TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE STRUCTURE, FUNCTION AND CAUSE OF GANG FORMATION IN CAPE TOWN

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1

BY WAY OF AN INTRODUCTION

Despite the facade of shuttered concrete and glass in the commercial centre and the urbanity of its wealthy, Cape Town is very much an African city. Geographically it is characterised by a mountain masiff forming a peninsula which is the division point between the Atlantic and Indian oceans. Clustered around the wooded slopes, along the mountain seaboard, and beside the transport arteries fanning outwards, are the residences and offices of the wealthy. They have property, capital and access to First World technology and skills. They are almost exclusively descendants of 300 years of European colonization, and their dominant position is protected by law and custom.

Between the peninsula and the next range of mountains to the east, a distance of some 30 kilometres, are the Cape Flats; low-lying, sandy and wind-swept table land that was once sea-bed. It is here that the Coloured and African working class and the unemployed have been relocated by massive population removals from the inner city. Here one finds the squatters, the overcrowding and the poverty of Africa. Here the rich fear to go. Most people on the Cape Flats do not own property or capital, and the majority are unskilled or semi-skilled labourers.

From time to time newspapers serving white residents have reflected alarm at the violence and disorderliness on the 'Flats'. The unspoken fear is that it will spill over into the white suburbs and the city centre, a sentiment reinforced by reports of 'muggings', housebreaking, rape, theft and occasional political protest marches which break out of their racial ghettoes. The response is characteristic: a call for more police action and an escalation in white gun sales.

But this local fear cannot be disconnected from a larger one. In the terminology of the government, South Africa is the victim of a 'total onslaught' against law and order. This is seen to come from any number of fronts - Russia, Cuba, communists, infiltrators, trade unions, striking workers, black students or white marxists. The response has been the evolvement of an ideology of national preparedness (by whites) called Total Strategy, which has virtually placed both civil and political society on a war footing.

In this climate 'street crime' is increasingly being blurred into white perceptions of Total Onslaught, particularly when it seems to be organized and efficient. In the 1981 Parliamentary Justice debate, during a discussion about the 'alarming'incidence of rape, a Member reasoned it this way:


> What I find particularly disturbing in connexion with the occurrence of the crime of rape is that the incidence across the colour line is on the increase. It appears to me as if it is a new form of terrorism . . . In conclusion I want to allege that we in South Africa are steeling ourselves against the onslaughts of enemies outside. We are preaching spiritual preparedness, and we are doing this with complete conviction and without restraint.[1]

Made explicit here is the link between the terror without and the terror within. Implicit in such thinking is the fear that there is a connection between the bush war-sabotage-strikes equation and rising crime rates in the urban areas. For the white urban dweller, beset from the early 1970s

by recession in the economy and teargas in the streets, the sum adds up to a 'time of troubles', a time when tough state action is seen as being justified for the maintenance of law and order.

If the daily Press is any indication, most crime in Cape Town is carried out by gangs. One of the more speculative tasks of this book is to assess what impact those gangs are likely to have on the changes urban South Africa will undergo in the last two decades of the 20th Century, be it peaceful, reactionary or revolutionary. A rather more immediate task, and a necessary precursor, is to explore the functions of these gangs and the causes of their existence. But this immediately leads us into wider and deeper areas, to poverty, social dislocation and strategies of class defense. And within and beyond these conditions can be found an ongoing struggle for survival, a class struggle, and the outline of the state itself. (It is here that one encounters a strange paradox: a system which upholds law and order while at the same time creating the preconditions for its breakdown.) But we must start with the street gangs.

A count in 30 areas on the Cape Flats during 1982 found in daily existence 280 groups who identified themselves as gangs. Nearly 80 per cent of the gang members interviewed for this study said their group was more than 100 strong, 54 per cent put the figure at 200 and several as high as 2000.[2] An extremely rough estimate gives a figure of 80,000 youths who would define themselves as gang members, or about five per cent of the city's total population. But of course this begs the question: What is a gang?



Eureka Estate, Cape Flats, 1980

In his work on Chicago in the 1920s, Frederick Thrasher defined a gang rather vaguely as:

> . . . an interstitial group originally formed spontaneously, and then integrated through conflict[3]

He found the Chicago gangs to be characterised by face to face meeting, street-corner 'milling', by movement through space as a unit, by conflict and by planning. This collective behaviour led to 'the development of tradition, unreflective internal structure, esprit de corps, solidarity, morale, group awareness, and attachment to a local territory'.[4]

Street gangs in Cape Town do not easily accommodate such definition. They are not all 'interstitial', in the sense of filling a space between larger social bodies. And they are not all integrated through conflict, although their activity carries a certain level of conflict. In fact it is necessary to view the term 'gangster' with suspicion; a noun far too easily attached to any youth whose activity is considered beyond the threshold of societal tolerance.

As soon as the concept of gang is questioned, however, the study of gangs becomes diffuse. One solution is to consider only those groups which define themselves as gangs. But this self-definition carries about as much legitimacy as the view of the Press, which probably labelled them as that in the first place. The route we have chosen is rather to side-step the issue and to begin by looking at the outer of ghetto organizations which exist both beyond the border-line of juridical legality and in the area causing 'public concern'.[5]

Justification for connecting them is that they cause this concern, that they interact with each other, that this interaction is often in undertakings which are illegal in terms of South African law, and that because many of these activities are illegal they provide a source of income which is protected from the competition of wealthy or powerful traders or corporations.

If this approach is less than precise, it will at least serve to map out the social environment in which gang-type activity takes place in the poorer areas of the city.

THE CORNER KIDS

Any day of the week the most noticeable social feature of the Cape Flats is the many young people on the streets. Under the inevitable flapping washing strung between blocks of flats are toddlers in the sand, youngsters chasing each other about, youths of ten and older clustered together on the corners, and small groups of young men in their late teens and twenties talking earnestly or playing kerrim.[6] Except on really hot summer days there is always a sense of busyness. If anything this is a tribute to human inventiveness: the action generally fills a vacuum of boredom and limited choices. It also hides much heartbreak. Almost every family on the Cape Flats is new to the area, having been relocated there(through decree or necessity) from the inner city areas, from squatter camps or from the countryside. Many of the families have broken up (for reasons which will be discussed later), most of the houses and flats are overcrowded, and the schools are packed to bursting point. Street life is mostly the spill from families, schools, jobs and overcrowding.



Elsies River on the Cape Flats, Winter 1974

In the blocks of flats, particularly, youths are exposed to a harsh dichotomy: either inside the flat, shut off, cramped, with no private space from the family; or outside, in the courtyard or the street. There is no intermediate space on either side of the door, no private or semi-private space. Every action except defecating is a public action and street life becomes the only life possible. It is also a relief from the physical and emotional pressures in which kids find themselves, and it is where their friends are.

One result is a constant forming and re-forming of playgroups. These are intensely important to youngsters and tightly area-bound. In Hanover Park, for example, playgroups tend to be formed by the kids who live in a certain block of flats or around a particular open court. Like their older brothers, they usually give their group a name . . . the Como Kids (of Como Court) or the Third Street Kids. Generally these playgroups are boys' business; girls are not included. And their heroes are the older youths who often use them to run errands. In return they may be offered a cigarette or even a puff of 'zol' (marijuana).

This pattern of peer-group formation is not, of course, inevitable. Some parents go so far as to lock their young children in a flat, unsupervised, all day to prevent contact with street 'skollies'. But it is the most pervasive pattern in the poorer areas of this city, as in many others. Playgroups are substitute families, sites of entertainment and a source of protection from the dangers of being alone.

THE DEFENCE GANGS


The distinction between types of youth culture is blurred, but perhaps the most determining factor is age. Most people spoken to on the Cape Flats agreed that 'the gangsters are getting younger'. The lower age limit of what can be termed 'defence gangs' is presently about ten. Apart from their age group, however, these gangs can be distinguished from playgroups on two counts: a hardening need for physical defence and a growing demand for certain commodities.

There is also another group which can be classed as a defence gang: the vigilantes. These, where they exist, tend to be older men who patrol their residential areas at night to supplement the sparse police patrols. Both groups, the younger and the older, arise out of the growing violence on the Cape Flats following 'group areas' removals, the rising cost of living and growing unemployment.

Young defence gangs are probably the most widespread gang phenomenon in Cape Town. As their name implies, they are formed to defend both themselves and their territory from other gangs. Although these 'other gangs' are often similar groups formed for the same purpose, the impetus for the spread of these groups comes from the sharp rise during the 1970s of reformatory and prison-based gangs, adding to the family mafias, which have been muscling in on the war for 'turf'.

The result of territorial struggles has been a 'parcelling up' of the Cape Flats into gang territories, as this map of one area, Hanover Park, shows.

HANOVER PARK GANG TERRITORIES



1. Vultures
2. Genuine School Boys (GSB)
3. Fancy Boys
4. Gipsy Kids
5. Sexy Boys
6. Mafias
7. Wild Ones
8. Nice Time Kids/Mojos/GSB
9. Fancy Boys
10. Mongrels
11. Laughing Boys
12. New York Yankees
13. Cape Town Scorpions
14. Three Bob Kids
15. Sexy Rexies
16. Dynamite Kids

A. "Society" people - no gang affiliation .
B. Bus terminus and shops - raided by all gangs but largely controlled, through the street hawkers, by the Fancy Boys.

When studied in 1982 the township was divided up between 16 groups, which had established their borders by shooting wars and constant skirmishes. If a member from one group wandered into an enemy territory he stood to be beaten up or even killed.

Violence is, for this reason among many, a constant shadow across the Cape Flats. During 1981 nearly 16,000 assaults were reported to the police,[7] but during that year the Ambulance Service conveyed nearly twice that many assault victims.[8] An average of two murders a day took place. Much of this violence is inter-gang, between groups jostling for influence and 'their' place in the social environment.

Although territorial and personal protection is an important factor in the formation of defence gangs, it is not their sole interest. Any gang strong enough to defend a territory is also organised enough to run 'rackets', and among impoverished youths this connection is seldom missed. Defence gangs are most feared for pay-packet robbery. They are generally armed, often with sophisticated stolen weaponry. They frequently break into cars in search of tape recorders and guns. They also organize housebreaking, often pushing a young playgroup kid through the window and thus minimise their chances of arrest. Two defence gangs which terrorise even the mafias - the Sicilians in Elsies River and the Hobos in Manenberg - were formed by youths who left school after the 1980 school boycotts in the city.


In Hanover Park I found a strong reformatory gang, the Cape Town Scorpions, and two family mafias, the Mongrels and the Fancy Boys. The other groups, although they contained youths with prison or reformatory experience, were

largely defence gangs. All were serving to force a brutal level of social coherence onto a 'new town' which had not yet found its cultural roots.

THE REFORM GANGS

The Cape Town Scorpions (CTS) and the Born Free Kids (BFK) are the fierce, hard centre of the street gang culture in Cape Town. They are the super-gangs. While they share many of the attributes of defence gangs, it is not on the streets that they are formed but in the reformatories and schools of industry. An extraordinarily high number of coloured youths share the 'brotherhood' of detention. During the last 10 years about 6,000 youths have passed through these institutions in Cape Town alone.[9] Immediately a boy enters 'reform' he is claimed by one of the gangs. A survey of institution gangs in one reformatory found 52 per cent to be Scorpions, 27 per cent to be BFKs and the remainder to be 'Kaffir slagters'. Gang membership, however, was 100 per cent.[10] On leaving the institution the youths gather in their home areas on the basis of their 'reform' allegiances. These allegiances give them access to 'fighting power' from gang brothers in other areas.

The development of reformatory gangs laid the foundations of an explosion of CTS and BFK influence across the Cape Flats in the 1970s. A gang count in 30 areas found CTS cells in 24 of them and the BFK in 22. The highest number of defence gang cells in these areas was a mere four.



The survey of reformatories showed certain distinct trends in the background of the youths. The families of 83 per cent were larger than the average of 5.6 for the Cape Flats and 40 per cent had more than 10 people staying in the house. However 70 per cent lived in a house with two or less rooms. To add to their troubles, 44 per cent had lodgers in their homes and 40 per cent had been moved under the Group Areas Act. Not surprisingly, although 91 per cent had attended school, only 30 per cent had got beyond standard two and a mere 4 per cent beyond standard four. Nearly all the youths said they had spent most of their time hanging around with friends. Only 7 per cent said they had a good relationship with their fathers.

Before being committed to an institution most of the youths had been in gang-type groups . . . 97 per cent said they had fought a gang war and 39 per cent had been stabbed. A relatively high number, 19 per cent, had fathers who had

been in gangs. The majority of youths said they had joined the 'reform' gang for friendship reasons and only 19 per cent felt it was out of a need for protection. But when asked whether they had been forced to join the gang 97 per cent refused to answer.

Inside the institutions the major gang preoccupation aside from power and privileges appears to be the smuggling of dagga (83 per cent held this to be the case). But on the streets the main focus of the CTS and BFKs is housebreaking and robbery. Their base is usually a shebeen or illicit drinking house, which they also 'protect'. The age group of the two gangs is from about 12 to 20, although the leader is often an older man with prison experience. However 35 per cent of those interviewed said the gang was led by a group and not a single individual.

The focus of most gang life outside the institutions is usually a back yard surrounded by high stockading of salvaged corrugated iron. Here youths can smoke 'white pipe' (a mixture of dagga, tobacco and mandrax) undisturbed. The gang headquarters is a social meeting place, an information centre and a fort in time of attack. Its members are always on the alert. Scouts are posted to warn of a police visit or an oppostion attack, and an 'unknown' youth will be escorted in and interrogated to establish his identity, purpose and 'connexions'. From the headquarters gang members will range in groups of two or more looking for a 'chance' . . . things to 'jep' (steal), people to rob or customers for dagga or mandrax.

Not infrequently the headquarters is the site of an all-out attack from an 'enemy' group. During 1980, for example, one gang which I spoke to, the Mongrels, were involved in a three hour gun battle with the Fancy Boys during which an assortment of firearms were used. The Mongrels, who

included a woman and two children, holed up in a house and pressed furniture and mattresses against the windows and doors, keeping up continuous sidearm fire on the invaders. The police, when they finally arrived, had to reverse their van onto the verandah of the house to get the occupants out without them being shot.

The number of illegal arms available on the Cape Flats is extremely high. During 1981 nearly 1,000 handguns were reported stolen by white owners in Cape Town.[11] Street information also suggests that arms are being smuggled into the city by men returning from army service. It is, of course, difficult to confirm such reports. But during research for this book I was frequently shown handguns for sale. When I feigned an interest in heavier weaponry, shotguns and Russian-made AK47s were offered. People classified as 'non-white' in South Africa may own a firearm only under exceptional circumstances. But for whites such ownership is easy. In the climate of fear out of which Total Strategy was born, the level of white domestic armaments is alarmingly high. In 1979 an average of one white person in three owned a licenced gun.[12] In that year 4,725 firearms were reported stolen.[13]

Virtually <u>all</u> guns owned by gang members are stolen. But despite heavy penalties if these guns are found by police, the boast of a 50-strong gang in Bonteheuwel is that every member owns a handgun. (The average age in this gang is about 16.) With this availability of firearms, street skirmishes become brutal and dangerous. The only breathing space, according to one policeman is that the gang members are such bad shots![14]



Elsies River on the Cape Flats, Winter 1974

The Reformatory gangs, then, are groomed into gang life in the state institutions. On release they are usually unable to find work because of their records or gang tattoos on their necks or faces. Often, after years in a reformatory, they are rejected by their parents. They have no family, no education, no jobs and nothing to do. The gang becomes their 'pseudo-kin', offering them a place to sleep, a job, a context, and a sense of pride. A member of a reformatory gang called Aapie put it this way:

> I was very small, you see, when my mother and my father they threw me away. There was no more money. And so okay while the years and months passed by, you see, I found myself in a stony place of sadness and madness where each dog was hustling for his own bone, you see. That's why I realised that there's only one thing for me: If I will survive I must play dirty you see. So that's why I became a gangster.[15]

THE MAFIAS

At a level of organization more complex than the reformatory gangs are what can be termed the family mafias. The word mafia is meant here, not in the popular sense, but in the more precise way used by Eric Hobsbawm in Primitive Rebels:

> The mafia was never a single secret society, centrally organised. It was, rather, a network of local gangs (cosche – today they seem to be called families) sometimes two or three strong, sometimes much larger, each controlling a certain territory, normally a commune or latifundium, and linked with one another in various ways.[16]

In Cape Town the mafias are perhaps the most interesting ghetto racketeers. They are the remains of an earlier form of social organization, of a time when large extended families operated a wide range of 'informal sector' activities in the old working-class areas of the city. This period (discussed in Chapter 3), was a time when the trust and the labour within extended families was essential for their survival. Powerful families could call on the contacts, capital and physical strength of their kin in any undertaking. But after the massive population relocations from the inner city, most extended families fell apart. Others were crammed into small dwellings to a degree that social relationships broke down. Certain families, with influence and no qualms about the use of illegal methods, transformed themselves into the mafias of the Cape Flats.

The older mafias include such groups as the Cisco Yakis, Stalag 17 and the Mongrels. However new mafias have been growing in influence, groups such as the Fancy Boys and certain cells within the Cape Town Scorpions. This generation of new mafias follows the old pattern. Firstly, kinfolk can be trusted if for no other reason than that pressure can be brought to bear on recalcitrant members through the family. Power-nuclei, therefore, tend to generate around brothers and cousins rather than around friends. Secondly, young toughs who cannot solve the problems of life through working - for there is no work - find that the older generation of the mafiosi have the lucrative rackets under their control and are reluctant to make way for the younger men. These newcomers therefore organise rival gangs, generally along the same lines as those they oppose.

The mafias, because of their type of influence and historical development, tend to be involved in extortion rackets - extracting 'protection' money from established businesses and individuals. And because of their

organization they tend to handle bigger undertakings, big payroll jobs rather than simple armed robbery, large-scale warehouse or shop thefts rather than housebreaking. And if the street gangs are the retailers of drugs the mafias are the wholesalers - buying in bulk (which demands a large capital outlay) and reselling in measured portion.

But although the mafias have considerable influence and power among a class which has none, they tend towards social stability, towards the maintenance of the status quo. They do this for the simple reason that in the absence of a conscious ideology they are unable to evolve an apparatus for physical force which is not at the same time an apparatus for crime and private enrichment. In other words, they inevitably tend to operate through gangsters because they are incapable of producing professional revolutionaries. But gangsters have a vested interest in private property, as pirates have a vested interest in legitimate commerce, being parasitic upon it.[17] This is true of all the Cape gangs, but it is particularly true of the mafias. They are in a sense defensive class organizations within capitalist social relations.

A mafia of particular interest are the Mongrels, for although they operate under the leadership of a single family, they reproduce and grow as a street version of the 26s, a prison gang. (The origin of such prison gangs is discussed in Chapter 7.) The Mongrels - the name is a corruption of the film title The Moguls - began in the inner city area known as District 6. They are remembered as the men of Bungalow 13 (the address of their headquarters) and were led by the April family. The group was originally involved in legitimate activities such as hawking and factory work, although several bitter fights with rival gangs took place as well. In the early 1970s the entire group was moved to the Cape Flats under the Group Areas Act. Initially the Mongrels occupied themselves with organizing a soccer

team. But, increasingly, the games ended in a fight with youths from other gangs. Out of the need for defence and income pssibilities the Aprils built around themselves a formidable fighting machine.

The connexion to the 26s occurred when several of the leaders received jail sentences, and attained rank within the prison gang. Back on the streets the organization and ideology of the 26s was adopted, with exacting initiation rites and a code of ethics which had to be memorised by each member. This prison link gave the Mongrels almost unlimited access to 'prison graduates' schooled in gang dynamics. For this reason the Mongrels are the only mafia with a large number of cells throughout the Cape. Of 30 areas surveyed on the Cape Flats, Mongrels were found in 18 of them, as opposed to four groups of Fancy Boys and three of Cisco Yakis.

SYNDICATES

The most profitable of ghetto organizations on the Cape Flats are the illegal syndicates. Some sell commodities which are prohibited in this country (like dagga or mandrax), some sell legal goods in an illegal manner (like the liquor networks) and others sell stolen commodities (like cars). Syndicates can best be described as associations of merchants organised for the purpose of securing the supply or monopoly of some commodity. Of course this description covers much legitimate commercial activity as well. It must be remembered that legality is an ideological term which, in the area of trade, has often been defined by monopoly companies to protect their own interests. What the outlawing of certain activities and commodities has done is simply to remove some operations from the competative sphere of 'legitimate' capitalist activity which is almost exclusively 'white'. This acts as a form of protection which has tended to place these activities

in the hands of ghetto entrepreneurs. Their markets, too, are almost entirely in 'black' urban areas. By far the biggest money-makers among these operators are the drug syndicates. Their influence on the lifestyles of street-corner youths is considerable, and on the Cape Flats dagga, mandrax and liquor are consumed in extraordinary quantities.

Dagga runners and corner merchants_

Dagga (the local name for marijuana) has a usage in South Africa long predating European colonization. Its sale, possession or use is prohibited under the Abuse of Dependence-producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act of 1971. Mere usage carries a maximum penalty for first conviction of up to 10 years and dealing up to 15 years.

South Africa produces some of the best quality dagga in the world. It is grown illegally, mainly in Natal and the Transkei, by black peasant cultivators. The use of dagga is widespread. In the five years following the implementation of the above Act about 80,000 people were sent to jail for dagga offenses.[18] During 1977/78 an average of 43 people were convicted every day for possession of dagga and 10 a day for dealing. However this merely scratches the surface. In 1977, for example, Colonel A.P. van der Heever of the Western Police Division estimated that only one out of every 10 dealers was arrested.[19] In 1982 the head of the Narcotics Bureau in Cape Town said the number of street merchants was 'absolutely uncountable . . . they're on nearly every corner in this city'.[20] Predictably the dagga trade has not escaped the notice of some 'total strategists'. In 1982 the MP for Schweizer-Reneke, Willie Lemmer, called on the government to institute the death penalty for drug dealers. This was, he said, because the use of dagga and drugs was an evil which was playing into the hands of the enemy:

> It is a well-known fact that the psychological onslaught against South Africa is aimed at totally crippling the spirit of the people. Drug dealers are therefore also deliberately planted among our people to make certain members of our community so dependent on these drugs that it later has an influence on the spiritual and psychological condition of the nation . . .
>
> (Cape Times 21.4.82)


The Member had good reason to snipe at the drug laws . . . they are virtually unenforceable. One of the reasons is the dynamics of supply in the Bantustans or 'independent' black homelands. The Transkei, for example, has a predominantly rural population and is deeply impoverished. Dagga selling is probably the region's highest single income earner other than labour. The income of many of its chiefs is also dependent on the plant, which brings into the region up to a million rand a month.[21] In a sense the dagga trade operates under the protection of its illegality. The plant is grown almost exclusively by black peasant farmers whose survival is dependent on the fact that the plant is illegal and is therefore not grown by commercial agriculture (heavily capitalized farmers would stand to lose too much if discovered). For the peasant farmer without equipment, security of tenure or easy access to markets, dagga growing is more than a means of supplementing a family wage: it is a survival technique.

The black city syndicate links the growers with the consumers, and also operates in a relatively protected market. For white entrepreneurs the risk is too high, given a wide range of alternative choices. In addition the growers and the majority of the users are black, which makes white operators conspicuous. Black entrepreneurs buy in the growing areas and run the gauntlet of police roadblocks to the urban areas. Although there is some competition at the dagga sales it appears that a sort of buying

cartel exists which keeps prices to the primary producers standard and uniformly low.[22] The greatest dangers are in transporting the drug. During 1981 the police confiscated 245,000kg of dagga with a street price of R245 million[23], but many times that amount still gets through. The transporters are highly organized, using pantechnicons, buses, hired trucks or convoys of fast cars with scouts up ahead. Citizen Band radios are used to communicate a 'clear' passage.[24] It has been estimated that between R10 million and R20 million worth of dagga is being marketed in South Africa every month.[25]

Huge profits are made 'down the line'. Dagga runners take about a 10 per cent cut. The syndicate bosses never handle the sacks when they arrive, simply organising their storage and sale. In the Bantustans a sack of dagga costs from R300 to R600 a bag, depending on the quality. In the city the syndicate will sell it in bulk for between R1,000 and R2,000. If delivered to Europe or the United States this sackful could fetch R20,000.[26] The big urban dealer who buys the sack will generally break it down into 'arms' (packs about the size of a forearm) and will resell it in this form, making about R1,000 profit. The street merchant will re-pack the arm into 'zols' or 'pencils' for sale. The arm would have cost him (at 1982 street prices) about R15, and by breaking it down his return is R30. On a good evening a merchant on a popular corner can make up to R300.

The demand for the drug is so great that even inter-syndicate competition is minimal. And the network also provides a relatively lucrative income for thousands of street merchants. As one dealer told me:



A corner gang and youths on the street in a Cape Town suburb



> If I sell 50 sticks a day its still okay. A boss won't give me 50 bucks a day . . . and I only work from 4 o'clock to 10 p.m.[27]

This informal street economy doesn't end there, however. Busy dealers and mafias act as retailers for smaller dealers and members of defence and reformatory gangs. These, in turn, may take in youths to help them sell, paying them anything from R50 a week to 20c for the sale of each 'zol'.

The dagga network is therefore an industry with vast profits - sometimes up to 3,000 per cent on the farm price. It employs perhaps hundreds of thousands of ghetto youths throughout the country and is a major component in the back-yard white-pipe culture which blossomed on the Cape Flats in the late 1970s.

Buttons and the Bottle-neck

The other component of the white-pipe culture is mandrax, the central commodity in a network stretching across the world. Mandrax or methaqualone is a sleeping tablet which was available over the counter in South Africa until it was found to be harmful and banned in the mid-1970s. Until that time it was increasingly being used by youths to give an added 'kick' to alcohol. About the time it was banned, however, some 'smokers' discovered that its effect was greatly increased if it was crushed and taken in a pipe with dagga. Its use, after prohibition, spread like wildfire.

While still legal, mandrax cost about 5c a tablet. By the 1980s it was selling for up to R15. The profits to be made by its importation from the East (where the price is low) are therefore enormous, aided by the fact that it is both physically and psychologically addictive. Within

five years of its prohibition, mandrax-taking in the form of a 'white pipe' was the central ritual of the city's street-corner life.

Unlike the dagga syndicates, which are run mainly by blacks, the mandrax merchants are mostly from the group defined as Asian. This is for good reason. The main supply of mandrax comes from India and Pakistan, which are among the few countries which continue to manufacture the drug legally. Mandrax was first made in Ludsnow, India, and used as a non-barbituate hypnotic for insomniacs. Although domestic use of mandrax in India amounted to nine tons during 1980, factories there produced several hundred tons, most of this going to countries in which the drug was banned.[28]

In Bombay the tablets can be bought in bulk for as little as 5c each. Consignments may be as high as 500,000 pills which are paid for in cash by couriers. These couriers, who may simply transport the drug into South Africa in the false bottom of a suitcase, make large amounts of money. A consignment of 300,000 tablets destined for South Africa, worth about R2m was to have put R65,000 in the courier's pocket, but it was discovered by police.[29] During 1981 Cape Town newspapers reported the seizure of 370,000 pills worth R2.2 million at street prices.[30] However Narcotics Bureau detectives say this is only a fraction of the quantity that goes undetected. As one pointed out:

> If you come in with 1,000 mandrax its worth a lot of money. Work it out. But 1,000 mandrax is just a handful, you can hardly see it.[31]

The Cape Town Narcotics Bureau has a staff of 36 men who have a reputation among dealers as being ruthless. But as its captain lamented, with no control over the supply, and profits of up to 30,000 per cent, the police have no chance of stopping the flow.[32] Syndicate bosses are wealthy and can pay well for their protection. Like the owners of illicit liquor outlets, they often hire a defence or reform gang to police their homes, storage areas or transactions, paying them in mandrax tablets, called 'buttons'. The syndicates never touch the drug, simply organizing its importation and distribution. The demand is such that a syndicate, selling in bulk, can get rid of a quarter of a million tablets in a single day.[33] Usually the mafias or the reformatory gangs act as the middle-men, re-distributing again to street merchants. They are all linked in an enterprise which counts police payoff, arrest and seizure merely as an unwelcome tax on a profitable business.

SHEBEENS AND THE LIQUOR MERCHANTS

The third and most problematical drug which influences ghetto life is liquor. Its consumption has a history going back as far as colonialism, and in the Western Cape this has been sharpened by the fact that the area is the centre of the country's wine and brandy industry. Liquor was initially a lure for manual labour, and the way in which it was used is discussed in the following chapter. Farm labourers in the Cape were given wine as part-payment for their services, a practise which continues to this day. However on the Rand mines drunkenness led to accidents and absenteeism, and liquor consumption and distribution by Africans was prohibited between 1896 and 1962. This merely drove production and distribution underground - into the skokiaan shops of the squatter 'yard' culture.[34]

Liquor prohibition ended in terms of the Liquor Amendment Act of 1961. In that year it was estimated that 30,000 people defined as coloured in the Peninsula alone were exclusively involved in the illegal liquor trade.[35] The Act allowed all races purchasing rights at bottle stores, and it was hoped that this would undermine shebeen distribution. It also allowed Coloured and Asian people sharehold rights in hottle stores in their own group areas.

However the shebeens refused to die for several reasons. By then illegal liquor sales had become the sole income of a large number of people too poor to invest in bottle stores. Secondly the scarcity of ghetto bottle stores, their hours of trading and their refusal to extend credit operated against them. Thirdly shebeens were more than distribution points. They were social meeting places, they extended credit to Fridays and they were nearby (the latter being important in dangerous areas). Fourthly, by legalising over-the-counter liquor sales, its procurement for shebeen distribution was simply made less hazardous. A survey of Elsies River done in 1981 by Wilfried Schärf found there to be five coloured-owned bottle stores in the area, four of which were supplying an estimated 400 shebeens.[36]

Another reason for the survival of shebeens is the pressure of the liquor-producing monopolies. Under agreement wine farmers in the Cape are guaranteed purchase of their grapes by the co-operatives. By 1981 this situation had resulted in a surplus wine lake of 400 million litres - over half the annual crop.[37] Quite apart from the loss of revenue from unsold liquor, this enormous surplus leads to a crisis of storage. Particularly during the recessionary period in the 1970s, the wine lake led to problems of profitability within the industry. An attempt to rationalise the situation was the so-called 1979 Agreement, which divided the liquor industry between

two monopolies: the Anglo-American-controlled South African Breweries (beer) and a new conglomorate, the Cape Wine Distillers (wine and spirits). Shares in CWD were held by S.A.B. (30%), K.W.V. Co-operative (30%), and the Rembrandt tobacco group (30%).[38] The effect of the ownership shuffle was to minimise competition through the creation of monopoly interests.

The second strategy of the liquor producers was to influence liquor sales. Under pressure from these monopolies the government is to legalise African shebeens subject to certain conditions. However this has not been contemplated for coloured shebeens, for the simple reason that the monopolies are not yet in a position to penetrate or influence the fierce syndicate control of the Cape shebeens. The operations of these shebeens is best captured in the biography of a single shebeener who opened for business in 1980.[39]

> Joker[40] joined the 'Terrible Josters' (TJs) at the age of nine. It was, according to him, the only way to grow up if you live in a dangerous township on the Cape Flats. Most of his friends in Heideveld and Bonteheuwel[41] had joined, so he also had TJ tattoed on his shoulder. Twenty years later, after spending sporadic periods in prison on charges such as theft, house-breaking and robbery, he decided to make a living by less dangerous means. His last prison term was the result of a 'job' which made him R300. A friend kept the money in a savings account for him until he had served his sentence. Joker however was not keen on working for the 'boere'.[42] The jobs available in factories or retail stores were too humiliating for him and not lucrative enough. He like being the 'lani'[43] and wanted to make big money. On his release from prison he moved to an area outside his former gang territory to avoid being drawn into their operations yet again. With the saved money he opened a shebeen at his rented semi-detached council house in Elsies River. Competition existed in the form of numerous small-time shebeens and one big buyer, and they all constituted a threat, not only to his livelihood, the

shebeen, but to his physical safety. Shebeeners hire gangs to raid, harass or eradicate opposition, or pass on information about illicit dealings to some policeman in the hope of safe-guarding their own business operation.

Joker's only contact with the legal liquor industry was through his suppliers, the bottle stores. Unlike shebeeners in Black areas, those in Coloured areas are not frequented by the big liquor companies with their promotion campaigns and advertising paraphenalia. Joker selected his suppliers on the strength of price and security considerations. Credit was not available to him although he eventually bought in large quantities regularly. The illegality of Joker's operation was most visible during his supply runs.

At the point of purchase, the bottle stores, the nature of his business could hardly be disguised. In working class areas such as Elsies River, where bottle stores depended on shebeens for most of their custom, it was essential that customers were not harrassed by over-conscientious policemen. Bottle stores that acquired a reputation for intervention-free liquor purchases were amply rewarded by increased patronage. Unfortunately the provisions of the Police Act No. 8 of 1959 criminalise any further discussion on how some bottle stores achieved this status. One can simply say that shebeens can only function if their suppliers are guaranteed, and this requires the active collusion of part of the formal liquor industry, in this case the retail sector.

The initial illegality of selling liquor however creates an amplification spiral of illegal <u>means</u> by which the business perpetuates itself. Next to the fear of detection, the most tenuous aspect of an illegal business operation is the unenforceability of contracts through the conventional State-run institutions (i.e. police, lawyers, courts and prisons). A shebeencr

characteristically achieves contractual compliance by means of force, or threats of force. Shebeeners either partner a number of 'private policemen' (i.e. a gang) in order to safeguard his interests, or alternatively employ the gangsters as wage labour. The power that a private police force affords a shebeener may encourage him to seek market expansion into other illicit business possibilities, e.g. drug trading.

> Joker's scale of operation soon reached the stage where he needed to employ 'guards' to assist and protect him against predatory raids of rival gangs. A forceful presence of guards also ensured the orderly behaviour of customers indulging under the tarpaulin in his back yard and facilitated the collection of outstanding credit.
>
> The guards he hired were mostly reformatory graduates belonging to one of two gangs, the Dobermans or Born Free Kids,[44] aged between 15 and 18. On release they found the familiar environment of their former 'beat' and the safety of a shebeener's protection to be acceptable alternative employment. The temporary absence of their imprisoned leader had weakened their solidarity, so working for the shebeener of an opposing gang was excusable.[45]
>
> A year after his release Joker bought a car which increased the volume of his sales capacity. The resulting increase in business eased his move into money-lending within the community at the usurious rate of 30 per cent a week, duly collected by his strong-arm contingent.
>
> Continuous harrassment of the smaller shebeeners in the area ensured that their liquor involvement became increasingly hazardous, and they slowly withdrew their opposition to Joker, who acquired their customers. He then extended his business into drug peddling by taking an ex-prison inmate into partnership. He and his new partner, Scarface, established five outposts at strategic street corners, where his gangster-guards sold sticks of dagga to the community. Within three months of starting the

new venture they bought a second car. With 15 guards in their service they gradually strengthened their control over their beat, an area of six blocks, housing an estimated 500 people.

Once the dagga-trading was running smoothly, they expanded into an 'agency' for stolen goods. They neither purchased nor handled the goods but simply acted as go-betweens. With their wide-ranging contacts in the underworld and the community, together with their own credit facilities the agency prospered.

Two years after his release from prison Joker had become one of the wealthiest members of his neighbourhood. He was envied by many for his rapidly acquired wealth, his shrewdness, and for being his own master. Nonetheless he was also feared by many for his unscrupulous exploitation of particularly the poorer members of his community. They had become dependent not only on his liquor, dagga and credit, but also on his goodwill. His private police force was capable of executing any threats at his command. It was thus in the interests of most people in the 'beat' to stay on the right side of him.

Becoming good customers, supplying information, granting favours, remaining silent where necessary, were means of reaffirming his power and securing their own safety. Joker's commands became norms that had to be heeded. When he decreed that people were ill-advised to frequent the other shebeen in the area, they did so at their own risk. In this manner he succeeded in closing it down.

Joker had consciously chosen youngsters as his guards because they were more dependent on him and consequently easier to control. Their lack of big-time gang experiences and bleak alternative employment opportunities gave them little option but to settle for the R45 a week that he paid them.[46] And they had to bear the brunt of frontline contact with the police.

In this sense the partnership with Scarface was an extremely well-planned strategy. Scarface was a 'pumulanga'[47] of the BFKs, and

the guards owed him allegiances and obedience which superceded anything Joker could have won from them. The business operated better with Scarface in joint command.

The gang did not only function as the private police force of the extended shebeen enterprise. Outside of their employment their relative autonomy was bolstered by their unemployed gang-brothers, also numbering about 15, whose means of survival had a quite different impact on the community. Not controlled by Scarface as tightly as the guards, the gangsters 'lived off' the community in an even more predatory fashion than the shebeen. For these gangsters the transaction involved strictly only 'take'. They pilfered, pickpocketed, stole, robbed, broke into houses and sold their spoils through the shebeen's stolen goods agency. Occasionally they intimidated by assaulting, stabbing and raping occupants of their beat. Their closely defined territory prevented them from 'working' in the opposition gang's beat. As long as it didn't adversely affect business, the shebeen partnership tacitly approved of these activities, for it strengthened their control of the community. Wronged members sometimes appealed to Joker to intercede on their behalf, which he would if he considered it in his interests. The guards thus also supplemented their earnings with the spoils of their predation.

For the community the gang's activities consitituted an irritation. Everyone was exposed to possible attack or intimidation by the gangsters/guards, especially when they were out of their houses or flats.

Movement in the township after dark was severely constrained by the gang, who patrolled the streets well armed. It is conceivable that more indoor recreation, including drinking and smoking dagga, was forced upon the community by the presence of the gang. And the gang's actions improved business for the shebeen, protecting those community members who were good customers.

The shebeen and its 'police force' thus substantially restricted mobility and activities of inhabitants in the area, be they educational, recreational, political or criminal.

This, then, is a rough topography of gang culture on the Cape Flats. It is a necessary starting point in any attempt to understand youth culture in the new ghettoes. For those on the 'white' side of town, gang activity is seen either as an index of anarchy or social degeneration or, alternatively, as a planned conspiracy. Certainly it is beyond the level of societal tolerance and is definitely a source of mounting anxiety. You burglar-bar your windows, don't walk alone at night, never venture into 'non-white' areas and perhaps you carry a gun. On the other side of town gang activity is seen, at uncomfortably close range, as a fight among groups who have sufficient organization and weapons to wield power. In a house with thin doors, among neighbours you hardly know, you slide the bolts when evening falls, trying to ignore the shouts and thumps in a fierce world outside that begins right at your doorstep. In each case, between rich and poor, age and youth, neighbour and neighbour, fear mans the boundary - a fear often greater than the threat.

How did it come to this in the Cape of Good Hope, known to ancient voyagers as The Fairest Cape in all the World? Why did hunger and fear visit the Tavern of the Seas, one of the most beautifully-positioned cities in the world?

Part of the answer can be found in the astounding exercise in social engineering which took place in Cape Town during the 1960s - the forced movement of thousands of families in what one newspaper described as the unscrambling of an omelette. Within that action can be found another part of the answer - the ideology underpinning the daily reproduction of

fear . . . fear of dispossession, violence and death. Both are apparatuses of control, and they are the two main threads which run through this book. But around this is a broader tapestry, involving the process of urbanisation, the growth of the city, the movement of people and their changing relationships . . . subjects too vast to deal with in a single study.

For reasons of clarity, therefore, I have focussed on only a narrow range of forces and relationships which impinge on underclass youths and their families. Indeed I believe the changing role of the family is a key to the understanding of life in both the newly-built and the bulldozed ghettoes of the city. For this reason it is necessary to trace the effects of proletarianisation on this fragile social organism . . . the 'schooling' of its members into the discipline of wage labour.

6. Kerrim is similar to snooker, except it is played on a small portable board with flat discs instead of balls.

7. Taken from police returns for 1981.

8. Figures from Cape Metropolitan Ambulance Service.

9. These institutions are known as Children's Act Schools. According to the Department of Internal Affairs (Coloured Affairs) the number of youths in these Schools in the Cape area in December 1980 were:

Faure school for girls	110
Faure school for boys	252
Wellington school of industries (girls)	95
Ottery school of industries (boys)	229
Porter Reformatory	516
TOTAL	1202

During the last 10 years the average number at Porter Reformatory was 600. The duration of stay at these institutions is usually 2 years.

10. Survey of Porter gangs done in 1981 - 100 interviews.

11. Police returns, Cape Town, 1981.

12. In that year there were 1,457,397 valid firearm licences in South Africa for a population of 4,408,000 whites. Hansard 1980 Col.123 and 540.

13. Ibid.

14. Interview with W.O. Rix, Lansdowne, June 1982.

15. Recorded in Hanover Park in October 1980.

16. E.J. Hobsbawm: Primitive Rebels, Manchester University Press, 1959. p.33.

17. See Hobsbawm, Ibid. p. 53.

18. 1978 House of Assembly debates, Col. 6328

19. Quoted from Barry Streek and Richard Wicksteed: Render Unto Kaiser, a Transkei Dossier. Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1981 p. 246.

20. Interview with Captain B. Uytenbogaardt, head of the Narcotics Bureau in Cape Town, June 1982.

21. See Streek and Wicksteed, op. cit. pp 249, 253.

22. Ibid. p. 249.

23. Cape Times, May 3 1982.

24. Ibid. 12-10-80. In the report a CID spokesman complained 'There's so much money in it (dagga running) we'll never stop it altogether'. The report said: 'A pilot car with either a CB or two-way radio would travel in front of the shipment and would notify the vehicle carrying the contraband of police activity or roadblocks. The vehicle would then change its course.' Alternatively, 'the driver in the pilot car telephones back to pre-arranged telephone boxes along the road to warn the vehicle carrying dagga,which either lies low or takes another route'.

25. Streek and Wicksteed, op. cit. p. 253.

26. Ibid. p. 246.

27. Interview with dealer Cliff, Cape Town, February 1981.

28. Cape Times 2-10-81. One hundred tons entered the United States that year for illegal use.

29. Ibid.

30. This is calculated at the wholesale price of R6 a tablet. Retail street prices are as high as R15, which would push the value if sold to R5.6 million.

31. Interview with Captain B. Uytenbogaardt of the Narcotics Bureau, Cape Town, June 1982.

32. Ibid. Uytenbogaardt's comment on the mandrax flow was: 'I'm worried, really worried'.

33. Conversation with syndicate boss.

34. See C. van Onselen: Randlords and Rotgut 1886-1903, History Workshop Journal No. 2 Autumn 1976; Andre Proctor: Class Struggle, segregation and the City: A history of Sophia town, 1905-1940, In B. Bozzoli (ed.) Labour, townships and protest: studies in the social history of the Witwatersrand, Raven Press, Johannesburg, 1979 and D. Pinnock: Langrok's shebeen and the sewing machine, in Janus, UCT, 1980.

35. W.C. Malan, Member for Paarl, in Hansard House of Assembly Debates Col.8312, June 16 1961. Quoted in W Schärf: Shebeens in the Cape Peninsula, a study done in conjunction with research for this book in 1982, Publication forthcoming.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. This case study was commissioned for this book from W. Schärf, who undertook the research by participant observation during 1982.

40. A ficticious gang nickname.

41. Two Coloured townships on the Cape Flats.

42. Usually means Afrikaners, or police but here it means Whites.

43. From Larney - Big Shot.

44. Both gangs belong to the same gang alliance.

45. Joker's original gang, the TJs belong to a gang alliance antagonistic to the BFKs-Dobermans.

46. This was at the time the equivalent of a builder's labourer's wage.

47. A leader. Although Joker and Scarface belonged to different street gangs, they had joined the same prison gang, which supercedes any other allegiances.

2

WORKER FAMILIES AND THE MOVE TO TOWN

Urbanisation and unemployment are bound together with hoops of steel. People move to the towns because they lose their stock, their land, their jobs on farms, or simply because poverty in the city holds out more chances of survival than poverty in the countryside.

Throughout the colonial history of the Cape, the central issue for the colonists continued to be the extraction of labour at least cost to themselves. The initial drive was to acquire a supply of farm workers. The period up to about 1830 was one in which the indigenous people were forced into labour. It was also a period of slavery and of rapidly expanding frontiers within which private ownership of land was recognised. During this time the products, the land and the labour of Khoisan families were taken by decree and force of arms. The second period, following the 1830s, could be described as the phase of growing urbanisation following the unbinding of slaves and the Khoisan, and the incorporation of the latter under the rule of law.

As the floodgates of proletarianisation gradually opened, more and more families migrated to towns and, finally, to the city. By 1900 there were large squatter camps in Cape Town and overcrowding in urban tenaments. By the 1920s serious attempts were being made to stem the flood, and by the 1940s it had reached crisis proportions for the urban managers and the state.

FORCED LABOUR AND THE FARMS

The early period was extremely brutal, as it was wherever a finger of colonial capitalism encountered a precapitalist people. The initial reason for the settlement of Europeans at the Cape was to supply foodstuffs to ships on the spice routes to the East. The trade with Khoisan pastoralists soon became violent when the demand for cattle exceeded levels which Khoisan families found acceptable. Amid the skirmishes and plunder which followed, Dutch farmers (free-burghers) settled on Khoisan land to take advantage of the growing demand for supplies. Two small wars were fought within the first 25 years of European settlement, but the Khoisan bands were no match for the fire power of the Boers. At the outer edge of the expanding European area of influence, the indigenous families were hunted like vermin by commandos of Boers and 'Bastards' (people of mixed Boer and Khoisan ancestry). Their cattle were plundered, their networks of interdependence broken and they were either killed or taken to labour on Boer farms.

Labour was an ever-present concern for the Boers. The first of a number of organised labour-catching expeditions was mounted in 1774 when a Boer Commandant was appointed to protect the 300 mile northern frontier between Piketberg and Sneeuberg. A force under him, consisting of Boers, 'Bastards' and 'loyal' Khoisan killed 503 Khoisan and captured 239 men, women and children.[1]

The Graaff Reinet Drosdy reported that between 1786 and 1795 on the Graaff Reinet frontier alone more than 2,500 Khoisan were killed and 699 captured. A traveller, G Thompson, was told that between 1790 and 1820 there had been 32 commandos against the Khoisan, and that in the six years between 1815 and

1821, 3,200 had been killed and a great number of children carried into the Colony.[2] Indeed there were many allegations, probably true, that the commandos went out expressly in order to capture Khoisan inboekselings (apprentices) for labour on their farms.[3] These children were indentured to Boer families for up to 25 years, becoming in reality little better than slaves. The theft of these children also hit at the ability of families to stay together and to expand, and carried the possibility that parents who were not killed would follow their children into labour.

The process of proletarianisation was further 'assisted' by three devastating smallpox epidemics: in 1713, 1755 and 1767. Following these epidemics, Khoisan families within the Colony and many beyond it 'sank into the position of a landless proletariat - labourers or vagrants on the lands of their ancestors'.[4]

Another inducement to labour was the introduction of liquor, that old ally of colonial penetration. Brandy and arrack were high among the inducements offered to make the Khoisan part with their cattle. As late as 1774 the Landdrost of Swellendam was asking the government in Cape Town for '388 cans of arrack to be used in the Hottentot trade'.[5] And on the farms the masters supplied liquor to their servants 'in part payment of wages . . . according to the usual practice of the country'.[6]

It should not be thought, however, that these assaults on Khoisan freedom met with little resistance. The Drosdy at Graaff Reinet reported that in the nine years following 1768 more than 720 colonists were killed in reprisal raids. Not long afterwards the town of Algoa Bay (later known as Port Elizabeth) came within a hair's breadth of being taken in a Khoisan uprising.[7]

Even in 1930 the Torch newspaper could report peasant resistance led by one Abel Simpi in the de Doorns mountains. It took police 10 weeks of 'running battle' to subdue the rebels.[8] There were numerous such outbreaks of 'social banditry' or peasant resistance throughout the 19th Century which deserve study. They were usually passed off in the Press (if they were ever mentioned) as criminal or irrational gang activities.[9]

But along the expanding northern fringe of the Colony trek parties of Griquas - people of mixed Boer/Khoisan ancestry - continued to force Khoisan family bands either northwards or into their service. The Reverend J. Campbell, who made two trips into Khoisan territory, noted that by 1820 the Khoisan between the Orange and Vaal rivers had become pastoralists on a considerable scale. But within a few years 'the advancing Boers put an end to this incipient progress south of the Orange, the Griquas and others to the north of it'.[10] By the end of the 18th Century the Boers had occupied all the favourable parts of the Colony and 'most of (the Khoisan) in the Colony were in the more or less regular service of Europeans or half-breeds'.[11] Those Khoisan families who were not proletarianised had either fled north or taken refuge as peasants on mission land. (Mission settlers were able to delay <u>full</u> proletarianisation for a further two centuries.)

Those within the Colony had become tied to the needs of capital by the tightest of laws. A study of labour contracts for Tulbagh and Graaff Reinet on 1805 and 1823 respectively showed that nearly half the Khoisan on the farms worked for nothing more than food and clothing.[12]

The repressive measures against Khoisan families culminated in a Proclamation by Governor Caledon on November 1 1790 which stated that each Khoisan was to have a fixed place of abode and be registered at the nearest landdrost's office. He could not move from this place without a pass signed by his master. It also decreed that labour contracts between Khoi and Boer for over three months had to be registered. In this way labour was immobilised in the place where it was needed.


In the 1820s it had become 'received opinion that a (Khoisan) found anywhere without a pass was a vagrant'.[13] It was considered competent for any European to stop him (Proclamation of 1809, Clause 6) and, if he had no pass,

> to apprehend and lodge him in goal. There he would have to stay until his master claimed him, or if he had no master, until one could be found for him. In either case the expenses of his keep would be debited against his future wages.[14]

And no Khoisan in the Colony was exempted from carrying a pass.

A second wave of 'incorporations' into the capitalist economy took place in the 19th Century when Boer farmers, short of both land and labour, claimed the Griqua lands as their own. The Griquas resisted fiercely, but were gradually absorbed as labour . . . or trekked northwards or eastwards over the Drakensburg mountains to found Kokstad.

A feature of this phase of labour catching and plunder was that large families were being proletarianised. Women were in demand as domestic labour and both men, women and children were used in the fields (the



A Khoisan tramp in Newlands Forest, pre-1910
(Cape Archives)

average Boer family had five Khoisan servants for every two slaves[15]). What is important for this study is the relatively rapid and complete incorporation of these Khoisan families into the agricultural labour force. Together with the mission peasants, they were to form the rural base from which, after Ordinance 50 in 1828, the urban migrations were to begin. But before considering the effects of this Ordinance it is necessary to look briefly at the second root of working-class Cape Town: the slaves.

In 1834 there were 39,000 slaves in the Cape Colony. Most of them had been brought from the East to work on Boer farms because of Khoisan resistance to inclusion in the labour force. In 1685 the Cape government passed a law prohibiting marriages between slaves and Europeans. Most slaves in the Colony were unskilled farm labourers with a few being used to hawk their masters' wares in Cape Town or work on the docks. Those with skills were mainly urbanised, and included tailors, cobblers, carpenters, cabinet-makers, painters, wagon-makers, brick-layers, smiths, harness-makers and skilled cooks for the rich Burghers. Most female slaves did domestic work, with a few being skilled seamstresses or hired out to European families as wet-nurses.[16] From 1760 every slave moving from town to the country or from farms to town had to carry a pass signed by his or her master which any 'passers-by' might ask them to show.[17]

In 1807 the British government abolished the slave trade for reasons unconnected to the Cape labour situation, and patrolled the seas to enforce the ban. As a result, between 1808 and 1816, about 2,000 'prize negroes' (blacks 'liberated' from slave ships) were landed at Simonstown. Due to the labour shortage and fears surrounding abolition they were immediately 'indentured' to European masters and often reduced to the level of slaves.

THE URBAN MIGRATIONS

In the early 19th Century two pieces of legislation were passed that were to drastically alter the labour position on Cape farms. The first was Cape Ordinance 50 of 1828 which abolished the need for the Khoisan to carry passes. Its passage was mainly due to the agitation conducted in Britain by the London Missionary Society. It also regulated relations between master and servant, repealed sections of Caledon's law on contracts and stated that Khoisan children could only be apprenticed to masters with their parents' consent.

The second piece of legislation was the British Act 73 of 1833 which abolished slavery throughout the British empire as from December 1834. Both these measures, coming within six years of each other, were imposed from the outside upon a hostile colony, and their effect was to loosen the hold masters had over their labour. The immediate result was, predictably, a chronic labour shortage on European farms. Boer fears were further heightened by a Cape Government decree commanding colonists to dismiss all Xhosa and Gonaqua servants preparatory to the expulsion of all 'kaffirs' beyond the Fish River.[18] These attacks on existing labour relationships were central to the 'Great Trek' of disgruntled Boers into the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. But another result was a dramatic increase in casual labour. After 1828 a sharp incline was noted in the practice of hiring labourers by the day, at relatively high wages, for occasional services such as harvesting (this practice is still widespread in the Western Cape today).[19] Although it may be argued that casual labourers lost job security (for what it was worth) they could be said to have gained the freedom to choose their employment and, in a labour scarce market, they could exert a measure of bargaining pressure over wages.



A newspaper cartoon suggesting the effect on the Khoisan of the passing of Ordinance 50
(Cape Archives)

The more general response of individuals and families however, was to move into the towns. As early as the 1820s Commissions of Inquiry found 'free blacks' to constitute 'a large portion of the lower class of tradesmen, fishermen and (wagon) mechanics' of Cape Town. 'Their large families', they noted, 'congregate in small and inconvenient houses . . . for which they pay extravagent rates to the owners'.[20] And after 1838, when the Cape slaves were finally freed of an extra five-year bondage to their masters, many also left their employment and began (in the words of an angry farmer) to 'crowd into the towns and villages'.[21]

Along with the slaves, migrating Khoisan families formed the nucleus of the growing proletariat of Cape Town and surrounding villages.[22] Old social patterns of organisation in the countryside began to break down. A Civil Commissioner observed in 1904 that,

> the Griquas as a tribe are practically extinct, and the few who are alive are paupers and their children are common labourers or in the towns.[23]

It is clear that the 1828 and 1833 legislation was bitterly resented by most European farmers . . . especially after the Colonial Office vetoed the 1834 Vagrant Ordinance, which had allowed Khoisan to be charged for vagrancy and sent to labour without the necessity of having to procure proof of any crime being committed.[24] War was one 'legitimate' method of labour catching and after the first Koranan war in 1868 it became the practice of police to arrest all Khoisan families in the area who had no visible means of subsistence and send them to different villages in the Colony to be apprenticed to farmers. During the second Koranan war in 1879 'as many of

the enemy as it had been able to capture . . . men, women and children, over 800 in all . . . were apprenticed as servants to Colonial farmers'. Korananland, according to a government report, was left derelict.[25]

Farmers also turned their gaze to the mission reserves. From the 1880s the breaking up of these reserves to 'free' labour was under constant discussion. A government official investigating the proposals, Melville, advocated

> the division of the garden and corn lands among the people, who should in future have the right of sale[26]

In other words he proposed full individual ownership of agricultural land among Khoisan families. It was generally realised that under such a system most of the occupants would soon lose their land to the few who had capital, and it was on this ground that the missionaries opposed the recommendation. On the same grounds the European farmers in the vicinity of the reserves 'enthusiastically urged individual tenure'.[27]

THE LURE OF LIQUOR

Another tactic used to obtain labour, one that hit at the roots of family cohesion, was to offer liquor in addition to housing. A government inquiry in 1849 observed that

> some farmers have adopted the expedient of giving huts on their farms to families on condition that they should turn out to work when required at stipulated wages. Many farmers [it noted] were finding it necessary to give more liquor to their labourers than had been the custom before emancipation.[28]

The fact was that after 1828 the 'tot system' - more than being a means by which farmers could dispose of cheap surplus wine instead of wages - rapidly became a labour-catching practice. From the early days of vine growing wine had been regularly supplied to labourers in agricultural districts to 'encourage' them in their work and in effect addict them to the labour arrangements.

By the 1820s government reports could complain that

> both slaves and Hottentots have readily taken to liquor (preferring brandy to wine if they can get it) and eye-witnesses frequently complain of over indulgence on the part of slaves[29]

But despite these measures the wine industry began to buckle, weighed down by labour problems, international competition and finally a disastrous attack of vine disease.[30] In an attempt to bolster the increasingly ailing industry the wine merchants cast their eyes to the growing urban proletariat. As a result of a change in the licencing system which became effective in October 1846, the number of canteens increased rapidly, especially in Cape Town.[31] Many Khoisan and slaves in the towns 'succumbed to the temptation of the strong drink which (these) canteens were only too ready to sell them'.[32] This was brandy of an extremely dubious quality known as Cape Smoke. Even before the change in legislation on licencing, the Civil Commissioner of the Cape District could observe that

> during the winter immediately following the promulgation of the 50th Ordinance (Khoisan) of both sexes were seen in numbers, at all hours of the day and night, in a state



A street-corner group in District Six, probably 1906
(Cape Archives)

> drunkenness and entire nakedness in the vicinity of Cape Town and along the Wynberg and Simonstown roads . . . and the lives of many of them were actually sacrificed from exposure, in a state of insensibility from drunkenness, to the inclemency of the weather.[33]

Even in the mid-20th Century government Blue Books were still noting a general increase of drunkenness among the urban proletariat of the Western Cape . .



A District Six hawker in about 1900
(Cape Archives)

From the early 19th Century, then, individuals and whole families had been moving off the land into the villages, larger towns and the city. In Cape Town they found slums, overcrowded and relatively expensive housing and a lack of formal employment. But they measured their progress from where they had begun, and conditions in the rural areas, with harsh 'white' bosses, droughts and layoffs through mechanisation, were considered far worse by many.

In the ghettos a pattern of existence began to emerge from the mid-19th Century that was to continue until the 1970s. Like the Afrikaners in early Johannesburg, the Cape rural families were not immediately absorbed into the city workforce.[34] But unlike the Afrikaners, people labelled 'coloured' did not have the political clout to ensure an increasing share of the expanding profits of urban industrialisation. The outcome was what may be termed a ghetto culture, linked into the city on all sides and penetrated by it, but yet different from it. The central life force of this urban ghetto development was the extended family. People moving into the city sought out their kinfolk as beacons of support in the new, hostile environment. With them and through them they found accommodation and, later, employment. Usually this employment was in the crevices of economic activity: in an extension of regular household duties and in micro-commerce and hawking - all with extremely limited access to capital. But the redistribution of wealth that this penny-capitalism ensured allowed for the reproduction of the workforce in adverse conditions. For many (unskilled as they were in urban occupations) these activities were often in areas considered illegal by the state. In the urban explosion however they flourished. But it would be incorrect to consider, as the middle class

of the city did, that the poor quarters were lawless in an anarchical sense. In the urban culture which emerged, based on extended families, a sense of place and the shared problems of poverty, the working class policed itself. An example of this internal control, to which I will now turn, is that which existed in the inner-city area known as District Six.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2

1. J.S. Marais: The Cape Coloured People, 1652 - 1937 (Longmans, London, 1939) p.17.

2. Marais p. 6.

3. Records of the Cape Colony (36 volumes) VII edited by G.M. Theal p. 114.

4. Marais p.6.

5. Quoted in Marais, p. 8.

6. Records VII p. 111 and Records XXV p. 330.

7. See Susan Newton King, unpublished thesis (forthcoming).

8. Umsebenzi - July 25 1930.

9. Eric Hobsbawm describes the form as such: 'Social banditry, a universal and virtually unchanging phenomenon, is little more than endemic peasant protest against oppression and poverty: a cry for vengence on the rich and the oppressors. A vague dream of some curb upon them, a righting of individual wrongs (p 3). He adds that 'a Man becomes a bandit because he does something which is not regarded as criminal by his local conventions, but is so regarded by the State or local rulers' (p 13) - Primitive Rebels (Manchester University Press, 1959).

10. Quoted in Marais p. 23.

11. Marais p. 7.

12. Marais p. 8.

13. Professor H.A. Reyburn, writing in The Critic, October 1934, pp. 46, 47, 51.

14. Records XXXV p. 146-147.

15. Marais p. 123.

16. Records XXXV p. 373-4

17. Records IX p. 157.

18. The Cape government came under tremendous pressure over the Black Labour issue. In 1828 the earlier decree was reversed by Ordinance 49, which itself was suspended in 1829. However Nguni people continued to enter the colony across the Fish River.

19. Marais p. 181.

20. Records XXVIII p. 36-40, Records XXV p. 138.

21. The quote is from a farmer named Cloete in Marais p. 190. Marais considered Cloete's statement to be an exaggeration, but concedes that 'a migration of some importance (among former slaves) did take place'.

22. See Masters and Servants Blue Book, 1849, p. 68-9.

23. Cape Government Publication No. 7, 1904.

24. UG 41, 1926, p. 29.

25. Ibid.

26. Marais p. 83.

27. Marais p. 83.

28. Masters and Servants Blue Book, 1849.

29. Records XXXV p. 330, 373

30. See Mary Rayner's Doctoral thesis on the subject, (unpublished) Duke University, North Carolina, USA.

31. Theal, G.M.: A History of South Africa from 1795 to 1827, Volume 2 p. 31, 204 (1915).

32. Marais p. 184.

33. British Parliamentary Papers 425 of 1837 p. 155.

34. See C. van Onselen: The Main Reef Road into the working class: proletarianisation, unemployment and class consciousness amongst Johannesburg's Afrikaner poor, 1890 - 1914: University of the Witwatersrand History Workshop, 1981.

3

CONTROL IN THE OLD CITY

District Six on the slopes of Table Mountain was originally farm land. It was settled on by Europeans attached to the Castle in the 18th Century. Rapid expansion took place in the early 19th Century when members of the city's multiplying settler middle-class began to build modest homes for themselves within easy reach of the central area. The wealthier merchants and officials already had houses closer to Cape Town on land which their clerks and assistants could not afford. So on the outskirts of town a middle-income community began to grow in District Six. The houses were unpretentious, mostly two-storeyed and built in terraces in the style which has come to be accepted as typical of the Cape under Georgian and Victorian rule. Narrow blocks were laid out parallel to Hanover Street and small semi-detached houses with long service lanes were built. From the 1880s skilled artisans, drawn to South Africa by the mining boom after the discovery of gold, began moving into Cape Town.

After the outbreak of the Boer War the town's population was swollen by an influx of troops and refugees from the Transvaal. From 1891 to 1900 the population jumped from 79,000 to 174,000, dropping back to 167,000 in 1911 after people moved back north. Great building activity took place in District Six during the War and the old two-storeyed buildings and flat-roofed houses with stoeps were penetrated by bigger two and three-storeyed blocks in a variety of architectural styles. Most of the properties in the area were owned by descendants of the european settlers and a few by Asians.

No homes were provided for workers and houses available to them were filled and then overcrowded, the remaining numbers being forced to squat on any available land. But after the Boer War a large number of businesses and offices were transferred back to the Rand. The tenements in District Six were vacated (but not transferred out of settler hands) as tradesmen, artisans and soldiers moved North and, through a filtering-down process, working class families moved in. By leap-frog movements of population the middle-income europeans shifted out, first to Woodstock, then to Observatory, Mowbray and beyond.

Throughout the 19th Century, as we have seen, working people had been moving into Cape Town as well. Initially this migration would be a circular one undertaken mainly by young job-seekers. But as the transition from an agrarian economy to an industrial one gathered pace it became a one-way flow of whole families. By the 1920s the march of the poor into Cape Town was being described by city administrators as 'formidable'.[1] Between 1904 and 1960 the population in all towns in South Africa had increased by 83.2%. But the population increase in the nine principal urban areas between 1921 and 1968 was no less than 420%.[2] From 1936 to 1970 the percentage of urbanised people in the Cape described as 'coloured' rose from 55% to 72%.[3]

As far back as 1867 District Six was considered as being overcrowded, and for the next 100 years migration into the area continued almost unabated.[4] In 1936 the official census put the population of the District at 22,440 and in 1946 at 28,377. But by 1950 it was nearly double, at about 40,000.[5] This growth in population reflected massive industrial expansion during and after World War II. Between 1955 and 1958 alone, the number of private industries in South Africa was to rise from 1,189 to 13,532.[6]

Many families in the area were extremely poor, living for generations by working at odd jobs here and there, scratching out a living by economic enterprise which counted its profits in halfpennies and farthings.

Various types of employment at these levels are reflected in court records:

> Tom Kalosa came to Cape Town from Queenstown. In 1907 he was working as a carter, with his own horse and cart. He supplemented his income by selling yeast to denti-brewers in the Ndabeni location. He himself lived in Maitland. He made about £2 a week, but had to set aside 2/- for yeast and 3/- for his horse's stable.

> Alfred Boois or Boyse, born in Basutoland about 1889, was in East London in 1907. In 1911 he was earning his living as an egg hawker in Cape Town selling eggs at 2/- a dozen to large houses in Sea Point and the Gardens.


> Sayid Kahn was an Afghan who came to Cape Town about 1901. He set up as a mattess-maker in Dorp Street, employing six or seven workmen who slept on the premises and were liable to dismissal if they did not return to their rooms by ten at night. He later also acquired a small soda-water factory. He was suspected of receiving stolen property.[7]

Throughout the migrations into Cape Town, the extended family was the catch-net of the urban poor. Within it were people who could be trusted implicitly, those who would give assistance willingly, immediately, and without counting the cost. Viewing a similar situation in Soweto, David Webster concluded that:

> in major calamities, like losing one's job, or a death in the family, it is one's kinfolk who rally to support first, and those whose support lasts longest. Kin are also the people who help find employment, accommodation, and who bribe or bail one out of the clutches of the law. They are, in short, indispensible.[8]

In a hostile and uncaring world the extended families in the city were also the domain within which the strategies of survival were worked out. They were the primary sites for the reproduction of the labour force.

District Six before its destruction



Central to the health of the family, of course, was working class wages. South Africa, like most Third World countries, paid its workers an extremely-low wage, which had to be conserved and stretched. The poor would respond to this situation, as David Webster has shown, in typical fashion:

> They create systems of redistribution, which help meagre incomes extend to the limits of their elasticity. These patterns of redistribution percolate through social networks to finally find their way into the pockets of those who are unable to find wage employment; it is above all a social form of redistribution, operating among friends, neighbours, workmates, acquaintances and friends of friends.[12]

A wage is simply a money expression of the value of labour power, and can be exchanged for food and other commodities necessary to reproduce the worker and his family on a daily basis.[13] It is of course in the interests of capital to prevent wages from rising relative to profits. This can be done in at least three ways: Firstly by ensuring a labour supply greater than its needs in order to increase competition for jobs and drive down wages; secondly, as we have seen, by replacing workers with machinery leading to an overall reduction of the workforce; and thirdly, by raising the cost of essential commodities which - even if wages increase - leads to a decline in the real wage. All these trends could be found in Cape Town from the 1930s, with a particularly steep rise after the outbreak of World War II. During the war rapid industrialization took place, coinciding with an influx of labour to the city and an increase in the cost of essentials like mealie meal (20%), paraffin (25%) and coal (50%).[14]

However the actual level of wages was not the absolute base-line of working class living standards. In an important paper on 'informal sector' economic activity Wilkinson and Webster have pointed out that the reproduction of the working class is mediated by certain other factors, depending on both the historical context and the type of culture. Three such factors are:

(1) The sphere of 'domestic reproduction', in which the structure of a family or household unit and the commitment of labour power to domestic labour (housework, child-minding, maintenance, etc.) can have a marked effect on the standard of living of the individuals within it, in terms of the quality and quantity of use values they consume. In addition, the question of the 'family wage' (whether or not the wage is sufficient to cover the costs of reproduction of the individual worker's family in addition to the costs of his or her daily subsistance) clearly arises and comes to bear on the process of reproduction of the labour force within this context.

(2) State provision of those social services or aspects of 'collective consumption' which complement or substitute for individual consumption within the sphere of 'domestic reproduction', i.e. the provision of subsidized state housing, health or child care facilities, education, etc. which constitute the 'social' or 'indirect' wage.

(3) Income (in cash or kind) derived from 'informal' activities or relationships not directly subject to the 'laws of motion' of

> capitalist commodity production and exchange which either replaces or supplements income derived from 'formal' wage employment.[15]

In District Six state-provided services and subsidies were notably absent. So it was through informal economic strategies and a sharing of the family wage that the poor survived.

Informal business in District Six arose simply from the obstinate desire of people in the urban area to say alive. It acted as a buffer against unemployment and countervailed, for a time, the full effects of increasing urbanization, low wages and unemployment. And the ground floor of these small-scale economic activities was the extended family. In 1937 a Commission of Inquiry found that:

> the entire Cape coloured family in the urban areas very often forms the earning unit, the income of the parents and one or more of the children being pooled to meet household needs.[16]

Table 3A lists some of the types and categories of income opportunities open to people in Cape Town at the time.[17] District Six, particularly, became known for the ingenuity, novelty and enterprise of its residents engaged in this small-scale production and services. By day it hummed with trade, barter and manufacture, and by night it offered the 'various pleasures of conviviality or forgetfulness'.

> The place has more barber shops to the acre than anywhere else in Africa (wrote Brian Barrow in 1966) some of them with great-sounding names like the Rio Grande Hairdressers. There are all sorts of alleys and lanes with names like Rotten Row, Drury Lane and Lavender Hill. There are tailors by the score, herbalists,

TABLE 3A INCOME OPPORTUNITIES IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN DISTRICT SIX, CAPE TOWN IN THE 1950s

FORMAL income opportunities

(a) Public sector wages

(b) Private firms (wages, dividends, etc.)

(c) Transfer payments - pensions, unemployment, benefits, workmen's compensation.

SEMI-FORMAL income opportunities : legitimate

(a) Domestic labour - wages, payment in kind.

INFORMAL income opportunities : legitimate

(a) Productive and secondary activities - building contractors and associated activities, self-employed artisans, shoe-makers tailors, knitters, carvers, artists, sweetmeats, samoosas, lace makers.

(b) Transporters - taxis, trucks, carts, bicycles.

(c) Distribution enterprises - rooming, commodity speculation, rentier activities.

(d) Small-scale distribution - market operatives, petty traders, street hawkers, caterers in food and drink, jumble sellers, legal lending, wood sellers.

(e) Other services - musicians, launderers, shoeshiners, hairdressers, photographers, vehicle repair and other maintenance workers, tinkers, ritual services, magic and medicine, scrap collectors.

(f) Small-scale renting

(g) Private transfer payments - gifts and similar flows of money and goods between persons, borrowing, begging, inheritance, lobola.

INFORMAL semi-legal

(a) Protection rackets, shebeens, begging, scrap recycling, pawnbroking.

INFORMAL income opportunities : illegal

(a) Production - liquor

(b) Services - hustlers and spivs in general, receivers of stolen goods, usury, drug pushing, prostitution, poncing, pilot boy, smuggling, bribery, political corruption, protection rackets, touts for courts, pickpockets.

(c) Transfers - petty thefts, pickpocketing, bag snatchers, burglary, armed robbery, speculation and embezzlement, confidence tricksters, gambling, fahfee.

> butchers, grocers, tattoo artists, cinemas, bars, hotels, a public bath house, rows of quaint little houses with names like "Buzz Off" and "Wy Wurry" and there is a magnificent range of spicy smells from the curry shops. The vitality and variety in the place seem endless and the good-humour of the people inexhaustable.
>
> Go into one of the fruit and vegetable shops and you soon realize how the very poor manage to live. In these shops people can still buy something useful for 1c. They can buy one potato if that is all they can afford at the moment, or one cigarette. You can hear them ask for an "olap patisellie" (a penny's worth of parsley), a "tikkie tamaties" or a "tikkie swart bekkies" (black-eyed beans), a "sixpense soup-greens", an "olap knofelok"(garlic) or an "olap broos", which means a penny's worth of bruised fruit.[18]

It would be incorrect, however, to suggest that these economic activities were in some way outside 'formal' capitalist relations. On the lowest rung, hawkers, peddlers and shebeens usually bought from retail outlets, and those in the cloth and shoe trade from local factories and tanneries. Perishable foodstuffs could only be bought in small quantities, negating the cost saving of bulk buying. Hawkers and shebeens also ran high risk or penalty costs. But what these small operators did was to take commodities into the far corners of the market, into areas inaccessible to the larger firms. In fact their activity was simply one aspect of the 'overall reproduction of the social totality', and their 'independence' was, in the final analysis, an illusion.[19]

But through all this the extended families maintained the vital relationships in the struggle for survival in the District and other similar areas. They provided accommodation, limited capital and labour for small-scale production and services, as well as maps of meaning for migrants from the countryside. But they provided more than this: they reproduced the relationships of social control. The powerful families 'ordered' the urban ghettoes through their connexions, inter-marriages, agreements, 'respect' and, at base, their force and access to violence. In the absence of effective police protection this control was seen as beneficial, even essential, to life in the ghetto. It kept things 'safe'.

Skollies and the Globe

In the 1940s this community control came to be tested in a particular way. Easy penetration into the 'informal sector' was as much its weakness as its strength. During the Second World War massive urban migrations took place in South Africa.

The most obvious manifestation of this problem was the squatter camps. In January 1947 the Johannesburg Municipality estimated the number of squatters at 63,000.[20] In Cape Town there were more . . . as early as 1942 a Committee of Inquiry into conditions on the Cape Flats estimated there to be 82,000 people awaiting housing.[21] The same year 25 squatter sites were counted, and by 1948 the number had risen to 30.[22] Estimates of squatter numbers are imprecise, but Dr. Oscar Wollheim, who was actively involved with the squatter communities at the time, estimated it to be over 50,000 in 1939. By 1948 the City Council found the figure had trebled to about 150,000.[23] By the end of the decade city officials

were signalling a situation beyond their control. The Housing Supervisor of the Cape Town Municipality told the Cape Times in 1950:

> Almost every house in the district where the Coloured people live is packed tight. Children grow up and marry and in turn have children and are unable to find a place of their own. A family is turned out of an overcrowded house and finds shelter with friends for a few days - which grow into weeks, months, years. They sleep in living rooms, in kitchens, in passages, in garages, on stoeps, married couples share rooms with other married couples . . . . waiting lists for accommodation grow longer and longer . . . families wait anything from six months to ten years before they can be re-housed.[24]

The squatters were also becoming increasingly politicised. In his work on the Johannesburg squatter movements, Alf Stadler has shown how clashes with officials and the police taught squatter leaders the tactics of political challenge . . . 'not as a political party, but directly as a pressure group mounted on the basis of popular action'.[25] However the United Party government was unwilling or unable to act against the squatters with too much force, because of the considerable influence over it of interests intent on the supply of cheap and available labour.

In District Six, apart from the hundreds of bergies (tramps) in the years following World War I, there were groups of youths who came to be known as 'skollies'. The word probably comes from the old Dutch schoeljie meaning 'scavenger'. Dutch sailors, so the tradition goes, shouted schoeljie at the seagulls which swooped to snatch up ships' offal from the waters of Table Bay, and the word came to be used for vagrants who picked at city refuse dumps or begged on the streets. Skollies were considered by residents of District Six as being people from 'outside' the area.[26] Many of these youths had prison experience or had spent time at Porter Reformatory.[27]

A Commission of Inquiry, looking at the period from 1928 to 1935, found the incidence of juvenile delinquency among coloureds to be 'very high'. There was an average of 2,600 such youths in prison for each of those years in South Africa, most of them in Cape Town.[28]

Until the 1940s these youths were a presence but not a problem, operating alone or in groups of two or three, but not in gangs. According to a policeman who worked in District Six before the war

> there weren't actual gangs consisting of youngsters and so on, it was just individuals, or a cluster of blokes together. But soon, due to their idleness and way of life, gangs started to form. Shebeens and gambling-houses started developing and these small gangs started robbing honest hard-working people, and in this way, a lot of decent people were just about forced to become gangsters for protection too. When the peoples' involvement with the Cape Corps ended in 1945 gangs started and crime escalated. This was because there were very few jobs available after the War. The gangs sprang up all over the place and they all had their different territories. Before, as policemen, we never wore firearms and we were

> posted one by one on foot. But later when you arrested someone you had to fight with him from the time you picked him up until you reached the police station. It was very dangerous alone, I mean they'd pelt you with stones or anything they could get.[29]

It was then that such names as the Red Cats, the Jesters, the Goofies and the Kettang Gang found their way into the streets of District Six and the pages of newspapers. From 1939 the police were armed for the first time and they patrolled the District in pairs.

Until the 1940s, as we have seen, the industrial reserve army of labour in Cape Town was supported by household production within the extended family. But growing industrialisation in that decade, coupled with the rapid development of capitalist farming, led to a meteoric rise in the numbers of the urban underclass.

In District Six the street corners seemed to fill up overnight and the sight of people or whole families sleeping on stair landings and in doorways became common. Pressure began to build up over territory for hawking, shebeening, prostitution or for just standing in. Youths from the 'outside' began hanging together with empty stomachs and nothing much to do. They started hustling, picking up this and that from shops, leaning

on a few people for cash or favours and living by 'shifts and ruses' of all kinds. Police methods of dealing with these groups were simple, direct and simply locked them more firmly into their way of life:

> We would pick them up and fine them, and they could be hired out for some work while under sentence, usually to farms. These kind of people were just idle loiterers who took part in illegal activities now and then.[33]

The time of street gangs had arrived.

Two groups viewed these developments in the District with alarm. One was the police. In 1946 a Special Squad with wide powers of arrest was set up expressly to deal with the skollies in District Six. It was led by a tough up-country policeman, Sergeant Willem Nel, and as he put it:

> I really worked them.[34]

But police pressure tended to be indiscriminate, arresting 'family' members and 'outsider' alike, and raised a howl of protest from the petty bourgeoisie in the District. The Torch, the mouthpiece of the Non-European Unity Movement, was shrill on the matter:

> The police in this country, in the sadistic fury and depraved bestiality which characterises their manhandling of non-europeans, innocent or guilty, can be compared only with Nazi storm-troopers who terrorised Germany and occupied Europe. Invariably they are recruited from the poorest layers of the Herrenvolk, ruined peasants, bywooners and poor whites; the semi-literacy and general coarseness of the majority of them is notorious. With a grudge against the world which has forced

> them to become policemen in a country where possession of a white skin is an "open sesame" to almost any walk of life, they have particular grudge against all non-europeans. For they regard the non-european as being responsible for their economic ruination and the educated non-european as someone who has risen at their expense. Much has been made of the crime wave and of the increase in crimes of violence. But nothing has been heard from the Press of crimes of violence which the police commit every day against the non-european. It is common occurrence to find the pick-up vans scouting around bars and other areas where non-europeans live, deliberately looking for trouble with the people. Any non-european who smells of liquor, or who looks as if he may smell of liquor, or who merely looks, is fair game for the police raiders. Every day brings fresh evidence of the mauling to which these innocent people are subjected in the cells. But they are terrorised and are too poor to involve themselves in legal action . . . they suffer in silence. But their resentment smoulders and the day will come when there will be serious consequences. (May 20 1946)

The other group troubled by the gangs was people of the 'old' families, often shopkeepers, skilled craftsmen and better-off hawkers whose security was being threatened. At night the sons of some of these shopkeepers used to congregate under a streetlight alongside the Globe Furnishing Company in Hanover Street opposite the Star Bioscope, watching the plentiful street life of the District. Their first action as a group, in the early 1940s, seems to have been to smash an informal tax racket at the cinema. A group of toughs would stand at the door of the Star, extracting a penny 'tax' from every patron. One night the Globe group, mostly Asians from the Muir Street area, gathered together their fathers' workers and barrow-boys, armed them with sticks and implements from a nearby stable, and thrashed the cinema toughs.[35] Thus began the remarkable rise

to power of the Globe Gang, although, in its early stages, it could be better described as a vigilante group.

Among the gang leaders were bricklayers, hawkers and painters. Its chief, Mikey Ismail, was a plasterer. They came from a class of artisans and shopkeepers. At its centre was the Ismail family, one member of which, A. Ismail, was a City Councillor. Several of his brothers controlled the morning vegetable market of the District, one ran a bus service and four had general dealers' shops. It was the sons of these vegetable sellers, particularly Mikey, who built the gang around themselves. 'They were not criminals', according to a tailor who made their clothes. 'They started to control the Jesters of Constitution Street who were beginning to "maak soos hulle wil" (do what they like). Their aim was eventually to break all gangs, to clean up the District'.[36] According to a member of the gang:

> The Globe hated the skollie element in town, like the people who robbed the crowds on (celebrations) or when there were those marches in town with the Torch Commando or Cissy Gool's sing song (demonstration) outside Parliament buildings. Mikey and the boys would really bomb out the skollie element when they robbed the people then. They tore them to ribbons.[37]

In the Press confusion began to grow around the Globe, and with it an inclination to describe 'gang wars' simply as 'crime'. Although police spokesmen insisted that organised crime in the District could not be ascribed to gangs, the Press began to fuel a 'moral panic', insisting in 1947 that there was a 'crime wave' and a 'reign of terror by killer gangs'.[38] However the same year a reporter considered with some surprise that 'about 75% of skollies are well educated' . . . obviously having 'discovered' the Globe.[39] But people of District Six were under no illusions about the differences between the gangs:

> The skollie is a rubbish in the gangster's mind. I remember once a judge told a gangster: "You're a rubbish, you're a low class, you're a skollie!" and the gangster said: "Ekskies Oubaas. Ek is nie 'n skollie nie. Moenie my insult nie".[40]

In a community coming under increasing pressure from waves of migration, the Globe was an organisation seeking to assert and maintain the control of the more wealthy families and the hawkers over the 'outsiders'. A member of the Globe insisted the distinction was that

> other gangsters didn't care a thing for their families. The Globe . . . respected each other and their families and so on. There were only a few who smoked pot and really got gesuip (drunk), but never the top dogs . . . they always tried to do things that wouldn't bring a scratch to their good family name. You know all these people I'm talking about are wealthy businessmen today - except of course Mikey is dead now. The Globe were the most decent and well-bred gangsters ever. All their parents were well-to-do businessmen with flashy cars and good clothes. The gang (leaders) were always beautifully dressed . . . Mikey had silk shirts specially made for him. And he drove around in lovely cars. And the women! Mikey always had the best women around him.[41]

The gang's connection with the police was one of wary mutual assistance.[42] The leader of the Special Squad, Willem Nel, considered them to be 'very decent blokes'. Gang members would visit his house socially or to ask advice or favours. The police, in turn, would request gang control of the skollies.

A Globe man remembers that:

> The police never busted the Globe Gang. They used to call on Mikey and the boys if they were having some trouble with another gang somewhere else, because they knew the Globe would be able to control the scene - especially with gangs like the Jesters or the Goofies. Mikey was so well known to the police, and so respected, that he could stop a police van and release anybody he wanted to from it. But him and the boys helped the police. If they heard of a robbery somewhere, like at a liquor store, they'd take the liquor away from the skollies who stole it and then invite the police around. They nearly got the whole of Caledon Square (police station) drunk that way one night.[43]

When the Globe confronted the gangs it was always violent and often bloody. A study on the district describes such a battle:

> On Saturday December 19, 1951, gang war burst in District Six. For weeks before tension had been rising in the District. When the Globe and Killer armies confronted each other in Hanover Street shopkeepers closed their stores, shebeen queens stopped serving liquor, prostitutes abandoned their beats and respectable citizens bolted their doors and barred their windows. In a running battle the two gangs, with the combined strength of some 300 members, swept through the District firing stolen pistols and leaving a trail of destruction. The showdown came in a house belonging to one of the gang members which was taken apart in the process. The police were notably absent.[44]

However, the Globe soon began to control more than the gangs. Any group in its territory had, quite literally, to pay allegiance. And the Globe was up for hire as a political hit force as well. Radical teacher organisations and the Communist Party were occasionally roughed up. A teacher would be 'told to go or we'd slaughter him' and members of the Communist Party would

be 'visited' by Globe members who would pretend to be drunk and:

> empty the fish bowl, drink all the wine and beer, and those that didn't sip would just pour it out on the floor. And they'd say: "come on, we're the people and your're supposed to be communist. Play us music and drink with us".[45]

City Councillors found their meetings broken up by the Globe which had been hired by their electoral opponents. And political parties were not exempt either. In 1951 a Nationalist Member of Parliament complained in Parliament that:

> On the evening I joined the Nationalist Party, I held a meeting in the Cathedral Hall here (in Cape Town). They (the United Party) took the Globe Gang from District Six there in taxis and before they could go into the meeting each one received about half a glass of brandy and a 10/- note and he went into the meeting with a razor blade.[46]

Mikey's brother, 'God', was only peripherally involved with the group, but was not interested in the family trade. 'Haas (rabbit) money', he told people 'was quicker than honest money', and his line was smuggling and blackmail. His group of toughs operated with the blessing of the Globe which, increasingly, seems to have assisted God in his operations. Certainly while Mikey was in jail for two years (members claim on a trumped-up charge of manslaughter) God increased his influence over the 'boys'. And in step with the ideology of their class, Globe members sought to increase their income by whatever means at their disposal. At the gang's height these means were considerable.

By 1950 the Globe was controlling extortion, blackmail, illicit buying of every kind, smuggling, shebeens, gambling and politcal movements in the District. Mikey's image had gradually shifted from 'keeper of the peace' to that of 'Robin Hood', and gang members were taking in large weekly doses of American gangland ideology at the cinemas in the District. In 1949 the Press noted that '1,000 lbs of dagga in the last four months has been traced to large traffickers in District Six where it is controlled by well organised big-time skollies in well-organised gangs. These are usually smartly-dressed and their families are usually well-to-do'. (Argus December 8).

In 1950 the newspaper was to expand on the cannabis network:

> Around dagga has grown up an infamous traffic, earning its principals many thousands of pounds a year. It is believed to be brought into Cape Town by Natives from the Trasvaal and the Protectorates. In Cape Town the dagga is taken over by wholesalers, and then distributed by countless 'runners', mostly in the form of kaartjies, which cost only sixpence. (January 25)

A member of the Globe claims the plant was being moved in bales by the truckload. In 1958 the same newspaper noted that the drug was still being sold in large quantities - by smartly dressed men in flashy cars (November 26).

Collecting 'protection' money was almost a natural outcome of the Globe's original function. But the line between 'protection' and straight extortion is a fine one. 'Shops, clubs, cinemas, Indians, Jews, they all

came to Mikey', remembered a gang member. But the truth of the matter was that Mikey came to them, as a letter to the newspaper from a shopkeeper in 1952 testifies:

> I came to this country from Australia a little more than a year ago, I started my Hanover Street shop almost immediately. I had not been there two weeks when two well dressed young coloured men walked in and asked me to join their 'Shopkeepers Protection Racket'. They said it would ensure that my shop would never be robbed or, if goods were stolen, they would be returned. All this, I was told, would be done for a 'small fee'. This trifling sum turned out to be £1 a week. I ordered them out. A week later my shop was entered at night and ransacked . . . I have had several thefts and attempted robberies since then. [The gangsters had worn] black hats and brown suits.[47]

A member of the gang elaborated on this system:

> The Globe really made some businessmen, because they protected them and did their work for a certain price . . . if somebody approached Mikey and said he'd give him £15 to bust some shop owner or whatever, Mikey would first ask for more money, say £25, then he would tell the shopowner. So the shopowner would pay Mikey not to bomb him out. And so the Globe gang were rich. Sometimes they'd even bandage the people up themselves and take them to hospital just to satisfy the guys who wanted somebody to be fucked up. Then the Globe would get paid even more.[48]

The gang also organised or 'protected' shebeens and gambling dens.



A Coon Troupe in Hanover Street, District Six

Slowly, however, its influence began to wane. There are a number of reasons for this. The leader, Mikey, was killed; stabbed with a kitchen knife by the brother of a girl who thought he was molesting her. God was jailed for blackmail. And as the gang's rackets increased it lost the support of the class which gave it birth. Gradually prison elements infiltrated the Globe, making it indistinguishable from the street gangs around it only in size. A member describes the process:

> Slowly there came the skollie element. A guy from Porter Reformatory joined them: Chicken. Then prisoners from up-country who'd never been in the cities. They raped and had tattoos on their faces and necks and they killed anybody, for nothing. Young boys arrived, and carried guns for no reason. More gangs were formed, like the Bun Boys, the Stalag 17, the Doolans, the Mongrels, the Born Frees. These types were really just a jail element: snot-nosed young boys. Then one day somebody interfered with a gang in the District and this gang thought it was the Globe but it wasn't. They attacked us and this set off the most terrible war. People were killed and the Globe decided to bust every gang everywhere. They couldn't stop. And that was the start of the Globe's bad name.[49]

What I have suggested here is that with the large migrations into District Six in the 1940s the shopkeepers and hawkers were threatened by both competition and theft, and the city perceived a threat to law and order. A two-pronged attack on the gangs which began forming was made by both the police (the Special Squad made 8,000 arrests in its first year of existence) and by the petty bourgeoisie. The affect was to allow the Globe Gang to win control in the District, but it soon turned this to its own ends. For the

police, though, this was a temporary respite. Gang control is a form of policing. Reviewing the previous nine years in 1959, the Cape Town Police Chief considered District Six to have been 'quiet'.[50]

Then in 1961 large areas of the city were declared 'white group areas' and coloureds were given notice to vacate. Working class culture in the declared areas began to crumble. People displaced by the Group Areas Act moved into District Six and overcrowding worsened. In 1965 the Minister of Community Development, P.W. Botha, called the District a 'blighted area' and talked of slum clearance . . . . setting the scene for events to follow.[51] Newspapers began reporting an 'alarming' rise in stabbings, assaults, drunkenness and child desertions. The Society for the Protection of Child Life doubled its number of social workers in the District.[52] In the insecurity the informal economy began to collapse and landlords allowed buildings to go unrepaired. By the time the first evictions began the more subtle forms of social control in the ghetto had fallen apart. The gangs now ruled the streets.

COLOURED POLITICS AND DISTRICT SIX

My account would be very one-sided if it gave the impression that gangs controlled <u>all</u> levels of social activity in the District. Indeed they were only part of the rich and complex web of relationships in the area. People with much higher profile were the political activists. There was no shortage of political groups in District Six. In fact their numbers, their affiliations and their mergers were, to an outsider, bewildering in their complexity (see Tables 3b and 3c). And underlying the organisations which sprang up was a sea of conflicting class interests, nationalist groups, union struggles, liberation movements and even family feuds.


TABLE 3B: 'COLOURED' POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN CAPE TOWN UP/TO 1966

A.A.C.	All African Convention
A.N.B.	African National Bond
A.N.C.	African National Congress
ANTI-C.A.D.	National Anti-Coloured Affairs Department (Advisory Council) Movement
APDUSA	African Peoples Democratic Union of Southern Africa
A.P.O.	African Political (Peoples) Organisation
C.A.T.A.	Cape African Teachers Association
C.P.N.U.	Coloured Peoples National Union
C.P.S.A.	Communist Party of South Africa
F.R.A.C.	Franchise Action Committee
I.C.U.	Industrial and Commercial Workers Union
N.C.P.P.	National Coloured Peoples Party
N.L.L.	National Liberation League
N.L.F.	National Liberation Front
N.E.F.	New Era Fellowship
N.E.U.M.	Non-European Unity Movement
P.A.C.	Pan African Congress
S.A.C.P.C.	South African Coloured Peoples Congress
S.A.C.P.O.	South African Coloured Peoples Organisation
S.A.P.	South African Party
S.A.S.O.	South African Students Organisation
S.O.Y.A.	Sons of Young Africa
T.E.P.A.	Teachers Education and Professional Association
T.L.S.A.	Teachers League of South Africa
T.A.R.C.	Train Apartheid Resistance Committee
U.A.L.	United Afrikaner League
Y.C.C.C.	Yui Chui Chan Club

*Source: Mary Simons - Organised Coloured Political Movements

TABLE 3C

LINES OF INFLUENCE BETWEEN 'COLOURED' POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS IN CAPE TOWN



*The dates in parenthesis are the year in which the organisations were formed.

But if one was to focus on group area relocations - state moves which were to destroy the District - what is astonishing is the silence with which they were met. Admittedly when the time came, the Torch (the mouth-piece of the Non-European Unity Movement), complained about property agents moving in for the kill. And a Group Areas Action Committee was set up by people outside the NEUM. But the committee's effect was small, and in The Torch several reports even considered that the Group Areas Act might be beneficial to better-off coloureds as it would move the skollies and poorer up-country people to the Cape Flats. Clearly the Globe gang and some Unity Movement teachers were having similar problems. But the truth is that when the blow came that was to kill the heartland of working-class culture in the city, the coloured political leaders were elsewhere - distracted by all-important franchise issues and beset by organizational difficulties. They were to pay dearly for this distraction.

What is important for this study (and the most one can do, given the complexity of the subject) is to pull out some threads in this political activity; to ask why these activists failed to block the massive social engineering which was to follow. Parts of an answer can be found in their increasing acceptance of a racially-based ideology, the class base of the leadership which tended to open a gulf between the movements and unskilled workers, the disunity within the leadership itself, and the crushing power of the post-war state.

Abdurahman and the African People's Organization

The District Six political groups were the product of a history of resistance to colonialism - often muted but ever present. Two slave revolts took place in the Cape in 1808 and 1825. Then in 1892 the Cape Franchise Ballot Act

raised the qualifications necessary to gain a municipal vote, a right which had been open to all men irrespective of colour since 1836.

The Coloured Peoples Association was formed to oppose the Act, and it attempted to vote a Malay into the Cape Parliament. But the move was blocked at the last minute by Cecil Rhodes, who secured an amendment to abolish plural voting, instituting instead a one man one vote system. This swung voting in favour of the white electorate.

In 1902 The African Political Organisation (later re-named the African People's Organisation) was formed by two craft-workers. It based its political hopes on an emerging cultural identity among skilled workers, rather than on strictly racial distinction.[53] However it concentrated initially on the promotion of coloured cultural interests in the Transvaal, The Orange Free State and Natal in the face of growing racism from whites in these territories. The APO was considerably weakened by setbacks to its ambitions suffered in the 1904 elections.[54]

Leadership of the organisation was then taken over by a District Six medical practitioner, Dr. A. Abdurahman, who began organising around the failure of the British to meet black expectations after the Anglo-Boer War.

The APO spread its influence rapidly with its campaign against the attack on the coloured franchise posed by the South African Act of 1909. By 1912 it was a well-established national movement with centres throughout the country and with its own weekly newspaper, the APO Journal.[55]

But increasingly Abdurahman's position reflected the growing dilemma of coloured political movements in Cape Town: whether to struggle for broad working class interests or the narrower interests of the coloured workers

(or more specifically the interests of coloured skilled workers and the petty-bourgeoisie). On this Abdurahman compromised, almost daily, depending on his audience.

But circumstances rapidly propelled the Distric Six doctor into a pro-British position. This resulted from his firm alliance to General Smuts' white South African Party, the party of British capitalism, which Abdurahman hoped would champion an unrestricted franchise. Also, large numbers of APO members in the city were drawn from 'English' churches and from temperance movements. These were opposed to the Afrikaner Bond, a coloured party with a largely rural following. The APO associated the Bond with the number of rural workers moving into Cape Town and with the Western Cape wine and brandy farmers and the tot system.

Abdurahman's organisation was largely a party of skilled workers and teachers. So although he had originally placed his hope for coloured South Africans in an alliance with Africans, he rapidly retreated from this position when erosion of the coloured franchise began to demote this group to political parity with blacks. And unskilled Africans, quite as much as unskilled coloureds, were a threat to the urban artisans. For coloured intellectuals the fight now became one to distance theselves from Africans by claiming allegiance to white cultural standards. The APO therefore never encouraged the joint organisation of African and coloured workers, and concentrated on drawing coloured workers from existing trade unions.[56]

By the end of the First World War Abdurahman, although calling for a united working class, was bitterly opposed to the S.A. Labour Party because of the racism of its white members, to the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union because of its mass based and largely rural organisation, and to the SA Communist Party for its organisation of unskilled workers in the Cape.

Increasingly the APO narrowed its focus to the coloured franchise question. Trade unionist David Lewis describes the organisation as a liberal civil rights body. Its method was that of:

> parliamentary lobbying and (it) never attempted to engage in the mass co-ordinated pressurisation associated with working class organisations, but chose to dissipate (its) energies in forming and breaking alliances with dominant political parties.[57]

The APO was a body articulating the interests of coloured skilled artisans and a petty-bourgeoisie packed tightly with teachers. Ever hopeful of eventual 'equality' of coloureds with whites, and compromised by his position on the Cape Town City Council, Abdurahman was forced into a position of support for the Smuts Government - even through its excesses during the Bulhoek massacre in Queenstown and the 1922 Rand Rebellion.

By the early 1930s the APO was markedly conservative with little support outside teacher organisations. But to understand the split which formed between Cape artisans and unskilled workers, a split which was to be a major factor in coloured political response to group areas, we must look more closely at the composition of labour organisations in the City.

The Cape Unions

For more than a hundred years skilled artisans in the Western Cape had been predominantly people of 'colour'. This dated back to the importation and training of skilled slaves to the region, coupled with marginally more relaxed racial attitudes among colonists in the area than in the northern provinces.

By the 1920s most trade union members in Cape Town were skilled craftsmen and would be defined as coloured. Among unionised painters, plasterers and furniture workers in 1930, about 90% were coloured, as were 50% of the bricklayers, 40% of the carpenters and 60% of the leather workers.[58]

The organisation of unskilled workers did take place as well. In the Depression years of the early 1930s widespread labour action took place in Cape Town, its focus being through the Coloured Unemployment League. At its height the League, which was led by Dr. Goolam Gool and members of the Lenin Club, could boast a membership of 30,000 workers. And during this period the Communist Party was particularly active in organising unskilled workers. A number of unions were formed, such as the S.A. Railways and Harbours Workers Union and, later, the Food and Canning Workers Union.

But generally these organisations of the unskilled were isolated from the mainstream of trade union activity in the city. Their leaders were harrassed and imprisoned and they came under severe criticism from the established unions, from their co-ordinating bodies and from their political fellow-travellers such as the APO.

The reason for this is not difficult to understand. The Cape organisations were mostly craft unions and they feared the process of job fragmentation and dilution which would follow the inclusion of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. It was simply not in their interest to admit such workers, or to support broad-based labour organisations.

For this reason Africans were generally not admitted to the Cape unions, and anyway most of them were prevented from joining registered unions in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924. Unskilled coloured workers -'moegoes' from the countryside - were discouraged from joining or prevented outright.

Parallels between the Cape unions and the APO are marked - probably due to a high degree of interaction of personnel between city unions and coloured political bodies. They often exchanged or shared leadership. But teachers tended to dominate the political movements. Both groups, teachers and skilled workers, saw little to gain from the organisation of people who were unskilled and largely recent migrants. Undoubtedly these people had their place as crowds and demonstrators, such as in the huge and successful protest against segregated transport in 1939. But generally they were a problem for the urban coloured elite, more than a few of whom must have wished for their relocation from the crowded inner city suburbs to the Cape Flats.

What must now be considered are the movements which took up the baton in the late 1940s and the 1950s, for it is they which were to be confronted with the Group Areas Act.

Resistance and the Franchise issue

When the Nationalist Party won the election in 1948 it gained power by a very slim margin. The coloured group which still had the vote could conceivably have swung the next election. By virtue of their language, coloureds were Afrikaners. But there was a long, almost traditional allegiance of the APO to the 'English'parties. Coupled with this was

competition between the coloured urban proletariat and recently-urbanised and unskilled white Afrikaners. The path of the National Party was therefore not to woo the coloured electorate, but to abolish its voting rights for a central Parliament.

This issue wholly occupied coloured political movements in Cape Town and elsewhere. At the centre of this struggle was the Non-European Unity Movement, which was a broad front of several organisations. It was a child of the APO in more than metaphor, many of its top members being the offspring of APO leaders. But to understand the movement we must consider its parts.

The All African Convention (AAC)

This was formed in Cape Town after a split between radical and conservative members of the African National Congress (ANC). The AAC saw itself as an umbrella body of black resistence. But in 1937 the ANC withdrew from the Convention in a move towards a black nationalist stance. After this the AAC gradually declined in influence until 1943 when it was revived in the form of the Unity Movement.

The National Liberation League (NLL)

In 1935 the NLL was founded in Cape Town by La Guma, 'Cissie' Gool (who was a member of the SA Communist Party and Abdurahman's daughter) and her brother-in-law, Dr. Goolam Gool (a Trotskyist). The NLL hoped publicly to be a united front of all race groups. But in fact it campaigned for independent coloured organisation, centering on the goal of obtaining for coloureds social, political and economic parity with whites.

The League eventually broke up over a policy dispute, 'Cissie' Gool championing a non-racial body while Goolam Gool and La Guma sought to prevent white membership. The split ended in a civil court action to decide which faction was indeed the NLL, the decision being made in favour of 'Cissie' Gool.

The Non-European United Front (NEUF)

The nationalist group within the NLL, led by Goolam Gool and La Guma, split to form the NEUF. When the Cape Provincial Council drew up a Bill in 1939 which would enable municipal councils to introduce segregatory measures in transport and amenities, the NEUF organised a series of meetings and demonstrations on the Grand Parade and outside Parliament. The protests were effective and the measure was vetoed by the Government (to be re-introduced nine years later).[59] It was from this point that city policemen on the beat began carrying firearms.

Anti-Cad

The NEUF languished during the war years, but in 1943 there was a dramatic revival of political feeling among the coloured population in Cape Town. In its preparations for a general election, the Government passed various measures designed to raise its prestige with the white electorate. One of these was to set up a Coloured Advisory Department which would 'care for the welfare of the coloured people'. This followed a recommendation in the 1937 Commission Regarding the Cape Coloureds, which expressed concern over the proximity of coloured ghettos to Cape Town.

A storm of protest arose. The new body was too similar to the Native Affairs Department, and it was seen as a further move in the differentiation between coloureds and whites and another step down the road to segregation.

The Government hastily changed the name to the Coloured Affairs Council. It sought legitimacy for the CAC in the coloured community and found it in nooks and crannies. Bodies which gave their approval were the Kleurlingvolksverbond, the Cristus Zy Zeningskerk, the Coloured Vigilance Society of Gordonia and Kenhardt, the Cape Malay Vigilance Society, the Cape Malay League and the Griqua National Conference of South Africa.[60] A coloured music teacher, Dr. H. Gow, was persuaded to accept chairmanship, and the Council was established in law.

But a young and militant group within the NEUF - the New Era Fellowship (NEF) - formed the Anti-CAD movement under the leadership of Goolam Gool. It pledged to fight the new Government move by boycott, protest and non-collaboration.

Anti-CAD was joined by more militant members of the APO and the Teachers League of South Africa. The leadership was made up largely of teachers, fighting against the erosion of their franchise rights.

The Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM)

In May 1943 the Anti-CAD movement called a conference at which it was decided to set up a broad front organisation. The result was the NEUM, which was made up of members from the TLSA, APO, NEUF, Anti-CAD and a revived AAC.

Goolam Gool took chairmanship and a 10-point Programme was published. Its first point was a demand for full franchise for all irrespective of colour, and its second was for compulsory education for every child up to the age of 16.

But despite its militant language it is clear that from the start the NEUM was a coloured civil rights movement with only occasional interest in working class issues.[61] This is because, more than all other movements, it was an organisation of teachers. Although teachers had skills which made them the natural leaders of the community, their professions set severe limits on their political action. Mary Simons makes the point that teachers were dependent on state salaries and had no leverage on white political organisations:

> . . . they could either support the government or express their political frustration in militant language and political inaction. The tactics of boycott and non-collaboration and insistence on adherence to the 10-point Programme as a matter of principle fulfilled these requirements.[62]

But this activity had little effect on the government, which found willing supporters for its apartheid institutions elsewhere in the community.

Another weakness of the NEUM, as it had been in teacher-led movements in the past, was its lack of support from unskilled and semi-skilled workers who formed the bulk of the labour force in Cape Town. The Unity Movement was bitterly antagonistic towards the Communist Party for its organisation of unskilled workers as much as for its theoretical position. There is also a strong possibility that it was opposed to 'non-coloured' or 'mixed' unions. The result was that it could not base its campaigns on the support of workers - the only people who could challenge capital in the workplace. Nor could the movement call on coloured artisans who, when the chips were down, were unlikely to jeopardise their relatively privileged position over the franchise issue.

The result was a good deal of noise and little lasting action. However this did not shield NEUM members from state reprisals. They were often harrassed by police and some of the leaders were served with banning orders.

The movement also came under attack from the right in the form of the Coloured People's National Union (CPNU) which was formed in 1944 by rightwing members expelled from the APO. Their platform was one of support for the Coloured Advisory Council. This opened up a split in coloured politics (which continues to this day) between collaborators and non-collaborators with the institutions of apartheid.

In 1950, when the Group Areas Act was passed, the NEUM was simply not in a position, politically or ideologically, to do anything about it but complain. The viewpoint of the movement's newspaper, the Torch, during that year is interesting for what it fails to say. The Act was initially seen as an attempt to restrict Asian trading and residency. Considering the history of urban zoning in other cities in South Africa this view was understandable. And as this had little to do with the coloured franchise it was seen to be of only passing importance. When it became clear that the Act was to be applied to coloureds it was still not grasped as being altogether serious. It was seen simply as a tactic to shift coloured voters out of the inner-city wards. But after the urban migrations of the 1940s into inner areas like District Six, the coloured petty-bourgeoisie had gradually moved further out of town anyway. The Act was seen to have the potential to 'clean up' the crowded ghettos of unskilled and unemployed workers. A prominent member of the NEUM at the time comments:

> In 1950 the Unity Movement bungled. They reckoned that the Group Areas Act affected only a small group of property owners. The Anti-CAD did nothing except maintain non-collaboration.[63]

The NEUM was in fact too busy fighting the franchise issue to take on group areas as well. The same year the Group Areas Act was passed, the coloured vote was restricted in Natal and the Transvaal - a hint of things to come. In 1951 a constitutional struggle began to remove coloured voters names in the Cape from rolls for the House of Assembly and the Provincial Council. The outcome was the Separate Registration of Voters Act in 1956 by which coloureds were placed on a separate voters list. At the core of this move was the fear by the National Party - a very real one - that the coloured vote could swing the next election in favour of the United Party which had considerable coloured support and trailed the 'Nats' by only a slim margin.

The beginning of the franchise issue in 1951 saw a strike in Cape Town on May 7 which was co-ordinated by The Franchise Action Committee (FRAC). This was not a NEUM committee, and in the decisive moment of the franchise struggle it decided <u>not</u> to support FRAC. It also took an antagonistic stance towards the Train Apartheid Resistance Committee, the Group Areas Action Committee and the South African Coloured People's Organisation (SACPO). At times, more energy seems to have gone into denouncing doctrinal deviations than into challenging the wagon of apartheid. One suspects that this antagonism was directed at the organiser of these movements, R.E. van der Ross, who Unity leaders considered to be a collaborator with apartheid.[64]

One of these bodies, SACPO, was extremely active between 1953 and 1956. It joined the Congress of the People Alliance and in 1955 accepted the Freedom Charter as its baseline. However its leaders were charged with high treason in 1956 in a trial which was to drag on for five years. Although all the accused were eventually acquitted, they were effectively prevented from organising during the trial. Mary Simons comments that

> the inability of (coloureds) to prevent the enactment of the Separate Registration of Voters Bill in 1956 and a lack of political direction caused by the arrest and detention of SACPO leaders and the organisation's consequent involvement in the Treason Trial left (coloureds) in a political wilderness which persisted, except for short bursts of activity . . . , until the CPRC Council Act was passed (1964).[65]

An activist during the period, Eddie Roux, observed that

> each (coloured) group tried independently, and by its own special methods, to obtain more rights for itself or, more often, merely ward off attempts to restrict its civil liberties.[66]

Considering group areas legislation, a former leading member of the NEUM, 'Ossie' Osman, concludes that:

> up until 1948 the coloured man really believed he would be made white because we share the same language, religion, culture. It was the ideal of the coloured people to absorb white culture - and anti-culture. Their ambitions were very often that their daughters should marry whites. Afterwards (after group areas) they became completely demoralised. There

> was a general sort of malaise. Then came Sharpville (1960) - and the Unity Movement stood on the sideline and feared.[67]

Some members of the coloured movements - better off financially and better educated - were also able to appraise the situation and manipulate it to their own advantage:

> In the 1950s we were told to boycott Group Areas, identity cards, etc. . . . so we did. Meanwhile our leaders, Marxists!, went out and bought up land, especially on the Cape Flats. This is where part of our bitterness comes from.[68]

From this brief tour of 'coloured' politics it can be seen why the movements - undergoing a crisis of leadership, unable to form a popular base, and with their leaders increasingly detained or banned - were in no position to effectively challenge the group areas removals which took place in Cape Town from 1961. The trade unions, mainly craft oriented and with a predominant membership of skilled artisans, could only challenge the state at cost to the priviledged status of their members. But both these groups presented themselves as champions of the working class. And by their presence they often actually inhibited true working class organisation.

The other side of the coin, of course, was that the form in which group areas removals were presented and undertaken defused any political challenge:

> The government had worked very well (says Osman). They didn't do their work on masse, but in small pockets under the guise of urban removals. They had already removed 'undesirables' to Robben Island (prison) and had a well-established reign of terror which silenced the rest of us. Hundreds were banned. Our leadership was underground. It was at this time that the CPRC collaborators and the Labour Party stepped in.[69]

In 1963 the Torch, the mouthpiece of the NEUM, closed down after arrests and banning orders served on Unity leaders. The movement began to splinter. Young blacks, disillusioned with NEUM inactivity and influenced by the Pan Africanist Congress, broke away to form the African Peoples Democratic Union of Southern Africa (APDUSA). Its aim was to 'organise the peasantry and the workers'.

The same year a group of militant coloured intellectuals formed the Yui Chui Chan Club (later called the National Liberation Front) with the aim of preparing for guerilla warfare. They were subsequently sentenced to many years imprisonment.

A less militant group within the NEUM, mainly members from the TLSA and Anti-CAD, joined the Sons of Young Africa movement to 'struggle for equality' along less militant lines. This group gradually became inactive.

By 1966, when District Six was declared a white group area, resistance to the move was left to white liberals, a handful of aggrieved individuals, and, curiously, the City Council.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3

1. S. Patterson: Colour and Culture in South Africa Routlege and Keegan Paul, London 1953 p. 67.

2. D. Welsh: The Growth of Towns in Volume 2 of The Oxford History of South Africa.

3. These figures are given in the Theron Commission. The term 'coloured' is defined in the Population Registration Act and Group Areas Act of 1950 as containing the 'racial groups' Malay, Griqua, Cape Coloured and Other Coloured. Although these categories refer to the generic origins of many of the Cape working class they are also used with reference to other classes as well - in fact to anyone who is deemed to have 'coloured blood' as seen by skin pigmentation. The term 'coloured' is primarily used as an ideological subdivision of 'race' in South Africa and is a term objected to by many people so defined. It is also theoretically a confusing classification. It will be used only where it is unavoidable, as in official statistics and pronouncements.

4. D. Pinnock: Argie boys to skollie gangsters; the lumpenproletarian challenge of the street-corner armies of District Six, 1900-1951. History Workshop Papers 3, University of Cape Town.

5. The Argus January 21 1950.

6. Urbanisation of Industrialisation as Criminogenic factors in South Africa. Penal Reform News 60, October 1962.

7. In R. Hallett: Violence and social life in Cape Town in the 1900s (unpublished seminar paper, 1979).

8. D. Webster: Seminar presented to the African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand on August 11 1980, entitled 'The social organisation of poverty' p. 15.

11. F. Endholm, O. Harris & K. Young: Conceptualising women, in Critique of Anthropology 3(9/10) 1977 p. 106. Quoted in P. Wilkinson: Discussion paper on 'informal sector' activities and the working class household, Wits 1980.

12. D. Webster, Ibid. p. 16.

13. See P. Wilkinson, Ibid. p. 10.

14. University of the Witwatersrand Survey, reported in SA Outlook July 1941 p. 139.

15. P. Wilkinson and D. Webster: Living in the interstices of capitalism: notes towards a conceptual redefinition of 'informal sector' activity in South African cities. University of the Witwatersrand (unpublished mimeo) 1981.

16. Cape Coloured Commission, UG 54, 1937.

17. Adopted from T. Matsetela, M. Matshoba, D. Webster, P. Wilkinson, J. Yawitch and H. Zarenda: Unemployment and 'informal' income-earning in Soweto, African Studies Institute seminar paper, July 1980. The original typology was developed by Keith Hart, 'Informal income opportunities and urban employment in Ghana, Journal of Modern African Studies II, 1973 and adapted for South Africa by K.S.O. Beavon and A. Mabin: 'Hawkers in Johannesburg' S.A.G.S. Workshop 1978 (unpublished).

18. Brian Barrow: Behind the Dark Doors of District Six, undated article in the Wollheim Collection, University of Cape Town, probably 1966.

19. Wilkinson, Ibid. p. 10.

20. Figures in A.W. Stadler: Birds in the cornfields: squatter movements in Johannesburg 1944-47 in B. Bozzoli: Labour, Townships and Protest.

21. J. Maree et. al.: The squatter problem in the Western Cape - SAIRR.

22. M. Budow: Urban squatting in greater Cape Town 1939-48. University of Cape Town thesis 1978 (unpublished) p. 56.

23. Ibid. p. 58.

24. Elsie Rowland (Cape Times 20.6.1950) quoted in Maree, Idib p 117.

25. Stadler, op.cit. p. 42. In Johannesburg Mpanza formed the Sofasonke party, getting his lieutenants to swear an oath of allegiance to 'die where you die', calling him their chief and them his soldiers.

26. There are various versions of the origins of the word of which this one is the most likely. It is given in L.F. Freed: Crime in South Africa (Cape Town 1963)

27. This is a recurring comment in the many interviews with people who lived in District Six before World War II.

28. Cape Coloured Commission, UG 54, 1937.

29. Interview with Sergeant Willem Nel, former head of the Special Squad in District Six.

33. Interview with Sgt. Willem Nel, leader of the Police Special Squad in District Six.

34. Interview with Sgt. Willem Nel.

35. This information is from interviews with members of the Globe, shopkeepers and skilled craftsmen in District Six.

36. Interview with Hadji Ahmad Levy (Cappie), District Six tailor.

37. Interview with Dave (his real name is withheld at his request), a 'core' member of the Globe.

38. The Argus August 19 and September 6 1947.

39. The Argus April 9 1947.

40. Interview with George Manuel, journalist, 1980.

41. Interview with Dave, a Globe member.

42. Interview with Hadji Levy.

43. Interview with Dave, a Globe member.

44. Rewritten from Cape Times and Argus reports of December 21 1951. in D. Pinnock: Argie boys to skollie gangsters, History Workshop 3.

45. Interview with Dave, a Globe member.

46. Debate on the Separate Representation of Europeans and non-Europeans Bill, 2nd reading. Hansard April 18 1951.

47. The Argus May 22 1952.

48. Interview with 'Gums', a Globe member.

49. Interview with Dave, a Globe member.

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51. The Argus March 3 1965.

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59. Edward Roux: Time longer than rope, a history of the black man's struggle for freedom in South Africa. - Wisionson Press edition p. 357 (First published in 1948).

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63. Interview with 'Ossie' Osman 1981

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65. Simons p. 227.

66. Roux p. 355.

67. Osman

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

4

THE CRISIS OF THE 1940s

The crisis of class defence was not confined to the harrassed traders of District Six. It was part of something much larger. When the soldiers came back from war in 1945 they were to find a country transformed by an industrial boom of unprecedented proportions. Between 1939 (when the war began) and 1946, the gross national income rose by 68.4 percent while the net output in manufacture went up by 81.6 percent.[1] The confident mood of the period is captured by AJ Norval:

> When the Second World War broke out in 1939, South Africa was by no means equipped to meet the exacting demands of the civilian requirements, let alone the requirements of participating in a global war... The Government did not wait to consider the costs. Factory buildings were built in the shortest time and plants installed to manufacture war equipment and ammunition for the forces leaving for the front; large contracts on the most remunerative basis were entered into with private manufacturers for clothing, footwear and food. Manufacturers in general were encouraged to manufacture whatever possible to make the country independent of outside sources should the war drag on for many years as was anticipated, and should the world supply routes be cut off. No efforts were spared, nor funds for the equipment of industries... The remarkable phenomenon was that there was no lack of capital... a new era had dawned in the industrial progress of South Africa. The country went from a labour-intensive to a capital-intensive basis of its manufacturing industries. Over the next 20 years a complete transformation took place in the plant set-up of secondary industry which was revolutionary in scope.[2]

But if the war was good for business it was also a painful forcing-house for the political bureaucracy. Under pressure from the demands generated by rapid

industrialisation, urban migrations, worker militancy and wage demands, the ruling class alliance would be forced to make deep, formative changes to its own structure and to the fabric of the State. Indeed the 1940s were exceptional years, a time when many papered-over and clogged social contradictions burst open, sending shock-waves through the State.

The effects on the city of Cape Town were to be profound. Cities are, if anything, concrete manifestations of the dominant forces in the society. In the post-war years Cape Town was to become a symbol of the rise of monopoly capital, merging the commercial, industrial and military town into a rapidly expanding metropolis. The merchant port of the Cape sea route was to be torn apart and rebuilt to the specificiations of industry. It would be cut off from the sea by raised highways connecting the new inner-city office park to the factories and to the white suburbs of the managers. Troublesome elements - workers with brown skins - were to be issued out of town, beyond the white frontier to the new factory estates on the Cape Flats. Over proposals for garden cities and green belts, planners talked of 'machine-gun' zones, 'buffer strips', 'military' roads and 'policeability'.[3] (In peripheral States, capital feels safer inside a defensive city, even if the walls are horizontal and the gates are juridical.)

MONOPOLY GROWTH IN THE GREENHOUSE OF WAR

The wartime industrial expansion in Cape Town was initially through the extension of existing factories geared for increased production. Much of this industry was small-scale and labour-intensive. In textile production, for example, more than half the firms had plant and machinery worth less than £100, and 75 percent of all manufacturing in the early 1940s had equipment valued at under £1000.[4] When the war ended in 1945 the boom conditions, as Norval indicated, were to continue. In the five years which followed, the number of industrial establishments in the Western Cape increased by 33 percent from 1446 to 1928, and the labour force by 36 percent.[5]

In 1946 the giant Rex Trueform clothing factory opened in Salt River, which was rapidly becoming the clothing belt of the city. Of the 102 industries investigated by John Shorten in his history of capitalist development in Cape Town, 95 percent were either started or experienced rapid growth between 1945 and 1951.[6]

However amid the halcyon days other forces were at work. The Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission of 1941 put it this way:

> ... industrial production has to be organised on mass production lines to be economical. This enables the work to be divided into such simple processes that, with the aid of labour saving devices such as the belt system, an efficient and economical use can be made of semi-skilled workers and unit costs can be reduced to a minimum.[7]

This was echoed four years later by the Board of Trade and Industries, which was arguing for a reorganisation and combination of the many small industrial concerns to encourage efficient production:

> The object of combination (it said) is not only to reduce output and to control prices, but also to facilitate plant specialisation and standardisation as a means of reducing costs. (BTI Report 282, 1945)[8]

What was being called for here was a decrease in local competition and a rationalisation of production. Because local production grew on import substitution during the greenhouse effect of wartime isolation, producers were under pressure to reproduce both the processes of production and the relations of the advanced capitalist centres. This set the scene for the rapid development of monopoly companies, with a corresponding growth of industrial technology and the post-war penetration of foreign capital.

Between 1946 and 1954 fixed capital stock rose to an all-time high of 6.9 percent per annum.[9] During roughly the same period the average value of plant/ machinery and tools per establishment grew by about 40 percent, and the average value of mechanical power per worker by 33 percent, suggesting a massive increase in mechanisation.[10] Both the capital and the industrial technology which flooded the country was predominantly from Europe and the United States. Increasingly production became centralised in large firms which could undertake research, afford the expensive machinery and take risks which would ruin smaller producers. Virtually all plant was imported. And within this process, capital tended to to become concentrated in fewer and fewer hands.

Under State measures designed to encourage the 'more efficient' producers, international capital flowed in. At least 60 percent of the Cape Town textile plants in the 1940s surveyed by Shorten were fully-owned subsidiaries of foreign trans-nationals. Other firms became sub-contractors for First World technology and skills. The concentration and centralisation of capital could be found as early as 1941 when, despite the numerical preponderance of small unit production, a mere 9 percent of producers were responsible for 73 percent of industrial output.[11] A rough idea of the degree of concentration can be gained from this table:

Table 4a


Percentage of establishments producing half of the output in respective industries 1940-1941[12]

Industry	Percentage establishments producing at least half of output
Food & drink	3.5
Vehicles	0.4
Metal & Engineering	5.0
Clothing & textiles	3.9
Leather	6.0

In Cape Town these trends resulted in an actual overall decrease in industrial establishments, despite an increase in productive output. An indication of this is the decline in the number of clothing and textile plants, the city's major industry.

Table 4b

Number of clothing/woolens factories in the Western Cape 1925 - 1976



(Source: J. Whittingdale)

For workers the initial result of the war boom was an increase in wage labour. In Cape Town's three main industries the employment figures between 1920 and 1960 increased dramatically:[13]

Industry	Percentage labour increase
Clothing/textiles	900
Food/beverages	238
Printing	335

During the labour-hungry war years influx control of migrant workers was virtually dropped, resulting in a large-scale movement of Africans to the towns from white rural areas and the Reserves. Between 1937 and 1948 the ratio of blacks to whites employed in manufacturing increased steadily:[14]

1937 - 2,5:1	1941 - 2,8:1	1945 - 3,2:1
1938 - 2,5:1	1942 - 3,0:1	1946 - 3,1:1
1939 - 2,5:1	1943 - 3,1:1	1947 - 3,1:1
1940 - 2,7:1	1944 - 3,2:1	1948 - 3,1:1

In the Western Cape the industrial employment between 1939/40 and 1944/45 showed a dramatic upward swing among people defined as 'non-white', particularly among women:[15]

Racial Groups	Percent Change
All races	+27.8
White male	+ 2.2
White female	- 1.5
White total	+ 1.9
Non-white male	+36.8
Non-white female	+43.3
Non-white total	+38.4

The rapid increase in the use of black and coloured labour was because it was both cheaper than white labour and because skilled labour was scarce as many whites were involved in the war. Skilled jobs tended to be fragmented and divided among semi-skilled operators. This fitted in with the new machine production, as a 1945 Board of Trade and Industries Report underlined:

> The central problem of organisation has been to integrate specialised equipment and processes in order to obtain the optimum results in terms of a smooth, even and continuous flow of work. Complex operations have been broken up into their constituent parts, and these taken over by specialised

> machines. This co-ordination of machinery and labour into a continuous chain of operations has had the effect of transforming the entire establishment into a semi-automatic and homogeneous unit... workers and machines are... placed in the sequence of the functions they perform... As each machine must be temporally and spatially adjusted to every other machine, so must every shop and department be timed and adjusted in the rate and intervals at which it contributes its lot to the main stream.[16]

It was not only the tasks that were being simplified in the new production lines, however. In Cape Town a whole stratum of self-employed workers and crafts-people was being wiped out by factory production, which could do their jobs more cheaply. A good example is the clothing industry.

Factory production of clothing began in Cape Town in 1907, although rubber waterproofs had been produced since 1889.[17] Before that all clothing was made by private tailors and seamstresses. Most of them were Malay, with skills handed down from parent to child since the early days of slavery. They formed an important source of income for areas such as District Six and the Malay Quarter. In the early 20th century these producers began experiencing competition from recent immigrants from Central Europe. Because these new arrivals were white, they tended to have better access to capital and were able to expand out of family business into factory production. By 1930 there were 135 clothing factories in the city and by 1952 clothing was the third largest industry in South Africa.[18] By 1965 there were about 30 000 employees in the industry comprising a third of Cape Town's labour force. Small tailors were being ruined by off-the-peg clothing and were increasingly incorporated into the factories as cutters - a department which today remains a male enclave in a female-dominated industry.

A survival tactic in the face of large but standardised opposition was the production of uniforms for the Coon Carnival, uniforms so gaudy, varied and cheap that no factory would consider their production. The origins of the Carnival are obscure. One tradition has it that it began as a celebration of slave emancipation, another that it was started by American negroes from a sailing ship which docked at Cape Town. The occasion still has an American Deep South flavour about it. The word 'coon' probably comes from 'racoon' and troupe members still paint their faces to look like the animal.

The annual reproduction of the carnival owed more to the tradition of the city's working class than to anything else. Troupe members got nothing out of it but fun and a sense that it was 'their thing'. But it is significant that the rise in popularity of the carnival coincided with the growth of clothing factories in Cape Town. The Carnival was, and still is, run by several 'boards' which, importantly, were very often tailor-dominated. These advanced money to various 'captains', who more often than not were shebeen owners or gang leaders. Throughout the year troupe members would lodge an amount of money with a tailor who would undertake to make their uniform for the big occasion on New Year's day. In about October the practices would begin, the captain having a ready troupe of shebeen regulars or gang members. After Christmas the uniforms would arrive in the troupe's colours. Often these were made of Japanese satin in purples, yellows, greens and gold: frock coats, pin-striped trousers with top hats, white gloves and bow-ties. In 1940 the required five yards of satin could be bought for 1/11d. The tailor would sell the uniform for 5/6d. Today a uniform costs R13 and is sold for R25.[19]

The first three days of each new year would afford the sight of thousands of hardened toughs in top hats and tails, faces painted black with large white lips, high stepping through the streets behind a banjo, bass and drum singing 'moppies' to admiring crowds. The celebration would end with huge drink and dagga parties which would start everyone off on the new year with a terrible headache.




Men at a Coon troupe practice.

The Carnival reached its height in the mid-1960s (a time when there were more than 200 clothing factories in the city). But by the 1970s it was on the decline. Because of the latent violence of the gang troupes and their illicit activities (and not without pressure from the City Council) the Carnival was driven off the streets and into stadiums. There it lost much of its spontaneity and popular support. It also came under bitter attack from the Unity Movement and the coloured petty-bourgeoisie who felt it 'reflected the people in a bad light'. More importantly, perhaps, was that the family tailors, who were responsible for re-generating the event each year, were being moved out of the reach of their customers by urban relocations. Their businesses collapsed and they were unable to exist on the Carnival alone or raise the money to forward to the captains. And fierce competition between the boards split the Carnival into smaller fractions and decreased profits. The result was the elimination of a whole stratum of small-scale family enterprise and its absorption into the factory system or its eviction into unemployment.

In many ways the history of women clothing workers parallels that of the men, but there are important differences. Since slave days Malay women had been skilled seamstresses. Until about 1900 they were the major manufacturers of women's clothing in the city. The growth of factories drove these women out of home production and into wage employment alongside the tailors. But another avenue for working class women was to take in laundry. This tradition went back to the early days of the colony, with washing done first on the slopes of Table Mountain and later in public wash-houses.

This was clearly a profitable line of work and capital, taking the situation as it found it, was soon muscling in on the market. By 1912 there were 45 steam laundries in the city, most of them run by Chinese. A boom for laundries came during the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918 when white customers feared contamination of their washing in the ghetto wash houses.

Table 4c



The number of washerwomen was inversely proportional to the number of laundries which averaged at around 45 until 1961. A change which did occur during this period was the eclipse of Chinese laundries by larger enterprises spearheaded by Nannucci.[20] In 1961 population removals moved the washerwomen away from both the wash-houses and their customers in the white suburbs, and the number of steam laundries increased dramatically. Thousands of women lost their jobs, and while some maintained their independence by becoming day-chars, many others turned to the factories for employment.

In 1936 only about one third of the coloured women in Cape Town worked outside their homes. Twelve years later (by 1948) the number of women in factories had increased by 138 percent.[21] In that year women comprised 79 percent of textile workers in the city, 43 percent of the food processing workers and 49 percent of book and printing workers.[22] The early post-war period in District Six is described by a textile worker, Elizabeth Weeder:

> My daddy came from Malmesbury during the war. He was in the Cape Corps so we came to live in District Six. Everything was going there! Hundreds of shops up Hanover Street and flower sellers, tailors, coal merchants, wood sellers and so many hawkers. And barber shops. Where can you get a good barber shop today? Or a shoemaker?
>
> I went to work in a factory after I got married. We needed money. Lots of women worked in factories all along Sir Lowry Road - there was Bucannans sweets and Fairweather clothing and Baumanns Biscuits and the fez factory. First I worked at Cork and Crown as a machine operator, doing man's work on the oak shive, making fishing net cork floats. Then I did beer-bottle tops. There was more money in factories than in service, though lots of women did washing at the Wash House in Hanover Street. Then I went to Fairweather. I was sewing shoulder pads on men's suits. Everything by hand. There were thousands of girls in that place, with supervisors to help or see we didn't talk.
>
> It was hard work - especially with that production business. You see if you made five garments an hour normally, and then you made 10, they would pay you more. Towards Christmas you would work, work to get more money - the whole day Saturday and half of Sunday too. It was tiring - but every penny counts. There were big families and they could look after the children. Today these are no more and women must give up work for the children. Or they just leave the children.
>
> The cutters were always men. They had been tailors usually. There were plenty of tailors before, but then they became less. You would buy your own cloth and they would make a suit. Also with the Coon Carnival... every week you would give a bit of money to the tailor and when you need your suit for the Carnival its paid for. The Carnival is how the tailors could live.

> In the factory the girls would see how the work is done and then leave and start a business making clothes. They would steal with their eyes. The factory was good, though, because they would have sales for the staff and we got clothes cheap. Also the girls made big business there. They would make cakes or konfyt or rooti or curry or knitted things and sell them at lunchtime. Then on Friday evening payday you would pay them. They sold everything there, even shoes.
>
> Most of the women who worked in the District were in factories. It cost me 8c to take a bus from Fairweather to home. Now think how much it costs from Mitchells Plain! (Interview: December 1981)

In the post-war boom working class women in the city were able to take up factory work because of the supportive structure of extended families, which allowed child care to continue despite the absence of mothers. Clothing factory owners exploited this fact to secure cheap female labour. In the poorer communities women came to be relied upon as a source of income and the whole orientation of the culture began to swing around this fact. Often women became the key breadwinners. But with the urban relocations of the 1960s extended families were broken up and working mothers were faced with the choice of giving up work or abandoning their children to neighbours, older children or the streets. In 1973 a report on the causes of absenteeism among coloured industrial workers concluded that:

> when the coloured people lived in their old residential communities, a considerable degree of co-operation existed between them in minding children when women were at work. In the clothing industry alone there are about 40 000 actively employed females.
>
> The communities were broken-up when the coloureds were resettled. They found themselves among strangers. The same degree of co-operation in looking after children has not yet developed. This has no doubt increased absenteeism and unpunctuality.[23]

A solution called for by the report was that the State should take over the role of parenting:

> The school class in modern society performs many of the functions for the developing personality of the child which under pre-industrial conditions had been performed by the family and kinship system. An extensive system of compulsory education for the Coloured population has simply become a sine qua non.[24]

WORKER RESISTANCE AND THE CRISIS OF CONTROL

As can be expected, the widespread urban migrations, poor living conditions, low wages and factory experiences led to increasing militancy on the part of workers. Not least among their grievances was the highly visible differences in consumption levels in the cities. Here the sheer concentration of population presaged a form of proletarianisation that was to place unprecedented pressure on capitalist relations. These pressures are catalogued by Graeme Bloch in his study of industrialisation between 1939 and 1969:

> There were indications of widespread social unrest and ferment (during the war years), finding expression particularly in agitation over housing and the growth of squatter movements. Pass laws, transport, food, liquor raids, all provided a focus for friction and threatened to coalesce in a linking of demands into a generalised assault on the State and the existing forms of social relations. For example, squatters' movements, representing a grassroots organisation of spontaneous unrest, began to show signs of co-ordination.
>
> Leftwing organisations and individuals were active. The Communist Party anti-pass campaign in 1944 won support from the ANC and Natal Indian Congress. The famous 'doctors' agreement' presaged an era of formal co-operation between the various Congress movements. Within the ANC a more radical current was to emerge with the Youth League in 1943 and its calls for direct action based on mass support. It increasingly gained influence within the ANC as a whole.[25]

In Cape Town there was a huge anti-apartheid rally in 1939, several campaigns against the formation of a Coloured Affairs Department once the Leftwing Non-European Unity Movement was formed.[26] By 1945 about 40 percent of the black industrial labour force was unionised.[27] During the war labour unrest had forced African wages to rise by more than 50 percent while white wages showed a slight decline.[28] The level of strike action can be seen in the number of strikes and the man-hours lost during this period. (See Table 4d)

The struggles reached a peak in 1946 on the Rand mines with a strike by 60 000 black migrant workers. Although it was suppressed, the strike rocked the South African ruling classes.[29]

By the late 1940s the State was facing mounting contradictions. In this situation could be detected what Antonio Gramsci termed an 'organic crisis':


> A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves... and that, despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making efforts to cure them from within certain limits, and to overcome them. These incessant and persistant efforts... form the terrain that the forces of opposition organise.[30]

Gramsci locates this crisis within the complex relations between the infrastructure (economic relationships) and the superstructures (the arena of political and ideological relationships) at a particular period of history.[31] In attempting to understand how the ruling classes maintain control of the State, however, it is necessary to distinguish further between civil society and political society, between:

1. the 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent

Table 4d

Industrial disputes in South Africa 1940 - 1950:
Black workers



confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because its position and function in the world of production;

2. the apparatus of State coercive power which 'legally' enforces discipline on these groups who do not 'consent' either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed.[32]

The State - the 'site or level of social formation with specific tasks' - can be seen as comprising dictatorship plus hegemony; not only as the apparatus of government, but also the 'private' apparatus of civil society (churches, clubs, political parties, trade unions etc.).[33] The art of hegemony is therefore the balance between force and coersion, political structures and private structures, law and convention, threat and ideology.

It is, of course, impractical for a dominant social class to rule by force alone for any length of time. The stability of a State is less at threat when this class can gain an upper hand in both political and civil society, imposing its perspective on subordinate classes as a 'universal' understanding via the apparatuses of civil society. It is easier if the ruled consent to be ruled - this is the basis of liberal democracy. To do this the State must appear to stand above the class struggle, 'moderating' it and performing reproductive work on behalf of capital while appearing to be neutral.[34]

In this way the State 'comes to be the structure which enables a ruling class alliance to give its ideas the form of universality...'.[35] To quote Hall et al:

> When a ruling-class alliance has achieved an indisputed authority and sway over all... levels of its organisation - when it masters the political struggle, protects and extends the needs of capital, leads authoritatively in the civil and ideological spheres, and commands the restraining forces of the coercive apparatuses of the State in its defence. When it achieves all this on the basis of consent, i.e. with

> the support of 'the consensus', we can speak of the establishment of a period of hegemony or hegemonic domination.[36]

The coersive element is not merely punitive, it does not merely struggle against 'dangerousness' and punish. It must also 'educate' when consent has failed, prodding the dominated classes towards a 'new type or level of civilisation'.[37] The State

> operates according to a plan, urges, incites, solicits and 'punishes' ... The Law is the repressive and negative aspect of the entire positive, civilising activity undertaken by the State.[38]

Here the State performs its work on behalf of the capitalist system, 'first, by destroying those structures, relations, customs, traditions which, deriving from the past, from past modes of life, stand in the way, fetter and constrain capital's "free development"; second, it performs the work of actively tutoring, forming, shaping, cultivating, soliciting and educating the emergent classes to the new social relations - which enable capitalist accumulation and production to begin 'freely' to unroll'.[39]

Hegemonic 'balance', however, is a condition seldom, if ever, attained - particularly in peripheral States under First World capitalist domination. Within the ranks of the urban proletariat opposition to the regime is ever-present, leading to a struggle which, in gramscian terms, can be seen as a 'war of fixed position'. It's challenge is not necessarily decisive, but simply ties down the State's resources, 'immobilising hegemony' within civil society. (A further stage is reached when these positions lose their value, and only decisive positions are at stake. The struggle is then set to pass over into siege warfare: a war of movement.[40])

A hegemonic crisis comes about

> either because the ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking for which it has requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad masses (war, for example), or because huge masses... have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands which taken together, albeit not organically formulated, add up to revolution.[41]

There can be two 'moments' in this crisis - conjunctural and organic. Conjunctural movements tend to be superstructural and do not have far-reaching historical significance... 'they give rise to political criticism of a minor, day-to-day character, which has as its subject top political leaders and personalities with direct governmental responsibilities.'[42]

However organic phenomena are deeper. They involve wider groupings, are more permanent and go beyond public figures. Efforts by the State to solve an organic crisis cannot merely be to conserve or defend a position. They will be formative:

> a new balance of forces, the emergence of new elements, the attempt to put together a new 'historical bloc', newpolitical configurations and 'philosophies', a profound restructuring of the State and the ideological discourse which construct the crisis and represent it as it is 'lived' as a practical reality; new programs and policies, pointing to a new result, a new sort of 'settlement' - 'within certain limits'. These do not emerge: they have to be constructed... The 'swing to the right' is not a reflection of the crisis: it is itself a response to the crisis.[43]

The outcome of such a struggle will depend on conditions particular to each State at its precise moment in history. But a loss of hegemony by the dominant classes is by no means assured. This is only one possible outcome. Another can be that the traditional ruling class retains power in an altered form.

It has, after all 'numerous trained cadres, (it) changes men and programmes and, with greater speed than is achieved by the subordinate classes, (it) reabsorbs the control that was slipping from its grasp. Perhaps it may make sacrifices, and expose itself to an uncertain future by demagogic promises; but it retains power, reinforces it for the time being, and uses it to crush its adversary and disperse his leading cadres...'[44]

Another possible outcome is what Gramsci calls 'Caesarism': a balance of the forces of opposition which allows the rise of a single powerful individual. (This was a path recommended by the State-appointed President's Council in 1982 when faced with splits in the ruling National Party.)

It was fears of a movement towards liberalization by the State in the late 1940s - a State facing seemingly incurable contradictions - that was to break up the ruling class alliance represented by the United Party. In order that capital accumulation could freely unroll a new balance of forces was necessary, a restructuring of the State 'within limits'. The ideological labour necessary to rework the ruling class alliance into a new configuration had been going on within the Broederbond since 1919. The National Party victory in 1948 and the subsequent swing to the right into 'law and order' was a political response to the crisis. Immediately new policies and directives began to be hammered out.

These emerged, among other things, as the Suppression of Communism Act (1950), the Registration Act (1950) to classify South Africans into racial categories, the Immorality Act (1950) the tough Criminal Law Amendment and Public Safety Acts (1952), the Group Areas Act (1950), the Rent Control Act (1950) and the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (1951). The degree of force implicit in these directives was not without its dangers - particularly because of the massive restructuring of civil society that they entailed. And the hard line was merely sweeping under the rug - albeit with a very stiff and effective broom - the structural problems of the urban proletariat and of the declining

reserves. But it was effective in the short run, putting a lid on rising African political demands (a process which had culminated, by the early 1960s, in the banning of the leading African nationalist organisations) and, most important, disorganising the African working class while driving down the wage bill. This also meant rising profits, and on this basis the South African economy settled into a long-term expansion, muting potential contradictions within capital and smoothing the way for monopoly holdings. After 1940, capital found that apartheid worked; and the bill would not come due for two decades. One of the cornerstones of the new hard line was the garrisoning of racial groups into separate spatial areas - into rural Bantustans or urban group areas. These initiatives were merely reworkings of older ideas, but with a sharper juridical edge. In the end they were to serve capital well.

THE ORIGINS OF URBAN RACIAL SEGREGATION

It is necessary to backtrack slightly at this point. From the beginnings of urban growth after the discovery of gold, voices could be heard in South Africa clamouring for urban land separation and economic protection from people of 'colour'. Until the 1940s these pressure groups - mainly traders and workers of European origin - were given only passing attention by governments dominated by mining or agricultural interests. The main focus for these pressure groups - constituted as town councils, tenants associations and chambers of commerce - was in Natal. Here people from India, brought to the country in 1860 as indentured labour for the sugar plantations, were coming to dominate the strata of small traders and shopkeepers.

As far back as 1884, evidence to the Wragg Commission had called for repatriation of Indians as well as trade and residential segregation - 'preferably outside the limits of the city'.[45] In 1893 Natal was granted responsible government and three years later the Natal Parliament deprived Indians of the franchise. In 1897 the Natal Witness, representing white business interests, urged that separate locations be established for Indians.

The same year the mayors of Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Newcastle petitioned the Colonial Secretary to stop the acquisition of land by Indians, but this was refused.[46] In 1906 Indians were obliged to carry signed Passes, a measure designed to inhibit their movements. This measure was fought by way of widespread passive resistance campaigns. In 1908 the Powell Committee submitted its report which included claims by white shopkeepers that they were being undercut by Indian shopkeepers. They declared that:

> the Indian represents a lower standard of civilisation than their own; that he lives negatively; is poorly housed; pays his staff (generally his family) at a rate at which Europeans could not live; and consequently compels European competitors to close their doors.[47]

In essence, white shopkeepers were unable to compete with the lower cost of living and extensive labour available within large Indian extended families.

In 1909 the Clayton Commission into Indian immigration found that 'in the interests of the superior races of South Africa, it will never be possible to have white and black races labouring side by side upon the same class of work'.[48] In 1922 the Durban Council restricted the sale of property under its jurisdiction to whites only (Ordinance 14) and the following year this was extended to all Natal towns by Ordiance 15.

In the Transvaal a parallel to the Natal Wragg Commission was Law 3 of 1885 (the Gold Law). It sought to implement trade protection from Asians by ordering that they could only own property in special streets and locations. This gave rise to a system of 'Asian bazaars' in Transvaal towns. The stated reason for the law was 'to preserve adequate standards of sanitation'. In the Orange Free State legislation was passed in 1885 preventing Indians from owning any property or conducting business. However within the Cape Colony Asians were not restricted from property apart from within the borders of the Transkei and Griqualand, within the area of the East London municipality.

The culmination of white trader pressure against Asians in the early period was contained in the Lange Commission of 1921 (UG/4). In its findings it:

> strongly recommended that some system of separate areas should be introduced both in the Transvaal and Natal... Such a scheme will tend to ensure the removal of Asiatics from the immediate vicinity of European traders.

The Commission received complaints that Asians depreciated the value of an area by their presence, and that Asian assistants in shops were 'paid so little that the costs of produce sold is lowered'. The suggestion of the Commission was to institute a minimum wage for assistants.

These findings were incorporated into the Class Areas Bill which was tabled in 1924, but failed to become law. The full title of the Bill made its intentions clear: 'To make provision for the segregation of residential and trading areas in urban areas for persons, other than "Natives", having racial characteristics in common'. By 'class', the Bill meant:

> any person having, in the opinion of the Minister, common racial characteristics, but does not include European persons, persons commonly described as Cape coloured persons and natives as that term is defined in Section 29 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, 1923 (paragraph 18).

It sought to give local authorities the right to declare certain urban areas closed to certain races for residential or trading rights. And it suggested a 'freeze' on the sale of properties in such an area pending the outcome of a Government Commission decision on the application.

The Bill gave rise to a storm of protest from Indians in Natal and elsewhere. Within a few months of the Bill's appearance the government changed hands in an election, and it failed to reach the Statute Book. The following year the Bill reappeared in slightly altered form in the Areas' Reservation Bill, but this was not passed either.

The reasons given for the failure of both Bills to become law was that between the governments of South Africa and India an agreement had been reached leading to a conference on the 'Indian question'. This amounted to an Imperial veto of the Bills because the agreement drawn up at the conference in 1926 did little more than confirm the status quo.

In fact, however, the class fraction clamouring for protection from Asians had neither sufficient economic strength nor political clout in the new Pact government to force its position. The result was that the two Bills were shelved - but not forgotten.

'PENETRATION' AND THE GHETTO ACT

The next phase in the fight for the racial partition of land took place between 1924 and 1946, the year in which the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act was passed. During this period the economic struggle of the traders was broadened by the crisis of falling property rates in the inner cities and an ideological assault on people not considered 'European'. The effect was to include white workers under the banner of urban land segregation, deflecting their grievances from the structures of capitalist exploitation towards the 'black threat' of migration into the cities.

Between 1924 and 1946, as we have seen, great social changes took place in the country. Following a five-year drought and an economic depression in 1930, thousands of workers and farmers were driven off the land and into towns. This period marks the transition of the composition of District Six from a largely Central European population to one comprised mainly of an indigenous proletariat.

Alongside rising inner-city population numbers were opportunities for 'informal sector' activities. This drastically increased competition for white traders, particularly in Durban and on the Reef. So while the industrialists prospered, small traders faced shrinking incomes. Their elected local authorities, meanwhile,

were confronted with the spectre of rising costs of services in the ghettos: The demand for urban racial segregation began to grow.

In 1930 a Select Commission, with witnesses drawn from small white businesses, white tenants and city councils, favoured the segregation of Asians in the Transvaal. These findings led to the drafting of a Bill, but this was again vetoed by Imperial intervention in the form of the Round Table Conference in 1932. However the same year in which the Commission sat, white women were given the vote. This rendered ineffective the vote of people defined as coloureds who were later disenfranchised, and consolidated in 1971 when they were removed from the municipal voting rolls. Following the Round Table Conference there were five Commissions of Inquiry on the 'penetration' of people of colour into white areas.[49] All but one recommended curbs on Asian or coloured land ownership and racial segregation. In addition there were three Select Committees on the issue, all favouring land segregation.[50]

What is notable about these inquiries is the sources from which their information came. Submissions were drawn mainly from city and town councils (their members generally representing small business or white ratepayers), white tenants and ratepayers associations, chambers of commerce, provisional councils, licencing boards, and 'ministers (of a church) in charge of coloured labour'.[51] In 1937 the Commission Regarding the Cape Coloured Population suggested that coloureds should be provided with segregated townships. In 1939 the Afrikaner Peoples' Economic Congress met to seek solutions for the protection of poor Afrikaners and small Afrikaner businessmen. Its findings were fed back into its umbrella organisation, the Broederbond, and disseminated through the Bond's numerous ideological outlets.[52] The same year (1939) the Prime Minister, General Hertzog, referred to the possibility of introducing legislation to enforce compulsory segregation between coloureds and whites. In 1944 a Commission met to consider 'mixed' marriages between whites and other races.

This was to have wider consequences two years later. In 1947 the Fagan Commission into migrant labour and influx control was presented. Its position was ambivalent, reflecting the crisis of hegemony within the ruling class alliance - urban migration had to be halted, and yet the mines and industry needed black labour. By bowing to both industry and to white workers it satisfied neither, and cost the government the confidence of white agriculture. This, together with white worker and trader dissatisfaction over the Ghetto Act, lost the 1948 election for the United Party, with critical defections in 36 seats.

The election won political power for 'Afrikaner' workers, farmers and the shopkeeper class. The result was that after 1948 the struggle over urban space took on an overtly political form, with powerful weapons drawn from an armoury of Parliamentary Acts, from the police and from the courts.


AFRIKANER HEGEMONY AND THE GROUP AREAS ACT

In 1942 the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut was formed, representing small-scale capital. Two years later its chairman was warning about the dangers of monopoly involvement, and by the end of the war the strategy of Afrikaner upliftment via the expansion of small-scale business (volkskapitalisme) had begun to founder. The petty-bourgeois vision of large-scale advance through the development of small undertakings was beginning to look like a utopian dream.[55] Smaller businesses were in no position to challenge Imperial Capital directly, they had to travel by an alternative, more political way.

One route was to intensify exploitation of the black proletariat, ensuring a degree of competative survival in the face of monopoly capital. It is notable that in the post-war period the only time black wages in manufacturing declined was immediately after the Nationalist Party victory - a reduction of 5 percent between 1948 and 1952.[56]

COLOURED GROUP AREAS

1 MALAY QUARTER
2 WALMER ESTATE
3 KENSINGTON
4 HAZENDAL
5 ATHLONE
6 BRIDGETOWN, KEWTOWN,
7 SILVERTOWN
8 BELGRAVIA & SUNNYSIDE
9 BELLVILLE SOUTH
10 NEWFIELDS
11 PENLYN
12 HANOVER PARK
13 LANSDOWNE
14 VANGUARD
15 SURREY ESTATE
16 MANENBERG
17 SHERWOOD PARK
18 HEIDEVELD
19 BONTEHEUWEL
20 ELSIES RIVER
21 MATROOSFONTEIN
22 BISHOP LAVIS
23 WOODITGEDACHT
24 BELHAR
24 KUILSRIVER
25 WYNBERG
26 PARKWOOD
27 GRASSY PARK EXTS. & LOTUS RIVER
28 GRASSY PARK
29 HEATHFIELD
30 RETREAT NORTH
31 RETREAT SOUTH
32 STEENBERG
33 HOUT BAY
34 OCEAN VIEW
35 DURBANVILLE
36 SCOTTSVILLE
37 SCOTTSDENE
38 CLOETESVILLE
39 IDASVALLEY
40 EERSTE RIVER
41 MITCHELLS PLAIN
42 MACASSAR
43 FIRGROVE
44 STRAND
45 RAVENSMEAD



Another route was to remove the possibility of competition from Asian and Coloured entrepreneurs. Indeed the physical removal of all 'non-white' people from the cities would serve the interest of both white entrepreneurs and workers, the class base of the new coalition government.

In a narrow economic sense, this called for direct coersion from the State in order to maintain conditions which would ensure the survival of the Afrikaner 'volk'. This situation ensured, also, that these functions of the State remained close to the surface in every struggle over wages.

The first actions of the new government in 1948 were therefore to tighten the Pass Laws and to announce an inquiry into the Ghetto Act. The result of this inquiry was the Joint Report of the Asiatic Land Tenure Laws Amendments Committee and the Land Tenure Act Amendments Committee (UG 49, 1950).

The first three chapters of the report were never made public, but in the final two chapters can be found the keystone of spatial apartheid. They were drafted by D S van der Merwe and Gabriel de Vos Hugo, assisted by the Attorney-General of Natal (WJ McKenzie) and the Chief Magistrate of Johannesburg (Ryle Masson). Of van der Merwe little information is available other than that he was chairman of the Group Areas Board, from which he resigned in 1951. De Vos Hugo had an impeccable Afrikaner background. He graduated from Stellenbosch University and studied religion in Amsterdam. Before the war he was a Nationalist Party organiser on the Witwatersrand and fought against dual-medium (English/Afrikaans) schools. He became chairman of the Krugergenootskap and of the Instituut vir Christelike Nationale Onderwys, an offshoot of the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kulturu[illegible] Broederbond organisation. His work was strongly influenced by the Sauer Report on the 'colour question'.[58]

In its recommendations the Joint Report ignored the smaller issue of Asian rights, claiming that the 'problem' was a national one and should be dealt with uniformly

throughout the country. Reviewing preceeding Commissions and Reports, it concluded that the demands for territorial racial segregation had for too long been ignored. It is interesting that it grounded its decision to include all coloureds in its recommendations on the basis of 'widespread suggestions that coloureds should be brought within the control of the Act... in Natal'. Inter-racial 'tension and strife' were seen as the basis of racial separation:

> We see no way of attaining (the avoidance of civil commotions) except to legislate for total territorial segregation of the different racial groups, so that in the course of time homogenous racial group areas are brought about' (paragraph 333).


On the type of group areas there were two possible solutions:

> One is that there should be total segregation of the various racial groups into fairly large areas of the Union with the possibility that eventually these large areas will become separate non-European States under the suzerainity of the Union. The other is that there should be total territorial segregation on a small scale, particularly in the urban areas. This means that the penetrated areas should be cleared up by uprooting non-European ownership and occupation segregating such ownership and occupation into the various non-European racial group areas... These two points of view are not mutually inconsistent and the one may be regarded as the ultimate aim and possible outcome of the other. (paragraph 334).

The sensitive issue of 'Bantustan' partition, however, was not yet within reach of the new government, given rising black aspirations and the narrow parliamentary majority of the late 1940s:

> In the evidence received we can find no substantial support for the view that what is now desired is few and large areas. Public opinion has not yet progressed to this stage. In our opinion, however, there is ample support of the view that there should be more and smaller racial group areas. .(paragraph 335. Emphasis added)

Grassroots November 1982



ANOTHER DISTRICT SIX?

"DISTRICT SIX is gone. Will Bo-Kaap be next?"

This is what Schotcheskloof residents are asking. They are asking this because they are seeing all the signs of a plan that will force them to move.

Home owners have already been forced to sell their homes to the council. No improvements are being made in the are.

Again and again, the council refuses to allow people to buy houses and vacant land. Even providing a rent office is too big an effort for the council – the people pay their rent through the caretaker's bedroom window.

The council says they have no money for Schotcheskloof.

The people do not believe the council. They say the council wants to move them into the bush because they cannot move them further up the hill.

"Our forefathers lived in the centre of town," they say. "Keerom Street, Loop Street and Long Street were where we used to live. But then the Supreme Court and other businesses took over the land." The people had to move up to Signal Hill.

In the fifties, a section of Bo-Kaap was declared white. More than 100 families were forced to move elsewhere in Bo-Kaap or out to the Cape Flats. At the time, the people had no strong organisation through which they could organise resistance.

Today, the Schotcheskloof Civic Association, leads the poeple in their struggle for the right to live in the area.

At a public meeting recently, more than 300 people decided that they would have no further dealings with the city council.

The people clearly have no confidence in the council. They have resolved to have meetings with other residents before any approach be made to council.

Racial divisions were to be made merely for reasons of bureaucratic necessity:

> The population of the Union should, for the purposes of the proposed legislation, be classified into racial groups and the lines of demarcation between the different groups should be clearly drawn in order to minimise administrative difficulties. We visualise the following groups, namely; the white group and the non-European groups of Natives (with sub-groups, if necessary), Coloureds and Asiatics, and perhaps the Malay Group. (paragraph 336).

Virtually all recommendations within the Report were translated into the Group Areas Act of 1950.[59] A feature of the parliamentary debate on the Group Areas Bill was the unanimity with which the opposition parties - the United Party and the Labour Party - approached racial segregation. Their only objection was over the method of application. The mayor of Durban, Percy Osborn, said the Act 'fitted very nicely with the city's plans'.[60]

The older inner-city ghettos with their maze of narrow alleys which adjoined white residential or business areas were to be systematically razed. Among their sins was that of being military hazards. In the words of Pierre van den Berghe they were to be replaced with

> model townships with unobstructed, rectilinear fields of fire, and wide streets for the passage of police vans and armoured cars. The new ghettos are typically situated several miles from white towns, with a buffer zone in between; they are sprinkled with strategically located police stations, and often enclosed by barbed wire.[61]

The legislative foundations for the construction of defensive cities had been laid.

CHAPTER 4 : NOTES

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13. Whittingdale, op cit p 134.
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18. Ibid p 2

19. Interview with Hadji Levy, a tailor organising the Carnival at Green Point Stadium in 1979.

20. These figures come from available Cape Peninsula directories from 1912 to 1973.

21. From the Coloured People, p 17, in the Wollheim collection, University of Cape Town BC 627 F1-4-11. Probably written by Dr O Wollheim.

22. Ibid p 17.

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47. Select Committee on Asiatic Grievances, A16 1908.

48. Paragraph 24, Report of Indian Immigration Commission.

49. Feetham Commission (1932), Commission regarding the Cape Coloured Population (1937). Murray Commission(1939), Broome Commission (1942). Post-war works and reconstruction commission (1943). Only the 1939 Commission (Transvaal) found no need for curbs. However the same year the Cape Municipal Congress favoured the segregation of racial areas.

50. The Select Committees of 1936 and 1937 as well as the Select Committee of Natal Provincial Council in 1943.

51. The submission of this last category was notable in the Feetham Commission.

52. See Maasdorp and Pillay, op cit, p 91.

53. Trading and Occupation of Land (Transvaal and Natal) Restriction Act, 1943.

54. Maasdorp and Pillay, op cit, p 91.

55. See Bloch, op cit p 96.

56. Kaplan, op cit p 309 Quoted in Bloch p 217.

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58. Verslag vir die Kleurvraagstuk Komitee van die Herenigde Nasionale Party (Report for the Colour Question Committee of the Re-United National Party) 1947. See P Wilkinson: A place to live, the resolution of the African Housing Crisis in Johannesburg 1944 - 1954 (African Studies Institute seminar paper July 1981, University of the Witwatersrand) for a discussion of the Report. Person details come from: GF de Vos Hugo, AM Hugo, JJ Hugo: Die Hugo-Familieboek (Kaap en Transvaal Drukkers, Kaapstad, 1977).

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5

BUILDING THE URBAN FORTRESS

If the developments of the 1940s were to provide the framework necessary to turn a city into a garrison, it was left to the local boys to fill in the details. They, in turn, drew heavily on 'overseas' precedents and planning ideologies. What is of interest here is why they chose the plans they did, when they did, and what their priorities were. A good starting point is the Foreshore reclamation scheme. Although it was not the first of the imported urban dreams, it certainly informed the 'urban renewal' schemes which were to follow.

THE GREAT LE CORBUSIAN DISASTER

In 1935 the South African Railways announced a plan to construct the Duncan Dock, a project that would reclaim from the Sea 480 acres adjacent to the inner city. The area was offered to the City Council for development. Dredging began in 1938 and the Council planners submitted their scheme for consideration. The Railways were not satisfied with the plan, which had to site the new station and goods yards in the area as well, and appointed two advisers, F Longstreth Thompson from London and LW Thornton White of the University of Cape Town. The City Council, from its side, engaged the services of no less than the chief architect to the French government, Eugene Beaudouin. Both parties submitted their proposals in mid-1940. The main objectives of both plans, apart from the siting of the station and the provision of roads and parks, were

(a) the construction of a Monumental Approach from the Harbour to the heart of the city. This is an essential component in the conception of Cape Town as the 'Gateway of South Africa'...

(b) the placing of a new City Hall at the head of the Monumental Approach where... it will be in a position to offer a dignified civic welcome to distinguished visitors on ceremonial occasions.[1]

Beaudouin's report, which was never made public, included several considerations not mentioned in the Railways proposal:

> The scheme will... affect the following sites: The spaces involved in the following proposed Slum Clearance Projects:
>
> (a) District Six
> (b) Malay Quarters
> (c) Docks Area...
>
> The replanning of District Six will present an opportune occasion for (the extension of a freeway towards the Cape Flats) which in no way interferes with the activity of Sir Lowry Road. On the west... it will be possible, at the right time, to undertake the planning of the slums of the Malay Quarters and the Docks...
>
> Having fixed the position of the town from the geographic and economic points of view, its defence is now the important matter for consideration. Its protection against external and internal attack must be planned for. This has been taken into account and two large rectilinear open spaces are proposed in the layout, with due regard to the dominant positions surrounding them. This question has been carefully examined and studied...
>
> The Castle... represents a historical monument of the highest order. It is a symbolic witness that must be carefully preserved in the new layout...[2]

The fate of District Six had thus been planned 26 years before it was publicly announced! A dispute then ensued between the Railways and the Council over the siting of the new station. It was finally resolved when the Railways agreed to sink the station below ground to avoid restricting the Monumental Approach. The agreed-upon plans were published in 1947, and building began.

Great blocks of curtain-wall glass offices, what Lewis Mumford calls 'vertical filing cabinets', began to appear. By 1951 the plan had run into problems and changes were recommended by the City Engineer.[3] In 1962 the Shand Committee, appointed by the Administrator as consultants for road and traffic planning, recommended that a solution to the growing traffic problem would be the construction of elevated roads across the Foreshore between the city and the sea. These were duly constructed, slicing through what remained of the Monumental Approach and cutting off central Cape Town from the ocean. (The hangover of the enormous costs involved remains today, with bits of half-constructed elevated freeway dangling in the air and blocked off by barrels.)

In his analysis of the Foreshore in 1966, Roelof Uytenbogaardt observed that 'the impossibility of reconciling the requisites of a Monumental Approach with actual demands is demonstrated very clearly by the departures that have been made from the 1947 plan and by the urgent problems at hand which cannot be solved within its framework'.[4]

These problems were not simply architectural. By the 1960s Cape Town was declining in relation to other economic regions, especially the Witwatersrand, with a relative fall-off of productive output. By the 1980s the city was also experiencing a slump in tourist trade and shipping. Writing in the Cape Times in August 1982, Brian Barrow observed that


> Table Bay harbour, one of South Africa's major ports and once a lively Tavern of the Seas of international repute on one of the busiest ocean routes, has been reduced to a ghost of its former self by radically-changed trends in shipping and cargo operations and by depressed economies around the globe. The effects of long spells of near-emptiness in a large part of the harbour that once bustled with the colourful comings and goings of passengers and cargo liners from all parts of the world have been felt throughout the economy of the Western Cape.[5]

Between 1972 and 1982 the number of ocean-going vessels using the harbour decreased by 50 percent. And between 1977 and 1982 the annual gross tonnage of ships handled by the port fell by 20 million as containerisation grew.[6] Williams complained that 'the general public is becoming less and less a part of the harbour scene and... no move has been made by the authorities to return to the public of Cape Town some of the considerable expanse of Table Bay shoreline that has been devoured by harbour developments...'[7]


What is of interest to this study, however, is not so much that the great Foreshore scheme went awry but that it was the product of a particular planning ideology. It was this, in the end, which was to have far more impact on the city than the dredging of Table Bay. One of the features of the Foreshore plan was the unquestioning acceptance of the ideas of the Swiss planner Le Corbusier. Above all other things, Le Corbusier was the urban planner of monopoly capital, and was feted by the emerging Modern Movement in the architecture of the 1930s. His plans were the most advanced and formally elevated hypotheses of bourgeois culture in the field of architectural design. (In Paris, where he worked, his formalism was rejected by French marxists as the 'spatial expression of the bourgeoisie'.[8]) The house, for Le Corbusier was a machine for living in, to be mass-produced like a tool.

> The city of today is dying (he wrote in 1929) because it is not constructed geometrically. To build on a clear site is to replace the 'accidental' layout of the ground, the only one that exists today, by the formal layout. Otherwise nothing can save us. And the consequence of geometrical plans is Repetition and Mass-production. And as a consequence of repetition, the standard is created, and so perfection (the creation of types). Repetition dominates everything. We are unable to produce industrially at normal prices without it... my 'cellular' system for dwellings anticipates the problem of mass-production. If only the captains of industry would examine these plans they would see immense scope in these suggestions.[9]







Adderley Street: A perspective view of the 1938 Congress Scheme




Part of the 1938 Congress Scheme for central Cape Town




NBERRA




PRETORIA
(UNION BUILDINGS)




NEW DELHI




WASHINGTON




CAPE TOWN
(CIVIC CENTRE)



PROPOSED KENYA CENTRE
NAIROBI





COMPARATIVE PLANS

om NAIROBI: Master plan for a colonial capital by L.W. Thornton-White, L Liberman, P.K. Anderson (1948)

For these captains Le Corbusier designed huge free-standing mushroom-construction flats surrounded by manicured greenery.

> In terms of town planning (he wrote with candid honesty) the flat may be considered as a cell. Cells, as a consequence of our social order, are subject to various forms of grouping, to co-optations or to antagonisms which are an essential part of the urban phenomenon... It is possible by a logically conceived ordering of these cells to attain freedom through order.[10]

With tireless energy Le Corbusier engaged in a seamless web of total design from wristwatch to region. He planned bombable blocks of flats, the minimum living cell for workers ($14m^2$), the Volkswagen beetle, vast running constructions which incorporated worker housing under freeways and in bridges, and grands ensembles of 'graph paper' flats. In 1939 he was active in founding the Congres Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM) which was to determine a minimum standard for worker dwellings. His Ville Contemporaine is described by Kenneth Frampton in Modern Architecture as 'an elite capitalist city of administration and control, with garden cities for the workers being sited, along with industry, beyond the "security zone" of green belt encompassing the city'.[11] The Indian capital of Chandigarh, which Le Corbusier designed and built, came to be seen as 'a tragedy... a city designed for automobiles in a country where many, as yet, still lack a bicycle'.[12]

In the Athens Charter, put together by the CIAM conference held in 1933 under Le Corbusier's tutelage, the means was documented by which the planners' grand design could be put into effect:

> The ruthless violence of private interests provokes a disastrous upset in the balance between the thrust of economic forces on the one hand and the weakness of administrative control and the powerlessness of social security on the other.
>
> The suburb... is a kind of scum churning against the walls of the city. The abode of an unsettled population enmeshed in numerous afflictions.

> To ensure the city the means of a harmonious development, the Administration must take responsibility for the management of the land surrounding the city before the suburbs spring up.
>
> (What is needed is) a political power... clear sighted, with earnest conviction, and determined to achieve those improved living conditions that have been worked out and set down on paper; an enlightened population that will understand, desire, and demand what the specialists have envisaged for it...
>
> The city will take on the character of an enterprise that has been carefully studied in advance and subjected to the rigor of an overall plan. Intelligent forecasts will have sketched its future...[13]

Le Corbusier's central directive for city development must have a familiar ring about it for those who witnessed the destruction of District Six:

> Surgery must be applied to the city's centre. Physic must be used elsewhere. We must use the knife...[14]

Le Corbusian town planning emerged in South Africa with a bang at the Town Planning Congress held in Escom House, Johannesburg, in 1938. Of the six exhibits on display, four were Le Corbusier's (he sent a letter of encouragement to the Congress), one was of a 'Native Township' and the sixth was a model for the replanning of central Cape Town.

'At this congress,' said speaker Norman Hanson, 'we pay a tribute to the colossal achievements in creative thought of Le Corbusier, from whose expositions and guiding principles we have taken our line of attack.'[15] The designes for Cape Town showed huge free-standing slab-constructions marching from the docks towards the mountain. District Six was planned out of existence, replaced by a single hotel surrounded by a vast acreage of greenery. The whole of Woodstock and Salt River had disappeared under huge Le Corbusian 'redant' blocks of worker 'cells'.


> It is the task of the architect (said W Gordon McIntosch in the spirit of the Congress) to sweep aside the clogging forces preventing growth.[16]

The spirit of the congress was unambiguously colonialist. Introducing the Cape Town plans, Norman Hanson observed that


> National sentiment fixes Cape Town as the focal point of South African history and character. White civilisation gained its first hazardous foothold on that southern peninsula, and from there it has spread in successive waves into the great hinterland. The atmosphere and character that time alone can create can be sensed where man has established himself along the sculpturesque lower slopes of Table Mountain.[17]

In true Le Corbusian style, the planning was to be uncompromising. There are, he said

> two possible methods to the replanning of the centres of cities. The first of these ruthlessly imposes a plan on what exists, the second allows the inherited plan to dictate the form and arrangement of any projected scheme. The latter - the plan of perpetual compromise - is choked in itself by the ever-present forces of sentiment, insularity or parochialism and short-sightedness... we have named this the Palliative Method. When however the life and future greatness of a town is to be considered we must concentrate our first activities at the city's centre, so that freedom of movement, accessibility and breathing space can be restored where they are vital. It is possible to achieve this radical re-organisation by drastic methods only, by a fresh start on cleared ground. This ruthless eradication directed towards a re-vitalising process we have, following Le Corbusier's lead, named the Surgical Method... through surgery we must create order, through organisation we must make manifest the spirit of a new age... with the calm and balance established by ordered planning, significant advances in the nation's welfare are possible - material things, industry, commerce...[18]



A Roman ex-urban cluster outside the city walls where travellers and workmen were forced to live




A development of the Roman town: St Gallen, Switzerland, in the 5th century AD with the monastic town (left) clearly seperated from the merchant/ artisan town (right)

(Source: S Moholy-Nagy: Matrix of Man)


Of course, in an economy based on the private ownership of property, the problem of ploughing up cities in the name of good planning would give rise to problems over who would exercise the authority. 'If town planning is to consist in the direction and control of the ecological organisation and location of urban communities,' asked a sociologist at the Congress, BA Farrell, 'who is to do the directing and controlling? It may, for example, be the case that town planning, at least on any extensive scale, is incompatible with every form of governmental organisation except Facist regimentation'. He answered his own question, however, by suggesting the formation of a State Planning Department and 'the compulsory purchase of the land by public authorities'.[19] Professor Thornton-White, who was later to become part of the Foreshore planning tribunal, suggested a combination of two possible solutions to the ordering of urban space - a centralised 'vertical town' on Le Corbusian lines with roof gardens, and a 'horizontal town', 'a ring of satellite towns or communities of 40 000 people, several miles apart, interconnected by planned rapid transport and centred about a cultural or civic centre...'[20]

Between the planning of the Foreshore, the destruction of inner-city working class communities and the construction of housing estates was a clear straight line.

Two years later Thornton-White was to co-submit proposals for the Foreshore based on aggressive Le Corbusian lines, incorporating many of the ideas of the Congress, with a Monumental Approach and a Grand Boulevard so wide that in a stiff southeaster it could take five minutes to cross the road on foot. In 1948 he was to produce Nairobi: master plan for a colonial city on the lines of Paris, Washington and Canberra. Each road would have served as an aircraft runway... in a country where many considered a motor car with awe.



Riverside, Chicago, 1869



Siedlung, Margarethenhohe, Essen 1909

THE GARDEN CITIES THAT WENT WRONG

The above detour into the Foreshore scheme has been necessary to underline the fact that post-war urban re-planning was not merely 'Afrikaner racism' and a 'frontier mentality', as many liberal writers have suggested. It was rather a spatial response to the development of monopoly capital on a world scale. Because of this, First World planning ideology could be swallowed, undigested, in the re-development of a colonial city on the southern tip of Africa, without much more than a blink. However, the sterilisation of the inner city on the scale envisaged by the Group Areas Act was to lead to immense problems over where to house the thousands of people it was to displace. Added to this was the post-war crisis of urbanward migration. In an attempt to solve the problem, both State and local authority planners again turned to the industrialised nations for a solution.[23] Again, local conditions were to give this solution a vicious twist. The template for the new working class ghettoes was, ironically, to be the English garden city, or in Professor Thornton-White's words, a 'ring of satellite towns served by a rapid transport network'.

On reflection it is obvious why the garden city or ex-urban cluster became the predominant township form in South Africa. As early as the Bronze Age, clusters were built outside cosmological cities, marking the division between the priests and 'other people'.[24] In the second millennium BC Assyrian traders had to stay outside the city walls in 'karum' clusters because they were 'foreigners' bound by no local loyalty oath. Satellite clusters developed faster during Roman world domination because, in the words of Sibyl Moholy-Nagy in Matrix of Man, 'the more stratified an urban society, the more rigid are its discriminatory laws'.[25] The cives 'a strictly nationalistic hierarchy of military and administrative delegates from the capital', were not prepared to share the city they governed with the native inhabitants (incolae) who were expelled to the vicus canaborum or land belt.

The Christians and Moslems were to inherit from Rome not only Roman Law and the influence of 'Romanesque' architecture, but many of the prejudices of imperialism, tolerating people of other races and other faiths, but excluding them from all civil rights. The social stigma attached to the cluster, whether outside the city gates or inside, found its strongest expression in the Jewish ghetto of the medieval city. In 1555 a papal bull proscribed any proximity between Jews and gentiles, creating the ghetto as an outcast community enclosed by walls, the gates of which were locked at night and on Christian holidays.[26]

The exclusion of the 'unclean' was to affect other groups as well. In 1514 the wealthy banking and trading house of Fuggers built a 'charity cluster' in Angsburg. It was surrounded by a wall and closed off from the city, by three locked gates. Christopher Wren constructed a similar establishment in London in 1680 to house the widows and orphans of seamen.[27] Gradually, however, the poor were being let into the inner city. During the Industrial Revolution the cluster concept came to be applied mainly to industry. The dirtiest and noisiest industries were required to move to the city outskirts, as had the tanners and stonemasons of the Middle Ages, laying the foundations of the industrial cluster. An exception was the company housing scheme. Probably the earliest example of this was Port Sunlight, built in 1887 outside Liverpool by the Lever family.[28] The street system was completely unrelated to the buildings, and the houses formed independent insulae, with no orientation towards each other or towards the city centre. This idea was followed by the Krupps ammunition dynasty which built two employee clusters in Essen, and the Pullman's Palace Car Company which built Pullman near Chicago in the 1880s.[29] These company clusters were seen, at the time, as 'prefect societies in the service of industry', an integration of town and factory with the aim of maximum productive efficiency. However they often failed because of the politicising effect on workers of the massive control centralised in the

company bosses. In 1894 Pullman's factory ground to a halt in a sustained strike that was to collapse the very concept of the company town.[30] More subtle methods of spatial control were clearly necessary. Indeed the future of the ex-urban cluster belonged to the more complex cosmological schemes of a man called Ebenezer Howard.

Reacting in fear against the rapid growth of an urban proletariat in the London inner-city of the late 19th Century, Howard developed the romatic, naturalistic notion of the Garden City. It was essentially decentralist and strictly controlled in terms of size and layout. In the words of a supporter it was 'a marriage of town and country, of rustic health and sanity and activity and urban knowledge, urban technical facility, urban political co-operation'.[31] The urban historian Lewis Mumford describes Howard's plan as an attempt to 'canalize the flow of population, directing it from the existing centres to new centres... decentralising industry and setting up both city and industry within a rural matrix' surrounded by a belt of green vegetation.[32] Mumford considered the Garden City to be one of the 'two great new inventions' of the early 20th Century, the other being the aeroplane.[33] Howard's plans were taken up by a wealthy London architect, Raymond Unwin, who planned and built Letchworth and Welwyn Garden City - both medium-density areas made up of tiny medieval farmhouses around dead-end lanes. But to the dismay of its more purist adherents, the garden city dream was soon to be co-opted by suburbia.

The early European and American suburbs had been a form of romatic middle-class escape, a sort of asylum for the preservation of an illusion and a nursery for children.


> There is no police so effective (wrote Emerson in 1865) as a good hill and wide pasture in the neighbourhood of a village, where the boys can run and play and dispose of their superflous strength and spirits.[34]

Howard and Unwin had showed, however, that the ex-urban cluster need not be an upper-class luxury, a lesson which was not lost on the British government of the 1930s. In 1938 the Green Belt Act was passed, and on its principles the Bressy-Lutyens Report proposed a complete set of rings and radials for London. In 1944 a White Paper provided for the State control of land to enable post-war reconstruction. The theoretical underpinnings were straight Howard:

> ...hold the great city at its present limits by a wide green moat, and move out beyond it the constricted industries and their slum-housed workers into self-contained industrial towns...[35]


In 1946, under the direct influence of Letchworth and Welwyn, the New Towns Act was passed, seeking to decongest London by projecting a ring of new towns to be built around the city and in other parts of England.[36] The outcome of the construction of these satellite towns has been all too familiar. In the words of the president of the Royal Institute of British Architects Lionel Esher

> In the new ideology, those parts of cities that to the planner, had seemed the worst, the 'grey areas', the run-down multi-purpose semi-commerical semi-residential low-rental inner rings, were the most fully humanised. And they were the safest. These hard-won parks and play spaces (of the new areas) whose soft green shapes diversified the geometry of new housing areas were death-traps, patrolled by gangs and addicts. Children rightly preferred to play in the street (of the old areas) and on the street, overlooked by the invisible eyes of residents, all of us were safe... Having childishly overlooked the pattern (of real social movement) planners had set about transforming the city into their simplistic image, stamping with hobnailed boots on the intricate urban ecology. And for what? For 'prim dreams of pure order' that were neither desirable nor affordable.[37]




From E. Howard: Garden Cities of Tomorrow






PLAN OF LETCHWORTH




Plans from the Bressy-Luytens Report for London, 1938



CAPE PENINSULA REGIONAL DIAGRAM

SHOWING MAIN COMMUNICATION SYSTEM AND DEFINED COMMUNITIES

1947 Cape Town Foreshore Plan:First report.


Residential and industrial
areas in Cape Town 1973
Table Bay
CAPE TOWN

Eighteen years after the building of Letchworth, the idea of the garden city was to flower in South Africa. While in Britain, Richard Stuttaford, the director of a large retailing shop in Cape Town, had become 'an avid supporter of the principles outlined in Howard's Garden Cities of Tomorrow - a book which endowed all modern languages with the term "garden city"'.[38]

In 1919 he wrote to the Acting Prime Minister, saying that:

> for some time in the past, and more particularly since the influenza epidemic, I have given a good deal of thought to the question of better housing accommodation for the people in our larger cities. I should like to put before you a proposal with regard to this matter, which I am prepared to support with my own money. ... Will you give me a quarter of an hour to discuss it with you...[39]

On June 16, 1919, the House of Assembly requested of the Senate

> the withdrawal from the Uitvlugt Demarcated Forest Reserve a portion thereof, in extent 272 morgen, and grant thereof, together with a further portion, in extent 95 morgen, to the Trustees of the Garden Cities Trust, for the purpose of establishing thereon a Garden City...[40]

Local designs for the scheme were submitted to Raymond Unwin, who rejected them all. A London architect was then engaged for the purposes, and the first house in the new township of Pinelands was compelted in 1922.

The Trust was later to construct five other garden suburbs in the city, and their iniative instigated the Cape Ordiance for the Control of Townships (No 13 1927) which gave the Surveyor General control over township planning. According to the Trust, Pinelands

> has proved that a properly-planned area is easier to control, cheaper, more satisfactory and certainly far more pleasant to live in than the erstwhile haphazard development.[41]

The non-subjective element of such observations did not go unnoticed by the planners of the new black and coloured townships, or the authorities who approved or rejected their designs. The latter, however, were under no illusions about the practicality of these imported ideas for the purposes of class defence. As the new concepts took hold two shifts of emphasis could be identified.

A. The Green Belts

The 1947 City Council Foreshore plans included a regional diagram for 'defined communities' on the lines of the Bressy-Luytens report for central London. It included ring roads and radials with neat self-contained townships in between - each with its enclosing swath of green belt. The projection was for clusters of inward-looking, mono-class satellites spreading out across the Cape Flats and connected to the inner city by fast highways. Three years later the Group Areas Act was passed, making cluster development compulsory by legislating for race-specific townships surrounded by an empty 'buffer strip'. Attempting to clear up ideas on the last point, the South African Institute of Race Relations advised readers of its 1954/5 handbook that

> the Native Affairs Department has laid down, as a general rule, that African locations should be separated from areas occupied by members of any other groups by buffer strips 500 yards wide, and from all other external boundaries by strips 200 yards in width, unless such external boundaries are main roads, in which case the buffer strips must be 500 yards wide if the boundary is a national road, and 300 yards wide if it is a provincial road. Rows of trees may be planted in buffer zones, but the land may not be developed.[42]

Public confusion over just what these strips were to be used for was voiced by WJ Davies with regard to Port Elizabeth:

> An interesting proposal put foreward by the Joint Town Planning Committee was the provision for extensive 'Green Belt' developments in the city, in all cases associated in one way or another with buffer strips between White and non-white group areas. A difficulty arises in this respect, though, since green belt development usually implies parkland. Which group, then, would have the use of the parks? Clearly freedom of access by all races was unacceptable in terms of the Act, and the division of such parkland would be impracticable. The reductio ad absurdum conclusion is that such parkland should not be used by anyone...[43]

Davies' conclusion, of course, was not entirely correct. The buffer strips were ideal for army manoeuvres in time of trouble. It is not without good reason that they were known in planning circles as 'machine gun belts'. These were not to be the new playgrounds of the urban proletariat but the horizontal walls of a defensive city. A 1973 map of Cape Town shows the extent to which buffering and satellite cluster planning was carried out. Particularly notable is the degree to which the mountain suburbs have been separated from the black residents of the Cape Flats by a wide stretch of empty land and a freeway.

B. Planned isolation

'Our first requirement', wrote Le Corbusier in 1929, 'will be an organ which is compact, rapid, lively and concentrated: this is the city with its well-organised centre. Our second requirement will be another organ, supple, extensive and elastic: this is the Garden City on the periphery. Lying between these two organs, we must require the legal establishment of that absolute necessity, a protective zone...'[44] Connecting these was to be the highway, that 'river of cars and the breath of freedom and industry'.[45]

Developments along these lines have given rise to what Mumford describes as the 'motor-car culture'. The luxury was to become a necessity. 'With the destruction of walking distances', say Mumford, 'has gone the destruction of walking as a normal means of human circulation: the motor car has made it unsafe and the extension of the suburb has made it impossible'.[46] For those who could not afford vehicular transport, however, the distant township was to become a trap. They were imprisoned by their poverty in environments hostile to human locomotion.

This imprisonment is more real than one would imagine. In the new towns (the products of what some commentators call 'crashed train' planning because of their layout), the roads constantly looped back on each other. The idea of this was to create a 'sense of identity' among residents, a 'village effect' without through-traffic, and an 'interesting' visual experience. The Cape garden city plans were to provide a minimum of access roads to main highways - and anyway these linkages all ran across a buffer strip. In this they differed dramatically from the older suburbs. In Cape Town, for example, the old suburbs of Claremont, Wynberg and Rondebosch have, respectively 43, 52 and 38 access roads. A contrast is these new townships:

Township/area	No. of access roads
Mitchells Plain	6
Manenberg	6
Bonteheuwel	4
Heideveld	7
Pinelands	4
Bishop Lavis	4
Guguletu/Nyanga/New Crossroads	8
Langa	3
Bridgetown	2

A Riot Policeman I spoke to was uninterested in the village effect: 'We can seal these places off in a few minutes, we know all the roads that go in'. This creation of 'policeable architecture' has parallels with recent developments in Belfast, which include the 'creation of open space (free-fire zones) by the army and the 'physical removal' of modern blocks (designed by architects to make the streets 'more interesting') by the Provisional IRA, which feared they would become convenient observation posts for the army.[47]

The overall effect of garden city planning, when applied to working class areas in Cape Town, was therefore to enclose people in hostile environments at all times, and to keep them there in times of social unrest. Attempts to 're-tribalise' coloured people in these areas crystalised in their elimination from the voters rolls and the setting up of 'local self-government' in each 'new town' or 'non-white' region. By 1970 at least 208 new towns for coloureds and 76 for Asians had been proclaimed in the name of decreasing 'further friction and deterioration of human relationships' between blacks and whites'.[48] Almost all were on the outer fringes of the now 'white' cities.

CITY COUNCIL RESISTANCE TO GROUP AREAS

We must consider now what seems to be a paradox. The Cape Town City Council, seemingly the architects of population removals and satellite cluster development, were to take a political line opposed to group areas removals. For two decades the Council refused to draw racial area maps to facilitate group areas partition and continually refused to attend Group Area Board hearings on racial partition unless subpoenaed to do so. When pressed, Councillors pointed out that the Council had its own, less drastic, slum clearance scheme under the Slums Act and did not need the State to teach it how to do its job. In truth, of course, 'less drastic' simply meant less. The first problem of the Council, which was in principle quite willing to countenance mass removals, was simply the costs involved.

For this reason the Council had a long history of reluctance to provide worker housing on any scale, and had taken up the tasks only when driven to by some or other epidemic. The reason was that housing cost the ratepayers money, and most ratepayers with any clout were white voters. It took an epidemic that threatened to break out of the ghettoes to justify expense on the working classes. With its necessarily longer view of the threat to cities from the urban poor, the State tried by carrot and stick, throughout the 1950s, to force the Cape Town City Council to undertake the housing of coloured workers moved from white group areas. Even when State funds were provided the Council resisted, because when the sums were done it was clear that the Council would be obliged to administer the housing schemes - collect the rent, maintain the estates and repay the loan to the State over a fixed period.

Another problem for councillors was the threat of the State 'stick': if the Council refused to comply with government demands, the State would usurp it power. This was the second horn of a dilemma for a council traditionally opposed to interference from 'up north', and the oldest one in existence. The fears were justified when the State began to hack away at the powers of the Council by means of legislation.

In the area of housing, the warning shots were fired in 1959 with the tabling of the Group Areas Development Bill. It contained a clause allowing the State's Development Board to appropriate properly outside a declared group area 'for the attainments of any of its objects'. This would mean the State could claim property within the Council boundary for worker housing - and then hand it over to a Management Committee under the Coloured Affairs Department. The clause was withdrawn after a howl of protest from local authorities who saw their areas of jurisdiction being chipped away by Presidential decree. But they were warned by the Minister that the clause would be re-inserted if local authorities (and particularly Cape Town) refused to fall in line with State planning.

In part, the clause was re-inserted in the Group Areas Amendment Act by a conflict-toughened government in 1963, and completed in the Community Development Act of 1964.[49] By then the first group areas in the city had been declared.

Councillors and the Vote

The problems of finance and State penetration had the tendency to split the City Council between councillors and paid administrators. The political composition of the Council in the 1950s was mainly professional people (particularly lawyers), landlords and small businessmen. In the main, their party allegiance at State level was towards the United Party, the official Opposition.[50] A notable absence were members representing industry, Afrikaner workers or professionals, and the big local finance houses like Sanlam and SANTAM. While the manufacturers wanted industrial peace and cheap labour, the Afrikaner group's position was expressed as a fear that coloureds would gain control of certain Cape wards and town councils unless they were deprived of their municipal voting rights. They would, it was feared, also out-bid white workers in the labour market, accepting lower wages for the same jobs. Concern was voiced in Parliament that the Cape would become a 'coloured province'. The 1951 census increased such fears when it showed a white migration <u>out</u> of central Cape Town and a 'non-white' increase of 22 000. In 1962 the secretary of the Cape Nationalist Party, Piet Marais, told Parliament that:

> the United Party dominated municipalities are mercilessly manipulating the coloured vote on the municipal voters rolls by a skillful way of handling the ward system... keeping them in sub-economic houses so as not to have the municipal vote.

But he warned that in the long run it would

> not be possible to keep their numbers of votes down by manipulating. In Cape Town, for instance, the coloured population has increased by 30 percent since 1951 while the whites have increased by only 15 percent... If the position is allowed to continue as it exists today, many municipalities in the Western Cape Province will eventually become over-ruled by coloured majorities, because the coloured people are steadily advancing (in numbers). Many towns in the Boland will soon be controlled by the coloured people.[51]

White councillors were, on the whole, not champions of the coloured vote. As far back as 1945, following an application by the City Council, the Supreme Court ruled that weekly tenants were not eligible to a municipal vote. A newspaper, reviewing the position 19 years later, claimed that since this judgement, the council had been transferring coloured people onto weekly tenancy in order to disenfranchise them.[52] And in 1961 the council accepted the recommendations of its Starke Committee to segregate the city's population on beaches, pavilions, forests, parks and gardens. The Torch commented dryly that:

> The City Council are, of course, past masters in the matter of apartheid in civic affairs and in discrimination against non-whites. When the present Administrator was still running about in the backveld in short trousers, the City Council was already erecting segregated housing schemes (locations) and chasing non-whites from swimming baths and other amenities reserved for whites only.[53]

However, although national disenfranchisement of coloureds took place in 1951 and Provincial Council membership was denied them in 1961, their municipal vote in the Cape continued until 1971 (when it was abolished by Ordinance 14). So throughout the 1950s and 1960s city councillors were to remain answerable to a sector of the population which was denied the vote at higher level. The muting of council objections to the coloured vote probably came about for several reasons outside the much-acclaimed Cape liberal tradition.

Many white voters, and even some councillors, had incomes directly based on services and trade within the city's ghettos. One such group was the property owners. A considerable number of councillors, and even more of their electorate in the inner-city wards, owned slum property. To slum landlords the threat of Group Areas removals and council housing was a threat to this income, a point which will be taken up presently.

Another group which profited from the ghettos were the traders, who represented a considerable fraction of the council. An example is AZ Berman, who swayed the council by oratory and intrigue for more than 30 years. He was an accountant who began his political life in District Six as a street-corner socialist. By 1960 he was chairman of the Council's Health and Housing Committee and, in addition to slum property, he owned a string of ghetto liquor outlets throughout Cape Town.[54] His objection to State housing was long and bitter, and he swung many council meetings during the crucial deliberations over the fate of District Six.

The objections of the white city traders to group areas was that, unlike their counterparts in Durban and Johannesburg, they held the dominant trading position in the working class ghettos. Their low point came in 1961 when the Group Areas Board began investigating the possibility of declaring District Six coloured, a move which would deprive them of their trading rights. In a petition in 1962 they asked the Group Areas Board to leave Hanover Street - the centre of District Six - as a 'non-racial island'. They pointed out that there were about 200 white businessmen in the District employing 2 000 people. The property they held was valued at R2 million and their annual turnover was R4,5 million (Argus 17.1.62).

However, the traders' concern began to lessen when in 1963 the old Malay area of Pageview in Johannesburg and the predominantly Indian area of Isipingo Beach in Natal were declared white. It began to be clear that group areas were being declared on the basis of land ownership and not residency - and most of

District Six, was owned by white absentee landlords.

In 1965, when the Committee for the Rehabilitation of Depressed Areas (Corda) was set up by the State, its chairman spoke of a future District Six as being a 'residential area for high-class development' catering for 'middle class people such as office workers and shop assistants'.[55] The plan was warmly supported by the District's white traders, who foresaw a 'new Hillbrow'. Corda was also given the public backing of the City Council, the Cape Provincial Administration, The Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Industries, the Coloured Chamber of Commerce (whose members were being offered control of the new coloured areas), the Institute of South African Architects, the University of Cape Town, the Afrikaanse Sakekamer and Syfrets Trust Company.[56] The Chairman of Corda gave the assurance that only slum areas in the District would be eliminated. 'Good buildings will remain and the whole area will not be razed'.[57] The promise was never kept.

By 1965 more than 300 000 coloured people had been resettled in State housing schemes on the Cape Flats, leading to a massive drop in the numer of coloured people with the municipal vote. Their threat to white councillors was thus considerably lessened. And on an individual level, white traders looked forward to the urban renewal of District Six while property developers awaited a housing boom. But neither of these was to occur.

Bureaucrats and the Rates Crisis

Another group within the council were the paid city administrators. They were, by training, businessmen and were employers of labour answerable to their directors in council and to the electorate, the 'shareholders' of the city. As can be expected the most powerful department was the City Engineers - a formidable force when coupled with the city Health Department.

With the rise of manufacturing, the council was increasingly called upon to foot the bill for the creation and maintenance of the urban infrastructure - particularly for roads, services and working class housing. The source of capital was therefore a constant concern, and the basis of city income was from rates levied on property.[58] These rates were set on the value of a property, and this was calculated by the estimated cost of construction at the time of valuation, less an allowance for structural depreciation and obsolescence or change in the nature of the area since it was erected. Because of a need to attract industry to the city, competitive industrial rates were offered. But this threw the burden of city costs onto home-owners.

From the 1940s the inner city was increasingly becoming an ethnic reservation as waves of impoverished workers moved in seeking work. As buildings in the city began to be overcrowded and neglected, the council fell into a gap between shrinking property tax and expanding expenditures on services. This amounted to a revenue flow out of the wealthy suburbs and into the inner city and the poor townships.[59] Pressure to ease the demand on the suburban rich was put on the administrators by councillors who had to answer to their electorate. And from the other side, a decrease of services to the poor, a decrease in workers wages or a rise in transport costs raised the spectre of rioting by the poor and the destabilisation of the central business district. Urban rezoning under the Group Areas Act was therefore, on the face of it, a heaven-sent solution to the crisis of city financing for the city administrators. If District Six could be upgraded into a middle class high-rise residential area rates would more than double (as has happened in the Loader Street area across town). Initial resistance to the Act by administrators can therefore be traced to two sources.

The first was, as I have said, over housing administration and costs. The early demands by the State was that local authorities finance new housing schemes.

However, in the face of strong resistance to this by city councils, the State undertook to pay for them out of loans from the National Housing Fund. But these were still loans, and they were not always granted in full. In 1959 the Council dug in and refused to rehouse people disqualified under the Group Areas Act unless the State Housing Commission funded 1 000 new houses a year. At that stage the housing backlog was 12 000, and on top of it the council found itself with a secondary crisis of housing administration.

The second problem was the belief that District Six would be declared coloured. From the point of view of the administrators this would have been a financial disaster. However in 1964 the Group Areas Board declared central Cape Town white. And the same year information was leaked to the Council by the Department of Community Development that District Six was to go the same way.[60] The Council then consented to take part in the Group Areas inquiry into the District and in 1965 the City Engineer agreed to serve on Corda to advise on its replanning.

The problems of city politicians and administrators did not end with the declaration of District Six as a white area. Indeed it signalled a defeat of the local authority by the State. In his book on the economic and legal aspects of real estate in South Africa, Peter Penny observes that urban renewal has become a central government rather than a local government function, and 'the participation of private enterprise was not discussed when the (Group Areas Development) Bill was debated in Parliament'.[61]

> Planning objectives (he says) are increasingly being attained not merely through the use of the police power of the State by means of zoning, but through the use of the State's power of expropriation... Central government powers in urban renewal include right of expropriation, right to freeze development, right of pre-emption, right to control usage, right to over-ride town planning schemes and ordinances passed by provincial administrations and by-laws by municipalities, the right to make ex gratia grants...[62]

Within the space of about a decade the City Council was to find its control over an expanding industrial city to be rapidly declining. In order to curb the profiteering which took place in the Southern Suburbs, following the 1961 declarations, the State took the initiative away from property developers and created the machinery of State purchase of property in District Six. In the uncertainty which followed property was neglected, vandalised and left to collapse. Gangs spread and the area became wracked with violence and crime. This was used as an excuse to consider the whole District as a slum, and the entire area was torn down. The dream of a middle class boom suburb turned sour on the traders, and by the 1970s even the nearby CBD trade began to die as it gradually changed from a shopping area to an office park. Valuations began to drop.

For the city administrators another crises began building up. Government property in the city was exempted from rates. So, far from being a new source of revenue, District Six under State ownership became a massive rates drain on city finances, running to hundreds of thousands of rands a year. Urgent appeals by the council to rectify the position continued to meet with no success. Furthermore capital was being drawn out of the city through State control of certain duties, taxes and licences, and re-introduced as grants - with strings attached. The city fathers were to pay dearly for their initial reluctance to implement the Group Areas Act. By the 1970s Cape Town was, effectively, under new management.

STATE HOUSING AND THE LANDLORDS

Until now I have been looking at the ideology of urban spatial planning in Cape Town. But there is another angle from which the massive relocation must be viewed: the ownership transfer of worker housing from landlords to the State. By 1980 the State would be forwarding up to R560 000 000 a year for housing development, and a large proportion of this would go towards urban development on the Cape Flats.[63]

One hundred and fifty thousand people defined as coloured were to be moved in the Peninsula alone within 20 years. Group Areas legislation was clearly a control measure, reshaping cities in the new image of racial capitalism, irrespective of the occasional cries of local authorities and some fractions of capital. Together with the political repression of the 1950s and early 1960s it was often an excellent control measure, tutoring some of the working class in the 'separate but equal' management committee system and a toothless Coloured Representative Council.. despite opposition.

But the Act, together with the National Housing Fund, did facilitate the provision of worker housing on a massive scale. Eventually, of course, the tenants would pay for it over a period of 30 or 40 years plus interest. But the setting of minimum building standards and the provision of cheap loans to local authorities housed the working class in disease-free dwellings at relatively low rents at a time when this was desperately needed. And although transport costs rose sharply, so did the average working class wage during the 1960s while rents remained relatively stable. It has been suggested that in a time of crisis real concessions may be won by the dominated classes. But concessions by the ruling class tend to be granted within the ruling ideological framework. The South African working class was demanding housing in a crisis of hegemony and it got it... but in a form that was beneficial to capitalist production.

Manuel Castells terms this State provision of housing and social services collective consumption

> what Marxists call the organisation of the collective means of reproduction of labour power. That is to say means of consumption objectively socialised which, for specific historical reasons, are essentially dependent for their production, distribution and administration on the intervention of the State.[64]

Around this perspective has grown a debate which is mostly centred on the metropoles of the First World and cannot, therefore, simply be transplanted to the southern tip of Africa. However certain key issues are useful here. These can be stated fairly briefly.

We must keep in mind two earlier points. The first is Poulantzas' contention that the State can act with relative autonomy 'in a positive fashion, creating, transforming and making reality'.[65] And the second is Stuart Hall's assertion that the State performs its work on behalf of the capitalist system in two ways: 'by destroying those structures, relations, customs, traditions which, deriving from the past... fetter and constrain capital's free development'; and by performing the work of 'actively tutoring, forming shaping' the emergent classes to new social relations which enable capitalist accumulation to 'freely unroll'.[66] These old 'structures, relations, customs' of the working class are part of ways of coping with the city in the early days of industrialisation - supportive extended families, migrants with rural ties - structures with a certain amount of resistance to urban control. Urban workers, as Sharon Zukin points out, 'develop their own associational resources and forms of entertainment which make up an oppositional culture - a working class culture or an urban sub-culture - that sustains resistance to labour discipline'.[67] This oppositional culture requires leeway, social and cultural space, as well as a portion of the agricultural surplus, to survive. Much of its activities are 'irrational' to the logic of monopoly capital. Household production locks up both labour and capital in 'unproductive' ways, away from the generalised investment structure.[68] This working class culture is also the ground in which an oppositional political structures can grow. With the rising stakes of capital accumulation in the city and the need for industrial peace this leeway is progressively under attack from monopoly capital, from urban institutions and from the forces of control.

The logic of Capital is that this 'semi-proletariat' must be pulled not only into the production process but into the consumption of commodities as well. This cycle, after all, is what the expansion of profit is all about. The search for new markets for capital and commodities, says Castells,

> is not achieved simply by the penetration into countries under imperialist domination, but by its penetration into pre-capitalist or semi-capitalist sectors of the economy of 'metropolitan' countries... through the dissolving of the social and economic relationships which exist there. Such is the case particularly in the sector of the production of means of consumption for the popular classes, a sector until recently differing from country to country, and largely dominated by (small) competitive capital.[69]

As the city industrialises the proletariat is progressively 'schooled' in 'rational' consumption patterns. But this leads to serious social contradictions. Technological progress requires the smooth functioning of conditions within which labour power is collectively reproduced. It needs a docile workforce that presents itself daily in a peaceful city and does not demand high wages. In Cape Town of the 1940s, however, industry was faced with a labour force which could 'hold out' against capital through its connection with household production. Also, although the city's population was expanding at an alarming rate, private capital was unwilling to underwrite the urban infrastructure and services necessary to support it. And as household enterprise began to buckle under the mounting pressures, so both lawlessness and political activity increased. This urban infrastructure and services is what Castells terms the collective means of consumption. It is explained as an attempt to 'regulate the process of reproduction of labour-power, and/or to buy off working class political pressure'.[70]

In the organic crisis of the 1940s, as we have seen, the State was being called on to solve grinding contradictions between capitalist production and an urban crisis.

It was forced to intervene,

> in a massive, systematic, permanent and structurally necessary way in the process of consumption... Thus we... witness a takeover by the State of vast sectors of the production of means essential to the reproduction of labour power: health, education, housing, collective amenities etc. It is here that the 'urban problematic' sends down its roots... The State becomes the veritable arranger of the process of consumption as a whole...[71]

The effects of such intervention are clearly 'political', in the sense that they extend the political control of the ruling class alliance over the dominated classes. And the consequence of this approach to the problem by the State is that the solution to the conflicts and contradictions become technical, not political. As Castells points out: 'Planning (rational, neutral and scientific) replaces social and political debate about the decisions which are the basis of the concrete manifestations of these problems.'[72]

The technical functions of the State in the metropolitan areas of monopoly capitalism are usefully listed by Peter Saunders in his book Urban Politics:

1. Sustenance of private production and capital accumulation

(a) through the provision of necessary non-productive urban infrastructure (roads etc);

(b) by aiding the reorganisation and restructuring of production in space (e.g. planning and urban renewal, group areas);

(c) through the provision of investment in 'human capital' (e.g. education in general);

(d) through 'demand orchestration' (local authority public works contracts, etc).

2. Reproduction of labour-power through collective consumption

(a) by means of the material conditions of existence (e.g. low rent local authority housing);

(b) by means of the cultural conditions of existence (e.g. libraries, museums, parks, recreation areas).

3. Maintenance of order and social cohesion

(a) through the means of coersion (e.g. police, courts, prisons);

(b) through the support of the 'relative surplus population (e.g. social services and other welfare support services);

(c) through support of the agencies of legitimation in civil society (schools, social work, foundations, funding etc).

The process of intervention is also ideological, and the integration of the working class within the dominant ideology goes alongside the separation of the activities of work, residence and leisure, a separation which is at the root of city zoning. Castells suggests that the value which comes to be placed on the nuclear family, the importance of the mass media and the dominance of an individualist ideology

> react in the direction of an atomization of relationships and a segmenting of interests in terms of individual aspirations which, in spatial terms, is translated into the dispersion of individual residences, be it in the isolation of the suburban home or the solitude of the big housing projects.[73]

With the transition of the productive base of the State to monopoly capital the long-run interests of the system, as we have seen, tend to gradually eliminate local urban characteristics, cutting them up into significant spatial units based on networks of interdependencies of the productive system.[74] In Cape Town a local characteristic singled out for particular attack in the old ghettos was private landlordism, the form in which most worker housing was available.

This landlordism was essentially a relationship from an earlier phase of capital accumulation. It was uncontrolled, it led to overcrowding and disease, and it allowed every form of occupation and activity to be carried out on its premises so long as the rent was paid every month. It arose in the old quarters out of a growing working-class need for housing - spurred on by large numbers of impoverished people moving into the urban areas. In 1926 the census showed that of the 70 000 'non-europeans' in Cape Town, 77.5 percent of them were living in overcrowded dwellings. By the 1940s 'tenant farming' was firmly established in the poorer sections of Cape Town - District Six housing being 90 percent landlord-owned. There was little construction in these areas. It was more profitable to buy existing housing stock and rent it out at high levels of density.[75] A policeman who worked in District Six recalls:

> Very few of the properties in District Six belonged to the coloured people, it was mostly the Indians and the Europeans that owned property there. Some of these flats in Vredehoek (a white suburb) were built from money made in District Six by landlords and shopkeepers. That's why white people complain today (about the destruction of District Six), it was because they were making money there. At the end of the month, if those people didn't pay their rent, the landlords had rent collectors and they would chuck them out, lock, stock and barrel. I've come across 40 to 50 people sitting in the rain out on the pavement. I've bought food out of my pocket for the children.[76]

In a scarce market the landlords were in a position to force up rents. Overcrowding was used as a way of realising a maximum rent from low-income tenants, and rents were often paid individually or by floor-space occupied. In 1947 a newspaper complained that:

> families in the poorer quarters of Cape Town are large, so that may mean anything up to 80 people or more living in a house built to house five or six... with one tap and one lavatory.[77]


Many of these families, often new arrivals in the city, were on the brink of starvation. In 1946 a study by the Institute of Race Relations found that 57 percent of coloured children and 71.4 percent of black children in Cape Town were suffering from malnutrition. The same year the city's Medical Officer of Health found that infant death rates within the first year of life to be 119.9 per 1000 for coloureds as against 33.84 per 1000 for whites.

This rack-renting was causing both a wage and a health problem for the white urban bourgeoisie. White residents were faced with the spectre of epidemics in their midst, and employers were increasingly confronted with demands for higher wages to meet workers' rents. This led to a contradiction between capital accumulation by landlords and a cheap labour force demanded by the growing number of small labour-intensive industries in the 1940s. In Cape Town the slum landlords were clearly identified as a contributing factor towards the increasing pressure on employers for increased wages as well as towards squatting and crime.[78] They came under fire both from the State and from finance capital.

The Rise of State Housing

A number of moves were to back city landlords into a corner. One of significance was building society interest rates on housing bond repayments, which began to rise after a 'low' in 1943 (to stimulate war-time borrowing), making it increasingly uneconomical to buy housing for rental purposes.

South African Building Society repayment interest rates on housing bonds for residential properties 1938 - 81



(Source: United Building Society)

The interest rates depended on money supply and were (and still are) fixed by a cartel responsive to the State Treasury. But there is also evidence of 'redlining' by these societies in Cape Town with respect to working class areas.[79] A second move against landlordism was the Rents Act, passed in 1951, which empowered the formation of Rent Boards and harshly curbed rent increases.[80] The effect of the developments was to halt the purchase by landlords of housing in working-class areas. Coupled with the uncertainty surrounding group areas legislation, this led to a rapid detrioration of housing stock in coloured suburbs.

> There is an interesting link (observes Peter Penny) between the State's interference with the price mechanism in imposing rent control and its subsequent action in attempting to remedy the defects in the operation of the price mechanism through urban renewal. It is to be wondered how often the need for urban renewal would not have arisen if rent control had not been imposed.[81]

A third move was of course the Group Areas Act, by which the State forced massive evictions, involving whole suburbs of the city. And the passing of the Illegal Squatting Act in 1951 completed the legislation necessary to effect the transfer of worker housing to the State. It made provision for the control of urban squatting and froze the number of shacks at the existing number. The location of every squatter dwelling in the country was to be noted and numbered.

It would, however, be misleading to assume that the State was eager to become the landlord of the working-class. As I have suggested, the State is generally drawn into the provision of housing and collective services in order to 'manage' crises which threaten the general conditions of capitalist production. The financing of housing, an unprofitable item of collective consumption, was to become the terrain of a struggle between the State and employers on a broad front. In 1948 the new Minister of Native Affairs said the task of providing houses for the massive numbers of urbanising blacks was becoming 'intolerable' and that:

> ... the time will come - and the matter has been enquired into - when employers will have to assume responsibility for their native employees, responsibility with regard to their housing (emphasis added).[82]

Industry was quick to reply:

> Prominent industrialists and financial authorities in Johannesburg are unanimously of the opinion that it is wholly impossible for industry to be saddled with an additional burden of making provision... for the housing of their Native employees, and yet retain their markets.[83]

The struggle over housing was only resolved in industry's favour in the early 1950s (the State picking up the bill) following widespread political mobilisation of the working-class and the necessity of large building programmes following Group Areas Act evictions.[84] Many coloured families, however, were to lose heavily. A newspaper reporter noted that:

> Over a lifetime of rent paying, many of them have paid the landlord many times over what the actual properties are worth. I was told of a home-ownership scheme (R200 down and R20 a month) in which one property is divided into five different houses. These are sold to five different people. But ownership is not transferred to them till all have paid the amounts in full. Should one buyer default the others cannot take ownership till the new buyer completes all his payments. The result is that they are still not the registered owners and when their turn comes to leave District Six any compensation given for the property will not be theirs.[85]

Housing and Family Structure

I must now backtrack slightly. It has been suggested that in part at least, the provision of subsidised State housing was a victory for the working-class, or at least a concession coming out of the struggles of the 1940s. But it was a concession which had built into it an ideological factor which was to cause extreme hardship for the new tenants. This was the depiction of the basic working class social unit as a nuclear family. This idea was based in the logic of capitalist production and reproduction, and it entered the new townships through the ideology of the planners. The fact that the basic social unit of the working-class was the extended family was simply ignored.

In 1946 the National Building Research Institute (NBRI) had been set up by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) to research the provision of low cost urban housing. Following the lead of CIAM in Europe, the NBRI set up a Research Committee on Minimum Standards of Accommodation in South Africa the following year to 'examine critically the tentative proposals suggested for minimum standards below which no dwellings should be erected'.[86] The committee's brief was to develop criteria, based on 'the best available information on the living patterns of the low income groups in South Africa', which could be 'taken by the planner and translated on the drawing board into a house plan'.[87] The minimum standards arrived at, were crystalised in the Department of Community Development's Housing Code, which is now a template for all State housing in South Africa.

From whence was this 'best available information' gained? An influential source was a guide book on the subject, Native Housing, written in 1939 by PH Connell and several other Rand academics. It held that:

> the modern (urban) family is liberal and democratic in its outlook, and loose in its structure... so if a family of this kind is the general rule, flat life would be a definite advantage. (It also observed that) owing to the extremely low income of the Native worker, women must go to work too. Some provision, therefore, must be made for babies and small children, so that they should not constitute an undue hindering of the extremely necessary work of their mothers...[88]

The authors, using Marxist tools of analysis, clearly sketched out the needs of capital: a nuclear family as the basic reproductive unit, and the need to allow women to work in order to create a potential reserve army of labour to drive down wages. Eight years later Connell emerged as a key ideologue of the NBRI. Drawing on 'standards adopted at some arbitary point and... amended from time to time', he produced a paper in 1947 which was to become the guiding principle for the Minimum Standards Committee. The key observations are worth quoting in full:

> There is a tendency of the Native to imitate the white man's form of dwelling when he comes into permanent proximity with European settlements. A general trend such as this would seem to indicate a distinct preference on the Native's part for the type of house characteristic of the more advanced culture. (emphasis added).
>
> Up to the present, the form of dwelling universally preferred by Europeans in this country has been the single-storey detached house standing in its separate plot, each with a front garden, back garden or backyard and two narrow strips of ground on either side giving access from front to back is the picture which the Native has in his mind when he thinks of 'progress' in terms of his dwelling. Second, there remains the old tradition of the separate hut which is the typical Native form of building... the traditions of the isolated structure remains, and tends to reinforce rather than retard the observed preference for the typical European style of home.[89]
>
> From the foregoing it will be seen that the action of the local authorities in casting the location in the same mould as the European suburb is reasonably in accordance with the observed tendencies and preferences of the urban Native...[90]

The family conceived of, dreamed into existence by these planners, consisted of 'father or wage earner, mother or housekeeper, high school, primary school and kindergarten children'.

Thus the State-provided house for the urbanised African family was to be for a nuclear family in the image of the bourgeoisie. But by dividing the working classes into nuclear units, not only was a housing shortage to be created (which served as an influx control) but the endless creation of single units led to an increased demand for industrially manufactured household commodities.

Industry was not unaware of its part in the new housing formula:

> To commerce the credit is due for the formation of the concept of the economic Native house, advanced many years ago in the face of considerable opposition from local authorities, which principle is now one of the cornerstones of accepted policy on Native housing. (SA Builder 31.8.1953).

This was to be the type of housing imported into Cape Town to house large Coloured and African extended families on the Cape Flats. And to compound the problem, families from the same 'old' area, and even the same household, were often rehoused in different townships - often far apart.

One of the formative actions of the new ruling class aliance which confronted the organic crisis of the 1940s was thus the creation of worker townships which would provide the minimum needs of reproduction of labour power. An important factor in the crisis was the political pressure which accompanied the high rate of urbanisation and rising unemployment among the black and coloured proletariat. The transition to State housing on a massive scale was part of the strategy of the new government to defend and conserve its position. The battle for hegemony was largely won under the banner of 'law and order'. Whole cities were re-shaped and harsh restrictions were placed on the rate and conditions of urbanisation.

The working class got housing, but not the form it wanted under conditions it desired. And if the landlords lost on the deal, a fraction of capital - the construction companies - was to gain immensely from the State moves. It was they, and not the landlords, which had the capital and experience to build houses on the scale required by the Department of Community Development. And contracts were awarded selectively. Of the nine big contractors handling Cape Flats construction by 1980, for example, it is significant that five were multinationals (one of them British and one Dutch), two were owned by Anglo American, and two (the largest) were Afrikaner capital. Of these last two companies, one of them, Besterecta, handled 42 percent of all Cape Flats contracts over R100 000 during the first six months of 1981 - worth R12,8 million.[91]

In the end the old city, the city of merchant capital, was destroyed and rebuilt to a different rhythm. In bourgeois ideology this has been depicted as quite natural, as the inevitable outcome of modern life. But it was only as natural as the rise of monopoly capital in a peripheral State, as natural as colonialism. John Keynes once suggested that the way to handle the opposition was to absorb it at an always new level. Le Corbusier's solution was to write it into a spatial utopia. Finally, though, the hidden agendas of both men was always that of control. When the citadel's wall disappeared, a network of organised controls - legal, spatial and electronic - replaced it. Just to the extent that the new powers were shadowy, hard to pin down, they performed the old functions more effectively. 'One might breach a city wall or kill a king' writes Mumford, 'but how could one assault an international cartel or break a wall of isolation'.[92] By the end of the 1960s the working class in Cape Town were like a routed, scattered army, dotted in confusion about the land of their birth. The division of labour was extreme, and the high priests of the new regime held the monopoly on knowledge and skills.

Even the drabbest industrial town has educational possibilities the suburb lacks. In the lonely crowd of the satellite clusters, with no control over communication networks, life tended to become reduced to what came through official channels and the ghetto grapevine. And with rising rates of violence in these areas the township became an increasingly difficult place to meet people after work - favouring silent conformity and not rebellion. De Tocqueville noted, rather dramatically, the same threads in the growth of American suburbs many years earlier:

> The first thing that strikes observation (he says) is an unocountable number of men, all equal and alike, incessantly endeavouring to produce the petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut their lives. Each of them living apart, is a stranger to the fate of all the rest - his children and his private friends constitute to him the whole of mankind; as for the rest of his fellow-citizens, he is close to them, but he sees them not; he touches them, but he feels them not, he exists but in himself and for himself alone; and if his kindred still remain to him, he may be said at any rate to have lost his country.[93]

The ultimate losers in this type of clastrophoebic atmosphere were the working class families, torn out of the areas they knew and scattered across the Cape Flats. The emotional brutality dealt out to them in the name of rational urban planning is incalculable. The only defence youths had was to build something coherent out of the only thing they had left - each other.

CHAPTER 5 : NOTES

1. Report of the town planning advisers on the Cape Town Foreshore Scheme, August 1940 p 8.

2. Outline of Scheme (Foreshore) for Cape Town (South Africa) E E Beaudouin Cape Town, June 1940 pp 5, 26, 24, 7.

3. 1951 Morris report: Metropolis of Tomorrow. Cape Town City Council.

4. Roelof S Uytenbogaardt and team: Cape Town Foreshore 66: Planned development for Roggebaai 1966.

5. Cape Times 28.8.82.

6. Ibid

7. Ibid

8. Charles Jencks: Modern Movements in architecture, Penguin, Oxford University Press, 1977 p 147.

9. Le Corbusier: The City of tomorrow, and its planning, John Rodker, London, 1929 p 220.

10. Ibid p 211.

11. Kenneth Frampton: Modern Architecture, a critical history, Thomas & Hudson, London, 1980 p 155.

12. Ibid p 230.

13. Le Corbusier: The Athens Charter, Grossman Publishers, New York, 1973 .

14. Le Corbusier: The City of Tomorrow, op cit p 258.

15. The Congress papers are published in Town Planning: Proceedings of a congress devoted to town planning held at Escom House by the Architectural Students Society, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 1938. Together with Gordon McIntosh, Hanson was instrumental in forming the Zero Hour Group which in 1933 began publishing Zero Hour, a journal putting forward ideas of the Modern Movement and particularly of Le Corbusier.

They, in turn, were part of the Modernist 'Transvaal Group', which included Rex Martienssen, who was a personal friend of Le Corbusier, and R Kantorowich, who was to do the drafts and sketches for the Cape Town Foreshore plan.

16. Congress papers.

17. Ibid

18. Ibid

19. Ibid

20. Ibid

21. JS Curl in M Emanuel: Contemporary Architects, Macmillan, London, 1980 ,p 81.

22. Brian Anson: Architecture as Colonialism in Architectural Journal July 7 1982.

23. That they never did solve the problem could be seen from the undeminishing number of homeless in Cape Town throughout the next 30 years. As recent as October 1 1982 the Cape Times could report 19 200 families on the City Council's housing waiting list, with only enough money to build 4878 new homes. This figure excludes those on Divisional Council waiting lists and those who didn't bother to place their names on housing lists and either put up shacks or lived with friends or relations.

24. Sibyl Moholy-Nagy: Matrix of Man : an illustrated history of urban environment, Pall Mall Press, London 1968, p 242.


25. Ibid | p 245.

26. Ibid p 250, 251.


27. Ibid p 250.

28. Ibid p 253.


Perspective of the Grand Boulevard
Cape Town Foreshore Scheme 1940





DUNCAN DOCK


DIAGRAM SHOWING RELATION BETWEEN FORESHORE AREA AND CITY 1947.
THE MOUNTAIN AMPHITHEATRE
RECLAIMED AREA.
BUILT-UP AREA.
RELEASED AREA.
CENTRAL BUSINESS-AREA.
F.L.T. & L.W.T.W.


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
1940 proposals for the Cape Town Foreshore by Longstreth-Thompson and Thornton-White



An artist's impression of Cape Town from the Maritime Terminal based on the 1947 Plan (B.S. Cooke)



Final report of the Cape Town Foreshore Joint Technical Committee, June 1947
Passed in May 1946



An artist's impression of the intersection of the Grand Boulevard and the Monumental Approach based on the 1947 Plan (B.S. Cooke)

29. Francesco Dal Co: From parks to regions: progressive ideology and reform of the American city. In The American City: from the Civil War to the New Deal by Ciucci, Dal Co, Manieri-Elia and Tafuri. (M.I.T. Press, Massachusetts 1973) p 196.

30. Ibid p 199

31. Lewis Mumford: Introduction to Howard's book Garden Cities of tomorrow (Faber and Faber, London 1945, First published 1898) p 34.

32. Ibid p 38.

33. Ibid p 29

34. Quoted by Mumford: The city in history, op cit p 564.

35. Lionel Esher: A broken wave: the rebuilding of England, 1940-1980 (Allen Lane, London 1981) p 43.

36. Mumford, op cit p 594.

37. Esher, op cit p 79, 80.

38. Fifty years of housing 1922-1972: the story of garden cities, (Garden Cities Ltd., Pinelands, 1972) p 8.

39. Ibid p 9.

40. Ibid p 7

41. Ibid p 95

42. A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1954-55 p 84.

43. Quoted in John Wesern: Outcast Cape Town, (Human & Rousseau, Cape Town 1981) p 92.

44. Le Corbusier: The City of Tomorrow, op cit p 166 (emphasis added).

45. Le Corbusier: The Radiant City, op cit p 119.

46. Mumford: The City in History, op cit p 576.

47. See Brian Anson: Architecture as Colonialism, op cit p 70.

48. This is the reason for group areas removals given by CJ Jooste in the Standard Encyclopaedia of South Africa.

49. By then the State owned property in Cape Town worth R1 820 000. In 1968 the State allocated R100 million for urban renewal schemes, and by then it had spent R20 million on the purchase of urban properties.

50. And of the 45 councillors in 1962, six were classed as coloured.

51. Quoted by The Argus - 2 March 1962.

52. The Argus, March 6 1964.

53. The Torch, November 22 1961.

54. Interview with Oscar Wollhein, former head of the Cape Flats Distress Association and member of the Provincial Council.

55. The Argus April 1 1965.

56. The Argus April 3 1965.

57. TH Niemand to the Argus, June 3 1965. Dr Oscar Wollheim, Warden of the Cape Flats Distress Association at the time, has estimated that the number of good houses in District Six in 1966 was in excess of 60 percent.

58. In 1979 the city income from rates was 54 percent.

59. For an excellent evaluation of this contradiction see E Castells: Wild City, in Kapitalstate No 4, 5 Summer 1976.

60. The letter 'requested the lease of two sports fields in District Six for coloureds in view of the fact that it is doubtful whether any areas (in inner-Cape Town) will be proclaimed for the Coloured group'. Argus June 3 1964.

61. Peter Penny: Economic and Legal Aspects of Real Estate in South Africa, (Juta, Cape Town, 1970) p 127.

62. Ibid pp 35, 42

63. See BA van der Vyfer: An approach to losses on housing projects financed by the State, a report by the Committee of Enquiry into alleged operating losses on Housing, April 1981.

64. Manuel Castells: The Urban Question, Edward Arnold, London, 1977 (first published in 1972) p 440.

65. N Poulantzas: State, Power, Socialism, New Left Books, 1978 p 30.

66. Stuart Hall et al op cit p 208.

67. S Zukin: A decade of the new urban sociology, in Theory and Society Vol. 9, No 4 July 1980, p 594.

68. A particularly useful article on this process is by David Harvey: Labour, capital and class struggle around the built environment in advanced capitalist societies, in Conditions for Conflict in Market Societies.

69. E Castells: City, Class and Power.

70. Peter Saunders: Urban Politics, a sociological interpretation, Penguin 1980.

71. Castells: The Urban Question, p 459.

72. Castells: City, Class and Power p 6.

73. Castells: Ibid p 27.

74. Castells: Ibid p 27.

75. Between 1938 and 1943 the interest rates on bond repayments dropped from 6 percent to 4.5 percent. Returns on rented space were between 8 percent and 10 percent - U.B.S. archives.

76. Interview with Sgt. Willem Nel of the Police Special Squad which operated in District Six in the late 1940s.

77. The Argus April 19 1947.

78. Interview with head of the Rent Board, Cape Town, 5.10.81.

79. 'Redlining' is an unwritten agreement by building societies not to issue loans in certain (usually working class) areas when they perceive the investment risk too high. My information is based on interviews with several District Six landlords of the pre-1966 period.

80. It is interesting that the CT Rent Board handled many cases in squatter camps around the city, making the letting of squatter shacks uneconomical.

81. Peter Penny, op cit p 127.

82. Quoted in P Wilkinson: A Place to Live: the resolution of the African housing crisis in Johannesburg, 1944-1954, African Studies Institute seminar paper, Wits, July 1981.

83. 'Industry cannot bear the cost of native housing', in SA Industry and Trade, December 1948 p 65. Quoted in Stadler op cit.

84. However for many years the Department of Community 'earmarked' percentages of existing municipal building schemes to house people moved by the Group Areas Act. In the mid-1960s this rose to as high as 80 percent in Cape Town.

85. Brian Barrow: Behind the dark doors of the District: Cape Times (probably 1966) in Wollheim Collection UCT.

86. This information is from Wilkinson 1981 op cit p 33.

87. Ibid p 34.

88. PH Connell: Sub-economic housing practice in South Africa: CSIR National Building Research Institute, Pretoria 1947.

89. The single hut system was of course based on the level of roof technology and not the social structure. In any event the single hut was merely a 'room' in the cluster of huts comprising an extended family.

See Vernacular Architecture in Southern Africa by Franco Frescura, Africa Perspective 8, July 1978.

90. PH Connell: Sub-economic housing practice in South Africa. CSIR National Building Research Institute, Pretoria 1947.

91. Much work still has to be undertaken in this area. The information was supplied by the Master Builders and Allied Traders' Association.

92. Mumford: The City in History, op cit p 605.

93. Quoted in Mumford, Ibid, p 584.

6

UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE BREAKING OF THE WEB

Given the political, ideological and economic framework within which group areas removals took place in Cape Town, a social disaster was inevitable. As the familiar social landmarks in the closely-grained working class communities of the old city were ripped up a whole culture began to disintegrate.

'Culture' is defined by John Clarke et al in Resistance through Rituals as 'the practice which realises or objectivates group-life in meaningful shape or form'.[1] A culture includes 'maps of meaning' which make life intelligible to its members. These 'maps' are not simply carried around in the head, they are 'objectivated in the patterns of social organisation and relationship through which the indiyidual becomes a social individual'.[2]

In a study of the East End of London, Phil Cohen found these patterns to rest on three structures:

1. the extended kinship network, which provides mutual aid and support while at the same time creating cultural continuity and stability;

2. the ecological setting of the working class neighbourhood. This dense socio-cultural space helped to shape and support the close textures of traditional working class life, its sense of solidarity, its local loyalties and traditions, and provided support in the day to day struggle for survival.

3. The structure of the local economy, which was both diverse and on the spot providing income for a large number of people although at a low level of income.[3]

Culture, however, is not merely the way in which events are experienced. It is also a history. Cultural patterns form a sort of historical reservoir, a field of possibilities which groups take up, transform, develop. 'Men make their own history', said Marx, 'but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.'[4] It is the way in which groups combine the past with the raw materials of the present that could be said to constitute a culture. And in any social formation there is not necessarily one culture, but many, linked to productive relations and differently ranked in relations of domination and subordination.

This is, of course, because there is more than one fundamental class in society and therefore there will be more than one cultural configuration in play at a particular historical moment. However, it is those structures and meanings which reflect the position and interests of most powerful class that will 'stand, in relation to the others, as a dominant social-cultural order. The dominant culture represents itself as the culture.'[5] This struggle for class-cultural domination takes place most sharply in the working class areas of the city.

In Cape Town, although these neighbourhoods were geographically bounded by outside forces and penetrated by them (in the form of schools, police etc.) they were places in which different strata of the working class had won space for their own forms of life. These spaces were both physical (the networks of streets, houses, corner shops and shebeens) and social (the networks of kin, friendships, neighbourhood and work). They were a weave of rights and obligations, intimacies and distances embodying a

sense of solidarity, local loyalties and traditions. The former warden of the Cape Flats Distress Association, Dr. Oscar Wollheim, describes this as a 'web of interlocking mutual interest':[6]

> The rings closest to the centre are represented by the man's immediate and extended family and his closest friends. The next would represent his acquaintances, his church, his school and the clubs he frequents. Other rings represent his employer, his transport and communications, the shops he frequents, the municipal and other officials he meets, his doctor, the police, the postman, the tax official. The anchors of the web represent the customs, habits and moral concepts of the community in which he lives.
>
> Each individual has his own personal web which varies in size and complexity according to the impact he makes on those around him and the influence he wields in the community. His usefulness to and within the community is determined entirely by the freedom with which he is able to move in and about his web, his knowledge of its structure and the facility with which he is able to make contact with the correct position of the web at the correct time.[7]

Above all, what was unsettled by group areas inroads into the defensive class culture was the precise position and role of the working class family. With it was ploughed up a concrete set of relations, a network of knowledge, things, experiences: the supports of a class culture. The effects of group areas removals (to pursue Wollheim's analogy) were:

> Like a man with a stick breaking spiderwebs in a forest. The spider may survive the fall, but he can't survive without his web. When he comes to build it again he finds the anchors are gone, the people are all over and the fabric

> of generations is lost. Before, there was always something that kept the community ticking over and operating correctly . . . there was the extended family, the granny and grandpa were at home, doing the household chores and looking after the kids. Now, the family is taken out of this environment where everything is safe and known. It is put in a matchbox in a strange place. All social norms have suddenly been abolished. Before, the children who got up to mischief in the streets were reprimanded by neighbours. Now there's nobody and they join gangs because that's the only way to find friends.[8]

What mattered here was not so much the re-moulding of the working class in the image of a consumer society (which occurred), but the dislocations this produced - and the responses it provoked. One of the major problems facing the working class as their culture began to buckle in both rural and inner city areas was a collapse of social control over youths. This informal control was described to John Western during his work on the suburb of Mowbray:

> When I was 15 or 16 if we did anything rude, offhanded in the street - like going to bars or smoking or taking a dame out - you'd get a pak (Slap) at night at home, they (parents) knew about it right away . . . It was the old men who used to stand at the corners chatting or sit on the stoeps; they'd pretend to be reading the Koran or a comic or playing kerrem or whatever, but out of the corner of their eye they were really watching you.[9]


It was this almost intangible but very real cement which held together the class culture, and one of the greatest complaints of group areas removals continues to be that individual people were moved to the Cape Flats and not whole neighbourhoods.

The stresses resulting from these changes brought with them psychological difficulties and skewed 'coping' behaviour. Marital relations were upset and the divorce and desertion rate rose; parent/child relationships were made difficult - often because the father's sense of inadequacy in his new environment.

Between 1961 and 1965, years which saw both rising industrial prosperity and mass relocations of people, there was a coloured baby boom. One can only speculate about its causes, but the relationship between crisis and a high level of childbirth is a well-known phenomenon.

Table 6a

Population pyramid by sex and five-year age-group intervals for Coloured people in the Greater Cape Town region 1970 - 1980



(Source: Cape Town, Annual Report of the Medical Officer of Health 1981.)

By 1980, as Table 6A illustrates, the effects of the boom could be felt in the 15-19 year old age group - the core age of the street gangs. Another indicator of rapid social change is the coloured illegitimacy rate, which nearly doubled between 1956 and 1981 (see Table 6B). What is notable is that this rate declined during the 1950s, began rising in 1961 (when the first group areas were declared in the city), peaked in 1967 (after coloureds were told to vacate District Six), and climbed alarmingly between then and 1976 (the period of the greatest evictions). In 1974 the Theron Commission found that more than 82% of all births to coloured women under the age of 20 were illegitimate. The findings of the Commission bear stark testimony to the breakdown of extended families which followed. It found a sharp decrease in what it called 'non-members' of nuclear families between 1960 and 1970 and a marked increase in single-parent families in the urban area. It was pointed out to the Commission that:


> it was very difficult indeed for parents with children of different sexes living in a house with only two or three rooms in a neighbourhood with few, if any, community amenities, to give their children a decent upbringing.

TABLE 6B

ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS IN CAPE TOWN AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LIVE BIRTHS: 1956 TO 1981

PERIODS	WHITE	COLOURED	TOTAL
1956	3,0	24,2	18,9
1957	3,6	24,7	19,8
1958	4,0	23,7	19,0
1959	4,1	23,8	19,2
1960	4,0	23,2	19,0
1961	3,8	23,3	19,0
1962	3,9	23,4	19,0
1963	4,7	24,2	20,1
1964	4,8	25,4	21,2
1965	4,6	27,0	22,9
1966	5,9	28,1	23,7
1967	8,3	29,9	25,3
1968	9,4	27,5	24,1
1969	7,8	28,6	24,7
1970	8.0	31,2	26,6
1971	7,5	33,4	28,3
1972	9,2	37,3	32,1
1973	10,1	39,1	34,2
1974	9,8	40,4	35,3
1975	9,6	42,2	36,8
1976	10,5	43,6	38,2
1977	9,8	44,1	38,9
1978	8,2	44,5	39,3
1979	9,9	44,4	39,7
1980	10,5	42,3	38,5
1981	9,4	42,3	38,0

Source: Cape Town, Annual Report of the Medical Officer of Health, 1981




Source: Cape Town M.O.H. Report, 1981




ABOVE: The Harfield Village Coon troupe

BELOW: Moving house after being evicted from Harfield Village, 1981



A corner group in Harfield Village



Houses being broken down for 'gentrification' in Harfield Village, 1981

Grassroots November 1982

Bread protest

ABOUT 500 people attended a meeting in Guguletu recently to protest against the high bread price.

The people were angry. They said they were tired of the Government's attacks.

"We must take action," they said.

The meeting decided to call for a protest boycott in the week of November 22 to 29. The people elected a Food Committee to talk to other organisations about supporting the boycott.

This meeting followed an assessment of the Bread Campaign by the UWO

They organised a "rag" procession to "parade" through the streets of the township, announcing the meeting. The Branch borrowed a van. They covered the van with banners and posters. The banners were painted with slogans:

BRING DOWN PRICES, WE ARE HUNGRY!

WE WANT BREAD, BUT THE GOVERNMENT BUYS GUNS!

BREAD FOR PEOPLE, NOT FOR PROFITS!

Women stood on the van, using a loudspeaker to talk to the people in the streets. People came out of their houses. They came out of the beerhalls and they stepped off the buses to hear what the "rag" had to say.

The procession moved slowly from street to street, from Section 1 across to Nyanga, New Cross Roads and the Nyanga Bush settlement.

The women handed out pamphlets from house to house as they went along. They talked to the people about the meeting. They urged them to attend.

"Imbila yaswela umsila ngekuyalezela" they said. (Come and hear for yourself so that you hear the true story.)

Children crammed on to the back of the van, eating bread. "It may be the last time we eat bread. Bring down prices, we are hungry", they said.

The "rag" procession was harrassed a number of times by vans and uniformed men, but the women went on regardless.



75,000 sign petition

IN ABOUT four weeks more than 75 000 people have already signed a petition in Durban to protest against the bread price increase.

Durban's Bread Committee say they aim to hand in 250 000 to the Government.


At a meeting in Newlands East recently, more than 200 agreed that the price of bread should not go up.

However, they rejected the call by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of Inkatha and the SA Black Alliance, for a boycott of white bread.

The meeting was organised by the Bread Committee. The committee represents political, worker, community, student and church bodies.

The demands of the petition are:

- The increase is totally unjust;
- The Government subsidy is too low;
- None shall go hungry in our society.



Unemployed youths outside a pool shop, Elsies River, 1980

And the Commission concluded that:

> no other statutory measure had evoked so much bitterness, mistrust and hostility on the part of the coloured people as the Group Areas Act.[10]

This statement merely echoed that of Wollheim, who in 1960 had warned that 'we can look forward to a period of increasing social dislocation which will have its roots in no other causes but in the application of the (Group Areas) Act'.[11]

The numbers that this Act affected can be judged from the combined figure of three separate surveys of the Cape Flats done in 1981: an average of 43% of the people interviewed had been moved by group areas legislation.[12]

As part of this study, a survey was done comparing family life and working class culture in an existing 'inner city' area and on the Cape Flats to which people had been relocated by group areas removals. The 'old' area chosen was Harfield Village, a section of Claremont.

At the time of the survey Harfield was a suburb 'in transition' to a white group area, and only about 100 coloured families remained. The average period of residence was 19 years, although more than 10% had been there 50 years or longer. The average number of people in each house was 5.1. What was significant about the area was the high number of people available for what might be described as 'crisis support'. Eighty per cent of the people interviewed had relations in Harfield and 82% had close friends in the area - this despite the fact that 65% had seen related families moved

from the village by Group Areas. There was no creche in Harfield. Of those interviewed 68% looked after their own children and 27% relied on relations to do this. In total 95% of children under 16 were taken care of within extended families, the remaining 5% being minded by friends. In comparison with the Cape Flats this shows an extremely high level of family-based child care, as can be seen from Table 6C.

TABLE 6C

A COMPARISON OF CHILD CARE IN

HARFIELD VILLAGE AND ON THE CAPE FLATS

	HARFIELD	CAPE FLATS
Children looked after by mother	68	46.5
Children looked after by relations	20	9.0
Children looked after by older child	7	4.9
Children looked after by friends	5	4.9
Children looked after by creche	0	15.6
Children looked after by nobody	0	18.5
	100%	100%
Children looked after by mother/relation	95%	60.4%

It can be seen that on the Cape Flats a high percentage of children under 16 received no parental care during the day, while about 16% were placed in creches. Harfield had all the benchmarks of a stable supportive community. This was also the case in Mowbray, where John Western found an average risidency of 33 years and where 70% of his interviewees were related to at least one other physically separate household.[13]

The people of Harfield were well aware of what was in store for them under the Group Areas Act. The probability of moving to the Cape Flats was fearful or extremely unsettling to 94% of those interviewed, and during the survey two elderly women died and another had a severe heart attack after receiving eviction notices. Most people (96%) saw the cost and time of transport as the main problem ahead of them, and 46% were worried about the effects on their children of transfer to a Cape Flats school.

The Cape Flats survey was specifically of mothers living in 35 different housing estates. The types of dwellings in which they lived were:

house	56%
flat	19%
shanty	14%
rented room	11%

The average number in each dwelling was 7.3 and the average length of residency was a mere 4 years.

Of the sample 44% were working and 25% were raising a family without a husband. In order to draw out changes in living patterns, they were asked about their own childhoods and then about their children. The figures showed a marked historical fall-off in access to family networks of child care:

	INTERVIEWEE AS CHILD	INTERVIEWEE'S OWN CHILDREN
Relations living in same house	32%	14%
Easy walking access to relations	70%	50%
Looked after by mother or relations	97%	60%

When asked about any problems they were having, the largest number of mothers said it was fear of gangs and lack of police protection:

Problems with skollies/police/crime	33%
Problems with housing	32%
Problems with income/cost of living	20%
Problems with facilities/recreation	6%
Problems with transport	2.5%
Problems with liquor	0.5%
Problems with other	6%

Comments included:

*I am unhappy in the area because of skollies. I would like to move to a safer area.

*Police should do something about gangsters for our safety.

*Send all the skollies to reformatory.

*Start vigilante groups or stop indiscriminate moving of people from different backgrounds into the same area.

*Gangs and group areas must be abolished.

*Stop association of police with shebeens.

The first effect of the removals into the high-rise schemes on the Cape Flats was to destroy the function of the street, the corner shop and the shebeens as articulations of communal space. As Cohen noted, following similar removals from the East End, the new areas contained only the privatized space of family units, stacked on top of each other in total isolation, juxtaposed with the totally public space which surrounded them, a space which lacked any of the informal social controls generated by the neighbourhood.[14]

The destruction of the neighbourhood street also blew out the candle of household production, craft industries and services. The result was a gradual polarization of the labour force -- into those with more specialized, skilled and better paid jobs, and those with the dead-end, low paid jobs and unemployment. And as the distribution pattern of new housing dispersed the kinship network, the isolated family could no longer call on the resources of the extended family or the neighbourhood. The family itself became the sole focus of solidarity:

> This meant that any problems were bottled up within the immediate interpersonal context which produced them; and at the same time family relationships were invested with a new intensity to compensate for the diversity of relationships previously generated through neighbours and wider kin. The trouble was that although the traditional kinship system which corresponded to it had broken down, the traditional patterns of socialization (of communication and control) continued to reproduce themselves in the interior of the family. The working class family was thus not only isolated from the outside but also undermined from within.[15]

The main - and understandable - product of this isolation was fear - fear of neighbours, fear of unknown people, fear of gangs and fear of the strange noises in the new place.

These pressures on the Cape Flats weighed heavily on the housebound mother. The street was no longer a safe place to play and there were no longer neighbours or kin to supervise children. The only playspace that felt safe was 'the home', usually a tiny flat. As pressures began to mount within the nucleated working class family, what had once been a base for support and security now tended to become a battleground, a major focus of all the anxieties created by the disintegration of community structures.

One route out of the claustrophobic tensions of family life was through the use of alcohol and drugs, vast amounts of which are consumed on the Cape Flats. This became the standard path of the men. Children were shaken loose in different ways. One was through early sexual relationships and perhaps marriage. Another was the emergence of youth subcultures on the streets - often in opposition to the parent culture. An attempted resolution of the problem of the working class family became ritualized in the violent youth gang culture on the streets, a consequence which simply reinforced the climate of fear. The situation was to be compounded by rising unemployment at the younger end of the potential labour force.

WORK AND WORKLESSNESS IN A DIVIDED CITY

In the previous section the focus has been on the social effects of relocation on the working class in Cape Town - a breakdown of family control and the collapse of a specific ghetto culture. In part, this forced

the control of youth out of the hands of the working class culture and into the state institutions. But a parallel phenomenon was taking place over employment. With the elimination of a wide range of jobs in the domestic sphere, more and more people were compelled to rely on employment in formal wage labour. For many workers this completed a process of proletarianization and forced a dependency on white employers. In the boom years this was not unduly problematical as factories sprang up in the city alongside their support industries and services. Between 1961 and 1974 production in South Africa grew at an average rate of 5.5% a year.

But these conditions were not to last. Although the country's exports increased four times over this period, its imports increased six times. This trade imbalance was compensated by foreign loans, and their interest alone increased from R28 million in 1966 to R759 million in 1979. Its dependent industrialization, linking it into the world system forced South Africa to catch the disease of recession in the early 1970s, causing industry to alter its optomistic estimates. By 1975 the country's growth rate fell to 2%. By 1977 it was lower, and by 1978 there was an absolute drop in production of some 25%.

South Africa's dependent status in the world economy occurred mainly because its industrial revolution took place in the 1940s, a time when the world system was already at an advanced stage of development. The international market was by then largely under the domination of monopoly capital. This position precluded the evolvement in South Africa of a fully autonomous 'national economy'. To accumulate wealth, therefore, South African industrialists and commodity producers had the choice of producing for an extremely small white or extremely poor black local market,

or submitting themselves to terms laid down in a competitive world market over which they had little influence. On the world market furthermore, effective competition increasingly required economies of scale - huge concentrations of investment using advanced machinery and techniques to produce cheaply for mass markets. Only the giant monopolies were able to afford this level of investment.

However, South Africa maintained a favoured access to world markets through its natural resources - mainly gold and diamonds. On the basis of this wealth the state was able to enter areas vital to the growth of industry, such as electricity, iron, steel, fuel, and transport, areas involving enormous outlays that no individual industrialist could afford. The state is presently the largest single investor and employer, and 57% of all plant and machinery is under its control.

But these developments have in fact resulted in an even closer integration of the national economy with the world economy, subjecting it more directly to upswings and downswings in world capitalism. For instance South Africa imports 90% of the machinery needed for production. Exports consist mainly of raw materials or agricultural products, and about three quarters of total export sales in 1980 consisted only of minerals or mineral products.

In world terms, therefore, manufacturing is a poor relation to mining. It must rely on local markets; even its natural markets to the north have been largely closed off for political reasons. But here a paradox arises. In order to keep the costs of products competatively low industry must rely on the availability of cheap labour. Yet cheap labour means low

wages. And as the greatest market for commodities is the working class, this means low purchasing power. One way out of this problem has been an almost endless extension of credit by way of hire-purchase agreements. But eventually the bill must become due, and the poor remain a poor market.

In the recession of the 1970s manufacturers had two choices to maintain viability - to lower real wages or to mechanise, prune products and fire workers. Both these alternatives they set about doing. Between 1978 and 1980 alone real wages declined 20% through inflation. A rand in 1970 was worth 36c in 1981 (Cape Times 2.4.81). Between 1977 and 1979 unemployment rose by an estimated half a million to around two million. In Cape Town in the 1970s these developments were to compound older employment problems for the city's workers, problems related to labour preference policies and the destruction of the domestic economy.

Coloured labour preference

Almost un-noticed amid the political events of 1961 was the drawing of a boundary line between Mossel Bay and the Karoo railway junction town of De Aar. The area on the Cape Town side of the line - known as the Eiselen Line - was to become a 'Coloured labour preference area'. The 200,000 Africans in this new 'Colouredstan' were to be endorsed out at a rate of five per cent a year . . . 'forced out of towns and factories and off farms and businesses to work on the mines and the Orange River Development Scheme'.[16] The purpose of the line, according to The Torch newspaper, was to:

> squeeze more labour, cheap labour, out of the coloured people. Through swallowing more areas in the rural districts, through increased regimentation by the Coloured Affairs Department(CAD),

> by the take-over of the housing schemes by the C.A.D., by C.A.D. control of schooling and through the "rehabilitation" scheme in the rural areas they hope to force more coloureds onto the labour market.[17]

While Africans were to be 'migrantized', rural coloureds were urged to sell their labour in the city. According to the Prime Minister of the time, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, those who wanted to continue to live in the area in which they had grown up 'were selfish because they stand in the way of the wonderful opportunities that the Group Areas offers to the coloured people'.[18]

What the Eiselen Line policy attempted to do was to split the labour force in the Western Cape along racial lines. It was to do this by restricting African access to residence and employment and by cementing coloured labour into a position between black and white workers. On the other side of the employment coin were those who could not find work at all. Many local factors increased joblessness, among them:

(1) population growth and urban migrations;
(2) a low level of industrial skills among workers;
(3) mechanisation in the factories;
(4) the erosion of ghetto enterprise by factory competition and group areas removals;
(5) the unstable fortunes of the building industry in which most male labourers were employed;
(6) the preference given to women in the major industry - textiles, and
(7) a slowdown in the Western Cape economy relative to the Witwatersrand, the industrial core of the country.

Official figures on unemployment - and particularly on under-employment - contain built-in problems which limits their usefulness. Among economically active people in South Africa, Charles Simkins found the unemployment figure in 1979 to be two million.[19] But Government figures for the same year put unemployment at a little under half a million.[20] Usually discrepancies arise over definitions of non-employment, leading to what is called 'hidden unemployment' (hidden, that is, to statisticians but very visible in the housing estates). An attempt to think through these discrepancies was made in a study of the Cape Flats housing estate, Bishop Lavis, by James Thomas and Andrea Blau.[21] They found the official statistics to be unhelpful because of their very narrow definition of unemployment. The definition used in the monthly Current Population Survey, holds that a person is unemployed if he or she is potentially economically active and:

(1) desires to work;

(2) does not work (has worked less than five hours in the past seven days);

(3) has attempted to find work during the previous month;

(4) is able to accept a position within one week;

(5) is between the ages of 15 and 64 if male, and 15 and 59 if female.

On this basis the unemployment rate for Bishop Lavis in 1981 was 9.5% of the economically active population.[22] But several questions arise. If a person does not fill all the above conditions and is not working, he or she is classed not economically active and therefore not part of an unemployment statistic. However what about:

A person who no longer desires to work because he or she has given up trying.

A person who has worked for six hours during the previous week (they could hardly be classed as employed).

A migrant worker who desires work but because of technical requirements cannot accept a position within one week.

A child under 15 years old who is not at school and desparately needs employment in order to stay alive.

A person who says they are at school but is not.

Thomas and Blau therefore expanded their definition of unemployement to include:

> any member of the economically active population who was not working and wanted to work, regardless of whether they were looking for work or not.[23]

The only people excluded from the category of economically active were:

> full-time students, those permanently medically unfit to work, those voluntarily retired and housewives not desiring work.[24]

With this definition the unemployment rate was found to be 13.9%. More than 63% of a sample of 2086 people in Bishop Lavis were found to have an income of R9 a week or less. Just over 60% of the sample group had not worked during the previous 12 months. This correlates with a survey of gang members done for this book. It found that 66% of the fathers of the youths had been out of work for the previous 12 months and 11% had

been without work for two years or more. Nearly 18% of those questioned in Bishop Lavis were found to be children who were not working but were not at school - almost as many as were in full-time study (21%). The ways in which the unemployed survived can be seen in Table 6D.

TABLE 6D

WAYS IN WHICH UNEMPLOYED IN BISHOP LAVIS SURVIVE

METHOD	MEN PERCENTAGE	WOMEN PERCENTAGE
Odd Jobs	8.5	5.6
Family help	78.4	8.6
Friends help	2.6	3.9
Pension	1.3	-
Savings	3.3	1.7
Unemployment Benefit	0.7	1.1
Other	2.0	1.7

Source: Thomas and Blau

Under-employment is more difficult to measure. This is because it must often be based on people's subjective assessment of their work potential. Thomas and Blau used the following definition:

(1) people who wish to work for more hours for more pay, whether they are actually looking for more work or not;

(2) people whose present job is below their level of qualifications;

(3) people who have been economically active over the past 12 months, but who have been unemployed for some of that time;

(4) people who have been less than fully employed (involuntarily), based on the number of hours worked in the past week.[25]

Using this definition they found the number of economically active people who were under-employed to be as high as 68%. This gives a combined figure for the underutilization of labour of just under 82%. As Bishop Lavis is a fairly representative Cape Flats housing estate, as Table 6E shows, these results can be generalised for much of the Cape Flats population.

TABLE 6E

INCOME AND POPULATION OF VARIOUS CAPE FLATS TOWNSHIPS(1970)[26]

Township	Total Population	Medium income per wage earner/year	Percentage of population earning
Tiervlei	22 276	R568	34.9%
Bishop Lavis	26 309	R585	34.6%
Elsies River	63 723	R589	35.2%
Manenberg	36 919	R594	32.0%
Retreat	37 971	R616	35.9%
Rontebeuwel	40 648	R619	32.9%
Grassy Park	31 555	R640	34.5%
Heideveld	17 484	R693	35.1%
Athlone	62 595	R692	41.6%
Metropolitan area of Cape Town	606 075	R604	38.8%

Source: Thomas and Blau

As can be expected, a particular feature of the army of unemployed is its youthfulness. One study in the Transvaal metropolitan area found that two-thirds of the black unemployed fell in the 15-24 age group.[27] Another

found that a quarter of the workseekers in Johannesburg and Durban, and two-thirds in Pietermaritzburg, had never been employed.[28] Petrus, a boy who had to leave school as a result of the 1980 education boycott, talks about the problems of finding a job in Cape Town:

> I've been out of work for the last 14 months. I have been trying to get a job at some firms and big companies but haven't been successful. I was offered some jobs, but the wages were so low I didn't accept. I'm not choosy about the work, but at least I want to get a wage I can survive on. I used to spend about R4 a week on travelling to find a job. I used to think it would be easy because I've got my Junior Certificate, but now I realise that isn't the case. All they want is cheap black labour so they can get rich and take the money out of the country before the revolution comes.
>
> I worked in one place for a couple of days. But they tried to bullshit me around so I resigned. My mother was upset but she tried to understand. I often hear them telling me how lazy I am when I don't accept just any job. I hope their eyes will soon see things in a better way instead of what TV and the newspapers feed them. My dad just about earns enough for us to live on. He is a heavy-duty driver. I think one day I also want to become a heavy-duty driver, then perhaps I get a job much better.
>
> There's such a lot of jobs advertised in the Argus, but when you go you find a queue of 30 people for just the one job. And chances are you won't get it. Perhaps they'll advertise for a messenger with Standard 6, but you'll find people there with matric certificates. You and your Junior Certificate can just turn around and leave again.
>
> One of the best ways of getting a job is having a connection, maybe an uncle or someone to bring you to the boss. I know of people who got jobs that way. But unemployment bureaus don't do

much to help. They just want qualified people like electricians. And they would rather employ blacks who they can fuck around and who they can't really communicate with so the worker can't argue back. I prefer stealing to working for someone who exploits you like that.

I have been around with some gangs here. Most of the members I know as childhood friends and we often do things together. They are also unemployed. Like me they don't want to work for someone who calls them 'boys' or 'hotnots'. People say gangs are bad. Perhaps they are, but they are still from our people. Perhaps they sometimes do things that isn't what I would agree with. But so does Botha and Vorster. Perhaps less obviously. If my own people have money I will take it from them, but I won't kill them for it, never. I just want to have enough to survive.

I've been locked up overnight in a cell once, just because I was waiting on the stoep of the shop for my mother to come home with the bus. I had to help her with the groceries. One can't trust a white man anymore. He'll stab you in the back if you don't look.

I have made my girlfriend pregnant. I'll have to find a way of getting a job soon. Perhaps I can go to Jo'burg to work at Sasol. That's what some of my friends do, then they come back and lie still for a while. But I'd rather stand on my legs fighting than go on my knees for the 'boere' and be used as a piece of machinery that gets replaced.

Quite apart from the frustrations generated by unemployment and the under-use of human potential, the sharp rise of the cost of living from the late 1970s was to create a crisis of survival in Cape Town. In 1942 more than 50% of people defined as coloured fell below the Poverty Datum Line - a calculated minimum income level for the survival of a family of five.[29] In 1959 it was still as high as one third.[30] The Theron Commission found

in 1975 that about 40% of the coloured population were living in need, many in an 'acute state of poverty'.[31] By the early 1970s South Africa was experiencing double-figure inflation. Between 1971 and 1980 the average wage for coloured people rose by 36%[32] But during the same period the cost of bread went up 147%, sugar 132%, potatoes 147% and mealie meal 185%. Between 1975 and 1980 the consumer price index rose 82.8% on all items, and 94.8% on food items.[33] So despite a money increase in wages in Cape Town, the real wage decreased - and with it the standard of living of the working class.

This coincided with a rise in black trade union militancy, and 1981 saw the greatest number of workers involved in strikes in the history of South Africa. In May that year the Cape Times observed that:

> rising prices, particularly in foodstuffs, would mean constant pressure from black trade unions for wage adjustments. It would also mean that a climate vulnerable to strikes and threats of strikes would have to be tolerated.[34]

And as the economic slowdown of 1981 deepened, a newspaper noted:

> a steady migration of skilled coloured workers (from Cape Town) to the Transvaal and abroad (while) at the same time, paradoxically, the region has a serious unemployment problem.[35]

The danger signals were even being emitted by City Hall, with the mayor warning of severe unemployment up ahead and an escalation of the crime rate.[36]

MIGRATION FROM THE RURAL HINTERLAND

The slowdown also coincided with the migration into the city of a large number of people from the rural areas. This migration, as we have seen, was based more on rural push than on urban pull. It is better understood as the decomposition of rural society than as an expression of the dynamism of urban society, and was (and still is) often a move from rural under-employment to urban unemployment. In the decade from 1960 to 1970 between 30,000 and 40,000 coloured workers were made redundant in 36 districts surrounding Cape Town.[37] This led to increasing migration into the city . . . at precisely the time that group areas removals were accelerating the need for Cape Flats housing. During these 10 years the 'coloured' population in the Peninsula was recorded as increasing by no less than 40 per cent.[38] This coincided with a concentration of land ownership and increasing agricultural mechanization. Between 1952 and 1981 the number of white-owned farms in South Africa dropped from 120,000 to around 70,000. However between 1937 and 1976 the number of tractors used on these farms - a sensitive index of mechanization - increased from 6,000 to 174,000. Indeed South Africa has 40% more tractors than the rest of Africa. The effects of these changes can be seen in a 43 per cent population increase in Cape Town between 1960 and 1970.[39]

In the city's hinterland the farm labour situation is extremely complex, with workers coming in from the Transkei on contract, cycles of migration between urban and rural areas and a movement towards smaller and less 'controlled' farms. A trend in the last two decades has been a change in property ownership from smaller independent farmers to the giant national wine conglomerates and even bigger food multinationals. These large agri-businesses tend to be capital-intensive, replacing farm labourers with

technological equipment and demanding higher skills from workers. Conditions for labour on these estates have been improving. But they have also tended to flush out 'unproductive' workers, and smaller farms in the area are finding themselves becoming dumping grounds for the resulting 'surplus' population.

Among this hidden group in the farm 'volkshuise' are those that cannot find work, together with the old, the maimed, the jobless youth and the alcoholic wake of the notorious tot system. As the real wages sink lower relative to the cost of living and are spread more and more thinly over a growing population, so petty trade and services spread: food stalls, shebeens and prostitution. Alongside these grow theft, violence and an abuse of alcohol born of desperation.

To gather statistics on these developments is virtually impossible and farmers tend to be extremely hostile to 'outsiders' interviewing their labourers. It was therefore decided to focus on one farm, to which I had unlimited access by acting as an 'overseer' for a month. The farm was a medium sized stand backing into the Klein Drakenstein mountains near Wellington, about 50km from Cape Town. It was privately owned, and had plum and apricot orchards together with smallish fields of youngberries, stawberries and granadillas. There was an olive orchard (which was not yet producing at the time of the study), a small dairy herd and some pigs.

The aim of the study was to gather worker biographies and to assess the effects, rather than the degree, of migrancy and job security among labourers in the area. The four job histories below were chosen, not because they were exceptional, but because they were typical of so many workers' experiences in the area.

DANIEL TENKWAN (23 years old).

Born in De Aar, he reached Std. 8 before joining the Railway offices there as a clerk. However he met a girl from Wellington and they decided to settle near her home and marry. The only work available to him there, he found, was farm labour and he managed to find work on the above farm in 1976. He was taken on at R10,00 a week and in four years it had risen to R13,00. He received a free house, firewood and half a bag of coarse meal a month, in addition to a large beaker of wine every weekday and two on Saturdays and Sundays. The two workers' toilets were communal and water was from an external tap. The house had no ceilings and a concrete floor. It was intolerably hot in summer and cold in winter.

His hours of work were from 5.30 a.m. to 7.15 a.m., 8 a.m. to 1 p.m. and 4 p.m. to 6.15 p.m. on weekdays. Work at weekends consisted of milking at 5.30 a.m. to 7 a.m. and again from 6.15 p.m. to about 7.15 p.m. He was also required to feed the stock at weekends and light the fire for hot water in the farm house in the mornings. Total hours worked came to about 50 hours a week, but he was on call at all times. Tenkwan was the 'boss boy' and organised milking and feeding of stock, fencing, tree felling and planting, all tractor work and was a skilled power mower driver. He undertook all minor mechanical repairs on the farm.

On R13,00 a week Tenkwan supported a wife and two small children. Wages were paid every two weeks. Most food purchases were made at the farm 'shop' - and at the end of the two-week period were deducted from his pay. During the month under review the 'credit' of two of the workers interviewed exceeded their wages and a third worker's debts equalled his pay. A constant preoccupation of all three older workers interviewed was the cancellation of their debts. But looking back in their credit books for the previous six months showed they had never succeeded in doing this. Tenkwan said this credit system was general on all farms in the Paarl/Wellington district. He considered his wage as being about average, R15,00 being 'high' and R20,00 exceptional. His wife occasionally added to their income by doing 'stukwerk' or casual labour in certain seasons when she could get it.

> Shortly after the initial interview was done Tenkwan resigned. The farmer was not sure where he or his dependents had gone, but had been told they had gone 'to town' (meaning Cape Town) to look for work.

As far back as 1876 Marx observed that when capitalist production takes possession of agriculture the demand for an agricultural population falls absolutely. 'Part of the agricultural population is therefore constantly on the point of passing over into an urban or manufacturing proletariat, and on the lookout for circumstances favourable to this transformation.'[40]

The Western Cape fruit farming area remains fairly labour-intensive, despite the use of machinery and chemical sprays. This is because there is no present substitute for picking, typing, packing and planting operations. Yet there has been a marked fall-off of coloured male labour on these farms. Brian Levy, in a study of labour migration in the area concluded that this was because there had been a trend towards the substitution of African migrant workers for 'coloured' workers in both permanent and seasonal employment. According to farmers he spoke to the supply of male 'coloured' labour had become increasingly scarce over time, relative to demand.[41] Another trend has been towards the use of women and children as labour 'commuters' from nearby areas. Levy found the major change that had taken place in the organisation of the non-resident seasonal labour market had been an inevitable consequence of the depopulation of many deeper rural areas:

> Until the relatively recent past many farmers in the Hex River Valley (near Worcester) used to travel to the Karoo from where they would recruit workers who remained on their farms for the entire season (November to May). Some farmers interviewed were using this system only three years ago (abour 1973)... As the 'coloured' population of the Karoo migrated to the (fruit growing) Boland... the system was transformed into (a) daily commuting operation.[42]

In the Paarl-Wellington area farmers confirmed that building contractors had been bringing in gangs of coloured labourers from De Aar in the Karoo and had been refusing to repatriate them when their contracts ended. They also said that although workers used to be seasonal, they were no predominantly daily commuters.

What we find, therefore, is a buildup of coloured men in Cape Town's rural hinterland who are unwilling to work as farm labourers. Considering Daniel Tenkwan's wages and the amount of work he was expected to do this is not surprising. With his experience it is probable that in time he would manage to secure a steady job. For him, as for many others from inland areas, the rural hinterland was used as a springboard into Cape Town. Another worker I interviewed, Petrus Zammana, was not able to use farm labour in this way to his own advantage, being forced into a trajectory different to that of Tenkwan:

PETRUS ZAMMANA (35 years old)

When interviewed Zammana had been working on the farm for a week. He had been fired by his previous employer for demanding a half-day holiday on Christmas Day. The employer's version was that Zammana was drunk and that: 'Daar is iets snaaks met hom, hy's 'n slim een' (there is something funny about him, he's a clever one) and because the farmer's wife was nervous in his presence.

Zammana was born in Wellington and got several jobs in the town before being forced to do farm work. He moved from farm to farm between Stellenbosch and Wellington, being fired often or leaving after coming into conflict with the farmer. When interviewed he was extremely bitter about his situation. He had a wife and four young children to support on a wage of R11,00 a week. His temperament (and no doubt his quick tongue) obviously did not endear him to employers, nor would his increasing alcohol intake and a tendency to be violent when drunk.

He had thus not been favoured in the training of skills, although obviously intelligent. He claimed to have been replaced in his job several times by black migrant labour from the Transkei, and expressed intense dislike for 'dom kaffirs'. It was apparent that since entering the labour market his living standards had deteriorated.

Three months after being employed on the farm on which he was interviewed he was fired for insolence. He was said to be working on another farm 'on the other side of Wellington somewhere'.

This labour biography leads us into a further speculation. In addition to permanent employment on farms in the Western Cape, Levy identifies three types of labour:

*Casual labour, in which the worker is hired purely on a daily basis - either as in the case of women and children living on the farm and undertaking odd jobs, or in the case of a worker hired for a specific task for which he is paid on completion.

*Workers employed on a daily basis to perform a seasonal task.

*Workers seasonally employed but on a regular rather than a casual basis, as in the case of migrant workers on short-term contracts.

Although Zammana's wife and children fit into the first category, it can be seen that he fitted into none of them. Although a quick survey may locate Zammana as a permanent worker - and the farmer would have identified him as such - his job history shows that he was in a slow migration across the rural areas of the Western Cape.

Because of the high relative surplus population and the low level of skill demanded on the smaller farms there is tremendous job insecurity - dismissals often being for 'cheek' or 'making a noise'. This had embittered Zammana, who was above average intelligence, and his attitude made farmers unwilling to teach him the skills that would give him a toe-hold of bargaining power in a conflict, allow him to land a more skilled job on the large agri-business estates, or to make the leap into the city.

His job insecurity was also increased by the threat of replacement by black contract labourers from the Transkei. Although the Western Cape is theoretically a 'coloured labour preference area', large numbers of black migrants are brought in on a continuous basis on six, nine and eleven month contracts. They are cheaper and more politically 'docile' than coloured labourers. Also, in the absence of a historical link with wine and perhaps with a slightly lower frustration level over social mobility, black migrants tend to have a lower alcohol intake and fewer 'babelaas' (hangover) Mondays. Recruiters of black labour in the Western Cape include the following:

Hex River Boeregroep
Berg River Farmers
Krom River Apple Farmers
Appelwaite
Cape Flats and Peninsula Farmers
Elgin Farmers Group
Stellenbosch Farmers Group
Grabouw Farmers Group
Philadelphia Farmers Group
Westelike Graan Boere
Kromvlei Farmers
Oak River Farmers
Owendale Farmers
Pandekloof Landgroep
Ceres Farmers Group
Landeshoff

In addition, many independent farmers appear to be able to recruit labour independently of these groups, although this is technically illegal. Others, until fairly recently, recruited teams of workers from the Karoo through team gang leaders who, although also labourers, were paid a higher wage. Further threats to male coloured farm labour is the use of children and builders' labourers from the towns during the grape-picking season (their holidays coincide with this activity) as well as women both from towns and farms who are hired at a lower wage.

Because Zammana was unwilling or felt he was unable to seek work in Cape Town he faced constant migration, a declining standard of living and the disruptions to social and family life resulting from continuous changes of abode.

LAFINA KAMMIES (about 50 years old)

When interviewed she had been working for the same employer for four years. In that time her wage had risen by 50c to R7,50 a week. In her previous job she, together with her 9-year-old son and older daughter, had worked as a team on a fruit farm near Elgin. They appear to have been employed both casually and seasonally, but were paid per task (for every load picked or tray sliced or de-pitted). Their combined wage came to R18,00 a week and no food was given. Evidently during the day tea was served with vetkoek, but cost 15c.

Kammies was born in De Aar and was brought to the Paarl-Wellington area by her father, who worked for the Post Office. After marriage she did seasonal work on or around the farms on which her husband was employed. She bore nine children. However her husband became an alcoholic and was unable to support the family. She was forced to use her family as a work team doing casual and seasonal work, acting as a char in the towns between seasons. Her position, when interviewed, was complicated by several factors.

During her previous employment on another farm she had lost all her 'papers' when she burned down her house while drunk. She had never been to school and was illiterate. She was terrified that the loss of her documents would be found out by the 'government'. Her fear was increased by demands, lawyers' letters and visits from debt collectors of a Wellington clothing store to which she owed money (these were all seen as 'government' demands). She had bought clothes at the shop two years previously, and although she was repaying at R2,00 a week she was required to pay at a rate of R7,00. The store was evidently not prepared to compromise.

Kammies was supporting her husband and five of her nine children, including a daughter over the age of 20 who occasionally procured casual farm work. Also sharing part of their house was a couple - the man worked in a piano factory in Wellington while the woman ran a shebeen at weekends. This led to tension with the farmer due to the noise, and both families were subsequently evicted from the house, Kammies being fired.

Kammies worked the same hours as Tenkwan and Zammana. Her duties were domestic - washing, ironing, cleaning four houses and attending to the sterilisation of milk equipment - as well as watering and weeding the large vegetable garden. In addition she had to tend the youngberries, strawberries and granadillas.

After being fired, Kammies was thought to be working at 'another farm down the valley'. It was not possible to find if she had obtained a house there.

This job history provides us with another view of the complex rural labour process. Within the larger cycle of slumps and booms in the capitalist economy, which cause the ejection and re-employment of the 'surplus' population, are also smaller seasonal cycles. These are particularly linked to agriculture. Workers like Kammies, caught in these smaller cycles, tend to oscillate between casual labour in both rural and urban areas and periods of worklessness in their search for

permanent employment. Others, higher up on the scale, supplement their urban wages with seasonal spells of farm work during holidays and between jobs. In the Western Cape it is women and children, particularly, who are involved in this cycle. Women form a large proportion of the seasonal labour force, and are drawn from three sources:

*Dependents of men working on farms.

*Women commuting daily from towns during certain seasonal activities on the farms. Between seasons they form part of the reserve army of labour in the towns, work as chars or undertake activities in the 'informal sector'.

*Women in a similar position to the above, but who actually migrate between town and country, living on farms during the thinning, picking and packing seasons, and in back yards or townships for the rest of the year. Levy had estimated that these women work an average of eight months a year on farms in the Western Cape. Farmers interviewed by him thought that for the rest of the year women were either unemployed, worked in domestic labour or in fruit processing factories, or in the West Coast fishing industry.[43]

During her life Kammies operated in the first and third of these categories. Her position when interviewed, however, was that of Zammana, possibly because of the need for adequate accommodation for her large family which only a farm would provide. However, in the absence of farm work it was likely that she would sign up at the rural fruit or fish factories, or be forced into a town and into a rural/urban oscillation.

The situation of Kammies shows several other aspects of farm labour in the area. Apart from her children, she was supporting an alcoholic husband and an out-of-work older daughter, both fully 'marginalized' and both in a sense casualties of monopoly capitalist penetration into agriculture. Furthermore she shared her house with a couple who stood in an entirely different relationship to capital: the man a permanent labourer in a factory, and his wife engaged in a small-scale commodity service - running a shebeen. Although the latter two were evicted from

their abode, they would have no trouble in obtaining other accommodation through their ability to pay rent. They were simply part of the urban proletariat, the difference being that part of their income was derived from farm labourers' wages.

Another consideration is the way in which farm labourers are tied into labour by poverty and addiction to alcohol. A breakdown of the purchases from the farm store by two of the labourers, Daniel Tenkwan and Lefina Kammies, was made over a two-week period. (see Table 6F)

Apart from some tobacco, condensed milk and radio batteries, the income was found to cover only essentials. Loans had to be made for unexpected outlays, one to bail a wife out of jail after a drunken brawl in Wellington, the other to honour HP demands for purchases of clothing and blankets. The workers were constantly beleagured with final demands and lawyers letters from retail firms in Wellington which offered goods on easy terms. In addition to these loans the other major outlay was on meat - usually cheap cuts such as sheep or cow heads and trotters or offal. In Tenkwan's case it can be seen that the largest cash outlfow was an unexpected R10 which he did not have savings to cope with. He came into the two-week period with a debt of R13, pushed this up to R43 during the next 14 days, paid off R20 of this and was left with R6 in cash. Had it not been for the R10 fine, his eventual debt would have again been R13, suggesting careful budgeting on his part. What actually occurred was that Tenkwan received a minimum amount of food in order to reproduce himself and his family plus R3 a week to buy clothes, non-food essentials and to cope with unexpected demands. It is likely, however, that much of this cash went to the purchase of wine for the weekly Saturday night party.

TABLE 6F

PURCHASES BY TWO FARM WORKERS DURING A 2-WEEK PERIOD IN 1980

DANIEL TENKWAN	R c
Debt brought foreward	13.18
100 g tobacco	50
750ml cooking oil	83
bread	6
matches	2
cheese	30
corned ox lung (tin)	31
1kg potatoes	30
1/2 cake soap	33
ox lung	31
6 eggs	29
1kg sugar	32
1/2kg peanuts	40
cow head	2.00
tobacco	50
cigarette papers	2
matches	2
bread	8
matches	2
ox lung	29
2kg sugar	64
2 pkts. yeast	5
100gm rooibos tea	15
1 bag of meal	2.75
loan to pay HP debt	6.00
loan to bail out wife	10.00
tobacco	50
margarine	29
ox lung	29
candles	28
1/2 cake soap	33
matches	2
margarine	29
1kg sugar	32
1/2 kg potatoes	10
peanuts	20
writing pad	40
1kg sugar	32
plums	10
TOTAL OWED	43.18
Pay for 2 weeks	26.00
Debt paid off @	20.00
CASH WAGE for 2 weeks	6.00
Still owes	23.00

LEFINA KAMMIES	R c
Debt brought foreward	10.64
cooking oil	42
tomatoe paste	13
sunflower oil	69
2kg sugar	64
2kg maize rice	50
corned ox lung	62
1kg potatoes	30
tomatoe paste	13
cow head	2.00
oil	83
2kg sugar	64
tomatoe paste	13
500g margarine	29
onions	5
stamped mealies,2.5kg	50
split beans	46
1/2 cake soap	33
oil	83
ox lung	29
bag of meal	3.54
200g tea	30
radio battery	1.02
1/2kg. potatoes	10
condensed milk	51
margarine	32
2kg. sugar	64
tobacco	50
TOTAL OWED	27.35
Pay for 2 weeks	15.00
CASH WAGE for 2 weeks	00.00
Still owes	12.35

Given the extremely sparce conditions on the farm it was interesting to discover why the workers stayed there for the length of time they did. The reasons they gave included:

*Free house for them and their family and an absence of such accommodation in the towns.

*No jobs in the towns.

*Fear of 'the city'.

*Because their family and relations were on surrounding farms.

*Guarantee of free wine.

The last factor was stressed by all workers interviewed in the district. In the four weeks of June 1979 the two male labourers on the farm drank more than 40 litres of cheap white wine dispensed free from the farm store at the end of each day. Much of what little cash they received was also spent on wine. The farm wine is given in smaller measures during the week when labour is required, and doubled at weekends. This consumption of wine is reflected in the high level of violence among coloured labourers in the Western Cape which peaks on Saturdays. During this time the roads between the towns and the farms become littered with drunken men and women either staggering along the verges or lying in heaps, unable to move. Admissions to the casualty ward of the Paarl Coloured Hospital near Wellington during the hour I spent there on the third Saturday in June 1979 included a man with his throat cut, one stabbed just below his heart, about 30 men and women with concussion, cuts or breaks sustained in drunken brawls in the area, and many children with wounds in advanced stages of sepsis.

The provision of housing and the issue of alcohol is clearly being used in the Western Cape in an attempt to bind the coloured labour force to the land at a time when almost any labour in the city, legal or illegal, provides better wages. However it is among the youth on the farms that this bond is most easily broken:

TOLLIES KAMMIES (13 years old)

The boy, who was born in the Wellington area, had been used as an assistant by his mother, Lefina, since he could walk. When interviewed in mid-1979 he was 13 and attending school in the mornings. In the afternoons he was required to work on the farm, for which he was paid R2,50 a week together with a piece of available fruit each day. His entire wage apparently went to his mother, who occasionally allowed him a few cents for a treat. All younger children on the farm assisted their elders and were paid only with a small amount of fruit each day.

During the year Tollies had begun dropping out of school for days, then weeks at a time. On several occasions he made trips to Cape Town accompanied by other youths of his age. About the time his mother was fired he had apparently passed beyond her control. He was not sleeping at home or attending school, and was constantly in the company of a group of youths roaming the farms, working where they could and probably living on stolen fruit and chickens, about which there was much complaint from farmers.

Child labour is common on Western Cape farms. Levy has shown that during school holidays children from coloured schools are often formed into agricultural work teams under a (well-paid) teacher for the purpose of fruit thinning or picking. He found that the seasonal thinning work

force in the Hex River Valley comprised 51 per cent school children, 38 per cent women and 11 per cent adult men during his period of study (1977) and that children were drawn from as far afield as Cape Town.[44]

By the time Tollies was ten he was a fully-fledged labourer being paid a derisive wage or simply fruit 'gesondheid' while having to attend school seven kilometres from his home. He had no time for homework in the afternoons and no space for it in his crowded, candle-lit house at night. By the age of twelve he was milking, hay-baling and cutting, digging holes and planting, fruit picking and preparing, and able to drive a tractor, for which he effectively earned nothing. His rebellion at the age of thirteen is hardly surprising, and his movement into a peer-group gang of roaming minors suggests that other youths found themselves in the same position.

The job history of Tollies is important for this study because it parallels that of at least a third of the youths found in the City's street gangs. During my study the boy made several trips to Cape Town. If things got 'hot' for him on the farms, as they probably would, he could contact friends in the city and move in with them. More than likely they would be from a gang. But a more common route to Cape Town is described by Patrick, a senior member of the Mongrels, one of the biggest gangs on the Cape Flats:

> Many of the gang are BJs (boere jongs - farm youths) but you'll see the leader is always a local person. He's got a house, a headquarters, a pad to sleep. These upcountry guys get arrested and they're sent to Tokyo (Porter Reformatory, situated in Tokai). There they stay maybe two years and they meet guys there who say "we'll fix you up when you come out". Maybe they join a gang in reform. When their time comes they don't want to go back home now. There's nothing for them to do there and now they've got

gedagtes (understanding) and they want to stay in town. So a gang leader he says to them: "you can stay here by me and get to know the place. I can find you work". So there he starts, you see. Little jobs - go get some sweets or milk from the shop, sell a little garu (dagga) and maybe some buttons (mandrax). Maybe after a time he can be trusted to pull a job.

This guy he sees the gangsters are making more money every day than his father makes a month. So he moves with them. After two years or something he will get stamped (tattooed) but he must be able to pull weight. Then he's full blast. This is how it happens: the kring (circle) sits, the main ouens, the top guys. These are guys who are in the various areas, they're pulling a lot of guys. One day the leaders of these branches (of the same gang) come together and decide to stamp their lighties. The new ones don't know about all this. Maybe they decide to leave one lightie out they're not sure of - he's not pulling weight - so then it will make him work harder and he'll become more brave.

There's a tattoo master in each gang, they use a needle and indian ink or a zombie (the black rubber seal in food jars) ... they burn it down and mix it with water. Then they get called in, but before their badge they must remember the laws - they will be asked. For the Mongrels its 26 because they're 26s. So they get their tshappie (tattoo). Afterwards when they're initiated they're like brothers - there's a law among them. And they won't be treated as lighties, it's no more "get this, do that". They can sit and smoke together.

You see this happens in the big gangs where there's discipline. There's very strict discipline, the leader just uses his eyes. But in the younger gangs, like The Hobos in Bonteheuwel or the Sicilians in Elsies River there's no discipline. It's frightening man! These young lighties with guns and they're 15. They hit merchants (drug salesmen), rob anyone. There's no thought. It's getting worse all the time.

What is being suggested here is that arrest, conviction and sentencing to a reformatory have become a ticket to the city for many farm youths. Here they join the unemployed and the gangs, urban hunters for the means to stay alive. What these gangs have done to survive in the face of tremendous odds is to rebuild a form of domestic economy in the new housing estates. This time, however, their customers are often their victims and their work is a crime.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6

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7

STATE INSTITUTIONS AND STREET-CORNER KIDS

A central point that can be distilled from the discussion so far is this: that the development of capitalism in the city and its hinterland has been the acid in which the working class family has dissolved. Urban migration, the destruction of settled urban areas, mechanisation, unemployment and poverty have gradually unpicked the fabric of extended families and of working class culture. And as communities dissolved, the institutions of the state have moved to replace family socialisation and control with bureaucratic regulation. The school, the clinic, the social work agency, the police, the children's home, the reformatory and even perhaps the prison are in a way bureaucratic extensions of family regulation. But they are different. Of necessity they are less flexible than the family, more impersonal and more punative. People are held to sets of rules and regulations which often pass their understanding. And in a country such as South Africa, with its emphasis on racial difference and on an unequal division of wealth, the main focus of the state's social apparatus becomes that of control.

It is understandable, therefore, that the major responses of many working class youths to these institutions has been anger and despair. For children from poorer families, or from families with a high level of internal dislocation or strife, state institutions set goals and standards which are often impossible to meet. This has tended to brutalise the self-esteem and integrity of youths who are not 'making it'. Very often they are, very impersonally, rejected from the mainstream. And in a tough environment it often takes only one harsh contact with bureaucracy to spark off a corresponding and face-saving rejection from

a youth with nothing to inherit but chronic poverty. A study done among black Americans after the riots in Watt, Los Angeles, during the mid-1960s makes the point that:

> early learning difficulty in mastering the basic intellectual skills which the schools and thus the broader society demands, leads to defeat and failure, a developing negative self-image, rebellion against the increasingly defeating school experiences, a search for status outside the school together with an active resentment against the society which the school represents. Quite early the child finds status and protection in the street and the gang which requires none of the skills which are needed in the school but makes heavy use of the kinds of survival skills which he learnt in his early home and street experiences.[1]

Usually it is in education that this clash of values comes, because it is here that the ideas of the ruling class first penetrate ghetto consciousness in a systematic way. It is in the c[illegible]t the poor learn that the survival behaviour which the white rulers consider destructive is the one great protection kids have against a system in which failure is almost assured. It is this point at which many begin to live out a terrible contradiction: striving for a 'respectable' standard of living through commodity consumption while living in an income bracket where this standard and not obtainable. A number solve the contradiction by hard work or luck and scramble up into respectability: a shiny car, a TV set and home-ownership in a good suburb. But for many this is a fading dream, which has only one chance of coming true - through acts defined as crime.

It is significant that a study of more than 500 youths under the age of 18 in Cape Town during 1980, showed that 73 per cent were charged with various forms of theft (what one might call a crime of pverty) and 16 per cent with robbery. Only 11 per cent were charged with assault or rape.[2] The search by these youths for high profile commodities and a higher standard of living generally leads to confrontation with the police, a court case, corporal punishment and perhaps even a reformatory or prison. In this way the initial rejection is simply reinforced, hardening into the sharp 'boer/bandiet' dichotomy of the prison gangs.[3]

What we must consider here is the effects that State institutions have on working class kids with no work to do and nowhere to go. Often the best way to do this is through the experiences of the youths themselves:

SCHOOLS: SIMON'S STORY

School was just a way of passing time. Other pupils felt this too. When I was younger I was in a class where the teacher would almost tear your ear off or put you across her lap and beat you with the heel of her shoe. It was very frightening. I often dreamed about growing up quickly and joining my big brother working as a messenger or a cleaner and buying myself the latest fashions that the boys in the street wear.

We were ranked according to the marks we scored in exams. The pupil with the highest marks sat under the teacher's nose and the poor marks people sat right at the back. We were constantly reminded about our clothes because they were different colours and they should have been a uniform. This reminding happened even in the middle of a lesson! It was very embarrassing. Then you had to cover your books with brown paper and plastic. No 'vetterige merke' (fat marks) were allowed. But how can you avoid getting stains on books when the only table where you can do your homework is where your mother cooks? And you can't sit up late with your books because candles are expensive. You never see any other books - except perhaps if you go with your parents to their bosses house.

At the three schools I attended there was always at least one teacher feared by everyone and who would beat you with his fist or anything. When I was in Standard one we heard the teacher next year would be Mr. Z, the most hated teacher at the school. Because of this the next year five pupils didn't come back to school - among them were the brightest students in the class. I remember one person, Joseph Martin, he was later the leader of the most fearful gang in Athlone. He has been in and out of prison often. He was a bright student.

Fridays were the favourite days for staying out of school. Firstly it is turn-out day (house cleaning day) then perhaps you had to accompany your mom to the old man's place of work so she can get some money before he spends it on booze. Usually we were sent in to get it. Then on Mondays the folks usually stayed at home after a very pissed (drunken) weekend. You aren't allowed to stay out of school, so on Monday you must have a letter from your parents. My bigger sister would write it because my parents couldn't read or write.

Then there was the problem of hidings. We would get them at home. But mothers didn't like to see their kids hit by somebody else at school. We were reluctant to tell my mom because we knew what would happen. Mom would turn up at school in her housecoat ready to fight. I remember once she arrived at school because my little brother's abdomen was covered in blue marks - she came with a lepel (spoon) in her hand! But then after this the teacher would victimise you and you might end up failing your exams. You've got to spend a whole year with that teacher, and maybe more.

Schools for working people in Cape Town date back to the First decade of colonization. In his diary on April 17 1658 van Riebeeck wrote:

holding school for young slaves... To stimulate the slaves attention while at school, and to induce them to learn the Christian prayers, they were promised each a glass of brandy and two inches of tobacco when they finish their task.[4]

By 1676 the Church Council in the Cape was pressing for racially segregated schooling.[5] This was not, however, legally enforced until 1911, when the Appellate Division of the Union Supreme Court ruled that 'it was part of the policy of the Cape School Board Act of 1905 to promote the establishment of separate public schools' for 'white and non-white children'.[6]

In 1962 moves were begun to transfer control of coloured education from the provinces to the central State. Then in 1964 the Coloured Persons' Education Act brought this tuition under the Department of Coloured Affairs. This was deeply resented by the coloured community and was seen as a move towards racist and inferior education.[7] However despite centralisation of education control, schooling for the majority of children defined as coloured was not made compulsory until the late 1970s - and even then it was not always strictly enforced.[8]

One of the main problems of compulsory education was the lack of facilities. In 1979 the number of pupils in the Cape affected by 'double-session' schooling (a method of literally doubling the number of pupils using a school building) was 56,944.[9] In March 1980 the Secretary of Coloured Affairs admitted a backlog of 10,680 classrooms for coloured children.[10]


Added to the overcrowding in schools is the 'put-down' of a basically alien school curriculum. Both the teachers and the educational material expect working class pupils to adopt paths to success and forms of behaviour with which they are largely unfamiliar and which have little association with their daily lives.

Most of the stories coloured children are required to read and the examples given in books are about another society - bourgeois and usually 'white'. The result is that the split between school and the real world gradually widens, and the skills that poor children need most to survive are frowned on or ridiculed by their education. What often develops is an agonising and internalised contradiction between a desire to conform to the schools' values and a rejection of the whole

The choices open to ghetto youths in this position are sketched out by Douglas Glasgow in his study of Watts before the 1965 riot.[11] Firstly, he says they can choose to adopt the perspective of the educational system. However this requires that they reject the ghetto culture and even their peers and alienate themselves from their immediate social base. The second option is to make a somewhat marginal adaptation - retaining some ghetto behaviours and selecting certain other 'alien' cultural values and perspectives. The third option is to adopt the aspirations and social context which has the most familiarity. However this tends to alienate a youth from his or her education and requires the acceptance of 'second-class' status. Reinforced by the difficulty of actually staying at school and, often, a lack of encouragement from parents, this option leads to an anti-school bias. However this third choice was seen, in Watts, as the most logical course of the many young men who fuelled the riot.[12]

In Cape Town the reasons for a rejection of the educational system by coloured pupils are perhaps greater than in the United States. The school boycotts of 1980 make it clear that 'Coloured Education' was seen as second-rate, racist 'boere' indoctrination carried on in overcrowded and undersupplied schools by often under-trained teachers.[13] One of the most dynamic features of the boycott was a total rejection of the set curriculum by students and the mounting of 'appropriate' seminars and lectures.

The pressures and contradictions of working class schooling in Cape Town has led to an appalling drop-out rate among coloured pupils. Figure 7a is a comparison between the percentages of coloured and white pupils enrolled in the various standards during 1980.



(Source: Race Relations Yearbook)

A study done in Bishop Lavis on the Cape Flats showed that more than 16% of those interviewed had no formal education at all. Thirty per cent had not progressed beyond Standard 2 and 97% did not have a Matric pass. The median education level was only Standard 4.[14] Another Cape Flats study showed that among 500 men with criminal records, 58% had been truants from school, 42% had been taken out of school to supplement their family income and 14% couldn't cope with school because they had moved house and school too frequently.[15] And a poll among youths who were members of street gangs in Cape Town showed that 70% had failed to reach Standard 5.[16]

CHILDREN'S HOMES: FRANSIE'S STORY

My parents separated from each other when I was nine years old, but up until that time the family was together. I went to the Wingfield Primary School until Standard 3 when I left school because of the hidings I got. We lived in a council house in Lion Street near Bloemhof Flats in District Six. My father never worked. He stole gun parts and made them up himself. I saw him making the guns. One day he shot a man in my ouma's back yard. So he's in jail now. My ouma told the police the guns were buried in the ground in the yard. They asked me also and said they'd give me R15,00. But I didn't want to say. When they took my father I cried all night and couldn't eat or sleep.

My mother worked in a tyre factory in Kensington. She earned R150,00 per month. She couldn't look after us all and I was the eldest so I had to get out of the house. I went to stay with friends. But they were gangsters so I went home again but my mother didn't want me so she got me sent here (Bruce Duncan Children's Home).

When I was at school there was the CTS (Cape Town Scorpions) gang there, their ages from 10 to 16. I knew four of them and they were stealing. I soon learned what to do. Later they were locked up in 'reform', in Bonnytoun (place of safety). To be with them I went on the rampage. We broke into Shawco at Kensington and broken open the safe. We got R3 500 but my buddy took it all for himself and gave it to his family. He was 13. The people opposite Shawco phoned the police and they came and took fingerprints and locked me up in the police station... for three months and 10 days. The magistrate sent me to Bonnytoun. Then from there the welfare nurse sent me here (Bruce Duncan Home). I was in Bonnytoun for three weeks. But the older guys used to hit me and tried to tattoo me to become one of their gang, one of the BFK (Born Free Kids). But I didn't want to. When I came here I was glad to see that the people wore ordinary clothes and not khaki's. Khaki is just being inside. I like it here... not locked up. Except at school here they hit me and laugh at the way I write. My hands shake and it comes out funny.

When I was in the cells there were two other boys of 10 years old with me. One of them broke into a safe and the other stole a bicycle. One had a TLK (Terrible Lightning Kids) tattoo on him. We used to eat katkop and bitter coffee. We only had two blankets and it was very cold. We had a mat to sleep on. And the toilets stank and there was never any toilet paper. We went to the court in a remand-truck in our own compartment. I don't know what happened to my other buddies.

When I was locked in the big cells, in Pollsmoor, this big guy told me to take my clothes off. I didn't want to so I starting banging on the door and screaming. He threw a shoe at me which hurt and I started crying. When the warder came I told him what was going on. He just said the guy should have fucked me 'till I was dead. They moved the guy away, but later I was raped and the gangsters there tool my jeans and shoes and leather jacket. They gave me broken stuff. Lots of guys make big trouble - especially on the way to court or when we're waiting there. They tell the other guys to take off their clothes, and if they have those balls and chains on they hit them with the chains and the balls.

Also the police at the cells take all papers and pictures and rings and watches and money when you go to court. When you come back they give back the pictures and rings andwatches, but they keep the money. The police are terrible, they just want to kill guys! They shot this girl's brother because he stabbed somebody and tried to run away over the roofs. The police get you into trouble if you just pee in the road or swear or throw stones at doves or anything. We didn't even kill the doves. We built a big cage and saw how many we could keep. Some days the same policemen will arrest you for doing the same thing he saw you doing yesterday.

In prison one night some policemen came to my cell because they said they wanted to teach me to shoot. But I didn't want to go so they locked me up again. They were drunk and I was scared they'd shoot me by mistake. They used to call us 'hotnots' and told us to work harder and quicker and called us 'fucking bastards'. They used to hit us with metal rulers on our heads if we wouldn't clean for them or wash up or make food. Sometimes in the evening the Captain would come around and ask us how we were.

When I told him what the warders did he said: "That's okay. Why don't you come to jail more often?" But the night the judge comes around all the police are quiet. He only comes once a month.

Here (in Bruce Duncan) my old gangster buddies still phone me at weekends - just to make trouble. They want to come and bring other skollies with them. Even if they got a lekker job they'd steal from their boss. They'll always be gangsters. In my area there were Terrible Josters, the CTS, the BFK, the TLK, the MGS (Mongrels) and the Nice Time Kids. There was also the Mafia and the Jesters. My mother's brother is also a gangster. When my mother told him to stop being a gangster and shooting people he left home. He carries knives on him and thing like a sword. My other brother isn't a gangster. He also was sent to Bonnytoun but when he came out he was good and he worked.

I used to work with the CTS. There were over 200 members. They used to send us to shebeens to steal wine and dagga for them. Me and my buddies would go there and wait 'till the people were drunk and stoned and then steal their dagga and wine and money. The big-time gangsters thought we were their servants. They would make us buy cigarettes and peanuts and sweets for them. And they would make us steal for them. Once they sent me into a school to open the safe. When they had the money they gave me only R1,00 and told me to go home and buy sweets. Also they used to pickpocket. They tried to teach me but I didn't want to. My friends did - and they bought long velvet three-piece suits. We used to steal from supermarkets - tins of food - and go to sleep in a broken, ruined house. We stole a primus stove and we lived there.

I like it here at Bruce Duncan. But I get home-sick when I have to sleep alone at night. I would like to sleep in the room with other guys. Its like a big family here. It's nice like a big family. I can't really go home. My mother is married again. My stepfather's name is Ridwaan. When I go home at weekends my sister always fights with me and my step-father helps my sister and never me.

According to Muslim News, during 1981 there were up to 200 000 young people in homes for child care in South Africa. Of these 95% were not orphans but had one or both parents living.[17] These homes are partly State-funded and have to comply with State regulations. In one of these institutions, in Cape Town and coloured children, just over 84% of the inmates were from families which were ultimately destroyed as a result of the excessive use of alcohol.[18]

The divorce rate in South Africa is correspondingly high. Between July 1980 and June 1981 there were 19.710 divorces - 54 a day.[19] To compound this, as we have seen, there is a very high rate of births to single mothers, and the Theron Commission found that among coloured mothers in 1970 this rate was 43% (whites 3%). Even if this figure is adjusted for couples living as families but who are not officially married, it is still greater than one third of all coloured births.

Initially Children's Homes in Cape Town were not designed to take in the overspill of broken families but to house children left homeless and parentless by wars and, particularly, epidemics. Their brief was to 'civilise' these 'waifs and street Arabs' and put them to service. Girls, from these homes were in some demand as domestic labour. In 1876 the Superintendent-General of Education was moved to note that:

> I was very much gratified to find from the Inspector's Report of the St. Michael's Home Mission School, that the standard of instruction and the discipline were satisfactory. When I call to mind the wild, unkept, hetrogeneous, lot of human waifs and strays, which you introduced to my notice a year or two ago, I feel that a real work both in teaching and training has been done. You have succeeded in elevating 70 or 80 nondescripts to the ordinary level of civilised humanity.[20]

Today the emphasis has shifted from the parentless children of some disaster to (almost exclusively) the products of broken families. And it is the lucky ones who go to children's homes. Their street brothers - and there are perhaps thousands in Cape Town - scratch out a living by petty theft and selling newspapers, sleeping around the warm air-conditioning pipes of big buildings in the inner city at night. In the children's homes children receive food, clothing and shelter as well as counselling and medical care. But children's homes do not - and cannot - shield youths from the contradictions which assail children in all working class families. Generally under-staffed and often under-financed, they are forced to fight (and often lose) a battle against the lure of the streets.

REFORMATORIES: THE TEACHERS' STORY

At the end of 1980 there were 2421 coloured youths under the age of 18 committed to reformatories, schools of industry or children's homes in the Western Cape.[22] More than half of these were in what are known as Children's Act Schools, where they are placed by courts for misdemeanour or felony. The largest of these is Porter School situated on a farm in the beautiful Tokai valley. During the past five years it has had an annual inmate population of just under 600 boys, but in April 1981 it was as high as 733. It was started with a bequest of £20,000 from Mr. William Porter in 1881.[23] The previous year 66 youths had been convicted of offences which were thought to warrant detenetion in a reformatory (24 for theft, 14 for gambling and 9 for vagrancy). By 1891 the reformatory contained 54 boys and the first case of sodomy was reported.[24]

The problems of detaining large numbers of youths - many of whom are tough and street-wise - within a confined area call for tight control measures. When a boy first enters the reformatory he is placed in the 'strafkoshuis' (cells) for about two weeks to 'cool off'. Then he is sent to work in the fields for about three months where he becomes part of the 'bandiet' workforce. Here treatment is severe. Boys are taken out early in the morning and often do the work of ploughs by hand. Many youths who passed through the reformatory remember great brutality on the part of the white farm overseers and beatings for 'slacking'.

Porter has about 140 staff members, of whom about 90 are white. They are divided into the administrative, academic and psychological sections, which are fairly small, and the trade and hostel sections which are large. A staff member admitted that the hostel staff were 'fairly crude' in their handling of the boys, having a 'rough and ready' approach without previous experience in juvenile problems.

These hostels are the core of gang activity. Although ganging is banned in the reformatory it is extensive, and together with the Ottery and Faure institutions, Porter is the heart of the two Cape 'super-gangs': The CTS (Cape Town Scorpions) and the BFK (Born Free Kids). A former staff member agreed that, in a way, the gangs were beneficial to the youths because:

> white people tend to look at the coloured people as a homogeneous group, whereas there is actually a great variety of outlooks and allegiances. So a boy coming into Porter could find his "spiritual" home in one particular group. They are very frightened when they

> come in. In the gang a boy would be protected. He would find a "family" where he could feel solidarity and support - and in a sense make some progress.[25]

If a boy has no gang affiliation on leaving the 'strafkoshuis' cells he is immediately grabbed by one of the gangs and given a tattoo behind his ear. This will either be 'BFK', 'CTS' or 'KFS' (King Fighting Souls or 'Kafferslagters'). A staff member pointed out that the youths rapidly realise that their position in the gang is more a matter of self-protection than self-expression.[26]

Another staff member outlined the gang structure in the hostels:

> I found this out from the BFK's. The CTS were not forthcoming with information. The gangs all seemed to have a 'General' at the top. The general of the BFK was a guy called Madoppie, he used to be an Argie boy (newspaper vendor) in Long Street. He was helped as a small kid by the bergies (tramps) and slept in a pipe. His instructions were law. Later in the year, when he was pinned down, among his possessions were many knives and sharp instruments. He was arrested and tried in the reformatory for dagga charges and 'bende aktiwiteite' (gang activity). The others told me this boy would hand out a knife and say, right, go and knife that one - and make sure you get him tonight.
>
> It was a power thing really, being a member of a gang. They had a network which sought to exploit the reformatory situation and find glory among their peers. There was this very repressive regime, and these boys would seek out the weak links and exploit these. And the gang leaders, like Madoppie, would hoard dagga and sort of reward his lieutenants with it. Dagga was a kind

> of lever. But Madoppie knew how to use physical power - pure intimidation of a fairly brutish kind. I think this was the basis of his power. The authorities did everything possible to disrupt the gangs, but the gangs fed on the system, they are part of it, and gang allegiance almost always would over-ride the reformatory epaulette (privilege) system.
>
> Also homosexuality is rife among the boys. It's part of the way of life there. This one small boy in Standard 7, I remember, he was continually raped by the others. He was considered 'easy'. Sometimes boys are also gang-raped.[27]

Punishments within the reformatory are usually carried out in the hostels. A staff member observed the hostel staff to be 'extremely authoritarian... they have a jail mentality'.[28]

Each hostel had two or three house fathers and a number of assistants.

> These people probably have standard 6 qualifications, if that. So the standard of treatment of the "hotnots" and "kaffirs", as they are called, is abysmal. The staff will refer to the boys like this: "Jou fokken hotnot, ek skop you wind uit, you fokken bek stukkend". That's standard procedure. When a boy commits a crime - violence, dishonesty, dagga - he's brought before a "court" of these uneducated whites who are required to give him a hearing and mete out punishment. There's a set of punishment codes. But often justice can go awry. For dagga a boy gets six lashes -- the cane is raised to the ceiling and the man puts every ounce of strength into it. Frequently he opens the skin on the boy's buttocks. Then he's put in a cell, stripped of his epaulette (privileges) and has to do three months in the fields.[29]

Often, however the staff feel justified in meting out harsh treatment because of the tough boys they are being paid to control. Here is a selection from some of the many interviews done with institutiionalised youths in Cape Town:

> Gamaat: The only other jail I've been in is Pollsmoor - for murder and a rape case. There was a whole lot of chommies, she was a big girl, man, about 16, in Belhar. We also used to steal cars - and money, then we'd buy wine and dagga. At the time I was 13, and now I'm 15.

> Pietie: I went to school 'till standard 3, then I came here (to the reformatory). I've never worked - me and another guy would do things. He was 17 and I was 15. I thought that if you're 17 you're really big and know everything - he was in high school. He used to tell me to joll with him and break into houses. We did it a lot.

> Chicken: I am 18 years old and have been here since I was 16. But I first went to Bonnytoun when I was eight years old. That was because two chommies and I killed a BFK. My one chommie stuck a knife in his back and we left him in the bushes. The police soon found out and they came and took me away. Long ago my father was locked up also. He killed his own brother.

However, evidence suggests that a question mark be placed over the possibilities of actual 'reform' in Cape Town reformatories and schools of industry, especially when they provide environments not much harsher than the streets from which the youths come. One teacher at a Children's Act school claimed that:

> one of the features of the mentality of the boys I taught was their almost daredevil desire to be put into jail, because there was a lot of prestige about being able to handle jail. There's a lot of status in it too.[30]

A former staff member of Porter summed up the situation:

> I often wonder what changes would take place among the so-called coloured community if Porter were removed, because it supplies such a large section of the poorer coloured youths with an income and a reason for living. Take away Porter and you've taken away a very definite nucleus of their lifestyle. You see very, very few of the boys are reformed really. Most of them end up in Pollsmoor Prison. They come out of oppressive township environments into oppressive state reformatories. If they do <u>well</u> there and avoid the gangs, when they go back to their home environment they'll be victimised - or even get killed. But if they come out with a killer-gang metality they'll be respected and honoured on the streets. Reformatories are the high school of violence, and prisons are the university.
>
> And there's this high turnover of kids passing through these institutions - they're just churning out leadership for street gangs. And reformatory boys stick together back home. Most sentences at Porter are about two years - its much the same at Ottery and elsewhere. So every year there are hundreds of kids being put back into the streets after reformatory "care". And this has been going on since 1881. Each boy has a number. I don't know when it started, but now it's close on 15,000.[31]

A newspaper article supporting these views was published in the Argus in 1982 by a former Porter psychologist

THE ARGUS, THURSDAY OCTOBER 21 1982

PORTER: REFORMING OR PUNISHING

QUOTE: "I feel the subsequent viciousness of many of the boys is directly correlated to the excessive punishment and beatings they received at the reformatory."

A psychologist who worked for three years at the Porter Reformatory believes the heavy emphasis on punishment at the institution "made the boys' lives miserable without having the desired effect of rehabilitation."

Mr Ernst Kroneberg, who is a lecturer in pedagogics at Wesley Training College, resigned from Porter Reformatory in 1979 because of the racial prejudice of many staff members and because he felt "the nature of the institution was not likely to lead to rehabilitation."

Mr Kroneberg, who has 30 years experience as a teacher and psychologist, worked for many years in a British community home and regional assessment centre for children found guilty of committing offences. He has a master's degree in psychology from London University and is now writing his doctoral thesis on the treatment of juvenile delinquints in South Africa.

In an interview with Woman's Argus he described savage beatings which he witnessed at Porter. He also told of how basic health care was inadequate and how a man with a standard 5 education and no medical training decided whether the boys were fit to do punishment drill.

He said although some minor improvements had been made since the Coloured Representative Persons Council Committee of Inquiry into all welfare institutions, reform and industrial schools in 1979, basic conditions at the school remained unchanged.

He said Porter reminded him of "a French Rococo castle — the surroundings are beautiful and they have lovely ornamental ponds and flower beds but they are not doing things to improve the lot of the boys. The staff use the boys to create acceptable and charming conditions for themselves."

Boys were sent to the reformatory by magistrate or supreme courts instead of punishment. Yet rather than performing an educational role the reformatory had a punitive role.

During his time at the school the "number of beatings received by the boys each year had been quite phenomenal."

"Because of the nature of the staff and their prejudices they quite often interpret normal behaviour as insubordination. The thing that the boys most seriously objected to was that they were not given the opportunity to explain what happened — they were tried in a sort of kangaroo court where they had to prove they were not guilty."

"The staff members who administered the punishment did it with a degree of severity I found astonishing. Some of them would administer the strokes in as sadistic a manner as possible — really lamming out at the boys.

"I am of the opinion that if you hurt people that hurt produces aggression that must come out. I feel the subsequent viciousness of many of the boys is directly correlated to the excessive punishment and beatings they received at the reformatory.

"I'll give you an example. I saw one boy being given four of the hardest blows I have ever seen administered. I followed him outside and saw him strike out and really smash into the first boy he came across.

"To my mind there ought not to be any corporal punishment at all. There is no evidence that punishment creates any improvement in behaviour. Most Porter boys have probably been sentenced to at least two beatings by a magistrate before they arrive at the institution. It is usually only after they have committed a third offence that they are sentenced to a reformatory. If the whippings had helped they would not have landed at Porter."

"The reformatory has punishment codes which

allow for whippings even in the case of trivial offences like using the telephone without permission.

"The very fact that they have such complicated codes of punishment suggests that Porter is a punitive rather than a rehabilitiative institute."

Mr Kroneberg said boys who absconded from the reformatory were sometimes sentenced to whippings by the court and then whipped again on their return to Porter.

"In one case a boy who ran away from Porter and committed a crime was sentenced to five strokes by a magistrate. He was given the five strokes in the morning and when he returned to Porter in the afternoon given six more strokes for absconding," he said. "He got a total of 11 strokes in one day.

"Another factor that caused great distress was the inadequate health care. Although the District Surgeon made a weekly visit and seriously ill boys were sent to Victoria Hospital, daily health inspections were done by two wardens.

"One of the wardens had only a standard 5 education yet he was allowed to decide whether a boy should be admitted to the sick bay and more importantly whether he was fit to do punishment drill.

"The punishment drill consists of half an hour of continuous strong physical training. Any boy seen to falter is immediately caned. If a boy complains that he is in pain or ill the warden examines him. If he says nothing is wrong then the boy is given cuts for wasting time.

"Many of these boys are in poor physical condition when they arrive at the reformatory. They may have been in serious fights and have old injuries which trouble them. Yet they are suspected of malingering if they complain.

"One boy complained of severe headaches. He said he had been beaten on the head during a fight. They said he was putting it on. After I intervened he was admitted to hospital and found to have severe secondary syphilis."

Another "very unsatisfactory aspect" was the long period of retention. Boys were usually sentenced to two years in the reformatory.

Mr Kroneberg said: "If they committed the same offence as an adult they would often have got a far shorter prison term."

The chief aim of the institution seemed to be to make boys conform to the rules and regulations of the institution rather than teaching them to adapt to society. Often the type of boy who best conformed to the rules of the institution was most unsuccesful when he left.

"We had one boy whose behaviour at Porter was top rate yet a week after leaving he landed in prison. In my opinion there is no rehabilitation at all if rehabilitation means going out into society and adapting and living with other people," said Mr Kroneberg.

"Being deprived of the normal social activities of a free society is punishment enough. The longer you keep young people away from free society the harder it is for them to adapt when they return.

"They don't learn to relate to their families because their mothers and fathers are allowed visits only once a month. They are not allowed visits by their brothers and sisters or their friends. How can they form and maintain meaningful relationships if they're not given the opportunity to meet people?

"Porter's answer to the boys' problems is to beat them or keep them longer. If they don't improve after two years then they are kept for three years.

"Take the case of three of my boys, who were kept at Porter in excess of two years. Soon after their release they were hanged because they murdered a former pupil of Porter by beating him to death with bricks and spades."

The final irony came when the boys were released.

"Porter sends boys out with the clothes they have on and perhaps R 1.50 in their pockets and then wonders why they end up in prison. No preparation is made at the material level to allow them to adjust to society. In most cases their parents haven't the money to support them.

"One of our best behaved boys — a champion runner who never committed an offence in the institution — was sent home to Pretoria to his blind father and crippled mother. They had no means of supporting him and within a week he was caught stealing and sent to prison.

"If they are going to sentence boys to two years in the reformatory then the last six months should be spent doing work which is remunerated so the boys can have some savings to tide them over when they are released. The little they do earn is absorbed in buying things like toothpaste and cigarettes.

"Any boy who comes to Porter has to make the decision within the first few days as to which gang he will join for his self protection. Boys came to me and said they did not want to join a gang but they had to for their own self-protection. A new boy needs friends and gang membership assures him of friends, protection against assault and sodomy and also some of the necesities he needs.

Mr Kroneberg said that in contrast to Porter, boys at the British insitutions where he worked were never caned.

"Punishment consisted of taking away rights rather than whippings and we would try and get the child to reflect on the reasons for his behaviour which was a great deal more constructive," he said.

Cases were individually assessed by a team of psychologists, psychiatrists, a social worker, teachers and the boys' house parents.

"The important thing was that very little consideration was taken of the boy's past in relating to his future. You were concerned with the boy and not so much what he has done."

The number of boys at the reformatories was small and at the institution where he worked the staff to pupil ratio was three to one.

"You were always aware of the individual and were able to do a much more worthwhile and effective job because you could develop a personal relationship with the children," Mr Kroneberg sais. "The interests of the child came first rather than the efficiency with which you could run the institution."

LINDA VERGNANI

PORTER REPLIES

These are the main points in a written reply by the Directorate of Education of the Department of Internal Affairs to the allegations made by Mr Kroneberg.

● "Corporal punishment is applied at this institution strictly in accordance with the Children's Act (Act 33 of 1960). In addition, in order to make quite sure that at no Children's Act institution of the directorate excessive punishment is given, guidelines have been issued to principals by the directorate and must be strictly adhered to. The punishment code you referred to has not substantially changed (from 1979). The application and the effect of corporal punishment is reviewed periodically and as a result of the latter corporal punishment does not now feature prominently.

● "Punishment drill was abolished in January 1982.

● "Regarding medical attention, all senior personnel and those in charge of hostels have instructions to keep a close check on the health of inmates. Psychologists, school teachers, superintendents at hostels and heads of departments are notified when inmates suffer light injuries. They are immediately referred to the sick bay. Serious cases are referred to the Victoria Hospital. Many cases are referred directly to the District Surgeon who visits the institution once weekly and who is also on standby. There is also a standby assistant day and night to take emergency cases to hospital.

"There has been a long standing vacancy for a qualified nursing sister for which no applications were received. Fortunately an appointment has now been made with effect from November 1, 1982. Inmates with serious psychopathological problems are referred to the full-time registered clinical psychologist on the staff who arranges referral to a psychiatric hospital when necessary.

● "Inmates who are discharged from the institution and have to travel overnight to their destination receive R1.50 pocket money per night as prescribed by the directorate as well as provisions for their journey and their rail ticket. Most of the inmates also have their own money received from their parents, deposited in a savings bank account and controlled by this institution. These amounts are paid out to them when they leave. Great care is taken to ensure that no child is released without being adequately provided for in all respects.

● "An observation that Porter School is seen as a punitive institution is doing it an injustice as it is in fact a rehabilitation and care centre for juvenile delinquents. Therapy is an important form of rehabilitation in which punishment hardly plays a significant role. The major emphasis is on academic and technical training and education in its broadest sense. One should expect that in any institution of this nature behavioural problems do come to the fore and strict but fair disciplinary action is enforced. Problems are in the first instance referred to the psychology section where the principle of a psychotherapeutic approach receives preference in solving emotional and behavioural problems.

"In conclusion the directorate would like to point out that Mr Kroneberg, on whose information your article is based, was employed as a teacher psychologist at the Porter School for approximately four years until 1980. During this period Mr Kroneberg who lays claim to a knowledge of the British reformatory system never at any time made any suggestions or recommendations to the directorate concerning an improvement to the rehabilitation programme in vogue in Children's Act institutions in South Africa. It must also be pointed out that Mr Kroneberg's experience of Children's Act schools is extremely limited, being confined to the relatively short period spent at Porter. He is thus hardly in a position to express an authoratative opinion on the South African system or to express valid criticism. He has also never been registered as a psychologist with the South African Medical and Dental Council.

"While Mr Kroneberg can most probably make worthwhile comments on educational matters which fall within the purview of his experience, it is apparent that he is not qualified to judge on the directorate's Children's Act institutions. From the nature and spirit of certain of his observations his impartiality to achieve objectivity is seriously questioned."

The reply is signed by the Press liason officer for the Director of Education.

NOTE: Mr Kroneberg is registered as a psychologist with the British Psychological services. He says: "When I returned to South Africa I did not register with the Medical and Dental Council because it was unnecessary for my work at Porter."

PRISONS: PAUL'S STORY

Look I'm going to jail tomorrow (for seven years for stabbing a policeman) and I'm a bit heartsore. Jail isn't a place for a human being. Prison life is no life. I'm really sorry I'm going there. Although this is the land where I was born they make me feel not part of it. I've got a pale complexion. I know my daddy was European. But he had to leave my mommy because of these Dutch laws, what do they call it... the Immorality Act. After that things were bad for us... some nights you'd come back, all four of us, and there'd just be two cups of black coffee. We used to make up stories... and steal mild from doorsteps and bread from the bakery. That's how I started stealing, doing this and that just to make ends meet. Sometimes I'd think: "when was the last meal - yesterday afternoon at 4 o'clock and its already again 4 o'clock and I haven't eaten yet". Now you can think for yourself... you can go blind, you must have something to eat. Who is going to give you food for nothing? But when I was little I was very wakey, you know. What makes me wakey wakey? Hard times!.

Then I ran away from home, I started getting naughty, then I came under probation. You understand? They always take me home again, but oraait, life there is just the same, I didn't want to be there because my father he was not there. I just left. I went to school as far as Standard 6 - but most of my time when I was small I spent in a reformatory... my parents were very poor.

Reformatory is hard when you're a little lightie. Like I got solitary confinement... locked up one, one. There you got a cup of castor oil - three fingers of milk. And if you drink that it makes you start shitting, you know, everything out. You become so hungry you don't know what to do with yourself - only a lavatory pot with you. You get a dose each day for three days. By the thrid day you're so weak you can't stand. Then on the fourth day they take you out and give you a full ration. But you're so sick you can't eat.

Then on the fifth day you go back for three days - perhaps you get 12 days like this. And when you finished you go straight into the span (work team). They don't even keep you in the yard to get your strength back.

The authority thing there got me. Every morning you do P.T. These exercises are not to help you, they are to day "I am the boss here. You do as I say, not like the way you want it". It's running up steps and down steps for an hour.

So I ran away. I was working in the officer's room one night and I saw the main gate's key there. I took it and a hat and scarf with a handkerchief and a mouthorgan and went. I was lying in the grass outside and I could hear them hunting for me. I could hear them say if they got me they would murder me. But they passed me. I stayed out three days before they caught me. They undressed me and locked me in a cell. Then at 5 o'clock they made the whole reformatory stand in two lines with towels. They're canvas towels, they're hard, they crack like something breaking when you dry yourself. The two lines had to fold the towel like and ox's tail and I had to walk between them and everyone hit me - as hard as they could. There were about 500 guys! After that they pulled me over a table - your arms one way and your legs the other way - and they gave me 12 shots with the heavy cane on my back. I've still got blue marks all over - also on my sides, ribs, my arms and some on my neck.

Alright I got over that, and I escaped again. I went to join the army - but the reformatory people were there signing in a batch of reformatory boys. They caught me and said I was too young for the army and couldn't sign the papers. But I wanted to and they found my dad and he signed. So I joined the army. That was December 1939. I went to Robben Island for a six-week course and then Durban. There were a lot of gangsters and crooks in the Cape Corps! After that I went to Port St Johns then to the desert. We went on and on - 1940, 1941, 1942. We were digging trenches and they said the coloureds weren't fighting. But we were fucking carrying rifles and bullets and why do you do that if you're not fighting?

Then in 1943 - I think it was June - Tubruk fell. I got caught. I was stabbed in the chest with a bayonet... there's still a big hole, it came right out the back. They left me there thinking I was dead. Then the German's Red Cross came behind and took me in an ambulance to a concentration camp. There I was again! Then they were moving us one day - about 50 in a truck. We started smoking dagga which we

had and blowing at the guard. He was sitting there with a machine gun and he was yawning and sleepy. We jumped on him and killed him. We made a hole in the side of the truck and got out. We drove until we came to a farm with Italians. Fucking traitors! They can't fight. But they called the Americans who took us to the British lines.

We went to England for about two months and then they sent us back to South Africa. They said they would give us trucks and things to help us out after the army. But where are they?

My people didn't expect me. I went to see my mother and she said it's no use going home to your wife because she's having an affair with another man. I didn't want to believe it. I went to the house that night. I knew where the key was so I went in at the back door and locked the door behind me. I locked the front door and took the key also. Then I went to the room where my wife was lying with this other man. I took out a bayonet. They were so intimate with each other they didn't even notice me. So I stabbed him, thinking I was stabbing through both of them together. But she jumped out and ran away.

So I received a sentence for the hangman's noose. I went to Pretoria for three months. One morning they called us and I thought it was time but I never heard the preacher come around yet. We were 12 in Death Row. Then the one officer said to the other: "Take this one (me) to the office." Then he told me they wanted to give me a chance because I had been fighting for my land. But they said I mustn't fight with my own land's people. I got a life sentence. The other 11 were hanged. I never got the rope. And as with life, I finished it. And then again I went to prison. And tomorrow prison again.

When I went in for life there were about 60 men in one cell. Long-term indeterminate sentence prisoners. There was a lot of fighting in jail. And there was a code among them. There's the 26, 27, 28 and Big Five. The code among them is not actually a piece of paper that you carry. You have to remember - Die Boek. Die Wet. Die Plank. This prison gang thing started on the mines. Each gang has a judge, a magistrate, a doctor and an office man they call a mbalan who takes the names of new

recruits. Each gang identifies itself by singing. They must tell each other things through stories. When you come in they try to frighten you when you are in that fearful stage and they watch you.

When this thing first started there were two gangs. They used to rob people. One would rob you with his mind, the other would rob you with force. Then some pulled out and made another gang, and then there were three. That's where they come from. They are different to outside gangs. But they are connected. Like when we're outside I do you a dirty and then you tell your brother and when I come inside the prison I'm finished. But they work different. In prison they come up behind you and stab you. Outside its by force... they'll grab you and your gun and jump into the car and there you go to Texas.

Inside, it they like your trousers they take them. You can't say nothing. And if you do you're gonna be stabbed. When you make a fault with these people they go and sit in a kring (circle) first. Then they discuss you. Then three men get the knife. They issue it from the magazine stores - they've underground. And if the knife is taken out it doesn't come back the way it went out. Its gotta come back with blood or a report behind it. The three men are: one to stab and two to escort and do the job if he misses. They use a short blade for punishment shots and a long one for hang-paal. The sentence of a magistrate is a short blade and of a judge its a long blade.

Now if its a 26 they stab you in this way: A light sentence, the first, is in six minutes, the second in six hours, the third in six days, the fourth in six weeks and the fifth in six years. So like for the last one you know they're gonna stab you for what you've done but don't know when for <u>six years</u>! Even if you're transferred to another prison the sentence goes with you. You think nobody knows you but they're there, just waiting.

World prison population figures per 100 000 of the total national population
imprisonment per 100 000 of population
0
100
200
300
400
South Africa
United States
Kenya
Venezuela
Ivory Coast
Tunisia
Sierra Leone
Britain
Australia
Dahomey
France
Sweden
Nigeria
India
Netherlands
Cambodia

> That's how prison life is. It's terrible man. Now if I'm not a gangster what am I to do? Save myself? You know I don't like violence. It's not a matter of being violent. But sometimes prisoners make you mad because they interfere with your self-respect. You are not worrying anybody but they are worrying you. I'm a slow starter. I take long to get cross. But when I get cross nothing will stop me, not even my mother. And she's dead now. You must join something. To be loose means everyone can clout and kick you whenever he likes, even fuck you. So you have to join something. And what is right is right. I'll die for it. And if there's a way I can help to get South Africa down, especially white South Africa, I'll do it.

Black Panther activist George Jackson commented that 'black men born in the United States and fortunate enough to live past the age of 18 are conditioned to accept the inevitability of prison... I was prepared for prison. It required only minor psychic adjustments.'[32]

In South Africa the problem is, if anything, more acute with a prison population among the highest in the world. The daily average of inmates is around 100 000.[33]

A racial breakdown of the South African prison population per 100 000 (official statistics here are obsessively racial) for the period June 1979 to June 1980 was:

Coloureds: 729 per 100,000 of the Coloured population
Africans: 362 per 100,000 of the African population
Whites: 81 per 100,000 of the White population
Asians: 57 per 100,000 of the Asian population.[34]

The figure for so-called coloureds is extremely high - 66% higher than the national average, which is in turn one of the highest in the world. It is nearly double the figure for Africans, even although the number of black prisoners is inflated by the many sentenced for technical (mainly Pass) offences which do not affect the coloured population.

The rate of recidivism (repeated conviction and imprisonment) is also extremely high and rising. Between 1965 and 1975 it rose by 13%. A study of former male prisoners in Cape Town showed an alrming cycle of institutionalisation take place:

63.6% had been in prison between 1 and 3 times
36.4% had been in prison 4 times or more
53.6% had been to a reformatory at least once
32.6% had been in a children's home
36% had been in a school of industry, and
16.8% had been treated in a psychiatric hospital.[35]

To go by statistics, more criminal activity takes place in Cape Town than anywhere else in the country. In 1979 the city, with 18% of the population among South Africa's principle urban areas, had 25% of the reported crime. Johannesburg, with 23% of the population, had 18% of the crime.[36] At this point officials, and often the Press, tend to settle for the analysis that 'the Coloured temperament is crime and violence prone'. And the statistics 'prove' it. But this is a form of selective myopia. Firstly one must remember that <u>other</u> South African cities 'export' their unemployed and destitute to Bantustans through a cruel system of Passes and labour legislation. This skews conviction

and prison statistics in their 'favour'. And secondly people defined as coloured are subjected to a more subtle but often more damaging form of racism than Africans. This tends to raise their living standard goals while binding them to second-class income possibilities. Commenting on a parallel situation in the U.S., George Jackson points out that:

> after one concedes that racism is stamped unalterably into the present nature of (the) socio-political and economic life in general . . . and concede further that criminals and crime arise from material, economic, socio-political causes, we can then burn all of the criminology and penology libraries and direct our attention to where it will do some good . . . For a real understanding of the failure of prison policies, it is senseless to continue to study the criminal . . . men are brutalised by their environment - not the reverse.[37]

People defined as 'non-white' are in one way or another prisoners of an oppressive structure whether they are inside or outside prison. But for thousands of people in Cape Town the prison - like the reformatory - has become a way of life. What they find there is taken back onto the streets when they are released. To understand the street-corner culture it is therefore essential to begin to understand the rhythm of life in the prisons.

Prison gangs

Tradition places the origin of prison gangs in the early days of the Rand mines. An official report, based purely on oral tradition, has their date of origin as 1920 when a Zulu named Paul Mabasa came up to the Witwatersrand to work on the mines.[38] Another report, based on both oral and documentary sources, finds evidence of these gangs during the

Boer War, 20 years earlier.[39] According to this work, by Charles van Onselen, the origin of the first prison gang, the 28s, came about in this way:

A man called Mzoozepi, born in 1867, migrated to the Rand from Harrismith in 1887. He finally secured employment with four gentlemen who subsequently turned out to be robbers. After a brief apprenticeship with these four he broke away to operate independently. He joined a group of 'sigebengas' (criminals) and started practicing the 'abathelisa' trick (impersonating officials to rob migrants on their way home).[40]

> Mzoozepi changed his name to Jan Note and rose to second in command of a band of Izegelekege (brigands) under Mohlopa. This gang numbering some 200 hid in the caves and hills south of Johannesburg at a place called Shabulawawa.[41]

After Mohlopa's imprisonment and subsequent conversion to Christianity, Jan Note assumed command of the gang. Note himself derived inspiration from the Bible, saying that he read in the Book of Nahum

> about the state of Nineveh which rebelled against the Lord and I selected this name for my Gang as rebels against the Government's laws.[42]

Jan Note then changed his name to Nongoloza and began to tighten discipline in his 'umkosi wa Ntaba' (regiment of the hills). 'I had', he wrote, 'an induna called the Governor-General. I had my fighting general on the model of the Boer Vecht general. The administration of justice was confined to a judge for serious cases and a landdrost for petty cases. The medical

side was entrusted to a chief doctor or inyanga. Then I had colonels, captains and sergeants in charge of the rank and file soldiers.'[43] By 1903 the Izelegelekege had found their way into the Amalaita brigand bands in Natal and their presence was noted in the Pietermaritzburg prison (to this day the 28 gang is referred to alternatively as Nongoloza, Amalaita or Ninevites).

At a certain stage one of Nongoloza's lieutenants, Kikilijaan (or Ngelejane) broke away to form the 27 gang. It seems that the split occurred over Kikilijaan's refusal to accept the Ninevite custom of homosexuality. There is some doubt over why numbers were chosen as gang names. One account says the leaders parted with 28 fighters and 27 fighters.[44] Another says the officers divided their allegiance seven to eight in the two gangs.[45] The third major prison gang, the 26s, evidently came about when Kikilijaan, locked in the isolation cells in Pietermaritzburg, gave permission to six 'voeltjies' (non-gang members) to operate as a gang, supplying the 27 gang with money and tobacco. In return the 27s would protect the 26s by fighting on their behalf.[46] All three gangs agreed not to fight among themselves and defined for themselves different times and areas of operation (28s from sunset to midnight, 27s and 26s from midnight to sunrise).

In 1907 Nongoloza was detained in Volksrust prison. By 1912 his Ninevites were to receive Parliamentary attention because of waves of crime and because of the visible existence on the Rand of a disciplined army of soldiers operating outside the law.[47] It was recognised that to throw the Ninevites into prison was to put them into the heart of the gang operation. A state crackdown occurred both within and outside prisons.

Gangs on the Rand were flushed out of disused mine shafts and gang membership in prison was made punishable. Nongoloza had his life sentence commuted on condition he disclaimed any involvement with gangs. He later became a 'native' constable.

By 1914 the Minster of Justice was confident that the State had the upper hand outside prisons, and by about 1920 the gangs were non-existent in their original form. But they had become entrenched in the prisons, and were operating inside these institutions on the Rand as well as in Durban, Cape Town and Kimberley. In 1927 the gang opened operations in Barberton Prison.[48]

Prison gang structure

Present-day prison gangs are both an ideological response to an unequal system, and a method by which scarce resources are both obtained and allocated. The Institute of Criminology found in a study that in a prison:

> the scraping of butter off one's bread, the splitting of matches, etc., are an attempt to create a small surplus, a bargainingship in dealing and swopping. The competition and reward flowing from the distribution of forbidden dagga and cash is even more intense . . .[49]

Although they have a long history, the gangs cannot be explained only in terms of this history, and they draw their life from the present prison conditions and culture. The gangs, the Institute found, were

> organised in a heirarchically ordered quasi-military structure. Membership is in form, though not in reality, voluntary. Membership is further non-racial and non-ethnic. Each gang draws on its own oral tradition and bears its distinctive colourful (but mostly imaginary) uniforms, tattoos, flags, salutes and other military paraphanalia.[50]

Each rank has specific duties and their officers 'wear' distinctive but imaginary uniforms. If an officer is transferred to another prison he will be asked to identify himself by describing this 'uniform' in exact detail and by reciting 'The Book' (a code of orally-transmitted laws). The uniform that is worn, for example, by a 'Neksman' is brown boots and white leggings with three buckles on each. khaki trousers with a thin red stripe down the outside of the legs and a jacket with silver buttons, a khaki helmet with a white band on which is fixed the gang number (26). The sign of rank is worn on the right forearm and a revolver (a spoon) is worn on the right side. A notebook is also carried in which the names of new members are written. A regular soldier does not wear the sign of rank and carries a rifle (a tin mug with a length of cloth looped through the handle - a deadly weapon). The Judge wears a dark cloak over his clothes, Captains carry an imaginary radio, and a General wears six gold stars on each shoulder.[51]

Each gang distinguishes itself from the others according to its goals:

> The 28s pamper, protect and organise catamites or 'wyfies'. The 26 steal and rob by patience and cunning. The 27 protect and enforce the codes of 27 and 26 . . . The Big Five (25) through informing and collaborating with the authorities seek to maximise their privileges (very often these are men who turn State witnesses in trials).[52]

The ranking within the gangs is highly structured. The 28s have a 'Bloodline' (the 'male' line) which commits violence and protects their 'wives', and the'Private' line which comprises the sexual partners of the fighters and who do 'feminine' domestic chores. Ranking in the 26 gang is as follows:

Government Makwezie
General No. 1
Inspector No. 1
Doctor No. 1
Mbalan No. 1 (clerk)
Prokureur No. 1 (advocate)
Landdros No. 1 (magistrate)
Judge No. 1
Captain No. 1

General No. 2
Inspector No. 2
Doctor No. 2
Mbalan No. 2
Judge No. 2
Captain No. 2

Sergeant Major
Sergeant No. 2
Sergeant No. 1
The'Heksman' (guard)
Soldiers.[53]

The Institute of Criminology's conclusions about prison gangs are interesting. It found that although the distribution of services and scarce resources was perhaps at the core of gang formation there were other inducements. One arose because of the high prison-inmate turnover and the diffuclty an ex-prisoner faced in getting a job and re-integrating into the community. The man was thus constantly aware that he might return to prison. Therefore turning to the prison sub-culture was a form of investment, in that it

brought rewards and security as well as eventual rank and prestige. And because the gangs are nationwide he would keep his rank whatever prison he was sent to. A more subtle appeal to join a gang was the separation of inmates from their family or community.

> The separation may be the result of the inability to correspond (illiteracy), or the inability to visit the inmate because of the cost of travelling. Or the separation may simply be the rejection by the family of a prisoner who has begun to serve a long-term sentence. Or his family may have disintegrated.[54]

The result is that the prisoner is cut off from external sources of cash or food, and this may force him to move away from an outward-looking perspective and turn towards the prison community for security and brotherhood. He will then measure his self-esteem in terms of the standards of the prison sub-culture and join a gang.

Once in the gang the laws of the brotherhood take over. At an initiation of a 26 gang member the 'Doctor' steps up to the initiate, and bending his arm says: 'I bend your arm and break your power and share it with all the members of the 26. We are equally strong. If you do wrong, you must take your punishment (from slaps to the death sentence - DP). If you refuse then you still have your own strength and your brothers will kill you because we have only 26 thoughts and we share our power equally.'[55] A soldier in the 28 gang must swear to abide by rules which include the following:

1. You must not talk behind your brothers' back.
2. You must not let down a brother.
3. You own nothing. From now on everything you own belongs to the gang.
4. You will not work with the white people.
5. You will not do a 'wyfies' (catemite's) work.
6. You will die beside your brother for the gang.
7. You will not interfere with the 'wyfie' of another 28 member.[56]

For the gangs, prison becomes analogous to a war zone. The us/them or boer/bandiet dichotomy is built up on hostile stereotypes situated in a quasi-military set-up:

> Armed and uniformed guards keep custody over quasi-military prison gangs . . . gang members cannot and will not seek to utilise warder or institutional channels to resolve conflicts . . . (and) violence is a more potent and likely form of resolving a dispute because the disputants cannot leave the field.[57]

George Jackson, the American prison activist, regards prisons as 'asylums in which none of the inmates are cured and many are driven insane . . . they are sent out of the prison more damaged physically and mentally than when they entered'.[58] They are also sent out into the very same social environments which gave rise to their 'criminality' in the first place. Into these environments they bring the skills learned in the prisons and the brotherhood of the gangs. It would therefore be surprising if, as the Institute of Crimonology's study erroneously suggests, there was no connection between prison gangs and the street brotherhoods.

Indeed one of the 'super gangs' of the Cape Flats, the Mongrels, is a street version of the 26s. Members abide by the '26 thoughts' (laws) of the prison gang. The Mongrels draw on the prisons for members, organisation and skills. This connection is yet another piece in the puzzle which makes up the hundreds of street gangs of the Cape Flats.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7

1. M. Goldberg: President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 1976, Washington Government Printing Office, p. 230. Quoted in M. Slabbert: Repetitive Cycles, Institute of Criminology, UCT. 1980.

2. W. Barnard: 514 cases at the Retreat Magistrates Court, Institute of Criminology, 1981.

3. Literally farmer/bandit. However 'boer' also carries the meaning of Afrikaner and, more particularly, policeman.

4. Quoted in Muriel Horrel: The education of the Coloured community in South Africa, 1652 to 1970, S.A. Institute of Race Relations, JHB. 1970 p. 3.

5. Ibid. p. 4.

6. Ibid. p. 14.

7. Ibid. p. 98.

8. The dates for compulsory education for 'coloureds' was staggered as follows:

7-year-olds	- 1974
Up to the age of 8	- 1975
Up to the age of 9	- 1976
Up to the age of 12	- 1977
Up to the age of 13	- 1978
Up to the age of 14	- 1979

Source: Report of the Administration of Coloured Affairs 1978-79

9. Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1980. S.A. Institute of Race Relations p. 483.

10. Ibid. p. 482.

11. D.G. Glasgow: The Black Underclass: poverty, unemployment and entrapment of ghetto youth. Vintage Books, New York, 1981.

12. Ibid. pp. 63, 64, 65.

13. See D. Pinnock: Elsies River, Institute of Criminology, UCT, 1980.

14. J. Thomas & A. Blau: Coloured Unemployment in Bishop Lavis: the story behind the statistics - S.A. Labour and Development Research Unit, UCT, 1982.

15. Mana Slabbert, op. cit. pp 22-26.

16. D. Pinnock 1981

17. Muslim News Vol. 21 No. 22, November 1981.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. The Church News 1876 (month undated). St. Michaels Children's Home archives.

21. The interview was conducted at the Bruce Duncan Home in Hanover Park. The work of Mr. Bruce Duncan on the Cape Flats is of inestimable value, I am also indebted to him for his assistance in this work.

22. The breakdown inmate population was:

Faure School for Girls	110
Faure School for Boys	252
Wellington School of Industry for girls	95
Ottery School of Industries for Boys	299
Porter Reformatory	516
Bonnytoun Place of Safety	200

(Source: Department of Coloured Affairs)

23. House of Assembly Reports of Select Committees 1881 (A1 1881).

24. Ibid. (A17, 1891).

25. Interview with previous staff member 'A' who requested to remain anonymous.

26. Staff member 'B'.

27. Staff member 'A'.

28. Staff member 'B'.

29. Staff member 'B'. The reference is: "You fucking hottentot, I'll kick your wind out, your fucking mouth out".

30. Staff member 'C'.

31. Staff member 'A'.

32. Soledad Brother: the prison letters of George Jackson, Jonathan Cape and Penguin, 1970, p. 27.

33. A fuller list is:

World Prison Population Figures per 100,000 of the population

Republic of South Africa	440	Germany	81
United States of America	189	United Kingdom	75
Columbia	178	Australia	70
El Salvador	175	Syrian Arab Republic	69
Kenya	165	Iraq	59
Venezuela	150	Equador	58
Israel	137	Belgium	58
Thailand	133	Dahomey	55
Ivory Coast	130	Denmark	54
Fiji	124	Phillipines	53
Jamaica	121	France	52
Panama & Lebanon	120	Italy	51
Argentina	109	Portugal	44
Chile & Morocco	108	Sweden	43
Austria	104	Japan	43
Tunisia	103	Nigeria	42
Finland	101	Spain	40
Sri Lanka	98	Norway	39
Canada	95	Malasia	37
Sierra Leone	88	India	36
Trinidad & Tobago	86	Ireland	35
New Zealand	85	Cyprus	31
Mexico	83	Netherlands	21
		Cambodia	9

Source: Mana Slabbert: Repetitive Cycles, an analysis of socialisation and institutionalisation patterns and discussion of crime prevention, intervention and diversion strategies, Institute of Criminology, UCT, 1980 p. 50.

34. The Argus October 14 1980 based on calculations by M. Slabbert, UCT.

35. M. Slabbert: Repetitive Cycles, op. cit. p. 29.

36. Op. Cit. p. 2.

37. George Jackson, op. cit. p. 42.

38. Bendebedrywighede in Gevangenisse en die Ontstaan Daarvan (28, 27 en 26 bendes) (Brandvlei Report).

39. C. van Onselen: South Africa's lumpenproletarian army: 'Umkosi Wa Ntaba' - the 'Regiment of the Hills', 1890-1920. I.C.S. Collected Seminar Papers Vol. 7 1976.

40. This summary of van Onselen's paper is from: Towards an Understanding of prison gangs, Institute of Criminology, U.C.T. 1981 p. 2.

41. Ibid. p. 2.

42. Ibid. p. 2.

43. Jan Note's Life. 'Introduction to Crime', Department of Justice Annual Report 1912, pp 238-240. Quoted in Institute of Criminology, U.C.T., op. cit. p. 3.

44. Van Onselen, op. cit.

45. Brandvlei Report, a report into gang conditions in Brandvlei Prison (undated).

46. Towards an understanding of prison gangs, p. 4.

47. Ibid. p. 5.

48. Ibid. p. 5.

49. Ibid. p. 29.

50. Ibid. p. 6.

51. Brandvlei Report p. 16.

52. Ibid. p. 7.

53. Ibid. p. 8.

54. Towards an understanding of prison gangs, op. cit. p. 30.

55. Ibid. p. 10.

56. Brandvlei Report p. 12.

57. Towards an understanding of prison gangs, op. cit. pp. 26, 27.

58. George Jackson, op. cit. p. 49.

8

POLICING THE APARTHEID CITY

Whether liberal or conservative, most commentators on the role of the police in South Africa share a common assumption: They take the existence of the police for granted. They assume that any modern society necessarily has to have a large and ever-present body of people whose job it is to coerce other people. The police are seen either as a necessary component in the growing complexity of modern urban society, or as the thin blue line between order and anarchy. Always they are considered to be the mechanism of social control. We must dig beneath these assumptions.

Any apparatus of the State (and it is well to remember that the police are a state apparatus) is dependent on the form of that state. In South Africa the state has been responding to a hegemonic crisis of long duration, continually balancing and rebalancing its forces in order to reabsorb control. The result has been a shift of weight within the police force and between it and the S.A. Defence Force. It makes no sense to consider these shifts in isolation from the central impetus of control coming from the state itself. So it is to this that we must turn as a starting point.

Until the mid-1970s internal control in South Africa was predominantly a police function. Between 1945 and 1960 the Force doubled, by which stage it was more than twice the size of the SADF.[1] Until the early 1970s the SAP were also responsible for most border patrols in Namibia and elsewhere. The political power of the police apparatus came to be centralised in the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) under Lt. General H.S. van der Bergh who, together with the Prime Minister (B.J. Vorster) and the Minister of the Interior (Connie Mulder) was a key figure in the formulation of state policy. All

three men were to be toppled from power in a drawn-out bloodless coup by the military after what became known as the 'Muldergate' information scandal in the mid-1970s.

Details of the coup are not relevant here except to say that when the report of the Auditor-General disclosed the first irregularities in the accounts of the Department of Information, the 'verligte' forces were presented with an ideal opportunity to discredit the hard-core 'verkramptes': Mulder, van der Bergh and, later, Vorster. Military strong-man P.W. Botha (Defence Minister since 1964) was elected prime minister in 1978, and the head of the SADF, General Magnus Malan became his Minister of Defence.

The new alliance was not so much the product of a conspiracy (although there were traces of this) as a convergence of interest among various elements within the state which had begun to form a relatively coherent position. We were to see the decline of BOSS and a closer alliance between the national bourgeoisie and the military. More than ever, though, the army came to be given an institutionalized role in the executive. The expanding role of the SADF was signalled by General Malan in February 1977:

> There are those who see only two basic points of view. On the one side war (which is horrible), on the other peace (which is good). In this situation the soldier who has to do the fighting is seen as a necessary evil.
>
> I do not subscribe to such a simplistic view. There is no such thing as total peace at any given time . . . The Defence Force cannot be seen as a separate entity. Some see strategy only as the means of fighting and winning a war. But in a mature state the fundamental conflict entails far more than war. It means the

> formulation of national objectives in which all the country's resources are mustered and managed on a co-ordinated level to ensure survival.[2]

A month later he outlined the evolvement of a purely military iniative into a verligte 'game plan' which was to be implemented at all levels of the state:

> A: "All my answers must be seen within the framework of the concept of total war. In this I refer to the Mao Tse-tung interpretation which has become the essential character of revolutionary strategy since the end of World War II. It implies that every activity of a state must be seen and understood as a function of total war."
>
> Q: "Has any attempt been made to devise such a total strategy for South Africa - to work out a game plan whereby all the different elements are co-ordinated to meet the continuing challenge to our security?"
>
> A: "Yes. There are, of course, two characteristic snags with which we are constantly confronted: The conflicting requirements of a total strategy and a democratic system of government. The fact that strategy is dynamic and requires constant and continued adaptation. A 'game plan' is, of course, the theoretical ideal. We are working towards something like it within the restrictions inherent in our democratic institutions."
>
> Q: "Would this (co-ordination with commerce and industry) not require continual forward planning, involving some sort of superbody and co-ordinated command structures at national, regional and local level?"

A. "I would baulk at the term 'superbody' but otherwise I agree. I would refer you once again to the problem of reconciling democratic principles with total strategy within the framework of our existing Constitution."

Q. "At what point would this (coordinated planning at all levels) require a total rethink of all our national resources, including, as you suggest, manpower?"

A. The time for a 'rethink' of all our national resources is now . . .
This 'rethink' definitely does not mean changes in the Constitution or social system, but it aims at a reorientation of activities within the framework of the prevailing order . . . For whites, moderate blacks and co-operative tribal leaders the issue at stake is survival. . . .
We must satisfy the country's military needs while at the same time expanding our peacetime economy. It demands an unprecedented economic flexibility to shift back and forth along a sliding scale between a war and a peace economy according to prevailing priorities.
This demand, on which our survival may well depend, means that the economy must be able to handle at the same time: conflict and development; survival and growth; central guidance, free enterprise."[3]

This conflict/development approach was soon to mature into a co-ordinated Total Strategy. In short, it was seen to be necessary to grant limited concessions, a 'reorientation of activities within the framework of the prevailing order'. As with state housing, each concession was a response to pressure put on the state by the oppressed people and their organisations, but each aimed to absorb the conflict by carrying with it the means to

co-opt a 'black middle class'. In this the state had by then gained a breathing space through the spatial re-organization of white cities and its curb on progressive black politics:

> The 'Age of Social Engineers' (as T.R.H. Davenport called it) is over: coloured and Indian people have been removed from most desirable residential and trading areas, largely to the benefit of Afrikaner workers and petty bourgeois elements. The market can now be trusted to retain these patterns. Likewise, disenfranchising the coloured and Indian populations was a Nationalist priority in the 1940s and 1950s, when they feared black votes could be used to oust them, but the NP is now confident enough of its ability to co-opt leading segments that it is willing to re-admit them (in terms of the President's Council proposals) to a subordinate political role.[4]

These reforms and concessions, however, were unable to solve the problem of growing urban unemployment nor, on their own, contain the intensifying resistance. So alongside the co-optive strategies was to go increased repression. In other words the reforms were to be a complement to, and not a substitute for, increased repression. (The coercive side of this concession/repression couplet of Total Strategy was to confuse many opposition commentators hopeful about the Botha government's new deal.)

From about 1976, however, the structures of co-optation and control began to break down. There are several reasons for this. One is certainly the implementation of some of the Riekert commission proposals about urban blacks. The commission, which delivered its report in 1979, recommended certain advantages in jobs and housing be granted to those blacks who had rights qualifying them to remain in urban areas. 'Qualifieds' would be

able to change jobs without going through a labour bureau (which control the allocation of African labour). They would also be allowed to change urban areas and have their families with them in the towns. The full implication of the Riekert proposals became clear in the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill which was debated in 1982. The Bill sought to push the fine for the employment of 'illegal' blacks to R5,000 plus 12 months in prison. The effect of these penalties, as Sheena Duncan of the Black Sash has pointed out, would make everyone into a policeman to enforce the legislation.[5] Another effect would be a massive step-up of pass raids, an increase of poverty and misery in the Bantustans where these people would be sent, and probably a radicalisation of black awareness among progressive worker organisations. This last point has come to the fore as the State finds itself increasingly unable to 'deliver the goods' of Total Strategy's co-optive wing.

By the early 1970s a new generation of young people had emerged, untouched by the repression of the early 1960s and increasingly angry about poverty and the shortage of school facilities and township amenities. In a recessionary period, furthermore, the most important stream of state patronage - housing - began drying up.[6] Among the results were the schools boycotts in 1976 and again in 1980. Despite the heavy death tolls among students and workers the people were not cowed, and the boycotts led to intense trade union activity and the rapid growth of township civic associations organising around grass-roots issues. The rejection of state solutions can be seen from the 90 per cent stay-away in the 1981 S.A. Indian Council elections, and by the solidarity between 'legal' and 'illegal' blacks in strike action.[7]

with armed engagements on several borders of the state, the South African army of the 1980s could, in General Malan's words, definitely be seen to be engaged in a 'total war'.

This growth of the SADF was reflected at all levels of the state and particularly in the formation and composition of the all-powerful State Security Council (SSC). The SSC was established in the early 1970s as an advisory body to the government. According to a White Paper on Defence its role was:

> to advise the Government regarding the formulation of national policy and strategy in connection with the security of the Republic, the manner in which this policy or strategy must be carried out, and a policy to combat any particular threat against the security of the Republic; and to determine an intelligence priority.[13]

By 1977, however, the functions of the SSC included 'interdepartmental co-ordination', and its brief had expanded to the investigation of:

- Political action
- Military/para military action
- Economic action
- Psychological action
- Scientific and technological action
- Religious-cultural action
- Manpower services
- Intelligence services
- Security services
- National supplies, resources and production services
- Transport and distribution services

Increasingly during the early 1980s one heard more about Total Onslaught and 'threats to law and order' than about Total Strategy as the shakey balance between controlled consent and force tipped towards the latter.[8] This was to parallel the rise of the military.

MILITARY MEN AND THE RISE OF THE EXECUTIVE

By the standards of the time, the South African Defence Force in the 1960s was 'practically obsolete'.[9] Its growth, however, coincides with the beginning of the armed struggle in South Africa in 1961. That year Defence Minister Jim Fouché introduced a ballot system of conscription and called on white mothers 'to give up their sons in defence of their land'. Initially there was a selective intake of 7 000 men for nine months service. This was extended so that by 1964 there was an annual intake of 16 500. In the course of four years the size of the Citizen Force rose by over six times, and the Permanent Force nearly doubled in size. In the same period the defence budget increased by over 5 times, so that by 1964/5 it was 21 per cent of the government budget.[10]

In 1967 universal conscription (9 months) of all white males between 17 and 65 was introduced, and in 1972 conscription was increased from nine to 12 months. By 1982 it had been raised again, this time to 2 years, and military spending was running at more than R8m a day.[11] The late 1970s also saw the phenomenal growth of arms manufacture, which by 1982 was the biggest in the Southern Hemisphere and the 10th largest in the world, employing about 100 000 workers.[12] Given the line-up of industrialists, financiers and economists behind this enterprise (the third biggest in South Africa) together

- Financial services
- Community services
- Communication services

> Together with the above fields (the SSC must) cover the whole spectrum of national security.[14]

By the late 1970s the SSC was clearly at the centre of the executive web, with power concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister. Parliament had become little more than a talking-shop, the Senate was disbanded and even the Cabinet had been virtually abolished as a responsible decision-making institution,leading a largely formal existence.

The Cabinet functions had been taken over by six Cabinet Committees (concerned with State Security, Finance, Economics, Internal Affairs, Welfare and Legislation and Parliamentary Affairs) as well as the SSC (which was operating both as a Cabinet Committee and a security council). These had become the effective executive bodies of government, and were answerable only to the Prime Minister. They were made up of individual Cabinet ministers together with an unspecified and changeable number of Prime Ministers' appointees, who did not have to be drawn from Parliament.

> The significance of this (according to a Nusas publication on SA militarization) lies in the extent to which it has shifted executive responsibility away from Parliament and even the parliamentary caucus of the National Party, and into the hands of a non-parliamentary group, which includes many prominant businessmen and senior military officers.[15]

In 1980 the SSC consisted of the political leaders P.W. Botha, Fanie Botha, Pik Botha and Chris Hennis, the head of the Department of National Security (DONS, previously BOSS and later the National Intelligence Service, NIS) the

chief of the Defence Force (General Malan), the secretaries for foreign affairs and justice, the Commissioner of Police and the chairmen of each of the other Cabinet committees. The secretary and chairman of the SSC's working group was General A.J. van Deventer who was serving on all other Cabinet Committee groups. Another person with power on the SSC was the secretary to the Department of the Prime Minister, J.E. du Plessis who was also Secretary to the Cabinet and on all working groups within the Cabinet Committees.

By 1982 the SSC was co-ordinating the activities of 15 interdepartmental committees, all of which included permanent military advisors regardless of whether SADF interests were involved. It had also been proposed that the SSC take control of all policy decisions of government departments and the semi-state organs such as ESCOM, ISCOR and the Atomic Energy Corporation.[16]

Real power in South Africa is therefore rapidly being concentrated in tighter and tighter structures. And as the separation of legislative, executive and judicial functions breaks down, so the political centralism of the state apparatus is continually being strengthened, particularly around the upper levels of administration. This is even taking spatial form. The city of Pretoria, for example, is hundreds of kilometres from the coast but even houses the headquarters and (concrete) flagship of the Navy. In such a process of bureaucratic condensation, says Poulantzas in State, Power, Socialism, the administration is no longer merely the apparatus charged with the execution of policy.

> . . . placed under the authority of the Executive, the state bureaucracy is becoming not merely the principal site, but also the principal actor in the elaboration of state policy.[17]

For this reason, therefore, it is becoming less necessary for the ruling class alliance to strike political compromises in the Parliamentary arena and to elaborate hegemonic interests in the form of a 'national interest'. Increasingly the various interests of the state apparatuses and of monopoly capital can be found directly within the administration - within the Cabinet Committees and on the SSC.

This drawing together of the administration and monopoly capital which characterises the Botha government is based on capital's need for a stable national state at almost any cost and the growing economic role of the state itself in the provision of weapons and infrastructure for capitalist development. From the centralism of power that this implies flow a number of consequences. One is, as I have mentioned, that even the dubious legitimacy of a whites-only parliament is passing over into a legitimacy of instrumental rationality and effeciency embodied by the executive-administration. Pacing this is a decline of law, a sharp rise in executive secrecy, government by the generation of increasingly unspecific fear, and a tendency for power to be personalised in the man at the top of the executive.

(a) The fall of Parliament

For more than a decade, behind the backs of the white population, the limited racial democracy of the white parliament and of the Nationalist Party has been whittled away. This has brought with it a decisive

curtailment of Parliament's authority over the administration. Indeed the process of government has become autonomous from parliament, and the administration distanced from the process of national representation. In this situation, says Poulantzas, 'while the opposition is first to be hit . . . these limitations of parliamentary power also affect majority deputies: they too are reduced to the position of government foot soldiers . . . The state bureaucracy has shut itself up in a water-tight container, almost completely blocking the access channel formerly open to deputies and political parties as legitimate representatives of the "national interest"'.[18]

Moves in this direction have been on the agenda for some time in South Africa, but have been delayed by the need to convince the electorate of a crisis great enough to warrant a surrender of their rights to the executive. In 1977 the Minister of the Interior, Dr. Connie Mulder, said publicly he would welcome a one-party state in South Africa 'should this come about in a normal way'. Speaking at the Cape National Party Congress he said the Congress 'should not create the impression that elections had become bothersome merely because the National Party was strong'.[19]

> We are not a one-party state, but should we develop into one in a normal way I would welcome it. It looks as if, though, it is going to happen. However we should not create the impression that we deal lightly with democracy.[20]

The same year a 'senior Nationalist MP' was quoted as having told the Sunday Express that:

> the government would not be able to meet future demands without giving heads of the Defence Force a definite say in the decision-making process in the country, and that South Africa may ultimately be ruled by a civilian-military junta.[21]

The machinery set up to legitimate executive centralism in the late 1970s was the President's Council, a wholly nominated body of 'experts' on issues of national importance. Probably its most important proposal to date has been to provide guidelines for the abolition of Parliament and the installation of a Gaullist-type executive presidency - a bonapartist strong-man to lead in a time of crisis.[22] In this proposal the Council was simply confirming the power already concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister. Such a personalized presedentialism is not, of course, the signal of a despotic power. It would function rather as the focal point of various administrative power centres and networks, making them converge at the apex of power. In this way it simply accords with the new political role of the administrative structure. The president would not be a dictator but the prime administrator, empowered to make fast decisionsin 'worrying times'. In such a situation the man at the top of the Executive is also the hostage of a political-administrative mechanism which, to a large degree, allocates him the pre-eminent position.[23]

The chipping away of party power, however, has not gone unnoticed by the white electorate. By apparently entering into an alliance with the Broederbond bogey of 'Hoggenheimer', the hated Imperial capitalist, the new Afrikaner executive has gradually lost the need for a base in the small farmers, urban middle class and white workers who constituted the hard centre of the Afrikaner 'volk'. The cement of this volk coalition

has been the guarantee of material privileges, protection of jobs, higher wages and the provision of social welfare for whites. It promised the defence of the volk against, on the one hand, the pressures of big business and, on the other, the rising demands for equality from the black majority. However the token multi-racialism and the advancement of a small black middle-class under the banner of Total Strategy, coupled with an alliance with monopoly capital, has weakened the cohesion of Afrikaner nationalism. As the upper layers of the middle class have been drawn together the lower layers of white society have become separated. This development can be seen in the formation of the ultra-right 'verkrampte' political groupings like the Herstigte Nationaale Party and the Conservative Party. This has clearly been a gamble the Executive has been forced to take, banking on the decreasing power of Parliamentary politics and the moulding of a national fear in the form of a 'Total Onslaught' to keep the volk in line. More and more, therefore, the legitimation process for state action has tended to shift to a one-way communication process - to the manipulatory circuits of the media dominated by the Executive.[24]

(b) Secrecy and the Press

The media have become vital in the maintenance of control by the Executive. It is significant that one of the 'leaks' in the 'Muldergate' Information scandal was that the state had used public funds to start an English-language daily newspaper (a hugely expensive undertaking) and a glossy magazine aimed at the black petty bourgeoisie.[25] The state also controls the only television network and all locally-based radio stations.

On the other side, larger numbers of student publications and overseas material are ritually banned weekly, and all films have to be submitted to a control board for laundering before public viewing. During the past decade increasingly severe curbs have also been placed on the commercial Press.

Professor John Dugard has pointed out that one of the most skilfully nurtured South African myths is that there is a genuinely free Press. This myth, he says,

> is perpetuated by the apparent freedom with which the English-language press criticizes governmental policies and practices in certain legally and conventially defined areas; by the praise of foreign critics who are continually surprised to find any criticism tolerated; and, particularly, by the shower of abuse poured upon the English-language press by Government spokesmen who regularly accuse it of disloyalty and subversion and threaten to deprive it of its 'freedom'.[26]

The truth, as Dugard points out, is probably more accurately stated by the historian Professor Leonard Thompson: 'the liberal Press has been reduced to insecurity and near impotence and the great English dailies are impeded from discovering and reporting the worst evils of apartheid and are under great pressure to refrain from fundamental criticisms of the Government'.[27]

Legislative restrictions on the Press can be divided into three categories: those directed at freedom of speech, those directed at journalists themselves, and those directed at newspapers as a whole. It is impossible for the Press to criticize some of the most important areas of political life - namely, matters affecting prisons, police and defence. The Prisons Act of 1959 makes it an offence to publish 'any false information concerning the behaviour or experience in prison of any prisoner or ex-prisoner or concerning the administration of any prison... without taking reasonable steps to verify such information', and the onus of proving that reasonable steps were taken is placed upon the accused.[28]

The police are protected from scrutiny by various acts which include prohibitions on the publication or communication of 'police matters' (any matter relating to the preservation of internal security or the maintenance of law and order by the police) or 'security matters' (any matter relating to the preservation of internal security). In terms of the Police Act anyone who communicates secret or confidential defence information gained by reason of office or employment to any other person (such information is presumed to be secret or confidential unless the contrary is proved) is guilty of a crime.[29]

On matters of 'national defence', all statements or reports which the Press wish to publish have to first be referred to a Defence Department public relations officer or to the military chiefs, and all matters of military policy must be referred to the Minister or Commandant-General.[30] The Press may not even publish the fact that the Minister has been approached, making gagging itself secret. With these procedures it is obvious that censorship could be exercised simply by chilling the communication channels and sanctions to the Press, these curbs on information are also contained in the Police Act of 1958. In terms of Section 27B, if anyone

> publishes any untrue matter in relation to any action by the Police Force, part thereof or any member thereof in relation to the performance and functions of its members, without having reasonable grounds for believing that such statement is true (the onus is on the person to prove this), the person shall be guilty of an offense and will on conviction be liable to a fine up to R10 000 or imprisonment up to five years or both fine and imprisonment.

Section 27C prohibits the publication in any newspaper, book, pamphlet or magazine or by radio any information relating to

(a) the constitution, methods, movements and deployment of members or part of the Force, concerned in any action for combatting and prevention of terroristic activities (as referred to in Section 2 of the Terrorism Act No 83 of 1967)

(b) persons or groups against which such action is directed

(c) any action referred to in (a) above by any member or part of the Police Force together with the South African Defence Force or the South African Railways Police.

Contravention of the Act carries a maximum fine of R15 000 or eight years in jail or both.

The Internal Security Act of 1982 carries presumptions which transfer the burden of proof to the accused, and caters for a range of actions extending far beyond that which would ordinarily be regarded as terrorism or treason. It prohibits any activity which attempts to 'endanger the State authority'. or 'achieve, bring about or promote any constitutional, political, industrial, social or economic aim or change in the Republic' or 'put in fear or demoralise the general public...' Attempts to commit or attempts to or conspire with someone to commit an act of violence is also prohibited. It is also an offence to intend to do the above, and in so doing interrupt a production process or industry, promote 'general dislocation or disorder at any place in the Republic', disrupt traffic on land, sea or in the air, or encourage racial hostility (Section 54). The Act also provides for indefinite detention without trial.

The threat of legislative, executive or conventional sanction therefore hangs heavily over all South African newspapers opposed to the Government. In Dugard's words,

> the disappearance of in-depth, critical feature articles about some of the greatest injustices of South African society, and the enlargement of the number of journalistically taboo subjects, testify to the effectiveness of this threat. Government spokesmen, however, continue to declaim on the licentious freedom of the English press and thereby conceal from the general public the absence of real freedom on the part of the press.[31]

This concealment simply hides from view the development of administrative secrecy - the hermetic insulation of power from any form of democratic control.[32]

Secrecy is the hallmark of absolutist tendencies, becoming a permanent matter of State through hidden mechanisms and a regime of administrative procedures that almost entirely escapes the control of public opinion. This is hardly surprising. The bureaucracy was always the State institution which rebelled most against the principles of representative democracy, no matter how limited this may have been in South Africa. This was because democracy was erected precisely in order to place institutional limits upon the privileges bequeathed to the administration by the Absolutist State.[33]

Secrecy and criminal justice system

Beyond the secrecy created by the official blocking of information through the media is another more complex kind: the secrecy caused by bureaucratic complexity. At the level of criminal procedure this is at work both within the structures and within the law itself. The fact that the courts and police stations where gang-members find themselves are not just legal institutions but the daily work places of policemen, lawyers, clerks of court, leads to the development of stereotypes, networks of shared understandings, alliances of alleged adversaries, techniques for routinising the work of policing or processing cases, to a situation where the suspect or dependent is the only one who is not part of the routine, is

mystified by the language, bureaucracy and process of justice. Added to these subtleties are interaction on the beat, information extraction games, remedial routines, court ceremonies and the structure of arrest, investigation, plea and trial.[34] No less complex, however, is the law itself.

> Criminal law (says Pashukanis) starts out not at all from the damage suffered by the injured party, but from the violation of the norm established by the State.[35]

It is worth asking how this norm is established. In South Africa it is based on a combination of Roman-Dutch Law as developed by the courts into a South African common law, and legislative enactment.[36] The scope and ambit of common law crimes are fairly settled in South African law. Their definitions have been formulated more or less authoritatively in textbooks followed daily in the courts.[37] No new common law crimes can be created by the courts.[38] However, the meaning given to the words in these relatively plain definitions is often very narrow from the point of view of the layman.

Thus a working legal definition of theft might be 'the unlawful taking of the property of another without his consent and with the intention of terminating the enjoyment of his rights therein'.[39] While this could refer to the work of a common pickpocket, it would also hold water as a description of colonial conquest. The crucial word here is 'unlawful', and we are back again to the problem of the eye of the beholder. One fares no better with assault. A standard South African legal textbook describes this act as:

> unlawfully and intentionally: (1) applying force to the person of another, or (2) inspiring belief in that other than force is immediately to be applied to him.[40]

Any street-corner kid would be excused if he mistook this for a description of police arrest procedure - how else could he be coaxed into the back of a patrol van?

In the same textbook murder is defined as 'th eunlawful and intentional killing of another person'.[41] (It is seen as justifiable if it is carried out 'by authority' or 'in abedienc eto orders'.) If we l ookfor a moment beneath the cl oak oflegality and authority, it can be seen that 'private' murder throughout history has never been comparabl eto publ icmurder by th ose veryinstitutions which uphold l aw Yet, in the course of their duties between 1968 and 1978 the South African Polic eshot dead 2 384 peopl e[42]

In 1970 South Africa accounted for nearl y50 per cent of all legal executions in the world. In just one year (July 1981 to July 1982) the South African Defence Force claimed more than 1 700 kills on the Angolan border alone.[43] These figures may not yet equal annual murder rates, but with the escalation of civil war in the sub-continent the imbalance is soon likely to be rectified. Such statistics, however, are nothing compared to the carnage of events like the two World Wars, the Vietnam war and endless other localised battles fought this century - all undoubtedly 'in the interests of State security'.

Once we move outside the ambit of common l awcrimes to crimes created by legislation the bounds of the common law largely disappear. South African courts have adopted a literal ist,positivist view of their interpretative function. The legisl atureis not c onstrainedby a Bill of Rights. Any form of conduct can be criminal ised. Such 'crimes' are direct refl ectionsof th ewil lof the State. Yet they share the measure of legitimacy which still at tachesto forms of conduct whic hhave 'always' been prohibited by the common law as 'natural' crime.

What I am suggesting is that criminal l awis not so much based on ancient moral principles as on expedience, and that the majesty of the law may be little more than an ideological cloak thrown around the daily business of social control. 'Crime', says Colin Sumner in Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment, 'is not behaviour universally given in human nature and history, but a moral-political

concept with culturally and historically varying forms and content... Modern criminal justice procedures are not universal, inevitable or "natural", but legitimated practices and moral-political controls which develop in response to conflicts spawned by the class relationships of exploitation and domination constituting the capitalist mode of production'.[44] To which Tony Platt adds quite bluntly: 'Under the legal definition of crime, the solutions are primarily aimed at controlling victims of exploitation...'[45]

At best, then, criminal law in South Africa can be seen as a key force in the stabilization of conflictful social relations. But in times of crisis, in a recession or in the face of political challenge, it is a stick held to the marginalised workforce and the young in a period when manufacturing cannot fully satisfy their needs or absorb their labour power. As we have seen, monopoly capital has developed alongside the expropriation of land from the powerless, the division of shared land, the dissolution of extended family support systems and the destruction of areas which supported 'informal' economic activity. These processes which are so often called the 'modernization of the traditional economy' inevitably transform attempts to preserve the old ways, resist the new order, accommodate to its hardships and to play the system at its own game into 'criminal behaviours'. Such forms of social action, says Sumner, 'frequently become crimes against the State... separated out in law from the community social relations which were their source (and) judicially constituted as a distinct category of reality'.[46]

The dominated classes encounter law not only as a barrier, but also as the reality which assigns the place they must occupy. But this reality is in essence a mystery. It is a fundamental maxim of the modern juridical system that no-one should be ignorant of the law. However this knowledge required of every citizen is not even a special subject of study at school - as if everything were done

to keep one in ignorance of what one is supposedly obliged to know. This maxim, according to Poulantzas, therefore expresses a relationship 'whereby the popular masses, whose ignorance of the law's secrets is built into this law and juridical language itself, remain dependent upon, and subordinated to, State functionaries as the makers, protectors and appliers of the law'.[47] The law in its complexity can be known by nobody but State representatives and those who can afford years of legal training. It is a State secret which grounds a form of knowledge monopolized for reasons of State. About kids caught between poverty and the complexity of the law; Stuart Hall et al view the question: 'Why do ghetto youths turn to crime?' as a 'practical obscenity'.[48]

The obvious result of this bureaucratic secrecy, coupled with increasingly repressive legislation, is that people have lost confidence in the legal system. A Gallup survey conducted in 1982 showed that only 39 per cent of Afrikaners, 24 per cent of blacks, 23 per cent of Asians, 18 per cent of English speakers and 11 per cent of Coloureds said they had a 'great deal' of confidence in the legal system. A seminar of advocates, attorneys and academic lawyers held shortly after the survey submitted that 'this disturbing loss of confidence in our legal system' was not unconnected to 'the abolition of habeas corpus and the introduction of practices incompatible with notions of fairness, justice and the Rule of Law...'[49]

(d) The generation of fear

There can be little doubt that the shift of the centre of gravity to the State bureaucracy has involved a parallel restriction of personal and political liberties for the majority of the population.

The control structures have been centralised and improved, laws concerning their activity have become dangerously open-ended and less disputable, and in the courts the proof of innocence is shifting to the individual. Indeed anyone in any way opposed to the Executive now tends to operate on the internalised assumption of his or her own guilt in terms of the law.

This is reinforced by the fact that such a person can be detained indefinitely in solitary confinement by the Security Police without the chance of proving their innocence in court.

This position, however, is not confined to political opponents. In September 1971 the president of the Association of Law Societies of South Africa, Mr Tjaart Vorster, told the Association that, over the centuries, criminal law had developed around the primary principle that the State had to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. But he warned that in South Africa:

> the authorities are now showing increasingly a disposition to break down this cardinal principle by means of regulations, ordinances and Acts which provide presumptions in favour of the State and thus impose the burden of proof on the accused.[50]

Officials of the State, particularly those involved in the control apparatus, are also increasingly being empowered to violate individual liberty. A policeman can, for example, bring a charge against anyone who annoys him in the course of his duty, search without a warrant on suspicion of certain crimes, in certain circumstances kill a person fleeing arrest or close down premises or prevent a meeting. In terms of Indemnity Act of 1977 the State or its officials are provided indemnity against civil or criminal proceedings 'in respect of any actions or statements ordered or done by them in good faith... to prevent or terminate internal disorder'. Although passed in March 1977 it was made retroactive to June 16 the previous year - the day on which police action against student boycotters took place in Soweto. The Dean of Law at the University of the Witwatersrand, Professor John Dugard, pointed out at the time that the Act ran contrary to the normal legal principle that policemen were held responsible for any unlawful acts they commit. He said the qualification about acting in good faith was meaningless because 'it is very difficult in most cases impossible, to prove that a policeman acted in bad faith'.[51]

The effect of the withdrawal of the Executive and its officials from democratic control, together with urban racial polarisation, has served to shape fear of the unexpected or the unknown as a means of social control. In its extreme form this could be stated as fear of death by legal sanction (by those who are somehow 'outside' the system) and fear of the 'black threat' (by those 'inside' the system).

The first fear is well illustrated in an essay entitled Reflections Before a Glass Cage by Hans Enzenberger, in which he explores the 'ancient, intimate and dark connexion between law, politics and murder'.[52] Using Freud's rather controversial conclusion that 'the original political act . . . coincides with the original crime', he begins from the premise that power is exercised by those who can have their underlings killed. The ruler is the survivor. This he sees as the basis of command in the modern state. No matter how attenuated it is, any command is still a 'suspended death sentence'. Within the state the maximum penalty is always death. Beyond the borders of the state it is war. In a sense we cede to the state our right to kill. The hangman is our deputy. Therefore what is forbidden to the individual - that is, to kill - is permitted to him as a member of the collective.[53] This, says Enzenberger, is the very heart of sovereignty. And if the state, as the overlord of the legal order, is permitted to kill one individual, it is also permitted to kill many or if necessary everyone, in its and the peoples' name, and to make the execution of this sovereign act a duty to its citizens.[54] (At this point crime having become total, explodes its concept.)[55]

By thus bending back upon itself the definition of crime, Enzenberger underlines again that 'crime' is a definition and not an act. But if the state is dedicated to creating and maintaining this definition, if it forbids the powerless to kill, protest or organise, protecting this prohibition by itself killing and organising, it is bound to create a climate of extreme social tension and fear.

At an ideological level, however, at the level of 'race consciousness', definitions of crime are very real, marking the borderline of societal tolerance. And stripped of its moral furniture we find that this boundary is negotiable, has a basis in history and is dependent on the power structure. It is in fact none other than the point of contact in a class struggle, and the working class is always, in a sense, on the 'other' side. Inside the boundary of 'common (bourgeois) decency' one finds those activities which, even if they do not necessarily support the 'system', are at least not a threat to it. Outside are activities which, even if they may not immediately threaten the system, are upheld as being a danger to it. The 'line', furthermore, tends to be a heterogenous, frequently bizarre assemblage of historically deposited orders to protect the most varied kinds of legal prerogatives and interests, codified concepts of taboos and morality and rules of the game', uncomfortably packaged under the heading of 'law' and frequently sold as common sense.[56]

In their book Policing the Crisis, Stuart Hall et al call this boundary the violence threshold,[57] the point beyond which 'measures must be taken'. A particular feature of this ideological line, they found, was that definitions of social behaviour tended to become transmuted. On the one hand a political issue may be presented as a criminal one, depoliticising

and criminalizing it. This is often convenient: The public might be reluctant to see the law used against political protesters, but who would stand between the law and a bunch of 'hooligans'? On the other hand criminal acts (murder, rape, robbery, theft) may be shifted into the political arena, focussing public attention on an 'urban crisis', justifying the use of 'more than usual' force against the growing number of unemployed in a period of recession. It could be argued that in the latter case the transmutation simply acts as an aid to policing. But a single example will show that it can also become an orchestration of public fear which feeds back into the control apparatus at a higher level.

In early September 1981 an increasing number of rape cases began appearing on the Supreme Court rolls in Cape Town. Their number escalated until the Public Prosecutor called for the death penalty for the rape of a white woman by two coloured men on the grounds that 'eight rape cases had come before the court during the current session and four more were on the roll'.[58] 'The sanctity of the home is being departed from', he said. 'Are we going to have to wait until women are strangled, raped and beaten to a pulp before imposing the ultimate sentence?' Sentencing a man for murder and rape two days later the Judge President, Mr. Justice Munnik, declared that 'the flag of rape is blowing through the Cape like a strong south-easter. It must come to rest at some time. The winds of lust must cease'.[59] He said it was 'frightening to open the three local Cape newspapers and to see how many rape cases were coming before court'.

These statements were picked up in the Press and by Parliament. The wife of a former Cabinet Minister called for castration and a Nationalist MP demanded the use of the cat o' nine tails.[60] In the Parliamentary Justice Debate, as we saw in Chapter 1, a

Member declared rape to be 'a new form of terrorism', and linked it to 'Total Onslaught' against the State.[61] Sentences for offenses which previously carried penalties of around four years in jail went up to as many as 12 years. Several 20-year sentences were handed down.[62]

However, in August of the following year the Attorney General of the Cape admitted that 'he had grouped together a number of rape cases on the Cape Town Supreme Court roll last year, and in so doing, drawn the attention of the public to the seriousness of the rape situation'.[63] He was clearly pleased with the result, and now 'hoped to give similar prominance to armed robberies and related cases' because 'the publicity they will receive when grouped together will hopefully serve as an effective deterrent'.[64]

But if rapists are terrorists what will robbers with guns be? Only the Total Strategists can tell! One thing is sure though: The focus will be on the violence, on the skollie 'folk devil' with a gun in the dark places of the city. This is not to say that rape and violence are not a serious problem. But a violent act is more amenable to dramatization than are the conditions which shape its development. Through a process of ideological convergence separate activities tend to become linked and parallels drawn: Crime - rape - violence - guns - agitators - terrorists - threat to law and order . . . raw material for a climate of fear in a city divided against itself. In this climate the police become the moral guardians of the existing order, sentries along the barricades of fear, and it is to them that our investigation must now turn.

POLICING THE TOWNSHIPS

In 1982, following recommendations in the Rabie Commission on internal security legislation, the security functions of the Department of Justice were placed under a Directorate for Internal Security which forms part of the Department of Law and Order. The reason given by Rabie for the change was 'because it is important that the Department of Justice should be seen as the protector of the interests of the citizens of the country' (leaving open the question about the role of the police).[65]

The new Department thus created was to have two separate functions, daily policing under a Commissioner of Police, and political policing - 'maintaining a balance between justice and effectiveness' - under a Director of Internal Security.[66] Both branches were to be answerable to the Minister of Law and Order, the SSC and ultimately the Prime Minster. However the Directorate for Internal Security is also closely linked to the Department of Military Intelligence - to a point where, given the increasingly paramilitary nature of the police, the South African Police could even be seen to be a wing of the South African Defence Force with further training in crime prevention.

These shifts of emphasis within the police force have closely followed the form of the state in its efforts to maintain hegemony, and they have been going on for a long time. Basic policing can be seen as a combination of two separate functions: the uniform branch which patrols the city, answers radio calls for assistance and is basically in the business of crime prevention; and the detective branch which investigates committed crime, constructs cases against suspects and brings them to court for trial.

A more recent development has been what may be called the 'specials', units concerned with political, military or technological policing. An indication of the various functions in Cape Town can be represented like this.

TABLE 8A

POLICE DIVISIONS IN CAPE TOWN, 1982[67]

DISTRICTS	UNIFORM BRANCH	DETECTIVES	SPECIALS
Cape Town Bellville Athlone Wynberg	*patrolmen	*C.I.D.	*Riot Squad Patrols
Divisional Headquarters	*patrolmen *Patrol Dog Unit	*Murder & Robbery Squad Diamond &Gold Branch *Narcotic Branch Commercial Branch Fingerprint Branch	*Riot Squad Patrols *Security Branch

*Connected by Radio Control

These functions are the result of needs which manifested themselves at different times in the historical development of the state.

The uniform branch is the oldest police force, descending from the soldiers who defended the early Cape settlement in the 17th Century. The first men to whom the term 'police' may be applied were ten farmers recruited in 1686 to form a regular watch for raiding Khoisan. They were termed the 'Burgerwacht'.[68] The following year a magistrate and police officer were appointed in Cape Town with a few armed constables at their disposal. However the major policing

functions remained in the hands of the 'rural police' which were mainly military units in the frontier areas invested with some police functions.[69] In 1855 these were amalgamated into the Frontier Armed Mounted Police (later the South African Mounted Riflemen) and charged with the 'maintenance of peace on the frontier'. Troopers were paid 5s.6d. a day and had to provide their own horses, equipment, food and clothing. Their uniform was yellow corduroy with a leather helmet.[70] The primary function of these Frontier police was the pacification and control of the indigenous people of the colony.

Crime prevention and detection in the Cape has a different and less definite history. By 1817 (when Lord Charles Somerset divided Cape Town into 16 wards) the Burgerwacht had developed into a system of watchmen under the control of a Fiscal.[71] They were supplemented by police riders who were armed and wore a uniform consisting of a green jacket, a yellow waistcoat, and trousers of Flemish linen.[72] Then in 1839 the city force was reorganised by John King, who had served as an inspector in Sir Robert Peel's Metropolitain Police in London. He oversaw a system of four sub-inspectors, four sergeants and 37 constables.[73] By 1844 the Chief Justice, Sir John Wylde, noted a 'total absence of public disorder and the almost absence of crime'.[74] (However the system was not without its problems: Although the full enrolment of King's force never exceeded 45, between 1840 and 1855 there were 749 changes from dismissals, resignations and deaths.[75])

The establishment of a <u>stable</u> crime detection unit had to await a more serious need. This came in the 1870s with the discovery of diamonds. About a third of all stones being found at the Kimberley diggings during that period were subsequently stolen.[76] In 1880 a detective branch was

established by Cape Ordinance II for special duties on the diamond fields and its first compliment was 34 men. The branch was soon expanded to other areas, and parallel development took place in the Transvaal with the formation of Die Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek Politie (ZARP) following the discovery of gold.[77] These organizations were later to form the basis of a criminal investigation department (C.I.D.).

When the South African Union was created in 1910 the two police forces maintained their separate functions - pacification and crime detection:

> There were to be two forces for the Union: the South African Police and the South African Mounted Riflemen (S.A.M.R.). The former were to be a regular police force in terms of the Police Act, but in time of war its members were to be subject to conscription in terms of the Defence Act. Conversely the S.A.M.R. were to be a regular military force under the Defence Act, but in time of peace were to perform police duties exclusively, especially in areas with a fairly dense Bantu population.[78]

The combined units and forces were finally constituted as the South African Police in terms of the Police Act of 1912, and in 1920 the S.A.M.R. was disbanded and its members incorporated into the S.A.P. This amalgamation signals a major shift of emphasis in state control - and for good reason. By 1920 the wars of dispossession had been fought and won by the colonists. With the growth of an urban proletariat, the 'frontier' was shifting into the cities themselves. The struggles, in Gramscian terms, had moved from a war of manoeuvre to a war of fixed position. This shift was evidenced by the activity of the S.A.P. shortly after its establishment on April 1 1913.

Within months of its formation 3,104 policemen were called in to put down a strike by 19,000 workers on the Rand mines. With the aid of the military they succeeded in doing this in 'a bloody confrontation'.[79] Two months later reinforcements were rushed to Natal to control a passive resistance campaign by Indians refusing to carry passes. The very next month they were back on the Rand in an alert following a national strike by industrial workers. Then in 1921 the police shot dead 163 people during 'the removal for unlawful squatting of a fanatic religious sect known as "Israelites" from the Bulhock location near Queenstown'.[80] And the following year 7,610 policemen assisted in containing the so-called Rand Revolt of white mineworkers.[81] The pattern of policing was being clearly established.

Moreover, as the cities filled with people and the distance between wealth and poverty grew greater in financial terms and smaller in terms of physical proximity, the problems of daily crime prevention were to escalate. An indication of this can be seen in Tables 8A and 8B. The result was an increasing pressure on the urban police forces. Together with other problems both within and beyond the Force, this situation was to lead to a crisis of urban crime prevention in the 1970s.

(a) The problems of the station cop

In every State, law is an integral part of the organisation of coercion. By issuing rules and passing laws the State establishes an initial field of injunctions, prohibitions and censorship, and in this way institutes the terrain and object of coercion. In this sense, law is a code of organised public coercion. But the efficiency of law is clearly more than the issuing of rules. In a society, particularly a class-divided one like South Africa,

Fig. 8a

Total South Africa:
Assaults (common and GBH)
reported to the police per
100 000 of population





Fig. 8b

Total South Africa:
Murders reported to the
police per 100 000 of
the population



the State takes precedence over law, in that there can be no law here without an apparatus that compels its observance and ensures its social existence. (Strength must remain on the side of the law). The police force forms the front line of this apparatus.

It would be wrong, however, to consider the police to be mere instruments of the State. They possess an autonomy, what Poulantzas calls a 'structural specificity', which is not reducible to a simple analysis of state power.[82] In fact major contradictions exist - both between organs and branches of the state, and between these apparati and civil society. The one which concerns us here, however, is between the laws and directives of the Executive which sanction physical coersion, and the fact that the police who carry out these laws have to penetrate into the heart of civil society and win a measure of consent there in order to remain effective.

This problem, which is common to all police forces, is compounded in South Africa by several factors. In its current form the law in this country does not so much set a standard of legality from which the police might deviate as to provide a licence to ignore it. The police are sanctioned to search without warrant in many situations, stop meetings, close down premises, shoot to kill and arrest people for a wide range of reasons. Many of their actions carried out 'in the interests of state security' need not be made public, and this secrecy can be corrupting. Given the wide legal sanction offered to the police, it would be surprising if they did not grasp it. Discussing this in Parliament during the 1982 session, Opposition Member H. Pitman observed that:

> If one gives unlimited and uncontrolled power to any branch of the executive, they being only human are going to use that power in their work. The problem we have is that power is being given to be exercised in secret without scrutiny by the House, without scrutiny by the public and without the control of the Supreme Court. The blame therefore does not rest entirely with the police.[83]

Behind this official screen it is obvious that policemen will attempt to cut corners to obtain evidence, particularly if they are dealing with known criminals. The daily demand is on effeciency in solving cases before more harm is done, and the emphasis is on force - get your man and maintain order. The temptation is always there to extort confessions or information, the due process of law can be so easily forgotten (and anyway if the law is a puzzle for the people, it is also a puzzle for the police). For many people on the other side of the charge-office counter, therefore, the rule of law becomes indistinguishable from the rule of force, and justice no more than the right of the stronger.[84]

This seemingly omnipotent position of the police is also reinforced ideologically. Commenting on the increased number of police assaults on members of the public during 1981/82, the chairman of the Civil Rights League, Brian Bishop, said this increase was being supported by the rising sanction of violence used to prevent democratic change through

> warped reports of a total onslaught by SABC/TV and by Cabinet Ministers. What is a young policeman to think after hearing a Cabinet Minister say: "When survival is at stake, no rules apply"?

Disrespect for the individual resulting from unjust laws and from certain churches,schools and newspapers ignoring the ancient principles of human dignity and impressing hostile emotions in the young;


Using the police force for unsavoury purposes such as raids on the women and children of Nyanga, intervention in labour disputes or interference with Black Sash stands;

Obsessional denials and cover-ups that encourage immature young men to believe that actions of violence receive support from above.

(Argus 27.2.82)

Fig. 8c

[illegible] shot by policemen in the course of their duties 1968 - 1978



(Source: Questions in Parliament reported in SAIRR yearbook)

'Hard' policing in turn leads to bad police/public relations. Speaking in a 1982 Parliamentary debate, Ray Swart pointed out that

> no Police Force can operate successfully unless it has support and sympathy of the general public. (In this respect) the lot of the South African policeman is perhaps amongst the most unenviable of any policeman in the world. This is so because of the nature of the society in which he has to operate and because of the unjust and inequitable laws which he is expected to enforce . . . Amongst (black) groups (police) authority is used to enforce (these) unpopular and unjust laws, whether in respect of pass law offences, forced removal of people from their homes, demolition of shacks or whatever it may be . . . in circumstances like that the policeman is very often . . . seen as a symbol of oppression.[85]

In terms of daily crime prevention, therefore, the power available to the police can generate as many problems as solutions for the station-based policeman, isolating him behind his uniform and inside the system he represents. Observing this situation in the United States, William Westley suggests that what tends to get amplified in such circumstances is the use of violence.

> The policeman finds his most pressing problems in his relationships to the public. His is a service occupation but of an incongruous kind, since he must discipline those whom he serves. He is regarded as corrupt and inefficient by, and meets with hostility and criticism from, the public. He regards the public as his enemy, feels his occupation to be in conflict with the community, and regards himself to be a pariah. The experience and the feeling give rise to a collective emphasis on

> secrecy, an attempt to coerce respect from the public, and a belief that almost any means are legitimate in completing an important arrest.[86]

The police are further isolated from the community by time, function, geography, patterns of sociability and often by race. They work when many people are at home, asleep or at leisure. Often they work long overtime, are separated from their families for considerable spells, and are in many cases temporarily out of phase with the normal population. This social distance increases when the police are confined to living in certain areas, whether they be suburbs or, more particularly, in police barracks or rows (a police estate has been built on the site of District Six). These factors tend to give rise to a police subculture, and this development is reinforced by the fact that all police come up through the ranks and that class distinction among them is not marked.


However this subcultural formation is greatly strengthened when policemen see themselves as an over-stretched and embattled minority faced with an indifferent bureaucracy and a staff shortage of crisis proportions. In 1979 South Africa's police force of 34,646 men was the same size as that of New York City - for a population twice the size of New York spread out over an area five times the size of Britain.[87] That year a newspaper complained that:

> Thirty years ago in Cape Town more than 100 policemen walked the night beat, assisted by a van and five on bicycle patrol. Today there are not more than six men on the streets at night. (Cape Times 15.2.79)

If anything the situation has since worsened. In 1982 the Minister of Law and Order admitted a police shortage among lower ranks in the metropolitain areas of 40 per cent and a total shortfall of 9,000 men.[88] He appealed for the enlistment of more reserve policemen.

Fig. 8d

Numbers of SAP who bought their discharges as a percent of the total force 1960 - 1980



(Source: Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Police)

The effect of this manpower drain has been to shorten the long arm of the law in the precise area that is desparate for its extension - routine crime prevention. Police Headquarters were unable to give me numbers and deployment concentration in Cape Town for strategic reasons, but manpower problems have

appeared in the Press and elsewhere from time to time. In 1975 Police Radio Control received 300,000 calls but could dispatch a patrol van to attend to only 18,000 or 6 per cent (U.S. city police receive on average one million calls and respond to 65 per cent).[89] The Grassy Park police district in Cape Town contains about 100,000 people and is patrolled by one van and two policemen per shift. The Bonteheuwel/Bishop Lavis district has two vans a shift, but each must deal with one call every 15 minutes (including travel time).[90] The shortage of policemen has prompted To The Point magazine to describe them as 'South Africa's most wanted men'.(August 1 1975)

> Our chaps are feeling the strain and are getting frustrated (a policeman told me). People criticize us but they don't know our problem. A fellow'phones and says: 'This is the third time I've 'phoned and that fellow that assaulted me, he's still walking up and down in the street and when are you coming?' Or a policeman's sitting in the office and someone 'phones and says somebody's burgling his house. But the policeman can do nothing because there's nobody to help - he walks out of the office to look for someone and there's not a single person to send. Or there's no van and he must use his own car . . . and there's no refund for petrol. There's just not enough policemen! We're just the step-child of the army. We get what's left - second-class equipment and a tight budget.[91]

The detectives fare no better than patrolmen. In Cape Town they can carry up to 80 dockets at once. This means that if they worked an hour a day on each - and this is hardly possible as people have to be traced and questioned - their working week would be 80 hours. Even those men prepared to do this would not be paid overtime for more than four hours a week.[92] In 1978 the detective staff position for Cape Town was given as follows:[93]

C.I.D. ONLY: CAPE TOWN	ESTABLISHMENT	ACTUAL STAFF	SHORTFALL
Whites - com. officers	28	36	16
- non. com. officers	175	151	
Coloured - com. officers	4	4	95
- non. com. officers	125	91	
Indians - com. officers	-	-	
- non. com. officers	-	-	
Blacks - com. officers	-	-	12
- non. com. officers	42	30	
TOTALS:	374	312	62(16.6%)

(Source: Questions in Parliament 1979)

The police shortage is undoubtedly a major contributing factor towards the sharp rise during the 1970s of both crimes of violence and property. 'The skollies are making hay now', a policeman told me, 'because they know we can't get to them all'. The incidence of assault in Cape Town can be seen in Figures 8E and 8F of assaulted victims conveyed by the ambulance service during the 1970s.

Fig. 8e



22000
20000
18000
16000
14000
12000
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
Assault victims
Years
Assault victims picked up by the Cape Town Metropolitain Ambulance Service between 1972 and 1980

Fig. 8f



3200
2800
2400
2000
1600
1200
Number per month of assault victims conveyed by the Cape Metropolitan Ambulance Service during 1978, 1979 and 1980
1980
1979
1978
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Number of assault victims conveyed
years

Fig. 8g

Reported robberies:
South Africa 1970 - 1980
(Total increase 47.3%)




Fig. 8h

Reported theft of firearms:
South Africa 1970 - 1980
(Total increase 98.5%)





Fig. 8i

Reported burglaries:
South Africa 1970 - 1980
(Total increase 66%)



(Source: Statistical Yearbooks and Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Police)

During the same period the number of reported robberies throughout South Africa increased by 47 per cent (Figure 8G), fire-arm theft went up by 99 per cent (Figure 8H) and burglaries by 66 per cent (Figure 8I). In the last category white residential premises were hardest hit, with an increase of 103 per cent.[94] In Cape Town during 1981 the non-solution rate of all reported crimes was 56 per cent, with some of the white mountain suburbs reaching as high as 75 per cent.[95] The solution to this high crime success is often seen as the placing of 'a cop on every corner'. The Viljoen Commission into the South African penal system noted that:

> a policeman patrolling an area on foot is in a far better position to develop an experienced eye and to smell out would-be criminals than a policeman patrolling an area in a vehicle. The vehicle moves too fast to enable the policeman to reconnoitre an area properly. The danger (of vehicle patrols) is that persons who either individually or in groups appear from a moving vehicle to act or move or loiter suspiciously, may be perfectly law-abiding . . . The motor vehicle has its advantages (but) there are criminologists and others who would like to see a full-scale return to the 'bobby on the beat.[96]


However, such saturation patrolling would produce its own problems. It would be as politically volatile to flood working class areas with policemen as it would be uneconomical (patrol activity being the single most expensive component of police labour). It would also instantly clog the control apparatus, as a policeman pointed out to me:

> If we had a full staff - all the men we required - and made the number of arrests we would like to, the people at the courts would chuck up their job and go home. Because at the moment they can't cope, they're so snowed up. They're even having court on Saturday mornings! But then even if the police and the courts could cope, then the prisons couldn't because they're too full. It's a crazy situation.[97]

This no-win situation is depressing for policemen working long hours and seemingly going backwards. Often these problems manifest themselves publicly as complaints about pay. Although policemen do not have a union and complaints are officially deemed 'unpatriotic', pay gripes do find their way into the Press (usually from ex-policemen) or get raised in Parliament (often by the Opposition before an election).

Fig. 8j

Reports about SAP pay in the Cape Times and Argus 1970 - 1981



As early as 1951 the Former Deputy Commissioner of Police for the Free State, Colonel du Toit, told the Press that:

> we have fought for better pensions since 1924 and still nothing has been done. During the past 12 months it has been proved that salaries were inadequate to afford members of the force a decent living. If the cost of living allowance is stopped (as had been suggested) more than half the police will land in the debtors' prison.[98]

In 1958 the Witwatersrand Deputy Commissioner, Colonel Grobler, complained that 'it is not humanly possible for a policeman to run a home and maintain a family on the meagre salary he receives'.[99] And the following year newspapers disclosed that a third of the entire force was comprised of badly-paid youths under the age of 21.[100] In 1965, after a wage increase described in the Press as 'a few crumbs', policemen were warned that 'in terms of standing orders members of the Force are not allowed to make public any complaints about conditions of service or other administrative grievances', and moves were made to bring police affairs under the Official Secrets Act.[101] Five years later policemen were still complaining in the Press that 'a policeman with seven years service earns less than the typist in his new office'.[102]

Pay increases which followed in 1972 were described by a Brigadier as 'utterly scandalous - we can now expect a flood of resignations', and two years later a university professor found in a poll, taken after a pay increment, that policemen were 'bitterly disappointed by what they regarded as inadequate rises and 82 per cent of constables in Johannesburg are thinking of resigning'.[103] In 1975, the year when police strength was at

its lowest, it was found that 'more than 100 SAP had been given permission to work at remunerative employment in off-hours - including 28 commissioned officers, 18 warrant officers, 50 sergeants and 31 constables'.[104] In 1978 an ex-detective attacked the Minister of Police in the Press for refusing to disclose police salaries 'as if they are a state secret. But the real reason (he said) is that they know that if the public knew what a policeman earned they would get no recruits'.[105] The following year, after disclosures about poor police pay in the Press, the Minister introduced a Bill to amend the Police Act 'to prohibit the publication of certain statements' about police conditions. The Bill was passed, and carried a fine of R10,000 or 5 years in jail for publishing 'uncleared or untruthful reports' about the police.[106] In 1981 it was disclosed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police that, despite a 15 per cent pay rise, 166 policemen a month had left the force in 1980 and by 1981 the figure was up to 200.[107] The following year police shortages were being described in Parliament as having reached 'crisis proportions', with shortages running at 40 per cent in some areas. 'Policemen these days are only working because they want to be policemen (a Major told me) not for the money or the conditions. You can't get anything out of the Public Services Commission (which determines wages)'.

Considering the problems of staff shortages and discontentment 'hard' policing is to be expected. Nobody can condone the action of a detective who carries a suspect to the cells in the boot of his car (See Argus 4.4.82). But given that the suspect is dangerous, that there is no patrol van, that the car is probably the detective's own, and that there is no colleague to help restrain the suspect, his seemingly callous action can at least be understood as a choice between

unconventional methods or letting the suspect go. Impossible situations give rise to improbable and often morally unacceptable solutions. The frustration of confronting a situation beyond his control was clear when I asked a policeman what could be done about the city gangs:

> I don't know what you can do - except maybe Nazi style line them up and shoot them. But that's not in the law . . . even the public think sentences are too soft. You should remove skollies from society to solve the problem. But then where would you put them? Perhaps you could send them to help Britain in the Falklands! But I say you cannot solve the problem according to the law . . . You need to drag them in here and give them all hangpaal (death sentences), you need public hanging or something.[108]

I will discuss presently the effects of the policing crisis on crime prevention patterns on the Cape Flats. But to understand this it is first necessary to look briefly at the rise of the police 'specials', the Security Branch and the Special Task Force.

(c) The rise of the 'specials'


If the incorporation of the Mounted Riflemen into the SAP marked a new phase in the class struggle (a shift from frontier warfare to urban control), then Sharpville was to mark another. The repression of black political and labour organisations drove them underground and shifted the struggle to one of sabotage and armed resistance. Many black leaders were imprisoned. Others fled the country and began the struggle from beyond the borders. In the undeclared 'state of emergency' which followed the Security Branch was formed 'to maintain internal security in regard to sabotage, Communism and other subversive activities'.[109] Its formation was to erase any ambiguity between policing and politics.

It is understandably difficult to gather information on the rise of the SB. By 1963 the Commissioner of Police, General Keevy, could announce that it had 'more than trebled to meet any threat to the country's safety'.[110] An indication of its growth from this point can be seen from annual Treasury allocations for 'secret services':[111]


1963	R 25,000
1964	R 224,000
1965	R 312,000
1967	R 412,000
1968	R5,281,000

'These financial statistics' commented The Argus on the 1968 figures, 'confirm the importance now being played by Lt. Gen. H.S. van der Bergh, former Chief of Security,Police and now the Prime Minister's special adviser on security matters'.[112] The importance of Van der Bergh was confirmed when he emerged as head of the newly-formed Bureau for State Security (BOSS) which was to centralise all security planning. However, after van der Bergh was discredited by the 'Muldergate' leaks, BOSS was effectively downgraded (first to the Department National Security, DONS, and then the National Intelligence Service, NIS), and placed in subordination to the Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) which emerged as the leading security service. The Security branch, however, has continued to grow, and has become known and feared for its ruthlessness and efficiency. It is of mounting concern that between 1963 and 1982 at least 50 people have died in detentions initiated by the SB.

SA Police budget
1974 - 1980



Expenditure on
police secret
services
1964 - 1969



A police unit of more central importance to this study, however, is the Special Task Force. Its growth dates from the mid-1970s. By this time the African National Congress had re-oriented its strategy to that of an exiled liberation movement - at a time when inflation and repression was sharpening trade union action. When the Frontline states surrounding South Africa became independent they also formed a base for guerilla action, orienting the SADF towards border conflict. And in the cities, with rapidly growing populations, unemployment and labour action, the undermanned police force was increasingly less able to feel secure about working-class action or urban 'disorders'. From the perspective of the State, the war of fixed position was undoubtedly seen as shifting to a war of manoeuvre.


If the growth of SADF influence was one strategy to contain this movement, another was the creation (in 1976) of an urban army called the Special Task Force. A captain in the Force described its specificity this way:

> The army's involved in conventional warfare. We study urban warfare and guerilla tactics. This is a completely new field. We liaise with the Special Branch and the army and work with the police. We go into everything.[114]

Plans for the Task Force were begun in 1975, a time when the strength of the SAP was at its lowest ebb and the recession was at its height.

Fig. 8k

Number of policemen in South Africa per 100 000 of population 1960 - 1982



The first urban units were formed as Riot Squads in early 1976 and forced their way to public attention as the men in camouflage and Hippo gun-wagons at the heart of upheavals in June that year. John Kane-Berman estimates that at least 700 people - mostly youths - were killed during the boycotts.[115] It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Riot Police were the cause of much of the violence in an otherwise peaceful boycott by black pupils refusing to be taught in Afrikaans. The Cillié Commission into the disturbances was told that 92 of the 97 people who died in the boycotts in Cape Town had been killed by the police. Of the 417 injured, 387 were injured by the police.[116] There were also reports and allegations of beatings and apparently unprovoked attacks on and shootings of children.[117] Speaking in Parliament in January 1977, Helen Suzman said that she heard

> a great many ugly stories about unprovoked violence in almost every township where there were disturbances. I have statements and affidavits which make one's hair stand up.

> Of course, the police have denied all charges of unprovoked violence. They say they shoot only when their lives are endangered, and I have no doubt that in some cases this is certainly true, but equally in other cases it is manifestly untrue . . . Africans say to me: 'The police can say what they like. We saw what happened and we know what happened; we don't care how many denials are made.' As I say, I have no doubt, from what I have heard, that there were many cases of unprovoked violence . . . I believe that the allegation that the riot police used arms indiscriminately is borne out by numerous eye-witnesses.[118]

The official view of the exercise was captured some months later by the Minister of Police, Mr. Jimmy Kruger, when he opened a new police station in Heilbron:

> It is so that the all-knowing God thought fit to exercise His authority on earth using the service of people, parents, officials, the Government. Therefore the wearers of the fine uniforms of the police are also the mandate-holders of God . . . Evil and permissive forces are almost unstoppably at work in the process of destroying authority in nearly every sphere (but) timeous and responsible action has, fortunately, always controlled this degeneration of life.[119]

Nobody is recruited into the Riot Squads without having first seen service against guerillas in a neighbouring country (Angola, Zimbabwe and possibly Mozambique). The cream of the local Squads are then picked to serve in the Special Task Force which is in turn the recruiting ground for an even more elite unit known simply as Koefoert. This unit is fully operational in the border wars at all times, using this arena as a training ground for urban insurgency and a testing site for new weaponry. A captain in the Cape Town Riot Squad told me:

> The major guidelines for the Local Reaction Squads come from the Special Task Force. The Task Force men are trained in urban control. There's nothing they can't do -from parachutes to diving, from driving a bulldozer to a Mini. These guys are incredible! They're based in Pretoria but at the moment they're operational. They are specially equipped and they're having huge successes on the border. You're totally into a different world here. We're not seeing ghosts in every cupboard. But we believe in preparedness.[120]

The development of the urban para-military units can be seen from the number of men being trained in counter-insurgency and anti-riot action. Starting in 1960, the numbers had increased 28 times by 1970. Between 1970 and 1980 the numbers had jumped by a further 150 per cent.[121] It may be simply coincidental that the years in which the greatest numbers of police were trained in riot action (1970/71, 1975, 1979) coincided with flashpoints in the black struggle in the years which followed (the Durban strikes in 1971/2, Soweto in 1976 and Elsies River in 1980).




Fig. 81

S.A. policemen doing training in riot control and counter-insurgency, 1960 - 1981

(Source: Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Police)

In Cape Town in mid-1982 the Riot Squad consisted of around 70 men under a 'Riot Colonel'. They were operating independently of the South African Police and, according to the Captain I spoke to, were being paid from a separate source. 'We are the military wing of the South African Police', I was told, 'but we are not like the army. We are not centralised. Each city operates under its own initiative along the guidelines of the Special Task Force. The men all know each other and every morning you see them on parade. They have a very high level of training and morale. We also are always gathering information. At every incident you will see there someone of the Riot Squad with a clip-board making notes. We are the eyes and ears of the Force'.[122] The Squad also has an 'incident vehicle' - a 'driving armoury with an operations room, five telephones and 200m of cable that can connect with anywhere in the country almost immediately'.[123]

But the Riot Squad also has another function, which is important in the context of this study. During 'peacetime', or as the Head of Criminal Investigation told me, 'in between riots', it is considered to be the Crime Prevention Unit. Its members patrol the streets in civilian clothes, on foot or with patrolmen on their beat, 'checking out the scene'. They compile photographic lists of law-breakers and liaise with the uniform patrols and detectives. The squad's function, I was told, was not to investigate cases but to identify them. The purpose of the patrols was clearly to get to 'know' the city both physically and socially, and to keep the men on the spot when they were needed. The riot captain put it this way:

> In between riots we train and care for our weapons. But we have X amount of men and we have to keep them fully employed - there's money at stake. We cannot train them all day, they'd get fed up. Now you've got to play around with ideas to keep them busy. So: Crime prevention! And when you need them, they're in.[124]

The Riot Squads in South Africa are similar in many ways to the Special Patrols in Britain and the Los Angeles Police Department's Special Weapons and Tactics Unit (SWAT) - with the same advantages to the State and the same problems. The advantages are speed, secrecy and military ruthlessness. At a time when city police forces are under-manned, overburdened and have to maintain a level of community credibility to remain effective, the Riot Squads can move in where patrolmen cannot tread. They have access to sophisticated weapons and technology, are at peak training and have a command and communications network ultimately responsive to Pretoria. Indeed they are the urban shock-troops of the Executive.

But they are not unproblematical. For maximum effectiveness the Riot Squads need a minimum of legal constraint, and as we have seen, they have received this. Virtually the only public control over the action of the Squads therefore becomes negative publicity. But almost all of their activities fall under Section 27C of the Police Act and may not be communicated or written about. When such para-military units are controlled by rules created within the police bureaucracy, when they operate beyond the constraint of the public, they can get out of control and have a tendency towards over-policing and excessive violence. In this way they can actually contribute to public violence and accelerate the decline in legitimacy of the state.

This over-policing by the Special Patrols was criticised by the Scarman Report into the 1981 riots in the London suburb of Brixton. The report found that 'hard' policing in the predominantly black area culminated in an exercise known as 'Operation Swamp'. Hundreds of policemen were poured into the area and more than 1,000 people were stopped and searched. 'Courtesy . . . was sometimes lacking.'[125] The angry response by the community was described by the Guardian as

> appalling scenes of violence and mayhem . . . It was as if we were brought to the edge of an abyss beyond which lay anarchy, the breakdown of law and order, and social catastrophe.[126]

In his recommendations, Lord Scarman laid particular stress on accountability, which

> renders the police answerable for what they do. Thereby it prevents them from slipping into an enclosed fortress of inward thinking and social isolation which would in the long term result in a siege mentality - the police in their fortress (happy as long as it is secure) and the rest of us outside, unhappy, uncertain and insecure (for we do not know what they will do or how they will do it).[127]

A Los Angeles Times report indicates a similar over-reaction from a SWAT force in the arrest of Black Panther members at the party headquarters in 1969:

> . . . a 40-man police team clad in black coveralls and black baseball caps, armed with automatic rifles and sniper rifles, opened fire on the headquarters. During the siege that followed police planted dynamite charges on the roof to blast their way in from the top, a police helicopter circled over the building, and an armoured personnel carrier stood by for possible use in the final assault . . . Thirteen Panthers were arrested for conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to commit assault on a police officer, and conspiracy to possess illegal weapons . . . the jury acquitted them of all but the last and least serious charge. The jury's decision showed that the L.A. Police Department's attempts to portray the Panthers as a threat to the community failed, and that it was clear to the citizens of Los Angeles that the Panthers had been set up and attacked by an overzealous and over-armed police assault team, for reasons that had nothing to do with public safety.[128]

In a similar attack on a house containing members of the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) in 1975, a SWAT force of 29 members and seven FBI men used weapons which included four automatic weapons that expended 5371 rounds

and launched 83 tear gas cannisters into an area equivalent to a 25 x 30 foot room. At one point the SWAT commander was reported to have requested fragmentation grenades. The SLA members were killed, the house was levelled and surrounding homes, cars and apartments were riddled with bullets.[129]

As a result of an amendment to the Police Act, passed shortly after the upheavals in Cape Town in 1980, Riot Squad actions cannot be reported in South Africa. However certain facts did emerge in the Press about the origins of the flare-up between boycotting students and the police during that period. On May 29 the Argus reported that in Elsies River, during an extremely orderly boycott of classes by Coloured pupils, a police van

> suddenly stopped and policemen, both uniformed and in camouflage gear, jumped out and baton-charged people on the pavements. People fled down side streets, across backyards and into houses. One youth was caught,brought to the ground and beaten by at least four policemen with batons . . . The police continued with this type of action along Halt Road and minutes later a car driven by a white woman had its side windows smashed by stones . . . a group again gathered on the corner of Halt Road and 20th Avenue about 2.30 p.m. According to Mrs. Enid November, who lives opposite, a blue kombi drove past and was stoned by the group. A man lying flat on the back seat of the kombi passed a shotgun to the driver who opened fire on the crowd. The men in the kombi were not wearing full camouflage gear, according to Mrs. November. It has been established, however, that the kombi is registered under the South African Police.[130]

Two youths were killed in the shotgun fire. Anger simmered over the deaths but order was maintained by student leaders as Riot Police reinforcements were airlifted into the city.[131] Then on June 17, on the second day of a

work stay-away to mark the anniversary of the Soweto unrest, youths began burning disused motor car tyres in the streets of the townships and stoned vehicles. In the confusion the gangs began to loot shops. Police used this as a signal to open fire on the crowds which had gathered on the streets. Although the police were later to be praised for their great restraint, at least 40 people were shot dead and many more injured.[132] It was officially announced that the police had been issued with 'orders to shoot to kill', but this statement was later retracted.[133]

These examples suggest that in all these cases triggers were being pulled too soon and that little negotiation or understanding existed between the community and Riot Squad-type units. But while the state might be hard-pressed to justify such action to the public, it is an effective form of crisis-policing for two reasons. Firstly it tends to blurr the boundary between political action and crime. This is particularly true when the Riot Squads become Crime Prevention Units 'between riots'. And secondly it serves to generate fear in populations in 'problem' areas, making them, in Lord Scarman's words, 'unhappy, uncertain and insecure', not knowing what the police will do or how they will do it. This fear is amplified when communities have been disrupted through urban relocation and housed in new townships, the very shape of which reinforce population control.

(d) New patterns of policing

One may ask what all this has to do with street gangs. The answer is that gang activity, whether brutal, acquisitive or simply social, is a complex network of relationships, and in this the police are key actors. For the purpose of illustration one could narrow the scenario of law and order down to a battle between two rival gangs, both composed of young, single, working-

class males, each seeking territorial control over a class habitat. But the difference is that one mob have the full weight of the State behind them, the other only themselves and their mates to fall back on. The scores they have to settle revolve, in the end, around the question 'Who rules?'[134] Since the 1940s the strategies of the street gangs has altered only in the magnitude of their members. From the other side, however, definite tactical changes have occurred.

Informal policing: This is not a new strategy, but simply a survival tactic developed by policemen faced with the sharp disparity between Police College and the real world. On the beat in a working class township the patrolman is not simply the upholder of law and order he was taught to be, but an actor in a complex social network in which he is both aggressor and victim.

On the one side he has trouble with the official 'system'. Firstly policemen see the complexity of the law as a threat to them when in the hands of a clever lawyer in court. And secondly known criminals are freed through what a policeman sees as technical loopholes in the judicial process. According to a detective interviewed by Cathy Albert in Cape Town,'even when he was 100 per cent sure of a case he could only be 50-50 per cent sure of getting a conviction'.[135]

> There's a big problem with the courts (a detective told me) You get a skollie, he's a killer and he's been living away from home for years but he's under 18. Then when you get him to court you have to have his parents with him or a welfare officer. And his mother says he's a good boy and he's the only breadwinner and she's under oath and you have to believe her but it's all lies. And when he gets sentenced he gets sentenced as a kid and he goes to Porter and that's like a holiday for him. And next week he's back here, escaped from Porter.

> Also in court cases witnesses get smashed. The gang says: 'You testify and you and your family are dead'. And you can't get witnesses - they don't want to testify in court although they will tell you all privately.
>
> Then if gangs fight they will come in here to the Police Station and lay charges against each other. But in court the complainant is a gangster and the accused is a gangster and the witnesses are gangsters and they're all under oath and all telling the truth of course but their stories are all totally different and the case is thrown out. Or they all withdraw charges. It's useless![136]

Given the porous nature of the justice system from the point of view of the detective or patrolman, the temptation to give a street youth a thrashing for some misdemeanour or an hour in the van and let him go must be strong indeed. However any doubt about the justice system leaves the policeman in a dilemma about his base-line of operation. It is here that an informal or grass-roots police science grows, where norms and techniques are absorbed from fellow officers with experience 'on the ground'. It is all part of 'getting to know the area', finding out who the informers are, who runs the rackets and who to leave alone. This was well captured by William Whyte in his study of Chicago street-corner society in 1943:

> Observation of the situation in Cornerville indicates that the primary function of the police department is not the enforcement of the law but the regulation of illegal activities . . . Under these circumstances the smoothest course for the officer is to conform to the social organization with which he is in direct contact and at the same time try to give the impression to the outside world that he is enforcing the law. He must play an elaborate role of make-believe and, in so doing,

> he serves as a buffer between divergent social organisations with their conflicting standards . . . An outbreak of violence arouses the 'good people' to make demands for law enforcement . . . therefore it is in the interest of the department to help maintain a peaceful racket organisation. Since competition in illegal activities leads to violence, it is also in the interest of the department to co-operate with the racket organisation in eliminating competition. By regulating the racket and keeping the peace, the officer can satisfy the demands for law enforcement with a number of token arrests and be free to make his adjustment to the local situation.[137]

Even if policemen worked to the rule book, this would (as we have seen) simply snarl up the courts and the prisons. They are therefore confronted with the impossible task of enforcing law or order and applying norms in the townships which they would not apply in the white areas. They must perform a delicate balance between productivity and acceptability within a lay police theory of crime and enforcement. And in a staffing crisis the police are drawn, through the necessity to maintain order, further into the township networks. In his study of the police, Paul Rock found that when crime

> is transformed into a stable organisation which generates a steady income, engages in a multitude of petty transactions and supports a network of dependants in a community, integration (with the police) is enhanced. Police action in this relationship will tend to focus on protecting it from disruption by other criminals or agencies, on ensuring that the activity of the organised criminal is confined within mutually defined limits of licence, and on maintaining a token display of control. When other segments of deviancy require extra attention, this particular form of rule-breaking can become virtually unpoliced.[138]

In my work with gangs a feature which constantly startled me was the arrival of policemen at a gang headquarters while I was there. They would hardly glance at me (an obvious outsider) or the circle of men passing around a white pipe, and would move into private discussion with the gang leader. A detective later clarified this for me:

> We work with the gang leaders. If we go to them and say we are looking for so and so they bring him here to the station. They know that if they don't we can get them, and they want peace with us. Also if we want to find out about this gang we go to the leader of the opposition gang and they tell us everything they know. We pay for information.[139]

In this way gangs and officers can co-police an area, keeping it 'quiet', picking up 'nuisances' and leaving the cores of gangs untouched. A case study done for this book by Wilfried Schärf found this delicate co-operation operating around a shebeen in Elsies River.

> Joker's shebeen operation made it necessary for him to exercise a control over his area which approximated the law. His private police (a gang) and their allies were a constant presence, but they were not the only contenders for power in the township. Opposition shebeeners' gangs and the SAP competed for that distinction.
>
> From the Police point of view it is clear that a number of shebeener's functions actually complemented their work. The 30-odd gangsters kept some 500 people in a state of relative submission using unorthodox techniques. Their street domination which inhibited mobility, social interaction and the possible release of tensions and conflicts outside the home, probably intensified conflict in the

homes. And their intimidating presence and the threat of reprisals rendered the number of crimes reported to the police a mere fraction of 'crimes' actually committed.

The gang, of course, performed a lot of its own policing functions, enforcing its own 'law' and processing 'offenders' by its own informal 'justice' procedures. The only counter to this power for the community was a seldom vocalised belief that police protection and law enforcement was their just due.

An aspect of the shebeen's private policing methods was its widespread network of contacts and alliances, all furnishing information which was probably inaccessible to the police. Joker's ability to extract almost any information he desired from the community was a vital asset to him in his relation to the police. They frequently approached him for clues and leads in pursuance of routine crime detection, often using his pointers as the only information in an investigation. Joker fostered this connection as it extended his influence and power in the township. The information he divulged was obviously never chosen to the detriment of his business interests. Indeed, in that respect the official police force worked for him, as their mutual interests coincided. The provisions of the Police Act unfortunately preclude any further development of this theme.[140]

The police, on the other hand, had to be seen as the ruling force in the township. Not all aspects of the shebeen's existence dovetailed with the interests they were expected to protect. But they focused their battle for township dominance on the most visible, the least experienced, and the most replaceable members of the shebeen, the guards. They were the frontline of Joker's business, peddling drugs and dispensing violence, whereas his power was far more subtly disguised. The police continuously harrassed the guards by repeated searches for drugs and dangerous weapons.

> The guards, in turn, developed their own strategies to cope under such conditions, increasing their shrewdness in concealing incriminating evidence. If they failed, the guards faced processing through the justice industry (police, court, prison and back), but their age usually favoured a speedy ejection, juveniles frequently being sentenced to strokes rather than imprisonment for minor offences.[141] Joker chose youngsters as his employees for this reason, and because the reserve army of unemployed young gangsters could easily replace any convicted members in shebeen duties. The dependence on Joker and fear of reprisals constrained the arrested guards from betraying him as their source of supply, even if it was common knowledge in the township.
>
> Hardly any of the police activity struck at the core of the operation. But Joker was also an extremely shrewd businessman who knew how to manipulate other gang-members so that he was only minimally exposed to the police. And his diverse alliances, backed up by the force he commanded, were relied on when his safety or business interests were in jeopardy. Witnesses who intended to testify against him were 'persuaded' to change their perception of the facts. His business continued to thrive but there was no guarantee that it always would. The forces that sustained it had to be carefully nurtured and balanced against each other without the contradictions becoming too apparent.[142]

Shebeeners' gangs are therefore performing a quasi-policing role in pursuance of their survival needs which to some degree dovetails with the State's duty to reproduce a labour force that is suitably subdued and politically docile. The division of potential worker solidarity that gangs contribute towards is also in the political interests of the State.

Informal policing by both police and syndicate bosses is therefore effective in terms of state control, but ineffective for the community as it tends to focus on high-profile street youths and leaves most of the big rackets untouched. This slack is in some sense taken up by the specialist units such as the Narcotics Bureau and the Murder and Robbery Squad, which can come in 'over the top' of regular policing. But if crime figures are any indication these are unable to reduce property crime or urban violence. Several other lines of defence have therefore been constructed.

Informers, vigilantes, guards and the Reserves: At the time of writing Cape Town was clearly in a transitional phase between precinct and para-military policing. The confusion of the period was giving rise to a range of strategies from both policemen and the public. The oldest technique is that of financial 'inducements' for information. It was not possible to find figures on the total amounts paid to police informers, but it is undoubtedly considerable. 'We have plenty of informers', a detective told me, 'we must because there are not many of us and there are many skollies'. The informer network is bolstered by 'agreements' and 'favours' worked out between the police and the community, and by 'leaning' on certain individuals who are threatened with arrest for some misdemeanour unless they 'squeal'.

A more organised response to the police shortage is the Police Reserve Force. Started in the 1970s, it had 11,152 adult members and 275 schoolboys by 1982.[143] Reservists are simply unpaid policemen, and were described by a policeman as 'the best thing that ever happened to the Force. We cannot work without them any longer. In fact we misuse their goodness. If they stopped working for us there would be chaos'.[144] However they are also the cause of some resentment in the SAP

> Reservists often give the force a bad name (a newspaper was told). They are just not experienced and make mistakes . . . and we get the blame. Why doesn't the department employ more police? They are using cheap labour by taking on reservists (and) closing their eyes to the alarming need for more policemen.[145]

A community response to rising insecurity in the townships has been the creation of vigilantes or citizen patrols, a move supported by the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce (which also called for the formation of a municipal police force). Several vigilante patrols were started during the 1970s but most of them collapsed. One reason for this is that they were penetrated by the gangs who then used them for their own purposes. The other reason was SAP refusal to recognise the patrols, probably because they tended to upset the delicate balance of control in the townships. In 1977 the Minister of Police told Parliament that

> the formation of vigilantes is not supported because the Police Reserve Force offers adequate opportunites to members of the public to perform vigilance duties in their own areas.[146]

Industry's response to a fall-off in police surveillance and rising urban property crime has been a massive increase during the 1970s of the use of private security guards. These men receive a brief training in security work and are issued with a gun. In 1982 the numbers of contract guards in South Africa was 50,000, a force 56 per cent bigger than the entire SAP. (This figure excludes 'in-house' guards employed by individual firms as part of their staff.)[147] This trend follows that of the more industrialised countries. In New York, for example, there are 30,000 policemen and 40,000 private guards.[148] Cape Town alone had 4,500 such guards in 1982.

These forms of policing operate largely as crime preventors - patrolling, guarding and finding out information. Increasingly, however, strategies to contain social deviancy in South Africa have been moving towards control through the generation of fear.

Dragnets and raids: The growing para-military nature of state policing can be seen in the decline of street policing and an escalation of what the Press like to call 'police swoops'. These take two forms (which are not unrelated), dragnets for 'subversive political elements' and pass raids which scoop up anyone who looks 'suspicious'.

The former cause greater public outcry, possibly because the people picked up are usually held under laws which allow detenetion without trial for indefinite periods, and because pass raids are far more frequent occurrences, taking place almost daily. The impression is inescapable that political dragnets are often for the purpose of compiling information and inducing fear in those opposed to the state, as this newspaper article indicates:

> When the Security Police swooped on the homes of more than 150 South Africans last October in a pre-dawn raid one Sunday morning, strong hints were dropped that a nation-wide conspiracy to undermine the State had been uncovered.
>
> Now that a year has passed since those raids the time is opportune to inquire what happened to the "conspiracy".
>
> Here are the facts: of the 150 people raided, 48 were taken into detenetion without trial.

Of these 48 detainees, 36 were released - no charges having been brought against them. Some were released within weeks, but others were held in custody incommunicado, for months.

Of the remaining 12 detainees, one was charged under the Suppression of Communism and Terrorism Acts, but acquitted and allowed to return to Britain, and another detainee, who gave evidence at his trial, was released and also allowed to leave the country.

A third detainee was released after he had paid a R20 admission of guilt fine on a drugs charge, and a fourth detainee was convicted under the Suppression of Communism Act and Customs and Excise Act of being in unlawful possession of banned books.

This left eight detainees. Three were released and charged under the Suppression of Communism Act but estreated their bail and escaped to Botswana.

Of the remaining five detainees, one was Ahmed Timol, who fell to his death from the tenth floor of police headquarters in Johannesburg and four were each sentenced to five years' imprisonment under the Terrorism Act for conspiring with Timol to promote the cause of the banned African National Congress and Communist Party in South Africa.

Excluding the three who estreated their bail, this means the State secured Terrorism Act convictions against only four people,and lesser convictions against two others.

That is the sum total of the "conspiracy" for which more than 150 people - among them 10 lecturers, two bishops, a newspaper editor and other prominent citizens - were rudely roused from their beds.
(Sunday Times 12.11.72)


Unlike police dragnets, 'crime swoops' have the air of military invasions into enemy territory, with heavy vehicles, dogs, machine guns and often men in camouflage. The Executive has admitted that on occasion the army has been used in these exercises.[149] The success of these raids is made possible by the sealed-off structure of the townships with their limited access roads and broad encircling buffer strips. This pin-point saturation policing can be seen as a new form of political domination and procedure in the management/reproduction of labour power, regulating urban migrancy and calling the unemployed to heel. In this regard, Poulantzas points out that with the decline of popular democracy

> the traditional form of social control, which is organised by general and universal norms defining guilt and distinguishing loyal subjects from those outside the law, is now combined with individualized regulation that starts out from the 'mentality' (the presumed intention) of each member of the society considered as a potentially guilty suspect. The general enclosure of outlaws in such total institutions as prisons or asylums . . . is now articulated to a process whereby diverse networks spreading throughout society's structure the population through administrative-police procedures adapted to the specifications of each category of suspect. From the punishable offence laid down by a universal and general act of parliament, we are moving towards the 'suspicious circumstance' whose contours are administratively defined by supple, malleable and particularist regulation . . .[150]


In the creation of group areas we are also witnessing the creation of 'prisons with horizontal walls' (Mumford) which can be sealed off by state warders in times of trouble. Cape Town citizens were first made aware of the new-style policing in 1961 with a massive drive by 'officers and men of the uniformed


police, CID and Security Police' to pick up 'loiterers, idlers and otherwise unoccupied people of all races found in the streets or on premises in suspicious circumstances' or people who 'could not give satisfactory account of themselves'.[151] In parallel raids throughout the country about 10,000 people, described by police as 'mostly idlers, vagrants, tsotsis and foreign Natives', were held.[152] Three months later another such raid was carried out on the Cape Flats by 600 policemen working through the night, and similar swoops were reported in the city in 1966 (400 arrested), 1969 (1,032 arrested), 1971 (543 arrested), 1973 (1,270 arrested) and increasingly from 1976 (although Press reports decreased).[153]

The dictionary definition of a raid is 'a sudden swift inroad, originally of horsemen, for assault or seizure'. As the class struggle in South Africa polarises, the raid and the spy - the original function of the 17th Century border patrols - are becoming the pattern of urban policing. Crime prevention - daily uniformed police penetration into civil society for the maintenance of peace and social harmony - is a withering function often dependent on crime syndicates for its operation. Working in the interface areas, therefore, one gets a strong feeling that battle lines are being drawn in a conflict that transcends crime.




Tyres burning in the streets of Elsies River June 1980







Police move in During
the 1980 schools' boycotts
in Cape Town




MANS SHOP


SHOP
DENIS BASSON





NOTES FOR CHAPTER 8

1. Nusas: Total War in South Africa: militarization and the apartheid state, October 1982, p 4.
2. Sunday Times 13.2.77. Quoted in W.I.P. September 1977 p 39.
3. Ibid. 13.3.77.
4. W.I.P. 24, 1982, p 12.
5. Public address 19.7.82.
6. See Constitutional Proposals in W.I.P. 24, 1982, p 13.
7. Ibid. p 13.
8. This is based on a reading of Hansard for the period - particularly the various Appropriation Bills.
9. Chester Crocker: Current and Projected Military Balances in Southern Africa, in Bissel and Crocker (eds): South Africa in the 1980s, Westview Press, 1979, p 81.
10. Argus newsclips.
11. Argus newsclips.
12. Argus newsclips.
13. White Paper on Defence 29.3.77 Section 5.
14. Ibid. Section 10.
15. Ibid. p 15.
16. Ibid. p 16 and Militarization in South Africa, W.I.P. 24, p 18.
17. Poulantzas, N: State, Power, Socialism, New Left Books, London, 1978, p 224.
18. Ibid. pp 222, 223.
19. Natal Witness 25.8.77.
20. Ibid.
21. Sunday Express 22.5.77.
22. Proposed early in 1982.
23. Poulantzas, op. cit. p 228.
24. See Ibid p 229.
25. The Citizen newspaper and Pace.
26. Dugard, J: Human Rights and the South African Legal Order, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1978 p 181.

27. Ibid p 181.

28. Ibid. p 182.

29. Mathews, A: The Darker Reaches of Government: access to information about public administration in three socieites, Juta, Cape Town, 1978 p 145

30. Ibid p 146.

31. Dugard, op. cit. p 186.

32. In addition, of course, all big English-language newspapers are owned either by the Argus Company or South African Allied Newspapers, subsidiary companies of giant corporations which are increasingly pacing the State's moves towards authoritarian statism.

33. Poulantzas, op. cit. p 226.

34. See Doreen J McBarnet: Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice, McMillan, London, 1981 p 4.

35. Pashukanis (1978) quoted in Pat Carlin: Radical Issues in Criminology, Robertson, Oxford, 1980 p 18.

36. See E M Burchell & P.M.A. Hunt: South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol 1, Juta, Cape Town, 1970. The first chapter of this work deals authoritatively with the historical development of South African criminal law.

37. In particular, P M A Hunt: South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol 11 2nd edition (by J R L Milton) Juta, Cape Town, 1982 and J C de Wet and H L Swanepoel Strafreg, Butterworths, Durban, 1975.

38. Burchell and Hunt op.cit.pp 55-6

39. S.E.S.A. 3 (Nasionale Bookhandel, London, 1971) p 493. The definition in the standard legal texts (footnote 37 above) is more complex (of Hunt op cit p 602 et seq). However, these complexities do not affect the general point made here.

40. Hunt op cit p 467.

41. Ibid p 340.

42. These figures come from:

Argus and Cape Times newspaper reports of questions asked in Parliament over the decade.

South African Institute of Race Relations yearbooks.

The figures for the shootings during the 1976 boycotts are conservatively estimated by John Kane-Berman at 700 in his book Soweto.

43. Cape Times and Argus 11.8.82.

44. Sumner, C (ed): Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment, Heineman, London, 1982, p 10.

45. Platt, T: Prospects for a radical criminology in the USA. In Taylor, Walton & Young (eds): Critical Criminology, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1975 p 103.

46. Sumner, op cit p 10.

47. Poulantzas, op cit p 90.

48. Stuart Hall et al: Policing the Crisis p 359.

49. Centre for Applied Legal Studies: Report on the Rabie report: an examination of security legislation in South Africa, Wits. Occasional Papers 3, March 1982 p 95 (data from the Gollup poll were also drawn from this report).

50. Quoted in S.A. Institute of Race Relations Yearbook for 1971, p 76.

51. SAIRR yearbook for 1977, p 107.

52. Hans Magnus Enzenberger: Raids and reconstructions: essays in politics, crime and culture, Pluto Press, London, 1976.

53. Ibid p 77.

54. The extreme form of this is the ceding of power to perhaps one single individual to press a single button that would bring on a nuclear war which could destroy the entire planet.

55. Enzenberger, op. cit. p 94.

56. Ibid p 73.

57. Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jeggerson, John Clarke, Brian Roberts: Policing the Crisis: mugging, the State, and law and order, MacMillan, London, 1980, p 225.

58. Cape Times 10.9.81

59. Weekend Argus 12.9.81.

60. Joyce Waring and John Wiley in the Cape Times 3.9.81.

61. F J Le Roux, Hansard, Wednesday, September 16 1981 cols 3952/3954.

62. See Rape: Criminology sourcebook 6, Institute of Criminology, UCT, January 1982.

63. Cape Times 16.8.82.

64. Ibid

65. Quoted by Ray Swart (PFP) in Parliament, Friday May 17 1982, Hansard col 6303.

66. Quotation by the new Minister of Law and Order (Le Grange) on Friday May 7 1982, Hansard Col 6369.

67. Supplied by the South African Police.

68. Standard Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa, (SESA), Nasionale Boekhandel, London, 1973 p 633.

69. Ibid p 635.

70. Ibid p 635.

71. Ibid p 633.

72. Ibid p 633.

73. Ibid p 633.

74. Ibid p 634.

75. Ibid p 634.

76. Ibid p 634.

77. Eddie Koch: The development of a police force on the Witwatersrand, 1886-1906, in Africa Perspective, No. 8, July 1978.

78. S.E.S.A. op cit p 625.

79. Ibid p 629.

80. Ibid p 629.

81. Ibid p 629.

82. Poulantzas, N: Political Power and Social Classes, New Left Books, London, 1973 p 115.

83. Hansard Friday May 7 1982 col 6353.

84. See Kathleen Albert: The police and their image: a comparative study of the American and Cape Town Policemen, Social Science Masters Thesis (unpublished) UCT 1978.

85. Hansard, op cit cols 6304, 6305.

86. W A Westley: Violence and the Police. American Journal of Sociology, July 1953, vol 49 p 35.

87. Cape Times 15.2.79.

88. Cape Times 15.10.82 and 22.10.82. By 1982 the total enlistment number was 34 271, a drop from the 1979 figure of 375 men.

89. Argus 3.10.1975, quoted in K Albert, op cit p 48.

90. Interviews with policemen in these areas.

91. Interview with policement, 1982.

92. Cape Times 14.2.79 and interviews with policemen.

93. House of Assembly: Questions in Replies Vol 76 para. 565.

94. Statistics taken from Police reports.

95. Ibid, A breakdown by suburbs is as follows:

Unsolved as Percentage of Reported Crime in Cape Town during 1981

Rondebosch	75
Pinelands	75
Mowbray	71.4
Woodstock	70.6
Camps Bay	69.8
Claremont	67.5
Sea Point	66.8
Diep River	63.8
Wynberg	63.4
Milnerton	62.2
Bellville	62.1
Cape Town	59.8
Athlone	59.2
Lansdowne	59.1
Maitland	58.7
Kensington	56.7
Goodwood	56.6
Parow	56.6
Durbanville	54.4
Philippi	52.7
Kraaifontein	50.3
Fish Hoek	50.2
Elsies River	49.6
Bishop Lavis	49.1
Manenberg	48.9
Retreat	48.6
Muizenberg	43.5
Grassy Park	43.2
Kuils River	41.2
Brackenfell	40.8
Hout Bay	39.9
Simonstown	37.9
Langa	26.2
Guguletu	25.5
Mitchells Plain	15.3
TOTAL	56.3% unsolved

(Source: Police dockets, Cape Town 1981).

96. Commission of Inquiry into the Penal system of the Republic of South Africa par. 3.1.15 p. 35.

97. Interview conducted 1982.

98. Argus 26.11.51

99. Argus 28.6.58.

100. London Daily Mirror 15.5.59, reported in the Argus of the same day.

101. Argus Jan. 29, March 5 and March 17, 1965.

102. Argus 9.7.70.

103. Argus 4.2.72 and 25.7.74.

104. Question in Parliament. Reported in the Argus 5.3.75

105. Sunday Times 28.5.78.

106. Argus 15.3.79 and 16.3.79.

107. Argus 7.3.81.

108. Interview during 1982, Cape Flats.

109. S.E.S.A. op. cit. p. 627.

110. Argus 18.7.63.

111. S.A. Institute of Race Relations Yearbooks and Argus newsclips on police.

112. Argus 27.3.69.

113. Report on the Rabie Report, op. cit. p. 100.

114. Interview with a captain in the Riot Squad 14.7.82.
By June 1976 there were Riot Squads in the following centres:

Pretoria	Middleberg (Tvl.)	East London
Johannesburg	Maritzburg	Oudtshoorn
Soweto	Durban	Kimberley
Potchefstroom	Cape Town	Welkom
Krugersdorp	Paarl	Bloemfontein
Springs	Port Elizabeth	Windhoek

(House of Assembly Questions and Replies Vol. 76 Tuesday, June 22 1976)

115. John Kane-Berman: Soweto: black revolt, white reaction. Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1978.

116. Ibid, p. 29.

117. Ibid, p. 30.

118. Hansard 1 (1977) cols, 136, 140, quoted by Kane-Berman, Ibid, p. 30.

119. Argus, 6.8.77.

120. Interview with Riot Squad captain, op. cit.

121. Figures from Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Police.

122. Interview with Riot Squad captain, op. cit. This note-taking was confirmed in a submission to the Cillié Commission by a Riot squad commander, who said that each member of each riot section had kept a minute-by-minute record of the events in Cape Town during June 1976. See Kane-Berman, op. cit. p. 29.

123. Riot captain interview, op. cit.

124. Ibid.

125. Reported in the Cape Times 17.12.81.

126. Cape Times 16.12.81

127. Cape Times 17.12.81.

128. Quoted in The iron fist and the velvet glove: an analysis of the U.S. Police, Centre for Research on Criminal Justice, Berkeley, California, 1975, p. 95.

129. Ibid. p. 96.

130. Argus 29.5.80.

131. Ibid.

132. Police reported 29 deaths but the Cape Times,counting hospital admissions, put the figure nearer 50.

133. Cape Times 23.6.80.

134. See Cohen, op. cit. p. 135.

135. Albert, op. cit. p. 111.

136. Interview with detective, Cape Town, 1980.

137. William Whyte: Street Corner Society: the structure of an Italian Slum. (University of Chicago Press, 1943) pp 138, 139.

138. Paul Rock: Deviant Behaviour (Hutchinson, London, 1973) p. 197.

139. Interview with detective, Cape Town, 1982.

140. Act. No. 8 of 1959 Sec. 27.

141. J. Midgley: "Children on Trial" (a study of juvenile justice) quoted in R. Graser(ed.) South African Studies in Criminology 1975 Cape Town at107.

142. W. Scharf: Shebeeners in the Western Cape.

143. Hansard Friday May 7, 1982 cols. 6346. 6347, 6349.

144. Cape Times 14.2.71.

145. Ibid.

146. House of Assembly Questions & Answers Vol. 76. Tuesday, April 26 1977.

147. Information from John McBreartry of the S.A. National Security Employers Association, Johannesburg.

148. The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove, op. cit. p. 149.

149. House of Assembly Questions and Replies, Vol. 76, Wednesday, April 12 1978.

150. Poulantzas: State, power, socialism, op. cit. p. 220.

151. Argus 17.5.61. and 18.5.61.

152. Ibid.

153. Taken from Argus newsclips for those years.

9

CRIME AND THE MAGICAL RECOVERY OF COMMUNITY

What has been outlined so far is the rise of the defensive city and its effect on people displaced or impoverished in the process. The new Cape Town is a city by built to protect capital accumulation and to control any resistance to its logic: a sanatized central office cluster and several shopping nodes, factory parks ringed with high fences and fast roads, the rich separated from the poor by buffer zones of open land, and the workers in separate ghettos with no back alleys. Police man the boundaries.

I must now turn to our original inquiry and ask: What part do the youth gangs play in all this? There is a fundamental point that must be made right here: The central reason for gang formation is not lack of motivation, laziness or poor education among the street youth; it is stark poverty. Ganging is primarily a survival technique, and it is obvious that as long as the city is part of a socio-economic system which reproduces this poverty, no amount of policing will stop the ghetto brotherhoods. This situation is not particular to South Africa. It seems to occur wherever employment and income are a privilege and not a right, where the primary social motive is profit and not the greatest good for the greatest number. Phil Cohen found in Britain that

> for the kids who are caught up in the internal contradictions of a subculture, what begins as a break in the continuum of social control can easily become a permanent hiatus in their lives. Although there is a certain amount of subcultural mobility... there are no career prospects![1]

La Fontaine has charted a similar situation in Zaire

> Depr ivation hasdriven more street gangs to outright delinquency. Unemployment has made the transition from the marginal position of youth to adult responsibility ever more difficult. Far more youths are excluded from a 'normal' adult existence. This has meant that the upper age-limit of street-gang members has slowly risen and these older youths appear likely to form the nucleus of a class of permanent criminals. In addition, the products of secondary schools find their opportunities curtailed and leave school only to enter the world of the unemployed. The street gangs are thus in the process of re-acquiring... educated members.[2]

Even Fredric Thrasher, an apologist for rapid capitalist development in the United States of the 1920s, observed that

> the process of breakneck competition in the development of (Chicago's) new wealth and the consequent tendency towards increasing division of labour and specialization have stimulated the rapid growth of (the city)... and the creation of a semicircular 'poverty belt' around the (inner) loop.[3]

In Cape Town while family disruption is causing an increase at the younger end of ganging, unemployment is extending the upper age limit, carrying a strong probability of permanent criminalisation. More than 95 percent of the gang members interviewed in the city said they would accept any job if it was offered to them, and two thirds said they would then leave the gang. In an open-ended question about what alternatives they would find acceptable to gang life, they answered

No alternative	26%
Business	48%
School	12%
Church	8%
Politics	3%
Other	3%.

(Source: Survey of Street gangs)

That the employment problem is being reproduced over generations can be seen in the fact that 66 percent of the gang members said their own fathers had been out of work. Of these, 85 percent said their fathers had been without work for periods longer than six months and 31 percent for more than a year.

Mass removals from the inner city, as we have seen, destroyed both the informal economy and many family support structures, networks which softened the hard dichotomy between wage labour and destitution. Coupled with rising inflation during the 1970s, this was to lead to increasing economic brittleness among the city's working class.

In 1980, for example, Divisional Council tenants in the city were served with 100 993 eviction notices, mainly because of their inability to pay the rent. This means that an average of about six eviction notices were issued for each Divisional Council housing unit during the year.[4] In June 1980 a massive worker boycott of buses began in response to fares increases of between 30 percent and 100 percent. Many buses were stoned.[5] This took place amid a boycott of 'coloured' schools in Cape Town and a consumer boycott of red meat products. A reading of the Grassroots community newsletter (effectively a Cape Flats newspaper) shows a constant struggle against the rising cost of State-provided and Council-provided items such as houses, water, electricity and transport, and the under-provision of creches, schools and amenities.

In times of a fall in the standard of living, people, of course, refuse to simply disappear when they are unable to become 'rational' consumers and producers. As Wilkinson and Webster have found:

> they resolve the problem for their continued survival by gathering together whatever skills they may have acquired and whatever means of production capital has either by-passed or produced as readily accessible commodities in the expansion of its market, in order to fashion some object or provide some service with an exchange value which will yield some sort of income.[6]

In the new ghettos informal economic activity was to continue, but under reduced circumstances. Unpicked from the urban fabric, pushed out of walking distance from the inner city and the wealthy suburbs, and sealed off in single-class townships, the poor found themselves with nobody to sell their labour or products to but the poor. And in times of hardship the latter concentrated on the bare essentials. social isolation


NB

It is here that we see the almost imperceptible slip from domestic production and services into what is defined as crime. And in the crisis of reproduction in the housing estates it is always the youths who are hit hardest. They are weaker physically, have less job experience, are less docile and have easier access to support within a gang. In a survey of juvenile offenders in Cape Town, 81 percent were convicted for crimes against property - mostly petty theft - while the total number of property crimes in the city was a much lower 54 percent. Seventy percent of the youths had no previous convictions and 90 percent of the offenders were boys.[7] Policemen on the Cape Flats estimate that 80 percent of all crimes in the area are committed by youths under the age of 18.[8] During 1981 property crime in Cape Town was made up of theft (68 percent), housebreaking (22 percent) and robbery (10 percent).[9] The root cause of all these offences can generally be traced back to simple material need.


Youths from poor families on the Cape Flats are therefore caught in a pincer between their decreasing access to income opportunities and tough penal laws. And these laws bear down heavily on 'informal' ghetto income. Indeed South Africa's prisons are filled mainly with poor people and political dissidents.

In Cape Town gang activity takes three forms: illegal services (drug sales, shebeens), property crime (robbery, theft, housebreaking and to a certain extent 'protection') and violence (assault, rape, murder). The first two are by far the most prevalent, the last being more of a spin-off of property crime and services.


Survey of gang members:
Number of people living
in the family house



Survey of gang members:
Size of house



Survey of gang members:
Number of brothers and
sisters



percentage of youths
10
20
30
40
domestic
housewife
machinist
unemployed
labourer
needlework
nurse
factory worker
clerk
farm worker
Survey of gang members:
Work done by mothers

percentage of youths
5
15
25
35
45
labourer/bricklayer
driver
painter
motor worker
farm worker
dead
unemployed
carpenter
in jail
gardener
fisherman
watchman
cleaner
gangster
factory worker
shop assistant
blockman
hawker
clerk
Survey of gang members:
Work done by fathers

Survey of gang members:
[illegible] af[illegible]
as a child

Survey of gang members:
[illegible]
[illegible]

ILLEGAL SERVICES

The first chapter outlined the services provided by gangs, both as the provision of illicit commodities and the sale of labour (as hit-men and a police force). The law with regard to illegal services is, on the face of it, curious. The sale of dagga and mandrax carries heavy penalties, yet the sale of tobacco, liquor and 'medical' drugs carries none. Prostitution is punishable, but marrying a man for his money or bestowing favours free of charge is not. The sale of liquor from a shebeen is illegal, yet the difference between it and a bottle store or hotel is the possession of a piece of paper bearing a stamp of authority. A licenced baker may produce and sell bread, yet a housewife may not. The defence of these contradictions is usually the argument that the legal transaction takes place under more sanitary conditions. But on closer inspection it can be seen that such laws are the weapon which monopoly capital uses in an attempt to stamp out competition from the informal sector. They simply serve to drive such activity underground.

Property Crime

Property crime is rather more complex, and a useful distinction between it and illegal services is made by Chris Birkbeck in his work on Cali, Colombia:

> Property crime (he says) is not a free exchange of money for a commodity or service, but a forced appropriation of goods or money from the victim with no recompense by the criminal. The relation is not governed by supply and demand, but by the ability of the victim to protect himself against such crime, and the ability of the criminal to overcome this.[10]

Property crime, like violent crime, has a victim. It is not morally justifiable whether it is carried out by the rich or the poor. But in the ghettos it must be understood in the context within which it arises. It is generally carried out by the poor on the poor, and through it very few escape their poverty. Property crime in the new single-class ghettos tends to generate and maintain poverty.

Another factor acting against a high income from hustling and hitting is that these activities do not represent undifferentiated income opportunities; they do not necessarily represent an opportunity structure which people can enter at the bottom and move up the scale of accumulated criminal earnings. In this sense crime has much in common with legitimate economic activity under capitalism: what you get out of it depends on what you invest.

A police officer in the Grassy Park housing estate described these class distinctions of the crime world like this:

> The gang leaders they are well off - like Robbie, he has a new Datsun and a bakkie. You see the older men are organised - and the lighties take the rap. Most crime is done by juveniles - kids under 18. They're often working for somebody. But they'll never say who they are or they'll get smashed up. Most of these young guys are not rich. They only have their clothes they are wearing... and they wear them for three weeks! All they want is their broek, baadjie, 'n bietjie kos en 'n plek om te slaap (trousers, jacket, a bit of food and a place to sleep). They're mostly from poor families. They'll sleep twelve in an old motorcar with one blanket, all cuddled up together - and they never get sick even in winter somehow. Their parents are always away at work or they're drinking all the time and they fight. Then the lightie thinks he can't stay there anymore and out he goes. And there's only the gang for him. You don't get rich being a skollie. But the main guys, the big ones... well that's different.[11]

An important distinction therefore exists between those who break the law to add to what they have, and those who break it simply in order to live. Birkbeck seeks to understand this by locating property crime within the broader capitalist social relations. Crime and delinquency, he says, cannot be explained simply in terms of poverty, because it is distributed throughout the social formation. (Indeed, in terms of magnitude, hustling pales into insignificance in the face of the crimes of the rich and powerful).

Within working class areas, however, it can be seen to contain three elements:

> First, there is an overriding preoccupation with being successful and attaining the 'good life': crime is inextricably bound up with the eternal question of when and how one will escape poverty. Second, the road to the better life is defined in individual and personal terms: arrival is achieved through one's own efforts and no one else's... (And thirdly) crime embodies the essential elements necessary for the achievement of status. It is a means for achieving a universally defined, universally desired, end... Much crime also implies violence, and violence too commands respect.[12]

Like most 'informal' economic activity in District Six, property crime on the Cape Flats is governed, in the last instance, by capitalist relations, for all that it appears in a somewhat refracted form. Status is dependent on individual material success and power; and what cannot be achieved in fact may be attained through the manipulation of the symbols of that success (as will be shown presently). The desire for personal success and status is incorporated into the gang in a complex and often inverse way and is mostly given life only vacariously through the media and bragging. Often these preoccupations corrode the very goals gang members may hold before them. If individualism and distrust of others are seen as characteristics for 'getting on' in life, these attitudes act against the co-operation necessary to pull off a profitable crime outside the township. These antagonisms are held in check within the gang by a strong leader or sheer necessity to stay alive. But gangs often break up over suspected intentions or unequal distribution of gains.

In the first months of 1982, for example, the Born Free Kids gang in Lavender Hill split over profits from drug sales. The two factions, one led by Kaffirtjie Des (aged 48) and the other by a man called Crow, were involved in a shooting war in the township which lasted for three weeks of almost continuous fighting. A common occurrence on the Cape Flats, too, are raids by a gang on drug merchants, shebeens and the homes of housebreakers known to have made big hauls, all people

involved in similar activities to the gang. It is the rare exception, rather than the rule, to find poor people who are involved in property crime organising and disciplining themselves in such a way as to gradually increase their scale of operation... investing the proceeds of one crime in the planning and execution of a further and more ambitious project. There is a general lack of organisation for striking at more lucrative targets. Thus the poor become the ready victims. For this reason property crime among the poor is generally not a means to lasting upward socio-economic mobility. However it is the most prevalent, constituting 55 percent of all reported crime in Cape Town during 1981.[13]

Violent Crime

More than any thing else it is the fear of violence that patrols the barrier between rich and poor in Cape Town, and this is not unjustified. Within a population of 1.5 million there were 764 reported murders in 1981... one every 11 hours.[14] By way of comparison, the murder rate per 100 000 people in Britain during 1979 was one, in West Germany 5.8, in the United States 9.7 and in Cape Town 24.[15] More than 18 000 crimes of violence were reported in the city during 1981, the ambulance service transported 22 800 assault victims.[16] Four rapes a day were reported ... nearly 6 000 people were robbed.[17] By mid-1982 the Head of Criminal Investigations in Cape Town was describing the increase in armed robbery as 'alarming' (Cape Times 16.8.82). On the basis of such figures there were innumerable reports and letters in the Press calling for more police protection to control the 'crime wave'. And all areas among the ten with the highest levels of violence in 1980 were on the Cape Flats.[18] On the other side of the colour line, an average of one white person in three owns a firearm.

However we must not be blinded by statistics. Quite apart from the fact that (at the best of times) they are very narrow representations of reality and often simply biased, presented in this way they tend to isolate ghetto violence as a distinct category of reality, a phenomenon unattached to any social matrix.

Gangs are a product of a social system, children of urban racial capitalism in a period of recession. One can go further and say that they are a parody of this system - a State within a State and a fairly faithful reflection of the rules of government employed by their rivals and competitors, whether it be the police or capitalist enterprise. It is because of this that although the gangs are no match for State power, although the power of the latter is never in doubt, they become its competitors for 'law and order' - they question the State's monopoly on violence. It is this violence which in the official mind forms the bridge between 'crime' and 'threats to State security', and gives rise to the funding of studies such as this one.

> The State (says Enzenberger) loves to claim that its "foundations" are endangered. And it does not take a holdup murder to "shake" them - a simple pickpocket or the writing of an article can be quite sufficient. However, what seems to irritate modern legislators more than anything else is "resistance to the power of the State". Whenever this crime is mentioned, the text gladly abandons its anachronistic equanimity. Foam begins to form at the guardians' mouths, the harmless get-together becomes a "conspiracy", the trespasser a delinquent...[19]

The State, which holds a monopoly of legitimate violence, understandably tends to see any challenge to this monopoly as treasonable. (Each condemnation of another constitutes an acquittal of oneself.) After reading the headlines one would be excused for thinking that a simple murder interests us more than a war, and that a sharp knife was a more terrible weapon than a nuclear bomb.

REGAINING THE LOST COMMUNITY

It would be a poor account, however, which viewed township gangs only as a response to poverty or the search for wealth. They are clearly much more than that. In perhaps the most thorough empirical study done on gangs - in Chicago in 1927 - Thrasher suggested that the gang represents 'the spontaneous effort of boys to create a society for themselves where none adequate to their need exists'.[20]

Discussing the roots of ganging, Thrasher's observations have a familiar ring about them:

> The failure of the normally directing and controlling customs and institutions to function efficiently in the boy's experience is indicated by disintegration of family life, inefficiency of schools, formalism and externality of religion, corruption and indifference in local politics, low wages and monotony in occupational activities, unemployment, and lack of opportunity for wholesome recreation. All these factors enter into the picture of the moral and economic frontier, and, coupled with deterioration in housing, sanitation, and other conditions of life in the slum, give the impression of general disorganisation and decay.
>
> The gang functions with reference to these conditions in two ways: It offers a substitute for what society fails to give; and it provides a relief from suppression and distasteful behavior. It fills a gap and affords an escape... Thus the gang, itself a natural and spontaneous type of organisation arising through conflict, is a symptom of disorganisation in the larger social framework.[21]

The adolescent gang, says Thrasher, occupies a period in the life of a boy 'between childhood, when he is usually incorporated in a family structure, and marriage, when he is re-incorporated into a family and the orderly relations of work'. It is his pseudo-kin. This group becomes important at a time of 'cultural disorganisation', a development likely to have been taking place in Chicago at the time of Thrasher's study (between 1900 and 1930 the city's population increased by 500 000, causing overcrowding and family atomization).

Working on the East End of London in the mid-1970s, Phil Cohen was to reflect some of Thrasher's observations about the effects of this disorganisation and the need of youth to find a symbolic substitute for their lost cultural base.

> It seems to me (says Cohen) that the latent function of subculture is this: to express and resolve, albeit "magically", the

> contradictions which remain hidden or unresolved in the parent culture. The succession of subcultures which this parent culture generated can thus all be considered so many variations on a central theme - the contradiction, at an ideological level, between traditional working-class puritanism and the new hedonism of consumption: at an economic level, between a future as part of the socially mobile elite or as part of the new lumpen proletariat. (Youth subcultures) all represent, in their different ways, an attempt to retrieve some of the socially cohesive elements destroyed in their parent culture, and to combine these with elements selected from other class fractions, symbolizing one or other of the options confronting it.[22]

We cannot, therefore, understand a youth subculture without understanding its parent culture because of the way in which this parent culture's problems are 'lived' by the youths. Cohen found, for example, that the London gangs were not only bound together by collective behaviour or need, but more particularly by territoriality. It was by staking out a geographical area that a gang became 'anchored in the collective reality of its members' and rooted in the community.[23] This was, he suggests, a 'magical' way of expressing territorial ownership lost by the relocated parent culture; a way of retrieving the solidarities of the traditional neighbourhood destroyed by urban redevelopment. This binding of a subculture to its parent culture is sketched by Clarke et al in their study of British street youth:

> Members of a sub-culture may walk, talk, act, look 'different' from their parents and from some of their peers: but they belong to the same families, go to the same schools, work at much the same jobs, live down the same 'mean streets' as their peers and parents. In certain crucial respects, they share the same position (vis-a-vis the dominant culture), the same fundamental and determining life-experiences as the 'parent' culture from which they derive. Through dress, activities, leisure pursuits and life-style, they may project a different cultural response or 'solution' to the problems posed for them by their material and

> social class position and experiences. But the membership of a sub-culture cannot protect them from the determining matrix of experiences and conditions which shape the life of their class as a whole. They experience and respond to the same basic problematic as other members of their class who are not so differentiated and distinctive in a 'sub-cultural' sense. Especially in relation to the dominant culture, their sub-culture remains like other elements in their class culture - subordinate and subordinated.[24]

These youths are socialised into a class identity and position primarily through the family and the neighbourhood. However this socialisation is not a simple rubber-stamp process. It is contradictory: (1) It is at the weak points in the chain of socialisation - at the points between the family/school nexus and the work process - that the subculture differentiates itself. (2) Working class subcultures are not simply a transcription of the contradictions of the parent culture at a micro-social level. They are rather a compromise solution to two contradictory needs: the need to express autonomy from their parent culture, and the need to maintain the security of ego defences which are supported by this parent culture. (3) Youth subgroups do not merely exist in the individual's biographical space between family and work, they are also ideologically located in the intersection between the parent culture and the dominant culture.[25]

The interface can be found most forcefully in schools and other State institutions. But for gang members with little school experience (my survey showed 55 percent had not gone beyond Standard 2) a major source of ruling class ideology comes through the media. A booklet produced after the shootings and arson in Elsies River in June 1980 at the height of a school's boycott made this clear:

> ... nobody in the ghetto (or elsewhere) is actually uneducated. People pick up education where they find it, and we must not think of 'education' as being only what happens in a classroom or in a book. Children are being educated right where they are, in the streets, in a society where great poverty and great riches can be seen side by side.

They are taught by advertisements, pictures and trips to the big city shops how they should live when they are rich. The advertisements tell them: When you are rich you are beautiful, and often 'white' as well.

They are taught that privilege and power come when you have money.

They are taught by prison experience (either directly or from friends or older brothers) that you've got to have a strong gang to get power and money, privilege and protection.

They are taught by the media (bioscope and TV) that the way to get money, or to defend what you've got, is with violence and weapons. In Elsies River during June this year, the month of unrest, about 60 different movies were shown. This is a list of the type and number of movies that were on at the two big cinemas nearest the areas of unrest during June:

63% - involving scenes of violence, killing and death
8,6% - horror movies
4,3% - movies involving disaster and scenes of destruction
6,5% - anti-hero movies where the 'bad' guy is the hero or where the hero comes off worst
10,8% - romance
8,6% - Comedy

More than 800 people saw a movie in Elsies River every day except Sundays. About 20 000 tickets were sold at the 4 cinemas in Elsies River during the month.[26]

The importance of the cinema to gang members can be seen in this quote from the owner of the biggest cinema in Elsies River:

When they come to the Panorama, they're like angels. What they do after they've left the Panorama... they could be the worst devils on earth. But when they come to the Panorama... the worst skollie is in the Panorama but you can hear a pin drop. They respect us. We're giving them entertainment so they've got to like us. When I see someone doing something wrong they hide their face and they run... because they know if I see their face I'll stop them coming to the Panorama, and that's their world.[27]

(4) Youth gangs are constantly in opposition to other peer groups. They fight for territory, control of markets, to strengthen their own gang or to avenge an 'insult'.

It can be seen therefore that any strategy worked out by a gang will stand in complex relation to that of other peers, to 'adult' strategies and solutions, and to the dominant culture with its repertoire of control. One cannot therefore simply 'read off' subcultural attitudes from the form or intentions of the media or of State institutions. Hegemony can never wholly absorb the working class into the dominant order. Like the defensive city, ruling ideology is full of holes. Rather like birds building a nest, gangs will tend to borrow 'bits' of attitude and material from their entire cultural environment to construct a whole expression of group position.

Cohen identifies four basic forms which this expression takes: dress, music, argot and ritual. These make up a visible style. In an article on class consciousness, Graham Murdock and Robin McCron agree that subcultural styles are made up of an amalgam of elements drawn from both sides of the cultural boundary: the "situated" class cultures embedded in the family and the local neighbourhood, and the mediated symbol systems sponsired by the youth-orientated sectors of the entertainment industry. These elements are the product of a cumulative process of selection and transformation through which available objects, symbols and activities are removed from their normal context, stripped of some or all of their con[illegible] the group into a new and coherent whole with its own special significance.

On the Cape Flats gang style is easy to recognise - and it is often essential to do this in order to avoid trouble. In the 1950s Oscar Wollheim was able to identify gang members by their dress:

> In most gangs the same traits are to be observed; a mode of dress easily identifiable as different from the usual form (they) usually wear caps back to front, or with peaks turned up sideways;

these caps are usually stuffed with folded newspaper so that the sides stand out and away from the head, giving protection if struck; they may also wear some or other unusual form of headgear and often have a piece of cloth or "doek" tied round the head underneath the headgear but showing at the bottom; the trousers are usually "half-mast" (known as 'hoppels' or reformatory pants), and their jackets, shirts or belts display emblems of various kinds. The particular style of dress and method of fixing the emblem often denote the particular gang or group or district to which they belong.[29]

More recently, gang dress includes a 'tiger' jacket (a standard lumber-jacket turned inside out showing the tartan lining and a 'Tiger' trade label), 'hang-gat' (baggy seated) trousers, a cloth cap and 'tackies' (tennis shoes) laced in an elaborate weave. An identifiable musical preference was until recently the traditional 'moppies' and 'liedjies' of the Coon Carnival, but this has given way to 'disco' music of little depth and with an unmistakable beat. The argot of the gangs is 'gamtaal', a fast-spoken mixture of Afrikaans, English and Xhosa with innumerable variations in different areas.

The predominant subcultural ritual since the mid-1970s has been the smoking of 'white pipe'. This usually happens in the gang 'place' - backyard or a shebeen. While one member 'cleans' the dagga, removing the seeds and sticks, another folds the mandrax 'buttons' into brown paper and pulverises them with the neck of a bottle. This 'bottle neck' is severed by heating the bottle around its circumference and then spitting onto the fingers and touching the heated parts. The bottle splits with a sharp 'ting'. The dagga and the mandrax are then mixed, while the brown paper is rolled to form a filter at the narrowest part of the 'neck'. The mixture is then poured into the mouth of the neck and lit from a double match. Who is to 'bust' the pipe (smoke first) is determined by unspoken agreement. If there is an 'outsider' he will be given the honour.

Otherwise it will be the leader, unless he wishes to express magnanimity to a gang member. The pipe is passed in a circle, usually from left to right, each member taking a huge draft and handing it on. A gang can smoke up to thirty of these pipes a day.

Through rituals, dress, language and territory gangs are therefore attempting both a material and an ideological solution to the circumstances in which they find themselves. We must now enquire what effect this may have on the development of wider social relations in the city.

Brotherhoods and the Class Struggle

A brief acquaintance with street gangs may impress one with their potential for resistance to the forces which constrain them. They are organised and have access to firearms, including shotguns and the occasional Russian AK47. When I put this question to a senior policeman he was dismissive:

> Political? Perhaps they'll join a riot. But there's nothing political in them - they only work for money. Also if its a political thing then the police are the complainant. If they hit someone in the street then he's the complainant. They can go to him and say: 'If you complain we'll bugger you up.' But they can't do that to me.
>
> The only way you get these guys is you'll have to pay. I can't see a political group getting control of a gang. Even a guerilla from outside - he'd be competition - they'd cut his throat. He's not going to last - he's not one of them. And there's no secrecy in the gang. They just want fun and booze and dagga.[30]

With this analysis Eric Hobsbawm would agree, placing as he does the weight of the historical class struggle upon organised labour:

> as a conscious social movement and especially a labour movement developes, the role of 'criminal' forms of social protest diminishes; except, of course, insofar as they involve 'political crime'... For the historian of labour movements, the study of 'social criminality' is important during the prehistoric and

formative periods of the movements of the labouring poor, in pre-industrial countries, and possibly during periods of great social effervescence, but otherwise he will be only marginally concerned with it.[31]

Elsewhere he has argued that:

The underworld (as its name implies) is an anti-society, which exists by reversing the values of the 'straight' world - it is, in its own phrase, 'bent' - but it is otherwise parasitic on it. A revolutionary world is a 'straight' world... The underworld enters the history of revolutions only insofar as the classes dangereuses are mixed up with the classes laborieuses, mainly in certain quarters of the city, and because rebels and insurgents are often treated by the authorities as criminals and outlaws; but in principle the distinction is clear.[32]

Deviants and criminals are seen here as a classic lumpenproletariat, as colourful actors without a historical mission, in line with Marx's well-known passage from the Eighteenth Brumaire on the 1851 Paris crisis:

Alongside decayed roues with dubious means of subsistence and of dubious origins, alongside ruined and adventurous off-shoots of the bourgeoisie, were vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged jail-birds, escaped galley slaves, swindlers, mountebanks, lazzaroni, pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, maquereaus, brothel-keepers, porters, literati, organ-grinders, ragpickers, knife grinders, tinkers, beggars - in short, the whole indefinite, disintegrated mass thrown hither and thither, which the French term la boheme.[33]

Marx considered this class to be unreliable, bribable and reactionary, living parasitically off the working class and ready to sell its services to the highest bidder.

But there are problems with these formulations because, to quote Hall et al, 'it is open to question whether a class stratum with this precise social composition could so easily be identified under the conditions of monopoly capitalism'.[34]

In his more mature work, Marx was to develop the concept of a 'relative surplus population' - workers thrown off the land and out of employment by the development of capitalist production.[35] This conceptualises more clearly the relationship between the unemployed and the productive or waged sectors of the working class.

In a country with some 3 million unemployed, it can be seen that the search for a job becomes a war of skilled against unskilled, experienced against unexperienced and worker against worker. As I suggested earlier, it is the youth who lose out on all counts - they are workers who never get near a factory or a construction site, making out by the only means possible - by crime. But if this connection to labour is tenable if the street youths are not irretrievably cut loose from the working class, then their relationship to the struggles of that class (however tenuous) is not an unimportant one. One can only speculate about the possibilities of their increasing political awareness and the consequences. Several factors are worth mentioning here.

On the Cape Flats I found very little professional criminal intent among young gang members. Rather they were 'making out until something turned up', and were angry at their lack of chances in life. Often acts of theft or violence were a mixture of necessity and an expression of defiance in the face of the 'boere' or 'witey', even although they were also often subversive of any worker struggle against exploitation. Few Cape Flats youths consciously chose crime. Rather they drifted or were pushed into it as one of the few remaining strategies for survival open to them. From this inevitability they developed a mixture of resignation and anger and a reservoir of charged feelings about racism. This was fuelled by the geographical homogeneity of the townships, the mono-class housing estates that reinforced the collective hurt and anger.

Into this situation were ploughed the school leavers unable to complete their education, or unable to find a job when they did. A Bonteheuwel gang, the Hobos, were almost entirely comprised of youths who left school during the 1980 school boycotts.

The name of another large gang in Hanover Park, the Genuine School Boys, indicates a link to better educated youths. Many of the 'school' youths carried into the gangs a strong sense of social injustice and the inequalities of racial capitalism. And this racial awareness was not necessarily negative. Hall et al suggest that race can be:

> the principal modality in which the black members of that class 'live', experience, make sense of and thus come to consciousness of their structural subordination. It is through the modality of race that blacks comprehend, handle and then begin to resist the exploitation which is an objective feature of their class situation. Race is therefore not only an element of the 'structures', it is a key element in the class struggle - and thus the cultures - of black labour... It is in the modality of race that those whom the structures systematically exploit, exclude and subordinate discover themselves as an exploited, excluded and subordinated class.[36]

Crime is not a political strategy: It is simply a rip-off. But the anger of the urban sub-proletariat is something still be be reckoned with. In a relatively stable (albeit oppressive) urban environment it can be held in check by spatial insulation, by playing gangs off against each other, or by unexpected swamp policing. But if the class struggle in the cities sharpens, if control starts slipping from the hands of the State, its anybody's guess which way the gangs will move.

However, with their history, their prison experience, their overcrowded living conditions and their poverty, it is unlikely that they will fill the role of the classic lumpenproletariat in the pay of the highest bidder. This caveat should alert progressive organisations not to abandon street kids to the possibility of permanent criminilisation. On this score much work still needs to be done, both at the level of organisation and consciousness.

APPENDIX A

GANGS IN CAPE FLATS AREAS

Athlone: Cape Town Scorpions (CT$), Born Free kids (BFK), Cisco Yakis, Junior Cisco Yakis, B.B. Boys, Holl Boys.

Belville: CT$, Mongrels (MG$), Fluffies.

Bishop Lavis: CT$, BFK, MG$, Blink Ding Kykers (BDK$), Mystery Kids, Flamingo Kids (FL$), Boba Kids, Naughty Boys, Posbere, Cisco Yakis, Back Street Kids, Klawe Kids, Wena Pipes, Panorama Kids (PK$), Mariatas, Weekend Spoilers (WE$), Restorama Kids.

Bo-Kaap: MG$, Gambling Boys, Junkie Funkies, Fancy Boys, Holl Boys, Jesters (JK$), Genuine School Boys (G$B), Bun Boys, Uru Cats.

Bokmakierie: CT$, Stupids, Sexy Americans, Sexy Young Ones, Holl Boys, School Boys.

Bonteheuwel: CT$, MG$, YBK, Dirty Bastards (DB$), G$B, Seventy Sevens, Sexy Young Ones, Sexy Wild Ones, Sexy Boys, Fancy Boys.

Claremont: Doolins, Sexy Boys, Last Born Kids (LBK$).

Constantia: BFK, CT$, MG$, Gipsies, Stalag Seventeen, Bishops.

Diep River: CT$, BFK, MG$, Stallag Seventeen, Mafias.

Elsies River: CT$, BFK, MG$, Kaffir Slagters (KF$), Sicilians, Naughty Cats (NC$), Nice Time Kids (NTK), DK$, Jesters, Stalag 17, Crime Josters, ML$, Mafias, Fire Boys, Sexy Jacksons, Fluffies, Fun Makers, Junior Brommers, Terrible Seam Staaners, Young Chargers, Six Mabona Kids (SMK), Back Street Kids (B$K), Weekend Spoilers, Devil Kids, Virgin

Breakers, Weed Boys, Mobsters, ORO.

Factreton: CT$, BFK, HL$, Terrible Josters, Takoeza Kids, Wonder Boys, NTK$.

Hanover Park: CT$, MG$, G$B, Three Bobs, Vultures, Holl Boys, Sexy Boys, Caszay Boys, Gipsies, Houthappers, Fancy Boys, Laughing Boys (LB$), Dingle Kids, Terminus Kids.

Kensington: BFK, CT$.

Kraaifontein: CT$ BFK, G$B, Stoute Mouters, Bosbere, Bobaaners, Tamatie Kids, Sexy Boys, Hobos, Sexy Jacksons, Fancy Boys, Hardlivings, Phantom Pirates.

Louwe's Bush: CT$, BFK, MG$, Stalag 17, Mafias.

Lotus River: BFK, MG$, Jesters, HL$, Kaffir Kids.

Macassar: CT$, BFK, Mur Killers, Mafias, Radio 5's, Fire Kids (FK$), Snowball Kids (SBK).

Marenberg: CT$, MG$, Jesters, Terrible Josters, Pingsters, HL$, Incredible Josters, Fluffies, MBK, Slice Corner Kids (SCK), Stoute Mouters, Mew Mews, Josters, Lethaba Kids, School Boys, Mafias, Stalag 17, Zarahs, Sexy Young Ones, Evil Young Bastards (EYB), Holmaaiers, Station Kids, Innocent Boys.

Mitchell's Plain: CT$, BFK, Josters, Incredible Josters, Terrible Josters (TJ$).

Netreg: CT$.

Ottery: MG$, BFK, Fast Guns, Mo Mo's Gipsies, JK$, Park Killers, Yankee Boys.

Paarl: CT$, BFK, MG$, Sexy Boys, Terrible Josters, DRK, Lover Boys (LB$), Going Line Kids, Fluffies, Nice Time Kids (NTK), Apache Kids (AK$), Pipe Killers (PK$), Naughty

Little Bastards (NLB), Genuine Boys (GB), Weekend Spoilers (WE$), Mafia Kids. Midnight Kids (MK$) Cavalla Kids, Woodstock Boys (WB$), Corner Boys (CB$), Bad Boys.

Phillipi: CT$, BFK, Josters, K77s, Crazy Kids, Pipe Killers.

Porterville: CT$, BFK, MG$, Jesters.

Potsdam/Wilnerton: CT$, BFK, MG$, Bun Boys, Holl Boys.


Retreat: CT$, BFK, Hard Livings, Sonstrale, Fluffies, Holl Boys, Doolins, Best Blends.

Steenberg: CT$, MG$, Mafias, HL$, Fluffies, Cisco Kakis, Sexy Jacksons, Sexy Boys, BFK, Uru Kids, Sonstrale, Suffering Kids.

Tierylei: CT$, BFK, MG$, Holy Ones, Vultures, DK$, G$B, YSK, YPK.

Vrygrond: CT$, BFK, MG$, Sexy Boys, Terrible Josters, Uru Cats, Co[redacted]. Kung Fu's Mafias Josters.

Worcester: CT$, BFK, Slice Corner Kids (SCK$), Barbarians (BB$), TJ Josters, Call Boys, Lover Boys (LB$), Dobermans, Mexicans, Fish tails, Jerry Boys



Mongrels gang graffiti in Hanover Park, Cape Flats

Grassroots November 1982

Union fights to protect unemployed

THE current economic recession is hitting thousands of workers in the Western Cape, who have already lost or will lose their jobs as bosses try to cut down on costs.

Workers in the steel and engineering industry and in the building industry have already been badly affected and many have been retrenched.

The most hard hit are unskilled contract workers. Unskilled workers are the first to be out on the streets when work is short and in South Africa most contract workers are offered little protection against retrenchments.

Workers from "independent homelands" find it very difficult to get their unemployment insurance benefits (UIF), if they manage to get them at all.

Contract workers who lose their jobs are no longer allowed to stay in the towns and look for new jobs.

They are endorsed out under influx control legislation, back to impoverished homelands, where they once more have to join the long queues of unemployed outside the labour bureaux.

For those workers organised into trade unions, the battle against retrenchment is one of the most difficult. When bosses no longer need the workers, their position is weak.

Workers are sometimes so desperate in times of high unemployment, they are often prepared to take anything, no matter what the wages or working conditions.

The General Workers' Union, which has many contract workers as members, have been negotiating retrenchment procedure with bosses in the factories where they have a majority for the past few months.

Although it is very difficult to abolish retrenchment altogether, the union says there are ways to fight retrenchments and so to lessen the blow for the workers.

An important principle to establish with the bosses is that workers must be given long notice of an intended retrenchment.

The amount of notice differs in various factories.

Options

In the stevedoring industry, for example, it is two weeks notice. This gives the workers' committee time to fight the retrenchment, says the union.

Bosses must explain exactly why they need to retrench certain workers.

The more information workers have, the easier it becomes to protect themselves against bosses trying to use a smaller number of workers to do the same amount of work as a way of cutting costs. It also gives workers time to think about alternatives to retrenchment.

Workers in the GWU have thought of three main alternatives to retrenchment. The first is a ban on all overtime. The second alternative is to put all workers on short time, so that all workers in a factory work fewer hours, rather than some of the workers being retrenched.

A third alternative, which has been taken up by workers at Dorman Long, is for workers to take unpaid leave in cycles. This means that all workers share the burden of the work shortage and are guaranteed their jobs back at the end of their cycle of unpaid leave.

An old union principle, and one that many of the progressive unions in South Africa, including the GWU try to stick to is the "last in, first out" principle.

If retrenchments seem inevitable, then workers with the shortest service should be the first to go.

The practise of "last in, first out" avoids victimisation and makes it difficult for the bosses to use retrenchments as a 'disciplinary procedure'.

When workers are retrenched many workers ask that "job-loss" pay be paid out to those who have lost their jobs. Bosses are often reluctant to do this.

But, says the GWU, why should workers be the only oness made to suffer the effects of retrenchment.

During the boom that usually precedes a recession, profits are usually high. The workers who have made those profits should also be entitled to share when times are bad.

Protection

In factories where workers have been retrenched, the first available jobs should go to those retrenched workers. Bosses should also try to find jobs in other factories.

As the unemployment queues get longer and the recession gets bleaker, workers are trying even harder to protect themselves against retrenchment.

CHAPTER 9 : NOTES

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18. Guguletu 2979
Bishop Lavis 1759
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Grassy Park 932
Parow 853
Retreat 834
Manenberg 823
Mitchells Plain 813
Langa 785
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Patrick 'Chicken' Edwards was born in Harfield Village and worked in several clothing factories before coming a street person. I met him on the corner and was captured by his intelligence and sparkling wit. He was later evicted from the house in which he was staying (being defined a coloured in a white area), and moved to the Cape Flats.

The emotional implications of the stigma that this definition of my friend carried for him was one of my early shocks in this study. Before I met him he had been picked up several times by the police for dealing, and had served one year in Pollsmoor Prison. While I was doing this study he was convicted for dealing mandrax and given a five-year prison sentence. At the moment of writing, his case is on appeal, with only a slim chance of success.

Without Chicken's help and range of contacts I could not have done this study. His insight into the problems of the poor and his understanding of the dynamics of the city went far beyond mine. The thought of such a person and others like him living for years in overcrowded prison cells is one of the most painful experiences that I take away from this study. Prisons are no place for a dog, let alone a human being, whatever the nature of their social misdemeanour! The sooner they are pulled down the better.

Many other people helped me to write this book, not least the people who [illegible] to my questions with patience and good grace. But special mention (in no order of precedence) must go to Mana Slabbert and Linda Wedepohl who supported me in many ways throughout my work, Dave Kaplan who supervised it, Marcelle Kooy who cleared the bureaucratic underbrush, Judge JJ Fagan who provided support, data and a sense of protection, Dennis Davis and Wilfried Schärf for their ideas and enthusiasm, Simon Fredericks and Pat Davids for their help with q tionnaires, Matt Esau for his sense of proportion, Vaness

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A NOTE ON SOURCES

From the beginning it became clear that the type of material I was looking for was not to be found in written sources. The urban underclass seldom records its passage through history in retrievable form, and is depicted largely through the eyes of state commissions of inquiry or medical officers of health. A range of techniques, approaches and strategies was therefore necessary. The first was to survey secondary sources, which were rich in European and American studies and theories, but extremely poor on Cape Town. The second approach was to people considered to be knowledgeable on urban issues and community affairs, particularly older members. This proved extremely fruitful, and most interviews were recorded on tape for later transcription (a JVC KD2 portable tape deck was used). My trajectory was superficially random, being dictated by who knew whom and could vouch for my credibility (mostly I was crossing both race and class boundaries). But in retrospect it covered a wide spectrum. A third strategy was the use of surveys and questionnaires - a useful way of covering a wide area, but a technique so filled with dangers of interpretation as to render it only partially useful. Altogether 243 working class mothers, 100 gang members and 85 family groups were interviewed. In addition the records of 514 juvenile offenders and 100 reformatory boys were studied. A further statistical survey was done on all assault victims who entered the Groote Schuur Hospital Trauma Unit between 1977 and 1979.

From here a complete break was necessary if I was to connect with street-corner youths. An initial strategy was to research (through interviews) the history of the legendary Globe Gang of District Six, an exercise which allowed me to map out the trajectory of the modern gangs, find out their structure and historical connexions. I then began to talk to corner 'dope'

merchants, buy some 'stuff' and sit around in the local shebeen. From here people passed me on to other people, all of whom were incredibly trusting and helpful. In this way I slowly gained the confidence of members of defence and reformatory gangs, and later access to a large mafia (mainly as their photographer).

I was, during the final stage of the research, also granted access to members of the police force on the Cape Flats, who added another and very necessary dimension to ghetoo life.

Throughout the study it was necessary to undertake theoretical excursions into areas which the empirical data failed to fill or which was a necessary framework before an empirical advance could be made. Again this seemed hopelessly random at the time, but in retrospect was a necessary method of progress. The struggle between empirical data and theory is the most exhausting of struggles, but it is better done on the spot as the empirical problems arise and not 'before' or 'after'. My main endeavours in this vein were into theoretical works on the state, urban sociology, planning ideology housing and deviancy.

Invaluable assistance here came from the meetings of the Western Cape Research Group at U.C.T.

A final mention must be made of press clippings. Throughout this study my wife, Patricia, cut articles on some 30 categories from several daily newspapers (these were later published as Criminology source books). The trends and press report differences that could only be plotted in this way formed the beginnings of an understanding of moral panics and the relationship between social fear and state control..

In the end, though, this study was an exercise in participant observation. The books mentioned in the Bibliography merely filled out the spaces in between. The overall pattern came from the people about whom I have attempted to write. This is my interpretation of their story. A far better strategy would have been to assist them to write their own story, but time was not on my side. A partial attempt to do this was published by the U.C.T. Institute of Criminology as a 80 page publication called Elsies River.

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JOURNALS

Work in Progress

Africa Perspective

S.A. Labour Bulletin

Janus

Hansard

SURVEYS

1 Survey of Cape Flats Mothers 1981 (243 interviews)

2 Survey of gang members 1981 (100 interviews)

3 Survey of Harfield Village 1981 (85 interviews)

4 Survey of Juvenile Crime, Retreat Juvenile courts 1980 (514 interviews)

5 Sample from Porter Reformatory Files 1981 (100 interviews)

6 Groote Schuur Hospital Data printout on assault victims 1977-1979.

NEWSPAPERS/MAGAZINES

Cape Times

The Argus

The Torch

Grassroots

The Sunday Times

The Tribune

Umsebenzi

Saspu National

Varsity

Muslim News

To The Point

Time

Frontline

PRESS CUTTINGS

Argus pressclips

Institute of Criminology Sourcebooks

TAPES

200 hours of interviews of which about 15 hours has been transcribed.

All recordings on a JVC KD2 portable tape deck using four-track TDK C90 tape.

LIBRARIES

Argus Editorial Library, St. Georges Street, Cape Town

Cape Archives Depot, Queen Victoria Street, Cape Town.

City Council of Cape Town Library, City Hall.

Library of Parliament, Parliament Street, Cape Town.

Nicro Library (National Institute for crime prevention and rehabilitation of offenders) Barrack Street, Cape Town.

South African Library, Queen Victoria Street, Cape Town.

Survey Library, Rhodes Avenue, Mowbray, Cape Town.

Town Planning Data Bank, Divisional council of the Cape, Wale Street, Cape Town.

University of Cape Town Libraries, Rondebosch, Cape Town.

Please return to:

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INTERVIEW ON GANGS | A | | | |

BACKGROUND

	CT	Dorp	Farm
5 Where were your parents born? Mother			
Father			
7 Where were you born?			

8 Where did you live before living here

9 Did your mother or father live together when you were young | Yes | No |

10 Who looked after you most when you were young?

Mum	Dad	Grandparent	Sister	Brother	Other

12 What jobs did your parents do?

Mother	
Father	

13

14 Was your father ever out of work? | Yes | No |

15 If so then for how long?

Less than one month	six months	a year	two years	five years

FAMILY/LIVING SPACE

16 Where do your parents live now?

17 What jobs do they do?

Father	
Mother	

18

19 How many brothers and sister have you? | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9+ |

20 How many boarders are there in your home? | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9+ |

21 Where do you live now? | Home | friends | street |

22 Describe the place you live in

FLAT/HOUSE

23 HOW MANY ROOMS

24 HOW MANY PEOPLE

25 GENERAL AREA

26 Were you ever moved by Group Areas?	Yes	No
27 Do you have a job?	Yes	No

28 If yes, what do you do?

29 If yes, what do you earn a week?

Less than R10	R20	R50	R100	R500

FRIENDS

30 Where do most of your friends live?

31 Have you known them for a long time?	Yes	No
32 Do you hang around together often	Yes	No

SCHOOLING

33 Are you at school?

Have been	Have never been	Are there now

34 What standard are you in/did you reach?

A	B	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	M

35 What do you think of school?

36 Are there gangs in schools?	Yes	No
37 Are they different from other gangs?	Yes	No

38 What do they do?

MEDIA/INFLUENCES

39 Do you watch films | Once a week | more often

40 How many days a week do you watch TV? | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

41 What is your favourite film or TV programme?

42 Do you think what is shown is true? | Yes | No

43 Would you like to be like the people in the films? | Yes | No

GANG

44 Are you a member of a gang (If no discontinue interview at this stage) | Yes | No

45 Were you forced to join or did you want to join? | Forced | Want to

46 Have you ever been stabbed or robbed before?

| No | Stabbed | Robbed | Both |

47 How do your parents feel about you being in a gang?

48 Have your parents ever been in a gang? | Yes | No

49 What does it mean to you to be in a gang?

50 What is your gang's name?

51 What is its territory (describe boundaries)

52 How many members are in your gang?

about | 10 | 20 | 50 | 100 | 200 | 500 |

53 Where in the territory do you usually meet?

54 Is there a single leader or a group in charge?

Leader	group	other

55 Who is the most powerful person in your territory?

56 Why is he powerful?

57 How many of your gang's members have been in prison?

None	few	many	all

58 Are you afraid of going to prison?

Yes	No

59 What does your gang do during:

Week days

60 Week nights

61 Weekends

62 What are the names of other gangs in your area?

63 Which gangs are friends and which are enemies with your gang?

Friends

64 Enemies

65 Why are some friends and some enemies?

66 Has your gang ever fought a gang war?

Yes	No

67 What usually starts a war?

68 What weapons are used?

69 What part do you take in a fight?

70 How does a gang war end?

71 Which is the strongest gang in Cape Town?

72 Where does it operate?

73 Why is it strong?

74 What does it do?

75 Is it connected to important people? | Yes | No |

76 Who are these people?

77 Do you like being in a gang | Yes | No |

78 Is there something else you would rather be involved in?

church	club	scho ol	bus iness	politics	other (specify)

79 Why do you think there are gangs?

80 Who are you most close to? | Father | mother | gang |

CONNECTIONS TO GROUPS/TRADES/PEOPLE

Do members of your gang get money/goods from

	Yes	No	Money	Goods
Shebeens	81			
Shops	82			
Dagga Selling	83			
Mandrax selling	84			
Robbery in	85			
Housebreaking	86			
Protection	87			
Other people (specify)	88			

89 What does your gang do to get the money/goods?

90 How much money do you make a week? Less than

R5	R10	R30	R50	R100	R200	R500+

Describe the connection between your gang and

91 Shebeen owners

92 Shop keepers

93 Dagga merchants

94 Hawkers

95 Clubs

96 Brothel owners

97 Gambling

98 Businessmen

99 Politicians

100 What other people/groups is the gang connected to?

101 Describe the supply and selling of

102 Dagga

103 Mandrax

104 Liquor

105 Which of these does your gang work with most

Dagga	Mandrax	Liquor	Other (specify)

106 How big are sales of the stuff your gang deals with a month?

R1-10	R10-50	R50-100	R100-500	R500-1000	R1000-5000	More

107 What do you feel about people trying to form political groups in your territories?

108	If you were offered a good ordinary job would you accept it	Yes / No
109	Would you like to stay in the gang if you had a good job	Yes / No

110 How do you feel about your girlfriend?

111	Would you leave the gang if you got married?	Yes / No
112	Would you like children of your own ?	Yes / No

POLICE

113	Do police ever try to stop a gang war?	Yes / No

114 What would happen if they tried?

115 What do you feel about the police?

116 What sort of activities do the police arrest you for?

117 If you gave a policeman money or goods would he let you off? | Yes | No |

118 Why do shebeen owners get arrested sometimes and other times they don't?

JUSTICE

119 If you were in court, would your friends be able to bribe the magistrate or prosecutor to get you off? | Yes | No |

120 If yes, how often does it happen? | Often | seldom | never |

121 How much money does it cost to bribe these people?

Less than | R10 | R100 | R500 | R1000 | R5000 |

122 If someone was a state witness against you, would your gang try to stop him giving evidence? | Yes | No |

123 If yes, how would they do this?

124 If you ever landed in the cells, did you feel you were locked up unnecessarily?

| Yes | No | Not applicable |

125 Do you think that you have done things that could get you locked up if the police found out? | Yes | No |

126 What do you think about doekoms?

127 How much does it cost to get one?

Less than | R2 | R5 | R10 | R20 | R50 | R100 | R500 | R1000 |

128 How successful are doekems?

129 How many doekems are there in Cape Town?

NUMBER OF COLUMNS USED HERE IS 110

NUMBER OF CASES IN THIS SURVEY IS 101

S U R V E Y O N G A N G S .

****

1. WHERE WAS YOUR MOTHER BORN?

CAPE TOWN	36	35.6%
DORP	41	40.6%
FARM	7	6.9%

5. WHERE WAS YOUR FATHER BORN?

CAPE TOWN	36	35.6%
DORP	40	39.6%
FARM	8	7.9%

7. WHERE WERE YOU BORN?

CAPE TOWN	58	57.4%
DORP	34	33.7%
FARM	4	4.0%

8. WHERE DID YOU LIVE?

PAARL	9	8.9%
DISTRICT SIX	11	10.9%
MANENBERG/MACASSAR	6	5.9%
KENSINGTON/KHAAIFONTEIN	10	9.9%
STELLENBOSCH/STRAND	5	5.0%
ELSIES RIVER/LAVENDER HILL	9	8.9%

BELLVILLE/GOODWOOD	6	5.9%
RETREAT/HEATHFIELD/DIEP RIVER/TOKIA	8	7.9%
FINGROVE/FACRETON	2	2.0%
WORCESTER/WOLSELEY	6	5.9%
OTTERY/LOTUS RIV./PARKWOOD/WYLANS	3	3.0%
HANOVER PARK	0	.0%
CITRUSDAL/VREDENBURG/LAMBERTSBAAI	5	5.0%
CRAWFORD	2	2.0%
PORT ELIZABETH/UITENHAGE/GRAAF REINET	4	4.0%
MOSSELBAAI/GEORGE	4	4.0%
METREG/RONTEBEUNEL	1	1.0%
ATHLONE/BRIDGETOWN	2	2.0%
BO-KAAP	6	5.9%

9. DID PARENTS LIVE TOGETHER?

THEY DID	71	70.3%
NO	26	25.7%

10. WHO LOOKED AFTER YOU?

MUM	50	49.5%
DAD	1	1.0%
GRANDPARENTS	14	13.9%
SISTER	22	21.8%
BROTHER	4	4.0%
OTHER	8	7.9%

12. WHAT JOB YOUR MOTHER?

DOMESTIC	39	38.6%
HOUSEWIFE	20	19.8%
DIED	0	.0%
UNEMPLOYED	3	3.0%
LABOURER	4	4.0%
NEEDLEWORK	3	3.0%
MACHINIST	13	12.9%

LABOURER	4	4.0%
NEEDLEWORK	3	3.0%
MACHINIST	13	12.9%
FARM WORKER	1	1.0%
FACTORY WORKER	2	2.0%
CLEANER	0	.0%
NURSE	3	3.0%
CLERK	2	2.0%
NOT ANSWERED	9	8.9%

13. WHAT JOB YOUR FATHER?

UNEMPLOYED	3	3.0%
GARDINER	2	2.0%
DIED	4	4.0%
PAINTER	5	5.0%
DRIVER	9	8.9%
FACTORY WORKER	1	1.0%
SHOP ASSIST.	1	1.0%
FISHERMAN	2	2.0%
CARPENTER	3	3.0%
BLOCKMAN	1	1.0%
WATCHMAN	2	2.0%
CLEANER/PORTER	2	2.0%
HAWKER	1	1.0%
MECHANIC/PANELBEATER	5	5.0%
I N J A I L.	3	3.0%
CLERK	1	1.0%
FARM WORKER	5	5.0%
LABOURER/BRICKLAYER/BUILDER	46	45.5%
DRUG PUSHER/SHEBEEN/GANGSTER	2	2.0%

14. FATHER EVER OUT OF WORK?		
YES	67	66.3%
NOT	30	29.7%
15. HOW LONG?		
LESS THAN 1 MONTH	10	9.9%
SIX MONTHS	36	35.6%
YEAR	10	9.9%
2 YEARS	6	5.9%
5 YEARS	5	5.0%
19. HOW MANY BROTHERS + SISTERS?		
NONE	1	1.0%
ONE	0	.0%
TWO	6	5.9%
THREE	8	7.9%
FOUR	9	8.9%
FIVE	16	15.8%
SIX	19	18.8%
SEVEN	10	9.9%
EIGHT	13	12.9%
MORE	17	16.8%
20. BOARDERS IN HOME?		
NONE	57	56.4%
ONE	6	5.9%
TWO	13	12.9%
THREE	7	6.9%
FOUR	2	2.0%
FIVE	3	3.0%
EIGHT	1	1.0%
NINE	1	1.0%

21. WHERE DO YOU LIVE [illegible]

NINE	1	1.0%
21. WHERE DO YOU LIVE NOW?		
HOME	85	84.2%
FRIENDS	14	13.9%
STREET	0	.0%
22. FLAT OR HOUSE?		
FLAT	12	11.9%
HOUSE	88	87.1%
23. HOW MANY ROOMS?		
ONE	10	9.9%
TWO	60	59.4%
THREE	19	18.8%
FOUR	9	8.9%
FIVE	1	1.0%
24. HOW MANY PEOPLE?		
ONE	0	.0%
TWO	2	2.0%
THREE	2	2.0%
FOUR	6	5.9%
FIVE	4	4.0%
SIX	8	7.9%
SEVEN	13	12.9%
EIGHT	15	14.9%
NINE	8	7.9%
TEN	12	11.9%
ELEVEN	8	7.9%
TWELVE	10	9.9%

THIRTEEN	6	5.9%
FOURTEEN	2	2.0%
FIFTEEN	1	1.0%
SIXTEEN	0	.0%
SEVENTEEN	1	1.0%

26. MOVED BY GROUP AREAS?

MOVED	40	39.6%

27. DO YOU HAVE A JOB?

HAVE A JOB	41	40.6%

28. WHAT DO YOU DO?

LABOURER	25	24.8%
NOT ANSWERED (I CAN GIVE YOU FURTHER DETAILS IF YOU WANT)	58	57.4%

29. WHAT DO YOU EARN PER WEEK?

LESS THAN R10	8	7.9%
R20	30	29.7%
R50	6	5.9%
R100	1	1.0%
R500	0	.0%

30. WHERE DO YOUR FRIENDS LIVE?

(I CAN ELABORATE)

31. HAVE YOU KNOWN THEM FOR LONG?

YES	92	91.1%
NO	7	6.9%

32. DO YOU HANG AROUND OFTEN?

YES	97	96.0%
NO	2	2.0%

33. ARE YOU AT SCHOOL?

HAVE BEEN	92	91.1%

32. DO YOU HANG AROUND OFTEN?		
YES	97	96.0%
NO	2	2.0%
33. ARE YOU AT SCHOOL?		
HAVE BEEN	92	91.1%
NEVER BEEN	7	6.9%
ARE THERE NOW	1	1.0%
34. WHAT STANDARD?		
SUB A	2	2.0%
SUB B	2	2.0%
STD 1	16	15.8%
STD 2	25	24.8%
STD 3	15	14.9%
STD 4	11	10.9%
STD 7	4	4.0%
36. ARE THERE GANGS IN SCHOOL?		
THERE ARE	52	51.5%
NO	46	45.5%
NOT ANSWERED	2	2.0%
37. ARE THEY DIFFERENT FROM OTHER GANGS?		
YES	16	15.8%
NO	41	40.6%
NOT ANSWERED	43	42.6%
39. HOW OFTEN DO YOU WATCH FILMS?		
ONCE A WEEK	49	48.5%
MORE OFTEN	19	18.8%

NOT	31	30.7%

40. HOW OFTEN DO YOU WATCH TV?

DON'T	32	31.7%
ONCE PER WEEK	3	3.0%
2X	18	17.8%
3X	14	13.9%
4X	7	6.9%
5X	1	1.0%
6 TIMES PER WEEK	2	2.0%

41. WHAT FAVOURITE PROGRAM?

KARATE/BRUCE LEE	19	18.8%
COWBOYS	14	13.9%
DALLAS	16	15.8%
LOVE STORIES	6	5.9%
AGENTS	13	12.9%
STARTREK	1	1.0%
POPSHOP	3	3.0%
HI CHAPERAL	4	4.0%

42. IS IT ALL TRUE

YES	64	63.4%
NO	35	34.7%

43. WOULD YOU LIKE TO BE THOSE PEOPLE?

YES	69	68.3%

44. ARE YOU A GANG MEMBER?

ALL OF THEM ARE	100	99.0%

45. WERE YOU FORCED TO JOIN?

YES	3	3.0%

46. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN STABBED/ROBBED?

STABBED	39	38.6%
ROBBED	4	4.0%

45. WERE YOU FORCED TO JOIN?		
YES	3	3.0%
46. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN STABBED/ROBBED?		
STABBED	39	38.6%
ROBBED	8	8.0%
BOTH	51	50.5%
47/ HOW DO YOUR PARENTS FEEL ABOUT IT?		
'DONT KNOW' (COULD MEAN 'I DONT KNOW' OR 'THEY DONT KNOW')	32	31.7%
THEY DON'T MIND	10	9.9%
THEY DON'T LIKE IT	49	48.5%
THEY WORRY	3	3.0%
48. HAVE YOUR PARENTS BEEN IN A GANG?		
YES	19	18.8%
49. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO YOU?		
'NOTHING'	19	18.8%
FRIENDSHIP	25	24.8%
PROTECTION/POWER	19	18.8%
MONEY	7	6.9%
SURVIVAL	5	5.0%
THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMIT CRIME (STEAL, DAGGA)	9	8.9%
'DIT WERK NIE UIT VIR MY NIE'	8	4.0%
50. NAME OF YOUR GANG?		
CTS	52	51.5%
BFK	27	26.7%
MGS	3	3.0%
MONGRELS	2	2.0%

FLUFFIES	2	2.0%
KATAT BENDE	1	1.0%
DKS	1	1.0%
GSB	2	2.0%
CIXO YAKIES	1	1.0%
YSK	1	1.0%
KFS	1	1.0%
HLS	1	1.0%
SEXY BOYS	2	2.0%
OOOLINS	1	1.0%
TERRIBLE JOSTERS	1	1.0%
GAMBLING BOYS	1	1.0%
CRIME JOSTERS	1	1.0%
LAUGHING BOYS	1	1.0%

52. HOW MANY IN GANG?

10	0	1.0%
20	3	3.0%
50	17	16.8%
100	23	22.8%
200	55	54.5%
500	1	1.0%

53. WHO IS IN CHARGE?

LEADER	56	55.4%
GROUP	35	34.7%
OTHER	6	5.9%

54. HOW MANY HAVE BEEN IN PRISON?

NONE	0	.0%
MANY	48	47.5%
ALL	50	49.5%

55. AFRAID TO GO TO PRISON?

I AM	12	11.9%

ALL	50	49.5%	
55. AFRAID TO GO TO PRISON?			
I AM	12	11.9%	
66. GANG FOUGHT A WAR?			
WE HAVE	98	97.0%	
71. THE STRONGEST GANG IN CAPE?			
CAPE TOWN SCORPIONS	18	13.9%	
BFK	2	2.0%	
NOT ANSWERED	84	83.2%	
75. ARE THEY CONNECTED TO IMPORTANT PEOPLE?			
THEY ARE	27	26.7%	
77. DO YOU LIKE BEING IN THE GANG?			
I LIKE IT	71	70.3%	
78. SOMETHING ELSE YOU WOULD LIKE?			
NOT ANSWERED	24	23.8%	
CHURCH	8	7.9%	no all 26·8
SCHOOL	12	11.9%	
BUSINESS	48	47.5%	
POLITICS	3	3.0%	
OTHER	2	2.0%	
DEFINITE 'NO'	3	3.0%	
80. CLOSE TO YOU?			
MY FATHER	7	6.9%	
MY MOTHER	89	88.1%	

FIRST MY GANG.	1	1.0%
81. TO 88. ALMOST ALL SAY BOTH (I CAN SPECIFY!!)		
89. ALMOST ALL SAY STEAL, ROB, PROTECTION, (DITO)		
90. HOW MUCH MONEY DO YOU MAKE A WEEK?		
R5	2	2.0%
R10	8	7.9%
R30	23	22.8%
R50	36	35.6%
R100	15	14.9%
R200	6	5.9%
R500+	3	3.0%
105. WHAT DOES THE GANG DEAL WITH?		
DAGGA	84	83.2%
MANDRAX	3	3.0%
LIQUOR	8	7.9%
106. HOW MUCH PER MONTH?		
R50 TO R100	1	1.0%
R100 TO R500	11	10.9%
R500 TO R1000	54	53.5%
R1000 TO R5000	10	18.8%
108. WOULD YOU ACCEPT A JOB?		
YES, I WOULD.	96	95.0%
109. WOULD YOU THEN STAY IN THE GANG?		
I WOULD	33	32.7%
111. WOULD YOU LEAVE IF YOU MARRIED?		
YES.	87	86.1%
112. WOULD YOU HAVE CHILDREN?		
I WOULD.	97	96.0%

111. WOULD YOU LEAVE IF YOU MARRIED?		
YES.	87	86.1%
112. WOULD YOU HAVE CHILDREN?		
I WOULD.	97	96.0%
113. DO POLICE TRY TO STOP GANG WAR?		
THEY DO	85	84.2%
117. COULD YOU BRIBE A POLICEMAN?		
IT IS POSSIBLE	95	94.1%
118. WHY DO SHEBEEN OWNERS GET ARRESTED?		
THEY DONT PAY UP	57	56.4%
THEY GET 'SPLIT'	6	5.9%
THE COPS DONT LIKE THEM	3	3.0%
	66	
119. BRIBE THE PROSECUTOR OR MAGISTRATE?		
YES.	32	31.7%
120. HOW OFTEN DOES THIS OCCUR?		
OFTEN	0	.0%
SELDOM	35	34.7%
NEVER	47	46.5%
121. HOW MUCH DOES IT COST?		
R10	0	.0%
R100	1	1.0%
R500	7	6.9%
R1000	20	19.8%

	R5000	7	6.9%
122.	WOULD YOU STOP WITNESS?		
	YES, WE WOULD	7	6.9%
123.	HOW WOULD YOU STOP WITNESS?		
	MAKE HIM SWAK	19	18.8%
	THREATEN HIM	16	15.8%
	WOULD HURT HIM	38	37.6%
	COULD KILL HIM	13	12.9%
	BRIBE HIM	2	2.0%
124.	LOCKED UP UNNECESSARILY?		
	YES.	46	45.5%
0	NO	11	10.9%
	NOT APPLICABLE	39	38.6%
125.	HAVE YOU DONE THINGS THAT COULD GET YOU LOCKED UP?		
	I HAVE	89	88.1%
126.	WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT OOEKOMS?		
	THINK THEY ARE BAD	38	37.6%
	DON'T BELIEVE IN THEM	16	15.8%
	THEY ARE OK	18	17.8%
127.	HOW MUCH DO THEY COST?		
	R5	0	.0%
	R10	3	3.0%
	R20	21	20.8%
	R50	23	22.8%
	R100	23	22.8%
	R500	6	5.9%
	R1000	0	.0%
128.	HOW SUCCESSFUL ARE OOEKEMS?		
	IT WORKS	12	11.9%
	THEY ARE FAIRLY SUCCESFUL		

R500	6	5.9%	
R1000	0	.0%	

128. HOW SUCCESSFUL ARE DOEKEMS?

IT WORKS	12	11.9%	
THEY ARE FAIRLY SUCCESFUL	41	40.6%	
NOT SUCCESSFUL. (SUCCES IN TERMS OF MONEY, OR SPELLS - UNCLEAR)	6	5.9%	

or, ornginal shells and others)

Household Questionnaire

1. How long have you lived in this house? 50 years

2. Who lives here with you?

	husband	
	wife	
	(mother)	1
	father	
	grandmother	
	grandfather	
How many:	children under 16	2
	children over 16	
	uncles	
	aunts	
	cousins	
	brothers	
	sisters	
	other relations or boarders	
	children of brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles or other relations	3

3. On the map which is shown to you, mark with a circle (O) the houses in which your relatives live. 0

4. On the map mark with a cross (X) the houses in which friends of yours live who you visit or who visit you. 15

5. During the day, who looks after your children?


no children	
yourself	✓
your husband	
your mother	
your father	
your grandmother	
your grandfather	
your brother	
your sister	
your aunt/uncle/cousin	
your older children	
friends	
your neighbours	
they play in the street	
nobody mentioned above	
nobody	

6. How many families related to you presently live in Claremont? [1]
7. How many families related to you were moved out of Claremont by the Group Areas? [1]
8. What do you feel about the possibility of being moved by Group Areas?

Very disappointed
heartbroken

9. What do you think will be the biggest problem for you after you have moved to a new area on the Cape Flats?

Transport costs.


Worcester Street
Stafford Street
Suffolk Street
Sussex Street
First Avenue
Norfolk
Second Avenue
Wesley Street
Devon Street
Bedford Street
Pembroke Street
Surrey Street
Lancaster Street
shop
shop
open space
open space

NUMBER OF COLUMNS USED HERE IS 30

NUMBER OF CASES IN THIS SURVEY IS 85

SURVEY IN HARFIELD VILLAGE.

---

1. HOW LONG HAVE YOU LIVED HERE?

NOT YET 10 YEARS.	35	41.2%
NOT YET 20 YEARS.	20	23.5%
NOT YET 30 YEARS.	6	7.1%
NOT YET 40 YEARS.	4	4.7%
NOT YET 50 YEARS.	9	10.6%
LONGER THAN 50 YEARS.	9	10.6%
NOT KNOW.	1	1.2%

11% longer than 50 yrs

MEAN 19.0 YEARS.

2. WHO LIVES HERE?

HUSBAND.	64	75.3%
WIFE.	80	94.1%
MOTHER.	12	14.1%
FATHER.	2	2.4%
GRANDMOTHER.	1	1.2%
GRANDFATHER.	1	1.2%
ONE CHILD BELOW 16	16	18.8%
TWO CHILDREN BELOW 16	20	23.5%
THREE BELOW 16	14	16.5%
FOUR BELOW 16	5	5.9%
FIVE BELOW 16	1	1.2%
ONE CHILD OLDER THAN 16	7	8.2%

No. with more than nuclear family = %

c/o child ~ 5 = 24%

TWO OLDER THAN 16	14	16.5%
THREE OVER 16	8	9.4%
FOUR OVER 16	2	2.4%
FIVE OVER 16	1	1.2%
SIX OVER 16	1	1.2%
UNCLE	2	2.4%
AUNT	2	2.4%
THERE WERE NO COUSINS		
BROTHER	5	5.9%
TWO BROTHERS	1	1.2%
SISTER	4	4.7%
TWO SISTERS	3	3.5%
FOUR SISTERS	1	1.2%
OTHER RELATIVE	3	3.5%
2 OTHER RELATIVES	3	3.5%
6 OTHER RELATIVES	1	1.2%
BORDER	7	8.2%
TWO BORDERS	3	3.5%
OTHER ONE	3	3.5%
OTHER TWO	3	3.5%
OTHER THREE	1	1.2%
OTHER FOUR	1	1.2%
OTHER SEVEN	1	1.2%

2. TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN HOUSE.

TWO	7	8.2%
THREE	11	12.9%
FOUR	20	23.5%
FIVE	16	18.8%
SIX	11	12.9%

36% hd more than 5 in house

SEVEN	8	9.4%
EIGHT	7	8.2%
NINE	4	4.7%
TWELVE	1	1.2%

MEAN 5.1 persons.

36% had more than 5 in house

SEVEN	8	9.8%
EIGHT	7	8.2%
NINE	4	4.7%
TWELVE	1	1.2%

MEAN 5.1 PERSONS

3. HOW MANY RELATIVE HOUSES IN HARFIELD?

NONE	17	20.0%
ONE	31	36.5%
TWO	19	22.4%
THREE	10	11.8%
FOUR	4	4.7%
FIVE	2	2.4%
SIX	1	1.2%
NINE	1	1.2%

MEAN 1.6 HOUSES.

4. HOW MANY FRIENDS HOUSES IN HARFIELD?

ZERO	15	17.6%
ONE	3	3.5%
TWO	4	4.7%
THREE	8	9.4%
FOUR	8	9.4%
FIVE	3	3.5%
SIX	9	10.6%
SEVEN	4	4.7%
EIGHT	5	5.9%
NINE	3	3.5%
TEN	2	2.4%
ELEVEN	4	4.7%
TWELVE	2	2.4%
THIRTEEN	2	2.4%
FOURTEEN	0	.0%

FIFTEEN	1	3.5%
SIXTEEN	1	1.2%
SEVENTEEN	1	1.2%
EIGHTEEN	1	1.2%
TWENTY THREE	2	2.4%
TWENTY FIVE	1	1.2%
TWENTY NINE	1	1.2%
THIRTY	1	1.2%
GREATER. (ONE OF THESE HAS ONLY BEEN HERE 1 YEAR -I DON'T KNOW!!)	2	2.4%

5. WHO LOOKS AFTER YOUR CHILDREN?

HAVE NO CHILDREN	19	22.4%
SELF	58	68.2%
MOTHER	3	3.5%
SISTER	1	1.2%
GRANDMOTHER	1	1.2%
NOT ANSWERED	3	3.5%

6. WHO DOES WHEN THE ABOVE IS NOT THERE?

HUSBAND	4	4.7%
MOTHER	15	17.6%
GRANDMOTHER	1	1.2%
GRANDFATHER	1	1.2%
BROTHER	1	1.2%
SISTER	10	11.8%
AUNT/UNCLE	2	2.4%
OLDER CHILD	6	7.1%
FRIENDS	1	1.2%
NEIGHBOURS	3	3.5%

Related.

6. HOW MANY FAMILIES DO ~~YOU KNOW~~ IN CLAREMONT?

NONE	40	47.1%
ONE	25	29.4%
TWO	9	10.6%
THREE	5	5.9%
FOUR	2	2.4%

} 51.8%

MEAN 7.15 Hours

Comparative

	Total %	Hospital		Clinic	
Mother	68.2%	by staff	68.2	47	
grandmother	2.4	relatives	20.2	9	
granddaughter	1.2	children	7	5	
husband	4.7	friends	5	5	
sister	13.0	Neighbours	0	16	
brother	1.2				
aunt/uncle	2.4				
other child	7.1				
friends	1.2				
Neighbours	3.5				

	Hospital	Flats
Mother or relative looks after kids under 5	95.6%	60%

NONE	40	47.1%	
ONE	25	29.4%	
TWO	9	10.6%	51.8%
THREE	5	5.9%	
FOUR	2	2.4%	
SEVEN	3	3.5%	

MEAN 1.4 FAMILIES

7. HOW MANY FAMILIES MOVE BY GRP AREAS.

NONE	30	35.3%	
ONE	6	7.1%	
TWO	15	17.6%	
THREE	7	8.2%	
FOUR	5	5.9%	
FIVE	1	1.2%	
SIX	4	4.7%	
SEVEN	1	1.2%	
EIGHT	1	1.2%	64.7%
TEN	2	2.4%	
ELEVEN	2	2.4%	
TWELVE	1	1.2%	
THIRTEEN	1	1.2%	
TWENTY	1	1.2%	
24	1	1.2%	
25	4	4.7%	
28.	1	1.2%	

MEAN 4.2 FAMILIES

8. HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT MOVING?

UNHAPPY	55	64.7%
WOULD FIND DIFFICULTY WITH NEW ENVIRONMENT.	25	29.4%
WOULD NOT MIND MOVING (AND GETTING BETTER HOUSE)	5	5.9%

9. WHAT PROBLEMS DO YOU FORSEE?

TRANSPORT COSTS (FIRST)	57	67.1%	96.5%
TRANSPORT COSTS (SECOND)	25	29.4%	
SCHOOLING (FIRST)	20	23.5%	45.9
SCHOOLING (SECOND)	19	22.4%	
NEW ENVIRONMENT (FIRST)	7	8.2%	10.6
NEW ENVIRONMENT (SECOND)	2	2.4%	
TOO EXPENSIVE (FIRST)	1	1.2%	2.4
TOO EXPENSIVE (SECOND)	1	1.2%	

END PROGRAM EXECUTION

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MOTHERS

1 Where do you live (eg Athlone, Hanover Park etc)

2 Do you live

in a house	
in a flat	
in a pondok	
rent a room	
somewhere else (specify)	

(Vir Afrikaans sien keersy)

3 Do you work

full-time	
casually	
don't work	

4 Are you married? Yes / No

5 Are you living with your husband (or any other man)? Yes / No

6 If yes, does he work? Yes / No

7 Do any of your children work? Yes / No

Who helps you support your family?

8 your husband	
9 the man who stays with you	
10 your parents	
11 grants, pensions/welfare etc	
12 your children	
13 other	

14 Do you live with your children? Yes / No

15 During the day, who looks after your children who are not at school?

yourself	
your mother	
your older child	
a relation	
a friend	
a creche	
nobody	

16 Do you have any children under 16 years old who do not work and who do not go to school? Yes / No

17 Are any of your children members of a gang? Yes / No

18 If they are, do you think gang membership is:

good	
bad	
you don't mind	

19 Are there gangs/skollies in your area? Yes / No

20 Are you afraid of them? Yes / No

21 Have they ever hurt or robbed you? Yes / No

23 In what area or town were your parents born?

	Mother	Father
Name of area in Cape Town		
Name of town area outside Cape Town		

25 If it was not in Cape Town, when did they come to Cape Town?

	Mother	Father
Before World War II		
Just after the War		
In the 1950s		
In the 1960s		
In the 1970s		

26 In what area were you born?

Name of area in Cape Town	
Name of town/area outside Cape Town	

27 If you were not born in Cape Town, when did you come to Cape Town?

Before World War II	
Just after the War	
In the 1950s	
In the 1960s	
In the 1970s	

28 If you moved house while in Cape Town, where were you living before your present place?

29 Were you moved by Group Areas? Yes / No

When you were young were there lots of relations (grandparents, aunts etc) living:

30 in your parents house	
31 in the same street	
32 within walking distance	

33 When you were very young, who looked after you during the day?

mother	
grandmother	
aunt	
sister	
a friend	
creche	
nobody	

Where you are now living, are there lots of relations living:

34 in your house	
35 in the same street	
36 within walking distance	

37 Can you suggest anything that would make life easier for you?

VRAELYS VIR MOEDERS

1 Waar woon u? (bv Hanover Park)

2 Bly u

in 'n huis	
in 'n flat	
in 'n pondok	
in 'n huurkamer	
enige ander plek? (beskryf)	

3 Werk u

voltyds	
deeltyds	
werk nie	

(For English see other side)

4 Is u getroud? Ja | Nee

5 Bly u met u man (of enige ander man)? Ja | Nee

6 Indien ja, wat werk u man? Ja | Nee

7 Werk enige van u kinders? Ja | Nee

Wie help jou om jou familie te onderhou

8	jou man	
9	die man met wie jy bly	
10	jou ouers	
11	onderhoud, pensioene ens	
12	jou kinders	
13	andere	

14 Bly u met u kinders ? Ja | Nee

15 Wie sien gedurende die dag om na jou kinders wat nie op skool is nie?

Jouself | Jou ma | 'n ouer kind | 'n familie lid | 'n friend | kleuter skool | Geeneen

16 Het u enige kinders wat onder 16 jr oud is en wat nie werk of skool gaan nie? Ja | Nee

17 Behoort enige van jou kinders aan 'n bende? Ja | Nee

18 As enige van hulle aan 'n bende behoort, wat dink u dat om aan 'n Bende te behoort?

goed is	
sleg is	
gee nie om nie	

19 Is daar bendes in u area ? Ja | Nee

20 Is u bang vir hulle? Ja | Nee

21 Het hulle u al beroof of seergemaak? Ja | Nee

22/23 In watter area of stad was jou ouers gebore?

	Ma	Pa
Naam van plek in Kaapstad		
Naam van dorp buitekant Kaapstad		

24/25 As dit nie in Kaapstad was nie, wanneer het hulle Kaapstad toe gekom?

	Ma	Pa
Voor die 2de Wereld oorlog		
net na die oorlog		

26 In watter area was jy gebore?

Naam van area in Kaapstad	
Naam van dorp/area buitekant Kaapstad	

27 As jy nie in Kaapstad gebore is nie, wanneer het jy Kaapstad toe gekom?

	Ma	Pa
Voor die Tweede Wereld Oorlog		
Net na die oorlog		
In die 1950s		
In die 1960s		
In die 1970s		

28 As jy al verhuis het terwyl jy in Kaapstad was waar het jy gebly voordat jy hier kom woon het?

29 Was jy al deur Group areas gemove? Ja | Nee

Toe u nog jonk was, het daar 'n klompie familie lede by u gebly? (bv ouma, ta

30 ? - u ouers as kw
31 in dieselfde straat
32 binne loop afstang

33 Toe u nog jonk was, wie het na u omgesien gedurende die dag?

ma | ouma | tante | sister | 'n vriend | klouterskool | niemand

Waar u nou bly wat woon daar baie familie lede?

34	In u huis	
35	in dieselde straat	
36	binne loop afstand	

37 Kan u enige iste aanbeveel wat die lewe vir u makliker sal maak?

NUMBER OF COLUMNS USED HERE IS 91

NUMBER OF CASES IN THIS SURVEY IS 243

QUESTIONAIRE FOR MOTHERS.

1. WHERE DO YOU LIVE?

ATHLONE	11	4.5%
BONTEHEUWEL	15	6.2%
CROSSROADS	3	1.2%
DIEP RIVER	0	.0%
ELSIES RIVER	25	10.3%
BELLVILLE	3	1.2%
GOODWOOD	0	.0%
HANOVER PARK	9	3.7%
GUGULETU	15	6.2%
KENSINGTON	2	.8%
KRAAIFONTEIN	5	2.1%
LANGA	6	2.5%
NDABENI	0	.0%
NYANGA	5	2.1%
CLAREMONT/LANSDOWNE/CRAWFORT	4	1.6%
PHILLIPI	22	9.1%
MANENBERG	21	8.6%
RAVENSMEAD	4	1.6%
DISTRICT SIX	0	.0%
MITCHELS PLAIN	18	7.4%
VALHALLA PARK	1	.4%
VASCO	0	.0%
WOODSTOCK	4	1.6%

BONTEHEUWEL	10	4.1%
WYNBERG/KENILWORTH	11	4.5%
SILVERTOWN	3	1.2%
BRIDGETOWN	1	.4%
HEIDEVELD	5	2.1%
HEATHFIELD/PETREAT	9	3.7%
PRIMROSE PARK	1	.4%
SIMONSTOWN/OCEAN VIEW	2	.8%
WELLINGTON???	10	4.1%
ATLANTIS	1	.4%
HYLANS ESTATE	8	3.3%
VRYCKOND	5	2.1%
NOT ANSWERED	4	1.6%

2. TYPE OF DWELLING

HOUSE	136	56.0%
FLAT	44	18.1%
BONDOK	35	14.4%
RENTED ROOM	26	10.7%
SOMEWHERE ELSE	1	.4%
NOT ANSWERED	1	.4%

3. TYPE OF WORK

FULL TIME	85	35.0%
PART TIME	22	9.1%
OUT OF WORK	131	53.9%
NOT ANSWERED	5	2.1%

4. MARITAL STATUS

MARRIED	195	80.2%
NOT MARRIED	41	16.9%
NOT ANSWERED	7	2.9%

5. LIVING WITH HUSBAND?

YES	182	74.9%

	NOT ANSWERED	7	2.9%
5. LIVING WITH HUSBAND?			
	YES	182	74.9%
	NO	51	21.0%
	NOT ANSWERED	10	4.1%
6. DOES HE WORK?			
	YES	149	61.3%
	NO	44	18.1%
	NOT ANSWERED	50	20.6%
7. DO ANY CHILDREN WORK?			
	YES	90	37.0%
	NO	137	56.0%
	NOT ANSWERED	15	6.2%
8. WHO SUPPORTS FAMILY?			
	HUSBAND	152	62.6%
	THE MAN WHO STAYS HERE	14	5.8%
	PARENTS	8	3.3%
	PENTIONS/WELFARE	41	16.9%
	CHILDREN	13	5.3%
	OTHER	7	2.9%
	NOT ANSWERED	7	2.9%
10. DO CHILDREN STAY HERE?			
	YES	222	91.4%
	NO	13	5.3%
	NOT ANSWERED	7	2.9%

193

22% of husbands out of work

15. WHO LOOKS AFTER CHILDREN?

SELF	113	46.5%
MOTHER	13	5.3%
OLDER CHILD	12	4.9%
RELATION	9	3.7%
FRIEND	12	4.9%
CRECHE	38	15.6%
NOBODY	12	4.9%
NOT ANSWERED	33	13.6%

16. NON-WORKING, NON-PUPIL CHILDREN BELOW 16?

YES	73	30.0%
NO	159	65.0%
NOT ANSWERED	11	4.5%

17. ARE THEY GANG MEMBERS?

YES	19	7.8%
NO	217	89.3%
NOT ANSWERED	7	2.9%

18. IS THAT

GOOD?	6	2.5%
BAD?	112	46.1%
DON'T MIND?	4	1.6%
NOT ANSWERED (THIS IS VERY HIGH)	121	49.8%

19. GANGS IN YOUR AREA?

YES	187	77.0%
NO	48	19.8%
NOT ANSWERED	8	3.3%

20. ARE YOU AFRAID?

YES	185	76.1%
NO	42	17.3%
NOT ANSWERED	16	6.6%

21. HAVE THEY HURT YOU?

YES	54	22.2%

20. ARE YOU AFRAID?		
YES	185	76.1%
NO	42	17.3%
NOT ANSWERED	16	6.6%
21. HAVE THEY HURT YOU?		
YES	58	23.9%
NO	180	74.1%
NOT ANSWERED	9	3.7%
22. WHERE WAS YOUR MOTHER BORN? IN CAPE TOWN?		
ATHLONE	4	1.6%
BONTEHEUWEL	0	.0%
CROSSROADS	0	.0%
DIEPRIVIER	5	2.1%
ELSIES RIVER	6	2.5%
PEILVILLE	4	1.6%
GOODWOOD	1	.4%
HANOVER PARK	1	.4%
GUGULETU	0	.0%
KENSINGTON	2	.8%
CAPE TOWN	58	23.9%
LANGA	1	.4%
NDABENI	0	.0%
NYANGA	0	.0%
CLAREMONT/LANSDOWNE/CRAWFORD	11	4.5%
PHILLIPI	1	.4%
MANENBERG	0	.0%
RAVENSMEAD	0	.0%
DISTRICT SIX	6	2.5%
MITCHELLS PLAIN	0	.0%

VALHALLA PARK	0	.0%
VASCO	1	.4%
WOODSTOCK	3	1.2%
WONTHEUWEL	0	.0%
WYNBERG/KENILWORTH	8	3.3%
SILVERTOWN	0	.0%
WHITEGETOWN	0	.0%
WEIDEVELD	0	.0%
HEATHFIELD/RETREAT	2	.8%
PRIMROSE PARK	0	.0%
OCEAN VIEW/SIMONSTOWN	5	2.1%
WELLINGTON???	0	.0%
ATLANTIS	1	.4%
RYLANS ESTATE	0	.0%
VRYGROND	0	.0%
NOT ANSWERED	123	50.6%

23. WHERE WAS YOUR MOTHER BORN? OUTSIDE CAPE?

ADELAIDE/ALICE	2	.8%
CALVINIA	5	2.1%
CERES	5	2.1%
DOUGLAS/ELLIOT	3	1.2%
ENGCOBO/PEDDIE	5	2.1%
LADY FRERE/NOQAMAKWE	5	2.1%
GEORGE	6	2.5%
KEETMANSHOOP	2	.8%
LUSIKISIKI	1	.4%
KINGWILLIAMS TOWN	1	.4%
O KIEP	0	.0%
LADYSMITH	2	.8%
MATATIEL/MAFIKENG	1	.4%
NAMAKWALAND	6	2.5%
OUDTSHOORN	5	2.1%
PORT ELIZABETH	6	2.5%
QUEENSTOWN	3	1.2%
RIVERSDAL	5	2.1%
SANKIESDORP/STELLENBOSCH	2	.8%

NAMAKWALAND	6	2.5%
OUDTSHOORN	5	2.1%
PORT ELIZABETH	6	2.5%
QUEENSTOWN	3	1.2%
RIVERSDAL	5	2.1%
SAKKIESDORP/STELLENBOSCH	7	2.9%
UITENHAGE	2	.8%
UMTATA	3	1.2%
JOHANNESBURG	2	.8%
WELLINGTON	13	5.3%
QUMBU	0	.0%
TRANSVAAL	0	.0%
ZWELITSHIA	0	.0%
PAARL	4	1.6%
ELIM	1	.4%
WARRE	3	1.2%
PNIEL	0	.0%
SWELLENDAM	6	2.5%
KIMBERLEY	4	1.6%
ST HELENA	0	.0%
GRAAFF REINET	4	1.6%
ALIWAL NORTH	0	.0%
NOT ANSWERED	131	53.9%

23. WHERE WAS YOUR FATHER BORN? IN CAPE TOWN?

ATHLONE	5	2.1%
BONTEHEUWEL	0	.0%
CROSSROADS	0	.0%
DIEPRIVIER	2	.8%
ELSIES RIVER	2	.8%
BELLVILLE	2	.8%

GOODWOOD	1	.4%
HANOVER PARK	0	.0%
GUGULETU	0	.0%
KENSINGTON	1	.4%
CAPE TOWN	52	21.0%
LANGA	0	.0%
NDABENI	1	.4%
NYANGA	0	.0%
CLAREMONT/LANSDOWNE/CRAWFORD	8	3.3%
PHILLIPI	1	.4%
PINELANDS	0	.0%
PLUMSTEAD	0	.0%
DISTRICT SIX	8	3.3%
MITCHELLS PLAIN	0	.0%
VALHALLA PARK	0	.0%
VASCO	1	.4%
WOODSTOCK	2	.8%
BONTEHEUWEL	0	.0%
WYNBERG/GRASSY PARK	9	3.7%
SILVERTOWN	0	.0%
BRIDGETOWN	0	.0%
HEIDEVELD	0	.0%
STEENBERG/RETREAT	5	2.1%
PRIMROSE PARK	0	.0%
SIMONSTOWN/OCEAN VIEW	4	1.6%
WELLINGTON???	0	.0%
PYLANS ESTATE	0	.0%
VRYGROND	0	.0%
NOT ANSWERED	138	56.8%

24. WHERE WAS YOUR FATHER BORN? OUTSIDE CAPE TOWN?

ADELAIDE/ALICE	2	.8%
CALVINIA/PIKETBERG	3	1.2%
CERES/WORCESTER	7	2.9%
DOUGLAS/ELLIOT	3	1.2%
ENGCOBO/PEDDIE	5	2.1%
LADY FREPE/NOUAMBANE	5	2.1%

ADELAIDE/ALICE	2	.8%
CALVINIA/PIKETBERG	3	1.2%
CERES/WORCESTER	7	2.9%
DOUGLAS/ELLIOT	3	1.2%
ENGCOBO/PEDDIE	5	2.1%
LADY FRERE/NOQAMAKWE	5	2.1%
GEORGE	5	2.1%
KEETMANSHOOP	1	.4%
KINGWILLIAMSTOWN	0	.0%
O KIEP	1	.4%
LADYSMITH	1	.4%
MAFIKENG/MAFIKENG	2	.8%
NAMAKWALAND	6	2.5%
OUDTSHOORN	4	1.6%
PORT ELIZABETH/EAST LONDEN	4	1.6%
QUEENSTOWN	4	1.6%
RIVERSDAL/RIVIERSONDEREND	5	2.1%
STELLENBOSCH/STRAND/SAKKIESDORP	5	2.1%
UITENHAGE	2	.8%
UMTATA	3	1.2%
JOHANNESBURG	2	.8%
WELLINGTON	11	4.5%
DUMBU	1	.4%
TRANSVAAL	2	.8%
ZWELITSHA	0	.0%
BABHI	4	1.6%
ELIM	1	.4%
MAYBE/MALMESBURY	4	1.6%
PNIEL	4	1.6%
SWELLENDAM/CALEDON	7	2.9%
KIMBERLEY/UPINGTON	6	2.5%

	ST HELENA/WASHINGTON	3	1.2%	
	GRAAF REINET	3	1.2%	
	ALTHAL NORTH	1	.4%	
	NOT ANSWERED	124	51.0%	
24.	WHEN DID MOTHER COME TO CAPE TOWN?			
	BEFORE WW II	17	7.0%	30.9%
	AFTER WW II	16	6.6%	29
	1950S	12	4.9%	55 ppl 21.8
	1940S	9	3.7%	16.3
	1970S	1	.4%	1.8
	NOT ANSWERED	188	77.4%	
25.	WHEN DID FATHER COME TO CAPE TOWN?			
	BEFORE WW II	16	6.6%	36.4
	AFTER WW II	17	7.0%	38.6
	1950S	4	1.6%	W/ 9
	1940S	7	2.9%	15.9
	1970S	0	.0%	
	NOT ANSWERED	198	81.5%	
26.	WHERE WERE YOU BORN?			
	IN CAPE TOWN.	166	68.3%	
	OUTSIDE CAPE TOWN.	88	36.2%	
27.	WHEN DID YOU COME TO CAPE TOWN?			
	BEFORE WW II	2	.8%	14.2
	AFTER WW II	5	2.1%	35.7
	1950S	3	1.2%	/4
	1940S	4	1.6%	
	1970S	0	.0%	
	NOT ANSWERED	166	68.3%	
28.	IF MOVED HOUSE, WHERE LIVING BEFORE? (I HAVE IGNORED FOR THE TIME)			
29.	MOVED BY THE GROUP AREAS ACT?			

NOT ANSWERED	166	68.3%	

28. IF MOVED HOUSE, WHERE LIVING BEFORE? (I HAVE IGNORED FOR THE TIME)

29. MOVED BY THE GROUP AREAS ACT?

YES	90	38.7%	
NO	127	52.3%	
NOT ANWERED (INCLUDE WITH 'NO')	22	9.1%	

30. RELATIONS (WHEN YOU WERE YOUNG) WERE LIVING

IN PARENTS HOUSE	77	31.7%	
IN SAME STREET	29	11.9%	
WITHIN WALKING DISTANCE	45	26.7%	70.3
NOT ANSWERED (NO OPTION GIVEN FOR NEGATIVE ANSWER)	72	29.6%	

33. WHO LOOKED AFTER YOU THEN?

MOTHER	107	60.5%	
GRANDMOTHER	08	19.8%	
AUNT	11	6.5%	
SISTER	12	6.9%	
FRIEND	11	6.5%	
CRECHE	2	.8%	
NOBODY DID.	8	3.3%	
NOT ANSWERED	4	1.6%	

34. RELATIONS (NOW) LIVING

IN YOUR HOUSE	33	13.6%	
IN SAME STREET	27	11.1%	
WITHIN WALKING DISTANCE	63	25.9%	50.6%
THERE ARE NO RELATIONS. (INTERPRETED???)	72	29.6%	
NOT ANSWERED (INTERPRETED????)	08	19.8%	

35. HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE LIVING IN YOUR HOUSE OR FLAT? /Rec...

ONE	0	.0%
TWO	4	1.6%
THREE	12	4.9%
FOUR	28	11.5%
FIVE	35	14.4%
SIX	29	11.9%
SEVEN	32	13.2%
EIGHT	30	12.3%
NINE	16	6.6%
TEN	20	8.2%
ELEVEN	7	2.9%
TWELVE	4	1.6%
THIRTEEN	3	1.2%
FOURTEEN	1	.4%
FIFTEEN	2	.8%
SIXTEEN	3	1.2%
SEVENTEEN	1	.4%
EIGHTEEN	2	.8%
TWENTY	3	1.2%
NOT ANSWERED	10	4.1%

mean: 7.32 people

17.

END PROGRAM EXECUTION
DATA IGNORED - IN CONTROL MODE

NUMBER OF COLUMNS USED HERE IS 12

NUMBER OF CASES IN THIS SURVEY IS 514

Retreat Juvenile Court, Cape Town

1980

SURVEY ON JUVENILE CRIME.

****

1. AGE

BELOW 10	6	1.2%
10	5	1.0%
11	7	1.4%
12	29	5.6%
13	38	7.4%
14	43	8.4%
15	83	16.1%
16	115	22.4%
17	108	21.0%
18	79	15.4%

AVERAGE AGE OF GROUP IS 15,53 YEARS

2. SEX

MALE	460	89.5%
FEMALE	54	10.5%

3. RACE

AFRICAN	19	3.7%

WHITE	31	6.0%
COLOURED	464	90.3%

4. CHARGE

HOUSEBREAKING & THEFT	178	34.6%
ASSAULT GBH	55	10.7%
THEFT	196	38.1%
ARMED ROBBERY	42	8.2%
OTHER	41	8.0%
RAPE	1	.2%
ASSAULT COMMON	1	.2%

5. SENTENCE

CORPORAL PUNISHMENT	288	56.0%
SUSPENDED SENTENCE	93	18.1%
DISCHARGED	72	14.0%
WARNED, CAUTIONED & DISCHARGED	17	3.3%
REFORM SCHOOL	16	3.1%
FINE	8	1.6%
PRISON 0-3 MONTHS	2	.4%
3-6	3	.6%
6-9	3	.6%
9-12	2	.4%
PRISON 12-18 MONTHS	5	1.0%
18-24	2	.4%
24+ MONTHS	1	.2%

6. NUMBER OF PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS

NONE	357	69.5%
ONE	80	15.6%
TWO	35	6.8%

THREE	15	2.9%
FOUR	8	1.6%
FIVE	6	1.2%
SIX	5	1.0%
SEVEN	4	.8%
EIGHT	2	.4%
NINE OR MORE	2	.4%

AVERAGE IS 0,6686 CONVICTIONS PER CHILD

7. FORMS OF PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS

NO PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS	357	69.5%	
THEFT	56	10.9%	
HOUSEBREAKING & THEFT	56	10.9%	
ARMED ROBBERY	12	2.3%	
OTHER	12	2.3%	
DAGGA POSESSION	7	1.4%	
RAPE	3	.6%	
DAGGA DEALING	1	.2%	
ASSAULT GBH	10	1.9%	
	157		

13. WERE THE PROCEEDINGS IN CAMERA?

YES	449	87.4%

8. TOTAL LENGTH OF IMPRISONMENT

0-3 MONTHS	1	.2%
3-6 MONTHS	1	.2%
NO PREVIOUS IMPRISONMENT	135	26.3%
NO PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS	363	70.6%

9. OTHER FORMS OF PUNISHMENT

CORPORAL PUNISHMENT	114	22.2%
SUSPENDED SENTENCE	25	4.9%
WARNED, CAUTIONED & DISCHARGED	10	1.9%
REFORM SCHOOL	3	.6%
NO PREVIOUS CONVICTION	357	69.5%

10. EDUCATIONAL STANDARD

NIL	2	.4%
KINDERGARDEN	3	.6%
STD 1-4	4	.8%
4-5	3	.6%
5-7	5	1.0%
7-10	8	1.6%
NOT AVAILABLE	489	95.1%

PORTER SCHOOL

RETREAT

DATA ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION

RANDOM SAMPLE (100) TAKEN FROM CURRENT FILES

AUGUST 1981

Segretti

* The Chief Psychologist subsequently interviewed all the 900 boys in Porter at present absent unrepresented

NUMBER	LEGALLY REPRESENTED (MOST RECENT OFFENCES)	SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND	OFFENCE FOR WHICH ADMITTED TO REFORM SCHOOL	PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS	YEAR OF BIRTH	EDUCATIONAL LEVEL ON ADMISSION
1	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT; Robbery; Robbery (3)	1963	Std. 3
2	No	Working Class	HBT	Probation	1964	M7
3	No	Working Class	Robbery	Robbery, Assault	1964	S2
4	No	Working Class	HBT	Theft	1960	S3
5	No	Working Class	Assault GBH	Assault GBH	1962	S1
6	No	Working Class	HB	HB	1966	S6
7	No	Working Class	HB	HBT; Stolen Goods	1966	Std. 4
8	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT; Theft	1964	Sub. A
9	No	Working Class	Malicious damage	HBT; Robbery; Assault	1963	B2 -
10	Ex Ottery	Working Class	HBT	HBT; Attempted Murder	1964	B1
11	No	Working Class	Theft from car	HBT	1964	Std. 3
12	No	Working Class	Theft; Malicious damage	Assault	1965	S1
13	Ex Ottery	Working Class	HBT	Children's Home	1964	S5
14	Transcript not available	Working Class	Theft	HBT	1964	S5
15	No	Working Class	Assault on police	Stolen fruit; Bad language; Assault	1964	S5
16	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1962	B2
17	No	Working Class	HB	HB	1964	M5
18	No	Working Class	Theft	HB; Escape; Malicious Damage	1963	Std. 4

NUMBER	LEGALLY REPRESENTED (MOST RECENT OFFENCES	SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND	OFFENCE FOR WHICH ADMITTED TO REFORM SCHOOL	PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS	YEAR OF BIRTH	EDUCATIONAL LEVEL ON ADMISSION
19	Ex Ottery	Working Class	Transfer from Ottery	Unknown	1963	Std. 4
20	No	Working Class	HB	HBT	1965	B4
21	No	Not available	Robbery	Not Available	1964	S1
22	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1963	B1
23	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1964	B2
24	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1963	S7
25	No	Working Class	Theft	HBT	1962	M5
26	No	Working Class	HBT	Theft	1963	4A
27	No	Working Class	Cattle theft	HBT; Theft	1963	S3
28	No	Working Class	HBT	Theft; HBT	1965	M5
29	No	Working Class	Theft	Probation; Theft	1964	B4
30	Transcript not available	Working Class	HBT	Theft; HBT	1964	Std. 5
31	No	Working Class	Assualt GHB	Robbery; Assault	1964	B2
32	No	Working Class	Robbery	Malicious Damage	1966	4B
33	No	Working Class	Theft	HBT	1960	B
34	No	Working Class	HB	HB; Assault GBH	1962	Sub.A
35	Ex Ottery	Working Class	Transferred from Ottery	In need of care - Ottery	1964	M1
36	No	Working Class	HB	HBT	1964	S4
37	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1966	M5
38	No	Working Class	HBT	HB	1964	Std.3

NUMBER	LEGALLY REPRESENTED (MOST RECENT OFFENCES)	SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND	OFFENCE FOR WHICH ADMITTED TO REFORM SCHOOL	PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS	YEAR OF BIRTH	EDUCATIONAL LEVEL ON ADMISSION
39	No	Working Class	HBT	HB (from parents)	1964	Std. 2
40	No	Working Class	HBT	Theft	1964	Std. 5
41	No	Working Class	Theft	Theft; dagga	1962	M1
42	No	Working Class	Attempted robbery	Theft; Robbery	1965	S5
43	No	Working Class	Theft	Theft	1965	5B
44	No	Working Class	HBT	HB	1966	B1
45	No	Working Class	Robbery	Theft; HB	1961	B2
46	No	Working Class	HB	Theft	1964	M5
47	No	Working Class	Theft	-	1961	S4
48	Transcript not available	Working Class	Murder (extenuating)	Not available	1963	B1
49	No	Working Class	Attempted robbery	Theft; Robbery	1965	Std. 2
50	No	Working Class	HBT	Theft	1964	S1
51	Ex Ottery	Working Class	Ex Ottery (uncontrollable)	-	1963	M5
52	No	Working Class	HBT	Theft, dagga	1962	M5
53	No	Working Class	Dagga dealing	Dagga	1964	M5
54	No	Working Class	Attempted theft	Robbery	1964	S3
55	Ex Ottery	Working Class	Ex Ottery	-	1966	M3
56	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1964	
57	Transcript not available	Working Class	HBT	-	1963	Sub A
58	Ex Ottery	Working Class	Orphan (Ottery)	-	1962	M2
59	No	Working Class	Dangerous weapon	Assault GHB sodomy; theft	1963	S1

NUMBER	LEGALLY REPRESENTED (MOST RECENT OFFENCES)	SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND	OFFENCE FOR WHICH ADMITTED TO REFORM SCHOOL	PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS	YEAR OF BIRTH	EDUCATIONAL LEVEL ON ADMISSION
60	Transcript not available	Working Class	Theft	Attempted theft	1964	B1
61	Pro Deo Advocate (Mej. Fouché)	Working Class	Murder	Theft	1964	B5
62	Ex Steinthal	Working Class	Ex children's home	-	1965	
63	Yes (Zietsman)	Working Class	Attempted Rape	-	1964	4C
64	Ex Ottery	Working Class	Robbery; HBT	HB	1961	M5
65	Ex Ottery	Working Class	Uncontrollable Ottery	-	1964	B1
66	No	Working Class	Theft	HB; Theft	1964	S7
67	No	Working Class	HB	HBT	1965	S1
68	No	Working Class	Assault	Theft	1964	M2
69	No	Working Class	Theft	Theft	1962	4A
70	No	Working Class	Dagga	Robbery; Assault GHB; Dagga	1963	M3
71	No	Working Class	Malicious damage	Not known	1962	B1
72	Yes JJ Swart (from Athlone)	Working Class	Rape	-	1963	S5
73	No	Working Class	Theft		1963	B4
74	No	Working Class	Robbery	HBT; Dangerous weapon	1964	4A
75	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1965	S5
76	No	Working Class	Attempted theft	HBT	1963	S5
77	No	Working Class	Fraud	HBT	1963	5B
78	No	Working Class	Theft	Theft; HBT; Assault	1964	M1

NUMBER	LEGALLY REPRESENTED (MOST RECENT OFFENCES)	SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND	OFFENCE FOR WHICH ADMITTED TO REFORM SCHOOL	PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS	YEAR OF BIRTH	EDUCATIONAL LEVEL ON ADMISSION
79	No	Working Class	Car Theft	Car theft; Assault; Theft	1961	4
80	No	Working Class	Robbery	Theft; Car Theft	1964	Left School no money Std. 3
81	No	Working Class	Theft	Children's Home; malicious damage	1963	M5
82	No	Working Class	Escape custody	Theft	1963	S5
83	No	Working Class	Robbery	HBT; Robbery; Theft; Malicious damage	1963	M1
84	No	Working Class	Theft	HBT; Theft	1964	
85	No	Working Class	Theft	Theft	1963	B2
86	No	Working Class	Car Theft	Theft	1964	B1
87	Yes - C Botha	Middle Class	Car Theft		1962	S5
88	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1963	S5
89	No	Working Class	HBT	HB	1964	B1
90	No	Working Class	HBT	Theft	1964	B1
91	No	Working Class	Assault GHB	Malicious Damage; Dagga	1964	S5
92	No	Working Class	HBT	Theft; HBT	1963	S3
93	No	Working Class	Rape	HBT	1964	S2
94	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1964	S3
95	No	Working Class	HBT		1966	B2
96	No	Working Class	Robbery	Several thefts; Robbery	1964	-
97	No	Middle Class	Theft	Theft; HBT	1964	Std. 7

NUMBER	LEGALLY REPRESENTED (MOST RECENT OFFENCES)	SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND	OFFENCE FOR WHICH ADMITTED TO REFORM SCHOOL	PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS	YEAR OF BIRTH	EDUCATIONAL LEVEL ON ADMISSION
98	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1966	-
99	No	Working Class	HBT	Theft; robbery	1965	Sub A
100	No	Working Class	Theft	Theft	1962	Sub A

birth	%	age
1960	2	= 20
1961	5	= 19
1962	9	= 18
1963	23	= 17
1964	42	= 16
1965	10	= 15
1966	9	= 14

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INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY,
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN

offence for which admitted

89% non-violent crime

68% for theft

8 JAN 1986