POLITICAL VIOLENCE, FEAR, AND DEMOCRACY

How Violence Shapes Democracy in Mozambique

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Abstract

How does living in a violent context influence political participation, political behavior, and attitudes about democracy? Since the end of the Cold War, intrastate violence has increased across developing democracies. This growing violence has occurred in parallel with the proliferation of elections. Although today, in almost every country globally, citizens are afforded the chance to select their leadership, too often, bullets and ballots mix. The mix of voting and violence threatens the democratization process, undermines essential democratic institutions, and can lead to prolonged civil conflict. It is dangerous to the survival of democratic regimes and, in many ways, can be a path to upending or suspending democratic processes altogether. Political violence makes it difficult to establish peace and stability and strengthen citizen confidence in democracy.

Despite the substantial literature on political behavior in Africa, we still do not fully understand how varying sociopolitical and socioeconomic contexts influence citizens' behaviors. Although cross-national studies have examined the influence of political and institutional contextual factors, such as electoral and party systems, on voter turnout, country-specific issues, like ongoing armed conflict or pervasive political violence, are not always included in these analyses. It is necessary to move beyond examining individual characteristics and include country-specific contextual factors that can explain voter behavior and attitudes about democracy within African countries. Individual characteristics alone do not tell the whole story, and by focusing solely on these variables, we miss out on a variety of social and political environmental factors that may shape how citizens behave and think.

Based on theories stemming from the literatures on the legacies of civil war, terrorism, electoral violence, and political behavior, I argue that voter turnout, vote choice, and attitudes to democracy are shaped by the social and political contexts in which citizens find themselves. Ongoing armed conflict and pervasive political violence are crucial contextual determinants that shape whether individuals decide to vote, whom they choose to support, and how they feel about democracy and democratic institutions. I also argue that close ties to a political party play a crucial role in conditioning the relationship between violence and democratic citizenship.

Using a rich array of data, I produce statistical evidence that shows violent contexts have a negative impact on these behaviors and attitudes. I examine the consequences of political violence and ongoing armed conflict in a country that regularly holds elections. The case of

Mozambique, and in particular, its 2014 election, presents an opportunity to understand the impact of armed conflict and political violence on both elections, and the larger multi-party regime.

The evidence supports the notion that the ruling party, FRELIMO, lost support because of the violence and that RENAMO was able to bolster its support. However, the identity of the perpetrators of violence, in combination with individual partisan identity influenced how violence shaped Mozambican political behavior. In addition to violent contexts, I find that fear of electoral violence reduces voter turnout, support for the incumbent, and satisfaction with and support for democracy. The effect of fear is particularly salient for individuals who are not attached to a political party. Thus, not only does violence shape how people behave in a given election, it also shapes how they view the larger multi-party regime in which elections take place.

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I, Rami H. Sayed, declare that this thesis represents my own work, both in concept and execution

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Beginning in the early 1990s, democracies proliferated around the world and supplanted other forms of governance. However, these democracies did not uniformly develop, and in many of them, the ballot did not necessarily replace the bullet as a means of expressing political opinion. Intrastate violence within democracies became more prevalent, in particular in developing countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. As democracies become increasingly violent, the consolidation of democratic norms is stifled. Young democracies are at risk of backsliding when political violence influences voters' decisions or prevents citizens from voting or making peaceful and informed electoral choices. Furthermore, not all violence that occurs in these democracies is directly meant to influence elections. Often, pervasive political violence is caused by ongoing grievances with a ruling party, ethnic and regional rivalries, growing inequality and uneven development, or rising extremist ideologies.

As violence stemming from these motives has become more commonplace, it is crucial to understand how this violence influences the process of democratization and, more importantly, how it shapes individual citizens. The emerging literature on electoral violence has started to ask about the causes and consequences of violence to understand its implications on elections and democracy writ large. However, the evidence from these studies has produced divergent results. Most scholars have centered their attention on the causes of election violence (Burchard, 2015; Claes, 2016; Collier & Vicente, 2012, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Joblonski, 2014; Robinson & Torvik, 2009; Taylor, Pevehouse & Straus, 2017; Wilkinson, 2004), and fewer studies have focused on its consequences (Bekoe & Burchard, 2017; Bratton, 2008; Burchard, 2015, 2020; Hoglund & Piyaranthne, 2009). Furthermore, the literature tends to focus on election-specific violence and ignores the impact of general political violence (see: Bekoe and Burchard 2017; Burchard 2015, 2020; Daxecker, 2014; Fjelde & Höglund, 2016; Fjelde, 2020; Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski, 2014; Straus & Taylor, 2012; Taylor, Pevehouse & Straus, 2017). However, scholars of young democracies need to examine all forms of politically related violence.

In this thesis, I examine the consequences of political violence and ongoing armed conflict in a country that regularly holds elections. The case of Mozambique, and in particular, its 2014 election, presents an opportunity to understand the impact of armed conflict and political violence on both elections, and the larger multi-party regime. Beginning in 1994, Mozambique held four

regularly scheduled elections without regressing back to its violent past. The country's two main political parties – who were the principal belligerents during its 16-year long civil war -- had committed to putting their guns down in favor of competition at the ballot box. However, after 20-years, the tenuous peace between the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) and the rebel group *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) fell apart. While the violence that occurred in the run-up to Mozambique's fifth presidential election in 2014 never reached the scale of the violence that had occurred during the 16-year civil war, it represented a form of violence that occurs most often in developing and emerging democracies. The low-intensity conflict was accompanied by a rise in general political violence throughout the country, most of which occurred in the 18-month period prior to the election. I use this case to explore further the consequences of violence on political participation, electoral behavior, and popular attitudes to democracy.

1.1 Argument and Findings

Based on theories stemming from the literatures on the legacies of civil war, terrorism, electoral violence, and political behavior, I argue that voter turnout, vote choice, and attitudes to democracy are shaped by the social and political contexts in which citizens find themselves. Ongoing armed conflict and pervasive political violence are crucial contextual determinants that shape whether individuals decide to vote, whom they choose to support, and how they feel about democracy and democratic institutions. I also argue that close ties to a political party play a crucial role in conditioning the relationship between violence and democratic citizenship.

I produce statistical evidence that shows violent contexts have a negative impact on these behaviors and attitudes. The evidence supports the notion that the ruling party, FRELIMO, lost support because of the violence and that RENAMO was able to bolster its support. However, the identity of the perpetrators of violence, in combination with individual partisan identity influenced how violence shaped Mozambican political behavior. In addition to violent contexts, I find that fear of electoral violence reduces voter turnout, support for the incumbent, and satisfaction with and support for democracy. The effect of fear is particularly salient for individuals who are not attached to a political party. Thus, not only does violence shape how people behave in a given election, it also shapes how they view the larger multi-party regime in which elections take place.

1.2 Research Design

Mozambique's 2014 election represents a particularly useful case with which to analyze citizen political behavior amidst rising political violence and ongoing armed conflict. In the year leading up to Mozambique's fifth democratic election in 2014, violent skirmishes between government forces and RENAMO combatants erupted across the central part of the country. In the 15 years between 1997-2012, there were 302 recorded conflict events (both violent and non-violent), according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED).[1] Between 2013 and 2014, in contrast, there were 306 recorded conflict events. The majority of these events occurred in the 18 months leading up to the 2014 national elections.

Despite the pervasive existence of violence in the country since 2012, the consequences of violence on current Mozambican political and electoral developments have not been adequately studied. During the first 20 years of multiparty elections, RENAMO utilized election boycotts, protests, riots, and threats of violence, to extract political benefits from the FRELIMO led government. In 2013, however, RENAMO shifted towards more explicit and organized armed conflict. The FRELIMO government, for its part, also used various strategies of repression and violence to impede RENAMO electorally. Although the scale of the violence from 2013-2014 did not reach levels of violence and armed conflict typically seen in other African countries such as Kenya (Laakso, 1997; Bekoe and Burchard, 2017), Nigeria (Bratton 2008), and Cote D'Ivoire (Strauss, 2012) it is still essential to understand. Low- to moderate political violence and conflict are more common than full-scale conflict and war (HIIK, 2020). Furthermore, in low to medium conflict settings, democratic institutions and elections can continue to function without complete interruption. However, there is a dearth of scholarly literature examining the consequences of violence at differing degrees of severity.

Even with the relatively low intensity of the conflict, the violence that occurred in Mozambique meets many of the standard definitions employed in the electoral violence literature (see: Hoglund, 2009:417; Laakso, 2007:227; Fischer, 2002:4; Haid, 2010:4; Sisk, 2009:4; Kehailia, 2014:31-39; Bardal, 2016:7). First, the violence coincided with a local municipal election in 2013, which RENAMO boycotted, and also took place in the run-up to the 2014 national election), in which it participated (Hoglund, 2009). Second, the use of violence was intended to influence electoral outcomes (Laakso,2007; Haid, 2010; Sisk, 2009). Some observers

1 ACLED only to collect this data in 1997.

of Mozambique may object to this claim, arguing that RENAMOs decision to return to the conflict was based on the discovery of natural gas resources in the north of the country. However, others have pointed out that tensions between RENAMO and the government stemmed from disagreements about electoral law (Vines, 2017). It can also be argued that RENAMO's role as the main opposition party meant that any violence in which it participated had political significance. Afonso Dhlakama (leader of RENAMO) understood very well that violence or even the threat of violence could mobilize support for him and the party (see Chapter 2). Lastly, both the government and RENAMO used coercive force during the 18-months of the conflict. Assassinations, physical harm, displacement, intimidation, and in some instances, disruption of the ballot all took place. Although known deaths during the conflict were not high, the electoral violence literature suggests that election violence need not entail fatalities.[2] Moreover, although formal hostilities between the government and RENAMO ceased less than two months before the election, the violence that had occurred was still fresh in many Mozambicans' minds.

For the empirical analysis of the Mozambican case, I draw upon both aggregate and individual-level data. This study will examine both the relationships among characteristics of aggregate units (districts) at the macro-level, and among individual and aggregate characteristics at the micro-level. Moving from macro (district) to micro (individual) analysis allows me to understand whether the impact of exposure to political violence on electoral behavior differs at each level. The macro-level analysis will examine the direct, unmediated relationship between political violence and electoral behavior. That is, do districts that have higher levels of violence have differential declines or increases in voter turnout and party choice in 2014 (compared to 2009)?

For the individual-level analysis, I rely on survey data. Given that my argument revolves around the importance of context, I use mostly multilevel analysis to test hypotheses about how Mozambicans' decisions to vote, whom to vote for, and their attitudes to democracy are shaped by both individual characteristics and the contexts in which they live. That is, do people who live in violent contexts behave differently than those that do not? Does living in these violent contexts influence the way people vote, whether they vote, and how they feel about democracy? A multilevel approach allows for a more precise evaluation of the extent to which context plays a role in individual behavior (Gelman and Hill 2007) through simultaneous modeling of individual

2 Research on African elections has found that intimidation and harassment are more common than lethal violence (Straus & Taylor, 2012).

and contextual determinants to explain individual behavior. Multilevel models distinguish amongst variations at different levels and make it possible to measure varying relationships between variables based on the difference of contexts, something that is often missing from existing analyses of the consequences of electoral and political violence.

1.3 Evidence

I use quantitative evidence to test my hypothesis, and the key independent variables throughout the three empirical chapters come from political violence datasets. To assess levels of violence in the run-up to the 2014 national elections at the district level, I use data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). ACLED collects political violence event data which focuses on civil and communal conflict, violence against civilians, remote violence, riots, and protests from countries across Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. One advantage of using ACLED rather than other political violence databases is that it captures conflict events in countries that experience various levels of political violence. For example, ACLED reports violent events in countries that are not experiencing full-scale civil war. ACLED captures a variety of conflict from electoral violence to war and everything else in between. The disaggregated data contains information on the date, location, group names, interaction type, event type, reporter fatalities, and contextual notes. Temporal disaggregation opens more opportunities to study causal mechanisms and enables the number of conflict events or fatalities can be compared to another variable on a much finer time scale (Landis, 2014). Another advantage is that ACLED uses detailed categorizations of conflict events and actors that move beyond state and non-state definitions. ACLED is also helpful because it allows researchers to distinguish between non-violent and violent events, riots and protests, and the perpetrators of the violence. In particular, I use ACLED Version 7, which covers all countries on the African continent from 1997-2016. Furthermore, ACLED provides weekly, real-time data updates which allows for a more thorough and accurate report of conflict events compared to other violence databases.

To test the effect of exposure to political violence at the individual level, use data from the Afrobarometer Round 6 survey, which was conducted in 2015. This survey is a nationally representative sample of 2,400 adults across every region in Mozambique.

Other variables were taken from a variety of sources. At the aggregate level, the electoral and political variables vote shares for RENAMO and FRELIMO, as well as voter turnout, were made

using reports published by the *Commisão Nacional de Eleições* (National Electoral Commission, CNE) in Mozambique. The data published by the CNE covers legislative and presidential election turnout, vote share, and registered voter information for every Mozambican election since 1994. At the individual level, I use data from Afrobarometer Round 6 to measure electoral and political behavior and individual socio-demographic characteristics. Lastly, for all other aggregate level district variables, I use census data from the *Instituto Nacional de Estatística* (National Institute of Statistics, INE) in Mozambique.

1.4 Roadmap

This thesis is divided into seven chapters, including this brief introduction. In Chapter 2, I present a historical narrative of Mozambique which highlights the country's experience with armed conflict and its path toward democracy. Throughout this chapter, I discuss the factors contributing to RENAMO's decision to abandon more than 20 years of peace and return to armed conflict. I argue that these factors were rooted in Mozambique's civil war and the uneven peace that followed the 1992 General Peace Agreement. This analysis provides the context with which to understand the unfolding of the country's 2014 national election.

In Chapter 3, I review what the existing academic literature has to say about political behavior and democratic attitudes amidst violence. I discuss what we think we know about the consequences of violence on political participation, voter turnout, and attitudes about democracy. This analysis sets the groundwork from which – based on insights from the literature on civil war legacies, electoral violence, and terrorism – I develop a model with which to understand the electoral and political consequences of violence. I then derive a set of predictions for political participation, vote choice, and democratic attitudes to test.

Chapter 4 focuses on the effect of violent conflict on political participation in Mozambique's 2014 election. Drawing on district- and individual-level data, I show that the larger context of violence had little impact on whether or not someone decided to vote. At the individual level, however, there is evidence that individual fear of violence had a significant effect depressing the likelihood that someone will vote. I also find that violence is much more likely to exercise a negative, disenfranchising effect on those citizens who do not identify with any political party.

Chapter 5 draws again on district-level and individual-level data to examine how violent conflict influences vote choice. Again, I find that individual exposure to violence has little effect

on vote choice at the district level. However, once we take into account the perpetrator of the violence, I find that violence does matter. In this case, violent contexts characterized by opposition (RENAMO) initiated violence reduced support for the incumbent (FRELIMO). Furthermore, at the micro level, I find that citizens who fear electoral violence are less likely to support the incumbent and more likely to support the opposition. Again, partisan preferences matter. People who identify with FRELIMO were unlikely to waver in their support, while nonaligned, independent voters were likely to punish both FRELIMO and RENAMO for the violence. Ultimately, the evidence in this chapter shows that violence served to polarize people. Supporters of RENAMO were more likely to prefer RENAMO when they were exposed to violence or feared being the victim of political violence. In contrast, FRELIMO supporters were likely to be unmoved and unaligned and independent supporters were more likely to drop out of the electorate altogether.

Shifting away from electoral behavior, Chapter 6 focuses on the effect of violence on citizen attitudes toward democracy. Overall, the evidence in this chapter demonstrates that violence and fear of violence is harmful to democracy. Evidence from Mozambique shows increases in violence and fear of violence reduce Mozambican's satisfaction with the way democracy works. After examining the specific case of Mozambique, I turn to a larger analysis of all of Africa. Using Afrobarometer data for 26 countries, I examine the effect of violence on public attitudes about democracy and find that much like Mozambique, violence has a deleterious effect on both support for and satisfaction with democracy. Thus, not only does political violence effect whether or not people take part in elections, and how they vote in those elections, but it also effects how people view the larger multi-party regime in which those elections are nested.

Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with a summary of the main empirical findings and a discussion of the major theoretical implications that this thesis provides for the study of political violence and electoral and political behavior. My conclusion also highlights the limitations of this dissertation and discusses possible future research avenues.

Chapter 2: Bullets to Ballots and Back – A History of Mozambican Violence and Elections

2.1 Introduction

This thesis examines the impact of intrastate conflict on political participation, vote choices, and beliefs about democracy in Mozambique. Following a bloody independence struggle against the Portuguese that ended in 1974, the country descended into a horrific civil war that lasted 16 years. Violence against the civilian population featured heavily throughout the period and was perpetrated by both the ruling party *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) and the rebel group *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO).[3] The signing of the General Peace Accord (GPA) in 1992 effectively ended the civil war, introduced multi-party elections, and ushered in an era of peace and optimism about the country's democratic future. Mozambique was widely regarded as a 'beacon of hope,' (see: Manning, 2002; Phiri, 2012) a rare African post-conflict success story, and a model for post-conflict reconciliation, democratic transitions, and economic growth.[4] However, this perspective has since unraveled. Since 2012 the country has experienced its highest levels of conflict since the civil war. Mozambique is unique in that the two main political parties, FRELIMO and RENAMO, were the principal belligerents during its civil war, and the main political parties competing for votes in every election since 1994.

Since 1994 Mozambique has been defined by "two contradictory discourses," "one an idealized narrative of economic growth and the institutionalization of democracy, [and] the other a story of political, military and social tension," which contributed to an increase in violent protest and the return to armed conflict (Darch, 2016 p.322). Based on this tension, RENAMOs decision to return to "the bush" in 2012 was not entirely surprising. What was surprising was that it took nearly 20 years for it to do so. The logic and rationale driving RENAMOs decision to return to violence and conflict are rooted in its experience as a guerilla group during the civil war and its continued opposition to FRELIMO rule. Despite a decades-long attempt to make a full transition into a normal political party, RENAMO's core is still that of a guerilla group that relies on violence

3 See Finnegan, William. *A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique*. University of California Press, 1996.
4 E.g., Manning, Carrie L. *From Armed Conflict to Civil Opposition: Post-Conflict Party Development in Mozambique, Bosnia, and Kosovo*. Institut für Afrikanistik, Universität Leipzig, 2002.; Phiri, Madalitso Zililo. "The Political Economy of Mozambique Twenty Years on A Post-Conflict Success Story?" *South African Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 19, no. 2, 20 Aug. 2012, pp. 223–245

or the threat of violence to accomplish its political goals. To understand how RENAMO has operated as a political party and why it decided to return to violence, it is necessary to examine its origins and role during the Mozambican civil war.

During the civil war, the former guerilla group employed various tactics meant to terrorize large swathes of the population and disrupt the FRELIMO government's ability to govern effectively. Rumors of RENAMOs brutality spread across the ten provinces raising levels of fear and causing hundreds of thousands to flee their homes. By 1981, RENAMOs destabilization efforts successfully destroyed the national economy and cripple the country's already weak transportation and communication systems. Furthermore, RENAMOs campaign against FRELIMO rule ruined much of rural society, where the majority of Mozambicans lived. Farmers in rural villages could no longer cultivate the land and were driven to cities or larger towns to seek refuge from the conflict. The displacement of farmers resulted in severe food shortages and a humanitarian crisis which observers of the conflict viewed as one of the worst since World War Two.[5] Despite the brutality employed by RENAMO during the civil war, it was undoubtedly popular among a large portion of the population, as evidenced by the support it received in the inaugural 1994 election it received a surprising percentage of support from areas of the country primarily affected by the civil war.

As a guerilla group, RENAMO successfully used violence to force political concessions from the ruling FRELIMO government. The group pressured FRELIMO to allow democratic elections to be held and open up political spaces for multiple parties to participate. The concessions won by RENAMO allowed the group to characterize itself as the vanguard of democracy, which contrasted with FRELIMO's authoritarian image. However, the transition from a guerilla group to a political party was fraught with uneven development and misguided leadership from Afonso Dhlakama, the leader of RENAMO. It became increasingly apparent that RENAMO, particularly Dhlakama, did not have the ability, and in some instances, the willingness to govern or advocate for the needs of its supporters. RENAMO policies became less coherent and less concerned with protecting and advocating for those areas that had comprised its traditional bases of support, particularly in Mozambique's north and central regions. From 1994 to 2012, Dhlakama's political strategy focused on the chronic obstruction of parliamentary sessions, protests, and the threat of

5 According to a U.S. State Department official, RENAMOs campaign was "one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War Two. (Reported in the New York Times, April 27th, 1988)

national demonstrations, all meant to irritate and annoy the FRELIMO government. Dhlakama used these non-violent strategies to also force RENAMO to the negotiating table, often in the hopes of securing concessions for himself. But while Dhlakama may have secured concessions for himself or other RENAMO cadres, these negotiations often failed to benefit ordinary supporters, and dwindled precious political capital. RENAMO and Dhlakama offered little vision beyond oppositionist and obstructionist politics. With RENAMO's declining levels of electoral support, the party's bargaining power also declined. Ultimately, RENAMOs transition towards an ordinary political party fell short and RENAMO began to resort to the violent tactics it had used in the past, hoping they would force the government to enter into meaningful negotiations about many of the promises that had not been fulfilled after signing the 1992 GPA. These promises ranged from the method of selecting provincial governors and reform of the national electoral body, to the integration of RENAMO fighters into the national army, and the equitable allocation of state resources to areas of the country where RENAMO support was highest.

This history provides the larger context in which Mozambique's' 2014 election took place, particularly the causes of RENAMO's renewed insurgency. I argue that the factors contributing to the renewal of conflict between RENAMO, and the government are inextricably linked to Mozambique's weakening democracy, RENAMOs history of relying on violence and obstructionist politics in order to extract political benefits and remain relevant, and RENAMOs opposition to FRELIMOs consolidation of political and economic power since independence. Ultimately, this chapter seeks to answer the following questions: What factors contributed to the renewal of conflict between RENAMO and the Government? Moreover, what was RENAMO trying to accomplish by returning to violent methods?

In the next section of this chapter, I examine RENAMOs origins and its transformation from a foreign-born guerilla group into an effective domestic opposition movement. I then unpack the General Peace Accord and the conditions that led to peace and allowed for Mozambique's first multi-party democratic election to take place. Section six covers the post-conflict period from 1994-2013 and focuses on the democratization process and its subsequent regression. In the last two sections, I discuss RENAMOs return to conflict and the results of the 2014 election.

2.2 The (Foreign) Origins of RENAMO

RENAMO's origins as a foreign-supported organization and its subsequent uses of violence against the civilian population during the civil war have been well documented (Finnegan, 1996). RENAMO was formed in 1976 by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) to retaliate against Mozambique for its support for the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA)[6] and Mozambique's sanctions against Rhodesia. Some scholars argue that RENAMO was formed solely to protect the interests of external forces. They argue that RENAMOs involvement in Mozambique resulted from the political, economic, and strategic interests of South Africa, Rhodesia, and other Western Powers (Chingono, 1996). Both the apartheid South African regime and Rhodesia had been allies of the Portuguese and believed that their minority-rule governments were threatened by the existence of an independent, black majority-ruled state on their borders. The newly formed FRELIMO government openly supported the independence efforts of the African National Congress (ANC)[7] in South Africa and the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) in Rhodesia. This support angered and frustrated South Africa and Rhodesia and led them to try and disrupt FRELIMOs ability to govern. Also, the United States supported South Africa's efforts to damage Mozambique's economy and weaken its government because FRELIMO adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology and aligned itself with the Soviet Union. Ultimately, RENAMOs creation was primarily driven by these foreign actors' desire to disrupt FRELIMOs rule.

Indeed, the depiction of RENAMO as a foreign entity was vigorously advanced by FRELIMO throughout the civil war. The government took every opportunity to describe RENAMO members as a group of *Bandidos Armados* (Armed Bandits) or *xiconhocas* (a pejorative cartoon figure that depicted a lazy, corrupt, and opportunistic Mozambican), whose very existence relied on the support of foreign powers.

Nevertheless, despite RENAMO's foreign influences, its image as a puppet of foreign control and as a "passive victim[s] of manipulations and machinations of powerful external forces (Chingono, 1996 pg. 10)" is grossly overstated and fails to consider Mozambique's internal struggles and FRELIMOs growing authoritarianism as a core explanation for its creation.

6 The Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) was the military wing of the political party the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), which fought for nearly 15 years against the Rhodesian Security forces. The FRELIMO government supported ZANU in its fight against white-minority rule in Southern Rhodesia. For more on the relationship between Mozambique and ZANU see: C.V.L Munguambe (2017); J.P. Moiane (2009) M. Mboa (2009) A. Bouene Mussanhane (2012)
7 See: Nadja Manghezi *The Maputo Connection: The ANC in the World of Frelimo* (2009)

RENAMO's rise may have been externally supported, but its ability to maintain as a durable and effective guerrilla group and ultimately transition into a political party, was the result of three main factors: (1) FRELIMOs one-party rule and attempts to control all state positions, civil society, and news media; (2) its re-education programs aimed at any potential opponents of the regime; and (3) its hostility to traditional Mozambican institutions.

2.2.1 FRELIMO's One-Party Rule

RENAMO's eventual rise to prominence and its sustained presence throughout the post-independence period can be traced to growing antipathy towards FRELIMO (misrule) amongst many sections of Mozambican society. Immediately following independence, FRELIMO enjoyed widespread support for vanquishing the Portuguese and establishing a modern, independent Mozambique. However, the war had radicalized its leadership, and FRELIMO adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology (Finnegan, 1992). At this point, most Portuguese had left, and the remaining few were on their way out of the country. FRELIMO's promise to guarantee private wealth and land ownership was quickly broken. The post-independence nationalization of land ownership, rental property, and social services such as education, medicine, and law, hastened the exit of the remaining Portuguese nationals (*ibid. p.30*). As the former colonizers left, they destroyed their agricultural machinery, salted their fields, and culled their livestock. FRELIMO inherited a bankrupt country with damaged infrastructure, depleted food supplies, a dearth of skilled or trained people, and a population with an illiteracy rate of over 90 percent. In response, FRELIMO attempted to implement ambitious plans to modernize and socialize agriculture and industry and replace the colonial mentality with create a national consciousness amongst the millions of isolated rural people living across Mozambique.

In 1975, the President of Mozambique, Samora Machel, took the opportunity to travel to every province to deliver a series of speeches aimed at establishing a sense of Mozambican identity or *moçambicanidade*. Known as the *Viagem Triunfal,* or triumphal journey, this trip established FRELIMO as the new source of political power in Mozambique (Darch, 2016). However, Machel's speeches and FRELIMO's decolonization rhetoric, broadcast on radio and printed in newspapers, also made clear that "there was no socially sustainable rebuttal available to those who disagreed or opposed particular policies" that the new government prescribed (*ibid p. 12)*. During this post-independence period, FRELIMO consciously tied Mozambican identity to FRELIMO

identity. The result was that any opposition to FRELIMO was equated to an attack on Mozambique and its people.

2.2.2 Re-Education Programmes

FRELIMO's push to control the definition of *Moçambicanidade* in the early years of independence caused some FRELIMO fighters and enthusiasts to break ranks and leave the movement. André Matsangaissa, the founding leader of RENAMO, was a former FRELIMO soldier whom the government had punished for stealing a Mercedes Benz and subsequently sent to a Re-Education Programme. The purpose of the Re-Education Programme was to "free Mozambican society from damage related to the colonial, bourgeois and capitalist world… and to go through a process of "re-education,"" (Thomaz, 2008, p. 179 in Ribeiro and Fonseca, 2019 p. 310). However, these camps were places of repression, where notions of "disciplined work, material detachment, overcoming old loyalties (ethnic, religious, class, racial, regional) and unassailable moral behaviour" were promoted in order to attain an "ideal of a New Mankind" (Thomaz, 2008, p.179) or what the FRELIMO government determined was Mozambicaness. These Re-Education camps were mostly full of Mozambicans detained for minor offences or persons thought to be political dissidents or former supporters/sympathizers/collaboraters of Portuguese rule.

Matsangaissa escaped the Programme after a Rhodesian army attack and was subsequently recruited by the CIO. The CIO took advantage of Matsangaissa's resentment towards the FRELIMO regime. They used Matsangaissa and other former freed FRELIMO combatants to conduct military operations in Mozambique, targeting transport and communication lines in order to disrupt economic activity. In turn, Matsangaissa's newly established RENAMO[8] was provided material and financial support and combat training.

Matsangaissa's initial pool of recruits came from FRELIMOs Re-Education Programmes. Those freed from the Programmes often joined RENAMO in a shared disdain and mistrust of FRELIMO. Afonso Dhlakama, the future leader of RENAMO, was also a product of the governments' Re-Education Programmes. The oppressive nature of these programmes sewed deep resentment towards FRELIMO rule. As Tavuyango (2011 p.44) states, "the first core of RENAMO combatants was, therefore, a group of disgruntled Mozambicans, who were guided by a desire for

8 The original name for RENAMO was the MNR which stood for Mozambique National Resistance. Even the name at this point was in English not in Portuguese. It was only later that it became widely known by its Portuguese abbreviation RENAMO.

revenge. They advocated for change through the removal of the FRELIMO government." Although these first RENAMO combatants were empowered by the training and funding of a foreign intelligence agency, it was ultimately their disdain for FRELIMOs comprehensive authoritarian modernization policy that influenced their decision to remain committed and to fight against FRELIMOs one-party state.

2.2.3 Attack on Tradition

The government's ambitions for building a modern socialist Mozambique meant that traditional institutions and authorities such as the chiefship were to be marginalized or dismantled altogether. RENAMO leaders often made claims that FRELIMOs socialist government was antithetical to Mozambique's traditional institutions. Afonso Dhlakama, during a rare interview with the press in 1983, stated that FRELIMO was worse than the Portuguese before them. Although the colonialists had exploited Mozambicans, Dhlakama explained that 'they [the Portuguese] did not try to wipe out our traditions because they are so-called "reactionary"' (*International Herald Tribune,* 14, September 1983).

FRELIMO policies established communal villages emphasizing practices for creating its "new mankind" as a refusal of traditional authorities and cultures, religion, and eradicating the alleged society outlaws such as those perceived as reactionaries or ideological deviants (Ribeiro and Fonseca, 2019). FRELIMO's attacks on traditional society, particularly in the northern and central regions, resulted in an antagonized and deeply dismayed population. RENAMO took full advantage of FRELIMOs lack of popular support, particularly in rural communities where traditional cultural practices were most important.

RENAMO positioned itself as anti-FRELIMO and the protectors of traditional customs, religious beliefs, and other marginalized institutions. Dhlakama often described himself as a Mozambican nationalist whose only responsibility was to rid his people of the anti-democratic and communist oppressive rule of FRELIMO (Hall, 1990). Thus, while RENAMO may have been funded and trained by foreign governments, its ideological opposition to FRELIMO originated from its frustrations with how it intended to rule Mozambique. As Tavuyango (2011, pg. 2) states, "while acknowledging that the insurgent movement was 'born' by the Rhodesian CIO [scholars] propound that it rapidly turned into a Mozambican phenomenon." This view of RENAMO purports that it was a movement meant to challenge unpopular centralized authority and upend

FRELIMOs oppressive one-party rule. Thus, RENAMO advertised/sold itself as the vanguard of democracy with a mission to ensure that Mozambique becomes a democratic country.

While RENAMOs critics characterized it as a foreign creation driven by foreign interests (Chingono, 1986; Tungamirai, 1987; Hanlon, 1984), and RENAMO depicted itself as a champion democracy, the real motivations driving the creation of RENAMO most likely sat between the two opposing narratives. On one hand, RENAMO was undoubtedly influenced by South Africa and Rhodesia. From 1977 to 1986, RENAMO was utterly reliant on foreign powers for resources to carry out combat operations, educate its soldiers, learn tactics, and even feed its troops. RENAMOs early success in sewing instability across Mozambique and its military effectiveness throughout the entirety of the civil war was "largely rooted in its Rhodesian and South African patrimony, adherence to a guerrilla warfare strategy, strong command and control and a steady source of war material" (Emerson 2013: 193).

On the other hand, FRELIMO's poorly conceived social and economic policies coupled with its heavy-handed attempts to displace existing social and economic institutions in the country without a prompt or effective replacement disproportionately affected rural communities. RENAMO capitalized on the growing unpopularity and resentment towards FRELIMO and became an outspoken defender of rural society from the government's oppressive modernization programs (Tavuyango, 2011). Although RENAMO may have started as a destabilizing tool created by Rhodesian intelligence and later bolstered by apartheid South Africa, its leaders could seize on the opportunities to acquire arms and training and eventually drive its anti-FRELIMO political agenda. RENAMOs existence is owed to Mozambique's neighbors' foreign policy agendas and FRELIMOs unpopular one-party rule.

2.3 RENAMO's Transition to a (Domestic) Opposition Movement

At the beginning of the civil war, RENAMOs goals were quite opaque. Although it was understood that the movement's ultimate aim was to remove the FRELIMO government, RENAMO rarely, if ever, talked about how it would govern or the policies it would implement. During the early years of the war, RENAMOs leaders never clearly articulated their purposes or their reasons for engaging in a campaign to disrupt FRELIMOs rule. The lack of a political agenda fueled RENAMOs reputation as a puppet of white-ruled Rhodesia, meant to destabilize the newly independent black-majority nation. RENAMOs rhetoric, tactics, and motivations were most

certainly reflections of Rhodesian policy in the early years. However, as RENAMO began to carve out its own identity and position itself as an alternative to FRELIMO, RENAMOs objectives became clearer. RENAMOs transition towards a domestic opposition movement, rather than just a foreign-born one, began when the South African government replaced Rhodesia as its primary source of material and financial support in 1980 and accelerated after the failed Nkomati Accords in 1984.

2.3.1 The South Africa Years 1980-1986

When the South African government replaced Rhodesia as RENAMOs primary supporter in 1980, it put pressure on the group to develop its political leadership and implement a program to attract national and international credibility. Following this pressure, RENAMO made public its aims as a movement in its *Party Manifesto and Programme* of 1981.[9] The document, which was ambitious in its scope[10] (see: Thomashausen, 1983), called for a Government of National Unity and an army based on RENAMO which would incorporate elements of FRELIMO's *Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique* (People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique). More importantly, it called for democratic elections, implementation of a free-market economy, and freedom of movement and religion (Hall, 1990; Finnegan, 1992; Young, 1989). The *Party Manifesto* was an anti-FRELIMO and anti-Socialist document aimed at undermining FRELIMO's socialist agenda and one-party rule. However, at this point, RENAMOs leadership rarely did much to sell its political agenda to Mozambicans. Although the document was made public, it was done so with little fanfare and media attention. Afonso Dhlakama was notoriously media-shy and rarely gave interviews to discuss his motives. In a rare interview given in 1983, Dhlakama stated that after his forces won the war and guaranteed national peace, RENAMO would push for democracy and allow the civilians and intellectuals to govern. Despite this guarantee of a democratic future, Dhlakama rarely conducted political meetings with civilians during this time, and only occasionally did soldiers and villagers gather to hear his speeches. RENAMO was still widely considered a guerilla group at this point, with very little time to promote a political agenda (Minter, 1998).

9 The document was adopted by the RENAMOs National Council on 17 August 1981. This document was the outcome of a secret conference of RENAMO leaders in July 1981 in West-Germany.
10 The document comprised seven chapters dedicated to politics, economy, justice, constitutional matters, health and education, public services and international policy.

By 1983, RENAMO's army had grown to 10,000 soldiers, up from just a thousand when Rhodesia supported it (Chingono, 1996). As the army grew, so did the scope and scale of its violence. During these years, RENAMO gained its notorious reputation for mutilating civilians and acts of indiscriminate violence. By 1984, RENAMO was attacking FRELIMO forces and targeting economic and social infrastructure in every province of Mozambique. The aim at this juncture was to weaken the economy and erode the populations' support for the government. During this period, FRELIMO attempted to end the war by signing the Nkomati non-aggression pact with South Africa. The South African government's support for RENAMO was already waning as news of massacres and other atrocities gained international attention.

Furthermore, FRELIMOs agreement to expel ANC members from Mozambique paved the way for the Accords signings. However, following the signing, the Nkomati Accords failed due to South Africa's continued support of RENAMO. Although South Africa had sent supplies to RENAMO, its involvement sharply decreased after the failed Accords.

2.3.2 The Post-Nkomati Accord Years

RENAMOs transition towards a meaningful domestic opposition took root immediately following the Nkomati Accord. Carrie Manning (1998) notes that RENAMOs political ambitions were born during this period, as it [the Accord] 'served as a catalyst to force [them] to establish itself as an organization in its own right' (p.163). Although the *Party Manifesto and Programme's* purpose was to frame an agenda and establish a political structure, RENAMO did not have a viable political or administrative framework prior to 1985 (Manning, 1998). Between 1984 and 1986, most of RENAMO's political and administrative core were recruited. Those recruited during this period had higher levels of education than the original cohort of RENAMO members. By the late 1980s, hundreds of students at the secondary and pre-university levels were included in RENAMOs ranks[11]. However, the dominant scholarly narrative about RENAMOs recruiting strategy was that most recruits were forcibly captured and coerced to join. There is some truth to this narrative. As Manning (1998) points out, recruits often joined after RENAMO soldiers attacked a village or town. However, the notion that RENAMO was a "captive army" is overblown. Christian Geffary's (1991) analysis of "captive" soldiers found that many young men either voluntarily joined or

11 RENAMOs leadership had promised many of these students' scholarships to study abroad. However, this did not materialize for a vast majority of the students and led to deep divisions in the party that carried over after the war.

allowed themselves to be captured. After 1984, many of these young men came from larger towns and cities in Mozambique's North and Central parts. Frustrations with FRELIMOs economic policies were often cited as a contributing factor to joining or sympathizing with RENAMO. Ultimately, many recruits joined RENAMO during this period for various reasons: In interviews with top officials, Manning (1998) found that what drove many Mozambicans to join RENAMO was a combination of factors: fear and the risks of deserting; the appeal of a lifestyle free of constraints and the opportunity to build a new identity; genuine dissatisfaction with the FRELIMO government; and the prospect for socioeconomic advancement (p. 174).

As the military wing of RENAMO expanded after 1984, so too did its political wing. By 1984, RENAMO made further efforts to establish formal political activities and structures. It established research centers in London and Washington DC to produce pro-RENAMO propaganda and lobby political officials in the United States and the United Kingdom. The goal was to present RENAMO as a viable political authority, with an anti-communist, pro-democratic agenda that ran counter to FRELIMOs. RENAMO also created a group of political commissars whose main activity was to explain to soldiers not only why they were fighting but why RENAMO leadership may negotiate with FRELIMO. They taught soldiers that "the goal [of RENAMO] was to eliminate the existing system, to make FRELIMO accept its errors and abandon its ways." They also reinforced the idea that "Mozambique belonged to everyone, that there should not be first- and second-class citizens. Frelimo had to stop humiliating people, and RENAMO would fight only until it had achieved these goals" (Manning 1998, p. 188).

By the late 1980s, the political commissars expanded their target audience from just soldiers to civilians across Mozambique's central and northern regions. In addition to the political commissars, a system of political delegates was implemented in local communities to create a conduit between RENAMO leadership and the civilian population. The political delegates were instructed to inform local populations, usually at the district level or lower, about the progress of the war, and similarly to the political commissars, to explain RENAMO's goals. In theory, these delegates were supposed to be trusted and influential people from among the local population. However, in reality, RENAMO leadership was most likely chosen and given orders to push an anti-FRELIMO agenda rather than receiving any input from local communities. Manning (1998) found evidence that rather than being effective liaisons between local populations and RENAMO,

political delegates were often not important people in the community, nor did they do more than promote the war effort against FRELIMO.

In June 1989, RENAMO held its First Congress. The Congress was a watershed moment for RENAMOs political development and helped reimagine the organization as more than just a rebel group. The substance of the Congress was similar to that of the *Party Manifesto and Programme* of 1981. The two critical ideas espoused at the Congress were establishing multi-party democracy and a free-market economy. Afonso Dhlakama also openly called for peace talks with FRELIMO, without preconditions.

Furthermore, the First Congress consolidated the fundamental changes that had been in the works since the Nkomati Accords and "moved RENAMO closer to something resembling a coherent opposition movement that would be capable of negotiating effectively with FRELIMO and with potential external supporters" (Manning, 1998 p. 187). The Congress also helped establish the dominance of RENAMOs domestic leadership and cement Dhlakama's role as both its military and political wing leaders. It served to sever ties with RENAMOs external leadership in Europe, who had been the dominant force of the movement since its inception. Dhlakama replaced its representatives in Lisbon and London with RENAMO members who came up "in the bush." Ultimately, the party's First Congress demonstrated RENAMOs transition from a foreign guerilla group into a domestic political opposition movement.

Despite the moves towards establishing political roots, RENAMO not only maintained its military objectives of destabilizing FRELIMO's rule, but its tactics also became more destructive, ruthless, and effective. Before the Nkomati Accords were signed, South Africa sent a large shipment of arms and munitions to RENAMO bases with the explicit intent of reducing its involvement in the war and pushing RENAMO to be more independent. RENAMOs success on the battlefield increased during this period, despite the loss of material and financial support from South Africa. However, RENAMOs tactics also became increasingly brutal and indiscriminate towards the civilian population (see: Vines, *RENAMO: Terrorism*). The group was often portrayed as committing violence for no other reason than "wanton barbarism"; however, as Finnegan (1992) points out, this is belied by the military facts. Despite its mass-terror campaigns throughout the country starting in the mid-1980s, RENAMO violence was strategic and had discernible motives. In the end, every act of violence served to destabilize and delegitimize FRELIMOs rule, damage the economy, and dissuade any allegiances with the government. According to Lisa Hultman

(2009), RENAMOs violence against civilians was mainly employed against supporters of FRELIMO, particularly in the southern provinces.

In the north and central provinces, where RENAMO was most supported, RENAMO violence targeted government infrastructure, transportation route, government officials, and symbols of FRELIMO rule. However, while RENAMO continued to play a destabilizing and disruptive role, it could not truly defeat the government. The FRELIMO government's steady stream of financial backing from the Soviet Union until the mid 1980s and military assistance from Zimbabwe, Tanzania and, Malawi allowed it to push back against any RENAMO advances and launch seasonal offensives RENAMO held territories. It was also helped when it became non-aligned and started receiving assistance from the United Kingdom and other western countries. However, despite the support, FRELIMO employed a conventional style war against RENAMO that was ultimately ineffectual. At this juncture, the war had reached a stalemate.

2.4 Towards a Hurting Stalemate

By the late 1980s, collective exhaustion swept across the country after more than a decade of continuous conflict. The war had reached a point where neither side benefitted from continued fighting, or what William Zartman (2000) calls a 'Mutually Hurting Stalemate' (MHS) Zartman (2000) argues that the initiation of peace negotiations (and ultimately the settlement of a conflict) can occur under the condition of a MHS between the warring factions (pp. 227-28). A MHS occurs when the major belligerents are locked in a conflict that they cannot win and are both sustaining defeats financially, physically, and morally (Zartman, 2000 p. 282). When this occurs, both belligerents are inclined to find a way out of the "hurting." Without such a stalemate, or when one side is winning, negotiations are unlikely to occur because as long as one of the parties believes it is still capable of winning, it will almost always try to do so (See Ferdowsi and Matthies, 2003 p. 30). Although conflict represents a necessary condition for negotiations between two parties to occur, it is not sufficient. Zartman (2000) explains that the conflict needs to be "ripe" for peace negotiations. Conflict ripeness signals a moment when the conflict can be pushed towards a negotiated settlement, effectively ending a conflict.

Before 1989, the likelihood of a MHS was low. The financial, ideological, and military support emanating from external actors like South Africa and the Soviet Union allowed the war to continue, even though the conflict itself was not economically self-sustaining for Mozambique.

Although there had been attempts to end the war, the situation was never mutually hurting, particularly for RENAMO, which still believed the war could be won. This optimism changed dramatically in 1989 as the Cold War ended and the apartheid regime in South Africa collapsed. Both FRELIMO and RENAMO lost significant sources of revenue and political backing. By 1989, the military capacity of both sides was severely diminished, and the combatants were exhausted mainly from endless years of fighting (see Mlall et al., 1999 p. 161). At this juncture, Mozambique had experienced almost thirty years of war (including the war of independence) with devastating consequences for the economy and the psyche of the population. More than one million people died due to the civil war, and more than six million people were internally displaced (Scnabel, 2002; Manning 2002). The enormous loss of life accompanied the large-scale destruction of the country's economy and infrastructure. In addition to the lives lost and the broken economy, the prolonged conflict resulted in a poverty rate of over 90 percent and a country plagued by repeated droughts.

By 1989, the civil war had reached a situation of a mutually hurting stalemate. However, as Zartman (2000 p.227) points out, the most crucial factor for settling a conflict is when the parties involved can identify or trigger moments that make it ripe for resolution. In this case, both FRELIMO and RENAMO recognized that it was time to end the war. First, FRELIMO undertook a series of reforms and initiatives to move Mozambique away from its Marxist-Leninist roots and instead adopt a more open and market-oriented economy. Furthermore, under pressure from international donors and its acceptance of an International Monetary Fund Structural Adjustment loan, FRELIMO underwent a political transformation, whereby the foundations for a multiparty system were adopted. The 1990 constitution was formally introduced to the Mozambican Popular Assembly. The adoption of the constitution by FRELIMO and the Popular Assembly bolstered the chances of the peace agreement and provided a foundational framework for a democratic transition to take place. Second, as mentioned before, in 1989, RENAMO held its First Congress, where it laid out its desires for multiparty democracy and a free-market economy and called for peace negotiations to occur with the government without any preconditions. Afonso Dhlakama understood that FRELIMO was not in a position to continue its war effort but that it was also ready to listen and make a transition to peace. After President Samora Machel was killed in a plane crash in 1986, he was replaced by Joaquim Chissano. Chissano was ready to move on from the war, and unlike his predecessor, he was ready to negotiate with Afonso Dhlakama. Third, the absence of

rigid ideologies allowed both parties to focus on actual interest rather than on their outdated and stubborn political positions. Lastly, only two sides took part in the civil war, making it easier for negotiations to occur and a transition towards peace.

2.5 The Peace Agreement

The peace talks started shortly after RENAMOs First Congress in 1989 but could not push the two parties towards peace. The negotiations were cut short because both sides refused to recognize the legitimacy of each other (Reed, 1996 p.280). However, the failed peace talks in 1989 did not end the process. Both sides were determined to persist. Less than one year after the initial negotiations had failed, RENAMO and FRELIMO representatives met again, with the mediation of the Catholic Community of Sant'Egidio. This meeting was a positive indication that they were committed to the peace process. After two years and 12 rounds of negotiations, Afonso Dhlakama and then President of Mozambique Joaquim Chissano met in Rome on 4 October 1992 to sign the General Peace Agreement (GPA). Perhaps one of the most important aspects and aims of the GPA was to end the hostilities between RENAMO and FRELIMO. For this to happen, both parties realized that the international community's involvement was essential and subsequently agreed that the United Nations (UN) involvement would be beneficial. The goodwill between the two warring parties in implementing the GPA contributed to the greater mobilization of international support (Gujamo, 2019)[12] due in part to the perception that there would be a high degree of success. In this context, the perception that a long-lasting peace would have been observed encouraged member states in the UN to adopt a resolution establishing the UN operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). UN Resolution 797 stressed the efforts made by the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO to maintain a cease-fire[13]. The intervention by the international community, and in particular the UN, strengthened the capacity of the Mozambican State for the implementation of GPA and the important tasks of demobilization and social reintegration of combatants from the government and RENAMO, the formation of a unified army, the return of displaced people and refugees of war, the preparation of the first multiparty elections and national reconstruction (Gujamo, 1999 p. 84).

12 Gujamo, Rufino C. (2019) "The Maintencace of Peace in Mozambique: From GPA to the First Multiparty elections, 1992-1994" *Cultural and Religious Studies* Vol. 7 No. 2. 77-98

13 "Security Council Resolution Establishing ONUMOZ, S/RES/797 (1992), 16 December 1992" In *The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995, With an Introduction by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations. The United Nations, Blue Book Series, Vol V.* New York: Department of Public Information, 1995, p.158

2.5.1 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)

One of the most successful aspects of the ONUMOZ mission was the demobilization and social reintegration of soldiers. At first, the task of demobilizing 110,000 fighters seemed insurmountable. However, it was made relatively easy due to two factors: First, fighters on both sides of the war no longer believed they were fighting for anything and simply wanted to go home[14]. According to Richard Synge, "the frustrations of the assembled soldiers, whose desire to rejoin civilian life was the most effective limitation on the parties' chances of returning to war' (Synge, 1997 p.112). Second, the UN trust fund contributed US$35.5 million to help pay two years' worth of salaries to every demobilized soldier. In addition to the two years of salaries, each soldier was provided transport anywhere in the country. The soldiers were provided with cash vouchers and cheque books to go to a local bank branch every two months to withdraw money. This process was essential to help socialize the former soldiers into everyday life. More importantly, the two years' worth of salary allowed them to buy land to farm and help them to establish a family (Hanlon, 2010). Although demobilization and reintegration efforts were initially successful, other aspects of the GPA's disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts were inadequately implemented.

Protocol IV set out the expectation to equally integrate soldiers from RENAMO and FRELIMO into a newly formed volunteer military on an equal basis. According to the GPA, the army would consist of a 30,000-strong army, with 15,000 soldiers from either side. However, low morale -- brought on by almost two decades of conflict, mutinies, and poor discipline made it difficult to attract recruits to the new army. Only 12,000 soldiers joined the unified army, of which around 9,000 came from the government and 3,000 from RENAMO. Neither side had sufficient soldiers to fulfill the original quota, and in the subsequent years, the government was concerned about the future loyalty of an army consisting of former RENAMO soldiers (Darch, 2018). The governments' suspicions and distrust of former RENAMO soldiers led to policies that purposefully marginalized ex-RENAMO combatants. For example, there were complaints that RENAMO soldiers were forced into retirement and denied promotions to senior positions (Darch, 2018). Furthermore, Afonso Dhlakama's insistence that the GPA include a provision that allowed him to

14 A surprisingly little discussed aspect of the Mozambican war, see van den Bergh, *Why Peace Worked*. It is also touched on by Hanlon, *Peace without Profit*, 18; Manning, *Politics of Peace*; and Newitt, '*Mozambique'*, 222.

maintain an armed group only weakened the trust between the two parties. The image of Dhlakama surrounded by what he dubbed “the Presidential Guard” most certainly did not help.

In addition to not fully establishing a unified army with equal representation from both sides, the GPAs goal of disarmament was also not realized. Aldo Ajello, who was appointed as the UN Secretary-General Special Representative in Mozambique, was tasked with coordinating, and organizing the implementation of the GPA. Ajello’s primary focus was to establish a close relationship with both Joaquim Chissano and Afonso Dhlakama. He is credited with building goodwill between the two leaders (Gujamo, 2019) and the peace process's success. However, Ajello admitted that he did not deem disarmament a priority for ONUMOZ (Darch, 2018). The collapse of the Angolan peace process loomed large in ONUMOZ’s and the government’s decision to approach disarming RENAMO. For Ajello, insisting that RENAMO adhere to a strict and comprehensive disarmament process could disrupt the peace process. Therefore, the disarmament process was the least respected part of the DDR. The result was that large quantities of weapons and ammunition were hidden in various parts of the country (Littlejohn, 2015 in Darch, 2018). ONUMOZ – and FRELIMO’s – tempered approach to disarmament was indeed displaced. Recent research (see Littlejohn, 2015) has shown that the caches are much larger than estimated and that the entire disarmament process contributed to the erosion of trust between the government and RENAMO.

2.5.2 The preparation of the First Multiparty elections

Perhaps the most considerable success of the GPA, aside from bringing the war to an end, was establishing a new set of rules for elections, which amended aspects of FRELIMOs 1990 constitution and set a timeline for Mozambique’s first multiparty election. The 1990 Constitution adopted by FRELIMO and the Popular assembly was the first step to installing a democratic system in Mozambique. It also introduced the ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system for both legislative and presidential elections. The adoption of this electoral system was not surprising, considering the Popular Assembly reflected the one-party state dominated by FRELIMO and would provide the party with a better chance at holding on to power.

However, RENAMO insisted that the electoral system be based on a system of proportional representation, and. FRELIMO acquiesced to this demand. Protocol III of the GPA established a Proportional Representation system for the election of Members of Parliament (MPs) to the

National Assembly from 11 provincial constitutions with at least 5 percent valid votes at the national level needed as a threshold of the allocation of parliamentary seats[15] (formerly the Popular Assembly). In addition, based on the principles established in the GPA, electoral law 4/93 of 20 December was created to put forth the rules that would govern the first multiparty election. This law became the source of national electoral rights and established the electoral model for future elections[16]. The law also specified that the President would be elected by through direct and universal suffrage, but required an absolute majority, and thus provided for a system of two round if needed. and a sole national constituency and MPs are elected through party lists in eleven electoral districts (the provinces),

Protocol V of the GPA established a timetable for the conduct of the electoral process and the creation of a National Electoral Commission (CNE) and a Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE). The adoption of these two electoral institutions institutionalized a power-sharing agreement between FRELIMO, RENAMO, and other unarmed opposition parties. In theory, the power-shared in the STAE[17] and CNE[18] would help drive decision-making through consensus building by ensuring both political parties would be represented throughout the electoral process. This was achieved by allowing both parties to nominate representatives into both electoral bodies. The obligation of consensus would force the parties to build a relationship based on cooperation. However, during the negotiation process, RENAMO felt that it was unequally represented in these bodies, and in particular within the CNE (Gujamo, 2019). According to Protocol III of the GPA, the CNE would be composed of 21 members. Eleven members would come from the Mozambican government (FRELIMO), seven from RENAMO, and the remaining three would come from unarmed opposition. RENAMO rejected this proposal citing that it would harm their position in these bodies. RENAMO proposed decreasing the government's representation to eight members, keeping their seven members, and increasing the unarmed opposition parties' membership to six. The government quickly, and unsurprisingly, rejected this proposal. Ultimately, the United Nations, with the help of then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-

15 See: Electoral law 4/93 of 20 December
16 Louis Brito (2003) *The Electoral System and Conflict in Mozambique*
17 The STAE is headed by a director general who is selected by the CNE and appointed by the Council of Ministers. During election periods, two deputy directors are appointed by the political parties represented in Parliament. In addition to the two deputy directors, the political parties with seats in Parliament, in proportion to their parliamentary representation, appoint nun representatives to the national STAE, five reps to each provincial STAE, and three reps to each district STAE.
18 The CNE chair is nominated by civil society organizations and appointed by the president of the republic. The other members are appointed by the political parties with seats in the legislature in proportion to the number of seats they hold. CNE members have five year terms

Ghali, reached an agreement with all parties. The CNE would include 20 members, of which ten would be appointed by the government, seven by RENAMO, and three representing the remaining opposition parties (*Noticias,* 21 October 1993). Ultimately, the arrangement was not beneficial for RENAMO. The agreement that was reached primarily reflected FRELIMO's original proposal, allowing them to dictate the conditions and the direction of the democratization process (Lalá & Ostheimer, 2003, p.7 in Gujamo article). Since the primary function of the CNE and its implementing arm, the STAE, was meant to register voters, arbitrate any electoral violence, and manage and supervise all electoral events, the dominance by FRELIMO, particularly in the CNE, was seen as being particularly destabilizing to the democratization process. For RENAMO and other opposition parties, the CNE and STAE should have been headed by independent members of civil society, not the government. The fact that this was not initially adopted was another factor contributing to growing mistrust between FRELIMO and RENAMO. Despite RENAMOs objections to the composition of the CNE, in 1993, the body agreed that elections would be held the following year on 27 and 28 October 1994.

2.5.3 Incomplete Peace

Although the GPA was successful at ending the 16-year civil war and ushering in an era of multi-party democracy, it ultimately failed at maintaining a long-lasting peace and creating a politically inclusive society. First, the GPA did not address how power would be shared and more importantly, how resources would be allocated across regions. Second, it failed to include a mechanism for national dialogue and reconciliation which could have helped Mozambicans come to terms with the atrocities committed by all sides during the 16-year civil war.

The GPA did not deal with the centralized system of governance and administration or regional and provincial inequities in access to resources and control over policy (Darch, 2018). It did not explicitly discuss the devolution of powers to the provinces, nor did it give any legislative powers to local governments. The constitution and the Law 3/94 of 13 September 1994, which created the initial legal framework for decentralization, both lacked the specific details for how citizens could officially participate in the political processes of their cities and villages and was [purposefully] vague about the definitions of local agencies of the state and local authorities (Igreja, 2013. p.321). FRELIMO was concerned about the federalization of Mozambique and

therefore resisted efforts to decentralize authority explicitly. Decentralization would prove another wedge issue between the two parties.

Another issue was that a formalized mechanism for transitional justice and reconciliation was never put into place. In contrast to its approach in Rwanda or El Salvador, the United Nations never proposed investigating individuals responsible for human rights violations. In El Salvador, for instance, the UN was adamant that a truth commission be established in order 'investigate the serious acts of violence that have occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently demands that the public should know the truth' (Bueno 2019). The UN was also responsible for establishing an International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda after the genocide.

In contrast, Mozambique was never pressured to implement any form of truth commissions. Law no. 15/92 granted amnesty for crimes committed between 1979 and 1992. According to Natalie Bueno, "the logic was that amnesty would facilitate reconciliation in Mozambique by preventing further polarization and allowing for the social integrating of those with a violent past" (2019, p.431). The law served those who committed crimes. It did not form a basis for successful reconciliation between the two sides. Instead, it promoted a policy of forgetting and silence and created a culture of denial. The political authorities encouraged "turning a collective blind eye, leaving horrors unexamined or normalized as part of the rhythms of everyday life" (Cohen 2001, pg. 101).

Although Chissano and Dhlakama made public commitments to make national reconciliation a priority, neither leader formally attempted, nor wanted to establish a mechanism to do so. In other words, an official silence about the war was established (see: Igreja, V. 2008). This official silence meant that there were never any public discussions regarding the origins of the civil war. FRELIMO authorities often portrayed the civil war as an attempt by external forces to destabilize their rule. The civil war for FRELIMO was a war of destabilization and a war caused by external forces. Even the term civil war, which implies two actors from within, was controversial in FRELIMO circles. On the other hand, RENAMO maintains that the war itself was a struggle for democracy and an internal struggle against post-independence FRELIMO authoritarian rule[19]. The narrative about the civil war largely remained the same in post-GPA Mozambique from the narrative the two parties espoused during the civil war. After the GPA, the

19 For a discussion on the politics of memory in Mozambique see Justice in Conflict, https://justiceinconflict.org/2019/08/12/marginalisation-and-conflict-the-politics-of-memory-in-mozambique/

relationship between FRELIMO and RENAMO was not much different than during the conflict itself, sans the violence, characterized by mistrust and the unwillingness to negotiate on important issues facing the country.

Thus, a deep polarization between FRELIMO and RENAMO, which can be traced back to the beginning of the 16-yearlong conflict, was entrenched into the socio-political fabric of Mozambican culture after the signing of the GPA (Pitcher, 2020). During the civil war, ideological differences represented the most significant rift between the two parties: FRELIMO's adoption of a Marxist-Leninist state versus RENAMOs rejection of FRELIMO rule and all it represented. However, this ideological rift was broken when FRELIMO adopted the 1990 Constitution and rid itself of its Marxist-Leninist ideology. In post-GPA Mozambique, polarization has endured because of new cleavages generated by regional, ethnic, and religious tensions, which are consistently exploited by the leadership of RENAMO and FRELIMO. The parties, since the civil war, have continued to "other" one another. For FRELIMO, RENAMO was simply a group of armed bandits influenced by foreigners. It was never a group that should be taken seriously or viewed with legitimacy. For RENAMO, FRELIMO was an illegitimate, dictatorial party that only represented the views of those living in the southern provinces (Azevedo-Harmon, 2015, p.140). These views did not go away after the GPA was signed. Despite the continued mistrust and unresolved issues regarding the civil war, the two parties accepted elections as their new forum for political competition. However, elections alone have not been able to heal the wounds that were created by the civil war, and FRELIMO and RENAMOs unwillingness to fully abide by the agreements outlined in the GPA and the GPAs inadequacies in addressing issues related to decentralization, power-sharing, and disarmament, have led to uneven democratic developments and entrenched polarization in the country.

2.6 Democratization and Regression, 1994-2013

This section examines Mozambique's democratization process and its subsequent regression, culminating in a return to conflict. Initially, Mozambique's multi-party democracy seemed a success. The signing of the GPA ushered in an era of electoral competition whereby FRELIMO and RENAMO traded bullets for ballots. For two election cycles (1994, 1999), there was a semblance of electoral competition. However, the elections also exposed deep rifts within the country. The civil war left the country polarized, particularly along ethnic, linguistic, and regional

lines. During election campaigning, both FRELIMO and RENAMO would try and exploit these divisions to make gains at the ballot box. In the first two elections, electoral support for RENAMO and FRELIMO coincided with the regions that they controlled during the civil war, as well as with the rural and urban cleavages that existed during the war. In addition, ethnic cleavages also bore out; however, this was most likely a function of regional voting blocs. For example, the Ndau and Shona speaking ethnic groups of the central region reliably voted for RENAMO. While in the Shangana dominated south, FRELIMO enjoyed widespread support. In the north, the results were more mixed.

Furthermore, RENAMO and smaller opposition parties complained about the unfair advantages that FRELIMO had in determining the conduct of elections. These complaints stemmed from FRELIMOs control of the CNE and the STAE. Over the period from 2004 to 2013, Mozambique's multiparty democracy began to slide towards a hybrid regime, which mixes regular elections with increasing levels of autocracy. This change in Mozambique was characterized by unfair elections with frequent irregularities, an uneven political playing field that favored FRELIMO, frequent violations of civil liberties, and the waning influence of the judicial and legislative branches to check the power of the executive. Although Mozambique's procedural rules for democracy continued to exist, FRELIMO managed to control the state and the economy, making it difficult for RENAMO or any other opposition to establish itself.

2.6.1 The 1994 Election

Mozambique's first multi-party democratic election was held on 28 October 1994. After almost three decades of conflict, this watershed moment brought a sense of hope and optimism, not only for Mozambique but for the prospects of democratic transitions in other post-conflict societies around the world. Moreover, the election formalized a multi-party electoral system that allowed RENAMO and other political opposition parties to participate in mainstream Mozambican politics for the first time. The 1994 election was hailed not only as a success for Mozambique but as the model for post-conflict democratic elections. Voter turnout was high, with close to 82 percent of all registered voters and 67 percent of the voting population participating.[20] As expected by the international community and longtime observers of Mozambique, FRELIMO won the election, as

20 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). (2020). Mozambique Election Data. Retrieved from https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/222/40

Joaquim Chissano garnered 53.3 percent of the presidential vote. Although they did not win the election, RENAMO's performance demonstrated that its appeal was more robust than previously thought. Before the election, RENAMOs capacity to gain meaningful support was in doubt because of its central role in the civil war. The extent of its popular support was unknown. According to Mark Sampson, "RENAMO's prospects [were] bleak given its infamous reputation for brutality during the civil war" (Sampson, 1993 pg. 20) [21] However, Afonso Dhlakama earned 33.7 percent of the presidential vote, and RENAMO gained 38 percent of the legislative vote to FRELIMOs 44 percent. RENAMO also secured 112 out of the 250 seats in the National Assembly. During the campaign, Dhlakama was an outspoken proponent of traditional culture and authority structures, which were well received by Mozambicans living in the rural areas. Dhlakama's rhetoric resulted in RENAMO slightly outperforming FRELIMO in rural areas (41 percent to 40 percent). RENAMO won the largest number of votes in the central and northern Provinces of the country, namely Sofala, Manica, Tete, Zambezia, and Nampula. Frelimo won the largest percentage of votes in the southern northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Gaza, Inhambane, Maputo province, and Maputo city.

These results echoed the ethno-regional cleavages that had manifested during the war. RENAMOs firm base of support came from the Ndau of central Mozambique and a large percentage of the Macuas in the Northern region (the largest ethnic group in Mozambique). During the election campaign, Afonso Dhlakama tried to exploit the identities and differences of certain ethnic groups in order to obtain an electoral advantage (Gujamo, 2018). In a plea for Macua support, Dhlakama said, "Now the time has come for you Macuas to enjoy your freedom which FRELIMO has never considered" (*Noticias,* 4, October 1994). Dhlakama pandered to leaders based on ethnic grounds and often promised that governors and district administrators would be of Macua origin if RENAMO won the election (Cahen, 2004). Dhlakama's strategy shifted depending on where he was in the country. On the one hand, when he was in Nampula (in the north), Zambezia, and Tete (both in the central region), he would use ethnically driven rhetoric. On the other hand, when he was in Cabo Delgado (in the far north) and the southern provinces, he would distance himself from ethnically charged language and resort to a tone of national solidarity (Gujamo, 2018). Despite attempts to appeal to ethnic identities, the 1994 election campaign was

21 Mark Sampson, 'The foreign and domestic factors in the transformation of Frelimo', *Journal of Modern African Studeis,* 31:2 (1993)

not dominated by this type of rhetoric. According to Manning (2002), the arguments and appeals to ethnic identities were marginally used by RENAMO and other political competitors and were replaced by appeals for national unity. During speeches, Dhlakama, as he had done during the civil war, framed RENAMO as the vanguard of democracy and himself as the father of a democratic Mozambique.

During the election campaign, FRELIMO, as it had during the civil war, presented itself as the party of national unity and the vanguard of the revolution based on its experience of struggle for independence. It often reminded supporters at rallies that FRELIMO vanquished the Portuguese and established modern-day Mozambique. Joaquim Chissano, during speeches around the country, often blamed Mozambique's economic problems, lack of social programs, broken infrastructure, and the misery caused by the war on RENAMO. FRELIMO's strategy was to avoid any ethnically discriminatory language that would serve to divide the country. However, in some cases, FRELIMO would spread rumors that a victory by RENAMO would lead to the expelling of certain ethnic groups, particularly the Makonde in Cabo Delgado and the Shangana in the south. Although they were rumors, it forced Dhlakama to distance himself from the ethnically motivated language he sometimes used on the campaign trail (Gujamo, 2018). For his part, Joaquim Chissano was careful to push a message of national unity while reminding Mozambicans across the country of the atrocities committed by RENAMO.

Although FRELIMO ended up securing the presidency and a majority in the national legislature, the election results revealed that the party did not have the extent of popular support that it had always asserted. Yet FRELIMO was able to maintain a level of dominance over political life after the 1994 election. For example, all provincial governorships were filled by FRELIMO party members after the 1994 election even though RENAMO had won a majority of the vote in four provinces (Wood, 1998). Furthermore, the Constitution gave FRELIMO priority over the other parties with a statement in its preamble that democracy should not jeopardize national unity and that FRELIMO was the guarantor of this national unity (Navungu and Sitoe, 2013). In effect, this aspect of the Constitution "implied that the unitary state and the country's sovereignty corresponded to hegemony by the FRELIMO party" (Mazula, 1995 p.350 in Navuga).

2.6.2 The 1999 Election

The lead-up to the 1999 elections was characterized by growing tensions and further mistrust between RENAMO and FRELIMO. In 1998, local elections had taken place, but RENAMO decided not to participate and boycotted the election. At that time, the international community and the UN Trust were urging RENAMO to complete its transition from a guerilla group into a political party. However, by the time campaigning for the local elections was to begin, RENAMO did not have sufficient financial resources. Dhlakama's authoritative hold over the party, his mismanagement of party funds, and his inability to delegate responsibilities to other members left RENAMO with little money to spend on campaigning (see Manning, 2007). RENAMO threatened to withdraw in the hope that the international donor community would donate millions of dollars to its campaign efforts, but the threat did not work. The international community recognized that RENAMO was no longer in a position to restart a conflict with the government, and therefore refused to pay (Wood, 1998). In addition to its financial problems, RENAMO was frustrated with FRELIMOs dominance in the National Election Commission (Comissão Nacional de Eleições, CNE). In particular, it wanted to repeat voter registration in all constituencies and draw new municipal borders. FRELIMO rejected any changes and was not willing to delay the elections. In the end, RENAMOs unwillingness to participate in the 1998 local elections meant that FRELIMO was able to gain control of 33 municipalities.[22]

Despite the tensions and issues with RENAMOs organization, the lead-up to the 1999 election was largely peaceful. But while voter turnout was relatively high (68.09% of registered voters and 58.21% of VAP), this constituted a decline from 1994. Joaquim Chissano secured his second term in office, as he gained a majority of votes with 52.3 percent. However, Dhlakama came away with 47.7 percent of the vote, and RENAMO increased its share of parliamentary seats to 117, out of 250, indicating Dhlakama and RENAMO's political maturation. Much like the 1994 election, voting patterns ran along regional lines. While FRELIMO continued its dominance in the southern provinces (Gaza, Inhambane, Maputo, and Maputo City) and the far north province of

22 The Constitution of 1990 limited political processes at the local level. However, the national parliament made an ad hoc revision of the constitution in 1996 in order to address constitutional limitations and replace the Law 3/94 which created the original framework for decentralization in Mozambique. The revision introduced the principle of local power at the local municipalities. Municipal elections used a PR system in order to elect an assembly and an executive agency with deliberative powers. Administrative, financial, and patrimonial autonomy were alos granted to the local municipalities (see: Victor Igreja, 2013, "The Politics of Memory, Decentralisation, and Recentralisation", *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 39, No. 2, 313-335)

Cabo Delgado, RENAMO maintained its support in the central (Manica, Sofala, Tete, and Zambezia) and northern provinces (Nampula and Niassa).

Although RENAMO increased its representation in the National Assembly and Dhlakama came very close to defeating Chissano, the party cried foul over the conduct of the elections. Dhlakama accused the CNE of stuffing ballot boxes with FRELIMO votes and pointed out that it took three weeks to announce the results of the election. RENAMO contested the election results in the Supreme Court but was ultimately unsuccessful in swaying the national courts to re-run the election. Soon afterward, RENAMO leadership conceded they lost and accepted their loss. As Tavuyango (2011 p.47) states, "the fact that RENAMO contested the final results through establish legal channels and that the CNE followed due process to address RENAMOs concerns were positive signs…"

Much like the 1994 elections, the 1999 elections were deemed largely free and fair by international observers. However, the results of the election, and the general optimism for Mozambique's democracy, shifted by late 2000 when RENAMO organized public demonstrations across the country against the results of the 1999 election. The vote-counting process in December 1999 after the election and the CNE's lack of transparency about the process led many opposition supporters to call into question the legitimacy of the 1999 election. Dhlakama felt that he should have won the presidency and refused to concede. Dhlakama's unwillingness to accept the results encouraged his supporters to protest the election. These protests spread across Mozambique and quickly turned violent. In the northern city of Montepuez in Cabo Delgado, 40 RENAMO supporters were killed in protests, and another 83 were later confirmed to have died in police custody. The violent protests and a general lack of trust in political institutions began a period of electoral and democratic malaise amongst Mozambicans. Furthermore, since the 2000 protests, Dhlakama's authority and ability to mobilize nationally measurably decline.

2.6.3 The 2004 Election

In the years between the 1999 and 2004 elections, RENAMO participated in the 2003 local elections and managed to win five out of the forty-five municipalities, including Beira, the second city in the country. However, RENAMO saw a decline in support that would continue for more than a decade. This period marked a reversal in RENAMOs political fortunes, which manifested

in low turnout, a decline in support for Dhlakama, and the loss of critical parliamentary seats in the National Assembly.

There are different explanations for RENAMOs rapid decline, some of which blame FRELIMO policies after the 1999 election that meant to counter RENAMOs rise and exclude them from power-sharing, and others which blame RENAMOs internal conflict, leadership disagreements, and its inability to transform into a political party fully. On one hand, RENAMOs decline has been attributed to three external factors (see: Cahen, 2011, 2015; Ostehiemer, 2004; Pereira, 2016; Forquilha & Orre, 2012). First, RENAMO supporters became disillusioned with the electoral process due to perceived fraud in 1999 (Cahen, 2015). For RENAMO supporters, the idea that FRELIMO would ever let RENAMO win the presidency seemed far-fetched, and no matter the popularity of Dhlakama, he would bever be allowed to win. RENAMO was displeased with the overt politicization of the CNE and called for reforms. In 2003, a revision was made, which proposed that civil society would elect the President of the CNE. However, empowering civil society organizations to elect the President of the CNE did little to reduce RENAMOs mistrust. The CNE was still primarily dominated by FRELIMO. RENAMO wanted an independent and depoliticized CNE, which would reduce the mistrust between parties, speed up the decision-making process by fostering consensus, and enhance the credibility of the electoral process (Ostehiemer, 2004). These demands were never actualized. Instead, the CNE was accused of corruption, denying elections observers access to election sites, and suffering from numerous errors and insufficiencies[23].

Second, political centralization ensured that FRELIMO would control local government no matter what (Ostheimer, 2004). After the 1994 elections, RENAMO supporters were angered and confused by the rules that allowed FRELIMO to name governors to the provinces where it had not won a majority of support. In the 1994 election, RENAMO had gained a majority of the vote in every central province and the northern Province of Nampula. After the 1999 election, RENAMO increased its share of the vote in all provinces yet was still excluded from governing at the provincial level. Although attempts were made to restructure the way governors were selected, disagreements between Dhlakama and Chissano prior to the 1999 elections kept the system the

23 EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) to Mozambique – 2004, Second Preliminary Statement, Maputo 20 December 2004. www.eueomm.org/statement2 , accessed 01.19.2021

same. The political centralization has also impeded RENAMO's ability to effectively dispense patronage failed because FRELIMO monopolized state resources (Cahen 2011; Pereira 2016).

In the centralized state that FRELIMO promoted, municipalities had minimal resources, and any funding that did come from the state was coming from a FRELIMO government. According to Cahen (2011), FRELIMO prevented RENAMO from effectively governing at the local level by allocating the budget only after long delays, and never approving special local development plans that would be beneficial to the population. FRELIMO also created a system whereby the municipality and the district would share powers which created rivalries between the two, especially where RENAMO had won a municipal government election.

> "Municipalities run only the urban part of the district, with the rural part remaining under the direct rule of the state, without elections. But when it was a RENAMO municipality, district governments would retain powers for education, wealth, and other social issues in the urban area. In municipalities where there was no rural area, there should no longer have been a district government since powers were in the hands of the municipalities. But in the three cases where there was no rural area in the district and the municipality had been won by RENAMO, the FRELIMO state maintained the district government, creating a true situation of dual power, RENAMO's poor power and the FRELIMO's rich one." (Cahen, 2011 p.8)

This arrangement allowed FRELIMO to take full advantage in controlling resources and distribute patronage in rural areas favorable to RENAMO rule in the past.

Third, FRELIMO successfully regained the support of traditional chiefs, whom the party had abolished. After independence, FRELIMO tried to dismantle and discourage traditional institutions in favor of creating a modern state. RENAMO took advantage of this and became a voice for the traditional. It was successful at gaining the support of the traditional chiefs in rural communities. This base of support helped it electorally in the 1994 election and the 1999 election. RENAMO understood that traditional authorities could mobilize support from the rural areas. After the close election result in 1999, FRELIMO saw the need to shift its strategy and support local chiefs and reverse its post-independence stance on traditional authorities. In 2000, Decree 15/2000 integrated traditional authorities into local political-administrative structures and local FRELIMO party representatives. This decree allowed for the manipulation and co-optation of traditional authorities into the political and administrative system (Forquilha & Orre, 2012).

Other scholars have attributed RENAMO's rapid decline to factors related to its own leadership and disorganization. Dhlakama was unable to create a sustainable party structure and was unwilling to democratize RENAMO in a way that would empower a new generation of leaders. The lack of internal party democracy resulted in high-level defections of RENAMOs most senior and most effective members. Although Dhlakama was elected to be leader by members of RENAMO during the Party's Congress, all other leadership positions were appointed by him (Manning, 2002). This frustrated many members of his party, particularly newer members with higher levels of education, and who had not participated in the war. For Dhlakama, this new crop of RENAMO cadres was a threat to his power, and he grew more paranoid about losing his position. According to Michel Cahen (2011), Dhlakama's decision to boycott the 1998 local elections was not necessarily because he objected to the conditions of the elections or because of financial problems; instead, it was because he was afraid of the possible emergence of a new generation of leaders.

Dhlakama's style of leadership became increasingly authoritarian, dismissing or alienating well-meaning and effective party members who had been involved with RENAMO from the beginning of the war. Dhlakama also moved against RENAMO officials who were able to be successful without his patronage. Most notably, Raul Domingos, second in charge to Dhlakama, a key negotiator for RENAMO during the Rome peace talks, and the leader of RENAMOs parliamentary group, was removed from his position and replaced by sycophant (Vines, 2013). Domingo's growing influence in the party and his growing relationship with FRELIMO officials directly threatened Dhlakama's rule. Domingos was subsequently expelled from the party and later started a new political party, the Partido para a Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento (Party for Peace, Democracy and Development or PDD. Some RENAMO members defected and joined the PDD. Others defected and created their own party.

Dhlakama's reluctance to let anyone else attain political power within RENAMO and let the parliamentary group have the power to make its own decisions reflects RENAMOs hierarchical military roots (Regalia, 2017). Ultimately, Dhlakama was not able to fully transition the party from its guerilla mentality. Instead, Dhlakama often leaned on obstructionist policies meant to disrupt FRELIMOs agenda rather than cooperate. RENAMO's failure to deliver on its wartime promises left many longtime supporters disillusioned with the party. It continued to lose support from its

base by refusing to allow qualified government professionals like teachers and health personal to enter into areas it had controlled following the 1994 elections.

As Manning (1998) notes, "RENAMO was torn between not wanting to yield control of its areas and its personnel, and the need for the patronage that state jobs represented" (p.185). Supporters of RENAMO felt that they did not have much to gain by supporting it and that it did not provide a viable or beneficial alternative to FRELIMOs rule. RENAMO, at this point, had failed to create a policy platform that differed from FRELIMOs.

By the 2004 election, enthusiasm for both RENAMO and the election process was waning. There was a precipitous drop in voter turnout (Figure 2.1). Only 35.6 percent of the voting-age population and 36.34 percent of registered voters participated in the election. FRELIMO's new candidate for President, Armando Guebuza, won the election in a landslide with 63 percent of the vote. Support for Dhlakama dropped considerably. He was only able to garner 32 percent of the presidential vote, and RENAMO lost 27 seats in the National Assembly. Nevertheless, the party won by large margins in its heartland areas of Sofala and Zambezia; however, it lost considerable support in other provinces it had easily won in 1994 and 1999 (Tete, Manica, and Nampula). Although RENAMO was given US$1.4 million per year from the state between 1999 and 2004 to develop its party structures, almost half of it was unaccounted for (Carbone, 2005). Establishing local party structures was essential for RENAMO to maintain its support across the central and northern regions. However, Dhlakama made little effort to do so, and more consequential, he failed to counter FRELIMOs courting of traditional authorities in the rural areas. RENAMO was unable to provide patronage to traditional leaders or simply keep promises that they would be put into important decision-making positions. Furthermore, RENAMOs branches in rural communities were often little more than a house with a flag (Carbone, 2005). RENAMOs disorganization during the campaign and failure to mobilize voters led to a high number of abstainers. According to an investigation of public opinion, trust and confidence in RENAMO (22 percent) was much lower than trust in the ruling party (61 percent) (Pereiera et al. 2003). Dhlakama's authoritarian leadership style, coupled with his inability to organize RENAMO, contributed to RENAMO's decline in the 2004 election

Figure 8.1 Voter Turnout (Registered and Voting Age Population)



2.6.4 The 2009 Election – Mozambique's Hybrid Regime

Before the 2009 national elections, two major events occurred that led to RENAMOs devastating electoral results. After years of Dhlakama's weak leadership and lack of organizational direction, a major split occurred in RENAMO, which led to the creation of Mozambique's most potent third-party, the *Moviemento Democratico de Moçambique* (Movement for a Democratic Mozambique or MDM). MDM's creation led to an exodus of RENAMO intellectuals (the few that existed) and lower-level members in the central regions (Cahen, 2011). The second major event was the election of Armando Guebuza as the President of Mozambique in 2004. Between 2004 and 2009, Armando

Guebuza set out to consolidate FRELIMOs power by centralizing power and controlling the economic, political, and social aspects of Mozambican life. Both events served to diminish RENAMOs role in the country's politics and eventually led to another electoral loss for RENAMOs, thereby continuing FRELIMO's dominance over Mozambique.

After the 2004 election, many of the same organizational issues and internal bickering that existed after the 1999 election plagued RENAMO. These issues were on display during the 2008 municipal elections, where RENAMO was unable to win a single municipality[24]. Dhlakama's relationship with long-established members of RENAMO was becoming increasingly strained. Daviz Simango, a popular member of RENAMO and the mayor of Beira, was expected to run in the local elections but was suddenly replaced just before the election. Dhlakama's decision to replace Simango was met with resistance and led Simango to run instead as an independent candidate. He won the election handily as an independent with 62 percent of the vote. RENAMO's replacement candidate was only able to gain 3 percent of the vote (Hanlon, 2010). Simango's popularity angered Dhlakama, which led to his expulsion from the party. In March of 2009, Simango formed the Moviemento Democratico de Moçambique (Movement for a Democratic Mozambique or MDM), which led many RENAMO supporters in urban areas and in the party's central strongholds to switch party support. These party defections were a devastating loss for RENAMO. Not only did they lose one of their most influential members, but they also managed to anger and alienate a loyal group of supporters. According to an Afrobarometer survey, trust in RENAMO dropped from 34.9 percent in 2005 to 18.7 percent in 2008.

Coupled with RENAMOs organizational decline and party schism, FRELIMO's new leader Armando Guebuza actively took a hardline approach in negotiations with Dhlakama and pursued policies to recentralize authority. Unlike the Chissano era, Guebuza was unwilling to work with RENAMO directly. During his first term in office, Guebuza did not meet with Dhlakama and began to exclude all opposition from government[state?] structures to (Morier-Genoud 2009 in Pearce Article), including expelling former RENAMO officers from the Mozambican military (Igreja, 2015 In Pearce Article). Chissano's era was marked by inclusivity, at least in comparison to FRELIMO's one-party rule days. However, Guebuza's presidency marked a reversal of such policies. Rather than favor technocracy, Guebuza rewarded party loyalists with ministerial positions and within state institutions. At the same time, he disregarded the notion of post-war

24 In 2007, an amendment to the Constitution increased the number of municipalities from 33 to 43.

reconciliation with RENAMO. He challenged all narratives of the civil war that RENAMO presented and reintroduced post-independence slogans of Samora Machel like "*a luta continua*" (the struggle continues) or "*victória ou morte*" (victory or death) when referring to electoral campaigns (Cahen, 2011). Guebuza wanted to control Mozambique's post-independence history and remind Mozambicans that FRELIMO was the party that liberated its people from colonial rule. During this period, any opposition to FRELIMO or FRELIMO's version of history was deemed an attack on the state, the presidency, and Mozambique.

During the Guebuza Presidency, FRELIMO increased its concentration of power within the state, capitalizing on the fact that no other institution was able to hold the executive branch accountable. For example, Guebuza had full powers to appoint and dismiss cabinet members and appoint every provincial governor. FRELIMO's dominance in the National Assembly also ensured that the executive would not be checked. FRELIMO MPs rarely, if ever, hold the president accountable (Azevedo, 2009). Under Guebuza, FRELIMO focused on strengthening party unity and guaranteeing that MPs would be compliant with executive actions and policies. Guebuza's success resulted from improving the party structures, controlling the economy, mainly through business, and co-opting civil society. Loyalty to FRELIMO was rewarded with vital political opportunities and access to economic resources and patronage. For example, to obtain privatized enterprises, charges, benefits, credit, commercial licenses, and often to just be a civil servant, it was necessary to be a member of FRELIMO. Politicians connected to Guebuza enjoyed a wide range of concessionary loans from former state banks and preferential access to investment deals. Those politicians, businesses, and civil society associations that did not adhere to the FRELIMO agenda or supported opposition parties were often left without funds or opportunities for advancement (See: Sumich, 2008; Sumich, 2017; Orre & Ronning, 2017) In other words, they would not benefit from Mozambique's fast-growing economy. In Inhambane, for example, civil society organizations advocating against HIV/AIDS and competing for state resources for their programming often pandered to FRELIMO party officials to make known that their communities political support would be for FRELIMO. Civil society activities sometimes mirrored political rallies, with HIV *activistas* donning FRELIMO party *capulanas*[25] and Guebuza t-shirts.[26]

25 Traditional woven textiles worn by woman in rural communities.
26 These observations come from my time working with civil society associations in Cumbana Agrícola, Inhambane Province from 2013-2016.

The results of the 2009 election reflected the political changes occurring in Mozambique. In particular, it highlighted FRELIMOs dominance over the state and RENAMOs dramatic electoral decline. Guebuza won the presidency with 75 percent of the vote, while Dhlakama won only 16.41 percent. The party lost 39 seats in the National Assembly and, for the first time, was unable to win a majority of the popular vote in the party's strongholds of Sofala and Zambezia. The MDM was successful in syphoning votes from RENAMO in those two provinces and gained eight legislative seats in the National Assembly. Nevertheless, the real success of the 2009 election was FRELIMOs dominance in every part of the country. It managed to gain 31 additional seats in the National Assembly, allowing the ruling party to cement its dominance over the political system. After the election, Dhlakama resorted to denouncing the election results and claimed that the vote was rigged, and that the election was stolen from him.

2.6.5 Democracy in Decline and Return to Conflict

In the aftermath of the 2009 election, relations between RENAMO and FRELIMO worsened, and RENAMOs position as a viable political party diminished due to two major factors. First, its loss, particularly within the National Assembly, meant that its economic base and patronage capacity dwindled. State subsidies are calculated based on the number of votes, and loss of more than 50 percent since 1999, meant that RENAMOs capacity to influence local leaders at the local level reduced. It lost the financial ability to deliver services to its constituents in areas it controlled and more importantly its was unable to continue to provide patronage to local leaders. Second, Dhlakama's inability to lead as a political leader allowed other political parties the chance to challenge RENAMO in its territories. MDMs popularity, particularly Daviz Simango's ability to pull urban support in Zambezia and Sofala, forced Dhlakama to abandon his home in Maputo, the capital, and move to the northern city of Nampula. He moved to Nampula in the hopes of winning back supporters who had defected to MDM. He viewed MDM as a threat to RENAMO and felt he could show his authority as the "true" leader of the main opposition[27].

Furthermore, the economic growth in the country, estimated at 8 percent per year from 1993 to 2014[28], helped to bolster the political elite in Maputo, but rarely if ever, trickled down to the rest of the population, particularly in RENAMO constituencies. The World Bank notes that

27 Irvin Reid and Cameron Wimpy, 'Defining Opposition: An Interview with Afonso Dhlakama of Renamo', Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, Vol.37, No.1, 2013.
28 World Bank, "*Accelerating Poverty Reduction in Mozambique: Challenges and Opporutnities"* 21 December 2016, p. 8

poverty reduction was unequal within the country, with Zambezia, Sofala, and Manica having seen poverty rates increase between 2003 and 2009[29]. The growing levels of poverty coupled with the fast economic growth also allowed Guebuza and FRELIMO to entrench neopatrimonialism further. As poverty levels rose, local leaders became more reliant on political leaders in their districts to deliver services and provide financial handouts. Guebuza was able to use state resources to influence these local leaders and patronage networks, particularly in regions that lacked independent sources of income or that relied on political elites for money. As Cahen (2011) notes, "in a society where political resources almost all come from the state, either directly or indirectly, in which neopatrimonialism and state clientelism are deeply rooted, it is a challenge for any opposition to succeed in mobilizing a large social base among people who need the state, precisely because of their absolute poverty (p. 11)."

The combination of these factors and declining voter turnout was a signal that Mozambique's appetite for democracy was waning. The democratization process was slowing down, and in many ways, reversing. Since 1994, most democracy indicators show a downward or stagnating trend. Freedom House has classified Mozambique as partly free since 1994. The more recent electoral democracy index created by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project measures essential elements of democracy such as freedom of expression, clean elections, the extent of suffrage, and independent media.[30] Mozambique's score on the index is around the midpoint between not at all democratic (0) and fully democratic (1). Since 2004, Mozambique's score has dropped (Figure 2.2). This indicated the erosion of its already weak democratic institutions and increasing authoritarianism (Pitcher, 2020).

Figure 8.2 V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index for Mozambique

29 Supra note 24.
30 For indicator and score, see Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, . . . and Daniel Ziblatt, 'V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset v10' Varieties of democracy (V-Dem) project (2016), <https://doi.org/10. 23696/vdemds20> (28 March 2018).



Concerning governance, the Worldwide Government Indicators (WGI)[31] on voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, the rule of law, and control of corruption, have also shown downward trends, particularly since Guebuza was sworn in as President of Mozambique (see Figure 2.3). During Guebuza's presidency, Mozambique's score has dropped across every indicator by more than ten points, except for corruption, which dropped by 2 points. In particular, the political stability measure shows how Mozambique's declining democracy also coincided with an increase in politically motivated violence.

31 The Worldwide Governance Indicators are a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprises, citizen, and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms. For indicator and score, see

Figure 8.3 Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) for Mozambique



Between 2008 and 2015, Mozambican perceptions of personal and political freedoms declined across three categories: the freedom to say what you think, the freedom to join any political organization, and the freedom to choose whom to vote for. At the same time, Mozambican's level

of fear increased. Between 2011 and 2015, there was a 20 percent increase in the percentage of Mozambicans that reported fearing political violence and intimidation (Figure 2.4).

Figure 8.4 Perceptions of Freedom and Fear of Violence[32]



2.7 RENAMO's Return to the Bush

By 2012, the tension between RENAMO and FRELIMO was at its highest levels since the end of the civil war. In March 2012, Dhlakama's presidential guard and 300 RENAMO ex-combatants engaged in a deadly shootout with police in Nampula city. Dhlakama and Guebuza met in April to ease the tensions between RENAMO and the government. However, the easing of tensions was temporary. In October 2012, Dhlakama, along with his presidential guard and a large group of soldiers, moved from Nampula City to Satunjira in Sofala province. The move was symbolic in

32 The survey questions come from Afrobarometer. Afrobarometer is a pan-African research institution that conducts a comparative series of public attitudes surveys surrounding views on democracy, governance, the economy and civil society. Since its inception, it has conducted 6 national survey rounds. The *Freedom* questions asks, "In this country, how free are you to say what you think/ to join any political organization you want/ to choose who to vote for?" Respondents could pick from five answers: Not at all free, not very free, somewhat free, completely free, or don't know. For this graph, I used the answer, completely free. The question on Fear asks respondents "During election campaigns in this country, how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of intimidation or violence". Respondents could answer; a lot, somewhat, a little bit, not at all, don't know. For this graph, I combined all three answers that indicate a little bit of fear to a lot.

that Satunjira was located close to RENAMOs bush headquarters during most of the civil war. Dhlakama claimed that his move to the bush was to keep him safe from the government's armed forces, which he believed were attempting to capture and kill him (Darch, 2016). In 2013, in an attempt to free a large group of RENAMO members that the police had arrested, fighting broke out. On October 22nd, 2013, a spokesperson for RENAMO declared that the 1992 GPA was officially dead, claiming, "Peace is over in the country… The responsibility lies with the FRELIMO government because they did not want to listen to RENAMO's grievances" (BBC, 2013). Dhlakama announced that he was training his supporters for renewed conflict and that RENAMO would split the country.[33]

2.7.1 The Renewal of Conflict

In the year leading up to Mozambique's fifth democratic election in 2014, violent skirmishes between government forces and RENAMO combatants erupted across the central part of the country. In the 15 years between 1997-2012, there were 302 recorded conflict events (both violent and non-violent), according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED).[34] Between 2013 and 2014, In contrast, there were 306. Most of these events occurred in the 18 months leading up to the 2014 national elections. The sudden increase in conflict events before the 2014 election was unique in that Mozambique had not previously experienced widespread and sustained political violence and conflict during an election year. The 2009 election previously had the most conflict events leading up to any election since 1994 (see Figure 2.5).

Furthermore, post-election violence or conflict had not been a feature of Mozambican elections except for 1999's contested election, which saw violent protests almost a year after the election resulting in over 40 deaths and hundreds of arrests. At that time, it had been the deadliest violence the country had seen since the civil war. Despite the riots and demonstrations against the government's malfeasance during the 1999 election, RENAMO's violent opposition did not last more than a few days, and political life in Mozambique returned to the status quo. The 2014 election year, on the other hand, was marred by sustained violent clashes between FRELIMO supporters and opposition groups, battles between RENAMO and the government, violence

33 'Dhlakama Threatens Bloodshed in Mozambique', *SAPA,* 12 Nov. 2012
34 ACLED does not have data before 1997.

against civilians across the country, political intimidation, and many high-profile political assassinations and assassination attempts.

Figure 8.5 Violent and Non-Violent Conflict Events in the Year Before Elections in Mozambique[35]



RENAMO and FRELIMO were quick to blame each other for the outbreak of the conflict. Although the violence that occurred did not approach the levels of intensity that had been witnessed during the civil war, it had been the worst fighting since the signing of the 1992 GPA. The renewal of conflict also conjured memories of Mozambique's violent past, demonstrated the fragility of the democratization process, and exposed long-standing unresolved grievances across the country. According to Victor Igreja (p.242, 2015), "the conflict seriously affected local life as it halted agricultural production and forced the internal displacement of up to 5,000 people, particularly in the Gorongosa region [in central Sofala]." Forty-six districts experienced some form of conflict leading up to the 2014 elections. The conflict occurred in the very southern part of the country up to the northern border with Tanzania. The majority of conflict events were located in the central and southern regions, while the north of Mozambique was the least violent. The provinces most directly affected by RENAMO and government military engagement were Sofala and Manica in the central region.

[35] Source: ACLED

Mozambique's return to violence was not surprising. RENAMO's leader Afonso Dhlakama's justifications for returning to violence were rooted in long-standing grievances about the post-civil war peace process, and in FRELIMOs monopoly over political and economic power. He claimed RENAMO's actions since 2012 were part of a long struggle for democracy, and that the party was 'tired of taking a beating' during elections (Pearce, 2020). In countries with relatively weak and new democratic institutions, like Mozambique, violence exists as one of several strategies to influence election outcomes (Mares & Young, 2016; Schedler, 2002). Ultimately, Dhlakama understood that violence could influence the election or at least pressure FRELIMO to make changes to the electoral process.

2.8 The 2014 National Election

The 2014 elections saw a reversal in the steady decline of RENAMO. For the first time in Mozambique's young democracy, elections were accompanied by insecurity and ongoing political conflict. Despite several failed peace talks between RENAMO and FRELIMO before the 2014 national elections, a hastily put together and tenuous agreement was finally signed in August. On October 15th, 2014, FRELIMO won its fifth national election. However, RENAMO increased its total vote share by more than 20 percent. RENAMO closely contested the election in five provinces, all located in the central and northern parts of the country, and took control of three of the eleven provincial assemblies (Azevedo, 2015). Of the 43 electoral districts that switched their party support from the 2009 elections, 40 of those districts moved from Frelimo to RENAMO. RENAMO also increased its share of the legislative vote and strengthened its representation in the National Assembly for the first time since the 1999 elections (Figure 2.6).

Figure 8.6 Legislative Election Vote Share and Seats in National Assembly



Furthermore, RENAMO's electoral gains occurred despite the fact that analysts found problems at more than 10% of polling stations, which were most likely intentional rather than accidental (Mozambique Political Process bulletin). The European Observation Mission (EU EOM) identified a series of irregularities across four provinces. These irregularities ranged from restricting the access of opposition political party representatives recognized by the CNE to tabulate votes, to broader voter intimidation outside of polling stations. A lack of electoral experience could not excuse the level of disorganization during the 2014 election. Daviz Simango of the MDM argued that electoral manipulation began long before polling day, and Afonso Dhlakama stated that FRELIMO organized the obstruction of the electorate in opposition areas from registering to vote.[36]

The 2014 election also demonstrated questionable variation in turnout levels across the provinces (Table 2.1). Within Frelimo strongholds, voter turnout amongst the voting age population was over 50 percent, while in provinces where RENAMO gained a plurality of the vote, such as Zambezia and Nampula, voter turnout was far below 40 percent of the voting-age

36 Reid, C. (2014, November 6). Mozambique Elections: big win or big fix for Frelimo? Retrieved from http://africanarguments.org/2014/11/06/mozambique-elections-big-win-or-big-fix-for-frelimo-by-cate-reid/

population. According to reports by multiple election observers from the European Union and the United States, opposition areas and provinces involved in close contests had an unusually high number of spoiled and blank ballots, such as Niassa[37]. Analysis by observers of the election estimated that ballot stuffing gave Felipe Nyusi at least 105,000 fraudulent votes (2014 National Elections, Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, Maputo).

Table 8.1: Voter Turnout by Province 2014 Presidential Election

Province	2014 Voter Turnout (Registered)	2014 Voter Turnout (Voting age Population VAP)	Difference Between Registered and VAP
Tete*	54.8	43.0	11.7
Manica*	53.5	42.9	10.6
Inhambane	55.0	45.4	9.7
Gaza	65.7	56.6	9.2
Maputo	55.7	46.6	9.2
Zambezia*	38.8	32.3	6.5
Sofala*	49.6	43.9	5.7
Niassa	45.60	40.3	5.3
Nampula*	40.2	34.9	5.3
Maputo City	60.5	56.1	4.4
Cabo Delgado	49.3	48.3	1.0

*RENAMO gained a plurality of the vote

RENAMO's "comeback" may not be surprising to students of Western politics, but it is astounding to observers of elections in divided or plural societies. In his seminal text, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (1985), Donald Horowitz posited that political parties in divided societies, whose supporters are known to come predominately from one group, or one region, but who are in the minority, tend to drop out over time because they think the winning party supporters will simply keep out-voting them. After two or three elections, once electoral cleavages have been solidified, those on the losing side either lose the incentive to vote or switch to support the larger party in the hope of getting clientelist rewards. When a party "is discredited and loses the support of the group

37 Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP) and European Parliamentarians with Africa (AWEPA), Maputo, 'Elections Results, 28 November 2014', Mozambique Bulletin, 56

it represents," recovering the losses is difficult (p.344). After two tightly contested elections in 1994 and 1999, Mozambique's 2004 and 2009 elections seemed to validate Horowitz's theory of party competition in deeply divided societies. RENAMO saw dramatic decreases in support and turnout across much of its traditional strongholds across the central and northern regions of the country. This decline in support culminated in 2009's embarrassing defeat in which RENAMO won the majority vote in only 5 of 128 districts.

The 2014 election results were all the more surprising as RENAMO was capable of shedding its reputation as a party of neglect and disorganization and ultimately erased more than 15 years of declining political support. The party's return to conflict forced FRELIMO and the government to the negotiating table and allowed Dhlakama to be viewed by many of his supporters as a hero. As Michel Cahen (2018) notes, the armed propaganda of RENAMO permitted Dhlakama to recuperate political space.[38] The signing of a new peace deal demonstrated to many supporters of RENAMO that the party was capable of taking real action to defend its principles. Dhlakama's rhetoric of tolerance and unity contrasted sharply with FRELIMO's either-with-us-or-against-us-approach (Allison 2014). The impressive ability to mobilize backers-despite the late start in campaigning[39], the large attendance at rallies[40], and the belief that RENAMO's leadership had done well in negotiating a new peace accord, left the party feeling victorious even though it failed to win the election.

38 Cahen, M. (2018, September 5). Desconcentração, descentralização, ou democratização? *Savana.* https://savana.co.mz/olhar-michel-cahen/

39 Official election campaigning began on the 31st of August 2013. Dhlakama only began to campaign on the 16th of September.

40 Dhlakama and Renamo were capable of attracting large crowds, often in the thousands, to its rallies.

Table 8.2: RENAMO vote share 2009 and 2014

Provinces	RENAMO Vote Share 2009 (Percent)	RENAMO Vote Share 2014 (Percent)	Percent Change
Cabo Delgado	14.4	17.2	2.8
Gaza	2.6	2.4	-0.2
Inhambane	8.4	16.2	7.8
Manica*	22.8	48.0	25.3
Maputo	6.3	10.8	4.4
Maputo City	14.9	20.6	5.7
Nampula**	27.3	44.0	16.6
Niassa**	11.6	36.2	24.6
Sofala*	35.8	52.6	16.7
Tete*	7.9	44.6	36.7
Zambezia*	35.9	46.2	10.2

*Province is considered in the central region **Province is considered in the north region

Although the choice to take up arms and return to the bush was not explicitly driven by electoral calculation, the renewal of conflict may have had the unintended benefit of bolstering RENAMO's electoral appeal. For many political observers of Mozambique, RENAMO's use of violence, particularly in the central part of the country, was a political "masterstroke" (Allison, 2014). Horowitz (1985) observed that the presence of permanent winners and permanent losers in electoral competition could lead to conflict. He argues that because parties can only appeal to members of one communal group, campaigning is designed to get voters to the polls, not attract new voters. RENAMOs use of violent tactics in the central part of Mozambique reinvigorated existing regional cleavages that had been erased by 2009. In 2014, the central and northern provinces saw the greatest swings in support towards RENAMO (Table 2.2). Political parties like RENAMO have an incentive to use extreme rhetoric or actions because fear is a powerful motivator: "the greater the collective danger, the greater the likelihood that politically apathetic group members will go to the polls" (Horowitz, 1985; p. 332). Although RENAMO ultimately lost the 2014 election, it improved its electoral performance across Mozambique, reinvigorated its relationship with former constituencies, and regained political negotiating power it had lost over the previous decade. It also engendered the party to use violent tactics and threats against the government to extract political benefits.

After the 2014 election, tensions increased between FRELIMO and RENAMO. Following the election, RENAMO, as it had made a habit of doing in every election, contested the results and accused FRELIMO of widespread voter fraud and suppressing opposition parties[41]. RENAMO felt that it had once again been robbed of governing, even at the local level, and demanded direct control of the six provinces that it had won a plurality of the popular vote. These demands reopened a long-standing debate about the merits of decentralization; something FRELIMO has long opposed. Ultimately, the tenuous cease-fire agreement that was signed before the 2014 national elections fell apart. On 2 April 2015, after Dhlakama continued to make public threats to restart the conflict if the government refused to provide concessions, Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) and RENAMO soldiers renewed clashes against one another in the southern province Gaza. The clashes that occurred after the 2014 elections and that lasted until the death of Afonso Dhlakama in 2018 were the worst clashes in Mozambique's short democratic life.

2.9 Conclusion

Overall, in this chapter, I have given an overview of violence and elections in Mozambique and have explained why violence in Mozambique was able to return. First, RENAMO's transition from a guerilla group to a political party was unbalanced and inconsistent. RENAMO often, oscillated back and forth between its rebel mentality and its democratic aspirations. Dhlakama held on to the party's guerilla image and never allowed the party to transform into a coherent and effective opposition party (See Vines 2003, 2017; Manning, 2002). This frustrated FRELIMO's relationship with RENAMO, as Dhlakama, the "guerilla leader," would often use the threat of boycotts and demonstrations, and sometimes violence, to force his way to a negotiating table. A second factor behind the conflict has been FRELIMO's absolute control over the state and its dominance of state-society relations (see: Macamo and Neubert 2003; Manning,2010). By the 2014 elections, FRELIMO had ruled Mozambique uninterrupted for almost forty years. This sustained rule allowed the party to institutionalize itself across every aspect of the Mozambican state successfully. A third factor contributing to the violence was the failure to implement the 1992 General Peace Accord (GPA) fully. The GPA did not adequately resolve the post-civil war tensions between RENAMO and the FRELIMO government. Although it was initially successful at ending

41 For more on electoral irregularities and voter suppression during the 2014 elections, see European Union Election Observation Mission, *Mozambique-Final Report: General Elections, 15 October 2014,* eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eueom_mozambique_2014_finalreport_en.pdf.

the fighting between the two sides immediately following the civil war, it did not provide a path forward for political accountability and transparency, the democratization of the state, and a better life for the majority of Mozambican citizens (See: Darch, 2018; Vines 2013; Igreja, 2008; Bueno 2019).

All of these factors prevented the deepening of democracy and, in many ways, reversed Mozambique's democratization process. Prior to the fighting in 2013, Mozambique's democracy was backsliding (Manning, 2010). The decline in democracy furthered the tensions between opposition parties, namely RENAMO and the MDM, and the government of FRELIMO. Democracy, for many in Mozambique, did not seem to have a chance at changing the country. These factors are essential for understanding why the renewal of violence in Mozambique was not surprising.

The general question that arises from this narrative and particularly following RENAMOs electoral gains during the 2014 elections is whether the conflict between RENAMO and the government impacted voter turnout, vote choice, and general sentiments and attitudes about democracy in Mozambique. As Horowtiz (1985) points out, civil disorder and breakdown are costly for permanent winners, and in this case, may have allowed RENAMO to make its "comeback." This "comeback" raises critical unanswered questions: To what extent did political violence and conflict shape Mozambican political behavior during the 2014 national elections? Did RENAMO's decision to return to the bush and resume its conflict with FRELIMO have the benefit of attracting voters to its side? Or was RENAMOs electoral resurgence the result of well-orchestrated violence (committed by RENAMO) that 'suppressed' FRELIMO support? Lastly, what, if any, unintended consequences resulted from the conflict? Are Mozambican beliefs in democracy affected? In the next chapter, I examine the literature on political and electoral violence and voting behavior to answer the questions derived from this chapter.

Chapter 3: The Consequences of Political Violence – A Theoretical Framework

3.1 Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, intrastate violence has increased across developing democracies, significantly outnumbering interstate ones both in frequency and in the number of casualties generated (Davenport, Nygard, Fjelde, and Armstrong 2019). This growing violence has occurred in parallel with the proliferation of elections. Although today, in almost every country globally, citizens are afforded the chance to select their leadership, too often, bullets and ballots mix. The mix of voting and violence threatens the democratization process, undermines essential democratic institutions, and can lead to prolonged civil conflict. It is dangerous to the survival of democratic regimes and, in many ways, can be a path to upending or suspending democratic processes altogether. Political violence makes it difficult to establish peace and stability and strengthen citizen confidence in democracy.

According to the Electoral Contention Violence (ECAV) dataset, most countries experiencing violence during election cycles between 1989 and 2012 were located in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. In Africa, election-related violence is commonplace. Between 1990 and 2014, violence occurred in 60 percent of elections (Burchard 2016). This violence ranged from low-level intimidation and harassment of voters to protracted conflict between the opposition parties and the incumbents and occurs before the election, during the election, or after an election. In Kenya, for example, pre-election violence and intimidation in 1997 killed over 100 people and caused more than 100,000 people to leave the city of Mombasa out of fear of ethnic cleansing (Laakso, 2007). Ten years later, the 2007 election was marred by large-scale post-election violence, which took over 1,500 lives. In Cote D'Ivoire, post-election violence resulted in more than one million people being displaced and a further 100,000 people seeking refuge in neighboring countries (Strauss, 2011). More recently, violence during elections has occurred in Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, threatening the democratization process, and causing long-lasting political crises. In many cases, violence, harassment, and intimidation were explicitly used to influence the elections' outcome.

However, violence targeted at the electoral process is not the only primary type of violence in countries holding elections. More than half (59 percent) of all countries that experienced electoral violence between 1985 and 2012 did so while ongoing armed conflict occurred (Daxecker

and Jung, 2018). Armed conflict can have deleterious effects on the electoral process. It can delay the voter registration process, make campaigning difficult, disenfranchise voters as they flee violence to districts or regions that are not where they live and vote, and cause citizens to lose faith in the democratic process altogether.

The impact that violent armed conflict has on electoral and democratic behavior is still not fully understood. Scholars have tried to understand the electoral consequences of being exposed to ongoing armed conflict and widespread political violence. Does it affect whether citizens decide to vote and whom they decide to support? Moreover, what unintended consequences, if any, result from upticks in violence? Does violence affect citizens' attitudes about democracy?

In the previous chapter, I discussed Mozambique's history with political violence, its transition to democracy, and the relationship between the two major parties, FRELIMO and RENAMO, during the civil war and post-war democratic phase. After 20 years of relatively peaceful multiparty elections, the year leading up to the 2014 national elections was marked by the highest political violence levels since the civil war. Considering RENAMOs choice to return to armed conflict against the government, and the general uptick in political violence events around the country, what was its influence on the outcome of the 2014 national elections? RENAMOs political comeback in 2014, both in terms of presidential vote share and national assembly seats, was unexpected. Despite almost 14 years of decline in popular support and inter-organizational challenges, RENAMO was able to renew its position as the main opposition party in the country. This reversal in RENAMOs political fortunes raises a critical question about the role that violence played in shaping electoral participation and voting behavior and how citizens respond to being exposed to violence. In terms of Mozambique, what impact did exposure to the violence of 2013-14 have on whether or not citizens decided to vote, whom they voted for, and their support for and satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions?

In the next section, I review what the literature has said about political behavior amid violence. I discuss what we think we know about violence's consequences on political participation, voter turnout, and attitudes about democracy. This analysis lays the groundwork from which – based on insights from the literature on the impact of civil war legacies, electoral violence, and terrorism – I develop a model for understanding the electoral and political consequences of violence. I then derive a set of predictions for political participation, vote choice, and democratic attitudes. Overall, I contend that citizen participation in elections, vote choice, and

attitudes about democracy are shaped by an individual's societal and political contexts. In this vein, I see ongoing armed conflict and pervasive political violence as crucial contextual determinants that impact 1) whether an individual decides to vote, 2) whom an individual decides to support, and 3) how they perceive democracy and democratic institutions. In addition, I argue that partisanship plays a crucial role in conditioning the relationship between violence and democratic citizenship.

3.2 The Consequences of Violence

During the last two decades, there has been a proliferation of studies that explain the relationship between violence and political behavior in countries that hold elections. Although a majority of the studies on violence and elections have focused on the causes (see: Burchard, 2015; Claes, 2016; Collier & Vicente, 2012, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Joblonski, 2014; Robinson & Torvik, 2009; Taylor, Pevehouse & Straus, 2017; Wilkinson, 2004), recent research has started to put greater focus on the consequences. In terms of political behavior, this research has examined the effect of electoral violence on voter turnout (Bekoe & Burchard, 2017; Bratton, 2008; Burchard, 2015, 2020; Hoglund & Piyaranthne, 2009). Other research has looked at electoral violence's influence on various political attitudes such as from satisfaction with democracy (Burchard, 2015), political knowledge (Söderström, 2018), social and political trust, and social capital (Dercon & Guitérrez-Romero, 2012).

Studies stemming from civil war legacies have contributed to the burgeoning area of research on the general effects of political violence on democratic citizenship. These studies have found a positive relationship between exposure to armed conflict and civic participation (De Luca and Verpoorten 2015), prosocial behavior (Voors et al. 2012; Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii 2014), political identities (Lupu and Peisahin 2017; Balcelss 2012), community and political participation (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009), and political trust (De Juan Pierskalla 2016). Another body of research has found that exposure to violence decreases levels of trust and lead citizens' to avoid risk in their daily behavior (Crenshaw 1983; Spilerman and Stecklov, 2009). Political violence in democratic settings can influence public opinion and changeattitudes (Berrebi and Klor 2008; Bali 2007; Davis and Silver, 2004). Despite the growing interest in understanding the consequences of violence, there is still little agreement about the actual effect on political participation, voting behavior, and attitudes about democracy. In the rest of this section, I will

review what we know about violence's consequences, focusing on three areas: 1) Voter Turnout, 2) Vote Choice, 3) Attitudes. After reviewing the literature, I will discuss my critiques of the existing literature.

3.2.1 How does violence affect voter turnout?

Why is violence expected to affect voter turnout, and what are the mechanisms that cause this to happen? A growing literature from studies on election violence in Africa has sought to understand the relationship between political participation and violence. Overall, the effect of violence on voter behavior and political participation has yielded mixed results. One the one hand, studies show that violence reduces voter turnout. In Nigeria, for example, targeted political intimidation in rural communities led citizens to remain at home during elections (Bratton 2008). In this case, political intimidation had the intended effect of making citizens abandon their right to vote out of fear of violent repercussions. Following this, Hoglund (2009) found that per-election violence led to low voter turnout because it reduced voter registration. Collier and Vicente (2014) also found that pre-election violence reduced turnout. In the context of Nigeria's 2007 presidential election, the authors found that violence and intimidation used by weak parties and challengers was an effective way of reducing voter turnout. Studies from other continents also provide evidence that pre-election intimidation and violence has a negative effect on turnout. Hickman (2009) demonstrated that violence at polling divisions during Sri Lanka's 2005 presidential election led to a reduction in turnout, particularly when cast by competing party supporters. However, Hickman found that the effect did not change the election outcome because the violence used by competing political parties canceled out in the aggregate.

On the other hand, more recent studies of African elections and violence have shown that violence has no discernible effect on voting. Bekoe and Burchard (2017) found that over time and across countries in Africa, electoral violence does not result in lower voter turnout, nor does it increase turnout. In a close examination of Kenya, the authors found that pre-election violence's intended effects are specific to each situation, resulting in suppressing voters or encouraging them to turn out at the polls. Using data from a sample of 20 countries that had elections between 2008 and 2009, Burchard (2015) found that fear of violence and intimidation had minimal impact on voting intentions. Her findings demonstrate that the relationship between voting and violence was dependent on the context of the violence and citizens' political preferences. For example,

partisanship was found to have a significant mediating relationship between fear of violence and the intention to vote. Mac-Ikemenjima's (2017) study on youth participation and political violence supports the notion that violence affects different groups differently. Using Afrobarometer public survey data from 20 countries to run a correlation analysis, the author found a negative relationship between violence and voting among youth.

In addition to the differing effects of different individual characteristics on voter turnout, varying levels of violence types also influence political participation differently. The literature on criminal violence found that fear of violence and the intensity of violence in a given location depresses turnout. Trelles and Carreras (2012) and Ley (2017) found evidence that as specific regions experienced more frequent and intense criminal violence, electoral participation was reduced. Ley's findings were confirmed at both the aggregate and individual levels. In the contexts of ongoing armed conflict, Garcia (2009) found that turnout was lowest in municipalities that experienced the most intense and frequent violent conflict during the decades' long conflict in Colombia. Garcia-Sanchez (2010) and Gallego (2011) both found that armed actors successfully altered voter behavior and affected electoral outcomes in Colombia's decades' long conflict. These studies also found evidence that the most violent and disputed areas during elections saw the lowest probability of voting. Bravo et al. (2012) and Carreras and Trelles (2012) found evidence from Mexico that supports the argument that violence depressed voter mobilization and turnout. Studies that stem from civil war legacies, armed conflict, and terrorism claim that exposure to violence led to an increased likelihood of voting. Bellows and Miguel's (2009) study on the effects of the Sierra Leone civil war found that individual households exposed to the most intense war violence were more likely to vote in elections. Their findings show that exposure to violence had the effect of increasing turnout. The findings from Sierra Leone are similar to other post-conflict countries in Africa. Finally, Blattman (2009) found that forced recruitment into a military or militia leads to an increase in the likelihood of voting. The author explains that violence may lead to personal growth and political activation in former child recruits and motivates them to be more involved in the politics occurring in their local community.

3.2.2 How does violence influence vote choice

To understand how vote choice is affected by violence, it is necessary to examine the goals of the perpetrators' intent and whether it is effective. One strand of literature has examined the political

effects of violence when used as a deliberate campaign strategy. In this case, violence is purposefully yielded by political parties to suppress, discourage, or intimidate voters from another party from voting. The use of violence, not as a by-product of electoral politics but as a campaign strategy, has been examined by several scholars. (e.g., Chaturvedi 2005; Robinson and Torvik 2009; Collier and Vicente 2012). Governments and incumbents are the most common, and often the most brutal, perpetrators of political and electoral violence (Straus & Taylor, 2013). Incumbents often use violence or other illicit tactics when they fear losing power or anticipating an unfavorable outcome, mainly when election contests are highly competitive (Fjelde & Hoglund, 2016; Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski, 2014). For an incumbent, it is essential to manage any uncertainty. The strategic aim is to provoke the political opposition to boycott the election/and or influence voter turnout in the incumbent's favor, both of which increase the probability that the incumbent will remain in power.

The choice to incite violence happens at times and in places where the incumbent politicians that it will not trigger significant electoral sanctioning or defection by core constituents (See: Chaturvedi 2005; Collier and Vicente 2012; Hafner-Burton et al., 2014; Wilkinson, 2004). In particular, politicians associated or tied to violence in societies divided along ethnic and religious grounds may boost ethnic solidarity and further increase the support of their core constituencies. In India, riots perpetrated by supporters of the incumbent helped to suppress opposition voters. Politicians in India carefully calculated whether or not to prevent a riot depending on if whether the riot itself would benefit them electorally (Wilkinson and Haid, 2009). Collier and Hoeffler (2009) found that incumbent politicians who incite violence and commit other forms of unlawful electoral practices (i.e., bribery and intimidation) remain in office three times longer than their counterparts that do not resort to violence. Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablosnki (2018) also find evidence that violence used by incumbent governments can secure an electoral victory. However, the long-term effect of resorting to violent methods in the pre-election period can lead to post-election protests and violence, which can damage the incumbent's reputation and, in some cases, lead to a change of government. For incumbents, the use of violence is not always cost less. However, incumbents will use it when they can maximize the benefits of violence, intimidation, and harassment.

From a strategic perspective, opposition parties and other armed actors use violence to harm the incumbent while also bolstering their political movement[42]. In most instances, armed actors in countries that hold elections are less likely to use violence for the explicit purpose of manipulating the vote. Instead, violence has other specific instrumental purposes that may end up having unintended electoral benefits. Armed forces and insurgents use violence to extract political benefits from the government or persuade them to yield on key issues of concern. Also, violence can strategically incite fear, forcing citizens to withdraw their support from a government. On the logic of violence, Kalyvas (2006) asserts that in the context of armed conflict, the use of violence, or the threat to use it, "is intended to shape the behavior of a targeted audience by altering the expected value of particular action" (p.26). In other words, violence can be used to manipulate for political reasons, and even the threat of violence can influence a citizens' behavior. Ultimately, the goal of armed actors, who have decided to use violence against either the political system or civilians, is to influence the social context in which individuals make their political decisions.

The electoral success of opposition political parties which engage in political violence depends on how they carry out the violence. In other words, who does the opposition or armed actor decide to target, and whom do they shield from the violence? Armed opposition parties will rarely target their own supporters, nor will they target voters whose support they seek. Instead, armed opposition groups that effectively maintain popular support are likely to deliver essential services, provide jobs and advocate on behalf of their supporters and the supporters they want while also using violent tactics to weaken the incumbent. In the Palestinian Occupied Territories, while Hamas was building its electoral base, it was also engaged in violent rhetorical and physical conflict with Israel. Bhasin and Hallward (2013) argue that this dual strategy allowed Hamas to wrestle political power from the dominant Fatah party. Hamas built support by showing that it could defend the Palestinian people against Israeli aggression and occupation while also providing tangible benefits and services that were well needed. Other armed political groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain have used these same tactics to bolster their support. De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2013) found that ETA attacks across Spain correlated with ETA's political wing's electoral success in the Basque region.

42 See Matanock and Staniland (2018) and Condra et. al (2018) for in-depth analysis on why armed actors decide to use violence during elections.

Furthermore, evidence suggests that ETA was keenly aware of the benefits that violence afforded its political wing and often perpetrated violence to improve electoral outcomes and extract political benefits from the Spanish government. In Lebanon, Hezbollah, an armed actor, and political party has successfully mobilized public support by implementing comprehensive political and social programs and delivering services to its constituencies while also using political violence to gain concessions from the government (Wiegand, 2009). As a minority party, it abandoned non-violent strategies for violence to gain more leverage over Lebanon's government.

Moreover, violence caused by opposition parties or other armed actors has the effect of destabilizing a country and, in turn, disrupting the incumbent's ability to govern effectively. The presence of violence and conflict can have ramifications on how citizens perceive their government's handling of a crisis. Violent conflict can harm an incumbent during elections because citizens will doubt their ability to govern appropriately (Ferejohn, 1986). Citizens who live in violent environments are unlikely to ignore the heightened sense of insecurity that permeates where they live. For voters in many countries, security issues matter. Citizens will sanction incumbents for either being too security-focused or not security-focused enough. For example, evidence from Israeli and Turkish elections found that terrorist attacks can push voters away from incumbents perceive to be ineffective at securing the state, and towards more hawkish, pro-war parties (Berrebi and Klor; 2006, 2008; Kibris, 2011). Voters who have weak ties with the incumbent's party are more likely to find an alternative political party they believe will be tougher on violence, or at the minimum, will better ensure their safety and security or drop out of the electorate altogether. However, in Spain, the 2004 Madrid train bombings decreased support for the incumbent Popular Party due to decision to to join the Coalition invasion of Iraq (Bali 2007). In this case, voters sanctioned the government due to its pro-war policy.

The literature on electoral violence has found that violence, or at least the fear of violence, has varying outcomes depending on an individual's partisan leanings (Burchard 2020). In some cases, undecided voters or voters affiliated with smaller minority parties during elections were most likely to stay at home due to violence (Wallsworth 2015). As these voters drop out of the electorate, the incumbent's chances of securing an electoral victory increase. However, Burchard (2020) found that fear of election violence was associated with a higher probability of supporting opposition candidates. The results hold for non-partisan voters as well. Fear of violence and intimidation during elections led to a decrease in votes for the incumbent party. The loss of support

was most notable among non-partisans and supported the notion that incumbents are held responsible for either being involved in the violence or being unable to curb violence. Burchard argues that violence has a backlash effect on the incumbent. Another recent study found that voters were less likely to support candidates rumored to have used electoral violence, even when the candidate is a co-ethnic or a co-partisan (Gutierrez-Romero and LeBas 2020). However, this sanctioning effect was not uniform across all voters. For example, the authors found that the most impoverished voters were less likely to punish a candidate that was rumored to have used violence. This was particularly pronounced when that candidate had a good record of reducing poverty.

3.2.3 How does violence influence attitudes about and behavior towards democracy?

There is a growing literature that examines how political violence shapes citizen attitudes and behaviors in democracies. The attitudinal and behavioral consequences of political violence range from decreased levels of trust and changes in citizens' daily behavior to avoid risk (Crenshaw 1983; Spilerman and Stecklov 2009). Political violence can influence public opinion and contribute to changing attitudes in the electorate (Berrebi and Klor 2008; Bali 2007; Davis and Silver 2004), enhancing group solidarity. Studies stemming from the legacies of civil war have contributed to this burgeoning area of research. These studies have found a positive relationship between exposure to civil war violence, civic participation (De luca and Verpoorten 2015), prosocial behavior (Voors et al. 2012; Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii 2014), political identities (Lupu and Peisahin 2017; Balcelss 2012), both community and political participation (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009), and political trust (De Juan Pierskalla 2016).

Vera Mironova and Sam Whit (2016:2) note that "researchers are increasingly examining the impact of violence on micro-level norms and preferences" but that the impact of violence is mixed so far. Bellows and Miguel (2009) in Sierra Leone demonstrate that individuals who directly experienced more intense conflict are more likely to attend community meetings and join local political and community groups. Blattman's (2009) study of Uganda found that individuals who had experienced forced conscription into rebel groups were more likely to self-report post-war participation in voting and community leadership. Other studies across Africa have noted similar patterns. Bauer et al. (2014) carried out a series of allocation games to determine whether violence increases prosocial behavior only towards people at the local level or whether the effects on prosocial behavior could be generalized to the entire population. They found that individuals

directly exposed to violence were less selfish and more averse to inequality eight years after experiencing war-related violence. Cecchi et al. (2015) found similar results from an experimental and observational study on young street soccer players. Voors et al. (2012), in their study of Burundi, found that nine years after its civil conflict, individuals who personally experienced war-related violence or who lived in attacked communities, behaved more altruistically towards neighbors and were more likely to report being involved in local community organizations. De Luca and Verpoorten (2012) argue a decrease in social capital in districts exposed to battle events. Rohner et al. (2013) also found that violence harms personal attitudes, specifically generalized trust. In Nepal, community members exposed to intense violence levels are more likely to contribute to public goods and are significantly more trusting. On the other hand, Weidmann and Zuercher (2013) do not find significant evidence that wartime violence leads to increased social cohesion.

Despite the increasing scholarly attention to how violence and conflict shape citizen attitudes, there is less understanding of how political violence shapes support for and satisfaction with democracy. Burchard (2015), in her examination of the effect of fear of violence on individual democratic attitudes, found that it has a statistically significant and negative impact. Across Africa, partisan ties do not change the negative impact of fear. Whether you are a supporter of an incumbent, opposition, or no party, fear of violence still carries a negative effect. The author notes that the impact of fear of violence can also lead to an erosion of public trust, public confidence, and legitimacy across all sectors of society (p. 164). Despite the compelling evidence of fear's negative effect, political violence and conflict exposure are given much less attention. In trying to understand the conditions under which citizens practice their political citizenship, there is a need to understand what violence exposure does to democracy. Closely related, research on the impact that criminal violence and crime have on society has found that citizen's perceptions of public safety are as important a factor as many socioeconomic variables in predicting support for and satisfaction with democracy (Bateson, 2012; Fernandez and Kuenzi, 2010). As citizens believe that they are safe from violence, they are likely to have more positive perceptions of democracy.

3.3 Critiques of the literature?

Despite the growing literature, various limitations and knowledge gaps and still remain. First, except for some recent scholarship (see: Wahman & Goldring, 2016, 2020; Dercon & Gutiérrez-

Romero, 2012; Reeder & Seeberg, 2018; Collier and Vicente 2014), much of the existing empirical work on the relationship between elections and violence in Africa has focused on cross-national studies that examine aggregate-level behavior (Bekoe and Burchard 2017; Burchard 2015, 2020; Daxecker, 2014; Fjelde & Höglund, 2016; Fjelde, 2020; Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski, 2014; Straus & Taylor, 2012; Taylor, Pevehouse & Straus, 2017). Cross-national studies have provided an understanding of institutional, societal, and international determinants and consequences of violence. However, sub-national examinations of the consequences, particularly in Africa, are still somewhat limited.

Furthermore, the existing literature does not adequately distinguish the impact of the identity of the perpetrator (i.e., government/opposition/civilian) or type of violence (differing levels of severity) at the individual or subnational level. Most studies of electoral violence have found that incumbents are often the perpetrators and focused on the strategic incentives for using such violence to influence elections[43] (Daxecker, 2012, 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski, 2014; Smidt, 2016; Wilkinson, 2004). However, much less understood are the strategic incentives of opposition party violence, or opposition armed political actors, and the consequences of their violence on political participation and vote choice. Furthermore, missing from current analyses is the acknowledgment that elections are often held amid existing violent contexts. This omission presents a growing challenge in the study of electoral violence. As stated before, among all countries that experienced electoral violence between 1985 and 2012, 59 percent took place during ongoing armed conflict (Daxecker & Jung, 2018 p.60). Researchers should not assume that ongoing armed conflict or pervasive political violence does not affect political behavior or voting behavior. Just as widespread criminal violence influences political participation and vote choice, ongoing armed conflict can also have intended and unintended consequences that shape elections. Organizations with peaceful electoral wings and violent factions operating at the same time have become more prevalent in developing countries with elections (Birnir and Gohdes, 2018; Staniland, 2015). Some studies have examined the effect of insurgent and armed opposition violence on the electoral fortunes of incumbent parties (Kibris, 2011; Berrebi and Klorr 2006; Lago and Montero 2006) and insurgent associate parties (Joshi and Mason 2008; Bhasin and

43 Governments and incumbents are the most common, and often the most brutal, perpetrators of political and electoral violence (Straus & Taylor, 2013). The rationale for using such violence typically stems from the incumbent's fear of losing power or the anticipation of an unfavorable outcome. According to Hafner et al. (2013), in the pre-election period, incumbent governments use violence to alter election results by reducing the level of competition.

Hallward 2013; Heger 2015; de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2013; Berrebi & Klorr, 2008; Matanock & García-Sanchez 2018; Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014). However, few researchers have considered their influence on political behavior, particularly within the African context.

This discussion highlights the difficulty in operationalizing electoral violence and distinguishing it from other forms of violence. On the one hand, all electoral violence can be considered political violence. However, many in the field of electoral violence argue that not all political violence is electoral violence. The differences between the two types have to do with whether the use of violence intends to purposefully influence electoral outcomes and the timing of violent events (Höglund, 2009). For example, a political parties call for its supporters to use violence to ensure that opposition supporters cannot vote on election day, is an obvious form of election violence. An attack on a village by an anti-government militia is not electoral violence. However, an attack on a village by an anti-government militia a few weeks or days before an election, can be considered electoral violence. In this case, the violence could have permanently displaced voters in that village or intimidated anyone supportive of the government from going to vote. Deciding whether violence is used purposefully is up to the researcher and is entirely subjective. In any case, researchers view electoral violence as any coercive force, including assassinations, physical harm, forced displacement, intimidation, and disruption of the ballot (Bekoe, 2012).

Moreover, electoral violence is considered distinct from widespread political violence in that electoral violence would not have occurred or would have shown up differently in the absence of an electoral contest (Fjelde & Hoglund 2016). In other words, electoral violence is a viable strategic tool to either mobilize or suppress voters. Although election-related violence would not necessarily have occurred *sans* an election, particularly from a strategic perspective, this does not mean that other forms of politically motivated violence, either produced by the state or by armed actors, would have been absent. Furthermore, elections, as noted already, do occur in tandem with other forms of violence. The standard conceptualization of electoral violence tends to ignore or dismiss the impact that widespread political violence may have on citizens' political behavior.

On the other hand, political violence is a broad and multifaceted term that includes all forms of violence that carry political significance and involve collective or mass activity (Hibbs, 1973). Political violence includes riots, armed insurgency, assassinations, and physical and

psychological intimidation. Although this is similar to electoral violence definitions[44], it does not assume that political violence influences the outcome deliberately. However, I argue that experiences with political violence can still profoundly shape how citizens interact with the state and how they think about politics and even elections. Evidence from the literature on civil war legacies and terrorism demonstrates that individual exposure to conflict influences political participation and behavior in the short and long term (Bauer et al., 2014; Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Cassar, Grosjean, and Whitt, 2013; Cecchi et al. 2015; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2015). Knowing that political violence has a variety of societal and political consequences and that electoral and political violence often occur together, it is necessary to broaden our conceptualization of election violence or, at the least, to understand how other forms of violence also influence political participation and voting behavior.

3.4 Argument/Theoretical Framework

Despite the substantial literature on political behavior in Africa, we still do not fully understand how varying sociopolitical and socioeconomic contexts influence citizens' behaviors. Bleck and Van De Welle (2019) argue that political participation across Africa depends on the context and that citizens are highly reactive to the incentives and power structures around them. Although cross-national studies have examined the influence of political and institutional contextual factors, such as electoral and party systems, on voter turnout, country-specific issues, like ongoing armed conflict or pervasive political violence, are not always included in these analyses. It is necessary to move beyond examining individual characteristics and include country-specific contextual factors that can explain voter behavior and attitudes about democracy within African countries. Individual characteristics alone do not tell the whole story, and by focusing solely on these variables, we miss out on a variety of social and political environmental factors that may shape how citizens behave and think.

The contextual effects literature, a subset of voting behavior, supports the idea that the social and political context that an individual is located shapes political decisions and influences

44 Paul Staniland (2015) offers a compelling critique of current definitions and operationalizations of electoral violence. He argues that electoral violence encompasses many different kinds of violence and that even the best sources of empirical data on electoral violence do not provide information on what makes an incident of electoral violence. "Efforts to define electoral violence are interpretively loaded, since "related" and "tied" are not self-evident," and this can lead to biases in the coding process (Staniland, 2015).

attitudes (Baker et al. 2006; Huckfeldt 1986; Huckfeldt et al. 2004; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987; Mondak et al. 1996). If an individuals' social and environmental context shapes political participation and voting behavior, then it could be inferred that an environment fraught with conflict will also influence political decision-making. Violent contexts are important mechanisms through which political decisions and attitudes are shaped. They are external to the individual and can directly affect a person by limiting how they can interact with politics and how they receive information to make decisions during elections. In more established democracies, the ethnic and socioeconomic composition of a neighborhood, the local distribution of policy preferences, and how political messages spread significantly affect the way people participate (Huckfeldt 1986; Huckfeldt & Sprague 1987). These contexts can influence how voters receive information about a candidate or a political party. They can either encourage mobilization through shared social networks or demobilize voters when a voter lives in a neighborhood or environment which does not share the same ethnic composition, religious views, or partisan perspectives. Additionally, individual-level characteristics influence the degree to which these environmental contextual factors impact a voter (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1993; Weatherford, 1982). In newer democracies, the effects of social and political contexts are even more pronounced than in developed ones (Baker, Ames, and Renno, 2006 see Garcia 2008).

Violent environments, much like any other structurally imposed contexts, are outside of an individual. In other words, conflict and violence often transcend the individual, so the average citizen cannot control the severity of the violence that exists in their immediate surroundings. Violence can be a barrier to relevant information. It can disrupt critical social networks and prevent important trade between communities. Violence increases a sense of insecurity while decreasing the quality of life for communities. Also, how citizens respond to violent contexts is undoubtedly shaped by who they are and who is committing the violence. I argue that such violent contexts have substantial consequences for political behavior. The following sections address three political effects: 1) voter turnout, 2) vote choice: and 3) democratic attitudes.

3.4.1 Voter turnout

Violent environments are expected to impact voter behavior negatively, and in particular, the likelihood, people will turn out to vote. At the most basic level, violence is disruptive to the entire electoral process. Violence between a government and armed actors can impose severe restrictions

on individuals' movement and displace people. In some cases, even if the violence takes place many months before an election, the severity of the violence can cause citizens to flee to other parts of the country, effectively removing themselves from the electorate. Violence also influences the efficacy of the voter registration process. Citizens that fled conflict may not be able to register in the district that they sought refuge. Furthermore, officials who attempt to register voters may be unable or unwilling to enter into areas they feel are dangerous. Those citizens that remain within violent contexts may experience harassment or intimidation and decide that political participation is too costly or not effective at making the change. As the frequency and level of violence increases, citizens may feel that the democratic process itself is unable to fix or change the outcome, reducing their desire to turnout to vote. In this case, nonparticipation or abstention can be used as a self-protection mechanism or a form of protest the democratic process altogether. I argue then:

Voter Turnout Hypothesis 1a: The greater the frequency and intensity of violence in a district, the lower the levels of voter turnout.

Voter Turnout Hypothesis 1b: The more frequent and intense violence in a district, the lower the probability an individual will turn out to vote.

In addition to the influence that violence and violent contexts have on individuals, it is crucial to examine the psychological influence of fear of violence on political behavior. A growing literature examines the role emotions have on citizens' attitudes towards the political system and their political behavior in general. Over the last two decades, research has focused on the many ways that emotions affect and influence political attitudes (Redlawsk 2006; Erisen & Erisen 2012), political preferences (Lodge, & Taber 2005), political decisions (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen 2000), and information processing (Lodge & Tabor 2005; Relawsk, Civettini, & Lau 2007; Cassino & Erisen 2010). In fact, in some instances, just the threat of violence alone has been found to influence elections (Ellman & Wantchekon, 2000). This growing body of literature indicates that emotional states and reactions can influence thoughts, cognitive processing, and social behavior in several ways (Sear, Huddy & Jervis 2003; Neuman et al. 2007; Lodge and Taber 2013). Moreover, in terms of violence and armed conflict, fear and anxiety are emotions that play a crucial

role in shaping political decisions.

Research on the political consequences of fear has shown that it can help mobilize voters. Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000) argue that fear can push people to become politically aware and to pay more attention to an election. Citizens who experience fear are more likely to seek information on the candidates and are inspired to improve their political knowledge. However, it is more likely that this will occur in information-rich societies, where access to newspapers, televisions, and the internet is more readily available. Citizens in countries with limited resources or access to information are at a disadvantage when experiencing fear, either from a negative campaign or political violence. In these environments, voters are more likely to lean on their communities and social networks for information. If their social networks are also experiencing the same level of fear without seeking out more information, voter mobilization may not occur. Trelles and Carreras (2012), in their study of violence and elections in Mexico, determined that insecurity stemming from a fear of violence changed the behavior of political actors during an election campaign and ultimately led to a decrease in voter turnout by the electorate. Fear in this context depressed voter turnout because citizens affected by this phenomenon were less willing to engage. Furthermore, exposure to political conflict can harm a person's psychological well-being, producing anti-social behavior, preventing citizens from political participation. Therefore, I expect that:

Voter Turnout Hypothesis 2: In low information contexts like Mozambique, the fear of violence will reduce the probability an individual will turn out to vote.

As mentioned before, in the contextual analysis literature, the structurally imposed environment you live in will influence your political behavior. However, the individual characteristics of citizens still matter and can shape how violence influences their decisions. Although evidence suggests partisan attachment in Africa is weak compared to other parts of the world, it becomes vital for citizens once developed. According to Michelitch (2017), sixty-three percent of all Africans reported feeling close to a political party. Furthermore, in countries with a liberation party, like FRELIMO in Mozambique, partisanship identity is salient. Harding and Mitchelitch (2017) found that countries with liberation parties were associated with higher partisanship rates. Partisan identification is one of the best predictors of participation.

Considering the strength of partisanship on political participation, I expect that partisan identification, and in particular, identification with the incumbent party, will increase the propensity to turn out to vote. Simultaneously, in the context of highly partisan political environments, violent conflict can force unaligned and independent voters to take sides to gain an advantage, seek protection, or simply express moral outrage over the violence (e.g., Wood 2008)[45]. According to Wallsworth (2015), unaligned voters are very reactive to violence, and that their experiences with violence are enough to deter them from voting. In Mozambique, where two parties have dominated the political landscape, independents and unaligned voters do not have a plethora of choices. For these voters, violence committed by both the opposition party and the government can lead voters to feel dismayed by the election process and may choose instead to simply not vote. Although partisanship is strong in a country like Mozambique, a significant minority of citizens do not feel close to any political party. Moreover, when the two main political parties are engaged in a conflict, and the two main political parties commit most political violence, the incentive to vote reduces. Therefore, I expect that:

Voter Turnout Hypothesis 3: Non-Unaligned citizens in violent contexts are less likely to have voted.

Also, fear of violence will play an essential role in shaping whether independents and unaligned voters decide to participate in elections. If the fear of violence is too high, these voters will simply stay at home and decide not to risk casting a vote. Therefore, I also expect that:

Voter Turnout Hypothesis 4: Unaligned and Independent citizens that fear violence will be less likely to have voted.

3.4.2 Vote choice

In the face of violence, some citizens will remain politically active and continue to vote and engage with the political system. How is violence expected to shape vote choice? The incumbent often uses violence before an election to deter opposition supporters and shore up their support (Bratton, 2013; Höglund and Piyarathne, 2009). However, violence is not always a viable tool for

45 Wood (2008) finds that in countries like Peru, El Salvador, Sri Lanka and Sierra Leone, violence transformed social networks and made the cleavage along which the violence was committed far more important to an individual's identity.

incumbents to use and can have a punishing effect on an incumbent party. Several mechanisms may facilitate this process. Violence can raise doubts regarding the incumbent's ability to govern appropriately (Ferejohn 1986). In some instances, violent terrorist attacks increased voter awareness about government policy and mobilized dissatisfied voters after an attack (Lago & Montero, 2006). Berrebi and Klor (2008) found that terrorist attacks caused ideological polarization and affected vote choice in Israel. In a study on Turkey, Kibris (2011) found that Turkish voters respond to terrorist attacks by holding the government accountable and shifting their vote choice. Another mechanism is that exposure to violence can produce feelings of fear, anxiety, and anger that can motivate voters to seek information about other parties or candidates. More importantly, it can generate interest and mobilize voters who may already be dissatisfied with the incumbent but are unwilling to vote. In general, for those who continue to participate in elections despite the violence, security-related issues should matter. I expect violence to reduce support for the incumbent, mainly when the incumbent has held power for a long time and is not widely supported. As violence disrupts daily lives and can hamper the government's ability to provide essential services or provide a sense of safety and security, voters will likely sanction the incumbent for its ineffective governance and its inability to keep citizens safe and secure. In this case, I expect that as violence levels rise, incumbent support will decrease. Therefore:

Vote choice hypothesis 1a: The more frequent and intense violence is in a district, the lower the incumbent's vote share.

Vote choice hypothesis 1b: The more frequent and intense violence is in a district, the lower the probability an individual will vote for the incumbent.

Violence may serve to sanction the incumbent and bolster support for an opposition candidate or party. If voters decide that they do not want to vote for the incumbent but still opt to participate in the election, they will likely vote for another party. In a country like Mozambique, with only two viable opposition parties, the choices are limited. Furthermore, vote switching is rare in such deeply polarized settings. If security-related concerns are the most crucial issue for an unaligned independent voter in this scenario, it is doubtful that they would switch their vote for another party engaged in violence. Therefore, it is likely that security-focused voters may decide to drop out of

the electorate all together or vote for a third party. However, this same opposition-led violence may push voters to the polls, particularly those who sympathize with an opposition party. For example, over consecutive elections, RENAMO supporters dropped out of the electorate due to their perception of the party's overall weakness and disorganization and its inability to stand up to FRELIMOs growing hegemony over the economics and the politics of the country. RENAMOs decision to return to armed conflict against the state may have benefited the party by mobilizing a traditional base of support it had lost, and in some instances, led some independent and unaligned voters to switch their vote from FRELIMO to them or another party, or drop out. Therefore, I expect ongoing armed conflict and pervasive political violence to reduce incumbent support and improve the oppositions' vote share.

Vote choice hypothesis 2a: The more frequent and intense the violence is in a district, the higher the vote share will be for the opposition.

Vote choice hypothesis 2b: The more frequent and intense the violence is in a district, the higher the probability an individual will vote for the opposition

Considering that violence is rarely committed by one actor, it is crucial to understand how violence perpetrated by different actors will influence vote choices. The electoral violence literature has found that the incumbent's use of violence can help win elections by improving its share of the vote (Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski 2016). In this case, violence is an intimidation tactic that depresses opposition support and leads to an incumbent victory. However, the government's violence, whether through physical intimidation, harassment, or conflict with an armed opposition group, can have a negative effect on voters unaligned with the incumbent government or the opposition party. This violence may divert these voters' attention away from economic issues and lead them to vote on security-related issues. If violent contexts, perpetrated by the government, affect a citizen's life, the expectation is that these voters will base their vote choices on security issues. Therefore:

Vote choice hypothesis 2a: The more frequent government violence is in a district, the lower the incumbent's vote share.

If the strategic incentive of opposition violence is to disrupt the incumbent's ability to govern and leads dissatisfied voters to vote against the incumbent, they may reward the opposition party at the polls. Furthermore, violence committed by a popular opposition party against an unpopular government may also help to mobilize its traditional base. I assume that violence committed by the opposition can have a mobilizing effect and improve their vote share. Therefore:

Vote Choice hypothesis 2b: The more frequent opposition violence is in a district, the higher the opposition party's vote share.

With the exception of work done by Burchard (2020), fear of violence as an explanatory mechanism has been missing from many studies on political behavior, especially within the African context. Rojo-Mendoza (2014) studied the effects of crime victimization in Mexico and found that individuals exposed to violence often self-report being overwhelmed by fear, anxiety, and feelings of vulnerability immediately following the violent event. If exposure to violence also has the effect of causing fear or raising feelings of insecurity, it is necessary to examine the role that fear plays in determining individual political behavior.

The insecurity, anxiety, and fear that can arise from exposure to a conflict can also have the unintended effect of leading to a higher likelihood of voting and civic engagement (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman, 2009). Gruszczynski et al. (2013) note that "negative emotions such as fear or threat, as well as more natural emotions such as anxiety, lead citizens to pay more attention to political information" (p.136). Furthermore, Valentino et al. (2008) found that fear, unlike anger, can boost information seeking and learning.

Fear is an emotional response that can trigger both attention and reflection. “Anxiety, or fear, among citizens, leads to an increase in attention, motivation to learn, and a reevaluation of their positions concerning that which caused the anxiety” (Marcus et al., 2000: 3f, 63, Marcus and Mackuen, 1993: 681). The importance of anxiety and experiencing threat in politics, on both behavior choices and opinions, is well-established, in particular, the role anxiety plays for information seeking political learning (see, for example, Huddy et al., 2005, 2007; Hunter et al., 2012: 4; Taber 2003: 461; Valentino et al., 2008, 2011; see also Erisen et al., 2014). However, there are still questions concerning the impact of a severe threat and the emotional response

(Marcus et al., 2000:95). “If the violence we experience and see in our community is political, the fear resulting from such violence may directly impact our attention to the origins of that violence: politics” (Soderstrom, 2017 p.870). I argue that fear of violence can drive support away from the incumbent as it can cause citizens to perceive the incumbent as failing to provide security. In this case, citizens living in fear will sanction the governing party for its inability to stem the violence or its use of the violence. Furthermore, as fear of violence is expected to lead to the incumbent's sanctioning, I expect opposition support to improve. This improvement is expected to occur because fear can provoke anger at the government, and individuals may be likely to focus on those in power because they either started the violence or failed to end it. Therefore:

Vote Choice Hypothesis 3a: Fear of violence and intimidation will decrease the probability of an individual voting for the incumbent

Vote choice Hypothesis 3b: Fear of violence and intimidation will increase the probability an individual will vote for the opposition.

Do individual traits, such as partisanship, mediate the relationship between violence and vote choice? The literature on political behavior in Africa has treated partisan affiliation as weak, purely pragmatic, or a proxy for other, more meaningful identities such as ethnicity. However, Carlson (2015) finds that partisanship in Africa has psychological salience and that partisan bias shapes how voters assess and feel about an incumbent's performance. Voters may support poor-performing politicians not necessarily because of voting buying or because they value other characteristics more than performance, but because they resist evidence that their chosen politicians are not performing as well as expected. Those aligned with the incumbent's party are expected to be impermeable to the effects of a context that contradicts their partisan allegiances because these individuals know they are part of a national majority (Garcia, 2009). Therefore, I argue that partisan identification assumes a significant role in the individual's life, and partisanship becomes a defining feature of the individual's identity. A person's perception of personal well-being will be more intimately related to the fortunes of their co-partisans. Because of this, individuals in communities that have suffered from political violence are more likely to have partisan exclusionary policy preferences and continue to support and identify with their party,

despite the violent context (Gurr 2000; Carlson 2015).

If the expectation that having a strong party identification makes an individual impervious to changes in society, then I suggest that violence will not affect incumbent supporters. On the other hand, the contextual literature has noted that political minorities and weak partisans or unaligned voters are more likely to be affected by their social environments than those individuals identified with the incumbent (Canache et al. 1994; Finifter and Finifter 1989; Huckfeldt et al. 2005b; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987). Unaligned and independent voters are likely to sanction the incumbent because of the violence. Since security issues are more likely to influence unaligned voters, violence committed by either the government or other armed actors is likely to have a negative effect on unaligned voters, in general. Those voters that decide to participate in an election are more likely to sanction the incumbent for perceived failures in securitizing the state. Although unaligned and independent voters are not expected to view opposition parties that use violence favorably, the incumbent will still be held responsible for the violence. Therefore:

Vote choice hypothesis 4: Unaligned voters and independents that either experience violence or fear violence and intimidation are less likely to vote for the incumbent than those who do not fear violence or did not experience violence.

3.4.3 Democratic Attitudes

How does exposure to political violence shape attitudes about democracy? Building on insights from political psychology, which argues that fear and anxiety can make people change previously held beliefs and behaviors (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000), I argue that attitudes about democratic institutions are compromised as violence increases. When citizens are exposed to violence committed by the state or other political parties, it influences their opinions about democracy being able to settle disputes, bring peace and stability, and ensure their everyday safety. Experiences with violence, particularly around elections, can exasperate these negative attitudes about democracy. Election violence has been found to reduce satisfaction with the political system because it failed to protect citizens from violence (Norris, 2014). Lower democratic satisfaction can also lead citizens to believe that their government and the actors involved in the elections (political parties) are less legitimate (Sisk, 2008), which leads to an erosion of trust in institutions (Norris, 2014). Within these contexts, citizens will become more cynical about the efficacy of

political institutions, democratic politics, and the electoral process itself. As citizens, particularly those without strong partisan attachments, drop out of the electorate and decide not to participate in elections, their evaluations and assessments of the democracy turn negative. Whether the country experiences periodic violence during elections, ongoing armed conflict, or pervasive political violence, citizens may shift their preferences from democracy to other forms of governance they feel may bring more peace and stability.

Just as exposure to political violence is expected to reduce political participation, it is also expected to reduce satisfaction with democracy. In addition, political violence will also reduce support for democracy as citizens deem it incapable of providing peace and stability. Therefore:

Democratic Attitudes hypothesis 1: Citizens exposed to political violence are less likely to be satisfied with democracy

Democratic Attitudes hypothesis 2: Citizens exposed to political violence are less likely to support democracy.

Although I expect that exposure to violence will negatively affect satisfaction with democracy, I argue that the effect of violence on support for democracy will not be homogenous across citizens. Citizens who closely identify with the incumbent party are expected to support the incumbent party no matter the levels of violence or fear of violence they experience. In other words, I expect that incumbent partisans, particularly in highly polarized societies, are willing to trade in democratic principles and norms for other less democratic forms of governance when faced with political violence. On the other hand, I expect that opposition supporters and unaligned and independent citizens are more likely to continue to support democracy and demand democracy, despite their encounters with violence. Therefore:

Democratic Attitudes hypothesis 3: Incumbent partisans exposed to political violence are less likely to support democracy

Democratic Attitudes hypothesis 4: Opposition supporters exposed to political violence are more likely to support democracy

Democracy Attitudes hypothesis 5: Unaligned and Independents exposed to political violence are more likely to support democracy.

3.5 Conclusion

Building from the literature on political violence, electoral violence, political psychology, and political behavior, in this chapter, I have developed a theory for understanding political behavior during ongoing armed conflict and political violence. Unlike other explanations that focus on either one type of violence, one perpetrator, or one outcome, I integrate various forms of violence, perpetrators, and outcomes to understand how violent contexts influence political behavior. Focusing on political violence, I have developed the implications of ongoing armed conflict for voter turnout, vote choice, and attitudes about democracy. I have suggested that exposure to violence impacts citizens' decision to participate in elections, whom they decide to vote for, and how they feel about democracy, in general.

I expect that when citizens live in violent contexts, their ability to vote or their incentive to vote will be compromised. For those who decide to participate in politics and elections, security will become a salient issue that drives vote choice decisions. Furthermore, violence will also contribute to increasing dissatisfied and cynical democrats who no longer believe that democracy upholds peace or is a solution to violence, but rather may be the cause of it. This dissatisfaction will have negative consequences for how citizens believe democracy is working. However, the effect of violence will not be homogenous across all voters. In highly polarized societies, I expect individuals with strong partisan ties to react differently to violence than those who are unaligned and independent. In the remainder of the thesis, I subject these propositions to empirical testing, using quantitative evidence from Mozambique's recent return to armed conflict and the increase in political violence.

Chapter 4: Political Participation Models –Voter Turnout during the 2014 Mozambican National Elections

4.1 Introduction

Although the literature examining the relationship between violence and political participation has garnered increasing attention over the last decade, most studies are derived from post-conflict or non-electoral periods and focus on criminal violence or terrorism. There remains less scholarship on the consequences of ongoing armed conflict during elections and almost nothing with regards to Africa.[46] Across much of the African continent, citizens are more likely to participate in violent rather than peaceful elections. According to Burchard (2016), fifty-five percent of African elections held between 1990 and 2014 experienced conflict ranging from voter intimidation to intense, prolonged conflict. As democracies across the continent have proliferated, so has electoral conflict. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) has tracked conflict events across the continent since 1997 and noted a dramatic increase in such events over the last decade. Conflict levels in Mozambique have also largely mirrored this trend as observed violent events increased before elections (Figure 4.1).

Figure 10.1 Violent and Non-Violent Conflict Events in the year before Elections in Mozambique



While scholars recognize the importance of contextual variables when analyzing electoral behavior (Baker, Ames, and Reno 2006), violence and conflict, as essential contextual variables, are mostly ignored or left out of the analysis. This research draws inspiration from previous studies on the consequences of violence and applies it to the Mozambican context.

46 For exceptions see Collier and Vicent (2008), Bratton (2008), Bekoe and Bourchard (2017), Burchard (2015).

The conflict that preceded the 2014 national elections in Mozambique presents an opportunity to understand the effect violence has on political participation. In the first section of this chapter, I briefly explain voter turnout trends in Mozambique leading up to the 2014 national elections. In the second section, my hypotheses developed in the theoretical framework chapter are tested using turnout data at the district level from the 2014 national elections in Mozambique – the period that corresponds to the reemergence of conflict throughout the country. At the district level, this chapter seeks to understand how politically motivated violent conflict influences political participation. The general question leading this section is what effect violent conflict had on voter turnout? Does violence, as the conventional wisdom suggests, depress voter turnout? Following my general theory presented in Chapter 3, I expect that violence will harm voter turnout and that districts that experienced the most violence will show decreases in political participation during the 2014 general election compared with the 2009 election.

In the third section, I turn to the individual level. I use Afrobarometer survey data to test the effect of political violence on self-reported participation during the 2014 national election. This analysis seeks to understand the mechanisms that may influence why someone chooses to participate in elections at the individual level. Who is the most affected by the violence? Does partisanship matter in violent contexts, in other words, does partisan identification have a differentiated effect for individuals living within violent contexts or who fear violence? I expect that partisanship attachments moderate the relationship between violence and voting. Furthermore, following the literature on terrorism's assertion that violence is expected to affect turnout due to rising fear and anxiety, I expect that violence will negatively influence participation in elections.

4.2 Voter Turnout in Mozambique

Regular and high levels of voter turnout is seen as a fundamental indicator of a healthy democracy. The conventional wisdom assumes that the greater the level of political participation in a country, the more vibrant and dynamic its democracy is. In 1994, the first democratic elections in Mozambique, voter turnout was at its highest, 87.89 percent of registered voters (or 66.38% Voting age population (VAP)), and the competition was closer between FRELIMO and the leading opposition group, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) than many anticipate it would be. However, after the 1994 elections, turnout in Mozambique steadily dropped. In 1999 voter turnout decreased to 66.1 percent of registered voters (or 58.2 percent VAP). In 2004 turnout

dropped further to just 36.3 percent of registered voters (or 35.6 percent VAP), amongst the lowest rate across the African continent at the time. According to Lijphart (1997), low voter turnout indicates that participation is "unequal." Low voter turnout rates in democracies may indicate that people are uninterested in the country's politics or do not support democratic institutions. In Mozambique, the main opposition party's (RENAMO) inability to transform itself from a rebel group into a viable political party and the ruling party's (FRELIMO) tightening grip over social, political, and economic aspects of the country attributed to the dramatic decrease in voter turnout between 1994 and 2004. RENAMO lost close to 18 percent of the voting-age population between 1999 and 2004. However, RENAMO was not alone in losing voters from the electorate. The ruling party FRELIMO also saw a decline in its share of the voting-age population vote. In 1994, close to 33 percent of the VAP voted for FRELIMO; however, by 2004, that dropped to a mere 20 percent of the VAP. The dramatic decrease in political participation, coupled with RENAMO's accusations of electoral irregularities, led scholars to suggest that the country was a backsliding democracy (Manning, 2010).

Voter turnout steadily increased over the next two elections. In 2009, voter turnout moved back up to 44.4 percent of the vote (or 42.5 percent VAP). However, the election was fraught with electoral irregularities and "tainted by misconduct, unfairness, and secrecy that brought sharp criticism from both domestic and international observers…" (Hanlon, 2010 p. 92). The 2009 election only furthered the notion that democracy in Mozambique was eroding and that Frelimo's grip on the state was tightening. Frelimo won the 2009 elections in a landslide victory with 75 percent of the vote. Although voter turnout increased slightly, only 6 percent of the voting-age population voted for RENAMO. At this point, Mozambican perceptions that elections were free and fair started to decline. In an Afrobarometer survey conducted in 2005, more than half of respondents believed that elections were free and fair (57 percent). A subsequent survey was conducted in 2011 and found that 41 percent of respondents believed that elections in Mozambique were free and fair.

Figure 10.2 Registered Voter Turnout and Voting Age Population (VAP) Turnout 1994-2014



Voter turnout increased again from 44.4 percent (or 42.5 percent VAP) in 2009 to 48.4 percent (or 44.9 percent VAP) in 2014. This increase is surprising as it occurred alongside renewed violent conflict between the government and RENAMO. While the overall increase in voter turnout was modest, our question is whether the conflict that started in 2013 influenced the change in voter turnout at the district level between the 2009 and 2014 elections? In 2014, districts that experienced conflict in the run-up to the election had levels of voter turnout (REG or VAP), that were on average, three percentage points higher than those that did not. This increase is surprising, considering that conflict and violence during elections often reduce political participation (Bratton, 2008; Collier and Vicente, 2010). If voter turnout was affected during this period, which voters were most affected by the protracted violence?

4.3 The effect of Violence on Voter Turnout – District Level Analysis

In the first part of this chapter, I use voter turnout data from the 2009 and 2014 national elections in Mozambique. The unit of analysis to test the hypotheses is the district. In 2013, the Mozambican Assembly of the Republic passed a law adding 13 new districts in four northern and central provinces. The total of districts equals 151; however, only 142 districts will be used for this study because there is district level date for both the 2009 and 2014 elections. Socio-economic and

violence data only includes information on 141 districts and the city of Maputo[47], which I include in the analysis.

The dataset for this analysis includes information, for each district, on voter turnout, the frequency of non-violent conflict events, the frequency and intensity of violent events, and the identity of the perpetrators of the violence, as well as a series of control variables that capture the political and socioeconomic characteristics of each district. I built the dataset using various sources. The electoral and political variables were made using reports published by the *Commisão Nacional de Eleições* (National Electoral Commission, CNE). Variables capturing the number of conflict events, the perpetrator of the conflict events, and the level of conflict intensity were constructed using data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED, Raleigh, et al., 2010), which collects disaggregated information on conflict across Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. Data for the socioeconomic variables were obtained from the *Instituto Nacional de Estatística* (National Institute of Statistics, INE).

4.3.1 Dependent Variable

To understand the relationship between violence and voter turnout, I use a variable that measures the change in voter turnout between the 2009 general election and the 2014 general election. The variable *Change in Voter Turnout* is measured as the difference in the percentage of registered voters (RV) in each district that cast a ballot in the 2014 national elections and 2009 national elections. The map on the right side of figure 4.3 shows changes in voter turnout between 2009 and 2014 at the district level. The map shows that there was wide variation in change across the districts of Mozambique. The darker areas signify an increase in registered voter turnout from the previous election, while the very light grey to white areas signify a district that decreased its turnout in 2014. The left map in figure 4.3 shows registered voter turnout levels across Mozambique during the 2014 election. The darker areas indicate where turnout was the highest and the lighter areas show a lower turnout percentage.

47 The City of Maputo is an aggregate measure of 8 urban districts: KaMavota, KaMaxakeni, KaMpFumu, KaMubukwana, KaNhlamankulu, KaNyaca, KaTembe. The aggregation of the districts was the result of data only being available at the city level.

Figure 10.3 Voter Turnout Maps: 2014 Registered Turnout and Change in Turnout (2009 to 2014)



There are two measures of turnout that are widely used in voting studies: election turnout expressed as a percentage of the total voting age population (VAP), and turnout expressed as a percentage of the number of registered voters (RV). VAP estimates the potential number of voters 18 years and older. For my analysis, I chose to use RV turnout because it was more readily available and reliable than the VAP data for Mozambique. The National Election Commission (CNE) in Mozambique publishes post-election data for every district in Mozambique which includes the number of registered voters and the number of registered voters who vote. Although it would have been preferable to use VAP turnout data, reliable information was not available in Mozambique. The population data at the district level for the year's corresponding to the election were difficult to obtain. Census data from 2007 was the closest population data corresponding to

the 2009 election. However, the data does not disaggregate population age appropriate for this study. The census data groups 15–19-year-olds into the same category making it difficult to determine the voting age population, which in Mozambique is 18 years and older. The 2017 census data was the closest population data corresponding to the 2014 election. The census data from this year also grouped 15–19-year-olds. Furthermore, if I was able to obtain the actual VAP for each district from the 2007 and 2017 census data, I would be underestimating the population for the 2009 election and overestimating for the 2014. In 2007 the population of Mozambique was 21 million. In 2009, that population increased almost 10 percent to 23 million people. In 2014, the population of Mozambique was 26 million and in 2017 the population was 29 million[48].

Thus, the question is whether RV turnout provides an acceptable proxy measure of VAP turnout in Mozambique. We can address at the provincial level since it is possible to collect provincial level estimates of both voting age population and registered population. Table 1 shows the discrepancies between RV and VAP turnout during the 2009 and 2014 presidential elections. In both cases, RV rates tended to be higher than VAP rates. The mean difference between VAP turnout and RV turnout was 6.7 percent in 2009. The most significant disparities were in Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo. During the 2014 election, the mean difference between VAP turnout and RV turnout was 6.2 percent. Like in 2009, the southern provinces of Gaza, Inhambane, and Maputo had the most significant disparities (see Table 4.1). In most studies on the difference between the two measurements, VAP turnout tens to produce lower estimates of turnout than RV (see: Stockemer, 2017). Although there is overreporting, the differences between VAP and RV are relatively stable across provinces within each election year.

48 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=MZ

Table 10.1 Difference between Registered and Voting Age Population Turnout Percent – Presidential Election 2009 and 2014

Province	*VAP 2009*	*Registered VP 2009*	*Province*	*VAP 2014*	*Registered VP 2014*
Maputo City	50.3	53.1	Maputo City	62.7	60.5
Sofala	44	47.2	Sofala	46.5	49.6
Niassa	34.8	38.4	Nampula	36.6	40.2
Nampula	33.3	38.5	Niassa	41.9	45.6
Manica	39.4	45.2	Manica	47.8	53.5
Zambezia	32	38.4	Zambezia	32.2	38.8
Tete	46.5	55.14	Tete	48.1	54.8
Cabo Delgado	36.2	45.3	Cabo Delgado	40.9	49.3
Maputo	38.1	47.9	Maputo	46.6	55.7
Inhambane	37	46.9	Inhambane	43.9	55
Gaza	52.1	62.2	Gaza	53.4	65.7

Another challenge in my operationalization of turnout was choosing between legislative turnout and presidential turnout. In Mozambique, the legislative and presidential elections are concurrent; however, turnout data at the district level for 2014 was only available for the legislative elections. District turnout data for the Presidential election was either missing or incomplete. Therefore, I opted to use legislative turnout rates for each district. I also examined the difference between the legislative and presidential elections and found that the turnout rates were almost identical across every province in both the 2009 and 2014 national elections. Registered voter turnout for the 2014 presidential election was 45 percent compared to 44.9% for the legislative election. For the 2009 election, the difference was 42.5 percent and 42.6 percent. Results from a two-sample independent t-test (Table 4.2) indicate that the mean average differences of executive and legislative turnout at the provincial level in the 2009 and 2014 general elections are non-significant. In other words, using legislative election data is a good proxy for also understanding presidential voting.

Table 10.2 Executive and Legislative Registered Voter Turnout 2009 and 2014

Province	***Legislative***	***Executive***	***Legislative***	***Executive***
Maputo City	53.1	53.1	60.2	60.4
Maputo P.	47.9	47.9	61.9	62.1
Gaza	62.2	62.6	73.9	73.7
Inhambane	46.9	46.8	59.0	59.2
Sofala	47.2	47.0	49.9	48.4
Manica	45.2	45.1	56.9	57.1
Tete	55.1	57.1	60.5	57.5
Zambezia	34.1	33.8	40.0	39.3
Nampula	38.5	38.2	38.8	39.6
Cabo Delgado	45.3	44.7	52.9	53.3
Niassa	38.4	38.5	48.8	49.5
t-tests	t = -.392 p = .704		t = .726 p = .484	

4.3.2 Independent Variable

In order to account for (dec)increases in voter turnout, I used variables that measure *Non-Violent Conflict (log), Violent Conflict (log), Conflict Intensity, RENAMO Violence (log)* and *Government Violence (log)*. All conflict variables were captured using data from ACLED v.7 and included events that occurred between January 1, 2012, and October 15, 2014. *Violent Conflict* captured any event that was considered a riot or protest with a violent outcome: any event that utilized weaponry, caused the destruction of property, or caused the displacement of population, violence against civilians, and armed battles. The *Non-Violent Conflict* variable measured the number of protests/demonstrations, any non-violent transfer of territory; the establishment of any headquarters or bases; and demands or claims connected with a threat but with the absence of actual violence. *RENAMO Violence* captures all violent event events that were considered to be perpetrated initially by RENAMO. This variable is essentially a disaggregated version of the *Violent Conflict* variable and identifies who initially perpetrated an attack, skirmish, and riot. The *Government Violence* variable captures any violent conflict event perpetrated by the government of Mozambique and is also derived from the *Violent Conflict* variable. This includes violence committed by the police, the armed forces of Mozambique, and individuals engaged in riots or violent demonstrations under the banner of the ruling party, FRELIMO.

In Figure 4.4, three maps show the distribution of violent conflict (logged), Government violence (log), and RENAMO violence (log) in Mozambique. Although violent conflict occurred throughout most of the country, a more significant concentration of the violence took place in the central part of the country. Violence committed by RENAMO was primarily concentrated in the central part of the country, with some noticeable activity in the southern provinces. Government violence occurred across provincial capitals, in the central provinces, and the city of Maputo.

Figure 10.4 Violence Distribution Maps - Violent Conflict, Government Violence, RENAMO Violence



The *Conflict Intensity* variable measures the reality of events in a district more accurately than using only event data. If I were to use only event counts as my unit of measurement, the analysis would not correctly distinguish between a battle between armed actors and a political assassination or a riot. This measurement is conceptually problematic when trying to understand the influence of violence and can affect causal inferences. The effect of a massacre is undoubtedly more significant than a protest that led to a death. Thus, to overcome this issue, I created a variable that distinguishes the degree of violence intensity within a district. *Conflict Intensity* is measured on a scale of 0 to 4, where 0 is peace, and 4 is severe violent conflict. The coding method for the conflict intensity variable is inspired by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), which has a rubric for classifying conflict intensity across the world (HIIK, 2003).

To operationalize this variable, I re-categorized each instance of violence counted by ACLED based on the definition from HIIK (Table 4.3). using ACLED notes on the extent of the violence, the targets, the deaths, and other contextual background. This *variable* helps distinguish between peaceful districts, districts that experienced only non-violent conflict, and districts that experienced moderate to severe levels of violent conflict. Table 4.3 shows how each district was coded. The inclusion of non-violent conflict events is necessary to understand the peculiarities of violent conflicts and the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation (Kalyvas, 2006). Following the HIIK scale of intensities classification, with few modifications, there are five intensity levels of conflict.

Table 10.3 Conflict Intensity Operationalization

State of Violence	Intensity Group	Level of Intensity	Name of Intensity	Definition from HIIK	Key Indicators from ACLED
Peace	**None**	**0**	**Peace**	There is no presence of conflict, violent or non-violent, in the district	No presence of conflict, violent or non-violent, in the district
Non-Violent Conflict	**Low**	**1**	**Latent Conflict**	Positional difference; clashing interests; demands/claims on national values rejected by the opposing side	Headquarters of base established, political posturing, protests/demonstrations
		2	**Manifest Conflict**	Demands/claims connect with a threat	Strategic development; non-violent transfer of territory riots
Violent Conflict	**Medium**	**3**	**Crisis**	Uprisings, rebellions, revolts, riots, single or occasional acts of violence.	Riots/protests (multiple): Violence against civilians (1); Battles (1)
	High	**4**	**Severe Crisis**	Regular violence clashes between parties with significant interruptions, guerilla warfare, numerous and continuous attacks against civilians	Multiple occurrences of violence against the civilian population, battles, internally displaced peoples, use of weaponry, destruction of property.

Level zero indicates that there is no presence of conflict, non-violent or violent conflict events. Level one represents non-violent escalations in conflict (e.g., positional differences, clashing interests; demands/claims on national values rejected by the opposing side). Level two is an escalation of violent threats between groups, typically manifest in large-scale protests, threats of violence against the state or civilians, and political posturing. Level three captures single or occasional acts of violence, e.g., riots, coups d'états, and violence against the civilian population. Level four represents regular violent clashes between conflict, but with significant interruptions,

skirmishes, guerilla warfare, numerous and continuous attacks against the civilian population.[49] During the analysis period, 28 percent of districts experienced Violent Conflict; 13 percent of districts experienced non-violent conflict; and in 59 percent of districts, there was no presence of conflict, violent or non-violent.

Lastly, I included a variable that captures both violent events within a district and the contiguous or bordering districts using a geospatial analysis tool (see Anselin 2005). The rationale for capturing violence in neighbouring districts is based on the idea that a place does not stand alone as "an island, entirely of itself" but rather as "a part of the main." According to Sampson, Morenoff, and colleagues (2001), social phenomena may be susceptible to processes of diffusion or spillover effects. In other words, someone can live in a district that has experienced little violence but may be surrounded by districts that experience quite a lot. How will being surrounded by violent neighborhoods influence your behavior? Recent empirical research examining violence and voting behavior in Latin America supports this notion (Trelles and Carreras, 2012; Garcia, 2009; 2016).

In Mozambique, it is quite common for working-age adults to live in one district and work in another or have family and friends. This proximity creates strong ties between different communities in different districts. Life in one place is not isolated from another. Therefore, it can also be assumed that although someone may live in a peaceful district, the violence in the neighboring district may have an indirect or direct effect on their work and way of life.

This variable was created using GeoDa 1.12.1.59. To calculate the total level of violence in bordering districts, I used a contiguity weight containing information on the neighborhood structure of each district (Anselin 2003: 2). This structure was defined using a contiguity criterion called a "Queen," which considers information from the districts sharing a border with a particular location and the districts placed in the vertices of that particular location. This helped me to calculate the total number of violent events in all bordering districts which I added to the total number of violent events within a district to create a variable I call *Wider Violent Conflict.* This variable, then, captures how violence influences behavior within a district and understand how

49 The original HIIK scale of intensity does not include a level of peace, which I have, and does add a level categorized as war. For my operationalization of conflict, I exclude war as the last level because it does not concern my analysis of Mozambique. War, according to the HIIK, is the systematic use of violent force within a period and is the use of all available measures and establishment of war economies. This has not occurred in Mozambique and will, therefore, was removed from my operationalization.

violence in other neighboring communities may indirectly affect a voter's attitudes or participation.

Regarding the controls, I included several variables that are often found to affect whether or not citizens decide to vote. These include, for each district, the level of urbanization[50] (measured as the population density per kilometer), poverty (measured as the percentage of houses in districts that do not have access to running water or electricity)[51]; and the illiteracy rate[52]. The voter turnout model also includes a variable that measures the "youth bulge" (measured as the percentage of the population less than 15 years of age). Following studies on political participation in Africa, I expect that the "youth bulge" and levels of urbanization will harm voter turnout levels (see Bratton 1999; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011). Recent research on African political participation has found that modernization theories do not explain turnout on the continent. Political parties target poorer voters with vote-buying tactics (Bratton, 2008) because they believe the material incentives are likely to bolster the participation of the most marginalized voters (Bleck and Van De Welle, 2019). Therefore, I expect to find increased levels of voter turnout in those districts where rates of poverty are highest.

The closeness of an election is an important variable. Blais (2000) found that more competitive elections at the district level can increase turnout because elites are more likely to mobilize voters. Young[53] (2004) notes that this mechanism stands "in contrast to the idea that citizens turnout in close elections because they see their vote as more decisive, though it still leaves electoral competitiveness with the same directional effect on turnout (p. 6)." Franklin and Evans (2000) find that closer contests at the district level can increase voter turnout even if the overall result may not be that close. The *closeness of the race* variable was captured by using two-party vote margin in 2009. In this case, the lower the margins, the closer the race. However, to make it more intuitive, I inversed the score by subtracting the margin percent from 100—this way, the higher the score, the more competitive the election. A score of 0 indicates that the district is not competitive, and a score of 100 means that it is highly competitive

50 In order to construct the urbanization variable, I used population density as a proxy. Data on Urbanization in Mozambique is not readily available at the district level, however, there is district on population density. The assumption made is that the denser the population is in a district, the more urbanized it is.
51 The poverty variable is an index of two variables: percentage of houses that are made from vegetation and the percentage of houses that do not have access to a water source near their home. The two variables are correlate $r = .794$, $p < .0005$
52 Illiteracy rates were for each district taken from the Mozambique Census, 2007: Instituto Nacional de Estatistica
53 Daniel J. Young "A Close-Up of Voter Turnout: Survey Data from Africa" 2004

4.3.3 Analytical Strategy

To test my hypotheses using the data described in the last section, I estimate an OLS regression analysis with robust standard errors[54]:

$$Change\ in\ Turnout_i = \beta_0\ Violence_i + Socioeconomic_i + Demographic_i + Closeness\ of\ Race + \varepsilon.$$

where i = (1,…,N) refers to the i-th district. $Violence_i$ is a vector of variables that measure the presence of violence in a district, the level of intensity, and the perpetrator of the violence. $Socioeconomic_i$ is a vector of socioeconomic variables, while $Structural_i$ is a vector of structural variables. $Closeness\ of\ Race_i$ measures the district-level competition between the top two parties during the 2009 general election.

Table 4.4 reports the results for six different specifications of the basic voter turnout model during the 2014 national election in 142 districts across Mozambique. Model 1 tests the effect of violent conflict in districts to determine whether an increase in violence is associated with a reduction or increase in voter turnout. The results indicate that violence had a non-significant effect on voter turnout during the 2014 election. This finding is similar to findings by Bekoe and Burchard (2017) who found that pre-election violence across Africa did not have a statistically significant effect on electoral participation.

Models 2 thru 6 also test the effect of different types of violence on voter turnout. Across all models, the coefficient remains negative (except for non-violent conflict in model 2). However, the effect is not statistically significant. This result supports other scholarly work on violence and voter turnout, which found that it does not meaningfully increase or decrease turnout Overall, the models do not support my notion that violence had a depressing effect on change in voter turnout between the 2009 and 2014 elections. These results indicate that violence was not a helpful method to mobilize voters or dissuade them from turning out in the aggregate.

In all six models, the *closeness of Race in 2009, illiteracy rates, youth bulge,* and *poverty* were statistically significant. As expected, illiteracy rates were negatively related to voter turnout at the 0.01 significance level. The illiteracy rate is used as a proxy for education levels. In districts with higher levels of illiteracy, the change in turnout decreased. The variable measuring competition between FRELIMO and RENAMO during the 2009 election (*Closeness of the Race)*

54 All models were estimated using SPSS v.27.

was also significant. However, the coefficient value was small. Lastly, and as expected, poverty and youth bulge were both negatively associated with turnout. Districts with higher poverty levels and larger youth populations had smaller changes in turnout between the 2009 and 2014 elections.

Additionally, I ran the same OLS regression models separately for each region to test whether different regions reacted to violence differently. In Mozambique, the regions are split between the North, Central, and the South. The results are similar to the country-level Mozambique models and indicate that violence did not influence voter turnout across all regions.

Table 10.4 OLS Regression Change in Voter Turnout 2009-2014

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*
Violent Conflict (Log)	-1.339					
	(1.632)					
Non-Violent Conflict (Log)		1.013				
		(2.233)				
Wider Violent Conflict (Log)			-.739			
			(1.116)			
Conflict Intensity				-.502		
				(.352)		
RENAMO Violence (Log)					-.434	
					(2.067)	
Gov. Violence (Log)						-1.940
						(1.870)
Closeness of Race in 2009	.062**	.057*	.065**	.063**	.060*	.062**
	(.031)	(.032)	(.031)	(.030)	(.031)	(.031)
Illiteracy Rate	-.220***	-.209***	-.226***	-.226***	-.215***	-.219***
	(.060)	(.062)	(.031)	(.060)	(.060)	(.060)
Youth Bulge	-.425**	-.430**	-.421**	-.409**	-.424**	-.442**
	(.185)	(.185)	(.187)	(.186)	(.185)	(.186)
Poverty	-2.579*	-2.549*	-2.612*	-2.547*	-2.542*	-2.559*
	(1.395)	(1.398)	(1.391)	(1.403)	(1.403)	(1.394)
Urbanization	-.521	-.584	-.682	-.491	-.543	-.490
	(.599)	(.598)	(.622)	(.590)	(.602)	(.597)
Constant	38.715***	38.276***	39.397***	38.926***	38.339***	39.318***
	(10.653)	(10.689)	(10.694)	(10.594)	(10.611)	(10.705)
N = Districts	142	142	142	142	142	142
R^2	.146	.144	.144	.153	.142	.146
Adj. R^2	.108	.106	.106	.115	.105	.108

Robust Standard Errors in Brackets (HCO)
*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

4.4 Fear, Violence and Voting – Individual Level Analysis

While there are no systematic effects of violence visible at the district level, it is possible that violence has important, though complex effects at the individual level since different people may perceive conflict differently. To analyze the impact of violence on the individual decision to vote during the 2014 Mozambican national elections, I relied on Afrobarometer Round 6 survey data. Afrobarometer Mozambique Round 6 is a nationally representative survey sample of 2,400 adults from all 11 provinces covering all of the country's geographical regions. The survey provides a unique look at political sentiment across Mozambique. It includes a variety of questions related to elections, political participation, and election violence. The survey was conducted between July and August of 2015, less than one year after the 2014 national elections.

4.4.1 Dependent Variable

To measure political participation at the individual level, I derive a variable from survey data which asks whether someone voted in the previous national election. What is coded as 1 is straightforward, however, deciding what constitutes 0 is more difficult because the survey gives respondents four choices for why they abstained: "*I decided not to vote*," or "*I was not able to vote"* along with "*Cannot remember*" and "*Election not held in my area*." Given the ambiguity of these two options, I created two measures of turnout that both measure voting and abstention. The more limited measure takes only those who said *they chose not to vote as* a 0, while the inclusive measure takes all *non-affirmative responses* as 0.[55]

Table 4.5 shows the self-reported turnout in each province, expressed in both forms, as well as officially reported turnout. There is a discrepancy between the survey percentages and official RV turnout percentages, with the survey percentages tending towards much higher turnout. It is well known that survey data has a tendency to inflate voting participation rates (see: Bratton, 1999, Norris, 2002). Voter turnout studies from the United States have found that this discrepancy is often the result of social-desirability bias, whereby many respondents will report that they voted even though they did not because they may want to be perceived as good citizens[56]. Across Africa,

55 All models were tested using non-affirmative responses, or the inclusive variable. The limited measure results were almost identical across all models.

56 See: Holbrook, A. L., & Krosnick, J. A. (2010). Social desirability bias in voter turnout reports: Tests using the item count technique. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *74*(1), 37-67.
Karp, J. A., & Brockington, D. (2005). Social desirability and response validity: A comparative analysis of overreporting voter turnout in five countries. *The Journal of Politics*, *67*(3), 825-840.

Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) attribute inflated turnout rates in surveys to the strong desire of Africans "to associate themselves with the act of voting (2005, 146). As a result, turnout estimates derived from public opinion surveys are often much higher than official records. Despite the overreporting of Afrobarometer turnout data, the use of this variable has been found to produce reliable results. Although social desirability may inflate levels of reported engagement, it does not necessarily jeopardize reliability. Using Afrobarometer survey data, Kuenzi and Lambright (2010) found that overreporting of voter turnout (greater than 10 percent of official turnout) did not bias the results of their study on voter behavior when comparing to the results of countries with no over-reporting (within ten percentage points of official turnout). Furthermore, Afrobarometer reports of having voted in previous elections are typically highly correlated with voting-age population turnout date (see: Krönke, Lockwood, and Mattes, 2000, appendix A.1).

Table 10.5 Differences in Official vs. Self-Reported Voter Turnout

Province	Voter Turnout (Legislative VAP)	Survey Turnout (Limited Measure)	Survey Turnout (Inclusive Measure)
Zambezia	40	74	72
Nampula	39	85	83
Niassa	49	64	64
Cabo Delgado	53	89	87
Sofala	50	75	70
Manica	57	56	54
Inhambane	59	84	83
Tete	61	80	73
Maputo Province	62	82	77
Maputo City	61	81	76
Gaza	74	85	85

4.4.2 Independent Variables

Since this analysis focuses on the effect of violent contexts, I include six district-level violence variables: *Violent Conflict, Non-Violent Conflict, Wide-Violent Conflict, Conflict Intensity, RENAMO Violence, and Government Violence.* The operationalization of these six variables can be found in the district-level analysis.

This section also includes an individual measure of violence fundamentally different from using event data derived from ACLED. It is a survey response to the question, *"During election campaigns in this country, how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political*

intimidation or violence?" Respondents could choose one of four categories; "A lot," "Somewhat," "A little bit," or "Not at all." This variable is then turned into an ordered categorical variable on a zero to three scale, with three corresponding to fearing violence, "A lot." According to Wallsworth (2015), "the main advantage using a survey response is that the survey provides measures of each person's perceived level of the threat, individual-level demographic characteristics, as well as each respondent's political affiliation and behavior (p. 14)." Not all violence can be captured in event data. The use of a survey question can help to capture sentiment and personal experiences with violence, something that event data is not capable of eliciting.

More than half of all respondents in Mozambique reported at least a little bit of fear. Table 4.6 reports how often Mozambican's fear violence. Across Mozambique, 10 percent of respondents stated they fear violence "a lot," while 15 percent reported "somewhat," and 31.6 percent reporting only "a little bit."

Table 10.6 Fear of Violence in Mozambique – "During election campaigns in this country, how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence?"

Fear of Violence	Percentage of Respondents
No Fear	**36** percent (N = 872)
A little bit	**32** percent (N = 759)
Somewhat	**15** percent (N= 368)
A lot	**10** Percent (N = 247)
Don't Know	**6**Percent (N = 154)
Refused to Answer	**0** percent of respondents

N= 2400

However, there are certain limitations to using *Fear of Violence* as a measure for understanding an individual's experience with violence. First, did the individuals who reported fearing violence live in an area where a reported violent event occurred? Around 55 percent of individuals who lived in a district experiencing one or more violent events reported having at least a little bit of fear of violence. However, sixty-three percent of individuals living in districts that did not experience any violence reported having at least a little bit of fear.

The disparity between personal experiences with violence, or fear of violence, and being located where a violent event occurred can be explained by a lack of reliable and up-to-date data on violence at the district level and the timing of the violence. For example, not all violence that was experienced by survey respondents occurred before the election. Many/Some violent

skirmishes and political violence occurred after the election, but before the survey. It is possible that individuals are responding to violence that is not accounted for in the ACLED data. It could also be that conflict datasets do not always capture political violence or election-related violence experiences. This underreporting is particularly true for countries that do not have a robust reporting capacity.

Furthermore, political violence and electoral violence do not always manifest in physical form. Harassment and intimidation can be just as effective methods to influence a person's behavior. Threats and intimidation can be made publicly and privately, and this may not be captured. Furthermore, the mere act of hearing about an act of violence or conflict may cause as much fear as actual experience. Moreover, repeated and frequent encounters with violence may normalize the violence itself. For these reasons, the inclusion of the fear of violence variable can help to fill in gaps about exposure to violence that the event data cannot.

There is also regional variation in fear of violence. More than half of all respondents in the Central and Northern provinces in Mozambique reported at least "a little bit" of fear. Niassa (79.9 percent of respondents) and Cabo Delgado (72.2 percent of respondents) were the provinces with the most fearful residents, both located in the North. Yet these two provinces also experienced the *least* amount of reported violent conflict. However, more than 60 percent of respondents living in the provinces that accounted for the most violent conflict, Tete and Zambezia (both in the central provinces), also reported at least "A little bit" of fear. In the Southern districts, which experienced above-average violence, respondents were the least likely to report fearing violence. Table 4.7 reports how respondents in the different regions of Mozambique responded to the question of fear of violence or intimidation during elections. The southern provinces (Gaza, Inhambane, Maputo, and Maputo City) were the least fearful.

Table 10.7 Fear of Violence in Mozambique by Region

Fear of Violence	South	Central	North
No Fear	64 percent	39 percent	28 percent
A little bit	22 percent	36 percent	38 percent
Somewhat	9 percent	15 percent	21 percent
A lot	5 percent	10 percent	13 percent

N= 2400

The contrast between experienced violence and fear in some regions of Mozambique can be explained by individual attributes that may influence how Mozambicans respond to violence or how they react when they fear violence. One crucial individual characteristic is whether Mozambicans feel close to or identifies with any political party. The partisan identification variable is derived from an Afrobarometer question, which asked the respondent if they thought of themselves as being close to a political party. The choice was binary, coded 1 if yes and 0 if they either refused to answer, did not know, or did not feel close to a political party. Most Mozambicans consider themselves close to a political party. Around 60 percent of all respondents from the Round 6 Afrobarometer survey reported being close to a political party, compared to just 21.4 percent who reported not feeling close to any political party. 13.3 percent of respondents refused to answer, and 6.2 percent said they did not know. Are partisans less susceptible to fearing violence than those that are unaligned with a political party?

Table 10.8 Fear of Violence by Partisan Identification

Fear of Violence	Partisan Identifiers	Unaligned or Independents
No Fear	45. percent (n=551)	39 percent (n= 448)
A little bit	29.9 percent (n=497)	35.2 percent (n=295)
Somewhat	14.5 percent (n=231)	16.4 percent (n=143)
A lot	10.3 percent (n=133)	9.4 percent (n=102)
Total	100 percent (n=1412)	100 percent (n=988)

Yet there may also be important interactions between exposure to violence, partisanship, and fear. According to table 4.8, respondents who reported being unaligned with a political party were around 6 percent more fearful of violence than their partisan counterparts. In peaceful districts, around 40 percent of individuals that reported feeling close to a political party also stated they feared violence compared to almost 60 percent of individuals who reported not feeling close to any political party. In districts with one violent event, only 39 percent of individuals who identified with or reported being attached to a political party reported at least a little bit of fear. In contrast, 61 percent of respondents without any party attachment stated at least a little bit of fear.

Nonaligned Mozambicans exhibited much more negative reactions to violence in their districts than those with close party ties. Those attached to a party also seem to experience less fear than independents and unaligned citizens. In subsequent analysis, I construct and include an interaction term that assesses the impact of being a fearful partisan.

Table 4.9 reports a cross-tabulation between *Fear of Violence* and *Free and Fairness of Elections.* What immediately stands out is the difference between those respondents that had a lot of fear and believed the election was completely free and fair and those that reported not being afraid at all and believing the election was completely free. Only 9 percent of respondents that reported *A lot* of fear also reported that the 2014 elections were completely free and fair, compared to 19 percent who believed the elections were not free and fair. In contrast, only 6 percent of respondents who had no fear believed the election was not free and fair and 34 percent believe the election was completely free and fair. In general, Mozambicans who reported having somewhat or a lot of fear, were more likely to also report that the 2014 election was either not free and fair or free and fair with major problems.

Table 10.9 Fear of Violence and Free and Fairness of 2014 National Election

Fear of Violence	*A lot*	*Somewhat*	*A little bit*	*Not at all*
Not Free and Fair	19 percent (n=47)	12 percent (n=44)	12 percent (n=90)	6 percent (n=50)
Free and Fair with Major Problems	27 percent (n=68)	32 percent (n=118)	31 percent (n=233)	18 percent (n=154)
Free and Fair with Minor Problems	33 percent (n=81)	30 percent (n=110)	34 percent (n=256)	31 percent (n=266)
Completely Free and Fair	9 percent (n=22)	13 percent (n=46)	16 percent (n=123)	34 percent (n=300)
Don't Know/Do not understand the question	12 percent (n=30)	14 percent (n=50)	7 percent (n=55)	11 percent (n=96)
Total	100 percent (n=248)	100 percent (n=368)	100 percent (n=757)	100 percent (n=872)

Following voter turnout literature in Africa, I include a set of control variables that influence African political participation; socio-demographics, attitudes, and political activity. Socio-demographic factors are studied to answer how personal attributes such as gender, age, education, and wealth affect turnout. Four demographic variables frequently appear in the literature that Afrobarometer allows me to measure. *Gender* is simply a dummy variable, coded 1 if female and

0 if male. *Age* is a raw number and ranges upward from 18. *Education* is measured in 10 categories ranging from *no formal schooling,* coded as 0, to *Post-Graduate*, coded as 9. The fourth demographic variable measures poverty. Poverty is based on five questions that ask how often an individual went without food, water, medical care, cooking fuel, and a cash income. Each question offered five choices from "never" to "always." I combined these five questions to create a poverty index. The variable measures an individual's experience with poverty.

The African political science literature often examines attitudes through the lenses of "neo-patrimonialism." This literature suggests that the higher prevalence of an instrumental view of democracy in Africa renders attitudes about democracy as a system of governance irrelevant. Attitudes about how well the system works (i.e., network for delivering goods), rather than a preference for democracy, are expected to be more critical in determining what influences turnout. I use a question from Afrobarometer to gauge Mozambican attitudes towards how well the system works. The question asks the respondent how well the government has managed the economy. Respondents can answer "Very Badly," "Fairly Badly," "Fairly Well," or "Very Well." This question was also coded as a binary for the analysis, where "Very Badly" and "Fairly Badly" are coded 0 and "Fairly well" or "Very Well" are coded as 1.

The third set of individual-level determinants has often been called "political activity" or "political interest." According to Young (2004), determinants of this category capture how much direct involvement an individual has in politics. The more politically involved a citizen is, the more likely they are to vote because of their ties to political interests and activities. African democracies are not expected to differ from their more advanced democratic counterparts regarding the influence that political affiliation has on voter turnout. If African citizens “view democracy as instrumental, then political affiliation variables are likely to reflect the degree to which citizens take part in these instrumental networks” (Young, 2004). In the process of explaining the mechanism by which institutional determinants shape turnout, Michael Bratton (1997) notes that they (institutions) "link citizens to the state." In this category, in addition to partisan attachment, one question from the Afrobarometer survey is particularly useful to gauging a respondent's political affiliation. This question asks how interested a respondent is in public affairs. The respondents had four choices: *"Not at all interested," "Not Very Interested," "Somewhat Interested," and "Very Interested."* I created a binary variable coding, *Not interested* and *Not very Interested* as 0 and *Somewhat Interested* and *Very Interested* as 1. Lastly, I include a variable for

associational membership. Associational membership is thought to increase the civic skills of citizens and provide a place for political parties to mobilize voters. Individuals who are members of a voluntary association, religious group, or other community organization are more likely to vote than those not associated with these groups (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2010). In order to operationalize the variable on associational membership, I used two questions from the Afrobarometer survey. The first question asks whether someone is a member of a religious group, and the second question asks whether someone is a part of a voluntary association or community group. The respondents had four choices for both questions: *"Not a member," "inactive member," "Active member," or "official leader."* I created a binary variable coding 0 for respondents who answered *Not a member,* refused to answer the question, or who did not know the answer for both questions. Everything else was coded a 1.

4.4.4 Correlations

To what extent did either violent contexts or fear of violence influence political participation during the 2014 Mozambican national election? I first address this question with a series of bivariate correlations between the various violence variables, fear of violence, partisan identification, the perceived freeness and fairness, and voter participation. In the first instance, I examine how the various violence variables and fear of violence are associated with individual reports of having voted in the 2014 election. In the second instance, I examine the relationship between the various forms of violence and a respondent's and belief that elections are free and fair. Lastly, I examine the relationship between partisan identification and a respondent's belief that elections are free and fair and respondent's reporting that they voted in the last election.

Table 10.10 Correlations of Self-Reported Past Voting and indicators of Fear/Violence

	Fear of Violence	Violent Conflict (Log)	Non-Violent Conflict (Log)	Wider Violent Conflict (Log)	Conflict Intensity	RENAMO Violence (Log)	Governments Violence (Log)
"*Voted in last Election*"	-.097***	NS	.039*	-.066***	NS	.049**	.036*

*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
N=2400

Although the strength of the relationship is small, there is evidence of a negative and statistically significant association between violence and self-reported past voter turnout. The only variables that do not show a significant association are *Violence (log)* and *Conflict Intensity* (Table 4.10).

Besides, Table 4.11 examines the correlations between the various forms of violence and a respondent's belief that elections in Mozambique are free and fair. Both perpetrator violence variables and *Fear of Violence* are significantly related to a respondent's belief that elections are not free and fair.

Table 10.11 Correlations of indicators of violence/fear with election not free and fair

	Fear of Violence	Violence (Log)	Non-Violence (Log)	Wide Violent Conflict (Log)	Conflict Intensity	RENAMO Violence (Log)	Government Violence (Log)
Elections Not Free and Fair	.119***	NS	NS	NS	.059***	.075***	-.053***

*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

The next table (4.12) shows the correlations for partisanship, perceived freeness of the elections with fear of violence. The results indicate that identifying with any party does not correlate with fear of violence. However, when considering specific parties, identifying with RENAMO is significantly correlated with Fear. Perceived fairness of the election is also significantly correlated with Fear of Violence.

Table 10.12 Correlation of Partisan Identification/Elections not Free and Fair with Fear of Violence

	Partisan Identification	RENAMO ID	FRELIMO ID	Elections Not Free and Fair
Fear of Violence	.027	.031*	-.029	.119***

*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

The last set of correlations looks at whether self-reported past voting is associated with an individual's beliefs that elections are not free and fair, as well as whether they are close to a political party (Table 4.13). Both partisan identification and the belief that elections are not free and fair are significantly associated with past voting.

Table 10.13 Correlation of Partisan Identification/Elections not free and self-reported past voting

	Partisan Identification	Elections Not Free and Fair
"Voted in the last Election"	.117***	-.074***

*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

4.4.5 Analytical Strategy

To analyze whether violent contexts and fear influence individual political participation, I estimated a series of multilevel models, with vote modeled at level-1, nested within districts at level-2. The district corresponds with the disaggregated violence data. The simultaneous modeling of individual and contextual determinants to explain individual behavior is possible with multilevel analysis. By considering the multilevel structure of data not as a nuisance but as a substance (Jones 1997), multilevel models not only distinguish different variations at different levels but make it possible to measure varying relationships between variables based on the difference of contexts. Since my dependent variable has a dichotomous form, I transform the dependent variable into a logit structure. Estimation and interpretation for multilevel logit analysis are similar to those used in conventional logit analysis (see Long 1997).[57]

Following the contextual effects literature, I argue that violent contexts (the district) will influence a voter's decision to participate in an election. As was hypothesized in chapter 2, individuals living in violent contexts will be less likely to have reported voting. I also expect that individuals who reported fearing violence will also be less likely to have voted in the last election. Furthermore, nonaligned voters (voters who do not feel close to a political party) who fear violence will be less likely to have voted than those with partisan attachments.

Model 1 in Table 4.14 displays the results for the fully unconditional model of voting. The intercept coefficient shows the average log-odds of voting across districts, which corresponds to a

57 I proceed – in accordance with my initial question – in three steps: first, I test the explanatory strength of the individual level independent variables, controlling for specified contextual effects:

(1) $\text{logit}(\pi ij) = \beta_1 + \beta_2 X_{2ij} + \ldots. + \beta_2 X_{nij} + \varepsilon_{ij} + \mu_{0j}$

The participation probability of an individual I within a district j (π_{ij}) is explained by an overall participation mean ($\beta 1$), individual characteristics (X, estimates β respectively), individual variation (εij with an assumed mean of 0 and a total within-context variance of σ^2), and contextual variation (μ_{0j} with an assumed mean of 0 and a total between-context variance of σ_u^2).

I specify the contextual level with contextual factors (W, their estimates α respectively)

(2) $\text{logit}(\pi ij) = \beta_1 + \beta_2 X_{2ij} + \ldots. + \beta_n X_{nij} + \alpha_1 + W_{1j} + \ldots + \alpha_1 + W_{1j} + \varepsilon_{ij} + \mu_{0j}$

I estimate the cross-level interaction with the selected individual (k) and contextual variables (k) ($W_{kj}X_{kij}$, their estimates γ respectively). Note that in those cases I model a varying effect of the individual variable X_k on participation (denoted by the j of the estimate).

(3) $\text{logit}(\pi ij) = \beta_1 + \beta_2 X_{2ij} + \ldots. + \beta_k X_{kij} + \ldots + \beta_n X_{nij} + \alpha_1 + W_{1j} + \ldots + \alpha_n + W_{nj} + \gamma_1 W_{kj} X_{kij} + \mu_{1j} X_{kij} + \varepsilon_{ij} + \mu_{0j}$

probability of voting of approximately .77[58]. In other words, the probability of voting during the 2014 national election was high. This result is surprising, considering that less than half of all Mozambicans voted during the 2014 national elections. However, it does reflect the fact that the Afrobarometer survey overreported voting in Mozambique. In addition, a significant intercept indicates that individuals were found to vary significantly around their district means. Taking into account the intercept coefficient and the district level variance, I found that 95% of the districts lie between .50 and .92 with respect to the average probability of voting in the 2014 national elections.[59] It appears that while in some districts, about 92% of respondents reported voting, in other districts, only half of the respondents voted in the 2014 elections. In short, the fully unconditional model suggests that there is a statistically significant variation in the probability of self-reported past voting that may be associated with district or contextual level factors.

Model 2 in table 4.14 estimates a conditional model with no level-2 predictors but with a random intercept in order to consider that the mean percent voting is not the same in all districts at the average predictor values. The coefficient for the variable on fear does support the view that fearful citizens are less likely to participate in an election. Holding all other predictors at their median values,[60] the probability of a Mozambican without any fear of violence voting is .86 and drops to .72 for the most fearful individuals. This finding confirms the depressing effect that fear of violence has on voting.

Models 3 through 8 incorporate the level-2 contextual violence variables. In model 3 I include a measure of violent conflict (logged) which captures all violent conflict across Mozambique in the 18 months prior to the election. This violence variable does not have a statistically significant effect on the probability of voting. Considering the results from the district level, this result is not entirely surprising. Again, the evidence confirms work by Bekoe and Burchard (2017), which found that actual levels of violence at the district level do not have a meaningful effect on political participation. The results in Model 4 are also not significant. Non-violent conflict is not found to have influenced voting.

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58 I used the odds ratio (OR) to estimate the probability (*p)* using the formula: p = OR/(1+OR). In Model 1 Table 13, the odds ratio of the intercept is 3.44. In order to estimate the probability of voting, I calculated 3.44/(1+3.44),

59 I estimated the log-odds interval using the following formular: $Intercept \pm (1.96 * \sqrt{district\ variance})$. I then transformed the log-odds interval into an odds ratio interval $OR = exp^{Log-Odds}$. I then transformed these odds ratio intervals into probabilities using the formula presented in foot note 12.

60 These values would represent a 33-year-old female who completed primary school; lives in a rural community; does not believe the government has handled the economy well; has in interest in public affairs; is an active member in a religious organization or non-profit; has a value of 1.4 on the lived poverty scale; thinks that the 2014 election was free and fair; and identifies with a political party.

Table 10.14 Multilevel Logit - Vote Intention DV

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
Violent Conflict (Log)			-.015 (.219)					
Non-Violent Conflict (Log)				.010 (.186)				
Wider Violence Conflict (Log)					-.385** (.155)			
Conflict Intensity						.002 (.048)		
RENAMO Violence (Log)							.319 (.347)	
Government Violence (Log)								-.016 (.239)
Level-1 Predictors								
Fear of Violence		-.212*** (.055)	-.215*** (.055)	-.215*** (.055)	-.216*** (.055)	-.215*** (.055)	-.214*** (.054)	-.215*** (.055)
Elections Not free = 1		-.224 (.170)	-.223 (.170)	-.224 (.170)	-.237 (.170)	-.223 (.170)	-.234 (.170)	-.224 (.170)
FRELIMO ID = 1		.426*** (.124)	.425*** (.125)	.426*** (.125)	.396*** (.125)	.426*** (.125)	.434*** (.125)	.424*** (.125)
RENAMO ID = 1		.518*** (.202)	.519** (.202)	.519** (.202)	.506** (.201)	.519** (.202)	.515** (.202)	.518** (.202)
Constant	1.235***	-.692**	-.688**	-.695**	-.395**	-.695**	-.737***	-.690**
Random Effects Variance Components								
District Effect	.36	.50	.25	.25	.22	.25	.23	.25
Observations	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400
Number of Groups	88	88	88	88	88	88	88	88

Within-Country weights are used in all models
Robust Standard Errors in Brackets (HC0)
*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Controls Included: Urban/Rural, Gender, Age, Education, Lived Poverty, Government Economic Performance, Political Interest, Associational Membership

Model 5 includes a measure of *Wider Violent Conflict* (logged) which captures a larger geographic area. In addition to examining levels of violence in a single district, this variable also captures violence in all bordering districts. The rationale for including this wider geographic measurement is that Mozambicans do not remain in one district and that their daily lives are sometimes spent in two or three districts. While violence may not occur where they live, it may occur where they work, shop, go to school or socialize. This model shows that wider violence has a statistically significant and negative effect on electoral participation. For example, an individual living in a district surrounded by violent districts was 26 percent less likely to vote in the 2014 election than an individual living in a district without such a wider violent conflict. Take, for example, two

voters with precisely the same individual characteristics but living in two different districts with distinct experiences with wider violent conflict. A voter in Buzi in the district of Sofala – which itself experienced a few violent events but bordered districts where some of the most intense fighting between RENAMO and government armed forces took place – is expected to have a .60 probability of voting, compared with a .87 probability for a voter in the southern city of Inhambane, where violence took place neither in the district nor the surrounding districts. In other words, an increase in violence, not just within a district but in the neighboring region, depressed turnout.

Models 6 through 8, which include the conflict intensity and perpetrator variables, are all non-significant. These results do not support my claim that moving from different levels of conflict intensity would result in reduced log-odds of voting. Nor do these results support my hypothesis that voter turnout would be affected by a specific perpetrator. In this case, RENAMO violence did little to mobilize voters or decrease the likelihood of voting. Although these results are surprising, they do reflect what occurred at the district level. Except for wider violent conflict, the level-2 violent context variables did not decrease the log-odds of voting. These results confirm other studies on electoral violence that found violence to have a non-significant effect on voter turnout.

As expected, across Models 2 through 8, partisan identification was positive and statistically significant. Based on Model 2 and holding all predictors at their median value, the probability of having voted during the 2014 election for a Mozambican who identified with FRELIMO (.79) and RENAMO (.81) was significantly higher than for unaligned or politically independent Mozambicans (.71). I was also expecting that for individuals who did not believe that the 2014 election was free and fair, there would be a significant reduction in the log-odds of voting; however, my models do not support this expectation.

Table 10.15 Multilevel Logit – Self-Reported Turnout Models with Cross-level Interactions

	Model 1 No Interactions	*Model 2 Individual Interactions*	*Model 3 Cross-Level Interactions*
Fixed Effects			
Level-2 Predictors			
Wider Violence (Log)	-.385**	-.377**	-.314*
		(.159)	(.178)
Level-1 Predictors			
Fear of Violence	-.216***	-.342***	-.340***
	(.055)	(.069)	(.069)
FRELIMO ID	.396***	-.041	.033
	(.125)	(.168)	(.261)
RENAMO ID	.507**	.596*	.889*
	(.201)	(.305)	(.419)
Fear X FRELIMO		.454***	.451***
		(.121)	(.122)
Fear X RENAMO		-.063	-.068
		(.194)	(.195)
Violence X FRELIMO			-.093
			(.251)
Violence X RENAMO			-.386
			(.368)
Constant	-.395	-.321	-.377
Random Effects Variance Components			
District Effect	.22	.241	.243
Observations	2400	2400	2400
Number of Groups	88	88	88

Within-Country weights are used in all models
Robust Standard Errors in Brackets (HC0)
*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Controls Included: Urban/Rural, Gender, Age, Education, Government Economic Performance, Political Interest, Associational Membership

In order to examine the possibility that violence had a differentiated effect for partisans and unaligned Mozambicans, Model 2 in Table 4.15 incorporates an interaction between *Fear of Violence* and the two partisan variables, RENAMO ID and FRELIMO ID. The results from the interaction model confirm my hypothesis that identification with a political party conditioned the relationship between fear of violence and participation in the 2014 national election. The interaction term for *FRELIMO ID* and *Fear of Violence* in Model 2 (Table 4.15) is statistically significant. The interaction between *Fear of Violence* and *FRELIMO ID* suggests that individuals who identified themselves with either FRELIMO are expected to have a higher probability of voting than those that do not identify with a political party. However, it also shows that the effect of fear of violence on the average probability of having voted significantly differs for those that

identify with a FRELIMO and those who do not. Figure 4.5 shows that individuals who belong to a FRELIMO are barely affected when their fear of violence increases. In contrast, the average probability of having voted for those not attached to any political party decreased by more than 20 points (from .88 to .69) as we move from those who reported no fear of violence to those that reported "a lot" of fear.

Figure 10.5 Marginal Effect of Fear of Violence on the Predicted Probability of Voting, FRELIMO v. Unaligned or Independent Identifiers



Although independents and un-aligned voters were significantly more likely to be affected by fear of violence than FRELIMO partisans, the same is not true with regards to RENAMO partisans. In Model 3 of Table 4.15, I tested the cross-level interaction effects between *Wider Violent Conflict* and the partisan variables. The results show that no statistically significant interaction is present. Thus, partisan identity was not a factor in influencing whether individuals living in violent "neighborhoods" were more or less likely to turn out to vote.

Regarding the individual level controls, results are consistent with some general findings in the literature on electoral participation in Africa. Demographic variables such as *age*[61] and *education*[62] are statistically significant and positive, as expected in the literature. However, with regards to Mozambique, being a male is not a significant predictor of electoral participation. Indicators on attitude, which assess satisfaction with the current electoral system and whether an individual has a positive view of the government's economic performance, are both positive and significant. Retrospective evaluations of government performance are the strongest predictors of past voting behavior. Political activity, measured through an interest in politics, is statistically significant and positive.

Overall, the evidence from this section provided mixed evidence for my argument. On the one hand, I found strong evidence for my claim that the fear of violence would reduce the likelihood of voting. Although recent research on the political consequences of fear has demonstrated that it can help to mobilize voters (see Hafner-Burton et. al, 2018), in countries characterized by limited resources or access to information, fear can be a powerful tool to dissuade voters from voting. In Mozambique, where access to TV, newspapers or internet is limited, there is a reliance on community and social networks for information. If the communities and social networks are also experiencing fear of violence, then the likelihood of seeking out information is reduced. Within these contexts, particularly during elections, the likelihood of voting reduces.

Furthermore, I also found robust evidence to support my hypothesis that partisanship shapes how voters reacted to fear. In this case, Mozambicans without any political attachments were less likely to have participated in the 2014 national election than FRELIMO partisans. As expected, partisanship has a decisive role in mobilizing voters and driving turnout.

On the other hand, the micro-level analysis did not lend strong support to the notion that living in a violent context would influence voter turnout. I did not find any compelling evidence to suggest that the violent or non-violent conflict, the intensity of violence, or the perpetrator of violence, would predict past voting. However, there was evidence at the individual level that wider violent conflict influenced past voting. Wider violent conflict takes into consideration not only violent conflict within a district but also in the bordering districts. Mozambicans who lived in

61 When all independent variables are set to the median and age is set to 18 years, the probability of voting is 0.69. When the value of age is increased to 50, the probability of voting increases to 0.83.
62 When all independent variables are set to the median and education is set to "no formal education," the probability of voting is 0.71. When the value for education is set to Secondary School, the probability of voting increases to 0.79. Lastly, when the value is set to its highest, post-graduate, the probability of voting increases to 0.85.

districts that experienced violent conflict and were surrounded by districts that experienced violent conflict were less likely to have reported participating in the 2014 national election.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I tried to establish a connection between violent contexts and voter turnout. Although there is some evidence that violent contexts influence political participation, the evidence is mixed. In the district level analysis, none of the models supported my hypothesis that violent contexts depressed voter turnout or that there were shifts in political participation from the 2009 election to the 2014 election. The non-significant results for all the violence variables support Bekoe and Burchard's (2017) findings that there is no statistically significant relationship between violence and voting. The individual-level results largely confirmed my findings at the district level. None of the contextual variables on violence were found to be significant, with the exception *Wider Violent Conflict*. In this case, evidence shows that widespread violence, rather than just localized district violence, had a significant effect that lowered the probability of reporting past participation.

Although the results from both the district level and individual models did not adequately demonstrate a relationship between district-level violence and voting, the results do show that fear of violence significantly influenced voter turnout. As individual's fear of violence and intimidation increased, they were more likely to report that they did not vote during the 2014 national elections. These results confirm findings by Bratton (2008) and Wallsworth (2015), demonstrating that fear of violence has a harmful effect on political participation. One of the main highlights of this chapter is that it shows how the effect of fearing violence is conditioned by partisan identification. I argued in chapter 2 that unaligned and independent voters would be the most affected by violence. In Mozambique, partisanship plays an essential role in mobilizing the electorate even amid violence. The relationship between fearing violence and voting was not significant for Mozambicans attached to either RENAMO or FRELIMO. However, the effect was statistically significant and negative for unaligned and independent Mozambicans. These findings show that despite the perceived risks of violence and intimidation, partisanship matters. Mozambicans, closely tied to a political party, are shielded from rising insecurity and violence and are likely to continue to go to the polls.

While the results do not demonstrate conclusively that violence at the district or individual level depressed political participation in Mozambique, this chapter does support my hypothesis

that fear of violence reduced past turnout. This chapter contributes evidence to the growing electoral and political violence literature and demonstrates that fear of violence can negatively affect electoral participation, and in particular, it demonstrates that partisanship matters. Partisans are less likely to be influenced by violence, while independents and unaligned voters will react negatively. This suggests that political parties can continue to mobilize their bases of support despite the environment, but unaligned and independent voters will be less likely to participate in elections.

Chapter 5: Voter Behavior during Conflict – How Pre-election conflict shaped vote choice during the 2014 national elections in Mozambique

5.1 Introduction:

How do voters behave during elections amid pervasive political violence and ongoing armed conflict? Do voters hold political parties accountable for rising violence? And if so, are incumbents likely to be punished for their inability to provide citizens with a sense of safety and security? In chapter 4, I produced evidence that violent contexts do not significantly affect political participation at the district level. However, I found substantial evidence at the individual level that fear of violence decreased the likelihood of voting in the 2014 general election and that living in a violent district bordered by violent neighborhoods reduced individual likelihood of voting. Furthermore, nonaligned, or independent Mozambicans were more likely to have stayed home as a result of fearing violent conflict, while those who identify with a political party were unaffected.

In this chapter, I move away from electoral participation and focus on whether the rising violence influenced Mozambicans' partisan preferences in the run-up to the 2014 election. Did RENAMOs decision to return to armed conflict help to mobilize its supporters? Or did Mozambicans punish the FRELIMO government for its inability to maintain peace in the country? In the 2014 national election, RENAMO improved its share of the national vote by 20 percentage points despite its role in returning the country to conflict. The election also saw FRELIMOs vote share drop by 18 percentage points. Although RENAMO ultimately lost the election, its ability to mobilize support across every province was impressive and surprising. The renewed support was surprising because the party had been in a state of electoral decline after the closely contested 1999 election (see Chapter 2).

Prior to the 2014 election, RENAMO's status as one of Africa's largest and most influential opposition parties greatly diminished. The party was in disarray internally, was opening up decades' old wounds from the civil war and was losing political space to an upstart and popular third party. RENAMO's popularity amongst its core constituents waned as the party failed to deliver services, improve the few municipalities where it governed, and truly transition into a viable and effective political party that could challenge FRELIMO's hegemony. RENAMOs

weaknesses became increasingly glaring during the 2009 national election when it lost by a vote margin of almost 60 percent. In the ensuing years, RENAMO boycotted the municipal elections in 2013, allowing the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM) to gain popular support from disaffected FRELIMO and RENAMO supporters. The MDM was on its way to supplanting RENAMO as Mozambique's main opposition. However, despite the failures of the party and its return to armed conflict, RENAMO was able to regain support across every province, win the plurality of the vote in five provinces, gain 38 seats in the legislature, and restore its reputation as the main opposition political party to challenge FRELIMO.

To what extent did any of these results from the strategic use of violence? Did violent contexts help to explain RENAMO's political resurgence? That is to say, were shifts in RENAMO support systematically related to conflict either at the district or individual level? Or were voters punishing the incumbent party? Rather than mobilizing vote support around RENAMO, did violence serve to polarize the population either for or against Frelimo? This chapter investigates whether living under the threat of violence and ongoing armed conflict affects vote choice and examines the role that violent contexts and fear of violence played in shaping the 2014 Mozambican national election outcome.

This chapter is organized as follows. First, I examine the direct effect of violence on both RENAMO and FRELIMO vote share at the district level to understand whether FRELIMO and RENAMO district vote shares increased or decreased according to the level of violence. Following my general theory presented in Chapter 3, I expect that security issues will matter to Mozambicans, and as a result, rising levels of violence will brings reductions in FRELIMO vote share. However, I also expect that RENAMOs decision to return to armed conflict helped mobilize its supporters and increase its share of the vote in the districts with increased levels of violence. I then turn to the individual level analysis, where I use Afrobarometer survey data to analyze how violent contexts and fear influence vote choice. This analysis seeks to understand the mechanisms that may influence whom a Mozambican decides to support during an election at the individual level. Much like at the district level, I expect that violent contexts and fear of violence will reduce support for FRELIMO while bolstering support for RENAMO. In addition, I continue to examine whether partisanship plays a vital role in electoral and political behavior. Following from evidence in Chapter 4, I expect that partisan attachments will condition the relationship between violence and vote choice.

5.2 Violent and Vote Choice – District Level Analysis

In this section, I analyze effects on district level vote share in the 2014 and 2009 general elections. To test the hypotheses laid out in chapter 3.[63] Specifically, I examine the change in vote share for FRELIMO and RENAMO from the 2009 national election to the 2014 national election. The data set I use also includes information on violent and non-violent conflict events, the intensity of the conflict, the identity of the perpetrators of violence, and control variables that capture each district's political and socio-economic characteristics. I built this dataset using various sources. The electoral and political variables were created using reports published by the *Commisão Nacional de Eleições* (National Electoral Commission, CNE). Variables capturing the number of conflict events, the perpetrator of the conflict events, and the level of conflict intensity were constructed using data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), which collects disaggregated information on conflict across Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. Data for the socio-economic variables were obtained from the *Instituto Nacional de Estatística* (National Institute of Statistics, INE).

5.2.1 Dependent Variable

To assess the relationship between violence and vote choice, I use two variables that measure the change in vote share for FRELIMO and RENAMO. I calculated the difference in vote share for both parties between the 2009 and 2014 general elections. Figure 5.1 displays FRELIMO and RENAMO vote share during the 2009 and 2014 elections and the change in vote share between the elections. Although FRELIMO won the 2014 election, there were some noticeable swings in support for RENAMO, and support for FRELIMO decreased in every province. On average, FRELIMO's vote share was 16.7 percent lower in 2014 than in 2009. The provinces that saw the most significant decreases were Tete (-40.4 percent), Niassa (-28.4 percent), and Manica (-24.9 percent). On the other hand, RENAMO saw increases in almost every province, except for FRELIMO's southern stronghold of Gaza. On average, RENAMO improved its vote share by 13.7 percent. Tete (+36.7 percent), Manica (+25.3 percent), and Niassa (+24.6 percent) saw the most considerable percentage change in support for RENAMO.

63 In 2013, the Mozambican Assembly of the Republic passed a law adding 13 new districts in four northern and central provinces. The total number of districts equals 151, however, for this study, only 142 districts are included. Socio-economic and violence data only includes information on 141 districts, and the city of Maputo, which is also included in the analysis.

Figure 11.1 Percentage Change in Vote Share for FRELIMO and RENAMO between 2009 and 2014



The *Vote Share* variables come from the legislative elections. In Mozambique, legislative and presidential elections are concurrent; however, legislative district-level data was the most complete. Independent samples t-tests (table 5.1) indicate that there is no statistically significant difference between the legislative and executive vote share. In other words, analyzing the legislative elections is a reliable proxy for analyzing the presidential election.

Table 11.1 Executive and Legislative Vote Share differences 2014

	RENAMO		**FRELIMO**	
Province	**Legislative**	**Executive**	**Legislative**	**Executive**
Maputo City	20.06	20.66	62.73	68.86
Maputo P.	16.8	17.61	69.8	73.64
Gaza	3.1	3.21	93.2	93.75
Inhambane	16.9	18.72	75.3	76.19
Sofala	49.8	55.82	35	35.4
Manica	47	48.54	47	47.7
Tete	47	49.38	45.8	46.27
Zambezia	48.9	52.48	38.5	39.2
Nampula	46	49.24	44.5	44.63
Cabo Delgado	17.3	18.39	77.6	77.8
Niassa	42.2	44.38	48.3	48.53
t-tests	t= -.277 p=.785		t=-.159 p=.875	

5.2.2 Independent Variable

To analyze the impact of violence on vote share, I rely on six different conflict measures derived from ACLED v.7. All conflict events between January 1st, 2012, and October 15th, 2014, are included. I first use the variable *Violent Conflict,* which captures any event that was considered a riot or protest with a violent outcome: violence against civilians, battles, events which caused the displacement of the population, or any event which caused the destruction of property. Second, I measure *Non-Violent Conflict,* which taps the number of protests/demonstrations, any non-violent transfer of territory; the establishment of any headquarters or bases; or demands or claims connected with a threat but without physical violence. I also included a variable on *Conflict Intensity* and two variables on the perpetrator of the violence *RENAMO Violence* and *Government Violence*. The construction for all of these variables can be found in the previous chapter. Third, incorporate the measure of *Wider Violent Conflict* introduced in chapter 4.

Controls

Regarding the controls, several variables that are found in the voting behavior literature to influence vote choice are added to the analysis. Four socio-economic district level variables are included: Population density, illiteracy rate, and media exposure[64]. As illiteracy rates increase, I expect RENAMO to be more likely to win that district's support. As poverty rates increase, I also expect to find less support for the incumbent party, FRELIMO, and more support for alternative parties like RENAMO or MDM. I also expect that the denser the population becomes, the less likely the vote will go to the incumbent. Although the conventional wisdom regarding Mozambique would expect that urban areas would vote for FRELIMO (Brito, 1996; Pereira, 1997; Chichava, 2007), the most densely populated regions of the country are along the coasts in the central and north parts of the country. Population density distinguishes between rural and urban and, in the Mozambican contexts, is a proxy for the region.

5.2.3 Analytical Strategy

In this section I analyze the extent to which conflict levels and conflict intensity affected vote share for FRELIMO and RENAMO. Models presented in this section have as the dependent variable the percent vote share obtained by the incumbent party FRELIMO and RENAMO. To test my

64 Media exposure is a composite variable which aggregates the percentage of residents in a district that have access to a radio, newspaper, and TV. All information was taken from INE.

hypotheses using the data described in the last section, I estimate an OLS regression analysis with robust standard errors:

$$\textit{District Vote Share}_i = \beta_0 \text{ Disrict } \textit{Conflict}_i + \textit{District Political}_i + \textit{District Socioeconomic}_i + \varepsilon.$$

Table 11.2 Change in RENAMO Vote Share – 2014 Mozambican National Election [65]

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*
Violence (Log)	4.632					
	(2.870)					
Non-Violence (Log)		5.836				
		(4.087)				
Wider Violence (Log)			5.066**			
			(2.061)			
Conflict Intensity				1.409*		
				(.750)		
RENAMO Violence (Log)					8.439**	
					(3.733)	
Gov. Violence (Log)						1.320
						(4.593)
Media Exposure	.373*	.359*	.341*	.358*	.373*	.384*
	(.201)	(.200)	(.200)	(.202)	(.199)	(.198)
Illiteracy Rate	.158*	.161*	.186**	.164*	.155*	.146
	(.094)	(.094)	(.093)	(.094)	(.094)	(.095)
Poverty (Log)	-3.513	-3.838	-3.080	-3.570	-3.361	-3.700
	(2.752)	(2.652)	(2.747)	(2.642)	(2.774)	(2.725)
Density (Log)	3.520*	3.157	4.457**	3.479*	3.861**	3.714*
	(1.967)	(2.034)	(1.919)	(1.929)	(1.881)	(2.064)
Constant	-23.059	-21.937	-26.893	-23.224	-23.656	-22.622
N = Districts	142	142	142	142	142	142
R^2	.132	.134	.147	.144	.146	.122
Adj. R^2	.101	.102	.116	.113	.115	.090

Robust Standard Errors in Brackets (HC0)
*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

[65] An additional model was that included all the violence variables that were significant in the iteratives models. In this model, all of the violence variables were insignificant.

5.2.4 Vote Share Changes – 2014 National Election

Table (5.2) shows the results for the 2014 Mozambican general election. This table uses RENAMO's change in vote share as the dependent variable. As expected, violence had a positive effect on RENAMO's vote share during the 2014 election. However, not all the violence variables were significant. Model 1 indicates a positive but non-significant coefficient for violent conflict. In other words, violent conflict, without distinguishing the perpetrator or the intensity of the violence, was not found to influence changes in RENAMOs vote share. Model 2 assessed the effect of non-violent conflict events such as protests on RENAMOs change in vote share. The result for this model was not significant either.

On the other hand, the Wider Violent Conflict measure in Model 3 is both positive and statistically significant. Compared to Model 1, which only examines violence within a district, the Wider Violent Conflict variable measures violence within a district and its bordering districts. The inclusion of violence from a wider geographic area appears to influence RENAMOs vote share significantly. Overall, I find an increase in *Wider Violent Conflict* one standard deviation above the mean prior to the 2014 national election resulted in an increase in RENAMO's vote share by almost 3 percent (Figure 5.2).

Figure 11.2 Predicted Value for Change in RENAMO Vote Share and Wider Violent Conflict (95% C.I.)



Model 4 measured the impact of different levels of conflict intensity on RENAMOs vote share. This model shows that changing levels of conflict intensity also had a statistically significant impact on the changes RENAMO vote share between the 2009 and 2014 national elections. The change in RENAMO vote share increased by 18 percent in districts that experienced severe conflict compared to 11 percent in peaceful districts.

In Model 5, the regression coefficient for RENAMO violence indicates that an increase in RENAMO violence is associated with slightly more than an eight percent increase in RENAMO vote share. Districts that experienced RENAMO violence one standard deviation above the mean saw RENAMO vote share increase by an average of 17 percent compared with a 12 percent increase in districts that did not experience any violence. This increase in vote share suggests that RENAMOs decision to return to conflict did help to boost its support, particularly in districts that saw RENAMO violence. However, contrary to what I expected, violence committed by the government (Model 6) did not impact RENAMO vote share. The coefficient regression for government-led violence was not significant. The contrast between the effect of RENAMO-led violence and government violence suggests that RENAMO had its sympathizers who were willing to turn out and vote for the party despite the conflict. And more broadly, that RENAMO violence was more effective, mainly if the goal was to drive support. RENAMOs support in the 2014 election likely came from its base, which had likely drop out of the electorate in the previous election supporters. The violence seems to have been one factor in mobilizing RENAMO support.

Did the renewal of conflict between the government and RENAMO and the general uptick in political violence influence FRELIMOs vote? As I laid out in chapter 3, I expected to find that FRELIMOs vote share would be negatively affected by the rise in violence. My assumption was based on the fact that citizens would hold the government accountable for not being able to maintain peace and order, and more explicitly, that the government would be punished at the ballot box.

Table 11.3 Change in FRELIMO Vote Share – 2014 Mozambican National Election

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*
Violent Conflict (Log)	-.822					
	(3.104)					
Non-Violent Conflict (Log)		-4.098				
		(4.687)				
Wider Violent Conflict (Log)			-2.451			
			(2.138)			
Conflict Intensity				-1.009		
				(.808)		
RENAMO Violence (Log)					-5.642	
					(3.910)	
Gov. Violence (Log)						5.187
						(4.859)
Media Exposure	-.378*	-.361*	-.358	-.360	-.372*	-.391*
	(.217)	(.218)	(.222)	(.219)	(.218)	(.212)
Illiteracy Rate	-.225**	-.235**	-.243**	-.238**	-.231**	-.211**
	(.104)	(.105)	(.104)	(.105)	(.104)	(.104)
Poverty (Log)	3.411	3.535	3.141	3.345	3.212	3.493
	(2.888)	(2.816)	(2.937)	(2.821)	(2.919)	(2.866)
Density (Log)	-6.431***	-6.012***	-6.788***	-6.233***	-6.505***	-6.947***
	(2.122)	(2.172)	(2.064)	(2.074)	(2.032)	(2.192)
Constant	29.196	28.613	31.171	29.525	29.787	29.304
N	142	142	142	142	142	142
R^2	.143	.148	.148	.153	.152	.148
Adj. R^2	.112	.117	.117	.122	.121	.117

Standard Errors in brackets (HC0)
*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Table 5.3 reports the results of the impact of violence on FRELIMO vote share. In sharp contrast to the effect on RENAMO, (in Table 5.2), none of the violence variables had a statistically significant effect on FRELIMO's vote share. FRELIMO's electoral support was neither damaged by the violence that preceded the 2014 national elections nor bolstered in the iterative models. Based on the previous set of models in Table 5.3, FRELIMOs anti-RENAMO rhetoric and propaganda could not diminish RENAMO support.

Regarding the control variables, across both tables, media exposure levels, population density, and illiteracy rates had statistically significant coefficients. Media exposure, which measures the percentage of the population in a district with access to a radio, newspaper, or tv, was statistically significant in both tables. Access to media had a positive effect on RENAMO and a negative effect on FRELIMO. Illiteracy rates showed differing effects for both parties. Districts

with higher illiteracy rates were associated with increased support for RENAMO. On the other hand, districts with lower illiteracy rates showed a decrease support for FRELIMO. The effect size across all models were quite small. Surprisingly, poverty rates were not significant in any of the tables. It appears that at the district level, poverty levels did not seem to influence the vote shares of either RENAMO or FRELIMO. Interestingly, less densely populated districts exhibited increased shares in FRELIMO support, while more densely populated districts were associated with increases in RENAMO support. This result demonstrates that opposition to RENAMO has shifted from traditionally rural areas to more urbanized districts.

5.3 Individual Level Results

To test my individual-level hypotheses on vote choice, I rely on Afrobarometer Round 6 survey data. Afrobarometer Round 6 is a nationally representative survey sample of 2,400 adults from all 11 provinces covering all Mozambique's geographical regions. The survey provides a unique look at political sentiment across Mozambique. It includes a variety of questions related to elections, political participation, and election violence. The survey was conducted between July and August of 2015, less than one year after the 2014 national elections. The following sections describe the questions and variables used for the individual-level analysis.

5.3.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable tested in this section is the *intended vote choice.* This binary variable is derived from an AB R6 question asking, "if a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for?" The respondents had several political parties to choose from: FRELIMO, RENAMO, Movimento Democratic Moçambicano (MDM), Partido para Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento (PDD), or Partido Independente Moçambicano (PIMO). Overall, 50.7 percent of respondents stated they would vote for FRELIMO, 13 percent for RENAMO, 3.7 percent for MDM, 0.3 percent for PDD, and only 1 respondent said they would vote for PIMO, and 1 stated other. Two percent of respondents stated they would not vote, 23.5 percent refused to answer the question, while 6.8 percent said they did not know.

From this survey question, I created two dichotomous variables from this question. The first variable measures an intended vote for FRELIMO. This variable was coded as 1 for FRELIMO and 0 for all other political parties. The question assesses whether an individual would support FRELIMO in the future or take any other action, whether it means voting for the opposition or admittedly not knowing whom they would support. Since the previous chapter analyzed voter turnout, I exclude from this variable all respondents who either stated they would not vote or who refuse to vote. In addition to the FRELIMO variable, I also created a variable assessing RENAMO vote intention using the same method. This binary variable was coded as 1 for RENAMO and 0 for all other political parties or admittedly no knowing whom they would support.

5.3.2 Independent Variables

In order to examine how violence and fear influence vote intention, I rely on the six different conflict measures derived from ACLED v.7 that have been used throughout this thesis. To test the contextual

effect of violence on vote intention for both FRELIMO and RENAMO, I match each respondent with the corresponding data on his or her particular context of violence at the district level. In addition to the contextual violence variables, I include a variable that measures an individual's fear of violence. The construction of this variable can be found in the previous chapter.

I argue that the impact of fear on the level of electoral support for FRELIMO and RENAMO is conditional on the individual's partisan attachment. Therefore, I incorporate two dichotomous variables to identify FRELIMO partisans and RENAMO. The variables were derived from an Afrobarometer R6 question. Table 5.4 shows the breakdown for each party, as well as for Unaligned/Independent respondents. More than half of all Mozambicans reported at least "a little bit" of fear. A quarter of RENAMO identifiers and Unaligned/Independents reported either having "somewhat" or "a lot" of fear of violence. The table shows that fear of violence was expressed by all groups.

Table 11.4 Fear of Violence and Partisan Identity

Identifier	Not at all	A little bit	Somewhat	A lot	**Total**
FRELIMO	422	334	132	95	983
	42.9%	*34.0%*	*13.4%*	*9.7%*	*100%*
RENAMO	72	86	32	23	213
	33.8%	*40.4%*	*15.0%*	*10.8%*	*100%*
Unaligned/	446	288	145	102	981
Independent	*45.5%*	*29.4%*	*14.8%*	*10.4%*	100%

Considering that positive evaluations of government performance are a strong predictor of incumbent support in Mozambique (Pereira, 2008; Shenga 2010), I included a dichotomous variable assessing whether citizens believe that the government is handling the economy well. I also include a variable on presidential approval. This variable assesses whether Mozambicans approve of the Presidents performance. It is a dichotomous measure coded as 1 for approve and 0 for those that do not approve. I expect that presidential approval will positively predict support for the incumbent (FRELIMO) and that not approving of the president's performance will be associated with not supporting the president in an election. Also, all models include the following sociodemographic variables: education level, age, and gender.

5.3.3 Analytical Strategy

Is there a relationship between violence and individual vote choice decisions? I first address this question with a series of bivariate correlations across the entire sample (Table 5.5). Although the strength of the relationships is small, there is evidence showing a statistically significant association between violence and vote preferences for both FRELIMO and RENAMO. The only variable that does not show significant association with FRELIMO vote intention is *Government Violence*. For RENAMO vote intention, *Conflict Intensity* is the only variable that does not show a statistically significant relationship. As expected, the violence variables are all negatively associated with FRELIMO vote share. Interestingly, all the violence variables are also negatively associated with RENAMO vote share, except for *RENAMO Violence.* These correlations assume that violence has a small but detrimental effect on an individual's vote intention for both parties. However, RENAMO support has a positive relationship with *RENAMO Violence.*

Table 11.5 Correlations of Self-Reported Past Voting and indicators of Fear/Violence

Vote Intention	Fear of Violence	Violent Conflict (Log)	Non-Violent Conflict (Log)	Wider Violent Conflict (Log)	Conflict Intensity	RENAMO Violence (Log)	Governments Violence (Log)
FRELIMO	-.073***	-.063***	-.034*	-.088***	-.118***	-.120***	NS
RENAMO	.038*	-.049**	-.062***	-.083***	NS	.058***	-.090***

*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
N=1781

To explain these relationships further, I estimated a series of multilevel binary logistic models, with vote intention modeled at level 1, nested within districts. I use the district as the level-2 unit because it is the lowest level where voting data is available, and it corresponds with the disaggregated violence data. The simultaneous modeling of individual and contextual determinants to explain individual behavior is possible with multilevel analysis. By considering the multilevel structure of data not as a nuisance but as a substance (Jones 1997), multilevel models not only distinguish different variations at different levels but make it possible to measure varying relationships between variables based on the difference of contexts. In this next section, I begin by examining the effect of violence contexts on *RENAMO Vote Intention.* I then examine whether these violent contexts will influence *FRELIMO Vote Intention.*

5.3.5 Statistical Results - RENAMO Vote Intention

The results of the multilevel analysis on vote intention for RENAMO are presented in Table 5.6. Model 1 in Table 5.6 displays the results for the fully unconditional model of voting. The intercept shows the average log-odds of voting for RENAMO across districts, which corresponds to a probability of voting RENAMO of approximately .12; in other words, the probability of choosing to vote for RENAMO in the future was relatively low. This result is not entirely surprising given the low numbers of support for RENAMO in the Afrobarometer survey. Compared to RENAMOs share of the national vote during the 2014 national election (36.6 percent), the percentage of Afrobarometer survey respondents who reported they would vote for RENAMO in the future was much lower (18 percent). However, the question is framed in such a way that it asks for a future vote, not to assess past vote choice. Furthermore, almost a quarter of respondents refused to answer whom they would vote for in the future. It is possible that many respondents did not want to disclose that they would choose RENAMO.

The significant intercept for the model indicates that individuals were found to vary significantly around their district means. Taking into account the intercept coefficient and the district level variance, I found that 95% of the districts lie between .02 and .36 with respect to the average probability of intending to for RENAMO in the future.[66] The probability of voting for RENAMO in the future is relatively low across all districts. It appears that while in some districts, around one-third of respondents said they would vote for RENAMO in the future, in other districts, only 2 percent of respondents said they would. The fully unconditional model, however, does suggest that there is a statistically significant variation in the probability of voting for RENAMO in the future that may be associated with contextual factors.

Model 2 in Table 5.6 estimates a conditional model with no level-2 predictors but with a random intercept in order to consider that the mean percent vote intention for RENAMO is not the same in all districts at the average predictor values. The coefficient for the variable on fear does not support my hypotheses that as fear of violence increases, the log-odds of voting for RENAMO in the future increased.

66 The formula to obtain these values can be found in footnote 13 in Chapter 4

Table 11.6 Multilevel Logit – Vote Intention for RENAMO

	Model 1 Unconditional	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	***Model 6***	*Model 7*	***Model 8***
Fixed Effects								
Level-2 Predictors								
Violent Conflict (Log)			.313					
			(.346)					
Non-Violent Conflict (Log)				.224				
				(.294)				
Wider Violence Conflict (Log)					-.286			
					(.249)			
Conflict Intensity						.058		
						(.074)		
RENAMO Violence (Log)							.976**	
							(.495)	
Government Violence (Log)								.117
								(.390)
Level-1 Predictors								
Fear of Violence		.063	.063	.058	.065	.067	.069	.063
		(.091)	(.091)	(.091)	(.092)	(.091)	(.091)	(.092)
Evaluation of Economy		-.770***	-.775***	-.784***	-.766***	-.770***	-.749***	-.779***
		(.214)	(.213)	(.214)	(.214)	(.214)	(.212)	(.215)
FRELIMO ID		-1.024***	-1.016***	-1.044***	-1.038***	-1.003***	-.992***	-1.024***
		(.220)	(.220)	(.221)	(.221)	(.221)	(.220)	(.221)
RENAMO ID		3.372***	3.364***	3.351***	3.380***	3.375***	3.357***	3.380***
		(.257)	(.256)	(.256)	(.258)	(.256)	(.255)	(.260)
Constant	-1.778***	-.721*	-.764**	-.736*	-.513	-.816**	-.870	-.734
Random Effects Variance Components								
District Effect	.69	.44	.39	.41	.43	.40	.31	.44
Observations	1781	1781	1781	1781	1781	1781	1781	1781
Number of Groups	88	88	88	88	88	88	88	88

Within-Country weights are used in all models
*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Controls Included: Approval of President Performance, Urban/Rural, Education, Age, Gender

Models 3-8 include the level-2 contextual variables on conflict to determine if living in violent contexts affected support for RENAMO. In model 3, I include a measure of violent conflict (log) which captures violent conflict within a district. Violent Conflict was not statistically significant. As in the aggregate models, the occurrence of any type of violent conflict, regardless of the perpetrator or the severity, within a district was not found to influence whether people decided to or not to support RENAMO. The results in models 4 through 6 are similar to Model 3. *Non-violent conflict*, *wider violent conflict*, and *conflict intensity* do not influence RENAMO vote either. Again, the result mirrors the aggregate models, with the exception of wider violent conflict, which significantly predicted RENAMO vote share at the district level.

Models 7 and 8 include the perpetrator variables for RENAMO and Government violence. Model 7 supports my hypothesis that increases in RENAMO violence will lead to increases in support for RENAMO. Holding all other variables at their median values, the predicted probability of reporting

a future vote for RENAMO was in districts without any RENAMO violence was .08 and increased to .29 in districts with the most RENAMO violence. In Model 8, the results indicated no statistically significant impact of government violence on RENAMO vote intention.

As expected, across all models' partisan identifiers were statistically significant. RENAMO identifiers, for example, were 11 times more likely to vote for RENAMO in a future election than those that were unaligned or independent. FRELIMO voters, unsurprisingly, were almost three times less likely to vote for RENAMO than independents or unaligned voters. In order to examine the possibility that violence had a differentiated effect for partisans and unaligned/independent Mozambicans, Model 2 in Table 5.7 incorporates cross-level interactions between RENAMO violence and the partisan variables. The results indicate that RENAMO partisanship significantly moderated the relationship between RENAMO violence and RENAMO vote intention. However, the results are not entirely expected. As RENAMO violence increases, RENAMO support among RENAMO partisans fell. In districts without any RENAMO violence, the predicted probability of voting for RENAMO was around .67 and fell to .58 in districts with the most RENAMO violence. This may have occurred for the same reason that I expected violence to have a punishing effect on incumbents. It is possible that RENAMO violence deterred some RENAMO supporters from voting because they did not believe violence to be a viable political tool. However, the results from the interactions do indicate that compared with RENAMO partisans, the predicted probability of independents and unaligned voters reporting they would support RENAMO in a future election increased. In districts without RENAMO violence the predicted probability of an independent/unaligned reporting support for RENAMO in a future election is around .05 and increases to .27 in districts with the most violence.

Concerning the control variables, *Approval of the President, Evaluations of the Government Handling of the Economy,* and *Age* were statistically significant across all models. *Approval of the President* (a FRELIMO president) was negatively associated with supporting RENAMO. Lastly, attributing a positive evaluation of the government's job on the economy was also negatively related to RENAMO support. In other words, when respondents positively evaluated the performance of the FRELIMO government and approve of the FRELIMO presidency, the odds of them intending to support RENAMO dropped.

Table 11.7 Multilevel Logit – Self-Reported RENAMO Vote Intention Models with Cross-Level Interactions

	Model 1 *No Interactions*	*Model 2* *Cross Level Interactions*
Fixed Effects		
Level-2 Predictors		
RENAMO Violence (Log)	.976** (.495)	1.270** (.556)
Level-1 Predictors		
Fear of Violence	.069 (.091)	.065 (.091)
FRELIMO ID	-.992*** (.219)	-.965*** (.270)
RENAMO ID	3.357*** (.201)	3.624*** (.306)
RENAMO Violence X FRELIMO		-.077 (.703)
RENAMO Violence X RENAMO		-1.523 .844
Constant	-.869	-.931
Random Effects Variance Components		
District Effect	.32	.34
Observations	1781	1781
Number of Groups	88	88

Within-Country weights are used in all models
Robust Standard Errors in Brackets (HC0)
*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Controls Included: Urban/Rural, Gender, Age, Education, Government Economic Performance, Approval of Presidential Performance

5.3.6 Statistical Results - FRELIMO Vote Intention

Do the results from the RENAMO vote intention models hold for FRELIMO? Table 5.8 presents the multilevel models on FRELIMO vote intention. Model 1 in Table 5.8 displays the results for the fully unconditional model of voting. The intercept shows the average log-odds for a future FRELIMO vote across districts, which corresponds to a probability of supporting FRELIMO of approximately .95[67]. in other words, the probability of choosing to vote for FRELIMO in the future is very high.

The significant intercept for the model indicates that individuals were found to vary significantly around their district means. Taking into account the intercept coefficient and the district level variance, I found that 95% of the districts lie between .13 and .86 with respect to the

67 I used the odds ratio (OR) to estimate the probability (*p)* using the formula: $p = OR/(1+OR)$.

average probability of intending to vote for FRELIMO in the future.[68] The probability of voting for FRELIMO varies quite dramatically across all districts. It appears that while in some districts, close to 90 percent of respondents said they would vote for FRELIMO in the future, in other districts, only 13 percent of respondents said they would. The fully unconditional model, however, does suggest that there is a statistically significant variation in the probability of voting for FRELIMO in the future that may be associated with contextual factors.

Model 2 in Table 5.8 estimates a conditional model with no level-2 predictors but with a random intercept in order to consider that the mean percent vote intention for FRELIMO is not the same in all districts at the average predictor values. The results from this model confirm my expectation. The log-odds of expressing an intention to vote for FRELIMO were negatively related to *Fear of Violence.* Individuals who reported that they feared violence and intimidation, the average probability of expressing support for FRELIMO appears to be significantly lower than for individuals who did not report fearing violence. Holding all other variables at their median value, for individuals with the highest fear, the average probability of vote intention for FRELIMO is expected to be about .43. This probability reaches approximately .56 for individuals who do not report any fear.

Model 3 includes the district level variable for *Violent Conflict (log).* Unlike the RENAMO vote intention models, violent conflict was found to have a statistically significant and negative effect on the likelihood of a Mozambican voting for FRELIMO in the future. Based on this model and holding all values at their median values, Mozambicans living in districts that experienced the highest levels of violent conflict were 20 percent less likely to vote for FRELIMO in the future than those living in districts without violent conflict. This result confirms the hypothesis that political violence, in general, has a punishing effect on support for the incumbent. Models 4 and 5, which include the variables for *Non-Violent Conflict (log) and Wider-Violent Conflict (log)* are both insignificant. Non-violent conflict, which includes protests and demonstrations, did not influence support for FRELIMO.

68 The formula to obtain these values can be found in footnote 13 in Chapter 4

Table 11.8 Multilevel Logit – Vote Intention for FRELIMO[69]

	Model 1 Unconditional	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
Fixed Effects								
Level-2 Predictors								
Violent Conflict (Log)			-.543*					
			(.292)					
Non-Violent Conflict (Log)				-.261				
				(.245)				
Wider Violence Conflict (Log)					-.163			
					(.221)			
Conflict Intensity						-.146**		
						(.063)		
RENAMO Violence (Log)							-1.147**	
							(.486)	
Government Violence (Log)								-.377
								(.315)
Level-1 Predictors								
Fear of Violence		-.170**	-.178**	-.173**	-.170**	-.182**	-.176**	-.175**
		(.079)	(.079)	(.079)	(.079)	(.079)	(.079)	(.079)
Evaluation of Economy		.985***	1.001***	.999***	.988***	.993***	.980***	1.001***
		(.165)	(.165)	(.166)	(.166)	(.165)	(.164)	(.166)
FRELIMO ID		2.676***	2.654***	2.666***	2.671***	2.639***	2.654***	2.668***
		(.184)	(.185)	(.185)	(.185)	(.184)	(.184)	(.185)
RENAMO ID		-1.593***	-1.627***	-1.609***	-1.597***	-1.619***	-1.596***	-1.614***
		(.260)	(.261)	(.260)	(.260)	(.260)	(.260)	(.260)
Constant		-1.974***	-1.839***	-1.907***	-1.848***	-1.739***	-1.814***	-1.923***
Random Effects Variance Components								
District Effect		.42	.39	.41	.43	.35	.35	.41
Observations		1781	1781	1781	1781	1781	1781	1781
Number of Groups		88	88	88	88	88	88	88

Within-Country weights are used in all models
*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Controls Included: Approval of President Performance, Urban/Rural, Education, Age, Gender
⊗ Percentage Explained – Between District Variance in voting accounted for by level-2 variables.

This result was similar to the RENAMO vote intention models. Model 6 tests includes the conflict intensity variables, which measures varying degrees of conflict intensity from peaceful to severe (battles and skirmishes). On its own, this model indicates that changing intensities in the conflict have a statistically significant effect on support for FRELIMO. In peaceful districts, the predicted probability of voting for FRELIMO in the future is .51 and drops to .37 in the districts that experienced severe violence.

Models 7 and 8 include the perpetrator variables. In Model 7, RENAMO Violence (log) is statistically significant and negative. The increased frequency of RENAMO violence in a district had a detrimental effect on reported support for FRELIMO. In districts with no violence, the

[69] An additional model was run which included both conflict intensity and RENAMO violence together. Both values were non-significant.

predicted probability of voting for FRELIMO in the future is almost .50. However, this drops down to .14 in the districts which experienced the highest levels of RENAMO violence. Again, this result demonstrates that RENAMOs return to conflict produced a punishing effect on the FRELIMO government. Government violence, on the other hand, did not deter nor bolster future support for FRELIMO (Model 8).

Table 11.9 Multilevel Logit – Self-Reported FRELIMO Vote Intention Models with Cross-Level Interactions

	Model 1 No Interactions	*Model 2 Individual Interactions*	*Model 3 Cross-Level Interactions*
Fixed Effects			
Level-2 Predictors			
RENAMO Violence (Log)	-1.147**	-1.140**	-1.507***
	(.486)	(.493)	(.565)
Level-1 Predictors			
Fear of Violence	-.176**	-.311***	-.310***
	(.079)	(.099)	(.100)
FRELIMO ID	2.654***	2.220***	2.175***
	(.184)	(.241)	(.273)
RENAMO ID	-1.596***	-1.787***	-2.163***
	(.260)	(.373)	(.412)
Fear X FRELIMO		.482**	.487**
		(.193)	(.194)
Fear X RENAMO		.202	.230
		(.271)	(.271)
Violence X FRELIMO			.296
			(.705)
Violence X RENAMO			2.175**
			(.898)
Constant	-1.814***	-1.757***	-1.690***
Random Effects Variance Components			
District Effect	.35	.37	.42
Observations	1781	1781	1781
Number of Groups	88	88	88

Within-Country weights are used in all models
Robust Standard Errors in Brackets (HC0)
*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Controls Included: Urban/Rural, Gender, Age, Education, Government Economic Performance, Approval of Presidential Performance

However, it is not entirely clear who was most influenced by this violence. Considering the importance of partisan identities in Mozambique, I assume that identifying with FRELIMO will reduce the effect of RENAMO violence and the Fear of Violence. On the other hand, I assume that independent and unaligned voters will be the most affected by RENAMOs violence and fear of violence. In order to examine the possibility that violence had a differentiated effect for partisans and unaligned/independent Mozambicans, table 5.9 shows two models which include interaction

effects. Model 2 in Table 5.9 shows the results for the level-1 interactions only. In this model interactions between *Fear of Violence* and the two dummy variables for partisan identification (FRELIMO and RENAMO) were included. The results in model 2 confirm that the interaction between FRELIMO partisanship and fear of violence is statistically significant. Increases in fear violence influenced both unaligned/independent Mozambicans and FRELIMO partisans. What stands out immediately is how fear influenced these two groups differently. FRELIMO partisans, as expected, were largely unaffected by fear of violence. In fact, as fear levels increased amongst FRELIMO partisans, the predicted probability of voting for FRELIMO in the future increased, albeit only slightly. On the other hand, unaligned/independents were found to be much less likely to vote for FRELIMO in the future as their reported fear levels increase. The probability of supporting FRELIMO in a future election for independents/unaligned Mozambicans that expressed no fear of violence was almost 60 percent and dropped to around 35 percent for those saying they feared violence "a lot". This confirms my hypothesis that security issues, particularly amongst independent voters, matters. Although independents and un-aligned voters significantly more likely to be affected by fear of violence that FRELIMO partisans, the same is not true with regards to RENAMO partisans.

In Model 3 of Table 5.9, I tested the cross-level interaction effects between RENAMO Violence (log) and two dummy variables for FRELIMO and RENAMO identification. The results show that the interaction effect between RENAMO Identification and RENAMO violence was statistically significant. As expected, support for FRELIMO amongst RENAMO partisans was largely unaffected by RENAMO violence (considering RENAMO partisans were unlikely to vote FRELIMO in the first place). There is a slight increase for FRELIMO support amongst RENAMO supporters as RENAMO violence increases. This mirrors the slight decrease in support for RENAMO amongst RENAMO partisans in the previous section. However, the increase here is much less, 3 percent. And support for FRELIMO amongst RENAMO partisans never goes above 19 percent (holding all variables at their median values). Compared with RENAMO supporters, independent and unaligned voters are much more effected by RENAMO violence. As RENAMO violence increases, support for FRELIMO in a future election amongst independents and unaligned Mozambicans drops. In districts that did not experience RENAMO violence, the probability of voting for FRELIMO in the future was around 60 percent. This probability drops to 43 percent for independents and unaligned Mozambicans living in districts that saw the most RENAMO violence.

5.4 Conclusion

African voting behavior models have often focused on ethnicity and economic issues as the most important determiners of vote choice. However, noneconomic issues often play an important role in elections and can sometimes define the outcomes of an election. This chapter examined the extent to which electoral support for FRELIMO and RENAMO was shaped by violent contexts, which follows from the argument that the location that an individual is placed within is expected to play a prominent role in shaping citizens' political behavior (Huckfeldt, 1979; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1987).

Individual political preference is a function of the characteristics of that individual and the characteristics of their surrounding environment. The results presented in this chapter support the argument that context matters and shows how violence and conflict can shape voter behavior. This chapter's analysis of the effects of political violence and conflict on vote share and future vote intention in Mozambique speaks to previous findings on the punishing role that violence has on incumbents. Violence in Mozambique harmed support for the incumbent at both the individual and aggregate district levels. Furthermore, opposition violence also harmed the incumbent. When RENAMO was the perpetrator of violence, the probability of voting for Frelimo decreased, supporting the notion that voters may punish the incumbent for its inability to curb the violence or put an end to a conflict or insurgency. Violence stands as a highly salient political issue that can compete with more traditional variables like trust and economic performance in the individual voting decision.

This chapter also provides quantitative evidence showing that emotions play a prominent role in how Mozambicans decide to vote. Fearful citizens were less likely to show support for FRELIMO. However, fear did not play a significant role in mobilizing support for RENAMO. These findings demonstrate that in addition to violence, feelings of insecurity play another important and salient role in how citizens vote. Incumbents are expected to provide safety and security to their citizens, and when this does not happen, voters punish those in office by either withdrawing support or switching their vote. In Mozambique, independents and unaligned voters were more likely to withdraw future support for FRELIMO in districts where violence levels were the most frequent and where fear levels were the highest.

The main conclusion is that political violence, and particularly RENAMO perpetrated political violence, as well as fear of violence, decreased support for FRELIMO during the 2014

general election. This chapter also demonstrated that violence had a positive effect on RENAMOs vote share. However, from the individual analysis, it appears that violence's role was mixed. Violence seems to have helped mobilize support for RENAMO, but it did not appear to encourage independents or unaligned voters and FRELIMO partisans to switch their vote for RENAMO. Independents or unaligned voters were more likely to have stayed at home, possibly contributing to the reduction in FRELIMO vote share. Moreover, FRELIMO voters were largely unaffected by all forms of violence and even fear of violence. I believe these findings have important implications for understanding why armed political groups or political groups with armed-insurgent ties may decide to pursue violence as a viable political strategy. The decision made by Afonso Dhlakama to return to violence after 20 years of relative peace may not have provided RENAMO with a victory; however, it did return RENAMO to political relevance and allowed the political party to recuperate more than a decade of lost support and influence while harming FRELIMO.

Chapter 6: The Effect of Violence on the Supply and Demand of Democracy

6.1 Introduction

How does living in a violent context shape political attitudes towards democracy? Although there is a rich literature that examines how economic and sociodemographic contexts may shape support for and satisfaction with democracy, very little is known about the influence of general violence and even less so about political violence and conflict. In this chapter, I continue my examination of Mozambique, a context marked by increasing levels of political intimidation and violence across the country and a country that continues to have regularly scheduled elections. Mozambique's transition to democracy started better than most expected after the General Peace Accord was signed in 1992 and adopted free and fair elections in 1994. Since then, the consolidation of democratic norms has stalled. Although six relatively free and fair elections have taken place since 1994, rising violence between the Government and the main opposition party RENAMO, assassinations of political leaders, corruption, economic and political insecurity, and growing citizen apathy towards State institutions have led Mozambican scholars to worry about a democratic backslide (see: Carrie Manning, 2010).

If we assume that political participation is the barometer for which democratic consolidation and norms should be measured, Mozambique's picture looks worrisome. Voter turnout levels, as pointed out in Chapter 3, declined dramatically between 1994 and 2004. Less than 35 percent of the voting-age population participated in the 2004 elections. Although an uptick in election participation occurred in the subsequent two election periods (2009, 2014), voter turnout is still considerably lower than its Southern African counterparts, except for Namibia. Mozambique's prospects at fully consolidating its democracy have been hampered by dominant party politics and an obstructionist opposition. Furthermore, the country has been plagued by government corruption, electoral manipulation, and an uneven political playing field, leading to rising animosity between FRELIMO and RENAMO.

FRELIMO's control of both state and economic institutions, and its placement at the center of political life in Mozambique, has forced many Mozambicans with diverging opinions to drop out of the electorate. This general apathy towards political participation, coupled with the RENAMO's inability to transform itself from a group of guerrillas and rebels into a viable political

party, has led to increasing numbers of citizens being unattached to a political party and unwilling to vote. According to Afrobarometer surveys taken in Mozambique, the percentage of Mozambicans that reported feeling close to a political party steadily declined as the number of Mozambicans unattached to a political party increased. Partisan identification dropped by almost 25 percent between 2005 and 2015. Despite the declines in political participation and a decreasing sense of partisan attachment, the 2014 national elections witnessed a resurgence in political participation and renewed faith that change could occur through the ballot.

The chapters on voter turnout and vote choice indicated that conflict and fear of violence influenced individual decisions. More so, violent contexts contributed to a reduction in FRELIMO's vote share and provided RENAMO an opportunity to gain seats in the legislature and improve its share of the presidential vote. However, the increased competition between FRELIMO and RENAMO at the polls did not necessarily signify an improved faith in the democratic system. The consolidation of democracy requires more than attendance at the voting booths on election days. Citizens must not only understand complex political issues and make an informed decision about the choices available to them, but they must also believe democracy is representative, accountable, and accessible. The "deepening" of democracy (Diamond, 1999) involves more than just recurring elections and regime stability. Ultimately, citizens must have confidence that democracy not only works but that it is suitable for them above all other regimes.

This chapter examines how living in violent contexts can influence popular attitudes about democracy. Although the return to conflict coincided with improved overall competitiveness of the election, it may have also come at the expense of the democratization process. On the one hand, Mozambicans rewarded RENAMO's "return to the bush," its engagement in armed conflict with the Government, and its overall anti-FRELIMO attitude, with an increase in support across much of the country. Thirty-seven districts that had voted in favor of FRELIMO in 2009 switched their vote for RENAMO in 2014. More importantly, the majority of these districts were the site of increasing political conflict. On the other hand, violent contexts decreased individual political participation and negatively influenced unaligned and weak partisans. If context matters for political participation and voting behavior, does it matter for shaping attitudes towards democracy? The contextual effects literature has shown that environmental contexts can influence political participation and voter behavior (see Contextual Lit Authors) and influence political attitudes. This chapter evaluates whether living amidst violence influences perceptions about democracy.

In the next section, I discuss recent trends in Mozambique. This section looks at how Mozambicans perceive democracy, whether they are satisfied with the way democracy works, and whether they prefer other forms of authoritarian rule. I introduce the concepts of the supply and demand of democracy, which are more rigorous ways to understand democratic satisfaction and democratic support. In the third section, I test whether violent contexts and fear of violence influence the perceived supply of and demand for democracy. In the fifth section, I examine whether the findings in Mozambique apply to the rest of the African continent. This section uses Afrobarometer data from 32 African countries to assess the impact of violence on the support of and demand for democracy.

6.2 Mozambican Supply and Demand for Democracy

Are Mozambicans satisfied with democracy? Do they believe that their country is a democracy? And more importantly, do Mozambicans generally support democracy as a form of government? From 2002 to 2015, there has been a steady decline in how Mozambicans perceive democracy. Furthermore, the return to armed conflict in 2013 coincided with a sharp drop in support for democracy and the belief that Mozambique is a democracy. Figure 2 shows how public attitudes about democracy have decreased in the long run. According to the Afrobarometer Round 6 survey, less than half of Mozambicans in 2015 believed that Mozambique was either a full democracy or a democracy with minor problems, compared to almost 70 percent in 2002 when the first Afrobarometer survey in Mozambique was taken. In 2002, more than half of Mozambicans reported being very satisfied or fairly satisfied with the way democracy functioned. By 2015, the number of Mozambicans satisfied with democracy dropped to 22.4 percent. Support for democracy also dropped since the 2002 Afrobarometer surveys were conducted.

In 2002, 53.9 percent of Mozambicans who were interviewed stated that democracy was preferable to all other authoritarian regimes. In 2012, this increased to 63 percent of Mozambicans. However, by the Round 6 surveys in 2015, less than half of all Mozambicans interviewed (44.2 percent) stated they preferred democracy.

Another way of viewing this is to understand how Mozambicans perceive that democracy is being supplied and whether they demand democracy. Supply of democracy is a more rigorous way to understand whether citizens are satisfied with the way democracy works and the extent to which they believe their country is one. This concept first appeared in an Afrobarometer report

(Bentely, Han, and Penar, 2015) and assess two survey questions. *1. In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Mozambique today? Is it a full democracy, a democracy with minor problems, a democracy with major problems, or not a democracy?* And *2. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [this country] today? Are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, not at all satisfied?* According to the survey, 42.2 percent of respondents reported Mozambique as either full democracy or a democracy with minor problems, and 22.4 percent stated they were fairly satisfied or very satisfied with democracy. On the other hand, 35.3 percent of respondents reported that Mozambique was not a democracy or a democracy with major problems, and almost 60 percent reported that they were not very satisfied or not satisfied with democracy. To understand whether a citizen believes there is a sufficient supply of democracy in their country, they must be both satisfied with democracy and believe that their country is a democracy. According to the Afrobarometer Round 6 survey, only 16 percent of respondents believed a supply of democracy in the country.

If Mozambicans are less satisfied with democracy, and less likely to think the country is a democracy, do they still want a democracy? In order to address this question, I discuss the concept of 'demand' for democracy to understand how committed citizens are to democracy. The construction of the *demand for democracy* variable follows Mattes and Bratton's (2016) idea of a "committed democrat." A committed democrat is someone who supports democracy and rejects all non-democratic regime alternatives. Support for democracy variable was taken from the Afrobarometer Round 6 survey, where respondents were asked the following question: *Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? 1. Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; 2. In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable; 3. For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.* According to the survey, 44.8 percent of Mozambicans reported that democracy is preferable to any kind of government; 17.5 percent of Mozambicans stated that in some circumstances, a non-democratic government would be preferable; 13 percent of Mozambicans reported it doesn't matter what kind of government they have, and almost 25 percent said they did not know.

However, as Mattes and Bratton (2016) stated, "among professed supporters of democracy, some may be merely paying lip service (p.4)." Therefore, it is necessary to understand the extent to which a citizen supports democracy. In the Afrobarometer Round six survey, respondents were asked if they reject various forms of authoritarian rule such as one-party rule, military rule, and

one-man rule. According to the survey, almost half of all respondents (49.6 percent) disapproved or strongly disapproved of one-party rule, while 32.7 percent approved or strongly approved of one-party rule. Less than half of respondents rejected military rule (43.3 percent); however, only 26 percent approved or strongly approved military rule. Lastly, only 33.4 percent of respondents rejected one-man rule while 30.9 approved or strongly approved. Table 6.1 shows the breakdown for each question. In Mozambique, only 19 percent of respondents disapproved of all three forms of non-democratic rule.

Table 12.1 Mozambican Approval of Non-Democratic Forms of Government

	One-Party Rule	**Military Rule**	**One-Man Rule**
Strongly Disapprove	17.6 (n=423)	14.9 (n=358)	10.9 (n=262)
Disapprove	32.0 (n=768)	28.4 (n=682)	22.5 (n=539)
Neither Approve nor Disapprove	10.0 (n=239)	19.1 (n=458)	15.4 (n=369)
Approve	23.4 (n=562)	19.5 (n=467)	22.4 (n=538)
Strongly Approve	9.3 (n=224)	6.5 (n=155)	8.5 (n=205)
Don't Know	7.9 (n=185)	11.7 (n=280)	20.3 (n=487)
	100% (N=2400)	100% (N=2400)	100% (N=2400)

To understand whether citizens genuinely are committed to democracy, they must both believe that democracy is preferable to all other forms of government while rejecting all the authoritarian alternatives. In this case, the number of committed democrats is meager. Only 8.7 percent of respondents demanded democracy fully. In other words, only 8.7 percent of Mozambicans rejected non-democratic alternatives to democracy while also reporting a preference for democracy.

Between the Afrobarometer survey's Round 5 (conducted in 2012) and Round 6 (conducted in 2015), the perceived supply of democracy decreased from 29 percent to 16 percent, and the demand for democracy dropped from 26 percent to just 9 percent. Citizens in Mozambique have the lowest demand for democracy out of the 36 countries surveyed by the Afrobarometer and are close to the bottom in the perceived supply of democracy. Only Sudan, Gabon, Sao Tome, and Principe, and Madagascar rank lower in perceptions of the supply of democracy. While Mattes and Bratton (2016, p.22) note that across Africa, "recent setbacks in popular democratic attitudes should be viewed in the broader context of generally positive long-term gains," for Mozambique specifically, the long-term trend has not been favorable and is a cause for concern.

Mattes and Shenga (2007) labeled Mozambicans as "uncritical citizens" based on a Round 2 Afrobarometer survey. The authors found that Mozambicans tended to have high levels of satisfaction with the supply of democracy, while they had low demand levels. They explain that this "uncritical" citizenship results from a low-information environment whereby Mozambicans low levels of education, access to media, and general apathy towards politics, leave citizens unable to make proper assessments about the supply of democracy and governance. Furthermore, they found that Mozambicans who experienced a greater supply of political freedom and believed that the national economy was improving were less likely to criticize the government and its ability to supply democracy. Figure 6.1 shows that the gap between Mozambicans perceived supply of democracy and their demand for democracy shrunk considerably over the three additional rounds of Afrobarometer surveys. By Round 5, which was conducted in 2012, demand for democracy increased by 11 percent, while the perceived supply of democracy reduced by 18 percent. Mozambicans' "uncritical" assessment about the perceived supply of democracy started to reflect the actual state of democracy in the country. After a controversial election in 2009, which saw then-President Armando Guebuza of FRELIMO win by more than three-quarters of the vote and his party secure more than 76 percent of the National Assembly seats, Freedom House moved Mozambique off its electoral-democracy list. The demotion was primarily due to significant irregularities and a lack of transparency pertaining to the registration of candidates and the tabulation of votes (Freedom House, 2010).

Figure 12.1 Supply of and Demand for Democracy Trends in Mozambique



The closing gap between the perceived supply of and demand for democracy suggests that Mozambicans became more critical about their assessments and evaluations of the government's political and economic performance. It might be expected that in a democracy, decreases in the supply of democracy would lead to increases in the demand for democracy. Norris (1999:3) characterizes critical citizens as those people who support democracy but increasingly find the existing structure of government wanting. In the past, Mozambicans had very high trust in leaders and political institutions but a low commitment to democracy itself (Mattes and Shenga, 2007). However, Mozambicans continued low level of commitment to democracy is being met by lower levels of trust in the institutions and leaders. General apathy towards the leadership of Mozambique has followed a general apathy towards democratic governance. As Colin Darch (2017: 15) states, "[T]he political system that emerged after the General Peace Accord (GPA) can perhaps best be understood not as a radical democratization and abandonment of FRELIMO's dominant political discourse, but as a reconfiguration that made room for such institutional arrangements as free elections and a multiplicity of political parties but did not fundamentally change the existing map of power." FRELIMO's continued dominance across all aspects of state-society relations has led to a frustrated public disillusioned, mainly with the capacity of the electoral process to promote change or even well-being (Darch, 2017). This frustration has translated into consistently low voter turnout during elections (VAP turnout has not exceeded 50 percent since the 1999 national election), a lack of faith that the existing political parties can make any meaningful changes to lives of Mozambicans (the number of unaligned or independent Mozambicans continues to increase), and discontentment with institutions that have become increasingly corrupt and less capable (trust levels for almost every major Mozambican institution continue to decline).

Figure 6.2 shows how trust levels in Mozambique have declined. In 2005, Mozambicans exhibited high levels of trust in the President (80.6 percent), the National Assembly (74.6 percent), and the FRELIMO party (75.9 percent). However, by 2015 trust levels, much like the perceived supply of and demand for democracy, dropped considerably. Trust in almost every leader and institution fell, except for trust in the opposition. Mozambican trust in opposition parties rose from a low of 17 percent during Afrobarometer Round 4 to just under 40 percent during Afrobarometer Round 6. Although the decreases were gradual, the most significant decreases happened between Afrobarometer Round 5 and Afrobarometer Round 6, which coincide with the renewal of conflict.

Mozambicans may be turning into more critical citizens, but they are not turning into committed democrats. The allure of democracy that seemed so bright has begun to fade. Darch (2017: 16) points out that "Mozambique has not yet achieved a shift to a system in which political opponents are viewed as co-participants within a stable and responsive system in which difference are debated and worked through – in other words, to an acceptance of a new and broadly democratic idea of national unity."

Figure 12.2 Mozambican Trust in Different Institutions



In the face of rising violence, Mozambican citizens have lost trust in the way democracy functions and have, at the same time, lost an appetite for it. Bateson (2010) and Fernandez and Kuenzi (2010) have both found evidence that violence depresses perceptions of the benefits of democracy. As violence increases, belief in the government's ability to provide safety and security to its citizens diminishes. And when the governments are democratic, citizens lose faith in democracy's ability to provide stability. While a substantial body of literature exists on the causes of electoral and political violence, we know comparatively little about its consequences and even less so about its effect on individual attitudes towards democracy. In the following two sections, I test the hypotheses set out in chapter 3 about the effect of violent contexts and fear on attitudes about democracy in Mozambique.

6.3 The Effect of Violence on the Perceived Supply of, and Demand for Democracy

In this section, I test the effect of violent contexts and individual fear of violence on citizens' perception that a supply of democracy is present in Mozambique and whether citizens also demand democracy. I rely on Afrobarometer Round 6 data (conducted in 2015) and district level violence data collected from ACLED between 2012 and 2015 just before the survey was collected.

6.3.1 Dependent Variable

As was mentioned in the previous section, the *Supply of Democracy* variable is a more rigorous way to assess democratic satisfaction. The *Supply of Democracy* variable is derived from two questions taken from the Afrobarometer survey. The first question asks, *1. In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Mozambique today? Is it a full democracy, a democracy with minor problems, a democracy with major problems, or not a democracy?* This question, which represents the *extent of democracy*, is turned into a dichotomous variable, whereby 1 = someone who thinks Mozambique is either a full democracy or a democracy with minor problems, and 0 = either a democracy with major problems or not a democracy at all. The second question asks, *Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [this country] today? Are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, not at all satisfied?* Again, this variable is turned into a dichotomous variable whereby 1 = very satisfied or fairly satisfied and 0 = not very satisfied or not at all satisfied. This variable represents *Satisfaction with Democracy.* The two questions were combined to create a binary variable representing the *supply of democracy* where 1 = someone who thinks their country is either a full democracy or a democracy with minor problems and is either very or fairly satisfied with the way democracy works. In this section, I will test my hypothesis on all three variables.

The *Demand for Democracy* variable, also mentioned in the previous section, is a more exhaustive way of understanding support for democracy. In this case, the *Demand for Democracy* is derived from two variables: support for democracy and rejection of all authoritarian alternatives. The first variable comes from an Afrobarometer Round 6 question which asks respondents which statement is closest to their own opinion. *1. Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; 2. In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable; 3. For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.* I turned this question into a

dichotomous variable where 1 = someone who reported that democracy is preferable to any kind of government, and 0 for all other answers. The second variable comes from three questions that ask respondents about their approval or disapproval of non-democratic forms of government; one-party rule, military rule, one-man rule (see the breakdown in table 1). From these three questions, I created a variable that identifies respondents who reject all non-democratic forms of government. The variable is coded 1 = Disapproves or strongly disapproves of one-party rule, military rule, and one-man rule, and 0 everything else. The two variables, *Reject* and *Support*, are then combined to create the *Demand for Democracy* variable. The dichotomous variable is coded 1 = someone who rejects all forms of non-democratic alternatives and finds democracy preferable to all other forms of government, and 0 = everyone else.

6.3.2 Independent Variable

As in the previous chapters, this chapter relies on six different conflict measures derived from ACLED v.7. All conflict events between January 1st, 2012, and October 15th, 2014 are included. I first use the variable *Violent Conflict,* which captures any event that was considered a riot or protest with a violent outcome; violence against civilians; battles; events which caused the displacement of the population; any event that utilized weaponry; and which caused the destruction of property. Second, I use *Non-Violent Conflict,* which measures the number of protests/demonstrations, any non-violent transfer of territory; the establishment of any headquarters or bases; and demands or claims connected with a threat but with an absence of physical violence. Third, incorporate the measure of *Wider Violent Conflict* introduced in chapter 4. I also included a variable on *Conflict Intensity* and two variables on the perpetrator of the violence *RENAMO Violence* and *Government Violence*. In addition to the contextual violence variables, I include a variable that measures an individual's fear of violence. The construction for all of these variables can be found in Chapter 4. Table 6.2 shows the percentage of respondents who demand democracy and perceive a supply of democracy at different levels of fear.

Table 12.2 Fear of Violence and Dependent Variables

Fear of Violence	Support for Democracy	Reject Alternative Regimes	Demand
No Fear	47.3 percent	21.3 percent	10.9 percent
A little Fear	41.9 percent	17.4 percent	6.3 percent
Somewhat Fearful	46.8 percent	13.1 percent	6.1 percent
A lot of Fear	40.0 percent	23.4 percent	11.1 percent
Fear of Violence	**Satisfied with Democracy**	**Extent of Democracy**	**Supply of Democracy**
No Fear	22.2 percent	42.7 percent	18.8 percent
A little Fear	24.7 percent	36.5 percent	16.2 percent
Somewhat Fearful	24.9 percent	35.3 percent	13.4 percent
A lot of Fear	11.5 percent	35.7 percent	7.7 percent

What stands out most is how fear of violence has a negative effect on most of the variables. Almost half of all Mozambicans who did not fear violence were more likely to support democracy (47.3 percent), compared to 40 percent who said they did fear violence. Mozambicans reported a lot of fear violence were less likely to be satisfied with democracy, believe Mozambique is a democracy, and perceive a supply of democracy.

Included in the analysis are several control variables that have been identified as determinants of support for and satisfaction with democracy, including the sociodemographic variables gender, education, age, and whether an individual resides in a rural community. Also, variables measuring how citizens evaluate the economic performance of the government are included. Citizen perceptions of regime performance can be distinguished between intrinsic and instrumental evaluations (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Bratton and Mattes, 2001). Intrinsic evaluations refer to how citizens respond to personal and political freedoms and responsive government (Bratton and Mattes 2001; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998). These evaluations are linked to essential features of a democratic system.

On the other hand, instrumental evaluations refer to citizens supporting democracy because they benefit from desirable governance outputs such as economic performance and delivery of services. Research has demonstrated a link between economic performance and other instrumental goods and support for and satisfaction with democracy (Dalton, 1994; Magalhães 2014; Rose and Mishler 1996; Armingeon and Guthmann 2014). There have been several studies that have included both measures of intrinsic and instrumental performance and found that the former is often a more significant determinant (Diamond 1999; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Mattes Denemark, and Niemi 2016).

I also include three variables identifying partisan affiliation. Partisanship is claimed to structure political behavior and political attitudes more broadly, providing an attitudinal linkage between citizens and the state (Hooghe and Kern, 2013). Partisan ties are expected to not only help determine support for a specific political party and its candidates but also more generally for the party system (Clarke & Stewart, 1998; Dennis & Owen, 2001), political values (Goren, 2005), and democratic procedures (Dalton & Wattenberg 2002; Dalton 2004). In other words, partisanship can shape various abstract ideas about the good and just society (Goren, 2005 p.882) and potentially influence citizen attitudes about democracy. Therefore, I include two binary variables that distinguish FRELIMO identification and RENAMO identification. Table 6.3 shows how the percentages from each group that perceive a supply of and demand for democracy. Across the supply variables, FRELIMO partisans have a higher percentage of reported satisfaction with democracy, belief that their country is a democracy, and over perceptions of the supply of democracy. RENAMO partisans and Independent/Unaligned Mozambicans show much lower satisfaction with democracy, less belief in Mozambique as a democracy, and lower perceptions that there is a supply of democracy in Mozambique. Similarly, support for democracy is greatest among FRELIMO partisans (48.9 percent). However, RENAMO partisans and Independent/Unaligned voters are more likely to reject non-democratic regimes, and a higher share of independent/unaligned voters have an overall demand for democracy (9.4%). Although for all three partisan groups, the demand for democracy is less than 10 percent.

Table 12.3 Partisan Variables and Dependent Variables

Partisanship	**Satisfied with Democracy**	**Extent of Democracy**	**Supply of Democracy**
FRELIMO ID	29.8 percent	52.6 percent	22.4 percent
RENAMO ID	14.8 percent	27.4 percent	10.1 percent
Independent ID	16.8 percent	36.8 percent	11.9 percent
Partisanship	**Support for Democracy**	**Reject Alternative Regimes**	**Demand**
FRELIMO ID	48.9 percent	15.4 percent	8.2 percent
RENAMO ID	32.1 percent	27.0 percent	6.8 percent
Independent ID	42.2 percent	20.4 percent	9.4 percent

6.3.3 Analytical Strategy

What is the relationship between violent contexts and fear of violence on the supply and demand for democracy? According to table 6.4, there are small but statistically significant correlations between the violence variables and the supply and demand variables. As expected, the *Supply of*

Democracy and the two variables that make it up, the *extent of democracy,* and *satisfaction with democracy,* are negatively associated with the violence variables. This result suggests that Mozambican satisfaction with democracy and the extent they believe their country to be a democracy are negatively affected within certain violent contexts. Fear of violence also has a negative association with the perceived supply of democracy. For the *Demand for Democracy* variable and its associated parts, the relationship looks different. The *Demand* variable is positively associated with violent contexts and violent contexts where the government committed violence. Although this correlation is tiny, it does suggest that violence may increase the desire for democratic governance. The *Support for Democracy* and the *Reject Authoritarian Alternatives* variables are also positively associated with some of the violence variables, including government violence. Violence committed by the government may be seen as an anti-democratic act, and this may spur citizens to reject what they believe are authoritarian practices and increase the desire and support for democracy.

Table 12.4 Correlations of Supply and Demand and indicators of Fear/Violence

	Fear of Violence	Violence	Non-Violence	Wide-Violence	Conflict Intensity	RENAMO Violence	Government Violence
Supply	-.090***	NS	-.034*	NS	-.035*	-.060**	NS
Extent	-.053**	.039*	-.041**	NS	NS	-.039*	.071***
Satisfaction	-.041**	NS	-.037*	-.037*	-.044**	-.052**	NS
Demand	NS	.061***	NS	.040**	.042**	NS	.068***
Support	-.035*	.058***	.063***	.066**	NS	.045**	.066***
Reject Others	NS	.059***	NS	NS	.090***	NS	.052**

*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

In order to understand these relationships further, I estimated a series of multilevel binary logistic models. To take into consideration the multilevel nature of the data (respondents within districts), multilevel generalized linear models were estimated using R. This approach allows for the inclusion of violence contextual variables that measure district-specific conditions and also provides a method that addresses the violation of the assumption of independence of errors for clustered or nested data (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).

The level-1 equation is:

$$\text{(1) Log } [\pi_{ij} /(1- \pi_{ij})] = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}(\text{Fear of Violence})_{ij} + \beta_{2j}(\text{FRELIMO ID})_{ij} + \beta_{3j}(\text{RENAMO ID})_{ij} + + \beta_{4j}(\text{Government Performance})_{ij} + \beta_{5j}(\text{Age})_{ij} + \beta_{6}j(\text{Education})ij + \beta_{7}j(\text{Urban/Rural})ij + \beta_{8j}(\text{Radio Access})_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

The level-2 model

$$\beta 0j = \gamma 00 + \gamma 01(\text{Violence Variables}) + \mu 0j$$

6.3.4 Statistical Results: The Effect of Violence on the Supply of and Demand for Democracy

Table 12.5 Multilevel Logit - Supply of Democracy Models

	Model 1 Fear	*Model 2 Violent*	*Model 3 Non-Violent*	*Model 4 Wide Violence*	*Model 5 Conflict Intensity*	*Model 6 RENAMO Violence*	*Model 7 Government Violence*
Fixed Effects							
Level-2 Predictors							
Violent Conflict (Log)		-.294 (.267)					
Non-Violent Conflict (Log)			-.219 (.225)				
Wider Violence Conflict (Log)				-.076 (.198)			
Conflict Intensity					-.078 (.059)		
RENAMO Violence (Log)						-1.021** (.480)	
Government Violence (Log)							-.049 (.287)
Fear of Violence	-.324*** (.074)	-.328*** (.074)	-.327*** (.074)	-.325*** (.074)	-.330*** (.074)	-.328*** (.074)	-.324*** (.074)
FRELIMO ID	.305** (.138)	.289** (.138)	.292** (.138)	.299** (.139)	.286** (.138)	.292** (.138)	.302** (.138)
RENAMO ID	-.094 (.284)	-.108 (.284)	-.109 (.284)	-.096 (.283)	-.101 (.284)	-.091 (.284)	-.098 (.284)
Constant	-2.487***	-2.413***	-2.419***	-2.428***	-2.370***	-2.383***	-2.479***
Random Effects Variance Components							
District Effect	.36	.35	.35	.36	.35	.34	.36
Observations	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400
Number of Groups	88	88	88	88	88	88	88

Within-Country weights are used in all models
Standard Errors in Brackets
*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Controls Included: Urban/Rural, Gender, Age, Education, Government Economic Performance, Radio

Table 6.5 shows the multilevel analysis results for the binary dependent variable on the *supply of democracy*. The result that stands out immediately is the negative effect that *fear of violence* has on the perception that there is a supply of democracy. Model 1 does not include any level-2 contextual predictors, only the intercept to account for variation between districts. The negative and statistically significant coefficient for the variable on fear of violence indicates that as fear of violence increases, the probability of perceiving a supply of democracy decreases. Table 6.6 shows the predicted probabilities of perceiving a supply of democracy at different levels of fear, based on model 1 in table 6.5.

Table 12.6 Fear of Violence and Perceiving the Supply of Democracy based on Model 1

Fear of Violence Levels	Predicted Probability of Perceived Supply of Democracy
No Fear	.15
A little bit of Fear	.12
Somewhat Fearful	.09
A lot of Fear	.06

The predicted probability of perceiving a supply of democracy for a Mozambican[70] who did not report fearing violence was around .15. However, when a Mozambican reported that they fear violence a lot, the predicted probability decreased to .06. This result is similar to the evidence found in chapter 4 on voter turnout. Increases in fear of violence have the effect of reducing a Mozambican's propensity to participate in elections (chapter 4) and reduces the probability that they are satisfied with democratic governance and whether they believe their country is a democracy. The rest of the models include the contextual violence variables. Contrary to my expectations, violent contexts did not significantly affect the perceived supply of democracy, except for RENAMO violence. Model 6 in table 5 indicates that increases in RENAMO violence led to a statistically significant reduction in the likelihood that a Mozambican perceived a supply of democracy. Figure 6.3 shows the predicted probabilities of reporting a supply of democracy based on Model 6 in Table 6.5.

Holding all variables at their median values, the predicted probability of perceiving a supply of democracy for an individual living in a district that experienced RENAMO violence one

[70] This is based on a 33-year-old, female Mozambican, who lives in a rural area and has completed primary school. In addition, she is a FRELIMO partisan, who owns a radio and believes the government's performance with the economy is good.

standard deviation below the mean was around 14 percent. For Mozambicans living in districts with RENAMO violence one standard deviation above the mean, the predicted probability of perceiving a supply of democracy reduced to 9 percent. The effect of RENAMO violence holds when running models with the *extent of democracy* and *satisfaction with democracy* as the primary dependent variables. In the Supply of Democracy models, partisan identification with FRELIMO is a statistically significant and positive predictor of perceiving that Mozambique has a supply of democracy. In order to further probe the importance of partisanship in Mozambique, I ran additional tests interacting the partisan variables with *Fear of Violence* and *RENAMO Violence.* The interaction effects were not statistically significant. Partisanship did not influence the relationship between fear of violence or living in a violent context and the perception that Mozambique has a supply of democracy.

Figure 12.3 Predicted Probability of Supply of Democracy at Different Levels of RENAMO Violence



Table 6.7 shows the multilevel analysis results for the binary dependent variable on the *Demand for Democracy*. Contrary to my hypothesis (set out in chapter 3), neither violent contexts nor fear of violence significantly predict demand for democracy. Furthermore, partisanship does not have a statistically significant effect on demand. These results hold for the support for democracy

variables and the rejection of authoritarian regimes. In the demand models, the only statistically significant variables were gender, education, and urban/rural. As the conventional wisdom would assume, increases in education level would also accompany demands for democracy. The positive coefficient for the urban/rural variable is also not surprising. People living in urban communities are more likely to see the benefits of democracy and demand more. Lastly, gender had a significant, albeit small, effect on the demand for democracy. Males were significantly more likely to demand democracy than their female counterparts. What is surprising is that assessments of how the government handles the economy is not significantly related to a demand for democracy. However, when looking at the models on support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian alternatives, the story is different. Across these models, citizens that assess the government's handling of the economy as either "fairly good" or "very good" were significantly more likely to support democracy than those that did not. In addition, the support and reject models also were significantly predicted by age. Most interesting here is that older Mozambicans were more likely to support democracy and reject authoritarian alternatives across both models, respectively. Lastly, those who have radio access are also more likely to demand democracy than those who do not.

Table 12.7 Multilevel Logit - Demand for Democracy Model

	Model 1 Fear	*Model 2 Violent*	*Model 3 Non-Violent*	*Model 4 Wide Violence*	*Model 5 Conflict Intensity*	*Model 6 RENAMO Violence*	*Model 7 Government Violence*
Fixed Effects							
Level-2 Predictors							
Violent Conflict (Log)		.278					
		(.310)					
Non-Violent Conflict			-..099				
(Log)			(.266)				
Wider Violent				.330			
Conflict (Log)				(.242)			
Conflict Intensity					.027		
					(.074)		
RENAMO Violence						.218	
(Log)						(.506)	
Government Violence							.366
(Log)							(.332)
Fear of Violence	-.020	-.003	-.006	-.005	-.004	-.005	-.003
	(.085)	(.085)	(.085)	(.085)	(.085)	(.085)	(.085)
FRELIMO ID	-.122	-.038	-.061	-.030	-.046	-.050	-.037
	(.289)	(.176)	(.177)	(.177)	(.178)	(.176)	(.176)
RENAMO ID	-.016	.082	.065	.087	.077	.073	.092
	(.378)	(.304)	(.304)	(.303)	(.303)	(.303)	(.302)
Constant	-3.275	-3.914	-3.811	-4.091	-3.880	-3.868	-3.900
Random Effects Variance Components							
District Effect		.578	.562	.549	.576	.577	.568
Observations		2400	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400
Number of Groups		88	88	88	88	88	88

Within-Country weights are used in all models
Standard Errors in Brackets
*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Controls Included: Urban/Rural, Gender, Age, Education, Government Economic Performance, Radio

6.4 Supply and Demand of Democracy Across Africa

In the second part of this study, I examine the effect of political violence on the supply and demand for democracy across the African continent. African countries provide a rich and heterogeneous sample of cases to study transitional democracies and the influence of conflict. The African continent has experienced unprecedented growth in democratic institutions over the last three decades. However, the consolidation period has not always been peaceful and has been marked by increases in political violence. Although democratic elections have become a mainstay in many of Africa's post-colonial states, other important elements of a fully democratized country have not cemented. The central challenge for the African continent has been the ability to build accountable, capable governments that can deliver security and inclusive growth. More than any other part of the world, with the exception of some Middle Eastern countries, African nations have a conflict

burden that is significantly higher than the global average. From the post-Cold War period to the present, Africa's populations have doubled, increasing by an estimated 89% (or by 546 million people) to 1.159 billion. In 1989, Africa had 12% of the world's population and 39% of its armed conflict. By 2014, Africa was home to 16% of the world's population and 52% of the world's armed conflict (ISS Paper 287, October 2015).

The rise in political violence and armed conflict across the African region has been made more complicated by the changing nature of conflict itself. In a world where war between countries is seldom officially declared and where the nature of organized violence has changed, the dividing line between armed conflict, organized crime, and extremist political violence/terrorism has become blurred. With its associated high number of fatalities, the traditional armed conflict has been in steady decline but has been supplanted by more subversive and oppressive forms of political violence. Although fatalities in conflict events have decreased considerably over the last 20 years, the number of conflict incidents has dramatically increased. Furthermore, since 2010 there has been a dramatic increase in social and political violence.

In "The future of intrastate conflict in Africa: More violence or greater peace?" (Cillier and Bello-Schünemann, 2013) found several structural correlations associated with intrastate armed conflict across Africa. The authors found that political violence and armed conflict were likely in countries with weak governance, a history of conflict, proximity to other unstable and violent countries, widespread youth unemployment and exclusion, and a median age of less than 25 years. Furthermore, many countries experiencing conflict increases are also characterized by low levels of political and economic inclusion. However, very little research has focused on how these increases in conflict and political violence ultimately affect the consolidation of democracy. Many African governments are of a mixed regime type (so-called anocracies or hybrid regimes), displaying both democratic and autocratic characteristics.[71] These regime types are inherently less stable than either autocracies or full multi-party democracies. The ongoing democratization process in Africa inevitably increases instability, and which can diminish public support for democracy.

[71] Since the 1990s, there has been an increased skepticism about the outcomes of the 'third wave' of democracy. Scholars have identified a number of regimes that are neither clearly democratic nor conventionally authoritarian. These regimes are situated between liberal democracy and dictatorship and have been viewed with various adjectives. For a more thorough discussion on these hybrid regimes see (Bogaards 2009; Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 1996, 2002 ; Schedler, 2006; Levitsky and Way 2002; Brownlee 2007;

According to survey data conducted by the Afrobarometer, African citizens' demand for democracy steadily increased from the Afrobarometer round 2 until Afrobarometer round 5. The same trend can be said for African perceptions about the supply of democracy in their country; however, the average is around 7 percent lower than the demand for democracy. Despite the positive trend in both the perceived supply and the demand for democracy, Afrobarometer round 6 shows a noticeable drop in both the supply of and demand for democracy. This decrease in overall support for democracy coincided with a sharp increase in political violence events in Afrobarometer surveyed countries. As well, the decrease in the number of political violence-related fatalities between 2002 and 2006 has reversed (See Figure 6.4).

Figure 12.4 Trends - Violence, Deaths, Supply, and Demand



6.4.1 Cross-National Level Analysis

Despite the increased prevalence of conflict across much of Africa, there remains very little systematic, cross-country empirical research examining the consequences of political violence[72] and even less examining how political violence influences support for democracy. In this section, I use merged ACLED political conflict data (2013-2015) with Afrobarometer Round 6 data to

[72] Bekoe and Burchard (2017) provide one of the few cross-national studies in Africa on the consequences of pre-electoral violence on political participation. Johanna Söderstrom (2017) uses Afrobarometer data to assess the influence of political violence and fear (using SCAD social conflict data) on political knowledge.

assess the influence of political violence on support for democracy. I constructed a data set that includes 31 countries from AB round 6 and which also provide variation in the levels of political violence and deaths from political violence.[73,74] Afrobarometer surveys provide a unique look at political sentiments across Africa. It includes a variety of questions related to democracy, fear, insecurity, and political violence. The surveys were conducted between 2014 and 2015. The following sections describe the questions and variables used for the cross-national micro-level analysis.

Dependent Variables:

The main dependent variables used throughout the cross-national analysis are the same as in the Mozambique section: Supply and Demand. For construction of these two variables, refer to those sections.

6.4.2 Independent Variables:

For the cross-national analysis, I use two measures of country-level violence take from ACLED. The first variable, *Political Violence*, was constructed by taking the number of political violence events in the one year leading up to each Afrobarometer country survey. The second variable measures the number of fatalities caused by political violence events in the same period leading up to the Afrobarometer survey. In the analysis, both variables are logged due to the right skewness of the data.[75] The two variables are tested in separate models, as they are highly correlated.[76]

In both the supply and demand cross-national analysis I included two variables for partisanship: *Government Support* and *Opposition Support*. *Government Support* is a binary variable where 1 indicates that the individual is a supporter of the government that is currently in power and 0 indicates otherwise. *Opposition Support* is a binary variable where 1 indicates support for any political party that is not currently in power and 0 is otherwise. Across the 31 African countries included in this analysis, partisan attachments to the government or an opposition party

[73] The cross-national analysis includes Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
[74] Five countries were excluded from the analysis due to missing or incomplete data – Togo, Lesotho, São Tome and Principe, Cape Verde, Swaziland.
[75] Political Violence (Log): Mean = 1.72, Min. = 0, Max. = 4.06, SD = 1.05; Political Violence Deaths (Log): Mean = 1.67, Min. = 0, Max = 3.15, SD = .749.
[76] .821***

are quite low. Individuals that support the governing political party is around 28 percent, while those individuals supporting an opposition party is 27 percent. The majority of those surveyed (almost 42 percent) stated no attachment to any political party.

6.4.3 Analytical Strategy

Given that I propose to examine the contextual effects of violence on the supply and demand for democracy, I estimate a series of multilevel models, with the supply of democracy and demand for democracy modeled at level 1, nested within countries.

The level-1 equation is:

$$(1)\ \text{Log}\left[\pi_{ij}/(1-\pi_{ij})\right] = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}(\text{Fear of Violence})_{ij} + \beta_{2j}(\text{GovEconPerformance})_{ij} + \beta_{3j}(\text{Urban/Rural})_{ij} + \beta_{4j}(\text{Gender})ij + \beta_{5j}(\text{Education})_{ij} + \beta_{6j}(\text{Partisan ID})_{ij} + \beta 7j(\text{Age})ij + \beta_{8j}(\text{Radio Access})_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

The level-2 model

$$(2)\ \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{Political Violence/Political Violence Deaths}) + \mu_{0j}$$

6.4.4 Cross-National Results

Table 12.8 – Cross-National Multi-Level Logit Supply of Democracy

	Supply 1	*Supply 2 Political Violence*	*Supply 3 Interactions*	*Supply 4 Deaths*	*Supply 5 Interactions*
Level-2 Predictors					
Political Violence Events (Log)		-.376*** (.133)	-.547** (.236)		
Political Violence Deaths (Log)				-.259*** (.094)	-.295*** (.083)
Level-1 Predictors					
Fear of Violence	-.254*** (.015)	-.253*** (.015)	-.251*** (.022)	-.254*** (.015)	-.251*** (.022)
Government Supporter	.642*** (.036)	.642*** (.037)	.065 (.168)	.642*** (.037)	.336*** (.097)
Opposition Supporter	.061 (.037)	.060 (.037)	-.017 (.152)	.061 (.037)	-.076 (.092)
Gov Support*Fear			.006 (.034)		.012 (.337)
Opp Support*Fear			-.012 (.035)		-.023 (.034)
Gov Support* Violence			.300*** (.856)		
Opp Support * Violence			.046 (.079)		
Gov Support * Death					.150*** (.044)
Opp Support * Death					.081* (.041)
Constant	-1.201***	-.521**	-.487**	-.710***	-.649***
Random Effects Variance Components					
District Effect	.364	.317	.324	.312	.311
Observations	44367	44367	44367	44367	44367
Number of Groups	31	31	31	31	31

Multi-Country weights are used in all models,
*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Controls included: Urban/Rural, Gender, Age, Education, Government Economic Performance, Radio

The multilevel analysis results on the on supply of democracy are presented in table 6.8. Model 1 predicts the supply of democracy without any level-2 predictions. The results from Model 1 indicate that Fear of Violence has a statistically significant adverse effect on the perception that there is a supply of democracy in a country. Africans who report "a lot" of fear are less likely to believe that there is a supply of democracy in their country. Holding all variables at their median value, the predicted probability of perceiving a supply of democracy in their country is 27 percent

for someone who does not fear violence compared to 14 percent for someone who fears political violence a lot.[77]

Model 2 includes the country-level effect of reported political violence events in the year preceding the Afrobarometer survey. The results from Model 2 indicate that political violence has a statistically significant adverse effect on the perception that there is a supply of democracy in a country. Holding all variables at their median value, Africans living in countries with political violence one standard deviation above the mean are 10 percent less likely to perceive a supply of democracy in their country compared with those living in countries with less political violence (one standard deviation below the mean).

In Model 4, I include a variable measuring the number of deaths associated with political violence events. The results from this model largely mirror the results of that of political violence. As the number of deaths caused by political violence increases, the less likely it is that a citizen will report a supply of democracy within a country. Table 6.9 reports the predicted probability of perceiving a supply of democracy a different level of political violence-associated deaths. Holding all variables at their median value, an individual living in a country that experienced deaths resulting from political violence one standard deviation above the mean was 11 percent less likely to perceive a supply of democracy than those living in countries with deaths one standard deviation below the mean.

Table 12.9 Predicted Probabilities - Supply of Democracy (Marginal Effects)

	Predicted Probability
Political Violence	
1 SD Below the mean	.32
1 SD Above the mean	.22
Political Violence Deaths	
1 SD Below the mean	.32
1 SD Above the mean	.21
Fear of Violence	
No Fear	.27
A lot of Fear	.14

[77] All values are held at their median values. These values represent a 34-year-old woman who completed some secondary school; does not support the government or any opposition party, lives in a Rural area, does not believe that the government has done a good job at handling the economy; has access to a radio at least a few times a month.

Throughout the models, both government supporters were found to have a statistically significant effect on the supply of democracy. Based on model 1, supporters of the government were 14 percent more likely to perceive a supply of democracy than those individuals who were not attached to any political party. The supply of demand, on the other hand, was not influenced by opposition supporters. Compared with independents or unaligned voters, opposition party supporters were only 2 percent more likely to perceive a supply of democracy in their country. Overall, opposition supporters and independents/unaligned voters were far less likely, in general, to believe that democracy was being supplied than those who support the government. Are these partisan differences in the perceived supply of democracy effected by levels of political violence?

In order to examine the possibility that violence and fear of violence had a differentiated effect for government supporters, opposition supporters and independent Africans, models 3 and 5 in table 6.8 incorporate interaction effects. In Model 3, interactions between political violence events and the partisan variables, and fear of political violence and the partisan variables were included. The results indicate that only the interaction between government support and country level political violence were significant. In other words, the variable for government support significantly conditioned the relationship between violence and perceptions of a supply of democracy. Government supporters living in a country with political violence levels one standard deviation above the mean were 6 percent less likely to perceive a supply of democracy than those living in countries with violence levels one standard deviation below (Figure 6.5). However, compared with government supporters the effect of violence on independents and unaligned voters was greater. Independent/Unaligned Africans living in countries with violence levels one standard deviation above the mean were 11 percent less likely to perceive a supply of democracy than those living in countries with little violence (one standard deviation below the mean).

Figure 12.5 Marginal Effect of Political Violence on the Predicted Probability of Supply of Democracy, Government Supporters v. Unaligned or Independent Identifiers



Model 5 includes interactions between political violence deaths and the partisan variables and fear of violence and the partisan variables. Much like model 3, the interaction effects between fear of violence and the partisan variables were not significant. However, unlike model 3, both cross-level interaction effects between deaths and the partisan variables were significant. Holding all values at their median values, the predicted probability of a government supporter perceiving a supply of democracy when living in a country with reported political violence deaths one standard deviation below the mean is .44 and drops to .36 for those living in places with more deaths (one standard deviation below the mean). As was the case in the model 3, the effect of death was greater for independents and unaligned Africans than government supporters (see figure 6.6). As well, opposition support moderated the relationship between reported political violence deaths and the perception of a supply of democracy. However, the differences between opposition supporters and independents/unaligned is more similar. The predicted probability of perceiving a supply of

democracy was 9 percent less for opposition supporters living in counties with deaths one standard deviation above the mean compared to those living in countries with reported deaths one standard deviation below the mean. For independents and unaligned Africans, the difference was 11 percent. Overall, for Africans, deaths and political violence had a negative effect on their perceptions of whether there was an adequate supply of democracy in their countries.

Figure 12.6 Marginal Effect of Deaths on the Predicted Probability of Supply of Democracy, Government Supporters v. Unaligned or Independent Identifiers



If violence has a substantively negative effect on how African citizens perceive the supply of democracy, does this translate into citizens demanding democracy? Table 6.10 presents the multilevel analysis results on demand for democracy. Model 1 estimates a conditional model without any level-2 predictors. The results indicate that fear of political violence has a negative effect on whether African's demand democracy. As African fear levels rise, the demand for democracy decreases. Africans who report fearing political violence "a lot" are 7 percent less likely

to demand democracy than those who have no fear. This may reflect Africans waning faith in democracy as a form of government that can provide safety and security.

Table 12.10 Cross-National Multi-Level Logit Demand for Democracy

	Demand 1	*Demand 2 Political Violence*	*Demand 3 Interactions*	*Demand 4 Deaths*	*Demand 5 Interactions*
Level-2 Predictors					
Political Violence Events (Log)		-.696*** (.142)	-.650** (.254)		
Political Violence Deaths (Log)				-.382*** (.121)	-.405*** (.132)
Level-1 Predictors					
Fear of Violence	-.072*** (.026)	-.071*** (.025)	-.050* (.028)	-.072*** (.026)	-.048* (.029)
Government Supporter	.001 (.084)	.002 (.084)	-.039 (.246)	.001 (.084)	-.300 (.215)
Opposition Supporter	.279*** (.052)	.279*** (.052)	.450** (.202)	.279*** (.052)	.412*** (.119)
Gov Support*Fear			-.056* (.032)		-.058 (.048)
Opp Support*Fear			-.054* (.031)		-.032 (.031)
Gov Support* Violence			-.013 (.082)		
Opp Support * Violence			-.085 (.074)		
Gov Support * Death					.177* (.040)
Opp Support * Death					-.048 (.037)
Constant	-.969***	.289	.255	-.254	-.225
Random Effects Variance Components					
District Effect	.544	.351	.352	.410	.413
Observations	44367	44367	44367	44367	44367
Number of Groups	29	29	29	29	29

Multi-Country weights are used in all models,
*** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Controls included: Urban/Rural, Gender, Age, Education, Government Economic Performance, Radio

Political violence has an even great negative effect on the demand for democracy than fear of violence. Model 2 estimates a conditional model with political violence as the level-2 predictor. The results show that political violence, as in the supply models, has a statistically significant and negative effect on the demand for democracy. As political violence levels increase within a country, the likelihood an African citizen will report a demand for democracy decreases. Table

6.11 shows the predicted probability of demanding democracy at different levels of political violence. Africans living in countries with political violence events one standard deviation above the mean are 15 percent less likely to demand democracy as a form of government. In other words, political violence seriously damages Africans desires for democracy. Model 4 in table 6.10 includes the level-2 variable for deaths caused by political violence. Much like political violence, deaths are also statistically significant and negative. Individuals living in countries with deaths one standard deviation above the mean are 13 percent less likely to demand democracy than those living in countries with death levels one standard deviation below. These models indicate the negative effect that both violent contexts and deaths have on African citizens' support for democracy and their rejection of all other authoritarian alternatives.

Just as was seen in the supply models, partisanship plays a critical role in predicting whether African's demand democracy. In the supply models, partisans aligned with the government in power were more likely than opposition supporters or independents to believe there is supply of democracy in their countries. In the demand models, opposition supporters were more likely to demand democracy than government supporters or independents. Considering the predictive power of partisanship in the demand models, it is necessary to explore the possibility that violence and fear of violence have a differentiated effect on opposition supporters, government supporters, and independent Africans. In models 3, I include interaction terms between fear of violence and the partisan variables and cross level interaction terms between country level political violence and the partisan variables.

Table 12.11 Predicted Probabilities - Demand for Democracy (Marginal effects)

	Marginal Effects – Demand for Democracy
Political Violence	
1 SD Below the mean	.45
1 SD Above the mean	.30
Political Violence Deaths	
1 SD Below the mean	.44
1 SD Above the mean	.31
Fear of Violence	
No Fear	.38
A lot of Fear	.31

In model 3, the coefficient for the cross-level interaction term is non-significant. The relationship between levels of political violence and the demand for democracy was not conditioned by the

partisan variables. The interaction terms between fear of political violence and the partisan variables, on the other hand, were significant.

Figure 12.7 Marginal Effect of Fear on the Predicted Probability of Demand for Democracy, Government Supporters v. Unaligned or Independent Identifiers



Figure 6.7 and figure 6.8 show the demand for democracy at different levels of fear. The conditional effect captured in figure 6.7 indicates that as fear of political violence increases for government supporters, the probability of demanding democracy decreases. The negative effect on government supporters is greater than for independents. Figure 6.8 shows how increased fear levels influence opposition supporters. Even more so than government supporters, an increase in fear reduced the likelihood an opposition supporter demands democracy. This model shows that fear of violence has a greater negative effect on partisans than independents or unaligned voters. However, it should be noted that for all Africans, fear of violence reduces the demand for democracy.

Figure 12.8 Marginal Effect of Fear on the Predicted Probability of Demand for Democracy, Opposition Supporters v. Unaligned or Independent Identifiers



Model 5 includes cross-level interaction effects between deaths in a country and the partisan variables. Unlike political violent events, the relationship between the number of deaths from political violence and the demand for democracy, is conditioned by some partisans. Figure 6.9 shows how increases in deaths influence the demand for democracy for government supporters and independents. In countries with low levels of deaths due to political violence, both government supporters and independents demand democracy the same (43 percent and 44 percent). However, as violence increases the predicted probability that an independent in Africa will demand democracy drops almost 15 percent, while government supporters demand drops only around 7 percent. Although the effect is negative for government supporters, it is far greater for independents. Supporting an opposition party did not condition the relationship between the number of political violence deaths and the demand for democracy.

Figure 12.9 Marginal Effect of Deaths on the Predicted Probability of Demand for Democracy, Government Supporters v. Unaligned or Independent Identifiers



Regarding the controls for the cross-national analysis, all the socioeconomic and demographic variables are statistically significant. However, assessments of a government's handling of the economy are only statistically significant for the supply models. Holding all values at their median value (based on Supply Model 1), an African citizen who believes their government has done either a "fairly good" or a "very good" job at handling the economy are 24 percent more likely to perceive a supply of democracy in their country compared to those who do not think so. In the demand models, the government's handling of the economy does not have a statistically significant effect. All other control variables significantly predict perceiving a supply of democracy and demand for democracy. Living in an urban community is positively associated with both the supply of and demand for democracy while being a female is negative. Education across all models is also positively linked to supply and demand. As African citizens attain higher levels of education, they are more likely to be satisfied with democracy, believe their country is a democracy, support

democracy, and reject other forms of government. Lastly, those who have frequent access to radios are also more likely to demand democracy and perceive a supply of democracy in their country.

Overall, the results presented in this section support the proposed hypotheses that living in violent contexts is likely to reduce both the supply and demand for democracy. Furthermore, it demonstrated that African citizens fearing violence are less likely to perceive a supply of democracy and demand democracy. These findings are important for understanding how democracies can consolidate. As political violence increase, citizen support for democracy reduces. If transitioning democracies are likely to experience long-term violent conflict, the trust in democratic institutions working for the people erodes with time, and the possibility of authoritarian alternatives supplanting democracy is increased. Young democracies across the region are at risk of backsliding when citizens are not in support of democratic institutions.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter offered empirical evidence suggesting that there is a relationship between violence and attitudes about democracy. Here, I showed how as RENAMO perpetrated violence in Mozambique increases in a district, perceptions of the supply of democracy significantly reduce. Also, increases in the level of fear that an individual experience also has a detrimental effect on perceptions of the supply of democracy. This chapter found evidence that demand for democracy in Mozambique was not affected by violent contexts. No matter the perpetrator of violence, type of conflict, or intensity, the demand for democracy remains unaffected. Fear of violence also does not appear to influence whether Mozambicans are likely to increase or decrease demand for democracy.

Moving from the Mozambican case to a broader examination of Africa, the similarities are mixed. Across Africa, demand for democracy decreases as political violence and the number of deaths associated with political violence increase. This differs from the Mozambique case, where demand for democracy is not affected by violence. A possible explanation for this difference is that Mozambicans already exhibit a very low demand for democracy. Compared to the other 34 countries surveyed by Afrobarometer in Round 6, Mozambicans expressed the lowest demand for democracy. Only 8.7 percent of those surveyed in Mozambique support democracy as a system of governance while rejecting all non-democratic alternatives. The next three lowest countries have almost or more than double demand for democracy (Egypt – 13 percent; Sudan 17 percent; Algeria

– 21 percent). Violence or the fear of violence, are unlikely to reduce the already negative perceptions of democracy in Mozambique. On the other hand, much like Mozambicans, violent contexts hurt how African citizens perceived the supply of democracy in their respective countries. Furthermore, in the cross-national models, increases in individual fear of violence also negatively affected both the perceived supply of and demand for democracy. This chapter represents an important contribution to the literature on democratic consolidation, political behavior, and political violence. It showed that beyond political and socioeconomic factors, violent contexts, and fear of violence have a crucial role in defining how citizens view democracy as a form of governance.

Results from this chapter support, in part, the theory presented in Chapter 3.0. In terms of the Mozambican case, violent contexts can shape attitudes about democracy. However, it is important to note that citizens in Mozambique react to violence differently depending on the perpetrator of the violence and that, surprisingly, Mozambican demands for democracy are unaffected. My expectation that the demand for democracy would increase as violence increased in districts was incorrect. However, it is also interesting that it did not decrease the demand for democracy either. Instead, demand was unaffected, and this could be because Mozambican commitment to democracy was already low. As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, Mozambicans are among the least committed democrats across the African continent. The presence of violence in a district was unlikely to affect this commitment. On the other hand, the violence perpetrated by RENAMO reduced Mozambican's satisfaction with democracy and perceptions of just how much of a democracy Mozambique is. This result supports my theory in Chapter 3. However, I was surprised to find that the other contextual violence variables were non-significant. Much like the previous two chapters, this result demonstrates that RENAMO violence had a salient effect on Mozambican citizens. Although RENAMO violence was found to influence political and electoral behavior, it came at the cost of the democratization process.

One of the main highlights of this chapter is that it shows how the effect of violence on perceptions of democracy is conditioned by partisan identity. According to my hypotheses that unaligned and independent citizen opinions about democracy are vulnerable to violence, I proposed that increases in violent contexts and individual fear of violence were supposed to have a greater effect on citizen perceptions of the supply of democracy and demand for democracy. This conditional argument found support in this chapter in the cross-national analysis only. I showed

that unaligned partisans are less likely to perceive a supply of democracy across Africa as the number of deaths caused by political violence increases. I also found that as political violence increased in African countries, unaligned and independent voters were significantly less likely to demand democracy than those who felt close to a political party. Fear of violence, on the other hand, had a greater effect on partisans then independents or unaligned voters. As fear levels increased, partisans were more likely to reduce their demand for democracy than independent or unaligned Africans. However, the effect of fear for all Africans is a reduction in overall demand for democracy. Ultimately, this chapter demonstrates that violent contexts and fear of political violence have a negative effect on African's satisfaction and support for democracy which allows for non-democratic forms of governance to appeal to citizens. Political violence harms the democratization process and severely damages citizens belief in it as a form of effective governance.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

This thesis aimed to understand the political and electoral consequences of political violence by looking at the Mozambican case, a country that after twenty years of relatively peaceful elections, returned to armed conflict. Like many emerging democracies worldwide, Mozambique has experienced increased levels of political violence and conflict while continuing to hold elections. Competitive elections did not replace violence as a means for settling political disputes and differences. Instead, violence has been used as a tool in which to extract political benefits and concessions, suppress citizens, and shape elections. This study has sought to understand how individual experiences with political violence and armed conflict shapes political behavior and electoral outcomes, as well as attitudes about democracy. In particular, this thesis sought to understand whether RENAMO's political "comeback" in the 2014 national elections was due to its decision to return to armed conflict against the FRELIMO-led Mozambican government. Generally, the research presented here suggests that violence affected both political behavior and popular attitudes about democracy. More specifically, the evidence from this thesis suggests that RENAMOs use of violence was detrimental to FRELIMO electoral support. However, RENAMOs use of violence also damaged democracy by leading to more negative evaluations of Mozambican democracy.

7.1 Summary of Argument and Main Findings

Citizens across the world are highly reactive to their surrounding environments. The contextual effects literature argues that the social and political contexts that an individual is located in can shape political decisions and influence attitudes (Baker et al. 2006; Huckfeld 1986; Huckfeld and Sprague 1987). However, missing from this analysis has been how violent contexts can disrupt, influence, and change the way citizens behave. If citizens in emerging democracies are increasingly likely to experience violence and conflict, then understanding how these contexts shape electoral and political behavior is vital. Political violence and, in particular, violent armed conflict are often imposed on populations who have very little control over the violence itself. This structurally imposed context can be a barrier to crucial political information. It can disrupt critical social networks and prevent relationships between communities. It can increase insecurity and vulnerability while also decreasing a community and an individual's quality of life. Overall, violent

environments are expected to influence how citizens make political choices. In particular, exposure to violence and fear of violence can reduce voter participation during elections, shift support from one political actor to another, and can diminish the confidence in democratic systems. How do political violence and armed conflict impact voter turnout, vote choice, and attitudes about democracy?

I argued that violent environments are disruptive to electoral participation and political behavior. Violence between a government and armed actors can impose severe restrictions on individuals' movement and displace people. It can also interfere with campaigning and voter registration. Violence can also lead citizens to prefer to stay at home than risk participating in elections they believe will become violent due to conflict in a country. The decision to stay home is particularly salient when the violence in a country is committed by two actors competing in an election. I argue that partisanship plays an important role by empowering some citizens to take the risk to vote, regardless of the level of surrounding violence. It can also cause would-be-voters to sanction either political parties who commit the violence, or governing parties unable to prevent the violence. Furthermore, I argue that individual fear of violence will have a largely depressing and adverse effect on all forms of electoral and political behavior. Lastly, I contend that violent contexts and fear of violence will be detrimental to citizen confidence in democracy. As violence increases, citizens may start to wonder whether democracy is a form of governance that can keep a country safe and stable or whether non-democratic alternatives may be better at this.

I tested all of these arguments using the Mozambican case. The voter turnout analysis showed that election participation was largely unaffected by violent contexts at the district level. Districts that experienced higher than average violence were not likely to see a reduction or increase in voter turnout. This finding supports analysis from Bekoe and Burchard (2017), who also found that violence before an election did not affect voter turnout. Moreover, the results from the individual analysis on self-reported past voting behavior also confirmed the findings at the district level. Violent contexts did not influence participation in the 2014 elections. The only evidence that violent contexts had a detrimental effect on electoral participation was when a wider geographic area outside the district was consumed by violence. In this case, evidence found that increases in violence outside of an individual's district decreased the likelihood of participating in the 2014 national election. In addition to the negative effect of living in a district with neighboring violent districts, individual fear of violence played a crucial and substantial role in predicting past

electoral participation. Fear of violence significantly reduced past participation. The results from the individual analysis confirmed my hypothesis that those not attached to a political party would be less likely or willing to vote. When independent or unaligned Mozambicans reported higher levels of fear of violence, they are much less likely to have reported voting during the 2014 national election. This finding also confirms my argument that those attached to political parties are less likely to be influenced by violence, or at least, fear of violence.

In Chapter 5, in which I examine effects on voter choice, the results supported my hypothesis that violent contexts shaped Mozambican voter behavior and preferences. The district-level results showed that increases in RENAMO initiated violence led to increases in support for RENAMO. Thus, RENAMOs return to armed conflict helped to mobilize supporters in districts that experienced violence. Moving from peaceful districts to more violent districts was also positively associated with RENAMO increasing its vote share. This suggests that RENAMOs use of violence helped make the party more competitive and that its decision to return Mozambique to armed conflict helped it extract political benefits from the FRELIMO-led government and helped the party gain essential seats in the National Assembly.

Contrary to my expectation, however, FRELIMO was not sanctioned at the district level for the increased violence that swept the country after 2012. FRELIMO's vote share was not significantly affected by the increases in violence. However, the results from the individual analysis show a slightly different picture. Although most of the violent contextual variables were non-significant, RENAMO perpetrated violent contexts negatively affected support for FRELIMO. In other words, individuals living in districts with RENAMO initiated violence were less likely to vote for FRELIMO than those living in districts no RENAMO violence. RENAMO violence worked to punish the government and reduce its support. Despite RENAMO violence being able to reduce support for FRELIMO, at the individual level, RENAMO violence, or violent contexts in general, did not increase or mobilize support for RENAMO. The nature of the dependent variable can explain the difference between the aggregate district-level analysis and micro-independent analysis. The district-level variable examined changes in vote share between the 2009 and 2014 elections. It also assessed something that had already happened. In contrast, the individual analysis assessed future vote choice, and was measured a few months after the election took place.

This chapter also highlighted the importance of using disaggregated data that distinguishes acts according to the identity of the perpetrator data in order to understand the effect of violence more fully. The key question here is whether violence "pays," electorally? Without disaggregating the data, violent contexts appeared to have no significant effect. However, once I took into account the identity of the perpetrator of violence, I was able to determine whether RENAMOs return to armed conflict had a positive effect on its electoral fortunes. From the district models, it seems that the use of violence worked to some degree. While RENAMO was unable to win the election, it doubled its vote share over the previous election and increased its seats in the legislature.

At the individual level, the role of violence was mixed. Violence seems to have helped mobilize support for RENAMO, but it did not appear to encourage independents or unaligned voters and FRELIMO partisans to switch their vote for RENAMO. Independents or unaligned voters were more likely to have stayed at home, possibly contributing to the reduction in FRELIMO vote share. Moreover, FRELIMO voters were largely unaffected by all forms of violence and even fear of violence. I believe these findings have important implications for understanding why armed political groups or political groups with armed-insurgent ties may decide to pursue violence as a viable political strategy. The decision made by Afonso Dhlakama to return to violence after 20 years of relative peace may not have provided RENAMO with a victory; however, it did return RENAMO to political relevance and allowed the political party to recuperate more than a decade of lost support and influence while harming FRELIMO.

In Chapter 6, which examined effects on the perceived supply of, and popular demand for democracy chapter, the results indicate that living in violent contexts and fearing violence negatively affect some attitudes, but not others. In particular, citizen satisfaction with democracy was most affected, while support for democracy was unaffected by living in a violent context, or by fear of violence. However, citizens who live in fear were less likely to be satisfied with democracy. And it did not matter which party they supported, or whether they were unaligned and independent. However, the degree to which they were affected was conditioned by partisanship. For example, RENAMO identifiers were much more likely to see a reduction in satisfaction with democracy due to fearing violence. Independent and Unaligned voters also had lower levels of satisfaction. Interestingly, FRELIMO identifiers in districts that experienced RENAMO perpetrated violence were less likely to be satisfied with democracy than those that did not identify with FRELIMO. This could very well suggest that FRELIMO partisans tied democratic

satisfaction with security concerns or that they do not believe democracy is useful at preventing violence. Ultimately, the results from this chapter support, in part, my theory that violent contexts can shape attitudes about democracy. However, it is the fear of violence that has the most significant and negative effect on citizen perceptions of democracy.

7.2 Theoretical and Methodological Implications

This thesis makes several contributions. First, it adds to the literature on Mozambique and African elections. With the exception of a few scholars' comprehensive overviews of voting behavior (see: (Brito, 1996; Pereira 1997; 2008), very little research has been published on voter behavior and turnout in Mozambique. Research on voting and violence in Africa tends to focus on a limited group of countries (e.g., Nigeria and Kenya). Although political violence occurs throughout much of the continent and in functioning democracies, there is little understanding of how low-intensity conflict can influence political behavior. This research clarifies that the incentive for participating in elections and voters' decisions at the voting booth are influenced by environments characterized by low-intensity conflict. Moreover, fear of violence plays a vital role in shaping democratic behavior.

Second, this study contributes a different methodology to understand the effects of violence on elections. Typically, the literature on election violence has focused on a specific form of electoral violence in the campaign period prior to an election, on election day, or immediately after. Furthermore, it only uses violent events that are purposefully intended to change the outcome of the election. This thesis broadens the scope of what electoral violence is by including all forms of politically related violence. It also addresses some temporal effects that exist within the literature. This thesis includes violent events that go back 18-months from election day, which coincides with RENAMOs return to conflict in Mozambique. This period allowed for a deeper understanding of how RENAMOs armed conflict with the government affected electoral and political behavior in Mozambique. Moreover, the inclusion of contextual violence variables helps to improve our knowledge of the conditions under which an individual's environment influences political behavior. It shows that violent environments can affect how citizens exercise their democratic citizenship and shape how they feel about democracy in general.

Third, by disaggregating the violence data and analyzing the effect of a specific perpetrator, this study demonstrates that who commits the violence matters. Most research on the consequences

of electoral and political violence has focused on the effects of violence committed by the government and often fails to distinguish the impact of different perpetrators of violence. While most violence studies have identified that incumbents are most often the perpetrators, much less is understood about the effects of opposition party violence. This study found that violence committed by RENAMO was more significant than government violence in shaping political attitudes and affecting political participation and vote choices.

Lastly, in addition to including various forms of contention, this study examines various consequences. Instead of only looking at the effect of violence on electoral outcomes, this analysis also shows that violence and violent contexts have a largely negative impact on attitudes about democracy. Moreover, the consequences of violence are conditioned by partisan ties. Partisanship plays a vital role in facilitating citizens' decisions to either vote, whom to vote for, and their attitudes about democracy.

7.3 Policy Implications

Given the negative effect that violence and fear of violence have on democratic citizenship, policymakers and the international community should ensure that the lead-up to elections are largely peaceful and that widespread political violence is minimized. For incumbents, political violence has a detrimental effect on their support. Whether the violence is committed by an incumbent to change the outcome purposefully, or whether opposition or third-party actors commit violence, the governing party does not benefit. In addition, opposition parties that use violence to mobilize supports or reduce support for the incumbent do so at the price of democratic consolidation. Increases in violence and fear of violence reduce the trust in democratic institutions. It is, therefore, necessary to work with all political parties to ensure that elections are not only free and fair but that the lead-up to elections are safe and secure. Ultimately, economic concerns are still the most salient issues that drive democratic satisfaction, voter turnout, and vote choices. As economies improve and individuals benefit from economic growth, citizens are more likely to believe in democratic institutions and exercise their democratic citizenship. However, economic growth and individual economic well-being will be stifled as long as there continues to be pervasive political violence and conflict.

In addition, policymakers need to address growing divisions in society. If Mozambique has any chance of mitigating future conflict, it will be important that FRELIMO remains open to

power-sharing and allowing other political parties, not just RENAMO, to have a real chance of representation. Before the 2019 national election, the FRELIMO government acquiesced to allow provincial governors to be chosen by-elections. This paved the way for RENAMO and possibly MDM to govern beyond municipalities and cities. However, the 2019 elections were highly contentious, and election observers noted that it was riven with fraud. Furthermore, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people from the large coastal city of Beira due to Cyclone Idai, meant that many opposition supporters were unable to vote. FRELIMO's dominance during the 2019 election frustrated the electorate further and pushed citizens away from democracy.

Moreover, Mozambique is currently in the throes of two major crises which threaten to polarize the country further and open new divisions. COVID-19 is spreading through much of the country, and the lockdowns and border closures are sure to increase economic inequality. Also, the Islamic insurgency that has gripped the northern province of Cabo Delgado since 2017 has the potential to spread throughout the country. It has become the most significant security risk to Mozambique since the height of the civil war. Unlike the conflict with RENAMO, which did not result in considerable casualties, the Islamic insurgency has been particularly violent, and much of that violence has been felt by the civilian population. If the low-intensity conflict in 2013-2014 was able to harm democratic citizenship, this new brutal form of unfettered violence coupled with the adverse economic effects of COVID-19 will undoubtedly too. Therefore, policymakers, political parties, and international donors and organizations must ensure peace and stability in Mozambique.

7.4 Limitations and Future Research

Despite this research representing an advancement to the studies on political violence, electoral violence, and voting behavior, it is not without its limitations. First, the findings presented in this thesis are only applicable to the Mozambican case. Mozambique is not the only African country to experience violent conflict during elections, nor is it the only one globally. Consolidating democracies around the world continue to struggle with ongoing conflict while trying to hold elections. This research would benefit from comparative analyses that compare Mozambique to other African countries and other countries consolidating democracies around the world.

Throughout this thesis, I included violent contexts at the district level to examine their impact on political participation, voter turnout, and attitudes about democracy. With access to better data, future research could include other forms of district level-violence, such as criminal violence or violence against women, to understand how different forms of contention and violence can influence political and electoral behavior. Lastly, this thesis is limited by its focus on how individuals react to violent contexts. Future research would benefit from analyzing how political institutions adapt to and behave because of ongoing political violence and conflict.

By analyzing Mozambique's return to violence, this thesis has attempted to demonstrate the political and electoral consequences of ongoing conflict. This thesis showed that political violence and fear of violence have a detrimental effect on incumbents. Opposition perpetrated violence can harm support for the governing party. However, if the opposition aims to win an election, violence as an electoral strategy is neither sufficient nor reasonable. This thesis also showed that independents and unaligned voters are most vulnerable to conflict and are likely to drop out of the electorate if faced with growing threats of violence. Furthermore, opposition violence was shown to reduce citizen satisfaction in violence.

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Appendix A

A. 1 Descriptive Statistics District Level Variables

Variable	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min.	Max
Dependent Variables					
Change in Voter Turnout	142	5.48	7.32	-17.17	30.08
Change in FRELIMO Vote Share	142	-16.88	15.41	-73.07	6.07
Change in RENAMO Vote Share	142	14.79	14.29	16.30	78.30
Independent Variables					
Political Violence (Log)	142	.18	.33	.00	1.58
Non-Violence (Log)	142	.17	.30	.00	1.65
Wider-Violent Conflict (Log)	142	.68	.47	.00	1.91
Conflict Intensity	142	1.15	1.56	.00	4.00
RENAMO Violence (Log)	142	.12	.26	.00	1.54
Government Violence (Log)	142	.09	.22	.00	1.34
Closeness of Race 2009 Election	142	40.24	27.09	1.09	97.51
Illiteracy Rate	142	58.04	16.00	9.80	85.10
Youth Bulge	142	48.40	3.82	37.91	57.75
Poverty Rate (Log)	142	.12	.67	-1.18	1.64
Density (Log)	142	1.60	.67	.06	3.49
Media Exposure	142	60.71	9.40	16.30	78.30

A. 2 Descriptive Statistics Individual Level Variables

Variable	**N**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**	**Min.**	**Max**
Dependent Variables					
Vote Intention	2400	.76	.43	0	1
FRELIMO Vote	2400	.51	.50	0	1
RENAMO Vote	2400	.13	.34	0	1
Supply	2400	.16	.37	0	
Demand	2400	.09	.29	0	
Independent Variables					
Fear of Violence	2400	.93	.99	0	3
Elections Not Free	2400	.10	.31	0	1
FRELIMO ID	2400	.41	.49	0	1
RENAMO ID	2400	.09	.28	0	1
Urban/Rural	2400	.45	.48	0	1
Gender	2400	.44	.50	0	1
Age	2400	35.02	12.84	18	85
Education	2400	2.96	2.00	.00	9.00
Lived Poverty	2400	-.02	.98	-2.37	2.99
Government Economic Performance	2400	.43	.50	0	1
Political Interest	2400	.54	.50	0	1
Association Membership	2400	.66	.57	0	1
Approval of President	2400	.76	.43	0	1
Radio	2400	.73	.45	0	1

Appendix B

AFROBAROMETER Round 6 Questions

Dependent Variables

Question Number: Q21
Question: Understanding that some people were unable to vote in the most recent national election in 2014, which of the following statements is true for you?
Variable Label: Q21. Voting in the most recent national
election
Values: 0-8, 9, 98, -1
Value Labels: 0= You were not registered to vote 1= You voted in the elections 2= You decided not to vote 3=You could not find the polling station 4=You were prevented from voting 5= You did not have time to vote 6= You did not vote because you could not find your name in the voters' register 7= Did not vote for some other reason 8= You were too young to vote 9= Don`t Know/ Can`t Remember
Source:

Question Number: Q99
Question: If a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for? ***Variable Label:*** Q99. Vote for which party
Values: 540- 544, 9995, 9997-9999, -1
Value Labels: 540= Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Mozambique), 541= Renamo (Resistência Nacional de Moçambique), 542= MDM (Movimento Democrático Moçambicano), 543= PDD (Partido para Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento), 544= PIMO (Partido Independente Moçambicano) ,9995=Other, 9997=Not applicable, 9998=Refused to answer, 9999=Don't know, -1=Missing
Source: Zambia 96

Question Number: Q41
Question: Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Mozambique? Are you:
Variable Label: Q41. Satisfaction with democracy
Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1
Value Labels: 0=Mozambique is not a democracy, 1=Not at all satisfied, 2=Not very satisfied, 3=Fairly satisfied, 4=Very satisfied, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Source: Eurobarometer
Note: Interviewer was instructed to "Read the question in the language of the interview, but always read "democracy" in English Translate "democracy" into local language only if respondent does not understand English term."

Question Number: Q40
Question: In your opinion how much of a democracy is Mozambique today?
Variable Label: Q40. Extent of democracy
Values: 1-4, 8, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Not a democracy, 2=A democracy, with major problems, 3=A democracy, but with minor problems, 4=A full democracy, 8=Do not understand question/ do not understand what 'democracy' is, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing ***Source:*** Ghana 97
Note: Interviewer was instructed to "read the question in the language of the interview, but always read 'democracy' in English. Translate 'democracy' into local language only if respondent does not understand English term."

Question Number: Q30
Question: Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?
Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.
Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.
Variable Label: Q30. Support for democracy
Values: 1-3, 9, 98, -1
Value Labels: 1=Statement 3: Doesn't matter, 2=Statement 2: Sometimes non-democratic preferable, 3=Statement 1: Democracy preferable, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Source: Latinobarometer (LB)
Note: Interviewer was instructed to "read the question in the language of the interview, but always read 'democracy' in English. Translate 'democracy' into local language only if respondent does not understand English term."

Question Number: Q28A
Question: There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives: Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office?
Variable Label: Q28a. Reject one-party rule
Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1
Value Labels: 1=Strongly disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Neither approve nor disapprove, 4=Approve, 5=Strongly approve, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Source: NDB
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q28B
Question: There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives: The army comes in to govern the country?
Variable Label: Q28b. Reject military rule
Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1
Value Labels: 1=Strongly disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Neither approve nor disapprove, 4=Approve, 5=Strongly approve, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Source: Adapted from NDB
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q28C
Question: There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives: Elections and the National Assembly are abolished so that the president can decide everything?

Variable Label: Q28c.Reject one-man rule
Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1
Value Labels: 1=Strongly disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Neither approve nor disapprove, 4=Approve, 5=Strongly approve, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing .
Source: SAB
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Independent Variables

Question Number: Q49
Question: During election campaigns in this country, how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence?
Variable Label: Q49. How much fear political intimidation or violence
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1
Value Labels: 0=A lot, 1=Somewhat, 2=A little bit, 3=Not at all, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1 =Missing.
Source: Afrobarometer Round 4

Question Number: Q22
Question: On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in 2014. Was it:
Variable Label: Q22. Freeness and fairness of the last national election
Values: 1-4, 8, 9, 98, -1
Value Labels: 4=Completely free and fair, 3=Free and fair, but with minor problems, 2=Free and fair, with major problems, 1=Not free and fair, 8=Do not understand the question, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Source: Afrobarometer Round 3

Question Number: Q90A
Question: Do you feel close to any particular political party?
Variable Label: Q90a. Close to political party
Values: 0-1, 8-9, -1
Value Labels: 0=No, (not close to any party), 1=Yes, (feels close to a party), 8=Refused to answer, 9=Don't know, -1=Missing
Source: Zambia 96

Question Number: Q90B***Question:*** Which party is that?
Variable Label: Q90b. Which party
Values: 540- 544, 9995, 9997-9999, -1
Value Labels: 540= Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Mozambique), 541= Renamo (Resistência Nacional de Moçambique), 542= MDM (Movimento Democrático Moçambicano), 543= PDD (Partido para Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento) , 544= PIMO (Partido Independente Moçambicano) ,9995=Other, 9997=Not applicable, 9998=Refused to answer, 9999=Don't know, -1=Missing
Source: Zambia 96

Variable Label: Q8a. How often gone without food
Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Source: NDB

Question Number: Q8B
Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without enough clean water for home use?
Variable Label: Q8b. How often gone without water
Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Source: NDB

Question Number: Q8C
Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without medicines or medical treatment?
Variable Label: Q8c.How often gone without medical care
Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Source: NDB

Question Number: Q8D
Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without enough fuel to cook your food?
Variable Label: Q8d. How often gone without cooking fuel
Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Source: SAB

Question Number: Q8E
Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without a cash income?
Variable Label: Q8e. How often gone without a cash income
Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Source: SAB

Question Number: Q8F
Question: When you say you went without *[insert item] [insert frequency]* would you say this occurred: ***Variable Label:*** Q8f. Frequency going without food
Values: 1-7, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=About once every two or three months 2= About once a month 3=Two or three times a month 4= About once a week 5= Several times a week 6= Every day 7=Not Applicable [DNR] 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Source: SAB
Note [Interviewer was instructed to identify the most intense (highest) code circled on Q8. If it is a 2, 3 or 4, i.e., if the respondent went without any item in Q8a-e "several times", "many times", or "always," take the most frequent response given and ask 8F.

Question Number: Q66A
Question: Now let's speak about the present government of this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Managing the economy?
Variable Label: Q66a. Handling managing the economy
Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1
Value Labels: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Source: SAB
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q13
Question: How interested would you say you are in public affairs?
Variable Label: Q13. Interest in public affairs
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1
Value Labels: 0=Not at all interested, 1=Not very interested, 2=Somewhat interested, 3=Very interested, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Source: SAB
Note : Interviewer was instructed to prompt if necessary with "You know, in politics and government."

Question Number: Q19A
Question: Let's turn to your role in the community. Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member: A religious group that meets outside of regular worship services? ***Variable Label:*** Q19a. Member of religious group
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1
Value Labels: 0=Not a Member, 1=Inactive member, 2=Active member, 3=Official leader, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Source: SAB

Question Number: Q19B
Question: Let's turn to your role in the community. Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member: Some other voluntary association or community group?
Variable Label: Q19b. Member of voluntary association or community group
Values: 0-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not a member, 1=Inactive member, 2=Active member, 3=Official leader, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Source: Afrobarometer Round 4

Question Number: Q68A
Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: President Filipe Nyusi
Variable Label: Q68a. Performance: President
Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1
Value Labels: 1=Strongly disapprove, 2=disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly approve, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Source: SAB
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q12A
Question: How often do you get news from the following sources: Radio?
Variable Label: Q12a. Radio news
Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Less than once a month, 2=A few times a month, 3=A few times a week, 4=Every day, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Source: Zambia96

Question Number: Q101
Question: Respondent's gender
Variable Label: Q101. Gender of respondent ***Values:*** 1, 2
Value Labels: 1=Male, 2=Female
Source: SAB
Note: Answered by interviewer

Question Number: Q97
Question: What is your highest level of education?
Variable Label: Q97. Education of respondent
Values: 0-9, 99, 98, -1
Value Labels: 0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling), 2=Some primary schooling, 3=Primary school completed, 4=Intermediate school or Some secondary school / high school, 5=Secondary school / high school completed , 6=Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or college, 7=Some university, 8=University completed, 9=Post-graduate, 99=Don't know [Do not read], 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
Source: SAB