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**Demobilisation, Reintegration,
Rationalisation and Peacebuilding in South
Africa**

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the degree of Master of Social Science in
Comparative and International Politics**

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Preface

This study investigates whether failed demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation processes pose a possible security threat to peacebuilding in South Africa. It examines the demobilisation and reintegration of former Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) combatants, and the rationalisation process of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). It thus argues that a possible security threat could result from the failure of the government to address the human security needs of former combatants. Faced with unemployment, homelessness and unmarketable skills, former combatants and rationalised SANDF members could resort to using their military skills to engage in crime, banditry, mercenary activities and political violence. To prevent this from assuming dangerous proportions, it is recommended that the government develop and support demobilisation and rationalisation programmes that will lead to the successful integration of former combatants and rationalised SANDF members into society.

The argument presented is that in addressing the human security needs of former combatants, a possible security threat in post-conflict South Africa could be prevented. However, the government failed to adequately do this. The planning, co-ordination and implementation of the demobilisation and reintegration programmes targeted at former MK and APLA combatants have not been successful in addressing their human security needs. Former combatants are faced with economic hardships such as poverty, homelessness and unemployment. Societal pressure, mistrust towards them and stigmatisation is also affecting them negatively, making it difficult for them to reintegrate into society after some exposure to other cultures in foreign countries. They also experience psychological difficulties in the form of aggression and violent behaviour. Most of these are due to poor demobilisation planning. Demobilisation planning was only started once the SANDF was faced with the difficulty of dealing with former combatants who could not be integrated into the SANDF. The shortsightedness in terms of proper demobilisation planning on the part of the

government has consequently resulted in the failure of reintegration. The lack of inclusivity, needs assessment surveys, training skill conceptualisation, and focus on the long-term socio-economic issues essential for reintegration also contributed to the failure of demobilisation.

Regardless, failure to provide for the needs of former combatants has not, in the present, led to a serious security threat, although there is evidence to suggest that a number of them engage in criminal activities. Political, economic, social, cultural and psychological measures implemented by the ANC government after democratic elections contributed to this situation. Despite these measures, human insecurity remains profound, and the current rationalisation planning reveals that some difficulties may be encountered with the process. These difficulties, compounded with the general economic and social difficulties facing South Africa, are a potential security threat, if not properly addressed. Some former combatants and rationalised SANDF members could in future resort to crime, banditry, mercenary activities and political destabilisation as a form of protest and anger.

Since the purpose of this study is to provide a nuanced understanding of demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and their impact on peacebuilding, several sources of information have been utilised. These include published books on the subject, chapters, journal articles, and conference and institutional papers. The study also draws on material focusing on MK and APLA, such as reports, journal and newspaper articles, as well as studies by international and local non-governmental organisations. Another source of information is interviews conducted with former combatants, experts and researchers. A snowball sample of 35 informants, which included 17 former MK combatants and 11 former APLA combatants, was undertaken in Gauteng, Free State and the Western Cape. Interviews were semi-structured to allow deeper interpretation of information provided within the broader parameters of the subjects under study.

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Abbreviations

ABET	Adult Basic Education and Training
ANC	African National Congress
APLA	Azanian People's Liberation Army
AZAPO	Azanian People's Organisation
BACs	Base Advice Centres
BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
BMATT	British Military Advisory Training Team
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CGE	Commission on Gender Equality
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CPR	Certified Personnel Register
DMI	Directorate of Military intelligence
DoD	Department of Defence
EIR	Employer Initiated Retrenchment Package
EO	Executive Outcomes
EU	European Union
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Reconstruction
GEM	Group for Environmental Monitoring
GNU	Government of National Unity
IJR	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
JMCC	Joint Military Co-ordinating Council
JSE	Johannesburg Stock Exchange
MDM	Mass Democratic Movement
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe

MKMVA	Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans Association
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MPNP	Multi-party Negotiations Process
NEDLAC	National Economic Development and Labour-Council
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NP	National Party
NSMS	National Security Management System
OSW	Office on the Status of Women
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia
PPC	Canadian International Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
PTSD	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADF	South African Defence Force
SAHRC	South African Human Rights Commission
SAMHS	South African Military Health Service
SAN	South African Navy
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SANGOCO	South African National NGOs Coalition
SC	Service Corps
SDUs	Self Defence Units
SPUs	Self Protection Units
SSC	State Security Council
SWAPO	South West African People's Organisation
TBVC	Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei
TEC	Transitional Executive Council
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TSC	Transitional Support Centre

UDF	Union Defence Force
UDF	United Democratic Front
UN	United Nations
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
ZNLWVA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association

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Chapter One

1. Introduction to the Study

Since the demise of apartheid, South Africa has undergone many important changes. The most significant and difficult of these is the current demilitarisation process, aimed at reversing the process of militarism and militarisation that occurred during the late 1970s and 1980s. The process of demilitarisation, aimed primarily at shifting the resources from the military to the much-needed social development, has a number of dimensions. These include: the reduction of military expenditure and their reallocation, the conversion of the defence industry and military bases, the reduction of various surplus weapons, and the creation of a representative, legitimate and professional defence force in the form of the SANDF [Cock, 1998:2].

These demilitarisation developments led to the integration of former MK combatants, the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC), former APLA combatants, the armed wing of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the four armed forces of the former Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei homelands (TBVC) into the SANDF. As a result, the force level of the SANDF increased significantly, leading to the process of demobilisation and reintegration. Despite the demobilisation of former MK and APLA combatants, the force level of the SANDF is still high, thus necessitating the process of rationalisation of SANDF members.

Demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation are integral and important components of the peacebuilding process, which is about removing the root causes of conflict in South Africa.¹ These processes provide an opportunity to

¹ The use of the word conflict differs from situation to situation. This includes the actual physical violence, fight or disagreement over differences of interests, opinion or principles. In the same way, the causes of conflict differ considerably. There are historical, political, cultural and religious causes of conflicts that occur between states or people [Kingma, 2000:3]. In South Africa, the root causes of conflict were mainly political, and manifested in social and economic spheres in the

enhance development through the reduction of the armed forces, thereby redirecting military resources, establishing of democratic civil-military relations and providing for the socio-economic needs of the country. This is especially important to prevent a possible security threat by former combatants and former SANDF members in the form of criminal activities and political destabilisation.

In South Africa, the processes of demobilisation and reintegration have proved to be urgent and important. First, as Cock [1993] maintains, not only will the success of these processes assist with the much-needed social and economic development, but also with reducing a possible security threat by former combatants in the future. This is necessary in the context of the overall reconstruction and development process following the legacy of discrimination and inequalities created by the apartheid system [Cock, 1993: 2].

Demobilisation allows for the reduction of military expenditure through a decline in the number of soldiers, thereby allowing for spending on social development and reconstruction. The process also increases human development levels through the creation of employment opportunities and increased foreign and domestic investment [Kingma, 2000:1].²

Second, the most pressing needs of former combatants, such as the lack of housing and employment opportunities, should adequately addressed. This is in order to reduce the possibility of internal security threats they may pose in the form of criminal activities and political destabilisation, which in turn could disrupt the peacebuilding process [Cock, 1993:2].

form of extreme inequalities and discrimination. These causes of conflict date back to the sixteenth and seventeenth century and involved both physical violence and disagreements. Given the nature of the cause of conflict in South Africa, conflict is used in this study to denote the actual physical violence as a result of the legacy of apartheid.

2 The impact of demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation forms an integral part of the peace dividend, which refers to the savings accumulated from the reduction of resources used for the military. Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). 1996. **Conversion Survey 1996. Global Disarmament, Demilitarisation and Demobilisation** (Bonn: BICC), pp. 63-64.

Finally, successful demobilisation and reintegration are critical processes as a means of acknowledging and recognising the significant contribution made by former combatants in the struggle against apartheid. It is therefore essential that the government develop a well-planned demobilisation and reintegration programme to ensure a successful peacebuilding process [Cock, 1993:2].

If not properly planned and implemented, demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation could undermine the peacebuilding efforts. This could result in social and political destabilisation through crime, banditry and mercenary activities. More serious is the risk of the resumption of conflict by the previous conflicting parties. The cost of inadequate planning, co-ordination and implementation of the demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation processes to the peacebuilding process goes beyond social and political destabilisation. The new causes of conflicts and dissatisfaction at different societal levels could emerge and hamper successful peacebuilding and, indeed, peace itself.³

The emergence of new conflicts is even more likely, given the fact that former combatants are equipped with a high level of military skills. This they could misuse in an attempt to support themselves and their dependants. The consequence of this could be internal destabilisation. It is essential to recognise that in many instances, former combatants and their dependants have to build from scratch livelihoods in the new social environment with little or no resources. Thus, faced with a variety of social difficulties and economic insecurities, the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life could lead to a feeling of hopelessness, which could ultimately disrupt the peacebuilding process.

³ Since peace is central to this study, it is important to understand this concept. There is a distinction between negative and positive peace. The former refers to the absence of peace and positive peace acknowledges the existence of conflict as a permanent character of human nature. However, conflict does not escalate into violent conflict or war [Haugerudbraaten, 1998:18]. In this study, when the word peace is used, it means positive peace, which is central to peacebuilding.

Demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation are complex and challenging processes. On the one hand, they present a sense of hope for peace and development through reduction of military expenditure, creation of employment opportunities, increasing investments, increasing levels of human development and general rise in the standard of living. On the other hand, demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation present uncertainty and the possibility of reawakening conflict in the form of criminal activities and political destabilisation. This is likely if former combatants' needs in the form of housing, education and employment are not met timeously.

Hence, successful peacebuilding and preventing the reawakening of old conflicts, depends on careful planning, co-ordination and implementation of programmes which will adequately address the political, social, economic and psychological needs of former combatants.

1.1. Overall Objectives of the Study

It is against the backdrop of the costs and benefits of demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation in South Africa that this study is undertaken. It examines demobilisation and reintegration of former MK and APLA combatants into civilian life, the planned rationalisation process within the SANDF and the peacebuilding process at the time of writing. Demobilisation and reintegration of former MK and APLA combatants have been completed, and the processes of rationalisation and peacebuilding are ongoing.

Although, there is evidence of some success with regards to demobilisation and reintegration, these processes were difficult, and often ignored the immediate needs of former combatants. In fact, the South African demobilisation and reintegration processes failed to deal with urgent social, economic and psychological needs of former MK and APLA combatants. Inadequate planning, co-ordination and implementation of the demobilisation programmes account for this failure.

Currently, the South African peacebuilding process is proceeding with relative smoothness. This is despite the failure of demobilisation and reintegration programmes to address the pressing needs of former combatants. Notwithstanding the nature of the peacebuilding process, the scope of the planned rationalisation process in the SANDF could disrupt the peacebuilding process, and possibly reawaken conflict in the future. Pressure in the form of increasing general political, economic, social, cultural and psychological difficulties and growing problems encountered by former MK and APLA combatants, could lead to a repetition of obstacles encountered with the demobilisation and reintegration process.

The apparent contradictions and complexities of these linked processes raise a number of important questions. What initial measures were taken to consolidate and ensure a successful peacebuilding process? What were the nature, dimensions and difficulties encountered with the demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding processes? What accounts for the inadequate planning, co-ordination and implementation of the demobilisation process? How are former combatants coping with civilian life, following their demobilisation and reintegration? What is the relationship between demobilisation and disarmament? How has society received former combatants? What, in the aftermath of these processes, happens to peacebuilding if they fail? To what extent have old conflicts been resolved and peacebuilding strengthened as a result of demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation?

This study is undertaken with these questions in mind. It seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of the South African demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding processes. The study offers a critical analysis of the above processes with the aim of sensitising policy-makers, researchers and scholars on the various issues involved. It is also aimed at facilitating further discussions and in-depth research in these areas of study. Therefore, this study is about the nature, challenges and difficulties of demobilisation, reintegration,

rationalisation, and their implications for the broader peacebuilding process in addressing the root causes of conflict in South Africa.

1.2. Specific Objectives of the Study

The central hypothesis of this study is that the South African demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation processes constitute a possible security threat to the peacebuilding process. The question investigated is what is the nature of the South African demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation processes in the SANDF, the difficulties encountered and their effects on peacebuilding. The analytical emphasis is on the planning, co-ordination and implementation of these processes, the difficulties experienced or are likely to be encountered, and the context within which these difficulties should be understood. The study also examines the place and significance of demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation within the broader peacebuilding process in South Africa.

In focusing on these issues, it is argued that demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation are important elements of peacebuilding in a post-conflict context. These processes serve as important aspects of demilitarisation in a society engaged in peacebuilding. While this is a positive development, the danger is that former combatants pose a security threat if their human security needs are not addressed. This is likely in the light of unemployment, homelessness and the lack of marketable skills. Furthermore, they could resort to using their military skills by engaging in criminal activities to make a living or in political disruption to express their dissatisfaction. A factor that compounds the possible threat is the fact that many former combatants have easy access to weapons. This is due to an insufficient disarmament process and lack of proper accounting of weapons, unidentified arms caches and continued holding of weapons by individual former combatants. In short, given their capacity to disrupt peacebuilding, former combatants should be attended to and their human security requirements be addressed.

In South Africa, due to inadequate planning and implementation of the demobilisation programme, reintegration did not succeed in addressing their political, economic, social, cultural and psychological needs. This kind of situation has led to a number of former combatants engaging in criminal activities. Nonetheless, this has not amounted to any significant security threat to disrupt the peacebuilding process presently taking place in South Africa. What accounts for this lack of security threat are the political, economic, social and psychological transformational measures taken prior to and during the transition period. These include: the creation of democratic political institutions, security reform measures, effective disarmament processes, economic opportunities, social provision and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) process. Yet, given the scope and certain planning aspects of rationalisation, general political, economic, social, cultural and psychological difficulties facing South Africa, and the continuing neglect of former MK and APLA combatants' needs, it is likely that in the future peacebuilding could be compromised.

1.3. Research Approaches to the Study

In providing an analysis and attempting to answer the central questions about the demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding processes in South Africa, this study follows a multidisciplinary approach. An examination of these processes is not tied to one specific approach and draws from politics, sociology, economics and developmental studies.

Despite the multidisciplinary approach context of this study, three research approaches that fall within these disciplines have been used. First, this study provides a descriptive analysis of demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding. This is with the intention of generating and contributing information to the already existing literature in the field. Moreover, the aim is to present a current reflection of the South African demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding processes with foci on the political, economic,

social, cultural and psychological conditions that propel certain events often absent in theoretical conceptualisation [Du Toit and Seegers, 1997:38].

The second approach to this study is analytical, exploring and providing an eclectic understanding of demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding. This is important in understanding the underlying nature of these processes, and how they are linked to each other. Furthermore, the intention is to explore the many issues, complexities and difficulties raised by these processes and how they impact on each other.

Third, since the major concern of this study pertains to the human security needs of former combatants and the dangers they pose if not addressed, this study will also include a theoretical component. Primary focus is on the concept of human security located within the broader context of demilitarisation, demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding.

Finally, in exploring possible feasible solutions to address some of the difficulties encountered with the demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation processes, a prescriptive approach is adopted. The purpose is to warn about those developments that could undermine the peacebuilding process. Apart from providing lessons to be learnt from these processes, the recommendations made are intended to assist in the formulation of appropriate and meaningful strategies in strengthening the peacebuilding process, not only in South Africa, but also in countries undergoing similar experiences.

Central to the prescriptive approach are human resource and human development approaches. The former refers to an individual's capacity with regard to skills, knowledge and health in order to engage in productive work. The argument made is that each individual possesses certain talents that make him or her more suitable for certain occupation. This could further be enhanced

through education, which could have positive end results on a person's values, attitudes and motivations to employ his productive capacity [Nübler, 1997:4-5].

A human development approach places people at the centre of development. It calls for equal access to opportunities and empowerment through investment in education and health. This is with the view that people experience the benefit of opportunities offered to them by the market. Human development involves the utilisation of acquired human capabilities in all aspects of society, such as those within the political, economic, social, cultural or psychological sector. As such, human development is not only about how human capabilities come about, but also about how they are employed [Nübler, 1995:4-5].

These approaches form an integral multidisciplinary part of this study's analysis. They will be employed implicitly or explicitly to discuss, describe, and evaluate the demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding processes in South Africa.

1.4. Research Methods in the Study

This study relies on several sources for information. These include the works of scholars, experts and policy-makers who have done substantial work on these subjects. The primary and secondary sources of such information include the works of Cock, Nathan, Seegers, Batchelor, Shaw, Williams, Kingma, Motumi and McKenzie. The form of this literature varies from books, chapters in edited books, journal articles, conference and institutional papers.

Furthermore, this study draws on the material focusing on MK and APLA, such as reports, journal and newspaper articles. The subjects examined vary and cover a wide range of issues falling within the demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding spectrum. These include: the nature of the political and military negotiations from apartheid to democracy, security policies

in transition from apartheid, the importance of addressing the needs of former combatants, methods and means that should be employed to assist them in meeting their needs and challenges facing the SANDF.

This study also draws on a significant amount of work done on the demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding processes by international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), the Group for Environmental Monitoring (GEM), the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Saferworld and the Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) have also contributed significantly to this work. The subjects covered range from policy assessment, engagement, and development to policy recommendations.

Another source of information is interviews conducted with people involved in these processes. These include former combatants who were demobilised following the demise of apartheid and those integrated into the SANDF, scholars, experts and researchers in the field. The use of interviews is critical, as they generate rich insight into the personal experiences of former MK and APLA combatants and illuminate their opinions, challenges, hopes and fears. They build on earlier studies on the demobilisation and reintegration experiences and aspirations of former MK and APLA combatants by Cock [1994], Motumi and McKenzie [1998], Mokalobe [1999] and Mashike [1999].

The interviews conducted were semi-structured or focused. The purpose of this type of interviews is to allow for more information within the broader parameters of a particular subject. The subject and hypothesis are known, but questions are not necessarily fixed. Instead, they are open-ended and allow for deeper interpretation and flexibility [Bailey, 1982:198-201]. Given the nature of the experiences of former MK and APLA combatants, the primary intention was for them to provide a detailed picture of their feelings, experiences and fears in order to understand the dynamics of demobilisation and reintegration.

A snowball sample of 35 informants which included former MK, APLA combatants, SANDF members, members of society, a defence official and a researcher was undertaken. In all, 17 former MK combatants and 11 former APLA combatants were interviewed. Some were demobilised and others had been integrated into the SANDF. The views they express in the interviews are their own.

Informants were selected purely on their involvement and knowledge of the demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation processes. The interview process involved an initial selection of informants who then identified and referred me to others they thought might be of assistance to the study. This was followed by interviews [Bailey, 1982:99-100]. The process of conducting interviews involved approaching senior former combatants who are part of the SANDF. They then referred me to others who were either demobilised or those who were integrated into the SANDF.

Another method was directly approaching those former MK and APLA combatants whom I knew personally either as my comrades or friends of friends. Some former combatants were interviewed during roundtable discussions and seminars hosted mainly by GEM on the demobilisation and reintegration process. Due to the nature and limited size of the sample, this study should be seen as a foundation and guidance for future research in this area.

Interviews were conducted in three provinces of South Africa: Gauteng, Free State and Western Cape over a two-year period - 1998 to 2000. Those interviews conducted in 1998 were part of an earlier study I undertook on the demobilisation and reintegration of former MK and APLA combatants. The main choice of these provinces was accessibility.

Furthermore, it was to ensure representivity and establish whether there are any differences in these provinces, given their different economic levels. In other

words, the geographical range assisted in determining whether there are more economic opportunities in one province than another. Comparing coping strategies also proved to be helpful.

Despite these differences, it must be emphasised that, in general, former combatants in all three provinces were faced with the same political, economic, social and psychological difficulties.

Provinces	MK Combatants	APLA Combatants	SANDF Members	Defence Official, Researcher, Family and Members of Society
Gauteng	6	6	1	1
Free State	7	4	2	2
Western Cape	4	1	—	1*
Total	17	11	3	4

*Although the interview was conducted in South Africa, the researcher who has written extensively in the subject of demobilisation and reintegration is based in Germany.

Table 1: Number and Location of Interviewees

As far as the rationalisation process is concerned, there is a limited amount of literature on the South African process available, because it is in the planning stages. Most of the information pertaining to rationalisation is in the form of government reports and publications and newspaper articles. This study also draws on interviews from SANDF members, the Department of Defence (DoD) and civil society organisations involved in the rationalisation process.

There is a great amount of literature on the South African peacebuilding process available. Most of it deals with the political, economic, social, cultural and psychological measures necessary for a successful peacebuilding process. Nevertheless, as far as the impact of demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation are concerned, there is as yet not much written. Most of the

literature available dealing with this subject is by Kingma [2000], which given its wide Southern African scope, does not deal adequately with the dynamics of these processes and their long-term effects on the South African peacebuilding process. Another work on this subject is by Mokalobe [2000]. As with Kingma, this study does not deal adequately with the overall aspects of demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation on peacebuilding.

This study will attempt to deal with some of the absent aspects in the literature on the topics. Using primary and secondary sources, some gaps in the literature will be covered.

1.5. Difficulties Encountered in the Study

Although the interviews were fruitful and offered rich insight into the experiences, challenges and hopes of former combatants, a number of difficulties were encountered. Some of them were reluctant to be interviewed and suspicious of how they could benefit from the study. I addressed this suspicion by pointing out that there was not much research on demobilisation and reintegration, therefore study could serve as the basis of drawing attention to some of their needs. I attempted to show them that the more policy-makers are cognisant of their difficulties, the better the chances redress. In other words, this study should not be seen just as an academic instrument but also as a practical tool that could influence policy.⁴

Another difficulty was the lack of sincerity in the information provided by some informants. They feared that full disclosure of their experiences might compromise their position in society, in the former liberation movement or at their work place. Those who were forthright in their opinions chose to remain anonymous. Yet, others did not see any difficulties in having their names

⁴ The intention here was not to influence the interviewees to provide information in exchange for a better life in the future, but to simply point to some of the general positive benefits of this kind of study.

published alongside their views. Members of society interviewed who chose to remain anonymous argued that they feared clashes with former combatants over their views. Few SANDF members feared losing their jobs if they were seen to challenge a particular official standpoint.

Closely linked to the problem of information was the emotional stress experienced by a number of former combatants during the demobilisation and reintegration processes. This resulted in the loss of important information.

Language also posed a problem. The interviews were mainly conducted in English, but some interviews were conducted using either one of or a combination of Sesotho, Setswana, Sepedi, isiXhosa and isiZulu. The benefit of this method was that communication was aided and the interviewees could easily express their feelings about particular issues. However, the difficulty lay in the fact that certain words in these vernaculars lack direct translation in English. Equivalents were used to provide the closest possible sense and meaning of a particular point expressed. Hence the accuracy of the translation cannot be fully guaranteed.

Another difficulty concerned the rationalisation process. Since it is only on its planning stages and still being debated in Parliament with regard to its implementation, information about the process keeps changing. Obviously, this makes the available information seem inapplicable. To deal with this difficulty, information was updated as it became available, and any information available was treated as applicable and relevant for the purposes of the study.

1.6. Structure of the Study

This study is divided into six chapters. Chapter two provides a conceptual explanation of the principal concepts underlying this study and a literature review. The primary intention is to explore the nature and aspects of demobilisation,

reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding concepts. Since these processes are taking place within the overall context of demilitarisation and new thinking on security, these concepts will also be explored. Furthermore, this chapter offers a literature review of these processes. The focus is on the different dimensions of demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation and their significance not only to former MK and APLA combatants and those members of the SANDF who will be rationalised, but also the entire South Africa.

In South Africa, the demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding processes resulted from the negotiation process preceding the advent of a democratic government in 1994. It was during the negotiations that ended apartheid that these processes were discussed. Following the first democratic elections, they were planned, co-ordinated and implemented. It is therefore important that critical analysis of the demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding processes first look at the South African negotiation process. Hence, the political and military negotiations that paved the way to a democratic South Africa requires analysis, especially with regard to the demobilisation and reintegration and the planning of rationalisation to strengthen peacebuilding. These are the subjects for discussion in chapter three. The main objective is to examine the South African approach to transition, transformation, and the impact thereof on demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding.

Chapter four examines the demobilisation of former MK and APLA combatants from the SANDF. The intention is to understand the context within which demobilisation occurred, the planning process, co-ordination, its implementation, and the difficulties encountered. The chapter also explores the professional and revolutionary soldier divide, as well as the formation of the SADF. The latter enables us to better understand the political context within which the SADF, MK and APLA operated and the impact thereof on demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding.

The focus of chapter five is the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life. It builds on chapter four by critically examining the implications of demobilisation difficulties on the reintegration process. Meaning that this chapter is about the personal experiences and difficulties encountered by former combatants as a result of inadequate planning, co-ordination and implementation of the demobilisation programmes. It also examines the Service Corps (SC) and Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans Association's (MKMVA) efforts to help with reintegration. This chapter asserts that because of inadequate planning, co-ordination and implementation, demobilisation resulted in former combatants experiencing a number of political, economic, social, cultural and psychological difficulties following their reintegration.

Chapter six is concerned with the rationalisation process in the SANDF. As rationalisation is in its planning stages, this chapter considers the lessons learnt from the difficulties encountered with demobilisation and reintegration, and its relevance to the rationalisation process. The chapter looks at the measures taken to prepare rationalised SANDF members for successful reintegration into civilian life. The position taken is that lessons have indeed been learnt from the failures of the demobilisation, and in all probability, difficulties will be encountered with rationalisation.

Chapter seven of this study provides a critical examination of the peacebuilding process. This chapter places the demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation processes within the broader context of peacebuilding. The central question asked is what does the difficulties encountered with demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation mean for the peacebuilding process. The argument is that given the nature and scope of the rationalisation process, the continuing lack of attention to former combatants' needs and other general challenges facing South Africa, peacebuilding could be disrupted in the future.

Chapter eight provides a summary of the conclusions of this study. It discusses the nature and dynamics of demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding and the contexts within which these processes could be understood. Most importantly, this chapter also offers general recommendations as to how these processes should be approached, particularly with regard to rationalisation in South Africa and in other countries undergoing similar experiences.

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Chapter Two

2. Demobilisation, Reintegration, Rationalisation and Peacebuilding. A Framework

This chapter provides an understanding of the main concepts used in this study and a literature review. It is divided into three sections. Since demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding are important aspects of demilitarisation and human security, these concepts are explored in the first section. In the second section, definitions of demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding processes are offered. Attention is also drawn to many dimensions relating to how these processes are understood and examined.

The third section offers a literature review of demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding. The intention is to consider the different methods of approaching and dealing with these processes. Given the wide scope of the literature available in this regard, five aspects of these processes' objectives, namely political, economics, social, cultural, and psychological objectives are examined.

2.1. Demilitarisation and Human Security in Perspective

The concept of demilitarisation is linked to that of militarism and militarisation. To first understand demilitarisation, militarism and militarisation should be defined. According to Luckham [1998], militarism refers to attitudes, ideas, values and practices that a society accepts in justifying military power and preparation for war [Luckham, 1998:2]. On the other hand, militarisation refers to a process whereby the military exerts its influence and power on society [Ross, 1987:564].

According to Cock [1989], militarisation in South African context involved:

Mobilisation of resources for war at political, economic and ideological levels. It involved both the spread of militarism as an ideology, and an expansion of the power and influence of the military as a social institution [Cock, 1989:2].

At an economic level, as the armaments industry expanded, there was a growing link between the SADF and the private sector. The seriousness with which South Africa undertook its military expression was apparent in its possession of nuclear weapons. At a political level, the SADF influence was evident in its destabilisation policy in neighbouring countries, its internal coercive role and societal control through the National Security Management System (NSMS). The SADF also influenced national ideology. State owned agencies glorified war and criminalised apartheid's opponents. War games and films were encouraged. In white schools, programmes such as veld schools and cadets were created "to cultivate the military spirit" [Cock, 1989:5-12].

Conversely, demilitarisation is a process where militaristic attitudes and practices that legitimise state violence decline significantly. Demilitarisation involves decrease in military expenditure, arms imports and production, the implementation of arms control measures, a ban on the production of certain types of weapons and the reduction of military personnel [Batchelor, 2000:2-3].

Closely linked to demilitarisation is the concept of new thinking on security, which seeks to demilitarise the notion of security [Nathan, 1994:17]. For years, security in South Africa was embedded in the notion of power defined in military terms. The concept of security was equated with the security of the state against an external threat. Nonetheless, as Booth [1994] argues, the security of the state is not necessarily synonymous with the security of those living within that state. In fact, for most citizens of the modern nation-state, their governments are the primary source of insecurity through oppressive policies or the inability to maintain human security for its own citizens [Booth, 1994:5].

Since the 1980s, scholars such as Buzan [1983], Ayoob [1986] and Booth [1991] argued that security cannot only be equated with the security of a state. Instead, security is multidimensional and has political, economic, social and environmental dimensions. Underlying this new approach is the premise that there is a link between security and development. The new approach stresses human security and calls for the alleviation of poverty, accesses to employment and health care, the consolidation of democracy, respect for human rights and the creation of a healthy and clean environment for all citizens [Cock, 1998:15].⁵

As Thomas [1999] argues:

Human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realised...At the most basic level, food, shelter, education, and health care are essential for the survival of human beings. But human security entails more than physical survival. Emancipation from oppressive power structures - be they global, national, or local in origin and scope - is necessary for human security [Thomas, 1999:3].

This emphasis on human security has also informed post-apartheid South African policies.⁶ Defining its national security objectives, the government acknowledges that growing economic difficulties in the form of unemployment, poverty and income inequalities represent a major threat to South Africa's future internal stability. According to the South African **White Paper on Defence**:

National security is no longer viewed as a predominantly military and police problem. It has been broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters. At the heart of this new approach is a paramount concern with the security of people. At the national level, the objective of security policy therefore encompasses the consolidation of democracy, the achievement of social justice, economic development and a safe environment, and a substantial

⁵ See also, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 1994. **Human Development Report** (Oxford: Oxford University Press) and Solomon, Hussein and Jakkie Cilliers (eds.). 1994. **People, Poverty and Peace: Human Security in Southern Africa**, IDP Monograph Series, No. 4 (Halfway House: IDP).

⁶ Details on the process of making defence policy in South Africa and the conceptual debates that informed policy-making are contained in Cawthra, Gavin. 2000. "From 'Total Strategy' to 'Human Security': The Making of South Africa's Defence Policy, 1990-99". **Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies**, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 51-67.

reduction in the levels of crime, violence and police instability. The RDP is the principal long-term means of promoting the well being and security of citizens, thereby, the stability of the country [Defence White Paper, 1996:3].

It is evident that both demilitarisation and human security places development at the centre of their argument. They argue for the creation of an environment conducive for both individuals and the country to thrive, and one in which basic human security needs such as shelter, health, water, food, money and a clean environment are provided.

2.2. Demobilisation, Reintegration, Rationalisation and Peacebuilding Defined

Demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and human security are other important aspects of demilitarisation and peacebuilding. Demobilisation is a process, which, following a peace agreement or the defeat of one party by another, or the perceived improvement in the security environment, members of the armed forces are reduced or disbanded [Kingma, 1998:3-4]. These may either be government or guerrilla forces. Demobilisation forms an integral part of the broad transformation process towards a peacetime economy, which involves the transfer of military resources to the development of other sectors of the economy.

It involves the assembly, disarmament, administration and discharge of former combatants. Parallel to these measures, there is often the creation of a unified and representative defence force [Mason, 1999:19]. The long-term objective of the demobilisation process is to ensure the economic, social and political development of former combatants and the entire country [World Bank, 1995:13].

The most important aspect of demobilisation is reintegration. Reintegration refers to the,

Targeted programmes of cash compensation, training, or income generation meant to increase the potential for economic and social reintegration of former combatants and their families [World Bank, 1995:13].

Reintegration is undertaken with the purpose of allowing former combatants and their dependants to be productive and self-sustaining citizens who are able to contribute to their own development. Therefore, reintegration can be viewed as a complex combination of psychological, social, political and economic processes, involving support of demobilised combatants in becoming ordinary and active members of society [PPC, 1998:2].⁷

"Former combatants" refers to those members of the government or opposition forces who, following a conflict, are demobilised and reintegrated into civilian life. In this study, the term "former combatants" is narrowly used to refer to former members of the MK and APLA liberation forces. This is because following the integration process of seven armed forces in the SANDF, only former MK and APLA combatants were demobilised and reintegrated into civilian life.

Rationalisation refers to the reorganisation of the military. While certain functions of the military may expand, others may decline to comply with particular security demands [SANDF Bulletin, 28 January 1998]. Rationalisation involves the reduction of force levels due to budgetary constraints and operational capability [Defence Review, 1998:23].

The conceptualisation of peacebuilding dates back to the publication of a paper by former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, **An Agenda for Peace**, in which he defines peacebuilding as,

Action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict [Boutros-Ghali, 1992:11].

⁷ Though the word "reintegration" is often used to describe a situation where demobilised combatants are assisted through targeted programmes, in most instances, the word integration seems more appropriate than reintegration. This is because following the end of conflict, former combatants are faced with a new environment in which they have to build new livelihoods.

For purposes of this study, peacebuilding refers to efforts to promote human security through demilitarisation, social reconstruction, democratisation and general development [Cock, 2000:2]. At the heart of peacebuilding is the link between development and security, which forms the basis of progress and human development [Batchelor and Kingma, 2000:6].

In a post-conflict situation, peacebuilding is a process intended to end a conflict, its origins and root causes. It is a tool for conflict resolution [Haugerudbraaten, 1998:18-19]. It involves a set of actions that are intended at suspending institutional structures and supporting interventions that will remove the root causes of conflict. The peacebuilding process has political, economic, social, cultural and psychological aspects [Kingma and Batchelor, 1998:11]. It is these aspects of peacebuilding that will form the basis of this study.

Peacebuilding is influenced by a number of structural and policy factors. At a structural level, such factors include: the promotion and protection of human rights, state capacity to create economic opportunities and civilian control over the armed forces, and protection of human security and the creation of a secure environment. Policy factors that may influence peacebuilding include: material and other provisions for demobilised and reintegrated combatants, reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure, disarmament and demining processes, and psycho-social support and assistance for trauma healing through truth commissions [Batchelor and Kingma, 2000:6-7].

	Peace and Human Development		
	Peacebuilding		
	Political	Economic	Social/Cultural/Psychological
Processes	Democratisation (formal and Informal) Empowerment Demilitarisation	Economic development State/nation-building Demilitarisation Conversion	Reconciliation State/nation-building Demilitarisation and
Structural factors	Civil-Military Relations (CMR) (patterns/ roles of armed forces) Security Political (human) Rights Law and order State capacity/ 'good governance'	CMR (defence industry) Economic security Socio-economic (human) rights Law and order State capacity	CMR (new perceptions/ roles) Human security Human rights Law and order
Policy/ Programmes	Structural adjustment Repatriation Demobilisation and Reintegration support Disarmament and Demining Redistribution	Structural adjustment Repatriation Demobilisation and reintegration support Disarmament and demining Redistribution Rehabilitation	Education/health care Repatriation Demobilisation and reintegration support Redistribution Psycho-social Assistance

Table 2: The Concept of Peacebuilding

Source: Batchelor and Kingma, 2000:7

Peacebuilding is a long-term process that may involve nation-building measures that are important to prevent a return to conflict.⁸ This may involve a number of phases in which conflict may pass: a situation without obvious conflict, situation of tension, a situation of open conflict and post-conflict situations [Haugerudbraaten, 1998:20]. This implies that the stages leading from conflict to peace, negotiations, demobilisation and reintegration are interdependent. The

⁸ Often there is disagreement about the duration of peacebuilding activities. Funders often recommend short-term support for the peacebuilding process. This was the case in Mozambique where peacebuilding support efforts were ended soon after the national elections. In Haiti, the process was much longer and was viewed as a "nation building" process rather than peacebuilding" process [Haugerudbraaten, 1998:20-21].

above measures to resolve a conflict are taken with the objective of ensuring a smooth transition to peace, development and human security [PPC, 1998:4].⁹

For peacebuilding to begin to take effect in a post-conflict situation, it is essential for it to occur at different societal levels. At the national level, leaders of former parties in conflict resolve their differences. At the regional and community levels, former enemies engage in a process of reconciliation and rehabilitation. Individuals deal with the resultant traumas of conflict, as a way of coming to terms with their experiences at the personal level [Kingma and Batchelor, 1998:11]. Central to the effectiveness of peacebuilding in countries emerging from a conflict is that local actors take responsibility for its ultimate realisation and success. Although international actors should provide support and encouragement to the principal actors, it is eventually the local actors who should oversee the implementation of peacebuilding. They should be the ones ultimately responsible for the shape, form and content of the peacebuilding process [Nathan, 2000:17-18].¹⁰

2.3. Demobilisation, Reintegration, Rationalisation and Peacebuilding. A Literature Review

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by the general process of demilitarisation. This led many countries to initiate a process of demobilisation, reintegration and peacebuilding. As a consequence, a voluminous amount of

⁹ According to the UNDP, security is crucial for development and peace. "The world could never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives. Future conflicts may often be within nations rather than between them with their origins buried deep in growing socio-economic deprivation and disparities. The search for security in such a milieu lies in development, not in arms". United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 1994. **Human Development Report** (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

¹⁰ Very often local peacemakers find themselves competing for funding and recognition with international NGOs. In addition, the problem of funding is due to the difficulty of dealing with individuals or leaders within the community who are singled out for recognition and resources. They feel entitled to special status and lose touch with the ordinary people on the ground and make peacebuilding their secondary objective. Crawford, Neta. 2000. **Notes on 10 Dilemmas of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding**. Paper Presented at the Conference of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Workshop. Cape Town, 26-29 June, pp. 4.

literature by scholars, governments and civil society organisations on these processes exist.

The literature focuses on a range of issues. The foremost include requirements for successful demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation processes, a framework for understanding issues pertinent to these processes, the varying nature and scope of these processes, the difficulties encountered in these processes and their potential threat to peacebuilding. Indeed, there is a wide scope on offer, but this study will limit itself to the political, economic, social, cultural and psychological objectives of demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding.

2.3.1. Demobilisation, Reintegration, Rationalisation and Peacebuilding. Political Objectives

Following the cessation of hostilities in a conflict, attention should be accorded to mechanisms aimed at creating an inclusive and tolerant political environment, as a significant step towards post-conflict reconstruction. As Kingma [2000] maintains, the lack of a democratic process with no commitment to reform measures, representivity and inclusive decision-making could develop new conflicts or rekindle old ones. Moreover, the failure to introduce meaningful disarmament measures and the availability of small arms could exacerbate the risk of people resorting to violence if disputes arise. In view of these, the political objectives of demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation should be concerned with the strengthening of democratic principles for the sake of peacebuilding [Kingma, 2000].¹¹

¹¹ In most cases, former combatants hold onto their weapons as a source of security in case the peace process fails or when they are sceptical that their needs will not be addressed once peace has been achieved to use for their survival. For more on disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants as part of peacebuilding see, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). 1996. **Management of Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues.** Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project (Geneva: UNIDIR) and Kingma, Kees (ed). 2000. **Demobilisation and in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Development and Security Impacts** (Basingstoke: Macmillan Publishers).

Mason [1999] is also mindful of the effects of insufficient disarmament during demobilisation. Despite the commitment to disarm former conflicting parties during peace agreements, disarmament has been one of the least executed aspects of the peace implementation process. Often, this is the result of vast quantities of weapons, which remain outside effective control, lack of commitment to disarm, inadequate resources, insufficient information about arms caches and stockpiles and lack of sufficient incentives. Some of these weapons are sometimes used to fuel conflict or for criminal activities by unemployed former combatants [Mason, 1999].

In keeping with Kingma and Mason's line of argument, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) [1998] argues that the political objectives of demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation programmes should be to build long-lasting peace between parties previously engaged in conflict. This can be achieved through the establishment of effective government mechanisms embedded in democratic principles of executive decision-making, administration, legislation and a judicial system. Before these can be realised, parties should agree on constitutional, governance, security, and economic arrangements that will allow them to co-operate in the future [PPC, 1998].¹²

BICC [1998] emphasises the establishment of the above institutions embedded in democratic principles as a first step towards creating lasting peace. These alone cannot guarantee successful demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding. Instead, the long-term objectives of these processes should be accompanied by a strong political commitment from parties previously engaged in conflict. This is in the interest of development, especially in the light

¹² Mozambique is a case in point. On 4 October 1994 the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO) government and the rebel National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) signed a General Peace Agreement in which they pledged their support for lasting peace. Under the Peace Agreement, both FRELIMO and RENAMO agreed to establish a democratic government, representative defence force and demobilise and reintegrate former combatants under the Reintegration Commission. Stephen, Michael. 1995. "Demobilisation in Mozambique", in Jakkie Cilliers (ed) **Dismissed. Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa** (Midrand: IDP), pp. 58-59.

of the devastation caused by conflict and the chances of other conflicts emerging [BICC, 1998].¹³

2.3.2. Demobilisation, Reintegration, Rationalisation and Peacebuilding. Economic Objectives

Although the creation of a democratic political environment is a major step towards peacebuilding, economic reconstruction also contributes to lasting peace. The World Bank [1998] maintains that post-conflict reconstruction is the cornerstone of economic recovery in societies emerging from conflicts. The rebuilding of the economy should include assistance programmes for people displaced by the conflict and former combatants through such means as credit lines and micro-enterprises. Moreover, the economy should be revitalised through investments, the creation of conditions for the resumption of trade and the promotion of macro-economic stability [World Bank, 1998].¹⁴

Focusing on the post-conflict economic conditions of former combatants, Nübler [1997] contends that the objectives of demobilisation and reintegration programmes should be to improve their human security. This is crucial considering their limited marketable skills and their military skills, which they could use to derail peace. Policies for the effective utilisation of former combatants' skills for civilian purposes should be developed. Programmes designed to create employment in a labour-intensive environment should be

¹³ The lack of political commitment and will was evident in Angola following the peace agreement that resulted in the signing of the Bicesse Accord in April 1991 and temporarily ended the civil war. The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the opposition force of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) failure to co-operate, disarm their combatants and maintain secret armies, led to another bloody civil war. The recent United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (UNOMA) mandate has been extended many times to keep pressure on UNITA to abide by the peace agreement without much success. Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). 1999. **Conversion Survey 1999. Global Disarmament, Demilitarisation and Demobilisation** (Bonn: BICC), pp. 80-81.

¹⁴ Many developing countries undergoing the transition from conflict or war to peace are often faced with economic difficulties. There is often the lack of economic resources and expertise to assist with the demobilisation process and the overall economic rehabilitation process. More serious is the fact that some have to deal simultaneously with the process of economic rehabilitation and averting a possible security threat that former combatants may pose.

implemented. Former combatants who want to be self-employed should have access to vocational training, credit facilities, equipment and land. In addition, skills verification methods should be introduced for those who have acquired marketable skills through certification [Nübler, 1997].¹⁵

In South Africa, where the level of unemployment is high, Williams [1998] argues that the challenge of demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding lies in human resource conversion and human resource development. The former refers to the conversion of former combatants' skills for use in a civilian lifestyle while human resource development refers to training provision for those with limited skills. Once these measures are in place and effectively utilised, they will ensure the long-term objectives of reintegration [Williams, 1998].

Similarly, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) [1995] emphasises the importance of addressing the economic needs of former combatant. This is in order to minimise possible future dissatisfaction that could hamper peacebuilding. Training provision, access to facilities and counselling serve as solutions in attaining economic reintegration. Nevertheless, these measures alone cannot ensure effective economic reintegration and peacebuilding. It is essential that employment feasibility studies, market surveys and training analyses be undertaken to determine the kinds of skills necessary for the market. This should inform skills training programmes implemented for former combatants so that their skills are marketable. This requires policy assistance, planning, co-ordination and international community support [ILO, 1995].¹⁶

¹⁵ The Mozambican demobilisation experience reveals that as part of the economic reintegration process, two to three former combatants were placed in small companies for on-the-job training. This skills provision method proved successful in providing former combatants with practical skills. Clark, Kimberly-Mahling. 1996. **Fostering a Farewell to Arms: Preliminary Lessons Learned in the Demobilisation and Reintegration of Combatants** (Washington, D.C: Research & Reference Services), pp. 18.

¹⁶ In Uganda, former combatants were successfully reintegrated into the mainstream economy. According to Mondo [1995], underlying the Ugandan success were preliminary surveys on the economic needs of former combatants, effective planning, execution, and monitoring of the

2.3.3. Demobilisation, Reintegration, Rationalisation and Peacebuilding. Social Objectives

Reintegration into civilian life represents a major challenge for former combatants. According to the NGO Networking Service [1995], societies in which they are reintegrated find it difficult to accept them either as a result of their association with a repressive regime or because they have undergone significant changes in lifestyle. This necessitates a well-planned programme to assist former combatants to deal with the societal stigmatisation they may encounter upon being reintegrated into civilian life. Members of society should not only be sensitised to the experiences of former combatants, but also encouraged to assist them in dealing with their difficulties [NGO Networking Service, 1995].¹⁷

Cock [1993] was also mindful of societal difficulties former MK combatants were encountering immediately following their reintegration. Many were unemployed, young and eager to continue with their disrupted education. They lacked shelter and a number of them were living with their relatives in overcrowded conditions, which often generated family tension. There was also the "returning hero syndrome", which generated its own stresses. Because of their heroic stature, society expected former combatants to live a better life. To overcome these societal expectations and pressures, some resorted to the use of alcohol and crime. To prevent this from occurring, demobilisation programmes should provide gratuities, housing, access to education, agricultural land and employment opportunities to former combatants. This is in order to decrease the likelihood of former combatants engaging in criminal activities, overcoming the legacy of discrimination and reconciling as part of the peacebuilding process [Cock, 1993].

demobilisation programme by the Veterans Assistance Programme (VAP), which was responsible for demobilisation, resettlement and reintegration [Mondo, 1995].

¹⁷ Efforts were made in Uganda to sensitise the community about the needs of former combatants in order to ensure that they became productive members of society. Following reintegration, the Ugandan Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) conducted seminars to educate the community not to view former combatants negatively, but to assist them in resettling into society. A radio programme was also initiated to educate the community and former combatants about issues relating to the assistance offered by veterans programmes. Kazoora, Benjamin. 1997. *The Ugandan Reintegration Experience* (Bonn: BICC), pp. 9.

The PPC [1998] shares similar views to that of Cock. The most common difficulties experienced by former combatants include: limited education, the lack of shelter, high levels of unemployment, limited financial resources, physical problems and marginalisation. This is often because of disruption in their education as youth, the de-skilling process during war and traumatic experiences. The primary social motive of reintegration programmes should be to reintegrate former combatants into civilian life so that they become ordinary, active and productive members of their communities. Progress in this regard depends on the following: the level of social unrest or peace, family relations seen in terms of harmony or tension, access to shelter, land, medical care, and other necessities of life, reconnection with community members, community involvement and participation, self-identification within the community, and the level of human security and positive vision for the future [PPC, 1998].¹⁸

2.3.4. Demobilisation, Reintegration, Rationalisation and Peacebuilding. Cultural Objectives

According to Kingma and Gebrewold [1998], during violent conflict or war, different cultural norms may develop within political movements that may be different to that held by the community. Female combatants or the wives of male combatants may acquire new gender roles that afford them equal status with their male counterparts. Once reintegrated into civilian life, former female combatants may be expected to return to their traditional roles in family and community. If they refuse to conform to traditionally defined roles, they are rejected by their communities, families, or in-laws, resulting in divorce and marginalisation. In order to avoid these difficulties from occurring, society should be sensitised to the cultural experiences and needs of those who were actively involved during war [Kingma and Gebrewold, 1998].¹⁹

¹⁸ According to ONUMOZ statistics, 37% of 92,881 demobilised combatants in Mozambique had their education disrupted by civil war and 34% had no formal education, whilst 32% were at least in possession of a primary education [Dolan and Schafer, 1997:76].

Musemwa [1995] points to the cultural difficulties experienced by former female combatants' upon reintegration into civilian life in Zimbabwe. Those former female combatants who wanted to marry found that civilian men were reluctant to marry them. While some men believed that they were too independent and powerful to provide them with the more passive kind of marriage partners they were seeking, others felt that they lacked propriety. These societal misperceptions and stigmatisation resulted in many female combatants finding it easier to live with and marry their former male combatants [Musemwa, 1995].

2.3.5. Demobilisation, Reintegration, Rationalisation and Peacebuilding. Psychological Objectives

Following the cessation of hostilities, the parties formerly involved in the conflict are inevitably left with deep traumatic wounds, hatred and mistrust. As a mechanism for peacebuilding, countries are often faced with the major challenge of creating an environment in which people can live with each other. Cock [1993] found that many former MK combatants had been subjected to harsh and stressful conditions during the liberation struggle. Although they were unaware or did not use the term "Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)", a number of them appeared to be suffering from this psychological condition, with symptoms including depression, aggressive behaviour and alcoholism. The consequence of PTSD is emotional damage, which continued to impact negatively on their lives and society in general. While some became involved in criminal activities, others are abusive to their family members. For these reasons, Cock argues for rehabilitation whereby the leadership and experiences of former combatants are recognised and affirmed as valuable assets for peacebuilding [Cock, 1993].

19 In Eritrea, female combatants comprised almost 30% of war combatants and considered their struggle for liberation as for both political and cultural freedom. Despite the lack of resources to support themselves, many did not want to return to their families where they would have had to give up their cultural independence following reintegration. Clark, Kimberly-Mahling. 1996. **Fostering a Farewell to Arms: Preliminary Lessons Learned in the Demobilisation and Reintegration of Combatants** (Washington, D.C: Research & Reference Services), pp. 22.

Almost five years into the formal demobilisation and reintegration processes of former MK and APLA combatants, as the Mokalobe [1999] study indicates, many are still faced with psychological difficulties as a result of their conflict experiences and everyday difficulties. Social and economic insecurity faced by a number of them continues the pattern of aggression, family and societal tension and alcoholism. Given these difficulties, the government should offer former combatants assistance in the form of counselling, medical provision and mental rehabilitation. This should be an integral part of addressing not only their psychological difficulties, but also their political, economic, social and cultural needs [Mokalobe, 1999].

Thede [1999] recognises that reconciliation is another way of dealing with the psychological difficulties experienced by former combatants and society. Reconciliation is an important way of dealing with past injustices and a crucial mechanism for peacebuilding. Countries find it increasingly important to use truth commissions to facilitate the truth telling without legal actions or further conflict arising. Truth commissions are seen as mechanism for national reconciliation and democratic stability. Such commissions serve as a symbolic mechanism when dealing with memories of the past. They also become formal mechanisms for recognising the historical contribution and sacrifice of victims and activists. This is essential as memories form the basis for building new values and institutions in a society in transition. Reconciliation should deal with crimes against humanity, strengthen democratic institutions, and encourage political dialogue and reconciliation between the parties formerly involved in conflict [Thede, 1999].

In South Africa, Liebenberg and Williams [1996] acknowledge the significance of the TRC in shaping the form of and entrenching tolerance in the SANDF in the light of the restructuring and integration processes. The TRC has been invaluable, particularly considering the history of the South African security establishment with its record of human rights violation. The TRC has also been

important for normative reasons such as justice, reconciliation and truth, nation-building, military professionalism, creating a new institutional culture and democratic civil-military relations, for maintaining cohesion and building morale in the SANDF. The success of these processes required that members of the SANDF disclose to the public their activities during apartheid and ask for forgiveness in order to reconcile with their past excesses [Liebenberg and Williams, 1996].

According to Howe [1994], another way of aiding and facilitating reconciliation is by creating a representative defence force that includes both former SADF and MK. A representative military that includes MK can bring legitimacy in the newly created defence force, specially in the eyes of black South Africans. Similarly, inclusion of white personnel in the new military can reassure the whites that their rights are recognised and protected under the new order. In this way, sources of potential opposition will be removed with the new defence force co-operating to protect the democratic government [Howe, 1994].

2.3. Conclusion

It is clear from this chapter that demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation are integral parts of demilitarisation, human security and peacebuilding. On the one hand, demilitarisation emphasises the need for shifting power and resources from the military to other social sectors of society. As a result, the path for development and growth is supported through the reduction of military resources. On the other hand, the concept of human security argues for the security of individuals from poverty, crime, disease and repression. This means that if political, economic, social and health needs of individuals are not attended to, they feel insecure and could pose a danger to the stability of the government. Clearly, opportunities arising from the process of demilitarisation feed into human security through the creation of employment opportunities and increased spending on education, health and other social sectors. This is important in the

case of former combatants who, given their human insecurity, could utilise their military skills for purposes of crime or banditry to make a living. This shows a strong connection between redirecting of military resources for development and meeting the human security needs of individuals.

The literature on the political, economic, social, cultural and psychological objectives of the demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding programmes indicate that the human security of former combatants is essential in achieving lasting peace. Scholars, policy-makers and experts alike agree that the political objectives of programmes about these processes should be to create lasting peace through the establishment of political, economic and social structures embedded in democratic principles. One way of achieving this is to ensure that specific economic objectives be aimed at improving the welfare of former combatants, while at the same time rebuilding the generic economic fabric of the country. These should be done through skills training provision, the creation of employment opportunities, and access to credit, equipment and land. Moreover, provision should be made to house, educate and employ them. Cultural objectives should concentrate on sensitising members of society about the experiences of former combatants so as to assist them in becoming productive members of society. Given their war experiences and stigmatisation they face, it is critical that their psychological needs be addressed through counselling, medical provision, as well as the reconciliation process.

Chapter Three

3. The Road to a Democratic South Africa

This chapter is concerned with the South African transition process. It provides an analysis of factors and circumstances that led to the advent of democracy, as well as the context within which they should be understood. It discusses and analyses the factors that led the National Party (NP) government to abandon the apartheid system and introduce political reform measures. Most importantly, this chapter looks at the measures taken by the different political parties and groups during the negotiation process to prepare the way for a democratic South Africa and the implications thereof for the transformation process. The purpose is to understand the initial process aimed at peacebuilding in South Africa, which resulted from a decision by the ANC and PAC to abandon the armed struggle in favour of a negotiated political settlement. This eventually led to the demobilisation and reintegration of former MK and APLA combatants.

The first section deals with the context in which the South African transition should be understood. The second section expands on the basis of the South African transition and looks at both international and national factors that led to the demise of apartheid. An evaluation of the demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding processes depends on a proper understanding of the negotiation process. For this reason, the third section focuses on the political negotiations, while section four examines the military negotiations, which formed the basis of demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding.

3.1. Understanding Transition in South Africa

Following four decades of the NP apartheid government's rule in South Africa, the first ever-democratic elections were held in 1994. Democracy brought fresh inspiration to politics. Given the brutal nature of the apartheid government and

the fierce struggle waged by social forces against it, the first democratically elected President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela described the transition to democracy as "a small miracle". Yet, the transition to democracy was not an easy process and proved difficult. As Lawrence [1994] contends, the transition to democracy represented a compromise whereby a minority handed political power to the majority without losing control of state machinery, and without becoming a junior but equal partner in politics [Lawrence, 1994:1].

What often occupied the minds of politicians and scholars alike during the transition was the nature and form democracy should take. Opinions and arguments in this regard differed enormously. In South Africa, Stedman [1994] argued that the task of those who negotiate the transition to democracy should be the achievement of economic equality and the creation of a culture of tolerance and national unity [Stedman, 1994:7-24]. These are critical elements of human security and peacebuilding.

Ginsburg and Webster [1997] agree with the above premise and maintain that since the struggle against apartheid was about a better and equal life for all, democracy should be about the achievement of these objectives. Looking at the nature of transition in South Africa, this theoretical base is derived from Adam Przeworski's **Democracy and the Market** [1991].²⁰ Przeworski argues that transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy are rarely achieved through revolution, but through negotiations or pacts between reformers in the state and moderates in the opposition liberation movement. Transition takes place when there is a mutual sense of stalemate. To facilitate talks, an alliance between reformers in the opposition and authoritarian government is formed to find common grounds in a limited notion of democracy. Parties then commit themselves to preserving the central pillars of a capitalist society, which ensures

²⁰ See also, Adler, Glenn and Eddie Webster. 1994. **Challenging Transition Theory: The Labour Movement, Radical Reform, and Transition to Democracy in South Africa**. Paper Prepared for Presentation at the Conference on Democracy: Popular Precedents, Popular Practice and Popular Culture. Johannesburg, 13-15 July.

that existing power holders maintain veto power over the pace, content and institutional form of democracy. Put differently, existing power holders retain significant control over essential state machinery such as property, the economy and the military [Ginsburg and Webster, 1997:111-113].

As the following section will demonstrate, the above transitional framework applies to South Africa. Its implications on the transformation process have been significant for the ways in which democracy was implemented. What becomes particularly clear, as will later be demonstrated, is that a number of the critical elements that necessitated the struggle against apartheid persist in South Africa today due to the nature of the transition.

3.2. The Demise of Apartheid in South Africa

Towards the end of the 1980s, the long-standing military and ideological antagonism between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, which had dominated international relations for more than three decades ended. In South Africa, these developments rendered the apartheid system futile, which had been the blueprint for racial domination and segregation on the basis of a perceived communist threat.

At the same time, the armed struggle by MK and APLA was increasing and paralysing to the NP government. In June 1980, MK combatants attacked the Sasol Oil Refinery and later Sasol's Secunda plant, resulting in damages estimated at millions of Rands. By the end of 1981, MK had mounted almost 51 operations against the apartheid government [Barrel, 1990:46-48]. In 1982, the Voortrekkerhoogte monument and Koeberg nuclear power station were attacked. In the following year, a car bomb explosion at the South African Air Force Military Intelligence building resulted in major structural damage [Motumi, 1994:2-3].

At the ANC June 1985 Kwabe conference, MK was declared a "Revolutionary Army" fighting a "people's war" [Williams, 1994:30].²¹ Following Kwabe, MK launched operation Vula in the late 1980s in order to establish a national underground political and military leadership presence inside South Africa. The results were considerable. Almost 150 MK combatants were moved into the country and underground structures established. Armed operations by MK increased to 136 and 67 incidents of handgrenade explosions on various targets were reported. By the end of 1989, reported MK operations exceeded 200 [Barrel, 1990:60-67].

On 10 August 1989, at the Frontline States meeting held in Lusaka, the ANC announced its willingness to negotiate with the NP government on condition that political prisoners be released, troops in the townships be removed, political prosecution of those opposed to apartheid end and a new democratic Constitution be drafted. This proposition, which was referred to as the **Harare Declarations**, was endorsed by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the UN and the South African Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) [Haysom, 1992:35-36].²²

²¹ The ANC peoples' war was based on three strategies. First, guerrilla units were established in the countryside, and combat units and self-defence units in urban areas. Second, all ANC revolutionary forces fell under the command of MK detachments. Finally, insiders within the NP government were recruited to supply guerrilla units with information [Williams, 1994:30-31]. This strategy was largely based on the Leninist approach for a successful revolution. Lenin argued that a successful revolution lies in the adoption of a flexible combat strategy based on the different forms of battle arising from a changing social environment. In Russia, Lenin agitated for urban guerrilla warfare because the cities were the heart of capitalism. Lenin further emphasised the creation of a "climate of collapse" through armed propaganda in order to make people aware of the significance of the struggle and how it affected their everyday lives through newspapers, leaflets, and countless other means. In addition, pressure through riots and strikes should be increased and security forces subverted. Moss, Robert. 1975. "Urban Guerrilla Warfare", in Sam Sarkesian (ed) **Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare** (Chicago: Precedent Publishing), pp. 475.

²² For discussion on contrasting views within the ANC as to whether to engage in insurrectionary people's war or negotiated settlement see, Lodge, Tom. 1989. "People's War or Negotiation? African National Congress Strategies in the 1980s", in Glenn Moss and Ingrid Obery (eds.) **South African Review** 5 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press), pp. 42-55.

In the 1980s, APLA operations also increased significantly. In the 1970s, APLA efforts to establish bases in South Africa had failed to materialise because of internal leadership power struggles, which impacted on APLA operations. This changed in the 1980s when a new leadership assumed power. APLA's organisational structure was revived and more bases were established in the country. In 1987, police claimed that they arrested or killed 85 APLA combatants. APLA in turn reported that its combatants killed 12 security personnel and wounded 67. In July 1988, 4 APLA combatants were killed and 12 policemen wounded in a shoot out with the police [Lodge, 1995:106-108].

While the ANC was considering a political settlement in the early 1990s, APLA operations increased.²³ In 1992, APLA combatants bombed a farm in Lady Grey and a police residence. Another attack was launched at the King Williams Golf Club where 4 people were killed and 17 injured [TRC, 1998:685-690]. In April 1993, Sabelo Phama, Chief Commander of APLA, declared 1993 the "Year of the Great Storm" where APLA would "disintegrate the enemy forces by striking them at their weakest link" [Azania Combat, 1993:3-4].²⁴ Following this declaration, 2 APLA combatants attacked the Heidelberg Tarven in Cape Town killing 4 people and injuring 3. In another attack at St James Church in Cape Town, APLA combatants killed 11 people and injured 58. In February 1994, the Craze Disco in Newcastle was attacked with 1 person killed and several others injured [TRC, 1998:685-690].

In the 1980s, political unrest in the country grew under the NP government's increasing repression. On 20 August 1983, youth, student, female, civil and

²³ APLA refused to abandon the armed struggle as a prerequisite to negotiations. It made it clear that it was continuing with all forms of struggle, the principal one been the armed struggle [Azania Combat, 1993:2].

²⁴ APLA strategy was based on Mao Tse-Tung's views on guerrilla warfare, which emphasised the mobilisation of the peasantry in order to "create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy". This strategic approach was based on the Chinese "wei-ch'i" game which premised the city as the stronghold of the government and the countryside as the weakest. Sarkesian, Sam. 1975. "Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: An Introduction", in Sam Sarkesian (ed) **Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare** (Chicago: Procedent Publishing), pp. 1-21.

workers organisations came together to establish the United Democratic Front (UDF) in Mitchell's Plain, Cape Town. Shortly following its establishment, the UDF embarked on political campaigns, "to build and strengthen non-racial democratic organisations as an alternative to apartheid itself". Between 1984 and 1985, the UDF led a nation-wide school and rent boycotts, which started in the Vaal Townships of Sebokeng, Sharperville and Boipatong and spread to other parts of South Africa. The boycotts were a protest against general education difficulties faced by black youth such as overcrowding, poor matriculation results and increasing rent costs [Lodge, 1991:47-77]. Underlying this strategy was to render the country ungovernable to prove the NP government was illegitimate and oppressive.

During the 1985 state of emergency, the UDF embarked on a successful nation-wide consumer boycott, which forced the affected business community to pressure the NP government to include blacks in government. The UDF campaigns continued to increase between 1988 and 1989. In many of these campaigns, the government responded with harsh repression measures. Such measures included detentions and military occupation of townships. Nonetheless, the UDF continued to grow and gained large support nation-wide. In 1989, the UDF formed an alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which became known as the Mass Democratic Movement. In 1989, the MDM launched a defiance campaign to challenge the segregation of government-controlled facilities, thus forcing the NP government to open segregated facilities to all [Lodge, 1992:78-112].

In addition to the enormous paralysing cost of the armed struggle and political unrest, the South African government could not withstand the heavy cost of economic sanctions by the international community. From the mid-1980s, the South African economy was starved of foreign capital and investment. In September 1986, the Council of Ministers of the European Community implemented a ban of new investment in South Africa. Similarly, the United

States of America enacted the Anti-Apartheid Act, which banned new investments in South Africa. Canada, France, Switzerland and Japan prohibited lending to South Africa. Although, Italy and Spain prohibited new investments in South Africa, they did not ban loans to the public and private sectors [ILO, 1991:1-2]

The sanctions proved effective and damaging to the economy. In July 1985, the Chase Manhattan Bank refused to grant South Africa a US \$550 million loan, which was due within a year. Other major international banks followed suite, forcing the closure of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) as a result of the severe decline in the value of the Rand. By the end of June 1989, the total outflow of capital in South Africa amounted to R24,9 billion and net payment of loans accounted for R14,7 billion of the total national debt. The total debt at the end of 1988 was US \$21,2 billion [ILO, 1991:1].

The sanctions also affected the political environment. In 1985, the South African business community met with the ANC for the first time to discuss options for a truce between it and the government. The following year, certain business associations drew up a Business Charter signed by the Afrikaanse Handelinstituut, an important body of Afrikaner businessmen, calling for an end to the forced removals of blacks, common citizenship to all South Africans, and black participation in national politics. This forced the NP government to reluctantly introduce some superficial political changes [CIIR, 1990:144-151]. In 1987, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, the Canadian Foreign Minister, Joe Clark, mentioned that because of the sanctions, a "growing numbers of individual South Africans have reached out for reform" [Adam and Moodley, 1993:52].

Consequently, there emerged within the NP government reformers who argued that apartheid had failed and that the only conceivable solution was a political compromise [Friedman, 1993:10]. They argued for reform not as a means to

effect genuine change or to do away with the existing order, but as a way of accommodating changes within the existing order, so as to maintain control [Friedman, 1990:9]. Following his election as the President of South Africa, F.W. De Klerk brought about some political reforms. In the 1987 white elections campaign, De Klerk warned the voters that political change was inevitable. Such change was to be NP government-led and controlled, and not accommodation of the "enemy". In De Klerk's view, racial groups, not people, were the permanent components of a working political order [Friedman, 1993:8-10].

3.3. Negotiations about Negotiations

On 2 February 1990, F.W. De Klerk announced the unbanning of political movements to negotiate the political future of South Africa. He also declared the release of Nelson Mandela as well as other ANC and PAC political prisoners. However, De Klerk made it clear that he was strongly opposed to black majority rule and warned that,

There could be no winner takes all system, but a power sharing one. Don't expect me to negotiate myself out of power [Sparks, 1995:12].

On the part of the ANC, there was a realisation that the armed struggle was one of many ways to bring about political change. In the words of Nelson Mandela,

It was clear to me that military victory was a distant if not impossible dream. It simply did not make sense for both sides to lose thousands if not millions of lives in a conflict that was unnecessary [Mandela, 1994:626].²⁵

Given this political situation, there was a mutually perceived sense of stalemate between the NP government and the ANC. Both parties were convinced that

²⁵ Nelson Mandela's realisation that the armed struggle was one possible way of achieving democracy was based largely on the changing political environment throughout the world. Another underlying factor was the growing repression by the NP government of the forces opposing apartheid. Between 12 June 1985 and September 1988, it was estimated that about 32 000 people were detained under the state of emergency regulations. The number of people detained for a period exceeding 30 days since 12 June 1986 was 16 000 and the highest daily average detainee population was 8 000 in July 1988 (SAIRR, 1989: 552-553).

neither apartheid nor the armed struggle could solve the political difficulties facing South Africa. The only available option was a political settlement and compromise. Once this stalemate was acknowledged, informal talks between the ANC and the NP government leadership began in the mid-1980s.

The first informal meeting between the ANC and the NP government took place in 1986 between Nelson Mandela and the Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons, Kobie Coetzee. Although nothing concrete emerged from this meeting, it opened the way for future talks between the two parties. In August 1987, a group of about 50 Afrikaners held a week long meeting with the ANC leadership in Dakar, Senegal. In July 1989, 50 ANC leaders hosted a delegation of 115 white South Africans, representing 35 opposition organisations, in Lusaka. Despite an indication among certain individuals within the Afrikaner community in the 1980s that political reform was necessary, President, P.W. Botha refused to negotiate with the ANC on the grounds that it did not reject violence as a political instrument [Sparks, 1995:49-87].

On 23 April 1989, the NP government tabled a Bill providing for indemnity against prosecution and detention of political activists, and exiles facing criminal charges. Once this precondition by the ANC for negotiations was met by the NP government, the first formal meeting between the ANC and the NP government aimed at removing obstacles to the future negotiations was held in Cape Town on 4 May 1990.

Following this meeting, in a document called the **Groote Schuur Minutes**, the ANC and the NP government agreed to the following:

- To establish a Working Group to define political offences and advise on mechanisms for dealing with political prisoners and granting of immunity
- To offer ANC leadership in exile temporary immunity from prosecution to assist with the establishment and management of political activities
- To review security legislation to allow free political activities and lift the state of emergency
- To establish channels of communication to curb violence [Haysom, 1992:28-29].

The second round of talks between the ANC and the NP government was held in Pretoria on 6 August 1990. This meeting resulted in the **Pretoria Minutes** with the two parties agreeing to the following:

- To release political prisoners and granting of indemnity
- The ANC suspension of the MK armed struggle
- To establish measures to curb violence and promote peace
- The lifting of the state of emergency in Natal
- To continue reviewing security legislation
- To hold negotiations on a new Constitution [Ebrahim, 1998:485-487].

Despite these agreements, relations between the ANC and the NP government were strained. The ANC emphasised that recruitment of combatants was not an armed activity and refused to reveal its arms caches in the country. The NP government contended that MK prisoners could not be released as long as there were still arms caches in the country [Haysom, 1992:32].

In an effort to resolve these difficulties, a Working Group comprising of military and security personnel from the ANC and the NP government was established under the **Pretoria Minutes**, paragraph 3, to define what armed actions and related activities meant. Under paragraphs 3, the two parties conceded to the followings:

In the interests of moving as speedily as possible towards a negotiated peaceful political settlement, the ANC announced that it was suspending the armed actions with immediate effect. As a result of this, no further armed actions and related activities by the ANC and its military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe would take place. It was agreed that a Working Group would be established to resolve all outstanding questions arising out of this decision to report by 15 September 1990 [Ebrahim, 1998:493].

The prevailing political climate in South Africa also strained relations between the two parties. The ANC complained about the NP government's unwillingness to prevent violence and charge those responsible for inciting violence [Haysom, 1992:32]. It was estimated that 101 people were dying every month due to the political violence that took place from July 1990 to June 1991. The SADF and Inkatha Freedom Party were responsible for 70% of this violence [HRC, 1993].

Convinced that their privileges were on the verge of collapse with the prospect of a democratic government under the ANC, SADF covert units especially the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the Reconnaissance Commando turned their attention to the destabilisation of liberation movements following their withdrawal from neighbouring Southern African countries [Howe, 1994:42-43].²⁶ These units embarked on a counter-insurgency strategy to weaken the liberation movements through unlawful methods such as torture and assassinations, using homeland governments to incite violence and carry out covert operations through the Third Force [TRC, 1998:695].

On 14 September 1991, in an attempt to end the political violence, the ANC, NP government and Inkatha signed the **National Peace Accord** where they committed themselves to the following principles:

- To bring an end to political violence through codes of conduct and certain procedures and mechanisms
- To establish mechanisms aimed at addressing the effects of violence at a local level within the wider context of socio-economic development
- To establish a multi-party democracy
- To uphold, respect and contribute to fundamental democratic rights and principles
- To refrain from incitement of violence and hatred
- Not to allow private armies or the use of security establishments to carry out, encourage and support political violence [National Peace Accord, 1991:3-6].

The **National Peace Accord** was later signed by representatives of 23 other political parties and movements. White right-wing groups did not support the **National Peace Accord** on the grounds that it compromised white privileges and political rights. Although they did not sign it, the PAC and the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) pledged their support for the **National Peace Accord**.²⁷

²⁶ Some soldiers in covert operation units of the SADF believed that the fall of apartheid could be prevented through "extreme measures". Seegers, Annette. 1990. "Current Trends in South Africa's Security Established". **International Political Science Association**, Madrid.

²⁷ The signing of the **National Peace Accord** did not end the violence, but served as a means to bring all political parties and groups together to work towards peace and a political settlement. This was important given that the NP government supported and incited political violence and continued to do so even after the signing of the **National Peace Accord**.

3.4. Political Negotiations

Once the **National Peace Accord** was signed, the basis for the formal political negotiations among political parties and groups began. In January 1991, Nelson Mandela urged for "an all-party congress" to start negotiating for a Constituent Assembly. Mandela's call was heard. On 20 December 1991, delegates from 19 political parties met at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in Johannesburg to begin negotiating the political future of South Africa [Sparks, 1995:129-130].

On 21 December 1991, 5 Working Groups responsible for creating a climate of free political participation, creating a Constitution-making body, creating the climate for an interim government, decide on the future of homelands, and consider time frames for implementing CODESA I agreements, were established. On 2 January 1992, F.W. De Klerk proposed to Parliament the establishment of an interim government, but insisted that Constitutional changes be approved by a referendum of Whites, Coloureds and Indian voters.²⁸

The intention behind the establishment of an interim government was to ensure that the NP government held onto power for at least 15 years, as the NP plan proposed both an elected authority and a power sharing authority. In contrast, the ANC was in favour of a multi-party interim authority with a short life span to prepare the way for elections in a manner that ensured that no single party gained an unfair advantage over the other through the use of state resources [Friedman, 1993:26-27]. Due to opposition by right-wing groups, De Klerk decided to call for a "whites-only" referendum, in which 68% of voters responded positively to the establishment of an interim government.

While the negotiations were continuing, the PAC maintained that it was not negotiating. It argued that a Constitution had to be written by a Constituent

²⁸ The racial groups are used in this study for clarification and understanding of certain points.

Assembly not in multi-party talks "packed with lackeys of the regime". Concerned with the growth in APLA activities, in April 1992, the NP government met with the PAC in Gaborone, Botswana. By August 1992, the two parties agreed that an elected body would draft a new Constitution. The NP government insisted that talks with the PAC could only begin if the PAC distanced itself from APLA attacks.²⁹ The PAC refused and rejected CODESA I [Atkinson, 1994:18-19].

Despite the PAC's refusal to participate in CODESA I, the second round of talks, CODESA II, was held on 15 May 1992. Before long, the talks collapsed over disagreement regarding the percentage needed for decision-making in a future interim government. While the ANC was in favour of 66,7%, the NP government insisted on 70% for issues regarding decision-making and 75% on issues relating to the bill of rights, regions and government structure. Following consultation with the Patriotic Front countries that included Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique, the ANC settled for 70% for decision-making issues. The NP government rejected this offer and CODESA II came to a deadlock [Ebrahim, 1998:127-129].

Another contributing factor to the collapse of CODESA II was the continued political violence throughout the country and the NP government's involvement and support of this violence. On 17 June 1992, hostel dwellers from an Inkatha stronghold, killed 45 people in the Township of Boipatong. Angered by this event and the NP government's incitement of violence, Nelson Mandela called for "no more contact with the regime" [Mandela, 1993:174-178].

In 1992, the Goldstone Commission reported that it had seized DMI documents indicating that the DMI was planning to run a smear campaign against the ANC by using "prostitutes, homosexuals, night-club owners, and criminal elements" to

²⁹ APLA rejected this proposition by the NP government. The APLA delegation made it clear that APLA was part of the PAC and only the PAC's annual Congress had the final authority over APLA operations. According to APLA's Chief Information Officer, Jonny Majosi, "there can be no APLA without the PAC. And without the PAC and APLA, Azanian people would have nothing" [Azania Combat, 1993:16].

lure MK cadres into giving to the SADF demands [Howe,1994:37]. In February 1995, Daluxôlo Luthuli of Inkatha confessed that he and 200 Inkatha Self-Protection Units (SPUs) members had been trained by the DMI and the Fifth Reconnaissance commando at the Caprivi Strip in the mid 1980. The aim was to eliminate ANC members [Mail & Guardian, 17 February 1995]. This led F.W. De Klerk to reluctantly admit to the involvement of forces in political violence: "Obviously there might be individuals who have their own agendas" [Business Day, 17 November 1992].

The ANC maintained that it would only resume talks if the NP government stepped up surveillance of hostel dwellers, prohibit the use of dangerous weapons by Inkatha supporters and release all political prisoners [ANC Negotiations Bulletin, 1992:1-4]. The cost of a stalemate was high for the country. Many people were still dying at the hands of the government, which was fuelling violence at all ends. Eventually, the NP government accepted these negotiation preconditions and the two parties signed the **Record of Understanding** on 26 September 1992. They agreed to deal with such issues as a Constituent Assembly, hostel dwellers, dangerous weapons and the release of political prisoners. In defiance, the Conference of Concerned South Africans (COSAG), comprising of the homelands of Bophutatswana, Ciskei, Inkatha, the Conservative Party (CP) and the Afrikaners-Volksunie (AVU), rejected the **Record of Understanding** and demanded that MK be disbanded [Ebrahim, 1998:140-594].

The ANC's decision to resume talks was based on a paper written by Joe Slovo, leader of the South African Communist Party (SACP), entitled **Negotiations: What Room for Compromise?** Slovo argued in favour of power-sharing for a fixed number of years after the adoption of a new Constitution. He maintained that a peaceful political settlement had always been the first option of the ANC, with the armed struggle only being conceived after this option had failed. Political settlement would include the establishment of a Constitution-making body, the

creation of structures to ensure free and fair elections, the disbandment of the tri-cameral Parliament, the creation of Constitutionally entrenched boundaries and the restructuring of the civil service [Slovo, 1992:36-40].

After the signing of the **Record of Understanding**, the ANC and the NP resumed talks. They agreed that the negotiations of all parties and groups at CODESA II and I should resume, and called for the establishment of a new negotiating forum, the Multi-party Negotiating Process (MPNP) to meet on 1 April 1993 [Ebrahim, 1998:150]. Despite the initial refusal to participate in the MPNP, there was a growing realisation among some PAC leaders that negotiations were an integral part of the fight against apartheid. In 1993, Dikgang Moseneke, the Deputy President of PAC, declared that the PAC was now "refocusing" its strategies on the ballot. Later the PAC joined the talks without abandoning the armed struggle [Atkinson, 1994:19-20].

On 1 April 1993, the first MPNP meeting took place in Kempton Park where representatives from 26 parties and groups which included COSAG members and the PAC resumed the multi-party negotiations. In December of that year, the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) was established to oversee the transition period to democracy. Despite disagreements on a number of issues, the parties agreed on the following:

- The 27 April 1994 as the date for the first democratic elections
- The establishment of nine provinces
- The establishment of a Constitution-making body
- The passing of a TEC Bill
- The establishment of a Government of National Unity
- The adoption of a democratic Interim Constitution [Ebrahim, 1998:156-168].

In December 1993, an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was appointed to oversee free and fair elections. On 2 February 1994, De Klerk announced that the elections would be held and that all the parties that want to stand in the elections should register. On 27 April 1994, the first ever-democratic elections in

South Africa were held and the ANC emerged victorious with 62% votes and 252 seats in the National Assembly.

Party	Votes	Percentage	Seats
ANC	12, 237, 655	62, 6	252
NP	3, 983, 690	20, 4	82
Inkatha	2, 058, 294	10, 5	43
Freedom Front	424, 555	2, 2	9
Democratic Party	338, 426	1, 7	7
PAC	243, 478	1, 2	5
African Christian Democratic Party	88, 104	0, 5	2
Other	159, 296	0, 9	0
Total	9, 533, 498	100	400

Table 3: Seat Allocation in the National Assembly by Party: 1994
Source: SAIRR, 1995:339

3.5. Military Negotiations

Once the political negotiations were underway, the future of the SADF became a concern. In 1992, General Pierre Steyn urged that the SADF should start negotiating with MK. The underlying reason behind Steyn's proposal was for the SADF to gain control of the future defence force. In April 1993, the SADF and an MK delegation met at the Simon's Town Naval Base in Cape Town to negotiate the future of a new democratic defence force. Among the representatives of the SADF were General George Meiring, Lieutenant-General Pierre Steyn and the former National Intelligence Director, Neil Barnard. The MK delegation was led by the MK Chief Commander, Joe Modise, the ANC's legal advisor, Matthews Phosa, and civil rights lawyer, Nicholas Haysom [Shaw, 1995:17-18].³⁰

³⁰ The first informal meeting between MK, the SADF and homelands army officers started in 1990 at the ANC Lusaka Conference. At the end, the parties proposed the following: that there should be a cease-fire before negotiations start; the SADF commence a programme of affirmative action; MK, SADF and the armies of the homelands should be integrated into a new defence force; monitoring of security forces during the transition period; establishment of a democratic, representative and legitimate defence force; reduction in the armed force level; professional military training of all the armed forces after integration; and the prosecution of soldiers and police for crimes committed under the apartheid system [Nathan, 1991: 6-8].

The preliminary meetings focused on issues such as identification of arms caches, location of assembly areas and the future legal standing of the defence force. The parties agreed to establish a Working Group to examine three important aspects concerning the armed force: control of the armed forces during the transition phase before elections, the establishment of a national peacekeeping force, and the integration of all armed forces into a new defence force after the elections. Under the TEC, three Sub-Councils, the Intelligence Sub-Council, the Law and Order Sub-Council and the Defence Sub-Council, were established to deal with security issues during the transitional phase. The Defence Sub-Council was charged with the responsibility of overseeing the control of the defence force [Shaw, 1995:13-19].

After the TEC Act became a law on 9 November 1993, the negotiations on the defence provision of the Interim Constitution began. The ANC's central argument was civil supremacy over the armed forces and accountability of the armed forces to the public through Parliament. The ANC further adopted an anti-militarist position with regards to threat analysis within which to plan new defence force policy. It emphasised the need for a defensive armed force with an armed force level in accordance to the prevailing security environment. The SADF delegation argued for the "retention of standards" and the "apolitical nature and character of the defence force" [Batchelor and Willet, 1998:59].³¹

The SADF maintained that the Interim Constitution should make provision for the new defence force to be a "technologically advanced military force, which complies with international standards" [Shaw, 1995:19-23]. This provision was included in the Interim Constitution and later in the **Defence White Paper** [Defence White Paper, 1996:4]. Although it seemed that the argument about the "retention of standards" was to halt the declining defence budget, in essence, it

³¹ The issue of retention of standards dates back to the 1990 defence Parliamentary debates when the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan rejected the integration of MK on the grounds that it was not a professional army. Malan's argument became irrelevant when he was replaced by Roelf Mayer who was willing to negotiate with MK [Nathan, 1991].

was intended to ensure that whites in the SANDF could hold on to power. This was due to the fact that most MK combatants were infantry and had not received training in the use of technologically advanced weaponry [Batchelor and Willet, 1998:60].³²

Given the nature and size of both MK and APLA, a number of scholars argued that apart from Constitutional means, former SADF members would dominate a new defence force. Nathan [1993] put forth that instead of been integrated, MK and APLA would be absorbed into a new defence force where the former SADF will remain dominant. This was because the SADF's qualitative and quantitative capability extended beyond that of MK and APLA [Nathan, 1991:13].

Although MK's force level was estimated at between 14 000 and 16 000, MK submitted 28 000 names to the Certified Personnel Register (CPR) for integration into the new defence force. It was reported that in early 1994, between 8 000 and 10 000 MK combatants received conventional military training in countries such as Zimbabwe and India [Shaw, 1995:15-22].

Cilliers [1991] saw the new SANDF in the above light. He maintained that the future South African army would be "built around and upon the SADF as it exists today" and is likely to "still be run by whites and its military culture will essentially be that of the SADF for many years to come". MK also came to accept its future role as a professional army and strive to match the qualitative and quantitative strength of the SADF. There was a shift in the training of MK combatants from a revolutionary army to a professional army in the late 1980s, which was accompanied by a recruitment campaign. In October 1990, MK Chief

³² Another contributing factor for the SADF's "retention of standards" constitutional argument success had to do with the nature in which the talks were conducted. Whilst the SADF had a team of specialists on every issue and presented their arguments in a functional way, the MK delegation was small, lacked expertise on a number of issues and often presented their arguments in a democratic fashion. Seegers, Annette. 1996. **The Dynamics of the Military in South Africa**. Paper Presented at a Conference on Transition to Democracy: Chile and South Africa. Santiago, Chile. 7-13 April, pp. 32.

Commander, Chris Hani stated that MK recruits were undergoing professional military training in a number of Commonwealth countries [Cock, 1994:145-148].

In contrast, Williams [1991] argued that in its early stages, the new defence force would appear as a duplicate of the SADF. This would change because of 1980s SADF total strategy policy that called for the recruitment and promotion of other race groups in the SADF [Williams, 1991:28].

In January 1994, the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council (JMCC) was established to oversee the operational and tactical strategic planning for the integration and the creation of a new defence force. The JMCC composed of all representatives of the armed forces that were represented in the TEC. These included MK, SADF and the armies of the former TBVC homelands, which because of their inexperience, were marginalised [Batchelor and Willet, 1998:60]. APLA was not part of the military negotiation process. It maintained that cessation of hostilities must include joint monitoring of all armed forces during the transition under a neutral authority. APLA further maintained that the international community be involved in scrutinising and investigating the location and size of the South African security establishments [Azania Combat, 1993:2].

In September 1994, the Integration Committee (IC) was created to oversee integration and deal with everyday difficulties that may be experienced. Based on their professional military training in countries such as Namibia and Zimbabwe, the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) was invited to assess and validate military standards for the new defence force, to monitor training, and to adjudicate and advise on the integration process. After the April 1994 democratic elections, the SANDF came into existence [Defence Review, 1998:72].

3.6. Conclusion

In examining the transition process, it is clear that democracy in South Africa was a product of a negotiated settlement. Put differently, the South African transition was a compromise. This ensured that those who were in power retained

significant control over essential state machinery such as the economic and military sector. In contrast, the needs of those who were disadvantaged received less attention. On the whole, this means that the lives of the majority of South Africa's people would not change much under a democratic government as a result of the negotiated settlement process. The political negotiation process revealed that many compromises were made. When the NP government realised that apartheid was near its end due to the increasing level of the armed struggle, internal political opposition and economic sanctions, it opted for a negotiated political settlement with the ANC. However, as F.W. De Klerk argued, the intention behind a negotiated settlement was to ensure that the NP remained in control in a democracy. When the political negotiations ended, parties had compromised on a number of issues undermining a number of their major interests.

The military negotiations were no exception. During the talks between MK and the SADF, the NP government made every effort to ensure that former SADF members remained in control and dominated a future defence force. Once the parties had agreed to the integration of various armed forces in a future defence force, the SADF delegation argued that professional standards and technological advancements be the cornerstone of a future defence force. This position was in essence aimed at ensuring that whites in the SANDF held on to power, as most MK combatants had not received training in the use of technologically advanced weapons. Similarly, the argument on the retention of professional standards was also intended at ensuring white control over the SANDF, as this are SADF standard. Given these developments, it is clear that the SADF was to have significant influence and control in the future military.

Chapter Four

4. The South African Demobilisation Process

The subject of this chapter is the demobilisation of former combatants following their integration into the SANDF. It looks at the nature of this process, its planning and implementation stages and the difficulties encountered. The chapter also explores the professional and revolutionary soldier divide and the formation of the SADF. This is in order to understand the political context in which the SADF, MK and APLA operated and the impact thereof on demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding. The argument here is that because of the lack of proper planning, co-ordination and implementation by the government, a number of political, economic, social, cultural and psychological difficulties were encountered with demobilisation. With regards to integration, the underlying causes of problems are former SADF members.

There are five sections to this chapter. In order to understand the political context in which the SADF, MK and APLA operated, and the differences that existed between them, the first section looks at the divide between a professional and a revolutionary soldier. This is followed by a section on the formation of the SADF, which will assist in understanding some of the difficulties encountered in the formation of the SANDF. Since demobilisation involved first the integration of former MK and APLA combatants into the SANDF, the third section of the chapter examines integration and its difficulties. Section four and five discusses the dynamics of the demobilisation process and difficulties experienced. This section looks at the government's failure to plan, co-ordinate and implement a successful demobilisation programme to address the political, economic, social, cultural and psychological needs of former combatants.

4.1. Professional and Revolutionary Soldiers in Perspective

There are four characteristics that define a professional soldier: expertise, client-relationship with the state, corporate character and ideology. Historically, a professional soldier's expertise was based on bravery and discipline. A modern professional soldier is an expert in "the management of violence" and his duties include training, planning and directing. Second, a professional soldier's responsibility is to his client, the state [Huntington, 1957:11-37]. Meaning that he is "apolitical" and only concerned with external issues that threaten the security of his client. Third, his corporate character is exclusive and hierarchical [Perlmutter, 1977:3-16]. Entry into certain units of different arms of service is limited to those who possess necessary education and training. Rank thus serves as a symbol of achievement, education, seniority and experience [Huntington, 1957:16-17]. The ideological character of a professional soldier is concerned with issues such as socialisation of officers, organisational matters and loyalty to the Constitution [Perlmutter, 1977:6-8].

A revolutionary soldier stands in sharp contrast to a professional soldier. Unlike a professional soldier, the expertise of a revolutionary soldier are socially and politically orientated [Perlmutter, 1977:16].³³ Giap [1962] explains the nature of the war they engage in,

Guerrilla warfare is a form of fighting by the masses of a weak and badly equipped country against an aggressive army with better equipment and techniques. Guerrillas rely on heroic spirit to triumph over modern weapons [Giap, 1962:48].

Second, the client of a revolutionary soldier is a political party or a revolutionary movement. He therefore serves and is guided by the political objectives of the

³³ There is voluminous literature on various factors that leads to a revolution and its dynamics see, Seegers, Annette. 1991. "Theories of Revolution", in Albert Venter and Alexander Johnson (eds.) **Politics: An Introduction for Southern African Students** (Cape Town: Oxford University Press), pp. 210-243; Skocpol, Theda. 1979. **State and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) and Rejai, Mustafa. 1977. **The Comparative Analysis of Revolutionary Strategy** (Beverly Hills: Sage).

revolutionary movement. Following a revolution, his client becomes the state. Third, the corporate character of a revolutionary soldier is non-hierarchical and highly mobile. There is almost an even relationship among soldiers and seniority is based on loyalty and heroism on the battlefield. Finally, the ideology of a revolutionary soldier is political. He is guided by and his actions are based on the interests of the party or liberation movement on whose behalf he is fighting [Perlmutter,1977:13-16].

4.2. The Formation of the SADF

In May 1990, the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, rejected the possibility of integrating MK and SADF soldiers claiming that they would not fit into the professional defence stature of the SADF as MK was a revolutionary army [Cock, 1994:142]. Nonetheless, the SADF was not as entirely professional as he claimed. It comprised multiple characters that were both professional and revolutionary.

When the NP won the elections in 1948, it was determined to strengthen the Afrikaner power position in the country. Its first measure in this direction was the introduction of segregatory laws against blacks. This alone was not enough. Accordingly, the NP turned its attention to the Union Defence Force (UDF) with the objective of minimising the professional British tradition by incorporating it into the apartheid system and Afrikaner culture [Grundy,1988:7-8]. The NP instituted the process of Afrikanizing the UDF. English medium units were converted into Afrikaans units and the British disciplinary code for the military was rewritten. In 1957, the Defence Act was passed renaming the UDF the SADF and Afrikaners were recruited to increase their group power in the military [Seegers,1996:92-94]. By 1974, Afrikaners constituted 85% of the entire SADF [Enloe,1980:54-46].

The 1960s witnessed the emergence of liberation movements such as the MPLA, FRELIMO, SWAPO and Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) to end

colonial rule in Southern Africa. Fearing these developments, in 1971, the Potgieter Commission argued that South Africa was faced with "a total onslaught" communist threat inside and outside its borders [Seegers,1996:132]. To counter the "total onslaught", the security establishment devised the "total strategy" concept, which involved economic, ideological, technological and social factors [Cawthra,1986:27]. In 1968, the SADF Staff College began to offer lectures on Strategic Studies based on the concept of Andre Beaufre who argued that states should adopt revolutionary strategies such as torture, murder and kidnapping to counter revolutionary war [Seegers,1996:133].³⁴

The SADF force level was expanded and conscription for white males was introduced. The PF had 11 500 troops, the CF had 56 500 and the *kommando* had 10 000 troops [Seegers,1987:147]. As the armed struggle gained momentum, it was announced that all race groups would be included in the SADF. By the 1980s, there were 5 000 Coloureds in the SADF, 1 000 Indians and almost 14 000 Africans [Cawthra,1986:62-71].³⁵

Major developments with regard to the military occurred after P.W. Botha assumed leadership in 1978. The SSC was upgraded into the NSMS as a "militarised bureaucracy" to run and plan state affairs. The NSMS was divided into a number of sub-organisations, which included the SSC, Joint Management Centre and (JMC) Local Management Centres (LMCs). The bureaucratic practices of the NSMS were profoundly embedded in Afrikaner culture. Institutional autonomy emphasised hierarchy and things had to be cleared with superiors. The achievement of goals lay in teamwork ("*spanwerk*") and co-operation ("*samewerking*"). Because group interest was seen as essential, all members of the team were expected to abide by group decisions. Finally,

³⁴ For an examination of the South African government's violence strategy against anti-apartheid activists and its implications see, Cock, Jacklyn. 1990. "The Role of Violence in Current State Security Strategies", in Mark Swilling (1990) **Views on the South African State** (Pretoria: HSRC), pp. 85-108.

bureaucratic loyalty embedded in the "total strategy" security doctrine formed the main basis of loyalty and heroism [Seegers, 1991:269-270].

An important aspect of the "total strategy" was the destabilisation of neighbouring countries that openly supported MK and APLA through direct military aggression and economic means. As the NP intensified its activities in Southern Africa, internal opposition grew and gained momentum. Troops were sent into the townships to quell opposition. On 23 October 1985, the SADF launched Operation Palmiet in the black townships of Sebokeng, Boipatong and Sharpeville. In 1985 and 1986, a national state of emergency was declared to deal with mass political unrest. The SADF withdrew from the townships in 1987, leaving in its wake residents who had been tortured, harassed, killed and detained [Nathan, 1989:67-77].

Clearly, the SADF was defined by both professional and revolutionary characteristics. The SADF was Afrikanized in line with the apartheid aspirations of the NP government, its client. Officers used revolutionary strategies and were deployed internally to suppress popular opposition. On the professional side, officers underwent military training, which was specialised and technologically advanced. Moreover, the corporate character of the SADF remained hierarchical and subordinate.³⁶

4.3. The Integration Process in the SANDF

The demobilisation experiences in countries that have undergone the transition from war to peace differ from case to case. In most cases, the demobilisation process generally consists of four stages through which former combatants pass through as part of their reintegration into civilian life: assembly, discharge, short-term reinsertion and long-term reintegration. The first two of these stages

³⁶ Williams' [1991] argument that with time, the newly created defence force that include the SADF, MK and APLA will be representative of all formations was based on this NP government's strategy of incorporating other races in the SADF.

constitute demobilisation and the latter two reintegration into civilian life [Ball, 1998:1]. Contrary, the South African demobilisation process involved first the integration of MK, APLA, SADF and former TVBC homelands defence forces into the SANDF. Since demobilisation formed an integral part of the integration process, it is essential to understand the integration process in the SANDF.

4.3.1. The Integration Process

Integration refers to a process whereby after the cessation of hostility or the end of conflict, armed forces, equipment and the various military traditions are merged to form a single defence force. The success of integration lies in the transformation of the institutional culture of the defence force and the strategic objectives underlying the process [Williams, 1993:46].

In South Africa, as Nathan [1991] and Cilliers [1991] argued, integration meant the absorption of former MK and APLA combatants by the former SADF. This is due to the Constitutional guarantees that the SANDF will ensure the "retention of standards", essentially former SADF standards, which consequently still dominate the SANDF [Seegers, 1996:32]. Furthermore, the SADF's qualitative and quantitative capabilities extended beyond that of MK and APLA. Added to this was the fact that MK and APLA have come to accept their future role as professional armies.

During the military negotiations, all armed forces agreed that they would submit lists of their members to be integrated into the SANDF to the Certified Personnel Register (CPR). The compilation of the CPR proved to be problematic. As part of the armed struggle, MK and APLA combatants had used pseudonyms to avoid arrest. This made it difficult to verify the authenticity of the names that appeared on the CPR. As one former MK commander said,

My name was not included in the CPR because for more than ten years my comrades have called me by my pseudo name. When I told them my real name,

³⁶ See also, Frankel, Philip. 1984. *Pretoria's Praetorian. Civil-Military Relations in South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

no one knew anything about me. I have to go through a laborious process of looking for some comrades who were under my command just to verify my name [Mokalobe, 1999:12-13].

Another difficulty was determining membership of MK and APLA. MK had four categories of those it viewed as its members: those who trained outside the country over a long period, those who trained inside the country for 1 to 2 weeks, those who played supportive roles, and those in underground structures. To ensure that all those who fell within these categories were integrated, MK presented a list of 28 000 members to the CPR. Another non-formal CPR was created to accommodate additional 1000 former MK combatants [Motumi and McKenzie, 1998:189-190].

As APLA did not participate in the military negotiations, its combatants were excluded by the Constitution from being part of the SANDF. Following the elections, the Interim Constitution Annexure D Section (224), which prevented any party that was not part of the negotiations from being part of the SANDF, was amended when APLA decided to join the SANDF. On 11 October 1996, the CPR was finalised [SANDF Bulletin, 7 July 1997].

Statutory Forces	
Former Permanent SADF members	90 000
Former TBVC Defence Forces	11 039
Subtotal	101 039
Non-Statutory Forces	
MK Certified Personnel List	27 801
MK Non Formal CPR	1 087
APLA	6 000
Subtotal	34 888
Total	135 927

Table 4 The Certified Personnel Register
Source: Motumi and Hudson, 1995:114

Following the completion of the CPR, the integration process in the SANDF began.³⁷ Integration involved four stages. During the first stage, former MK and APLA combatants were assembled regionally under their different commands. In the second stage, former combatants were assembled at different military bases throughout the country. Three military bases were identified for the integration process: Wallmansthal, Hoedspruit and De Brug. Between 1994 and 1995, eight intakes of former MK combatants and a few former APLA female combatants and veterans were received at Wallmansthal and Hoedspruit. In De Brug Base, there were five intakes of former APLA combatants. By March 1996, 19 964 former MK and APLA combatants had assembled at different military bases. Out of this number, 1 293 former combatants either joined the South African Police Service, resigned, were arrested or discharged [Integration Report, 1996:1-2].

In the third stage, former combatants appeared before the Placement Board (PB), which was comprised of representatives of the different armed forces and BMATT. Under the PB, former MK and APLA combatants underwent Potential Tests as part of the integration process. The JMCC decided that since former SADF and former homelands forces possessed the necessary conventional military training only former MK and APLA combatants would be processed. Those who were not in possession of formal military or educational qualifications were tested and graded in categories 1 to 10. Those who fell within category 1 to 3 were not integrated into the SANDF. Those in category 4 to 6 were accepted as commissioned officers, and those in category 7 to 10 were integrated. In the final stage, former combatants were placed into different SANDF arms of service after undergoing conventional military training.

³⁷ For legal reasons, former MK and APLA combatants in the SANDF were referred to as Non-Statutory Force members (NSF), whilst those of SADF and former TBVC homelands forces were referred to as Statutory Force (SF).

Former Force	Force Distribution
APLA	3 713
BOP	2 799
CISKEI	919
KZSPF	1 788
MK	11 738
SADF	39 077
SADF (CIV)	17 976
SANDF	9 580
SANDF (CIV)	1 020
TRANSKEI	2 290
VENDA	1 235
TOTAL	93 324

Table 5: SANDF Composition by Former Force as at 1 April 1998
Source: Defence Review, 1998:70

It was initially decided that the integration process would be completed after a period of seven months. Due to administrative, financial and other problems, this timeframe was later extended to three years. On 21 April 1997, the final mass intake occurred and 721 former combatants were integrated at Wallmansthal Base. All in all, the MK contingent comprised 45,5% of the total intake and APLA 54,5%. In total, seventeen intakes were processed at Wallmansthal Base, five at De Brug Base and one at Hoedspruit Base since April 1994 [**SANDF Bulletin**, 7 July 1997]. By April 1998, 11 727 and 4 901 former MK and APLA combatants were integrated as uniformed members of the SANDF [**Defence Review**, 1998:70]. A decision was also taken in 1996 to include approximately 200 member of Inkatha's former SPUs members into the SANDF as new recruits.

Provision was made to continue with the integration of those former combatants who wanted to join the SANDF but could not do so because they were still overseas studying or had not yet returned to the country. To conclude the integration process, the Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota tabled 3 Bills in Parliament intended to end integration of former combatants. The set deadline for integration was 31 March 2001 [**Pretoria News**, 14 February 2001].

4.3.2. Difficulties with the Integration Process

Immediately following the integration process, a number of racially and discriminatory motivated difficulties were encountered in the SANDF. With former combatants in the SANDF, the SADF Afrikaner institutional culture was deliberately strengthened. This appears to have been a strategy by which former SADF members sought to demoralise former MK and APLA combatants so that they lose hope in the integration process [Seegers, 1996:36].³⁸

First, former SADF members used military professionalism or "standards" to justify their racist behaviour. A former MK combatant was dismissed for allegedly refusing to obey an order and for not meeting professional military standards.

I was given an order in Afrikaans, despite an assurance that English will be used. When I told the commander that I did not understand Afrikaans, I was dismissed for refusing an order and therefore I could not meet the required standards [Mokalobe, 1999:14].

Another former MK combatant complained that,

We were told to drill for the entire three hours without a break. This, we were told, was one of the prerequisites to be part of the SANDF. We were warned that failure to do so would result in either dismissal or being court marshalled. This was nothing else but to ridicule us [Mokalobe, 1999:14].

Second, former combatants felt that integration was unfair to them, as they alone had to undergo integration Potential Tests and orientation into professional military training. Worse was the fact that the Potential Tests were mainly administered by former SADF members who sometime behaved with prejudice towards former MK and APLA combatants. A former MK veteran complained,

Integration was a bit lopsided, a bit-one sided because only MK and APLA had to go before the panel and answer questions and undergo tests before they could be accepted for integration and be given status...It looked more like the MK and APLA were joining the SADF and not forces being integrated [Motumi and McKenzie, 1998:191].

³⁸ The argument here is limited to the main source of problems within the SANDF with regard to integration. This is not to suggest that other sources of problems in the SANDF, such as ill-discipline and inefficient administration do not exist.

A former APLA combatant adds,

There was nothing fair about the integration. Most of us did not have a say in the process. Even our comrades who were part of the placement board did not have much power as the former SADF members were in control of the process [Interview with a former APLA combatant, 15 January 2000].

Another former APLA combatant complained,

If we were all integrated into the SANDF, how come only us had to appear before the placement board [Interview with former APLA combatant, 2 December 1998].

Third, there is also unhappiness about the positions allocated to former combatants. A former APLA commander criticised the ranking system:

It depended on tests set up and monitored by the SADF. I know of many deserving people who were given very low positions mainly because of these tests. Some of us feel worthless in the SANDF [Mokalobe, 1999:15].

Fourth, to a number of former combatants, the racist behaviour of former SADF members ruled out any possibilities of a better future in the SANDF:

Things were getting worse day by day. I could not stand what the SADF members were doing to us. I decided to leave. Many did leave too. Few were fortunate to get employment but many of us are still unemployed [Mokalobe, 1999:15].

Another former APLA combatant confirmed the above view:

We were discriminated by the entire integration process under the hands of former SADF members. Remember these are our former enemies. How can any one trust them? What they wanted was to make the process so difficult that some of us should leave. Even if we complained about their behaviour to our senior comrades, nothing was done. There was just no hope in that system [Interview with a former APLA combatant B, 15 January 2000].

Finally, some had no interest in becoming professional soldiers and considered themselves as revolutionary soldiers only. The underlying difficulty for many of these former combatants was dealing with the formal hierarchical and disciplinary nature of a professional army. They found that the professional army tradition

alienated them from their fellow comrades in senior ranks because of their lower education level.

A former MK combatant commented in this regard:

The professional military system is causing division among us. Imagine some of my comrades who were under my command are now giving me instructions because of the level of their education. Some do not even listen or associate with you anymore. It is as if you are a stranger to them [Interview with a former MK combatant, 3 December 1998].

I never had any desire to be a professional soldier. I was a guerrilla. Because now the course that we fought for has been achieved, my duty is complete [Mokalobe, 1999:15].

Another former MK combatant said:

I could not bear the professional military environment. There is no sense of brotherhood and togetherness. That is why I opted for the demobilisation gratuity [Mokalobe, 1999:15].

In September 1994, because of dissatisfaction with integration, 2 500 former MK and APLA combatants walked out of Wallmansthal Base and 265 of them never returned. In the following year, nearly 200 former combatants embarked on a looting campaign in Durban, Cape Town and Bloemfontein as a form of protest against conditions in the SANDF. Others formed groups such as the South African Total Liberation Force and MK-APLA to express their dissatisfaction. However, the existence of these groups could not be confirmed by military intelligence [Motumi and McKenzie, 1998:191].

BMATT was well aware of the integration difficulties and criticised the integration process. BMATT pointed out that "attitudes had hardened" among former SADF members towards former MK combatants [**Jane's Defence Weekly**, 18 March 1998]. It warned of the "far-reaching" implications of these hardened attitudes at the 1 SA Infantry Battalion in Bloemfontein by the top military personnel [**Sunday Times**, 19 September 1999].

On 16 September 1999, BMATT's warning tragically came true when Lieutenant Sibusiso Madubela shot dead six of his white colleagues and a white female civilian, before being shot dead himself at the Tempe Military Base in Bloemfontein. Following this incident, a group of former combatants in the SANDF issued a media statement saying that if nothing was done to address racism and discrimination in the SANDF, such violent incidents would recur.

Testifying again at the discrimination and dissatisfaction within the SANDF, on 10 April 2000, another shooting incident occurred at the Phalaborwa 7 SA Infantry Battalion Military Base. Lieutenant Harry Ntoagae, a platoon commander, shot dead his white superior, Major Pieter van As before handing himself over to the police. Commenting on this incident, Defence Minister Lekota, mentioned that racism might have been the underlying factor behind the shooting. Minister Lekota said that for some time, there have been incidents of abuse at the base. The Minister further indicated that,

Tensions are rising at bases throughout South Africa because of one or two or three fools and strongly warned that such elements will be removed from the SANDF [**The Star**, 14 July 2000].

In another shooting incident in the South African Navy (SAN), a young black junior officer, Wiseman Mchunu, shot dead his white colleague, John Clarkson in Simon's Town Naval Base before shooting himself. Racism was cited as the main reason behind this incident [**Sunday Times**, 24 September 2000].³⁹

Shocking incidents of racism were also reported in KwaZulu-Natal army bases to the Setai Commission established by Minister Lekota to investigate racism in the SANDF, following the shooting incident at Tempe Military Base. According to provincial chairman of the South African Security Force Union, Captain Madoda Nofemele,

³⁹ Prior to this incident, problems of racism were reported in the SAN. Black officers accused the SAN of giving preferential treatment to white officers by promoting them to better positions while the majority of officers remained in junior positions. Black officers complained that affirmative action was not been implemented in the SAN [**City Press**, 10 September 2000].

There are racial tensions in this province because black soldiers are treated like dogs. Our members do not enjoy the same privileges available to their white counterparts. Some black soldiers were made to work for white farmers and the situation was worse for part-time members. These members are not allowed to wear a formal uniform and they are forced to sleep on the floor [Daily News, 21 February 2001].

These incidents indicate that racism is a serious issue in the SANDF. The SADF institutional culture rooted in apartheid, which for many years characterised the SADF, remains intact within the SANDF. Not only does this undermine the process of peacebuilding in South Africa, but also the legitimacy and morale within the SANDF. It further encourages hatred, division and prejudice, which may impact negatively on the capability and cohesion of the SANDF. As one defence official stated,

There is still much that needs to be done in transforming the SANDF and ensuring that everyone is treated the same. The division between the SANDF and former MK and APLA combatants needs serious attention [Interview with a former MK combatant who is a Colonel in the SANDF, 3 August 2000].

4.4. The Demobilisation Process

On 21 April 1995, demobilisation of former MK and APLA combatants in the SANDF was announced by the then Minister of Defence, Joe Modise. This process, according to Minister Modise, was aimed at,

The voluntary release of former non-statutory members, who are Constitutionally part of the SANDF, but who do not wish to serve in a full-time force or who are unable to do so [Motumi and McKenzie, 1998:194].

Demobilisation involved first the integration of all those former MK and APLA combatants who were on the CPR into the SANDF. While it might have appeared that demobilisation was aimed at reducing the SANDF force levels, it was specifically aimed at dealing with former combatants who did not qualify for integration. What bears testimony to this was the fact that only former combatants had to undergo Potential Tests for integration into the SADF.

Although this process marked the formal demobilisation process, the first informal demobilisation took place in 1993 when the South African political climate began to show signs of change. Following the suspension of the armed struggle by the ANC after the signing of the **Pretoria Minutes** in 1990, almost 5 000 MK combatants returned to the country as “unarmed civilians” as part of the United Nations Repatriation of Exiles Programme [Cock, 1994:7].

On 1 December 1996, Parliament approved the Demobilisation Act, which extended demobilisation to members of the SANDF who could not be integrated because of their age, level of education, health or individuals who chose not to integrate because of dissatisfaction with their rank after placement in the SANDF.

The demobilisation package included the provision of gratuities, which varied according to the number of years served in MK and APLA and age. The package included a voluntary 2 weeks of counselling for former combatants in personal, careers, finance matters, as well as 18 months training in basic skills, life skills and adult literacy [Motumi and McKenzie, 1998:195].

Category	Period in Service	Years of Former Service	Amount Paid
A	Jan 61 – Dec 72	22 – 23 Years	R42 058
B	Jan 73 – Dec 76	18 – 21 Years	R34 313
C	Jan 77 – Dec 82	12 – 17 Years	R28 721
D	Jan 83 – Dec 89	5 – 11 Years	R20 201
E	Jan 90 – Dec 94	0 - 4 Years	R12 734

Table 6: Categories and Gratuities in Respect of Demobilisation

Source: Defence Review, 1998:73

The demobilisation process was carried out in three Phases. Those demobilised during Phase 1 were the so-called Roll Over Group. These were the “vulnerables” (members of the SANDF who were medically unfit for integration), the veterans (those who could not be integrated into the SANDF due to age),

members of the SANDF scoring in category 1 and 2 on the integration Potential Test and intake members who opted for the facility.

Phase 2 was specifically designed to identify those members of the SANDF who wished to be demobilised in their own region in order to decentralise integration.

Given the lack of response to Phase 2 of integration because of communication and other logistical problems, Phase 3 was designed as an extension of Phase 2 to further decentralise the process.

Category	Number of Persons Demobilised	Gratuity Paid
A	171	R 7 191 918
B	144	R 4 941 072
C	1 090	R 31 305 890
D	1 877	R 37 917 277
E	2 643	R 33 655 962
Z	1 413	R 52 973 686
TOTAL	7 238	R167 985 805

Table 7: Number of Persons who have Benefited from Gratuities and Amounts of Benefit

Source: Defence Review, 1998:73

By September 1995, 371 members of the SANDF were demobilised. In 1997, the number stood at 3 770, with the demobilisation exercise costing R69 million [Motumi and McKenzie, 1998:195].⁴⁰ By 1 April 1998, 7 238 members had benefited from demobilisation packages [Defence Review, 1998:73].

4.5. Difficulties with the Demobilisation Process

As experience in other countries shows, demobilisation is not an easy task. The process requires a thorough planning framework prior to its implementation.

⁴⁰ The government has recently announced a R500 million pension plan for former combatants who have entered into employment contract with the DoD. About 9 771 former MK and APLA combatants who were not integrated will not benefit from this pension scheme [Mail & Guardian, 16 March 2001].

Issues such as disarmament, provision of shelter, food and other immediate needs of former combatants, political and social reconstruction and human

resources development should be adequately dealt with to ensure the success of demobilisation. In Namibia, the overall demobilisation exercise was successful in addressing the immediate needs of former combatants. Following independence, the government devised a cash payment scheme. The Development Brigade was also created with the objective of providing training skills to former combatants and reintegrating them into society. They were trained in a variety of skills and placed in different sectors of the economy [Shikangalah, 1995:70-71].

Demobilisation in Uganda was also a success. Such success was due to the preliminary surveys on the needs of former combatants, effective planning and execution and monitoring by the Veterans Assistance Programme of the resettlement and reintegration programme [Mondo, 1995].

In contrast, the Zimbabwean demobilisation process was unsuccessful because of the government's failure to provide for the immediate and basic needs of former combatants. As Dada [1999] shows, almost 20 years following the demobilisation process, many are destitute, unemployed and homeless and now pose a security threat to the stability of the country through the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) [Dada: 1999].

Driven by the need for land, which forms the basis of subsistence in Zimbabwe and was the underlying factor behind the liberation war, the ZNLWVA began occupying white owned farms to express their anger and need. These incidents resulted in conflict between white farmers and former combatants, and drew widespread international attention.

The South African demobilisation process also proved to be a difficult task. Most of the difficulties stemmed from the lack of adequate planning, co-ordination and

implementation of the process. This eventually resulted in a number of political, economical, social, cultural and psychological difficulties.

4.5.1. Political Difficulties

The framework for the demobilisation exercise should be planned well in advance. Preparatory work should include needs assessment and sensitisation of those who will be affected by the process. Planning and implementation of the process should not be undertaken in reaction to a destabilisation threat posed by former combatants. Most importantly, former combatants and civil society organisations should be consulted as important partners in the demobilisation process [Interview with Kees Kingma, 10 March 2000].

The South African demobilisation process was characterised by numerous difficulties. First, demobilisation failed to win political support. Planning only began when the SANDF was faced with the difficulty about a plan of action concerning elderly former combatants and those who had scored poorly on the integration Potential Tests. The process was decided in a top-down method, without much involvement of former combatants and civilian organisations [Motumi and McKenzie, 1998:197].

As former MK combatants who is now a defence official said,

It is important that former combatants own the process to assist with the planning of the process by identifying their needs that required immediate attention. Civilian organisations could have helped in the implementation of demobilisation, as they are closer to the community [Interview with Tsepe Motumi, 9 April 2000].

The top-down planning of demobilisation led to feelings of abandonment by the leadership for a number of former combatants.

The leadership lost contact with us. It was no longer visible. Many were occupied with high politics and lost interests with the grassroots. I was demoralised and decided to leave without training and counselling [Mokalobe, 1999:19].

Another former combatant said,

Most of the decisions were made without our knowledge. The leadership decided what to do and how to do it without consulting us. We have to rely on newspapers all the time. Even some of the ANC offices did not know what was happening with demobilisation [Interview with a former MK combatant B, 17 January 2000].

4.5.2. Economic Difficulties

War affects the social viability of former combatants in various ways. This includes the lack of marketable skills and financial resources, and limited education. These conditions require the government to develop, support and implement policies that will help them overcome economic difficulties. Measures taken in this regard should include adequate severance pay, skills training, employment creation and placement, access to credit and land, and financial assistance from the international community.

For these objectives to be effectively implemented, the government should undertake feasibility studies, surveys, data collection and market research. These factors were lacking in the South African demobilisation process. First, the demobilisation one-off gratuities only served as a short-term solution and did not encourage long-term productivity in former combatants. Studies elsewhere indicate that severance payment should be accompanied by other reintegration programmes to increase the long-term financial capability of former combatants [Motumi and McKenzie, 1989:198].⁴¹

⁴¹ The advantage of one-off gratuities is that they are easy to administer and distribute. These lessen the need for a bureaucratic structure to administer payments and fewer chances for corruption. The disadvantage is that there is a great temptation on the part of former combatants to spend their money immediately on items that will not help sustain their livelihood in the long-term. An alternative is to provide money on a regular basis over a given period of time. In Mozambique, under the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS), former combatants were provided with benefits from 6 months to 2 years, which increased by 75 000 meticaïs per month for lower-ranked combatants. Clark, Kimberly-Mahling. 1996. **Fostering a Farewell to Arms: Preliminary Lessons Learned in the Demobilisation and Reintegration of Combatants** (Washington, D.C: Research & Reference Services), pp. 14-15.

A former APLA combatant pointed out that some of these economic difficulties could have been avoided if the government had collected adequate data on the economic needs of former combatants.

There was nothing done to find out about the needs of former combatants. They were given money, and told that they were no longer soldiers. Should there have been some need assessment on their needs, things could at least have been different for many of our comrades now [Interview with a former APLA combatant who is a Captain in the SANDF, 15 January 2000].

A defence expert agrees,

Indeed, there was less effort on the part of the government to find out more about the economic needs of many former combatants [Mokalobe, 1999:21].

Second, training skills provided by the SC showed a lack of adequate conceptualisation. There was no market research done on the type of skills in demand by the market. Furthermore, SC training skills were also available to other members of society, increasing competition for employment opportunities. A number of former combatants also viewed many of the skills provided as too basic.

People are trained in skills like carpentry. Not that there is a problem with carpentry, but for someone in the front command structures of MK to be trained as a carpenter is an insult [Mashike, 1999:14-15].

The SANDF was also charged with the task of running the SC under military ethos. This neglected other aspects necessary for reintegration, such as counselling and life skill advises.

Finally, the lack of inclusivity within demobilisation and government control and implementation of the process failed to attract international assistance in the form of expertise and funding. Experiences in other countries reveal that societal organisations provide good mechanisms for guiding demobilisation. These organisations act as a link between a country undergoing reconstruction and development and the donor community. Moreover, this connection increases the

local community's stake in the successful incorporation of former combatants into civilian life, thereby encouraging members of society to take an active interest in supporting the demobilisation process [Ball, 1998:6].

4.5.3. Social Difficulties

Not only did the government fail to adequately meet the economic needs of former MK and APLA combatants, but also with regard to their social needs. Again, planning for demobilisation was not informed by detailed research about their needs. Despite earlier studies by Cock [1993] which revealed that many former MK combatants were unemployed, lacked shelter and resources, little was done as part of the planning process for demobilisation to ensure that at least these difficulties were addressed.

First, there were no efforts to unite former combatants with their families and to encourage their active and productive participation in their communities.

Although there was counselling in life skills and other matters, it was limited and often not relevant. Information centred on how to handle finances and what employers are looking for when you apply for a job. I gave up after two sessions. I thought it would have been much better if we were informed about where to seek information with regard to job opportunities, health care and other social needs that were important then [Interview with a former APLA combatant, 15 January 2000].

Second, provision was not made to provide former combatants and their families with shelter. Some former combatants also indicated their interests to continue with their education, but there was no education provision.

Finally, government control, planning and implementation of demobilisation failed to sensitise society to the needs of former MK and APLA combatants. While some members of society viewed them as heroes, others viewed them as criminals. These societal misperceptions and stigmatisation ultimately impacted negatively on them. To overcome these problems, a number of former

combatants became alcoholics and others constantly clashed with members of society.

My greatest difficulty is that I am not working. So every time when peoples' goods get stolen, I become the obvious suspect. I have on a number of occasions been accused of stealing and this has led to several clashes with some members of society [Interview with a former MK combatant, 17 January 2000].

4.5.3. Cultural Difficulties

The need to sensitise the community about the cultural environment of former combatants forms an integral part of the demobilisation planning process. This is not only in the interest of societal harmony and acceptance, but also about acknowledging and respecting cultural differences between former combatants and society. It is therefore important that demobilisation planning takes into account these cultural differences and makes society aware of them.

This failed to happen. Instead, former combatants were left alone to deal with a difficult cultural environment following their reintegration. Others felt alienated by their families because they no longer practised certain cultural traditions.

When I came home, I stayed with my family, which still pride itself of its culture. As I did not perform some of our cultural ceremonies when my children were born my father blamed me for neglecting our culture and said the gods will punish me for life. I could not convince him to understand the conditions we were living under [Interview with a former APLA combatant, 1 February 2000].

Former MK and APLA female combatants came to bore the brunt of the lack of cultural sensitisation. Apart from the political, economic, social, cultural and psychological difficulties they found themselves confronted with, there were additional difficulties. Former female combatants experienced difficulties of a gendered nature. This mostly took the form of being positioned as subordinate to males in the community they returned to. This has resulted in family tensions, alienation, societal misperceptions, divorces and limited economic opportunities. The state of affairs following demobilisation has proved difficult for female

combatants who had viewed the liberation struggle as a fight for political, economic and social equality, which included gender equality.⁴²

4.5.3. Psychological Difficulties

The aftermath of conflict presents a psychological challenge to former combatants. In February 1984, the Working Committee of the ANC established a Special Commission to investigate the conditions of its MK camps in Angola following a shooting incident in one of them. The Commission reported that the general living conditions in Angolan camps had deteriorated significantly because of poor diet, lack of clean water, poor health care and long stays in the camps. These conditions had adverse psychological effects and led to widespread mental disorder such as depression and a sense of hopelessness among a number of combatants. As one combatant remarked,

Our lengthy stay and conditions in exile (i.e. camps) has made some of us to lose all sense of human feeling, lose complete touch with humanity, we do not have the same resistance [ANC Special Commission, 1984:1-10].

APLA combatants were also confronted with a similar situation. Many combatants found the living conditions in the camps difficult due to lack of basic resources.

The conditions were so hard that sometime we will go for days without eating. Our health care system was so poor and many comrades died of all sorts of diseases. Others became mentally sick [Interview with a former APLA combatant who is a Major in the SANDF, 3 August 2000].

Despite this state of affairs, the demobilisation planning process did not pay enough attention to support programmes aimed at assisting former combatants to deal with these conditions. Instead, support came in the form of limited

⁴² During the war in Eritrea, female combatants comprised almost 35% of all combatants. Following reintegration, many not only found themselves with no means to support themselves, but did not want to return to their families who disapproved of their lifestyle. In dealing with this problem, their government established the Women's Demobilisation Bureau to assist former female combatants with their political, economic, social, cultural and psychological needs. Clark, Kimberly-Mahling. 1996. **Fostering a Farewell to Arms: Preliminary Lessons Learned in the Demobilisation and Reintegration of Combatants** (Washington, D.C: Research & Reference Services), pp. 22.

counselling, which, apart from its short 2 weeks life span, focused mainly on career and financial matters. The long-term medical, personal and social issues that form the basis for transition from being a combatant becoming an active civilian failed to get the attention they deserved.

4.6. Conclusion

It is clear from the discussion in this chapter that integration and demobilisation are challenging and difficult processes. A number of difficulties were encountered with integration in the SANDF, which formed the first step to demobilisation. Following integration, former combatants complained of racism, discrimination and unjust treatment by former SADF members. Despite the fact that integration was meant for all armed forces, only former MK and APLA combatants underwent integration Potential Tests and were allocated lower ranks in the SANDF. The difficulties experienced by former combatants are mostly due to the power exerted on them by former SADF members who control the SANDF as a result of the political settlement reached during the negotiations. As a result, a number of former combatants left the SANDF, whilst others found ways to protest. More worrying has been the increase in shooting incidents at military bases, which shows that racism and discrimination in the SANDF are serious issues and could have adverse effects on the military if not addressed.

Demobilisation was also marred with difficulties as a result of the government's poor planning, co-ordination and implementation of the programme. The problem was that the planning of the process only began when the SANDF was faced with the difficulty of having to deal with former combatants who did not qualify for integration. Furthermore, the process was government controlled, with former MK and APLA combatants and societal organisations excluded. Former combatants were provided with one-off gratuities, but no provision was made in terms of addressing their long-term productivity and economic needs. Even the SC, which was established to overcome the gratuity difficulties, lacked adequate

conceptualisation with regards to training skills it provided. Former combatants also complained about the lack of shelter, education and stigmatisation from society. The government failed to assist them in adapting to their new cultural environment after reintegration. With regards to psychological needs, the only support provided took the form of 2 weeks of counselling. It failed to focus on the long-term medical, personal and social issues essential for reintegration.

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Chapter Five

5. The South African Reintegration Process

This chapter offers a critical analysis of the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life. It explores and analyses the effects of demobilisation on reintegration. Put differently, this chapter is concerned with the personal experiences of former combatants resulting from inadequate planning, execution and implementation of the demobilisation programmes. It also investigates the ways by which former combatants have attempted to deal with the daily difficulties they experience.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the nature of the reintegration process. It looks at the SC as a body established with the purpose of ensuring that former combatants are successfully reintegrated. This section will also examine the efforts of the MKMVA to help with the reintegration of former MK combatants. The second section explores the government's failure to plan, co-ordinate and implement a successful demobilisation programme and how this affected reintegration. It considers the political, economic, social, cultural and psychological difficulties that are being experienced by former MK and APLA combatants following their reintegration. In the third section, the focus is on the connection between difficulties encountered by former combatants and its implied security threats. The argument presented is that although unemployed former combatants pose a serious security threat in the form of crime, such a threat is not imminent, but could disrupt peacebuilding in the long-run.

5.1. The Reintegration Process

During the military negotiations, there was a growing recognition by the Sub-Council on Defence for the need of establishing a SC or the Service Brigade (SB) as it was earlier called, as an integral part of the demobilisation and reintegration processes. At least three reasons affected this decision. First, apart from the fact

that a number of former combatants could not be integrated, the number of SANDF members far exceeded the required force strength of 70 000. Second, the SC fell within the ambit of the government's **Reconstruction and Development Programme** (RDP). Finally, the SC was to provide training skills to black youths who because of the apartheid system had experienced social, economic and political hardships [Mokalobe, 1999:20].

While preparation for reintegration through the SC was conceived during the military negotiations, MK was already preparing its combatants for reintegration into civilian life towards the end of the 1980s. This decision followed the 1980s secret negotiations between the NP government and ANC. It seems that the two parties agreed in principle that such measures were necessary as important steps towards creating democracy, which was soon about to become a reality.

While some MK combatants were trained as conventional soldiers, others were trained in different life skills such as farming and business management. These measures served as the first major steps by MK to prepare some of its combatants for demobilisation and reintegration. As a senior MK members observed,

Some of our cadres did not have interests in a conventional military career. They only saw themselves as revolutionary soldiers. So it was our duty as MK to make sure that we prepare for the future well being of our cadres. We wanted to avoid the situation where our cadres will be jobless and engage in criminal activities after demobilisation [Interview with SANDF General Andrew Masondo, 1 December 1998].

A former MK combatant conceded,

Towards the end of the 1980s, there was a change in the way MK conducted its training. It was evident that democracy was just on our doorstep. The leadership decided that it was important for many of us to start gaining other skills, which will help us after the reintegration process. Surely, not all of our comrades could become soldiers in the new army and something was done about that [Interview with a former MK commander, 3 December 1998].

While MK was preparing its combatants for integration into the SANDF and reintegration into civilian life, APLA was intensifying its operations in the country. In the words of a former senior APLA combatant,

There was no way that the apartheid government could be trusted and that is why we embarked on the armed struggle during the negotiations. APLA wanted an assurance that apartheid will be totally dismantled and this did not offer our combatants time to prepare themselves for reintegration. However, it is important to note that as part of the overall military training, APLA training included other civilian skills such as farming [Interview with a former senior APLA combatant, 3 August 2000].

However, on 15 January 1994 the PAC suspended the armed struggle and decided to participate in the national elections. This decision led to the subsequent suspension of APLA [Lodge, 1995:108-112].⁴³

On 31 January 1995, Minister Joe Modise launched the SC as a body to oversee the formal reintegration of former MK and APLA combatants from the SANDF [Motumi and McKenzie, 1998:200]. The foremost objectives of the SC was defined as to,

Assist with the reintegration of ex-service members into civil society by upgrading their standards of education, vocational and life skills to enable members to find employment or start their own enterprises in the private sector, provide career guidance on a continuous basis and assist with the social reintegration of members where possible [Defence Review, 1998:90].

The SANDF was charged with the task of running the SC, as it possesses the facilities essential for the training of former combatants and expertise. Training was conducted by former SADF members under a military ethos and former combatants wore the former Venda Defence Force uniform. Besides providing training skills, the SANDF was to carry out tasks important to the RDP, which did not appeal to the private sector. The SC training lasted for 18 months and

⁴³ The early preparation of MK combatants for reintegration into civilian life did not help much. This was because of inadequate demobilisation programmes to provide for the political, economic, social, cultural and psychological needs of former MK combatants. Many experience the same difficulties that former APLA combatants are faced with. This is despite the fact that former APLA combatants never received prior training for reintegration.

comprised of 3 months literacy and adult life skills training, 3 months vocational training, and 12 months practical experience in different RDP projects. Introductory training dealt with career development, leadership, outdoor activities, personal and organisational behaviour and physical training. Life skills training included communication, dealing with conflict, life planning, problem solving, social interaction, self-esteem and the work ethos. Vocational training, which was linked to the Department of Labour, included training in building, catering, transport and engineering [Motumi and McKenzie, 199:200].

The first intakes started their training in September 1995 and the second in September 1996 at 1 Construction Regiment. The training involved more than 1 000 trainees countrywide [Defence Review, 1998:90].

MK also took the initiative to assist with the reintegration of its former combatants through the MKMVA.⁴⁴ In 1996, MKMVA which included all those former combatants who joined MK before the suspension of the armed struggle and those in the SANDF, was established with the following objectives:

- Assisting MK veterans who are not in a position to fend for themselves due to old age and disabilities
- Creating and developing income generating community-based projects which will involve veterans
- Assist in vocational training, education and reintegration of veterans into society
- Provide assistance to dependants of veterans who fell during the armed struggle for a non-racial South Africa
- Promoting and defending the rights and dignity of all MK veterans, as well as promoting the history and heritage of MK [Mashike, 1999:16].

Following the formation of MKMVA, President Nelson Mandela managed to secure R25 million to help advance its objectives [Mashike, 1999:16]. In March 1998, British Aerospace (BAe) also pledged R4,5 million to assist MKMVA with the reconstruction of an industrial park south of Johannesburg that would include

⁴⁴ Veterans Associations prove to have been helpful in other countries when it came to the reintegration. In certain countries, veterans were used to advance political agendas, which did not benefit them. This shows that while on the one hand Veterans Associations can assist peacebuilding, they can also be abused for personal interests with harmful effects on the peacebuilding process.

training centres. The purpose of the park is to provide business and training opportunities to former combatants [**Business Report**, 26 March 1998]

5.2. Difficulties with the Reintegration Process

One of the legacies of apartheid is the enormous income inequalities among the different population groups. Inequalities resulting from apartheid also had severe impacts on the educational, social and employment opportunities available to black. Hence, it is important that government reintegration programmes deal with some of these problems. The question is to what extent has the government succeeded in overcoming these problems in relations to former combatants through the provision of gratuities, the SC and MKMVA? From the point of view of many former combatants, little success has been achieved in this regard.

5.2.1. Political Difficulties

Political reintegration calls for the establishment of mechanisms aimed at creating a tolerant and democratic political environment. Former combatants should be included and encouraged to participate at local and national level in the decision-making processes, which will affect their future as former combatants and as ordinary members of their communities. Contrary, a number of former MK and APLA combatants found it difficult to actively participate in politics due to societal stigmatisation and misperceptions.⁴⁵

One former MK combatant complained that society does not trust them in local politics. This is despite society's previous support prior to his joining of MK.

⁴⁵ In general, the political difficulties encountered by former combatants seem to be more prevalent at the level of local politics. At national and provincial level of politics, a number of former combatants have successfully reintegrated into politics. While some have been elected as provincial leaders in various positions, others occupy leadership positions at national level as members of Parliament and ministers. However, many of these former combatants are the former leaders of either MK or APLA, who unlike the majority of ordinary members of these two liberation movements, were in a better position to gain entry to these positions because of their status.

Before I joined MK in 1990, I was very active in local politics. I was one of the campaigners for houses, access to water, electricity and a health care system. Now things are different. After the elections, I thought I would dedicate my time to helping people at the grassroots level. After joining the Local Council, some money went unaccounted for and I was accused of stealing it. I was removed from office [interview with a former MK combatant, 5 February 2000].

Another former MK combatant mentioned that,

When the RDP houses were constructed, we were promised that we would be given first priority. Many of our comrades were involved in the Council. Things changed after the houses were completed. Our comrades were accused of trying to separate our needs from those of society and we never received houses as promised. We took our case to the MKMVA, but it did not have much power in this regard [Interview with a former MK combatant B, 5 February 2000].

Such political mistrust also manifested in resentment and misunderstandings between politically active community members and former combatants. As one former combatant stated,

I was elected to the Transitional Local Council as a representative of my area. However, I was constantly disagreeing with other councillors on a number of issues and I was accused of being MK radical. I was sidelined from major decision-making processes that were part of my mandate. Eventually, I decided to resign [Interview with a former MK combatant, 14 January 2000].

Another former MK combatant concurred,

Every time when there was any problem in the council, everybody will look at me as if I am responsible. They will blame me for almost everything. Sometime they will talk behind my back and feared facing me [Interview with a former MK combatant, 15 January 2000].

5.2.2. Economic Difficulties

Long-term integration remains an important part of the transition process by former combatants. Ultimately, it is economic security that will bring a sense of belonging in society as, by its nature, civilian life calls for economic security in the form of employment opportunities to foster self-reliance. This is critical not only to avert security threats which former combatants may pose in the form of crime, banditry and political violence, but also because many are uneducated and lack marketable skills.

In South Africa, many former combatants feel that the gratuities granted to them were not enough. They believe that the package did not take into account their general economic conditions and needs. As one former combatant said,

The R12 000 that I was granted was less. My responsibilities have increased significantly. I had to share it with a family of nine. Besides this, things are very expensive [Mokalobe, 1999:21].

Another former APLA combatant made a similar comment.

How could a man with a wife and three children whose life has been dedicated to the liberation of his country be rewarded with such little money? I am very bitter to my comrades in power. It seems we mean nothing to them [Mokalobe, 1999:21].

One area of concern is the kind of training provided by the SC. Successful economic reintegration lies in providing valuable skills for which there is a demand in the market place [Nübler, 1997]. Contrary, a number of training skills provided by the SC were already being provided by other members of the communities into which former combatants were integrated. This made it difficult for them to start their own businesses. As one noted,

After completing my motor mechanics training I decide to open up my business. However, many other people in this business were already well-established. I literally did not have any customers. I am now unemployed and it is very hard for me to live on the mercy of my relatives [Mokalobe, 1999:21].

Many former combatants were also not interested in the skills offered by the SC,

People are trained in skills like carpentry. Not that there is a problem with carpentry, but for someone who was in the front command structures of Mk to be trained as a carpenter is an insult [Mashike, 1999:15].

A number of difficulties emerged from the manner in which the SC conducted its training. Since training was conducted by SANDF members under a military ethos, many aspects of reintegration such as psychological counselling and life skills advice were not given sufficient attention [Motumi and McKenzie, 1998:201].⁴⁶ As a former combatant noted,

⁴⁶ Despite the Namibian government's attempts to provide for the economic needs of its former combatants through the Social Integration Project for Ex-fighters, many did not stay long in their

It would have been much easier if the SC was part of a civilian structure. Most of these structures understand the demands of the communities and the communities trust them [Mokalobe, 1999:21].

Besides paying little attention to essential psychological and life skills, the SC training also served to further militarise former combatants. The problem with this is that the hierarchical and command military traditions do not encourage people to think critically, which is important for reintegration purposes. As one SC officer stated,

People tend to have an approach which is militaristic; there is a military culture and discipline, but these people in the Service Corps are not in the army – they have been demobbed and are re-entering society [Motumi and McKenzie, 1998:201].

A former senior APLA combatant agrees,

Most of our members who received their training in the SC are unemployed. This tells you much about the kind of training and the manner in which it is conducted. There is something wrong and changes is needed to correct some of these mistakes [interview with a former senior APLA combatant, 3 August 2000].⁴⁷

Despite R5 million funding from BAe, MKMVA has also provided limited funding to former MK combatants.

We were initially provided with R500 a month for 3 months, but we were later told that funds have dried up. As far as I know, MKMVA has not provided any training to anybody. To some of us, it is only a place where you meet your comrades and share your memories [Interview with a former MK combatant B, 5 February 2000].

According to a recent **Mail & Guardian** article, MKMVA cannot account for R5 million donated by BAe. More than 20 000 former veterans who were supposed to receive training have not received training two years after the

jobs for various reasons, including difficulties to adjust to "a regular job" [Kingma, 2000:11]. This bears testimony to the government's lack of attention to other life skills provision for former combatants, which forms an integral part of their reintegration into civilian life.

⁴⁷ In a recent independent audit of the SC commissioned by Deputy Minister of Defence, Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, allegations were made that large sums of money meant for the training of former combatants could not be accounted for. Although the SC was allocated

money was donated. Nonetheless, as the BAe representative, Linden Birns indicated, the problem was acquiring the land for development. He assured that once this have been dealt with, the project will go ahead [Mail & Guardian, 2 March 2001].⁴⁸

5.2.3. Social Difficulties

Social integration of former combatants also proved difficult as a number of them have no shelter, are unemployed and have limited education. A former APLA combatant said,

Since my arrival in 1993 from Tanzania, I have been living with my family. It is very hard because we are so overcrowded and this leads to tension in the family. If I can find employment I would build my own house [Interview with a former APLA combatant, 3 December 1998].

A former MK combatant shares the above sentiments,

I was staying with my family but because of problems I decided to build myself a shack. This is not a problem for me, but my family finds it hard to accept. My children just cannot adjust to these conditions. But I have no choice [Mokalobe, 1999:22].

Society also pressures former combatants with regard to expectation of lifestyle. The failure to meet these expectations has resulted in emotional difficulties.

Society sees us as heroes and expects too much from us. When they see some of our comrades driving in beautiful cars, they expect the same from us. This is a real frustration to me. To escape this pressure of heroism I spend most of my time drinking [Mokalobe, 1999:22].

The lack of shelter and unemployment adds to emotional difficulties.

I thought that after a training course in computers I would find employment, but I am unemployed. I am financially dependent on my mother who is a pensioner. I

R30 million for this purpose, it seems to have little success in providing training to former combatants [Mail & Guardian, 8 September 2000].

⁴⁸ In 1980, Zimbabwe passed the War Victims Compensation Act to help assist former combatants with their reintegration. Later, it emerged that there was a widespread abuse by government officials of former combatants' pension scheme. For more details see, Kriger, Norma. 2000. "War Victims Compensation: Collusion Between Zimbabwean Ex-combatants and Government." *Journal of African Conflict and Development*, Vol. 1, pp. 35-45.

spend most of my time drinking to forget my problems. My life is very lonely [Mokalobe, 1999:21].

The brother of a former MK combatant whose motor mechanic business failed complained that,

Every time when he is upset, he threatens to shoot us. The situation is worse when he is drunk. He threatens to shoot all those he suspects of hating him in the community. People complain almost every weekend about him to my mother. They resent him [Mokalobe, 1999:21].

Despite the fact that some former combatants wanted to continue with their disrupted education, provision was not made for this. A former combatant said,

I completed my matric two years ago and it has always been my desire to go to university to study law. I have been trying without any success to get funding from the government even though promises were made that we will be financially assisted [Interview with a former MK combatant, 5 February 2000].

A former MK combatant and former Major in the SANDF argued that government should make educational provision for former combatants.

There is a lot of potential among many of my comrades. I know of many that are intelligent, but have nothing to continue with their education. If they could be provided with some funds or somehow be helped by the government to continue with their studies, South Africa will prosper [Interview with a former SANDF Major Khaya Hamana, 29 September 2000].

Another former APLA combatant said,

When I was in exile, I trained as an electrician and when I came into the country I wanted to further my studies in electrical engineering through a technikon. Unfortunately, funding has been hard to come by. I finally gave up. Now I am unemployed [Interview with a former APLA combatant, 1 February 2000].

5.2.4. Cultural Difficulties

As Mashike [1999] argues, while life in exile for many former MK combatants was tough, it was also exciting. They were faced with different cultures, which to them was a learning experience. As a former MK combatant remembered,

We gained new experiences something we never expected like spending some sleepless nights, eating snakes, crocodiles, cooking for large groups of people. Even though it was a new experience it was difficult, challenging, and exciting but we missed home, friends, relatives, and most importantly our families [Mashike, 1999:12].

Following many years of conflict and exile, a number of former combatants soon find out that the cultural environment they have been reintegrated into is different.

When I came home in 1993, I thought like in other countries such as Zimbabwe, we would be welcomed as liberators. But things were different. There were no celebrations for home welcoming. Instead, many of us had to deal with a different culture, which viewed us as different from other members of our communities. Sometimes people call us names. It is sad considering these are the people you were part of and fought for [Interview with a former MK combatant B, 14 February 2000].

A former APLA combatant agrees,

It has not been easy for me to culturally fit in my family. When I left the country to join APLA, I left with my uncle and I was 18 years old. I got married in Tanzania and I got used to some of the Tanzanians traditions. Now my family views me as someone who is culturally different and this lack of understanding have led to cultural misunderstandings between me and my family during traditional ceremonies [Interview with a former APLA combatant, 5 February 2000].

Former female combatants encountered cultural difficulties of a gendered nature. Not only do they have to deal with indifferent cultural environment, but intolerance concerning gender equality. In contrast, during the liberation struggle, former female combatants were treated as part of the liberation movement community. Societal gender differences that separate their roles from that of males were generally not explicit within MK and APLA.⁴⁹

A former MK female combatant confirms these equal gender relations.

⁴⁹ Former female combatants in Mozambique experience similar difficulties. They express feelings of being scapegoated and stigmatised because of their involvement in war. Those female combatants, who had families, accepted the demands of their family to the extent of handing over all their subsidy money. Those without families were faced with both economic and societal hardship [Dolan and Schafer, 1997: 123].

We dug trenches, did guard duty, shared working and washing...everybody did their own washing. We all did the same things. We ate the same food. We did lots of physical exercises so we all had beautiful bodies [Cock, 1991:151].

Another former MK female combatant agreed.

True. Even though there were separate sleeping places and so on, there were no gender differences between our male comrades and us. We undertook joint operations and did the same work. Some of our female comrades were better at other things than males such as intelligence gathering and analysis, map reading and offering counselling [Interview with a former APLA combatant who is a Captain in the SANDF, 3 December 1998].

Not surprisingly, once they were reintegrated, former female combatants had to deal with cultural values that still entrench deep gender divisions.

My community is highly traditional. I am expected to dress and behave in a particular way. When I don't comply to these norms they see me as a deviant [Mokalobe, 1998:22].

A former female APLA combatant agrees,

At first, people around my community had all kinds of ideas about me. They even called me names. Because I was often in the company of my former male comrades, they saw me as immoral. Now things have changed and many understand that these are the people I share a lot in common with and feel comfortable around [Interview with a former APLA combatant who is a Captain in the SANDF, 3 December 1998].

The pressure on former combatants to comply with sexist cultural values and norms mainly takes the form of being directed suspicion and misperceptions. While some members of the community believe that former female combatants use their status to instil fear among people, others are convinced that because they had lived together with their male counterparts in exile they lack morality. One male civilian stated,

I can't imagine myself being involved with a female ex-combatant. I really doubt their moral standing. I even fear a situation where she may shoot me when we have a row [Mokalobe, 1998:23].

Another member of society noted,

It will be problematic for me to stay with someone who was staying with whole lot of men. You don't know what they have done. It will be problematic for me [Interview with a member of society, 3 January 1999].

Foreign wives of former combatants also find it difficult to integrate into South African society because of cultural differences.

We came to South Africa in 1993. Before building this house, we stayed with his family for over three years. It was very difficult for me to accept some of the cultural practices that were expected of me. This alienated me culturally and was made worse by the fact that I only speak Swahili and English. Communication was difficult between us [Interview with a wife of a former APLA combatant, 15 January 2000].

5.2.5. Psychological Difficulties

One way of helping former combatants to cope with their new social environment and exposure to civil war in Mozambique was through traditional healing mechanisms in the form of ceremonies. It is generally accepted that evil spirits haunt anyone who has killed, with an ensuing widespread belief that accepting former combatants into villages invites evil spirits. Hence, "cleansing" the demobilised combatants is necessary to remove the evil spirits through isolation and three days of "bath" under a traditional healer's care [Taju, 1998:56].⁵⁰

In South Africa, the failure of demobilisation programmes to provide for the psychological needs of former combatants had negative effects on reintegration. A number of them still experience trauma which in some instances has hampered their active participation in community life.

Because of my aggressive behaviour, my mother has on several occasions taken me to the police. The social workers have advised me to seek psychological treatment, but I cannot afford it. I need help [Mokalobe, 1998:22].

⁵⁰ Traditional ceremonies conducted in Mozambique had four functions: acknowledging the loss of family members, cleansing former combatants of any evil they may have perpetrated during the war, giving thanks to the spirits for their safe home return and re-establishing interdependence and re-submitting to family and societal structures [Dolan and Schafer, 1997:38].

These views are shared by another former MK combatant,

When I was in Angola, we constantly clashed with UNITA. All you could hear were the sounds of guns and after the encounter, people will be lying dead. These things come back to me. I sometime get violent for no reason [Interview with former MK combatant, 17 February 2000].

Another former MK combatant has a similar experience,

The only thing that still lingers in my mind and affects me mentally is the fact that when I came back home, I learnt about the death of my brother. He was killed by the apartheid government who thought he was me [Interview with a former MK combatant B, 14 February 2000].

A 1992 study by Cock of 180 former MK combatants who returned into South Africa during informal demobilisation also revealed that of those interviewed, 72,2% of them indicated that they suffer from either emotional or physical problems.

I am an emotional wreck. I have twice come close to committing suicide. At the same time, most had to rely on their families for material support. Often this situation led to family tension and disputes. My sister-in-law makes it clear that I am a burden on them [Cock, 1994:7]

Some former combatants regret not having made use of the opportunity for counselling, which was offered by the SC.

It is now that I start to realise the importance of counselling. I am depressed and miserable. I wish I could have seen the importance of counselling before being reintegrated. Maybe things would have not been the same. Now I don't have money for medical treatment [Mokalobe, 1999:22].

This indicates that the limited counselling of 2 weeks offered to former combatants was ineffective, as follow up counselling during reintegration is more important. It is here that psychological difficulties seem to mainly occur.

5.3. The Reintegration Process and Security

Many former combatants found themselves unemployed, with no education and appropriate marketable skills to support themselves. This human insecurity

coupled with political, social, cultural and psychological difficulties created a sense of insecurity. As a result, some embarked on criminal activities.⁵¹

A former MK combatant confirmed unemployment as one reason for crime.

I have been to Johannesburg and Pretoria looking for work without any success. I could not bear the pain and suffering that unemployment brought to my family and me. It is difficult as a father to see your children going hungry and keep on begging for money to people. I feel my obligation as a father and breadwinner is taken away from me. That is the reason why I decided steal. It is not out of choice [Mokalobe, 1998:23-24].

Another former APLA combatant said,

I used to be a petty criminal. The kind of crime I was doing involved mostly pick pocketing and shoplifting. This was just for my immediate survival. Things are better now, I managed to make enough money from the clothes and jewellery I used to steal to start my own small business. I sell anything from clothes, vegetables and liquor [Interview with a former APLA combatant, 1 February 2000].

One former MK combatant who is involved in serious crime stated,

I am involved in different jobs like housebreaking, armed robbery, cheque fraud and theft. Stealing cars is my speciality [Mashike, 1999:8].

In the recent transport conflict between Golden Arrow buses and taxis in the Western Cape, a former MK combatant admitted in the Cape High Court that he had been hired as a hit man by taxi owners to shoot at Golden Arrow buses. He said that he was paid between R50 and R350 for each attack [**Cape Argus**, 8 August 2000].

These criminal activities indicate a crucial link between economic insecurity encountered by unemployed former combatants and the security threat they pose. This also shows their affinity to misuse their military skills in the absence of proper reintegration.

⁵¹ It is worth noting, as Cock (1994) points out, very often the press exaggerated security threats by former combatants. This was another way by the NP government to discredit the ANC. Operation Echo was an example of an SADF strategy to discredit the ANC by linking former MK combatants to criminal activities [Motumi and McKenzie, 1998:187].

A former MK member and former Major in the SANDF offered a cautionary note,

These shooting incidents in the Cape reveal that unemployment and the lack of education, which many former combatants are faced with, could easily translate into instability in the country if something is not done to engage them in meaningful projects. This is a time bomb that needs attention given the talent many former combatants possess [Interview with a former SANDF Major Khaya Hamana, 29 September 2000].

Often, there is limited attention paid to the utilisation of former combatants' military skills in civilian activities.⁵² Nübler [1997] argues that certain military skills can be easily transferred to civilian life. He distinguishes between inter-occupational skills and specific and general skills. The former includes functional and extra-functional qualifications, which are related to performance, experience and knowledge of a particular job. Extra-functional qualifications are technical and economic qualification. They include competencies in communication, logical thinking and technical creativity. Given their nature, extra-functional qualifications are transferable from the military to the civilian sector. Soldiers acquire modern attitudes by working with modern machinery. Military services also enhance the ability to work in teams and co-operate where skills such as co-operation and leadership are acquired.

Regarding specific and general skills, the former are skills transferable from firm to firm. In the military, these are transferable skills such as in the steel and aircraft industry. Specific skills are those that increase the productivity of a trainee in one firm, but not in another. Such skills include astronauts, fighter pilots and missile men. The latter raises the productivity of the military but not of civilian society [Nübler, 1997:6-7].

A former senior MK combatant agrees that some skills acquired during military service can be used by former combatants to fend for themselves in society without resorting to criminal activities,

⁵² Mashike [1999] covers the issue of skills in length. He argues that the notion of skills should be broadened to take into consideration such skills as dress making, shoe making and farming which were acquired by former combatants during military training [Mashike, 1999:23].

We provided various valuable skills to our cadres during the liberation war, such as motor mechanics, communication through our journal and radio station, building and many others. The problem they face is they are discriminated against because it is still white people who regarded them as enemies that are major employers. That is why some are now doing crime. What we need to do is to encourage people to create jobs for themselves and train them in other useful skills [Interview with SANDF General Andrew Masondo, 1 December 1998].

Security incidents involving former combatants serve as an indication that if their pressing human security needs are not addressed, instability could become a serious problem and threaten peacebuilding. Despite the seriousness of some of these incidents, security threats by former combatants do not amount to a major threat to the stability of South Africa at the moment. However, this could lead to instability in the long-run, if neglected. At least four reasons account for this stability.

First, despite the ideological differences between the ANC and PAC, there was no animosity between these two liberation movements. Both viewed their individual struggles as fighting for the same cause: dismantling the apartheid system. These shared values have come to serve as an important factor in creating cordial relationships between the following demobilisation.⁵³

A former APLA combatant confirms this relationship.

Because we were never part of the negotiation process that was the deciding factor for demobilisation and reintegration of our combatants, we have to rely heavily on MK. They have been extremely helpful in assisting our comrades [Interview with SANDF Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce Masangu, 2 December 1998].

Second, only a small number of former combatants, 7 238, were demobilised and reintegrated. Given the small number of demobilised former combatants, it was

⁵³ An important reason for the renewed civil conflict between the MPLA government and UNITA in Angola is the lack of a shared enemy. With its history of destabilisation and support from the NP government, UNITA came to view the MPLA government as the enemy. Similarly, MPLA viewed UNITA as a rebel movement and enemy of the government. These differences and mistrust have resulted in ongoing hostility between the two.

unlikely that they could pose any serious security threat to the security of South Africa following their reintegration.⁵⁴

Third, despite the difficulties they encountered following their reintegration, many former combatants were easily absorbed into their communities. They view their daily difficulties in a similar light to that of their community suffering as a result of apartheid. Due to this, they feel they do not deserve special treatment. A former APLA combatant said,

Some of those who stayed in the country suffered more than many of us. These are the people who were faced with the brutality of the apartheid system on a daily basis. Now they are faced with the same problems of unemployment, the lack of housing and better education as us [Interview with a former APLA combatant 15 February 2000].

Fourth, some of the former combatants were absorbed into the main-stream economy. Others took advantage of their military skills and established themselves in private security businesses. Former MK combatants established two major security companies in the country, Sibuyile and Thuthuka in 1995. The monthly turnover of Sibuyile in 1995 was R700 000, with its personnel numbering 600 [Mail & Guardian, 7 July 1995].

Another group of former MK combatants has established their own tourism company, the Western Cape Action Tour Project. The Project provides tours in the Townships of Langa, Gugulethu and the Cape Flats. This is with the primary objective of offering tourists the opportunity of experiencing township life and the effects of the apartheid system on these communities. According to the Project

⁵⁴ In contrast, almost 50 000 former combatants were demobilised in Namibia from both sides of the conflict, the Peoples' Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) of the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) and the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF), which had fought on the side of the South African NP government. Although some of the needs of combatants were met, a large number of demobilised combatants, high expectations and the high level of unemployment caused considerable dissatisfaction among former combatants. In 1995, a large group of former PLAN combatants marched to the offices of the President and Prime Minister demanding jobs and threatened more serious disruption. These incidents continued between 1997 and 1998 in Windhoek, Walvis Bay and Grootfontein [Kingma, 2000:10-12].

co-ordinator and former MK combatant, Yazir Henry, the Project was established because,

We realised that we didn't want to be trapped in a spiral of negativity. We talked a lot about how we could turn our experiences and our lives around, adapt to our new environment and contribute something to society at the same time...We were able to move from anger and helplessness to searching for solutions without blaming anyone else for our situation [Leadership, December 1999].

Other former combatants went into the private sector and NGOs.

I was fortunate enough to go into the private sector soon after been demobilised. Through my hard work and dedication, I was made a marketing manager [Interview with a former MK combatant who is a Marketing Manager 1 January 2000].

Another former MK combatant said,

After demobilisation, I was unemployed for several months. Now I am working for a non-governmental organisation. I am happy with my job [Interview with a former MK combatant, 3 April 1999].

Finally, many former combatants believe that with time, things will get better.

I sometimes get so frustrated that I strongly think of doing crime. That is not what I fought for. I joined APLA to fight for freedom and development of this country. This is what the government believes and stands for and I cannot destroy that. Things are changing and we need to be patient [Mokalobe, 1999:24].

One former MK combatant conceded,

Since democracy, things are changing. Who thought that we would be supplied with water and electricity in our own yards? What about the construction of the houses, clinics and roads? This is a positive sign of good things to come [Interview with a former MK combatant, 5 February 2000].

5.4. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that demobilisation and reintegration are closely intertwined. If one process fails, the other is also bound to fail. This is true of South Africa where poor planning and implementation of demobilisation is

negatively affecting reintegration. Former combatants are faced with a number of difficulties. They complain about their inability to reintegrate into their communities due to societal mistrust and resentment. They feel that the gratuities offered to them were not enough to provide for their economic needs. There is also dissatisfaction with the SC. Apart from providing them with non-marketable skills, the training offered by the SC was militarised, thus failing to provide necessary life skills. In the social sphere, many former combatants have no shelter, are unemployed and possess limited education. Societal pressures and stigmatisation are taking its toll on their emotional well being. Furthermore, they find it difficult to reintegrate into their cultural environment after been exposed to different cultures in foreign countries such as Tanzania and Angola. It is former female combatants who are encountering cultural hostility, gender inequalities and stigmatisation. Many experience psychological difficulties in the form of aggression, violent behaviour and a sense of worthlessness. These difficulties indicate that consultation, inclusiveness, needs assessment, suitable skills training, provision for housing and education and accessible free medical provision were neglected by the government.

Naturally, human insecurity could raise a future security threat. Faced by unemployment, limited education and unmarketable skills, former combatants engage in criminal activities such as housebreaking, theft and car hijackings. Nonetheless, the magnitude of these activities does not pose a serious threat to the stability of South Africa at present. For many, the post-election period represents a moment of hope and excitement where transformation is still taking place. This is evident in the way that many former combatants see themselves as no different from other members of society who also suffered under apartheid. Some have entered the main-stream economy, thereby providing hope to others that with time, life will improve. Moreover, only a small number of former combatants loyal to the government and its transformation policies were demobilised, hence the lack of a serious security threats. Clearly, in the short-term, it would appear that the failure of demobilisation has not triggered a serious

security threat. It is, however, in the long-term that stability will be really tested, if the human security needs of former combatants are not addressed. Failure to attend to their needs in the future could lead to a major security threat that could derail the stability of South Africa.

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Chapter Six

6. The South African Rationalisation Process

This chapter examines the rationalisation process. The question is what is being done by the DoD to prepare SANDF members for successful reintegration. Since rationalisation is in its planning stages, this chapter looks at the lessons learnt from the failures of demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants in relation to rationalisation. The chapter also explores the political, economic, social, cultural and psychological difficulties, which may be encountered by former SANDF members following their reintegration into civilian life.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section deals with the mechanisms and measures that are being put in place to prepare SANDF members for successful reintegration. The assertion is that lessons have been learnt from the failures of the demobilisation and reintegration process. The second section builds on the first one. It argues that notwithstanding the positive plans being put in place by the DoD to ensure successful reintegration, as some of the planning measures taken this far reveals, there is a likelihood that difficulties will still be encountered with the process.

6.1. The Rationalisation Process in the SANDF

Following the integration process in 1994, the SANDF force level stood at 100 000, which exceeds the required 70 000 number. It was estimated by the DoD that 30 000 members will have to be rationalised, considering the desired budget, which is 40% on personnel, 30% on operating costs and 30% on capital [Defence Review, 1998:77]. The DoD has already reduced the number of full time members from 102 600 in 1995/96 to 82 258 in April 2000. It is estimated that a further 11 159 members will be rationalised by March 2002 to reach a planned strength of 77 704 [DoD, 17 May 2000].

There is also a need to redirect military resources to social development. This is at the heart of the concept of demilitarisation and human security. In 1989, the defence budget dropped from 4,5% of the gross domestic product (GDP) to 1,5% in 1998, and from 15,6% as a percentage of government expenditure to 5%. Between the 1993/94 and 1995/96 fiscal year, savings of R1,6 billion were redirected from the defence budget to RDP social development programmes [Batchelor and Willet, 1998:170].

A need for operational capability has also necessitated rationalisation. On 18 April 1999, the Cabinet approved a R30 billion weapons purchase proposal for the SANDF. According to the DoD, this purchase is in line with the SANDF's commitment to being a technologically advanced army that is able to perform its support duties and peacekeeping missions [Batchelor, 1999:1-2].

Type of Equipment	Quantity	R Million
Submarines	3	5 345
Corvettes	4	6 917
Helicopters	30	1 949
Fighter Aircraft – Tranche 1	21	7 110
Lead-In Fighter Trainer – LIFT	12	1
Advanced Light Flight Circuit –ALFA	9	-
Subtotal		21 330
Fighter Aircraft Tranche 2 and 3	21	8 662
LIFT	12	-
ALFA	9	-
Total		29 992

Table 8: SANDF Armaments Procurement
Source: DoD, 2000:155

Initially planned at R30 billion, the weapons purchase is now been estimated at R43 billion, taking into account exchange rates and other costs. The weapons purchase contradicts the DoD commitment to a process of demilitarisation of redirect military resources to the much-needed social developments. Defence spending increased nominally from R11,6 billion in 1998/99 to R12,6 billion in

1999/2000 and represents some 6% of the total defence budget and 2% of GDP [SAIRR, 1999:96]. In the 2000/2001 budget, defence has been allocated R15,8 billion, with the weapons purchase taking up almost half this amount, R4,220 billion.⁵⁵

Arms of Service	Allocation
SA Army	R3, 61 billion
SA Air Force	R1, 94 million
SA Navy	R945 million
SA Military Health Service	R1, 09 Billion
SA Military Intelligence	R164 million

Table 9: Defence Allocation for 2001

Unlike demobilisation, rationalisation will be conducted in a transparent and equitable manner. It will apply to all different members of the SANDF. The process will also be inclusive, the details of which will be communicated to all parties involved [SANDF Bulletin, 28 January 1998]. In identifying members for rationalisation, the DoD will consider the level of expertise, physical and psychological abilities, disciplinary record, family circumstances and financial position. However, operational readiness, legitimacy and representivity will form the basis for rationalisation [SANDF Bulletin, 27 January 2000].

To prevent some of the political, economic, social, cultural and psychological difficulties encountered with the demobilisation of former MK and APLA combatants, the DoD has established the Transitional Support Centre (TSC). The TSC, which form an integral part of the South African Military Health Service (SAMHS), consists of psychologists, social workers, nurses and a chaplain. Its support to rationalised SANDF members will include the following:

- Seeking and applying for employment
- Training to facilitate employment
- Stress management
- Assisting in family and social adjustment

⁵⁵ Taking into consideration such factors as exchange rates and the value of the Rand, it is estimated that the cost of the arms deal will increase significantly.

- Identifying resources and opportunities in civil society [SANDF Bulletin, 28 January 2000].

The DoD has also established regionally based Base Advice Centres (BACs). The responsibilities of the BACs will be to,

Assist with advice and details regarding personnel matters such as leave, gratuity, pension, subsidies, housing (state/private), medical continuation etc. Briefings/seminars on a wide range of topics such, as personal financial planning will be given [SANDF Bulletin, 28 January 2000].

As in the case with reintegration, the SC has been chosen to oversee the reintegration of former SANDF members. The SC will act as a Resettlement Agent to prepare former members for a new beginning into civilian life. This will be done through upgrading rationalised members' education standard, and vocational and life skills, provision of training, and practical experience in order to create employment opportunities for themselves. The primary functions of the SC will be,

- To assist members in selecting a career
- To facilitate training and development
- To assist members to find employment, or start their own business
- To provide training skills aimed at being self-employed
- To provide members with Job Search Skills
- To provide members with opportunities to interact with potential employers
- To develop an Employment Management Information System to provide members with employment opportunities [SANDF Annual Report, 1999].

The SC has entered into an agreement with the Department of Labour to utilise its facilities, which are accredited by various training boards. The SC Employment Service has been established to assist with the creation of employment opportunities for those rationalised SANDF members [SANDF Bulletin, 28 January 2000].⁵⁶

⁵⁶ The Deputy Minister of Defence, Madlala-Routledge has announced her intention to transform the SC to become a "national civilian development army" in the next few years. The Deputy Minister's plan is for the SC to provide non-military training skills and assist in finding employment for any South African who wishes to do so. The SC will become an independent body under the control of the President [Saturday Star, 17 February 2001].

There is also ongoing consultation between the DoD, the private sector and other sectors of the economy to accommodate former members. Attempts are also underway to consider redeployment of rationalised SANDF members to other government departments such as police and correctional services.

The DoD has entered into a partnership with NGOs to assist with rationalisation. This has attracted funding from international organisations. CCR has secured funding from the World Bank to assist the DoD with the planning, co-ordination and implementation of the process. Such assistance will focus on the following issues:

- Undertake a skills audit and socio-economic profile of those members who will be rationalised
- Provide career counselling to those members to be rationalised
- Undertake research to identify educational, training, employment and other opportunities for rationalised members
- Engage in consultation with key stakeholders in this process
- Evaluate the capability of the SC
- Develop a rationalisation programme for rationalised members based on the strength of the above

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) has also established a project that will assist with the reintegration process.

6.2. Difficulties with the Rationalisation Process

These positive measures being put in place to ensure a successful rationalisation process indicate that lessons have been learnt from the difficulties experienced with demobilisation and reintegration. Nonetheless, possibilities exist that the political, economic, social, cultural and psychological difficulties encountered with demobilisation will also be experienced with rationalisation.

6.2.1. Political Difficulties

Rationalisation is being delayed. The government has not yet approved the Employer Initiated Retrenchment (EIR) package that will form an important part of the rationalisation process. Although there are general steps to be followed

concerning the process, the criteria for rationalisation has yet to be approved by Parliament [DoD, 17 May 2000].

There are a lot of unanswered questions regarding rationalisation. It is important that the credibility of the SANDF remains intact and the government is trying to deal with some of these issues [Interview with SANDF member, 4 August 2000].

These difficulties indicate that rationalisation is a political issue. The DoD is faced with the dilemma of simultaneously ensuring expertise and representivity in the SANDF. Rationalisation of the majority of former MK and APLA combatants in the SANDF will be viewed as a double betrayal. More serious is that their rationalisation will be viewed as a failure to acknowledge their contribution to the liberation struggle. This may result in some rationalised SANDF members engaging in crime and acts of violence.

Rank	In Fixed Establishment Posts	In Supernumerary and Integration Posts	Total
LT GEN	2	1	2
MAJ GEN	4	0	4
BRIG	15	12	27
COL	18	33	51
LT COL	92	58	150
MAJ	186	127	313
CAPT	329	140	469
LT	310	207	517
2 LT	8	4	12
CPLN	5	2	7
WO 1	14	21	35
WO 2	36	44	80
SSGT	177	113	290
SGT	547	330	877
CPL	1 111	614	1 725
LCPL	968	815	1 783
PTE	5 388	4 898	10 286
CIVILIANS	11	1	12
Total	9 221	7 419	16 640

Table 10: Placement of Former Non-Statutory Forces as at 01 April 1998
Source: Defence Review, 1998:72

Added to the criteria difficulties, the issue of achieving representivity within the SANDF is crucial. Despite general agreement on steps to be taken for rationalisation to occur, there is an emphasis on retrenching members employed in the Short-Term and Medium Services Systems. Many of these are black, young, less educated and former combatants occupying low ranks in the SANDF.⁵⁷ This will undermine representivity and legitimacy of the SANDF.

Currently, some SANDF members who were members of MK and APLA are very concerned about their future. They don't know whether they are going to be retrenched or not. This has led to moral decline in the SANDF and could affect the capability of the SANDF if it is not dealt with immediately. There is a possibility that some people will resort to crime if rationalised. Representivity should be given consideration when rationalising members [Interview with SANDF member, 1 January 2000].

6.2.2. Economic Difficulties

Given the estimated 30% unemployment rate, not all rationalised SANDF members will find employment. This could result in economic insecurity, compelling some former SANDF members to engage in criminal activities. Another option is mercenary activities, which have become a lucrative business for former soldiers in African civil wars. Following the 1990s security reforms by De Klerk, a number of former SADF members became involved in mercenary activities.⁵⁸

In the late 1980s when the global security environment was changing and force level declining in the SADF, a former SADF member, Eben Barlow, founded a mercenary company, Executive Outcome (EO). In Barlow's words "The [end of the] Cold War left a huge vacuum and I identified a niche in the market". Since its

⁵⁷ The Short-Term and Medium-Term Services were initiated after the integration process as flexible systems aimed at creating a full-time personnel for the SANDF, which may be adapted to changing human resource needs.

⁵⁸ For a discussion on the South African security establishment reforms under F.W. De Klerk see, Nathan, Laurie and Mark Phillips. 1992. "Cross Currents: Security Developments under F.W. de Klerk", in Glenn and Ingrid Obery (eds.) **South African Review 6: From "Red Friday" to CODESA** (Johannesburg: Ravan Press), pp.112-127.

establishment in 1989, EO has fought in Angola and Sierra Leone. Besides mercenary activities, EO is involved in arms brokering, mining and oil drilling activities [Muthien, 2000:14-18].⁵⁹

In the ongoing bloody civil war in Sierra Leone, a former SADF colonel, Fred Rindle is said to be supplying arms and training to Liberia President Charles Taylor's private army and Sierra Leone's rebel movement, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), to maintain control of the lucrative diamond mines in the region. According to **Africa Confidential**, Rindle was also operating with UNITA and served as a liaison officer in the 1980s [Mail & Guardian, 14 July 2000].

These activities may exacerbate insecurity by driving away investment, disrupting daily business and hampering South Africa's relations with other countries.

An emphasis on retrenching members employed in the Short-Term and Medium-Term Services Systems, will not only undermine representivity and legitimacy, but will also see many former combatants in the SANDF unemployed. For many white junior, middle and senior SANDF officers, it should be easy to find employment in the private sector. This is due to the good education, they acquired under apartheid and the nature of military professionalism, which stresses the need for education. Some of their skills will easily be transferable into the civilian sector. In contrast, it will be more difficult for many black officers to find employment and gain access to business opportunities. This can be attributed to lower education levels due to inferior apartheid education and low ranks they occupy within the SANDF.

Another possible economic difficulty relates to the kinds of training skills the SC will be providing to former SANDF members as a body charged with the

⁵⁹ See also, Nathan Laurie. 1998. "Trust Me, I'm a Mercenary": The Lethal Dangers of Mercenaries in Africa", in Jacklyn Cock and Penny McKenzie (eds.) **From Defence to Development. Redirecting Military Resources in South Africa** (Cape Town: David Philip), pp. 184-185.

responsibility of overseeing their reintegration. Currently, a number of training skills such as motor mechanics, bricklaying and carpentry will be offered to rationalised SANDF members. These were provided to former MK and APLA combatants. This could again result in providing unnecessary skills that will not be of much use to former SANDF members given the oversupply of such skills in the community.

One SANDF senior official commented,

There has not been much that has been done in terms of skills that will be provided to those rationalised. The same skills will be provided to former members. This may see unemployment, as it was the same with demobilisation and reintegration. There needs to be some conceptualisation [Interview with a senior SANDF member, 4 August 2000].

In dealing with some of these difficulties, trade unions such as COSATU should be consulted to play a role in overseeing the implementation of the rationalisation programme. As with other civilian role players such as CCR and the ISS, COSATU could offer its support to rationalised SANDF members by providing training skills and identifying areas of the economy where such skills could be utilised, and strategies to achieve this.

6.2.3. Social Difficulties

Some SANDF members who are to be rationalised have for many years been living in the military bases and have been provided for by the government. Clearly, the professional military provides a secure environment to its members and dependants. The free market economy is full of uncertainties and demands that individuals fend for themselves. With rationalisation, SANDF members will be forced to start a new life where they will have to provide for their own shelter and other needs. This may result in lifestyle difficulties, considering the high cost of living and other general economic conditions.

Expressing his uncertainty about the future, an SANDF member said,

For the past three years, I have been living together with my family in the base. The government is providing us with food, helping with education of my children and transportation, and medical care. If I am rationalised, I will have to provide for myself and with the high cost of living, I wonder whether I will be able to make it [Interview with SANDF, 1 January 2000].

It is evident that SANDF members who are likely to be rationalised are those employed in the Short-Term and Medium-Term Services Systems. Many are in the low strata of the army and possess limited education.

A senior SANDF member commented,

Many of these people are still young and are less educated. Some are clever. It will only be fair enough if they could be provided with some form of funding by the DoD to continue with their education up to institutions of higher learning. This will not only be good for them, but also the entire country [Interview with a senior SANDF member, 4 August 2000].

The DoD places emphasis on the "first line response" training through the SC. That is, imparting skills to rationalised members in lower ranks with limited skills and without managerial or academic skills. Given the developed nature of the South African informal sector, it is unlikely that this approach will produce worthwhile results, as it is most effective in the informal rural and urban sector [Williams, 1998:211]. This situation will leave a number of rationalised SANDF members not only unemployed, but most importantly, with limited education. This is despite the fact that some are talented but lacks the resources to continue with their education. Thus increasing human insecurity and chances for crime, banditry and political instability.

Even though the DoD has entered into partnerships with some NGOs to assist with rationalisation, there is currently less, if any, focus on sensitising the community about the possible needs of those to be rationalised in order to increase the support base for the process. Failure to sensitise society may lead

to all kinds of suspicions, misperceptions and stigmatisation about rationalised SANDF members and impact negatively on their lives.

6.2.4. Cultural Difficulties

The cultural environment in which former SANDF members will reintegrate into following their rationalisation serves as an important factor in determining their active and effective participation in their respective societies. By its nature, professional military environment is authoritative and hierarchical. While these elements may be present in some communities, most communities tend to be democratic and less hierarchical.

Therefore, the cultural significance of reintegration calls for sensitisation of both rationalised SANDF members and society. Communities should be made aware of what to expect from rationalised SANDF members and how members of the community could accommodate them. This will assist in ensuring their successful reintegration into civilian life.

Currently, cultural awareness programmes are not part of DoD's planning for rationalisation. There are no programmes in place to make both SANDF members and society mindful of each other's differences, and how these can be reconciled. If this situation is not addressed, it is likely that the same cultural difficulties, such as family intolerance, gender indifference and societal stigmatisation experienced by demobilised MK and APLA combatants, may be encountered by rationalised SANDF members.

As an SANDF member said,

There are no programmes to sensitise members of cultural problems they may encounter. It may be that the DoD takes it for granted that since we sometime have contact with our families outside, we are used to the different cultures of our communities. This is despite the fact that we have been socialised into a different culture of discipline, punishment and reward. It may be that the DoD will introduce such programmes later. The sooner the better not only for those who will be rationalised, but also for those who will remain part of the SANDF [Interview with SANDF member B, 1 January 2000].

6.2.5. Psychological Difficulties

One positive measure undertaken by the DoD to deal with possible psychological difficulties that rationalised SANDF members may encounter is making available the services of the SAMHS in the form of the TSC. The TSC will have regional offices throughout the country. Nevertheless, these will be situated at the medical command of each province. Most of these medical commands are in the cities and will not be easily accessible to those SANDF members who will choose to settle in rural areas or small towns.

There should also be awareness programmes within the DoD focusing on the importance of counselling and skills training. These should be free and easily accessible. The TSC should also enter into partnership with NGOs that provide counselling services. This will allow for constant monitoring of the progress of members and allow the TSC to respond not only to the changing needs of rationalised members, but also of the entire programme. This will also assist the government in adopting a flexible approach to difficulties encountered by rationalised members and identifying priorities.

6.3. Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the failure to adequately address the needs of former combatants following their demobilisation has prompted the government to avoid repeating the same mistakes with rationalisation. A number of plans are being put in place to ensure rationalisation is successful. Regionally based BACs are being established to help former SANDF members with gratuities, pensions, housing and medical care. The DoD has also established the TSC to assist rationalised members with their psychosocial needs. More so, the SC is being revamped to ensure that rationalised SANDF members are successfully reintegrated by upgrading their education levels through life skills and training provision. To ensure the inclusiveness of the process, the DoD is involved in consultations with the private sector and other sectors of the economy

to accommodate former SANDF members. It has also entered into partnerships with NGOs such as CCR to assist with the process.

Despite these positive measures, there are still loopholes in the current planning process that could lead to political, social, economic, cultural and psychological difficulties being encountered with rationalisation. The DoD is faced with the difficulty of simultaneously maintaining expertise and representivity, while implementing the rationalisation process. If only former combatants are rationalised, this will be viewed as a failure to acknowledge their contribution to the liberation struggle. Consequently, some may resort to criminal activities or political violence. This is highly likely considering the DoD's emphasis on retrenching members employed in the Short-Term and Medium-Term Services Systems, many whom are black, former combatants with limited education.

Naturally, this will see many faced with economic hardships in the future such as unemployment. The kind of training skills provided by the SC are unlikely to be different to the ones provided to former combatants, and are to likely result in the same difficulties encountered they encountered. Given the fact that rationalised SANDF members will have to start a new life, the emphasis on rationalising mostly black and less educated members is likely to see a number of these SANDF members without shelter and employment. There are no cultural awareness programmes to sensitise society on the needs of rationalised members. This could lead to cultural difficulties such as family intolerance, gender differences and public misconceptions. More serious are the psychological difficulties that may be encountered by rationalised members due to problem of accessibility, availability and general lack of counselling awareness programmes within the SANDF. This calls for additional measures to be undertaken by the DoD. Rationalisation should be based on expertise and representivity to ensure the legitimacy of the SANDF. The SC training skills should be conducted in a way that will create employment opportunities. Labour movement and other interested parties should be called on to assist with the

process. There should also be provision for housing and education, cultural awareness campaigns, and free and accessible psychological counselling facilities.

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Chapter Seven

7. The South African Peacebuilding Process

This chapter examines peacebuilding. It focuses on the significance and impact of demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation within the broader context of peacebuilding. It argues that the difficulties encountered with demobilisation and reintegration did not negatively affect peacebuilding due to transformation measures implemented soon after the elections. Given the nature of rationalisation and the general political, economic, social, cultural and psychological difficulties facing South Africa, conflict in the form of crime, banditry and political violence could erupt. This could be worsened by the lack of attention to the increasing needs of former combatants, thereby hindering peacebuilding.

The chapter is divided into two sections. Section one examines peacebuilding and the measures taken after the elections to address inequalities that characterised apartheid South Africa. The intention is to understand why the difficulties encountered by former combatants did not negatively affect peacebuilding. The second section examines the political, economic, social, cultural and psychological transformation difficulties facing South Africa, and how these combined, could disrupt the peacebuilding process.

7.1. The South African Peacebuilding Process

The principal objective of the demobilisation and rationalisation processes is to avoid conflict that may disrupt peacebuilding. This requires the government to address the human security needs of former combatants and the overall political, economic, social, cultural and psychological challenges facing a country emerging from conflict. Conscious of the security threats stemming from demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation, the ANC government embarked on a process of peacebuilding. The process was aimed at creating a political,

economic, social, cultural and psychological environment conducive for lasting peace.

To this effect, the ANC and its Alliance partners, COSATU and the SACP, together with NGOs developed the RDP as the policy framework for building a democratic and non-racial South Africa. Underlying the objectives of the RDP were six important principles.

- Overcoming the legacy of apartheid through the harnessing of resources in a coherent and purposeful way
- Meeting the immediate needs of all citizens regardless of race or sex
- Promoting peace and security and establishing a representative security force
- Removing the apartheid legacy of racial discrimination
- Integrating growth, development, reconstruction and redistribution in developing South Africa and achieving peace and security
- Democratising South Africa where all the people participate in policy decisions affecting them [ANC, 1994:1-7].

7.1.1. Political Environment

A legitimate and stable political environment is essential for successful peacebuilding as the progress of demobilisation and reintegration depends largely on it. Given the effects of conflict, the consolidation of state capacity, law and order, and the establishment of democratic principles are central elements of peacebuilding in preventing conflict from recurring [Kingma, 2000:17].

Following the elections, a democratic GNU came into existence and the new Constitution was signed, becoming a law. According to Chapter 1 (1)(a,b,c,d), "The Republic of South Africa is one sovereign democratic state founded on the following values:"

- Human dignity, the achievement of equality and advancement of human rights and freedom
- Non-racialism and non-sexism
- Supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law
- Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections, and a multi-party system of democratic government to ensure accountability, responsibility and openness [Constitution of South Africa, 1996:5].

The Constitution created a bicameral Parliamentary system which consists of the National Council of Provinces and the National Assembly to provide legislative power to the provinces and legislature, and oversight power to both legislatures [Jacobs, 1998:5]. Section 55(1,2) of the Constitution defines the responsibility of the National Assembly as to "consider, pass, amend or reject any legislation...and initiate or prepare legislation...ensure that all executive organs of the state...are accountable to it...maintain oversight of the exercise of national authority...and any organ of state" [**Constitution of South Africa**, 1996:28].

Despite the fact that Parliament was new and most of its members inexperienced, there were noteworthy achievements in a relatively short time. During the first three Parliamentary sessions, an average of 108 bills were passed into laws. Committees were also created to guarantee transparency and inclusiveness in the law-making process. More significant, Parliament members are now representative of race and gender demographics of South Africa [Jacobs, 1998:5-8].

To safeguard democracy, a number of independent institutions were established under Chapter 9 of the Constitution. These are: the Public Protector (PP); the Human Rights Commission (HRC); the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities; the Commission for Gender Equality (CGE); the Auditor-General; the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC); and the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) [**Constitution of South Africa**, 1996:77-81].

Democratic principles were also extended to the security forces, which is an important tool in creating a stable political environment. Retraining and reorientation of the military through the introduction of strong civil-military relations, and the creation of a representative armed force play an important role in peacebuilding. It is critical that former combatants identify with these changes as they create confidence and bring legitimacy into the military [Kingma, 1998:5].

In May 1996, Parliament approved the **White Paper on Defence** with the overarching theme of transforming the defence policy. It scrutinised the following issues: civil-military relations; strategic environment; functions of the defence force; human resources; budgetary considerations; arms control; defence industry; and the environment [Nathan, 1998:41]. The **Defence White Paper** commits the SANDF to a "non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture" that "reflect the composition of South Africa" [**Defence White Paper**, 1996:4-5].⁶⁰

As Nathan [1998] points out, the **Defence White Paper** sets "an agenda for demilitarisation". It signifies a break with the NP government defence policy and brings the new defence policy in line with democratic principles, the Bill of Rights, the strategic environment facing South Africa and international law on armed conflict. The **Defence White Paper** further seeks to demilitarise society whilst at the same time transforming the security forces [Nathan, 1998:41].

In line with the policy objectives of the **Defence White Paper**, significant transformational measures have been introduced into the SANDF. For instance, the post of the Chief Directorate of Equal Opportunities and Affirmative Actions was established to ensure the speedy implementation of affirmative action and dealing with discrimination. A number of special education and training programmes aimed at standardising military procedures and upgrading the military skills of all SANDF personnel were also introduced. These include Adult Basic Education Training (ABET) aimed at equipping SANDF personnel with the necessary basic education skills, and a Civic Education programme aimed at providing education on the Constitution, civil-military relations, multi-cultural diversity and military professionalism [**Defence Review**, 1998:81-86].

⁶⁰ On the issue of the South African civil-military relations see, Williams, Rocky. 1993. **The Changing Parameters of South African Civil-Military Relations: Past, Present and Future Scenarios** (Johannesburg: Military Research Group), Seegers, Annette. 1992. "Current Trends in South Africa's Security Establishment". **Armed Forces and Society**, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 159-174 and Nathan, Laurie. 1995. "Who Guards the Guardians? An Agenda for Civil-military Relations and Military Professionalism in South Africa". **Strategic Review for Southern Africa**, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 47-74.

Gender inequality and discrimination in the SANDF and DoD are also being addressed. In November 1998, the DoD committed itself to the following principles as required by the Office on the Status of Women (OSW):

- Conduct a campaign to eliminate violence against women and children who are dependants of SANDF members and employees of DoD
- Formulate and enforce a policy on the prevention of sexual harassment for the DoD
- Formulate a policy to prevent violence against women during armed conflict and address the unequal relations of power between men and women
- Adhere to all international conventions and treaties, including customary law and tradition, with reference to the treatment of women and children during armed conflict [SANDF Annual Report, 1999/2000].

Now, women are allowed to serve in combat roles and mustering. The **Defence Review** stipulates that women can serve in mustering and all uniform posts [Defence Review, 1998:80]. This was never the case in the SADF. Whereas women were recruited from 1971 and trained in the use of weapons, they were not allowed in combat roles. Their inclusion in the SADF was due to the need for "manpower", and reinforcing both white and male supremacy. In turn, this legitimised perceptions that "women are instinctively unlikely to kill, women's socialisation is inappropriate, women are incapacitated through physiological functions such as menstruation" and "male chivalry" [Cock, 1991:130-131].

These transformation measures have led to significant changes in the SANDF. In 1998, a total number of 19 800 SANDF personnel were promoted, 68% of which were African, 1% Asian 19% Coloured and 21% White. Equally important, former MK and APLA combatants occupy key positions in the SANDF. General Sipiwe Nyanda is the Chief of the SANDF, Lieutenant-General Gilbert Ramano heads the South African Army, Major-General Godfrey Ngwenya is the Chief of Joint Operations, Lieutenant-General Motau leads Defence Intelligence and Major-General Jackie Sedibe is the Chief of Equal Opportunities. Significant improvements are also envisaged in the future.

Former Force	Proposed Number	Percentage
APLA	3 850	5, 50%
KZSPF*	1 820	2, 60%
MK	9 898	14, 14%
SADF (Civilian)	15 351	21, 93%
SADF	23 905	34, 15%
SANDF+	6 489	9, 27%
SANDF (Civilian)	791	1, 13%
TBVC	7 042	10, 06%
TBVC (Civilian)	850	1, 22%
TOTAL	70 000	100%

* Kwazulu Natal Police Force

+ These are people who joined the SANDF following its formation in 1994

Table11: Proposed Strength after Final Integration Based on Projected Transformation Strength 70 000

Source: Defence Review, 1998:78

The disarmament of former combatants also played a significant role in creating a stable political environment. As part of the peace settlement, it was agreed during the negotiations that MK arms caches be cleared and those arms in the possession of former combatants be handed over to the government at assembly points and police stations.

In 1995, Minister Modise stated that the collection of weapons from MK and other non-statutory forces integrated into the SANDF would occur in Phases. Phase 1, which took place from June 1994 to August 1994, involved the recovery of weapons from bulk stores. Phase 2 occurred between November to December 1994 and involved the recovery of weapons from arms caches. Phase 3, which took place from November 1994 to March 1995, centered on the recovery of weapons from individuals. These disarmament measures resulted in the recovery of 273 AK-47 machine guns, 156 pistols, 534 limpet mines, 2 857 grenades, 104 922 rounds of ammunition, 2 RPG-7 rocket launchers, 14 RPG-7 rocket and 6 other rifles [SAIRR, 1996:69].

These disarmament efforts were in essence a continuation of the process to lay the foundation for negotiations to pave way for peacebuilding. Under the **Pretoria Minutes** paragraph 3, the ANC agreed to suspend its armed actions, but there was no cease-fire. Still, on the whole, measures to disarm former combatants proved successful in avoiding conflict. According to a former MK combatant, who is now a defence official, concerted efforts were made before and after the democratic elections to disarm former combatants.

After the **Pretoria Minutes** some cadres returning from exile left their arms in host countries. They returned as unarmed civilians and just before the integration some arms caches were identified. The government also introduced voluntary arms collection programmes where people were given amnesty for returning their arms to the police [Interview with Tsepe Motumi, 9 April 2000].

A former APLA combatant agreed.

One should remember that we were only allowed to come into the country as unarmed civilians. Our weapons were taken away from us even before democracy could be achieved. This strategy worked [Interview with a former APLA combatant who is a Major in the SANDF, 3 August 2000].

Disarmament was not without its difficulties, considering that there was no cease-fire. A major reason for the lack of a cease-fire was the increasing violence, and the NP government's continued participation in it. This resulted in MK keeping some of its weapons in case negotiations failed. In April 1991, Nelson Mandela stated that there was no way that the ANC could terminate the armed struggle.

MK was in a state of readiness in case the forces of counter-revolution once more block the path of a peaceful transition to a democracy. MK was also making expertise available to those communities engaged in the process of self-defence units [Mandela, 1993:85-112].

Senior MK combatants provided training to SDUs to defended communities against security forces and Inkatha. In Kwazulu-Natal, MK combatants such as Jeff Radebe and Sipho Sithole trained and armed the SDUs to protect communities against warlords in the townships. In the townships of Tembisa,

Katlehong and Soweto, SDUs engaged in violent conflict with Inkatha and vigilante groups such as the "Toasters" and "Russians" [TRC, 1998:669-676].⁶¹

Some SDU members also took advantage of the violence for selfish gain, which was not part of the ANC self-defence strategy. While some became agents of the security forces, others engaged in criminal activities such as SDUs members in Queenstown [TRC, 1998:671-676].

A great deal of the weapons used in ensuing violence could not be accounted for during the disarmament process. These weapons were estimated at 20 tons and had been smuggled into the country during Operation Vula between 1988 and 1990. They included AK 47s, pistols, landmines, hand grenades, limpet mines, and rocket launchers [Williams, 1995:3].

A former MK combatant who is now a defence official conceded,

It was difficult to account for all the weapons. Some cadres kept their weapons and never handed them to the government despite the amnesty. Very important maps about arms caches were also lost. There were also criminal elements within the SDUs that used and kept weapons for criminal purposes [Interview with Tsepe Motumi, 9 April 2000].

7.1.2. Economic Environment

When the ANC came into power, the economy was characterised by low growth, a high unemployment rate and gross income disparities between whites and blacks. In 1991, the Central Statistic Service (CSS) reported that real economic growth measured by GDP at constant 1985 market price was -0,6%. This compared unfavourably with the previous economic growth of 2,3% in 1989 and 4,2% in 1988 [SAIRR, 1993:526]. In 1993, the economy only grew by 1,2% as

⁶¹ The discussion on the SDUs during and after apartheid is contained in, Marks, Monique and Penny McKenzie. 1998. "Militarised Youth. Political Pawns or Social Agents?", in Jacklyn Cock and Penny McKenzie (eds.) **From Defence to Development. Redirecting Military Resources in South Africa** (Cape Town: David Philip), pp. 222-232.

measured by GDP at constant 1990 market price compared with a decline of 2,2% in 1992 and 1% [SAIRR, 1995:378].

The level of unemployment was also high. In 1994, the CSS reported that the unemployment rate stood at 29%, which represented 3,6 million people. Blacks constituted 37,2% or 3 million people of this number while whites constituted 8,4% or 200 000 [SAIRR, 1995:381]. In 1995, the IMF identified "high and still rising" unemployment in South Africa as a "dark cloud on the horizon". It was estimated that 8,8% economic growth was needed per year over ten years to absorb labour [SAIRR, 1996:535].

In 1995, the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) reported that in 1993, 47,2% of black households and 18,5% of coloureds were living in poverty. In terms of gender, 48,3% women and 43,5% men were living in poverty [SAIRR, 1996:537-538]. One underlying source of this poverty is the vast income disparities in terms of race and gender. The 1996 Census reported that 16% of employed people received income of more than R3 501 per month, while 26% received R500 or less. Moreover, 65% of white males received more than R3 501 per month and only 6% of black males and 5% of females received the same income. About 26% of black males and 48% of black females received R500 per month or less [SAIRR, 1999:247].

To eradicate economic disparities and their devastating effects on people's lives, the government adopted the RDP as a macro-economic strategy. The RDP was aimed at addressing the social and economic needs of South Africans through a "strong, dynamic and balanced economy" in order to:

- Create jobs that are sustainable
- Alleviate poverty, low wages and extreme inequalities in wages and wealth
- Address economic imbalances and structural problems
- Integrate into the world economy utilising a growing home base
- Ensure that no one suffers discrimination in hiring, promotion or training on the basis of race or gender
- Develop the human resource capacity

- Democratised the economy and empower the historically disadvantaged
- Create employment opportunities [ANC, 1994:24-25].

Within a short time in office, the government achievements in the economic sphere were considerable. From 1994, the economy began to show satisfactory signs of growth. In 1994, the economic growth rate at a market price was 2,7% and 3,3% in 1995, the highest since the 1988 economic growth rate of 4,2% [SAIRR, 1996:529]. This growth rate continued in 1996 at 3,1% [SAIRR, 1997:652]. As President Thabo Mbeki observed in his 2001 State of the Nation Address, in the third quarter of 2000, the economic growth rate in real GDP was 4% [Mbeki, 2001:4].

Significant efforts were also made not only to deal with obstacles standing in the way of reducing the high level of unemployment, but also to change discriminatory labour laws. To transform the labour markets, the Minister of Labour, Tito Mboweni established the Directorate for Equal Opportunities and the Labour Inspectorate to formulate labour policies and enforce employment equity.

In 1995, the Labour Relations Act of 1995 was passed to promote "orderly collective bargaining" and "employee participation in decision-making in the workplace" [Juta's Statutes, 1998:172]. Two years later, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 was passed to enforce and regulate basic conditions of employment [Juta's Statutes, 1998:296].

In 1998, two other legislation were passed, the Employment Equity Act and the Skills Development Act. The former was passed for "promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the elimination of unfair discrimination; and implementing affirmative action to redress the disadvantages in employment experienced by designated groups" [Government Gazette, 1998:12]. The aim of the Skills Development Act is to provide the labour force with the opportunity to develop and improve its skills [Juta's Statutes, 1998:307-308].

These proved fruitful in the economic sphere. According to the 1994 FSA-Contact public and private sector survey, 84% of 86% participating companies had introduced some form of affirmative action compared with 74% in 1993, and 58% in 1993. The number of black employees at senior management positions had risen from 3,5% in 1993 to 18% in 1994 [SAIRR, 1996:272].

In 1998, BusinessMap reported that the total value of black economic empowerment transactions in the JSE was R21 billion compared with R5 billion in 1997 and R1,6 billion in 1996 [SAIRR, 1999:490]. Although the overall employment rate has been slow, new employment opportunities have been created. In 1994 and 1995, employment in the public sector rose by 0,5% [SAIRR, 1997:348]. In 1998, employment in the public sector accounted for about 36% of the total formal employment, which represented a 9% increase from 28% in 1975 [SAIRR, 1999:265-266]. From 1996 to 1999, total employment increased from 9,3 million to 10,4 million [Mbeki, 2001:3].

7.1.3. Social Environment

The apartheid legacy was also visible in the social environment. The majorities of South Africans were homeless, illiterate and had no access to health care services. In 1994, the housing backlog was estimated at 1,5 million units, with the shortage for blacks accounting for 93%. If hostels and rural areas were included, housing backlog was estimated at more than 3 million units and was expected to increase to 200 000 units a year [SIRR, 1995:508].

Mindful of the need for housing, the Department of Housing announced that it would build 350 000 houses annually in the next five years. In April 1996, the National Housing Finance Corporation (NHFC) was created to provide housing subsidies of R15 million to low-income earners. The People's Housing Process was also initiated to provide subsidies, service land, skills training, advice, building materials and technical support to the poor [SAIRR, 1997:738-740].

Between March 1994 and August 1995, the average monthly housing delivery was 536 subsidies. This increased by 6 952 subsidies between September 1995 and September 1996. In September 1996 alone, 15 620 subsidies were issued [SAIRR, 1997:748]. By March 1999, a total of 745 717 houses had been built or were under construction [SAIRR, 1999:168]. The number of houses built or under construction by December 2000 was 1 129 612 and subsidies allocated amounted to 1 323 205 [Mbeki, 2001:3].

Another social factor, negatively affected by apartheid is education. The 1996, the Joint Education Trust survey of adult education estimated that in 1994, about 7,5 million people aged 15 or older were illiterate. In 1995, the CSS reported that 2, 8 million people over the age of 20 had no education and blacks accounted for 92% of this figure. Women accounted for 61% and men 39% of people with no education [SAIRR, 1997:151-152].

Besides discriminatory laws relating to education under apartheid, the high illiteracy rate was due to unequal distribution of income among different race groups. Between 1969 and 1970, expenditure on black education amounted to 16% of the total education budget, while 70% on whites and 41,9% on coloureds. Fourteen years later, this number had not significantly changed. While whites received 52% of the total education budget, blacks were allocated 31% and coloureds 12% between 1984 and 1985 [SAIRR, 1992:193].

In 1995, the Department of Education published a **White Paper on Education and Training** with the objective of providing quality education to all. ABET was introduced for those who "historically missed out on education and training". The National Commission on Higher Education (NCHE) was also established to oversee the transformation of higher education and learners from Grade 1 to Grade 9 were to be provided with free education [White Paper on Education and Training, 1995:21-73].

The education budget was increased to overcome education disparities created by apartheid. In the 1994/95 national budget, R30,85 billion was allocated to education. This represented 22% of the total national budget compared with 20,9% of the 1990/91 national budget [SAIRR, 1995:235]. In the 1996/97 national budget, education was allocated R35,2 billion [SAIRR, 1997:171]. Education continued to be a priority for the government. In the 1999/2000 national budget, education was allocated R48,5 billion, which was 22,1% of the total budget [SAIRR, 2000:125]. In 1996, 67 000 of higher education students received loans from the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (TEFSA) [SAIRR, 1998:138].

Under the NP government, the health care system was grossly inefficient and inadequate. Although the NP was spending almost 10 times more than what the World Bank estimated it should cost to provide basic public health care for all, millions of South Africans were without health care services [ANC, 1994:42].

To reverse this, in May 1994, the ANC announced a five-year health programme to create a single national health care system based on effective primary health care [SAIRR, 1995:277-278]. In April 1997, the Department of Health tabled a **White Paper for the Transformation of the Health System in South Africa** in Parliament. The **Health White Paper** sets the objectives of the Department of Health as:

- To unify fragmented health services at all levels into a comprehensive and integrated National Health System
- To promote equality, accessibility and utilisation of health services
- To extend the availability and ensure the appropriateness of health services
- To develop health promoting activities
- To develop the human resource available to the health sector
- To foster community participation across the health sector
- To improve health sector planning and the monitoring of health statutes and service [Department of Health, 1997:14-16].

A number of measures to transform the health care sector were initiated. The free health care programme for children under the age of 6 and pregnant mothers, and a school-feeding scheme was introduced. A total of 495 clinics

were built and 249 clinics were upgraded, 2 298 received new equipment and 215 mobile clinics were purchased [Department of Health, 1999:26].

7.1.4. Cultural Environment

In South Africa, the struggle against apartheid was not only about politics, but all forms of discrimination including gender inequalities. Women in South Africa played a major role in the liberation struggle. Apartheid was not only a system of political injustices, but also gross gender discrimination. Gender discrimination and inequality are entrenched under the system of patriarchy viewing women as subordinate to men. Describing the state of patriarchy in South Africa, Albie Sachs observed,

It is a sad fact that one of the few profound non-racial institutions in South Africa is patriarchy...Indeed, it is so firmly rooted that it is frequently given a cultural halo and identified with customs and personalities of different communities. Thus to challenge patriarchy, to dispute the idea that men should be dominant figures in the family and society, is to be seen not as fighting against the male privileges but as attempting to destroy African tradition, or subvert African ideals, or undermine civilised and decent British values [CGE Annual Report, 1998:14].

Under democracy, gender equality and discrimination is being accorded serious attention. On 15 December 1995, South Africa ratified the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in which it committed itself to the following:

- Increased measures to end violence against women
- Include women in high positions of power in government and leadership
- Economic empowerment of women
- Public awareness campaigns
- Reform the laws and customs that prohibit the advancement of women
- Protecting human rights for women [Department of Welfare, 2000:37-38].

Structures outside and inside government have been created to highlight gender issues and gender equality. They include the OSW, the Joint Standing Committee on the Improvement of Quality of Life and Status of Women in Parliament, the Commission on Gender Equality (CGE) and the Parliamentary

Women's Group (PWG). While the OSW's task is to ensure women's representation in government, the CGE is responsible for transforming society by exposing all forms of gender discrimination and cultivating a culture of women's rights as human rights [CGE Annual Report, 1998:3].

The commitment of these structures to ensure gender equality is producing notable results. There are now 25% of women in Parliament, 23% in Provincial Legislatures and 19% in local governments, with many women occupying ministerial positions [Department of Welfare, 2000:38]. Since 1994, the number of women occupying senior positions in the Public Service increased from 4% to 10% in 1998 [CGE Annual Report, 1998:66].

In the social realm, laws were introduced and public campaigns undertaken to attain and highlight gender equality. The Recognition of Customary Law Act of 1998 and the Succession (Customary Law) Amendment Bill were passed. The former equalises the rights of men and women under customary law and the Succession (Customary Law) Amendment Bill brings into accordance with the Constitution a series of rights under customary law. On 13 December 1999, the Domestic Violence Act of 1998 was also promulgated to deal with the scourge of violence against women [Department of Welfare, 2000:38-39].

The CGE has entered into partnerships with government and NGOs to advance and encourage gender equality. It has undertaken workshops throughout the country with the objective of understanding the everyday difficulties facing women and how they can best be dealt with. The CGE is also involved with its partners in the process of formulating gender policies and programmes [CGE Annual Report, 1998:35-41]. The OSW has concluded a Draft Policy on Women's Empowerment and Gender Equality to the government. The Draft Policy deals with the socio-economic needs of women and how they can be addressed [Department of Welfare, 2000:38].

7.1.5. Psychological Environment

Dealing with the past injustices in South Africa is important for peacebuilding. On the one hand, it assists in dismantling the apartheid legacy and providing some measure of justice to those who suffered under the apartheid regime. On the other hand, it provides a space for reconciliation and unity. Equally important, it demonstrates the significance and morality of the struggle against apartheid and the armed struggle [Asmal, Asmal and Roberts, 1996:10].

On 15 December 1995, President Nelson Mandela established the TRC under the leadership of Archbishop Desmond Tutu. To enable the TRC to proceed with its responsibilities, the Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar passed the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995 with the following objectives:

To provide for the investigation and the establishment of as complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes and extent of gross human rights violations committed during the period from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date contemplated in the Constitution...emanating from the conflicts of the past, and the fate or whereabouts of the victims of such violations; the granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political objective committed in the course of the conflicts of the past...affording victims an opportunity to relate the violations they suffered; the taking of measures aimed at the granting of repatriation to, and the rehabilitation and the restoration of the human and civil dignity of victims of violations of human rights, and reporting to the Nation about such violations and victims [Juta's Statutes, 1998:194].

Under the TRC, three Committees were established: the Committee on Human Rights Violations, the Committee on Amnesty, and the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation. According to section 14(1)(a,b) of the Act, the Committee on Human Rights was responsible for gathering evidence about gross human rights violations and making recommendations to the Commission about measures to be followed when granting reparations to victims or creating institutions conducive to a stable society [Juta's Statutes, 1998:196-198].

The task of the Committee on Amnesty is granting amnesty to the perpetrators of acts of human rights violations on condition that it is proven that their acts were politically motivated. Under sections 20(1)(c), the Committee can grant amnesty given that the "applicant has made a full disclosure of all relevant facts". According to sections 20(2)(a,b,e,f) such amnesty applies to:

Any member or supporter of a publicly known political organisation or liberation movement...any employee of the State or any former state or any member of the security forces...any person in the performance of a *coup d'etat* to take over the government of any former state...and any person...who on reasonable grounds believes that he or she was acting in the course and scope of his her duties and within the scope of his or her express or implied authority. If the Committee believes that there was no full disclosure and the acts committed were not politically motivated it can refuse amnesty [Juta's Statutes, 1998:199-201].

The Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation was tasked with the responsibility of making recommendations on reparation measures to the victims of human rights abuses at the recommendation of the Committee on Human Rights and the Committee on Amnesty. Section 1(1) defined reparation as "any form of compensation, *ex gratia* payment, restitution, rehabilitation or recognition" [Juta's Statutes, 1998:195-202]. This means that reparations can differ from situation to situation and the most common form of reparation is apology, which could be imposed by Commissioners [Asmal, Asmal and Roberts, 1996:17].

7.2. The South African Peacebuilding Process Under Threat?

Despite the fact that the democratic government has achieved a lot to improve and better the lives of many South Africans, there is still much to be done. Many South Africans are still unemployed, illiterate and impoverished. This section looks at these conditions, as they affect not only former combatants, but also ordinary South Africans. The possible security threat they may pose to the broader peacebuilding process needs to be looked at.

7.2.1. Political Environment

Despite the government's successful implementation of democratic principles, certain factors continue to undermine them. As with the apartheid government era, corruption is prevalent in the present day government. It includes such practices as bribery, fraud and misappropriation of public funds. In the 1995/96 financial year, the irregularities in government spending amounted to more than R150 million. Unauthorised expenditure of R58 million was spent by the Department of Health, R35 million by the Department of Correctional Services and R47 million could not be accounted for by the Department of Finance [Electronic Mail & Guardian, 28 March 1997].⁶²

Corruption is widespread at the levels of provincial and local government. In his 1997/98 report, the Auditor-General stated that the quality of management and administration in many provinces was unsatisfactory and a "cause for grave concern". What accounts for this state of affairs are such factors as: the late submission of appropriation accounts; weaknesses in internal control systems; and the lack of properly trained staff [Auditor-General's Report, 1999:21-22].

In 1997, the Department of Health reported that R4,3 million intended for school feeding schemes was stolen in all provinces, with the Eastern Cape accounting for R2,3 million of this amount. In Kwazulu-Natal, 372 state owned cars worth approximately R33 million were appropriated from merchants who claimed to hold lien over them. It was also discovered that 3 Promissory Notes to the value of R340 million were issued by the Mpumalanga Parks Board without proper authorisation [Heath Special Investigating Unit, 1998:9]

Commenting on corruption, a former female MK combatant said,

It is public knowledge that some government officials are corrupt and it is even worse at local level. People are enriching themselves with the money that is supposed to serve the interests of the people. You have to pay bribes for

⁶² See also, Lodge, Tom. 1999. **South African Politics Since 1994** (Cape Town & Johannesburg: David Philip Publishers).

everything. This behaviour needs to be stamped out and people should be made to pay back every cent they steal from the public [Interview with a former female MK combatant, 5 February 2000].

Nonetheless, the government has adopted a "zero tolerance" approach to corruption. In August 1998, the office of the Public Protector was investigating 4 419 cases of corruption and the Health Special Investigating Unit was investigating 95 000 cases worth about R8-R9 billion in March 1999 [Camerer, 1999:1-3]. The public also appears to be confident about government efforts to fight corruption. According to the March 1999 HSRC survey about corruption, 34% of the participants said that the government was giving enough priority to the issue, 20% mentioned that corruption was given "too high a priority", and only 3 out of 10 said that corruption was receiving "too low a priority" [Humphries, 1999:7].

Added to the problem of corruption, are the serious problems of racism and racial discrimination. Many farm workers are victims of racism, abuse and murder by white farm owners. In one racially motivated incident, the son of a farmer was sentenced to 25 years in jail after assaulting a black labourer with an iron rod, stabbing him with a sword on his stomach and tying his body to his car before driving off until he died [**Sunday Times**, 19 November 2000].

In the police service, racism is also prevalent and includes practices such as bias, victimisation, the use of derogatory language and ill-treatment of black officers by their white counterparts [HRC, 1999: 45]. In a racially motivated incident, 6 white police officers were seen on television using dogs to torture three alleged black illegal immigrants. Outraged by this event, the Minister of Safety and Security, Steve Tshwete said that "although the incident took place in 1998, I find it difficult to believe such a naked display of racism and brutality could occur four years into our democracy" [**Cape Times**, 8 November 2000].

As the recent shootings in the SANDF reveals, the military have not escaped problems of racism and racial tension. According to the Interim Report of the **Defence Ministry Inquiry into Shootings at Tempe Military Base**, racism is one serious concern in the SANDF. It manifests itself in abusive language, unfair disciplinary action, assault, exclusion from units and condemnation of black officers. The concept of one army is none existent as it is undermined by discriminatory practices within the SANDF [Lekota, 18 September 2000].

Continuing racism in the military could have far reaching implications for peacebuilding. In a country such as South Africa engaged in peacebuilding, the government should foster internal cohesion within the military at the level where different armed formations interact to prevent divisions. Since the military is a state institution, providing a picture of the relationship among different groups of a society, the lack of internal cohesion can spill over into society and undermine the legitimacy of the military, leading to possible conflict [Malan, 1996:41-45].

A former MK member who is now in the SANDF reflected the extent and the nature of racial tension in the SANDF, and what it could lead to if left unattended.

There are sharp divisions in the SANDF between particularly the middle and junior ranking officers. Sometimes these divisions can lead to physical attacks and abuse. Many black junior officers are frustrated with the oppression they have to deal with on a daily basis. That is why you see so many shootings in military bases throughout the country. Motivated by racism, middle-ranking officers often prevent the implementation of good policies by senior officers. It is rare in the army to see white and black officers interacting together. This state of affairs is unfortunate and could lead to instability [Interview with a former MK combatant who is a Brigadier in SANDF, 4 August 2000].

The level of tension in the military and its security implication was demonstrated by the recent weapons theft from various military bases. In May 1998, two members of the SANDF with right-wing connections were arrested in what became known as the biggest arms theft from the SANDF armoury at the Tempe Military Base. Weapons stolen included rocket-launchers, R4 and R5 rifles, machine-gun and mortars. In June 1998, another two soldiers transporting

weapons were hijacked outside Bloemfontein and ammunition was stolen [Pretoria News, 6 July 1998]. Recently, the police arrested seven people, four of them SANDF member, who were smuggling weapons at an SANDF base in Jankempdorp [Sowetan, 28 September 2000].

A former APLA combatant stated,

There are weapons being stolen by former SADF members to destabilise the country. These are the people who make life difficult for former cadres in the SANDF. These are people who try hard to frustrate unity and understanding in the army. They should be dealt with or otherwise they could cause instability. After all, these are the people who regarded us as enemies and still see us as enemies [Interview with a former senior APLA combatant, 3 August 2000].

South Africa today is also awash with firearms. A total of 2 052 041 firearms were reflected in the National Firearms Register. According to the Minister of Safety and Security, Steve Tshwete, 125 179 people own 5 or more firearms, 78 999 own 4 firearms, 142 249 own 3 firearms, 317 475 owns 2 each and 1 388 139 people own 1 firearm each [E.P. Herald, 28 October 2000].

Crimes involving firearms are also on the increase. From 1994 to 1998, 57 106 cases of murder and 111 000 cases of attempted murder were reported to the police. Between 1996 and 1998, 180 088 robberies using firearms were committed. In the same period, 99 409 firearms were reported stolen and 13 283 were reported lost, bringing the number of stolen firearms to 112 692 between 1994 and 1998 [Chetty, 2000:18].

Reasons for the demand and growing use of firearms vary. Mostly, they are socially constructed and heavily embedded in "militarised identity" linked to gender, ethnicity, race and nationality. For the apartheid government, militarisation and procurement of weapons served as a symbol of white minority protection. In response, the AK 47-assault rifle was considered by many black

youths as a symbol of liberation.⁶³ Presently, the demand and use of firearms is embedded in "banal militarism" where war and weaponry are seen as natural and inevitable [Cock, 1998:127-131]. These reasons point to the fact that even after democracy, South African society is heavily militarised, with the suspicious mentality of apartheid still rife.⁶⁴

7.2.2. Economic Environment

In 1996, the government adopted the **Growth, Employment and Redistribution** (GEAR) macro-economic policy, which represented a departure from the RDP's policy objectives. With GEAR, the government committed itself to the following:

- Budget reforms to strengthen the redistribution thrust of expenditure
- Fiscal deficit reduction programmes to contain debt service, counter inflation and free resources for investment
- An exchange rate policy to keep the real effective rate stable
- The gradual relaxation of exchange controls
- A reduction in tariffs
- Tax incentives to stimulate investment
- Speeding up the restructuring of state assets
- An expansionary structural flexibility within the collective bargaining system
- Intensifying a levy system to fund training on a scale commensurate with the needs
- An expansion of trade and investment flows in Southern Africa [Department of Finance, 1996:2].

The adoption of GEAR was in response to the depreciating value of the Rand and pressure from the private sector to liberalise the economy. The government argued that the RDP was a good policy, "but the arithmetic doesn't hold up" and

⁶³ In an effort to discredit the South African liberation movements, primarily the ANC, and justify the existence of apartheid among white South Africans and the world at large, NP government associated AK 47 with a "communist onslaught" against the state. In this sense, for the apartheid apologist, the AK 47 was a symbol of Russian evil. This distortion still exists particularly within the media, and the AK 47 is associated with crime despite the fact that most violent crimes are committed with pistols and revolvers [Cock, 1998:125-126].

⁶⁴ Alarmed by the proliferation and growing use of firearms, the government has drafted the Firearms Control Bill to address the problem. Two important provision of the Bill in this regard are that a competency certificate which expires after 5 years is needed to apply for a firearm and a person will only be allowed to own 1 firearm. Not suprisignly, the Bill was not welcomed by the South African Gun Owners Association (SAGA) which claims that the reduction of number of firearms will jeopardise the security of gun owners and give criminals more power.

GEAR was "non-negotiable" [Cronin, 1997:31].⁶⁵ The business community welcomed GEAR. At the May 1997 National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) summit, the chairman of Business South Africa, Hans Smith commented that because of its "disciplined macro-economic framework" business supported GEAR, as it encourages investment and competitiveness [Smith, 1997:23-24].

For the Tripartite Alliance, the adoption of GEAR remains a source of disagreement and debate. Both COSATU and the SACP called for the implementation of the RDP. According to the President of COSATU, John Gomomo, unlike the RDP, COSATU rejected GEAR's fiscal policy, which saw a major decrease in social spending, leading to a decrease in economic growth, and increasing unemployment and poverty. Gomomo called for the adoption of macro-economic strategies of the RDP [Gomomo, 1997:28].⁶⁶

GEAR has done little to address most of the pressing structural crises facing the South African economy. With the adoption of GEAR, the government set economic growth at a rate of 6% per annum and GDP growth rate of 20% to 26% in the year 2000 [Department of Finance, 1996:1-6]. In contrast, the economy only grew by 0,5%, a slower growth rate than in the past five years [SAIRR, 1999:402].

Rising unemployment remains the most challenging task for the government's GEAR policy. In 1999, Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) reported that according to the expanded and strict definition of unemployment, 36% and 23% of South

⁶⁵ Despite the failure of GEAR to address economic challenges facing South Africa, the government indicated its commitment to this macro-economic strategy. President Mbeki said that the primary objective of the government is to create an investor friendly economic environment through the introduction of flexible labour laws, reduced corporate tax rates and setting up an investment council [SAIRR, 1999:396].

⁶⁶ These sentiments emerged again at the recent seventh COSATU's National Congress. COSATU argued that since the ANC came into power, the working relations within the Tripartite Alliance has been characterised by the lack of co-operation leading to the failure of the RDP. Instead, policies are implemented by bureaucrats with the support of the business community [The Shopsteward, September 2000].

Africans were unemployed respectively. Between 1997 and 2000, 1 in every 10 formal jobs were lost. This led the South African Reserve Bank in 1999 to conclude that unemployment in the formal sector was no different from that of the late 1970s [**The Shopsteward**, September 2000].

In line with GEAR's objectives of speeding up the restructuring of the public sector, the government announced that it will privatise a number of its enterprises such as Telkom and Spoornet. While the government contends that privatisation will generate more than R12 billion in the next several years, the downside is that an estimated 100 000 jobs in the civil service will be lost. The SANDF is also in the process of retrenching some of its members. Approximately 11 000 SANDF personnel will lose their jobs. Growing unemployment would exacerbate unemployment and possibly lead to instability, as more people engage in criminal activities or banditry to survive.

The 2001 South African national budget has come under criticism from COSATU, South African National NGOs Coalition (SANGOCO), the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and other organisations, which have launched the People's Budget Campaign. These organisations say that they welcomed some social spending by government, but felt that R4,3 billion weapons procurement deal this year and the R6 billion increase in two years, compares unfavourably with this year's poverty allocation of R1,5 billion. They have also criticised privatisation as been driven by fiscal pressure to reduce debt [**Business Day**, 23 February 2001].

A difficulty that still characterised democratic South Africa is poverty and sharp income inequalities. The 1998 **Poverty and Inequality Report** stated that about 65% of South Africans live below the poverty datum line. It was also reported that 19 million (46%) of South Africans were trapped in poverty, surviving on household expenditure of R353 per month. Blacks were the poorest in the country at 61% followed by coloureds at 38% and whites at 1%. The poverty rate

was high among female-headed homes at 60% as compared with 31% of male-headed households [Department of Welfare, 2000:13].

Despite talks to deal with income inequalities, the latter remain extensive. The richest 20% of households have 65% of income and the poorest 20% households have 3% and the poorest of the 20% poor have 1% [Department of Welfare, 2000:15]. During the 1998 Poverty Hearing organised by SANGOCO, the SAHRC and the CGE, many black people disclosed that they were earning as little as R10 a day while some executive directors were earning nearly R10 000 a day [Cock, 1999:2].⁶⁷

As one former combatant said,

Some of our comrades are getting richer and richer. They are less concerned about the ordinary people. They only care about themselves and their lavish lifestyles, and forget it is through our blood and sweat that they are where they are today because of us. Some of those who benefit today were never part of the struggle. When we were fighting they were doing nothing and enjoying themselves. Now they earn large salaries and the poor keep on getting poorer [Interview with a former MK combatant, 11 October 2000].

Growing economic difficulties in the form of unemployment, poverty and income inequalities represent a major threat to peacebuilding. Defining its national security objectives, the government acknowledges this threat. The **White Paper on Defence** views human insecurity in the form of poverty, unemployment, the lack of education and shelter, crime and violence as threatening the stability of South Africa [Defence White Paper, 1996:3]. Mindful of the general consequences of crime in South Africa, President Mbeki said,

The government will continue to pay the necessary attention to the issue of crime. We are very conscious of the fact that safety and security of all citizens is a fundamental right and a critical element in our continuing efforts to improve the quality of life of all our people [Mbeki, 2001:12].

⁶⁷ The purpose of the Poverty Hearings was to provide the poor with the opportunity to speak about their poverty experiences and difficulties they have to endure in their every day lives in gaining access to their rights. Issues covered during the Hearings included the followings: forced evictions and difficult living condition on farms; gender discrimination; and the lack of access to such essentials as water, food, shelter, health care services, social services, and education.

The economic difficulties facing the country stand as one of the most worrying factors for a number of SANDF members. They see themselves unemployed, poor and without general economic security to survive should they be rationalised. A former APLA combatant who is now a Captain in the SANDF observed,

You wonder whether you can find a job if you can be retrenched. A number of people are unemployed in South Africa even those with degrees. What about me with only military training? Who will employ a soldier who was also an APLA cadre for that matter? I have a family to feed and should I not get a job, I will look at other possibilities even crime if needs be [Interview with a former APLA combatant who is a Captain in the SANDF, 5 January 2000].

A former MK combatant who is a senior member of the SANDF also shared his concerns about the possible negative effects that economic difficulties could spell for the country's peacebuilding process if some rationalised SANDF members do not find employment.

There is some disillusionment and frustration among particularly the junior ranking officers in the SANDF. These soldiers are young and the prospect of a bleak future could lead to instability for South Africa [Interview with a former MK combatant who is a brigadiers in SANDF, 4 August 2000].

Another former MK combatant said,

Even though the government is doing everything to address some problems, it is difficult to deal with them all. Unemployment is one of those. Many cadres are faced with this problem. It has been said that some former cadres were hired as hit men in the taxi and bus conflict in Cape Town and paid R50 per hit. This shows what economic hardships could lead cadres into. You should also remember that there are still elements within the SANDF of the apartheid era who will want to engage in acts of violence against the government if they are rationalised. Some are engaged in mercenary activities in conflict areas in Africa. These conditions are a threat to the stability of the country [Interview with a former SANDF Major Khaya Hamana, 29 September 2000].

Many of the demobilised combatants are generally dissatisfied with their economic conditions. They view their difficulties as ongoing and believe that this situation will remain so for sometime. Expressing his dissatisfaction about his increasing economic insecurity, a former APLA combatant said,

It seems that things are moving from bad to worse. Me and some of my comrades have been unemployed since we arrived in the country. Our hope is running out now and some are already involved in petty criminal activities. The government must try to do something [Interview with a former APLA combatant B, 5 February 2000].⁶⁸

7.2.3. Social Environment

Social difficulties are also far from over. South Africa is faced with housing shortages and difficulties in education and health care services. In the 2000/2001 housing budget vote, Minister of Housing, Sankie Mthembu-Mahanyele stated that there is an estimated housing backlog of 3 million and with the current budget, less than 200 000 subsidies will be provided. The Minister indicated that if the housing budget was to be increased by 25% on subsidies, it would still take 60 years to eradicate the housing shortage [Ministry of Housing, 2000].

Commenting on housing shortage and slow pace of delivery, a former MK combatant observed,

It looks like some of us will die without enjoying the fruits of our liberation struggle. I have now been staying in a shack for over five years and there has always been the promise that we will be provided with houses. This has not happened. Where are the houses we were promised? [Interview with a former MK combatant B, 11 October 2000].

Another former MK combatant said,

We have been promised houses each year and nothing yet has happened. I wonder whether I will ever stay in my own house [Interview with a former MK combatant, 17 January 2000].

Another difficulty besetting government is the education conditions facing black schools. Problems range from the lack of resources, discipline among learners and the lack of skilled teachers. In 1996, about 58 000 pupils were without classrooms in Gauteng, 200 000 in Mpumalanga, and 85 000 in the Northern

⁶⁸ Dissatisfied about their living conditions and general economic conditions facing South Africa, a group of former MK combatants, former SDUs members and Inkatha's SPUs appeared on television warning that if their plight is not looked into, they will resort to crime to survive. Others threatened to stand as independent candidates in the local government to challenge their parties.

Province. In the Eastern Cape, there was a shortage of over 20 000 classrooms and 15 000 in Kwazulu-Natal in 1996 and 1995, respectively. Other provinces also experience classroom shortages due to overcrowding [SAIRR, 1997:182-185]. Although the problem has been addressed to some extent, classroom shortages are still serious to date.

There is also high number of incidents of violence in schools. In 1996, in Kwazulu-Natal, teachers from about 200 schools embarked on a three-week long strike demanding the improvement of security following the death of several of their colleagues [SAIRR, 1997:199]. There have also been incidents of male teachers having sexual relationships with female learners. Recently, a 51-year-old primary school teacher in the Northern Province was charged for statutory rape of a 15-year-old pupil at his school [Sowetan, 17 November 2000]. In the same province, another teacher was arrested for allegedly raping two pupils at his school, one 15 years old and pregnant, and the other 17 years old [Sowetan, 16 November 2000]

Concerned about the state of education, President Thabo Mbeki challenged the Department of Education to improve the conditions of education facing black township schools. President Mbeki said that it is important for the Ministry of Education to "consolidate and intensify the important work of bringing about effective governance, administration and monitoring at all levels of the education system". He added that a safer education environment and the provision of quality education were urgent [City Press, 29 October 2000].

Higher education is also compounded by the difficulties of decreasing enrolment. This is the case mostly at historically black universities. In 1998, university enrolment declined by 6% compared to 1997 [SAIRR, 1999:139-144]. Compared to 1998, enrolment at historically black universities declined by 14%, 2% at historically black technikons, 2% at historically white (English) universities, 4% at historically white technikons and there was an increase of 2% at historically white (Afrikaans) universities. At the heart of these declines are such factors as

secondary education conditions, declining real income, growing disillusionment regarding employment prospects and declining funding [Vally, 2000:67-68].

Transformation of the health care service has not been adequate. In the 1999/2000 financial year, the Department of Health underspent R60 million (28%) of its budget earmarked for hospital rehabilitation. At the Christ Hani Baragwanath Hospital, there were shortages of food, beds and medicines for patients. The Wilhelm Stahl Hospital in the Eastern Cape appeared to be on the brink of closure due to the lack of food and other medical essentials [**Sunday Times**, 5 November 2000]. In the 1999/2000 financial year, R99 million of the budget was underspend on the feeding scheme. This has seen many pupils from poor families going without their daily food [**Mail & Guardian**, 3 November 2000]. The situation is being exacerbated by immigrating doctors, and the unwillingness of local doctors to work in rural areas [**Sunday Times**, 5 November 2000].

7.2.4. Cultural Environment

The most serious difficulties that confront government and society today is widespread violence, abuse and ill-treatment of women. In a mid-1998 survey of violence against women undertaken by the ISS, the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVr) and the University of Cape Town's Institute of Criminology, about 90% of 269 women interviewed had experienced physical abuse, 90% emotional abuse, 70% sexual abuse and 58% economic abuse. In these incidents, 59% of the abusers were partners or lovers while 69% were abused by someone unknown [Louw, 1999:12-13].

In many cases, violence against women has led to death. Between 1990 and 1994, 212 women were killed by their partners. Between November 1999 and June 2000, 36 women were killed by their partners. In 2000 in Alexandra, 9 women were killed in just 3 months and 5 women were killed in the Northern Province in just a month [**Mail & Guardian**, 3 November 2000].

Remarking on the abuse and violence against women, a former female MK combatant said,

It looks like the liberation that we all fought for means nothing today. Our treatment by society leaves much to be desired. There is no respect for women and they are on a daily basis abused and treated like objects. This situation is unacceptable. It is time that we are accorded the respect we deserve not as women, but as human beings [Interview with a former female MK combatant, 5 February 2000]

Another former MK combatant said,

Society treats women as if they are nothing. The situation is becoming worse and needs serious attention. Some of these problems emanate from different South African cultures that treat women as subservient to men. According to customs, women are not seen as having the same rights as men. Their role is to nurture children and take care of their family and husbands. Its all power relations embedded in customs and believes [Interview with a former MK combatant, 5 February 2000]

It appears as if the justice system is doing little to deal with these difficulties. The National Directorate of Public Prosecution reported that sexual offences against women take up between 40% and 50% of the cases in courts, but are poorly prosecuted cases. The Department of Justice reported that of more than 54 000 cases of rape reported in 1998, less than 7% resulted in prosecution [Mail & Guardian, 3 November 2000]. Of the 394 rape cases reviewed between 1997 and 1999 in Southern Johannesburg, 272 of the rapes were reported to the police, but only 17 were considered official police "cases", 5 were referred to the court and only 1 resulted in prosecution [Andersson, Mhatre, Mqotsi and Penderis, 1999:18].

7.2.5. Psychological Environment

With the conclusion of the work of the TRC and the publication of its final report in 1998, it was hoped that the process of national reconciliation would take place. It was also expected that racial division and animosity, which were dominant features of apartheid South African, would be a thing of the past. Unfortunately, South African society is still characterised by divisions, racism and racial tension.

The TRC findings concluded that apartheid was a crime against humanity and the NP government committed acts of torture, detentions without trial, judicial execution and banishment against its opponents to uphold white minority power. Covert forces such as the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) and Third Force were used to torture and maim opponents, vigilante and proxy groups were also trained and armed to kill in order to further the government interests. The TBVC homelands were created and mobilised to counter opposition to apartheid. Their security forces were not autonomous and often worked with the South African security forces in abducting, killing and torturing anti-apartheid activists and those critical of the homeland system [TRC, 1998:165-493].

The TRC also charged the ANC and PAC of gross violation of human rights in the course of the liberation struggle.⁶⁹ The Commission reported that a number of military attacks by MK combatants had resulted in injury to civilians despite the ANC's policy to avoid civilian casualties. Casualties were as a result of either "unplanned" military operations or poor intelligence. The ANC was also held responsible for the killings of informers and the torture of its combatants in its camps. With regards to the PAC, the Commission reported that in its early years, APLA attacked and killed civilians. APLA also committed acts of gross violation of human rights within its own ranks due to internal divisions [TRC, 1998:325-376].

Almost 1 700 amnesty applications were received by the TRC concerning gross violation of human rights, of which 750 were from supporters of the ANC and 350 from the South African security forces personnel. Although blacks participated and shared their stories as victims under apartheid, many former SADF and

⁶⁹ When the TRC released its report and charged liberation movements of gross violation of human rights, the ANC challenged this assertion and said the Commission had failed to take into account the just war context in which the liberation war had occurred. In response, the TRC stated that in looking at the activities of both the ANC and PAC, its findings were based on international law, which recognised the cause of the ANC and PAC, but which made clear the distinction between just and unjust war as laid down in international convention. It therefore found that these two liberation movements committed acts of human rights violation in the course of the liberation struggle, for which they were morally and politically responsible [TRC, 1998:325].

whites who had committed acts of violence accepted no responsibility for their actions. They failed to play a meaningful role in the process of reconciliation. For the sake of reconciliation, many top former SADF members behind acts of torture and murder were granted amnesty.

According to the October 2000 **Reconciliation Survey** published by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) on the attitudes of South Africans regarding national reconciliation, many felt that there was a lack of commitment by most whites to the process of reconciliation. Asked whether the TRC process was important in building unity, 77% of blacks agreed, with only 29% of whites following suit. Fifty six percent of coloureds responded positively. While 77% of blacks agreed that it is their responsibility as South Africans to contribute to the process of national reconciliation, 75% of coloureds agreed with the same. On the question of whether there should be material compensation for victims of apartheid 70% of blacks agreed and only 20% of whites agreed. On the issue of whether national reconciliation requires forgiveness, 81% of blacks responded positively and 64% of whites agreed, while 83% of coloureds were positive [IJR, 2000:2-3].⁷⁰

It is evident that reconciliation in South Africa has mixed results. Many white South Africans deny their role in supporting the apartheid system. They continue to enjoy their privileges under a democratic government while the majority of black who suffered still endures economic and social hardships. Consequently, there is a danger that reconciliation without social and economic justice may lead to a culture of retribution, widen racial division and increase tension.

Few white people participated in the TRC and most of those who did were forced. These are the people who oppressed and murdered us. Even when we

⁷⁰ Although many white South Africans feel they have nothing to contribute to the processes of reconciliation and nation-building, there are others who are firmly committed to these processes. This group of white South Africans have called for the **Home for all Campaign** where they urge individual white South Africans to acknowledge that they have benefited from and contributed to the advancement of apartheid at the expense of blacks. They have signed a **Declaration of Commitment by White South Africans** not only to advance reconciliation, but also national-building, reconstruction and development of all South Africans.

show our willingness to forgive them, they still fail to acknowledge their deeds. Now we have to act as if we are at the mercy of the perpetrators of these hideous acts. There is no reconciliation in South Africa only divisions between blacks and whites [Interview with a former MK combatant, 11 October 2000].

There is a prevailing mood among blacks of not only division and discontent about the TRC process, but also of hatred and reprisal. A former APLA combatant noted with great concern that,

Justice was not done at the TRC hearings. Some of those murderers are living in luxury and occupy high positions in the present government. Nothing was done to those Generals in the SADF who committed acts of terror. While these Generals were let free despite the atrocities they committed, many of our comrades who liberated this country are still in jails [Interview with a former senior APLA combatant, 3 August 2000].⁷¹

Another former APLA combatant remarked similarly,

As long as whites are not willing to admit that apartheid was a crime against humanity, there will be no reconciliation. Sometimes I am filled with a sense of anger and revenge when I see white people today. Nothing has changed for many of us victims of the apartheid system. We are still the same way as we were twenty years ago [Interview with a former APLA combatant who is a Major in the SANDF, 3 August 2000]

There is also dissatisfaction with the lack of reparations. The Committee on Reparations and Rehabilitation recommended that a sum of R2,86 billion be made available over a six year period to compensate 22 000 victims of gross violation of human rights [SAIRR, 1999:369]. The Committee also recommended that in honour of victims, there should be symbolic reparation in the form of renaming of streets and public facilities, construction of monuments and the declaration of a National Day of Remembrance; community rehabilitation undertaken through demilitarisation programmes, introduction of accessible treatment centres, and education and housing provision for the victims of gross violation of human rights [TRC, 1998:188-194].

⁷¹ The PAC, Deputy President, Dr Motsoko Phoko also remarked that instead of creating an environment of reconciliation, the TRC has "manifested injustice and racism". Although some former APLA combatants are still in prison, former SADF members were granted amnesty [Sowetan, 1 November 2000].

The government has not acted upon most of these recommendations. In August 1999, about R3 500 urgent interim reparation was provided to 3 200 people. The government indicated that instead of providing monetary reparation, there might be symbolic reparation. In the 2001 national budget, the government apportioned R800 million for reparations. However, as the Reparation Committee Chair, Hlengiwe Mkhize, pointed out, reparation will not only take the form of monetary value and will include such measures as basic maintenance support, funding of education and empowerment projects [Mail & Guardian, 16 March 2001].

Not everybody will be entitled to reparations. In the meantime, for some former combatants, the lack of provision for reparation for those who suffered under the apartheid government indicates the lack of appreciation of the contribution made by victims to the liberation of South Africa. As a former APLA combatant remarked,

Reparations have not been forthcoming. The government is silent about this issue. This is an indication that the efforts of many people who suffered under apartheid are not valued in a democracy [Interview with a former senior APLA combatant, 3 August 2000]

A former MK combatant agreed,

There has to be reparation to assist black people to rebuild their lives destroyed by years and years of apartheid. White people should contribute economically and in other ways to this reparation process as the benefactors of the apartheid system [Interview with a former MK combatant B, 11 October 2000].

7.3. Conclusion

It is clear from this chapter that peacebuilding is proceeding relatively smoothly due to political, economic, social, cultural and psychological measures being undertaken to deal with the legacy of discrimination and conflict created by apartheid. Demobilisation and reintegration had minimal effects on this process, and do not pose a security threat. Credit in this regard is due to the ANC government, which after taking power introduced democracy as the cornerstone

of the South African political environment. A democratic Constitution was formulated and institutions to safeguard democratic principles were put in place. Based on the RDP, although unemployment and income inequalities remained relatively high, the economy grew, jobs were created, just labour laws were introduced and opportunities created for black business. Priority is also given to gender equality through the establishment of institutions such as the OSW, CGE, and PWG to ensure that women's rights are protected. In the psychological arena, the TRC was established to deal with human rights violations and create an atmosphere of forgiveness and unity among all South Africans.

Notwithstanding these measures, human insecurity among blacks remains a reality that if neglected, might derail peacebuilding and lead to possible conflict in the form of crime, banditry and political violence. The nature of transition and political settlement has played a major role in this process. Whilst, on the one hand it laid the basis for peacebuilding and preventing conflict, on the other hand it stood in the way of development and progress for those who suffered under apartheid. Under the South African negotiated settlement, whites still dominate the economy and military. Many blacks are still faced with the same difficulties they experienced under apartheid. This is demonstrated by many white South Africans' unwillingness to contribute to the process of reconciliation and building unity. Blacks still find themselves as victims of racism and discrimination. In the SANDF, where whites remain in control, racism has had devastating effects on former combatants. If not addressed, racism will exacerbate racial divisions and tensions that could spill over into society. In the economic sphere, whites are still far better off than many blacks who are poor, unemployed and homeless.

The situation is no different for many former combatants who almost seven years following their demobilisation, are still unemployed, homeless and with limited education. With rationalisation, which is part of the government's overall plan to down size the civil service, rationalised SANDF members could be faced with similar economic and social difficulties given the limited economic opportunities.

This lack of human security is a potential danger to the security and stability of South Africa as some former combatants and rationalised SANDF members could use their military skills for purposes of crime, banditry, mercenary activities and political violence. The new government has generally done a lot to improve the lives of many South Africans through political, economic, cultural and psychological measures. In turn, these have helped in dealing with the possible negative effects of demobilisation and reintegration on peacebuilding. Despite these valuable measures, rationalisation in the SANDF, the general political, economic, social, cultural and psychological difficulties facing South Africa coupled with the lack of attention to difficulties facing many former combatants could lead to instability and stand in the way of peacebuilding if not addressed.

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Chapter Eight

8. Conclusions and Recommendations

Chapter eight provides a summary of the findings of this study. It discusses the nature and dynamics of demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding in South Africa. It also looks at the context in which these processes should be understood as argued in every chapter. More importantly, the chapter offers a number of recommendations on how these processes should be approached and lessons that could be learned from them.

This chapter is divided into two sections. Section one reiterates the arguments of this study, summarising the main arguments presented in each chapter. Section two provides general recommendations that could be helpful to the planned rationalisation process and other countries undergoing demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding experiences.

8.1. Conclusions

The purpose of this study was to investigate the assertion that in South Africa, demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation are a possible security threat to peacebuilding. This could be brought about by the failure of the government to address the human security needs of former MK and APLA combatants and rationalised SANDF members. Faced with unemployment, homelessness and poverty, former combatants and rationalised SANDF members may resort to using their military skills for crime, mercenary activities and political violence to earn a living. To prevent such a security threat, the government should develop well-planned demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation programmes that will address the immediate human needs of former combatants and rationalised SANDF members. This is significant not only in the interest of peacebuilding and stability, but also for the development of a country emerging from conflict. These

processes are crucial part of demilitarisation, whose chief objective is about shifting resources from the military to the much-needed social development.

In investigating this assertion, it was contended that due to inadequate planning and implementation of the demobilisation programme, reintegration of former combatants was not successful in addressing their human security. Although it was expected that the failure to provide for their human security would translate into instability, this did not happen. Some former combatants did engage in criminal activities, but this did not threaten the stability of South Africa. What accounts for this lack of a serious security threat are the political, economic, social, cultural and psychological measures implemented by the ANC government following the first democratic elections.

Notwithstanding these, human insecurity among former combatants and blacks in general remains a reality. The negotiated settlement and inadequate government policies have resulted in whites still being better off than many blacks who still remain poor. Given the current rationalisation planning difficulties, failure to address increasing former combatants human insecurity, and the general difficulties facing South Africa, a potential security threat exists. Former combatants and rationalised SANDF members could use their military skills for crime, banditry, mercenary activities and political violence, and derailing peacebuilding.

It was demonstrated in **Chapter Two** that demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding are integral parts of demilitarisation and human security. While demilitarisation is about redirecting military resources to social development, human security calls for individual security from poverty, diseases and repression. As the literature on the objectives of the demobilisation, reintegration, rationalisation and peacebuilding reveals, the human security of former combatants is essential to avoid destabilisation. On the political level, political, economic and social structures embedded in democratic principles

should be created. Economic programmes should be geared towards improving their human security through skills training, employment opportunities, and access to credit, equipment, and land. There should also be provision for housing, education and employment opportunities the social sphere. Cultural programmes should concentrate on sensitising society about the needs and experiences of former combatants to assist them with their psychological needs. This could further be addressed through counselling, medical provision or reconciliation process.

Chapter Three showed that South Africa's transition to democracy was a product of a negotiated settlement. Whites pushed to retain control of important state machinery such as the economy and military following democracy. When the NP government realised that apartheid was near its end, it chose a political settlement with the ANC. A number of compromises to protect whites' interests were made. The NP government made all efforts to control the new defence force during military negotiations as the basis of white control, which it still maintains. It successfully argued for the retention of standards, which are essentially SADF standards and for technological advancement in the new defence force. The rationale behind this was that former combatants would lose hope in the integration process and leave the SANDF. Not surprisingly, the negotiated settlement had a significant impact not only on demobilisation and reintegration, but also on the overall political, economic and social climate of South Africa.

Chapter Four demonstrated that integration and demobilisation proved difficult and challenging. Following their integration into the SANDF, former combatants complained of racism, discrimination and unjust treatment by former SADF members who control the SANDF. This has led to tensions and confrontations, culminating in shooting incidents at various military bases in the country. Demobilisation was also not without its problems. The process only began when the SANDF was faced with former combatants who for various reasons could not

be integrated. The lack of inclusivity, failure to take into account the immediate needs of former combatants, the lack of training skill conceptualisation, and the lack of focus on the long-term medical and social issues essential for reintegration also added to difficulties.

Building on the previous chapter by looking at the effects of the failures of demobilisation programme on reintegration, **Chapter Five** showed that reintegration was difficult because of the poor implementation of the demobilisation programmes. Former combatants are faced with the political, economic, social, cultural and psychological difficulties. They find it difficult to participate in the political sphere due to societal mistrust and stigmatisation. They are also faced with economic hardships such as poverty, homelessness, unemployment and limited education. Societal pressure and stigmatisation is impacting on their cultural reintegration attempts. They also experience psychological difficulties in the form of aggressive and violent behaviour. These human insecurities resulted in some resorting to crime. Yet, the security threat they posed did not threaten the stability of South Africa. This is because only a small number of former combatants were demobilised. Most believed that their difficulties are no different from other members of society who had suffered under apartheid and felt that their lives would get better with time.

The argument presented in **Chapter Six** is that the failure to achieve human security resulting from inadequate demobilisation has prompted the government to avoid the mistakes it had made with rationalisation. Measures are being put in place to ensure that rationalisation is successful. Regionally based BACs and TSC are being established to help rationalised SANDF members with gratuities, pensions, housing, medical care and counselling. Although the government will oversee rationalisation, it will also include other role players such as civil society organisations and the private sector. As the planning reveals, the process could still run into difficulties. The biggest dilemma for government is maintaining expertise and representivity in the SANDF, as most of those likely to be

rationalised are former combatants. Black members with limited education who are rationalised could resort to crime or political violence to earn a living or express their dissatisfaction. Others could become engaged in mercenary activities. Rationalisation could further be compromised by the lack of training skill conceptualisation, shelter, cultural awareness and counselling programmes.

In **Chapter Seven** it was argued that despite the fact that peacebuilding is proceeding relatively smoothly, there is a potential security threat in the form of crime, banditry, political violence. This could disrupt the peacebuilding process. Unlike whites, many blacks are still poor, homeless, unemployed and with limited education. Many former combatants are also faced with the same difficulties as the majority of black South Africans. Almost seven years following their demobilisation and reintegration, many are still unemployed, homeless and with limited education. These difficulties are worsened by economic policies that have achieved limited success in creating employment opportunities and alleviating poverty. With the rationalisation in the SANDF, it is likely that rationalised members will be faced with the difficulties of economic insecurity, given that there is an emphasis on retrenching those with limited education. Naturally, this would translate into limited employment opportunities for them in the future. Evidently, all these difficulties poses a security threat if not addressed, as some former combatants and rationalised SANDF members could use their military skills for purposes of crime, banditry, mercenary activities and political violence.

8.2. Recommendations

Given some of the difficulties encountered in the demobilisation and reintegration process, this section suggest mechanisms that could assist and enhance the success of these processes. This is helpful with reference to the rationalisation process and peacebuilding.

8.2.1. Demobilisation, Reintegration, Rationalisation and Peacebuilding: Political Environment

The overall political aim of demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation should be to create an environment embedded in democratic principles where tolerance and unity is forged among former warring factions. This requires a strong political will and commitment to the cease-fire process from conflicting parties. Therefore, the political negotiation settlement should not favour one group over another, as this could impact negatively on peacebuilding and even lead to possible conflict in the future.

One way of ensuring commitment to a cease-fire is through an adequate disarmament process, which should form part of the negotiation processes. Once the parties have agreed to a peace settlement, a credible body such as the government or UN should start with disarmament and weapons management process during the assembly of former combatants. For disarmament to be successful, arms caches should be located and weapons collected from former parties in conflict. Incentives such as amnesty and monetary compensation should be introduced for voluntary weapons collection methods. Stringent arms control laws should be introduced not only for disarmament purposes, but also to assist with rooting out the "culture of violence" that flourished during conflict.

The demobilisation, reintegration and rationalisation programmes should be planned well in advance before these processes take place in order to respond to the needs of former combatants. To help broaden the political base support of these processes, planning should include civil society organisations and those who will be directly affected. This will assist in bringing into the processes different expertise, attracting funding and identifying priorities. As most societal organisations deal with the community on a daily basis, they understand better the needs of members and can help facilitate the reintegration of former combatants.

8.2.2. Demobilisation, Reintegration, Rationalisation and Peacebuilding: Economic Environment

The economic environment created following a peace settlement is critical for the development of a country and the reintegration of former combatants or former military personnel into civilian life. Revitalisation of the economy through investments and macro-economic stability should be introduced. Human insecurity through unemployment and the lack of marketable skills by those demobilised or rationalised could lead to a security threat as they could resort to crime, banditry or political violence.

It is therefore important that needs assessment study into the economic needs of those who will be affected and their dependants be undertaken in assembly areas or within the defence force before rationalisation occurs. These should include the skills level and education of those to be demobilised, settlement areas, capabilities and number of dependants. Vigorous programmes to deal with the identified needs should follow this. A fixed amount of cash payment should also be provided on a monthly basis over a fixed number of years to help former combatants re-establish themselves in society in the short-term.

Long-term measure to address their needs should include provision of skills through training and converting existing skills for use in a civilian environment. Such training should be demilitarised and provided by NGOs and trade unions, which have the expertise and are able to include other social aspects of reintegration into the training process. These organisations could also assist in identifying sectors of the economy where such skills will be valuable. The private sector should also be included in order to employ those with necessary training skills. This is important, particularly for young demobilised combatants or rationalised personnel who are still creative and productive.

Those who want to be self-employed should be encouraged and supported. Furthermore, individual and collective projects should be supported and former

combatants or former military personnel should have access to credit facilities, equipment and land. For those who want to continue with their education, they should be provided with scholarships and bursaries. These measures will help in rebuilding the economic fabric of the country and economic security among those affected, thereby enhancing peacebuilding.

8.2.3. Demobilisation, Reintegration, Rationalisation and Peacebuilding: Social Environment

Following their demobilisation or rationalisation, former combatants and former military personnel should become active and ordinary members of their community. This is the primary social objective of the reintegration process. To achieve this, it is crucial to provide shelter to them so that they can re-establish their lives with their families. They should also be made aware of the different social demands of living in rural areas and cities.

Employment opportunities should be created through skills training and education support methods. Labour intensive employment opportunities should be created in the public sector, such as building of roads and houses. Education support should not only be extended to former combatants, but also their dependants. In the process of providing these needs, former combatants should not be singled out as a special group, especially in the long-term where the aim is to ensure that they become active and ordinary members of their communities. If attention is only paid to former combatants, this may lead to resentment from other members of the community.

8.2.4. Demobilisation, Reintegration, Rationalisation and Peacebuilding: Cultural Environment

After living in different cultural environments for years, many former combatants find it difficult to adapt into the cultural environment into which they are reintegrated. To help them settle into their different communities, the government should introduce cultural awareness programmes targeted at both former

combatants and members of the community. Both should assist each in understanding the expectations of the other and how these can be reconciled. The media, such as radio, television and newspapers can be used to facilitate this programme through talk shows and bulletins dealing with the lives and experiences of former combatants. Advocacy programmes through pamphlets and public forums should be carried out to educate society about former combatants.

This is important for former female combatants who have to deal with societal stigmatisation and misconceptions of a gendered nature following their reintegration. For former female combatants, special support programmes such as women's co-operatives, health programmes and education training should be developed and supported. They should be encouraged through women's organisations and other social organisations to take advantage of such opportunities. These initiatives should be localised in order to overcome socio-cultural barriers, to educate society of their gender roles during conflict and to show how society can benefit by learning from such roles where gender equality, respect and tolerance is concerned.

8.2.5. Demobilisation, Reintegration, Rationalisation and Peacebuilding: Psychological Environment

The psychological environment that should be created to assist with peacebuilding and remove the root cause of conflict, rationalisation and reintegration should foster a climate of tolerance, reconciliation and provide for the needs of former combatants or former military personnel. At national level, truth commissions should be established and fully supported to facilitate reconciliation, as failure to do so could cause further divisions and animosity. Truth commissions should also serve as the starting point to tell the stories of the past, histories, which should be incorporated into the national education systems.

Another important factor for encouraging reconciliation and averting division to help facilitate peacebuilding is forging unity in the new defence force. One group should not dominate the military, as this could lead to conflict. Strong civil-military relations should be encouraged to ensure legitimacy and build confidence in the new defence force. A firm commitment to representivity and adequate education and training processes and promotions in the military can help achieve this. This will encourage reconciliation in the military between former opposing parties who now have to live together in the new defence force.

Given the traumatic experiences of former combatants or former military personnel during conflict, attention should be paid to their psychological needs. It is important that the government provide counselling and adequate health care. Counselling should be incorporated into the skills training process to allow for a broader outlook on the process. For those needing medical care, this should be easily accessible and be made available free of charge. Information centres should be established at local level and should be accessible, they should provide information about counselling and other socio-economic needs. The media, especially radio, should be used to provide information to former combatants or former military personnel about support they can receive and where to go for this.

Military Veterans Associations should also provide a forum for former combatants to meet and discuss their difficulties, and to strategise how assistance can be gained to cope with difficulties. Psychologists and counsellors should be invited to these forums to provide professional. In providing these types of services to its members, Military Veterans Associations should highlight the socio-economic needs of its members for society and engage in dialogue with the government about their needs. They should also try to raise funds from international organisations to help with reintegration.

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Interview with SANDF Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce Masangu, 2 December 1998.

Interview with SANDF General Andrew Masondo, 1 December 1998.

Interview with a former female MK combatant, 5 February 2000.

Interview with a wife of a former APLA combatant, 15 January 2000.

Interview with a former senior APLA combatant, 3 August 2000.

Interview with a member of society, 3 January 1999.

Interview with Kees Kingma, 10 March 2000.

Interview with Tsepe Motumi, 9 April 2000.

Interview with SANDF member, 1 January 2000.

Interview with SANDF member B, 1 January 2000.

Interview with a former APLA combatant, 5 February 2000.

Interview with a former APLA combatant, 15 January 2000.

Interview with a former APLA combatant B, 15 January 2000.

Interview with a former APLA combatant, 3 December 1998.

Interview with a former APLA combatant, 1 February 2000.

Interview with a former MK combatant, 3 April 1999.

Interview with a former MK combatant, 14 January 2000.

Interview with a former MK combatant B, 14 February 2000.

Interview with a former MK commander, 3 December 1998.

Interview with a former MK combatant, 17 January 2000.

Interview with a former MK combatant B, 17 January 2000.

Interview with a former MK combatant, 5 February 2000.

Interview with a former MK combatant B, 5 February 2000.

Interview with a former MK combatant, 15 January 2000.

Interview with a former MK combatant, 3 December 1998.

Interview with a former MK combatant, 11 October 2000.

Interview with a senior SANDF member, 4 August 2000.

Interview with a former MK combatant B, 11 October 2000.