

FEDERATION AND CONFEDERATION

IN

SOUTH AFRICA

1870 - 1880

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE

TO

THE CAPE COLONY.

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BY

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P R E F A C E.

If, at the outset, I admit that the following pages contain neither revolutionary theses nor brand-new facts it may require a word of explanation and perhaps apology for almost two hundred pages which I used to say what has already been said by others in some form or other about the history of imperial policy over the period I have chosen.

Before I started on this thesis I read "The Imperial Factor" published in 1937 by Dr. C.W. de Kiewiet and I made bold to turn to the author personally for a word of advice regarding a subject upon which I felt convinced he was pre-eminently qualified to advise me. Dr. de Kiewiet's main suggestion was : tell the story from the despatches.

Once I began to uncover possible sources of information I realized that this word of guidance was indeed valuable, for I saw in the long list of secondary works published that "the story" had been told not only frequently in the past but also from all possible and impossible angles, with the most divergent objects in view. My task clearly was to add another angle but to do my best to make my view as objective and balanced as possible in dealing with a question about which feelings ran so high in Cape politics in the Seventies of the last century. This I have attempted to do.

I have not attempted, however, to write a sketchy history of federation movements in South Africa in this decade. In the work of historians like Uys and de Kiewiet the wider field has been covered and high politics followed to its furthest recesses of intrigue and diplomacy, especially as regards the "South-Eastern" aspect of Lord Carnarvon's schemes in South Africa. I have confined myself to the part played by events in the Cape Colony. I have followed Sir Henry Barkly on his quarrels with the Republics, and watched the changes of public opinion there; I have noticed the activity of Sir Garnet Wolseley in Natal and President Burgers on the Continent. Also of the European background I have taken cognisance; of the motives behind Imperial policy, the troubles in Bulgaria and the see-saw of party politics in England. Then again I have digressed to look at the causes of Sir Bartle Frere's delay in furthering the matter of Confederation in the years 1877 to 1879: the Gaika-Galeca War, the Zulu War, the maladministration of the Transvaal and the return of Wolseley. But all this was necessary and served the one purpose viz. to place Cape events in their proper prospective and explain the influences at work on public opinion in the Colony.

It has not been an easy task as a first attempt at research. My principal handicap has been the bewildering mass of information as well as the diametrically opposed view points which historians have adopted in the past: on the one hand I had to use the conclusions of others to guide my own in approaching the "arid wastes" of official correspondence; on the other hand I realized how dangerously biassed most of the public<sup>ist</sup> works were. There were so many axes to grind on behalf of the chief actors in the events of these years that axe-grinding forms the sole excuse sometimes for the elaborate biographies which we have of men like Southey, Molteno and Frere.

The history of confederation in the period under discussion was made by men perhaps more than by circumstances, men like Froude, Molteno, Barkly, Brand, Burgers, Carnarvon and Hofmeyr to name but a few. I have therefore been compelled to lay special emphasis on the role of individuals. But in this respect I have used secondary sources sparingly for the opinions which they contain, less sparingly for information of purely factual nature and liberally for documents quoted and correspondents reproduced.

Official correspondence has however been my last resort and I have read all despatches of importance which passed between the Colonial Office and Government House for the ten years between 1870 and/

and 1880.

From the nature of the subject it was necessary to get nearer to the undercurrents of local politics and public feeling than is possible from a study of formal correspondence, and for this purpose I chose some of the 80 of the newspapers published in South Africa between 1870 and 1880 and found them an invaluable (and largely untapped) source of detail and of contemporary opinion. In the pages of these old newspaper folios there lingers a very real atmosphere of the day-to-day life of the people who tend to become mere names to us today. But newspaper research requires much time and fruitless turning of irrelevant pages. Under circumstances I could not pay attention to more than the three or four principal papers of the Colony, supplemented by the copious extracts from contemporaries which they regularly published.

For reasons which will appear more clearly hereafter I chose the "Grahamstown Journal" as a representative of Eastern opinion. It had the widest circulation of any colonial newspaper at the time. From the Capetown newspapers I selected the "Cape Argus" as most prominent amongst the English group of journals and the "Zuid-Afrikaan" as the mouthpiece of Afrikaners. I stated that my work contains no theses; yet I may modify this statement in view of the conscious attempt that I have made to show in its true significance the part played by Afrikaner national sentiment in this period. The "Zuid-Afrikaan" has been my guide almost exclusively in this respect. After 1878 the Cape Times advanced as ministerial organ of the Sprigg government and I have counter-balanced the somewhat vitriolic "Cape Argus" and the adamant leaders from Hofmeyr's pen by the views of this journal, especially in the last two chapters. Besides published books, official correspondence, and newspapers I used two further sources of information. Firstly the great collections of pamphlets in the South African Public Library and the Mendelssohn Collection in the Parliamentary Library. I selected forty relevant pamphlets (some are bulky volumes in themselves) and used them wherever possible. Much of the information they contain can perhaps be designated as "new" if only because of the few people who have set eyes on these pamphlets since they were written sixty and seventy years ago.

Then there were the Merriman Papers in the South African Public Library, of which I was privileged to read about sixty. This was a very useful means of supplementing the more impersonal information from other sources, especially in view of the fact that the late Mr. Merriman played such an important part in politics after 1875.

I feel that there are certain gaps in my information, however. Some are inevitable, for others I have only one excuse that I had no time in the circumstances under which I worked to study all that was to be found. Among the sources which, inevitably, I could not see were those informal minutes which were scribbled on despatches from Government House and which can today only be seen in the Public Records Office in London. I have been compelled to forego this very reliable indication of the true feelings which prompted Colonial Office despatches. The good use that can be made of such information has been proved by Uys and de Kiewiet in their work.

Secondly, I was handicapped by lack of informal information regarding Mr. J.H. Hofmeyr's political influence in these years. It is well known that his circle of personal friends was a wide one and I hoped to be able to secure access to extant private correspondence of the Afrikaner leader in the period 1870 to 1880. I was informed that the Hofmeyr Papers in the South African Public Library did not contain such correspondence and when I wrote to the biographer of "Onze Jan" the Hon. J.H. Hofmeyr, ~~former Minister of the Interior~~, he expressed the opinion that this correspondence must have been destroyed. There is still a possibility however that it exists.

The position is the same with regard to the private correspondence of John Paterson. I was informed that it was being kept at Port Elizabeth Public Library. The librarian however assures me that he has no knowledge of such papers.

I received every assistance I could wish for in the Capetown, Archives in consulting the manuscript despatches but I was refused access/

access to several folios of confidential despatches since it was impossible to grant me permission to use these documents except after communication with the British authorities. Eventually I was granted this permission but at a time when I could no longer make full use of the confidential correspondence. I have therefore only used those after 1875.

Lastly there is the Southey Correspondence in the Capetown Archives to which I was introduced by the Archivist. Not only was it too late for me also in this case to use this collection but it is so enormous that, in the present semi-classified and uncatalogued state of the documents, it would have been futile to attempt systematic reading of the relevant letters. These thousands of letters as yet remain an unexplored mine of information. In conclusion I wish to thank those who have helped me in various ways. Dr. J.S. Marais who gave me all possible advice from time to time; The Archivist of the Capetown Archives, Mr. P.J. Venter, and Mr. Victor de Kock of the Staff who have saved me much time and effort by their assistance. Mr. A.C.G. Lloyd, late Librarian of the South African Public Library gave me valuable personal information regarding the late Mr. J.K. Merriman to whom he was private secretary at one time; he also obtained permission from his fellow trustees of the Merriman Papers to give me access to certain of the letters. My thanks also to Miss V. Ralling, secretary to the Librarian for her kind assistance and Mr. D. Varley the present Librarian for giving me facilities to use the pamphlets in the Library. Lastly, my appreciation is also due to Miss A.J. van Minnen who tackled the task of typing single-handed.

W. J. de Kock

12<sup>th</sup> Oct, 1938.

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ABBREVIATIONS USED.

1. Titles of secondary sources have been abbreviated in such manner that the full title can be found by reference to the Bibliography.

2. Owing to the length of the full titles of pamphlets a numbered list has been appended (Appendix A. page 211).

3)

C.H.B.E. VIII. - Cambridge History of the British Empire.  
Volume VIII.

C.1399 - Imperial Parliamentary Papers no.1399.

C.75-'76 - Document published by order of the Cape Legislative Council, 1876.

A.1-'79 - Document published by order of the Legislative Assembly of the Cape Colony, 1879.

G.17-'80 - Document published by order of the Government of the Cape Colony, 1880.

S.C.12-'75 - Select Committee Report no.12 of 1875.

G.H.1/22 - Folio no.22 of the first group of Government House papers in the Capetown Archives.

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INTRODUCTORY.

The failure of Grey's scheme for federation - Apathy towards the Colonies and its causes - The "cold fit" passes - Wodehouse and the Cape Parliament.

The New Spirit.

"The affairs of the colonies and their relations with the mother country, have been the subject of so much discussion in recent years, that it may be difficult to realise that there once was a time when they were of considerable indifference."<sup>1)</sup>

On this reflection rests the understanding of the failure of Sir George Grey in 1858 to bring about some form of closer union between the balkanized states and the colonies of South Africa. Behind the unsympathetic reception of Grey's appeal to his Government to set foot once more beyond the Orange River, from where they had so unceremoniously retreated in 1852-'54, one has to consider the whole course of British history in the middle decades of the nineteenth century.

Great Britain was passing through a period of social, political and industrial metamorphosis. Of the three directions of change, the industrial was the most important, indeed, it was the root and cause behind the events of the time. What France accomplished by means of a violent revolution at the close of the 18th century and reinforced by two more upheavals by 1848, England was attaining by means of the process of evolutionary growth, which is the most characteristic feature in the history of the development of British institutions.

In the life of the individual there is that most important interlude of adolescence, the difficult years during which physical development and emotional "Sturm und Drang", so subtly interconnected place the character, as it were, in the crucible, where it undergoes the determining influence of circumstance and innate tendencies, the shaping for the life that lies ahead. It would perhaps not be wholly inapt to say that in these middle decades of the last century, Great Britain as the future head of the most extensive empire in history, was virtually in the crucible. It was the time when

internal/

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1) Fitzmaurice - Life of Granville II. - p.20.

internal circumstances were deciding the all-important question of Britain's destiny as a colonial power.

The industrial revolution was not accomplished in a decade, nor yet in two; the rise of industry in the first half of the century had been accompanied by a rationalistic outlook on politics, a closer scrutiny of the place which this newly-born industrialised labour-class was to occupy in the social caste of conservative England, where the husks of feudalism yet remained, dominating strangely enough, after so many centuries, not only the economic life of the nation, but also the entire parliamentary system and the policy of Great Britain beyond the seas.<sup>1)</sup>

This new rationalism one connects with the names of men like Jeremy Bentham<sup>a</sup>, the founder of the Utilitarian School; J.S. Mill, the exponent of the political philosophy of extreme individualism; Ricardo and Malthus, the radical economists, Richard Cobden of Corn Law fame- these names represent the intellectual and theoretical force which accompanied the growth of industrial England and which laid the foundations of a bloodless revolution in the sphere of politics and social organization.<sup>2)</sup>

One is apt to regard the concept of laissez-faire as an economic principle, pure and simple. Applied to the field of colonial policy it obtained a very important and new significance in the days when the Manchester School ruled England. In matters of colonial policy free-trade meant a practical application of the time-honoured adage that charity begins at home. At a time when financial depression prevailed in England, moreover, and "the Chancellor of the Exchequer sat by the side of a bottomless pit fishing for a budget" it is no surprising fact that there was little inclination towards imperial ~~exhaustion~~<sup>expansion</sup>. An attitude of national individualism characterised British politics and external policy in these years in the middle quarter of the century; there was a desire to put the British house in order while, for the time being, maintaining imperial commitments

abroad/

1) Adams - Constitutional History of England. p.p. 153 ff.

2) Greyvenstein - Het Sociaal Utilisme van Bentham. p.p. 107-108.

Davidson - Political Thought of the Utilitarians from Bentham to J.S. Mill. p.p. 72-92.

abroad at the absolute minimum.

Only four years after Great Britain had withdrawn her sovereignty from the country beyond the Orange River and, by implication, endorsed the policy of non-intervention in the republics across the Vaal, Sir George Grey penned his famous despatch on the possibilities of a South African federation, and received a severe rebuff from Downing Street.<sup>2)</sup> Partly the explanation for the hostile reception of Grey's scheme, lay in the dominant spirit of anti-imperialism at home, where radicals and separatists were keeping up a steady barrage against the expensive pastime of maintaining worthless colonies who could bear the costs of their own defence. In the vanguard of attack were men like Sir William Molesworth, Gladstone, Cobden, John Bright, Hume and Adderley. The formula varied little: reduce imperial expenditure on colonies and turn the benefits of the reduction to the account of the British taxpayer, let the colonies exert themselves in their own defence - laissez-aller and laissez-passer if need be.<sup>3)</sup> This was undoubtedly the extremist view, yet the influence of the vocal minority was marked even when tempered by conservatism.

Apart, however, from the adverse tendency towards territorial extension, there were, in South Africa itself, further reasons why this single-handed attempt of an enterprising colonial governor was bound to come to naught. Grey came to a country where he immediately recognised the extreme artificiality of the political divisions between the states and British colonies, as well as the forced racial/

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- 1) For a vivid study of the panicky atmosphere at the colonial office, when the policy of reaction reached its height c.f. de Kiewiet - British Colonial Policy. p.50. ff.
  - 2) Walker - History of South Africa. p.250. quotations from despatch 19 Nov. 1858, Grey to Lytton;  
Newton - Unification vol I pp. 1-12.  
de Kiewiet - British Colonial Policy. pp.103-137.
  - 3) cf. Pamphlet no.I (appendix)  
Pamphlet no.8: Molesworth: Materials for a speech (1854).  
de Kiewiet - op. cit. (pp.110-111) : the attitude of Labouchere to Grey's proposals before 1858.

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racial divisions which had been wrought since 1836. No less obvious to his alert mind were the economic disabilities under which the sparsely-populated and vast country was suffering. To a man of his sweeping vision and love of active policy the only remedy which could suggest itself was a levelling of disparities and a merging of interests. But political idealism has always died a painful death in South Africa whenever it raised its hopeful head, and here was one of the first instances of its failure in the face of realities.

When Sir George Grey was a very old man, he said of the Afrikaner Boer "I have lived in many countries and among many nations, but nowhere have I found a nation so rich alike both in private and public virtues as the Boers". Yet he overlooked the fact in 1858, that there was no evidence of reciprocity of these noble sentiments on the part of the Transvaal republics towards Great Britain or the "Englishman" as such. Grey himself found it necessary to curb the first signs of expansionism of the Pretorius party towards the Free State,<sup>1)</sup> a tendency which, under the régime of Thomas Burgers, blossomed into undisguised propaganda for the pan-Afrikaner South Africa under Transvaal leadership.<sup>2)</sup>

Natal made no articulate response to the desires of Grey, and the Free State remained the only territory which gave any encouragement to the policy advocated by the Cape Governor. Recently abandoned to her own resources the little republic was fighting an uphill battle against state bankruptcy: her revenue trickled in slowly from a pastoral community where direct taxation was a difficult matter, and at the coast ports Natal and the Cape Colony received the dues from Free State imports.<sup>3)</sup> In the valley of the Caledon, a harassing war had just been unsatisfactorily concluded with the Chief of the Mountain, and the prospect of peace on a basis favourable to the

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republic/

1) Walker - History of S.A. pp.301-302; De Kiewiet: British Colonial Policy. pp.107-108.

2) Engelbrecht - Burgers. pp.185-187; 188-189.  
Zuid-Afrikaan. 16th December, 1874.

3) Cf. De Kiewiet - British Colonial Policy. p.111.

republic was very remote. <sup>5</sup> Indeed, the Free State had nothing to lose by returning under the British flag, and there is no doubt that Grey would have effected such a voluntary reunion, had he been supported from the Colonial Office.

✓ The most decisive factor which, in the end, would undoubtedly have prevented the successful execution of a federation scheme in 1858, was the financial state of the Cape Colony and the utter lack of communications. When Canada in 1867 adopted a federal system of government, it was a sine qua non condition on the part of the out-lying states especially, that the federal government should immediately undertake the construction of the "iron backbone" of the dominion, a fact which proves the <sup>great</sup> importance attached to efficient means of communication as an instrument of political cohesion. Geographically, the position in South Africa in 1858 was identical. Pretoria and Capetown were a thousand miles apart, and life still moved at the pace of the ox or the horse, at best. Beside animal transport, there existed no means of communication, even by telegraph, and in the great open spaces of South Africa the single little railway line from Capetown to Wellington was but a negligible nucleus for the railway construction which would have been an indispensable undertaking, had federation come to the country when Grey asked for it. A substantial Imperial grant would have been a preamble to any federative act just then, and how remote the possibilities of such magnanimity were at home, has already been made clear. The gleam of the first diamond of Griqualand West had not caught the eye of the white man yet. Agriculture and commerce went their own sluggish way still, and the Cape Colony was, to all intents and purposes, as pastoral as the republics themselves. Budgets under the rule of Grey fortunately still balanced, it is true, but there was no guarantee at all in the financial circumstances of the colony of a favourable return for expenditure of Imperial funds or even public money to make the contemplated political change a lasting success.

Small wonder that the first attempt to encourage federation in South Africa died still-born, and the idea was not revived in official circles until the clock had moved on some twelve years, a period in which the solid front against colonial expansion which

had/

had met the proposals of Grey,<sup>6</sup> caved in to a considerable extent. There was a general change in the Zeitgeist in England and in Europe as a whole. The winter sleep of consolidation was almost over, and in the debates of the British Parliament during the Sixties, the very divergence of opinions on Colonial matters was a sign of the times.<sup>1)</sup>

When Wodehouse in 1868 got explicit permission to intervene in the Basuto quarrel with the Free State, it was an unmistakable sign that the frigid isolationism of the Fifties was abating, and that the Imperial Government no longer dreaded any active policy beyond the frontiers of the British possessions in South Africa. On the other hand, however, there is no reason to assume that the Imperial Government had adopted imperialism suddenly and unreservedly. Far from it. Not until the advent of Disraeli and his second ministry was imperialism made a party slogan. By 1868 British public men were by no means unanimous on the matter of colonial policy or even clearly divided into two main groups for and against the abandonment of "Little Englandism" in colonial matters.

Lord Carnarvon, the man who was destined to play such an important role in the federation movement of the next decade, by the strange irony of political circumstances, defended the government policy of the day in 1867, in regard to the reduction of Colonial military garrisons and the levying of charges on colonial governments for troops stationed in the colonies,<sup>His speech</sup> evoked a chorus of criticism in the Lords, led by the Duke of Manchester,<sup>2)</sup> who presented a petition from the Cape against this

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- intended/
- 1) De Kiewiet - British Colonial Policy: pp.208-224. an account of the revival of interest in Colonial problems after the more embarrassing issues had been temporarily shelved during the war in the Crimea and the Indian Mutiny.
  - 2) Pamphlet no.39: Speech in the Lords, June 18th 1867: the proposals made by Lord Carnarvon as Colonial Secretary in a despatch to the colonies in 1867 were intended to bring about a gradual withdrawal of regiments from the colonies annually, over a period of a few years, leaving a minimum garrison for which a fixed rate per man was payable by the colonial governments. The colonial government could further obtain as many troops as were paid for in addition to the minimum strength.: See also Fitzmaurice - Life of Granville. pp.22-23 : As early as 1st Dec. 1866, Carnarvon had sent a circular despatch to the colonies on the withdrawal of troops. In the House of Lords, Russel and Carnarvon argued that in time of war scattered garrisons were ready-made prisoners-of-war and a concentration in the home country was preferable to maintenance of garrisons.

intended reduction of military strength when the Colony had no money to pay for its own administration, and the Eastern Frontier was a constant source of anxiety. It may be imagined that Gladstone, after 1868, would not have relaxed in pursuing this policy. He had been the spearhead of agitation in the Sixties, for a reduction of Imperial expenditure.<sup>1)</sup>

On 9th December 1869, Lord Granville took up the matter again in a despatch to Wodehouse, and by May 1870 two more had followed, urging the Cape to place its defences on a sounder basis, and to comply with the wishes of the Imperial Government.<sup>2)</sup>

It would be unjust to condemn the policy of the Gladstone government as purely mercenary and unsympathetic towards the colonies, following in the anti-expansion traditions of the time. It is true that the Gladstonian budget had a great influence on policy,<sup>3)</sup> but there were substantial motives beside the purely financial in this line of action,<sup>4)</sup> and undoubtedly the Cape had lagged further behind in her measures for self-defence, and, in the words of Carnarvon, paid less than any British possession "from Hong-Kong to St. Vintcent" for her troops. Only the fact that drought and depression had dogged the administration of Wodehouse in the "dismal Sixties"<sup>5)</sup> had delayed the demands of Downing Street for so long.

In Europe the atmosphere of international relations was becoming more charged as time went on, and a concentration of troops at home proportionately more urgent. Besides, the Cape Colony had enjoyed tranquillity on the Eastern Frontier for fifteen years, and there were no signs of danger from a Kaffir invasion or war.

Moreover, Granville had repeated in his despatch, the opinion expressed by Carnarvon in 1867, when he said in the House of Lords:

"I am/

- 1) De Kiewiet - British Colonial Policy : p.211ff.
- 2) G.H.1/17 ; Granville to Wodehouse: 29th Jan. and 23rd May, 1870.
- 3) Morley - Life of Gladstone II. p.374. Morley quotes an extract from a letter from Gladstone to Lowe, his Chancellor of the Exchequer, which admirably illustrates the tight-fisted policy of his government "Can we look to finance as supplying what we want? This is the only remaining question... If we can get  $\frac{3}{4}$  of a million off the naval and military estimates jointly, then as far as I can judge, we shall have left the country no reason to complain..."
- 4) Cf.: C.H.B.E. vol.VIII. p.421.
- 5) Walker - History of South Africa. p.307.

"I am not prepared to say that when we require the Cape Colony to bear the burden of the military expenditure there, we should not at the same time give the Colony responsible government. The expediency of having responsible government was discussed in the Colony more than once some six or seven years ago, and a proposition in its favour was rejected by a small majority.<sup>1)</sup> If responsible government by the Colony itself were to be adopted, of course very many important changes will follow upon it. Your Lordships may not be aware that the Colony itself is divided into two districts: the Eastern and Western districts, and the Eastern district, apart from the native population is chiefly inhabited by settlers of English descent, while the Western district is inhabited chiefly by Dutch colonists; and it is a curious fact that the English colonists are rather averse to responsible government while the Dutch are generally in favour of it."<sup>2)</sup>

✓ It will be necessary to return to the last portion of this statement: its main importance as regards the future policy of the Imperial Government towards the constitutional development of the Colony is evident, however. By 1869 this impatience had grown considerably when it was perceived that the Colony was making no headway towards that self-governing status which the Government was anxious to confer upon it.

The representative constitution had been well handled by Grey but his successor could not fill his place for tact and tolerance. From the outset Wodehouse had been at loggerheads with his Assembly and he failed to realise that the natural ambition of the able men in the Legislative Assembly was not to sever any connections with the mother country, but to work towards the logical culmination of the representative institutions of 1854, viz. to bring the Executive into harmony with an elected assembly and council by the principle of ministerial responsibility and full control of internal affairs and administration.<sup>3)</sup>

With a very noisy and persistent opposition in the Assembly, and drought ravishing the colony far and wide, revenue falling below the figure of an ever-increasing expenditure and financial depression

limiting/

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1) Carnarvon refers to the motion by Molteno in 1860 (cf. Molteno - Life of Molteno. I. p.77.)  
 2) See note 1) p.8.  
 3) When he departed from South Africa in 1870, Wodehouse made the following "confession" of his personal views in his last address to Parliament: "I have never been a colonist. All my sympathies are enlisted in the close connection of the Colony with England and the movements taking place towards the dissolution of those ties, are to me most unwelcome...For any difficulties that I may have unadvisedly or unnecessarily created, I hope you will accept my assurances of regret." (Wilmot - Life of Southey. p.181.) Wodehouse did not perceive, nor did he wish to open his eyes to, the great march from crown colony status to sovereign autonomy within a commonwealth which was in his time beginning in all the major possessions of Great Britain and had in most of them advanced much further than at the Cape.

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limiting the possibilities for additional taxation, Sir Philip's administration sank lower and lower in the scale of popularity every year.<sup>1)</sup>

Wodehouse in 1868 faced the Assembly with a deficit of £91,306 and an estimated deficit of £50,000 for 1869, which he proposed to meet by the ultima ratio fisci viz. additional taxation.<sup>2)</sup> The general election of 1868-1869 had brought new strength to his opponents: there were the old stalwarts: J.C. Molteno<sup>3)</sup> leader since 1860 of the agitation for responsible government; Saul Solomon, the diminutive enigma of Cape politics; J.F. Ziervogel, virtual leader of the "Dutch vote" and personal friend of Molteno, Philip Watermeyr, member for Colesberg, nicknamed the "member for the Transvaal" on account of his constantly expressed sympathies for the Republic, William Porter, ex-colonial Secretary and member for Capetown since 1869, J.H. de Villiers<sup>4)</sup> the young attorney, member for Worcester since 1868, finally John X. Merriman, returned for Aliwal North in 1869, and destined to sit<sup>5)</sup> in the Cape and Union Parliaments without a break till 1924.

Party allegiance in the "Old Cape House" was relatively loose and shifting. Personal followings of men like Molteno or his inveterate political antagonist John Paterson, leader of the Eastern members, determined the nature of division lists. On the Treasury benches sat Richard Southey, the Colonial Secretary, and at his side William Downes Griffiths, to bear the brunt of criticism from the "Lions of Beaufort" and his followers.<sup>6)</sup>

The session of 1868 had degenerated into a tussle over finances

between/

1) cf. Walker - History of South Africa. p.313.

2) Molteno - Life of Molteno I. p.121.

3) John Charles Molteno: (1814-1886) member for Beaufort West (1854-1879) and first Premier of the Cape Colony (1873-1878) Member for Victoria West (1880-1883) and for some time member of the Scanlen Cabinet (1881-1882).

4) Walker - de Villiers p.39ff.

5) Lawrence - Life of Merriman. pp.1-15: Merriman did not become a supporter of Molteno till about 1875. In his first years in Parliament he inclined more towards the Eastern views.

6) Ralph Kilpin - (The Romance of a Colonial Parliament) passim:- if one desires to recapture a breath of the atmosphere of the Council chamber, or the old Assembly, these sketches are invaluable. They help to make the men who have become mere names to us to-day, live again before the mind's eye as they rise to take part in those momentous debates with a zest and vitality which would be a credit to any legislative of to-day.

between Wodehouse and Molteno. It is true that a calmer atmosphere prevailed, but it was a calm of pessimism perhaps, more than a reconciliation to the administration. Finances were in a deplorable state, and Wodehouse's proposals for additional taxation were met by insistent demands from the opposition for retrenchment. Then came the annexation of Basutoland to add to Sir Philip's embarrassments in 1869. In exasperation he dissolved parliament in 1869, and prepared for the fourth attempt to bridle the refractory parliamentary opposition by means of a unicameral system.

The "Jamaica" Bill of 1870 was Wodehouse's last chance. Granville had watched his losing battle with a constitution he could not handle, and now curtly informed him that:-

✓ "If the Government cannot by some such measure (as the proposed bill) be enabled to command the co-operation of the Legislative, it remains that the Legislative shall be enabled to ensure the co-operation of the Government, that is, that responsible government should be established in that as in other colonies of equal importance." 1)

✓ The situation for Molteno was not quite so simple, however, and despite the fact that the weight of public opinion had been on the side of the Opposition, the defeat of the Reform Bill in January 1870, by no means left an open road for responsible government.

Carnarvon, in the last part of his statement in 1867<sup>2)</sup> had drawn attention to the fact that, the main opposition to responsible government had come, strangely enough, not from the Afrikaners, who had some reason at this stage to fear English domination under a system of self-government, but from English-speaking Eastern districts of the Colony. This was not quite true, for among those who lent their support to Wodehouse's proposal to truncate the Legislative<sup>3)</sup> was Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, the youthful editor of "De Volksvriend" which he had made by his zeal and ability the most prominent Dutch newspaper in Capetown, with the possible exception of v.d. Sandt de Villiers' "Volksblad". It can safely be assumed that there was by no means unanimous support among Afrikaners in the Western districts for Molteno's efforts to obtain responsible government. The East

remained/

1) C.459 of 1871, p.14: cf. also C.H.B.E. vol.VIII. pp.427-428.

2) Supra p.8.

3) Hofmeyr - Life of Hofmeyr. pp.103-104.

✓ remained the stronghold of the <sup>ll</sup> anti-responsible<sup>u</sup>: the history of Separation forms the subject <sup>of</sup> a study by itself. It is a long story reaching back to the days before the Great Trek, and in the course of time, even the aims of the Separatists changed from a desire for a full-fledged crown colony within the Cape to a more moderate demand for provincial status on equal footing with "Greedy Capetown", with a central government for the whole colony. <sup>1)</sup> Kaffraria formed an obstacle in the way of Eastern ambitions. The men of Kingwilliams-town had little sympathy with Separation, whatever its meaning <sup>might</sup> ~~may~~ be. The Midlands, with a predominantly Afrikaner population evinced but a half-hearted enthusiasm for the noisy demands of Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth. <sup>2)</sup> The closer one scrutinizes the so-called "East" the more it dwindles to the ultra-British Grahamstown and its environment, and commercial Port Elizabeth, whose financial tentacles stretched from Capetown to the Transvaal. The extremely vocal opposition to the West, is apt to be misleading, but it loses much of its significance when this fact is borne in mind. <sup>3)</sup> <sup>4)</sup>

When the despatch of 9th December, 1869, reached Capetown, this matter of a reduction of troops had been before the public for more than two years; a week after the rejection of Wodehouse's Reform Bill a Select Committee was appointed to report on the despatch. <sup>5)</sup> The committee which consisted of two Western members, F.W. Reitz (senior) and J.H. de Villiers, a Kaffrarian C.A. Smith and an Eastern member, J.C. Thompson, brought out a report strongly deprecating <sup>ing</sup> ~~ed~~ the decision of the Imperial Government. It drew attention to the military force necessitated by the "two experiments" being carried on in Basutoland and Kaffraria and the risks of a withdrawal of troops before the success of these annexations had been proved. "The despatch of the Noble Earl" concludes the report: "appears to us to suggest in regard to the existing constitution of the Colony and possible modification thereof in future as connected with and collateral to the other

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1) cf. Grahamstown Journal, passim.

2) Ibid., 8 Nov., 1865; 26 Feb., 1869; Graaff-Reinets Herald, 12 Sept. 1863; 3 Nov., 1863

3) Graaff-Reinets Herald; 20 Jan., 1866; 4 June, 1870.

4) cf. Walker - de Villiers p.134.

5) AIO - '70.

issued  
1) raised in the same document. <sup>12</sup>To these questions we do not propose to advert)

2)  
Even "The Cape Argus" joined in these sentiments but condemned the concluding paragraph as too weak for a true statement of the Colonial view. "If any one will step in and show us how the responsibilities of the Colonists in reference to their own defence is to be recognised while yet the help of England may be pledged in the hour of extremity," the paper had said some time before, "he would make a reputation as a statesman." That was a dilemma to all but Molteno. He appears to have been the only man who had enough confidence in the resources of the Colony to advocate an unhesitating abandonment of the Imperial apron-strings. In the East, and even in Kaffraria and some circles in the West, this matter of military garrisons had shown that the main reason for the reluctance of the Cape Parliament to strike out on its own and take the incident responsibilities of self-government, was the financial state of the Colony which at this stage inspired no optimism.

Together with the parliamentary address based on the Select Committee report <sup>3)</sup> had come a petition from the Eastern districts. Granville hesitated; all he could do was to protest against the passive attitude of the Cape towards its defences. In May he granted temporary concessions to the Colony regarding the withdrawal of troops. <sup>4)</sup>

On the 20th May, 1870, Wodehouse departed. The curtain had fallen on eight years of bickering in the Cape Parliament and economic depression in the country at large. Revenue was at its lowest ebb; in the session of 1870 Richard Southey estimated a deficit of £61,343 for the current year and nobody was surprised. That deficit never occurred, however, for the tide was turning. In August General Hay wrote to Granville that the discoveries of diamonds north of the Orange River had given rise to rival claims and that he was keeping an eye on both diggers and natives. <sup>5)</sup> In September a stone was picked up to the East of the Vaal River at du Toitspan - a flood of correspondence

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- 1) Ibid paragraph 3. 2) Cape Argus - 22nd March, 1870.
  - 3) G.H. 31/11 - Wodehouse to Granville 2nd April, 1870.
  - 4) G.H. 1/17 - Granville to Wodehouse 7th April, 1870: reply to Eastern Province petition; G.H. 1/17 - Granville to Hay 23rd May, 1870.
  - 5) G.H. 31/11 - Hay to Granville 4th August, 1870.

with the Free State began to swell the enclosures of ~~Hay~~ Hay's despatches. By the end of the year the dispute with the Free State was in full swing.

In England Disraeli's Conservatives were at last emerging with a policy of "forward" imperialism, in contrast with the hesitant and calculating course of the Liberals. Disraeli himself was holding his fire, for Gladstone's star was bright still. Only in 1872 did he go to the Crystal Palace to stand on his imperial platform for the first time.<sup>1)</sup> But Carnarvon, his first lieutenant on colonial affairs, already spoke otherwise than in 1867:

"Granville really does desire the Separation of Canada," he wrote on the 10th December 1869, "He instructed Sir Thomas Young<sup>2)</sup> to feel the pulse of the country and he accordingly made the speech which made so great an effect at the time and which he subsequently tried to explain away at Halifax. Granville also wrote to Galt, who had talked of approaching separation and said he had never had a communication which gave him greater pleasure."<sup>3)</sup>

In a speech on the 14th February, 1870, he ~~said~~<sup>said</sup>, in referring to the parsimony towards the colonies which he helped to defend three years before: "But after all, gold may be bought too dear; and he is not a prudent man who will not insure his house simply because he grudges the insurance money."<sup>4)</sup> Canada was the case in point: recently the Red River rebellion had been <sup>n</sup>suppressed there, British Columbia was being tempted by the United States to exchange the Union Jack for the Stars-and-Stripes. It was time, said the Conservatives, to act for the preservation of the Empire.

On the Continent the process of national consolidation was being completed in Germany and Italy. In August the Germans crossed into France. In January 1871, the German Empire became a fact. In September 1870, Victor Immanuel was the ruler of a <sup>united</sup> ~~United~~ Italy. Gladstone's head was beginning to lie uneasy. The rise of imperialism over all Europe was at hand. Within four years it had helped ~~the~~ ~~the~~ to sweep the Liberals and their half-baked colonial policy out of office.

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1) Ensor - England 1870-1914 pp.18-20. ; Morley - Life of Gladstone II pp.390-391. 2) Governor-General of Canada.  
3) quoted by Hardinge - Life of Carnarvon II. p.17. 4) Ibid.p.19.

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## CHAPTER I.

RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AND FEDERATION.

Barkly finds the stage set - Federation and responsible government - The attitude of Downing Street - Moltens triumphs - The break with the republics and the chaos in Griqualand West - Langalibalele. the

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While he was still in England, Sir Henry Barkly received a despatch defining the scope of his task at the Cape: 1)

"I have thought it advisable," wrote Kimberley, "to bring before you these subjects directly or indirectly connected with the constitutional Government of the Cape in order that before leaving England you may have the opportunity of discussing them with Sir Philip Wodehouse from whose ability and experience, he does not concur in all the opinions which I have expressed, you will, I am sure, derive the greatest advantage." He proceeded to express his satisfaction that the reforms of Wodehouse had fallen through; even if the large native population within the Colony was considered, Her Majesty's Government was nevertheless of opinion "that the Colonists would act wisely in adopting the principles of self-government which prevail which prevail in Australia and British North America."

To attain this object, continued the Secretary of State, it would be necessary to remove any obstacles in the way: the reception of Granville's despatch had shown more clearly than ever to the Colonial Office the real obstacle to the adoption of responsible Government, viz. the strong antagonism of some Eastern districts to the existing political divisions within the Colony.

"Experience of other colonies has shown" Kimberley continued, "that wherever the seat of Government is placed, those at a distance from it will not be permanently satisfied unless the Provincial or District authorities are invested with a far greater share legislative and administrative power than is now conceded to them in the Cape Colony. The carefully considered constitution of the Dominion of Canada deserves your particular attention as presenting a solution. It need scarcely be said that the subjects of defence and native policy should on no account be delegated to any subordinate authority."

In this despatch Kimberley further drew the attention of the new Governor to the precarious and ineffective nature of British control over Basutoland and expressed the hope that this matter may be settled. For three years Wodehouse's acquisition had been kept "in the air", 2) neither the Cape nor Natal being asked to annex it. It did not matter which way the decision went now, as long as the administration of Basutoland became the definite responsibility of one or the other of the colonies.

Briefly/

1) G.H. 1/17 - Kimberley to Barkly, 17th October, 1870.

2) Walker - History of South Africa. p.330.

✓ Briefly then Barkly was instructed to do his best to further the introduction of responsible government, to placate Eastern prejudices by a system of provincial devolution on federative lines and to have Basutoland annexed to one of the two British colonies. <sup>1)</sup>

In this case, as in many subsequent situations, the Colonial Office proposed and circumstances at the Cape disposed. Barkly arrived in Capetown on the last day of 1870, and among those who welcomed him, was the President of the Free State. No considerations of personal adulation or even of political advantage to be gained on a friendly gesture, had induced him to come down from Bloemfontein: he came to seek the ear of authority after his attempts to obtain a reasonable discussion of the diamond fields claims of the Free State had been frustrated for months by the acting administration.

Sir Philip Wodehouse had left a military man as acting governor. In the months May - December 1870 the virtual ruler of the Colony had not been General Hay, but Richard Southey, the Colonial Secretary. <sup>2)</sup> Southey's private correspondence leaves no doubt that he made the most of his opportunities to further his imperialistic ideals in this time. It is necessary to refer to the details of the dispute between the native chiefs and the Republics. <sup>3)</sup> What is of importance is that Barkly found the stage set for him in Griqualand West by the machinations of Southey with Arnot over the Waterboer claims <sup>4)</sup> and the sending of a special magistrate to Klipdrift in October 1870, an act which, even if defensible on the grounds of growing disorder on the diggings, undeniably compromised the British Government's impartiality

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1) The Cape Colony in 1871 decided to annex Basutoland. A commission of the Cape Parliament reported in favour of annexation (Aug. 1871) and the annexation was ratified by the Queen in November, special legislative machinery being set up for the administration of the country by the Cape Parliament in conjunction with the High Commissioner (cf. C459 of 1871: pp. 47, 47; Theal - A Fragment of Basuto History pp. 178-188; Pamphlet no. 13 - Walker - History of S.A. pp. 355-356; Eybers - Documents p. 61.) <sup>2)</sup> quoted freely by Wilmot (Life of Southey) <sup>3)</sup> Walker - op cit pp. 333-345: a well-documented summary of the dispute up to 1871, especially the "game of poker" played by David Arnot with the republics since the early sixties. <sup>4)</sup> cf. letters to Arnot; 12th September, 1870, and that of 29th Oct. 1870 (when Campbell had already been appointed) in which occurred the opinion that "the only chance for Waterboer and the natives generally to be able to keep possessions of their lands will be by Her Majesty taking them over". Arnot's replies, remarks Southey's biographer "would fill volumes. He seemed to possess the cacoethus scribendi!". See also letter to P.L. Buyskes (31st Oct. 1870) announcing Campbell's appointment as magistrate. (Wilmot - Southey: p. 191. ff.) cf. also J. Agar-Hamilton - The Road to the North p. 92.

in the dispute.

Obviously, Barkly could not have mastered the intricate and controversial detail on which the land dispute rested by the time he met Brand,<sup>1)</sup> and he took Hay and Southey with him into the Conference with Brand and Hutton.<sup>2)</sup> If his mind had been unbiased<sup>s</sup> on arrival, his advisers certainly would not have aided him in any efforts at impartiality. By the 19th January, Sir Henry gave up the attempt to meet Brand on ~~the~~ matters of detail, and sent Southey and Griffiths to compare evidence with the President. It was the detail that mattered, and Southey was the last person in the world Brand wanted to meet on this matter. He knew the quest had been in vain. "Considering that we have brought all the points connected with the Vetberg line and the Campbell grounds to your Excellency's notice and being anxious to return home," he wearily wrote to Barkly, "we are desirous of knowing whether your Excellency wishes for any further information respecting<sup>3)</sup> ~~respecting~~ the matter." Barkly's reply left Brand convinced that ✓ Southey's imperialism on the "North Road" had found an eager, if discreet, disciple. He packed his bags and was followed soon after by Sir Henry Barkly on his first visit to the Fields.<sup>4)</sup>

Returning to Capetown for his first meeting with the Cape Parliament, Barkly had the privilege to announce that for the first time ✓ in some ten years there was a surplus of revenue.<sup>5)</sup> In 1868, Southey had laid the first diamond on the Table of the House of Assembly and predicted that it would bring vast changes in South Africa. The effect of the diamond discoveries had been almost instantaneous. The atmosphere of despondency had cleared away. The purchasing power of the Colony was increasing, by 1880 it had risen to 500% over that of 1870. Credit was improving. In 1870 the output of diamonds was ✓ 102,500 carats, in 1872 the figure had jumped to 1,080,000, by 1880 the diamond export value was £3,000,000.<sup>6)</sup> Four years after the active  
 commencement/

1) G.H.18/1 - Correspondence Barkly - Brand , January 1871. The first meeting took place on 4th January. G.H.17/1 - Subsequent correspondence.

2) G.H.31/11 - Barkly to Kimberley, 18th January, 1871.

3) G.H.18/1 - Brand to Barkly, 24th January, 1871.

4) G.H.31/11 - Barkly to Kimberley, 5th March, 1871.

5) A1-'71: revenue for 1870 had surpassed that of 1869 by £103,022 and was in excess of estimates by £117,626. The surplus was £40,000.

6) C.H.B.E. vol.VIII. p.775 ff.

commencement of mining, Southey wrote to Merriman: "Only let the diamonds' mines collapse from any cause and in three years the Cape Government would be in the same difficulties as it was from 1858 to 1870." 1)

The Standard Bank embarked on a decade of unprecedented progress: reserve fund increased from £6,000 in December, 1870 to £335,000 in 1880, and over the same period deposits rose from £504,000 to £5,133,000, loans to the public from £1,370,000, to £6,070,000, dividends from 4% to 16%; and in October, 1871, the bank already raised its dividend from 4% to 5% and placed £4,000 to reserve. 2) Economic prosperity was bolstering up the demands of the Molteno party and, if responsible government was to be adopted, no stronger argument in its favour than the financial solidarity of the Colony would be adduced.

In June 1870, Southey wrote to H.W. Pearson the M.L.A. for Port Elizabeth: 3)

"My dear Pearson - I have never been a Separationist and could never see the advantage to be gained by separation. In the East, hitherto, all the leading men have been too much absorbed in their ordinary avocations to be able to attend much to public affairs, and I fancy that it is still the case. I do not think that there is a prospect of a change of Imperial policy at present. Great changes do take place every now and again, but it requires time to bring them about. I consider the present moves intended to induce the Colony to adopt 'Responsible Government' but it doesn't follow as a necessity that the Colony should do so. No doubt Sir H. Barkly will favour the introduction of it, but there will be no attempt at coercion. When all the movements of troops now going on have been effected, there will still be two regiments between us and Natal. I wouldn't advise much stir in political matters just now....." 5)

But Barkly had no mind to let responsible government at rest for so long as Mr. Southey would have wished it. Molteno was given the opportunity to introduce his "annual" motion in the session of 1871. 6)

Barkly's Executive Council set a resolute face against any constitutional change/

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- 1) Southey to Merriman; 8th September, 1874. (Merriman Papers).
  - 2) De Kock - Economic Development pp.47 ff. Amphlett - History of the Standard Bank p.47.
  - 3) quoted by Wilmot - Life of Southey p.187.
  - 4) Presumably the appointment of Sir Henry Barkly to succeed Wodehouse.
  - 5) The admonition to Pearson was a timely one, even if it proved of no avail, for Pearson, although an Eastern Member, actually supported responsible government in the next session. (vide Molteno - Life of Molteno I p.169.)
  - 6) Text of Molteno's motion, June 1st, 1871:- "That the time has arrived when the system of parliamentary government in this Colony should be carried to its legitimate consequence by rendering the Executive responsible through the medium of its principle officers to the Legislature, and in addition that a commission be appointed by the Governor to consider the expediency of provincial governments with a federation thereof, and if deemed expedient to enquire and report upon the arrangements which may be necessary for their introduction and establishment."

change although, according to Barkly they promised the Governor to abstain from interference if responsible government was introduced, "leaving the decision to the unbiased votes of the representatives returned by the several constituencies at the last general election when the question was fairly placed before the country" <sup>1)</sup> by Molteno, and Porter therefore devolved the duty of initiating the matter.

✓ Molteno's motion was carried and the Bill drafted by Porter subsequent to the success of the motion, was passed in the Assembly by 34 to 27, amid public rejoicing "Crowds waited outside and lustily cheered the Liberal leaders, giving Mr. Porter one cheer more as he stepped into his carriage" records Molteno's biographer. In the Legislative Council the Eastern preponderance and the conscientiousness of some Westerners in respect of ten-year-old "pledges" to their electors, wrecked the Bill by 12 votes to 9 and the East and Southey <sup>2)</sup> breathed once more.

Molteno had consented to tack a proposal to his resolutions, regarding a commission on the possibilities of 'federation'. One must assume that the purpose of the motion was limited to purely "colonial" re-arrangement of districts under local governments and it is to be doubted whether any one at this stage looked beyond this narrow and unambitious object, except a man like de Villiers who certainly envisaged from the outset something more than a mere composition of the Eastern grievance. Molteno himself was prepared just then for neither, as his subsequent actions showed; but he was willing to yield a point in the direction of provincial subdivision to further his ideal of responsible government.

✓ "As I have understood federation" he said in his speech, "it means joining Natal, the Free State and other places. The country, Mr. Speaker, hardly understands this very difficult, intricate question of federation: in fact, Sir, we have not been educated to it. I cannot understand why gentlemen that I know to be favourable to responsible government, should object to get it till they get confederation". <sup>3)</sup>

The east/

- 1) G.H. 31/11; Barkly to Kimberley, June 1st, 1871. G.H. 1/18: Kimberley to Barkly, 21st July, 1871. Wilmot - Life of Southey pp.200-203: minute by R. Southey, E.M. Cole, R. Graham and J.C. Davidson (26th April, 1871) p.203: separate minute by W.D. Griffiths; pp. 204-210: memorandum by Southey on Barkly's despatch of 1st June, 1871 in which he virtually denies the "promise" to Barkly not to interfere
- 2) Molteno - Life of Molteno pp.163-174.
- 3) Molteno - Ibid pp.166 ff.

The East did not propose a larger federation at this time, and Molteno knew it. He knew also why they insisted on 'federation' first, for the tune of the East against Capetown greed and Western (Dutch) domination seldom varied.

It was in this debate, however, that J.H. de Villiers, one of the "silent workers" for a larger form of union, imparted a new note to the old quibbling of the East-West-controversy. As a personal friend of the Free State President he had written to him to hear his views on federation and to inform him of the coming effort for responsible government.<sup>1)</sup> Brand was not averse to the idea and in his reply stated that the adoption of responsible government would greatly facilitate negotiations in this direction. On this authority de Villiers stated in the Cape Parliament that responsible government would clear the way for a union with the Free State. De Villiers had omitted to mention, however, that Brand had attached an important proviso to his offer for co-operation:

"I cannot consistently with my duty as head of the O.F.S. consent to give up part of its most valuable land," he wrote at the end of his letter to de Villiers, "merely in the hope that <sup>with</sup> confederation it will be attached to our province. If justice is not done to us now, we cannot expect fair treatment after confederation."

The prospects of a settlement of the diamond fields dispute had not improved since the visit of the President to Capetown. Brand's original request for external arbitration, had been provisionally agreed to by Barkly,<sup>3)</sup> but the Colonial Secretary thought otherwise and informed Barkly that "to admit the action of Foreign powers into these South African disputes might lead to serious embarrassments" and he saw no reason why the Free State should not accept an arbitration court on the model of the Bloemfontein <sup>hof</sup> ~~fontein~~ one.<sup>4)</sup>

Had the Earl of Kimberley recognised behind the pertinacity of the Free State President not only the mental and moral calibre of the man who was conducting the case of the little republic - for Jan Brand was indeed the Free State in these years - but also those unseen yet potent forces which enlisted the sympathies of every Afrikaner  
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1) de Villiers to Brand, 20th March, 1871. (Walker - de Villiers p.51ff)

2) Brand to de Villiers, 6th April, 1871. (Ibid p.52)

3) G.H. 31/11 - Barkly to Kimberley, 3rd June, 1871: Barkly to Brand, 13th May, 1871.

4) G.H. 1/18 Kimberley to Barkly, 20th July, 1871.

in the Colony as well as the Transvaal, he might have been even more reluctant than he was when he addressed to Sir Henry Barkly the despatch which gave his sanction to the Southey-Arnot-Barkly scheme of annexation in Griqualand West. <sup>1)</sup> Had he foreseen at the time he acceded to the counsels of his officials at the Cape what widespread results this policy at the diamond fields would have on public opinion and on the South African problem as a whole, it is a matter of speculation Southey would have received so powerful a weapon to wield in the Cape Assembly. The despatch of 18th May, arrived while Molteno was making his bid for responsible government. Southey impatiently waited for the end of the debates before proposing his motion for annexation of Waterboer's lands in July. <sup>2)</sup>

The House was depleted after a long session and Molteno's party opposed the resolution strongly. With a majority of one, Southey and Barkly did not feel confident enough to press for a more explicit mandate and with the authorization of both Houses to "take such measures as may appear necessary for the maintenance of order among the diggers....as well as the collection of revenue and the administration of justice" <sup>2)</sup> the Governor and his henchman had to be satisfied. In July the Golconda of South Africa had been accidentally located at Colesberg Kopje, the future Kimberley. <sup>3)</sup> The influx of diggers

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1) G.H. 1/18 Kimberley to Barkly, May 18th, 1871: "It is not without reluctance that Her Majesty's Government consent to extend the British territory in South Africa, but on a full consideration of all circumstances, the presence of so large a number of British subjects in the diamond fields, the probability that this number will rapidly increase, the danger of serious disturbances on the Northern frontier of the Cape Colony if a regular authority is not established without delay in Waterboer's country and the strong desire expressed both by Waterboer and the new settlers that the territory in question should be brought under British rule, they have come to the conclusion that they ought to advise Her Majesty to accept the cession offered by Waterboer...."

2) C 508 of 1872 pp.4,12: Wilmot - Southey pp.210-211: letter to David Arnot (29th June, 1871): "You will be glad to hear that His Excellency has received from the Secretary of State needful authority to enable him to act, with the concurrence of our Parliament, in the matter of annexation. We shall soon submit a scheme."

3) Gardner F. Williams - The Diamond Mines of S. Africa p.302 ff. G.H. 31/12 - Barkly to Kimberley, 29th October, 1872: The most marvellous example of these dry diggings is furnished by the farms "Colesberg Kopje" at De Beers New Rush, where the first diamond was discovered at the end of July 1871, under the roots of an old thorn tree which then crowned a grassy knoll some ten acres in extent, but which has now, from continuous excavations resumed the original form of a crater, and is honey combed with pits varying from 50 to 100 ft. in depth according to the amount of labour employed by the 1300 claimholders."

into territory claimed by the Free State gave the dispute a new aspect. At the same time it stimulated Barkly's impatience. He informed Kimberley that his parliament opposed the annexation not on principle, but because it was too sudden. He was prepared to wait for a suitable opening but "the fiction of acting in Waterboer's name cannot be upheld any longer."<sup>1)</sup>

On 27th October, 1871, Barkly proclaimed the Sovereignty of the Queen over the lands claimed by Waterboer and the Free State.<sup>2)</sup>

The effect, on the relations between the republic and the Colony, of this abrupt negation of the claims of the Orange Free State was disastrous, and the setback to the first signs of a movement towards federation is the more regrettable since there was genuine interest in the prospects of such a movement at the ~~same~~ time. Though Molteno's Bill for responsible government had been rejected, the committee on federation, recommended, in his resolution was duly appointed in June 1871.<sup>3)</sup> It is true that the purpose of the commission was not very much more than an investigation of the advisability of internal partition of the Colony itself and to find thus "whether the good government of the entire Colony would not be facilitated and the contentment and progress of certain portions thereof promoted by its divisions into provinces, each Province having its own Legislative, to legislate for local and private purposes only",<sup>4)</sup> but in the course of its sessions it availed itself of the opinions of men from all the colonies and states of South Africa by means of a questionnaire to leading personalities.<sup>4)</sup> Amongst these ~~was~~ President Brand's consular representative, Mr. H.A.L. Hamelberg; on his way to London, Hamelberg confirmed the statement of de Villiers in Parliament:

"I can confidently state that there is no anti-English feeling in the Free State at all" he said, "nor any ill-feeling against the British Colonies, but the Free State would not be willing to take part in a federation, as long as the Governor of the Cape, or the High Commissioner has such authority as he seems to have now to interfere in the Free State matters."<sup>5)</sup>

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- 1) G.H. 31/11 - Barkly to Kimberley, 30th August, 1871.
  - 2) G.H. 31/11 - Barkly to Kimberley, October, 1871: C 508 of 1872 pp.8, 33, 49.
  - 3) The Federation Commission issued its report in April 1872. (G46-72 pp.1-449)
  - 4) Ibid: evidence pp.78 ff.
  - 5) Ibid: p.102: evidence of H.A.L. Hamelberg, July 15, 1871. Muller - Ouden Tyden in den Oranje-Vrystaat. :pp.177-179.

It was clear that the Free State trusted in the possibility of harmonious co-operation with the Cape Colony only if they had to do with colonial statesmen and not with Her Majesty's representatives wielding authority beyond the powers of colonial statesmen - responsible government had to precede any form of union. Brand, himself, cautiously intimated through his <sup>State</sup> Secretary, F.K. <sup>Wolke</sup> Helme, that he would not make a statement without the <sup>h</sup> authorization of his Volksraad.

Barkly's attention had been caught by the statement of de Villiers as well as Hamelberg's evidence, both signs of the revival of the larger question of federation as Grey had proposed it twelve years before. He addressed a despatch to Kimberley in August, in which he asked for the definite views of Her Majesty's Government if the Federation Commission should report in favour of a form of federation. He even discussed the legal procedure if a permissive measure should become necessary. <sup>1)</sup> Whether Barkly saw in the adoption of a scheme of confederation a means of imperial expansion or merely a speedy and satisfactory way of terminating the embarrassing dispute with the Free State, this despatch indicates that he gave this new idea serious consideration. As had been the case in 1859, Barkly had to admit that Natal was not much favoured as a prospective partner in confederation by the Cape while the Transvaal "is likewise regarded with much indifference". <sup>2)</sup> He mentioned the views of de Villiers and Hamelberg and made the <sup>g</sup> significant observation on the position of the Free State that there the feeling was widely different, "there being scarcely a family in the Colony which has not a brother or son, or cousin there, whilst no reflecting politician can fail to perceive that either for good or for bad, the progress of the settlement on the opposite bank of the Orange River is destined to exercise a most important influence over the future fortunes of the Cape Colony". He urged that no obstacle be placed in the way of a federation of the O.F.S. with the Colony. And yet in this same despatch Barkly contradicts his own estimate of the

significance/

- 1) G.H. 31/11 - Barkly to Kimberley, 30th August, 1871.
- 2) to ascertain the truth of this statement one has but to glance through the newspaper files of these years: indeed the Transvaal in 1871 seemed to be regarded by the Cape press as an ultima Thule and news items were garbled, scant and very rarely published.

significance of the Free State affairs in Cape politics by the Macchiavellian recommendations that the Free State must on no account get the diamond fields since

"It requires no gift of prophecy to predict that, should the Free State be suffered to absorb the best portions of the Diamond Fields, as seems but too probable, it will soon rival the Eastern and Western Province in wealth and population and that it will not then be content to play a secondary part or go on playing customs duties at Cape Ports for all manufactured goods imported for its own use without attempting retaliation". Barkly was certainly not kindly disposed towards republican independence.

His enthusiasm was reciprocated to some extent by the Colonial Office.<sup>1)</sup>

Federation of the states and colonies had by no means been regarded as a doomed project since 1859, both in England and at the Cape. Before replying to his despatch however, Kimberley forwarded to Barkly correspondence with Hamelberg in London, dealing with Brand's attempt to lay his case directly before the Foreign Office:<sup>2)</sup>

"We had some further conversation," he wrote, "on the general relations of the Free State and the Cape Colony, in the course of which Mr. Hamelberg expressed himself strongly in favour of a Federation in which the Free State should be included. He thought such a measure would be favourably regarded in the Free State if Responsible Government were established in the Colony."

\*But he misunderstood the Free Staters still, for he blandly

concludes that "for this reason (the union of the Free State with the Cape Colony) I hoped he would urge upon Mr. Brand the importance of terminating the controversy about Waterboer's territory without delay as the prolongation of the dispute might give rise to bitter feelings which might impede such an arrangement if it were found possible hereafter."

This question of a general federation in South Africa had been in the air for some time and as early as 1865 "Jan Volksvriend"

(J.H. Hofmeyr) the future Afrikaner leader had foreseen ultimate unification.<sup>3)</sup> In the "London Times" appeared a letter in 1868 with the text of Grey's famous/

1) G.H. 1/18 - Kimberley to Barkly, 16th November, 1871.

2) Ibid. - Kimberley to Barkly, 2nd November, 1871; enclosures. (a) F.K. Hohne to Kimberley, 20th July, 1871; (b) Correspondence with H.L. Hamelberg (3rd to 24th October, 1871).

3) De Volksvriend 19th July, 1865:- "Even if it had proved somewhat premature to agitate such large questions as that of a grand South African Confederacy, we find, that if the natural course of events on this continent be pretty much what it is elsewhere under similar circumstances, our political future must at some not very distant time be shaped in the position now indicated. No doubt the United States of South Africa seems as yet a rather high-sounding Utopian title, but we think that it is only what the natural course of circumstances points to as our future."

famous despatch of 1858, stressing the need of a more reasonable trade agreement with Natal and urging a permissive measure by the Imperial Government for Confederation. "The unwitting recall of Sir George Grey in 1858 (sic)" wrote the correspondent, "has been felt ever since from year to year as a great mistake - an error of portentous magnitude"<sup>1)</sup>. And the "Natal Witness" in May 1871, declared as a matter of fact that, "The Federation or Confederation of the four now distinct settlements in South Africa is the leading political idea of the moment"<sup>2)</sup>.

It was inside the Colonial Office, however, that there was evidence at this time of keen interest in the idea of federation on the part of those permanent officials, whose "subterranean" influence<sup>3)</sup> Leyds so dearly saw in Transvaal affairs, and who were straining at<sup>4)</sup> the leash of Kimberley's policy to do something towards the new idea. The rôle once played at the Colonial Office by men of the calibre of Sir James Stephen and Herman Merivale or by "a man named Rogers" who for many years practically dictated colonial policy to his political chiefs,<sup>5)</sup> is an indication of the importance one must attach<sup>6)</sup> to the presence of a man like Sir Robert G.W. Herbert and even to the "young cocks crowing in the Colonial Office" from time to time in these years: E. Fairfield, W.R. Malcolm and Knatchbull-Hugessen. Outside the little group of men at the Colonial Office there was

little/

1) Pamphlet no. 11.

2) quoted in the C.H.B.E. vol. VIII p.443.

3) Leyds - Eerste Annexatie pp.184-185.

4) Dr. Uys (In the Era of Shepstone, p.76. ff.) traces from the minutes on incoming despatches, in the Colonial Office records, the rising enthusiasm of men like R.G.W. Herbert and Knatchbull-Hugessen. cf. also de Kiewiet - (British Colonial Policy pp.296 -297): minute 19th Oct. 1871, by Hugessen on Barkly's despatch of 30th August, 1871, on the "timorous and feeble policy.... which abandoned the Orange River territory and on account of a pitiful economy crippled our power of dealing wisely, calmly and generously with the native tribes on whose gradual absorption under British rule and on the ultimate federation of whose country under one Government rests the great hope of the full and satisfactory development of the resources of South Africa".

5) National Dictionary of Biography art. "Frederic Rogers (Lord Blackford)"

6) Second cousin to Lord Carnarvon. Permanent Under-Secretary for the Colonies since 1870, at one time Premier of Queensland. Herbert was persona grata with Carnarvon and by reason of his close connection with the details of colonial matters must have been responsible for many an important despatch or draft despatch signed by a Secretary of State. (cf. Hardinge - Life of Carnarvon II, p.6)

little to indicate that the British Parliament had taken up this matter of a South African federation on the Canadian model, seriously. Even the motions of R.N. Fowler M.P., do not provide this evidence if one looks at them closely.

The first motion was proposed on 3rd March, 1871 (already<sup>1)</sup>) and Fowler did not even mention in his speech the connection of the project with the efforts to be made for responsible government at the Cape. Why a motion, which undoubtedly of importance on grounds of general policy, should come from a private member, becomes more clear from the fact that he was a prominent member of the Aborigines Protection Society. He quoted freely from a pamphlet on "Transvaal slavery" written in 1868 by his friend F.W. Chesson, the same man who was to rouse the ire of Sir Bartle Frere in the difficult days after Isandhlwana. In 1868, said Fowler, the Legislative Council of Natal had passed a resolution in favour of federation and the "Friend of the Orange Free State" had echoed it and pointed to the misdeeds of President Brand: the expulsion of the Standard Bank from the O.F.S.<sup>2)</sup> thwarting of general progress and construction of telegraphs and railways etc. The old disintegration spirit was strong still:

"Many honourable members" said Viscount Bury, "must be aware that these Transvaal republics, instead of wishing to join us, desired to split up in a series of still smaller republics in order to carry on their own modes of government and to make predatory inroads into neighbouring states with less inconvenience"<sup>3)</sup> C.B. Adderley also suffered from the slave-dealing complex. "He feared, however, that the people of the Transvaal Republic were too much wedded to the commando system; were too much enamoured of slavery and had become too much brutalized by it to desire now to join us. He ~~was~~ doubted whether the Free State would willingly return".<sup>3)</sup>

On April 26th, 1872, Fowler tried to bring forward a similar motion, but after a count the Speaker declared that there was no quorum!<sup>4)</sup> Eventually on 28th May, 1872, Fowler's third motion was adopted and it is this resolution which was forwarded by Kimberley to Barkly.<sup>5)</sup> Fowler's speech again afforded ample proof that his

main/

1) Hansard 3rd series vol. CCIV. col. 1275 ff.

2) cf. Amphlett - History of the Standard Bank in S.A. p.49. ff.

3) Hansard 3rd series vol. CCIV. cols. 1258 - 1291.

4) Hansard 3rd series vol. CCX. col. 1926.

5) G.H. 1/19: Kimberley to Barkly, 1st June, 1872: enclosure - resolution passed by the House of Commons on 28th May: "that in the opinion of this House it is desirable that facilities should be afforded by all methods which may be practicable for the Confederation of the Colonies and States of South Africa".

main concern was not a practical solution of the problems of a dis-united South Africa but a misguided effort to "do something for the natives": wholesale grant of responsible government, British flag everywhere, a wave of the magic wand - and it would be there. Whatever may have been the significance attached to the resolution it is very safe to say that Fowler's programme could not have appealed to a Gladstonian ministry! No considerations of practical statesmanship were responsible for this motion: under the layer of prejudice and ignorance concerning details of local conditions in South Africa there was a deep tinge of the "dear brother" sentiment. It was a motion on behalf of the Aborigines Protection Society and nothing more.

The answer to Barkly's despatch of 30th August arrived in December, after the Diamond Fields had been annexed and the prospects of Confederation considerably dimmed if not entirely destroyed for the moment, and it showed that there was a spirit of extreme caution at the Colonial Office still on this matter of extension of Imperial responsibilities. The major part of the despatch is taken up by a review of the report of the Law Officers on the legal aspect of a political change in South Africa, chapter and verse being quoted for precedents and examples. On the subject of federation itself, Kimberley takes up a disinterested, hesitant and, one may almost say, "permissive" attitude which it is interesting to compare with some of the despatches by Lord Carnarvon on the same subject in 1875:-

"I concur generally in your views on the subject of Federation and I authorize you if requested either by the Federation Commissioners or by the Colonial Legislature to communicate officially with the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal and the Presidents of the Free State and South African Republic on the subject, or if you think it preferable, to sanction the convening of Delegates from those States and Natal for the purpose of considering the conditions of Union".

It showed further, besides the objective interest of Kimberley in federation, that the relief from expenditure still formed one of the primary motives behind the support of the Imperial Government for confederation, and that Kimberley clearly estimated the chances to bring about such a reduction of expenses to be more favourable if Barkly, instead of wasting energy on the larger scheme, would push

ahead/

1) G.H. 1/19 Kimberley to Barkly, 16th November, 1871: Printed in C.508. of 1872 p.13.

ahead with responsible government at the Cape. Hence his concluding remarks:

"It would be premature for me to attempt at present to define the terms of union, but there are two conditions which Her Majesty's Government regard as indispensable to their consent to any scheme of Federation, namely, first the adoption of Responsible Government and secondly, that the united provinces should undertake to provide for the maintenance of order within their territory and for the defence of their frontiers".

1)

Barkly had hoped for much from the Federation Commission and his despatch and the reply from Downing Street had taken some or other recommendation beyond mere provincial devolution, for granted. In reply to a question by Lord Salisbury on responsible government, Kimberley said on 8th March:

"that Her Majesty's Government would be quite willing to grant a provincial constitution if the commission made such a recommendation. I must, however, express my opinion" he continued, "that the future arrangement of the South African colonies will be a question requiring considerable attention because I have a strong conviction that the time is not far distant when all the white communities of South Africa now separated into various states, will form one body.... That, however, is not a matter which Her Majesty's Government in any way propose". 2)

It was unnecessary for the Secretary of State to nip any recommendation in this direction in the bud for the mountain of evidence produced, the proverbial mouse in the report of the Federation Commission, presented in April 1872. The bulk of evidence had been gathered in the previous year, and during February the Commission considered the results. Public interest was great, but the prospects of a unanimous report were remote. 3) Chairman of the Commission was Robert Godlonton, the Doyen of Separation, and on the Commission sat an even number of representatives from the East, the West and Kaffraria. 4) The/

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1) Lord Blachford who remained a moderate "Little Englander" to the end of his days in criticising the 'forward' policy of Lord Carnarvon in 1879, said:- "I do not here express any opinion on the prudence or necessity of this course (of forcing confederation on a government that is not inclined to it) I only say that, right or wrong, prudent or imprudent, it was a clear departure from the policy of non-interference which had been previously pursued....and.... tended to replace on Great Britain the responsibility of the administration and therefore for the safety of the Colony which it was the object of previous Secretaries of State to fasten on the Colonial Government." (Nineteenth Century, August 1879, p.277). 2) Hansard 3rd Series, vol.CCIX. cols. 1621, 1747. 3) Cape Argus, Feb.13th 1872:"In fact there are as many opinions on Federation and Provincial Government as on the best route for the Eastern Railway". The "Argus" regularly published replies of prominent persons to the circular sent out by the Commission. 4) P.E. de Roubaix, J.C. Chase, J.F. Ziervogel, J.C. Molteno, C.A. Smith and J.H. de Villiers, the draftsman of the Commission. Molteno resigned to go on a health trip to Europe and was replaced by W. Porter on August 24th, 1871.

The report of the Commission was not very encouraging to those who had hoped for a larger scheme of federation. <sup>1)</sup> In his despatch on the report, Barkly did not conceal his disappointment: the Draft Bill scarcely went far enough to satisfy any portion of the Colonists unless it be the inhabitants of Graaff-Reinet and neighbouring districts included in the proposed midland province. Grahamstown would prefer two provinces, Kaffraria would like either Kingwilliamstown or Capetown as its capital and the Western Province was content with what it had. <sup>2)</sup>

"Although therefore the labours of the Commission may be destitute of immediate result and no decisive step may be ventured on until a responsible Ministry exists" decided Barkly, "these labours will eventually bear fruit and in all probability the measure then agreed to will not differ very widely from the moderate scheme of provincial government now submitted." <sup>3)</sup>

Yet the/

1) Clause VII of Report:- The majority of the Commissioners think that there should be a division of the Colony into Provinces for local purposes. Some, whose opinions are entitled to great respect, are of opinion that, until the Free State, the Transvaal Republic and Natal showed disposition to federate with the Cape, and until West Griqualand and the country between the Kei and the Bashee, or between the Kei and Natal shall have been annexed to the Colony, no change of the kind proposed will be either necessary... The time may come when the advantages of a union amongst South African communities for the creation of a strong government... will become apparent to all. At present it appears to the majority of the Commissioners that the prospect of such a union is remote, and that the advantages of local Governments should not, in the meantime, be withheld from the Colony as it now exists....

2) G. 26 - '72: pp.2-419: in the course of its work the Commission had collected evidence from 17 leading officials and politicians including John Paterson, Solomon, Watermeyer and Southey. A circular was sent to 168 others in the Colony, G. West and the republics and to 47 divisional councils and 32 municipalities. The response was poor: of individuals addressed, only 32 replied, some merely to say that they did not feel justified to give an opinion. With their report a Draft Bill was submitted, incorporating the recommendations of the majority of the Commission. Three members (Godlonton, Chase and Smith) submitted a minority statement. The main provisions of the Draft Bill were; (1) creation of three provinces including the following districts, Western Province:- Capetown, Cape division, Stellenbosch, Paarl, Malmesbury, Piquetberg, Clanwilliam, Calvinia, Namaqualand, Tulbagh, Worcester, Robertson, Caledon, Bredasdorp, Swellendam, Riversdale, Oudtshoorn, George, MosselBay, Knysna, Beaufort, Prince Albert, Fraserburg. Midlands:- Victoria West, Hoptown, Colesberg, Richmond, Murraysburg, Middelburg, Graaff-Reinet, Somerset, Humansdorp, Uitenhage, Port Elizabeth, Alexandria. Eastern Province:- Municipality of Grahamstown, Albany, Bathurst, Fort Beaufort, Stockenström, Victoria East, Peddie, Kingwilliamstown, East London, Bedford, Cradock, Albert, Aliwal North, Wodehouse, Queenstown. (Clause 2. - Heads of Act. p.12), (2) Powers of the Cape Parliament to be left intact except for removal of certain topics of legislation (3) Equal distribution of revenue and equal obligations towards public debt etc., (4) Elections to the Legislative Council on basis of 7 members for province.

3) G.H. 31/11 - Barkly to Kimberley, 1st May, 1872.

Yet the labours of the Commission were not destitute of immediate result for this Federation Commission served its purpose admirably in muzzling Eastern opposition to Molteno's final effort for responsible government. Molteno's political ruse was realised too late by the East and when the men from Grahamstown saw the report of the Commission, pigeon - holed by Barkly, and responsible government a fait accompli,<sup>1)</sup> the remarks on Molteno's conduct were not complimentary,<sup>1)</sup> and as late as 1880 the charge of faithlessness and a "broken pledge"<sup>2)</sup> were levelled at his head.

Nevertheless, on June 13th, after a hectic hold-up in the Legislative Council,<sup>3)</sup> the Bill for responsible government was carried at last, to the joy of those who had striven for it for many years. The "Cape Argus" chuckled with glee; the East was apoplectic in its abuse of Barkly and the "Eastern Star"<sup>4)</sup> vowed vengeance.

It was an achievement for the Governor too, yet his satisfaction could not have been unmixed: he had rather unexpectedly received a severe rebuff at the hands of the Cape Parliament for his proclamation in Griqualand. The sanction of the Colonial Office to annex Waterboer's country had been on the explicit understanding that the Cape Parliament should provide for incorporations of the territory in the Colony.<sup>5)</sup> Southey's resolution had been to authorize Barkly to annex only those lands proved to be Waterboer's. Barkly had taken Waterboer's claims and disregarded the dispute pending with the O.F.S. Kimberley was dubious and in forwarding Letters Patent for the new acquisition, remarked rather sourly that the Government approved "being convinced that you would not have acted in anticipation of provisions being formally made by the Cape Parliament for the annexation of Waterboer's territory to the Colony unless you had fully satisfied yourself that there were imperative reasons against further delay."<sup>6)</sup>

When/

1) cf. Molteno - Life of Molteno I. pp.184-185. 2) Grahamstown Journal : June 22nd, 1875, June 18th, 1880. 3) Kilpin - Romance of a Colonial Parliament. pp.92-96: Eybers - Documents p.63 G.H. 31/11 Barkly to Kimberley, 17th June, 1872. 4) June 15th, 1872: "We wholly disbelieve the report that the "Standard & Mail" is in future to be issued from Robben Island and we fully expect to see our contemporary amongst the foremost champions of free political institutions and, possibly, spreading its sails to catch new party breezes!". 5) Vide G.H. 1/18 Kimberley to Barkly, 18th May, 1871. 6) G.H. 1/18 - Kimberley to Barkly, 8th December, 1871.

When the Cape Parliament met in April it was in ugly mood over the actions of the Governor. To the West there were two motives for this attitude: firstly, the "Dutch vote" had been totally alienated by what was regarded as high-handed and unjust treatment of the Afrikaners across the Orange, and this feeling of national affinity was more deeply-seated than Barkly had thought; for the first time Afrikaner sentiment was roused into open protest in the Western villages. In the second place, the new territory was regarded by men like Solomon and Molteno as a hot potato for the Cape, while Free State claims remained unsettled. The East, in turn, secretly hoped to keep this annexed territory an Imperial responsibility till the time for a larger confederation should arise and Griqualand West could be clamped on to the prospective autonomous Eastern Province, On the diggings the majority of men hailed from the Eastern districts and had brought with them also an Eastern Press which kept alive the natural antagonism to Cape rule over their new home.

Yet Barkly believed that public opinion favoured his Diamond Fields Annexation Bill. On June 5th, however, Solomon moved an amendment, and Merriman, who had supported Southey's motion in 1871, used his sharp tongue to support the member for Capetown. Needless to say, Philip Watermeyer, "member for the Transvaal",

and/

1) "It was the belief then among members of Parliament, it is the belief now of nine-tenths of them, that the Boers exist only to the North of the Orange River. They will not understand that two-thirds of the inhabitants of the Cape Colony are Boers, and that every light word they utter is dwelt upon with resentment in every Dutch household" (J.A. Froede in Edinburgh - Jan. 9th, 1880. Two Lectures p.79) G.H. 31/11 - Barkly to Kimberley, 17th June, 1872. Zuid Afrikaan (quoted by C.H.B.E. vol. VIII p. ) "No doubt His Excellency has all along depended upon receiving the sanction of Parliament to his proceedings; but we are not so sure that he will find Parliament but too particularly anxious to endorse every step he has taken pleased to take. If Parliament should tell His Excellency that the Colony infinitely prefers its "ancient ally" the Free State to its "ancient ally" the 'nigger' Waterboer, Parliament would not be doing anything very antagonistic to the feelings of the majority of the Colonists."

2) G.H. 31/12 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 25th May, 1874. de Kiewiet - Imperial Factor p.13.

3) G.H. 31/11 - Barkly to Kimberley, 22nd February, 1872: Barkly mentions the result of a by-election for the Legislative Council to prove the transplanting of the East to Griqualand: H.B. Christian defeated W. Fleming by 3466 votes to 1849. Out of 14573 voters only 5315 voted (37%) due to the absence of large numbers at the Fields.

4) G.H. 31/11 - Barkly to Kimberley, 17th June, 1872.

and at this time the best representative of Afrikaner sentiments vigorously supported the opposition. Barkly withdrew the Bill, consoling himself with the powers granted to him by Act 103 of 1855 to use the F.A.M.P. beyond the borders of the Colony. Besides, said Barkly, his correspondence in the matter of arbitration with the O.F.S. "would be more unfettered"!

Kimberley expressed his regrets:

"As you are well aware" he informed the Governor, "Her Majesty's Government never contemplated undertaking the Government of Griqualand West except as part of the Cape Colony and they trust that the time will soon arrive when the present provisional arrangements may be terminated, since it is for many reasons inconvenient that a territory, which is practically a part of the Colony should not be formally incorporated with it.

"You will be better able to judge when a responsible ministry has been formed in the Colony at what time and in what manner the proposal for the annexation of this territory should be renewed." 1)

The prospects of federation at this juncture were undoubtedly 'in abeyance'. The Cape Parliament had clearly shown that it did not regard a constitutional advance as a prelude to a scheme of federation, but rather as a very necessary step towards progress within the Colony alone, in the first instance. It is necessary to divest oneself of the "panoramic" outlook which the Colonial Office held as a matter of course on this question. At Downing Street, South Africa was seen as an Imperial problem, at best as an Imperial worry. The vision of Cape Statesmen did not extend so far; to them the affairs of the Colony were bound up, after all, with the exigencies of practical politics, there was little idealism in their efforts to enhance the constitutional standing of their Colony. It was the opportunity to manage their own internal affairs and to have peace on their borders, that they desired, and no more. Yet they were not impervious to the endeavours of those whose responsibility it was to consider the destinies of the country that lay beyond their borders, but their co-operation was always limited to the extent to which such proposals as the Imperial Government made, were consistent with their material and parochial interests. The reactions of the Cape

Parliament/

1) G.H. 1/19 - Kimberley to Barkly, 7th July, 1872.

Parliament to Barkly's actions at the Diamond Fields represents a significant instance of the mule-like resistance offered to any adventurer of the Imperial Government outside the colony whenever these interests were thought to be endangered. The fact that the Cape Parliament adopted responsible government immediately after the rejection of the Diamond Fields Annexation Bill, is clear proof that the imperialism which was gradually gaining ground in England, found no echo or appreciation in the Cape Colony.

Barkly looked forward to "unfettered" continuance of the correspondence with the Free State when his proclamation had dashed all hopes of a rapprochement on federal lines with the little republic.<sup>1)</sup> Brand now carried on his correspondence with the Governor with no quarter asked or given in the battle over title deeds, historical evidence and surveyor's boundaries, and the case grew more and more in volume and complexity on either side as the correspondence proceeded. By June 1872, however, Kimberley consented to foreign arbitration and suggested the Austrian Ambassador or Italian Minister.<sup>2)</sup>

Brand had scored, but he was not to enjoy the advantage gained, for he was suddenly struck down by a dangerous illness and before he could resume negotiations at the close of 1873, much damage had been done to the cause he had striven for, partly because Sir Henry Barkly had embarked on a course of action towards the Republics which was rapidly closing the road for federation which his Imperial masters would so urgently require in the near future.<sup>3)</sup>

Molteno had formed his first ministry in December 1872, and

to placate/

1) The Cape Argus: 24th February, 1872: (quoting the "Friend") "We, knowing the present temper of our Government and the feelings of the Great Bulk of Burgers of this state have of late studiously avoided this subject and have not so much as attempted to reply to the printed queries, copy of which was very considerably addressed to us by the secretary of the Federation Commission. The only Federation, we may state, which would just now be acceptable to the government of this ~~state~~ country would be a Federation or Confederation of States in which the British Government should have no voice i.e. one after the model of the United States of America."

2) G.H. 1/19 - Kimberley to Barkly, 3rd June, 1872.

3) van Oordt - De Levenschiedenis van President Brand. pp.51-61. G.H. 31/12 - Barkly to Kimberley, 26th January, 1874.

to placate ruffled Eastern feelings, included besides his brilliant young lawyer friend J.H. de Villiers and Dr. White, his Treasurer-General, also an opponent of responsible government, C. Abercrombie Smith as Minister of Crown lands and Public Works, and that veteran of native diplomacy, Charles Brownlee, to guide the policy of the ministry on the Eastern Frontier.

He had received the blessings of the "Argus" and a letter from the new Transvaal President which spoke of a future federation. Even the "Zuid-Afrikaan" which had been diffident about the abilities of the new regime came into line after the first session and grudgingly acknowledged that they had got through more work in 63 days than was formerly the case in longer sessions. The first responsible ministry had an auspicious start: revenue was increasing by leaps and bounds; there was peace still on the Eastern Frontier thanks to the tact of Charles Brownlee and useful legislation had been passed for education, railways and public works.

At the same time Moltano had done his best to crush Separatism even before the session, and in the Governor's speech the ministry had expressed the sincere hope that the East should join in the effort to bring progress to the Colony. Moltano had

introduced/

1) c.f. Walker - de Villiers pp55-63; Brookes - Native Policy pp.107-108. 2) 30th November, 1872. 3) Burgers to Moltano, 27th Dec., 1872: quoted by Moltano (Life of Moltano I. p.201) "I am confident that (the constitutional change) will direct the spirit of the nation in that particular channel which will ultimately lead to a closer union between the different colonies and states of South Africa. Accept the assurance, Sir, that nothing will give me greater pleasure than to see an intimate and friendly relationship maintained between our respective Governments." 4) 23rd April and 28th June, 1873. 5) c.f. A.1 - '73; Theal - (History of S.A. 1872-'84. vol. I pp.3-7); de Kiewiet - Imperial Factor p.65; G.H. 31/13 Barkly to Carnarvon, 8th July, 1875; G.H. 31/12 Barkly to Kimberley, 18th February, 1873. 6) G.H. 31/12 Barkly to Kimberley, 30th June, 1873: "As previous Sessions have generally occupied two or three months there was certainly good for congratulation on the rapidity and harmony of action thus exhibited during the first session under Responsible Government, especially as the business disposed of was of more than ordinary importance as Your Lordship will perceive when I forward the twenty-six acts which have been passed." 7) A.1 - '73, clauses 19 & 20; A5 - '73: minute of Ministers (3rd Jan., 1873) on petition for separation submitted 4th Dec., 1872, bearing 13,672 signatures; Kimberley to Barkly, 14th February, 1873, confirming minute of Ministers; c.f. Newton - Unification p.17.

introduced in this session his <sup>1)</sup>Seven Circles Bill with the express aim of dealing a final blow at the election of the Legislative Council on separatist lines. It proved the fly in the ointment for the Premier. When the Bill was rejected by the Council, Molteno, with his characteristic sensitiveness in matters political, took it as a sign of lack of confidence and asked for a dissolution of both houses.

In the early months of 1873, Barkly came into conflict with the Triumvirate of the Free State over two "frontier incidents". Some time in January the Free State stopped waggons carrying firearms to the Diamond Fields at Magersfontein, on their way through the Free State. The reason given for the confiscations was the increasing gun-trade with the natives working on the fields.<sup>2)</sup> Barkly immediately demanded an apology and payment of compensation.<sup>3)</sup> Under ~~process~~<sup>test</sup> the Free State yielded, but feeling ran high against the High Commissioner for his action against a weak neighbour. "The (Free State) policy is not one of violence but of inexhaustible patience. That is where the force of the Free State's case lies." remarked the "Friend"; "De Tijd", a Dutch contemporary, launched a violent tirade against Barkly.<sup>4)</sup>

In March a second crisis arose to try the patience of the Free State, this time over the alleged shooting of Basutos carrying guns from the mines to Basutoland across Free State territory.<sup>5)</sup> "Sir Henry Barkly - lucky man! - has again found that the British Government has been insulted," commented the "Zuid-Afrikaan".<sup>6)</sup> In the Free State public opinion was thoroughly antagonised by the Governor. Barkly had forgotten a fact which he himself had pointed out to Kimberley in 1871 - the close

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- 1) G.H. 31/12 - Barkly to Kimberley, 2nd July, 1873; Molteno - Life of Molteno I. pp.240-243; Theal (History of S.A. 1872-1884) vol.I. p.10 ff. 2) C.F. statistics of Griqualand West arms, trade given by de Kiewiet for this exact period:  
 3) G.H. 31/12 - Barkly to Kimberley, 3rd and 18th February, 1873.  
 4) quoted by the "Zuid-Afrikaan" : 8th February, 1873.  
 5) G.H. 31/12 - Barkly to Kimberley, 4th April, 1873: reporting the incident, Barkly states that the Commissioners had evaded his demand for an impartial enquiry.  
 6) 10th May, 1873.

ties of kinship and sentiment between Colonial Afrikaners and their countrymen across the Orange. Had he borne this in mind, his memory would have had more pleasant associations in our history, indeed, much of the history of 1875 would have been written differently. He was not defending British honour in standing on his "nemo me impune lacessit"; he was tearing down sympathies and alienating support which was being increasingly sought as time passed and the Liberal sands ran out at home.

Since about the year 1870, the breath of political consciousness had been stirring the dormant Afrikaner nationalism in the Cape Colony. It is true that there had always been able men of Afrikaner birth in the legislative councils and high official service, men like Sir Johannes Truter, Sir Christoffel Brand, Sir Andries Stockenstrom, Francis William Reitz, J.H. Weich and J.F. Ziervogel, who took a leading part in affairs of their day. But they had only proved that Afrikaner ability was as yet an unexploited asset of the colony, and, as far as they were concerned with the politics of their day, had hardly made an effort to form a party group within the legislatures in which they sat, or to speak to the body of men from whom they sprung. A change was now coming about, especially with the return of normal conditions in the economic life of the Colony and easier times for agriculture after the vicissitudes of the 1860's: growing prosperity was leaving more time to the Western agriculturist to turn his attention to the political matters which involved his interests, to contribute his point of view and to participate actively in the Government of the Colony.

What was lacking still, was leadership both inside and outside Parliament. The initiative was destined to come from outside for a considerable time before the influence of the "Dutch vote" within Parliament became a factor to be reckoned with in party politics, and the man who, more than any single individual, was to lead the rise of the Afrikaner in politics, after 1870, was Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr. First as journalist, then the

politician/

politician, ultimately the moving force behind the rise to power of the Afrikaner Bond which ruled the Cape Colony on the eve of the epic struggle of the Boer republics at the close of the century, he had his hand on the pulse of Afrikaner feeling for forty years, and died just before the climax of the drama in which he had played so great a part. Educated on liberal lines, with a thorough knowledge of both English and Dutch and a facile pen in either, he had taken his share in the rise of the Dutch Press in Capetown, which had grown in influence steadily since 1824,<sup>1)</sup> and as a youth of 18, had become editor in 1833 of "De Volksvriend", a paper founded on the religious Liberalism of "Het Volksblad" in the stormy days when the future President of the Transvaal and his colleague, Rev. Kotze of Darling, were facing the fires of controversy within the Dutch Reformed Church. By 1871, "Jan Volksvriend" had become the editor-owner of "De Zuid-Afrikaan", the oldest Dutch newspaper in the Colony, and from this vantage point in colonial journalism he spoke to the Cape farmer in his leaders till 1883, when he threw his whole weight into politics.

A man of untiring enthusiasm and intellect, tolerant yet firm when he was convinced that his cause was just, his standpoint was that of an Afrikaner loyal to the flag under which he was born, yet desirous of living out his national aspirations without violating the political relations that flag implied. Though he lived before the day when the component parts of the British Empire rose from the status of mere colonies, he believed even then that he could conciliate the feelings of nationalism which moved him, with allegiance to the power which bore rule over him and his countrymen in the Colony. He fought unremittingly for the preservation of the Boer republics, yet he maintained till the end of his days that he was no republican. His was a difficult attitude to maintain without arousing the distrust of both republican Afrikaners

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1) Hofmeyr - Life of Hofmeyr - pp.10 - 43.

and English fellow-citizens. He incurred the distrusts of both at times in his long political career. But he was a born leader if one has to judge by his meteoric rise in the confidence of Afrikaners in the years after 1870, when, still in his twenties, his influence extended over men more than twice his age. He entered the House of Assembly only in 1879, ; what he did before that time, was done as a journalist and from the public platform. If we speak, therefore, of the "Zuid-Afrikaan" it is in the first place as the mouth-piece of reviving Afrikaner sentiment under the guiding influence of Hofmeyr and his immediate circle. The "Volksblad" cannot lay claim to such influence even though it was under the direction of ~~such~~ an able man like v.d. Sandt de Villiers; it was closely connected with the "Standard and Mail", and more often than not, at variance with Hofmeyr on matters touching national sentiment. The young Afrikaner leader was identified with his paper more completely even than that big head in the small body, Saul Solomon, was with his "Cape Argus".

From an English journalist, who knew Hofmeyr personally, one of the few who appears to have shared with J.A. Froude the true appreciation of the factor of nationalism in the events of the time, we have the following words, written in 1880, when Hofmeyr was in Parliament and the first lap in his life's work had been done:

"There too, on that same bench sits Mr. Hofmeyr, editor of that widely-circulating Dutch newspaper, the Zuid-Afrikaan, the recognised leader of the Dutch party, precise and incorruptable in spectacles, who speaks as you may have occasion to hear, excellent and forcible English, though with that peculiar clipping short of the words which seems to haunt you all around the streets of Capetown. Mr. Hofmeyr is a comparatively young man, and he has not yet held office. That he will, however, be found holding office before very long, may be regarded as a strong probability. And the day that Mr. Hofmeyr takes office, will be the day of recognised Dutch ascendancy. Consider this fact well; don't turn away from it with supercilious contempt, saying to yourself that the Cape is a British Colony.... the whole of the Western Province of the Cape Colony from Capetown to Port Elizabeth eastward, from the Indian Ocean to the Orange River northward, a territory, roughly speaking, some 400 miles square, is Dutch to the very marrow. There are the Dutchman's grazing farms, his vineyards, his cornlands; there are the homesteads that pass on from father to son in unbroken succession. He is a stay-at-home creature; he loves his fireside better than the street; he has a keen eye, almost as keen as a Yorkshireman's, for the main chance, and he will under all circumstances make the best of things. He made, as

"he deemed it, the best of things, this Western Province farmers, when he schooled himself to tolerate the presence of the British flag over the castle of Capetown..... The Western Province Dutchman has never yet put forth his political strength for two reasons. In the first place he is slow to move. In the next place, no one has hitherto taken the great trouble to tread on his toes. Now, however, you have trodden on his toes. You have engaged in an unjust war with his kinsfolk in the Transvaal, and he is tingling to his finger-ends with animosity towards you..... Take note of Mr. Hofmeyr, for he does not, when he speaks, speak only for himself. There are hundreds and thousands of Dutchmen in South Africa who echo the word he says. And if what he says should seem in any way antagonistic to British Rule, take note of his words all the more." 1)

In 1873, Barkly too, had trodden on Dutch colonial susceptibilities, and his blunder coincided with an undercurrent of renewed interest in politics, fanned by the "Zuid-Afrikaan". The indignation of Colonial Afrikaners had progressed to a further stage on the way to political consciousness. Lindley's defence of the Free State claims to Griqualand West in his book "Adamantia" was greeted with enthusiasm, and just before the Legislative Council elections following upon the dissolution of 1873 the "Zuid-Afrikaan" spoke to the electors as follows (I quote the Dutch text):

"Zoveel te meer betaamd het den stemgeregtigden die niet onder de leus der Hervormingsacte 3) willen opgescheept worden met mannen die anti-Afrikaansche gevoelens toegedaan zijn, wakker de handen aan het werk te slaan. Dat die Acte er doorga, dat verlanger wij van harte, doch zelfs niet terwille daarvan of van een half dozijn dergelijke documenten zouden wij mannen die de uitwoering der Arnot-Waterboer namenrottingen bevorderen willen herkozen zien en leden als de heeren Neethling en De Smidt die zucht met alle kracht welke in hen is daartegen verzetten, de deur zien wijzen. Geschied zulks dan is al het gepraat over Afrikaanderisme en nationaliteitsgevoel niets anders dan bittere spot." 4)

It is with an eye on the Afrikaners of the Cape Colony as a potential factor in the carrying out of that policy of confederation which was soon to become the chief concern of Downing Street, that one thus discusses the actions of Sir Henry Barkly towards the republics.

Shortly after his quarrels with the Commissioners of the

Free State/

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- 1) F.R. Statham - Blacks, Boers and British pp.37-40 (Pamphlet no. 32)  
 2) Zuid-Afrikaan: 29th March, 1873. 3) The Seven Circles Bill.  
 4) Zuid-Afrikaan: 23rd August, 1873. Incidentally the two candidates named were re-elected in 1873. c.f. Kilpin - Romance of a Colonial Parliament, Annexure D.

Free State followed his correspondence with President Burgers<sup>1)</sup> over the Keate Award area.

The new president of the South African Republic was a strange phenomenon in the Transvaal of his day, so strange that even to-day, although recently historians have made his administration the subject of special study, no decisive verdict has been reached on the merits and demerits of his deeds.<sup>2)</sup> "A dreamer, dreaming greatly" said one writer.<sup>3)</sup> Of what? asked the "Zuid-Afrikaan".<sup>4)</sup> Of a united South Africa, but under what flag? His contemporaries never knew what he aimed at, though his utterances leave little doubt that before 1877 he believed in a republican Afrikaner state in South Africa.<sup>5)</sup> A man with the "go" of a steam-engine, declared Anthony Trollope, the novelist, when he met him in South Africa - but a megalomaniac, adds Dr. Uys.<sup>6)</sup> He makes out a strong case to prove that such tendencies as Burgers displayed in this direction, may have had a pathological background in the ailments ~~of Burgers~~<sup>7)</sup> which eventually caused his early death.

There may be justification for all these opinions of Burgers, one fact is certain, the "go" dominated his behaviour in the first period of his administration. Pretorius had left the presidency in disgrace through his clumsy handling of affairs before Keate in 1870. Would Burgers accept the situation created by his predecessor's blunder? He soon showed that he had no mind to do so and had in fact, little respect for the provisions of the Keate Award. Barkly had spoken of "Transvaal slavery" in 1871 already. He now complained to the Secretary of State of Burgers' encroachments in the area assigned by Keate to the Batlapin,<sup>8)</sup> guardedly mentioning his own conversations with Mahhoro-

ane's/

1) c.f. Pamphlets no. 17&18; Engelbrecht - Burgers p.127 ff: de Kiewiet - Imperial Factor pp.21-26; J. Agar-Hamilton - The Road to the North pp.98-124. 2) Dr. S.P. Engelbrecht in Thomas Francis Burgers and Dr. C.J. Uys in his work In the Era of Shepstone (both published in 1933) 3) Hofmeyr - Life of Hofmeyr. pp.154-160. 4) 16th December, 1874: quoting "the Transvaal Advocate". 5) See references; infra p. note 4; also Engelbrecht - Burgers p.379. ff. 6) Pamphlet no. 1. 7) Uys - Shepstone p.201. 8) G.H. 31/11 - Barkly to Kimberley, 8th March, 1871. G.H. 31/12 - Barkly to Kimberley, 15th January, 1874.

agent Arnot and regaling the Colonial Office with a tale of the "intrigues" of Burgers to supersede Mankoroane in favour of the rival chief Botlasitse Gasibone Molabahanque.

1)

On 4th March he wrote once more, as yet unaware of the fact that the Earl of Carnarvon had taken the place of Kimberley. "It seems impossible to doubt Mr. Southey is correct in affirming that short of prompt acceptance by Her Majesty of the proffered allegiance of Manhoroeane and the other chiefs and their tribes, can accomplish this end" was the action he suggested to put an end to the ambitions of the Transvaal President, and without waiting for replies, Barkly and the Lieutenant-Governor of Griqualand West plunged into active advancement of their imperialistic designs on the road to the North: it was still the old Waterboer formula of annexation, and Southey was still adviser-in-chief while Arnot had roamed to pastures new, and now filled the position for Man-<sup>2)</sup> koroane which he had so successfully occupied for Waterboer.

Burgers was plied with despatches and in his answers exhibited a rising tone of irritation at the naggings of the British officials. The controversy soon overstepped the bounds of decorum of official correspondence and it was a relief to Barkly no doubt, when his wrangle with the sharp-tongued President came to a somewhat similar pause as his correspondence with Brand in 1872 - Burgers was prostrated by a chronic ailment while on his way to Botlasitse with his State Attorney Buchanan and lay for some time between life and death<sup>3)</sup> at Potchefstroom. There was even some<sup>4)</sup> hope on Barkly's part, according to de Kiewiet, that Burgers might die and a more amenable successor to be found, but there appears to be little foundation for such conclusions as this historian draws from Barkly's militant attitude. If he reported to the Colonial Office the possibility that Burgers might not survive his illness, it was certainly not with a view to furthering<sup>5)</sup> confederation; that policy had by no means yet become one of the

outspoken/

1) G.H. 31/11 - Barkly to Kimberley, 4th March, 1874.

2) c.f. Arnot and Orpen : The Land Question p. 65

3) G.H. 31/12 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 23rd May, 1874.

4) de Kiewiet - Imperial Factor p.26 (quoting despatch to Carnarvon of 24th June, 1874)

outspoken aims of the Imperial Government at the time. Barkly was concerned only with the more immediate object; keeping a thumb on the republics to prevent any territorial expansion and simultaneously advancing his imperialistic views by extension of Griqualand West Northwards.

Strangely enough, the government which had come to power in February 1874, with imperial aggrandizement as their main plank, did not encourage Sir Henry Barkly in the least in his <sup>1)</sup> policy towards the republics. Carnarvon sounded a clear note of <sup>2)</sup> warning to Barkly in his first despatch:

"With respect to the case of Mankoroane.... Her Majesty's Government (has) no further connection with those tribes than arises from a desire that the terms of the Deed of arbitration as to their territorial rights, to which you, as Her Majesty's Commissioner were a party should be fairly and fully carried into execution." And, although no Transvaal expansion would be tolerated, said Carnarvon, "It would, I ~~think~~, need not say, be a proceeding unworthy of a powerful country to be hasty in settling a controversy with a weak neighbour by premature threats and use of force". <sup>3)</sup>

Richard Southey, however, would not leave well alone and he <sup>4)</sup> got a special reprimand for his negotiations with Mankoroane:

"The question of how far the native tribes were harshly treated by the authorities of the Free State, and what might be the advantages of the acceptance of this territory is wholly different. Whether such acceptance was right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, it was not for him to prejudice the matter and to fetter the future policy of Her Majesty's Government and I am all the more

impressed/

1) Ensor - England 1870 - 1914. p.30 ff. Morley - Life of Gladstone LL. p.391 :- Self-government when it was conceded ought to have been conceded as part of a great policy of imperial consolidation. It ought to have accompanied by an imperial tariff, by securities for the people of England for the enjoyment of the unappropriated lands which belonged to the sovereign as their trustee, and by a military code which should have ~~been~~ precisely defined the means and the responsibilities by which the colonies should have been defended and by which, if necessary, this country should call for aid from the colonies themselves. It ought further to have been accompanied by the institution of some representative council in the metropolis which would have brought the colonies into constant and continuous relations with the home government (Disraeli at the Crystal Palace, 24th June, 1872)

2) G.H. 1/21 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 14th March, 1874.

3) G.H. 1/21 - Carnarvon to Barkly, (Confidential) 25th April, 1874.

4) G.H. 1/21 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 25th July, 1874.

"impressed that a public officer of the experience and the ability of Lieutenant Governor Southey, should have fallen into so patent an error. You will be good enough to convey to him this expression of my opinion on the course which he adopted."

Whatever may have been the course Carnarvon desired to keep unfettered, it was not a policy of coercion towards the republics. His despatches make this abundantly clear, and he left no despatch of Barkly on this matter unanswered. The Governor, on the other hand, instead of seeking a reconciliation with Burgers, awaited his opponent's recovery with impatience,<sup>1)</sup> and meanwhile assured Carnarvon that Brand was the man whom he was treating with caution!<sup>2)</sup>

He was rudely awakened, for on the very day he wrote to Carnarvon, Burgers signed a despatch to Barkly which was certainly the longest ever written in South African history. It covered 200 folio pages and contained more than 46,000 words!<sup>3)</sup> No wonder Barkly was flabbergasted and promptly sent off the phenomenal tirade of Burgers and Buchanan to Richard Southey to draft a reply while he toured the Eastern Province and Transkei. "The notorious despatch" had been couched in anything but the painfully polite and unctuous periods of ordinary official correspondence. To the tune of "your Excellency further states" Burgers had<sup>ass</sup> assailed Barkly on scores of questions of detail and had not hesitated to call <sup>him</sup> Barkly a liar, by implication, in several instances.

"Indeed/

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1) c.f. further correspondence: G.H. 31/12 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 15th and 30th June, 1874; the letter a very lengthy plea for the ideas of Southey and himself, covering 13 closely-written folio pages and surveying all aspects of the case. "Your Lordship seems to think," he remarks in one place, "that Mr. Southey was not justified in describing in the threatening terms in which President Burgers intimated to Man-oroane the execution of the treaty by which his cousin professes to cede to the South African Republic all the rights, as equivalent to a declaration of war, but looking at the situation as not very dissimilar to that which existed in France when the Orleans family sat on the throne, permit me ask, whether, if England had then obtained a cession of Algeria or Martinique from the Comte de Chambord, or worse still from Don Carlos of Spain (whose position corresponds more closely with that of Botlasitse), it would not have been constituted a legitimate casus belli?" Elsewhere he again warns Carnarvon that no strong republican state must be allowed in South Africa for "such a state, despite any concessions that might be made to it of a share of customs duties, would never rest content without access to the seaboard which could be conveniently gained through Natal alone, and one of its first objects would undoubtedly be the subjugation, not to say enslavement of the natives far around." G.H. 1/21 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 29th June, 1874: Carnarvon curtly intimates to Southey that a bankrupt Griqualand cannot annex an inch of territory. (See also infra p. 98) 2) G.H. 31/12 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 31st August, 1874. 3) Volksblad (supplement, 20th October, 1874) - Burgers to Barkly, August 1874. Pamphlet no. 17.

"Indeed" exclaimed the Governor, informally acknowledging the tome, "I am much mistaken in my estimate of the South African public if, whenever your Honour's despatch sees the light, the violence of the language employed in it does not the cause of your Government for more than the most elaborate refutation on my part could do". 1)

But public opinion, as represented by the press, was not so unanimously against Burgers after all. Only the Eastern Star, the Diamond News and the Cape Argus openly disapproved of the despatch, for obvious reasons, while papers like the Standard and Mail, Graaff-Reinet Herald, Graaff-Reinet Advertiser and Graaff-Reinet Courant, the Fort Beaufort Advocate, Colesberg Advertiser and Diamond Fields Mining Gazette, were uncritical. 2)

The "Zuid-Afrikaan" had never defended the legal grounds of Burgers' case overmuch, 3) but this devastating reply by the Transvaal President made Hofmeyr's paper chuckle with satisfaction. "This despatch of President Burgers has at last made an end to that dabbling in weighty interests which has characterized British Policy during the last years, and in the interest of humanity itself, all judicious-minded people should rejoice in this result." 4)

"Grandmamma" was unkind at the expense of both parties: "The style of the despatch is such as one regularly finds in a platform discussion between an atheist preacher and a missionary paid at £1 per week to support Calvinism and Revivalism. Mr. Burgers addresses Sir Henry Barkly as an American stump orator to another" 5)

The "Volksblad" spoke plainly and warned Barkly of the trend of public opinion and the opposition of the Afrikaners to any high-handed action. "Only if all bickering between Britain and the Free State ceases, can South Africa grow naturally to the ideal of a Federative Alliance, which was the ideal of Grey" 6)

And another paper declared its hope "that the correspondence between

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1) Pamphlet no.18. On 28th Dec., 1874, in a covering letter to Barkly a 40 page memorandum by Richard Southey (dated 15th December, 1874) Barkly replied as best he could to the mass of evidence collected by the President. 2) Volksblad, 27th Oct., 1874: reviewing press opinion. 3) c.f. Zuid-Afrikaan, 11th Dec., 1872. 4) Ibid : 21st October, 1874. 5) Ibid : quoting "The Grahamstown Journal". 6) Pamphlet no.23 : articles from "Capetown Daily News" 1875.

"the President of the South African Republic and Sir Henry Barkly, so voluminous, so steeped in gall, must have opened Lord Carnarvon's eyes to the fact that his predecessor had been unwittingly led astray." <sup>1)</sup>

How open Carnarvon's eyes were, few guessed. What was obvious, however, was that Barkly's cup of troubles was overflowing; his despatch on the reply of President Burgers remained unanswered by Carnarvon except for a mere acknowledgement. <sup>2)</sup> The reason will appear in the sequel. Barkly was at deadlock with the republics and public opinion was hostile in the Cape Colony. Moreover, the "empire of Southey" was slowly becoming the worst of his troubles.

Thrown back on his own resources after the rejection of the Diamond Fields Annexation Bill by the Cape Parliament in April 1872, <sup>3)</sup> Barkly was compelled to step into the anarchy which reigned at the Fields. The triumvirate government established in October, 1871, was a failure and a crown colony constitution was instituted. On July 17th, 1873, Richard Southey, a "spare part" in the Colony since he refused the first Premiership, was installed as Lieutenant-Governor at a princely salary which Kimberley <sup>4)</sup> granted with great reluctance. Set down in the midst of the noisy tin-camp which was Kimberley, where gambling and lawlessness, illicit diamond buying and gun-running to natives thrived, where squabbles over tenure of claims and disputes in the crumbling, fantastic mazes of the Big Hole never ceased, with the rising power of companies and lack of jurisdiction over the hotbed of dispute, the proprietary form of Voortzicht, <sup>5)</sup> and impotent in the collection of revenue to bolster up his administration, Southey was beaten before he had started. He had no funds to administer his government, he/

1) Pamphlet no 1

2) G.H. 31/12 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 3rd Dec., 1874. G.H. 1/22 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 15th Jan., 1875. 3) G.H. 31/11-12 - Barkly to Kimberley, 2nd August, 3rd and 29th Oct., 1872; Cape Argus : 21st Sept., 1872; Leyds - Eerste Annexatie pp.157-161. Wilmot - Southey pp.236-240  
4) G.H. 1/20 - Kimberley to Barkly, 24th April, 1873: (~~Struben - Recollections p. 130~~) Wilmot - Southey p.229 ff. 5) ~~Matthews - Inwadi Yam~~

5) Matthews - Inwadi Yam p.275 ff.; Struben - Recollections p.130 ff Wilmot - op cit. p.240 ff.; de Kiewiet - Imperial Factor : not the least of the evils which grew under Southey's administration was the guntrade to natives, to serve as labour-bait. De Kiewiet states that in the period April-Dec. 1873 18,000 guns were imported and 10,000 permits of sale issued in Griqualand West. For the imported guns

he had no police to enforce the law; on the one hand he was under pressure from the possessors of capital, who desired collective holdings, on the other hand ruffians like Aylward, Tucker and Ling, clamoured for individual tenure.<sup>1)</sup>

The Colonial Office viewed this growing sore in South Africa with extreme apprehension, and in 1873 already, warned Southey to furnish financial returns of his administration.<sup>2)</sup> By April 1874, Carnarvon realized that all was not well in Griqualand, and he bitterly complained to Barkly that the Cape Parliament had left the Imperial Government in the lurch in reversing its "pledge" of 1871.<sup>3)</sup> Should Griqualand West be abandoned? This was the distasteful question that hovered in the background. Barkly valiantly attempted to whitewash his Lieutenant-Governor, but the returns were not forthcoming and Carnarvon anxiously repeated his request at the end of the year.<sup>4)</sup> Southey was fighting a losing battle and his imperialism had not gained him friends and sympathisers in the Colony. Carnarvon himself, had sneered at the position of a bankrupt "quasi" crown colony acquiring more responsibilities; ~~7/8~~ "s'heeren Southey's rijk"<sup>5)</sup> became the target of Hofmeyr's sarcasm too.

In/

5) (contd. p.44) the Cape Colony collected 20/- per barrel customs duty, G.West 12/6, and Natal 10/-. c.f. Also G.26 of 1874 p.577: In 1873 gunpowder imported was 479,518 lbs. of which 349,413 lbs. was entered for consumption. In the same year 63,206 guns entered Cape ports, 47,837 being entered for consumption. For general conditions on the Fields, see Cape Monthly Magazine vol.IX. (June-Dec. 1874) art. "From Grahamstown to the Diamond Fields" by Dr. W. Guybon Atherstone: a most interesting and amusing account of the early days. Containing two ingeniously composed letters in rhyme.

1) Southey to Merriman, 8th Sept., 1874. (Merriman Papers) de Kiewiet - Imperial Factor p.50 ff. J.B. Currey to Merriman, 29th Jan., 1875. (Merriman Papers) G.H. 1/21 Barkly to Carnarvon, 25th June, 1874. (enclosures) petitions against mining ordinances. 2) G.H. 1/20 - Kimberley to Barkly, 22nd Aug., 1873. 3) G.H. 1/21 - Carnarvon to Barkly 25th April, 1874. 4) c.f. De Kiewiet - op. cit. p.27 ff. G.H. 31/13 Barkly to Carnarvon, 13th July, 1874. G.H. 1/21 Carnarvon to Barkly 31st Dec., 1874. 5) Zuid-Afrikaan: 30th Sept., 1874: "See, the Government of the diggings only costs £74,000 per year. While New Rush and du Toitspan were at their peak, that money could be found though not without difficulty. But alas! the happy time is past. The population has dwindled to half its original number and is disappearing more and more rapidly. Of those who remain many find nothing to do, for the majority of the claims are filled with water, and those who still continue have less cash than formerly, for diamonds are getting scarce, and prices do not want to rise. Consequently they spend less money, they are less labourers and less guns and ammunition are sold, merchants retrend instead of expanding their transactions and the Government gets less and less in its coffers.... and the beggars' administration may depend upon it that, if the Imperial Government ever decides upon territorial expansion of that Colony, it will take a/

In short, the Governor who really was the prime mover in the Griqualand affair, and who took the lead in the controversy with the Republics, had become very unpopular by the end of 1874 with the colonial Afrikaners and republican Boers. Moreover, the fact that the ways of the Governor were not always the ways of Lord Carnarvon was not appreciated by the bulk of the people and the policy of the Imperial Government was indentified to some extent with that of Barkly in the absence of public repudiation of the Governor's views by Downing Street. Even among the English-speaking sections in the Colony his actions were not endorsed.

Lord Carnarvon had not yet shown his hand, indeed, there was an air of mystery about imperial policy to the Colonial mind in these months after the Conservatives had brought imperialism to power. Then, out of the blue appeared a thunder-cloud.

In October 1873, the Klubi chief Langalibalele, "revolted" on the Basutoland border of Natal, under circumstances which offered good grounds for his defenders at a later date to allege that he had been driven into rebellion by fear and ignorance regarding a "disarmament" policy of the Natal Government. Within eighteen months a voluminous amount of correspondence had accumulated on the subject of the outbreak.<sup>1)</sup> Despite the fact that Barkly and Kimberley had made light of the temporary disturbance of the peace,<sup>2)</sup> "the chief with the long name" had afforded excellent electioneering ammunition to Disraeli's party against the staggering Liberal government in the early months of 1874.<sup>3)</sup> With Gladstone's fall, and the entry of new factors into the case, it had proved a boomerang to the Conservatives, and in turn caused a parliamentary jolt to the Moltens ministry on their placid career

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~~5) (cont. p. 45)~~ "take a similar precaution in the interests of the Batlapin and Barolong's even if they recognised the satellites of Mr. Southey as legal chieftains!"

1) Theal - History of S.A. (1872-1884) vol. I. pp. 227-237: Uys - Shepstone pp. 88 ff.: C.1025, C.1119, C.1121, C.1158, C.1187, C.1141, C.1342, C.1348, C.1244 of 1874-'75.

2) G.H. 31/12 - Barkly to Kimberley, 15th November, 4th and 15th Dec., 1873. G.H. 1/20 - Kimberley to Barkly, 20th Dec., 1874. G.H. 1/22 Kimberley to Barkly, 10th Jan., 2nd March, 1874.

3) Uys - op cit. p. 90.

of railway construction and general economic prosperity.

Langalibalele was tried by an ad hoc court under Pine and Shepstone and condemned to banishment. Molteno readily introduced an act in the session of 1874 for the detention of the chief on Robben Island<sup>1)</sup> and there the matter rested for some months, and would have rested for always had not Bishop Colenso descended from Bishopstowe to break a lance for the exiled chief. Already during the campaign he had made his voice heard, he now proceeded to England where the Aborigines Protection Society and the majority of the press were only too eager to listen to him.<sup>2)</sup> The name of the "heretic" bishop of Natal carried weight and (~~the majority~~) public opinion was not to be ignored: Carnarvon had to take action. The legal aspects of the ad hoc trial had become subordinated to the political importance of the matter. Advised by his Law Officers,<sup>3)</sup> Carnarvon struck both at Pine in Natal and, what was more important, at the Cape Ministry, threatening to disallow Act 3 of 1874.<sup>4)</sup>

Barkly had foreseen such a pass as early as August.<sup>5)</sup> He knew the views of his Colonial Secretary and suggested that the Act was valid after all, in terms of the Prisoners' Removal Act (32 and 33 Vict. cap. 10) and quoted as precedent Macomo's removal and imprisonment. (Statute Book, no.25 of 1857) Molteno himself had become apprehensive of the Colenso agitation and in a long private letter to Barkly, stressed the immediate detriment to peace and security in South Africa should the action of the Natal Government be reversed.<sup>6)</sup> On the same day Charles Brownlee wrote an elaborate memorandum to emphasize the effect that the release of Langalibalele might have on the natives' mind in Zululand and the Transkei.<sup>7)</sup>  
This/

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1) Act 3 of 1874. 2) Zuid-Afrikaan : 19th Dec., 1874; Uys - Shepstone pp.90-92. The Hour, the Morning Post, the Daily News and Pall Mall Gazette. 3) Uys - op cit. p.96: quoting C.O. 179/116. Law Officers (13624) Malcolm to Law Officers 25th Nov., 1874; reply 27th Nov., 1874. 4) G. 46-'75: Carnarvon to Barkly, 4th Dec., 1874; enclosing despatch to Sir Benjamin Pine. 5) Ibid Barkly to Carnarvon 14th August 1874. 6) Molteno to Barkly, 24th Dec., 1874 (quoted Molteno - Life of Molteno I. p.261) 7) G.46-'75 pp.4-7;

On the outbreak of hostilities the Cape Government had promptly despatched a police force through Basutoland under Orpen and Griffiths to head off and prevent an influx of ~~Xhosa~~ Hlubi<sup>1)</sup> to that country. This well-timed action had earned the gratitude of Natal and had given the Cape renewed confidence in the efficiency<sup>2)</sup> of their police as well as the general principles of their policy. Molteno and his ministers were firm believers in the decisive policy and, rightly or wrongly, saw in the possibility of a reversal of Pine's action nothing but disaster to their policy on the Eastern Frontier.

Carnarvon's despatch thus arrived at an inopportune moment and it brought the Secretary of State into conflict for the first time with those Cape politicians who (in the words of Froude) "strut about with their constitution as a schoolboy newly promoted to a tailed coat". Molteno was indignant and stubbornly refused ~~re-~~ ~~fused~~ to be forced into revoking Act 3 of 1874 and he sullenly informed the Governor that the ministry would wait either for a request by the Natal to release the chief, or the Queen's pardon or the disallowance of the Act by the Imperial Government, but it would not be revoked.<sup>3)</sup>

Lord Carnarvon sat up when he met this unexpected resistance from the Cape. For several reasons he had no inclination to quarrel with the Molteno ministry just now. Urged on ~~by~~ by the bogey of public opinion and the tongue of Bishop Colenso he had overlooked the susceptibilities of colonial statesmen, jealously hostile towards any encroachment on the sacred precincts of colonial self-government. Only when he read the strongly worded ministerial minute refusing to repeal an act of the Cape Parliament at Imperial behest, did he realise his error.

On the other hand, the opening of the British Parliament was approaching and Carnarvon did not expect the Liberals to be mute

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1) G.H. 31/12: Barkly to Kimberley, 13th Jan., 1874; G.H. 1/21 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 2nd March 1874.  
 2) Natal Mercury, April 1874.  
 3) G. 46-'75: Barkly to Carnarvon, 5th Jan., 1875; enclosures (1) Molteno to Barkly, 24th Dec., 1874. (2) Memo. by Charles Brownlee, 24th Dec., 1874. (3) Memo. of Ministers, 4th Jan., 1875.

on the matters raised by Colenso's agitation. This delay caused by the Cape Ministry in covering up the Langalibalele affair was inevitably going to lead to embarrassments during the forthcoming session. In the despatch in which Carnarvon replied to Molteno's minute there was a true reflection of his mixed feelings. <sup>1)</sup> "It falls under the head of paternal supplication and also of paternal reprimand. The first characteristic predominating," remarked the "Zuid-Afrikaan". <sup>2)</sup> Carnarvon commenced by expressing the hope that he might tell both Houses soon that the matter had been amicably settled. <sup>3)</sup> :-

"It should be superfluous for me to say" he continued, "that the Imperial Government has never entertained a thought of dictating to your ministers the course which they should pursue in matters as to which, under the constitution of the Colony, they may properly claim to be responsible, but if such an assurance be needed I can sincerely and readily give it to you. I shall indeed rely so unreservedly on the good sense and loyalty of the Cape Legislature and on the wisdom and rectitude of your principal advisers, that I shall not allow myself to doubt for a moment their readiness to meet me half-way in my endeavor to find a satisfactory solution of a difficulty such as that in which all parties find themselves placed."

He proceeded to point out that the Cape had no legal right to pass Act 3, <sup>4)</sup> and repeated that the ministry had placed him in serious embarrassments. A strange mixture of threats and entreaty: he had the right to recommend the disallowance of the Act - what would people say if the Cape resisted him "in so important a matter"!

The historian, Mr. James Anthony Froude, also lent a hand (with or without the knowledge of his noble friend). He had recently met Molteno on his first visit to South Africa, and now wrote him a private letter in which he candidly outlined Carnarvon's position. <sup>5)</sup> "Let/

1) G.H. 1/22: Carnarvon to Barkly, 15th Feb., 1875. 2) 24th March, 1875: 3) He did in fact tell the House of Lords so on April 12th 1875. (See Hansard 3rd ser. vol. C.C. XXIII. col. 664 ff.) "When I read in Sir Henry Barkly's despatch that the disallowance of the Act might be construed as an improper interference with the self-government of the Colony, I confess that I was at a loss to understand the argument. I believe it arose from a pure and absolute misconception of the facts.- certainly from an entire misapprehension of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government. I think I have set that matter at rest...." 4) c.f. Uys - Shepstone p. 95: another report of the Law Officers declaring the Act itself valid but Langalibalele's sentence illegal. 5) Molteno - Life of Molteno I. p.276. (Froude to Molteno, 9th Feb., 1875): As the first unofficial harbinger of the great despatch on confederation, this letter is important. It should be read as an introduction to the second letter of 29th April, 1875. (Molteno - op cit. p.337.)

"Let me assure you first" he began, "that the thought never crossed Lord Carnarvon's mind of dictating to the Cape administration on the course to be pursued towards Langalibalele.... the object was to be able to tell Parliament on the opening that the matter was settled.... I am heartily sorry that in consequence of the reply which you felt yourself obliged to return matters cannot now go off with the quietness which was so earnestly desired. It is necessary for Lord Carnarvon to make an immediate statement in the House of Lords. The papers must be laid on the table. I believe, indeed, that they are already published." Even flattery was not excluded from Mr. Froude's appeal to Molteno to save Carnarvon's skin. "When I had first the pleasure of making your acquaintance, I said to myself that the Cape Colony would have given no fitter proof of its fitness for the management of its own affairs than in the (advise) choice which it had made of a Prime Minister. I told the Secretary of State that you were alarmed for the peace of the Colony and still more for that of Natal, when the decision should be made known. I suggested that another regiment should be landed at the Cape on its way to India, to be ready if needed either in Natal or in your Eastern frontier. I trust I met your wishes in this."

Molteno closed his eyes to the storm that he knew would break over his head in the Cape Parliament. He laid by his dispute with

1)  
Barkly, and acquiesced in the wishes of the Colonial Office promising his assistance by means of the introduction of a bill for  
2)  
the repeal of the obnoxious act.

When the belated minute arrived Carnarvon had already faced a motion of censure for the policy pursued towards the Cape, proposed by Earl Grey.  
3)  
It was in the course of this debate that Lord Carnarvon made a very significant remark in the light of events later in this year:-

"Hitherto the interests and systems of all the States in South Africa have conflicted with each other. My wish is to see those interests and systems brought into greater unity. I desire, in the first instance, to see a greater development of those great resources which South Africa possesses", he told the House of Lords, "Secondly, I desire to see a uniform system adopted in these States, because as long as different systems exist, among them, they will be a perpetual source of danger and, lastly, I look most earnestly to a better understanding being created between the two Dutch Republics and ourselves. I think it would be in the interest of all parties to concur in demanding there  
should/

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1) A minor constitutional controversy had arisen between Molteno and Barkly: Barkly had sent a memo. with the despatch of 15th Feb., in communicating it to Ministers. Molteno's contention was that such a form of procedure reduced the ministry from advisers to advised. (Cf. Molteno - Life of Molteno I, pp.269-270: Molteno to Barkly, 19th March, 1875).

2) G.H. 31/12 - Barkly to Carnarvon: 23rd March, 1875. Enclosure: Minute of Ministers: 22nd March, 1875 - read in the Commons on 20th April, 1875.

3) Hansard - 3rd ser. vol. C.C. XXIII. cols. 664, 1285 ff.

should be a better understanding and a more conciliatory course of action between those republics and our Colonies." 1)

Small wonder that Barkly's complaint of the Burgers despatch remained unanswered.

Lord Carnarvon's high ideals did not save Moltano from the criticism of his political enemies, however. His acquiescence in the views of Downing Street had been indeed a sacrifice of his own interests in this respect. The men from Port Elizabeth came up to do battle. Hitherto the "opposition", as has been remarked already, consisted of personal followings rather than parties formed on principles of policy. In this session of 1875, for the first time something like an organised opposition appeared. John ~~Batter-~~<sup>PATER-</sup>son and Merriman were the moving spirits, and caucus meetings were held ~~before~~ Moltano had to defend his actions on two flanks: the first was that of native policy proper where ~~Saul~~<sup>Saul</sup> Solomon and the "negrophilists" awaited him, the second was <sup>the</sup> constitutional aspect of the case: the relations with the Colonial Office. On the last issue the majority of the critics fastened: Sprigg rejoiced in the fact that on the opposition benches there were at least a few who had not yet "bent the knee to Baal". (the day was destined to come when he himself sat in Moltano's place and heard the same taunt, in June 1880). Moltano's speech was frequently interrupted ~~by~~ amid sarcastic laughter, by Saul Solomon. Fairbridge supported by Vincent and Paterson proposed the second reading "to-day six months"; on the 7th May the debate was adjourned and finally concluded on the 10th.

"Never has a Government run the gauntlet like our Ministry on Wednesday and yesterday on the protracted debates on the transfer of Langalibalele to "Uitvlug" on the Cape Flats" commented the "Zuid-Afrikaan", "alternately it was the subject of taunts and mockery, contempt and indignation. Men of the most diverse dispositions took part in the stoning - the Conservative gentlemen Fairbridge and/

1) Hansard 3rd Ser. vol. C.C. XXIII. col.694.

2) Moltano - Life of Moltano I. p.271. Merriman papers: J. Paterson to Merriman, 30th March, 1875: Paterson suggested that twelve members of both Houses might be sufficient and mentioned Solomon, Sprigg, Fairbridge, Manuel and Watermeyer, for the Assembly and de Korte, Hofmeyr and Godlonton for the Legislative Council.

and Ross-Johnson as well as the liberal gentlemen Vincent and Solomon, "de goedhartige heer Manuel", the vindictive Mr. Boyes, the moderate Mr. Bam as well as the impetuous Mr. Merriman. At eleven o'clock only the torture ceased, to be continued on Monday by such seasoned artists as Mr. Sprigg and Mr. Paterson.... Yet the bill passes with a large majority. No one fears that the rejection will mean the liberation of Langalibalele, the others the dismissal of the Ministry. Hence Mr. Molteno's safety." 1)

Molteno had little for which to thank Lord Carnarvon. Not only had he been made the target of all parties, but he had, according to the "Zuid-Afrikaan", lost ground with the Afrikaners - why, it is difficult to see. 2) While the debate over Langalibalele was in progress, however, Carnarvon's despatch which was to set the whole Colony agog for the rest of 1875, was on its way to the Cape. With regard to federation Molteno found himself in a false position unwittingly: he was upholding the "Imperial Factor" when very shortly <sup>his</sup> deep-rooted constitutionalism was bound to make him turn against Carnarvon's policy. There is no doubt that Molteno had, since the assumption of office, consciously striven to guard the constitutional rights of the Colony and had always been on the qui vive for any infringement of its internal independence. No one will deny that his views often led him to see ghosts, but in this matter of Langalibalele, he was for once lulled into a departure from his usual attitude: he considered that he could yield to the Colonial Office without compromising his position as defender of colonial liberties.

This attitude proved very hard to reconcile with the new situation after the arrival of the first Confederation despatch. It was just because Carnarvon had forced him and not Paterson or his friends, to become the champions of Imperial "fair play" towards the Cape that Molteno found himself in a humiliating position and

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1) 8th May, 1875.

2) Ibid. 28th April and 12th May, 1875: It is more probable that general grievances rather than opposition to this particular action of the Ministry was responsible. The paper points out that Molteno had been the idol of the "farmers' party" but had fallen from favour because he did nothing for them. They expected him to prevent the Free State being deprived of Griqualand West, to appoint Afrikaners to the Civil Service and respect the Dutch language. "Frankly", it declared, "the National party in the House of Assembly is weaker than ever under our present form of government, and for the sole reason that it is unable to form its own ministry." After the debate on Langalibalele, it was noted with satisfaction that, whereas in 1874 Afrikaners had solidly supported Molteno, 7 now voted against him.

felt himself deceived by the Secretary of State.

It is easy to over-estimate, as Molteno's biographer does with such dramatic flourish, the effect of Carnarvon's "deceit" on Molteno's subsequent attitude and regard it as an adequate reason for his opposition to confederation. Carnarvon himself, did not deliberately practise deceit as far as one can judge from all his utterances; he was convinced rather, that the inconsistency lay on the part of the Cape Government. The matter can only be decided by considering what led up to the dramatic declaration of policy by Downing Street, after so many years of wavering, and what factors were operative at the Cape to justify the attitude in which the representations of the Imperial Government were received by the Molteno Ministry.

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## CHAPTER II.

The Despatch of 4th May, 1875.

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The background to confederation - Wolseley in Natal - The great despatch finds no favour - Froude returns - Afrikaners and separationists rise in opposition to Molteno - The prosperity of the Cape Colony; railways, native policy and sound finances - The self-assurance of Molteno versus the tactlessness of Carnarvon.

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It seems to have become customary to open a condemnation of the rôle played by Lord Carnarvon in South African affairs by mentioning his share in the "Little England" policy as Under-Secretary to Sir E.B. Lytton in 1858, then to trace his contribution to Canadian federation and accept the latter event as the prime motive for his "vigorous policy" in South Africa. It is not difficult for those who adopt this method to represent him as the advocatus diaboli of an iniquitous scheme which brought unending troubles to South Africa and Great Britain in the years 1870 - 1881.

In justice to his memory it must, however, be remembered that, despite any personal indiscretions and even major blunders which he committed in his dealings with the Molteno Ministry, Carnarvon was no more than a single figure among many who shared his views. The change in outlook which not only brought Disraeli to power with a programme of imperialism in 1874, but was forcing Great Britain to take heed of the changing face of Europe, was responsible for the new line of policy in South Africa perhaps to a greater extent than any personal influence of Lord Carnarvon.

The year 1870 has been called the "watershed" of the nineteenth century; if it started a stream it was that of overgrown nationalism, and nowhere did that torrent flow more rapidly than over the face of the African continent. With the rise of Germany to the line of first-rate powers and the simultaneous collapse of France, Great Britain began to realise the urgency of consolidating her far-flung possessions. Hence the party-cry of the Conservatives for stronger imperial ties and the stern opposition of Carnarvon to the withdrawal of troops from the colonies which he once

advocated/

advocated and the persistent dangling before the Liberals of (~~the~~)  
1)  
"Prussia's well-considered policy".

It was not Carnarvon who inaugurated the policy of Confederation within the Empire; it was a sign of the times rather, a matter of expediency and necessity. Germany and Italy had set the example of the benefits of a consolidation of interests, Canada had, by circumstances, been compelled into a federation. New Zealand was already unified, and in Australia the movement towards federation was gaining ground even in the absence of very urgent internal motives. Only South Africa, the most curious freak of history within the Empire, was disunited and drifting further and further from the possibility of closer union while it had the most urgent problems calling for united attention of its colonies and independent republics.

Here, more than anywhere else within the sphere of British influence, was an opportunity for an effort to protect a strategic Achilles heel from the shafts of European imperialism.

"Confederation may be viewed as a direct reaction growing out the abuse of what used to pass under the name of disintegration policy, at one time as much in favour as is now its opposing project" wrote a pamphleteer in 1877 in a vigorous condemnation of the confederation panacea, 2) "The supporters of the disintegration scheme granted constitutional and popular rights, on demand, to such of our colonies as were supposed to be prepared for them and, even before they were ripe, some had such rights forced down their throats..... This scheme of the Utilitarian School being set aside for the nonce we have become enamoured of one of a seemingly opposite nature and our authorities are busy endeavouring to bind up the outlying portions of our Empire into confederated groups. It must not be overlooked that this new idea is to be carried out under Colonial Secretaries who, on the average, do not keep office for more than eighteen months at a time, with the assistance of didactic despatch-writers who have a very confused knowledge of the people whose happiness and interests they are so freely disposing of.... It has become a matter of dispute by their respective followers whether the prior claims to the promoter of confederation belongs to Lord Kimberley or to Lord Carnarvon, our present Secretary of State for the Colonies."

Yet another motive for the new tendency, perhaps the all-pervading one, which ran through the whole idea of imperial consolidation in the Seventies, was the consideration of economy.

Even/

- 1) C.f. Hardinge - Life of Carnarvon II. p.18 ff.  
Ibid., pp.26-27: Carnarvon's article in the "Political quarterly" October, 1871.  
2) Pamphlet no.21 ; C.f. Morley - Life of Gladstone II. p.607.

Even the Conservatives at the height of their career of imperial aggrandisement, were as hesitant to make new acquisitions as the Liberals in their most parsimonious moments, and carefully weighed the situation before, <sup>risking</sup> a soldier and especially a shilling for new territory. Behind all the magnificent speeches of Disraeli on England's destiny as a colonial power was always the sobering reflection that the budget must balance.

"The ultimate effect of Lord Carnarvon's South African policy" declared ~~the~~ Carnarvon in a special memorandum to the Cabinet in January 1876, "would be to relieve the Exchequer not only from the ordinary and serious charge of the Natal and Cape garrisons but also from a contingent liability of vast proportions of which there is no way of divesting ourselves while the civilized states are yet isolated from one another." 1)

Then there was the native problem, always first and foremost in Carnarvon's speeches on South African Confederation. Alone among the British colonies South Africa had a native population outnumbering European colonists and, what was worse, not wholly under British control. The always present potential danger of native unrest necessitated stronger military garrisons than would have been the case in an ordinary colony like Australia or Canada. Since 1853 there had been no major hostilities between black and white, yet the Treasury looked with more hostile eyes on the Cape than any other part of the Empire and its animosity was to be increased to bursting point in the years 1877-1880. If Lord Carnarvon believed before 1874 that the solution of South Africa's problems lay in some form of closer co-operation between the states and colonies of South Africa it was Langalibalele which made him realize where the strongest argument in favour of confederation really lay.

But was the native question really such a decisive factor in his confederation policy? It is easy to fall into the error of reading the history of 1875-1880 in terms of native policy, and a historian like Dr. de Kiewiet certainly gives a very distorted view of facts by magnifying <sup>this aspect</sup> ~~this aspect~~ of Carnarvon's policy to the virtual exclusion of other equally important contributing factors/

1) de Kiewiet - Imperial Factor p.67.

factors. A comparison of Carnarvon's despatches of 1875 will show that, as time passed the native problem loomed less large in his appeals for unity; it was only in August 1876 that large he resuscitated it as the thin edge of a wedge used to discredit the attitude of Moljenc and a pretext for inviting the Free State President to his "bundle of sticks" conference.<sup>1)</sup>

Nevertheless the explosion in the "powder magazine" in October 1873 was a serious ailment in the South African problem which Carnarvon inherited from the Liberals thanks to Colenso; Natal had been made a veritable nightmare to the Colonial Office by the end of 1874.<sup>2)</sup> Simultaneously with his appeal to the Molteno Ministry in February, he had taken the first active steps in furthering the federation ideal in South Africa by sending Sir Garnet Wolseley to Natal.<sup>3)</sup>

The task entrusted to the debonair hero of Coomassie was twofold: patently, to place the machinery for native administration on a new basis in order to prevent the recurrence of outbreaks, in reality, to ensure that Natal should be no obstacle to the federation schemes which Carnarvon was preparing to present to the Cape Colony and the republics as soon as circumstances permitted. For this last purpose it was necessary to stifle the independent voice of Natal and the easiest way to do so was to swamp the elective members in the Legislative Council by additional official nominees. This was the main purpose of Wolseley's special appointment.

In informing Barkly of Wolseley's appointment, Carnarvon made it quite clear that special importance attached to the successor

of Sir/

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1) C.f. despatches 4th May, 15th July and 22nd October 1875. Annexures (no's. 1, 2, & 4) pp. 193-200 de Kiewiet - Imperial Factor pp. 85-90.  
 2) For the reaction of the Colonial Office to Colenso's humanitarianism c.f. Uys - Shepstone p. 93 ff; pp. 102-104: Shepstone's letter to E. Jenkins M.P. President of the A.P.S. 3) Already in the last months of 1874, J.A. Froude, a personal friend of Carnarvon, had toured South Africa. With a view to the important part played by Froude later on, his activities had best be considered in relation to his second visit. The Colenso agitation reached its height only after he had departed from England (he passed Colenso at sea) and if he had instructions to investigate Natal affairs it must have been a very subsidiary motive for his first visit; c.f. Paul - Life of Froude p. 22 Froude's report ( C. 1399 pp. 63-64).

of Sir Benjamin Pine:

"He will make you acquainted confidentially with his instructions from which you will understand the reasons for his appointment." he wrote. "It will be desirable that during Sir Garnet Wolseley's administration of the Government you should abstain from any exercise within Natal of your functions as Her Majesty's High Commissioner, of course inviting his attention whenever you think it expedient, to any native questions which appear to you to demand any particular action." 1)

Wolseley reached Capetown at the moment when Barkly and Molteno were corresponding on the despatch of 15th February. 2) Only Barkly surmised the true reason of his coming, apparently, for Molteno actually gave Wolseley his blessing when they met at Westbröcke and wished him luck with the settlement of the Langalibalele imbroglio. 3) In replying to Carnarvon's instructions, Barkly wrote that "Sir Garnet Wolseley was made fully acquainted with the intentions of this government in regard to Langalibalele and its views on native policy in general, and I was able to promise him every assistance and co-operation in regard to that part of his mission..!" 4)

With his colourful entourage, 5) Wolseley landed in Durban at the end of March, packed off Sir Benjamin Pine and set to work on the reform of Natal's constitution. On 5th May, the Bill was introduced, by the 25th May it was passed and Wolseley could turn his attention to native affairs, find leisure to admire the South African sunset from the banks of the Tugela and despatch Butler and Colley on their "intelligence" journeys through the Republics. 6)

How he accomplished this feat, by means of his amiable yet

forceful/

1) G.H. 1/22 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 19th Feb., 1875. 2) Molteno - Life of Molteno p.269. 3) But Mrs. Julia Merriman, that remarkable old lady who evinced a knowledge of Cape politics which shatters all our ideas of Victorian women, wrote to her son, (undated) 1875: "What think you of the idea started that Griqualand West Govt. is to be knocked on the head at last and Natal, Free State and Transvaal to be drawn with us into a Confederation? Sir Garnet Wolseley and staff must have made a great sensation in Capetown." (Merriman Papers) Molteno to Froude, 6th April, 1875 (quoted by Molteno - op cit. p.279. Maurice and Arthur Wolseley p.81. 4) G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 25th March, 1875 5) Wolseley had been "loaned" for six months by the War Office to the Colonial Office and allowed to choose his own staff; he chose his comrades of Ashanti days, including Col. Pomeroy Colley, Col. W. Butler, Major Henry Brackenbury, Capt. Lord Gifford V.C. and Mr. Napier Broome, late leader-writer to the "London Times" (C.f. Butler - Autobiography pp.172-173; Maurice and Arthur - Ibid. pp. 76-79.) 6) Eybers - Documents p.99; Cape Argus - 10th June, 1875. C.H.B.E. vol. VIII pp.255-256; Walker - History of South Africa. p.364.

forceful personality, liberal expenditure on sherry and champagne for the good citizens of Pietermaritzburg and tactful (if not too scrupulous) handling of the elected coast members in the Legislative Council - these things<sup>1)</sup> are familiar in history. Wolseley found the main task over, and marked time in Natal till September, holding the fort for Carnarvon while the latter was in the midst of his "adventure" in the Cape Colony.

On the 2nd June, 1875, Carnarvon's great confederation despatch of 4th May, arrived in Capetown.<sup>2)</sup> With the same mail came a letter from Froude to Molteno explaining at great length why he had advised Carnarvon to send the despatch and containing an extremely tactless suggestion of personal honours should he carry confederation.<sup>3)</sup> Infuriated by the letter (of which, as it proved, also John Paterson had received a suitable <sup>copy</sup> ~~copy~~!) more than by the despatch Molteno opened an excited altercation with Barkly, urging him, despite the instructions in the despatch, not to publish it.<sup>4)</sup> Barkly's sense of duty prevailed, and on the 8th June the despatch was laid on the table of the House of Assembly together with a ministerial minute of the previous day, declining to have anything to do with the proposals made therein. When the Clerk read the despatch by request of the House, Carnarvon's missive was greeted with hilarious laughter, especially paragraphs 12 and 14 which mentioned the names of Sir Arthur <sup>Cunynghame</sup> ~~Amyngame~~ and John Paterson. Sprigg immediately gave notice of a motion in support of the minute of ministers.<sup>5)</sup>

The "Cape Argus" fell upon the despatch as a weak attempt on the part of the Imperial Government to get rid of Griqualand West

and/&

1) Walker - History of S.A. p.363; Maurice and Arthur - Wolseley p.82 ff. de Kiewiet - Imperial Factor pp.40-43; Butler - Autobiography pp.173-175. 2) See Annexure no. 1; also Newton - Unification pp.18-20. C. 1244 p.14; A. 20-75; Standard and Mail (Supplement) 8th June, 1875.

3) Froude to Molteno, 29th April 1875. (quoted by Molteno - Life of Molteno I. p.337.)

4) Ibid. p.342 ff.

5) A. 20-'75; V&P. (Ass.) 8th June, 1875; Molteno - op cit. pp.345-347. Cape Argus 9th June, 1875.

and Natal. The "Zuid-Afrikaan" regarded it from another angle:

"It is clear that Lord Carnarvon wishes to use the native question as a bait to induce the Free State and Transvaal to place themselves under British flags wings" was the comment of Hofmeyr. The paper expressed its doubts about the tenacity of Mr. Molteno's resistance, however, "temporarily the scheme of Downing Street has stranded on the refusal of Mr. Molteno and his colleagues. But will not these gentlemen on the receipt of a second despatch take to flight as they did in the case of Langalibalele?" 1)

Those gentlemen gave a clear indication of their attitude in the debate on Sprigg's motion on 14th June. Molteno could not, and did not intend to retreat from the position taken up in the minute. 2)

Without entering into the merits of the despatch or a discussion of Molteno's reasons for rejecting it, one must confess that the subsequent complaint on the part of Froude, Carnarvon and the local opposition that the despatch had been hurriedly disposed of without the attention it merited, was not unfounded. Space forbids quotation from speeches in the debate. 3) They should be read, however, to feel that it was not sound argument and deliberate discussion which carried the day against Carnarvon's proposals. On the part of the ministry there was a tone of complacency over the prosperity of the Colony and its ability to manage its own affairs. Molteno, himself, participated heartily in the hot-headed demolition of despatch number thirty-nine. The Lion of Beaufort liked to preface his speeches by the confession that he was no orator, but one has but to look at the numerous rhetorical questions scattered throughout this speech to realise that on this occasion he delivered a soap-box oration of the first order.

Sprigg/

1) Cape Argus : 10th and 12th June, 1875; Zuid-Afrikaan : 9th June 1875

2) V. & P. (Ass.) 11th and 14th June, 1875: Sprigg (seconded by Solomon) moved: "That this House, without giving any opinion as to the expediency of assembling a Conference of delegates of the various Colonies and States of South Africa for the purpose of considering the several questions mentioned in the Despatch of the Right Hon. the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 4th May, 1875, desires to express its approval of the Minute of Ministers on that Despatch and is of opinion that this Colony being possessed of responsible government it is desirable that any such proposal as that contained in the Despatch should so far as this Colony is concerned, come from its own government acting in harmony with the Legislative, who are best able to judge of the time and occasion on which such a proposal could be considered with most advantage to the people of this Colony."

3) Cape Argus : 15th June, 1875; Zuid-Afrikaan : 16th June, 1875.

Sprigg resorted to parallels in the British Constitution to  
 1)  
 illustrate his standpoint:

"Sir, if any man wishes to know what is the constitution of this Colony" he exclaimed, "he will not look at those two acts of Parliament alone (Constitution, Ordinance and the Responsible Government Act quoted by Watermeyr). He will look to Magna Carta, he will look to the Bill of Rights, he will look to the proceedings of the Convention of 1688, he will look to the pages of Hallam and May, he will look to the records of the Imperial Parliament from the days of de Montford down to the present hour. Through these six eventful centuries he will trace the growth of the constitution of England, and the constitution of England .... is the constitution of this Colony."

Solomon commenced with an attack on the constitutional views of Froude, who was on his way to South Africa, and wound up with an outburst against Wolseley's mission to Natal. Why did Lord Carnarvon ask the colonies and states of South Africa to devise a common native policy if he himself inaugurated a policy of his own in Natal?

In the Legislative Council the Eastern predominance ensured a better reception for the despatch and a vote of thanks to Lord Carnarvon was adopted by 9 votes to 7.  
 2)

Meanwhile the press was discussing Mr. Froude's return to the Colony, and there was a sure indication of the under-currents of public opinion in the attitude of the principal newspapers. The "Cape Argus" condemned his coming in unambiguous terms and wrote reams on the interference from Downing Street with Cape liberties - this was the ministerial point of view. The "ZUID-Afrikaan" was the main opponent of the Ministry in Capetown, and greeted the decision of Parliament as a rejection of the message of goodwill towards the Republics. This was the second "blow" in public sentiment which must be borne in mind; the view of the Colonial Afrikaners. Thirdly, there was the "Grahamstown Journal" representative of "Eastern" views. The "Journal" was enraptured at the prospect of the arrival of so influential a tool to force on the cause of separation. Three factions were thus in existence: Western conservatives (the constitutional party) including mostly English and a few Afrikaners, anti-ministerialist Afrikaners, whose strength was concentrated in the Western Province, and the Separationists of the East/

1) Pamphlet no.22 p.42. 2) V. & P. (Council) 16th June, 1875.  
 G. H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 14th and 21st June, 1875.

East, mainly in the Grahamstown-Albany-Port Elizabeth area.

The Kaffrarians were a somewhat indefinite group, with little sympathy either way, but gradually turning to the East as time passed.

"Neither Great Britain nor the Colonies and States in this part of the world have yet heard the last of the results of the Langa-libalele business" said the "Argus" a few days after the debate, "If one considers the effects of the action taken against the old chief, it will be seen there is some excuse for the reputation he bears as a magician among the natives. The blundering that then took place threw Natal into ferment and caused an excitement in other parts of South Africa that has hardly yet subsided. It had Sir Benjamin Pine recalled and sent Sir Garnet Wolseley to succeed him; it changed the constitution of Natal and induced the Cape Parliament to pass two acts to keep the chief within the boundaries of the Colony. What is more to our present purpose, it brought Mr. Froude to South Africa to the immense delight of all who wish eminent Englishmen to visit the colonies". 1)

Froude's first visit had not passed unnoticed; an attitude of suspicion manifested itself when he first arrived as a "man of letters travelling for his own amusement" and this attitude now blossomed into open hostility in the opposition press, a wholesale denunciation not only of his presence and activities in South Africa but an attack on his personal views and ability as an historian. No paper was more ready than the "Cape Argus" to expose the superficiality of his knowledge of South African Affairs and his "library mind" and evil designs on the liberties of the Cape Colony. In this light Froude has been mainly represented to students of South African history - as a sort of villain of the piece - and not without some justification. It is, however, only too clear that the opponents of Froude never tried to get to the bottom of his apparently confusing public utterances and have, generally presented his blunders alone without appreciating either the circumstances under which he made them or his true aims which led him into difficult situations. The very fact that he won and retained to the end of his life the trust and confidence of those Afrikaners in the Colony who made his personal acquaintance and who followed his writings after 1875, is an important point in his favour; they did not condemn him as they condemned Lord Carnarvon in 1877, for Froude sincerely remained their champion when those

whom/

1) Cape Argus : 15th June, 1875.

whom in 1875 they imagined to be their friends, proved wolves in sheep's clothing. <sup>1)</sup> He came to South Africa with an unbiassed mind, as far as one can discover, even if the principal aim of his first visit was to reconnoitre the situation as a preliminary to his friends' confederation plans. <sup>2)</sup> His fame as an historian had been established; he had lived the stormy part of his life and found his feet in the academic world. He was an honest searcher in the field of history, a lover of men, at times ~~of~~ a despairing misanthrope - his one passion was the sea. Thus his biographer has <sup>3)</sup> pictured him. Froude moved among great men and ~~under~~ the well-known figures of the nineteenth century whom he counted as his friends, were men like Gladstone, Disraeli, Carnarvon, Chamberlain, Lord Derby, Thomas Carlyle, John Tyndall, Max Müller and Charles Kingsley. <sup>4)</sup> He was no orator, though he made good speeches in South Africa; he could not "think on his feet". It was only in the silence of seclusion that he sometimes made music out of words and infused poetic beauty into facts that were in themselves "just history"; then it was that he wrote a passage such as that with which he opened his life's work "The History of England". Froude was often accused of being lost, like Plato's philosopher, when brought into the upper world of sobering reality. Yet, was it not his strong power of vision, that could bridge centuries and their events with a single powerful paragraph which also enabled him to advance as the critic of British policy in the light of South African history? It is with a feeling of chagrin rather than indignation that one is compelled to notice Froude's errors in South Africa and to see him in a position where he was the target of opprobrium and antagonism in carrying out a task which required play-acting of a

standard/

1) c.f. Zuid-Afrikaan : 2nd June, 1877. 17th and 29th Feb., 1880. Maurice and Arthur - Wolseley p.175.

2) It is to be deprecated that Froude openly lied about his intentions when he was asked the reason for his first visit, since he freely admitted it afterwards: c.f. Froude - Two Lectures p.46; Zuid-Afrikaan 25th Dec., 1874; Molteno - Life of Molteno I. p.330 ff. C.1399 pp. 63-64; Paul - Life of Froude p.254.

3) Paul - op cit. pp.1-49, 72-142, 250, 416-445.

4) Ibid: passim.

standard for which he was not suited by disposition or inclination.

He had gone through South Africa rapidly in 1874, passed through Port Elizabeth, paid a brief visit to Natal, <sup>journeyed</sup> journeyed up to the Transvaal, visited the Diamond Fields and ended his tour in Port Elizabeth and Capetown within two months. He had supplemented his study of Blue-Books, however, with very definite ideas on the situation as he saw it on his journey. For a man of his intellectual power the time was sufficient to take in the more important aspects of the relations between the scattered communities through which he passed; he had met the Cape Premier and local politicians in East and West, he had visited Richard Southey in the midst of his troubles and made the acquaintance of Burgers and Brand. He found the Free State President "a resolute, stubborn-looking man, with a frank but not over-conciliatory expression of face".<sup>1)</sup> But the President unbended after he had heard Froude's speech in Bloemfontein and frankly discussed the dispute over the Diamond Fields.<sup>2)</sup>

Brand was a cautious man with everything and everyone that was English in these days; a man accustomed to keeping his own counsel in a milieu where he stood high above his fellow-citizens not only as the head of the State but in the true appreciation of the difficulties that beset his little republic. He naturally regarded this envoy as a man to be used, but tested first, and used carefully afterwards. If any doubt remained in his mind as to Froude's intention, the speech which the historian delivered in his presence at a Bloemfontein dinner, must have done much to dispel it.

If Britain saw South Africa strong enough to stand on her own legs she would recognise her independence, he said to the Free Staters. Men had told him to see how lively things were at Port Elizabeth. He saw the bustle of trade but too many imports: He

took/

1) Paul - Life of Froude pp.261-262.

2) Froude - Two Lectures p.63: "I much liked President Brand. He appeared to me a just, upright man, who would stand up by his engagements and never utter untrue words. I thought, for myself, that the support and friendship of such a man would contribute more to the peace and welfare of the English parts of South Africa than a hundred miserable diamond holes."

took his audience the round of his journey showing them how weak they were. Natal was asleep with a dangerous native problem demanding attention. It was otherwise in the Republics, but their population was too scanty for safety; the population on the Fields was a miserable lot - What could those speculators and adventurers do for South Africa in her need?

"You have the misfortune to possess" he told his hearers, "soil and climate of an unexampled excellence, and a position on the globe, the most attractive to every ambitious and aggressive power; the independence of South Africa will come when you can reply to those powers with shot and shell." Let them develop their country, cherish their independence and scorn filthy lucre, "Nourish a hardy people whose home is South Africa, and whose hope is fixed here. Then you can hope one day to see your own Confederate flag waving over Capetown. Cherish your independence while Britain is there to protect it for you." 1)

The moral of the story was plain, but the Delphic ambiguity of the speech puzzled those who paid attention to the utterances of the eminent historian. Afrikaners could not believe their ears and waited in hopeful expectation to hear the new note of friendship sounded again. A "confederate" flag was evidently something which was not a Union Jack. The "Zuid-Afrikaan" nodded wisely; here was wisdom and no flattery. "Should these words uttered by Mr. Froude contribute anything to the awakening of a national consciousness, his name will be for ever noted as a benefactor of South Africa."

Was this what Froude had intended to do? He was to make more startling statements in the months to follow. Yet he was the emissary - elect for a scheme which entailed the inclusion of both republics in the British Empire. Froude had already let the cat out of the bag that his mission was not so unofficial after all, and that he had quite a definite commission to report on the prospects of confederation and the circumstances of the diamond fields dispute. 2)

At/

1) Zuid-Afrikaan : 25th Dec., 1874; Graaff-Reinet Advertiser 12th Jan., 1875.

2) Natal Witness : 27th Oct., 1874; Standard & <sup>MAIL</sup> Mail : 14th Nov., 1874: "We were not until the arrival of the Natal post last night, aware that Mr. Froude's presence in this land was so important of such vast consequence. We confess having been taken quite aback when we discovered that he is here as the confidential adviser of Lord Carnarvon; that upon his report the form of the adjustment of the territorial question now agitating the various Governments and States greatly depends."

At Port Elizabeth he had alarmed the English colonists further by placing the "unjust" policy towards the Free State and the brusqueness of the Cape Governor in his dealings with Burgers, at the door of the Imperial Government. What have we to do with Barkly's tactlessness towards the republics? asked one newspaper, in taking Froude to task for his statements in public on imperial policy.

The Afrikaners, however, had recognised in Froude a champion of their rights and that of the Free State; they saw clearly the connection between Barkly's policy and the Cape Colony, and they showed it in their sympathies with their kinsmen beyond the river. On his return in 1875, both Capetown's Dutch newspapers gave Froude their unhesitating support.

Mr. Froude's coming overshadowed the very despatch of 4th May in its effect on public opinion and if the East had shaken its head at the speeches in January, a new tone was now audible; a strong clarion call for separation. Molteno had taken up that fourteenth paragraph as the peak of shortsightedness in the despatch. Separation had been a dying creed, maintained the ministry and their supporters, and these efforts were disastrous in re-opening an old controversy. There was no truth in this contention: separationism was as much alive as ever and the virulent opposition to the abolition of the Eastern Districts Court early in 1875 is good evidence of this fact. A Judicial Committee had recommended the re-union of the two divisions of the Supreme Court which had been set up a decade earlier and this recommendation immediately created great excitement in the East. A protest meeting was convened and Gedlonton, the doyen of Separation

created/

1) Molteno - Life of Molteno I. p.370; Pamphlet no.22. (art "Cape-town Daily News") "It was just this critical stage of constitutional development which was chosen by the Home Government to throw the apple of discord among the colonists and to stir once more the elements of strife. The mistake of English critics has been the assumption that the agitation at the Cape has been a new movement consequent upon a new and bold English policy, whereas it was but the revival of old feuds of which all friends of the Colony hoped they had heard the last".

2) Grahamstown Journal : 10th Feb., 1875.

created tremendous enthusiasm by his speech. Many speeches and resolutions followed, all directed against Capetown "autocracy", and the "Journal" declared in a sub-leader that, "the people were of one mind and gathered with one accord in one place. The sentiment was one of profound disgust and detestation at Cape Town greed and unscrupulousness"<sup>1)</sup> It is difficult to see how Molteno could have considered separation at rest when it came to life so violently only four months before Carnarvon's despatch was received.

Nevertheless it cannot be denied that the distinction which was openly made in paragraph fourteen between an Eastern and Western province added fuel to the fires of Godlonton, Paterson and their ilk. Froude maintained to the end that he had always avoided stirring up this <sup>feud</sup> ~~feud~~ between Molteno and his opponents,<sup>2)</sup> yet his claim becomes ridiculous both in the light of his own actions and on account of the very fact that the injudicious wording of Carnarvon's despatch (which for all we know, he might have written with his own hand!) he was brought under the obligation to humour the Eastern view if he expected any support outside the ranks of the anti-ministerialist Afrikaners. Grahamstown was not slow to point this out for the benefit of all concerned:-

"Separation we have always considered as the prelude to Federation, and yet now the latter is offered us without the delay and difficulties that a chrysalis process would involve, the most determined advocates of Separation treat the offer with indifference if not contempt" declared the "Journal", "To our mind this is inconsistent. Our Course is undoubtedly to give Mr. Froude, as the commissioner of the Imperial authorities, all the support in our power. Should the centralising policy of the West which we are convinced is at the bottom of the opposition, cause this so-called premature proposition to come to naught, no better illustration of the unfair disadvantage this province is placed in, could possibly be given, and the Imperial authorities would have the most practical evidence of unreasonableness of our claims. If separation is worth agitating for, our time will be when the failure of Mr. Froude's mission is manifest. Should the Home Government not support us then it never will, and we may at once blot the word out of our political vocabulary. We are inclined to think under such circumstances we should not urge our rights in vain. The more so as, should separation be conceded

Western/

1) Grahamstown Journal : 12th February, 1875.

2) c.f. Report of Froude, 10th January, 1876. (C. 1399 pp.58-83)  
 Newton - Unification I p.28.

Western politicians will be only too glad to accept Federation or any other "ation" in order to continue as an integral part of a united South Africa". 1)

In the correspondence columns of the "Eastern Province Herald" there appeared a letter, prefaced by a little doggerel dialogue:-

"England: Paterson to represent the East  
Beaufort West: Damn Paterson and damn the East  
Cape Papers: And so say all of us."

"Men of Port Elizabeth" continued the correspondent, "the Queen appoints your chosen member to represent the Eastern Province Covenanters of the Eastern Province Separation League! Notwithstanding Seven Circle's Bill bringing together alien territories, alien interests notwithstanding the proposed destruction of your Eastern Province Court, the Eastern Province lives to-day in the Councils of your Queen. Kimberley promised to hear us another day, but a greater than Kimberley calls upon us to prefer our requests. If we be united and wish it, Victoria's pen will separate us forever from Western Province misgovernment and plunder." 2)

Ample proof that the East saw in Froude's coming and the despatch which was responsible for it, a final chance for the attainment of their extremely selfish aims.

Behind the opposition press one must thus recognise the double-headed resistance to Molteno. Lord Carnarvon had to serve two masters to further public sentiment in his favour: on the one hand the Afrikaners of Hofmeyr's way of thinking, who largely welcomed a policy of conciliation towards the republics as an implication of the project of Confederation, on the other hand an implacable East, extremely vocal after the arrival of the despatch, with little sympathy for the sentimental claim of the Afrikaners whose domination they had always feared as much as they despised "Capetown greed". Now both these sections read into the same despatch a realization of their hopes. One side

had/

1) Grahamstown Journal: 14th June, 1875. It may be noted here that these sentiments were not shared by the Midlands, largely composed of Afrikaners, but containing also a fair sprinkling of English-speaking people who remained aloof from the Eastern extremism without supporting Molteno either. (c.f. Graaff-Reinet Herald. Quoted by the Cape Argus: 10th July, 1875)

2) quoted by Cape Argus: 10th July, 1875; Mrs. Merriman wrote to her son: "I think if you had given more time for consideration you must have seen that the East at any rate would be benefited by a régime which would strip (~~South African affairs and so~~) Cape Town of its undue and selfish predominance and grabbiness in South African affairs and as an Eastern member would not have opposed the Conference". - Julia Merriman to Merriman, 4th July, 1875. (Merriman papers)

had to be disappointed and disillusioned eventually, and the Afrikaners were destined to experience this disillusionment in 1877, whilst the East, though never attaining their aim of a separate province within the Colony, were, as will be seen, greatly favoured by the policy in the north. For these months between June and September then, the ill-matched pair, Hofmeyr and Paterson<sup>1)</sup> son, pulled together against the sullen Lion of Beaufort.

There remains the ministerial attitude to be considered. Molteno and his supporters had studiously avoided offending the feelings of the Afrikaners by preserving a strictly neutral attitude in the dispute between Barkly and the Republics,<sup>2)</sup> and he had according to Froude, even favoured abandonment of the Griqualand annexation in 1874.<sup>3)</sup> All that remained between him and those who felt for the republican cause was that he now stood in the way of a reconciliation between Great Britain and the free states. To Molteno this objection by no means weighed as heavily as his own abhorrence of the despatch, firstly because it encouraged an attitude in the East which he regarded as subversive to the progress of the Colony as a whole. Secondly, he objected to the scheme of confederation as the shrewd business-man that he was. He was never regarded as a brilliant man by his contemporaries, but he had plodded his way to the confidence of the majority of the Cape Colonists by the very deliberateness and caution, which had brought him success in the commercial world. He thus showed a natural and justifiable opposition to a scheme which entailed a more or less artificial levelling of problems without adequate economic and material stability in the communities concerned to warrant such an experiment. Confederation in 1875 would have meant breaking the back of the Colony economically by imposing on it the brunt of the financial burden which the

federated/

1) Up to the Uitenhage incident (See p.100 below)

2) c.f. G.H. 31/12 - Barkly to Carnarvon: 30th June, 1874: "...as to my responsible advisers having ever sought directly or indirectly to suggest to me the expediency of a further extension of territory in Batlapin Land, I feel bound in justice to them to add that there is not the slightest ground for such a notion".

3) Froude - Two Lectures p.49; Report - C.1399 p.64.

federated state would have had to bear in the first years of its existence in respect of its more backward members whose treasures<sup>1</sup> were empty and whose surface was totally devoid of a mile of railway or even adequate roads; added to this was a mass of natives in the republics, Natal and Zululand which would certainly not contribute to the comfort of a federal government and had, at all times, to be considered as a potential drain on revenue. Whether in the process of peaceful administration or the more expensive process of military operations. Such, was the view which, rightly or wrongly, Moltene held and he had some reason to be jealous in his guardianship of Colonial prosperity.

The first responsible ministry had taken office at the turning of the tide. Revenue receipts in 1872 had increased by £300,000 over the figure for 1871, and in the next year they rose, mainly as a result of imports to show another annual increase of £170,070; Barkly could report an actual surplus for 1873 of £306,450.<sup>1)</sup> Revenue for 1874 exceeded the estimates by £375,013 and even after deduction for the Sinking Fund, a slight surplus remained.<sup>2)</sup> Despite heavy expenditure and the negotiation of loans for public works, Moltene was able to show an increase on ordinary revenue for 1875 of £84,901.<sup>3)</sup>

Imports were gradually out-distancing exports, as the appended table will show, yet the discrepancy was mainly due to the value in diamonds which was exported on the person, and

thus/

1) G.H. 31/12 - Barkly to Carnarvon : 27th July, 1874 : summary of Blue-Book for 1873; A.1 - '73.

2) A.1 - '75; G.H. 31/12 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 8th July, 1875:-

	<u>Revenue</u>	<u>Expenditure</u>
1870.....	£ 661,392	£ 35,518
1871.....	734,663	97,712
1872.....	1,039,887	389,318
1873.....	1,232,756	295,943
1874.....	1,518,008	405,523

Total surplus £1,222,014.

Of this surplus £546,966 went to pay off temporary loans and railway debentures. Public debt by the end of 1874, was £2,399,708, representing an interest charge of £123,374 of which £100,000 was met by revenue, and the balance by harbour dues. By 31st December, 1875, the public debt had increased, though railway loans to £2,790,208, of which £364,880 was under guarantee of general revenue (Blue-Book for 1875).

3) G. 59 - '76.

thus did not figure among the official export statistics.

A general atmosphere of prosperity prevailed and Molteno's proposals for railway construction on an unprecedented scale found little opposition.

In the Sixties the East had wrangled unceasingly over the routes of non-existent railways. In 1872, the first sod was at last turned near Port Elizabeth, <sup>2)</sup> and in the same year preliminary surveys and clearing was commenced in earnest. Before forming his Ministry Molteno had gone to London to negotiate the transfer of the privately-owned Wellington railway and concluded the arrangements despite "our old friend separation with a new face" viz. the strong Eastern opposition to Western railway extension. In the sessions of 1874, Molteno outlined his railway schemes <sup>3)</sup> entailing an expenditure of almost £5,000,000 of which £4 million was to be raised by loan and the balance from accumulated revenue: £1,626,000 was to be spent on the Western system and £3,179,000 on the Eastern system where there were no lines in existence, and where the nature of the country would require heavy initial expenditure on the construction of the permanent way. A loan for £660,000 had been authorised in 1873, and Molteno informed his parliament that credit was so good that funded debts could not be paid since holders of Colonial debentures would not part with them before their legal expiration! <sup>4)</sup>

By 1875/

	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	
1870.....	£2,352,043	£2,453,494	
1871.....	2,585,198	3,531,609	
1872.....	4,388,782	4,797,494	(annual increase of imports 69%: increase of exports 36.9%.)
1873.....	5,130,665	3,907,911	(decrease of 25.4% in exports owing to drought and collapse of diamond market)
1874.....	5,558,218	4,138,838	(imports included £500,000 railway material.)
1875.....	5,731,319	4,088,125	(approx. value of diamonds not included - £1,600,000. Increase in imports 3.114%. Decrease in exports 23.7%. Wool 5% less.)

(Compiled from Blue-Books and despatches).

2) Cape Argus: 9th January, 1872.

3) Zuid-Afrikaan: 17th June, 1874; Molteno - Life of Molteno I. p.232 A.1-'73; A.5-'73; A.1-'74. 4) Molteno repaid, however, £235,000 in loans raised to cover deficits in revenue before 1870, and bought all existing telegraph lines., in the period 1873-'74. Molteno - op.cit. p.236.

By 1875 the total appropriations for railways amounted to  
 1) £4,197,000, and Barkly confidently told Carnarvon in July, that

"few colonics could show, as has been done, that they owe little more than a year-and-a-half's income -two-thirds of it being for the purchase or construction of reproductive works, or that they have an annual surplus of at least double what is payable for interest on this debt-.

Such a position fully justifies the Cape Colony in looking to the English money market for a loan of a million per annum for the next five years in order to carry out the General scheme sanctioned by its legislature, and it can hardly be doubted that it will obtain from time to time on the most favourable terms the funds wanted". 2)

Simultaneously with the advance of railways the telegraph system was extended and by 1875, £103,700 had been voted for 1335 miles of telegraph and by the end of that year, 2,040 miles were  
 3) in use. Bridges, harbours and roads were being improved and constructed,  
 4) mail contracts were being speeded up and educational  
 5) facilities rapidly increased. 6) Indeed, at the time when Molteno

was asked by Carnarvon to consider proposals for a political union with the rest of South Africa, the flourishing finances and unprecedented progress in every direction had reached its zenith and the Colony stood in sharp contrast with the sparsely-populated Natal and with the Republics and Griqualand West, struggling to keep their heads above water, with state bankruptcy continually  
 7) threatening their existence. The Cape Colony was the only possible leader in a South African movement, and it was being asked to do so by sacrificing the enjoyment of the smile of fortune

and/

1) G.3-'78 : Act 13 of 1873, Act 19, of 1874.

2) G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon: 8th July, 1875. The Cape had certainly out-distanced Natal, her chief commercial rival, since the opening of the Kimberley market. Natal had no railways to boast of 1875; nor was there any immediate prospect of getting railways, though frantic and misguided efforts had been made in this direction since 1872. Carnarvon himself, smothered the ill-advised Welborne scheme and warned Natal to cut her coat according to her cloth. (c.f. Cape Argus: 9th Jan., 1872. de Kiewiet - Imperial Factor p.wff: Walker - de Villiers p.125. Maurice and Arthur - Wobseley. p.80; Theal - History of S.A. 1872-1884 I. pp.244-245; G.H. 1/20 No.313 : enclosure: J. W. Welborne to Herbert, 7th Feb., 1873; G.H. 1/23 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 25th Jan., 1876.) 3) G.15-'76; G.11-'77. 4) Walker - op cit. p.62. Theal - op cit. pp.7-9. de Kock - Economic Development p.46; A.1-'74. 5) Amphlett - History of the Standard Bank p.36; Theal - op cit. p.7 G.H.17-'75; Molteno - Life of Molteno L. p.202 ff. G.H. 31/13 : Barkly to Carnarvon, 8th July, 1875. (Dr. Dale reported in 1875 that there were 593 schools in the Colony with 51,254 pupils as against 355 in 1865 with 26,454 pupils). 7) C.f. Leyds - Erste Annexatie p.248 ff. Pamphlet no. 12 : O.F.S. revenue in 1874. de Kiewiet - op cit. p.199.

and shouldering the disabilities of communities on a greatly inferior financial footing, with no prospects or means of establishing an efficient system of communications on their own credit as the Cape Colony was doing. The "isolationism" of Moltano was thus not such an unreasonable attitude: the consciousness of the superior position which the Colony occupied financially, together with constitutional objections to the methods employed by Carnarvon, formed an argument against federation which gained force as time passed and eventually triumphed when the energy of Froude and the opposition press was spent.

Not so defensible, however, was the ministerial attitude on the question of native policy. Carnarvon, in his first despatch, made the "recent occurrences in Natal" the text for delivering an <sup>h</sup>exportation to the Cape to co-operate in devising a uniform native policy in South Africa. <sup>1)</sup> In the Assembly the attitude was immediately taken up that the Cape needed no advice on her native administration and besides, added Saul Solomon "it is putting the cart before the horse to send out Sir Garnet Wolseley to introduce a new native policy in Natal, and to state what it is and then to suggest a conference of delegates to decide upon a native policy for the whole of South Africa". <sup>2)</sup> There had been no war with the Xosas for 22 years, and the old "chess-board" policy of interspersing European and native had been abandoned. Since 1865 the Cape had gradually developed a policy of direct administration and de-tribalization of the natives through the influence of resident officials: It was a system different, in a way, from any of the others pursued in South Africa and a direct antithesis to the "herd" policy of Shepstone in Natal, evolved under stress of circumstances to gain some means of control over Natal's redundant native population, while at the same time keeping an eye on an empty treasury. The fact that the Cape had no inclination to mingle European and Bantu, and no necessity for doing so, constituted the principal

difference/

1) c.f. Paragraphs 4 & 5 of the despatch of 4th May, 1875.

2) Cape Argus : 12th June, 1875.

difference with the line of policy followed in the republics  
 1)  
 and especially the Transvaal.

In the Free State there was practically no native problem after the Basutos had come under Cape rule, but in Griqualand West the native mind was undergoing a great transformation for better and for worse. From far and wide natives flocked to dig diamonds for the white man: from Secoecoeni's country and Bechuanaland, from Basutoland and, last but not least, from the Transkei whence it was estimated that one-sixth of the adult males had gone to the Fields by 1875. The influence of the European industrial world was not lost on the native and came to the surface in many ways; and worst of all the consequences of his sojourn at the Diggings was the gun he took back to his kraal. So alarming had the unchecked gun traffic become by 1875, that it was one of the main reasons for the Conference Carnarvon proposed.  
 2)

The Cape had pursued its way uninterruptedly and Molteno had in Brownlee, a very effective guide for the inauguration of the policy of eastward extension of Cape jurisdiction. At the beginning of 1873 a slight hitch had occurred to ruffle the placid waters: the quarrel between Krell and Gangalime which Charles Brownlee fortunately composed without bloodshed.  
 3)  
 Molteno was free to follow the principle of "voluntary annexation" as fast as the Imperial Government would continue to issue Letters Patent. He did so as far as circumstances permitted, but the ratification from Downing Street was not always forthcoming after 1875, for reasons not unconnected with Molteno's attitude towards Confederation.

The favourable position in which the Cape found herself also in this respect, may serve as an excuse for the attitude of cocksureness assumed towards Carnarvon's proposal for a round-table

conference/

- 1) Schapera - The Bantu-speaking Tribes of South Africa (art. J.S. Marais pp. A concise comparison of the characteristics of the different systems of native administration) (ff.  
 2) de Kiewiet - Imperial Factor p.18 ff. Matthews - Incwadi Yami p.94  
 3) Molteno - Life of Molteno p.213. G.H. 31/12 : Barkly to Kimberley, 28th Feb., 1873. Ibid. Barkly to Carnarvon, 12th August, 1874.

conference on native affairs. But was it wise to rest on the laurels of peace with the natives for over twenty years? The answer cannot be otherwise than in the negative if one looks at the events that followed in the next few years. The despatch had not aimed at forcing any obligations on the Cape, it was even free to Molteno to withdraw the Cape delegates from a conference if anything else than native affairs was discussed (as Brand did in 1876). It gave a very reasonable exposition of the native situation at that moment, and the urgency for consultation (paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, & 8). The dangers Carnarvon pointed out did exist and subsequent events proved that it would have been wise for the Cape ministry to look ahead, to face the fact that the South African native problem was at that stage one which was not merely the concern of one state or colony; the great social changes following inevitably in the wake of the contact between black and white at the mines as well as the steady infiltration<sup>ion</sup> of arms from all directions, was affecting Xosas, Basutos, Bapedi, Batlapin, Korannas, Zulus and Swazis alike.

It was Carnarvon's error that he had, through his ignorance of colonial susceptibilities, prevented his despatch in the first from being calmly considered on its merits throughout instead of being rejected on account of its minor indiscretions; it was also an oversight on his part that he did not give the Cape Colony credit for her achievements in the sphere of native administration and the position of temporary security which she enjoyed. It was the fault of Molteno that he could not, as he had done in the case of Langalibalele, choose the aurca media; that he rejected the good with the bad in despatch number thirty-nine. Had he taken a longer view of the main theme of the first despatch - the desire to place the guardianship of black South Africa on a sounder basis at a moment when it was passing through a critical stage in its contact with the European - Molteno might have obviated his Waterloo in February, 1878, when a harrasing Gaitza rebellion (carried on by the guns supplied by the merchants of Port Elizabeth?) snuffed out the life of a successful ministry. He might have spared

his/

his successor and Sir Bartle Frere the nightmare in Basutoland, and the fringe of insurrection on the Northern Border after May 1878.

When Froude landed in Capetown on 9th June, he had a truly bewildering reception: the Afrikaners eagerly expectant, the East willing to trade their support for a kind word on Separation, the other anti-ministerialists eager to make political coin out of his visit, the Governor morally supporting Molteno's attitude, and Molteno himself adamant in his views and determined to abide by the resolution of the Cape Assembly on the despatch of 4th May.

There was a carriage<sup>ge</sup> from the Governor to meet him at the quay-side and also an invitation to attend a dinner on 23rd June, organised by gentlemen known to have little sympathy with the ministry and supported by the "Standard & Mail"; the "Zuid-Afrikaan" and the "Volksblad" the principal papers opposing Molteno. Such was Froude's dilemma.

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CHAPTER III.

Froude in the Cape Colony and Natal.

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The speech at the Capetown dinner - "Hopes which must not now be disappointed". - The campaign in the West - Merriman enters the ministry - The second despatch on confederation - Froude throws off the mask at Port Elizabeth - Public sentiment before the special session; John Paterson, Premier-to-be and the Uitenhage incident - The attitude of the Republics and the plight of Richard Southey - Barkly and Molteno estranged on the eve of the special session - The special session: Carnarvon's third despatch scatters the opposition - The role of Froude.

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Froude made up his mind in favour of the dinner and crossed the Rubicon despite the warnings of Molteno and Barkly.<sup>1)</sup> In doing so he maintained that he was not taking sides in colonial politics, but removing misapprehensions with regard to Lord Carnarvon's despatch.<sup>2)</sup>

"In the ambiguous position which I hold" he wrote to Molteno, "it would be improper for me to do anything which could have an unconstitutional semblance. I shall be called on, however, for explanations at home, and I must ask you therefore, to put in writing what you stated to me verbally in a form which I can transact to Lord Carnarvon" and he added in a post-script, "Will you also kindly define for me for my future guidance what you conceive to be the limits of my constitutional freedom while I remain in this Colony".

He thus virtually gave the Premier the right to lodge his objections with the Secretary of State who was more than three weeks away, as far as communication was concerned, while he proceeded to propound his views as official mouth-piece of Lord Carnarvon until further instructions arrived. Molteno's objection to Froude's public appearance had been purely constitutional, and on the constitutional aspect little can be said against his view that "any explanation which, in the position you hold, you may wish to make to the people of this Colony, as to the purport of Lord Carnarvon's despatch, should not from a constitutional point of view, apart from other reasons, be made otherwise than through the Colonial government".<sup>3)</sup>

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Froude/

1) Correspondence between Molteno and Froude (21st & 22nd June, 1875) quoted by Molteno - Life of Molteno I. pp.358-359.

2) Froude - Oceana p.51: In 1886 he gave as a further reason his desire to use the despatch as a means of settling the quarrel with the republics. Was he sincere or was it an ex post facto statement?

3) Molteno - Life of Molteno p.359: Molteno to Froude, June 22nd, 1875.

Froude had been sent by Lord Carnarvon on the assumption that the proposed conference would be held and that he should be the representative of the Secretary of State at such a conference. The resolution of the Cape Assembly automatically removed his raison d' être in South Africa. The question arises whether he still had any official authority apart from his personal connection with Lord Carnarvon. Molteno held that any he may have been holding was subordinated to the decision of the Cape Assembly and that the direct expression of his views, contrary to the decision of the Cape legislature, would be an infringement of the internal sovereignty of the Colonial Parliament. In appearing at the Commercial Exchange to address pronounced antagonists of the Ministry Froude<sup>1</sup> stood on very flimsy legal ground. His biographer, who clearly stresses the fact that Froude thought the granting of responsible government to the Cape "an act of deliberate insanity" on the part of Kimberley, also gives his opinion of his first public appearance as follows:

"Froude, however, both went (to the dinner) and spoke, claiming as an Englishman the right of free speech in a British colony. The right was of course incontestable, the expediency was a different matter. Froude was not accustomed to public speaking and only long experience can teach that most difficult part of the process, the instinctive avoidance of what should not be said. His brilliant lectures were all read from manuscript and he had never been in the habit of thinking on his legs. In 1874 he could at least say that he spoke for himself. In 1875 he committed the Colonial Office and even the Cabinet to his own personal opinions which were not in favour of Parliamentary government as understood either by English or by Afrianders". 2)

Had Froude attacked the colonial ministry as a "private man of letters" and publicly repudiated (under circumstances not foreseen by Lord Carnarvon when he gave him his instructions) the fact that he spoke for the Secretary of State, he would have withheld from Molteno the most powerful weapon of defence against the storm of public opinion raised between his arrival and the special session in November. He chose to use the names of Lord Carnarvon and the Queen to lend authority to his words when he might have reached the same effect without laying himself open to the charge of unconstitutional agitation.

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Mr. Barry/

1) Paul - Life of Froude p.266.  
 2) Paul - Ibid. p.267.

Mr. Barry took the chair on 28th June, the night of the historic dinner. The Governor and his ministry were not represented among the 200 guests present. They had declined their invitations. "We thank the Governor, the ministry and other opposition for the resistance they have offered" said the "Zuid-Afrikaan" afterwards, "By so doing they have given to a banquet which would otherwise have been meaningless and colourless, all the attributes of an inspiring, triumphant, glorious, political demonstration".<sup>1)</sup> Under banners of "Loyalty" and "Patriotism" Froude rose to speak and, despite the apologies of his biographer, it was a brilliant speech which he delivered.

He described how his knowledge of South African affairs was the result of assiduous study of Blue-Books in 1874, and that he delighted in the opportunity as an intimate friend of Lord Carnarvon to be able to remove misapprehensions in the despatch. He sarcastically alluded to Molteno's letters of the previous week. Since the conference was rejected he could be himself and speak out. He acknowledged that he was in a position "to a certain extent ambiguous" but he had a sacred duty to fulfil in disillusioning the Cape public and he had the right of a British subject to speak. For the Afrikaners he had a special word: he unmistakably condemned Barkly's policy towards the republics. The only remedy, he added, was to table grievances - and that was what the ministry called an infringement of the privileges of selfgovernment! Froude went on <sup>in</sup> the same vein to demonstrate how confederation had really been a very secondary motive in the despatch. People had been so kind as to attribute to him the idea of confederation - he did not deny it - for he understood republican feeling, he had seen the "Express" and he respected it.<sup>2)</sup> Nobody ~~would~~ <sup>would</sup> ~~take~~ <sup>take/</sup>

1) Zuid-Afrikaan: 30th June, 1875: unless otherwise stated all detail in connection with Froude's tour is taken from the reports of "Z.-Afr."  
 2) Note the influence of this speech on the "Express": quoted in the Zuid-Afrikaan: 26th June, 1875 - "It is time to speak out and speak without ambiguity. Those who are not with us are against us, and we know only one answer to any attempt to hoist the British flag on our soil, which is concise and sincere 'NO' ". On the 10th July, the "Zuid-Afrikaan" quoted another leader: this time the paper urges a departure from extremist views and a moderate outlook. The extreme courtesy of Carnarvon's despatch is favourably compared with the tone of Barkly's correspondence. While the G. West dispute remained unsettled however there was no chance of federation.

take the republics' independence away. He saw in the despatch of Carnarvon this same desire to allow the South African community to work out its own destiny.

His defence of the inclusion of names in the despatch was not so convincing and he cautiously refrained from defending the fact that it had been done. "I do not appeal to the inhabitants of this Colony against their ministers", he exclaimed in conclusion, "I appeal to the Ministry of this colony against themselves". And his enthusiastic audience never paused to analyse his logic!

Barry replied and was followed by Sebastiaan van Reenen of Constantia who spoke "by the request of his best and most intimate friends". In his reply Froude voiced a thought which in after years continually recurred in his writings. People had thought of creating a Gibraltar at Simonstown, he said, i.e. to abandon South Africa and preserve a strategic point in the Peninsula (that was Froude's own view as it proved subsequently) but Lord Carnarvon preferred a solid South Africa. More toasts followed and among the speakers were both v. d. Sandt de Villiers of the "Volksblad" and Hofmeyr himself on behalf of the "Zuid-Afrikaan."

Needless to say, Froude's words caught the ear of the Dutch press, and if he had been playing to the gallery, sincerely or hypocritically, he had succeeded as well as he could wish: his task lay in the West, in the first instance, and he knew it. Hofmeyr had a large following and Philip Watermeyer had joined the ranks of anti-ministerialists. R.W. Murray and the "Standard & Mail" as well as its Dutch counterpart the "Volksblad" were behind him, together with 30 newspapers throughout South Africa, while only four proclaimed in favour of Molteno.<sup>1)</sup> On the 9th July, Froude wrote to his daughter:

"Here the authorities are beginning to be more respectful. Last night there was a State Dinner at Government House when I took in Lady Barkly.... Outside Capetown, on the contrary, in every town in the country, Dutch or English, I should be carried through the streets on the people's shoulders if I would only allow it.... Things are in a pretty wild state here and grow  
daily/

1) Zuid-Afrikaan - 7th July, 1875.

daily wilder. I am responsible for having lighted the straw, and if Lord Carnarvon has been frightened at the first bad news there will be danger of real disturbance. The despatch has created a real enthusiasm and excited hopes which must not now be disappointed". 1)

He could only have referred to Afrikaner hopes for he realised what an important element of public opinion was lying fallow, ready to be used in support of confederation, if cautiously handled; in his task (self-imposed) to guide public reaction against Molteno it would prove an invaluable ally.

About the same time Mrs. Merriman wrote a letter to her son which revealed perhaps more accurate insight into the situation which Froude in the hour of his popularity had seen in such roseate colours:

"Whether the Dutch will knock under to our flag is problematical" wrote this lady with the remarkable political acumen, 2) "Mr. Burgers may dine with the queen and the Dutchers in Capetown may dine with Mr. Froude, but I don't fancy the Dutch birds will be caught with chaff nor with anything more substantial. 3) Mrs. Orpen thinks very likely the Free State will get the Home Government to return the Fields (or rather give up the fields for Mr. O. says they never belonged to the F.S.) as a lure into the Confederation enclosure, but when the Free Staters have secured them they will kick up their heels and have nothing to do with us - I thought Mr. Froude a hambug from the time he held forth at Bw-tein. I wish Lrd. C. had made use of a man more sound in the faith and consequently more steady and dependable in his views and actions with regard to things mundane." 4)

On 20th July the "Zuid-Afrikaan" announced Froude's itinerary through the Western Province, commencing on 14th July. Before his departure Froude had advised Barkly to forward the despatch of 4th May officially to the republics (although it was published in the press long before already) and on the 25th of June Barkly did so. 5)

Froude/

- 1) Paul - Life of Froude: pp.264-265 (the underlining is mine).
- 2) Julia Merriman to Merriman: 4th July, 1875 (Merriman Papers).
- 3) c.f. Zuid-Afrikaan: 28th July, 1875: "Elfde Gespreck Tu-se Oom Jan Vasvat en Neef Daantjie Loslaat deur Klaas Waarzegger Junior - ..... Kyk hoe maak hulle met Burgers in Engeland. Simpanje en serrie kan banja doen. Dit sal mijn nix verwonder nie as hy nog een dag Engelse Goufeneur word wat o'er die Transvaal regeer - Nou kom Froude wat lekker kan praat en die Afrikaners heuning om hulle mond smeer, en so denk die Engelsman sal ek mijn plan tog uitvoer en sal mijn vlag waai o'er die hele Suid-Afrika - Transvaal syn goudvelde saam".
- 4) Referring in all probability to the fact that Froude had been virtually expelled from Oxford in 1849 for his treatise on "The Nemesis of Faith" which was regarded as heretical ( Paul - Op cit. pp.47-49) Mrs. Merriman was, after all, a bishop's wife!
- 5) G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon: 1st July, 1875.

Froude opened his campaign at Stellenbosch on the appointed day, and ostentatiously refused to participate in a public demonstration after he had been liberally entertained at an Elsenburg farm and had granted many "interviews" on his mission. He was offered a private dinner by Mr. W.A. Krige and in the presence of a hundred guests, including professors from the Gymnasium and Theological Seminary, Froude held a short speech in reply to a toast by Professor Murray, who openly praised his mission. He said little of importance. It was his policy to let the public speak where possible, and the value of private dinners for this purpose was obvious. The propaganda value was decidedly higher than that of a mere public meeting. Froude's refusal to speak, only served the useful purpose of enlisting public sympathy with his difficult position and to suspend the halo of a martyr to the constitutionalism of Molteno over his head. Besides, the presence of the representatives of at least three Western newspapers ensured that his actions and words would be carried to the remotest Cape farmhouse.

It was true at the same time that Froude here gained an intimate knowledge of the outlook of these people on whom the success of Carnarvon's proposals to such a large extent depended.

"The farmers attend to their own business" he wrote in his report, "and think little of the politics of the day. Outside their own concerns they care only for their own history and the interests of their own nationality. They have long memories. They can write the catalogue of the wrongs which they have suffered from Great Britain as fluently as an Irish patriot, and they tell their story with a passion which is not less deep because it is more constrained and subdued." and in another place he said, to an English public, "The Boers of South Africa of all beings now on this planet correspond nearest to Horace's description of the Roman peasant soldiers who defeated Pyrrhus and Hannibal... The Dutch South Africa though obstinate as mules are emotional and easily affected through their feelings". 2)

On the 15th July Froude was in Paarl, the next day he was warmly received at Malmesbury with an address and a dance in his honour in the evening. On the 17th he was in Wellington and after spending the week-end there, he set out for Worcester where elaborate preparations had been made for his visit and an

arch/

1) Movements of Froude Zuid-Afrikaan: 10th, 14th, 17th, 21st, 24th and 28th July, 1875.

2) Froude - Oceana p.42 ff.

arch of honour constructed through which Barkly, on his way to settle the troubles of Griqualand West, had to pass!

Froude chose the opportunity of another private dinner at Worcester to make the second long speech of his tour. Its significance lies in the fact that he uttered in the stronghold of Afrikaner sentiment a prophetic word the fulfilment of which he did not live to see, but which must be remembered when one sums up his rôle in South African affairs, for it was a remarkable confession of his personal views rather than the interpretation of imperial policy,

Downing Street, said Froude on this occasion, was determined to make no more mistakes. Carnarvon was determined to do justice in the matter of the diamond fields, and to remove suspicious attacking to Dutch republican native policy. This was a fine country which England desired to leave to itself in all internal affairs. "Grow you must, grow into a great and powerful people. If you have to grow you must do so in your own direction not ours... we protect you with our fleet and flag". England asking nothing in return but a naval base at Simonstown. "For the present you must stay a British settlement; but a time will come, perhaps in the days of your sons and grandsons, we cannot say - but a time will come when you will have come of age and you will assume the duties as well as the privileges of a complete and perfect nationality. Then it will depend on you whether you wish to be independent and add a nation to the free nations of the world or to be connected with Great Britain no longer as a dependent colony, but as a participant in the Great British Dominions, to share its <sup>1)</sup> honour, fame and perils".

Was/

1) Zuid-Afrikaan : 24th July, 1875. Was Froude envisaging that voluntary association of sovereign dominions united by a common loyalty to the Crown which became the new ideology of the British Commonwealth of Nations after the Great War? It appears that despite the "coincidence" in his words he did not have a very clear idea of the implications of his statement - c.f. Froude's report (C.1399 p.79: "It appeared to myself that both (Mr. Merriman) and the rest of the Ministry regarded the connection with Great Britain as no closer than that which once existed between Great Britain and Hanover, a connection in and through the Crown alone, and that they were themselves the sole advisers of the sovereign in all concerns of the Colony, domestic and external alike".

Was Froude sincere when he used this bold language? His audience was not too critical of his motives. His eloquence and the visions he portrayed carried the day. - Were they not emotional, these Afrikaners before him, "and easily affected through their feelings"? So Froude talked his way down the Breede River valley in that week. On the Wednesday he was at Montagu, on the Thursday at Swellendam, on the Friday at Riversdale where scenes of great enthusiasm took place. He arrived at Mossel Bay on the Saturday and on the 26th left in the "S.S. Basuto" for Port Elizabeth.

The first part of his journey was over and in his trail Froude had left bristling Afrikaner opposition to the Ministry. In the East he would have to be cautious. If there was "singular" unanimity between Hofmeyr and Paterson in their opposition to the ministry, their motives for co-operation were diagonally opposed in many respects. It required but the minimum of tactlessness to upset the structure of Afrikaner confidence built in a fortnight's tour.

Public opinion in the East had given expression to its enthusiasm at the arrival of Froude in South Africa and while he held after-dinner speeches a series of meetings was convened in support of confederation. Port Elizabeth led with a resolution on 7th July and John Paterson actually delivered a panegyric on the glorious past of his Dutch fellow-countrymen! On the 14th July Port Elizabeth requested the Governor to dissolve parliament.

Kingwilliamstown/

1) Cf. Zuid-Afrikaan, 24<sup>th</sup> July 1875; Froude's Report - C1399 h. 79.

2) So rapid had been the "stumping tour" of Froude, that up in G. West John Blades Currey was still ignorant of the activities of the historian when he wrote to Merriman on 24th July; - "Here all is quiet and we are looking to the arrival of Sir 'Enry and old Froude. Are you or are you not sick of the name of the latter. What the devil is he doing?..... He will, however, I believe, make a mess of his present mission and oh golly! won't the Africanders turn and rend him when he shows them some of the other cards in his hand". (Merriman Pps.

3) Zuid-Afrikaan: 10th, 17th and 31st July; 11th, 14th and 18th Aug. 1875. G.H. 31/12 - Barkly to Carnarvon 14th July, 1875: In forwarding these resolutions Barkly wrote: "My advisers to whom these Resolutions were in the first instance communicated do not desire to add anything to the views set forth in the Minute which they addressed to me before Your Lordship's despatch was presented to the Colonial Parliament, in which especial reference was made to the risk of a revival of this question of separation".

Kingwilliamstown threw in its lot with the anti-ministerialists and Kowie and Grahamstown followed. Somerset East passed a similar resolution on 19th July, and in Pretoria, of all places, a meeting on the 16th decided in favour of a conference; Graaff-Reinet and Hanover, the centres of Midland opinion, followed and v. d. Sandt de Villiers was present to inspire the Hanover meeting, and in August Murraysburg, East London and Colesberg swelled the number of resolutions. So impressive was the demonstration against the government that a ministerial supporter felt compelled to warn Mr. Froude that all these addresses:

"are supplied from a Capetown newspaper office ready cut and dried to suit each occasion .... and Mr. Froude will soon learn if he does not already know that many of the mock-heroic speeches and addresses now being dinned into his ears and all the fulsome adulation, almost worship - with which he is daily being bespattered instead of being, what some of the newspapers grandiloquently style 'the voice of the country' is simply and solely the voice of some half-a-dozen individuals of a political party clique, who would just as soon kiss the blubber-lips of Langalibalele and otherwise 'take him in' if it suited their purpose to do so".

Hofmeyr was making a first attempt to get into parliament at a Stellenbosch by-election and in his first outspoken political speech he gave Froude his blessing:

"We may differ on the question of Federation" he told the electors in July, "we may hold that for years to come; it will be absurd to strive after the establishment of a great South African Dominion as utterly impracticable - we may differ on the subject of the celebrated despatch - and may hold that there are serious blemishes in that document. But its spirit is unmistakably such as to recommend it to most Afrikaners and for the words spoken by him concerning our relations across the river, and for the same sentiment towards our farming population Mr. Froude is most assuredly deserving of the goodwill and the gratitude of the population."

The ministry did not reply. The first session of 1875 terminated on 30th June and Molteno's first move in the recess was to promote C.A. Smith, his Treasurer-General, to the permanent civil service as Auditor-General, shuffle portfolios and appoint J.X. Merriman the "silver-tongued" member for Wodehouse to be commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works.

The outcry from all sides was deafening. The "Zuid-Afrikaan" fell upon the Colonial Secretary as much for his subtle, "sapper" policy of stealing the thunder of the opposition by enticing their

oldest/

- 1)  
 2) Hofmeyr - Life of Hofmeyr p.139.  
 3) Zuid-Afrikaan : 17th July, 1875; Lawrence - Life of Merriman, p.17.

oldest lieutenants into his own camp, as for his disregard of conventions in appointing the political head of a department to the civil service: first the East got railways to keep them quiet, continued the paper, then representation in the cabinet, then Moltano tried to win over Sprigg by offering him the Portfolio of Native Affairs. Now Merriman, of all people, the man who delighted in teasing the Lion of Beaufort into a towering rage not so long before. Such conduct made it "folly to speak of principles which divide the opposition party from the ministerial".<sup>1)</sup> The papers in the East followed suit; in his own constituency a resolution was passed at Dordrecht on 2nd August condemning Merriman's actions in joining the ministry. From home came a reprimand in pleasing contrast to the harsh tone of public criticism.<sup>2)</sup>

Those who had most to lose were evidently least perturbed: Paterson, nursing secret hopes of supplanting his old rival, was condescending towards his "young friend and favorite" and in his first letters,<sup>3)</sup> he talked airily about the purchase of Vooruitzicht farm in Griqualand West and a young railway engineer for whom he asked the new minister's patronage, for,

"as Port Elizabeth, mark the word Port Elizabeth, wishes its railway pushed a little faster than by that wretched creature Smith with 202 men on it by your last return published, I want you to take on Allen...." and he could not omit to gnash his teeth just once as the deft manoeuvring of Moltano: "A very contemptible character" he burst out, "A true Italian as you used to call him to me..... a cross of craft and cowardice about the most hateful cross imaginable to all honourable minds".

There will be occasion to meet Mr. Paterson, so high here on his moral pedestal, in the years that followed; and it will be more

appropriate/

1) The Eastern Star, Grahamstown Journal, Somerset Courant, Fort Beaufort Advocate and Diamond News.

2) Julia Merriman to Merriman (10th July, 1875):- "What I in common with most Easterners hope for through its means (referring to Confederation) is getting rid of Cape Town centralization - spending our money on Kowie Railway and bridges rather than upon new Houses of Parliament.... Your friends in club circles think you are not worldly wise in accepting office under Mr. Moltano as he is almost certain of being turned out on this question and then your own party would ~~be~~ cold shoulder you.... You may be sure the Eastern Star will try to pick holes in everything you do and hold you up to public reprehension.... Mr. Moltano's marriage I suppose made him friends with all the world - but what made you friends with him?" See also J.B. Currey to Merriman, 24th July, 1875 (Merriman Papers).

3) Paterson to Merriman: 31st July and 30th Aug., 1875 (Merriman Papers)

appropriate to judge then his qualifications for judging others.

With unerring political instinct Moltano had picked "the best read man and the best talker in South Africa" to infuse<sup>fuse</sup> young blood and a fighting spirit into his rather slow-moving and stolid little cabinet. Merriman had heckled him often since 1869; he had heckled him over Langalibalele, but on the arrival of the first Confederation despatch he had laid aside the jester's cap and proved to the "crafty Italian" that he was sincere on this issue by which the Moltano cabinet was to stand or fall. "Tall pugnacious, silver-tongued" (in the words of Walker) "gifted with a wealth of imagination and endowed, if it cannot be said blessed, with a taste of epigram and the retort descriptive, which made him many enemies, destined to be Minister four times and Premier once in the last days of the Old Cape Parliament", Merriman not only became the spearhead of verbal defence of the ministry in these days, but the draughtsman of most of the important cabinet <sup>minutes</sup> ~~minutes~~ which at times so sorely tried the patience of Lord Carnarvon.  
1)

Apart from an exchange of private letters between Lord Carnarvon and Moltano on the subject of the despatch, and a vigorous speech at Mossel Bay at the end of August by Lewis Vincent M.L.A.,  
2)  
3)  
in which he condemned the agitation of Froude, the ministerial side of the conference issue, had been relatively undefended since the prorogation of parliament in June, and the "Cape Argus" was fighting alone and (apparently) losing battle against the rising tide of public opinion. Froude arrived at Port Elizabeth on 2nd August and was met on board by representatives of the Paterson party (the leader being in Griqualand West at the time)

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- 1) Verbal information from Mr. A.C.G. Lloyd, sometime private secretary to Merriman; Walker - de Villiers p.43; Cape Argus, 22nd June, 1938: art. Leslie Blackwell "Some Recollections of J.K. Merriman".  
2) Carnarvon to Moltano: 21st May, 1875. Moltano to Carnarvon: 26th June, 1875 (Moltano - Life of Moltano I. pp.379-381)  
3) Zuid-Afrikaan : 8th September, 1875.

He refused to speak in public, and after some parleys with leading political men he accepted Sir Garnet's "very affectionate" invitation to come up to Maritzburg.

Froude took with him to Natal Carnarvon's first despatch on the great issue of confederation since that of 4th May.<sup>2)</sup> It was written, as Lord Carnarvon states in the document, on information received by Barkly's despatch of 14th June and from newspapers privately forwarded to him. It was written, moreover, before Molteno's well-considered private reply to his letter of 21st May,<sup>3)</sup> could have reached him, or the explanation of Barkly in his despatch of 1st July,<sup>4)</sup> containing the information that number thirty-nine had been forwarded to the Republics. If most of the points raised in the despatch thus missed fire at the Cape it was mainly due to tardy means of communication between Downing Street and the Colony; yet, even if one makes allowance for the fact that Carnarvon was relatively uninformed as to recent events, several matters raised in this despatch call for attention.

Firstly, in paragraphs 4 and 5, in an attempt to justify the inclusion of names of representatives Carnarvon added insult to injury by confirming separationist hopes in the East, the more so since in paragraph 7 he virtually admits that the inclusion of names can serve no useful purpose except to give, as he explains "a sketch of the Conference as it seemed to me that it might perhaps be constituted". Although he is undoubtedly on the right side in the argument advanced in paragraph 9, he fails to appreciate the fundamental motive behind Molteno's constitutional objection viz: the fact that Molteno claimed the right to withhold from publication such a document as despatch number thirty-nine, which contained besides the question of "Imperial concern" also allusions which he regarded as detrimental to the parochial and internal interests of the Colony, whether the main object of the despatch was carried out or not. His claims that the Cape Colony  
 ))) \_\_\_\_\_ under/

1) Grahamstown Journal: 2nd Aug., 1875; Zuid-Afrikaan: 11th Aug., 1875  
 2) G.H. 1/22 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 15th July, 1875 - See Annexure no.2. /3) See note 2 page 87. 4) G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon 1st July, 1875. c.f. Barkly to Carnarvon (Confidential) 6th December, 1876.

under a system of responsible government, had the right to initiate a scheme of confederation, was thus overstated for the sole reason that the recognition of imperial prerogative as outlined in paragraph 9 would lay open his ministry to influence of the Imperial Government in party politics. This was the unexpressed fear behind Molteno's "constitutionalism". The reprimand for Barkly, though justified perhaps, was impolitic. From the Governor's few notes scribbled on the original despatch and the curt tone of his minute to his ministers,<sup>1)</sup> it is not difficult to perceive that any sympathy he might have had with the efforts of Lord Carnarvon was considerably cooled by this reproachful despatch.

The proposal to remove the conference from the Colony to Natal was a foolish threat which must have inevitably appeared ridiculous in South Africa at the time: This despatch reached Barkly in Griqualand West where he was doing his best to set the tottering regime of Southey on some basis of authority - Griqualand West plainly had to be regarded as a liability rather than a partner in any confederation. From the republics Carnarvon had no reply when he wrote on 15th July, except a verbal statement from Burgers. In Natal Sir Garnet Wolseley had just set up a puppet "quasi" - crown colony - not to lead the way to confederation, but, on the contrary, to ensure that there should be no local resistance if the Cape should agree to have Natal in a confederation. Recent Natal history certainly did not point to that colony as the leader in a South-Eastern confederation. An empty threat such as this, a "shot in the dark", could not by the faintest chance intimidate the Cape Colony in an era of economic prosperity and self-confidence. It brings to mind Franklin Roosevelt's saying of the four inch tail wagging the ninety-six inch dog.

Most obvious feature of all in the second despatch was the fact that in the whole despatch it was confederation and not native policy which was the theme song this time. Whereas on 4th

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May/

1) Annexure No.3.

May confederation had been wedged into one of the last paragraphs as an issue which the Imperial Government hoped might arise "in the free exchange of communications between the representatives of the various States concerned", and as the possible outcome of a round-table discussion on native affairs, not one word occurs in the second despatch on the native affairs conference. Except for a passing reference to the Delagoa Bay arbitration and the "hostile attitude of the Zulus" it is the political union of the South African communities which occupies the bulk of the despatch.

It is true that this despatch provided Froude with a subject for an after-dinner speech at Wolseley's farewell banquet in Pietermaritzburg,<sup>1)</sup> but it could never have been intended as a "smoothing-down" gesture to Molteno (such as had been sent to settle the Langa-libalele affair) despite the unctious assurances in the last paragraph. The threat to remove the Conference to Natal added force to the attack of the East and renewed the outcry against a ministry which was withholding from the Eastern province the benefits of confederation and forcing the Colony into "splendid isolation" should a "South-Eastern" confederation of the republics, Griqualand West and Natal, ever materialize. Froude was aware of public feeling and the advantage he had gained from the second despatch.<sup>2)</sup> He had nothing to lose by a final "appeal" to Molteno:

"You were not encouraging when we had our last conversation" he told Molteno in a letter on 20th August, "and I left you 'grieving' like Ephesians 'that I might see your face no more'. The interests at stake, however, are so serious, and the consequences to the Cape Colony of a possible formation of a northern confederation with Natal and Delagoa Bay for Ports, and railways from both of these penetrating the Free State would be so inevitably injurious that I have determined to make one more effort, and I shall return to Capetown with Sir Garnet Wolseley".

Yet/

1) Grahamstown Journal : 31st August, 8th Sept., 1875. Pamphlet no.23. p.68: Under a sense of duty Mr. Froude delivered himself of a speech, recalling at the same time Sir Cornwall Lewis' remark that it would be very pleasant but for its annoyments and not without an uneasy recollection that the words uttered in after-dinner speeches, like curses, came home to roost. Speeches, however, have their uses and Mr. Froude is a firm believer in the advantage to be gained from an exposition of Imperial policy over the festal board.

2) The despatch of 15th July, was accompanied as usual by a separate despatch with instructions to Barkly to publish it immediately in the Government Gazette (G.H. 1/22 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 22nd July, 1875).

Yet he did not return immediately. He parted from Wolseley at Port Elizabeth where he waited for the result of the interview between Wolseley and Molteno in Capetown.

1)

Meanwhile he wrote another letter to Molteno before the latter could reply to his first: he intimated a change of plans and took exception to a speech by Sprigg to his constituents:

"Mr. Sprigg says you told him twice that it was useless for Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth to expect a separation of the provinces for that you knew from me that the Imperial Government would not allow it. I must have expressed myself with great obscurity or you must have misapprehended my meaning. I certainly said that I did not believe Lord Carnarvon in naming a representative for the Eastern Province had contemplated an encouragement of the separation policy. Lord Carnarvon's object in the despatch was not separation but union. His Lordship, however, had never spoken to me on the subject and I really did not know what his views might be .... It appeared to me to be a question of internal Cape politics on which it would be highly improper for me to express an opinion. I feel this, still I have endeavoured as far as possible to comply with your wishes... I purposely abstained from going to Grahamstown, where I should have been obliged to attend a public meeting, and where I could scarcely have avoided tresspassing on ground which you would have wished me to avoid. I feel it rather hard on me, therefore, that opinions and statements of mine, the purport of which has been so completely mistaken should be circulated in the Colony; while I am myself completely debarred from contradicting them...." 2)

While Wolseley and this letter were on their way to Capetown,<sup>3)</sup> Froude published a letter in the same vein in the "Easter Star". Its significance was clear. Froude had decided on war against the ministry and had thrown tact to the winds. Separation was the one issue on which the East would rise unanimously in his support, and this public controversy over Sprigg's speech would prove that, if he was not in a position to support separation, he still had an open ear for both sides and refused to do as Molteno wished, viz. publicly declare himself opposed to it. An attitude of willingness to hear the case for separation had but one meaning for the Eastern, as well as the Western mind - virtual support of separation.

How much personal influence did Wolseley exercise over Froude during his brief stay in Natal to make him embark on this adventure?

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2) Froude to Molteno, 29th Aug., 1875 (quoted in extenso by Molteno - Life of Molteno I. p.394)

3) Ibid. p.395.

It is a question one may never be able to answer; there is no doubt, however, that his action over the Sprigg speech was a convenient if not too ingenious excuse for a public appearance to "vindicate" himself and it was according to Froude the reason 1) for his appearance in Port Elizabeth.

On the very day that Wolseley interviewed Molteno, Froude forsook his tested belief in "the advantage to be gained from an exposition of Imperial policy over the festal board", and he delivered a speech on the 9th September at an enthusiastic public meeting held in the Port Elizabeth Town Hall. While in Natal, he had already found the tight-rope walking between English views and Afrikaner sentiment too strenuous. He was in Rome and he was determined to speak the words Rome waited for, to allay the fears and suspicions aroused by his previous statements. 2) He now told Port Elizabeth that up to that moment he had "invented reasons, he had to admit not altogether true ones" for not speaking before. He took the plunge then:-

"I regard the people of this Colony as the real source of power", he told the meeting, "I am now placed in such circumstances, that I am compelled to take action in a matter in which the Cape Colonists are deeply interested. Therefore I feel it would be ungenerous -it would be improper almost, for me to be tongue-tied any longer by the forms of constitutional etiquette. I am compelled to appeal to the people of this Colony to answer the questions I am compelled to put to them. If I am doing wrong, I believe these very constituencies represent a majority in Parliament and if I am to be impeached for what I am doing, I must ask my friend Mr. Paterson to help to carry an act of Indemnity for me." With a touch of melodramatic finality he concluded that he was now obliged to hold the conference in Maritzburg, but "I will suspend the conference for a few weeks, until I am 3) ascertain what are really the wishes of the people of this Colony."

Froude's monstrous bluff was merely intended to further the real purpose of his speech: A special session or even a general election to challenge Molteno's strength in the Assembly. He

made/

1) C. 1399 p.77.

2) The East did not like his Bloemfontein speech in 1874, (c.f. Graaff-Reinet Advertiser, 12th Jan., 1875; Grahamstown Journal: 14th June, 1875) and while in Natal Froude had done his best to explain it away. (to his shame - if one remembers the good ground there is to believe that he spoke sincerely to the Free Staters). He explained to Natal what had made him talk of a "confederate" flag: "it was my anxiety to see South Africa rising and prosperous, that led me to those unreasonable remarks".)

3) Molteno - Life of Molteno I. pp.399-401; Grahamstown Journal, 13th Sept., 1875; Port Elizabeth Telegraph, 10th Sept., 1875; C.1399 pp.30-33.

made no attempt to deny that he was technically infringing the political liberties of a self-governing colony; he did not care for precocious colonial constitutions. The breach of "constitutional etiquette" by a direct appeal to electoral opinion he justified as the means to a good end viz. to reveal a discrepancy between majority opinion in Parliament and ministerial policy. Froude's supporters in the West were not too sanguine about the prospects of majority opinion in the Assembly. Indeed it will not be an overestimation of Hofmeyr's opinion to say that he recognised the grave mistake of the "eminent historian" in offending constitutionalism, and foresaw (rightly as it proved) that this might be Molteno's most powerful weapon to turn the tables on Froude in the end. Hofmeyr was a good tactician. Why ask Parliament to decide the issue? he wrote as soon as it was known that a special session was to take place.<sup>1)</sup> Let the Premier ask the country, as Gladstone had done the previous year, otherwise a special session would mean nothing. Had a general election been held on this issue the Afrikaner party would undoubtedly have swept the West and Midlands while in the East the support for Froude would have been unanimous; in a house of 68 members, Molteno's existing majority would have been eclipsed.

There was a further flaw in Froude's neck-or-nothing speech: the designation of John Paterson as premier-elect.

As early as July, the "Journal" had spoken of Paterson as Premier-to-be.<sup>2)</sup> When Froude was in Port Elizabeth in August, Paterson was negotiating the sale of Vooruitzicht farm to the Government.<sup>3)</sup> He used this opportunity to pay a visit to Bloemfontein, the first since 1850, shortly after he had landed in the East, as a young schoolmaster. He interviewed President Brand on the 7th August, on the prospects of confederation and publicly expressed the conviction that the Free State would join closer union/

1) Zuid-Afrikaan : 15th Sept., 1875.

2) Grahamstown Journal : 23rd July, 1875.

3) Paterson to Merriman : 31st July, 1875 (Merriman Papers) G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon : 31st May, 1875: G.H.B. 3/5 - Correspondence on Vooruitzicht Farm.

union of states. Though he found little encouragement for his views, the "Friend" openly called him "the future Premier of the Cape Colony".<sup>1)</sup> Now Froude also joined in, but all his nice words could not remove the fact that John Paterson's name was anathema to the vast majority of Westerners, and in the East his leadership was strongly challenged by that weathercock of politics, J.G. Sprigg of East London, who was playing a waiting game, and by his very unobtrusiveness eclipsing the garrulous merchant-banker of Port Elizabeth. Paterson's name was in the papers too often in these years, in an unappetising wrangle though he generally succeeded in "clearing\* his reputation". Libel dogged his movements, people spoke of his "tobacco swindle" for years though it only came to a head in a libel action against the "Cape Argus" in 1876.<sup>2)</sup> As is the case with many big financiers, his widespread commercial activities did not always escape the epithet of "shadiness", though no definite accusations were proved against him and probably never will be.<sup>3)</sup>

"Mr. Paterson is an able man" sneered a paper after Froude's speech at Port Elizabeth, "his friends boast of his faithfulness at this day to his policy of a quarter of a century ago (of which Separation and the removal of the seat of government were the most salient features) and no member of the House is more resolute in working out an end of which he has once formed a clear conception. But is Mr. Paterson the politician who has the confidence of the country for the office of Prime Minister? We will not argue the point. Suffice it to say that with all Mr. Paterson's ability and debating power he has never gained a following in the House and seldom influenced a vote."<sup>4)</sup>

Paterson realised that he would be more at home criticising Molteno's financial policy and urging on Separation from the opposition benches, than shouldering the responsibility of seeing confederation through. In March his efforts had failed to form an opposition; in the same letter in which he spoke of Molteno's craft and cowardice,<sup>5)</sup> he once more told Merriman that he desired

to form/

1) Zuid-Afrikaan: 18th August, 1875.

2) Ibid. : 3rd March, 1875; 8th March, 1876; 3rd March, 1877: Cape Argus: 4th and 7th March, 1876.

3) I believe that personal papers of John Paterson (if still to be found) can cast much light on his commercial transactions. Whether his private correspondence will neutralise the unfavourable opinion one forms of him from casual references in contemporary sources, or brand him beyond doubt as a selfish profiteer, is a matter of speculation. 4) Pamphlet no.23: art. "Capetown Daily News".

5) Paterson to Merriman, 30th August, 1875. (Supra p.86 ).

to form an opposition - not to oust "poor Molteno" - but to render good service. He was pressed on all sides, he said, to form a ministry but, though Molteno had fallen so low in his estimation, he hesitated to take office. This was written ten days before Froude's speech.

Worst of all obstacles to Paterson's chances of replacing Molteno was the Hofmeyr faction. No open hostility was shown in these days to him, it is true, (he had, after all, praised the virtues of the Afrikaners at Port Elizabeth!) but the aims of the two sections opposing Molteno were so entirely divergent, that it required but the least provocation from either side to estrange the other. Subsequent events confirmed the fact that Afrikaner opposition to Molteno was by no means intended to smooth the way for an ultra-Eastern ministry. They had no mind to exchange the sting for the scorpion, their only aim was to reform the Molteno programme if possible, and to obtain stronger representation for Afrikaner interests, while at the same time assisting a policy of friendship towards the republics. To separation they were as resolutely averse as Molteno himself.

Froude's first political speech had thus to some extent missed fire outside the sphere of extreme Eastern opinion. Nevertheless he was fêted on his new "stumping" tour: Grahamstown was the next objective, and the citadel of separationism received Lord Carnarvon's envoy with a salute from an old cannon while "Grandmamma" chortled with delight in a theatrical leader.<sup>1)</sup> Great festivities preceded the speech and in the evening fireworks rounded off the prodigious welcome. Only one bad omen marred Eastern optimism - the balloon named "Molteno" refused to rise!

"The public demonstrations in Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth in favour of Lord Carnarvon's Scheme of Federation must surely show the ministry that it is no use any longer for them to resist public opinion" said a Midlands paper,<sup>2)</sup> but Molteno had hardened his heart against Froude, and a tone of unconcealed hostility crept

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1) Grahamstown Journal : 17th September, 1875.

2) Graaff-Reinet Advertiser : 14th September, 1875.

into his letters in which he politely yet clearly intimated to Froude that his correspondence was unwelcome. <sup>1)</sup>

Despite the explicit injunctions of Carnarvon that Froude should have access to all correspondence to and from Downing Street, <sup>2)</sup> the Premier refused to allow Froude to see the ministerial minute of 14th September, sent to Carnarvon under covering private letter, and drawn up in compliance with Barkly's minute <sup>3)</sup> on the despatch of 15th July. This minute was a lengthy exposition of the views of the Ministry on Confederation and concluded with strong complaint to the Secretary of State against the line of action adopted by Froude at Port Elizabeth, enclosing a copy from the "Port Elizabeth Telegraph" of his speech on 9th September and of a letter of thanks which he had written to the mayor of Grahamstown after his visit to that place. <sup>4)</sup> With this material on the one hand, and the resolutions of meetings and cuttings from the anti-ministerial press on the other, Carnarvon had to decide on his future course of action towards the Colony.

Prospects of overruling the Molteno ministry in its opposition to a conference were reasonably favourable at this stage in the middle of September. It was the holding of a conference and not so much the actual problem of confederation which was foremost in the public mind and none of the other states and colonies had rejected the proposals contained in the despatch of 4th May.

The answer of Natal was a foregone conclusion: Wolseley had duly sent the formal consent of his Legislative Council to a

<sup>5)</sup>  
conference/

- 1) Molteno - Life of Molteno I. pp.395-399; 446-447.
- 2) Carnarvon to Barkly (Conf.); 15th June, 1875. G.H. 1/22 - Carnarvon to Barkly : 5th August, 1875.
- 3) C.1-'75 ; Molteno - op.cit. pp.437-441 (summary) C.1399. p.30ff. G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 20th October, 1875 (enclosure)
- 4) Molteno - op. cit. p.414: "I must write a few words now, when the excitement of the first impression has cooled, to thank Grahamstown for the splendid support which it has rendered to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, and to thank you further on account of your own self for the reception you gave me as Lord Carnarvon's unworthy representative. Nothing, I assure you can give more pleasure either to Her Majesty's Government or the English Nation than to receive such an account of the hearty loyalty of the inhabitants of so important a community as yours; a loyalty, I may say, which has been displayed remarkably and universally through both provinces of this great Colony".
- 5) G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 2nd Sept., 1875. Enclosure ; Brand to Barkly, 6th August, 1875.

Brand showed in his official reply that the desire for closer co-operation between his republic and the Colony which had led him to entrust a goodwill message to the Cape Assembly through J.H. de Villiers in 1871, was still sincerely alive - but the injustice which his state was suffering in the matter of the diamond fields was to him an insurmountable obstacle in the way of confederation. "We entertain the fervent hope that the disputes may soon be amicably adjusted" he wrote, "so that the cordial good feeling between Her Majesty's Government and the neighbouring colonies and this state may be strengthened, and that all may harmoniously co-operate in whatsoever may tend to promote the future welfare of South Africa"<sup>1)</sup>

The Transvaal President was not at home when the despatch arrived in July; he was "within the grey walls of Leyden" participating in Dutch student festivals.<sup>2)</sup> But he had seen the despatch before it left the Colonial Office and confidentially approved of it to Carnarvon, while he was on his "railway" visit to London in May. What was more, he sent a "touching letter, laden with impulse" to Piet Joubert, the acting-President of the Transvaal,<sup>3)</sup> recommending acceptance of the invitation to a conference and wrote a memorandum on republican native policy for Carnarvon.<sup>4)</sup>

Joubert officially replied meanwhile, in a very cautious letter.<sup>5)</sup> Without pledging his government to any ultimate action, he said, he "heartily concurred in the liberal and enlightened sentiments" expressed by the Earl of Carnarvon in the despatch. A discussion of native policy was evidently the strongest motive for the Transvaal to come to the conference, and Joubert availed himself of the opportunity to tell Barkly of the "prejudicial influence" on the natives, of policies pursued in some parts of South Africa, adding that he could give many strong proofs in support.<sup>6)</sup> "I/

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1) G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 30th July, 1875. Enclosure; Brand to Barkly, 14th July, 1875. 2) Zuid-Afrikaan: 14th July, 1875. 3) Uys - Shenstone p.200; Engelbrecht - Burgers p.178. 4) G.H. 1/22 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 15th June, 1875. 5) G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 5th August, (enclosure) 6) C.f. Uys - op. cit. pp.191-195 and Engelbrecht - op. cit. pp.193-195; evidence of Southey's pernicious influence with the Transvaal natives and the gun-running activities of Mr. Herbert Rhodes the "Volksraad Member for Pelgrimsrust" in 1875, while Burgers was in Europe. Joubert's reference in his letter was in all probability inspired by his knowledge of these doings.

"I accept to the fullest <sup>Uwe</sup> His Grace's (~~Mr~~ Genade's) many assurances in his despatch" concluded Joubert warily, "that it is not his wish to involve the independent states of South Africa through this conference in any loss of or interference with the independence Great Britain has recognised."

Brand regarded the existance of Griqualand West as a symbol of injustice; Joubert looked upon it as a source of corruption of the natives in his republic and the country at large. To Carnarvon himself the struggling administration of Richard Southey was becoming daily more distasteful, and the necessity for some solution of the manifold problems of this 'quasi' crown colony, was growing with the chaos within it.

Southey's finances were in confusion. Despite repeated instructions to forward returns, the lieutenant-governor could not submit his balance sheet before March 1875,<sup>1)</sup> and this was so "cooked" that Carnarvon dubbed it "highly unsatisfactory" and asked once more for fuller information warning Southey at the same time of his neglect to provide an adequate police force both for prevention and cure of the chronic insurrection which had regularly broken out since 1874, though in that year £12,000 had been spent on a constabulary:

"I cannot conceal from myself that there is a weakness on the part of the Governm~~ent~~ in this respect which may easily lead to very serious consequences", complained Carnarvon, "I must own to much surprise that a Governor of Mr. Southey's experience and ability should have allowed himself to be placed in so unfortunate a position." 2)

Carnarvon's fears were confirmed by a despatch from Barkly just as his own was leaving England: open insurrection had broken out on the Fields in March and April.<sup>3)</sup> In the absence of an efficient police force defiance of Southey's authority had steadily grown under the leadership of a "half-dozen insolvent idiots" or (in Barkly's words) "a small band of Fenians and German Red  
Republicans"/

1) G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 1st and 25th March, 1875.

2) G.H. 1/22 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 5th May, 1875.

3) G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 5th April, 1875. (Enclosure: Southey to Barkly, 20th March.)

Republicans" like Ling, Aylward, Tucker and Von Schlikmann; men were being openly drilled in the streets of Kimberley and a mock proclamation was issued in the name of the Queen. <sup>1)</sup> Southey's rule was a helpless farce, and, to the Imperial Government, a costly one. Faced by insurrection, Southey had turned to Barkly for military and Sir Arthur ("War Horse") <sup>Cuning</sup> ~~Amynghame~~ was compelled to march northwards with 300 men. <sup>2)</sup> It was a real picnic for the "expeditionary force" while the inexorable finger of the Imperial authorities chalked up another £20,000 against the empty Griqualand West treasury. By the time the troops reached Kimberley, the Fenian and Red Republican birds had flown. They <sup>soldiers</sup> were greeted by the diggers' natives with shouts of "Daar is die rooibaadjies!" received oranges and were later entertained on bread, cheese and beer! <sup>3)</sup>

While Froude was holding after-dinner speeches, Barkly was in Kimberley, doing his best to clean up the mess for Southey - or rather Southey's successor, for the Lieutenant-Governor had fallen into bad repute at home. In June Carnarvon confidentially told Barkly that Mr. Southey would no longer be a suitable chairman for his proposed conference as suggested on 4th May. <sup>4)</sup> Southey meanwhile replied to the despatch on confederation, cordially offering his services and forwarding a resolution from his Legislative <sup>5)</sup> Council in favour of a conference.

The die had been cast, however. Carnarvon stopped the fooling with <sup>an</sup> elaborate despatch in August: he condemned at great length the heavy and increasing expenditure in a colony where population was steadily decreasing. Nothing remained but "to cut down at once with an unsparing hand every unnecessary expense". Southey with his £5,000 a year salary, John Blades Currey whom it was said every miner cursed in his sleep, and every unnecessary

official/

1) J.B. Currey to Merriman: 29th Jan., 1875 (Merriman Papers) Zuid-Afrikaan : 3rd and 10th April, 1875; Wilmot - Southey p.288 ff.; Matthews - Incwadi Yami p.284 ff.

2) G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 5th May, 1875.

3) Zuid-Afrikaan - 10th July, 1875.

4) Carnarvon to Barkly, (Conf) 15th June, 1875.

5) G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon: 30th July, 1875. (enclosures).

official had to go; a simplified form of government would be introduced and a special financial commissioner was to be appointed. <sup>1)</sup>

Indirectly the recall of Southey was a measure of censure for Barkly himself, who had staunchly whitewashed him to the end of his financial maladministration. <sup>2)</sup> The Governor now became responsible for Griqualand West as High Commissioner, and he stayed at his post in Kimberley till the end of September before returning to Cape-town in time for the special session of the Cape Parliament.

Griqualand West had thus virtually disappeared as a separate party to the proposed conference; the Republics had welcomed the idea provided their political independence was not touched, and, in the case of the Free State, the dispute with Great Britain satisfactorily settled beforehand; Natal would come to the conference unconditionally. The Cape Colony alone had officially rejected the proposals of the 4th May, but the tide of public opinion appeared to be rising fast against Moltens and his ministry. Froude was playing an unconstitutional game, yet in view of this general state of affairs in South Africa in September, it appeared to be well worth while. On the 10th November the Cape Parliament would re-assemble. The Port Elizabeth speech and the Grahamstown ovation were the first shots in the "conference" campaign.

Then Merriman created a sensation at Uitenhage on 23rd September. <sup>3)</sup>

From/

1) G.H. 31/13 1/22 - Carnarvon to Barkly: 4th August, 1875. This despatch together with one of 25th April, 1875 in which Carnarvon rebuked Southey for his misguided zeal in Batlapinia, was demanded for publication by the Cape Parliament on 26th May, 1876. Barkly refused to publish more than extracts, maintaining that "the despatch was written in consequence of the transmission (by him) to the Secretary of State of certain resolutions passed by the Legislature of Griqualand West, and also of memorials from the Chamber of Commerce of Port Elizabeth and the traders of Hopetown in favour of the annexation of Batlapin territory". (A13-'76). (Underlining is mine)

2) C.f. G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon: 4th June, 1875. In fairness to Southey one must not overlook the disadvantages under which he worked. His biographer has attempted to do him justice (Wilmot - Southey p.271 ff.) but the great mass of his personal correspondence (partly unclassified) still lies unexplored in the Capetown Archives. A standard biography of Sir Richard Southey may perhaps one day shed more light on his three years' struggle in Griqualand West.

3) A brief account is to be found in Lawrence - Life of Merriman p.24. Mr. A.C.G. Lloyd supplied interesting detail from personal conversation with Mr. Merriman, whom he accompanied on an inspection "in loco" of his "last stand" of 1875, more than 30 years later.

From the ministerial side no public announcement had yet been made on the conference issue since the prorogation of parliament. Merriman was now called upon as Minister of Public Works to open the Uitenhage railway at a banquet which was attended by numerous gentlemen of the "Bay" including Paterson and Mr. Froude himself. Judging by the preparations and preliminary speeches, was really intended to be a non-political occasion (even the ladies were present!) True to his pugnacious nature, Merriman could not let Froude out of his grasp without "washing his head" for him: the Port Elizabeth speech was only a fortnight old. So Merriman launched a personal attack on Froude as the representative of the Imperial Government and was quickly forced to beat a retreat from the marquee in which he spoke, aided in his departure by the remnants of the dainty dishes prepared in his honour! Froude prudently followed him, and Paterson carried on the meeting, standing on the chairman's seat. Merriman's critics had fastened on to a phrase he was reputed to have uttered, and every Eastern paper had its own variation to use as a text for vituperation. 1) Merriman was accused by one and all of having referred to Froude as the representative of a foreign government agitating this colony. Froude himself wrote to Barkly in Kimberley complaining of Merriman's words and eventually Molteno was requested to ask Merriman for a statement. He answered as follows on 25th October: 2)

"My dear Mr. Molteno,

I have to acknowledge your letter enclosing one from the Governor in which he brings to your notice a statement made to him by Mr. Froude to the effect that I had at Uitenhage spoken of the Queen's Government as a "Foreign Power". I can only in reply give an absolute denial to the statement made by Mr. Froude which is a misrepresentation of the most gross kind - on the occasion referred to I spoke of an "Imperial agitation by an Imperial agent" (meaning Mr. Froude) which I stated was causing great embarrassment to the Colonial Government and I have no wish to retract one word of that statement.

"The Governor good-naturedly hints that the noise might have caused/  
caused/

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1) C.F. Graaff-Reinet Advertiser : 28th Sept., 1875; Grahamstown Journal : 24th Sept., 1875; Ibid.; 27th Sept., 1875, quoting reports of the speech in the Port Elizabeth Telegraph, Eastern Province Herald and Uitenhage Times (which agrees most closely with Merriman's own statement).

2) The words underlined in this letter were scratched out by Merriman in the draft which he kept and from which I copied this letter. Does it point to uncertainty on his part as to the words he used?"

"caused Mr. Froude to misunderstand me; this is ~~not~~ possible he was sitting next but one to me and I spoke in a most audible tone. Several fictitious telegrams to the same effect were circulated by certain unscrupulous newspapers but were contradicted by the more honest journals as you are probably aware.

I think that some explanation and apology is due to me from Mr. Froude and with your permission will call on him to make one.

I am etc.,

J.X. Merriman."

The press required no explanations to form an opinion. The Eastern papers fell upon Merriman in a body, led by the "Eastern Star" with a leader styled "The Ministerial Wail" 1)

"The Government of the Colony is in so false a position that the whole conduct of public affairs is coming rapidly into ridicule and contempt. All respect for the officials of the State has vanished ..... The melancholy and contemptible figure cut by Mr. Merriman ..... we purposely abstain from any harder words .... in his first public appearance as a philosophic Minister on Tuesday last at Uitenhage has served one good purpose .... it has shown the line of attack which the Ministry intend to pursue when the House is called together on November 10th". The ministry intends muzzling Froude. He must keep his tongue "open his eyes, shut his mouth and see what Mr. Moltencroft sends him".

Merriman heard once more that he was the man who had called the despatch of 4th May "balderdash". It was because he considered the interference of the throne, interference of a "foreign power".

"This sentiment will grate upon the loyalty and sense of honour of every Dutch as well as of every English Colonist in the Old Colony - indeed in South Africa. .... As it is the scene and the sentiment will excite in every Eastern and equally in every Western constituency, a feeling compounded of indignation and resentment".

One more quotation must be added to show that, instead of affecting the Afrikaner "loyalty and sense of honour" as the "Eastern Star" prophesied, the Uitenhage banquet evoked a shudder of disapproval from the West against Eastern extremism. Besides the "Cape Argus" and the "Volksblad" the "Zuid-Afrikaan" also turned on the Paterson faction: "More incredible still is it" declared its leading article,

"that a Paterson should <sup>lead</sup> have the vulgarity after chairman and ladies had left in disgust. If the Ministry can in any way regain their popularity, then it will be through treatment such as it received from the Port Elizabeth aristocracy. The conduct of Mr. Froude showed up well against that of his "quasi" admirers. He has proved himself a gentleman." 2)

The affinity between Afrikaners and Paterson had never been more than/

1) 24th September, 1875.

2) Zuid-Afrikaan : 25th September, 1875.

than skin-deep; after this their forced co-operation was even less cordial.

But the special session was approaching, and time was valuable for cultivating anti-ministerialist feeling. Merriman was coolly received at Grahamstown and his unwillingness to realise their hopes of a railway of their own did not contribute towards his popularity. At Uitenhage a furious public meeting decided in favour of confederation, a meeting at Peddie, followed suit on the 16th October, and Port Elizabeth on the 21st. Petitions were being drawn up for presentation to Parliament in November. <sup>1)</sup>

Froude was quiet and made no more public appearances. He published a letter, however, written (in reply to a resolution from Potchefstroom) to "Dr." Rutherfoord, editor of the "Transvaal Argus and Potchefstroom Gazette". In this letter he once more assured the Transvaal people that their independence would be respected. <sup>2)</sup>

Even the "Cape Argus" fell silent and patiently awaited the outcome of affairs:

"In the Argus of Saturday" it told its readers, "we had several important items of Central African intelligence (about the explorations of H.M. Stanley) which we would have commented on at some length, but for the pressure of this lamentable Froude-Carnarvon Agitation which is becoming even more wearisome to ourselves than it must be to our readers." <sup>3)</sup>

The "Zuid-Afrikaan" spared <sup>no</sup> ~~to~~ print to sway public opinion. <sup>4)</sup>  
Hofmeyr wrote lengthy articles drawing parallels with Canada (as Merriman was to do for a different purpose five years later) he exhorted the people to avoid a forced dissolution of parliament (!) by voting for the conference and urged public meetings to obtain a popular mandate by the 10th November. In one leader occurs an interesting classification of the different elements opposing the conference: firstly, the constitutional party - those sharing Molteno's personal views on Colonial self-government; secondly, some "beefsteak Englishmen" of the Southey-Currey school of imperialists - the protagonists of the "Home factor" evidently;

thirdly/

1) Zuid-Afrikaan : 29th Sept., 2nd, 9th and 16th Oct., 1875.

2) Ibid. : 30th October, 1875.

3) 28th September, 1875.

4) C.f. issues of 9th, 13th, 16th, 20th, 27th and 30th October; 3rd, 6th and 10th November, 1875.

thirdly, ignorant people who feared and suspected the Carnarvon overtures, lastly, a section of obstinate Afrikaners who blindly followed Mr. Molteno. It was good propaganda, this article, and typical of many others: all the past signs of the Molteno government were raked up, including the ever-green grievance that Molteno had drained away farm-labour by not importing enough "navvies" for his railway construction! Supplementary pastimes were the Free State's dispute and <sup>attacks on</sup> ~~the visiting sins of~~ the "Argus".

Molteno had his own troubles in these days, in other quarters. His personal relations with Barkly had always been cordial, the more so since it was an open secret that the Governor's sympathies in the matter of confederation were on Molteno's side. Carnarvon had accused him, by implication, in the 12th paragraph of the despatch of 15th July, of antagonism to his wishes, Froude did so openly in his report, and in the Legislative Council in May 1876 John Geard did not hesitate to call him "a partisan of the Molteno ministry"<sup>1)</sup>.

In September 1875, however, Barkly seemed for a while to turn towards Froude. The direct cause of this change of attitude was ~~not~~ Molteno's refusal to allow Froude to see the ministerial minute of 14th September.<sup>2)</sup> A lengthy triangular correspondence between Barkly, Molteno and Froude followed while Barkly was on his way back from Griqualand West in October and the Governor consistently disapproved of his Premier's attitude.<sup>3)</sup>

Molteno won this passage of arms and Froude did not see the document which, as Molteno maintained, he was under no obligation to show the "Imperial agent" since it was a communication addressed by a self-governing colony to the Imperial Government through the proper channel viz. the Colonial Office. Carnarvon had to accept Barkly's explanation that "constitutional precedents to the contrary were wanting". Nevertheless Barkly's last letter on the subject showed that Molteno's "constitutionalism" did not

please/

1) Zuid-Afrikaan - 20th May, 1876.

2) Infra p. Supra p. 96 note 3.

3) quoted in extenso by Molteno - Life of Molteno I. pp.441-447.

please him:

"(A reply to) this letter I shall not acknowledge till I return to Capetown" he wrote from Beaufort West, "but if I am not in a position then to refer (Mr. Froude) to the Minute already sent as the best answer I can give (regarding the course that the Colonial Government intends to pursue) I shall be obliged to address you officially for this information, and I cannot help thinking that if you refuse it the fact will be turned to your disadvantage with the country". 1)

In a despatch covering the disputed minute, Barkly now suddenly assured the Secretary of State that he had spared no efforts to make the colonists see that a conference would be in their interest (a somewhat unfounded claim) but, he continued,

"unfortunately the question has during the last few months assumed a party, not to say personal aspect, and I am bound as representing the Crown in a Colony possessing Responsible Government to observe in public the strictest neutrality on all matters connected with it. The feeling of the country, however, has been so loudly expressed in most Districts in favour of the proposals for a Conference and the yearning of the Colonists of Dutch descent for reunion with their kinsfolk beyond the Orange River, has been so powerfully excited by the discussion that I cannot but think that if reciprocal sentiments exist in the Republics, such a Conference will ere long be held and the Confederation of the South African States and Colonies under the British Flag, for which Your Lordship is so earnestly laboring, be accomplished despite all the obstacles which at the present moment threaten to impede so important and desirable a consummation."

Was Barkly, who all along had been one of the "beefsteak Englishmen" about whom Hofmeyr wrote, at last converted to Carnarvon's views? Compared with his impassiveness of June this despatch certainly seems to indicate a volte-face on the Governor's part, and yet he enclosed for Carnarvon's benefit a page from the "Cape Argus" Molteno's strongest supporter in the press, containing doggerel verse by the yard on Mr. Froude and a slashing leader on that gentleman's speech at Port Elizabeth! 3)

The nett effect of the "estrangement" between Barkly and Molteno was perhaps not so much to make an enemy out of an erstwhile ally of the ministry, but to rob Molteno of the moral support of the Governor by reducing him to a position of "strict neutrality" at a time when public opinion was strong against the policy of the Government.

Amid/

1875.

- 1) Molteno - Life of Molteno I. pp.445: Barkly to Molteno, 10th Oct.,
- 2) G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon: 20th October, 1875.
- 3) Cape Argus - 14th September, 1875. Even if one makes some allowance for the fact that Barkly personally disliked Froude, the latter was still the representative of the policy he praised in his despatch.

Amid the demonstrations of conference supporters, was a single ray of light for Molteno: a large public meeting in Capetown on 19th October passed a motion supporting the attitude of the ministry. Men like C.A. Fairbridge, Saul Solomon, and P.G. Stigant, all members for Capetown, led the discussion and J.A. Bam the fourth member who was away on business, was known to agree with them. In transmitting the report of this meeting, Barkly off-set its effect by informing Carnarvon that he was, on the other hand, daily receiving addresses from Eastern and Western districts thanking him for re-assembling parliament and expressing the wish that it might reverse the decision of the previous session. <sup>1)</sup>

The House of Assembly and the Legislative Council were met by an avalanche of petitions in favour of a conference when they met on 10th November, <sup>2)</sup> and the two Houses immediately commenced to examine (in the words of the opening speech) the grounds for "the excitement created throughout the country during the last few months by the agitation of questions of the gravest consequence incidentally raised by the proposals for a conference."

In the Council, Godlonton's motion in favour of a conference and disapproving of the Governor's speech the previous day, was carried by 9 votes to 6. <sup>3)</sup> In the Assembly the matter was not so easily decided. Molteno moved at the first opportunity as follows:- <sup>4)</sup>

"That in the opinion of this House, the Agitation which has been created and encouraged in this Colony, in the name of the Imperial Government in opposition to the Colonial Government, on the subject of a Conference of Representatives of the several Colonies and States in South Africa, as proposed by Lord Carnarvon, is unconstitutional and such as to make the successful working of Self-Government in this Colony impossible, and this House, having considered the Despatch of the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 15th July last, is still of opinion, that the interests/

1) G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon: 23rd Oct., 1875: Zuid-Afrikaan - 30th October, 1875.

2) V & P. (Ass. and Council) in favour of conference: Simonstown, Uitenhage, Kraai River, Alexandria, Lady Grey, Robertson, Piquetberg, Victoria West, Grahamstown, Swellendam, (69 names) Paarl, George, Fraserburg, Queenstown; Against- Swellendam.

3) V. & P. (Council) 11th November, 1875.

4) V. & P. (Ass.) 10th and 12th November, 1875. In the original motion, the words "in the name of the Imperial Government" read "by the Imperial Government" but it was altered on the personal interference of Sir Henry Barkly (Molteno - Life of Molteno vol. II. pp.3-6)

"interests of this Colony would not be promoted by pressing forward, at the present time, such a Conference as the Secretary of State proposes."

On this motion Molteno and his supporters carried the war into the enemy's camp. On the 15th Philip Watermeyr moved as an amendment that the invitation to a Conference be immediately accepted, and William Walter, member for George, countered with a "rider" to Molteno's original motion: "But this House is further of opinion that the Government and Parliament should, if it be desired by the Imperial Government, give it their counsel and assistance in settling the difficulties which have arisen out of the extension of British Jurisdiction to the Territory known as Griqualand West".

This supplementary motion was a neat piece of strategy on Molteno's part, for it eliminated the main force in the Afrikaner opposition who had, together with the "commercial factor" of the East, taken exception to the Premier's refusal to act in the matter of Griqualand West formerly. The Afrikaners were satisfied at the prospect of a settlement with the Free State, the Easterners saw a chance of annexation. Barkly immediately sent off a despatch warning Carnarvon that there was now no possibility of a ministerial defeat.<sup>1)</sup>

In the morning, Carnarvon himself, unwittingly brought further confusion and disunity to the assailants of the Treasury Benches the arrival of<sup>2)</sup> by the despatch of 22nd October. "The despatch received by the "Windsor Castle" yesterday was the most marvellous ever sent by a Responsible Minister of the Crown in England to a Constitutional representative of Her Majesty in any British Colony endowed with Free representative institutions", declared the "Cape Argus". "It was marvellous in many respects, and first of all in its mystical unintelligibility.....".

The sarcasm was justified by the contents of the document. If one bears in mind that by 1875, the British colonies were well on their way towards that final goal of political autonomy

on the/

1) G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 16th November, 1875.

2) G.H. 1/22 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 22nd October, 1875, (Annexure no.4.)

on the same constitutional basis (mutatis mutandis) as Great Britain, if one further remembers that Carnarvon was aware of Molteno's views on the constitutional position of a self-governing colony as expressed in his letters and minute of 14th September, then the boyish naivety of the first three clauses appear indeed "marvellous". In September Carnarvon had to choose his way between newspaper reports from anti-ministerialist sources and deference to the views of the ministry. He decided to stake his chances of success on the opposition to the existing government, and accepted newspaper opinion as his guide.<sup>1)</sup> This is the only way in which one can explain his disregard of political conventions and his reference to Barkly's powers in case of "a divergence between the decision of Parliament and the wishes of the community".

The fourth paragraph is no doubt the example of "mystical unintelligibility"; it represents a return to the motif of the despatch, but why, one asks, the cumbersome and vague phrases such as "it may be thought, as I myself am becoming disposed to think"? Such wording could not but produce an unfavourable impression and create the suspicion of a half-hearted dabbling in weighty affairs. The whole despatch bears a stamp of irresponsibility or a deliberate attempt to slur over matters which were known to loom large in colonial politics, and which could not be brushed aside with optimistic enthusiasm over some favourable demonstrations of public opinion.

It was Saul Solomon who pounced upon the fifth paragraph as the means of dealing a decisive blow at the opposition. For the first effect, in that quarter, of Carnarvon's proposal to hold the conference in London, was loss of confidence in their own cause. The "Zuid-Afrikaan" was perplexed and made no efforts to conceal its mixed feelings towards the despatch.<sup>2)</sup>

Its/

1) C.f. Molteno - Life of Molteno I. pp.428-430; vol.II. p.42.: Correspondence of T.E. Fuller, proving to what extent Carnarvon's views were influenced by the "singular unanimity" of the Colonial Press in his favour.

2) Zuid-Afrikaan - 20th November, 1875. Grahamstown Journal (quoted by Molteno - op cit. II. p.43) "A more inopportune time document it has seldom been our lot to read - what are we to understand by the despatch/

Its lukewarm attitude was duly reflected eventually in the division lists, for all Western members except the Barry brothers voted with Molteno.<sup>1)</sup> Philip Watermeyr was the first in the field, however, on the 18th November, and moved as an amendment that paragraph five of the despatch be complied with, but a counter-amendment came from J. Laing "that the House cannot even give an implied assent to any of the suggestions in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Despatch no.111, dated 22nd October, from the Secretary of State for the Colonies". Solomon proposed to incorporate Walter's amendment in the following resolution:

"As it appears from the Despatch dated the 22nd October, 1875, that the Right Hon'ble the Secretary of State for the Colonies has withdrawn his proposal for a Conference of Representatives of the several colonies and states of South Africa, this House is of opinion that it is not now called upon to record its continued objection to the holding, at the present time, of such a Conference, or its condemnation of the unconstitutional agitation carried on in this Colony in connection with this question."

Molteno withdrew his motion on the 23rd, Watermeyr's was defeated by 22-35 and Solomon's accepted by 36-22, together with the Griqualand West "rider".<sup>2)</sup>

The resolution was a patent misinterpretation of the tenor of the despatch,<sup>3)</sup> but it had survived the debate because the despatch had sown discord amongst those on whom Carnarvon (and Froude) had counted. Unaware of the outcome of the special session Carnarvon followed up his first despatch by another in which he further elaborated the idea of a London Conference.<sup>4)</sup> He was taking as much for granted as in his previous despatch and what has been said with regard to that document applies with even greater force to this one.

In his earnest desire to flog the unwilling Molteno horse

towards/

2) contd. from infra p.108. - "despatch?....The only way to carry out Lord Carnarvon's original views in which most of us are so earnestly interested, is to disown certain points in His Lordship's latest despatch. We, his followers, must disagree with him, as to the non-necessity of the Conference and by so doing endeavour to seal the fate of the Ministry, and we must disown all intention to submit our affairs to a Conference in London." The "Volksblad" adopted a similar attitude.

1) V & P. (Ass.) 23rd, Nov., 1875. Molteno - Life of Molteno II. p.33.

2) V & P. (Ass.) 23rd Nov., 1875; Newton - Unification p.33 G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon: 24th November, 1875.

3) c.f. Molteno - op cit. p.43 ff. for the opposite view.

4) G.H. 1/22 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 15th November, 1875. Annexure no.5.

towards confederation, Carnarvon cuts a ridiculous figure to-day when we arrange these despatches chronologically. Not the least important factor, as Carnarvon himself noticed in paragraph 3, was the aimless criss-crossing of despatches in the absence of instantaneous telegraphic communication between Cape-town and London. Had Carnarvon been in possession of this facility, the effect of his efforts in 1875 would undoubtedly have been different.

Barkly, however, lost no time in conveying the news of the 23rd to Carnarvon. He furthermore, informed the Colonial Office that the ministry recognised no "moral obligations" to assist in settling the affairs of Griqualand West and acted solely on the resolution of the Assembly in this matter.<sup>1)</sup> On the prospects for a conference in London, he could give no views since:

"the opinions on this point indicated by the supporters of a conference in South Africa were, as your Lordship has since been made aware, somewhat divided when the first intimation was conveyed to Parliament in Despatch no. 111 of the 22nd October, and as yet no opportunity has occurred for any expression of feeling out of doors by that party."

Moltene had officially stated in a memorandum of 4th January 1876, that he would visit England only on terms of the despatch of 4th December.<sup>2)</sup> On hearing of the success of the Ministry, Carnarvon confidentially informed Barkly that he was "disposed to think that a dissolution of Parliament is not necessary at the present moment to bring the Legislature and the constituencies into accord ...."<sup>3)</sup> It is just as well that Moltene never saw such proof of the Secretary of State's views on colonial self-government!

James Anothy Froude's second visit had ended ingloriously with the rejection of Carnarvon's third despatch. He had made no public appearance since September, though he continued to correspond with influential politicians up to the end of the Special session.<sup>4)</sup> On the 25th November, he quietly left South Africa.

Sir/

- 
- 1) G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 24th November and 4th December, 1875.  
 2) G.H. 31/14 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 3th January, 1876.  
 3) Carnarvon to Barkly (Conf.) 23rd December, 1875.  
 4) Moltene - Life of Moltene I. pp.446, 418, 447, vol.II. pp.32, 34.

Sir George Colley, who ended a gallant career on Majuba five years later, was a fellow-passanger and Froude's biographer quotes his impressions of the man who had been in the limelight of political strife since June, 1875.

"It was rather a sad mind, sometimes grand, sometimes pathetic and tender, usually cynical but often relating with the highest appreciation and with wonderful beauty of language, some gallant deed of some of his heroes of the fifteenth or sixteenth century," records Colley. "He seemed to have gone through every phase of thought and come to the end 'all is vanity'! He himself used to say the interest of life to a thinking man was exhausted at thirty or thirty-five. After that there remained nothing but disappointment of earlier visions and hopes. Sometimes there was something almost fearful in the gloom, and utter disbelief, and defiance of his mind." 1)

If this was the real Froude, and there is ample evidence from his life that it was, one must involuntarily admire his role in South African affairs, even if it cannot be approved of. A man whose mind was formed, as his critics like to point out, "in the unexhilarating atmosphere of the library", it was nothing less than an effort on his part to project himself into the petty realities of practical politics.

What were his personal views? It may seem a strange question to ask with so many after-dinner speeches and articles from which to find the answer; it is the more difficult to discover because all this evidence serves to obscure rather than to reveal Froude's honest convictions on the South African problem. One fact stands out clearly - Froude saw, better than many of his contemporaries the significance of the Afrikaner national spirit in any scheme of confederation. Because he studied the lessons of the past as an historian he could feel sympathy and understanding for Dutch-South African conservatism - so much sympathy that he waxed genuinely sentimental about it and incurred the distrust of his own countrymen. That he was sincere in this matter is proved by much of what he wrote and said subsequently, but no one realised better than he how impossible his position would become if he extolled Afrikaner rights to independence (as he had done at Bloemfontein) to the exclusion of wider imperial interests. Hence the inevitable

contradictions/

1) Paul - Life of Froude p.270.

contradictions in some of his public speeches: on the one hand he preached his noble friend's desire to unify South Africa as an integral dominion under the British flag, on the other his own regrets that Great Britain should ever have hoisted her flag beyond the sandflats of the Cape. <sup>1)</sup> In the first instance one feels he is "saying his lines", the next moment the tone of conviction rings clear as he lays aside his sentiments as a born Englishman and becomes a rational critic. But as such he was of little use to his friend in Downing Street.

His enemies flung his belief in autocratic government at his head, quoting his connection with Carlyle and passages from his historical works. This was not quite fair to Froude: he believed as strongly as his liberal critics in the ultimate development of the colonies into full-grown states. <sup>2)</sup> In 1875 he was opposed to colonial self-government not because he regarded autocracy as a preferable form of government, but because he believed that it was essential that the initiative in the major matters of policy should rest with the British Government. This object could not be attained if the right of the Imperial Government was disputed on constitutional grounds by the colonies when, as Froude believed, they were still in a tutelary position in many respects. The opposition of the Cape Colony to confederation he regarded, rightly or wrongly, as a good example of colonial precocity, and he never <sup>3)</sup> hesitated to denounce responsible government in after years. He did believe, however, in the advantages of strong government,

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- 1) C.f. Froude - Two Lectures pp.112 ff. 76:- "If a line could be drawn across from Table Bay to False Bay, if the Cape Peninsula was and ours only, and the rest of the country was entirely independent<sup>ouys</sup> of us, as I heartily wish it was, then I would leave South Africa to the South Africans, white or coloured, to shape out its own fortunes; the responsibility would then be theirs". Engelbrecht - Burgers pp.188-189 (Froude to Burgers, 12th March, 1877) "If I had to decide I would run a line of forts from Table Bay, hold the Table Mountain Peninsula as an Imperial position and leave the rest of the Country Independent. But I find no one will agree with me and this will not be done."
- 2) C.f. his speech at Worcester p.63
- 3) Cape Argus: 22nd May, 1879 (on article in "Quarterly Review") Ibid: 28th and 30th October, 1879 (on article in "Fortnightly Review") Walker - de Villiers p.140. Hardinge - Life of Carnarvon II. p.202.

and never concealed his contempt for orthodox democracy. If he was mis-cast for the part he played, nobody will accuse him of hypocrisy. The expedients he used to bridge an almost insurmountable divergence of interests in the Colony, and in the Republics, are not above reproach by any means, one may even concede that his public speeches were not logically consistent - but speeches were to him a means to an end and he sincerely believed that the end would be good.

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C H A P T E R IV.

## Carnarvon Changes the Key.

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The Colony after Froude's departure - The report - The new policy towards the Republics - The London Conference - Preparations for annexation - The Permissive Bill - The annexation.

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The supporters of the conference had lost the first round, but they were determined to take up the fight in the new year. Natal had adopted a resolution in favour of two extra delegates to the conference on the same day that Solomon's motion passed in Capetown, and expressed the "hope of more friendly intercourse and closer union with Colonies and States whose interests are by nature and circumstances inseparable from (their) own"<sup>1)</sup> Early in January John Paterson took ship for Natal<sup>2)</sup> - was it commercial interests or an apostolic mission in the lost cause of confederation? There were some who maintained that the two motives had never been otherwise than synonymous for John Paterson. Be that as it may, there was still hope on the part of the Eastern Confederationists.

The Afrikaner section in the Western province were equally determined not to abide by the decision of the Assembly. In December, Malmesbury and Riversdale had censured their members of parliament for voting with Molteno.<sup>3)</sup> From Pretoria came a severe denunciation of the pigheadedness<sup>4)</sup> of the Cape Parliament which showed that the belief in a frank discussion between the South African communities was strong still in the Transvaal.

"Lord Carnarvon's fourth despatch on the conference question... deserves careful consideration from the people and press of the whole of South Africa, and not the least from the Republics" declared the "Volkstem", "It scatters to the winds the shallow pretence of the Cape Parliamentary majority headed by Mr. Saul Solomon, that his Lordship in his despatch of 22nd October abandoned the idea of a conference. It completely and distinctly demonstrates the fallacy of the statements, so repeatedly made to frighten weak-minded people,<sup>5)</sup> by participating in the Conference the Colonies and States of South Africa would bind themselves to whatever conclusions<sup>6)</sup>

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1) G.H. 1/23 - Carnarvon to Barkly: 13th Jan., 1876 Enclosures: (1) Bulwer to Carnarvon, 26th Nov., 1875 (2) Carnarvon to Bulwer, 13th Jan., 1876.

2) Cape Argus : 15th Jan., 1876.

3) Zuid-Afrikaan : 15th Dec., 1875.

"conclusions the Conference may arrive at. In fact, this despatch most completely cuts away the ground raised by Mr. Solomon for the Molteno ministry to stand upon in their shortsighted and selfish policy at this most important juncture in the history of South Africa. Above all, this despatch proves beyond any possibility of doubt that the present British ministry is actuated by a perhaps not disinterested but, at all events, a fair and reasonable desire to do justice to the Republics." The independence of the republic will not be swallowed by a "Dominion of Canada" model of confederation, continued the paper, "We are quite willing to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance, to form some form of coalition for mutual protection against the hundreds of thousands of natives around. Our independence, however despicable in the eyes of those who covet it, we will not surrender" 1)

The Froude agitation had aroused the political consciousness of the "Dutch party" in the Cape Colony and the happenings of 1875, had coincided with the first active cultural and language movement on the part of Afrikaners. The acceptance of the Griqualand West "rider" by Molteno, was regarded as a triumph by the Hofmeyr faction. "Now that the current of Afrikanerism began to rise against them" said the "Zuid-Afrikaan", "they found themselves compelled to concede, now they vote for a resolution to offer the Imperial Government counsel and assistance. Even so we advise our friends to drop the agitation for the present and await developments." 2)

In January, 1876 two newspapers appeared in the Western Province: the "Cape Times" as a balance for the "Argus" and "Di Patriot" of Paarl, the first Afrikaans newspaper to be published. The English paper has survived to this day, the Afrikaans one has been defunct since 1904, yet it was the 'Patriot' which played the more important role in these early years of their existence. The history of the first Afrikaans<sup>aans</sup> language movement out of which this little paper was born, has often been dealt with in

Afrikaans/

1) Volksstem : 15th January, 1876: But a Colonial Doubting-Thomas warned as follows:-

"Daar kom 'n stem uit Engeland  
Pas op!  
'Transvaal geef ons die broederhand!'  
Pas op! Pas op!  
Die stem klink mooi en soet;  
Dis alles wel en goed;  
Mar pas op wat jull' doet.  
Let jull' nie op,  
Dan's jull' gefop."

2) 27th November, 1875.

3) Cape Argus : (special issue) 2nd January, 1932.

Afrikaans from a literary point of view. It is political significance as we see it today, was not recognised at first even by contemporary opinion among Afrikaners themselves. We admit today that the literary productions of this first movement to make Afrikaans a written language, are negligible in quality, if not in quantity. It was merely the rising national spirit, the effort of the Colonial Afrikaner to "pull his weight" which found literary expression. That the satirising and condemnation of English influence on the Afrikaner should have followed on a period of national dormancy and passive submission to extraneous cultural influences, is but another instance of the laws of reaction. Even the increasing republican tendency of the "Patriot" as time passed, must be regarded in this light. || At its birth in 1876, the "Patriot's" republicanism was that of the average Colonial Afrikaner viz. a natural feeling of affinity towards the inhabitants of the republics and a desire to see justice done to them. Hence we find that, although both the Dutch papers in Capetown looked askance at the language in which the little newcomer appeared,<sup>2)</sup> Its sentiments were applauded and Hofmeyr found it worth his while to defend its right of existence against attack from no less a man than Sir J.H. de Villiers in May, 1876.<sup>3)</sup> The immediate effect of this supply of reading matter in the vernacular to the country reader was to stimulate his interest and, frequently to

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1) E.C. Pienaar - Taal en Poësie in Suid-Afrika <sup>prosa</sup> ; P.C. Schoon-  
ees : Prosa van die Tweede Afrikaanse Taalbeweging (Introduction)  
G.R. van Willigh - Eerste Afrikaanse Skrywers and Lydia V. Niekerk -  
Die Eerste Taalbeweging en Letterkundige Voortbrengselen : This is  
a very concise treatment of the subject and it contains useful extracts  
from the "poetry" of the "Patriot" on political topics. (pp.42-82)

2) Volksblad : 20th and 25th April, 1876; Zuid-Afrikaan : 16th Feb.,  
and 8th April 1876. Ibid: 23rd Feb., 1876: here a correspondent  
took up the cudgels for Afrikaans: "Veledede week het ek een party  
mense op die trein hoor praat over de Patriot. Hulle kom van die  
onderveld, en zeg dat de mense algemeen daarvoor is. Ja, hulle gaat  
zoo ver en zeg dat de mense aankomende jaar in de Parlement al Afri-  
kaans moet word" <sup>of spreekwoord</sup>.

c.f. Lydia v. Niekerk - op cit. p.9. (quoting the Cradockse Afrikaan  
24th November, 1875): "Zotter onderneming is, onzes inziens, wel  
byna niet denklik".

3) Zuid-Afrikaan : 17th May, 1876: In a speech at the Capetown Pub-  
lic Library the Chief Justice had argued against the advisability  
of the survival of Afrikaans.

move him to take up his pen and strike a blow for his political convictions in the most apt and amusing doggerel verse! Soon the "Patriot" was in a position to claim that it might possibly be indirectly increasing the circulation of the "Zuid-Afrikaan" itself. Hofmeyr saw the force of the argument and the time did come when he publicly buried the hatchet with the "Hotnostaal"! <sup>1)</sup>

Lord Carnarvon had already warned Barkly that he had something to tell the Cape still on the conference matter, and Molteno's original motion in particular, <sup>2)</sup> and he did so to his heart's content in the fifth confederation despatch. <sup>3)</sup> It is unnecessary to discuss this document in detail; it is by far most long-winded of the series since 4th May, and, as a whole, constitutes a heart-felt outburst on Carnarvon's part against the Cape Government. Even Sir Henry Barkly did not escape the lash. There was a challenging note in this despatch which becomes more audible if one pays attention to the preparations which the Secretary of State was making at this very moment to further his pet policy. If Molteno would not work with him he would do his best to work round this government whose gospel was the principles of responsible government and which persisted in sacrificing his ideals to the idol of constitutional liberty.

The immediate effect of this renewed invitation to the Cape to participate in a London Conference, coupled with such sharp disapproval of the attitude of both Governor and Ministers, was the resuscitation of the conference party. Froude's report had just been published <sup>4)</sup> and his advocacy of a conciliatory policy towards the republics was pleasing to the Afrikaner ear. This news, coinciding as it did with the laudatory <sup>0</sup> remarks in Carnarvon's despatch on Froude's work in South Africa, was well-timed <sup>5)</sup> in its effect just before the opening of the Cape Parliament.

From/

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- 1) Zuid-Afrikaan: 23rd March, 1879: "Leader of the Afrikanerstaal" Public  
 2) G.H. 1/23 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 18th Dec., 1875.  
 3) Ibid. - Carnarvon to Barkly, 24th January, 1876 - Annexure no.6.  
 4) See extract *in f-1a p.119*  
 5) C.f. Zuid-Afrikaan: 23rd and 29th March, 1876: Thus writes the man (referring to Froude's report) of whom we have had to hear so often that at the dinners offered him in Bloemfontein and in the West, he played the game with Afrikaners of "aap wat ben je een mooije jongen" to laugh at them behind their backs .... what will they say now of this report directed not to the colonists but to England's minister?"

From the East came a Grahamstown resolution thanking Carnarvon for the despatch and expressing the hope of separate Eastern representation. Port Elizabeth followed suit, then Queenstown, Kingwilliamstown, Fort Beaufort, Port Alfred, Aliwal North and once again Port Elizabeth asking for John Paterson as delegate, while Grahamstown adopted a similar resolution to its first.<sup>1)</sup>

Hofmeyr wrote a series of articles in his paper on the advantages which closer union with Natal would bring to the Western Province wine farmers and urged public support for the conference.<sup>2)</sup> The "Argus" contented itself with observations on the poor attendance at conference meetings and pungent remarks on Mr. Paterson's "tobacco swindle"! Except for a heated debate in the Legislative Council, however, the matter of Molteno's mission to England was quickly disposed of and he was armed with a resolution from the Assembly to discuss at the London Conference only the existing position of Griqualand West.<sup>2)</sup>

Carnarvon's South African enterprise had attracted little public attention in England in 1875 and that little was mostly unfavourable.<sup>3)</sup> Disraeli had just purchased the Khedive's shares in the Suez Canal and the Conservatives were pressing themselves in the sunlight of a brief spell of popularity before the gloom of the Balkan Crisis descended over them in 1876. No wonder that the Prime Minister was annoyed at the failure of Froude's mission<sup>4)</sup> and that Carnarvon hastened to take up the threads of his policy once again.

Froude's report which has often been referred to in other connections,<sup>5)</sup> furnished a good starting-point. It contained matter

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1) G.H. 31/14 - Barkly to Carnarvon, St h March, 24th April, 9th and 19th May, 9th June, 13th and 21st and 25th July, 1876.

2) Zuid-Afrikaan - 29th April, 3rd and 10th May, 1876.

Ibid. - 20th May, 1876: G.H. 31/14 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 14th June, 1876.

3) Cape Argus - 21st Sept., 1875, 22nd January, 1876. Pamphlet No.33. (Lord Blachford to Sir Henry Taylor, Dec, 28th, 1875): "What do you know or think of Lord Carnarvon's Cape of Good Hope agitation? It seems to me (as to the Cape people) that the Froude mission was an error both as to the thing and as to the man.

I wonder Hebert with his Australian experience agreed to it. And Froude was not the man (I should think) to make it go down .... No doubt he is a very clever fellow and when he has got a truth he makes it tell. But I cannot imagine a more impersuasive person - judging from his books and from a long-ago recollection of his person".

4) Buckle - Life of Disraeli v. h. 412.

5) C.1399 of 1876 - Disraeli: Newton - Unification p.

C.1399 of 1876, p. 58-53; Newton - Unification h.

which proved embarrassing to Carnarvon, for instance the references to the position of Griqualand West as a motive for a conference<sup>1)</sup> and Froude's criticism of Barkly,<sup>2)</sup> but in his concluding paragraph Froude had made his most significant remark:

"The protest of the Orange Free State has been four years before the world" he wrote, "and the Government of Bloemfontein insists that the demand for foreign arbitration must either be allowed or must be superseded by direct negotiations, unless the British Government intends to rely merely on superiority of force. The difficulties connected with the dispute have been insoluble so long as the Cape Parliament set aside its obligations.. Your Lordship can now bring to an end a long and intricate controversy, which was embittering against the British Government not only the republics themselves, but a large and meritorious portion of the population of the Colony."

In June, 1875, Brand had sought direct access to the Foreign Office and Carnarvon had thwarted his efforts by urging participation in the conference as a sine qua non for further negotiations.<sup>3)</sup> Brand persisted in his refusal to sit with a representative of Griqualand West if anything else than native policy or the arms traffic with natives was being discussed. "This is a question of right and justice" he told Barkly, "and after the negotiations to settle it by arbitration have failed I cannot see any other alternative for the amicable settlement thereof than by friendly negotiations between representatives of Her Majesty's and our Government specially appointed for that purpose."<sup>4)</sup>

Ten days after Froude had written his report, Carnarvon sent off a despatch to Barkly inviting Brand to London in cordial terms. Referring to past negotiations he assured Brand that "if negotiations of a different character are now opened he will not find me wanting either in that spirit of conciliation, or in that sincere to attain a speedy and effectual settlement which he/

1) C.f. Paul - Life of Froude pp.270-274.

2) Barkly deeply resented Froude's remarks and Carnarvon had the greatest difficulty in hushing the personal difference which was "calculated to revive the recollection of differences which all must desire to see terminated" - especially when it was just before the London Conference (C.f. G.H. 31/14 - Barkly to Carnarvon 27th March, 1876, : G.H. 1/23 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 26th June, 1876: Carnarvon to Barkly (Conf.) 28th July, 1876: Barkly to Carnarvon - (Conf) 6th December, 1876. )

3) G.H. 1/22 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 31st August, 1875. Enclosure - Brand to Derby, 16th June, 1875.

4) G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 19th Nov., 1875. Enclosure: a sealed packet for Carnarvon and covering letter (Brand to Barkly, 17th November)

"he so justly urges as essential conditions of success ....(and) it will be a pleasure to Her Majesty's Government to show him the consideration due to his own personal eminence, no less than to the high position which he holds". As a cautious-worded afterthought he added an invitation to the conference on confederation. 1)

It is not difficult to see that Lord Carnarvon was going out of his way to effect a more amiable relationship with the Free State after the brusqueness of Barkly had ruffled Brand's temper, for four years. It was an essential preparation for enticing the President to the conference. That Carnarvon further regarded the settlement of the dispute by a monetary payment as a foregone conclusion is obvious in view of the fact that Moltens was coming to London for the sole purpose (as all knew, though they did not all admit it) to annex Griqualand West. About the same time that he sent the invitation to Brand he wrote a confidential letter to Barkly which throws further light on this point. 2)

In happy anticipation of the Free State's reply, the Queen's speech contained a reference to the proposed conference on South African affairs <sup>3)</sup> and (quite untruthfully as it appears) Carnarvon ~~held~~ <sup>told</sup> the Cape Colony in the despatch of 24th January "I have before me cordial expressions of readiness from the authorities of the Free State and the Transvaal republic to attend (the conference) and it therefore only remains to decide what may be the most suitable time and place for such a meeting."

If this statement was a half-truth in the case of the Free State it was a total misrepresentation of the official attitude of the Transvaal, despite the extract from the "Volksstem" which has been quoted elsewhere. Burgers was on his way back to South

Africa/

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- 1) G.H. 1/23 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 22nd January, 1876.  
 2) Carnarvon to Barkly (Conf.) 4th February, 1876: "It is of course my object and desire to conduct any communications which I may have with Mr. Brand in a spirit of friendly compromise rather than with reference to the precise value of any documents upon which either party would rely if it were a case of litigation or of formal arbitration".  
 3) Zuid-Afrikaan - 18th March, 1876.

Africa after his long European visit and in Pretoria the "Volksstem" was wildly enthusiastic at the news of the £300,000 railway loan (of course His Honor had not yet said whether it was subscribed!) and the "Gold Fields Mercury" was for once forced on the defensive, with the choicest abuse of Burgers as its only weapon.<sup>1)</sup>

Ever since April 1875 the President's quest for a railway loan had occupied not his attention alone: unbeknown to him the watchful eyes of Downing Street were wide open to catch any move on his part. It never entered the guileless mind so full of grandiose ideas that Great Britain had kept silent watch over every movement of his republic since the days when McCorkindale sailed up the Maputa River<sup>2)</sup> or that Carnarvon had secretly instructed Barkly to take stock of the Transvaal's military strength shortly after he had come to the Colonial Office in 1874 already.<sup>3)</sup> Much less did he realise the significance of capitalist influence behind the gold-mining and land prospectuses which from time to time invited more immigrants to swell the muster of Pelgrimsrust.<sup>4)</sup> So he tactlessly broadcast his intentions to all the world when he set out for Portugal in search of his railway loan and his message was duly received as far as the Court of St. Petersburg!<sup>5)</sup> The "Argus" actually bid the President godspeed,<sup>6)</sup> but the "Standard and Mail" was nearer

the/

1) Volksstem - 22nd Jan., 1876. Ibid - 4th March : A telegram arrived which was evidently a relief to the paper, even if it proved a lie eventually "Burgers got his £300,000 loan at 6% in Holland. Loan open only two days when the whole was subscribed".

2) G.H. 1/13 - Kimberley to Hay, 23rd Aug., 1870 (Enclosure: Wodehouse to Kimberley, 20th July, 1870) Granville to Wodehouse (Conf.) 21st March, 1870.

3) Carnarvon to Barkly - 24th April, 1874 (quoted by Hardinge - Life of Carnarvon II. p.172)

4) C.f. Pamphlet no. 7. Theal - History of S.A. 1872-1884 I. p.280 G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 8th July, 1875. According to a report of the Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce 3827 ounces of Transvaal gold-dust valued at £14,772 was declared at Port Elizabeth in 1874-'75 (apart from dust carried on their persons by passengers)

5) This story of diplomacy is best told by Uys - (Shepstone pp.139-161 : the chapter on "Delagoa Bay and the Policy of Confederation") By the time Burgers arrived in London from Portugal, Carnarvon had no fears that his railway plans would ever mature, and to make doubly sure he had concluded a pre-emption agreement with Portugal pending the Mac Mahon Award of Delagoa Bay!

6) 10th April, 1875.

the mark:

"I am afraid that President Burgers has selected a very unpropitious time for asking the English public for money for his railway." wrote its correspondent from London. "The whole subject of loans to little independent states stinks in British nostrils.... John Bull has always plenty of money to advance but he asks a few questions first.... He has no great love for republics at any time - and the question not unnaturally asked is - What are those South African Republics? How did they originate? Why do they exist as separate communities?" 1)

In Natal Wolseley was still kicking his heels at the time Burgers left: he utilised the opportunity of the President's absence to send Colonel Colley on an extensive scouting tour through the Transvaal, with instructions inter alia, to learn the route of the proposed railway. Meanwhile he manifested his good wishes for Burgers' enterprise in a typical note to Sir Henry Barkly. 2)

Oblivious to the mixed feelings his mission aroused and the forces at work around him, Burgers proceeded to London and, as has been noted, verbally assured Carnarvon of his willingness to join the Conference and make friends with Sir Henry Barkly. In due course therefore, Carnarvon informed the High Commissioner that no more had to be heard about the Keate Award dispute. 3)

Burgers, however, was pre-occupied with his railway and his interview with the Secretary of State had taken the place before the English money market refused him a loan! Returning to Pretoria as the "conquering hero" he stopped to deliver a speech at Graaff-Reinet in April 1876, which was so strong in its pan-Afrikanerism that Official circles at the Cape were thoroughly disturbed and annoyed and even Froude warned him to go slowly. 4)

Back in his capital Burgers advanced suddenly as an open

antagonist/

1) Quoted by the Eastern Star - 8th June, 1875. Mrs Merriman too, had no illusions about the matter. Burgers' intended visit to Portugal was simply "to get Portugal to espouse the cause of the T. Vaal make the railway (to) Delagoa Bay; clapperclaw the Gold Fields and set England at defiance whilst putting her into the background and shutting the door in her face". (Julia Merriman to Merriman - indicated - Merriman Papers.)

2) Engelbrecht - Burgers p.223 ff. Maurice and Arthan - Wolseley p. (Wolseley to Barkly, 5th May, 1875) : "~~Getways is preparing for war. I am told he will most probably turn his arms against the native tribes on his own border~~

3) G.H. 1/22 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 6th September, 1875.

4) Engelbrecht - Burgers op cit. pp.185-187 : 188-189.

antagonist of Confederation under the British flag and the "Volksstem" took up the cry with gusto. While Brand was on his way to London, the Transvaal President rose and told his Volksraad that he had not been invited to attend the conference - which was again a half-truth <sup>1)</sup> - and that "in case a majority of the inhabitants should by petition pray for confederation under the British flag he would immediately resign his office because he did not believe in a dishonest alliance". The same issue of the "Volksstem" reported trouble in Secoecoeni's country. <sup>2)</sup>

What transpired in London between Brand and Carnarvon and at the "conference" of 23rd August 1876 in the Colonial Office, is familiar history and need not be repeated here. <sup>3)</sup> Of more importance than the miserable failure of Carnarvon to force the pace, is the dramatic coincidence of circumstances which caused Lord Carnarvon to send Shepstone packing for South Africa, with instructions to make the best of the confused state of affairs in the Transvaal which Barkly was describing in every mail to England, on authority of the "Cape Argus" and its "Special correspondents" at Pelgrimrust. <sup>4)</sup>

While awaiting the results of this plunge he had taken, Car-

narvon/

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- 1) C.f. G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 19th Feb., 1877. Enclosure Burgers to Barkly, 2nd Feb., 1877.  
 2) 15th April and 20th May, 1876 (underlining is mine)  
 3) Moltens - Life of Moltens II, pp.92-121 : de Kiewiet • Imperial Factor p.90 : Hardinge - Life of Carnarvon II, p.210 ff. : Pamphlet no.39: text of Carnarvon's speech on 23rd August.  
 4) For comparison: Uys - Life of Shepstone p.172 ff. Buckle - Life of Disraeli VI, p.412 ff. (letters from Carnarvon to Disraeli on Shepstone's mission) Volksstem - 1st 22nd and 29th July, 26th Aug., 1876. Cape Argus - 8th and 15th July, 26th Aug., 16th Sept., Official correspondence: G.H. 1/23 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 12th July 1875. Barkly to Carnarvon (Conf.) 14th and 21st July, 4th and 11th Aug., 1876, 25th Aug., (covering telegram on Burgers' defeat. News from the "Cape Argus".) 1st Sept., 1876:- containing the post-script "I was enabled to send under cover of a few hasty lines to your Lordship an extract from a letter dated at Lydenburg on the 15th ultimo, stating that a meeting had been held at that place on the receipt of the news of President Burgers' defeat, at which it was unanimously resolved to request the British Government to take over the country". See also confidential despatches; 15th Sept., 9th and 17th Oct., 1876. G.H. 31/14 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 2nd 9th and 30th Oct., 6th 14th 18th and 20th Nov., 1876. (On the alleged atrocities of Schlickmann's volunteers in Secoecoeni's country. These despatches were fully supplemented by cuttings from "The Cape Argus", "The Transvaal Advocate" and occasionally "The Gold Fields Mercury")

Carnarvon had many other matters to occupy his attention.

Brand had departed after telling the "conference" that the Free State had had no native problem except that which Richard Southey had created. He resolutely refused to discuss confederation. Carnarvon's reaction was instantaneous: those who are not with us, are against us: That was his new attitude when he saw the end of his hopes to win over the Free State, and he tacitly marked also the Free State for the use of the mailed fist where the velvet glove had failed - but first the Transvaal.<sup>1)</sup>

Molteno was still in London. He had interviewed Carnarvon on 31st July and then patiently awaited the end of the conference to commence the Griqualand West discussion. The settlement with Brand had annoyed Molteno and he adopted an attitude of do-as-you-please:

"I desire to submit to your Lordship" he wrote to Carnarvon, "that the difficulty with the Free State having been overcome there does not appear to be the same necessity for the immediate settlement of these important questions as would undoubtedly have existed had their adjustment constituted a requisite preliminary to concluding the agreement with that State...." 2)

He was right, technically, for the resolution of the Cape Assembly said nothing about annexation though Carnarvon took it for granted that "counsel and assistance" covered this expedient also. All Molteno could do was to consent to recommend annexation to Parliament.<sup>3)</sup> Carnarvon insisted on much more than such vague assurances. He offered Molteno a veritable Hobson's choice: firstly, incorporation of Griqualand West with the Cape Colony, an arrangement which was most acceptable to the Premier. But Carnarvon made Molteno understand plainly that he did not like it personally since it would obliterate Griqualand West as a separate member of any future confederation; he had no desire

to weaken/

1) G.H. 1/24 - Carnarvon to Barkly 31st Aug., 1876: "I am unable to make a recommendation in favour of a participation in the Customs Duties by any state not prepared to give its adhesion to some satisfactory scheme of Confederation". He did not desire to appear to press the Free State into form of confederation, and he was going to offer no further remarks."

2) Molteno - Life of Molteno II. p.98 : G.H. 1/24 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 4th October, 1876. Enclosures - Correspondence between Molteno and Colonial Office.

3) Zuid-Afrikaan - 17th August, 1876.

to weaken the "plurality" of communities outside the Colony and at the same time acquiesce in Molteno's unification ideas. So, in the second place he suggested a federal union between Griqualand West and the Colony. Molteno's answer may be imagined. Thirdly, he demanded a share of customs duties for Griqualand West (the very thing he had refused to Brand) if the Cape should reject the first two proposals. Again Molteno disapproved of such patchwork to rehabilitate the treasury of Griqualand West. To make the choice still more difficult he informed Molteno that, unless he made some move to meet the position the annexation of Tembuland, and Walvis Bay, resolved upon by the Cape Parliament in 1875, would not be sanctioned.<sup>1)</sup>

The negotiations came to a deadlock. Molteno protested that he could see no connection between the matters. Herbert merely arranged another interview for him with Carnarvon: "Lord Carnarvon feels constrained to add" he wrote further, "that if the delay you deprecate in arriving at a settlement of the question of Walfisch Bay and Tembuland is open to so much risk, the delay which you think yourself obliged to interpose in the settlement of the Griqualand West difficulties appears to his Lordship no less fraught with objection and danger". Molteno went once more to the Colonial Office and on 22nd September, agreed to recommend the incorporation of Griqualand West in the Colony to the Cape Parliament.<sup>2)</sup> Before Molteno sailed from England Herbert made a last attempt to sound the obstinate Cape Premier on his attitude towards confederation and in private letter he asked him his views "as to the general principles upon which the colonies of Natal and Griqualand West, or the Transvaal Republic, if the cession of it to the Crown, as from recent information seems

not/

1) Molteno - Life of Molteno II. pp.99-103 : G.H. 1/13 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 24th and 27th January, 1876 : De Kiewiet - Imperial Factor p.131.

2) Hardinge - Life of Carnarvon II. pp.213-218 : G.H. 1/24 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 4th Oct., 1876.

Enclosures: (1) Molteno to Carnarvon, 15th September  
 (2) Herbert to Molteno, 6th September  
 (3) do. do. 20th September  
 (4) Molteno to Herbert, 22nd September

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not improbable, should take place, can be best brought into connection with the Cape Colony".<sup>1)</sup>

Molteno was on the point of departure and excused himself on this ground from entering into the matter of Confederation; but he made the following statement which is important because it sums up very clearly the stand-point from which he acted for the remainder of his premiership and which was carried on by his party (and Merriman particularly) till the June debate of 1880 and after.

"I would beg to observe at the same time" he told Carnarvon, that as your Lordship will have gathered from me in the course of conversation, I incline to the opinion (taking a general view of the question) that the mode in which the unification of South Africa could eventually be most satisfactorily effected and maintained would be by the gradual annexation of the several Minor Colonies and States to the Cape Colony - due provision being made for relegating to local Administration matters which may properly be regarded as local in character and application and not demanding action on the part of the General Government." 2)

So Molteno departed without having received the least indication from the Colonial Office as to its intended policy regarding confederation. He was not over anxious to hear any such indication, one can assume, except perhaps that it was to be dropped for good, but by this time Carnarvon certainly must have decided already on the drafting of a permissive bill for the federation in South Africa. It is difficult to justify this deliberate silence on the part of the Secretary of State on the proposed measure when he had the opportunity to discuss the matter with the Cape Premier, whom his written communications had so disastrously offended in the past. Yet he chose a very unwise method of making public his future intentions.

On the 26th October, three weeks after Molteno's departure, Carnarvon received a deputation of South African "merchants, residents and others" at the Colonial Office and in reply to an address from the deputation for the first time announced his intention of drafting a Permissive Bill.<sup>3)</sup>

His audience consisted of the representatives of thirty-seven

commercial/

1) Enclosures - Herbert to Molteno, 30th Sept., 1876.

2) Ibid. - Molteno to Carnarvon, 2nd October, 1876.

3) Pamphlet no. 38 - "Proceedings at a Deputation of Residents, etc."

commercial institutions and thirty-two private individuals including Messrs. Paterson and Blaine, the Eastern Province delegates to the "conference" in August. The theme song <sup>from</sup> for their side was nothing less than the immediate annexation of the Transvaal. They made it clear in their speeches that for them annexation and confederation <sup>was</sup> inter-dependent and Blaine actually urged a measure of permissive nature (a coincidence?) just before Carnarvon rose to reply.

Involuntarily the question arises as one reads the proceedings of this meeting - to what extent was Carnarvon's sudden letter to Disraeli on 20th September in which he announced his intention of sending out Shepstone, <sup>1)</sup> influenced by some of these very men who publicly petitioned him on 26th October to annex the Transvaal? Blaine and Paterson had been in constant touch with Carnarvon; the latter declared himself to be indebted to Paterson for "information of the most valuable kind on many more than one single point, valuable in itself and valuable also in a sense of having been given by one so deeply interested in the Cape Colony in which he is so distinguished a member of Parliament." <sup>2)</sup> There is one question on the Transvaal annexation which must still be answered: to what extent can the proclamation of Sir Theophilus Shepstone be said to have emanated from the warehouses of Capetown, Port Elizabeth, Durban - and Liverpool. <sup>3)</sup> In reviewing the financial administration of Shepstone this question will again come into prominence as indeed it does in the petitions of the days immediately following upon the annexation. John Paterson himself made no secret of the fact that commercial interests alone prompted the presence of the deputation, even if he did not have the candour to confess that in his own case it was the possible rise in land prices and the value of "greenbacks" which interested him as speculator and banker. <sup>4)</sup> It/

1) Infra p.123(note 4)    2) Pamphlet no.38. p.31.

3) C.F. F.R. Statham - Blacks, Boers and British (Pamphlet no.32) pp.210-212 (Quoted also by Engelbrecht - Burgers pp.373-374) Walker-de Villiers p.130 : Kotze - Memoirs pp.296-300 ; Sir John openly alleges that Paterson was the moving force behind the agitation to annex the Transvaal and that £1,000,000 was outstanding to the Port Elizabeth merchants.

4) "It would perhaps not be improper if I called your Lordship's attention to the quality of the signatures to that address (presented at this meeting)" said Paterson. "They are the signatures of all the leading/

It comes as a disagreeable surprise to those who try to give Lord Carnarvon all possible credit for his ability as administrator and man of experience in colonial matters to find that, in this instance, he jeopardised, to all intents and purposes the future of his confederation policy in passing by the proper channels of negotiation with the Cape Colony in favour of a commercial clique which was not only unrepresentative of public opinion and undoubtedly moved by selfish interests, but contained persons who had in the past led the opposition against the Cape ministry.

Molteno was meanwhile unofficially notified by Herbert of the announcements to the deputation <sup>1)</sup> and eighteen copies of a shorthand report of the proceedings were forwarded to Barkly for publication, with the due proviso by Carnarvon: "I shall be obliged by your Government reserving any opinion on the subject until they are in possession of the Draft Bill and the explanations with which it will be accompanied." <sup>2)</sup>

The Draft Bill followed in due course and reached Capetown <sup>3)</sup> just as Shepstone entered Pretoria with his staff. Public

opinion/

1) (Contd. from p.128 note 4) "leading merchants connected with the Cape and with South Africa and their interest in South Africa is to be expressed not by thousands or by tens of thousands or even by hundreds of thousands but by the large figure of millions sterling ..... merchants do not often interfere in politics .... unless at a time when the very foundations are beginning to give way, when the foundations on which credit and security and confidence and trust rest are giving way ....."

2) Molteno - Life of Molteno II. pp.128-130 : R.G.W. Herbert to Molteno 29th No., 1876; Molteno to Herbert, 16th January, 1877.

3) G.H. 1/24 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 8th Nov., 1876.

3) Ibid - Carnarvon to Barkly, 14th Dec., 1876 : Newton - Unification p.51 (text of the South African Act) The main provisions of the Permissive Bill were as follows:- It proposed to create a federal union of the colonies and states of South Africa under a Governor-General. There was to be a Privy Council of the Union and a Union Parliament. The central legislature was to consist of a Legislative Council or Upper House and a General Assembly or House of Representatives. The local legislature in each province was to be a provincial council of one or two chambers. The Bill provided for the "due representation of the natives in the Union Parliament and in the Provincial Councils, in such manner as shall be deemed by Her Majesty to be without danger to the stability of the Government". The Union Parliament was empowered to deal with matters of common concern but the following matters were exclusively reserved for the provincial councils; the qualifications of electors for and members of, a provincial council; direct taxation within the Province for revenue for provincial purposes; public lands, education, local works, marriage and property laws, the administration of justice. There was to be free trade within the Union and a general Court of Appeal was to be established. The chief executive officer of a province and all members of the legislatures were to take an oath of allegiance to the Queen on taking their seats.

opinion, as expressed by the Cape newspapers, was apparently not visibly excited by the new move in the Confederation game.

Events in the Transvaal had brought about an atmosphere of uncertainty and of depression in Afrikaner circles. The attitude of Sir Henry Barkly and the "Cape Argus" <sup>1)</sup> on the Secoecoeni war was deeply resented by those who did not share the negrophilism of Saul Solomon or the in<sup>e</sup>terate anti-republicanism of Barkly. The position of republican sympathisers in the Colony was further embarrassed by the undeniable unpopularity of Burgers in the Transvaal. The poor spectacle presented by the Transvaal Government after Burgers' "defeat" in Lydenburg made even the "Volksstem" turn its face away from the unhappy president when it was disclosed, moreover, that only some £90,000 of the railway loan had been <sup>2)</sup> subscribed.

In the Colony the "Zuid-Afrikaan" roundly denounced Burgers as the fons et origo mali in the Transvaal as a result of his retreat from Secoecoeni's country.

"When a nation, surrounded by enemies, as is the Transvaal, lacks the courage of self-defence" declared the paper bitterly, "and gets to look for its salvation in the recruiting of a handful of unmanageable foreign mercenaries it means the end of their national existence. The question for the Transvaal is simply: to fight for themselves or surrender to England. Which will they choose?" <sup>3)</sup>

The advent of Shepstone, the chaotic finances of the republic and the approaching presidential election on the one hand, the firm belief in the Transvaal right to independence and the success of the despised volunteers of Von Schlickmann against Secoecoeni, on the other - these factors produced a tone of distressed indecision in the leader column of the principal exponent of Afrikaner views in the Colony. Was it to acquiesce in the seemingly

inevitable/

1) Cape Argus - 28th Sept., 1876: "It has so often been our lot to differ from Earl Carnarvon on his method of dealing with South Africa questions that we have the greater satisfaction in expressing our admiration of his despatch which we publish to-day (that of 12th Jly) The tone of it admirable for its happy combination of force and dignity while the principles which it enunciates and the line of conduct it indicates are worthy of a British Statesman. The subject is the miserable war now being waged between the Transvaal and the native tribes under Secoecoeni - if indeed we are justified in calling a series of acts of brutality and cowardice on the one side, and resistance to them on the other by the honourable name of warfare"

2) Volksstem - 16th, 30th Sept., 7th October, 1876.

3) Zuid-Afrikaan - 25th Oct., 1876.

inevitable or lend unremitting support to the tottering regime? It was only the proclamation of 12th April 1877 which ended the dilemma for the "Zuid-Afrikaan".<sup>1)</sup>

In this way its erstwhile support for Carnarvon had cooled and the Draft Bill was condemned as a party measure.<sup>2)</sup> In the Colony at large and Natal the press did not smile upon the Bill either: all papers except the "Natal Times" found fault with its provisions, even in Port Elizabeth it found no favour and the "Port Elizabeth Telegraph" referred to it as a threat to Eastern interests:

"It is pitiful mockery to be offered the semblance of representation with a view to the Colony being saddled with responsibilities, debts and taxation, while the opinions of those representatives when disagreeable can be brushed aside as mere cobwebs by the presumptuous nominee Council an obsequious Privy Council and magnificent Governor-General".<sup>3)</sup>

The despatch of 14th December, covering the Draft Bill, is perhaps the most farcical of all the confederation despatches just because the Bill was so un-called-for at the time, despite Carnarvon's assumption in the opening paragraph that the "Government and people of South Africa generally are no doubt anxious to learn the particular manner in which Her Majesty's Government have decided to deal with this important question." The Cape Government was anxious to hear the end of this confederation dirge. It was not interested in the Bill for the reasons assumed by Lord Carnarvon, but reacted sharply to the fifteenth paragraph in which his Lordship blandly declared:

"I am glad to have been able to satisfy myself that, under the machinery provided by the Bill, there need be no difficulty in admitting Griqualand West into the Union as a separate Province, by which of course I apprehend that the views both of your advisers, as expressed to me by Mr. Moltano and of the Memorialists of the Province will be adequately met".

Moltano had undertaken to recommend the incorporation of Griqualand West to his parliament and he was intending to pilot a bill to this effect through the Assembly in May when the 1877 session was to open. He had nothing to do with confederation

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1) Zuid-Afrikaan - 30th Sept., 25th Oct., 1876: 27th Jan., 21st 28th Feb., 1877.

2) Ibid. 18th January, 1877.

3) Moltano - Life of Moltano II. pl49 : Zuid-Afrikaan, 14th Feb., 1877 : review of press opinion.

and the Memorialists of Griqualand West who as "beggars" could scarcely be "choosers" in this matter. Carnarvon was informed in a ministerial minute that he was going back on his word of September 1876 and his Lordship wisely yielded the point. <sup>1)</sup>

As regards the Free State, the Bill and despatch offered little inducement to Jan Brand to consider it favourably. Acceptance entailed British sovereignty over the republic with the scant consolation for the Free State of retaining "The leading characteristics of its individuality as a state without changing those local institutions and customs to which the people are naturally attached." <sup>2)</sup> The Volksraad and the "Express" had given its President a stormy welcome in 1876, apparently because he had not brought back Griqualand West together with the £90,000! ~~He~~ He warily referred to a resolution of the Raad when he declined the Draft Bill formally. <sup>3)</sup> The "Express" was openly hostile to the proposed federal constitution:

"The Free State does not intend to abdicate its independence, its flag, its language and its high aims among the South African States" declared the paper. "We want to have nothing to do with a British Governor-General and a General Parliament of two houses; we are satisfied to remain burghers of the Free State and it is not the desire of burghers to become British subjects. We intend to preserve our President, Volksraad, flag and language as our right and not only as permitted toys which could be abolished, changed or destroyed by the Governor-General in a moment after we have consented to Union." <sup>4)</sup>

After the annexation the Volksraad once more condemned the Bill declaring that "they place too high a value on the beloved treasure (viz. the independence of the inhabitants) bestowed upon this state by Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen of Great Britain easily again to abandon that jewel". <sup>5)</sup>

Barkly/

1) G. 40-'77: Moltens - Life of Moltens II. pp.133-137. G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 22nd Jan., 1877 (enclosure) G.H. 1/25 - Carnarvon to Barkly, 28th Feb., 1877.

2) "The same observations of course would apply generally to the Transvaal" added Carnarvon cryptically in the despatch, "though in the present lamentable condition of affairs in that state it may be as well that I should not at this moment enter into any more detailed consideration of its circumstances and prospects."

3) G.H. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 9th Feb., 1877. Muller - Dade Tijden in den Oranje-Vrystaat p.226.

4) Quoted by the Zuid-Afrikaan - 10th February, 1877.

5) G.H. 17/2 - Brand to Frere, 29th May, 1877. Zuid-Afrikaan 6th June, 1877.

Barkly was just on the point of leaving South Africa. He reported the reception the Bill had received, made a few lukewarm criticisms and "respectfully submitted" that the more the imperial act could be rendered purely permissible the easier it would be to arrange a general scheme. "It should give the barest outline possible of the conditions on which the Colonies and States of South Africa may if they think fit, confederate under the British flag - leaving all matters of detail to be filled in hereafter by the Royal orders in Council." 1)

Carnarvon patiently revised the draft according to the recommendations but when it arrived Molteno added but another minute to that of the 15th March, noticing that the matter of the incorporation of Griqualand West was still unprovided for in the revised text! 2) In this previous minute of 15th March 1877, the ministry had finally rejected the Bill:

"The effect of the measures submitted for their consideration in its present form" ran the minute, "will be, as Ministers conceive, to abrogate, on the union of any State or Colony with the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope - the constitution which Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to bestow on this Colony, and to substitute for that Constitution, a Legislature elected under the provisions of the Bill. If this were absolutely necessary, however much Ministers would deplore it, they might feel inclined to yield but seeing that this Colony is from its size the number of its population and its resources by far the most important of the South African communities, and to a great extent may be considered as the parent of these communities, such a measure seems unnecessarily sweeping and Ministers do not consider it would be either necessary or desirable." 3)

But the Secretary of State refused to be discouraged. He had just sent Sir Bartle Frere to South Africa to replace the "strict neutrality" of Barkly by a more "active" policy; moreover he could not pause in his stride when every mail might bring the news that the Union Jack had been hoisted in Pretoria. Indeed, it had been flying there a fortnight when Carnarvon moved the second reading of the Permissive Bill in the House of Lords on 23rd April, 1877. It had an easy passage and even Lord Kimberley supported it. 4)

In the/

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- 1) G.E. 31/13 - Barkly to Carnarvon, 15th Feb., 1877.  
 2) G. 58-'77 p.3 : Minute of Ministers, 14th May, 1877. C.f. Frere to Carnarvon (conf.) 29th May, 1877. Carnarvon to Frere (Conf.) 4th July, 1877 in which he advises Frere to leave the matter till the Bill had passed the Commons.  
 3) G. 58-'77 pp.1-3. paragraph 18.  
 4) Pamphlet no.39 : Speeches, etc., pp.246-268. Newton - Unification pp.44-49.

In the Commons the path of the Secretary of State's measure was not so smooth as in "the other place", however, and evoked the most harassing criticism and obstruction till August when it was at length reported.<sup>1)</sup> The main opposition came in the first place from the Irish members with Parnell, O'Donnell and Biggar in the vanguard. Parnell proved himself the prince of obstructionists and made the house waste hour, deciding whether he should be suspended for obstructing its working. With the Irish stood Leonard (afterwards Lord) Courtney, the Radical Liberal member for Liskeard, who was destined to figure frequently in South African affairs in the next few years as the staunch protagonist of the Transvaal cause.

"(The Bill) has been so maltreated by criticism in the colonies" he told Under-Secretary Lowther, "that it is now reduced to a mere skeleton, which I do not think this House, with any sense of responsibility, can sanction. It is a Bill to enable certain States in South Africa to join in a Confederation. The Confederation is to be ruled by a Senate to be appointed as the Queen might direct, with such rules for the representation of the Native population as the Queen might direct and such a distribution of powers as the Queen might direct." He opposed this Bill because it had been rejected by every South African Colony and "still more, because it has involved us in a deed which makes Englishmen blush and which if ratified, will bring disgrace and dishonour on the English people." 2)

3)  
Yet the South African Act of 1877 was placed on the Statute Book on August 10th and remained there as a dead letter for thirty-two years until it was eclipsed by another South African Act for which even Lord Courtney voted and which this Act of 1877 so strongly foreshadowed in many respects.

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- 1) Hansard 3rd series vol. CCXXXV. cols.974-1002.  
vol. CCXXXVI. cols.1743 ff.  
 2) Ibid vol. CXXXV. cols.980-987.  
Gooch - Life of Courtney pp.132-133.  
 3) 40 and 41 Vict. C.47 : Newton - Unification. pp.51-68  
 C.1980 pp.35-41.

C H A P T E R V.The annexation and After -  
Confederation in Abeyance.

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Sir Bartle Frere arrives - The Afrikaner reaction to Lord Carnarvon's Transvaal Policy - Confederation forced into the background - The sands run out for Moltenc - Frere and the Gaika-Galeca War - The Sprigg ministry in 1878 - The scene shifts to Natal and the Transvaal - Frere, Shepstone and the constitutional issue in the Transvaal.

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South Africa, the "grave of gubernatorial reputations" since the days of Somerset and D'Urban, claimed yet another victim in Sir Henry Bartle Edward Frere who landed as Barkly's successor at the end of March, 1877, a fortnight before Shepstone read his proclamation in Pretoria. This is not the place to attempt a vindication of his memory against the opprobrium and condemnation with which history has loaded his name; a great effort has, moreover, already been made to accomplish this end.<sup>1)</sup> Yet it is no more than just to this man, with his high qualities of character and intellect (which even his enemies dared not dispute) who remained to the end of his much-maligned administration at the Cape a model servant to his Queen, fighting the conspiracy of circumstance and political prejudice which opposed him, that we should try to recognise his merits wherever possible after his mistakes have so long been paraded.<sup>2)</sup>

That he was an imperialist of the old school no one will deny: it was for this reason that Carnarvon's choice fell upon him to do what Barkly had not dared to attempt. He came to South Africa at a time which was extremely critical for Great Britain. The Bulgarian "atrocities" of May 1876 had brought on war between

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1) Basil Worsfold - Sir Bartle Frere - A footnote to the History of the British Empire: This work is not so much a biography of Frere as a defence of his Zulu policy and subsequent actions in the Transvaal and the Colony, based on an unpublished private correspondence with Sir Michael Hicks Beach. It is unconvincing in places, it over-states the case in others, but on the whole it is an able attempt to do what Frere himself hoped for: "Unless my countrymen are much changed" he wrote in the hour of defeat to Hicks Beach on 22nd September, 1879, "they will some day do me justice".

2) C.f. Moltenc - Life of Moltenc II. pp.158-467.

Russia and Turkey at the very moment that Frere landed in Capetown. Not only were British interests seriously threatened in India but internal politics had assumed an ugly aspect.<sup>1)</sup> Gladstone had emerged from his retirement denouncing the Turkephile policy of Disraeli and the Conservatives themselves began to doubt the wisdom of their leader. In the face of a grave European situation party strife was dividing her powers. Those who realised the grave dangers besetting the Empire knew that Disraeli was whistling to keep up his courage when he said in his last speech in the House of Commons "What our duty is at this critical moment is to maintain the Empire of England. Nor will we ever agree to any step, though it may obtain for a moment comparative quiet and a false prosperity, that hazards the existence of that Empire."<sup>2)</sup>

Frere thus came in the first place to "maintain the Empire of England" and we see him doing this every time he turns his eyes on some unannexed portion of the African coastline, be it Pondoland or Walvis Bay.<sup>3)</sup> It was present in his thoughts when he told Hicks Beach that a restored Transvaal republic in which the Transvaalers were dominated by "Germans, Hollanders, Irish Home Rulers and other European republicans and Socialists - will become a pest to the whole of South Africa and a most dangerous fulcrum to any European Power bent on contesting our naval supremacy or injuring us in our Colonies."<sup>4)</sup> He was also the sincere imperialist when he wrote urgent despatches to Carnarvon just after his arrival and continued to do so to Hicks Beach, urging the necessity for stronger defences in the Cape Peninsula and expressing his apprehension of Russian espionage.<sup>5)</sup>

His appointment was extraordinary in view of the fact that

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1) Ensor - England 1870-1914, pp.40 ff. Morley - Life of Gladstone II. pp.548-571.

2) Hansard - 3rd series CCXXXI. vol.1138 (August, 1876)

3) Worsfold - Frere pp.80, 299; C.H.B.E. vol.VIII p.478. Pamphlets nos.10 and 30 (reports of Palgraves' Damaraland expedition). G.H. 32/2 Frere to Carnarvon (Conf.) 12th Nov., 1877. Frere to Hicks Beach (Conf.) 5th Sept., 1878. G.H. 31/16 - Frere to Hicks Beach 11th July, 1879.

4) Pamphlet no.14 p.57.

5) Worsfold - op cit. pp.67, 72.

6) De Kiewiet - Imperial Factor p.127 ff.

his official career was over and he was due for retirement. He now received a peculiar status, special remuneration for his services and a particular commission from the Colonial Office. Carnarvon made it clear that his appointment was by no means merely that of a successor to Sir Henry Barkly. He personally came to the Langham Hotel to wish Frere godspeed:

"My Right Honourable friend goes out trained in the high school of Anglo-Indian Statesmanship" he said at the farewell dinner. "He goes out with that kindliness of temperament, that geniality of disposition and that social sympathy with the native races which, in my opinion constitute not weakness but great strength .... In that great, that rich, that wonderful land, South Africa there is one cause of much anxiety and that cause of anxiety as all South Africans know is the native problem. To that all other questions are subordinate." 1)

Had Frere been able to lift the curtain off the future for three years he might well have smiled wryly, for on native policy his reputation was wrecked in England and the traditions of the school of Anglo-Indian statesmanship proved the favourite line of attack whenever the Cape opposition wished to advance proof of Frere's leanings towards autocracy and dictatorship.

In "conference" circles his arrival was awaited with a feeling of expectancy. 2) The Molteno faction were uneasy and as early as July the wish of the "Cape Argus" fathered the rumour that Frere might depart to India as Viceroy. 3)

The new Governor had hardly settled down at Government House when the news of the Transvaal annexation changed the whole political situation in South Africa. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that any chances Sir Bartle Frere may have had to further the cause of confederation (and he did have reasonable prospects when he landed) were shattered within a fortnight of his arrival by the estrangement of the great majority of Afrikaners in the Colony as well as in the Free State, not to speak of the sullen mass of the Transvaal population who did not belong to the "great majority of the inhabitants" whose support Shepstone claimed. As the first months of 1877 went by the purpose of Shepstone became unpleasantly clear in the Colony and the "Zuid-Afrikaan"

looked/

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- 1) Pamphlet no. 39 : Speeches, etc., pp. 241-245; (28th Feb., 1877)  
 2) Zuid-Afrikaan - 4th April, 1877.  
 3) Cape Argus - 26th July, 1877.

looked into its own heart even on the very matter of Confederation which it had so unhesitatingly supported formerly:

"For the Afrikaner the existence of the Transvaal, governed by his spiritual brothers, maintaining his language in Legislature and Judicial Courts, possesses something poetic, something which he will not like to see disappearing. But Confederation means the creation of a powerful Anglicising influence before which also the two Republics would ultimately have to bow, first their independence then abdicating also their language." 1)

On the 10th March the paper declared in a leader that annexation of the Transvaal meant the doom of confederation, but on the eve of the annexation there was actually a note of acquiescence, a remarkable fact if one compares the outcry which arose in these same editorial columns three weeks later: 2)

"According to latest reports received the finances (of the Transvaal) are in such a deplorable condition that even highly-placed officials voice the fears that it will ultimately be necessary to take refuge with the British Government. If it comes to that we wash our hands of it if British wings are spread over the Transvaal. And it is probable that Sir Theophilus Shepstone realises this too, that it may come to that sooner or later and thus takes up a waiting attitude ....." 3)

The English press in the Colony received the news quietly and little comment was offered except by the "Cape Argus" which doubted the legality of Shepstone's proclamation. The "Journal" had recommended in February already "a trained English Governor with a regiment of soldiers and a staff of clerks" to cure the troubles of the Transvaal "under the benign and powerful rule of Great Britain" and it now waxed poetic over the colonial destiny of England in a leader worth quoting: 4)

"The Empire, like the great globe itself, is indeed constantly receiving accretions of small floating bodies which naturally gravitate towards it, escaping from their loose and aimless wanderings in the dark void of barbarism. But the bulk of the Empire is not sensibly affected by the acquisition of Parim or Fiji. In the Transvaal it is a different matter....." and the act/

1) Zuid-Afrikaan - 28th Feb., 1877: In the following pages I have taken this paper as a guide to the reaction of Afrikaner sentiment in the Colony. The reason for doing so I have already stated elsewhere (p. 37)

2) C.f. Also Merriman to Prof. G. Smith, 3rd Feb., 1879 (Merriman Papers): "The effect (of the annexation) was to make every Dutchman in the Cape Colony as well as in the republics a suspicious man and thus at once put an end to the growing feeling of unity and fellowship which is a primary necessity of any scheme of confederation".

3) 21st March, 1877 (the underlining is mine) It must be noted that a backdoor was kept from this defeatist attitude. Shepstone was shortly afterwards attacked because he had not waited till he was asked to annex (C.f. Zuid-Afrikaan - 18th April, 1877).

4) Cape Argus - 17th and 19th April, 1877 (quoting the London Standard of 22nd March): "The English Commissioner has no more right to establish a government in Pretoria than in Paris".

"act of Sir Theophilus Shepstone would "shed deserved lustre on his reputation." 1)

Smaller Dutch newspapers like the "Beaufort Courier", however, ranged on the side of the Transvaal and the "Northern Post" (Aliwal North) sought parallels in Europe to condemn the rape of the Transvaal. "Twenty-thousand Christians may be cruelly butchered in Bulgaria" it declared, "and hardly has Prussia threatened to come to their aid or the British fleet steams to Constantinople. Russia dare not extend her authority without British permission, but who cares for the poor, weak, Transvaal?" 2) "Di Patriot" was flooded by the contributions of the doggerel experts, who knew how to wield sarcasm and biting irony. Every issue contained a selection of "poetry". 3)

Feeling ran so high in the columns of the "Zuid-Afrikaan" that it is not difficult to choose one of the many leaders to convey the tone of indignation and protest which for months on end rang in the farm-houses of the Colony, wherever this paper was read. I choose the first one after the news of the annexation had been received: 4)

"What our feelings are on a subject such as this we need hardly record. It is more a feeling of sorrow than indignation. We expected so much from Lord Carnarvon in the cause of fraternising English and Dutch South African nationalists. Not so much because we assumed that he was more kindly disposed towards the Dutch South African Boer than his predecessor but because we gave him credit for wider, less narrow-minded conceptions. Judging by his public utterances we thought that he had realised that the interests of England would be promoted more by a policy of conciliation and concession towards the Republics than by jealousy (na-ijver) against them. We thought that he perceived that a single act of violence, whatever might be the apparent gain, which for the moment England tends to obtain thereby, would arouse more malice and bitterness against the Empire than the value of millions. But they have blundered. A Carnarvon is even more short-sighted in his greed than a Kimberley. He had once set his heart on it to benefit by the troubles of the Republic and after a flood of nice words he has swallowed the country. It is the repetition of the story of the wolf and the lamb. The wolf has of course in his case numerous excuses too. ....

Throughout/

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- 1) Grahamstown Journal - 2nd February and 18th April, 1877. c.f. Uys - Shepstone p.181: "(After his departure from England) he became the puppet in the hands of political wirepullers and within a short space of time he sacrificed on Carnarvon's federation altar a name and reputation that had taken him half a century to acquire."  
 2) Quoted by the Zuid-Afrikaan - 2nd May., 1877.  
 3) Lydia van Niekerk - Eerste Taalbeweging p.51 ff.  
 4) 18th April, 1877. (my translation).

"Throughout the length and breadth of this Colony in thousands of homes people now cry shame on this deed we condemn. But the majority of the Press, knowing little about and sympathising less with the Transvaalers, will give no expression to the feeling which embitters hearts. Are we to allow that the reckless deed, which will separate Afrikaner and Englishman for another generation finds no other public condemnation than that of the Dutch and a few English newspapers? If so, we shall soon hear it said the violent annexation of the Transvaal was a most popular step and was applauded by both nationalities unani- mously and with such a representation of the matter before him Lord Carnarvon will soon regard the time as propitious to in- corporate also the Free State willy-nilly in the British Dom- inions. Afrikaners must act."

The climax was reached in the Free State where Schermbrucker the editor of the "Express" added an extra issue to vent his speech in ironical and virulent tirades against Carnarvon's duplicity towards Brand. ("As regards the £90,000 - blood-money - let us give back to the great nation its pieces of silver and let Great Britain realize that the Boers are simple, poor and trusting.") The British residents of Bloemfontein were furious at the articles and burned an effigy of Schermbrucker to show their indignation, shouting the while "We will hang Schermbrucker to a sour apple tree!" Afrikaners retaliated by presenting an address to the editor at Smithfield when he left the Free State at the end of April, and uprooting the flagpoles in Bloemfontein flying the Union Jack! <sup>1)</sup> Racialism was loose.

Acting on the leader quoted above, the "Zuid-Afrikaan" and "Volksblad" co-operated in spreading a petition among its readers <sup>2)</sup> for the revocation of the Transvaal annexation. For once the correspondence columns leapt to life and even Afrikaans "versies" appeared in Hofmeyr's paper from time to time. "Di Patriot" had warmly supported the petition, maintaining that all Afrikaners should and would sign it "met uitsondering van enkele Engelse voetlekkers." In May the "Zuid-Afrikaan" could report that counter-petitions had been organised by the "Cape Times", "Eastern Star" and "Capetown Daily News" and that an Englishman at Lady Grey had told the people they would go to gaol if they signed!

Public/

1) Zuid-Afrikaan - 26th April, 1877 : Cape Argus - 5th May, 1877. Even Brand was attacked by the "Zuid-Afrikaan" (16th May) and accused of thwarting the wishes of the Volksraad and "playing Bismarck."  
2) Hofmeyr - Life of Hofmeyr p.162 : Zuid-Afrikaan - 21st April, 1877 (text of petition).

Public meetings began to be called in the Western Province.

Malmesbury led with a resolution which regretted

"the unlawful and arbitrary way in which the Transvaal had been declared British territory by Her Majesty's Commissioner Sir Theophilus Shepstone. The meeting expresses the opinion that such actions will deal a heavy blow to the loyalty of the inhabitants of this Colony towards the British Government and call into existence a feeling of bitterness between English and Afrikaner elements, thus impeding the progress of the Colony."

The Durbanville, Koeberg and Philadelphia farmers met on Jan Louw's farm at Phisante Kraal and adopted a similar resolution.

In June Paarl followed suit.<sup>1)</sup> Meanwhile the Midlands farmers met in the first congress of farmers' societies. Under the guidance of Rev. S.J. du Toit of Paarl, the moving force behind the Patriot group, these farmers' societies laid the foundations of the Afrikaner Bond which came into being two years later.

"Wat ons hier eintlik wil uithaal is dit: waarom kan in di Westelike Provinsie, Vrystaat en Transvaal nie sulke Vereniginge van boere gevorm worde, wat so nu en dan in 'n kongres bij mekaar kom (natuurlik alles in die taal van ons boere, nie in Engels) om di belange van ons boere te bespreek en te bevorder"<sup>2)</sup> enquired the "Patriot" in a leader.

The estrangement of an important section, the important section indeed, of the supporters of Carnarvon's proposals of 1875, boded ill for the mission of the new Governor. Frere could not understand it all, and he gave his own version of the situation in some of his long, model despatches. In June he had an interview in Capetown with Kruger, Bok and Jorissen on their first mission to England. Kruger offered to bargain -<sup>3)</sup> confederation for independence - but Frere believed that this rough-hewn, deep-voiced man spoke only out of the discontent of his own mind and on behalf of a small clique in the Transvaal.<sup>4)</sup>

"The case is somewhat different in the Western Province where the real welfare of the Transvaal very remotely affects commercial

1) Zuid-Afrikaan - 5th 9th and 30th May, 2nd June, 1877. From Port Elizabeth and Alfred Edden a wealthy merchant of Capetown came resolutions in favour of annexation. (G.H. 31/14 - Frere to Carnarvon, 5th June, 5th July, 1877.)

2) Quoted by the Zuid-Afrikaan - 30th June, 1877.

3) van Oordt - Paul Kruger p.186.

4) G.H. 31/14 - op. cit. 5th June, 1877.

"and agricultural interests and where there is nothing to prevent indulgence by persons connected with the Transvaal in a somewhat sentimental regret for the for downfall of the late Government" he reported to Carnarvon. "But I feel assured from all enquiries I can make that in no part of the Colony are there many persons of property or influence who would really desire to see what has been done, undone."

A little later in reviewing the reception of the news of the annexation in another despatch he once more sought to minimize all dissent to the general approbation with which the East had greeted Shepstone's coup:<sup>1)</sup>

"In the Western districts of the Colony and about Capetown itself where the Dutch-speaking population predominates and has been longest settled and has the greatest stake in the welfare of the country, the general feeling seems much the same as I have described above but there are other elements which give rise to expression of a different feeling. The advocates of Western influence of all classes dislike all Eastern extension. A natural sympathy with what was nominally a Dutch power finds in Cape town and in the West no drawback from any responsibility for political disorder or bankruptcy - and among what is called the "liberal party" there is much sentimental sympathy with Mr. Burgers and his efforts to establish a great Dutch-speaking African Republic."

In a post-script he added a typical explanation of the foregoing reference to Afrikaner sentiment: "I should mention that in the use of the word sentimental (~~like the feeling of~~) I wish to indicate a feeling apart from a principle of action something like the feeling of attachment to the Stuart Line among many loyal English and Scotch people at the present day. It is necessary to note this for among those who feel most reluctant to part with their own Flag or the exclusive official use of their ancestral language in the Transvaal, are I believe, many who, like the great body of the Dutch-speaking population of the Western Colony yield to none of Her Majesty's subjects in heartfelt loyalty to Her Majesty and devotion to the British Crown."

No one will deny that there was an element of truth in this last paragraph, but Frere was led by this view to under-estimate the fact that genuine distrust of British policy could have serious repercussions on the question of confederation. Only three years later did he realise this significance of the "sentimentality" he now dismissed so lightly.

When he forwarded the first Afrikaner petition bearing 6,000

names/

1) G.H. 31/14 - Frere to Carnarvon, 12th June, 1877.

names, which v.d. Sandt de Villiers presented soon after, he deemed it his duty to disparage its meaning by an attempt to prove to Carnarvon that the other petitions carried by the Kruger deputation were fakes.<sup>1)</sup>

Enough opposition had been evinced in the Colony however, to prove that the annexation of the Transvaal was a step backward as far as confederation was concerned. The policy of the "strong hand" which it represented was based on the fact that in matters political as in any other case there is nothing which succeeds like success. The history of the next three years showed only too clearly that Carnarvon had failed to clear the hurdle and his failure doomed all his subsequent efforts to be a painful struggle on the defensive, not only against public opinion in the republics and Colony but also against the watchful critics of Conservative imperialism at home. What was said and written in England was eagerly reprinted, moreover, in South Africa and in the Colony in particular.<sup>2)</sup>

It has already been noted how strongly the Liberal Radicals spoke against the annexation in opposing the Permissive Bill. It was Courtney and Dilke who again took up the chorus of condemnation when Kruger and his two compatriots reached London in August. Courtney was a lone voice when he moved against annexation, "owing more to Liberal ignorance than approval" as his biographer states. His motion was treated with condescending tolerance by the Government and the matter was dropped without being pressed to a division.<sup>3)</sup> "Wait till the end" persisted the member for Liskeard however, "That act, without justification of policy or principle, exposes the country to greater peril of war than any suggestions for the coercion of Turkey." Courtney and the Radicals never failed to remind the Government of this first act of "forward policy" when, a few months later, wars in South Africa and Afghanistan began to come in unending succession for

three/

1) G.H. 31/14 - Frere to Carnarvon, 25th June, 1877.

2) c.f. Zuid-Afrikaan - 9th June, 1877.

3) Hansard - 3rd Series CCXXX VIII cols. 545-566 (7th Aug., 1876)  
Gooch - Life of Courtney - pp.131, 132-133, 140-141.

three years. We meet Mr. Courtney again in 1878, 1879 and 1880, when Carnarvon's successor reaped the whirlwind of his efforts in 1877.

Even Beaconsfield shrugged his shoulders and hoped for the best from "Titters'" new adventure, while he half-heartedly defended it in the Lords as "a geographical necessity".<sup>1)</sup> Last but not least, Mr. Froude himself was thoroughly opposed to this new line of policy pursued by his friend the Secretary of State. He had been dropped as pilot of the policy he had helped to shape in 1874-'75; this stroke of force was in direct opposition to his recommendations in his report and he never gave his adherence to it though he tried to make the best of matters by assisting Carnarvon with the Permissive Bill.<sup>2)</sup>

In the Cape parliament confederation made no progress in the session of 1877. Frere had to look on in silence and content himself with a vague paragraph in the opening speech.<sup>3)</sup> On the opposition benches had appeared the ex-Lieutenant-Governor of Griqualand West to strengthen the hands of Paterson and Sprigg, while the late "member for the Transvaal", Philip Watermeyer, had decided to become a staunch "loyalist" in sympathy with his friend the ex-President of the Transvaal.<sup>4)</sup> The Afrikaner members feared the/

1) Buckle - Life of Disraeli VI. pp.419-420. Hansard - 3rd Ser. CCX col. 1689 (march 1879)

2) Merriman Papers : Julia Merriman to Agnes Merriman, London, 26th July, 1877, : "Mr. Froude seems to be shelved by his own party and found out by the opposition - still the flavour of his cookery runs through the whole mess" (the Permissive Bill); Engelbrecht - Burgers pp.188-189 (Froude to Burgers, 12th March, 1877) "At the same time you must be aware that I was fighting your battle (and the O.F.S. battle single-handed) and with no help except in Lord Carnarvon's and Mr. Herbert's goodwill, that I had all the English traditions to contend against, the determined hostility of the permanent staff at the Colonial Office and the persistent opposition of the Cape Government (sic) and Sir Henry Barkly who would all, if they could, have obstructed the arrangement with Brand." Uys - Shepstone, p.166 Froude - Two Lectures (Edinburgh 6th and 9th Jan., 1880) p.3 : "WE have annexed a country as large as France, which belonged to Dutchmen. Dutchmen do not like to have their independence taken away from them any more than we do, and nobody exactly knows why we did it. I believe that in our hearts we are sorry now that we did annex it at all and would like to get rid of it again if we only knew how to get rid of it again without seeming ridiculous to the rest of the world."

3) A.1-'77 paragraph 6.

4) Molteno - Life of Molteno II. p.208 : Cape Argus - 19th June, 1877 Julia Merriman to A. Merriman, 26th July, 1877 (Merriman Papers)

the East after the recent events and gradually became less critical of Molteno and his ministry. Paterson's leadership was weak. Molteno had no difficulty in pushing through the Griqualand annexation Act<sup>1)</sup> and he calmly ignored the persistent questions by Paterson, Dowling, Watermeyer and Boyes, drawing the attention of the government to paragraph six of His Excellency's speech!<sup>2)</sup>

Greater matters were beginning to demand the attention of the ministry when the session closed in August: on the Eastern Frontier where everything had been quiet since February, trouble was brewing between Galecas and Fingoes. In August Frere decided to go through the Transkei on his way to Natal and the Transvaal, but he got no further than Kingwilliamstown where the ninth Kaffir War delayed him till March 1878.

Neither the causes nor the events of this, the most barbarous and grim war in the long history of strife between European and Xosa, need be discussed for the present purpose.<sup>3)</sup> It seems clear, however, that economic circumstances, over-population, drought, famine and imperfect adaptation to European standards of living, rather than abortive native policy hastened the outbreak and prolonged the war against the Gaikas within the Colony.<sup>4)</sup> There was, however, also undeniable unpreparedness on the part of the Cape G. and lack of a well-organized defence force to handle the situation. Had Molteno been unable to strike and strike decisively at the Galecas in the first phase of the war, he might have prevented a Gaika rebellion and remained the Premier of the Colony.<sup>5)</sup>

Furthermore/

1) Cape Argus - April 4th, 1877: on his return from England Paterson had tried to whip up Eastern support by his famous "Pas-op-Press-on" circular; an appeal to the East to push on their claims and a warning to the West to call a halt in railway construction etc.: Zuid-Afrikaan - 4th and 14th April, 1877. V. & P. (Ass.) 27th May; 11th and 27th June; 4th, 6th, 9th and 27th July, 1877.

2) Ibid : 5th and 28th June, 10th and 31st July, 1877.

3) Theal - History of S.A. 1872-1884 I. pp.52-96; 118-139.

4) c.f. de Kiewiet - Imperial Factor pp.148-170. "The Economies of War". Cape Argus - Jan., 1878. Zuid-Afrikaan - 23rd Feb., 1878.

5) The Sprigg Defence Commission appointed in 1876 (c.f. Walker - History of S.A. p.374: Zuid-Afrikaan 3rd Feb., 1877: G. 1-'77) reported in January, 1877, and made practical recommendations for legislation in the coming session. These recommendations show that the existing system of frontier defence was inadequate, nevertheless, Molteno did not act on this report in 1877. The recruiting of English lads for the Frontier Ploice had further weakened the existing force in reliability and morale:- "In the place of a well-seasoned body of men, hardened and ready for exposure like the force of a few years back, which, if not well-drilled, at least possessed the discipline/

Furthermore this war had caught the Cape Colony, financially, on the wrong foot. It is a fact which has not yet been noticed or stressed by historians of this period, that the general state of finances at the end of 1877 and natural conditions within the Colony, undoubtedly contributed as much towards the unbewailed fall of Moltano as the Gaika War itself. After the prosperity which had given self-confidence to the Ministry in its political struggles in 1875 and disarmed the critics, the lean years were now setting in.

The programme of public works had to go on. The public debt incurred mainly on this account had risen from £2,435,358 in 1875 to £5,028,958 in 1877 and the public debt under security of general revenue from £364,850 to £464,050.<sup>1)</sup> Telegraph lines were being extended steadily and in 1877 alone 361 miles were erected.<sup>2)</sup> With regard to railways, matters were not so favourable. The report for 1876 showed a retardation in the rate of progress especially in the Eastern Districts where bush clearing and construction of bridges and culverts absorbed time and funds: at the beginning of 1877 only 67 miles were opened for traffic on the eastern system. In that year the lines to Malmesbury, Kingwilliamstown and Bushman's River came into use but by the end of 1877 only some 25%<sup>3)</sup> of the original scheme of 895 miles had been completed.

In the sphere of trade and commerce matters were not too prosperous either. The diamond market was still in a state of stagnation following the general depression in Europe;<sup>4)</sup> exports from the Colony fell by 28.37% in 1875-1876 while imports slightly decreased by 3%; the position remained the same in 1877, imports falling a further 4%.<sup>5)</sup> Colonial revenue felt the pinch too and

decreased/

5) (Contd. from p.144 note 5) discipline of self-reliance - we have now a mob of raw, unseasoned lads..... without discipline and utterly unreliable. The disorganization and unreliability of the police has caused great expense in the present disturbances and it is our manifest duty to see that in future we get fair value for our money." (J.X. Merriman to Moltano, 31st Oct., 1877 - Merriman Papers).

1) Blue-Books for 1875 and 1877. 2) G. 44-'78. 3) G.49-'77: G.32-'78 and G. 3-'78 (report of Railway Commission of 1877) pp.3-20. 4) Ensor - England 1870-1914 pp.102-111. G.H. 31/18 : Barkly to Carnarvon, 20th Sept., 1876. 5) G. 51-'77 : G. 37/'78.

decreased by £297,932 in 1876-1877. Customs duties fell £179,390 and sales of crown lands £110,169, the cause in both cases being given as "financial depression". The deficit on general revenue in June 1877 was £613,496, the biggest the Cape had ever known.

Molteno himself was getting nervous over his finances and we find him writing the following letter to his Minister of Public Works:

"I am sorry to say it will be quite impossible in my opinion to find money for this purpose (of irrigation). Irrespective of other reasons which in my opinion render it necessary to act with great caution in the present somewhat critical times. I hope you will not think this throwing cold water on your important measures. I am keeping the thing constantly in mind and hope in some way or the other we may be able to take effective action before long. With regard to money matters there is no doubt about the steady decline of revenue during the present year and I am afraid this must be expected to continue until improvement takes place in the general prospects of the country which I agree with you in thinking, are pretty gloomy. In consequence of refunds from various sources there was no deficit at the end of the last financial year but in how far such receipts will come to our aid during the present one I cannot at present say. The customs last month fortunately gave a fair amount but I shall be only too well satisfied if we can get on financially this year as well as we did last, but to say that I am not anxious about it, would be misleading you.."

Nor was Molteno oblivious to the fact that his position was being weakened by these factors. In another letter he told Merriman that he was hesitant to call together parliament and was not at all confident of his ability to silence the opposition. Molteno was in good company. Beaconsfield was also struggling with falling revenue at this very moment and his Cabinet was being disturbed by the "Russian party" within it: Carnarvon himself and his friend Lord Derby.

The War thus came at a moment most unfavourable both for Great Britain and the Cape Colony. It is not surprising therefore, that Sir Bartle Frere did not leave a stone unturned in his efforts to bring hostilities to an end by whatever means at his disposal. He stayed at military headquarters for seven months, though he was no military man as many of his predecessors had been. In

January/

1) G. 59.4767: Blue Book for 1877. This deficit was largely effaced by government refunds from various sources (see letter below)  
2) Molteno to Merriman: 27th Aug., 1877 (Merriman Papers): c.f. Cape Argus 5th April, 1877 "we trust the session of 1877 will not pass without some effective legislation on the subject of irrigation. The country expects it, and a well-considered measure could be carried through the Parliament with acclamation."  
3) Molteno to Merriman, 22nd Oct., 1877. (Merriman Papers)  
4) Buckle - Life of Disraeli VI. (p. 217)

January 1878 the operation of Imperial forces within the Colony following upon Mackinnon's escape and the Gaika rebellion, precipitated the crisis between Frere and the Molteno Ministry over the question of the military command of imperial and colonial forces. On 2nd February, 1878 Sir Bartle Frere astounded the Colony by dismissing Molteno and inviting Sprigg to form a new ministry.

Whether Frere had any justification for violating a constitutional convention in the colonies which in England the sovereign would never have dared to disregard or whether he was right in the dispute over the supreme military command of colonial troops - these are questions for the constitutional lawyer. It does not prevent or obscure an understanding of what followed the dismissal if one leaves the legal aspect to the authorities quoted for either side, such as Todd and Berriedale Keith, and to the biographers of the parties concerned. The dismissal was received by the public and judged by Parliament, not on constitutional grounds but according to the dictates of party politics and the general feeling towards Molteno and his colleagues.

The reaction of the colonial newspapers is interesting if one remembers the stand they took over the confederation issue. The "Journal" was overjoyed, as might be expected, and reiterated its "congratulations to the country" for some time.

The "Zuid-Afrikaan" was disillusioned at last and could not bring itself to attack the ministry now that it was down. Hofmeyr and those who shared his views had never opposed Molteno because they expected to get more out of an Eastern ministry. On the contrary, their efforts were directed at reform, and when they criticised it was almost in the form of reproach to Molteno for not listening to their counsels and thus avoiding his own ruin at the hands of the ultra-Eastern clique. After/

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1) c.f. Molteno - Life of Molteno II. p.254 ff. Grahamstown Journal 18th Nov., 1877. 2) Lawrence - Life of Merriman pp.26, 41 ff; Molteno - op cit. pp.222-363. Warsfold - Frere pp.60-61. Martineau - Life of Frere vol. p. 3) Grahamstown Journal - 4th, 6th, 8th and 13th Feb., 1878. 4) Zuid-Afrikaan - 4th April, 1877: "We favoured the Conference not only as a means of curbing the old exasperating policy towards the Free States but also because resistance would have isolated the Western/

After April 1877 Afrikaners no longer wanted confederation. That had been the last link with the aims of the Eastern opposition. In these weeks before the session of 1878 they quietly decided to follow Molteno into the wilderness.<sup>1)</sup>

Anti-confederation feeling was revived in March, moreover, by the arrival of Frere's printed despatches quoted above.<sup>2)</sup> The annexation outcry had faded from the "Zuid-Afrikaan"<sup>3)</sup> except for stray letters now and then and a tragi-comic paragraph stating how President Burgers had fallen into the water at Hout Bay when his little boat capsized! Kruger and Jorissen further cooled Colonial sympathies by allowing Lord Carnarvon to settle their hotel account of £1400 in London.<sup>3)</sup> "As if the cup of shame in the Transvaal is not yet full enough" remarked the "Zuid-Afrikaan" bitterly, Messrs. Jorisson and Kruger are filling it to overflowing by accepting gold from Lord Carnarvon's hand - Mr. Burgers begs for British gold, Messrs. Kruger and Jorisson actually accept it."<sup>4)</sup>

Now, however, the old cause was taken up again now against Frere's despatches and the leaders of 1877 were re-cast to suit the occasion.<sup>5)</sup>

Frere had been sent to South Africa to further the very policy Molteno had always obstructed. Now he had dismissed the ministry for a reason altogether unforeseen and disconnected with confederation. The natural thing would have been for the Government press to accuse him of ulterior prejudice against Molteno. But the "Cape Argus", Molteno's strongest supporter since 1872, abruptly left him in the lurch, with a few half-hearted leaders in his

defence/

1) (Contd. from p.147 note 4) Western Province and ensure the Grahams-town-Port Elizabeth clique the reputation of being the loyal party par excellence and also of the favour of the Imperial Government." Through the policy of Molteno, Carnarvon now listened to Eastern counsels. If he persisted in his obstinacy he might find an ultra-Eastern ministry in power.

1) Zuid-Afrikaan - 6th, 20th and 23rd Feb., 11th, 13th and 18th May. Volksblad - 9th Feb., 1878.

2) p.140 infra (note 4) p.141 supra (note 1)

3) v. Oordt (Paul Kruger p.205 - footnote) and Struben (Recollections p.151) confirm the fact.

4) Op. cit. - 23rd Feb., 1878 - Zuid-Afrikaan

5) Ibid. - 2nd and 6th March, 1878.

defence and some luke-warm support for Sprigg's "liberal" and "moderate" policy. Why this sudden change of front? one asks.

The answer undoubtedly lay with that diminutive figure who played "the role of Warwick the King-maker", who made and unmade ministers, - Saul Solomon. He had quietly been building up Spriggs' position and had made him for reasons of his own, the coming man. Did he now send instructions to the offices of his newspaper to give the new ministry provisional support? In all probability he did, and they got this support - for some time, - till they started disarming Xosas and Pasutos, then the fat was in the fire once more and Solomon set his "Argus" on to the "Cape Times", the defensor fidei of Sprigg, with all the fervour of his negrophilistic convictions.

Only one consolation remained to the dismissed ministry: Lord Carnarvon was no longer at the Colonial Office. The "Russian party" (i.e. Carnarvon and Derby) had resigned a week before the dismissal, over the sending of the British fleet to Constantinople, and it was once more a South African deputation which had afforded the Secretary of State an opportunity on 3rd January to offend, not Moltens this time, but Beaconsfield himself. In answering a deputation of Port Elizabeth merchants who had come to ask him to stop the Gaika War, Carnarvon had delivered an uncalled-for attack on Beaconsfield's Turkish policy and the latter had pointed out to him that such views were/

1) Cape Argus - 5th, 7th, 9th, and 12th February : 16th March, 1878.

2) c.f. Ibid. - 23rd April, 1921 : R. Kilpin "Pioneers of Parliament" art. V.

3) Ibid. - 2nd January, 1932.

4) Merriman, who had come into close contact with Frere, lapsed into a very black mood after the dismissal (c.f. Lawrence - Life of Merriman p.41 ff.) "There is one gleam of comfort" he wrote to his father, "and that is that Lord Carnarvon is 'out'. We shall have no more of his meddling at all events and shall be allowed to 'fry' in our own fat', that is if we have any fat left to fry in. - I am, as you may imagine, extremely curious to see what view the Imperial Government will take of us. Of course, the poor Cape ministry will get all the blame and Sir B. Frere who is duplicity itself, may be trusted to do all that misrepresentation can do to blacken us." (and to his mother) "I must say I was not prepared to find him such a double-dealing hypocrite and so vindictive". (Merriman Papers : J.X. Merriman to father, 19th February, 1878 : to mother, 25th February, 1878.)

were incompatible with his <sup>150</sup> presence in the cabinet. 1)

He was succeeded by Sir Michael Hicks Beach, a very capable man, but without any experience of colonial affairs. The aftermath of the Gaika-Galeca war and the re-weaving of the broken strands of Carnarvon's federation policy was to be his training school. What methods he used and how much success he had will appear in the sequel.

Frere had forwarded despatches putting his case for dismissing Molteno, and Beach supported him unconditionally although he privately warned him to secure his position by having his actions confirmed by Parliament. 2) In his public despatch he contended however, that, in view of special circumstances in South Africa, responsible government was subject to limitations not existing elsewhere and on these grounds he justified the Governor's actions constitutionally. 3) 4)

Before the session began Frere presented a memorandum to Ministers and also the first batch of the voluminous correspondence on which the case for either side rested. 5) 6)

When Parliament met it was Sprigg who took the wind out of Molteno's sails with a motion that all papers be printed including confidential minutes. 7) Molteno protested, discussions ensued and the late premier was compelled to withdraw his objections.

This/

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1) Buckle - Life of Disraeli VI. p.217 ff. Hardinge - Life of Carnarvon II. pp.380-391. Pamphlet no.39 pp.297-304 : Till his death in 1890 Carnarvon retained his interest in South Africa and it is interesting to note that he visited the Cape and Kimberley in September 1887. He was entertained by the Capetown Freemasons and as Chancellor of the S.A. College he conferred the degrees at the annual ceremony. In reply to an address presented by the Mayor of Kimberley he told South Africa once more (Ibid. pp.480-483) that he had been misrepresented in 1875. "I then knew" he concluded, "that of Confederation could be secured, it must be as the spontaneous outcome of the general popular feeling."

2) Frere to Beach (Conf.) 5th Feb., (Printed in C.2079 pp.90-93) and 11th Feb., 1878. G.H. 31/15 - Frere to Beach, 22nd February, 16th April, 1878.

3) Hicks Beach - Life of Hicks Beach II. p.20

4) G.H. 1/26 - Hicks Beach to Frere, 21st March, 1878. "In what respect is our responsible government thus an improvement on the Southey-Griffiths government?" asked the "Zuid-Afrikaan" drily. (18th May, 1878)

5) G.H. 31/15 - Frere to H. Beach (enclosure) Memo. 9th May, 1878.

6) Ibid : enclosures 1 to 5 (A. 2, 4, 5, and 6-'78) 103 letters ranging from 8/12/77 to 3/2/78. Printed in C.2079 pp.176-238.

7) Molteno - Life of Molteno II. p.379 ff. Zuid-Afrikaan 29th May, 1878. Details of debate Cape Argus 11th, 14th, 16th, 18th, 27th and 30th May : 1st and 6th June, 1878 : Theal - History of S.A. 1872-1884 I. pp.107-114.

This was but the beginning of the end. By 14th May the "Cape Argus" had already formed its opinion and it had the privilege of qualifying its attitude every time that Mr. Littleton, the Governor's private secretary brought a fresh bundle of documents to the House of Assembly.<sup>1)</sup> This was the way in which everybody had to judge the situations.

On the 23rd May, Merriman proposed a motion of virtual censure on the Governor and High Commissioner and led the attack with a terrifically long and intricate speech, and Uppington, the Attorney-General replied in an equally lengthy oration into which he managed to work in even some quotations from Vergil's Aeneid! Molteno plodded through his defence in another marathon speech of 3½ hours and was duly replied to..... On the 6th June Merriman's motion was lost by 37 votes to 22 despite another long speech in reply.

Molteno had not been judged on the tome of minutes and letters he had exchanged with the Governor in January - no normal member of parliament could digest such a tangle, especially when it was presented piecemeal at regular intervals of time "Het ganze dispuut raakte daadzaken en niet begin selen" thus the "Zuid-Afrikaan" closed the ~~debate~~<sup>matter</sup> in one pithy sentence on 8th June. Molteno's day was over and he retired from active politics for two years.<sup>2)</sup>

Frere's high-handed action had been endorsed by the legislature; Sprigg had come to office, pledged to confederation (though he later systematically denied it); the Gaika-Galeca war was over. On the surface it looked indeed as if Frere might now urge on the great ideal with some success. But it was not to be.

The war had been a vicious setback for confederation, as far as the Cape Colony was concerned. Finances were "at sixes and sevens", and the new Treasurer-General, John Miller, announced

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1) The last batch arrived on 19th June, a fortnight after the conclusion of the debate!

2) "His day was past, he was getting old and appeared to be incorrigibly lazy. He had no power of organization and beyond the regard which his sturdy independence claims for him he had no other quality which would attract men towards him and hold them when once there? (J. Sivewright to Merriman, 2nd December, 1878 - Merriman Papers.)

a deficit on revenue of £206,000 despite the fact that trade conditions were improving and the increase in revenue over 1877 had been £237,477. This gap had to be filled by extra taxation and the "Argus" sadly noted that the per capita figure of taxation would be raised from £1 6s. 8d. to £1 12s. 5d. Public debt had climbed by the end of 1878 to £6,986,358 and in the session of 1878 a further £1,865,000 had to be appropriated for railway purposes. <sup>1)</sup> The war had consumed a disastrously great sum and a special loan of £750,000 was necessary to cover actual expenses not yet paid; <sup>2)</sup> The war in toto had cost the Cape Government close upon £1,200,000 and had seriously embarrassed the finances of the Colony. <sup>3)</sup>

Hicks Beach had urged Frere in March and April to get this war over as soon as possible and he did not fail to remind the Governor that an understanding should be arrived at without delay respecting the provisions to be made for defraying the charges attendant upon the employment of "Her Majesty's Forces now in the Field". <sup>4)</sup> The bill was presented in due course and amounted to about £550,000 which in 1879 had dwindled to some £260,000, payable for the war which had "led to the acquisition" of the Transkeian territories. <sup>5)</sup> The correspondence over the war expenses lasted well into 1879 and presented the unedifying spectacle of Her Majesty's Secretary of State insisting upon his pound of flesh from a colony which not only had good grounds for disputing his claim, <sup>6)</sup> but upon whose goodwill Her Majesty's Government was entirely dependent at that moment for the furtherance of Confederation in South Africa. Despatches from Downing Street invariably appeared in colonial newspapers on arrival, and it can be safely assumed that the mercenary attitude of Sir

MICHAEL/

- 1) A.1-'78 : Blue Book for 1878 : Cape Argus 20th June, 1878. Act 26 of 1878 (railway extension).  
 2) A. 9-'79 - financial statement by Miller : A.49-'78 : Spriggs' statement of "unprovided for" expenditure (Sept., 1877-June 1878) which amounted to £633,703 : Walker - History of S.A. p.376.  
 3) G.H. 31/15 - Frere to Hicks Beach, 24th Feb., 1879 (enclosure)  
 4) G.H. 1/25 - H. Beach to Frere, 21st March and 4th April, 1878.  
 5) A. 3-'80 : G.H. 1/30 H. Beach to Frere, 12th June, 1879 (enclosure)  
 6) c.g. G.H. 31/15 - Frere to H. Beach, 24th Feb., 1879.  
 G.H. 31/13 - do. do. 11th July, 1879.

Michael Hicks Beach won no converts for confederation if it was to please so exacting a creditor.

In the session of 1878 Sprigg further spoiled the case for confederation. In the first place he lost the support of the Solomon faction by his so-called Peace Preservation (or Disarmament) Act - the name became a good joke by 1880.<sup>1)</sup> It was a drastic measure for the disarmament, not only of the defeated Xosas but also of the Basutos. It had the full support of Frere and was part of a series of stringent measures against native unrest, calculated to outrage the feelings of any true negrophilist (and the Basuto too, as it proved!)<sup>2)</sup> Spriggs' second blunder was the attempt to levy a tax of 2/- per gallon on Colonial brandy in order to ~~help~~<sup>fill</sup> the hole in Miller's budget and pay the war expenses.<sup>3)</sup>

This proposal in June, 1878 to levy an excise tax on "western Province brandy was a political godsend to Jan Hofmeyr, for it provided an excellent pretext for a great effort on the part of the future leader to galvanise the farmers of the wine-producing districts into a party, organised to hold its own."<sup>4)</sup> Once again, it was not pounds, shillings and pence that mattered so much,; it was a corporate consciousness among the farming community and the awakening to their own interests, material and national, which inspired an agitation over the Excise Bill which must otherwise appear ridiculous.<sup>5)</sup> It did, in fact, appear unreasonably noisy to those who took it on its surface value. Hofmeyr's personal friend v.d. Sandt de Villiers was dead, and the "Volksblad" would not follow his lead in this matter, but joined the English press in Capetown in denouncing the agitation.<sup>6)</sup> Hofmeyr carried on, nevertheless, and condemned this "tax on the West to pay for an Eastern war." Soon the political aspect of the matter became clear: Hofmeyr urged the founding of farmers' protection societies

(Boeren/

1) Act 13 of 1878.

2) Theal - History of S.A. 1872-1884 I. p.115 ff. Acts 5,7,9,10 of '78.

3) Acts 2 and 18 of 1878.

4) Zuid-Afrikaan : 22nd June, 1878 and almost every subsequent issue of 1878. Hofmeyr - Life of Hofmeyr pp.147 ff. 152.

5) Ibid. p.227 : By 1884 Hofmeyr realized that the Excise had not affected the wine farmers seriously at all, due mainly to a great demand and good prices for Cape brandy since 1878.

6) Ibid. 5th October, 1878.

(Boeren Bescherminings Vereniging).

"Let there be a good general committee in the neighbourhood of Capetown" he urged. "Let the Association have branches in each (electoral) division with representatives in each field cornetcy ..... Even a minority can under party government exercise a powerful influence, but then it must be composed of determined men, and supported by determined electors."

At the meeting held in Stellenbosch on 12th August to found the B.B.V. he unambiguously told his listeners that this organization was calculated not only for agitation against the excise but as a political instrument.<sup>1)</sup> A fortnight later Paarl founded the first branch of the Society,<sup>2)</sup> and by the end of October 1878, the number of branches was large enough to arrange a general meeting and choose a committee including members from as far as Beaufort West and Calvinia. The B.B.V. was complete and eagerly awaited its opportunity in the general elections due in March 1879.<sup>3)</sup> This new growth did not auger well for the Sprigg ministry. Despite assurances to the contrary, there was an inevitable flavour of racialism in the B.B.V. and its sister organization which followed in the Midlands in 1879 (the Afrikaner Bond).<sup>4)</sup> Indirectly this new development was a national reaction against what was considered an unpardonable injustice to the Transvalers and treason towards those Cape Colonial Afrikaners who had so hopefully supported Froude in 1835.

Sprigg was a wary politician, much more so than the loud-mouthed Paterson. In his Manifesto to his electors in February 1878, just a week after the dismissal, he had been careful to insert confederation as a plank in his platform.<sup>5)</sup> In the

Governor's/

1) Hofmeyr - Life of Hofmeyr p.149 : "It was not so much in connection with the Excise that he saw the use of such an Association. It was an Educational institution that he saw its value. Responsible government and the rest were all very well, but if men thought they could go and sit with folded arms and that the constitution would look after their interests entirely of its own accord, they would find themselves deceived. Political privileges involved political obligations. The power of the East was due to there being organizations of this kind in existence. If the electors were alive and energetic their members would be so too. If the establishment of the Boeren Bescherminings Vereniging led to a development of such a healthy spirit in the farming districts, he would never regret the day, although the Excise Act remained for ever."

2) Zuid-Afrikaan - 21st August, 1878.

3) Hofmeyr op. cit. pp.150-151. Zuid-Afrikaan - 5th Oct., 1878.

4) Ibid. - 9th Oct., 1878 : "Het Koloniale Patriotisme".

5) Cape Argus - 12th Feb., 1878.

Governor's speech on 10th May appeared the following paragraph:

"The attention of my ministers will be directed at an early opportunity towards approaching the neighbouring States and Colonies with a view to a joint and friendly investigation of such a basis as may provide a sound foundation for a satisfactory measure of confederation."<sup>1)</sup>

Frere had indeed gone ahead with this new "conference" proposition off his own bat and had sent despatches to those authorities concerned,<sup>2)</sup> but Mr. Sprigg began to think otherwise now he saw that his seat on the Treasury benches was none too secure as yet. Confederation as a government measure was tacitly dropped.

Something had to be done however, to act as a sop to Downing Street's impatience, and John Paterson provided the solution by moving, as a private member, the immediate steps be taken by the Cape Colony to bring about confederation in South Africa.<sup>3)</sup>

"Half-past four had arrived before Mr. Paterson (~~provided the solution~~) was called upon to move the resolution standing in his name" reported the "Cape Argus". "At that time there were less than thirty members present and to all appearances there was not one, Mr. Paterson himself not excepted, who felt any particular interest in the subject which so recently set all men by the ears. On the strength of a diplomatic paragraph in the Governor's speech, supported by a passage in the Premier's address to his constituents as well as by the manifesto of Attorney-General when soliciting the suffrages of the electors of Colesberg, Mr. Paterson claimed the support of the Ministry."

Only Philip Watermeyer, his seconder, supported the motion.

Fairbridge, Sauer, Solomon and Sprigg himself, spoke against it and Solomon moved the "previous question", which was accepted. So little interest was taken in this effort by the member for Port Elizabeth that some newspapers did not even mention it.

Sir Bartle Frere devoted a long despatch to it, however, and was careful to assure Hicks Beach at the outset that Paterson had acted as an independent member and without previous concert with ministers.<sup>4)</sup> He proceeded to state four reasons against immediate action in this matter. Firstly, there was the fact that the session was almost over and no good could come of hurried attempts at legislation.

"Moreover"/

1) A. 1-'78 par. 12.

2) G.H. 31/15 - Frere to Hicks Beach, 14th May, 1878 (enclosure)

3) V. & P. (Ass.) 16th July, 1878 : Cape Argus - 18th July, 1878.

4) G.H. 31/15 - Frere to Hicks Beach, 22nd July, 1878.

"Moreover," continued Frere, "the question seems to me to have made much progress in the minds of thoughtful colonists during the past twelve months and what hesitation appears on the part of those who advocate it, is due simply to the fact that a question emerges from the theoretical stage towards that of discussion with a view to immediate action, both its importance and the character of the difficulties to be overcome are more evident and the necessity for full and careful discussion and handling becomes more apparent."

In the next place there was the necessity for measures of colonial defence which were essential preliminaries to confederation, thirdly, the changed situation in the Transkei. The Colony should be allowed all possible latitude to extend her jurisdiction there. "The altered condition of Kaffraria" he urged, "will facilitate a comparison and discussion of the system of native policy hitherto followed in Natal and the Cape Colony and pave the way to such an uniform system of managing native affairs as is essential to any lasting confederation". Lastly, there was the need for a uniform customs policy.

In concluding this despatch the Governor touched on matters which later assumed greater prominence in his views and will be noted in another context: the urgent need for self-government in Natal and a constitution for the Transvaal. Frere never forgot for a moment that ultimately it was his responsibility to promote some form of closer union between the Free State and the three British colonies - his private correspondence bears testimony to this fact - but he saw the futility of impatience when so many and widely different problems had to be cleared away before a unified government could be successfully instituted. In his attempts to start this preliminary settlement, disaster and misunderstanding overtook him. His caution and appreciation of the difficulties of the Sprigg government appeared to his superiors nothing less than deliberate dilatoriness and lack of spirit; he was recalled eventually because he had failed to overcome by the unremitting application of his personal abilities, the blunders of imperial policy over which he had no control, but for which he was blamed nevertheless.

In September 1878 he made the voyage to Natal which the Kaffir War had interrupted the previous year. Since April the Zulus

had given Natal cause for anxiety and long letters had passed between Hicks Beach and Frere on the subject. In June the Commissioners appointed to determine the ownership of the Blood River territory<sup>1)</sup> had reported in favour of the Zulus and Frere had forwarded the decision to Shepstone in Pretoria. He was now going to Natal to enforce the decision and give personal attention to the "Zulu menace".<sup>2)</sup>

It is not necessary to make even a sketchy attempt here to review the pro's and con's in the dispute over Frere's Zulu policy, to prove or disprove that he disregarded instructions from Downing Street and "forced a war on Cetewayo" in December 1878. Several blue-books were filled at the time on the subject and, as was the case with the ministerial dismissal, biographers<sup>3)</sup> have done their best to present the "right" side of the question. There is only one reason why we follow Sir Bartle to Natal, viz. to gauge the effects of the war on his subsequent activities in South Africa.

The main facts of the war are quickly told: on 13th November, Frere sent the Boundary Award to Cetewayo with the conditions which left the Zulu chief a choice between war and the voluntary disbandment of his impis. He chose the former by giving no reply. On 11th January Lord Chelmsford crossed into Zululand over the Tugela with three columns. On the 22nd January occurred the massacre of Durnford's column of 800 regulars and as many natives at Isandhlwana followed by the desperate fight at Rorke's Drift. In March Col. Wood gained a victory near Kambula Mountain and on 2nd July Chelmsford crushed the Zulus before the royal kraal at Ulundi, while Sir Garnet Wolseley, who had been sent in the panic after Isandhlwana to supersede him, was on his way to the army to take over.<sup>4)</sup>

It/

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1) See map p. 219 2) c.f. Warsfold - Frere p.74 ff. Theal - History of S.A. 1872-1884 I. pp.300-301. Hicks Beach - Life of H. Beach p80f.  
 3) c.f. C.2144, C.2222, C.2454. Warsfold - op. cit. pp.65-202. As has been pointed out already this is the best defence of Frere's policy yet written. By way of contrast: Hicks Beach - Ibid. I. pp.90-136. a totally different view based on the same sources. Walker-History of S.A. pp.377-380 : summary of events leading up to the Zulu War.  
 4) Walker - History of S.A. pp.383-384 : Warsfold - op. cit. pp.114-122. Maurice and Arthur - Wolseley pp. 119-120.

It was the news of the terrible disaster at Isandhlwana which raised a howl of execration from the Liberal Radicals against the "forward policy" which had brought on an Afghan and a Zulu War in close succession. It was an outcry, at the same time, against the "preconsul" who had involved England in disaster in South Africa. The Government itself seemed to lose its head at the unforeseen reverse to British arms. There is ample evidence that, before Isandhlwana Beaconsfield himself had shrugged his shoulders and hoped for the best. His prestige had been raised very opportunely by his success at the Berlin Conference in July 1878, but the Afghan War had cancelled out a good deal of Conservative popularity and this disaster was an appalling blow to the Cabinet. Small wonder that the Prime Minister broke down physically when the news reached London in mid-February, and even spoke of resignation in his letters to the Queen.<sup>1)</sup>

The Liberals showed no quarter: Beaconsfield was compelled to defend Frere when he too desired to recall him immediately. Lord Carnarvon did his best for his old friend. "I think he has had at the present crisis somewhat scant justice" he told the House of Lords at the end of his speech on 25th March "and but for the unfortunate disaster at Isandula, I do not believe he would have stood in need of defence here tonight". Beaconsfield, in duty bound, added that "great services are not cancelled out by one act or one single error."<sup>2)</sup> Hicks Beach faced the eloquence of Charles Dilke, supported by Courtney, Chamberlain and the rest of the Radicals: there was no danger of defeat for the Government but the music to be faced was not pleasant.<sup>3)</sup>

In the wake of the politicians came the pamphleteers with nasty remarks on the war.<sup>4)</sup> Blachford contributed a scathing

article/

1) Buckle - Life of Disraeli VI. pp.410: 423, 425.

2) Hansard - 3rd Series C.C.XL IV. cols.1606-1695 (debate on the motion of Lord Lansdowne.

3) Ibid. cols. 931-932: 1503: 1916-2090 (14th, 24th, 27th, 28th March, 1879) vol. CCXL V. cols. 20-39: 246-306 (31st March, 1879)

Gooch - Life of Courtney pp.145-146, 156:- "To the end of his life Courtney looked back with satisfaction on his share in the recall of a man who, despite his high character and attractive personality, incarnated for him the spirit of aggressive Imperialism."

4) Pamphlets : nos. 1 and 2.

article to the "Nineteenth Century" <sup>1)</sup> and Frere <sup>had</sup> to use all his powers of tact to restrain Bishop Colenso from making a second Langalibalele out of Cetewayo. <sup>2)</sup> Even Col. William Butler discovered a demon in Frere and his views form a good example of the general tone of criticism levelled at the High Commissioner: <sup>3)</sup>

"I feel perfectly certain that if the great mass of the good and well meaning people of the land thoroughly realized the exact state of our relations with these wild races the loud voice of their opinion would compel other treatment to be tried but such people seldom really get at the truth and none are so industrious to keep the truth hidden than men of the Bartle Frere type who are Xtian civiliziers after dinner at Exeter Hall and exterminators of the Black man in Zulu or Basutoland."

The reaction to Isandhlwana came as strongly from "Exeter Hall" as from the opponents of imperialism. There was one exception to the general formula of criticism. "The Flag of Ireland" was delighted at the "joyous news" of Isandhlwana and compared it to the fate of Sennacherib's army before Jerusalem. Te <sup>4)</sup>  
Deum Laudamus! An extract shocked the House of Commons!

Beaconsfield was disturbed by the noise. He summoned a series of cabinets to discuss the position and the outcome was public censure for the man who had grown grey in the service of his Queen. She alone stood by him and through her personal influence made Beaconsfield stand by Hicks Beach, the only member of the Cabinet who opposed Frere's recall. She could not prevent "the most dashing soldier of the age" with his Machiavellian mind from superseding Frere in Natal and the Transvaal, <sup>5)</sup> however.

No one knew better than Frere how the news of the massacre on 22nd January would be received in Downing Street. It was a totally unexpected military blunder for which he could not be held directly responsible. It had struck him a severe blow at a moment when there had been every prospect of a speedy end to the war and success for his mission to South Africa. <sup>6)</sup>

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1) Pamphlet : no.40.

2) Pamphlet no.27 : voluminous correspondence between Colenso and Frere (Dec. 1878 - March 1879)

3) Unpublished letter (see Pamphlet no. 37)

4) Quoted by the "Zuid-Afrikaan" : 5th April, 1879.

5) c.f. Warsfold - Frere p.278 ff : Buckle - op. cit. pp.430-431.

6) c.f. G.H. 31/15 - Frere to Hicks Beach : 24th January, 1879. This earnest appeal for understanding was sent off before the news of the massacre reached him. It is one of the greatest despatches he wrote in S.A. and a monument to his diligence and tireless application to detail.

"I was honoured with a drive in his carriage on Thursday afternoon, there being none other besides" wrote Sivewright to Merriam, "and I did not let the opportunity slip. Poor old man one cannot help being sorry for him. You would pity him yourself."

The sympathy he deserved came from the Colony and Natal. Before the news of the censure reached South Africa, a torrent of resolutions arrived from the towns of the Eastern and Western Provinces, headed by a Capetown resolution, of 24th March, "tendering to his Excellency its heartiest sympathy and support in the present emergency."<sup>1)</sup>

Frere was already on his way to the Transvaal when the first condolences arrived. Shepstone's administration had come to a sudden end in February 1879, owing to Frere's personal insistence that he should be removed. The main reason was his incompetence in financial administration<sup>2)</sup> and the preference he had allowed to the claims of the Cape Commercial Bank in respect of moneys advanced to Burgers.<sup>3)</sup>

These matters had been closed, however, and Sir Owen Lanyon was already in Shepstone's place. Frere's principal object in visiting the Transvaal was not unconnected with confederation: he was going to make an effort to smooth down Boer discontent by personal contact with the leaders.

"Unless I am much misinformed" he had told Hicks Beach in his despatch/

1) G.H. 31/15 - Frere to Hicks Beach, 16th, 24th, 26th, 29th, April: 5th, 7th, 16th, 17th May: 7th June, 1879 - enclosing resolutions of confidence in the Governor from Riversdale, Pietermaritzburg, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Cradock, Grahamstown, George, Graaff-Reinet, Swellendam, Kingwilliamstown, Queenstown, Stellenbosch, Murraysburg, Victoria West, Frankfort, Somerset East, Hanover, Beaufort West, Oudtshoorn, Mosselbay, Richmond, Alice, Komgha, Bedford, Adelaide, Tarkastad, Cathcart, Willowmore, Fort Beaufort.

2) The matter is fully discussed by Uys - Shepstone pp.290, 299, 302, 235-36: 400, 404, 443-444: de Kiewiet - Imperial Factor pp.122-124 180: Warsfold - Frere pp.99, 152-153: Leyds - Eerste Annexatie pp.252-257.

3) G.H. 1/25 - Carnarvon to Frere, 25th July: 11th and 17th Sept., 1877. (T.V. Despatches 13, 14, 15 and 20) G.H. 31/14 - Frere to Carnarvon, 23rd and 31st July, 1877 (Enclosures: correspondence with manager of Standard Bank, Cape Town) The Standard Bank had taken over the claims of the Cape Commercial Bank just after the annexation. Hicks Beach to Frere - (Conf.) 16th Oct., 1878 (enclosing a copy of Sargeants' financial report on the Transvaal).

despatch of 22nd July, 1878, "it will be long before the Boers can be reconciled to any autocratic Governemnt which is not of their own election and unless they are contented I do not see how the Lieutenant-Governor can devote the requisite attention to organizing the administration..... Some sort of constitution to the Transvaal seems to me essential ..... " 1)

He had backed up this despatch by a private letter to Beach, stressing the necessity for granting a constitution rather than increasing the number of troops in the Transvaal as the Secretary of State continually suggested. 2) Recognising the disquieting effect which the arbitrary oppression of the Transvalers and their consequent passive resistance, had upon the Colony, he now hastened to clear up the position.

His interview with Kruger and the other leaders was not successful. Frere realised that they had a right to the independence they demanded but he could not possibly promise it; they, for their part, did not care for the "liberties of born Englishmen" which he offered them. 3)

"Whether the world knows it or not, I have endeavoured to keep the people within the law whether Your Excellency considers it to have been kept or not, till they should have seen Your Excellency with a view to getting Your Excellency's support". said Paul Kruger ominously, "and I wish Your Excellency would consider it, for this is the end of the matter." 4)

With Kruger's warning in his ears and humiliation in his heart at the news of his censure (which had just reached him) 5) Frere wrote a long despatch on the necessity for a constitution. He then left the Transvaal, stopped a few days at Kimberley, and reached Capetown after an absence of seven months, in the beginning of June, to do his best for confederation. With shorn authority he stooped to pick up the threads where he had left them - in April, 1877. It was more than two years since Barkly had left, yet the cause in which his successor had followed the Permissive Bill to South Africa was just where Molteno had left it when he finally rejected that measure. Public opinion had been encouraging to Frere in the hour of his defeat. Just how far would it support him if he urged the Sprigg government on once more?

1) p. 155 infra.

2) Hicks Beach - Life of Hicks Beach II. p.87 ff.

3) v. Oordt - Paul Kruger p.254 ff. Warsfold - Frere p.203 ff.

4) Pamphlet no.3.

5) G.H. 31/16 - Frere to H. Beach (T.V. 40) 6th May, 1879.  
Hicks Beach - op. cit. p.150.

## CHAPTER VI.

The Impatience of Downing Street - Kruger, Joubert and Jorissen add the Epilogue to the Confederation Drama.

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Frere's reception in Capetown - Sprigg's difficulties and the abandonment of confederation - The despatch of 12th June and after - Merriman and unification - Griqualand West once more - The Conference issue in 1880 - Recallof Frere.

As he passed through the Cape Colony addresses were once more showered upon Frere: this time no Eastern manifestations of confidence, but all from the Western divisions. In Capetown festal arrangements had been made on an unprecedented scale to receive him when he arrived on 7th June. This burst of welcome was so spontaneous that it affected even the "Argus", Frere's bitterest opponent after Isandhlwana, and editor Dormer placed leaders in succession expressing the mingled sentiments that while Frere was responsible for all the misery in Zululand he was a fine man who had acquitted himself well of a task he should never have undertaken.

But the "Zuid-Afrikaan" was left unmoved by the reception in Capetown "as Capetown has never before received anyone, be he Governor or President, Prince of the British or any Royal House". Had they all forgotten Isandhlwana? "When we hear that British ministers are already speaking of dividing war expenditure among the different 'Governments of South Africa'" wrote Hofmeyr, "then we ask ourselves whether it is advisable to amuse oneself with convulsions of joy over the policy of a High Commissioner whose life is to force through annexations." 3)

Frere/

1) G.H. 31/15 - Frere to H. Beach - 7th June 1879, enclosing addresses from Hopetown, Victoria East, Britstown, Beaufort West, Worcester, Ceres Road, Wellington, Paarl, Capetown, Simonstown, Stellenbosch, Caledon, Malmesbury, Durban(ville?) Piquetberg, Swellendam, Riversdale, Clanwilliam and Bredasdorp.

2) Cape Argus : 7th and 10th June, 1879. There was a strange story behind the attitude of the "Argus". Among the Merriman Papers I found a letter from James Sivewright to Merriman (probably written in January 1879) According to this letter Capt. Durnford the commander of Isandhlwana who was killed with his men, had betrayed some affection for the second daughter of Bishop Colenso. The tragedy of this broken romance naturally would have stirred the Bishop against those whom he held responsible for the disaster. "Mr. Dormer (the editor of "The Cape Argus") is ~~exactly~~ already sworn to his cause" wrote Sivewright, "the Saul-Colenso connection is (plain) and the telegrams which you have already seen are to some extent explained. Mr. Statham of the Witness whom I have in hand and who sends all the Times telegrams both here and to England is sworn to the other side...." We shall meet Mr. Statham again in 1879.

3) Zuid-Afrikaan : 7th June, 1879.

Frere was determined to strike while the iron was hot and he chose the occasion of the banquet offered to him to make confederation coin out of the public enthusiasm. He expressed his thanks for a mark of personal honour bestowed upon him; he hoped that it was also his policy which found favour. Then he struck a telling blow at the constitutional <sup>party</sup> whose final argument against him was always his supposed autocratic tendencies and aversion to responsible government.

"Gentlemen" he said, "among the remedies prescribed for the maladies which afflict us there is one which is very frequently prescribed, and that is, that all this mischief is due to responsible government, and that the sooner you throw off responsible government and revert to some more autocratic form of administration the better it will be for you. This advise has 1) been given you by critics and men of very great weight at home, but I feel convinced that my countrymen will never listen to them. I think it is firmly resolved that there shall be no going back in this matter, and these critics will come round, sooner or later, to my own opinion, that it is to responsible government that your safety at this moment is mainly due, that it is to responsible government you must look for the means for the development of South Africa and that it is by extending such government as you yourself possess to other parts of the country that you may best join with them in promoting a united South Africa." 2)

It was time to draw public attention to confederation for, not only had it disappeared from newspaper columns, but it also seemed that Sprigg was becoming more and more unwilling to face his "obligations". 3) The nominations and general elections in March and May had aroused little public interest and the press was so quiet that one has to hunt for news of the election. 4)

The B.B.V. had come into action, however, and although too late to affect the Legislative Council elections, many candidates were set up for the Assembly in Western districts. 5)

"The confederation party seems to be not by far as strong in the House (as was expected)" commented the "Zuid-Afrikaan" on the nominations, "but the anti-excise party much stronger than was expected/

1) (The underlining is mine) It is interesting to note how Frere was abused for views openly expressed by Froude. The dismissal of the Molteno government and Frere's Indian experience were of course, regularly cited by his opponents (c.f. Cape Argus : 22nd May, 1879).

2) Pamphlet no.26.

3) Cape Argus : 20th May, 1879: "As to confederation, when the election took place it was as completely abandoned on all sides as it has been by Mr. Froude in his latest utterance in the "Quarterly Review" on the "South African Problem" ..... as an election cry it was abandoned and had no more influence on the late struggle than it might have in Melbourne or Sydney."

4) Ibid. 15th and 18th March: 17th May, 1879.

5) Hofmeyr - Life of Hofmeyr pp.148-149.

expected. All the Western members returned unopposed belong to the latter party. Also the so-called Afrikaner party will be more formidable in the next parliament than in the previous one. At Beaufort West it has an opportunity of winning two members. The choice of Rev. de Villiers is certain and that of D.F. du Toit (Patriot) practically certain." 1)

In the ensuing elections these hopes were realised to a great extent and Hofmeyr himself became an M.L.A. for Stellenbosch. His entry into the Assembly was timely. The Afrikaners had been more or less leaderless all along and <sup>just now</sup> Andries Stockenström, whom many regarded as the Afrikaner leader after the dismissal of the Molteno cabinet in which he had sat since October 1876, died in his late thirties. Hofmeyr himself was only 34 and he succeeded to the leadership in the Assembly when it met on 24th June.

In the opening speech there was no mention of confederation and a doleful tone pervaded the ministry's greeting to the Assembly and Council. Sprigg had no wish to bring a further hornet's nest about his ears. Already things were not looking too bright for him on the Northern Border of the Cape Colony, where a harassing Koranna war had consumed more than £80,000 since its outbreak in May 1878 and was laying the ministry open to scathing criticism. 2) In Basutoland the disarmament act was already eliciting mutterings and since February 1879 Morosi had been in open rebellion. 3)

There were other difficulties too, which no one appreciated

better/

1) Zuid-Afrikaan: 15th March, 1879: a distinction is here made between the "excise" party and the nuclei of S.J. du Toit's future Bond which was founded later in the year. Fundamentally it was du Toit's republicanism which was splitting the Afrikaner element into two branches. In 1883 Hofmeyr succeeded in uniting the two retaining du Toit's name for the party but Hofmeyr's principles! (c.f. Hofmeyr - Life of Hofmeyr pp.195-214).

2) Cape Argus - 24th June, 1879: Theal - History of S.A. 1872-1884 II pp.29-37: A.23-'78: A.1, 11-'79: G.61-'79 pp.12-45. (Upinton's report on the Northern Border) and pp.1-108 (Correspondence) G.H. 31/15 - Frere to Hicks Beach, 24th Feb., 1879 (enclosures) The Merriman Papers: Sivewright to Merriman, Jan., 1879: (Do the Cape people ever bestow a passing thought upon that Northern Border? That alone would in England turn out the strongest ministry which ever sat together. Lanyon who is here and staying with me at present ... assures me that in the Cape Colony there is not the remotest idea of the manner in which things have been and are being conducted up there. Lanyon says that he couldn't afford to strive with Sir Bartle Frere otherwise Sprigg would have had a rough time of it and shown up in anything but a flattering light".)

3) Theal - op.cit. pp.41-53.

better than Sir Bartle Frere himself: Griqualand West was not yet annexed though the Act of 1877 had been ratified by the Imperial Government early in 1878; in the Transkei Sprigg's extension policy was being held up by the refusal of the Imperial Government to grant Letters Patent for the annexation of Bomvana-land and Galecaland. Last, but not so very unimportant, came the ~~same~~ the question of war expenses in 1877-'78, which was to a cer-  
tain extent linked up <sup>with</sup> the Transkeian annexations.

The assent to the Cape act for the annexation of Griqualand West had been delayed by Frere on various pretexts. <sup>1)</sup> Then the Griqua war had broken <sup>upon</sup> Lanyon and forced him to conduct a costly campaign in the Langebergen and the desert around Boetsap and Kuruman between May and October, 1878. <sup>2)</sup> Beach anxiously wrote to Frere to hurry on annexation now, <sup>3)</sup> federation or no federation.

The other aspect of the matter was bound to carry more weight with a much-criticised ministry: "The Cape Colony has no possible interest in prying into the financial condition of its neighbours" said the "Argus", "but when the Imperial Government is endeavouring to affect a partnership between the various South African Colonies, it is well that each should know the financial position of the other - Griqualand West finances for 1877-'78: revenue £105,726 (estimated revenue £116,800) expenditure £199,957 (estimated expenditure £95,111) - The War expenses account for the increase in the expenditure of the Colony but at the same time, when annexation takes place the Cape will have to pay for the military displays of Col. Lanyon and Col. Warren." <sup>4)</sup>

Frere himself advised that the annexation should be postponed pending the arrival of "an important despatch from Her Majesty's Government on the subject of Confederation" which he had reason to expect shortly.

On the matter of the Transkeian annexations he was the champion of the Sprigg ministry and unceasingly impressed upon Beach the senselessness of coupling the grant of letters patent with the necessary demand for war expenses from the Cape government. In May he lost his patience with Beach in a curt paragraph on this matter:

"I would strongly recommend" he wrote, "that the request of the  
Cape/

1) c.f. A.10-'79.

2) Agar-Hamilton - The Road to the North pp.128-141, A.30, 35-'79.

3) Hicks Beach to Frere, 13th March, 1879. (Warsford - Frere p.234)

4) Cape Argus - 13th March, 1879.

Cape Parliament as expressed in their resolution of last session be complied with so as to enable legislation to proceed in the coming session. I do not anticipate that the questions immediately relating to Galeca and Bomvanaland can be affected by any 'conference of colonial delegates' which is likely to assemble whilst any discussion of 'the general principles of confederation' will be much facilitated by a legal settlement of Galeca and Bomvanaland." 1)

Despite his efforts, however, six years passed by before these territories were finally annexed in August 1885. 2)

More important perhaps than these two objections which Frere urged on behalf of his ministers was a more personal consideration viz. his antagonism towards Wolseley, the newly-appointed "High Commissioner for South-East Africa", and his firm belief that his authority had been impaired by this open withdrawal of confidence in him by Her Majesty's Government.

In the Commons Wolseley's appointment had been justified on the following ground: "It will be remembered" said the Chancellor of the Exchequer, "that this district (the Transvaal) is at a distance of more than 1000 miles from Capetown, where during the approaching session of the Cape Parliament Sir Bartle Frere must be engaged on important and pressing affairs". 3)

From the War Office and the Queen came strong opposition to Wolseley's appointment, but Beaconsfield was determined to see him off. 4) Beach repeated the arguments in the Commons when he wrote to Frere.

"Above all" he added, "Her Majesty's Government are anxious that the larger and more complicated questions connected with confederation, on which I shall shortly address you should be considered under your guidance during the approaching session of the Cape Parliament, and they attach special importance to the advantages which may be derived from your exertions in promoting this great work." 5)

But Sir Bartle could not be coaxed into silence. He would not take Wolseley's appointment in good part and maintained that

his/

1) G.H. 31/15 - Frere to Hicks Beach, 19th May, 1879. c.f. G.H. 1/29 Hicks Beach to Frere 20th March, 1879: G.H. 31/14 Frere to H. Beach 9th Jan., G.H. 31/15 - Frere to H. Beach 22nd July, 1878, 9th May, 1879. Theal - History of S.A. 1872-1884 I. pp.139-142: Worsfold - Frere p.285.

2) Theal op. cit. I. p.142.

3) Hansard 3rd Series CCXL VI. cols, 1227, 1241 (debate on Civil and Military commands in S.Africa, 26th May, 1879.)

4) Maurice and Arthur - Wolseley pp.114-115: Buckle - Disraeli VI. pp.432-433.

5) G.H. 1/30 - H. Beach to Frere, 28th May, 1879.

his prestige had been lowered in South Africa and his usefulness impaired. It was furthermore a good excuse for Natal to go ahead with the movement for a "South-Eastern" confederation. "They look upon any check administered to the present Governor of the Cape Colony as a victory" he complained, "and in this light, judging from newspaper telegrams, they regard the present arrangement."

Sprigg had refused to insert mention of confederation in the opening speech because he regarded Wolseley as an unknown quantity in the situation.

"The opposition papers here assume from Sir Garnet Wolseley's appointment that Her Majesty's Government have some intention of adopting a retrograde policy with regard to responsible government" he continued in a second despatch, "Mr. Sprigg informed me that he and his colleagues felt no apprehension on that point, being well satisfied with my assurance that I did not myself doubt that speedy determination of the Zulu War was the sole object of Sir Garnet Wolseley's return to Natal. But they considered that it was more prudent to avoid discussion on the subject in Parliament until they could ascertain from your promised despatch the exact present sentiments of Her Majesty's Government on the subject of Confederation." 1)

To make matters worse a personal estrangement between Frere and Wolseley developed soon after the latter's arrival and there was little prospect of co-operation, especially on Transvaal affairs which so closely affected the Colony, and the matter of constitutional advance in Natal. 2)

Neither Governor nor ministers were thus in a congenial mood to receive the "promised despatch" when it did arrive on the 6th July, and the despatch indeed contained nothing which was calculated to improve their attitude. 3)

The peremptory tone in which Beach wrote was the most outstanding feature of the document, and it was not lost upon Sir Bartle. The bargaining spirit in which all the proposals were conceived only served to make it unmistakably clear that if ever there was a direct motive behind the Imperial desire to bring about confederation it was the desire to "scuttle" responsibilities by hook or by crook. 4) It was a document incredibly naive and/

1) G.H. 1/30 - H. Beach to Frere, 23th May, 1879.

1) G.H. 31/16 - Frere to H. Beach, 17th June, 1879 (two despatches)

2) c.f. Maurice and Arthur - Wolseley p.121.

3) G.H. 1/30 - H. Beach to Frere 12th June, 1879 (Annexure no.7) h206.

4) c.f. Hansard 3rd Series. CCXL IV. (March 25th, 1879) Lord Cadogan, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in the debate on the Zulu War:- Confederation will involve, we hope, self-defence, which will remove the liability under which we labour of spending our blood and money upon these wretched Kaffir quarrels in South Africa.!

and tactless in thought and wording and in sharp contrast with the communications of Lord Carnarvon on the subject (as the press was not slow to note). The Sprigg ministry resented the fact that Hicks Beach ignored their efforts in 1878 to place the defences of the Colony on a sound footing and in due course they told him so.<sup>1)</sup> For the present they handed the Governor a minute declining to take action on the despatch since the session was half-way over (as had been the case in 1878) and pointing out the unsettled state of affairs in Natal and the Transvaal.

"The whole of the South African communities are anxiously awaiting the result of the War on the Natal and Transvaal frontiers" they concluded, "Pending its settlement Ministers cannot but feel that to 'submit general proposals for the establishment of a South African Union or Confederation' to the Cape Parliament, would be to invite the Legislature to commit itself to unknown responsibilities."<sup>2)</sup>

3)

The annotations Frere made to the despatch clearly indicate his personal views, and one cannot help feeling that the press comment which he carefully gathered and forwarded to Hicks Beach was a convenient way of adding to his official reply the things he could not possibly tell the Secretary of State without disastrous results to himself! And the press was not complimentary:

"The present Secretary of State for the Colonies, has on no occasion shown himself to have a competent knowledge of South African affairs and in dealing with those affairs he has, accordingly, to rely on the aid and advice of others," was the opinion of the "Standard & Mail".<sup>4)</sup> "When we read his despatch of the 12th of June..... we need not ask who has been this time, his his adviser. The idea of having a definite form of Constitution for the Union..... adopted by the Cape Parliament..... and that of considering the amount contributed by the inhabitants of each Province towards the revenue of the Union as an element of primary importance in calculating their share of representation to be allotted to it, have had, both of them, their origin in the fertile brain of that eminent Colonial statesman Mr. John Pater-son who at a time when his fellow-Colonists have long ceased

to/

1) G.H. 31/16 - Frere to H. Beach, 26th Jan., 1880 (enclosure) See p.167 With the despatch of 12th June arrived a telegram sent off four days later via St. Vincent. It once more urged the settlement of the War expences Bill. "I may add" said Hicks Beach in this telegram, "that the acceptance by the Cape Colony of those responsibilities (of defence) for the future which would devolve upon it as a member of a South African Union would be felt by Her Majesty's Government to have a very important bearing upon the decision of this question."

2) Minute of Ministers: 10th July, 1879.

3) A printed copy of the despatch of 12th June, minuted in pencil by Frere and filed with the original is to be seen in the Cape Archives. It appears to be a rough draft of the despatch of 11th July in which Frere officially replied. I have made Frere's marginal notes into footnotes appended to the text of the despatch of 12th June (SEE Annexure no.7.)

4) 12th July, 1879.

to attach any importance to anything he does or says, is so fortunate as to see his ideas readily endorsed and taken over by Sir M. Hicks Beach." 1)

The official organ of the ministry had even nicer things to say: 2) "Sir Michael Hicks Beach is certainly not a polite letter-writer" commented the paper, "his epistolary style being clumsy and his diction bald and inelegant. Lord Carnarvon on the other hand wrote like a scholar, and when Mr. Froude sat at the noble Earl's elbow the despatches of the Colonial Office were positively literary master-pieces." Even in the stronghold of confederation there was a cold douche from "Grandmamma" for the despatch: "The cold and grudging manner in which Sir Michael Hicks Beach speaks of the efforts of this colony during the war is not the more pleasant because it is his habitual style of acknowledgement towards us" said the "Journal", and the "Queenstown Representative" added that "Sir Michael Hicks Beach seems to display a fair share of that well-meaning ignorance, which, as has often been remarked, is a grievous calamity in high places." 3)

The "Cape Argus" threw the last stone at the despatch: "We are not, therefore, at all amazed to find that the communication is conceived in a spirit of profound ignorance as regards the subject to which it relates; nor are we surprised at its poverty of thought and language when compared with the magnificent state papers to which we have grown accustomed." ran a leader, "(But) we have a shrewd suspicion that Sir Michael Hicks Beach will not be very surprised at the reception accorded to his despatch.

D During a recent discussion in the House of Lords, Earl Cadogan gave it as one of the reasons for Sir Garnet Wolseley's appointment that Sir Bartle Frere's presence was necessary in

Cape Town/

1) The private correspondence with Frere confirms this (Warsfold - Frere p.257: Hicks Beach to Frere, 29th May, 1879): "You shall have a despatch by the mail leaving England on June 13th. I send, however, with this note two memoranda, drawn up for me by Mr. Paterson of Port Elizabeth in which I think there is much force." Hicks Beach's superficial view of the difficulties facing Frere in a self-governing colony, may further be judged from a confidential despatch which he wrote to Frere on the same day as his public despatch: "I have explained to you in my Despatch no. 415 of this day the reasons for which Her Majesty's Government desire that the question of confederation should, without any delay be seriously considered by the Cape Parliament. I trust that the elections will have resulted in the assembling of a parliament generally well disposed to deal with this important subject and you are aware that I rely greatly upon your ability and influence for removing such objections as may be raised by interested persons or through misapprehension."

2) Cape Times - 19th and 21st July, 1879.

3) Quoted by the Cape Argus - 29th July, 1879.

4) Ibid. 12th July, 1879.

Capetown to push forward the work of confederation. A noble Lord exclaimed that confederation was further off than ever, 'that may be' replied the Under-Secretary, 'but there is no harm in trying for it'. Now we think that Sir Michael Hicks Beach is but 'trying' for it." 1)

Frere's official reply was a lengthy and remarkable document. 2)

In about 9000 words he considered the paragraphs of the despatch seriatim and so forcefully was his criticism that Hicks Beach refused to publish it and instructed him to replace it by a short

summary of his views. 3) Frere grasped this opportunity to unburden his soul of all matters that had been raised unsuccessfully in the past: he vindicated the defence policy of his ministers, urged once more a settlement in the Transkei, British immigration for the sparsely-populated (and discontented?) parts of South Africa, and responsible government for Natal. He violently opposed the withdrawal of Imperial assistance in defence matters, both as regards men and money and ended with a strong plea to the Imperial Government to see that South Africa was on her feet first in matters of military defence, population and railway construction before speaking of wholesale withdrawal of Imperial assistance. In the course of his arguments he stressed once more Sprigg's willingness to further confederation and stated a three-fold reason for the rejection of the despatch: firstly, one-third of members were of uncertain opinion and thus a risky element should a division be taken; secondly, the session was drawing to a close; thirdly, ministers were unable to give satisfactory replies to questions on Sir Garnet Wolseley's intentions in the Transvaal and Natal. 4)

The/

1) (The underlining is mine). c.f. Hicks Beach to Frere - (Conf.) 11th Dec., 1879: the belated reply to Frere's despatch of 11th July (below)

2) G.H. 31/16 - Frere to Hicks Beach, 11th July, 1879.

3) A brief little note pasted over the original entry in the despatch book (G.H. 31/16.).

4) c.f. Watsfeld - Frere p.285: Frere's private letter accompanying this despatch. "As regards Confederation, I much fear your action and the two despatches on the subject, which I received last week, have had an effect the reverse of what you intended. You tried no doubt, to avoid anything like coercion or threatening. But Colonists are very sensitive and their backs had already been put up by similar arguments and proposals.... put before them by Mr. Paterson, with the assurance that if they were not accepted willingly, they would be forced on all the Colonies concerned. When therefore, the same plans were recognised in your despatch, even Confederationists took alarm, and neither I nor Mr. Sprigg are able to satisfy some of his staunchest supporters that their fears are groundless. They believe that Wolseley has secret instructions to confederate the Transvaal and Natal forcibly...."

The assertions could not be refuted, he said, "that my policy as regards Zululand and the Transvaal has been emphatically disapproved by Her Majesty's Government and that, although I have not been recalled, I have been so far superseded that there can be no obvious assurance either that the demands originally made at my instance on Cetewayo will be enforced or that Her Majesty's sovereignty over the Transvaal will be maintained. With nothing which they can oppose to this kind of argument it would obviously be most suicidal in the Colonial Ministry to risk a debate on any proposal pledging the Colonial Parliament to federation."

When Parliament was prorogued on 2nd August, there was a simple announcement in the Governor's speech to the effect that "the great question of the Union of South African communities has been postponed for a time". Postponed? asked a Capetown paper. Why, it was as dead as a doornail! Even Frere was pessimistic in his report of the session. "The opposition to Ministers made up in perseverance and vehemence for numerical deficiencies. By skilful combinations they managed often to attract avowed Ministerial supporters to their side in divisions and both in Parliament and the Press repeatedly taunted Ministers with half-heartedness in the matter of confederation in a manner which bespoke confidence that, if any resolution on the subject were brought forward, they hoped to have a fair chance of defeating the Ministry".<sup>1)</sup>

But the story was not ended yet.

Frere's despatch of 11th July was regarded by Hicks Beach as a dignified form of "sulking" on the part of an aggrieved governor who was grinding his axe on the policy sponsored by those who had censured him. It was a natural conclusion, perhaps, to one in his position, holding still the panoramic view of South African affairs and finding himself far removed from the clashing problems which were more significant to one who studied the situation at close quarters. It was the same old story which recurred regularly since the days of Glenelg and D'urban.

Hicks Beach did not reply to the despatch. He acknowledged<sup>it</sup> and drew the Governor's attention to the fact that he had forgotten to enclose the minute with which he had communicated the despatch of 12th June to the Cape ministry.<sup>2)</sup> There was a good reason for his silence and his insistence on seeing that minute (which eventually turned out to be quite harmless). For three days after asking/

1) G.H. 31/16 - Frere to Hicks Beach, 23rd Sept., 1879.  
2) G.H. 1/31 - Hicks Beach to Frere, 26th August, 1879.

asking for the minute he wrote to the only supporter of Sir Bartle Frere who could not be ignored - the queen herself. 1)

"If Sir Bartle Frere had, either directly or indirectly, persuaded his Ministers not to take the step which Your Majesty's Government had pressed on them and had issued a sort of public manifesto in direct opposition to the suggestions and policy of Your Majesty's Government, Sir Michael Hicks Beach would, however, reluctantly, be compelled to submit to Your Majesty that Sir Bartle Frere's recall is essential - for the greater influence, the more harm he might do if permitted to remain there. But Sir Michael Hicks Beach thinks it both wise and just to be sure of the facts.....(for) even if Sir Bartle Frere should ultimately be recalled, it might be better that it should be done three months hence than at the present moment....." 2)

At the Cape, meanwhile, John Paterson was trying to bring about confederation off his own bat! Undaunted by the reception given to Hicks Beach's proposals and the light in which his own name figured in connection therewith, he published a "manifesto" in the press, expounding his own ideas of confederation: the Cape was to act as hen to the chickens, admitting one by one community to a confederation on equal footing. Even a draft per-<sup>3)</sup> missive measure was included in Mr. Paterson's surprise packet. The "Cape Times" alone sponsored his individual effort and even the "Journal" condemned the move:

"By Mr. Paterson ordering the Cape Legislature to sit in judgment upon the fitness of these colonies to enter into a proposed Union (his proposals) will not be received kindly in the other colonies" it remarked."..... Mr. Paterson, however, has some proposals to submit to the country and he is afraid to wait for a more convenient time, lest perchance he should be forestalled. These proposals, however, are not happy." 4)

"The great apostle of Confederation is impatient," jeered the "Argus".<sup>5)</sup> "The men of his choice do not move fast enough for him; he entertains a suspicion of insincerity in their hustings cry and he has resolved upon recourse to independent effort to bring

about/

1) Hicks Beach - Life of Hicks Beach I, pp.153-155: Hicks Beach to the Queen, 29th August, 1879.

2) c.f. The tribute paid to Frere by the Cape Argus (23rd August, '79 "Sir Bartle Frere, as his friends and enemies alike know, is not the sort of man who succumbs to a temporary check. The humiliation inflicted upon him he resolved to pocket, to bide his time, to achieve the task for which he was specially appointed and not to return to his country and sovereign until he could return in triumph."

3) Cape Times : 27th August, 1879. Cape Argus : 1st September, '79 letter from Paterson, explaining his standpoint.

4) Grahamstown Journal : 2nd September, 1879.

5) Cape Argus : 28th August, 1879.

about the realization of his political dream."

It was the last time, however, that the name of John Paterson was the target of his political enemies. He sailed once more for England towards the end of 1879 and never returned.

Confederation had been swept into the shallows by government and opposition alike. On the surface it seemed as if the status quo was desired by all, yet behind the limelight of the public press the old Molteno party was groping for something constructive with which to combat the moribund but tenaciously reviving cry for "confederation". J. K. Merriman was the first to strike out in a new direction. He chose as his platform the very <sup>idea</sup> of "evolutionary" unification which Molteno had expounded to Carnarvon in 1876, and he stood by unification, as opposed to federation, until the actual consummation of Union thirty years later. 2)

In November 1878 he wrote to Professor Goldwin Smith of Toronto University <sup>3)</sup> seeking information on the working of federation in Canada.

"A Federation seems to be peculiarly unsuited" he wrote, "to a scanty and scattered population that can barely find money enough to support one government and where the expenditure on public works constitutes the principal topic of policy. But Downing Street always dangles Canada before our eyes as modern political Elysium and I have therefore been impertinent enough to ask a perfect stranger, but one who, from his writings I am sure can better than any one else answer the question whether things are as couleur de rose as they are painted." 4)

The replies of Smith convinced Merriman that the federal system <sup>5)</sup> was not working satisfactorily in Canada and he treasured this information against the day when he would be called to do battle for his convictions; the day came in June 1880.

Meanwhile he had got into touch with a brilliant young journalist/

1) p. 126 above

2) Laurence - Life of Merriman p.25 : Pamphlets nos. 35 and 36.

3) A prominent educationalist with pronounced Independent Liberal views. Professor of History at Oxford (1858-1866) and of English and Constitutional History at Cornell University (1868-1871). Member of the Senate of Toronto University.

4) J.K. Merriman to G. Smith : 3rd November, 1878 (Merriman Papers)

5) c.f. Cape Argus : 25th Feb., 1879. (quoting the Canadian Paper "Weekly Free Press"): "One thing is certain, Canada cannot alone bear the cost which confederation of the colonies has entailed and is likely to entail in the near future. Confederation was an Imperial work and was carried out in furtherance of Imperial interests ... England must either help us or allow us to help ourselves as best we may...."

journalist of the "Natal Witness", F. Reginald Statham, and correspondence ensued for the establishing of an independent newspaper in Capetown advocating Merriman's views and managed by an ex-editor of the "Cape Argus" named P. McLoughlin.<sup>1)</sup>

Statham was very enthusiastic and sketched the political aims of this new "unification" newspaper in a long letter to Merriman, from which I quote, mainly because Statham's idealism comes as a refreshing breath after the rather monotonous see-saw of party politics over the confederation question:<sup>2)</sup>

"The chief danger as it strikes me, is the impossibility of getting together any organized opposition. I do not mean in the Cape Colony alone but from South Africa generally, and the main point I am anxious about is the possibility of, by any means, creating such an organized opposition.

"At the present moment, as far as I can see, there is not a single paper in S. Africa that is devoted to the advocacy of S. African interests in the constitutional sense as a whole. I do my best from time to time here; but it is perfectly obvious that a movement in favour of general political union cannot proceed from Maritzburg. It would be simply a voice crying in the wilderness and anything that is to be done must originate in Capetown (which is at the moment practically the metropolis of South Africa). Now is there anything to be done. Is there no chance of starting a constitutional paper which will aim at emphasizing the fact that S. Africa is and must be one but one constitutionally, and for its own sake and not one for the purpose of being pulled hither and thither from Downing Street.

It has been said to me.... that the proper time to start such a paper would be when your party returned again to office. - This I cannot think for the mere fact of the return of your party to office would be proof that the work was done and the constitutional victory, at least so far as the S. Colony is concerned, gained. Judging by recent indications I should say that there is yet a very hard fight to be fought before that victory can be gained, in the meantime the constitutional party seems to me to have no flag to fight under, the Argus being of necessity too much suspected of neprophilism to be (trusted).

Now if you and your friends can start a constitutional paper, I am willing and more than willing to come to Capetown and put all my strength and pray understand that I do not offer this with any personal motive.... My offer, if you will believe it - and it seems, I must say, a difficult thing to believe in these times - is based on public grounds entirely and I make it because I have a profound faith in the S. African future if only we can once get the present crew and the present principles worked overboard."

In this vein he continued in a second letter to Merriman on

12th October:

"Let it be known that (the paper) represents what I may call the "Young African" party - the party that looks forward to union and self-government by natural means and process, not by heroic policies and Caesarean operations..... A particular feature and a most important/

1) It is not clear who started this correspondence. From subsequent correspondence which it would seem that Merriman was responsible for Statham's resignation from the "Natal Witness" to edit this paper in Capetown (c.f. Zuid-Afrikaan : 13th May, 1880 and reproduced in Cape Post 9th June, 1880.).

2) F.R. Statham to Merriman : 15th September, 1879. (Merriman Papers)

importance one would be the interest taken in S. African communities outside the Cape Colony. It always seems to me that one of the most melancholy things in S. African politics is the manner in which everything outside a colony is sneered at by the press within that colony this is a grand mistake and is both a sign and a cause of political weakness.

I need not point out to you the political value of such an undertaking. It would be living indication, so to speak, that South Africa is naturally one and that the force to make it practically one is proceeding from colonists themselves. It would be a standing protest against the miserable ( ) of Imperial interference and a proof of their want of justification - The Dutch element would have to be regarded as the backbone of agricultural success and political independence, and a course steered with regard to native affairs free from false philanthropy on one side and any approach to race hatred on the other."

These high ideals were soon tarnished by a rather ridiculous dispute over remuneration and editorial control, but the "Cape Post" appeared duly in January 1880. Molteno had interested himself in the project financially and hopefully watched its start.<sup>1)</sup> But for the trouble with Statham this paper would have become a power in the political world; under such unfavourable circumstances it collapsed before the end of 1880.

The year 1879 was drawing to a close. In the Transvaal the third of the "four years of protest" which ended on Majuba, was bringing increasing worry to the Imperial Government; the opposition of Transvalers was becoming more vocal from day to day and Colonial Afrikaners were no less loud in their denunciation of the annexation. Hostility against Sir Owen Lanyon, Shepstone's successor, was growing apace, and Wolseley's arrival did not improve matters. He believed, like Lanyon, in the superiority of a regiment over a parley, when it came to negotiation; he had no time for the slow, deliberateness of the Boer. His job had been to settle the Zulus. He had done so to the best of his ability and he was now anxious to get away from the "dirty" political duties into which Hicks Beach forced him in the Transvaal.<sup>2)</sup>

In the leader columns of the "Zuid-Afrikaan" the annexation<sup>3)</sup> once more figured for months on end and even the "Cape Times" joined in once to show how the Imperial Government had thrown

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1) Merriman Papers : Correspondence between Merriman, Statham, Molteno and P.C. Loughlin.

2) Maurice and Arthur - Wolseley pp.126-129. de Kiewiet - Imperial Factor p.248.

3) c.f. Zuid-Afrikaan : 1st and 22nd March : April passim : 13th August, October, passim.

an obstacle in the way of confederation:

"We do not say that the annexations could ultimately have been avoided, but there was a way of doing it while not seeming to do it and a way of not doing it while doing it in a hurry; and the Imperial Government unhappily adopted the latter course. Like a broken limb clumsily set, we question whether it will not now need to be broken again in order to fit it for a more effectual application of surgery." 1)

In July the "Volksblad" presented another petition from over 7000 colonial Afrikaners against the annexation. Frere felt bound to complain to Downing Street that this agitation was becoming more and more embarrassing and certainly exercised great disturbing influence on the Transvaal. 2) In November Hofmeyr personally led a deputation to Frere to ask for a Transvaal plebiscite on the annexation. The deputation consisted of 19 members of the Legislative Assembly (including men like Solomon, Merri-man, Stigant and Fleming) and two Legislative Councillors, besides seven private persons. 3)

Frere was not very sympathetic (perhaps because he was not in good health at the time, as he told the deputation) and when he reported to Hicks Beach on the proceedings, 4) he remarked that

"the meeting illustrated the strong and intimate connection in feeling which exists between the Transvaal Dutch farmers and their relatives who form so large a portion of the conservative country party in this Colony. It also shows" he added, "how such feelings and sympathies may be used for purposes of party politics by those who in general have little in common with that section of Dutch conservatives."

One again: Solomon meant the "Cape Argus" and the "Cape Argus" spelt anti-confederation - that was all Frere saw.

In the Transvaal, despite an imposing proclamation by Wolseley, the Transvalers held a huge meeting at Wonderfontein on 10th December while Wolseley was away in Lydenburg wiping out Se-coecoeni's power with a relish. 5) There was talk of fighting the English now that negotiations proved in vain and it was

evident/

1) Cape Times : 21st July, 1879.

2) Volksblad : 10th July, 1879 : G.H. 31/16 - Frere to Hicks Beach : 6th May and 12th July, 1879 Enclosure: Petition bearing 7256 signatures.

3) Zuid-Afrikaan : 12th November, 1879 : v. Oordt - Paul Kruger pp. 275-281 Kotze - Memoirs pp.656-657.

4) G.H. 31/16 - Frere to Hicks Beach : 11th November, 1879 (G. 2482 pp.445-454).

5) Cape Argus : 6th December, 1879 : Hofmeyr - Life of Hofmeyr p.166 : v. Oordt - op. cit. pp. 283-288.

evident that armed rebellion was more imminent than ever before. Wolseley was not the man to mind a fight, but he bitterly complained to Hicks Beach that the men behind the agitation were none other than Gladstone, Froude and Leonard Courtney.<sup>1)</sup>

Sympathy with the Transvaal ran so high in the Free State by now that even Brand could not keep up to popular expectations. He had no great sympathy with the Kruger party and would have preferred to settle the Transvaal problem by an adequately representative form of government under the Union Jack. He secretly forwarded drafts of such a constitution to Frere, who gratefully passed them on to Hicks Beach.<sup>2)</sup> His Volksraad disliked his moderate attitude towards the sister republic (he was, after all, a Colonial bred and born) and "refused to hear His Honor" when he tried to oppose a resolution in which the Raad expressed itself in favour of Transvaal independence. The motion was carried by 25 votes to 7.<sup>3)</sup>

Before the end of the year, however, the Sprigg ministry gave the Colonial Office some hope that they would again take up the matter of confederation. In a minute of 15th September they informed Frere that Cetewayo's capture "made the issue of Confederation of more immediate consequence" and all that now remained was to know exactly what the Zulu settlement would be. The next day Sprigg and Upington, his Attorney-General, set off for Kimberley to hold an inspection in loco before taking up negotiations for annexation once more.<sup>4)</sup>

They had hardly left Capetown when the news of Wolseley's

settlement/

1) Hicks Beach - Life of Hicks Beach pp.171-172, 175 : "The Boer meeting broke up the day before yesterday, its last resolution being a vote of thanks passed with enthusiasm to Mr. L. Courtney M.P.! I think I have told you in previous letters that I have long had reason to believe that he was in frequent correspondence with the leaders of the malcontents. Mr. Jorissen.... is supposed to be in constant communication with Mr. Gladstone....."

"It is the moral support which the discontented party here receive from a clique at home, Mr. Froude, Courtney and the Home Rulers that induce the Boer leaders to act as they do" (Wolseley to Beach 19th December, 1879 and 28th February, 1880.)

2) Frere to Beach (Conf.) 6th and 20th Feb., 1879. (enclosures) v. Oordt - Leven van President Brand p.65.

3) v. Oordt - Paul Kruger p.274 G.H. 31/16 - Frere to Hicks Beach 23rd June, 1879 (enclosure).

4) Ibid. 16th Sept., 1879 (Telegram of even date).

settlement reached the press. If Sir Michael Hicks Beach had read the comment of the newspapers in Natal and the Colony on this "baker's dozen" settlement by the High Commissioner for South East Africa he would certainly not have been overjoyed at the ministerial minute which preceded it:

"A savage nation is now divided into a number of savage nations each leaning on the other with all the force of common blood and common traditions" was the opinion of Sprigg's mouthpiece, the "Cape Times". "We are earnest in our belief but with Sir Garnet Wolseley and John Dunn's Zulu settlement confederation would be the dream of a madman." The Natal press unanimously disapproved of the settlement. 1)

When Sprigg returned from Griqualand West he was in no mood for confederation. He penned another minute in which he took up the standpoint that the Griqualand West liabilities had been unreasonably increased since the act of 1877 was passed and that, furthermore, the Zulu settlement was wholly unsatisfactory.

Despite the fact that Hicks Beach had promised to allow the Transkeian annexations and assured the Governor that Wolseley's settlement, though not on the same lines as the policy of the Cape Colony in the Transkei "was necessarily more akin to those (measures) which your Ministers have adopted in Damaraland," Sprigg could not be persuaded to depart from his views. In a terse minute on 24th January the ministry intimated that:

"by their minute of 15th December last Ministers have indicated that in their opinion the settlement of Zululand does not rest on a satisfactory basis. It is not a settlement to which ministers would have assented had they been consulted, and they take this opportunity of intimating most respectfully, that as Her Majesty's Government were desirous that the Cape Colony, as the leading State, should move in the direction of confederation there was nothing unreasonable in the hope that the proposals for the settlement of Zululand would be submitted to the Government of the Cape Colony before they were finally carried out..."

"In approaching the subject of Confederation, Ministers desire to disencumber it of any such considerations, as are referred to in the Respatch of the 12th June with regard to the expenditure incurred by the Imperial Government in the Transkei War and

Gaika/

1) Cape Times : 16th and 18th September, 1879. Standard & Mail 18th Sept., 1879. G.H. 31/16 - Frere to Hicks Beach, 16th and 23rd Sept. 1879.

2) C. 2584 p.35 : Frere to Hicks Beach 17th Jan., 1880. Enclosure: Minute of Ministers: 15th Dec., 1879.

3) G.H. 1/31 - Hicks Beach to Frere, 20th Nov., 1879.

4) Ibid - Hicks Beach to Frere, 11th Dec., 1879.

"Baika rebellion. The two subjects are totally distinct. If the union of the various Colonies of South Africa is a desirable object, the Ministers of the leading colony recognise it as their duty to endeavour to attain it and they require no extraneous inducements to urge them to their duty. If on the other hand it should appear that such a union would not be beneficial in itself to the Cape Colony, or the other South African Colonies, then the offer to recruit any portion of the claim of war expenses that may justly be preferred against the Cape Colony by the Imperial Government would present to Ministers to take even preliminary steps towards such a union." 1)

And yet at the end of the minute Sprigg promised to bring forward a proposal in the coming session that a conference be held by representatives of the Colony, Griqualand West, Natal and the Transvaal to consider the advisability of confederation. Sprigg had thus at last committed himself, although the language of the minute certainly showed no signs of toadying to the Imperial Government.

The questions of Griqualand and the Transkei were thrashed out in the next few months with greater despatch than was formerly possible, owing to the fact that on Christmas Day 1879, the submarine telegraph between London and Capetown had come into operation at last. 2) When Parliament met on the 27th May, Sprigg inserted a paragraph in the opening speech that Griqualand West was at last to be annexed. 3) Up in Kimberley Cecil Rhodes rubbed his hands and actually wrote a long letter to Merriman. 4)

In England the last paragraph of the minute of 24th January was welcome to the Conservatives. When the British Parliament opened early in February there was actually mention of the prospect of a South African conference in the Queen's speech and Beaconsfield, politically on his last legs, made the most of this "achievement" of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to im-

press/

1) The underlining is mine.

2) c.f. Also G.H. 31/16 - Frere to Hicks Beach, 2nd march, 27th April, 1880.

De Kiewiet - Imperial Factor p.256 ff : A. 3-'80 pp.1-15 : 17, 22-24 : A. 64-'80 pp.6-7.

3) A. 1-'80.

4) Because it has never been published I have reproduced this letter. (Annexure no.8) It makes interesting reading as a picture of the rising power of the diamond companies which replaced the individual digger of the early years before 1875.

impress the House of Lords - to Sprigg's discomfiture at the  
 1) Cape. Natal was abruptly told by Hicks Beach and Kimberley  
 after him, to stop their clamour for responsible government  
 until the Cape should agree to confederation. 2) It must have  
 looked like a happy ending to Downing Street, but Cape politics  
 willed otherwise.

Sprigg's minute had not been communicated to the press, and  
 the news of his promises to Hicks Beach only transpired in the  
 middle of March, while the blue-books containing the correspond-  
 ence since 15th September were received late in May only. 3) Un-  
 officially it was known, however, what the Premier intended to  
 do, and, while the "Zuid-Afrikaan" strongly opposed the idea of  
 cloaking "confederation" under the guise of a conference, 4) Sprigg  
 was warmly received in the East. Grahamstown decorated the hall  
 where he spoke with banners bearing the legends "Confederation"  
 "Disarmament" and "Railways" and the "Journal" was as enthusiastic  
 as it had been in 1875. 5)

The news of the minute and the despatch from Hicks Beach of 11th  
 December, was the sign for an intensive campaign by the "Cape  
 Argus" which soon degenerated into an editorial dog-fight with  
 the "Cape Times", the "Zuid-Afrikaan", "Volksblad" and Merriman's  
 "Cape Post" as well as that "terrible and scurrious freak of a  
 paper which Paarl produces" biting heartily in the rear while  
 the mouthpiece of Saul Solomon fought the foe in the main battle.  
 It would be difficult, to discover in the history of South Afri-  
 can journalism, a period in which the pen was wielded with so  
 much dexterity as in these four months before June 1880. 6) The  
 question of Basuto disarmament blended to some extent with the

conference/

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- 1) Zuid-Afrikaan - 3rd March, 1880. Cape Argus - 9th March, 1880.  
 2) c.f. Theal - History of S.A. 1872-1884 II. p.209 : Hicks Beach-  
Life of Hicks Beach I. p.176. A. 47-'80 - Kimberley to Sir George  
 Colley, 27th May, 1880.  
 3) Cape Times : 22nd May, 1880.  
 4) 18th February, 1880.  
 5) Zuid-Afrikaan : 25th February, 1880 : Grahamstown Journal 8th  
 March, 1880.  
 6) c.f. Cape Times : 2nd, 23rd and 28th April; 15th, 17th, 20th and  
 22nd May; 2nd, 22nd and 23rd June; Cape Argus : 9th, 30th March;  
 3rd and 16th April; 22nd and 24th May; Volksblad : 9th March.

conference dispute and the Ministry had to "cover up" on two fronts simultaneously. Actually the debates on disarmament proved a difficult hurdle in the ensuing session and, to some degree, as important for Sprigg's security as the conference matter. Personal attacks were made by the "Cape Times" on Saul Solomon and the "Argus" glibly responded that it was easy to "Shunt the discussion of Basuto affairs into the siding of personality" and furthermore, maintained the paper, "when an article cannot be answered it is still possible to make a wild guess at the writer and to hint something terrible about his grandmother." The Sprigg minute, said the "Argus" in another place, was merely the agreement of the ministry "to submit the destinies of this colony to a conference in which six colonists shall be pitted against Sir Bartle Frere, backed by nine Imperial nominees."

In the calmer atmosphere of the East, where hardly any dissent marred the cry for a conference, the "Journal" once more smiled on Sir Michael Hicks Beach:<sup>1)</sup>

"The attitude of the Home Government is not one of compulsion towards the Colony" it assured its readers. "The sensitive independence of the Colonists is not offended by any expression which would imply that they are forced into union against their will.... Even the great stumbling-block of the native question which seemed by the terms (of the South Africa Act) to be especially contrived for Imperial intervention will not, it is evident, be allowed to form a difficulty....."

As the date of the opening of Parliament approached, activity increased; The Sprigg ministry was to be attacked first on the question of Basuto disarmament. The War with Morosi had ended in February and the last embers of the war on the Northern Border had been stamped out by the end of 1879, but there was trouble brewing in the hills of Basutoland. At the Pitso in October the chiefs had told Sprigg that he "must not take the knife out of his children's hands by force, but gently." Even now a deputa-<sup>2)</sup> tion was on its way to urge the postponement of disarmament. Solomon and his lieutenants would not let the chance slip by. If Sprigg survived the first attack, he had hopes of facing also the debate on the conference.

In/

1) Grahamstown Journal : 2nd April, 1880.

2) A. 1-'80.

In May, however, a new element entered into the situation to confound the hopes of Frere and the ministerialists - Kruger, and Joubert and Jorissen arrived in Capetown.<sup>1)</sup> The reason for their visit was not very obscure.

As early as August 1879 the Free State "Express" had advised the Transvalers to bring their cause to the Cape Parliament "where they may yet get justice and be protected against further ignominy and violence."<sup>2)</sup> At a meeting on 8th March, 1880 it was decided to make this last bid to prevent the Cape from acquiescing in a step which would rob the Transvaal of all chances of success in her agitation for independence. All further agitation was postponed while the three leaders were away.<sup>3)</sup>

After the great meeting at Wonderfontein the "Zuid-Afrikaan" had published a leader entitled "What now?". It urged the Transvalers to appeal to the Cape ministry with petitions and a carefully prepared motion, now that everything else had been tried in vain. And why not send a man to speak for them in England? The general election was soon to take place; let the Liberals add also this to the grievances "with which the Liberal platforms will shortly resound from Land's End to John o' Greats."<sup>4)</sup> It was an open secret by now that the Liberals were already hand in glove with the Transvalers and Courtney gladdened their hearts with a similar motion to those of 1877 and August 1878, in which he urged Transvaal independence.<sup>5)</sup> When the news of Gladstone's Midlothian speeches reached Capetown it sounded almost too good to be true; there was no doubt now that Gladstone would prove a powerful ally if he won the elections. An address of thanks was drafted to him, and Mr. Courtney received special mention. The "Zuid-Afrikaan" immediately prepared for another memorial to parliament.<sup>6)</sup>

When/

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1) v. Oordt - Paul Kruger pp.293-298.  
 2) Quoted by the Cape Argus : 28th August, 1879.  
 3) v. Oordt - op. cit. p.294.  
 4) Zuid-Afrikaan : 14th January, 1880.  
 5) Ibid : 14th February, 1880.  
 6) Ibid. : 28th February, 1880; Morley - Life of Gladstone II. pp.586-596. Sir Bartle Frere was furious over the Midlothian speeches and wrote a long despatch to Hicks Beach enclosing a memorandum for Gladstone in which he attacked the Liberal leader for laying both the war in Afghanistan and the disaster in Zululand

When the Marquis of Hartington further condemned the annexation and British periodicals took up the cry, Hofmeyr and his party grew even more hopeful. 1) The announcement of a "constitution" for the Transvaal which Beach had counted upon as a palliative measure for ruffled Afrikaner feelings, was passed unnoticed and the "Cape Post" dismissed it with a contemptuous remark that the grant of a constitution at this stage was "rather like the act of a man attacking a first-class conflagration with a squirt" and left it to the "Journal" to find some good in it. 2)

Gladstone's victory at the polls was not generally expected in South Africa and the joy of Afrikaners was therefore so much greater; but it was short-lived. News had filtered through that Hicks Beach and Hartington had agreed not to make the annexation a party question. This was soon confirmed, and the urgent question now arose - what would the new Liberal government do about the annexation? Gladstone had <sup>made</sup> no announcement on the matter as yet and the British Parliament was due to meet only in May. 3)

A week after the opening of the Cape parliamentary session Sprigg read a telegram in the Assembly from Lord Kimberley that the annexation would not be revoked. In the House Jan Hofmeyr sat up and exclaimed aloud "No Confederation!" It was an act of political treason on Gladstone's part. Nothing remained now but to fight with backs to the wall. 4)

In/

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5) (Contd. from p.182) at his door. He enclosed extracts from Cape newspapers to show what harm those speeches had done to his position in South Africa. In 1881 he followed up the feud with a letter to Gladstone (then Premier) in which he says *inter alia*: "I cannot hope that, whilst weighted with the cares of the whole nation, you will have time to consider whether there was any just ground for the attacks on any character I may have had for justice, humanity or intelligent devotion to public duty; but a time may come when you may have leisure to think on these things; and I may at least have put it in the power of those who come after us to judge whether I have been justly included amongst those who, in these latter days have brought ruin and disgrace on regions in which it has been my duty and my pride for forty-six years to serve my country." (all this correspondence was published in a booklet - Pamphlet no.25.)

1) Zuid-Afrikaan : 18th Feb., 6th March, 1880.

2) G.H. 1/32 - Hicks Beach, 14th January, 1880; Cape Post, 16th Jan. 1880. c.f. Walker - de Villiers p.139; Grahamstown Journal : 21st January, 1880.

3) c.f. Zuid-Afrikaan: 1st, 3rd and 27th April, 1880.

4) Cape Times : 15th May, 1880 : Hofmeyr - Life of Hofmeyr p.167.

In his disillusionment Hofmeyr could not have been expected to see in the policy of Gladstone and the Liberals anything more than another trick of "perfidious Albion." It was difficult for the colonial mind to appreciate the workings of English party politics and, in this case, to grasp the fact that Gladstone's party had gained victory by playing the Conservatives at their own game. They had adopted a new version of imperialism as their own hustings cry. Just about this time there arrived a letter in South Africa, written by John Paterson. It is the last time his name comes into the story for he was not here to do battle for confederation when Sprigg proposed his motion in June. His liner was wrecked on the way to South Africa and he was drowned off Las Palmas on 12th May, 1880. In this last letter he reviewed the position of parties in England before the election:

"Both political parties here are bidding against each other for colonial good opinion," he wrote. "The Conservatives have long made the 'Colonies' a favourite cry or watchword - the Liberals are now going in as strongly for them because the masses speak of them as the industrious man's heritage and the Liberals have taken fright and say now that the colonies are to be guarded and preserved by the whole might of the Empire."

This then was the reason perhaps why the Gladstone decided to see what Frere could do with the Cape Parliament before Downing Street should call off the confederation policy for good as far as the Liberals were concerned. In a letter to Kruger and Joubert he gave them the cold comfort that everything would be done to ensure the liberty of the Boers in the Transvaal but that this liberty "may be most easily and promptly conceded to the Transvaal as a member of a South African Confederation."

The Transvalers did not wait for explanations: their manifest duty was to wreck the conference on confederation and the Cape Parliament was already in session. On the 13th May they addressed a meeting in the Capetown Commercial Exchange, Kruger and Joubert/

1) Quoted from the "Eastern Province Herald" by the Cape Argus, 24th May, 1880.

2) Cape Times : 17th May, 1880.

3) A. 90-'80 : Kimberley to Frere, 24th June, 1880. Enclosures: Kruger and Joubert to Gladstone, 10th May, 1880. Gladstone to Kruger and Joubert, 8th June, 1880.

4) Zuid-Afrikaan : 15th May, 1880. Details of the movements of Kruger, Joubert and Jerissen are from the "Zuid-Afrikaan" unless otherwise stated.

Joubert and Jorissen making short speeches to an audience including many M.L.A.'s. On the 18th they were at Paarl where an address was presented to them and a short meeting held. With a mobility reminiscent of Mr. Froude (and, strangely enough on the same route) they proceeded to Malmesbury the next day, spent the week-end there and held a meeting on the 22nd May before returning to Capetown, where the debate on Basuto Disarmament was in full swing.<sup>1)</sup>

Saul Solomon was indeed on the <sup>same</sup> warpath with Hofmeyr and his friends; on his 62nd birthday on 25th May the little man invited the Transvalers to his Sea Point home and hospitably entertained them before they set out on the second part of their "stumping" tour, this time down the Breede River Valley. They began at Stellenbosch four days later and addressed a large and enthusiastic meeting there on 31st May. They were at Worcester on 2nd June and on the same day they attended a dinner at Montagu. Jorissen and Piet Joubert did the talking on all these occasions and Kruger usually followed on with a few epigrammatic remarks (which created perhaps a greater impression than the eloquence of his colleagues.) After a visit to Goudini they were back at Daljosaphat on the 11th June for a rest amidst the peaceful surroundings where several of the leaders of the "Patriot" movement lived.

On the following day the "Zuid-Afrikaan" opened the campaign with a long article on the undignified and precarious position

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1) Cape Times : 20th May - 2nd June, 1880. The debate arose out of a motion by T. E. Fuller, censuring the Government for this Basuto policy. The motion was eventually lost by 28-37, and uncomfortably close margin for Sprigg. The "Cape Times" as well as the opposition had sensed the crucial nature of the debate before it started. "This will be a day of battle in the House of Assembly" prophesied the ministerial organ on 20th May, "A ministry is to be stormed and that ministry is prepared to hold its position. But there are chances in war and it is quite possible that by a flank movement the opposition may be carried. Before the session began it was known that an opposition was organised. It was known that Mr. Saul Solomon was prepared to fight to the death a ministry who had overthrown his influence, it was known that Mr. Merriman would move heaven and earth to regain sweets of office; it was known that Mr. Hofmeyr would accept any alliance by means of which he might gain the chance perfecting his scheme of animosity to English institutions."

of Sir Bartle Frere. It was common knowledge that Gladstone was struggling with rebellion in his own camp. Courtney had got 86 of the Liberal M.P.'s "below the gangway" to sign a petition for the recall of Sir Bartle Frere and presented to the Prime Minister on 3rd June. This news was welcome to the Cape opposition Press, which immediately proceeded to tell its readers that the conference was a matter of life and death to the Governor and a last chance to save himself from recall. Gladstone himself admitted this in replying to a question in the Commons on 25th May.<sup>1)</sup> Frere had good reasons for his subsequent complaint that the Imperial Government had thrown him to the wolves.

In the Assembly itself the Governor's despatches in which he stated in one place that confederation came "from the colony itself" formed the theme of several questions by Fuller, Merriman and Solomon on the 17th and Sprigg in despair told them that he was not responsible for the Governor's official correspondence.

The Transvaal agitation continued in full force. Every leader of the "Zuid-Afrikaan" told the same story: wreck this conference proposal for the sake of the Transvaal, "where in thousands of homes the hope is entertained that our representatives, by refusing to have anything to do with Conference or Confederation because of the Transvaal situation, will make the British Government understand that the annexation is not only a crime but also a blunder."<sup>2)</sup>

On the 18th June Hofmeyr handed in the third petition since 1877 against annexation. This one bore 5424 signatures and was directed to the Cape Assembly, requesting that no conference be held before the Transvaal had received justice. On the same day Hofmeyr presided at a meeting of 22 members of the Assembly, convened at his house "Welgemeend".<sup>3)</sup> It was probably the first time in Cape parliamentary history that such a formidable caucus had been held on any issue. The Transvalers were present and

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1) Zuid-Afrikaan : 12th and 22nd June, 1880. Gooch - Life of Courtney p.153 ff.

2) Zuid-Afrikaan : 17th June, 1880.

3) Ibid. : 19th June, 1880. Hofmeyr - Life of Hofmeyr p.170.

had an opportunity of discussing matters with members in preparation for the great debate which was to commence on 22nd June.

At Stellenbosch Kruger and his companions appeared on the day after this meeting. The occasion was a local meeting called to discuss molasses distilling and "other important matters". Needless to say the molasses distilling got scant attention! The three visitors could now do little more than await the result of the debates and do as much "lobbying" as was possible. When Sprigg rose to move the resolution standing in his name on Tuesday 22nd June, 1880,<sup>1)</sup> Paul Kruger, Piet Joubert and Dr. Jorissen occupied places of honour "below the bar" of the House and listened with rapt attention to the debates.

In judging the outcome of this debate it must be borne in mind that Sprigg insisted from the outset that he was going to keep the conference proposals a non-party measure. Considering however, the past history of the confederation question, such a claim on his part was nothing less than a confession of defeat before he started. Sprigg's speech was well-weighed and brilliantly delivered, but if it had not lasted for 2½ hours that afternoon and another half-an-hour the next day, he might have made some converts among the waverers in the House.<sup>2)</sup> Fuller brought an amendment on the second day of the debate, changing slightly the wording of the first part of the motion and substituting in the second part nineteen instead of sixteen delegates, nine being from the Cape Colony (instead of six) to be nominated in the Legislature and elected by ballot, the three Transvaal members to be selected "in such manner as to render them representative of the People."<sup>3)</sup> The amendment was hopefully greeted by the "Cape Times" as "(stripping) the Conference of all cause of offence save to those who resist any and every attempt to arrive at a better understanding among the South African communities." Yet in the House the debate flagged and almost

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- 1) V. & P. (Ass.) 22nd June, 1880. Newton - Unification I. p.84.  
 2) Extracts quoted by Newton - Ibid. pp.71-84.  
 3) Cape Argus : 23rd June, 1880. Detail of this debate from the "Notes in the House" of the "Cape Argus".

came to an end at 10.40 p.m.; the Speaker was already on his feet when Solomon rose to ask for an adjournment with precedence. June the 24th was Merriman's day, however. For two hours he held the House under the spell of his oratory. Entering the enemy's camp he accused the supporters of the conference proposal of muzzling parliament and public opinion by removing to a body of sixteen or nineteen people what should properly be discussed in the House itself.

"Ministers with a majority behind their backs would not fail to persuade or cajole the House into adopting confederation when it had never been discussed in that House at all. That was just the object of this conference. Means were found to carry confederation in Canada. One man was promised a C.M.G., another a railway, there was evidence of it in the Blue-Books."

In Canada, continued Merriman, an "unnecessary" railway had to be constructed to bribe outlying provinces and the same would be done in South Africa. Triumphantly he pulled out all his correspondence with Goldwin Smith and read letter after letter to prove the failure of federation in Canada: Public debt had risen enormously in the period 1867-1875. In ten years of "dual government" public expenditure had risen from 1,180,000 dollars to 3,120,000 dollars. Then there was Griqualand West to be considered. It was "Naboth's vineyard" he said, using the same term that Sir William Butler applied to the Boer Republics twenty-seven years later; its annexation had been purposely postponed for three years. This ministry had no policy. It was pushing forward the conference as a "hollow sham" to force the hand of the Cape Parliament and hand it over to Downing Street. "The whole of the Colonial Secretary's speech of three hours and a half" said Merriman as a parting shot, "was a laboured apology for not daring to nail his colours to the mast." Hofmeyr followed on the last day of the debate with a powerful speech and after a model oration from Saul Solomon the "previous question" was accepted by Sprigg on 25th June.

"The Government has beaten the retreat. The Conference has

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1) Full report Zuid-Afrikaan : 29th June, 1880.

failed" announced the "Zuid-Afrikaan" with satisfaction. "Sir Bartle Frere could sum up his failure in three words. 'The annexation of the Transvaal' (annexatie der Transvaal). We congratulate Messrs. Kruger, Joubert and Jorissen." And these gentlemen on the same day sent off a letter to Leonard Courtney: 1) "In the Friday sitting of the House of Assembly the Jingo-Imperial policy received a deadly blow, to our great satisfaction because the result may lead to better understanding at home how utterly wrong and how impossible, how full of evil consequences that policy is..... They maintained Sir Bartle Frere, they denied any rights to the Transvaal, believing that the great statesman would be able to prepare the panacea for all the evils in South Africa..... We, taking it to be our duty, attempted all legal means in order to frustrate the scheme of a conference....."

"Do not wash your hands in the blood of your brethren" said Paul Kruger on his departure to Hofmeyr and the Cape Afrikaners. 2)

Three days after the conference debate W. Fleming moved a motion of confidence in the Ministry to bolster up the anomalous position of the Sprigg cabinet. It was carried in an empty House, most of the opposition choosing to absent themselves.

Merriman wrote to Goldwin Smith in explanation:

"As probably your colonial experience may have taught you a defeat on a cardinal question of policy does not involve a resignation and the next move was an abstract vote of confidence moved by a supporter and spoken to by the ministry, which was carried - of course the power of the purse is great in a country like ours and the dispensers of public works and public patronage can always command a following besides the majority of our population is one of the most conservative in the world to whom 'the Government' means some abstraction that unless something very dreadful happens they are bound to love, honour and obey. I ventured to make use of your letters in debate and I think the extracts had much weight." 3)

There remains the rather tragic aspect of this denouement to the confederation drama: the consequences for Sir Bartle Frere. He offered no excuses for the defeat of the Sprigg proposals and admitted that Afrikaner-Republican opposition had wrecked all hopes of success. Resignedly he concluded his despatch with the same thought that Froude had placed in the last paragraph of his report. He too, realised that "plants of slow growth" could not be hurried. There was no real opposition to Union, he said, "The main difficulty is the same in every case: the difficulty of ascertaining what the people who are to live under the constitution really require and of giving effect to their reasonable desires."

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1) Zuid-Afrikaan : 26th June, 1880. Hicks Beach - Life of Hicks Beach p.183; Gooch - Life of Courtney p.156.

2) Kruger - Memoirs p.91.

3) J.X. Merriman to G. Smith, 9th July, 1880. (Merriman Papers)

The Liberals showed Carnarvon's tool no mercy. Even before the end of the conference debate he was offered the indignity of a reduction in his allowances as High Commissioner.<sup>1)</sup> To this he replied on the 15th July.<sup>2)</sup> On the 3rd August he received a telegram to the effect that he was recalled. Again he pleaded his case in a long despatch.<sup>3)</sup> On the 15th September he sailed from South Africa. Few bewailed his departure and one cannot blame Frere if he took away a bitter recollection of his three years in South Africa. It was the tragic end to an official career stretching almost over half a century and it symbolised the end of the policy of confederation which, in one form or another had been present in the South African public mind and in the Cape Colony in particular, for more than a decade.

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Whether we leave the history of the confederation issue there or point to the graves below Majuba as the last evil fruits of the efforts to establish British hegemony in South Africa, makes no difference. One can safely say that the force of the federation idea was spent by the end of 1875, and that it was mainly a matter of time before it would be inevitably smothered by the effects of the refusal on the part of an ambitious Secretary of State for the Colonies to accept defeat and at the same time admit the failure in South Africa of the Conservative programme of imperial aggrandisement and consolidation.

I can do no better, at the conclusion of a study of Cape politics during the eventful ten years after 1870, than point out the main patterns of public feeling and political events which eventually caused confederation to be pigeon-holed once more as a matter of practical politics.

The line of the graph of policy started at a low level in the late Sixties with apathy in Downing Street and disinterest at the Cape. This dispassionate attitude gave way to rising

excitement/

1) G.H. 1/22 (Merriman to G. Smith, 6th July, 1880. (Merriman Papers). Kimberley to Frere, 1st June, 1880.

2) G.H. 31/16 - Frere to Kimberley, 15th July, 1880.

3) Ibid. - Frere to Kimberley, 3rd August, 1880. c.g. also Pamphlet no. 39.

excitement in the Cape Colony over the question of constitutional advance, a period which culminated in the grant of responsible government and the advent of John Molteno as first premier. The awakening coincided with active Free State interest in alliance with the Cape, such as Grey had advocated in 1859 and a hopeful (if essentially selfish) Liberal interest in the possibilities of such a union.

The annexation of the diamond fields irreparably antagonized the Free State and the unhappy controversy with the sister republic over the Keate Award further outraged republican feelings. What was more important, however, it roused Afrikaner national spirit in the Cape Colony for the first time and forced to the front the person of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr.

Then the Liberals fell in 1874. Lord Carnarvon made his great appeal in the following year for the federation of South Africa and sent Froude to the Cape Colony. From a mere objective consideration, confederation had grown into a vital principle of Downing Street policy. The line was rising steeply in sympathy with widespread public interest throughout South Africa and Conservative imperialism in England.

The constitutionalism of Molteno proved a spanner in the works. By the end of 1875 Carnarvon's bolt was shot. Even with the help of Afrikaners of the Colony he could not persuade the leading community in South Africa to come into line with Imperial wishes.

Then came Sir Bartle Frere. The line was quivering at the lower level to which it had fallen after the apex of 1875, the level of the Permissive Federation Bill. But in April, 1877, with the coup d'etat in the Transvaal, confederation was doomed to failure. The curve was falling under the pressure of Afrikaner hostility and gathering clouds in Europe which distracted the attention of the Beaconsfield cabinet from the problems of South Africa. Downing Street was on the defensive and stayed with its back to the wall, as far as South Africa was concerned, till August 1881 when the Transvaal was once more left to its

own devices after four years of resistance to British authority. First came the Gaika-Galeca War, six months later the Zulu War and rebellion in Basutoland followed by a fringe of insurrection against the Cape Colony on the Northern Border and a costly war for the Imperial Government in Griqualand West. The Conservatives tore their hair at these "wretched Kaffir quarrels" and denounced Frere. Sprigg fought shy of the half-buried but ever recrudescing idea of confederation. The treasury had been empty and when handed to him by Molteno and he was determined not to pay for wars in Griqualand West. Sir Bartle Frere shook his head at the unreasonable policy pursued in the Transvaal yet publicly endorsed it because he could not do otherwise. The Afrikaners swore undying opposition to a confederation unless the Transvaal entered it as an independent partner.

Hicks Beach determined to force up the line of policy with a spasmodic jerk in July 1879, with unencouraging results. Confederation was by this time no longer claimed to be a panacea for South African ills but a means of assuaging the tempers at the British Treasury.

And then came the reaping of the whirlwind. Afrikaner sentiment, with all the force it had gathered through three years of compassion with the Transvalers, wrecked the forlorn attempts of the Sprigg ministry to infuse new breath into the five-year old pet policy of the Conservatives, with which the Liberals were making a last experiment. The influence of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr and his followers was never recognised at Downing Street in these years after 1870. Indeed, I believe no historian has yet attached enough importance to the role these men played; and yet they shaped the destinies of confederation ever since the arrival of the first despatch of Carnarvon in 1875.

Taken in conjunction with the manifold other factors in Cape politics, these men made such a significant contribution to events of the day that even the particular attention paid to their activities in these pages is inadequate.

ANNEXURE NO. I.Lord Carnarvon to Sir Henry Barkly, 4th May, 1875.

Sir,

It has been impossible for me in considering the many difficult questions connected with South African affairs, which have unceasingly demanded my attention since I assumed the seals of this office, not to be struck with the great and serious disadvantages whether in regard of security from disorder or of material progress, under which the several Colonies and States are placed through the absence of any defined and consistent policy governing questions of vital interest to all.

(2) Up to the present time it has from many causes been difficult for the Government's capital of South Africa to make any effectual approach towards a clear and complete understanding of many points. Their isolation from each other, the diversity of the interests in which people actively engaged in settling and developing new countries are necessarily absorbed and the existence in some cases of questions as to the ownership or boundaries of territories which have not proved easy of adjustment, have, with other disturbing causes, retarded the approximation which is so much to be desired.

(3) You are well aware that those who have considered most deeply the requirements and prospects of South Africa and are best able to comprehend them, have for some time past been of opinion that circumstances are becoming favourable to a better understanding and more uniform course of action on several very important subjects and indeed that there are some the joint consideration of which cannot with safety be any longer postponed.

(4) Recent occurrences in Natal have brought the question of the consideration and treatment of the native population throughout South Africa into the foremost rank of questions which especially demand uniformity of treatment. I need not now recapitulate the principal characteristics of the native policy which prevails under each Government they are familiar to those to whom this despatch will be of more immediate interest and it may be sufficient for me here to say that while I believe the policy of each Government to present features which may be studied with advantage, there is a real and serious inconvenience, containing the germs of a great danger, in the continued maintenance in close proximity of widely differing systems of native treatment.

(5) As long as the natives, who are shrewd observers in such matters, perceive that the comparatively small European population of South Africa is divided under a number of Governments which not only are not in close and cordial relations with each other in regard either to native questions or to any other matters but are in some cases estranged by controversies which are sometimes sustained with only too much warmth, they are at the mercy of factious intriguers and are ready to listen to suggestions as to their power of combining successfully against the disunited European Governments.

(6) The result is that there exists a distinct danger - though it is not, I trust, imminent - of widely extended dissatisfaction which, if circumstances lent themselves to it, it might be difficult to subdue. Even in the absence of any threatening combination each Government is required, in order to maintain order among the natives within its own territory and to guard against possible attacks from those without, to expend on police and other defensive organization an amount of anxious thought, as well as of money, which might be better devoted to the general advancement of the community.

(7) It is then, with regard to the native question that I conceive it to be most urgent at the present moment that there should be a free and friendly interchange of opinions among the neighbouring Governments of South Africa; and if it were for the consideration of this question alone, I should conceive that the assembling of a conference such as I am about to propose, of representatives of the colonies and states, would be productive

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of the greatest advantage.

(8) But there are other matters of importance and urgency, such as the sale of arms and ammunition, the arrest and surrender of criminals, as well as minor territorial questions which might be beneficially discussed and more particularly the present position of Griqualand West presses very urgently for a careful consideration in its financial, administrative and political aspects; and the Province is so closely connected in its relations with both the Cape Colony and the Dutch States, that I would gladly be made acquainted with the opinions of those who are locally conversant with all the details of so important a subject.

(9) For these reasons Her Majesty's Government is desirous that a conference of delegates, representing the Colony of Natal, the Province of Griqualand West, the Orange Free State, the South African Republic and the Eastern and Western Province of the Cape, under such presidency and with such assistance as Her Majesty's Government can give, should meet at the earliest practicable time at some convenient place within the Cape Colony for the discussion of Native Policy and of such other questions as it may be agreed upon to bring before the conference.

(10) With regard to the delegates which should represent this country and the British Dependencies in South Africa at such Conference, and more particularly with regard to the person who should preside over its deliberations, I have felt some difficulty in forming a definite opinion, but I will state the general view which I entertain as to its constitution.

(11) For many reasons I should be glad if it could be presided over by yourself. Your great knowledge of South African Affairs, the temperate manner in which you have conducted your discussion with the presidency of the neighbouring republics, the confidence which Her Majesty's Government can place in your tried ability and experience, and the position which you hold, would indicate you to be the most suitable person to be President of such a Conference.

(12) But I am very reluctant to desire you in express terms to assume this function, as I feel that no one but yourself can judge whether this onerous duty should be added to the burdens and responsibilities which you already have to bear. I leave it therefore entirely to your decision whether you should join the conference which you can hardly do in any other than the chief capacity, that of President. If, after fully considering the matter, you determine that it will be preferable that you should not undertake this service I am disposed to think that the Deputy High Commissioner Sir Arthur Cunynghame, would best fill the office.

(13) As the representative of this country on the conference I do not think that it would be possible to find any person so highly qualified as Mr. Froude, to whose very eminent abilities and high reputation are added (most fortunately for all parties) an extended knowledge of and a strong interest in colonial subjects, and who has recently given much attention to the affairs of South Africa. It has given me much pleasure to learn that Mr. Froude has decided to revisit the Cape and is willing to take a part in these negotiations.

(14) As Representative of the Western Province of the Cape the name of Mr. Molteno obviously suggests itself. His position as first Minister renders him the proper exponent of the views of your Government and I sincerely trust that he may be able to give the conference the advantage of his great ability and knowledge. For the Eastern Province, I should be disposed to think that an excellent representative will be found in Mr. Paterson of whose fitness for such a duty I have been lent to form a high opinion. As regards these two gentlemen, I do not wish to seem to dictate their appointment to this conference, should, for any reason other names be generally desired. My object is to secure the services in this the most important question of public men who will truly understand and express the opinions of those communities which they represent; and I mention the names of Mr. Molteno and Mr. Paterson because I believe them from their ability and personal standing, to be such as I have indicated.

(15) In the case of Natal I can have no hesitation in designating Mr. Shepstone of whose high qualities it would be superfluous to/

to speak. Griqualand West also needs a representative. On Mr. Southey's character and ability it is unnecessary that I should dwell. If his duties prevent him from serving on the conference, or if it should not be in accordance with his wish to do so Mr. Recorder Barry would appear to me to be very suitable. Failing both of these gentlemen I should prefer to consider further before nominating a representative of this Province. With regard to the representatives who may be selected on behalf of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal Republic I do not, of course, venture to indicate an opinion. I do not doubt they will be chosen not only with regard to character and ability, but also to that conciliatory temper, without which such a conference as this now proposed can be of little public advantage.

(16) It will, of course, be clearly understood that this conference will meet to deliberate and report, but not to take any action upon the subjects which might come before it. I do not desire to suggest any closer restriction of subjects, as it appears to me that it would be unadvisable to exclude any important question of common interest which the majority of the Commission may think it desirable to discuss. As I have already said, the more immediate benefits which I should look for would be some satisfactory understanding as to native policy but if in the free exchange of communications between the representatives of the various states concerned, the all-important question of a possible union of South Africa in some form of confederation should arise Her Majesty's Government will readily give their earnest and favourable attention to any suggestion that may be made. Assuming always a due regard to certain considerations of Imperial and native policy, on which I should apprehend no serious conflict of opinion, this great object is one to the achievement of which Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to contribute their best and most cordial assistance. It is a measure which, in their opinion, would tend to develop the prosperity of South Africa, to sweep away many subjects of prolonged and unfruitful discussion and to knit together the scattered communities of European race into a powerful and harmonious union, valuable alike for the interests of themselves and of the whole Empire. I need only further observe on this head that I can see no reason why, in the event of such a confederation, the form of Government in each state or province should necessarily be uniform, or why the Local Governments might not be conducted on different systems, all this would be matter for consideration and arrangement, should the general question be favourably received on the spot, and be then brought under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

I only desire to add - and there must be no misapprehension on this point - that the action of all parties, whether the British colonies or the Dutch states, must be spontaneous and uncontrolled. It is a question for them to decide whether it is for their interests to enter into such a union, and I desire to place no pressure on that decision.

(17) It is my desire that after considering this despatch in conjunction with your Ministers, you should send copies of it to the Presidents of the Republics and to the Governments of Natal and Griqualand West with a friendly invitation to take the subjects of it into their early and favourable consideration; and that you should endeavour to arrange for the opening of the Conference without delay. If, unfortunately, either of the Republics should hesitate to send a representative, the President should be assured that, the object being purely friendly, there will be no desire to take advantage of the absence of a delegate from the State, but, on the contrary, it will be consulted at later stages. But I sincerely trust that the proposals which I am now making will be accepted in the spirit in which they are offered.

(18) And while I am sanguine enough to hope that great practical results may be obtained through this conference, I feel that no small benefit will in any case accrue from the opportunity of unrestricted exchange of opinion and comparison of experience which it will afford and it is not too much to expect that many difficulties which may have arisen in a great degree from a want of a thorough mutual understanding will prove to have no real foundation, and will be affectually dispelled.

(19) I request you to give the fullest publicity to this Despatch

Despatch without delay as I desire all of whom it is of interest should understand precisely what it is that Her Majesty's Government have in view.

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ANNEXURE NO. 2.

Lord Carnarvon to Sir Henry Barkly, 15th July, 1875.

Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Despatch no. 76 of the 14th June on the subject of the Conference which, in my Despatch of the 4th May I had suggested for the purpose of considering certain questions of importance to South Africa generally.

(2) In this despatch you have transmitted to me a copy of a Minute with which your Ministers thought it expedient to accompany my Despatch in presenting it to Parliament and I have had an opportunity of reading a report of the Debate in the House of Assembly on a motion approving of that Minute.

(3) It would have been a great assistance to me, if, as is usual in the larger Colonies under Responsible Government when an important communication is received from Her Majesty's Government, which for any reason the Colonial Ministers may think open to exception your advisers had placed in your hands for transmission to me a statement of the course taken by them on this occasion; and I regret that it should not have occurred to you to remind them of the convenience of this practice (No such practice existed in my day in Australia - H.C.B.) In the absence of any such communication I am obliged to have recourse to a report of a debate conducted with some warmth, (in which it was of course not likely that the most accurate and deliberate language would in all cases be used) for an explanation of the considerations which led your Government to give a less favourable reception to my proposals than I perhaps had reason to anticipate. It is of course my desire to maintain a complete and friendly understanding on all matters with your Advisers whose attention on recent occasion to the views and wishes of Her Majesty's Government I have lately had pleasure in acknowledging and I am confident that they will concur with me in desiring that as far as practicable all misapprehensions on this question should be removed.

(4) On referring then on an interpretation of the Minute, to the report at the Debate, and principally, as I am bound to do, to the speech of Mr. Moltano, the Colonial Secretary, I find that a construction has been placed upon some portions of my Despatch which a more careful perusal of it would have shown to be contrary not only to its whole intention but to the language actually used. Although it is probable that the great interest necessarily felt in the subjects to which I have directed attention will before now have caused the terms of my proposal to be more closely examined, I feel it important at once to show that the mistakes which appear to have arisen might have been avoided.

(5) I observe in the first place that exceptions taken in the Minute to the suggestion which I had made that the Western and Eastern Provinces of the Cape should be separately represented at the Conference. I am glad to learn that there is now no longer any practical difficulty in satisfying the requirements of the two Provinces under one administration and I doubt not that this is largely due to the prudence and ability with which public affairs have been conducted by your Ministers since their accession to office. But I am unable to perceive that it would have been right for me, on an occasion in which important constitutional points were under consideration, to ignore the fact that when the question of Federation was raised no longer ago than 1871, Mr. Moltano moved a Resolution to the effect that the Colony should be divided into three or more Provincial Governments and that in the Commission which you subsequently appointed to enquire into this question you were careful to provide for the equal representation of the Eastern/

Eastern and Western Provinces. Nor could I forget that in replying to a very urgent appeal for the separation of the Eastern from the Western Province my Predecessor had, in 1873 referred to possibility of placing each of the great divisions of the Colony under a Provincial Government subordinate to a General Legislature. The distinction whether ultimately maintained or not between the Provinces, could not indeed fail to present for consideration whenever Confederation might be under discussion and I see no reason to fear any inconvenience from my having alluded to it, but I attach no special value to a separate representation of these or any other Districts should the general feeling of the Colony be adverse to it, and I should have most readily acquiesced in the suggestion that a united representation (of these or any other Districts) of the Cape Colony would now be preferable.

(6) The Minute proceeds however a principle with which I am less able to concur. I do not think it possible to admit that any one party among those invited to a Conference can have any claim to decide what proportion the number of its delegates should bear to the whole number of representatives to be assembled. (How was the number arranged in Conference in Canada - H.C.B.) In assigning two representatives to the Cape Colony and one only to the other Colonies and States, I had desired to do full justice to the interests of the Cape, and I hope that on further consideration your Ministers will feel able to look upon this as a point which not only is commonly felt but of right belongs to that Central and Imperial authority, upon which, from its position, the duty of endeavouring to bring all parties together naturally devolved.

(7) Mr. Molteno is reported to have referred in his speech to what he considered the extraordinary step taken by me in appointing delegates to attend a Conference on behalf of a Colony which is possessed of Responsible Government. It might perhaps have been better if I had abstained in the first instance from suggesting any names, but not expecting that objections on points of detail would interfere with the fair consideration of a question so large and important as this, and in order to explain more precisely what I had in view, I gave a sketch of the Conference as it seemed to me that it might perhaps be actually constituted. I feel however that I am entitled to ask attention to the fourteenth paragraph of my Despatch of the 4th May in which I took special pains to guard myself against being considered to assume to decide a matter which is obviously one for the consideration of the Colonial Legislature. (But the publication of names did virtually decide - H.C.B.)

(8) After suggesting but by no means nominating or "appointing" Mr. Molteno, the Prime Minister of the Colony and Mr. Paterson a very leading member of the House of Assembly as persons who appeared to me to be suitable I use the following words "As regards these two gentlemen I do not wish to seem to dictate their appointment to this conference, should, for any reason other names be more generally desired. My object is to secure the service in this most important question of public men who will truly understand and express the opinions of those communities which they represent; and I mention the names of Mr. Molteno and Mr. Paterson because I believe them, from ability and personal standing to be such as I have indicated." I hardly know in what manner I could have more elaborately expressed my desire to avoid anything like dictation or how the selection of representatives can be said (as in the Minute of your Ministers) not to have been left to the free action and judgment of the Cape Colony, should it be desired to substitute any other names for those I ventured to suggest.

(9) It was I observe further frequently urged in support of Mr. Molteno's view that the proposal for a conference, if any were to be held, should have originated with the Cape Government. and that the power of self-government which has been accorded to the Cape Colonists has been violated by the Imperial Government originating such a proposal I trust it is needless for me to say that there is no one more anxious than I am to respect and support the right of the Colonies to exercise an uncontrolled discretion in the administration of their internal affairs when once it has

been deemed advisable that they should be placed under Responsible Government. But on the other hand I cannot be strongly and distinctly protest against any such doctrine as that Her Majesty's Government in courteously inviting a group of Colonial Governments and Independent States to deliberate upon questions of common interest, because they do not previously obtain the consent of one single member of that group to such a proposal, therefore infringe the rights of that Government, should it not approve of the invitation. It has of course been my strong desire that the great and important Colony over which you preside should take a part, and I may say a leading part, in a Conference at which so great a question as the Confederation of some or all of the Governments of South Africa would probably receive serious discussion. But Her Majesty's Government are alone in a position to invite communities wholly independent of each other to meet and to confer, and if it were not convenient to the Government or Parliament of the Cape (or of any other Colony or State) to accept such an invitation it might I think have sufficed to give me a friendly intimation to that effect. As I was careful to explain in my former despatch the action of each party would have been uncontrolled and I should have desired to place no pressure on its decision.

(10) I am nevertheless not without hope that your Government and Legislature may upon a more mature consideration of the whole question than was possible at the very early moment at which its discussion was pressed upon the House of Assembly, feel disposed to take part in a conference which I still trust may meet this year. I am well aware that so great a work as the Confederation of South Africa is not likely to be speedily completed and it may be some time before even two or three of the Colonies and States can agree upon a union which Her Majesty's Government can sanction. But that is no reason why any two or more who may agree to do so should not enter upon consideration of the subject.

(11) In the tenth paragraph of your despatch of the 14th June, you say that in the position in which matters now stand it does not appear to you that any advantage would accrue from your communicating with the other Colonies and States, and that you will await fresh instructions from me before proceeding any further.

(12) I trust that I am not to infer from these words that you have not formally communicated my despatch to the Presidents and Lieutenant-Governors, as considering that it has been published and fairly discussed they were entitled to receive it at once in an official manner; and it was in consideration of the position which you hold as Her Majesty's High Commissioner as well as Governor that I prefer to make the communication through you, but the time and manner of doing this was not a matter left open to your discretion or to be decided by the advice of the Ministers of one Colony. But if your Government should continue to be able to take part in a Conference, and if after the views of the other Governments have been ascertained it is found that a Conference may with advantage be held between one or more of the Republics, the Colony of Natal and the Province of Griqualand West, it will obviously be undesirable that such a Conference should be held within the Cape Colony and it will also be preferable that you (and probably that Sir Arthur Cunynghame whose duties lie principally within the Cape) should not preside over it. In such case you will be pleased to confer with Sir Henry Bulwer and inform him that I desire that the instructions which I have given to you should for present purposes and as far as they may be applicable be considered to be addressed to him; and that he should arrange and preside over the meeting of such a conference as may be determined upon.

(13) There are at the present moment some very important matters more immediately affecting the Transvaal Republic and Natal as to which I should anticipate much benefit from an interchange of opinion, such as the result of the arbitration respecting Delagoa Bay, the course to be taken in consequence of the award and the hostile attitude of the Zulus. Other questions of more direct interest to the Cape Colony would probably be touched upon in the course of any discussions that may take place, and it will of course be my desire that the views of the Cape Government even though absent from the Conference on any such questions should be fully

considered/

considered by Her Majesty's Government at such time and in such manner as may be most convenient.

(14) I request you to assure your Ministers that in entering at length into an examination of the proceedings which follow the receipt of my Despatch of May 4th, I have been actuated by no desire to question or limit their discretion in any matter as to which they are responsible. My object has rather been to explain to them (as it is very convenient to do thus early after the introduction of Responsible Government) the limits within which the authority and jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Government on the one hand and of a Colonial Government on the other have been in other cases advantageously exercised and I feel much confidence that whatsoever differences of opinion may exist (and they must frequently occur as to questions of policy your advisers will at least do me the justice of believing that I should not bring forward large proposals seriously affecting the interests of their Colony without a strong conviction that their consideration has become necessary, while on the other hand I shall always be ready to allow to their opinions that weight to which they are entitled on account of the ability with which they have administered their local affairs.

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ANNEXURE NO. 3.

Minute of Sir Henry Barkly to Ministers.

In communicating this despatch to Ministers and inviting their special attention to the assurances directed by Ld. Carnarvon in the 14th paragraph to be given them, the Governor would suggest that it is by no means too late to rectify the omission of which his Lordship complains in Par. 3 by furnishing a statement in explanation of the course they felt it their duty to adopt on receipt of the Despatch of 4th May. The opportunity might at the same time be taken of affording some distinct indication of the views which Ministers entertain in regard to the introduction of a more uniform system of policy as to Native Affairs and likewise as to a Confederation of the South African States and of the course they are prepared to pursue with regard to these questions in the future.

Henry Barkly  
Governor.

Kimberley  
19 August 1875.

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ANNEXURE NO. 4

Lord Carnarvon to Sir Henry Barkly, 22nd October, 1875.

Sir,

I have received with much satisfaction and indeed I may say with great personal gratification the accounts which principally through the reports of the Colonial press have reached me, evincing the deep interest which is felt throughout the Colony in my proposals for a Conference between the Governments of South Africa; more especially as affecting the great question of Confederation.

The remarkable expression of feeling which has been elicited may be considered to have by this time sufficiently attained its object and it may now be convenient to bring to its legitimate conclusion an agitation which cannot with advantage be indefinitely prolonged.

(2) I approve therefore of the course taken by you under the advice of your Ministers in summoning Parliament to hold without delay a special session for the purpose of considering the subject which principally occupies the attention of the country and which cannot elsewhere be so adequately and authoritatively discussed.

(3)

(3) On the probable decision of the Parliament as affecting local parties, I do not desire to speculate; and it is I am confident, unnecessary for me to say that I have no personal feeling in such a matter. Whatever may be in this respect the result, I cannot suppose that Parliament will fail to be in accord with the opinion of the Country.

If however from any cause there should appear to be a divergence between the decision of Parliament and the wishes of the Community on a question of so great public importance you will not need to be reminded by me that the true Constitutional course will be (when ever it can properly be taken) to dissolve the Parliament and remit the question to the final and supreme appeal of the Constituencies of the Colony.

(4) But whatever may follow upon the debates in Parliament, there is another proceeding which has suggested itself to me. It appears to me not improbable that the great amount of discussion which has been given throughout the Colony to the question of confederation may be held to have fulfilled most of the purposes of that preliminary Conference which I had originally suggested, and it may be thought, as I myself am becoming disposed to think, that the time has arrived when Her Majesty's Government should more specifically explain the general principles upon which they are of opinion that the Native policy of the future should be based and the terms and conditions upon which they conceive that a Confederation might be effectively organized.

(5) If it should be considered that the time for such explanations has come, it will deserve much consideration whether a full and satisfactory understanding may not be best attained by a meeting in this country of those persons who are especially able to lay before Her Majesty's Government the views and requirements of the different communities of South Africa.

(6) I shall probably address you further on this point at an early date, but I may now add that whether or no such a meeting as I have just indicated should take place, it is not impossible that I may find it desirable to request either you or Mr. Froude, or possibly both to proceed to this country and confer with me on many points as to which it is impossible to arrive at a complete understanding by correspondence.

(7) I request you to lay this despatch before Parliament or otherwise to give it full publicity, as soon as possible.

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ANNEXURE NO. 5.

Lord Carnarvon to Sir Henry Barkly, 15th November, 1875.

Sir,

Since writing my Despatch no. 111 of the 22nd October, in the concluding portion of which I intimated that I would before long address you further with reference to the possible expediency of holding in this Country a meeting of those persons who might be best qualified to represent the views of the South African Colonies and States on the Subject of Confederation, I have given much consideration to this point, and although I am of course unaware of the decision which may be (or indeed perhaps has been by this time) arrived at by the Cape Legislature with respect to my proposals, I think there can be no disadvantage while there may be some convenience, in my at once communicating to you the further conclusions which I have, as at present advised been let to form on the subject.

(2) I may again repeat, although it is I hope unnecessary for me to do so, that what I write with respect to the holding of a conference is in the nature of a suggestion to which I would invite the attention of Cape Government and Parliament as well as of the other Colonies and States; and in arriving at a decision on the grave questions which would come under consideration, the extent to which the interests of each community must be left to the Government which is responsible to it will have to be carefully borne in mind. Whatever then may be the decision of the Cape Parliament, whether/

whether on the one hand they may decide thus that the Cape Colony shall take part in a Conference or whether they may determine to stand aloof from any such meeting, it will at least be clear thus when the Legislature has pronounced its opinion that a distinct stage in the proceedings will have been completed and that it will be expedient to consider carefully and deliberately what should be the next step.

(3) My present opinion, subject of course to those local contingencies which at this distance from the Colony I cannot anticipate and which may unexpectedly occur to affect it, is that for several weighty reasons the first meeting of the Delegates from those communities which desire to be represented would be more advantageously held in this Country than in any part of South Africa. There are as I observed in my previous Despatch subjects on which the views of Her Majesty's Government must be pronounced and questions which must be answered before any Government or Legislature in South Africa can be fairly asked to adopt a definite scheme of Confederation. These explanations it would be almost impossible to give or obtain satisfactorily through the medium of despatches even if we possess the great advantage which is unfortunately wanting of telegraphic communication with the Cape, and it would be equally impossible for Her Majesty's Government to invest any person or persons with either plenary powers or adequate instructions on which he or they could safely act without further reference to this country.

(4) If however the Representatives were to meet here it would be possible for me from time to time to communicate in person with them collectively or with any one of them who might desire information on some point especially affecting the interest or circumstances of this government. The advantage of this was found to be very great when the details of the Canadian Confederation were being settled and looking to the peculiar conditions under which a similar undertaking is now being approached I think it will not be questioned that much doubt and misunderstanding will be cleared away if it is made possible to dispose speedily and summarily of many points as soon as they arise.

(5) I learn that the President of the Orange Free State, perhaps not unnaturally from his point-of-view continues to feel doubtful how far his government can take part in a meeting the presence at which of a Representative of Griqualand West would appear to be to him to prejudge some part at all events of the questions connected with this Province as to which it is desired to come to an agreement with him. This is perhaps another of those subjects which would cease to present a practical difficulty if the Conference were assembled in this country. Looking to the excellent advice which they could still command though in a less formal manner, and looking also to the essentially provisional position and character of the Administration which Her Majesty has been pleased within the last few weeks to substitute in Griqualand West for its former Government, Her Majesty's Government could if it were thought desirable, dispense with the presence of a special representative from the Province and could themselves decide how far the questions at issue with the Free State should come before the Conference or should be dealt with by direct communication with Mr. Brand, who I hope would himself undertake a duty which no one else could so adequately discharge.

(6) If then it should prove to be in accordance with the wishes of those principally concerned that the Conference should at a convenient time be held in London and if the Cape takes part in it, it will be for your Government who will have fully ascertained the feelings of their Parliament to select the two persons whom, having regard to the extent and the variety of interests involved it would, I still presume, be the desire of the Colony to send as their Representatives. The representation of Her Majesty's Government and of Natal is a matter on which I need not of course here enter.

(7) I would only say in conclusion that I am decidedly of opinion that the first Conference will be able to do more than deliberate and report to the Governments and Legislatures represented at it. There need be no apprehension that any Colony or State which takes part in it can be finally bound either by the conclusions at which the majority may arrive or even by the acts or votes of its representatives. But I am not without hope that such a basis of

general agreement would be arrived at as to satisfy the several Legislatures that it is both safe and desirable to confederate on terms not very dissimilar from those adopted by the Provinces which now constitute the great Dominion of Canada.

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ANNEXURE NO. 6.

Lord Carnarvon to Sir Henry Barkly, 24th January, 1876.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatches no.154 of the 16th November and no.158 of the 24th November, in which you report the further proceedings of the two Houses of the Cape Parliament in the Special Session convened for the purpose of considering my proposal for a Conference of the South African Colonies and States.

(2) In the first of these despatches you transmit to me an Address adopted by the Legislative Council, declaring that the conference is desirable, and that it is of the utmost importance to the Cape Colony that it should be represented at it; and you report the commencement and adjournment in the House of Assembly of a debate arising out of Mr. Molteno's notice of motion.

(3) In the other Despatch you inform me that after eight days discussion decisive divisions were taken, and that the Colonial Secretary's Motion having been first got rid of, that of Mr. Watermeyer, in favour of appointing Delegates to represent the Colony at a Conference, was next negative by 35 to 22 Votes and finally Mr. Solomon's amendment which then became the main question, was adopted by 36 to 22. I have further had the advantage of perusing the Report of the Debates as given in the Colonial Newspapers and I may here be permitted to express my (appreciation) of the ability with which, on the part of many of the Speakers, these discussions have been conducted.

(4) In thus reviewing the circumstances of this debate and with every desire to touch as lightly as possible on some of its incidents, I cannot entirely avoid all allusion to the motion of which Mr. Molteno gave notice immediately after the delivery of your opening Speech, and to the terms of which I found myself bound (in my Despatch no.142 of 7 December) to say that I should be compelled to take exception. I observe, however, that, on reflection, the language of the resolution was, no doubt through a conviction of its impropriety, modified, and I will therefore say little more than that I greatly regret that a gentleman holding the Queen's Commission as the leader of the Government in a very important Colony should have so imperfectly comprehended the nature and obligations of his position as to feel able to subscribe his name to a Resolution reflecting so seriously on the servants of the Queen in this Country, and charging them with conduct which, if it could be substantiated, would make them, in my opinion, unworthy of advising the Crown on this or any subject.

(5) I am aware of Mr. Molteno's ability, and of the position which he holds in the estimation of his fellow subjects in the Cape Colony and I think it can only have been from a failure to understand the relations which must, both in language and in practice, subsist between the Imperial Government and the Officers of the Colonial Government that the terms of his motion were such as one, to the best of my belief, without parallel or precedent even in cases which have been far more open to controversy than this can be said to be, and for obvious reasons are not adopted by persons continuing to hold office in Colonies under the representatives of the Queen.

(6) The recent prolonged discussions, however, both in and out of Parliament, will, I doubt not, have greatly contributed to explain many to whom the subject was not familiar the true character and limits of Ministerial responsibility in a Colony under Respon-  
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Responsible Government, and, passing at once to the motion itself, it is my first duty to place it on record that nothing unconstitutional has been done or contemplated by Her Majesty's Government, not has any "agitation been created and encouraged by them or in their name in opposition to the Colonial Government."

(7) These words, which are those of Mr. Molteno's motion, whether as originally drawn up or as amended, were of course, directed against Mr. Froude and while I think it on the whole fair to that gentleman to leave it to him to explain (as he does very fully and ably in his report to me, of which a copy will be transmitted to you among the papers that will be laid before Parliament) the part which he has taken in these proceedings, it appears desirable that I should here state what has been his true position with reference to myself and to Her Majesty's Government.

(8) In the 13th paragraph of my Despatch of the 4th May last I stated that "it had given me much pleasure to learn that Mr. Froude had decided to revisit the Cape, and was willing to take a part in the Conference" at which I proposed he should represent this country. In the event, then, of a conference being assembled, Mr. Froude would have occupied the position of a representative of Her Majesty's Government, but as no conference has as yet been agreed upon he has of course at no time assumed any such function or responsibility. He has possessed from first to last my full confidence, accorded to him no less on account of his high character and ability, than because of the unhesitating earnestness with which he has contended for the promotion of South African interests and his general concurrence in my view of the manner in which those interests could best be advanced; and whilst unfettered in the exercise of his own discretion as to the events of the moment with regard to which it is obvious that I could not give and for which I purposely abstained from giving detailed instructions, he has been able to explain the general tenor of my wishes and objects with an eloquence and fulness and ability to which hereafter, if not now, ample credit will be given. And now that his visit has terminated, I gladly take this opportunity to express my recognition of the great and lasting benefit which he has conferred upon South Africa by his untiring energy, by the high qualities which he has brought to bear on the particular question of the time; under circumstances of peculiar difficulty and by the clear and forcible manner in which, on many occasions he has inculcated a policy and principles not unnaturally lost sight of by many under the more immediate pressure of local questions. And if indeed he has been misunderstood and misrepresented in some quarters, I trust that he will have been well rewarded by the knowledge that he was taking part in no common or insignificant question; and by the consciousness of having done his utmost to render those measures in which he has been engaged really beneficial to all concerned in them, of whatever nationality or race.

(9) Nor ought I here to be silent on another point which, as I am aware, has excited some attention. During the course of local discussion every kind of position, duty and function has been attributed to Mr. Froude, motives have been freely imagined, and many suppositions have been entertained, which a little enquiry would have easily removed. It might, however have been known by anyone who cared to ascertain the fact, that Mr. Froude has acted in no capacity beyond that already indicated and has received, in the strict sense of the word, no official instructions and further that no formal correspondence has passed between him and this Department, for this reason, because I felt that all such correspondence ought to pass through you as the representative of the Crown, and as the legitimate adviser of Her Majesty's Government. I have therefore throughout the discussion of this question addressed my Despatches solely to you with the request that you would communicate them to Mr. Froude as well as to your Ministers.

(10) I was thus abundantly observant of the consideration due to the Responsible Ministers of the principal dependency of the Crown in South Africa and to care that they should, if they thought fit, be the channel through which the views of Her Majesty's Government might be made known to the people of the Cape Colony. But as the subjects to which my Despatches related did not concern the Cape

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only I did not think it right to leave it to your Advisers to decide whether, or when, they should be published and I accordingly directed you to publish them at once for the general information of the various Communities of South Africa.

(11) The circumstances of the case would have fully justified this course, even if you had not, in addition to the Office of Governor of the Cape Colony, held that of Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa, in which capacity you are the ordinary and recognised means of communication between Her Majesty's Government and the neighbouring Republics and in the discharge of which you are responsible to them alone. I am afraid however that it may not at all times have been sufficiently remembered that your duties as High Commissioner cannot be subordinated to the local policy of your advisers, and that even in matters affecting the Cape alone you have obligations to Her Majesty's Government which no Colonial Minister can expect you to overlook.

(12) But however this may be, after the publication of my despatches, it soon became apparent that the true nature and object of my proposals was being misrepresented, and when Mr. Froude was strongly pressed in many quarters to explain what he understood to be the real meaning, I consider not only that he was through the independence of his position, perfectly free to give such explanations as might appear to him to be necessary at a very critical moment, but he would have done wrong had he refused them. On the other hand I equally approve of his having declined repeated invitations of this nature after his construction of my objects had been sufficiently made known, whatever might be the local disappointment felt or expressed at his absence from public meetings held for the purpose of discussing these questions.

(13) In short, being fully satisfied that no unconstitutional agitation has been carried on within the Cape Colony in connection with this question, I cannot but express my regret that expressions which, although indirectly, implied such a fact, were retained in the amendment adopted by the Assembly on the motion of Mr. Solomon. They are not consistent with the facts of the case, nor, as far as I understand the debate, with the general spirit in which this amendment was moved, and if so they are, I venture to think, hardly worthy of the temper in which such a controversy as this deserve to be conducted. As however that amendment concludes with an offer to assist Her Majesty's Government in a matter of grave importance on which the Assembly has since the establishment of Responsible Government shown much indisposition to take any action I gladly assume that its general intention is friendly, and in that feeling I earnestly desire to lay aside all past misunderstanding and to consider only what course as best alike in the interests of the Colony and the Empire, may be taken in the future.

(14) And here I am bound to point out, although indeed the matter now appears to be more generally understood a singular but absolute misconception of fact in the statement with which Mr. Solomon's amendment opens, that Her Majesty's Government have withdrawn their proposal for a conference both in my Respatch of October 22nd and in my subsequent despatches on the subject I have repeatedly stated that I do not think it desirable after all the long and animated discussion of the last few months that the first or preliminary meeting of delegates should take place without some more definite enunciation of the views of Her Majesty's Government on several questions, and that I conceive it to be most convenient for such explanations to be given in this Country. Not only indeed do I decidedly adhere to the opinion that an early meeting is desirable but I have before me a distinct Resolution on the part of the Legislature of Natal in favour of the representation of that Colony at a Conference, together with cordial expressions of readiness from the Authorities of the Free State and the Transvaal Republics to attend it, and it therefore only remains to decide what may be the most suitable time and place for such a meeting.

(15) I have invited President Brand to visit this country at an early date in order to confer with me respecting the claims of his state in connection with Griqualand West pending a settlement of which he feels unable to take part in a conference so far as the  
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affairs of that Province are concerned. I am disposed to hope that some friendly arrangement may be come to with the Free State but, anyhow, in view of the Resolution of the Assembly and the consequent offer of your Ministers to advise and assist Her Majesty's as to Griqualand West, I think it due to them to invite them to consider whether some competent Representative of the Cape Government should not be present in this Country to consult with me on this subject while President Brand, or whoever may represent the Free State is here. Being on the spot, you will be able to ascertain when that is likely to be, and to make such arrangements as they may consider desirable.

(16) It is then my hope that an arrangement may be shortly made for the holding of a conference in London, probably to follow upon the communications which I have proposed to President Brand. As I have never pressed upon the Cape Government so I now desire to avoid the least semblance of pressing upon them an attendance at the Conference. I merely think it right to say that if any person or persons duly authorised on behalf of the Colony who may be sent to this country with reference to these Griqualand negotiations should desire, or be empowered further to attend discussions of the Conference that will probably take place, he or they will, so far as I am concerned have every facility for doing so and, although I should not now repeat so obvious a statement except for the frequent and to me incomprehensible misconceptions on the subject, I must add that nothing said or done at such a Conference will bind any of the Governments or Legislatures who may be represented at it, and that it will be for each Legislature to decide whether any measure which a Conference may agree to propose shall be accepted.

(17) I must not conclude without some observations respecting that important question of Confederation which has engaged so much public attention in South Africa. I understand that some persons have considered that in my Despatch of October 22 I have too readily assumed that the Cape is prepared to affirm the present expediency of Confederation, and even that I have indicated an intention of pressing that policy upon the Colony. It is true that in that despatch as in more than one which you have subsequently received I gave special prominence to this question; so I did also in my first Despatch suggesting a Conference, for I have felt it to be the question in the presence of which all others are of secondary importance.

(18) In your Despatch of October 20, written at almost the same time as mine of the 22nd you yourself say "the feeling of the country has been so loudly expressed in most Districts in favour of the proposals for a Conference, that I cannot but think that if reciprocal sentiments exist in the Republics such a Conference will ere long be held and the Confederation of the South African States and Colonies under the British Flag, for which Your Lordship is so earnestly labouring, be accomplished."

(19) I trust this may be so. That the two Republics should see their way, on fair and honourable terms, to resume their connection with the British Crown, from which they were unfortunately separated many years since, would be a result of the highest and most unquestionable value; that they should even enter into a cordial and intimate alliance with that Empire in which I firmly believe their surest interests to be bound up, would in my eyes be an object in the next degree desirable.

(20) But in any case I continue to think that no proper and convenient opportunity of studying this great question should be lost and that whenever Her Majesty's Government can meet with Representatives from the Governments concerned or whenever they may agree to consult together on subjects of common interest, the principles and bearings of Confederation may properly be considered while however in consequence of the recent discussion, the present time appears to me peculiarly opportune for laying down the outlines of such a scheme, I am, as I always have been, very far from desiring to press any Government or Legislature to commit itself finally to so grave a step as that of Confederation, without clearly understanding what it implies.

(21) I entertain no doubt that, when its operation is so understood/  
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stood, not only those who are most anxious for the strengthening and consolidation of Colonial and Imperial interests, but many of those also who now shrink from the idea of a new and untried form of Government, will recognise from every point of view the value of such a policy as I desire to see adopted. But in order to be successful and enduring Confederation should be the result of a clear conviction on the part of each State entering into it that its Political, social, and material interests, as a whole, will be advanced and that those minor objections which always present themselves, when any large scheme is proposed, and which, at first sight, even appear to constitute serious obstacles, can be satisfactorily disposed of.

(22) I will, in conclusion only add, by way of recapitulation of what I have already said, that, putting aside any objections I may have to the language in which the Resolution of the House of Assembly is couched, I accept it with satisfaction as a very substantial concession to the Imperial Government of points of real importance. Not only has the House declined to place on record the statement which would have been neither accurate nor becoming, that the Imperial Government has been connected with an unconstitutional agitation, but it has accepted, in terms which I have no reason to doubt the Colony will understand to imply substantial co-operation, the duty which I have repeatedly urged on your Government of redeeming those pledges which were given by a former Parliament and in consequence of which Griqualand West was brought under British rule.

(23) This resolution has, I hope materially advanced the final settlement of a difficult question, and I am sincerely obliged to the Assembly for a decision which embodies one of the first and principal results which I had thought a Conference likely to bring about and as regards the Representation of the Cape at a Conference (for the objection of holding any Conference at all was of course an error which I need not notice) I understand the Colonial Government to be left free to act at any future time as it may deem best.

(24) I trust that on reflection this result will appear satisfactory to those who voted for Mr. Watermeyer's amendment as it does to myself and that the people generally will at least feel that their various interests and requirements are now much better understood, both here and in the Colony, than they had been before. The termination of the late Debates in Parliament closes the most important era which has occurred in the history not only of the Cape Colony but of South Africa. It is most essential that the grave questions which have been raised should now be calmly and deliberately considered in all their aspects. If this is undertaken in a generous and ungrudging spirit, it is not unreasonable to hope that the scattered communities of South Africa, now weakened by their isolation, retarded by conflicting interests, will, at no distant day, be united into one of the most considerable Dependencies of the British Crown

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ANNEXURE NO. 7.

Sir Michael Hicks Beach to Sir Bartle Frere, 12th June, 1879.

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Sir,

In my despatch in acquainting you that Her Majesty's Government have determined to unite in the person of Sir Garnet Wolseley the chief military command in South Africa and the control of civil affairs in Natal and the Transvaal I stated that I should address a separate Despatch to you on the subject of confederation of the South African Colonies. 1)

(2) On the general advantages of such a consolidation of the powers and functions of Government I do not now propose to dwell.

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1) These are generally admitted.

It is sufficiently obvious that small communities with limited population and revenue, cannot command the best materials for Government, and, while unable to assist, may seriously impede, the progress and policy of their neighbours. There are already, besides the Dominion of Canada, no less than three British Colonies, each of which is of considerably larger area than the whole of the British possessions in South Africa combined, while the united revenues of those possessions are also less than that of more than one single Colony. Neither the area nor the work of administration of the South African Colonies are so great as to prevent Her Majesty's subjects in that part of the world from adopting a policy which would secure to them all the benefits which they are entitled to expect from their aggregate wealth and population; and it appears to me that the time has arrived at which it is due to them that a determined effort should be made to establish a system the principle of which has already been accepted under which the advantages of responsible government possessed by the Cape Colony might be extended to the other portions of South Africa, and Her Majesty's representative might be aided in dealing with the singularly difficult and intricate problems of government in that country by all the knowledge, experience, and authority that a Ministry and a Parliament representing the whole of a South African Union could afford.

(3) In my Despatch no. 319 of the 25th February, and in previous communications from my predecessor and myself, on the subject confederation, you were informed that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the consideration of this question might best be commenced by means of a Conference of Delegates from the Colonies to be convened by you at Cape Town. In the existing condition of affairs, this course, which under other circumstances would have been the most convenient, appears no longer practicable. The gentleman who, from their official position and local reputation, would most fully represent Natal and the Transvaal, could ill be spared for a prolonged absence in another colony at the present juncture: while the proceedings of a conference, even if your public duty should enable you to conduct them continuously in person, would be so protracted as to defer that definite action which is now of immediate urgency.

(4) I request you therefore to consider with your Ministers at the earliest possible moment, whether general proposals for the establishment of a South African Union or Confederation may not be submitted to the Cape Parliament soon after it has assembled. The proposals for this object may very properly originate in the Legislature of the principal Colony, to which the privileges of responsible government has already been conceded. They might assume the form of resolutions affirming the expediency of establishing a union and suggesting such a definite form of Parliamentary constitution as would, in the opinion of the Cape Parliament, secure a fair share of representation to each of the several members (1) which might be admitted into that Union. In framing such resolutions, due attention would of course be paid to the provisions of a "South African Act 1877", and the amount contributed by the inhabitants of each province towards the revenue of the Union would doubtless be considered an element of primary importance in calculating the share of representation to be allotted to it. The further details requiring settlement before an order-in-Council could be issued under the "South African Act 1877" including the nature of the local government to be accorded to each province, could be arranged afterwards, subject, of course, to the approval of Her Majesty's Government by a conference of the delegates from the communities affected, to be appointed for that purpose.

(5) I sincerely trust that you will find yourself met by a general and earnest desire to co-operate for the early settlement of this most urgent question, the postponement of which would in various

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1) How about T. V. G. W. Natal or even Kaffra? I had submitted plans for governing all these with a view to confederation and you have hung them up.

ways impede the progress of the Cape Colony. In particular, I may observe that the measures which have been initiated with respect to the lately disturbed districts on the Eastern Frontier and other adjacent territories have been for some time in abeyance, (1) and cannot be proceeded with in the present condition of affairs.

(6) This country, which has already in various ways borne a large part of the cost of the proceedings which have resulted in the acquisition and pacification of these territories without receiving any direct benefit in return, cannot be expected to undertake the responsibility of their future government and expense. (2) But it is essential to the interests of the Cape Colony that due provision should be made for this purpose in order to prevent recurrence of those local difficulties which, as recent experience has shown may, if not promptly dealt with, develop into serious outbreaks (3) affecting not only the district in which they occur, but also the whole native population within the Colony. Yet it does not appear that this task could, in present circumstances be safely entrusted to or efficiently performed by the Cape Colony alone. I fully recognise the self-reliant spirit which the people of that Colony have shown in the Acts passed to provide for the defence of the country, for the maintenance of peace within its borders and for the expenditure of the late war. But further efforts are required to provide adequately for the needs of the territories to which I have referred; I need not point out how much the burden would be aggravated by the absence of that consistent and uniform policy throughout South Africa which alone can really maintain peace and good order among the natives and which it has long been sought to secure through a Confederation or Union of the several Governments. It is therefore an essential preliminary to any decision upon the future position of the valuable territories beyond the Eastern Frontier of the Cape Colony, (4) that I invite the immediate attention of your ministers and of the Cape Parliament to this great question (5)

(7) It will doubtless be expected that you should be in a position to give explanations on behalf of Her Majesty's Government on the subject which is of the most immediate importance to all who would be comprised in the proposed union, namely, the general scheme of defence, and the mode in which its cost is to be met. On this I may observe, that it would be contrary to the true and permanent interest of South Africa itself, that Her Majesty's forces will only be permanently stationed there as a garrison at or near Cape Town, for the defence of a naval station of great importance to the interests of the whole Empire. (5)

(8) In these circumstances, an immediate necessity will arise for a regular organization for the frontier defence of the Union (6) It may be confidently anticipated that the danger to be provided against will soon be materially diminished by the settlement of Zulu affairs on a basis which will afford adequate security for the safety of Her Majesty's subjects in that part of South Africa. (7) But Her Majesty's Government do not forget that the Cape Colony, while obtaining the advantages, will also incur the liabilities inseparable from the chief position in an important Union. They would therefore be prepared, if the suggestions I have made were carried out in a manner which they could approve, and a pledge was given by the Cape Parliament on behalf of that colony, to be afterwards confirmed by the Union Legislature, that no further aid should be required from this country for military purposes; to propose to Parliament that, as its contribution towards defensive organization pending the  
complete/

1) no difficulty but that raised by H.M. Govt. (2) The Cape does not wish it. (3) This has to a great extent been obviated by present Ministry. (4) They are quite willing to consider it but what is to be the policy of H.M. Govt. beyond the Ea. Frontier? I gave you one, you disapproved of it. What now is to be your course?

(5) But is it a fallacy to expect to wash your hands of the need of Imperial troops. Where Englishmen are even in foreign countries there will English troops be required, as long as Eng.d. is England.

(6) How does this affect the Cape.

(7) Hope so. but it will be Natal's affair not the Cape Colony until they are united.

complete establishment and consolidation of of the Union. This country should undertake, for a term of five years to provide annually a sum equal to that voted by the Union Legislature, for the maintenance of a frontier defense force the numbers of such force and the places at which it should be stationed being mutually agreed upon between the Imperial and Colonial Governments. This force would be raised by the Union Government, and not borne on the Imperial Army Estimates. The contribution thus to be made from Imperial funds would, of course, be contingent upon the thorough efficiency of the force, as shown by the annual report of an Imperial Officer, under whose inspection it would be placed.

(9) This outline will, ~~watheit kee~~ I think, explain sufficiently the general nature of arrangements contemplated by Her Majesty's Government, and I trust that, with the assistance thus to be provided, the South African Colonies will, without hesitation take the necessary steps to co-operate for their own defence and good government, as members of a prosperous and powerful Union.

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ANNEXURE NO. 8.

Letter, C.J. Rhodes to J.X. Merriman. (Merriman Papers)

Kimberley,  
May 16, 1880.

My dear Merriman,

I have often intended writing to you but with my usual dislike to letter writing have continually postponed it. I see you are in the full heat of another Capetown fight. I must say I sympathize most heartily with you over the Basuto question and gather from the papers you have some chance of success.

We are evidently to be at last annexed. I hope if there is any chance of increased representation for this place you will not oppose it. I am sorry you did not pay this province a visit during the last year you would wonder at the change the result of producing nearly four millions per annum without fluctuations has made a marvellous difference with the place.

I saw an article in your Cape Post on Vickers figures as to import 22 of this place. I can only assure you that with few exceptions this pamphlet may be relied on as fairly accurate and there is every chance of our prosperity lasting, the old fear of the mines working out is rapidly fading for instance the Kimberley Mine is now 300 feet deep has a shaft in its centre 180 feet below that level and no sign of a change diamonds being found out of the stuff coming out of the bottom pit. To show you the change since you were here, De Beers was almost abandoned in your time and yet now is valued at nearly a million and you must remember these are no fictitious figures but ground changes hands steadily at the values marked on the valuation plans, in fact claims here sell much more readily than land in the Colony. Dutoitspan is steadily going ahead which in our time was simply deserted, last week two blocks, one of 50 claims and one of 27 claims changed hands for 25000, and 35,000 respectively. I mention these facts to you to shew you the wonderful changes that have occurred since you left us. Dismissing of course the old twaddle about Griqualand West saving the colony from bankruptcy what I want to impress on you is the fact that this is now the richest community in the world for its size and that it shows every signs of permanency the present proved depths of our mines alone would take at our present rate of working a 100 years to work out and of course we cannot tell how much deeper they may go.

I hope you will support railway extension direct here although I see you are rightly opposed to that wretched system of making a railway to every village in the country for the sake of the political support of its members still facts are incontrovertible to show that a direct line her from Capetown would return a splendid interest on its construction.

It would be tedious in a short letter of this sort for me  
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to go into voluminous figures but I will quote for argument one item. We burn here wood equal to about 500 tons of coal weekly taking the estimate at  $2\frac{1}{2}$  tons of wood to one of coal this wood costs us about £12 per buck waggon load and a load of wood is generally about 4,000 lbs. of say two tons therefore you may say our fuel costs us compared with coal or represented in coal £12 per ton and this is getting scarcer every year and of course with increased depths in mining we require more lifting power and therefore more fuel. Coal can be laid down from Capetown for £7 10s. per ton taking charges at £2 per ton per mile, the result would be a saving of nearly  $\frac{1}{2}$  to us, and in your estimate as to probable carriage here 500 tons per week may be safely counted on for fuel transport alone.

I see the Argus referring to formation of companies here fears these mines may fall into the position of Namaqualand Copper Mines and that the population will disappear. I think such fears are groundless partly on account of their enormous area (I speak figuratively) when you consider the amount of work one claim represents. I mean the whole of it being diamondiferous to an unknown depth. And not like other mines where the minerals are in lodes and you will I think agree with me that the production of nearly four million per annum must require a large population no matter how the stuff is worked whether on a large or small scale. Up to the present companies have simply tended to increase rather than diminish population in fact this Province has never been so prosperous as at present. With the feeling against annexation is merely confined to a few press writers like Murray, the bulk of the population being too immersed in diamond speculations to care about anything else. You will see by the papers there is an opposition to the proposed export duty on diamonds and I think fairly, for under annexation the revenue of this province I think about 120000 per annum is ample to meet its expenditure and though there is a debt of about £300,000 it is called 5 but two are due to the Imperial government who will doubtless forego it. You must remember that when we join the Cape Colony we at once share in your responsibility for 10 millions I do not think that you can object to our 300,000 as an unduly excessive proportion. I have scribbled already too much and if you will take a word of advice from an old acquaintance ~~By~~ during this session when the Griqualand West question comes up show a consideration for this Province. The community here always think that whenever you can get a chance you abuse them and never give them fairplay. There will be two opportunities I should think, namely an increased representation and railway extension here, both of which are fairly due you must remember that the Griqualand West of 1880 and that of 1877 are two very different places. I feel more than a fair admission in parliament by you of the wealth and importance of this province and a generous appreciation of the help it furnished to the Old Colony during the late Caffir wars will not be regretted by you afterwards.

Yrs. ever,

C.J. Rhodes.

A P P E N D I X . A .LIST OF PAMPHLETS.South African Public Library.NO. 1

The History of English Rule and Policy in South Africa.....  
lecture by R.S. Watson, Newcastle-upon-Tyne (30 May 1879): New-  
castle-on-Tyne 1881.

NO. 2

Imperialism in South Africa: J.Ewing Ritchie London 1879.

NO. 3

Interview between H.M. High Com., Sir Bartle Frere and the  
deputation from the Boer Committee at the Burgher Camp, April, 1879  
with Memorial to the Queen, and Despatch of Sir. Bartle Frere  
forward the same, also "Chapter from the History of Natal" taken  
from "Zuid-Afrikaan" newspaper, and enclosed in Despatch of April  
6th, 1879. Reprinted from P. Papers C.2367, July, 1879.

NO. 4

Thoughts upon the Present and Future of South Africa, and Central  
and Eastern Africa. A Paper read by Donald Currie Esq. C.M.A.G.  
at the Royal Colonial Institute on Thursday 7th June, 1877. Lon-  
don, 1877.

NO. 5

Correspondence between Sir Michael Hicks-Beach Bart., Secretary  
of State for the Colonies and Transvaal Delegates to which is  
added Further Documents and Correspondence Relating to the Same  
Subject. London 1881.

NO. 6

Four Years of Protest in the Transvaal, A Poem from the South  
African Blue Books by Edmund H. Verney, Captain R.N. Chairman of  
the Transvaal Independence Committee. London, 1881.

NO. 7

"A Guide for Agriculturists and Capitalists, Speculators, Miners  
&C. wishing to invest money profitably in The Transvaal Republic,  
South Africa, containing descriptions of A Number of First class  
Farms situated in Different Districts of the Republic. The Tariff  
of Customs House Duty in Delagoa Bay and General Useful Information  
With a Map showing the Gold Strata as it is supposed to run from  
the Tati to Marabastad and Leydenburg also the Bay of Lorenzo Mar-  
quez or Delagoa Bay and the Adjacent Countries. Compiled by  
O.W.A. Forssman, 20 years President in the Transvaal. Second  
Edition by Special Request. Cape Town, William Foster & Co.,  
Printers, 55, St. Georges-Street. 1874."

NO. 8

Materials for a Speech in Defence of the Policy Abandoning the  
Orange River Territory, May 1854. London 1854. (Reprinted for  
Kruger and Joubert. Oct., 1878)

NO. 9

Statistics of the Cape Colony by W.L. Blore Esquire reprinted  
from the "Cape Argus" 1870-1871. Cape Town J.C. Juta, Wale-Street.  
1871.

NO. 10

Report of W. Coates Palgrave Esq. Special Commissioner to the  
Tribes North of the Orange River, of His Mission to Damaraland  
and Great Namaqualand in 1876. Cape Town. Saul Solomon, 1877. (G.  
50-77.)

NO. 11

Letter to the "London Times" Dec. 16, 1868 by "Confederacy".

NO. 12

"Precis of information concerning South Africa. Orange River  
Free State and Griqualand West. Prepared in the Intelligence  
Branch of the Quarter-Master General's Department, Horse Guards,  
War Office, London. 1878."

NO. 13

"A Fragment of Basuto History (1854-1871) by George Mc. Call  
Theal. Capetown. Saul Solomon & Co., 1886."

NO. 14

"The Problem of South African unity by W. Basil Worsfold. London G. Allen. 1900."

NO. 15

"Isandhlwana 22nd January, 1879, A Narrative compiled from Official and Reliable Sources by Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Durnford. London 1879."

NO. 16

Isandhlwana, Lord Chelmsford's Statements compared with Evidence by Lieut-Col. E. Durnford. London 1880.

NO. 17

"Official Correspondence: Reply of President Burgers to Despatches of Sir Henry Barkly of 12th and 14th March, 1874. Cape Town Van der Sandt de Villiers & Co. 1874."

NO. 18

"Official Correspondence: Replies of the High Commissioner and of the Lieut-Governor of Griqualand West to President Burgers' Despatch of 31 August, 1874. Cape Town S. Solomon. 1875."

NO. 19

"Official Report of Proceedings at the Pitso or Annual Gathering of the Basutos and Other Native Tribes residing in British Basutoland, Cape Of Good Hope, Held at Maseru on Thursday and Friday, the 16th and 17th October, 1879. Cape Town, Saul Solomon & Co. 1879."

NO. 20

"A Manual of the Transvaal, A New Field of Enterprise for Agriculturists, Capitalists and Miners, comprising Notes from the Royal Geographical Society's Journal, 1877, contributed by Chevalier Frederick Jeppe F.R.G.S. with a Few Words of Advice to Persons Wishing to Emigrate and a Description of the Various Routes, Also a Short Introduction by Chevalier O.W.A. Forseman F.R.G.S. 26 years Resident in the Transvaal. Silver & Co. London (1878)."

NO. 21

"South Africa: Its Difficulties and Present State, suggested by a Recent Visit to that Country by A.R. Campbell-Johnson F.R.S. London. Wilson, 1877."

Mendelssohn Collection.NO. 22

"The South African Conference. The views of the Cape Ministry and their supporters on Earl Carnarvon's South African Policy as set forth in their Speeches in the Cape Parliament With an Introduction by an Old Colonist. London, 1876."

NO. 23

"Articles from the "Capetown Daily News". Capetown, 1875."

NO. 24

Article "Nineteenth Century" Feb., 1881. H.B.E. Frere.

NO. 25

"Afghanistan and South Africa. Letters to the Right Hon. W.E. Gladstone, M.P. regarding portions of his Midlothian Speeches and a Letter to the Late Sir John Kaye, and other papers, by the Right Hon. Sir Bartle Frere, Bart., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., F.R.S., etc. Fifth Edition, containing Additional Correspondence with Mr. Gladstone. London, 1881."

NO. 26

"Speech of His Excellency the Right Honourable, Sir Bartle Frere Bart., etc., etc. Governor of the Cape of Good Hope and Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa, And of Others, Delivered on the Occasion of the Banquet given to His Excellency upon his Return to Cape Town, June 11, 1879. London. 1879."

NO. 27

"The Zulu War - Correspondence between His Excellency the High Commissioner and the Bishop of Natal, Referring to the Present Invasion of Zululand with Extracts from the Blue Books and Additional Information from other Sources."

NO. 28

"A Letter to the Right Honourable the Earl of Kimberley, etc., etc., in Acknowledgement of his Despatch of October 14th 1880 from Sir Bartle Frere, Bart., F.R.G.S. Privately Printed. London, 1880."

NO. 29

"Correspondence Relating to the Recall of the Right Hon., Sir Bartle Frere Bart., G.C.B., G.C.S.I. London, 1886."

NO. 30

Damaraland and Great Namaqualand by W.C. Plaggrave (Cape Monthly Magazine XV. July - Dec., 1877)

NO. 31

"The Colonial Intelligencer", the Organ of the Aborigines Protection Society. Jan. 1878.

NO. 32

Blacks, Boers and British, A Three-Cornered Problem by F.R. Statham. London. MacMillan, 1881.

NO. 33

Letters to Lord Blachford. London 1896. Ed. G.E. Marindin.

NO. 34

"The Causes of the Zulu War." Nineteenth Century - March 1879. Article by Lord Blachford.

NO. 35

"The Closer Union of the Empire" Nineteenth Century - April 1887. Article by J.X. Merriman.

NO. 36

"Our relations with the Imperial Government, considered as a whole in Reference to the Late Despatch and to Confederation, by J.M. Orpen, M.L.A. Capetown 15 July, 1879. Foster, Capetown, 1879."

NO. 37

Unpublished Letter by Major W.E. Butler pinned to the fly-leaf of his book "Far Out".

NO. 38

"Proceedings at a Deputation of Residents, Merchants and Others interested in the South African Colonies to the Right Honourable the Earl of Carnarvon, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, Colonial Office, White Hall, Thursday, 26th October, 1876. London. Bedell, 1876."

NO. 39

"Speeches on the Affairs of West Africa and South Africa" by Henry Howard Molyneux Herbert, Fourth Earl of Carnarvon. Printed for private circulation. London. John Murray, 1903. Preface by R.G.W. Herbert."

NO. 40

"South African Policy" - Nineteenth Century - August 1879. Article by Lord Blachford.

A P P E N D I X B.BIBLIOGRAPHY.A. Bibliographical references:

The Cambridge History of the British Empire vol. VIII (South Africa) London. 1936. Bibliography to Chapters XVIII and XIX. List of relevant British parliamentary papers for the period 1870-1880 (A.3-part. 1)

Walker E.A. - A History of South Africa. London. 1935. Contains a very complete bibliography.

Adam M.J., Ewing, J., Munro J. - A Guide to the Principal Parliamentary Papers relating to the Dominions.

B. Primary and Contemporary Sources:-

(1) Manuscript: (a) The Merriman Papers: I have used about sixty letters from this collection of correspondence, kept at the South African Public Library, Capetown. Many other letters from this period could not be made accessible for me because of their essentially private nature; much information contained in these letters thus remains unused. The letters have, on the whole, proved an invaluable means of getting behind the meaning of formal official correspondence. I found the views of Mrs. Julia Merriman particularly refreshing!

(b) Official correspondence in the Capetown Archives: All the official correspondence for the period can, with the exceptions of some cancelled despatches, be found in the Imperial Blue Books. I preferred to use the manuscript originals in the first place for very much the same reason as Bishop Colenso when he wrote "I will defy any one to get a true idea of the case from the confused despatches in the Blue Books (where the affairs of the Cape Colony, Eastern Frontier, Griqualand West, Griqualand East, Basutoland, Pondoland, Transvaal, Natal and Zululand are all mixed up "higgledy-piggledy" without any attempt at arrangement) without an enormous amount of labour which no public man can be expected to undertake." In the second place I found a few valuable unpublished despatches and others made confidential by the Secretary of State and thus not to be found anywhere else but in the Public Records Office in London or in these despatch books into which all outgoing despatches were copied. In one case I found a minuted despatch. Sir Henry Barkly frequently annotated despatches but his handwriting is so indecipherable that only an expert can read it! I have not found anything of importance in such portions as were decipherable. The following is a list of documents consulted in the Government House group of the Capetown Archives:-

- (1) G.H. 1/17-32: Public despatches received from the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
- (2) G.H. 2/1-4: Confidential despatches received from the Secretary of State.
- (3) G.H. 3/3-5: Index to public despatches (7/3/'67 - 24/4/1884).
- (4) G.H. 4/5-14: Circulars and telegrams to and from Secretary of State.
- (5) G.H. 6/1-5: Ministers' minutes 1873-1880 (very incomplete)
- (6) G.H. 14/1: Correspondence on the annexation of Walvis Bay (1875-1880.)
- (7) G.H. 31/11-17: Public despatches from the Governor and High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
- (8) G.H. 32/1-3: Confidential despatches from the Governor and High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
- (9) G.H. 33/4-5: Index to public despatches to the Sec. of State.
- (10) G.H. 34/21-41: Enclosures to public despatches to the Sec. of State.
- (11) G.H. 17/1-2: Correspondence with the Orange Free State (1871).

- (12) G.H. 23/1-3: Correspondence on Diamond Fields and Keate Award.  
 (13) G.H.B. 3/5: Griqualand West disturbances.  
 (14) G.H.B. 4/10, 11, 12: Despatches from Griqualand West to the Sec. of State (26/11/1875-Dec., 1880).  
 (15) G.H. 20/1: S.A. Republic and Transvaal (miscellaneous correspondence 1877-1880).  
 (16) G.H. 29/2, 4, 7: Miscellaneous correspondence (classified).  
 (17) G.H. 35/8-9: Further miscellaneous correspondence.  
 (18) G.H. A.9/6, 7: General letterbooks of the Governor and High Commissioner.  
 (19) G.H.B. 3/7: Correspondence with private individuals.

(ii) Printed: (a) Imperial Parliamentary Papers:-

- 1870:- XLIX: Removal of troops and Responsible Government.  
 1871:- C.459: Responsible Government and Griqualand West affairs.  
 1872:- C.508: Federation, Correspondence on Diamond Fields.  
       C.618: Natal Railways (Correspondence August '71 - May '82)  
 1873:- C.732: The introductions of responsible government.  
 1874:- C.1025: The Langalibalele outbreak.  
 1875:- C.1119, C.1121, C.1158, C.1187, C.1141, C.1342: Further correspondence on Langalibalele.  
       C.1348: Correspondence August, 1874-February, 1875.  
       C.1244: Text of first Confederation despatch.  
 1876:- C.1399: Correspondence on Confederation. Froude's report.  
       C.1401: Correspondence on Griqualand West Land Court.  
       C.1681: Griqualand West affairs.  
 1877:- C.1732: Correspondence on Permissive Federation Bill November, 1876 - April 1877.  
       C.1776: Shepstone's mission to the Transvaal.  
       C.1815: Financial affairs of the Transvaal.  
 1878:- C.1980: Further correspondence on Griqualand West and the Permissive Federation Bill.  
       C.1961, C.2000: The Gaika-Galeca War and the Expeditions to Damaraland.  
       C.2079, C.2100, C.2144: The Ministerial Dismissal.  
       C.2128: Proceedings at first visit of Transvaal Delegation.  
 1879:- C.2222: Ultimatum to Ctewayo.  
       C.2257: Further Correspondence on Gaika-Galeca War.  
       C.2144: Zulu War. Transvaal finances for 1878.  
       C.2220: Second Transvaal deputation.  
       C.2318, C.2374: Morosi's rebellions.  
       C.2454: End of the Zulu War. Hicks Beach's despatch on confederation.  
 1880:- C.2482: Lanyon's administration in the Transvaal.  
       C.2584: Correspondence on Transvaal finances.  
       C.2586: Gladstone and confederation.  
       C.2505: Correspondence on Basuto Disarmament and confederation.  
       C.2655, C.2676, C.2695: C.2374: Natal affairs. Resolution for confederation. The appointment of Wolseley.

(b) Cape Parliamentary papers: These papers are found in the "Appendices to Votes and Proceedings" of the House of Assembly and Legislative Council. In Capetown there are four fairly complete sets of these Appendices: two in the Capetown Archives, one in the South African Public Library, and one in the Parliamentary Library. The documents are divided into four classes (1) those printed by order of the Legislative Council (e.g. C.14-'75) (2) those printed by order of the House of Assembly (e.g. A.1-'80) (3) Those printed by order of the Government (e.g. G.1-'77) (4) Committee reports (e.g. S.C.3-'72).

A complete index of these papers, in alphabetical order according to topics, is to be found in E.F. Kilpin's - Index to Cape Parliamentary Papers 1854-1897.

(c) British Parliamentary Hansard: A complete series of Hansard for the period 1870-1880 is to be found in the S.A. Public Library, Capetown. A select list of references is given in the Cambridge History of the British Empire vol. VIII. (c.f. Section A.)

(d) Newspapers: In the period 1870-1880 there were approximately 80 newspapers published in South Africa. The following is a list of the more important papers published. The date of establishment and/  
 and/

and cessation (if before 1880) appear in brackets:

Transvaal:

Gold Fields Mercury, The (June 1876-Feb., 1878) Pelgrimsrust.  
Transvaal Advocate, The (1874-June 1877) Potchefstroom.  
Transvaal Argus, The (Aug. 1875-Dec. 1876) Potchefstroom.  
Volksstem, De (1874) Pretoria.

Orange Free State:

Express, The (De) (1875) Bloemfontein.  
Friend, The (1850) Bloemfontein.

Natal:

Natal Colonist, The - Durban.  
Natal Mercury, The - Durban.  
Natal Witness, The - Pietermaritzburg.  
Times of Natal, The - Pietermaritzburg.

Grigoland West:

Daily Independent, The (1879) Kimberley.  
Diamond Field, The (1870) Kimberley.  
Diamond Fields Advertiser, The (1878) Kimberley.  
Diamond News (1870) Kimberley.  
Mining Gazette, The (Feb.-Nov., 1875) Kimberley.

Cape Colony:

(a) Capetown:

Cape Argus, The (1877)  
Cape Mercantile Advertiser (1852)  
Cape Post, The (Jan.-Sept., 1839).  
Cape Times, The (1876)  
Cape Town Daily News (Dec. 1874-March 1878)  
Daily News, The (1875-1878)  
Evening Star, The (April - July, 1878)  
Penny Post, The (1871 - 1874)  
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# SOUTH AFRICA 1870 - 1880

- Magisterial Divisions within the Cape Colony
- Boundaries between territories
- Railways (1880)
- Main Coach Routes
- Disputed and Unannexed Areas

