

## Political Marginalisation and Political Violence in the Niger Delta

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## Abstract

This study analyses the relationship between perceived marginalisation and the willingness of civilians to participate in, and justify political violence in Nigeria's Niger Delta region. The dominant literature in this area tends to highlight political, economic and identity marginalisation as the causal factors behind political violence. However, there remains a lack of clarity in the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the purported political and socioeconomic marginalisations. This because large portion of the literature fails to take into account the psychological aspect of marginalisation. Using a statistical analysis of Afrobarometer<sup>1</sup> survey data collected in 2003, the study applies two regression models to measure the predictive effects of 16 variables on attitudes towards both political violence justification and the willingness to participate in political violence in the Niger Delta. The benefit of survey methodology is it is a more accurate measurement of the term marginalisation, as marginalisation is perceived by people and is thus a psychological phenomenon. By disaggregating these broad marginalisation terms into discrete items, this study provides a more nuanced analysis of the motivating factors behind political violence. Interestingly, no measures of economic marginalisation were statistically significant in either model. Two elements of political marginalisation exhibited a statistically significant effect on the justification of political violence. Multiple aspects of political marginalisation and identity group prioritisation exhibited statistically significant effect on the willingness to participate in political violence, however not all items exhibited effects predicted by the majority of the literature. This analysis does confirm that the relationship between citizen and state is a salient predictor of attitudes towards political violence. However, the results also demonstrate that the blanket marginalisation terms used in political science literature are overly simplistic and lack nuance. Nevertheless, both scholars and policy makers should prioritise the government's relationship with society when crafting policy designed to minimise political violence.

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<sup>1</sup> Afrobarometer "is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues in more than 35 countries in Africa. [Afrobarometer] is the world's leading research project on issues that affect ordinary African men and women. [Afrobarometer] collect[s] and publish[es] high-quality, reliable statistical data on Africa which is freely available to the public" (Afrobarometer, n.d.).

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## Acronyms

AEMI - Area Economic Marginalisation Index

GPI - Government Performance Index

GTI - Government Trust Index

MEND - Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

NDPVF - Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force

PMI - Political Marginalisation Index

PEMI - Personal Economic Marginalisation Index

SFTI - Security Force Trust Index

## Chapter 1: Introduction to the Delta

### Background to Problem

The Niger Delta houses 28.9 of the 186 million people that constitute Nigeria's expanding population and is an area prone to conflict. The population is highly heterogeneous, with people belonging to various ethnic and religious groups vying for scarce political and economic resources. This study analyses the relationship between perceived political and socioeconomic marginalisations and the willingness of non-government security force personnel (civilians or people belonging to militant groups) to participate in, and justify political violence in Nigeria's Niger Delta region. The region is rich in natural resources. It is comprised of nine states - Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo and Rivers – within which the largest wetlands in Africa are found, as well as myriad oil and natural gas fields. The revenue generated from the Delta's vast oil reserves reportedly accounts for 90% of Nigeria's wealth (Tobor, 2016). However, the wealth has not been distributed to the majority of the region's population. As Tobor asserts,

“Instead of improving the quality of life of the inhabitants in the region, the discovery and exploitation of oil has led to worse living standards, lost income for the inhabitants as their main source of livelihood from fishing, carving, and dwindling agricultural sector has not replaced employment with another industry” (2016, p.26).

Poverty, unemployment and diachronic conflict are a persistent feature in the Delta, despite the region's oil wealth. This has led to a multitude of researchers asserting that the socioeconomic marginalisation experienced by the Niger Delta residents has driven political violence incidents in the region. Moreover, from the 1970s, people from communities situated in close proximity to the oil and natural gas deposits have formed militias that attack interests associated with the extraction of the region's natural resources (Watts, 2004).

Another feature is that Nigeria is divided along ethnic and religious lines. There are the Yoruba, whose main residential region is the southwest, and there are the predominantly Christian Igbo group whose primary residential area is in the southeast. The Yoruba and the Igbo are the largest groups countrywide, which represent “approximately 20 and 16 percent of the population, respectively” (Mähler, 2010, p. 22). The Niger Delta is comprised of many smaller ethnic groups, with the largest being the Ijaw, representing approximately 8 percent of the Nigerian population (Mähler, 2010, p. 22). The unequal distribution of wealth in the country overall has manifested as large wealth disparities between regions and ethnic groups, thus exacerbating already existing tensions. As Omeje (2004, p.428) argues, “the state itself is, to a large extent, dominated by an unstable coalition of some ethnic majority elites whose geographical homelands have little or no oil reserves”. The dynamic of wealth generated from the Delta – which is siphoned out of the region’s communities without adequate compensation – has led to social unrest and sustained conflict in the region (Clauson, 2011; Mähler, 2010). Watts (2004, p. 51) describes the context of conflict since 2003, where oil production is linked to politics and violence in the region.

President Obasanjo’s deployments of notoriously corrupt security forces to the Delta prompted further violence and threats by Ijaw militants to detonate 11 occupied oil installations. On 19 March 2003 all of the oil majors withdrew staff and closed operations, with the consequence that production has dropped by 817,000 barrels per day (40 per cent of national production).

In 2005, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) emerged as the area’s largest militia faction where it has since targeted the oil and natural gas industry systematically in a series of highly publicized violent attacks. These persisted until 2009, following the implementation of an amnesty programme for militants. The series of MEND’s attacks on the oil industry led to decreased petroleum production and the country’s overall economic output. As Clausen states, “Through sustained attacks on oil multinationals, oil installations, and government security forces, within a matter of days of its launch close to one-third of national output was shut-in” (2011, p.21). In the first three quarters of 2008, reports alleged that the Nigerian government lost USD 23.7 billion in oil revenue as a consequence of attacks orchestrated by MEND and other militia groups in the Delta region (Clauson, 2011). Although violence reduced drastically

following the aforementioned amnesty deal, violent uprisings and attacks on natural resource industry facilities and personnel have resumed since the deal's expiration in 2016 (Tobor, 2016).

This has led to widespread dissatisfaction among people living in the region, expressed through popular mobilisation taking the form of demonstrations and riots, which tend to turn violent, and the aforementioned attacks on the region's natural resource interests. One of the reasons for the widespread social dissatisfaction result from the brutal counter-insurgency campaign by the Nigerian state, which has led to the deaths of thousands of civilians and wiped out entire villages and communities (Connect SAIS Africa, 2018; Ikelegbe, 2005). Citizens also protest against the area's wealth disparity, as compared to the urban centres of Nigeria. Protests and violent mobilisations have also been recorded due to environmental damage caused by the liquid natural gas and petroleum industries. The violence affects the daily lives of the population; however, these instances of mobilisation have received less global attention than have the high profile attacks on transnational corporate interests (Gberevbie, Oyeyemi, & Excellence-Oluye, 2014). To address the persistent outbreaks of violence in the region, both from the government and the general Delta communities, a deeper understanding of the underlying motivations behind participation in political violence is necessary.

As Williams (2016) argues, military or short-term measures aimed at quelling political violence often fail in sub-Saharan Africa because they do not address the factors that allow violent dispositions to exist. Therefore, strategies aimed at addressing these underlying factors will be more effective than attempting to quell political violence with military repression or destructive and ineffective counterinsurgency campaigns (Gurr, 2013). However, before strategies can be synthesised, the aforementioned factors that can lead to violence need to be understood. The propensity for violence is not reserved to criminals, deviants or those people who have a psychological predisposition for violence. The violent history of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century reveals that 'normal' persons classified as non-deviants, according to sociological standards (Gurr, 2013), often engage in acts of political violence. No state has been able to completely deter citizens from engaging in political violence, even via the utilisation of extreme coercion (Gurr, 2013). As such, this study will analyse the factors that contribute to peoples' motivations to participate in, and justify politically-motivated violence.

## 1.1 Research Question

Do perceived levels of political, economic and social identity group marginalisation in the Niger Delta region affect propensity to justify and engage in political violence?

## 1.2 Conceptual Clarification

### 1.2.1 Political Violence

This study's dependent variable is people's justification of, and willingness to engage in political violence, as measured by two separate dependent variables. The study does not measure actual incidents of political violence but uses survey data to measure respondents' propensities to justify and participate in political violence. Political violence is a complex and contested concept. The term 'political violence' broadly, refers to both state violence and violence caused by civil insurrection. However, this dissertation is concerned with the motivations behind, and the justifications of political violence as exhibited by citizens that are not associated with the state security apparatus. As Gurr argues, political violence "challenge [s] the monopoly of force imputed by the state" and can "interfere with... and destroy normal political processes (2010, p.4).

However, the Afrobarometer questionnaire does not define political violence despite the term being used in multiple survey questions. When asked to clarify, the person in charge of the codebook and data informed me, "we don't have a definition of such [political violence]. Interviewers are asked to just keep to the script of the questionnaire". The lack of clear definition in the framing of the questions related to political violence presents a limitation of the study, as respondents must interpret the entails of political violence subjectively. However, Afrobarometer does not explicitly define what constitutes the 'political realm' as distinct from the personal.

Conge (1998) defines the 'political realm' as relating to a nation state at all levels, from federal to local government structures. Although other definitions may utilise a broader definition concerning one's relationship with societal power structures, this study conceptualises the political

realm (political, politics, etc.) as one (or a group's) relationship with the Nigerian state. It is also important to note the distinction between private and political goals, and hence private and political violence (Kalyvas, 2003). Kalyvas argues that whilst they are distinct, the line can often become blurred between the two. The distinction between what makes violence political is articulated clearly by Andre du Toit,

Typically, political violence is differentiated from other forms of violence by claims to a special moral or public *legitimation* for the injury or harm done to others as well as the by the *representative* character of the agents and targets of these acts of violence. The demonstrators throwing stones at the police, and the security forces shooting or whipping protest marchers differ from a similar number of people engaged in a brawl ...in that they believe that their acts of violence are sanctioned or even required, by a higher morality or public cause, be that, in the one case, the struggle against injustice and oppression, or in the other case, the maintenance of public law and order as the responsibility of the state (Du Toit, 1990: 6).

Expanding on Du Toit, I argue that the motivation behind an act of violence, and not the target is what constitutes an act as political. Therefore, political violence is not limited to the targeting of explicit state interests. Violence is then considered political if the motivation is an attempt to change the political status quo or one's position within that political or state power structure. Thus violence that targets corporate interests in the Delta can be considered political provided it is motivated by participants' attempts to garner political or economic concessions and/or power from the Nigerian government. While Tilly (2003) argues that violence that changes the relationship between the governed and the sovereign constitutes political violence, I avoid this broader definition. This because Tilly's definition would then include violence motivated by purely criminal interests if it affected the relationship between citizens and state. This would be exemplified by the kidnapping of an oil worker for ransom as opposed to political purposes. I am interested in explaining the desire to participate and justify that latter incidents of violence.

Therefore, for the purpose of this study I follow the conceptual interpretation of both Gurr (2010) and Mähler (2010) and define political violence as any form of physical violence carried out by persons that are not affiliated with Nigeria's state security service, and that is used in the attempt to achieve a political outcome. Following this definition, the study aims to determine what causes the willingness to participate in (and justification of) political violence by non-state actors. Non-state actors simply implies persons not aligned with formal or informal state security

services. Thus both civilians and members of militant groups that are not aligned with Nigerian government interests are included in this definition. The main independent variables are perceived political, economic and identity group marginalisation, as these are the most common variables purported by the literature. The three variables are intersectionally linked; (Awodola & Ayuba 2015; Courson, 2011; Obi, 2009). However, the primary independent variable is political marginalisation.

### 1.2.2 Political Marginalisation

Marginalisation is associated with alienation, exclusion and/or disparagement. The concept refers to exclusion (of the citizen), or the extreme incentivisation to not participate – be it an individual, a community, or the selected representation of either – in a country’s political and/or economic systems (Oskarason, 2010). I argue that marginalisation can be related to Gurr’s definition of relative deprivation, as marginalised individuals compare themselves to other portions of society which can result in a perceived sense of deprivation and/or marginalisation. Marginalisation is the “peripheralization of individuals and groups, from a dominant central majority” (Hall, 1999, p.89). Thus the term marginalisation, in this context, refers to the perceived lack of influence, ability to exert power and ability to participate in, and derive benefits from a particular system, be that economic or political (Hall, 1999).

Hence, political marginalisation denotes the involuntary exclusion from access and influence to state power. As Osaghae (1995) asserts, it is the perceived lack of ability to harness state power and/or the perceived lack of control over political affairs leading to a lack of individual or group sovereignty and autonomy. This may be in the form of a certain groups’ representatives lacking influence within the state, a group lacking the ability to exert any political influence on its representatives, a combination of both or the group having no political representation or influence on policy at either a state or federal level. In the context of the Niger Delta states, the state governments have been excluded from the decision-making process by the federal government despite the transition from junta rule to democracy in 1999 (Obi, 2009).

This study also views oppression and exclusion as intertwined (Hall, 1999). For this reason certain ‘oppression’ variables have been included for analysis, as discussed in the Methodology section of Chapter Two. As this study analyses individual respondents’ perceived political marginalisation as a contributing factor to one’s propensity to engage in, and the justify political violence, all of these aspects may apply whilst the person is ‘assessing’ their position in Nigeria’s political, economic and social structures.

### *1.2.3 Economic Marginalisation*

The same argument for exclusion, whether by incentives, or explicit barring, applies to economic marginalisation. I do not define the ‘economic realm’ only with reference to one’s wealth or employment status. A respondent’s living conditions, in addition to the ability to obtain certain services - such as access to healthcare and education - also reflect a person’s overall economic status. Hence, economic exclusion implies the perceived inability to compete for legally sanctioned wealth generating resources within Nigeria. Political influence does contribute to one’s ability to generate wealth in Nigeria’s (Ikelegbe 2005; Obi, 2009). However, I do not include it in my definition of economic exclusion. Rather, I have separated the two concepts to assess their respective effects on willingness to engage in and justify political violence.

### *1.2.4 Identity Group Marginalisation*

The political and economic spheres are areas in which individuals, or a group, may be excluded, regardless of their religious, ethnic or racial identities. The third main independent variable - identity group marginalisation - is defined as a particular group’s exclusion from one or both of these spheres. Political and economic exclusion variables portend to an individual’s perceived alienation from either sphere. The identity group variable measures the perceived marginalisation of the respondent’s identity group in either dominion. Although the particular identity groups that the respondents identified with vary – from religious to ethnic and lingual communities – the term ‘identity group’ implies a distinct conceptualisation of identity apart from their Nigerian citizenship. Furthermore, the measurement and elements, of all three marginalisation concepts will be elaborated on in the Methodological portions of Chapter 2.

### 1.2.5

This section has defined the concepts of political, economic and identity group marginalisations. All three concepts are intersectionally linked and are perceived psychologically. Political marginalisation entails perceived exclusion and/or lack of influence from and within a political system. Economic marginalisation can be summarised as the perceived inability to fairly compete for legal economic resources. Finally, identity group marginalisation is an individual in a group's perceived exclusion from both or one of these spheres.

### 1.3 Literature Review/State of Knowledge

This section reviews the primary theories explaining political violence incidents in the Niger Delta. The majority of the literature is focused either on the violence carried out by the region's various iterations of militant groups, which predominantly attack state and transnational resource company interests (Courson, 2011; Golden-Timsar, 2018). Additionally a smaller portion of the literature focuses on mass mobilisations against the aforementioned state and corporate interests (Omotola, 2009; Orogun, 2010). Furthermore, as the majority of authors do not make the distinction between perceived and actual marginalisation, the literature review does not use the term unless utilised by a specific author.

Academic explanations of political violence in the Niger Delta tend to frame conflicts as related to aspects of relative deprivation – or marginalisation – be it from ethnic, cultural, social, or political exclusion or from economic inequalities. The reasons provided by Omotola (2009, p.38) include, “ethnic conflict, hatred, discrimination, and oppression; religious and ideological conflicts, socioeconomic relative deprivation; and perceived political inequalities, infringement on rights, injustice, or oppression”. While these categories are distinct, economic, political and ethnic/social disparities also intersect with one other. As Idemudia & Ite (2007) argue, a multitude of variables are required to explain the persistence of violence in the region. While some scholars contend that all of these variables compound to create the inclination towards political violence (Amaraegebu, 2011), these items can also be disaggregated under economic marginalisation,

environmental degradation, political marginalisation and group identity/ethnicity marginalisation categories.<sup>2</sup> While different groups of scholars place varying levels of significance on the aforementioned factors, all tend to agree that marginalisation, in some form, is a key catalyst of the numerous outbreaks and subsequent cycles of violence perpetrated by non-state security service personnel in the Niger Delta.

As elaborated above, other factors such as environmental degradation and violent counterinsurgency strategies by the state have contributed to civilian mobilisations in the Delta region (Omotola, 2009). However, as causal factors, these tend to be coupled with other manifestations of perceived or actual political marginalisation. To understand the confluence of the various forms of marginalisation, I address economic factors first as this is the most common ‘marginalisation variable’ in the literature (despite the emphasis on intersectionality economic marginalisation is the most common marginalisation element) and conceptually transitions into political marginalisation arguments.

### *1.3.1 Economic Marginalisation and Grievance*

Economic marginalisation is cited as a key cause of one engaging in political violence. The economic marginalisation explanation rests on the symbiotic relationship between the central government and transnational oil companies. As stated previously, the Niger Delta is responsible for the vast majority of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – the overall income generated in the country’s economy (Tobor, 2016). Gberevbie, Oyeyemi, & Excellence-Oluye (2014), Mähler (2010) and Tobor (2016) assert that the Delta region continues to suffer from chronic underdevelopment which is reflected in the low levels of education and infrastructure, in addition to high unemployment rates. Wealth is not seen to “trickle down”, but is rather transported away from the Delta region into Abuja, Lagos and bank accounts of international oil companies (Mähler, 2010; Watts, 2004). The effect is vast inequality between the urban centres of Nigeria, where the wealth is concentrated, and the underdeveloped Niger Delta states. Furthermore, Watts (2004) argues that the global perception that wealth was the inextricable by-product of oil further

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<sup>2</sup> Although discussed in the literature review, this study does not assess the direct effects of environmental destruction due to the lack of Afrobarometer questions regarding environmental degradation.

antagonised Delta citizens once they realised that the wealth from resource extraction was not being invested into social services and improving the lives of the majority of the population.

Ajayi & Adesote (2013) note the effect of economic marginalisation by citing an incident from 2005, where a group of Delta delegates walked out of a conference. The conference had been established to determine the percentages of oil revenue allocation that the nine Delta states were entitled to. Since the 1970's the percentage of oil revenue allocated to Niger Delta states decreased from roughly 50 percent in 1970, to three percent by 1999. The Delta state delegates walked out in protest on the grounds that representatives from other regions determined the petro-revenue percentage the Delta states would receive. The Delta representatives and their constituents viewed the final outcome as heavily skewed in favour of the central and urban regions (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013). Thus Ajayi & Adesote (2013) argue that this disparity crystallised the Delta residents' perceptions of economic alienation in the context of perpetual and chronic underdevelopment and that this - combined with financial exclusion from resource rents - led to the formation of armed militias and violent civil unrest. Thus, the core argument purported by the literature postulates that economic inequality perpetuated by natural resource rents, and the associated grievances, caused inhabitants to demand change and voice discontent through violence. As Idemudia & Ite (2005, p.392) state Delta inhabitants have been "in dispute with the government over access to oil wealth and resource control, or they are locked in conflict with one another over claims to ownership of areas where oil facilities and accompanying benefits are cited."

Literature also connects economic deprivation to political violence through the relation to criminal activity. As Ikelegbe (2005) and Orogun (2010) argue, there are now vast criminal networks that operate on financial concessions generated from illegally activities surrounding mainly the oil industry, and to a lesser degree natural gas extraction infrastructure. This results in the formation of a criminal or informal economy, which can result in violent attacks such as kidnapping foreign nationals and the illegal siphoning of oil for sale on black markets (Ikelegbe, 2005).

Criminal or illicit economic activity is compounded by the fact that oil infrastructure mishaps like oil spills have destroyed local communities' means of sustenance. Estimates by the UNDP assert, "between 1976 and 2001 approximately three million barrels of oil were spilled, and most

of this oil was not recovered” (Mähler, 2010, p. 16). This pollution has killed fish which once populated the region’s waterways (Anugwom, 2014). Anugwom (2014) and Idemudia & Ite (2005) state that environmental degradation is one of the core causes of violence in the region. Not only does pollution diminish economic opportunity, the environmental degradation also destroys a way of life, thus making it impossible to engage in certain cultural practices which are dependent on a healthy natural environment (Anugwom, 2014). Drinking water and food becomes contaminated by oil infrastructure, even in the absence of oil spills, which leads to desperation and can drive people towards violence as a means to fulfil their basic needs (Idemudia & Ite, 2005). Additionally, Anugwom (2014) and Courson (2001) both argue that the only economic opportunities that exist revolve around the oil extraction economy. Therefore, they conclude that because the majority of Niger Delta locals do not possess the necessary skills to be hired into the formal oil economy, their only option is to participate in the illicit petrol trade. This point is further clarified by Omeje’s (2004) who argues that the Nigerian state’s crackdown on the illicit oil trade constrained the Delta citizens’ economic prospects, which incentivised people to participate in violent mobilisation. Thus the criminal element and environmental explanations, are symptoms of a lack of legitimate economic opportunities.

Dating back to the early 1980s, it has been stated that the Delta population has had economic grievances because residents have been unable to obtain what they believe to be a fair share of resources revenue allocations (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013; Osaghae, 1995). Moreover, Courson (2011) asserts that these grievances, even when channelled through legitimate or political channels, were not addressed and thus violence became the only perceivable avenue the Delta inhabitants could utilise.

### *1.3.2 Political Marginalisation*

Despite numerous scholars attributing Niger Delta political violence to the contention over natural resource-derived wealth, another paradigm argues that it is rather political marginalisation in which the violence is rooted (Mähler, 2010). Political marginalisation arguments have been prevalent in arguments throughout conflict literature pertaining not only to Nigeria but to sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.

The history of marginalisation from economic competition and political influence dates back to the early colonial period. Many groups in the Niger Delta functioned as traders between Europeans and communities living further inland. However, when the British initiated colonial rule, Delta inhabitants lost territorial control and the ability to charge merchants for shipments into the what is now the interior of present day Nigeria. The British did little to invest in the region as the empire had no initial economic interests in the Delta. Furthermore, during the early colonial period the region was underdeveloped, as resources were diverted to infrastructure aimed at increasing the country's cash crop production (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013). Thus even prior to the country's bid for independence, various Delta groups believed they had an unfair lack of political power and pushed for the creation of a decentralised distribution of power in order to increase local autonomy (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013; Obi, 2009). As a result of these events, Idemudia & Ite (2005) state that in comparison to the rest of Nigeria, the people of the Niger Delta have had less of a political voice, as well as fewer economic opportunities, since the beginning of colonialism.

Idemudia & Ite (2005) argue that one of the field's main assertions is that that Nigeria's inhabitants have little political identity due to the forced or unnatural development of the nation-state by colonial powers. They state that after independence, despite the creation of different states in a federal system, the central government was the branch that profited from the region's oil extraction. Thus further consolidating power at the federal level and decreasing the political power of individual states. "In essence, government failure to deliver developmental benefit in the face of perceived political and economic marginalisation created a sense of disenchantment within the region" (Idemudia & Ite, 2005, p.397). Tobor (2016) builds on this theory and goes on to argue that the Niger Delta inhabitants were denied a federal political identity along with ability to represent and govern themselves within the federal government. Starting in the 1990's with the Ogoni uprising, the Nigerian state perpetually responded to peaceful demonstrations with repressive violence, thus removing civil disobedience from the repertoire of available political grievance recourse. This repression, as argued by Idemudia & Ite (2005), increases perceptions of political marginalisation in the region as voices are silenced by the federal authorities.

After the 1999 election of President Olusegun Obasanjo, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was created to facilitate development and growth. The plan was to turn the

Delta into “a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful” (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013, p.511). However, the NDDC was reportedly a disappointment to the people of the region as it failed to live up to their expectations due to logistical problems, underfunding and lack of political power and influence (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013). The failure of these nationally-led development plans in the region has led Obi (2009) to assert that political marginalisation has created and perpetuated the region’s economic exclusion as efforts to procure natural resource revenue are consistently ignored. Obi continues that despite half-hearted efforts by various central governments to enact policies to include the region in political decision making, the insincerity of such efforts has been painfully obvious to the Delta’s inhabitants as even their elected representatives were unable to exert meaningful political will.

Similar to Courson (2011), Ajayi & Adesote (2013) conclude that it thus economic grievance combined with political exclusion that lies at the crux of motivations behind violence. This chronic hindrance of political and economic rights is used to explain the recurrence of political violence in the region when compared to other areas of the Nigeria (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013; Idemudia & Ite 2005; Mähler, 2010). Hence, the perceived economic marginalisation from the fruits of economic development is seen as a major influence on political mobilization and potential to engage in political violence.

Ajayi & Adesote (2013), Obi (2009) and Williams (2016) concur that state sponsored violence and repression tactics can also motivate political violence participation. Violence in the form of kidnapping, militancy, oil infrastructure sabotage and theft continued into February 2000. In response, Nigerian soldiers razed an entire village in what was known as the Odi Invasion after they were unable to find suspects accused of kidnapping a foreign oil worker. This incident drew international backlash and is often cited as the catalyst for the development of multiple organised militant groups in the region. The violence inflicted on the Delta population signified the government’s campaign of political and social repression. They not only attempted to stamp out criminal activity, but the Nigerian military also shut down - often violently - legal protests (Williams, 2016). Additionally, the government was able to use the wealth extracted from the Delta to finance its security apparatus, which in turn often violently cracked down on communities thought to be harbouring suspected militants. However, this repressive strategy further motivated

people to join militias or partake in mass mobilisations against the government thus elucidating how government repression can also serve as a motivating factor behind the willingness to participate in political violence (Obi, 2009).

### 1.3.3 Identity Group Marginalisation

Swathes of studies argue that conflict in the Niger Delta is partly rooted in ethnicity because of economic – and political – disparities between ethnic groups (Amaragbu, 2011; Mähler, 2010; Obi, 2009). Many Nigerian citizens identify with multiple group identities, beyond merely the national group identity (Olojede, 2000). Olojede (2000) asserts that a large portion Nigerians rather have weaker ties towards their national identity and stronger ties to their clan or ethnic identity. For Olojede (2000) this amounts to a weakened sense of political identity, which is amplified in Nigeria due the heterogeneity regarding ethnicity and religion, combined with decades of changing and often repressive regimes and poor governance. Thus people often identify with a communal or ethnic group before identifying as Nigerian, leading to the groups in power to employ patronage networks denominated on ethnic lines to maintain their rule. This creates ground for further political exclusion and socioeconomic marginalisation along ethnic lines (Olojede, 2000). Thus patronage over benevolent public policy has defined the Nigerian political system (Olojede, 2000).

The control of the central government – and therefore control over oil and natural gas revenues – is held by majority ethnic groups who do not reside in the Delta. Obi (2009) asserts that these have led to perceptions of distrust of the central government; distrust which has manifested along ethno-political lines. According to Olojede (2000) the salience of identity groups in forging perception of other groups and the state, even where no actual marginalisation is present, may lead to violence.

The Ogoni and Ijaw groups are often cited as groups in the Delta that have been economically and politically marginalised, and also who have participated in famous incidents of political violence. These include the Ogoni uprising in the early 1990s and the detonation of 11 oil facilities in 2003 by militants of the Ijaw ethnic group (Courson, 2011; Watts, 2007; Ukeje, 2001). Although the mechanisms for ethnic marginalisation can be similar to economic or political marginalisation, ethnicity becomes another organising way in which to deny groups the right to self-determination

and economic prosperity (Ikelegbe, 2005). Thus the marginalisation of an ethnic group pertains to that group's exclusion from both the economic and political arenas. Stewart (2010) builds on this concept and argues that regardless of how group identity is construed, economic and political status differences between groups can lead the disenfranchised group into violent mobilisation.

Thus while scholars seem to agree that economic and political marginalisation is the cause of political violence, few attempts have been made to define and measure marginalisation. The above mentioned theories and scholars fail to address if, and how, Delta inhabitants interpret or perceive their purported economic, political and identity group statuses. Thus the psychological domain of marginalisation is left unaddressed and Delta scholars fail to answer how this leads people to participate in, or justify political violence. However, there have been a multitude of scholars that explore generalisable theories of political violence. These will be discussed in the next section, as this is where this study makes its contribution by applying a combination of Delta specific and general political violence theories to the Niger Delta states. Although the Delta specific literature makes a compelling case for the various marginalisation's as strong causal variables, a combination between specific and general theories, that explain a link to the willingness of action, give us a better link between the concept of perceived marginalisation and the propensity to justify and engage in political violence.

#### *1.3.4 Conclusion of Literature Review*

Inhabitants of the Niger Delta have been marginalised, economically, politically and socially since the colonial period. This has led to diachronic violence directed at government and corporate interests prompting the government to respond – often with disproportionate military force (Williams, 2016). Scholars studying conflict in general, in addition to those focused on the violence specific to the Niger Delta states, have used various forms of marginalisation-based arguments to explain the political violence perpetrated by organised and individual non-state actors. Academic explanations for violence in the Delta region often refined or applied versions of the 'general' theories of conflict discussed in the first section of the literature review. The literature examining conflict in the Delta revolves around three interconnected forms of marginalisation – economic, political, and identity group exclusion. Thus the statistical models this study employs

will examine the applicability of these marginalisation theories to the Delta and elucidate which form of marginalisation has the greatest impact on the justification of, and willingness to engage in political violence. This study's research methodology provides a different perspective on the occurrence of political violence by testing the existing paradigms and using public opinion data from Afrobarometer. Thus the statistical models analysed in this study will be used to assess the validity of general conflict theories, applied to the Delta region.

#### *1.4.Methodology Overview:*

Despite the literature's comprehensive explanation for violence in the Delta, there is an absence of quantitative methodology being utilised to test the power of these existing theories. This cross sectional study, using survey data from Afrobarometer, assesses respondents' perceptions of political, economic, and group marginalisation and the extent to which these perceived marginalisations influence the willingness to participate in, and justify, political violence. Two questions, discussed in more detail in the following chapter, will be used to measure participants' justification of, and willingness to participate, in political violence.

The software programme SPSS will be utilised to analyse the data set. The data set is comprised of the responses from the 2003 Afrobarometer survey, which has a sample size of 2,428 participants, divided across all states. For the purpose of this research, the dataset was adjusted to reflect responses from those respondents residing in the Niger Delta states. Although there are nine states that make up the Delta region, the dataset contains no respondents from Imo state. Furthermore, two respondents who responded that they work for state security services were removed so as to ensure only 'civilian' (as defined earlier as non-state security personnel) responses were included in the analysis. Thus, the sample size is 665, without excluding missing cases. However, according to Uppsala Conflict Data Program, only one 'conflict' death was recorded between 1998 and 2004 in Imo. Although death is not the only measure of political violence, Imo state appears to have experienced less politically motivated violence than the rest of the region, as measured by number of active militants (Ajayi, 2013).

“Round Two” data from 2003 was used due to methodological and conceptual reasons. From a methodological perspective, the 2003 survey was the only round of Afrobarometer surveys that included ethnicity marginalisation variables, which related to two questions regarding attitudes towards political violence engagement. Moreover, on a conceptual level, Delta violence reached a peak in the immediate years 2003-2005 following the survey collection. This is reflected by quantitative and qualitative assessments of Delta violence levels depicted by the number of deaths, infrastructure damage and corporate kidnappings (Mähler, 2010).

Univariate data (Mean, Mode, Standard deviation, etc.) is presented before the multivariate analysis phase, as ‘descriptive statistics’ contextualises marginalisation and political violence attitudes within the sample. For all variables used in this analysis, I removed the ‘missing cases’ in a list-wise fashion, for people who refused to respond also indicated that they do not know how to respond to the particular question. This is done to ensure a single sample for all analysis. Regression Models, as well as independent variables within these models, are considered significant at p values less than 0.05. All variables slated to be included in an index with greater than four items will undergo factor analysis to determine latent variables in addition to reliability tests of any scales created.

I am assuming Niger Delta inhabitants, based on the literature, are making comparisons to other regions. Although not all Afrobarometer questions are asking respondents to compare conditions, the responses, whatever they are, are being compared to the conditions of other Nigerians, notably those outside of the Delta. This is done to grasp the comparative aspect of perceptions of marginalisation.

It is possible the percentage of respondents that stated they would justify or participate in political violence was under reported due to the nature of survey data. This because respondents may be fearful of repercussions should they admit to participating in, or justifying, incidents of political violence. 48.8 percent of the sample size believed that the interviewer was sent by a government entity. Thus another limitation of this study is that the number of respondents admitting to participation, or justification, may be under represented due to fear of punitive measures on behest of the government (Holbrook, Krosnick, & Pfent, 2007).

## 1.5 Hypothesis justification

### 1.5.1

**H<sub>1</sub>:** As perceptions of political marginalisation increase, respondents are more likely to justify and engage in political violence.

Political marginalisation has been a recurrent independent variable in political science literature used to explain events from civil wars to riots and terrorism. Following Gurr's (1993) quantitative study showing that political marginalisation is one of the causal variables that can explain the onset of civil war, Wimmer, Cederman, & Min (2009) used ethnicity as a proxy for political exclusion to argue that states in which ethnic marginalisation (and thus political marginalisation) are prevalent are prone to civil wars, compared to states without a politically excluded population. Furthermore, they assert that a politically-excluded population is often the party that initiates the violence at the civil war's onset. The main causal linkage between violence and marginalisation has been discussed in literature and is often boiled down into two forms – the rational actor model and a seemingly emotional model.

“From one perspective, protesters are in a sense irrational, lashing out because they are alienated, frustrated, and/or have been cut-off from the mechanisms that integrate most people into the political arena of a liberal democracy. From the other perspective, protesters are calculating political actors who assemble the evidence, question the assumptions of liberal democracy, and choose to respond to delegitimized state violence with their own violence” (White, 2000, p.104).

Regardless of either model there is a clear link between marginalisation and the expression of politically motivated violent mobilisations. Politically excluded individuals, by definition, do not have the ability, incentives or resources to express political desires and grievances through legal or legitimate channels, or all these legal avenues have been exhausted. As such, this population has no legitimate or sanctioned avenue to engage with a country's political elites and is forced to resort to alternative means to voice political grievances. As Mähler (2010, p.26) states,

“Especially for the younger generations, the “lesson” of the Ogoni protests in the middle of the 1990s is that peaceful protest does not produce any positive results. As the transition to democracy, which was associated with a lot of expectations and hope for improvement

of the socioeconomic situation, has been largely disappointing, the people's willingness to use violence has been further strengthened.”

Thus even without a comparison to another group's circumstances, it appears that politically excluded individuals may feel incentivised to engage in political violence (Ukeje, 2001).

However the nature of political exclusion varies according to the experiences of different groups or sects of a country's population. This will have varying effects on the population in question. Le Billion notes the potential effect of a widening wealth and power gap between social classes and its relationship to spurring the potential for violent retaliation among the aggrieved classes.

As the wealth and power gap between the ruling and the ruled increases, so does the frustration of marginalised groups seeing political change as the only avenue for satisfying their greed and aspirations, or expressing their grievances. In the absence of widespread political consensus — which cannot be maintained solely through a distribution of rents and repression — violence becomes for these groups the main, if not only route to wealth and power (Le Billion, 2001, p.567).

Therefore, a perceived inequality can lead individuals or groups to mobilize and partake in political violence borne out of resentment for segments of the population that are perceived to be better off compared to the disenfranchised group; although the violence may not target the advantaged group (Gurr, 2006).

After the 1956 discovery of oil in the Delta, which led to the reduced power of Delta political structures – as the federal government sought complete control over the oil revenue and thus the political landscape – violent incidents perpetually increased until the Delta was transformed into an “outright unstable region with persistent violence since the 1990s” (Idemudia & Ite, 2005, p.392). The region's exclusion from substantial political decision-making and the stark political and wealth inequalities spurred mobilisation and subsequent violence in the Delta as the politically marginalised had no political capacity to contest the federal government's resource wealth allocation policies. As such, violence targeting government interests was the only logical recourse for inhabitants seeking to increase their socioeconomic and political status (Wimmer, Cederman, & Min, 2009). Therefore, increased perceptions of marginalisation should correlate with greater propensity to participate in, and justify political violence. Thus my model takes into account the

political marginalisation and political violence relationship irrespective of the mechanism; as my model accounts for both the perceived inequality of political power directly causing violence and violence as the only viable communication tool through the blocking of legitimate political channels.

Finally, the infamous Niger Delta militant groups the NDPVF and MEND have both issued communiques arguing for increased regional autonomy (Mähler, 2010). While this could be a ploy to gain political legitimacy, if the organisations were simply criminal and motivated by economic gains I am unable to see the rationale behind these statements. Furthermore, neither group has attempted to manipulate ethnic divisions *within* marginalised ethnicities in the Delta; as such, this indicates the groups' involvement in violence is indeed motivated by political grievances.

### 1.5.2

**H<sub>2</sub>:** As perceptions of economic marginalisation increase, respondents are more likely to justify and engage in political violence.

Economic exclusion and wealth inequality have been a prominent theme in literature explaining violent events both inside and outside the Niger Delta. Although poverty on its own does not automatically lead to violence, economic inequalities have long been associated with political violence, as first popularized by Ted Gurr in 1970. Although the economic inequality component of the onset of violence is still debated in the broad conflict literature, it is an appropriate and necessary concept to include in my model as we can test how the theory applies to a specific case.

When applied to the Niger Delta, the stark contrast of the economic and development conditions between the rest of the country and the Delta states is obvious. Furthermore, the impoverished Delta inhabitants are well aware the luxury they see in other parts of the country not only comes from their area, but has come at a cost to the region's inhabitants in the form of environmental degradation leading to a loss in economic opportunities (Tobor, 2016). It seems almost impossible that Delta inhabitants will not compare their economic status and wealth generation opportunities to the rest of the country and will most likely have strong perceptions of economic marginalisation due to the region's comparative (and absolute) lack of development.

I am sceptical of the argument that political movements are often concealments for advancing economic opportunities (Wimmer, Cederman, & Min, B. 2009). Testing both the indicators for economic and political marginalisation will shed light on this proposition to test individual effects of each concept on violence. I expect that increased perceptions of economic marginalisation will correlate with a higher propensity for one to engage in, and justify political violence due to the economic inequalities prevalence in both Niger Delta specific and general literature. and my agreement with the relative deprivation hypothesis applied to the Delta as several scholars have done qualitatively.

### *1.5.3*

**H<sub>3</sub>:** As perceptions of marginalisation of one's identity groups increases, one is more likely to justify and engage in political violence.

Some literature cites ethnicity as a proxy for identity group, which can affect an individual's willingness to justify and engage in politically-motivated violence. Although 66.6 percent of respondent's identified ethnicity as their primary identity group, this hypothesis rests on the assumption that any identity group will have the same effect as ethnicity on attitudes towards the justifications and participations concerning political violence. However, ethnicity as a driver of violence has been one of the most controversial factors when explaining manifestations of conflict and violence. Scholars deliberate its role, and while there is consensus that violence is not an intrinsic consequence of an ethnically diverse polity, ethnic cleavages in conjunction with other stimulating factors can manifest as ethnic conflict. Therefore, ethnic marginalisation is an important control variable in my analysis of the Delta.

Ethnic animosities can be exacerbated by political divisions and elite manipulation, but are also affected by political and economic differences between ethnic groups in Nigeria (Obi, 2009). Nigerian politicians have made ethnic cleavages salient (Courson, 2011; Tobor, 2016) and hence we can expect people who belong to various ethnic groups to compare their own political and socioeconomic conditions with other groups'.

Economist Frances Stewart is the main proponent of the importance of horizontal inequalities. Regardless of how groups are defined, “differences between groups... can cause deep resentment that may lead to violent struggles” (Stewart, 2011, p.1). Stewart argues political, economic, and societal divisions are the differences that are most likely to lead a group to participate in acts of goal oriented violence. Although Østby (2013) and Stewart (2011) argue absolute poverty is not a significant causal variable, relative poverty in unequal societies, (in addition to the other forms of exclusion) should correlate with disenfranchised communities partaking in violence aimed at changing the status quo. While the authors of these theories were not speaking specifically about violence in the Niger Delta, scholars seeking to explain the continued bouts of violence towards corporate and national interests have modified and applied these theories in their work as discussed in the previous section of the literature review.

Stewart’s concept of horizontal inequality postulates that the intergroup comparison is a stronger predictor of violence due to psychological ties to a group, which provides incentives for collective action (Stewart, 2011). Although ethnicity in Nigeria is a proxy for socio-economic status and the associated lived experiences, and there are no primordial differences between ethnic groups, due to the apparent marginalisation of people, denial of groups certain political and economic rights and resources, Stewart’s horizontal inequality hypothesis may be appropriate to predict that identity marginalisation variable will be a significant predictor of political violence attitudes in the Delta.

However, there is a need to distinguish whether participants are motivated by grievances against other ethnic groups in the Delta per se, or the ethnicities of the ruling elites. Thus, I apply theories specific to ethnicity to group identity in general and assume the same causal logic that applies to an ethnic group’s willingness to participate in political violence holds true for any other identity group listed by Afrobarometer. It should be noted identity group marginalisation is a separate concept from identity group versus Nigerian nationality prioritisation and this hypothesis applies to the former concept of group marginalisation.

### 1.6 Significance of the Study

Since the 1960's scholars have debated the causal factors behind civil war, terrorism, destructive protests and other forms of political violence. The literature is mainly divided into motivation – such as greed or grievance (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) – and opportunity; as exemplified by the repressiveness of a state's security apparatus (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Obi, 2009). The latter views political violence resulting from the relative strength of the state vis a vis the society, and the willingness and/or ability of the state to quell political violence incidents (Awodola & Ayuba, 2015). This study is concerned with the factors that affect the justification of, and willing to participate in political violence, and thus the literature pertaining to opportunity will not be addressed. The extent of state repression may affect public motivation to engage in political violence, which will be addressed in this study.

Poverty, social and political exclusion, and opportunity coupled with greed have all been used to explain motivations behind various forms of political violence generally (Østby, 2013), and these arguments have also been used to explain violence in the Niger Delta. However, there has been a failure in the Delta literature to establish whether a clear causal link exists between marginalisation and an outcome of political violence (Østby, 2013; Stewart, 2008). Furthermore, as noted earlier, the majority of Delta scholars work under the assumption that marginalisation is a real world concept and do not measure individual perceptions marginalisation. There could be a case where a group is objectively marginalized; however, if that group does not *feel* or *perceive* themselves to be marginalised, then marginalisation as an independent variable that explains political violence falls short. The few studies that have attempted to measure marginalisation and its effect on political violence participation, have used sub-par items to operationalise different concepts of exclusion (Smith, et al., 2012).

The Human Development Index (HDI) and Gini Coefficient measure levels of poverty and inequality. However, one cannot assume that these reflect marginalisation. This is because perceptions towards marginalisation are subjective to individuals (Østby, 2013). The aforementioned variables and other popular quantitative measures of 'marginalisation' cannot capture whether or not the population actually feels marginalised as they do not measure public attitudes towards their economic position. Numbers are assigned simply based on living conditions

and other ‘measurable’ aspects that these items attempt to quantify. Furthermore, the literature that uses these variables assumes that everyone who has the same number of some variable, i.e. a low rating on the Human Development Index, feels the same way towards their environment, such as government authorities, and thus experiences the same degree of marginalisation (Østby, 2013). Additionally, Thiesen (2008) argues that economic indicators are poor predictors of political violence when compared interview data concerning participants’ subjective perceptions of their living conditions.

While these studies provide useful quantitative and comparative data, they are unable to assess how people discern and navigate through socio-political world. Thus my study uses opinion data on public opinion to understand what is driving behaviour in the Delta region. The study shall elucidate how people living in the region interpret the extent of their marginalisation and whether their understandings of marginalisation cause a justification of, and participation in incidents of political violence.

Despite the wealth of literature on the Niger Delta’s lengthy conflict history, no studies I am aware of have used data sets from survey responses to test the factors that influence inclination among citizens to participate in, and justify acts of political violence. Although Tobor (2016) conducts several interviews with former Niger Delta militants, the number of interviews is too low for a statistical application. Furthermore, the interviews are aimed at contributing to the qualitative body of literature on the Delta. Thus, this study contributes to knowledge on understanding the Delta region by measuring public opinion on marginalisation and predisposition to engage in, and justify political violence.

Finally, much of the data pertaining to conflict in general, and to the Delta region specifically, can be unreliable due to the difficulty of obtaining accurate information in a conflict-ridden area. Despite the best efforts of data gathering campaigns conducted by NGOs, universities, governments and think tanks obtaining ‘hard’ or non-psychological variables used to quantify concepts, such as the nature of violence, levels of economic development or living conditions, the gathered information is often inaccurate (Mähler, 2010). Thus, due to largely unreliable data concerning incidents of violence, measuring justification of, and willingness to participate in

political violence (this study's dependent variables) may provide a more concrete understanding of political violence dynamics in the Delta.

Measuring the effects of political versus economic or social marginalisation will be valuable to decision-makers looking to design policies to address a specific form of marginalisation and its effects (Awodola & Ayuba, 2015). This study aims to bridge the gap between Delta-specific theories and more generalised theories of political violence. I do this by applying general theories of marginalisation to the Delta context. I test relative deprivation inspired theories for their applicability to a selected case and Delta-specific theories that use marginalisation as a real world concept. Thus a brief review of literature regarding non-Delta specific literature is provided below.

Poverty is one of the oldest theories in modern social science that has been used to explain political violence. Given prominence by Samuel Huntington, economic exclusion has been utilised to explain political violence incidents in the 1970's in the United States and Southeast Asia (Piazza, 2006). Furthermore, poverty was centre stage after the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States, and policy-makers went on to stress the necessity of economic development in the Global South to prevent transnational terrorism and other forms of politically motivated attacks (Piazza, 2006). As the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan stated in regards to both transnational and domestic terrorism and associated political violence, "No one in this world can be comfortable or safe when so many people are suffering and deprived...Low levels of economic and social development increase the appeal of political extremism and encourage political violence and instability" (cited in Piazza, 2006, p.159-160).

In a large sample size study pertaining to incidents of terrorism, Piazza (2006) concludes that poverty and inequality, as measured by several economic variables, are not statistically significant predictors of political grievance-inspired terrorism. Although the Piazza study's chief concern is terrorism, terrorism is a form of violence that is done with the aim of achieving a political outcome and therefore it can be classified as a form of political violence (Gurr, 2010; Mähler, 2010). Krueger & Maleckova (2002) allege that poverty, among other factors, is not a significant causal mechanism of political violence. Krueger & Maleckova conducted interviews with Palestinians from different socioeconomic backgrounds and found that education and income have no effect

on how the participants in the study felt towards attacks (conducted by Palestinians) that killed Israeli civilians. Collier & Hoeffler (2004), however, argue that poverty, or individual/communal grievances, are insufficient factors to explain political violence, when compared to economic-based motivators – such as perceived socioeconomic disparities. However, this argument has been largely contested when applied to a sub-Saharan Africa context (Dumas, 2002; Østby, 2013). Hence, whilst these authors contend that poverty alone is not a substantial explanatory variable in the general literature concerning political violence, a society's degree of inequality is said to have an effect.

Relative Deprivation Theory, popularized by Ted Gurr's 1970 book *Why Men Rebel*, has been a highly influential and contested theory for over 45 years. Gurr argues that dissatisfaction with life circumstances arises when an individual compares his or her life circumstances, or the circumstances of the group to which he/she belongs, to other individuals or groups that are relatively perceived to be better off society (Awodola & Ayubam, 2015; Gurr, 1970). Although the theory was originally concerned with economic parameters, scholars eventually applied the concept to include social and political elements. As Gurr stated, "People become resentful and disposed to political action when they share a collective perception that they are unjustly deprived of economic and political advantages or opportunities enjoyed by other groups" (Gurr, 2006, p.87). This fuels the desire for mobilisation and subsequent episodes of political violence (Awodola & Ayuba 2015; Gurr, 2006). The theory suggests that inequality – namely the perception of inequality – spurs the sense of relative deprivation in a society (Gurr, 2006). Gurr argued that societies that possess a segment(s) of society that perceives themselves to be politically and/or economically disadvantaged are prone to civil war compared to an egalitarian polity (Gurr, 1993). Other studies, such as that of Richardson (2013) have extended this argument, stating that other forms of inequalities in a society have the potential to lead to violence of a political nature (Richardson, 2013). Furthermore, Tilly (1978) also argued that the ability and willingness of the state's security apparatus to engage in repressive action is a strong determinant of citizen-driven political violence; as the citizenry is responding the same violent manner toward the state.

In a review of primarily quantitative literature pertaining to political violence, Østby (2013) observed that many academics tend to refute relative-deprivation as salient in explaining political

violence. However, she found that many studies' measured vertical inequality instead of horizontal inequality, which was less salient. Østby contests that these studies are simply comparing individuals and not comparing inequalities across groups. As Stewart (2008) stated, if a group or community perceives that they are faring worse than other groups, the group may be driven to 'rebel', or mobilise in a violent manner.

The Niger Delta is renowned for corruption, conflict and oil. British colonial rule marked the Delta region loss of its economic livelihood – as it no longer had the ability to control trade through the area's waterways – and political autonomy (Idemudia & Ite 2005). As the colonial government invested in cash crops in other regions of Nigeria, the Delta's economic relevance, and thus its political importance and influence, also degraded. Following the discovery of oil and the economic gains beginning in the 1950, various Delta groups have demanded autonomy from the federal government and increased oil and natural gas revenue percentages. However, these demands were often ignored (Ikelegbe, 2005). This led to the creation of various militant groups that attacked state and multinational corporate natural resource interests in combination with widespread civil unrest (Obi, 2009) with violence peaking in 2004 and 2005 (Courson, 2011). As follows,

## 1.7 Summary of Chapter 1

This chapter set out to provide a background of non-state security personnel-driven political violence in the nine states that comprise the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Additionally, the literature that explains political within the Delta was reviewed in addition to more general theories of political violence. As this study aims to investigate the relationship between political, economic and identity group marginalisation with the justification of, and willingness to participate in, political violence.

### 1.7.1

Chapter 2 provides a thorough methodological overview of the thesis, including the justification of the data set. This chapter elaborates on the research design in terms of the operationalisation and computation of the variables for political, economic and ethnic marginalisation that are analysed subsequently in the regression models is outlined in this chapter.

### 1.7.2

Chapter 3 provides a final analysis and discussion on the results of both regression models as well as some final conclusions on what the models may tell us about political violence in the Delta region. The results are contextualised within the existing marginalisation theories. The applicability of this theories to the Delta is then discussed, followed by the dissertation's conclusion.

## Chapter 2: Methodology and Research Design

### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an explanation of the operationalisation of the key concepts used in this study: political, economic and identity group marginalisation. It also illuminates the study's use of control variables. The extent to which each variable impacts on propensity to justify or engage in political violence is tested using regression models to explain why roughly a third of the respondents for both dependent variable questions (elaborated below) have predispositions to justify and/or engage in political violence.

To test the relative strength of each variable, indices (also known as 'scales' or 'composite variables') were formed via a combination of theory and factor and reliability analyses. This was to ascertain the appropriate items intended for use in both primary and control variable indices. All the indices used in this study are computed as an average of the scores of the individual variables included in the scale. One cause of concern to some may be the way in which the study indexes political marginalisation. This is because the Political Marginalisation Index (PMI) is comprised of questions measuring one's contact with a government official, and not perceived political marginalisation per se. I assume that these six aspects measure elements of perceived political marginalisation. Using a factor and reliability analysis twelve variables that captured other aspects of political exclusion were excluded from the analysis. Two of these excluded variables -- the perceived ability to make elected representatives listen to grievances, the extent to which one is interested in politics -- were rather included in the regression models. These items were deemed appropriate for inclusion based on theoretical grounds, which will be elaborated on later in this chapter. Furthermore, with the exception of dummy variables and the items that measure government contact, all variables that measure an aspect of political exclusion have been recoded so that higher numbers indicate a higher degree of marginalisation.

Unlike the case for political marginalisation, the ‘round two’ Afrobarometer questionnaire contains over 50 questions that measuring aspects of economic marginalisation, which were used to create the Economic Marginalisation Index (EMI). I disaggregated these items into three categories of perceived economic marginalisation. The first category is personal or household economic marginalisation; second is personal or household wealth (monetary); and third is the degree to which there is an absence of ‘development’, in terms of access to basic infrastructure for service delivery, in the sampling area. The variables intended to be included in each economic marginalisation category were subject to three separate factor and reliability analyses.

The following chapter describes the methodological and theoretical rationales behind each of the variables’ inclusion in the regression models, which measure the relationship between the perceived marginalisation and other potential control variables on attitudes towards condoning or participating in political violence. The chapter accounts for the theoretical and conceptual justifications behind the items’ inclusion, index and variable operationalisation and finally the index computation.

## 2.2 Theoretical Justifications for Main Variables

This section provides justification for the inclusion of each of the following variables in the regression models. To this end, both theoretical and practical reasons are provided.

As elaborated on in the section of the chapter dealing with operationalisation, a respondent’s disposition towards political violence is broken down into two separate variables: ‘Political Violence Justification’ and ‘Political Violence Participation’. ‘Political Violence Participation’ measures one’s propensity to participate in political violence, while ‘Political Violence Justification’ captures respondents’ propensity to endorse violence to attain a political goal. I assess the factors influencing one’s propensity to believe political violence is justified. I posit that an analysis of these factors will provide insight into the motivation behind participation in violence. Like Boyle (2002) and Du Toit (1990) this study assumes one must believe his/her violent act to be justified, or legitimate, before a person engages in what they conceive as a violent political act (O’Boyle, 2002). Thus reasons for investigating justification attitudes, opposed to solely the willingness to participate in political violence, are warranted. I disaggregated political

violence into two concepts because the dataset contained two questions regarding political violence. While each question's vernacular is stated in the operationalisation portion of this chapter, it can also be found in the *Afrobarometer Questionnaire* section of the Appendix.

### 2.2.1 Political Marginalisation

Although Afrobarometer does not have a question with the wording of political exclusion, alienation, or marginalisation, there exist several sets of questions that relate to, or are a symptom of, political marginalisation. After carefully analysing the 2003 Afrobarometer questionnaire for Nigeria, eight 'question sets' were selected pertaining to the overall concept of political marginalisation. Overall these question sets comprise 22 individual questions, or items, analysed via an exploratory factor analysis to create a composite variable for political marginalisation that was slated to be termed the Political Marginalisation Index (PMI).

The first question analysed by the exploratory factor analysis asked respondents how interested they are in public affairs. The rationale for inclusion into the PMI is that a lack of interest in politics may be a symptom of political marginalisation. If a person feels like they have no political voice, there is reason to believe that they have less interest in public or political affairs, as they do not feel that they affect their lives directly. Alternatively, a lack of a political voice may increase the respondent's willingness to engage with political topics due to frustration (Leysens, 2004; Lipset, 1959). This variable is termed 'Interest in Public Affairs'.

The second item included in the PMI measures the perceived ability of respondents to make elected representatives listen to their demands. The ability, or lack thereof, is part of the definition of political marginalisation as according to Bratton (2012) when there is an excluded group who has little to no say in political matters, it is likely to lead to a dissatisfied citizenry (Bratton, 2012). This item is labelled the 'Perceived Ability to Make Public Officials Listen'.

The third set of items is derived from a ten-part question that measures how often the respondent contacts government officials. The options range from local government entities to traditional rulers. These items were selected because the propensity of someone to contact a party official is

likely to be dependent on an individual's perceived level of political marginalisation. According to Hirlinger (1992) it is unlikely that an individual or group would take the time to contact government officials if there is no benefit to be derived. There are factors which influence whether or not someone has contacted one someone holding political office. These include whether a person had time to do so or the extent of difficulty in establishing contact with that particular person or state office. If a citizen is required to travel a day to contact their local government councillor, as opposed to a few hours travel time, I posit this may serve as deterrent. This position is based on Hirlinger's (1992) research concerning citizen-initiated contact with local political figures. This would then negate the variable as a potential symptom of political marginalisation. However, there is no question in the Afrobarometer questionnaire that is able to provide clarity. As such, lack of contact, or less contact is assumed to be a symptom of political marginalisation. This set of items is termed 'Contact with Government Officials'<sup>3</sup>.

The next question selected for the PMI asks how often Nigerians believe they are treated unequally by the legal system. People who are politically marginalised are assumed to be unlikely to receive equal legal treatment because there is no pressure on the legal system to treat them fairly, or there is no punishment for justice system officials that promulgate unfair treatment (Highton, 1997). As Highton (1997) states, if marginalised individuals have de jure equal legal rights, these rights may not be afforded to persons de facto, who belong to a marginalised group. Thus, the perceived equal or unequal treatment may be viewed as a symptom of political exclusion and explains its inclusion in the factor analysis for political marginalisation concept. This variable is titled 'Perceived Legal Inequality'.

The next item examined by factor analysis is 'Perceived Attentiveness of Leaders'. I referred to a question that measured the extent to which a person believes the state responds to, and engages with its citizens' political goals. The extent to which one feels that their voice is being heard by political officials is seen as key to operationalising perceptions of political marginalisation in the Niger Delta. It is for this reason that this item was analysed by the PMI factor analysis.

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<sup>3</sup> This variable set was recoded to run in a different direction into *Perceived Government Contact* in order to differentiate the directionality of the new variabe

The next variable that measures perceived political marginalisation is titled ‘Perceived Difficulty of Voter Registration’. It was selected for the PMI because it asks the respondent to assess their the difficulty experienced in an attempt to obtain a voter registration card. This variable was included, as governments have been known to use voting legislation and access to stifle political dissent (Highton, 1997).

The final question that measures political marginalisation asks whether a person feels close to any political organisation or party. This is relevant to feelings of political marginalisation persons who do not feel close to a particular party are do not have their interests represented within the electoral aspect, or realm, of the political system. Furthermore, those who do not affiliate with a political party are acknowledging there is no legitimate political party that represents their interests (Erdman, 2007; Lipset 1959). As such, this variable is titled ‘Political Affiliation’.

### 2.2.2 Economic Marginalisation

Due to varying conceptual aspects of economic marginalisation, as well as the variety of scales exhibited by the questions for operationalisation of economic marginalisation, three different aspects of economic exclusion have been identified. The first to be discussed is personal economic marginalisation. For all items, a higher value corresponds with a greater degree of economic marginalisation. Furthermore, all items listed below were analysed via an exploratory factor analysis to ensure the *PEMI*'s validity. This is discussed in the final computation section of this chapter.

### 2.2.3 Personal Economic Marginalisation Index (PEMI)

The first set of variables were examined by factor analysis to determine the appropriate items for the creation of the Personal Economic Marginalisation Index (*PEMI*) composite variable. The question asked the respondent to rate Nigeria's present economic conditions as well as their own living conditions. These conditions, while having the potential to pertain to a variety of factors, are likely the effect of one's income and economic status, which explains their inclusion in the *PEMI*. The next item in this set asks respondents to compare his or her living conditions with those

of other Nigerians. This question is phrased in terms of a relative deprivation conceptual framework, because it asks the respondent to compare his or her living situation to that of their fellow countrymen. This variable set is termed 'Economic Outlook'.

The next set of items that were included in the PEMI measure how often the respondent has gone without certain basic necessities. These necessities range from food to a cash income. Each of the items listed, notably a cash income, is dependent on the respondent's economic position, which explains its inclusion in the PEMI. The variable set is labelled 'Gone Without'.

The final set of items is comprised of questions labelled 'Perceived Service Availability'. These asks respondents to rate the availability of a range of services, such as the level of difficulty of obtaining primary school placement, or the ease of attaining police services. These factors were included due to access to basic services is being cited often as a symptom of economic marginalisation (Alexander, 2010).

#### 2.2.4 Personal Wealth Index (PWI)

The Personal Wealth Index (PWI) measured the individual's household, or personal, economic status. The items that comprise this variable measure the perceived wealth of the respondent in addition to the perceived wealth of their parents and children. I expect that previous and future wealth perceptions may affect the context in which the respondent views their ability to accrue wealth currently. For example, if a one perceives that their parents are more wealthy than they are, they may be more likely to feel a sense of injustice or hold negative feelings towards a familiar reduction in overall wealth. This would be a perceived injustice, which is appropriate to understanding the concept of economic marginalisation.

In addition, the opposite situation applies. If a person believes his or her children are likely to be better off in the future, this may decrease perceptions of exclusion. Therefore, should the preceding assumptions be correct, the related items will provide a more nuanced operationalisation of economic marginalisation.

### 2.2.5 Area Economic Marginalisation Index (AEMI)

The final aspect of the economic marginalisation concept were derived from questions that measure the availability of certain services and facilities in the respondent's sampling unit. The services range from post-offices to supermarkets. The root cause of the presence or absence of one of these services may be rooted in macroeconomic factors rooted in the international political economy (Alexander, 2010; Courson, 2011). However, the presence or lack of these services are also indicative of the region's level of economic development. Wealthy areas are likely to include more of these entities because there is more potential for businesses to profit from wealthy communities in addition to wealthy individuals being able to demand certain services, due to increased influence. However, this study does not have the capability to measure if the area's economic development is a product of foreign aid, as there were such projects evident in the Delta in 2003 (Zalik, 2004). An example is the demand for a recreation facility. Thus this variable is termed the Area Economic Marginalisation Index (*AEMI*).

### 2.2.6 Identity Group Marginalisation

In the previous chapter, I hypothesised that belonging to a identity group, which perceived themselves to be marginalised (as measured from the standpoint of an individual within the group) was likely to be correlated with political violence given the lack of power in legal political channels (Amaragbu, 2011; Olojede, 2000). Identity groups range from ethnic to religious identifications. Hence, the index was slated to be comprised of two questions that measure the respondent's perceived political and socio-economic status, in relation to other identity groups. Essentially this aims to measure the perceived differences between groups – regardless of which identity group the respondent identifies with, which is termed horizontal inequality (Stewart, 2010). As Stewart argues, perceived group differences or treatment are likely to lead to occurrences of political violence.

## 2.3 Control Variables

### 2.3.1 Security Force Trust Index (*SFTI*)

Swathes of political violence literature argues repressive governments deter violent mobilisation by force, and such disproportionate or violent dispersion may create a justification of, and willingness to action political violence (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013). Hence, trust in Nigeria's security forces is a separate concept to political marginalisation and is included as a control variable. Accordingly, a Security Force Trust Index (*SFTI*) was created. Some authors have argued that political violence enacted by non-state actors is often a response to politically repressive regimes (Muller & Weede, 1990). It is likely that perceptions of trust towards the state security apparatus may influence the likelihood of participation in political violence, as lower trust could indicate the respondent – through the rational actor model – would be disincentivized for fear of repercussions inflicted by police and/or military units. Therefore, the respondent may perceive the cost of violent action as greater if the respondent has low trust in state security forces (Muller & Weede, 1990). While this variable may not have a discernible effect on respondents' attitudes regarding the legitimacy of political violence, it may affect how people calculate the benefits and costs of participating in politically motivated incidents of violence.

### 2.3.2 Government Trust Index (*GTI*)

Levels of trust in government institutions were the next items examined by factor analysis. I posited that a lack of trust in government institutions may not spur political violence, how trust in political institutions may serve as a deterrent (Muller & Weede, 1990). While a lack of trust in government institutions may be a symptom of political marginalisation, a lack of trust in institutions may also impact individuals holding favourable attitudes towards participation in political violence. As Muller and Weede (1990) assert, one who lacks trust in government is likely to view violence as the only means of political expression. Thus levels of vertical trust is may affect predispositions towards political violence, hence its inclusion in the model of the *PMI*.

Whilst there is ample political science literature that addresses institutional trust, on the one hand (Newton, Stolle, & Zmerli, 1999) and political marginalisation on the other (Hall, 1999; Gurr, 2006; Osaghae, 1995; Oskarason, 2010; Piazza, 2006), they are often viewed as separate concepts that do not influence one other (Gberevbie, Oyeyemi & Excellence-Oluye, 2014). Only a few scholars have looked at the relationship between institutional trust and factors that may affect trust,

such as accountability and good governance. For this reason, levels of vertical trust should not be included in the *PMI*. However, as an additional check the above mentioned ‘government trust’ variables were examined by the *PMI* factor analysis. Accordingly, an institutional trust index was created, which is explained later in this chapter. However, these variables were not included in the *PMI*. This scale forms the Government Trust Index (*GTI*). As discussed in this chapter’s results section the *GTI* is was not included in the *PMI* due to the *PMI*’s pattern matrix factor loadings, combined with the separation of the concepts of ‘Trust’ and ‘Marginalisation’ in the literature.

#### 2.3.4 Government Performance Index (*GPI*)

The Government Performance Index (*GPI*) measures opinions of how the government has handled a variety of issues, ranging from job creation to HIV/AIDS management campaigns. If government performance was rated highly, I posited that an individual would be less likely to attempt to disrupt the political system that they believe is benefiting the country. Although it is unlikely that persons who are politically or economically marginalised would rate government performance as high, one who gives a low rating does not necessarily entail that person is marginalised. As such, these items were compiled into an index, but function as a control variable, as opposed to functioning as elements of political or economic marginalisation. I argue that the extent to which one rates government performance as high has the ability to affect the extent to which one might endorse and/or participate in political violence. there was a need to control for this variable because an individual is unlikely to retaliate against a government that he or she believes is not performing well.

#### 2.3.5 Age

The next variable to be controlled for is ‘Age’. In literature that encompasses both generalised theories and Delta-specific theories explaining the motivating factors behind political violence, age is a recurrent factor. While the causal mechanisms behind the effect of age on political violence dispositions are multifaceted and often disputed, the majority of scholars argue that youths are more likely than non-youths to engage in political violence (Obi, 2009; Ukeje, 2001). Common theories underscore the fact the youths are often relatively deprived compared to the rest of society,

as they often have less economic resources and accumulated wealth. One reason provided in the literature is that youths have had less time to generate income (Ukeje, 2001). Additionally, Okafor (2011) argues that Nigeria's high youth unemployment rates are a contributing factor to political violence and the country's political stability. Various studies conceptualise age differently and set varying ranges to define and conceptualize youth. Thus, while unemployment rates are not directly analysed, the disproportionate amount of unemployment among the country's youth is a justification for why age affects political violence, as unemployed youth may be aggrieved and have more time to engage in political violence (Okafor, 2011). Participants in the interview sample are required to be persons over the age of eighteen. I do not define an upper age boundary for the youth, but posit that younger people are more likely to justify and have a willingness to participate in political violence in comparison to older people.

### 2.3.6 Head of Household

The next control variable is 'Head of Household'. The questionnaire asked whether an individual is the head of their household. I surmised that one who is the head of his or her households would be less likely than others to have favourable attitude toward political violence. Typically, the head of the household is responsible for welfare of that household and hence, are more likely to contemplate the risks associated with such violence. This is based on Inglehart and Welzel's scholarship, which argues humans are likely to prioritise basic survival needs and security over higher, or more abstract and complex political goals (2009). Whilst this is accepted, the adverse view is also held, where a head of a household may also feel more inclined to partake in a violent action that they believe will benefit the household in the long term. I posit that this view may be underpinned by the perception of responsibility. Thus, literature suggests that 'Head of Household' is relevant to both regression models.

### 2.3.7 Gender

Several studies focused on violence and conflict have documented female participation in political violence (Coulter, Persson, & Utas, 2008). However, most of the literature relevant to the Niger Delta emphasizes the participation of men in political violence, both in relation to involvement in

militias or counter-insurgency, such as MEND or the NDPVF. While this literature, concerning regarding the higher propensity of men vs women to participate in violent conflict or political violence, may be bias in failing to capture women's participation in political violence, it makes a strong case to include a gender control variable in my model regarding genders influence on political violence attitudes. This variable is termed '*Gender*'.

### 2.3.8 Identity Group Prioritisation

The final variable included in this analysis is labelled '*Identity Group Prioritisation*'. This measures the extent of attachment to Nigeria's national identity versus the other identity groups as one's primary identity marker. As has been mentioned prior, the identity group options offered by the Afrobarometer questionnaire include gender and age, and ethnicity and religion. These identity markers form a separate variable to the abovementioned '*identity group marginalisation*' concept, as the item does not attempt to measure the degree of marginalisation perceived by the respondent. For this reason I exclude it from the '*Identity Group Marginalisation*' concept and because it measures which group the respondent feels a stronger affiliation with. However, identity group prioritisation does portend to attitudes surrounding political violence. Following Idemudia & Ite (2005) who write about the effects of ethnic group identities on feelings of marginalisation and which result in violence against the state; I surmise that individuals who prioritise a group identity over national identity are more likely to engage in violent acts against the state. Alternatively, if they do not feel that they are part of the nation state's societal fabric, may be disincentivised to engage in political violence (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013; Watts, 2004). Prioritising national identity can one's propensity to want to engage in political violence against the state (Olojede, 2000). Furthermore, in a potentially spurious relationship, people who feel more attached to their group identity may feel this way because they have been marginalised by the state. Therefore, we need to control for which identity group a respondent associates most strongly with.

## 2.4 Operationalisation

### 2.4.1 Political Violence Justification

The first dependent variable used in the linear regression model is whether one feels that violence is ever justified in support of a political cause. The survey question asked respondents if they ‘Strongly Agree’ and ‘Agree’ with Statements ‘A’ and ‘B’. Statement ‘A’ reads, “The use of violence is never justified in Nigerian politics,” whilst Statement ‘B’ reads “In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.” This variable was coded from 1-4 with higher values corresponding to positive views towards political violence. As such the variable was labelled as follows: 1= Strongly Agree with Statement A; 2=Agree with Statement A; 3= Agree with Statement B; 4= Strongly Agree with statement B. The respondents who agreed with neither statement (3.1 percent) were removed from the sample. Although this variable is ordinal, it was treated as continuous within the linear regression model. Accordingly, this variable is labelled ‘Political Violence Justification’.

#### *Political Violence Participation*

The second dependent variable used to measure ‘political violence justification’ was operationalised using five response options to a question that asked whether a person had, or would, “use violence for a political cause” (Afrobarometer, 2003). The options ranged from, “No, would never do this”, “No, but would do if had the chance”, “Yes, once or twice”, “Yes, several times” and “Yes, often”. This variable was split into a nominal variable, where “No, would never do this” was coded ‘0’ with the rest of the options recoded to ‘1’. Whilst this coding may detract from the variance in response, it made both methodological and conceptual sense. The reason being is that this study investigates the driving factors behind what leads people to have the inclination to participate in political violence. With this variable altered, they either have the desire or do not. Hence, using a logistic regression model brings forth the variables that increase the likelihood of a respondent ‘having’ the desire to participate in acts of political violence. Therefore, “No, but would do if had the chance,” was included in the category to represent whether one is inclined to participate in political violence as these respondents have the ambition but may have lacked the opportunity. The other respondents in this category explicitly stated they have participated in political violence episodes. This variable is termed ‘Political Violence Participation’.

While both variables measure separate aspects of opinions surrounding political violence, I group the questions together under the singular conceptual term of attitudes (disposition, propensity, inclinations, views, etc.), towards political violence.

#### 2.4.2 Political Marginalisation

All variables intended for inclusion in the Political Marginalisation Index (PMI) were recoded so that higher numerical values for the variable corresponded with a higher degree of political marginalisation. Hence, all variables evaluated by the factor analysis were recoded so that their values ranged from '0 to 2', '0 to 3' or '0 to 4'.

*Interest in Public Affairs* was operationalised by a question asking, "How interested are you in public affairs" (Afrobarometer, 2003). However, the 'public interest' variable was excluded from the PMI following the factor analysis. This is due to a loading below the .30 factor loading coefficient threshold.

The *Perceived Ability to Make Elected Officials Listen* was measured using the survey question asking, "If you had to, you would be able to get together with others to make elected representatives listen to your concerns" (Afrobarometer, 2003). This variable was recoded prior to a factor analysis. Responses ranged from '0' (Strongly disagree that the respondent can make elected representatives listen) to '4' Strongly Agree that the respondent can make elected representatives listen).

*Perceived Contact with Government Officials* was operationalised by the question, "How often" in the past year, "have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a problem or to give them your views" (Afrobarometer, 2003). The response options included were: a local government councillor, a state assembly representative, an official in the state governor's office, a National Assembly representative, official of a government ministry, political party official, a religious leader, a traditional ruler, an official of village/town development association, and other influential person.

Although religious leaders, traditional rulers and other influential people were included in the options, they are not political entities. Hence these questions were analysed by the factor analysis to corroborate my assumption that these items load onto a different factor, as they are not measuring engagement with a government or state entity. My assumption proved to be correct. Consequently, the value labels for the items concerning the frequency of contact with public officials range from ‘0’ (Often) to ‘3’ (Never)<sup>4</sup>. Never having contact with political figures is presumed to be a function of political marginalisation (Hirlinger, 1992). The data set did not contain data relating to whether a person *attempted* to contact one of the officials, but was unsuccessful but only measured actual contact. Although we do not know why a respondent did not engage with the specific official, a reluctance to engage state authority is likely a symptom of political exclusion (Hirlinger, 1992). Furthermore, the inability to contact a government official may encompass political exclusion. An individual has no reason to contact an official if that person believes their concerns will be ignored, as they may perceive that action as being a waste of their time. I believe this is a likely scenario, since I assume officials (regardless of what group the official belongs to) are more likely to ignore requests from marginalised groups. One reason for this is that the excluded groups may have little means to pressure the official or office into addressing the marginalised group or individual’s demands. Thus, one of this study’s assumptions is that the majority of respondents who did not contact their representatives believed that their request would not be addressed. This is why the ‘Never’ option was included at the marginalised end of the scale.

‘Perceived Legal Inequality’ was measured by a question asking, “How often are people treated unequally under the law” (Afrobarometer, 2003). The values correlated with responses ranged from ‘0’ (Never) to ‘3’ (Always) concerning the frequency of unequal treatment under the law.

‘Perceived Attentiveness of Leaders’ was operationalised by a question which inquires to subjects if elected leaders (defined as National Assembly members, State Governors or Local Government

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<sup>4</sup> This variable was recoded after factor analysis into *Perceived Government Contact* so that higher values indicate increased government contact. This was done to increase the ease of understanding the results interpretation.

Councillors) “try their best to listen to what people like you have to say” (Afrobarometer 2003). Once again the numerical values were recoded so they range from 0 (Always) to 3 (Never).

The next variable, *i*, is operationalised by the question, “Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is to obtain... a voter registration card for yourself” (Afrobarometer, 2003). The variable was recoded so that a higher numerical value corresponded with a higher degree of marginalisation. Hence the variable scale ranged from ‘0’ (Very Easy) to ‘3’ (Very difficult). Although 7.3 percent of respondents did not attempt to obtain a voter registration card (which could also be seen as a symptom of political exclusion) I recoded these respondents as ‘missing’ because we do not know why they did not try to obtain the card.

The final perceived political marginalisation variable, ‘Political Affiliation’ measures an aspect of political marginalisation. However, this was not analysed by the PMI factor analysis as it measures if respondents, “feel close to any particular political party or political organization” (Afrobarometer, 2003). The responses have been recoded to reflect that the people who felt close to a party were coded as a ‘0’ while all respondents that stated they felt close to no parties were coded ‘1’. Political Affiliation was not examined by the PMI factor analysis due to its categorical/nominal coding. However, its effect on one’s propensity to endorse or engage in political violence was analysed in the final regression models.

#### 2.4.3 Personal Economic Marginalisation Index (PEMI)

The Economic Outlook variables were measured by the responses to seven questions. The first two questions asked that the respondent rate Nigeria’s present economic conditions and then his or her own present living conditions. The third question asked respondents to compare their living conditions with those of other Nigerians. The fourth and fifth questions required the respondent to compare their present living and economic conditions to twelve months ago. The final two items measured the respondents’ attitude toward their future living and economic conditions and whether they believed that in the next twelve months their economic predicament would improve. Each of the above-mentioned questions have scales that were recoded to run from ‘0’ (Much better) to ‘4’ (Much worse). No categories (besides the aforementioned ‘missings’) were removed for the

‘Economic Outlook’ question set, however, the variables were recoded so that higher values corresponded with perceptions of poorer living and economic conditions.

The ‘Gone Without’ variables were operationalised by questions related to deprivation of basic goods and services. One question asked, “Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: food, water, medical care, electricity, cooking fuel and a cash income” (Afrobarometer, 2003). The scale of the ‘Gone Without’ category ran from ‘0’ (Never), to ‘4’ (Always). Together, these items create a lived poverty index, as they reflect the actual deprivation experienced by an individual in the Delta region in Nigeria.

‘Perceived Service Availability’ measures how an individual perceives and experiences their access to basic services. This item was operationalised with a question that asked, “Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is to obtain the following services? Or do you never try and get these services from government?” (Afrobarometer, 2003). The services included were: ‘primary school placement’, ‘household services’, ‘government loan or payment’ and ‘help from the police’. The variables were recoded to reflect the values where ‘0’ represented (Very easy) to ‘4’ (Never tried). A number of reasons may explain why a respondent never did not attempt to obtain a certain service. However, my assumption is that one is deterred when one experiences difficulty in obtaining the one of the listed services, rather than it being a result of apathy or ineptitude. Hence, ‘Never tried’ was placed at the end of the scale that corresponds with an assumed high degree of economic marginalisation.

#### 2.4.4 Personal Wealth Index (PWI)

The Perceived Wealth Index (PWI) measures a person’s self assessment of their economic position. This item was operationalised by three questions that asked respondents, “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 are “poor” people and 10 are “rich” people: Which number would you give yourself today?” (Afrobarometer, 2003). I recoded the variables in this index so ‘0’ corresponds with ‘extreme wealth’ and ‘10’ with ‘extreme poverty’. Two other questions using the same scale and vernacular were also included where the respondent rated the wealth of his or her parents and

the predicted wealth of the their children. This added an intergenerational dimension to the perceived wealth index.

#### 2.4.5 Area Economic Marginalisation Index (AEMI)

The Area Economic Marginalisation Index (AEMI) was operationalised by a set of questions that determined whether a certain service was available in the sampling unit. The size of sampling units differ based on Afrobarometer’s methodological considerations; however, approximately eight interviews were conducted within each sample unit. The sampling unit areas are often disaggregated by government localities but the Afrobarometer data set does not provide information on exactly what constitutes the sampling unit area. The services included for measurement were a post-office, school, police station, bus or taxi service, electricity grid that the majority of households have access to, piped water that the majority of households have access to, a sewage system the majority of houses have access to, health clinic, recreational facilities, community buildings-i.e. town halls, petrol station, liquor store, supermarket, cafes/eateryies/corner shops or markets. The variable is a dummy variable as the interviewer simply indicated if the aforementioned ‘services’ were present (1) or not (0).

#### 2.4.6 Identity Group Marginalisation

To measure the level of one’s perceived identity group marginalisation, a composite variable was created from two items. Initially, this was intended to assess a person’s perception of the extent of their identity group’s political and economic marginalisation. The first question used to measure this asked the respondent whether, “economic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in this country” (Afrobarometer, 2003). Afrobarometer does not define the term “other groups”; however, regardless of how the term is interpreted by the interviewee, it remains indicative of perceived marginalisation the identity group. This variable is labelled ‘Perceived Identity Group Economic Marginalisation’. After recoding the options were ‘0’ (Much better) to ‘4’ (Much Worse). The second variable – ‘Perceived Identity Group Treatment’ was operationalised using a questions that asked how often the person thinks that his or her identity group is “treated unfairly by the government” (Afrobarometer, 2003). Responses were coded in a

scale from '0' (Never) to '3' (Always). These two items were then combined and the variables recoded to create the IGMI, which runs from '0' to '4', with 4 indicating a higher degree of identity group marginalisation. As discussed in the computation section, each variable was treated separately in the final regression models, despite the conceptual rationale for measuring the aggregated effects of both these elements of identity group marginalisation.

## 2.5 Control Variable Operationalisation

### 2.5.1 Security Force Trust Index (SFTI)

To control for other factors, a Security Force Trust Index (SFTI) was created. The SFTI variable was comprised of questions that ask, "How much do you trust each of the following institutions - the military and police - or haven't you heard enough about them to say?" (Afrobarometer, 2003). These variables, termed 'Military Trust' and 'Police Trust' were combined to form the SFTI, where responses were coded to range from '0' to '3' with '3' indicating lower levels of trust in security forces in the Niger Delta.

### 2.5.2 Government Trust Index (GTI)

The Government Trust Index (GTI) is operationalised using a questions that asked respondents to rate their level of trust in a number of government institutions. The question asked, "How much do you trust each of the following institutions?" (Afrobarometer, 2003). The institutions included in the question are: The Executive, National Assembly, National Electoral Commission, state assembly, respondent's state governor, local government council and the ruling party. Each variable was coded individually before creating an index. The individual variables were combined to form an index running from '0' to '3', with higher values indicating lower trust levels.

### 2.5.3 Government Performance Index (GPI)

The Government Performance Index (GPI) is comprised of thirteen items that measure how a person rates government performance. The question used to operationalise this was, "How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters?" (Afrobarometer,

2003). The matters included are: managing the economy, creating jobs, price stability, narrowing the wealth gap, crime reduction, basic health service improvement, educational needs, food stability, fighting corruption, resolving communal conflict, combating malaria and combating AIDS. A GPI composite variable was created, which run on a scale from '0' to '3'. Higher values correspond with perceptions of poor government performance as this study assumes unfavourable attitudes concerning the government's performance are likely to correlate with higher levels of perceived political and economic marginalisation.

#### 2.5.4 Age

'Age' was left as a continuous variable ranging from 18 to 82. I am not primarily concerned with what specific age groups have more favourable attitudes towards political violence. Hence, this study simply aims to control for the effect of on one's willingness to endorse or engage in political violence in the Niger Delta.

#### 2.5.5 Head of Household

'Head of Household' is a dummy variable. It was measured using a question that asked, "Are you the head of the household?" (Afrobarometer, 2003). The variable is coded as '0' (Not head of household) and '1' (head of household).

#### 2.5.6 Gender

The study also sought to control for the effect of different genders in condoning or participating in political violence. 'Gender' was operationalised using a question which asked the interviewer to report on the person's gender. Only two options are provided by Afrobarometer, where '1' signifies (Male) and '2' signifies (Female).

#### 2.5.7 Identity Group Prioritisation

The 'Identity Group Prioritisation' variable was formed based on a question that asked, "If you had to choose between being a Nigerian and being a [respondent's identity group]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to?" (Afrobarometer, 2003). One was provided with two choices, where '0' indicated that a person prioritised their Group Identity and '1' indicated their prioritisation of their Nigerian, or national identity.

## 2.6 Computation

This section provides the results of the factor and reliability analyses performed on the chosen variables. Moreover, it elaborates on the methods used to compute all index variables. At the end of the computation section for each composite variable, a minimum number of values required for the case inclusion is listed. Unless stated otherwise, this number denotes the minimum number of non-missing values required for a case to be included in the computation of the composite variable.

The mean score for a response with 'missing' values for certain items is calculated using the numerical values of the 'non-missing' variables. This method increased the number of available cases included in the multiple regression model to increase robustness. Not all variables were included in the computation, such as Political Violence Participation. Listwise exclusion was used in all factor and reliability analyses, in addition to the computation process for all variables. Furthermore, the suitability of the items for the appropriate factor analyses are only listed for 'Political Marginalisation', and unless stated otherwise, the items listed were deemed suitable. The pattern matrices and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (BToS) and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) can be found in the appropriate tables.

### 2.6.1 Political Marginalisation

The Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (BToS) yielded a significant result ( $p < .0001$ ). Additionally, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test provided a value of .868, denoting the selected variables in the sample are suitable for factor analysis. Analysis of these 22 items produced five factors with eigenvalues greater than one using the Maximum Likelihood extraction method with a Direct Oblimin rotation; these five factors explained 44.5 percent of the common variance. See **Appendix**

1. As expected, the questions that measured ‘institutional trust’ all loaded onto a single factor and were the only variables with loadings above .30 to load onto that factor. Thus, due to the separate factor loadings combined with the previously mentioned rationale, the variables comprising the GTI were examined by the regression models as a control composite variable instead of being utilised in the PMI.

‘Interest in Public Affairs’ and the ‘Perceived Ability to Make Public Officials Listen’ both loaded onto the same factor (factor 4). However, ‘Interest in Public Affairs’ has a loading of .291. Although this loading is technically substantive enough for PMI inclusion, the items were better slated as a control variable. This is because it is unclear whether interest in public affairs is contingent on any feeling of marginalisation or something wholly different.

The items that constituted ‘Perceived Contact with Government Officials’ loaded onto a single factor (factor 1) and were the only variables with loadings higher than .30 on factor 1. As expected, the questions that measured frequency of contact with non-government officials loaded onto a separate factor and will thus be excluded from the PMI. The factor analysis confirmed my assumption that they do not correspond with the level of one’s engagement with a state entity.

Finally, the results of the factor analysis yielded that ‘Perceived Legal Inequality’, ‘Perceived Attentiveness of Leaders’ and ‘Perceived Difficulty of Voter Registration’ did not load onto any of the factors. Hence, these variable were excluded from the PMI.

After excluding the above mentioned items – Interest in Public Affairs, GTI items, Perceived Attentiveness of Leaders, Perceived Legal Inequality and Perceived Difficulty of Voter Registration – seven variables were spread over two factors and used to create a scale. The scale had a Cronbach’s alpha ( $\alpha$ ) of .680. However, when I removed the variable, ‘Perceived Ability to Make Public Officials Listen’, the PMI scale’s increased to a superior reliability ( $\alpha = .836$ ). Thus the scale only consists of the ‘Perceived Contact with Government Officials’ question set. Although I originally intended to have the PMI scale measure a large swathe of the identified political marginalisation elements, the factor and reliability analyses have constrained the PMI to only include the questions concerning contact with public officials.

However, the scale had to be narrowed down to fewer variables in order to preserve methodological integrity. The effects of one's perceived ability to make public officials listen in addition to the level of one's interest in public affairs are still measured, due to their inclusion as separate independent variables in the regression models. However, the term PMI will no longer be used as the PMI is solely comprised of the 'Perceived Contact with Government Officials' item set. Therefore the new variable is 'Perceived Government Contact', which is comprised of six variables. Each of the variables are set as a scale running from '0' (Never) to '3' (Often). Significantly, 'Perceived Government Contact' has been recoded so that higher values reflect higher levels of perceived contact with government officials. While this study still assumes reduced contact is a symptom of marginalisation, this variable labelling allows for a clearer discussion in the chapter that follows. Accordingly, the 'Perceived Government Contact' composite variable also runs on a scale from '0' to '3'. The sample consists of 654 respondents after listwise case exclusion was used in the computation.

*Table 1: Perceived Government Contact Variables*

V1: Contact local government councillor	V4: Contact National Assembly representative
V2: Contact State Assembly representative	V5: Contact official of a government ministry
V3: Contact official in the state governor's office	V6: Contact political party official

### 2.6.2 Personal Economic Marginalisation Index (PEMI)

A factor analysis using the Unweighted Least Square method, provided a rotated solution five factors that explain roughly 48.74 percent of the communal variance. See **Appendix 2**. All 19 items form reliable scale ( $\alpha = .747$ ), While these items measure smaller components of personal economic marginalisation, as demonstrated by the different factors loadings, they will still be

included in the *PEMI* scale as *PEMI* aims to capture the overall concept of personal economic marginalisation. Furthermore, there were no variables that failed to load onto any of extracted factors with eigenvalues greater than one. Therefore, 19 items comprise the *PEMI*. During the computation of the variable, cases were included as long as each case had a non-missing value for at least 12 of the 19 *PEMI* items.

Table 2: Personal Economic Marginalisation Index (PEMI) Variables

V1: Country's present economic conditions	V10: How often gone without medical care
V2: Your present living conditions	V11: How often gone without cooking fuel
V3: Your living conditions vs. others	V12: How often gone without electricity
	V13: How often gone without cash income
V4: Country's economic conditions 12 months ago	V14: Difficulty to obtain identity document
V5: Your living conditions 12 months ago	V15: Difficulty to obtain primary school placement
V6: Country's economic conditions in 12 months	V16: Difficulty to obtain voter registration card
V7: Your living conditions in 12 months	V17: Difficulty to obtain household services
V8: How often gone without food	V18: Difficulty to obtain government loan or payment
V9: How often gone without water	V19: Difficulty to obtain help from the police

### 2.6.3 *Personal Wealth Index (PWI)*

Because the scale is encompassed by just three variables, factor analysis is not appropriate. The PWI scale has a low reliability ( $\alpha = .661$ ); however, dataset contained no other variables that fit into the PWI from a conceptual point of view. Therefore, the low reliability of the PWI is a limitation of this study. When the PWI was computed, each case required a 'non-missing' value for at least one out of three items for PWI inclusion. Thus the final case number in the variable is 6.

### 2.6.4 Area Economic Marginalisation Index (AEMI)

This factor analysis used the Unweighted Least Square method. It provided a rotated solution with five factors with eigenvalues greater than one that explains 56.73 percent of the communal variance. See **Appendix 3**. Despite the different loadings, a scale with all sixteen items was included and was highly reliable ( $\alpha = .849$ ). The minimum number of ‘non-missing’ values necessary for a case to be included was ten, leading to an AEMI consisting of 668 cases.

*Table 3: Area Economic Marginalisation Index (AEMI) Variables*

V1:Post-office in the PSU/EA	V9: Health clinic in the PSU/EA
V2:School in the PSU/EA	V10:Recreational facilities in the PSU/EA
V3:Police station in the PSU/EA	V11:Community buildings in the PSU/EA
V4:Bus or taxi service in the PSU/EA	V12:Petrol station in the PSU/EA
V5:Electricity grid in the PSU/EA	V13:Bottle store/bar/beer parlour in the PSU/EA
V6:Piped water system in the PSU/EA	V14:Supermarket in the PSU/EA
V7:Sewage system in the PSU/EA	V15:Cafes/eating places/corner shops in the PSU/EA
V8:Railway station in the PSU/EA	V16:Market Stalls in the PSU/EA

### 2.6.5 Identity Group Marginalisation

Although 'Identity Group Economic Marginalisation' and 'Perceived Identity Group Treatment' were slated to comprise the IGMI. A reliability analyses of the two items returned a negative Cronbach's alpha. As such both 'Identity Group Economic Marginalisation' and 'Perceived Identity Group Treatment' were treated as separate independent variables.

### 2.6.6 Security Force Trust Index (SFTI)

As the index is only comprised of two items, *Military Trust* and *Police Trust* it exhibits a low reliability ( $\alpha = .557$ ). Although not an ideal Cronbach's alpha, it is sufficient to proceed as the scale is reliable more often than not and this study aims to measure the effects of trust in the state security apparatus as a single concept. After listwise exclusion was utilised in the *SFTI's* computation, the *SFTI* consists of 644 cases.

### 2.6.7 Government Trust Index (GTI)

A factor analysis was conducted using the Maximum Likelihood extraction method and all items in the index loaded onto one factor that explained 59.41 percent of communal variance. See **Appendix 4**. The Government Trust Index (*GTI*) scale is highly reliable ( $\alpha = .884$ ). The minimum number of non-missing values necessary for a case to be included was three, with the *GTI* consisting of 655 cases.

### 2.6.8 Government Performance Index (GPI)

The Maximum Likelihood extraction method extracted two factors with eigenvalues greater than one and this explained 46.98 percent of the shared variance. All of the variables loaded onto one factor, except for the items pertaining to communal conflict, malaria and counter HIV/AIDS efforts **See Appendix 5**. The frequency distribution tables revealed that a greater number of respondents held more favourable views regarding the government's performance concerning the three aforementioned issues and this explains the different loadings. Despite the different factor

loadings, these are still aspects of government performance and therefore, they were included in the GPI index. Furthermore, all thirteen items comprise a reliable scale ( $\alpha=.876$ ). The minimum number of 'non-missing' values necessary for a case to be included was eight, with the *GPI* consisting of 663 valid cases.

## 2.7 Conclusion

This chapter provides clarification on the operationalisation the conceptualisation of political, economic and identity group marginalisation. The items were based on the literature's core arguments explaining political violence in the Niger Delta. this section also illuminated the computation of control variables used in general and Delta-specific theories of political violence. Although I initially intended to use the PMI as a measurement of perceived political exclusion; such an index would not have been valid due to methodological issues. Thus whilst the only composite variable that measures perceived political exclusion is 'Perceived Government Contact'; 'Interest in Public Affairs', 'Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen' and the 'Political Affiliation' variables all attempt to measure some element of Political Marginalisation.

Furthermore, each variable's inclusion was based on literature, had a conceptual basis (Head of Household) and underwent methodological confirmation via factor and reliability analyses. As such, the final sixteen variables are seen as the most accurate indicators to measure the core concepts and control variables, derived from the Afrobarometer questionnaire. Even prior to statistical analysis, it is clear that they allude to the complexities of the broader marginalisation concepts that mainstream political violence literature, both general and Niger Delta specific, has tended to overlook.

## Chapter 3: Results and Conclusion

### 3.1 Introduction

This dissertation has assessed the arguments advanced by academic literature on political, economic and/or ethnic marginalisation's effect on political violence in Nigeria's Niger Delta region. The literature suggests that large portions of the population suffer from a lack of meaningful political representation and feel the harsh effects of poor economic growth. This is despite large amounts of natural resource wealth extraction from the Delta states. The sources also reveal that a major ethnic group of the Delta (the Ijaw) have had little federal government representation, which has allowed for the persistence of political violence by non-state actors (Mähler, 2010; Omotola, 2009; Tobor, 2016). However, this study's main hypothesis focused on perceived *political* marginalisation's effect on one's willingness to justify and engage in political violence, as political power is seen as an avenue towards economic prosperity in Nigeria (Bekoe, 2005; Courson, 2011; Obi, 2009; Omeje, 2004).

The violence evident in the region takes multiple forms. There are organised armed groups such as MEND, which attack oil installations and there are various other manifestations of violent civil unrest (Idemudia & Ite 2007). Amongst the literature on Niger Delta violence, there is very little that use survey data on attitudes of perceptions of marginalisations. I have argued that marginalisation has been ill-defined in the literature, as psychological concepts (such as how someone feels or perceives marginalisation) are measured by observed data points. An example is the Human Development Index, which does not measure how people feel about the level of development, or level of perceived marginalisation. My results challenge the purported ingrained explanations of political violence in the Niger Delta, while also affirming that certain aspects of political marginalisation do catalyse favourable attitudes towards political violence.

This chapter provides an analysis of my results, and problematises the concept of 'marginalisation'. I argue that the concept may not be appropriate for use in providing casual explanations of political violence. the chapter shall also showcase why further research on the

relationships between the presumed aspects of political marginalisation require further empirical research.

### 3.2 Univariate Analysis

Just under one third (30.5%) of Delta residents stated they have used, or would be willing to “use force or violence for a political cause” (Afrobarometer, 2003). Furthermore, 33.4 percent of Niger Delta inhabitants stated they either agreed with, or very strongly agreed that violence is sometimes necessary to achieve political goals, although this number is lower as fewer people answered this question. As noted in Chapter 1, I define political violence as physical damage to property and/or individuals (Mähler, 2010) that seeks to change the political system, or one’s position within that system.

When respondents were asked if they would “use force or violence for a political cause” (Afrobarometer, 2003) the modal, or most frequent response given (out of a sample size [ $N$ ] of 655 respondents) was ‘No’. The available choices were ‘No’ and ‘Yes’, and the standard deviation (SD) was .461 with a standard error ( $SE$ ) of .018. For the second dependent variable, which is scored from ‘1’ to ‘4’ and gives the respondents ( $N=617$ ) the options to agree/ or strongly agree/ with the statements: **Statement A**: “The use of violence is never justified in Nigerian politics” and **Statement B** “In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause” (Afrobarometer, 2003) the modal response was to *agree* with **Statement A** ( $SD= .950$ ;  $SE=.038$ ).

The univariate data for the variable ‘Perceived Government Contact’ (scored from 0 to 3;  $SD= .481$ ;  $SE=.019$ ) indicate the sample perceived themselves principally as being politically marginalised, with ‘0’ (never having contacted a government representative) being the modal response. A high degree of perceived marginalisation is evident in the sample, based on the assumption that marginalisation corresponds with decreased contact with a government official, and the mean of ‘Perceived Government Contact’ was .256. However, as discussed in the later portion of this chapter, the assumption that a lack of contact with a government official indicated marginalisation may be incorrect.

Table 4: Univariate Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Standard Error	Mode	Standard deviation
Political Violence Justification	617	2.160	.038	2	.950
Political Violence Participation	655	0.305	.018	0.00 (No category)	.461
Interest in Public Affairs	652	1.18	.027	1	.697
Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen	625	2.62	.044	1	1.112
Political Affiliation:	595	.432	.020	0 (feel close to a party)	.496
Perceived Government Contact	655	.256	.019	0	.484
PEMI	666	2.059	.019	2	.493
PWI	667	3.635	.063	3.33	1.635
AEMI	668	.577	.010	.38 (smallest mode)	.248
Perceived Identity Group Treatment	579	1.860	.041	3	.990
Perceived Group Economic Marginalisation	590	1.373	.043	2	1.050
SFTI	644	2.581	.023	3	.577
GTI	655	2.617	.018	3	.460
GPI	663	2.216	.020	3	.512
Age	667	31.36	.479	20	12.358
Head of House Hold	668	.645	.019	1	.479
Gender	668	1.50	.019	2	.500
Identity Prioritisation	600	.375	.020	0	.485

The above table suggests that Niger Delta residents perceive themselves to be less economically marginalised, compared to their views concerning their degree of political alienation. This was evident when PEMI ( $N=666$ ) univariate statistics are analysed. The *PEMI*, that runs from '0' to '4', exhibited a mode of 2 and a mean of 2.06 ( $SD= .493$ ;  $SE=.019$ ). However, when compared to those revealed by the *PWI*, the *PEMI* marginalisation attitudes exhibit a higher degree of marginalisation. The mean and mode of the *PWI* ( $N=6687$ ) are 3.63 and 3.33 ( $SD=1.635$ ;  $SE=.063$ ) on a scale that runs from '0' to '10', respectively. In contrast to the *PWI*, the *AEMI* ( $N=668$ ) manifests a lesser degree of economic marginalisation. The mean and the smallest modal responses are .577 and .38 ( $SD=.248$ ;  $SE=.001$ ) which run on a scale from '0' (service absent) to '1' (service present), thus indicating a that a respondent perceives the area in which they live to be more developed than undeveloped.

Therefore, the data provides some significant insights into attitudes of political and economic marginalisation and propensity to endorse and engage in political violence. From the sample, it may be inferred that the Delta population does not have strong overall inclinations towards political violence but does feel politically marginalised. It appears that residents also have negative perceptions pertaining to personal wealth, but do not exhibit a strong degree of other forms of economic marginalisation or identity group marginalisation, despite much of the literature concerning the Niger Delta.

### 3.3 Political Violence Justification Regression Results

A multivariate linear regression model was conducted to explain justification of political violence using sixteen predictor variables. The main explanatory variables are: 'Interest in Public Affairs', 'Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen', 'Perceived Government Contact' and 'Political Affiliation'. The Control variables are: PEMI, PWI, AEMI, Perceived Identity Group Treatment, Perceived Group Economic Marginalisation, SFTI, GTI, GPI, Age, Head of House Hold, and Gender Identity Prioritisation. The model was suitable for the data ( $f=1.689$ ) and was statistically significant ( $p=.046$ ). It also accounted for 2.5 percent (Adjusted  $R^2=.025$ ) of the variance in the dependent variable. 'Interest in Public Affairs' and 'Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen' were the only statistically significant variables in the model (at a

P Value significance level of .05) that predicted 'Political Violence Justification' scores. 'Interest in Public Affairs' exhibited a negative relationship ( $\beta=-.151$ ;  $p=.003$ ) with 'Political Violence Justification', while 'Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen' yielded a positive relationship ( $\beta=.098$ ;  $p=.048$ ) with the dependent variable.

Table 5: Political Violence Justification Regression Model

I.V.	Standard Error	Beta Coefficient	Standardized Beta Coefficient	t statistic	p value
Constant	.538	2.776		5.159	.000
Interest in Public Affairs	.067	-.202	-.151	-3.032	.003**
Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen	.044	-.088	-.098	1.987	.048**
Perceived Government Contact	.102	.121	.061	1.183	.237
Political Affiliation:	.096	.047	.025	.493	.622
PEMI	.112	.104	.054	.931	.353
PWI	.032	.007	.013	.235	.814
AEMI	.190	-.067	-.017	-.351	.726
Perceived Identity Group Treatment	.052	.039	.041	.757	.450
Perceived Group Economic Marginalisation	.051	-.024	-.027	-.477	.634
SFTI	.102	.008	.005	.082	.935
GTI	.128	-.167	-.083	-1.308	.192
GPI	.104	-.012	-.006	-.115	.908
Age	.004	-.001	-.014	-.243	.808
Head of House Hold	.114	-.005	-.002	-.041	.967
Gender	.097	.061	.032	.626	.532
Identity Prioritisation	.094	-.102	-.054	-1.084	.279

Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> =.025    **P<0.05\*\***

### 3.3.1 Endorsement or Justification of Political Violence: Discussion

As the numerical value for 'Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen' increased the respondent was less likely to believe that political violence was ever justifiable. The increased scores are indicative of the beliefs that one has little influence on elected representatives and these respondents were more likely to have favourable views towards the justification of political violence. This falls in line with my prediction that there is something intrinsic to feelings of political marginalisation that will affect attitudes concerning the justification of political violence. The reasoning follows that citizens who believe their governments fail to listen to and represent their interests are more likely to justify alternative means to attain their ends beyond the established legal channels (Hirlinger, 1992). Thus, the statistical significance of 'Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen' and positive standardized beta coefficient confirm the positive correlation between feelings of political marginalisation and more favourable attitudes towards the justification of political violence. The 'Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen' represents a portion of political exclusion (Bratton, 2012; Hirlinger, 1992). The results substantiate general and Delta-specific theories that argue that political alienation can lead to conditions conducive to political violence justification.

The model's other statistically significant variable, 'Interest in Public Affairs', did not exhibit the predicted direction. As a respondent's interest in politics increased the interviewee was less likely to believe that political violence was ever justifiable. This is in contrast to my prediction that a higher degree of interest in politics is necessary for one's justification of political violence. Although this is not proven by the statistical analysis, the fact that a high degree of political interest does not correlate with a favourable disposition towards political violence justification, may indicate perceptions of political marginalisation may actually decrease interest in public affairs. This on the grounds that people lose interest in politics if they cannot affect political outcomes. This is based on the reasoning supported by the literature that argues politically marginalised individuals are more likely to engage in political violence (Gurr, 2006; Omotola, 2009). However, the results cannot conclusively determine if political marginalisation influences interest in public

affairs. However, the relationship between political interest and marginalisation remains unclear. Hence, more research should be conducted into the factors that influence interest in politics, given that this variable may assist in predicting the likelihood of the degree of political violence justification.

The variables that were not statistically significant will be discussed in the next section. The relationship between the condoning of violence and actual participation in violent acts requires further research. The justification of political violence may explain the region's persistent political violence, even if though a justification of violence does not necessarily lead to individual participation.

Nonetheless, favourable attitudes towards political violence justification exhibited by the region's citizenry may explain Delta inhabitants' amenability towards violent groups, as argued by Olojede, (2000) and Orogun (2010). This carries the potential to result in the implicit or tacit support of armed groups such as MEND. Additionally, it may result in a failure to condemn violent gatherings, even if one would does not engage in political violence him or herself. Thus, a civilian population that exhibits a high degree of justification for political violence is likely to complicate counterinsurgency strategies, due to the potential of aiding and abetting militant groups (Arjona, 2015). Another potential situation is if the state perceives there to be population support for militia, which could lead to counterinsurgency operations that cause mass civilian casualties. This was seen in the example provided earlier by Odi Invasion, where the Nigerian military destroyed an entire village in such an anti-militant operation (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013).

The data also suggests that the link between attitudes that justify political violence and the extent of support with anti-government movements requires further study. Surprisingly, the factors expected to influence political violence such as economic marginalisation, identity group marginalisation and trust in security forces do not appear to contribute to attitudes concerning political violence justification in the Niger Delta. Although there were statistically low levels of feelings of political marginalisation, there remained as increase in the respondent pool's justification of political violence. This means that scholars should review the accepted causes of political violence justification in the Delta to ascertain whether they are applicable to other case

studies or general theories. Furthermore, the statistical significance of both ‘Interest in Public Affairs’ and ‘Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen’ signifies that there is a need for a disaggregation of the components of perceived political marginalisation to provide clearer understanding on the specific items, or societal-government relationships, that affect the propensity for the justification of political violence.

### 3.4 Political Violence Participation: Logistic Regression Analysis

Prior to testing the model, the reference category for the dependent variable was set to the category indicating persons who were not willing to “use force or violence for a political cause” (Afrobarometer, 2003). The main explanatory variables analysed by the model are: ‘Interest in Public Affairs’, ‘Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen’, ‘Perceived Government Contact’ and ‘Political Affiliation’. The Control variables are: PEMI, PWI, AEMI, ‘Perceived Identity Group Treatment’, ‘Perceived Group Economic Marginalisation’, SFTI, GTI, GPI, ‘Age’, ‘Head of House Hold’, and ‘Gender Identity Prioritisation’. The Political Violence Participation logistic regression model was statistically significant (Chi-Square=64.177; df=16;  $p < .001$ ) and explains roughly 18.5 percent (Nagelkerke’s pseudo  $R^2 = .185$ ) of Political Violence Participation’s variance. Four variables ‘Perceived Government Contact’ ( $p < .001$ ), ‘Political Affiliation’ ( $p = .024$ ), ‘Age’ ( $p = .008$ ) and ‘Identity Group Prioritisation’ ( $p = .011$ ) were significant at the P Value significance level of .05. The data reflects that as ‘Perceived Government Contact’ increases, people three times more likely (OR=3.045) to be willing to participate in political violence, relative to those who expressed no desire for political violence participation. Older people were 2.9 percent less willing (OR=.971) to participate in political violence. Furthermore, those who felt close to a political party (*Political Affiliation*) (OR=.595) were 40.5 percent less inclined to participate in political violence. Another significant result is that those who prioritised their group identity were 1.8 (OR=1.833) times more likely to participate in political violence than those who prioritised national identity as their identity marker.

Table 6 Political Violence Participation Regression Model

479 cases processed in Regression model

**Reference: Not Willing to Use Force or Violence for Political Cause**

I.V.	Degrees of Freedom	P value.	Exp(B)/ Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Interest in Public Affairs	1	.121	1.293	.934	1.789
Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen	1	.152	.857	.694	1.059
Perceived Government Contact	1	p<.001**	3.045	1.851	5.009
Political Affiliation: Not close to party	1	.024**	.595	.378	.935
<b>Reference: Political Affiliation :close to party</b>					
PWI	1	.101	1.132	.976	1.313
AEMI	1	.806	1.121	.451	2.783
Perceived Identity Group Treatment	1	.101	1.230	.961	1.576
Perceived Group Economic Marginalisation	1	.433	1.102	0.864	1.405
SFTI	1	.795	1.067	.654	1.740
GTI	1	.277	1.410	.759	2.620
GPI	1	.579	.865	.518	1.445
Age	1	.010**	.971	.949	.993
Not Head of House Hold	1	.067	1.650	.965	2.822
<b>Reference: Head of House Hold</b>					
Male		.983	1.005	.635	1.591
<b>Reference: Female</b>					
Identity Group Prioritisation		.012**	1.833	1.144	2.936
<b>Reference: Nigerian Identity Prioritisation</b>					

**P<0.05\*\***

### 3.4.1 Participation in Political Violence: Discussion

As expected, 'Age', 'Political Affiliation' and 'Identity Group Prioritisation' all affected the propensity of Niger Delta residents to participate in political violence. While the casual effect of age on political violence participation is still debated (Obi, 2009); as predicted by the literature, an increase in age correlated with decreased willingness to participate in political violence. The lack of feelings of closeness to a political party (*Political Affiliation*) was also identified as a core element of political marginalisation, as it is indicative of a perceived lack of a political voice (Erdman, 2007; Lipset 1959). The data result substantiates that the level of closeness one feels to a political party affects one's willingness to participate in political violence; which affirms general theories on this topic, such as that by Lipset (1959), when applied to the Delta. Having said this, a lack of political party affiliation is only one aspect of political exclusion. Thus, we are reminded that theories using the term 'political marginalisation' should interrogate the use of the term and ask which specific aspects of the exclusion concept may be the dominant explanatory factor. This applies to theories on political violence in general, and in the nine Delta states.

Likewise, as expected, the prioritisation of one's group identity over Nigerian or national identity prioritisation increased the likelihood of one's willingness to participate in political violence. The finding follows the rationale lower levels of national identity prioritisation entails less of a moral allegiance to the government, which may deter individuals from engaging in violence against the Nigerian state (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013; Watts, 2004). However, 'Identity Group Prioritisation' is not a measure of a group's perceived marginalisation and relates to theories concerning the social contract and national vs group/lingual/ethnic identity in the Niger Delta, opposed to specific grievances suffered by people that do not prioritise a nation state identity. While the study does not specifically measure ethnic marginalisation or ties to ethnicity, roughly two thirds of respondents stated their ethnicity was the primary feature they used as their identity marker. Thus theories concerning ethnic marginalisation and political violence should be re-evaluated to include conceptions of the self and identity as it may be a key indicator for one's propensity to engage in political violence. This may apply to non-case specific arguments as well.

However, some findings ran contrary to my hypothesis. As the frequency of Perceived Government Contact increased (what I originally assumed represented a lower degree of political marginalisation) the likelihood of the respondent being willing to engage in political violence, increased. This is in relation to respondents who had no desire for political violence participation. I advance several possible explanations for this result.

Firstly, one may become frustrated after contacting a public official as the individual may be ignored. The repeated, fruitless contact leads to discontent in the political system thereby creating the inclination to participate in political violence due to negative views held by the Niger Delta inhabitants concerning their political institutions and figures (Eberlein, 2006). In this case, regardless of the initial reason for contact, the interaction with a political representative is what creates the perception of political marginalisation, as the individual feels side-lined by the official. As the modal response for all questions that comprised the 'Perceived Government Contact' Index was "Never," the absolute lack of contact would thus lead to no frustration and thus no desire for participation in political violence, as a channel of political expression has been removed or blocked (White, 2000).

Scenario two challenges my initial assumption that politically marginalised Niger Delta inhabitants do not contact public officials. Following Hirlinger (1992) this study assumed that politically marginalised individuals would be unlikely to contact government officials because they believe that their demands will not be heard (Hirlinger, 1992). However, if the opposite is true, increased feelings of marginalisation would lead to more contact. Therefore, if this scenario holds true the assumption that marginalisation leads to little contact – which was my initial assumption of political marginalisation was based on – is incorrect. Rather, increased contact is seen as a symptom of increased perceptions of marginalisation. However, this theory is undermined if the modal response of never contacting an official is the result of material barriers, such as time, travel distance, the financial expense and the representative's availability. It must be noted that it is possible contact is not related to marginalisation and thus a separate factor in explaining attitudes towards political violence. Unfortunately, the nuances of this relationship are beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, the *Perceived Government Contact's* association with *Political Violence Participation* begs the question of to what extent political marginalisation affects Niger Delta

inhabitants' willingness to contact public officials and whether this is an appropriate measure of political marginalisation. This highlights the importance of studies that measure the factors that drive people to contact public officials in Nigeria, and the Niger Delta region specifically (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013; Idemudia & Ite, 2005).

### 3.5 General Discussion

'Perceived Government Contact' was found to be statistically significant in the Political Violence Participation model, whilst not being statistically significant in the 'Political Violence Justification' model. This raises further questions concerning the interaction of the motives that drive individuals to participate in political violence. Presumably, why did Perceived Government Contact not have a significant impact on the variance of Political Violence Justification? This question is posed as it is assumed that one would condone violence prior to deciding to participate in political violence (McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2008). As it stands, the relationship between political violence justification and participation remains unclear in terms of why it is the case that increased contact with public officials increases the likelihood of *participating* in political violence but does affect attitudes concerning the *justification* of political violence. Accordingly, the interaction between justification and participation of political violence merits further investigation.

However, the fact that 'Interest in Public Affairs' is statistically significant in the Political Violence Justification model, but not in the Political Violence Participation model adheres to the existing academic framework concerning the barriers to violent action (Østby, 2013; Stewart, 2010). The belief that political violence is justified does not inform a willingness to participate in violence due to the perceived costs and/or punishments associated with violent action (Muller & Weede (1990; Stewart, 2010). However, Stewart's concept of horizontal inequality and how group grievances can contribute to addressing collective action problems may provide a rationale for the significance of 'Identity Group Prioritisation' in the Political Violence Participation model.

The problem of collective action is that one may not participate for fear that others will not participate and so one may rather seek to further his individual needs if they are secured. Stewart (2010) argues that when a grievance is internalised as a group grievance, rather than an individual one, the collective action problem is solved as a group identity allows for easy organisation and

group mobilisation. However, if this were the case, we would expect the two variables that measure perceived identity group marginalisation – ‘Perceived Identity Group Treatment’ and ‘Perceived Identity Group Economic Marginalisation’ – to exhibit statistical significance. Thereby, theories that argue that political violence arises from, or is not deterred by, a lack of national identity – potentially rooted in the underpinnings of the colonial state (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013; Idemudia & Ite 2005) – are more applicable to the Niger Delta context than the theories that argue identity (usually ethnic), political or economic marginalisation fail to have a statistically significant effect on political violence attitudes in the Niger Delta. The data suggests that the way in which an individual identifies concerning national or group identity, is a more salient determinant their propensity to engage in political violence than said group’s perceived marginalisation. Thus, this study proposes that arguments on ethnic marginalisation and their potential effect on political violence in the region should be reviewed.

Furthermore, the fact that neither the *GTI* nor *SFTI* provide a statistically significant portion of either models’ variance seems to be an anomaly due to the salience of ‘Identity Group Prioritisation’. Both the *GTI* and the *SFTI* indices are measures of trust in government and state-run institutions, and hence are related to a contractual relationship with the state, similar to ‘Identity Group Prioritisation’. The fact that there is no statistical significance with the *SFTI* is peculiar, given that the Delta inhabitants tend to have a tenuous and antagonistic relationship with the Nigerian government (Idemudia & Ite, 2005; Obi, 2009). Hence, the findings contradict general theories that argue a trust in state institutions is necessary for a peaceful society (Muller & Weede, 1990). It also poses a challenge to theories that have argued brutal repression by security forces is likely to spur violence, as state repression has been evident in the Delta region (Arjona, 2015; Bekoe, 2005; Stearns, 1979).

Interestingly none of the variables that measured economic marginalisation were statistically significant in explaining engagement in violence in either model either, which contradicts the myriad theories that explain political violence in the Niger Delta via an economic exclusion framework. This finding urges that more research be done to explain political marginalisation’s effect on engaging in political violence in the Niger Delta. While the Niger Delta inhabitants suffer significant degrees of economic marginalisation (Ikelegbe 2005; Obi, 2009), economic disparity

is not a statistically significant factor in explaining Delta inhabitants' attitudes concerning the justification of, and the willingness to participate in political violence. Nonetheless, resources will continue to play a critical role in the Niger Delta's violence, as political efficacy may be viewed as the path to obtain the region's resource wealth.

The findings raise further questions related to how Niger Delta inhabitants view the relationship between economic prosperity and their political influence. The apparent low effect of economic marginalisation on both political violence variables in both models may be a result of Niger Delta residents realising that the path to economic prosperity is through political power (Mähler, 2010) and that the region's dire economic situation is viewed as a consequence of politics (Omeje, 2004). Another explanation is that the region's inhabitants blame macroeconomic factors, such as the price of oil, for their economic woes. Much of the literature argues that politics are intrinsically linked to economics in Nigeria. Hence, the statistical significance of 'Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen' to justify political violence, as well as the significant relationship between 'Political Affiliation' and participation in violence may be evidence that people living in the Delta believe political power is the path to wealth.

However, neither of these variables measure the attempted access to wealth via politics. Rather, they measured the relationship with elected and officials and political parties. While this study does not attempt to answer this question, it does indicate the importance that Delta inhabitants place on the political sphere, as further evidenced by the lack of statistical significance of the Government Performance Indicator (GPI) in both models.

The fact that the *GPI's* had no statistical significance is a further signal that Niger Delta inhabitants are more concerned about access to political power, or having a political voice or representation than having an efficient government. Presumably, giving credence to the idea that the respondents are separating the political and economic spheres as respondents are more concerned with political clout. Furthermore, neither 'Head of Household' nor 'Gender' were statistically significant predictors of attitudes towards political violence in either model, thus rebuking my assumption that the familiar responsibility bestowed on a head of house would serve as a political violence deterrent. As such, the salience of gender regarding political violence justification and

participation should be reassessed, due to assumptions that women are often non-participants in political violence (Coulter, Persson, & Utas, 2008).

Finally, the fact that no control variables, besides 'Age' and '*Identity Group Prioritisation*' were significant urges that there be a re-evaluation of theoretical literature on the causes of political violence in the Niger Delta. These control variables, which are often cited by the literature, failed to account for the justification of, and the willingness to participate in political violence. Thus proponents of the explanatory power of these variables ought to re-evaluate their significance in specific contexts, especially when evaluating Niger Delta violence.

### 3.6 Conclusion

This dissertation's initial aim was to test whether mainstream academic theories that purported political, economic and identity marginalisation accurately depicted the causal factors behind violence in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. It made use of survey data to measure respondents' opinions towards perceived marginalisation and the respective effects of a) the justification of, and b) participation in political violence. The first benefit of survey methodology is that it provided a more accurate measurement of 'marginalisation' as a perceived state, as marginalisation is experienced by people and is thus a subjective experience. Other development indexes like the Human Development Index (HDI), have tended to measure more concrete things like electricity availability and sanitation standards. However, whilst helpful in many senses, tools like the HDI cannot aptly measure human behaviour and attitudes. It may fall short in measuring marginalisation, as not every respondent may have the same 'HDI value' in a given area. Other seemingly objectively verifiable data, such as GDP per capita, does not reflect attitudes of the citizenry (Østby, 2013). Even qualitative studies that seek to explain violence in the Niger Delta tend to utilise the vague 'marginalisation terminology' and assume it exists in some form, be it political, economic, social etc. without properly defining the term. Consequently, this study showed the complexities of attempting to measure marginalisation, notably political marginalisation.

However, it should be acknowledged that it is likely that a certain percentage of survey respondents did not answer the questions honestly (Bertrand, & Mullainathan, 2001). This is likely due the fear of punitive measures be enacted against respondents who displayed favourable attitudes towards violence.

Nevertheless, these results, at least partially, confirm theories that argue political marginalisation does lead to political violence. They also raise questions concerning how political marginalisation is measured, and how multifaceted and ill-defined the concept is. The effect of 'Perceived Government Contact' calls into question whether this is a symptom of political marginalisation and how different aspects of political exclusion - such as Interest in Public Affairs and Political Affiliation - can affect propensity to endorse or engage in political violence.

Furthermore, although the Niger Delta states are underdeveloped, compared to the rest of Nigeria (Tobor,2016), this study did not find economic marginalisation measures to be salient predictors of the willingness to participate in, and justify political violence. Additionally, those who experienced identity group marginalisation did not hold favourable attitudes towards political violence. These findings lead one to question the applicability of economic-rooted theories explaining violence in the Delta region.

The findings also further highlight the importance of paying attention to particular context when analysing the causes of political violence or attitudes towards violence as legitimate political expressions. Furthermore, the apparently weak effect of economic marginalisation has implications for policy makers. The fact that this, along with 'Perceived Government Contact', 'Interest in Public Affairs', 'Identity Group Prioritisation' and 'Political Affiliation' suggest the importance of the political relationship between the state and its citizenry. While these variables may be critiqued for failing to measure all elements of political marginalisation (although 'Identity Group Prioritisation' was not intended to) the statistical significance of these variables, with regards to the political violence models, highlight that the political dynamic between government and constituents remains a pivotal concern when explaining propensity to justify or engage in political violence. Although this study has alluded to certain factors that influence violence, further questions are raised concerning how citizens view the state and its role in economic prosperity. As

the country's GDP in 2002 was below the Sub-Saharan Africa average GDP per capita (World Bank, 2018) it is questionable whether the Niger Delta inhabitants blame macroeconomic trends or Nigerian policies for economic underperformance. Given the confluence of economic wealth and political power (Mähler, 2010; Osaghae, 1995) in addition to the salience of the political variables, it appears the delta's citizenry believes the polity bears greater responsibility.

Nevertheless, these results do provide an avenue to mend grievances that do not require expensive development projects or extended patronage systems. Instead, a revitalised social contract is a potential solution to potentially alleviate the high levels of violence in the Delta. The violent protests and militant attacks have resumed in recent years following the amnesty deal expiration and the stoppage of cash payments to Delta communities (Golden-Timsar, 2018). Thus a renewed social contract is a possible alternative to continued patronage and bribery along with costly security operations from a fiscal and humanitarian standpoint.

As such, Federal and Niger Delta politicians should consider why more contact with public officials predicts willingness to participate in violence, as this is a key indicator that the relationship between the state and Delta population is dysfunctional. This combined with my findings that the political relationship is paramount provides an argument that the social contract be re-evaluated and renegotiated. This could be done in a way that prioritises Nigerian nation state identity opposed to a group identity prioritisation, as this could lead to a decreased willingness to partake in political violence. I suggest that more research be conducted to explain citizen-state relationships and their effects on political violence dispositions. Despite improved resource allocation and development, a focus on nurturing and restoring people's sense of political inclusion should have lasting effects on alleviating political violence in the Niger Delta.

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## Appendix A

Note all loading coefficients (with the exception of interest in public affairs) lower than .30 were removed.

### **Appendix 1: Political Marginalisation Factor Loadings**

Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (BToS):  $p < .0001$

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) :.868

<b>Item Name</b>	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
Interest in public affairs				-.289	
Perceived ability to make elected officials listen				.333	
Contact local government councillor	.515				
Contact state assembly representative	.721				
Contact state government official	.781				
Contact National Assembly representative	.735				

Contact ministry official	.750				
Contact political party official	.535				-.328
Contact traditional leader			.713		
Contact village official			.928		
Other influential person			.368		
Contact religious leader					
Trust in President		.666			
Trust in National assembly		.737			
Trust in electoral commission		.660			
Trust in state assembly		.729			
Trust in state governor		.818			
Trust in local government council		.818			
Trust in ruling party		.658			
Perceived Legal inequality					
Perceived Attentiveness of Leaders					
Difficulty of Voter Registration					
<b>Eigenvalues</b>	<b>5.244</b>	<b>3.524</b>	<b>1.609</b>	<b>1.165</b>	<b>1.101</b>
<b>Shared Variance</b>	<b>27.760</b>	<b>13.959</b>	<b>4.755</b>	<b>2.179</b>	<b>1.856</b>

**Appendix 2: Personal Economic Marginalisation Index (PEMI)**Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (BToS):  $p < .0001$ 

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) :.763

<b>Item Name</b>	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
Economic conditions		.593			
Living conditions		.595			
Cross Nigerian living conditions comparison		.595			
Previous Economic conditions		.581			
Previous living conditions		.719			
Future economic conditions				.640	
Future living conditions				.968	
Gone without food			.527		
Gone without water			.701		
Gone without medical care			.745		
Gone without electricity			.331		
Gone without cooking fuel			.552		
Gone without cash income			.597		
Difficulty to obtain id	.709				
Difficulty to obtain primary school placement	.627				
Difficulty to register to vote	.607				
Difficulty to obtain household services	.380				-.508
Difficulty to obtain loan					-.802
Difficulty to get help from police					-.525
<b>Eigenvalues</b>	<b>3.715</b>	<b>3.322</b>	<b>2.334</b>	<b>1.165</b>	<b>1.027</b>
<b>Percent of Variance</b>	<b>16.964</b>	<b>15.267</b>	<b>9.478</b>	<b>3.700</b>	<b>3.329</b>

**Appendix 3: Area Economic Marginalisation Index (AEMI)**Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (BToS):  $p < .0001$ 

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) :.762

<b>Item Name</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>	<b>Factor 3</b>	<b>Factor 4</b>	<b>Factor 5</b>
Post-office in the PSU/EA	.695				
School in The PSU/EA			.760		
Police Station in The PSU/EA	.621				
Bus or Taxi service in The PSU/EA	.747				
Electricity Grid in The PSU/EA			.567		
Railway Station in The PSU/EA					.395
Piped Water System in The PSU/EA					-.413
Sewage System in The PSU/EA	.716				-.509
Health Clinic in The PSU/EA			.485		
Recreational facilities in The PSU/EA				.785	
Community Building		.630			
Petrol Station in The PSU/EA	.745				.371
Bottle store/bar/beer parlour		.674	.316	-.345	
Supermarket in The PSU/EA	.682				
Cafes/Eating Places/Corner Shops in The PSU/EA		.736			
Market Stalls in The PSU/EA		.321	.615		
<b>Eigenvalues</b>	<b>5.078</b>	<b>1.811</b>	<b>1.715</b>	<b>1.324</b>	<b>1.233</b>
<b>Percent of Variance</b>	<b>29.312</b>	<b>8.621</b>	<b>7.985</b>	<b>5.986</b>	<b>4.827</b>

**Appendix 4: Government Trust Index (GTI)**Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (BToS):  $p < .0001$ 

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)        :.899

Item	Factor 1
Trust in President	.666
Trust in National assembly	.737
Trust in electoral commission	.660
Trust in state assembly	.729
Trust in state governor	.818
Trust in local government council	.818
Trust in ruling party	.658
<b>Eigenvalue</b>	<b>4.159</b>
<b>Percent of Variance</b>	<b>59.412</b>

**Appendix 5: Government Performance Index (GPI)**Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (BToS):  $p < .0001$ 

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)        :.881

Item	Factor 1	Factor 2
Management economic	.667	
Management job creation	.771	
management price stability	.766	
Management narrow wealth gap	.640	
Management crime	.584	
Management basic services	.460	
Management education	.524	
Management water	.558	
Management food	.708	
Management corruption	.555	
Management conflict resolution		-.495
Management malaria		-.880
Management AIDS		.846
<b>Eigen Value</b>	<b>5.346</b>	<b>1.705</b>
<b>Percent of Variance</b>	<b>35.632</b>	<b>11.344</b>

## In Text Tables

*Table 7: Perceived Government Contact Variables*

V1: Contact local government councillor	V4: Contact National Assembly representative
V2: Contact State Assembly representative	V5: Contact official of a government ministry
V3: Contact official in the state governor's office	V6: Contact political party official

Table 8: Personal Economic Marginalisation Index (PEMI) Variables

V1: Country's present economic conditions	V10: How often gone without medical care
V2: Your present living conditions	V11: How often gone without cooking fuel
V3: Your living conditions vs. others	V12: How often gone without electricity
	V13: How often gone without cash income
V4: Country's economic conditions 12 months ago	V14: Difficulty to obtain identity document
V5: Your living conditions 12 months ago	V15: Difficulty to obtain primary school placement
V6: Country's economic conditions in 12 months	V16: Difficulty to obtain voter registration card
V7: Your living conditions in 12 months	V17: Difficulty to obtain household services
V8: How often gone without food	V18: Difficulty to obtain government loan or payment
V9: How often gone without water	V19: Difficulty to obtain help from the police

Table 9: Area Economic Marginalisation Index (AEMI) Variables

V1: Post-office in the PSU/EA	V9: Health clinic in the PSU/EA
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V2:School in the PSU/EA	V10:Recreational facilities in the PSU/EA
V3:Police station in the PSU/EA	V11:Community buildings in the PSU/EA
V4:Bus or taxi service in the PSU/EA	V12:Petrol station in the PSU/EA
V5:Electricity grid in the PSU/EA	V13:Bottle store/bar/beer parlour in the PSU/EA
V6:Piped water system in the PSU/EA	V14:Supermarket in the PSU/EA
V7:Sewage system in the PSU/EA	V15:Cafes/eating places/corner shops in the PSU/EA
V8:Railway station in the PSU/EA	V16:Market Stalls in the PSU/EA

Table 10: Univariate Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Standard Error	Mode	Standard deviation
Political Violence Justification	617	2.160	.038	2	.950
Political Violence Participation	655	0.305	.018	0.00 (No category)	.461
Interest in Public Affairs	652	1.18	.027	1	.697
Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen	625	2.62	.044	1	1.112
Political Affiliation:	595	.432	.020	0 (feel close to a party)	.496
Perceived Government Contact	655	.256	.019	0	.484
PEMI	666	2.059	.019	2	.493

PWI	667	3.635	.063	3.33	1.635
AEMI	668	.577	.010	.38 (smallest mode)	.248
Perceived Identity Group Treatment	579	1.860	.041	3	.990
Perceived Group Economic Marginalisation	590	1.373	.043	2	1.050
SFTI	644	2.581	.023	3	.577
GTI	655	2.617	.018	3	.460
GPI	663	2.216	.020	3	.512
Age	667	31.36	.479	20	12.358
Head of House Hold	668	.645	.019	1	.479
Gender	668	1.50	.019	2	.500
Identity prioritisation	600	.375	.020	0	.485

Table 11: Political Violence Justification Regression Model

I.V.	Standard Error	Beta Coefficient	Standardized Beta Coefficient	t statistic	p value
Constant	.538	2.776		5.159	.000
Interest in Public Affairs	.067	-.202	-.151	-3.032	.003**
Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen	.044	-.088	-.098	1.987	.048**
Perceived Government Contact	.102	.121	.061	1.183	.237
Political Affiliation:	.096	.047	.025	.493	.622
PEMI	.112	.104	.054	.931	.353
PWI	.032	.007	.013	.235	.814
AEMI	.190	-.067	-.017	-.351	.726
Perceived Identity Group Treatment	.052	.039	.041	.757	.450
Perceived Group Economic Marginalisation	.051	-.024	-.027	-.477	.634
SFTI	.102	.008	.005	.082	.935

GTI	.128	-.167	-.083	-1.308	.192
GPI	.104	-.012	-.006	-.115	.908
Age	.004	-.001	-.014	-.243	.808
Head of House Hold	.114	-.005	-.002	-.041	.967
Gender	.097	.061	.032	.626	.532
Identity prioritisation	.094	-.102	-.054	-1.084	.279

Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> =.025    **P<0.05\*\***

Table 6: Political Violence Justification Regression Model

Logistical- Political Violence participation

479 cases processed in Regression model

**Reference: Not Willing to Use Force or Violence for Political Cause**

I.V.	Degrees of Freedom	P value.	Exp(B)/ Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Interest in Public Affairs	1	.121	1.293	.934	1.789
Perceived Ability to Make Elected Representatives Listen	1	.152	.857	.694	1.059
Perceived Government Contact	1	p<.001	3.045	1.851	5.009
Political Affiliation: Not close to party	1	.024	.595	.378	.935
<b>Reference: Political Affiliation :close to party</b>					
PWI	1	.101	1.132	.976	1.313
AEMI	1	.806	1.121	.451	2.783
Perceived Identity Group Treatment	1	.101	1.230	.961	1.576
Perceived Group Economic Marginalisation	1	.433	1.102	0.864	1.405
SFTI	1	.795	1.067	.654	1.740
GTI	1	.277	1.410	.759	2.620
GPI	1	.579	.865	.518	1.445
Age	1	.010	.971	.949	.993
Not Head of House Hold	1	.067	1.650	.965	2.822
<b>Reference: Head of House Hold</b>					
Male		.983	1.005	.635	1.591
<b>Reference: Female</b>					
Identity Group Prioritisation		.012	1.833	1.144	2.936
<b>Reference: Nigerian Identity Prioritisation</b>					

Correlation Matrix: Only significant correlations have been reported ( $P < 0.05^*$ )

Table 1	P.V Justification	P.V. Participation	Interest in Public Affairs	Ability to Make Elected Reps Listen	Perceived Gov. Contact	Political Affiliation	PEMI	PWI	AEMI	Identity Group Treatment
P.V Justification	1	.122*	-.141*	-.126*	.087*		.			
P.V. Participation	.122*	1	.	-.094*	.267*	.147*			-.083*	.103*
Interest in Public Affairs	-.141*		1	.107*		.165*				
Ability to Make Elected Reps Listen	-.126*	-.094*	.107*	1	-.116*				.108*	
Perceived Gov. Contact	-.087*	.267*		-.116*		.090*				
Political Affiliation		.147*	.165*		.090*					
PEMI								.318*	-.157*	.218*
PWI							.318*			
AEMI				.108*			- .157*			-.133*
Identity Group Treatment		.103*					.218*		-.133*	1
Identity Group Econ. Marginalisation			.		.137*	-.142*	- .293*			-.396
SFTI										
GTI					-.161*		.183*			.273*
GPI	-.087*			.081*	-.226*		.303*		-.100*	.173*
Age					.160*					.10*
Head of Household		-.124*	-.111*		-.151*	-.180*				
Gender			-.186*		-.123*	-.251*				
Identity Group Prioritisation	-.081	-.161*		.109*					.171*	-.154*

Table 2	P.V Justification	P.V. Participation	Identity Group Econ. Marginalisation	SFTI	GTI	GPI	Age	Head of Household	Gender	Identity Group Prioritisation
P.V Justification	1	.122*								
P.V. Participation	.122*	1				-.087*		-.124*		-.161*
Interest in Public Affairs	-.141*							-.111*	-.186*	
Ability to Make Elected Reps Listen	-.126*	-.094*				.081*				.109*
Perceived Gov. Contact	-.087*	.267*	.137*	-.109*	-.161*	-.226*	.160*	-.151*	-.123*	
Political Affiliation		.147*	-.142*					-.180*	-.251*	
PEMI			-.293*		.183*	.303*				
PWI			-.279*	.123*	.163*	.133*				-.111*
AEMI						-.100				.171*
Identity Group Treatment		.103*	-.396*	.130*	.273*	.173*	.101*			-.154*
Identity Group Econ. Marginalisation				-.259*	-.316*	-.308*				.116*
SFTI			-.259*	1	.568*	.320*				-.112*
GTI			-.316*	.568*	1	.386*			.083*	-.126*
GPI	-.087*		-.308*	.323*	.386*	1		-.004*		-.086*
Age							1	-.482*	-.082*	
Head of Household		-.124*					-.482*	1	.323*	
Gender					.083*		-.082*	.323*	1	
Identity Group Prioritisation	-.081	-.161*	.116*	-.112*	-.126*	-.086*				1

## Appendix B

### Afrobarometer Questionnaire

#### *Political Marginalisation Questions*

##### *Interest in Public Affairs*

Question Number: Q27

Question Number: How interested are you in public affairs?

Variable label: Interest in public affairs

Values: 0-2, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not interested, 1=Somewhat interested, 2=Very interested, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

##### *Perceived Ability to Make Elected officials listen*

Question Number: Q28C

Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? If you had to, you would be able to get together with others to make elected representatives listen to your concerns.

Variable label: Can make elected representatives listen

Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly Disagree,

9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Note: The interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

##### *Perceived Government Contact*

Question Number: Q29A1-NIG

Question: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a problem or to give them your views: A State Assembly representative?

Variable label: Contact State Assembly representative

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing

Question Number: Q29A2-NIG

Question: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a

problem or to give them your views: An official in the state governor's office?

Variable label: Contact official in the state governor's office

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing

Question Number: Q29B

Question: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a

problem or to give them your views: A National Assembly Representative?

Variable label: Contact National Assembly representative

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing

Question Number: Q29C

Question: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a

problem or to give them your views: An official of a government ministry?

Variable label: Contact official of a government ministry

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing

Question Number: Q29D

Question: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a

problem or to give them your views: A political party official?

Variable label: Contact political party official

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing

Question Number: Q29E

Question: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a

problem or to give them your views: A religious leader?

Variable label: Contact religious leader

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing

Data

Question Number: Q43A

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The President?

Variable label: Trust the President

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q43B

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The National Assembly?

Variable label: Trust National Assembly

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q43C

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The Independent National Electoral Commission?

Variable label: Trust the Independent National Electoral Commission

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q43D

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Your State Assembly?

Variable label: Trust your state assembly

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q43D1-NIG

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Your State Governor?

Variable label: Trust your state governor

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q43E

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Your Local Government Council?

Variable label: Trust your local government council

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q43F

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The Ruling Party?

Variable label: Trust the ruling party

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q87A

Question: Do you feel close to any particular political party or political organization? If so, which party or organization is that?

Variable label: Close to political party

Values: 0, 260-268, 995, 998-999, -1

Value Labels: 0=No, not close to any party, 260=Yes, People's Democratic Party (PDP), 261=Yes, All Nigeria People's Party (APP), 262=Yes, Alliance for Democracy (AD), 263=Yes, People's Redemption Party (PRP), 264=Yes, All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), 265=Yes, NCP, 266=Yes, UNPP, 267=Yes, UNDP, 268=Yes, NDP, 995=Other, 998=Refused to Answer, 999=Don't Know, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q41D

Question: In this country, how often: Are people treated unequally under the law?

Variable label: People are treated unequally

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Rarely, 2=Often, 3=Always, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q50A

Question: How much of the time do you think elected leaders, like National Assembly members, State Governors or Local Government Councilors, try their best: To look after the interests of people like you?

Variable label: Leaders look after people's interests

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Some of the time, 2=Most of the time, 3=Always, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Source: Afrobarometer Round 2

Question Number: Q50B

Question: How much of the time do you think elected leaders, like National Assembly members, State Governors or Local Government Councilors, try their best: To listen to what people like you have to say?

Variable label: Leaders listen to people

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Some of the time, 2=Most of the time, 3=Always, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q58C

Question: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is to obtain the following services? Or do you never try and get these services from government? A voter registration card for yourself.

Variable label: Difficulty to obtain voter registration card

Values: 1-4, 7, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Difficult, 2=Difficult, 3=Easy, 4=Very Easy, 7=Never Try, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

*Personal Economic Marginalisation Index (PEMI) Questions*

Question Number: Q1A

Question: Let's begin by talking about economic conditions. In general, how would you describe: The present economic conditions of this country?

Variable label: Country's present economic condition

Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very bad, 2=Fairly bad, 3=Neither good nor bad, 4=Fairly good, 5=Very good, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q1B

Question: In general, how would you describe: Your own present living conditions?

Variable label: Your present living conditions

Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very bad, 2=Fairly bad, 3=Neither good nor bad, 4=Fairly good, 5=Very good, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q2B

Question: In general, how do you rate: Your living conditions compared to those of other Nigerians?

Variable label: Your living conditions vs. others

Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q3A

Question: Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: Economic conditions in this country?

Variable label: Country's economic conditions 12 months ago

Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to

Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q3B

Question: Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: Your living conditions?

Variable label: Your living conditions 12 months ago

Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q4A

Question: Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Economic conditions in this country in twelve months time?

Variable label: Country's economic conditions in 12 months

Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q4B

Question: Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Your living conditions in twelve months time?

Variable label: Your living conditions in 12 months

Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q9A

Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: Enough food to eat?

Variable label: How often gone without food

Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don't Know,

98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q9B

Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: Enough clean water for home use?

Variable label: How often gone without water

Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don't Know,

98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q9C

Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without:

Medicines or medical treatment?

Variable label: How often gone without medical care

Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don't Know,

98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q9D

Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without:

Electricity in your home?

Variable label: How often gone without electricity

Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don't Know,

98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q9E

Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: Enough fuel to cook your food?

Variable label: How often gone without cooking fuel

Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don't Know,

98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q9F

Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: A cash income?

Variable label: How often gone without cash income

Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don't Know,

98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q58A

Question: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is to obtain the following services? Or do you never try and get these services from government? An identity document (such as a birth certificate, driver's license, or passport).

Variable label: Difficulty to obtain identity document

Values: 1-4, 7, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Difficult, 2=Difficult, 3=Easy, 4=Very Easy, 7=Never Try, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q58B

Question: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is to obtain the following services? Or do you never try and get these services from government? A place in primary school for a child.

Variable label: Difficulty to obtain primary school placement

Values: 1-4, 7, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Difficult, 2=Difficult, 3=Easy, 4=Very Easy, 7=Never Try, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q58C

Question: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is to obtain the following services? Or do you never try and get these services from government? A voter registration card for yourself.

Variable label: Difficulty to obtain voter registration card

Values: 1-4, 7, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Difficult, 2=Difficult, 3=Easy, 4=Very Easy, 7=Never Try, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q58D

Question: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is to obtain the following services? Or do you never try and get these services from government? Household services (like piped water, electricity or telephone).

Variable label: Difficulty to obtain household services

Values: 1-4, 7, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Difficult, 2=Difficult, 3=Easy, 4=Very Easy, 7=Never Try, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q58E

Question: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is to obtain the following services? Or do you never try and get these services from government? A loan or payment from government (such as agricultural credit or a welfare grant).

Variable label: Difficulty to obtain government loan or payment

Values: 1-4, 7, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Difficult, 2=Difficult, 3=Easy, 4=Very Easy, 7=Never Try, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q58F

Question: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is to obtain the following services? Or do you never try and get these services from government? Help from the police when you need it.

Variable label: Difficulty to obtain help from the police

Values: 1-4, 7, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Difficult, 2=Difficult, 3=Easy, 4=Very Easy, 7=Never Try, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

### *Personal Wealth Index (PWI) Questions*

Question Number: Q6A

Question: On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 are "poor" people and 10 are "rich" people: Which number would you give yourself today?

Variable label: Score self poor/rich today

Values: 0-10, 97-99, -1

Value Labels: 0=Poor, 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7, 8=8, 9=9, 10=Rich, 97=Not Applicable, 98=Refused to Answer, 99=Don't Know, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q6B

Question: On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 are "poor" people and 10 are "rich" people: Which number would you give your parents ten years ago?

Variable label: Score parent rich/poor 10 years ago

Values: 0-10, 97-99, -1

Value Labels: 0=Poor, 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7, 8=8, 9=9, 10=Rich, 97=Not Applicable, 98=Refused to Answer, 99=Don't Know, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q6C

Question: On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 are "poor" people and 10 are "rich" people: Which number do you expect your children to attain in the future?

Variable label: Score children rich/poor in future

Values: 0-10, 97-99, -1

Value Labels: 0=Poor, 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7, 8=8, 9=9, 10=Rich, 97=Not Applicable, 98=Refused to Answer, 99=Don't Know, -1=Missing Data

### *Area Economic Marginalisation (AEMI) Questions*

Question Number: Q112A

Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area:  
Post-office?

Variable label: Post-office in the PSU/EA

Values: 0, 1, 9

Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can't determine

Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor

Question Number: Q112B

Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area:  
School?

Variable label: School in the PSU/EA

Values: 0, 1, 9

Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can't determine

Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor

Question Number: Q112C

Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area:  
Police station?

Variable label: Police station in the PSU/EA

Values: 0, 1, 9

Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can't determine

Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor

Question Number: Q112D

Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area:  
Regular bus or taxi service?

Variable label: Bus or taxi service in the PSU/EA

Values: 0, 1, 9

Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can't determine

Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor

Question Number: Q112E

Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area:  
Electricity grid that most houses could access?

Variable label: Electricity grid in the PSU/EA

Values: 0, 1, 9

Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can't determine

Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor

Question Number: Q112F

Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area:  
Piped water system that most houses could access?

Variable label: Piped water system in the PSU/EA

Values: 0, 1, 9

Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can't determine

Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor

Question Number: Q112G

Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area:

Sewage system that most houses could access?

Variable label: Sewage system in the PSU/EA

Values: 0, 1, 9

Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can't determine

Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor

Question Number: Q112H

Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area:

Railway station?

Variable label: Railway station in the PSU/EA

Values: 0, 1, 9

Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can't determine

Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor

Question Number: Q112I

Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area:

Health clinic?

Variable label: Health clinic in the PSU/EA

Values: 0, 1, 9

Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can't determine

Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor

Question Number: Q112J

Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area:

Recreational facilities for e.g. a sports field?

Variable label: Recreational facilities in the PSU/EA

Values: 0, 1, 9

Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can't determine

Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor

Question Number: Q112K

Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area:

Any churches, mosques, temples or other places of worship?

Variable label: Places of worship in the PSU/EA

Values: 0, 1, 9

Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can't determine

Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor

Question Number: Q112L

Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area:

Any town halls or community buildings that can be used for meetings?

Variable label: Community buildings in the PSU/EA

Values: 0, 1, 9

Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can't determine  
 Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor

Question Number: Q112M  
 Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area:  
 Petrol station?  
 Variable label: Petrol station in the PSU/EA  
 Values: 0, 1, 9  
 Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can't determine  
 Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor

Question Number: Q112N  
 Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area:  
 Bottle store/bar/beer parlour?  
 Variable label: Bottle store/bar/beer parlour in the PSU/EA  
 Values: 0, 1, 9  
 Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can't determine  
 Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor

Question Number: Q112O  
 Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area:  
 Supermarket (food and/or clothing)?  
 Variable label: Supermarket in the PSU/EA  
 Values: 0, 1, 9  
 Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can't determine  
 Source: SAB  
 Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor

Question Number: Q112P  
 Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area:  
 Cafes/eating places/corner shops?  
 Variable label: Cafes/eating places/corner shops in the PSU/EA  
 Values: 0, 1, 9  
 Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can't determine  
 Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor

Question Number: Q112Q  
 Question: Were the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area:  
 Market stalls (selling groceries and/or clothing)?  
 Variable label: Market stalls in the PSU/EA  
 Values: 0, 1, 9  
 Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can't determine  
 Note: Question was filled in conjunction with field supervisor

*Identity Group Marginalisation Questions*

Question Number: Q55

Question: Are \_\_\_\_\_s' [respondent's identity group] economic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in this country?

Variable label: Identity group's economic conditions

Values: 1-5, 7, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Much Better, 2=Better, 3=About the Same, 4=Worse, 5=Much Worse, 7=Not Applicable, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. If respondent had not identified a group on question 54, this question was marked as "Not Applicable."

Question Number: Q56

Question: How often are \_\_\_\_\_s [respondent's identity group] treated unfairly by the government?

Variable label: Identity group treated unfairly

Values: 0-3, 7, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Sometimes, 2=Often, 3=Always, 7=Not Applicable, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. If respondent had not identified a group on question 54, this question was marked as "Not Applicable."

### *Control Variables*

#### *Security Force Trust Index (SFTI) Questions*

Question Number: Q43H

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The Army?

Variable label: Trust the army

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q43I

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The Police?

Variable label: Trust the police

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

#### *Government Trust Index (GTI) Questions*

Question Number: Q43A

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The President?

Variable label: Trust the President

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q43B

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The National Assembly?

Variable label: Trust National Assembly

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q43C

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The Independent National Electoral Commission?

Variable label: Trust the Independent National Electoral Commission

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q43D

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Your State Assembly?

Variable label: Trust your state assembly

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q43D1-NIG

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Your State Governor?

Variable label: Trust your state governor

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q43E

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Your Local Government Council?

Variable label: Trust your local government council

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Question Number: Q43F

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The Ruling Party?

Variable label: Trust the ruling party

Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

### *Government Performance Index (GPI)*

Question Number: Q45A

Question: Now let's speak about the present government of this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Managing the economy?

Variable label: Handling managing the economy

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q45B

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Creating jobs?

Variable label: Handling creating jobs

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q45C

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Keeping prices stable?

Variable label: Handling keeping prices stable

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q45D

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Narrowing gaps between rich and poor?

Variable label: Handling narrowing gaps between rich and poor

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q45E

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Reducing crime?

Variable label: Handling reducing crime

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q45F

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Improving basic health services?

Variable label: Handling improving basic health services

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q45G

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Addressing educational needs?

Variable label: Handling addressing educational needs

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q45H

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Delivering household water?

Variable label: Handling delivering household water

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q45I

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Ensuring everyone has enough to eat?

Variable label: Handling ensuring everyone has enough to eat

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data  
 Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q45J

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Fighting corruption in government?

Variable label: Handling fighting corruption in government

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q45K

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Resolving conflicts between communities?

Variable label: Handling resolving conflicts between communities

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q45K1

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Combating malaria?

Variable label: Handling combating malaria

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q45L

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Combating HIV/AIDS?

Variable label: Handling combating HIV/AIDS

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

*Age*

Question Number: Q80

Question: Finally, let us record a few facts about yourself. How old were you at your last birthday?

Variable label: Age

Values: 18+, 998-999, -1

Value Labels: 998=Refused to Answer, 999=Don't Know, -1=Missing Data

### *Head of Household*

Question Number: Q81

Question: Are you the head of the household?

Variable label: Head of household

Values: 0, 1, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

### *Gender*

Question Number: Q96

Question: Respondent's gender

Variable label: Gender of respondent

Values: 1, 2

Value Labels: 1=Male, 2=Female

Note: Answered by interviewer

### *Identity Group Prioritisation Questions*

Question Number: Q57

Question: Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Nigerian and being a \_\_\_\_\_ [respondent's

identity group]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to?

Variable label: Group or national identity

Values: 0-1, 7, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=National identity, 1=Group identity, 7=Not Applicable, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion. If respondent had not identified a group on question 54, this question was marked as "Not Applicable."

