

**University of Cape Town**  
**Faculty of Humanities**  
**Department of Political Studies**

**2012**

**POL 5010W**

**A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION MISSION IN  
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: A FOCUS ON MONUC**

**A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of  
the degree of *Master of Social Sciences in International Relations***

**By**

**TAFADZWA ZVOBGO**

**ZVBTA001**

**Supervisor: Professor Annette Seegers**

The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.

## **COMPULSORY DECLARATION**

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced according to the Turbian/Chicago citation style.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

University of Cape Town

## **Acknowledgments**

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Annette Seegers, for her valuable advice, guidance and insight. I would also like to thank my family and friends for their encouragement and support.

University of Cape Town

## **Table of Contents**

<b>Acknowledgments</b> .....	3
<b>Abbreviations</b> .....	6
<b>Abstract</b> .....	8
<b>Chapter 1: Introduction</b> .....	10
1.1 Problem Statement .....	10
1.2 Methodology .....	11
1.3 MONUC in the Context of United Nations Peace Operations .....	12
1.4 Concepts .....	16
1.4.1 Peacekeeping .....	16
1.4.2 Mandate .....	16
1.4.3 Objectives .....	16
1.5 Chapter Outline .....	17
1.6 Conclusion .....	18
<b>Chapter 2: Literature Review</b> .....	19
2.1 Introduction .....	19
2.2 Failures of Peacekeeping Operations .....	19
2.2.1 Mandates .....	20
2.2.2 Logistical Issues and Resource Problems .....	23
2.2.3 The Misconduct of Peacekeepers .....	24
2.2.4 Peace Agreements .....	26
2.3 Responding to MONUC's Failures .....	27
2.4 Conclusion .....	29
<b>Chapter 3: The DRC, the 1998 Conflict and the United Nations in the DRC</b> .....	31
3.1 Introduction .....	31
3.2 The 1998 DRC Conflict .....	31
3.2.1 Introduction .....	31
3.2.2 The Rwandan Genocide .....	33
3.2.3 Rebel Groups .....	34
3.2.4 Natural Resources .....	36
3.2.5 The Land .....	38
3.2.6 Questions over Citizenship and Identity .....	39
3.3 Peacemaking .....	41

3.4 The United Nations in the DRC .....	43
3.4.1 MONUC's Mandate .....	44
3.5 The Current Status in the DRC .....	47
3.6 Conclusion .....	48
<b>Chapter 4: MONUC's Mandates, Objectives and Accomplishments 1999 - 2010 .....</b>	<b>49</b>
4.1 Introduction .....	49
4.2 MONUC 1999 - 2002 .....	49
4.2.1 Mandates .....	49
4.2.2 MONUC's Objectives .....	52
4.2.3 MONUC's Implementation of Objectives .....	53
Observing and Monitoring .....	53
Protection of Civilians .....	53
4.2.4 Conclusion .....	54
4.3 MONUC 2002 - 2004 .....	55
4.3.1 Mandates .....	55
4.3.2 MONUC's Objectives .....	58
4.3.3 MONUC's Implementation of Objectives .....	59
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes .....	59
Protection of Civilians .....	59
4.3.4 Conclusion .....	61
4.4 MONUC 2004 - 2006 .....	62
4.4.1 Mandates .....	62
4.4.2 MONUC's Objectives .....	63
4.4.3 MONUC's Implementation of Objectives .....	64
Elections .....	64
Use of Force .....	65
4.4.4 Conclusion .....	66
4.5 MONUC 2007 - 2010 .....	67
4.5.1 Mandates .....	67
4.5.2 MONUC's Objectives .....	69
4.5.3 MONUC's Implementation of Objectives .....	70
Security Sector Reform .....	70
Conflict Management in the Eastern DRC .....	72
Civilian Protection .....	74
The Local Election Process .....	75
4.5.4 Conclusion .....	75
4.6 Conclusion .....	76
<b>Chapter 5: Conclusion .....</b>	<b>78</b>
<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>81</b>

## **Abbreviations**

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
ADFL	Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
CNDD/FDD	National Council for the Defence of Democracy/Forces for the Defence of Democracy
CNDP	National Congress for the Defence of the People
DDRRR	Disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	European Union
EU-IEFMF	European Union-International Emergency Multinational Force
EUFOR RD Congo	European Union Force in the DRC
EUPOL	EU Police Mission in the DRC
EUSEC	EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the DRC
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
FAR	Rwanda Armed Forces
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FIPI	Front for the Integration and Peace in Ituri
FNI/FRPI	Nationalist and Integrationist Front/Patriotic Force of Resistance in Ituri
ICD	Inter-Congolese Dialogue
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
JMC	Joint Military Commission
JVM	Joint Verification Mechanism
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MLC	Congo Liberation Movement
MONUC	United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC
MONUSCO	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Nongovernmental Organisation
OIOS	United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services
PARECO	Patriots in the Congolese Resistance
PUSIC	Party for the Safeguarding of the Congo
RCD	Congolese Rally for Democracy
RCD-G	Congolese Rally for Democracy - Goma
RCD-K	Congolese Rally for Democracy - Kisangani
RCD-ML	Congolese Rally for Democracy - Movement for Liberation
RCD-N	Congolese Rally for Democracy - National
RPA	Rwandan People's Army

<b>RPF</b>	<b>Rwandan Patriotic Front</b>
<b>SADC</b>	<b>Southern African Development Community</b>
<b>SEA</b>	<b>Sexual Exploitation and Abuse</b>
<b>SSR</b>	<b>Security Sector Reform</b>
<b>TCC</b>	<b>Troop Contributing Country</b>
<b>UN</b>	<b>United Nations</b>
<b>UNSC</b>	<b>United Nations Security Council</b>
<b>UNSCR</b>	<b>United Nations Security Council Resolution</b>
<b>UPC</b>	<b>Uganda's People's Congress</b>

University of Cape Town

## **Abstract**

Critical discussions on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations are primarily failure-focused and seek to reform those operations, thus limiting the literature about peacekeeping and its results. This dissertation intends to expand the scope of inquiry into UN peacekeeping operations by critically analysing the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). It accomplishes this by examining how MONUC's United Nation Security Council mandates and objectives (its prioritisation and interpretation of mission mandates) impacted the mission. In addition, it includes an examination of MONUC's accomplishments.

The dissertation reveals that there were key problems with the MONUC mandates as formulated by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR). The mandates lacked clarity; were too many for the mission to implement effectively; and, at times, caused the mission to operate at a level outside its capacity and capability. Furthermore, there were problems with the mission's objectives. Firstly, MONUC's prioritisation of issues led the mission to neglect addressing other United Nations Security Council (UNSC) objectives such as the instability in the eastern Congo. Secondly, mandates were mostly developed in cooperation with the Congolese government, a government known for its corruption. Thus, any collaborative exercises with this government were compromised.

The key findings of this dissertation are that the mission produced better results when it focused on a central goal, as it did in the preparation for the elections from 2004 to 2006 as opposed to its relatively passive approaches from 1999 to 2004. In addition, in certain instances, *how* MONUC interpreted its mandates and used its resources had more of an impact on the mission's accomplishments than did the amount of resources MONUC had and whether or not MONUC could use force or protect civilians.

MONUC's accomplishments should not be overlooked. Despite the weakness of the Congolese government, MONUC's difficulty in protecting civilians, and continued instability in the eastern Congo, MONUC successfully contributed to the 2006 election process and the stabilisation of the greater Congolese area.

University of Cape Town

## Chapter 1: Introduction

### 1.1 Problem Statement

After 'Africa's First World War' erupted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in August 1998<sup>1</sup>, the United Nations (UN) deployed the United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC).<sup>2</sup> This dissertation analyses the MONUC peacekeeping mission, particularly its mandate, objectives and the operations undertaken from 1999 to 2010. I ask two major questions:

What were MONUC's mandates and objectives?

and

To what extent did MONUC accomplish its objectives?

Most scholarly discussions on UN peace operations are concerned with identifying 'the causes and nature of conflict and assessing - in instrumental terms - the efficacy of alternative strategies for peace and the experiences of particular operations'.<sup>3</sup> Though these

---

<sup>1</sup> In this dissertation, the names Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Congo will be used interchangeably to refer to the country.

<sup>2</sup> MONUC was renamed the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) as of 1 July 2010, in order to adapt its capabilities to allow the mission to deal with the new phase of peace and consolidation in the DRC and exit strategy for the UN as of 1 April 2010. This paper will be examining the MONUC mission only.

United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1925 S/RES/1925 (2010)," [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925\(2010\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925(2010)) (accessed October 5, 2010); United Nations, "The Thirty-first Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC," [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/164](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/164) (accessed October 5, 2010).

<sup>3</sup> Alex J. Bellamy, "The 'Next Stage' in Peace Operations Theory?" *International Peacekeeping* 11, 1 (2004): 1. These discussions can be found in the following sources: Tatiana Carayannis and Herbert F. Weiss, "The Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1996-2002," in *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations*, ed. Jane Boulden (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 253-304; Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, *Peacekeeping in the DRC: MONUC and the Road to Peace* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2001); Emeric Rogier, "The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: A Critical Overview," in *Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, ed. Mark Malan and João Gomes Porto (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 25-42; Paul D. Williams, "Peace Operations in Africa: Seven Challenges, any Solutions," *ACCORD: Conflict Trends* 3 (2009).

discussions provide useful explanations and descriptions of the missions' accomplishments and challenges, these studies usually limit their analysis of UN operations to the existing ends, means, and forms of UN operations. This is because much of the literature 'devotes too much attention to 'policy relevance' or the goal of offering advice and recommendations to policy makers' or identifying lessons to learn.<sup>4</sup> The inevitable result is that inquiries into UN peace operations are limited to reformist lessons.

This dissertation, in contrast, aims to contribute to the study of UN peacekeeping operations through a critical approach. This approach includes evaluation of the normative underpinnings of the operations, as well as of the organisations that conduct operations.<sup>5</sup> The benefit of analysing normative assumptions of and within peace operations is that a better or at least more balanced understanding of UN peace operations can be developed.<sup>6</sup>

## 1.2 Methodology

This dissertation is a case study because it is concerned with 'understanding and explaining the complexities... and underlying values'<sup>7</sup> of *one* UN peace operation, namely, the MONUC peacekeeping operation in the Congo. MONUC presents a valuable perspective on UN peace operations because of its formation, duration and expenses: the operation proved to be the most expensive (incurring approximately US\$ 1 billion per year); the largest (up to 20 000 troops); and the longest-running (11 years) UN operation in the world.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Roland Paris, "Broadening the Study of Peace Operations," *International Studies Review* 2, 3 (2000): 28.

<sup>5</sup> Bellamy, "The 'Next Stage'," 19.

<sup>6</sup> Paris, "Broadening the Study," 29.

<sup>7</sup> Roger Pierce, *Research Methods in Politics: A Practical Guide* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2008), 45.

<sup>8</sup> United Nations, "Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010 A/C.5/64/15," [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.5/64/15](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.5/64/15) (accessed March 18, 2011).

The case study research method is defined as 'an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident'.<sup>9</sup> Because this dissertation deals with a single case, the analysis of MONUC cannot be equated with other UN peace operations.<sup>10</sup> This dissertation's conclusions can, however, contribute to a better understanding of peace operations: the dissertation is, in other words, a 'theory'-generating case study.<sup>11</sup>

The dissertation does not attempt to propose policy advice, identify lessons to learn from the mission or propose new approaches for UN peacekeeping in the Congo.<sup>12</sup>

The information of this dissertation is primarily qualitative, drawing on primary and secondary information. These include articles, books, journals, newspaper articles, NGO-reports, UN reports and internet sources.

### 1.3 MONUC in the Context of United Nations Peace Operations

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) gave MONUC the necessary legal empowerment to promote peace and security in the Congo through the authorisation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) or mandates.<sup>13</sup> The basis of all UNSC authorisations for peacekeeping missions is the Charter of the United Nations.<sup>14</sup> Although not specifically stated in the Charter, peacekeeping operations are normally ordered by the UNSC under Chapter VI, VII or VIII of the Charter, depending on the needs of the deployments' zone.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> Robert K. Yin, *Case study research: Design and Methods* (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2009), 17.

<sup>10</sup> Yin, *Case study research*, 18.

<sup>11</sup> Paris, "Broadening the Study," 32.

<sup>12</sup> Bellamy, "The 'Next Stage'," 18.

<sup>13</sup> United Nations, "MONUC Mandate,"

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/mandate.shtml> (accessed March 29, 2011).

<sup>14</sup> United Nations, "MONUC Mandate."

<sup>15</sup> United Nations, "Mandates and the Legal Basis for Peacekeeping,"

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/pkmandates.shtml> (accessed January 24, 2012).

'However, the Security Council need not refer to a specific Chapter of the Charter when passing a resolution authorizing the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation.'<sup>16</sup>

Chapter VI of the UN Charter on the 'Pacific Settlements of Disputes' permits operations to 'investigate any dispute, or any which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security'.<sup>17</sup> At the same time, this chapter authorises a mission to encourage the settlement of disputes 'through negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, [through] regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means'.<sup>18</sup>

Chapter VII of the UN Charter is concerned with 'Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression'.<sup>19</sup> Chapter VII permits a peace operation to take military action or use force when necessary to maintain peace and encourage stability and security.<sup>20</sup>

UN peacekeeping, according to Chapter VI of the UN Charter, adheres to three key principles:

the consent of the main parties involved in the deployment zone;

operating impartially; and

---

<sup>16</sup> United Nations, "Mandates and the Legal Basis,"

<sup>17</sup> United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 6."

<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter6.shtml> (accessed September 14, 2011).

<sup>18</sup> United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 6."

<sup>19</sup> United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 7,"

<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml> (accessed September 14, 2011).

<sup>20</sup> United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 7."

not using force except in instances of self-defence, protecting civilians and defence of the mandate 'particularly in situations where the State is unable to provide security and maintain public order'.<sup>21</sup>

The non-use of force principle is the most controversial in peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations are allowed to use force only when authorised to do so by the UNSC and with the consent of the main parties in the conflict.<sup>22</sup> 'Although on the ground they may sometimes appear similar, robust peacekeeping should not be confused with peace enforcement, as envisaged under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.'<sup>23</sup> Peace enforcement operations differ from peacekeeping missions in that they do not require the consent of the main parties of the conflict to use military force.

MONUC peacekeeping not only aims at implementing peace and security in the Congo by containing hostilities or implementing respective peace agreements, but also promotes political reform through elections; encourages the rule of law; protection of human rights and civilians; promotes security sector reform (SSR) through disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) of former combatants; and the training of government forces.<sup>24</sup> These aspects are not found in the traditional definition of peacekeeping. This form of peacekeeping, which incorporates aspects outside of what is considered traditional, is known as multidimensional peacekeeping. The MONUC peacekeeping mission is thus a multidimensional peacekeeping operation. The main activities of a UN multidimensional peacekeeping operation are to:

---

<sup>21</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, "Peace and Security," <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml> (accessed July 5, 2011).

<sup>22</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, "Principles of United Nations Peacekeeping," <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/principles.shtml> (accessed July 5, 2011).

<sup>23</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, "Principles of United Nations."

<sup>24</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, "What is Peacekeeping?" <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml> (accessed July 5, 2011).

- a) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State's ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- b) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance; and
- c) Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.<sup>25</sup>

Most UN peacekeeping operations' mandates contain a degree of consistency in the tasks mandated in their resolutions.<sup>26</sup> These are to:

- Deploy forces to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of conflict across borders;
- Stabilise conflict situations after a ceasefire in order to create a conducive environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement;
- Assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements; and
- Lead states or territories through a transition to a stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development.<sup>27</sup>

UN peacekeeping operations, like MONUC, can also be mandated to support peace building activities such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants; mine action; SSR and other rule of law-related activities; the protection and promotion of human

---

<sup>25</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines," [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/164](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/164) (accessed July 5, 2011).

<sup>26</sup> United Nations, "Mandates and the Legal Basis."

<sup>27</sup> United Nations, "Mandates and the Legal Basis."

rights; electoral assistance; support for the restoration and extension of State authority; and the promotion of social and economic recovery and development.<sup>28</sup>

## **1.4 Concepts**

### **1.4.1 Peacekeeping**

Peacekeeping here is defined as

‘the deployment of international military and civilian personnel to a conflict area with the consent of the parties to the conflict in order to: stop or contain hostilities or supervise the carrying out of a peace agreement’.<sup>29</sup>

### **1.4.2 Mandate**

In this dissertation, mandates are defined as the tasks, activities and operations that MONUC is called to and expected to implement on the ground. MONUC obtains the authorisation to implement these mandates from the United Nations Security Council through the authorisation of UNSCRs.<sup>30</sup>

### **1.4.3 Objectives**

The United Nations Security Council normally authorises a large number of tasks to a mission at a time. This makes it difficult and impractical for a mission to address each issue with equal weight. As a result, peacekeeping missions prioritise mandates according to the

---

<sup>28</sup> United Nations, “Mandates and the Legal Basis.”

<sup>29</sup> United Nations Association in Canada, “United Nations Peacekeeping: Definition,” <http://www.unac.org/peacekeeping/en/un-peacekeeping/definition/> (accessed July 5, 2011).

<sup>30</sup> United Nations, “MONUC Mandate.”

perceived need on the ground. For the discussion of this dissertation, MONUC's objectives are defined as the mandates that the mission prioritised during a specified period despite the full list of authorised UNSCRs.

### **1.5 Chapter Outline**

The dissertation consists of five chapters:

The discussion in this first chapter determines the parameters of this study and defines the key concepts utilised in it. These concepts are peacekeeping, mandate and objectives.

The second chapter contains a literature review that evaluates the academic literature that is pertinent to the study.

The third chapter contains a brief historical background of the UN in the Congo, an overview of the events that led to the formation of the MONUC peacekeeping operation, and a brief outline of that operation. It also provides a brief historical background to the 1998 Congolese conflict and delineates the features of the conflict that continued to have an impact on the country during the MONUC peacekeeping operation.

The fourth chapter analyses the mission's mandates and objectives. It also examines MONUC's accomplishments. It critically assesses all these factors in four consecutive timelines from 1999 to 2002, 2002 to 2004, 2004 to 2006, and 2007 to 2010. The chapter, thus, effectively ensures that any shifts in the dynamics that played out in the Congo and MONUC's peacekeeping are reflected in the analysis.

The fifth chapter concludes the dissertation.

## **1.6 Conclusion**

The aim of this dissertation is to contribute insights into UN peace operations. It intends on accomplishing this by critically analysing the MONUC peacekeeping mission, particularly its mandate, objectives and accomplishments from 1999 to 2010. Though there are limitations to this study, it aims to contribute to scholarly discussions on UN peacekeeping and MONUC. A review of existing critiques on the MONUC peacekeeping mission is, however, required for this study to make informed contributions to the literature on UN peacekeeping. A literature review thus follows in the next chapter.

University of Cape Town

## **Chapter 2: Literature Review**

### **2.1 Introduction**

The United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) has inspired a significant amount of writing. Some of these use MONUC as a window on UN peacekeeping operations in general; others focus on only MONUC. This chapter analyses both of these sets of writing.

### **2.2 Failures of Peacekeeping Operations**

A fair amount of the studies on UN peace operations set out to examine UN peacekeeping operations' failures, for example: Jane Boulden; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis; and Dennis C. Jett.<sup>31</sup> Only a few studies are concerned with successful peacekeeping operations. These include studies by Donald C. F. Daniel, Bradd C. Hayes and Jean Krasno; Michael W. Doyle; Ian Johnstone and Robert C. Orr; and Lise Morjé Howard.<sup>32</sup>

MONUC is often used as a case study within failure-focused UN studies. MONUC's failures are often attributed to mandates; logistical issues; troop and resource shortages; the weaknesses of the peace agreements; and the misconduct of peacekeepers.

---

<sup>31</sup> Jane Boulden, *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in the Congo, Somalia and Bosnia* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001); Jane Boulden, ed., *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 305-316; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War & Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operation* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006); Dennis C. Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (New York: Palgrave, 1999).

<sup>32</sup> Donald C. F. Daniel, Bradd C. Hayes and Jean Krasno, eds., *Leveraging for Success in United Nations Peace Operations* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003); Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone and Robert C. Orr, eds., *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997); Lise Morjé Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008).

### 2.2.1 Mandates

Most studies in this category centre their arguments on mandates as the underlying cause of the problems of MONUC. Alex J. Bellamy, Stuart Griffin and Paul D. Williams; Mark Malan and João Gomes Porto; and Emeric Rogier all argue that because MONUC was initiated with weak mandates, numerous difficulties with the mission resulted.<sup>33</sup> One weakness, for example, was MONUC's limited authority to use force to protect civilians. Generally, enforcement capacities are not available to peacekeepers. Yet, the use of force can be permitted for self-defence purposes and in order to protect civilians in a more robust understanding of peacekeeping.<sup>34</sup> Thus, MONUC's mandate needed to be formulated with peace enforcement capabilities. Adekeye Adebajo; René Lemarchand; and Paul D. Williams describe the mission's inability to use force when it was needed, protect civilians and address instability in the eastern Congo.<sup>35</sup>

Séverine Autesserre; Bellamy et al.; Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan; Mark Malan; and Paul D. Williams point out that the weaknesses in the mandates were rooted in other areas as well. They suggest that MONUC's peacekeeping failures reside in a lack of clarity in the mandates; the mandates' inability to recognise the weaknesses of the peace agreement; the mandates' focus; and continued instability in the Congo.<sup>36</sup>

Séverine Autesserre highlights the importance of a mandate implementation sensitive to micro-level actors because much of the violence in the east emanates from both macro and

---

<sup>33</sup> Alex J. Bellamy, Paul D. Williams and Stuart Griffith, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010); Mark Malan and João Gomes Porto, eds., *Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 25-42.

<sup>34</sup> Robust Peacekeeping is known as existing in Chapter 6.5 of the UN Charter. However, the Charter does not have a Chapter 6.5 and an explicit Chapter for peacekeeping. It is generally assumed and accepted that robust peacekeeping lies somewhere in between Chapter 6 and 7 of the UN Charter. United Nations, "United Nations Peacekeeping," <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/> (accessed September 10, 2010).

<sup>35</sup> Adekeye Adebajo, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts* (Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2011), 94; René Lemarchand, *The Dynamics of violence in Central Africa* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 279; Williams, "Peace Operations in Africa."

<sup>36</sup> Bellamy, Williams and Griffith, *Understanding Peacekeeping*; Cilliers and Malan, *Peacekeeping in the DRC*; Mark Malan, "The UN 'Month of Africa': A Push for Actual Peace Efforts of a Fig Leaf on the DRC," *Institute for Security Studies* 44 (2000); Williams, "Peace Operations in Africa."; Paul D. Williams, "Lessons Unlearned: MONUC has little Success to Show," *Journal of International Peace Operations* 4, 4 (2009): 11-14.

micro-level sources of violence and complexities of the war.<sup>37</sup> Autesserre argues that MONUC's mandate implementation primarily focused on the macro-level, with effects expected to trickle down to the micro-level.<sup>38</sup> MONUC's 'top-down' mandate implementation was inadequate for effectively implementing solutions on the local level in the Congo.<sup>39</sup>

There are, nevertheless, numerous studies that recognise the successes of MONUC as these relate to mandates and objectives, for example, by Henri Boshoff; Nicola Dahrendorf; William Durch; Philip Roessler and John Prendagast; and Tom Woodhouse.<sup>40</sup>

Boshoff; Dahrendorf; Roessler and Prendergast examine MONUC's mandate implementation concerning disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR).<sup>41</sup> They assess the programme's activities; the problems with rebels refusing to disarm; and the reasons for that refusal. Boshoff; Dahrendorf; Roessler and

---

<sup>37</sup> Séverine Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 41-125.

<sup>38</sup> Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local*, 41-125.

<sup>39</sup> Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local*, 41-125.

<sup>40</sup> Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local*, 41-125; Henri Boshoff, "Overview of MONUC's Military Strategy and concepts of Operations," in *Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, eds. Mark Malan and João Gomes Porto (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004); Henri Boshoff, "Update on the Status of Army Integration in the DRC," *Institute for Security Studies Situation Report* (2005), <http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/31300/1/050902DRC.pdf?1> (accessed February 2, 2012); Henri Boshoff, "Blurred Vision: From Ituri to North Kivu, a Lack of Vision," *Journal of International Peace Operations* 4, 4 (2009): 15-18; Henri Boshoff, Hans Hoebeke and Koen Vlassenroot, "Assessing Security Sector Reform and its Impact on the Kivu Provinces," *Institute for Security Studies Situation Report* (2008), <http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/31036/1/SITREPDRC261108.pdf?1> (accessed February 2, 2012); Nicola Dahrendorf, "MONUC and the Relevance of Coherent Mandates: the Case of the DRC," in *Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Mission*, eds. Heiner Hänggi, Vincenza Scherrer (Zurich: LIT Verlag Münster, 2008), 67-102; William Durch, ed., *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 229-318; Tom Woodhouse, "Peacekeeping, Peace Culture and Conflict Resolution," *International Peacekeeping* 17,4 (2010): 486-498.

<sup>41</sup> Boshoff, "Update on the Status."; Dahrendorf, "MONUC and the Relevance," 67-102; Philip Roessler and John Prendergast, "Democratic Republic of the Congo," in *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*, ed. William Durch (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 229-318.

Prendergast examine MONUC's mandate implementation concerning DDRRR, however, with limited consideration of its mandate implementation of other activities.<sup>42</sup>

Woodhouse addresses the role of cultural issues within peacekeeping operations; his study identifies how 'culture and cultural analysis might be used to develop more effective and sustainable peacekeeping interventions'.<sup>43</sup> Peacekeeping operations are criticised for failing to identify the crucial role of culture in deployment areas. Woodhouse points out how MONUC encouraged its peace and stability mandate through peace games, which were 'held to support an atmosphere of peace and reconciliation around the elections of July and August 2006'.<sup>44</sup>

The problem with the various perspectives on MONUC's mandates is, firstly, that they are primarily failure-focused. The authors do not provide a balanced assessment of MONUC's failures *and* achievements. Secondly, the failure-focused perspective 'is not particularly concerned with explanation'.<sup>45</sup> In other words, these studies make limited efforts to discover the underlying explanations for the failures. It is not enough to state, for example, that the mandate needed or lacked enforcement capabilities: it is important to consider why it did not.<sup>46</sup> Thirdly, while the focus on one part of the mandate is valid, it should be conceded that no multi-functional UN mandate can realistically address all of the mandates authorised to it. Leaders of a mission inevitably rank a mandate's various objectives. But one finds few studies assessing MONUC's actual priorities (or objectives). Finally, the literature

---

<sup>42</sup> Boshoff, "Update on the Status."; Dahrendorf, "MONUC and the Relevance," 67-102; Roessler and Prendergast, "Democratic Republic of the Congo," 229-318.

<sup>43</sup> Woodhouse, "Peacekeeping, Peace Culture," 486.

<sup>44</sup> Woodhouse, "Peacekeeping, Peace Culture," 495.

<sup>45</sup> Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard, "Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature," *The Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (2008): 287.

<sup>46</sup> Fortna and Howard, "Pitfalls and Prospects," 284.

rarely considers the overall effectiveness of the operation. For example, was the Congo better off with MONUC or without it?<sup>47</sup>

## 2.2.2 Logistical Issues and Resource Problems

Many studies on MONUC peacekeeping argue that the size of the DRC and the complexity of the Congolese conflict - involving at least twelve armed rebel groups and nine African countries - required a large and well-resourced mission to be effective. Adebajo; Boulden; and Cilliers and Malan suggest that the weaknesses of the MONUC operation were partly due to logistical problems; insufficient troop strength; and financial resources.<sup>48</sup> Boulden argues that the UN's unwillingness to commit resources, especially at the start of peacekeeping operations, affected the missions' credibility and thus increased the likelihood of failure.<sup>49</sup> Many other authors simply argue that it was because of inadequate financial resources and an insufficient number of troops, equipment etc., that the peacekeepers were unable to accomplish their tasks satisfactorily.<sup>50</sup>

Logistical weaknesses, shortages of resources and troops were serious problems within the MONUC operation. Why these shortages existed is rarely considered, except by Roessler and Prendergast; and Tobias C. Berkman and Victoria K. Holt.<sup>51</sup> There is also limited consideration in the literature of *how* MONUC used its resources. This could have had more of an impact on the mission than the quantity of available resources.

---

<sup>47</sup> Virginia Page Fortna's 2008 study is an example of where overall effectiveness is considered. She rarely mentions MONUC. Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

<sup>48</sup> Adebajo, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, 93-94; Boulden, *Dealing with Conflict in Africa*; Cilliers and Malan, *Peacekeeping in the DRC*.

<sup>49</sup> Boulden, *Dealing with Conflict in Africa*, 253-304.

<sup>50</sup> Jane Boulden, "Mandates Matter: An Exploration of Impartiality in United Nations Operations," *Global Governance* 11, 2 (2005): 147-160.

<sup>51</sup> Victoria K. Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, The Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Henry L Stimson Center, 2006), 159; Philip Roessler and John Prendergast, "Democratic Republic of the Congo," 249-254 and 256-259.

### 2.2.3 The Misconduct of Peacekeepers

Some MONUC peacekeepers failed to maintain high professional standards. These troops took advantage of the collapsed societies and fragile communities and committed crimes against communities, women and children.<sup>52</sup> These crimes included: the theft of property and natural resources (gold, diamonds etc.); illegal arms trading; sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA); and human trafficking. MONUC peacekeepers, who were meant to protect, assist and 'do no harm'<sup>53</sup> had become abusers, scoundrels and thieves.

A few studies pursue the allegations of the peacekeeper's participation in the illegal arms trade and theft of valuable resources. For example, Martin Plaut described how Pakistani UN peacekeeping troops were illegally dealing directly with the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI) militia group, together with the Congolese army and Indian traders from Kenya.<sup>54</sup> He argues that there was reliable evidence revealing that MONUC peacekeepers were illegally trading with the FNI militia group by giving the confiscated arms (confiscated during the DDRRR programmes) for gold that the militia group had illegally extracted.<sup>55</sup> Plaut maintains that MONUC peacekeepers contributed to the instability in the country by participating in the illegal arms and mineral trade.<sup>56</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> Ray Murphy, "An Assessment of UN Efforts to Address Sexual Misconduct by Peacekeeping Personnel," *International Peacekeeping* 13, 4 (2007): 531-546.

<sup>53</sup> The term 'do no harm' is associated with Mary Anderson's approach to identifying the negative effects of humanitarian aid. She puts forward recommendations aimed at improving the delivery of humanitarian aid and development assistance for the Nongovernmental Organisation (NGO) world. 'Do no harm' is recognised as a contemporary theoretical approach useful for analyzing and explaining unintended consequences during peace operations in Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur, eds., *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping* (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2007), 16-17; Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

<sup>54</sup> Martin Plaut, "Trading Guns for Gold: Pakistani Peacekeepers in the Congo," *Briefings, Review of African Political Economy* 34, 113 (2007): 580-588.

<sup>55</sup> Plaut, "Trading Guns for Gold."

<sup>56</sup> Plaut, "Trading Guns for Gold."; Martin Plaut, "UN Troops 'Traded Guns for Gold'," <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6681457.stm> (accessed August 3, 2010); Martin Plaut, "UN Troops 'helped smuggle Gold'," <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6941480.stm> (accessed August 3, 2010).

Ayesha Siddiqa ascribed the involvement in theft and illegal arms trade to soldiers' poor remuneration packages from their home governments.<sup>57</sup> She uses the example of Pakistani troops to show how this was the case and argues that these troops became involved in criminal activities during peace operations because their government remunerated them inadequately.<sup>58</sup> Illegal trading became another means through which the peacekeepers could earn 'an economic advantage from a foreign posting'.<sup>59</sup>

Studies that examining MONUC's SEA are more extensive, perhaps because the sexual abuse of civilians in the Congo has attracted considerable attention. Studies often described the abuses committed and the lack of accountability measures, attributing MONUC peacekeepers' SEA misconduct to poor training, ineffective disciplinary deterrents, and a legal framework within which peacekeepers were protected.<sup>60</sup> Examples of these studies include those by Lauren Hunter; Vanessa Kent; Ray Murphy; Susan A. Notar; and Sarah W. Spencer.

One case of, for example, SEA, is more than we should tolerate and thus, the discussion of MONUC peacekeepers' misconduct is valid. Yet this focus has had a tendency to divert attention from MONUC's accomplishments (positive or negative) to the peacekeepers' misconduct.

---

<sup>57</sup> Plaut, "Trading Guns for Gold," 588; Ayesha Siddiqa, *Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy* (London: Pluto Press, 2007).

<sup>58</sup> Plaut, "Trading Guns for Gold."; Siddiqa, *Military Inc.*

<sup>59</sup> Plaut, "Trading Guns for Gold."; Siddiqa, *Military Inc.*

<sup>60</sup> Lauren Hunter, "Should We Prosecute the Protectors? Holding Peacekeepers Accountable in Cases of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse," *Carleton Review of International Affairs* 1 (2009): 15-34.

#### 2.2.4 Peace Agreements

UN protocol acknowledges that peacekeeping requires good peacemaking: there must be 'peace to keep' to enable UN military personnel to effectively assist in implementing peace agreements.<sup>61</sup> Numerous authors centre their studies on the relationship between peace agreements and peacekeeping in the Congo. Bellamy et al.; Cilliers and Malan; Rogier; and Williams recognise the effect of the peace agreements on the environment for a peacekeeping operation.<sup>62</sup> These authors attribute difficulties and instability in the DRC to the peace agreements' weaknesses.

Bellamy et al. reveal how the weaknesses of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999 made it difficult for the peacekeepers to keep the peace.<sup>63</sup> They argue that continued instability prevailed because of the liaison officers' failure to identify severe ceasefire violations; a lack of commitment from the signatories; and the exclusion of armed belligerents from the agreement.<sup>64</sup> This argument is in line with Stephen John Stedman's famous analysis and identification of 'spoilers', whom he defines as 'signatories to [a] peace agreement who fail to fulfill key obligations to the agreement or non-signatories (belligerents and rebels) who are excluded from the peace process or who exclude themselves and use violence to attack the peace process'.<sup>65</sup> These spoilers cause major disruptions during the peace process. Bellamy et al. recognise the spoilers in the DRC scenario as both excluded belligerents and those signatories that lacked commitment to adhere to the peace agreement.<sup>66</sup>

---

<sup>61</sup> Bellamy, Williams and Griffith, *Understanding Peacekeeping*.

<sup>62</sup> Bellamy, Williams and Griffith, *Understanding Peacekeeping*; Cilliers and Malan, *Peacekeeping in the DRC*; Williams, "Lessons Unlearned."

<sup>63</sup> Bellamy, Williams and Griffith, *Understanding Peacekeeping*.

<sup>64</sup> Bellamy, Williams and Griffith, *Understanding Peacekeeping*.

<sup>65</sup> Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security* 22, 2 (1997): 8.

<sup>66</sup> Bellamy, Williams and Griffith, *Understanding Peacekeeping*.

Williams argues that the combination of complex conflicts, problematic agreements, a large number of parties and armed belligerents, 'leave peacekeepers operating in zones where the occurrence of warfare is a constant threat'.<sup>67</sup> He highlights that there is considerable risk of sending peacekeepers to zones where there is no peace to keep. He also lists factors, endogenous and exogenous to the peacekeeping operation, that affect peacekeepers capabilities to keep the peace. The list includes complex mandates, an insufficient number of troops and police, an insufficient number of Western or well-trained troops, and, lastly, what he terms 'too many' bad peacekeepers.<sup>68</sup> He uses different cases to illustrate his respective points, some of which include MONUC peacekeeping.

The existence of spoilers in a complex conflict is, for many authors, the preferred explanation for MONUC's failures in the DRC. However, the studies rarely point out how MONUC managed the problems that were not of its own making.

### 2.3 Responding to MONUC's Failures

Much of the literature on MONUC's failures identifies lessons to be learnt; prescribes solutions and policy; and/or recommends strategies.

Many studies of UN peace operations analyse peacekeeping operations in order to learn 'lessons'; for example, Bellamy et al; Patrick C. Cammaert; Lise Mojé Howard; Malan and Porto; and William Lacy Swing. Even UN reports such as the Brahimi Report of 2000, 'A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping Report', were written with this perspective in mind.<sup>69</sup> Most of this literature, particularly that on MONUC from

---

<sup>67</sup> Williams, "Peace Operations in Africa."

<sup>68</sup> Bellamy, Williams and Griffith, *Understanding Peacekeeping*.

<sup>69</sup> Patrick C. Cammaert, "Learning to Use force in the Hoof of Peacekeeping: Reflections on the Experience of MONUC's Eastern Division," *Institute for Security Studies Situation Report* (2007), [http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/31147/1/SWING%20SITREP\[9\].pdf?1](http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/31147/1/SWING%20SITREP[9].pdf?1) (accessed February 2, 2012); Patrick C. Cammaert, "A Peacekeeping Commander's Perspective: From Headquarters and

Cammaert and Swing, highlights the need to learn from its use of force; resolve problems relating to the protection of civilians; how to deal with logistical and tactical issues; coping with shortages of financial resources; the quality and quantity of the troops; accountability issues; communication and decision making measures; mandates; and international and regional support.

Many authors propose policies or recommend strategies.<sup>70</sup> For instance, Autesserre; Boulden; Virgil Hawkins; and Rogier's recommendations include: increasing MONUC's resources; strengthening its mandate by giving it the capabilities it needed to address the flaws within the agreement; dealing with the causes of the continuing instability and the lack of commitment from signatories; improving the UN's policy regarding the protection of civilians; and transforming its implementation strategies.<sup>71</sup> The bulk of the policy and strategic recommendations offered in respect of MONUC pertain to the misconduct of the peacekeepers. Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur; Max Du Plessis and Stephen Peté; Lauren Hunter; Vanessa Kent; Ray Murphy; and Susan Notar are relevant authors.<sup>72</sup> These recommendations included improving training; increasing accountability measures; and ensuring peacekeepers' liability for the crimes they committed.

---

the Field," *The RUSI Journal* 153, 3 (2008); Howard, *UN Peacekeeping*; Malan and Porto, *Challenges of Peace Implementation*; William Lacy Swing, "The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC): Lessons Learnt," *Institute for Security Studies Situation Report* (2007). [http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/ispui/bitstream/123456789/31147/1/SWING%20SITREP\[9\].pdf?1](http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/ispui/bitstream/123456789/31147/1/SWING%20SITREP[9].pdf?1) (accessed February 6, 2012); United Nations, "Brahimi Report: Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All their Aspects (2000)," [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/) (accessed July 16, 2011); United Nations Department of Peacekeeping and Department of Field Support, *A New Partnership Agenda Report: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* (2009), <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf> (accessed February 2, 2012).

<sup>70</sup> Fortna and Howard, "Pitfalls and Prospects," 288.

<sup>71</sup> Autesserre endorses adopting micro-level peacekeeping and peacebuilding, while Tom Woodhouse sanctions identifying culture and using it to promote peace and stability. Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local*, 41-125; Virgil Hawkins, "History Repeating Itself: The DRC and the UN Security Council," *Institute for Security Studies African Security Review* 12, 4 (2003): 50-51; Woodhouse, "Peacekeeping, Peace Culture," 486.

<sup>72</sup> Aoi, Coning and Thakur, *Unintended Consequences*, 16-17; Max Du Plessis and Stephen Peté, "Who Guards the Guards? The ICC and Serious Crimes Committed by United Nations Peacekeepers in Africa," *African Security Review* 13, 4 (2004): 5-17; Vanessa Kent, "Protecting Civilians from UN Peacekeepers and Humanitarian Workers: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse," in *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping*, eds.

The peacekeeping literature's focus on lessons to learn and policy and strategic recommendations is revealing. The problem with these perspectives, however, is that they fail to recognise that some of MONUC's failures originate in the normative underpinnings of the United Nations.<sup>73</sup> Most of the solutions put forward might solve the problems in the short-term, but the same problems could re-surface in other operations because of the way that the UN is constituted and functions. This has been recognised by some authors: Roland Paris; Bellamy; and Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham all suggest that the focus on policy relevance, strategies recommendations and lessons learnt fails 'to address the more fundamental critiques of peacekeeping pitched at the meta-theoretical level'.<sup>74</sup>

## 2.4 Conclusion

Critics of MONUC often direct their studies to the identification of the failures of the mission. These failures were frequently attributed to weak mandates; the methods of their implementation; logistical issues, troop and financial shortages; the weaknesses of peace agreements; and the misconduct of peacekeepers. The studies' explanations of these failures are useful but limited. We do not often get to read of MONUC's ability to achieve prioritised objectives. Similarly, the MONUC critiques might be, simply, the result not of conditions in the DRC but consequences of the nature of the UN. Any literature concerned with only 'establishing instrumental practices to address pre-existing problems'<sup>75</sup> or 'policy relevance' or the goal of offering advice and recommendations to policy makers<sup>76</sup> is unlikely to see this.

---

Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2007), 53; Murphy, "An Assessment of UN Efforts," 531-546; Susan A. Notar, "Peacekeepers as Perpetrators: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of Women and Children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," *American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and Law* 14 (2006): 413-430.

<sup>73</sup> Bellamy, "The 'Next Stage'," 1; Paris, "Broadening the Study," 28; Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, "Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and the Globalization of Security," *International Peacekeeping* 12, 2 (2005): 139-156.

<sup>74</sup> Bellamy, "The 'Next Stage'," 1; Paris, "Broadening the Study," 28; Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, "Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping," 139-156.

<sup>75</sup> Bellamy, "The 'Next Stage'," 19.

<sup>76</sup> Paris, "Broadening the Study," 28.

This dissertation intends to expand the scope of inquiry on MONUC. Before it can accomplish that aim, however, a brief background to and description of the UN in the Congo and the 1998 Congolese conflict and its effects is required. This follows in the next chapter.

University of Cape Town

## **Chapter 3: The DRC, the 1998 Conflict and the United Nations in the DRC**

### **3.1 Introduction**

The 1998 conflict has been described as 'Africa's First World War' because of its complex intra-state and inter-state, regional, national and local characteristics.<sup>77</sup> This chapter briefly outlines the background of this war along three lines: the main causes of the war; the peacemaking; and the context of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo's (MONUC) involvement.

### **3.2 The 1998 DRC Conflict**

#### **3.2.1 Introduction**

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), formally Zaire, is located in the heart of central Africa, bordered by Angola; Burundi; Central African Republic; the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville); Rwanda; Sudan; Tanzania; Uganda; and Zambia. It is physically the third largest country in Africa; has an estimated population of 70.9 million as of 2011; and consists of over 200 African ethnic groups.<sup>78</sup> After obtaining its independence from Belgium in 1960, the DRC suffered from instability and fighting until 1965, when the former President Joseph Mobutu Sese Seko took control of the country, which he renamed Zaire. Under Mobutu's 32 years of dictatorship, from 1965 to 1997, the country's economy dwindled, poverty escalated, and infrastructure and service provision wasted away.<sup>79</sup> By 1996 the DRC was in a dire position because of Mobutu and his corrupt government's behaviour. Conflict broke out from 1996 to 1997. This 'First DRC War' was conceived as a 'civil war against

---

<sup>77</sup> Term first used by Susan Rice, US Assistant Secretary of State. Filip Reyntjens, *The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996 – 2006* (New York: Cambridge, 2009), 194.

<sup>78</sup> Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) - The World Factbook, "Africa: Congo, Democratic Republic of the," [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/countrytemplate\\_cg.html](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/countrytemplate_cg.html) (accessed January 18, 2011).

<sup>79</sup> Thomas Turner, *Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, Reality* (London: Zed Books, 2007), 2.

dictatorship, rather than international war'.<sup>80</sup> Mobutu's dictatorship rule ended in May 1997, when he was overthrown by Laurent Désiré Kabila and his party, the Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), with - crucially - the support of Angola, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda.

After Kabila's takeover, many hoped for a different form of leadership from that of Mobutu. Kabila failed to accommodate 'internal democratic forces that had struggled against Mobutu for a long time', and was also unable 'to aggregate, reconcile and respond to various interests in the coalition that overthrew the Mobutu regime and brought the AFDL into power'.<sup>81</sup> Kabila's inability to respond to these interests negatively affected his relations with neighbouring states and internal factions. By 1998 Kabila was no longer seen as a liberator but rather a corrupt, greedy and nepotistic leader.<sup>82</sup> In August of 1998, an attempt was made to overthrow Kabila by internal factions, such as the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)<sup>83</sup> and the Congo Liberation Movement (MLC), together with neighbouring state support from Rwanda and Uganda.<sup>84</sup> Neighbouring countries had expected to benefit from the Kabila government. Rwanda and Uganda in particular, had already become very disappointed by Kabila's security policies.

Kabila responded by requesting assistance from the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SADC's response was divided, with Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe pursuing a militaristic operation to protect Kabila's presidency and Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa<sup>85</sup> pursuing a peacemaking solution. Kabila opted for military support from SADC, leading Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe to become directly involved in the conflict. This was the beginning of the 1998 DRC conflict that came to be known as the 'Second

---

<sup>80</sup> Turner, *Congo Wars*, 2.

<sup>81</sup> Mwesiga Baregu, *Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Harare: SAPES Books, 1999), i-ii.

<sup>82</sup> Reyntjens, *The Great African War*, 194.

<sup>83</sup> RCD later broke off into two factions, RCD-Goma supported by Rwanda and RCD-Kisangani supported by Uganda.

<sup>84</sup> Reyntjens, *The Great African War*, 194.

<sup>85</sup> South Africa also had the support of Mauritius, Seychelles and Swaziland.

Congo War' or 'Africa's First World War'.<sup>86</sup> Overall, the war involved at least twelve armed rebel groups and nine African countries including Chad, Libya and Sudan.

Some of the salient features of this conflict - that would affect MONUC - include the 1994 Rwandan genocide; the presence of multiple rebel groups; natural resources; land; and questions over citizenship and identity.

### 3.2.2 The Rwandan Genocide

The 1994 Rwandan genocide is a key factor that contributed to the 1998 Congolese conflict. After the genocide and overthrow of the Rwandan government by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1994, masses of refugees, consisting of Hutu citizens, Interhamwe militias and ex-Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) members, fled Rwanda. These refugees settled along the Burundian, DRC and Tanzanian borders. Some refugee camps were converted into 'organised systems of mass mobilisation for a political purpose...under the authority of their former [ex-FAR and Interhamwe] leaders, ready to be used for further aims' against the Tutsis in Rwanda.<sup>87</sup> The exclusion of the ex-FAR and Interhamwe from the peace process in the DRC, and the unresolved refugee crisis, resulted in rebel and civilian clashes that contributed to continued instability and fighting in the country.

From the DRC border, raids and armed intrusions into Rwanda became the Hutu militias' regular conduct. These led to an eruption of violence along the border between the Rwandan People's Army (RPA) and Hutu militias based in the DRC. In retaliation, Rwanda supported Kabila in 1996 in order to protect its border from these raids. The rupture of

---

<sup>86</sup> Reyntjens, *The Great African War*, 194. The Second Congo War is also known as the 'War of Occupation'.

<sup>87</sup> Gérard Prunier, *From Genocide to Continental War: The 'Congolese' Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa* (London: Hurst, 2009), 24.

Kabila and Rwanda's relations in 1998 came when 'the AFDL leadership felt a growing need to distance itself from [Rwanda in order]...to build for itself a domestic political power base'.<sup>88</sup> The Rwandan government's concern over its border security, in turn, led it to support DRC rebels, such as the RCD-Goma faction.<sup>89</sup>

Uganda, like Rwanda,

justified its intervention by claiming that it [was] concerned about security threats emanating from Sudanese supported rebels, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).<sup>90</sup>

Rwanda and Uganda's undertakings directly contributed to the occurrence of the 1998 DRC conflict through their direct participation and involvement in supporting rebel factions. The two countries continued to support rebel groups in the Congo even after the official end of the war in 1999. The countries' continued participation in the Congo, particularly during Phase I and II of MONUC's operation,<sup>91</sup> made it difficult for the mission to implement respective peace agreements and address the fighting in the country.

### 3.2.3 Rebel Groups

The DRC has been plagued with numerous rebel groups, militias and smaller armed groups. These armed non-state groups

---

<sup>88</sup> Koen Vlassenroot and Chris Huggins, "Land, Migration and Conflict in Eastern DRC," in *From the Ground Up*, Jenny Clover, Chris Huggins, Prisca Kamungi-Mulemi, Herman Musaraha, Benson M. Ochieng, Johnstone S. Oketch, Johan Pottier and Koen Vlassenroot (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 149.

<sup>89</sup> Lemarchand, *The Dynamics of Violence*, 223.

<sup>90</sup> International Crisis Group, "The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace," 13, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Congo%20An%20Analysis%20of%20the%20Agreement%20and%20Prospects%20for%20Peace.ashx> (accessed July 20, 2011).

<sup>91</sup> From 1999 - 2001.

range from armed bandits, vigilantes, cultist groups, private security companies, criminal bands, community/ethnic/religious/regional armies, armed wings of political parties and private armies to militias, Islamist militants and rebel groups.<sup>92</sup>

The list includes groups such as:

- the National Council for the Defence of Democracy/Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD/FDD);
- the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP);
- Front for the Integration and Peace in Ituri (FIPI);
- the Nationalist and Integrationist Front/Patriotic Force of Resistance in Ituri (FNI/FRPI);
- the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA);
- Mai Mai militias;
- the Congo Liberation Movement (MLC);
- Patriots in the Congolese Resistance (PARECO);
- the Party for the Safeguarding of the Congo (PUSIC);
- the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD);
- RCD-Goma;
- RCD-Kisangani;
- RCD-Movement for Liberation (ML);
- RCD-National; and
- the Uganda's People's Congress (UPC).

This list of the rebel groups and armed actors in the Congo is not exhaustive.<sup>93</sup>

---

<sup>92</sup> Augustine Ikelegbe and Wafula Okumu, "Introduction: Towards Conceptualisation and Understanding of the Threats of Armed Non-state Groups to Human Security and the State in Africa," in *Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa*, eds. Augustine Ikelegbe and Wafula Okumu (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 1.

<sup>93</sup> Phillip Kasaija, "Rebels and Militias in Resource Conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo," in *Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa*, eds. Augustine Ikelegbe and Wafula Okumu (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 194-196.

Most of the rebel groups in the Congo were formed with the intention of addressing specific issues. For example, PARECO, consisting of former Mai Mai members, was formed to fight FDLR opposition rebel groups in eastern Congo in 2007.<sup>94</sup> PARECO collaborated with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) to fight against the CNDP in 2008.<sup>95</sup> Despite their reasons for their formation, rebel groups such as PARECO sometimes continued fighting outside their original purpose in order to benefit from opportunities present in the Congo.<sup>96</sup>

Some of the rebel groups were supported by Rwanda, Uganda or the DRC government. These groups had an 'interest in the initiation, perpetuation, and renewal of conflict' because they 'did well out of war'.<sup>97</sup> Their opportunistic activities were extensive, ranging from theft, illegal arms trade, primary commodity trading, any form of rent-seeking trading, illegal resource exploitation, to political recognition and seeking appointment to leadership positions.<sup>98</sup> In cases where armed non-state actors benefit from profitable opportunities, peaceful settlements of disputes were less likely to be successful as the rebel groups found no opportunities, incentive or benefit from the agreement.<sup>99</sup> As a result of these opportunities, MONUC's operation faced fighting and attacks from rebel groups, particularly in the east.

### 3.2.4 Natural Resources

The Congo is rich in natural resources such as coal, copper, diamonds, gold, hydropower, petroleum, silver, uranium, timber and more.<sup>100</sup> Despite the country's abundant natural

---

<sup>94</sup> Kasaija, "Rebels and militias," 193.

<sup>95</sup> Kasaija, "Rebels and militias," 193.

<sup>96</sup> Paul Collier, "Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective," in *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, eds. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 110.

<sup>97</sup> Collier, "Doing Well out of War," 110.

<sup>98</sup> Collier, "Doing Well out of War," 103-104.

<sup>99</sup> Collier, "Doing Well out of War," 103-104.

<sup>100</sup> Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) - The World Factbook, "Africa: Congo."

resources, it is one of the most poorly economically developed countries on the continent, and its economic situation worsened with the conflict.<sup>101</sup> State weakness and insufficient border control has made the illegal exploitation and export of these resources easy.<sup>102</sup> Mass looting by Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and rebels groups occurred even prior to the 1998 DRC conflict. These resources were being used by the countries and rebel groups to fund their insurgency activities and accumulate wealth.<sup>103</sup> Laurent Désiré Kabila's takeover in 1997 and his subsequent disruption of relations with Rwanda threatened access to these resources.

Rebel groups consider the access to and exploitation of resources important because they provide them with the funds necessary to make them wealthy and maintain their organisations.<sup>104</sup> These reasons provide a greater incentive to continue fighting than any other motivations.<sup>105</sup> The 1998 insurgency provided an opportunity for these groups to maintain and gain access to these resources. The rebels' desire for easy access to unregulated natural resources also contributed to the occurrence of violent attacks during MONUC's mission.<sup>106</sup>

---

<sup>101</sup> Rob Quinn, "The Congo War: Economic Causes and Consequences," *Student Economic Review* 21 (2007): 201.

<sup>102</sup> Turner, *Congo Wars*, 10-11.

<sup>103</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo (2001),"

<http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/drcongo.htm> (accessed October 5, 2010).

<sup>104</sup> Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE)*, WPS/2002-01 (2001), <http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2002-01text.pdf> (accessed January 29, 2011).

<sup>105</sup> Collier and Hoeffler, *Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE)*, 1.

<sup>106</sup> Luke Moffet, "Ending the Cycle of Violence in the Congo: Is Peace Possible in the Heart of Darkness?" *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development* 13 (2009): 6-7; Turner, *Congo Wars*, 9.

### 3.2.5 The Land

Land is in short supply in the eastern Congo: clashes rooted in this scarcity contributed to the occurrence of the 1998 conflict.<sup>107</sup> The DRC is rich in fertile land; yet of the '120 million hectares of fertile land... only 2%' was cultivated by 2009, the cultivated area being primarily (but not exclusively) located in the eastern part of the DRC.<sup>108</sup> A large area of the central land mass in the country is covered by dense tropical rain forest, making it difficult for the land to be productively utilised.<sup>109</sup>

Population density is a further complicating factor. The eastern Congo is a densely populated area for two reasons. Firstly, the east's fertile cultivatable land attracted large numbers of Congolese people.<sup>110</sup> Secondly, refugees from bordering countries have settled in the eastern DRC.<sup>111</sup> The refugee presence caused problems over land ownership in the DRC. As Prunier suggests:

the evolution from traditional patterns of land control to modern systems of land ownership had been accompanied by swindling and manipulation on the part of some of the Kinyarwanda-speaking populations who took advantage of their close relationship with the Mobutu regime.<sup>112</sup>

Controversy over ownership of pastoral and agricultural land intensified into violent clashes that led to the 1998 conflict during the senior Kabila's regime.<sup>113</sup>

---

<sup>107</sup> Mahmood Mamdani, "Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 43, 4 (2001): 659; Mahmood Mamdani, "African States, Citizenship and War: A Case-study," *International Affairs* 78, 3 (2002): 503.

<sup>108</sup> All Africa.Com, "Africa: DRC Hands SA Farmers Access to Land," <http://allafrica.com/stories/200910220529.html> (accessed January 18, 2011).

<sup>109</sup> Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) - The World Factbook, "Africa: Congo."

<sup>110</sup> Vlassenroot and Huggins, "Land, Migration and Conflict," 147.

<sup>111</sup> Vlassenroot and Huggins, "Land, Migration and Conflict," 147.

<sup>112</sup> Prunier, *From Genocide to Continental War*, 172.

<sup>113</sup> Prunier, *From Genocide to Continental War*, 172.

Land distribution issues and the refugee crisis in the east were very much a problem in the DRC during MONUC's operation.<sup>114</sup> For example, in Masisi and Walikale in North Kivu from 2003, land allocations originating from the Belgian colonial period fuelled fighting amongst 'the Congolese of Rwandan descent, especially the Tutsis among them, [who] own most of the land'.<sup>115</sup> The problem lay with the Hundes and the Nyangas who continued to claim that the land was their own, based on ancestral ownership patterns. These continuous battles resulted in the exodus of numerous Congolese Rwandan refugees fleeing the fighting over the land.

### 3.2.6 Questions over Citizenship and Identity

Concerns originating from the Congo's colonial period over citizenship and identity contributed to the occurrence of the 1998 war and fighting during MONUC's mission. During the country's colonial period, the Belgians created a 'native policy' to manage their territory.<sup>116</sup> This 'native policy' entailed 'schools for sons of chiefs' [that] provided the necessary skills to the new generation of literate chiefs, who would serve as intermediaries between the colonial administration and the African masses'.<sup>117</sup> Furthermore, this policy entrenched the Congolese peoples' ethnic differences and leadership roles were allocated in a manner that favoured Hutus over Tutsis.<sup>118</sup> The Belgians exported this policy into Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda and Burundi).<sup>119</sup> Belgium's abrupt withdrawal from the Congo and Rwanda at independence in 1960 resulted in ethnic clashes over land ownership, leadership and identity in the countries.<sup>120</sup> These clashes led to large numbers of refugee flows between Burundi, Congo and Rwanda.

---

<sup>114</sup> Moffett, "Ending the Cycle of Violence in the Congo," 9.

<sup>115</sup> Séverine Autesserre, "The Trouble with the Congo: How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict," *Foreign Affairs* 87, 3, (2008): 96.

<sup>116</sup> Turner, *Congo Wars*, 28.

<sup>117</sup> Turner, *Congo Wars*, 28.

<sup>118</sup> Turner, *Congo Wars*, 28.

<sup>119</sup> Turner, *Congo Wars*, 28.

<sup>120</sup> Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopard to Kabila: A People's History* (London: Zed Books, 2003), 221.

Given that the Banyarwanda are 'East Africa's largest ethnic group',<sup>121</sup> the ethnic populations living in the Great Lakes region are posed with a constant ethnic security dilemma.<sup>122</sup> An ethnic security dilemma is a condition in which there is 'emerging anarchy'<sup>123</sup> brought on by state weakness,<sup>124</sup> historical events, and 'collective fears of the future' and it is under this condition that ethnic communities 'invest in and prepare for violence', and, in doing so, 'make actual violence possible'.<sup>125</sup> The dilemma exists in that 'what one does to enhance one's own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure'.<sup>126</sup> Ethnic groups in the Congo, such as the Banyarwanda, were faced with such a security dilemma.

Contentions surrounding the issues of identity and ethnicity were compounded during President Mobutu's rule as ethnic identities and citizenship were manipulated as a political tool. These contentions related to the identity and citizenship of the Banyarwanda<sup>127</sup> who had settled in the DRC before 1959. Mobutu implemented the 1972 decree that 'granted citizenship to 1959 refugees', only to overturn this law with a 1981 law that 'emphasized ancestry over residence'.<sup>128</sup> These laws were reversed again during

the Congolese national conference, [when] the gathering of the political and civil opposition to Mobutu, met to consider the citizenship question in 1991,

---

<sup>121</sup> Mamdani, "African States," 494.

<sup>122</sup> Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler's study of the causes of civil war revealed 'that societies characterised by 'ethnic dominance', i.e., where one ethnic group makes up 45 - 90 percent of the population, have a systematically higher risk of civil war'. For a detailed discussion see Collier and Hoeffler, *Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE)*.

<sup>123</sup> Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic conflict," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, ed. Michael E. Brown (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 103.

<sup>124</sup> The state becomes weak when it loses its 'ability to arbitrate between groups or provide credible guarantees of protection for groups'. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fears: The Origin and Management of Ethnic Conflict," *International Security* 21, 2 (1996): 43.

<sup>125</sup> Posen, "The Security Dilemma," 103.

<sup>126</sup> Posen, "The Security Dilemma," 104.

<sup>127</sup> Banyarwandans consist of three groups: the Banyarutshuru, who 'have been considered indigenous to Congo, the Banyamasisi and Banyamulenge who are not'. Baregu, *Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, 59-60; Mamdani, "African States," 501.

<sup>128</sup> Mamdani, "African States," 503. For a detailed discussion see Mamdani, "Beyond Settler," 651-664.

they too passed a law confirming Mobutu's 1981 law emphasizing ancestry over residence as the basis of citizenship.<sup>129</sup>

Confusion and speculation over the Banyarwanda identity often led to protests and violent clashes amongst Congolese inhabitants. Laurent Désiré Kabila, like Mobutu, used ethnic identities as a political tool and caused some controversy by raising the issue of citizenship during his presidency.<sup>130</sup> This led to resentment and clashes against Rwandan refugees and the Banyarwanda.

### 3.3 Peacemaking

Soon after the start of the 1998 conflict, peacemaking efforts were initiated. These led to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999); the Agreement between the Rwanda and the Kinshasa Government (the Pretoria Accord of 2002); the Agreement between the DRC and Uganda (the Luanda Agreement of 2002); the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement and Final Act of Endorsement, often known as the Sun City Agreement (2003); and agreements about security sector reform.

The signing of the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement brought a ray of hope for the Congo. The ceasefire agreement endorsed the 'cessation of hostilities pending a political settlement' through an Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD).<sup>131</sup> MONUC initiated its peacekeeping operation on 30 November 1999, yet violence, instability and insecurity persisted in the country. Multiple attempts were made to resolve the continued instability and violence in the country. Kabila, however, was particularly difficult during negotiations and was criticised for stalling the ICD process.<sup>132</sup> In 2001, Laurent Désiré Kabila was assassinated by his

---

<sup>129</sup> Mamdani, "African States," 503.

<sup>130</sup> Baregu, *Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, 25-28; Mamdani, "African States," 503.

<sup>131</sup> International Crisis Group, "The Agreement on a Cease-Fire."

<sup>132</sup> International Crisis Group, "The Agreement on a Cease-Fire."

bodyguard. Laurent Désiré Kabila's son, Joseph Kabila, succeeded him as President of the DRC. After Joseph Kabila's appointment negotiations proceeded more smoothly.

The Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM), 'an agreement designed to address cross-border issues, specifically to deal with the threats of the Interhamwe and ex-Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), groups responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda' was signed by Rwanda and the DRC in 2002.<sup>133</sup> This agreement officially ended the feud between the DRC and Rwanda which led to the minor improvement of border security between the two countries. The Luanda Agreement, signed on 6 September 2002, was an agreement on the withdrawal of troops from the Congo between the DRC and Uganda.<sup>134</sup> This saw the official withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the Congo in 2003. Despite the withdrawal of foreign troops, clashes between the DRC government and rebel groups and opposition parties, particularly those in the Kivus, continued.

South Africa successfully brokered the Sun City All-Inclusive Agreement in 2002. The Sun City All-Inclusive Agreement, first formalised in July 2002 and signed on 19 December 2002, was part of the ICD aimed at resolving the crisis in the Congo. The Sun City All-Inclusive Agreement called for the formation of 'a transitional government headed by President Kabila and four vice presidents', the formation of an integrated and newly restructured national army, the disarming of militias and rebel groups, and the withdrawal of foreign troops.<sup>135</sup> This agreement was signed by 'the Government of the DRC, the RCD, the

---

<sup>133</sup> Ted Dagne, "The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments," <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40108.pdf> (accessed January 27, 2011).

<sup>134</sup> Institute for Security Studies (ISS), "Agreement Between the Governments of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Uganda on the Withdrawal of Ugandan Troops from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cooperation and Normalisation of Relations between Two Countries (2002)," <http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/drcongo/cdreader/bin/5luanda.pdf> (accessed September 27, 2011).

<sup>135</sup> Dagne, "The Democratic Republic of Congo.;" Relief Web, "Democratic Republic of the Congo (the): Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DR Congo: Inter-Congolese Dialogue - Political Negotiations on the Peace Process and on the Transition in the DRC (2002)," <http://reliefweb.int/node/410903> (accessed September 15, 2011).

Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), the political opposition, civil society, the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML), the Congolese Rally for Democracy-National (RCD-N) and the Mai-Mai'.<sup>136</sup> The Agreement called for 'a transitional government headed by President Kabila and four vice presidents and in July 2003, the four vice presidents were sworn in',<sup>137</sup> elections were held in 2006 and a democratically elected government was instituted.<sup>138</sup>

Unfortunately, the elections did not have a lasting effect on the country's stability. This instability was partly rooted in clashes that had begun in 2004. There was a serious outbreak of violence in the North Kivu in 2004 when Laurent Nkunda<sup>139</sup> and his CNDP troops clashed with the transitional government's army, FARDC. These clashes continued over the years with Nkunda refusing to recognise the election results and the government.<sup>140</sup> The Goma deal was signed to end these clashes between the government and Nkunda's factions in 2008. Regardless of this, violence was rampant in the Kivus. Nkunda was later arrested in 2009 in Rwanda but, despite his arrest, his supporters continued to attack civilians in the eastern provinces.

### 3.4 The United Nations in the DRC

Soon after the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 1999, the UN launched its peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, named MONUC. MONUC initially functioned as a small liaison force and later as a bigger force to implement the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.

---

<sup>136</sup> Dagne, "The Democratic Republic of Congo.;" Relief Web, "Democratic Republic of the Congo (the)."

<sup>137</sup> Dagne, "The Democratic Republic of Congo."

<sup>138</sup> Moffett, "Ending the Cycle of Violence in the Congo," 7.

<sup>139</sup> Laurent Nkunda was a former officer of RCD-Goma who later became the leader of National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP).

<sup>140</sup> Human Rights Watch, "Renewed Crisis in Nord Kivu," <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/10625/section/6> (accessed February 24, 2011).

### 3.4.1 MONUC's Mandate

MONUC's mission was implemented in phases for two reasons. Firstly, the former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, recognised the precariousness of the political situation in the Congo, as well as the difficulties posed by the country's geographical size and features.<sup>141</sup> Thus, the mission was thought better to be implemented on a piecemeal basis. Secondly, concerns over financial contributions, and thus, available resources, also suggested a phased peacekeeping operation in the DRC.<sup>142</sup>

The MONUC mission was indeed implemented in four phases:

Phase I (November 1999 to February 2000) entailed the deployment of civilian liaison officers accompanied by 500 military personnel.<sup>143</sup> At this stage, MONUC was essentially an observer mission under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Under this Chapter, the observer mission focused on providing information that assisted the UN in determining recommendations on how to address the instability in the Congo.<sup>144</sup> The MONUC operation began in February 2000 following the authorisation of the UN liaison/observer mission in August 1999.<sup>145</sup> MONUC was deployed under a mandate consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1258 (1999), 1273 (1999) and 1291 (2000) that called

---

<sup>141</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Preliminary Deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo S/1999/790 (1999)," [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/790](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/790) (accessed March 28, 2011); United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1279 S/RES/1279 (1999)," [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1279%281999%29](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1279%281999%29) (accessed February 2, 2011).

<sup>142</sup> Holt and Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, 59. Quoted in Joshua Marks, "The Pitfalls of Action and Inaction: Civilian Protection in MONUC's Peacekeeping Operations," *African Security Review* 16, 3 (2007): 69.

<sup>143</sup> Mark Malan and Henri Boshoff, "A 90-Day Plan to Bring Peace to the DRC? An Analysis of the Pretoria Agreement of 30 July 2002," *Institute for Security Studies* 61 (2002): 5; United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations S/1999/790 (1999)."

<sup>144</sup> United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 6.;" United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1279."

<sup>145</sup> United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1279."

MONUC to collect information and monitor signatories' adherence to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.<sup>146</sup>

For Phase II (February 2000 to November 2001) MONUC had a similar mandate to that of Phase I, in that the mission recorded information and respective findings whilst implementing the Luanda and Sun City Agreements. The operation also monitored the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and expanded to include 5 537 military personnel. But Phase II was authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which gave the military personnel authority to take necessary action against civilian attacks and instances of aggression.<sup>147</sup>

Phase III (November 2001 to December 2006) entailed the deployment of an increased number of military personnel implementing the disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) programme and assisting with the Presidential and National Assembly election process in the Congo.<sup>148</sup> In 2003, MONUC's troops were increased to approximately 10 800 and its budget increased to almost US\$ 670 million. MONUC remained under the ambit of Chapter VII during this phase. The mission's force was increased by an additional 5 900 personnel in October 2004 and, as Table 3.1 shows, its budget also increased to an estimated US\$ 941 000.

---

<sup>146</sup> United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1279."

<sup>147</sup> United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1291 S/RES/1291 (2000)," [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1291%282000%29](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1291%282000%29) (accessed March 28, 2011).

<sup>148</sup> United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1376 S/RES/1376 (2001)," [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1376%282001%29](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1376%282001%29) (accessed March 29, 2011).

**Table 3.1. MONUC's Expenditure from 1999 - 2010**

<b>Period</b>	<b>Amount: (Thousands of US\$)</b>
1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010:	1 351 539 (estimated)
1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009:	1 222 639
1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008:	1 129 624
1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007:	1 135 261
1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006:	1 078 498
1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005:	940 946
1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004:	665 059
1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003:	508 122
1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002:	401 302
1 July 2000 to 30 June 2001:	246 472
6 August 1999 to 30 June 2000:	55 271
<b>Estimated Total: US\$ 8.73 billion</b>	

*Source:* United Nations, "MONUC, United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo: MONUC Facts and Figures," <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/facts.shtml> (accessed June 1, 2011).

*Note:* These funds exclude donations and contributions used for specific functions such as those made available by the EU for the election process.

MONUC shifted its attention from 2005 to addressing and implementing preparations for the elections in the Congo. The elections were held on 30 July 2006, and the follow up presidential run-off election on 29 October 2006. MONUC also focused on ensuring that the environment in the DRC remained stable conducive for the successful execution of the election process.

The financial contribution to MONUC for the election process increased from June 2005 to July 2006. During this time, the EU collaborated with the UN under the framework of the

European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to form the temporary European Union Force in the DRC (EUFOR RD Congo) military support operation for MONUC.

Phase IV (December 2006 to June 2010) involved the implementation of subsequent operation objectives such as security sector reform, civilian protection and conflict management in the eastern DRC.<sup>149</sup> At its maximum strength, 'MONUC had 19 815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police, and 1 050 personnel of formed police units'.<sup>150</sup> From 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010, the operation cost the UN approximately US\$ 1 350 billion, making it, at the time, the most expensive UN operation.<sup>151</sup> MONUC's mandate centred on, amongst other aspects, the protection of civilians, the implementation of DDRR programmes on local and foreign combatants, conflict management in the eastern part of the DRC, and training and collaborating with FARDC.<sup>152</sup>

### 3.5 The Current Status in the DRC

President Joseph Kabila requested the UN to withdraw its troops from the DRC and cease the MONUC operation in 2009. The UN accepted this request and began preparations for withdrawal, despite much criticism and discouragement from the international community as some feared that a withdrawal will throw the country back into a state of full-blown conflict.<sup>153</sup> The international community argues that the UN's objectives and mandates are incomplete and the situation in the DRC is still too fragile to warrant a withdrawal.<sup>154</sup>

---

<sup>149</sup> Boshoff, "Overview of MONUC's Military Strategy," 137.

<sup>150</sup> United Nations, "United Nations Security Resolution 1856 S/RES/1856 (2007)," <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/mandate.shtml> Security Council resolution 1856 (accessed February 18, 2011).

<sup>151</sup> United Nations, "Approved resources for peacekeeping A/C.5/64/15."

<sup>152</sup> United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1807 S/RES/1807 (2008)," [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1807\(2008\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1807(2008)) (accessed July 13, 2011).

<sup>153</sup> Oxford Analytica, "Congo-Kinshasa: MONUC Exist Is Probable but Premature," <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/VDUX-844JDX?OpenDocument> (accessed May 15, 2010).

<sup>154</sup> Alan Boswell, "UN Backs New DRC Offensive," <http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/africa/UN-Backs-New-DRC-Offensive-86921042.html> (accessed May 13, 2010).

In accordance with the UNSCR 1925 passed in May 2010, the UN renamed MONUC to the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) on 1 July 2010.<sup>155</sup> MONUC peacekeeping officially ended on this date. The operation was renamed MONUSCO in order to adapt its capabilities to allow the mission to deal with the 'new phase of peace and consolidation' in the DRC and an exit strategy for the UN.<sup>156</sup> Sporadic attacks are still occurring and the mass rape and assault of women and children are still prevalent in the country. To date, the UN is currently pursuing its MONUSCO objectives. MONUSCO's mandate has been extended until June 2012.<sup>157</sup>

### 3.6 Conclusion

The characteristics of the 1998 DRC conflict are rooted in the country's population; geopolitical characteristics; neighbours; and political dynamics. These combine to produce instability and violence, directly affecting MONUC's peacekeeping. Most of the violence and instability, further, would occur particularly in the east. Any consideration of MONUC's failures and successes is obliged to take the violent context of operations into account. The effects ranged from the need to protect MONUC's employees to dealing with groups who, facing predation, thought they had to defend themselves. To put it simply, the persistence of instability and violence limited what MONUC *could* achieve. An analysis of MONUC's mandates, objectives and accomplishments follows in the next chapter.

---

<sup>155</sup> United Nations, "MONUSCO Mandate,"

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/mandate.shtml> (accessed May 15, 2011).

<sup>156</sup> United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1925.;" United Nations, "The Thirty-first Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC,"

[http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/164](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/164) (accessed October 5, 2010).

<sup>157</sup> United Nations, "MONUSCO Mandate."

## **Chapter 4: MONUC's Mandates, Objectives and Accomplishments 1999 - 2010**

### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter analyses MONUC's mandates and objectives in the periods 1999 to 2002; 2002 to 2004; to 2004 to 2006; and 2007 to 2010. In each period, UN Security Council mandates are first, identified; second, objectives or the actual priorities in the mission mandates are identified; and third, the strengths and failures of the mission are discussed.

### **4.2 MONUC 1999 - 2002**

#### **4.2.1 Mandates**

The mandates assigned to MONUC during this period were through United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR), specifically UNSCR 1279 (1999); UNSCR 1291 (2000); UNSCR 1341 (2001); UNSCR 1376 (2001); and UNSCR 1417 (2002).<sup>158</sup> These called on MONUC:

- to liaise and communicate with all the relevant signatories to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement;
- to monitor, observe and investigate that agreement and any subsequent violations of it;
- to encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes;
- to monitor the disengagement of troops in the Congo;
- to organise and implement a mine action plan; and
- 'to facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including women, children and demobilized child soldiers'.<sup>159</sup>

---

<sup>158</sup> United Nations, "MONUC Mandate."

MONUC was mandated to work in cooperation with the Congo's Joint Military Commission (JMC) with implementing its resolutions at this stage.<sup>160</sup>

From November 1999 to February 2000, MONUC was classified as an observer mission under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Chapter VI of the UN Charter on the Pacific Settlements of Disputes permitted MONUC to 'investigate any dispute, or any situation [in the Congo] which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security'.<sup>161</sup> At the same time, this chapter authorised the MONUC mission to encourage the settlement of disputes 'through negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, [through] regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means'.<sup>162</sup> In other words, MONUC's Chapter VI authority authorised the mission to engage in peacemaking, including monitoring the situation; acting to encourage the formation of new agreements that promote peace and security; and ensuring that actors adhere to existing peace agreements.

In February 2000 MONUC's mandate expanded to include elements of Chapter VII authority. Chapter VII of the UN Charter is concerned with 'Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression'. Chapter VII permits a peace operation to take military action or use force when necessary to maintain peace and encourage stability and security in the Congo.<sup>163</sup> UNSCR 1291 (2000) mandate called MONUC to take necessary action

---

<sup>159</sup> United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1291."

<sup>160</sup> United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1291.>"; United Nations, "United Nations Documents on MONUC," <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/resolutions.shtml> (accessed September 15, 2011).

<sup>161</sup> United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 6."

<sup>162</sup> United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 6."

<sup>163</sup> United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 6."

in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located Joint Military Commission (JMC) personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.<sup>164</sup>

The resolution allowed MONUC the authority for 'more robust' peacekeeping in instances of self-defence and protecting civilians.<sup>165</sup>

There were two main problems with MONUC's mandates.

Firstly, in Chapter VII MONUC, very early on in the operation, had the necessary authority to use force in self-defence and protecting civilians. But the mission's mandates lacked clarification as to the extent to which MONUC's Chapter VII authority could be implemented.<sup>166</sup> MONUC was only permitted to implement components of Chapter VII authority, specifically using force to protect MONUC troops and in protecting civilians '*under imminent threat of physical violence*'.<sup>167</sup> This Chapter VII authorisation could be interpreted and implemented in any way by MONUC troops.<sup>168</sup>

Secondly, there were too many different tasks simultaneously assigned to MONUC. These tasks ranged from monitoring, observing and investigating adherence to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement; monitoring the disengagement of troops in the Congo; protecting civilians '*under imminent threat of physical violence*'; and other human rights monitoring. From almost the start of its mission, MONUC was in danger of being over extended.

---

<sup>164</sup> United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1291," 4.

<sup>165</sup> United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1291," 4.

<sup>166</sup> Clifford Bernath and Anne Edgerton, "MONUC: flawed mandate limits success,"

[http://www.refugeesinternational.org/files/reports/MONUC\\_May2003.pdf](http://www.refugeesinternational.org/files/reports/MONUC_May2003.pdf) (accessed June 21, 2010).

<sup>167</sup> Bernath and Edgerton, "MONUC: flawed mandate."

<sup>168</sup> Bernath and Edgerton, "MONUC: flawed mandate."

#### 4.2.2 MONUC's Objectives

From 1999 to 2002 MONUC's primary objectives involved (a) assisting with the implementation of the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and (b) observing and monitoring stability in the Congo. What did (b) entail? The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, signed by Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, called for the immediate cessation of hostilities within 24 hours of the signing of the agreement.<sup>169</sup> MONUC was deployed as a liaison mission focusing on collecting information and monitoring adherence to this agreement.<sup>170</sup>

The signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement resulted in tremendous optimism about the Congo's future. Unfortunately, violence continued; by late 2000 all the signatories to the agreement had violated the ceasefire in some respects. Non-compliance with the peace agreement continued until 2003, when another agreement, the Sun City All-Inclusive Agreement, was reached. MONUC's deployment in this unstable environment was considered problematic. This was because it is a 'well-known lesson that peacekeepers cannot function where there is no peace to keep. Missions [such as MONUC] keep being mounted in the Micawberesque belief that everything that can go right will',<sup>171</sup> which is hardly an ideal situation.

Even so, MONUC continued with its tasks, because the UN considered the mission necessary for the stabilisation of the Congo: the operation and MONUC's presence would act as a deterrent against further fighting and violations of the ceasefire agreement.<sup>172</sup> In other words, without MONUC, things would be worse. This meant, however, that MONUC was

---

<sup>169</sup> United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 23 July 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council S/1999/815 (1999)," 4, [http://www.un.org/Docs/s815\\_25.pdf](http://www.un.org/Docs/s815_25.pdf) (accessed September 12, 2011).

<sup>170</sup> The mission started this function in February 2000. Malan and Boshoff, "A 90-Day Plan," 5; United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations S/1999/790 (1999)," 4.

<sup>171</sup> Caty Clement and Adam C. Smith, eds., *Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges in United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: International Peace Institute, 2009), 3 and 15; David M. Malone and Ramesh Thakur, "UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned?" *Global Governance* 7, 1 (2001): 13.

<sup>172</sup> Malan and Porto, *Challenges of Peace Implementation*.

more than observing, monitoring and implementing the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement - the primary reason why MONUC had been deployed in the first place. MONUC now had some entitlement to forcibly create peace, which is not a normal Chapter VI operation. MONUC was expected to do more than it was designed to do.

#### 4.2.3 MONUC's Implementation of Objectives

##### *Observing and Monitoring*

The mission's observer personnel were focused on monitoring, collecting and reporting relevant information in 1999. These officers, unfortunately, struggled to acquire relevant information because of continued violence, obstructions from the Congolese state and travel restrictions.<sup>173</sup> This meant that MONUC had limited information as to the situation in the DRC thereby restricting its preparedness.<sup>174</sup>

##### *Protection of Civilians*

MONUC struggled to protect civilians, despite their authority to use force in doing so. For example, in May 2002 there were severe attacks against civilians in Kisangani by the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)-Goma troops. The RCD-Goma troops maimed, injured and killed over 100 civilians in less than a week.<sup>175</sup> These attacks received little attention from MONUC's approximately 1 000 military personnel stationed in that area, who were well aware of the events occurring at that time.<sup>176</sup> It is said that MONUC chose not to act because the present MONUC deputy force commander 'was unwilling to risk UN lives to

---

<sup>173</sup> United Nations, "Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Preliminary Deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo S/1999/1116 (1999)," 4, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/1116](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/1116) (accessed March 31, 2011).

<sup>174</sup> United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1291," 3-4.

<sup>175</sup> United Nations, "Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo S/2002/621 (2002)," 1, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2002/621](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2002/621) (accessed September 20, 2011).

<sup>176</sup> Marks, "The Pitfalls of Action and Inaction," 71.

curb the violence'.<sup>177</sup> MONUC did attempt to curb the attacks by having a meeting with the rebels from the RCD-Goma. The meeting occurred days after the attacks and only resulted in the 'protection of seven civilians and negotiations for the release of two missionaries. These achievements, however, paled in comparison to the loss of life and destruction the UN could have averted or at least mitigated'.<sup>178</sup>

#### 4.2.4 Conclusion

MONUC achieved some success in monitoring adherence to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Observation and monitoring of the situation in the Congo by MONUC, however, was difficult to achieve because the continued violence, obstructions from the Congolese state and travel restrictions imposed on the UN observer mission made it difficult for the mission to fully reach its potential as a monitoring mission.

How MONUC interpreted its mandates was also a factor. MONUC was entitled to use force to protect civilians. Yet, during the 2002 Kisangani massacre, MONUC had approximately 1 000 military personnel stationed in the area, MONUC's deputy force commander's interpretation of the mandate and the situation on the ground, resulted in a feeble response when lives could have been saved. MONUC's commander's rather narrow interpretation of the mission's mandate, therefore, had a deleterious influence on the operation's implementation: clearly, the failure to protect civilians could not be attributed to a shortage of resources.<sup>179</sup>

---

<sup>177</sup> Marks, "The Pitfalls of Action and Inaction," 71.

<sup>178</sup> Marks, "The Pitfalls of Action and Inaction," 71.

<sup>179</sup> Cilliers and Malan, *Peacekeeping in the DRC*, 75; Roessler and Prendergast, "Democratic Republic of the Congo," 256-259; Williams, "Peace Operations in Africa."