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**Can a Mega-Event be Developmental? A Case Study of  
Cape Town as it Prepares for the 2010 World Cup**

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A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the award of the degree of  
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**CUMPULSORY DECLARATION**

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Signed by candidate

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## Abstract

Cities and nations around the world vigorously compete to host mega-events such as the Olympics and the World Cup, despite the history of mixed economic and social impacts of these events. While such events have been traditionally sought by hosts as vehicles primarily for economic growth, image enhancement, and generation of civic and cultural pride, a recent trend is emerging in which substantial developmental components are integrated into hosting strategies. This study utilizes the human development paradigm, and its attendant emphasis on facilitating gains by the poor and disadvantaged, to evaluate the degree to which Cape Town can integrate developmental priorities into the role it plays as one of South Africa's host cities of the 2010 World Cup. The analysis focuses on the clash between the city's expansive human development objectives and the logistical and commercial dictates of hosting a mega-event. Also brought to the fore are the consequential public planning decisions required when hosting a mega-event in a developing city, with ramifications that can be particularly acute for the disadvantaged.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Background

Cities, regions, and nations around the world are competing with each other like few other periods in history. One area is pitted against another in a battle to attract a limited number of resources, whether financial, human, or other. As cities and nations have become increasingly entrepreneurial in an attempt to attract investment and win international prestige, they have often used the strategy of hosting mega-events such as the Olympics and the football World Cup. These mega-events require huge outlays, drastically change public planning and spending priorities, and have a profound social and economic impact on the areas that host them.

Mega-events usually are held in wealthy northern countries. The typical scenario is that a group of business and political elites initiate the bid for the event and then direct the planning and hosting of it. Although support for hosting such events is often sought by portraying the event as a catalyst for economic development, much of the economic benefit is often accrued by only a small group of private businesses such as construction companies and media firms. The general public usually derives only limited material benefits from the event and is largely excluded from the public planning process in the run-up to the event.

In four years South Africa will host the 2010 Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup (hereafter referred to as the World Cup). As a middle-income developing nation, South Africa has greater demands on its public resources than the richer nations in the North that have traditionally played host to mega-events. The importance of analyzing the impacts of bidding for and hosting mega-events on developing nations is underscored by the fact that the prominent academic development studies journal *Third World Quarterly* devoted an entire special issue called “Global Games” to the topic in 2004. In light of the special concerns of poorer countries, as well as the potential for mega-events to exacerbate social and economic inequalities, it can be argued that it is imperative that South Africa actively integrates human development priorities and innovative public planning into its preparations for the hosting of the World Cup. ‘Human development’ in this case refers to the social and economic upliftment of the poor and disadvantaged.

A trend is beginning to emerge in which certain cities have incorporated strong human development components into their bid for a mega-event, most notably Toronto in its bid for the 1996 Olympics and Cape Town in its bid for the 2004 Olympics. Both of these bids were ultimately unsuccessful. By contrast, the 2010 World Cup in South Africa provides an opportunity to consider the developmental potential of a mega-event as it moves from the bid stage, to event implementation, and finally the legacy period after the event. Considering the vast human development needs in South Africa as well as Cape Town’s significant human development component in its 2004 Olympic bid, the time is ripe for a further evaluation of the degree to which human development can be advanced through a mega-event.

This dissertation describes the findings of research conducted in Cape Town in March to May 2006 that focused on determining the degree to which human development in Cape Town could be advanced through the city's role in South Africa's hosting of the 2010 World Cup. Interviews were conducted with officials from national and local government, the media, big and small business, and the NGO sector, and relevant documents were examined. The findings are analyzed in light of the human development paradigm, with its emphasis on productivity, equity, sustainability, and empowerment and the effect they each have on facilitating gains by the poor and disadvantaged.

## **1.2 Cape Town's Mega-Event History**

In order to help ground the present analysis of Cape Town's preparations for the 2010 World Cup, and the potential therein to integrate human development priorities, we must briefly look back a decade. Cape Town's mega-event history is more substantial than just its current preparations for the 2010 World Cup. The city made a bid for the 2004 Summer Olympics which, although unsuccessful in the end, entailed an extensive amount of work during the mid to late 1990s and attempted to address developmental needs in the city that remain largely unmet to this day. The bid was promoted as a 'developmental' bid and highlighted proposed measures that would positively impact on historically disadvantaged people and areas.

The three pillars of the modern Olympics have traditionally been sport, culture, and the environment. To these three elements Cape Town added a fourth: human development. The bid was portrayed as an opportunity to use the Olympics as a catalyst for better

integrating the three elements of poverty [alleviation], development, and the environment, with a view to improving the quality of life of Cape Town's "dispossessed." (Cape Town, 1996: 1) The Cape Town Bid Charter explains its inclusion of development as a fourth pillar of the Olympic Movement as follows: "Our philosophy is that the Olympic process...should contribute to improving the quality of life of the people of the city, region, nation and sub-continent, especially the most marginalized." (City of Cape Town, 1996: iii) The Bid used the slogan *The Developmental Olympics – for Cape Town, for South Africa, for Africa*. (City of Cape Town, 1996: ii) Organizers proclaimed, "We want to make the Olympic Games in Cape Town different from any held before." (City of Cape Town, 1996: 6) The idea was to make the Games a catalyst for widespread redevelopment in Cape Town which would begin to redress years of neglect during the apartheid era.

Since Cape Town was not awarded the right to host the 2004 Olympics, we will never know whether or not it would have achieved its objective of hosting a developmental Games. We can only evaluate it on what was done during the few years that the city was competing in the bidding process. With regard to one developmental aspect of the bid—the Bid Company's desire to include a robust public participation element in the bidding process—Arnold (1997: 9) notes that the combination of International Olympic Committee requirements, a lack of resources, and social and political transition all conspired against meaningful public participation. Many stakeholders did not have access to the planning process. Aside from public participation, other developmental aspects of the bid suffered similarly disappointing results. What came through in many analyses was the acknowledgement that the development objectives of Cape Town's bid would not be able to completely coexist with other practical considerations. In reviewing the Olympic Bid

transport proposals, Cameron (1997: vii) finds they could not “satisfy both the logistic and developmental objectives set for the Games.” It seems that even in the bid stage, before Cape Town would have needed to begin making serious decisions and preparations had it won the bid, the city’s expansive vision was already being compromised as it met with mega-event realities. Nevertheless, just formulating the vision was a significant accomplishment—the product of true social entrepreneurialism. Cape Town’s bid for the 2004 Olympics also laid conceptual groundwork for South Africa’s bid for, and eventual hosting, of the 2010 World Cup.

### **1.3 Chapter Outline**

While mega-event analysis has not emerged as a stand-alone field in its own right, a number of theorists from various disciplines have made significant contributions in the past twenty years. Chapter II reviews this mega-event literature. It also traces the emergence of the idea of human development, which is the most important concept discussed in this study after the phenomenon of mega-events. The research methodology employed in the study is the focus of Chapter III. The chapter includes the justifications for using interviews as the primary method of data collection and includes a description of the interview event. The latter part of the chapter is concerned with the concepts that guided data analysis, including the four pillars of the human development paradigm—productivity, equity, sustainability, and empowerment. Chapter IV presents the research findings, drawn primarily from the interviews but supported by documentation. Findings are grouped into four areas: (1) Loci of Control and Competing Priorities, (2) Human Development as a Priority, (3) Implementation of Human Development Strategies, and (4) Legacy. The findings are

analyzed in Chapter V, with particular attention given to the aforementioned pillars of the human development paradigm. The chapter then offers a conclusion by commenting upon the findings' relevance for mega-event analysis past, present, and future.

## Chapter 2

### Literature Review

The two issues dealt with most prominently in this study are mega-events and development. While a library-full of information exists on the latter, the former is still a fringe topic in just about any academic discipline. Nonetheless, a literature review will help place this research project in the body of work that already exists.

#### 2.1 Mega-Events

What, exactly, can be called a mega-event? The concept of a mega-event is an outgrowth of earlier ideas around 'landmark,' and, to a greater extent, 'hallmark' events. The most commonly used definition of a hallmark event in the 1980s and 1990s was that supplied by Ritchie (1984: 2): "Major one-time or recurring events of limited duration, developed primarily to enhance the awareness, appeal and profitability of a tourist destination in the short and/or long term." Such hallmark events help to put a city on the map, and are often utilized during lulls in the tourist season. The range of things that have been described as hallmark events by theorists has varied from something as small as a festival in a small town to an event as large as the Commonwealth Games. However, there has been general consensus that only large events of significant scale can be classified as hallmark. (Hall, 1992: 4)

As the body of hallmark event literature has been augmented over the years, it has become necessary to distinguish a select few hallmark events that clearly stand out from the others due to the excessive scale that characterizes them. These events have come to be known as ‘mega-events.’ Hall (1992: 5) defines mega-events as events that are “expressly targeted at the international tourism market” and ‘mega’ because of the significant size of their “attendance, target market, level of public financial involvement, political effects, extent of television coverage, construction of facilities, and impact on economic and social fabric of host community.” As examples he lists the Olympics, the World Cup, World Fairs, and World Expos.

This study will define mega-events in a similar manner to Hall but with some modifications. For the purpose of this study, a mega-event can be defined as an event which occurs in a city or nation usually only once or at lengthy intervals, requires huge outlays, drastically changes public planning and spending priorities with resultant profound impacts on communities, commands global attention of the highest level, and does not occur annually. This study views Olympics and World Cups as the pinnacle of mega-events and will limit its analysis to these two events. The primary reason for only including Olympics and World Cups is that they stand apart from other mega-events because they command an unmatched level of international attention, require a much greater effort to host—sometimes involving nearly a decade of planning, are vastly more expensive, and have an accordingly greater impact on the host area.

Indeed, the Olympics and the World Cup are preeminent global spectacles now, not least because of the enormous television coverage they receive. Cities, regions, and nations are

fiercely competing to host such events. In fact, hosting an Olympics has replaced hosting a World Fair or World Exposition as the favored method of promoting a city and spurring economic development. (French & Disher, 1997) The World Cup is perhaps the only event with wider global appeal than the Olympics. There are more members of FIFA (207) than there are of the United Nations (191). It is fitting, then, to single out the World Cup and the Olympics as extraordinary mega-events.

Cities around the world are competing with each other like never before to attract resources and rise to prominence on the global stage. While globalization and information technology have not led to the end of cities as some predicted, cities around the world are being forced to compete with each other and find or refine their niche in the global marketplace. (Sassen, 1994) Mega-events are increasingly being utilized by cities to accelerate processes of economic development, image enhancement, and other tasks that generally make them more competitive with other cities. (Andranovich, Burbank, & Heying, 2001; Essex & Chalkley, 2004a & 2004b; Matheson & Baade, 2004) The small number of scholars who have written on mega-events, when analyzing the motivations for such events, have focused on this so-called 'mega-event strategy' employed by cities (or regions or nations) to make themselves more globally competitive.

As might be expected, economic arguments feature most prominently in the rhetoric used by cities to justify bidding for and/or hosting a mega-event. According to Hall (1992: 37), the potential for "economic stimulus" exists in the preparations for the event, the hosting process, and the increase in tourism that follows the event. Government and the private sector see countless commercial opportunities in such events. It's not only the influx of

visitors during and after the event and the accompanying tourism spending that can benefit the economy, but also the outburst of activity including construction of infrastructure and special venues for the event. (Hall, 1992: 44) Though economic studies continually find that the economic impacts of mega-events are usually disappointing in comparison to the predictions made beforehand, economic arguments for mega-events are still employed as much as ever. The 1984 Los Angeles Olympics were run as a tight business and have become known as the commercial Games. They are one of the only Olympics to have made money and many cities hosting mega-events have adopted the L. A. model.

After economic considerations, the next most common theme featured in the legitimization of mega-events is image creation and modification. Cities use the hosting of a mega-event to project an image of themselves that they want the rest of the world to see. This image may or may not reflect the reality of daily life in the city. One of the most common messages a city seeks to portray through its imaging is that it is an attractive destination—whether you are interested in finding your next vacation spot or looking for a place to hold a business conference. Another message is the conveyance of cultural or national pride.

Equally important as their ability to create or convey entirely new images of cities, mega-events can also be used to re-image a city and alert the international community that a change has occurred. Black & Van der Westhuizen (2004: 1206) have labeled this ‘signaling’ and note that “a succession of World War II Axis powers (Rome 1960; Tokyo 1964; Munich 1972) sought the Olympic Games in part to signal their rehabilitation within the international community.” South Africa’s hosting of the 1995 Rugby World Cup is another example. Other cities/nations have signaled different messages through the hosting of a

mega-event. Japan (Tokyo 1964) and Korea (Seoul 1988) used the occasion of hosting the Olympics to alert the world to the fact that they had become global economic players. Kidd (1992: 156) notes that those involved in Toronto's failed bid for the 1996 Olympics wanted to use the hosting of the Olympics as the culmination of Toronto becoming a "world class city" after a surge of business investment in the city. It can be argued that Cape Town wanted to use the 2004 Olympics to signal a similar message. The hosting of the Games was viewed as a final verification that the city had 'arrived' on the international scene.

In a recent review of common arguments employed by proponents of mega-events, Black & Van der Westhuizen (2004: 1205) identify three types of arguments that are most frequently used: (1) "Identity building and signaling," (2) "development," and (3) "promoting political liberalization and human rights." Development motivations are further divided into those focused solely on sports development and those that have a potential to make a wider impact on social and/or economic development. The authors do not, however, acknowledge the generic economic growth argument discussed above that is the most common of all the arguments employed in favor of mega-events. This argument assumes that simply because mega-events prompt an injection of cash into the local economy from tourist spending and increased investment resulting from an elevated international profile, those at all levels of the economy are bound to benefit in some way. However, evidence repeatedly shows that this argument is unsupportable because the economic benefits from mega-events are overwhelmingly accrued by elites. Arguments for mega-events should thus only be classified as "developmental" if they attempt to redress this tendency of economic benefits to not reach those who need them most. Black & Van der Westhuizen's

categorization of “development” arguments is therefore not completely sufficient for the purposes of this study.

Black & Van der Westhuizen’s highlighting of development arguments is important because it points to the growing use of these arguments in the legitimization of mega-events. It is also evidence that scholars are beginning to take notice of the use of development considerations as a key argument for mega-events in recent years. This trend has been notably commented upon by Kidd (1992) and Hiller (2000), discussed later.

Because mega-events are incredibly resource-intensive, all sorts of arguments are made to justify them. These arguments are one of the most important aspects of a mega-event because they help reveal the varying motivations behind the actions of different groups of stakeholders. Hiller (1997 & 2000) has taken note of this element of a mega-event more than other researchers. He posits (Hiller, 1997: 64), “Since the mega-event is of only limited duration, a rationale must be developed to justify the long-term benefit of the cost and effort involved.” Andranovich, Burbank, & Heying (2001: 114) add, “image creation [brought about by hosting a mega-event] provides a rationale for the allocation of scarce resources.”

Many studies (e.g. Hall, 1992; Matheson & Baade, 2004) have sought to analyze the various impacts of mega-events, partly to determine whether earlier predictions were correct and partly to examine all the impacts in their own right. These studies, conducted both before and after the event concerned, have overwhelmingly focused on the economic impact and have neglected non-economic dimensions. This is a deficiency that has been noted by a number of authors (Andranovich, Burbank, & Heying, 2001; Hall, 1992; Haruo & Toshio,

2002; Roche, 1992) but has still yet to be fully rectified. This is not to say that early mega-event literature neglected to acknowledge the need to evaluate the impacts of mega-events in a number of areas. Ritchie (1984), for instance, identifies six categories of impacts of mega-events which included sociocultural impacts and psychological impacts. Generally, however, later researchers still evaluated mega-events' impacts from a primarily economic perspective. One aspect of mega-events' legacies that has managed to find its way into analyses with increasing frequency is the impact upon the natural environment. There is a growing trend to conduct environmental impact assessments before mega-events. Sometimes these analyses do not focus solely on the physical environment but invoke a broader interpretation of 'environment' that includes the social environment as well. For the most part, however, social issues have largely been neglected in the body of work on the impacts of mega-events.

Since economic considerations are among the most common justifications provided for mega-events, it is reasonable to evaluate the impact of a mega-event along economic lines first. This is not because the economic dimensions of the event are paramount, but because the potential economic benefits of a mega-event are invoked as a primary justification so frequently. Unfortunately for those who rely upon this argument, the evidence does not bear it out. This has been reported time and again. Horne (2004) finds that the 2002 World Cup co-hosted by Japan and South Korea has done little to generate income or improve the quality of life of the Japanese population on the whole, which was an aim of the country.

In a review of the impacts of the Olympics on host cities, Andranovich, Burbank, & Heying (2001: 118) helpfully divide the mega-event process, and thus the analysis of it, into three phases: "the bid process, the organization period, and the legacy of the Olympics." Though their particular analysis is focused on the hosting of the Olympics it can be easily applied to

World Cups and lesser mega-events as well. The authors' recognition of the phases of a mega-event and the expectations attached to each phase is important because it allows for a better analysis of whether or not a city has met its objectives through hosting a mega-event. The legacy period is most important in regards to any developmental aspect of the event because it is this period that is longest and has the most potential for meaningful impact upon the less fortunate. In their review of three American cities that have hosted Olympics, Andranovich, Burbank, & Heying (2001: 124) find that the benefits of living in these "world-class" cities, so often touted in justifications for mega-events, rarely affect the day-to-day lives of residents.

One of the most popular arguments proponents of mega-events use to justify their enthusiasm for such events is the presumed notion that infrastructure developed for the event, particularly stadia, will be easily and readily utilized after the event. That is, once a city has a world-class stadium, it should be easy to attract 'the next big thing.' Mega-event literature, however, provides evidence to the contrary. In an analysis of Japan and Korea's infrastructure development in preparation for the 2002 World Cup, Haruo & Toshio (2002: 190) report that as of 2002 no city or prefecture in either country had noteworthy plans to make use of the new stadia after the event.

A number of observers (e.g. Kidd, 1992; Lenskyj, 1996) have sought to evaluate the effects of mega-events from a community development perspective. Because of the large amount of urban infrastructure changes required by most mega-events, low-income urban residents often bear a disproportionate share of the inconveniences caused by such events. These infrastructure projects often require the removal and transplant of low-income housing to

other areas. Newman (1999: 157) concludes that low-income residents in Atlanta viewed the Olympics in that city as “another excuse to reshape the city.”

The trend over the years has been for mega-events to become more and more expensive. The vast sums of money spent on these events almost always carry with them high opportunity costs, as most cities hosting mega-events are large, post-industrial cities with neglected urban districts that are in great need of public funds. Whitson (2004: 1227) reports that, “almost without exception, governments that have had to take on the expenditures associated with a mega-event, or have seen costs escalate beyond what was budgeted for, have had to make cuts in other areas.” The International Olympic Committee has grown concerned over the size to which the Olympic Games have grown, reporting, “If unchecked, the current growth of the Games could discourage many cities from bidding to host the Games.” (IOC, 2002: 16, quoted in Essex & Chalkley, 2004a: 10) While the trend over the past two decades, at least for Winter Olympics, has been increased private funding (Essex & Chalkley, 2004b: 215), this funding has been concentrated in ventures that are lucrative for the private sector. Hence, even though recent mega-events have received a higher proportion of their funding from private sources compared with earlier mega-events, the private sector has understandably different priorities than the public sector, and increased private sector funding does not necessarily free up more public sector monies.

In light of the often drastic social impacts of mega-events, there have been calls for increased awareness and the development of practical requirements to address such concerns. Ritchie & Hall (1999) argue that a social impact analysis component should be a part of any bid to host a mega-event. Theirs is a timely and admirable proposal. Unfortunately, the need to more fully analyze the social impact of mega-events has not

attracted the level of attention it deserves. It is a primary aim of this study to place the social dimension more squarely in the center of mega-event analysis, particularly with regard to the poor.

## **2.2 Human Development**

This study's interest in mega-events' social and economic impacts upon the poor draws from development theory and practice. Development as an idea only really began in the years following World War II. United States President Harry Truman pledged in his 1949 Inaugural Address to give poor nations assistance in growing their economies and hopefully becoming strong democracies. This became known as the Truman Doctrine. By the 1950s and 1960s many western governments, international organizations like the UN, and a host of NGOs were actively involved in 'development' around the world. In its early stages development theory and practice was influenced by economic growth theory in various forms, such as Rostow's (1960) idea of five stages of economic growth that successful countries must progress through. Economic growth theory viewed the many poor countries in the world as simply low-income countries. Thus, increasing incomes through economic growth became the preferred method for addressing poverty. In overwhelmingly focusing on income over all other factors, this approach was obviously limited and inadequate. While income is an important factor that partly determines the quality of life people enjoy, there are many other dynamics that must be considered.

In contrast to theorists who viewed the poverty in developing nations as a consequence of low incomes, a group of scholars emerged who pointed instead to the dependency

developing nations had on the industrialized nations of the West. They viewed this dependency as the defining characteristic of the relationship between developing and developed nations, and the poverty of the former. Frank (1966) employs the idea of the 'development of underdevelopment.' Rather than explaining the underdevelopment of poor countries by suggesting their old institutions and lack of capital have hampered them, he instead places the blame squarely on the development of the global capitalist system itself and the resulting economic development of wealthy northern countries.

Other broad theories emerged to attempt to explain the wide variance in levels of development across the globe, including world systems theory and modernization theory. The emergence of these theories is evidence that earlier theories of development that focused solely on economics had proven insufficient, and that the poverty of many 'developing' nations could not be adequately explained by only pointing to their own internal characteristics and excluding the actions of developed nations. By the 1980s, after a generation of lackluster results, growing dissatisfaction with the development project led some theorists to begin questioning the notion of development itself. This hostility towards the notion of development reached its fullest expression in Escobar's (1995) seminal *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. He posits that the development "discourse and apparatus" (1995: 11) systematically produce knowledge and power in a way that creates an inaccurate perception of poor nations and leads to concrete actions that harm them. His work is important in that it turns on its head the idea that one part of the world has 'arrived' and the other hasn't, that one group of nations has developed to the point of reaching a modern, industrialized ideal and another group of nations will be continually lacking until they achieve the same.

It is well beyond the scope of this literature review to comprehensively debate the merits of competing development theories, or even the concept of development itself. This study acknowledges the troubled history of development and by no means suggests that the economic policy prescriptions and level of industrialization in western nations should be categorically emulated by the rest of the world, nor that such a state of affairs would be universally healthy or desirable. It is still a worthwhile pursuit, however, to examine the range of economic and social strategies that have been employed by both rich and poor nations over the last half century in a context of rapid industrialization, globalization, and technological change. The term 'development' is not dead and has not been rendered useless. When elaborated upon within a worthy paradigm, such as the human development paradigm described below, it can aid in understanding the condition and needs of the poor around the world.

To evaluate whether or not a mega-event can be developmental, as this study seeks to do, it is necessary to first determine what 'being developmental' requires. To answer this, one must first ask *what is development?* The foregoing discussion revealed that development can mean many different things to different people, which leaves no clear, easy answer to the question. It is thus necessary to locate the study within a particular development paradigm. The one best suited to the task is the human development paradigm, which has been chiefly espoused in the United Nations Development Programme's annual Human Development Reports, initiated in 1990. Human development, as its name implies, places people at the center of development efforts. People are viewed as both the means and ends of

development. The process of development is deemed valuable only inasmuch as it increases people's ability to do and be what they want.

Human development is an ideal lense through which to evaluate the developmental impact of a mega-event because it incorporates many other aspects in addition to economic expansion, and only values economic growth if it increases people's ability to achieve what they want to. Typical analyses of mega-events have focused primarily on gauging the event's economic impact, but have failed to go a step further and ask whether on the whole the event would contribute to increasing people's abilities to live the lives they want to, particularly the poor. The human development paradigm, with its specific acknowledgement of economic growth as something that is often necessary—but also often not sufficient—for development, is thus a fitting framework in which to evaluate mega-events.

Early sculptors of the human development paradigm were significantly influenced by the work of Amartya Sen and his concept of capabilities. In *Commodities and Capabilities*, Sen (1985) highlights the need to focus on people's functionings rather than the levels of opulence or utility they enjoy. The potential things that people can do or be are viewed as capabilities, while the actual things that they can do or be are regarded as functionings. The capability approach highlights the need of people to be *capable* of using what they have to bring about what they desire. Just having something, like a high income, is not necessarily enough.

A second concept that substantially contributed to the emergence of the human development paradigm was the Basic Needs approach. Much of the conceptual and

or be what they want to do or be, regardless of whether or not these investments ever lead to growth outside of the individual person. The person is viewed as an end in herself.

Basic Needs is an approach that suffers from noticeable weaknesses. There is confusion and disagreement about what basic needs are and who should determine them. Should it be the poor themselves? Should it be experts? Second, the title 'approach,' which many early Basic Needs theorists attached to their paradigm, was aptly given, because in many ways Basic Needs falls short of being considered a theory. There has been no comprehensive development of a strategy and associated policy prescriptions. An additional weakness of Basic Needs, contrary to the capabilities approach, is that the intrinsic value of human development is not emphasized. Despite these shortcomings, Basic Needs is still important because of its ability to cut through what can seem like endless theoretical debate and rhetoric and focus attention on vital, easily recognizable needs of the poor around the world. As Ghai (1977: 18) concludes, "The appeal of this approach lies in its urgent focus on meeting the basic needs of the poor in the shortest time possible."

In 1990 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) issued the first of what would become annual Human Development Reports. The team that produced the report was led by Mahbub ul Haq and a number of scholars, many of whom had been involved in formulating the capabilities or Basic Needs approaches. These two schools of thought were, to an extent, married in the new Human Development Report. The central thesis of the report was simple—that people, in development efforts as in life, are what truly matter. In a modification of Adam Smith's famous title, the first line of the report reads, "People are the real wealth of a nation." (UNDP, 1990: 9)

As one of its first tasks, the report sets about defining human development. It calls it a “process of enlarging people’s choices.” (UNDP, 1990: 10) The availability of choices around three objectives is viewed as most important: (1) living a long, healthy life (2) acquiring knowledge, and (3) being able to access the resources needed to enjoy a reasonable standard of living. Human development is described as the process of both forming human capabilities, such as improved literacy, and employing those capabilities, such as reading a novel for pleasure or reading an operating manual at work. The concept of employing capabilities is similar to Sen’s (1985) notion of functionings.

The Human Development Report 1990 goes on to describe the manner in which human development differs from other similar ideas. Unlike human resource development theory and human capital formation theory, human development does not view humans as primarily only means in the development process. Rather, it views them as the ultimate ends of all development efforts. Theories of human welfare generally regard humans as beneficiaries instead of active agents in the development process, as the human development paradigm does. The Basic Needs approach is viewed as too focused on the provision of a group of basic goods and services, while not giving adequate attention to expanding human choices. Human development as defined in the report thus builds upon all of these earlier approaches. (UNDP, 1990: 11)

The annual release of the Human Development Report (HDR), and the intellectual debate that occurs while the report is being created and after it is released, has emerged as the primary avenue through which the concept of human development is further refined. A

number of the background papers written for the preparation of the reports over the years have been made available to the public, sparking international debate around key issues involved with human development. Additionally, each new Human Development Report has highlighted a theme related to development that was pertinent at the time of the report's issuance; often the theme would reflect an issue that at the time was rising prominently on the global agenda such as sustainable development and human rights in the 1990s. There have also been scores of national human development reports written over the years. South Africa released its own human development report in 2000, voicing agreement with the broad views laid out in the UNDP's global HDRs and adding that, in a South African context, "sustainable human development implies a rapid process of redress, social reconciliation, nation-building and economic growth with equity, alongside the sustainable utilisation of natural resources." (UNDP, 2000: ix)

In recent years, one of the most widely known and persuasively argued texts which has advanced the human development paradigm has been Sen's *Development as Freedom*. Though he doesn't specifically position the work as an augmentation of human development theory, the concepts he describes are readily compatible with the main tenets of the paradigm. Sen (1999: 89) argues that poverty should be seen as capability deprivation, with capabilities being "the substantive freedoms" a person has to "lead the kind of life he or she has reason to value." Development becomes a process of decreasing the deprivations, or increasing the capabilities, that people have.

Sen (1999: 89) gives three important reasons for viewing poverty and development through the capability approach. (Note: Though Sen still refers to the 'capability approach' in this

work, it is clear he has refined the concept since his earlier writings on the subject in the 1980s, and this more recent elaboration of the approach has aided in the augmentation of the human development paradigm). First, inadequate income is only “instrumentally” significant, in that it can impact one’s capability to do something. More important than low income are deprivations that are “intrinsically” significant, such as not being able to secure adequate food or shelter. Second, income is not the only factor that determines capabilities. Third, the impact income has on capabilities is not uniform. It may be minimal in one family or community and all-encompassing in another. The most important aspect of Sen’s work is that it views development as a process that should enhance people’s capabilities, whether or not their incomes rise.

Human development theory has made a substantial contribution to thinking around development and poverty, particularly by expanding the range of issues that are considered relevant. The human development paradigm is often applauded for its broadening of the idea of development beyond mere income expansion. More important, however, is the reason *why* this expansion is significant. If poverty was only caused by low income, then the human development paradigm would not be important because other development paradigms have dealt with the need for income expansion for decades. The fact that the human development paradigm has pushed conceptions of development beyond just thinking about income levels is significant because the paradigm also demonstrates that poverty is not just caused, or characterized, by low income. So, just as high income is not a sufficient remedy for poverty, low income is not, by itself, a sufficient description of the ailment. This acknowledgement of the many factors that influence poverty and the multitude of policy prescriptions they require is one of, if not the, chief contribution of the human development

paradigm. No other development paradigm has so thoroughly focused attention on the myriad needs and desires of the poor.

Despite its many positive attributes, the human development paradigm is not without weaknesses. First, much of what human development seeks to promote is very difficult to quantify. Kaul & Menon (1993) lament the tendency for human development goals to be expressed in non-quantifiable terms. This is not important because quantitative measures are inherently superior to qualitative measures, but because the former lend themselves more easily to objective comparisons and evaluation. If a nation has a population of 16 million people one year and 17 million in five years' time, and the statistics are reliable, it is easy to grasp the change that has occurred. But if it is reported that child education has improved dramatically in one country, there will most likely be many differing ideas of what this means. One person might interpret it to mean that most of the children are now in school, while another might consider it to mean that graduation rates have leapt, and a third person may believe it means girls and boys are enrolled in equal numbers. The qualitative nature of many of the goals of human development make it more difficult to determine when these goals have actually been met.

The creation of the Human Development Index (HDI) in the first Human Development Report in 1990 was an attempt to address this problem by quantifying the measurement of human development, but the index created new issues as well. The index was comprised of three key variables, each one measuring one of the three chief aspects of human development as identified in the Report. To measure longevity, the index used life

expectancy at birth; to assess education levels, the index used literacy rates; to measure command over resources, per capita income figures were utilized.

The primary success of the index from its first use in 1990 to its most recent incarnation has been its demonstration of the plausibility of quantification of human development indicators and the resulting comparability across country statistics that is made possible by the index's numerical rankings. The index clearly has implications for policymakers, and evidence over the years has suggested that HDI rankings have in some instances galvanized political elites' responses to social and economic concerns.

Nevertheless, for most of its life the index has been viewed as a work in progress, as even its creators have admitted. (UNDP, 1990: 11-13) Three important problems have plagued the index since its inception. First, determining what variables should be included in the index has always been a contentious issue. Second, the data that is used in the index conceals vast discrepancies within societies/countries. Third, the reliability of the data varies widely depending upon the country from which it originates.

The most important of these three problems is the difficulty in determining what should be included in the index. How does one identify and then aggregate the components of a person's life? Some theorists, such as Nussbaum (2000), have attempted to compile a list of basic, essential capabilities that are broadly accepted. But what one person views as an essential capability another sees as a luxury, so such an exercise is a difficult undertaking.

Although the Human Development Index has imperfections which are readily visible, the idea of human development should not be marginalized on account of the failings of its measure. Rather, human development as a concept is, argues Fukuda-Parr (2003: 307), “much more complex and broader than its measure.” Human development advocates removing barriers that keep people from achieving what they want to in life. It aims to expand the choices that people have. While the three components of the HDI—namely literacy, life expectancy, and per capita income—do have a substantial impact on the choices that people have, they are just a few of a long list of issues that must be addressed. Human development seeks to engage the whole range of concerns that could potentially keep people from living lives of freedom and dignity.

This may have seemed like an unnecessary discussion of the Human Development Index. But as the chosen means of measuring human development, no analysis of the former would be complete without it. The Index is widely known, popular, and often reported in media, thus significantly contributing to the general public’s knowledge of the idea of human development. A basic knowledge of the strong and weak characteristics of the HDI can thus shine light on why the public perceives human development as it does.

A second weakness of the human development paradigm is the argument that human development works well at a theoretical level but it is not very operational. That is, it is hard to implement human development at a policy level. It is a theory that is full of noble ideas—the first HDR quoted Aristotle and Kant—but does not lend itself to concrete measures in the same way that more rigid paradigms do.

Another weakness some theorists have pointed to is the growth-oriented nature of the human development paradigm. Sagar & Najam (1999: 748) argue, “The current human development paradigm still treats development as a linear process with the end goals being the state of the so-called ‘developed countries’, and with ‘more being better.’” So although human development rejects the notion that economic growth is all that counts, it nonetheless adopts a framework that is also characterized by accumulation—this time, accumulation of choices. (Sagar & Najam, 1999: 749) The danger in this is that the focus on accumulation can divert attention away from the critical issue of personal responsibilities and development, particularly the responsibilities of the wealthy and advantaged towards the poor and disadvantaged.

These drawbacks of the human development paradigm are genuine, but it remains a worthy theoretical framework. Many of its weaknesses are in fact characteristics that greatly contribute to its attractiveness. For example, lack of rigidity (and thus policy prescriptions) is a major element of the most appealing aspect of human development: instead of focusing on one sole (usually economic) measure of progress, it draws attention to a host of information and indicators about the quality of life people enjoy. (Sen, 2000: 18) The Human Development Reports are a yearly chronicle of the degree of success people around the world have achieved in living good, full lives. (ul Haq, 1995)

### **2.3 Human Development in Mega-Event Analysis**

The concept of human development has not received much attention in mega-event literature. This is attributable to (1) the meager amount of mega-event literature in general

and (2) the fact that human development priorities have only recently begun to be integrated into mega-event planning. Hiller (1990) was one of the first to note the general neglect of the human dimension in mega-event analysis. The literature that does exist is mainly the product of analyses of the bidding processes of two mega-events in particular—Toronto’s bid for the 1996 Summer Olympics and Cape Town’s bid for the 2004 Summer Olympics.

Literature dealing with human development aspects of the Toronto bid focuses on community consultation and participation in the bidding process. Kidd (1992) and Lenskyj (1992; 1996) have provided most of the noteworthy literature. Kidd (1992) draws attention to the widespread public participation in the Toronto bid process and the resulting social contract—The Toronto Olympic Commitment. The Toronto bid faced opposition, or at least skepticism, from a number of community groups that believed the city should be spending its money on solving its social problems rather than hosting an Olympics. One such group was Bread Not Circuses, which argued that the city should not spend its money on circuses (spectacles like the Olympics) when what many of its citizens needed was bread. The Toronto Olympic Commitment was intended to assuage the fears of groups like Bread Not Circuses and included pledges such as:

- The affordability of all Olympic housing
- No displacement of residents as a result of Olympic tourists
- Subsidization of entrance tickets to Olympic events for low-income residents

The Toronto Olympic Commitment as well as the broader public dialogue were evidence to Kidd (1992: 155) that Toronto’s Olympic bidding process had become a “project of social

democracy.” Kidd places the Toronto experience in the context of modern mega-event history and views it as a harbinger of future mega-events in which human development issues will be priorities. He believes the lesson of Toronto is that “a Games bid represents more than elites” (Kidd, 1992: 164) and views the Toronto bid as something which can be built upon by future bidding cities.

Lenskyj (1992; 1996) is less eager to view Toronto’s public participation as a success story. Much of her analysis concerns whether or not the public consultation process involved meaningful participation of community members or if it was just a front for the manufacture of consent by elites. This is an important issue, but because she does not take a step back and look at the Toronto bid in the context of its place in the progression of escalating social demands attached to mega-events, her analysis is less helpful than Kidd’s.

What both Kidd and Lenskyj demonstrate is that communities are no longer viewing hosting a mega-event like the Olympics or World Cup as simply hosting a sporting event. Instead, communities are aware of the many social issues that are also involved and are forcing these issues onto the agenda. Despite their recognition of human development priorities within the Toronto bid, Kidd and Lenskyj, as well as other writers, have generally viewed the human development aspects of the bid as more about managing the event’s possible negative consequences than about proactively using it as a catalyst to achieve human development objectives. This is the most important difference between the developmental aspects of the Toronto and the Cape Town bids, and the analyses thereof.

The bid put forth by Cape Town for the 2004 Summer Olympics included a decidedly developmental component. In fact, the Cape Town Charter proclaimed 'development' a fourth pillar of the bid, after the Olympic Movement Charter's three traditional pillars of sport, culture, and environment. This elevation of development to a high priority—indeed, a very pillar of the bid—was unprecedented in the history of mega-events and worthy of the attention of researchers. Regrettably, Hiller (1997; 2000) is the only academic who has conducted any serious examination of the developmental aspect of Cape Town's bid. Though his is a relatively small body of work, it is an important contribution to the genesis of literature that evaluates the developmental impact of mega-events.

Hiller (2000: 454) states that “the Olympics itself cannot be considered a project in human development.” He considers aspects of the Olympics such as the preferential treatment given to corporate sponsors and the excessive requirements of elitist sport inherently contradictory to development. He reminds the reader that the Olympics are an exercise in sport and business, not development. In drawing attention to the fact that the Olympics, by their very nature, cannot be considered developmental, Hiller has illuminated a key truth that is pertinent to understanding the developmental potential of mega-events. Because these are typically huge, elite-driven, top-down events the pursuit of any type of human development objective requires action that is contrary to the intrinsic nature of the event, and thus necessitates a concerted effort of enlightened thought and action. Hiller (2000: 454) concludes, “Since the Olympics are not about development per se, the Games could only be developmental to the extent that there was a deliberate will to make them so.” This is a crucial finding. Since advancing human development is not an inherent priority of cities

hosting mega-events, it can only be attained through willfully acting in a manner contrary to the accepted norm.

Roaf, van Deventer, & Houston (1996), from the Cape Town-based Development Action Group, a long-standing ally of the urban poor in that city, make a small contribution to the debate about the development potential of the 2004 Olympics. They review the experiences of eight other cities that have bid for or hosted Olympics and made some attempt to integrate development priorities. They group their findings into five themes: Land and Housing, Economic Opportunities, Community Participation, Public Debt and Costs, and Tourism. (Roaf, van Deventer, & Houston, 1996: 3) Their analysis, probably because of its wide intended audience, is not sufficiently rigorous to be able to augment concepts around development and mega-events. However, they do support the idea above about having to war against the natural tendency of mega-events to be anti-developmental. The authors write, "In order to minimize the costs and maximize the benefits [of hosting the 2004 Olympics], it is essential that timeous and appropriate mitigating measures are implemented." (Roaf, van Deventer, & Houston, 1996: 2) Developmental priorities can only be integrated into the event through proactivity.

Despite the use of developmental rhetoric in recent bids for mega-events, the actual achievements of these events have often been disappointing. This includes events that actually happened, like the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, and events that were unsuccessfully bid for, such as the 1996 Toronto Olympics and 2004 Cape Town Olympics. Swart & Bob (2004: 1323) find that the process behind the scenes often remains one in which, "decision making and resources become increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few." An analysis

of the 1996 Atlanta Olympics by French & Disher (1997) reports that despite organizers' stated objective of spreading the positive impacts of the Games to poor neighborhoods, there was hardly any redevelopment of low-income urban areas. Literature concerned with the developmental aspect of mega-events is at a place where it would benefit from one or a succession of developmental mega-event success stories—cities that successfully bid for a mega-event and follow through with plans to incorporate developmental components into the event. The literature could then begin to grapple with the difficulty of successfully integrating human development priorities into the hosting process as pressures from a plethora of stakeholders mount and the event date gets nearer.

## **2.4 Summary**

Mega-events and development have received an unequal share of attention from researchers around the world. Development, because of its contentious discourse and practice and the multitude of important global issues it involves, has been the focus of an immeasurable amount of literature for decades. By contrast, mega-events have been under-studied, particularly in light of their increasing importance to cities seeking to become more competitive in the global economy. When looking at mega-events, the work of Hall is very important because he has written most about the subject and has described in depth the motivations for hosting mega-events. He has also given the fullest description of the potential impacts of mega-events and the positive and negative consequences that must be weighed against each other.

Hiller and Kidd have made the most useful contribution to mega-event literature that is concerned with the developmental potential of mega-events. Kidd's work around the 1996 Toronto Olympic bid positions that city's bid as a milestone in the history of mega-events because of the importance given development priorities. Hiller's work focused on the 2004 Cape Town Olympic bid takes the analysis of the developmental potential of mega-events to a new level. Also, because Cape Town's preparation for the 2010 World Cup is the case study used in this study, Hiller's work on the 2004 Cape Town Olympic bid is all the more significant.

The most important theorists who have contributed to the creation and augmentation of the human development paradigm are those such as ul Haq, Streeten, Kaul, and Fukuda-Parr who have been involved in the writing of the United Nation's annual Human Development Reports. Many of these theorists were earlier involved in developing the Basic Needs or capabilities approach. Above the rest, however, the work of Sen stands as most responsible for the creation of the human development paradigm. His early work on capabilities, intellectual guidance to those in the UN's Human Development Report Office, and persuasive advocacy in texts such as *Development as Freedom* of ideas in congruence with human development have had a profound impact on the human development paradigm.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Methodology**

#### **3.1 Determining a Methodology**

The methodology used in this study was decided upon by first determining what information was needed to answer the research question. Identifying these information needs then informed the selection of methods. In order to address the research question of whether or not a mega-event can promote human development, it was necessary to evaluate the beliefs, actions, and circumstances of people who are, in one way or another, drivers with regard to the 2010 World Cup and its potential to promote human development or sufficiently familiar with the relevant issues to give an informed opinion. This includes people with the power to make the World Cup more developmental or less developmental.

Because much of the data needed to address the research question was of a qualitative nature, it was only natural to employ qualitative research methods. This necessitated gathering qualitative data and then following Darlington & Scott's (2002: 7) process of making "qualitative judgments" about the data in order to "inductively derive categories from the individual responses." Then responses could be placed into categories, which aided in the process of extracting findings and insights. Other options for collecting data were limited, as the development of categories for analysis was dependent upon first collecting an initial batch of data. Qualitative data collection often proves to be an

appropriate means for gathering data that is ill-suited to quantitative methods. As Albert Einstein once said, “Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted.”

## **3.2 Interviews**

Interviews were the cornerstone of data gathering methods for this study. Their adaptability makes interviews attractive. When conducting an interview it is possible to follow up on interesting leads, probe for underlying feelings/assumptions, and clarify meanings, all in an intimate social event in which trust has (hopefully) been established. The richness of information that can be collected in an interview is hard to match using other methods of data collection. Furthermore, because our primary concern is human development—an idea that has very humane and compassionate elements—it seemed only natural to solicit the desired information through the vehicle of close interpersonal interactions. There are drawbacks, of course, such as the inherent subjectivity imbued in interviews and the resulting potential for bias in analysis. But the drawbacks are pale in comparison to the many advantages of using interviews.

### **3.2.1 Determining who to interview**

The primary means by which data was gathered was a series of interviews with people involved with planning for the 2010 World Cup or in a position to give a qualified opinion on the prospect of the event being able to advance human development. Interviewees were specifically drawn from a range of sectors in order to provide the most comprehensive view

possible given the resource constraints of the study (i.e. there was a limited number of people that could be interviewed). The sectors represented amongst interviewees included local and national government, big and small business, media, the football community, and the NGO/social sector. Seven individuals were interviewed, with the length of interviews ranging from one to two hours. All names of interviewees will be kept confidential in order to protect their anonymity. Interviewees will be referred to as Interviewee 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, with the numbers reflecting the order in which they were interviewed. The professional positions held by the interviewees, also listed in the order they were interviewed, were:

1. **Programme Director: 2010 Soccer World Cup** - This is the chief 2010 official in Cape Town, responsible for all aspects of the city's preparations for the event, from stadium construction to holding meetings with the public. The official reports directly to the Mayor of Cape Town and South Africa's 2010 Local Organizing Committee (LOC) based in Johannesburg.
2. **Socio-economic Development Researcher, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa** - This researcher provides research to Parliamentary Committees and other decision-makers and is keenly aware of current national government priorities.
3. **Football Reporter, The Cape Times** - This reporter is a well-respected former footballer and is actively involved in a range of social development projects in Cape Town's disadvantaged areas.
4. **Director, World Cup Business Network** - The World Cup Business Network is a network of professional companies across South Africa promoting the interests of

small, medium, and large businesses that wish to benefit from the 2010 World Cup and other similar events.

5. **Business Manager, T-Systems** - T-Systems is an international information technology and communications firm and an official sponsor of the 2006 World Cup in Germany. It is actively seeking to become involved in the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. This business manager is responsible for liaising with government and business leaders and developing business projects in Cape Town and other South African cities as they prepare for the 2010 World Cup.
6. **Manager: Business Support and Skills Development, City of Cape Town** - This official is one of the key leaders in the city's Department of Economic & Human Development and is especially interested in promoting small business development and skills development amongst the poor.
7. **Researcher, Development Action Group** - The Development Action Group has been one of the staunchest supporters of Cape Town's urban poor for many years. They are aware of the vast human development needs within the city. They were involved in analyzing the development potential of Cape Town's 2004 Olympic bid.

These interviewees were selected by a combination of methods. Some interviewees were identified before the commencement of the interviewing period and were specifically sought after because of their influential position and ability to impact the city's hosting strategy. Other interviewees were identified through the snowball method—they were recommended by one of the other interviewees as someone who should be consulted.

Another idea that informed the selection of interviewees was theoretical sampling (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This is a process in which initial data collection and analysis leads to further data collection and analysis, with the cycle continuing until all the needed data has been gathered. Data from interviews for this project was analyzed immediately after the interview. After the first round of interviews, a few holes in the data emerged. That is, the first interviewees were unable to provide information on some of the topics that were necessary to discuss. Additional interviewees were then sought out—interviewees who would be able to give information that would plug the holes in the data. Data collection and analysis was thus a very cyclical process.

Considering this study is concerned with the needs and desires of the poor and disadvantaged, it may seem negligent to not include them among the interviewees, and may even seem to exhibit a disregard for their opinions. Nothing could be further from the truth. The viewpoints of the marginalized are of course relevant to a study such as this. However, the focus of this study is on the development and pursuit of objectives relating to mega-events and the disadvantaged are, sadly, not involved in naming or pursuing those objectives. It is the very nature of the unenviable position they hold in society that they are often not involved in the decision-making processes that significantly impact their lives.

### **3.2.2 Interviewees as World Cup elites**

Though the interviewees who participated in this project might not be considered ‘elite’ under the most stringent definition used in the literature, it can be argued that the majority of them can be considered elite with regard to their ability to influence thinking and action

around Cape Town's hosting of the World Cup. Furthermore, many of the interviewees are only one degree of separation from undisputable elites, such as senior national politicians, big business chief executives, and newspaper editors-in-chief. Interviewees' beliefs about what can and should be accomplished through mega-events have no doubt been influenced by the views of these elites. It is necessary, then, to keep in mind Kalati & Manor's (2005) findings on South African elites' perceptions of poverty.

After conducting research that was one component of a global study on elites' perceptions of poverty and inequality, Kalati & Manor (2005: 176) find that South African elites are generally unaware that the inequalities in their country are more pronounced than almost anywhere else in the world and unconcerned that they live in a First World bubble in a nation where the poor are the majority. The way in which elites perceive the poor has clear implications for the advancement of human development. Many of the societal positions in Cape Town with the greatest potential to negatively or positively impact the advancement of human development are held by elites. This makes sense, given that many positions in society have elitism inherently built into them, such as posts like government policymakers, business leaders, and university professors. So whether the person makes the position or the position makes the person, the elites in Cape Town have the power to use their formal and informal positions to influence the degree to which human development objectives are pursued. If elites believe that the poor are poor entirely due to their own personal choices, that there are no structural issues involved in poverty, or that it is acceptable to have a society with a large mass of poor people, then they will be much less likely to concern themselves with a human development agenda.

According to de Swaan (2005: 187), there are three principal ways in which elites perceive the poor. The first is total indifference, the second is concern but only for selfish reasons, and the third is genuine concern that is sometimes coupled with concrete action. The elites most helpful to the cause of human development will be this third group—those that have some type of commitment to the poor and a degree of social awareness. De Swaan (2005: 186) considers two important components of elites' social consciousness to be the realization that “as members of the elite they bear some responsibility for the condition of the poor” and the belief that “feasible and efficacious means to improving the lot of the poor exist or might be created.” If elites involved in preparing for a mega-event are to pursue a course of action that advances human development, they must first believe that they have a responsibility for the state of the poor and that what they are attempting to do through the mega-event will potentially make a difference in the lives of the poor. Most interviewees who participated in the project held views that were more poor-friendly than the typical South African elite described in the literature. This necessitates both cautiously evaluating any excessively optimistic remarks by interviewees and appreciating the fact that implementing human development strategies requires considerable will on the part of a number of elites, whose attitudes towards the poor may or may not be closely matched to the beliefs of interviewees.

### **3.2.3 Candidness of interviewees**

In general, interviewees who participated in this study seemed truthful in their statements. Certainly, if anyone had behaved in a way that implied deceitfulness, he or she would have been excluded from the project. It is undeniable, however, that most people present an ideal

version of themselves in interviews instead of the realistic version. Since a major focus of this study is whether or not mega-events can benefit the poor, many of the questions that were asked in the interviews dealt to some degree with respondents' attitudes to the poor. Most people don't want to be seen as anti-poor, especially people like the interviewees in this project—government officials, business leaders, people from the NGO community, etc. It can therefore be assumed that the majority of interviewees probably tweaked some of their responses to present a more favorable view of themselves and their attitude towards the poor. Riessman (2002) finds that narrators craft their preferred identities by manipulating what they say. This in no way invalidates the findings of this study, but it nonetheless must be acknowledged.

#### **3.2.4 Conducting interviews**

The “interview guide” approach described by Patton (2002: 342-344) was employed during interviews. This strikes a balance between being too rigid in structure and being detrimentally unstructured. Questions that were to be explored in interviews were listed in the guide, ensuring “the same basic lines of inquiry” (Patton, 2002: 343) were pursued in every interview. This element of structure allowed for a more systematic process of data collection from the many interviews, as the same topics were covered in each interview. On the other hand, the interview guide was unstructured enough to allow for freedom within each question or topic area. The interviewer could pursue interesting leads and explore topic areas to varying degrees depending upon the information that was being unearthed during the interview.

The researcher shares Darlington & Scott's (2002: 56) view that there is no such thing as a completely unstructured interview. No matter how much liberty is given in terms of the range and order of topics covered, every interview still retains some element of structure. As Darlington & Scott (2002: 56) note, "The interview itself is a structured social interaction—the very act of setting it up brings its own structure and context." Indeed, why hold an interview if one does not have some idea of what one wants to speak about with the interviewee? However, this recognition of the needs of the interviewer needs to be balanced with an appropriate respect for the interviewee and the meaningful interaction that can potentially take place during the interview. Interviewees in this study were not viewed as mere stores or vessels of knowledge, but were valued for their ability to help create new knowledge during the interviewing process. This idea of 'active interviewing' has been impressively developed by Holstein & Gubrium (1997). They believe, "Respondents are not so much repositories of knowledge—treasuries of information awaiting excavation, so to speak—as they are constructors of knowledge in collaboration with interviewers." (Holstein & Gubrium, 1997: 114) This view of respondents (interviewees) was adopted in this study. There were often moments during interviews when the interviewer and interviewee discussed an idea, clarified concepts with each other, and constructed new knowledge.

Interviews were conducted in a non-confrontational, conversational manner. Some questions were asked in an attempt to gauge interviewees' beliefs and convictions, such as their perceptions about poverty and what should be done about it, in order to determine how to interpret their responses. Aside from that, interviewees were given leeway over the structure and content of their responses so that their perspectives were allowed to emerge on their own, without undue interference from the interviewer's agenda.

On a practical level, the interviewer took written notes during all interviews. Each interview was tape recorded and transcribed. All interviews were conducted in quiet offices with only the interviewer and interviewee present in order to minimize distractions and maximize confidentiality.

### **3.2.5 Reflection on interviewees' comments**

As would be expected, interviewees' comments revealed their own opinions and interests. Those interviewees who were employed by the government, for example, had a tendency to align their comments with the views of national politicians more than other interviewees did. Very surprisingly, the interviewees who came from government expressed a cautioned outlook on the World Cup's potential to advance human development in Cape Town—a view that is warranted considering the historical impact of mega-events but unusual coming from government representatives who would normally be expected to wholeheartedly sell the event to the public.

Interviewees were unequally informed, or misinformed, about the World Cup. This necessitated weighing their comments differently. Interviewee 1, although inherently biased to a degree because she is the city's World Cup Director, provided the most credible information because she is intimately involved in World Cup planning and she provided the relevant information sources that verified what she said. By contrast, the credibility of the information provided by Interviewee 4 was limited, as his comments revealed that he was not sufficiently familiar with the economic impact of past mega-events and his enthusiasm over the potential economic benefits of the World Cup seemed more the product of his

position as Director of the World Cup Business Network than his own thorough research. On the whole, interviewees were most familiar with the aspect of the World Cup that related to their own functional position, such as skills development for Interviewee 6. Interviewee 1 was the only interviewee who had something approaching comprehensive understanding of the potential benefits and pitfalls of hosting the World Cup. All of these issues were taken into account when reporting findings.

### **3.2.6 Advantages and disadvantages of using interviews in this study**

It was only through privileged access and interviews with ‘insiders’ that it was possible to gather the needed information for this study. Interviews allowed the interviewer to solicit and extract in-depth information from interviewees. Much of this information would have likely remained uncovered had another method of data collection been used. The flexibility of interviews enabled the interviewer and interviewee to freely explore the significance of the questions, answers, and topics discussed. What is more, the interviews allowed for the investigation of phenomena that are generally hard to observe, such as the motivations of government and business leaders, the degree to which human development is a priority amongst government officials, the nature of the relationship of the City of Cape Town to FIFA, and other similar issues. Quite simply, much of this information is not available to the general public. Interviews were thus an ideal method of data collection.

Disadvantages associated with using interviews for this study were only minor. On a practical level interviews are very time consuming. Questions must be formulated, interviewees must be identified, logistics must be arranged, the interview must be conducted

(with travel to and from), and the interview must be transcribed. More importantly, bias is a plague of qualitative interviews and data analysis, especially when only one researcher is involved (as was the case with this study). Steps were taken to mitigate this problem, including actions such as the triangulation of methods and sources. All things considered, interviews were an appropriate match for the needs of this study and served their purpose well.

### **3.3 Document Review**

Documents were utilized as a secondary data source for primarily two reasons. First, there are documents available with content that further enhances the data gathered for this study. Many of these documents were made available by interviewees who shared them after the interview. The second reason for examining documents was that by using multiple data types (interviews and documents) it was possible to use triangulation to test the validity of findings. Marshall & Rossman (1989) describe how one method of data collection can compensate for the drawbacks of a different method. This enhances the credibility of findings. It must be noted, however, that documents were used only as a supplementary data source and were not used to the same degree that interviews were.

Because documents did not feature as a data source nearly as much as interviews, the analysis of documents will be mentioned here rather than in the following section, which deals exclusively with the analysis of data from the interviews. Documents were analyzed under the premise that despite our tendency to view documents as a product of an individual's beliefs and efforts, they are more often attributable to "collective rather than

individual action.” (Prior, 2003: 10-11) Many people are involved in the production of a document in addition to the listed author. The documents reviewed for this study were mostly created in organizational settings in which many people were likely influencing the content of the document. Thus, documents were valued not so much for being creations of single authors but more for being windows that reveal the beliefs, motivations, and priorities of organizations and other groups.

### 3.4 Data Analysis

The analyses of findings presented later are only useful to the extent that they generate insights that are relevant to the question of whether or not a mega-event can promote human development. Though a qualitative analysis such as this is naturally flexible and moderately unstructured, conceptual moorings are necessary to guide the process of analysis. To this end, findings have been evaluated in light of their contribution towards the four pillars of human development described in the 1995 Human Development Report, which have remained largely unchanged over the past decade. These pillars are productivity, equity, sustainability, and empowerment. (UNDP, 1995: 12) *Productivity* refers to people’s ability to be productive and earn income for themselves. *Equity* in this case means that all people must have equal access to opportunities. *Sustainability* can be viewed as equity over time—future generations should have the same access to opportunities that we do today. Lastly, *empowerment* is the idea that people have the potential to be active agents in the process of development. People are not only the ends of development but the means who will bring it about. These four pillars draw from other ideas, such as sustainable development and

human rights. They nevertheless are important benchmarks by which to gauge human development efforts.

It is important not just to determine whether progress is being made in these four areas, but who the progress is benefiting, as well. What strata of society are registering the gains? The 1997 Human Development Report distinguishes between a 'conglomerative perspective' on development and a 'deprivational perspective.' The conglomerative perspective looks at the progress made across all segments of society, from the absurdly wealthy to the destitute, and comes to a judgment based on this aggregate view. By contrast, the deprivational perspective judges development "by the way the poor and the deprived fare in each community." (UNDP, 1997: 15) This approach allows the progress, or lack of it, in reducing the deprivations faced by the poor to be revealed regardless of any gains made in better-off segments of society. The deprivations faced by the poor cannot be "washed away" by large gains made by the more affluent. It is not that gains made by the better-off are not important; an improvement in anyone's life is noteworthy. But from a human development perspective there is a priority on facilitating gains by the poor. This emphasis on meeting the needs of the disadvantaged has long been recognized by leaders around the world. One of Franklin D. Roosevelt's most famous quotes comes from his second inaugural address in 1937, in the midst of the Great Depression, when he remarked, "The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too little." In a similar vein, the relative success or failure of a mega-event in advancing human development will be judged firstly on the degree to which it reduces the deprivations faced by those at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. There is no question that there will always be some people who benefit

from mega-events—some of the business elite will no doubt make a fortune in construction, tourism, media, and other areas. In this analysis, however, the gains that count most are those that benefit the disadvantaged.

The analysis of findings is also guided by the acknowledgement that this study is of a scholarly nature, and the findings which are most important are those that make a contribution to the existing body of literature. These findings could demonstrate “substantive significance” by having confirmatory significance (they support other work) or innovative significance (they make a new contribution to knowledge). (Patton, 2002: 467)

In the case of the developmental potential of mega-events, as mentioned in Chapter II, a significant gap in the literature—and an area with a potential for findings with innovative significance—is the absence of analyses that deal with the practical aspects of implementing a human development strategy within the process of planning for and hosting a mega-event.

The reason for this gap is understandable—to date the only cities that planned to include a strong human development component in the hosting of a mega-event have been Toronto (1996 Olympics) and Cape Town (2004 Olympics), and both of these cities lost their bids. Cape Town’s part in South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 World Cup thus provides a valuable opportunity to evaluate the degree to which a city that is actually hosting a mega-event can implement a human development strategy. Though ‘development’ has not been explicitly incorporated into Cape Town’s 2010 preparations to the degree it was in the Cape Town 2004 Olympics bid, it is evident that human development priorities are important to many of the people involved in planning for the event, particularly those in government. At the same time, because the event is only four years away there has already been a significant amount

of decision-making and negotiating between government and other interested parties such as FIFA that reveals the often disharmonious objectives of various stakeholders. An analysis of Cape Town's preparations for the 2010 World Cup is therefore an opportunity to evaluate development issues in the context of a mega-event that has advanced far beyond Toronto 1996 and Cape Town 2004, both of which never moved beyond the bid stage. It is an opportunity to analyze the developmental potential of a mega-event at a stage when contractual obligations and commercial considerations conflict with development priorities, and to glean insights that are a welcome addition to the literature.

The analysis of data was organized around key issues that are pertinent to the research question. A classification and coding system was developed in order to manage the data and facilitate the process of drawing out themes. Identifying patterns in the data was the primary imperative. As patterns were identified, they were then interpreted so that their significance could be elaborated upon. No one theory, such as grounded theory or qualitative comparative analysis, was solely utilized to guide analysis. Objectivity and systematic rigor were guiding principles.

## **3.5 Research Considerations**

### **3.5.1 Context**

March to May 2006—the months during which research for this project was conducted—was a period of political instability in Cape Town. Helen Zille was elected Mayor in March and a political conflict ensued for the next few weeks as various political parties jostled for

power. At the same time, a debate was raging in the city about what stadium should be the primary stadium used for the 2010 World Cup, as well as whether or not a new stadium should be constructed. In early 2006 the City had made it clear that it favored using Athlone Stadium, a stadium located in the historically disadvantaged Cape Flats and in an area that is arguably one of the epicenters of football players and supporters in the city. However, the city soon changed positions and instead announced plans for the construction of a new, world-class stadium in Green Point, a wealthy area of the city far removed from the masses of poor residents and soccer supporters on the Cape Flats. When Zille was elected mayor she froze all activity on the stadium until the city could more fully assess how much the stadium would cost and if the city could afford it. Due to the combination of the political instability, contentious stadium debate, and concerns about whether the city could build the stadium in time for the World Cup, human development issues were not given the prominence they might have otherwise enjoyed in more stable times. It was difficult for some interviewees, particularly government officials, to see past the urgent need for agreement on a plan for the stadium and commencement of construction. This is not to say that these interviewees had not thought about human development, because they had. But even in the best of times, implementing a strategy to advance human development is rarely a high priority during the planning for a mega-event, and the first half of 2006 in Cape Town, with political bickering about everything from power-sharing to the 2010 stadium, was hardly the best of times.

### **3.5.2 Scope**

This study only seeks to analyze the experiences of Cape Town as it prepares for its part in the 2010 World Cup. South Africa as a whole country is hosting the 2010 World Cup and Cape Town is only one of ten cities that will host football matches. The focus of the study is not about what happens when a country hosts the World Cup, it is about what happens when a city hosts a mega-event. A mega-event may or may not be the World Cup. However, because Cape Town is just one of the cities involved in hosting the World Cup, the scope of this study extends only as far as Cape Town's involvement in the World Cup. Only a portion of the decisions made will be made in Cape Town, only part of the things said and done will happen there, and only some of the impacts of the event will manifest themselves there.

### **3.5.3 Limitations**

This study was limited by the reality that the majority of mega-event literature which this project draws on deals with the analysis of the Olympics. But as mega-events, the Olympics and the World Cup are not entirely comparable. There are important differences that separate the one from the other. As mentioned above, the Olympics are hosted by only one city, whereas an entire nation hosts the World Cup. Because the Olympics are also usually of a larger nature, they generally make more of a concentrated impact on an area, be it positive or negative. The larger nature of the Olympics provides more opportunity for advancing human development. For example, because hosting the Olympics requires providing temporary housing for athletes, the media, and the rest of the entourage, there is a

potential to use this substantial amount of housing to contribute to the stock of affordable housing after the event. The World Cup, on the other hand, does not require the provision of housing of the type the Olympics does. Instead, athletes and guests are housed in hotels and other accommodation that already exists. The findings from this study can thus not be viewed as completely applicable to analyses of the Olympics.

A second limitation that should be noted is that the planning and preparations for the 2010 World Cup in Cape Town are at an adolescent stage. The LOC, the City of Cape Town, the Province of the Western Cape, and other stakeholders have simply not yet developed many of the strategies and plans that will eventually give shape to the hosting of the World Cup. This study is just a snapshot in time, capturing what has been done, said, and thought about 2010 in Cape Town up to this point. A final limiting factor on this research was the constraint brought about by limited time and resources. This accordingly dictated how in-depth the research could be and how broad a scope it could have.

#### **3.5.4 Significance**

This study has begun to fill a gap in mega-event literature by analyzing the degree to which human development priorities can be integrated into the planning of a mega-event. Toronto included human development aspects in its bid for the 1996 Olympics, as did Cape Town in its bid for the 2004 Olympics, but both of these bids proved unsuccessful. South Africa 2010 is actually happening, and Cape Town will play a major role. It is an opportunity to evaluate how human development priorities can or cannot be integrated into a mega-event, as the process progresses over the years from the bid to the actual hosting to the legacy

period after the event. Human development is still not a major issue in the planning for mega-events, so the fact that it is at least somewhat of an issue in Cape Town's planning for 2010 is significant. Further, Cape Town's involvement in 2010, in light of its unsuccessful bid for the 2004 Olympics which included an explicit commitment to human development, presents an unparalleled opportunity to evaluate how the idea of human development paired with mega-events has changed as the city has gone from an unsuccessful bid for a mega-event to a successful one.

The 2010 World Cup in South Africa will be the first time the World Cup has been hosted by an African country. Indeed, there have been only a handful of instances of mega-events being held in the south and has never been an Olympics or World Cup in Africa. South Africa's hosting of the event raises important questions like whether or not a costly mega-event should be held in a middle-income developing country with enormous demands on its resources such as assisting a large mass of the population obtain housing, employment, and basic social services. But the 2010 World Cup is also an opportunity to focus global attention on Africa and on the south, rather than the status quo of Olympics and World Cups being held in wealthy northern countries. The fact that football is the sport of the global masses, especially the poor, makes the 2010 World Cup all the more compelling to study. It is fitting that a study such as this, concerned with how a mega-event impacts the needs of the poor, uses as a case study a mega-event which involves the indisputably most-loved sport amongst the world's poor, being held in a city and country where the poor are the overwhelming majority.

## Chapter 4

### Findings

The findings which emerged from interviews and document review were exciting both for their level of richness as well as their confirmatory and innovative significance. Despite the reality that planning for the 2010 World Cup is in an early stage, many interviewees exhibited a surprising level of familiarity with crucial mega-event issues that can only be the result of their own personal investigation and thoughtfulness.

Findings have been summarized and organized into key groupings to facilitate the process of analysis. To better examine the question of whether mega-events can promote human development, findings have been grouped into four areas elaborated upon below. Firstly, the various loci of control involved in preparing for the World Cup, along with their corresponding priorities, will be discussed. These findings deal with the general mega-event environment and point to the various actors and stakeholders involved in the 2010 World Cup and how they might influence whether or not human development is made a priority. The second group of findings to be discussed looks at human development as a priority. Should it be a priority? Can it be a priority? Is it likely to be a priority even though there are a host of competing priorities? To the extent that human development is a stated objective, a third group of findings focuses on issues of implementation. If human development is made a priority, then where does potential exist for the integration of this priority into the hosting strategy? Interviewees had strong beliefs about what was and wasn't able to be done

in terms of facilitating gains by the poor and disadvantaged and advancing human development. An equally significant issue is whether or not certain policies or strategies are likely to actually happen, regardless of whether the potential exists. Lastly, the fourth group of findings centers on the predicted impact of the 2010 World Cup on Cape Town. What will the legacy be, particularly regarding human development?

#### **4.1 Loci of Control and Competing Priorities**

More than any other single issue, interviewees spoke extensively about the different loci of control involved in planning for the World Cup and the different priorities promoted by each. Understanding this political/economic stakeholder universe is key to understanding the human development potential of the 2010 World Cup in Cape Town.

##### **4.1.1 Power and interest**

In a PowerPoint presentation prepared by the City of Cape Town to explain its strategy for hosting the event, one slide is a drawing of a typical two line graph, with the x- and y-axis creating quadrants. (City of Cape Town, 2006) A higher position on the y-axis indicates higher power to influence planning for the World Cup, while a higher position on the x-axis represents higher interest in the World Cup, whether this interest is motivated by self-serving commercial considerations or more benign reasons. About two dozen different stakeholders are plotted as points on the graph, reflecting the 2010 office's view of each stakeholder's power and interest. The upper right quadrant represents those stakeholders with the highest power and interest. At the extreme uppermost position furthest to the right, at the very edge

of the diagram, are FIFA and the LOC, indicating they are viewed as having the most power and interest. Perhaps this is an image that best portrays the unequal distribution of power among the many stakeholders in a mega-event such as this.

After FIFA and the LOC, the graph shows the national government as having the next highest level of power and interest, followed by SAFA (South African Football Association) and “the private sector.” Interviewees expressed similar ideas of which stakeholders were most powerful and influential. “There will be three main players in the success of 2010,” Interviewee 4 said. “One will be government at all levels, two will be the organizers of the event—FIFA, SAFA, etc., and three will be business.” He envisioned the government acting as an intermediary between the organizers of the event and the private sector: “The government and FIFA need enterprises to supply the hotels and services required, the private sector needs the Local Organizing Committee to supply the event, and the government—they’re in between to make sure everyone’s happy.” Asked about which of these stakeholders wields the most influence, he identified the event organizers as most influential and quipped, “FIFA is definitely wearing the pants in the relationship.” Interviewee 1 agreed that the organizers of the World Cup had the most power. She remarked, “The body directing things at the national level is the Local Organizing Committee. Their primary concern is making sure that the event runs smoothly and is viewed as a success. They are the be all and end all of event stuff.” Interviewee 6 added, “The LOC procures everything centrally,” thereby limiting the degree to which individual cities could promote their own small businesses or pursue other strategic objectives.

#### 4.1.2 The needs of the city vs. the needs of the event

The most prominent demarcation of competing priorities is the line drawn between the needs of the event and the needs of the city/country. Interviewee 1 noted that Cape Town's unsuccessful 2004 Olympic bid, with its explicit developmental component, was a "South African wish list" and added that the country's initial 2010 plan was also a bit of a wish list. She continued, "The difference is that we are dealing with FIFA and now it has become not what is best for South Africa but what is best for the *event*." This tension between the needs of the event and the needs of the host city or country has been readily apparent in the history of mega-events. Josep Miguel Abad (2001: 71), Director General of the Organizing Committee of the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, spoke of this issue at a conference in 2001:

When it comes to planning the organization of an edition of the Olympic Games, one can choose between two important strategic models: one that subordinates the interests of the Games to those of the city and country, and one that subordinates the interests of the city and country to those of the Games. Barcelona opted for the first strategy, clearly and transparently. We decided to make the Games benefit the city and its citizens. Olympic history is full of examples of both of these models and an outside observer can make a clear distinction between those Games which were profitable and will carry on being so despite the passing of time, and those which failed and did not lead to anything, or what is worse, in no way served the citizens.

The strategy employed by Barcelona was successful and the 1992 Barcelona Olympics have been widely heralded for the economic stimulation and image enhancement they brought the city.

No interviewee mentioned Barcelona as a success story of a city that had managed to make its own needs paramount rather than the needs of the event, but all interviewees mentioned the conflict between Cape Town's needs and the needs of the World Cup, necessitating the proactive assertion of the former. FIFA's financial imperatives were identified as the guiding factor shaping its management of the World Cup. A number of interviewees made the insightful comment that the World Cup was FIFA's primary revenue source, and it only occurred once every four years.

It is clear that FIFA's concern over financial gain trumps any other potential priority, including human development. The official 35-page contract that host cities enter into with FIFA contains just one small reference to sustainable development, stating that the host cities should act in a manner that "embraces the concept of sustainable development" (FIFA, 2006: 17), but does not elaborate upon what this would mean. In contrast, most of the rest of the contract concerns itself with the minutiae of commercial obligations, such as the requirement that office vending machines supplied to the Local Organizing Committee be procured from FIFA's official commercial affiliates. (FIFA, 2006: 15)

FIFA requires the secondment of government staff in order to pursue its own objectives, such as combating "ambush marketing" (marketing by businesses who are not official FIFA partners). (FIFA, 2006: 20) Government is already struggling to provide adequate service delivery to the poor at present. This diversion of manpower could further diminish service delivery, if these government employees would have normally spent their time on work that promoted human development and social service provision.

#### **4.1.3 Local realities vs. international image**

Interviewee 1 reported that her team of colleagues has identified international media exposure as one of the three major 'positives' Cape Town will receive from the event (the other two positives were new infrastructure and an influx of visitors). It is not surprising that, given this unprecedented media exposure, city officials and event organizers want to portray the city in the best possible light. In many cases this requires glossing over the enormous human development needs in Cape Town. Interviewee 1 said, "FIFA told us they want to promote our country, not our townships."

Those involved in planning for the World Cup are keenly aware that the international image and reputation of Cape Town will be formed not just by the images that flash on television and computer screens around the world, but also through the on-the-ground experiences of fans and tourists in Cape Town during the event. What will these people experience? Interviewees spoke of the difficulty of getting these tourists to the townships and other disadvantaged areas in light of organizers' concerns about safety, crime, and cleanliness. It is expected that the majority of tourists who visit Cape Town for the World Cup will spend their time primarily or exclusively in the affluent areas of the city with well-developed tourism infrastructure and on visits to well-known tourist sites in the surrounding areas, such as the winelands and Robben Island. If these tourists spent more time in disadvantaged areas they would advance human development in two ways. First, by being in such areas and spending money, they would benefit local businesses. Second, visitors would make personal contact with people and organizations in the area, thereby becoming more aware of the

human development needs which in turn would likely make them more determined advocates and potential partners in development.

Several interviewees believed that a key prerequisite for increasing the number of visitors to townships and other disadvantaged areas is the creation of marketing identities for these places. Interviewee 2 remarked, “We know Stellenbosch and Paarl, that’s the wine route, right? But now how do you get somebody to, say, Khayelitsha [a Cape Town township]? What’s the identity that we can get a tourist, say, from France or from Italy to go there?” But there are varying opinions about what areas of the city should be marketed and how the city should attempt to construct/modify its international image. The City of Cape Town originally wanted to use Athlone Stadium as the primary match venue. This stadium is in a disadvantaged area in need of investment. FIFA, though, insisted the city use a stadium in a more attractive area and the city is now drawing up plans for a new stadium. This stadium will likely be located in Green Point, an affluent and aesthetically pleasing area which already has a stadium that falls short of FIFA’s requirements. According to Interviewee 1, the use of Athlone Stadium as the main venue “was unacceptable to FIFA. And I can understand why from their point of view. Who wants to have the match venue next to a power plant and sewage treatment facility? We have an iconic mountain and the only venue that showcases it is Green Point Stadium.” On the switch from Athlone Stadium to Green Point Stadium, Interviewee 7 added, “the location is driven more from a tourism perspective than the general public’s perspective and definitely not from a development perspective.”

## **4.2 Human Development as a Priority**

The degree to which human development is made a priority will depend to a large extent on what other objectives are being pursued through hosting the World Cup. The findings of this study are in line with what the literature has repeatedly reported as top priorities of cities hosting previous mega-events; namely, economic stimulation, image enhancement, and the generation of national pride. Another factor that will influence the degree to which human development is made a priority is the commitment of event planners and organizers to the concept. Do they believe human development is necessary and desirable, and that the 2010 World Cup represents an opportunity to advance human development in Cape Town?

### **4.2.1 Worthiness of human development as a priority**

Interviewees believed the integration of human development priorities into the planning for the World Cup is an appropriate and necessary endeavor. According to Interviewee 5, local government should go to FIFA and say “we would like to see one, two, three, four happen to make sure this happens and benefits poor people if possible because really if it’s a pro-market event and it’s not pro-poor it would then further set us back.” He later added, “FIFA’s job is not pro-poor development—their focus is extremely different. So, it’s our duty and responsibility to ensure we incorporate and ensure that such type of [human] development, such type of integration takes place.”

This expressed commitment to human development was also shared by Interviewee 1. She believed that the World Cup could be called a developmental World Cup, and that it was

becoming more and more so. She also realized that everything that goes by the name of economic development does not automatically benefit the people who need it most. “We have to be smarter about it than in the past,” she said. “You can’t just put a piece of infrastructure down and assume it is going to improve peoples’ lives. Look at the airport [which borders townships]. It’s there, but do the people who live all around it really benefit?” This comment, and many other similar ones from the interviewees, revealed that they viewed human development as a worthy objective for hosting the World Cup and wanted to see the event lead to gains that were targeted at the poorest and most disadvantaged.

#### **4.2.2 Practicality of human development as a priority**

The implementation of human development strategies is limited by the realities of the stakeholder universe. As already discussed, there are numerous competing priorities that are all vying for a limited amount of available resources. Some priorities, most notably those advanced by FIFA, will enjoy more favor because of the inherent power structure of the World Cup. Thus, the feasibility of achieving human development goals is dependent upon proponents’ ability to proactively integrate human development objectives within the existing structure of the World Cup. Some interviewees spoke of the need to ‘pick our battles,’ because FIFA is unlikely to concede to Cape Town on many issues. Interviewee 1 cited Germany and its preparations for the 2006 World Cup as an example of a country that had fought for something from FIFA in order to be able to leave a legacy that the country wanted. FIFA usually controls all ticketing at the match venues but Germany paid FIFA in order to control ticketing themselves because they wanted the ticketing technology to be left

as a legacy for their stadiums to use after the World Cup ended. She continued, “We have to pick what fights are important to us. We want small businesses to be involved in concessions and other areas. Maybe we will buy this right from FIFA.” She shared a document that summarizes the outcomes of a special two-day 2010 World Cup planning workshop in 2005 attended by various city officials. In it, the city pledges itself amongst other things to the development and implementation of “a strategy to engage with FIFA and LOC in respect of getting FIFA to seriously consider changing their procurement and production initiatives for goods to be used at the games, to the City and Province.” (City of Cape Town, 2005).

Other interviewees were more pessimistic about the practical aspects of advancing human development through the World Cup. Interviewee 7, the interviewee most informed about human development needs in Cape Town, believed that any human development achieved as a result of the World Cup would not be because the city was able to forcefully assert its own will but because it was able to partially mitigate the negative effects typically associated with a mega-event. “Trying to get any positive spin-offs from it is.....I mean, it’s more like a damage-control exercise,” he said.

#### **4.2.3 Likelihood of human development emerging as a priority**

Interviewees generally saw limited prospects for human development to emerge as a priority. Interviewee 5 believed strategies could be put in place to benefit poor communities but “not at the expense of the mega-event.” He thought it would require “tough negotiations between the role players and FIFA.” Interviewee 2 thought the government would not

develop strategies for the event without consulting with NGOs that represent disadvantaged communities: “Government will put something on the table and I’m sure as part of the consultative process they would consult before they put that plan together. So they’ll go to NGOs and say ‘what do you think about this?’ and once they come out with a final plan people will then slot in that play different roles.” In his view, human development could be made a priority to the extent that the government consulted with and responded to the needs of disadvantaged communities.

Interviewee 1 had a more nuanced perspective. Though purporting that the 2010 World Cup in Cape Town would be “developmental,” she never asserted that human development would be made a defining aspect of the event. She repeatedly spoke of “the wish list” versus “the reality,” implying that many of the city’s developmental objectives were likely to be sacrificed at the altar of FIFA. As the interviewee most intimately involved in dealing with FIFA and the LOC and probably most aware of the competing priorities of stakeholders, her comments are telling.

### **4.3 Implementation of Human Development Strategies**

The previous section dealt with the chances of human development becoming a priority in Cape Town’s hosting of the World Cup. The following section takes as its starting point human development being a priority, and then considers issues of implementation. Where does potential exist for implementing human development strategies? Interviewees saw potential in many of the same areas but there were also many points of disagreement about what was and wasn’t possible. Interviewees generally saw limited potential for the

promotion of human development through the World Cup. Interviewee 6 remarked, “The opportunities that exist, exist in certain areas; specifically, tourism and accommodation and transport and I’d say that’s about it,” and Interviewee 7 added, “I mean, a few games—one wouldn’t imagine that there will be a large opportunity in the actual running of those few games.”

#### **4.3.1 Economic opportunities**

One thing almost everyone can agree on, and certainly all of the interviewees, is that there are some indisputable economic gains to be had from hosting the World Cup. But just acknowledging this is not enough. The crux of the matter lies in determining how the gains are going to be distributed and who is going to enjoy them, as well as what costs are involved. It is necessary to distinguish between the different groups of people who could potentially realize economic gain from the World Cup in Cape Town. The group that is poised to benefit most is big business, comprised of multinational corporations that are most likely not based in South Africa but who have partnerships with FIFA that often stretch over more than one World Cup. These corporations will likely only have a fleeting interest in South Africa and Cape Town.

The second group is medium and small businesses located in or near Cape Town. Some of these businesses potentially have the finances, relationships, and skills needed to take advantage of opportunities that come with the World Cup. These businesses have a significant impact on the level of human development possible because they are the source of most of the new jobs in the economy. If they are awarded contracts for the World Cup

and have to increase the scale of their operations accordingly, they could potentially require new employees drawn from disadvantaged areas. Also, to the extent these businesses are located in disadvantaged areas, increased levels of business would mean increased economic spillover into the surrounding communities.

Interviewees were generally cool towards the idea that small businesses stood to gain much from the World Cup. Those interviewees who were familiar with FIFA's requirements were especially skeptical. "FIFA prefers to deal with large, established companies," Interviewee 1 said. "When we [South Africa] hosted the Cricket World Cup and the Rugby World Cup, small businesses didn't benefit in the way some people thought they might. They don't have the money to market themselves and compete for big tenders." Multiple interviewees explained FIFA's preference to deal with large companies as a practical consideration—these companies can be trusted to deliver what they say they will both in terms of the quality of the goods or services they provide and any revenue they are expected to generate for FIFA through commission, licensing, and other arrangements. Interview 1 explained, "They [FIFA] like to deal with big companies because they trust these companies will do the job well and deliver a revenue stream to FIFA." A similar view was expressed by Interviewee 6: "FIFA makes sure of its revenue."

A third group of businesses are the truly small businesses with minimal resources and employees, unable to compete with more sophisticated small businesses. To this third group we can add micro and 'survivalist' enterprises operating in the formal and informal economy such as food/street vendors and crèches operated out of homes. Interviewee 4 thought there were limitless opportunities for these small businesses, saying, "Oh, there's millions [of

opportunities], there's no way I could go through it, from outside the stadium and on the street selling to oncoming traffic...the opportunities are there." The information pack of documents his World Cup Business Network sends prospective members uses language such as "Imagine the effect [of the 2010 World Cup] on the South African economy." (World Cup Business Network, 2006: 2) He believed the opportunities were 80% of the way there and people just needed to put in the remaining 20%. However, his comments don't reflect the level of familiarity with the relevant issues that the comments of other interviewees do. For instance, although he envisioned opportunities for hawkers to sell their wares in proximity to the stadium, FIFA forbids this. His excessively rosy outlook represented a minority opinion.

Most interviewees saw difficulty in effectively harnessing the event to create opportunities for Cape Town's local small businesses. Interviewee 6 said, "During the event professional services, ticketing, merchandising, everything that moves on the stadium—the revenue goes to FIFA, so there is no way that we benefit." She reported that at a conference she attended, representatives from the small business community asked the LOC what types of opportunities existed for small businesses to take advantage of the World Cup. The LOC's only reply was, "We suggest you look at tourism." Interviewee 6 was disappointed with this limited advice from the LOC, although she agreed that tourism does hold the most potential for small businesses. Interviewee 3 also saw limited prospects for small and survivalist businesses. He remarked, "It's all sponsored products related, you know, so there are going to be a lot of shattered dreams. I mean, I hear these things in the community, 'Oh, I'm going to Athlone [stadium] and putting up my boerewors [sausage] stand there,' and you

know, by golly, it's not going to happen.” He added, “Obviously Coke can get on well—it’s an official sponsor.”

One economic aspect of the 2010 World Cup that interviewees unanimously agreed holds potential to benefit the poor is the increased demand for low-skilled labor for infrastructure projects. Interviewee 7 said a major World Cup opportunity lies in “providing the infrastructure that would be necessary.” He also noted that simply creating jobs was not enough; they had to be targeted at the poor and un- or underemployed: “In the way one allocates jobs one needs to have a pro-poor slant.” Matheson & Baade (2004: 1093-1094) find that in cities with a large pool of underutilized labor, there is an increased likelihood that earnings from mega-event related infrastructure projects will be accrued by local residents and stay in the area after the event. This is because the labor requirements of the infrastructure projects can be quickly met by the local population. Cape Town, with a population of more than 3 million and an unemployment rate of between 25 and 40 percent depending on how broad a definition of unemployment is used, is certainly a city that fits Matheson & Baade’s criteria. Interviewees consistently mentioned that Cape Town was well placed to greatly benefit from the labor needs of infrastructure projects.

#### **4.3.2 Skills development**

Opportunities for skills development will be available as a result of preparing for the World Cup, but they will not impact upon people equally. Analyses of skills development opportunities in mega-events often focus on the transfer of construction skills through large infrastructure projects. Interviewees didn’t speak much about this but rather the range of

skills development opportunities that might arise. Interviewee 5, a seasoned government technocrat, saw opportunity for skills development amongst local government officials involved in the planning for 2010. He said, “We see opportunities for skills development because this is really a global event and for staff working on this program there’s a big opportunity for human resource development and skills development.” He said local government should be disappointed with itself if they don’t target human resource and skills development opportunities. Interviewee 3 also envisioned opportunities for skills development to primarily be for professional as opposed to non-professional workers, but cautioned that the desire for skills development should not supercede the practical necessity of having competent people in strategic positions. “We can’t put any local person in a top position,” he remarked. “If a person isn’t able to do their job in a particular field then they must go. Everything mustn’t be local if it leads to failing—it needs to be a successful World Cup.” According to Interviewee 2, any contribution to skills development and human resource development was worthwhile: “I think that human resource development is never wasted. It adds value to your society and you need people that are creative and skilled.”

Some interviewees spoke of the difficulty in developing the skills of those who need it most, the poorest of the poor. They highlighted the important distinction between the people who, while having low incomes and facing many hardships, still have some resources to draw upon, and the *totally* marginalized who have very few or no resources or contacts to help them survive. In other words, there are the poor and excluded and there are the very, very poor and very, very excluded. Some people live in relative poverty and others in absolute poverty. While the government, civil society, and others certainly want to help the people who need it most, those who are slightly better-off are usually more likely to be able

to take advantage of opportunities because of their higher level of education, greater network of contacts, more extensive work history, or other reasons. Interviewee 2 believed this held true in the context of opportunities for skills development. He remarked:

There's a wide spectrum. Let's look at the lowest stratum of society—somebody, say, living in a squatter camp. I see the trickle down [of World Cup economic and skills development opportunities] in those areas not to be much. Your next stratum is like, say, your working class areas with 60% unemployment where the employed person takes care of the whole extended family, has some basic high school education, a basic house, some computer literacy, and did some typing course somewhere. I see opportunity happening there and above. The challenge is to get those at the lowest end. The problem is that it's much more expensive. It'd be very interesting to see how they [the government] do it, because what are you going to do?

He clearly believed that it is more costly and difficult for the government or other interested parties to implement strategies that assist the very poorest as opposed to the somewhat better-off. Of course, from a human development perspective gains are more valuable if they help those who are most disadvantaged. So if skills development only helps those who already have some skills and resources, then it is surely an improvement but it is not the best possible outcome.

#### **4.3.3 Impact on communities**

Interviewees spoke often about the impact the World Cup could have on disadvantaged communities. Many of the comments centered on the potential for the World Cup to lead

to greater engagement between disadvantaged communities and government. Hosting a mega-event such as the World Cup requires a significant rearrangement of public spending and planning priorities; the general public thus has a considerable stake in the decisions that are made and a rightful expectation of consultation. Disadvantaged communities tend to be neglected in this process due to their generally low levels of political and economic power and influence. If Cape Town deviates from this trend and engages disadvantaged communities in the planning for the World Cup—like Toronto proposed to do in its bid for the 1996 Olympics—then a real contribution to human development can be made.

Most interviewees expressed a belief that disadvantaged communities had to be involved in preparing for the World Cup if there were going to be lasting impacts on human development. Interviewee 3 said, “At the end of the day I think the benefit is going to be higher up not lower down unless there’s that kind of activity where local people from the community are engaged and asked to participate.” Interviewee 7 was disappointed with the lack of community consultation thus far in the government’s planning for the World Cup, and expressed doubt that the situation would improve as time went on. He said dryly, “It’s always difficult to have a participatory process after the decisions have already been made... I doubt if there is going to be a participatory process.” His desire was for “a forum that represents a wide range of stakeholders including groups representing the poor to try to involve people in decision-making.”

A second factor that will determine the impact of the World Cup on Cape Town’s disadvantaged communities is the possible construction of facilities in these areas and the accompanying potential for economic and social development. If World Cup facilities are

located in disadvantaged areas or if these areas are upgraded in preparation for the event, it can spark further rounds of both financial and social investment. Interviewee 7 believed that if the primary match venue was located in a disadvantaged area, it would be possible to “maximize social and economic benefits” in those areas. Interviewee 2 was very disappointed that plans for using a stadium in a disadvantaged area as the primary match venue were abandoned in favor of Green Point Stadium, thereby removing a potentially huge inflow of investment into poor communities. He explained, “Now they’re going to take it [the primary match venue] out of Athlone [a disadvantaged area] which raises questions about how you get those people with foreign currency to go now to this area, because that’s how money gets transferred. The first economy is going to remain—it’s going to keep those people—and the best we’re going to do is a tour around the township with the local tour company.” Interviewee 5 also believed that the location of the stadium was crucial, saying that if plans went ahead for constructing the stadium in Green Point, most of the government’s money would be used there. Interviewee 2 said, “Geographically where it [the stadium] is, is where the money’s going to trickle down to. The shops around Green Point and the businesses and malls and shopping centers are going to do very well.” He saw only limited potential for human development advances in communities that were not near the primary match venue.

The majority opinion amongst interviewees was that the one act with the single greatest potential for promoting human development would be the location of the stadium in a disadvantaged area. This was indisputably first prize. With 2010 organizers now planning to build the stadium in the affluent Green Point area, a major potential catalyst for human development in neglected communities has been lost. It will now take very innovative

public planning to ensure that disadvantaged areas still receive a measure of investment in the run-up to the World Cup and are not, in the language of football, left on the sidelines.

#### **4.3.4 Indirect benefits**

In addition to the World Cup's potential direct effects on disadvantaged people and communities, there is also the likelihood of indirect impacts. During interviews the most commonly cited likely indirect benefit was the upgrading of the transport system. Much of this will surely be done in affluent, tourist-frequented areas near the center of the city, so at first glance it would seem there is only limited potential to impact the disadvantaged. But since many people from disadvantaged communities work in and transit through affluent areas, an improvement of the transport network in these areas might make their lives easier. For example, Interviewee 1 spoke of government's plans to use the public transportation improvements in the city center—necessitated by the influx of visitors for the World Cup—to also leave a lasting legacy for the scores of people from Cape Town's disadvantaged areas that commute to the city center for work everyday, many of them on dilapidated and overcrowded trains. She said, "We want to make it easier for people who work in the city bowl [center] to get here, and we want to make it easier for them to get around the city after they arrive at the railway station." Later in the interview she added, "After 2010, the whole face of the city and public transportation will be different."

Interviewee 6 believed that the pressure of preparing for the World Cup creates a "compelling reason to develop our infrastructure" and that without the 2010 deadline "it would probably take another ten years" to make the government initiate large scale

infrastructure upgrades. This is in line with Matheson & Baade's (2004: 1093) finding that, "A mega-event may prompt otherwise reluctant public officials into making improvements in general infrastructure." Any improvements in general infrastructure are important because they are more likely to be enjoyed by low-income residents who may not be financially or logistically able to utilize the new sports infrastructure built for a mega-event.

A second indirect benefit that could lead to human development is the increase in national pride and unity that results from hosting the World Cup. In Cape Town, as in the rest of South Africa, many communities are divided along racial and socioeconomic lines, and the process of hosting the World Cup together could help integrate these communities and even lead to a season of national soul-searching. This might in turn result in a renewed commitment to meeting the country's human development needs.

Interviewee 7 saw the hosting of the World Cup as "not only a financial and economic issue" but also "a status and national pride issue—sort of the whole [global] north-south disequilibrium." He reasoned this was an argument "for hosting events like this in countries of the south." A PowerPoint presentation developed by the City of Cape Town's 2010 office claims the World Cup will "inspire national pride and unity" and "break down racial, ethnic, and gender discrimination." (City of Cape Town, 2006) Interviewee 1 believed pride would be a significant effect of the 2010 World Cup, commenting, "We still go on about hosting the Rugby World Cup in 1995 and the Cricket World Cup in 2003." Interviewee 6 said, "I'm really hoping that this whole thing will bring the whites, blacks, and coloureds together through soccer." The potential for integration was commented upon by Interviewee 5, as well: "Football is most prevalent in the black communities and also the

coloured and Indian communities. This event presents the opportunity to integrate.” Interviewee 2 stressed the need to work together. “This is a South African event which involves everyone,” he said, “and we should all put our shoulder to the wheel and make it work.” Interviewee 4 remarked, “Sports does unify people” but added that FIFA will not go out of its way to promote social unity; the onus is on government and local organizers to make it a priority.

#### **4.4 The Legacy of the 2010 World Cup**

While the World Cup will only be in Cape Town for a month at most, the positive and negative impacts of the event could potentially stretch for decades. Creating and managing the legacy is of such importance that Cape Town’s 2010 office has proposed the city name a senior official to serve as legacy manager. Interviewees provided insights into the potential legacy of the 2010 World Cup in Cape Town, both in terms of human development and more generally.

When asked about the legacy of the World Cup, many interviewees’ thoughts turned first to the stadium. “There will be a big stadium that pokes up above everything else,” lamented Interviewee 7. Other interviewees were more enthused about the prospect of a new stadium but warned there must be a plan for it to be utilized after the event. Interviewee 5 was aware of the international trend of stadia used in mega-events becoming white elephants: “I’ve seen in Japan and Korea [2002 World Cup hosts] they’ve demolished a number of stadiums.” There were also interviewees who did not entertain any thought of the stadium becoming a white elephant, instead believing 2010 would be only the beginning of a long line

of mega-events to be hosted in Cape Town. "It's about getting more games after 2010," Interviewee 4 pronounced. Interviewee 1 said, "Perhaps the greatest impact is that we will have a piece of infrastructure for the next big thing. The next big thing will only be a matter of time." Interviewee 6 believed the stadium would prove to be so profitable the city could use it as a revenue source to finance other spending on infrastructure. This is in contrast to Interviewee 7, who thought the stadium was likely to saddle the city with debt.

Even if the utilization of the stadium after the event is as great as it possibly can be, it holds little chance of significantly impacting the lives of the poor since spending on this type of entertainment is a luxury and largely unaffordable to them. Thus, it is the improvements to the general infrastructure of the city that will leave the most positive legacy for the poor and disadvantaged. Interviewee 3 said, "If a kid plays football in Mitchells Plain [a disadvantaged area] and can get into a train that's safe or a taxi or bus or whatever and get home safely without getting mugged, then his life will have improved." Other interviewees made similar comments about ways improvements in general infrastructure could benefit the disadvantaged. Some degree of general infrastructure legacy was viewed as probable by all interviewees. There was also unanimous agreement that the development of a plan for successfully utilizing infrastructure after the World Cup was crucial, though not a certainty.

Many interviewees' optimism about a positive legacy was tempered by the reality that, at the end of the day, all this hoopla is only about a few football matches. Interviewees made comments like "It's only a few games" and "The World Cup will come and go." Interview 3 described the sentiment in disadvantaged communities like this: "A lot of people are sitting back and asking 'How is my life going to change.'" Interviewee 7 expressed skepticism

about the accuracy of projections of visitor numbers during the World Cup, and implied that this would limit the impact and legacy. He said, "I know from past sports events the impact of how many people will need to be accommodated and transported around are often wildly over-estimated." Interviewees generally believed that the World Cup would be significant to the extent that the city leveraged it to promote its own objectives that might not have been catalyzed had the World Cup not come to town.

A common topic interviewees discussed in interviews was the type of impression that Cape Town would give to the rest of the world depending on how it performed as a host city. Interviewees expressed concern over the city's ability to perform its duties aptly and feared it would bungle one or more of its responsibilities. This is what troubled them most when thinking about potential legacies. "If you ask me," Interviewee 3 said, "just pray that we don't embarrass ourselves. You don't want to be the first country in Africa that gets to host the World Cup and it's not exactly, you know, the most successful World Cup." Interviewees said South Africa has a history of being inadequately prepared for international events it hosts.

Interviewees did not foresee the 2010 World Cup in Cape Town being remembered for leaving a human development legacy to the city. They thought that if there was any type of human development legacy, it would most likely be through the integration of human development as a secondary priority in the hosting of the event. According to interviewees, this would largely depend upon local government and World Cup organizers successfully accomplishing two things. The first is developing a sound strategy for ensuring that infrastructure improvements commissioned for the event deliver lasting benefits to the

disadvantaged afterwards, and the second is leveraging the business opportunities that come with the event in a way that allows local, small businesses to profit. Interviewees all had a desire for the 2010 World Cup to leave a notable human development legacy to Cape Town, but they were not planning on it doing so.

## Chapter 5

### Analysis and Conclusion

#### 5.1 Analysis

There are numerous perspectives from which to evaluate a mega-event, *ex ante* and *ex post*. From a tourism perspective, mega-events seem highly attractive. So too from the perspective of big businesses involved with finance capital. This study has from the outset stated its intention to evaluate mega-events, and in this case Cape Town's role in the 2010 World Cup, from a human development perspective. This perspective is shaped by the human development paradigm, which, although refined over the years to reflect new concerns about people's lives and well-being, has continued to be guided by the four pillars—productivity, equity, sustainability, and empowerment—elaborated upon in the 1995 Human Development Report (UNDP, 1995: 12) and repeatedly mentioned in subsequent HDRs. (UNDP, 2001: 17; UNDP, 2004: 24; UNDP, 2005: 48) Findings presented in the previous chapter must be evaluated in light of these pillars, as well as an overarching concern with how mega-events affect the most disadvantaged and deprived.

### 5.1.1 Productivity

*People must be enabled to increase their productivity and to participate fully in the process of income generation and remunerative employment. Economic growth is, therefore, a subset of human development models. (UNDP, 1995: 12)*

The importance the human development paradigm places on productivity arises from the recognition that people must be able to increase their productivity, since as people increase their productivity they are more likely to be able to raise their income. This income is the means by which people are able to accomplish many of the things they want to in life. Findings of this research show that of the four pillars of the human development paradigm, productivity is most likely to be positively impacted by the 2010 World Cup in Cape Town. There will be opportunities for unemployed and underemployed people to become employed through the World Cup. While most of these jobs will be temporary, even a fleeting work opportunity has the potential for skills transfer, leaving a legacy of increased productivity in the worker.

For human development to be advanced in Cape Town, the productivity of the city's residents needs to be increased, especially those residents with few skills. Increases in the productivity of firms is not enough. In today's global capitalist economy, increases in firm productivity are often achieved by introducing labor-saving technology, resulting in a shedding of jobs. Since these are usually low-skilled, labor-intensive jobs, their elimination disproportionately affects the disadvantaged who rely on these types of jobs more than other people do. The 1999 Human Development Report cautions that although conventional

economic theory assumes increased [macro] productivity will lead to an enlargement of job opportunities for the poor, such a result is not assured. (UNDP, 1999: 32) In Cape Town, the productivity of the local economy will almost certainly increase as a result of the catalyzing effect of the World Cup. This increase in productivity, however, will only contribute to human development to the degree that the disadvantaged have been given training and skills development.

The South African government has explicitly stated its intention to favor labor-intensive work processes when awarding contracts in an effort to address sky-high unemployment, through initiatives such as the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP). Local government in Cape Town has wholeheartedly adopted EPWP principles. But it is possible, and perhaps likely, that the time constraints of preparing for a World Cup only four years away will force the government to renege on its earlier commitment to labor-intensive processes. Every government representative interviewed for this study remarked that, in the words of Interviewee 1, “getting the stadium up on time” is government’s first priority, trumping all other concerns, including the use of labor-intensive construction methods. Time constraints will also dictate that some skills be imported from abroad rather than be developed locally, as the latter option will take too long. These constraints will limit the productivity gains realized by the disadvantaged, even though they will increase productivity on a macro level and within certain firms.

### 5.1.2 Equity

*People must have access to equal opportunities. All barriers to economic and political opportunities must be eliminated so that people can participate in, and benefit from, these opportunities.* (UNDP, 1995: 12)

Mega-events by their very nature can be highly elitist. Sports entertainment/spectacles of this nature are a luxury good, aimed at those with large pools of discretionary income. If a mega-event is to be developmental it must adopt measures that enable non-elites and society at large to reap some of the benefits of the event, both through enjoying the event as spectators/participants and being integrated into the process of planning, preparing for, and presenting the event. When Barcelona hosted the 1992 Summer Olympics it attempted to combat the elite nature of the event by ensuring those who could not attend Olympic events still enjoyed benefits like public art and lighting displays that were happening all over the city during the time of the Olympics. (Kitchen, 1996) Cape Town must similarly adopt measures—and do so aggressively—to limit elitism, promote equity, and contribute to human development in the city. For example, the FIFA contract with host cities requires the establishment of a fan park “at or near the centre of the Host City.” (FIFA, 2006: 18) This, of course, diminishes the chance that the poor will be able to make use of the fan park since most of them live on the Cape Flats, away from the city center. Since one of the primary motivations for having a fan park is to cater for residents who want to participate in the event in some way but cannot afford tickets to matches or are otherwise unable to attend, locating a park away from the primary mass of low-income residents seriously inhibits the fulfillment of this purpose. Cape Town must assert its right to establish fan

parks in poor communities, and adopt other measures that will make the event more equitable.

On the whole, equity seems very unlikely to be advanced through Cape Town's part in the hosting of the World Cup. If anything, it is likely that existing inequalities of opportunity in the city will be reinforced as a result of the hosting of the World Cup. The combination of the short preparation timeframe, FIFA's commercial interests, and the nature of the work that needs to be done means that large, established companies are much more likely to be given economic opportunities than small local businesses. There is simply no time for learning and catching up. If a business was already a player before Cape Town began planning for the World Cup, it is quite possible it will remain a player. But it is unlikely the World Cup will unearth opportunities for those businesses and would-be entrepreneurs that need it most—the ones who are marginalized under the current status quo. Mbhazima Shilowa, Premier of South Africa's wealthy Gauteng Province, recently admitted that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) do not have the same level of access to FIFA and government that large corporations do and are in danger of "miss[ing] the boat." (Benjamin, 2006: 4) Cedric Frolick, MP, Parliamentary Committee on Sport and Recreation, said at a 2010 panel discussion: "Let's be honest. The first two tiers [of economic opportunities] are out. FIFA has already given those to the big multinational corporations. We need to fight for the third tier opportunities for local South African businesses." (Frolick, 2006) The potential economic opportunities associated with the World Cup are also unevenly distributed across sectors of the economy. Analyses conducted immediately after the conclusion of the 2006 World Cup in Germany found that the impact of the event on

retailers from different sectors varied widely and that businesses “did not participate to the same extent [in reaping the benefits].” (Donahue, 2006: 10)

Along with an exacerbation of economic inequality will probably be a furthering of political and social inequality. Cape Town’s record thus far in preparing for 2010 does not suggest it will enter into a meaningful and sustained dialogue with disadvantaged communities as the 2010 World Cup draws nearer. Fulfilling contractual obligations to FIFA and preparing for an influx of international tourists and media will require government to focus its attention on areas of the city that hold potential to attract large numbers of tourists. These areas, for the same reasons they are attractive to tourists, are less in need of government assistance than other communities. Investing more money and giving more voice to residents of these affluent and influential communities will only increase the lead these communities enjoy over other areas in regard to political influence and social opportunity.

The probable locating of the stadium in affluent Green Point is a case in point. It will receive more financial investment than any other area of the city even though it is one of the neighborhoods least in need of such investment. Interviewee 1 said, “Because we are spending so much money building our primary stadium at Green Point, if we use facilities in disadvantaged areas we will probably only upgrade existing facilities rather than build entirely new stadiums.” Marten Fontein, the head of prominent Dutch football club Ajax Amsterdam of which football club Ajax Cape Town is a feeder, criticized FIFA for promoting locating the match venue in Green Point, calling it “an elite white area and too far from the football masses.” He continued, “If FIFA were really in tune with what’s needed in [Cape Town] and if they really wanted to boost the overall development of the game, they

should have sanctioned a World Cup match venue in the townships. That's the football legacy this city yearns for and needs rather desperately." (Abrahams, 2006: 13)

### **5.1.3 Sustainability**

*Access to opportunities must be ensured not only for the present generations but for future generations as well.*

*All forms of capital—physical, human, environmental—should be replenished. (UNDP, 1995: 12)*

The 2010 World Cup in Cape Town will not contribute in any meaningful way to the sustainability described above. The World Cup, like other mega-events, is about consumption. Cape Town is preparing for this event with the consumption needs of visitors at the center of its agenda. This focus on consumption will likely supersede concerns about sustainability.

The World Cup is inherently unsustainable. That is why it is aptly called an *event*. It would be impossible for Cape Town to repeatedly host the World Cup. It is thus necessary and right that the World Cup only lasts for a few weeks and not any longer. It is also understandable that most of the economic and participatory opportunities associated with the World Cup will cease once the event has concluded. The central issue is whether the actions undertaken to bring about opportunities in the hosting of the World Cup jeopardize or enhance the ability of Cape Town's citizens to access opportunities in the future.

Opportunities to utilize many types of capital must be protected and ensured for future residents of Cape Town, one of which is environmental capital. Local government in Cape

Town has commissioned an environmental impact assessment to address the implications of various plans for renovating/building stadia and propose strategies to mitigate negative effects. Nevertheless, if Cape Town decides to build a new stadium in Green Point—which seems likelier than any other option being considered—environmental sustainability will be adversely affected, as the construction will require the destruction of one of the major green areas in the city and it is unlikely that the stadium will be adequately utilized after the event. Indeed, Interviewee 7 remarked, “A 68,000 seat stadium [in Green Point] is very dubious because even the 20,000 seat Athlone Stadium has very seldom been filled.” Two and a half years after the 2002 World Cup in Japan and newly developed South Korea, only five of South Korea’s ten stadiums had regular tenants and none of them attracted significant crowds. (Matheson & Baade, 2004: 1091)

The effect on the sustainability of other forms of capital is likely to be less pronounced. The World Cup will not significantly impact the sustainability of the city’s human capital. This can only be impacted by long-term policies and priorities advanced by government and the private sector. The World Cup is likely to lead to a small to medium amount of skills transfer, with skills being imported from abroad as well as transferred between people in South Africa. This will increase human capital, which can be seen as the skills and abilities people use, particularly in employment. The sustainability of human capital, however, depends upon future investment into skills training and transfer, and this in turn is reliant upon the appropriate structures being in place, such as government programs that provide incentives for businesses to invest in skills development and training of their own employees or community members. The World Cup will probably not contribute to the development of these structures since many businesses will be challenged just to complete their core

deliverables on time, let alone achieve more peripheral objectives such as significant skills transfer and development. Senior FIFA officials have commented that South Africa does not have the luxury of time to prepare for the World Cup. Time pressure will be an ever-present impediment to the implementation of skills development strategies between now and 2010.

As for the third type of capital specifically mentioned by UNDP in its description of sustainability—physical capital—the period of World Cup preparation will mark a surge in the use of these assets but will not contribute to sustainability. In general, in most lines of business profitability and survival are the primary concerns while sustainability of the environment, human capital, and physical capital are usually only a secondary concern at best. When this is taken into account, along with the short period of time before the World Cup, sustainability seems unlikely to be increased as a result of the World Cup.

#### **5.1.4 Empowerment**

*Development must be by people, not only for them. People must participate fully in the decisions and processes that shape their lives. (UNDP, 1995: 12)*

There are certainly opportunities for empowerment embedded in the World Cup coming to Cape Town. But these opportunities are mostly for those least in need of social and economic empowerment. Since from a human development perspective it is of primary importance to facilitate gains by the most disadvantaged, the World Cup does not hold potential to significantly increase empowerment as the idea is expressed in this paradigm.

Local government's own policies of Black Economic Empowerment, in which businesses are given favorable treatment if they meet certain requirements such as being 30% black-owned, can potentially be slightly advanced through the World Cup. But as discussed earlier, the control local government has over procurement, contracting, and other business matters will be severely limited by FIFA's commercial requirements.

Moving outside the purely economic arena into issues of community participation/development and social needs, the World Cup does not present an opportunity for Cape Town's people, particularly the disadvantaged, to "participate fully in the decisions and processes that shape their lives." World Cup planning in Cape Town has progressed without significant community consultation or participation, and when organizers and planners have gone to communities for discussions it has been more to inform these communities of what the city is already doing rather than solicit input that could alter plans which have already been set in motion. This is true not just for disadvantaged communities but for the entire general public. Interviewee 7 drew attention to the fact that "the first time anybody knew about the Green Point stadium was when it appeared in the newspaper." He called it "a practical example of how neoliberalism works in practice where a Secretary General of FIFA can tell a country government 'you decided *that* [to locate the stadium in a disadvantaged area], but no, we want *this* to happen [to locate the stadium in Green Point].'"

It could be argued that there is no other way, that the time pressure of preparing for a massive mega-event dictates bypassing the public and proceeding with plans irrespective of the presence or absence of public buy-in. While this may be true, the consequences of such

actions in many ways inhibit the empowerment of people. The majority of Cape Town's people have not been able to discuss the World Cup decisions that will affect them, and this of course includes the disadvantaged. When asked if community consultation would be a priority for government as it prepared for the World Cup, Interviewee 1 did not believe that any special efforts were necessary and implied that the 'consultation mechanisms' built into local government would suffice. That is, despite the magnitude of the public spending and planning decisions, and their resultant ramifications, facing the city as it prepares for the World Cup, it has not introduced measures to increase consultation with the community.

#### **5.1.5 The Cape Town experience and mega-events past, present, and future**

In sum, Cape Town's hosting of the 2010 World Cup holds little promise for the advancement of human development within the city. Of the four pillars of the human development paradigm—productivity, equity, sustainability, and empowerment—only productivity seems at least somewhat likely of being meaningfully enhanced. What is more, the potential gains that exist are just as likely to be realized by the already affluent and advantaged as they are to be achieved by the poor and disadvantaged. It is therefore unlikely that Cape Town will be able to leverage the 2010 World Cup as a catalyst for human development. Given the significance of these findings and their relevance to a world in which mega-events are becoming increasingly important, it will be a fruitful endeavor to place them within the existing body of mega-event analyses and examine their implications for the past, present, and future.

Findings from this study are much in line with the conclusions that have arisen from prior analyses of mega-events. This study has revealed that the legitimizations for and the perceived benefits of the 2010 World Cup in Cape Town are similar to those of earlier mega-events. Where this study adds to the analyses of prior mega-events is in the fusion of development and mega-event analysis in the context of a mega-event that is in the implementation stage. As mentioned at multiple points, this study has sought to build upon evaluations of the unsuccessful bids of Toronto for the 1996 Olympics and Cape Town for the 2004 Olympics. Analyses of these bids have focused on each city's incorporation of developmental themes into their bids. But as neither city was ultimately awarded the right to host, analyses of these bids have only been able to go so far. Hence, this study's description of Cape Town's difficulties in implementing human development strategies through the 2010 World Cup qualify, and help to better interpret, the analyses of previous developmental bids for mega-events that never progressed beyond the bid stage.

These findings also hold relevance for the present. Most obviously, they can assist people and organizations devising Cape Town's strategies for hosting the 2010 World Cup. The findings bring to the fore the difficult issues that must be addressed if Cape Town is to successfully advance its own objectives. This is important, since many of the people involved in planning for the World Cup are not sufficiently familiar with the nature and impacts of mega-events. Many interviewees, particularly those involved in formulating and implementing policy, expressed a desire to have access to the findings of this study. In this way, these findings can be applied in Cape Town's preparations over the next four years.

But the possibilities for present application of these findings are not restricted to Cape Town. These findings can be used by other cities and nations that are considering bidding for a mega-event, or have won the right to host one and are now busy preparing. Beijing, for example, will host the 2008 Olympics. Though China is much wealthier than South Africa, large swaths of its population live in the type of extreme poverty that is also found extensively in South Africa. China, like South Africa, must weigh a multitude of needs and concerns in deciding how to prepare for a mega-event and what to spend money on.

The significance of these findings for the future arises out of the fact that not only is the ‘mega-event strategy’—in which cities or countries bid for mega-events in an effort to generate economic development and image enhancement—being adopted as never before, but it is being increasingly adopted by developing countries who face much greater costs and risks from hosting a mega-event than do the richer developed nations that have traditionally been the hosts. When the United States hosted the World Cup in 1994, it spent less than \$30 million on infrastructure because it had an abundance of stadia that were suitable for the event. By contrast, South Korea spent \$2 billion on stadium infrastructure in preparation for the 2002 World Cup. (Matheson & Baade, 2004: 1091) The South African economy is merely 1/40<sup>th</sup> the size of 2006 World Cup host Germany’s and is the third smallest economy to host the event, after Uruguay in the 1930s and Chile in the 1950s. (West, 2006: 2) Cape Town, just one of ten host cities in South Africa, will most likely spend on the construction of just one stadium \$600 million (Yeld, 2006: 1), or 20 times the amount the United States spent on its *entire* 1994 World Cup infrastructure improvements.

Not only are the costs of hosting a mega-event in a developing country greater, but the opportunity costs are, as well. If a developing country spends \$300 million building a football stadium, the question that is begging to be asked is what else could have been done with that money? As Matheson & Baade (2004: 1091) explain, "From an economic point of view, the cost of building a new stadium is not best described by the amount of money needed to build the facility but rather the value to society from the same amount of capital spent on the next best public project." Since developing countries usually have limited financial resources as well as pressing social needs for things such as poverty alleviation, housing, and sanitation, the opportunity cost of spending money on something else is greater than in other countries.

When such considerations are taken into account, one might ask why developing countries have latched onto the mega-event strategy with such conviction. Part of the reason for this can only be that the pitfalls of hosting such events and the limitations of the benefits have not been adequately elucidated. This study should make a contribution towards rectifying this deficiency. Hopefully, developing cities and nations considering bidding for mega-events in the future will take note of the harsh lessons learnt by previous hosts.

## **5.2 Conclusion**

As cities and nations increasingly compete to host mega-events, and pursue a wider set of objectives through the hosting of such events than in the past, the time is ripe for more critical analysis of what is and is not possible to achieve through the hosting of these events. For as many mega-event hosts as there are, there are an equal number of hosting strategies.

Mega-event hosts are looking to these events to deliver an increasing array of positive impacts. One of the most important hosting ideas at the moment is the integration of development concerns into cities' and nations' hosting strategies.

Increased expectations, however, do not necessarily give rise to increased results. Cape Town's current preparations for its part in South Africa's hosting of the 2010 World Cup reveal how difficult it is to use a mega-event to advance human development. Even though Cape Town's preparations for 2010 are only just beginning the city has already had to make a number of concessions to FIFA and the national LOC, and there will surely be more in the future. The World Cup holds little potential to advance human development in Cape Town. Aside from the large quantity of low-skilled labor needed for infrastructure projects and the potential for skills transfer and small business development in certain areas of business involved with 2010 preparations, the World Cup will not present the disadvantaged with substantial opportunities to realize gains.

Mega-events are by their inherent nature at odds with human development. They need speedy, decisive, top-down processes and, for the implementation of the event, favor actors that have already demonstrated their political and economic prowess. The difficulty Cape Town has had, and will continue to have, in promoting human development through the World Cup is not an aberration. Other mega-event hosts and potential hosts (unsuccessful bidders) have encountered the same problems. Certainly, there are other factors that determine the degree to which a mega-event is developmental. Different mega-event hosts will each have their own hosting priorities, so the advancement of human development will not be pursued with equal vigor. Also, not every mega-event is the same. The two titans of

global mega-events, the Olympics and the World Cup, are different in that the Olympics are centralized in one city whereas the World Cup is hosted by an entire nation with a number of cities serving as hosts, each subject to the final authority of the national LOC. Caveats aside, the conflicting nature of human development priorities and mega-event necessities is a recognizable trend across most mega-events. Cape Town's experience in preparing for 2010 is further confirmation of this phenomenon, and provides valuable insight about how and why human development priorities are often forced to be discarded as mega-event preparation progresses.

An issue that should be considered is whether or not a host city or nation that needs a mega-event to be developmental has any business hosting the event in the first place. Mega-event spending can be a dubious use of public monies even in nations that are exceedingly wealthy; in poor countries it can be something approaching recklessness. The cost and opportunity cost of hosting a mega-event in a low-income country compared to a rich one is staggering. In rich countries, no matter how wildly successful or thoroughly disappointing a mega-event is, its impact is likely to be no more than a momentary blip on the radar screen. The same is not true of mega-events held in poor countries. Here, the decisions made about the allocation of resources in preparation for a mega-event have a much greater impact with ramifications for all members of society, and the potential to be particularly acute for the disadvantaged.

The yoking of human development strategies with mega-event hosting seems destined to continue appearing in the future. Mega-events are seen as huge potential economic catalysts because of the concentration of economic opportunities in the global cities that host them.

But along with this concentration of opportunity is a concentration of poverty and social need. This is the story of our rapidly urbanizing world of today. Just having a mega-event in the neighborhood, however, is not enough to catapult people out of poverty. As Interviewee 1 remarked, “You can’t just put a piece of infrastructure down and assume it is going to improve peoples’ lives.” For human development to be advanced through a mega-event, the disadvantaged must be consulted with, empowered, and integrated into all aspects of planning for the event. The time, effort, and cost required to do this are at odds with the structure and dictates of mega-events. Hosts seeking to bridge this divide are likely to continue meeting with disappointment.

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