

**LANGUAGE ON MUSIC: BEETHOVEN,
MANN AND THE ABSOLUTE**

François Verster

Submitted as requirement towards completion of a Master of
Arts degree at the English Department of the University of
Cape Town, August 1995

The University of Cape Town has been given
the right to reproduce this thesis in whole
or in part. Copyright is held by the author.

The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS :

I would primarily like to thank both Professor J.M. Coetzee for careful supervision and guidance during the writing of this dissertation and Professor Stuart Reiner for extensive assistance with musical details. Gratitude extends also to the CSD and to UCT Administration for graciously providing me with financial assistance during the period of study, to Reggie Heuschneider for extensive help with translation from German, to Jeanine Neethling for making scoring and printing possible, to Brenda Atkinson for careful and patient proofreading, and to all the people who have kept my interest in music alive over the years.

François Verster
August 1995

ABSTRACT:

This dissertation investigates the general use of language on instrumental music. Three types of linguistic usage are identified: the metamusical, the systemic, and the metasystemic.

In the first section, various forms of the metamusical - description, attempts at "recreation" and formal analyses of music - are considered, and are all shown to fail in different ways. The limitations of existing systems for negotiation between language and music are also brought to the fore. Failure is redefined, and shown to be intrinsically related to the tradition of musical ineffability, which finds its most extreme development in the notion of "absolute music".

The second section attempts to provide a systemic discourse which takes the failure of language into account. Drawing on Lacan's imaginary/symbolic distinction and on Derrida's notion of the frame, it sets forth a construct called "the word of music", which is itself an impossible point of aspiration, but which manages to account for some of the dialectical complexities involved in systemic negotiation with a non-denotative form such as music.

The third section entails metasystemic analysis proper; in other words, metamusical and systemic sources are analyzed and assessed. This part consists of a passage-by-passage translation of eight pages from Thomas Mann's *Doctor Faustus*, in which the fictional character Wendell Kretschmar delivers a lecture on and performance of Beethoven's Opus 111. Various metamusical and systemic issues are discussed: it is shown that Mann draws on a large number of established musicoliterary traditions, with his sources ranging from early Beethoven biographies to the writings of Theodor Adorno. Particular attention is given to the Romantic "Beethoven myth" and to Adorno's analysis of the composer's late music. Mann's negotiation between two partly opposing trends in the presentation of Opus 111 as an "ultimate" or "absolute" composition - the one based in a Romantic discourse of musical transcendence and the other originating in Adorno's identification of a tendency towards alienation in Beethoven's late style - is extensively discussed.

CONTENTS:

Acknowledgements	i
Abstract	ii
 Preface	
Starting Points.....	vii
Theorizing the Proposition.....	viii
 SECTION 1: METASYSTEMIC	
An Example.....	1
Reasons.....	4
Examples.....	6
Language and Reason.....	8
Recreation.....	11
Redefining Failure.....	14
Other Arts.....	16
Jackendoff and Lerdahl.....	17
Deryck Cooke.....	20
Language and Music: Forms.....	23
Further Meanings: Semiotics.....	25
Meaning and Ineffability.....	27
Ineffability and the Absolute.....	28
 SECTION 2: SYSTEMIC	
Introduction.....	32
The Word of Music.....	33
Imaginary and Symbolic.....	34
The Fictional Work.....	37
Framing the Absolute.....	38
Derrida's Frame.....	40
Systemic?.....	43
 SECTION 3: METASYSTEMIC	
(i) Method	
Switching.....	46
Hypertext.....	46
Line by Line.....	47
Looking at Literature, Looking at Music.....	49
Translation.....	49
 (ii) The Text	
Text.....	51
Literature and Music.....	52

Failing Again.....	54
The Novel.....	57
Work.....	58
America, Germany.....	59
Chains of Identity (1).....	61
Mann and Music.....	64
Schoenberg.....	66
The Canon.....	67
Hearing, Lecturing.....	68
Inclusion, Exclusion.....	69
Not Speaking.....	72
Chains of Identity (2).....	73
Comedy, Rhetoric.....	74
S/Z.....	75
Mann and Nietzsche.....	76
Language on Music as Inspiration.....	77
Speaking.....	78
Introducing a Lecture.....	79
The Work.....	80
The Piano.....	81
Iterability.....	82
The Impossible Situation.....	83
Performance.....	84
The Beethoven Myth.....	86
Intertextuality, Montage.....	88
Anecdote.....	90
The Biography Industry.....	92
The Good Author.....	94
Art and Commerce.....	98
Metamusical: Reception.....	100
The Three Periods.....	101
Negative Reception.....	104
Metamusical: Mixing.....	106
Discourse of Lastness.....	109
Positive Reception.....	111
Mann and Adorno.....	112
Metasystemic: Adorno on Late Beethoven.....	114
Mann and Adorno on Death.....	119
Language and the Impossible Memory.....	121
Acting Adorno.....	123
Metamusical: Figuring Equivalence.....	124
Metamusical: The Storm.....	127
Expectation Achieved, Extended.....	130
Reducing.....	131
Anthropomorphization Extended.....	134
Deletion, Ineffability.....	136
Adorno: Metamusical.....	138
True Words?.....	140
Subject and Object? (1).....	143
One Moment.....	144
The Archetypal Sentence.....	146
Hope.....	147
Subject and Object? (2).....	150
Ending the Sonata.....	152
Reasonings.....	152
Philosophical Influences.....	153

Technical Achievement and Expression.....	155
Lastness.....	157
Double Ineffability.....	159
Ending Off.....	162
Lastly.....	164

Notes

Notes to Preface and Section 1.....	167
Notes to Section 2.....	171
Notes to Section 3.....	173

References.....	189
-----------------	-----

Preface

Starting Points

The experience of music has often been explored in language. As it is only in historical times that we can assess how music has been understood before, our understanding of the function and experience of music already entails looking at language itself. Often, in writings about music, we also come across the need to define how the writers' own medium of communication relates to music. What this dissertation will set out to do is both to explore how others have tried to theorize, explicitly or implicitly, the links between language and music, and to propose certain other ways of doing so.

It soon becomes obvious that the relationship between language and music is at any given moment a fairly precarious one. This relationship presents a "problem" in so far as the goal of any critical investigation is to find unambiguous links, to cast expression in a single mould, to provide an iterable system of organization, or to recreate the identity of one form by means of translation into the other. Theorists often invoke the notion of *origins*: music and poetry are said to have a mutual basis in song, and must therefore function in similar ways. Such an explanation however turns out to be no more useful than identifying any other historical position of language-music interaction; the presence of mutual influence says little about the "nature" of each. The emancipation and remarkable extension of instrumental music during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, on the other hand, does entail an extreme development. Here, one system could explore its ability to rely on its own means and attempt to gauge its identity by positing the limits of its own expression against that of the other. Separation, in other words, provides a degree of analytical clarity: language and music come, in their motion towards self-definition, to be "accessible" in those terms they dictate from within.

It is for this reason that the link between language and instrumental music - here, "western art music"¹ - is a more practical and valuable object of analysis than song or opera. The verbal meanings which musical units acquire or create for the first time within opera can by no means be excluded from, or have their origin pinned down within instrumental music "proper". This is primarily because the purity of each form is already made impossible by the very act of association itself. Yet looking at these meanings only within the operatic context limits music to a large degree to its conventional song or dramatic context.

What becomes obvious, then, is the need for an approach that is dialectical - one that acknowledges temporal instability, mutual constitutiveness, corruption of pure forms - rather than one that attempts to maintain the objective ascendancy of language over that which it describes, or one that unifies music and language in a crude manner. The dialectic of history or society - which tends to side with language - can in this manner be incorporated into a motion that is more subtle, that branches outwards and alternatively allows each of music and language a certain independence by associating the other in turn with more "objective" social or historical factors. Again, it is through separation that the two forms can be seen dialectically; whereas it is possible to identify dialectical interchanges between parts in song, this amounts largely to an observation of authorial intent, which says little about the parts themselves.

Theorizing the Preposition

What do we mean by "Language on Music"? The apparent implication of directionality (for we are remaining, in the most banal of senses, true to the analytic form employed here) already suggests a self-limitation.

We can think about the preposition here as an essential third term. It fills a mediating position, relating the two topics in the very simplest manner. Such simplicity is of course also the most effective generator of ideology, and thus we find within three words a variety of polemical positions: *language about music* (the two are distant, but language can comfortably stride into new territory - the commonsense or uncritical approach); *language for music* (music cannot stand on its own and needs a successful counterpart in the more efficient sphere); *language in music* (song, opera, program music, score directions); *language after music* (temporal inequality, Bergsonism); *language from music* (music comes to its full expression in its return to language, the school of Wagner, logocentrism, inspiration); *language through music* (language is enhanced, given greater appeal through music); *language around music* (words can never identify what is intrinsic to music, but can frame it); *language towards music* (music as the ineffable, Hegelianism, apocalyptic motion). The list could go on, and the difficulty of selecting the most appropriate middle term lies exactly in the fact that each preposition named is both valid and limited to the subject matter that is related to its goal.

To an extent, the preposition "on" reflects all of the others; it is, in fact, not temporally unidirectional - the copy on CD sleeves, writing on fictional pieces of music, the biography industry (all of which "pre-create" the experience of music) attest to this. The subject of this dissertation is the language that is intended to result separately alongside a composition that already exists - language which claims to have an "object", even though the true distance from its counterpart is essentially impossible to judge. The preposition chosen seems to provide a means of instating awareness of such a separation, as opposed to a conflated

language with music. Language "on" music will also be a weak language - it is one which cannot contain, cannot fix, and which is therefore more appropriate to the more fluid dialectical process desired.

SECTION 1: METASYSTEMIC

An Example

In an essay that has achieved a remarkable standing within the literary world's response to music, the French theorist Roland Barthes writes:

Language, according to Benveniste, is the only semiotic system capable of *interpreting* another semiotic system... How, then, does language manage when it has to interpret music? Alas, it seems, very badly. If one looks at the normal practice of music criticism..., it can readily be seen that a work (or its performance) is only ever translated into the poorest of linguistic categories: the adjective... Naturally, this epithet, to which we are constantly led by weakness or fascination (little parlour game: talk about a piece of music without using a single adjective), has an economic function: the predicate is always the bulwark with which the subject's imaginary protects itself from the loss which threatens it. The man who provides himself or is provided with an adjective is now hurt, now pleased, but always constituted.²

Among the host of issues raised by this statement, perhaps the most striking element that comes forth is perhaps the reintroduction of a Romanticist discourse within the bounds of a fairly strict structuralist approach to the relation between music and language. On the one hand, pure musical subjectivity is seen to be an impossibility - language is a prerequisite for its social functioning; on the other, Barthes would seem to be granting music access to realms of self-annihilation that are entirely beyond the grasp of language. He goes on in this regard to ask, "would it be that music is dangerous - the old Platonic idea? that music is an access to *jouissance*, to loss, as numerous ethnographic and popular examples would tend to show?"³

What is at stake here, of course, is the old question of ineffability. Barthes' position is interesting in that it opposes both the association of language with reason and a reigning poststructuralist critique of presence in its own terms; a long tradition of musical ineffability is acknowledged from two partially conflicting angles. The beginnings of formalism are closely tied to the rise of

instrumental music - the notion of "absolute music" is in a sense a logical intermediary - yet it is the same music that gave rise to theories of the transcendental in music. Within both views the subject - in so far as it can be related to the terms of human expression - is to an extent excluded. Barthes attempts to find an answer for the crisis of linguistic value by "displac[ing] the fringe of contact between music and language"⁴ onto sites within the body. Via Kristeva's notion of the "genotext" he arrives at what he calls the "grain" of the body. Ineffability is couched in terms of emotion and desire, which for Barthes directly communicate from within the body.⁵

What has Barthes achieved here? Some fairly obvious problems are raised by his attempt to reestablish, by relocating the source of music within the body, the notion that music provides direct experience unmediated by cultural factors; such a subjugation of sociopolitical issues to desire itself is of course the hallmark of his later writings.⁶ Yet his avoidance of the rationalizing strictures of formalist analysis by insisting on subjective value - while at the same time opposing "weak" descriptive writing - is commendable: he manages to skirt two extremes of writing on music which have been strongly - and, as shall be seen, appropriately - criticized from opposing angles. But how does his writing fare once the musical object itself enters into the picture, once his fairly sophisticated system of negotiation enters into practice?

The disappointing reality is that his application of the notion of the "grain" to actual musical events is far less convincing than his theorization of the construct itself. In "The Grain of the Voice" the concept becomes a highly (and fairly irritatingly) subjective principle of performance evaluation: Panzera's singing is said to "contain" the grain while Fischer-Deskau's does not. And in Barthes' other lesser

known essays on music the use of similar constructs results in a degeneration into hyperbolic valorization of private somatic and emotional responses, as in for instance the following passage from "Rasch":

In Schumann's *Kreisleriana* (Opus 16; 1838), I actually hear no note, no theme, no contour, no grammar, no meaning ... No, what I hear are blows: I hear what beats in the body, what beats the body, or better: I hear this body that beats.⁷

Such writing - with regard to how music comes across through language - is in effect not very different from the kind of "impressionistic" analysis and general writing on music which early formalists such as Riemann, Schenker, Keller and Adler were reacting against.⁸ The end result here amounts to little other than Barthes positioning himself as enthusiastic listener; the less sceptical reader may possibly be left feeling inspired to listen to the music.

What we may discern, then, is failure on more than one level. Music firstly does not have any "objective" presence: its effect alone is reproduced in highly subjective terms; it is not recognizable; there is no exactitude in identifying creative or formal aspects of the composition. That all of this should amount to failure of course depends on what is primarily required from language on music; for the time being it can be noted that music does contain what may be called a *mathematical* element: all systems of composition - tonal, serial, non-Western - adhere to certain structural rules, overtly or implicitly there.

Another failure occurs in the way that an interesting generalized philosophical solution to problems in linguistic responses to music fails at the moment that it proceeds towards actual objects of analysis. We may already at this stage discern the three levels of language on music that will form the basic structuration of such language in this dissertation itself. Barthes' theorization of the "grain" may

successfully describes one possible response to music. There seems to be an *aporia* here, a gap between what language apparently sets out to do and how it achieves it. We are thus led to the necessity of trying to define the role of language in general: if we want to identify the aims of language on music - in order to ascertain whether it fails in specific instances or not - we have to consider how language comes to have purpose generally. These processes are highly varied and difficult to pin down, and the few that I will identify here will be related directly to the debate in question.

In the broadest of terms, and as the earlier passage from Barthes has indicated, language is the only way of making music "workable" within society. But does that mean that all musical experience itself is mediated through language? An extreme structuralist viewpoint such as that of Benveniste would hold that all responses to music are, like any other form of subjectivity, constituted directly by language;¹⁰ it follows from this position that to identify all the traces in individual linguistic history that make up one's musical experience is theoretically possible. This is, after all, also in a sense the aim of Lacanian psychoanalysis - at the moment where the unconscious, which for Lacan is structured like a language,¹¹ reveals itself in exteriorized linguistic form, the goal of psychoanalysis has been achieved. The implication, however, is that - even if this process is possible - we are faced with no more than the text of the individual unconscious: metamusical discourse as object of analysis can be measured against this individually "true" text, and not against the music itself. In other words, arguing for or trying to identify linguistic subjectivity does not tell us much about the worth or successfulness of language on music. Language here is a necessity - there can be no "failure" - and attempts at coming closer towards truth or reality are not

strictly relevant.

Language on music generally attempts to extend outwards, into the musical experience or musical form, even if such a motion is indeed framed by linguistic subjectivity or constituted by self-denial, as in the example given earlier. Let us look again at specific extracts from metamusical writing to investigate how this occurs.

Examples

Emil Ludwig, writing in 1943, sums up Beethoven's Piano Sonata Opus 111 - a work that will be a central object within the metasytemic analysis found in Section 3 - as follows:

Beginning with two great notes, oppressive and sombre, the introduction reminds us somewhat of *Prometheus*. In the beginning this sonata seems to be a sister work to the *Appassionata*. Then a thunderstorm breaks loose, the basses roar and thunder. The treble, however, storms and blows as if the lower world of the Titans were in conflict with the upper world of the gods. The second movement, twice as long - an aria with variations - brings back an atmosphere of quiet humility, resignation to the fate that has just surged past, a song filled with longing and faith. The first variation floats quietly on its way like a gondola in Venice. The next two are animated, even cheerful; the fourth ghostly; the fifth ascends to the heights. All flow into one another without interruption, like an improvisation. In the famous final variation with the long trill, parts of the theme are heard underneath, while the upper parts begin to brighten, as if the sun had come out again after the storm, while drops, perhaps raindrops, perhaps teardrops, still fall from the lower branches.¹²

Let us take this passage as an example of what will be referred to as "impressionistic" writing on music. We can compare Ludwig's description of "the famous final variation" with the analysis of the same section by Donald Francis Tovey. While Tovey is by no means accepted in musicological circles as an objective formalist critic, his writing on Beethoven's sonatas, printed in 1931, brings him closer to such a position than his other work:

106-117. - The expected close is indefinitely postponed by a cadential trill. Below this figure (a) enters in the bass,

defining a $\frac{5}{4}$ suspension. This is resolved by a modified answer in 6ths around the trill. The trill becomes minor, and the modified answer changes its mode also. The leading-note B, after hesitating for a bar, descends to B^b, while the treble rises from G to A^b. We are now in the dominant of E^b (b^bIII.). Figure (a) in the bass defines this with its 5th, not its $\frac{5}{4}$. The figure is echoed 2 octaves higher below the trill, which then becomes a triple trill on the dominant 7th of E^b for 2 bars. ... The topmost trill mounts alone by semitones for 4 more bars; a dominant bass enters at the bottom of an abyss, and the passage closes into 118-121.¹³

Can either of these two analyses be called more "valid" than the other? The first extract for the most part falls squarely into what Barthes identified as "weak" adjectival writing, with the musical "feel" carried over into metaphors which end up offering a literary program for the sonata. Subjectivity (and the political dangers that accompany its free expression) can be invoked here as accusation: there is no real reason to believe that Beethoven was thinking of the weather while writing his sonata; Hans Keller's point that "description gives a verbal account of what you hear and is essentially unnecessary" also holds.¹⁴ While Keller was an outright opponent of Tovey,¹⁵ the second extract comes close to his idea that language on music should illuminate organic structure rather than perceptual effect: it tells the musically uneducated nothing at all about how Beethoven's Opus 111 is experienced, bordering instead on the incomprehensible.

The issue of audience already comes directly into play: the aims and concomitant language use are clearly dependent on who is to consume it. Ludwig's writing may thus be highly effective in inspiring readers to listen to the sonata (and may for some have artistic value in itself, something against which the accusation of self-prioritization can also be laid); yet it is difficult to assess how much of an admission to metaphoricality is made and therefore how much closure is forced on music. Language may well function as *suggestion* here. Tovey's analysis, on the other hand, seeks to *explain* the

sonata, to find mathematical structures which redefine music in terms of reason.¹⁶

Language and Reason

This dissertation will deal primarily with the use of the metamusical within a novelistic context (particularly as it appears in Thomas Mann's *Doctor Faustus*), with the result that not much attention will be paid to the kind of stronger formalist musicological analysis in question. Impressionistic description of music offers many avenues for ordinary literary analysis; more technical forms of musicology however require some further comment here.

A form of goal-based reason associated with language could already be discerned in the psychoanalytic discussion earlier; it is of course more glaringly present in the empiricist tendencies found in the kind of analysis under discussion. Language - as active critical mechanism - can here be seen as attempting to extend its borders progressively further into unspoken territory, and to place that which it finds under the sign of logocentric understanding.¹⁷ Language sides with reason, with the aims of scientific progress: in this sense a culture of writing such as ours may be said to be essentially eschatological, where all articulation is eventually to be gathered (as is all knowledge) under the sign of Logos, with God returning and inhering in all forms. To some extent language opposes music, with the result that the 1980s and 1990s have seen a large surge of writing that attempts to counteract the supposed alienation of music via technical language.¹⁸ Joseph Kerman's recent book *Contemplating Music: Challenges to Musicology* accordingly identifies analytic "positivism" as the primary animating force in what he considers a devaluation of musical "worth" in musicological studies. He argues that

Musicology is perceived as dealing with the factual, the documentary, the verifiable, the analysable, the positivistic. Musicologists are admired for the facts they know about music. They are not admired for their insight into music as an aesthetic experience.¹⁹

Aside from the glaring simplification of interpretative issues, the questioning of an all-too-confident belief in the appropriative power of language is appropriate. The loucheness of composers like Edgar Varèse who wrote of *Density 21.5* that, "if you have read what is written in the score, following the various indications, you can ignore the analyses by Wilkinson and all the others",²⁰ can to an extent be forgiven in this regard.²¹

What Kerman's statement also reflects is a recent trend towards reinclusion of the listening experience in analysis, which has obviously been downplayed by formalism. In extreme instances (which have perhaps been the norm until recently) composition itself has moved further into language in that experimental music seems often to be written for the purpose of analysis itself rather than for performance. Such language has then little need for perceptual comment, and tends to become increasingly mathematical in its vocabulary. George Steiner - in an article of questionable conclusions - cites the following passage from *The Musical Quarterly* in this regard:

The initial pitch class of S is denoted by the couple $(0,0)$, and is taken as the origin of the co-ordinate system for both order and pitch numbers, both of which range over the integers 0-11 inclusive, each integer appearing once and only once as an order number and a pitch number. In the case of order numbers, this represents the fact that twelve and only twelve pitch classes are involved: in the case of pitch numbers, this is the arithmetical analogue of octave equivalence (congruent mod. 12).²²

Whereas such discourse may indeed entail what Steiner calls a "retreat from the word" in that language steers away from "humane literacy" towards becoming a quasi-mathematical symbolic apparatus, it remains a written form and can

therefore still be included in our broader definition of language. Even where semiological analyses of music make extensive use of graphs and tables²³ such interpretations are still secondary to the score itself.

For general purposes here, verbalization of existing phenomena (and it is not formalist analysis only that is relevant in this regard) may be said to be a process which imagines for itself a timeless horizon - and yet it is time itself which is necessarily its condition of extension and change, the basic field of the dialectic between what it seeks to accomplish and what has been included before. This dialectic also extends into its own identity: to be aligned with reason, language has to exclude its object while assimilating it. Its relationship to itself - the connection between language as a whole and what has been given as its definitional aim in a field such as musicology (description, communication) - is ever problematic, and it is specifically in moments of appropriation, in transformations of the language-music balance, that its reductive (controlling) drive would seem to be largely inconsistent with this attributed intentionality. Thus, for example, when an original musical phenomenon takes place language has within this temporal break both to redefine itself (it has to relocate its own systemic structures regarding, say, language on the symphony to accommodate the arrival of the symphony which suddenly no longer ends in the tonic key) and to keep itself distant from music (it must keep up the appearance both of advance control and of being more "objective" than the symphony it is assimilating).

This can be linked to claims for totalized linguistic subjectivity: where language fosters our experience it also proves the invalidity of its own prescriptions (its denotative involvement), for it is then constituted by a remove from

itself. In other words, language cannot create and describe at the same time; at such moments it must be "loose": it does not exist ahead of music in any sure manner, and the project of reason ascendant through language is flawed as result of the process of self-definition. Put more simply, what we have is a failure of linguistic closure over music, due to the fact that the language of reason stands in dialectical relation to music and is not constituted only in its own terms.

Recreation

But what about the attempt to provide an *equivalent* for music that is heard? This is, after all, the implied pursuit of many works of literature which at the same time inherently respect the presumed supra-literary qualities of music, and would seem to offer the most practical way of making judgments regarding levels of success or failure.

Distinctions can be made here among *reproduction*, *discussion*, *representation*, *interpretation*, *analogy* and *correlative*. As these words are commonly used, it is only the first that lays a claim to achieving equivalent identity of sorts with the musical object - the example that comes to mind is that of the recording of a musical performance. We are thus led to another problem: where does "music", the object of language, exist - in the score, the performance, or the aesthetic experience? This debate will be entered into at a later stage; for the time being a formulation by the Canadian musicologist Jean-Jacques Nattiez may be put to constructive use here.

Nattiez divides the "total musical fact" into three definitional categories: the neutral (or immanent) level, the poietic level and the esthetic level. The neutral level - a term coined by Jean Molino - is the level at which traditional structuralism functions: "the symbolic form is embodied

physically and materially in the form of a trace accessible to the five senses".²⁴ Nattiez has reservations about the possibility of objective definition here, and acknowledges that operations at the other two levels influence our conception of the neutral. These are identified as the poietic level (that is, the compositional or improvisatory process) and what Valéry termed the esthetic level (perception, the listener's construction of the text).

Nattiez tries to show in *Music and Discourse* that many of the problems of musicology are related to the fact that linguistic attention often tends to focus on one of these three levels, to the exclusion of the rest. As far as the poietic level is concerned, the attempt at equivalence addresses the authorial intention or the essence of a musical work, or more directly searches for the "program" behind the work. While even a musical piece with the most explicit program can hardly be equated with such a program (the music is for instance another *interpretation* of the verbal idea, or vice-versa), the former two attempts are generally impossible to achieve within analysis.

Formalist analyses approach the neutral level, and whereas identification of structural procedures often accounts successfully for emotions relating to suspension and resolution techniques (especially in the tonal language), there is little sense of music being made *tangible* to the reader. In other words, analysis tends to look at what is "done" rather than "said", and the musical experience itself cannot be said to be reproduced. Nattiez remarks, in a statement that could well apply to other levels as well, that

Because it is a metalanguage, musical analysis cannot substitute for the lived experience of the musical. If analysis should achieve this substitution, that would mean that discourse is the musical piece itself. The relationship between experienced musical reality and discourse about music is necessarily an oblique one.²⁵

Even if analysis were to consist of a line-by-line transcription of the score ("a dotted crotchet consisting of A2, D3 and F#3 followed by a quaver repeating the same, above D2 of half-note value in the bass") it would amount to little more than a clumsier alternative to an existing version of musical directions.²⁶

It would seem that it is primarily within artistic literary endeavours that equivalence on an *esthetic* level is sought. Many literary works dealing with music attempt to reflect neutral elements of specific musical compositions or genres within language: Calvin S. Brown's two groundbreaking studies *Music and Literature: A Comparison of the Arts* and *Tones into Words* trace quite effectively the extent to which literary works manage to incorporate the rhythmic and structural elements of the music that is their object.²⁷ His findings, like those of most careful musicoliterary critics writing on the same topic,²⁸ are generally highly pessimistic. Whereas awareness of musical structure usually does enter into verbal attempts to create an *effect* analogous to that produced by the original music, such aspirations on the other hand have validity in a different way. Both language and its object may be said to function at a remove from objective material, and the success of recreation no longer has any direct relation to repetition of formal structures and procedures. In a sense the most subjective *description* of music can also be included here in that it entails a verbalization of the esthetic itself rather than of the neutral level.

As far as recreation of music is concerned, it is at the esthetic level, then, that metamusical undertakings have the greatest validity, primarily because the placing of music within a subjectivist framework by definition acknowledges the failure of generalizable reason. Thus even extreme instances of verbal impressionism - such as the passage by Ludwig given

earlier on - can be considered "successful" in so far as they manage for the author to recreate or bring to mind his or her own musical experience after the fact of writing. The various hermeneutic and poststructuralist positions which emphasize the "role of the reader"²⁹ in the production of meaning are applicable here; "validity" is redefined as soon as objectivity or generalizability is no longer seen as a stable aim.

Redefining Failure

Direct structural, rhythmic, melodic, dynamic, textural and visual reproduction of the musical performance would have been a tangible point of comparison; such an extreme is obviously impossible (language would then, as Nattiez has pointed out, become music) and this impossibility must be accepted as a given. Music, in other words, has to some extent to be ineffable by definition. Failure becomes difficult to pin down once language moves towards discussing aspects or the essence of music, and also, as has been shown, once the balance is shifted away from the neutral towards the esthetic level.

But this also happens in more practical ways. The preceding discussion has avoided, amongst other issues, any direct mention of political instrumentality inherent in the use of language: here we can take as a simple example the way in which scientific explanation of music has "successfully" been employed in relaxation experiments - language aligned with reason is shown to be effective within the latter's greater range of social functioning. The relation between reason and capitalist modes of production is fairly obvious once such knowledge is employed by the music therapy industry. The shift towards esthesis mentioned above also entails the complication of the notion of success in other types of metamusical discourse. The biography and music magazine

industries, advertising, reviews and album notes all constitute versions of language on music that are successful in so far as they manage to sell goods within consumer society; the evaluative aspect of performance and record criticism can from a sceptical viewpoint also be placed within such an economy of musical production. On a more direct political level, the abuse of Wagner by Nazi authorities can again be seen as having been *politically* successful.

The terms of success are dictated by the structure within which language finds itself, and such a structure is not always metasystemic like the present one. Analysis and other general scholarly pursuits set their own goals, and pleasure is contained within self-defined dimensions (successful analysis for instance often amounts to pleasurable "trick-solving"). Writing on music is also used as a means towards further *non-musical* intention within literature - in the writings of symbolist and modernist authors such as Mallarmé, Valéry, Woolf, Pound, Huxley and Eliot it is often employed as an idealized space of free subjective projection³⁰ by which wider novelistic or poetic ideas can be developed. Language on music can also be seen as a result of music acting as artistic "stimulation" or "inspiration", and may bear, while being artistically valid, little or no relation to the music itself.

Thus it can be seen that the term "failure" is useful only in so far as it is linked to rational verifiability or placed against the constraints of one system of language on music. In other words music, by dint of its generally non-referential nature, its tendency towards the status of ineffability, presents an obstruction to the pursuits of non-dialectic reason itself, against the type of classification represented by the evaluation of the successfulness of language as parallel mechanism. Music can in this regard to an extent be taken as a "model" for poststructuralist theories of

language which oppose verifiability, stable signifier-signified linkings and so forth.³¹ Its relationship to language is interesting exactly because, as noted earlier, failure here also to an extent becomes a measure of the successfulness of language. Rather than attempting to make complicated distinctions between what is objective and subjective in the recognition or reproduction of music within language,³² analytical attention can be shifted to the interface between language and music itself, and towards the relationship of language to its own failure. Where the problem of meaning or "essence" in music is addressed, a form-content distinction can for instance be made in both fields, and so on.

Under a broadly hermeneutic banner all verbal approaches to music, then, have "validity", whether failing according to the projects of reason, because of non-verifiable impressionistic content, or otherwise. Listening to music necessarily entails a need for words, but the failure of such words to provide true closure propels music as form into a space where subjectivity can have freer play. The inherent problems of metamusical discourse have been identified in broad terms, and it is worth looking at the two separate fields of language and music in themselves, at how they have been related systemically, before moving on to more complex dialectic interactions.

Other Arts

First of all, let us ask the question: if language is said to exist in a relation of intrinsic failure to music, is there any use in attempting to consider music outside of it?

Music has been interpreted extensively by other art forms that do not employ language. Dance, painting,³³ architecture,³⁴ sculpture have all taken musical compositions as their point of departure at times; in Walter Pater's aesthetics music is

the principle of integration between form and content towards which the artist must strive.³⁵ Robert Schumann was said to uphold the principle that all artists communicate the same matter in different formats; this position is put forward more directly by Jacques Barzun, who writes that "[t]he meaning of literature resides in the same motions of the spirit as those aroused by music; only the means differ."³⁶

The debate surrounding this issue is generally obscured by a conflation of - to use Nattiez's terms - the poietic and neutral levels. Barzun's comment is of the least verifiable kind - although he presumably incorporates the esthetic level into his formulation it is at the poietic level that it is primarily relevant; suffice it to say that it is extremely difficult to give comparative commentary on the spiritual state of artists at the time of creation. It is far more practical to consider different art forms at their respective neutral levels, which are generally implicated if a clear distinction is not made. The interaction among these, however, is an extensive subject of study by itself - for our purposes, it is enough that verbal language is set aside from other articulative forms by dint of the denotative or communicative primacy lent it by society. The *mode of knowledge* that we seek through language (especially when it acts as third party, as in the metasystemic discourse employed here) is linked to a greater specificity which music does not have; where language attempts to "become music" it usually avoids a direct object altogether because it no longer has responsibility towards its own identity.³⁷

Jackendoff and Lerdahl

Attempts have, of course, been made to find operative similarities between language and music; if music can be shown to "work like a language" inferences regarding meaning and

denotation can presumably be drawn more effectively. The vexed issue of musical meaning is of prime importance to the relations between music and language: if the meanings of music can be stipulated, if its signifieds can be identified, metamusical language will be valid in that it will be able to mean the same thing and achieve closure without having to enter musical form itself.

In broad critical terms this kind of discussion of music and language is bound to centre on comparative analysis. Analysis in comparison to language can either concern linguistic functioning or literature; in other words, are we to see music as a "language" in itself or as art, where meaning is acquired only by means of larger-scale structuring (as "narrative")? This distinction itself has major implications for claims towards universal or "natural" elements in musical organization.

The most authoritative attempt at proving the existence of musical structures that are analogous to those governing linguistic functioning is to be found in the work of Ray Jackendoff and Fred Lerdahl. The "generative theory of tonal music" arising from this combination of musicology and linguistics is based within Chomsky's transformational grammar: it lays claim to modelling the "largely unconscious knowledge which the [experienced] listener brings to music and which allows him to organize musical sounds into coherent patterns".³⁸ Natural musical "rules" are analogous to Chomsky's innate cognitive "deep structures"³⁹; these can be divided into metrical and grouping rules, which analyze rhythmic structures and higher-level time-span, and prolongational rules, which analyze relations between rhythm and pitch.⁴⁰ Working within tree structures, the findings of analysis based on these rules are not dissimilar from Schenker's *Urfinie* and *Ursatz*.⁴¹

The usual objections to Chomskian theory are applicable

here. The notion that language is a site of struggle and that meaning is produced socially is ignored almost entirely, both in that the esthetic level is subsumed under the neutral here, and in that the neutral is linked to "naturalness". Jackendoff and Lerdahl are less outright on the "innateness" of their musical rules than Chomsky (the problem of how representative the "experienced listener" actually is already casts doubt on this). The most obvious critique on this point is that their theories are applicable exclusively to tonal music; they are for instance not clear on the position of non-Western listeners. The dominant presence of twelve-tone techniques (and others which are "arbitrary" in relation to classical tonalism) in twentieth-century "serious" music (employed to a far greater extent than for instance Joycean "destabilization" of language in literature) brings the implied correlation between language and music into serious question. It would seem that within the realm of the symbolic music has an autonomous property granted exactly by its lack of communicative primacy, which extends to syntactic and semantic structure as well. To identify grammatical structures inside music is not the same as discovering denotative meaning in specific notes, keys, or melodies. Jackendoff and Lerdahl themselves write that:

Many previous applications of linguistic methodology to music have foundered because they attempt a literal translation of some aspect of linguistic theory into musical terms - for instance, by looking for [a] musical ... semantics ... [This] is an old and largely futile game ... [W]hatever music may "mean", it is in no sense comparable to linguistic meaning.⁴²

This systemic theory thus does not give an answer to the problem of what music actually signifies; musical units if anything signify other parts of the musical structure. The implication of the "generative theory" is that a musical composition relates to the basic principles identified as verbal discourse would to grammatical rules. Semantic

limitations, however, include the impossibility of finding stable equivalent units for elements of language inside music, with the result that the articulative ability of language on music is by no means altered by following this model. In *Music and Discourse* Nattiez, following Nicholas Ruwet, devotes several pages to the multiplicity of differing definitions of musical terms such as "cell", "motif", "figure", "theme", "phrase", "period" and "sentence", and to the extreme level of interreferentiality amongst them;⁴³ if these units themselves are not stable, it is even less likely that they could be linked to elements of language. The "findings" of the generative theory are still presented in structural musical terms, which, in the end, do not bring us much closer to "effability" that is substantially significant beyond the neutral level;⁴⁴ the placing of music as a "language" here is limited on both syntactic and semantic levels.

Deryck Cooke

The other main contender for the discovery of the linguistic nature of music is Deryck Cooke's popular and controversial *The Language of Music*. This book has become a central point of reference in the debate surrounding language-related meaning, even though Cooke often tends merely to reopen earlier debates. His strength lies perhaps in the extent of his coverage of examples from tonal music, and in the systematic way in which he develops (sometimes questionable) first principles.

Cooke explicitly sets out to oppose formalist thought on music,⁴⁵ arguing that "the conception of music as a language capable of expressing certain very definite things is not a romantic aberration". His book "tries to pinpoint the inherent emotional characters of the various notes of the major, minor

and chromatic scales, and of certain melodic patterns which have been used persistently throughout our musical history."⁴⁶ Most of the fairly severe problems to be found in his work are already raised by these statements; while Cooke's musicological argumentation is fairly sophisticated and often convincing within its own framework, his conception of how musical language comes about is for the most part dependent on untenable philosophical and political presumptions that need to be pointed out here.

Firstly, Cooke never quite defines what he means by "language", generally following a simple communication model which does not take larger syntagmatic elements or esthetic variables into account. The meanings of musical elements are considered static: they do not change and are simply consumed in similar manner across the span of history. Expression, then, is for the most part based on ready-made phrases: this stands in direct opposition to the views of a theorist such as Theodor Adorno, for whom expression is, as shall be seen, far more of a subjective principle, arising in dialectical relation to conventional forms.

Secondly, Cooke skirts the issue of how language comes into being: the use of the preposition *of* in his title already suggests that language is a fixed attribute, something inside music that can be drawn out with suitable care. As Alan Durant points out, Cooke ignores problems relating to language and meaning as sites of sociopolitical contestation:⁴⁷ he takes his examples from the work of serious composers only, and even so does not make clear how intervals and progressions come to acquire significatory status. A conflict arises between the emphasis on language as a natural and as a culturally shaped phenomenon; in the end it is Cooke himself who subjectively assigns meanings to musical elements. The interpretative closure forced upon music is in many cases extreme: the

opening section of the funeral march from Beethoven's *Eroica* symphony "presents the feeling of heavy, universalized grief",⁴⁸ and Cooke insists that

If someone were to declare the ... March to be a sanguine piece, we should unhesitatingly accuse him of being emotionally undeveloped. ... The truly musical person, with a normal capacity to respond to emotion, immediately apprehends the emotional content of a piece of music to the degree that he can experience this.⁴⁹

Such a hypostatization of the "normal" listening subject is, then, central to much of his argumentative method.

There are other practical problems relating to Cooke's analysis: performance variables are left out, and while he does take tempo into account, he fails to acknowledge that the performance of certain works at tempos that are even marginally different can substantially change the emotional effect (certain of Mahler's symphonies are prime examples here). In other words, musical meaning cannot purely be located within the composition as it exists on paper.

Lastly, Cooke admits that "music cannot express concepts; ... [it] can only express feelings".⁵⁰ Admission is thus made to the lack of specificity in this "language": if language is indeed seen as the one articulative form that allows denotative, conceptual and communicative clarity, Cooke's use of the term becomes little more than a metaphorical one. More pertinently, the idea that music does "communicate" effectively - Cooke writes that "the listener makes direct contact with the mind of a great artist"⁵¹ - can itself be severely criticized. Jean Molino reformulates the traditionally unidirectional producer-message-receiver model of artistic communication by placing equal emphasis on the input of receiver and "producer" in the construction of the "trace";⁵² he thus "deems communication no more than any particular case of various modes of exchange, only one of the possible results of the symbolic process."⁵³ Cooke, then, is in

effect doing little more than placing the author, in the most traditional of ways, in a position of absolute control.

Language and Music: Forms

Both the systemic models elaborated above are inadequate in supplying a workable mechanism for relating music to language: the first offers questionable structural similarities that bring us no closer to a more effective employment of metamusical discourse; and the second has made claims for meaning in music that approximates meaning in language, without showing how the two forms can be structurally related. It is perhaps worthwhile to look at the problems of relating music and language from a different angle.

If our purpose is to find similarities or dissimilarities between music and language (or literature) on the neutral level only, an imbalance is bound to appear once we look at metamusical discourse itself. This is because - at least regarding the musically uneducated, for whom connotations have not yet been formed - a technical analysis of the musical neutral level will either "mean nothing" or exist as an organization of signifiers set up around arbitrary parameters of duration, frequency, amplitude and so forth,⁵⁴ it can be seen as markedly different from such an analysis of language. In the latter case, for all existing attempts to achieve a "mathematical objectivity", the object is still directly inscribed into the code itself; language, in other words, provides its own metalanguage. The esthetic is, as it were, inseparable from any functional implementation of a signifying form; one can imagine - and here music reveals its "positive" independence - the difficulty of using musical units to analyze musical texts in a symbolically certain manner.⁵⁵ Language thus inhabits a dual potential which music does not: it has a socially ordained instrumentality, and the same

"positive" lack of referential precision attributed to music.

But whereas it is impossible to find a third term which is comprehensively applicable to both language and music, it must also be noted that the two forms cannot be conclusively separated either. There can be no exclusive formulation of what music *is*: both Nattiez and Durant show decisively that music cannot be stably distinguished on the basis of its relationships either to dissonance, to "noise", to non-performance, to speech, to dance, or even to silence.⁵⁶ This is also of course a problem of *perception*: in writing about ethnomusicological research, Nattiez makes "the distinction between an 'etic' approach (that is, an analysis accomplished only by means of the methodological tools and categories of the researcher) and an 'emic' approach, an analysis that reflects the viewpoint of the native informants".⁵⁷ Where this relates to the question of musical universals he concludes that "[s]ince etically similar phenomena can be emically dissimilar, and etically distinct phenomena may result from the same emic categories, *universals can no longer be sought at the level of immanent structures, but in more profound realities.*"⁵⁸ What a Western ethnographer might perceive as music might for instance have the emic function of prayer, and so on. The "profound realities" are to be found, then, in creative and perceptive processes, which are not necessarily directly related to music as form itself.

It makes sense to look at music and language dialectically even at a basic systemic level, and it also makes sense to acknowledge that esthesis is a central component of such a dialectic. It is in this sense that the attempt at discerning musical meaning is an inevitable outcome of metamusical discourse trying to get beyond pure form.

Further Meanings: Semiotics

Many of the issues raised by the section on Deryck Cooke can be related to general debates surrounding signification in music, specifically in the field of musical semiotics. A long tradition descending from nineteenth-century formalism holds that music is an artistic form without a signified, and various schools of semiological thought have attempted either to reclaim such a signified or to locate it within the musical composition itself.⁵⁹

This distinction is important: Bright speaks of a difference between *endo-* and *exo-*semantics of music; Roman Jakobson distinguishes between *introversive* and *extroversive* semiosis.⁶⁰ Theorists have taken different sides on the issue: Benveniste acknowledges that music does have a "language", but insists that semiosis never occurs: "With music, we have a typical example of units that are not signs, that do not designate anything";⁶¹ other structuralist positions such as those of Jakobson and Ruwet hold that music is indeed capable of referring intrinsically, but not extrinsically.⁶² Jakobson writes that

instead of aiming at some extrinsic object, music appears to be *un langage qui se signifie soi-même*. Diversely built and ranked parallelisms of structure enable the interpreter of any immediately perceived musical signans to infer and anticipate a further corresponding constituent... and the coherent ensemble of these constituents. Precisely this interconnection of parts as well as their integration into a compositional whole acts as the proper musical signatum.⁶³

This kind of semiosis is intramusical; intrinsic referral can also be intermusical, and this is for instance Cooke's point of departure.

As far as musical meaning is concerned, it follows from a position such as Jakobson's that such meaning would amount to the *elements of musical structure themselves*. The strict tabular division in some semiological analyses of musical pieces into pitch classes, number of attacks, number of first

beats, degree statuses and so on⁶⁴ leads to a fairly arbitrary assignment of the status of signifier and signified: after doing an analysis of Brahms' Intermezzo, Opus 119, no 1, Jonathan Dunsby concludes fairly simply that "[the pitch] units and their arithmetic values might be considered signifiers and signifieds forming twelve tonal signs."⁶⁵ The only instance where "meaning" in the ordinary sense occurs via intramusical semiosis is when musical quotations are made;⁶⁶ generally, it would seem to require some form of reference to extramusical content.

When it comes to music's potential for extrinsic symbolization, Nattiez makes a division into three fields: the spatio-temporal, the kinetic, and the affective. Psychological studies have established mental associations in Westerners between a musical movement from high and low and an image of movement, between volume and space, between pitch and level of lightness or darkness, and so forth;⁶⁷ these associations are of course by no means "natural", especially when it comes to the affective sphere. With regards to the latter Nattiez draws up a table indicating comparative interpretation of tonal symbolism: for Rameau, for instance, the key of F major suggests "storms, rages" while for Lavignac it suggests a "pastoral, rustic" mood.⁶⁸ The obvious question is asked by Nattiez:

Did Beethoven choose F major for the Sixth Symphony (the "Pastoral") because F major is (according to Lavignac) a 'bucolic, pastoral' key? Or is it not rather that we (with Lavignac) associate a bucolic character with F major because Beethoven picked it for the Pastoral Symphony?... Above all, we must not confuse music's meaning, properly speaking, with translation of that meaning, since verbalizing music's meaning is itself a special type of symbolization.⁶⁹

Once semiotics proceeds away from pure structuralism the same problems that are encountered with general attempts at establishing musical meaning come to the fore.

Meaning and Ineffability

The recent trend towards application of feminist, sociocultural and deconstructionist models within music criticism⁷⁰ would seem to entail a forceful move away from structuralist or general philosophical methods which uphold the idea of ineffability as well as from the emphasis on programmatic signification. While much of this work promises interesting results, it seems that the notion of "meaning" here has so far remained limited to narrow ideological programs, with much debate centering around redefinitions of authorial intent. The claim of Lawrence Kramer - one of the critics at the forefront of this movement - that the discursive meanings of music "are definite enough to support critical interpretations comparable in depth, exactness, and density of connection to interpretations of literary texts and cultural practices"⁷¹ is nowhere borne out by his own analyses.

Whereas it seems safe to assume that instrumental music cannot ever approach the narrative specificity of verbal language - if only because of the primacy lent to the latter by society - it would also be foolish to deny that any musical act produces meaning within context. Once again a definition presented by Nattiez is useful here:

*An object of any kind takes on meaning for an individual apprehending that object, as soon as that individual places the object in relation to areas of his lived experience - that is, in relation to a collection of other objects that belong to his or her experience of the world.*⁷²

Meaning is in the last analysis a subjective phenomenon, and the difficulty of pinpointing it in any given musical fact is directly related to and exacerbated by the failure of reason in the face of the denotatively ineffable as shown earlier on.

The alternative to placing musical meaning in verbal terms (to aiming for a metamusical that is based on perception of meaning) is to take the kind of line followed by Susanne Langer:

[I]t seems peculiarly difficult for our literal minds to grasp the idea that anything can be *known* which cannot be *named* ... But this ... is really the strength of musical expressiveness: that *music articulates the forms that language cannot set forth.*⁷³

John Dewey takes a similar approach when he writes:

If all meanings can be adequately expressed by words, the arts of painting and music would not exist. There are values and meanings that can be expressed only by immediately visible and ... auditory qualities, and to ask what they mean in the sense of something that can be put into words is to deny their distinctive existence.⁷⁴

Both these statements make claims for radical ineffability, but this ineffability is said not to exclude meaning itself. In structuralist terms such a condition of course entails a paradox; this paradox has however been commented upon earlier on, and is the result of attempting to apply any thought whatsoever to the notion of ineffability. Ineffability has been the unspoken other in all of the discussion thus far - it is in a sense the logical "conclusion" of all attempts at writing on instrumental music - and it is worthwhile looking at it more closely also as historical phenomenon.

Ineffability and the Absolute

There exists a long Western tradition which sees music as a whole somehow accessing or representing greater metaphysical realities or truths than other forms of human expression. Plato describes in Book X of *The Republic* how tones are generated by the revolution of the spheres, and how each sphere produces its own sound in natural harmony with that of the others. The notion of a numerically based universal harmony found in Pythagoras and Euclid grants, then, that proper application of the tonal system amounts to an embodiment of greater principles of order within musical compositions themselves. The "music of the spheres" also finds a later place in the Christian tradition of God as the author of all things, and is continued directly in the writings of

Boethius and the *Somnium Scipionis*.

A further Biblical tradition, that of God as the ineffable, combines with the rise of instrumental music in the Eighteenth Century⁷⁵ to divide musical experience from the perceived power of language to convey it. The impossibility of describing the music of the spheres is already a repeated theme in Milton and Shakespeare;⁷⁶ it is however only under the sign of a "religion of art" following upon the Enlightenment - especially within the Romantic tradition - that individual musical works assume the same status in relation to language. Thus for Schopenhauer - as for Schlegel earlier⁷⁷ - music is the highest of all the arts, an embodiment of pure Will, in which not even emotions can be separately identified.⁷⁸ The German Idealist belief in "music as the key to the transcendental world of absolute ideas"⁷⁹ is absorbed by Nietzsche, the symbolist poets and other late nineteenth-century writers, and it is Walter Pater's formulation in "The School of Giorgione" that "all art constantly aspires to the condition of music"⁸⁰ - in other words, that music is an ideal unmediated form where code and referent coincide - which has probably had the greatest effect on twentieth-century thinking on music in this regard.

The term "absolute music" itself was not coined, as many would believe, by its staunchest defendant Eduard Hanslick, whose book *Of the Beautiful in Music* is often seen as representing the beginning of musical formalism,⁸¹ but by Wagner himself, who in 1846 wrote of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony as "breaking the bounds of absolute music".⁸² It is only in Wagner's later writings that absolute music becomes an object of polemical assault; here at its inception it still conveys a sense of *ultimate achievement* in instrumental music (even as the latter was on its way out), represented of course by Beethoven's symphonic compositions. Where the term is

applied in this sense to music generally, it is understandable that a conflation of music and transcendence (of the ordinary, of the human) will take place.

When music is set outside of reason and linguistic restrictions, then, ineffability itself becomes a loaded sign, one on which the meanings of "purity", "transcendence" or "ultimacy" are hung. Where specific compositions are singled out, the act of identification of course does involve "speech", and - partly because one cannot speak of degrees of ineffability - recourse is often made, as shall be seen, to correlatives within events, places or states of mind that are ineffable by convention, such as spiritual peace and paradise.

The rest of this dissertation will take ineffability as a *point of organization*. Section 2 will provide a systemic model for mediating between language and music with the failure of language assumed as a basic tenet; Section 3 will look metasystemically at how the absolute appears in a passage from Thomas Mann's *Doctor Faustus*, and place ineffability within wider literary, philosophical and historical context.

SECTION 2: SYSTEMIC

I mistrust all systematizers and I avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of integrity. - Nietzsche

Introduction

It is apparent from the preceding section that the metasytemic is not exclusive; an alternative systemic methodology is implicit in any process of metasytemic criticism, and is in a practical sense made necessary where one identifies failure. In other words, language cannot merely be said to "fail" while it is still being used metasytemically to point out failure elsewhere: music is an obvious dialectical if unarticulated presence. What this section will set out to do is to theorize more extensively the relation of language to failure.

I will consider language and music as pure semiological mechanisms. Because my interest here is in *primary representation* or signification, I will hold by the problematic tradition of musical ineffability, and address the formal nature of music and language *before* the switch to contextual meaning occurs. The identification of social meaning entails in the larger sense a motion towards language, in so far as denotation and connotation are more readily identifiable in the latter. Music cannot merely be relegated to being a successfully "mystified" form even by the most successful of sociopolitical analyses. The absolute centrality of the absolute-program debate itself requires a systemic position if one is to engage in it critically. In my own analysis, I will avoid this debate as it has recently been cast in contestations between structuralist and broadly Marxist schools of thought, and instead address it in its "own" historical terms.

This section thus presents a "mechanism" which may be

employed as third term in semiological or psychoanalytic approaches to musicoliterary or general metasystemic analysis. Once again, metamusical analysis will inevitably appear, and this section will in that regard suggest ways of reformulating what is metamusically "useful".

The Word of Music

The word of music is the imaginary word: it is the one that is called into existence by logocentric subjectivity. Yet as such, while still embodying a necessary desire, it achieves articulation in itself, without the appearance of the written or spoken word.

The word of music is not the same as song; singing entails the confluence of two differing orders. Speech and music encroach upon each other. They may for our purposes be said to *affect* each other, where "affectation" reads as the artificial appropriation of an alien discourse; an attempt at alignment with a contradicting code; or, ultimately, at self-denial, as in the subordination of the enunciation of words to the use of the voice as a pure instrument. Thus "words spoken musically" can for instance only be judged from one of two angles, and never from a unified vantage point: "Is the meaning or poetic effect of the words enhanced or brought into a different light by their musical presentation?" and "Are the words sung in a way that contributes towards or comments on the musical means (texture, rhythm, melody, tonality and so on)?" The poems of those genres which explicitly set out to "aspire to the condition of music" (Symbolist, Dadaist) may well be located at an interstice between language and music (the emphasis being more on rhythm and sound than on verbal meaning), but are difficult to place within the definition of song.¹ Schoenberg's development of *Sprechstimme* thematizes this difficulty: even when the human voice is balanced "perfectly"

between speech and song the performed text generally needs instrumental accompaniment to be recognized as song. Moreover, the word here proceeds *into* music and not from it; whereas the word of poetry attempts meaninglessness, the word of music is exactly that meaning that originates from within the musical text.

(A counterargument: surely one can judge a song in terms of its beauty alone? Yes, but we are speaking about words here: the beauty which does not spring solely from the poetry of a sung text is, as the two questions above show, ascertained from a purely musical vantage point. The use of the adjective "musical", often analogical to "beautiful", to judge a verbal text also implies an always external yardstick: the switch to the noun form never occurs except metaphorically.)

The connection of the word of music to song is thus the same as it is to instrumental music. It does not seek to unify music and external language, and exists rather as a spatio-temporal incarnation of the dialectic itself.

Imaginary and Symbolic

The notion of an "imaginary word" at first poses a problem to Lacanian theory: how can the word, the mainstay of the symbolic, proceed so uninhibitedly from the resort of the imaginary? Is the word interstitial? Does it come to the fore *despite* the control which "usual" language attempts to assert over music, or more specifically, *despite* the inherent difference between the two forms?

As a starting point, we may consider the place of music within Lacan's rather rigid formulation of existence as it relates to "meaning" and "being". Kaja Silverman explains how Lacan's thinking here can be placed in a "your-meaning-or-your-life" pattern: meaning is directly proportional to self-

alienation and to loss of Being, which is associated with the imaginary.² The imaginary is one of the vaguest concepts in psychoanalytic terminology: for our purposes, it can be read as the pre-symbolic projection of and subsequent narcissistic relation to the ideal self.³

Music is obviously a symbolic form: patterns have certain social meanings, hegemonies exist as in any other form of expression. Yet it would be difficult to equate the effects of music with what Lacan posits as the self-alienation resulting from the acquisition of language (and therefore, in his terms, of subjectivity).⁴ Much modernist fiction for instance equates the experience of music exactly with access to an imaginary realm unhindered by the constraints of language. For modernist authors, music in fact manages to articulate the complexities of human nature with far more clarity and sensitivity than poetry or prose; the entry into musical writing (the imitation of structure, sound and "mood") is in part an attempt at more exact or comprehensive self-expression.⁵ Music thus does relate to meaning while yet being linked to a mode of existence that is not by definition one of alienation. What it represents is in a sense a composite of the Imaginary and the Symbolic, no doubt being partly because language does have communicative primacy in our society. It is not that music is a transparent code, experienced without mediation while yet containing a verbal impulse (the current wave of sociopolitical critique is at great pains to prove this). Nor is it that music is as rigid and limiting to the initiated as what language is (which seems to be one of the implications of Adrian Leverkühn's artistic development in Mann's *Doctor Faustus*).⁶ Rather, music fills an indeterminate position which grants it great freedom within this debate itself: it can to an extent tip either way.

Thus the word manages to proceed from the Imaginary.

Once it is articulated in a known form it is of course subsumed within the symbolic order; we know this already from Barthes' statement that "[the musical adjective] is always the bulwark with which the subject's imaginary protects itself from the loss which threatens it". In both Lacan's and Barthes' terms desire - created by musical experience - is not fulfilled, but is checked and contained by a word that is necessarily false. The word of music, the imaginary word, is however not bound to Lack as is the case with the symbolic word. Whereas it is called into being by the same need it also proceeds from within music itself; it is equivalent to the "meaning" of music when the latter is not articulated in speech or on paper.

The word of music is thus an impulse; it is experience before it is spoken, self-constitution before that self can enter the outside world. It remains "verbal" in that it is a sign into which wider musical motion is contracted (or to which the latter gives rise), and in that it is the necessary predecessor to exterior verbal articulation. The word of music is furthermore the explicit or implicit aim of all speech on music: it is the subjectively perceived and elusive "feel", structure, biographical detail, extramusical ("program") event which language attempts to woo onto paper, beyond the failure of phenomenological and hermeneutic enquiries.⁷ Desire here stays within its own bounds, yet achieves a degree of formalization it would usually find only in its (fake) translation into language. The Derridean concept of deferred meaning is therefore of little concern; a "bearable completion" of desire is achieved without recourse to the symbolic word (which has the paradoxical misfortune of needing to present and inevitably having to defer meaning).

The Fictional Work

The fact that the word of music can never be spoken or written down links it intimately to the imaginary work of music in fiction. The forgotten choral pieces of Johann Conrad Beissel in *Doktor Faustus*,⁸ the various works of Adrian Leverkühn, the sonata of Vinteuil in Proust's *A la Recherche du Temps Perdu* - the description of all of these fills the reader with the desire to experience them, to partake in a music that is more intense than that which he or she has ever heard before, music that offers transcendence of its context. Like the forgotten manuscript found in the stories of Poe and Borges, the imaginary work of music, existing only in actual words and never represented in its actuality, depends on a hierarchical principle. On occasion it may merely inspire interest, but most of the time it is set up by the author either as representative of some form of lost Golden Age or as an embodiment of artistic, spiritual or social ideals which are at odds with and which transcend contemporary social conditions. The point is that the text leads to desire for an Imaginary which is still acknowledged as such; there are leanings towards fantasy, and in Bakhtinian terms the transgression into the carnivalesque⁹ reads here as the entrance into a harmonious realm that denies social conventions and restrictions. The written word is the sole trait within which music finds existence, and at the same time it is this word that creates desire for experiencing the same music. The music as such exists *within* the desire for it: like the imaginary word, it cannot be represented (language cannot represent anything "real", and the music furthermore becomes "greater" than the written words that create it), but is granted actuality by the reader's or listener's desire and by the desire which it produces in turn. While we may wish to urge the word of music into language it remains verbal (real)

only within the confines of the musical text or performance: similarly, the fictitious piece of music acquires its *superior* reality only within language. Although language has succeeded in generating music, these words do not however amount to the imaginary word: the latter, once again, is a locus at which desire finds a midway position, at which the reader begins the attempt at voicing his or her own translation.¹⁰

Framing the Absolute

Can we at all negotiate the relation between the word of music and the word that writes or speaks about music?

It is only in so-called program music that an entire piece of music may be said to follow a verbal arrangement. Compositions such as Chopin's nocturnes and preludes which are supposed to reflect the composer's emotional or mental state at the time of writing¹¹ - even if they do succeed in this - do not have a piece of verbal discourse as their "narrative": emotions are meant to be represented directly (and more faithfully) in musical shape and are therefore not accessible to language. With program music, on the other hand, a relatively clear narrative is re-represented by musical means. Associations, however, do not occur naturally (except in rare cases where conventions are strongly established, such as the use in the nineteenth century of chromatic progressions to represent approaching storms) and the listener has to be guided in nearly every element of understanding.

Nattiez touches on a central issue when he writes:

When I read the phrase "the marquise went out at five o'clock", I don't need a *title* to know what has been narrated. When I hear the beginning of *The Sorcerer's Apprentice*, I have to know that I am dealing with a symphonic poem in order to approach the work with the intention of hearing it as narrative.¹²

The word "title" here can also read from the angle of recent literary theory as "frame". When we hear a major key melody

literary theory as "frame". When we hear a major key melody played by an oboe in Prokofiev's *Peter and the Wolf* we know that it is the duck who is being represented, having been told to make this association by the (speaking) narrator. The process of framing an instrument is obvious: any entrance of oboe sound into the texture of the music is "framed" by the word "duck". Similarly, in a piece such as Berlioz's *Symphonie Fantastique*, where there is no verbal interference in the text itself, our "understanding" of individual movements is led by descriptions in the program notes of the scene which each represents. Finally, the entire length of Dukas's work is heard with a prerecognized fable in mind; the title alone is sufficient as framing device. As Nattiez notes, however, the music need not rely on its frame; it is also obvious that although a framing of every fragment or musical event could arguably be possible (although this has never been achieved) the frame can never cease to exist. However far it manages to intrude into its object (the word "subject" assumes a simplistic unity between frame and "picture" which is not there) it never reaches a point where it becomes equal to the latter (the point of self-dissolution), not even to the minutest musical detail. Music here, like those abstract expressionist paintings which still claim to have a referential link to some external object, needs a name to tell a story.

But what about musical works that do not relate to some specific program event? Where the title of a piece relates to its categorical identity (*Symphony No 9, Piano Sonata Opus 111*) the frame could for instance be said to proceed from within the music itself (a sonata can be recognized by its structure without needing a title). A similar situation occurs with regard to the names of movements (*Andante espressivo, Lebhaft*): these terms are *directions* for how to perform the

music, but unlike other textual directions (printed notes, crescendo symbols and so forth) they remain as the markers by which movements are finally identified. Furthermore, one might also ask what the relationship of the *composer's name* is to the frame: the title of a piece is rarely announced without the name of its author, and few would deny the power of the sudden intervention of a composer's name in changing one's response to music already being listened to - the "frame" here once again actively directs our experience. It is clear that the relationship between frame and framed is more complex than a simple division between the two or imposition of the one over the other.¹³

Derrida's Frame

In *The Truth in Painting*, Jacques Derrida takes up the issue of framing as it relates to language and painting at great length.¹⁴ Drawing from and criticizing Kant's third Critique, he argues for the non-exclusivity of *ergon* and *parergon*, questioning in other words the binary opposition of inside/outside which is traditionally instituted by the frame (the frame is a strong example of Derrida's notion of the "trait", the line which divides absence and presence, the sign which allows but also controls understanding and which he constantly seeks to reconsider). At the most obvious level, the frame does not institute an absolute division between subject and object; the viewer (or, then, listener) cannot prevent his or her subjectivity from affecting the perception of the work of art. The exterior world as such becomes part of the *ergon* and, in turn, of the *parergon*. Similarly, the work of art is internalized by the spectator, becoming part of the outside world. Looking at program music from this angle, one can better consider the inevitable influence of subjective experience - particularly in the case of "non-

representational" art forms - on the "prescribed" narrative.

The questions asked by Derrida are thus in the line of: where does the frame begin - inside or outside the art work?; where does it end?; where does it "take place"?; does the frame signify in itself or does it merely supplement the *ergon*? The difficulty of answering these enquiries becomes clear in a comparison of different views on a Van Gogh painting of a pair of shoes: while Heidegger holds that the peasant to whom the shoes presumably belong is *inside* the frame, the art critic Meyer Shapiro argues that the peasant is *outside*, while Van Gogh himself is inside (we seem to be able to sense his emotions and so on). There are distinct correlations between the fluid nature of parergonality apparent here and the two-way framing process in music described earlier; how, then, does the imaginary word fit into this model?

Let us return to an earlier reading: the frame is the limit of music *and* of the exterior world, which we equate with language; the two articulative forms may be said to converge within parergonality.¹⁵ The frame as *significatory institution* is however always verbal: whereas in painting, frames can exist without verbal titles, in order to exist next to a musical work the frame requires a written or spoken sign. Yet the music remains "inside" the frame in a form whose ontological status is unclear, but which is accepted as real. Now we have claimed that the word of music is an impulse towards verbalization from *within* the musical fact: does this constitute it as an inner frame, lying alongside the real one? If this is the case, we have a double frame; in other words we have *three traits*, the middle one being the line which divides the two frames and which therefore amounts to a frame itself. Even without considering Derrida's critique of parergonality as limited to an exclusive field, this kind of designatory

division presents a problem. We can see how this multiplication of the frame can be practically infinite: the middle frame is also separated by something on either side, and so on. Where there are two adjacent frames, the trait that divides the two (what would here be the difference or convergence between word and imaginary word) reveals a capability for endless fragmentation.¹⁶ It becomes impossible to stipulate the point at which the two frames are given meaning by the dividing trait, or at which point the trait itself is given meaning by those traits that institute its inner divide.

It therefore makes little sense to try understanding the relation between real and imaginary word in the way described. The conjectured model furthermore supposes that the word of music is *framed by language*, which leads to an interesting paradox. If we question whether this is possible, the answer is both yes and no. On the one hand, the word of music is part of its music, and the two are framed together. On the other hand, language has not said anything about this word: the difference in code between language and music suspends the realization of failure, whereas the fact that language does not reach its own element points towards a more remarkable inadequacy. The word of music is also the *aim* of language: "language frames music in an attempt to reach its true word". And, finally - incontrovertibly - the word of music is *imaginary*. It cannot be judged from the same ontological position as two empirically verifiable social acts. Not completely inside or outside, not destroying the frame, but acting as an unstabilized base - it fills an *expansive field*, with the frame adrift like a lifesaving ring on an open sea. It spills over, it cleanses, it confuses language.

Systemic?

The word of music acts as a dialectical model, and it finds its own models in Derrida's conception of the frame, in the Platonic-type metaphor of the sea, and in language, which according to Ricoeur and Barthes is metaphoric (connotative) in its basic nature. It is a critical instrument, and its conceptual validity is perhaps no greater than the instrumental validity of language in describing music.

The comparison of music and language, the study of their various interactions, is by nature apt to give rise to a variety of models which are difficult to evaluate. Systemic framings range from "melopoeisis"¹⁷ to "melophrasis",¹⁸ and it is amusing to see how many of these have considered themselves definitive in establishing a critical idiom that provides answers in the field. The word of music for this reason does not seek to demonstrate anything: it cannot signify, and as metaphor it does not claim access to any particular piece of music. It remains, rather, a general point of aspiration which avoids limitations of two forms by becoming a third, properly impossible term.

The mechanism and function of critical - especially metasystemic - analysis thus become points of reconsideration. Are literary transcriptions, musicological analyses, biographical diagnoses all to be judged under the yardstick of how they adhere to the imaginary word, or of the extent to which the latter appears, both of which are impossible to ascertain? Are they to be evaluated in terms of their recognition of the existence of such a word, which is a construct in any case? What questions should we ask in relation to the word of music?

Firstly, we should keep in mind that the imaginary word, as an object of aspiration rather than emulation, leads to a change in the nature of language as functional field. In

writing the imaginary, language should not be judged as it would be under "ordinary" conditions: the impossibility of the object should be a starting point, and representation discarded as functional aim.¹⁹

Secondly, the word of music is in a sense a *metaphor* for the general predicament of language; such a figure is applicable in so far as the term itself is a condensation of the various battles between opposing forces, an operative embodiment of the play between word and world. It illustrates a suspension of value, which in working outwards allows the *repressed* tension of representation to surface around a governing but non-determining body. By being itself included, it "normalizes" both metaphoricity and failure.

Thirdly, the imaginary word brings into association the concepts of reading and writing. The denial of the notion of origin is implicit in the imaginary order, and the infusion of both activities with an anti-referential mood lends a general condition of the *scriptible*.

The word of music, then, should be allowed free play in order to deregulate the aims of reading, writing, listening, so that the experience of language and of art can avoid being structured through metaphors of space, direction and intentionality. Its field lies beyond language while occupying the whole of the symbolic; its presence is signalled from within a position of engagement, and is difficult to exist (I exist it = I find, choose, create, experience). The resistance it forces against closure is, by dint of its metaphoric nature, also applicable to exterior definition and suggests, ultimately, the notion of the *membrane*: it allows passing of inspiration for the rest.

SECTION 3: METASYSTEMIC

Method:

Switching

Moving from observation and systematization to *praxis* here is not a simple procedure, or at least not one of those in which theoretical concepts confidently find self-justification by reconstructing the text to which they are applied. The limitations of the frame model have been elaborated, and are indeed implicit in the conception of this model: it is largely the notion of *praxis* itself which is called into question by inscribing failure as a principle of truth. Because of the interrelatedness of the three levels of language on music, the transition is furthermore not a uniform process: practical application (and by application we mean splicing, tangentiality, "another voice") of any systemic approach becomes a metamusical exercise. Similarly, metasytemic analysis necessarily incorporates systemic and metamusical tropes (at the simplest level, through implied comparison). Whereas the following section can as a whole be labelled metasytemic (for critical consciousness tends to be placed along a hierarchical line, where the furthest position is accorded the greatest truth value until it is shown to be defective), all different levels are admitted, informing analytic process as both subject and object.

Neither of the preceding two sections, then, can be excluded; the vagueness of the first, the self-acknowledged over-specificity of the second both acquire structural relevance in their relation to an "open metatext".

Hypertext

Are we thus heading for what has been called the *hypertext*, the endless text, for what Deleuze and Guattari have labelled

the *rhizome*?¹ Language itself is a hypertext (that is, after all, the implication of Derrida's notion of *différance*)² and, as a result, all verbal texts are hypertextual: there can be no closure of interpretation as long as connotation or association is seen as a free (or circular) process. To admit to this belief within analysis is to "move away" from the text, to allow it to generate meaning beyond its own intention, to assign it *through process* the status of Barthes' *scriptible*. Intertextuality is "naturalized" in that it no longer depends on directionality in being shown; via such a method we can exit and enter the text in a relatively free fashion while still acknowledging it as a primary generative locus.

The hypertext is thus one way of acknowledging some of the complexities of the dialectical approach to language and music elaborated earlier. Although the reading that follows will not have the direct interreferentiality of the hypertext proper, it can be called "rhizomic"³ in that it avoids linear goal-orientation, in that no metamusical or systemic form is given direct preference, in that the notion of ineffability, rather than being an inviolable Other, can be interspersed throughout the space among nodal points.

Line by Line

In the introduction to *S/Z*, a reading of Balzac's story "Sarassine", which has substantial similarities to the process which follows, Barthes writes:

Discerning ... signifieds systematically for each lexia does not aim at establishing the truth of the text (its profound, strategic structure), but its plurality (however parsimonious); the units of meaning (the connotations), strung out separately for each lexia, will not then be regrouped, provided with a metameaning which would be the ultimate construction to be given them ... We shall not set forth the criticism of the text, or a criticism of *this text*; we shall propose the semantic substance (divided but not distributed) of several kinds of criticism

(psychological, psychoanalytical, thematic, historical, structural); it will then be up to each kind of criticism (if it should so desire) to come into play, to make its voice heard, which is the hearing of one of the voices of the text. ... [T]he work of the commentary, once it is separated from any ideology of totality, consists precisely in *manhandling* the text, *interrupting* it. What is hereby denied is not the *quality* of the text (here incomparable) but its "naturalness".⁴

For Barthes, it is thus exactly the fragmentation of the text which allows for the actualization of what Bakhtin defined as *heteroglossia*,⁵ which works to avoid ideological closure. The added dissolution of strict subject/text relations as implied earlier has direct relevance here: connotation as governing principle allows the primary text to appear alongside others, to avoid its necessary critical ascendancy. Where it is accepted that language-music relations are not going to be consistent, such a reading also normalizes the presence of the third party, of *interpretation*, and does not exclude those readings that may work against it. Similarly, different readings will be allowed to *reread* or contradict one another, to follow the logic of their own language; it is for this reason that conclusions (which are contrary in spirit to the rhizomic procedure in any case) will in many places be avoided, in favour of subjective inference.

By dividing the primary text into extended fragments, it can also to some extent stand on its own; it is not simply *incorporated* into the critical text. It is thus not a question of drawing large inferences from small bits of evidence - the effect of the text (be it pathetic, boring, "musical") can still be assimilated independently.

As regards the "presence" of music: in a few instances, fragments from the score will be inserted; "music lies between the lines"; it is only by means of a line-by-line analysis that such a crude direct comparison can be achieved.

Looking at Literature, Looking at Music

But the important question remains unanswered: is this method specifically more valid for musicoliterary study? Will music "appear" more successfully than in other readings?

On an elementary level, the passage through the text is linear - it approaches the time experience of listening to a piece of music rather than that of reading, which allows easy repetition, turning back of the page. But this is perhaps an idle point: listening can be repeated, interrupted, and the time sequence of the text in this case does not follow that of the music, except in certain limited sections.

What is perhaps of particular use here is that music and literature can be approached separately as well as in interaction; the ordinary concerns of textual analysis (narrative, metaphor, symbolism, characterization and so on) as well as of musicology can be followed. Both language and music are given "subjects", with the result that comparison can occur in a wider sense; issues relevant to musicoliterary study can be distinguished, and because literature can combine metamusical and (by implication) systemic discourses, the interrelations can be perceived more clearly.

Translation

The problem of the translated text should be raised here: is it valid to analyze a musicoliterary text which is not in its original form, which has lost the sounds, rhythms, phrasings, and connotations which make up a large part of its metamusical texture?

As far as possible, relevant phrases are given in German also; but it is likely that much authorial intention is lost. The obvious point may be observed, however, that the galaxy of esthetic variables are endlessly fluid, especially in the temporal sense; all individual readings are secondary to that

of the author, which cannot be a fixed entity.

The problem is one of both form and content. Musical effect cannot be isolated within either, and it is thus difficult to relegate the problem solely to the act of translation itself. What is lost cannot be designated; translation in this sense approaches the act of experiencing the text (verbal or musical) itself, in that ineffability is the condition of its own reading. Translation can here be linked to music via Kant's notion of the sublime: the moment of radical heterogeneity, the ultimate principle of difference still evokes a reaction after the experience of loss in those painters and writers whose concern it is has passed. In twice-tempered fashion, the language of translation approaches an uncategorizable Other, following on the heels of language itself as it finds its way into those limits surrounding music, cauterizing its own substance for the sake of necessity, continuation and, in the supreme instance, ecstasy.

The Text:

Wendell Kretschmar, at that time still young, was born in the state of Pennsylvania of German-American parentage. He had got his musical education in his country of origin; but he was early drawn back to the old world whence his grandparents had once migrated, and where his own roots lay, and those of his art. In the course of his wanderings, the stages and sojourns of which seldom lasted more than a year or so, he had become our organist in Kaisersachern. It was only an episode, preceded by others (he had worked as conductor in small state theatres in the Reich and Switzerland) and followed certainly by others still. He had even appeared as composer and produced an opera, *The Statue*, which was well received and played on many stages.

Text

To begin, we may ask, what are we looking at? Designating the boundaries of the text is itself an impossibility, as the frame model has made amply clear, and the method that follows entails an actualization of the principle of instability. Words in the text here are themselves a frame, unable to exclude or include music as a subject. Such a dialectical interchange is of course not contained by a metasystemic reading such as this one either.

This is a re-reading: we know what the lecture is about, we know its own subject. Let us then emancipate the notion of text, so that Mann, Kretschmar, Beethoven, Opus 111 and all others are no longer enclosed within a primary locus. Barthes writes in his essay "From Work to Text":

It is ... as though the *interdisciplinarity* which is today held up as a prime value in research cannot be accomplished by the simple confrontation of specialist branches of knowledge ...; it begins effectively ... when the solidarity of the old disciplines break down ... in the interests of a new object and a new language...⁶

This "new object" is "text" itself, that which does not, like the "work", "[close] on a signified".⁷ In this sense

Beethoven's Opus 111 is not the *object*, the signified of Mann's (or Kretzschmar's) language; it may be said to appear from within the text.

Literature and Music

The ubiquitousness of music within literature is perhaps astounding for those who have not considered such a presence or who think of artistic disciplinarity as being confined by exclusive barriers. A brief investigation of a critical resource such the MLA bibliography reveals that studies are being done on the role of music in the works of writers ranging from Shakespeare, Milton, and Spenser to Hoffman, Lenau, Burns, Blake, De Quincey, Dickens, Poe, Whitman, Tolstoy, Balzac and the French symbolists, from Proust, Kafka, Rilke, Hesse, Camus, Artaud, Gide, Yeats, Shaw, Lawrence, Forster, Huxley, Eliot, Pound, Woolf, Joyce and Beckett to Patrick White, Burgess, Grass, Carpentier, Kundera and Pynchon. These studies are generally considered to constitute the field of musicoliterary study proper: metasystemic investigation can include consideration of the role of music as theme, as structural or esthetic principle, as subjective principle of characterization, and so on.

An entire continuum of musical involvement in literature (and vice-versa) can accordingly be drawn up, from discreet allusion to specific compositions, to entire literary translations of musical works, where transcription of theme, structure and presumably meaning and aesthetic quality into literary format is attempted. On the one side, Eliot's *Four Quartets* are for instance generally seen as alluding to Beethoven's late string quartets;⁸ in the middle, we find basic versions of the metamusical such as discussions and subjective interpretations of compositions for the sake of characterization, theme, and so on; on the other side, we can

take as example that which occurs between Beethoven's Third Symphony and Anthony Burgess' *Napoleon Symphony*. It is worth noting that the latter form of transcription has occurred more often in the opposite manner: Jean-Pierre Barricelli writes of Liszt's *Divina Commedia* (which, incidentally, is often regarded as a *musical failure*) that "the composer becomes a remarkable literary interpreter".⁹ Various ways of musicalizing the poems of Stéphane Mallarmé, from emotional interpretation to attempts to find exact musical equivalents for rhythms and sounds in the poems, have been attempted throughout the course of the last century by composers ranging from Debussy to Pierre Boulez to the contemporary Swiss composer Walter Feldmann. The number of Mallarmé's works "transformed" into music as well as the variety of musical styles utilized for the purpose presumably represent a lack of denotative restriction both in musical forms themselves and in certain specific forms of literature.¹⁰ The links between the role of music and that of language in the Symbolist tradition are clear: the symbolic form is one that is ordered without ordering the interpreter, and often the traditional intense artistic experience is to be gained from the paradox that the human (the self-conscious) is activated yet "meaningless".¹¹

Music is, of course, also a principle of artistic and spiritual guidance and, at times, of redemption; this tendency finds its fullest exploration in the literature of high modernism. In Proust, for example, music is highly important thematically as well as in constituting a "compositional sensibility" informing his novel at every level;¹² Nattiez points out how it is music that both unifies the thematic and structural concerns of *A la Recherche* and provides the "model" from which Marcel will henceforth be able to pursue his own creative calling.¹³ Writers such as Joyce, Huxley, Eliot, Pound, Mann and Rilke all experimented with musical structure,

generally with a questionable degree of success. It has been mentioned elsewhere how an ascetic withdrawal into an idealized musical space was one response to twentieth-century alienation; the obsession with sound and form approaches the traditional notion - subscribed to by a large number of modernist writers - of "musicality" as a metaphorical index of beauty and often of literary value, propagated further by Pater's dictum that "all art constantly aspires to the condition of music". The idea that music can command immediate and absolute presence carried an obvious appeal for writers struggling with the limitations of language and the problems facing the individual within regulated society. As in the Symbolist tradition, "meaning" here is not meant to be primarily verbal, and language itself would seem to desire an escape from narrative process; the result is often a blurring of outer details of the kind found in long parts of Proust's narrative. Where music is described, then, technical terms themselves also acquire an enchanting status, becoming signifiers that grant access to an exclusive or supposedly unlimited sphere of being.

Failing Again

It has to be noted that translation between literature and music for the most part entails another grand history of failure. The use of the term "musical" as an analogy for auditory beauty already implies a substantial level of dilettantism:¹⁴ the issue is as simple as listening to certain less accessible works of Schoenberg or Varèse. Even a poet such as Mallarmé, whose work is more intensely concerned with music than that of nearly any other recent major poet, had no musical education to speak of, and his poems consider music in an abstract and idealized form rather than basing themselves on practical models. The charge of dilettantism is perhaps no

more valid than that laid against writers using terms such as "chiaroscuro" in their work; the difference lies however in the extent to which there is an active attempt at conveying formal elements in writing.

The problems that arise have to do mainly with three phenomena: the failure to recognize possible authorial intentions such as irony and parody (this works both ways: in so far as it is relevant to how the music is experienced, Tchaikovsky for instance missed the irony in Pushkin's *Eugene Onègin*), the overemphasis on surface similarities or generalities,¹⁵ and the incorrect application of musical terms.¹⁶ It is within the latter category that the worst "atrocities" have occurred - while it is not easy to consider music and language in any exclusive way, there does seem to be a distinct irrelevance in the claims made by literary works towards paralleling fairly strictly and clearly defined musical forms. Thus Robert Nicolosi points out that Eliot might have used the name of any other classical form for his *Four Quartets* without any noticeable change.¹⁷ Similarly, Nattiez clearly establishes the incorrectness of finding symphonic and sonata structures in Proust¹⁸ and cites Matoré and Mecz as having "listed once and for all everything that distinguishes the specificity of a leitmotif in music from the Proustian system of preparation and anticipation".¹⁹ It would seem that within serious musicoliterary criticism there are only a few authors - one of them Thomas Mann - whose attempts at implementing musical principles have been taken seriously.²⁰

The practical point remains that many musical terms - especially those hailing from the period of early instrumental music - themselves to an extent seem calculated to retain musical identity, to remain immune to incorporation into systemic terminology. Whereas melody can historically be related to the spoken (and by implication the written) line,

other forms and techniques such as counterpoint, modulation and the fugue are impossible to achieve within the non-temporal written text.²¹ The historical departure in literature from orality in this sense also parallels a departure from performable musicality; on the most obvious level, the novel, the literary essay and certain forms of experimental poetry are intrinsically further from song than any other literary form in history; the efforts of later Romanticism and Modernism in literature are in a sense an attempt at historical reversal.

Some of the worst excesses have occurred within criticism itself. Alan Durant notes how the use of musical terms usually "take[s] the form of analogy and license only"²² and we need look no further than the writing of a cultural overseer such as George Steiner to find an instance where such a judgment is not unfair:

The words [in Broch's *The Death of Virgil*] literally [!] flow in sustained polyphony. Strands of argument interweave exactly as in a string quartet; there are fugal developments in which images are repeated at governed intervals; and, at the last, language gathers to a dim, sensuous rush as remembrance, present awareness, and prophetic intimation join in a single great chord.²³

Kundera's extensive theorization of the novel as a "polyphonic" form²⁴ (a term also taken from Bakhtin) must be placed in the same category. And yet a simple problem raises itself here: what if Kundera had merely employed Bakhtin's more "objective" term "heteroglossia"? If, as Ricoeur has argued, all language originated metaphorically,²⁵ such a usage cannot be rejected outright, and we are once again faced with an argument about specificity. It is perhaps simplest - if theoretically untenable - to acknowledge that these musical terms make no practical contribution to the study of literature which cannot be made by other metaphors.²⁶ Similarly, in parallel fashion to the relation between program music and narrative, much literature would not be recognized

as having a "musical structure" unless so indicated by a title.

Calvin Brown makes a fairly simple concluding statement to a book dealing with the poetic treatment of music:

The poem on a specific composition is, in general, inadequate and derivative. On the other hand, music has been an important source of inspiration ... in recent literature...²⁷

We are thus cast back to the notion of the *membrane* as suggested in Section 2, of art proceeding from music rather than towards it; the claims which the author makes for literature itself need not have a relation to how it is experienced.²⁸ Where the musical object is fictional, where it is idealized, the implicit presence of a signified is not as much of a controlling input as when the object is a real and heard one, around which signifiers have already accumulated. Nonetheless, it is in reading as *writing*, in interpretation, that stable linkages can be dissolved; once the domination of the signified is discarded (and also where it enters the range of signifiers as *structure*), reading about an existing object can be allowed freer play.

The Novel

Calvin Brown limits one of his musicoliterary studies to poetry alone, because, he explains, there are too many "vague uses of music as a part of the atmosphere or the setting of the novel" and because "also, in prose we can draw no sharp dividing line between attempts at an artistic treatment of a piece of music and simple program notes, technical descriptions, or analyses".²⁹ This statement gives a positive indication of the scope which the novel allows for metamusical and systemic heteroglossia here; it will be shown that the section from *Doctor Faustus* under consideration makes use of all the methods that Brown mentions.

Georg Lukács argues that the novel differs from drama and poetry in that it entails an objective stance towards time and space; drama confuses time identity because it seems to occur in the present, while poetry lies somewhere between drama and the novel.³⁰ Lukács' theorization of the novel, which is generally based upon realist texts, is shown to be limited exactly by the way in which Chapter VIII of *Doctor Faustus* plays with these issues: Kretschmar is in context an actor, and there is a sense of immediacy even though the event is twice refracted in time. The effect of the text seems also to be a highly visual one. Zeitblom is by no means an "objective" narrator - he is largely employed for the purpose of parody, and his careful memory of details from childhood experience in a chapter such as this one is definitely not a "realistic" possibility. In the first passage we are given Kretschmar's historical details - "realism", for sure, but only an inkling of what is yet to come.

Work

The work here is the context of the text; it does not set its boundaries but may be said to posit them for analytical purposes. Once again what lies "behind" the work, what constitutes its supposed closing signified, can be drawn into the text at the same way that the text can be worked outwards to disrupt that closure. Let us, then, consider the work in teleological, hierarchical fashion, where *telos* reads as the attempt at historical closure.

Thomas Mann's novel *Doctor Faustus: The Life of the German Composer Adrian Leverkühn as Told by a Friend* was completed while he was in exile in California in 1947, and is perhaps the least well known, most difficult, and most widely misunderstood of his major works.³¹ Although generally acknowledged as his most self-conscious attempt at artistic

innovation and avant-gardism,³² this novel stands in problematic relation to the modernism conceived of by other writers such as Joyce, Woolf and Kafka. While actively attempting to theorize the modern in the terms of Theodor Adorno's cultural critique - which Fredric Jameson calls "one of the most pessimistic and thoroughgoing that we possess"³³ - Mann struggles to embrace the full implications of this approach. The dichotomy between the profoundly alienating conclusions which such a critique necessitates and Mann's inability to forgo the humanist-Romantic roots which so strongly inform his earlier writings, finds its fictional counteridentifications alternately in the composer Adrian Leverkühn and his biographer Serenus Zeitblom.

Doctor Faustus is the culmination of a long-standing concern with the role of the artist in society, with death and sickness as a creative principle, and with music.³⁴ As such, it is an "end" novel, something which is also reflected in the thematic matter, and in the discussion of the sonata to come.³⁵ In writing it, a lifelong interest in music is expanded in a thematic direction, and is brought into conjunction with intense speculation on the troubled fate of art and of the artist in modern society, a situation which finds for Mann both correlative and cause in the fate of Germany under the Nazis.

America, Germany

It was during his stay in the United States that Mann formulated his most influential ideas on German culture and identity; the address entitled "Germany and the Germans" is perhaps his most famous, and reflects many of the concerns which found their way into the writing of *Doctor Faustus*. Mann argued that music, as well as a dangerously abstract notion of Romantic self-transcendence, are intrinsically bound up with

German identity. He writes:

Music is both calculated order and chaos-breeding irrationality. It is rich in conjuring incantatory gestures, in magic of numbers, the most unrealistic and yet the most impassioned of arts, mystical and abstract. If Faust is to be the representative of the German soul, he would have to be musical, for the relation of the German to the world is abstract and mystical, that is, musical...³⁶

Kretschmar, then, represents Mann's own attempt at a more "balanced" subjectivity, one which is passionately bound up with German culture but which attempts to see the self from an outsider's - in this case American - vantage point. To place the analysis of Beethoven's last piano sonata in the mouth of one whose personal and artistic "roots" are truly German, but who also hails from what Mann perceived as a more democratic culture, is to lend it both more objective authenticity as well as to locate it within a definite historicocultural program executed by one who can associate with the value of what is being said.

It is perhaps relevant that Kretschmar's famous composition - the only one mentioned - is an *opera*, a form in which language is at least as important as music. In the same essay mentioned earlier, Mann writes - albeit unfactually - that Germans are "primarily musicians of the vertical, not the horizontal ... instrumentalists rather than glorifiers of the human voice".³⁷ His caution regarding this phenomenon is revealed climactically in *Doctor Faustus* when Adrian Leverkühn decides to "take back" Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, the "good and noble ... what we call the human, although it is good, and noble";³⁸ the implicit association here between the appearance of words and what is "human" and "good" descends directly from Mann's reading of Kierkegaard. In the latter's *The Concept of Dread* the demonic is defined not as recklessness (of the Don Juan variety) but as "shut-upness" (*Indesluttedhed*), that which wants no communication.³⁹ Such a retention of rationalist Christianity (which forms but one part of the philosopher's

complex system of aesthetic paradox) is basic to the theme of "inhumanity" and the return to the demonic in Leverkühn's music, and to Mann's critique of Wagner and Nietzsche in his later years. Although Kretschmar remains the original "music master" in the novel and is the one who convinces Leverkühn to follow his musical calling, he would at this early stage still to an extent seem to be associated with rationality as a positive influence.

Unpretentious in appearance, a short, thickset, bullet-headed man with a little clipped moustache and brown eyes prone to laughter, he might have meant a real boon to the cultural life of Kaisersachern if there had been any such life to begin with.

Chains of Identity (1)

Could Mann have had any real-life model in mind here? Could the "clipped moustache" have some peripheral relation to his own appearance or to that of Adolf Hitler, at the time the symbol of Germany for the rest of the world? Such questions are perhaps not entirely pointless. Mann seems always to have laid great importance on the appearance of his characters: of Zeitblom and Leverkühn he writes:

My family was always asking me to describe [Leverkühn]. ... how mysteriously forbidden it was, in a way I had never felt before! Impossible in a different sense from the impossibility of Zeitblom's describing himself. ... Only the characters more remote from the centre of the book could be novelistic figures in the picturesque sense ... But not the two protagonists, who had too much to conceal, namely the secret of their being identical with each other.⁴⁰

Elsewhere Mann writes that Zeitblom is a "parody" of himself and that in "Adrian's attitude towards life there is more of [his] own than one might think - or than the reader is intended to think".⁴¹ Both Zeitblom and Leverkühn are also extensively associated with various other characters inside and outside the novel. The result is a web of identities, an

the humanist. Form and content, if anything, join within a third term that posits subjectivity itself above any established form; a "flattening" of narrative, structure, and historical content may be said to occur within an extended field of human subjectivity which after all is also the effect of one of the supposed capacities of music: its allowance for a multitude of imaginary identities. From a Lacanian perspective, both historical and fictive identities are accessed in metonymic (or contractive) fashion: a single signifier grants entry to a range of signification which allows for wider subjective identification; the "chains" also grant the possibility of including original identity.

If any *specific* musical form was intended in chapter 8 at all, it would most probably have been the sonata form, one which Mann had already tried to employ long before. The chapter consists of Kretschmar delivering two lectures on Beethoven and one on Beissel, and a discussion of the young Adrian's opinions on all of this. A "failed" (a superficial) reading (but one possibly failing less in the identification of authorial intent) could see the transformation of the signifier "Kretschmar" via history into an "integrated" Leverkühn as an enactment of the theme, development, and recapitulation pattern of the classical sonata, again actualized in terms of interrelated human identities.

His organ-playing was expert and excellent, but you could count on the fingers of one hand the number of those in the community able to appreciate it. Even so, a considerable number of people were attracted by his free afternoon concerts, in which he regaled us with organ music by Michael Pretorius, Froberger, Buxtehude, and of course Sebastian Bach, also all sorts of curious genre compositions from the time between Handel and Haydn's highest periods. Adrian and I attended these concerts regularly.

Mann and Music

Mann's passion for music is well documented.⁴⁵ He has traditionally been a favourite source of quotation for writers on music who desire eloquent appraisals of its super-literary qualities, emotive power and so forth. He was among the very first novelists to engage seriously with the role of music in literature, employing both the sonata-allegro form and Wagner's *leitmotif* as structural principles in his early works. As early as 1918 Mann spoke of his work as that of a musician, comparing himself to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, "men of letters as well as musicians, but the latter more than the former";⁴⁶ he takes his place in an established German tradition of employing music in literature.⁴⁷ In 1936 he wrote of *Tonio Kröger*, published in 1903:

Here probably I first learned to employ music as a shaping influence in my art. The conception of epic prose-composition as a weaving of themes, as a musical complex of associations, I later employed largely in *Der Zauberberg*. Except that there the verbal leitmotif is no longer, as in *Buddenbrooks*, employed in the representation of form alone, but has taken on a less mechanical, more musical character, and tries to mirror the emotion and the idea.⁴⁸

It is indeed in the work of Wagner that Mann's love for music is steeped. He often admitted that "[t]he triad world of the *Ring* ... is at bottom my musical homeland",⁴⁹ and from early on he was fascinated by the dangerously irrational reactions of audiences to Wagner's operas⁵⁰ - the story "The Blood of the Walsungs" is evidence of this interest.

Mann lacked substantial formal education in music, and was lucky to have among the group of exiles living in California at the time none less than Adorno, Stravinsky and Schoenberg. During the writing of *Doctor Faustus* he was also in contact with Ernst Krenek, Hanns Eisler, Ernst Toch, Artur Rubinstein, Bruno Walter and a number of other famous musicians. He writes about his attempts at learning from these men:

It was almost alarming to see what concern the technical musical aspect of the book was giving me. For one of the chief demands of the book was a command of these technicalities, at least to the extent that no professional (and there is no more jealously guarded profession) could laugh at me.⁵¹

The subject position engaged with here is one that appeals to the modernist: there is an implied attempt, in the study of music by an outsider, at "secret knowledge", at access to a hermetic code in which the self, in the absence of God, can reign as supreme principle.⁵² Through a *reformulation of language via music* this position has access to the "new", to the yet unspoken; narcissism lies in precarious balance with the perceived capability of escaping or complicating an existing verbal symbolic.

It was indeed one of the most complex writers to whom Mann turned to for large-scale assistance: the German philosopher Theodor Adorno. Mann relates in *The Story* how he read the unpublished manuscript of Adorno's *Philosophy of Music* while writing his novel, and how many sections were completed to Adorno's exact specifications.⁵³ Much of Leverkühn's dialogue is taken almost directly from Adorno's writings, and the lectures on music by the figure Kretzschmar are in places almost verbatim transcriptions of Adorno's private talks. Rose Rosengard Subotnik goes so far as to call *Doctor Faustus* "the closest thing to a definitive exegesis of Adorno's music criticism".⁵⁴ The result is a novel that is extremely difficult to read for both initiated and uninitiated; it attempts to reach the perceived limits of grammar, language identity, philosophy, and ultimately of *expression*.

In any case, *Doctor Faustus* offers a range of possibilities for investigating relations between music and language: intertextually, structurally, philosophically, thematically. The discursive sources of "language on music"

can to an extent be identified, and attempts at narrative production from within music can be placed against these other relational concerns.

Schoenberg

In discussing the sources for his ideas on music Mann writes about Adorno's *Philosophy of Music*:

The manuscript [Adorno] brought me ... dealt largely with Schönberg [sic], his school, and the twelve-tone technique. The author professes his belief in Schönberg's commanding importance, but then goes on to subject the system to a profound and searching criticism. In a pithy, excessively sharpened style that owes much to Nietzsche and still more to Karl Kraus, he shows the dire consequences that must flow from the constructive Schönbergian approach to music. However necessary it may be to subject music to rigorous rational analysis, and however illuminating that may be, the effect is just the converse of rationality. Over the head of the artist, as it were, the art is cast back into a dark, mythological realm. What could fit in better into my world of the 'magic square'?⁵⁵

Mann did not like Schoenberg's music,⁵⁶ and would not have heard much of it by the time he had finished the novel.⁵⁷ It was the idea of a "system" which appealed to him, and finally adapted Schoenberg's dodecaphonic technique for his own purposes, misrepresenting it so as to criticize what he perceived as the condition of modern music.⁵⁸

The interaction among Mann, Adorno and Schoenberg in the production and subsequent history of *Doctor Faustus* has been the subject of a large number of articles,⁵⁹ and has been described by Robert Craft as "[o]ne of the strangest incidents in modern literary history".⁶⁰ After the publication of the novel Schoenberg accused Adorno of somehow divulging secret knowledge and threatened to sue Mann himself for appropriating his own method of twelve-tone composition and presenting it as the invention of the fictional Leverkühn.⁶¹ Mann's own conduct in the affair seems to have been highly disingenuous: it is inconceivable, given all the instances of direct plagiarism,

that he is sincere when writing in *The Saturday Review of Literature* that there is "no point of contact, not a shade of similarity, between the origin, the traditions, the character, and the fate of my musician, on the one hand, and the existence of Schoenberg, on the other."⁶² Many instances also occur in this later book where he tries to defend the system in context as his "property".⁶³

Can the extremity of intertextual borrowing be explained in terms of a fluid music-language relationship? The musical system (tonality, serialism), which is by its nature also systemic in the way we have defined, is that part of music which is most accessible to language; "ownership" of such a system amounts to an attempt at diachronic fixing which denies the temporal flexibility intrinsic to a dialectical music-language interaction. Mann's behaviour towards Schoenberg, should perhaps rather be seen as an extreme instance of uncompromising adherence to a limited systemic formulation which results exactly from applying such a formulation to the larger historical status of music. In other words, the attempt to negate the expressive potential of modern music - which is, after all, one of the main points on which Mann's system differs from Schoenberg's intentions for his own music - as a literary concern leads to rigidity, dogma, and the necessity of linguistic and authorial control.⁶⁴

The Canon

Music, in the section cited, like the small-town and typically old-German setting of Kaisersachern, provides the background for what is to come: for the lecture, for the entry of Beethoven, for Adrian's development as artist. The musical setting is an early one: mostly baroque and pre-baroque German music, played on the organ, an instrument with strong baroque and ecclesiastical connotations.

We find in this section the language of biography, as well as the language of fictional biography, of the *Bildungsroman*. Leverkühn's early musical influences are identified: the older German canon (which "of course" includes Bach), up to Haydn, all of which provides a framework for the impending introduction of Beethoven. Leverkühn is placed within a developmental line; as the "hero of our time",⁶⁵ the authentic artist of the modern age, he is positioned as the inheritor of a long musical tradition which is for Mann necessarily a German one (even here no works by composers of differing nationality are performed; the "curious genre compositions" merely function to strengthen the canon itself, providing variety and interest). The interdependence of the demonic and the divine, to become of major importance later in the novel, is introduced for the first time and is also given biographical relevance.

A complete failure, on the other hand, at least to all appearance, were the lectures which he held indefatigably throughout a whole season in the hall of the Society of Activities for the Common Weal, accompanied by illustrations on the piano and demonstrations on the blackboard. They were a failure in the first place because our population had on principle no use for lectures; and secondly because his themes were not popular but rather capricious and out of the ordinary; and in the third place because his stutter made listening to them a nerve-wracking occupation, sometimes bringing your heart into your mouth, sometimes tempting you to laughter, and altogether calculated to distract your attention from the intellectual treat in anxious expectation of the next convulsion.

Hearing, Lecturing

The trope appears: listening to music itself is easier than listening to language on it; why should lectures have to interfere with the immediacy of listening? What exactly is to be gained by fragmenting music at the keyboard (the uniform

musical workplace), by explaining its structures graphically on a blackboard?

The novel itself, like most writing on music, constitutes the answer to this question: Mann needs a format - the novel, the lecture - in which to develop music *thematically* rather than descriptively (the second and third reasons for the lectures' failure are inventions for normalizing the narrative), to use language at all. Music in *Doctor Faustus* is a condition of modern life: Kretschmar, then, is the one who first attempts to deal with it, as historian, as analyst, as one who is aware of a fatal condition in Beethoven's work. He is "indefatigable" in his lecturing: music must be made both a more important and a more conscious experience, and it is of course only through language that such a *critical* social or cultural commitment can be actualized.

Inclusion, Exclusion

Thomas Mann was convinced that his novel would be misunderstood in America;⁶⁶ narcissism here functions as the desire for exclusion, as a reinstatement of the authorial position, if not via control over the text, then via its difficulty.⁶⁷ In *The Story* he mentions his irritation at finding that Herman Hesse was working on a novel the concerns of which seemed to parallel his; in the same section he adds:

I admit to a wholehearted contempt for mediocrity. The mediocre know nothing of excellence and therefore lead an easy, stupid life. To my mind, too many people write.⁶⁸

Zeitblom and the young Leverkühn are of the few who attend Kretschmar's lectures; while attending "art music" concerts - especially those at which works from the established canon are performed - is an easy way of positioning the self as "cultured" in the most banal of senses, attending difficult lectures on music entails a different manner of experiencing such music altogether.

A number of recent studies have attempted to redefine the notion of musical appreciation or understanding; empirical experiments have for instance tried to show that appreciation of form is not successful even amongst the most "educated" listeners.⁶⁹ The "return of the listener"⁷⁰ seems to be a phenomenon that is gaining critical ground, in a parallel if belated version of the role of the reader in the work of Culler, Fish, Barthes and Eco. The exclusivity of the twentieth-century "serious music" world has been similarly attacked by conservative⁷¹ and feminist camps alike.⁷² This process is also accompanied by a dismantling of the notion of "art music" in the works of composers such as Kevin Volans, Philip Glass and Michael Nyman and in more recent electronic and sample-based ambient music. Whereas uneducated listening is often bound to suffer under the tyranny of melody and to miss elements such as irony and quotation in music to a greater extent than the uneducated reader would miss the same in literature (how many "educated" first-time listeners would recognize the use of Bach in Alban Berg's Violin Concerto anyway?), the validity of response in itself - especially when located in the body, in emotion, rather than within intellectual apprehension - seems to be gaining recognition above that of understanding proper. Education is in any case often a question of knowing what to look for; in other words, a question of language containing music: language becomes a measure of exclusivity.

For the purposes of the novel, however, the distinction is important: if anything new or serious is to be said about music, it is likely to be done in exclusive terms. Leverkühn, the immediate inheritor of the Romantic tradition, in which the artist for the first time moves from "public servant to isolated genius",⁷³ is also essentially bourgeois: culture aims to protect itself via self-transcendence, and in works from

the modern age this is achieved through increased hermeticism. In a positive sense such exclusivity amounts to non-cooperation with the dominant symbolic (this is also perhaps why Kretschmar's lectures are "capricious and out of the ordinary"). The listening or reading subject is denied easy association with music which has already formed accepted linguistic bonds within society, and it is exactly a reformulation of music through language which serves to this effect.

As will be shown, however, Mann's commitment to humanism (and also his love of humour, of parody itself) prevents him from taking an extreme position in this regard. While *Doctor Faustus* is in general highly difficult to read (a factor which is in any case due more to its explicit intellectual content than to formal and stylistic innovation of the kind found in Joyce and Faulkner) this is not the case in all places. There is to be found in the novel a strange dialectic - one that parallels the easy oscillation of the sublime and the obscene or banal in Shakespeare and Goethe - between passages containing difficult argument and passages that are merely entertaining or informative (and, in the case of the section dealing with Leverkühn's nephew, almost sensationalist). From a negative perspective it would seem that narcissism - of author, narrator and reader - appears here plainly in its liberal humanist sense, so that the individual can exist as most important entity by being allowed a position of exclusivity while still taking, as a self-protective measure, the interests of greater humanity into account.

His stutter was of a particularly typical and developed kind - tragic, because he was a man gifted with great and urgent riches of thought, passionately addicted to giving out information.

Not Speaking

Why is Kretschmar, the person who has so much to say, made to stutter? Such an unusual characteristic may be linked fairly safely to conscious authorial intrusion; it seems to us that the stutter must be there for a reason. In other words, it is conceivable that Mann is putting forward a systemic proposition: serious language on music is fragmented, interspersed with tension and silence.

Primarily, however, Kretschmar's stutter provides parody and comic relief in a chapter of which the intellectual content is both highly complex and unilateral (it is not part of the dialogue between characters, whereas most of the other academic discussion in the novel is). On this level, the stutter, "which was calculated to distract your attention from the intellectual" concerns, is a direct enactment of the principle set up in which language is a measure of exclusivity: it both parodies and "humanizes", and introduces the presence of the body into language which might otherwise lose its relation to both reader and music itself. Conversely, as a departure from fluid technical (dehumanized) use of language, it might also in an emotional sense be considered a physical rebellion against the absence of "melody" in language, of the *melos* which was during the Renaissance believed to accompany the emotional use of words.⁷⁴

But it is not *melos* which is reinstated: rather, words cannot articulate; they are syntagmatically self-obstructive. Is Mann employing the trope of the silent musician - shades of the handicapped Beethoven - who communicates better in music than in language? Stuttering can be linked to the unspeakable - in Lacanian terms, that which is repressed - and in Kretschmar's case this may well relate both to the difficulty of subjective assertion in the modern age and to the inadequacy of language to do justice to music itself, to the

impossibility of *fulfilling desire within language*.

Chains of Identity (2)

The given passage can be read in conjunction with one from *The Story*:

[Adorno] is a cousin of Walter Benjamin, harried to death by the Nazis ... Adorno ... is a person of similar mental cast, uncompromising, tragically brilliant, operating on the highest level. Having grown up in an atmosphere entirely dominated by theory (political theory as well) and artistic, primarily musical, interests, he studied philosophy and music.⁷⁵

It is of course from Adorno's ideas that Kretschmar's lecture is constructed; the disappearance of the subject within modernity is an important element in Adorno's writings on later music and can be directly related to the lecturer's supposed difficulty of articulating complex musicological ideas. Kretschmar in this sense, then, prefigures via the body the ideas which will be drawn from Beethoven's last piano sonata.

And his little bark would move upon the waters by stretches swift and dancing, with a suspicious ease that might make one forget and scout his affliction. But inevitably, from time to time, while constantly and only too justifiably awaited, came the moment of disaster; and there he stood, with red, swollen face on the rack; whether stuck on a sibilant, which he weathered with wide-stretched mouth, making the noise of an engine giving off steam; or wrestling with a labial, his cheeks puffed out, his lips launched into a crackling quick-fire of short, soundless explosions; or finally, when with his breathing in helpless disorder, his mouth like a funnel, he would gasp for breath like a fish out of water; laughing with tears in his eyes, for it is a fact that he himself seemed to treat the thing as a joke. Not everybody could take that consoling view; the public was really not to be blamed if it avoided the lectures with that degree of unanimity that in fact several times not more than half a dozen hearers occupied the seats: my parents, Adrian's uncle, young Cimabue, the two of us, and a few pupils from the girls' high school, who did not fail to giggle when the speaker stuttered.

Comedy, Rhetoric

As suggested earlier, comedy is a way of "humanizing" the novelistic essay form. Mann writes in *The Story* that one reason for including Zeitblom as narrator was to provide more humour in the novel;⁷⁶ he also mentions a diary entry commenting on the peculiar effect of a public reading by Bruno Frank, who

uses the humanistic narrative style of Zeitblom with complete seriousness as his own. In matters of style I really no longer admit anything but parody. In this, close to Joyce...⁷⁷

In the section cited Mann uses the language of the Bible, of slapstick humour, of warfare, of technical linguistics. These are all merged together in long, syntactically confusing or at places rhetorical sentences designed to equalize these discourses and to deliver parody via juxtaposition. There is perhaps nothing intrinsically "musical" about such use of parody except that language proceeds towards losing control, towards attaining connotative meanings that are more relevant than the denotative ones of the words in question.⁷⁸

The humour is however not there for all, and the fact that Kretschmar can laugh at himself in the manner described foreshadows the "demonic laughter" or emotional coldness associated with Leverkühn later on in the novel.

Kretschmar would have been ready to defray out of his own pocket such expenses for hall and lighting as were not covered by the ticket money. But my father and Nikolaus Leverkühn had arranged in committee to have the society make up the deficit, or rather relinquish the charge for the hall, on the plea that the lectures were important for culture and served the common good. That was a friendly gesture; the effect on the Common Weal was doubtful, since the community did not attend them, in part, as I said, because of the all too specialized character of the subjects treated. Wendell Kretschmar honoured the principle, which we repeatedly heard from his lips, first formed by the English tongue, that to arouse interest was not a question of the interest of others, but of our own; it could only be done, but then infallibly was, if one was

fundamentally interested in a thing oneself, so that when one talked about it one could hardly help drawing others in, infecting them with it, and so creating an interest up to then not present or dreamed of. And that was worth a great deal more than catering to one already existent.

S/Z

In the original German, the name of our lecturer reads "Kretzschmar". Why would the translator have chosen to drop the "z"?

In Barthes' analysis of Balzac's "Sarassine", the letter "z" is identified as the "letter of deviation", of inversion, the "initial of castration".⁷⁹ Did the translator, Helen Lowe-Porter, decide to "soften" Kretzschmar's name, or to remove the "wound of deficiency" located within its graphological format?⁸⁰ It is hardly likely that her translation would have historically prefigured Barthes' idiosyncratic association with the letter, or that there would have been a reason to divert attention away from the borrowing of the name from the German musicologist Hermann Kretzschmar, director of the Berlin Hochschule für Musik from 1909 to 1920,⁸¹ whose life history and musical orientation have only marginal similarities to those of Mann's character.⁸² Instead, we see translation effecting the castrative act itself inversely: the space of relativity, of ambiguity (here intertextual), is imposed as a condition of secondary reading; the lecturer's castrated tongue is removed from his graphological presence. Whereas for Barthes it is the dash between the two letters which constitutes "the surface of the mirror, ... the abstraction of limit"⁸³ (or, in the terms of an earlier argument, the line between presence and absence), translation here removes the Other entirely, and disempowerment, in the form of not being able to distinguish between what can and cannot be said, is institutionalized as approach to the text itself.

Mann and Nietzsche

Erich Heller has also made the unlikely suggestion that the name "Kretzschmar" is to some extent an anagram of "Nietzsche", an intellectual source who had far more influence on the writing of *Doctor Faustus* than the original Kretzschmar.⁸⁴ Mann refers to his own reading of Nietzsche in *The Story*,⁸⁵ and admits to incorporating various of his biographical details into Leverkühn's own life story;⁸⁶ further parallels between the two figures - especially their mutual Faustian nature - are elaborated extensively elsewhere.⁸⁷

Mann elaborates his views on Nietzsche most clearly in the essay called "Nietzsche's Philosophy in the Light of Our Experience". Here he criticizes the philosopher for being too fundamentally opposed to reason, and for shifting aesthetics itself to a position where it governs both life and morality. Mann is primarily at odds with the fact that Nietzsche denounces the latter in favour of the former, rather than following the more Kierkegaardian opposition between aesthetics and ethics.⁸⁸ In *Doctor Faustus* Nietzsche's beliefs - especially those dealing with culture and "barbarity" - are, as it were, put to the test and brought to their full implication, with a resultant critique that is similar to that presented in the essay on Nietzsche.⁸⁹

But to what extent are Nietzsche's own views on music still incorporated by Mann?⁹⁰ For Nietzsche, music directly offers an alternative to rationalism and to the predominance of the visual associated with it. In *The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music* the metaphysics of knowledge and morality are replaced with a metaphysics of music; Dionysiac destruction and "becoming" are opposed to Apollonian "appearance" and linked to a "separation of life from art", to "the annihilation of the real",⁹¹ a position which music of

course fills comfortably. Nietzsche writes that

Out of the Dionysian root of the German spirit, a power has arisen which, having nothing in common with the original conditions of Socratic culture, can neither be explained nor excused by it, but which is rather felt by this culture as something terribly inexplicable and overwhelmingly hostile - German music as we must understand it, particularly in its vast solar orbit from Bach to Beethoven, from Beethoven to Wagner.⁹²

The unusual level of nationalism encountered here would of course by no means be unusual in Mann's case; besides this superficial similarity, a belief in the romantically unspeakable power of music expressed here (it is absolute music which is for Nietzsche the "original metaphysical form"⁹³) directly parallels Mann's attraction to music as discussed elsewhere. The novel can perhaps be included as object of attack in Nietzsche's polemic against the "curious arrogance" of placing music "in the service of a series of images and concepts, to use it as a means to an end",⁹⁴ but it is a Nietzschean affinity to music which Mann comes to reproduce in the writing of his book.

Language on Music as Inspiration

Kretschmar's assertion that "to arouse interest [is] not a question of the interest of others but of our own" is of course a reflection *par excellence* of the Nietzschean - and Beethovenian - principle of individualism. Language on music here exists in a "pure" form: new musical experience is *introduced* through language; desire is at first constituted on a linguistic basis only. Such a unidirectional approach is of course not technically possible: it would otherwise have to depend on an entirely exclusive subject position (Kretschmar must have been the first to hear the sonata, to understand it in this specific way). Yet in the context of fiction, and also in the context of reading, language is placed in a liberated space - it leads towards music as "magical other", as that

which exists within the verbal text as a future presence.

It was a pity that our public gave him almost no opportunity to prove his theory. With us few, sitting at his feet in the yawning emptiness of the old hall with the numbered chairs, he proved it conclusively, for he held us charmed by things of which we should never have thought they could so capture our attention; even his frightful impediment did in the end affect us only as a stimulating and compelling expression of the zeal he felt. Often did we all nod at him consolingly when the calamity came to pass, and one or the other of the gentlemen would utter a soothing "There, there!" or "It's all right," or "Never mind!" Then the spasm would relax in a merry, apologetic smile and things would run on again in an almost uncanny fluency, for a while.

Speaking

If this section is compared to Leverkühn's lecture and last performance at the house in Pfeiffering,⁹⁵ the first obvious difference is the reaction of the audience to what is being said. Whereas Leverkühn's pre-psychotic use of archaic German represents a complication of language parallel to Kretschmar's stutter, the old-German *Gemütlichkeit* found here has by this stage been replaced by rejection, incomprehension and vulgarization. Both characters exist outside the verbal symbolic to some extent: Kretschmar's language is broken and in large parts consists of silence, while Leverkühn reverts to archaic (pre-contemporary) convention, effecting a dissipation of the subjective which directly parallels Adorno's analysis of the music of Beethoven and modernist composers. Kretschmar may once again be said to prefigure Mann's composer (in the Barthesian sense his body emanates from a text in which the body of the latter is completely absent), but is substantially different in that he is still zealous, still has things to say in what would if possible be a direct manner. The paradox here, that silences speak more truthfully, is perhaps more applicable to Adorno's analysis of Beethoven's late work than

to the complete overriding of the subject which he identifies in the modernist compositions upon which Leverkühn's works are modelled; like Beethoven's late music, Kretschmar's stutter here is an early symptom of what is to come.

What did he talk about? Well, the man was capable of spending a whole hour on the question: Why did Beethoven not write a third movement to the Piano Sonata Opus 111? It is without a doubt a matter worth discussing. But think of it in the light of the posters outside the hall of Activities for the Common Weal, or inserted in the Kaisersachern Railway Journal, and ask yourself the amount of public interest it would arouse. People positively did not want to know why Op. 111 has only two movements.

Introducing a Lecture

Mann is indulging in a bit of bad faith here: thus far the intellectual content of the chapter has been elided, and by letting Zeitblom assume the voice of easy camaraderie, he downplays an issue that has been extensively discussed.⁹⁶ By marginalizing the relevance of the lecture in the same fashion as the population of Kaisersachern, Mann-Zeitblom is negating the musical subject at the moment where that subject is still absent. In a more theoretical sense (which once again prefigures Adorno's analysis of Opus 111) he is paradoxically able to lead into the discussion by denying its "speech potential" first. In keeping with the argument on exclusivity presented earlier, Mann also has to move into a more technical sphere for simpler reasons; he writes elsewhere:

There is nothing sillier, in a novel about an artist, than merely to assert the existence of art, to talk about genius, about works, to hail these and rave about their effects upon the souls of the audience. No, concrete reality, exactitude, were needed - this was utterly clear to me.⁹⁷

What is the value of the question in context? The question as critical or artistic mechanism can also be theorized as a *membrane*, an intrinsically unstable frame, that

which does not fix meaning, but which opens possibilities outward instead of drawing them towards the signified of the text. A question such as the one which forms the title of the lecture (a "why" question) of course expects a stable answer - the lecture promises to follow a pattern of metamusical production: a containment will be made, a "solution" in language will be given to a problem of musical experience. How Kretschmar will approach an essentially eschatological process - how he will negotiate between novelty and closure - is of prime importance. For most of the Kaisersachern population, however, the question as such does not exist: desire is inactive, and we find an example of *complete failure*, where language, at its most vulnerable but potentially most effective, fails as metamusical discourse.

The Work

A composition that is given an opus number is regarded as a "work" deemed worthy - firstly, of course, by publishers - of inclusion in a composer's official musical history; historiography here entails the collection of facts related to the production of the work. Beethoven's last piano sonata, dedicated to the Archduke Rudolph of Austria, was completed early in 1822, the third of a closely interrelated series which, with the *Hammerklavier* Sonata and the Diabelli Variations, forms the main body of piano works composed within what Lenz and other biographers identify as his third or last creative period. Here Beethoven returned to C minor - a key which he had not used for any sonata since the *Pathétique* - to write the last of four sonatas in his career that contain only two movements.

We who were present at the explanation had indeed an uncommonly enriching evening, and this although the sonata under discussion was to that date entirely unknown to us. Still it was precisely through these lectures that we got to know it, and as a matter of fact very much in detail; for Kretschmar played it to us on the inferior cottage piano that was all he could command, a grand piano not being granted him.

The Piano

Op. 111 concluded a long and fruitful interaction with a musical form which not only - unlike in the case of his predecessors - produced some of Beethoven's greatest works but also acted as a reliable barometer of his development as composer. The piano itself plays a massively important role in Beethoven's world. He was an accomplished performer and a great improviser,⁹⁸ and when Charles Rosen writes that "Beethoven is perhaps the first composer for whom the exploratory function of music took precedence over every other: pleasure, instruction, and even, at times, expression"⁹⁹ it is work at the piano which forms the initial and physical step in the process.

One of the most widely quoted statements made by Beethoven is that the "pianoforte is, after all, an unsatisfactory instrument".¹⁰⁰ Beethoven's return to the church modes in his late string quartets was one way of attempting to gain a greater expressivity which the keyboard, "the elegant embodiment of the Renaissance concept of uniform pitch space",¹⁰¹ might not have offered. Joanna Goldstein points out, however, that the composer's dissatisfaction may well have had partly to do with the instrument technology of the time;¹⁰² the "inferior cottage piano" that Kretschmar plays is perhaps closer to the *Hammerflügel* of Beethoven's time than to the grand pianos Kretschmar's contemporary audience would have been used to. It is highly probable that Beethoven would have preferred later pianos, and we find in the performance of the sonata a good example of unstable poiesis, of authorial intent

both reproduced and uncertain.

Iterability

The small audience is faced with *the new*, that which for Derrida is impossible. In *Limited Inc.* Derrida argues that meaning can only come about as a result of iterability;¹⁰³ that which appears for the first time has no meaning, or if it has, is a reformulation of recognizable meanings. The uniterated is thus different from the general impossibility of temporally and otherwise unmediated meaning which results from the process of *différance*: it lies on the other end of the eschatological scale, appearing long before it strains towards presence, or the "coming of the Other".

But how does music relate to this? It would seem that we have here an instance in which poststructuralist theory does not survive the transition into the philosophy of music: because sound units are not as easily defined as linguistic ones, there can be no such thing as a "nonsense sound".¹⁰⁴ What newly appears in the world of instrumental music will obviously convey certain connotations, but where something (a texture, a combination of sounds) produces new experience, the experience exists, albeit as loss (which is not uniform either).

We thus have "levels of the new": Beethoven's Op. 111 is "entirely unknown" to Zeitblom and Leverkühn, yet the name of the composer and the musical form already assumes knowledge and expectation. On the other hand, getting to know the sonata "very much in detail" is also a subjective proposition: because no "full knowledge" on a piece of music can ever be claimed, the new will also exist at all times.

He played it capitally despite the rumbling noise the instrument made; analysing its intellectual content with great impressiveness as he went, describing the circumstances under which it - and two others - were written and expatiating with caustic wit upon the master's own explanation of the reason why he had not done a third movement corresponding to the first.

The Impossible Situation

In one sentence here, we find four different secondary responses to music: description of performance, analysis, description of poietic context, and witty biographical description. It is as if Mann is attempting to transcend literary boundaries by what will be the inclusion of all forms, to aim for an unsuccessful exhaustion. The fact that no hierarchy of metamusical discourses is formed indicates a striving for *fullness* via equalization. This situation is of course impossible: Kretschmar cannot do all of this at once, even though Mann's sleight of hand would have us believe so (playing the piano is mentioned before any extract from the lecture, even though this contradicts the sequence of events as clarified later on). A further simple impossibility lies in the fact that Zeitblom remembers a lecture heard as a child in so much detail.

Could we see this as the metamusical entering the metasystemic as *fantasy*? Rosemary Jackson in her book of that title links fantasy to Bakhtin's notion of the carnivalesque, the menippean situation where different discourses, different worlds can exist without conflict.¹⁰⁵ It has often been said, albeit usually within reactionary writing, that "all music is fantasy":¹⁰⁶ the relatively unlimited scope for projection offered by music would seem to allow a connection with Jackson's formulation.

We are faced once again with the *imaginary*, the ideal: Mann's metasystemic conglomeration is an impossible rendering of music exactly because it attempts to capture such an

imaginary. Barthes speaks of the subject gaining "access to bliss by the cohabitation of languages *working side by side*";¹⁰⁷ desire is located within the rupturing of a position of unified control, and it is here that the "word of music" may be said to come into existence, as an object of aspiration, of impossible emulation.

Performance

Where does description of performance fit into our tripartite division? As a genre, such description is perhaps the most common and "safest" way of using language on music. The fact that Kretschmar plays "capitally" (*vortrefflich*) reflects on Zeitblom's own old-bourgeois sensibilities; it is also easy to locate such a judgment within an implied line of subjective evaluation, one that is less susceptible to rigorous critique because it never claims objectivity. But is this metamusical, systemic or metasystemic usage?

The difficulty of answering this question lies exactly within the problem of relating performance to the ontological identity of music, in other words, to the question of whether music "exists" within the score, within the performance, or within perception - immediate or remembered - itself.¹⁰⁸ Is performance a "rewriting" of the existing composition, or is it a gloss on how music should best be brought across? A musical performance is intrinsically different from a public literary reading: even the most accomplished musicians usually insist on the need to hear scores; the level of musical education necessary to "grasp" music from a pure score reading is furthermore substantially higher than the knowledge of theatre required to imagine a dramatic play on stage.

Central to the issue is the question of *interpretation*. The level of autonomy granted the performer is of course a historical variable: Alan Durant writes that during the early

nineteenth century the musician became an instrument for authorial intention, that "the orchestra is transformed from an ensemble of musicians into a huge instrument which the composer plays by notation";¹⁰⁹ yet during the twentieth century the interpreter has in some ways achieved a status almost equal to that of the composer. This is no doubt largely due to market forces: names of conductors sell CDs, and so on. The rise of the performer is usually not a democratic process: the "best" performance is still identified as the one that is closest to contemporary conceptions of authorial intention. As regards musical meaning, performance presents a complication too: esthetic perception is necessarily twice refracted, and it is impossible to stipulate how much of what is perceived amounts to the author's or the performer's intention. Once again, music is shown as being freer than language in this regard. Durant also argues that the *visual* component of performance constitutes an important part of how music is experienced,¹¹⁰ which brings us back to Zeitblom's words on Kretschmar.

Again eliding direct reference to music, the chapter thus far - despite its denotative contents - has produced a highly visual effect: due, in part, to Mann's use of auditory images that have equally strong visual connotations (the ocean, the fish, the steam engine), and due also to the continual reminder of the presence and experience of the audience, of the extent to which the situation is a *spectacle*, a comic corporeal performance by a clown lecturer. The practice of music criticism can of course hardly avoid describing the visual, nor can it avoid commenting on the *qualities* of music in the simplest metamusical terms: even here there are no clear breaks, and the question asked at the beginning of this section avoids a singular answer in the most practical of terms too.

As regards *language on interpretation*, however, Mann does manage to achieve an unusual success once Kretschmar actually starts analyzing the sonata. Interpretation occurs via performance and verbally *at the same time*: in other words, Kretschmar provides - in the dialectical fashion described above - a metanarrative for his own performance. It is of course impossible to judge how closely these two relate to each other; for purely textual purposes, the language of performance is vitalized by insight into interpretative principles.¹¹¹

The Beethoven Myth

Thus far Beethoven has only been mentioned once, in the title of the lecture; here, without further ado, he is referred to as "the master".

The word "Beethoven" itself is what Barthes might term a "mythical signifier", a social reflection that has been inverted and naturalized.¹¹² Its historical proximity to the signifier "great music" has remained intact with remarkable tenacity, even where such music itself is negated from a mass music perspective. The "connoted system" which is linked to it may well contain, in Barthes' sense, the ideological signifieds of German "mastery", high culture, patriarchy and so forth, but it seems as if neither cultural criticism nor what Barthes calls the "pull of the purely signifier" - the turning of the word into "pure form" - has in this instance managed to dismantle the Romantic "discourse of the hero" or musical genius. Thus Joseph Kerman could write in 1980 that "Beethoven has survived demythification"¹¹³. Even when a feminist musicologist such as Susan McClary criticizes the "masculinist" violence of development and closure procedures in Beethoven's 9th Symphony,¹¹⁴ the tensions she identifies are not far removed from those elements which - as shall be seen -

for Adorno render this work "authentic"; she admits that

[t]he Ninth Symphony is probably our most compelling articulation in music of the contradictory impulses that have organized patriarchal culture since the Enlightenment. Moreover, within the parameters of his own musical composition, he may be heard as enacting a critique of narrative obligations that is every bit as devastating as [that effected by Adrienne] Rich's [poem "The Ninth Symphony of Beethoven Understood at Last as a Sexual Message"] or [Janika] Vandervelde's ["Jack and the Beanstalk"].¹¹⁵

Whereas Beethoven was exceedingly popular while still alive, an ensuing Romantic sensibility that targeted him as the archetypal artist-as-hero pushed his standing to unprecedented heights. Bettine von Arnim, a friend of Goethe, was particularly influential in promoting this view during the earlier part of the Nineteenth Century, initiating a personality cult based on attributes which Arnold Schmitz identifies as child of nature, revolutionary, magician, religious leader and prophet.¹¹⁶ While classical-style stoicism remains important to the myth's inherent moral idealism, these Romantic qualities soon gained precedence.

We thus find the composer described in messianic terms by Liszt, who wrote that "[f]or us musicians, Beethoven's music is like the pillar of cloud and fire which led the Israelites through the desert".¹¹⁷ Wagner conceived of Beethoven "as a sublime and unique supernatural being",¹¹⁸ and as late as 1911 Paul Bekker wrote of him as "crucified and descending to hell and rising again".¹¹⁹ Elsewhere he is described as the "sun of the musical firmament".¹²⁰

The revolutionary musical leader who follows the dictates of his own imagination rather than social expectations¹²¹ is necessarily also a moral transgressor. While a major work such as the Eroica Symphony was for instance banned in Prague after being declared "morally corrupting" by its display of "musical anarchy",¹²² it is exactly such a crossing into new dimensions which captured the Romantic imagination of writers at the

time. A fascination with limitlessness, ineffability and transcendence began to appear among early Romanticists such as E.T.A. Hoffmann, who claimed as early as 1808 that "Beethoven's instrumental music opens to us the realm of the colossal and the immeasurable".¹²³ French writers such as De Vigny, Lamartine and Hugo were all drawn to the concept of the "infinite" in Beethoven's music¹²⁴ and Balzac wrote of the Fifth Symphony: "After that supreme musical poem, we have nothing left to say; we can only lower our hands and meditate."¹²⁵

Beethoven, it seems, had calmly answered this question, put by his famulus, by saying that he had not had time and therefore had somewhat extended the second movement. No time! And he had said it "calmly," to boot. The contempt for the questioner which lay in such an answer had obviously not been noticed but it was justified contempt.

Intertextuality, Montage

This passage is taken almost directly from Anton Schindler's *The Life of Beethoven*, which reads:

I allowed myself, in my innocence, to put a question to the master, who was seated opposite me; why, I asked, had he not written a third movement comparable in character to the first. Beethoven answered calmly that he had had no time for a third movement; that was why the second movement had to be extended to such large proportions. ... his answer sufficed.¹²⁶

In *The Story* Mann mentions some biographical sources for his writing on Beethoven: these include Schindler, Bekker and Newman. In an exhaustive matched-column analysis, Gunilla Bergsten¹²⁷ has illuminated the extreme extent to which Mann borrowed directly from these and a large number of other sources in the writing of his novel. Mann himself writes about *Doctor Faustus*:

This work ... took a curiously ruthless form, and I was constantly amazed by the way its fantastic mechanisms drew upon factual, historical, personal, and even literary data.

... This montage technique was continually startling, even to me, and gave me cause to worry. Yet it rightly belongs to the conception, to the "idea", of the book; it has to do with the strange and licentious spiritual relaxation from which it emerged, with its figurative and then again literal directness, its character as arcanum and confession, so that, as long as I was working on the book, the concept of its public existence did not enter my mind. ... Quotations of [the anecdotal kind taken from Nietzsche's life history] have something musical about them, disregarding the innate mechanical quality. They are, moreover, reality transformed into fiction, fiction that absorbs the real, and thus a strangely protean and attractive mingling of the spheres.¹²⁸

It is conceivable that the scope of Mann's project - his ambition to deliver a definitive evaluation of the role of the artist in the modern age - would lead him to extend fiction into reality in the way he describes; his extensive use of musical sources is however more likely due to a lack of confidence in musical education. Elsewhere he writes about his use of apocalyptic texts:

the extent to which John of Pathos borrowed from other visionaries and ecstasies is certainly striking. ... I was struck, as the text puts it, by the fact "that a raving man should rave in the same pattern as another who came before him; that one is ecstatic not independently, so to speak, but by rote". This psychological item ... coincided in a way with my own growing inclination ... to look upon all life as a cultural project taking the form of mythic clichés, and to prefer quotation to independent invention.¹²⁹

A conflict may be perceived between Mann's justification of his use of montage and the type of reasons for which montage is valorized in other fields such as recent film theory. Within the latter, the piecing together of shots from different angles or shots with different content is seen as a way of destabilizing the control of a unitary gaze.¹³⁰ Here, however, montage is related rather to *borrowing*, to reimplementation of patterns that "recur eternally".¹³¹ The author, rather than being reinstated in a position of control, is located within the functioning of an even greater and metaphysically governing force. Thus Mann can be "mythically" linked to Adorno, to Kretschmar, to Leverkühn, to Beethoven,

to Faust.¹³² From a more critical angle this process can of course be likened to the self-promotion - the electing of a father - entailed in the excessive praise bestowed on Beethoven by composers like Wagner, Liszt and Brahms. Yet for analytic purposes here the return to mythical reality - however it relates to incorporation of the past - can be seen as a typical modernist response to the exhaustion of artistic possibility (from the angle of modernism, the elaborate patterns of displacement that occur in *Doctor Faustus* may also be said to attest directly to the perceived crisis of subjectivity in the modern age). At the same time it can also be noted that the ease with which Mann locates his own late work within an endless and unchangeable cultural force is perhaps at odds with the sense of defeatism which Adorno - another modernist - identifies in the return to convention in late Beethoven, as well as with the evil associated with the return to the elemental in Leverkühn's music.

Anecdote

Why should anecdotal quotations "have something musical about them"?

The anecdote is the *marginal*, that which does not fit the exclusive collection of important biographical or historical fact. As far as "official" personal chronology is concerned, the anecdote is a "story" with little relevance; yet, when reading biographies it is often the irrelevant interesting details which are of greatest interest.¹³³ In Barthes' terms they produce "the pleasure of the text", reinstating the body of the written subject across a no longer alienating temporal divide.¹³⁴ This body is of course never unmediated (in biography it passes through another), and the anecdote about Beethoven's own answer to Schindler's question serves to reaffirm a standard trope of the composer as irascible, proud,

and coolly removed from worldly affairs. The possibility that the answer may have been a straightforward one - Beethoven was at the time under great contractual and financial pressure - is excluded entirely in an extreme moment of suprematizing the author's voice. The anecdote is, in any case, successful in once again softening the more technical details to come, and in validating Kretschmar's own answer to the question he poses.

Does the "musicality" of anecdotal usage lie then in the greater potential for *connotation* - physical, emotional - found within the *story*? It is likely that Mann is also referring to the process of artistic *construction*: the grand final linking of completed segments would traditionally seem closer to the process of musical composition (delayed repetition, reprise and in a sense also recapitulation sections are practically ready-made in advance) than to the novelistic process, which after all descends from the linear weaving of epic narrative. As far as the value of anecdote as decoration is concerned, it may be noted that all musical writing is an attempt at *decorating language*, at adorning, at adding what is not usually there; restructuring of literary form does not change the intrinsic (denotative and syntactic) qualities of language.

To return, finally, to montage: there are marked similarities between Mann's process and the metasystemic procedure we are using at present. We have made claims for "opening" music within a literary text by following a system of association, of marginal relatedness, and the same happens in *Doctor Faustus*: anecdote may appear in relatively isolated form, with the inference of the third term left to the reader.

And now the speaker described Beethoven's condition in the year 1820, when his hearing, attacked by a resistless illness, was in progressive decay, and it had already become clear that he could no longer conduct his own works.

The Biography Industry

In the previous passage cited, biography has already been naturalized: the "famulus" is not identified, nor is it pointed out that Beethoven's use of this term for Schindler was decidedly ironic.¹³⁵ Narrative sources are furthermore obscured: Zeitblom's use of the term "it seems" makes it unclear whether Kretschmar or Schindler is being cited; what follows is not identified as free indirect speech, yet we still read it under the banner of the "lecture". Why should Mann flatten narrative elements in this way?

Mann's attraction to *myth*, to the changeless, has been discussed earlier: the practical result and possible danger of a freely eclectic process such as his are apparent here. Beethoven's life becomes a story, becomes myth; as with legends generally, the sources of origin are effaced. Exact chronological details are neglected: Beethoven did conduct after 1820, and Zeitblom/Kretschmar rounds off the true date of composition to the closest decade. The power of established convention as well as the need to maintain the central importance of such a convention within an overt artistico-cultural program thus appear as equalizing forces establishing a *collectivity* of voices - a differentiated grouping that is at basis similar in purpose - rather than heteroglossia proper.

This collectivity is extensive in the extreme, and upholds a self-serving principle of production, extended highly effectively into the political¹³⁶ and commercial sphere. This principle is altered only - and paradoxically reinforced - by the appearance of negatively slanted Beethoven

biographies during the twentieth century. Such a development however does not seem to have stemmed the regular tide of new biographies; the parallel appearance of extraordinary biographical details and "great music" continues to result in unprecedented productivity within the field of language on music. In this sense Beethoven's situation also aggravates a general danger: the notion that music is "politically suspect"¹³⁷ gains validity with regard to biographical writing in that both greatness and supposed poetic intention can be extended more freely into verbal programs due to the lack of exactness of meaning in music. Here specifically, Beethoven is promoted both as genius and as typically German.¹³⁸

Biography in itself is systemic; even a work such as Thayer's *Life of Ludwig van Beethoven*, which does not offer any musical analysis at all, implicitly provides parallels between life history and compositional sequence. The systemic is merely more clearly defined in psychoanalytical or sociocultural readings. Life assumes the status of the linguistic text, and it is in the nature of biographical myth-making to develop certain standard linkages: between great music and the great man, between the musical transformation of despondent minor-key themes and the personal victory over uncommon hardship, between spiritually and ethically uplifting music and the man of unquestionable and even of transformative moral superiority.¹³⁹ With regard to the last connection a typical example reads as follows: "as regards [Beethoven's] moral character we can say of him that he now and then was overcome by affections, but never by passions ... just as he withstood like a man the temptations of wine, so he seems never to have been seduced by the power of love".¹⁴⁰

In the passage under consideration, then, Mann approaches two standard tropes of Beethoven literature: deafness and lastness. The extent to which he complies with traditional

ways of handling these is telling at least of the need to present a Germany that one used to be able to believe in, to fix a historical position against which he can measure his own artistic construct. By the time that Kretschmar's lecture supposedly takes place the proposal that Beethoven's deafness was the result of syphilis acquired either at birth or via his dealings with prostitutes had already gained ground.¹⁴¹ Such historical placing is perhaps not of consequence in any case; one of Mann's sources on Beethoven is Ernest Newman's *The Unconscious Beethoven*, a work in which the syphilis issue is faced "freely and soberly"¹⁴² in head-on fashion. Mann had to be aware of the possibility of such a further link between Beethoven and his own composer, and, while he was more than likely drawn - as he was elsewhere - to the link between disease and creation, he chooses to pitch the original as a victim "attacked by a resistless" but unidentified illness.

The Good Author

To investigate the reaction evoked by objections to the common link between Beethoven's personality and his supposedly morally superior compositions is a remarkable experience. Personal critique of the composer usually concerns his excessive use of alcohol, his dealings with prostitutes and with publishers and, most importantly, the affairs surrounding his nephew after his brother Karl's death.

Schindler destroyed a large number of Beethoven's conversation books, letters, and documents soon after his death. Arguments that have been made regarding Schindler's motives suggest that he might have been protecting his own self-respect, concealing the political indiscretions of the composer and his friends, or destroying evidence of Beethoven's venereal diseases and less than reputable financial dealings.¹⁴³ Schindler's own sycophantic biography

reveals little of the composer's darker side; it is telling that the generally objective Thayer felt unable to complete his three-volume biography when he began to discover beyond doubt that Beethoven's behaviour had been morally reprehensible at stages; from this point onwards the biographer fell ill each time he attempted to continue working on it.¹⁴⁴ Editha and Richard Sterba's admittedly polemical and one-sided book *Beethoven and his Nephew: A Reappraisal*, published in 1954, was important in revealing details that had until then been effaced, and has since elicited a host of remarkably defensive reactions from even the apparently least biased of commentators.¹⁴⁵ Recent biographical writing still seems unable to avoid taking sides on the nephew issue, and at some point usually contains an implicit self-positioning in this regard.¹⁴⁶ One of the most historically successful books written in direct defense of Beethoven's morality - this time specifically in terms of his interpersonal and financial dealings - is that of J.W.N. Sullivan, who took the notion of judging artists by alternative standards to an extreme, basing his argument on the idea that "[n]o man was ever more completely loyal to his own experience than was Beethoven."¹⁴⁷

It is of course a Romanticist notion which is at work here: that of the artist as God, as shamanistic link between the ordinary and the spiritual or otherwise transcendent worlds. Art is *transformative* here: the poietic, although the definite locus of greatness, is made inaccessible to linguistic reduction, and it is the work and its effects that remain. To follow such a pattern, biography should by implication avoid *details*, the particular; "romanticization" reads, in its most obvious sense, as the shaping of life events into the generalized narrative patterns of *romance*.

Mann writes about looking at facsimiles of Beethoven's letters:

I looked at them for a long time, those scrambled and scratched lines hurled onto paper, that desperate orthography, all that half-wild inarticulateness - and could find no love for it in my heart. Once again I sympathized with Goethe's rejection of the 'untamed human soul', and once again gave thought to the relationship between music and intellect, music and good breeding, music and humanity. Has musical genius, then, nothing at all to do with humanity and 'better society'? Does it perhaps work directly in opposition to these? But Beethoven was a man with faith in revolutionary humanitarianism, and French writers have taken him to task for employing, as a musician, the language of a radical politician...¹⁴⁸

His ambivalence is also revealed when he describes listening to the Ninth Symphony during the time of writing:

Never had I more deeply admired the scherzo and adagio - but once again could summon up no affection for the variations of [the] disjointed last movement.¹⁴⁹

Beethoven - like Mann himself - occupies a problematic position within the Kierkegaardian dualism identified earlier. When Leverkühn refers to the Ninth Symphony as a natural instance where "the word should burst forth out of music" because "language was music, music a language",¹⁵⁰ Zeitblom is quick to point out that such a belief is qualified by the fact that what Leverkühn

had vaguely in mind was as un-Wagnerian as possible, and most remote from nature-daemony and the theatrical quality of the [*Purgatorio*] myth: a revival of opéra bouffe in a spirit of the most artificial mockery and parody of the artificial.¹⁵¹

Whereas Mann did admire Opus 132,¹⁵² this work is in *Doctor Faustus* clearly linked to the ineffable in a way that others are generally not; Leverkühn comments to Zeitblom about the initial theme played by the first violin in the fourth movement:

it is vexatious, if you don't want to call it gratifying, that in music, at least in this music, there are things for which one cannot scare up, out of the whole rich realm of language, do what you like, any properly characterizing epithet or combination of epithets. ... you cannot find any adequate term for the spirit, the attitude, the behaviour of this theme. For there is a lot of behaviour there. Tragic? Bold? Defiant, emphatic, full of élan, the height of nobility? None of them good. And "glorious" is of course

only throwing in your hand. You finally land at the opposite direction, the name: *Allegro appassionato*. That is the best after all.¹⁵³

The attitude towards this music is strikingly different from one found in Leverkühn's introduction and conclusion in a letter accompanying a description of what Carnegy has identified as the prelude to third act of Wagner's *Meistersinger*:¹⁵⁴

I am embarrassed at the insipidness which is the supporting structure, the conditioning solid substance of even the work of genius, at the elements thereof which are training and common property, at use and wont in achieving the beautiful: [a lengthy and eloquent description of the work follows] ... Dear friend, why do I have to laugh? ... Why must I think that almost all, no, all the methods and conventions of art today are good for parody only?¹⁵⁵

The demand for parody exists in direct relation to the effability of this music, and Leverkühn's extremely difficult search for expression begins exactly with parodic rejection of expressiveness, or easy metamusical closure. Such descriptions of Beethoven's works are explicitly avoided in *Doctor Faustus* - the most extensive description, that of Opus 111, follows an entirely different pattern - and it is perhaps exactly the lack of humanity, the kernel of danger present in Beethoven which held a precarious attraction for Mann. Also significant in this regard is the fact that the devil - who notably insists on his hell being ineffable, claiming that "one can really not speak of it at all, because the actual is beyond what by word can be declared"¹⁵⁶ - upholds Beethoven's work itself as an example of inspiration that does not come from God.¹⁵⁷

Schopenhauer writes in *The World as Will and Idea* that

The composer reveals the innermost nature of the world, and expresses the profoundest wisdom in a language that his reasoning faculty does not understand, just as a magnetic somnambulist gives information about things of which she has no conception when she is awake. Therefore in the composer, more than in any other artist, the man is entirely separate and distinct from the artist.¹⁵⁸

This notion, while still fitting the Romanticist bill, reformulates the position of the author so that the irreducible is alienated also from his own self; the composer is subject to greater and unknown forces in a manner which is less predictable than the placing of the artist within a pattern of eternal return as found in Nietzsche. Such an assessment is more fitting as a principle of artistic philosophy for the more general themes of *Doctor Faustus* than the humanitarianism which causes Mann to be troubled about Beethoven. While the author had ample personal cause to dislodge the Romantic Beethoven image, the composer instead remains an idealized presence in the novel, and metamusical discourse, rather than definitively embracing the heterogenous aspect of the systemic is solidified within homogenous metamusical tropes.

Kretschmar told us about the rumours that the famous author was quite written out, his productive powers exhausted, himself incapable of larger enterprises, and busying himself like the old Haydn with writing down Scottish songs. Such reports had continually gained ground, because for several years no work of importance bearing his name had come on the market. But in the late autumn, returning to Vienna from Meddling, where he spent the summer, the master had sat down and written these three compositions for the piano without, so to speak, once looking up from the notes, all in one burst, and gave notice of them to his patron, the Count of Brunswick, to reassure him as to his mental condition.

Art and Commerce

We may identify here, emanating through an anecdote again borrowed from Schindler,¹⁵⁹ an aporia: it is the consumer market that is shown to be the measure of "importance"; language is for the rest merely "rumour". The unknown in the production of art is suddenly interrupted by the real, by - in the simplest sense - the reality of the symbolic, which as an economic principle of language is far more effective in

"realizing" music than the rhizomic mechanism of rumour. Rumour here entails the paradoxical liberation of language in the face of absence (it metaphorically enacts the systemic procedures followed in this analysis), yet it also returns itself to the economic principle: Beethoven's development, like that of Haydn, is said to follow a natural curve of production, with the peak already achieved. Similarly, the suspicion of madness can be related to the nature of the latter as anti-symbolic, as a condition in which stable signifier-signified linkings and thus the logic of language are subverted.

Yet again this pattern itself is set up only to be invalidated by the appearance of the great artist: Beethoven's lastness is a historically new phenomenon, and on his return from the country to the city of music - which can be related to the end of transgression into the disorder of madness¹⁶⁰ - his productivity both exceeds expectation and proceeds away from the symbolic towards incomprehensibility. Production itself - and the return to larger works, indicating sustained effort - is alone necessary at this stage to ensure the stability of the "mental condition"; the symbolic is directly related to form rather than to content, enacting in the most simple of senses the division between the success of language in describing formal elements and in describing what is expressed.

And then Kretschmar talked about the Sonata in C minor, which indeed it was not easy to see as a well-rounded and intellectually digested work, and which had given his contemporary critics, and his friends as well, a hard aesthetic nut to crack. These friends and admirers, Kretschmar said, simply could not follow the man they revered beyond the height to which at the time of his maturity he had brought the symphony, the piano sonata, and the classical string quartet.

Metamusical: Reception

The audience (and a large section of the readership) are themselves doubled: the new is placed as *history*, and is normalized by becoming iterable itself. Inexplicability is both detemporalized and affirmed as general condition (the powerfulness of the work remains); it is furthermore presented as a narrative prologue against which some kind of explication will be given. Both these are techniques on Kretschmar's part to create a *field for language*. Kretschmar diverts the metamusical onto the metasystemic: historiography amounts to a deindividualization of linguistic response, to both the acquisition of self-consciousness and the location of the self within a larger convention.

But does initial reception of a musical composition not in general differ from how it is received later on? As relatively *primary* linguistic response the former potentially has great power in directing the future course of language in relation to this music; such associations may be read in the context of as simple a principle as the arbitrariness of signifier-signified relations identified by Saussure.¹⁶¹ Where original responses are revised by the supposedly objective progress of history, such responses are also often kept alive in support of a present reading; the initial rejection of a composer's works is for instance linked to greatness itself, is given as proof of artistic foresight. The immediate response, as a defense against loss in Barthes' sense, is one that needs to be *effective*: quick, formulaic; this is perhaps why Opus 111 is referred to as a "nut to crack" (*eine Nuß zu knacken*). Linguistic reductionism is revealed as being at its most extreme at the *moment of appearance*, a condition which supports the point that subsequent linguistic activity might well exist as language *on language* rather than on music.

The Three Periods

In most cases, chronological classification of a composer's musical production necessarily depends on an identification of uniform "development", and can be made in terms of a practically limitless array of parameters: the balance between different musical genres composed in, the appearance of certain "set" stylistic characteristics, the number of works given programmatic relevance, the length of compositions, and so on. Whereas artistic development is generally granted its own logic it is also the practice of general musicology to link such development to biographical elements; at the most basic level there is a correlation of *sequence*, and the existence of poietic reality at any given stage unavoidably creates an implicit correlation with the composer's subjectivity.

Beethoven's case is unusual in that his artistic development seems in traditional terms capable of being fairly successfully divided into three stages. This division was already made by an anonymous French writer in 1818,¹⁶² and gained great currency later with the publication of Schindler's biography soon after the composer's death and Lenz's *Beethoven et ses trois styles* in 1852. The middle period is in each case divided from the early and late ones by a productive hiatus; both these dividing stages have been causally linked to traumatic experiences, the first to Beethoven's awareness of becoming deaf and his probable suicide attempt and the second to the loss of the "Immortal Beloved", severe illness and the battle for guardianship over his nephew.¹⁶³ Inferred causality behind what is here specifically *stylistic* output is significantly more developed than usual: the extensive presence of the great personality manages to frame metamusical discourses in their extended forms also, and to direct even formalist analyses of the

composer's works.

In this regard it may be noted that the triadic division has been questioned in terms of uniformity and number. Kerman has suggested that Beethoven's use of different genres is at unequal stages of development during any given period¹⁶⁴ - the late quartets and sonatas are for example far more iconoclastic than the Ninth Symphony - and others have either identified further "periods"¹⁶⁵ or subdivided the three existing ones into further temporal categories.¹⁶⁶ The number three represents a standard trope of completion and natural balance: the temporal subject, which generally achieves ascendancy - and its furthest temporal extension - during the "middle stage", that of the adult male or functional member of patriarchal society, requires a preceding and succeeding phase for self-definition - the "cycle of life" has for centuries been linked to triadic temporal structure in nature. Beethoven as great human being is both a reflection of and an archetypal model for the subsequent centrality of division according to this number.

As Nattiez's notion of plot and seriation process (mentioned earlier) brings to the fore, even the most technical formalist analyses are subject to musicological-political programs. Stylistic analysis - although it cannot ever simply be relegated to the entirely subjective, the entirely unidirectional - chooses its own objects, and is slanted towards identification of certain formal procedures within what is relatively ambiguous matter in all senses. Thus while Beethoven's late style is usually characterized by his extensive use of polyphony, we should note that "polyphony" itself is not a stable frame, and can to some extent be ascribed to all music in which different parts do not strictly follow an identical progression of note durations. Limited use of polyphony under the traditional definition may in any case

be observed even in the earliest of Beethoven's works such as the String Trios, Opus 9. Similarly, Opus 111, while not containing - like Opus 110 - a fugue "proper" (which is in itself a difficult stipulation to make), is said to contain "fugal procedures";¹⁶⁷ to some extent, then, stylistic development is pressured into uniqueness for the sake of claiming radical heterogeneity and, ultimately, ineffability.

As regards definition of period via musical genres, Mann also relegates this process to novelistic requirements. Even though it is only the piano sonata and the mass that will be lectured on by Kretschmar, Mann identifies the "height" reached during the middle period as consisting in "the symphony, piano sonata, and the classical string quartet"; the concerto - which for many represents Beethoven's greatest achievement - is ignored. The metamusical as *criticism* intrudes into musicology proper (musicology as historical categorization), and what Mann values the most (it is late-period works - the Ninth Symphony and the Fifteenth String Quartet - that are mentioned elsewhere in the novel) governs his definition of the middle period.

In the works of the last period they stood with heavy hearts before a process of dissolution or alienation, of a mounting into an air no longer familiar or safe to meddle with; even before a plus ultra, wherein they had been able to see nothing else than a degeneration of tendencies already previously present, an excess of introspection and speculation, an extravagance of minutiae and scientific musicality - applied sometimes to such simple material as the arietta theme of the monstrous movement of variations which forms the second part of this sonata. The theme of this movement goes through a hundred vicissitudes, a hundred worlds of rhythmic contrasts, at length outgrows itself, and is finally lost in giddy worlds that one might call other-worldly or abstract. And in just that way Beethoven's art had overgrown itself, risen out of the habitable regions of tradition, even before the startled gaze of human eyes, into spheres of the entirely and utterly and nothing-but-personal - an ego painfully isolated in the absolute, isolated too from sense by his loss of hearing;

lonely prince of a realm of spirits, from whom now only a chilling breath issued to terrify his most willing contemporaries, standing as they did aghast at these communications of which only at moments, only by exception, they could understand anything at all.

Negative Reception

The response to the incomprehensible music of the late period is an *emotional* one, and can be thus because of a personal link to the composer. The "friends and admirers", these "most willing contemporaries", are affected by an alienating "process" which in this passage is not clearly located within either music or composer; they "stand before" it (*vor ... gestanden hätten*), or it appears "before [their] startled gaze" (*vor erschrocken nachblinkenden Menschaugen*).

Syntactical constructions create an anthropomorphization of musical process; in one sentence "Beethoven's art" and "an ego painfully isolated" are both used as the subject. By doubling the possible situation of the audience Kretschmar again makes what is to come more accessible; whereas the original audience could respond directly to poesis in its purest form it is the alienating work itself that here has to be dealt with.

Beethoven as *human*, in succession to how he has been presented thus far, remains present as an integral part of introductory discourse, which is in fact already penetrated here by musical analysis of Opus 111.

Whereas author and text are directly linked within esthesis here, the normal process of reception entails a more detached - and linguistically considered - response, however quickly it appears. The more careful sections of critique found in the passage no doubt have their origin in the published history of reception (largely as found in Schindler), which often reveals attitudes to Opus 111 that were far from flattering.

While Beethoven's music enjoyed considerable popularity

during his lifetime, especially during his middle period, the later music was generally not well received by the public, particularly for reasons of its unusual harmonic and structural configurations. Although a number of recent studies have shown how the notion of the historically "misunderstood genius" in general is itself often a myth,¹⁶⁸ it does seem as if the sonata, together with a number of other late-period works,¹⁶⁹ took a long time to gain acceptance outside of a specialized audience. Maynard Solomon writes that

Beethoven in his late sonatas and quartets may be regarded as the originator of the avant-garde in music history ... The late sonatas had been Beethoven's first works that were composed without the expectation of performance in either aristocratic salon or public concert ... their audience was in the private musicale.¹⁷⁰

Beethoven himself during this phase moreover seemed to place great belief in the judgement of posterity; a memorable example of this attitude occurred after finishing the *Hammerklavier Sonata*, op. 106.¹⁷¹

Late-period works were called "obscure", "abstruse", "capricious", "meaningless" and "aimless", "difficult to play and understand", "perversely extravagant";¹⁷² and it is of relevance that Beethoven's supporter Grillparzer wrote in one of the last conversation books, "We can make nothing of your music".¹⁷³ While publishers were uneasy about the fact that the sonata only contained two movements¹⁷⁴ - the aspect that also puzzled Schindler¹⁷⁵ - blame was laid elsewhere on the composer's by now complete deafness and perceived mental deterioration. William Gardiner wrote in 1837 that in Beethoven's last works "[h]is imagination seems to have fed on the ruins of his sensitive organs"¹⁷⁶, and even Lenz identified the extra thirty-second notes found in certain measures of the second movement as "the spectacle of madness".¹⁷⁷ A review by *The Harmonicon* of August 1823 is particularly slighting:

The Sonata, op. 111 consists of two movements. The first betrays a violent effort to produce something in the shape

of novelty. In it are visible some of those dissonances the harshness of which may have escaped the observation of the composer ... [The signature variation of the second movement] really is laborious trifling, and ought to be by every means discouraged by the sensible part of the musical profession ... [T]he publishers have, in their title, deemed it necessary to warn off all pirates by announcing the sonata as copyright. We do not think they are in much danger of having their property invaded.¹⁷⁸

More telling, however, and reflected directly in Kretschmar's talk, were accusations of "scientificity", of the departure from humanistic input into this work in favour of artificially contrived formal complexities. The *Harmonicon* accused the composer a year later of "studied eccentricity",¹⁷⁹ and Schindler writes of how the piece was criticized for the "employment of an excess of scientific methods on such simple material as the 'Arietta'".¹⁸⁰ He cites a review from Leipzig:

It has pleased the composer, in working out his fine material, to make use for the most part of such artificial means as we consider not quite worthy of his genius.¹⁸¹

The *Berliner Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung* similarly criticized Beethoven for not writing "more naturally";¹⁸² other writers subsequently tried to find connections between Op. 111 and the composer's obsession with arithmetic figures at that stage of his life.¹⁸³ Sir George Smart's opinion that "although the later works of Beethoven may have been theoretically correct, they were to the ear harmoniously unpleasant"¹⁸⁴ seems to sum up the attitude entailed.

Metamusical: Mixing

Both paragraphs and sentences are extremely long at this point: Kretschmar is finally approaching his topic directly, and musicology proper needs space within which to develop alongside other discourses on music. A number of different forms of the metamusical may be identified.

First of all, we find music described in terms that approach technical analysis. Phrases such as "theme",

"movement", "variations" and "rhythmic contrasts" are borderline cases, musical frames which are applicable also to non-musical matter, and which are likely to be understood also in a musical context by the relatively uneducated subject. In this regard Kretschmar's analytic discourse is closer to Tovey than to Schenker or Babbitt: the terms identified are placed alongside impressionistic qualifiers. The variations movement is "monstrous", and the "rhythmic contrasts" inhabit a purely metaphoric "hundred worlds" which later become "giddy worlds" that are "other-worldly or abstract". We are faced head-on here with the need to evaluate the subjectivist principle. If metasystemic analysis is to occur at all, it will be of no use to grant an absolute measure of freedom in writing metamusically; the "object", which inheres in the symbolic at the most basic level, can be located within literary and political requirements as a method of *metasystemic production*. For an analyst such as Adorno the object is found in historical reality and *already exists* even if it cannot be reduced linguistically; for a writer like Mann it is there as *approach*.

Thus the adjective "monstrous" (*ungeheuren*) - which connotes size, threat, ugliness, brutality - can be both validated (the arietta movement is, after all, the longest slow movement found in any of Beethoven's sonatas) and traced to the history of reception that is being described, to the appearance of the demoniac which is central to the novel, to Mann's notion of the inhumane. Similarly, from the other side, the sentence beginning with "The theme...", while indicating a narrative switch to "fact" on *Zeitblom's* part, admits to metaphoricity, or at least to inexactitude of language, through use of the phrase "one might call".

This type of dual positioning extends also to the way in which language deals with the absolute; while ineffability is

an "objective" fact, the evaluative and descriptive elements attached to the absolute stem from more diverse spheres. Music here is repeatedly described in vertical imagery, and thereby metaphorically given a bearing of transcendence; at the same time such imagery is linked to subjective biography, to what Mann finds important in the late Beethoven for his own purposes (coldness, isolation, danger). The possible *neutral* elements allowing such a reading (and it must be remembered that the neutral level can only coexist with the poetic and esthetic) will be considered later on.

A further use of metamusical discourse here entails the evaluation of formal complexity. Language in this regard is perhaps more closely bound to its own intentions than in the examples above - it is not a question of direct "content" but of *placing* of music for further means. The arietta theme is for rhetorical and narrative purposes positioned at the far end of simplicity (musical material can be "as simple as" this), but the parameters in which such a judgement lies are not identified. When looking at the first sixteen bars of the second movement of Opus 111 (see fig. 6), we see that there are no unusual or extended modulations from the most basic of tonalities, that of C major, no unexpected chromatic procedures, no well-defined polyphonic divisions, no harmonic development out of keeping with what may have been expected within the tonal language of the 1820s, no abrupt dynamic or time signature changes, no strange silences. Simplicity here is generally defined by the *absence* of the unusual, of innovation: difference can be relativized in that objective judgment seems to be lodged more plainly in convention itself. In other words, the metamusical in this instance does not involve a "true" line of evaluation: even though the appearance of music cannot be fixed at a basic level, evaluation proceeds from a singular direction, from the

position of language itself facing the as yet unwritten.

So far, so good, said Kretschmar. And yet again, good or right only conditionally and incompletely. For one would usually connect with the conception of the merely personal, ideas of limitless subjectivity and of radical harmonic will to expression, in contrast to polyphonic objectivity (Kretschmar was concerned to have us impress upon our minds this distinction between harmonic subjectivity and polyphonic objectivity) and this equation, here as altogether in the masterly late works, would simply not apply.

Discourse of Lastness

The intrusion in the first sentence of everyday speech, which reanchors the narrative position, signifies a switch from history to the present, from a foreground that is based within the "normal", the expected, to the subversiveness of the new. What is novel for narrative purposes has again however a historical basis, and Kretschmar proceeds towards an established discourse which, even though it reached its apex in this century, was already a strong presence in the previous one.

The narrative of the heroic, the Promethean figure who overcomes personal struggles against Fate - deafness, loneliness - by creating great art, whose art embodies these successes, extends to and attains an ambiguous conclusion in Beethoven's late-period style. Here the heroic or "dramatic" mode, which found its fullest expression in middle-period works, is replaced by what has been called a period of "transcended antitheses"¹⁸⁵ where "conflicting principles somehow become component parts of a harmony".¹⁸⁶ The late period works, especially the string quartets,¹⁸⁷ have - more so than any other body of music in history - attained a widespread transcendental value among writers and composers alike. The glorification of the problematic Ninth Symphony is

well known; Wagner, for one, wrote of how this piece "preaches repentance and atonement in the deepest sense of divine revelation".¹⁸⁸ It was also Wagner who initiated - partly as a means of promoting his own ideas on music¹⁸⁹ - a widely-supported critical tradition which sees the choral movement as resulting from the fact that Beethoven had definitively "fulfilled all that was possible in the domain of absolute music, surpassing everything that had been achieved before."¹⁹⁰

Other, less easily accessible late-period works received similar attention: Stravinsky is said to have considered the Grosse Fuge from Op. 130 the greatest piece of music ever written; Burnett James wrote of how the late quartets "stand alone among expressions of profound mystical experience in terms of created art."¹⁹¹ Eliot, Huxley and Woolf were all deeply affected by Beethoven's late music, and seemed to desire certain of his effects in their own works.¹⁹² Perhaps the most extreme moments of adulation occur in a book that did much to promote the "late Beethoven myth" in the twentieth century: J.W.N. Sullivan wrote in 1927 that "[t]he music of the last quartets comes from the profoundest depths of the human soul that any artist ever sounded"¹⁹³ and argued that in the final stages of his life Beethoven finally came to peace with his by now complete deafness, transcending human suffering completely and achieving the "state of great visionaries where there is no more discord".¹⁹⁴ Such a biographical explanation is directly translated into his assessment of the C sharp minor quartet:

It is the completely unfaltering rendering into music of what we can only call the mystic vision. It has that serenity which ... passes beyond beauty. Nowhere else in music are we made so aware, as here, of a state of consciousness surpassing our own, where our problems do not exist, and to which even our highest aspirations, those that we can formulate, provide no key.¹⁹⁵

Such ideas no doubt had great appeal, and they reappear almost

directly in Renate von Geyses claim that what "makes [Beethoven] unique, is his simultaneous artistic and spiritual development. The wisdom and clarity of the music of the third period resulted directly from the spiritual wisdom, the being at one with God, which he had attained by that time."¹⁹⁶ The potential for political abuse is of course glaringly obvious from such an association, as it is from the claim that music is able to reflect a state "where our problems do not exist"; for current purposes we will however look at the application of such discourse in its own terms.

Positive Reception

This discourse of "lastness", of ultimate vision and unbridled creativity before the prospect of final transgression, does then also find its way into discussions on Opus 111. Apart from attempts at presenting the sonata as the formal perfection and transfiguration of all Beethoven's earlier piano works, there exist a large number of commentaries in which the concept of transcendence, of entry into a paradisiac realm above language, occurs with great regularity, especially in descriptions of the second movement. The fact that Beethoven wrote at least seven more groups of piano music after this sonata is most often elided, partly because emphasis is generally laid on Beethoven's last works as the culmination of Classicism in music, which had essentially been represented by the sonata-allegro form itself. We thus find impressionistic glosses on Beethoven's transcendent vision such as those of Carl Reinecke who in 1897 talks of the work's "supernaturally glorified sublimity and profundity"¹⁹⁷ and, more recently, of Robert Wallace and Wilfrid Mellers who respectively claim that the sonata arouses "[m]ystical visions [that] are indescribable ... [and] inhabit spiritual realms rarely probed in either instrumental music or prose fiction"¹⁹⁸

and that "Opus 111 is truth in process".¹⁹⁹

Paradise appears as the logical extension of visionary insight, and already in Lenz's biography of 1855 we find the two movements of the sonata respectively described as *Sansara* and *Nirvana*.²⁰⁰ William Behrend writes that "this pure, transfigured and exalted music ... and the deep wisdom of [Beethoven's] thoughts have opened for us a view into a beautiful, mystic and far-off land";²⁰¹ Wilfrid Mellers claims that "Beethoven entered paradise in effecting 'a communication that reaches its goal'";²⁰² Robert Wallace calls the second movement "heavenly",²⁰³ arguing that "Beethoven reached, in Opus 111, the frontiers of what is possible in a piano sonata."²⁰⁴ Language here makes extreme claims for music granting "absolute" experience, and the situation is ripe for the appearance of a closer association of such a term with its nineteenth-century meaning.

As a matter of fact, Beethoven had been far more "subjective," not to say far more "personal," in his middle period than in his last, had been far more bent on taking all the flourishes, formulas, and conventions, of which music is certainly full, and consuming them in the personal expression, melting them into the subjective dynamic. The relation of the later Beethoven to the conventional, say in the last five piano sonatas, is, despite all the uniqueness and even uncanniness of the formal language, quite different, much more complaisant and easy-going. Untouched, untransformed by the subjective, convention often appeared in the late works, in a baldness, one might say exhaustiveness, an abandonment of self, with an effect more majestic and awful than any reckless plunge into the personal.

Mann and Adorno

The quality of language here is distinctly different from anything preceding it thus far. The dialectic between subject and object with its link to harmony and polyphony, which "Kretschmar was concerned to have [the audience] impress upon [their] minds", is already employed as a given. The audience

(and readership) has to accept a theoretical construct - a systemic proposal - so as to have access to metamusical discourse which is in itself more "poetic" than "technical". The difficulty of language here lies in conceptual content rather than in form; the *novelty of language* - its deformation - exists as the reinterpretation of the familiar rather than the recreation of the symbolic form itself. According to the argument presented this happens directly in the manner of Beethoven's late music.

Such interrelatedness of form and content is in the broader sense an intrinsic part of Adorno's philosophical writings, and while his works are generally far more austere in nature than those of Mann, the shift in the metamusical towards dialectical philosophy may be ascribed to what is practically a position of co-authorship on Adorno's part. *The Story* traces the extensive involvement of the "Privy Councillor"²⁰⁵ - the "helper, adviser and sympathetic instructor ... who, through exceptional knowledge and intellectual attainments, was precisely the right person"²⁰⁶ - and Mann admits about the writing on the *Apocalypsis cum figuris*:

I am tempted to say that his chief contribution to the chapter lay not in the musical sphere but in the realm of language and its nuances...²⁰⁷

With characteristic proprietary defensiveness, Mann also writes:

The analysis of the row system ... in Chapter XXII of *Faustus* is entirely based upon Adorno's essay. So are certain remarks on the tonal language of the later Beethoven, such as early in the book in Kretschmar's splutterings: the comments on the uncanny relationship that death establishes between genius and convention. These ideas, too, I had encountered in Adorno's manuscript, with a feeling of their strange familiarity. As for the - what word shall I use? - serenity with which I put my version of them into the mouth of my stammerer, I have only this to say: after prolonged activity of the mind it frequently happens that things which we once upon a time threw upon the waters return to us recast by another's hand and put into different

relationships but still reminding us of what was one our own. Ideas about death and form, the self and the objective world, may well be regarded by the author of a Venetian novel of some thirty-five years ago as recollections of himself.²⁰⁸

What is important, then, is to investigate Adorno's own ideas in order to ascertain how far they constitute the metamusical in this chapter of *Doctor Faustus*. Their applicability to Beethoven reception in general can thereby also be assessed.

Metasystemic: Adorno on Late Beethoven

Fredric Jameson begins his long opening section on Adorno in *Marxism and Form* with the purely rhetorical question: "To whom can one present a writer whose principal subject is the disappearance of the public?".²⁰⁹ It seems that mentioning the impossibility of summarizing any of Adorno's work, of systematizing its "atonal philosophy",²¹⁰ is an introductory prerequisite to all discussions on it, and I will not spend time here on repeating apologia that have been expressed far more effectively elsewhere.²¹¹

One of the central "theses" of Adorno's unyieldingly pessimistic musical and general artistic philosophy is the paradoxical formulation that the greater the autonomy of the work of art, the more likely it is to embody the exterior social forces at play during its production. He argues that Western art has ever since the late Enlightenment moved towards increased isolation from society, and that in complicated ways the free modern subject, who has become an impossibility as ontological category, can find the hope of expression only in entirely rigidified formal artistic structures. In music, this position is represented by the serial music of Schoenberg, Berg and Webern, whose work is a culmination of tendencies already present in Beethoven's late style.

Adorno having himself been a pupil of Schoenberg's

disciple Alban Berg, the musical example he returns to time and time again is the technique of serial composition developed by Schoenberg in the 1920s. A typical statement reads as follows:

The terror which Schoenberg and Webern spread, today as in the past, comes not from their incomprehensibility but from the fact that they are all too correctly understood. Their music gives form to that anxiety, that terror, that insight into the catastrophic situation which others merely evade by regressing. They are called individualists, and yet their work is nothing but a single dialogue with the powers which destroy individualism...²¹²

Elsewhere, in a metaphor adopted from Walter Benjamin, the "shocks of incomprehension" are said to "illuminate the meaningless world". Modern music "has taken upon itself all the darkness and guilt of the world. Its fortune lies in the perception of misfortune; all of its beauty is in denying itself the illusion of beauty".²¹³ Music which gives simple pleasure, such as the pop music played by radio stations, is "regressive"²¹⁴ and serves as an escape from social realities.

In an excellent interpretation of Adorno's analysis of the late Beethoven, Rose Rosengard Subotnik explains how his thinking is rooted in a dialectic between form and freedom, two "forces" which are at the same time contradictory and interdependent.²¹⁵ Form is social, extrinsic to subjective freedom, yet still provides the structure in which such freedom can find expression.²¹⁶ Beethoven's second-period style, according to Adorno, corresponds to exterior historical conditions which appeared to offer the *possibility* of dialectical synthesis.²¹⁷ In Beethoven's music from this period, then, the musical individual (or "subject"), "(...being at times identical with the individual tone, at times with the 'theme' or with the part for the concert instrument) is able to develop from within itself and to organize the totality of the musical work from the inner dynamics of the participating elements".²¹⁸ Through what

Schoenberg termed the principle of "developing variation", the "musical element subjects is said to "[subject] itself to logical, dynamic change while simultaneously retaining its original identity, thus overcoming the contradiction between identity and nonidentity",²¹⁹ that is, between subjectivity and form. The clearest example of this phenomenon is of course to be found in the development and recapitulation procedures of the sonata-allegro form,²²⁰ and it is indeed Beethoven's sonatas and symphonies (which often employ sonata forms) from this period that traditionally constitute his most widely popular body of works, a body which is popularly read as being engaged in a successful battle against Fate, or, then, "objectivity".

The "fatal condition" of Schoenberg's music is however but a culmination of tendencies already present in Beethoven's work. Subotnik writes that at any given moment "each is implicit in Adorno's consideration of the other";²²¹ the "process of dissolution or alienation" which Kretzschmar refers to is thus the first signal of the eventual position of the artistic subject in the modern age. Whereas Schoenberg's music represents for Adorno the end of human history, the period between the two composers' work represents a "winding down"²²² of humanity (which for Adorno means bourgeois humanism).²²³ It is important to note that Adorno nowhere claims that dialectical synthesis *did* occur during Beethoven's lifetime; the composer, rather, fulfilled in his second period a historical possibility within the realm of art, which served to criticize society's imperfections through its own wholeness.²²⁴ The reason why the music from the second period could do this lies partly in its contemporary popularity; a deeper reason for both is that society at the time found in the music an answer to a general belief in and need for individual self-determination.

It is important, however, to note that Adorno nowhere claims that dialectical synthesis *did* occur during Beethoven's lifetime; the composer, rather, fulfilled in his second period a historical possibility within the realm of art, which served to criticize society's imperfections through its own wholeness.²²⁵ Even in the second-period style, Adorno claims, Beethoven was bringing into question the authenticity of the principle of synthesis; one example is the "bludgeoning effect" or forcedness of closure in his recapitulation procedures, something which feminist musicologists have made much of.²²⁶ The replacement of an older, fixed metaphysical system by a dialectical model, which conclusively occurs in Beethoven's second period, inevitably introduces the need for new formal principles to contain subjective existence,²²⁷ and the sense of overstatedness also found in Beethoven's development sections brings the free coexistence of part and whole into question.²²⁸ Subotnik writes, in a passage that might sum up the thrust of Mann's relatively impressionistic "transcription" of the second movement of the C minor sonata in Adornian terms, that

according to Adorno, just as the work of society inevitably requires the sacrifice of individuality, so too, Beethoven's development tends to wear down its engendering material - the musical subject - to the point where the latter negates itself entirely in the service of the larger entity. Unlimited development, in other words, turns freedom into enslavement.²²⁹

The possibility of subjective integration disappears, and the "process of dissolution or alienation" which Mann's Kretzschmar refers to becomes the first signal of the eventual position of the artistic subject in the modern age. In the third period, music - if it was to be authentic - had to forgo its pretence to individual freedom, and had to express in some way the irreconcilability of subject and object (or, of individual and society). It was thus forced to negate "affirmative culture", which now directly partook in affirming

social repression; only "negative culture" could defend free human subjectivity, and, as such, a "double negation" had to occur.²³⁰ Beethoven thus had to sever affinities between his art and the exterior social world as far as possible. Artistic specifications had to come from within himself, with the result that his music became "consciously and implacably autonomous".²³¹

The artist who attempts the latter is of course faced with a paradox: if, as Adorno believes, the purpose of "authentic" art is to protect individual freedom, this "split in human wholeness" would however render the artist ineffectual, unless the musical subject at some stage acquired confirmation from the more forceful precepts of objective reality.²³² Hence, for Beethoven's third-period music to retain its authenticity in Adorno's sense, it had to embody the principles of autonomy and heteronomy at the same time.²³³

Adorno finds a solution to this paradoxical situation in what he identifies as a reformulation of the subject-object relation, one which reflects what has now become their absolute incompatibility. The musical subject, in order to achieve such a reflection, had to yield to and assimilate the formal features of objective reality to a far greater extent than ever before;²³⁴ Subotnik writes that "by increasing the explicitly formal character of music, the subjective could acknowledge its own underlying dependence on a foreign source of authority, objectivity, without ever going beyond the autonomous processes of musical construction".²³⁵ To put it simply, the musical subject had to disappear from the music; and Adorno accordingly claims that in the late Beethoven corpus it almost never appears directly, being instead dispelled to a position of "permanent renunciation".²³⁶

Henceforth, "the very absence of a subject from a musical configuration necessarily constituted an integral component of

that configuration",²³⁷ and Adorno believes that the subject in Beethoven's third period maintained its identity exactly through its own negation. In this way, both autonomy and heteronomy are comprised at the same time;²³⁸ the ways in which Beethoven is said to achieve this will be elaborated later on.

In these forms, said the speaker, the subjective and the conventional assumed a new relationship, conditioned by death.

At this word Kretschmar stuttered violently; sticking fast at the first sound and executing a sort of machine-gun fire with his tongue on the roof of his mouth, with jaw and chin both quivering, before they settled on the vowel which told us what he meant. But when we had guessed it, it seemed hardly proper to take it out of his mouth and shout it to him, as we sometimes did, in jovial helpfulness. He had to say it himself and he did. Where greatness and death came together, he declared, there arises an objectivity tending to the conventional, which in its majesty leaves the most domineering subjectivity far behind, because therein the merely personal - which had after all been the surmounting of a tradition already brought to its peak - once more outgrew itself, in that it entered into the mythical, the collectively great and supernatural.

Mann and Adorno on Death

In a moment that is perhaps closer to Heidegger than to Adorno, Kretschmar has to resolve his struggle to articulate the absolute alone; approaching death, the limit of personal existence, is the ultimate moment of individual subjectivity. The objectivity of death, its ultimate collectivity, is however also absolute.

In his essay "Spätstil Beethovens" - an instance of unusually ahistorical analytic method on the philosopher's part - Adorno theorizes this paradox in a manner that is parallel to the more strongly history-based one elaborated upon above. He speaks here of the relationship of convention to subjectivity as a "law of form" (*Formgesetz*), one which becomes visible to the artist once the reality of death, which amounts to the abolishment of art, is considered.²³⁹ It is

however only associated with "the creature, not the creation",²⁴⁰ and therefore appears in broken form within the artwork, as what Adorno calls *allegory*. Psychological interpretations which seek to explain late styles as a move towards unlimited and regressive subjectivity therefore miss the point; Adorno writes that "in the later works the violent power of subjectivity lies [instead] in the rapidly upward-moving gesture with which it departs from the work of art",²⁴¹ thereby shaking off the illusion of art. The nexus of such a process with the presence of genius is elaborated as follows:

Touched by death, the masterly hand sets free the material which it had formed earlier; the cracks inside it, evidence of the ultimate powerlessness of the I when faced by Being, is its [the I's] final creation. ... [The] fragments, fallen apart and left behind, are finally transformed into expression; expression now no longer of the solitary "I" but of the mythic one of the creature and its fall, whose steps, in the same manner as moments of holding back, are figuratively hewn by the late works.²⁴²

While Adorno is never as specific as Mann is on the notion of "genius" (the essay on the *Missa Solemnis* perhaps approaches this issue slightly more directly), the point of association is clear.

Mann's own attraction to the ideas of death and sickness - to pathology - as essential elements to artistic creation goes back to his early novellas such as *Tristan* and *Death in Venice*; *The Magic Mountain* itself is in many ways a "medical history" of intellectual debate, and in *The Story* he felt it necessary to locate *Doctor Faustus* as well within a creative period when he himself was often ill and at times seriously concerned for his own life.²⁴³ The influence of Schopenhauer - whose thought is after all an important precursor to the kind of Freudian explanation that would usually be given here - is evident,²⁴⁴ and the sonata in this section in a sense directly embodies Beethoven's "will to death". The romanticization of death implicit in much of Mann's writing follows the leanings

of Romanticism proper. While Adorno's ideas as expressed above also show signs of a Schopenhauerian²⁴⁵ or Nietzschean heritage, the philosopher's approach to the late music is perhaps more historically sophisticated, with the position of the subject before death also being placed - within his further writings - in the context of an approaching historical impasse.

He did not ask if we understood that, nor did we ask ourselves. When he gave it as his view that the main point was to hear it, we fully agreed. It was in the light of what he had said, he went on, that the work he was speaking of in particular, Sonata Op. 111, was to be regarded.

Language and the Impossible Memory

Another impossibility arises, called forth by the requirements of the novelistic essay: Zeitblom has just elaborated a complex argument set forth by Kretschmar in a fair amount of detail, and yet admits here to not "understanding" what has been said. Later in the same chapter he interrupts his report of another lecture

to remark that the lecturer was talking about matters and things in the world of art, situations that had never come within our horizon and only appeared now on its margin in shadowy wise through the always compromised medium of his speech. ... We listened to it all with the dimly excited fantasy of children hearing a fairy-story they do not understand, while their tender minds are none the less in a strange, dreamy, intuitive way enriched and advantaged. Fugue, counterpoint, "*Eroica*," "confusion in consequence of too strongly coloured modulations," "strict style" - all that was just magic spells to us, but we heard it as greedily, as large-eyed, as children always hear what they do not understand or what is even entirely unsuitable - indeed, with far more pleasure than the familiar, fitting, and adequate can give them. ... And I believe that the stretches jumped over fill[ed] in of themselves over time.²⁴⁶

As in Proust, desire is located within childhood memory: the response to "magic words" - even while there are in this passage overtones of Mann's notion of the eternal as discussed

earlier - parallels the desire for exclusivity promised by the metamusical discourse identified earlier. Language *itself* is "meaningless" and manages to function as membrane here, and *linguistic* completion comes about with the "filling in" of meaning over time.

On a superficial level, we are presented here with an enactment of Derrida's principle of *différance*: the syntagmatic function of words can only be linked to meaning at an imaginary position in the future, and "memory" until that moment concerns the purely signifier. Yet while such an extension of a theory of meaning towards the process of language acquisition itself may be valid in a general sense, deferred meaning will here be provided by a *non-linguistic* form, that of musical performance. The general deferral of meaning is more relevant to the experience of music to come than to what has been spoken, and it is exactly the fact that language - understood neither by audience nor general readership - admits to both failure ("the main point was to hear") and necessity ("It was in the light of what he said ... that the Sonata ... was to be regarded") which locates textual functioning in discourse that is different by virtue of being metamusical already. In other words, the failure of words is more *intrinsic* to metamusical discourse than to general language, and this aspect is foregrounded - language is freed - by novelistic admission. Directionality - and, to some extent, dialectic interreferentiality - becomes less important within a form that is at the most basic level removed from an object that *can speak by itself*: the move to the "particular" is not uniform. Factual impossibility can be related to both the parodic nature of the first two sentences here (the issue is normalized by means of humour) and to the problematic of musical interpretation itself.

Far, then, from setting up a simple opposition between

analysis and pure listening, Mann's text reveals some of the complexities arising from setting both, with their respective relationships to desire, within the framework of the novel. Differing metamusical discourses are unable to claim hierarchical positions while still bound to the verbal text itself, and negotiations among them would seem to occur within a *further frame*, that of the impossibility - one which extends to the attendant "rules" or reality of the respective discourses - of actualizing the music that is their object.

And then he sat down at the cottage piano and played the whole composition out of his head, the first and the incredible second movement, shouting his comments into the midst of his playing and in order to make us conscious of the treatment demonstrating here and there in his enthusiasm by singing as well; altogether it made a spectacle partly entrancing, partly funny; and repeatedly greeted with merriment by his little audience. For as he had a very powerful attack and exaggerated the forte, he had to shriek extra loud to make what he said halfway intelligible and to sing with all the strength of his lungs to emphasize vocally what he played.

Acting Adorno

As if to restate the idea that no language will stand by itself, remain impenetrable, give closure, Mann returns directly to parody. In *The Story* the following passage - one that incidentally reveals a two-way intertextuality - appears:

Then Adorno sat down at the piano and, while I stood by and watched, played for me the entire Sonata Opus 111 in a highly instructive fashion. I had never been more attentive.²⁴⁷

The revered philosopher, the man of "brutish seriousness"²⁴⁸ who is the source of the language preceding this section, is given a body here, one which is drawn from a real event and made comical. Parody is again linked to the impossible: Kretschmar's interspersive technique is the most practical attempt at language-music unity (song, instrumental

performance, analysis and enthusiastic persuasiveness all proceed from a single source) but the impossibility of effectively doing this results in burlesque humour. The need to describe performance where actual listening is impossible leads to an exaggeration of such performance, to its extension into the process of *writing* itself; this can be seen as a further instance of language adhering to its own boundaries and attempting extension at the same time. Both the body and language struggle to appear through music in a reversal of the central difficulty of the metamusical novel, and here a further object of parody can be identified, namely the Wagnerian idea that in Beethoven's late music "the word should burst forth out of music". To some extent Leverkühn's "taking back" of the Ninth Symphony is foreshadowed by the relegation of the singing voice to parody, which later in the novel is closely associated with the demoniac.

With his lips he imitated what the hands played. "Tum-Tum, tum-tum, tum-tr-r!" he went, as he played the grim and startling first notes of the first movement; he sang in a high falsetto the passages of melodic loveliness by which the ravaged and tempestuous skies of the composition are at intervals brightened as though by faint glimpses of light.

Metamusical: Figuring Equivalence

In the original German the imitation of the initial phrases of Opus 111 reads as follows:

Bum, bum - Wum, wum - Schrum, schrum...

The translator is in effect making a mistake: these are Kretschmar's actual nonsense words, and she is giving preference to interpretation of the primary musical text rather than to Mann's secondary one. The fact that we can identify a problem with the altering in translation of supposedly non-denotative words indicates that such language

is in some sense given a status not bound by ordinary linguistic concerns. In other words, they are closer to music than they would have been had they contained denotative meanings; presumably they involve the imitation of sound and rhythm only.

From such an angle the original "translation" is however less correct than Lowe-Porter's secondary one. The following is the passage being imitated:

The musical score is for a piano piece, marked "Maestoso" and "1". It is in 3/4 time and features a complex rhythmic pattern. The score is written for piano and includes dynamic markings such as *f*, *sf*, and *p*. A trill (*tr*) is indicated above a note in the right hand. The score is presented in a grand staff format with treble and bass clefs.

- figure 1 -

The scanning of these notes as "Tum-tum, tum-tum, tum-tr-r!" is rhythmically closer to the score, even though the reader who has not heard the sonata would be more likely to interpret these phrases as follows:

A musical staff showing a sequence of notes. The notes are quarter notes, and the final note is marked with a trill (*tr*) above it. The staff is shown in a simplified manner, focusing on the rhythmic and melodic elements.

- figure 2 -

"Tum-tum" is of course an anglicization of printed matter that would be difficult to pronounce otherwise: the practical concerns of translation reveal, then, that the symbolic extends beyond denotation alone. Translation traditionally,

rather than involving interlinguistic syntagmatic association, is a question of transposition via an imaginary signified which can be linked to otherwise unrelated signifiers. The recasting here, rather than following the process of "musical" (syntagmatic, form-bound) translation at a *textual* level, is firmly rooted in the traditional procedure. The former would in fact amount to an impossible situation of translation not taking place at all, this being so both because of context and the necessary production of meaning within esthetic subjectivity. Of two "musics" one (the signified and not the text) is given primacy; the result, again, is that what is possibly a strongly ironic gloss by Mann on the type of metamusical method involved (the German words are "silly", "embarrassing"), and is therefore an equally important signified, is missed.

Direct transformation of the neutral qualities of music into language already fails (neither Kretschmar's nor Lowe-Porter's attempt manages to create rhythmic or auditory equivalence); the "musicalizing" of language into nonsense (it is exactly "sense" which leads to complications) does not lead to a stable position of understanding either. Content proceeds from form as soon as the esthetic is engaged, and this results in a destabilizing of both signified and signifier, of the presence of both music and the metamusical.

We find in the same sentence an entirely different metamusical procedure. The diminished seventh opening chords are described as "grim and startling" (*grimmig auffahrenden*): does this not seem to tell us more about the music? Again we find a *relatively* impressionistic term, related to the esthetic in terms of emotional response, combined with a *relatively* objective one, related to the formal level: as the devil points out to Leverkühn, Beethoven employs here "the harshest dissonance known to him",²⁴⁹ one that steers away

(*fahrt auf*) from the historically "normal". We can see this juxtaposition, as well as the placing of description next to rhythmic imitation, as a further example of the attempt at fullness where individual languages fail.

Metamusical: The Storm

Mann's use of impressionistic terms also follows an established avenue for describing many of Beethoven's compositions, especially the piano sonatas. The "discourse of the storm" and the attendant "storm-calm principle" provides an easy mechanism for programmatizing a general pattern of extreme dynamic, rhythmic, contrapuntal and modulatory polarity found in his work, and appears extensively in discussions of his more well-known works. It extends to the names of compositions as well, as in the case of the Seventeenth Piano Sonata retrospectively being called "The Tempest". The dualism of storm and calm can of course fairly easily be attributed to the two movements, so different in character, of Opus 111.

Objectively, again (where the object is drawn from the symbolic), the identification of a storm in the first movement can be related to an established convention of meaning, that of chromatic progressions signifying approaching turbulent weather. Some form of slow chromatic build-up is present in bars 6 to 11 (see fig. 3), the rumble produced by the bass demisemiquavers and semiquavers of bars 16 to 18 (see fig. 4) can be seen as "non-ascending chromaticism" (the tension of expectation is prolonged by its development occurring primarily dynamically), and chromatic progression proper occurs in bars 47 to 53 (see fig. 5), even though the latter leads to a motoric anticlimax. The storm is however also extended metaphorically across the whole movement, allowing Mann both to continue a parodic usage of the singing voice (while at the same time establishing a

Figure 3 consists of six measures of music, divided into three systems. The first system (measures 5-6) features a treble clef with a trill (tr) and a dynamic range from *sf* to *p*, ending with a *decresc.* marking. The bass clef provides a steady accompaniment. The second system (measures 7-8) is marked *pp* and *sempre pp*, showing dense chordal textures in both hands. The third system (measures 9-10) begins with a *cresc.* marking and reaches a *f* dynamic, with a *sf* marking in the final measure.

- figure 3 -

Figure 4 consists of three measures of music. Measure 16 is marked *pp* and features a treble clef with a chordal texture. Measure 17 is marked *cresc.* and continues the texture. Measure 18 is marked *f* and features a treble clef with a melodic line and a bass clef with a rhythmic accompaniment. The tempo is indicated as **Allegro con brio ed appassionato**.

- figure 4 -

Musical score for piano, measures 47-53. The score is written in a key signature of three flats (B-flat, E-flat, A-flat) and a 3/4 time signature. The notation includes treble and bass staves for each system, with various musical markings such as dynamics (*f*, *ff*), articulation (*tr*), and performance instructions (*1.*).

Measure 47: *f* (forte). The right hand plays a series of chords, and the left hand plays a rhythmic pattern. A trill (*tr*) is marked on the final note of the right hand.

Measure 49: *f* (forte). The right hand features a trill (*tr*) on a note, followed by a melodic line. The left hand continues with a rhythmic pattern.

Measure 51: *f* (forte). The right hand plays a complex melodic line with many accidentals. The left hand plays a rhythmic pattern. A trill (*tr*) is marked on the final note of the right hand.

Measure 53: *ff* (fortissimo). The right hand plays a single chord, and the left hand plays a single note. A first ending bracket (*1.*) is shown above the right hand.

traditional association between beauty and verticality, here in terms of voice pitch) and to again connect Beethoven and Leverkühn through a prefiguring of the end of the *Lamentation* (the composition is "brightened as though by faint glimpses of light").

At last he laid his hands in his lap, was quiet a moment, and then said: "Here it comes!" and began the variations movement, the "adagio molto semplice e cantabile."

Expectation Achieved, Extended

The moment of silence bears great significance: it introduces that upon which emphasis has been laid all along and represents the end of a struggle listening-wise, through difficult performance, through the events given by the program and, ultimately, biographically. It forms a two-way *frame of absence*, dividing absolutely the earthly from the ultimate.

"Opus 111", as excerpts from the literature of reception have shown earlier, may be said to exist in its second movement: it is the latter which is drawn more readily to the verbal frame. In general discussions of the sonata there is a tendency towards either far more²⁵⁰ or far less²⁵¹ space being bestowed upon this movement than on the first (it either draws extensive praise or is simply placed as "ineffable"); it is only in more formalist-oriented readings that the subjectivist element is "denied" in favour of the supposed objectivity of the neutral (Schenker in his monograph on the sonata²⁵² for instance spends 43 pages writing on the first movement and 52 on the second). The economy of metamusical production at work here is variable, and the absolute can be seen as working both for and against language.

In this instance, narrative expectations require a climax, something new, different or unusual. Where music

cannot be heard, this obviously has to occur within words themselves, either in "content" or stylistically.

The arietta theme, destined for vicissitudes for which in its idyllic innocence it would seem not to be born, is presented at once, and announced in sixteen bars, reducible to a motif which appears at the end of the first half, like a brief soul-cry - only three notes, a quaver, a semiquaver, and a dotted crotchet to be scanned as, say: "heav-en's blue, lovers' pain, fare-thee well, on a-time, mead-ow-land" - and that is all.

Reducing

What is immediately new here, then, is the attempt at finding equivalent units for musical segments which designate both rhythm and "content". Although the metaphorical nature of these phrases is admitted to by the inclusion of the qualifier "say" (*etwa*), they entail a hitherto unprecedented entry of language into music: verbal meaning implicitly proceeds from music (the arietta theme "speaks", makes itself heard where performance is merely described) while also directly reflecting what is important to Mann (or Adorno)'s interpretation of the sonata and to the novel as a whole.

The arietta motif of course offers a prime opportunity for association with the subject in Adornian terms- or for "subjective entry", judging by the "objective" simplicity of the motif and theme. It is for this reason that the longer theme is "reducible": Bergsten has pointed out how Adorno made such a reduction in pencil in Mann's own copy of the score,²⁵³ and Mann follows Adorno's reading directly in his novel. This step however also occurs for more practical reasons: the motif is short, easily identifiable, and because of its simple rhythmic stability can be easily "scanned" into verbal form; the fact that identification of the kernel of the work occurs in syntagmatic terms (melody and rhythm) can be related to the

greater accessibility of such elements both to general readership (and to their subsequent understanding of "variation") and to linguistic equivalence.

Why the motif should be said to "[appear] at the end of the first half" is also directly related to the specifically Adornian analysis of the sonata: the rhythmic configuration identified is already present in the very first bar in the tonic triad (see fig. 6), but instead the reduction of the theme is said to appear in the form in which the configuration appears halfway through bar 7, extending into bar 8. Here it clearly occurs on the dominant, thus not entailing harmonic (and analytic) closure: the motif at the very end is in the tonic. Mann, as Bergsten shows, takes this information directly from Adorno's comments written above bar 8 in his score ("The motif in its original, 'objective' form: at the end of the first half of the theme."),²⁵⁴ and is very likely subjugating his own understanding to that of the far more accomplished musical thinker. The motif in the position identified represents penultimacy, "becoming" (the leading B "requires" the appearance of the tonic), rather than a set unit to be elaborated upon, but it is this D-G-G version that will be "humanized" later on, that will, with an addition, in its "leave-taking form", represent the reformulated object. It is for this reason that the motif is also identified at the end of the initial thematic statement rather than in bars 1 and 2, where it appears in D-G-G form for the first time: it appears right before the end of the statement, which in the variation genre also represents the end of what is "said" as a whole. On a more basic level it is also possible that such a positioning reflects a sense of unfulfilment at the beginning of the sonata, one that can only be left behind as ultimacy is attained by the end; while the tonic represents closure, the dominant is still allowed scope for subjective travel.

Arietta

Adagio molto, semplice e cantabile

Musical score for *Arietta*, Adagio molto, semplice e cantabile. The score is in 9/16 time and consists of four systems of piano accompaniment.

- System 1:** Measures 1-4. Treble clef, bass clef. Dynamic: *p*.
- System 2:** Measures 5-8. Treble clef, bass clef. Includes first ending (1. 8a) and second ending (2. 8b).
- System 3:** Measures 9-13. Treble clef, bass clef. Includes a *cresc.* marking.
- System 4:** Measures 14-17. Treble clef, bass clef. Includes first ending (1. 16a) and second ending (2. 16b). Dynamics: *sf*, *p*, *dolce*.

Anthropomorphization Extended

The verbal phrases suggested by Zeitblom/Kretschmar (once again the source of narrative is uncertain here) are again not rhythmically "correct": the translation for the most part successfully retains the rhythm of the original German phrases - *Himmelsblau, Liebesleid, Leb'-mir wohl, Der-maleinst, Wiesengrund* - but even these (except to an extent the last three, through the placing of a pause within the normal rhythmic pronunciation by means of hyphens) cannot stipulate exact following of the rhythmic pattern identified. "Himmelsblau" would in a retrospective "scanning" for instance amount to two notes of equal duration, the first stressed, followed by another stressed note of double that duration. In terms of pitch variation in pronunciation the German words generally however follow the melody of the motif, at least as it appears right at the beginning, in broad directional terms. Such issues are perhaps relevant where the technical terms (quaver, semiquaver, dotted crotchet) are not familiar, but exactitude of rhythm and pitch is in general subordinated to poetic content.

Mann employs heavily connoted images to convey the feelings which he is likely to be associating with the theme (the motif itself would rather acquire emotional relevance in context than on its own). The phrases used are all vague and nostalgic, relating to an ideal pastoral state, imaginary or real, that has been left behind. As such, they entail the general pattern of desire for the "impossible" of music (music *speaks its own impossibility*), one that has become associated with a Germany that is no more, with what is for Adorno the marriage between subject and object, with illusion. At the moment of departure, where it reaches the limits of music as defined from within, the sonata is allowed verbal self-definition.

The modernist author again projects his own subjectivity - or web of interpersonal subjectivity - into the sonata: the motif comes to "act out" the lives of Beethoven, Leverkühn and, as Bergsten suggests, that of Leverkühn's nephew Nepomuk Schneidewein²⁵⁵ "or Echo as everybody ... straightway called him".²⁵⁶ The "co-author" of *Doctor Faustus* is already present in the phrase "mead-ow-land";²⁵⁷ the way in which Beethoven's "art had overgrown itself" has been compared to the motion of the arietta theme earlier, and the composer's own biographical progression through incredible hardship towards a stage of spiritual transcendence, his "farewell" to the sonata form, will now be lived out by the motif too. The motif itself - in an association of pure *signifiante* - furthermore becomes an "Echo" both of itself and, in context, of that which "might have been". Anthropomorphization is more clearly present, as Bergsten shows, in the parallel situation by which Echo himself is "destined for vicissitudes which in [his] idyllic innocence [he] would not seem to be born". Further associations can be made by means of seeing language as external description - Bergsten connects the phrase "heav-en's blue" with the colour of Echo's eyes²⁵⁸ - and also within novelistic structure: the same critic suggests that Echo's appearance in the novel is a "brief soul-cry" within the larger stride of the inhuman, and that the phrase "love's pain" (*Liebesleid*) signifies Leverkühn's own response to the child's death.²⁵⁹

Such a confluence of structural, thematic, historical, systemic, metamusical, projectional and anthropomorphic interests within a single three-note motif indicates both the radical heterogeneity allowed by "musical translation" and the flattening of difference - between levels of the tripartite division, between form and content, and so on - within the musical novel. The section cited contains the most direct

attempt in the whole of *Doctor Faustus* at equalizing language and music, and is more effective than many others because of a process of *initial association* rather than retrospective closure: music and language start at a similar point and - for the chronological sequence of the lecture - are similarly repeated and eventually transformed.

What now happens to this mild utterance, rhythmically, harmonically, contrapuntally, to this pensive, subdued formulation, with what its master blesses and to what condemns it, into what black nights and what dazzling flashes, crystal spheres wherein coldness and heat, repose and ecstasy are one in the same, he flings it down and lifts it up, all that one may well call vast, strange, extravagantly magnificent, without thereby giving it a name, because it is truly quite nameless; and with labouring hands Kretschmar played us all those enormous transformations, singing at the same time with the greatest violence: "Dim-dada!" and mingling his singing with shouts.

Deletion, Ineffability

Earlier on it was said that the theme of the movement "goes through a hundred vicissitudes, a hundred worlds of rhythmic contrasts, at length outgrows itself, and is finally lost in giddy worlds that one might call other-worldly or abstract". The transformation of technical numbering into metaphor (the variations can, after all, be counted) already indicates a motion towards language admitting its own failure even within "exactitude", and in the section here such failure is pushed towards a further extreme.

The sentence begins with analytical language: it is indicated that the "utterance" will undergo transformation in what are traditionally the three most important parameters within musical composition. It soon, however, lapses into syntactical "garbage" (the original German is no less diffuse), without any point of clarity other than a semicolon break after which the "situation" (and parody) returns. This

may be a "true" dialectical reflection of the confusion produced by Kretschmar's method of multiple presentation (to recreate experience produced by content in artistic form is not an unusual aim in modernist writing), but there is also a sense here of language nearing its limits. Description of effect, of compositional procedure (of Beethoven "working" on the object), of metaphorical space attained and of ineffability itself work against one another while also blending (it is not clear whether the motif "says", "does" or "reaches". The "it" which is "truly quite nameless" is not identified, and the motif attains a super-ontological character; the result is that a deletion of meaning begins to take place.

This deletion is already found in the "content" itself here: the binary oppositions "black nights and ... dazzling flashes", "coldness and heat" and "repose and ecstasy" are all nullified. They are in this composition "one and the same". Such a removal of difference - which can be related to the more uniform sense of calm attained after the dynamic, rhythmic and expressive extremes of the first movement - of course amounts in the terms of both Derrida and Saussure to the absence of the production of meaning. Examples have already been given of descriptions of the second movement that entail entry into paradise: if we read paradise as that which lies before, above or after earthly human existence, and therefore outside of language, the use of language to deny itself completely - to "defend" ineffability - is to be expected.

The idea that what the arietta movement attains is "truly quite nameless" is thus also found elsewhere. Eric Blom for example maintains that

to write about this farewell [the second movement] to the sonata for the piano ... is to come as near an attempt at describing the indescribable as any one can possibly be

faced with. One cannot even extract musical quotations from it. No idea can be given of the theme on which Beethoven bases his variations except by writing out the whole of it; ... this movement ... can be formally analysed but is extremely hard to assimilate spiritually.²⁶⁰

Similarly, for Barry Cooper "Op. 111 epitomizes Beethoven's late style... Words are inadequate to convey the range of emotions - the tension, the despair, the sublimity - expressed therein".²⁶¹ Marion Scott writes that "no human terms can give an idea of [the first movement's] magnitude. Nor can words describe the serenity and light of the arietta that follows - a set of variations upon what one may call a theme of light and peace everlasting."²⁶² In more extreme fashion Philip Barford calls bars 106-9 of the second movement "the profoundest moment in all music, a still emptiness transcending thought and emotion".²⁶³

The notion of the absolute finds its particularized fulfilment and "proof" here: the sonata exceeds language and other music altogether; it is as if an entire philosophical notion comes to be drawn into a single musical instance. The sonata, retrospectively, can combine language and music by itself - the flip into the absolute, to the limit, allows once again for experience beyond formal division.

"These chains of trills!" he yelled. "These flourishes and cadenzas! Do you hear the conventions that are left in? Here - the language - is no longer - purified of the flourishes - but the flourishes - of the appearance - of their subjective - domination - the appearance - of art is thrown off - at last - art always throws off the appearance of art. Dim-dada! Do listen, how here - the melody is dragged down by the centrifugal weight of chords! It becomes static, monotonous - twice D, three times D, one after the other - the chords do it - dim-dada! Now notice what happens here -"

Adorno: Metamusical

The hyphenated appearance of this passage reminds of

Kretschmar's stutters earlier on: while music is in a sense represented by means of graphological absence (music exists on paper where language admits to disappearing), the fracturing of language itself is necessary in terms of what has happened in the preceding sentence, for analytical closure would work directly against the idea that the sonata is "nameless". For the sake of narrative structure, however, the dialectical argument presented earlier on has to be located within specifics, and we again find Adorno's ideas appearing. The links between musical elements and dialectic theorization are not readily apparent from this passage, and it will be worthwhile to look at how Adorno identifies such elements elsewhere.

In his essays on Beethoven's late style and on the *Missa Solemnis* Adorno elaborates a number of ways in which Beethoven achieves what was identified as the reformulation of the subject-object relation earlier on; they will be mentioned briefly.²⁶⁴ First of all, he extensively reintroduces counterpoint, which Adorno identifies as a more objective or "collective" form,²⁶⁵ as well as other Baroque and pre-Baroque techniques such as use of the church modes,²⁶⁶ "the dissolution into often short, hardly symphonically integrated parts, the lack of decisive thematic inspirations ... and a lack of discharging dynamic developments."²⁶⁷ Secondly, convention, unlike in the second period, suddenly plays a heightened role in the last works: Adorno attaches special importance to the appearance of "trills, cadenzas, and fioritures"²⁶⁸ as well as other ornaments, the accompanimental bass pattern, and the simple V-I cadence. Convention for Adorno signifies what Nietzsche would call the *immergleich* aspect of external reality, the unchangeable elements unaffected by subjectivity; thus Beethoven's return to convention in his last works signifies that the belief in subjective musical ordering was

but a "passing phase", even if convention is now self-consciously assimilated.²⁶⁹ In a passage to which Mann must have had direct access to, conventions are said to

become expressions of their barest depictions of themselves. This occurs by means of ... the shortening of his style: it desires less to remove the flourish from the musical language than to remove the appearance of the flourish having subjective control: the liberated flourish, released from the [subjective] dynamic, speaks for itself.²⁷⁰

Thirdly, Beethoven replaces development with repetition or variation: the *Missa* for instance "does not at all break out of the pre-planned objectivity of the model through any subjective dynamic, nor does it create the totality ... out of itself"; its motifs "rather constantly reappear in changing light though they are always identical."²⁷¹ Fourthly, there is an absence of mediating structures²⁷² between extreme moments within last-period works, so that we often find unresolved "collisions" or unusual silences. The idea that "art always throws off the appearance of art" is central to the essay "Spätstil"²⁷³ and to much of Adorno's thought in general,²⁷⁴ and the methods by which the presence of the subjective is denied on a surface level all amount to such a "throwing off" of that appearance in the face of death or larger historical necessity.

Many of these musical processes or elements are of course to be found in Opus 111, and if we accept Adorno's explanation, accusations of "artificiality" can be understood within a framework of incipient alienation. This process itself is directly linked to a motion towards ineffability, and Adorno's ideas will be considered in relation to other possible explanations of why Opus 111 should specifically be linked to the absolute or ultimate in piano music.

True Words?

The phrase "dim-dada" appears as what may be called a "true

leitmotif" within literary format: it entails a *specified* representation, a fixed quantity that does not proceed beyond what it represents originally; it is not extended or developed until the end. In Barricelli's terms,²⁷⁵ the reader is here thus engaged in a successful musicoliterary process. Language comes to partly enact the *structural* role of a musical unit; it can, however, be noted that this is but a limited achievement if the aim of writing is to *reproduce* music.

The term "monotonous" in this context is a "true word" from another perspective. Whereas identifying an *effect* such as monotony is strongly lodged within the subjective, the repetition of the D in what is presumably bars 106 to 114 (see fig. 7) entails a change within an expected pattern of reappearance towards immediate restatement of the most basic melodic unit, so that "monotony" appears in its most direct etymological sense (*one tone is repeated*). In other words, etymology coincides directly with supposed effect; the neutral and esthetic levels are unified in an uncommon fashion by language from the outside, and the form-content union - Pater's "music" - appears because of a shifting of content towards perception itself (music does not *signify* monotony but *exists* in it). Language here "is" music by the removal of the *signified of music* while at the same time being even further away from it. We should perhaps note that the D is stated in a trill, and this trill moves from major to minor - in effect there is thus not *only* one tone that is repeated. For the purposes of analysis here, however, such departures can be grouped as harmonic rather than melodic variance.

106

f *p* *decresc.* *pp*

tr

8va

Detailed description: This system contains measures 106 through 112. The music is written for piano in a key with two flats. The right hand features a melodic line with slurs and trills, while the left hand provides a rhythmic accompaniment. Dynamic markings include *f*, *p*, *decresc.*, and *pp*. Trills are indicated by 'tr' above notes, and an octave sign '8va' is present above the right-hand staff.

113

p cresc. - - - *sf* *p cresc.* *decresc.*

tr

Detailed description: This system contains measures 113 through 119. The right hand has a melodic line with trills and slurs. The left hand has a rhythmic accompaniment. Dynamic markings include *p cresc.*, *sf*, *p cresc.*, and *decresc.*. Trills are marked with 'tr'.

120

espressivo
p *p diminuendo* *pp*

Detailed description: This system contains measures 120 through 124. The music is characterized by a fast, rhythmic pattern in the right hand, marked *espressivo*. The left hand has a steady accompaniment. Dynamic markings include *p*, *p diminuendo*, and *pp*.

125

sempre pp

Detailed description: This system contains measures 125 through 128. The right hand features a complex, fast-moving texture. The left hand has a rhythmic accompaniment. The dynamic marking is *sempre pp*.

129

cresc.
3 3 3

Detailed description: This system contains measures 129 through 132. The right hand has a melodic line with slurs. The left hand features a rhythmic accompaniment with triplets, indicated by '3' above groups of notes. The dynamic marking is *cresc.*.



- figure 7 -

It was extraordinarily difficult to listen to his shouts and to the highly complicated music both at once. We all tried. We strained, leaning forward, hands between knees, looking by turns at his hands and his mouth. The characteristic of the movement of course is the wide gap between bass and treble, between the right and the left hand, and a moment comes, an utterly extreme situation, when the poor little motif seems to hover alone and forsaken above a yawning giddy abyss - a procedure of awe-inspiring unearthliness, to which then succeeds a distressful making-of-itself-small, a start of fear as it were, that such a thing could happen.

Subject and Object? (1)

The audience context is returned, but what is said about them at first bears little relation to the narrative sense: Zeitblom immediately returns to a "better educated" (although confidently universalizing) position towards music - he makes it clear that the essential characteristic of the music in question is "of course" the one that he identifies. The "technical" knowledge that the *tessitura* of the movement is unusually large is however immediately reformulated in lay terms: "bass" and "treble" are "explained", if inversely, as "the right and the left hand". The way in which anthropomorphization of the motif is continued also relates more to a general than to a musically educated readership: the motif is described both sympathetically and in the language of

existentialism, and is both subjugated to audience authority and granted a certain heroic quality.

Could the interplay between analysis and more accessible language be related to that of object and subject? Could the dialectic established between audience and lecturer, young and old, listening and understanding, be a further instance of Mann's making use of Adorno's thought, of attempting a form-content reflection even in the reception of his novel? Mann's interest in parody as source of humour, his political commitment by this stage towards democracy, the need to present a bygone Germany, and the basic fact that he is still writing a work of art and not of theory all lead towards an approach that is markedly different from Adorno's consistently austere style and active complication of the position of the reading subject. More specific comparisons between the writer and philosopher are made elsewhere; it can be noted at this point that the "subject-object" interaction in terms of style here is more a question of juxtapositional balance than of mutual reformulation.

One Moment

Where the "moment comes" in bars 114 to 118 (see fig. 7), Zeitblom's reading of the sonata is hermeneutic in the Barthesian sense.²⁷⁶ One specific instance is isolated, is given subjective prominence, and becomes a bodily kernel, a "figure" which is both the presence from which the rest of the interpretation is drawn and the point in which it reaches its most extreme emotional actualization. The procedures leading up to the falling fifths at bar 110 are perhaps *harmonically* as unusual as what the gaps over more than four octaves in bars 117 to 119 are in terms of piano *tessitura* (the highest and lowest notes here are practically at the limits of the keyboard available to Beethoven). Either way, however, the

earlier idea that emotional response to the neutral level could occur because of a direct poietic presence is now extended to the history of music itself. The fear "that such a thing could happen" is thus a *formal* one in more than one sense. Depending on how Zeitblom's analysis is itself interpreted on a larger scale, the later "moment", where a C sharp is added to the D-G-G motif, may in any case be a more important one.

Bergsten again links the workings of the motif here to Echo's life, and to the extreme oscillations between heaven and hell in the chapter describing his death;²⁷⁷ the procedure of "awe-inspiring unearthliness" is related both to transcendence and to vertigo. Mann is perhaps forcing his interests: the motif neither appears in D-G-G form, nor does it follow its original direction or exact rhythm in the relevant section. Yet his claim that music here produces the sensation of vertigo is perhaps not far-fetched or entirely subjective: empirical evidence towards showing that music does in specified instances create spatial or kinetic effects has already been mentioned earlier. The fact that such effects are not "natural", that they are also encoded by the symbolic, brings them into association with Mann's own "symbolic", in as far as that exists as verbal opposition to music.

If we follow the text closely, the "start of fear" is located in bars 119 to 130: a *musical* response is given to the "extreme situation"; in other words, music is given both narrative and metanarrative ability. Such a "narrative" does, if the moment is considered in the greater light of Zeitblom's translation, seem to make sense in relation to the descending sequence of semiquavers within the contextually subdued key of E flat major, the *diminuendo* into *pianissimo* and the relative stasis or carefulness of melodic statement up to where the theme reappears in the original tonic key in bar 130. In other

words, the identification of the specific "moment" comes, as first principle, to direct narrativization of subsequent development in a successful manner, especially in as far as the nature of the moment is given in broad metaphorical terms such as it is here.

Much else happens before the end.

The Archetypal Sentence

Calvin S. Brown writes in a passage that sums up a large number of literary - specifically poetic - attempts at translating music:

The opening bars of a movement can readily be described, interpreted, or imitated almost note by note, but the complications of musical form soon outrun the possibilities of poetic treatment, and before long we find the poet lost, so far as the music is concerned, and going off on his own tack, keeping the composition in mind only vaguely, if at all.²⁷⁸

The most successful use of music for language thus far has been the transcription of the initial motif. The problem identified by Brown is to some extent circumvented by the motif reappearing in similar form throughout the movement (if it had for instance developed significantly in melodic or fugal fashion this would not have been possible); Mann also sticks more closely to analysis than the poetry which Brown is referring to generally does. Yet the statement is valid in other ways: a longer technical analysis than this one would get boring; a longer poetic one would become self-indulgent, prolonging the worst excesses found in the earlier sentence beginning "What now happens to this mild utterance...", and would affirm the failure of language in the most undesirable fashion. For language to elicit *desire* - to produce inspiration - it has to be an *initial* moment; again, a *membrane* rather than a covering that closes.

But when it ends and while it ends, something comes, after so much rage, persistence, obstinacy, extravagance: something entirely unexpected and touching in its mildness and goodness. With the motif passed through many vicissitudes, which takes leave and in doing so becomes itself entirely leave-taking, a parting wave and call, with this D G G occurs a slight change, it experiences a small melodic expansion. After an introductory C, it puts a C sharp before the D, so that it no longer scans "Heav-en's blue," "Mead-owland," but "O-thou heaven's blue," "Green-est meadowland," "Fare-thee well for aye," and this added C sharp is the most moving, consolatory, pathetically reconciling thing in the world. It is like having one's hair or cheek stroked, lovingly, understandingly, like a deep and silent farewell look. It blesses the object, the frightfully harried formulation, with overpowering humanity, lies in parting so gently on the hearer's heart in eternal farewell that the eyes run over. "Now for-get the pain," it says. "Great was - God in us." "'Twas all - but a dream," "Friendly - be to me." Then it breaks off. Quick, hard triplets hasten to a conclusion with which any other piece might have ended.

Hope

The image shows a musical score for a piece titled "Hope". It consists of two systems of music, labeled with measure numbers 168 and 170. Each system has a treble clef staff and a bass clef staff. In measure 168, the treble staff has a melodic line with a trill (tr) and a slur over several notes. The bass staff has a triplet accompaniment. In measure 170, the treble staff continues the melodic line with a trill and a slur. The bass staff continues the triplet accompaniment and includes a dynamic marking of *pp* (pianissimo). The score is written in a style typical of a piano score, with notes, rests, and articulation marks.

- figure 8 -

Adorno's advice is followed through: where the C-C#-D-G-G sequence occurs in bars 170 and 171 (see fig. 8), the philosopher wrote in Mann's score "the humanized leave-taking variation at the end",²⁷⁹ and above the C sharp he wrote "the added, differentiating note is C sharp".²⁸⁰ Whereas the motif has been human for Mann all along (and in its new form acquires direct agency both within musical narrative and esthetic process), such a "subjectivizing" of the object occurs *directly* in the Adornian sense for what is possibly the first time here. Adorno concludes his essay "Spätstil" - in which he argues that subjectivity itself "takes leave" much in the manner of the motif - by writing that

The fragmented landscape [the "collected" musical "matter"] is objective; the light that glows therein subjective. [Beethoven] does not bring about their harmonious synthesis. He tears them apart in time, as a force of dissociation, perhaps to preserve them for Eternity. In the history of art, late works are the catastrophes.²⁸¹

The appearance of the subject within fragmented objectivity - in the face of death - redeems art from its nature as illusion, but does not redeem the subject from its isolation, its imminent departure into final absence.

It is here that Mann departs from Adorno's radical pessimism. In *The Story* he mentions how the philosopher persuaded him to give the *Lamentation* a less hopeful ending,²⁸² and when Zeitblom writes about Leverkühn's last work there are strong shades of Adorno's impossible idealism:

[T]his dark tone-poem permits up to the very end no consolation, appeasement, transfiguration. But take our artist paradox: grant that expressiveness - expression as lament - is the issue of the whole construction: then may we not parallel with it another, a religious one, and say too (though only in the lowest whisper) that out of the sheerly irremediable hope might germinate? It would be a hope beyond hopelessness, the transcendence of despair - not betrayal to her, but the miracle that passes belief. ... what remains, as the work fades into the air, is the high G of a cello, the last word, the last fainting sound, slowly dying in a pianissimo-fermata. Then nothing more: silence, and night.

But that tone which vibrates in the silence, which is no longer there, to which only the spirit hearkens, and which was the voice of mourning, is so no more. It changes its meaning; it abides as a light in the night.²⁸³

The emphasis on a single tone which offers some kind of redemption can be directly linked to the appearance of the C sharp in Kretschmar's analysis of Opus 111; the reformulated motif appears in full once only in bars 169-70 and is cut off, "left hanging in the air", at the end of bar 170, as the "objective" conclusion steps in. It is likely that this procedure is closely related to the kind of "moment" Adorno refers to when he writes:

It is subjectivity which compresses the extremes in movements, which loads tightly packed polyphony with its tensions, which breaks them up in unison and escapes from them, leaving behind the naked tones, which uses the empty flourish as a monument of the past, within which subjectivity is petrified, decays and dies. The caesuras and abrupt endings, however, which more than anything characterize the late Beethoven, represent such moments of escape; the work is hollow when it is left behind and turns its hollow insides outwards.²⁸⁴

Subjectivity - or what may be identified as hope for the individual - can only appear within its own escape from musical matter. Yet, within the passage cited from Mann, the appearance of the extra note amounts to a victory of humanism over historical necessity, even if this can be achieved only retrospectively. Its "mildness and goodness" can be related to the return of dynamic and rhythmic stability, yet this phrase also arises from a direct correlation of tonality, the conventional system, with the good. The added C and C sharp are in effect here a "reinforcement" of the existing tonal pattern, a leading up to its beginning that imbues it with more "presence".

The emotional effect which the reformulated motif produces is one of nostalgic reaffirmation of the humane, nostalgic because the latter is about to be left behind absolutely, as are the "rage" and "extravagance" of both

movements, the lives of Beethoven and Echo, the old German tradition, and the sonata as genre itself. Subjectivity departs both in the simple sense of the individual approaching physical death and as more abstract possibility within art. The verbal equivalents for the extended motif, reformulated and new, also reflect such sentiments: the addition of *ewig* to the phrase *Leb'-mir wohl* and the new phrase "'Twas all - but a dream" are both examples of this.

Kretschmar did not return from the piano to his desk. He sat on his revolving stool with his face turned towards us, in the same position as ours, bent over, his hands between his knees, and in a few words brought to an end his lecture on why Beethoven had not written a third movement to Op. 111. We had only needed, he said, to hear the piece to answer the question ourselves.

Subject and Object? (2)

An instance of easy symbolism occurs: Kretschmar will not return to the locus of isolated and commanding verbalization, will remain seated beside his musical instrument, vulnerable, in the same position as the audience; "it is music that remains", which is universal, and which here transcends both the barrier between performer/lecturer and audience and the difference principle supposedly unique to language. In so far as the chain of identity is concerned, Kretschmar is once again linked to Beethoven: he, too, has struggled through the performance of the work itself (in a sense, his vocal involvement indicates a direct correlation of the performer-as-subject with the motif itself), and will "go away" alone, amid the sound of "thin but prolonged applause".

On one level, then, Kretschmar as subject himself has been involved in a "reformulation": from a parodic to a fairly serious situation, from comic subjectivity to a subjectivity that is now grounded in "the collectively great and

universal", reconstituted by the entry of both music and audience. The lecture - the overarching term - is of course also the objective containment of Kretschmar's entire linguistic and musical performance, and its central paradox - that of presenting a musicological argument while stating that music needs no words - can perhaps be explained in a similar regard. In other words, while there is a definitive shift towards the importance of listening for answering the original question, such a subjective evaluation can be cast by Kretschmar in absolutely objective terms by virtue of objectivity now being located within transcendence, within the absolute itself. The "objective" analytical introduction that appeared earlier is - within the fictive world of the novel - restated in combined musical and verbal terms; it proceeds through performance towards silence.

In the end, it is the reader and not the fictive listener who is left, and association can only extend to the substance of narrative itself. The dialectic between language and music as theorized fails more decisively for the reader in that the absence of music is also a proportional one. The parts where music is "present" via combined description of performance and analytic comment are limited to less than a paragraph, with the result that understanding of the subject-object theorization itself cannot adequately occur. Language here, in the last analysis, primarily inspires further - extra-novelistic - listening.

A third movement? A new approach? A return after this parting - impossible! It had happened that the sonata had come, in the second, enormous movement, to an end, an end without any return. And when he said "the sonata," he meant not only this one in C minor, but the sonata in general, as a species, as a traditional art-form; it itself was here at an end, brought to its end, it had fulfilled its destiny, reached its goal, beyond which there was no going, it cancelled and resolved

itself, it took leave - the gesture of farewell of the D G G motif, consoled by the C sharp, was a leave-taking in this sense too, great as the whole piece itself, the farewell of the sonata form.

Ending the Sonata

A value judgment is implicit here: Opus 111 is distanced absolutely from Beethoven's other two-movement piano sonatas, and the knowledge that Beethoven did write other piano music, that he lived for another four years, and that others did write more sonatas, is all cast aside by rhetorical persuasiveness. Kretschmar in this regard provides final closure on what has been a close association of biography and musical progression. He engages in rhetorical overkill to bring his point across: Beethoven had for once and for all transcended all human possibility of sonata writing; the sonata had achieved its ultimate potential technically, expressively, in all manners of speaking. In an extreme Hegelian moment the motif takes leave of Opus 111, Opus 111 takes leave of the sonata form as a whole, Beethoven takes leave of music and of life, and the novel takes leave of the cultural achievements made possible in Beethoven's work.

Reasonings

The idea that Beethoven reached with Opus 111 the limits of what is possible in the sonata form is not unique to Mann: the idea is already implicit in much of the positive reception identified earlier, and Mann himself (possibly Adorno too) seems to have taken the "leave-taking" metaphor from a line in Bekker's biography which states that "[w]ith Opus 111 Beethoven conclusively took leave of the piano sonata form."²⁸⁵

It will be worthwhile to again place Mann's writing within the wider discourse on Beethoven, not only to locate sources but to investigate also the ways in which language

comes to assign ultimacy. "Objective" musicological reasons will thus be sought for why Beethoven's last piano sonata should specifically be linked to the realization of the absolute, both in the way described here and in terms of transcendence or ineffability. These elements can then also be related to the way in which Mann manages a negotiation between the two broad opposing forms of reception of the sonata identified.

Philosophical Influences

Various streams and figures within Mann's own philosophical background have been discussed; to start off, we will here consider more general trends in the production of language on Opus 111.

The idea of transcendence through art is central to the discourse of Romanticism. Whereas Beethoven, in the words of Martin Cooper, "remained to the very end of his life ... a man of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment",²⁸⁶ the strong ethical drift traditionally observed in his work comes into conflict with introspective tendencies in the late music. Prometheus becomes more Faust-like, and the "overreacher"²⁸⁷ provides a suitable model for both early writings on the "morality of art" and later Romantic concepts such as Nietzsche's idea of *übergehen*, which in the last analysis of course amounts to a rejection of the language of society as well.

Robert Jacobs has successfully identified the similarities between Beethoven's recorded statements and the thought of Kant,²⁸⁸ and it is not difficult to see how Kant's moral idealism arrives at Beethoven's door via Schiller when the composer writes in a letter that "[o]nly art and science give us intimations and hopes of a higher life".²⁸⁹ Schiller's dictum that the artist must "set himself the task of an idyll ... that will lead humanity, for whom the path to Arcadia is

forever closed, onwards towards Elysium"²⁹⁰ seems to be at the center of Beethoven's self-concept. This is clear from statements such as "Whosoever understands my music will henceforth be free from the misery of the world."²⁹¹ Kant's propagation of the noumenal as a sphere resistant to control via reason, with attendant shades of ineffability, is further reflected in a request supposedly made by the composer to Von Arnim: "Tell [Goethe] to hear my symphonies and he will then agree that music is the only bodiless entry into a higher world of knowledge which comprehends mankind, but which is not comprehended by it."²⁹²

Beethoven is thus, of course, complicit in being assigned messianic status and in the general tradition of discourse on his music. Again, to critics of his later symphonies he replied: "You have not the energy, the bold wing of the eagle, to be able to follow me."²⁹³ Although there seems to be little evidence concerning his own opinions on the last piano sonata, it is clear that he himself saw his later music in transcendent terms. In a letter written to the Archduke Rudolph shortly after the completion of Op. 111 he states that "[t]here is no loftier mission than to come nearer than other men to the Divinity, and to disseminate the divine rays among mankind";²⁹⁴ he is also known to have considered his last works better than his earlier ones.²⁹⁵ It might be worthwhile to note that among the books found in Beethoven's possession after his death, there were three by the theologian Johann Michael Sailer, who argued that art was the expression of the divine in human terms; the thesis that the religious and the artistic impulse are identical is extensively elaborated in one of these three, the *Bund der Religion und der Kunst*.²⁹⁶ To the extent that authorial intention is acknowledged, then, the sonata does "express" or "create" paradisiac or transcendent states of mind; poiesis may be said to frame esthesis directly

(and this is exactly why Beethoven's own approaching death plays such an important part in Kretschmar's analysis of Opus 111), with this frame necessarily ruptured by language and intention working against itself.

Technical Achievement and Expression

As far as the notion of ultimacy in terms of technical achievement is concerned, it is likely that Beethoven did believe that he had achieved enough with the classical sonata form as regards the piano. Whereas unfinished works after 1822 include a Mass, an Overture on the notes B-A-C-H, a String Quintet and a Tenth Symphony,²⁹⁷ no attempt seems to have been made at writing a thirty-third piano sonata. After condemning the physical limitations of the piano by calling it "an unsatisfactory instrument" the only keyboard compositions completed were the Diabelli Variations (which, it must be noted, is in itself a "colossal" achievement) and a number of short pieces. A. Forbes Milne writes that Op. 111 "crowns with success the efforts which Beethoven made to combine the harmonic and structural principles of the sonata with the contrapuntal requirements of the fugue",²⁹⁸ and it is likely that the composer would have been highly satisfied with his successful implementation of a genre that had caused him much difficulty before. There is an unusually clear line of development in Beethoven's sonata writing, and Milne identifies the attempt at such a fusion as the logical conclusion to this progression.

The idea of the limit is relevant also in other ways. While it is for instance impossible to objectively gauge levels of "expressive content", there is a sense in which Beethoven's oft-remarked historical achievement of unprecedented expression within Classical forms²⁹⁹ can indeed be authenticated. It is at points of renewal - and particularly of individualist renewal - in musical development

that "expression" can in one sense be said to occur: the individual appears exactly where there is a departure from convention. The composer's endless striving towards formal development - often in rejection of social expectations - can be read, together with the increasing number of score directions (the appearance of *molto espressivo*, *cantabile* and so on in particular) as a tipping of Classical balance towards subjective experience, a paving of the way for Romanticism. The tendency towards "organic form"³⁰⁰ can already be observed in the *Pathétique* Sonata, where the separate introductory section is combined with the first theme of the allegro; in the first movement of Op. 111 the exposition almost fuses with the development stage, suggesting an extensive progression towards primacy of subjective exploration.

While Beethoven never quite abandoned Classical forms³⁰¹ he did stretch them to the limits of what Paul Henry Lang calls "their maximal tensile strength".³⁰² In the exceptionally long Arietta movement the harmonic configuration of the "little song" remains "almost primitively simple"³⁰³ and Beethoven can - in an optimistic view - be said to achieve the old ideal of maximum content within an established form, again occupying an ideal transitional locus between two aesthetic codes. Whereas the first movement of Op. 111 still carries elements of the "dramatic style", the switch to variation form in the second movement (and in his only subsequent piano work of importance, the Diabelli Variations) indicates an attempt at drawing the most from a simple form. The length of the second movement, the scope of octaves employed, the technical difficulty of performance, the repetitions, the great number of extended trills and also of silences between notes, and above all, the sheer scope of dynamic, rhythmic and melodic redefinition within variations, all point to a desire for maximum deliberation (or "exhaustion") within a consciously

that "expression" can in one sense be said to occur: the individual appears exactly where there is a departure from convention. The composer's endless striving towards formal development - often in rejection of social expectations - can be read, together with the increasing number of score directions (the appearance of *molto espressivo*, *cantabile* and so on in particular) as a tipping of Classical balance towards subjective experience, a paving of the way for Romanticism. The tendency towards "organic form"³⁰⁰ can already be observed in the *Pathétique* Sonata, where the separate introductory section is combined with the first theme of the allegro; in the first movement of Op. 111 the exposition almost fuses with the development stage, suggesting an extensive progression towards primacy of subjective exploration.

While Beethoven never quite abandoned Classical forms³⁰¹ he did stretch them to the limits of what Paul Henry Lang calls "their maximal tensile strength".³⁰² In the exceptionally long Arietta movement the harmonic configuration of the "little song" remains "almost primitively simple"³⁰³ and Beethoven can - in an optimistic view - be said to achieve the old ideal of maximum content within an established form, again occupying an ideal transitional locus between two aesthetic codes. Whereas the first movement of Op. 111 still carries elements of the "dramatic style", the switch to variation form in the second movement (and in his only subsequent piano work of importance, the Diabelli Variations) indicates an attempt at drawing the most from a simple form. The length of the second movement, the scope of octaves employed, the technical difficulty of performance, the repetitions, the great number of extended trills and also of silences between notes, and above all, the sheer scope of dynamic, rhythmic and melodic redefinition within variations, all point to a desire for maximum deliberation (or "exhaustion") within a consciously

limited framework. Where expression is accepted as compositional aim, it is easy to see how these expressive elements in Op. 111 come to be seen as "aiming towards silence" - or towards self-exhaustion - and are transposed into descriptions of the ultimate or paradisiac.

Lastness

The discourse of the absolute, be it in terms of expressiveness or otherwise, can of course not be sustained on technical explanation only. Writing on Op. 111, Eric Blom claims that "[f]orm ... is not only an indispensable attribute of a work of genius; it is the only attribute that is analysable".³⁰⁴ The conflation of musical achievement with a valorized biographical program is evident in his statement that "[t]he last Sonata sums up the whole experience gathered by Beethoven throughout all the sonata writing that had occupied him on and off for twenty-six years".³⁰⁵ Wilfrid Mellers makes the point even more directly: "Though opus 111 has only two movements, it traverses the total range of Beethoven's experience, as manifest in the previous sequence of sonatas."³⁰⁶

Discourse on the last music forms a logical narrative conclusion to a more well-established myth: the artist who has heroically battled against giant setbacks throughout his life now reaches peace, a happy ending. A long-standing tradition maintains that the successful resolution of a long struggle over the guardianship of Beethoven's nephew as well as final acceptance of deafness led to a period of peaceful and unhindered creation; the composer's self-absorption and neglect of physical appearance here - and even his questionable dealings with publishers - are signs of his "unworldliness".³⁰⁷ Historically, however, this is simply not true. Beethoven's concern over financial matters, his health

and his nephew's education placed him, if anything, painfully in the middle of worldly affairs, and there occurs, rather, a remove between art and life, reflected stylistically in the departure from the "heroic mode". Maynard Solomon cites Beethoven's loss of patronage, his waning popularity in favour of Rossini's "narcotic" music, and a general public disillusionment with the social and political ideals of the Enlightenment³⁰⁸ - a point which is implicit to Adorno's analysis - in this regard.

Other writers have seen the late works as the result of sickness and struggle themselves, either in terms of sublimation or of joyful inspiration upon recovery.³⁰⁹ Psychoanalytic readings have attempted to explain the creative fertility of the late period as the direct outcome of pathological mental fragmentation occurring at that stage,³¹⁰ and some have cited the composer's supposed syphilis as the source of creative success.³¹¹ On a more mundane level - if we accept Schindler's record - the fact that the last three sonatas were written in response to accusations of inventive exhaustion might well account partly for their formal excellence.

The idea that a composer's last works, because of their general temporal proximity to death, manage to capture visions of afterlife is not unique: Mahler's Ninth Symphony for instance still carries the "I saw death" tag even though a Tenth Symphony was almost fully completed. The trope of artistic foresight is extended to the ultimate limit itself, and the temporal status of last works contributes directly to being assigned hierarchical supremacy in terms of general "vision" or expression as well. For a writer like Thomas Mann death is central to all artistic creation, and this explains his strong attraction to late Beethoven works in a novel such as *Doctor Faustus*.

What is more problematic, however, is a response to Op. 111 from Berlin published while Beethoven was still alive, in which the reviewer claimed to hear "the sounds of the grave" and "the digging of the grave" in the sonata.³¹² While rumours of Beethoven's physical and supposed mental deterioration might be at the root of this, the chance that contemporary musical perception might have functioned in ways inaccessible to modern-day analysis cannot be discounted. Even when considered metaphorically, these images in a sense have aptness beyond that of merely signifying criticism of the compositional result.

Double Ineffability

The extremity of the difference between the two broad types of reception mentioned earlier might suggest the general nonverifiable nature of linguistic translations of absolute music; yet the two are undeniably linked in their descriptions of motion away from understandable "language", musical or otherwise. Joseph Kerman identifies a "drive toward dissociation" in Beethoven's late works, which signifies for him the dialectical obverse of the composer's dominant synthesizing impulses;³¹³ similarly, Martin Cooper writes that one of "the characteristic marks of his late style" is that "nothing is conceded to the listener, no attempt is made to capture his attention or hold his interest."³¹⁴ This process can be read as a departure from (and, in Adorno's sense, a self-deconstruction of) Enlightenment ideals (such as synthesis between individual and society): the dissolution of the middle-period style, with its powerful resolution procedures, results in a denial and subsequent exclusion of the human subject as integrated entity. The language of reason and of successful "appropriation" of exterior objects such as music begins to fail, and silence offers the possibility of an

"open" reading in either positive or negative direction.

Adorno's views offer an interesting perspective on this process as historical event, and, in so far as Op. 111 is representative of the late style in general, clears up many of the apparently contradictory elements in its reception. Whereas his analysis of Beethoven's late style is a far more pessimistic reading of subjective expression than the one expressed earlier, the subject can be said to tend towards the absolute - both as silence and ultimacy - by assuming a position of "implacable autonomy", even if that subject is no longer redeemable from the outside. It is worth noting that Adorno himself considered the *Missa Solemnis* - completed soon after the last sonata - as "the greatest of [Beethoven's] works".³¹⁵ The reason for this is most probably that this "resistant" composition embodies a pessimistic stance toward both religion and the certainties of the Enlightenment tradition of bourgeois humanism, which Adorno values as "humanity" at its peak³¹⁶ and which was realized by Beethoven in his second period,³¹⁷ while yet containing a kernel of idealism. In a sense Beethoven's return to convention is thus more "authentically" subjective than the works of later Romanticists who take his middle period as their starting point.

Where the subject is still to an extent discernible, as in the Arietta motif of the second movement of Op. 111, the listener's identification, if it does occur, leads him or her to exhaustion, fragmentation or silence. In both cases the subject comes to be defined by absence, and the assignment to the sonata of both paradise - which Adorno might well call regressive³¹⁸ or link to "affirmative culture" - and anti-humanist artificiality make sense under the sign of *horror vacui* assumed at the limits of subjective being. It is to Adorno's credit that he sees the difficulty of the late music

as an atemporal phenomenon - in 1959 he could write of the *Missa Solemnis* that "recognition of its content ... [is] to this day ... still missing"³¹⁹ - and it is in this sense that the two responses elucidated are not bound merely to ideological positioning or historical progress.

The idea of ultimacy in a work of music is, as has been shown, bound to result in the positing of a correlative related in some way to silence. If the correlation between ineffability and paradise is kept in mind, and if it is accepted that Beethoven's late music occupies a tentative position between the integrated and the totally absent subject in music, it can be argued that guided access into emptiness within Op. 111 allows for a form of ecstasy similar to that aimed for in certain Eastern religious traditions, one that is also akin to the self-annihilation desired in certain symbolist and modernist literary works. Adorno's assertion that the *Missa Solemnis* "balances on a point of ineffectivity which approaches nothingness"³²⁰ is particularly relevant in this regard. Silence, however, becomes in many cases a term against itself, as the excessive verbal discussions on the inadequacies of language have indicated earlier. While God cannot be described, paradise and the human condition of silence can, and in a sense must be given linguistic form. "Meaning" returns as a linguistic means of ordering musical experience into a continued human existence that is not transcendental itself. As a corollary, art replaces religion as transcendental signifier, finding its specific and accessible embodiment in a work of music such as Beethoven's Op. 111. Whereas Beethoven's own life history can be embraced as a principle of artistic heroism, it is this musical limit that remains, and which can, in the end, be read as the place where the non-human, human and archi-human come together.

With this Kretschmar went away, accompanied by thin but prolonged applause, and we went too, not a little reflective, weighed down by all these novelties. Most of us, as usual, as we put on our coats and hats and walked out, hummed bemusedly to ourselves the impression of the evening, the theme-generating motif of the second movement, in its original and leave-taking form, and for a long time we heard it like an echo from the remoter streets of the little town: "Fare-thee well," "fare thee well for aye," "Great was God in us."

Ending Off

The lecture is over, the frame has exhausted itself, individual identity is returned to the real in the act of applause.³²¹ The highpoint of musical history, of the novel, of desire, has been reached; what follows will be a motion into lesser achievement, into verbalization. The motif remains, together with the words it has become associated with, echoes into the world of the novel, into homewards motion, into Leverkühn's musical career, into the short life of a later character. It is in this sense that the worded motif is a "parting wave and call": by acting as *membrane* it is not merely a frame within which the rest takes place, but figures both further desire and inspiration, allows outward movement instead of forcing closure on a piece of music and the process it supposedly brings to an end. Musical experience is both privatized (each audience member repeats the motif "bemusedly" to himself) and extended.

It is here that important differences between the approaches of the two authors in this chapter can again be ascertained. While Beethoven's late music represents for both Adorno and Mann (in context of the novel) a "leave-taking" from earlier musical possibilities, the musical positioning of the reading subject in Mann's novel is substantially different from the experience of Adorno's reader. This is obviously due in part to a "poeticizing" of theoretical language, but there is also a sense in which Mann draws on *desire for the*

impossible. Especially for the reader who has not heard Beethoven's last piano sonata, the functioning of desire is little different from that - as identified in an earlier section - surrounding fictional works of music such as Proust's Vinteuil sonata; such a hope for subjective association and expression is of course an impossibility for Adorno. While the main intellectual topics of *Doctor Faustus* often correspond extensively to Adorno's theories, and whereas music is physically absent to the same extent as in the non-fictional writing thus far considered, Adorno's writings themselves embody the condition of modernity by complicating or "alienating" the music which is their concern to a far greater extent than Mann does in his novel (it is utterly inconceivable that Adorno could for instance, like Mann, speak of "[t]he eternally romantic quality of music...").³²² In his easy conflation of biographical details, history of reception, formal musical history, evaluation of performance, aesthetic judgement of the work itself, pure Adornian theory, impressionistic transcription, linguistic translation of specific musical phrases, formal analysis and "natural" emotional response (singing, shouting), Mann draws on a number of forms of the metamusical which are far more readily accessible than Adorno's paratactic and hypotactic discourse, and which would in many cases be considered regressive by the philosopher; the heteroglossic aspect of such a presentation has in general less impact on the reader than the persistence of a generalized Romantic vision of "musical power".

Criticizing Erhard Bahr's idea that in *Doctor Faustus* Mann's long-standing concern with the Nietzschean opposition between life and art is replaced and even resolved by Adorno's dialectical structures, Helmut Schneider asks: "Could Thomas Mann not ... aim at the Nietzschean heritage in Adorno, rather than 'supersede' it?".³²³ Adorno's praise of Beethoven is

admittedly subjective, and the composer forms part of his complicated idealism - incredibly pessimistic as it is - only in so far as he appears at a specific point in history. Mann's historical project, on the other hand, is more consciously Germanocentric, and the "barbarous" implications of a Nietzschean tradition of self-transcendence discovered by the novel are perhaps exactly alleviated by passages in which language can still create a sense of "that which was".

The ending to Kretschmar's lecture is thus sensitive even as music becomes disparate (and it can only be so because of the latter): in its echo, the earlier musical appearance - as the last phrases of Zeitblom's report further suggest - is broken up, repeated, turned into remnants, into darkness, sleep, dream and forgetting. Closure reads as the *institution of nostalgia*, the empowerment of rereading, the necessary positioning of the subject within the limit before silence, and ultimately, the attempt at *response*, at a metasystemic that is always called into being because of the absence of the object in the perceived metamusical ("Of that which one cannot speak and of which others do, one must let words appear anew"). The musical novel, then, has to be an "open text" - open towards an impossible signified or towards further production - if it hopes to avoid false closure; Mann's own *Story of a Novel* is a prime example of how language is extended in both directions.

Lastly

Mann's metamusical discourse has been shown to be complex, eclectic, disparate, and this is one reason why metasystemic closure is more difficult to attain than usual, is in a sense rendered a conspicuous instance of conscious delinquency, in that it is placed in the same relation of linguistic closure towards music itself. His own "metasystemic" - *The Story of a*

Novel, his essays on music, philosophy and culture - does not account for historical, semiotic, intertextual, and musicological processes that are well beyond the scope of even an investigation such as this one (at the furthest point, the "presence" of the absolute - musical and otherwise - in a linguistic form cannot be judged effectively even in the most basic of definitional terms).

The word of music has perhaps "appeared", as inspiration, as liberating process, somewhere between Mann's text and this one, in that the intricacies of music-language involvements have not been successfully "framed" at any stage, both because of the specific nature of the "objective" metamusical and the metasystemic procedure itself. The original text has, like language, been a necessary frame: it is the process of interpretation itself, the making parallel of pure music and the imaginary signified of the text, which allows the solidity of this frame to be dissipated. Carefulness, the affirmation of failure, ecstasy, "truth" can only appear within such a process, and it is in this regard that the many avenues opened by the present reading have not been given definitive directionality, linkages, endings: there is extensive room for further research, and it is the imperative of the Wittgensteinian-style aphorism above to let such a chain proceed of its own accord.

Notes

Notes to Preface and Section 1:

1. For the sake of avoiding facile sociopolitical arguments, it can be noted here that this is what the term "music" will henceforth refer to.
2. Barthes, 1990, p. 179.
3. *ibid.*
4. *ibid.* p. 181.
5. See *ibid.* p. 189.
6. See particularly Barthes, 1975b, 1984, 1986a.
7. Barthes, 1986b, p. 299.
8. See Bent and Drabkin, 1987, chs. III and IV for a history of the rise of formalist analysis.
9. See Brelet, 1968 for a provocative - if excessively esoteric - reading of the relationship between language and silence.
10. See Benveniste, 1971.
11. See Lacan, 1981.
12. Ludwig, 1943, p. 230.
13. Tovey, 1948, pp. 294-95.
14. In Kerman, 1985, p. 76.
15. See for instance *ibid.* p. 75.
16. Generally, Tovey tended to balance technical analysis with what he called the "aesthetic": it is by juxtaposing them that a full understanding could be achieved (see Kerman, 1977, pp. 176-81).
17. See Derrida, 1976 on logocentrism generally.
18. See for example Narmour, 1977, Kerman, 1985, Maconie, 1990, McClary, 1991, Cook, 1992, Detels, 1992.
19. Kerman, 1985, p. 12. It can be noted that even a "strict" semiologist such as Nattiez asks, "[D]o we not often feel that a deep and sensitive commentary, like Tovey's, goes a lot farther than the most elaborate system of generative rules?" (1990, p. 165). He adds that "Formalist reductionism's great mistake is to proceed as if gaining precise knowledge of a work were possible only by working through the constraints of formalization" (*ibid.*). Other semioticians such as David Lidov actually include "intuition" as an important variable in all semiotic undertakings.
The debate on the validity of empirical method for aesthetic theory is one of the key issues of twentieth-century philosophy, and it is often in the "science" of cognitive psychology that the most confident claims for scientific explanation are made. See Raffman, 1993 for an example of a more subtle approach from this angle; see also Seashore, 1981.
20. In Nattiez, 1990, p. 152.

21. It can also be noted here that doing a "correct" analysis of a musical composition in itself nears impossibility; in a section on "plot and seriation process" Jean-Jacques Nattiez displays the extent to which analyses are effected via preordained "paths" (see Nattiez, 1985, 1990, pp. 223-33).

22. In Steiner, 1967, pp. 42-43.

23. See for instance Nattiez, 1982, especially pp. 290-97.

24. Nattiez, 1990, p. 12; see Preface and ch. 1 for general discussion.

25. *ibid.* p. 153.

26. Cases in which performed music is notated for the first time (for instance in transcriptions of audio recordings by ethnomusicologists) can of course be seen as successful renditions - it is to be decided whether notation is to be seen as "language" or not. It can also be noted that early notation recorded "general lineaments of successful improvisations" (Durant, 1984, p. 98), with little respect being paid for precise details of performance or for the intentions of composer.

27. Brown, 1948 and 1953 (see especially ch. II).

28. See for example Barricelli, 1988, pp. 1-10, Schoolfield, 1992; on systemic difficulties see Scher, 1981, 1983.

29. The title of a critical work by Umberto Eco (Eco, 1984). The classical instance promoting this position is of course Barthes' essay "The Death of the Author" (in 1990).

30. See Aronson, 1980, chs. 1 & 2.

31. Two simple examples are Barthes' notion of the "writerly" text (see Barthes, 1975a) and Derrida's idea that there is nothing outside the system of signifieds (see Derrida, 1976), one which, incidentally, is indirectly borrowed from Schlegel, who himself was greatly influenced by Romanticist thought on music (see Bowie 1990, ch. 4). A writer such as Boyne (1990) approaches the work of Derrida and Foucault directly from the angle of anti-rational critique. A further simple correlation can be made with metafictional and metahistorical programs from the viewpoint that music cannot be related to "fact" or "fiction".

32. Barthes' deconstruction of the categories of "objectivity" and "subjectivity" is useful in this regard (see Barthes, 1975a, pp. 10-11).

33. The attempt at translating the "music of the spheres" into painting was common among Renaissance artists such as Ficino and Da Vinci; in the Twentieth Century this tradition is continued primarily by Mondrian and Kandinsky (see Aronson, 1980, pp. 6-8).

34. Both Goethe and Hegel saw architecture as "frozen music"; the link between music and architecture coincides with a long tradition of natural mathematical relations existing both in harmony and visual proportion, the divine appearing in numbers, humanist ideals being perfected in the Golden section (see for example *ibid.* p. 7).

35. See Pater, 1948; this is discussed in further detail elsewhere.

36. In Wallace, 1986b, p. 1.

37. Most of the poems in Mallarmé, 1957 can be taken as examples here. See Hertz, 1987 for a careful discussion of the role of music in the Symbolist tradition.
38. Jackendoff and Lerdahl, 1977, p. 111.
39. See primarily Chomsky, 1965 and Chomsky, 1966.
40. See Jackendoff and Lerdahl, 1980, 1990; see also Raffman, 1993, p. 19.
41. For an explanation of the latter, see Schenker, 1979; see also Dunsby and Whittall, 1988, chs. 3 & 4.
42. Jackendoff and Lerdahl, 1990, pp. 5-6.
43. Nattiez, 1990, pp. 156-60.
44. See also Raffman, 1993, pp. 33-35.
45. See especially preface to Cooke, 1962.
46. *ibid.* pp. xi-xii.
47. See Durant, 1984, pp. 10-11.
48. Cooke, 1962, p. 29.
49. *ibid.* p. 22.
50. *ibid.* p. xii.
51. *ibid.* p. 18.
52. See Nattiez, 1990, pp. 16-18.
53. *ibid.* p. 17.
54. Ethnomusicological research would seem to indicate that "music" as defined from a Western viewpoint is a far less universal phenomenon than what a comparable notion of "language" is. The mobility and extreme variety of interpretants found in separations between music and non-music (see *ibid.* ch. 2) is a good indication of this point.
55. In Hans Keller's analyses, musical examples are juxtaposed in order to comment without words; Nattiez notes however that "Keller, of course, has simply transferred to the listener any responsibility for constructing analytical [verbal] conclusions" (*ibid.* p. 153).
56. See *ibid.* chs. 1 to 4 and Durant, 1984, chs. 2 & 3; for a sociopolitical analysis of the issue of "noise" see Attali, 1985.
57. Nattiez, 1990, p. 61.
58. *ibid.* p. 65.
59. For general discussion of musical semiology see Nattiez, 1977, 1989b, Keller, 1981, Lidov in Sebeok (ed.), 1986, pp. 577-87. For a more sceptical view, see Orlov, 1981.

60. In *ibid.* p. 111.
61. In *ibid.* p. 116.
62. See *ibid.* pp. 111-17.
63. In *ibid.* p. 111.
64. See for instance Dunsby, 1982, Nattiez, 1982.
65. Dunsby, 1982, p. 241.
66. See for example Rabinowitz, 1985 on the role of quotation in musical composition.
67. See Nattiez, 1990, pp. 118-27.
68. *ibid.* p. 125.
69. *ibid.* p. 124.
70. See for instance Shepherd, 1977, Ballantine, 1984, Durant, 1984, Norris (ed.), 1989, Kramer, 1990, Easthope, 1991, McClary, 1991, Detels, 1992. A recent edition of *Perspectives of New Music* (32:1) contains a special section on feminist music theory, with articles by McClary, Marion Guck, Suzanne Cusick and Marianne Kielian-Gilbert.
71. Kramer, 1990, p. 1.
72. Nattiez, 1990, p. 9.
73. Langer, 1942, p. 198, p. 207. See also Raffman, 1993, ch.1 ("Does Music Mean What It Cannot Say?").
74. In *ibid.* p. 2.
75. For a definitive account of this event see Neubauer, 1986.
76. See Edgecombe, 1993, pp. 2-3.
77. See Bowie, 1990, pp. 201-3.
78. Schopenhauer, 1958, II, p. 450.
79. Wallace, 1986a, p. 3.
80. Pater, 1948, p. 271.
81. See Dahlhaus, 1982, ch. 9; see also Carpenter, 1984.
82. In Dahlhaus, 1989, p. 18; see also this study generally for a detailed historical account of the notion of absolute music.

Notes to Section 2:

1. There is a long tradition which, finding partial verification in the historical movement from song lyric to lyric poetry, argues that poetry is by definition a "blending" of music and prose (see for instance Egri, 1988). Parameters addressed in judging music such as rhythm and texture are of course basic to all forms of verbal usage; the fact that they are foregrounded in poetry necessitates a similar judgment but does not imply any *intrinsic* difference between poetry and prose as expressive forms.

2. See Silverman, 1981. The consummate nature of this division is expressed in *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* as follows:

We can locate this *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* in our scheme of the original mechanism of alienation in that first signifying coupling that enables us to conceive that the signifier appears first in the Other in so far as the first signifier, the unitary signifier, emerges in the field of the Other and represents the subject for another signifier, which other signifier has as its effect the aphanisis of the subject. Hence the division of the subject - when the subject appears somewhere as meaning, he is manifested elsewhere as "fading", as disappearance. There is, then, one might say, a matter of life and death between the unary signifier and the subject, qua binary signifier, cause of its disappearance." (Lacan, 1981, p. 82)

3. See Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, p. 210.

4. There are other models of semiotic functioning - such as those of Kristeva and Barthes - which avoid such a strict division; for the purpose of commenting on the articulation of music, however, Lacan's model is more useful as basic groundwork here.

5. Certain works of music of course also offered a sense of wholeness through which the artist could escape the social alienation of twentieth-century existence; one critic writes that "Proust, Forster, Virginia Woolf and Thomas Mann... alike turned to the musical experience as embodying a primordial vision of human life expressed through rhythm or melody, pitch or volume, concord or discord. In their search for a faithful representation of the inwardness of experience, be it through individual consciousness or through the awareness of social identity, they discovered in music a metaphor of harmonious coexistence" (Aronson, 1980, p. 32). One could hardly dismiss the similarity between the kind of "unity" perceived here and the idealizing nature of Lacan's notion of Being.

6. Leverkühn's "anti-art" develops as a response to what he refers to as the "laughability" - the creative predictability - of existing compositions. While most of his work is permeated by irony or by "relentless ugliness", pushed to final extremes in *The Lamentation of Doctor Faustus*, this last work however still ends with an almost imperceptible glimmer of hope, a high G that "abides as a light in the night" (Mann, 1948, p. 491). Positivity here reads both as the ability to avoid "epigonality" and to produce music which has meaning beyond its textual functionings (the "value" of music is measured from early on in Mann's novel by its ability to escape explanation in words; the narrator Zeitblom fills a paradoxical position in following this principle while yet being particularly eloquent and insightful in his discussion of Leverkühn's own works).

7. It has been noted (see for instance Kerman, 1985, Scher, 1983) that much of the "serious" music from the formalist trend of the 1960s and 70s was written exactly for the purpose of analysis, in other words with analysis both as informant and as object. In a sense the music here is intended to be "equal" to the analytical discourse that accompanies it, and an interesting paradox occurs in the fact that formalist analysis, which continues the tradition of absolute music, changes (if one includes mathematical analytical constructs under "language") the ontological status of these musical works into one which is primarily verbal. Whereas the verbal "meanings" released by such analysis

cannot of course be negated, they can never entirely indicate how music is experienced, especially by the musically uneducated.

8. Whereas transcripts of some of Beissel's works have surfaced in recent years, those that have been "forgotten" assume for all practical purposes the same status as imaginary works, both representing something unattainable and therefore capable of mirroring unlimited desire.

9. See Jackson, 1981, pp. 14-17.

10. The interaction between the word of music and passages in fiction writing which deal with imaginary music is thus also an exemplary instance of what occurs with Barthes' *scriptible* text: "The writerly text is a perpetual present, upon which no consequent language (which would inevitably make it past) can be superimposed; the writerly text is *ourselves writing*, before the infinite play of the world (the world as function) is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized by some singular system (Ideology, Genus, Criticism) which reduces the plurality of entrances, the opening of networks, the infinity of languages" (Barthes, 1975a, p. 5). Art here, as in the Symbolist tradition, becomes a "membrane" through which outward movement is made possible.

11. A good example occurs where George Sands for instance writes about the fifteenth prelude:

There is one [prelude] which occurred to him on a rainy dismal evening which produced a terrible mental depression. We had left him... The rain had come on, the torrents had overflowed... and we arrived in the dead of night... On seeing us he rose, uttering a great cry, then he said to us, with a wild look and in a strange tone: 'Ah, I knew well that you were dead!'... [H]e had seen all this in a dream and, no longer distinguishing this dream from reality, he had grown calm and been almost lulled to sleep while playing the piano, believing that he was dead himself... His composition of this evening was indeed full of the drops of rain which resounded on the sonorous tiles of the monastery, but they were transformed in his imagination and in his music into tears falling from heaven into his heart. (in Brown, 1953, pp. 89-91)

12. Nattiez, 1990, p. 127.

13. Returning to program music, it is also for example possible that the program narrative occurred to the composer after certain sections of the composition had been written. The non-referential nature of music once again makes it difficult to make decisions on points such as this one.

14. Derrida, 1987; see especially the first of the four essays, "Parergon".

15. It acts in this sense as both intersection and dividing factor.

16. The difference between this process and what happens with the "traits" between the ordinary single frame and the interior or exterior of its "object" lies in the fact that the lines here do not require the type of metanarrative that the "middle frame" is meant to provide. Where the borders of the single frame come into question, the difficulty of fixing their position, or definition, becomes - as Derrida would point out - immanent in a similar way.

17. Barricelli, 1988.

18. Edgecombe, 1993.

19. The imaginary word can in this regard be employed as an *a priori* informant of "dialectical sensibility".

Notes to Section 3:

1. See Deleuze and Guattari, 1987.
2. See Derrida, 1982.
3. See also Bogue, 1991, for a "rhizomal" reading of music in general.
4. Barthes, 1975a, pp. 14-15.
5. See the essay "Discourse in the Novel" in Bakhtin, 1981, especially pp. 263-64; see also Bakhtin, 1984 for his theorization of novelistic "polyphony".
6. Barthes, 1990, p. 155.
7. *ibid.* p. 158.
8. See for example Aldritt, 1978.
9. Barricelli, 1988, p. 9.
10. Nattiez makes an interesting related point: "A proliferation of *formal* interpretants is, indeed, also characteristic of symbolic phenomena basic to domains otherwise saturated with the indisputable presence of 'signifieds', domains such as literature or discursive thought. Do not the rhymes at the end of a line of verse depend on symbolic functioning of a musical type?... [C]annot the formal aspect of the semiological functioning of music serve as a model for other symbolic domains, at least preventing us from downplaying, within these domains, dimensions that are utterly essential to them?" (Nattiez, 1990, p. 148).
11. The Lacanian meaning/being dichotomy as identified in Section 2 is of course again brought into question by such an idea; Barthes' theorization of pleasure as self-dissolution, as set out earlier, is perhaps a more tenable approach here.
12. Edward Said, in his largely forgettable *Musical Elaborations*, makes passing reference to this issue: "Music is of fundamental interest [to Proust] because it represents the rarity, uniqueness and absolute individuality of art, as well as its intermittent, fragmentary, highly conditional and circumstantial existence" (Said, 1991, p. 75). Nattiez, 1989a, takes this up in greater detail.
13. See *ibid.* chs. 2 & 3.
14. See Barricelli, 1988. p. 1, Scher, 1982, pp. 241-42.
15. See for example Edgecombe, 1991, p. 253.
16. Another general point of failure lies in the predominance of "simply bad poetry" (which can conceivably be traced to intrinsic differences between forms); Brown (1953, pp. 35-36) cites a memorable example:
 Frances Ridley Havergal was attempting to describe and imitate simultaneously when, in describing the *Adagio* of the *Moonlight Sonata*, she wrote some of the world's worst lines:
 Loving and longing, loving and yearning,
 With a hidden flow of electric burning
 Ever returning;
 Meeting again in a calm repeat,
 Slow and sweet,
 Sweet and Slow.

17. Nicolosi, 1980, pp. 197-98. For an even more scathing (and lucidly reasoned) assessment of Eliot's employment of "music" see Bebbington, 1989.
18. Nattiez, 1989a, pp. 2-4.
19. *ibid.* p. 3. Barricelli makes the relevant point that the term *Leitmotif* tends to be used interchangeably with "theme" or "motif" in their usual senses (1988, p. 133-34).
20. See for instance Barricelli, 1988, pp. 1-10 and ch. 11. Another so-called "success" is Verlaine's poem "Chanson d'automne" (see Brown, 1953, p. 22).
21. Ann P. Linder, writing on Proust, states that what happens here is "the metamorphosis of the quintessentially fugitive art of music into an intrinsically static landscape" (in Zaenker, 1981, p. 521).
22. Durant, 1984, p. 14.
23. Steiner, 1967, p. 48.
24. See Kundera 1990, part 4.
25. See Andrew, 1988, pp. 180-85.
26. This opinion is stated also by Lessing when writing on a poetic description of the Laocoon group:
I can see well enough how his independently working imagination might produce this or that trait; but the original reasons why his judgment felt called upon to change the beautiful traits which were before his eyes into other traits are beyond my comprehension. (in Brown, 1953, p. 142)
27. *ibid.*
28. Karl Zaenker points out that where literature, after drawing inspiration from music, leads away from it, it "does not necessarily speak against the poetic quality of the text itself which, after all, should not be confused with the program notes for a concert" (Zaenker, 1981, p. 521).
29. Brown, 1953, pp. 1-2.
30. See Egri, 1988, p. 41.
31. A good indication of this is the remarkable absence of criticism which mentions the influence of Adorno's own thought on the novel; see also Grim, 1988, p. 73 for a similar opinion.
32. Mann himself, for instance, mentions his affinity to Joyce on various occasions during the period of writing: in his 1942 diary he notes, "Undoubtedly a brother" (in Vaquet, 167); see also Mann, 1961, p. 47, pp. 75-76.
33. Jameson, 1971, p. 3.
34. Erhard Bahr points out that this novel is the last of an extended series of works dealing with the same theme; he writes that "*Doctor Faustus* proved to be the novel in which Thomas Mann overcame and transcended the Nietzschean dilemma of his art" (1991, p. 146) and argues that the writer finds this solution in Adorno's thinking.

35. André von Gronicka writes that Adrian Leverkühn is "a sacrifice on the altar of [Mann's] self-liberation" from a "complex, problematic relationship to [music]" (1948, p. 214).
36. In Carnegy, 1973, p. 6. It thus also seems to be Mann's own ambivalence towards music which is expressed when Zeitblom states early on in the novel that music "does not seem to me to be included in the pedagogic-humanistic sphere ... Rather ... to a world of the spirit" (Mann, 1948, p. 9). While this does not clearly come to the fore in the essay under question, Mann was also probably highly aware of a conscious nineteenth-century project to claim first-world status for Germany via its musical achievements.
37. Zaenker, 1981, p. 518.
38. Mann, 1948, p. 478.
39. See Pattison, 1990, pp. 7-8.
40. Mann, 1961, pp. 74-75.
41. In a letter to Paul Amann (in Carnegy, 1973, p. 116).
42. See Mann, 1961 throughout; at one point he speaks of "the for ever unsatisfactory lecture chapter, VIII" (p. 151).
43. *ibid.* pp. 54-55.
44. See for example Dahlhaus 1982.
45. See for instance Carnegy, 1973, ch. 2 ("The Supremacy of Music").
46. In Aronson, 1980, p. 31.
47. For a representative account of the role of music in German literature see the collection of essays under McGlathery (ed.), 1992.
48. In Barricelli, 1988, p. 7 (see also pp. 7-8 generally, pp. 133-39). The theme of autonomous art, which attains a developmental conclusion in *Doctor Faustus*, and is in a sense a concern of all "high modernist" writing, is also already present in these early works (see Bahr, 1991, pp. 145-46).
49. Mann, 1961, p. 79.
50. See also Carnegy, 1973, pp 26-27. This recognition attains a different employment in *Doctor Faustus*; Mann writes in *The Story* of how in the process of writing he "recalled the enormous influence the equivocal magic of [Wagner's] art had had upon [his] youth - an influence which might even be called determining. The sinister side of this art had been revealed by the role it had played in the Nazi state." (Mann, 1961, pp. 180-81)
51. *ibid.* pp. 35-36.
52. See Aronson, 1988, ch. 3, for a discussion of snobbery and self-alienation in various modernist writers' attitudes to music; one exception seems to have been James Joyce, whose musical tastes were "unquestionably, obstinately and ostentatiously low-brow" (*ibid.* pp. 37-8).
53. See for instance Mann, 1961, pp. 39-40. Bahr in his article on Adorno's influence on Mann, argues that Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory*, although published much later, is a more comprehensive correlative for the Adornian philosophy

found in *Doctor Faustus* (see Bahr, 1991, pp. 161-63).

54. Subotnik, 1976, p. 243. As in the case of various other collaborative projects, Adorno seems here to have been unperturbed by not receiving any formal acknowledgement for what amounts for all practical purposes to co-authorship. See also the article by Bahr, who writes that "[h]is influence [on Mann's novel] cannot be overestimated" (Bahr, 1991, 153).

55. Mann, 1961, pp. 39-40.

56. He writes in a letter: "I understand the New Music only very theoretically ... though I know something of it, I cannot really enjoy and love it." (in Carnegy, 1973, p. 6). He does however indicate in a list published in *The Saturday Review of Literature* that he was fond of Berg's *Wozzeck* (in *ibid.* p. 12), perhaps so because of the opera's partial retention of Romantic qualities.

57. See Craft, 1975, p. 20.

58. See also Carnegy, 1973, p. 41.

59. See for instance Craft, 1975, Henius, 1981, Maegaard, 1974, Reif, 1983.

60. Craft, 1975, p. 20.

61. The history of the Mann-Schönberg legal exchange is documented in Carnegy, 1973, chapter 4 and pp. 168-73.

62. In *ibid.* p. 172.

63. See for example Mann, 1961, p. 33.

64. Schoenberg, of course, can be criticized similarly for his insistence on "intellectual ownership" of the twelve-tone technique; his shocked attack against Mann however seems to have been based in various personal precedents as well (see Craft, 1975, p. 20).

65. Mann, 1961, p. 74.

66. See Von Gronicka, 1948, p. 206. The issue of audience is of course a complicated one for a writer in exile; it may also be noted here that the text might be more accessible to a German audience in a general sense because of the greater importance that musical education plays in German culture.

67. Yet another aspect of the difficulty of reading is pointed out by Viktor Oswald, who discusses the width of learning necessary to find the "various clues of ... remarkable virtuosity" left by Mann in various "puzzles" (Oswald, 1948, p. 249).

68. Mann, 1961, p. 62.

69. See Cook, 1992, pp. 43-70. Experiments by Francés show that not even simple elements such as the subject and countersubject in fugues are perceived correctly (see Nattiez, 1990, p. 17).

70. See for example Hoyt, 1985, Sharpe, 1984.

71. See for example Maconie, 1990.

72. See for example McClary, 1991, Detels, 1992.

73. Durant, 1984, p. 40.

74. The attempt in early Italian madrigals at imitating speech patterns within melodies indicates that a correlation between melody and pitch relations in human speech was at least at some stage considered "natural" or at least desirable; Vincenzo Galilei for instance is said to have objected to the use of harmony in song on the grounds that it was too musical and detracted from the verbal purity of song (see Palisca, C.V. "Galilei, Vincenzo" in Sadie (ed.), 1980, vol. 7, pp. 96-98 for general discussion of Galilei's views). The trend towards using emotionally charged scenes in operas reflects the need to make such an imitation more "musical", for it is of course in passionate moments that pitch variation in speech is at its highest; thus the sense of emotional exaggeration nowadays almost considered generic to opera and the concomitant move away from the conscious presence of speech in music in general.

75. Mann, 1961, pp. 38-39.

76. *ibid.* pp. 28-29. In an interview of 1953, he mentions - in a statement also applicable as critique of Leverkühn - that "humour induces the laughter that wells up from the heart. This I personally rate higher as the effect of art and welcome it more happily ... than the Erasmus-like smile which irony evokes." (Mann, 1964, p. 171).

77. Mann, 1961, p. 47.

78. Carnegy argues that Mann was drawn to music because as ironist he was already making extensive use of ambiguities and abstractions (see 1973, p. 25). See also Gross, 1986, on the general use of parody in modernist writing.

79. Barthes, 1975a, pp. 106-7.

80. *ibid.* p. 107.

81. See Jones, G.G. "Kretzschmar, (August Ferdinand) Hermann" in Sadie (ed.), 1980, vol. 10, pp. 258-59.

82. It may be of relevance that the original Kretzschmar practiced musicology "as a history of culture" and acted as director of the Institut für Kirchenmusik in Berlin (see *ibid.*).

83. Barthes, 1975a, p. 107.

84. Heller, 1958, p. 266.

85. Mann, 1961, p. 13.

86. *ibid.* p. 30.

87. See Lindsay, 1954, p. 78.

88. Mann writes that "Nietzsche did a great deal of mischief by acting as though it were our moral consciousness which, like Mephistopheles, raises an icy, satanic fist against life." (1959, p. 162) See also Carnegy, 1973, pp. 163-7.

89. Carnegy argues that Mann departs from Nietzsche in finding hope at the last moment, at the end of Leverkühn's *Lamentation of Doctor Faustus* (1973, p. 10); Bahr, 1991, argues that the novel replaces Mann's concern with Nietzsche's art-life distinction with Adorno's dialectical structures.

90. See also Corngold, 1980, and Putz, 1971, on this topic.

91. Nietzsche 1909, p. xxvii.
92. Nietzsche, 1967, p. 119.
93. See Dahlhaus, 1989, p. 33.
94. In Dahlhaus, 1989, p. 31.
95. Mann, 1948, ch. 47.
96. On this see Kramer, 1990, ch. 2.
97. Mann, 1961, p. 36.
98. "Improvisatory" qualities are highly evident in exploratory works such as the first movement of Op. 109; the unusual shifts in and out of modulations found in much of Beethoven's work can also be related to the "decision making" that accompanies improvisation.
99. Rosen, 1971, p. 445.
100. See for example Tovey, 1948, p. 297.
101. Maconie, 1990, p. 109.
102. See Goldstein, 1991, pp. 74-75.
103. See Derrida, 1988.
104. A related point here is that "noise" itself can always be incorporated into the definition of music, as can be seen from what has happened in Dadaist musical performances and in recent psychedelic, industrial rock and sample-based music. See Attali, 1985, for a discussion of how music is in effect a field of combat on which opposing notions of order and noise are battled out.
105. See Jackson, 1981, pp. 14-17.
106. Barricelli, 1988, p. 170; see also pp. 168-88 generally.
107. Barthes, 1975b, p. 4.
108. See also Ingarden, 1986, for a discussion of this particular problem.
109. Durant, 1984, p. 38.
110. He writes that "[t]he advent of visual emphases in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century musical performance is also a decisive moment in progressive relegation of music's supposedly magical and religious properties, an arrival of music as dominantly a secular entertainment divorced from earlier metaphysical significances, and incorporated in emerging conceptions of human achievement and art." (ibid. p. 88; see also ch. 4 generally) The "making invisible" and "magicalizing" of music of course reappears with Wagner's concealment of the orchestra at Bayreuth.
111. As far as locating performance within the tripartite division is concerned, it may be noted that textual confusion here results also from Zeitblom, who is a metasystemic narrator for the most part, later on producing "pure" metamusical discourse while at the same time describing performance.

112. See Barthes, 1990, p. 165.
113. In Kerman, J., Tyson, A. "Beethoven, Ludwig van" in Sadie (ed.), 1980, vol. 2, p. 394.
114. See McClary, 1991, pp. 127-131.
115. *ibid.* p. 129.
116. In Cooper, 1991, p. 296.
117. in *ibid.*
118. in *ibid.*
119. In Cooper, 1970, p. 5. As Bergsten points out (Bergsten, 1974, p. 254), messianic discourse is also incorporated by Mann in Kretschmar's next lecture: when Beethoven finds his "food burnt and dried up" after working till after midnight, he thunders at the maids that have fallen asleep, "Could you not watch one hour with me?" (Mann, 1948, p. 58). This is of course taken directly from Jesus's words to His disciples after praying in the Garden of Gethsemane on the night before His crucifixion (see Mark 14:38).
120. Crowest, 1908, p. 253.
121. See for example Einstein, 1958, p. 244.
122. In Cooper, 1991, p. 293.
123. In *ibid.*
124. In *ibid.* p. 297.
125. In Barricelli, 1988, p. 24.
126. In Landon, 1992, pp. 192-93.
127. Bergsten, 1974.
128. Mann, 1961, pp. 29-30.
129. *ibid.* p. 125.
130. See for example Higgins, 1991.
131. See Carnegy, 1973, pp. 113-16 for further discussion of the connection between Mann's montage technique and Nietzsche's notion of eternal recurrence.
132. See *ibid.* p. 159 for a reading of Mann himself as Faustian intellectual.
133. Mann's repeated use of Schindler's largely inaccurate biography of Beethoven can be explained in this regard; he writes that it is "an intellectually limited, philistine book, but full of interesting anecdotes and useful facts" (Mann, 1961, p. 43).
134. Barthes for instance writes of how the sound of speech in cinema "succeed[s] in shifting the signified a great distance and throwing, so to speak, the anonymous body of the actor in my ear" (1975b, p. 67).

135. See Thayer, 1960, III, p. 106 on Beethoven's use of other nicknames for Schindler.
136. It should be noted that the "Beethoven program" extends directly into the works of so-called "strict" formalist analysts such as Heinrich Schenker. Schenker's objects of analysis are drawn almost exclusively from the German canon, of which Beethoven's music forms for him the apex. His essay "Rameau oder Beethoven?" (Schenker, 1930), with its almost hysterical anti-French sentiments, is a remarkable instance of the use of Beethoven's music - and analysis itself - as a tool of pre-World War II nationalistic propaganda.
137. See Bowie, 1990, p. 178.
138. See Cook, 1993 for a general overview of the directly propagandistic use of the composer's name and work in history.
139. See for example Crowest, 1908, pp. 229-31.
140. Friedrich Wähler in Newman, 1927, p. 43.
141. Sir George Grove mentions this as early as 1879 (see Larkin in Cooper, 1970, p. 451).
142. Newman, 1927, p. 41.
143. See for example Cooper, 1970, pp. 6-10, Sterba and Sterba, 1971, pp. 14-16.
144. See for example Alan Pryce-Jones' introduction to Thayer, 1960, p. 111; see also Sterba and Sterba, 1971, pp. 16-17.
145. See for example Barford, 1969, Solomon, 1977.
146. For a pro-Beethoven position see as example Cooper, 1970, ch. 5; for the opposite see Pryce-Jones' introduction to Thayer, 1960.
147. Sullivan, 1933, p. 188.
148. Mann, 1961, p. 171.
149. *ibid.* p. 178.
150. Mann, 1948, pp. 163-64.
151. *ibid.* p. 164.
152. See Mann, 1961, pp. 52-53. Zaenker links the biographic overtones of this work to the plot of *Doctor Faustus* itself (see 1981, p. 520).
153. Mann, 1948, pp. 160-61.
154. Carnegie, 1973, p. 63.
155. Mann, 1948, pp. 133-34.
156. *ibid.* p. 244.
157. *ibid.* pp. 236-37.

158. Schopenhauer, 1958, I, p. 260.
159. See Schindler in Thayer, 1960, III, pp. 48-49.
160. The link between madness and nature is central to much of medieval thought (see for instance Foucault, 1988, ch. 1 on the "easy wandering existence" associated with the ship of fools) and reappears with the "liberation" of both within the discourse of Romanticism.
161. See Saussure, 1983, part 1 section 1.
162. See Cooper, 1991, p. 198.
163. See for example *ibid.* pp. 198-99.
164. In Kerman, J., Tyson, A. "Beethoven, Ludwig van" in Sadie (ed.), 1980, vol. 2, pp. 377-78; see also Cooper, 1991, pp. 199-200.
165. See Kerman, J., Tyson, A. "Beethoven, Ludwig van" in Sadie (ed.), 1980, vol. 2, pp. 376-77. Others, like Liszt, argued that there were actually only two phases of development (see Cooper, 1991, p. 199; see also the more recent theory of Broyle in *ibid.*).
166. See *ibid.* pp. 199-200, Kerman, J., Tyson, A. "Beethoven, Ludwig van" in Sadie (ed.), 1980, vol. 3, p. 377-78.
167. See for example Milne, 1925, pp. 58-59, Blom, 1968, p. 236.
168. See for instance Lenneberg, 1980.
169. See for example Wallace, 1986a, especially ch. 3, and Barricelli, 1988, p. 21.
170. Solomon, 1980, pp. 440-41. R.B Ayres argues that while the symphony as genre is designed for the general listener, the string quartet - which is Beethoven's "eventual" form - is intended for the player and connoisseur (in Aldritt, 1978, p. 31).
171. See Solomon, 1980, p. 416.
172. In Crowest, 1908, p. 250.
173. In Cooper, 1970, pp. 11-12.
174. See for example Behrend, 1937, pp. 187-88.
175. In Landon, 1992, p. 195.
176. In Slonimsky, 1953, p. 46.
177. In *ibid.* p. 49.
178. In *ibid.* p. 43.
179. In *ibid.* p. 44.
180. In Landon, 1992, p. 195.
181. In *ibid.*

182. In Wallace, 1986a, p. 58.
183. See Cooper, 1970, p. 45.
184. In Crowest, 1908, p. 228.
185. Philip Barford in Wallace, 1986b, p. 102.
186. Wallace, 1986b, p. 108.
187. Zaenker writes that string quartets, "the later string quartets of Beethoven in particular, ha[ve] reached an exemplary status representing a 'metaphysical' type of music" (1981, p. 509).
188. In Aronson, 1980, p. 91.
189. A telling example of this process is to be found in the way in which the larger part of his monograph celebrating the centenary of Beethoven's birth (Wagner, 1872) is devoted to theorization of his own ideas on musical theatre.
190. Crowest, 1908, p. 231.
191. In Von Geyso, 1963, p. 76.
192. See Aronson, 1980, especially ch. 1.
193. Sullivan, 1933, p. 217.
194. *ibid.* p. 238.
195. *ibid.* pp. 132-33.
196. Von Geyso, 1963, p. 76.
197. Reinecke, 1897, p. 139.
198. Wallace, 1986b, p. 103.
199. Mellers, 1983, p. 278.
200. In Barford, 1969, p. 110.
201. Behrend, 1937, pp. 191-93.
202. Mellers, 1983, p. 283.
203. Wallace, 1986b, p. 102.
204. *ibid.* p. 108.
205. Mann, 1961, p. 176.
206. *ibid.* p. 37; see also ch. 5 generally, pp. 120-21, pp. 176-77.
207. *ibid.* p. 176.

208. *ibid.* p. 41. It would seem that Mann also had access to the ideas from Adorno's essay "Spätstil Beethovens"; the identification of the late sonatas as five and not four for instance seems in general musicology to be peculiar to Adorno (see 1964, p. 14).

209. Jameson, 1971, p. 3.

210. A term used by Martin Jay in his book on Adorno (Jay, 1984). For the philosopher's own "systemic" see Adorno, 1993.

211. See Jameson, 1971, Jay, 1984, Paddison, 1987, Subotnik, 1976. The issue of translation is also at stake here, primarily because the German language seems to be far more suited to Adorno's way of arguing; see Weber's introduction to Adorno, 1981 for a convincing discussion of why translating the philosopher's work effectively is in many ways impossible.

212. Adorno, 1990, p. 298.

213. Adorno, 1973, pp. 131-33.

214. See Adorno, 1990.

215. See Subotnik, 1976, pp. 246-48.

216. See Adorno, 1973, pp. 32-33.

217. See *ibid.* pp. 55-56 and Jameson, 1971, ch.1, section 3.

218. Feher, 1975, p. 106. See as example Adorno, 1964, p. 14 on how the subjective dynamic develops in the first movement of the Fifth Symphony in an unconventional way out its own uniqueness.

219. Subotnik, 1976, p. 249.

220. See for instance Adorno, 1964, p. 14 on autonomous subjectivity in the *Appassionata* sonata.

221. *ibid.* p. 244.

222. Subotnik, 1976, p. 245.

223. See Adorno, 1973, pp. 67-71 as well as the essay "Arnold Schönberg, 1874-1951" in Adorno, 1981.

224. Jameson argues that it is exactly Adorno's transposition of subjectivity and objectivity into content and form that manages to avoid the "metaphysical nostalgia" which results from naive attempts at finding reconciliation between the two within actual historical chronology; see 1971, pp. 38-40.

225. Subotnik, 1976, p. 250; see also Jameson, 1971, pp. 38-39.

226. See for instance McClary, 1991, ch. 5.

227. See Adorno, 1976, p. 120, pp. 122-23.

228. Robert L. Jacobs in his article "Beethoven and Kant" (1961) tries to connect Beethoven's "moral idealism" with Kant's philosophy, in which the composer seems to have shown a peripheral interest. Subotnik writes of this kind of association that the "appearance [of self-control in the musical

subject] was no less an illusion, in Adorno's judgement, than Kant's attempts to derive objective categories of moral law from within human subjectivity" (1976, p. 252).

229. *ibid.*

230. The notion of "double negation" is central to much of Adorno's thought, especially to works such as his *Aesthetic Theory* (see footnote to *ibid.* p. 254).

231. *ibid.* p. 255; see Adorno, 1976, p. 123.

232. See Adorno, 1976, pp. 118-23.

233. See Subotnik, 1976, p. 255.

234. See Adorno, 1976, p. 122.

235. Subotnik, 1976, p. 256.

236. Adorno, 1976, p. 122.

237. Subotnik, 1976, p. 256.

238. See Adorno, 1976, p. 122.

239. See Adorno, 1964, p. 15.

240. "Er is einzig den Geschopfen, nicht den Gebilden auferlegt" (*ibid.*; translation mine).

241. "Die Gewalt der Subjektivität in den späten Kunstwerken ist die auffahrende Geste, mit welcher sie die Kunstwerke verläßt." (*ibid.*; translation mine)

242. "Vom Tode berührt, gibt die meisterliche Hand die Stoffmassen frei, die sie zuvor formte; die Risse und Sprünge darin, Zeugnis der endlichen Ohnmacht des Ichs vorm Seienden, sind ihr letztes Werk. ... Als Splitter, zerfallen und verlassen, schlagen sie endlich selber in Ausdruck um; Ausdruck jetzt nicht mehr des vereinzelteten Ichs, sondern der mythischen Artung der Kreatur und ihre Sturzes, dessen Stufen die späten Werke gleichwie in Augenblicken des Einhaltens sinnbildlich schlagen." (*ibid.* pp. 15-16; translation mine)

243. See Mann, 1961, pp. 7-9.

244. Mann seems to have been strongly drawn to this philosopher; see for instance the essay called "Schopenhauer" in Mann, 1947b; see also Carnegy 1973, pp. 151-54.

245. Schopenhauer himself, like Nietzsche, was drawn to the idea of circularity; see Gardiner, 1963, ch. 7 for a discussion of his views on reincarnation.

246. Mann, 1948, p. 57.

247. Mann, 1961, p. 42.

248. Jay, 1984, p. 28.

249. Mann, 1948, p. 239.
250. See for instance Mellers, 1983, Wallace, 1986b.
251. See for example Behrend, 1937, Salsbury, 1931, Reinecke, 1905.
252. Schenker, 1971.
253. See Bergsten, 1974, p. 106.
254. "Das Motiv in seiner ursprünglichen, 'objektiven' Gestalt: am Schlusse der ersten Hälfte des Themas." (in *ibid.*; translation mine)
255. See *ibid.* pp. 234-37.
256. Mann, 1948, p. 462.
257. "Into the poetic little illustrative phrases I wrote for the arietta theme I slipped Adorno's patronymic, *Wiesengrund* (Meadowland), by way of showing my gratitude." (Mann, 1961, p. 42)
258. Bergsten, 1974, p. 235.
259. *ibid.*
260. Blom, 1968, pp. 238-39.
261. Cooper, 1991, p. 242.
262. Scott, 1943, p. 146.
263. Barford, 1954, p. 331.
264. See also Subotnik, 1976, pp. 257-61.
265. See Adorno, 1973, pp. 90-95, Adorno, 1976, p. 117, Adorno 1964, pp 13-14, 16-17. In "Spätstil" Adorno also links polyphony to "the extremes which no longer tolerate a safe middleground and harmony of spontaneity" ("den Extremen, die keine sichere Mitte und Harmonie aus Spontaneität mehr dulden"), paying specific attention to the unison (1964, p. 16).
266. See Adorno, 1976, p. 116.
267. *ibid.* pp. 116-17.
268. "[Die fünf letzten Klaviersonaten] sind voller schmückender Trillerketten, Kadenzen und Fiorituren; oftmals wird kahl, unverhüllt, unverwandelt die Konventionen sichtbar" (Adorno, 1964, pp. 14-15).
269. See *ibid.* pp. 14-16 for the similar role that convention plays in the late Goethe and Stifter.
270. "So werden beim letzten Beethoven die Konventionen Ausdruck in der nackten Darstellung ihrer selbst. Dazu dient die oft bemerkte Verkürzung seines Stils: sie will die musikalische Sprache nicht sowohl von der Floskel reinigen als vielmehr die Floskel vom Schein ihrer subjektiven Beherrschtheit: die freigegebene, aus der Dynamik gelöste Floskel redet für sich." (*ibid.* p. 16; translation mine) Mann's original German reads as follows: "Da - wird - die Sprache - nicht mehr von der Floskel - gereinigt, sondern die Floskel -

- vom Schein - ihrer subjektiven - Beherrschtheit - der Schein".
271. Adorno, 1976, p. 117.
272. See *ibid.* p. 116.
273. See Adorno, 1964, p. 15.
274. Zuidervaart, 1991 for instance makes this idea the main concern of his book on Adorno - and also draws his title from it.
275. See Barricelli, 1988, pp. 133-35.
276. See Barthes, 1975b on the value of the "fragment".
277. Bergsten, 1974, p. 235.
278. Brown, 1948, p. 28.
279. "[D]ie vermenschlichte abschiednehmende Variante am Schluss" (in Bergsten, 1974, p. 107).
280. "[D]ie hinzugefügte, entscheidende Note ist CIS" (in *ibid.*).
281. "Objektiv ist die brüchige Landschaft, subjektiv das Licht, darin einzig sie erglüht. Er bewirkt nicht deren harmonische Synthese. Er reißt sie, als Macht der Dissoziation, in der Zeit auseinander, um vielleicht fürs Ewige sie zu bewahren. In der Geschichte von Kunst sind Spätwerke die Katastrophen." (Adorno, 1964, p. 17; translation mine).
282. Mann, 1961, p. 176-77.
283. Mann, 1948, p. 491.
284. "Subjektivität ist es, welche die Extreme im Augenblick zusammenzwingt, die gedrängte Polyphonie mit ihren Spannungen läßt, im Unisono sie zerschlägt und daraus entwicht, hinter sich lassend den entblößten Ton; die Floskel einsetzt als Denkmal des Gewesenen, worin versteint Subjektivität selber eingeht. Die Zäsuren aber, das jähe Abbrechen, das mehr als alles andere den letzten Beethoven bezeichnet, sind jene Augenblicke des Ausbruchs; das Werk schweigt, wenn es verlassen wird, und kehrt seine Höhlung nach außen." (Adorno, 1964, pp. 16-17; translation mine)
285. "Mit dem Werk 111 nimmt Beethoven endgültig Abschied von der Form der Klaviersonate." (in Bergsten, 1974, p. 107)
286. Cooper, 1970, p. 105.
287. Steiner, 1967, p. 58.
288. See Jacobs, 1961.
289. In Solomon, 1980, p. 438.
290. In Kramer, 1990, p. 27.
291. In Von Geyses, 1963, p. 76.
292. In *ibid.*

293. In Crowest, 1908, p. 229.
294. In Cooper, 1970, p. 118.
295. Barford, 1969, p. 110.
296. In Cooper, 1970, p. 113.
297. See Cooper, 1991, pp. 275-78.
298. Milne, 1925, p. 58.
299. See for example Crowest, 1908, p. 241, Von Geyso, 1963, p. 73.
300. Wallace, 1986b, p. 39.
301. See for example Einstein, 1958, p. 70.
302. In Wallace, 1986b, p. 11.
303. Cooper, 1970, p. 201.
304. Blom, 1968, p. 236.
305. *ibid.*
306. Mellers, 1983, p. 240.
307. See for example Scott, 1943, pp. 79-81, Von Geyso, 1963, p. 76, Sullivan, 1933, II, ch. 6.
308. See Solomon, 1980, pp. 317-8 & ch. 19.
309. See for example Crowest, 1908, p. 250.
310. See for example Lichtenberg, 1984.
311. See Barford, 1969, p. 108.
312. In Wallace, 1986b, p. 126.
313. Kerman, 1966, p. 286.
314. Cooper, 1970, pp. 10-11.
315. Adorno, 1976, p. 124.
316. Adorno, 1981, p. 137.
317. See Subotnik, 1976, pp. 244-45.
318. See Adorno, 1990.
319. Adorno, 1976, p. 113; see also pp. 113-115 generally.
320. *ibid.* p. 120.

321. See also Maconie, 1990, p. 179 in this regard.

322. Mann, 1961, p. 44. Peter Egri tries to argue that in Mann, as in Bartók, Kodály and the later Brecht and Eluard a synthesis occurs in which that which Stephen Spender calls the "contemporary" attitude leads to intensification and organic perception of the "modern" (1988, pp. 136-37).

323. Schneider, 1991, p. 165.

References

- Adorno, T.W. 1964. "Spätstil Beethovens" in *Moments Musicaux*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, pp. 13-17.
- Adorno, T.W. 1973 (1948). *Philosophy of Modern Music* (transl. A.G. Mitchell, W.V. Bloomster). London: Sheed & Ward.
- Adorno, 1976 (1959). "Alienated Masterpiece: The *Missa Solemnis*" *Telos*, pp. 113-24.
- Adorno, T.W. 1981 (1967). *Prisms* (transl. S. & S. Weber). Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Adorno, T.W. 1990 (1938). "On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of Listening" in Arato, A., Gebhart, E. (eds.) *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*. New York: Continuum, pp. 270-99.
- Adorno, T.W. 1993 (1956). "Music, Language and Composition" *The Musical Quarterly* 77(3), pp. 401-14.
- Aldritt, K. 1978. *Eliot's "Four Quartets": Poetry as Chamber Music*. London: The Woburn Press.
- Andrew, D. 1984. *Concepts in Film Theory*. Oxford U.P.
- Aronson, A. 1980. *Music and the Novel: A Study in Twentieth Century Fiction*. Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Attali, J. 1985. *Noise* (transl. Brian Massumi). Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota P.
- Bahr, E. 1991. "Art Desires Non-Art: Thomas Mann's Dialectic of Art and Theodor Adorno's Aesthetic Theory" in Lehnert, H., Pfeiffer, P.C. (eds.) *Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus: A Novel at the Margin of Modernism*. Columbia: Camden House, pp. 145-60.
- Bakhtin, M.M. 1981. *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays* (ed. Michael Holquist). Austin: U. of Texas P.
- Bakhtin, M.M. 1984 (1929). *Problems of Dostoyevsky's Poetics* (ed. & transl. Caryl Emerson). Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota P.
- Ballantine, C. 1984. *Music and Its Social Meanings*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
- Barford, P. 1954. "Beethoven's Last Sonata" *Music and Letters* 35, pp. 320-31.
- Barford, P. 1969. "The Approach to Beethoven's Late Music" *The Music Review* 30, pp. 106-17.
- Barricelli, J-P. 1988. *Melopoesis: Approaches to the Study of Literature and Music*. New York U.P.
- Barthes, R. 1975a. *S/Z* (transl. Richard Miller). London: Johnathan Cape.
- Barthes, R. 1975b. *The Pleasure of the Text* (transl. Richard Miller). New York: Hill and Wang.
- Barthes, R. 1984. *Camera Lucida* (transl. Richard Howard). London: Flamingo.
- Barthes, R. 1986a. *A Lover's Discourse: Fragments* (transl. Richard Howard). London: Penguin.
- Barthes, R. 1986b. *The Responsibility of Forms: Critical Essays on Music, Art and Representation* (transl. Richard Howard) Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Barthes, R. 1990. *Image, Music, Text* (ed. & transl. Stephen Heath). London: Fontana.
- Bebbington, W.G. 1989. "Four Quartets?" *Essays in Criticism* 39(3).
- Beethoven, L. *van Sonaten für Pianoforte Solo*. Leipzig: Edition Peters.
- Behrend, W. 1937. *Ludwig van Beethoven's Pianoforte Sonatas* (transl. Ingeborg Lund). London & Toronto: J.M. Dent.

- Bent, I., Drabkin, W. 1987 (1980). *Analysis*. New York & London: W.W. Norton.
- Benveniste, E. 1971. "Subjectivity in Language" in *Problems in General Linguistics* (transl. M.E. Meek). U. of Miami P., pp. 223-30.
- Bergsten, G. 1974. *Thomas Manns Doktor Faustus: Untersuchungen zu den Quellen und zu Struktur des Romans*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Blom, E. 1986. *Beethoven's Pianoforte Sonatas Discussed*. New York: Da Capo.
- Bogue, R. 1991. "Rhizomusicology" *SubStance* 66, pp 85-101.
- Bowie, A. 1990. *Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche*. Manchester U.P.
- Boyne, R. 1990. *Foucault and Derrida: The Other Side of Reason*. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Brelet, G. 1968. "Music and Silence" in Langer, S.K. (ed.) *Reflections on Art: A Source Book of Writings by Artists, Critics and Philosophers*. Oxford U.P., pp. 103-21.
- Brown, C.S. 1948. *Music and Literature: A Comparison of the Arts*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Brown, C.S. 1953. *Tones into Words: Musical Compositions as Subjects of Poetry*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Carpenter, P. 1984. "Musical Form and Musical Idea: Reflections on a Theme of Schoenberg, Hanslick and Kant" in Strainchamps, E., Maniates, M.R., Hatch, C. (eds.) *Music and Civilization: Essays in Honour of Paul Henry Lang*. New York & London: W.W. Norton, pp. 394-427.
- Carnegy, P. 1973. *Faust as Musician: A Study of Thomas Mann's Novel Doctor Faustus*. New York: New Directions.
- Chomsky, N. 1965. *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Chomsky, N. 1966. *Topics in the Theory of Generative Grammar*. The Hague: Mouton.
- Cooke, D. 1962 (1959). *The Language of Music*. London: Oxford U.P.
- Cook, N. 1992 (1990). *Music, Imagination and Culture*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Cook, N. 1993. *Beethoven: Symphony No. 9*. Cambridge U.P.
- Cooper, B. (ed.) 1991. *The Beethoven Compendium: A Guide to Beethoven's Life and Music*. London: Thames & Hudson.
- Cooper, M. 1970. *Beethoven: The Last Decade 1817-1827*. London: Oxford U.P.
- Corngold, S. 1980. "Mann as a Reader of Nietzsche" in *Boundary2* 9(2), pp. 47-74.
- Craft, R. 1975. "The Doctor Faustus Case" in *The New York Review of Books* 22(13), pp. 18-21.
- Crowest, F.J. 1908 (1899). *Beethoven*. London: J.M. Dent.
- Dahlhaus, C. 1982. "Fiktive Zwölftönmusik: Thomas Mann und Theodor W. Adorno" *Deutsche Akademie für Sprache und Dichtung Jahrbuch* pp. 33-49.
- Dahlhaus, C. 1989 (1978). *The Idea of Absolute Music* (transl. Roger Lustig). U. of Chicago P.
- Deleuze, G., Guattari, F. 1987. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (transl. Brian Massumi). Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota P.

- Derrida, J. 1976. *Of Grammatology* (transl. G.C. Spivak). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U.P.
- Derrida, J. 1982. "Différance" in *Margins of Philosophy*. Brighton: Harvester.
- Derrida, J. 1987 (1978). *The Truth in Painting* (transl. G. Bennington & I. McLeod). U. of Chicago P.
- Derrida, J. 1988. *Limited Inc.* Illinois: Northwestern U.P.
- Detels, C. 1992. "Soft Boundaries and Relatedness: Paradigm for a Postmodern Feminist Musical Aesthetics" *Boundary2* 19(2), pp. 184-204.
- Dunsby, J. 1982. "A Hitch Hiker's Guide to Semiotic Music Analysis" *Music Analysis* 1(3), pp. 235-42.
- Dunsby, J., Whittall, A. 1988. *Music Analysis in Theory and Practice*. London & Boston: Faber Music.
- Durant, A. 1984. *Conditions of Music*. London & Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Easthope, A. 1991. "Musicology" in *British Poststructuralism since 1968*. London: Routledge, pp. 124-29.
- Eco, U. 1984 (1979). *The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts*. Indiana: Bloomington U.P.
- Edgecombe, R.S. 1991. "The Nature of Literary Interludes" *Durham University Journal* 83(2), pp. 253-57.
- Edgecombe, R.S. 1993. "Melophrasis: Defining a Distinctive Genre of Literature/Music as Dialogue" *Mosaic* 26(4), pp. 1-20.
- Egri, P. 1988. *Literature, Painting and Music: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Comparative Literature*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
- Einstein, A. 1958. *Essays on Music*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Feher, F. 1975. "Negative Philosophy of Music - Positive Results" *New German Critique* 4, pp. 99-111.
- Foucault, M. 1988 (1965). *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (transl. Richard Howard). New York: Vintage Books.
- Goldstein, J. 1991. *A Beethoven Enigma: Performance Practice and the Piano Sonata, Opus 111*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Grim, W.E. 1988. *The Faust Legend in Music and Literature*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellin.
- Gross, H. 1986. "Parody, Reminiscence, Critique: Aspects of Modernist Style" in Chefdor, M., Quinones, R., Wachtel, A. (eds.) *Modernism: Challenges and Perspectives*. Urbana & Chicago: U. of Illinois P., pp. 128-45.
- Heller, E. 1958. *The Ironic German: A Study of Thomas Mann* London: Secker and Warburg.
- Henius, C. 1981. "Die wirkliche und die erdachte Musik im Roman *Doktor Faustus* von Thomas Mann: Eine Studie der Beziehungen zwischen Thomas Mann, Theodor W. Adorno und Arnold Schönberg" *Neuland* 1, pp. 61-65.
- Hertz, D.M. 1987. *The Tuning of the Word: The Musico-Literary Poetics of the Symbolist Movement*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois U.P.
- Higgins, J. 1991. "Critical Cinema and the Reality of Reflection" in Criticos, C., Prinsloo, J. (eds.) *Media Matters in South Africa*. Durban U.P., pp. 110-22.
- Hoyt, R.J. 1985. "Reader-Response and Implication-Realization" *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 43(3), pp. 281-90.

- Ingarden, R, 1986. *The Work of Music and the problem of its Identity* (transl. Adam Czerniawski). London and Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Jackendoff, R., Lerdahl, F. 1977. "Toward a Formal Theory of Tonal Music" *Journal of Music Theory* 21, pp. 111-71.
- Jackendoff, R., Lerdahl, F. 1980. *A Deep Parallel between Music and Language*. Bloomington: Indiana University Linguistics Club.
- Jackendoff, R., Lerdahl, F. 1990 (1983). *A Generative Theory of Tonal Music*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Jackson, R. 1981. *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion*. London: New Accents.
- Jacobs, R.L. 1961. "Beethoven and Kant" *Music and Letters* 42, pp. 242-51.
- Jameson, F. 1971. *Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Language*. Princeton U.P.
- Jay, M. 1984. *Adorno*. Cambridge: Harvard U.P.
- Keiler, A.R. 1981. "Two Views of Musical Semiotics" in Steiner, W. (ed.) *The Sign in Music and Literature*. U. of Texas P., pp. 138-68.
- Kerman, J. 1966. *The Beethoven Quartets*. London: Oxford U.P.
- Kerman, J. 1977. "Tovey's Beethoven" in Tyson, A. (ed.) *Beethoven Studies 2*. Oxford U.P., pp. 172-91.
- Kerman, J. 1985. *Contemplating Music: Challenges to Musicology*. Cambridge: Harvard U.P.
- Kramer, L. 1988. "Expressive Doubling: Beethoven's Two-Movement Piano Sonatas and Romantic Literature" *Studies in Romanticism* 27(2), pp. 175-201.
- Kramer, L. 1990. *Music as Cultural Practice, 1800-1900*. Berkeley: U. of California P.
- Kundera, M. 1990. *The Art of the Novel*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Lacan, J. 1981 (1973). *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* (transl. Alan Sheridan). London & New York: W.W. Norton.
- Landon, H.C.R. (ed.) 1992. *Beethoven: His Life, Work and World*. London: Thames & Hudson.
- Langer, S.K. 1942. *Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite and Art*. New York: New American Library of World Literature.
- Laplanche, J., Pontalis, J-B. 1973 (1967). *The Language of Psycho-Analysis* (transl. D. Nicholson-Smith). New York & London: W.W. Norton.
- Lenneberg, H. 1980. "The Myth of the Unappreciated (Musical) Genius" *The Musical Quarterly* 66(2), pp. 219-29.
- Lichtenberg, J.D. 1984. "The Late Works and Styles of Eugene O'Neill, Henry James, and Ludwig van Beethoven" in Gedo, J.E. (ed.) *Psychoanalysis as an Intellectual Discipline*. New York: International Universities P., pp. 297-319.
- Lindsay, J.M. *Thomas Mann*. Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1954.
- Ludwig, E. 1943. *Beethoven: Life of a Conqueror*. (transl. G.S. McManus) London: Hutchinson.
- Maconie, R. 1990. *The Concept of Music*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Maegaard, J. 1974. "Schönberg hat Adorno nie leiden können" *Melos* 41(5), pp. 262-64.

- Mallarmé, S. 1957. *Poems* (transl. C.F. MacIntyre). Berkeley: U. of California P.
- Mann, T. 1947a. *Doktor Faustus: Das Leben des deutschen Tonsetzers Adrian Leverkühn, erzählt von einem Freunde*. Stockholm: Bermann-Fischer.
- Mann, T. 1947b. *Essays of Three Decades* (transl. H.T. Lowe-Porter). New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Mann, T. 1948. *Doctor Faustus: The Life of the German Composer Adrian Leverkühn as Told by a Friend* (Transl. H.T. Lowe-Porter). New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Mann, T. 1959. *Last Essays* (transl. Richard and Clara Winston, Tania and James Stern). London: Secker and Warburg.
- Mann, T. 1961 (1949). *The Story of a Novel: The Genesis of Doctor Faustus* (transl. Richard & Clara Winston). London: Secker & Warburg.
- Mann, T. 1964. "Humour and Irony: Remarks in a Radio Discussion" in Hatfield, H. (ed.) *Thomas Mann: A Selection of Critical Essays*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., pp. 170-72.
- McClary, S. 1991. *Feminine Endings: Music, Gender and Sexuality*. Oxford: U. of Minnesota P.
- McGlathery, J.M. (ed.) 1991. *Music and German Literature: Their Relationship since the Middle Ages*. Columbia: Camden House.
- Mellers, W. 1983. *Beethoven and the Voice of God*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Milne, A.F. 1925. *Beethoven: the Pianoforte Sonatas, v II*. London: Oxford U.P.
- Mowitt, J. 1992. *Text: The Genealogy of an Antidisciplinary Object*. Durham: Duke U.P.
- Narmour, E. 1977. *Beyond Schenkerism: The Need for Alternatives in Musical Analysis*. U. of Chicago P.
- Nattiez, J-J. 1977. "The Contribution of Musical Semiotics to the Semiotic Discussion in General" in Sebeok, T.A.(ed.) *A Perfusion of Signs: Advances in Semiotics*. Indiana U.P., Bloomington, pp. 120-42.
- Nattiez, J-J. 1982. "Varèse's 'Density 21.5': A Study in Semiological Analysis" (transl. Anna M. Barry) *Music Analysis* 1(3), pp. 244-340.
- Nattiez, 1985. "The Concepts of Plot and Seriation Process in Music" (transl. Catherine Dale) *Music Analysis* 4(1/2), 1985, pp. 107-18.
- Nattiez, J-J. 1989a. *Proust as Musician* (transl. Derrick Puffet). Cambridge U.P.
- Nattiez, J-J. 1989b. "Reflections on the Development of Semiology in Music" (transl. Katherine Ellis) *Music Analysis* 8(1-2), pp. 21-75.
- Nattiez, J-J. 1990. *Music and Discourse: Towards a Semiology of Music* (transl. Carolyn Abbate). Princeton U.P.
- Neubauer, J. 1986. *The Emancipation of Music from Language: Departure from Mimesis in Eighteenth Century Aesthetics*. New Haven: Yale U.P.
- Newman, E. 1927. *The Unconscious Beethoven: A Study in Musical Psychology*. London: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Nicolosi, R.J. 1980. "T.S. Eliot and Music: An Introduction" *The Musical Quarterly* 66(2), 192-204.

- Nietzsche, F. 1909. *The Birth of Tragedy, or Hellenism and Pessimism* (transl. W.A. Haussman). London: Foulis.
- Nietzsche, F. 1967. *The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner* (transl. Walter Kaufmann). New York: Vintage Books.
- Norris, C. (ed.) 1989. *Music and the Politics of Culture* New York: St Martin's Press.
- Orlov, H. 1981. "Towards a Semiotics of Music" in Steiner, W. (ed.) *The Sign in Music and Literature*. U. of Texas P., Austin, pp. 131-37.
- Oswald, V.A. 1948. "Thomas Mann's *Doctor Faustus*: The Enigma of Frau von Tolna" in *The Germanic Review* 23(4), pp. 249-53.
- Paddison, M. 1991. "The Language Character of Music: Some Motifs in Adorno" *Journal of the Royal Musical Association* 116(2), pp. 267-79.
- Pater, W. 1948. "The School of Giorgione" in *Selected Works* (ed. Richard Aldington). London: Heinemann, pp. 269-84.
- Pattison, G. 1990. "Music, Madness and Mephistopheles: Art and Nihilism in Thomas Mann's *Doctor Faustus*" in Jasper, D., Crowder, C. (eds.) *European Literature and Theology in the Twentieth Century: Ends of Time*. London: Macmillan.
- Putz, P. 1971. "Thomas Mann und Nietzsche" in Putz, P. (ed.) *Thomas Mann und die Tradition*. Frankfurt: Athenaum, pp. 225-49.
- Rabinowitz, P.J. 1985. "Circumstantial Evidence: Musical Analysis and Theories of Reading" *Mosaic* 18(4), pp. 159-73.
- Raffman, D. 1993. *Language, Music and Mind* Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Reif, J. 1983. "Adrian Leverkühn, Arnold Schönberg, Theodor Adorno: Theorists Real and Fictitious in Thomas Mann's *Doctor Faustus*" *Journal of the Arnold Schönberg Institute* 7(1), pp. 102-12.
- Reinecke, C. 1897. *The Beethoven Piano Sonatas: Letters to a Lady* (transl E.M. Trevenen Dawson). Augener, London.
- Reinecke, C. 1905. *De Piano-Sonaten van Ludwig von Beethoven*. Scheltens & Giltar, Amsterdam.
- Rosen, C. 1971. *The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Sadie, S. (ed.) 1980. *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*. New York: Macmillan.
- Said, E.W. 1991. *Musical Elaborations*. New York: Columbia U.P.
- Salsbury, J. 1931. *A Concise Analysis of Beethoven's 32 Piano Sonatas*. London: Weekes.
- Saussure, F. de 1983. *Course in General Linguistics* (transl. Roy Harris). London: Duckworth.
- Schenker, H. 1930. "Rameau oder Beethoven? Erstarrung oder geistiges Leben in der Musik?" in *Das Meisterwerk in der Musik*, vol 3. Munich: Drei Masken.
- Schenker, H. 1971 (1960). *Beethoven: Die letzten Sonaten: Sonate C Moll Op.111*. Vienna: Universal.
- Schenker, H. 1979 (1935). *Free Composition: Vol III of New Musical Theories and Fantasies* (transl. & ed. Ernst Oster). New York & London: Longman.
- Scher, S.P. 1982. "Literature and Music" in Barricelli, J-P., Gibaldi, J. (eds.) *Interrelations of Literature*. New York: MLA, pp. 225-50.

- Scher, S.P. 1983. "Theory in Literature, Analysis in Music: What Next?" *Yearbook of Comparative and General Literature* 32, pp. 50-60.
- Schneider, H.J. 1991. "Response to Bahr" in Lehnert, H., Pfeiffer, P.C. (eds.) *Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus: A Novel at the Margin of Modernism*. Columbia: Camden House, pp. 161-66.
- Schoolfield, G.C. 1992. "Rilke and Music: A Negative View" in McGlathery, J.M. (ed.) *Music and German Literature: Their Relationship since the Middle Ages*. Columbia: Camden House, pp. 269-91.
- Schopenhauer, A. 1958 (1818) *The World as Will and Representation* (transl. E.F.J. Payne). New York: Dover.
- Scott, M.M. 1943 (1934). *Beethoven*. London: Dent.
- Seashore, C.E. 1981. *In Search of Beauty in Music: A Scientific Approach to Musical Aesthetics*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Sharpe, R.A. 1984. "The Private Reader and the Listening Public" in Hawthorn, J. (ed.) *Criticism and Cultural Theory*. London: Edward Arnold, pp. 15-26.
- Shepherd, J. 1977. "The Musical Coding of Ideologies" in Shepherd, J., Virden, P., Vulliamy, G., Wishart, T. (eds.) *Whose Music? A Sociology of Musical Languages*. London: Latimer, pp. 69-124.
- Silverman, K. 1981. "Kaspar Hauser's 'Terrible Fall' into Narrative" *New German Critique* 24, pp. 73-93.
- Slonimsky, N. 1953. *Lexicon of Musical Invective: Critical Assaults on Composers since Beethoven's Time*. New York: Coleman-Ross.
- Solomon, M. 1977. "Beethoven and his Nephew: A Reappraisal" in Tyson, A. (ed.) *Beethoven Studies* 2. Oxford U.P., pp. 138-71.
- Solomon, M. 1980 (1978). *Beethoven*. London: Granada.
- Steiner, G. 1967 (1958). *Language and Silence: Essays 1958-1966*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Sterba, E., Sterba, R., 1971 (1954). *Beethoven and his Nephew: A Psychoanalytic Study of their Relationship*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Subotnik, R.R. 1976. "Adorno's Analysis of Beethoven's Late Style: Early Symptom of a Fatal Condition" *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 29(2), pp. 242-75.
- Sullivan, J.W.N. 1933. *Beethoven*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Thayer, A.W. 1960. *The Life of Ludwig van Beethoven* (3 Vols.). London: Centaur Press.
- Tovey, D.F. 1948 (1931). *A Companion to Beethoven's Piano Sonatas* London: Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music.
- Veget, H.R. 1991. "Mann, Joyce, Wagner: The Question of Modernism in *Doctor Faustus*" in Lehnert, H., Pfeiffer, P.C. (eds.) *Thomas-Mann's Doctor Faustus: A Novel at the Margin of Modernism*. Columbia: Camden House, pp. 167-92.
- Von Geyses, R. 1963. "A Philosopher in Music: Ludwig van Beethoven's Contribution to Music" *Lantern*, pp. 73-80.
- Von Gronicka, A. 1948. "Thomas Mann's *Doctor Faustus*: Prolegomena to an Interpretation" *The Germanic Review* 23(3), pp. 206-18.
- Wagner, R. 1872 (1870). *Beethoven* (transl. Albert R.

Parsons). Indianapolis.

- Wallace, R. 1986a. *Beethoven's Critics: Aesthetic Dilemmas and Resolutions During the Composer's Lifetime*. Cambridge U.P.
- Wallace, R.K. 1986b. *Emily Brontë and Beethoven: Romantic Equilibrium in Fiction and Music*. Athens: U. of Georgia P.
- Zaenker, K.A. 1981. "String Quartets in Prose" *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature* 8(4), pp. 508-22.
- Zuidervaart, L. 1991. *Adorno's Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of Illusion*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.