman maintains, however, that the practical significance of Islamic universalism only can be met through a creative engagement of cosmopolitan Islam in meeting the befallen social and political predicaments of Muslim community.[41] Corresponding creatively to the modern context, the cosmopolitan Islam seeks to inculcate an essentially moderate, tolerant and progressive view of Islam where Muslims and non-Muslims are equal and freely practice their religious expressions. And more importantly as he continues, an intellectual endeavour of cosmopolitan Islam to constantly responsive toward the challenges of existing civilizations would eventually create a 'new civilization.'

By implication, the cornerstone of cosmopolitan Islam is the recognition of the extraordinary differences present in the cultural expressions of the people, religiously, ethnically, and politically, which ultimately form the historical context of

contemporary world. Thus, Abdurrahman argues, the required prerequisite to respond to this existing diversity is to substantially reformulate Islamic principles to appropriately articulate the themes of universal human rights, democratic transformation and socio-cultural reassertion of Islam in the modern life.[42] Referring to the Indonesian context, it is therefore, imperative that the efforts of Islam are directed towards the realization of these universal values of Islam.

Based on the premise of cosmopolitan nature of Islamic civilization, Abdurrahman acknowledges the role of Indonesian culture as a valuable element enriching his brand of Islamic visions. Because culture as to him, is "the art of living, which regulates the continuation of life and also produces the pillars contributing to maintain the existing social structure."[43] This suggests that culture is an important means by which the expressions of religious messages within any given society could be carried out. Therefore, it is entirely unsurprising that the early spread of Islam in the archipelago had significantly taken the form of cultural manifestations.

Acknowledging the significance of the cultural frameworks within any given society, Abdurrahman develops an approach of Islamic indigenisation or *pribumisasi* Islam, which is an intellectual attempt to creatively respond to the social and cultural needs in which Indonesian Islam is found. This concept does not suggest that religion and culture is on an equal standing. While it is true that religion is a separate entity whose dimensions is transcendental and spiritual, and the notion of culture whose dimensions encapsulate the worldly aspect of 'human social life' and often at odds with the principles of religion, both entities cannot be separated because of their mutual dynamic inter-relationship. He asserts,

> The source of Islam is revelation, which bears its own norms. Due to its normative character, it tends to be permanent. Culture, on the other hand, is a creation of human beings and therefore develops in accordance with social changes. This difference, however, does not prevent the manifestation of religious life in the form of culture.[44]

In this fashion, he explicitly rejects the reduction of *pribumisasi* Islam into the domain of syncretism or Javanization, for the syncretism means the juxtaposition of adulterated local traditions and the ritual veneration of the ancestors with the basic beliefs of Islam. *Pribumisasi* Islam Abdurrahman emphasizes, is an attempt to merely

> [c]onsider the needs of local traditions in formulating religious rules without changing its original verdict. Neither it attempts to omit the character of [religious] normative in favour of culture; rather it is for the religious norms to accommodate the needs of culture by appropriating the opportunities facilitated by the variants of *nash* or textual interpretations while acknowledging the role of *Ushul Fiqh* and *Qaidah Fiqh*.[45]

The preoccupation of *pribumisasi* Islam with the social and cultural needs is then, nothing less than an endeavour to accommodate the cultural paradigm of any given society that is consistent with the Islamic tenets. This concept, which asserts an effort to creatively incorporate an untainted localized culture, appears to demonstrate Abdurrahman's ardent criticism against an increasing demand of some Muslim intellectuals to literally apply Islam and subsequently emphasize the formalization of Arabic cultural symbolism. An attempt of Arabazing Indonesian Islam however, he

warily argues is harmful and consequently, would certainly alienate Indonesian Islam from its deep cultural roots and traditions.[46]

The example to use *'assalāmu'alaikum'* vis-à-vis *'selamat pagi'* – literally means good morning – is an illustrative example given by Abdurrahman in order to demonstrate Islam's consideration of local tradition. However, this proposal has increasingly brought about a widespread controversy and criticism. He has been criticized from religious standpoints for sacrificing religious teachings to the social and cultural demands of a society. Some critics even go further to cast doubt upon his Islamic credibility hereby maintaining that he is religiously offensive towards Muslim sensitivity.[47]

To counter this ardent criticism levelled against him, Abdurrahman cautions that in the articulation of *pribumisasi* Islam, the local culture should not be brought together with the Islamic principles. This is, to avoid the local practices from tainting the blueprint of Islam. In spite of the need to consider the cultural context of the local traditions, the distinctiveness of Islam must be preserved intact. For instance, the recitation of Qur'an should be forever performed in its Arabic language.[48] However, what is "indigenised *(dipribumikan)* is the manifestations of Islamic life. [And] not the core beliefs [of Islam] and its formal religious observances."[49]

In order to fully comprehend the articulation of *pribumisasi* Islam within the historical context of Islam, an extensive elaboration of Abdurrahman's argument is worth quoting. He posits that

> [c]ontextualization of Islam is part of Islamic history in both its original country, that is, Saudi Arabia, and non-original countries, including Indonesia. The two histories form a wide and long river, multiplied in various branches. If a new branch of the river joins them, it comes with a

4. Towards an Islamic Weltanschauung

As may be gleaned in the introduction of this chapter, the common notion shared by Muslims is that Islam is a universal teaching embracing every aspects of human life. This orientation has been the fundamental element of Islamic thinking providing the foundations for Muslims to perceive their relationship with the world. This emphasis on the all-embracing message of Islam is nothing less than an articulation of a timeless relevance of Islam and as such, transcending the barriers of time and space. One may argue then, Islam represents the complete order of civilization and a comprehensive body of moral values for both individual and collectively.[52]

But nevertheless, in spite of the universality of Islamic system, Abdurrahman argues that Islamic teachings can be divided into two broader structures, which are the established principles of Islamic values and the mechanism in which the application of these essential values can be realized at the practical level. His reflection on the concept of Islamic universalism is to essentially articulate Islamic Weltanschauung, which is characterized by an Islamic commitment to uphold the principles of social justice, equality and democracy.[53] He maintains that the articulation of these fundamental variables is of enormous importance, which would reinforce the role of Islam towards fostering an agenda of progress and social development thereby creating an egalitarian community.

Therefore, the conspicuous theme underlying Abdurrahman's endeavour is the continuous engagement with the issue of social justice. While recognizing the significant contribution of the Qur'an in providing the theoretical foundations of the matter, he is not content that the issue of justice is dealt with. He observes that the notion of justice being developed by the Qur'an is more mechanistic and legal-formalistic which then, lacks a creative reflection. He states, "because of the legal-

formalistic characteristic of the formulation of justice in the Qur'an, we can directly notice as a result, two basic problems arise namely, the limited vision of the notion of justice itself, and the compensatory nature in which the concept is practically articulated."[54]

To him, the limited vision of justice is discernable in the instance of the husband who has more than one wife. In this case, the fulfilment of justice is mechanistically articulated in the sense that the Qur'an only demands mere fair treatment from the husband towards his wives. The Qur'an thus, does not critically address the issue whether marrying more than one wife is indeed, a just deed. Moreover, the compensatory nature of the Qur'anic concept of justice is even manifest in its dealing especially with the divorced woman who is pregnant. The husband has a responsibility to financially supporting the woman who carries his unborn child. The financial support is therefore, conferred to the divorced pregnant woman as a compensation for her service of carrying the unborn child.[55] Given these limitations, it is on these grounds that Abdurrahman argues that it is imperative that Islam develops for itself a comprehensive reformulation of the concept in order to genuinely address all forms of injustices. In such a fashion, Islam is capable to creatively respond to the Muslim's social and political predicaments.

He argues that the realization of social justice is an essential prerequisite to create an egalitarian society whose dimension is to practically attain the prosperity and social transformation for the entire people regardless of their primordial loyalties. In line with this demand, Abdurrahman positively emphasizes that organized religions must attempt toward the fulfilment of this orientation. He exclaims,

public interest – *Tasarruf al-Imām 'alā Ra'iyyatihi Manūtun bi al-Maslaha.*[59] This principle constitutes an Islamic legal proposition with a definite impact on the articulation of genuine democratisation. As a concerned Muslim, Abdurrahman's purpose is however, to bring the moral truth of Islamic sharī'a to bear on the objective interests of the people.

Yet, it must be noted that his vision of Islam although more progressive, is no less reflective of the wisdom of Islamic modernism of the nineteenth century Middle East Islam. Muhammad Abduh for instance, strongly emphasized the role of consultation in order to maintain the moral fabric of the community, which he equated with 'parliamentary democracy'[60] making the ruler accountable to the popular will of society. Moreover, Abdurrahman's thought is also deeply rooted in the progressive thinking of 'Ali 'Abd al-Rāziq who argued that the principles of justice *('adālah)*, equality *(musāwāh)*, and democracy *(shūrā)* constitute the cornerstone of Islam.[61] As long as these principles sufficiently maintained, al-Rāziq assumed the establishment of Islamic state is controvertible.[62]

Like other modernist, it is apparent from above discussion that Abdurrahman is of the opinion that modern nation-state is a model for governance Islam. He thus, equates the prophetic model of statecraft *(shūrā)* with the doctrine of parliamentary democracy. What Abdurrahman fails to recognize, is the fact that these models not only of different frameworks and propositions,[63] but also ignores the notion that constitutional sovereignty assumes "a legislative authority of a binding nature" whereas the concept of *shūrā* is void from any claim of authority and hence, does not produce new legislation. It only continues to implement the established law.[64] It is therefore; not surprising that this modernist claim encountered harsh opposition from

Islamist holding that modernist is loosing some continuity with the past tradition. As Rahman persuasively argued,

> Indeed, the Modernist did not develop traditional Muslim thought from the inside to supply an adequate basis for the new values and institutions. It is also true that liberalism, as it has grown in the modern West, claims absolute validity for itself, and seeks no compromises or rapprochement with any other system of ideas or values. It is obvious enough that this liberalism, pushed to its logical conclusions, is self-defeating, and that it must impose certain checks upon itself. The early Muslim Modernists, the starting point of whose Modernism lay in Westernism, almost deified liberalism, and sought to impose its categories upon Muslim society. The result was that, when their message penetrated into the interior of the society, it was vehemently rejected.[65]

In addition, the West is equally critical of the undemocratic style of Muslim governance. Countering the severe critics of the West, which insistently holds the incompatibility of Islam with the modern democratic values, Abdurrahman confidently posits that Indonesian Islam could provide a workable example between Islam and democracy. He argues,

> All that the West sees in Islam is radicalism and its incompatibility with modern, open, democratic politics. Indonesia, however, has the opportunity to show that politics based on confession –as it is in Algeria and Iran– is not the only way. Not only can modernity and open politics exist in a Muslim-majority society, as it can here in Indonesia, but it can be nurtured so that democracy can flourish well in Islam.[66]

It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that Abdurrahman is vividly in agreement, despite relatively successful with the realization of democratisation, with a society where the notion of social justice is its underlying concern. He points out that an Islamic Weltanschauung could have not been effectively comprehended unless the urgent task of reinterpreting Islam or context-based ijtihād is pursued aiming to properly meet the contemporary challenges of a globalizing world.

5. From a Literalistic Ijtihād to the Context-based Ijtihād

As has been shown, the modern development of Indonesian Islam is preceded by the emergence of reform movement of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muhammad Abduh in the Middle East Islam at the turn of nineteenth century who unrelentingly promoted the new Islamic ideas and solutions to the cultural challenges of the West as well as to its colonial presence. Al-Afghānī argued that the urgent task facing the modern Muslim mind is, how to create a viable unitary front of Islamic world under the auspice of single Caliphate institution. This political manifesto has been widely known as pan-Islamism.[67] Meanwhile, he also vigorously encouraged Muslims to adopt modern technology necessary to the development of Islam in the modern age. He pointed out; the success of the West is basically due to its commitment to proper application of knowledge, while the weakness of Muslim is due to the prevailing state of ignorance and blind imitation.[68]

Additionally, the role of Abduh is equally of tremendous importance in the later development of Islamic new thinking in Indonesia. Assuming the decadence of Islamic civilizational sensibilities, he maintained that Muslim should directly go to the original principles of Islam and appropriately utilizes them in order to regain the

degree of 'greatness' of Islam. Nonetheless, this established set of sources and values must be contextually reinterpreted in order to meet the changing demands of the contemporary world.[69] It is with little doubt that the current of this reform thought was to be felt with some force in the newly established school of Indonesian neo-modernism.

One may argue that the wave of Islamic reformism steadily developed in Indonesia as early as nineteenth century when prominent Indonesian students went to the heartland of Middle East Islam for the pursuit of religious knowledge. As they returned to Indonesia, they pioneered the establishment of Muhammadiyah a puritan Islamist organization aimed at intellectually revoking the cultural penetration of the West and to withstand the presence of colonial authority in the archipelago. Like its counterpart in the Middle East, Muhammadiyah was equally more concerned with the need to purify Indonesian Islam from the corrupted impacts of localized traditions. Even though they could not completely transform the sizeable number of Muslims into their own image, "Islamic modernism has nonetheless" Federspiel argues, "exerted considerable influence within that community and can claim credit for acting as a catalyst in the development of communal advancement in the last century."[70]

It is important to note though that while this reform movement occurred amidst the subordination of political Islam and an intellectual decay of Indonesian Islam, the leading Muslim modernists in Indonesia were content to view that Islam is a singular and monolithic entity that painstakingly embraces the private and social aspects of life. Thus, they insistently required the establishment of Islam as a basis of the state. Differed considerably from the common orientation of Islamic modernism elsewhere, it must be emphasized that Indonesian modernist has been often associated with the movement that demands the reinstitution of sharī'a-based state.[71] Moreover,

basing their intellectual endeavour on the legacy of Islamic modernism, they arrived at the need to cultivate the ideological agenda of Islam as the only legitimate foundation for independent Indonesia. In response to this representation, while being aware of the importance of classical Islam, the intellectual landscape of Indonesian Islam at the end of seventies and in the beginning of eighties has experienced a substantive transformation that is more sensitive to and responsive towards the changing situations and the cultural penetration of the West.

This nucleus of new Islamic thinking discursively engages with the essential task of contextually reformulating Islam. Sadly, the contemporary discussion of Islamic discourse as neo-modernist bemoans, is often located in an ideologically and politically charged territory. Most crudely, the general preoccupation of Islamic scholarship has been long dichotomised between Muslim modernist who holds that Western images of modernity is the viable orientation of solving Muslim predicaments while remaining faithful to the tenets of Islam on the one hand, and the legal-formalist who aspires to re-institute a sharī'a-based constitutions to form an Islamically informed righteous society on the other. However, these prevalent intellectual trends have consequently moved steadily towards a type of Islamic liberalism and religious fundamentalism respectively.[72] One could argue that this intellectual dichotomy between modernism and Islamism constitutes a part of post-colonial imagery where Islamic discourse is embroiled within broader nationalist debates about the foundational principle of the state, majority-minority rights, and the process of democratic transformation.

In response to these intellectual phenomena, Indonesian Islam represents a different school of Islamic thinking of which Abdurrahman is a main contributor and whose aspiration is to substantially engage with the historical legacy of Islam in order

to creatively attend to modern challenges facing the Muslim community. It is appropriate to say that Abdurrahman's ideas were formulated at the time of the severe crisis of Islamic politics and the long-standing tension between Islamic traditionalism and modernism in Indonesia. Although he addresses the political agenda of Indonesian Islam, his intellectual preoccupations were essentially cultural in orientation and less concerned with the ideological articulation of Islam. But, we also cannot dismiss the political ramifications of Abdurrahman's discourse upon the broader political landscape in Indonesia especially with regard to the contentious issue of Islam-*Pancasila* relationship, since he is after all the chairman of the NU, the largest traditionalist organization in Indonesia. Abdurrahman's thought fundamentally emerges in response to the problems that were intrinsic to a process of cultural and social reassertion of Indonesian Islam in the modern era through an articulate and innovative reinterpretation of Islamic teachings.

He firmly argues that the befallen social, political and cultural predicaments of contemporary Islam reside in a more traditional legal-formalistic and scripturalistic interpretation of Islamic principles, which has considerably hampered the pursuit of Islamic reform. He is undoubtedly aware of the effort of a sizable number of Muslims to impose the application of Islamic sharī'a through the politicisation of Islamic organization.[73] As he argues, the current efforts of Islamic movements have essentially been

> [e]ntrapped in the universal and idealistic view, which how the textual underpinnings of religious teachings form religious laws in an idealistic manner out of which the universal frameworks of Islamic life is based. Indeed, this perspective is nothing less than an indication of a critical interest, which often does not reflect the public interest of the people.[74]

This rigid universalistic approach however, merely emphasizes an overly literal understanding of scriptures, which have ultimately engendered the kind of religious extremism that rejects an attempt to reconcile the essence of Islamic transcendental values with the changing needs of modern life.[75] Abdurrahman describes the current emergence of religious radicalism is a result of reductionist interpretation of the "documents from the 7th and 8th centuries, from the alien world of tribal Arab society among the desert sands"[76] out of its historical context.

He goes on to demonstrate that the dominant orientation of an idealistic interpretation of Islam can be captured in the following reasons, the most important of which is, an excessive emphasis to idealize the historical example of Islamic civilization. If anything, this emphasis of the recognized greatness of Islamic civilization has resulted in an idealistic speculation, which is unfortunately incapable of reflecting the empirical reality of the present needs. In addition, contemporary Islamic scholarship in its endeavour to revive the Islamic civilizational vivacity often employs a subjective approach. As such, neither is this effort able to generate a discreet objective investigation, nor is it capable of transcending its present socio-political, cultural and intellectual impasse. This approach Abdurrahman posits unsurprisingly leads towards an irrational need to realize an idealistic society, which would necessarily preclude the perceived reality of Muslims society. Moreover, a non-compromised attitude of Islamic reform to articulate the features, dispositions and characters of righteous Islamic society equally results in the historical de-contextualization of Islamic legacy.[77]

Most crudely, these efforts have intellectually created an Islamic legalism whose sharī'a-based state is the prime aspiration. An Islamic legal-formalism is

however, the product of the past, which is the distorted historical reality that unfortunately resulted in the transition of Islamic thought from dynamism to an overly scriptural-formalism. In other words, over the course of its historical development, Islam has been literally legalised and institutionalised through the institution of Islamic sharī'a especially, when al-Shāfi'ī in the latter half of 2nd/8th century tirelessly propounded the Hadīth as the authoritative foundation for the law, and simultaneously dislodging an effort of independent reasoning or ijtihād through *qiyās*.[78] Undoubtedly, an early attempt to formalize and institutionalise an idealistic picture of Islam instead, brought about a rigid and oppressive reality. Abdurrahman states,

> We are presented now with an Islam that oppressively puts human life within the narrow confinements of a rigid viewpoint: the demand for the so-called 'sharia state,' the equivalent of what is known in Western thought as theocracy.[79]

This legal-formulistic approach is essentially grounded in a more rigid literalistic understanding of scripture, a monolithic and singular vision of Islam that demands, "a mono-cultural environment for its religious expression, with rigorous conformity to the prescribed life pattern and no room for any deviation."[80] It seeks to literally formalize Islam in the life of the nation-state, idealising the example of prophetic state as the only viable social system[81] with the assumption that it is likely capable of overcoming the befallen socio-political crisis of the Muslim world and transcending the limitations of cultural expression of Islamic teachings. It equally seeks to assert and impose the implementation of the prescribed past Islamic legal opinions as a positive law albeit superficially, in the present day, with little concern for the agenda of reformulating contemporary Islamic principles to meet the demands of the time.

In spite of an urgent need of Islamic reform to resolve an inner decay of Islam, Abdurrahman is not content with the literalistic and reductionist approach in regenerating the sensibilities of Islamic civilization. Contrary to this standpoint, he begins by redefining Islam, providing Islam with newly developed understanding that would reinforce the role of Islam in the life of nation-state and recapture its cosmopolitan character. He strongly believes that Islam does not need the formal institutional structure in order to articulate its religious teachings. Instead, Islamic teachings should be contextually reformulated to recapture the universal values of Islam and its timeless relevance.

As previously discussed, the universal teachings of Islam are thoroughly embedded in its concept of monotheism *(tawhīd)*, law *(fiqh)* and ethics *(akhlāq)*. In order to correspond to the challenges of modern world creatively, Islam should develop new approaches seeking to recapture Islamic sensibilities. This new religious thinking requires the reinterpretation of Qur'an and Hadīth contextually and as such, they are not to be understood in its normative and theological sense.[82] Moreover, it overwhelmingly suggests that the dogmatic and normative articulation of the text is only feasible in the matters that are directly related to the principles of religion. In essence, this attempt is to reprove the ideological appropriation of Islam and hence, lay the foundations for an Islamic renewal that is responsive to the modern development.

Abdurrahman explicitly rejects Islam as a political ideology that requires its adherents to establish an exclusive Islamic institutional structure as a prerequisite vehicle to articulate the formal goal of *al-Amr bi al-Ma'rūf wa al-Nahyu 'an al-Munkar*. Instead, the pursuit of this legal maxim, according to him, should be undertaken in a fashion that reinforces the socio-cultural reassertion of Islam. This

approach essentially asserts the ethical and moral elements of Islamic teachings. In turn, it would generate the process of Islamization from below and thereby foster an Islamically oriented society[83] without being trapped in the political rhetoric of institutionalised Islam.

Being a concerned Muslim, Abdurrahman recognizes the all-encompassing aspect of Islamic teachings. Nonetheless, he challenges Islam as being a permanent and rigid body of principles. He states,

> I never reject "the main teaching of Islam" like the Islamic faith in God (tauhid). But, I have opposite thought against the other thought which judge some teaching as "the final and unchanged teaching of Islam." In fact, the teaching they refer to had, through certain ways, been changing. Among of the certain ways is the teaching reinterpretation by Muslims over matters, which had been before considered as the truth. Those "relative truth" had changed through reinterpretation of teaching by Muslims who believe Islam as the last religion.[84]

This view strongly implies that Islam over the course of its historical development underwent a substantive reinterpretation and transformation in a way that directly corresponds to new issues and problems in order to recapture its universal relevance. Therefore, Abdurrahman maintains that in the light of modern challenges, the frameworks of Islamic teachings should be developed in a new perspective that is sensitive to the dire issues afflicting Muslim societies such as poverty and the prevalent structure of socio-political injustices.[85] Stated differently, Abdurrahman's agenda of religious reinterpretation lies in the need to understand the religious principles and teachings with its empirical reality seriously taken into consideration.

As such, he rejects the conviction that Islam is a final and unchanged body of teachings.

The contextual reapplication of the texts is possibly the best example in which to demonstrate that Islamic sharī'a is primarily a relative truth. According to Abdurrahman, it is not to suggest that the reinterpretation of texts necessarily mean the need to change the original verdict of the text; rather it is an attempt at the continuous reinterpretation of Islamic scruples seeking to meet the demands of modern requirements and articulate its timeless applicability.[86] He asserts that

> [t]here is a subtle linkage between belief and empiric reality in a Muslim. This linkage, by itself, exists as the result of natural and common process among the life of Muslim community. Based on the reality, which has been recorded in the history of Muslim, this can likely come true. Here we find the significant worth of the words "the conflicting opinion among leaders is a mercy on the people.[87] –*Ikhtilāfu ummatī rahmah.*

In articulating this view, Abdurrahman sees the reduction of Islam to stifling literalism and formalism as an aberration and a major impediment to pursuing religious transformation in the globalizing world. "The whole situation has to be changed," he states, "if Islam is asked to contribute to the formulation of a new world civilization in the future."[88] He further maintains that the conceptualisation of Islam as, simply a rigid formulation of the divine law should constantly undergo a perpetual reinterpretation and develop a dynamic character of its tradition to better reflect the basic and universal vision of Islam in light of ever-changing human situations. This process, Abdurrahman posits will produce a dynamic and creative approach that is more suitable to and capable of responding to the perceived reality of modern life.

Thus, it is intellectually imperative that the principle of flexibility be maintained while undertaking the task of reinterpreting Islam. A case in point is his view on the Qur'anic verse of the permissibility of polygamy, which ignores the implicit contextual understanding of the verse. He states,

> I do not agree with the permissibility now of having more than one wife. We shall develop consensus that will disallow that. Why? My thinking is in line with the verse, which says that if there is a fear among you of injustice then a man can only have one wife. Who should decide on the issue of justice? Whether it is just or not? The woman is the object not the subject. In this matter, then, there should be a referendum and the women should decide. And I think it will be the majority. Yes, the majority. But, you know, although I call for that I do not reject its permissibility in the past. That is important.[89]

This without doubt suggests that the change in values and orientations is an inevitable consequence of the changing environment. Even though this practice was acceptable in the past, it could not be so in the present. He continues, "I will never ever say that the Prophet made a mistake. It was appropriate at that time. We have to find a way to make Islam relevant to the needs and practices of the time. And for me at this time we should not allow this."[90] However, in constantly reformulating its teachings contextually, Islam then, would be able to attend to the changing modern demands and as such, will reinforce its timeless relevance and compatibility. Thus, defining Islam in the idealistic fashion Abdurrahman argues, is harmful and will only result in the trivialization of understanding Islam and consequently distort the genuine picture of Islam.[91]

The example of women leadership in the modern time also suffices to demonstrate an urgent need of perpetual reformulation of Islamic teachings. The invocation of prophetic saying that allegedly prevents Muslims from being led by women, Abdurrahman argues, should be historically and contextually reinterpreted. He explains that when the Prophet stated this case, he was referring to the tribal society of Arab in the seventh century, where the civil war, robbery, adultery were rampant. Given the absence of the organized structural system within tribal society, as the pole of the tribe, the chief was fully responsible for the well-being of his society. Nevertheless, this structural system of society and the mode of tribal leadership are hardly found in the modern age and its authority is no longer personalized. Unlike the traditional tribal system, the authority in the modern world has been institutionalised, and inevitably requires the equitable distribution of authority. On this basis, Abdurrahman concludes that women in modern days are equally entitled to assume the leadership.[92]

Above all, with the empirical reality of modern developments, which increasingly challenges the standard worldview of Muslim, it is imperative that Islam continuously engages with social realities in order to creatively contribute to the broader picture of Islamic thought. As for Abdurrahman, the discipline most urgently in need of reformulation is Islamic law. He observes that

> [t]he pattern or thinking regarding Islam in this country [Indonesia] is, in the same way, very apologetic in nature, able only to proclaim a vision of an ideal world in which Islamic law, it is emphatically proclaimed, has the power to bring happiness in this life and in the life to come, a world of the form of a city of God *(Civitas Dei)* far beyond the reach of this present age, with all of its needs and critical issues requiring urgent attention and instant

> solutions. Should we then be surprised if Islamic law has lost its relevance to the developments in our lives all around us?[93]

Thus, in order to acquire the relevance of Islamic law in the present day, it must

> [d]evelop for itself a dynamic character. In doing this it needs to formulate itself as supporter of the development of national law in its realm of development. This dynamic character can only be obtained if Islamic law focuses its attention upon the sort of worldly issues that our nation is struggling with at present, and provides solutions for the real life problems facing us at this point of time. It is being demanded of Islamic law that it develops itself in this way in a process of fluid change, and not be simply bound to the visions of a fantasised reality, conceived in accordance with theories created in a long past age. This self-development requires a vision that extends well beyond the circle of Islamic legal experts themselves. In other words, it requires taking a multi-dimensional approach to life, and not simply reaming bound to normative formulations long since settled, that are, in fact, virtually at the point of becoming fossils.[94]

He continues, stating that in spite of the remarkable significance of al-Shāfi'ī legacy in systemizing the Islamic legal method to arrive at the legal religious decision, his *Ushūl al-Fiqh* or the roots of jurisprudence is less effective to overcome the literal and formalistic view of Islamic sharī'a. Instead, this effort he suggests, has eventually failed to prevent religious law from being in a creative way responsive to the unfolding modern requirements. Further, being literally tied to the use of words, Islamic law has consequently become an irrelevant repertoire, which has completely lost touch with the reality.[95]

Drawing an ardent desire to effectively recapture the relevance of Islamic law in the globalizing modern world, Abdurrahman explains

> [t]he invitation for growth and re-invigoration is not an invitation to tear down Islamic law. Rather, an invitation such as this is simply intended to align Islamic law to the needs of the moment, to align it to the constantly changing needs of humankind. What is intended is that efforts be made to make it more sensitive to the needs of humanity in this present age and in the age to come. Through this sensitivity Islamic law will constantly make the adjustments required, without sacrificing its transcendental values as fixed by God who must be praised. Through this sensitivity Islamic law will continue to contribute to the development of the nation, that is to say it will create dynamic principles for life based upon an awareness of the necessity for men and women to labour within the limits of their ability as mere creatures.[96]

It is therefore, the reinvigoration of Islamic law and the reformulation of its 'principle of decision-making which should better reflect the needs of our age. Human judgement must be given due place' to meet the contextual demands of the modern time and correspond to the empirical reality of public interest. As such, the reformulation of Islamic sharī'a would not only better regenerate the greater social and cultural reassertion of Islam in the modern world but also would foster the establishment of an Islamic Weltanschauung that is capable of upholding the essence of human dignity, the principles of democracy and social transformation.

Abdurrahman's purpose of his reinterpretation is to bridge the gulf within Islamic society, and in so doing to strengthen its moral fabric. He believes that this cannot be done by a return to the idealization of the past; rather its pursuit must start

with accepting the need for change with Islamic principles as a basis for the process. Equally, he emphasizes that the universal values within Islam possesses the potentialities of a rational religion and ethical code, which could serve as the foundation for modern life and the basis of progressive society. He argues "the inclination of both to formalise Islamic teachings in the life of the people and Islamise it in the form of symbolic manifestations would not be beneficial, instead, will result towards the barrenness of [Islamic] substance."[97]

To show that Islam can be made as much responsive to the demands of the time, Abdurrahman though in a subtle way employs the established principle of *maslaha*, or the consideration of public interest, in developing his context-based ijtihād. As far as the practice of Mālikī jurists is concerned, this rule has been traditionally used to interpret Qur'an and Hadīth in explaining the principle purpose of revelation to establish the essential welfare of the people. The fullest expression of *maslaha* is to be found in the Shātibī's discussion. He defines this principle as follows,

> I mean by *maslaha* that which concerns the subsistence of human life, the completion of man's livelihood, and the acquisition of what his emotional and intellectual qualities require of him, in an absolute sense.[98]

Abdurrahman believes that the texts must be contextually reinterpreted to attend to specific problems of modern social life reflecting on the perceived reality of the people. Since the problem is in constant flux and change, the application of revelation is consequently susceptible to change. However, the fundamental principle in which the reinterpretation of Islamic teachings can be understood is the rightful consideration of the general welfare of humankind. Only in such a way, can the

applicability of Islamic law in the modern day be maintained. He strongly believes that by asserting contextualized ijtihād in dealing with the problems afflicting Muslim society, Islam would be able to pursue an agenda of transformation and attain greater social and cultural reassertion.

What the context-based ijtihād assumes is an ardent desire to appropriately establish the implicit contextual understanding of the texts in order to creatively meet the challenges of modernity through the process of 'dynamization.' To Abdurrahman, the 'dynamization' is the "revitalization of the available positive values, and the replacement of values towards perfection. This process of replacement is called modernization. It is clear that the meaning of modernization itself has been basically constituted in the word dynamization. The usage of dynamization itself means "changes towards improvement" by using the available world-view and tools as its bases."[99] I now turn my attention to the role of Islam in bringing about socio-cultural transformation.

6. Islam and Transformation

While recognizing the importance of the substantive reinterpretation of religious teachings to meet the demands of the modern age, Abdurrahman strongly believes that religion also has an effective role to articulate an agenda of massive transformation.[100] He argues that the social significance of religious teachings fundamentally lie in its role to regulate the life of people in a relatively orderly manner. Moreover, religion is equally instrumental in shaping and determining the social values and cultural orientations by which the entire society is bound.

Sadly, religion is often sociologically assumed to be a potential impediment to realize meaningful transformation and is consequently regarded as a difficult variable

to accommodate change. Unlike religion, other components of social infrastructure such as the societal system, language, arts and technology are more likely to constantly undergo the process of gradual transformation and change. Against this analysis, Abdurrahman argues that religion has vast potentialities, which are useful and beneficial for the transformation of traditional society.[101]

He firmly believes that Islam has in its history been, albeit gradually, more susceptible to the process of change. He asserts that every religion essentially possesses the transformative potentialities, which enable it to survive ever-changing situations. Given this ability of religious potentialities to realize the process of social change, it has thus been continuously appropriated to serve as an agent of social transformation. Consequently, social transformation necessarily requires a perpetual reapplication and readjustment of religious principles in order to meet that demands. In support for his position, he quotes Snouck Hurgronje who holds the view that every period in the history of the culture of a nation, compels its religious groups to re-examine the essence of its *'aqīdah* and religion.[102] Abdurrahman argues,

> Religion, among other things, as an element of social values, its understanding of religious teachings undergoes a process of change as the values are changing. The changes in values and the understanding of religious teachings were the result of internal changes in the society as well as of the external influences.[103]

To affirm the role of religion as an essential drive for social change, Abdurrahman exhibits the display of intellectual flexibility of the traditionalist or 'old-fashioned' scholars of NU in response to the needs of modern life. He writes,

> The flexible approach of this unique 'old-fashioned' *kiai*[104] is most interesting, because it has a number of implications. What is clear is that it is not right for us to regard these 'old-fashioned' *kiai* as forming opinions without any rational basis, being only able to pass on the contents of classical *fiqh* literature without expanding upon it in any way...They also have an ability to apply principles drawn from religious conclusions to concrete cases in accordance with what they understand to be the needs of the day.[105]

While assuming the importance of reinterpretation, he states that this hermeneutical understanding of the texts is also essentially intended to articulate the program of transformation seeking to regenerate the social and cultural presence of Islam in the public domain. "Every religion" Abdurrahman writes, "essentially possesses the transformative character, which strives to inculcate new values and replace the old ones, which is detrimental to the teachings of religion."[106]

Nonetheless, he does not to suggest that the need of the transformation of religious teachings is to discard the past of Islamic tradition completely. Rather, it is to render a change with some continuity with the past. Abdurrahman believes that

> [t]he tradition is the valuable legacy of the past, which should be as long as possible preserved without hampering the growth of individual creativity. Nevertheless, the tradition itself should be constantly dynamized in order to avoid the process of stagnancy and rigidity for the growth of individual creativity. Therefore, an effort must be put to emphasize the ability of the tradition to adjust itself to the continuous unfolding demands, or in other words, how to develop the essence of the tradition in the constantly changing circumstances.[107]

Furthermore, in order to foster a meaningful and effective transformation, he asserts that the creative engagements with the totality of Islam should be directed to rediscover and extract the underlying moral rectitude of Islam and the essence of its worldviews. Thus, an effort of religious transformation needs not to be perceived as an institutionalisation of formal Islam and the establishment of an institutional structure of political Islam. Instead, it is more concerned with the cultivation of greater participation of socio-cultural expression of Islam in the globalizing world. In sum, it appears to reveal the "positive legacy of the past", informing the moral acumen of modern life.[108]

However, it follows according to Abdurrahman that the transformation of religious thought and the modernization of Islamic thinking is the first step in resuscitating the social and cultural reassertion of Islam in the modern world. This leads him as previously discussed, to retain the fundamental values of Islamic universalism that is more suitable to and capable of religious rejuvenation. The developments of religious thinking therefore, should better reflect the issues and problems of modern requirements hereby being able to meet the contextual demands of ever-changing circumstances.

Abdurrahman's synthesis of the transformative capabilities of religion thus, emerges from the internal motivations of religion, which allows it to form a cohesive societal category and the external situations, which continuously challenge the claim of timeless applicability of religious universal values. As God's vicegerent on earth, Muslims are responsible for constantly witnessing, fostering and founding the righteous society capable of sustaining the genuine equality.[109] Thus, this internal contextual understanding of religion should reflect the commitment to realize the prosperous society whereby the essential equality between the people is its grounding

rule. Moreover, with the increasing challenges of modern circumstances and the changing human conditions, religion has to mobilize it religious as well as social capacity in order to realize an agenda of transformation or "conscientization"[110] seeking to effectively create an egalitarian society to borrow one of Abdurrahman's neologisms. He states, what constitutes the principle of democracy is an underlying commitment to sustain the implementation of the equality, freedom and the structural transformation of the people.[111]

I have no doubt in my mind, that while recognizing the effective impact of religion to serve as an agent of social transformation, Abdurrahman's conclusion is consistent with Weberian analysis of religion in the contemporary nineteenth century debates in relation to modernity. Max Weber is of the view that religion and Protestantism in particular, constitutes the driving force of modernity. Through the manipulation of symbols, Weber firmly believes that religion is able to provide a basis for the development of a more rationalized, and abstracted social organizations.[112] Therefore, the role of religious priests, *ulama* or *Kiai* and monastic orders are crucial for the evolution of the society toward the fulfilment of modernization. As Geertz aptly describes the important function of *Kiai* in the Javanese Islamic society as a "cultural broker" who "able to play a cultural middlemen role between peasant and metropolitan life, and so create an effective juncture between traditional cultural patterns and modern ones, is in many way the most essential prerequisite for the success."[113]

7. Conclusion

In this chapter I have thoroughly examined the historical development of 'neo-modernism,' the newly established school of Islamic thinking which occurred in

eighties Indonesia, using Abdurrahman Wahid as the representative of this trend. The intellectual preoccupation underlying this school, as argued, is to advocate an integration of Islamic traditional scholarship with the modern methodologies of Western thought. Moreover, the themes of the universal values of Islam, the cosmopolitanism of Islamic civilization, and the contextualized ijtihād or *pribumisasi* Islam are the central features of Abdurrahman's thought and, according to him are necessary for the development of society in meeting the dire social ills and modern challenges afflicting Muslim societies.

Abdurrahman's concerted emphasis on the reinterpretation of Islam was sought to articulate the Weltanschauung of Islam in order to foster a genuine effort at democratic transformation, political pluralism, equality and freedom in modern Indonesia. The deployment of this concept equally intended to effectively cultivate a social as well as a cultural reassertion of Islam in the globalizing world. As such, Islam would be able to reaffirm its presence and thereby positively and meaningfully recapture the relevance of the cosmopolitan nature of Islamic civilization.

Despite the vigorous contribution of the 'neo-modernism' thinking in the current intellectual landscape of Indonesian Islam which attracted the growing educated groups and that urban middle class, like earlier modernists, Abdurrahman's thought remains incapable of bringing about tangible solutions to the current social, political and cultural predicaments of Indonesian Islam. While his writings represent an ardent criticism of a de-contextualized legal-formalistic interpretation of Islamic thought, his engagement with the tradition of Islamic heritage is notwithstanding, more superficial rather than a genuine one. The next chapter explores some of these shortcomings by critically engaging Abdurrahman's neo-modernist vision.

Endnotes

[1] Iqbal, Sir Muhammad. 1986, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, p. 134.
[2] An interview quoted in Saeed, Abdullah. 1997, '*Ijtihād* and Innovation in Neo-Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, vol. 8, no. 3, p. 288.
[3] Watt, Professor William Montgomery. 1988, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity*, Routledge, London & New York, p. 3.
[4] Even though intellectually contestable, I believe it is a theoretical necessity to deploy this term of 'neo-modernism' as an explanatory trend of new intellectualism emerging at the end of 1970s and in the beginning of 1980s Indonesia contrasting the prevalent stream of Islamic modernism that often associated with the desire to realize sharī'a-based state. See, Rahman, Fazlur. 1970, 'Islamic Modernism: Its Scope, Method and Alternatives, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 317-333.
[5] Barton, Greg. 1997, 'Indonesia's Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual *Ulama*: The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in Neo-Modernist Thought', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, vol. 8, no. p. 324.
[6] Mitsuo, Nakamura. 1995, 'Nahdlatul Ulama', In John L. Esposito (Ed), *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World*, vol. 3, Oxford University Press, New York, London, p. 218.
[7] Saleh, Fauzan. 2001, *Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse in 20th Century Indonesia: A Critical Survey*, Brill, Leiden, p. 71.
[8] Peacock, James L. 1978, *Muslim Puritans: Reformist Psychology in Southeast Asian Islam*, University of California Press, Berkeley, p. 51.
[9] Samson, Allan A. 1968, 'Islam in Indonesian Politics', *Asian Survey*, vol. 8, no. 12, p. 1002.
[10] Geertz, Clifford. 1990, 'The Religion of Java', In Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique and Yasmin Hussain (Eds), *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, p. 273.
[11] Barton, Indonesia's Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual *Ulama*, p. 324.
[12] Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal. 1987, 'Islamic Modernism', In Mircea Eliade (Ed), *The Encyclopaedia of Religion*, vol. 10, Macmillan, New York, p. 14.
[13] Ibid., p. 15.
[14] Barton, Greg. 1995, 'Neo-Modernism: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia', *Studia Islamika*, vol. 2, no. 3, p. 5.
[15] The late Fazlur Rahman who made a vigorous attempt to describe the evolving new school of Islamic thought in the modern era first employed the term of Islamic 'neo-modernism', which subsequently deployed by Nurcholish Madjid –Rahman's student at the University of Chicago– to express his renewal effort. His seminar paper 'The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integration of the Ummat' was inadvertently popularised this term. For the complete translation of the paper refer to Muhammad Kamal Hasan. 1982, *Muslim Intellectual responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia*, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, pp. 187-197. However, while this movement is sort of the continuation of the early Islamic modernism in Indonesia, it is true that its creative approach to deal with the modern requirements is extremely different from that of the earlier modernism.
[16] Saleh, *Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse in 20th Century Indonesia*, p. 242.
[17] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1994, 'Islam, Politics and Democracy', In David Bourchier & John Legge (Eds), *Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s*, Monash University Press, Clayton, p. 151.
[18] Samson, 'Islam in Indonesian Politics', p. 1004.
[19] The 'Old Order' was basically used to politically describe Sukarno rule, which spanned a period from 1945 to 1965.
[20] After the forceful deposition of Sukarno, the military-backed regime of Suharto was installed on March 11, 1966, which later became well known as the 'New Order.' However, with the severe and ravaging economic inflation in 1997, an uncontrollable spiral of social and political disturbances was rampant across the archipelago. Additionally, with the widespread protest led by the students'

movements and other non-governmental organizations, in May 1998 Suharto unwilling to give up his rule, heralded the birth of a 'reformation' era of Indonesian history.

[21] Hefner, Robert W. 2000, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*, Princeton University Press, Princeton & Oxford, p. 59.

[22] See, Schwarz, Adam. 1994, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s*, Westview Press, Australia, pp. 162-193; Vatikiotis, Michael R. J. 1993, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change*, Routledge, London & New York, pp. 120-138.

[23] Madjid, Nurcholish. 1982, 'The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integration of the Ummat', In Muhammad Kamal Hasan (Ed), *Muslim Intellectual responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia*, p. 196; Johns, Anthony H. 1987, 'An Islamic System or Islamic Values? Nucleus of a Debate in Contemporary Indonesia', In William R. Roff (Ed), *Islam and Political Economy of Meaning: Comparative Studies of Muslim Discourse*, Croom Helm, London & Sydney, pp. 254-280.

[24] Indonesian neo-modernists are more concerned with the increasing apologetic and literal approach of Indonesian modernist to vigorously argue for the reinstitution of an Islamic state. As an ardent critic against this approach, Nurcholish Madjid argues that "viewed from the perspective of the history and development of thought, the emergence of the idea of the "Islamic State" represents, in reality, a kind of apologetic tendency." He continues, "The concept of "Islamic State" is a distortion of the [properly] proportioned relationship between state and religion. The state is one of the aspects of worldly life whose dimension is rational and collective, while religion is an aspect of another kind of life whose dimension is spiritual and personal." See Madjid, Nurcholish. 1982, 'Reinvigorating Religious Understanding in the Indonesian Muslim Community', In Muhammad Kamal Hasan (Ed), *Muslim Intellectual responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia*, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, p. 230 and 232 respectively. Likewise, with the extraordinary diversity of Indonesia, Abdurrahman contends that the creation of the Islamic state in Indonesia is untenable. He argues the absence of the 'concept' of the state has been regarded as a major obstacle to determine the scope and structure of the issue. See Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1999, *Tuhan Tidak Perlu Dibela*, *LKiS*, Yogyakarta, p. 17.

[25] Cited in John L. Esposito and John O. Voll. 2001, 'Abdurrahman Wahid: Scholar-President', In *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 207.

[26] Dessouki, 'Islamic Modernism', p. 16.

[27] Rahman, Fazlur. 1970, 'Revival and Reform in Islam', In P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton and Bernard Lewis (Eds), *The Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 2, The University Press, Cambridge, p. 649.

[28] Rahman, 1966, *Islam*, p. 223.

[29] Barton, 'Indonesia's Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual Ulama', p. 344.

[30] Hefner, Robert W. 2001, 'Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization', *Sociology of Religion*, vol. 62, no. 4, p. 498.

[31] Barton, Greg. 1994, 'The Impact of neo-Modernism on Indonesian Islamic Thought: The Emergence of a New Pluralism', In David Bourchier & John Legge (Eds), *Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s*, Monash University Press, Clayton, p. 145.

[32] Saeed, '*Ijtihād* and Innovation in Neo-Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia', p. 284.

[33] See, Riddell, Peter. 2001, *Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World: Transmission and Responses*, Horizon Books, Singapore.

[34] Mujiburrahman's translation, Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1994, 'Universalime Islam dan Kosmopolitanisme Peradaban Islam', In Budhy Munawar-Rachman (Ed), *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam Dalam Sejarah*, Paramadina, Jakarta, p. 545.

[35] Ibid., p. 546.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid., p. 549.

[38] Ibid., p. 550.

[39] Moosa, Ebrahim. 2001-02, 'The Poetics and Politics of Law After Empire: Reading Women's Rights in the Contestations of Law', *UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law*, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 37.

[40] An interview cited in Saeed, '*Ijtihād* and Innovation in Neo-Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia', pp. 292-3.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1999, *Islam, Negara, dan Demokrasi*, Penerbit Erlangga, Jakarta, p. 52.

[43] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 2001, *Pergulatan Negara, Agama, dan Kebudayaan*, Desantara, Depok, p. 3.

[44] Ibid., p. 117. [This is Mujiburrahman's translation, which appears in his article 1999, 'Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Political Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, vol. 10, no. 3, p. 342.]
[45] Ibid., p. 119.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Barton, Greg. 2002, *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid*, Equinox Publishing, Jakarta, p. 159.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Wahid, *Tuhan Tidak Perlu Dibela*, p. 92.
[50] Wahid, *Pergulatan Negara, Agama, dan Kebudayaan*, p. 120.
[51] Ibid., p. 118.
[52] Maududi, Abul A'la. 1978, 'What Islam Stands For', In Altaf Gauhar (Ed), *The Challenge of Islam*, Islamic Council of Europe, London, p. 13.
[53] Wahid, *Pergulatan Negara, Agama, dan Kebudayaan*, p. 131.
[54] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1994, 'Konsep-Konsep Keadilan', In Budhy Munawar-Rachman (Ed), *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam Dalam Sejarah*, Paramadina, Jakarta, p. 101.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Quoted in Mujiburrahman. 1999, 'Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Political Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, vol. 10, no. 3, p. 347.
[57] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1996, 'Islam, Pluralisme dan Demokratisasi', In Arief Afandi (Ed), *Islam Demokrasi Atas Bawah: Polemik Strategi Perjuangan Umat Model Gus Dur dan Amien Rais*, Pustaka Pelajar, Yogyakarta, p. 118.
[58] Wahid, *Islam, Negara, dan Demokrasi*, pp. 87-8; and for a detailed analysis of neo-modernist intellectuals on the issue of democracy refer to, Abdillah, Masykuri. 1995, *Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy (1966-1993)*, Dissertation zur Erlangung der würde des Doktors der philosophie der Universität Hamburg.
[59] Wahid, *Pergulatan Negara, Agama, dan Kebudayaan*, p. 131.
[60] Hourani, Albert. 1970, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939*, Oxford University Press, London, Oxford, New York, p. 144.
[61] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1994, 'Islam, Ideologi dan Etos Kerja di Indonesia', In Budhy Munawar-Rachman (Ed), *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah*, Paramadina, Jakarta, p. 584.
[62] 'Abd al-Raziq, 'Ali. 1998, 'Message Not Government, Religion Not State', In Charles Kurzman (Ed), *Liberal Islam: Sourcebook*, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, pp. 29-36.
[63] Filali-Ansari, Abdou. 1998, 'Can Modern Rationality Shape a New Religiosity? Mohamed Abed Jabri and the Paradox of Islam and Modernity', In Cooper, John, R. L. Nettler and Mohamed Mahmoud (Eds), Islam and Modernity: Muslim Intellectuals Reaspond, London, I. B. Tauris, p. 159.
[64] Moosa, 'The Poetics and Politics of Law After Empire: Reading Women's Rights in the Contestations of Law', p. 38.
[65] Rahman, 'Revival and Reform in Islam', p. 649.
[66] Cited in Ramage, Douglas E. 1996, 'Democratization, Religious Tolerance and Pancasila: The Political Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid', In Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (Eds), *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia*, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, p. 227.
[67] Badawi, M.A. Zaki. 1976, *The Reformers of Egypt*, Croom Helm, London, p. 27. Al-Afghānī's fierce campaign of pan-Islamism is neither an aspiration to create a single Islamic state. As Hourani observes, "there is no sign that he had it in mind to create s single Islamic State or to revive the united caliphate of early times. When he talked of the caliphate he meant by it some sort of spiritual authority or else simply a primacy of honour. If the spirit of co-operation existed, the existence of more than one State was of no importance; if it did not exist, then Muslims had to obligation to obey their ruler.", p. 116.
[68] Cited in Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, p. 114.
[69] Federspiel, Howard M. 2002, 'Modernist Islam in Southeast Asia: A New Examination', *The Muslim World*, vol. 92, no. 3 & 4, pp. 373-4.
[70] Ibid, p. 373.
[71] John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, 'Abdurrahman Wahid: Scholar-President', p. 205.
[72] Rahman, Fazlur. 1966, *Islam*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, p. 223.
[73] See, Liddle, R. William. 1996, 'The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 55, no. 3, pp. 613-634.
[74] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 2002, *Islam dan Diskripsinya*, http://www.gusdur.net/Indonesia/detail.asp?-contentOID=270. 10/03/2004.

[75] Wahid, *Pergulatan Negara, Agama, dan Kebudayaan*, p. 103.
[76] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 2002, *How to Counter Islamic Extremism*, http://www.gusdur.net/english/english_detail.asp?contentOID=145. 10/03/2004.
[77] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1981, *Muslim di Tengah Pergumulan*, Leppenas, Jakarta, p. 11.
[78] Rahman, *Islam*, pp. 75-9.
[79] Quoted in John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, 'Abdurrahman Wahid: Scholar-President', In *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, p. 206.
[80] Ibid, pp.206-7.
[81] Wahid, *Muslim di Tengah Pergumulan*, p. 11.
[82] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1999, *Prisma Pemikiran Gus Dur*, *LKiS*, Yogyakarta, p. 202.
[83] Ibid, p. 30.
[84] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 2003, *The Reinterpretation of 'Relative Truth'*, http://www.gusdur.net/english/english_detail.asp?contentOID=144. 10/03/2004.
[85] Wahid, *Muslim di Tengah Pergumulan*, p. 7.
[86] Wahid, *Pergulatan Negara, Agama, dan Kebudayaan*, p. 123.
[87] Wahid, *The Reinterpretation of 'Relative Truth.'*
[88] Quoted in John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, 'Abdurrahman Wahid: Scholar-President', p. 207.
[89] Cited in Saeed, '*Ijtihād* and Innovation in Neo-Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia', p. 289.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Wahid, *Islam dan Diskripsinya*.
[92] Wahid, *Pergulatan Negara, Agama, dan Kebudayaan*, p. 88.
[93] Barton's translation, Wahid, *Prisma Pemikiran Gus Dur*, p. 38.
[94] Ibid, pp. 38-9.
[95] Ibid, p. 42.
[96] Ibid, pp. 51-2.
[97] Wahid, Pergulatan Negara, Agama, dan Kebudayaan, p. 130.
[98] Quoted in Masud, Muhammad Khalid. 1989, *Islamic Legal Philosophy: A Study of Abū Ishāq al-Shātibī's Life and Thought*, International Islamic Publishers, India, p. 225.
[99] Cited in Barton. 'Neo-Modernism: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia', p. 51.
[100] Wahid, *Muslim di Tengah Pergumulan*, p. 5.
[101] Wahid, *Prisma Pemikiran Gus Dur*, p. 71.
[102] Ibid, p. 72.
[103] Ibid, p. 71.
[104] *Kiai* is a Javanese term to describe a respected Islamic scholar who has an essential expertise in Islamic religious scholarships.
[105] Cited in Greg Braton. 1996, 'The Liberal, Progressive Roots of Abdurrahman Wahid's Thought', In Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (Eds), *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia*, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, p. 216.
[106] Ibid, p. 74.
[107] Wahid, *Muslim di Tengah Pergumulan*, p. 44.
[108] John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, 'Abdurrahman Wahid: Scholar-President', p. 207.
[109] Wahid, *Muslim di Tengah Pergumulan*, p. 18.
[110] Ibid, p. 8.
[111] Wahid, *Islam, Negara, dan Demokrasi*, p. 64.
[112] For detailed exposition on the issue see, Weber, Max, 1864-1920. 1976, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Translated by Talcott Parsons and Introduced by Anthony Giddens, Allen & Unwin, London.
[113] Geertz, Clifford. 1960, 'The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 229.

CHAPTER THREE
REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSION

A method, even a novel one, may be in vain *if it fails to produce anything new* – **Louis Althusser**[1]

1. Introduction

In spite of the earnestness and sophistication of Indonesian neo-modernist discourse in general and Abdurrahman's thought in particular, it would not be inaccurate to state that the latter's essential limitation remains its inability to transcend the social, political and cultural predicaments of Muslim society. In illustrating this shortcoming, I shall demonstrate the manner in which this approach, on account of its superficiality, fails to engage the social, political and cultural histories in which the Islamic heritage was forged. The paper concludes with some reflections on how Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thinking suffers from both a de-historicized understanding of the Islamic heritage and the cultural transmission of, which are the dominant positions within contemporary Islamic thinking.

2. Engaging Neo-Modernist Thought

As has been clearly elucidated in the last chapter – that the Traditionalist/Modernist rift is no longer an accurate characterization of contemporary Indonesian Islamic thought – the subsequent emergence of neo-modernism in the eighties heralded the changing attitude of a group of Muslims intellectuals that began to engage the cultural challenges of modernity.[2] The implicit goal of this new form of Islamic thinking, as has been frequently argued, has been to render Islam responsive and adaptable to modern requirements and changing social relations. Its ultimate objective is to

provide Muslim society with an Islamically-informed foundation through which a process of change can be driven meaningfully.

An attempt to delineate the methodology of Islamic neo-modernist thinking and its intellectual bearing on Indonesian Islam has been articulated by Greg Barton, who argues persuasively that this newly emerged school of Islamic thought constitutes a genuine attempt at presenting a systematic and coherent understanding of historical Islam, while seeking to attend to modern living contexts. In explaining the methodological formulation of neo-modernist thought, he states that Indonesian neo-modernist thinking is

> [e]ssentially religious in nature and is motivated primarily by concern for the progressive development of Islam and the Islamic community in Indonesia. Also, it is concerned with the formulation of a consistent and universal methodology for Qur'anic exegesis, exegesis that is rational and sensitive to the historical and cultural context of both the original scriptures and the modern societies that now seek their guidance. Along side, and undergirding, these aspirations is an approach and attitude which is positive, progressive and forward looking, and reflects the bold and helpful conviction that, in this 14th century of Islam, the best is yet to come, that the golden age lies not in the distant past but in the not too distant future.[3]

Barton goes further to argue that the conceptual framework of the neo-modernist discourse in general and Abdurrahman's thought in particular is "based unambiguously on theological convictions."[4]

Similarly, Bahtiar Effendy also writes that, by the eighties, Indonesian Islam had experienced a substantial Islamic awakening essentially motivated by the socio-

political crises of modern Indonesia, which was responsible consequently for the emergence of a 'new intellectualism.' This new intellectualism sought to develop theoretical and methodological tools for the contextual analysis of historical Islam in relation to ever-changing social and political circumstances, while remaining faithful to the core principles of Islam.[5]

I share neither Barton's nor Effendy's enthusiasm for neo-modernist thinking, especially with respect to its reading of the history of Islamic tradition as well as the cultural paradigm of Western institutionalism. In light of the subtle manner in which neo-modernist thinking attempts to reformulate old ideas and mitigate the current malaise within social, political and religious thought, its intellectual project remains ambiguous and reductionist. I shall demonstrate that the methodological construct of Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thinking is deliberately selective, emphasizing one dimension while marginalizing others. Worse still, many modern observers – both Western and Indonesian – have come to believe that by virtue of its sustained intellectual endeavour, neo-modernist thinking represents an adequate understanding and a genuine historical criticism of Muslim social, political and religious institutions. Nonetheless, the criticism must be levelled against Abdurrahman's neo-modernist approach that his methodological construct lacks a coherent and contextualized interpretation of social, political and cultural circumstances implicit in the Islamic heritage.

3. Abdurrahman and the Absence of Historical Consciousness

Abdurrahman is a prominent Indonesian scholar of Islam and a recognized political figure upon whom contemporary Indonesian Islam draws, for, among other things, a systematic reformulation of Islamic principles in the context of changing social and

political relations. While he maintains that Islam should be freed from the restrictions of legal-formalism in order to respond creatively to unfolding modern requirements, his treatment of the cultural legacy of Islam is, nevertheless, superficial. Consequently, his work is not underpinned by an informed historical criticism of the Islamic legacy and is, therefore, apologetic in its content.

While he has endeavoured to bring about a transformation of Islamic civilization by freeing current Islamic thinking from the chains of legal-formalism, his engagement with the social, political, religious and cultural malaise of modern Muslim society lacks a historical awareness of the Islamic heritage as well as its epistemological structure. Without doubt, Abdurrahman's awakening discourse has had an enormous impact, which has "nurtured a group of eclectic intellectuals and thinkers who sought to re-define Islam to meet the needs of current society."[6] However, its shortcoming derives principally from its lack of a conceptual foundation, which has resulted in its inability to reconstruct Islamic thought and transcend the cultural decline that has befallen the Muslim community.

The case of Abdurrahman is similar to that of other modernist scholars, who were "influenced by ideas of foreign provenance... [and] felt compelled to try to reach their goals by reference to the early *kalam*."[7] Thus, his invocation of Islamically-inspired foundations such as the universal values of Islam and the cosmopolitan nature of Islamic civilization was essentially made in order to legitimate his reformist efforts. However, in spite of the vitality of the universal values of Islam and the cosmopolitanism of Islamic civilization in establishing the principles of social justice and socio-political pluralism,[8] his reading of these phenomena lacks an in-depth historical analysis of the Islamic legacy and thus

presents an idealistic interpretation, of seeming authority, whose application he seeks within the changing social, political and historical relations.

If anything, Abdurrahman's description of the early phase of Muslim history is entirely divorced from its social, political and historical contexts. On the basis of the cosmopolitan nature of Islamic civilization, for instance, he maintains that the Islamic version of freedom of opinion is reflected in the Mu'tazilite view on the createdness of the Qur'an.[9] Indeed, on the basis of their critical interpretation of Qur'anic scripture, the Mu'tazilites were repressed by the Umayyad authorities and many of them were killed.[10] Worse still, since they differed in their theological propositions from the politically sanctioned articles of faith, they were subsequently regarded as heretics and innovators. According to Ibn Khaldun, they "deviate[d] in their dogmas from the early Muslims and Muslim orthodoxy."[11]

Moreover, having both acknowledged the importance of delving into the historical development of Sunnī thought such as the dialectic occurring from within Islamic socio-political thought as well as from without[12] and bemoaned the institutionalisation of Ash'arite doctrine as the only legitimate article of belief, which in turn has bitterly diminished the cosmopolitan nature of Islamic civilization,[13] Abdurrahman, nevertheless, is of the view that the "reconstruction of religious thinking" can be achieved by "demonstrating the universality of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah thought."[14] Needless to say, his analysis of the Sunnī tradition in recapturing the greatness of Islamic civilization is unconscious of the Islamic heritage and subsequently ignores its ideological bearing, with the following example being indicative of the ahistoricity of his work. On the issue of 'free will and predestination' he maintains that Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah had articulated a coherent interpretation of the doctrine. He claims that

> *Aswaja* [Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah] had clearly placed the position of humankind in the exalted position within the scheme of the universe. *He is allowed to desire whatever he wants, even though that will eventually is subject to the fact of the authoritative will of God that cannot be resisted.* [However] this freedom of will requires from human being the responsibility to highly exalt the meaning and the virtue of life.[15]

This quote is a demonstration of internal ambiguity and inconsistency within Abdurrahman's thought. While recognizing the effectiveness of human agency and the freedom of the human will on the one hand, he vigorously argues, on the other, that the efficacy of the human will is entirely subject to the eternal will of God. The established doctrine of free will and predestination inherent within the structural formulation of orthodox Islam is apparently treated separately from a historical understanding of its development. Instead of addressing the issue critically, Abdurrahman apologetically embraces the viability of the theory of predestination to the exclusion of its historical, political and social determinants.

It is undeniable that the doctrine of free will and predestination developed initially within the context of specific historical circumstances and was motivated essentially by the political interests of the despotic Umayyad rule. While unsuccessful in his attempt to rally sufficient allegiance for Yazīd – his designated successor – it is reported that Mu'āwiya was the first companion to have institutionalised the doctrine of predestination. With respect to the inauguration of Yazīd, he stated that "[t]he issue [of the designation] of Yazīd is the will of God's predestination, and there is no choice for the people in the affair."[16] Hence, it must be stressed that the dubious temporal and political interests of Mu'āwiya were primarily responsible for the

emergence of the predestination doctrine, which later exerted an enormous influence upon the cultural and structural formulations of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah. Taking this into account, al-Qādhī Abd al-Jabbār therefore reiterated that "predestination is the belief of Umayyad."[17]

What this episode clearly demonstrates is the fact that the issue of free will and predestination was principally a political doctrine, which both reflected political controversies between parties and the conflicting political interests of the powers of the day. In addition, it must be noted that the Umayyad dynasty, as a front for its legitimacy, imposed this doctrine through a dubious appropriation of religion. Worse still, the deification of this politically derived notion of predestination left the question of its historicity unconsidered, while relieving human beings of the moral imperative that goes hand in hand with personal responsibility.[18] It would not be rash to state that religion fell prey to the political intrigues of the ruling elite, whose singular aim was the illegitimate validation of the status quo.

Moreover, the formulation of this doctrine within the established teachings of Islamic orthodoxy has resulted in far-reaching social, political, cultural as well as psychological ramifications for the modern Muslim. A closer examination of the Ash'arite proposition of the eternal knowledge of God, for instance, which essentially emphasized that "God eternally knows a man who did not – and will not – exist, and knows believers who have never existed and non-believers who are not yet created,"[19] reveals that it ignores – if not entirely divests – human action of its independence.

From the foregoing example it is clear that, what is posited, is that human beings were eternally known as either believers or disbelievers before they were actually created. What is meant is that "human beings do nothing except that which God has predetermined eternally by His knowledge they will do. Consequently,

human acts become nothing but a monotonous repetition – for what God knows eternally – void of creativity and innovation."[20] By keeping this proposition in mind, it would then become unreasonable to hold that God could punish or reward human beings for their actions, since these were eternally imposed upon them; reward and punishment, under such circumstances, would contradict the principle of the justice of God. Given the prevalence with which this doctrine is uncritically accepted, the notion of the moral and ethical responsibility of human beings has thus been rendered meaningless, while the absolutist inclinations of the social, political and cultural scholarship of orthodox Islam remain the dominant trend of contemporary Islamic thought.

To be precise, the absolutist structure of orthodox Islam can be found in its articulation of the relationship between God, man and the world. In the formulation of this relationship, the Ash'arites argued that the establishment of God's centrality was an epistemological necessity "due to the difference and contrast between them that goes beyond any formal and abstract intellectual construct."[21] Paradoxically, this has significantly negated the interactive and creative relationship between these three elements, which has, in turn, denied the potentiality of human creativity and the objectivity of world canons. As Mabrook explains,

> The aim of their system of thought and the cause of its formulation were principally to exhibit the dominance of the divine absolute at the expense of both man and the world. That is why their system was crystallized as a complete reiteration of the concept of God, to the extent that the world seems to be void of anything but God. This resulted in the dislodging of the objectivity and necessity of the world and the activity of man. Hence, for the Ash'arite, the world and man are empty and fragile existence without value.

> Accordingly, the true existence of God necessitates the marginality of any other existence.[22]

In response to the seemingly religious controversy that surrounded the notion of predestination, the Mu'tazilites became ardent critics of the absolutist Ash'arite interpretation of the eternal knowledge of God. Unlike the Ash'arites, the Mu'tazilites adopted the view that the human being is the author of his actions. As such, in reaffirming the ethical nature of God's justice, the Mu'tazilites maintained that the human being was destined to be an independent agent who would determine his own will. The Mu'tazilite view was fundamentally rooted in the notion of the essential unity of God. Al-Shahrastānī eloquently described the Mu'tazilite position, stating that

> [t]he common belief of the sect of the Mu'tazilites is, that Allah is eternal and that eternity is the most peculiar description of His essence. They absolutely reject all other eternal qualities, saying, It is by virtue of His essence that He has knowledge, power and life; not because they are eternal qualities or ideas inherent in Him. For if the qualities should partake of His eternity, which is His most peculiar description, they would partake of His divinity...and they agree upon this, that will and hearing and sight are not ideas inherent in His essence.[23]

Unlike the Ash'arites, who believed in the eternity of God's knowledge, the Mu'tazilites held that the knowledge of God was distinguishable from the essence of God Himself. On the grounds of the affirmation of God's unity and free will on the one hand, and Divine justice on the other, the Mu'tazilites have become widely

known as the 'partisans of justice and unity,' which forms the very core of their creed and dogma.

While aware of the enormous importance of the historical analysis of Sunnī discourse in reconstructing contemporary Islamic thought, Abdurrahman apparently fails to meet the objective which he sets for himself. Instead, he does not consider adequately the social and political circumstances of historical Islam that were responsible for the production of the discourse. Abdurrahman's treatment of the predestination issue fails to deliver a historically grounded analysis of the controversy. What is missing, then, in Abdurrahman's reading of the history of the Islamic heritage is a thorough explanation of the socio-political contexts within which those early thinkers formulated their ideas. Ironically, he can be regarded as having committed the "same error of a-historicity of which he accused"[24] the legal-formalists.

Interestingly, Abdurrahman also criticizes al-Shāfi'ī's attempt to systematically avoid both the occurrence of conflicting legal opinions and the haphazard method of arriving at legal-moral judgements that was then prevalent in the field of Islamic jurisprudence. According to Abdurrahman, the sophistication of al-Shāfi'ī's methodology, to a great extent, weakened the spirit of independent reasoning. He states that

> [t]he reformation of al-Syafi'i (died 205 H/820 CE) succeeded in eliminating haphazard decision-making processes. His method, which became known by the name *'tariq al-istiqra'*, succeeded in simplifying the haphazard decision-making processes and creating a system that later came to be known as roots of jurisprudence *(usul al-fiqh)*, as is manifested in his monumental work on jurisprudence, *al-Risalah*. But the effort of al-Syafi'i himself ultimately

> failed to ward off the process by which religious law was made irrelevant as a consequence of being tied to an overly literal approach to the use of words and terms.[25]

What this extract asserts, is that current Islamic thinking has been moving increasingly towards an Islamic neo-conservatism, which Abdurrahman firmly believes is the logical consequence of the intellectual shallowness and literal approach of the contemporary Islamic revivalist discourse, of which al-Shāfi'ī's jurisprudential methodology has been the prime exponent. For Abdurrahman, neo-conservatism refers to a closed-minded attitude toward progress and change that stands in the way of attending to contemporary concerns. What is required, then, as far as Abdurrahman is concerned, is the "reformulation of a new principles of hermeneutics and jurisprudence that better meet the contextual demands of the modern age. These principles, he suggests, must reflect the humanitarian spirit of Islam and allow it to speak to the needs of today's generation."[26]

In spite of Abdurrahman's criticism of al-Shāfi'ī *Ushūl al-Fiqh* methodology, it must be stressed that the current socio-political and cultural predicaments of Muslims cannot be laid entirely at the door of the legal-formalistic approach to modern Islamic discourse. Additionally, his criticism of al-Shāfi'ī legal philosophy does not take into account the historical context and civilizational circumstances that were responsible for the production of that discourse. Accordingly, Abdurrahman has been unable to appreciate the internal logic of al-Shāfi'ī's methodology.

Understandably, the adherence to conservative Sunnī thought and the uncritical acceptance of the authority of al-Shāfi'ī's *fiqh* tradition might explain the very crisis that is evident in the methodological structure of Abdurrahman's thought. He states that "the tradition of religious studies adhered to by NU, relies on the

original concept of what is referred to by the NU as *aqidah ahlussunnah waljama'ah*. This doctrine is based on the following essential points: adhering to the *tauhid* (oneness of God) concept or view of Al-Asy'ari and Al-Maturidi (which states that there is but one God and recognizes the messenger Muhammad), adhering to one of the four schools of thought of *fiqh* (Muslim law) – Hanafi, Maliki, Syafi'i and Hambali – and following the mystical ways and orders established by Al-Junaid Al-Baghdadi."[27]

Beside Abū al-Hasan al-Ash'arī (d. 324/935-6) and al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), Muhammad Ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi'ī (150-204/767-819) was an influential figure whose works and personality has overshadowed the intellectual consciousness of modern Islamic thinking. Al-Shāfi'ī's establishment of the Islamic legal philosophy – *Ushūl al-Fiqh* – by way of conferring unlimited authority on the Hadīth has been deemed as an essential contribution to the development of the discipline. However, al-Shāfi'ī was the first jurist to assert "that the authority of God and the authority of Muhammad, the human instrument of divine revelation, are both indistinguishable and one and the same, and have only an intra-Qur'ānic reference."[28] Al-Shāfi'ī, in his defence of the prophetic Hadīth as the principle of law, attempted to broaden the nature of the authority of the prophetic Hadīth – *al-Sunna* – regardless of its content. Accordingly, the prophetic sayings have thus been sacralized, which, according to Nasr Abū Zayd, has utterly nullified the humanness of the Prophet.[29] Rebuking the ideological stance of al-Shāfi'ī, he asserts "al-Shāfi'ī's preference for tradition over reason, for rationalizing Quraysh's domination over Islam, and for saying that Islamic history was a conspiracy hatched by the caliphs of Quraysh."[30]

Similarly, Alī Mabrūk critically shows that al-Shāfi'ī's attempt to supposedly systematize the deduction of Islamic legal opinions by conflating the authority of the

prophetic Hadīth with God's authority, reaffirms the notion of 'sacredness' and detaches the development of Hadīth literature from the historical contexts in which it was produced.[31] Subsequently, this intellectual legacy, which permeates the construct of modern Islamic tradition, has ironically reproduced the discourse of hierarchy, oppression and subjugation.[32]

It is my contention that the challenge of the contemporary Islamic awakening discourse involves more than merely reinterpreting Islamic teachings in a new fashion and reformulating the "principles for decision making in matters of religious law which reflect the need of our age,"[33] as Abdurrahman would have one believe. His reinterpretation of Islam attempts solely to confront certain external forces, while ignoring the internal structure that informs Islamic epistemology. Consequently, "this intellectual tradition in its twentieth-century guise was now devoid of its erstwhile depth, diversity, and critical apertures. What remained was an atrophied and skeletal tradition that only contributed to stagnation."[34]

The process of rethinking Islam should attempt to engage with the entirety of the Islamic heritage – *al-Turāth*, which represent Muslims' "psychological storehouse", their theoretical foundation for the structure of reality and the basis of their contemporary consciousness. As Hasan Hanafī aptly put it, "the historical roots of the crises of the [present] age [are] in the old heritage, reading the past in the present and seeing the present in the past."[35] Such a process will enable us to disclose the ideological contents implicit in the epistemological structure of the Islamic heritage.

Prominently lacking in Abdurrahman's thought is, thus, a systematic evaluation and critical analysis of the historical evolution of the Islamic heritage, especially its political, social and cultural dimensions. It is evident that, while he

repeatedly assigns himself this task, he is not entirely committed to the critical study of the Islamic legacy. Indeed, it is an exercise in futility to call for the reinvigoration of Islamic thought or its contextualization if one fails to undertake a historical analysis and critique of its epistemological contents.

Therefore, what is essentially required is a sustained historical analysis of the Islamic tradition in order to uncover the roots of the present crises and thereby advance a genuine attempt at reviving contemporary Islamic awakening discourse. However, the idealism that is typical of Islamic tradition – the fatalism of al-Ash'arī's doctrine and al-Shāfi'ī's deification of the humanness of the prophet – cannot overcome the social, political and cultural predicaments that are bearing down on the modern Muslim mind.

4. The Consciousness of Historicity: A Model for Engaging the Islamic Heritage

Varied attempts at religious reconstruction and the moral regeneration of Islamic thought in post-colonial times have unfortunately proven incapable of providing a coherent body of thought capable of bringing about genuine awakenings. The current Islamic awakening discourse of *islāhī* thinking, for instance, has been "more or less mechanical and semantic rather than interpretative or scientific."[36] Rahman posits that religious modernism, which emphasizes the 'interpretative' and 'scientific' aspects of religious understanding, is methodologically necessary in order to recapture the pristine beginnings of Islamic civilization. The approach of 'Islamic modernism,' however, has endeavoured to reinvigorate and revivify the relevance of Islamic teachings by employing the methodology of ijtihād. Moreover, it submits that rational inquiry is theoretically essential if Islam is to meet modern requirements effectively. Similarly, Muhammad Abduh argued that the deterioration of Islam's cultural

underpinnings were rooted in the habit of blind imitation, which was fundamentally at odds with the true meaning of Islam.[37] In order to overcome this crisis, he stated that

> Islam should emancipate [its intellectual activities] from the shackles of *taqlīd* – an uncritical acceptance of ideas or concepts – [and accordingly] understand religion in accordance to the manner in which Muslim forebears or *salaf* understood before the occurrence of [theological] dissensions.[38]

Despite the two hundred years of labour of Islamic modernism, Muslim society has been unable to stem its political, social, cultural and psychological decline. Rahman has articulated the roots of this plight, writing that

> [t]he current strategy... is not so much aimed at a positive goal; it seems rather to be a very defensive one: to save the minds of Muslims from being spoiled or even destroyed under the impact of Western ideas... particularly ideas that threaten to undermine the traditional standards of Islamic morality. The crucial question to which we must eventually seek an answer here is whether there is an awareness among Muslims... that an Islamic world view does need to be worked out today and that this is an immediate imperative.[39]

On the other hand, Smith argues that "the fundamental *malaise* of modern Islam is a sense that something has gone wrong with Islamic history. The fundamental problem of modern Muslims is how to rehabilitate that history: to set it going again in full vigour, so that Islamic society may once again flourish as a divinely-guided society should and must."[40] However, contemporary efforts at the revision and reawakening of Islamic civilization have been paralysed because "all attempts at reform and

progress still remain in the sphere of dreams, desires, even illusions, in spite of almost two centuries of striving and enterprise."[41]

In spite of varying perceptions and a plurality of concepts, it is repeatedly argued that the contemporary civilizational crisis of Islam is linked to the absence of a political impulse and the presence of undemocratic institutions that cannot guarantee the establishment of sound democratic governance. This point has been clearly made by Abdurrahman, especially when he presents the socio-cultural approach as a solution to the contentious issue of the religion-state relationship. He states that, since it advocates

> [w]orking within the framework of 'social experiments' such as community development, technology transfer and restoration of the natural environment, this... approach provides us with a good example of how Muslim activists could participate in democratisation of the society as a whole, without resorting to any formal political identity. Through NGO's, 'social organizations', such as religious organizations, movements to 'promote Islamic propagation' (*dakwah*), this socio-cultural approach in essence forms a cluster of activities, which will contribute to the democratisation of Indonesia in the long run.[42]

Abdurrahman apologetically adopts the Western notion of democracy in order to guarantee the realization of democracy in Indonesia. He appears to assume that "by learning from Western democratic states, Indonesia can build a more solid governance system that lets the country's political process take its course."[43] Presumably, the inability of the Islamic paradigm to provide an adequate theoretical foundation for

democratic governance has prompted him to adopt the politics of, as Abdul Hamid A. AbuSulayman describes it, the "imitative foreign solution."[44]

Doubtless, Western democracy can make a significant contribution towards the articulation of distributive justice, good governance and democracy in Indonesia. All the same, it must be emphasized that the socio-political catastrophes that have befallen the Muslim community cannot be attributed solely to the absence of democratic institutions and sound political organizations, as Abdurrahman believes. Additionally, a mere duplication of Western democratic institutions cannot lead to the realization of democracy nor can it overcome the prevailing trend of despotism within the Muslim community. Moreover, what is absent in Abdurrahman's theorizing is a contextualized understanding of Western democratic organizations and their particular historical complexities. Once again, this approach to reform is merely a cynical reproduction of a discourse that has been isolated from its social and political contexts.

Had Abdurrahman acknowledged this historicity, he would have been able to offer, simultaneously, a critical commentary. "Our liberal-democracy, like any other system," as C. B. Macpherson argues, "is a system of power; that is, indeed, again like any other, a double system of power."[45] Explaining its complex history, he continues that "liberal-democracy is a fairly late product of the market society; the first need of the market society was for the liberal state, not a democratic one."[46] What Abdurrahman fails to observe is the fact that, in order to achieve a viable system of liberal-democracy, an excessive accumulation of wealth is necessary, in which the West, through the manipulation of its colonies, was extremely successful. Hence, one is justified in concluding that the realization of the liberal-democratic system in the

West was based primarily on the principle of colonialism rather than on any ideal concepts.[47]

Equally, by emphasizing the moral and ethical aspects of religion, Abdurrahman's socio-cultural approach significantly reduces the role of religion in the political realm and has paved the way for the adoption of the 'grand theory' of secularisation. Albeit ambiguously articulated, the socio-cultural approach, rather than denoting the decline of religion, appears to argue for the role of religion as an agent of transformation – this interpretation being the pervasive position of sociologists today. Defending the secularisation paradigm against its critics, Yamane states that the "postsecularisation theorists misrepresent secularisation theory by claiming it advances the idea that religion will decline in modern society, when in fact the core architects of the paradigm have always theorized not the decline or disappearance of religion but its transformation."[48]

However, disillusioned with the Muslim impasse, Abdurrahman believes that the recovery of current Islamic sensibilities is only achievable through the 'categories of a borrowed culture.' Ironically, these categories of intellectual 'repetition' and 'projection' will only succeed in producing an impoverished and spurious knowledge and will likely entrench the state of historical unconsciousness. "This repetition," Mabrūk argues, "impoverishes the subject and leads to its disappearance, since the subject is unable to unfold everything it includes and encompasses within its depth. It [even prevents] revealing its truest import in the context of a comprehensive structure that includes it with other [subjects]."[49]

This intellectual enterprise of borrowing and copying, which has been characterised by a process of 'ideological consumption' of modern trends has failed and frustrated all efforts to mobilize Islamic reform. Because of Abdurrahman's

implicit assertion of the superiority of Western ideologies as well as the exaggerated novelty of Islamic cultural tradition, he attempts continuously to adopt them by demonstrating culturally the innate inefficiency of contemporary Islamic thought. Accordingly, Abdurrahman's attempt is in fact a distorted effort to ontologically and epistemologically detach these systems of thought from their specific historical and cultural circumstances.[50]

To be precise, the mechanism of transmission on which the structural methodology of Abdurrahman's thought is based, is not rooted in an actual reality as much as it is in a created reality in order to validate the appropriation of a borrowed model. The mechanism of transmission, needless to say, involves an essential negation of the epistemological foundations of the borrowed model and an assertion of its ahistoricity. In so doing, the borrowed model has been "transformed from the epistemology, which was formed within history and from it, into an epistemology of absolute that has every feature of dominance, sanctity and a-historicity."[51]

The foundations of Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thinking, which turn significantly on his ruminations concerning the exaggerated medievalization of classical Islamic culture – the de-historicized assertion of the universal values of Islam and the idealization of the cosmopolitanism of Islamic civilization – and his uncritical adoption of 'imported ideas' has undermined any awakening discourse and worsened the poverty of Muslim thought. His reformist efforts represent but a rhetoric of repetition that is culturally destructive and intellectually inadequate.

Consequently, Abdurrahman's thought, ironically, has moved steadily towards utopianism. It is utopian because it runs in opposition to the "state of reality within which it occurs. This incongruence is always evident in the fact that such a state of mind in experience, in thought, in practice, is oriented towards objects which do not

exist in the actual situations."[52] This characteristic is typical of the intellectual and cultural projects of contemporary Islamic awakening discourse, which developed its methodological foundations in a shallow and utopian manner reminiscent of both medieval Islam and modern Western epistemologies. However, in order to transcend meaningfully the inherent ineffectiveness of contemporary Islamic thinking, it is the "historical consciousness alone [that] will allow [the Muslim thinker] to free himself of them [i.e. borrowed models and the exaggerated novelty of the Islamic cultural tradition]."[53]

It is imperative to critically analyse the cultural heritage of Islamic tradition, which crystallises the records of social and political experiences and all forms of intellectual endeavours under the auspices of history, in order to make sense of the epistemological dimensions implicit within its structural discourse. It must be emphasized that the cultural tradition of the Islamic legacy is not value-free, nor can it be divorced from its socio-political circumstances and historical conditions. Historical consciousness of the discourse is, thus, epistemologically necessary in order to prevent the alienation of the discourse from its historical development and socio-political situatedness. Any effort to revive an intellectual and cultural legacy in isolation of its historical reality will only contribute to the establishment of the sanctity of the discourse outside of its specific context.[54] By establishing its sanctity, history is no longer 'an open horizon' susceptible to various interpretations on the one hand, nor is it 'an open formation' essentially determined by human consciousness on the other. Hence, the cultural heritage of Islam, which is a historically articulated body of tradition, cannot be detached from its temporal dimension. In other words, the Islamic heritage has been 'formed in history, through history and for the sake of

history.' The historicist approach to the study of Islamic tradition entails, as Arkoun explains,

> [t]he study of mythical knowledge as being not limited to the primitive archaic mentality, according to the definitions imposed by the positivist historicist school since the nineteenth century. On the contrary, the main intellectual endeavour represented by thinking Islam or any religion, today is to evaluate, with a new epistemological perspective, the characteristics and intricacy of systems of knowledge –both the historical and the mythical.[55]

The historical analysis of Islamic tradition is, hence, unavoidable in order to uncover the underlying hidden structure that establishes and orders the current structure of Islamic thought. Moreover, this approach is intended to define the 'relations' of discourse with the existing historical reality or, put differently, to disclose the epistemological relations between power and knowledge, because "words and meanings do not arise in a historical vacuum."[56] In other words, it asserts that "the truth, meaning, and value of anything...is to be found in its history."[57] The fullest expression of the relationship between power and knowledge has been succinctly elaborated by Michel Foucault, who stated that

> [t]ruth is centred on the form of scientific discourse and institutions, which produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political incitement (the demand for truth, as much for economic production as for political power); it is the object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption (circulating through apparatuses of education and information whose extent is relatively broad in the social body, not with standing certain strict

> limitations); it is produced and transmitted under the central, dominant, if not exclusive, of few great political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media); lastly, it is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation ("ideological" struggles).[58]

Within the traditional classification of Islamic knowledge, Islamic theology constitutes arguably the kernel of the cultural epistemology of Islamic tradition. In view of this, it is impossible to comprehend the cultural underpinnings of Islamic discourse without having recourse to the underlying structure of Islamic theology. According to Hanafī, an Egyptian philosopher, the science of dogma, or *'Ilm al-'Aqāid*, for instance, should be interpreted contextually and understood in the light of the *Imamate*, since the formulations of its theological methodology is linked fundamentally to the social and political events that took place immediately after the death of the Prophet as well as during the reign of the *Khulafā al-Rāsyidīn*.[59] Similarly, one should be aware of the fact that the science of dogma, at the onset of its development, reflected the political controversies between Muslim factions and ended up becoming the battleground upon which political gains were secured. Subsequently, these internal squabbles, under the guise of religion, led, ironically, to the validation of patrimonial authority based on the 'autocracy' of the tribe.[60]

The starting point for an Islamic awakening, therefore, should begin with the historical analysis of Islamic cultural thought in its entirety. The concept of historicity, as a methodology for dealing with this intellectual crisis, is necessary in order to uncover the epistemological structure of the Islamic heritage and unearth the historical forces that were and are responsible for the production of its knowledge.

This approach entails the critical engagement of socio-political milieux in which the Islamic heritage was intellectually formulated and culturally articulated. It

is indisputable that any discourse – social, political or cultural – carries certain meanings and concepts. Bearing this in mind, one should investigate the internal structure of a discourse in order to reveal the established "unconscious infrastructures" that "make them possible or intelligible."[61] Any attempt at intellectual reform must approach "ideas and values not in terms of absolute norms of truth or good, but as expressions of a specific age, culture, or people."[62] In so far as this approach is capable of contextualizing the discourse, it is also useful in unmasking its internal logic, which has been responsible for directing the current cultural synthesis of Islam and determining the consciousness of Muslim mind. To be sure, the failure to recognize the historical dimensions of the Islamic legacy will frustrate inevitably any effort to produce an awakening discourse.

Indeed, it is the de-historicized reading of the Islamic heritage, which is the pervasive characteristic of the modern Islamic intellectual landscape, that perpetuated its seeming inability to produce, epistemologically, a new discourse. For centuries, Islam has been "imagined in standard textbooks... which hold" that "Muslims somehow keep on cherishing it, as a dreamy utopia, making it the object of curiosity rather than of historical, political or ideological analysis."[63] It is this intellectual ahistoricity of the Muslim awakening discourse and the transmission of foreign ideas that is responsible for the exacerbation of the troubles of Islamic thought. Instead of engaging with the historical dimensions of the Islamic legacy, Muslim intellectuals remain trapped "in the absolute truths of the medieval world: al-Jāhiz's language, al-Ash'arī's scholasticism, al-Ghazālī's mysticism."[64]

The purpose of the historical analysis of the Islamic heritage is to "unravel the apparent disorder and to penetrate the amorphous mass of historical detail in order to bring to light"[65] "a single axis that is capable of encompassing all of the shifts within

the text in a way that any particular idea in these texts finds its justification and logic within this fixed structure."[66] This approach seeks to emancipate one from any prior ideological prejudices and assumptions in order to reveal the underlying constant structure, or epistemological underpinnings, that inform historical events and texts. It is to be emphasized that *any* discourse is conditioned profoundly by its historical context and determined by human agency. The cultural tradition of the Islamic heritage, without qualification, is a socially and politically bound entity that cannot be divorced from its relationship with history. That stated, "the ultimate goal" of this approach "is to redress the hermeneutic relationship between the subject and the Text, while relying on the awareness that there are inescapable conditions, based on the 'recognition' of reality, for shaping a socially creative discourse."[67]

While it is true that Abdurrahman's reorientation of Islamic thought seeks to provide a meaningful and viable mechanism for contextualizing Islam that it may respond creatively to the challenges of modern times, his methodology is flawed. From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Abdurrahman's theorizing has suffered significantly from an inadequate historical analysis of the cultural tradition of the Islamic heritage. His explication of Islamic teachings – the universal values of Islam and the cosmopolitan nature of Islamic civilization – has been selective, which has resulted, in turn, in the absence of a historical reading of the structural formation of the Islamic legacy.

Additionally, what further weakens Abdurrahman's reformist effort is his apologetic consumption of Western epistemologies. For instance, he astutely maintains that the transfer of Western democratic institutions will enable Muslims to overcome the prevalent practices of authoritarianism, social injustice and sectarianism.[68] However, while emphasizing the vitality of this foreign mechanism,

Abdurrahman actually does not know "how to transcend the collapse of his reality except by leaping to a point outside, which he borrows and transmits from the other."[69] Contemporary Muslim awakening discourse, as Laroui has articulated, "profess[es] the traditionalist rationale *(salafī)*; the rest profess an eclecticism. Together, these tendencies succeed in abolishing the historical dimension."[70] For this reason, Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thought is unable to transcend the current social and political impasses of Muslim society. "The *salafī* imagines," Laroui continues, "that his thoughts are free. He is mistaken: in reality, he is not using language to think within the framework of tradition; rather, it is tradition that lives again through language and is "reflected" in him."[71] Hence, it is only the historical analysis of the Islamic heritage – *al-Turāth* – that can lead to a genuine reconstruction of contemporary Islamic thinking.

Doubtless, Abdurrahman's appropriation of traditional Islamic concepts demonstrates the manner in which this mechanism merely compels the Islamic heritage to speak the language of the borrowed ideology through 'selection' and 'compulsion' – without a consciousness of its historicity and epistemological underpinnings. Instead of producing a new reading, this one entails a denial of historical reality and, as such, embodies a shallow and inadequate awakening discourse. Indeed, it is from such intellectual superficiality that Althusser's aforementioned aphorism takes its significance. In spite of the scale of Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thinking, his methodology remains incapable of producing a new epistemology that can overcome the current crisis within Muslim society.

Worse still, his tendency towards ahistoricity has perpetuated the absolutist abstraction of the Islamic heritage and modern imported ideologies, which has led,

consequently, to a denial of human agency. By endorsing the absoluteness of the Islamic heritage and the borrowed models, their epistemological structures are now without stricture, interpretation and historical formulation, and are "unrestricted by any human or historical effectiveness, while the world in essence is a historical formation that cannot be restricted to the boundaries of any absolute facts."[72] Through the subordination of the role of human agency in history, in effect, Abdurrahman disallows the presence of the heritage itself and consequently renders it a barren and ineffectual body of thought.

Without doubt, the continuing Muslim predicament and the flaw within Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thinking is due to a broken sense of historical reality. Indeed, his approach, which is based putatively on the reinterpretation of the Islamic heritage, is but a "selective reappropriation of the past as a means for shaping the path to the future."[73] His ideological consumption of foreign trends also constitutes an atavistic reading of these borrowed models. The glaring deficiency within Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thinking is that it uncritically selects and borrows ready-made Western epistemologies and apologetically adopts the ahistorical reading of the Islamic heritage. Unfortunately, his efforts towards the reconstruction and mobilization of the Islamic tradition have perpetuated the pattern of "accumulated retardation, successive defeats, and ultimately the drift into ahistoricity."[74] Needless to say, the mechanism of ahistoricity is but "an effective ruse to obliterate from general consciousness the very experience of historical positivity."[75]

The foregoing discussion clearly demonstrates that because of his particular articulation of Islamic concepts and importation of Western ideas, Abdurrahman's intellectual contribution is, essentially, another exercise in ahistoricity that conceals the historical formation of the Islamic legacy and subsequently ignores the role of

human agency in the production of texts. His atavistic repetitions of *al-Turāth* and the borrowed models only cement their lifelessness and mounting impoverishment. Accordingly, reality becomes a nominal consideration and is forced to defer to the boundless and fixed authority of the heritage as well as the borrowed models. Therefore, it should not be too far to state that the absence of the historical consciousness is the main feature of Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thinking.

Abdurrahman's selective treatment of the Islamic heritage and Western ideology is a confirmation of his inability to offer solutions for the current Muslim predicaments of social injustice and politico-cultural authoritarianism. The crisis of Indonesian Islam cannot be attributed simply to the literalist approach of Muslim legal-formalism and the absence of democratic institutions, as Abdurrahman repeatedly claims. Indeed, his own neo-modernist thinking and intellectual eclecticism hardly provides an adequate foundation for Islamic reform and the mitigation of the Muslim crisis.

Surely, it is only by way of a historical reading of the Islamic heritage and a deconstruction of the epistemology implicit in its structural formulation that the recovery of contemporary Muslim society from despotism can be engineered. As Mabrūk has written, "in truth, the ahistoricity of this discourse [the Islamic legacy] does not in any way mean the absence of any notion of 'history,' but rather the absence of history as a framework of human action and progress and a form of human consciousness of the world; or history as a creative process coming forth from forms of existence that are more developed and effective."[76]

5. Conclusion

Islamic civilization was once the glory of the world. Muslims believe that glory to have resulted from the correct application of the Qur'an and Sunna by their forbears within their respective socio-political contexts. In time, however, as al-Afghānī declared passionately, it was the growing corruption of the Islamic spirit that led Muslims to their present state of civilizational decline.

Nonetheless, as this study has attempted to demonstrate, it is not altogether true that the contemporary Muslim crisis is exclusively the result of the corruption of the Islamic spirit and the lack of a sound democratic impulse in Muslim society. Rather, this crisis has been perpetuated by the failure of the current Islamic awakening discourse – Abdurrahman's neo-modernist thinking being a case in point – to interrogate the historical formation of the Islamic heritage, especially the role of Islamic orthodoxy, which has relied on theological propositions to establish its ideological supremacy. This supremacy was made possible by the transfer of ideological contents to the plane of sanctity, a denial of historicity and a subsequent immunity from interrogation.

As has been expressed in this thesis, the historical reading of the Islamic heritage is a prerequisite for comprehending the context within which its epistemological underpinnings were forged. The historicist approach both seeks to reconcile Islamic history with its temporal situatedness and deconstruct an intellectual mechanism whose preoccupation rests with the transmission and importation of foreign ideologies. It is inconceivable to argue that the restoration of Islamic civilization to its former greatness can only be achieved by offering a critique of the political practices of Muslim society. Indeed, Muslim reform must begin with the informed deconstruction of the epistemological context within which the Islamic

heritage took shape. For, only then can the transformation of Islamic civilization be spoken of with any real conviction.

Endnotes

[1] Althusser, Louis. 1959, *Politics and History: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hegel and Marx*, Translated from the French by Ben Brewster, Western printing Services Ltd, Bristol, p. 43.
[2] Barton, Greg. 1994, 'The Impact of neo-Modernism on Indonesian Islamic Thought: the Emergence of a New Pluralism', in David Bourchier & John Legge (Eds), *Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s*, Monash University Press, Clayton, p. 147.
[3] Barton, Greg. 1995. 'Neo-Modernism: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia', *Studia Islamika*, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 7-8.
[4] Barton, Greg. 1996, 'The Liberal, Progressive Roots of Abdurrahman Wahid's Thought', In Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (Eds), *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia*, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, p. 221.
[5] Effendy, Bahtiar. 1995, 'Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktek Politik Islam di Indonesia,' *Prisma*, no. 5, pp. 3-28.
[6] Desker, Barry. 2002, *Islam and Society in Southeast Asia after September 11*, no. 33, Singapore, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, p. 10.
[7] Akhavi, Shahrough. 1997, 'The Dialectic in Contemporary Egyptian Social Thought: The Scripturalist and Modernist Discourses of Sayyid Qutb and Hasan Hanafi', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 29, no. 3, p. 377.
[8] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1994, 'Universalisme Islam dan Kosmopolitanisme Peradaban Islam', In Budhy Munawar-Rachman (Ed), *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah*, Paramadina, Jakarta, p. 549.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Khaldun, Ibn. 1958, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, Translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal, vol. 3, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, p. 49.
[11] Ibid, p. 34.
[12] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1981, *Muslim di Tengah Pergumulan*, Leppenas, Jakarta, p. 39.
[13] Ibid, p. 550.
[14] Wahid, *Muslim di Tengah Pergumulan*, p. 39.
[15] Ibid, p. 40. Emphasis is added.
[16] Ibn Qutayba, al-Daynūrī. 1967, *Al-Imāmah wa al-Siyāsah*, Edited by Taha al-Zain, Maktabat al-Halabī, al-Qāhirah, p. 158.
[17] Cited in Mabrūk, Alī. 2003, *al-Hadāthah Bayn al-Bāsyā Wa al-Jinrāl*, Markaz al-Qāhirah Li al-Dirāsāt Huqūq al-Insān, al-Qāhirah, p. 181.
[18] Ibid, p. 28.
[19] Al-Ash'arī, Abū al-Hasan. 1950, *Maqālāt al-Islamiyyīn*, Edited by Muhammad Muhyiddīn Abd al-Hamīd, Maktabah al-Nahdah al-Misriyya, al-Qāhirah, vol. 1, p. 223.
[20] Mabrook, Ali. 2004, *The Ash'arite Dogma: The Root of the Arab/Muslim Absolutism'*, Revised and edited by Abdul Kadir Riyadi, unpublished paper, p. 9.
[21] Ibid, p. 2.
[22] Ibid, p. 3.
[23] Al-Shahrastānī, Abī al-Fath Muhammad Abd al-Karīm Ibn Abī Bakr Ahmad. n. d, *Al-Milal wa al-Nihal*, Abd al-'Azīz Muhammad al-Wakīl (Ed), Dār al-Fikr, Lebanon, pp. 43-5; also cited in Wensinck, A. J. 1979, *The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical Development*, Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, New Delhi, p. 75.
[24] Akhavi, 'The Dialectic in Contemporary Egyptian Social Thought: The Scripturalist and Modernist Discourses of Sayyid Qutb and Hasan Hanafi', p. 393. Abdurrahman's attempt to transcend the moral and cultural predicaments of the contemporary Muslim community through the articulation of Sunnī thought appears apologetic and idealistic. It is apologetic because of its insistence on locating the Islamic precursors of modern institutions and it is idealistic because of its uncritical and ahistorical analysis of Sunnī discourse, as though it were created in a historical vacuum. For a comprehensive account of the idealistic presentation of Islamic orthodoxy, see Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1981, *Muslim di Tengah Pergumulan*, Leppenas, Jakarta, pp. 38-45.
[25] Barton's translation, Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1999, *Prisma Pemikiran Gus Dur, LKiS*, Yogyakarta, p. 42.

[26] Barton, 'The Liberal, Progressive Roots of Abdurrahman Wahid's Thought', p. 205.
[27] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1986, 'The Nahdlatul Ulama and Islam in Present Day Indonesia', In Taufiq Abdullah and Sharon Siddique (Eds), *Islam and Society in Southeast Asia,* Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, p. 178.
[28] Rahman, Fazlur. 1966, *Islam,* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 50.
[29] Hāmid Abū Zayd, Nasr. 1996, *Al-Imām al-Shafi'ī wa Ta'sīs al-Idīlūjiyah al-Wasatiyah,* Maktabah Madbūlī, al-Qāhirah, p. 33. In this book, Nasr has analysed brilliantly the ideological stance implicit in the language of al-Shafi'ī's discourse, which essentially sought to prove the unquestionable authority of the Arab in general and the superiority of the Quraishite tribe in particular.
[30] Najjar, Fauzi M. 2000, 'Islamic Fundamentalism and the Intellectuals: The Case of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,* vol. 27, no. 2, p. 179.
[31] For a detailed analysis, see Mabrūk, Alī. 2003, 'Ta'sīs al-Taqdīs: Al-Shāfi'ī Namūzajān', pp. 45-72.
[32] See Mabrūk, Dr. Alī. 2003, *al-Hadāthah Bayn al-Bāsyā Wa al-Jinrāl,* Markaz al-Qāhirah Li al-Dirāsāt Huqūq al-Insān, al-Qāhirah, pp. 25-42.
[33] Barton's translation, Wahid, *Prisma Pemikiran Gus Dur,* p. 46.
[34] Rahman, Fazlur. 2000, *Revival and Reform in Islam: A Study of Islamic Fundamentalism,* Edited and with an Introduction by Ebrahim Moosa, Oxford, Oneworld, p. 7.
[35] Quoted in Akhavi, 'The Dialectic in Contemporary Egyptian Social Thought: The Scripturalist and Modernist Discourses of Sayyid Qutb and Hasan Hanafi', p. 391.
[36] Rahman, Fazlur. 1965, *Islamic Methodology in History,* Islamic research Institute, Islamabad, p. ix.
[37] Hourani, Albert. 1970, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939,* Oxford University Press, London, Oxford, New York, p. 150.
[38] Cited in Imārah, Muhammad Dr. 1980, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī: Muhammad 'Abduh Wa Madrasatuhu,* Dār al-Hilāl, al-Qāhirah, p. 40.
[39] Rahman, Fazlur. 1982, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition,* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, p. 86.
[40] Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. 1957, *Islam in Modern History,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, p. 41.
[41] Aslam Farouk-Alli's translation, Mabrūk, Alī. 2002, *'An al-Imāmah Wa al-Siyāsah Wa al-Khitāb al-Tārikhī Fi 'Ilm al-'Aqāid,* Markaz al-Qāhirah Li al-Dirāsāt Huqūq al-Insān, al-Qāhirah, p. 9.
[42] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 1994, 'Islam, Politics and Democracy in the 1950s and 1990s', In David Bourchier & John Legge (Eds), *Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s,* Monash University Press, Clyton, p. 154.
[43] Wahid, Abdurrahman. 2001, 'Indonesia's Mild Secularism', *SAIS Review,* vol. 2, no. 2, p. 28.
[44] Khan, Mohammed A. Muqtedar. 1997, ' Epistemological Poverty or Poverty of Epistemology', *The Muslim World,* vol. 87, no. 1, p. 70.
[45] Macpherson, C. B. 1965, *The Real World of Democracy,* Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, p. 4.
[46] Ibid, p. 35.
[47] Shimogaki, Kazuo. 1988. *Between Modernity and Post-Modernity; The Islamic Left and Dr. Hasan Hanafi's Thought: A Critical Reading,* The Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, International University of Japan, p. 80.
[48] Yamane, David. 1997, 'Secularization on Trial: In Defense of a Neosecularization Paradigm', *Journal for the Scientific of Religion,* vol. 36, no. 1, p. 113.
[49] Aslam Farouk-Alli's translation, Mabrūk, Alī. *'An al-Imāmah Wa al-Siyāsah Wa al-Khitāb al-Tārikhī Fi 'Ilm al-'Aqāid,* pp. 13-4.
[50] Mabrūk, Alī. 1995, 'al-Lātārikhiyah...Azmah al-Khtāb al-Arabī al-Mu'āsir', In Mahmūd Amīn al-'Ālim, *Qodhāyā Fikriyah, al-Fikr al-'Arabī 'alā Mashārif al-Qarn al-Hādī Wa al-'Ishrīn: Ru'yah Tahlīliyah Wa Naqdiyah,* Qodhāyā Fikriyah Li an-Nashr Wa al-Tauzi', al-Qāhirah, p. 102.
[51] Ibid, p. 108.
[52] Mannheim, K. 1936, *Ideology and Utopia,* Harcourt, New York, p. 192.
[53] Laroui, Abdallah. 1976, *The Crisis of the Arab intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism?,* Translated from the French Diarmid Cammell, University of California Press, Berkley, Los Angeles, London, p. 157.
[54] Mabrūk, 'al-Lātārikhiyah...Azmah al-Khtāb al-Arabī al-Mu'āsir', p. 104.
[55] Arkoun, Mohammed. 1987, *Rethinking Islam Today,* Occasional Papers Series, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington D.C, p. 2.
[56] Abu-Rabi', Ibrahim M. 1991, 'Discourse, Power, and Ideology in Modern Islamic Revivalist Thought: Sayyid Quṭb', *The Muslim World,* vol. 81, no. 3-4, p. 286.

[57] Lee, Dwight E. and Robert N. Beck. 1954, 'The Meaning of "Historicism"', *The American Historical Review*, vol. 59, no. 3, p. 577.
[58] Foucault, Michel. 1980, *Power/Knowledge*, Collin Gordon (Ed), Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, pp. 131-2.
[59] Salvatore, Armando. 1995, 'The Rational Authentication of Turāth in Contemporary Arab Thought: Muhammad al-Jābirī and Hasan Hanafī', *The Muslim World*, vol. 85, no. 3-4, p. 211.
[60] Mabrūk, *al-Hadāthah Bayn al-Bāsyā Wa al-Jinrāl*, p. 30.
[61] Culler, Jonathan. 1998, 'Structuralism', In Edward Craig (Ed), *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, vol. 4, Routledge, London and New York, p. 176.
[62] Quoted in Morera, Esteve. 1990, *Gramsci's Historicism: A Realist Interpretation*, Routledge, London and New York, p. 17.
[63] al-Azmeh, Aziz. 1993, *Islams and Modernities*, Verso, London, New York, p. 94.
[64] Laroui, *The Crisis of the Arab intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism?*, p. 159.
[65] Morera, *Gramsci's Historicism: A Realist Interpretation*, p. 12.
[66] Mabrūk, *An al-Imāmah Wa al-Siyāsah Wa al-Khitāb al-Tārikhī Fi 'Ilm al-'Aqāid*, p. 17.
[67] Salvatore, The Rational Authentication of Turāth in Contemporary Arab Thought, p. 212.
[68] See Ramage, Douglas E. 1996, 'Democratisation, Religious Tolerance and Pancasila: The Political Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid', In Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (Eds), *Nahdlatul Ulama. Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia*, Monash Asia Institute, Clyton, pp. 227-256.
[69] Aslam Farouk-Alli's translation, Mabrūk, *'An al-Imāmah Wa al-Siyāsah Wa al-Khitāb al-Tārikhī Fi 'Ilm al-'Aqāid*, p. 10.
[70] Laroui, *The Crisis of the Arab intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism?*, p. 153-4.
[71] Ibid., p. 156.
[72] Mabrūk, *al-Hadāthah Bayn al-Bāsyā Wa al-Jinrāl*,p. 176.
[73] Salvatore, The Rational Authentication of Turāth in Contemporary Arab Thought, p. 203.
[74] Laroui, *The Crisis of the Arab intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism?*, p. 159.
[75] Ibid, p. 156.
[76] Aslam Farouk-Alli's translation, Mabrūk, *'An al-Imāmah Wa al-Siyāsah Wa al-Khitāb al-Tārikhī Fi 'Ilm al-'Aqāid*, p. 10.

Bibliography

'Abd al-Raziq, 'Ali. 1998, 'Message Not Government, Religion Not State', In Charles Kurzman (Ed), *Liberal Islam: Sourcebook,* Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, pp. 29-36.

Abdillah, Masykuri. 1995, *Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy (1966-1993),* Dissertation zur Erlangung der würde des Doktors der philosophie der Universität Hamburg.

Abu-Rabi', Ibrahim M. 1991, 'Discourse, Power, and Ideology in Modern Islamic Revivalist Thought: Sayyid Quṭb', *The Muslim World,* vol. 81, no. 3-4, pp. 283-298.

Alatas, Syed Farid. 1985, 'Notes on Various Theories Regarding the Islamization of the Malay Archipelago', *The Muslim World,* vol. 75, no. 3-4, pp. 162-175.

Al-Ash'arī, Abū al-Hasan. 1950, *Maqālāt al-Islamiyyīn,* Edited by Muhammad Muhyiddīn Abd al-Hamīd, Maktabah al-Nahdah al-Misriyya, al-Qāhirah, vol. 1.

Al-'Awwā, Dr. Muhammad Salīm. 1987. *Fī al-Nižām al-Siyāsī li al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah,* Dār al-Shurūq, Cairo.

Al-Azmeh, Aziz. 1993, *Islams and Modernities,* Verso, London, New York.

Al-Fārūqī, I. R. 1986, 'Meta-Religion: Towards a Critical World Theology', *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences,* vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 13-57.

Al-Shahrastānī, Abī al-Fath Muhammad Abd al-Karīm Ibn Abī Bakr Ahmad. n. d, *Al-Milal wa al-Nihal,* Abd al-'Azīz Muhammad al-Wakīl (Ed), Dār al-Fikr, Lebanon.

Althusser, Louis. 1959, *Politics and History: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hegel and Marx,* Translated from French by Ben Brewster, Western printing Services Ltd, Bristol.

Akhavi, Shahrough. 1997, 'The Dialectic in Contemporary Egyptian Social Thought: The Scripturalist and Modernist Discourses of Sayyid Qutb and Hasan Hanafi', *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 377-401.

Anderson, Benedict. 1990, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia,* Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.

An-Na'īm, Prof. Dr. Abdullah Ahmed. 2003, *Shari'a and Positive Legislation: Is an Islamic State Possible or Viable,* Public Lecture, January 4, 2003, Pusat

Bahasa dan Budaya Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta.

Anshari, Saifuddin. 1990. 'Islam or the Panca Sila as the Basis of the State', In Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, Yasmin Hussain (Eds), *Reading on Islam in Southeast Asia,* Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, pp. 221-228.

Anwar, H. Rosihan. 1971, *Pergerakan Islam dan Kebangsaan Indonesia,* P. T. Kartika Tama, Djakarta.

Anwar, M. Syafi'i. 1995, *Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Politik Tentang Cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru,* Paramadina, Jakarta.

Arkoun, Mohammed. 1987, *Rethinking Islam Today,* Occasional Papers Series, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington D.C.

Azra, Azyumardi. 2001, 'Globalization of Indonesian Muslim Discourse: Contemporary Religio-Intellectual Connections Between Indonesia and the Middle East', In Johan Mueleman (Ed), *Islam in the Era of Globalization: Muslim Attitudes Toward Modernity and Identity,* INIS, Jakarta, pp. 31-50.

Badawi, M.A. Zaki. 1976, *The Reformers of Egypt,* Croom Helm, London.

Barton, Greg. 2002, *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid,* Equinox Publishing, Jakarta.

----------1997, 'Indonesia's Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual Ulama: The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in Neo-Modernist Thought', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations,* vol. 8, no. pp. 323-350.

----------1996, 'The Liberal, Progressive Roots of Abdurrahman Wahid's Thought', In Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (Eds), *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia,* Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, pp. 189-226.

----------1995, 'Neo-Modernism: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia', *Studia Islamika,* vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 3-75.

----------1994, 'The Impact of neo-Modernism on Indonesian Islamic Thought: The Emergence of a New Pluralism, In David Bourchier & John Legge (Eds), *Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s,* Monash University Press, Clayton, pp. 143-150.

Benda, Harry J. 1958, 'Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia, *The Journal of Modern History,* vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 338-347.

----------1958, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945,* W. van Hoeve Ltd, The Hague and Bandung.

Binder, Leonard. 1988. *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies,* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London.

Boland, B. J. 1990, 'The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia', In Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, Yasmin Hussain (Eds), *Reading on Islam in Southeast Asia,* Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, pp. 137-142.

----------1982, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia,* Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague.

Bousquet, G.-H and J. Schacht (Eds). 1957, *Selected Works of C. Snouck Hurgronje,* E. J. Brill, Leiden.

Bowen, John R. 1995, 'Western Studies of Southeast Asian Islam: Problem of Theory and Practice', *Studia Islamika,* vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 69-86.

Bruinessen, Martin van. 1995, 'Muslims of the Dutch East Indies and the Caliphate Question', *Studia Islamika,* vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 115-140.

Casanova, Jose. 2001, 'Civil Society and Religion: Retrospective Reflections on Catholicism and Prospective Reflections on Islam', *Social Research,* vol. 68, no. 4, pp. 1041-1080.

Chadwick, Owen. 1975, *The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, London, New York, Melbourne.

Christie, Clive J. 1998, *Southeast Asia in the Twentieth Century: A Reader,* I. B. Tauris Publishers, London & New York.

Culler, Jonathan. 1998, 'Structuralism', In Edward Craig (Ed), *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy,* vol. 4, Routledge, London and New York, pp. 174-177.

Desker, Barry. 2002, *Islam and Society in Southeast Asia After September 11,* Institute of Defense and Strategy Studies, Singapore.

Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal. 1987, 'Islamic Modernism', In Mircea Eliade (Ed), *The Encyclopaedia of Religion,* vol. 10, Macmillan, New York, p. 14-17.

Effendy, Bahtiar. 1995, 'Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktek Politik Islam di Indonesia', *Prisma,* no. 5, pp. 3-28.

Enayat, Hamid. 1982, *Modern Islamic Political Language,* The University of Texas Press, Austin, Texas.

Esposito, John L & John O. Voll. 2001, *Makers of Contemporary Islam,* Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Fakhry, Majid. 1954, 'The Theocratic Idea of the Islamic State in Recent Controversies', *International Affairs,* vol. 30, no, 4, pp. 450-462.

Fealy, Gregory John. 1998, *Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: A History of Nahdlatul Ulama, 1952-1967,* Department of History, Monash University.

Federspiel, Howard M. 2002, 'Modernist Islam in Southeast Asia: A New Examination', *The Muslim World,* vol. 92, no 3-4, pp. 371-386.

----------2001, *Islam and Ideology in the Emerging Indonesian State: The Persatuan Islam (PERSIS), 1923 to 1957,* Brill, Leiden, Boston, Köln.

Feillard, Andrée. 1997, 'Traditionalist Islam and the State in Indonesia: The Road to Legitimacy and Renewal', In Robert W. Hefner & Patricia Horvatich (Eds), *Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia,* University of Hawai'i Press, United States of America, pp. 129-153.

Feith, Herbert. 1962, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia,* Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

Filali-Ansari, Abdou. 1998, 'Can Modern Rationality Shape a New Religiosity? Mohamed Abed Jabri and the Paradox of Islam and Modernity', In Cooper, John, R. L. Nettler and Mohamed Mahmoud (Eds), *Islam and Modernity: Muslim Intellectuals Respond,* I. B. Tauris, London, pp. 156-171.

Foucault, Michel. 1980, *Power/Knowledge,* Collin Gordon (Ed), Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York.

Fregosi, Renée. 1989, 'From the Secular to the Politico-Religious: Reflections on *The Name of the Rose*', *Contemporary European Affairs,* vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 15-27.

Geertz, Clifford. 1990, 'The Religion of Java', In Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, Yasmin Hussain (Eds), *Reading on Islam in Southeast Asia,* Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, pp. 271-277.

----------1960, 'The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker', *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* vol. 2, no, 2, pp. 228-249.

Hāmid Abū Zayd, Nasr. 1996, *Al-Imām al-Shafi'ī wa Ta'sīs al-Idīlūjiyah al-Wasatiyah,* Maktabah Madbūlī, al-Qāhirah.

Hassan, M. Kamal. 2003, 'The Influence of Mawdūdī's Thought on Muslims in Southeast Asia: A Brief Survey', *The Muslim World,* vol. 93, no. 3-4, pp. 429-464.

----------1982, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia,* Percetakan Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur.

----------1987, 'The Response of Muslim Youth Organizations to Political Change: HMI in Indonesia and ABIM in Malaysia', In William R. Roff (Ed), *Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning: Comparative Studies of Muslim Discourse,* Croom Helm, London & Sydney, pp. 180-196.

Hefner, Robert W. 2001, 'Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization', *Sociology of Religion,* vol. 62, no. 4, pp. 491-514.

----------2000, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia,* Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J.

----------1998, 'Secularization and Citizenship in Muslim Indonesia', In Paul Heelas (Ed), *Religion, Modernity and Postmodernity,* Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts, pp. 147-168.

----------1997, 'Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia', In Robert W. Hefner & Patricia Horvatich (Eds), *Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia,* University of Hawai'i Press, United States of America, pp. 75-127.

----------1993, 'Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class', *Indonesia,* 56, pp. 1-35.

Hourani, Albert. 1970, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939,* Oxford University Press, London, Oxford, New York.

Hurgronje, C. Snouck. 1970, *Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th Century: Daily Life, Customs and Learning the Moslims of the East-Indian-Archipelago,* E. J. Brill, Leiden.

Imārah, Muhammad Dr. 1980, *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī: Muhammad 'Abduh Wa Madrasatuhu,* Dār al-Hilāl, al-Qāhirah.

Ismail, Faisal. 1995, *Islam in Indonesian Politics: A Study of Muslim Response to and Acceptance of the Pancasila,* Ph D Dissertation. Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

Iqbal, Sir Muhammad. 1986, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam,* Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore.

Johns, Anthony H. 1987, 'Indonesia: Islam and Cultural Pluralism', In John L. Esposito (Ed), *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society,* Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, pp. 202-229.

----------1987, 'An Islamic System or Islamic Values? Nucleus of a Debate in Contemporary Indonesia', In William R. Roff (Ed), *Islam and Political*

Economy of Meaning: Comparative Studies of Muslim Discourse, Croom Helm, London & Sydney, pp. 254-280.

Keane, John. 2000, 'The Limits of Secularism', In John L. Esposito and Azzam Tamimi (Eds), *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East,* Hurst & Company, London, pp. 29-37.

Kennedy, Emmet. 2000, 'The Tangled History of Secularism', *Modern Age,* vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 31-37.

Khaldun, Ibn. 1958, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History,* Translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal, vol. 3, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

Khan, Mohammed A. Muqtedar. 1997, 'Epistemological Poverty or Poverty of Epistemology', *The Muslim World,* vol. 87, no. 1, pp. 67-81.

Kratz, E. V. 1990, 'Islam in Indonesia', In Peter Clarke (Ed), *The World's Religions: Islam,* Routledge, London, pp. 119-149.

Kroef, Justus van der. 1958, 'The Role of Islam in Indonesian Nationalism and Politics', *The Western Political Quarterly,* vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 33-54.

Laroui, Abdallah. 1976, *The Crisis of the Arab intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism?,* Translated from the French Diarmid Cammell, University of California Press, Berkley, Los Angeles, London.

Lee, Dwight E. and Robert N. Beck. 1954, 'The Meaning of "Historicism", *The American Historical Review,* vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 568-577.

Legge, J. D. 1964, *Indonesia: Third Edition,* Prentice-Hall of Australia Pty Ltd, Sydney.

Liddle, R. William. 1996, 'The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 55, no. 3, pp. 613-634.

Mabrook, Ali. 2004, *The Ash'arite Dogma: The Root of the Arab/Muslim Absolutism'*, Revised and edited by Abdul Kadir Riyadi, Unpublished Paper.

Mabrūk, Alī. 2003, 'Ta'sīs al-Taqdīs: Al-Shāfi'ī Namūzajān', *Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics*, no, 23, pp. 45-72.

Mabrūk, Dr. Alī. 2003, *al-Hadāthah Bayn al-Bāsyā Wa al-Jinrāl,* Markaz al-Qāhirah Li al-Dirāsāt Huqūq al-Insān, al-Qāhirah.

----------2002, *'An al-Imāmah Wa al-Siyāsah Wa al-Khitāb al-Tārikhī Fi 'Ilm al-'Aqāid,* Markaz al-Qāhirah Li al-Dirāsāt Huqūq al-Insān, al-Qāhirah.

----------1995, 'al-Lātārikhiyah...Azmah al-Khtāb al-Arabī al-Mu'āsir', In Mahmūd Amīn al-'Ālim, *Qodhāyā Fikriyah, al-Fikr al-'Arabī 'alā Mashārif al-Qarn*

al-Hādī Wa al-'Ishrīn: Ru'yah Tahlīliyah Wa Naqdiyah, Qodhāyā Fikriyah Li an-Nashr Wa al-Tauzi', al-Qāhirah, pp. 101-114.

Macpherson, C. B. 1965, *The Real World of Democracy,* Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford.

Madjid, Nurcholish. 1982, 'Reinvigorating Religious Understanding in the Indonesian Muslim Community', In Muhammad Kamal Hasan (Ed), *Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia,* Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, pp. 216-233.

----------1982, 'The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integration of the Ummat', In Muhammad Kamal Hasan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia,* Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, pp. 187-197.

Mannheim, K. 1936, *Ideology and Utopia,* Harcourt, New York.

Manzoor, S. Parvez. 2000, 'Desacralising Secularism', In John L. Esposito and Azzam Tamimi (Eds), *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East,* Hurst & Company, London, pp. 81-96.

Martin, Richard C, Mark Woodward and Dwi S. Atmaja. 1997, *Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu'tazilism From Medieval School to Modern Symbol,* Oneworld, Oxford.

Masud, Muhammad Khalid. 1989, *Islamic Legal Philosophy: A Study of Abū Ishāq al-Shātibī's Life and Thought,* India, International Islamic Publishers.

Maududi, Abul A'la. 1978, 'What Islam Stands For', In Altaf Gauhar (Ed), *The Challenge of Islam,* Islamic Council of Europe, London, pp. 3-14.

McVey, Ruth. 1983, 'Faith as the Outsider: Islam in Indonesian Politics', In James P. Piscatori (Ed), *Islam in the Political Process,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 199-225.

Mitsuo, Nakamura. 1995, 'Nahdatul Ulama', In John L. Esposito (Ed), *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World,* New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, vol. 3, pp. 217-223.

----------1995, 'Abdurrahman Wahid', In John L. Esposito (Ed), *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World,* New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, vol. 1, pp. 14-15.

Moosa, Ebrahim. 2001-02, 'The Poetics and Politics of Law After Empire: Reading Women's Rights in the Contestations of Law', *UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law,* vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1-46.

Morera, Esteve. 1990, *Gramsci's Historicism: A Realist Interpretation,* Routledge, London and New York.

Mujiburrahman. 1999, 'Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Political Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations,* vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 339-352.

Najjar, Fauzi M. 200, 'Islamic Fundamentalism and the Intellectuals: The Case of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,* vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 177-200.

Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. 1996, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism,* Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford.

Peacock, James L. 1978, *Muslim Puritans: Reformist Psychology in Southeast Asian Islam,* University of California Press, Berkeley.

Purdy, Susan S. 1982, 'The Civil Religion Thesis as it Applies to a Pluralistic Society: Pancasila Democracy in Indonesia (1945-1965)', *Journal of International Affairs,* vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 307-316.

Qutayba, Ibn. 1967, *Al-Imāmah wa al-Siyāsah,* Edited by Taha al-Zīnī, Maktabat al-Halabī, al-Qāhirah.

Rahman, Fazlur. 2000, *Revival and Reform in Islam: A Study of Islamic Fundamentalism*, Edited and with an Introduction by Ebrahim Moosa, Oneworld, Oxford.

----------1982, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition,* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London.

----------1970, 'Islamic Modernism: Its Scope, Method and Alternatives, *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 317-333.

----------1970, 'Revival and Reform in Islam', In P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton and Bernard Lewis (Eds), *The Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 2, The University Press, Cambridge, pp. 632-656.

----------1966, *Islam,* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London.

----------1965, *Islamic Methodology in History,* Islamic research Institute, Islamabad.

Ramage, Douglas E. 1996, 'Democratisation, Religious Tolerance and Pancasila: The Political Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid', In Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (Eds), *Nahdlatul Ulama. Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia,* Monash Asia Institute, Clyton, pp. 227-256.

----------1995, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance,* Routledge, London and New York.

Riddell, Peter G. 2002, 'The Diverse Voices of Political Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations,* vol. 13, no.1, pp. 65-84.

Riddell, Peter. 2001, *Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World: Transmission and Responses,* Horizon Books, Singapore.

Saeed, Abdullah. 1997, 'Ijtihad and Innovation in Neo-Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations,* vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 279-295.

Saleh, Fauzan. 2001, *Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse in 20th Century Indonesia: A Critical Survey,* Brill, Leiden, Boston, Köln.

Salim, Arskal and Azyumardi Azra (Eds). 2003, *Shari'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia,* Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

Salvatore, Armando. 1995, 'The Rational Authentication of Turāth in Contemporary Arab Thought: Muhammad al-Jābirī and Hasan Hanafī', *The Muslim World,* vol. 85, no. 3-4, pp. 191-214.

Samson, Allan A. 1968, 'Islam in Indonesian Politics', *Asian Survey,* vol. 8, no. 12, pp. 1001-1017.

Schwarz, Adam. 1994, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s,* Westview Press, Australia.

Shepard, William E. 1987. 'Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology', *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 307-335.

Shimogaki, Kazuo. 1988. *Between Modernity and Post-Modernity; The Islamic Left and Dr. Hasan Hanafi's Thought: A Critical Reading,* The Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, International University of Japan.

Sivan, Emmanuel. 2003, 'The Clash Within Islam', *Survival,* vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 25-44.

Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. 1957, *Islam in Modern History,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.

Steenbrink, Karel A. 1993, *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596-1950,* Translated by Jan Steenbrink and Henry Jansen, Rodopi, Amsterdam & Atlanta.

Syamsuddin, M. Din. 1995, 'Islamic Political Thought and Cultural Revival in Modern Indonesia' *Studia Islamika,* vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 47-68.

Tibi, Bassam. 1990, *Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change,* Westview, Boulder.

Vatikiotis, Michael R. J. 1993, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change,* Routledge, London & New York.

Wahid, Abdurrahman. 2001, 'Indonesia's Mild Secularism', *SAIS Review,* vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 25-28.

----------2001, *Pergulatan Negara, Agama dan Kebudayaan,* Desantara, Depok.

----------1999, *Gus Dur Menjawab Perubahan Zaman: Kumpulan Pemikiran K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid Presiden ke-4 Republik Indonesia,* Kompas, Jakarta.

----------1999, *Islam, Negara dan Demokrasi: Himpunan Percikan Perenungan Gus Dur,* Collected by Imam Anshori Saleh, Penerbit Erlangga, Jakarta.

----------1999, *Prisma Pemikiran Gus Dur, LKiS,* Yogyakarta.

----------1999, *Tuhan Tidak Perlu Dibela, LKiS,* Yogyakarta.

----------1998, *Tabayun Gus Dur: Pribumisasi Islam, Hak Minoritas, Reformasi Kultural, LKiS,* Yogyakarta.

----------'Negara Islam, Adakah Konsepnya?', *Kompas,* May 17, 2002.

----------1996, 'Islam, Pluralisme dan Demokratisasi', In Arief Afandi (Ed), *Islam, Demokrasi Atas Bawah,* Pustaka Pelajar, Yogyakarta, pp. 107-121.

----------1994, 'Islam, Ideologi dan Etos Kerja di Indonesia, In Budhy Munawar-Rachman (Ed), *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah,* Paramadina: Jakarta, pp. 582-587.

----------1994, 'Islam, Politics and Democracy in the 1950s and 1990s', In David Bourchier & John Legge. (Eds), 1994, *Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s,* Monash University Press, Clayton, pp. 151-155.

----------1994, 'Konsep-Konsep Keadilan', In Budhy Munawar-Rachman (Ed), *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah,* Paramadina, Jakarta, pp. 97-102.

----------1994, 'Universalisme Islam dan Kosmopolitanisme Peradaban Islam', In Budhy Munawar-Rachman (Ed), *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah,* Paramadina, Jakarta, pp. 545-552.

----------1986, 'The Nahdlatul Ulama and Islam in Present Day Indonesia', In Taufiq Abdullah & Sharon Siddique (Eds), *Islam and Society in Southeast Asia,* Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, Singapore, pp. 175-186.

----------1985, 'The Islamic Masses in the Life of State and Nation', *Prisma,* 35, pp. 3-10.

----------'Pancasila dan Ajaran Agama, Tidak Saling Bertentangan', *Kompas*, Feb 01, 1984.

----------1981, *Muslim di Tengah Pergumulan*, Leppenas, Jakarta

Watt, Professor William Montgomery. 1988, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity*, Routledge, London & New York.

Weber, Max, 1864-1920. 1976, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Translated by Talcott Parsons and Introduced by Anthony Giddens, Allen & Unwin, London.

Wensinck, A. J. 1979, *The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical Development*, Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, New Delhi.

Widjojoatmodjo, Raden Abdulkadir. 1942, 'Islam in the Netherlands East Indies', *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 48-57.

Wilson, Bryan R. 1987, 'Secularization', In Mircea Eliade (Ed), *The Encyclopaedia of Religion*, vol. 13, Macmillan, New York, pp. 159-165.

----------1985, 'Secularization: the Inherited Model', In Phillip E. Hammond (Ed), *The Sacred in a Secular Age*, University of California Press, Berkeley, pp. 9-20.

Yamane, David. 1997, 'Secularization on Trial: In Defense of a Neosecularization Paradigm', *Journal for the Scientific of Religion*, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 109-122.

Internet Sources

Wahid, Abdurrahman. 2003, *The Reinterpretation of 'Relative Truth'*, Retrieved: March 10, 2004, from: http:www.gusdur.net/English/English_detail.asp?co-tentOID=144.

----------2002, *How to Counter Islamic Extremism*, Retrieved: March 10, 2004, from: http://www.gusdur.net/english_detail.asp?contentOID=145.

----------2002, *Islam dan Diskripsinya*, Retrieved: March 10, 2004, from: http://www.gusdur.net/Indonesia/detail.asp?-contentOID=270.

----------2002, *Islam dan Formalisme Ajarannya*, Retrieved: March 10, 2004, from: http://www.gusdur.net/Indonesia/detail.asp?content- OID=278.

----------*The Uniqueness of Man in Islam*, Retrieved: April 04, 2004, from: http://www.rghr.net/mainfile.php/2000/-34.

World in Focus, *Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid*, Retrieved: May 04, 2004, from: http://www.abc.net.au/foreig/stories/s5511-41.htm.