

Can Donors Build Social Capital?: civil society assistance and civic participation in
sub-Saharan Africa

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ABSTRACT

Donors have been using various strategies to promote democracy in developing countries. One of the strategies is to support civil society organisations to foster vibrant civil society that can hold government responsive and accountable. Sub-Saharan Africa is no exception, in that all sub-Saharan countries except for the Seychelles were the recipient countries of civil society assistance.

This research tests whether donors' civil society assistance is related to the changes in the level of civic participation in the 18 sub-Saharan countries. Firstly, I measure civil society assistance between 2005 and 2009 employing OECD aid statistics, and measure the subsequent change in the level of civic participation by comparing the civic participation level in 2005/6 and 2011/3 using Afrobarometer survey Round Three and Round Five. Then, I investigate whether there is a positive correlation between the two variables.

The findings show that the level of civic participation did not change significantly over time. However, further analyses indicate that there is a partially positive correlation between civil society assistance and the change of civic participation. Also, the positive correlation between the assistance and the specific type of civic participation, communing activities, is sustained even when an endogenous factor, the political environment of the countries is hold constant.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Problem Statement

Donor countries have been using various strategies to promote democracy in developing countries. While programmes' foci differ by donors, and have been modified as experience accumulates, the three major sectors of democracy assistance programmes have been: electoral assistance, support to political institutions, and civil society building (Carothers, 1999a). Among these approaches, building and fostering civil society came to the fore amongst donors in the mid-1990s, following the publication of Robert Putnam on the importance of social capital for good governance (Davis & McGregor, 2000). By analysing the reasons for the different outcomes of institutional reform in the Southern and the Northern regions of Italy, Putnam (1993) concluded that it was the different political culture between the two regions that determined the gap. He explained that social capital, represented by horizontal networks of civic engagement strengthened the performance of a polity by reducing the incentives for defection and by encouraging coordinated action. Moreover, the more social capital was used in a society, the more it was accumulated as a virtuous cycle (Putnam, 1993). Donor agencies took great inspiration from Putnam's idea of social capital as a way to build democracy.

The growing interest amongst donors in fostering civil society is clearly reflected in aid flows. According to the OECD aid statistics, the amount of assistance provided to promote democratic participation and civil society for the purpose of democracy promotion nearly doubled from 1.3 billion in 2005 to 2.5 billion USD in 2013 (2013 constant prices).¹ Sub-Saharan Africa was no exception. Civil society assistance was distributed to every sub-Saharan country except the Seychelles, and the amount more than doubled, from 272 million to 562 million USD during the same period.

¹ The figure is measured by total disbursed grant-type aid provided to all recipient countries allocated to 'democratic participation and civil society' sector in OECD Creditor Reporting System.

Despite the recent expansion of donors' support on fostering civil society as a tool to promote democracy, our knowledge of whether such assistance actually works is insufficient.

Trends in Democracy Assistance

Targeting State-oriented Sectors until mid-1990s

This study intends to assess the impact of donor support to civil society in sub-Saharan Africa by analysing the correlation between civil society assistance provided to 18 sub-Saharan African countries between 2005 and 2009, and subsequent changes in levels of civic participation from 2005/6 to 2011/3. However, it is necessary to start by briefly describing trends in democracy assistance in order to appreciate a larger context in which civil society assistance has developed.

Democracy assistance, foreign aid that is particularly designed to help newly democratised countries during initial democratic transition or its consolidation, expanded with the openings of new democratic waves in the late-1980s (Ottaway & Carothers, 2009:5). Since then, spreading democracy has been one of the main goals of donors' foreign aid policy, together with socio-economic development. To this aim, donors have provided considerable amounts of democracy assistance in various forms. There are three main pillars that constitute democracy assistance: intervention in electoral processes, public institutions, and in civil society (Carothers, 1999a).

However, civil society was not a main focus from the beginning. In the first phase of democracy assistance, from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, donors put emphasis on assisting elections in transitional countries. Then, their focus moved to reforming state institutions. In the third phase from mid-1990s, donors started highlighting civil society support, considering active civil society as an important driving force of democracy (Carothers, 1999a; Ottaway & Carothers, 2000: 5).

Donors' early emphasis on electoral processes was based on the assumption that the experience of having a free and fair election would gradually lead a country to form democratic institutions and undertake subsequent democratic reforms. With this expectation, the donor community often adopted electoral assistance as an exit strategy, particularly in post-conflict countries

(Santiso, 2001). Holding an initial election in a country with no previous experience required assistance in every stage from installation of new institutions, such as an independent electoral commission, to logistic tasks like delivering ballot boxes which costs tremendous amount of funding from donors. Still, donors were willing to support initial elections, based on the conviction of their necessity for democratic transition. However, such assistance has proven to be unsustainable. In spite of costly initial electoral assistance, funding the system was usually not maintained or updated for a long term. Furthermore, when donors cut funding for the subsequent elections, the quality of elections often deteriorated (Ottaway & Chung, 1999).

In donors' minds, once foundational elections are held, the next step was to reform the public sector and institutionalising democracy to sustain the process of transition. Public sector reform often underscored the principle of separation of power; building limits on a strong executive creating greater separation between the state and the ruling power. This type of aid was usually delivered to state institutions for proposed constitutional or judicial reform, decentralisation, etc. (Santiso, 2001: 158). Despite donors' clear targets and vision, beneficiary institutions were often reluctant to reform, considering that the change might weaken their political and bureaucratic power (Carothers, 1999: 200). General lesson that donors learned across all regions is that it is difficult and slow to strengthen state institutions (Rakner, Menocal & Fritz, 2007).

Rise of Civil Society Assistance since mid-1990s

From mid-1990s, donors moved their attention to building civil society in promoting democracy for several – international political, practical and theoretical – reasons. Firstly, the rise of civil society assistance in 1990s was a reflection of the apparent lessons learned from democracy movements in some communist countries in the late 1980s (Ottaway & Carothers, 2000:6, Robinson, 1995:70). During that time, civic groups of in countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary successfully challenged communist rule. After the fall of Berlin Wall, civil society actors were viewed as a leading force of democratisation in the region. It inspired donors to support civil society in other developing countries in 1990s (Ottaway & Carothers, 2000:6).

Secondly, for practical reasons, donors reinforced their new focus to civil society, the demand side of democracy, because of their experiences in supporting the supply side of democracy in late 1980s and early 1990s. Donor agencies were disappointed with the unimpressive outcomes of supporting elections and public sector reform especially when compared to the costs, as target state institutions often showed little interest in reform. For donors, supporting civil society seemed to be a good alternative. Because of the basic characteristics of civil society organisations that interact between citizens and the state advocating people's interest and opposing non-democratic behaviour of the state without being engaged in formal politics, donors thought they could stimulate external pressure to state institutions for reform from the outside (Carothers, 1999a; Ottaway & Carothers, 2000). In terms of budget, civil society programmes were considered to be more economical, requiring smaller amounts of budget relative to programmes in other sectors. Thus, supporting vibrant civil society was seen as "a low-cost way to achieve large-scale effect" (Carothers, 1999a: 209) among donors.

Finally, many studies cite that Putnam's social capital theory provided a theoretical background of donors' support to build civil society (Carothers, 1999a; Hearn & Robinson, 2000; Lean, 2007; Ottaway & Carothers, 2000). The political culture approach generally emphasises the political culture which refers to the "orientations that people have to the political process" as a key component for a successful democratic government. It argues that there is a specific political culture that is more favourable to democratic systems, and such culture is more important than the structure of a government for a stable democracy. Almond and Verba (1963) called it the civic culture, which is related to citizen's values and attitudes on their relationship with state and with other citizens. Almond and Verba (1963) explained a democratic political culture as "a set of beliefs, attitudes, norms and perceptions and the like, that support participation." (Almond & Verba, 1963: 178)

More recently, Putnam (1993) developed the idea of social capital as a strong factor of effective governance. Social capital has two major components: horizontal networks of civic engagement and norms of reciprocity. These two features facilitate social trust that lowers the transaction cost of cooperation, and eventually increases the likelihood of collective action for better

institutional performance. According to Putnam, social capital is cumulative and self-reinforcing. When social capital is more used by citizenry, it flourishes and creates a virtuous circle that has significant political consequences in promoting democracy and good governance (Putnam, 1993). Compared to Almond and Verba's idea of civic culture, Putnam's argument on social capital gave more emphasis to behavioural features of political culture by highlighting the horizontal networks of civic engagement.

It is important to note that the political culture is not static and can be maintained or changed by political socialisation. The conventional agents of political socialisation are family units, school structures, peer or reference groups, experience in employment and direct contact with political systems (Almond & Powell, 1966). In traditional political culture theory, the political socialisation was often considered to be a long-term or even generational process. However, the role of civil society in democratic transition is highlighted by Putnam. He argued that horizontal networks of civic engagement, such as associational membership in civic organisations, are important for societal cooperation and coordination, and the social capital built on such horizontal networks has important consequences for democracy (Norris, 2002). From this idea, donors saw an opportunity to initiate the virtuous cycle of social capital by fostering civil society throughout their democracy promotion strategies to build vibrant civil society.

1.2. Different Strategies to Civil Society by Donor

Based on the reasons demonstrated above, donors are contributing significant amount of aid to foster vibrant civil society as a way of democracy promotion. However, donors' reasons for supporting civil society are not identical when implementing their programmes because their approaches to build civil society are within their encompassing framework of democracy promotion.

At its most general level, US democracy assistance is based on a political approach, while European one as developmental approach (Carothers, 2009). Carothers (2009) explains that political approach respects the value of democracy as an end goal itself, and the socioeconomic reason of supporting democracy is only secondary. On the other hand, the developmental approach focuses on

democratic governance, such as transparency, accountability, etc. because they ultimately contribute to economic and social development. For European donors, the adherents of developmental approach, promoting democracy cannot be separated from governance and human rights issue, and is a part of a process to achieve more equitable development in general (Carothers, 2009; Youngs, 2008).

The same logic is applied in their efforts to foster civil society under the purpose of building democracy. Thus, it is worthwhile to analyse donors' broad strategies toward civil society within the context of their democracy promotion efforts and find their common aspects or differences. For this, I analyse the civil society assistance policies of the three biggest contributors, US, Sweden and Germany.²

United States

The Centre for Democracy and Governance (DG) was established under USAID in 1994 to build sustainable democracy (USAID, 1998:5). It was a part of USAID's integrating development agenda, but as Carothers (2009) analysed, USAID had long pursued the value of democracy promotion itself. The very first sentence of its conceptual framework report clearly captures its core value.

"The United States Government works to encourage democracy in developing nations throughout the world on the basis of the ideals of liberty, personal and civic freedom, and government of, for, and by the people – values on which the United States was founded and which gird the social and political life of our nation." (USAID, 1998: 1)

Within this context, the four sub-sectors that DG focused on are: rule of law, civil society, elections and political processes, and governance. Among them, civil society was considered as a core element that could realise the freedom of speech and association to people in the process of formulating public policy. This was well reflected in its budget distribution. According to Azpuru et al. (2008), 37.5 percent of the total USAID's democracy assistance between 1990 and 2005 was distributed to build civil society.

² The US, Germany and Sweden are the three greatest contributors of total civil society assistance - the disbursed grant-type aid provided to 'democratic participation and civil society' sector - based on OECD Aid Statistics between 2005 and 2013. Each country contributed 2.9 billion, 2.6 billion and 2 billion USD of civil society assistance respectively during the period.

The DG strategy expected to achieve five results from its support for active civil society: (1) increased institutional and financial viability of CSOs, (2) increased citizen participation in the policy process and oversight of public institutions, (3) enhanced free flow of information, (4) strengthened democratic political culture, and (5) a legal framework to protect and promote civil society. (USAIDa, 1998: 115) Disentangling the five intermediate results, there was a sequential order among the results: the first result can be considered as the immediate output of the Agency's intervention building capacity of recipient organisations. The second and third results relate to the outcome of the improved capability of target organisations in operating their activities towards citizens. Finally, the last two results indicate the influence of such activities on political culture and on enabling environment for civil society in recipient countries. However, when implementing programmes, such result categories are often mixed and not always discrete.

As for the agents, USAID targeted various reform-oriented CSOs, such as pro-democracy groups, think tanks, etc., and put particular significance on free and independent labour unions (USAID, 1998: 16). Of course, the civil society sector was not always completely independent from the state in developing countries, thus USAID also made efforts to create an enabling environment for civil society within the state. Still, when it came to creating a vibrant civil society, a heavy weight was put on enabling people to communicate, participate and formulate their opinions to lead reform for democratic transition or consolidation.

In 2013, however, there was a major modification in strategy. Compared to its previous framework, the new strategy endorsed a developmental approach of democracy promotion, highlighting human rights and infusion of DRG with other development practices. In the new objectives, civil society was not demonstrated as an independent sector to develop unlike previous strategy. However, despite this strategy reframing, the roles of civil society, mobilising citizens and advocating their interests are highlighted under each sub-objective. Its citizen-based approach was re-emphasised in the new strategy, clearly recognising citizen participation and voice as essential features of a democratic political process, by stating, "A robust democratic process requires an active and engaged citizenry. Broad-based engagement in civic and political life contributes to a dynamic exchange of ideas in a society and inclusive political processes" (USAID, 2013: 18). The support was

mainly provided for civic education programmes, for civil society organisations, including unions and business associations, and for an open media.

In addition, the advocacy role of civil society was also stressed, as CSOs “facilitate the articulation of public “demand” for transparent, accountable and inclusive governance” (USAID, 2013: 20). For this purpose, USAID supported CSOs to build their capacities in gathering data, performing analytical research, and in advocating on governance issues.

Summarising USAID’s new democracy promotion strategy, it emphasised various roles of civil society, such as citizens’ participation and advocacy, by embedding them across all sub-objectives of its new framework of democracy promotion, while the previous one stressed civil society as a whole as a sector or pillar of democracy.

Sweden

Swedish support to democratic governance began with supporting democratisation through elections and public sector reform in the early 1990s. Fostering civil society followed afterwards, and supporting human rights was introduced in 1997 in the Swedish democracy promotion policy.

The normative basis of Sweden’s overall aid policy was human rights. Within the context of rights-based approach, democracy was important because human rights could be best respected in it. Swedish policy emphasised democracy and human rights as a starting point for tackling poverty and stressed a well-functioning state and vibrant civil society as a pre-requisite to ensure democratic governance and to respect human rights (SIDA, 2008).

In Swedish approach to civil society, securing freedom of expression and assembly were the key values because they were considered people’s basic human rights and pre-requisites to empower people under poverty to improve their living conditions (MFA, 2010). Such view is well displayed its policy paper:

A person is living in poverty, for instance, if he or she lacks freedom of expression and the chance to participate, thus lacking influence. All individuals must therefore have the

opportunity, the power and the security to change their situations in life and influence how their country develops. (MFA, 2010:8)

Its democratic development policy was composed of three focus areas: (1) the institutions and procedures of democracy and rule of law, (2) civil and political rights, and (3) the actors of democratisation. The role of civil society was highlighted in each area. Among the three focus areas, civil society was of particular importance in order to foster the actors of democratisation as democracy was not possible without democrats (MFA, 2009).

Stressing civil society's key role as a collective voice, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) prioritised democratically-minded civil society actors. The civil society actors were anticipated to work in creating routes and empowering people, so that they, disadvantaged groups in particular, could realise their human rights, make their voices heard and raise issues in society. They were also expected to act as watchdogs of the government and to be a leading force of democratisation (MFA, 2009).

Germany

Germany associated its democracy promotion efforts to the other target dimensions of its development policy, based on the conviction that development could not be achieved without good governance (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development [BMZ], 2005). Good governance had been a core concept of Germany's development cooperation strategies, since the mid-1990s, and democracy was emphasised as a key feature of good governance. In addition, its notion of good governance went beyond the realm of government. It recognised that good governance can only be achieved when a state and its society have a constructive relationship in addition to a general state-building (BMZ, 2009).

Thus, BMZ aimed to promote democracy within this context. It equally highlighted both civil society organisations and state institutions. Its multidimensional approach to promote political involvement included building institutionalised democratic processes and improving state capacity that could be responsive to civil society (BMZ, 2009).

When supporting civil society to promote political involvement, the agency aimed to endorse as many diverse social groups as possible, particularly the disadvantaged and marginalised ones, to

participate in political processes, even between elections, so that they had adequate representation. Its priority did not go to every single citizen to be part of every policy making process. Instead, it focused on empowering members of marginalised groups in society to know their rights and opportunities for participation, and to improve their negotiating skills - on how to organise, to express their interests and to form networks. Through this, people could influence the policy making process. Its target organisations included disadvantaged groups, lobby groups and free independent media (BMZ, 2009).

To summarise the broad strategies of three donor countries towards civil society, donors' emphasis on civil society started from different overarching democracy promotion framework: For the US, civil society was essential itself as a feature of democracy. Sweden perceived civil society as an agent to secure human's basic rights – freedom of expression and assembly, while Germany highlighted civil society as a catalyst of good governance outside the state sector. However, when supporting the civil society actors, all three donors commonly perceived two essential roles of civil society – promoting people's participation and advocating public policy on behalf of ordinary citizens or marginalised groups. Through this, the people were expected to make greater influence on public decision making process ultimately.

1.3. Donors' Logic of Supporting Civil Society

Even though Putnam's theory of social capital encompassed people's horizontal associations with a broad range of organisations, including sports and cultural association, donor agencies, donor agencies focused on a more narrowly defined set of groups in their democracy promotion strategies. The target groups were CSOs that ultimately intend to make influence on public decision making process, such as trade unions, advocacy groups, think tanks, etc. Furthermore, when providing the assistance, donors commonly focused on two major functions of such organisations: mobilisation and advocacy.

What type of changes, and what sequence of changes do donors expect to see as a result of their support to civil society organisations then? A summary of a USAID's project evaluation criteria demonstrated in **Figure 1.1.** provide the basic criteria of expected results that donors hope to achieve.

Figure 1.1. Evaluation Criteria of USAID's Increased Citizen Participation Project in Angola

Donor	USAID
Project	Increased Citizen Participation Project in Angola (Oct 1998 – Oct 2000)
Input	- Grant of \$1,079,000 awarded in 1998
Activity	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Training intervention: 29 workshops on general capacity building held with Angolan CSOs. 2. Technical assistance for advocacy campaigns, building public support and organisational effectiveness: i.e. financial management, proposal development, planning of public forums, campaign planning, etc. 3. Civic participation/advocacy sub-grants: 19 advocacy campaigns conducted to influence programme, policies and practices.
Output	<p style="text-align: center;">Criteria of evaluation</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Community based CSOs represent their constituencies more effectively, gain public support, and engage in public policy debate: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.1. Increased membership in CSOs 1.2. Number of consultation meeting between local government officials and CSOs 1.3. Number of advocacy initiatives that have influenced officials to change policies 2. Community based CSOs collaborate with each other, local government, and other sectors in resolving problems and meeting the needs of their members: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2.1. Number of coalition formed 2.2. Increased percentage of trained CSOs that have taken part in a coalition or joint action 2.3. Number of local problems resolved through joint action
Outcome	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increased understanding of the role of CSOs as channels for representation of citizens' interests: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.1. Increased number of citizens in target provinces belonging to CSOs 1.2. Increased percent of local government officials in target provinces who CSOs as legitimate partners in the reform process 2. Increased citizen participation in local and political decision making <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2.1. Increased number of local problems addressed with citizen participation 2.2. Increased percentage of local government officials who describe being influenced by citizen pressure.

Source: America's Development Foundation (ADF), 2000

This two-year project designed to promote citizen participation in Angola was composed of two different levels of approaches: one at the organisational, and the other at the project level. By building the capacity of beneficiaries (*Activity 1 and 2* in **Figure 1.1.**), the Agency aimed at improving effectiveness of recipient organisations in their activities. Through this, the beneficiaries were able to recruit more members and form strategies to engage government offices more effectively on their agenda. Secondly, through direct funding for campaigning and advocacy activities, the recipients implemented an increased number of projects that could reach a broader range of ordinary citizens and government offices. (*Output* in **Figure 1.1.**) Thus, the two-track strategy attempted to enhance CSOs activities in terms of both quantity and quality: increasing the number of projects and improving the capacity of CSOs in mobilising and advocating public issues.

In brief, with more members, more donor-funded projects, and with better strategies, the recipient organisations were expected to approach more ordinary citizens in raising public awareness on local problems and increase their roles in solving the problems at broader level beyond their communities as the next step (*Outcome* in **Figure 1.1.**).

To take another example, a 5-year project for democratic participation in Kenya funded by SIDA, Amkeni Wkenya, aimed at strengthening the Kenyan citizens’ role in the deepening of democracy and governance reforms through CSOs. The project funded 41 CSOs and reached 340,000 people through workshops, road shows and open air meetings. In addition, 363,000 people were reached through community radios, posters and flyers. Furthermore, it funded 50 CSOs to provide civic and voter educations in the country to enhance understanding of decentralisation and elections. As the outcome of the projects, SIDA reported that the recipient CSOs created country-level awareness on devolution, and subsequently the number of spoilt votes significantly dropped in the 2013 elections (SIDA, 2014).

Figure 1.2. Sequence of Donors’ Civil Society Programmes




Figure 1.2. summarises the sequence of change drawn from donors’ evaluation on their civil society assistance programmes. As the first step, donors provided financial or technical assistance to target CSOs or directly funded their projects. Through this, more civil society actors operated more projects on public issues. In addition, these CSOs improved their strategies to mobilise people and approach relevant government offices. More civic agents with better capacities and more donor-

funded projects allowed target organisations to persuade more citizens to civic activities and to enhance the influence of civic agents on public decision-making processes, and through this, civil society in the recipient countries ultimately became more vibrant. This eventually led to democratic development in recipient countries.

As such, donors' policy evaluations suggested that donors attempted to make influence the general public at a broader level, such as provincial or national, with their short or mid-term projects through their target organisations and communities, by empowering more active and strategic agents of change and by supporting more campaigns or advocacy projects.

1.4. Research Question

For donors, civil society is a crucial element of democracy promotion. As demonstrated previously, despite donors' different normative basis of civil society support, they commonly focused on the two major function of civil society organisations: mobilising people and advocating people's interest in public-decision making processes. Thus, when evaluating the impact of donors' civil society assistance, it can be tested based on two standards: to what extent citizens were mobilised in various civic activities and to what extent people influenced public or political decision making processes in recipient countries with the donors' support towards CSOs. This research focuses on the first aspect as it is difficult to quantitatively measure the extent of people's influence on public decision making process. In this context, I raise my research question as:

Does foreign civil society assistance promote civic participation in sub-Saharan Africa?

Following the research question, this research investigates whether the level of citizens' participation in various forms of civic activities in sub-Saharan countries increased or decreased in proportion to the foreign civil society assistance.

1.5. Hypothesis

Following donors' logic of civil society support demonstrated in *Section 1.3.*, I expect to find a positive correlation between donors' civil society assistance and civic participation in the sub-Saharan countries at the national level. Thus, my core hypothesis is:

Civil society assistance increases the level of civic participation in sub-Saharan Africa.

Donors often measure the number of members of target organisations or general supporters of their campaign/advocacy projects, when evaluating their aid projects as suggested in Chapter One. However, such measurement focusing on the size of civil society does not capture how much civil society assistance had an impact on fostering active citizens, in terms of individuals' level of involvement in civic activities. Thus, this research aims to investigate the relationship between civil society assistance and ordinary citizens' behavioural change in civic participation, by capturing the extent of people's involvement in three different modes of civic activities - *associational membership, communing and, contacting representatives* – suggested in the previous section. In other words, I expect that citizens became more active participants of civic activities owing to donors' civil society assistance. Besides the increase in the overall level of civic participation, I also expect the increase in each mode of participation respectively. Thus, I set three sub-hypotheses as below:

(1) Civil society assistance promotes the level of participation in associational membership.

(2) Civil society assistance promotes the level of participation in communing activities.

(3) Civil society assistance promotes the level of participation in contacting representatives.

I assume that the level of participation increases in all three types of actions, and the extent of increase is different by country, in proportion to the amount of assistance provided to each country. In other words, I expect to find a greater increase in the level of civic participation in the countries where more civil society assistance is provided.

1.6. State of Knowledge

Debates on Democracy Assistance

Many donor countries support democratic transition and its consolidation in various ways, by supporting electoral processes, strengthening judicial reforms and fostering civil society. Despite of donors' decades-long efforts in promoting democracy, evaluating the impact of democracy assistance has been subject to complex debate among scholars and policy makers. Before demonstrating the debates on civil society assistance, the main interest of this research, it is worthwhile to briefly explain debates on the impact of democracy assistance as civil society assistance is a part of donors' democracy assistance scheme.

Democracy assistance to civil society has not gone without its critiques. Carothers (1997; 1999a) pointed out two major problems in donors' democracy promotion strategies. Firstly, the impact of democracy assistance was only marginal, as donors applied standardised strategies like a template to countries with different conditions (Carothers, 1997; 1999a). According to Carothers (1997), donors' basic strategy of democracy promotion was similar everywhere starting with electoral support and then institutional reform and civil society development, even though the assistance was implemented in a tremendously diverse range of countries. Such donors' approaches were donor-oriented idea about democracy, without consideration of diverse political conditions in non-western countries, since there was no unified model of democratic transition or consolidation. Democracy was developed in many different paths and paces (Carothers, 1997).

Secondly, democracy assistance strategies tended to ignore the underlying power relations among social, political and economic forces which decided the political life of a country, and focused on building capacities of target institutions by providing technical assistance. In other words, donors believed that it was possible to develop democracy simply by treating symptoms through technical assistance, which was not proven (Carothers, 1997; 1999a, Santiso, 2001). Critics argued that donors needed to understand the political environment in the recipient countries to make an impact on democratic development. Due to such strategic issues, donors' democracy promotion programmes

only made a secondary effect, without a direct and decisive influence on deep-rooted grounds for democracy (Diamond, 1999; Santiso, 2001).

A quantitative study, by Cornell (2013), supported Carothers' second argument concluding that democracy aid had limited effects to recipient countries depending on the regime type of recipient countries. By comparing 143 countries between 1990 and 1997, the literature argued that dictators decided whether to support or obstruct democracy aid based on the threat and fear of losing power. The findings suggested that while democracy aid had the most positive effects in stable authoritarian regimes, in other words one-party regimes with solid political institutions, the results were mixed in multi-party regimes, monarchies and democracies. In addition, it had the least positive effect in military regimes. However, stable authoritarian regimes did not necessarily reach to hold democratic election and further their democratisation process, but rather allowed some freedom within the authoritarian environment (Cornell, 2013).

While there is a volume of literature that challenges the idea of assisting democracy, there are a smaller number of quantitative studies that suggest the opposite result (Dietrich & Wright, 2012; Finkel et al, 2007; Scott & Steele, 2007). These studies conclude that democracy assistance has its unique impact, distinct from that of developmental aid, for democratisation or democratic consolidation in non-democratic countries. For example, Finkel et al. (2007) conducted an extensive quantitative empirical study on the impact of the US democracy assistance. This longitudinal research claims that USAID Democracy and Governance (DG) programme had a significant impact on the change in Freedom House Index and Polity Index of 165 countries between 1990 and 2003, controlling for other factors that are related to democratic change, such as economic growth, regional diffusion, etc. It also found that the expenditures on particular programmes, such as elections, civil society and free media programmes tended to have the greatest impact on democratic performance of all USAID DG programmes (Finkel et al., 2007). Even though, the study only dealt with the US democracy assistance, it is still meaningful considering that the US is one of the greatest contributors in funding democracy and political transition. It is also important to note that the study focuses on the impact of democracy assistance, separating it from other service-oriented developmental aid.

Debates on Civil Society Assistance

Narrowing down the range of study to civil society assistance, it becomes even more difficult to make a solid judgement whether civil society assistance contributes to democracy in recipient countries. Mixed results are drawn from the different research methodologies and evidences that scholars used. Many were case studies focusing on specific countries or aid programmes, rather than large-N analyses comparing at national level. In addition, methodologies also varied significantly regarding how to evaluate the impact of civil society assistance. In country or programme-specific literatures, some were qualitative studies based on interviews with NGOs or government officials, while others used survey data collected from the participants of donor projects. With such different approaches, the literature provided dissimilar and debatable results. Despite the debates about the significance of civil society assistance in fostering a vibrant civil society, no study concluded that the civil society assistance has had no influence on civil society in the recipient countries.

Even though civil society assistance started being noticed by donors since the mid-1990s, following the contribution of Putnam, doubts about this approach were raised mainly from three different views – theoretical, cultural and practical. First and foremost, such doubts partly come from the ideas that democracy could not be achieved by changes in political culture only (Fukuyama, 2001; Sardamov, 2005). Furthermore, it is difficult to foster civil society through stimulation from outside in places where there is no local traditional foundation of civil society. According to this opinion, political socialisation is derived from the deep changes in social structures, such as modernisation, rather than external factors. Thus, in societies that are not equipped with the preconditions of a democratic transition, civil society assistance may rather deepen resentment among sceptical publics, hindering social reform, in that the assistance tends to privilege limited groups (Sardamov, 2005). Carothers (1999b) supports this idea in his qualitative research on the impact of civil society assistance in the post-Communist countries. Despite the rapid increase in the number of NGOs followed by the increased civil society assistance after the collapse of communism in the region, the support did not move further in building vibrant civil society because the recipient countries were not

committed to the agenda reform, prioritising other problems in their economy and politics (Carothers, 1999b).

Secondly, the impact of donor assistance to civil society was considered to be limited due to the unique cultural environment of a region. Carapico (2002) chose the Arab world as an example with hostile conditions toward civil society assistance. According to his qualitative study, various donors, such as USAID and its Scandinavian counterparts, provided civil society assistance to many Arab countries after their breakthrough elections during the mid-1990s. Many intermediary networks arose, directly responding to the donors' demand, but this ended up causing controversies and risks, as the local partners were regarded as foreign agents. Their activities were considered to be the West's cultural attack on the Arab world (Carapico, 2002).

A third doubt about civil society assistance highlights about the practical issues of supporting civil society organisations - the recipients' financial dependency on donors (Diamond, 1992; Hadenius & Ugglå, 1996). When civil society organisations were excessively tied to their sponsors, the recipient organisations tended to neglect their members, as they were less important financial sources than the donors' support. In this case, donors' funding ironically damaged the democratic procedures within the organisations unlike its intention, deteriorating the quality of civil society in regards to plurality, broad popular base and autonomy. A micro-level quantitative study conducted by Gugerty and Kremer (2008: 585) showed such alteration in the leadership and membership of civil society organisations after the infusion of foreign assistance. Analysing the behavioural dynamics in 80 women's groups in Kenya, the study found out that the number of applicants sharply increased in the groups that received donor funding, having twice as many new members compared to the financially independent organisations. However, at the same time, the number of people who left the programme groups also doubled due to internal conflicts with the new members. The women who left were mostly vulnerable members over 50 years old. In short, the donors' financial assistance definitely has a positive impact on leading more people to civil society. However, it may also marginalise the more vulnerable people who are in need, since it affects the population features of the recipient organisations. Moreover, Fioramonti (2010) pointed out that recipients' high level of

financial dependency on donors tended to challenge their long-term sustainability, in that many young community-based organisations failed to secure alternative financial sources on their own, when all-inclusive funding from donors disappeared.

To sum up, the critics argue that civil society assistance to formulate a democratic political culture show non-significant or limited influence on achieving this goal. Although effective in the early stage of support in increasing the number of civic agents, often sustainability was lost due to more essential factors that affect political culture, the hostile environment for democracy assistance in recipient countries and the dependent relationship between donor and beneficiaries. However, no study above fully denies the necessity of civil society assistance, as it clearly has an impact in a society, especially on the size of civic space, in terms of the number of organisations, and on the inclusion of more people in civil society.

In contrast to the criticism, there were studies, both quantitative and qualitative, that demonstrated positive effects of civil society support, especially when the focus of studies was narrowed down to a specific sub-type of civil society assistance.

The studies assessing the donors' civic education programmes consistently showed positive results in fostering democratic culture among the participants (Finkel, 2002; Finkel & Ernst, 2005; Finkel & Smith, 2011; Mattes, Denmark & Niemi, 2012). Through longitudinal micro-level survey analyses of various civic education programmes in newly democratising countries, such as the Dominican Republic, Kenya and South Africa, Finkel (2002) concluded that civic education programmes had a significantly positive influence on individuals' cognitive and attitudinal change to democratic values, notably when they were combined with more active teaching methodologies and frequent participation.

Moreover, another quantitative study on civic education by Finkel and Smith (2011) showed that the civic education programme not only changed the participants' understanding and attitude on democratic values, but also encouraged them to be the agents of spreading ideas. This secondary and indirect effect was through post-civic education discussions by the participants who shared their

experiences of the programmes in their communities, involving a broader range of people into democratic orientations, especially the socially disadvantaged (Finkel and Smith, 2011). Even though the result was drawn only from a specific programme, the Kenyan National Civic Education Programme, mostly funded by the EU, it was a promising finding on the contributions of donor-sponsored civic education programmes to develop democratic political culture in recipient countries.

The potential of fruitful contribution of civil society assistance was not only suggested in civic education programmes. Regarding strengthening the advocacy role of CSOs, it has been evaluated that civil society assistance might have influenced the dynamics of domestic politics especially in a country at a critical juncture. For example, in post-Apartheid South Africa, civil society organisations supported by USAID were assessed to have played a prominent role during the country's transition period (Hearn, 2000; Robinson & Friedman, 2007). Hearn (2000) evaluated that US support to South African civil society had "successfully influenced the rules of the game" (Hearn, 2000: 828), by creating a widespread adherence to liberal democratic values. Robinson and Friedman (2007) agreed to this view, stating that the foreign civil society aid in South Africa stimulated the formation of new organisations and positively contributed to strengthening the capacity of democracy-oriented civil society organisations during a crucial time of South Africa.

In addition, investigating conditions for successful civil society assistance through six domestic election monitoring organisations in the Americas, Lean (2007) cautiously proposed an encouraging outcome that civic organisations with sustained support over time from diverse sources could be an important force of democracy, in terms of the organisation's ability to improve elections and to bolster civic networks, even in an unfavourable environment to support civil society such as the case of Nicaragua.

As discussed above, it is still contested whether foreign civil society assistance can be an important factor that fosters vibrant civil society. The results were mixed depending on research methodology, scope and region in which each study concentrates. To briefly summarise the previous research approaches, there were three characteristics in the literatures evaluating the impact of civil

society assistance. First, many studies, especially critiques, analysed the influence of civil society assistance through qualitative methods, narrating the dynamics around the donors' civil society funding and domestic politics in the recipient countries. Second, these studies tended to focus on specific countries. Third, a relatively small number of quantitative studies were mostly carried out at micro- or at meso-level, centred on a sub-type of civil society assistance programme. All of these studies were meaningful. However, considering that donors aimed to create vibrant civil society in the recipient countries by supporting their CSOs, the previous studies were not sufficient in explaining whether the civil society assistance had been making any meaningful impact at national-level. Therefore, a comprehensive quantitative analysis is necessary in order to assess the contribution of civil society assistance to cultivate a more inclusive and participatory civil society in the recipient countries.

1.7. Significance of Study

Developing and sustaining stable democracy in newly democratised countries has been an important goal of donors' aid policy for a long time. However, whether it is achieving its goal or not has been a long debate. Evaluations are contesting and inconsistent. This is partly because of the difficulties in assessment methodology. Such difficulty has been acknowledged by aid practitioners and researchers (Green, A. T. & Kohl, R. D., 2007). Green and Kohl (2007) addressed several points, for example, the time period of evaluation, linkages of project-level evaluation to sector-level and issues of case selection. Despite the difficulties of concretely evaluating democracy assistance programmes, it has important policy implications, as donors have been contributing significant amount of aid for promoting democracy.

Based on this, I attempt to fill the research gap of pre-existing literature. Firstly, I narrow down the focus to democracy assistance provided for the specific purpose of fostering civil society, a fast growing sector within donors' democracy promoting portfolio. This is to investigate whether donors' support to civil society has a primary impact on the civil society sector itself, before it promotes democracy. Secondly, recognising that the donor policy evaluations are heavily project-

based, I scale up to sector-level and investigate whether donors' civil society assistance as a whole has an impact on promoting citizen participation in recipient countries, beyond the level of target organisations. Lastly, by conducting a medium-N analysis of 18 countries over time, it allows the research to compare the impact of civil society assistance across countries.

This research provides both theoretical and practical contributions. Firstly, by analysing the extent of change in civic participation, it is possible to explain whether civic political culture can be nurtured during a relatively short period of time. Political culture theorists argued that changing political culture was a long-term, even generational, process. However, donors' assumption for supporting civil society was that the culture could be nurtured by their intervention via civil society assistance. Thus, if the level of civic participation in the 18 sub-Saharan countries in this research changed extensively from 2005/6 to 2011/3, a question regarding the theory on the change of political culture could be raised.

Secondly, examining the correlation of civil society assistance between 2005 and 2009 and its subsequent change in civic participation allows me to assess whether civil society assistance has an impact on encouraging citizens to participate in civic activities. This provides policy implications whether current donor strategies to foster civil society is achieving its goal or not.

1.8. Conclusion

In this chapter, I outlined growing donors' interest on supporting civil society as a way of democracy promotion: its trend, major donors' basic policy frameworks for democracy promotion, the logic of civil society assistance and debates on civil society assistance. Based on this, I raised my research question of whether foreign civil society assistance promoted civic participation in sub-Saharan Africa.

Chapter Two sets out my argument on the research question and shows how I test my hypothesis. In Chapter Three, I explore foreign civil society assistance in different dimensions, on how much it accounts in donors' democracy assistance portfolios, who the donors are and the recipients, employing the OECD aid statistics. It also demonstrates the level of civic participation and

its change in 18 sub-Saharan countries over time. Chapter Four put things together and evaluates the correlation between foreign civil society assistance and change in the level of civic participation. Lastly, Chapter Five discusses the result and its implication for aid policy.

CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY

Donor agencies have been focusing on fostering civil society, among other strategies of democracy promotion in developing countries since mid-1990s (Ottaway & Carothers, 2000). While donors' aims and strategy frameworks in assisting democratic development were different, their basic expectations towards civil society organisations were similar. They emphasised civil society's role as a collective voice that was formed by mobilised citizens advocating their interests to influence public policy making processes. Donors thought such collective voices from citizens would hold government more responsive and accountable and promote democratic transition or consolidation (MFA, 2009; BMZ, 2009).

In this sense, I separate the donors' assistance to foster civil society from other types of democracy assistance programmes and test whether it had a unique influence on fostering vibrant civil society in recipient countries, in terms of civic participation, one of the two major roles of civil society expected by donors in their programmes. This chapter outlines how I set my hypotheses and examined the correlation between foreign civil society assistance and civic participation in sub-Saharan Africa.

2.1. Key Concepts

Foreign aid

It is necessary to first clarify what foreign aid is, since the concept of civil society assistance used in this study is a subdivision of foreign aid programmes. Foreign aid is defined as, "a voluntary transfer of public resources from a government to another independent government, to an NGO, or to an international organisation to better the human condition in the country receiving the aid" (Lancaster, 2007: 9). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the OECD committee that deals with development cooperation issues, concretely defines Official Development Assistance (ODA) as:

Those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent). (OECD, 2008)

Under the main objective to promote economic development and welfare, the purpose of aid programmes comprises various agenda related to social and economic infrastructure and services in recipient countries. Some of the purposes are: education, health, agriculture, communication, energy generation, and government and civil society (OECD, n.d.). Based on the two definitions, the three key features of foreign aid are in its source, purpose and character.

Civil society assistance

Civil society assistance is a practical term as a part of donors' democracy assistance programme. To clarify what civil society assistance indicates it is necessary to define civil society in the first place. Civil society is generally conceptualised by scholars and donor agencies as the sphere between families, the state and the market that is formed for collective purposes and that enjoys autonomy from the state and the market (Anheier, H. K., 2004: 20; Blair, H., 1998: 66; Ottaway & Carothers, 2009: 8, Robinson M., 1998: 55). SIDA agrees with this concept in its aid policy, defining civil society as "an arena, distinct from the state, the market and the individual household, created by individuals, groups and organisations acting together to promote common interests" (MFA, 2009: 7). This research adopts this definition of civil society.

However, when it comes to policy implementation within donors' democracy promotion strategy, it is important to note that donors support a narrower range of actors in civil society. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish the meaning of civil society in the context of civil society assistance as a term. When providing assistance for the purpose of building civil society, donors target civil society organisations (CSOs) which are defined as, "organisations existing in the space between the state and the family that both enjoy autonomy from the state and seek to have a significant influence on public policy, at any level" (Blair, H., 1998: 66). Organisations who conduct civic education or advocacy

activities, lobby groups, labour unions, human rights groups representing marginalised persons, free and independent media, etc. are the examples of CSOs. CSOs are distinguishing from other non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in that their activities aim to affect public policies.

As this research focuses on donors' effort to build civil society within the context of democracy promotion, it excludes donors' assistance to service-oriented NGO activities that directly provide social services such as basic health care, education, etc.

Civic participation

Putnam's social capital theory that provided theoretical background to donors' democracy promotion strategies encompasses various behaviours in civic engagement including newspaper readership, membership to sports and cultural associations and voting turnout. However, donors narrowed down the concept when adopting his idea in aid policy, and each donor uses different terms. For example, SIDA defines democratic participation as, "the process through which people take part in and influence, public decisions that affect their lives" (SIDA, 2002). Similarly, Germany emphasises political involvement in its policy, explaining the concept as, "all forces within society having an equal say in political decisions" (BMZ, 2009). USAID employs citizen participation as its equivalence. The common features of donors' definitions on participation are that they indicate activities beyond personal level that have an intention to affect public or political decision making. Such donors' definition excludes individual behaviour such as newspaper readership.

Donors' conceptualisation is similar to the definition of political participation by Verba and Nie (1972), which refers to, "activities by citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or actions they take" (Verba & Nie, 1972: 2). According to Verba and Nie (1972), the concept includes different modes of participation, such as voting, campaign, cooperative activity and contacting. However, donors' definition of participation is different from political participation, in that they underline peoples' participation between elections (BMZ, 2009; USAID, 2013). Hence, I do not include electoral participation in the concept of civic participation.

Following donors' perspectives of participation, this research concentrates on three types of actions in which individuals can participate to operationalise the concept of civic participation: associating with CSOs as their members, communing with others for public purposes, and contacting representatives. The three modes of participation rightly capture donors' concept of participation, in terms of the level of behaviour and intention. In addition, I interchangeably use the term civic participation with other donors' terms, democratic participation and citizen participation.

2.2. Measurement

Outcome variable

This research focused on behavioural change caused by donors' efforts to build civil society in terms of peoples' participation in the civic arena. Following Putnam's social capital theory, individuals' membership to voluntary groups became a typical measurement of civic engagement (Welzel, Inglehart & Deutsch, 2005). Other than associational membership, this research only considers non-electoral activities, as the donors emphasize citizens' participation in between elections when fostering civil society.

Based on the definition of civic participation suggested earlier, I operationalised the concept capturing three sub-dimensions, which were membership, communing and contacting, employing Afrobarometer survey data. Comprising the three features with equal weight on each of them, I constructed an index, the Civic Participation Index (CPI), using the selected questions (**Table 2.1.**) for both Round Three and Round Five. The index was based on the mean scores of each variable. My outcome variable, the change in civic participation from 2005/6 to 2011/3 was calculated by comparing the CPIs for the two rounds. However, as the pattern of individuals' participation was different by its mode across countries, I also disaggregated the CPI by its three sub-components in the research in order to find whether there was different relationship with civil society assistance by mode of participation.

Table 2.1. Afrobarometer Survey Items for Civic Participation Index

Dimensions	Afrobarometer Survey Items	
Membership (Index)	- For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member:	
	<i>Round 3:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A trade union or farmers' association • A professional or business association • A community development or self-help association 	<i>Round 5:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some other voluntary association or community group
Communing (Index)	- For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attended a community meeting • Got together with others to raise an issue 	
Contacting (Index)	- During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views?	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A local government councillor • A member of parliament • An official of a government ministry • A political party official 	

Afrobarometer Round 3, Round 5

In terms of variables for membership, the questions that asked people's membership in three different types of civic organisations in Round Three were combined to one question in Round Five, by using more general term, other voluntary association or community group. Hence, as a measurement of membership for Round Three, I integrated the three variables by computing the mean scores of all three variables. Regarding communing activities, the original scale of the two variables was not consistent to the variables of other modes of participation (See **Appendix B.1**). To match the scale to the other items, I merged the responses categories for 'No, would never do this,' and 'No, would if had the chance,' and recoded the five-point original scale to four-point scale, ranging from zero to three.

The four survey items on contacting representatives were not asked in Zimbabwe for Round Three. Thus, the CPI for Zimbabwe only includes membership and communing aspects. In Round Five, the questions on how often people had contacted a local government councillor and a member of parliament were not asked in Malawi and Madagascar respectively. For these two cases, the mean scores were calculated with available data only.

The constructed index ranged from zero to three. Higher value indicated higher level of civic participation in a country. I tested the reliability and validity of my proxies, both overall CPI and its three sub-components, via exploratory factor analysis for each round at individual level before constructing a national-level index, using maximum likelihood extraction and direct oblimin rotation.

Predictor variable

The predictor variable of this study was the civil society assistance per capita disbursed to 18 sub-Saharan countries accessible at OECD CRS aid activities statistics. The data was collected based on a report from donor countries and organisations, and each country was advised to report their aid statistics following the agreed guideline by the OECD (OECD, n.d.).

The database allowed users to disaggregate total aid based on various standards: recipient country/region, scope of aid activity, channel of delivery, flow and flow type. In this research, I measured civil society assistance as grant-type aid amount disbursed to the 18 sub-Saharan countries in 2013 constant USD provided for the purpose of fostering ‘democratic participation and civil society’.

Table 2.2. OECD Aid Categories of Government and Civil Society Sector

Government and Civil Society, General
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public sector policy and administrative management • Public finance management • Decentralisation and support to sub-national government * • Anti-corruption organisations and institutions * • Legal and judicial development • Democratic participation and civil society • Elections • Legislatures and political parties * • Media and free flow of information • Human rights • Women’s equality organisations and institutions

Note. * Categories introduced to CRS from 2009 aid flow

Source. OECD Creditor Reporting System Aid Activities Database

CRS covered a wide range of categories directly related to democracy promotion, under the category of ‘government and civil society, general’. **Table 2.2.** demonstrates the list of various aid activities relevant to democracy promotion. Such categorisation of OECD CRS, based on the purpose of aid activities, was different from democracy promotion frameworks of each donor agency. Thus,

when reporting their aid statistics, donors were required to code their assistance projects based on the code descriptions suggested by OECD. Thus, it was necessary to re-organise the categories to capture civil society assistance based on the OECD guidelines. Based on the guideline, I only consider ‘democratic participation and civil society’ as my predictor variable. The List of CRS Codes (OECD, n.d.) provides a concrete description on the category as:

Support to the exercise of democracy and diverse forms of participation of citizens beyond elections; direct democracy instruments such as referenda and citizens’ initiatives; support to organisations to represent and advocate for their members, to monitor, engage and hold governments to account, and to help citizens learn to act in the public sphere; curricula and teaching for civic education at various levels. This purpose code is restricted to activities targeting governance issues. (OECD, n.d.)

According to the description, the category, ‘democratic participation and civil society’ covered the mobilisation and advocacy function of civil society that donors commonly intend to foster in general. Thus, I adopted ‘democratic participation and civil society’ as the predictor of my research. The other issue-specific categories were not the major interest of this research, as such activities did not directly engage in mobilising people, as their primary goal.

It is important to note that the classification is based on the objective scope of democracy assistance that the transferred aid intended to foster, and does not indicate that the aid is provided to civil society organisations. As mentioned previously, the data can be adjusted by the type of recipients, excluding donors’ assistance directed to state sector. However, I did not limit the type of beneficiaries to civil society organisations for two reasons. Firstly, channel of delivery was included as a basic reporting item since 2005 after modification of the OECD aid reporting system. However, this converged reporting system had been implemented voluntarily by donor countries, and as of 2010, only 21 out of 29 DAC members employed the system (DAC, 2011). For this reason, a considerable amount of democracy assistance did not have information on type of recipients. Accordingly, it was very possible that the amount of civil society assistance would be underestimated at the earlier period of the measurement around 2005, if the type of beneficiary organisation was limited to the aid provided to civil society organisations only. Secondly, when fostering civil society, donors did not solely support civil society organisations. By working with state institutions organising policy

dialogues or supporting legislation on associations or NGO activities, they aimed to found a better enabling environment for civil society as well. Thus, it was fairly logical not to differentiate the beneficiaries.

To calculate the per capita assistance provided for promoting democratic participation in the 18 sub-Saharan countries, I combined the total aid amount provided to each recipient country from 2005 to 2009, and then computed its per capita amount using the 2005 World Bank country population statistics, to take into account population at the baseline. The donors included in the CRS are 29 DAC member countries and international organisations.³

Data Limitation

In measuring civil society assistance, there are two major limitations. The first limitation is related to the aid data collection process. As explained in Chapter one, donors' foci on civil society were not identical depending on their democracy promotion strategies. However, the aid statistics were collected based on a creditor reporting system agreed by OECD. Despite detailed guidelines regarding categorisation provided by OECD, such reporting systems – re-classifying programmes after implementation based on unified codes – may not capture the concept of each programme identically due to different interpretation by each donor country (Green & Kohl, 2007: 159).

The second issue concerns the lack of data on civil society assistance provided by non-governmental donor agencies, such as Open Society Institute, Mott Foundation, etc. These private donors are known to be active supporters of civil society in democracy promotion (Burnell, 2000). However, due to the lack of data from them, civil society assistance from the private donors is excluded from this research.

Regarding the outcome variable, survey questions for associational membership are different in Round Three and Round Five. In Round Three, membership was asked in three times

³ There are four non-DAC countries - Estonia, Hungary, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates - incorporated in the CRS, but the countries did not contribute democracy assistance to the 18 sub-Saharan countries during the measurement period.

differentiating the types of civic organisations, but the three questions are merged to one question with more general terms that asked respondents' belongings to general voluntary association or community group. For Round Three, the three questions were combined, not excluding any specific type of organisations to be consistent to the corresponding item in Round five. However, as the wordings of the questions are not identical, there might be measurement errors in membership index.

2.3. Research Design

To test my hypothesis, I use cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis by investigating the correlation between the per capita amount of civil society assistance provided between 2005 and 2009 and subsequent changes in levels of civic participation in sub-Saharan Africa from 2005/6 to 2011/3, employing the OECD aid statistics and Afrobarometer survey data.

The research takes into account 18 sub-Saharan African countries, of which data is accessible from both Round Three and Round Five Afrobarometer surveys. The countries that are included in both rounds are: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Based on the OECD aid statistics, all 18 countries are the recipients of civil society assistance. However, the amount of the assistance they received varies by country. The countries are diverse, therefore, they are a good indicator to show the relationship between civil society assistance and the change in civic participation in sub-Saharan Africa.

When conducting the analysis, I firstly aggregated the individual-level survey data to the national-level and constructed an index, Civic Participation Index (CPI), for the 18 countries, as the research was cross-national comparative study. Then, in order to measure change in the level of civic participation across each of the countries, I compare two rounds of survey data, Round Three and Round Five. Thus, the operationalised outcome variable of this research is the change in CPI. Afrobarometer Round Three was conducted in 2005/2006, and Round Five in 2011/2013.⁴

⁴ For Round Three, the survey was conducted in 2005 in all countries, except for South Africa. The South African survey was done in 2006. For Round Five, the survey schedule is as follows: Benin, Cape Verde, Kenya

The Afrobarometer survey measured public attitudes on social and political environment in selected African countries. The survey asked a range of questions that capture the concept of civic participation over rounds. Thus, it allows me to compare whether there was an increase or a decrease in various forms of civic participation in the sample countries between 2005/2006 and 2011/2013. The Afrobarometer project surveyed either 1,200 or 2,400 cases as a standard sample size for a country, representing all citizens over minimum voting age. The total number of cases for the Afrobarometer survey is 25,397 for Round Three, and 32,410 for Round Five. It strictly applied random selection methods at every stage (Afrobarometer, n.d.). This sampling method provided proportionate representativeness of the survey and its reliability and validity.

Secondly, my predictor variable was the per capita amount of total foreign aid disbursed for the purpose of promoting democratic participation between 2005 and 2009. The data was available within the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Aid Activities database. The OECD aid statistics database provided aid statistics at activity level with brief descriptions. The data were collected from reports of donor countries based on a standard methodologies and definitions agreed by the OECD (OECD, 2011: 2). Thus, it was a good way to compare donors' assistance by recipient countries and to analyse trends of aid in both combined and disaggregated forms based on the parameters provided in the data, such as purpose of assistance programmes, type of recipient organisations, etc.

Employing the two variables, I conducted a simple correlation analysis between per capita aid for democratic participation and change in civic participation, both the overall CPI and its three sub-components. To examine whether donors' assistance particularly designed to promote participation had a unique relation with the change in civic participation, I included the per capita aid provided for other purposes within democracy assistance, such as public sector reform, elections, etc. Then, in order to test whether the correlation was robust after controlling for political condition of recipient countries using the change of Freedom House Index between 2005 and 2011, in that the change of

and South Africa in 2011; Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe in 2012; Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Zambia in 2013 (Afrobarometer, n.d.)

civic participation level might be due to improvement or deterioration of political environment for civil society.

Regarding the time frame for concerning my predictor variable, I captured the total aid provision from 2005 to 2009. However, by looking at the change in civic participation between 2005/6 and 2011/13 for the outcome variable, at least two-year gap is providing from the final measurement of predictor variable. This is to examine the subsequent changes in civic participation followed by the provision of civil society assistance, allowing time for the direct activity outputs to be reflected as the outcomes at the national level. Yet, I did not set the time lag for longer in order to test donors' cost-effective strategy towards civil society. As demonstrated in Chapter one, one of the donors' expectations on civil society assistance programmes is that fostering civil society would cost less and take less time to make a meaningful change. Donors usually evaluated their projects shortly after a project was completed. In case of SIDA, it conducted evaluation on its aid projects within a year after implementation (SIDA, 2008).

2.4. Conclusion

This chapter firstly outlined how I conceptualised and measured the key concepts of this research: civil society assistance and civic participation. In this analysis, I measured the predictor variable, civil society assistance, as per capita disbursed grant-type aid provided for the purpose of promoting democratic participation and civil society between 2005 and 2009 using OECD statistics. For the outcome variable, Civic Participation Index and its sub-indices were created to operationalise the concept were created employing Afrobarometer survey. To measure the subsequent change in the level of civic participation after the provision of civil society assistance, two survey rounds - Round Three (2005/6) and Round Five (2011/3) - were compared.

Then, as per my research design, a simple correlation analysis between the two variables was conducted to test the hypothesis. The correlation between civil society assistance and change in CPI and its three sub-indices, membership, communing and contacting. This separate analyses allow the research to explore whether civil society assistance had different relationships by mode of

participation. In order to confirm the hypothesis on the donors' contribution in promoting civil society, there had to be a positive correlation between civil society assistance and the change in the level or extent of civic participation, both in overall civic participation and in its three sub-components.

The measurement of this research had limitations that mainly came from data collection process. However, this study fills the research gap and contributes to the literatures on evaluating donors' democracy assistance programmes, in that it attempted to analyse the impact of donors' civil society assistance programme on recipient countries, scaling up from specific projects and communities. Also, by conducting a medium-N analysis, it allowed country comparison and generalisation of the result in sub-Saharan region.

CHAPTER 3. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

In this chapter, I firstly address the recent trend of democracy assistance to sub-Saharan Africa in general to look at civil society assistance in a comparative context, expecting to find an increasing trend of civil society assistance within donors' democracy assistance portfolio. Secondly, I unpack civil society assistance in sub-Saharan Africa by donors, to find the greatest contributor of the assistance. Then, I view it from recipients' angle. I examine sub-Saharan Africa in comparison to other regions. Furthermore, by comparing the aid amount to the 18 sub-Saharan countries, I attempt to find a pattern in the distribution of civil society assistance.

Then, the chapter discusses civic participation in the 18 sub-Saharan African countries. Firstly, it suggests the level of civic participation in 2005/6 using the Civic Participation Index (CPI), constructed based on the Afrobarometer Round Three, encompassing three modes of participation: membership, communing and contacting. It is the baseline measurement for outcome variable. It then displays the change in the level of civic participation between 2005/6 and 2011/3, which is the outcome variable employed for my hypothesis testing.

3.1. Civil society Assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, 2005-2013

3.1.1. *Democracy Assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, 2005-2013*


To test my hypothesis, I only considered the aid amount provided between 2005 and 2009. However, this section demonstrated the aid statistics up to 2013 in order to look at the most recent trend regarding civil society assistance. **Graph 3.1.** displays the total amount of democracy assistance to sub-Saharan Africa between 2005 and 2013, disaggregated by purpose.⁵ The total amount of democracy assistance to sub-Saharan Africa increased from 2.1 billion in 2005 to 3.2 billion USD in

⁵ OECD categorises democracy assistance in 11 sub-sectors (See Table 2.2.). However, Graph 3.1. displays the biggest five sectors of donors' assistance programmes. I collapsed the remaining six categories to 'Others'. The six categories included in the 'others' are: Decentralisation and support to subnational government, human rights, women's equality organisations and institutions, media and free flow of information, anticorruption organisations and institutions, legislatures and political parties. (listed by the total assistance amount - largest to smallest – between 2005 and 2013)

2010. However, after its peak in 2010, the amount had steadily decreased, recording 2.7 billion USD in 2013. Disaggregating the total democracy assistance by purpose, ‘public sector policy and administrative management’ was the sector to which donors allocated the most amount of democracy aid. The greatest amount was distributed to the sector in 2008, 1.2 billion USD, but since then it has consistently shrunk, recording the lowest amount, 550.3 million USD in 2013. Meanwhile, the assistance for ‘democratic participation and civil society,’ the second largest sector within donors’ total democracy assistance, had been continuously growing over time, ascending from 272.5 million in 2005 to 562.2 million USD in 2013. Especially in 2013, the assistance for democratic participation exceeded that for public sector policy. The distribution to this sector peaked in 2012, with the amount of 648.5 million USD. The third largest category was ‘public finance management.’ Donors’ support for the category sharply increased from 186.9 million in 2006 to 563.3 million USD in 2007, but similar to ‘public sector policy and administrative management,’ it had been descending since then. Electoral assistance followed. It did not show a consistent fluctuating trend by year, but it was by far lower amount than the assistance for democratic participation. Its annual average between 2005 and 2013 was 257.8 million USD. The legal and judicial development sector was the fifth greatest sub-sector in the democracy assistance portfolio. Its amount steadily increased during the same period from 171.7 million in 2005 to 319.9 million USD in 2013 like the ‘democratic participation and civil society’ sector, but its increased amount was lower than that of ‘democratic participation and civil society.’ The amount for ‘others’ category, which was composed of six sub-sectors as of 2009, sharply increased from 281.1 million in 2008 to 669.9 million \$ in 2009 as three new categories were introduced in the OECD Creditor Reporting System.⁶ (For raw aid statistics, see **Appendix A.1.1.**)


⁶ The three new categories introduced from 2009 are: ‘Decentralisation and support to sub-national government’, ‘Anti-corruption and institutions’, and ‘Legislatures and political parties’.

Graph 3.1. Portfolio of Democracy Assistance to sub-Saharan Africa by Purpose, Total Amount, 2005-2013



Note. Disbursed grant-type aid amount in 2013 constant million USD
Source. OECD Aid Statistics

Graph 3.2. Portfolio of Democracy Assistance to sub-Saharan Africa by Purpose, Percentage (%), 2005-2013



Source. OECD Aid Statistics

The percentage of each sub-sector shows much clearer comparison of the sub-categories within donors' democracy assistance (**Graph 3.2.**). The 'public sector policy and administrative management' shared nearly half of the total democracy assistance from 2005 (45.1%) to 2008 (43.5%). However, as the aid distributed to the sectors declined from 2008, its proportion sharply


dropped to 26.5 percent in 2009, and the percentage hit its lowest record at 20.3 percent in 2013. Regarding ‘democratic participation and civil society’, its share did not change drastically like public policy sector, but had been consistently ascending from 13.2 percent in 2005 to 20.8 percent in 2013. In 2013, the democratic participation sector occupied the highest share of the total democracy assistance as a single category, exceeding ‘public sector policy and administrative management’ for the first time. ‘Public finance management’ recorded its annual average at 13.1 percent between 2005 and 2013. The proportion of electoral assistance fluctuated by year, sharing 9.4 percent in average. The share of other categories was less than 10 percent in 2005. However, owing to the aforementioned reason, introduction of three new categories, their share jumped to 23.3 percent in 2009, and recorded 29.1 percent in 2013. Among the ‘other’ sectors, the three pre-existing categories relevant to civil society activities, ‘human rights’, ‘women’s equality organisations and institutions’, and ‘media and free flow of information’, had been also increasing, occupying 9 percent in 2005 and 14.5 percent in 2013. The three sectors account for 10.7 percent in total. (**Appendix A.1.2.**)

Summarising the recent trend of democracy assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, donors still focused more on reforming or improving public sector than any other sectors within their democracy assistance portfolio, in that ‘public sector policy and administrative management’ and ‘public finance management’ take account of an average of 46 percent of total democracy assistance per annum provided to sub-Saharan Africa from 2005 to 2013. However, it was noticeable that the assistance for public sector has been consistently decreasing. On the other hand, donors’ assistance allocated for ‘democratic participation and civil society’, the predictor variable of this research, was the second largest sub-sector in democracy assistance in total, and its amount and proportion have been steadily growing over time. Such trends reflected donors’ growing interest on building civil society as a strategy to promote democracy. Assistance to other sub-sectors relevant to civil society activities, such as human rights, women’s equality and media, did not share a large proportion within donors’ democracy assistance, but their proportion had been slowly increasing as well. Meanwhile, electoral assistance, which donors prioritised at the early stage of democracy assistance, was not the top priority of donors’ democracy promotion strategies.

3.1.2. Donors' Assistance for Democratic Participation to sub-Saharan Africa, 2005-2013

Donors' assistance for 'democratic participation and civil society' did not form the largest allocation of democracy assistance. Still, it shared a significant percentage of total democracy assistance, 17.7 percent in total, and the proportion had been steadily increasing. This section narrows down the focus to assistance to democratic participation to sub-Saharan Africa, disaggregating it by donor.

Graph 3.3. Total Assistance for Democratic Participation to sub-Saharan Africa by Donor, 2005-2013



Note. Disbursed grant-type aid amount in 2013 constant million USD.

Source: OECD Aid Statistics

As displayed in **Graph 3.3.**, the majority of the assistance for democratic participation came from the five biggest donors: the EU Institutions, Germany, Sweden, UK and Norway. The EU was not the largest contributor for democratic participation in 2005 but drastically increased its support from 17.4 million USD in 2005 to 98.6 million USD in 2008, and the amount reached its peak, 108.1 million USD, in 2010. The UK and Sweden steadily increased their support for democratic participation. Sweden provided 11.2 million USD in 2005, but the amount expanded to 103.7 million USD in 2013. The UK also showed similar trend, increasing its assistance from 24.3 million USD in 2005 to 115.2 million USD in 2013. The assistance from Germany and Norway were stable with modest changes over time, 69.5 million and 48.6 million USD per annum each on average. (**Appendix A.1.3.**) Surprisingly, the US, which is traditionally known to be a great contributor of

democracy assistance, was only the seventh biggest donor for ‘democratic participation and civil society’ in sub-Saharan Africa, following Denmark. However, such small amount of the US civil society assistance could be possibly due to the definitional issue of aid reporting system. As mentioned in the *data limitation* section in Chapter Two, donor agencies had to categorise their aid activities when they reported to the reporting system based on the unified descriptions provided by OECD. From this point of view, one possible explanation is that the US civil society aid might have a slightly different definition from what was included in ‘democratic participation’ at OECD creditor reporting system.

Graph 3.4. Assistance for Democratic Participation to sub-Saharan Africa by Donor, Percentage (%), 2005-2013



Source: OECD Aid Statistics

Due to the changes in the amount of assistance provided by donor each year, a single country or institution did not remain as the biggest or smallest donor. For example, Germany that used to be the greatest donor in 2005 accounting for 17 percent of total assistance for democratic participation, ranked only fourth, at 12.1 percent in 2013. Meanwhile, the percentage of Swedish assistance ascended from 4.1 in 2005 to 18.4 percent in 2013. (Graph 3.4. & Appendix A.1.4.) However, it was clear that the five biggest contributors consistently shared over 60 percent of the total assistance provided by all donors since 2006, 62.2 percent on average. Especially in 2013, 72 percent of the total assistance for democratic participation was from the five donor countries or institution.

Analysing the proportion of assistance for democratic participation among each donor's own democracy assistance amount to find how much emphasis each donor agency put on democratic participation within their democracy promotion policies, Germany and Sweden similarly allocated a third of their total democracy assistance to democratic participation between 2005 and 2013, 33 percent and 32.4 percent respectively. However, their trends were different: the percentage of Swedish democratic participation assistance within its total democracy assistance sharply increased from 10.9 to 41.2 percent from 2005 to 2013, while that of Germany showed a slightly decreasing trend, declining from 37.3 to 26.9 during the same period. The EU moderately increased its allocation for democratic participation from 4.4 in 2005 to 17.6 percent in 2013.


3.1.3. Recipients of Donors' Assistance for Democratic Participation, 2005-2013

Graph 3.5. presents the flow of assistance for democratic participation by recipient region. The graph separates Africa into three groupings, 'South of Sahara,' 'North of Sahara' and 'Africa, regional' based on OECD categorisation to specify the assistance provided to sub-Saharan Africa, the main area of interest for this research.⁷ Asia was the biggest recipient region of democratic participation assistance, followed by sub-Saharan Africa according to OECD statistics.⁸ However, the gap between the two regions has been narrowing down, and the amount that sub-Saharan Africa received surpassed that of Asia between 2009 and 2012. The assistance provided to sub-Saharan Africa doubled from 272.4 million in 2005 to 562.2 million USD in 2013. The assistance distributed to America and Europe was significantly less than that to Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the assistance toward the America and Europe was in a declining trend, while the amounts distributed to Asia and sub-Saharan Africa were increasing in general. However, it was necessary to note that a considerable amount of aid statistics did not contain information on recipient region. (**Appendix A.1.5.**)

⁷ 'Africa, regional' indicates for the cross-national projects, not directly focusing on one country.

⁸ Asia includes Middle East Asia.


Graph 3.5. Total Assistance for Democratic Participation by Recipient Region, 2005-2013



Note. Disbursed grant-type aid amount in 2013 constant million USD.

Source: OECD Aid Statistics

Graph 3.6. Assistance for Democratic Participation by Recipient Region, Percentage (%), 2005-2013




Source: OECD Aid Statistics

Sub-Saharan Africa had been steadily accounting for over 20 percent of total donors' assistance for democratic participation since 2008. (Graph 3.6. & Appendix A.1.6.). Such a high proportion is fairly logical, in that the greatest amount of aid for democratic participation had flowed into sub-Saharan Africa from 2009 to 2012 as noticed from the total amount figures in the previous section.

3.1.4. Democratic Participation Assistance to 18 Sub-Saharan African Countries, 2005-2009

Narrowing down the range to the 18 sub-Saharan African countries between 2005 and 2009 for the further analysis in this research, the total amount of the assistance that each country received between 2005 and 2009 varied considerably, ranging from 5.2 million for Botswana to 136.7 million USD for Tanzania. The country mean amount of total aid for democratic participation was 61.1 million USD. (Graph 3.7. & Appendix A.2.1.)

Graph 3.7. Total Foreign Assistance for Democratic Participation to 18 sub-Saharan Countries, 2005-2009




Note. Disbursed grant-type aid amount in 2013 constant million USD.

Source. OECD Aid Statistics

Despite the large amount of total assistance for democratic participation provided to each country for the five years of measurement, the average civil society assistance per capita provided to the 18 sub-Saharan countries during the same period is 4.6 USD. (Graph 3.8. & Appendix A.2.3.) Cape Verde, whose population is less than five hundred thousand, received the highest per capita civil society assistance, 12.9 USD, despite having a total assistance amount that was the second smallest among the eighteen countries, 6.2 million USD. On the other hand, Nigeria, the most populated country in sub-Saharan Africa, got less than a dollar, 0.3 USD per capita, during the same period.

Graph 3.8. Per Capita Assistance for Democratic Participation to 18 sub-Saharan Countries, 2005-2009



Note. Disbursed grant-type aid amount in 2013 constant million USD.

Source: OECD Aid Statistics

Distribution of Assistance for Democratic Participation: consideration of political condition

As the data has shown, there is a clear difference in aid allocation by recipient country. Which raises the question: why do some countries receive more civil society assistance than others? According to various donors' policy reports on democracy assistance, donors set different principles in democracy promotion depending on the political environment of the recipient countries. A clear comparison of their policies was difficult, as the donors perceived situations in different ways. Still, donors tended to particularly highlight the role of civil society as a crucial driving force of democratic change in authoritarian regimes due to the restricted options for donors to take. In a liberal environment, donor strategies got more diverse based on their own analyses of the political conditions in recipient countries; balancing their approaches between public sector and civil society (USAID, 2013; SIDA, 2007; BMZ, 2009). If this basic policy framework was applied in the aid allocation, it was anticipated that there would a correlation between regime type and the total assistance distributed to recipient countries - less liberal states would receive more assistance for democratic participation than more liberal ones.

Conducting a simple correlation analysis using 2005 Freedom House Index (FHI) and total democratic participation assistance between 2005 and 2009, the results showed that there is a

significant positive correlation with a Pearson coefficient of 0.47 at 0.05 level.⁹ In other words, donors gave larger amounts of assistance to countries that are less democratic. Such correlation between the total amount of civil society assistance and 2005 FHI in the 18 sub-Saharan countries did not suggest a causal relationship between the two variables. However, the fairly high correlation coefficient suggested that the political environment of the recipient countries in terms of their states of freedom may be considered by the donors in aid distribution in practice. (For the 2005 FHI, see **Appendix A.2.4.**)

3.2. Civic Participation in 18 sub-Saharan African Countries

This section demonstrates the level of civic participation. It firstly displays the participation level of all population in 2005/6. The level of civic participation was measured using the Civic Participation Index (CPI) which was based on the nine Afrobarometer survey items (in case of Round Three).¹⁰ It then moves on to the descriptive analysis on the change in the level of civic participation between 2005/6 and 2011/3 which is the outcome variable of this research.

I constructed a proxy of civic participation, CPI, aggregating the individual-level Afrobarometer survey to a national-level index. It encompassed three sub-components by the modes of participation: membership, communing and contacting. Despite CPI as the key measurement for overall civic participation, it was important to disaggregate the index by sub-components, in that people's participation demonstrated different patterns by sub-component. Thus, I also constructed indices for each sub-component separately – Membership Index, Communing Index and Contacting Index. To test the validity of the indices, factor analysis was conducted using maximum-likelihood extraction and the direct-oblimin rotation technique for both Round Three and Round Five. Reliability of the indices was also tested.

⁹ Freedom House Index ranges from one to seven measuring political rights and civil liberties: one represents the freest and seven indicates the least free.

¹⁰ For Round Five, seven survey items were employed, as the questions for associational membership have changed.

The result for overall CPI for Round Three demonstrated that the nine variables included in the measurement explained 43.63% of the variance cumulatively with high reliability (Cronbach's alpha= 0.73). Being consistent to the conceptual categorisation, the result extracted three factors. (**Appendix B.2.1.**) As for Round five, the seven items explained 47.9% of the variance in total. Its reliability was also high with Cronbach's alpha at 0.74.¹¹ (**Appendix B.2.2.**) Reliability tests and factor analyses were also conducted for each sub-index where applicable. The results showed that the three sub-indices are also valid and reliable.¹²

The CPI and its sub-indices are constructed based on the mean score of each type of participation, ranging from one to three. The higher value indicates the more active participation in each civic activity.

3.2.1. Level of Civic Participation in 18 Sub-Saharan Countries in 2005/2006

The outcome variable for this research was the change in civic participation. However, it was necessary to demonstrate the level of participation at the reference point before analysing the change. Firstly, analysing the level of civic participation by sub-index, communing was the most prominent way of participation across all countries, with the highest mean score compared to other modes of participation. The mean values of each sub-index were: 1.2 for communing, 0.35 for membership and 0.29 for contacting. (**Graph 3.9.**)¹³ Furthermore, the communing indices were considerably different by country, ranging from 1.74 for Madagascar to 0.65 in Cape Verde. In terms of membership, Kenya showed the highest index at 0.66, while Madagascar had the lowest, 0.15. The level of participation in contacting representatives was slightly lower than associational membership in general - the


¹¹ The factor analysis results for Round Five extracted two factors – items for membership and civic action as one factor and those for political contact as the other. However, factor loading for associational membership, 0.44, is distinctively lower than those for the other two items: 0.84 for attend a community meeting, and 0.78 for join others to raise an issue. Thus, it is acceptable to keep three conceptual categories for civic participation.

¹² For Round Three, Cronbach's alphas of three membership variables, two communing variables and four contacting items were 0.58, 0.74 and 0.72 respectively. For Round Five, two communing items and four contacting variables both had Cronbach's alpha at 0.75.

¹³ Four questions on political contact were not asked in Zimbabwe for Round Three survey. Thus, in the CPI for Zimbabwe does not contain political contact component.


contacting index was the highest in Uganda (0.46) and the lowest in Madagascar (0.15). (**Appendix C.1.1.**)

Graph 3.9. Civic Participation Index of 18 sub-Saharan Countries by sub-Category, 2005/6



Note. Countries ordered by Communing Index: the highest to the lowest.
Source: Afrobarometer Round 3

Graph 3.10. Civic Participation Index of 18 sub-Saharan Countries, 2005/6



Source: Afrobarometer Round 3

According to Verba and Nie (1987) such low levels of political contact across all countries compared to the two other sub-components could be accounted for by the different characteristic of the activity. In the explanation on the modes of democratic participation, the authors noted that

contacting representatives was the most distinctive mode compared to other types of participation, in that individuals may take their own initiative regarding their agenda to contact a representative or an official, thus the outcome of the activity can be either collective or particularised. Furthermore, since the individuals motivated themselves and chose an occasion to take such action, it required a stronger initiative than other types of actions (Verba & Nie, 1987: 52). Due to such features of contacting activity, the difficulty of the action could be higher in comparison to other modes of participation, and thus result in the lower level of participation in contacting.

Graph 3.10. displays the aggregated CPI of the 18 sub-Saharan countries in 2005/2006 for all populations; the baseline level of civic participation. The overall level of civic participation was not high in general. The mean CPI of the 18 countries was 0.62, and the index ranged from 0.85 for Tanzania to 0.37 for Cape Verde. The original scale of the index was between zero and three, the higher value indicating more active participation in civic activities.


3.2.3. Change in Civic Participation between 2005/6 and 2011/3

This section explores the change in the CPI from 2005/6 to 2011/3 from the baseline level of civic participation demonstrated in the previous section, as the research aimed to examine whether there was any meaningful positive change in civic participation with the provision of donors' assistance for promoting democratic participation.

Graph 3.11. disaggregated the overall CPI change by each sub-component - membership, communing and contacting. Among the three sub-indices, the membership index increased in all 18 countries, ranging from 0.57 (Mali) to 0.02 (Ghana), with mean value of 0.28 (**Graph 3.11.**). Especially in Mali, Tanzania (0.51) and Senegal (0.48), the indices increased by around 0.5 points between the two rounds of the survey. Such change was meaningful in that engaging citizens as members of civic organisations are one of the immediate targets of donors' civil society projects as demonstrated in Chapter One (see **Section 1.2.3.**). However, it was possible that such an increase was derived from the changes in the survey questions on associational membership from Round Three to Round Five. The Round Three survey asked for individual's associations to specific types of

organisations, such as trade unions, business associations or community development organisations, while Round Five asked people’s memberships of any kind of voluntary or community organisations. Still, it was meaningful that the membership level had increased across all countries in regards to the hypothesis of this research.

Graph 3.11. Change in Civic Participation Index by sub-Category, 2005/6-2011/3




Note. Countries ordered by membership index change: highest to lowest
Source: Afrobarometer Round 3 and Round 5

There was no considerable change in the mean indices of communing and contacting, -0.02 and zero respectively, but the two modes of participation showed different patterns. The level of contacting representatives did not change substantially across countries ranging from 0.18 (Madagascar) to -0.15 (Lesotho). On the other hand, the change of the communing index varied by country. Malawi (1.09) showed the largest positive change in communing level, while Madagascar had the greatest negative shift (-0.9). (**Appendix C.3.1.**)

Such drastic changes in the communing index in the two countries at the opposite ends were exceptional compared to other countries. Extending the time frame of analysis for the two cases, employing all available rounds of Afrobarometer data for each each country, it was shown that the changes in the two countries occurred drastically between Round Four to Round Five. Drastic domestic political situations in the two countries may provide a preliminary explanation to the changes. Firstly, in case of Madagascar, the level of participation in communing activities sharply

decreased from 2005 to 2013. It was possible that the steady decline was due to the exacerbated political environment in the country since the military coup in 2009. According to the country analysis by Freedom House, freedom of assembly had been harshly restricted since the 2009 military coup. Reflecting this, the Malagasy Freedom House Index dropped from three in 2005 to five in 2013 (Freedom House [FH], n.d.).

Graph 3.12. Participation Level in Communing in Madagascar, 2005-2015




Source. Afrobarometer Round 3, Round 4, Round 5 and Round 6

Afrobarometer survey data also showed that Malagasy citizens participated less in communing activities after 2009. Analysing the recent trend of people’s participation in communing, employing four rounds of Afrobarometer survey from Round Three (2005) to Round Six (2015), there was an extensive decrease in the participation level for communing activities after 2009; the communing index being dropped from 1.58 (in 2008) to 0.84 (in 2013).¹⁴ Furthermore, the communing score additionally fell to 0.61 point in 2015 (**Graph 3.12**). Such a downward trend could be attributed to the regressed political environment in the country as reported by Freedom House.

¹⁴ Madagascar is included in the Afrobarometer survey from Round Three (2005).

Graph 3.13. Participation Level in Communing in Malawi, 1999-2015



Source. Afrobarometer Round 1, Round 2, Round 3, Round 4, Round 5 and Round 6


In contrast, communing in Malawi surged during the same period. Analysing the Malawian communing index from Afrobarometer survey Round One to Round Six, which covered from 1999 to 2015, it demonstrated that the score spiked in 2012, amid its general upward trend. On the next survey round in 2015, the index dropped (**Graph 3.13**). Considering that there were nationwide protests triggered by the worsening economic situation in the country in 2011 (Cammack, 2012), a year before the Round Five survey was conducted, the sharp increase in the communing index of Malawi could be explained as a transient fluctuation derived from the mass protests, rather than general regression of its political environment. Thus, I adjusted this factor for my hypothesis testing, by substituting the Round Five communing index (2.27) to the mean value of Round Four (1.56) and Round Six scores (1.99) – 1.78. The adjusted communing index changed from 2005 to 2013 is 0.60, and the CPI changed for Malawi used for further analyses is 0.23. (See **Appendix C.2.1.** & **C.3.1.** For the adjusted table, See **Appendix C.3.2.**)

Combining all three scopes of CPI, the extent of change was not substantial with the mean CPI change at 0.09. Considering that the index scale ranged between zero and three, it could be said that the mean value of 0.09 was minuscule. The index increased in 13 out of the 18 sub-Saharan countries. There was no change in Botswana and South Africa, and even dropped in Namibia (-0.01), Ghana (-0.12) and Madagascar (-0.21). Except for Madagascar, the four countries with no or negative

changes in the CPI – Botswana, South Africa, Namibia and Ghana - were relatively more democratic than the other countries. Originally, the CPI of Malawi (0.39) increased the most. However after the adjustment, Tanzania (0.24) showed the greatest increase, while Madagascar was at the opposite end. (Graph 3.14.)

Negative CPI changes in some countries and marginal increases in CPI in general were not ideal considering that all 18 countries were recipients of donors’ democratic participation assistance. However, such minor change in civic participation in general was not surprising theoretically, in that fostering a civic culture was often known to be a long-term process, according to political culture theories (Verba & Nie, 1963).

Graph 3.14. Change in Civic Participation Index, 2005/6-2011/3



Source: Afrobarometer Round 3 and Round 5

Note: Adjusted CPI change for Malawi (0.23) is displayed in this table.

In relation to the hypothesis of this research, the negative changes in both the overall CPI and its sub-categories were not desirable, in that donors expected to promote people’s participation in civic activities when they provided civil society assistance, not the opposite. However, such dissimilar changes in the overall civic participation and its sub-components by country provided a possibility that the difference may be connected to the amount of civil society assistance that was provided to each country.

3.3. Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated the descriptive analyses of predictor and outcome variables of this research: per capita aid for democratic participation and change in the level of civic participation in 18 sub-Saharan countries.

The section started by analysing the total democratic participation assistance to sub-Saharan Africa in comparative perspective. Within donors' democracy promotion programmes, the sector shared the second largest proportion of aid following 'public policy and administration management.' Furthermore, aid provided to foster democratic participation and civil society had been steadily increasing, while that for public sector reforms were in downward trend. This trend reflected donors' growing interest in fostering civil society as a way to promote democracy. In regards to the recipient of the aid, sub-Saharan Africa was the second biggest recipients after Asia. Narrowing down the range to the 18 sub-Saharan countries for the further analysis, all of them received donors' assistance for the purpose of promoting democratic participation, but the amount varied by country. Considering that there was a fairly high correlation between the per capita aid for democratic participation and 2005 Freedom House Index, which indicated that more civil society assistance was provided to less democratic countries, it was possible that political environment of recipient countries may have been taken into consideration when donors allocate the aid.

Regarding the change in civic participation, the overall CPI did not change considerably between 2005/6 and 2011/3 in general. By disaggregating the index by its three sub-indices - membership, communing and contacting - the three modes of participation showed different patterns in their variance. The membership index increased across all countries, while the contacting index change was close to zero. Such increased participation in membership activities in all countries was desirable, considering that donors firstly aimed to increase members of beneficiary organisations as agents to foster active citizens, who are generally more active in civic activities. In terms of the communing index, the change varied by country significantly. Two countries, Madagascar and Malawi, where there were drastic changes in domestic politics showed extensive changes during the

period. Such domestic factors were taken into account and adjusted for the further analyses. Overall, the changes in the level of participation were not uniform by type of activities. Such different change patterns implied that the civil society assistance might affect mode of participation differently.

CHAPTER 4. ANALYTICAL ANALYSIS & HYPOTHESIS TESTING

The previous chapter demonstrated the trend of donors' democracy assistance. Furthermore, it displayed the level of civic participation in the 18 sub-Saharan countries employing a construct, CPI, and its change from 2005 to 2013. In general, the CPI did not change considerably. However, there were different patterns displayed by mode of participation: the membership level increased in all countries, and contacting representatives remained nearly the same over time. The change in civic action varied by country.

By conducting simple correlation analyses between the per capita assistance for democratic participation and the change in the level of civic participation – for both overall CPI and for each mode of activities - this chapter examines whether different the changes in civic participation among the countries during the time of measurement were related to the per capita amount of assistance for democratic participation provided in the 18 sub-Saharan countries. It was demonstrated in Chapter One that the donors aimed to influence more citizen engagement in various civic activities not only at target organisations but also at a broader level, such as at country level, by providing financial and technical assistance to civil society organisations. In accordance with the donors' intentions of civil society support, I expected to find a positive correlation between per capita aid for democratic participation and change in the level of civic participation, both in overall CPI and in its sub-categories: membership, communing and contacting. In other words, the level of civic participation would increase to a larger extent in the countries where more donors' assistance for the purpose is provided. In order to examine its unique relationship, the correlations between the per capita aid of other democracy assistance programmes and change in the civic participation level were compared.

4.1. Association between Donors' Assistance and Change in Civic Participation

The first model (**Table 4.1.**) demonstrates the pearson correlation coefficients between changes in the indicies of civic participation - both overall CPI and its three sub-components - and

each democracy assistance programme.¹⁵ (For total and per capita aid provided to other democracy assistance programmes between 2005 and 2009, see **Appendix A.2.5 & A.2.6.**) The results indicated that donors’ assistance for the purpose of promoting ‘democratic participation and civil society’ was significantly related to the change in overall civic participation of ordinary citizens with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.515 at significance level below 0.05. Disaggregating the CPI by its sub-indices, only the Communing Index change was positively correlated to the per capita assistance for democratic participation ($r=0.618$, $p<0.01$). In other words, citizens in the countries with more per capita assistance became more active participants in communing activities, such as in attending community meetings or in joining others to raise issues, from 2005/6 to 2011/3, compared to those in the countries with less per capita assistance for democratic participation. In terms of associational membership, despite the increase in membership index in all 18 countries, it was shown that such an increase was not related to the per capita aid for democratic participation that each country received. Change in the Contacting Index was also not correlated to the per capita DP assistance.

In short, the results indicated that there was a greater positive change in overall civic participation in the countries where more per capita assistance for DP was distributed, but such relation was driven by the change in communing, not the other types of participation.

Table 4.1. Correlation between Civic Participation Change and Per Capita Assistance of Democracy Programmes in 18 sub-Saharan countries¹⁶

	DP	HR	WOM	MED	PSP	PFM	LEG	ELEC
CPI change	0.515*	0.291	-0.335	0.274	0.234	0.011	0.207	0.502*
Change in membership	0.140	0.054	-0.150	0.044	0.191	0.026	0.025	0.063
Change in communing	0.618**	0.306	0.147	0.228	0.268	0.129	0.290	0.552*
Change in contacting	-0.261	-0.332	-0.322	0.070	-0.109	-0.304	-0.077	0.133

Note. $N=18$

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Among other democracy assistance programmes except for democratic participation, only ‘elections’ had a statistically significant correlation with overall CPI change ($r= 0.502$, $p < 0.05$) which was also led by the positive correlation with the Communing Index change ($r= 0.552$, $p < 0.05$).


¹⁵ Among the eleven categories of donors’ democracy assistance programmes, three sectors included to the creditor reporting system from 2009 are excluded.

¹⁶ DP=Democratic participation and civil society, HR=Human rights, WOM= Women’s equality organisations and institutions, PSP= Public sector policy and administrative management, PFM=Public finance management, LEG= Legal and judicial development, ELEC=Elections, MED= Media and free flow of information. For total aid and per capita aid provided to each sector between 2005 and 2009, see **Appendix A.2.5. & A.2.6.**)

Its correlations with membership and political contact were not statistically significant. This could be understood in that the electoral assistance included activities that intended to promote citizen participation in regards to elections, such as voter education according to OECD codes definition (OECD, n.d.). However, it was also important to note that such a significant relation was meaningful due to the minuscule amount of per capita assistance provided for elections. Per capita electoral assistance distributed to the 18 sub-Saharan countries between 2005 and 2009 ranged from 3.4 USD (Cape Verde) to 0.01 USD (Senegal). (**Appendix A.2.6.**)

As communing activity was the only type of participation which had a significant correlation with per capita aid for democratic participation, a scatter plot focusing on the relation between per capita DP assistance and the Communing Index change was presented to investigate the relationship in more details (**Graph 4.1.**) Even though the Pearson coefficient was fairly high, the slope of the regression line ($y=0.0552x-0.3$, $r\text{-square}=0.384$) was nearly flat, as the extent of change was marginal in general. Furthermore, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, the Communing Index actually decreased from 2005 to 2013 in eight out of the 18 countries overall, with the mean of -0.02. Thus, the countries with relatively smaller amount of per capita assistance for democratic participation actually tended to show decreases in their participation level in communing activities. Among the seven countries that received more than the average per capita aid for democratic participation, 4.6 USD, provided to the 18 sub-Saharan countries, all countries increased in the Communing Index at least, except for Namibia, even though the changes were minuscule in general. However, among the 11 countries with assistance smaller than 4.6 USD, seven countries regressed in their Communing Index. Thus, it can be summarised that it was more probable for a country with greater per capita DP assistance to have a positive change in its Communing Index between 2005/6 and 2011/3.

Graph 4.1. Scatter Plot between Per Capita Democratic Participation Assistance and Communing Index Change in 18 sub-Saharan countries



However, it was necessary to take into account the Malagasy case, as its exceptionally sharp decline in its communing level from 2005 to 2013 was possibly due to the drastic regression in the domestic political environment after the military coup in 2009, not because of the low level of donors' assistance for democratic participation. Accordingly, another correlation analysis was conducted using the same variables, excluding Madagascar. As in **Table 4.2.**, the pearson coefficient between per capita aid for democratic participation and the overall CPI change is not statistically significant anymore. However, the correlation between per capita DP aid and the Communing Index change remained significant with slightly lower pearson coefficient ($r=0.6$) with the level of significance below 0.05.

Table 4.2. Correlation between Civic Participation Change and Per Capita Assistance of Democracy Programmes in 17 sub-Saharan countries excluding Madagascar

	DP	HR	WOM	MED	PSP	PFM	LEG	ELEC
CPI change	0.436	0.166	-0.139	0.198	0.218	-0.097	0.177	0.512*
Change in membership	0.048	-0.038	-0.205	-0.020	0.170	-0.025	-0.010	0.015
Change in communing	0.600*	0.160	0.074	0.126	0.283	0.027	0.303	0.638**
Change in contacting	-0.125	-0.208	-0.296	0.210	-0.058	-0.257	-0.018	0.254

Note. N=17

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Reviewing the relations between other democracy assistance programmes and changes in civic participation, electoral assistance was the only sector that had a significant correlation with the changes of overall CPI and the Communing Index which was similar to the previous model.

As explained in Chapter Two, the donors considered pre-existing political environment of recipient countries as an important factor to allocate civil society assistance, as the activities of CSOs were highly influenced by the political condition. Also, from Chapter Three, it was confirmed that there were extensive changes in the level of civic participation in the countries where there were drastic changes in domestic politics. Hence, I conducted a regression analysis controlling for the change in Freedom House Index(FHI) change between 2005 and 2011, in order to take into account the influence of improved or deteriorated political situation of recipient countries on the Communing Index change (For FHI change from 2005 to 2011, see **Appendix A.2.4.**). In this regression analysis I did not exclude Madagascar, as the change of its domestic political environment was included as a control variable.

Table 4.3. Summary of Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Communing Index Change from Democratic Participation Assistance per capita and Political Environment

Variable	B	SE	b
(contant)	-0.192	0.095	0.061
DPA per captia	0.037	0.089	0.419*
FHI change	-0.229	0.089	-0.479*
Variance explained (R²)		0.571	
Adjusted R²		0.514	

*Note. N= 18, Outcome Variable = Communing Index Change, * p<0.05*

Firstly, the model was significant with the signifiance level below 0.01, and its Adjusted R² of the overall regression model was 0.514, explaining 51.4% of the variance of the Communing Index change. The standardised beta of democratic participation aid per capita and the FHI change were both significant at the 0.05 level, and both per capita democratic participation aid and the change in political environment measured by the FHI change are conducive to the Communing Index change. Among the two variables, the change of political environment ($b=-0.479$) was a better predictor for the Communing Index change, indicating that the level of participation in communing activities

increased where political environment improved. In regards to per capita democratic participation aid, it had slightly lower standardised beta than FHI change, but it was still significant controlling for the FHI change ($b=0.419$). In other words, when more civil society assistance was allocated to the citizens of recipient countries, they became more active participants in communing activities even when political condition is controlled. This regression analysis robustly holds the correlation between the provision of civil society assistance and the subsequent change in the communing index change.

In summary, there was no significant correlation between per capita aid for democratic participation and change in the overall level of citizen participation, when Madagascar, a country with a drastic change in its domestic politics, was excluded from the model. Disaggregating by mode of civic participation, communing activities were the only type of participation that showed a significant relationship with per capita DP aid. Such positive relationship was consistent even when the domestic political condition was considered. Hence, the results suggested that per capita assistance for democratic participation would be a positive factor that promoted citizens' participation in communing activities.

Regarding the other mode of participation, the Contacting Index remained nearly the same over the two rounds of surveys across all countries and its correlation with per capita DP assistance was not significant. In terms of associational membership, the Membership Index increased in all 18 sub-Saharan countries. However, such an increase in the 18 countries was not related to the amount of per capita assistance provided to promote democratic participation.

Collating all the results, I rejected the overarching hypothesis of this research that civil society assistance promoted overall levels of civic participation. However, the data supported a positive correlation between per capita assistance for democratic participation and change in the Communing Index even when the political environment of each country was held constant. Thus, it can be concluded that the donors' assistance for democratic participation was positively related with a certain type of participation, which is communing activity.

4.2. Discussion

Summarising the analyses, one of the major findings is that foreign civil society assistance that particularly focused on promoting democratic participation was selectively related to a certain mode of civic activities. As demonstrated in the previous section, the assistance is significantly correlated to the change in communing activities only.

With regards to the selective significant correlation between the DP assistance and the change in communing activities, it can be interpreted by the characteristics of the donor-funded civil society projects. Donors' short-term projects focusing on highly visible activities, such as conferences, radio programmes, etc. were pointed out as their biggest limitations (Zeeuw, 2007). A project evaluation of USAID and SIDA demonstrated in Chapter One also suggested raising public awareness and obtaining wider public support on their agenda via campaigning, public forums, local radio programmes, were considered as the important criteria in their projects. Such type of ad hoc projects may be effective to raise public awareness and promote citizens' participation for temporary communing activities, such as signing on petition, etc. However, the short-term projects may not be enough to convert citizens into active participants endorsing them as members of civic organisations or motivating them to directly contact political representatives on public agenda.

In addition, the non-significant relationship between civil society assistance and membership level change can be explained by the different strategies of donors. Although the donors' intention to build civil society is to hold government accountable or to promote democracy, their focus on fostering civil society was different. As demonstrated in Chapter One, USAID and SIDA tended to balance strategy between promoting citizen participation at the individual level and strengthening capabilities of recipient organisations in advocacy roles at the organisational level. However, BMZ tended to focus more on organisational development in enhancing advocacy or skills of beneficiary organisations to better negotiate with government officials.

Furthermore, professional civic organisations such as think tanks are not heavily membership-based and do not promote individuals' participation in their activities. Rather, they tend to pressure

governments by disseminating information to the public, collaborating with media. Since not all donor-funded organisations or projects aim to promote individuals' participation, civil society assistance may not directly increase individuals' participation in different civic activities .

Compiling all analyses conducted in the research, the results, also raised an intrinsic question, whether foreign civil society assistance can play a major role in building more participatory civil society during a short period of time. The extent of change in civic participation level was overall minimal regardless of the types of activities, except in countries which experienced drastic domestic political changes, such as Madagascar and Malawi. Such results show that domestic political environment was a stronger motivation for individuals to participate in civic activities than short-term donors' assistance.

It is important to note that only simple correlation analysis was conducted in this research due to the small number of cases (18 countries). Thus, the analysis does not explain a causal relationship between the two variables. In addition, the correlation between per capita assistance for democratic participation and indices of civic participation, both overall and disaggregated ones, showed mixed results. However, it is still meaningful in that there was a fairly high positive correlation between the per capita DP aid and the Communing Index change during such a short period of time. This opens a possibility on the positive impact of civil society assistance on promoting democratic participation when longer period of time was considered.

4.3. Conclusion

This chapter tested my hypothesis, by conducting correlation analyses between per capita assistance for democratic participation and change in the level of civic participation, both in overall and by mode of activities. To examine whether the assistance with direct purpose of promoting participation has a unique relation to the outcome variable, I also ran correlation analyses between per capita aid for other donors' democracy assistance programmes and the change in indices, and then compared the Pearson coefficients to that with per capita democratic participation assistance.

The result showed that there was a unique correlation between per capita DP assistance and the overall CPI change in the 18 sub-Saharan countries. However, when the CPI change was disaggregated into its sub-indicies, the correlation was only significant with the Communing Index. Thus, the positive relation between the amount of DP assistance and the CPI change was driven by the change in the Communing Index, not other types of activities. However, I conducted the same analyses repeatedly excluding Madagascar, since the positive correlation between the two variables could be due to the exceptional case of Madagascar which showed a considerable decline in its Communing Index due to its domestic political environment. Excluding Madagascar, the correlation between per capita DP assistance and the overall CPI change was not sustained, but that with the Communing Index change was still significant, even though the level of significance was lower.

Integrating the correlation results, donors' assistance for democratic participation does not have robust relation with the change of overall civic participation when drastic change of domestic political environment was taken into account. However, among the three modes of participation, the Communing Index change was significantly related to the per capita DP aid consistently in all models with consistency.

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION

In this study, I presented a cross-national analysis to investigate a correlation between donors' civil society assistance and the subsequent change in the level of civic participation in 18 sub-Saharan countries. Firstly, per capita civil society assistance is captured from OECD aid statistics. I combined total aid provided to 'democratic participation and civil society' sector between 2005 and 2009, and then calculated per capita assistance based on 2005 World Bank population data. Secondly, I measured change in the level of civic participation operationalising donors' concept on democratic participation in their policy report, which is composed of three scopes of activities: associational membership, communing and contacting representatives, by comparing Afrobarometer survey Round Three(2005/6) and Round Five(2011/3).

My results firstly showed that the level of civic participation did not change extensively over time from 2005/6 to 2011/3 in general. This may be an indication that changing political culture is a long-term process, as traditional political cultural theorists argued. Meanwhile, investigating the Communing Index of Madagascar and Malawi, the countries that experienced severe changes in domestic politics, showed exceptionally drastic changes between 2005 and 2011. Further analysis is required, but such results suggest that domestic political condition may encourage or discourage citizens to participate in civic activities. This result also implies that the people are more influenced by domestic political environment for civil society rather than external external intervention, such as civil society assistance. It is also supported by the results of regression analysis in Chapter Four.

Thirdly, my results showed that per capita democratic participation assistance is selectively correlated to citizen participation by the type of civic activities, since the aid was only correlated to the Communing Index change. Still, my findings may be a indication that donors' civil society assistance is positively related to promote civic participation in terms of communing, in that the Communing Index change was positively associated with the per capita aid for democratic participation even when change in the political environment of each country was controlled. In addition, considering that the Communing Index actually decreased in the countries where the amount

of per capita assistance for democratic participation is relatively small, my findings may be an indication that civil society assistance prevents significant decrease of the Communing Index.

My findings suggests limited but positive results on the impact of civil society assistance. However, it has limitations that can be improved by future researches. Firstly, regarding the data collection, non-governmental donor agencies are also big contributors of civil society assistance, but the data was not available for this research. Secondly, this research considered political environment change as the only control variable due to a small number of cases. Political environment is an important factor that influence civil society's activities according to donors, but there are other factors that affect the vibrancy of civil society such as economic growth. Lastly, the time period might be too short to find a significant change in civic participation, even though achieving a quick improvement in civil society is what donors expect from their civil society assistance. Thus, the findings of this research will be developed by further research that fills out the limitations mentioned above.

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APPENDIX A

A.1. DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 2005-2013

A.1.1. Total democracy assistance to sub-Saharan Africa by sector, million \$, 2005-2013

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Public sector policy and adm. management	931.3	1236.1	1243.9	1241.9	763.5	759.1	794.2	651.8	550.3
Democratic participation and civil society	272.5	364.2	407.3	495.3	474.2	596.2	584.6	648.5	562.2
Public finance management	215.8	186.9	563.3	437.6	429.2	377.8	404.5	308.4	332.0
Elections	278.7	263.8	129.6	200.9	292.4	445.2	316.6	187.6	205.6
Legal and judicial development	171.7	174.2	172.5	200.7	253.2	261.9	261.3	319.9	269.6
Decentralisation and support to subnational govt.	9.8	18.1	33.0	21.4	281.0	309.8	249.8	313.2	298.1
Human rights	127.1	142.9	158.6	148.9	180.2	181.7	183.7	180.2	215.4
Women's equality organisations and institutions	32.3	33.0	69.4	65.0	82.4	87.8	101.8	112.3	123.5
Media and free flow of information	25.7	34.1	33.4	43.6	57.7	57.4	60.5	59.0	52.2
Anti-corruption organisations and institutions	0.4	12.9	5.4	2.2	28.7	29.2	45.2	42.9	44.7
Legislatures and political parties	-	-	-	-	39.5	45.6	50.1	48.8	50.6
Total	2065.4	2466.2	2816.4	2857.5	2882.0	3151.7	3052.3	2872.6	2704.2

Note. Disbursed grant-type aid amount in 2013 constant million \$

Ordered by the total amount of the aid – largest to smallest

Source. OECD Creditor Reporting System Aid Statistics

A.1.2. Democracy assistance to sub-Saharan Africa by sector, Percentage (%), 2005-2013

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Mean
Public sector policy and adm. management	45.1	50.1	44.2	43.5	26.5	24.1	26.0	22.7	20.3	32.9
Democratic participation and civil society	13.2	14.8	14.5	17.3	16.5	18.9	19.2	22.6	20.8	17.7
Public finance management	10.4	7.6	20.0	15.3	14.9	12.0	13.3	10.7	12.3	13.1
Elections	13.5	10.7	4.6	7.0	10.1	14.1	10.4	6.5	7.6	9.3
Legal and judicial development	8.3	7.1	6.1	7.0	8.8	8.3	8.6	11.1	10.0	8.4
Decentralisation and support to subnational govt.	0.5	0.7	1.2	0.8	9.7	9.8	8.2	10.9	11.0	6.2
Human rights	6.2	5.8	5.6	5.2	6.3	5.8	6.0	6.3	8.0	6.1
Women's equality organisations and institutions	1.6	1.3	2.5	2.3	2.9	2.8	3.3	3.9	4.6	2.8
Media and free flow of information	1.2	1.4	1.2	1.5	2.0	1.8	2.0	2.1	1.9	1.7
Anti-corruption organisations and institutions	0.0	0.5	0.2	0.1	1.0	0.9	1.5	1.5	1.7	0.9
Legislatures and political parties	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.9	0.9

Source. OECD Creditor Reporting System Aid Statistics

A.1.3. Total aid for democratic participation to sub-Saharan Africa by donor, million \$, 2005-2013

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
EU Institutions	17.4	32.9	60.1	98.6	63.0	108.1	82.9	95.9	72.4
Germany	46.2	69.7	66.7	76.5	78.0	76.5	75.2	68.6	68.3
Sweden	11.2	62.1	39.8	44.7	60.1	71.0	78.9	96.6	103.7
United Kingdom	24.3	22.3	34.8	39.5	48.4	61.3	70.3	88.2	115.2
Norway	40.4	44.9	44.3	53.0	55.1	61.3	47.0	46.0	45.3
Others	132.9	132.2	161.7	183.0	169.6	218.3	230.3	253.2	157.3
Total	272.5	364.2	407.3	495.3	474.2	596.5	584.6	648.5	562.2

Note. Disbursed grant-type aid amount in 2013 constant million \$

Source. OECD Creditor Reporting System Aid Statistics

A.1.4. Aid for democratic participation to sub-Saharan Africa by donor, Percentage (%), 2005-2013

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Mean
EU Institutions	6.4	9.0	14.7	19.9	13.3	18.1	14.2	14.8	12.9	13.7
Germany	17.0	19.1	16.4	15.4	16.5	12.8	12.9	10.6	12.1	14.8
Sweden	4.1	17.1	9.8	9.0	12.7	11.9	13.5	14.9	18.4	12.4
United Kingdom	8.9	6.1	8.5	8.0	10.2	10.3	12.0	13.6	20.5	10.9
Norway	14.8	12.3	10.9	10.7	11.6	10.3	8.0	7.1	8.1	10.4
Others	48.8	36.3	39.7	36.9	35.8	36.6	39.4	39.0	28.0	37.8

Source. OECD Creditor Reporting System Aid Statistics

A.1.5. Total aid for democratic participation by recipient region, million \$, 2005-2013

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
Asia	356.2	457.9	427.4	524.4	437.3	588.2	523.7	522.7	605.9	4443.6
South of Sahara	272.5	364.2	407.3	495.3	474.2	596.5	584.6	648.5	562.2	4405.3
America	195.0	285.0	245.5	259.3	278.5	287.9	254.9	236.7	210.8	2253.7
Europe	170.2	183.8	147.4	188.9	136.1	151.6	155.2	258.3	169.4	1561.1
North of Sahara	14.9	27.7	41.6	62.1	37.7	39.7	61.4	73.9	61.8	420.8
Oceania	21.0	36.6	14.5	37.5	32.0	29.0	33.4	30.1	37.4	271.3
Africa regional	20.2	18.9	41.7	23.3	13.6	18.4	19.1	24.5	26.6	206.2
Developing countries unspecified	228.3	272.5	321.3	375.2	230.3	242.5	329.9	918.2	842.9	3761.1

Note. Disbursed grant-type aid amount in 2013 constant million \$

Source. OECD Creditor Reporting System Aid Statistics

A.1.6. Aid for democratic participation by recipient region, Percentage (%), 2005-2013

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
Asia	27.9	27.8	26.0	26.7	26.7	30.1	26.7	19.3	24.1	25.7
South of Sahara	21.3	22.1	24.7	25.2	28.9	30.5	29.8	23.9	22.3	25.4
America	15.3	17.3	14.9	13.2	17.0	14.7	13.0	8.7	8.4	13.0
Europe	13.3	11.2	9.0	9.6	8.3	7.8	7.9	9.5	6.7	9.0
North of Sahara	1.2	1.7	2.5	3.2	2.3	2.0	3.1	2.7	2.5	2.4
Oceania	1.6	2.2	0.9	1.9	2.0	1.5	1.7	1.1	1.5	1.6
Africa regional	1.6	1.1	2.5	1.2	0.8	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.2
Developing countries unspecified	17.9	16.6	19.5	19.1	14.0	12.4	16.8	33.8	33.5	21.7

Source. OECD Creditor Reporting System Aid Statistics

A.2. DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE TO 18 SUB-SAHARAN COUNTRIES, 2005-2009

A.2.1. Total Assistance for Democratic Participation to 18 sub-Saharan Countries, 2005-2009

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Benin	2.2	1.7	3.5	5.6	3.8	16.8
Botswana	0.5	0.7	0.9	2.0	1.1	5.2
Cape Verde	0.3	0.8	1.6	2.5	1.0	6.2
Ghana	4.5	6.9	7.2	11.0	16.5	46.1
Kenya	7.7	24.9	26.4	19.3	26.3	104.6
Lesotho	0.5	1.3	2.0	2.5	2.7	9.1
Madagascar	0.6	4.0	1.6	1.5	1.3	9.0
Malawi	23.4	22.0	27.3	30.1	22.7	125.5
Mali	15.4	15.9	16.1	20.9	22.6	91.0
Mozambique	13.8	11.9	39.1	34.4	24.6	123.8
Namibia	1.2	4.1	3.9	3.4	1.2	13.9
Nigeria	5.1	5.9	6.1	9.2	16.8	43.1
Senegal	3.5	4.9	4.6	5.7	5.9	24.5
South Africa	16.7	16.6	28.0	17.0	18.6	96.9
Tanzania	17.6	21.7	25.7	34.8	36.8	136.7
Uganda	13.8	16.8	19.8	17.8	14.0	82.1
Zambia	11.6	15.8	14.4	11.3	15.8	68.9
Zimbabwe	15.2	17.6	19.4	23.3	21.0	96.5

Note. Disbursed grant-type aid amount in 2013 constant million \$.

Source. OECD Creditor Reporting System Aid Statistics

A.2.2. Population of the 18 sub-Saharan countries, 2005

	Population
Benin	8,182,362
Botswana	1,875,805
Cape Verde	478,651
Ghana	21,384,034
Kenya	35,785,718
Lesotho	1,925,844
Madagascar	18,290,394
Malawi	12,924,746
Mali	11,941,258
Mozambique	21,010,376
Namibia	2,027,026
Nigeria	139,585,891
Senegal	11,270,826
South Africa	47,639,556
Tanzania	38,824,384
Uganda	28,724,869
Zambia	11,470,022
Zimbabwe	12,710,589

Source. World Bank

A.2.3. Predictor Variable: Per Capita Assistance for Democratic Participation, 2005-2009

	Per capita aid
Benin	2.0
Botswana	2.8
Cape Verde	12.9
Ghana	2.2
Kenya	2.9
Lesotho	4.7
Madagascar	0.5
Malawi	9.7
Mali	7.6
Mozambique	5.9
Namibia	6.9
Nigeria	0.3
Senegal	2.2
South Africa	2.0
Tanzania	3.5
Uganda	2.9
Zambia	6.0
Zimbabwe	7.6

Note. Disbursed grant-type aid amount in 2013 constant \$
Source. OECD Creditor Reporting System Aid Statistics

A.2.4. Freedom House Index, 2005 & 2011

	2005 FHI	2011 FHI	FHI Change
Benin	2	2	0
Botswana	2	2.5	0.5
Cape Verde	1	1	0
Ghana	2	1.5	-0.5
Kenya	3	3.5	0.5
Lesotho	2.5	3	0.5
Madagascar	3	5	2
Malawi	4	3.5	-0.5
Mali	2	2.5	0.5
Mozambique	3.5	3.5	0
Namibia	2.5	2	-0.5
Nigeria	4	4	0
Senegal	2.5	3	0.5
South Africa	1.5	2	0.5
Tanzania	3.5	3	-0.5
Uganda	4.5	4.5	0
Zambia	4	3.5	-0.5
Zimbabwe	6.5	6	-0.5

Source. Freedom House Index

Note. Scale ranges from 1 (Free) to 7 (Not free).

A.2.5. Total democracy assistance to 18 sub-Saharan Countries by Sector, 2005-2009¹⁷

	PSP	DP	PFM	LEG	HR	ELEC	WOM	MED
Benin	120.87	16.75	19.71	25.24	13.82	19.92	4.47	0.67
Botswana	11.87	5.20	2.78	1.37	2.08	0.03	0.53	0.73
Cape Verde	25.66	6.18	8.30	4.25	1.19	1.63	0.69	0.52
Ghana	158.50	46.06	70.94	9.71	13.19	8.66	2.80	2.47
Kenya	155.30	104.64	15.80	47.41	68.84	22.23	11.64	3.01
Lesotho	31.57	9.06	32.98	5.67	0.97	0.53	0.19	0.16
Madagascar	133.34	9.01	13.06	18.09	3.33	6.24	0.92	0.10
Malawi	102.58	125.53	39.54	27.24	16.41	25.91	9.72	0.60
Mali	293.92	90.96	9.30	9.61	8.16	6.72	10.49	1.14
Mozambique	239.92	123.84	92.54	39.97	44.27	10.60	13.33	3.95
Namibia	29.09	13.91	8.27	1.89	6.95	0.93	13.31	1.23
Nigeria	202.42	43.11	101.33	65.33	23.46	96.91	5.50	3.16
Senegal	128.83	24.55	8.67	6.96	5.94	0.15	7.56	0.51
South Africa	192.54	96.85	23.30	68.16	39.58	1.74	16.92	2.66
Tanzania	365.79	136.65	98.48	34.42	22.77	38.50	12.80	10.23
Uganda	216.99	82.08	137.30	95.63	64.23	13.06	13.19	1.82
Zambia	113.12	68.91	62.65	13.92	14.13	28.57	14.91	5.05
Zimbabwe	31.49	96.48	0.01	15.45	53.22	16.97	4.69	10.28
Mean	141.88	61.10	41.39	27.24	22.36	16.63	7.98	2.68

Note. Disbursed grant-type aid amount in 2013 constant million \$.

Among the 11 sectors, three categories introduced to the OECD CRS from 2009 aid flow are excluded.

¹⁷ PSP= Public sector policy and administrative management, DP=Democratic participation and civil society, PFM=Public finance management, LEG= Legal and judicial development, HR=Human rights, ELEC=Elections, WOM= Women's equality organisations and institutions.

A.2.6. Per Capita Democracy Assistance to 18 sub-Saharan Countries by Sector, 2005-2009

	PSP	DP	PFM	LEG	HR	ELEC	WOM	MED
Benin	14.77	2.05	2.41	3.08	1.69	2.43	0.55	0.08
Botswana	6.33	2.77	1.48	0.73	1.11	0.02	0.28	0.39
Cape Verde	53.62	12.91	17.34	8.89	2.49	3.41	1.45	1.08
Ghana	7.41	2.15	3.32	0.45	0.62	0.40	0.13	0.12
Kenya	4.34	2.92	0.44	1.32	1.92	0.62	0.33	0.08
Lesotho	16.39	4.71	17.12	2.94	0.50	0.27	0.10	0.08
Madagascar	7.29	0.49	0.71	0.99	0.18	0.34	0.05	0.01
Malawi	7.94	9.71	3.06	2.11	1.27	2.00	0.75	0.05
Mali	24.61	7.62	0.78	0.80	0.68	0.56	0.88	0.10
Mozambique	11.42	5.89	4.40	1.90	2.11	0.50	0.63	0.19
Namibia	14.35	6.86	4.08	0.93	3.43	0.46	6.57	0.61
Nigeria	1.45	0.31	0.73	0.47	0.17	0.69	0.04	0.02
Senegal	11.43	2.18	0.77	0.62	0.53	0.01	0.67	0.05
South Africa	4.04	2.03	0.49	1.43	0.83	0.04	0.36	0.06
Tanzania	9.42	3.52	2.54	0.89	0.59	0.99	0.33	0.26
Uganda	7.55	2.86	4.78	3.33	2.24	0.45	0.46	0.06
Zambia	9.86	6.01	5.46	1.21	1.23	2.49	1.30	0.44
Zimbabwe	2.48	7.59	0.00	1.22	4.19	1.34	0.37	0.81
Mean	11.93	4.59	3.88	1.85	1.43	0.95	0.85	0.25

Note. Disbursed grant-type aid amount in 2013 constant \$.

Among the 11 sectors, three categories introduced to the OECD CRS from 2009 aid flow are excluded.

APPENDIX B

B.1. CIVIC PARTICIPATION INDEX CONSTRUCTION

Variable	Afrobarometer survey item	Original scale	Thesis scale		
Membership (Index)	For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member:	Not a member	0	Non participant	0
		Inactive member	1	Inactive participant	1
		Active member	2	Active participant	2
		Official leader	3	Very active participant	3
	<i>Round 3</i>	Don't know	9	Missing	999
	- A trade union or farmers association	Refused	998	Missing	999
	- A professional or business association				
	- A community development or self-help association				
	<i>Round 5</i>				
	- Some other voluntary association or community group				
Communing (Index)	For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year:	No, would never do this	0	Non participant	0
		No, but would do if had the chance	1	Non participant	0
		Once or twice	2	Inactive participant	1
		Several times	3	Active participant	2
	- Attended a community meeting	Often	4	Very active participant	3
	- Got together with others to raise an issue	Don't know	9	Missing	999
		Refused	998	Missing	999
Contacting (Index)	During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views:	Never	0	Non participant	0
		Only once	1	Inactive participant	1
		A few times	2	Active participant	2
		Often	3	Very active participant	3
	- A local government councillor	Don't know	9	Missing	999
	- A member of parliament	Refused	998	Missing	999
	- An official of a government ministry				
- A political party official					
CP Index	Additive scale with three sub-indices weighted equally ranging from 0 to 3.				

B.2. Validity and Reliability of Outcome Variables

B.2.1. Factor Analysis of the 9 items for Civic Participation Index, Round 3

Survey Item	Rotated factor loadings		
	1	2	3
Member of trade union or farmers association	.038	-.007	.564
Member of professional or business association	-.093	.008	.605
Member of community development association	.100	.008	.543
Attend a community meeting	.884	-.035	-.025
Join others to raise an issue	.641	.068	.050
Contact local government councillor	.121	.524	.040
Contact MP	-.023	.691	-.032
Contact official of government ministry	-.045	.664	.003
Contact political party official	-.003	.673	.009
Eigenvalue	2.288	.957	.683
% of variance	25.420	10.630	7.588

Note. N = 19,438. Factor loadings > .30 are in boldface. Factor loadings were obtained using maximum likelihood, extraction with oblimin rotation.

B.2.2. Factor Analysis of the 7 items for Civic Participation Index, Round 5

Survey Item	Rotated factor loading	
	1	2
Member of voluntary association or community group	.444	.107
Attend a community meeting	.839	-.068
Join others to raise an issue	.784	-.025
Contact local government councillor	.112	.580
Contact MP	-.051	.701
Contact official of a government agency	-.017	.692
Contact political party official	-.002	.716
Eigenvalue	2.332	1.023
% of variance	33.314	14.615

Note. N = 18,819. Factor loadings > .30 are in boldface. Factor loadings were obtained using maximum likelihood, extraction with oblimin rotation.

APPENDIX C

C.1. AFROBAROMETER ROUND 3

C.1.1. Level of Overall Civic Participation in 18 sub-Saharan Countries, 2005/6

	Membership	Communing	Contacting	CPI
Benin	0.30	0.98	0.18	0.49
Botswana	0.15	1.21	0.26	0.54
Cape Verde	0.22	0.65	0.24	0.37
Ghana	0.47	1.09	0.34	0.63
Kenya	0.66	1.25	0.36	0.76
Lesotho	0.17	1.68	0.45	0.77
Madagascar	0.15	1.74	0.15	0.68
Malawi	0.61	1.18	0.26	0.68
Mali	0.46	1.08	0.29	0.61
Mozambique	0.34	1.61	0.27	0.74
Namibia	0.22	0.89	0.25	0.45
Nigeria	0.49	0.86	0.23	0.53
Senegal	0.44	1.37	0.32	0.71
South Africa	0.26	1.00	0.20	0.49
Tanzania	0.45	1.67	0.42	0.85
Uganda	0.42	1.35	0.46	0.74
Zambia	0.28	0.86	0.21	0.45
Zimbabwe	0.15	1.12	n.d.	0.64
Mean	0.35	1.20	0.29	0.62

Note. Contacting items were not asked in Zimbabwe for Round three. The index for Zimbabwe is based on membership and communing scores only.

Source. Afrobarometer Round 3

C.2. AFROBAROMETER ROUND 5

C.2.1. Level of Overall Civic Participation in 18 sub-Saharan Countries, 2011/3

	Membership	Communing	Contacting	CPI
Benin	0.65	1.11	0.20	0.65
Botswana	0.33	0.92	0.36	0.54
Cape Verde	0.49	0.87	0.27	0.54
Ghana	0.49	0.72	0.32	0.51
Kenya	1.08	1.27	0.36	0.90
Lesotho	0.56	1.50	0.30	0.78
Madagascar	0.23	0.84	0.33	0.47
Malawi*	0.72	2.27	0.24	1.07
Mali	1.03	1.16	0.20	0.80
Mozambique	0.57	1.63	0.20	0.80
Namibia	0.36	0.83	0.14	0.44
Nigeria	0.66	0.82	0.20	0.56
Senegal	0.92	1.47	0.27	0.89
South Africa	0.40	0.84	0.22	0.48
Tanzania	0.96	1.71	0.59	1.09
Uganda	0.71	1.20	0.37	0.76
Zambia	0.58	0.93	0.22	0.58
Zimbabwe**	0.56	1.17	0.46	0.87
Mean	0.63	1.18	0.28	0.71

* *Communing Index for Round 4 and Round 6 are 1.56 and 1.99 respectively. Thus, the adjusted Round 5 Communing Index and CPI are 1.78 and 0.91.*

C.3. CHANGE FROM ROUND 3 TO ROUND 5

C.3.1. Change in Overall Civic Participation Level, 2005/6-2011/3

	Membership	Communing	Contacting	CPI
Benin	0.35	0.13	0.02	0.17
Botswana	0.18	-0.29	0.11	0.00
Cape Verde	0.27	0.22	0.03	0.17
Ghana	0.02	-0.37	-0.01	-0.12
Kenya	0.42	0.02	-0.01	0.15
Lesotho	0.39	-0.19	-0.15	0.02
Madagascar	0.08	-0.90	0.18	-0.21
Malawi*	0.11	1.09*	-0.02	0.39*
Mali	0.57	0.08	-0.09	0.19
Mozambique	0.23	0.02	-0.07	0.06
Namibia	0.14	-0.06	-0.11	-0.01
Nigeria	0.17	-0.04	-0.03	0.03
Senegal	0.48	0.09	-0.05	0.18
South Africa	0.14	-0.17	0.01	0.00
Tanzania	0.51	0.04	0.17	0.24
Uganda	0.29	-0.15	-0.09	0.02
Zambia	0.30	0.08	0.01	0.13
Zimbabwe**	0.41	0.05	n.d.**	0.23
Mean	0.28	-0.02	0.00	0.09

Note. * The changes in Communing Index and CPI based on the adjusted Round 5 index are 0.60 and 0.23 respectively.

** Change of Contacting Index for Zimbabwe cannot be measured as there is no baseline data (Round 3) for the country.

C.3.2. Adjusted Change in Civic Participation Level, 2005/6-2011/3

