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**The Merits of the Human Security Paradigm:  
A Materialist Account of Peasant Insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa**

**Ryan Lobban**

**LBBRYA001**

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of the requirements for the award of the degree of  
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## COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

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## **Dedication**

This work is dedicated with love and a lot of gratitude to my father. Thank you for providing me with the privilege of the education I have been fortunate enough to receive, as well as all your support and compassion during my years of study.

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## Abstract

Contemporary food security concerns in sub-Saharan Africa centre on the pertinence of food versus fuel forms of production. As the global energy market enters into the post-fossil-fuel epoch, the demand on land for commercial biofuel and feedstock production threatens the livelihood of sub-Saharan Africa's sizeable peasant community. This paper examines the theoretical and paradigmatic attributes of the human security and food security rubric, and its pertinence in accounting for the social threats which threaten individuals within an increasingly interconnected global economic system. While the emergence of these neologisms of the critical security studies school represent a marked divergence from that of the traditional approach of understanding security threats, they remained mired in contestation due to their lack of theoretical parsimony. This paper attempts to redress these contestations by accounting for human and food insecurity through a materialist framework of analysis. It is argued that the paradigm's relevance lies in its ability to account for structural forms of violence; a violence superlative within imperialist relations. Human insecurity is thus endemic to the structural relations and structural inequalities of the global capitalist system. Through the integration of human security and Marxian agrarian political economy, the paradigm's academic relevance is truly revealed. As such the contemporary debate surrounding food insecurity and land expropriation for biofuel production must be understood in terms of the historical usurpation of structural violence upon the highly vulnerable individual. The paper attempts to frame sub-Saharan Africa's human insecurity as the historical product of agrarian commodification. An analysis of Tanzania's agrarian dynamics demonstrates the pertinence of the paradigm's academic significance.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

It is widely accepted that the contemporary global economy has precipitated a rescaling of economic space. It denotes a degree of denationalization regarding the manner in which economic activity, and many of the spillovers thereof, become increasingly interregional and multicontinental; “transcending the bounded national economic space.”<sup>1</sup> Whilst the growing interdependence of states within an integrated economic system produces a global division of labour, economic differentiation and functional integration, the spillovers of such developments are felt well outside the economic spheres of society. Within this context, scholarly and policy endeavour relating to security threats has been mired by contestation. In essence this contestation is reflected in the debate between critical security studies of the post-Cold War era, and the predecessor of the realist or traditional approach to security studies. Under the former, the rubric of human security has emerged. Supposedly, the analytical coherence of the paradigm resides in its ability to account for threats which transcend the state-centric militaristic notion of security. Emphasis is placed on the security of the individual, rather than that of the territorial sovereignty of the state.

This dissertation explores the merits and pitfalls of the human and food security paradigm. This delineation will be undertaken through a critical theory framework of analysis. The critical theory approach emphasises the need to broaden the approach taken towards threats and rejects the primacy of state-centric notions of security. The approach adopts a materialist account of insecurity, utilising Marxian political economy to critique global capitalism’s role in engendering individual insecurity.<sup>2</sup> This is in part due to what Ake terms the contradictory evolution of global capitalism. Whilst the spread of global capitalism creates uniformities regarding “efficient” economic practices and policies, the process is also mired by a tendency to fragment, differentiate and marginalize the weaker social forces; forces which are often exploited in order to advance capitalist accumulation.<sup>3</sup> According to Salih, this primarily due to the manner in which market elements of neo-liberal globalization

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<sup>1</sup> McGrew, A. 2007. “Introduction”, in McGrew, A. and Poku, N. (eds.), *Globalization, Development and Human Security* (Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 4

<sup>2</sup> Lawson, S. 2003. *International Relations* (Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 88

<sup>3</sup> Nabudere, D. 200. “Globalization, the African Post-colonial State, Post-Traditionalism and the New World Order” in Nabudere, D (ed.) *Globalization and the Post-Colonial African State* (Harare: AAPS Books), pp. 12

are more resolute with the security of financial institutions and corporate interests than that of the human security ramifications thereof.<sup>4</sup>

At the outset, it is argued that human security remains a paradigm within international relations enquiry; and not a theory. As a paradigm it thus does not possess theoretical parsimony. However, this does not render the paradigm ineffectual as an academic tool. Secondly, an attempt will be made to delineate some of the paradigms core merits. Thirdly, it will be argued that the human security paradigm is rendered more theoretically robust when addressed from a materialist perspective. The paradigm strengths lies in its ability to account for Johan Galtung's notion of structural violence<sup>5</sup>, which is embedded within capitalist relations. The final two chapters attempt to delineate how structural violence is embedded within contemporary food insecurity concerns within sub-Saharan Africa and Tanzania, respectively. Concurrently, food security concerns within the agrarian setting of sub-Saharan Africa centre on the food-versus-fuel debate. Diminishing fossil-fuel reserves coupled with changing global dietary patterns and increased emphasis on biofuel production is argued to be contributing to increased demand pressure on arable land. Within the agrarian setting of sub-Saharan Africa, these dynamics threaten the livelihood of smallholder agrarian livelihoods.

It is argued that food security concerns are the manifestation of structural violence, engendered through the historical process of the commodification of agrarian relationships. Emphasis is placed upon how food insecurity emerges as a result of the historical subordination and domination of the peasantry. The legacy and continuation of food and human insecurity faced by the peasantry remains a product of "the relations of exploitation engendered by imperialist domination of the small peasant, mediated through local classes ..."<sup>6</sup> The peasantry's entitlement to specific livelihood patterns is slowly threatened, via a "reproductive squeeze", as the peasantry is increasingly integrated into agro-industrial relations.

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<sup>4</sup> Salih, M. 2001. Globalization and Human Insecurity in Africa, in Assefa, T. et al, (eds.) *Globalization, Democracy and Development in Africa: Challenges and Prospects*. (Addis Ababa: OSSREA), pp. 65

<sup>5</sup> Galtung, J. 1969. "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3)

<sup>6</sup> Shivji, I. 1992. "The Roots of an Agrarian Crisis in Tanzania: A Theoretical Perspective", in Foster. P. and Maghimbi, S. (eds.), *The Tanzanian Peasantry: Economy in Crisis* (Aldershot: Avebury), pp. 142

## 1.1 A Paradigm and Theory

At the outset of this paper it seems necessary to delineate what constitutes a paradigm, and what distinguishes a paradigm from that of an international relations theory. The distinction remains significant for the subsequent argument as much of the contestation around the human security rubric relates to its parsimony as a theoretical tool; both in scholarly and policy disciplines. The debate to follow deals primarily with the former of these domains.

Theory within international relations is regarded as possessing research guiding properties and operates as a prudent framework for the simplification of observable facts. In many regards it is the adoption of the positivist methodology of the purely scientific realm into that of the social sciences. At a narrow level Stephen van Evera defines theories as “general statements that describe and explain the causes or effects of classes of phenomena. They are composed of causal laws or hypotheses, explanations and antecedent conditions.”<sup>7</sup> While theories can be either explanatory, normative or prescriptive in nature, they maintain these general dynamics or functions. In addition, theories serve to “improve our analytical competences... question or challenge our world views.”<sup>8</sup> Whether the prescriptive dynamics of the theory focus attention on actors, processes or structures, international relations theories can serve to extrapolate an explanation for the constitution, or dimensions of data, by placing these in perspective.

Undoubtedly the most significant discussion of the paradigm can be found in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, despite the contestation that surrounds the applicability of this term. Written in 1962, Thomas S. Kuhn’s *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* attempts to demarcate the development, practice and history of modern science. Various authors have attempted to utilize the writings of Thomas Kuhn within the fields of political science and sociology. According to David Hollinger the publication of the book has been momentous due to its subsequent application in answering a variety of questions in various fields of inquiry outside the purely scientific realm. Firstly, Kuhn’s writings have become monumental in answering “how, if at all, can Kuhn’s sense of historical development can enrich political, cultural, and intellectual history and other fields outside the history of

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<sup>7</sup> Jørgensen, E. 2010. *International Relations Theory: A New Introduction* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 10

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 8

science?”<sup>9</sup> Secondly, questions have been asked about the normative implications of Kuhn’s “philosophy of science-his sense of validity” and the manner in which these tenets can be utilized in improving the quality of knowledge produced outside the scientific realm. While Kuhn’s writings were explicitly concerned with the natural science he himself nonetheless perceived his insights as relevant to sociology and the social psychology of scientists.<sup>10</sup> According to Hollinger, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* excites the imagination of working historians chiefly because much of what it says about scientific communities seems to apply so strikingly to other kinds of communities.”<sup>11</sup>

Kuhn’s understanding of the nature and historiography of scientific inquiry has subsequently become a “methodological postulate” for understanding the history of inquiry within other non-scientific communities.<sup>12</sup> Central to Kuhn’s philosophy of science was the notion that effective scientific inquiry was highly dependent upon the use of paradigms.<sup>13</sup> According to Kuhn, a paradigm has two central characteristics. Firstly, a paradigm is “sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity.” Secondly, it is sufficiently “open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the refined group of practitioners to resolve.”<sup>14</sup> Kuhn subsequently distinguished between two senses of paradigms: the “disciplinary matrix”, which consists of “the entire set of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community” and; “exemplars” the exact, “concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science.”<sup>15</sup> The former of these two has gained limited merit within the discipline of political science. The exact definition of a paradigm within Kuhn’s work has been subject to such incongruity that as many as twenty-one different ambiguous uses of the term have been found within the 1962 text.<sup>16</sup> Nonetheless, according to Janos the normative implications of the Kuhnian paradigm is that paradigms operate as constructs for identifying broad

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<sup>9</sup> Hollinger, D. 1973. “T.S. Kuhn’s Theory of Science and Its Implications for History”, *The American Historical Review*, 78(2), pp. 371

<sup>10</sup> Kuhn, T. 1962. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (London: The University of Chicago Press), pp. 8

<sup>11</sup> Hollinger, D. 1973. “T.S. Kuhn’s Theory of Science and Its Implications for History”, pp. 371

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 373

<sup>13</sup> Janos, A. 1986. *Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Change in Social Science* (California: Stanford University Press), pp. 1

<sup>14</sup> Kuhn, T. 1962. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 10

<sup>15</sup> Hollinger, D. 1973. “T.S. Kuhn’s Theory of Science and Its Implications for History”, pp. 373

<sup>16</sup> Foster-Carter, A. 1976. “From Rustow to Gunder Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment”, *World Development*, 4(3), pp. 168

relationships between multiple categories, together with some underlying presuppositions regarding the nature of the larger world. Defined in this manner, paradigms “are not theories, for they do not provide explanations only instructions as to where to go for explanations...they allow us to organize research and, by structuring intellectual curiosity, provide an appropriate focus for scientific disciplines.”<sup>17</sup> Thus, paradigms are essential in creating a foci point for initial scientific inquiry.<sup>18</sup> They operate, often even unconsciously, as a “pre-theoretical entity, a set of domain assumptions which in a very strong sense serve to define the field of study.”<sup>19</sup>

For Kuhn the use of such paradigms and “of the more esoteric type of research it permits is a sign of maturity in the development of any given scientific field.”<sup>20</sup> The paradigm is seen as “a model from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research.”<sup>21</sup> When scientists “disagree about whether the fundamental problems of their field have been solved, the search for rules gains a function that it does not ordinarily possess. While paradigms remain secure, however, they *can* function without agreement over rationalization or without any attempted rationalization at all.”<sup>22</sup> However, the road from a paradigm towards a firm research consensus is “extraordinarily arduous.”<sup>23</sup> Of concern to Kuhn was the process by which paradigmatic traditions lost their constituencies. Since paradigms are largely disciplines of a specific time, transition from one tradition to another was likely to occur within the historical progression of science. The notions of “anomaly,” “crisis,” and “paradigm-shift” (or “revolution”) are all elements which Kuhn foresaw as part of the process by which paradigmatic traditions would encounter change.<sup>24</sup> For Kuhn, the scientific community is often reluctant to abandon the preceding paradigm. Bound by emotion and obstinate intellectual commitment, the scientific community may eventually “lose faith and then consider alternatives, [but] they do not renounce the paradigm that has led them to crisis. They do not, that is, treat anomalies as counterinstances.”<sup>25</sup> For Kuhn, a community may eventually go through the full cycle of “(1) secure tradition, (2) novelty and

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<sup>17</sup> Janos, A. 1986. *Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Change in Social Science*, pp. 1

<sup>18</sup> Kuhn, T. 1962. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 27

<sup>19</sup> Foster-Carter, A. 1976. “From Rustow to Gunder Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment”, pp. 168

<sup>20</sup> Kuhn, T. 1962. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 11

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 10

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 49

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 15

<sup>24</sup> Hollinger, D. 1973. “T.S. Kuhn’s Theory of Science and Its Implications for History”, pp. 374

<sup>25</sup> Janos, A. 1986. *Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Change in Social Science*, pp. 2

confusion, (3) disagreement over whether to resist innovation or encourage it, and if the latter, in what direction, (4) coalescence around certain candidate that might become (5) another secure tradition.”<sup>26</sup>

For certain academics<sup>27</sup> an application of Kuhn to the “imperfect knowledge” disciplines of social science is to encourage the imposition of arbitrary and tight research consensus on disciplines so as to make it appear a nearer approximate to the natural sciences.<sup>28</sup> Since Kuhn is concerned with the natural sciences, an application of his provocative ideas to the social sciences are likely to be problematic in principle. These concerns lie beyond the scope of discussion but nonetheless deserve some mention. For Kuhn, the social sciences existed in a pre-paradigm situation.<sup>29</sup> While he saw the pre-paradigm stage and paradigm stage as different he nonetheless notes that the competing pre-paradigm stages are “guided by something much like a paradigm.”<sup>30</sup> Within the realm of natural sciences, Kuhn saw paradigms as defined by their predecessors. According to Aider Foster-Carter, Kuhn’s depiction of paradigm development was such that once the history of a science had begun with the founding of the ruling paradigm, “its development proceeds diachronously: there is one (and only one) paradigm, until with the emergence of an anomaly this is replaced (without any sort interregnum) by another paradigm, and so on.”<sup>31</sup> This postulation is vastly different to the social sciences, where no one paradigm has acquired complete overarching saliency.

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<sup>26</sup> Hollinger, D. 1973. “T.S. Kuhn’s Theory of Science and Its Implications for History”, pp. 374

<sup>27</sup> Hill, L. and Eckberg, D. 1979. “The Paradigm Concept and Sociology: A Critical Review”, *American Sociological Review*, 44(6)

<sup>28</sup> Hollinger, D. 1973. “T.S. Kuhn’s Theory of Science and Its Implications for History”, pp. 384

<sup>29</sup> Kuhn, T. 1962. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, pp. x

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, pp. xi

<sup>31</sup> Foster-Carter, A. 1976. “From Rustow to Gunder Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment”, pp. 170

## 1.2 Conclusion

While Kuhn's use of the paradigm was intended for the natural sciences, the use of the term "paradigm" as a cognitive pre-theoretical device is argued to be pertinent to any heuristic endeavour. While not a theory, a paradigm may be defined as a set of basic beliefs (or metaphysics) that deals with the first principles; a "worldview that defines for its holder, the nature of the world and the individuals place in it."<sup>32</sup> The subsequent debate will attempt to give credence to the paradigm of human and food security; and the manner in which it possess the two central elements of the Kuhnian paradigm.

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<sup>32</sup> Guba, E. and Lincoln, Y. "Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research", in Denzin, N and Lincoln, Y. (eds.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (Sage: Thousand Oaks), pp. 107

## Chapter 2: The Historical Background and Paradigmatic Attributes of Human and Food Security

The superfluity of literature pertaining to the human security paradigm prevents a full account of its numerous conceptualizations and critiques. At a broad level of abstraction this has been elicited by the ontological, epistemological, and normative multidimensionality of the rubric itself. While the general impetus of the current debate pertains to food security concerns, it is nonetheless necessary to delineate some of the core paradigmatic attributes, both positive and negative, of the overarching rubric that is human security.

### 2.1 The Antecedents and Attributes of Human Security

The phrase “human security” is most commonly associated with the *1994 Human Development Report* on human security, drafted and campaigned by Mahbub ul Haq. The central impetus of the report was to forward the central normative freedoms of the United Nations; that of “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear.” The report acknowledged that the founders of the United Nations had entitled favour to the latter of these two components, a judgment which had predicated the dominance of state-centric military interpretations of national security.<sup>33</sup> The neologism of human security proposed within the 1994 Report supposedly marked a divergence away from the traditionalist state-centric notion of security. According to the *1994 Human Development Report*:

For too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states. For too long, security has been equated with threats to a country’s borders. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their security. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime – these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> UNDP. 1994. *Human Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 24

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 3

At a fundamental level, the human security concept seeks to redress the essential notion of whom is protected and how that protection is afforded. The approach takes individuals, rather than states, as the referent object for security, and does so in a manner which emphasises a holistic, long-term view of security that seeks to acknowledge structural inequalities.<sup>35</sup> According to the 1994 Report, the attainment of human security is dependent upon two dynamics; “The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want.”<sup>36</sup> Accordingly, the proclamation would suggest that freedom from fear is intended to indicate freedom from violence, while the freedom from want phrase would suggest freedom from poverty. In addition to the above the 1994 report made several other assertions regarding the four central attributes of human security. Firstly, human security is conceived as a “universal concern” in as much as these concerns are common to all of the worlds people. Secondly, the components of human security are interdependent as the consequences of these concerns travel the globe. Thirdly, human security is “easier to ensure through early prevention” of its upstream threats than via latter intervention. Finally, human security is people centred and is concerned with the ability of people to exercise choices and their access to market and social opportunities.<sup>37</sup> As the report itself notes, the definition of human security is seen as distinct from notions of human development<sup>38</sup> as defined within the preceding *Human Development Report*. While these concepts are seen as distinct it is nonetheless acknowledged that they are linked. The key premises of the 1994 UNDP Report developed this definition of human security in relation to several dimensions of economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security.<sup>39</sup>

The 1994 UNDP Report lists the aforementioned threats and notes, one of the key problems with the notion of human security is that “human security is most easily identified through its absence than its presence.”<sup>40</sup> While each dimension of the human security concept is delineated within the report, the notion of human security and its interdependent

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<sup>35</sup> Hendricks, C. 2006. “From State Security to Human Security in Southern Africa: Policy Research and Capacity Building Challenges”, *Institute for Security Studies*, No. 122, p. 3

<sup>36</sup> UNDP. 1994. *Human Development Report*, pp. 24

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 23

<sup>38</sup> Human Development is defined as the process of widening the range of people’s choices.

<sup>39</sup> UNDP. 1994. *Human Development Report*, pp. 25

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 23

constitutive elements have been subject to much critique because consensus is yet to be reached on the core values of the terms.

Subsequent to the 1994 UNDP Report various attempts have been made to offer a more scholarly precise definition of human security. This has been done not only in an attempt to provide an operational sense of the term, but also a more precise theoretical framework. A central problem with this endeavour is the broad nature of the rubric of human security. It is important to note that human security has both qualitative and quantitative aspects. At one level the notion of human security is concerned with the ability of the individual to attain the basic material needs. At another level the notion of human security pertains to a moral dimension concerning the achievement of human dignity. This dimension relates to a more moral-philosophical dimension regarding the personal autonomy of the individual.<sup>41</sup>

During the year 2000 Kofi Annan delineated the following broad description of human security:

Human security, in its broadest sense, embraces far more than absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human – and therefore national – security.<sup>42</sup>

This multidimensionality has entailed that the paradigm has been further extrapolated and propagated based upon the following four perspectives. The human rights perspective has given credence to the normative elements of the framework, believing that the protection of basic liberties is of the foremost importance for the attainment of human security. The feminist perspective utilises the term to challenge the patriarchal nature of the traditionalist approach towards security studies and security structures. The developmentalist literature

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<sup>41</sup> Thomas, C. 1999. "Introduction", in Wilkin, P. And Thomas, C. (eds.), *Globalization, Human Security, and the African Experience* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 3

<sup>42</sup> Annan, K. 2000. "Secretary-General Salutes International Workshop on Human Security in Mongolia." Two-Day Session in Ulaanbaatar. Available from: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000508.sgsm7382.doc.html> [Accessed: 10/06/2010]

has tended to utilise the paradigm in tandem with the notion of human development, despite criticism regarding the conflation of the two terms; since development is the creation of choices and human security is the ability in exercising specific choices. This approach does not rank the priorities of human security but sees the threats to human life as wide and varying.<sup>43</sup> The globalist perspective places human security within the context of global security, whereby the latter can not be achieved in isolation from the former, and visa versa. The perspective places much emphasis on the role of the global governance structure for the attainment of this goal, which in itself has been subject to much contestation. Albeit, the four above mentioned perspectives have attempted to utilize the paradigm of human security, a Marxist perspective of the term remains grossly underrepresented within the present literature. Nonetheless, consensus and coherence is yet to be reached due to the severe breadth and depth of the term human security. Consensus regarding the core values of the paradigm remain elusive and have been the topic of various scholarly endeavours to offer a more theoretically robust and sound delineation of the concept.

## 2.2 The Antecedents and Attributes of Food Security

Food security falls within the broader rubric of human security. The prominence of the concept can be traced back to the 1975 World Food Conference. During this period, the pertinence of the concept was strongly related to the global shortfall in world food production following a spike in global oil prices in the early 1970's. The first official definition of food security was published in 1974 and defined the concept as "the availability at all times of adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices."<sup>44</sup> At this outset the notion of food security entailed avoiding transitory shortfalls in the aggregate supply of food.<sup>45</sup> According to Staatz, the realization that inadequate levels of global food supply is not the sole cause of famine has contributed significantly to the

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<sup>43</sup> Akokpari, J. 2007. "The Political Economy of Human Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa", Visiting Research Fellow (VRF), *Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO)*, Series no. 431, (Japan: JETRO), pp. 5

<sup>44</sup> Patel, R. 2009. "Grassroots Voices: Food Sovereignty", *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 36(3), pp. 664

<sup>45</sup> Staatz, J. (et.al.) 1990. "Measuring Food Security in Africa: Conceptual, Empirical, and Policy Issues", *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 72(2), pp. 1311

broadening of the concept post-1970.<sup>46</sup> Such an account of food security had its genesis in Amartya Sen's *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation* written in 1981. The book extrapolated a debate for an account of famine based upon unequal access and inequalities built into the global food distribution mechanism, rather than the transitory shortfall account. Thus, food security has evolved to incorporate the chronic problems of inadequate access and unequal distribution at global and domestic levels.

According to Raj Patel the concept emerged during the epoch of the Sahelian famine, the zenith of demands for a New International Economic Order, and the peak of Third Worldist power. The contemporary neo-liberal era has entailed "the widening Gyre of food security."<sup>47</sup> According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), food security is defined as "a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for a healthy and active life."<sup>48</sup> The notion of food security does not, however, entail food self-sufficiency; the ability of a country to meet its domestic food needs through domestic production. Food security refers to the ability of individuals at the household level to obtain the required amount of food, whether this is produced locally or imported. The concept thus remains particularly complex due to the varying dimensions of food security, both at intra- and inter-national levels.

Concurrently, the definition of food security is dependent upon four dimensions of the concept. Food availability, "the availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production imports (including food aid); food access, "access by individuals to adequate resources (entitlements<sup>49</sup>) for acquiring appropriate foods; utilization, "through adequate diet, clean water, sanitation, and health care to reach a state of nutritional well-being where all psychological needs are met"; stability, "access to adequate food at all times."<sup>50</sup> The multiple dimensions of food security, as outlined above, are indeed far from clear cut and remain mired in academic contestation. A further

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<sup>46</sup> Staatz, J. (et.al.) 1990. "Measuring Food Security in Africa: Conceptual, Empirical, and Policy Issues", pp. 1311

<sup>47</sup> Patel, R. 2009. "Grassroots Voices: Food Sovereignty", pp. 664

<sup>48</sup> Tibaijuka, A. 2004. "Food Security in Africa: Agriculture, Trade, and the Environment", *New Economy*, 11(3), pp. 170

<sup>49</sup> United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization. 1996. "Food Security", *Policy Brief June 2006, Issue 2*. p. 1 According to the FAO, entitlements are defined as "a set of all commodity bundles over which a person can establish command given the legal, political, economic and social arrangements of the community in which they live (including traditional rights such as access to common resources).

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

dimension of the concept has emerged more recently. Under the leadership of Via Campesina at the World Food Summit of 1996 the notion of “food sovereignty” was introduced as a central component of food security. Accordingly, food sovereignty entailed the normative “right of each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its basic foods respecting cultural and productive diversity.” Critically, Patel notes that this element continues the trend to evade discussions regarding the parameters of social and economic control within the international food system.<sup>51</sup>

In light of the above, food security is said to have undergone three paradigmatic shifts. According to Simon Maxwell the conceptual development of food security is related to specific historical phases.<sup>52</sup> The first paradigm shift centred upon a shift of focus on food supply from the global and national level to the household and individual. Occurring between 1975-85, the shift prescribes that it is no longer possible to speak of food security as a problem of merely supply, without reference to dynamics of entitlement and access. Subsequently it is more usual to define food security as the problem of access, “with food production as the best route to entitlement, either directly for food producers, or indirectly by driving market prices down for consumers.”<sup>53</sup> Contestation remains as to whether the household or individual should take precedence as the unit of analysis. The stress within the subsequent debate will be on the individual access as it holds greater congruency with current definitions, the rubric of human security and the subsequent materialist account thereof.

The second shift concerns a shift from a food-first perspective to a livelihood perspective. Post 1985 food security has come to incorporate the notion of livelihood security. According to Steffano Ponte the notion of livelihood as it relates to food security concerns, is conceptualised as “the assets (natural, physical, human, financial and social capital), the activities, and the access to these (mediated by the institutions and social relations) that together determine the living gained by the individual or household.”<sup>54</sup> The paradigm shift dictates that we see livelihood security as “a necessary and often sufficient condition for

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<sup>51</sup> Patel, R. 2009. “Grassroots Voices: Food Sovereignty”, pp. 665

<sup>52</sup> Maxwell, S. 2001. “The Evolution of Thinking About Food Security”, in Maxwell, S. and Devereux, S. (eds.), *Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa* (London: ITDG), pp. 14

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 17

<sup>54</sup> Ponte, S. 2002. *Farmers and Markets in Tanzania: How Policy Reforms Affect Rural Livelihoods in Africa* (Oxford: James Currey), pp. 7

food security.”<sup>55</sup> This view entails a long-term focus whereby the individual or household is seen as a reproductive and productive unit. Such a view has been further discussed in the contestation surrounding the impact of cash versus food crops, and the impact therefore on the resilience and sensitivity of the unit.

The third and final shift of the conceptual development of the food security rubric has entailed a movement away from objective indicators towards subjective perception. The former of these dynamics centres on the manner in which poverty literature has favoured objective conditions and variables of deprivation.<sup>56</sup> Such variables include the target consumption levels and nutritional intakes. The objective dynamics have been subject to criticisms regarding their true objective nature, since they remain the product value judgements and, in their quantitative form, fail to acknowledge subjective qualitative dynamics regarding the food quality, the consistency with local cultural acceptability, human dignity and other dynamics of “feelings of deprivation.”<sup>57</sup> Subjective assessment has subsequently become heavily embedded within the conceptual framework of food security. As a result of these paradigmatic shifts since the mid-1970’s, food security has become concerned with the complexities of “livelihood strategies in difficult and uncertain environments, and how people themselves respond to perceived risks and uncertainties.”<sup>58</sup>

### **2.3 The Contextualization of Human and Food Security**

Placing the concept of human security within its historical and theoretical contexts aids in abetting some of the merits and demerits of its use. The concepts of human and food security have not emerged within a vacuum. In many ways it has gained a strong degree of intellectual currency due to its “ability to better account for existing realities.”<sup>59</sup> Both have had dual uses as academic approaches and fledgling policy movements. As an academic approach, human security and its constituents represents the deviation away from the “traditional” approach towards the concept of security in the discipline of international relations.

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<sup>55</sup> Maxwell, S. 2001. “The Evolution of Thinking About Food Security”, pp. 20

<sup>56</sup> Ibid

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, pp. 21

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Hendricks, C. 2006. “From State Security to Human Security in Southern Africa: Policy Research and Capacity Building Challenges”, pp. 2

The emergence of human security, and a refined notion of security, whilst commonly cited as a product of the 1994 *Human Development Report*, can in fact be traced back to the growing dissatisfaction with the dominant notions of both development and security in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. According to Kanti Bajpai, Marxian economic critiques led the way in their analysis of dominant models of economic development in the 1960s.<sup>60</sup> The response therefore was that during the 1970s the Club of Rome published a series of volumes on the “world problematique” which acknowledged that there is “a complex of problems troubling men of all nations.” These concerns have to be placed within the context of a complex global system which impinges upon the individual’s life chances, particularly “accelerated industrialization, rapid population growth, widespread malnutrition, depletion of non-renewable resources, and a deterioration of environment.”<sup>61</sup> In the 1980s two further commissions contributed to the changing thinking about development and security. The first was the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, which issued the so-called “North-South Report.” The second commission of the 1980s was the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues which drew attention to the manner in which Third World security was increasingly threatened by “poverty and deprivation, by economic inequality.”<sup>62</sup>

While these commissions remain relatively trivial they were nonetheless part of a growing consensus and call for new thinking in security matters. The post-Cold War era and the proliferation of globalisation has earmarked the dissolution of the primacy of a state-centric militaristic notion of security. Globalisation necessitates that the international system no longer be characterised exclusively by states due to the vast number non-state actors which currently dominate the international system.<sup>63</sup> These developments have thrust new “threats” into the centre of the security debate. Barry Buzan’s literature remains the most seminal in addressing this new-fangled security environment. Despite belonging to the Copenhagen school of security studies, Buzan cites the altered post-Cold War environment as necessitating a shift in the security agenda. Buzan draws upon Galtung’s *A Structural Theory of Imperialism* to capture the hierarchy of this post-war North-South era, whereby

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<sup>60</sup> Bajpai, K. 2000. “Human Security: Concept and Measurement”, Kroc Institute Occasional Paper #19:OP:1

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, pp. 5

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, pp. 7

<sup>63</sup> Akokpari, J. 2007. “The Political Economy of Human Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa”, pp. 8

the centre has become more dominant over the periphery.<sup>64</sup> According to Buzan, security centres upon the fundamental notion of survival of human collectives and thus includes a variety of dimensions related to the conditions of existence. While there is an emphasis towards a state-centric unit of analysis for security concerns, human collectives are affected by a myriad of political, economic, societal and environmental threats.<sup>65</sup>

Sabine Alkire contests that the altered security environment can be represented by superimposing three contemporary alterations upon the security environment: empirical, analytical, and institutional.<sup>66</sup> These dynamics have been extensively discussed and are not of much importance within the scope of this paper, but nonetheless deserve some mention. Empirically, observable changes to the nature of security threats include the manner in which conflict itself is increasingly intra-state in its dimension. Moreover, population pressures and increased consumerism continue to contribute towards increased concerns regarding ecological insecurity, increased immigration, and increased pressures upon the remaining sustainable water and energy sources. The resultant dynamics of economic crises, increases in global inequality, global drug-resistant pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS, international criminal activity, and conflicts across gender, class, and religious cleavages has placed greater pressures upon the already fragile and destitute social groups of the global village.<sup>67</sup> While these security threats vary in their supposed size and depth, they nonetheless remain extant stresses in the global security landscape, particularly within the sub-Saharan Africa. While security is about survival, it is also concerned with the “conditions of existence.”<sup>68</sup> These dynamics rightly produce the need for a conceptual tool which can be utilized to aid in “insights of interlinkages” between the international and the domestic realm.<sup>69</sup> Analytically, the concept of human security has emerged largely as a theoretical, qualitative, an quantitative means to produce insights that can be utilized to leverage the potential safety of individuals. At the heart of this endeavour is the desire to illustrate many of the interrelationships within the post-Cold War security landscape. While the relationship

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<sup>64</sup> Buzan, B. 1991. “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century”, *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 67(3), pp. 432

<sup>65</sup> Buzan, B. 1983. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era* (England: Pearson), pp. 11

<sup>66</sup> Alkire, S. 2003. A Conceptual Framework for Human Security. *Working Paper 2: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE*. (Queen Elizabeth House: University of Oxford) p. 11

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, pp. 11

<sup>68</sup> Buzan, B. 1991. “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century”, pp. 433

<sup>69</sup> Alkire, S. 2003. A Conceptual Framework for Human Security, pp. 12

between many of these variables remains mired in complexity, there is nonetheless a considerable benefit from addressing interrelated variables holistically.<sup>70</sup> Finally the notion of human security has also emerged out of various institutional reconfigurations and capabilities within the post-Cold War world.

#### 2.4 The Critique of the Orthodox and Human Security Approach

Within the discipline of international relations the term security has for a long time been synonymous with the notion of “national security.” From its Westphalian extraction, national security refers to the protection of the state from external threats and has its roots in the emergence of the modern nation-state of seventeenth century Europe.<sup>71</sup> Theoretically, this perspective has been framed based upon realist tenets, whereby states are held as the key referent object for the analysis of security threats. Within the context of Cold War bipolarity, threats were perceived as external pressures to the territorial integrity of the state. Military response, or threat thereof, was largely acknowledged as the key mechanism of deterrent, defence, and invariably, peace. The orthodox security approach remains heavily premised upon a realist account of the international system. As such the realist premises remain central. Firstly, within the anarchical nature of the global self-help system, no state can be guaranteed security, regardless of inter-state alliances. The core assumption of the universal rationality of state actors entails inevitable convergence around similar goals and policies to render themselves secure. According to Wilkin this common pursuit can best be described as “a military defence framework that serves to act as a minimum deterrent to external aggressors who might threaten the sovereignty of the state, embodied in its territory, boundaries, political institutions, and the general population’s right to self determination.”<sup>72</sup> The notion that international politics is a separate realm of analysis and activity from that of the domestic is a key factor entrenched in the orthodox approach; “the international is the realm of survival whereas the domestic is the realm of

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<sup>70</sup> Alkire, S. 2003. A Conceptual Framework for Human Security, pp. 12

<sup>71</sup> Shinoda, H. 2004. “The Concept of Human Security: Historical and Theoretical Implications”, in, *Conflict and Human Security: A Search for New Approaches of Peace-building. IPSHU English Research Report Series No.19*, pp. 6

<sup>72</sup> Wilkin, P. 1999. “Human Security and Class in a Global Economy”, in Wilkin, P. And Thomas, C. (eds.), *Globalization, Human Security, and the African Experience* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 24

the good life.”<sup>73</sup> The attainment of the latter is dependent upon the ability of the state to render itself secure in the former.

According to Wilkin, the emergence of the human security discourse can be premised upon three theoretical criticisms of the orthodox approach to security. The first of these criticisms refers to the manner in which the orthodox theoretical framework remains based upon an abstract and ahistorical framework.<sup>74</sup> As such, the international system, its constituent units, its characteristics and interests are portrayed regardless of time and space. Rationality, anarchy, power, and the state centric nature of the global system are “universal characteristics in a world of timeless essence” preventing any theoretical account of substantive changes.<sup>75</sup> The primary issue remains the fervent sense of essentialism embedded within the theory. This leads to a degree of reductionism and determinism which has been strongly criticized. While a number of scholars both within and outside the orthodox school have attempted to make the theory more amenable to these substantive changes, the criticism of the orthodox process of abstraction remains a robust critique. A second critique of the orthodox approach has been the lack of theorizing of the state. The notion of the functional equivalence of states ignores: the various typologies that reflect the varying tasks of states, the relationship between the way various states have come into existence within the international system, the relationship between their internal constituents and external actors, and, the variance of these dynamics over time.<sup>76</sup> Thirdly, the assumption of the neutrality of states within the orthodox account of security remains strongly reproached. This assumption places states in a neutral space between domestic and international relations; rationally pursuing the national interest within the international self-help system.<sup>77</sup> Both the second and third critique mentioned above remain particularly relevant for the analysis of security concerns within Africa and the Third World in general.

A key argument proposed for the alterations to the security discourse is that notions of security must be “embedded within the global capitalist economy and associated global social structures.”<sup>78</sup> Richard Ullman’s *Redefining Security* written in 1983 remains a poignant

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<sup>73</sup> Wilkin, P. 1999. “Human Security and Class in a Global Economy”, pp. 25

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, pp. 25

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, pp. 25

<sup>76</sup> Ibid, pp. 27

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Thomas, C. 1999. “Introduction”, pp. 1

scholarly endeavour in the debate between varying conceptions of “security” and the analytical problems that are intrinsic to both. Ullman foresaw the inherent tension between the two debates. Firstly, defining national security “merely in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality.” Not only does it precipitate states to focus “on military threats and ignore other and perhaps even more harmful dangers,” but, it also contributes the “pervasive militarization of international relations that in the long run can only increase global insecurity.” The corollary is that the incorporation of non-military threats is fraught with conceptual peril. Intellectually, it is particularly difficult “to measure the relative contributions toward national security.”<sup>79</sup>

In redefining “threats”, Ullman delineates some of the tradeoffs that are endemic to this analytical endeavour. Subsequently, the notion of a security itself remains a contentious and analytically perplexing concept. David Baldwin has argued that debates over varying conceptions of security require a clear definition of the notion of security. Baldwin utilizes Arnold Wolfers’ “*National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol*” characterization of security as “the absence of threats to acquired values.” Since there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the phrase “absence of threats,” Wolfers further reformulates his definition as a “low probability to acquired values.”<sup>80</sup> Wolfers’ work focuses on the manner in which the notion of “security” in its breadth, covers such a range of goals that “that highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of security.”<sup>81</sup> Utilizing the work of Walter Lippmann, Wolfers’ conceptualizes security as a value. According to Wolfers, security has much in common with wealth and power, “but while wealth measures the amount of a nation’s material possession, and power its ability to control the actions of others, security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fears that such values will be attacked.”<sup>82</sup>

For Baldwin, literature pertaining to new security concepts as an aid to coping with the post-Cold War world can still be accommodated by the conceptual framework as elucidated by Wolfers in 1952.<sup>83</sup> Despite the fact that Wolfers focused primarily on the national dimension

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<sup>79</sup> Ullman, R. 1983. “Redefining Security”, *International Security*, 8(1), pp. 129

<sup>80</sup> Baldwin, D. 1997. “The Concept of Security”, *Review of International Studies*, 23(1), pp. 13

<sup>81</sup> Wolfers, A. 1952. “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol”, *Political Science Quarterly*, 67(4), pp. 484

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 485

<sup>83</sup> Baldwin, D. 1997. “The Concept of Security”, pp. 23

of security, he nonetheless acknowledged that security could be discussed on “higher and/or lower dimensions as well.”<sup>84</sup>

However, a number of vital questions must be addressed if the multidimensionality of this new security approach is to be analytically and prescriptively useful. Herein lies the primary critique of the human security approach. While specifying security for whom and for which values are fundamental dimensions of the concept of security, “they provide little guidance for its pursuit.”<sup>85</sup> Additional dimensions also relate to: how much security, from what threats, at what costs, by what means, and in what time period?<sup>86</sup>

These questions have led to a myriad of critiques within its conceptual, methodological, and institutional realms of human security. At a conceptual level, the notion of human security remains particularly elusive and less parsimonious, despite its ability to incorporate social threats. The literature which offers a critical evaluation of the conceptual framework of human security is quick to cite its numerous theoretical flaws. Firstly, the concept of human security requires a degree of vexing value judgements required in the conceptualization of human security; and its respective core values. Secondly, it requires operationalisation, where, as of yet there is no clear consensus within the evolving critical security studies as to what constitutes the key parameters of the field of inquiry. For scholars of alternative schools of security studies the definition of the field in this manner threatens its intellectual coherence and feasibility. As such, the pervasive nature of the concept of human security, although frequently cited as a strength, remains its primary flaw. These dimensions have entailed that the process of extending the description of security studies is one of “dizzying complexity.”<sup>87</sup> The inability to prioritize goals requires that all elements within the holistic term are equally valid.<sup>88</sup> However, due to the manner in which the multiple elements which comprise human security are intrinsically connected and impinge upon one another, and the wider socio-economic and political environment, consensus regarding the exact impact of various policy surrounding human security becomes exceedingly convoluted. According to Roland Paris, it is this broad truism that renders the concept of human security and

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<sup>84</sup> Baldwin, D. 1997. “The Concept of Security”, pp. 23

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 14

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 14-17

<sup>87</sup> Alkire, S. 2003. “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security”, pp. 9

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

anachronism for policymakers and academic analysis.<sup>89</sup> In addition, the dilemma is further compounded by the fact that it is difficult “to talk about certain socioeconomic factors ‘causing’ an increase or decline in human security, given these factors are themselves part of the definition of human security.”<sup>90</sup> The manner in which international agencies equate human security with development is indeed a false depiction. While development is the creation of choices, human security is the ability in exercising specific choices. Nonetheless, authors such as Paris perceive the human security concept as the sprawling “psychedelic umbrella” under which multiple proponents of development are able to gather.<sup>91</sup>

## 2.5 Conclusion

In light of the above it seems apparent that there is equal contestation about varying conceptions of security. As a theoretical tool, human security lacks the parsimonious nature that would allow for its acceptance as an academic tool. Nonetheless, this remains part of a trade-off which seems endemic to any contemporary understanding of threats which operate outside the purely state-centric arena. It must be conceded that the concept of human security is not the solution to all of society’s ills. However, as an academic approach it must also be given credence for its ability to account for a broader notion of threat, threats which have become more pervasive and endemic to the concurrent international system.

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<sup>89</sup> Paris, R. 2001. “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” *International Security* 26(2) pp. 92

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 93

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 94

### Chapter 3: Structural Violence, Human Security and a Materialist Account of Insecurity

The critique of the human security nonetheless raises the central question of whether the paradigm does little more than to just complicate matters, “to no productive purpose?”<sup>92</sup> Central to the current debate is the manner in which the *1994 Human Development Report* forwarded the paradigm of human security as a paradigm for addressing the structural inequalities which engender insecurity. This is despite the fact that a causal explanation thereof was all but absent. For much scholarly endeavour pertaining to the academic usefulness of the human security paradigm, credence is given to the manner in which the advent of human security marked the emergence of a paradigm which placed the dynamics of abject poverty and powerlessness in qualitative congruency with the vulnerability to and from threats of physical violence.<sup>93</sup> As such, the paradigm of human security is given appraisal for the manner in which it implicitly incorporates a broadened sense of threat, and the manner in which these threats are congruent with “*structural violence*” that is embedded within the global political, social, and economic systems.<sup>94</sup> Despite alluding to the pertinence of structural violence within much of the literature pertaining to human security, little attention is given to the extrapolation of the concept and the manner in which its conceptual tenets aid in buttressing some of the paradigmatic strengths of human security.

#### 3.1 Structural Violence

The notion of structural violence was propagated by Johan Galtung in *Violence, Peace, and Peace Research* in 1969 and remains one of the most influential causal explanations of human security.<sup>95</sup> Concerning notions and a definition of peace, Galtung highlights the incongruency of a conceptualization of peace based upon the absence of physical or somatic violence. Similar to the central impetus of the human security endeavour, Galtung discusses the manner in which threats, conceptualised in terms of violence, transcend the rudimentary “goal orientated” behaviour intended to “achieve some particular or general

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<sup>92</sup> Pettman, R. 2005. “Human Security as Global Security: Reconceptualising Strategic Studies.” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 18(1), pp. 138

<sup>93</sup> Cilliers, J. 2004. *Human Security in Africa: A Conceptual Framework for Review*, A Monograph for the African Human Security Initiative (Pretoria: African Human Security Initiative), pp. 8

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Akokpari, J. 2007. “The Political Economy of Human Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa”, pp. 19

purpose(s).”<sup>96</sup> For the purposes of the argument posited, it is necessary to delineate the six dimensions of violence according to Galtung. Violence according to Galtung is defined as the “cause of the difference between the actual and the potential.”<sup>97</sup> However, this is not limited to merely somatic forms of incapacitation at the hands of an actor. An extended concept of violence is indispensable; since “highly unacceptable orders would still be compatible with peace” according to a narrow somatic definition of violence.<sup>98</sup> The actual must be deemed “avoidable” for violence to be present. As Galtung notes, the difficulty lies in consensus regarding the meaning of “potential realizations.” Similar to the traditional approach towards security studies, somatic aspects of human life is where “consensus is more readily obtained.”<sup>99</sup> For Galtung, this problem remains contentious. In many regards it is this problem which leaves the human security endeavour at a point of impasses with regards to both its operationalisation and conceptualization. Nonetheless, it does not render the paradigm useless in terms of its intellectual resilience in incorporating a broader understanding of violence and insecurity.

### **3.1.1 Human Insecurity as Structural Violence**

Violence must be understood in terms of influence. The cyclical notion of violence presupposes “an influencer, an influencee, and a mode of influence.”<sup>100</sup> The concept of influence remains central in any effort to analyse violence. The first readily acceptable distinction to be made by Galtung is that violence can be psychological, physical, or both. The subsequent distinctions have specific pertinence to the human and food security paradigms. The second distinction concerns the positive and negative approaches towards influence. A person can be influenced by punishment according to what the influencer considers wrong as well as rewarding him when he does what the influencer considers right. In such cases “constraints may be decreased instead of increased, and somatic capabilities extended instead of reduced.”<sup>101</sup> Violence may still be present in such cases because the net result may still be that “people are effectively prevented from realizing their potentialities.” Accordingly, contemporary thinkers emphasise this point with regards to the manner in

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<sup>96</sup> Bajpai, K. 2000. “Human Security: Concept and Measurement”, pp. 25

<sup>97</sup> Galtung, J. 1969. “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, pp. 168

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid, pp. 169

<sup>100</sup> Ibid, pp. 196

<sup>101</sup> Ibid, pp. 170

which capitalist society “rewards amply he who goes in for consumption, while positively punishing he who does not. The system is reward orientated, based on promise of euphoria, but in so doing narrows down the ranges of action.”<sup>102</sup> While there remains significant contestation around the merits of such a system, “better in terms of giving pleasure rather than pain, worse in terms of being more manipulatory, less overt”, the important point is that the extended concept of violence renders itself a conceptual tool for a much “richer basis for discussion.”<sup>103</sup>

The third dimension notes that violence can still be present even in the absence of physical and biological hurt. Truncated violence exists when there is the threat of violence and indirect threat of mental violence. Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, Galtung proposes that violence can exist whether or not there is a subject who acts in an intentional manner. While violence can be explicit, direct and personal, it can also manifest itself inconspicuously in the form of structural or indirect violence.<sup>104</sup> In both cases individuals can be hurt and manipulated, but the influence remains more implicit within the latter form. Structural violence is built into the structure “and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances.”<sup>105</sup> The process remains embedded within the distribution of resources and the power to decide over the distribution of these resources. The influence is aggravated if the influencees who are low on income “are low on education, low on health, and low on power- as is frequently the case because these dimensions tend to be heavily correlated due to the way they are tied together in the social structure.”<sup>106</sup> At this point the materialist criticism can be posited - that capitalist society engenders this process since money remains highly convertible and “power to decide over the means of the production process is reserved for the owners of the means of production.”<sup>107</sup> This point will be explored further within the subsequent sections. Nonetheless, for Galtung the point is that “if people are starving when this is objectively avoidable, then violence is committed, regardless of whether there is a clear subject-action-object relation ... as in the way world economic relations are ordered today.”<sup>108</sup> The fifth distinction made is between violence

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<sup>102</sup> Galtung, J. 1969. “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, pp. 170

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 171

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>108</sup> Galtung, J. 1969. “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, pp. 171

which is intended and unintended. In both Judeo-Christian and Roman jurisprudence, guilt has been tied more heavily to intention rather than consequence.<sup>109</sup> The consequence of this bias in thinking about violence, peace and related concepts is that ethical systems geared against intended consequences will fail to acknowledge forms of structural violence which may be both more pervasive and injurious.<sup>110</sup> The sixth dimension of violence relates to the distinction between manifest and latent forms of violence. Manifest violence, whether in the form of direct-personal or indirect structural violence is observable; albeit, this may remain contestable due to the notion of “potential realizations.” Latent violence is defined as violence which is “not there yet [,but] might easily come about.”<sup>111</sup> The precursor to such forms of violence according to Galtung is premised upon situations of unstable equilibriums such that the actual realization level easily decreases.

For Pettman, human security in neo-Marxist terms is a mixed materialist and mentalist discourse. The latter of these two dynamics entails the manner in which the crafting of a global consciousness is often to the self-serving advancement of the global bourgeoisie; the perception of the discourse of human security in its operational sense as a “bourgeois smokescreen.”<sup>112</sup> Similarly Taylor, drawing on the work of Mark Neocleous, discusses the manner in which the concept of security is the supreme concept of bourgeois society, the tension between “security, rationality and development, a capitalist world order.”<sup>113</sup> The materialist dynamic refers to the manner in which the neo-Marxists discourse can serve as an analytical tool to highlight the exploitation and alienation of global capitalist relations. In this manner neo-Marxism can serve as a means of developing an analytical understanding of the causes of human insecurity via a “global awareness about the international division of labour, the hierarchy of production and control that it represents, and the need to confound the hegemonic patterns of behaviour that make these patterns of behaviour possible.”<sup>114</sup>

While several dimensions of Galtung’s definition of violence can be related to the paradigm of human security, it is the notion of structural violence which deserves significant attention for the purposes of a materialist account of human and food insecurity. Most importantly,

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid, pp. 172

<sup>111</sup> Ibid

<sup>112</sup> Pettman, R. 2005. “Human Security as Global Security: Reconceptualising Strategic Studies”, pp. 146

<sup>113</sup> Taylor, M. 2009. “Displacing Security in a Divided World: Global Security, International Development, and the Endless Accumulation of Capital”, *Third World Quarterly*, 30(1), pp. 149

<sup>114</sup> Pettman, R. 2005. “Human Security as Global Security: Reconceptualising Strategic Studies”, pp 147

the notion of structural violence challenges the traditional bias of thinking about violence as personal violence. Whereas “personal violence shows ... Structural violence is silent.”<sup>115</sup> A robust understanding about the latter remains embedded within the thinking of the Marxist materialist tradition. While the former form of violence shows “tremendous fluctuations over time” the latter has shown a certain stability which has aided in its indifference. Justification for the distinction between personal and structural violence is presented “(1) in terms of a unifying perspective (the cause of the difference between potential and actual realization) and (2) by indicating that there is no reason to assume that structural violence amounts to less suffering than personal violence.”<sup>116</sup>

Thus, the potential level of realization is that which is possible with a given level of insight and resources. If insight and/or resources are monopolized by a group or class or are used for other purposes, then the actual falls below the potential level, and violence is present in the system. In addition to these types of indirect violence there is also direct violence where means of realization are not withheld, but directly destroyed ... But there is also indirect violence insofar as insight and resources are channelled away from constructive efforts to bring the actual closer to the potential.<sup>117</sup>

### 3.2 The Materialist Foundations of Structural Violence

Rooted in a materialist understanding, the conceptualisation of structural violence is extrapolated within Galtung's *A Structural Theory of Imperialism*. The general formula behind structural violence remains inequality, particularly within the distribution of power embedded within the interaction structure. Galtung posits that “just as military science and related subjects would be indispensable for the understanding of personal violence, so is the science of social structure, and particularly stratification, indispensable for the understanding of structural violence.”<sup>118</sup> The concepts which remain central to the understanding of structural violence are that of actor, system, structure, rank and level. The conceptualisation is based upon the premise that the world consists of both Centre and

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<sup>115</sup> Galtung, J. 1969. “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, pp. 173

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid, pp. 169

<sup>118</sup> Galtung, J. 1969. “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, pp. 175

Periphery nations, where each nation in turn possesses its own centre and periphery. Centre and Periphery nations are defined relatively loosely according to three dimensions. Firstly, nations can be categorised according to their absolute properties such as the more readily acceptable development variables. Secondly in terms of interaction relations, such as the trade composition indices. Thirdly, in terms of the interaction structure, the centrality of the nation within the vertical interaction structure.<sup>119</sup>

The system of imperialism is seen as an ordering structural relationship which “splits up the collectives” by engendering relations of harmony of interest in some areas and relations of disharmony of interest in others.<sup>120</sup> The notion of interest is closely tied to the idea of living condition (LC) but also a “value premise of equality”.<sup>121</sup> Living condition may be measured in terms of variables such as income, “standard of living in the usual materialistic sense – but notions of quality of life would certainly also enter, not to mention notions of autonomy.”<sup>122</sup> Conflict of interest is defined as a “special case of conflict in general, defined as a situation where parties are pursuing incompatible goals.”<sup>123</sup> Conflict, or disharmony of interest, exists when nations interact in such a way that the LC gap between them increases. The specific concern for Galtung is the manner in which “interaction relations and interactions structures are arranged in such a manner to induce inequality to the detriment of the weaker party.”<sup>124</sup>

Borrowing largely from the work of Lenin, Galtung defines imperialism as the manner in which the Centre nation has power over the Periphery nation, such that a condition of disharmony of interest exists between the two nations. This relationship remains a product of both intra- and inter-national relations. Firstly, there exists a harmony of interest between the centre in the Centre nation and the centre in the Periphery nation. Secondly, there is more disharmony of interest within the periphery nations. Thirdly, there is a disharmony of interest between the periphery in the Periphery nation and the periphery in the Centre nation.<sup>125</sup> While both the Centre and the Periphery are vertical societies, with LC gaps, the inequality within the Periphery surpasses that within the Centre. This dynamic

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<sup>119</sup> Galtung, J. 1971. “A Structural Theory of Imperialism”, *Journal of Peace Research*, 8(2), pp. 103

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 81

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 83

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 82

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 83

<sup>125</sup> Galtung, J. 1971. “A Structural Theory of Imperialism”, pp. 83

engenders the two centres, both in the Periphery and the Centre. The centre in the Periphery is seen as a “transmission belt” for the transferral of value (e.g. raw materials) to the Centre nation.<sup>126</sup> Interactions enrich both centres, with some enrichment trickling down to the periphery in the centre. However, central to entire structural arrangement is the manner in which “there is less disharmony of interest in the Centre than in the Periphery, so that the total arrangement is largely in the interest of the periphery in the Centre.”<sup>127</sup>

The mechanisms of this imperialist relationship are two-fold. The first mechanism relates to the interaction itself, and the second relates to the symmetry or asymmetry of the interaction within the interaction structure. Within the former, the interaction involves both vertical interaction relations as well as a feudal interaction structure. The former involves the value exchange between the actors, “inter-actor effects”, and the effect inside the actors, “intra-actor effects.”<sup>128</sup> The latter refers to the feudal interaction structure both within and between nations; a *divide et imperia* which operates in a reinforcing manner both at the inter- and intra-national level. Vertical interaction is the major factor behind inequality, while the periphery’s feudal interaction structure is the dynamic which both reinforces and maintains the inequality.<sup>129</sup> According to Galtung’s model of imperialism, global exchange is based upon an international division of labour between Periphery nations which supply raw and/or semi-finished products and Centre nations which supply finished products.

Contemporary vertical interaction revolves around the process of exchange according to the principle of comparative advantage between two nations. The dynamic engenders structural violence primarily due to the manner in which exchange occurs across different *levels of processing*; where processing is defined as the activity of imposing Culture (e.g. mathematics, science) on Nature (e.g. raw materials).<sup>130</sup> The dynamic is engendered if the centre in the Periphery is content on “being rather than becoming, on ownership rather than processing.”<sup>131</sup> The centre in the periphery relies upon its periphery to extract raw materials. Nature is thus, through the “beneficial interaction”, converted into money,

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<sup>126</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 84

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 85

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 89

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 86

<sup>131</sup> Galtung, J. 1971. “A Structural Theory of Imperialism”, pp. 88

however since there was so little effort required on the behalf of the Periphery this is precisely what makes the exchange so disadvantageous in the long-run.

These vertical interactions, inter-actor effects, also have intra-actor effects which are hard to conceptualise in their “social totality.”<sup>132</sup> As nations exchange products, with differences in processing levels, the intra-actor effects are seen as impinging upon multiple dimensions. While there is a bias to see this merely in terms of subsidiary economic effects, the dimensions also engender changes for nations’ political position in the world structure, military benefits, communication benefits, knowledge and research, specialist knowledge, skills and education, social structure, and psychological effects.<sup>133</sup> Therefore, the nation “that in the international division of labour has the task of providing the most refined processed products ... will obviously engage in research. Research needs an infrastructure, a wide cultural basis of universities ... and it has obvious spill-over effects in the social, political, and military domains.”<sup>134</sup> As such positive spin-offs accrue in relative superfluity to nations with higher processing levels, and also further reinforce their position relative to the latter. The dynamic is part of the foundation of a “social machinery” which engenders highly differentiated and asymmetrical spin-off. The economic consequences can entail a degree of import and export concentration, as well as commodity concentration and export dependency for the Periphery nation. The ramifications hereof obviously infiltrate beyond merely the economic dimension.

### 3.3 Conclusion

While Galtung’s conceptualisation of the multiple dimensions of intra-actor effects remains tentative, the important dynamic with regards to current debate is the manner in which “professional imperialism is based on structural rather than direct violence.”<sup>135</sup> The argument posits a strong case for the conceptualization of the causal dynamics and objective consequences of human insecurity in terms of repressive structures; which, in turn, lead to highly disparate social structures and the cyclical reinforcement of the structure itself. If the focus is on the objective consequences rather than the subjective intentions

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid, pp. 87

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> Galtung, J. 1971. “A Structural Theory of Imperialism”, pp. 91

which inhibit the potential realizations of individuals, then human insecurity must be understood in terms of the structural elements of the interaction structure which create structural inequalities.

## Chapter 4: Food Insecurity as a Manifestation of Structural Violence

Addressed from a materialism perspective, human security possess a robust paradigmatic forte in its ability to account for the emergence of “social threats” which both reinforce and manifest through the process of structural violence. Utilizing the theoretical framework of Johan Galtung’s structural account of imperialism, and the manner in which it engenders structural violence, the subsequent section seeks to delineate some of the key conceptual tenets of how contemporary food security concerns can be understood in terms of a materialist account of structural violence.

### 4.1 Overview of Contemporary Food Security Concerns: Biofuels versus Food

At the outset it is necessary to outline the broad nature of food security concerns as they relate to the sub-Saharan African context. In late 2007 global concerns were raised about a declining global staple food availability and the possibility of a global food security crisis. Mirroring the transitory shortfall phase of the mid-1970’s, these concerns occurred in conjunction with increased oil prices. These empirical dynamics have foreshadowed global land investment acquisitions by private conglomerates and state owned enterprises alike in a pre-emptive attempt to attain future food and energy security. Concerns have subsequently been raised regarding the possible impact these dynamics may have on poorer communities’ access to land, entitlement and livelihoods, as poorer farmers are displaced from the land in the interests of rewards in new global economic niches in the maize, oil seeds and sugarcane sectors. These concerns are frequently framed within the conceptual framework of human and food security literature. According to this literature, increased pressures are likely to be exacerbated by demographic growth and rising urbanization which remain common features of many developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.<sup>136</sup> Sub-Saharan Africa remains especially vulnerable. In Sudan, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique and Tanzania alone, national inventories recorded a staggering 2 492 684 hectares (ha) of land allocated for agricultural investment between 2004 and the 2009.<sup>137</sup> One of the major motivations behind the growing number of land acquisitions is the issue of

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<sup>136</sup> Cotula, L., Vermeulen, S., Leonard, R. and Keeley, J. 2009. *Land grab or development opportunity? Agricultural investment and international land deals in Africa*. (London/Rome: FAO, IIED, IFAD), pp. 14

<sup>137</sup> *ibid.*

food and energy security. The global population is expected to reach nine billion by 2050 and already, placing high demand on food production.<sup>138</sup> In addition, increasing urbanisation means that a greater share of the global population is beginning to depend on food purchases. Roughly 60 percent of the global demand comes from nations that are dependent on imports for their food.<sup>139</sup> For these net food-importers (particularly nations like the Gulf States, which are oil-rich but essentially desert), Africa's arable land is becoming an increasingly valuable commodity. Though many wealthy nations can easily afford to import food, the uncertainty of the global food and energy markets makes land acquisitions pivotal for securing food supplies for their own people. In 2008, global cereal prices had increased by approximately 60% and in 2006 sugar prices peaked at a level twice as high as previous years.<sup>140</sup> This occurred because the agriculture sector is increasingly linked to the energy sector, both indirectly, via input costs, and directly via competition for resources such as water and land for the production of food, feed or energy crops.<sup>141</sup> Government consumption targets for biofuels<sup>142</sup> in the developed world have also been a driving force behind foreign agricultural investment as well as increased food prices. Volatility in the oil price over the last few years has led nations to pursue alternative energy sources for long-term sustainability. Additionally, projections of dwindling supplies of non-renewable energy sources have led nations to pursue biofuel expansion. Importantly, some biofuel feedstocks and bioethanol produce compete for land use with staple foods, thereby further increasing land-use demand and, subsequently, the food price.<sup>143</sup> Higher energy prices are also believed to place added constraints on the inputs of the agricultural sector

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<sup>138</sup> Biney, A. 2009. 'Land grabs: Another scramble', *Africa Files*. Available from: <http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=21803> [Accessed 10/10/09]

<sup>139</sup> Cotula, L., Vermeulen, S., Leonard, R. and Keeley, J. 2009. *Land grab or development opportunity? Agricultural investment and international land deals in Africa*. pp. 53

<sup>140</sup> Müller, A. et al. 2007. "Some Insights in the effect of Growing Bio-energy Demand on Global Food Security and Natural Resources", Paper presented at the International Conference: "Linkages between Energy and Water Management for Agriculture in Developing Countries", Hyderabad, India. Available from: [http://www.globalbioenergy.org/uploads/media/0701\\_FAO\\_Mueller\\_-\\_Some\\_insights\\_in\\_the\\_effect\\_of\\_growing\\_bioenergy\\_demand\\_on\\_global\\_food\\_security\\_and\\_natural\\_resources\\_01.pdf](http://www.globalbioenergy.org/uploads/media/0701_FAO_Mueller_-_Some_insights_in_the_effect_of_growing_bioenergy_demand_on_global_food_security_and_natural_resources_01.pdf) [Accessed 07/09/2010]

<sup>141</sup> Ewing, M. and Msangi, S. 2009. "Biofuels Production in Developing Countries: Assessing Tradeoffs in Welfare and Food Security", *Environmental Science and Policy*, 12(4) pp. 521

<sup>142</sup> Sulle, E. And Nelson. F. 2009. *Biofuels, Land Access and Rural Livelihoods in Tanzania* (London, IIED), pp. 7

Biofuels include biodiesel, ethanol, or purified biogas derived from crops, plant residues, or wastes. They can be utilised as either substitutes or supplements to traditional fossil fuels. Produced from biomass, these fuels are part of a broader trend towards renewable energies.

<sup>143</sup> Ewing, M. and Msangi, S. 2009. "Biofuels Production in Developing Countries: Assessing Tradeoffs in Welfare and Food Security", pp. 520

value chain, driving the prices up for energy intensive inputs such as fertilisers, pesticides and fuel.<sup>144</sup>

Foreign land acquisition of land in poorer African states has raised accusations of “neo-colonial” behaviour. This is particularly pertinent given the long term nature of these land leases. Fifty- and even 99-year land leases are likely to be both politically and socially unsustainable unless local welfare is guaranteed. Lacking negotiation power, the rural poor remain vulnerable to “powerful forces offering comparatively large amounts of windfall cash.”<sup>145</sup> Frequently, where the land is *de jure* within the ownership of the fiscally impecunious states, investors may take precedence.<sup>146</sup> Daewoo Logistics 1,3 million hectare abortive acquisition in Madagascar in 2007 was mired in contestation about the ramifications the investment would have on smallholder entitlement. In 2008, a Chinese businessman secured 10 000 hectares of land in Cameroon for rice production.<sup>147</sup> Later that same year, three Gulf firms created an Islamic investment fund, AgriCapital worth \$1 billion, which purchased land internationally to produce food for the desert region, as well as fund research in biotechnology.<sup>148</sup> In Mozambique, joint partnerships were being negotiated with the Chinese government to develop rice production, while investments were being made in infrastructure, research, and training.<sup>149</sup> Further specific examples include GEM Biofuels’ 50 year lease of 450 000 ha in Madagascar, UK energy firm CAMS Group’s 45 000 ha lease in Tanzania, Varun Agriculture SARL’s lease of 170 000 ha in Mozambique, and US based Jarch Capital’s land acquisition in southern Sudan.<sup>150</sup>

There remains significant contestation around the supposed long-term adverse effects of the “food-versus-fuel” scenario. Food prices have steadily increased since 2002, increasing by 140 percent between 2002 and 2008. Approximately 75 percent of this increase is due to biofuel production.<sup>151</sup> According to the UN, biofuel is expected to supply 25 percent of global energy between the next 15-20 years. The aggregations hereof predict Third World

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<sup>144</sup> Müller, A. et al. 2007. “Some Insights in the effect of Growing Bio-energy Demand on Global Food Security and Natural Resources”, pp. 3

<sup>145</sup> Molony, T. and Smith, J. 2010. “Briefing Biofuels, Food Security and Africa”, *African Affairs* 1(10), pp. 5

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 5

<sup>147</sup> GRAIN. 2008. ‘Seized: The 2008 landgrab for food and financial security’. Available at <http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=212> [Accessed 10/09/09]

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>150</sup> Cotula, L., Vermeulen, S., Leonard, R. and Keeley, J. 2009. *Land grab or development opportunity? Agricultural investment and international land deals in Africa*. pp. 38

<sup>151</sup> Molony, T. and Smith, J. 2010. “Briefing Biofuels, Food Security and Africa”, pp. 8

countries to be the primary suppliers of biofuels while First World countries will be the primary consumers.<sup>152</sup> The biofuel niche of monoculture production, particularly in jatropha, is frequently cited as both an infrastructure and employment stimulating trend. It is argued that these spinoffs counteract adverse effects by generating income and expanding agricultural production technology via biofuel development in tropical climates which are suitable for export-led and rural-based development strategies. It is argued that these effects in turn increase the purchasing power of the rural poor and decrease their vulnerability to price shocks within the energy and food markets.<sup>153</sup> Such trends are a marked divergence from the past trends of stagnation or decline that characterised the long-term trend in many of these commodity markets. Furthermore, fossil-fuel importing nations in the developing world may be offered the chance to reduce their energy expenditures. For example, Tanzania currently spends 25 percent of its foreign exchange earnings on importing oil.<sup>154</sup> The emergence of the Pan-African Non-Petroleum Producers Association signifies the increased state acknowledgement hereof. Nonetheless, as Ewing and Msangi note, the positive ramifications thereof remain dependent upon whether investment is geared towards the satisfaction of smallholders' and labourers' livelihoods which remain part of a sizeable value chain.<sup>155</sup>

#### **4.1.1 Food Security as the Contradiction of Capitalism for Peasantry Entitlement**

Of pertinence to the current debate is the manner in which market driven forces might engender insecurities in line with the aforementioned materialist argument. Specifically, how these concerns manifest themselves in terms of "unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances."<sup>156</sup> The subsequent debate frames the empirical concerns regarding the manner in which these impact upon the individual rural poor farmer. This dilemma has

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<sup>152</sup> Padilla, A. 2007. "Biofuels: A New Wave of Imperialist Plunder of Third World Resources", *Special Release*, (5), pp. 3

<sup>153</sup> Ewing, M. and Msangi, S. 2009. "Biofuels Production in Developing Countries: Assessing Tradeoffs in Welfare and Food Security", pp. 520

<sup>154</sup> Molony, T. and Smith, J. 2010. "Briefing Biofuels, Food Security and Africa", pp. 2

<sup>155</sup> Ewing, M. and Msangi, S. 2009. "Biofuels Production in Developing Countries: Assessing Tradeoffs in Welfare and Food Security", pp. 521

<sup>156</sup> Galtung, J. 1969. "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", pp. 171

been framed within materialist literature as the tensions between “subsistence and market participation, of peasant subordination to other social groups.”<sup>157</sup>

Within Marxist and agrarian political economy literature, the contradictions of capitalism as they relate to the agricultural sector are frequently framed in the manner in which they impact upon the peasantry’s livelihood. According to Bryceson the term “peasantry” refers to rural dwellers who “occupationally live off the land as farmers and/or pastoralists combining subsistence and commodity production.”<sup>158</sup> By defining peasants as farmers the implication is that their access to the resource of land remains crucial for the attainment of their livelihood.<sup>159</sup> They occupy “the margins of the modern world economy. With one foot in the market and the other in subsistence they are neither fully integrated into that economy nor wholly insulated from its pressures.”<sup>160</sup> The following discussion draws attention to peasant vulnerability, a term which has in part emerged from the populist tradition of “taking the part of the peasant.” According to Ellis this can be expressed in terms of exposure, the risk factor, and sensitivity, the precariousness of the peasant to livelihood shocks.<sup>161</sup> The pertinence of the Marxian conceptual framework in is that it places emphasis on the social reproductive nature of the peasantry’s productive activity, and on the contradictions of market participation. As such it draws attention to the manner in which the process of commodification engenders high vulnerability via a process of agrarian change and primitive accumulation.

#### 4.2 The Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of the Peasantry

The conceptual framework for the analysis of peasant vulnerability and its relationship to capitalism- the agrarian question- is particularly vast. However, little credence has given to the manner in which contemporary food insecurity is related to the process by which African smallholder agriculture is exposed to the indirect forms of structural violence which are embedded within the contemporary capitalist international system. Teodor Shanin

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<sup>157</sup> Ellis, F. 1988. *Peasant Economics: Farm Households and Agrarian Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 44

<sup>158</sup> Bryceson, D. 2009. “Sub-Saharan Africa’s Vanishing Peasantries and the Spectre of a Global Food Crisis”, *Monthly Review*. Available from: <https://www.monthlyreview.org/090720bryceson.php#Volume> [Accessed 2010/04/28]

<sup>159</sup> Ellis, F. 1988. *Peasant Economics: Farm Households and Agrarian Development*, pp. 8

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 4

<sup>161</sup> Ellis, F. 2006. “Agrarian Change and Rising Vulnerability in Rural Sub-Saharan Africa”, *New Political Economy*, 11(3), pp. 393

notes that “any image of the peasant household or peasant community with no ‘external’ ties are conceptual constructs, exceptions, miscomprehensions or caricature ... The massive extension in the intensity of ties during the last decade made them more central than ever effort at the understanding of the peasantry.”<sup>162</sup> According to Frank Ellis, Marxian political economy stresses the manner in which livelihood of all groups of people is dependent upon two dynamics. Firstly, who holds effective control over the productive resources and, secondly, what occurs to the output created from those resources.<sup>163</sup> Such productive resources, which include land and other instruments of production, are referred to as the *means of production*. Output thereof may be directly consumed or sold. The *social relations of production* refer to the direct relationship between control of these resources and use of the output thereof.<sup>164</sup> The social relations of production remain inextricably linked to class differentiation which is manifested through the evolution of capitalism. Hence, the social relations of production determine not only the access individuals have to productive resources but also their entitlement to the product thereof. An extension of this notion is that of the *mode of production*, which characterises social and economic systems of dominance as a whole. This includes the forces of production and the superstructure which regulates the operation.<sup>165</sup>

Labour in Marxian political economy is seen as distinct from other inputs of production, and is central for the materialist account of food security, as it draws attention to the individual both within, and outside the production structure; the peasant. Labour is central to the process of social reproduction, or “the material [in]capacity for social renewal.”<sup>166</sup> Social reproduction can be simple reproduction, maintaining the same material level of living, or expansive.<sup>167</sup> The latter of these two forms requires expanded output, or value, in the form of investment, and more importantly surplus value; surplus above wage costs of production. Ellis notes the creation of surplus does not necessarily guarantee expanded social reproduction because of the manner by which local and global class structures can inhibit

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<sup>162</sup> Araghi, F. 1995. “Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990”, *The Sociological Quarterly*, 36(2), pp. 337

<sup>163</sup> Ellis, F. 1988. *Peasant Economics: Farm Households and Agrarian Development*, pp. 46

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 46

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 47

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 48

such alterations. Since capitalism is based on a social class structure to achieve a level of surplus, the social relations of production are already embedded within the system.<sup>168</sup>

Just as class is central to the social relations of production, so too is it that class remains central to the dynamics of human security; because “inequalities of social power and class manifest in the myriad forms of exploitation, subordination, and unequal access to resources that help generate conflict within and between states and societies.”<sup>169</sup> This dynamic reflects itself in a structural positioning and lived experience of the individual, since the material positioning of various classes is “directly related to their social power and the subsequent uneven satisfaction of their human needs.”<sup>170</sup> Marxian agrarian political economy argues that commodification plays a central role in engendering this class differentiation. According to Marx, primitive accumulation demands that “once capital exists, the capitalist mode of production itself evolves in such a way that maintains and reproduces this separation [between producers and the means of production] on a constantly increasing scale ...,” meaning that accumulation is premised on the “silent compulsion of economic relations.”<sup>171</sup> The process of primitive accumulation is inherently exploitative in nature, requiring the “appropriation and co-optation of pre-existing cultural and social achievements as well as confrontation and suppression.”<sup>172</sup>

Marxian agrarian theoretical work makes a strong distinction between the manner in which this process is engendered within feudal and subsequent capitalist social relations. Under the former peasants are a class whose subordinate role is necessary for the renewal of feudal social relations.<sup>173</sup> Under the latter Marxian theoretical work is marked by contestation. Literature pertaining to the agrarian question under capitalism is separated into two distinct categories. Farshad Araghi labels these two bodies of literature the permanence thesis and the disappearance thesis.<sup>174</sup> The literature concerning the disappearance thesis argues for capitalism as the force of social differentiation, the process whereby peasant communities are predicted to dissolve into two social classes of wage

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<sup>168</sup> Ellis, F. 1988. *Peasant Economics: Farm Households and Agrarian Development*, pp. 48

<sup>169</sup> Wilkin, P. 1999. “Human Security and Class in a Global Economy”, pp. 31

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 3

<sup>171</sup> De Angelis, M. 2004. “Separating the Doing and the Deed: capital and the continuous character of enclosures”, *Historical Materialism*, 12(2), pp. 10

<sup>172</sup> Harvey, D. 2003. *The New Imperialism* (London: Oxford University Press), pp. 146

<sup>173</sup> Ellis, F. 1988. *Peasant Economics: Farm Households and Agrarian Development*, pp. 50

<sup>174</sup> Araghi, F. 1995. “Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990”, pp. 338

labourers and capitalist farmers.<sup>175</sup> The disappearance thesis, as advocated by Marx and Engels, argued that the dissolution of the peasantry was a logical and inevitable consequence of class differentiation in rural areas of European nations. Marx initially forwarded the notion of “primitive accumulation.” Primitive accumulation refers to the process whereby peasantry would inevitably be transformed into a proletariat stripped of control over the means of production and divorced from their land.<sup>176</sup> According to Engels the peasant is “hopelessly doomed ... a future proletarian.”<sup>177</sup> Karl Kautsky’s *The Agrarian Question* and Lenin’s *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* further elucidated the disappearance thesis. Kautsky’s interpretation of the disappearance thesis was to see it as a “tendency subject to countervailing influences.”<sup>178</sup> In contrast, Lenin sought to show how the dissolution of Russia’s peasantry had involved the emergence of “a class of commodity producers in agriculture and a class of agriculture wage workers.”<sup>179</sup>

In variation to the disappearance thesis the permanence thesis argues that peasant societies persist because “they operate according to a logic that enables them to resist the expansionary forces of capitalism.”<sup>180</sup> The genealogy of the permanence thesis is commonly recognised as having its origins in the work of Russian economist A. V. Chayanov’s *The Theory of the Peasant Economy*. Herein Chayanov extrapolated from Marx’s modes of production what may be cited as “the peasant mode of production.” As an economic system in its own right the aim was to demonstrate the manner in which peasant production was geared towards “the satisfaction of family needs to the point that their subjective distaste for manual labour outweighs the possible increase in output.”<sup>181</sup>

There are multiple components which underpin the permanence thesis and the belief that peasants can withstand the pressures of agrarian capitalism. Ellis notes that, firstly, peasant economies are geared towards reciprocity rather than profit maximization. Secondly is the subdivision of land based on inheritance. Thirdly, the capacity of the peasant to withstand

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<sup>175</sup> Ellis, F. 1988. *Peasant Economics: Farm Households and Agrarian Development*, pp. 50

<sup>176</sup> Bryceson, D. 1996. “Deagrarianization and Rural Employment in sub-Saharan Africa: A Sectoral Perspective”, *World Development*, 24(1)

<sup>177</sup> Araghi, F. 1995. “Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990”, pp. 340

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid, pp. 342

<sup>181</sup> Ibid, pp. 343

market forces by “self-exploitation.”<sup>182</sup> Fourthly, the natural and technical nature of peasant farming which makes it unattractive to capital. Fifthly, the manner in which capitalism can reduce risk and costs by leaving peasant production to operate towards its functional advantage and finally, the ability of peasants to maintain their needs of simple production “due to their control over the means of production, especially land.”<sup>183</sup> Orthodox Marxian approaches also concede that there are two other dynamics which are working against the dissolution of peasant production. Firstly is the argument that simple reproduction of the peasant is in the interest of capitalism. This is facilitated through the process of surplus appropriation via rents of various kinds, price hikes and taxes. This helps in the “devalorisation” of peasant labour time in the interests of capitalism.<sup>184</sup>

Numerous attempts have been made to apply the late-nineteenth century debate on the peasant question to the Third World. Central to the current debate is the manner in which agrarian change is related to food insecurity, and how this process must be understood in the context of structural violence and the imperialist mechanisms which engender it. The subsequent debate errs in favour of Kautsky’s argument that the disappearance thesis remains a process which is subject to countervailing tendencies. Within sub-Saharan Africa, the marginal persistence of the peasantry may be regarded as what Alain de Janvry calls “functional dualism”, the persistence of the peasantry to fuel the capitalist enterprise via cheap labour for surplus-value.<sup>185</sup> Despite the fact that the concept of functional dualism was developed by de Janvry in his analysis of the agrarian question in Latin America, the nature of functional dualism still holds strong impetus within sub-Saharan Africa where “imperialism ... preserves this backward form of production.”<sup>186</sup>

### 4.3 The African Peasantry

An application of the agrarian question to the Third World is fraught with conceptual peril as the agrarian question was based upon the renderings of nineteenth century Europe. The

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<sup>182</sup> Ellis, F. 1988. *Peasant Economics: Farm Households and Agrarian Development*, pp. 51

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid, pp. 52

<sup>185</sup> Araghi, F. 1995. “Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990”, pp. 341

<sup>186</sup> Shivji, I. 1992. “The Roots of an Agrarian Crisis in Tanzania: A Theoretical Perspective”, in Foster, P. and Maghimbi, S. (eds.), *The Tanzanian Peasantry: Economy in Crisis* (Aldershot: Avebury), pp. 126

historical conditions and contemporary manifestations of the agrarian question in sub-Saharan Africa requires a unique conceptualization of the African peasantry.

The definition of the peasantry provided above remains an ahistorical conceptualisation and possesses a descriptive utility. Henry Bernstein's theoretical framework for the analysis of contemporary peasantries, with specific reference to Africa and Tanzania in particular is apt for the current discussion. The key difference between African peasantries and their European counterparts lies in the difference between feudal forms of surplus labour appropriation, and "relations of commodity production and exchange which lock them into the international capitalist economy," respectively.<sup>187</sup> The latter centres upon a specific social relation of production which is of applicable value to the current debate. Understanding this dynamic requires an acknowledgement of the theory of "the capitalist mode of production using that theory to understand the 'world-historical' process (Marx) of the development of capitalism on a global scale, to investigate how pre-capitalist modes of production are destroyed in the process and pre-capitalist forms of production (such as peasant production) subsumed in the circuit of capital."<sup>188</sup> In line with Bernstein's argument, this process can be chronologically represented in the form of: the destruction of the natural economy, the process of commodification, the simple reproductive squeeze, the differentiation of the peasantry, and finally, the extent of commoditisation.<sup>189</sup> While there are indeed some extending widespread characteristics, the plural, peasantries, is used to indicate that the trend for the peasantries of Africa has been for from ubiquitous: primarily due to some of the contradictory and uneven development of capitalism on the continent.<sup>190</sup>

Social relations prior to the penetration of capital define the natural economy. Although exchange relations did exist, the production of "use-value" is perceived as dominant.<sup>191</sup> Occurring during the latter quarter of the nineteenth century, the destruction of the natural economy was facilitated primarily through the colonial state, although this process is argued to have been underway since the sixteenth century through 'private accumulation' in the form of slave trade and the amassing of natural products. According to Bernstein, the

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<sup>187</sup> Bernstein, H. 1979. "African Peasantries: A theoretical framework", *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 6(4), pp. 422

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 422

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 423-432

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 423

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid*.

colonial state required the explicit exploitation of labour, “which necessitated breaking the reproduction cycle of the natural economy.”<sup>192</sup> The repercussions hereof resulted in the initial removal of use-value production in agriculture, animal husbandry, hunting, and fishing. Furthermore, monetisation forced the first movement of rural producers towards commodity production, either in the form of wage labour or cash crops.<sup>193</sup> In a dialectic fashion, the destruction of the natural economy facilitates the creation of conditions of commodity production. The means thereof included the imposition of taxes, the use of forced labour in public works, the creation of plantations by settlers, international capital, and/or the state, and the inevitable imposition of cash crop production.<sup>194</sup> The slow demise of use-value production necessitates the consumption and production of commodities to meet the needs of simple reproduction in the face of pressures exerted by the process of commoditization. In this manner the peasant can be said to be a simple commodity producer.

Commoditization has not occurred evenly across sub-Saharan Africa. Agriculture within the sub-Saharan African setting consists primarily of smallholder units. According to Bryceson, this consists of a large percentage of “nonmarket, self-provisioning activities, labelled the subsistence sector, whose nature and extent are difficult to measure objectively.”<sup>195</sup> Nonetheless, as commodification occurs, simple commodity production becomes essential for social reproduction. Simple commodity producers thus engage in subsistence (use-value) production, for the non-productive members of the household, as well as generating a replacement fund through the sale of a commodity.<sup>196</sup> The simple commodity producer is not a proletariat since there remains some control over the organization of production, as well as no internal division of labour to the production process.<sup>197</sup> The central difficulty remains the balance between use-value production and commodity production. The productive resources of land, labour and time are all central to this process.

The destruction of the natural economy and the process of commodification highlights the initial and long-term process of structural violence which merchant capital sets upon the

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<sup>192</sup> Bernstein, H. 1979. “African Peasantries: A theoretical framework”, pp. 423

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 424

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>195</sup> Bryceson, D. 1996. “Deagrarianization and Rural Employment in sub-Saharan Africa: A Sectoral Perspective”, pp. 99

<sup>196</sup> Bernstein, H. 1979. “African Peasantries: A theoretical framework”, pp. 425

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid*.

peasantry. Merchant capitalism according to Bernstein is “the form of capital which organises the circulation of commodities.” This is done in an indirect manner and can only be undertaken via “unequal exchange, that is, by buying commodities and selling them at, or above, their value.”<sup>198</sup> During the colonial era the interest was in maintaining the supply and production of cash crops. These interests were embodied within the interests of the metropolitan consumers; large trading companies; and the colonial state- which required commodification to “increase its revenue from taxation (to meet the costs of administration and of infrastructure development, and to contribute to imperial investment funds accumulated in the capital of the colonial power), to ensure the supply of raw materials to the industries of the home country, and at the ideological level to turn Africans into ‘economic men.’”<sup>199</sup> This was conducted in conjunction with the monopolistic pricing arrangements of marketing boards as well as “cultivation bye-laws, compulsory land-improvement schemes and credit and extension schemes which tied producers more closely to particular kinds of production.”<sup>200</sup> Imperialist motives of the colonial era served to define colonial land policies which continued to undermine individual peasantry livelihood well into the post-colonial era.<sup>201</sup>

During this period peasants slowly began to experience a “reproduction squeeze” as they were exposed to increasing cost of production as well as decreasing returns from labour. It also important to note that peasants emerge as a subordinate class, subsidiary to the state’s, regional, and international market’s agenda of extracting surplus and engendering further class differentiation.<sup>202</sup> According to Moyo, the role of the African peasantry as producers in relation to the international and state markets is central to understanding their repression and exploitation.<sup>203</sup> Increased competition and increased costs of “efficient production demands the use of more expensive means of production.”<sup>204</sup> This extensive use of fertilizers, insecticides, pesticides, and intensified cultivation leads to the inhibition of fallow patterns and increases the precariousness of future output based on soil quality. By definition the

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<sup>198</sup> Bernstein, H. 1979. “African Peasantries: A theoretical framework”, pp. 426

<sup>199</sup> Ibid, pp. 427

<sup>200</sup> Ibid.

<sup>201</sup> Moyo, S. 2003. “The Land Question in Aica: Research Perspectives and Questions”, Draft paper presented at Codesria Conferences on Land reform, the Agrarian Question and Nationalism in Gaborone, Botswana (18-19 October 2003) and Dakar, Senegal (8-11 December 2003), pp. 13

<sup>202</sup> Bryceson, D. 1999. “Sub-Saharan Africa Betwixt and Between: Rural Livelihood Practices and Policies”, ASC Working Paper 43, pp. 4

<sup>203</sup> Moyo, S. 2003. “The Land Question in Aica: Research Perspectives and Questions”, pp. 7

<sup>204</sup> Bernstein, H. 1979. “African Peasantries: A theoretical framework”, pp. 427

“low level of development of the productive forces of peasant agriculture means that the household is extremely vulnerable to failure in any of its material elements of production.”<sup>205</sup> Deteriorating terms of exchange further exacerbate this vulnerability. This process leads to a dynamic whereby the acquisition of a cash income becomes an imperative for simple reproduction, replacing use-value production.<sup>206</sup>

According to Bernstein, this has an important impact upon food production since:

... when food needs are satisfied on a regular basis by the purchase of food this signifies the that commodity relations have developed to a higher level. It reflects a more advanced social division of labour in which some peasants specialise in the commercial production of food, some of which is directed through the market to peasants engaged in other branches of production, or in which food is produce on capitalist farms with higher levels of productivity of labour and is available more cheaply food produced within the household.<sup>207</sup>

Nonetheless, Bernstein argues that in Africa the differentiation of the peasantry prevents a ubiquitous application of an advanced social division of labour. The distinction is made between poor, middle and rich peasants. Household use-value production can not sustain reproduction of the poor peasant. These peasantries thus emerge as rural semi-proletariats but retain access to a small plot of land which enables a degree of subsistence, albeit this also reduces their labour value. Middle peasantries can reproduce themselves but only via “their relationship with other forms of production.”<sup>208</sup> This is often via a precarious relationship with the “kulaks” or rich peasantries, who act as an all round “agent for the extension of commodity relations” and have managed to accumulate a sufficient amount for purchasing superior means of production. Similar to the work of Engels, Kautsky, and Lenin, the resultant commodification adversely effects the poor, and sometime middle, peasantries who, have to reduce their standard of consumption as well as produce

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<sup>205</sup> Ibid, pp. 428

<sup>206</sup> Ibid.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid, pp. 429

<sup>208</sup> Ibid, pp. 431

commodities in concurrence with reduced terms of exchange; the result is the squeeze or devalorisation of peasant labour time in the interests of capitalist forms of production.<sup>209</sup>

Following independence, the role of the African state is also noteworthy in the manner in which it has facilitated the extent of commodification. The state remains a key player in vertical concentration, “the coordination, standardisation and supervision” of small producers.<sup>210</sup> Firstly, the role of the state is economic in the sense that the ruling classes have an interest in accumulation. Their reproduction is dependent upon their accumulation of state or individual property and alliances with international capital. Commodification is central in this process, often to the point that the state’s ruling classes may have more of a “direct interest in the development of commodity relations within *any given country* than international companies which mobilise capital and switch investment on a global basis.”<sup>211</sup>

#### 4.4 Depeasantisation and Deagrarianisation in sub-Saharan Africa

The process of commoditisation is attributable to two trajectories within peasant production. The first is the notion of deagrarianisation. According to Bryceson, the process involves: (1) occupational readjustment, (2) the reorientation of livelihood, and (3) the spatial realignment of human settlement away from agrarian areas.<sup>212</sup> The second trajectory relates to the notion of depeasantisation, which is the “the erosion of the family basis of livelihood,” a dynamic which inhibits the social cohesion of the peasantry.<sup>213</sup> The literature which focuses on deagrarianisation and livelihood diversification is split between scholars who conceptualise it as a matter of opportunity and choice, versus those who see the process as a survival response which is subject to greater degrees of risk or vulnerability.<sup>214</sup> The divergence between literature which is critical versus supportive of deagrarianisation has much to do with the categorisation of the peasantry. According to Seppälä, wealthy households (kuleks) can utilise such options to generate higher profits, middle-income

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<sup>209</sup> Bernstein, H. 1979. “African Peasantries: A theoretical framework”, pp. 429

<sup>210</sup> Ibid, pp. 433

<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

<sup>212</sup> Bryceson, D. 1999. “Sub-Saharan Africa Betwixt and Between: Rural Livelihood Practices and Policies”, pp. 99

<sup>213</sup> Ellis, F. 2006. “Agrarian Change and Rising Vulnerability in Rural Sub-Saharan Africa”, pp. 387

<sup>214</sup> Ponte, S. 2002. *Farmers and Markets in Tanzania: How Policy Reforms Affect Rural Livelihoods in Africa*, pp. 7

households (middle peasantry) make use of diversification for risk minimisation, while poor households (poor peasants) are forced to utilise such options as a survival strategy.<sup>215</sup>

The purpose of the current debate is not so much as to discuss the empirical data validating this process, but rather discuss this tendency in broad terms and draw correspondence to the manner in which it resembles a form of structural violence which results in the difference between the actual and the potential.

Recent biofuel acquisitions have been labelled as a new form of imperialist plunder, but little attention has been given to the manner in which the process forms part of a continued trend in the agrarian rivalry between peasant production and commodification.<sup>216</sup> Farshad Araghi's global and historical-materialist conceptualisation of this process highlights the interplay of social, economic, political and ideological forces at the domestic and global level. Araghi has shown that this process of deruralization has occurred relatively ubiquitously across the developing world, with sub-Saharan Africa experiencing approximately a 12 percent rate of deruralisation between 1960 and 1980, despite a non-unilinear variance between states.<sup>217</sup> This process occurred slowly during the post-war economic nationalism era, but has become "relatively" more pervasive post-1973. Prior to the failings of national developmentalist strategies, national protection strategies afforded peasant agriculture a range of benefits via subsidised inputs which "slowed down the rate at which naked exposure to market forces would have undermined the position of millions of small farm owners."<sup>218</sup> This support was essential for peasants to meet their livelihood needs. The United State's interest of disposing domestic subsidised grains surpluses, as well as utilising food aid as a political leverage, contributed the initial deagrarianisation process between 1945 and 1973.<sup>219</sup> As part of the New Deal, which sought to protect American farmers, over subsidised U.S grain prices contributed to the depression of world prices, discouraged its production in previously self-sufficient regions, and internationalised the American diet; resulting in the progressive replacement and increased reliance on food imports.<sup>220</sup> Post-independent African states, with relatively low levels of food productivity and high domestic

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<sup>215</sup> Ponte, S. 2002. *Farmers and Markets in Tanzania: How Policy Reforms Affect Rural Livelihoods in Africa*, pp. 7

<sup>216</sup> Padilla, A. 2007. "Biofuels: A New Wave of Imperialist Plunder of Third World Resources"

<sup>217</sup> Araghi, F. 1995. "Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990", pp. 350

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 352

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 349

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 350

transport costs became heavily reliant upon cheap U.S. and European Community staple food supplies; the initial perpetuation of food import dependency. In this sense food security was achieved at the expense of domestic staple food production, counterproductive social divisions of labour, and the further marginalisation of peasant production.<sup>221</sup> Sub-Saharan Africa also experience “derived urbanisation.” Given the favourable political and economic conditions, urbanisation remained dependent upon the nationalisation of state power and the internationalisation of capital. As a consequence, a dual economy was established whereby peasants supplied the cheap labour and raw materials which “‘built’ the urban areas, ... But the circuit did not return to the rural areas.”<sup>222</sup>

The disappearance thesis has held more strongly post-1973. The contributing facts thereof are attributable to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, and the emergence of finance capital that can more freely evade national regulation. Structural adjustment programmes (SAP’s) concurrent with 1980’s lending policies and outward-orientated economic growth strategies espoused by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and other bilateral donors, further set commoditisation upon the peasantry. U.S hegemony and the theoretical preoccupation with efficient market allocation has necessitated the deregulation of the land market, the devaluation of African currencies, and the removal of subsidies.<sup>223</sup> This occurred in conjunction with deterioration global agricultural commodity prices in the 1980’s and 1990’s and continued urbanization.

Akram-Lodhi has labelled this era of neoliberal reform the reconfiguration of a “bifurcated” agrarian property relations in the South; the emergence of export-orientated capitalist farming alongside peasant subsistence-orientated farming.<sup>224</sup> This reconfiguration bears strong similarity with de Janvry’s notion of functional dualism. The process was heavily premised on the market-led agrarian reform (MLAR) processes pursued in African states. The process was premised on the assumption that land was “principally an economic resources; and that markets are institutions in which participants are equal.”<sup>225</sup> MLAR

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<sup>221</sup> Bryceson, D. 1999. “Sub-Saharan Africa Betwixt and Between: Rural Livelihood Practices and Policies”, pp. 102

<sup>222</sup> Ibid, pp. 102

<sup>223</sup> Araghi, F. 1995. “Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990”, pp. 355

<sup>224</sup> Akram-Lodhi, A. 2007. “Land, Market and Neoliberal Enclosure: An Agrarian Political Economy Perspective”, *Third World Quarterly*, 28(8), pp. 1437

<sup>225</sup> Ibid.

sought to instigate the replacement of state owned land with willing seller-willing buyer agrarian reforms in which market facilitated transactions were believed to generate economic efficiency and welfare. These policies also fell within the confines of a general regime impetus towards liberalised trade in agricultural products, privatization, deregulation, and defined property relations.<sup>226</sup> Such policies legitimised the expansion of large scale farming and landholdings and undermined the redistributive land reform policies in favour of the peasantry.<sup>227</sup> However, these assumptions ignore the socially embedded nature of land and markets as discussed above, whereby land possesses not only a livelihood element for the peasantry but also a set of social, economic, ecological, political, and cultural dynamics. The nature of capitalist agrarian reform inevitably undermined these embedded social relations, “transforming the socially embedded nature of land into that of a more abstract, and hence alienated, commodity.”<sup>228</sup> The subtraction of these relations resembles what is referred to as depeasantisation, a specific form of deagrarianisation whereby peasants are detrimentally affected, losing their economic capacity and social coherence.<sup>229</sup>

According to Bryceson, the period from 1980 to 1995 resulted in the increased intensity of deagrarianisation and depeasantisation whereby “peasant agriculture, with its subsistence orientation, and relatively low yielding, unstandardised agriculture ... was the antithesis of agro-industrial production in the world’s agricultural commodity trade circuits ... reflected in the steady decline of African agricultural exports as a share of the world’s agricultural trade as well as two dramatic surges of imports, notably food, into the continent.”<sup>230</sup> The second critique of MLAR is that its neoclassical conceptualisation ignores the manner in which “market transactions are built upon non-market institutions which structure resource control and allocation. Thus markets, like land, are embedded within the wider social processes and relations.”<sup>231</sup> This argument relates to Bernstein’s assertion that since dominant classes own significant share of the means of production they can de facto “regulate” market relations to the detriment of those who enter the market with limited

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<sup>226</sup> Akram-Lodhi, A. 2007. “Land, Market and Neoliberal Enclosure: An Agrarian Political Economy Perspective”, *Third World Quarterly*, 28(8), pp. 1438

<sup>227</sup> Moyo, S. 2003. “The Land Question in Africa: Research Perspectives and Questions”, pp. 23

<sup>228</sup> Akram-Lodhi, A. 2007. “Land, Market and Neoliberal Enclosure: An Agrarian Political Economy Perspective”, pp. 1439

<sup>229</sup> Bryceson, D. 2002. “The Scramble in Africa: Reorientating Rural Livelihoods”, *World Development*, 30(2), pp. 727

<sup>230</sup> Bryceson, D. 1999. “Sub-Saharan Africa Betwixt and Between: Rural Livelihood Practices and Policies”, pp. 6

<sup>231</sup> Akram-Lodhi, A. 2007. “Land, Market and Neoliberal Enclosure: An Agrarian Political Economy Perspective”, pp. 1440

means of production; even under the ‘ideal type’ economic and governance structures which might attempt to mitigate these dynamics.<sup>232</sup>

The effects of MLAR and commodification on the peasantry thus engenders the concept and *telos* of enclosure in shaping rural livelihoods.<sup>233</sup> Furthermore, enclosure and the extension of commodification also result in “negative externalities”, that is costs that are not included in the market price of goods because these costs are incurred by social agents who are external to the producing firm.”<sup>234</sup> The result of neoliberal enclosure has thus been the significant reduction of the relative power of peasants, achieved by direct policies that promote capitalist economic rationality, which despite contextual variation, have resulted in diminished access to land and livelihood.<sup>235</sup>

As commodity relations penetrated these countries more heavily, land reform, the industrialization of agriculture, and state support thereof in line with primary export development strategies, accelerated the process of deagrarianisation. This resulted in an increased diversification of sources of income and livelihood; “dependence partly on petty commodity production, partly on rural labour markets, partly on seasonal migration as well as occasional wage labour on large capitalised farms during peak periods, an, more recently, on subcontracting income linked to multinational corporations.”<sup>236</sup>

As a response to increased risks of private accumulation the “knee-jerk reaction” was to “secure access to land for direct food provisioning.” Bryceson states that household budget surveys in sub-Saharan Africa of the 1970’s and 1980’s indicates that this occurred via urban investment into the rural sector at the “hands of the relatively better off ... deepening the rural labour market.”<sup>237</sup> This has resulted in the bifurcated agrarian structure which characterises much of sub-Saharan Africa. Commodification, and the semi-proletarianisation of the peasantry, has resulted in the emergence of a globally integrated export-orientated sub-sector which is incorporated into the agro-food system but emerges at the expense of the produce-for-use sector. According to Akram-Lodhi this is based upon

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<sup>232</sup> Akram-Lodhi, A. 2007. “Land, Market and Neoliberal Enclosure: An Agrarian Political Economy Perspective”, pp. 1441

<sup>233</sup> De Angelis, M. 2004. “Separating the Doing and the Deed: capital and the continuous character of enclosures”, *Historical Materialism*, 12(2)

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 16

<sup>235</sup> Akram-Lodhi, A. 2007. “Land, Market and Neoliberal Enclosure: An Agrarian Political Economy Perspective”, pp. 1446

<sup>236</sup> Araghi, F. 1995. “Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990”, pp. 347

<sup>237</sup> Bryceson, D. 1996. “Deagrarianization and Rural Employment in sub-Saharan Africa: A Sectoral Perspective”, pp. 103

an imperialist relationship whereby the South “acts as a provider of agro-food commodities that lower the value of labour power in the North and hence raise the rate of relative surplus value, while at the same time having the potential to act as a source of agri-fuels that could power capitalist production.”<sup>238</sup> This relationship is direct but also indirect, undertaken by dominant classes and intermediaries, both public and private. For Shivji, the role of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie has been particularly influential in facilitating the emergence and reproduction of peripheral capitalism in the African state, often concealed by the facade of a socialist depiction.<sup>239</sup> For McMichael, the continuation of the American model of agro-industrialization in the Third World has served to construct a new division of labour whereby Southern labour is pivoted on specialising in high-value non-traditional exports and low-value cereal imports from the North; fortifying southern food dependency.<sup>240</sup> As such the agrarian question is framed as a “political construct” which has been managed across the north/south divide by capitalist power relations embedded within multilateral policies of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the IMF.<sup>241</sup>

Frank Ellis links this process to increased vulnerability whereby peasants are “everless able to generate surpluses of any kind.”<sup>242</sup> The late liberalisation drive has in many ways been unable to overcome the “pathological” market inefficiencies of the parastatal era. For peasant production this has resulted in a “‘food security first’ rationale that the upheavals of liberalisation merely enforced ... it makes sense for them to retain as much production as required [in the face of increased enclosure] to ensure annual food security.”<sup>243</sup> Similarly Bello notes that the departure of the state “crowded out” rather than “crowded in” the domestic private sector. This has left peasant farmers more food insecure and governments more dependent on erratic flows of aid to mediate these insecurities.<sup>244</sup> This has been in addition to the fact that sub-Saharan African peasants experience the trend of declining farm size in the face of inherently unstable “free” agricultural markets. Slow rates of economic growth, rapid population growth, and environmental degradation entail that

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<sup>238</sup> Akram-Lodhi, A. 2007. “Land, Market and Neoliberal Enclosure: An Agrarian Political Economy Perspective”, pp. 1447

<sup>239</sup> Shivji, I. 1976. *Class Struggles in Tanzania* (London: Heinemann)

<sup>240</sup> McMichael, P. 1997. “Rethinking Globalization: The Agrarian Question Revisited”, *Review of International Political Economy*, 4(4), pp. 640

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 641

<sup>242</sup> Ellis, F. 2006. “Agrarian Change and Rising Vulnerability in Rural Sub-Saharan Africa”, pp. 388

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 389

<sup>244</sup> Bello, W. And Baviera, M. 2009. “Food Wars”, *Monthly Review*. Available from: <https://www.monthlyreview.org/090706bello-baviera.php> [Accessed 2010/04/28]

small-scale farming is still an essential livelihood element, but Africa has nonetheless been transformed from “a continent of land abundance in the first half of the twentieth century to one of increasing land scarcity by its end.”<sup>245</sup> These dynamics have resulted in increased livelihood diversification amongst peasants, but this nonetheless remains “highly opportunistic in nature, involving quick responses to market supply and demand.”<sup>246</sup> While rich and middle peasantries tend to diversify into non-farm business activities, such as trade, transport and vending, poor peasantries resort to casual wage work but remain “heavily reliant on subsistence crop production.”<sup>247</sup> The 2001 LADDER findings have shown that while diversification into non-farm activities for the rich and middle peasantry, this option rapidly diminishes for poor peasants who “are mired in poverty traps characterised by low asset status and persistent difficulty in achieving food security from own production, factors that intensify as the depths of poverty increase.”<sup>248</sup> The nature of livelihood diversification in many SSA countries is such that these options remain heavily dependent upon the vigour of the broader economy. In stagnant or recessionary periods such options remain absent.

#### 4.5 Conclusion

It should not be assumed that commodification and agrarian change remain the only dynamics that engendering vulnerability. Various factors have played prominent roles in engendering significant levels of human and food insecurity within sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, the overt manifestations of the process of deagrarianisation are a reduced ability, the difference between the actual and the potential, of rural peasantries “food and basic needs self-sufficiency, a decline in agricultural labour relative to non-agricultural labour in rural households ... a decrease in agricultural output per capita in the national economy relative to non-agricultural output ... These are all tendencies observable throughout sub-Saharan Africa.”<sup>249</sup> This insecurity is thus the mirrored reflection of capital accumulation’s usurpation upon the peasantry, “as evidenced through vulnerability to coercion, insecurity of contract, low wages and the absence of social protections.”<sup>250</sup> The

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<sup>245</sup> Berry, S. 2002. “Debating the Land Question in Africa”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 44(4), pp. 639

<sup>246</sup> Bryceson, D. 2002. “The Scramble in Africa: Reorientating Rural Livelihoods”, pp. 732

<sup>247</sup> Ellis, F. 2006. “Agrarian Change and Rising Vulnerability in Rural Sub-Saharan Africa”, pp. 391

<sup>248</sup> Ibid.

<sup>249</sup> Bryceson, D. 1996. “Deagrarianization and Rural Employment in sub-Saharan Africa: A Sectoral Perspective”, pp. 99

<sup>250</sup> Taylor, M. 2009. “Displacing Security in a Divided World: Global Security, International Development, and the Endless Accumulation of Capital”, pp. 149

process of deagrarianisation and depeasantisation thus remains a product of an indirect form of structural violence which separates the peasantry from “access to social wealth they have which is not mediated by competitive market and money as capital.”<sup>251</sup> This process is what Harvey labels “accumulation by dispossession.”<sup>252</sup> Combining the work of Lenin and Luxemburg, Harvey asserts that during the course of accumulation the peasantry experiences subjugation as a product of commodification and capitalism’s attempt to “circumvent the pressures of overaccumulation”; the fundamental problem of a lack of viable opportunities for profitable investment.<sup>253</sup> The process results in greater levels of social inequality via a wide range of processes which include “the commodification and privatisation of land and the forceful expulsion of the peasant populations...”<sup>254</sup>

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<sup>251</sup> De Angelis, M. 2004. “Separating the Doing and the Deed: capital and the continuous character of enclosures”, pp. 14

<sup>252</sup> Harvey, D. 2003. *The New Imperialism* (London: Oxford University Press)

<sup>253</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 137

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 145

## Chapter 5: Structural Violence, Agrarian Change and Food Insecurity in Tanzania

Sub-Saharan Africa remains characterised by the highest proportion of global food insecurity. According to the FAO, undernourishment is approximately 33 percent within the region.<sup>255</sup> Within the East African region food insecurity remains elevated relative to the rest of the region, with nearly 87 million individuals exposed to varying levels of undernourishment.<sup>256</sup> Most recent data places Tanzania's level of undernourishment at approximately 44 percent.<sup>257</sup> Approximately 80 percent of residents, either directly or indirectly, still derive their livelihood from agriculture or pastoralism.<sup>258</sup> The costs of protein and energy malnutrition were calculated to be roughly 14 percent of the Tanzania's annual gross domestic product (GDP) in 2002.<sup>259</sup> Between 1992 and 2002 the number of individuals exposed to undernourishment increased from 9 to 15 million, while population by only increased by approximately 33 percent; an overall 7 percent increase in the level of undernourishment within the population.<sup>260</sup> Within the above mentioned contextual setting, it is thus not surprising that there remains increased contestation surrounding the continued encroachment of agri-business for biofuel production within Tanzania.

According to Sulle and Nelson, of central concern is the impact these encroachments have on the prices of food crops and land alienation of smallholder farmers; an exit option which remains particularly significant given levels of food insecurity.<sup>261</sup> Concurrently, 4 million hectares of land have been requested for biofuel investment within Tanzania, of which 640 000 ha have been allocated, and only 100 000 assigned formal occupancy rights.<sup>262</sup> The subsequent debate nonetheless frames Tanzania's agrarian crisis within the historical process whereby its peasantry have experienced the adverse effects of commodification; a form of structural violence which has rendered high levels of food and human insecurity. The following section frames food security concerns through an historical account of commodification and exposure to structural violence within Tanzania. This subordination

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<sup>255</sup> FAO. 2004. *The State of Food Insecurity in the World* (Italy: FAO/UN)

<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 35

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>258</sup> Sulle, E. And Nelson. F. 2009. *Biofuels, Land Access and Rural Livelihoods in Tanzania*, pp. 35

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 12

<sup>260</sup> FAO. 2004. *The State of Food Insecurity in the World*, pp. 35

<sup>261</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 3

<sup>262</sup> *Ibid.*

and domination of the Tanzanian peasantry has, and continues to emerge through particular state apparatus as well as vertically by social class divisions.

## **5.1 The Agrarian Question in Tanzania and the Evolution of the Agrarian Crisis**

The agrarian question as it applies to the case of Tanzania can only be fully conceptualised by taking into account the historical process whereby the peasant mode of production has become increasingly disarticulated through forms of structural violence and continued commodification. The antecedents of this process have their roots in the colonial economy. Issa Shivji has argued that the conditions under which capitalism has penetrated the African state has resulted in a divergent form of capitalist development to the European case. During both pre- and post-interdependence eras, "while some ranks of the peasantry protect their interests by fraternising with the bureaucracy, the poor peasantry is exploited by both internal and external dominating classes."<sup>263</sup>

### **5.1.1 The Colonial Origins of Agrarian Change**

Within Tanzania, the initiation of the process of commodification occurred with the introduction of cash crops into the Tanganyikan economy during German imperialism of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and the subsequent period of British colonial rule. This resulted in the initial "reproductive squeezes" to which the peasantry was exposed; a dynamic which has become increasingly commandeering as the economy has become further integrated into the metropolitan capitalist structure.<sup>264</sup> Imperialist capitalism of the colonial era served to destroy the peasantry's self-sufficiency and establish the peasantry as both a petty commodity producer and source of cheap labour. Via the process of constant integration into the global capitalist system, the peasantry becomes characterised by the two-fold division of his/her production: that of food crop for consumption, and that of wage-labour or cash crop production for sale. This twofold division under imperialist relationships is facilitated largely through the indirect forms of structural violence which place the peasant

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<sup>263</sup> Shivji, I. 1975. "Peasants and Class Alliances", *Review of African Political Economy*, (3), pp. 10

<sup>264</sup> Ibid.

in a highly vulnerable position between surplus production for the capitalist enterprise and the ability to reproducing him/herself.<sup>265</sup>

Following the removal of German settler farmers after World War I, the British economy became increasingly reliant on her colonies for agricultural imports. Prior to the outbreak of war, Britain's heavy reliance on American producers for cotton, sugar, tobacco, and other raw materials had led to a sizeable budget deficit and an increased debt to the United States following a period of steady economic decline from the latter 19<sup>th</sup> century. The colonial economies were thus essential for strengthening the Sterling currency and building up foreign exchange reserves. According to Marjorie Mbilinyi, these factors resulted in the emergence of colonial economies "increasingly centred on large scale private and public agriculture, and not on peasant production. This was neither natural nor voluntary..."; and increasingly relied upon capitalist "hindrances to block the development of a more inward-orientated and diversified economy..."<sup>266</sup>

The colonial impetus to usurp cash crop production on the peasantry occurred intensively during periods of economic crisis. Investment into peasant production remained all but absent until the 1950's, when it occurred largely as a response to the exigencies of the independence movement. The colonial state also made use of compulsory crop production laws. For example, during the interwar years cotton cultivation was compulsory in Tanzania's Musoma region.<sup>267</sup> The use of excessive taxation, price fixing, and control of export marketing boards, geared peasants towards market-orientated cash crop production as well casual labour on plantation sites. Just prior to the outbreak of World War II, the British colonial authorities established The African Products (Control and Marketing) Ordinance which allowed Boards to monopolise export-crop marketing and cultivation.<sup>268</sup> As a result, for example, African cotton producers in 1951 received half the producer price paid for cotton than that of non-Africans. Within Musoma, peasant cash crop producers were subject to a 50 percent taxation on cotton produced.<sup>269</sup>

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<sup>265</sup> Shivji, I. 1992. "The Roots of an Agrarian Crisis in Tanzania: A Theoretical Perspective", pp. 132

<sup>266</sup> Mbilinyi, M. 1991. *Big Slavery: Agribusiness and the Crisis in Women's Employment in Tanzania* (Tanzania: Dar es Salaam University Press), pp. 3

<sup>267</sup> Ibid, pp. 4

<sup>268</sup> Shivji, I. 1992. "The Roots of an Agrarian Crisis in Tanzania: A Theoretical Perspective", pp. 136

<sup>269</sup> Mbilinyi, M. 1991. *Big Slavery: Agribusiness and the Crisis in Women's Employment in Tanzania*, pp. 4

The white settler movement post-1930 also necessitated the need for increased casual labour and land expropriation. Imperial state provisions of preferential prices, transport charges, subsidies, credit and private ownership were proved to settler producers alone. The vast majority of Africa producers within Tanzania were deprived of such benefits. Legislative and judicial barriers further prohibited the development of a rural Tanzanian agricultural capitalist class. By 1937, Tanzania's agricultural exports were split 44 to 56 percent between African farmers and non-African corporations, respectively.<sup>270</sup> This was largely facilitated by the merchants temporary monopoly of knowledge of values in both societies, allowing for non-equivalent exchange, super-profits and the entrenchment of monopoly capital.<sup>271</sup>

By 1956 the amount of alienated land in Tanzania was approximately three million acres, with one million acres expropriated between 1949 and 1956.<sup>272</sup> This was facilitated through the British Land Ordinance Act of 1923, which declared all land as public and Crown Land. Corporations in tea, sisal and cotton increasingly monopolised within the Tanzanian agro-industry- as allocation of land was given preference to conglomerates on the basis of a plantation economic model. At the point of independence the Tanzanian economy was so dependent upon its agro-industry base that this sector of the economy alone accounted for "59 percent of all construction business, 48 percent of machinery and equipment, and 54 percent of capital assets."<sup>273</sup> Fluctuations in its commodity prices were thus likely to have severe implications for the economy. Post-independence, the abolition of the 10 percent Commonwealth preferential import relationship by the British government led to significant economic regression within Tanzania. The removal of these colonial preferential trade relations combined with such a fabricated and specialised economy contributed to significant trade imbalances. Tanzania's trade imbalance, as a result increased from 36,1 million Tanzanian shillings (TZS) in 1969 to 6142.2 million (TZS) in 1980.<sup>274</sup>

The role of compradorial elites in facilitating this process is also noteworthy. The centre within the periphery was largely established via the imperialist alliances with the "ruling strata of the previous social structure, with the feudal lords and the trading and money-

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<sup>270</sup> Mbilinyi, M. 1991. *Big Slavery: Agribusiness and the Crisis in Women's Employment in Tanzania*, pp. 5- 6

<sup>271</sup> Shivji, I. 1992. "The Roots of an Agrarian Crisis in Tanzania: A Theoretical Perspective", pp. 133

<sup>272</sup> Mbilinyi, M. 1991. *Big Slavery: Agribusiness and the Crisis in Women's Employment in Tanzania*, pp 6

<sup>273</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 7

<sup>274</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 8

lending bourgeoisie against the majority of the people.”<sup>275</sup> Within Tanzania this relationship was institutionalised within the creation of the Native Authority Ordinance, endowing native authorities with the task of ensuring that African peasants would cultivate a certain minimum of cash and food crops.<sup>276</sup>

Shivji, quoting Sweezy, states that the within much of colonial Africa “The consequence is the swelling of the ranks of the peasantry, increased pressures on the land and the deterioration of the productivity and living standards of the agricultural masses who constitute by far the largest section of the colonial populations.”<sup>277</sup> Within Tanzania the rural bourgeoisie remained largely absent. The development of commodity exchange served to proletarianise the peasantry and manufacture an underdeveloped capitalist society.<sup>278</sup> It is under these circumstances that the colonial state was able to engage in surplus value extraction from the peasantry. This initial form of structural violence also served in increasing the labour share devoted to market orientated behaviour, and diminishing that which was devoted to family or use-value consumption.<sup>279</sup> Peasant surplus production, production above the necessary level for consumption, remained low or regressive. Low productivity via a denial to improved means of production as well as continued land expropriation served to define the peasantry as the source of surplus for agri-business usurpation. As cash crop or wage labour became increasingly necessary for livelihood purposes, peasants diverted away from producing a variety of food produce to one or two staple foods; in favour of cash crop production. According to Shivji, general impetus within Tanzania was to rely of the low nutritional value of starchy foods such as cassava which required limited labour time. The result was the “direct relationship between the inadequate and coarse diet of the peasantry and the introduction and intensification of export crops.”<sup>280</sup> The declining terms of trade and volatility of the agricultural commodities market necessitated that at times even food crops had to be sold to meet livelihood needs.

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<sup>275</sup> Shivji, I. 1992. “The Roots of an Agrarian Crisis in Tanzania: A Theoretical Perspective”, pp. 134

<sup>276</sup> Ibid, pp. 135

<sup>277</sup> Shivji, I. 1975. “Peasants and Class Alliances”, *Review of African Political Economy*, (3), pp. 12

<sup>278</sup> Ibid, pp. 12

<sup>279</sup> Mbilinyi, M. 1991. *Big Slavery: Agribusiness and the Crisis in Women’s Employment in Tanzania*, pp 4

<sup>280</sup> Shivji, I. 1992. “The Roots of an Agrarian Crisis in Tanzania: A Theoretical Perspective”, pp. 128

### 5.1.2 Post-Independence Peasant Exploitation under Ujamaa and Villigization

Diversification of the economy occurred more fervently post-independence in 1961. Nonetheless, the process of deagrarianisation and the exploitation of the peasantry has largely persisted due to a continued emphasis on export crop production. This is despite the fact that prominence was placed on rural areas for Tanzania's socio-economic development.

Under Nyerere's socialist mandate of the Arusha Declaration of 1967, the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU) government, based on World Bank recommendations, sought to "transform" and "improve" rural productive capacity.<sup>281</sup> Subsequently, the *Ujamaa* and *Villigization* policies were implemented in 1963 and 1974, respectively. In many respects, the Ujamaa, defined as the voluntary resettlement of people into planned settlements, and the Villigization policy, defined as the mandatory resettlement process, led to increased stagnation in the economy and a further widening of the gap between urban and rural living standards.<sup>282</sup> During this period the state, under its socialist and modernising mandate, nationalised its authority over land. The general motivation was nonetheless to resettle significant numbers of small rural producers into designated villages, where they would engage in modern farming techniques geared towards self-reliance and improved production, under the supervision of state officials.<sup>283</sup>

The Ujamaa policy of 1966-1973 entailed that by 1974, 5000 villages had been established incorporating two and a half million rural smallholder producers.<sup>284</sup> The failure of these systems was largely attributable to the manner in which it continue to operate through the land tenure systems and marketing board structures of the colonial era. In many regards the controls exercised by boards were "more elaborative, comprehensive and authoritarian."<sup>285</sup> In accordance with local customary laws and land tenure systems peasants were still required to cultivate a certain mix of designated cash and food crops. Even in 1985, a breach

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<sup>281</sup> Townsend, M. 1998. *Political Economy Issues in Tanzania* (USA: The Edwin Mellen Press), pp. 47

<sup>282</sup> Ibid, pp. 45

<sup>283</sup> Mapolu, H. 1990. "Tanzania: Imperialism, the State and the Peasantry", in Amara, H. and Founou-Tchuigoua, B. (eds.), *African Agriculture* (London: Zed Books Ltd), pp. 141

<sup>284</sup> Townsend, M. 1998. *Political Economy Issues in Tanzania*, pp. 57

<sup>285</sup> Shivji, I. 1992. "The Roots of an Agrarian Crisis in Tanzania: A Theoretical Perspective", pp. 137

of such by-laws was considered to be a criminal offense subject to a fine of 200 TZS or a minimum of two month incarceration.<sup>286</sup>

The improvement and transformation policies were financed primarily through conditional loans under the auspices of the World Bank. Mbilinyi and Bernstein have shown that World Bank funding in this regard was geared primarily towards export crop production and large-scale agricultural parastatals.<sup>287</sup> Bernstein asserts that the World Bank's Dar es Salaam office, with its linkages to Ministries and parastatals, operated "effectively as a state apparatus in its own right... and contributed significantly to the enlargement and centralisation of Tanzania's version of the 'modernising state.'"<sup>288</sup>

The de-emphasis on food production served to establish Tanzania as a net-food-importing country throughout the 1970's and 1980's. By 1985, grain imports has increased to half a million tons per annum, while smallholder cultivation occupied only five percent of the total arable landmass. In many respects this has been part of both the colonial and post-colonial states emphasis towards containing the peasantry.<sup>289</sup> The effects hereof have been the peasantry's greater dependence on the foreign market for the marketing their produce, provision of inputs, and the supply of food.<sup>290</sup>

The Arusha Declaration of 1967 served to increase nationalization of the state within all section of the economy and further entrench compradorial elites under the facade of self-reliance and a populist-socialist reign. According to Townsend, the subjugation of the Tanzanian peasantry served the interests of merchant capital and Tanzania's petit-bourgeoisies, allowing both to maintain a monopoly foothold in the economy through mechanisms of state organs and cooperative institutions. These institutions, supposedly essential to the transformative and improvement agenda, nonetheless contributed significantly towards further social differentiation and the cheap labour pool.<sup>291</sup> In essence the petit-bourgeoisie continued to control the means of production well into the post-independence era.

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<sup>286</sup> Shivji, I. 1992. "The Roots of an Agrarian Crisis in Tanzania: A Theoretical Perspective", pp. 138

<sup>287</sup> Mbilinyi, M. 1991. *Big Slavery: Agribusiness and the Crisis in Women's Employment in Tanzania*, pp. 14; Bernstein, H. 1977. "Notes on Capital and Peasantry", *Review of African Political Economy*, (10), pp. 47

<sup>288</sup> Bernstein, H. 1977. "Notes on Capital and Peasantry", *Review of African Political Economy*, pp. 48

<sup>289</sup> Mapolu, H. 1990. "Tanzania: Imperialism, the State and the Peasantry", pp. 141-142

<sup>290</sup> Townsend, M. 1998. *Political Economy Issues in Tanzania*, pp. 51

<sup>291</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 54

Despite efforts to increase communal production, the Ujamma policy did not result in substantial improvements. For a small proportion of the peasantry, the effects of commodification allowed them to move into commercial and merchant activities. These kuleks nonetheless increasingly extended commodity relations within the rural economy. The state increasingly monopolised in terms of dictating the price paid for produce (after subtracting the costs for the various inputs provided), acting as middlemen in the sale of communal produce and maintaining the difference in value exchange that had existed during the colonial era. District official's ability to dictate the amount of produce to be allocated for family consumption entailed that peasants slowly resorted back to non-communal forms of subsistence farming, where village officials were unable to gain access to such produce.<sup>292</sup> Peasants also attempted to redirect the marketing of their produce through the creation of co-operative organizations which were answerable to the peasants themselves rather than the state.<sup>293</sup>

The peasantry's increased wavering towards the Ujamma programme entailed that in 1973 the state's emphasis radically shifted towards coerced forms of village resettlement. Between 1973 and 1975 nine million traditional peasants were resettled, often coercively, into large, planned village settlements based on the rationale that it would allow the government to provide the rural population with essential social services.<sup>294</sup> By 1975 the marketing co-operatives were also abolished in an effort to re-establish the state's monopoly over the marketing of export crops. The subsequent emergence of Crop Authorities brought the state back into direct contact with the peasantry, allowing the state bourgeoisie to re-establish its control. Maghimbi remarks that the largest problem with the Crop Authorities was that they were "bureaucratic organizations set up to meet the interests of politicians."<sup>295</sup> The largest of these was the National Milling Corporation, which possessed the sole rights to import and export major grains including maize, rice, and wheat. Crop Authorities also became increasingly dependent upon fiscal subsidies to fund their often inefficient and cumbersome and inefficient setups. This in turn fuelled higher levels of inflation, discouraging many peasants from producing cash crops all together, "since the

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<sup>292</sup> Townsend, M. 1998. *Political Economy Issues in Tanzania*, pp. 59-60

<sup>293</sup> Mapolu, H. 1990. "Tanzania: Imperialism, the State and the Peasantry", pp. 146

<sup>294</sup> Ibid, pp. 147

<sup>295</sup> Maghimbi, S. 1992. "The Abolition of Peasant Cooperative and the crisis in the Rural Economy in Tanzania", in Foster, P. and Maghimbi, S. (eds.), *The Tanzanian Peasantry: Economy in Crisis* (Aldershot: Avebury), pp. 226

value of money they got was not worth it.”<sup>296</sup> Additionally, the Villagisation programme entailed that for 60 percent of the population, each individual was allocated 1,43 ha of land under the Villigization programme, despite the fact that Tanzania’s low population density allows for 7,27 ha per capita.<sup>297</sup>

Mapulo remarks that:

Villigization can therefore be seen as the culmination of colonialist efforts to restructure rural economic life in order to facilitate exploitation and domination of the rural masses by international capitalism...only the existence of centralised institutions that directly control the peasants can achieve these objectives.<sup>298</sup>

The continued siphoning of surplus value under imperialist domination, mediated through various local classes and state institutions had increasingly detrimental effects on the peasantry’s food crop purchases. For example, between 1978-1979 maize purchases decreased from 223 000 tons to 105 000 tons; rice from 52 000 to 5000 tons; and millet and sorghum to nil from 40 000 and 50 000, respectively.<sup>299</sup> Upon the era of independence malnutrition was recorded at 30 percent, by 1983 it averaged 60 percent.<sup>300</sup> Between 1964 and 1977 the peasants’ terms of trade declined by 24 percent.<sup>301</sup> Overspecialisation in export crop production entailed that in 1980, following the second oil crisis, Tanzania’s food imports took more foreign exchange earnings than all four previous years.<sup>302</sup> Moreover, the state’s ability to finance these import increasingly came under strain due to its acute reliance on favourable commodity climates for its agricultural exports. Crisis within the rural economy increasingly resulted in increased levels of rural to urban migration, and deagrarianisation, placing further pressures on the rural area to feed burgeoning urban centres.<sup>303</sup> The ability of peasants to withdraw from the sphere of commodity production into that of food crop production also rapidly diminished during this period as the peasantry became more specialised in types of commodity production. Bernstein cites World Bank

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<sup>296</sup> Maghimbi, S. 1992. “The Abolition of Peasant Cooperative and the crisis in the Rural Economy in Tanzania”, pp. 225

<sup>297</sup> Mapolu, H. 1990. “Tanzania: Imperialism, the State and the Peasantry”, pp. 145

<sup>298</sup> Ibid, pp. 146

<sup>299</sup> Ibid, pp. 148

<sup>300</sup> Msambichaka, L. 1987. “State Policies and Food Production in Tanzania”, in Mkandawire, T. and Bourenane, N. (eds.), *The State and Agriculture in Africa* (London: CODESRIA Book Series), pp. 137

<sup>301</sup> Maghimbi, S. 1992. “The Abolition of Peasant Cooperative and the crisis in the Rural Economy in Tanzania”, pp. 229

<sup>302</sup> Msambichaka, L. 1987. “State Policies and Food Production in Tanzania”, pp. 123

<sup>303</sup> Maghimbi, S. 1992. “The Abolition of Peasant Cooperative and the crisis in the Rural Economy in Tanzania”, pp. 217

figures when he argues that figures on peasant production and income by region show that the ability to withdraw into use-value-production corresponds with areas within Tanzania where commodity production remains least developed.<sup>304</sup>

### 5.1.3 The Structural Adjustment Era of Deagrarianisation and Fast Crops

The imposition of structural adjustment programmes (SAP's) from the mid-1980's to the mid-1990's had a drastic effect on the peasantry and food crop production. By 1980 the Tanzanian government had reached a critical point, unable to finance essential import, especially food.<sup>305</sup> The government was thus forced to enter into negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These negotiations led to several SAP's, including the National Economic Survival Programme (NESP) and the 1986 Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). Under the auspices of international financial institutions and other donors, Tanzania's budget of 1984/85 sought to undertake significant adjustments to the agricultural sector. These included: a doubling in agricultural expenditure, the removal of consumer subsidies, an increase in agricultural producer prices, and a substantial 25 percent devaluation of the national currency.<sup>306</sup> The IMF, World Bank, and other IFI's placed increased emphasis on deregulating the economy and reducing the role of parastatals within the agricultural sector. Under the ERP the NMC was reduced to a manager of food security concerns and a buyer of last resort. Its ability to enforce control prices and marketing within the state was also abolished.

Significant contestation remains around the success of both the ERP and its successors, the ERPII 1989/82 and Tanzania Agricultural Adjustment Programme (TANAA). The IMF regarded the policy as a success, stating that under its mandate "agricultural production increased considerably, spurred by improved weather conditions, higher producer prices, the enhanced flexibility of the marketing system for domestic food crops, and generally improved availability of agricultural inputs."<sup>307</sup> By 1993 these perceptions changed. Donors became unsatisfied with the supposed superficial implementation of the reforms, citing "the shortcomings in tax reforms, the large public deficit, excessive monetary expansion, and the

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<sup>304</sup> Bernstein, H. 1977 "Notes on State and Peasantry: The Tanzanian Case", *Review of African Political Economy*, (21), pp.

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<sup>305</sup> Ponte, S. 2002. *Farmers and Markets in Tanzania: How Policy Reforms Affect Rural Livelihoods in Africa*, pp. 57

<sup>306</sup> Ibid.

<sup>307</sup> Ibid, pp. 60

failure of agricultural cooperatives to reduce their outstanding debts with the banks” as factors undermining the liberalisation process.<sup>308</sup> Ponte states that with hindsight, statistical evidence of the liberalisation process produced by the IFI’s was “extremely shaky.” For example, by 1994 it is possible that maize food production was overestimated by as much as 45 percent.<sup>309</sup> The concern for the current debate is nonetheless the impact this period had on the Tanzanian peasantry. While deregulation under SAP’s did indeed facilitate the abstraction of parastatal monopolies of the petit-bourgeoisie, it is also argued to have exposed the peasantry to new vulnerabilities.

Goodman and Watts argue that the enforcement of neo-liberal policies of the SAP era marked the emergence of the open-door policy to international market forces. The period also marked the hiatus between a surge in agricultural imports, particularly food, and a decline in African export as a percentage of global agricultural trade. Implicit within these forces is the process of global deagrarianisation, whereby the peasants remaining “subsistence orientation and relatively low yielding, unstandardised agriculture and high transport costs, was the antithesis of the growing dominance of agro industrial production in the world’s agricultural trade commodity circuits.”<sup>310</sup> As a result these livelihood activities of the poorer and middle peasantries are increasingly threatened.

The removal of the remaining agricultural subsidies during this period, albeit that this was previously a mechanism of class control, is also cited as a factor that adversely affected Tanzania’s peasantry. It is important to note that despite liberalisation, the Tanzanian peasantry still remained under the legal mandate of minimum by-laws for export crop production. The result of the removal of subsidies (for pesticides, fertilisers, and seeds) entailed that Tanzania’s peasantry was subject to uncertain market environments and greater international competition. Input prices rapidly increased as the private traders which replaced the parastatals were less capable to reach and supply rural producers. Yields and incomes as a result dramatically decreased. In addition, under the mandate of the SAP’s, the Primary Cooperative Unions (PCU) only provided access to credit for fertilizers and other inputs to be used on export crop cultivation.<sup>311</sup> African petty commodity

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<sup>308</sup> Ponte, S. 2002. *Farmers and Markets in Tanzania: How Policy Reforms Affect Rural Livelihoods in Africa*, pp. 64

<sup>309</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 66

<sup>310</sup> Bryceson, D. 1999. “Sub-Saharan Africa Betwixt and Between: Rural Livelihood Practices and Policies”, pp. 6

<sup>311</sup> Ponte, S. 1998. “Fast Crops, Fast Cash: Market Liberalization and Rural Livelihoods in Songea and Morogoro”, pp. 320

producers in general were also exposed to increased competition from modernised Asian plantations.<sup>312</sup>

In response to these dynamics the Tanzanian peasantry resorted to the cultivation of fast crops, which require less expensive inputs. These include beans, cabbage, tomatoes, bananas and coconuts. The problem however was that fast crops have a tendency to deteriorate quicker after harvest, and have to be sold at what the market price dictates at the time of harvest. In addition, prices for fast crops have a tendency to be less predictable than slow crops.<sup>313</sup> As a result, for example, Mung'ong'o has shown that annual mean household income experienced a 71 percent decline in Tanzania's Njombe district between 1979 and 1992.<sup>314</sup>

The result of a decline in income as a result of liberalisation has entailed the emergence of landless agrarian classes, as peasant farmers with small acreage have resorted to "selling or renting of their land out to larger-scale farmers and turning to agricultural wage labour or non-farm activities."<sup>315</sup> According to Madula's study of Tanzania's Mwanza region, 50 percent of non-agricultural activity started in and post-1990, while another 30 percent in the 1980's.<sup>316</sup>

While this is not synonymous with poverty and food insecurity, it does indeed result in an increased degree of vulnerability for the peasantry with regards to the aforementioned threats. The emergence of a dual livelihood strategy requires two very different skills sets. Bryceson's *Deagrarianisation and Rural Employment (DARE)* research findings argue that the peasantry, under income diversification, is required to incessantly move between relying more prevalently on the former or the latter based on marginal changes in profit.<sup>317</sup> While a stratum of the peasantry do achieve success from diversification, non-agricultural livelihood pursuits are subject to a great deal of inherent risk. Bryceson states that this is due to the manner in which non-agricultural employment for the peasantry is often "capital degenerating in nature" and exposes the peasantry to greater "inflationary incursions."<sup>318</sup>

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<sup>312</sup> Bryceson, D. 1999. "Sub-Saharan Africa Betwixt and Between: Rural Livelihood Practices and Policies", pp. 7

<sup>313</sup> Ponte, S. 2002. *Farmers and Markets in Tanzania: How Policy Reforms Affect Rural Livelihoods in Africa*, pp. 114

<sup>314</sup> Bryceson, D. 1999. "Sub-Saharan Africa Betwixt and Between: Rural Livelihood Practices and Policies", pp. 8

<sup>315</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 25

<sup>316</sup> Bryceson, D. 2002. "The Scramble in Africa: Reorientating Rural Livelihoods", pp. 730

<sup>317</sup> Bryceson, D. 1999. "Sub-Saharan Africa Betwixt and Between: Rural Livelihood Practices and Policies", pp. 28

<sup>318</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 31

Therefore, the reliance on subsistence fallback remains strong and important. However, the commercialization of rural life under liberalisation policies of the 1980's and 1990's has precipitated that production-for-use is subject to higher cash requirements for farming, increasing food insecurity vulnerabilities.<sup>319</sup>

The subjugation of the peasantry has also been compounded by Tanzania's dual land tenure systems. Land tenure remains a contestable dynamic within the literature concerning Africa's agrarian question. The antecedents of this dynamic stem from the method in which land was allocated for settler production during the colonial epoch, and the manner in which this system of exclusion contributed to the creation of a landless class that remains at the margins of Africa's agro-industrial base.

According to Maghimbi, in essence:

...the distortion of land property relations, including the issues of land concentration and exclusion, the expansion of private landed property, and the deepening of extroverted capitalist relations of agrarian production, in the context of food insecurity, increased food imports (and aid dependence), the continued decline of the value of agrarian exports, and the collapse of Africa's nascent agro-industrial base, define the significance of land in the political economy of Africa's development.<sup>320</sup>

Sulle and Emmanuel state that during the 1980's the shift towards neo-liberal policies resulted in large increases in land acquisitions by local, national and foreign elites. Such acquisitions occurred in a "context where the administration of land had been centralised progressively in an increasingly inefficient state bureaucracy and past administrative measures have led to widespread confusion with regards to land tenure patterns."<sup>321</sup> According to Cotula, agricultural investment in Africa in general is plagued by a lack of "[institutional] mechanisms to protect local rights and take account of local interests, livelihoods and welfare." Furthermore, the position of the local population is critically undermined by a "lack of transparency and of checks and balances in contract negotiations"

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<sup>319</sup> Ponte, S. 1998. "Fast Crops, Fast Cash: Market Liberalization and Rural Livelihoods in Songea and Morogoro", pp. 332

<sup>320</sup> Sulle, E. And Nelson. F. 2009. *Biofuels, Land Access and Rural Livelihoods in Tanzania*

<sup>321</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 37

as well as “corruption and deals that do not maximise the public interest.”<sup>322</sup> Customary tenure, developed under the colonial divide-and-rule imperative, remains embedded within the land tenure system of Tanzania, despite the era of MLAR. Concurrently, Tanzanian’s land tenure is still managed under the mandate the Village Land Act 1999 and the Land Act 1999. The former allows village council offices to grant occupancy rights, while the latter places all land in Tanzania under public control of the presidency.

According to Sara Berry, commercialisation of land thus occurs “within the (shifting) parameters of “traditional”, which makes contractualisation and social negotiation difficult to separate from each other.”<sup>323</sup> In such a context, the monopoly of rights to allocate occupancy becomes especially controversial. This is because an equitable entrée to agrarian resources and state support to smallholder producers is essential in reversing food insecurity trends. Shivji argues that Tanzania’s current land tenure system thus reflects remarkable similarities to the Land Ordinance the colonial period.<sup>324</sup> The monopolistic right of state officials to allocate land is argued to be the extension of the compradorial role played by the state under the era of neo-liberal agro-industrial relations.

## 5.2 Conclusion

The above section has attempted to demarcate the historical manner by which Tanzania’s peasantry have been exploited. The emergence of food insecurity within Tanzania can be seen as largely the result of indirect forms of structural violence. The inability of the peasant to resort to production for use, and the declining livelihood thereof is the result of the contradiction of agrarian relationships under the colonial, post-colonial and neo-liberal era. The food security concept highlights the demise of subsistence livelihood as a social threat which smallholder producers are exposed to. However, through a materialist account of Tanzania’s agrarian question can these social threats be fully acknowledged. Addressed from the materialist perspective, the inherent continuation of human insecurity experienced by the Tanzanian peasantry remains a product of “the relations of exploitation engendered by imperialist domination of the small peasant, mediated through local classes and the

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<sup>322</sup> Cotula, L., Vermeulen, S., Leonard, R. and Keeley, J. 2009. *Land grab or development opportunity?*, pp. 7

<sup>323</sup> Ponte, S. 1998. “Fast Crops, Fast Cash: Market Liberalization and Rural Livelihoods in Songea and Morogoro”, pp. 334

<sup>324</sup> Shivji, I. 1998. *Not Democracy Yet: Reforming Land Tenure in Tanzania* (Tanzania: University of Dar es Salaam), pp. 2

state.”<sup>325</sup> The peasantry’s entitlement to specific livelihood patterns is slowly threatened as the peasantry is integrated into agro-industrial relations. The result is increased livelihood diversification, which is subject to greater degrees of vulnerability to food insecurity.

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<sup>325</sup> Shivji, I. 1992. “The Roots of an Agrarian Crisis in Tanzania: A Theoretical Perspective”, pp. 142

## Chapter 6: Conclusion

As a paradigm human security operates as is a “worldview that defines for its holder, the nature of the world and the individuals place in it.”<sup>326</sup> It is conceded that the paradigm is not without its flaws. The concept of human and food security remained mired by contestation due to the broad inclusive nature of these terms. Furthermore, it remains difficult to delineate the core values that comprise these terms. Nonetheless, the advent of the paradigm remains inextricably linked to the context within which it has emerged. The post-Cold War era and the proliferation of interconnectedness precipitates that the notion of the threat has to be expounded. The timeless essence of the traditional account of security, with such emphasis on rationality, state-centrism, power, and anarchy seems inept within the post-Cold War security arena. The paradigm of human security, and its constitutive parts has emerged to fill this scholarly vacuum. In the words of Thomas Kuhn, the paradigm’s strength lies in nature of being open-ended enough to answer new questions. However, the scientific community is always reluctant to fully abandon the preceding paradigm, bound by emotion and obstinate intellectual commitment. As such, a full paradigm shift is yet to occur.

The argument posited in the preceding paper has attempted to buttress the paradigm through the use of critical theory. Accordingly, human and food insecurity was argued to be synonymous with the manifestation of structural violence. Galtung’s notion of structural violence offers a theoretical framework for the notion of structural inequalities and the manner in which they manifest into structural inequalities. The argument attempted to posit a strong case for the conceptualization of the causal dynamics and objective consequences of human insecurity in terms of repressive structures; which, in turn, lead to highly disparate social structures and cyclical reinforcement of the structure itself. If the focus is on the objective consequences rather than the subjective intentions which inhibit the “potential realizations” of individuals, then human insecurity must be understood in terms of the structural elements of the interaction structure. The use of Galtung’s structural theory of imperialism model highlights the manner by which “professional imperialism is based on structural rather than direct violence.”<sup>327</sup> The role of class exploitation engendered

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<sup>326</sup> Guba, E. and Lincoln, Y. “Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research”, pp. 107

<sup>327</sup> Galtung, J. 1971. “A Structural Theory of Imperialism”, pp. 91

between core and periphery nations via exchange across varying degree of processing power underlies this structural arrangement.

The paper subsequently attempted to delineate the structural elements of the interaction structure as it pertains to food security concerns. Biofuel demand and the threat it poses to peasantry livelihoods must be placed in the broader context of the history of agrarian relations within the continent. Within sub-Saharan Africa the peasantry has been slowly subject to the increased commodification of agrarian relations. The paper conceptualised food insecurity as a result of Kautsky's notion of the disappearance thesis, which remains a process that is subject to countervailing tendencies. Within sub-Saharan Africa, the marginal persistence of the peasantry may be regarded as what Alain de Janvry calls "functional dualism", the persistence of the peasantry to fuel the capitalist enterprise via cheap labour for surplus-value.<sup>328</sup> While food insecurity is subject to intervening variable, there is strong evidence to suggest that food insecurity remains primarily the product of the commodification of agrarian relations. According to Bryceson, the result is the overt manifestation of deagrarianization and the difference between the actual and the potential, of rural peasantries' "food and basic needs self-sufficiency, a decline in agricultural labour relative to non-agricultural labour in rural households...a decrease in agricultural output per capita in the national economy relative to non-agricultural output...These are all tendencies observable through-out sub-Saharan Africa."<sup>329</sup>

Central concepts of peasant analysis in Marxian political economy stress the importance of the social relations of production, the mode of production, social reproduction and surplus value. Social relations of production determine the livelihood of different groups in any society. Accordingly, peasant livelihood vulnerability remain a product of who possess the effective control over productive resources, and what happens to the product created by those resources.<sup>330</sup> Social relations of production refer to the access various social groups have to these means of production, and subsequently the "the control of what they produce in society at large."<sup>331</sup> Under capitalist relations of production the process of commoditization serves to destroy the natural economy and change the "fundamental

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<sup>328</sup> Araghi, F. 1995. "Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990", pp. 341

<sup>329</sup> Bryceson, D. 1996. "Deagrarianization and Rural Employment in sub-Saharan Africa: A Sectoral Perspective", pp. 99

<sup>330</sup> Ellis, F. 1988. *Peasant Economics: Farm Households and Agrarian Development*. pp. 46

<sup>331</sup> Ibid.

social changes in the conditions of production.”<sup>332</sup> Within Tanzania, it is plausible to see the manifestation of chronic levels of malnutrition as the product of the commodification of agrarian relations. Under colonialism, the post-independence socialist mandates, and neo-liberal liberalisation mandates the peasantry has become increasingly integrated into the global agro-industrial system. Under all three eras the imperative has been to move away from the “inefficient” methods of peasant production towards market orientated and modernising imperatives. Within Tanzania, a historical materialist framework of analysis was utilised to demonstrate the manner by which the peasantry has been rendered vulnerable. The production for use livelihood pattern became increasingly unsustainable as the peasantry was exposed to the various reproductive squeezes engendered under capitalist relations. The food security concept is thus placed in context of the broader relationship of peasant agrarian relations. It is through this critical theory lens that the paradigm reveals its true coherency, unveiling the structural inequalities which render the individual insecure.

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<sup>332</sup> Bernstein, H. 1977. “Notes on Capital and Peasantry”, pp. 62

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