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THE NEO-CALVINISTIC CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO

THE PHILOSOPHY OF H. DOOYEWEERD

A Study in the Problem of Philosophic

Communication

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CHAPTER I

The Problem of Neo-Calvinistic Philosophy.

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The influence of the new Calvinistic philosophy developed during the last decades at the Free University of Amsterdam, has been largely confined to Reformed academic circles in the Netherlands, the United States of America and South Africa. However, with the translation of the major works of its chief expounder, Professor H. Dooyeweerd, into English, and the newly awakened interest among Roman Catholic philosophers both in France and Germany in its contribution to the problems of Christian philosophy, the new philosophy has become more widely known and appreciated.

Apart from the gain in recognition, there has been another gain, namely, a greater degree of self-criticism on the part of neo-Calvinistic philosophy itself, stimulated by the challenge of its fundamental principles from without. The first phase, the actual construction and completion of the main body of this philosophy, is past. The second, reflective phase, has commenced, with an attempt to discuss and defend, in a critical philosophical manner, its own conception of philosophy, which it claims to be specifically Calvinist.

Of this concept of philosophy H.G. Stoker, himself a Calvinist philosopher of the University of Potchefstroom,

South Africa, writes as follows: "The new philosophy," he states, "has a great pretension. It wishes to remove a century-old lack of Calvinism, namely, the lack of an own Calvinistic philosophy." ^{"1)} He adds that in the history of the cultures of the world there has never existed a Calvinistic philosophy.

Stoker's statement is of interest primarily for the problem which his use of the term "Calvinistic philosophy" raises. This problem is not one of historical verification; we are not firstly concerned with establishing whether there indeed exists or has existed a philosophy which corresponds to the concept of Calvinistic philosophy, or which satisfies its requirements. Our problem belongs to the philosophical order, namely, what does the term "Calvinistic philosophy" mean?

At a first glance this problem seems to offer no great difficulty. If Platonic philosophy is philosophy based on the philosophy of Plato, if Thomist philosophy is philosophy based on the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, Calvinistic philosophy will obviously mean philosophy based on the philosophy of Calvin. The problem is then simply to find out what Calvin's philosophy is before deciding whether the new philosophy is indeed Calvinistic philosophy. But in that case, why does Stoker claim that it has made good the lack of a Calvinistic philosophy?

We are faced, moreover, with the unanimous assertion of Calvin scholars that Calvin never presented us with a system of philosophy, and that it is indeed futile to attempt

to construct one from his own declarations concerning philosophy. As Potgieter²⁾ and Bohatec³⁾ further point out, Calvin was not even consistent in his use of the term, philosophy. He writes of a Christiana philosophia, meaning "gospel of grace"; of a "heavenly philosophy" (coelestis philosophia), meaning the mysteries of salvation. In the French edition of the Institutes in 1541, he uses the term la Philosophie Chrestienne to signify the doctrine of the Christian faith. Then again he uses "philosophy" as a term of abuse. The contemporary scholastic theology persuades the people per illam philosophiam, against which St. Paul had warned us,⁴⁾ and he criticises those who are not satisfied with the simplicity of the Gospels but wish to change it into a profanum philosophiam.⁵⁾

On the other hand we know that Calvin protested against the Lutheran and Anabaptist depreciation of philosophy and that he included philosophy, especially Aristotelian philosophy, in the curriculum of the Academy of Geneva.⁶⁾ He claims that philosophy is a gift of God, and that even the heathen scholars who through all ages devoted themselves to it were inspired by God Himself. The writings of antiquity on "physics, logic, mathematics and other arts and sciences" claim his admiration and gratitude.⁷⁾ "Whenever, therefore," Calvin writes, "we meet with heathen writers, let us learn from that light of truth which is admirably displayed in their works,

that the human mind, fallen as it is, and corrupted from its integrity, is yet invested and adorned by God with excellent talents. If we believe that the Spirit of God is the only fountain of truth, we shall neither reject nor despise the truth itself, wherever it shall appear, unless we wish to insult the Spirit of God; for the gifts of the Spirit cannot be undervalued without offering contempt and reproach to the Spirit himself Shall we say that the philosophers were blind in their exquisite contemplation and in their scientific description of nature? Shall we say that those, who by the art of logic have taught us to speak in a manner consistent with reason, were destitute of understanding themselves? We shall not be able even to read the writings of the ancients without great admiration; we shall admire them, because we shall be constrained to acknowledge them to be truly excellent. And shall we esteem any thing laudable or excellent, which we do not recognise as proceeding from God? Let us, then, be ashamed of such great ingratitude, which was not to be charged on the heathen poets, who confessed that philosophy, and legislation, and useful arts, were the inventions of the gods." 8)

But while Calvin agrees with Erasmus that elements of truth are present in pagan thought, and while he appreciates their value and acknowledges God Himself as their primum gratiae fontem, these moments of truth are made possible only by

God's common grace, which does not destroy but curtails and retards the effects of original sin.⁹⁾ Sin has dimmed our eyes to such an extent that we cannot even see the clear manifestation of God's glory in the structure of the world, the revelatio generalis. Scripture, as the revelatio specialis, serves as a pair of spectacles to enable us to recover our lost perceptions. Calvin elsewhere likens Scripture to a torch or a sun, compared with which the rudimentary truths which heathen science and philosophy can attain by means of the gratia communis appear only as sparks.

In a discussion of Calvin's concept of philosophy, Bohatec refers primarily to the first chapters of the Institutes, where Calvin grounds all knowledge in self-knowledge. Self-knowledge teaches us our own ignorance and wickedness, and turns the mind to God as the source of all perfection and wisdom. "Since man is subject to a world of miseries, and has been spoiled of his divine array," Calvin writes, "this melancholy exposure discovers an immense mass of deformity. Every one, therefore, must be so impressed with a consciousness of his own infelicity, as to arrive at some knowledge of God. Thus a sense of our ignorance, vanity, poverty, infirmity, depravity, and corruption, leads us to perceive and acknowledge that in the Lord alone are to be found true wisdom, solid strength, perfect goodness, and unspotted righteousness; and so, by our imperfections, we are excited to a considera-

tion of the perfections of God." ¹⁰⁾ Calvin however unconditionally rejects all metaphysical speculations which seek unaided to penetrate to the essence of God, which we can never approach by human reason but can only adore. Our acquaintance with God's nature is not the outcome of "vain and airy speculation" ¹¹⁾ but is founded on religion and piety. "Cold and frivolous, then," Calvin exclaims, "are the speculations of those who employ themselves in disquisitions on the essence of God, when it would be more interesting to us to become acquainted with his character, and to know what is agreeable to his nature Our knowledge of God should rather tend, first, to teach us fear and reverence, and secondly, to instruct us to implore all good at his hand, and to render him the praise of all that we receive." ¹²⁾

True self-knowledge further reveals to us that the highest wisdom is not the perfection of reason advocated by the philosophy of antiquity, but the salvation of man. Of this eschatological orientation of Calvin's notion of philosophy, Bohatec writes as follows: "Der Gegenstand der christlichen Weisheit, die allein den Namen einer wahren Philosophie verdient, (vera et germana philosophia, solaque digna suo nomine) ist nicht bloss der zur rationalen Vollkommenheit gelangte Mensch, sondern der Bürger des Gottesreichs, der nach seiner Pilgrimschaft hienieden die ewige Seligkeit im Himmel erreichen will. (in regno Dei victurus

in coelumque tandem migraturus)."¹³⁾ According to Calvin, Bohatec continues, the chief characteristic of philosophy should be a critical humility, prudentia, which is the fruit of self-knowledge, and which teaches us that it is the greatest wisdom to attend the school of God, by bowing to the authority of Scripture.¹⁴⁾

While the Institutes itself was used as a handbook in theology at both continental and English universities, Calvin yet touches, as we have seen, on certain philosophical problems. The excellence of heathen philosophy is explained in terms of the doctrine of common grace, and its faults ascribed to its metaphysical pretensions, founded on pride. The possibility of a philosophy taking its principles from a general revelation is discarded, for the latter can be deciphered only through the special revelation in Scripture. This causes Calvin to declare that the principles of all knowledge must be sought in Scripture. The acceptance of Scripture cannot, however, be dissociated from the accompanying virtues of humility, true piety and religion, which are gifts of the Holy Spirit.¹⁵⁾ Calvin thus breaks completely with the optimistic rationalism of the Renaissance and contemporaneous Humanism, according to which man himself is the source and norm of all truth.

It does not follow, however, that Calvin has validated these statements in a philosophical manner, or that he has

presented us with a system of philosophy. The history of philosophy in the Calvinistic world after Calvin furthermore reveals, according to the American Calvinist philosopher, W. Young, that though there was philosophical activity, there was no philosophy which could properly be termed Calvinistic. Whether this lack must be sought, as according to Gilson's point of view, in an explicit condemnation of philosophy on the part of the Reformation,¹⁶⁾ or, as according to Calvinistic interpretation, in the resistance of the traditional conception of an autonomous philosophy in Lutheran as well as Calvinistic circles, is not at the moment relevant. The fact remains, writes Young, "that we have found a series of compromises between Reformation theology and various forms of secular philosophy. At no point did Calvinism even display the consciousness that in its theological system were contained clues for the development of a radically unique system of philosophy it was an attitude of accommodation and synthesis with prevalent or classical modes of philosophising."¹⁷⁾ He refers to the strong Scholastic influence in the writings of Beza and Arminius, and in Voetius' criticism of Descartes. The predominating influence of Descartes in the seventeenth century, which affected even the gifted Calvinistic thinker, Arnold Geulincx, is pointed out by Sas-

18)
sen. In the nineteenth century the empiricism of Opzoomer, the Spinozism of van Scholten and the ethical idealism of Chantepie de la Saussaye and Hoekstra predominate. Among the philosophical activities in England and North America the same spirit of syncretism is visible. Young mentions the Platonism of Hooker and Howe, the influence of Locke on Butler, of Newton's determinism on Jonathan Edwards, and of the school-philosophy on Baxter, whom he quotes as saying that no books so suited his disposition as Aquinas, Scotus, Durandus, Occam and their disciples, "because they narrowly searched after truth and brought things out of the darkness of confusion." 19)

This opinion of Young is echoed by Dooyeweerd, when he writes that the Reformation never developed a philosophy on her Reformed Christian basic conception, 20) and that even her theology had become tainted with Aristotelian and Scholastic traditions, 21) notably with the metaphysical doctrine of substance.

We have progressed to this extent, that we have established that Calvinistic philosophy does not mean a philosophy based on the philosophy of Calvin. Dooyeweerd writes explicitly, with reference to the term "Calvinistic philosophy": "It does not mean, that we will seek a philosophical system in Calvin that is not there." 22) Neither does it mean a synthesis of Reformed theology with traditional philosophy. To establish what it does mean, we

/must turn to

those thinkers who were not only Calvinists, and philosophers, but for whom the notion of a Calvinistic philosophy itself first became a problem.

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The first sign of the emergence of such a "radically unique system of philosophy" is to be found in the thought of Abraham Kuyper, the founder of neo-Calvinistic philosophy.²³⁾ Kuyper's initial aim is the reformation of the theology of the Nederlands Hervormde Kerk,²⁴⁾ but this develops into a re-examination of all spheres of knowledge, which he wishes to relate to the principles of Calvinism. Thus he writes:

"Philosophy, psychology, aesthetics, jurisprudence, the social sciences, literature, and even the medical and natural sciences, each and all of these, when philosophically conceived, go back to principles, and of necessity even the question must be put with much more penetrating seriousness than before, whether the ontological and anthropological principles that reign supreme in the present method of these sciences are in agreement with the principles of Calvinism, or are at variance with their very essence."²⁵⁾

The question then at once arises: what, for Kuyper, are the principles of Calvinism?

The form of this question itself requires an explana-

tion. We have asked, not simply what the principles of Calvinism are, but what they are for Kuyper. The reason for this is that there is considerable difference of opinion in Calvinistic scholarship on this matter. Venter points out that there are many scholars who wrongly seek to find in Calvin's thought one cardinal principle, and he cites in this connection Kuyper, who finds in the doctrine of the sovereignty of God not only the principle of political philosophy but also of aesthetics, cosmology and epistemology. The Calvin scholar, Bohates, again, Venter continues, has varied in his conception of what the "Stammlehre" of Calvin is, attaching himself consecutively to the doctrine of predestination, the doctrine of the sovereignty of God, the scholastic elements in Calvin's thought and the influence of Aristotle and Roman Law. Venter concludes: "From our study of his writings it has become clear to us that it is completely without meaning to try and find one basic truth in Calvin from which other truths can be logically deduced."²⁶⁾

F.J.M. Potgieter, again, agrees with Venter that the thought of Calvin contains a plurality of principles, none of which may be raised to a privileged position above the rest. He mentions amongst others the principle of the total depravity of man through sin, that of common grace and of palingenesis. With specific reference to the relevance of these principles to philosophy, Potgieter disclaims the at-

tempt of Reformed philosophers to found their philosophy on any one principle, such as Bavinck's idea of revelation, Stoker's idea of creation or Dooyeweerd's idea of law. "It is without doubt true," he writes, "that Scripture teaches that there is a revelation, creation and order; but, although each of these principles is per se Scriptural, it is logically excluded that each of them, corresponding to Scripture, should serve as the sole foundation of a Calvinistic philosophy. There is only one solution, namely, that following the steps of Calvin, an ordered plurality of principles, each with its own independent meaning, must serve as a basis of philosophy."²⁷⁾

In the light of these opinions, it could be questioned whether Kuyper is indeed giving us a satisfactory account of the principles of Calvinism. Kuyper himself believes that he is writing in the authentic spirit of Calvin. Thus he writes in a letter to Gunning: "I do nothing but copy. What I wish to achieve in the spheres of theology, canon law and political philosophy" (and philosophy too, he could have added) "is nothing but to produce a pure copy of what Calvin visualised."²⁸⁾ According to Rullman, Kuyper does not merely confine himself to Calvin but "proceeds from the eternal, unchangable and incorruptible principles which the great Reformer produced from God's Word in the 16th century Dr. Kuyper did not copy Calvin but was the regenerator of

Calvinism, of the whole Reformed view of life, of which the reformation of the Church was only one, even though important, part." ²⁹⁾ To effect this regeneration of Calvinism in all spheres of knowledge, Kuyper founded the Free University of Amsterdam in 1880, which had as its aim not only the creation of a Reformed theology but of a Reformed science and a Reformed philosophy.

Our aim is not, however, to decide whether Kuyper was indeed the regenerator of Calvinism, or whether he distorted Calvinism in the interests of a speculative and modernistic spirit, ³⁰⁾ but to indicate what, to Kuyper himself, the Calvinism to which he wishes to relate the principles of the sciences and philosophy, means.

In his Stone Lectures, Kuyper gives an account of what he understands by Calvinism. Calvinism, he states, is neither an ecclesiastical, nor a theological, nor a sectarian conception, but an all-embracing system of principles, a complete life-view. ³¹⁾ Such a life-view, in whatever culture we find it, demands an insight into the three fundamental relations of all human life, namely, our relation to God, our relation to man, and our relation to the world. Calvinism expresses these relations as follows: For our relation to God, an immediate fellowship with the eternal, independent of priest or church; for the relation of man to man, the recognition

of each person as a value, which is his by virtue of his creation in the image of God, and therefore of the equality of all men before God and his magistrates; and for our relation to the world, the recognition that in the world the curse of sin is restrained by grace,³²⁾ that the life of the world is to be honoured in its independence and that we must, in every domain, discover the treasures and develop the potencies hidden by God in nature and in human life.³³⁾

The primary interest of this summary account of what Kuyper understands by the Calvinistic world-view lies, for the philosopher, in Kuyper's conception that man's relation to man and to the world, which involves the very possibility of science and philosophy, depends on his prior relation to God. What he understands by this "immediate fellowship with the eternal", Kuyper attempts to explain in his next lecture on the connection between Calvinism and religion.

Firstly, Kuyper states, religion is not confined to one group or church, but is common to all men. No man can claim to be constitutionally devoid of the semen religionis which God, together with the sensus divinitatis, has implanted in every man. Moreover, Kuyper continues, religion is a relation of the whole man to God. Quoting the Gospels, "Thou shalt love God not only with all thy heart and with all thy strength, but also with all thy mind," Kuyper states that the

religious organ is to be found, not in a part of our being, for example our intellect, will or feelings, but in our whole being,³⁴⁾ at that point where all the faculties are drawn together in a unity. Hence the importance of the following passages:

"If such an action" (i.e. our interpretation of our relation to God) "is to put its stamp upon our entire life, it must start from that point in our consciousness in which our life is still undivided and lies comprehended in its unity - not in the spreading vines but in the root from which the vines spring. This point, of course, lies in the antithesis between all that is finite in our human life and the infinite that lies beyond it. Here alone we find the common source from which the different streams of our human life spring and separate themselves."³⁵⁾

Again:

"As the entire creation reaches its culminating point in man, so also religion finds its clear expression only in man who is made in the image of God, and this not because man seeks it, but because God Himself implanted in man's nature the real essential religious expression God Himself makes man religious by means of the sensus divinitatis, i.e. the sense of the Divine, which He causes to strike the chords on the harp of the soul the heart is to be understood not as an organ of feeling but as that point from which God

acts and from which he acts on the understanding." ³⁶⁾

On these passages Dooyeweerd comments, saying that Kuyper has here with one tremendous sweep destroyed the anthropological concept of man. He has led us beyond the temporal functions, including thought, to the central religious root, the heart, as concentration point and deeper unity of our whole existence.

From this it follows that there is no aspect of our existence which can be considered to be indifferent or neutral to religion. God is sovereign, all life belongs to Him and is created by Him according to its proper law and nature. The sovereignty of God over the whole cosmos is then, for Kuyper, the fundamental principle of Calvinism. "First stands the confession of the absolute Sovereignty of the Triune God," he writes, "for of Him, through Him, and unto Him are all things This is the fundamental conception of religion as maintained by Calvinism, and hitherto, no one has ever found a higher conception." ³⁷⁾ Everything created, he continues, was furnished by God with an unchangeable law of its existence. Because God has ordained such laws and ordinances for all life, all life must be consecrated to His service. If everything that is, exists for the sake of God, then it follows that the whole creation must give glory to God. ³⁸⁾

Now what does the Calvinist mean by his faith in the

ordinances of God? Kuyper asks. Every aspect of created life, he answers, has a law for its existence, instituted by God Himself. These laws or ordinances we may call laws of nature, provided that by this term we mean, not laws originating from nature, but laws imposed upon nature. ³⁹⁾ From this doctrine of God's sovereignty over all aspects of creation, Kuyper develops his conception of sovereignty in its proper orbit, applying it especially in his theory of church and state.

Finally Kuyper asks the question whether religion must be normal or abnormal. Must we reckon de facto with man in his present condition as normal, or as having fallen into sin and having become abnormal, in which case religion must necessarily assume a soteriological character. ⁴⁰⁾ If we consider man as normal, his religion is a slow process of development from the most primitive stages to its present status as the "unconscious feeling for an Unknown Infinite," and sin itself is explained in terms of an evolution from a lower to a higher moral position. ⁴¹⁾ According to the abnormalist theory, man being created in the image of God, was also created with a pure and genuine religion. The degrading religions of primitive pagan communities are not natural to man but the outcome of his Fall, and religion can consequently only be restored to its original purity in a soteriological manner, by a radical regeneration of man. Palingenesis, however, is not only an immediate act of grace "setting right the crooked

wheel of life," but involves the necessity of Scriptural revelation, which presents us with a clear consciousness of our relation to God. But Scripture is not only the formal principle of the Reformed confession, states Kuyper.⁴²⁾ In our abnormal condition, our immediate communion with God is lost, sin has brought separation and darkness, and the necessitas luminis artificiosi arises. As Calvin points out, this need for Scriptural revelation does not rest in ratiocination, but on the immediate testimony of the Holy Spirit, the testimonium Spiritus Sancti.⁴³⁾

If we accept the latter point of view, then all life, which includes the life of thought, is affected by original sin, and all life, also the life of thought, must be regenerated by God's special grace. The radical fashion in which sin influences intellectual activity, Kuyper describes as follows:⁴⁴⁾ (1) Corresponding to the abnormal condition of the universe, falsehood in every sense of the word is now prevalent. This particularly affects those sciences which depend upon personal communication. (2) Except for actual falsehood, we have the unintentional mistake, in observation and memory as well as in the actual processes of thought, from which follows, (3) self-delusion and self-deception, making true scientific self-knowledge impossible. (4) Because of the abnormal condition of our imagination, the boundary between phantasy and reality becomes blurred. In some the imagination

works too weakly, in others it is over-excited. (5) The abnormal element in the condition of other minds affects us. The power of education, language and the spirit of the time cannot be resisted. (6) The effects worked by sin on the body deserve equal consideration. No one is in a normal bodily condition and our spiritual disposition is consequently affected. (7) The different parts of the content of our consciousness affect and contaminate each other. Thus the evil indefinitely multiplies.

Palingenesis is therefore not confined to the order of religion, but, in conformity with Kuyper's conception of the radical unity of man in his religious root, the heart, it is of immediate importance for the proper exercise of thought itself. There will thus be two kinds of science, determined by a two-fold point of departure: the one rooted in the unregenerate heart, the other in the regenerate. Because there are two kinds of people, or two kinds of human consciousness,⁴⁵⁾ there are two kinds of science.

From this it follows that for Kuyper there can be no conflict between faith and philosophy. What Dooyeweerd terms Kuyper's "great Scriptural conception" (groot Schriftuurlijke⁴⁶⁾ greep)⁴⁷⁾ is his insight that all science is rooted in faith, and that the whole scale of Christian sciences, theology included, must be contrasted with the whole scale of non-

Christian or apostate sciences, apostate theology included. While formally faith functions in both cases, so that we may say that "Christianity and paganism stand to each other as the plus and minus form of the same series,"⁴⁸⁾ they are at the same time absolutely antithetical to each other, because both proceed from a central religious attitude of the heart, the one Christian, the other apostate.

"Not faith and science, therefore," Kuyper concludes, "but two scientific systems, or if you choose, two scientific elaborations, are opposed to each other, each having its own faith. Nor may it be said that it is here science which opposes theology, for we have to do with two absolute forms of science, both of which claim the whole domain of human knowledge, and both of which have a suggestion about the supreme Being of their own as the point of departure for their world-view. Pantheism as well as Deism is a system about God, and without reserve the entire modern theology finds its home in the science of the Normalists. And finally, these two scientific systems of the Normalists and the Abnormalists are not relative opponents, walking together half way, and further on, peaceably suffering one another to choose different paths, but they are both in earnest, disputing with one another the whole domain of life, and they cannot desist from the constant endeavour to pull down to the ground the entire edifice of their respective controverted assertions, all the

supports included, upon which their assertions rest. If they did not try this, they would thereby show on both sides, that they did not honestly believe in their point of departure, that they were no serious combatants, and that they did not understand the primordial demand of science, which of course claims unity of conception." ⁴⁹⁾

In spite of Kuyper's radical distinction between the "Normalists" and the "Abnormalists", between a degenerate and a regenerate science, he nevertheless, like Calvin himself, acknowledges that pagan thought reveals many excellent characteristics. The names of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are still honoured by Christian thinkers and the philosophy of Aristotle had been an invaluable aid in the training of the Christian scholar. ⁵⁰⁾ This is explained by Kuyper in terms of the doctrine of common grace. God's grace extends itself, not only as special grace to the elect, but also as common grace (gratia communis) to the whole human race. Without God's common grace, which curbs the full effects of sin, there could be no possibility of science at all, and pagan thought would be nothing but a tissue of lies. ⁵¹⁾

Kuyper's conception of the sovereignty of God in all spheres of life, of the heart as the central unity of human existence, his doctrine of antithesis and of common grace,

play an important rôle in later attempts, notably that of H. Dooyeweerd, to develop a Calvinistic philosophy. For this reason we have gone into his views at some length. But the views of his colleagues at the Free University, who likewise attempted to examine the notion and possibility of a Calvinistic philosophy, must also be mentioned. Of these the most important are H. Bavinck, Professor of dogmatic theology, J. Woltjer, Professor of philology - which at the Free University also included philosophy - and V. Hepp, Bavinck's successor.

Bavinck's philosophical reputation is based primarily on his book, Wijsbegeerte der Openbaring (Philosophy of Revelation), in which he discusses the relation between revelation and philosophy, nature, history, religion, Christendom and culture. In the chapters on philosophy and science, he presents his conception of a philosophy based on Calvinistic principles, which he terms a philosophy of revelation. In attempting to show the relation between philosophy and revelation, Bavinck points out that philosophy proceeds from ordinary daily experience, the universal natural certainty of man regarding the objectivity and truth of his knowledge. Philosophy does not create the capacity for knowing and knowledge, but accepts it and tries to explain it. Bavinck thus accepts a moderate realism in epistemology, attacking both empiricism and idealism.

However, Bavinck continues, the "given" in knowledge can be finally understood only if we consider it as a revelation. Bavinck draws a distinction between special and general revelation. God reveals Himself to man firstly through Scripture, but also in nature and in human self-consciousness. This threefold revelation is expressed by Bavinck as the principium essendi, cognoscendi externum and cognoscendi internum of any science. ⁵⁴⁾ The principium essendi is God the sovereign Creator, the principium cognoscendi externum is the cosmos created by God and embodying the ideas of God, and the principium cognoscendi internum is man in whose self-consciousness God and world are related. These principles are rooted in God as the causa efficiens principialis of all knowledge. ⁵⁵⁾ Bavinck states that our knowledge of God is an impression (theologia ectypa) procured from Scripture, of the knowledge which God has of Himself (theologia archetypa). Hence both science and philosophy are referred to Scripture ⁵⁶⁾ as the source of their principles.

As Stoker ⁵⁷⁾ has pointed out, Bavinck's idea of revelation cannot offer a satisfactory solution to all philosophical problems, but it is the main key to a Calvinistic epistemology. In accepting the objectivity and independence of the known, it gives epistemology an ontological basis. It furthermore causes us to see the essence of knowledge as a gift, an

uncovering, a revelation, and founds the relation of knowledge on the sovereignty of God as the great Revealer.

Bavinck's conception of the rôle of self-consciousness or self-knowledge in epistemology, which is of fundamental importance in contemporary neo-Calvinistic philosophy, must also be mentioned.⁵⁸⁾ Finally, he made an important negative contribution by weeding out from Calvinistic thought pagan and Scholastic notions which had retarded the development of a Calvinistic philosophy.

Woltjer's philosophical speculations are to be found in systematic form in an essay, Ideëel en Reëel (The Ideal and the Real), in which he proceeds from the distinction between the real and the ideal. What is knowable in the real is idea, which he compares with the stamp on the copper or silver.⁵⁹⁾ The ideal exists primarily as the eternal thoughts of God, secondly as expressed in the cosmos and in man, and lastly in man's mind, which can discern the ideas and is the bearer of a world of ideas.⁶⁰⁾

The task of science and philosophy is to penetrate to the ideas of things, to which he ascribes an objective existence. "The idea is intuited by the mind," he writes, "from which, however, it in no way follows that it exists only in the mind; it is in any case no function of the mind, the mind intuits the ideas as its objects. And not only the mind has reality, but also the ideas; as such, as ideas, they are

and they have reality." ⁶¹⁾ As both idea and mind have reality, which refers to their common origin, God, science and philosophy must begin with faith. ⁶²⁾

According to Young, Woltjer is a Christian Platonist, standing in the line of Augustine, Anselm, Bonaventura and Malebranche, and he claims that Woltjer's Ideëel en Reëel is to be numbered among the classics of Augustinian philosophy. ⁶³⁾ While we may consider that Young overrates the philosophical value of this essay, it is nevertheless true that Woltjer initiated a neo-Calvinistic trend in philosophy with an explicit Augustinian orientation.

Of these thinkers, Hepp is most theological in his approach. His contribution is limited chiefly to the problem of the source of certainty in judgements, which he finds in the testimonium Spiritus Sancti. This doctrine, he states, lies on the boundary line between theology and philosophy. As proceeding from the Holy Spirit, the testimony belongs to the field of theology; as terminating in human consciousness, it is of an epistemological nature. The lack of a Christian philosophy Hepp ascribes to a neglect of this dogma, caused by the overstressing on the one hand of the doctrine of the logos, and on the other hand of the doctrine of the autonomy of reason. ⁶⁴⁾

Hepp distinguishes between the testimonium Spiritus

Sancti speciale and generale. The first testimony, which guarantees the certainty of Revelation, is carried by the testimonium generale, which is also the foundation of epistemology. The testimonium generale is divided again into the testimonium externum, which, as objective truth, testifies to us, and the testimonium internum, which provides certainty. Neither testimonium is sufficient, leading individually either to a false objectivism or subjectivism. ⁶⁵⁾

The relation between the two testimonia produces the fides generalis, which, however, is concerned only with central and primary truths, not with derived truths procured by deduction and induction.

Hepp states that sin cannot destroy the testimonium generale. Error and doubt are situated, not in the perception of central truths but in ~~that~~ of derived truth. ⁶⁶⁾ He presents the following summary of his doctrine: "The testimonium generale is the immediate and irresistable activity of the Holy Spirit, in which He testifies to and in the human spirit of the truth in its centre, and through which in every man a final certainty is born. Or, philosophically speaking, the testimonium generale is the final ground of the certainty of knowledge. ⁶⁷⁾

What, we may ask, has been achieved by these thinkers of the Free University? It is of interest to note that they

themselves considered that their philosophical and theological researches were of a preparatory nature only. Thus Kuyper writes in 1895, that he is still digging at the foundations of the new Calvinistic movement and that as yet no stone is to be seen above the ground.⁶⁸⁾ And Woltjer states that while the completion of the building cannot be expected in the immediate future, the foundations are being laid by the Free University.⁶⁹⁾

Summing up the achievements of these thinkers, Young writes as follows:

"In the first place, these men gave to Calvinism a scientific expression in terms of the modern situation. The monumental theological achievement of Kuyper and Bavinck was a precondition of fruitful philosophical development along Calvinistic lines. Secondly, a strong emphasis was placed on the fact that Calvinism was not only a theological and ecclesiastical system but an all-embracing view of life and the world. The Reformed Faith was seen to have implications for every area of human activity, therefore for philosophy also. In this connection Abraham Kuyper's doctrine of the antithesis between the Christian and the non-Christian is of paramount importance. This doctrine involves the necessity of a distinctively Christian point of view in all areas of scientific inquiry. Once inflamed with zeal for Christian scientific enterprise, the Christian community, the church as or-

ganism, in Kuyper's language, must in the course of time produce a Christian philosophy.

Finally, we have seen that Kuyper, Bavinek, Woltjer and Hepp have actually engaged in philosophical inquiry, especially in the field of epistemology. They have thus made the first attempt to realise the ideal of philosophia reformatata.⁷⁰⁾

Although these earlier Calvinistic thinkers did not present us with a system of Calvinistic philosophy - a task which has been attempted only in the last thirty years at the Free University of Amsterdam - they have to a great extent clarified the notion of a Calvinistic philosophy, its aim and requirements. It means, then, a philosophia reformatata, a philosophy which is not an uneasy synthesis between traditional philosophy and Reformed theology, but a philosophy, as Dooyeweerd states, which is completely penetrated by the Christian religion.⁷¹⁾ "It does mean," he writes, "that we will relate philosophical thought in its entire foundation, starting-point, and transcendental direction, to the new root of our cosmos in Christ."⁷²⁾ Rooted in the fundamental religious principles of the Reformation, which were first clearly expressed by Calvin, it may never mean an uncritical adherence to Calvin as the "pater angelicus of Reformed philosophical thinking."⁷³⁾ but even involves a criti-

cism of pagan and scholastic residues in Calvin's thought in the name of these very Reformed principles. Calvin himself, Stoker writes, emphasised that after the Reformation the church should seek further reformation. We must consider those principles in Calvin as Calvinistic, he continues, taking into account the exigencies of his time and of his life, which do not contradict each other and which carry the building of his life work.⁷⁴⁾

In the same spirit Dooyeweerd draws a distinction between "uncalvinistic" and "Calvinistic" trends in the thought of his predecessors at the Free University. He states that where Kuyper develops, as in his Stone Lectures, his great conception of the meaning of Calvinism, we find a fundamentally Reformed approach. As soon, however, as Kuyper attempts to apply this conception to more particularised aspects of theology and philosophy, his Reformed thinking begins to waver and loses its strength. This appears especially in his scholastic conception of the relation between soul and body, his doctrine of the logos, his realism of ideas and his attempt to correlate his encyclopaedic system of the sciences with the traditional five faculties, in which philosophy is closely associated with philology and history and deprived of her right to furnish the theoretical foundations of the special sciences.⁷⁵⁾

While Bavinck and Woltjer, again, whole-heartedly ac-

cept the Reformed point of view and labour in the same spirit as Kuyper and with the same aim, Dooyeweerd continues, their work represents to a much greater extent than that of Kuyper the spirit of synthesis with traditional modes of thought. Bavinck is under the influence of Scholasticism and Woltjer under the influence of Plato and neo-Platonism. Thus both Bavinck and Woltjer cannot see the central significance of the heart for thought, and identify the central unity of man with the intellect or logos, as Kuyper himself still does in the Encyclopaedie.⁷⁶⁾ Woltjer further accepts a neo-Platonic doctrine of the degrees of reality and individuality, and, unlike Kuyper, overrates the value of scientific knowledge. While Woltjer's thought is more consistent than Kuyper's, because of the latter's vacillation between Reformed and traditional conceptions, Kuyper's thought is yet of primary importance for its unsurpassed clarity regarding the fundamentals of Calvinism.

According to Van Til, Hepp makes concessions to a Roman-Catholic type of natural theology. This is especially evident in his doctrine of the testimonium generale, which is common to both believer and unbeliever, and which is not affected by sin. Hepp furthermore does not sufficiently stress the distinction between general and special grace. Bavinck's appreciation for the traditional proofs of God's existence shows

that Bavinck has not altogether freed himself from non-Christian forms of thinking. Van Til also criticises aspects of Kuyper's thought as Roman Catholic, Aristotelian and Scholastic.⁷⁷⁾

In the course of this chapter we have repeatedly made use of the term "Calvinistic philosophy." This term is used by the adherents of the new philosophy themselves, on the grounds that this is the only philosophy which is authentically Calvinistic, that is, in principle Reformed. There are, however, reasons for preferring the term "neo-Calvinistic" to signify the new philosophy in the Calvinistic world. Firstly, there are other philosophical trends in the Calvinistic world, and the term "neo-Calvinistic" serves as a way of distinguishing this movement from, for example, the philosophy of Loen, Aalders,⁷⁸⁾ de Hartog, Haitjema, and Kohnstamm, to mention only a few. Secondly, not all Calvinists agree that this philosophy is indeed Calvinistic. This approach is especially evident in the publications of V. Hepp,⁷⁹⁾ the late professor of theology at the Free University, and in that of the Reverend Steen;⁸⁰⁾ in the controversy between Engelbrecht⁸¹⁾ and Coetzee⁸²⁾ regarding the term "neo-Calvinism"; and more lately in articles by W. Masselink.⁸³⁾ The burden of the

criticism is: depreciation of historical Calvinistic theology, unfounded originality and biblicism, which is considered to be contrary to the Drie Formulieren van Eenigheid formulated at the synod of Dordt in 1619, and accepted as the principle of unity (accord van kerklijke gemeenschap) of the Calvinistic Churches of the Netherlands.

The relativity of the term used is, however, emphasised by Vollenhoven's suggestion that the new philosophy should simply be termed "Scriptural"⁸⁴⁾ and Dooyeweerd's claim that it should be called "Christian."⁸⁵⁾ We retain the term "neo-Calvinistic philosophy" as a purely nominal indication of the new movement, without in any way denying its claim to be authentically Calvinistic, Scriptural or Christian, and accepting the use of the term "Calvinistic philosophy" as it appears in the publications of this philosophy.

In attempting to establish the neo-Calvinistic concept of philosophy, one is, however, faced with the problem of the diversity of nuances or trends in neo-Calvinistic philosophy itself. Thus Stoker distinguishes between at least four main trends:⁸⁶⁾ (1) The philosophy of the idea of Revelation, associated with the name of H. Bavinck, (2) the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea by the Amsterdam philosophers Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven, (3) his own philosophy of the idea of creation, and (4) a philosophical movement showing the influence of Woltjer's Augustinianism, developed especially by the Ame-

rican Calvinist philosophers Van Til and Young. Then Stoker mentions contributions, for example, by Bohatec, K. Schilder and D. Jellema, which do not fall within any of these four classes. Moreover, the boundaries are nowhere clear, and variations appear within one and the same trend. Stoker states: "Together these nuances constitute one school, bound not by the ipse dixit of a master, but by the common basis, religious motives and fundamental principles. The differences in nuances are determined amongst others by the difference in accentuation of common principles and by the different influences of other philosophical systems."⁸⁷⁾

Of these trends, there is only one which has received a final philosophical formulation. We may with justice speak only of one completed neo-Calvinistic system of philosophy, namely, the philosophy of the cosmomic idea. Of its two founders, Volleghoven has confined himself chiefly to an analysis of the history of philosophy, in the light of the neo-Calvinistic conception of the religious basic motives of the West. Dooyeweerd has concerned himself with the systematic construction of the philosophy of the idea of law. In attempting to establish the neo-Calvinistic concept of philosophy, we shall therefore limit ourselves to the philosophy of Dooyeweerd, indicating where there are relevant points of contact with, or divergences from, other neo-Calvinistic trends. Of these, the most important is the philosophy of the idea of creation, developed by H.G. Stoker. Although this philosophy equals that of Dooyeweerd in its scope

and profundity, it has been published only in the form of short brochures. ⁸⁸⁾ Stoker himself considers that these earlier works need radical revision. His mature philosophical position, presented in academic lectures at the University of Potchefstroom, has not yet been published. For an outline of his philosophy of the idea of creation, see Appendix I, page 121.

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Dooyeweerd's philosophy is developed primarily along the lines of Kuyper, as is indeed explicitly acknowledged by him. In his assessment of Kuyper's contribution to his philosophy, Dooyeweerd mentions (1) Kuyper's discovery of the Scriptural principle of the sovereignty of God as the basic idea of philosophy, and (2) Kuyper's grounding of all thought in the heart, which he ⁸⁹⁾ terms Kuyper's religious basic conception. With reference to his own philosophical development, Dooyeweerd writes in the foreword to the first edition of his Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, that while he was initially attracted to the neo-Kantian philosophy and later to Husserl's phenomenology, the great turning point in his thinking was marked by the discovery of the religious root of thought, the "heart" as proclaimed by Holy Scripture. Thereupon, he continues, new light was shed on the failure of all attempts, including his own, to bring about an inner synthesis between the Christian faith and a philosophy which is rooted in faith in the self-sufficiency of human reason, and he saw the need of a revolution of a very radical character in philosophical thought.

This autobiographical passage brings into relief Dooyeweerd's central purpose, which is evident in all his philosophi-

cal writings. The great "turning point" in his thought is the insight that if Christianity and philosophy are to be brought into contact at all, it can happen only on the basis of a new, specifically Christian, concept of philosophy, the development of which has indeed become Dooyeweerd's life work. Thus his publications, in spite of his more specialised philosophical interests in the fields of jurisprudence and political philosophy, reveal an increasing concentration on the problem of the nature of philosophy itself. In his inaugural lecture at the Free University in 1926, De Beteekenis der Wetsidee voor Rechtwetenschap en Rechtsphilosophie, Dooyeweerd is seeking for a Christian basis for jurisprudence, which leads him on to the philosophical problem of the relation between the different aspects of the cosmos. In his next work, De Crisis in de Humanistische Staatsleer (1932), the basic motives of his philosophy: the structural diversity of the cosmos, the principle of sovereignty in its proper orbit and the religious foundation of epistemology, are clearly exposed, although still applied to the special fields of political philosophy, jurisprudence and sociology. It is only in the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (1935-36), however, that we find an exposition of his concept of philosophy itself, and the formulation of its basic idea as the idea of law. Since then it has been amplified in the English edition of this work, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, as well as in a smaller English publication, Transcendental Problems of Philosophical Thought, and in many articles. His latest work, Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte,

is concerned more specifically with an analysis of the antinomies in the Greek and Scholastic conceptions of philosophy.

Dooyeweerd's concept of philosophy was developed, as he states in his foreword, in the closest co-operation with his colleague, Prof. Vollenhoven. In the foreword he further visualises a circle of adherents who will examine not only specifically philosophical problems but also the principles of the special sciences in the light of the philosophy of the cosmomic idea, a programme which was realised by the creation of an international quarterly magazine, Philosophia Reformata (1936-1957). This journal, by presenting possibilities for polemical discussions, internal criticism and the development of relatively obscure aspects of Dooyeweerd's thought, has contributed much to the consolidation of the philosophy of the wetsidee.⁹⁰⁾

We have thus at our disposal an articulated system of philosophy, with all the advantages of explicitness and multiple illumination of the central theme which common activity within a strict philosophical school makes possible.⁹¹⁾ Yet at once our initial problem arises once again. We may formulate it as follows: Why is it necessary to characterise this philosophy as "Calvinistic"? At a first glance the term "philosophy of the cosmomic idea" seems adequate. It points to the central theme, the idea of cosmic law, which, as a cosmological structural principle, seeks to offer a new solution to the fundamental epistemological and ontological problems of

philosophy. Like every other philosophy, the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea has its principles, its coherence, its demonstrations, and its claim to universal validity, and the problem, if there is any, seems simply to be whether its principles are self-evident, its coherence truly coherent, its demonstrations necessary and its claim to universality well-founded. In short, if the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea is philosophy, what meaning can it have to qualify it as Calvinistic philosophy?

The thought of Dooyeweerd and his school reveals this great merit, that it nowhere seeks to evade the immense difficulties which this formulation of the problem involves. Thus Vollenhoven, in a book treating this matter, commences his analysis by asking whether the term "Calvinistic philosophy" is not a contradictio in terminis.⁹²⁾ What possible connection is there, he asks, between philosophy and the Calvinistic confession? In this philosophical school the treatment of the different problems of philosophy is never dissociated from the problem of the nature of philosophy, which in its turn involves an exhaustive examination of the relation between philosophy and Calvinism in particular, and between philosophy, theology and religion in general. Where the very right to existence of the philosophy of the wetsidee is thus bound up with this term, it is clear that our examination

of its concept of philosophy must from the outset face the problem presented by the term "Calvinistic philosophy" as its fundamental problem.

Our examination of the thought of Calvin, Kuyper and his colleagues at the Free University has established that Calvinistic philosophy means philosophy which takes its principle from Scripture. But at once the problem is sharpened. If philosophy proceeds from a principle taken from Scripture, it is proceeding from a premiss taken from without the order of philosophy itself, namely, Revelation. In that case, this philosophy will be intelligible only to those who accept the same premiss. Moreover, the acceptance of the authority of Scripture by the philosopher depends, if it is genuine, neither on the outcome of a course of reasoning nor on the will, but on the testimonium Spiritus Sancti, which is a grace. How, then, is the whole system of philosophy which proceeds from it, communicable? What has become of the universality and necessity of philosophy?

Here we have indeed touched on the core of the problem of neo-Calvinistic philosophy. It is not primarily the problem of the internal consistency of this philosophy with its own premises, what we may call its intrinsic intelligibility, but the problem of its extrinsic intelligibility. Extrinsic intelligibility we may define as the consistency

of the premiss or first principle of a philosophy with the universally valid conditions for thought. Our problem then resolves itself into the further questions: what are these universally valid conditions for philosophical thinking which make the intelligible communication of principles possible? In a fragment attributed to him, Aristotle writes: "You say one must philosophise. Then one must philosophise. You say one must not philosophise. Then, to prove your contention, you must philosophise. In any case, one must philosophise." ⁹³⁾ Aristotle emphasises here that philosophy does not consist in the statement of propositions held to be true, but in the validating of these propositions in an intelligible manner, where intelligibility denotes communicability within a common universe of discourse.

The problem arises because in the history of philosophy these premises more often than not contradict each other. The difference between Plato and Hobbes, Aristotle and Descartes, Aquinas and Kant, or, in contemporary philosophy, between, say, Maritain and Chestov, is not merely a difference in emphasis or degree. Here we find fundamental differences which challenge the claims of each to be philosophy. The history of philosophy reveals many examples of coherent systems, which may nevertheless contradict our common sense, our experience, our faith or the underlying assumptions of our cul-

ture, and which causes us to subject them to critical re-consideration. Usually we discover that such a philosophy's point of departure, which it considers to be self-evident, does not reveal a similar self-evidence to us. The question then arises whether philosophy is nothing but a kaleidoscope of irreconcilable systems, or at most forms patterns within specific perspectives. Are there only philosophies or is there philosophy?

The urgency of this problem is evident from the attention it has received in contemporary philosophy. Thus Gilson, for example, formulates it as follows: Confronted with the continual interchange of philosophical systems, must we therefore conclude, he asks, that philosophy itself is an impossibility? The radical mistakes which have been committed in the history of philosophy, he continues, must not, however, be laid at the door of philosophy itself, but are caused by the misuse of a principle of continuity present in the human spirit. This principle is for Gilson the intelligence, as rooted in the first principles of reason, and in the light of which not only philosophical truth but philosophical error becomes intelligible. Principles will become more or less intelligible in the degree to which they conform to this "metaphysical structure" of reality. Thus he writes: "There is and there always will be a history of philosophy, because philosophy exists only in human minds,

which themselves have a history, and because the world of knowledge and action to which the first principles apply is a changing world, but there should be no history of the first principles themselves, because the metaphysical structure of reality itself does not change. Perennis philosophia is not an honorary title for any particular forms of philosophical thinking, but a necessary designation for philosophy itself, almost a tautology. That which is philosophical is also perennial in its own right.⁹⁴⁾

H. J. de Vleeschauer, on the other hand, protests against this conception of the continuity of philosophy. The philosophia perennis is only a name for the permanent recurrence of the same problems, methods and solutions,⁹⁵⁾ a point of view with which E. Stein agrees when she rejects the idea of a perennial philosophy as "ein starres Begriffssystem, das als toter Besitz von Geschlecht zur Geschlecht weitergegeben wurde."⁹⁶⁾ De Vleeschauer, other than Stein, however, questions the very notion of a principle of continuity in philosophy. It depends on the assumption of a homogeneous human spirit, he writes, which answers to the same logical and psychological structure and conditions. But in that case there is no explanation possible for the divergent expressions of that spirit, nor for philosophy as a historical reality. The universe is created according to a principle of differentia-

tion. The concept man is a philosophical abstraction. There exists no Man, only types of men, and correlatively a multiplicity of thinking and spiritual structures. To conform to one's type is for all a spiritual fate, although the attempt to understand the spiritual structures of others is also a duty. ⁹⁷⁾ But the notion that the intelligence constitutes the principle of the continuity of philosophy, is simply the philosophical expression of one such type.

Dooyeweerd, unlike de Vleeschauwer, does not reject the notion of philosophical continuity. Against de Vleeschauwer's differentiated spiritual structures, Dooyeweerd further emphasises, with Gilson, the basic unity of the human race and its identical spiritual structure, and accepts the notion of the philosophia perennis. But how is this to be reconciled with his claim that his philosophy is founded on Scripture, on religion, when this excludes the possibility of philosophical communication?

The bold step which characterises Dooyeweerd's great philosophical originality, is his attempt to prove that these claims do not contradict each other. But at the same time he claims the right to reformulate the problem. He does not wish to characterise Calvinistic philosophy as a philosophy rooted in religion in contrast with philosophies rooted in reason or in some other premiss, which at once gives rise to the problem

of external intelligibility mentioned above. With such fundamental divergences in the nature of their principles, it is impossible for one philosophical system to communicate with another. But Dooyeweerd wishes to show, with a philosophical necessity, that all philosophies are rooted in premises of a religious nature.

This task, of which Dooyeweerd states that compared with it Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy must be considered as peripheral, ⁹⁸⁾ is attempted by him in his transcendental critique of theoretical thought. This Dooyeweerd himself considers as the first step to the solving of the problem of philosophical communication.

CHAPTER II

The Transcendental Critique.

-1-

We have introduced the transcendental critique as the attempt of Dooyeweerd to prove, with a philosophical necessity, that all thought proceeds from premises of a religious nature. As it stands, this would seem to imply that Dooyeweerd accepts the religious foundation of thought as an axiom, which he then attempts to prove correct in the course of the critique. However, the actual argument of the critique begins with Dooyeweerd's presentation of the problem of philosophic communication. The philosophy of the cosmogenic idea, he writes, has been accused of being founded on a dogmatic assumption (dogmatische machtspreuk) because it proceeds from a principle, the sovereignty of God, accepted from Scripture. Though it may present an internal intelligibility and coherence, once the premiss is accepted, the premiss itself is private in the sense of being a subjective religious prejudice, and thus this philosophy as a whole lacks the universality which is to be found in philosophies proceeding by means of human reason alone.

It is exactly this criticism which Dooyeweerd turns to his own account. He points out that the so-called universality of reason itself contains a great problem. If all philosophical schools chose their points of departure in reason alone and not in deeper axioms, it ought to be possible to convince an opponent in a purely theoretical way that his arguments are false or true. But what actually happens is that philosophers reason at cross-purposes; a philosopher of the Thomist school, for example, can never succeed in convincing one of the Kantian critical school.¹⁾ In reality the universality of reason is an uncritically accepted dogma, cloaking diverse supra-theoretical points of departure. However, Dooyeweerd continues, the time has come that we may no longer accept this dogma as self-evident, but must examine it as a critical problem, and this requires a critical investigation into the structure of thought itself. In so doing, he initiates the argument which reaches its climax and completion in the fourth stage of the critique, where Dooyeweerd claims to have proved the existence of the religious motives controlling all scientific and philosophical thinking.

In his A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Dooyeweerd has, however, introduced a "first way" to the critique, in which he attempts to show that it is of the nature of philosophy to be directed to the origin of cosmic reality.

In the "second way" (the transcendental critique proper), Dooyeweerd argues from the structure of the act of thought to the existence of the religious presuppositions or a priori of thought.

It is difficult to see why Dooyeweerd has introduced the argument of the first way at all. In the first edition of the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee it appears as a general introduction to the whole work. In the New Critique of Theoretical Thought, although it is now called the first way of the transcendental critique, it serves the same purpose, namely, to give us a summary view of the main problems of his work. "These single introductory theses contain in themselves the entire complex of problems involved in a discussion of the possibilities of genuine philosophy," Dooyeweerd writes. ²⁾ At the same time he attempts to give also a provisional solution to these problems. The extreme condensation which is the result of this, together with the disjointed manner of exposition, makes this in many respects the least satisfactory of all his philosophical writings.

In the preliminary definition of philosophy which we find in this section, the influence of Kuyper is clear. Kuyper distinguishes between a wider and a narrower meaning of the term, philosophy. According to the first, philosophy is

the investigation into man's psychical existence,³⁾ which involves a specialised study of psychology, ethics and logic, the latter again dividing into the study of the principles governing our thought, logic proper and epistemology. Dooyeweerd rejects this view of philosophy, saying that Kuyper confuses philosophy with these special disciplines. Far more correct, according to Dooyeweerd, is Kuyper's second account of philosophy, where he conceives of philosophy as a knowledge of the cosmos as a whole.⁴⁾ The following well-known passage from Kuyper gives us this conception very clearly. He writes:

"The whole is always something different from the combination of its parts. First because of the organic relation which holds the parts together; but much more because of the entirely new questions which the combination of the whole presents: questions as to the origin and end of the whole; questions as to the categories which govern the reflection of the object in your consciousness; questions as to absolute being and as to what non-cosmos is. In order to answer these questions, you must subject the whole cosmos to yourself, your own self included. In order to do this, in your consciousness, you must step out of the cosmos, and you must have a starting point (*δός μοι πού στῶ*) in the non-cosmos. And this is altogether impossible as long as sin confines you with your consciousness to the cosmos."⁵⁾

Kuyper distinguishes in this passage between (1) the special sciences as the knowledge of aspects of the cosmos and philosophy as knowledge of the whole, which involves the question of the origin and end of this whole, (2) the need for self-knowledge in philosophical activity, (3) the point from which philosophy must proceed in order to achieve an all-embracing glance over the cosmos. While (2) and (3) are immediately relevant to Dooyeweerd's conception of self-knowledge and his doctrine of the archimedean point treated in the second way, Kuyper's conception of the task of philosophy (1) is the direct antecedent of Dooyeweerd's conception as developed in the first way.

In the first way Dooyeweerd states that all genuine philosophical thought can be characterised as thought directed to the origin of the cosmos, ⁶⁾ for the creation refers beyond itself to its origin as an explanation of its own being. Non-Christian philosophy, however, seeks the origin within the cosmos itself, hence Dooyeweerd designates all non-Christian philosophy as immanentist philosophy.

When we contrast our immediate or naive experience with the abstractions of scientific and philosophical thought, he

writes, what first strikes us is the indissoluble coherence of all aspects of reality. No aspect can exist by itself but refers to the whole coherence which is expressed or mirrored in each individual aspect. But this coherence or nexus as a whole again refers or points beyond its own limits towards a central unity or totality, which in its turn postulates a final ground or origin of cosmic reality. Its character of referring and expressing which is proper to our entire created cosmos, stamps created reality as meaning, Dooyeweerd writes,⁷⁾ in accordance with its dependent, non-self-sufficient nature.

The introduction of the word "meaning" (zin) in this context is of the greatest importance for the understanding of the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea. For Dooyeweerd the word "meaning" signifies "contingent being" and by "contingent being" he means "created being." Thus he states that meaning is the mode of being of all created being. It has a religious root and a divine origin.⁸⁾ The cosmos has not meaning, which would imply participation in a hypothetical order of being; it is meaning, an insufficient, contingent mode of being.

The aim of philosophy is to achieve a theoretical view over the cosmos as a whole; it must answer the question, "Wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt."⁹⁾ In other words, it is directed to the totality of meaning of the cosmos. "The proper character of philosophical thoughtmay never be disregarded with impunity. Philosophical thought is theoretical thought direc-

ted towards the totality of meaning." ¹⁰⁾ But the totality of meaning is still meaning, and therefore points in its turn to an origin of meaning which is not meaning but Being. ¹¹⁾ Because all meaning is from, through and to an origin, the direction towards the origin is therefore necessarily included in the nature of philosophy. This genetic basic tendency of philosophy, its tendency to the origin, is rooted in the nature of the cosmos as meaning. ¹²⁾ From this tendency to the origin, philosophy cannot withdraw itself. It is an immanent law of philosophy to think from and to the origin, which alone gives ¹³⁾ meaning its ground and existence.

Because of its intimate connection with Dooyeweerd's concept of philosophy as a whole, we cannot at this stage pause to examine this first introductory argument critically. However, it must be pointed out that the argument of the first way does not in any sense bear the character of a proof. ¹⁴⁾ Its only function as a first way seems to be to give a preliminary definition of philosophy which will accustom us to the argument of the second way. As he writes at the transition to the second way, in this definition of philosophy he started from above, from the position that it is the nature of philosophy to be directed to the totality of meaning of the cosmos. But in thus defining philosophy, he had to start from a supposition about the character of philosophy which is by no

means universally accepted in philosophical circles. The con-
ceptions of the task of philosophy are extremely divergent,
he continues, and any a priori choice in this matter may be
considered dogmatic.¹⁵⁾ Consequently, if the transcendental
critique is to be unbiased, it should proceed by examining
the structure of thought itself and its necessary presupposi-
tions. This will issue in a critique of the subjective as-
sumptions or prejudices of philosophy which answer in a sub-
jective, a priori manner on basic philosophical questions.¹⁶⁾
Dooyeweerd considers that this task of distinguishing between
the necessary presuppositions and unnecessary prejudices in
scientific and philosophic activity will be acknowledged by
all who have departed from a naive positivistic attitude.¹⁷⁾

Dooyeweerd then defines the transcendental critique
proper as follows:

By this we understand a critical inquiry (respecting
no single so-called theoretical axiom) into the universally
valid conditions which alone make theoretical thought possi-
ble, and which are required by the immanent structure of this
thought itself.¹⁸⁾

In examining the structure of thought, three transcen-
dental problems arise. Dooyeweerd defines the first tran-
scendental problem as follows:

What do we abstract in theoretical thought from the

structures of empirical reality given in naive experience,
and how is this abstraction possible?¹⁹⁾ Or, more simply, how
is theoretical thought characterised in contrast with pre-
theoretical naive experience?

To answer this question, Dooyeweerd must first of all give an account of what he understands by naive experience. He finds it necessary to emphasise from the start his break with the conception of naive experience as a theory of reality. Naive experience is given, it is the first datum for any theory about the nature of reality and of knowledge, and not that theory itself.

In naive experience we experience the aspects of the cosmos in their coherence with each other and with ourselves. All aspects of reality are grouped in an indissoluble duration of time, as individual structures intertwined in concrete events. Further, Dooyeweerd writes, there is as yet no vestige of abstraction, no analytical distinction between the aspects²⁰⁾ of the cosmos. We become aware of them only implicitly.

Although abstraction is absent from naive experience, Dooyeweerd nevertheless allows a non-theoretical cognitive relation between what he terms the subject and the object. We experience things as objects opposed to ourselves as subjects, and in this subject-object relation reality remains intact as a nexus. By "object" Dooyeweerd here means things or concrete

events as individual unities. Science, also philosophy, has no object in this sense. By the term "subject" again, he means man as a unity of all his different functions, and he sharply criticises theories of knowledge in which the object is identified with the known and the subject with the knowing function.

Dooyeweerd's conception of naive experience reveals a remarkable similarity to the views of Bradley and Whitehead. Bradley, and after him, Whitehead, both hold that epistemology and metaphysics have suffered a large measure of distortion ever since the inadequate analysis of experience which we find in Descartes, Locke and Hume. Bradley and Whitehead contend that finite selves, a conception of the ego as a res cogitans, or the perception of clear-cut sensa, presuppose a living, changing basis of experience which escaped the notion of earlier philosophers, and which they term "immediate experience." The term "immediate" denotes its non-derivative character, that is, it is not a form of experience which is the end-result arrived at by a process of abstraction, elimination or comparison. All such processes, though they transcend immediate experience, never leave it behind as a stage that is over and done with.²¹⁾

Whitehead often uses the term "prehension" to denote this experience. Prehension is a complex, vague mass of process,

which is continuous with the immediate past, and dimly fore-
shadows the immediate future. For Whitehead, as for Bradley,
there is never the mere perception or apprehension of an ob-
ject. While thinkers like Descartes, Hume and Locke in their
analysis of experience, throw all the emphasis on those ele-
ments of experience which lie distinct and clear-cut before
them, they do not perceive that they are dealing with abstrac-
tions, that are being lifted clear of a "massive, inarticulate
subjective form" provoked or brought into existence by data an-
tecedently given.

For them, Whitehead continues, echoing Dooyeweerd, the
structure or pattern of experience is essentially that of sub-
ject-object, and by subject they mean a bare knower and by ob-
ject they mean the bare known. The relation between the two is
the bare cognitive relation which may be described in various
terms, for example, perceiving, conceiving, apprehending, in-
ferring, etc. This deduction, he says, "presupposes that the
subject-object relation is the fundamental pattern of expe-
rience. I agree with this presupposition, but not in the sense
in which the subject-object relation is identified with the
knower and known. I contend that the notion of mere knowledge
is a high abstraction and that conscious discrimination is a
variable factor only present in the more elaborate factors of
experience. The basis of experience is emotional." While
22)

Dooyeweerd would distrust the use of the term "emotional" in this context, claiming that the sphere of feeling is but one aspect abstracted from naive experience, he believes, with Bradley and Whitehead, that the act of knowledge is secondary, depending on an abstraction from a pre-existing experience which remains at all stages of the formation of concepts in scientific and philosophical activity.

When we turn to Dooyeweerd's conception of theoretical thought, we find that it is characterised as abstractive or analytical thought, thought which separates the unbroken texture of naive experience into different modalities or aspects. Already in the introductory paragraph of the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, where Dooyeweerd contrasts philosophy on the one hand with naive experience and on the other hand with the special sciences, this is emphasised:

"If I consider reality as it is given in the naive pre-theoretical experience, and then confront it with a theoretical analysis, through which reality appears to split up into various modal aspects, then the first thing that strikes me, is the original indissoluble interrelation among these aspects which are for the first time explicitly distinguished in the theoretical attitude of mind.^{"23)}

Under theoretical analysis, Dooyeweerd continues, the cosmos reveals its aspects as space, movement, organic life,

12 } feeling, rational distinction, history, language, economics, aesthetics, law, morality and faith. Dooyeweerd is prepared to admit that further examination may reveal more aspects than the fourteen enumerated by him. It should further be noted that the terms "aspects," "modalities," "modal aspects" and later "spheres of law" or "modal spheres", are interchangeable terms. By this, Dooyeweerd states, he means the fundamental universal modalities of temporal being which do not refer to the concrete "what" of things or events but are only the different modes of the universal "how" which determine the aspects of our theoretical view of reality. The so-called "historical event", for example, only has a historical aspect. It will also have many other aspects or modalities.

In theoretical thought, then, we abstract modal aspects from our naive experience of reality. On the question, how this abstraction is possible, Dooyeweerd answers that in theoretical thought a theoretical distance is created between the logical aspect of our real act of thought and the non-logical aspect or aspects of our experience. This produces an antithetical relation (Gegenstand-relation) in which the non-logical aspects resist any attempt to grasp them in a logical concept. However, Dooyeweerd emphasises that this separation and antithesis between the two poles of the antithetical relation is purely intentional and artificial, and presupposes the coherence of both logical and non-logical aspects in the self in the

concrete act of thinking. "A real, concrete act of our thought," he writes, "has as many aspects as empirical reality itself has. The thinking and knowing self as subject and centre of its acts cannot be the true correlate of the Gegenstand. For in this case the self would remain ever a stranger to the Gegenstand and human knowledge would be impossible. The antithetical relation is only regarding the logical aspect of our act of thought as opposite to the non-logical aspects of reality, respectively of our real act. This implies at the same time that the identification of Gegenstand, reality and 'object' must be fundamentally erroneous."²⁴⁾

It is very difficult to understand what Dooyeweerd means by this account of the antithetical structure of thought. Except for the fact that his style is always cumbersome, repetitive and obscure, and that this has not been improved by the translation into English, the sense of confusion which the reader experiences at this stage is due to the fact that Dooyeweerd is obliged to refer to matters which he explains only in his epistemology, after his detailed account of the modal spheres. For this reason the editor is compelled to affix detailed footnotes explaining much of Dooyeweerd's philosophy which is only presented later. The obscurity of Dooyeweerd's account of the antithetical relation must therefore be ascribed, firstly, to a structural fault in the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, caused by his insistence that the transcendental critique should serve as a

prolegomenon to the rest of the work, while actually the critique, and especially the first transcendental problem, cannot be understood before the whole work has been mastered. In the second place it should be noted that his description of the structure of theoretical thought, even when fully understood, depends on his peculiar conception of analytical distinction as one modal aspect, a conception which in its turn proceeds from his conception of the refraction of God's sovereign law into modal aspects or spheres.

However, in spite of Dooyeweerd's introduction of the problem of the antithetical relation in the first transcendental problem, it is not of any great importance in the actual structure of the critique. What Dooyeweerd wishes to emphasise here is not how abstraction is possible, but that theoretical thought is thought which abstracts and "sets apart in opposition" the different cosmic modalities, which also include logical distinction.

The second transcendental problem Dooyeweerd formulates as follows:

From what point of view can we re-unite synthetically the logical and the non-logical aspects of naive experience which were set apart in opposition to each other in the theoretical antithesis?
25)

As it stands, the second transcendental problem seems to be concerned with the question, how the antithetical re-

lation can issue in a theoretical synthesis, that is, in a logical concept of the non-logical gegenstand. However, except for stating that the true starting point of the theoretical synthesis cannot be found in any of the two poles of the antithetical relation, Dooyeweerd further ignores it, to return to it only in the second volume of the Wijsbegeerte der Wet-
idee, where he presents his epistemology. Here he proceeds at once to an associated problem, which stands revealed as the true second transcendental problem, namely, what is the point of departure of the philosopher in his account of cosmic reality? Dooyeweerd is not simply concerned with how the special scientific act of thought - the theoretical synthesis - is concluded, which is for him an epistemological matter in the narrow sense of the word, but how the philosophical glance of totality over all aspects of the cosmos - the inter-modal synthesis of meaning - is achieved.

According to Dooyeweerd this is the central problem of the transcendental critique. By raising it, he claims that every possible starting point of philosophical thought is subjected to a fundamental criticism, for a truly critical attitude of thought does not allow us to choose such a starting point in any special aspect.

By this Dooyeweerd means that there are as many types of theoretical thought as there are aspects of the cosmos. In

every case there is a synthesis of the logical aspect with one of the non-logical aspects of our experience. When we take any of these non-logical aspects as a point of departure, we interpret the whole of reality in terms of that aspect. This is the remote cause of all "isms" in philosophy: biologism, physicism, psychologism, historicism, etc. When we take the logical aspect as the point of departure, the whole of reality again becomes logicised or idealised. These "isms" are therefore uncritical in a two-fold sense: Firstly, the antithetical relation gives no ground for the pretended absolutism of any aspect, and avenges itself in antinomies. Secondly, each "ism" returns the basic problem of theoretical synthesis, for it presupposes a synthesis of the logical aspect and the non-logical aspect, which is proclaimed to be "absolute". But the absoluteness of any aspect cannot be proclaimed before that aspect has been abstracted by means of a theoretical-logical analysis. ²⁶⁾ The "Divine irony" thus reveals itself in this, that the absolutisation of any cosmic aspect is at the same moment relativised by the possible absolutisation of every other aspect. ²⁷⁾

The problem which Dooyeweerd emphasises here is how we can achieve an inclusive glance over all these aspects of reality abstracted from naive experience. It is the problem of the archimedean point of philosophy. ²⁸⁾ He expresses

it differently by saying that I must ascend a tower from which I can survey all aspects and the coherence of aspects of the cosmos. Only thus can I achieve that glance of totality which Kuyper emphasised.

Dooyeweerd admits that the notion of the archimedean point has been recognised in the history of philosophy, as the existence of the "isms" mentioned above illustrate. In all these cases one aspect or one type of theoretical thought is absolutised, is considered as an archimedean point from which the whole of reality can be interpreted. What is not realised, however, is that this process of absolutisation itself is not a theoretical but a religious activity, ²⁹⁾ moreover, a religious choice of position in an idolatrous sense.

From this Dooyeweerd concludes that we can obviate the "isms" of philosophy only if we choose the archimedean point in the self, which is operative in all acts of thought, and which constitutes a "subjective totality", a "concentration point" of all the modal aspects. While theoretical thought is dispersed in the diversity of meaning in so far as it is always directed to some of other abstracted aspect of the cosmos, the self, while participating in every single modal aspect, yet transcends them all. "There is no single modal aspect of our cosmos in which I do not actually function," Dooyeweerd writes. "I have an actual function in all the modal aspects.

The I remains the central point of reference and the deeper unity above all modal diversity of the different aspects of my temporal existence." ³¹⁾

Without critical reflection on the self there can thus be no reflection on the totality of meaning or on the nature of philosophy. A deeper knowledge of the self is required, as Socrates realised when he raised the Delphic maxim to the primary requisite of philosophical reflection. ³²⁾ "Know thy-self" ³³⁾ must be written above the portals of philosophy.

At once the third transcendental problem arises:

How is this critical self-knowledge, this concentric direction of theoretical thought on the self, possible, and of what nature is it? ³⁴⁾

This question is pertinent because we have seen that for Dooyeweerd theoretical thought is abstractive thought, and can function only within the diversity of modal aspects. As the self transcends this diversity, it cannot become a Gegenstand to the logical function; only aspects of man are accessible to theoretical analysis:

"If you ask the special sciences active in the field of anthropology: what is man? you will obtain a diversity of items from physical-chemical, biological, psychological, cultural-historical, linguistic, ethnological and sociological points of view. These items are valuable. But no spe-

cial science, nor an encyclopaedic sociology, can answer the question, what man himself is in the unity of his selfhood. Human I-ness functions, to be sure, in all modal aspects of reality. But it is nevertheless, a central and radical unity ³⁵⁾ which as such transcends all temporal aspects."

Nevertheless, while we may agree that man can never be completely known by any special science or the sum of special sciences, it is not so clear what kind of knowledge we can ³⁶⁾ have of the self. In attempting to explain what kind of thought is involved in self-knowledge, Dooyeweerd states that the self, although it is the concentration point of the cosmos - a "subjective totality" - is still meaning, and can therefore be understood only in the light of its true or pretended origin. Self-knowledge is thus in the last analysis ³⁷⁾ dependent on our knowledge of God.

This knowledge of God, Dooyeweerd continues, is not the same as theological knowledge of God, for theological knowledge is still theoretical knowledge. It is still the result of the synthesis of the logical aspect of thought with a non-logical Gegenstand, in this case, the modality of faith. The knowledge of God to which Dooyeweerd is referring here he terms a "supra-theoretical" knowledge, a "central" and religious knowledge, rooted in man's heart. This does not mean that it remains enclosed in the heart, Dooyeweerd states. From there it penetrates into every sphere of our consciousness and into theoretical thought itself. ³⁸⁾

But if self-knowledge is dependent on knowledge of the true or pretended origin, a knowledge which is not "theoretical" but "religious", the third step of the critique demands an adequate description of what Dooyeweerd understands by religion. However, he points out that as religion transcends all modal aspects, also that of faith, it cannot be grasped in a theoretical concept. It can only be approximated in a theoretical idea. Hence he defines religion as follows:

"Religion is the innate impulse of human selfhood to direct itself towards the true or pretended absolute origin of all temporal diversity of meaning, which it finds focussed concentrically in itself."³⁹⁾

He claims that this is a theoretical and philosophical definition, formally transcendental, but stripped of the immediacy of the religious experience. It solely has the function "of relating the theoretical diversity of modal aspects to a central and radical unity and to an origin."⁴⁰⁾ The content of this idea will, however, remain abstract in so far as it must comprehend all possible forms of religion, even apostate ones. Because it cannot be a Gegenstand, it cannot be studied as a psychological phenomenon, cannot be described phenomenologically, is not

a feeling perception, not even an expression of the mysterium tremendum.⁴¹⁾ Dooyeweerd concludes the few pages devoted to the third transcendental problem by characterising religion as complete self-surrender to the true or pretended God.

After this account of what he understands by religion, Dooyeweerd considers that the inner point of contact between philosophic thought and religion has now been established.⁴²⁾

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The primary aim of the critique is to establish that theoretical thought is not self-sufficient but is rooted in presuppositions of a religious nature. The third transcendental problem is thus of great importance, for it is here that Dooyeweerd must satisfactorily illustrate in what manner the influence of religion enters the theoretical realm. Yet to this important problem Dooyeweerd pays less attention than to any other problem in the whole critique. He proceeds at once to the fourth stage of the critique, where he introduces the four religious motives which he considers to be the final presuppositions underlying Western thought.

A two-fold presupposition of philosophy has been discovered, Dooyeweerd states: firstly, an archimedean point from

which the self can direct its view over the diversity and coherence of meaning; secondly, a choice of what the self considers to be the absolute ground and origin of all meaning, and which determines the content of its view. This is always a religious act, "because it contains a choice of position in the concentration point of our existence in the face of the Origin of meaning." ⁴³⁾

This religious choice of the self is not yet, however, the starting point of philosophy in the fullest sense of the word. While it is true that the super-theoretical presuppositions make their influence felt in philosophy through the self, this self is not individual, not enclosed in itself. The self can exist only in a religious community. Moreover, philosophy is not an individual activity, but a social task involving a tradition of thought. But such a religious community shares a common spirit which, as shared and accepted by the individual self, constitutes the true starting point of philosophy, its religious a priori or religious basic motive.

"These fundamental motives," Dooyeweerd writes, "are the true motive forces which have dominated the evolution of Western scientific and philosophical thought. Each of them has established a community among those who have started from it. And the religious motive as hidden motive force of his spiritual community dominates the thinker all the more if he is unconscious of it. The thinker, indeed, can fashion this motive ac-

according to his individual view, but the motive itself is super-individual." ⁴⁴⁾

Two such basic religious motives have appeared in the history of the human race. The first is the motive of Creation, fall, and redemption in Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Ghost. ⁴⁵⁾ According to this motive all mankind is spiritually included in Adam. In him the whole race has fallen, and in mankind also the entire temporal cosmos which was concentrated in it. In Jesus Christ the creation which had apostatized in the Fall is again re-directed to its true origin and is again one in root, as the members of one body. ⁴⁶⁾ Our selfhood is then for Dooyeweerd rooted in the spiritual community of mankind. It is no self-sufficient "substance", he writes, no "windowless monad", but it lives in the spiritual community of the "we" which is directed to a divine "Thou" according to the original meaning of creation.

The second basic motive is that of the spirit of apostasy from the true God. It leads the heart in an idolatrous direction, and is thus the source of all absolutising of creation or creaturely aspects. The history of the West reveals the following variations of this religious a priori: (1) The Greek motive of matter and form, (2) the Scholastic motive of nature and grace, which is a synthesis of the Greek and the authentically Christian motives, (3) the Humanistic motive of nature and liberty.

(3)
nature

These motives bear two common characteristics:

Firstly, they cannot escape the law of the divinely instituted order of creation, and simply follow an existing pattern. Only because of the law of the religious concentration of the cosmos, can they absolutise an aspect of the cosmos. ⁴⁷⁾

Secondly, these motives contain in themselves a religious antithesis. Because they absolutise a relative modal aspect of meaning, they evoke a relative correlate which claims an absoluteness opposed to that of the absolutised aspect. As implacable and irreconcilable opposites they give rise to a religious dialectic in which now one, now the other pole of the antithesis enjoys a priority. A true synthesis of these religiously opposed poles is impossible in virtue of each one's claim to absolutism. "At best it allows the awarding of the first rank to one of the antithetical motives." ⁴⁸⁾

Dooyeweerd clearly distinguishes between a theoretical dialectic and a religious dialectic. The theoretical dialectic or antithesis initiates the act of knowledge and requires a theoretical synthesis by the thinking self. Dooyeweerd criticises attempts to treat the religious antithesis as a theoretical antithesis. According to Hegel, for example, the religious motives are opposed to each other as parts of a larger whole, which encompasses both, the parts opposed being each other's correlates and thus not absolutely excluding each other. Among the different religions there is, then, as ascending

evolution. The Christian religion is a synthesis of the Greek and oriental religious motives, the highest form of religion, though it remains a symbolical representation of the Absolute. 49)

According to Dooyeweerd Hegel's thought is dominated by the basic religious motive of Humanism, more particularly, by absolutised metaphysical thinking. Dilthey, again, in attempting to penetrate to each religious point of view in a neutral manner, does not realise that he himself is revealing the bias of a fundamental religious motive, the Humanistic, specifically absolutised historical thinking. 50)

Against these views Dooyeweerd emphasises that the apostate religious basic motives do not reveal a common religious character with the Christian, which would allow for a comparative analysis of religion from a neutral point of view. This does not mean that the apostate motives are not authentically religious, in the sense defined in the transcendental critique, but that their precise nature as religious can only be grasped as an analogue of the true Christian religious motive. 51)

The basic motive of the Christian Revelation cannot effect a synthesis of the apostate motives, for a synthesis cannot stand in absolute antithesis to the moments which have been synthesised. As such these motives can contribute nothing to the true motive, they have no positive content of truth opposed to it. But Christianity can locate these mo-

tives as false religious assumptions whose very relative moments of truth are possible only within the structure of the Christian a priori.

In the light of these distinctions, Dooyeweerd analyses the three apostate motives of Western thought and reveals their religious dialectic and the theoretical antinomies to which they give birth. ⁵²⁾

The first great religious motive is the Greek motive of matter and form. The origin of this motive is to be found in the conflict between the old nature religions of pre-Homeric Greece and the cultural religion of the Olympic Gods, which Nietzsche terms the Dionysic and Apollonic elements. The first is a deification of the formless stream of life out of which periodically emerge generations of beings subject to death and fate, anangke or moira. This is the matter motive in the Greek religious a priori, which finds its most complete expression in the worship of Dionysius. The culture religion, on the other hand, was a religion of form, measure and harmony, where the Gods themselves acquire an individual immortality.

However, these motives remain opposed to each other in the Greek consciousness. The immortal Olympic gods themselves cannot stay the working of anangke and cannot therefore solve the problems of life and death. They furthermore establish no moral sanction and ultimately become the official gods of

the polis, while the religious life of Greece itself is bound to the mystery cults of the older religion, for example, the Dionysic and Orphic movements.

This antithesis also enters the structure of Greek philosophy. Greek philosophy initially reveals the dominance of the motive of matter. The formless vital fluid becomes the divine arche of all individual things and is identified with true nature or physis. Anaximandros terms it the indivisible or unlimited, that from which everything proceeds and to which everything returns. Heracleitus conceives of this eternally flowing stream as fire. With the dominance of the motive of form, however, the reality of the flowing hule (matter) is denied. Thus in Parmenides true physis is eternal, unchangable being. All origin of movement and life is now sought in pure form, or divine thought, which as a demiurge gives form to an original chaos. Because of the vestiges of the matter motive, which remains in opposition to the motive of form, the notion of creation is excluded in Greek thought. The origin of the world in the Timaios, for example, is not by creation but by the "persuasion" of matter. It further gives rise, in Plato's thought, to the dualistic conception of an immortal soul imprisoned in an impure, mortal body and to the contrast between the transcendental world of ideas and the material world of befo-

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ming.

In Aristotle, the antithesis between pure form and pure matter appears. Although he attempts to synthesise them in his doctrine of the substantial unity of body and soul, of which the rational soul is the form of the body, the dualism reappears in his conception of the act of thought which is completely separate and which comes from without.

The motive of nature and grace was according to Dooyeweerd the attempt to reconcile the two opposed religious motives of Greek and Christian thought. Nature, conceived as matter and form in the Greek sense, becomes the autonomous basis of supernatural grace. But, Dooyeweerd writes, this strikes at the heart of the Christian doctrine of creation. In Thomas Aquinas' natural theology, for example, creation is understood as a natural truth which can be proved by the argument from motion. But the conclusion of the syllogism assumes as a religious presupposition that God is pure Form. If Aquinas accepts this from Aristotle, he must also accept a prime matter opposed to pure form, which cannot be accepted according to the Christian view. 54) Again, the creation of man contains a natural and a supernatural element: human nature and a supernatural donum superadditum. Because of this cleavage in man, he lacks an intrinsic, radical unity. Correlative to this, sin is also deprived of its radical sense

and becomes merely the loss of supernatural grace.

Proceeding to the influence of this religious a priori in Scholastic philosophy, Dooyeweerd is concerned primarily with the philosophical system of Aquinas, who for him represents the most sustained attempt to overcome the dualism in his religious a priori as it appears in his distinction between philosophy and theology. Among the many classical attempts in Mediaeval philosophy to harmonise reason and revelation, philosophy and theology, that of Aquinas is of importance because he seeks to do full justice to both terms of his synthesis. Presented with the conflicting claims to truth of both philosophy and theology, Aquinas proceeds along the line already indicated by Albert the Great, namely, the distinction between the order of faith and the order of natural reason. Faith implies the assent of the intellect, under the compulsion of the will, to something which is not evident in the light of reason but which is revealed by God, where the authority of the God who reveals is itself the motive of assent. Theology, then, is the science of those things which are received by faith from divine Revelation. Scientific knowledge, 55) on the other hand, implies assent of the intellect to something which we perceive as true in the natural light of reason, the assent being here motivated or

determined by its object, namely, quiddities or essences. Thus we have here two distinct species of knowledge, which causes Aquinas to conclude that the same thing cannot be known and believed at the same time: impossibile est quod de eodem sit fides et scientia ⁵⁶⁾ (science taken here in the sense of rational knowledge).

At the moment it is only necessary to point out that for Aquinas the difference between philosophy and theology is a difference in the principles from which each science proceeds and which determines the nature of the assent given in each instance. Theology can never come into conflict with philosophy because its principles are taken from the supernatural order of Revelation, while those of philosophy are taken from the order of natural reason.

According to the Calvinistic view, Aquinas' attempt fails exactly because of his over-emphasis of the difference between nature and grace. Where there is no inner point of contact between faith and reason, the so-called synthesis is avenged by the emergence of internal contradictions. Thus, while Aquinas expressly states that if a philosophical conclusion contradicts a revealed truth, the philosopher must re-examine his reasoning in the corrective light of Revelation, his conception of philosophy as ancilla theologiae destroys the true nature of theology. Since

this theology had accepted Aristotelian philosophy as its "handmaid", Holy Scripture itself was interpreted in an Aristotelian manner. Furthermore, where theology as regina scientiarum claimed to control the scientiae profanae, what in fact happened was that the special sciences were retarded in their development by Aristotelian theses. In modern rationalism the "handmaid" had indeed broken her bonds and become mistress. After Aquinas the absolute distinction between nature and grace is openly proclaimed by Occam on the one hand and the Averroceists on the other hand, leading to the doctrine of the two-fold truth. This religious motive of nature and grace has reasserted itself, according to Dooyeweerd, not only in modern Thomism, but also in the thought of the great Protestant theologian, Karl Barth.

With the disruption of the Scholastic synthesis of nature and grace, the Humanistic motive of nature and liberty appears. It originates in the new religious cult of the liberty and autonomy of the human personality - the Titanic notion of freedom expressing itself in the idea of the absolute sovereign personality - combined with the new Faustian passion to dominate nature. In religious fashion this new ideal of science becomes a method of understanding reality as a whole, and gives birth to a new metaphysics, inspired by mathematics, which is radically opposed to the Scholastic and Aristotelian

metaphysics. Natural science in its classical form, however, construes nature as a mechanism, an uninterrupted chain of causes and effects, in which there is no place for a sovereign and autonomous personality. The conflict between these two ideals Dooyeweerd sees in Kant's dualism between nature and liberty, science and belief, theoretical and practical reason. 60)

Post-Kantian idealism seeks this liberty and autonomy no longer in the individual but in a super-personal national community with an own spirit. From this proceeds a new irrationalistic ideal of science. The classical ideal of science makes way for the historical method of thought which relativises the idea of liberty and autonomy as being itself historically determined. According to Dooyeweerd "historicism" combined with positivistic and evolutionary thought heralds the breakdown of humanistic culture, and is the final term in the dialectical process of the basic religious motive of nature and liberty.

-3-

The fourth stage of the transcendental critique has revealed what Dooyeweerd understands by his doctrine of ^{the} antithesis in philosophy. Because there are two fundamental religious motives, the Christian and the apostate, there are two fundamental types of philosophy: Christian philosophy and immanentist philosophy. Dooyeweerd writes:

"There exists only one ultimate and radical antithesis in philosophy, viz. that between absolutising, that is, deifying of meaning, in apostasy from God on the one hand, and on the other hand the return of philosophic thought in Christ to God, which leads to the insight into the complete relativity and lack of self-sufficiency of all that exists in the created mode of meaning." ⁶¹⁾ This antithesis is an ultimate one, he continues. Although the ground-motives in the Greek and Humanistic world are opposed to each other, it is not in the same radical sense as their opposition to the Christian motive. Moreover, the polar tension existing within each dialectical basic motive is completely different from that existing between the Christian and apostate religious a priori.

It is important to realise that for Dooyeweerd immanen-
tism is the only alternative philosophical root-doctrine to
Calvinistic Scriptural philosophy. This is often termed by
Dooyeweerd "the doctrine of the autonomy of theoretical thought".
In order to understand what he means by this expression, it is
necessary to turn again to his account of the structure of
theoretical thought in the first and second transcendental
problems. Theoretical thought reveals an antithetical struc-
ture, in which the logical aspect of the act of thinking is
opposed to a non-logical aspect of our experience. This issues
in a theoretical synthesis in which a concept of a special

scientific (modal) kind is formed. A philosophy which proceeds from any of these possible theoretical syntheses as archimedean point, is then, for Dooyeweerd, an example of a philosophy accepting the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought. "Autonomy" thus means the "selfsufficiency" of thought, where the religious root of the theoretical synthesis, and of the inter-modal synthesis of meaning, is not acknowledged. Dooyeweerd considers, however, that the transcendental critique has proved, beyond any possibility of doubt, that the dogma of the autonomy of reason ^{itself} proceeds from a supra-theoretical religious motive, and which is the "hidden player playing on the keyboard of theoretical thought."
62)

The question then arises whether the radical break, the unbridgeable antithesis, between Calvinistic and apostate philosophy also destroys all relation between the two. What remains for the Calvinistic thinker of the age-old idea of the philosophia perennis, Dooyeweerd asks. When we do not identify this perennial philosophy with any shade of immanentist philosophy, but consider it as the evolution of philosophic thought, Calvinistic philosophy can accept this notion. "Philosophic thought as such stands in an inner relationship with historical development, postulated by our very philosophic basic idea, and no thinker whatsoever can withdraw himself from this historical evolution. Our transcendental ground Idea itself requires the

recognition of the "philosophia perennis" in this sense and rejects the proud illusion that any thinker whatever could begin as it were with a clean slate and dissociate himself from the development of an age-old process of philosophical reflection." ⁶³⁾ Especially with Kant's critique, Dooyeweerd writes, his work reveals an inner historical connection. The elaboration of his conception of sphere-sovereignty, again, depends on the entire preceding and contemporary development of the different branches of modern science and of philosophy. Whoever takes pains to penetrate into the philosophic system of the cosmonomic idea, "will soon discover how it is wedded to the historical development of philosophic and scientific thought with a thousand ties, so far as its immanent philosophic content is concerned, even though we can nowhere follow the immanence-philosophy." ⁶⁴⁾ Moreover, reformation assumes something which must be reformed. It is not a creation out of nothing,

Dooyeweerd's use of the term philosophia perennis in this connection is, however, misleading. ⁶⁵⁾ By this he understands the historical development of philosophy, to which his philosophy is connected with a "thousand ties". That the intelligence forms the perennial thread of intelligibility in the tradition of philosophy is rejected. The philosophy of the cosmonomic idea in this sense claims no philosophical antecedents and connects up with no philosophical tradition. There can thus

be no inner or formal relation between Calvinistic and immanentist philosophy, no acceptance of so-called partial truths,⁶⁶⁾ only a reformation of non-Calvinistic philosophy. There are no partial truths. Where such are found in Calvinistic philosophy they are atavistic remains. Even the proposition two plus two equals four is not true in itself, but only in the context of the laws of number and of logic,⁶⁷⁾ which again presuppose the whole modal nexus. To summarise, the notion of the antithesis in philosophy depends on a basic cleavage in the human race itself, implying "the biblical-Augustinian idea of the continuous struggle in the religious root of history between the Civitas Dei and the Civitas Terrena."⁶⁸⁾

The history of Western philosophy thus shows, according to Dooyeweerd, that the movement of philosophy is not contributory to a perennial philosophy, but antithetic, and that the criteria of evidence, consistency and universality have an arbitrary connotation depending on the deeper presuppositions of the philosopher himself. These presuppositions must be recognised as religious basic motives which cannot be discussed in a purely theoretical manner. This Dooyeweerd substantiates when he writes: "It would be pure illusion if one should imagine he

could convince his opponents in a purely theoretical way that a standpoint is in itself true or false. For in that question are concerned the thinker's religious convictions, which as sure are not capable of theoretical discussion." ⁶⁹⁾

The criticism of any one philosophy from the point of view of any other philosophy thus remains extrinsic, that is, from another religious a priori. But in that case the problem of communicability has not been solved but aggravated by the doctrine of antithesis in philosophy proclaimed in the fourth stage of the transcendental critique. Dooyeweerd's presentation of the critique as the attempt to prove that all thought is rooted in religion as the first step to establish communication with other philosophies, has made this very communication impossible.

This is the burden of Prof. de Vos' criticism of the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee. When one studies this philosophy, he writes, one turns away disappointed and even angry. To the question as to whether this is caused by a deficiency in the reader or in Dooyeweerd's philosophy, he refers to the latter's point of departure,

"The starting point of their philosophy causes the antithesis," he writes. "There exists an antithesis between the Scriptural and non-Scriptural thought, which, practically, speaking, means between the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee and all

other philosophies. This antithesis is so final that all attempt at synthesis must be rejected. The antithesis is founded in its turn on another and deeper, nay, the deepest: it is caused by the line of division which, in virtue of predestination, runs through the human race and divides it into two sections, that of the faithful and of the non-faithful. This line of division is not halted by science and philosophy, but on the contrary runs right through them. This, however, means their isolation, not accidentally, but fundamentally and in principle. Therefore the followers of this philosophy cannot expect that others should grasp, least of all accept, their philosophy.⁷⁰⁾ It is understandable that De Vos should proceed to accuse Dooyeweerd's philosophy of solipsism.

What De Vos however misses, is that Dooyeweerd himself fully realises the implications of his doctrine of the religious a priori of thought. Thus he writes:

"The religious motives, which since the Greeks have controlled the course of the development of Western philosophy, cause radical breaks within this development, because they themselves are not of a purely historical, but rather of a transcendent religious nature. On the other hand we must retain the notion of the philosophical continuity of thought of the West, and the notion of the historical continuity in the development of philosophy.

How can these two attitudes be reconciled without inner contradiction? Surely not, as long as we attempt to reduce basic theme, philosophical community of thought and historical continuity in the periods of development to one level. In that case, the one must necessarily exclude the other." ⁷¹⁾

It would obviate much unjust criticism of the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee if it were realised that Dooyeweerd nowhere considers that the doctrine of the religious a priori destroys communication and historical continuity. For Dooyeweerd the critique not only posits the religious root of thought and the doctrine of antithesis, but at the same time provides the possibility for a philosophical dialogue between philosophies with radically different religious starting points, more particularly, between immanentist philosophy and neo-Calvinistic philosophy. Before proceeding to this aspect of the critique, however, we must first of all establish Dooyeweerd's conception of neo-Calvinistic philosophy, and in what manner it is rooted in the Calvinist religious basic motive.

CHAPTER III

The Basic Idea of Philosophy.

Dooyeweerd considers that the transcendental critique has established, by means of a purely philosophical analysis, that all thought is rooted in supra-theoretical presuppositions which can be grouped into four religious basic motives. He distinguishes, however, between the religious a priori and the basic idea of philosophy. The latter explains how these religious motives control the immanent course of philosophical thought and how they determine the content of the three transcendental problems of the critique. ¹⁾

According to Dooyeweerd philosophy is influenced by the religious a priori through the medium of a triad of transcendental ideas, which correspond to the three transcendental problems of the critique, namely, the nature of the origin of meaning, the totality of meaning and the nexus of meaning. ²⁾ The answers to these questions result in one basic idea. This basic idea must be clearly distinguished from the theoretical concept, which is confined to the antithetical relation of theoretical thought:

"While the theoretical concept of a modal aspect is directed to the modal diversity of meaning and separates

the aspect concerned from all the others, the transcendental theoretical Idea is directed to the coherence, the totality and the Origin of all meaning, respectively.

This theoretical Idea does not cancel the theoretical separation and antithesis of the modal aspects, and thus it retains a theoretical character. But within the theoretical attitude of thought itself, it relates the analytically separated and opposed aspects concentrically in their mutual relationship and coherence of meaning, to their integral - or else dialectically broken - radical unity and Origin. It relates them in other words to the presupposita which alone make possible the theoretical concept of the modal speciality and diversity of meaning.³⁾

By the basic idea, then, Dooyeweerd means an idea which controls the entire course of philosophical investigation. It does not only lie at the basis of philosophy, but indirectly also at the basis of the special sciences, for the latter remain dependent on philosophy in their theoretical conception of reality.⁴⁾ As idea it is still theoretical, but in answering the questions formulated above, it points beyond its own limitations. As Dooyeweerd puts it, in its reflection on its basic idea, philosophy is forced to the limits of its own meaning in the universal nexus of meaning. Philosophy may not posit her own limits in an autonomous

sense, but discovers and defines them in its tendency towards the origin. The basic idea is therefore a limiting concept, the final transcendental grounding or hypothesis of philosophy.⁵⁾

For Dooyeweerd this basic idea is always a cosmogenic idea. This term was coined by him, he writes,⁶⁾ when he was struck by the fact that not only the great systems of antiquity and the Middle Ages, but also some of the great modern philosophical systems, explicitly orientated their philosophy to the idea of a world order, which is termed lex naturalis, lex aeterna, harmonia praestabilita, and so forth. These systems still largely conceived their cosmogenic idea in a rationalistic and metaphysical fashion. However, he concludes, he attaches no great value to the term used. The term "transcendental ground-Idea" or simply "basic idea" may be used as equivalents, as long as what is signified by it is retained, namely, the relation and distinction between the diversity of meaning and the origin.

It may be objected that Dooyeweerd assumes that there is an origin or source of the meaning of the cosmos. But he points out that while the different forms of philosophical monism as atheism, acosmism, pancosmism and pantheism refuse to acknowledge the existence of such a distinction, it does not mean that these philosophies do not reveal a

basic idea. The only difference is that the origin is sought in an absolutised cosmic aspect. Partial theistic systems, again, do acknowledge the distinction between God and cosmos, but draw the line in different ways. In some systems the mind, or the will, is deified.⁷⁾

The cosmologic idea of philosophy describes the relation between God and cosmos as an idea of law. Law is the boundary dividing cosmos and God. God is above the law; everything else is subject to the law. The idea of law can thus never be separated from the idea of the source of law and the idea of the subject of law. Law and subject are correlative terms.⁸⁾ Dooyeweerd does not conceive of the notion of law in a juridical or moral sense. God's laws are not confined to the Decalogue. They must be seen primarily as universal ordinances and uniformities encompassing creation in all its aspects as constant structural principles making possible individual things and events.⁹⁾ Their ontological character is guaranteed by the fact that they are not founded in the subjective consciousness, but are created by God.

At this stage of Dooyeweerd's argument the notion of the basic idea is treated in a purely formal way. It must be presented in such a fashion, he states, that it can serve as the foundation for all possible philosophical sys-

tems, and can become the central criterion of the principal distinction between the different philosophical schools. Hence Dooyeweerd cannot accept Stoker's conception of the basic idea as an idea of creation. (See Appendix I, p. 121). This idea will be rejected in principle by every philosopher who does not accept the Biblical account of creation, he states, and thus lacks the universality which is demanded from the basic idea. The description of the content of the cosmogenic idea from the point of view of the Christian a priori only follows next in order.¹⁰⁾

After these preliminary formal clarifications, Dooyeweerd proceeds to the content of the cosmogenic idea, which will differ according to the content of the religious presupposition accepted by any particular philosopher. Dooyeweerd refers, for example, to the Aristotelian cosmogenic idea as an idea of natural law, which controls the teleology of natural substances.¹¹⁾ For Aquinas the cosmogenic idea is the lex aeterna, founded in God's reason, and is His divine plan of the creation. The lex naturalis is no longer autonomous but participates in the lex aeterna.¹²⁾ The result of this synthesis, according to Dooyeweerd, is that the Aristotelian principle of teleology is substituted for the Christian dogma of predestination and the universe is considered to be a hierarchy of natural substantial forms, directed to-

wards God as Prime Mover and purpose of the teleological process. The Humanistic motive of nature and freedom produced as its cosmomic idea autonomous human reason, which can be considered either as absolutized scientific mathematical thought or as transcendental thought which prescribes to nature its laws, or which, as practical reason, is the source of moral freedom.¹³⁾

From the Christian religious a priori, the cosmomic idea of philosophy receives the following contents:¹⁴⁾

To the question, what is the origin of the totality and modal diversity of meaning with respect to the cosmomic side and its correlate, the subject side, Dooyeweerd answers that it is the sovereign holy will of God the Creator, who has revealed Himself in Christ.

To the second transcendental question, what is the totality of meaning of the cosmic aspects, and their supra-temporal unity, Dooyeweerd answers that with respect to the cosmomic side it is the law of the love and service of God and our fellow-creatures with our whole heart. With respect to its subject-side, it is the new religious root of the human race in Christ.

To the third transcendental question regarding the relation between the modal aspects, Dooyeweerd answers that it is sphere sovereignty, the mutual irreducibility of the

modalities within the cosmic coherence of meaning, subject to cosmic time.

"The totality of meaning of our whole temporal cosmos is to be found in Christ, with respect to His human nature, as the root of the reborn human race," Dooyeweerd writes. "In Him the heart, out of which are the issues of life, confesses the Sovereignty of God, the Creator, over everything created. In Christ the heart bows under the lex (in its central religious unity and its temporal diversity which originates in the Creator's holy will) as the universal boundary (which cannot be transgressed) between the Being of God and the meaning of His creation. The transcendent totality of meaning of our cosmos exists only in the religious relation of dependence upon the absolute Being of God."¹⁵⁾

It follows that in the attitude of apostasy, the heart, the radix and central religious unity of man, is affected, and through the heart the entire creation which was consecrated in mankind. From the heart, sin permeates into all aspects of reality, for apart from this root the creation has no meaning and no reality. With Kuyper, Dooyeweerd thus accepts the radical nature of sin, and its immediate¹⁶⁾ influence also on theoretical and philosophical thought.

According to the Scriptural view, then, we will draw

the boundary between God as the sovereign Creator and the universe as subject to Him.¹⁷⁾ For Dooyeweerd this is not the only distinction between God and cosmos, but it is for philosophical purposes the fundamental distinction. Nor does it involve, as Van der Walt suggests, the rejection of the immanence of God in his creation.¹⁸⁾ Dooyeweerd is concerned with the distinction between the mode of being of God and creation, not with separating each in its own sphere.¹⁹⁾ Van der Walt's criticism is met by Vollenhoven, when he explains that nothing spatial is intended. "All spatial boundaries separate things within the cosmos," he writes. "If God stood outside the cosmos in a spatial sense, justice could not be done to the confession of His immanence. But the word 'boundary' has another meaning, which is non-spatial. In this case it signifies that which makes possible a clear distinction, so that of the two things which are distinguished, the one lies totally on the one side of the boundary, and the other totally on the other side."²⁰⁾

Dooyeweerd is also careful to point out that this does not mean that his conception of the sovereignty of God is in any way related to that of Occam. Calvin's Deus legibus solutus is indeed far removed from Occam's Deus exlex.²¹⁾ According to Dooyeweerd, Occam's conception of the sovereignty of God is not Scriptural, but a voluntaristic construe-

tion, an attempt to measure God's sovereign will in human terms, which he contrasts with Calvin's judgement that human reason can never penetrate to the essentia Dei.²²⁾ That Calvin's conception of the absolute authority and sovereignty of God does not imply voluntarism, is also declared by Bohater,²³⁾ and by Zuidema in his study of Occam.²⁴⁾

-2-

The general theory of the modal spheres is developed from the doctrine of the sovereignty of God by means of the theory of cosmic time, which "constitutes the basis of the philosophical theory of reality."²⁵⁾ In order to explain his meaning more fully, Deoyeweerd makes use of a figure:²⁶⁾

"The light of the sun is refracted through a prism, and this refraction is perceived by the eye of sense in the seven well-known colours of the spectrum. In themselves all colours are dependent refractions of the unrefracted light, and none of them can be regarded as an integral of the colour differentiation. Further, not one of the seven colours is capable of existing in the spectrum apart from the coherence with the rest, and by the interception of the unrefracted light the entire play of colours vanishes into nothing.

The unrefracted light is the time-transcending totality

of meaning of our cosmos with respect to its cosmonomic side and its subject side. As this light has its origin in the source of light, so the totality of meaning of our cosmos has its origin in its arche through whom and to whom it has been created.

The prism that achieves the refraction of colour is cosmic time, through which the religious fulness of meaning is broken up into its temporal modal aspects of meaning.

As the seven colours do not owe their origin to one another, so the temporal aspects of meaning in the face of each other have sphere-sovereignty or modal irreducibility.

In the religious fulness of meaning there is but one law of God, just as there is but one sin against God, and one mankind which has sinned in Adam. But under the boundary line of time, this fulness of meaning with reference to its cosmonomic side as well as to its subject side separates, like the sunlight through the prism, into a rich variation of modal aspects of meaning. Each modal aspect is sovereign in its own sphere, and each aspect in its modal structure reflects the fulness of meaning in its own modality. ²⁷⁾

For Decyeweerd, then, time is the medium through which God's creative will is broken up into different modal spheres or the diversity of meaning. He distinguishes between time-order and time-duration as the law and subject aspects of

time. Only the indissoluble correlation of order and duration can be called cosmic time. "Cosmic time overarches the different aspects as order," Dooyeweerd writes, "and streams through their boundaries as duration." ²⁸⁾ He thus simultaneously rejects the ultra-realist as well as the subjectivist account of time. As illustration of the former view, Gassendi holds that time is neither substance nor accident, but is eternal and uncreated. In similar fashion S. Alexander posits that time is presupposed by space-time, from which emerges life, mind and deity. To this Dooyeweerd would reply, firstly, that space cannot be associated with time, as space is one modal sphere amongst others, while time is a precondition for space. It is, moreover, a creation of Deity, not a condition for Deity. Similarly he rejects Kant's view of time as an a priori intuition of sensibility, because it is founded in the subject and not in an objective and transcendental order.

In every modal aspect, however, cosmic time appears in a different functional guise, revealing a different temporal structure. (See Appendix II, p. 126). It follows that the universal nature of time is obscured where one type of time-order is elevated to the status of cosmic time itself. In modern Humanistic thought, for example, philosophical thought is driven consecutively towards a mechanical, an

irrationalistic, vitalistic, psychological and historical view of time.²⁹⁾ In all these instances, time is identified with one modal aspect. As long as philosophical thought proceeds from a dialectical religious motive, Dooyeweerd writes, it is caught in a religious dualism and then an integral conception of time is impossible.

Now while we can grasp the different functional orders of time in the theoretical concept, the notion of cosmic time itself can be approached only in the transcendental idea. Only in the religious centre of our existence do the different aspects of time converge, and only there do we experience cosmic time. The heart's experience of time, Dooyeweerd characterises by the use of a term borrowed from the Scholastics: *aeviternitas*. The Scholastics agree in distinguishing three kinds of duration: eternity, *aevum* and time. The first is the duration of a thing which is altogether unchangeable,³⁰⁾ the second that of a thing which is subject to accidental change, though it remains immutable in its essence, the third the duration of a thing which is subject both to substantial and accidental change. Dooyeweerd, however, rejects the notion of substance and accident as it appears in the above definitions, and redefines the *aevum* as "the concentration on the part of the creature on eternity, in religious transcending of the boundary of time."³¹⁾

Dooyeweerd's account of time has caused some difficulty to philosophers who otherwise accept in principle the philosophy of the commonomic idea. Thus Stoker in an early publication asks why time itself is not a modal sphere, perhaps the first of all. ³²⁾ Later, however, he accepts Dooyeweerd's account of the cosmic nature of time. Stoker further states that although Dooyeweerd's cosmic time "overarches" all the spheres, it does not account for "substantial causality," the real impingement of a thing or an event on another. One other criticism by Stoker must be mentioned. He asks whether there does not exist a danger that we should overestimate the rôle of time, and ascribe to it what properly belongs only to God's creative will. God Himself created the world during six days, and God's will itself is the source of the cosmological and ontological succession and orders, and the basis of all differentiation. After the creation a further and secondary differentiation was effected through cosmic time, for example, in the cosmic temporal succession of moments and events. Cosmic time and cosmos are created simultaneously and mutually refer to one another. Cosmic time does not enjoy a cosmological or ontological priority above the creation, which would cause a "magical element" to enter ³³⁾ Dooyeweerd's philosophy.

In a postscript to Stoker's article, Dooyeweerd states that Stoker's criticism is rooted in his initial view that

the cosmomic idea does not fully accentuate the idea of creation. According to Dooyeweerd cosmic time may never be seen as a magical demiurge, which takes over the creation of modalities and individual structures from God. The creator of heaven and earth Himself called into being the temporal world order, in which he created all things. ³⁴⁾

Through cosmic time, then, God's sovereign, undivided law is broken up or refracted into a number of modes of time, modes of meaning or modal spheres. Dooyeweerd puts it that the modal sovereignty of each sphere is founded in ³⁵⁾ cosmic time and at the same time made relative by it.

Made relative: for the modal spheres have no independent existence in themselves but are interwoven with all others in the temporal coherence of meaning; founded, for specific modal sovereignty is possible only in the temporal splitting up of the fulness of meaning.

Dooyeweerd here acknowledges his debt to Kuyper's application of the Scriptural principle of God's universal sovereignty to philosophy. Each sphere has a status, rooted in its divinely instituted nature, which cannot be infringed upon by any other sphere. This constitutes its modal sovereignty or sovereignty in its proper orbit and in virtue ³⁶⁾ of which each modal sphere is equal. As Veenhof puts it: "The spheres of life have 'sovereignty in their proper or-

bits,' given them by God himself in virtue of the ordinance of creation. They live in this world next to one another and may not supplant or take advantage of one another. And thus lying next to one another, they all stand under the sovereignty of God.³⁷⁾ This does not, however, mean that each modal sphere is self-sufficient. As Calvin had clearly distinguished between the sovereignty of God, rooted in His aseity, and the derived sovereignty of creatures and institutions,³⁸⁾ Desjournet distinguishes between the sovereignty of God the Creator and the derived sovereignty of the modal spheres.

The sovereignty in its proper orbit of each sphere is preserved by the principium exclusae antinomiaae. This must be distinguished from the logical principle of contradiction, which is founded in the principle of the excluded antinomy as its cosmological foundation.³⁹⁾ It has a two-fold task. Firstly, it settles and safeguards the specific modal meaning of each sphere, and thus ensures its modal sovereignty. In this sense the method of antinomy is a valuable immanent criticism of Calvinistic philosophy itself. Secondly, as a transcendental criticism, it fulfils the function of the reductio ad absurdum by revealing the antinomies which arise in immanentist philosophy when the boundaries between spheres are obliterated, or when the modal sovereignty of the spheres is transgressed through the influence of a dialectically broken religious a priori.

This is always caused by an attempt to press the nexus of meaning into a theoretical continuity.⁴⁰⁾

Young comments on Dooyeweerd's notion of antinomy as follows:

"Antinomy literally signifies a contradiction of laws. It is used by Plutarch in a juridical sense to indicate an inner contradiction in the positive law, which is revealed in the fact that both parties can expound it in their favour. Dooyeweerd uses the term not in such a juridical sense, but with reference to the basic cosmological meaning of law. In this connection, he emphasises the subjective anti-law character of antinomy. The law in the basic sense of cosmic order of law cannot be antinomie. Nor can the laws of different spheres of reality contradict each other. Rather do all theoretical antinomies arise in theoretical thinking, which involves itself in inner contradiction in theoretical judgments. This contradiction results from a false conception of the coherence in the diversity of meaning of the laws, by which the appearance of a contradiction between the laws themselves arises. Antinomy in this sense is contradicted by the idea of the cosmic law. This idea thus implies the principium exclusae antinomiae."⁴¹⁾

The notion of the causality of God is according to Dooyeweerd the "notorious antinomy"⁴²⁾ of speculative theolo-

gy. In this case God's causality stands in absolute contradiction to man's personal freedom and responsibility. The reason is that the notion of cause is extended beyond its meaning in the physical and biological spheres. Human acts as "caused" are rooted in man's religious centre, the heart. If God is referred to as "cause", the term denotes God as the absolute Origin of all meaning. When causality in the case of man or of God is interpreted modally, insoluble antinomies arise.⁴³⁾ In this connection Kant's criticism of speculative metaphysics and theology is of value, especially his criticism of the misuse of the category of causality. However, because of the dualism in the religious basic motive which determines his thought, new antinomies arise in his philosophy, notably that between mechanical causality and modal freedom.⁴⁴⁾ The antinomies of Zeno, again, (Achilles and the tortoise, the flying arrow) are founded in the attempt to reduce the modal meaning of motion to that of space.⁴⁵⁾ The antinomy between retributive justice and love, to take another example, arises from the eradication of the modal boundaries of the juridical and moral spheres.⁴⁶⁾

Antinomy may not be confused with relations of contrariety. Contraries like logical-illogical, moral-immoral, polite-impolite, and so forth, present themselves within the same modal aspect, and do not contain a real antinomy, in its inter-modal sense.

The modal spheres do not, however, exist only in horizontal independence of each other and vertical dependence on God. They reveal an architectonic and hierarchical structure and relations. They exhibit, Dooyeweerd says, an order of increasing complication in accordance with the order of the succession of the spheres in the temporal coherence of meaning. Because immanentist philosophy could not grasp the idea of a cosmic order of modal spheres, and thus necessarily eliminated the temporal order and inter-modal coherence of spheres, it could not offer a satisfactory account of the relation between the different aspects of reality and tends to see it merely as one of increasing logical complexity. But the modal spheres may never be identified with "categories of thought", nor with any arbitrary theoretical delimitation.

Before proceeding to the relations between the modal spheres, the scheme presented on page 126 should be kept in mind. It gives the order of the spheres, their modal moments ⁴⁷⁾ which guarantee their sovereignty, the functional time of each, and the corresponding science. One further distinction which Dooyeweerd draws has not been indicated in this scheme, namely, that between the normative and the a-normative spheres. By this Dooyeweerd means that the sub-

jects of the first five modal spheres have no option but to obey the correlative laws. From the analytical sphere onwards, however, the laws become norms. Although these norms have been laid by God in principle in the structure of each sphere, they must be discovered, explicated, applied, that is, positivised. The laws of justice or love, for example, do not contain a precise formulation of their meaning in each concrete instance.

A first important notion to explain the relation between the modal spheres is that of universality in each orbit. Each modal sphere, according to Dooyeweerd, is a refraction of the religious fullness of meaning; consequently the temporal order of the modal spheres must be expressed in each sphere. Each sphere has a modal moment, irreducible to that of any other, which safeguards its sovereignty in its proper orbit. But surrounding the modal moment are a number of analogical moments, some of which refer back to the modal moments of preceding or substratum spheres, others to the modal moments of superstratum spheres. ⁴⁸⁾ The first are modal retroicipations, the second modal anticipations. Both analogical moments are qualified by the modal moment of their specific sphere. ⁴⁹⁾ The following is an example of modal moment, modal retroicipations and anticipations, as exemplified in the analytical sphere: ⁵⁰⁾

Modal Moments: rational distinction.

Retrecipiations:

logical apperception.

logical thought-life.

logical movement of thought (subjected to the principle of logical causality, viz. the principium rationis sufficientis.)

logical thought-space.

logical unity and multiplicity (of logical characteristics).

Anticipations:

logical domination (ruling by systematic theoretical concepts or logical forms).

logical symbolics.

logical commerce.

logical economy of thought.

logical harmony.

logical right.

logical "eros" (platonie love).

logical certitude.

The succession of the modal spheres proceeds from the sphere of number as the first terminal sphere. Its modal moment is discrete quantity. The least complicated sphere created by God, it has no modal foundation and therefore no retrecipiations, but anticipations in all the higher spheres. Dooyeweerd points out that the fact that this sphere lacks retrecipiations, gives no reason to absolutise its structural

meaning. Although it is the modal foundation of the spheres, these spheres retain their modal sovereignty.

Dooyeweerd's conception of number has been criticised by G.H.T. Malan, who asks whether this so-called first sphere is not itself founded in the structures of naive experience. Dooyeweerd answers that Malan has misunderstood him. The sphere of number is founded in naive experience only in the sense of being abstracted from naive experience. He also rejects Malan's view that numbers are "objects". Objects have numbers; number itself is not an object but a theoretical abstraction, a modal function. Against the Aristotelian objection that number presupposes space and Russell's logicising of arithmetic, Dooyeweerd further insists that quantity has no modal substratum.

The sphere of faith is the second terminal sphere. This brings us to the second important notion explaining the interrelation between the spheres, namely, the process of disclosure. Under certain conditions the anticipations of a sphere unfold or open and thus deepen the modal moment of that sphere. If the anticipations are closed, that sphere functions only in its retroceptions, in restrictive function; if the anticipations are disclosed, in expansive function. As example we may take the feeling of /pain as ex-

perience by the animal and by man. The psychical sphere is the last function of subjectivity in the structure of the animal, that is, its feeling of pain is still bound to the sensory organs. It can only be differentiated, not deepened or disclosed, as in the case of man. Man can grasp his pain analytically, he can give linguistic expression to it, he can consider it as an injustice or as a divine chastisement. Here the modal moment of the psychical function is disclosed through its anticipations in the superstratum spheres.

It follows that the disclosure of the normative spheres is in the last instance dependent on the disclosing function of faith, which has no anticipatory moments. ⁵³⁾ In the scheme of the modal spheres, the function of faith occupies the highest position, forming the uppermost boundary of the hierarchy of the spheres, and of the entire earthly reality. "Without faith this reality cannot exist," Dooyeweerd writes. ⁵⁴⁾ Its modal moment can only be grasped, writes Dooyeweerd, if we see faith in its immediate reference to the arche of all temporal existence. Hence he defines its modal moment as an original transcendental certainty, within the limits of time, related to a revelation of the arche which has captured the heart of human existence. ⁵⁵⁾ It is the only modal moment which refers beyond time. Therefore we can strictly speaking have no concept of the meaning of faith;

we can only form a theoretical idea of it. The function of faith must furthermore be clearly distinguished from religion, which cannot be enclosed in any modal sphere, but is rooted in the heart, which transcends all the functions. (56)

Where faith is identified with religion, the latter becomes modalised or functionalised; it is considered as one aspect of human life and its essentially transcendental nature, transcending even faith, is not grasped.

Now this function is common to both believers and unbelievers. "There is an apostate faith," Dooyeweerd writes, "and there is a faith which can only come into action in man through the Spirit of God. But both function within the modal structure of a modal sphere, implanted in human nature at creation." (57)

In both, he continues, a sharp distinction must be made between the subjective function, the principle, the content, the direction and the root of belief. The root of belief is the heart, which determines the direction of our faith to the true or pretended God. The principle which determines the content of faith is always found in revelation, either the Christian revelation or an apostate one. (58)

Dooyeweerd acknowledges his debt to Kuyper for the discovery and development of his conception of faith. (59)

While Kuyper's conception of faith is initially almost identical with the usual conception of intuitive evidence,⁶⁰⁾ he later gives a definition of faith in which pistis is laid⁶¹⁾ at the foundation of every form of immediate certainty. Kuyper clearly shows that faith in this sense was implanted in man at creation, and that its structure was maintained in spite of original sin. After the fall of man, however, it develops either in an apostate or a soteriological direction.

This "deep Biblical conception" of faith Dooyeweerd contrasts with the psychologising of faith into a feeling, its logicising into an actus intellectus due to a supernatural gift of grace (Aquinas), its elevation into a religious a priori (Troeltsch, Otto). He also rejects the view of Karl Barth, according to which man, as the subject of Christian belief, is a new creation. The term "new" can only mean "renewed", according to Dooyeweerd. He insists, over against Barth, that the function of faith implanted in human nature at creation is the same for Christians and non-Christians, and cannot be destroyed by sin. "It has a modal structure which guarantees its unbreakable meaning-coherence with all the other modal aspects of the temporal order. If

not, unbelief or apostate belief could not be the opposite to the Christian faith. It would belong to an entirely different order and could have no point of comparison with the belief in Jesus Christ.⁶²⁾"

In order to explain in what manner faith initiates the process of disclosure, Dooyeweerd distinguishes between general and special revelation. At the creation, God revealed Himself in the world by creating man in His image and by expressing Himself in the totality of meaning of the cosmos. In its very nature the cosmos thus bears the imprint of its Creator. From the very beginning, however, this general revelation was explained by the Word-revelation addressed to mankind in community with its first head, Adam. In this revelation God speaks to the heart of man, who must only listen to understand the meaning of creation. With Abraham, the Word-revelation becomes a special revelation communicated to a chosen people.

Natural reason cannot explain the nature of meaning apart from special revelation,⁶³⁾ and the appeal to St. Paul's utterance in Romans 19-23 is based on a delusion.⁶⁴⁾ The apostle does not refer to the possibility of a natural theology based on an autonomous natural reason, but to a general revelation, which is contrasted with a particular or special revelation. When the general revelation is detached from the special revelation, the function of faith falls under the law of sin, it

becomes closed to the light of Scripture and reveals its transcendental direction in the quest for an absolute in creation itself. ⁶⁵⁾ In primitive life the restrictive function of faith finds its expression in the absolutisation of pre-logical aspects. Here the forces of nature are deified (mana-belief, totemism, magical practices and rites). ⁶⁶⁾ In civilised communities man creates his idol in the image of the normative functions of his own personality, for example, the Greek deification of theoretical thought. Dooyeweerd also analyses the restrictive influence of the faith in the mathesis universalis and historicism in Humanistic thought. ⁶⁷⁾

For Dooyeweerd, then, apostate faith still retains its transcendental ⁶⁸⁾ terminal function. Apostate or mythical ⁶⁹⁾ faith, too, is transcendental certainty in time regarding the origin of all meaning. It, too, leads the process of disclosure of the modal spheres. But in this transcendental but restricted sense, however, it can no longer serve as the point of contact for Divine grace.

Dooyeweerd has distinguished between the law and subject aspects of the cosmos, and in his general theory of the modal spheres he has described this law aspect, as it is differen-

tiated into specific modal laws. The subjects of these laws are the things, structures and events which come into being, endure and decay within the constant unchangeable modal horizon, and which are experienced in naive experience as totalities and unities.

In his theory of the typical structures of individuality and the enaptic intertwinements of the cosmos, Dooyeweerd attempts to give a theoretical account of the things of naive experience. The ability to do so, he states in his epistemology, is one of the criteria of the truth of a philosophical theory.⁷⁰⁾ The structures of individuality must, however, be distinguished from the individual things of naive experience themselves.⁷¹⁾ The latter are the subjects, the structures of individualities are the cosmomic principle of the subjects, the "structural type."

As a foil to his own theory, Dooyeweerd examines the Aristotelian doctrine of substance.⁷²⁾ According to this theory, substance is the first and primary category, indicating what a thing is. The accidental categories only enjoy a relative being, orientated to substance, which has being per se and is the bearer of all the accidentalia. But, Dooyeweerd states, the experience of the identity of things in naive experience gives no ground for the hypothesis of supra-

temporal substances beneath the accidental categories. 73)

He acknowledges that the theory of substance has some contact with naive experience, namely, the duration of things, which in Greek metaphysics takes the form of the distinction between being and becoming. But this being has no metaphysical priority above the diversity. Only in the religious centre of the cosmos do the modal aspects converge. When we abstract from any individual thing its modalities, nothing remains. Moreover, the Aristotelian theory does not grasp the universal cosmic nature of time and considers it as an accidental determination of being. In this theory, according to Dooyeweerd, we have a typical distortion of the evidence of naive experience, which can only be corrected in the light of the cosmonomic idea. 74)

In the structures of individuality, Dooyeweerd writes, the modal aspects are grouped to form an individual totality, which as a unity overarches the modal aspects. 75)

A structure of individuality functions in all fourteen spheres of law, either as subject or as object. In Dooyeweerd's terminology, a thing has a function of subjectivity in all the spheres to which it is subject, but in a later sphere it has a function of objectivity. The bird's nest has a function of subjectivity in the first three spheres but a

function of objectivity in, for example, the psychological sphere in so far as it is an object of concern to the bird, or in the aesthetic sphere, if it forms part of the aesthetic structure of a painting or a poem. The tree, again, has a function of subjectivity in the first four spheres, but a function of objectivity in the juridical sphere, when it is the cause of a law-suit, or in the sphere of faith, if it becomes the object of worship of some religious cult.

But a structure of individuality is not simply a sum of the different modal spheres in which it has a function of subjectivity. It has an original modal individuality, Dooyeweerd states, situated in its last sphere of subjectivity, which is termed the qualifying function of the structure. This function discloses the anticipatory moments of the structure. So complete is the control of, say, the biotic function of the tree, that the whole tree reveals an individual structure and internal unity. These are structures of individuality of the first order. But there is a secondary order of structures where the qualifying function is situated in a function of objectivity, for example, any human work of art or human production. As examples of these secondary structures of individuality, Dooyeweerd analyses the structure of a work of art, objects of use, the family, state and church.

The qualifying or disclosing function determines what Dooyeweerd terms the radical type, to which any specific structure belongs. Dooyeweerd distinguishes between three basic radical types or structural "kingdoms": that of the inorganic (qualified by the physical and chemical modalities), of plant life (qualified by the biotic sphere) and that of animal life (qualified by the psychical modality.) Each structural type encompasses sub-types and variation-types.

Certain structures of individuality together form a larger structure, in which the identity of each is preserved. The term enkapsis signifies, according to Dooyeweerd, the interrelation between structures of individuality, each retaining its own sovereignty, the whole being qualified by the highest structure of individuality in the encaptic whole.⁷⁶⁾

Dooyeweerd's account of the structures of individuality has been sharply criticised by Stoker.⁷⁷⁾ While he agrees with Dooyeweerd's criticism of the metaphysical notion of substance,⁷⁸⁾ he nevertheless feels that a Calvinistic concept of substance is necessary to give an adequate account of naive experience. In this respect he criticises Dooyeweerd's use of the term "systasis" to denote a structure of individuality.

This term, Stoker states, refers to a coherence of

modal spheres which together form a "thing" or "systasis". A triangle, a pen, an animal, are "systases" in precisely the same sense of the word. Stoker's problem is then to indicate the difference between a substantial and a non-substantial systasis. He claims that between, for example, a triangle and a plant, there is a difference in principle. The first is not a substance, the second is. And this difference, according to Stoker, "corresponds to naive experience." It does not mean the absolutisation of the created, but the perception of individual things as created entities with an own nature. The idea of creation, for Stoker, provides a better account of naive experience than the idea of law.

Stoker further points out that the term systasis refers first to a multiplicity and then to a unity. But in naive experience, Stoker states, we first of all experience the unity and after that the diversity. "If the unity is the logical prins," he writes, "and is also first given in naive experience, then we can say: the specific retroceptions and anticipations, which are patent (and latent) in a systasis, are determined by this pre-given unity and not vice versa; the unity is given by the anticipations, retroceptions and especially the functional rôle of the leading modal sphere. The unity is constitutive for the coherence of the multipli-

city, and not vice versa."⁷⁹⁾

In his answer to Stoker's criticism, Dooyeweerd emphasises the danger of a concept of substance for a Calvinistic philosophy. Stoker believes "that in his concept of substance he can truly theoretically ascend above the modal horizon, which I deny, while I am also not persuaded that he places enough emphasis on the immanent and temporal nature of the structure of individuality as I do."⁸⁰⁾ Again, the temporal, non-modal unity and identity of things do not allow themselves to be grasped in a theoretical concept, because they are founded in the continuity of cosmic time, which makes all experience, also theoretical thought, first possible. The nature of a thing as a unity remains "cosmologically and a fortiori an insoluble problem," and the account from the point of view of the cosmonomic idea is the nearest approach to a theoretical account which the philosopher can achieve.⁸¹⁾

Stoker's criticism has nevertheless brought to light the basic weakness in Dooyeweerd's ontology: his lack of a satisfying substitute for the classical doctrine of substance which he has rejected. While Stoker acknowledges the value and the validity of the cosmonomic idea, he nevertheless allows other perspectives to explain the nature of cosmic reality, for example, that of values, teleology, causality.

Each perspective (kegelsnit) is qualitatively different from every other. If we confine ourselves to only one, as Dooyeweerd does, we are committing an error similar to that committed by the immanentist philosopher: we are forcing the whole of reality, not into one modal sphere, but into one cosmic perspective.

Lastly Dooyeweerd turns to the human being as a structure of individuality. This subject will be fully treated in his expected publication on the subject of anthropology. In the meantime he has given some indications of his doctrine. He states that man differs from all other typical structures of individuality in that he has no temporal qualifying function. Even the function of faith does not qualify man. Instead of such a qualifying function, man has a soul, the heart as the religious centre of man in which all temporal modalities are transcended and concentrated.⁸²⁾ He rejects the Scholastic idea that man is a compositum of two substances, for the problem, what makes the compositum into one substance, remains unanswered.⁸³⁾ Moreover, in the Scholastic conception, the soul as a rational substance does not transcend the boundary of time. It is the abstraction of a complex of normative spheres from the temporal nexus of

meaning.

The philosophy of the idea of law, according to Dooyeweerd, does not draw the distinction between soul and body as between two groups of modal functions (the physico-chemical and the normative) but between the whole "mantle of functions" as the body and its supra-temporal centre, the soul or the heart.

The human body is a complicated total structure in which different structures of individuality are intertwined. It consists of (1) The physically qualified structures of the elements necessary for the building of the body, (2) The biotically qualified structure of the living organism. Here the auto-nervous system regulating the organic functioning of the body plays an important rôle. (3) The psychically qualified structure of the animal nervous system. (4) The act-structure of the human body which comprehends the above-psychical normative functions as knowledge, imagination and willing. This is absent from animals, who only have a function of objectivity in the higher spheres. At death the whole body, that is, all man's temporal functions, is destroyed, neither thought nor faith excluded. The body, however, has no existence in itself apart from the heart.

Dooyeweerd's use of the term "heart" offers considerable difficulty to the student who approaches this philo-

sophy for the first time. Dooyeweerd nevertheless claims that it is strictly Scriptural. Indeed, Spier has distinguished between eight different uses of this term in Scripture, all of which, he claims, point to Dooyeweerd's conception. ⁸⁴⁾

In Scripture, according to Spier, this term denotes: The inner man as opposed to the outer; the source of man's life energy; the background of our thoughts; of our emotional life; of all wisdom and knowledge; of our words and deeds; the source of all sin; and the deepest centre of our whole temporal existence, where the renewing activity of the Holy Ghost takes place. Of the heart, Dooyeweerd writes as follows:

"The heart in its pregnant Biblical sense as religious root and centre of the whole human existence may never be identified with the function of 'feeling' nor that of 'faith,' neither is it a complex of functions like the metaphysical concept of the soul which is found in Greek and Humanistic metaphysics. It is alien to any dualism between the body (as a complex of natural functions) and the soul (as a complex of psychical and normative functions).

The heart is not a blind, or dumb witness, even though it transcends the boundary of cosmic time with its temporal diversity of modal aspects, and temporal thought within this diversity. For it is the fulness of our selfhood in which all our temporal functions find their religious

concentration and consummation of meaning." ⁸⁵⁾

Dooyeweerd's conception of the relation between body and soul has met with considerable criticism from theological and philosophical circles within neo-Calvinism itself. From the theological side, it is considered to be unscriptural, involving the denial of the immortality and substantiality of the soul. ⁸⁶⁾ From the philosophical side, the criticism of Young is important. He asks whether Dooyeweerd's distinction between the temporal body and the supra-temporal soul does not land him in the same position as the Scholastic dualism which he criticises so sharply. ⁸⁷⁾ Again, Young considers that Dooyeweerd's conception of the heart as supra-temporal, does not maintain the basic distinction between Creator and creation. For Young the heart remains under the boundary of time, as is also stated by Stoker. ⁸⁸⁾

These criticisms seem to emphasise a dualism which Dooyeweerd himself wishes to avoid and which, indeed, does not seem to be justified by his conception of man as a radical unity. For Dooyeweerd, man is not a dualism of heart and functions. His heart is not separated from these functions, but, as Dooyeweerd repeatedly points out, it is the centre, the concentration point of these functions. And this explains the true reason for Dooyeweerd's choice of the heart as the archimedean point of philosophy. The self is

not simply a turret from which we can survey the modal aspects of reality. Man is archimedean point not only in virtue of his detachment from all the modal aspects, but because he participates in, he experiences all aspects, as his "body".

Dooyeweerd's statement that the self, in understanding its own meaning, understands the meaning of the entire cosmos, may thus be taken literally. ⁸⁹⁾ Man is the only "substance" in this philosophy, for he alone of all created beings has a supra-temporal core or essence. ⁹⁰⁾ We may never ascribe "objective" qualities to the cosmos out of relation to the human heart, Dooyeweerd writes. In the heart of man not only human existence, but the existence of the entire created world, is concentrated, and with the Fall of man the entire cosmos was affected. ⁹¹⁾ Hence Dooyeweerd can state that the doctrine of man stands both at the beginning and at the end of philosophy. ⁹²⁾

APPENDIX I

The Philosophy of the Idea of Creation.

H.G. Stoker, a gifted student of the phenomenologist, Max Scheler, became interested in the idea of a Calvinistic philosophy independently of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven. On the publication of the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, Stoker expressed both his profound appreciation of this philosophy, and also offered interesting points of criticism. The fundamental difference between Dooyeweerd and Stoker centres round the former's presentation of the cosmonomic idea as the basic idea of philosophy. Stoker considers that the idea of creation encompasses the idea of law, and also gives a more adequate account of the relation and distinction between God and cosmos.

In introducing his own philosophy (See his Die Wysbegeerte van die Skeppingsidee, De Bussy, Pretoria, 1935), Stoker states that the object of philosophy is not God, nor the diversity of cosmic phenomena, but the cosmos as a unity. This at once raises the problem of the relation between the cosmos as a unity and God, and the relation of the cosmos as a unity to the diversity within the cosmos. For Stoker, then, the aim of philosophy is threefold:

(1) To explain the formal or extrinsic unity of the cosmos, that is, the relation of the cosmos to God.

(2) To explain the diversity of inter-cosmic phenomena.

(3) To explain the intrinsic or material unity of the cosmos, and the relation between the extrinsic and intrinsic unity of the cosmos.

Stoker points out that to define the formal or extrinsic unity of the cosmos, we need a vantage point or archimedean point outside the cosmos. Stoker makes no distinction between archimedean point and basic idea, and usually uses the former term. Thus for him the Calvinistic world has produced three archimedean points (for Dooyeweerd, basic ideas), that of revelation, of law and of creation. However, although the cosmos is a revelation, although it is subject to God, the archimedean point offered in Genesis I, namely, the account of the creation of the world, surpasses both these archimedean points. According to Stoker, the cosmos is primarily a creation of God, and God is not only Lawgiver but the sovereign Creator of the cosmos.

However, the formal unity of the cosmos - the cosmos as a creation of God - encompasses a rich variety of cosmic phenomena. There are differences of degree, of quality, different modalities, values and beings. Stoker points out that

this diversity is as fundamental as the unity of the cosmos. Moreover, all phenomena in the cosmos are formally equal, as all are immediately derived from the Creator. Hence Stoker, with Dooyeweerd, sharply criticises philosophical theories in which any cosmic aspect is absolutised at the expense of any other. He agrees with Dooyeweerd that this is the cause of all the "isms" in philosophy. (Compare especially Die Slakkehuisteorieë van die Bewussyn, De Bussy, Pretoria, 1933).

While Stoker recognises Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven's conception of sovereignty in its proper orbit, he introduces another related principle to characterise the unique and irreducible nature, not of every modality, but of every created existent. This principle, which cannot be translated literally, is termed by him vryheid in eie bevoegdheid. We may attempt to describe it as follows: every substance, from the lowest to the highest, reveals a nature of its own, and it acts, grows, develops and expresses itself according to this nature. In this sense it reveals a certain "freedom" to act according to its own nature. However, this freedom is not arbitrary and cannot, therefore, contradict or cancel the universal modal laws. Corresponding to Dooyeweerd's modal universality in each orbit, Stoker also posits the principle of universaliteit in eie bevoegdheid, which means that every

existent affects every other, and is in its turn affected by every other.

Lastly Stoker turns to the intrinsic or material unity of the cosmos. For Stoker, there is no single principle of unity to which the whole cosmic diversity can be reduced. The latter can only be approached from different perspectives. (kegelsnitte). The cosmonomic idea, with its account of the modal spheres and their relations, is one such perspective in terms of which one aspect of the whole cosmic diversity is explained. Another perspective is that of substance, with its two principles mentioned above. This perspective, like the cosmonomic perspective, refers to one aspect of the whole cosmic diversity, namely, the qualitative difference between existents, each revealing a nature of its own. In the same way the cosmic diversity can be approached from the perspective of value, causality or teleology.

However, it is impossible to explain the cosmic diversity from the point of view of only one of these perspectives. If we wish to present the modal structure of the cosmos as such a principle of unity, we are faced by the fact that individual existents cut across the modal spheres. If we wish to explain the diversity only in terms of substance, the continuity of modal strata through all beings is an insurmountable obstacle. In the same way, every other

perspective can be shown to presuppose every other in such a manner that it is impossible to abstract any one perspective as a final principle of unity. For Stoker the ultimate unity of the cosmos thus lies in the cosmological and ^{ontical} ~~ontological~~ coherence of cosmic perspectives, founded in the extrinsic unity of the cosmos as a creation of God.

As already stated, Stoker's philosophy has been published only in the form of short brochures and articles, and this simplified presentation of the philosophy of the idea of creation may possibly conceal obscurities and inconsistencies. Although his philosophy seems to surpass that of Dooyeweerd on many important points, it should not be compared with that of Dooyeweerd as an alternative neo-Calvinistic philosophic system before Stoker's mature philosophical views, in a complete and revised form, have been published.

APPENDIX II

Scheme of Dooyeweerd's Cosmology.

In this scheme, we present Dooyeweerd's fourteen modal spheres in their correct sequence, together with the modal moment which qualifies each sphere and the form which cosmic time assumes in each modality. Finally, we present a list of the sciences corresponding to the different modal aspects of the cosmos.

Dooyeweerd does not consider this scheme as final. According to him, further research may reveal more modal spheres or may cause some change in the order of the spheres. The rapid development of especially the pre-normative sciences, may also cause the modal moments of the relevant spheres as well as their time-order to be revised.

<u>Succession of Spheres</u>	<u>Modal Moment</u>	<u>Order of Time</u>	<u>Science</u>
1.The numerical.	Discrete quantity.	Succession and relation of numbers.	Mathematics.
2.The spatial.	Extension.	Spatial simultaneity.	Mathematics.
3.The physical.	Movement.	Measured time, according to movement of earth round its axis.	Physics and chemistry.
4.The biological.	Organic life.	Organic development.	Biology, physiology, morphology.

<u>Succession of Spheres</u>	<u>Modal Moment</u>	<u>Order of Time</u>	<u>Science</u>
5. The psychical.	Feeling and sensation.	Succession of feelings.	Empirical psychology.
6. The analytical.	Theoretical distinction.	Logical prior and posterior.	Logic.
7. The historical.	The cultural process of development of human society.	Historical development in the sense of periodicity.	History.
8. The linguistic.	Symbolic signification.	Pauses, tenses, declensions, etc.	Philology.
9. The social.	Social intercourse.	Social status and convention.	Sociology.
10. The economic.	Economy.	Calculation of interest, investments, etc.	Economics.
11. The aesthetic.	Harmony.	Unity of time, aesthetic duration.	Aesthetics.
12. The juridical.	Retribution.	The course of retribution, expiring of contracts, etc.	Jurisprudence.
13. The ethical.	Love of one's neighbour.	Prudence.	Ethics.
14. The mystical.	Transcendent certainty regarding the arche.	The reference to eternity.	Theology.

CHAPTER IV

Dooyeweerd's Concept of Philosophy.

-1-

Dooyeweerd has stated that the Christian religious a priori influences the content of philosophy through the medium of the cosmonomic idea, in terms of which he has described the modal structure of the cosmos and also the structures of individuality and their intertwinements. But philosophy itself, as Dooyeweerd repeatedly points out, is not autonomous; as a human activity it, too, is encompassed by cosmic law. Dooyeweerd's concept of philosophy will thus primarily involve an examination of the position of philosophy within the structure of the cosmos.

Dooyeweerd's concept of philosophy is best approached by re-considering the scheme of the sciences presented on page 126. What first strikes us about this scheme is that philosophy is not listed with the other sciences and that consequently it has no modal moment which constitutes its formal object of study. This is explained by the fact, already stated by Dooyeweerd in the first way of the critique,¹⁾ that the special sciences study only aspects of meaning, while philosophy is concerned with the totality of meaning, "Wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt," and as such necessarily transcends the whole order of the special sciences.

In thus pointing out the difference between philosophy and the special sciences, Dooyeweerd at the same time emphasises that it is impossible to draw a line of demarcation between philosophy and science in order to emancipate the latter from the former. This implies a positivistic and nominalistic manner of thinking according to which the scientist claims that he operates with technical concepts and methods which are independent of philosophical and religious presuppositions.²⁾ But science, Dooyeweerd writes, cannot be isolated in such a way as to give it a completely independent sphere of investigation, for it is constantly confronted with the temporal nexus of meaning, and indeed always entertains presuppositions regarding the nature of this nexus.³⁾ In so far as it is the task of philosophy to give an account of these presuppositions, it is concerned with the very foundation of science.

It follows, then, that corresponding to every special science there is also a philosophia specialis, concerned with the relation of that science to the nexus and totality of meaning. This does not only apply to the natural, but also to the normative sciences. In this sense disciplines like logic, aesthetics and ethics, which are usually considered to be parts of philosophy, are special sciences to which corresponds a philosophy of logic,⁴⁾ aesthetics and ethics. As special sciences studying specific modal spheres, they are intrinsically not more philosophical than, say, biology or physics.

Dooyeweerd points out, however, that no philosophia specia-

is may occupy a place of honour above the rest, for all have an identical aim. Neither can philosophy be divided into theoretical and practical philosophy. Philosophy is directed to the totality of meaning; it is always necessarily theoretical. 5)

While rigidly excluding any possible division of philosophy, which necessarily ends in the elevation of one aspect of philosophy into a prima philosophia, Dooyeweerd considers that philosophy proper consists of the following fundamental but inseparable themes: 6)

(1) The transcendental criticism of philosophical thought, implying the investigation of the religious basic motives which determine the contents of the transcendental basic Idea.

(2) The investigation directed towards the analysis of the modal aspects of temporal reality in order to discover their functional structure. This is the general theory of the modal aspects and their proper modal spheres.

(3) The theory of knowledge with respect to naive experience, the special sciences and philosophy, or the transcendental self-reflection on the universally valid conditions of naive experience and of the theoretical analysis and synthesis of modal meaning, in the light of the transcendental basic Idea.

(4) The examination directed towards the data of naive experience in order to investigate the typical structures of individuality of temporal reality, and their mutual interlacement.

(5) The investigation of the structural unity of human existence within cosmic time, in the light of the transcen-

dental idea of human selfhood; this is the theme of philosophical anthropology.⁷⁾ According to Dooyeweerd it can only be developed on the basis of all former themes of investigation.

The problem of time, Dooyeweerd concludes, cannot be a particular theme, since it has a transcendental character embracing every philosophical question.

Now this account of the task of philosophy does not imply that any of these problems can be viewed in isolation as a special department of philosophy. Epistemology is the theory in which the self, having attained the limits of philosophical thinking, returns into itself and reflects upon the limits and supra-temporal suppositions of temporal knowledge.⁸⁾ In this sense, all philosophy is epistemology. At the same time, Dooyeweerd asks, what is all philosophy other than philosophy of the structure of temporal reality or of time? In all its dimensions, he writes, philosophical investigation signifies the structural theory of reality, directed towards the totality and origin of meaning in religious self-reflection. In so far as philosophy itself, as a theoretical activity, is also meaning, in reflecting upon itself it is compelled to examine itself in its genetic relation to the origin of all meaning, and thus to recognise its position within the created order of the cosmos. The religious self-reflection of philosophy, which is common to all five of the themes

enumerated by Dooyeweerd, is thus in the last analysis an account of the cosmological presuppositions which make meaning in all its forms, also philosophy, possible. This is termed by Dooyeweerd the "a priori" moments in human experience, which form its boundaries or horizon.

He himself distinguishes between an a priori in the cosmological sense: the structure of our human experience, in so far as it bears the character of law, and a subjective a priori in the epistemological sense: our subjective insight into this horizon. These a priori moments he terms the structural and the subjective a priori respectively. As a theoretical activity, the latter is necessarily enclosed within the cosmological or structural a priori.

Dooyeweerd points out that his use of the word "a priori" may not be confused with the Humanistic idea of the creative logical function of human consciousness, founded in a sovereign transcendental subject. For him the term "a priori" denotes the constant structure of the cosmos, given in the order of creation itself. Even before the creation of the world it was already present in God's plan.

"This horizon," he writes, "is not a priori in the Kantian sense of non-empirical. It belongs implicitly to human experience in so far as it constitutes its a priori determining element. This implicit experience is only made explicit in the

transcendental and in the radical religious self-reflection, of which the former is based upon the intuitive insight into the cosmic order of time. If we had no experience of this horizon, how should we ever be able to know of it, and how could we give an account of it philosophically? It can only be called an a priori structure in so far as it is the constant meaning-structure of all human experience and of all temporal reality." ¹³⁾

Dooyeweerd proceeds to distinguish between four levels of the structural horizons:

(1) The transcendent horizon of human experience is constituted by the religious root of human existence, the heart, in its communal structure. The selfhood is limited and determined by the law in its central religious sense. This makes it impossible for human experience to be detached from the religious attitude of the self. Since God created the cosmos in a concentric relation to the heart, all human experience is therefore religiously rooted. ¹⁴⁾

(2) The transcendental horizon of human experience is time. All our experience of the modalities and of the typical structures of reality is bound to time and made possible by it, not by time in its modal differentiation, but by the cosmic time which is their foundation and guarantees their

15)
coherence.

(3) The modal horizon of human experience is formed by the functional structure of the modal aspects. This horizon makes possible the articulation of meaning into specific modal spheres, each sovereign in its own orbit. It is, however, insolubly bound to the temporal horizon. We cannot experience the aspects of meaning except as a temporal coherence. 16)

(4) The plastic horizon is the structural principles of individual things and events. While the modal horizon remains the same for all things, and forms the a priori condition for all experience of individual reality, the plastic horizon reveals infinite possibilities of variation, mutation, interlacement and individuality. 17)

The order and coherence of these different a priori levels form the perspectives according to which we experience the cosmos.

Proceeding to the subjective a priori of epistemology, Dooyeweerd states that the idea of truth will have the same perspectivistic character as the horizon of human experience. Christ, as the perfect Revelation of God, is the fulness of the meaning of Truth, and constitutes the transcendent horizon of truth. 18) The transcendental dimension of truth is the accordance between the subjective a priori knowledge enclosed

by the temporal horizon, as expressed in a priori judgements, and the a priori structural laws of human experience within this temporal horizon.¹⁹⁾ Theoretical truth, corresponding to the modal horizon of experience, is the accordance between the subjective a priori synthesis of meaning with the modal structure of the Gegenstand of theoretical thought,²⁰⁾ in its inter-modal coherence within the temporal horizon.

The problem of the criterion of theoretical truth, Dooyeweerd continues, has been obscured by the distinction between "a priori" and empirical science, creating the impression that the different special sciences have entirely different criteria of truth. But no special science is possible without an a priori theoretical synthesis of meaning,²¹⁾ even if handled only implicitly. From this it follows that any theoretical judgement which ignores the modal horizon of its Gegenstand and the notion of sphere-sovereignty, or which in principle denies the temporal nexus of meaning in the theoretical synthesis of meaning, is false. Likewise, any theoretical judgement in which a relative theoretical truth is absolutised, or which assumes that theoretical thought is independent of the transcendent fulness of truth,²²⁾ is false.

Dooyeweerd emphasises that theoretical truth may never be considered to be self-sufficient. It is completely dependent on the Christian cosmonomic idea, as the immanen-

tist idea of truth is dependent on its cosmonomic idea. He discards the notion of a neutral criterion of truth:

"The neutrality postulate stands or falls with an idea of truth which considers theoretical verity to be self-sufficient. But at all times the very problem of truth has proved to be the Achilles heel of immanentist philosophy. As long as the only issue was the logical aspect of truth, with the formal criterion of the principium contradictionis, it seemed an easy task to refute relativism and scepticismBut it is evident that nothing has been gained by this argument for the idea of a universally valid neutral philosophy. Even the question: What is to be understood by universally valid truth? cannot be answered by logic alone. More than that: the logical criterion of truth owes its logical meaning exactly to the structure of the entire horizon of human experience in all its different levels. And this structure cannot possibly be grasped independently of a cosmonomic idea." 23)

To understand what Dooyeweerd means, it is necessary to refer again to his epistemology. The aspects of meaning, he has already stated, cohere in the inter-modal nexus of meaning (zin-systasis). This nexus of meaning is cosmologically and ^{ontically} ~~entelegically~~ prior to the theoretical synthesis. Now Dooyeweerd distinguishes between the analy-

24)

tical synthesis and the theoretical synthesis of meaning. This distinction, he states, unknown to immanentist philosophy, is necessary to place the problem of knowledge on a cosmological basis. The analytical or logical synthesis is concluded within the logical sphere; it is the synthesis of a logical multiplicity to a logical unity. All theoretical syntheses, by which we obtain knowledge, are, however, of an inter-modal nature, that is, they consist in the synthesis of the analytical with another aspect of meaning. Even the judgement a is a can be understood as a logical judgement only if we consider it in its coherence with the aspect of language. There is thus no room in the philosophy of the cosmological idea for a formal logic, because the analytical itself is completely and intimately bound to the structure of the other modalities. Any judgement, however formalised, presupposes the inter-modal synthesis of meaning. 25) A formal logic, according to the Calvinistic view, can only mean thought which in particular examines the meaning of the analytical sphere in its relation to the total nexus of meaning. Thus Dooyeweerd writes:

"Even formal logic remains bound to the cosmological fundamental principles of modal sphere-sovereignty and sphere-universality. At this point a truly Christian logic differs essentially from the current logical theories rooted

in the immanentist standpoint. This difference does not lie in unimportant corrections of traditional logic or of modern 'formal' logic. And a fortiori it has nothing to do with the meaningless supposition that Christian thought should be subject to other logical laws than that of non-Christians.

It can only mean that formal logic ought to come under the control of our Christian cosmological Idea and ought to be made fruitful by the transcendental Idea of the 'logica universalis' which does not find a rest in time but is irresistably directed to Christ and in Him to the Creator of all things. A truly universal formal logic ought to be orientated to the philosophic basic Idea of the Origin, the meaning-totality, and the universal cosmic meaning-coherence when it sets out to investigate the logical relations as such."²⁶⁾

From this passage it is clear that Dooyeweerd is only opposed to the absolutisation of logic. Within its own modal sphere, logic enjoys a sovereignty in its proper orbit, subject to the logical modal laws of the principia identitatis, contradictionis, exclusi tertii and rationis sufficientis.²⁷⁾ Moreover, in every theoretical judgement, it appears as one pole of the theoretical antithesis which is synthesised by the self in the act of knowledge. Dooyeweerd's rejection of the self-sufficiency of the logical criterion of truth can thus never mean the denial of logic as such. Moreover, Dooyeweerd com-

pletely rejects the position of Van Til, who states that the Christian and the non-Christian do not share the same logic.²⁸⁾ But Dooyeweerd does claim that no theoretical criterion of truth has any validity if it is dissociated from the perspectivistic structure of truth, which is finally grounded in Revelation.

This also holds for the two special criteria of theoretical truth which Dooyeweerd offers. The first of these is the principium exclusae antinomiae: the divine world-order passes judgement on theoretical thought by entangling it in internal antinomies at every infringement of the modal sphere sovereignty of the aspects within the transcendental horizon.²⁹⁾ The second special criterion states that philosophic theory must enable the philosopher to give an account of the structure of temporal reality given in naive experience. As soon as it explains away the pre-theoretical datum of the plastic horizon, it contradicts transcendental theoretical truth, which again cannot exist in itself.³⁰⁾ Both criteria presuppose insight into the full structure of the horizon of human experience.

... ..

Dooyeweerd's concept of philosophy, issuing in his doctrine of the criterion of truth, has revealed in what

fashion philosophy as an immanent theoretical activity is rooted in its transcendent presupposition, Christ. Theoretical truth can be distinguished, but not separated, from transcendental and transcendent truth. The whole of his book, Dooyeweerd writes, is intended to illustrate the thesis that the Christian idea of truth can and should permeate scientific thought from root to crown. A Christian pursuit of science is completely different from a confession of faith which leaves the immanent course of scientific investigation untouched. ³¹⁾

A scientist or philosopher who believes that theoretical truth is self-sufficient, clings to a Fata Morgana. ³²⁾ Thus Dooyeweerd writes, summing up his position:

"Christ, as the fulness of God's Revelation, is the Truth. Standing in the Truth as the sharing in the fulness of meaning of the cosmos in Christ, is the indispensable prerequisite for the insight into the full horizon of our experience.

This means that we have once and for all given up the illusion of possessing the norm of truth in our own fallen selfhood. We have arrived at the self-knowledge that outside of the light of Divine Revelation we stand in falsehood . . . Any one who grasps this Divine Revelation with all his heart abides in the Truth. Abiding in the Truth frees our insight into the horizon of human experience from the prejudices of

immanentist philosophy, and it also enables theoretical knowledge to be directed to the Truth." ³³⁾

Again:

"In the order of this life all human experience remains bound to a perspective horizon in which the transcendent light of eternity must force its way through time. In this horizon we become aware of the transcendent fulness of the meaning of this life only in the light of the Divine Revelation refracted through the prism of time. For this reason Christ, as the fulness of God's revelation, came into the flesh: and for this reason also the Divine Word Revelation came to us in the temporal garb of human language.

But if our experience were limited to our temporal functions of consciousness, or rather, to an abstractum taken from our temporal complex of experiential functions, as is taught by the critical and the positivistic epistemologies, it would be impossible to have true knowledge of God, or of ourselves, or of the cosmos. And in the apostasy in which falsehood (and not truth) rules, we have no such knowledge man cannot attain to true self-knowledge without true knowledge of God, which cannot be gained outside of the Divine Revelation in Christ." ³⁴⁾ Hence the first book of Calvin's Institutes is the alpha and the omega of any truly Christian epistemology. ³⁴⁾

At this point, Dooyeweerd states, many of his readers will turn away annoyed at his seeming dogmatism. But is the proclamation of the self-sufficiency of human reason any less dogmatic? His philosophy makes bold to accept the "stumbling block of the Cross of Christ" as the corner stone also of epistemology.
35)

Dooyeweerd's challenge to immanentist philosophy could not have been put more strongly. But at the same time it gives rise to a serious problem. Dooyeweerd has distinguished philosophy as concerned with the totality and origin of meaning, from the special sciences, which study only aspects of meaning. Theology, too, has been listed as a special science, although the most complex and highest in the hierarchy of the sciences. But if philosophy, in its proper task of self-reflection, must necessarily be instructed by Revelation, it appears as if philosophy is dependent on theology for the procuring of its principles. To arrive at a proper understanding of Dooyeweerd's concept of philosophy, it is thus necessary to examine the relation between philosophy and the ology in the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee.

We are here on difficult ground, and it is necessary to make clear distinctions. From the thomist point of

view, against the background of Aquinas' treatment of the subordination of the sciences, the above conception of Dooyeweerd's position will almost inevitably follow. The dependence of one science on another, Aquinas writes in the prima pars of the Summa Theologica, can happen: (a) Where the end of one science is subjected to that of another, as for example, horsemanship is subjected to the military art. (b) Where the subject of one science is contained under the subject of another (for example, biology as the science of living bodies is subalternate to physics as the science of bodies); or where the subject of the subalternate science results from the addition of an accidental difference to the subject of the subalternant science (for example, arithmetic has number as its subject, music sonorous number, the accidental difference being sound). (c) Finally, the subordination of sciences can happen by reason of principles. For the evidence of its principles the subalternate science must go to the subalternant or superior science. Here the most important distinction is that between subalternation impropriae et simpliciter and subalternation secundum quid. In the first case the sciences which proceed from natural reason are subalternate to metaphysics. All their subjects are contained as quasi-species under the subject of metaphysics, although they remain dis-

tinct sciences on account of their degree of abstraction. In the second case a science demands the assistance of another science and borrows its own principles from it though it is independent of the other science and proves its own conclusions from its proper principles. The conclusions of the subalternant science are then the principles of the subalternate science.

Aquinas states that theology is such a subalternate science. He distinguishes between the theologia dei, the science which God has of Himself,³⁷⁾ the theologia beatorum, which is the non-discursive cognition which the blessed have of God in heaven, and the theologia nostra ut via tores, which is a habit of conclusions acquired by demonstration from revealed and credited principles through divine and infused faith. The latter theology, he writes, is a science truly and properly subalternate to the science of God and the science of the beati.³⁸⁾ Arguing from the analogy of proportionality between theology and music, Aquinas concludes that just as music in the man who is not at the same time an arithmetician is in a state of imperfection because he credits principles given to him by arithmetic and cannot resolve them in principles per se nota, so sacred theology is in a state of imperfection compared with the theologia dei and beatorum.³⁹⁾

Garrigou-Lagrange, commenting on this passage, writes that the principles of a subalternate science can thus be known by faith and without evidence and by science and with evidence, for example, the musician believing the principles of arithmetic has a genuine science of music but in an imperfect state. But if the musician afterwards becomes an arithmetician, then he possesses the science of music in a perfect state. Similarly, the theologian credits the revealed principles and theology in him is truly a science, but in an imperfect state. In heaven, his discursive theology, ⁴⁰⁾ becomes in him truly a science and in a perfect state.

To return to our problem: Because of his distinction between the orders of nature and grace, Aquinas cannot consider the relation between philosophy and theology as the relation of a subalternate to a subalternant science. The principles of philosophy are taken from the order of natural reason and are self-evident. Philosophy as the subalternant science of the entire order of the natural sciences, is a ⁴¹⁾ perfectum opus rationis. Theology, however, proceeds from principles revealed and credited on the authority of God Himself, and considers all things under the formality of ⁴²⁾ being divinely revealed. In themselves the principles of theology are not self-evident but are reducible to the con-

clusions of a higher science, in this case the theologia dei
and beatorum.⁴³⁾

The very distinction between reason and revelation thus safeguards the autonomy of both philosophy and theology for Aquinas. But does Dooyeweerd's rejection of this distinction not lead to the very opposite position: is he not compelled to see the relation between philosophy and theology as the relation of a subalternate to a subalternant science, the former accepting its principles from the latter in the manner in which music accepts its principles from arithmetic, or discursive theology from the theologia beatorum? In so far as Christian Revelation is the transcendent precondition for all true knowledge of the cosmos, surely the delicate balance between reason and revelation which the notion of a Christian philosophy requires, has been destroyed at the expense of reason, and what we have here is simply a theology dressed up in philosophical terms.

At once, however, we are confronted with Dooyeweerd's own claim that this knowledge of God procured from Revelation and which is a condition for all true knowledge of the cosmos, is not a theological knowledge. He writes explicitly:

"In the limitation and weakness of the flesh, we grasp the absolute truth in our knowledge of God derived from His

Revelation in prayer and worship. This knowledge in the full sense of the word contains the religious principle and foundation of all true knowledge, and primarily has a religious enstatic character. It no more rests primarily on a theoretical meaning-synthesis than does the cosmic self-consciousness.

The knowledge about God in which religious self-knowledge is implied, is not primarily gained in a so-called theological way. That which is very inadequately called 'theology' is a theoretical knowledge obtained in a synthesis of the logical function of thought and the temporal function of faith. It is a knowledge which itself is entirely dependent on the cosmomic idea from which the thinker starts. The true knowledge of God and of ourselves is concerned with the horizon of human experience and therefore also with that of theoretical knowledge. It rests on our trustful acceptance of Divine revelation in the indissoluble unity of both its cosmic-immanent sense and its transcendent religious meaning: an acceptance with our full personality and with all our heart. It means a turning of the personality, a giving of life in the full sense of the word, a restoring of the subjective perspective of our experience, enabling us to grasp reality again perspectively in the light of Truth. This does not mean a kind of mystical supernatural cognitive function, but it refers to the horizon that God

made for human experience in the cosmic order created by
Him." ⁴³⁾

From this passage it is clear that Dooyeweerd does not consider that philosophy is subalternate to theology. God's Revelation in Scripture may never be identified with theology, which is a special theoretical discipline, but directly influences the heart of man, and thus indirectly all spheres of life and of thought. Bavinck has stated that Scripture is the "book of religion"; ⁴⁴⁾ and for Dooyeweerd, too, philosophy is rooted in religion and not in theology.

With this other neo-Calvinist philosophers will agree. Van der Walt states that if we procure the principles of philosophy directly from theology, theology itself will have a general theoretical and cosmic function, and that consequently there will be as many philosophies as there are theologies. The dogmatic schools of Kant, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Barth, Brunner, Doedes, Kuyper and van Oosterzee will then quarrel among themselves about the nature of philosophical principles. ⁴⁵⁾ Stoker states that philosophy has its religious a priori which is philosophically formulated in the basic idea, but cannot allow a theological formulation of its a priori without becoming theologised. ⁴⁶⁾ This is also granted by Spier. ⁴⁷⁾

Considerable difference of opinion arises, however, when Dooyeweerd proceeds to define theology as a special science bound within its own modal limits, and claims that it borrows its principles from philosophy.⁴⁸⁾ Rejecting this view, W. Young pleads for the reintroduction of theology as not only as ultima scientia but also as ultima philosophia. Dooyeweerd obscures the universal character of theology by classing it with the special sciences, but ascribes to philosophy a singularly unique position.⁴⁹⁾ Van der Walt writes that if we attempt to confine theology to the function of faith, we turn theology into a special science amongst other special sciences, and thus dependent on philosophy, which, as a theory of totality, provides the a priori foundation for theology. For van der Walt this is the result of Dooyeweerd's choice of the heart as archimedean point, leading to the acceptance of religious experience instead of Revelation, objectively given in Scripture, as a source of knowledge. This is also the burden of Potgieter's criticism of Dooyeweerd: the certain basis of the revelatio specialis may never be exchanged for the ego regeneratus, which is sinful and fallible, and cannot serve as an a priori.⁵⁰⁾

Van Til has attempted to defend Dooyeweerd against the accusations of subjectivism by insisting that Dooyeweerd

wishes at all times to subject the regenerated man to Scripture.⁵¹⁾ Nevertheless, Van Til has not seen the real danger pointed out by Dooyeweerd's critics. If theology is controlled by the cosmonomic idea, formulated by philosophy from the religious a priori, we are in fact making theology subject, not to the objective norm of Scripture as traditionally interpreted, but to a religio subjectiva over which we have no control. That this may even be the cause of radical divergence from traditional Reformed theology, is affirmed by W. Masselink in a study of neo-Calvinistic theology.

"The question constantly emerges," he writes, "is this a new system or can it be considered as a development of the old Reformed system of theology? Much of course depends upon the answer to this question. Must the disagreement with historical Reformed theology be regarded as basic or are they non-essential? I venture to answer this question in the affirmative That this is a new system seems to be evident from the contents of its teachings. Basic departures from historic Reformed thought appear to be involved in their conception of the following truths: common grace, the image of God in natural man, the universal fatherhood of God in the creative sense, total depravity, the antithesis between God and natural man, the contact point for mission work and the Reformed conception of apologetics.

New views regarding these doctrines are contained in their theology. Coming to the philosophy, we meet with difficulties, in their conceptions of the soul and other truths especially related to Reformed psychology and eschatology We therefore conclude from its teachings and its own declarations that this movement may be regarded as a new system of theology and philosophy It is evident that they all depreciate historic Reformed theology." ⁵²⁾

In considering the issues raised by Dooyeweerd's critics, we are handicapped by the fact that Dooyeweerd himself does not devote to this very important problem the attention which it deserves. This is admitted by Spier, when he writes that an examination of the nature of theology constitutes a field which from the point of view of neo-Calvinism has hardly been touched. ⁵³⁾ Spier himself attempts to remedy this lack to some extent. His short analysis follows the method and pattern of similar analyses of modal spheres by followers of the wetsidee, ⁵⁴⁾ namely, ascertaining the position of the relevant sphere amongst the others, establishing its modal moment and analogies. ⁵⁵⁾ In this article Spier is, however, primarily concerned with an examination of theology as a science. He states that the normative aspect of the modality of faith is represented by the exegetical and dogmatic sciences, the subject aspects by the sciences of diaconology and ecclesio-

logy. The latter's analogical connections with earlier spheres give rise to the further sciences of, for example, canon law (juridical analogy) and ecclesiastical history (historical analogy). Spier emphasises that the normative science of dogmatics does not create the norm of faith. Neither does the church: the church confesses the norm, which is Revelation.⁵⁶⁾ The examination of pseudo-faiths also belongs to theology. This does not fall under the subject or law aspects of faith, but is another part altogether, which as apostate theology is again divided into subject and normative sciences.⁵⁷⁾

Spier's short article does not assist us very much in defining the relation between theology and philosophy in the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee. But it does make it clear that when Dooyeweerd refers to theology, he refers to it in an encyclopaedic sense: the whole corpus of theological subjects, situated around the modal moment of the sphere of faith. According to this conception, developed by Kuyper in the three volumes of his Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid (Encyclopaedia of Sacred Theology), there is no theological science which occupies a higher position than any other. Dogmatics, traditionally considered to be theology proper, is on the same level with all the others.⁵⁸⁾

The problem with which we are really concerned, is the

following: If a science is distinguished from another primarily by the formal object of its study - or, as Dooyeweerd prefers to term it, by its gegenstand - what is the difference between the formal objects of theology and philosophy in the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee? The answer will intimately affect the position which theology will occupy in the corpus of the sciences.

According to the traditional thomistic view, theology is distinguished from philosophy in virtue of the lumen under which it considers its object. While both theology and philosophy may study the same material object, for example, God, theology studies God sub ratione Deitatis, while philosophy studies God as first cause, being, etc. The distinction in formal object depends on a distinction in lumen. In philosophy it is the first principles of reason; in theology it is the lumen theologicum or virtual revelation. The hierarchy of the sciences, with theology at its head, is then determined by the supernaturalness of the formal object of theology. This traditional view of theology is emphasised by Van der Leeuw in the Protestant world. Theology, he states, was and still is, the queen of the sciences. It is difficult to see, according to Van der Leeuw, how a science which treats of the Revelation of God, can be other than the "immanente Spitze des Wissens."⁵⁹⁾

But this whole approach Dooyeweerd considers to be influenced by the distinction between nature and grace, which

he has rejected in favour of his perspectivistic or refractive view. Here there is no distinction of lumen, which gives theology the pre-eminence it traditionally enjoys. The light which illumines the object at all levels of knowledge is the light of Revelation, refracted by means of cosmic time into temporal reality. In the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee the formal object of a science is determined by the modal aspect of the cosmos to which it is directed.

It is for this reason that both Dooyeweerd and Kuyper insist that the object of theology is the modal sphere of faith. The latter becomes the gegenstand of the analytical function, the synthesis between the two modalities giving rise to the science of theology. We have seen that there is an apostate as well as a sacred theology. In so far as both are qualified by the modal moment of the sphere of faith: transcendental certainty in time regarding the arche of all meaning, both are legitimate theologies.

But we are at the moment concerned primarily with the formal object of sacred theology. Here, too, its object is the modal sphere of faith, but a faith of which the law aspect is Revelation, and not some presumed absolutisation of either the pre-normative or normative aspects of meaning. But although the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea acknowledges the unique nature of sacred theology among the other sciences, in so far as it points beyond the created to the Creator, ⁶⁰⁾ it is nevertheless a science, a theoretical activity, ⁶¹⁾ which has as its

object the modal sphere of faith, and thus studies a mode of meaning formally equal to any other mode of meaning. Philosophy, however, studies a more general object, which encompasses the formal objects of all the other sciences, also that of theology, and considers them in relation to the arche of all meaning. Theology is thus necessarily inferior to philosophy, which, in its cosmomic idea, is concerned with the very refraction of God's law through cosmic time into the different modal spheres.

However, it must be pointed out that this does not constitute a ground for criticism on the part of other Calvinist theologians and philosophers. Dooyeweerd is confronted with a Protestant world divided into different theological traditions, each claiming the enlightenment of the Holy Ghost and each reading into the past a prolongation of its own tradition. This is especially evident in a passage by Potgieter, where he is concerned with proving against Roman Catholic accusations⁶²⁾ of individualism and subjectivism on the part of Protestant theology, that the latter is actually no less than Rome bound to tradition.⁶³⁾ But Dooyeweerd points out that much of Protestant theology is riddled with notions procured from the very pagan and Scholastic traditions which in principle rejects. This holds for Calvinist no less than for Lutheran theologies. As Stoker further points out, in the past even Reformed theology was compelled to make use of an immanentist philosophy,

which largely contributed to its decadence and modernism. Hence the necessity of creating a specific neo-Calvinist philosophy, which will preserve theology from the errors to which it is prone in the use of a different philosophical conceptual apparatus.⁶⁴⁾ Dooyeweerd, then, appears to have been more consistent than his critics. With the rejection of an infallible theological tradition, theology necessarily becomes dependent on the cosmonomic idea of philosophy.

But a second conclusion follows: In attempting to establish the basic idea of philosophy, Dooyeweerd has drawn the distinction between God and world as an idea of law, that is, the world is subject to law, God is above the law in the sense of being the source of law. This distinction, he claims, is Scriptural. But the sense in which this is to be interpreted in the fact^x of the lack of specific texts, the emphasis placed on it, its connection with other equally probable basic ideas, is not controlled by an objective and traditional theology. It lies in the judgement of the individual Calvinist philosopher whose final criterion is his own private judgement, based on religious experience, a religious knowledge obtained "in prayer and worship", and thus necessarily fallible and subjective. The individual philosopher himself must decide what is Scriptural and what not. He cannot claim

here the guidance of theology, for theology is controlled by the cosmonomic idea, which in its turn is determined by a religio subjectiva. The question, whether this religio subjectiva is truly Christian, cannot be decided on theological grounds, for it transcends the whole realm of theoretical discussion. It is a religious a priori, and as such incommunicable. In this sense Dooyeweerd's conception of a Scriptural philosophy has endangered the existence not only of theology, but of philosophy itself.

It is no longer possible to escape the examination of the fundamental problem of Dooyeweerd's concept of philosophy. If the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea is rooted in the religious attitude of the heart, as the transcendental critique has revealed, if every other philosophy is similarly rooted in religion, either Christian or apostate, how is philosophical communication possible between the Wijsbegeerte der Wets-idee and other philosophy? Dooyeweerd claims that communication is possible, and that it is effected by the transcendental critique. It is to this aspect of the critique that we are now enabled to proceed.

CHAPTER V

The Dialogue with Immanentist Philosophy.

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In attempting to establish the neo-Calvinistic concept of philosophy, we found, already at the beginning of our enquiry, that it is closely associated with a fundamental philosophical problem. This problem we defined as the problem of philosophical communication, and in raising this problem, we raised the question of the possibility of philosophy and of the philosophie perennis.

The primary importance of this problem in Dooyeweerd's philosophy is occasioned by his conception of the structure of philosophical thought. For Dooyeweerd a philosophical system, in its attempt to give a total view of cosmic reality, is a coherent body of statements proceeding from one or more principles. In the transcendental critique of theoretical thought, Dooyeweerd further claims to have proved that these principles are rooted in supra-theoretical religious motives, which can finally be reduced to two: the Christian and the apostate. Each motive demands the total surrender of the whole personality, and as such reveals an exclusive and

antithetical character. In so far as the first principle or basic idea of any philosophy is determined by the religious motive accepted by the philosopher, that philosophy as a whole will share in the exclusive nature of the religious motive. For this reason Dooyeweerd accepts only two fundamental and mutually exclusive types of philosophy: the immanentist and the Christian.

If this is so, Dooyeweerd's conception of the religious a priori, presented in the transcendental critique, appears to have destroyed the possibility of a common philosophical universe of discourse. Yet Dooyeweerd persists in offering the critique as a means of communication. Since its appearance on the scene of the Netherlands philosophy, Dooyeweerd writes, the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea has pleaded with increasing intensity for a rapprochement between the different philosophical schools and directions. What he visualises is not a formal exchange of opinion, but the development of a true dialogue of one school with another, both sides entertaining the desire to penetrate to the deepest levels of philosophical thought and to approach the philosophical position of their opponent from his own deepest presupposition.

This is made possible by the transcendental critique, he continues, which sharply distinguishes between theoretical judgements and supra-theoretical prejudices, rooted in a reli-

gious basic motive and determining the whole direction of theoretical thought. His aim in introducing the transcendental critique as a means of communication should not, however, be considered as a dogmatic attack on the idea of the autonomy of reason. All that he asks is that his opponents should not consider this dogma as a philosophical axiom but in a conscientious critical manner attempt to assess its true character. In this manner, Dooyeweerd concludes, there is a great possibility that in a philosophical discussion the arguments will not merely pass each other without true contact.¹⁾

Dooyeweerd emphasises that his radical rupture with the starting points of immanentist philosophy does not mean that an intrinsically reformed Christian philosophy should intend to break off philosophical contact with Greek, Scholastic and Humanistic thought. On the contrary, the Christian philosophy developed by him is enabled to enter into the most inward communication with immanentist philosophy.

"It will never break the community of philosophical thought with the other philosophical trends," he writes, "because it has learned to make a sharp distinction between philosophical judgements and the supra-theoretical prejudices which lay the foundation of every possible philosophy. The danger of breaking this community of thought is, as we said in an earlier context, always caused by philosophical dogmatism, which

makes its religious pre-suppositions into theoretical axioms, and makes the acceptance of the latter the necessary condition for philosophical discussion." ²⁾ As he repeatedly states, the philosophical monologue of dogmatic philosophy must make place for a true philosophical dialogue on a basis of equality, which is the only possibility for a fruitful exchange of philosophical views and points of view, and in which the ex-cathedra tone is exchanged for an honest attempt to approach each other in a critical theoretical manner. ³⁾

The fundamental importance of the critique in Dooyeweerd's conception of philosophy is thus established. ⁴⁾ In the light of the antithesis between the different religious motives controlling the philosophical thought of the West and which actually makes one point of view unintelligible to any other, ⁵⁾ the transcendental critique alone retains the possibility of mutual understanding and constructive criticism. Practically this means that the critique makes possible communication between the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee and immanentist philosophy.

The immanentist philosopher, however, has not yet discovered the existence of the critique, and indeed cannot discover it, for he is blinded by the doctrine of the autonomy of reason, whatever form it may take. The "dialogue" will

then presumably be conducted by Dooyeweerd himself, who, by means of the three transcendental problems, leads his opponent along the concentric way of the critique. Beginning with the presentation of the evidence of naive experience, he is led step by step via the problems of theoretical abstraction, the archimedean point of philosophy and the possibility of self-knowledge, to the final recognition of the religious motives in which his thought is grounded.

Now what will have been gained in this argument? Obviously, from Dooyeweerd's point of view, a great deal. The conclusion of the immanentist philosopher will be, that what he has up till now accepted as theoretical autonomous axioms, are really religious prejudices. He will then realise that what has been his main objection to the Wijsbegeerte der Wet-
idee, that it is dogmatic and incommunicable, because rooted in religion, must now be discarded in the face of the proved fact that his own philosophy is equally rooted in religion and thus equally dogmatic and incommunicable. 6)

The immanentist philosopher will thus have gained in self-knowledge and self-criticism. But a further conclusion follows: Having perceived the religious foundation of his own thought, he will grasp that what he has absolutised is simply one or more modal aspects. In other words, the transcendental critique will serve as a negative criterion of the truth or

untruth of his religious basic motive. Furthermore, the critique shows that the construction of a philosophy free of antinomy is possible only if the philosopher has a true self-knowledge, procured from a true knowledge of God, and this may serve as an incitement to the immanentist philosopher to become interested in the Christian religion. In this sense the critique, except for its purely critical qualities, is also a preambula fidei, a preparation for faith, and thus also has a moral and religious purpose.

A true philosophical dialogue, however, must be conducted according to certain rules recognised by all who participate in it, and which guarantee its critical character and its universal validity. Now in what does this supremely critical quality of the transcendental critique consist, and which makes it unique in the history of philosophy? This is an extremely important question, and the whole success of Dooyeweerd's claim that he is presenting us with a philosophy which is both Christian and communicable, will depend on his answer.

In order to answer this question, the structure of the critique must be closely examined. Here we are at once faced by Dooyeweerd's division of the argument into a "theoretical"

and a "non-theoretical" part. Up till the third transcendental problem, Dooyeweerd states, the demonstrative force of the critique has been negative in character, so far as it, taken strictly, can only demonstrate that the starting-point of theoretical thought cannot be found in that thought itself, but must be supra-theoretical in character. That it is to be found only in the central religious sphere of consciousness is no longer to be proved theoretically, because this insight belongs to self-knowledge, which as such transcends the theoretical attitude of thought.⁷⁾ On the same page he ascribes a more positive significance to the first "theoretical" part of the critique; it no longer merely demonstrates that the origin of thought is not situated in thought itself, but that it is situated in the self as archimedean point: "What is stringently proved, in my opinion, is the thesis, that the concentric direction of thought in its self-reflection cannot originate from the theoretical attitude of thought itself, and that it can issue only from the ego as a supra-theoretic individual centre of human existence."⁸⁾

These statements of Dooyeweerd are obscure. His distinction between the "theoretical" and the "non-theoretical" parts of the critique, is presumably caused by his own peculiar conception of theoretical thought. Theoretical thought is thought which is gegenständlich, that is, reveals an anti-theoretical structure in which the analytical aspect is opposed

to some other modal aspect. In this sense of the term, the thinking employed by the special sciences is the pattern of all theoretical thinking. But if this is so, what does Dooyeweerd mean when he states that the argument of the first two problems is theoretical? Surely Dooyeweerd's thinking about the special scientific (theoretical) attitude of mind is not itself "theoretical" thinking. In the first two problems he is concerned with the very conception of the diversity of meaning, which, together with the idea of the totality of meaning and the origin of meaning, he terms "transcendental ideas", not "theoretical concepts". It is therefore difficult to understand why he describes the argument of the first two questions as "theoretical", when, according to his own terminology, it should rather be termed "transcendental" thinking.

However, Dooyeweerd contrasts this section of the critique with the argument of the third and the fourth transcendental problems. According to him, the proof that the origin of thought is situated in the self as archimedean point (the first two transcendental problems) is "theoretical." That the archimedean point is situated in the heart, is the fruit of self-knowledge, and not of ratiocination. This self-knowledge the immanentist philosopher cannot have; it is excluded by his immanentist religious point of departure.

Therefore he can know nothing about the heart, although his very immanentist attitude originates here. Furthermore, he can neither perceive the relation between this religious consciousness and the religious basic motives nor can he know that self-knowledge is correlative to our knowledge of God. If, therefore, the proof of the critique extends only up till the second transcendental problem, Dooyeweerd has missed the whole purpose of the critique. Its whole success depends on its ability to prove, not simply that the archimedean point of philosophy lies in the self - for Dooyeweerd has pointed out that this has already been recognised by philosophers - but that it is situated in the heart, "the central religious sphere of consciousness." All four stages of the critique must thus be presented as a proof, if Dooyeweerd wishes to realise the aim of the critique. This is borne out by Dooyeweerd's own statement elsewhere that the critique as a whole is the "final theoretical foundation" of his philosophy.

On examining the third and fourth transcendental questions, we do, in fact, find a continuation of the proof. In the third problem, Dooyeweerd attempts to prove the religious presuppositions of thought as follows: The self is a totality, a concentration point of cosmic aspects. However, as created, it is still meaning, still radically contingent, and can therefore be understood only in the light of its origin. Knowledge of self is thus correlative to our know-

ledge of God, which is not a conceptual knowledge but a religious consciousness of God, obtained in prayer and worship. If, therefore, knowledge of the cosmos presupposes knowledge of the self, and knowledge of the self presupposes religion, knowledge of the cosmos necessarily presupposes religion. The definition of religion itself, which Dooyeweerd presents at this point, is according to him a "formal and transcendental" idea, stripped of the immediacy of the religious experience. The argument is extended to the last stage of the critique, where Dooyeweerd points out that religion is never private, but demands a communal religious life, proceeding from a common religious basic motive. His argument here is supplemented by historical, anthropological and cultural data.

It thus appears that in spite of Dooyeweerd's reference to the two parts of the critique, he presents the whole critique as a proof, and considers the argument from start to finish as necessary. However, Dooyeweerd is right in discerning that the critique reveals a dual character; but instead of his division of the argument into a "theoretical" and a "non-theoretical" part, the distinction should be drawn between what we may term the formal and reflective aspects of the critique.

The formal aspect predominates in the actual exposition

and presentation of the critique. Here we are presented with the sequence of transcendental problems, issuing in the affirmation of the critical necessity of self-knowledge. The starting point of theoretical thought is established to be supra-theoretical, founded ultimately in the direction of the heart to a presumed or real origin of all temporal diversity of meaning, which it finds focussed concentrically in itself. The formal ideas of the diversity, unity and origin of meaning are, however, given no content. "If, as we have demonstrated," Dooyeweerd writes, "theoretical synthesis is possible only from a supra-theoretical starting point, then only the contents of the supra-theoretical presuppositions implied thereby, can be questioned, but not the very necessity of them."⁹⁾

But it must be remembered that the actual dialogue takes place between philosophers who, unconsciously, have already given a content to these ideas, but who are still under the impression that these ideas are only theoretical axioms of universal validity. If the philosopher accepts the formal argument of the critique, Dooyeweerd requires from him to reflect on his own experience and explicitly to give a content to the empty form of the critique. This is termed by Dooyeweerd the way of transcendental self-reflection. What immediately happens, of course, is that the immanentist philosopher perceives that his conception of the origin is a religious absolutisation

of a modal sphere, with resultant antinomies in the theoretical realm. The immanentist philosopher who, having once accepted the formal argument, ventures on the way of self-reflection, is inevitably compelled to surrender his own position.

The acceptance of the formal aspect of the critique is thus the absolutely necessary prerequisite for the intercommunication which Dooyeweerd desires, and which he is confident is made possible by the critique. Our question therefore recurs: in what does the necessity and universality of the formal argument of the critique consist?

First of all, it must be asked whether the very claim of the critique to be a proof, does not endanger the validity of its conclusions. This danger is clearly perceived by Dooyeweerd himself. "If our criticism should actually prove something stringently," he asks, "does it not move in a vicious circle? For does a proof not suppose this very autonomy of theoretical thought, the impossibility of which our criticism tried to demonstrate?"¹⁰⁾

As the critique has already shown that the doctrine of the autonomy of theoretical thought is a dogmatic axiom, the real question is how the claim of the critique to be a proof can be reconciled with his own critical demand that all thought must necessarily proceed from a religious presuppo-

sition. Dooyeweerd solves the problem by stating that his argument is both a proof and reveals the influence of his religious a priori. It is a proof in the sense of satisfying the formal demands of logic, which are the same for all men. But in spite of the fact that the immanentist and Christian philosophers share the same logic, they nevertheless arrive at different conclusions, caused by the supra-theoretical presuppositions which influence the content of their thought. His own religious a priori 'frees' philosophy from the uncritical acceptance of false axioms.

"It is of course impossible," Dooyeweerd writes, "that this transcendental criticism - although up to the question of self-knowledge being of a strictly theoretical character - itself should be unprejudiced. For in that case it would refute its own conclusions. But what shall we say, if the very supra-theoretical presuppositions hold here, which free theoretical thought from a dogmatic 'axioms' standing in the way of a veritable critical attitude?"¹¹⁾

His own religious a priori influences the actual argument of the critique by 'uncovering' the modal state of affairs which serves as the starting point of the critique, and which is obscured by the religious a priori of the immanentist philosopher. Once this state of affairs is accepted, the greatest obstacle to the acceptance of the formal argument is removed.

However, it is difficult to see how this contributes anything to the problem of communication, unless the immanentist philosopher can both recognise and accept this state of affairs. This problem is not met in the transcendental critique itself, but in the introduction to the detailed description of the modal spheres the problem of the recognition of the modal diversity arises. Dooyeweerd distinguishes here between undoubtable states of affairs in reality, and the judgements in which we attempt to grasp them theoretically. No man will doubt that two plus two equals four. But a scientific judgement has to consider the idea of number in its relation to other aspects of meaning. Here the subjective interpretation, determined by the religious basic motive, is of overwhelming importance.¹²⁾

The recognition of the modal, structural state of affairs, he continues, is made possible by a methodical suspension of philosophical prejudices on the part of the immanentist philosopher. In this connection the following important passages must be kept in mind:

"....The state of affairs described in the preceding examinations"(in connection with the modal spheres) "urge themselves upon the human mind as soon as they have been detected, because they are really the same for everybody. But their discovery and the manner of description are not

independent of a religious starting point. For it is evident that the dialectical basic motives of immanentist philosophy must divert our attention from them, so that we have no concern in an exact description. Therefore I can agree without hesitation that the preceding inquiry into the states of affairs implied in the fundamental analogical concepts was not unprejudiced in a religious sense. But I must at the same time deny that this circumstance detracts from the fact that the states of affairs here intended are a common basis for philosophical discussion." And on the next page he concludes: "It is impossible to eliminate the religious starting-point of theoretical thought. But it is not impossible to perform a provisional epoche of all specific philosophical interpretations of the state of affairs which are to be established in a precise way before we try ¹³⁾ to account for them in a philosophical theory."

Except for asserting that the suspension of prejudices is in fact possible, Dooyeweerd devotes no further attention to this problem. However, there are a few curious passages elsewhere in which the possibility of the epoche seems to be assumed:

The cosmic order with all temporal laws and structural states of affairs founded in it, he writes here, is the same for every thinker, no matter whether he is a Christian, a pagan or a Humanist. Structural states of affairs, as soon

as they are discovered, force themselves upon everybody, and it does not make sense to deny them. All philosophical schools learn from one another, even from fundamental mistakes made in the theoretical interpretations of the laws and structural states of affairs founded in the temporal order of the cosmos. Dooyeweerd admits that immanentist philosophy can discover many states of affairs which have been neglected up till now by a philosophy directed by an intrinsically Christian basic idea, and vice versa.¹⁴⁾

In the effort to account for these states of affairs theoretically, he continues, all philosophical trends will compete. He does not claim a privileged position for the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea, for even the Calvinist religious a priori and the content of the basic idea determined by it, does not give security against mistakes, even fundamental mistakes.

"Every serious philosophic school," Dooyeweerd concludes, "contributes to the development of human thought to a certain extent, and no single one can credit itself with the monopoly in this respect. No single serious current of thought, however apostate in its starting-point, makes its appearance in the history of the world without a task of its own, by which, even in spite of

itself, it must contribute to the fulfilment of the Divine plan in the unfolding of the faculties which He makes to perform their work even in His fallen creation." ¹⁵⁾

We are faced with an amazing situation. In spite of the fact that the doctrine of antithesis has been emphasised in the strongest possible terms in his philosophy, Dooyeweerd now not only asserts the possibility but also the existence of contact between immanentist and Calvinist philosopher, and even allows for error in the latter's philosophical account of reality. Yet the question of how the suspension of philosophical prejudices - which enables the immanentist philosopher to recognise the state of affairs initiating the formal argument of the critique, - is possible, is entirely ignored. Moreover, his very conception of structural states of affairs which are to be distinguished from their philosophical interpretation, is, with the exception of unimportant casual references, mentioned only in the passages quoted or referred to in this chapter; and its only mention in the sixty pages comprising the exposition of the transcendental critique itself, is at the point of transition to the third transcendental problem: "Up to now it (the argument) has remained strictly within the theoretic

sphere, and has laid bare structural states of affairs which have been ignored under the very influence of the dogma as to the autonomy of theoretical reason. However, these states of affairs, once they have been discovered, may no longer be ignored by anyone who appreciates a veritably critical standpoint in philosophy." ¹⁶⁾ This paragraph makes little impression on the reader, and does not appear as a significant statement on the problem of communication.

It is therefore necessary to attempt to construct a consistent statement of what Dooyeweerd does in fact mean by the philosophical epoche, and to examine its implications.

Dooyeweerd has distinguished between the structural and the subjective order, between the immediate testimony of reality and the philosophical interpretation of this ~~reality~~ testimony. He is referring here, firstly, to the plastic horizon of experience, which we meet in naive experience, and secondly, to the modal horizon, including the special modal states of affairs or phenomena which are the data of the special sciences. While the influence of apostate presuppositions distorts and obscures this testimony, the suspension of philosophical prejudices enables the structural states of affairs to speak for themselves again. Freed from his philosophic interpretation, the immanentist philo-

sopher can now both recognise and describe these states of affairs. However, at once two significant alternatives arise.

Firstly, Dooyeweerd's distinction between the testimony of states of affairs, and our philosophical interpretation of it, points to the fact, also noted by Marlet,¹⁷⁾ that philosophy proceeds in a two-fold way: it establishes and describes relevant states of affairs, and it interprets them in terms of its basic idea of philosophy, the content of which is determined by the religious a priori which the philosopher has consciously or unconsciously accepted. The methodical suspension of prejudices will then enable the philosopher to recognise and describe the states of affairs. But if this is so, it is difficult to see the value of the epoche. Is the philosophical activity of the immanentist philosopher who has succeeded in freeing himself from his prejudices then merely confined to a description of states of affairs? This would seem to follow, if the philosophical interpretation, implying the construction of a philosophy, is only made possible by a basic idea which is either apostate or Christian.

Let us consider the other alternative, that the immanentist philosopher with suspended prejudices is indeed able to proceed to the construction of a philosophical system. The question which immediately arises in one's

mind at this point, is whether we have not perhaps misunderstood Dooyeweerd's views. Is he not perhaps allowing for a phenomenological description of an ontical state of affairs, which will compel our assent in virtue of its immediacy? In such a philosophy "construction" and "interpretation" will ^{be} at its minimum, and the account of "wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt" will simply be an elaboration of the states of affairs which have been discovered by the philosopher. We are faced here with the opinion of D. Jellema, the American Calvinist philosopher, when he writes that Dooyeweerd, like the neo-Calvinist Stoker and the Catholic Edith Stein, effected a synthesis between the Christian religion and German phenomenology. Jellema perceives a correspondence between Nicolai Hartmann's Schichtenbau and his discovery of irreducible ontological levels, and Dooyeweerd's account of the modal spheres, which he ascribes to the influence of Husserl on both Hartmann and Dooyeweerd; and through Hartmann on Dooyeweerd. ¹⁸⁾ He also refers to the philosophy of the American philosopher James Feibleman, ¹⁹⁾ similarly influenced by Hartmann, who, irrespective of any knowledge of the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee or acceptance of the Calvinist religious motive, evolved a system of eight basic law spheres corresponding in many respects to that of Dooyeweerd. ²⁰⁾

Jellema's comparison between Hartmann and Dooyeweerd is, however, extremely superficial, as is evident from the following passage:

"VAD (the philosophy of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd) and Hartmann also have differences, of course," Jellema writes, "Hartmann does'nt believe in God, VAD do. But this difference, as far as I can make out, has little major effect on the structures of their respective philosophies. The law that governs one of Hartmann's spheres is immanent; the law that governs one of VAD's spheres is given by God. But this means no more than that VAD's philosophy can be called a 'Christian phenomenology', just as Woltjer's philosophy can be called a 'Christian Platonism.' " ²¹⁾

The differences so casually dismissed by Jellema are really of a fundamental nature. As Mekkes points out, ²²⁾ Dooyeweerd's conception of the modal spheres differs radically from that of Hartmann or Feibleman in so far as they may never be considered apart from the heart of man. With this we may agree. While the modal spheres are sovereign in their own orbits, they are not 'autonomous' but can be fully understood only in the light of their complete dependence on the Origin of all meaning. While the influence of phenomenology might be traced in his Inaugural lecture, where we find him speaking of the 'intuitive perception

of the spheres of law,²³⁾ Dooyeweerd's mature and considered opinion is that modern phenomenology is a much more dangerous adversary of a Christian philosophy than classical Humanistic idealism or naturalism. This is owing to the fact, he writes, that it has penetrated to an a priori level of philosophic thought which had never been seen so sharply in the earlier Humanistic views, rendering the semblance of its being unbiased all the stronger and all the more deceptive.²⁴⁾ But according to him the phenomenological attitude itself is founded in a religious prejudice, namely, that the investigator is sovereign and free of any religious prejudice. As such this attitude lacks a transcendental self-criticism.²⁵⁾

Dooyeweerd's criticism of phenomenology, then, is not directed against its attempt to proceed from an 'ontical level of philosophic thought' (states of affairs), but against its claim that the philosopher can present a phenomenological view of the cosmic totality free of presuppositions. This substantiates our conclusion that, for Dooyeweerd, if a philosopher with suspended prejudices proceeds to the construction of a philosophy, it must

necessarily be controlled by a basic idea, either apostate or Christian. If it is apostate, the immanentist philosopher is back where he was, and this interpretation must again be suspended, etc. etc. On the other hand, he cannot do so in accordance with the Christian basic idea, because this demands a total regeneration of the heart. In either case, thus, the possibility of positive philosophic activity appears to be excluded.

It is here that the importance of the transcendental critique becomes evident. The suspension of philosophical prejudices makes possible the recognition of the modal state of affairs which Dooyeweerd presents as the starting point of the critique. The transcendental critique itself is not a philosophical system; it is a "prolegomenon" to philosophy, an examination of the pre-conditions of philosophy considered as a view of totality. Accepting Dooyeweerd's description of the modal diversity, the immanentist philosopher can now accept the formal argument and recognise the necessity of the religious presuppositions of thought. The way of critical self-reflection further shows him the antinomies in his own thought and the dogmatic, uncritical nature of the axioms he has hitherto accepted as self-evident. Finally, if he cannot accept the philosophy of the cosmogenic idea, he at least perceives that it is free

of antinomy. In other words, if the suspension of prejudices by the immanentist philosopher does not enable him to construct a philosophy, it makes possible accurate description of the states of affairs relevant to philosophical research, a critical appreciation of the presuppositions of thought and critical self-knowledge. Dooyeweerd has thus established a common critical basis for philosophical discussion, founded in the compelling evidence of reality itself.

However, this conclusion assumes the possibility of the epoche. But now it must be pointed out that if a philosophical interpretation of states of affairs is controlled by the basic idea of the philosopher, which in its turn receives its content from the religious a priori, the suspension of this philosophical interpretation must necessarily involve the suspension of the influence of the religious a priori. If not, we must assume that the influence of the religious a priori stops at the theoretical horizon, allowing the theoretical sphere of consciousness to function in a neutral manner, thus contradicting Dooyeweerd's view that the theoretical horizon may never be detached from the horizon of the selfhood, which is never neutral. This Dooyeweerd has already unequivocally stated to be "impossible". Yet his doctrine of the provisional epoche points to some such conclusion.

These objections are accurately gauged by Dooyeweerd, and we find that he clearly describes the contradiction which he expects to be attributed to him:

"Does this methodical suspension of philosophical prejudices imply an elimination of the religious starting points?" he asks. "If so, it would be necessary to accept a religious neutrality which contradicts at least the universal necessity of a religious basic motive with respect to theoretical inquiry. If not, the 'states of affairs' which should provide a common basis for philosophical discussion cannot satisfy this requirement."²⁶⁾

Dooyeweerd is content to leave the matter here, with the bald assertion of the possibility of the epoche in the face of the influence of the religious basic motive, and we are left to draw our own conclusions. However, unless we assume that the epoche is the result of a special act of divine grace, which - apart from the fact that it would in effect mean the introduction of a deus ex machina into the philosophical argument - leaves us with the perplexing question of why it does not always intervene and with equal success, there is only one possible solution. We consider that Dooyeweerd means that

the influence of the religious a priori is only in evidence in positive philosophic activity. There appears to be no reason why the immanentist philosopher may not suspend his philosophical prejudices in the sense of ceasing from philosophical activity. In other words, if and when he philosophises, he cannot escape the influence of the religious a priori; but he is not determined to philosophise. And if he does not philosophise, he can place himself in the position of a man who has not yet started to philosophise and who has not yet distorted the evidence of ontical states of affairs through the influence of the religious a priori. This seems to be the most satisfactory interpretation of Dooyeweerd's conception of the suspension of philosophical prejudices.

However, if we have solved this problem, another and graver difficulty arises, which we may formulate as follows: How is the pre-theoretical recognition of structural states of affairs by the immanentist philosopher possible, if, as Dooyeweerd has repeatedly pointed out, the influence of the religious a priori, both Christian and apostate, penetrates into the entire subjective horizon and into naive experience itself?

Here again, in lieu of any specific treatment of the problem in Dooyeweerd's philosophy, we must attempt to construct a consistent account of what Dooyeweerd does in fact mean by the pre-theoretical recognition of states of affairs. This is no problem in the sense that he acknowledges, and indeed, emphasises, the universal recognition of such states of affairs as a fact which cannot be questioned. It only becomes a problem when we ask how this is compatible with the doctrine of antithesis, and whether it does not again involve Dooyeweerd in the hypothesis of a pre-theoretical neutral sphere of consciousness.

After a close scrutiny of the argument of the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, the only possible solution to this problem seems to appear in some paragraphs devoted to the doctrine of common grace. Indeed, for a Calvinist philosopher who takes the doctrine of antithesis seriously, the doctrine of common grace seems to offer the only possibility of communication with a philosophic world which is almost entirely 'immanentist'. However, this doctrine itself has never achieved a final dogmatic precision in Calvinist theology, and, as Lasselink has pointed out, it is subject to diverse interpretations.²⁷⁾

The main points of difference are concerned with the sense in which Calvin's conception of common grace should be interpreted. According to Calvin, as we saw in Chapter I,

common grace restrains the full effect and implications of sin, and enables unregenerated man to perceive something of God's general revelation, and even to recognise the Author of the world in His works. Hence Calvin feels justified in praising the excellences of heathen philosophy, art and science, as a manifestation of the universal charity and grace of God.

In his account of the traditional Reformed view of this doctrine, Masselink emphasises that this doctrine does not allow for any natural powers left in fallen man, and that it does not cancel the effects of original sin. He thus radically differs from the position of Van Til in the latter's paper on common grace. According to Van Til, man has certain 'moral powers' in spite of original sin, and common grace only restrains the principle of evil in natural man in order that these inherent moral powers may come to expression. Masselink protests against this view, stating that if natural man still has knowledge of God and morality, entirely apart from the operations of God's spirit, it must follow that natural man is not 'dead in trespasses and sin'. In other words, he continues, this whole reasoning brings us logically to the Arminian position, and, carried to its conclusion, denies total depravity.²⁸⁾

According to Masselink, Van Til is wrong when he makes a constant appeal to Calvin for support of his views. Masselink agrees with Berkouwer and Hepp that Calvin never

considered that man had any remnant of natural, that is, autonomous rational knowledge left, irrespective of common grace, which makes the disposition of fallen man still receptive to the external and internal witness of the Holy Spirit. In other words, common grace does not remove the impediments to the natural functioning of man's mind, but it checks the principle of decay operating in the mind. The view, lately developed by Christopher Dawson, that for Calvin the human mind possesses a natural knowledge of God, thus contradicts Masselink's conception of common grace. ²⁹⁾

Dooyeweerd, too, criticises what he terms "Reformed Scholasticism", in which the distinction between nature and grace is continued in the distinction between special and common grace, the latter finding a contact with current 'neutral' philosophy. ³⁰⁾ He recognises in common grace a counter force against the destructive work of sin in the cosmos, because the antithesis between sin and creation is really abrogated by the redemption in Jesus Christ. However, common grace may not be dualistically opposed to particular grace. If this is done, the dualistic motive of nature and grace is permitted to enter Reformed thought under another name. Dooyeweerd emphasises that Calvin himself subordinated 'gratia communis' to 'gratia particularis' and to 'the honour and glory of God', and that common grace is

meaningless without Christ as the root and head of the regenerated human race. "Gratia communis," Dooyeweerd concludes, "is grace shown to mankind as a whole, which is regenerated in its new root Jesus Christ, but has not yet been loosened from its old apostate root." 31)

Dooyeweerd's views are wholly in accord with Bavinck's distinction between general and special revelation, and Hepp's conception of the testimonium Spiritus Sancti generale internum and externum. The states of affairs are founded in the structure of the cosmos, created by God, and exist independently of man. They present the final, indubitable 'given' from which science and philosophy proceed in their theoretical account of reality, 'indubitable' because of the certainty generated in man through the testimony of the Holy Spirit. Both apostate and redeemed man share this certainty; their differences only arise with the interpretation of the states of affairs, or, as Hepp puts it, in derived truth.

But common grace does not only mean that the Holy Spirit testifies to all men; it also, as Kasselink has shown, preserves the 'receptivity' of man to this testimony. This points to the fact that the testimony presupposes structural conditions in human nature itself. This is indeed acknowledged by Dooyeweerd when he writes that the

nature of man reveals a point of contact for divine grace. In his cosmology he has stated that this point of contact is the modal sphere of faith. Pistis is implanted in man's nature, and is thus 'natural' to man in the sense of an ineradicable aspect of his structure, present even from his creation. Dooyeweerd refers here to Kuyper's conception of faith as a function which, apart from its purely soteriological meaning, also has a much wider cosmological and epistemological significance, and which is present in all branches of knowledge. ³²⁾ This corresponds to Hepp's view, quoted by Dooyeweerd, that, without pistis, man would be incapable of any science, philosophy, morality or religion. ³³⁾

All men, then, have a natural receptivity to the testimony of the Spirit, and all men do, in fact, receive this testimony, not through a necessity of their nature, but as the result of common grace. From this must be concluded that, although the testimony itself is supernatural, it is so constant and universal that its withdrawal would mean, if not the destruction, at least the total paralysis of man's thinking and all the actions which flow from it. Considered thus, there is little practical difference
/between this

view and the view that man can 'naturally' recognise structural states of affairs. The only difference seems to be whether this ability is implanted in man at his creation, or whether it is presented to man as a continual act of grace.

However, if common grace preserves the modal sphere of faith, there is reason to suppose that the other spheres will also be preserved. Indeed, according to Dooyeweerd, common grace preserves the structure of the entire cosmos. It is all due to God's common grace in Christ, he writes, that there are still means left in the world to resist the destructive force of sin. Thus meaning in apostasy remains real meaning in accordance with its creaturely mode of being. For example, an illogical reasoning can occur only within the logical modality of meaning; the non-beautiful can only be found in the aesthetic law sphere; organic disease remains something within the biotic modality. Sin itself has no meaning or existence independent of God's laws, and in this sense St. Paul's utterance is to be understood, to the effect that but for the law, sin is dead. 34)

This conception is emphatically repeated in the following passage:

"In our temporal cosmos God's common grace reveals

itself, as Kuyper brought to light so emphatically, in the preservation of the cosmic world-order. Owing to this preserving grace the framework of the temporal refraction of meaning remains intact." ³⁵⁾

But if this is indeed Dooyeweerd's view, it follows that common grace must also preserve the modal structure of thought. In that case the hypothesis of a methodical suspension of philosophical prejudices could be rejected in favour of a view in which the 'nature' of thought is preserved by common grace. The above passages point to such a conception, and it appears to be substantiated in an article by Dooyeweerd devoted to an exposition of the transcendental critique.

"It cannot be questioned," he writes, "that the conception of the transcendental critique of philosophy maintains the theoretical activity of thought between those who proceed from radically different points of view. This is made possible by the fact that this critique is founded in the ontical structure of philosophical thought, which is of universal validity, and is not based on a purely subjective prejudice." ³⁶⁾

In another article he explains what he understands by the ontical structure of theoretical thought. 'Ontical', he states, means 'founded in the temporal order of reality', and,

as such, ~~is~~ unchangeable and not subject to historical development. The structure of thought is, firstly, of a logical nature, but the order of time connects this logical aspect with all other modal aspects of reality. The second structural characteristic of thought is the antithetical relation between the analytical sphere and its field of research. Finally, the modal structure of the gegenstand must be considered as part of the structure of thought. These are all states of affairs of universal validity. Dooyeweerd emphasises that not a subjective, purely epistemological a priori, but an ontical, structural a priori, guarantees the possibility of a theoretical community of thought, situated in the 'nature' of theoretical thought as such. ³⁷⁾

It is difficult to decide how these passages must be interpreted. It appears as if Dooyeweerd is stating that the point of contact between philosophers is to be found in theoretical thought itself, which is "of universal validity for all time." If, by the universal validity of the structure of thought, he means that its laws and principles are also of universal validity, his view corresponds to that of Gilson, who has stated that the unity of philosophical thought is

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in the first principles of reason, which are the same for all men. But - unless Dooyeweerd allows for another epoche and another testimonium, - how is this view to be reconciled with his doctrine of the religious a priori?

This implication has been noticed by the Catholic thinker, J. Jansen, who has written an illuminating article on the present state of Christian philosophy, devoting some attention also to the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee. According to Dooyeweerd's argument in the critique, Jansen writes, contact is sought on the basis of an 'ontical a priori'. He asks whether this does not mean that in the ontical structure of thought and in the relation of thought to cosmos, the Creator has placed a certain autonomy, which may serve as a common ground between the Christian and the immanentist philosopher. Dooyeweerd may not be prepared to grant this, but according to Jansen it appears to be borne out by the theory of the modal spheres, where each sphere has to a certain extent a cosmonomic autonomy. Furthermore, does not Dooyeweerd's conception of the universal, ontical structure of thought imply a relative weakening of the influence of the religious a priori? If this is indeed so, Jansen finds great possibilities for communication, but he claims that in that case Dooyeweerd has made a compromise with immanentist philosophy which would justify us in accusing his philosophy of being 'dialectical'.
38)

Except for raising these questions, Jansen does not mention the problem of communication again in his exposition of the philosophy of the cosmomic idea; but it is clear that if he has indeed rightly interpreted Dooyeweerd's thought, he has touched on a fundamental contradiction.

However, it is difficult to reconcile this interpretation with the problem lying at the root of the critique. This is the problem of the dogmatic exclusivism of the schools, which destroys communication. Hence Dooyeweerd's insistence that the philosopher should practise critical self-reflection, and his demand for philosophical integrity. This means, firstly, that he must recognise and acknowledge the supra-theoretical presuppositions of his own thought. Secondly, he must realise that thought always and necessarily involves presuppositions, that is, that it is in the nature of thought to proceed from presuppositions. Critical thinking, then, is thinking which conforms to the true nature of thought and which has relinquished the idea of the autonomy of reason as itself a dogmatic axiom.

This is simply a repetition of what Dooyeweerd himself has said, but it has the merit of showing clearly that his reference to the universal validity of the structure

of thought cannot mean, as Jansen has concluded, that he accepts a certain autonomy of thought. Therefore we must examine a second and more probable interpretation, namely, that Dooyeweerd means that the point of contact is situated in the common recognition of the universal structure of thought. This interpretation is, moreover, wholly in accord with his view that the critique is founded in structural states of affairs, which includes the modal structure of thought, the recognition of which is ensured by the two-fold testimony of the Holy Spirit.

If this interpretation is correct, the only question which remains is whether this recognition of the structure of thought, which precedes the acceptance of the formal argument of the critique, does indeed create the conditions for a philosophical dialogue between the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee and immanentist philosophy.

But at once we are faced with the question as to why we should indeed accept Dooyeweerd's description of the modal spheres and the modal structure of thought as indubitable states of affairs. Assuming the testimonium Spiritus Sancti generale internum and externum and the fides generalis which it generates, assuming that our

philosophic prejudices are indeed provisionally suspended, it does not follow that Dooyeweerd's account must necessarily be accepted. Described in the barest possible terms, the structural state of affairs with which he is concerned is the existence of irreducible diversities in the cosmos. In the thomist doctrine of analogy this diversity is described in a way which differs from Dooyeweerd's description. Dooyeweerd has stated that this is already an interpretation, caused by the influence of the religious motive of nature and grace. But within the orbit of neo-Calvinistic philosophy itself, Stoker accepts Dooyeweerd's description only if it is supplemented by other possible descriptions of the relevant state of affairs. Dooyeweerd replies that Stoker's account is not as fundamental as his own, moreover, that Stoker's use of the notion of substance as one cosmic perspective, points to a synthesis with immanentist philosophy. If the possibility of differences regarding the exact nature of the cosmic diversity, even within neo-Calvinistic philosophy itself, does not necessarily mean that Dooyeweerd's account is incorrect or incomplete, it does mean that it cannot be accepted without further ado as self-evident. The same holds for his description of individual modal spheres.

However, it cannot be questioned that in his account

of the ontical structure of thought, Dooyeweerd has indeed proceeded beyond the legitimate boundary of an unprejudiced description. The critique starts with the problem of abstraction: what do we abstract in theoretical thought from naive experience? Yet, as Stoker has pointed out, Dooyeweerd's conception of naive experience already reveals the influence of the cosmonomic idea, and his account of the act of abstraction, which issues in his account of the modal aspects and the antithetical structure of thought, is itself only possible from the point of view of his basic idea. This is especially evident in his conception of the gegenstand-relation, which Dooyeweerd describes as the opposition between the logical aspect of the self and some other aspect of the concrete act of thought. This account assumes the whole scale of modal spheres, the position of the analytical sphere within this scale, the internal structure of the analytical sphere and his conception of the ego as a totality of modal spheres. This does not exclude the possibility that his account may be correct; but it shows that this account is already an interpretation, and, as Dooyeweerd himself has stated, an interpretation necessarily involves the basic idea and religious a priori of the philosopher. Therefore it cannot be considered an unprejudiced description.

But provisionally accepting these matters as Dooyeweerd has presented them, does the argument of the critique itself comply with the demand that it shall be necessary?

If we turn to the second transcendental problem, the necessity of an archimedean point in philosophy follows. It also follows that the archimedean point cannot be situated in the theoretical antithesis itself or in any modal aspect. But it does not necessarily follow that it is situated in the self, in the sense Dooyeweerd wishes us to understand this, unless we also accept his account of the self as a subjective totality of modal spheres, described in terms of the striking image of the refraction of God's law through cosmic time into modal articulations, and their concentration in the heart of man.

Proceeding to the third transcendental problem, we find that Dooyeweerd's conception of religion, too, is treated cosmonomically: it has the function of relating the diversity of meaning, focussed in the self, to the origin. Finally, the structure of the religious basic motives themselves reveals the influence of the cosmonomic idea. A religious motive is apostate if it is dialectical. It is dialectical if it gives rise to antinomies, that is, if it does not satisfy the requirements of the principium exclusae antinomiae, which, according to Dooyeweerd, pre-

supposes the acceptance of the transcendental idea of cosmic order.³⁹⁾ The Christian-Calvinistic motive, on the other hand, is termed by Dooyeweerd 'integral', free of dialectical tension, and, in so far as it enters the theoretical realm through the basic idea, free of antinomy. And it is from this very basic motive that Dooyeweerd's cosmonomic idea receives its content, and which in its turn controls Dooyeweerd's interpretation of the ontical structure of thought and the modal diversity in which the critique is founded.

It thus appears that the proof of the critique not only assumes what must be proved, but assumes at every step of the argument what must be proved. The critique fails, not because as a proof it accepts the doctrine of the autonomy of reason, but because it is both a circulus vitiosus and petitio principii.

If the critique has failed, it means, firstly, that Dooyeweerd has failed to prove his claim that the critique is the final theoretical foundation of philosophy, in so far as it gives a theoretical account of the supra-theoretical hypothesis of all thought.⁴⁰⁾ Therefore the philosopher who does not accept Dooyeweerd's conception of the religious foundation of thought, is justified in rejecting Dooyeweerd's description of his philosophy as 'immanentist'.

It means, secondly, that Dooyeweerd has failed to find a point of contact between philosophies proceeding from radically different points of departure. On the contrary, in so far as his own philosophical position and the critique itself is wholly determined by the content of his basic idea, it reveals the same dogmatic exclusivism characteristic of immanentist philosophy. The only difference between them is that the immanentist philosopher is uncritically dogmatic, while Dooyeweerd is consciously and critically dogmatic.

In attempting to establish the deeper reason for the failure of the transcendental critique, we must turn again to Dooyeweerd's conception of the structure of thought. He has rejected the view that man is capable of achieving philosophic knowledge by the light of innate principles of intelligibility. He accepts Kuyper's view that as the consciousness is one, the attitude of the heart - the centre of the personality - must necessarily penetrate into theoretical thought itself in the form of presuppositions. This causes him to distinguish between the structure and the content of thought. The structure of thought is an empty framework or receptivity, which must be filled by either an apostate or a Christian content.

This structure Dooyeweerd has already described above as the relation between the analytical function and

its gegenstand, and its connection with the whole modal horizon. But it now appears that this description errs by omission. It is the modal structure of thought; it is even the ontical structure of thought, if by 'ontical' Dooyeweerd means 'founded in the temporal order of reality.' But it is not the structure of human thinking in the full sense of the word. The very aim of the critique is to show that the antithetical relation demands an archimedean point, and that the archimedean point - the heart - is never neutral, but always directed in an attitude of surrender to an absolute. He emphasises that theoretical thought may never be separated from the dimension of the heart, and that if it attempts to do so, it does not escape the laws of its own structure, for it still retains archimedean point and religious a priori in an inverted and apostate sense. As at the level of the immediate perception of structural states of affairs, the testimony of the Holy Spirit presupposes the sphere of faith as a structural condition, so at the level of derived truth the influence of the content of the religious a priori presupposes as its structural condition both the modal relation of antithesis and the heart as archimedean point, including the presupposition originating in the heart's direction to an absolute.

In other words, the religious presupposition does not imply an irrational incursion into the autonomous realm of theoretical thought. It is itself part of the structure of thought. This is clearly expressed in Dooyeweerd's statement that only the contents of the supra-theoretical presuppositions can be questioned, but not the very necessity of them.

Thus Dooyeweerd is correct in claiming that lack of contact is caused by irreconcilable differences in the content and direction of thought, corresponding to the religious a priori accepted by the philosopher. But we cannot agree that the point of contact must therefore be sought in the modal structure of thought, for his account of this modal structure only becomes intelligible in the context of the full structure of thought which includes both a modal, theoretical structural aspect and a supra-theoretical structural aspect. And this conception of the full structure of thought and of the positive rôle of religion in philosophy, is the immediate implication of Dooyeweerd's interpretation of the sovereignty of God, the central thesis of his religious a priori. For this reason we must conclude that the transcendental critique is not a proof but a description of Dooyeweerd's fundamental epistemological assumption, which lies at the root of his entire

philosophy and ^{is} most inaccessible to the immanentist philosopher.

But in that case Dooyeweerd can only conduct a philosophical dialogue with a philosophy which shares his conception of the religious root of thought and which, fortified and enlightened by the same Christian religious a priori and self-knowledge, can discuss and criticise his philosophy on the 'equal footing' which he desires. It is to this possibility that we must finally turn our attention.

CHAPTER VI

The Dialogue with Christian Philosophy.

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As was pointed out in Chapter I, Dooyeweerd's central purpose is to develop a new concept of philosophy. In his doctrine of the antithesis in philosophy we furthermore noted that for Dooyeweerd there are fundamentally only two concepts of philosophy: the one rooted in the Christian religious motive and the other in the apostate. His concept of philosophy is then developed by continually contrasting it with immanentist philosophy and revealing the apostate root of this philosophy, the deification or absolutisation of human reason. From the critical point of view, then, in the sense in which Dooyeweerd himself uses the word in the transcendental critique, the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea has only one protagonist, immanentist philosophy, and it is with immanentist philosophy as such that Dooyeweerd attempts to communicate in the transcendental critique.

On the other hand there is an increasing tendency in Dooyeweerd's publications to recognise the Christian founda-

tions of contemporary Catholic philosophy. Since the last decades of the former century, Dooyeweerd writes, three phenomena have appeared in Western philosophy. In the first place the decay of the Humanistic thought which since the Renaissance had dominated Western thought and which reached its climax in German idealism; secondly, the great revival of Scholastic philosophy, especially that of thomism, initiated by the papal encyclical, Aeterni Patris in 1879, and lastly, the new philosophy in the Calvinistic world, which has remained true to the basic motives of the Reformation and thus to the Christian faith itself. In the general disruption and decay of Western culture, he continues, the older and spiritually consolidated cultural powers of the West, Roman Catholicism and Reformation, have arisen anew to fight with modern weapons for supremacy in the struggle for the future of the West.¹⁾

This passage reveals that the relation between Reformed and Scholastic philosophy is not only a relation of opposition but a relation in opposition. Thus Dooyeweerd states that the question of the relation between nature and grace which causes thomism and Reformed philosophy to diverge, does not affect their close relationship in virtue of a common faith, and which causes them also to present a common front to the idea of an autonomous philosophy which

in principle rejects all relation with the Christian faith. 2)

This is further emphasised in the New Critique of Theoretical Thought, where Dooyeweerd writes that he definitely rejects the term "Calvinistic philosophy" as being appropriate to name the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea, even though he fully acknowledges that this philosophy was the fruit of the Calvinistic re-awakening in the Netherlands and even though he himself, at an earlier stage of his development, called his philosophy "Calvinistic." Because of its religious basic motive and its transcendental basic idea, this philosophy deserves to be called Christian philosophy without any further qualification. 3) Except for Reformed Christian philosophy, Dooyeweerd acknowledges a neo-Scholastic Christian philosophy, which has also abandoned the doctrine of the autonomy of reason. He mentions as the main representatives of neo-Scholastic philosophy Gilson and Maritain, on the one hand, following the tradition of Thomas Aquinas, and on the other hand the school of Blondel, which is more inspired by the Augustinian tradition. 4)

If both Reformed and neo-Scholastic philosophy can be called Christian, this is, however, effected through different conceptions of the Christian basic motive. Dooyeweerd writes: "In the former the Biblical basic motive of

the Christian religion is operative in an inner reformation of philosophic thought, whereas the latter remains bound to the Scholastic motive of nature and grace and within this cadre only seeks to break through the boundaries between the natural and the supernatural spheres in order to show the insufficiency of natural philosophical thought in respect to the Christian faith.⁵⁾"

From the Catholic side we find a similar recognition of Dooyeweerd's philosophy as Christian philosophy. In a prize essay on the problem of Christian philosophy, the Catholic philosopher J. Jansen writes as follows:

"As far as we can judge, Prof. Dooyeweerd in his Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee has been consistent to his Calvinistic a priori. The sovereignty of God - the fundamental point of Calvin's doctrine - and opposed to this the great insignificance of man who dares to lift his hand against God; the law, which states the absolute distance between creature and Creator of all things from Whom, to Whom and through Whom everything exists; the new regeneration of the law through God's death on the cross; the all-significant meaning of God's Word, Holy Scripture; the statement of the heart as religious centre of human existence; predestination to salvation; justification only through faith; these are all typical Calvinistic motives, which penetrate

into the basic idea of this extremely interesting philosophical movement. While the Catholics are still concerned with the foundation of the building of a Christian philosophy, the inaugurators of the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea have already succeeded with untiring energy and rigid systematisation to achieve the building itself. In general there is no reason to question either the Christian or the philosophical nature of this system.⁶⁾

Jansen however objects to Dooyeweerd's interpretation of the motive of nature and grace, which Jansen acknowledges as the religious a priori of Catholicism. According to Jansen, Dooyeweerd ascribes to this motive an immanentist character in virtue of the latter's accommodation to the Aristotelian motive of matter and form, its conception of the root of human existence as situated in reason, nature as the autonomous step to grace, and the weakening of the radical Christian conception of sin and salvation. Jansen states that this criticism may be valid if directed against late Scholastic trends, but it is certainly not true of Thomas Aquinas, nor of modern Catholic philosophers such as Blondel, Marcel or Robbers. He points out that the motive of sin and salvation itself could be interpreted as dialectical and unscriptural.⁷⁾ Moreover, by what authority does Dooyeweerd consider the motive of nature and grace to be "unscriptural?"

Jansen refers to the power of the Catholic apostolic tradition in the preservation of the meaning of Holy Scripture. He writes:

"When a Catholic thus consciously and with full knowledge of what he is doing, bows his head before the authority of the Church, which teaches God's Word to fallen and redeemed man; when he directs the 'religious root' of his existence to God, and allows himself in his philosophic activity to be controlled by the doctrine of nature and grace, then also Prof. Dooyeweerd will have to acknowledge that there is in this case no possibility of a 'theoretical' immanentist point of view, but of a truly religious attitude, and consequently, that this religious attitude is a true worship of God and no apostate worship of idols. But the acceptance of the motive of nature and grace implies the acceptance of the whole of Catholicism as one great religious a priori, as indeed the Calvinist, with his motive of sin and salvation really affirms the whole of his Calvinism as a religious reality. The religious basic motive is thus immediately connected with the whole of that specific religion." 8)

This difference in identity is expressed by Dr. Marlet in even stronger terms. Marlet, a Jesuit, comes to the conclusion that neo-Calvinist philosophy is founded in an authentic Christian religious experience, which to a very great

extent corresponds to that of the early Scholastic thinkers. He characterises this experience as the experience of the glory of God, revealing Himself as the sovereign and lord of all creation, and Whom the whole creation must glorify. However, Marlet considers that this gives expression to only one aspect of the full Christian experience, caused by the secession of the Reformed world from the Mother Church. In this sense the Calvinistic religious a priori is more Humanistic than Scriptural.⁹⁾

Like Jansen, Marlet considers that Dooyeweerd does not grasp the true nature of the Catholic religious motive, by identifying it with certain rationalistic trends especially in contemporary neo-thomism, where the Aristotelian element in Aquinas is overemphasised at the expense of the Augustinian element. Dooyeweerd's criticism of Aquinas is controlled entirely by the presumed dominance of the Aristotelian motive of matter and form in his philosophy. Marlet emphasises the originality of Aquinas in the face of his Greek sources, claiming that his philosophy is completely penetrated by the Christian faith.¹⁰⁾

It is clear that Dooyeweerd's sharp division between the Calvinist religious a priori and the other three religious motives, must be revised. Dooyeweerd no longer dismis-

ses the motive of nature and grace without further ado as "immanentist" or "dialectical", as, from the Catholic side, Dooyeweerd's motive of sin and salvation is recognised. Dooyeweerd's greatest obstacle to communication with immanentist philosophy, the acceptance of irreconcilable religious motives, has thus collapsed.

Accepting fundamentally the same Christian verities,¹¹⁾ although expressed in different basic motives, it is to be expected that there will also be some agreement as to the self-knowledge which, for Dooyeweerd, is correlative to our knowledge of God. Dooyeweerd has claimed that the notion of the heart as the religious root of the cosmos is the great re-discovery of Calvinism. It expresses the integral unity of the sin-salvation motive, according to which the whole man is fallen and the whole man redeemed, and some of his strongest criticism directed against Scholasticism is directed against the latter's presumed conception of the soul as a rational substance.

We find, however, in contemporary Catholic thought a similar emphasising of the unity of man, which corresponds in many respects to that of Dooyeweerd. Such a totalitarian conception of the person is, for example, characteristic of Maritain's analysis of the soul in his latest work, Creative Intuition.¹²⁾ In her treatment of the human person, Edith

Stein, too, finds that it cannot fully be grasped without an examination of the image of the Divine Persons in man. In this section of her work she refers to the dictum of Teresa of Avila, that self-knowledge and our knowledge of God are inseparable,⁽³⁾ and she makes use of the term "heart" to denote the essential unity of man.⁽¹³⁾

Gilson, again, points out that the demand for self-knowledge and the doctrine of the image of God in man, has always occupied a central position in Christian anthropology. The great gift of Revelation is exactly the revelation that the heart of man is a mystery which escapes conceptual knowledge. Because man is created in the image of God,⁽¹⁴⁾ we can claim to understand the self only if we understand God. As the inner life of God is a mystery, it is indeed presumptuous for the philosopher to claim that he can understand man as he really is. Moreover, this image of God in man is no accidental character superadded to human nature, but human nature itself taken in its constitutive essence. With reference to this problem, Gilson comments as follows: "Important questions are involved in this, and when some agreement is reached on the spirit and principles of Christian philosophy,⁽¹⁵⁾ they will call for detailed study."

But there is an even greater possibility for communication to be found in the common acknowledgement that the

Christian revelation and religion intimately affects philosophy itself. As regards the exact nature of this influence, there is considerable difference in the Catholic philosophic world. As was pointed out, Dooyeweerd distinguishes, with Jansen, Robbers and Marlet, between two main trends in contemporary Catholic thought, that presented by the thomists Gilson and Maritain, and by Blondel.

In his The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, Gilson is primarily concerned to prove against Brehier's claim that the notion of a Christian philosophy has no historical justification, that historically there indeed exists a connection between philosophy and Christian Revelation, moreover, that Revelation opened the mind to the perception of certain truths which it would not otherwise have arrived at, even though these truths are accessible to human reason. For example, the truth revealed to Moses by God: I AM WHO AM, has presented philosophy with the insight that God is self-subsistent being and existence. It furthermore assists the philosopher in the selection of problems. Hence Gilson can conclude that Christian philosophy is "every philosophy which, although keeping the two orders formally distinct, nevertheless considers the Christian Revelation as an indispensable auxiliary to reason."

Gilson nevertheless considers that a Christian philosophy is possible only in Catholicism,²⁵⁾ which assumes the distinction between the orders of nature and grace. Though reason is rectified and directed to its proper object by grace, it still retains its natural character. "Sa connaissance est donc vraiment naturelle," Gilson writes, "sa philosophie, même si elle se constitue comme chrétienne, est une vraie philosophie."²⁶⁾

Maritain is less concerned with the historical influence of Christianity on philosophy than with the problem of the effect which the acceptance of Christianity by the philosopher has on his philosophy. He distinguishes between the nature and the state of philosophy.²⁷⁾ Its nature is the abstract essence of philosophy as a science, proceeding from the first principles of reason. As such philosophy is neither Christian nor non-Christian. The state of philosophy is its existence in the concrete being who philosophises: philosophical systems will always bear the imprint of the philosopher, who philosophises not simply with his reason but with his whole personality. It is here especially, according to Maritain, that we must look for the meaning of Christian philosophy. Revelation has presented reason with the renforcements internes of grace, which fructifies the mind and assists it easily to grasp a truth like the exis-

tence of God, involving a strict and difficult process of reasoning, and moreover provides it with greater certainty regarding the truth of these statements. Maritain further agrees with Gilson that Revelation also presents philosophy with an apport objectif in the sense of truths belonging per se to the field of philosophy and thus accessible to human reason, but which it would not have perceived without the assistance of Revelation. 28)

A different approach altogether is found in the philosophy of M. Blondel. Against Brehier, Blondel claims that there indeed exists an integral connection between philosophy and Christianity. Revelation places man in an ontological situation, a "transnatural" state in which man has a natural longing to embrace the supernatural life, expressed in the experience of his complete insufficiency and need. To this fait intérieur, Christianity, as it is found in the Catholic Church, corresponds as the fait extérieur in which man's restlessness is resolved. Philosophy itself does not only acknowledge this insufficiency but experiences itself as insufficient, and reveals a natural tendency and desire to be completed by Revelation. Blondel's doctrine is echoed by H. Robbers, who declares that philosophy itself, in a purely rational manner, is forced to recognise its own in-

sufficiency, and is directed in "longing expectation" to Revelation.²⁹⁾ This doctrine of the insufficiency and immanent direction of philosophy to Revelation is, however, opposed to the views of Gilson and Maritain, according to whom philosophy is autonomous in its own field, a work of natural reason having as its formal object being, and allowing only a moral and historical influence of Christianity.

The views of the thomists and Blondel regarding the nature of a Christian philosophy represent, then, two sharply divergent schools. The papal encyclical of 1879, Aeterni Patris, recommends the study of the philosophy of Aquinas, a recommendation which is repeated in the encyclical Humani Generis (1950), in which the division between the orders of nature and grace, and the doctrine of the analogia entis is accentuated. The Anti-modernist Oath of 1910 furthermore requires the Catholic philosopher to accept that the existence of God can be proved by human reason without any possibility of error, through the medium of created things,³⁰⁾ according to the Five Ways of Aquinas. Among the errors condemned by the Vatican Council (Positivism, Traditionalism, Fideism, Kantian Criticism), Garrigou-Lagrange also classes what he terms Blondel's immanent method, a method which is "deplored" by the encyclical Pascendi,³¹⁾ and

which, according to both Garrigou-Lagrange and Fr. de Tonquidec, reveals a close affinity to the views of Luther, Calvin, Baius, Jansenius and others.³²⁾ Maritain offers substantially the same criticisms of Blondel.³³⁾

While retaining the distinction between nature and grace, philosophers like Sertillanges, Jolivet, Romeyer, Henri de Lubac and especially H. Robbers, have attempted to effect some reconciliation between the two opposed views. Thus de Lubac claims that the philosophy of Gilson and Maritain need the philosophy of Blondel for its completion,³⁴⁾ and Robbers states that not only does there not exist a contradiction between Gilson and Maritain, and Blondel, but that the former philosophy only becomes legitimate in the light of Blondel's conclusions.³⁵⁾ A new emphasis on the situation of the concrete man in the cosmos, the rejection of the autonomy of reason in its rationalist sense and a strong personalist and anthropological approach is common to both to these philosophers - among which must also be reckoned G. Marcel - and the German tradition of Catholic philosophy, represented amongst others by Przywara, Von Balthasar, Wust, Pieper, Stein, Rahner and Hengstenberg.

The question with which we are concerned is whether, or in what degree, communication is possible between the philosophy of the cosmomic idea and contemporary efforts in the Catholic world to create a Christian philosophy. We suggested that in the light of a common, or related, religious experience, a common acknowledgement of man as a radical unity, created in the image of God, and a common acceptance of the fact that religion exercises an influence on philosophy, communication should present no problem.

Now first of all we should note that both main trends of Christian philosophy in the Catholic world, which we may distinguish as traditional and progressive thomism, accept the distinction between nature and grace as a presupposition, but both the interpretation of this presupposition as well as its position within the structure of philosophy differ. If we first of all turn to the traditional thomistic school represented by philosophers like Gilson, Maritain and Garrigou-Lagrange, we find that, although the distinction between nature and grace is acknowledged, it is not arrived at along the way of the transcendental critique, that is, by means of a consideration of the immanent insufficiency of theoretical thought, and thus lacks the accompanying criticism which, for Dooyeweerd, is essential in any affirmation of the

philosopher's religious basic motive.

Moreover, while acknowledging this distinction, philosophy still retains its autonomous character. The influence of religion takes the form of a spiritual and moral purification, which facilitates the working of reason in its own sphere. Within the order of natural reason, the philosophy of Gilson and Maritain thus on the whole reveals the same character as the school of Louvain, associated with philosophers like L. Noël, M. de Wulf, L. de Raeymaker, F. van Steenberghen and Dondeyne. According to this school, Christian dogmas cannot enter into a philosophical system or serve as elements in a philosophical demonstration without prejudicing the character of philosophy as a purely natural and rational discipline. Philosophy is a whole of natural truths and is concerned only with objective evidence. At most Revelation serves as a negative norm to philosophy, which, in its own order, is a study of being and the degrees of being.

Dooyeweerd's invitation to a philosophical dialogue with traditional thomism has met with no response. In lieu of such a dialogue, Dooyeweerd attempts to point out the fundamental differences in their approaches. ³⁶⁾

With his characteristic acumen, he at once penetrates to the crucial point of difference, namely, the transcenden-

tal validity of human reason in thomist metaphysics. He points out that the structure of the critique, exemplified in the first three transcendental problems, corresponds to the metaphysical doctrine of being.³⁷⁾ According to Dooyeweerd, the doctrine of being, too, is concerned with the problem of the common denominator of the diversity of meaning, and truly attempts to arrive at the idea of the totality of meaning.³⁸⁾ This is attempted in the thomist natural theology, issuing in the five proofs for the existence of God, which takes the place of the transcendental critique of theoretical thought.³⁹⁾ It is on this point, then, that we must focus our attention if we wish to establish whether philosophical communication is possible between these two philosophies.

As Mascall has shown, the five ways of Aquinas,⁴⁰⁾ developed from the facts of movement, causality, contingency, degrees of perfection and order, find ~~its~~^{their} most significant formulation in the following syllogism:⁴¹⁾

(1) If contingent beings exist, a necessary, self-existing being exists.

(2) But contingent beings exist.

(3) Therefore a necessary being exists.

(And this we all call God.)

However, as Mascall as well as Garrigou-Lagrange point

out, the transcendental validity of human reason assumed in this proof, can only be justified by means of the doctrine of analogy.⁴²⁾ The anti-modernist Oath itself needs this doctrine to define the sense in which "proof by reason alone" must be interpreted.

According to this doctrine, a perfection can be predicated of things either univocally, equivocally or analogically. "Univocal" means that the entities signified by a common name are themselves simply the same, for example, the name animal is univocally predicated of a man, a worm or a cat, notwithstanding the difference which is extrinsic to the genus. "Equivocal" means that there is only a verbal, no real, similitude between the things considered, for example, the name "dog" is predicated of a domestic animal, a dogfish, a dogrose, a dogstar. Analogous things, however - called by Aristotle equivocals not by chance but according to plan (a consilio) or similars according to proportion - are those things of which the name is common but that signified by the name totally diverse, although relatively the same in respect of some proportion. Thus colour, air, medicine, food, animal or Cape Town may all be termed healthy.

Analogous things, then, are things which are neither wholly alike nor wholly unlike. There is a certain proportion

of similitude between them. This gives rise to two types of analogy: analogy of proportion or attribution, and analogy of proportionality. The analogy of proportion or attribution is procured from a proportion of things to some other principal (prime analogate), importing only extrinsic denomination in the subordinate analogates. When calling both medicine and air healthy, they are so called only in relation to an animal. Analogy of proportionality, however, is derived from a similitude of proportions existing between different things. The statement that the life principle in man is to his vital operations as the life principle in plants is to their vital operations, is such an analogy of proper ⁴³⁾ proportionality.

Up to this point the doctrine of analogy has been concerned primarily only with relations existing between created things. As Edith Stein puts it, "Man spricht vom Seienden in vielfachem Sinn aber in Hinblick auf eines und auf ein Natur." ⁴⁴⁾ The real problem of analogy arises where analogical notions are predicated of God. The doctrine of analogy declares that being and other perfections are predicated of God by means of the analogy of proper proportionality plus the analogy of attribution or proportion. ⁴⁵⁾ In the first case we may simply state, for example, that the human intelligence stands to the human being in the

same proportion as the divine intelligence to the divine being. In the analogy of proportion, however, knowledge of God is procured per viam causalitatis. If we have demonstrated, by means of the argument from the contingency of beings, that God is their cause, it follows that the effects must bear some imprint of the cause. In the via negationis, by considering the characteristics of created things, we affirm analogically what God is not. By the via eminentiae we arrive at true and positive analogical knowledge of God by affirming that in God alone the perfections found in creation exist eminently and primarily.

Garrigou-Lagrange puts it that God can be known naturally only by his effects. These effects necessarily demand the existence of a first cause, which exists of and by itself. Moreover, whatever perfection there is in the effects must pre-exist in the cause. Finally, these perfections which formally do not imply any imperfection, although abstracted by reason from the created mode which in itself is imperfect, must exist in God according to a divine mode. Absolute perfections like being, truth, goodness, beauty and so forth, can be found without any admixture of imperfection only in God. Reason itself, however, cannot know by itself the essence or quiddity of Deity. The analogical knowledge to which it can attain, it can attain only per creaturam.⁴⁶⁾

"Our knowledge of absolute perfections is analogical and positive," Garrigou-Lagrange writes, "and we affirm them of God as expressive of causality (per viam causalitatis); 'not that God is good because He causes goodness, but, on the contrary, He diffuses goodness in things because He is good.' The mode in which these perfections exist in God, we express either negatively, as when we speak of unlimited goodness, or else in an eminent sense (relatively), as when we speak of sovereign goodness. Hence we do not positively know in what precisely the mode consists intrinsically according to which these perfections are predicated of God; we possess but a negative and relative knowledge of this mode, and in this sense we can truthfully say that we cannot know what God is. It is only by means of the common concepts of analogy that we can acquire a knowledge of God." 47)

Among thomists there will be minor points of difference regarding the emphasis to be placed on the via negationis and the via eminentiae as well as the exact meaning of the analogy of proportion, but there is common agreement regarding the fact that analogical knowledge of God can be procured from a consideration of the relation of causality between God and creature. This is especially evident at the papers read at the Eighth General Meeting of the Society

for Thomistic philosophy at Nijmegen in 1941, where the subject of discussion was the analogia entis.⁴⁸⁾ In considering the formal differences between Dooyeweerd's philosophy and that of thomism, we must therefore refer again to the relation of causality between God and the world, expressed in the above syllogism.

If we carefully consider this argument, it is clear that Dooyeweerd differs from the above formulation of the syllogism on two fundamental points, which leads to its rejection as a whole:

The first point of difference is concerned with the sense in which the notion of contingency is considered in the thomistic and neo-Calvinistic systems. For the thomist the datum from which philosophy proceeds is always the concrete existent. Contingency denotes, that in any created thing essence and existence are really distinct, that existence is not necessitated by essence but is imparted to it by a first cause or being, in whom essence and existence are identical. The immanence of God in this individual existent, His all-sustaining sovereign power which preserves it from nothingness, does not, however, contradict the relative autonomy and substantiality of the thing, which is made possible by the doctrine of secondary causality.⁴⁹⁾

Dooyeweerd, however, differs from Aquinas both as regards the datum from which philosophy proceeds and in his conception of contingency. The datum of the philosopher in his theoretical account of reality, is not the individual concrete existent. The final irreducible unique 'given' in the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea, is the modal diversity of spheres. Only after the account of the modal structure of the cosmos, does the individual existent become accessible to theoretical analysis. As regards his conception of contingency, for Dooyeweerd there is no residue of substantiality left in the created thing. It is "meaning", which denotes complete insufficiency, having no being and existence in itself, and absolutely relative to the origin. The minor premiss of the above syllogism is thus interpreted differently by the thomist and Dooyeweerd. The decisive difference, however, is concerned with the formulation of the major premiss, namely, that if a contingent being exists, a necessary being exists.

At a first glance, it seems as if Dooyeweerd has indeed accepted this syllogism, arriving at the notion of the origin by a consideration of the contingency of meaning. This seems to be borne out by the argument of the first way of the critique:

"Meaningconstantly points without and beyond

itself toward an origin, which is itself no longer meaning. It remains within the bounds of the relative. The true Origin, on the contrary, is absolute and self-sufficient." 50)

And Spier gives the following account of Dooyeweerd's doctrine on this point:

"Nothing exists from itself, in itself and for itself. Everything exists only in coherence with other things. Every aspect of cosmic reality points to the other aspects of reality. The created finds in itself no final point, no point of rest. The whole cosmos points above itself to its CreatorBut God, the giver of meaning, is Himself not meaning. He is above all meaning, for He alone is self-sufficientThe character of the universe as meaning thus points to its relativity. Only God is absolute." 51)

These statements seem to be of a metaphysical nature; it appears as if Dooyeweerd is offering us here, in a condensed fashion, actually an a posteriori proof for the existence of God, almost exactly similar to that of Aquinas.

However, if we carefully consider these statements in their full context, it is clear that we have no demonstration from which we can conclude: therefore God exists. It cannot be affirmed because theoretical thought is confined within the horizon of time. This inability of human reason to penetrate to the origin of the cosmos, is not the re-

sult of original sin, of the darkening of reason, but flows from its very immanent structure. Fallen man as little as man in the paradisaical state can move from meaning to being. Only religion connects meaning and being. ⁵²⁾ The conception of reason as meaning has thus destroyed the possibility of an a posteriori proof for the existence of God.

In the above syllogism we are then, according to Dooyeweerd, confronted with an argument which completely moves within the theoretical sphere. Human reason has become the archimedean point, penetrating both the modal horizon and the transcendental horizon of time to the Arche itself. This logically untenable leap from the relative to the absolute clearly reveals the doctrine of the autonomy of human reason, unmasked by the transcendental critique as a supra-theoretical religious presupposition (primarily the Greek religious motive of matter and form) in the form of logical conclusions. ⁵³⁾

As it stands, this is a distortion of Aquinas' position, for this very "untenable leap" Aquinas seeks to explain in terms of the doctrine of analogy. But against this doctrine itself Dooyeweerd has serious objections. According to him the via negationis reveals the influence of Augustine, who has rejected the autonomy of reason. But it also reveals

the old Testament conception of the transcendence of God. If pushed to its extreme, the notion of the absolute transcendence of God contradicts the Scriptural Revelation. Aquinas must thus synthesise the via negationis with positive knowledge of God, and this is effected through the analogy of proportion, in which the Aristotelian notion of the autonomy of reason is clearly displayed.⁵⁴⁾ A direct analogy between God and creation is now accepted on account of the one-sided relation between the divine first cause and its effects, the proportional similitude being a similitude by imitation. But the criterion of what qualities are to be ascribed to God in a proper sense, is determined not according to Scripture, but according to the former matter motive of Aristotelian natural theology and the proof from movement. In other words, Aquinas has extended the notion of causality beyond its modal sense and thus relapsed into antinomy.⁵⁵⁾"

It must be pointed out that Dooyeweerd's criticism suffers from a certain misinterpretation of the doctrine of analogy. He states that the idea of being does not satisfy the requirements of a transcendental idea in a truly critical sense, for a purely analogical concept of totality lacks the concentric direction to the root of the cosmic diversi-

ty, and thus denies its own religious foundation. 56) Thomism will deny that this transcendental idea of totality has a religious foundation. It is conceived analogically and is as such the metaphysical presupposition of all specific and generic (modal) concepts of totality. But this analogical idea of totality cancels the irreducible moments of the modal spheres, resulting in speculative vagueness and scientific unfruitfulness. 57) Therefore an analogical concept cannot be useful in philosophy unless it is qualified by a non-analogical moment of meaning, which determines its special modal sense. 58)

It is clear that Dooyeweerd's criticism reveals a misunderstanding of the thomist conception of the mode of abstraction by means of which the analogous concept is obtained, and which must be distinguished from the concept of being obtained by the abstractio totalis or extensive abstraction. 59) Here we have the mere disengagement of a universal from particulars, according to a scale of increasing generality. Thus from Peter and Paul I abstract the notion of man, from man, that of animal, and so on. The notion of being, if arrived at along this way, is simply an all-inclusive class, a genus supremum, excluding all the individual differences between beings.

When the metaphysician, however, states that his for-

mal object is being, he means something quite different. Thomist metaphysics clearly distinguishes between being as a universal and as a transcendental and analogical concept. In the latter the abstractio totalis is relinquished in favour of imperfect abstraction, ⁶⁰⁾ in which the notion of being is grasped both in its complete generality and its total unicity. Maritain's characterisation of this mode of abstraction as "intuition idéative, visualisation eidétique," ⁶¹⁾ De Petter's "impliciete intuitie," Balthasar's "transcendentalisation, acte intuitief de transcendentalisation, expérience spirituelle," all emphasise the intuitive and ontical nature of this analogous concept of being.

Dooyeweerd, however, persists in interpreting this analogical abstraction or intuition of being in the sense of the abstractio totalis, hence his demand for a non-analogical moment of meaning to qualify the analogical concept and his fear that it will cancel the modal moments of the spheres. Similarly, in claiming that the notion of causality abused in the proofs for the existence of God, transgresses its modal limits, he does not perceive that the thomist is using the notion of causality in an analogical sense, transcending all possible modal conceptions of causality.

Fundamentally this misinterpretation is caused by

Dooyeweerd's emphasis on the influence of the Greek religious motive of matter and form on the thomistic natural theology. The absurd conclusions to which this can lead one, when coupled with a misinterpretation of the thomistic doctrine of analogy, is to be found in Venter's criticisms of Aquinas' proofs for the existence of God. Venter claims that if the motive of matter and form is the religious presupposition of Aquinas' proof for the existence of God, say, from movement, the religious presupposition that God is an endlessly flowing stream of life (matter-motive) will enable us to prove His existence perfectly logically from the fact of experience, namely, the coming into being and decay of natural forms.⁶²⁾ He has completely misunderstood the limits within which the thomistic proofs are legitimate, and which are drawn by the analogia entis.

Dooyeweerd himself does not perceive that for the thomist not form-matter, but essence-existence, constitutes the primary metaphysical polarity in approaching the Proofs. Thus Mascall writes: "In the last resort St. Thomas has only one datum for an argument for the existence of God, namely, the existence of beings whose existence is not necessitated by their essence, i.e. beings in which essence and existence are really distinct."⁶³⁾ This is also admitted

64) by Garrigou-Lagrange, and by Przywara. 65) Aquinas does not proceed, in the Proofs, from substance (explained in terms of matter and form) but from the individual existent, which is contingent, and in whom essence and existence is not identical. The doctrine of matter and form teaches, how more than one substance can exist. When, however, we start from entia (which consists of essentia and esse) we do not consider the essentia as prior to the esse, but the esse as metaphysically prior to the essentia. In other words, to ask what a thing is, we must ask how it exists, the existence of the thing not being a concept but affirmed in a judgement. I cannot conceive (affirm an essence) that a thing exists, I can only affirm it in a judgement, that is, I use the notion of existence ut exercita not ut signata. Therefore thomists state that one can never along the way of conceptualisation, the so called ontological way, arrive at the affirmation of God's existence. Only the real existence of the concrete being can serve as the starting point for the proofs for the existence of God.

However, this does not necessarily affect Dooyeweerd's argument, for he would claim that the notions of essence and existence themselves are given a metaphysical content, largely influenced by the Greek motive of matter and form. When Gilson, for example, states that Christianity presen-

ted philosophy with the notion of existence, referring to God's declaration to Moses: I AM WHO AM, this notion of existence is explained only in terms of its opposition to essence, which is procured from Greek philosophy.

Finally, the thomist will claim that in spite of Dooyeweerd's rejection of the doctrine of analogy, his own philosophy must necessarily also make use of this doctrine, and indeed, that it cannot be escaped in any philosophy which sets as its problem the relation between the cosmos and its origin. From the Protestant side, this is admitted by Feisser, when he writes that the doctrine of analogy not only has a place in thomist philosophy, but also necessarily in Protestant philosophy, and especially in the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea.⁶⁶⁾ I do not think this conclusion can be avoided even in the case of Barth, in so far as he makes use of human words to describe the absolute distance between God and His creation. Even the affirmation that God is the wholly other (Ganz anderes) involves the use of analogical terms. In Dooyeweerd's case the thomist will see a clear analogy of proportion, the prime analogate being God as sovereign, sovereign ruler and creator.

This Dooyeweerd, however, will not deny. His criticism is not directed against the use of analogous terms, the necessity of which he will admit, but against the predication of the perfections of God by human reason. Dooyeweerd

will admit that the term "sovereign" in his philosophy is an analogous term, but he will state that the sense in which we apply it to God can be determined by Scripture alone. Other uses of the term "sovereignty" in his philosophy, for example, "sovereignty in its proper orbit," are derived from this pre-eminent and Scriptural meaning of sovereignty.

In the light of these fundamental differences between thomism and the philosophy of Dooyeweerd, it is clear that formal communication between them is impossible. The "state of affairs" - the structure of thought presupposing the theory of the modal spheres - the acceptance of which Dooyeweerd claims as a prerequisite in his exposition of the transcendental critique, the thomist cannot accept, for he proceeds from the concrete existent, explained in terms of the essence-existence polarity. Therefore he must necessarily reject the whole of Dooyeweerd's argument in the critique. Dooyeweerd, on his part, will reject the metaphysical proofs for the existence of God, on the grounds that the causal relation between God and the world, exposed in these proofs, assumes the autonomy of human reason, which really masks a non-Christian religious a priori.

With Dr. G.C. van Niftrik, Dooyeweerd will then agree

that Reformed philosophy is primarily a "summa contra metaphysicos,"⁶⁷⁾ and for this reason must necessarily consider that the claim of traditional thomism to be Christian philosophy, is seriously challenged by its metaphysical pretensions.

-3-

When we turn to the second school of Christian philosophy in the Catholic world, initiated by Blondel, a totally different situation arises. Dooyeweerd himself does not for one moment relinquish the rigidity of his transcendental criticism.⁶⁸⁾ Thus he denies Sassen's claim that the philosophy of Blondel reveals an intrinsic similarity to the philosophy of the cosmomic idea.⁶⁹⁾ He states that although Blondel attempts to ground his philosophy integrally in the concrete existence of the self, experiencing its own insufficiency, his thought still reveals the Scholastic distinction between nature and grace. Moreover, it issues in an activist, irrational and universalistic metaphysics, which also shows the influence of the Humanistic a priori of nature and freedom.⁷⁰⁾

Nevertheless, confronted with the close similarity between their conceptions of the manner in which religion

influences philosophy, it is to be expected that a dialogue will be possible between these philosophers, as far as the difference in basic motive will allow, and it is only here that attempts at communication on a common ground have met with any degree of success at all.

Although the appearance of the Wijsbegeerte der Wets-
idee has been noted in the Catholic world, the attempts to meet Dooyeweerd's argument on a common ground are confined to Robbers and Marlet, who has written an academic thesis on the identity and divergences between the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea and thomism. While Jansen in his article on Christian philosophy devotes several pages to Dooyeweerd's philosophy, he confines himself to a sympathetic exposition of this philosophy and is content with a few queries as to the communicability of its fundamental principles.

According to Dooyeweerd the great significance of his dialogue with Robbers is not that the latter discards the notion of the autonomy of natural reason - which indeed he does not do - but that he acknowledges that his philosophy is rooted in a transcendent religious motive, that of nature and grace.⁷¹⁾ Robbers states that in the dialogue two religious basic attitudes are undoubtedly opposed to each other: that of nature and grace, and that of sin and

salvation, and that philosophical speculation alone cannot
prove or disprove the truth of these basic attitudes.⁷²⁾

At once, however, it becomes clear that very little commu-
nication, if any at all, has been achieved, and that the
acknowledgement of the religious motive controlling their
respective philosophies, simply leads to the rejection of
the other's philosophy. This is especially evident in the
discussion concerning the word "zin" (meaning) which Rob-
bers interprets in the light of the Scholastic notion of
intelligibility. According to Robbers, Dooyeweerd's con-
ception of "zin" means "contingent being", which posits
God as absolute and self-sufficient Being.⁷³⁾ But When Dooye-
weerd states that God is not meaning but being, it is a
metaphysical statement, implying that God is accessible
to theoretical reason.⁷⁴⁾

Dooyeweerd strongly objects to this interpretation
of his position. The notion of being, whether considered
as contingent or absolute, is a purely theoretical concept
which in Robbers' thought becomes a transcendental idea.
When he himself speaks of meaning, he implies primarily
the absolute boundary between God and creation, and the
religious concentration of the latter in the human heart.
Because a theoretical concept, such as Robbers' concept of
being, can never be dissociated from its supra-theoretical⁷⁵⁾

presuppositions, the transcendental illusion arises that these latter presuppositions are themselves accessible to theoretical thought.⁷⁶⁾

For Dooyeweerd, Robbers has not succeeded in giving a truly transcendental critique of the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea.⁷⁷⁾ In fact, he has missed the whole aim of the critique by considering the religious motives as irrational presuppositions, and thus interpreting the religious dialectic as a theoretical. But in that case the transcendental critique becomes superfluous and natural reason itself has again become the arbiter. Dooyeweerd concludes that Robbers is still uncritically dogmatic.⁷⁸⁾ Robbers, on the other hand, entertains the same idea about Dooyeweerd.

What, then, may we ask, has been achieved by this attempt at a philosophical dialogue on the basis of the acknowledgement of each's religious a priori? As Jansen points out, does not the consistent reduction of one's point of view to a religious motive make intercommunication finally impossible, issuing in the complete isolation of the philosophy which consciously accepts this motive?⁷⁹⁾ Also Robbers seems to think that there remains no common ground for discussion.

The same disappointing results are obtained from a philosophical dialogue with a Barkhian philosopher, Dr. Mis-

kotte, who, although Protestant, accepts, according to Dooyeweerd, the religious a priori of nature and grace. Both refuse to relinquish their final religious presupposition, and instead of a philosophical dialogue, Dooyeweerd presents a transcendental criticism of Barth according to the usual pattern.
80)

The most successful attempt at communication has been effected by Marlet, who has avoided the misinterpretation and misunderstanding of Dooyeweerd's position which prove to be such serious obstacles in philosophical communication. According to Dooyeweerd, Marlet has succeeded in steering the dialogue between neo-thomism and neo-Calvinism away from the cul-de-sac in which the dialogue with Robbers had led it. He appreciates Marlet's placing of the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea on an ecumenical Christian basis, and Marlet's agreement with his own conception of the religious basic motives of the West, even though he considers that ultimately his own religious position and that of Marlet cannot be reduced to each other. However, this does not affect the great gain in sympathetic understanding and true communication.
81)

Marlet commences his book with an account of the historical background of neo-Calvinistic philosophy, followed by an exposition of the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea,

and a sketch of the present state of Christian philosophy in the Catholic world, after which he proceeds to indicate the fundamental identity and difference between neo-Calvinism and "philosophy in the Church of God" (philosophia in Ecclesia recepta ac agnita).

Marlet accepts the distinction between natural rational knowledge and faith, drawn by the Vatican Council in 1870, although it subsequently appears that his interpretation of this distinction differs from the traditional interpretation of, for example, Garrigou-Lagrange.⁸²⁾ In recommending the study of Aquinas, Marlet writes, the encyclical Aeterni Patris simply wishes to emphasise the value of the philosophical inheritance of the past.⁸³⁾ Aquinas had not only taken note of his whole philosophical past and of contemporaneous mediaeval philosophy, but had drawn all these views together in a unique synthesis, Marlet writes, referring to Przywara's characterisation of Aquinas' philosophy as "die Vergangenheit in sich erfüllend, und die Zukunft aus sich entfaltend."⁸⁴⁾ The progressive attitude which Aquinas himself exemplified in his work, Marlet wishes to continue, and this, he claims, is in accordance with the deeper spirit of thomism.

Marlet states that the nature-grace religious motive, held especially by the school of Louvain, is actually a Car-

tesian a priori,⁸⁵⁾ and that in the main line of development of Catholic philosophy, which he represents, this must be perfected by the religious a priori of grace-nature. For Marlet the point of convergence between progressive Catholic philosophy in France and Germany and that of Dooyeweerd, lies in the persuasion that philosophical thought is always encompassed by a theological a priori in the sense of a Revelational a priori.⁸⁶⁾ Philosophy and theology exist in the "contrapuntal relation" envisaged by Josef Pieper,⁸⁷⁾ While theology proceeds from the self-consciousness of Christ, philosophy proceeds from the Christian self-consciousness. Its formal object is the reality of the human person,⁸⁸⁾ and from within this centre contemplates the cosmos as being. In terms almost exactly the same as that of Dooyeweerd, he describes the main outlines of his Christian philosophy:

The concrete, historical man is man in Christ. This concrete man is attacked by sin in the root, the centre of his personality, and can achieve his regeneration through grace only by means of the way of the Cross. The whole man must accept this way, the whole man must die with Christ and live in Him. Grace corrects the relation between God and the heart of man, frees man in his centre, from the bondage of sin, as, in Dooyeweerd's philosophy, religion renews the heart of man. Salvation thus becomes the point of depar-

ture in man's perception of the structure of temporal reality. The analytical aspect of man, Marlet continues, belongs to temporal reality, while the archimedean point is situated in the heart, in the Christian or apostate self-consciousness. Philosophy proceeds from the person, confronted with his Creator, and terminates in the intuition of being.⁸⁹⁾ Thus the thomist conception of philosophy, too, is conscious of itself as theoretical thought which articulates naive experience and structural states of affairs in accordance with its basic idea of being, procured from the Christian religious basic motive.⁹⁰⁾

To the main differences between his own philosophical position considered as an account of the cosmic totality, and that of Dooyeweerd, Marlet devotes comparatively little attention.⁹¹⁾ It is concerned primarily with their different conceptions of being. Marlet states that Dooyeweerd has interpreted Aquinas' idea of substance in a Cartesian sense, as that which needs nothing beyond itself to exist.⁹²⁾ Sketching the different interpretations of the idea of being in Catholic philosophy, Marlet decides in favour of a "thomistic existentialism", and a conception of substance which he claims is indeed that of

"Calvin emphasises the transcendence of God over against the world - the boundary - to such an extent," he writes, "that the structure of creation, carried and given by God, cancels the idea of being as existential principle or principle of perfection. Thus he denies what he before considered to be the constitutive meaning of being. On the other hand, he emphasises the existential immanence or immanence of perfection of God to such an extent, that the perfection of creation can no longer be predicated of itself. To summarise: the one-sided emphasis on the exclusive activity of God (Alleinwirksamkeit Gottes) can be characterised theoretically as the tendency to separate absolutely structure and its perfection, law and subject." 97)

Marlet's book on Dooyeweerd has been subjected to a detailed analysis by Berkouwer, who states that either we have long misunderstood the nature of the conflict between Rome and Reformation, or that Marlet has erred in his description of "philosophy in the Church of God." 98) Marlet's presentation of the nature-grace motive deprives Dooyeweerd of all grounds for criticism. But this account which Marlet offers represents only one trend of Catholic philosophy. Berkouwer asks whether this account is legitimate,

/that is,

can be reconciled with Catholic doctrine. Again, can the théologie nouvelle associated with the theological views of Söhngen, von Balthasar and Schoonenberg and which forms the theological background of Marlet's conception of Christian philosophy, be reconciled with the papal encyclicals, the anti-modernist oath and the Vatican Council decrees? Berkouwer considers that it cannot,⁹⁹⁾ an opinion which is also held by Meuleman, in his analysis of the new trend in Catholic theology.¹⁰⁰⁾

Berkouwer further considers that the difference regarding the notion of being between Dooyeweerd and Marlet is really of a fundamental nature, which must necessarily affect their whole ontology, and proceeds from a decisive difference in the religious a priori. Dooyeweerd's conception of the sovereignty of God, issuing in his notion of the complete insufficiency of meaning, cannot be reconciled with Marlet's conception of creation. However, Berkouwer concludes, Marlet's book is of importance because it has cleared up many misunderstandings and has helped the dialogue between Rome and Reformation to progress in defining their exact and real divergences.¹⁰¹⁾

The philosophical problem, however, is not whether Marlet's position can be reconciled with traditional Catholic philosophy and theology and the traditional interpre-

tation of the relation between nature and grace, but whether Marlet has succeeded in meeting Dooyeweerd on a common ground, and in what this ground consists. To establish this, we must look once again at their points of agreement and disagreement.

First of all it must be noted that there is a large measure of agreement between Dooyeweerd and Marlet as regards the conditions under which the philosopher works, the influence of the religious a priori, the necessity of an archimedean point and the nature of the self - to such an extent, indeed, that Berkouwer considers that Marlet's position is no longer strictly Catholic in the traditional sense, but reveals some of the primary characteristics of Reformed thinking. This Marlet will deny. But it cannot be denied that Marlet's agreement with certain aspects of Dooyeweerd's thought, notably that of the insufficiency of theoretical thought, must necessarily cause radical disagreement between Marlet's position and that of traditional thomism. The points of difference will centre primarily round the analogia entis. Although Marlet, accepting the relative autonomy of created reality, will also have to accept the causal argument for the existence of God per creaturam, his conception of the religious root of thought must cause him to interpret the via

eminentiae in a different way. In his book on the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea, Marlet has closely associated himself with the views of Przywara, and it is not improbable to conclude that he will agree with Przywara's distinction between at least six types of analogia entis in the Christian world, which can finally be reduced to two, the thomistic and the Augustinian, each indispensable to the other.¹⁰²⁾

Marlet's insistence that the motive of nature and grace must be supplemented and completed by the motive of grace and nature, brings him, then, to a position which does not fundamentally differ from that of Dooyeweerd. It must be emphasised, however, that the contact has not been established along the way of the transcendental critique. Marlet has not approached Dooyeweerd's philosophy along the formal way of the critique, but along the way of transcendental self-reflection, starting from the knowledge of God and issuing in knowledge of the self and through the self, of the cosmos. There is agreement on the level of theology and religious experience, a similar interpretation of certain aspects of the Christian verities, especially regarding the fact of the insufficiency of human reason and the necessity of palingenesis and grace in philosophical activity.

But it is not a critical agreement in the sense of a painstaking clarification and recognition of a common "state of affairs" which Dooyeweerd himself visualised when he presented the critique as a means of philosophic communication.

In considering their points of disagreement, we are forced to the same conclusion. Marlet cannot follow the formal way of the critique, for the critique proceeds from a conception of the being of creation which Marlet cannot accept. As Marlet's conception of the creative act of God and of secondary causality gives rise to his conception of the relative autonomy of created being, so Dooyeweerd's conception of the sovereignty of God gives rise to his conception of the insufficiency and relativity of created being. Hence Marlet's criticism of Dooyeweerd's account of meaning involves primarily, for Marlet himself, a criticism of Dooyeweerd's conception of the sovereignty of God and his one-sided emphasis on this Christian truth at the expense of the full Christian Revelation. In the same way, Dooyeweerd's criticism of Marlet's conception of being means a criticism of Marlet's religious a priori. Both the correspondences and disagreements between Dooyeweerd and Marlet must thus be traced to

an agreement and disagreement as regards the interpretation of the Christian religious a priori.

We conclude, then, that Dooyeweerd and Marlet have

Aquinas himself. According to Marlet the key to the understanding of the notion of substance is not the distinction between form and matter, but that between essence and existing.⁹³⁾ (essentia and esse). Substance, as a union of form and matter, is only a possible existent; its highest act is the act of existing, and its first law the principle of identity, which safeguards its own proper created nature.⁹⁴⁾ Marlet's position finds its echo in the doctrine of being of De Raeymaker, when he writes that the experience of being is an experience of its absoluteness, its fundamental law being its complete self-identity. When being is revealed to man, man can only answer: "It is, it is itself."⁹⁵⁾

Dooyeweerd, however, Marlet continues, accepts Calvin's doctrine of the sovereignty of God in its full implication. Because of the over-emphasis of God's transcendence at the expense of His immanence in creation,⁹⁶⁾ Calvin has destroyed the notion of secondary causality, which ultimately means the denial of the structural perfection of the creation.

weerd's philosophy appears to satisfy this requirement. His first premiss is indeed consistent with the universally valid conditions for thinking, because he considers that the universal structure of thought is of such a nature that it of necessity demands a religious presupposition. Dooyeweerd emphasises that lack of contact and thus of a common basis of philosophical criticism is caused by differences in the content of the religious presupposition only, and he has presented the transcendental critique as an attempt to focus the attention of the philosopher on the structure of thought. Once this structure of thought is recognised as universal, the method of antinomy vindicates his own Scriptural point of departure. Therefore Dooyeweerd considers that if his philosophy is not recognised as satisfying the conditions for intelligible philosophic communication, the cause must be sought in the uncritical and dogmatic attitude of his critics, and not in his own point of departure.

However, we have shown that this conception of the structure of thought, by positing the structural necessity of the religious presupposition, is itself the immediate implication in epistemology of his conception of the sovereignty of God. Thus it would appear that Dooyeweerd's presentation of the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee as a Scriptural philosophy, has made him inaccessible to criticism,

for, as he himself has pointed out, a criticism from the point of view of another religious basic motive, or from a different interpretation of Scripture, is a transcendent criticism, dogmatic and without value in a philosophical discussion.

Yet Dooyeweerd persists in his attempt to present us with a universal Christian philosophy, a philosophy which will be wholly consistent with his Scriptural point of departure, and wholly consistent with the nature of philosophy as an account of the cosmic totality. He considers that this is made possible by his distinction between the content of the basic idea of philosophy, determined by the religious a priori of the philosopher, and the structure of the basic idea itself.

The three transcendental ideas of the coherence, totality and origin of meaning, which result in the basic idea of philosophy, are termed by him "abstract" and "formal" ideas, transcendental categories of philosophical thinking devoid of content. These ideas are universal and a priori in the sense that they belong to the structure of philosophic thought created by God. Hence already in the first way of the critique, Dooyeweerd refers to them as connected with an "immanent law" of philosophy.

His own Scriptural presupposition enters philosophy as the content of the basic idea. Dooyeweerd emphasises that the basic idea is not formulated by theology, for theology is a theoretical science, itself completely dependent on the cosmonomic idea of the theologian. The content of the basic idea is formulated directly from Scripture by the philosopher himself, in accordance with a knowledge of God obtained in "prayer and worship". This content must conform to the structure of philosophic thought by giving relevant answers to the three transcendental questions. Thus Dooyeweerd states that the origin of meaning is the holy, sovereign will of God, Who has revealed Himself in Christ; the totality of meaning is the heart renewed in Christ, subject to the law of the love and service of God and neighbour; the coherence of meaning is described in terms of sphere sovereignty, modal anticipations and analogies.

However, this content in itself does not yet give us a philosophical account of "wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt." A further transcription of this content is required, if the content and structure of the transcendental ideas are to be thoroughly integrated. Hence the contingent cosmos, created ex nihilo, becomes meaning, which reveals itself under theoretical analysis as modalities. The creation does

not stand in a relation of causality to its Creator, but the modalities refer to a final ground of meaning which is not meaning but being. The God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is an absolute, a final principle of unity, to which the modal spheres are directed and on which they are focussed, subjectively through the ego, structurally through cosmic time. The revealed mysteries of Christianity themselves constitute the religious a priori of philosophy, which does not contain a dialectical tension but which is integral and does not give rise to antinomies. Religion is an attitude of surrender to a real or presumed origin of all temporal diversity of meaning.

These ideas are not found in Scripture, but belong to common philosophical language, with a well-defined metaphysical meaning already attached to them. Dooyeweerd's philosophical system itself, which attempts to relate world and origin in a theoretical idea, reveals all the characteristics of a coherent and impressive metaphysic. Yet, when confronted with the question of its extrinsic intelligibility, Dooyeweerd can only refer to its correspondence with Scripture.

This conception of a Christian philosophy has been subjected to unfavourable criticism by other neo-Calvinist philosophers. Jellema asks whether this is not a synthesis

of Christian motives and pagan ideas. ¹⁰³⁾ Young asks whether the metaphysical distinction between form and matter does not re-appear in the distinction between structure and content. In that case either the content disrupts the structure, leading to irrationalism, or the content is subjected to the structure, which, in Dooyeweerd's case, leads to a nomological interpretation of reality. ¹⁰⁴⁾ Stoker asks whether Dooyeweerd's pre-occupation with the transcendental problems of philosophy does not denote a synthesis with immanentist, especially Humanist, philosophy. This will happen if the term "transcendental" is seriously accepted by Calvinistic philosophy. ¹⁰⁵⁾ For Stoker, the religious risk (waagstuk) ¹⁰⁶⁾ of the Calvinist philosopher, makes any attempt to meet immanentist philosophy on a common ground suspect. Finally, Stoker considers that Dooyeweerd's philosophy reveals an objective idealism in so far as he states that the whole of created reality only achieves meaning in its religious root, the heart. ¹⁰⁷⁾ In general, while Stoker expresses a profound appreciation of Dooyeweerd's philosophy, he fears that Dooyeweerd's over-emphasis on epistemological problems leads to a neglect of the ontological, creational character of a truly Calvinistic philosophy.

These criticisms are of value. It is possible to in-

dicating Hegelian influence in Dooyeweerd's conception of God; to show the influence of Husserl's rationalistic idealism in his account of meaning, and especially Kantian and neo-Kantian influence in the formulation of his theory of knowledge. But Dooyeweerd himself considers that a philosophia reformata is not a reformation out of nothing. It is in Dooyeweerd's favour that he has formulated his problems, not against the background of a Greek or Mediaeval metaphysic, but in the context of his own historical philosophic situation, which is primarily Humanistic. Thus his struggle - mentioned in the Introduction to the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee - to arrive at clarity as regards his own Calvinistic position, is also a struggle with the neo-Kantian philosophy which he himself had accepted and deeply understood.

Furthermore, although criticism of the 'immanentist' tendencies in Dooyeweerd's thought is important within the neo-Calvinistic world and is indeed demanded by the Reformed doctrine of antithesis, we are concerned primarily with his philosophy as a representative neo-Calvinistic philosophy, and with the fundamental problem which it presents. This problem we have defined as the problem of communication. Dooyeweerd's concern with this problem - on the whole avoided by neo-Calvinist philosophers - is caused by

his attempt to re-think the Christian credo ut intelligam in the light of Reformed principles. Thus his very pre-occupation with epistemological problems, rooted in the fundamental problem of the relation between reason and faith, is necessary to place neo-Calvinistic philosophy on a critical foundation, in the light of which it can maintain itself not only against other conceptions of Christian philosophy but also against a philosophical world which denies any relation between reason and faith. It is in this context, and in this context only, that his attempts to define the conditions for philosophical communication can be legitimately criticised.

This problem originates in the Mediaeval controversy regarding the primacy of reason or faith, Athens or Jerusalem, and culminates in Aquinas' conception of the orders of nature and grace. While the thomistic synthesis can lead and has led to a rationalistic conception of reason, Aquinas himself did not understand the distinction between faith and rational knowledge as a separation or as an Averroistic opposition. The first principles of reason are themselves created, and philosophy is sustained and perfected in its proper order by grace. However, as Feisser points out, within the Reformed world the credo ut intelligam and fides quaerens intellectum of Christian philosophy has always been conceived against the background of the metaphysical

rationalism before Kant and German idealism after Kant. Haunted by the spectre of an autonomous and critical reason, Reformed thought rejected any conception of a harmony between reason and Revelation. This resulted in an irreconcilable tension, expressed in B.J.H. Ovinck's statement that what is philosophical, is not Christian, and what is Christian, is not philosophical. (108)

It is this conflict between reason and Revelation that Dooyeweerd attempts to destroy in his "Copernican revolution" of philosophy, by positing that all thought proceeds from religious presuppositions, and that the dogma of the autonomy of reason itself has an apostate religious foundation. Hence Jansen holds that neo-Calvinistic philosophy does not attempt to prove the possibility of a Christian philosophy; it simply posits a philosophy which it considers to have transcended the problem of the conflict between reason and Revelation. (109)

However, if Dooyeweerd considers that his conception of the religious root of thought has destroyed the rationalistic doctrine of the autonomy of reason, it does not prevent the emergence of grave difficulties in his own philosophical position. Christian theology maintains that we assent to the Word of God on the authority of God and not as the result of a philosophical demonstration, which would reduce the theology of Revelation to natural theology, that is, to

metaphysics. But if the articles of faith are not deduced from metaphysics, the question arises whether these articles of faith can legitimately become the principles of rational knowledge, and whether the content of philosophy can be drawn from theology. Dooyeweerd states that it cannot. Philosophy does not obtain its principles from theology, but directly from Scripture formulated as the content of the basic idea of philosophy; and this basic idea controls theology itself in the sense of defining the cosmological and epistemological conditions for theological activity.

This means, firstly, that we are asked to assent to the Word of God, not on the authority of the God who reveals, but on the authority of the individual philosopher, who claims that his theoretical transcription of Scripture in the basic idea, is correct. It means, secondly, that we are asked to assent to philosophical conclusions, not in the light of natural evidence, but as articles of faith. Yet these articles of faith are not procured from theology but from the philosophical formulation of Scripture in the basic idea.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Dooyeweerd's destruction of the distinction between reason and Revelation has led to rationalism in theology and irrationalism in philosophy, by reducing both to an arbitrary

theoretical transcription of Scripture. This transcription we cannot believe, for God has not revealed it. Neither can we know it to be true in the light of natural evidence, for there is no evidence. Yet the entire edifice of the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee is built on the assumption that the individual Calvinist philosopher not only understands Scripture - and understands it adequately and profoundly - but that his interpretation of what Scripture might mean as the content of the basic idea and the three transcendental ideas has the same claim to certitude as a revealed mystery of the Christian faith.

But if so, the credo ut intelligam of Christian philosophy, which appears in Dooyeweerd's philosophy in the guise of his conception of the religious presuppositions of thought, has destroyed the notion of a common universe of discourse, not because it subjects reason to faith, but because it subjects both reason and faith to an arbitrary theoretical point of departure. Thus Dooyeweerd's conception of a Scriptural philosophy reveals the same exclusive character as the 'immanentist' philosophy which he has criticised so sharply, and thus - according to the Divine irony - it is equally dogmatic and incommunicable.

Conclusion.

It is to be regretted that in a work as widely read as Spier's Introduction to the Wijsbegeerte der Wets-¹⁾idee, written, moreover, by a philosopher closely associated with the neo-Calvinist movement, the impression is created that Dooyeweerd does not go beyond the sharp assertion of the antithesis in philosophy. We may agree that in general contact with non-Christian philosophy does not constitute a serious problem to the neo-Calvinist philosopher. But it is impossible to study Dooyeweerd's philosophy without perceiving that, although he has written very little with specific reference to the problem of communication, it is for him an absorbing and urgent problem.

This is evident, firstly, in his own correction of possible misinterpretations of his doctrine of antithesis. He points out that this doctrine, which has caused misunderstanding also amongst philosophers accepting the Calvinistic faith,²⁾ must be understood in a universal sense. It does not draw a line of personal classification, but a line of division according to fundamental principles

passing through every Christian personality. Thus the struggle between the Civitas Dei and the Civitas Terrena is primarily a struggle within the thinker himself, a painstaking attempt to arrive at consistency in his own thinking. In this connection he also emphasises that his philosophy must not be understood as the exclusive thought of a small clique of Calvinists, but that it is indeed a universal Christian philosophy.³⁾

Secondly, it is evident in his transcendental criticisms of non-Christian, especially Humanistic, philosophy. As a critique of philosophical dogmatism, these criticisms attempt to reveal the presuppositions underlying the assumption of the so-called autonomy of philosophical thought, and to force the 'immanentist' philosopher to critical self-reflection. As Dooyeweerd himself considers that the recognition of the presuppositions controlling philosophical thought is the first step to philosophical communication, the transcendental criticisms must be considered as a negative contribution to the problem.

Finally, we have seen that in the transcendental critique of theoretical thought, Dooyeweerd actually attempts to define the conditions for philosophical con-

tact. He clearly shows that the common ground between philosophies cannot be found in the subjective order of presuppositions, but that it is situated in the recognition of the ontical structure of the cosmos. However, this recognition may be retarded, obscured or even made impossible by the influence of dogmatisms originating outside the order of philosophy in the subjective horizon of the heart. Hence Dooyeweerd holds that man cannot know the cosmic order unless he knows his own place within that order. This demand for self-knowledge is wholly in the Socratic and Christian philosophic traditions, which consider that the speculative virtues involve the moral virtues, and that the pursuit of philosophy springs from love.

But a philosophy is important, not only for what it achieves, but for what it does not achieve, and its failures contribute in a negative way to the clarification of the problems with which it is concerned. Dooyeweerd's Calvinistic background has given him a special sense of the reality of the sovereignty of God in all spheres of life and thought, and has enabled him to enter profoundly into the problem of the relation between religion and philosophy. This, coupled with his great philosophical integrity, has caused him to penetrate in a wholly consistent manner to the extreme implications of his Reformed point of de-

parture, even where it leads him to inconsistencies and contradictions. This accounts for the friction and strain which we find in the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee between the structural and subjective perspectives; his criticism of dogmatism and his own dogmatism; his rejection of speculative thinking and the speculative character of his own thinking; finally, his own serious and persistent attempts to meet other philosophies on a common ground, and the inescapable isolation of his own philosophy.

These inconsistencies can all be traced back to a common source, namely, Dooyeweerd's conception of the structural necessity of religious presuppositions in thought. The attempt to create a system of Christian philosophy on this basis, implies the philosophical transcription of Scripture into the transcendental ideas of philosophy. This means the destruction of the theology of Revelation and of the necessity of philosophy by subjecting both to an arbitrary theoretical point of departure.

Apart from Dooyeweerd's positive contributions to the problem of philosophic communication - which should be noted by all philosophers interested in the problematics of a Christian philosophy - these inconsistencies contribute to the philosophical dialogue in a negative way

by suggesting a re-thinking of the relevance of the doctrines of the Sovereignty of God and the Kingdom of Christ to philosophical activity; and secondly, by suggesting a more profound analysis of the possibilities for philosophical communication contained in the doctrines of Common Grace, General Revelation and the Testimonium Spiritus Sancti Generale.

NOTES

Notes to Chapter I

1. "Die nuwere wysbegeerte, het 'n grootse pretensie. Dit wil 'n eeuelange gebrek van die Kalvinisme uit die weg ruim, nl. die gebrek aan 'n eie Kalvinistiese Filosofie. Streng geneem was daar in die geskiedenis van die wêreldkulture nog nie 'n kalvinistiese wysbegeerte gewees nie." H.G. Stoker, Die Nuwere Wysbegeerte aan die Vrije Universiteit, p. 3.
2. F.J.M. Potgieter, Die Verhouding Tussen die Teologie en die Filosofie by Calvyn, p. 195.
3. J. Bohatec, Budé und Calvin, p. 251.
4. "Eiusdem est candoris, quod tradis, populum spinosis subtilibusque quaestionibus fuisse a nobis seductum: adeoque per illam philosophiam, a qua cavere iubet Christianos Paulus circumductum." Responsio ad Sadoleti Epistolam, Opera V, col. 395. (Quoted by Potgieter, Die Verhouding Tussen die Teologie en die Filosofie by Calvyn, p. 197.)
5. "Ego autem grandiloquentiam eorum et inflatam magnis ampullis garrulitatem notari existimo, qui evangelii simplicitate non contenti ipsum in profanam philosophiam convertunt." Epist. Pauli ad Timotheum I, cap. 6, 20. Opera LII, col. 335. (Quoted by Potgieter, Die Verhouding Tussen die Teologie en die Filosofie by Calvyn, p. 172.)
6. Compare P.F. Geisendorf, Théodore de Bèze, p. 303: "Outre ses doctrines hétérodoxes sur le gouvernement de l'Eglise, n' a-t-il pas en effet, à plusieurs reprises, vigoureusement attaqué l'autorité d'Aristote, alors que Calvin avait mis Aristote à la base de l'enseignement philosophique donné à l'Académie? ... Après avoir soulevé des orages à Heidelberg par la hardiesse de ses idées, Ramus est venu offrir ses services à Genève en mai 1570. Beze ne l'a autorisé à monter dans une chaire professorale qu'à condition de le voir mettre une sourdine à ses doctrines. Et Ramus, reparti peu après pour la France, ayant, quelques mois plus tard, proposé de reprendre son enseignement, Bèze lui a répondu par un refus courtois et ferme, toujours basé sur la question de l'intangibilité d'Aristote."

7. Institutionum Christianae Religionis, II, 2, XVI.

8. "Quoties ergo in profanos scriptores incidimus, illa, quae admirabilis in iis affulget, veritatis luce admoneamur, mentem hominis, quantumlibet ab integritate sua collapsam & perversam, eximiis tamen etiamnum Dei donis vestitam esse & exornatam. Si unicum veritatis fontem, Dei Spiritum esse reputamus, veritatem ipsam neque respuemus, neque contemnemus, ubicunque apparebit: nisi velimus in Spiritum Dei contumeliosi esse, non enim dona Spiritus, sine ipsius contemptu & opprobrio, vilipenduntur. Quid autem? Veritatem affulsisse antiquis Jureconsultis negabimus, qui tanta aequitate civilem ordinem & disciplinam prodiderunt? Philosophos caecutisse dicemus, cum in exquisita ista naturae contemplatione, tum artificiosa descriptione? Dicemus mentem illis defuisse, qui arte dissèrendi constituta, nos cum ratione loqui docuerunt? Dicemus eos insanivisse, qui medicinam excudendo, suam industriam nobis impenderunt? Quid mathematica omnia? putabimusne amentium deliria? Imo ne sine ingenti quidem admiratione, veterum scripta legere de his rebus poterimus: admirabimur autem, quia praeclara, ut sunt, cogemur agnoscere. Porro laudabilene aliquid aut praeclarum censibimus, quod non recognoscamus à Deo provenire? Pudeat nos tantae ingratitude, in quam non inciderunt Ethnici Poëtae, qui & Philosophiam, & leges, & bonas omnes artes, decorum inventa esse confessi sunt. Ergo, quum homines istos, quos Scriptura $\psi\upsilon\chi\iota\kappa\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ vocat, usque eo fuisse pateat in rerum inferiorum investigatione acutos & perspicaces, talibus exemplis discamus, quot naturae humanae bona Dominus reliquerit, postquam vero bono spoliata est." Ibid., II, 2, XV.
9. "Sed hic succurrere nobis debet, inter illam naturae corruptionem esse nonnullum gratiae Dei locum, non quae illam purget, sed intus cohibeat. Nam, si singulorum animos laxis habenis Dominus in libidines quaslibet exultare permetteret, nemo haud dubie esset, qui non re ipsa fidem faceret, verissime in se competere omnia mala, quibus universam naturam damnat Paulus Si omnibus ejusmodi portentis obnoxia est unaquaeque anima (quemadmodum audacter pronunciat Apostolus) videmus certe quid futurum sit, si Dominus humanam libidinem pro sua inclinatione vagari sinat. nulla est rabiosa bellua, quae tam praecipitanter feratur: nullum est quamlibet rapidum ac violentum flumen, cujus adeo impetuosa sit exundatio. In electis suis morbos istos curat Dominus, eo quem mox exponemus modo: in aliis, injecto freno duntaxat coërcet, tantum ne ebulliant, quatenus expedire providet ad conservandam rerum universitatem. Hinc alii pudore, alii legum metu retinen-

tur, ne in multa foeditatis genera prorumpant, utcumque suam magna ex parte impuritatem non dissimulent: alii, quia honestam vivendi rationem conducere ducant, ad eam utcumque aspirant: alii supra vulgarem sortem emergunt, quo sua majestate alios contineant in officio. Ita sua providentia Deus naturae perversitatem refrenat, ne in actum erumpat: sed non purgat intus." Ibid. II,3,III.

10. "Nam ut in homine reperitur quidam miseriarum omnium mundus, ac ex quo spoliati sumus divino ornatu, pudenda nuditas immensam probrorum congeriem detegit: propriae infelicitatis conscientia unumquemque pungi necesse est, ut in aliquam saltem Dei notitiam veniat. Ita ex ignorantiae, vanitatis, inopiae, infirmitatis, pravitatis denique & corruptionis propriae sensu recognoscimus, non alibi quam in Domino fitam esse veram sapientiae lucem, solidam virtutem, bonorum omnium perfectam affluentiam, justitiae puritatem: atque adeo malis nostris ad considerandam Dei bona excitamur." Ibid. I,I,I.
11. Ibid. I, 10, II.
12. "Itaque frigidis tantum speculationibus ludunt quibus in hac quaestione insistere propositum est, quid sit Deus: quum intersit nostra potius qualis sit, & quid ejus naturae conveniat scire Quin potius huc valere debet ejus notitia, primum ut ad timorem ac reverentiam nos instituat: deinde ut ea duce ac magistra omne bonum ab illo petere, & illi acceptum ferre discamus." Ibid. I,2,II.
13. Budé und Calvin, p. 241.
14. "In der Überzeugung, dass die wahre Weisheit nicht der menschlichen Vernunft entsprünge, sondern von Gott zu erbitten ist, verzichtet der christliche Philosoph auf jedes Selbstvertrauen und überlässt sich ganz der göttlichen Autorität. Seine Wissenschaftlichkeit wurzelt nicht in einem kritiklosen Stolz, sondern in der kritischen Selbstbescheidung, einer freudigen Anerkennung der Grenzen, die der menschlichen Erkenntnis gezogen sind. Der christliche Philosoph ist in diesem Punkt über den stoischen erhaben, für den es jenseits der Grenzen des Verstehens nur die Furcht vor den Göttern gab. Der christliche Philosoph prüft alles, bekundet aber darin seine sittliche Höhe, dass er den unentwirrbaren Geheimnissen gegenüber sein Urteil klug ("prudencia") zurückhält. Es ist das höchste Gesetz der Demut,

zu glauben, dass unsere Wege in Gott geborgen sind, und in die Schule Gottes zu gehen, in der uns die klare und tiefere Wahrheit durch seinen Geist geoffenbart ist. Bleibt dabei immer noch ein grosser Rest unserem Fassungsvermögen unzugänglich, so ist es die höchste Äusserung der Demut, die Geheimnisse Gottes anzubeten und zu bewundern." Budé und Calvin, p. 251. Compare also Bohatec: Autorität und Freiheit in der Gedankenwelt Calvins, Philosophia Reformata V, p. 236-237: "Anders der christliche Philosoph. Er ist auch ein Philosoph, erfüllt mit erhabenen Gedanken, aber ein Philosoph, der weise sein will 'nach dem Munde Gottes.' Er sinnt über die Wahrheit, die als solche ihrem Wesen nach nur göttlich ist; denn Gott allein ist wahr und wahrhaftig. Darin liegt 'der höchste Grundsatz der christlichen Philosophie', dass sie unabhängig von dem menschlichen, trügerischen Urteil im unbedingten Gottesgehorsam und im Vertrauen auf die absolute göttliche Wahrheit das ungebrochene, ungezähmte ('indomiti') Ich mit seiner "Rhetorik" den Hammerschlägen der unbestechlichen göttlichen Wahrheit unterwirft. Die wissenschaftliche Freiheit eines Christenmenschen ist Bejahung der göttlichen Wahrheitsautorität. Er sieht sich demnach die 'Wissenschaften' und Künste darauf an, ob sich in ihnen das göttliche Fundament findet: sonst sind sie trotz ihres Wertes leer. Dazu gehört zu den 'Anfangsgründen der christlichen Philosophie' das Bewusstsein der eigenen Unzulänglichkeit, das Irrewerden an Selbstverehrung und Selbstbespiegelung."

15. Institutionum Christianae Religionis, I, 6, III-IV.
16. "Ce qu'il y avait de nouveau dans la Réforme, sur ce point du moins, ce n'était ni un ton, ni même une attitude, mais une doctrine. Pour la première fois dans l'histoire du christianisme, cette condamnation radicale portée contre la philosophie par tant de chrétiens, éloquemment formulée mais jamais fondée, se trouvait prise au sérieux et recevait sa pleine justification." Christianisme et Philosophie, p. 18.
17. W. Young, Towards a Reformed Philosophy, p. 35
18. F. Sassen, Geschiedenis van de Nieuwere Wijsbegeerte tot Kant, p. 144.
19. Towards a Reformed Philosophy, p. 33.
20. "Naar het eenstemmig getuigenis van alle ter zake kundigen een traditie van wezenlijk Calvinistisch wijsgeerig

denken niet bestaat. Nimmer heeft de Reformatie op den grondslag van haar reformatorisch-Christelijke grondconceptie een eigen wijsbegeerte ontwikkeld." Kuyper's Wetenschapsleer, Phil. Ref. 4, 1939, p. 198.

21. "De scherpe oppositie, welke zij op dit punt van bepaalde theologische zijde ontmoette, behoeft ons niet te verwonderen, wanneer men bedenkt, dat de gereformeerde theologie, sinds Beza weer de studie van de aristotelische logica en metaphysica als noodzakelijken grondslag voor de universitaire theologische opleiding wist in te voeren, geleidelijk in de banen van het scholastisch denken werd teruggevoerd, waaruit Calvijn de gereformeerde theologie grotendeels had bevrijd. En ofschoon Kuyper het theologisch denken weer van den frisschen reformatorischen geest doordrong, bleven, bij gebreke aan een intrinsiek reformatorische wijsbegeerte, de residuen van de scholastische wijsbegeerte met de taaiheid eener eeuwenoude traditie dit denken belasten. Het aristotelisch-thomistisch substantiebegrif met zijn voedingsbodem: de grieksche metaphysische zijnsleer, vormde inderdaad het centrum van deze scholastieke traditie, die zich tot in de terminologie van enkele buitenlandsche belijdenisschriften (met name de Westminsterconfessie en de confessio Helvetica posterior) had weten in te dringen." Individualiteitsstructuur en Thomistisch Substantiebegrif IV, Phil. Ref. 11, 1946, p. 52.
22. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 522.
23. The attempt of Pierre Ramus (1515-1572), a French Huguenot, to develop a Calvinistic Christian philosophy, should be mentioned. Opposed to the Aristotelian Scholasticism which Beza attempted to introduce, he sought for a new basis for the sciences, and arrived at the notion of the coherence of all science under the sovereignty of God. According to Dooyeweerd this remains a fruitless attempt, because for Aristotelian Scholasticism he substitutes a dialectical method derived from Plato and exhibiting idealistic and humanistic characteristics. (See especially Young: Towards a Reformed Philosophy, p. 31.) Alsted (1588-1648) similarly attempts to derive from Scripture the principles of theology, philosophy, jurisprudence and medicine. Of this attempt Kuyper writes that "tot innerlijke consequentie is ook Alsted nog niet gekomen." (Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Vol. I, p. 174.)

24. In 1618 the Synod of Dordt accepted as the common confession of the Calvinist faith (accord van kerkelijke gemeenschap) the Three Formularies of Unity (De Drie Formulieren van Eenigheid). The controversy within the traditional Calvinistic church of the Netherlands, De Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk, regarding the sense in which these formularies should be interpreted, gave rise in 1892 to the founding of De Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland. The latter claimed that the Nederlands Hervormde Kerk had diverged from the teachings of Dordt, and in founding the Free University of Amsterdam in 1880, presented a 'reformed' Calvinism differing not only in the conception of the structure of the church, but also in the fields of theology proper, philosophy and science. Historians such as Reitzema (Geschiedenis van de Hervorming en van de Hervormde Kerk) and Knappert (Geschiedenis der Nederl. Herv. Kerk) consider that it was no reformation but a distortion, a point of view which Prof. Engelbrecht sharply accentuates in his polemic with Dr. Coetzee concerning the term "neo-Calvinism." Engelbrecht accuses the Gereformeerdes of being bound to a confession "as akkoord van kerklike gemeenskap" in accordance with which they interpret Scripture, which he considers to be a Roman heresy, instead of confessing Scripture in the true Protestant spirit. The Gereformeerdes are then for him not Calvinists but neo-Calvinists, where the "neo" signifies a degeneration from true Calvinism. Coetzee, as indeed the school of Dooyeweerd as a whole, strongly objects to this title. The movement of the 1880's is, from the Reformed point of view, exactly what Engelbrecht denies it to be: the re-emphasising of the original insights of Calvin, as formulated at the Synod of Dordt in 1618-19.
25. Calvinism. Six Stone Lectures (1899), p. 267.
26. Gesagsbeskouing by Calvyn, met verwysing na die Moderne Parlementere Staat, p. 9.
27. "Dit is ongetwyfeld so dat die Skrif leer dat daar 'n openbaring is, 'n skepping is en orde is; maar, al is elkeen van die beginsels per se Skriftuurlik, is dit logies uitgesluit dat elkeen van hulle ooreenkomstig die Skrif as enigste fondament van 'n Calvinistiese wysbegeerte kan dien. Daar is slegs een oplossing, nl. dat op die voetspoor van Calvyn, 'n geordende pluraliteit van beginsels, wat elkeen selfstandig betekenis het, ten grondslag van die filosofie gestel word." Die Verhouding Tussen die Teologie en die Filosofie by Calvyn, p. 223. See also p.216.

28. "Ik ben niet origineel, ik doe niets dan copieeren. Wat ik op theologisch, kerkrechtelijk en staatkundig gebied beoog is niets dan zuivere copie leveren van wat Calvijn en zijn school beoogde." Quoted by V. Hepp, Dreigende Deformatie I (Diagnose), p. 11.
29. Quoted by S.P. Engelbrecht, Neo-Calvinisme, p. 13.
30. Compare S.P. Engelbrecht, Neo-Calvinisme, p.11 ff.
31. Compare R.H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (Pelican Books), p.111.
32. For Kuyper's special treatment of the doctrine of Common Grace, see his De Gemeene Gratie, especially vol.I and II; also Calvin, Inst. II,3,III.
33. Calvinism. Six Stone Lectures, p. 63.
34. "Thus the religious organ being found, not in the whole of our being, but in part of it, being confined to our feelings and our will, consequently also the sphere of religious life must assume in consequence the same partial character. Religion is excluded from science, and its authority from the domain of public life: henceforth the inner chamber, the cell for prayer, and the secrecy of the heart should be its exclusive dwelling place." Ibid. p. 86. Again, p.88: "His whole being including all his abilities and powers, must be pervaded by the senses divinitatis, and how then could he exclude his rational consciousness - the logos which is in him - the light of thought which comes from God Himself to irradiate him? To possess his God for the underground world of his feelings, and in the outworks of the exertion of his will, but not in his inner self, in the very centre of his consciousness, and his thought: to have fixed starting-points for the study of nature and axiomatic strongholds for practical life, but to have no fixed support in his thoughts about the Creator Himself - all of this was, for the Calvinist, the very denying of the Eternal Logos."
35. Ibid. p. 42.
36. Ibid, p. 79.
37. Ibid. p. 80.
38. Ibid. p. 88, 89.

39. "There is no life outside us in Nature, without such divine ordinances - ordinances which are called the laws of Nature - a term which we are willing to accept, provided we understand thereby, not laws originating from Nature, but laws imposed upon Nature. So, there are ordinances of God for the firmament above, and ordinances for the earth below, by means of which this world is maintained, and, as the Psalmist says, these ordinances are the servants of God. Consequently there are ordinances of God for our bodies, for the blood that courses through our arteries and veins, and for our lungs as the organs of respiration. And even so are there ordinances of God, in logic, to regulate our thoughts; ordinances of God for our imagination, in the domain of aesthetics; and so, also, strict ordinances of God for the whole of human life in the domain of morals." Ibid. p. 113.
40. Ibid. p. 91.
41. Ibid. p. 202.
42. Ibid. p. 95.
43. "Atqui testimonium Spiritus omni ratione praestantius esse respondeo. Nam sicuti Deus solus de se idoneus est testis in suo sermone: ita etiam non ante fidem reperiet sermo in hominum cordibus, quam interiore Spiritus testimonio obsignetur." Institutionum Christianae Religionis I, 7, IV. Compare also I, 7, V: "Maneat ergo hoc fixum, quos Spiritus sanctus intus docuit, solide acquiescere in Scriptura, & hanc quidem esse *αὐτομνησὸν*, neque demonstrationi & rationibus subjici eam fas esse: quam tamen meretur apud nos certitudinem, Spiritus testimonio consequi. Etsi enim reverentiam sua sibi ultro majestate conciliat, tunc tamen demum serio nos afficit quum per Spiritum obsignata est cordibus nostris. Illius ergo virtute illuminati, jam non aut nostro, aut aliorum judicio credimus, à Deo esse Scripturam: sed supra humanum judicium, certo certius constituimus (non secus ac si ipsius Dei numen illic intueremur) hominum ministerio, ab ipsissimo Dei ore ad nos fluxisse. Non argumenta, non verisimilitudines quaerimus quibus judicium nostrum incumbat: sed ut rei extra aestimandi aleam posita, judicium ingeniumque nostrum subjicimus. Non id quidem qualiter solent quidam interdum rem incognitam arripere, quae mox perspecta displicet: sed quia inexpugnabilem nos veritatem tenere, probe nobis consci sumus. Neque qualiter superstitionibus solent miseri homines captivam mentem addicere: sed quia non dubiam vim numinis illic sen-

timus vigere ac spirare, qua ad parendum, scientes quidem ac volentes, vividius tamen & efficacius quam pro humana aut voluntate aut scientia, trahimur & accendimur."

44. Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid II, pp. 53-55.
45. "Deze *παλιγγενεσία* toch breekt de menschheid in tweeën, en heft de eenheid van het menschelijk bewustzijn op. Brengt toch deze van buiten inkomende daad der *αναγεννησις*, zij het ook slechts potentiëel, een principiëele verandering in het zijn des menschen tot stand, en oefent deze verandering tevens invloed op zijn bewustzijn, dan bestaat er van dat oogenblik af een kloof, waarover geen brug is te leggen, tusschen het menschelijk bewustzijn, voorzoover het er vreemd aan bleef. Het is er meê, als met wild hout, waarvan ge het ééne deel inent, en het andere niet. Van het oogenblik van die inenting af, is, zoo het entsel aanslaat, en het wilde hout behoorlijk gesnoeid wordt, het proces van beide soort boomen een geheel ander, en niet slechts relatief en gradueel, maar specifiek verschillendeen verschil in soort." Ibid, p. 99.
46. Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, II, p. 228.
47. Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid II, pp. 71-93.
48. Ibid, pp. 97-131.
49. Calvinism. Six Stone Lectures, p. 203. Compare also p. 209: "With regard to the present condition of things we, of course, have to acknowledge two kinds of human consciousness: that of the regenerate and the unregenerate; and these two cannot be identical. In one is found what is lacking in the other. One is unconscious of a break and clings accordingly to the normal; the other has an experience both of a break and of a change, and thus possesses in his consciousness the knowledge of the abnormal. If, therefore, it be true that man's own consciousness is his primum verum, and hence must be also the starting-point for every scientist; then the logical conclusion is that it is an impossibility that both should agree, and that every endeavour to make them agree must be doomed to failure. Both, as honest men, will feel in duty bound to erect such a scientific edifice for the whole cosmos, which is in harmony with the fundamental data, given in their own self-consciousness."
50. De Gemeene Gratie, Het Practisch Gedeelte, p. 497.
51. Ibid, p. 497.

52. "Uitgangspunt der Erkenntnisstheorie behoort te zijn de gewone, dagelijksche ervaring, de algemeene en natuurlijke zekerheid des menschen aangaande de objectiviteit en waarheid zijner kennis. De filosofie scheidt toch het kenvermogen en het kennen niet, maar vindt het en beproeft het nu te verklaren; en elke solutie, die het kenvermogen niet verklaart maar vernietigt en het kennen niet begrijpt maar tot eene illusie maakt, is daardoor geoordeeld. Alleen zulk een Erkenntnisstheorie heeft kans van slagen, die eenerzijds den bodem der ervaring niet verlaat maar anderzijds ook in heel de diepte van het probleem indringt." Gereformeerde Dogmatiek II, pp. 195-196.
53. Wijsbegeerte der Openbaring, ch.11, pp. 24-69.
54. Gereformeerde Dogmatiek IV, pp. 180-186.
55. Ibid. p. 183.
56. "De verhouding nu van deze selfkennis Gods tot onze Godskennis werd vroeger zoo uitgedrukt, dat gene de theologia archetypa was van deze, en deze de theologia ectypa van gene. Onze kennis van God is een afdruk van die kennis, welke God van zichzelf heeft, maar dan altijd in creatuurlijken zin. De kennis van Gods in zijne schepselen is maar een zwakke gelijkenis, eene eindige, beperkte, naar het menschelijk of creatuurlijk bewustzijn geaccommodeerde schets van het absolute zelfbewustzijn Gods. Maar hoe groot de afstand ook zij, principium essendi van onze Godskennis is alleen God zelf, die zich vrij, selfbewust en waarachtig openbaart." Ibid. p. 184.
57. "Wat is die waarde van die openbaringsbeginsel? Openbaring en kennisneming is korrellatief. Nie vir die wereld, maar vir die kennis is hierdie beginsel grondlegend. Die openbaringsbeginsel is dus die hoof sleutel vir 'n kalvinistiese kenteorie, maar nie vir 'n kalvinistiese algemene filosofie nie. So gou ons die beginsel algemeen-wysgerig stel, verwag ons te veel daarvan. As geloofs- en kenbeginsel is dit egter 'n ware en vrugbare argimedespunt. Dit erken vir die kenteorie die objektiwiteit en gees-onafhanklikheid van die gekende, maar tog ook sy afhanklikheid van geesteswerking om geken te word. Dit erken die eieaard van die gekende sowel as van die kenner, en laat die hele kenrelasie rus in die soewereiniteit Gods as the Groot Openbaarder agter alles. Deur die objektiwiteit en mens-onafhanklikheid van die gekende te handhaaf, gee die beginsel die kenteorie 'n ontologiese, 'n realiteitsbasis. Die Kalvinistiese kenteorie moet altyd ontologies gefundeer wees." Stoker: Die Nuwere

Wysbegeerte aan die Vrije Universiteit, p. 11.

58. Compare especially Wijsbegeerte der Openbaring, pp. 55-65.
59. Ideëel en Reëel, p. 181.
60. "Het ideëele bestaat in de eerste plaats als de eeuwige gedachten Gods, Zijn bestek en Zijn raad, waarnaar Hij al het geschapene in zijn zijn en worden en in zijne tallooze relatiën, het zijn zoowel als het bewustzijn, heeft voortgebracht. - Het ideëele bestaat in de tweede plaats geobjectiveerd, ectypisch, in den kosmos en in den mensch, in zoover beide, in hun verwantschap zoowel als in hunne tegenstelling, de uitwerking zijn van het ééne scheppingsplan. Deze objectiveering of daarstelling kan, tegenover de ideeën zelf, het reëele genoemd worden, waaruit dan echter terstond volgt, dat het ideëele niet minder in waarde ten opzichte van het zijn kan wezen dan het reëele, maar de grond is van dit reëel bestaan. En eindelijk: het ideëele bestaat in den geest van den mensch of van het menschelijk geslacht, daar hij, als naar Gods beeld geschapen, krachtens dezen geestelijken aanleg, de ideeën, in den kosmos geobjectiveerd, daaruit kan kennen, en alzoo een eigen wereld van ideeën in zich dragen, die, voor zoover zij geworteld zijn in het wezen, het verband en de orde van Gods schepping, zijne wetenschap vormen." Ibid, p. 218.
61. "De idee wordt aanschouwd door den geest, waaruit echter geenszins volgt, dat zij alleen in den geest bestaat; zij is in elk geval geene functie van den geest; de geest aanschouwdt de ideeën als zijne objecten. En niet alleen de geest heeft realiteit, maar ook de ideeën; als zoodanig, als ideeën, zijn zij en hebben zij realiteit." Ibid. p. 189.
62. "Die ware realiteit der idee in de dingen na te speuren en te leeren kennen, dat is de taak der wetenschap; doch om dat te kunnen moet zij beginnen met geloof ...het bewijs der zaken, die men niet ziet." Ibid. p. 182.
63. Towards a Reformed Philosophy, p. 79.
64. Het Testimonium Spiritus Sancti, I, p. 69ff.
65. Ibid. pp. 167-182.
66. "De zonde had op het testimonium generale geen vat, omdat het in een onmiddellijke werking des Geestes bestaat. Schijnbaar is echter het effect op den menschelijken geest veranderd. Onzekerheid en twijfel hebben, zoo zou men oordeelen,

de plaats van de zekerheid ingenomen en de zekerheid, die den mensch nog gebleven is, moet gedankt aan de gratia communis. Dit gaat evenwel niet op. Het testimonium generale houdt mede het wezen van den mensch in stand. Daarom kan het nooit van effect veranderen. Hoe moet dan het bestaan van den twijfel verklaard? Deze schuilt niet in het directe, maar/slechts in het reflexieve denken. Daar de zonde is er tusschen direct en reflexief denken tweespalt ontstaan. Het sterkst wordt deze openbaar bij atheïsten. Naar het directe denken is ieder overtuigd van het bestaan Gods, alleen in het reflexieve denken kan er aan worden getwijfeld." Ibid., p. 243.

67. "Het testimonium generale is die onmiddellijke en onwederstandelijke werking van den H. Geest, waarin Hij tot en in den menschelijken geest getuigenis geeft aan de waarheid in haar centrum en daardoor in ieder mensch een onomstootelijke zekerheid doet geboren worden. Of filosofisch gesproken: Het testimonium generale is de laatste zekerheidsgrond onzer kennis." Ibid., p. 245.
68. De Heraut, no. 940, 29th Dec., 1895. Quoted by Young: Towards a Reformed Philosophy, p. 46.
69. "Wij, hoogleeraren aan de Vrije Universiteit, hebben de roeping, om, voor zoover onze krachten en gaven reiken, de diepste beginselen onzer wetenschap zoo zuiver mogelijk op te sporen en in 't licht te stellen, opdat, waar de voltooiing van het gebouw in de eerste tijden nog niet is te verwachten, althans de grondslagen hecht en vast mogen zijn en zóó gelegd, dat de indeeling van het komende geheel in die grondslagen ligt vóórgeteekend." Ideel en Reel, p. 180.
70. Towards a Reformed Philosophy, p. 95.
71. A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol. II, p. 572.
72. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 522.
73. Ibid., p. 522.
74. "Allereers dan, wat is Calvinisme? Die nie 'n kritieklose bewondering van alles wat Kalvyn gedoen het nie, en ook nie 'n letterlike herhaling van wat Kalvyn geleer het nie. Kalvyn self het nie altyd en orals tot die suiwere Christelike standpunt kon deurdring nie. 'n Teorie oor die verhouding van kerk en staat, soos A. Kuyper dit uitgewerk het, is deper deurdink as Kalvyn se eie teorie hieromtrent - maar daarom tog goed Calvinisties. Kalvyn se eie teorie is nie so

suiwer nie, omdat dit in verband staan met die nood van sy tyd, - nl. die beskerming van die vlugtelinge wat vir veiligheid en geloofsvryheid na Geneve gevlug het. Kalvyn het self op punte in die Skolastiek bly vassteek, wat weer verklaarbaar is uit die nood van sy lewe ...Kalvyn self het beklemtoon dat na die reformasie die kerk verder nuwe reformasie moet soek. Ons moet kalvinisties noem die beginsels van Kalvyn, - met inagneming van die nood van sy tyd en die nood van sy lewe, - wat mekaar nie weerspreek nie en saam die gebou van sy lewensarbeid dra." Die Nuwere Wysbegeerte aan die Vrije Universiteit, p. 13.

75. H.G. Dooyeweerd: Kuyper's Wetenschapsleer, Phil. Ref. 4, 1939, pp. 193-232.
76. While agreeing with Dooyeweerd that Bavinck is under the influence of Thomistic and Aristotelian metaphysics, Van der Walt nevertheless does not agree with Dooyeweerd's statement that Bavinck does not recognise the central importance of the heart. Referring to the above mentioned article by Dooyeweerd, Van der Walt writes: "Dit is b.v.onbillik ...die bewering te maak dat hy 'het hart uitdrukkelijk met den zetel der affecten, resp. het geheel der aangeboren driften vereenzelvigd en onder het begeervermogen' rangskik. Wie Bavinck in sy ander werke oor dieselfde saak volg en hom die hart as die sentrale orgaan, waarin die ganse mens teenoor die ganse kosmos en teenoor God staan, sien vasstel, erken dadelik dat hierdie kritiek altans nie op Bavinck van toepassing is nie." Die Wysbegeerte van Dr. Herman Bavinck, "p. 155.
77. These views of Van Til are given in an article by W. Masse-link: New Views Regarding Common Grace in the Light of Historic Reformed Theology, (The Calvin Forum, vol. XIX, no.X).
78. That this term is indeed widely used in theological and philosophical circles to signify the movement originated by Kuyper, is pointed out by S.P. Engelbrecht: Neo-Calvinisme, p. 13.
79. Dreigende Deformatie I, II, III, by V. Hepp.
80. Philosophia Deformata (Kampen, 1937), by. H. Steen.
81. S.P. Engelbrecht: Neo-Calvinisme, Ontwikkeling en Afwyking.
82. J.V. Coetzee: Neo-Calvinisme - Verbastering of regte Ontwikkeling?

83. New Views Regarding Common Grace in the Light of Historic Reformed Theology, I, II. (The Calvin Forum, vol. XIX.)
84. Het Calvinisme en de Reformatie van de Wijsbegeerte, p. 21.
85. A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, vol. I, p. 524.
86. Fundamentele Beginsels van die Huidige Calvinistiese Wysgerige denke. (Paper read at the second South African Congress for Philosophy, Pretoria, 1953.)
87. Ibid, p. 1.
88. Compare especially: Die Wysbegeerte van die Skeppingsidee, Die Nuwere Wysbegeerte aan die Vrije Universiteit, Iets oor Redelikheid en Rasionalisme, Slakkehuisteoriee van die Bewussyn.
89. Compare Kuyper's Wetenschapsleer, Phil. Ref. 4, ^{1939,} pp. 193-232.
90. Special chairs devoted to the study of this philosophy have also been instituted at the Universities of Leiden, Groningen and Utrecht; at the School of Economics in Rotterdam, and the Technical School at Delft.
91. Dooyeweerd distrusts the use of the word "school" in this connection. His philosophy, he writes, (A New Critique, foreword) is not a matter of a "system", subject to all the faults and errors of human thought, but concerns the foundation of philosophical thought. Stoker, too, writes that if we persist in speaking of this philosophy as a school, it is an "open school", allowing for development, criticism and even variation.
92. Het Calvinisme en de Reformatie van de Wijsbegeerte, p. 13.
93. Cited by J. Maritain in "An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 104.
94. The Unity of Philosophical Experience, p. 318.
95. "Terwille van die kontinuïteit wat tot uiting kom in die permanente terugkeer van dieselfde probleme, dieselfde metodes en dieselfde groep oplossings, maak die kontinue filosofie aanspraak op die karakter van volstrektheid. Dit glo dat ons evidente of evident gemaakte wete absoluut is, omdat dit op rasionele evidensies of op analitiese

bewysvoerings berus, en vandaar op 'n volstrekte algemeen-geldigheid binne die hele mensgeslag mag pretendeer. Die denke bestaan derhalwe in die oë van 'n so op kontinuïteit gestelde filosoof in 'n sisteem van algemeengeldige en noodsaaklike kennis, waarby denkfoute aangewys and individuele dwalingsoorsake bestry kan word." Handleiding by die Studie van die Logika en die Kennisleer, p. 251.

96. Endliches und Ewiges Sein, p. 5.

97. Handleiding by die Studie van die Logika en die Kennisleer, p. 264.

98. "Vanuit dit sentrale Christeljk gezichtspunt bleek mij een omwenteling in het wijsgeerig denken noodzakelijk van zoo radicaal karakter, dat Kant's 'Copernicusdaad' daartegenover slechts als een periphere kan worden gequalificeerd." De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, I, p. VI.

Notes to Chapter II.

1. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 37.
2. Ibid., p. 4.
3. Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Vol. II, p. 46 ff.
4. H.G. Dooyeweerd: Kuyper's Wetenschapsleer, Phil. Ref. IV, 1939, p. 227.
5. Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Vol. II, p. 59.
6. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 9. Compare Stoker: Calvinistiese Wysbegeerte I, (Standpunte 7, p. 70). "Deur die eeue heen vra die wysgeer na die Arche, die Oergrond van alle bestaan. Hy trag te vind en vas te stel wat die Absolute, die Absolute realiteit, die Algenoegsame is wat vir sy bestaan niks anders as homself nodig het nie en waarvan al die ander geheel en al afhanklik is en waaruit hierdie ander verklaar moet word. Thales vind dit in water, Parmenides in die syn, Heraklitus in 'n vuuragtige worde Spinoza in die substansie, Leibniz in die oermonade, Kant in die homo noumenon, Hegel in die Idee, Bergson in die élan vital, Holiste in 'n dinamiese geheelsbepaling. Volgens die teologie (wat sy gegewens primêr uit die Heilige Skrif put), is God Drieëinig die Arche, die Algenoegsame, die Enige, die Alpha en Omega. Hy is dus die Absolute, die Absolute Syn, Causa Sui et rerum, Substantie, Aseitas." A remarkably similar account is to be found in Gilson: The Unity of Philosophical Experience, p. 306: "It is an observable character of all metaphysical doctrines that, widely divergent as they may be, they agree on the necessity of finding out the first cause of all that is. Call it matter with Democritus, the Good with Plato, the self-thinking Thought with Aristotle, the One with Plotinus, Being with all Christian philosophers, or let it be the absolute Idea of Hegel, the Creative Duration of Bergson, and whatever else you may cite, in all cases the metaphysician is a man who looks behind and beyond experience for an ultimate ground of all real and possible experience."
7. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 3.
8. Ibid., p. 4.

9. Ibid., p. 4.
10. Ibid., p. 7.
11. "Yet it, too, in the last analysis remains meaning, which cannot exist by itself but supposes an arche, an origin which creates meaning." Ibid., p. 8.
12. "Meaning constantly points without and beyond itself towards an origin, which is itself no longer meaning. It remains within the bounds of the relative. The true origin, on the contrary, is absolute and self-sufficient." Ibid., p. 10.
13. Ibid., p. 11.
14. This Dooyeweerd himself admits: "In our introduction," he writes, "it could appear that this problem (the origin of philosophical thought) was introduced as a 'deus ex machina' the necessity of which was unaccounted for in the course of the first critical inquiry." Ibid., p. 50.
15. Ibid., p. 34.
16. Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought, p. 25.
17. De Niet-Theoretische Voor-oordeelen in de Wetenschap, Phil. Ref. III, p. 193. (1938)
18. A New Critique, Vol. I. p. 37.
19. Ibid., p. 41.
20. Ibid., p. 41 ff.
21. Bradley writes explicitly: "Immediate experience is not a stage which may or may not at some time have been there, and has now ceased to exist. It is not, in any case, removed by the presence of a not-self and of a relational consciousness. All that is thus removed is at most, we may say, the mereness of immediacy. Every distinction and relation, so far as experienced, is also felt, and felt in a sense to belong to an immediate totality." Characterizing his conception of immediate experience, Bradley writes: "In my general feeling at any moment, there is more than the objects before me, and no perception of objects will exhaust the sense of a living emotion." Compare especially: Appearance and Reality, pp. 455-458, and chapter XXVII, p. 524.

22. Adventures of Ideas, p. 171. (Pelican Edition)
23. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 3.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 39 ff.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
26. Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought, p. 38.
27. "There is a Divine irony in the development of apostate philosophy, since the temporal world-order at first seems to justify every kind of theoretical absolutization in an equal measure. When viewed from the immanence-standpoint, is not historicism as convincing as a logicistic or a psychological interpretation of empirical reality?" A New Critique, Vol. II, p. 333.
28. H.G. Stoker explains this term as follows: "As is known, Archimedes said, 'Give me a place on which to stand outside the earth and I will move the earth.' So also the Calvinist says: 'Give me a point outside the earth (the cosmos) and I will determine the meaning of the unity of the cosmos. A point outside the cosmos is needed in order to peruse the cosmos in its totality and to understand it as a unity.'" Die Wysbegeerte van die Skeppingsidee, p. 61.
29. "The choice of an archimedean point, even on the standpoint of immanentist philosophy, proves to be impossible as a purely subjective act which prejudices nothing in a religious sense." A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 21.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
36. Dooyeweerd states that Kant's critical philosophy seems to offer a solution to this problem. Kant's great value lies in his insight that philosophy presupposes a critical

self-knowledge. He further grants that the ego is active in actual thinking. This thinking ego is the residue of a methodical elimination of all those moments in the concrete individual self functioning in time and space which I can still make into a Gegenstand of the ultimate subjective logical function of thought. What remains is the 'transcendental logical subject'. It does not transcend the logical function but is an immanent subjective pole of thought against which the whole of experienced reality stands as its Gegenstand, and is therefore the transcendental prerequisite for all knowledge, the ultimate logical unity of the epistemological subject.

What actually happens, according to Dooyeweerd, is that this so-called transcendental subject is abstracted from the ego which is actually operative in its logical function, the result of a process of elimination by which the thinker imagines that the logical function of thought is a self-sufficient activity. But this reduction can be executed only by the self. "This latter, which thinks theoretically, cannot itself in turn be the result of the abstraction formed by thought." The transcendental subject is in the final analysis nothing but the bare concept of the subjective logical unity of thought which presupposes the thinking ego. Besides, it is a pseudo-concept, because supposed incapable of being analysed. All actuality in the act of thought issues from the ego which transcends thought, Dooyeweerd concludes. The idea of a transcendental subject is involved in contradictions, for the actual logical function of thought can never be "an sich". Apart from the ego it simply is not actual and has no existence. Compare A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 53 ff.

37. "All self-knowledge is dependent on knowledge of God. In the same way the apostate selfhood only arrives at self-knowledge through its idols." A New Critique, Vol. II, p. 323.
38. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 55 ff.
39. Ibid., p. 57.
40. Ibid., p. 57.
41. Ibid., p. 58. R. Otto, like Dooyeweerd, criticises a conceptual knowledge of the Deity, (The Idea of the Holy, ch. I). which he contrasts with a "profounder religion" which is a non-rational experience of the numinous. This experience is, however, never completely distinguished from the spheres of feeling and emotion and cannot therefore satisfy Dooyeweerd's critical demands. In William James' Varieties of Religious

Experience the religious phenomenon is treated as a Gegenstand of theoretical thought, an approach which is not permissible from Dooyeweerd's point of view.

42. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 59.
43. Ibid., p. 20.
44. Ibid., p. 61.
45. Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought, p. 60.
46. "As Creator God reveals Himself as the absolute and integral Origin of all things. He has no powerful, original entity opposed to Him and therefore the created cosmos too is no expression of a dualistic principle of origin." Reformatie en Scholastiek, Vol. I, p. 30.
47. "The dynamis of sin can unfold itself only in subjection to the religious concentration law of human existence. Therefore, the apostle Paul says, that without the law there is no sin and that there is a law of sin." A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 63.
48. Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought, p. 61.
49. Reformatie en Scholastiek, Vol. I, pp. 47-49.
50. Ibid., pp. 45-46.
51. "Er geldt althans geen wederkeerigheid in de religieuze verstaansmogelijkheden tusschen het Christelijk uitgangspunt en de niet-Christelijke uitgangspunten. Wel bestaat van uit Christelijk standpunt de volledige mogelijkheid, tot den diepsten religieuze zin der hieraan auto-thetische uitgangspunten en grond-thema's door te dringen, omdat eerste van hieruit deze laatste hun diepste zin kunnen onthullen. De Christen deelt in de solidariteit van den zondeval, van het menschengeslacht, zoodat de bedoelde grondthema's hem in religieuze zin niet 'vreemd' kunnen zijn.
Het Christelijk grondthema wijst aan de niet-Christelijke themas hun plaats aan in den zondeval, die zelve in de verlossing door Christus Jesus niet dialectisch, maar reeël verzoend is. D.W.Z. de niet-christelijke grondthema's worden in het christelijke niet dialectisch opgeheven, maar principiëel als valsche uitgangspunten in hun zin onthuld. Zij kunnen aan het christelijke niets toevoegen, zij hebben geen eigen positieve waarheid tegenover het eerste.

Daarentegen bestaat vanuit niet-christelijk standpunt de eigenlijke, d.i. religieuze, verstaansmogelijkheid ten aanzien van het christelijk uitgangspunt niet. Voor deze verstaansmogelijkheid is de 'levendmakende Geest' nodig, die het geestesoog verlicht en op het ware levenscentrum, den Christus, concentreerd." H.G. Dooyeweerd: Grondthema's van 't Wijsgeerig denken van 't Avondland, Phil. Ref. VI, 1941, p. 173.

52. Reformatie en Scholastiek, Vol. I, ch. I.

53. Dooyeweerd treats the influence of the Greek basic religious motive in detail as it appears in Plato's dialogues, showing the strain between the orphic and pythagorean influences, the dynamic ethical conception of Socrates and the static mathematical conceptions of the Eleatics. Ibid., ch. I.

54. For Dooyeweerd's criticism, compare Reformatie en Scholastiek, pp. 56-58.

55. Following Aristotle, Aquinas distinguishes between scientia proper, which is knowledge arrived at by illative argumentation, and intellectus principiorum, which is the knowledge which every intellect immediately has of first principles such as that of contradiction, finality, causality, and which are the proper principles of philosophy.

56. Qu. Desp. de Veritate, qu. XIV, art. 9, ad Resp., and ad 6nm.

57. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 510.

58. Ibid., p. 511.

59. According to this doctrine, held in the schools of Paris in the 12th en 13th centuries, the conclusions of philosophy are opposed to the teaching of Revelation. While we are compelled to state that the conclusions of philosophy necessarily follow from the principles of natural reason, we cannot but believe, if we are Christians, that what Revelation teaches about the same matter is true. Philosophically we may hold, for example, that the notion of creation in time is an absurdity, but as Christians we must believe that it is possible for God to do so. This doctrine of the two-fold truth all too easily relapses with John of Jaudun, into irony at the expense of Revelation, or even into the extreme rationalism expressed in the Averroestic opinions condemned by the Bishop of Paris in 1277, such as: "Nothing should be believed, save only that which either is self-evident, or can be deduced from self-evident princi-

- ples." (prop. 37). "Christian Revelation is an obstacle to learning." (Prop. 175). "One knows nothing more for knowing theologytheology rests upon fables." (props. 153, 152). Compare Gilson: Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, p. 61 ff.
60. For Dooyeweerd's detailed analysis of Kant, compare De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, Vol. I, pp. 325 - 402, Vol. II, pp. 491-532, and A New Critique, Vol. I, pp. 325-402, Vol. II, pp. 491-537.
61. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 123.
62. Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought, p. 54.
63. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 118.
64. Ibid., p. 118.
65. Compare Popma: Philosophia Perennis (Phil. Ref. 20, 1955, p. 85) in which the idea of the philosophia perennis is rejected as "worldly".
66. Stoker modifies Dooyeweerd's view by allowing the extraction of "moments of truth" from non-Calvinistic systems, on condition that they be verified anew. This "exheretic" method he distinguishes from eclecticism. "...Die eklektisisme kies willekeurig waarheidsmomente uit en vertoon soddende 'n gebrek aan 'n aprioriese eenheidsgrondslag. Die eksheretiese metode daarenteen wikkel die betrokke waarheidsmomente los uit die betrokke x-istiese sisteemwindsel en verifieer hulle opnuut aan die betrokke gegewens in en van die kosmos voordat hierdie waarheidsmomente in die Calvinistiese stelsel aanvaar word." Standpunte, Jaargang 3, no. I: Calvinistiese Wysbegeerte, p. 58.
67. Compare A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 116: "The proposition: $2 \times 2 = 4$ is not 'true in itself', but only in the context of the laws of number and the logical laws of thought. This context is, as we have seen, possible only in the all-sided coherence of meaning of all modal law-spheres, and supposes a totality of meaning of which both the numerical and the logical aspects are special modal refractions in cosmic time. There exists no partial truth which is sufficient to itself. Partial theoretical truth is truth only in the coherence of the theoretical truths, and this coherence in its relativity pre-supposes the fulness or the totality of truth.
- Consequently, also the philosophical view of the mutual relation and coherence of the numerical and the logical aspects - and thereby of the modal meaning of number and of

- logical concepts - is influenced from the start by the transcendental ground-Idea of philosophical thought and by the religious ground-motive which determines its content."
68. Ibid., p. 119.
69. Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought, p. viii
70. "Het uitgangspunt toch van hun filosoferen vormt de antithese. Er bestaat een tegenstelling of antithese tussen het Schriftuurlijk en het onschriftuurlijk denken, wat praktisch betekent tussen de wijsbegeerte der wetsidee en alle andere filosofieën. Deze tegenstelling is zo volstrekt, dat alle pogingen tot synthese afgewezen moeten worden. Deze antithese berust op haar beurt weer op een andere en diepere, ja, de diepste: zij wordt veroorzaakt door de scheidslijn, die, krachtens de praedestinatatie door de mensheid heenloopt en haar verdeelt in twee kampen, nl. dat der gelovigen en dat der ongelovigen. Deze scheidslijn houdt niet halt voor de wetenschap en de wijsbegeerte, maar gaat er integendeel dwars door heen. Dit betekent echter het isolement, niet toevallig, maar principiëel. Dan kunne de aanhangers echter ook niet verwachten, dat anderen hun filosofie zelfs maar kunne begrijpen, laat staan aanvaarden." De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, article in Kerk en Theologie, 3e Jaargang, no. 3, p. 141. For a similar criticism, compare D. Tellema: The Philosophy of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven, Part I, in Calvin Forum, Vol. XIX, no. 9, April, 1954, p. 169-170.
71. "De religieuze grondthema's, die den ontwikkelingsgang der westersche wijsbegeerte vanaf de Grieken hebben beheerscht, brengen inderdaad radicale caesuren daarin aan, omdat zij niet zelve van puur historisch, maar veeleer van transcendenten, religieuzen aard zijn. Toch moet anderzijds worden vastgehouden aan een wijsgeerige denkgemeenschap van het avondland, en aan een historische continuïteit in den ontwikkelingsgang der wijsbegeerte.
- Hoe laat zich een en ander zonder innerlijke tegenpraak vereenigen? Zeker niet, zoolang men grondthema, wijsgeerige denkgemeenschap en historische continuïteit in de ontwikkelingsperioden in één vlak zoekt te brengen. In dit geval moet het een het ander noodwendig uitsluiten. Op welk wijze dan wel?" Grondthema's van't Wijsgeerig denken van't Avondland, Phil. Ref. VI, p. 172ff. (194)

NOTES to Chapter III.

1. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 69.
2. Ibid., p. 69.
3. Ibid., p. 69.
4. Ibid., p. 69.
5. "Only in reflection on its transcendental basic idea is philosophy urged on to its insurmountable a priori limits which give philosophical thought its ultimate well-defined character in the universal cosmic coherence of meaning. It is not philosophic thought that determines its a priori conditions in self-sufficiency, but the very reverse: philosophic thought is determined and limited by its transcendental focussing towards its presupposita. It is limited by being bound to its intentional as well as to its ontical structure in cosmic time.
In the basic Idea of philosophy we are engaged in reflecting while thinking to the limits of philosophic thought. This Idea is therefore in the full sense of the word a limiting-concept par excellence, the final transcendental foundation of hypothesis of philosophy, in which we retire into ourselves when thinking. We can reflect critically upon the limits of philosophic thought, only because in our selfhood we transcend them as limits of philosophical knowledge. The presupposita of philosophy, towards which the basic idea of philosophy points, are themselves infinitely more than Idea. Idealism, which elevates the Idea itself as totality of meaning, is possible only upon the immanence-standpoint." Ibid., p. 87.
6. Ibid., p. 93.
7. For a treatment of monistic and partial theistic systems with reference to the idea of law, compare Dooyeweerd: Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte, Vol. I, part I, ch. 3, and part II.
8. "Considered from the linguistic point of view, it may ap-

- pear to refer only to the nomos-side of the cosmos. However, it actually occupies a position just as much with reference to the subject-side of reality in all its individuality. For the cosmic "nomos" has meaning only in indissoluble correlation with the subject side of the cosmos. In other words, the cosmonomic Idea implies the Idea of the subject, which points toward the factual side of reality according to the basic relation among totality, diversity and coherence of meaning." A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 96.
9. "Deze wetskringen of modaliteiten, zin-zijden of aspecten der tijdelijke werkelijkheid noemt Prof. Dooyeweerd ontische a priori's. Ze zijn a priori als constante grondleggende structuren der ervaarbare werkelijkheid. Ze vormen het fundament, waarop in de realiteit zich in alle wisselende verschijnselen voltrekken. Als zodanig dragen ze een ontisch - d.w.z. een zijnskarakter, omdat ze niet - gelijk Kant beweerde - in het subjectief bewustzijn, doch in de door God geschapen tijdsorde van de werkelijkheid gegrond zijn." Spier, Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, p. 43.
 10. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 95. "In the first place, in pointing to the preliminary questions of philosophic thought,
 11. the basic Idea of philosophy must be so conceived, that it actually catches the eye as a necessary condition for every philosophic system. This implies, that the universal term by which this basic Idea is designated may not include special contents derived from the ground-motive of the Christian religion. The determination of the contents of the transcendental basic Idea is to be a subject of subsequent discussion. A cosmonomic Idea is actually at the basis of every philosophical system. On the other hand, the Idea of creation will be rejected as a transcendental basic Idea of philosophy by each thinker who denies creation, or in any case supposes that it must be eliminated from philosophic thought."
 11. Ibid., p. 181.
 12. Ibid., p. 182.
 13. Ibid., p. 191 ff.
 14. Ibid., p. 101.
 15. Ibid., p. 99.

16. "Sin is the revolt against the Sovereign of our cosmos. It is the apostasy from the fulness of meaning and the deifying, the absolutizing of meaning, to the level of God's Being. Our temporal world, in its temporal diversity and coherence of meaning, is in the order of God's creation bound to the religious root of mankind. Apart from this root it has no meaning and so no reality. Hence the apostasy in the heart, in the religious root of the temporal world signified the apostasy of the entire temporal creation, which was concentrated in mankind. Thus the disruption of the fall permeated all temporal aspects of meaning of cosmic reality. There is no single one of them that is excepted in this respect, neither the pre-logical aspects of temporal reality, nor the logical, nor the post-logical ones." *Ibid.*, p. 100.
17. "De Heilige Schrift leert de rechtstreeksche souvereiniteit van dien God, Die Zich in Zijn Woord geopenbaard heeft, over alle dingen, op welk terrein oock, en onderscheidt in overeenstemming daarmee helder tusschen God als den Souverein en het door Hem geschapene." Vollenhoven: Het Calvinisme en de Reformatie van de Wijsbegeerte, p. 21.
18. Die Wysbegeerte van Dr. Herman Bavinck, p. 175.
19. Compare K. Schilder: Zur Begriffsgeschichte des "Paradoxon" mit besonderer Berücksichtigung Calvins und das Nach-Kierkegaardschen "Paradoxon", chapter IV, in which the writer points out that Calvin stresses both the transcendence and the immanence of God in the creation. "Obwohl die Transcendenz, die Souveränität, die absolute Erhabenheit, das Ganz-anders-sein Gottes in seiner Theologie unbedingt festgehalten wird, so lässt er doch noch mehr Faktoren wirksam sein, wenn es gilt, das Verhältnis zwischen Gott, dem Offenbarer, und dem Menschen als Hörer aufzuzeigen." (p. 419).
"Calvin sowohl als Barth suchen der Transzendenz Gottes gerecht zu werden; Calvin aber hat das grosse "Paradoxon" von der Untrennbarkeit der Transzendenz und Immanenz Gottes gewagt, nicht weil er sich das philosophisch ausgedacht hatte, sondern weil es ihm durch die Heilige Schrift geoffenbart worden war. Ihn hat der Gehorsam gegen dieselbe von der Lehre des Zusammengehens der Transzendenz Gottes mit seiner Immanenz geführt zur per consequentiam für den locus de revelatione daraus entnommenen Lehre der Akkommodation Gottes." Schilder refers in this paragraph to the following text from the Institutes, I, p. 292: "Ergo, ut Deus, ad spoliandam omni patrocinio hominum impietatem, numinis sui fulgorem in creaturis de-

lineatum sine exceptione universis proponit: ita quibus se destinavit in salutem manifestare, eorum imbecillitati efficaciore remedio succurrit. Nam in eorum eruditionem non mutis duntaxat magistris utitur, sed os quoque sacrosanctum reserat; neque tantum promulgat, colendum aliquem esse Deum, sed eum se esse pronuntiat, qui colendus est. Nec ipsos docet modo in Deum respicere, sed se quoque exhibet in quem respiciant."

20. Het Calvinisme en de Reformatie van de Wijsbegeerte, p. 24.
21. Spier: Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, p. 38.
22. "Het uitgangspunt is hier niet in de rede, of voluntaristisch in het zgn. wilsvermogen, maar transcendent-religieus gekozen. Calvinijn snijdt de realistische speculatie, die meent door redelijke redeneering in de essentia Dei, quale est per se te kunnen doordringen, bij den wortel af, en scherpt het den lezer in, dat Gods wet de laatste maatstaf is van goed en kwaad. De grens der wet kan de menschelijke rede nimmer overschrijden. God staat boven de wet. Maat evenzeer toornet Calvinijn tegen de consequenties van het nominalistisch voluntarisme, dat Gods heiligheid aanrandt." Kuyper's Wetenschapsleer, Phil. Ref. 4, 1937p. 216.
23. "Die Autorität Gottes, die von Hause aus als Bezeichnung der Macht und Majestät Gottes erscheint, ist die Zusammenfassung aller göttlichen, mit dem Wesen Gottes unzertrennlich verbundenen Eigenschaften nach ihrer ökonomischen Seite. Diese Einheit der göttlichen Eigenschaften, die Einheit aller Bestimmungen des göttlichen Seins, desjenigen, was man heute als Kausalität des Characters Bezeichnet, die Verknüpfung der göttlichen Handlungen mit seiner Substanz, das alles gibt der Calvinischen Gottesvorstellung den Charakter einer in sich geschlossenen, wahren, absoluten Autorität. Denn das ist keine Autorität, die aus reiner Willkür und Laune nur zufällige und zersplitterte Zwecke ohne Ordnung und innere Notwendigkeit verfolgt. Fliessen auf diese Weise die göttlichen Betätigungen aus dem göttlichen Wesen gleichsam spontan, aus innerem Drang und innerer Notwendigkeit heraus, so kann Calvin einen etwas paradoxen, aber die Sache durchaus treffenden, Bernhard von Clairvaux entlehnten Ausdruck zur Gesamtbezeichnung der göttlichen Autorität gebrauchen, nämlich den Ausdruck: freie Notwendigkeit." Bohatec: Autokratie und Freiheit in der Gedankenwelt Calvins, Phil. Ref. V, 1940p. 28.

24. "Overduidelijk blijkt trouwens het humanistisch karakter van Occams godsleer, wanneer we het zuiver voluntaristisch godsbegrip van Occam leeren kennen," he writes. "Occams humanisme is immers voluntarisme In de leer van den autonomen en rede-wet scheppenden wil Gods openbaart zich het humanisme van Occam's godsleer zonder eenig masker. God is de 'Uebersch' . Zoodra dan ook naast God een even sterke macht zou ontstaan, en God dus niet meer het 'agens fortissimum' zou zijn, zou ook bij God de wil op de rede volgen, en het pragmatisme het voluntarisme beteugelen.

Eigenlijk is het zelfs nietzeggend, te beweren, dat re ratio bij God op den wil volgt. Want een voorafgaande wilsactus praedisponneert in God allerminst op een volgende: de eerste wilsoord is niet wet voor een tweede. Het is daarom ook zinloos, van een ratio in God te spreken: er is in god niets, wat naar de wet dezer ratio zou moeten luisteren. De wil Gods is slechts ratio voor de entia realia buiten Gods wezen. Zij, niet God, zijn aan Gods wil gehouden. Vandaar, dat Gods wezen louter wilssubstantie is. Vandaar ook, dat in deze humanistische theologie ten duidelijkste de hoofddichotomie van het occamistisch systeem naar voren komt: boven de grens ligt de vrije wil, en beneden de grens de ratio." Zuidema: De Philosophie van Occam in zijn Commentaar op de Sententiën, p. 452.

25. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 28.
26. An anticipation of this figure we find in Kuyper: Stone Lectures, p. 43: " In the depths of our hearts, at the point where we disclose ourselves to the Eternal One, all the rays of our life converge as in one focus."
27. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 102.
28. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 3.
29. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 27. For a full treatment of Dooyeweerd's conception of time, see his article: "Het tijdsprobleem in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee", Phil. Ref. V, p. 160-234.
30. Compare Bohatec: Gottes Ewigkeit nach Calvin, Phil. Ref. III, p. 133 ff. for a study of the notion of eternity in Calvin's thought. Of special interest is the distinction which Calvin draws, according to Bohatec, between eternity as an ontological and a dynamic concept.
31. Het Tijdsprobleem en zijn Antinomieën, part II, Phil. Ref. p. 5.

32. Die Nuwere Wysbegeerte aan die Vrije Universiteit, p. 56.
33. "Die deur God self geskape oer-onderskeidings in die kosmos, soos in die kosmologiese en ontologiese suksessies veronderstel, sou ek dan ook moeilik as sinbreking van of deur die kosmiese tyd kan opvat. Want anders word die spesiale skeppingsdade, die besondere skeppingsbevele Gods oorbodig, sin-loos. Maar al kan ons dan ook nie die kosmiese tyd vir hierdie 'sin'breking 'verantwoordelik' hou nie, bly alle besondere verskynsels van die kosmologiese en ontologiese skeppingsordes, skeppingssuksessies, tog tydsgebonde. Die kosmiese tyd is saam met die kosmos geskape, die kosmos saam met die kosmiese tyd, en daar bestaan 'n onloënbare opmekaar-aangewys-wees, 'n unieke aanmekaar-aangepas-wees, 'n in-mekaar-ingeskakel-wees, 'n onderlinge onverbreeklike samehang en wedersydse veronderstelling van kosmiese tyd en kosmiese besonderheid - en wel so, dat die kosmiese tyd nie die religieuse 'sin'-volheid, die kosmiese 'sin'totaliteit kan omvat nie. Met die kosmiese tyd kan net 'sin'besonderheid en 'sin'verskeidenheid gegee wees: en met die 'sin' besonderheid en 'sin' verskeidenheid net kosmiese tyd. Maar hierin lê nie opgesluit 'n kosmologiese of ontologiese prioriteit van kosmiese tyd of van die kosmiese oer-verskeidenheid nie." Phil. Ref. II, p. 65-98: Iets oor Kousaliteit. (1937)
34. "De Christelike wetsidee welke aan onze gemeenschappelijke wijsbegeerte ten grondslag ligt, vindt immers haar oorsprongsgedachte in de scheppingsdaad Gods, gelijk die ons in de Schrift is geopenbaard. De kosmische tijdsorde mag dan ook nimmer worden gezien als een soort magisch demiurg, die de schepping der modale en individualiteitsstructuren van God zou overnemen. De Schepper van hemel en aarde heeft veeleer die modale en individualiteitsstructuren zelf in Zijn tijdelijke wereldorde tot aanzijn geroepen gelijk Hij zelf - en niet de kosmische tijdsorde - de rijken der physich-chemisch gequalificeerde dingen, zoowel als planten- en dierenrijk en eindelijk den mensch geschapen heeft. Maar bij die schepping heeft God tegelijk aan alle creaturen hun eigen aard, hun eigen individualiteitsstructuren verordend, die Hij constant in de tijdelijke wereldorde verankerd heeft.....Ik ben overtuigd, dat Stoker, die trouwens de mogelijkheid van misverstand zijnerzijds uitdrukkelijk erkent, bij nader inzien zal toegeven, dat van 'magische insluipsels' in mijn tijds-idee geen sprake kan zijn." Postscript by Dooyeweerd to Iets oor Kousaliteit, Phil. Ref. II, p. 98. (1937)

35. A New Critique, Vol. II, p. 3.
36. Compare Stoker: Die Wysbegeerte van die Skeppingsidee, p. 28: "Die baie en onderskeie verskynsels in die kosmos is formeel gelykwaardig. In sy oorspronklike eieaard en individualiteit staan formeel geen enkele verskynsel bo die ander nie; elke oorspronklike verskynsel het sy unieke eieaard onmiddellik van die Skepper en in hierdie onmiddellike verhouding van die indiuiduele as indiuiduele teenoor sy Oorsprong het geen enkele verskynsel 'n prismaat bo enige ander nie."
37. Quoted by Young: Towards a Reformed Philosophy, p. 67.
38. Compare Bohatec: Autorität und Freiheit in der Gedankenwelt Calvins, I and II, Phil. Ref. V, 1940.
39. A New Critique, Vol. II, p. 47.
40. In this connection Dooyeweerd as well as Vollenhoven have treated in detail the course of antinomies in Greek, Scholastic and Humanistic thought.
41. Towards a Reformed Philosophy, p. 122.
42. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 38.
43. Ibid., p. 41: "Antinomy arises in the first place through ignoring this religious determination and dependence of theoretical thought, because this thought sets out to interpret God's causality or that of human volition in a functionalistic way. That which is one in the full sense of the word in the totality of meaning and in the Origin of all meaning respectively, turns into a contradiction between two modal functions of meaning, if interpreted functionalistically: the reason is that these two functions are made absolute in theoretical thought."
44. Ibid., p. 44.
45. Ibid., p. 103.
46. A New Critique, Vol. II, p. 162.
47. In the original Dutch text the term "zin-kern" is used, and this is translated in the English edition as "nuclear moment". The term "modal moment" seems to be a better translation of the original.

48. To explain this, Dooyeweerd again makes use of a figure: Divide a circle into two equal halves. Its centre is the modal moment of the sphere. The radii drawn from this centre in the left half signifies those analogical moments which refer to earlier spheres, those drawn on the right hand half signify the analogical moments referring to later spheres. Ibid., p. 75.
49. The structure of the spheres thus show an increasing complication, because a modal retrocipation, in referring back to the modal moment of a substratum sphere, necessarily also refers to the whole concatenation of that modal moment with its retrocipations and anticipations. The same holds for the modal anticipations.
50. H.G. Dooyeweerd: Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought, p. 47.
51. "The objects which have number lie in altogether different spheres. They are points, stones, apples, movements and so on. But none of them belong to the first (i.e. numerical) sphere. Dooyeweerd is not aware of this lack of specific substantial objects in the sphere. Nevertheless, he speaks about the latter as if there are such objects and calls them 'numbers'. What kind of objects can these numbers be, and from where does he get them? The answer is: he constructs them in a metaphysical way. He postulates first a mode of being or modal meaning, i.e. quantitative discreteness in abstractio. Then he hypostatizes this mode of being or meaning and gets his entity 'number'. 'Number' as an object is the hypostatized quantitative mode of being. From the mode of being itself 'number' is born." G.H.T. Malan: Die Eerste Getals-) kring van Dooyeweerd, Tydskrif vir Wetenskap en Kuns, Oktober 1949, p. 101ff.
- This opinion is echoed by Young: Towards a Reformed Philosophy, p. 137: "Discrete quantity, the simplest of Dooyeweerd's lawspheres, itself is not so simple as Dooyeweerd represents it. For a number to be a discrete quantity, it must be, it must be itself, it must even be related to something other than itself. Being, sameness, otherness, relation, are thus pre-supposed by numbers and by all more complex structures of reality. The most basic structures of reality are thus not numerical but ontological."
52. A New Critique, Vol. II, p. 84.
53. Among the normative spheres the historical occupies a

unique position, for it reveals itself as the foundation of all normative disclosure. Only with the historical and cultural development is the disclosure of the higher spheres made possible: a historical consciousness, a differentiated economic life, a deepened conception of law, etc. Dooyeweerd states that the disclosure of the normative spheres demand both retroceptions on the historical and anticipations of faith for their disclosure. For a detailed treatment of Dooyeweerd's conception of the rôle of cultural development in the process of disclosure, compare A New Critique, vol. II, p. 192-297.

54. Ibid., p. 305.

55. Ibid., p. 304.

56. Ibid., p. 298.

57. Ibid., p. 298.

58. Ibid., p. 298.

59. "Faith as a particular modal function is not to be viewed in an exclusively soteriological orientation but in a much wider perspective. This view was no doubt first developed by Dr. A. Kuyper in his famous Encyclopaedia of Theology. In a masterly way he analysed pistis as an irreducible function in the whole process of human knowledge." Ibid., p. 299.

60. Kuyper calls faith the "formal function of the life of the soul, which lies at the basis of each fact in our human consciousness." "Immers door pistis zift ge zeker van al datgene, waaromtrent ge een vaste overtuiging bezit, zonder dat die overtuiging bij u vrucht is van waarneming of bewijsvoering." It is and remains always a means to be persuaded with certainty, "een onmiddellijke daad van ons bewustzijn, waardoor in dat bewustzijn zekerheid omtrent enig punt ontstaat buiten alle waarneming of bewijsvoering om." Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Vol. II, p. 71ff.

61. All science proceeds from certain axioms which are given with our self-consciousness and is inseparable from it, Kuyper states. Faith is here the "mysterious bond" which binds the self-consciousness to the axiom. Even if we take the principle of identity, A - A, the fact would still remain that the certainty, the starting point for all proof, is faith. Ibid., p. 83.

62. A New Critique, Vol. II, p. 301.
63. "The uncorrupted 'natural' knowledge about God was not a kind of knowledge originating from a reason that was self-sufficient in this 'natural domain'. It was not the 'theologia naturalis' of speculative philosophy: but it was knowledge which, in its temporal character, was in the last instance exclusively guided by faith in the Word of God. Through this Word alone the eyes of the mind were opened to the understanding of the universal revelation of God in created nature. Only the function of faith was able to direct the logical function of thought to the Divine Revelation, and only the Word-Revelation could disclose to faith the Revelation in nature." Ibid. p. 308.
64. "Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them, for God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead: so that they are without excuse." Romans I, 19, 20.
65. "Taken in this restrictive sense, pistis can never be the starting point for the positive development and deepening of meaning of the function of faith implanted in man at creation. It must rather be viewed as the transcendental limit in the devolution, the degeneration and the running to waste of the true nature of faith. But it can serve as the starting point for the transcendental deepening of meaning in the process of apostasy of pistis." A New Critique, Vol. II, p. 310.
66. Dooyeweerd points out that his position has been strengthened by modern scholarship, which has revealed a pre-magical cultural stage and which has thus destroyed the evolutionistic attempt to explain Christian faith as a development from magic. The true nature of faith can only be examined by a theoretical inquiry led by the cosmomic Idea. (Compare p. 315, A New Critique, vol. II.) "Nor can our examination of the restrictive meaning-structure of the revelational principle of faith be understood as an inquiry into the original phase of belief preceding all the other developmental phases. The restrictive pistic revelational principle, in the sense intended by us, can only be understood from the cosmomic

order itself, in the light of the Divine Word-revelation." Compare A.A. Bowman: Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, vol. II, which bears out Dooyeweerd's argument.

67. A New Critique, Vol. II., p. 337 and 354.
68. According to Dooyeweerd, the term "transcendental" here means "pointing beyond the limits of time to a Deus absconditus, revealing itself in the world." Ibid., p. 309.
69. Ibid., p. 326.
70. Ibid., p. 579.
71. "En zoo is iedere individualiteitsstructuur implicite een typische tijdsorde voor den individuellen bestaansduur van het subjectieve ding of wezen, dat zich in deze structuur een typische wet voor zijn individueel bestaan ziet voorgeschreven." "De verhouding tusschen de individualiteits-structuur en de individualiteit zelve, wordt daarmee volkomen duidelijk. De eerste is een typische wet der subjectieve individualiteit, en de laatste is aan deze wet als subject onderworpen. Het subjectieve ding of wezen is intrinsiek en integraal individueel binnen het wetmatig kader zijner individualiteits-structuur. De individualiteits-structuur blijft in haar afdalende reeks van typiseeringen vanaf het radicaal-type tot het stam-type, het variabiliteitstype en het met verder getypiseerde elementair-type, van wetmatig karakter. Het bereikt nimmer zelve de eigenlijke individualiteit van het subject. Want wet en subject zijn, ondanks hun onverbrekelijke correlatie, nimmer tot elkander te herleiden." Individualiteits-structuur en Thomistisch Substantiebegrip, Phil. Ref. 9-10, 1944-45, p.22.
72. Ind. Structuur en Thomistisch Substantiebegrip, part 1, Phil. Ref. 8, p. 66 ff, 1943.
73. "Het strictgegevene in de identiteitsbeleving ten aanzien van de tijdelijke dingen gaf in geen geval een toereikenden grond, voor het zoeken naar boven tijdelijke substanties achter de dingen der naieve ervaring. De bedoelde ding-identiteit word immers onwedersprekelijk zelve als een tijdelijke ondervonden." Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, Vol. III. p. 3.
74. "Daarentegen moeten wij weder opmerken, dat de idee der individualiteits-structuur, gelijk zij door de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee is ontwikkeld, wezenlijk van het gegeven der naieve dingervaring theoretisch rekenschap geeft. Zij

is vanuit het schriftuurlijk scheppingsmotief der Woordopenbaring ontworpen en gegrond in het inzicht dat de individualiteits-structuren der werkelijkheid wezenlijke tijds-structuren zijn van typische geaardheid, evenzeer als de modale structuren der onderscheidene werkelijkheidsaspecten (als die van getal, ens) als wezenlijke modale structuren der werkelijkheid moeten worden gevat." Individualiteitsstructuur en Thomistisch Substantiebegrip, Phil. Ref. 9 and 10, 1944-45, p. 21 ff.

75. "In ...de individualiteitsstructuren der werkelijkheid zijn de modale aspecten op typische wijze gegroepeerd in een individueel totaliteitsverband, dat als typisch geheel de aspecten overspant." De Transcendentale Critiek van het Wijsgeerig denken en de grondslagen van de Wijsgeerige Denkgemeenschap van het Avondland, Phil. Ref. 6, p. 7, 1941.
76. "Onder 'enkaptisch structuurgeheel' verstaat de W.d.W. een typisch vorm-geheel (in den zin van gestalte-eenheid) waarin meerdere intrinsiek verschillende individualiteitsstructuren - met behoud van haar internen eigen aard en 'sovereiniteit in eigen kring' - tot een individueel geheel zijn vervlochten, terwijl dit vorm-geheel door de hoogste, daarin vervlochten structuur is gequalificeerd." Individualiteitsstructuur en Thomistisch Substantiebegrip, Phil. Ref. 9 and 10, 1944-45, p. 21 ff.

Dooyeweerd mentions different types of encaptic intertwinements: (1) Foundational intertwinement (the statue founded in the marble), (2) correlative intertwinement (the tree and its surroundings), (3) symbiotic intertwinement (the bee and the bee-colony), (4) intertwinement between subject and object (bird and nest, parish and church-building), (5) territorial intertwinement (between state and social structure within the same territory.)

- 77.) Die Nuwere Wysbegeerte aan die Vrije Universiteit, pp. 40-57.

78. "Aanvegbaar is die gangbare opvatting van substansie (en dit beklemtoon Vollenhoven en Dooyeweerd tereg) hul ankering in die immanensie-standpunt, die standpunt wat die argimedespunt in die kosmos en nie in die relasie van kosmos tot God sien nie." Ibid., p. 43.

79. "As die eenheid die logiese prius is, en ook in die nuwe ervaring die eerste gegee is, dan kan ons sê: die bepaalde retrosipasies en antisipasies, wat in a sistase patent (en latent) is, is bepaal deur hierdie voorafge-

gewe eenheid en nie omgekeerd: die eenheid is te danke aan die antisipasies, retrosipasies en veral die funksionele rol van die leidende wetskring. Die eenheid is konstitutief vir die samehang van die veelheid, en nie omgekeerd nie." Ibid., p. 45.

80. Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, Vol. III, p. 52.

81. Die Nuwere Wysbegeerte aan die Vrije Universiteit, p. 48.

82. Compare Dooyeweerd: Boekbespreking: Vraagstukken uit de Natuurphilosophie, Phil. Ref. 6, p. 58. "De zelf-heid kan in geen geval als typisch structuurkenmerk dienst doen. Zelf-heid in eigenlijken zin wil zeggen het individueele religieuze concentratiepunt of centrum van alle tijdelijke functies, doch zulk een centrum komt aan geen enkel louter tijdelijk schepsel toe. Dit is juist het radicaal verschil tusschen den mensch eenerzijds, dieren, planten en anorganische schepselen anderzijds dat alleen de eerste een geconcentreerd bestaan heeft."

83. "Uit twee zelfstandigheden kan geen nieuwe substantie ontstaan, tenzijnde laatste een nieuwen zelfstandigheidsvorm zou bezitten, die zich dan noch met dien van de "lichamelijke", noch met de 'geestelijke' substantie mag dekken, maar niettemin alle vermogens van de elementaire substanties aan het compositum moet waarborgen. Maar volgens de door Thomas verdedigde aristotelische leer heeft de mensch als compositum geen anderen substantieelen vorm dan de anima rationalis, terwijl bovendien een 'geestelijke substantie' nimmer haar actueel bestaan kan verliezen, omdat zij 'onverwoestbaar' is. Derhalve kan de anima rationalis als 'deel' van de 'menschelijke natuur', geen 'onsterflijke substantie', maar, gelijk Aristoteles leerde, slechts 'vorm van het lichaam' zijn.

Thomas houdt echter aan het substantieel karakter van de anima rationalis vast. Dan kan echter de laatste ook niet de zelfstandigheidsvorm van het materie-lichaam zijn en moet het materie-lichaam zelve als een 'substantie' onafhankelijk van de anima rationalis worden beschouwd. Daarmede is dan de terugkeer tot de traditioneel-scholastische leer van den mensch als compositum uit twee substanties gegeven, die weer in de gesignaleerde antinomie vervalt, dat zij met de aangenomen substantieele eenheid van den mensch in strijd komt, omdat Thomas althans het actueel voortbestaan van de anima rationalis als zelfstandigheid in het compositum niet kan loochenen." Individualiteitsstructuur en Thomistisch Substantie-begrip, Phil. Ref. 11, 1946, p. 29. See also: Kuyper's Weten-

schapsleer, Phil. Ref.4, 1939, p. 201ff.

84. J.M. Spier: Inleiding tot de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, p. 25.
85. Compare also: A New Critique, Vol. I, p 55: "A real account of this fact is rendered only by the Biblical Revelation concerning the creation of man in the image of God. God reveals Himself as the absolute Origin excluding every independent counter-power which may be His opposite. He has expressed His image in man by concentrating its entire temporal existence in the radical religious unity of an ego in which the totality of meaning of the temporal cosmos was to be focussed upon its Origin. The fundamental dependence of human self-knowledge upon the knowledge of God has consequently its inner ground in the essence of religion as the central sphere of our created nature."
86. Compare especially: Hepp, Dreigende Deformatie, Vol. II I. and J. Masselink: New Views Regarding Common Grace, (Calvin Forum, vol. XLX, no. X.)
87. "Man is the bearer of God's image and can be qualified by none of his functions. Nevertheless, Dooyeweerd's conception of the relation of the heart to the functions is not without certain difficulties. Is a sharp dualism of heart and functions more satisfactory than a sharp dualism between two groups of functions? Is the transcendence of the human heart in Dooyeweerd perhaps an abstract transcendence? Has Dooyeweerd perhaps not completely overcome the abstraction of the Kantian transcendental subject which he so skilfully attacks? Dooyeweerd's functionless soul, especially when conceived in its separated state after death, seems a more shadowy spectre than the scholastic anima rationalis. Such a ghost of a soul would appear a far cry from that soul defended by Calvin in the Psychopannychia. Calvin conceives of the soul as a substance, which after the death of the body truly lives, being endued both with sense and understanding. A soul deprived of all sense, according to Calvin, would be a soul which has none of the properties of soul, a soul dissevered from itself. In the words of Tertullian, anima animae sensus est. Can we not purify Calvin's conception from certain accidental philosophical appendages in view of Dooyeweerd's just criticism of the Scholastic psychology? We might thus arrive at a conception of the soul more concrete but not less a unity than that of Dooyeweerd. In particular, we should reject any sharp cleavage, while retaining the distinction between heart and functions. The unity of the full personality is

threatened by any such dualism as well as by that of Scholasticism. A heart which includes in itself an element of the functions rather than one which excludes everything functional would after all be more transcendent than the product of pure negation of the functions. To take only the case of thinking. Thinking may not be the centre of human nature, but an element of thinking is included in that centre. The scriptural conception of the heart presents a rich diversity of function. The unity of man is not a unity excluding diversity but rather a unity in diversity, even as the Divine Unity is a Unity in diversity." Towards a Reformed Philosophy, p. 143.

88. Die Nuwere Wysbegeerte aan die Vrije Universiteit, p. 144.
89. "The latter restlessly seeks its origin in order to understand its own meaning, and in its own meaning, the meaning of our entire cosmos." A. New Critique, Vol. I, p. 11.
90. "De mensch heeft inderdaad zulk een religieus centrum, maar anorganische stoffen, planten en dieren zijn louter van tijdelijke structuur." Individualiteitsstructuren en het Thomistisch Substantiebegrip I, Phil. Ref. 8, 1943, p. 97. Compare also: De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee en de Barthianen, Phil. Ref. 16, 1951, p. 153:
"De zonde raakt de radix, de religieuze wortel-eenheid der menselijke existentie, zij raakt het 'hart' van ons bestaan, waaruit de uitgangen des levens zijn en waarin onze gehele tijdelijke existentie in haar grote divergentie van functies en structuren, convergeert in haar religieuze concentratie zoals in het centrale gebod van de liefdedienst van God en de naaste, de wortel-eenheid is vervat van de goddelijke wetsorde in al haar tijdelijke verscheidenheid van wetskringen, zo ligt in het hart van de mens in zijn bijbels-religieuze zin de wortel-eenheid van de menselijke existentie in haar aan de wet onderworpen subjectiviteit. In het hart des mensen is niet slechts de menselijke existentie, maar de gehele tijdelijke creatuurlijke wereld geconcentreerd. Vandaar dat Adams zondeval deze gehele tijdelijke wereld - inbegrepen de anorganische, de planten- en dierenwereld - meesleepte. Vandaar ook, dat de zondeval noodwendig radicaal is."
91. Compare J. H. Diemer: Natuur en Wonder, Phil. Ref. 8, ¹⁹⁴³ p. 104. "In Adam als eerste Hoofd van het menschengeslacht, waarin geheel de tijdelijke kosmos religieus was geworteld, is het wonder der schepping voor den mensch zichtbaar geworden. In hem lagen alle structuren van den tijdelijken kosmos besloten en ook na de ontsluiting dezer structuren aan

het einde der 'scheppingsweek' zijn ze van hem niet los te maken. De uiteenstelling in Genesis I is geenscheiding, doch een ontsluiting voor het geestesoog van de rijke structuurverscheidenheid, die in den wortel als concentrische eenheid lag opgesloten."

92. "De leer van den mensch staat tegelijk aan het begin en aan het einde van het wijsgeerig onderzoek: Aan het begin, omdat men in de idee van het archimedisch punt van het theoretisch wijsgeerig denken, reeds een allesbeheerschende vooronderstelling over de menschelijke existentie meebrengt. Aan het einde, omdat de eigenlijke anthropologie eerst kan worden opgetrokken op de grondslagen van een wijsgeerige werkelijksleer, waarin alle structuren der tijdelijke realiteit aan een omstandig onderzoek zijn onderworpen." Dooyeweerd: Individualiteits-structuur en Thomistisch Substantiebegrip IV, Phil. Ref. 11, 1946, p. 52.

Notes to Chapter IV.

1. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 3 ff.
2. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 550.
3. Ibid., p. 548.
4. Ibid., p. 546, footnote.
5. "...The human selfhood as the religious root, as the heart of our entire existence, transcends the temporal limits of our cosmos. It transcends all the modal aspects. Philosophy, directed toward the totality of meaning, in the whole of its activity, is necessarily of a theoretical character. From a Christian point of view, therefore, it is meaningless and even dangerous to take over a basic classification, employed by immanentist philosophy, which is rooted in the intrinsic dissension of its archimedean point."
Ibid., p. 541.
6. Ibid., p. 541.
7. Dooyeweerd's promised work on the subject of philosophical anthropology has not yet been published.
8. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 543.
9. Ibid., p. 548.
10. "The word a priori stands in bad repute in special science (with the exception of logic and mathematics). And rightly so, for the word is badly tainted with the rationalistic prejudice of the humanistic science ideal, which ascribed a creative logical function to human consciousness. It was supposed that the structure of given reality should be first methodically eliminated, after which the a priori constructive order of 'creative' thought has to be imposed on itThe constructive view of the subjective a priori elements of our knowledge, based as it is on the humanistic cosmomic idea, is in reality a consequence of the ... pride of man, who in his supposed self-sufficiency of thought refuses to submit to the Divine world-order. From the outset we have rejected this view, as we have broken with the cosmomic idea in which it is founded. The cognitive subject does not create the horizon of his experience

himself. The law-conformable structure of his experience does not originate from a sovereign 'transcendental subject'. The modal structure of the law spheres abstracted in the theoretical synthesis of meaning, must be carefully read from the horizon of the full temporal reality created by God." Ibid., Vol. II, p. 556.

11. "The a priori horizon of human experience is thus the Divine order of the 'earthly' creation itself, in which man and all things have been given their structure and order in the cosmos." Ibid., p. 559.
12. Ibid., p. 559.
13. Ibid., p. 549.
14. Ibid., p. 552.
15. Ibid., p. 552.
16. Ibid., p. 554.
17. Ibid., p. 557.
18. Ibid., p. 564.
19. Ibid., p. 573.
20. Ibid., p. 575.
21. "We have seen that no single special science is possible without an a priori theoretical synthesis of meaning, in which the modal horizon of the law-sphere forming the Gegenstand has been intended theoretically. Even if a special scientist does not critically take account of this subjective a priori synthesis, he must handle it implicitly. Otherwise he is unable to conduct investigations in the domain of his special science. Mathematics in itself cannot fix the modal horizon of the physical law-sphere theoretically. Neither can ethics define the horizon of the juridical aspect, or psychology that of the aesthetic sphere. As to the a priori theoretical foundation of all special sciences whose field of research is delimited by a particular aspect of experience, one and the same criterion of theoretical truth is valid: the accordance between our subjective a priori meaning-synthesis and the modal structure of the Gegenstand, in the all-sided coherence of the temporal horizon of our experience, and in relation to the religious fullness of Truth." Ibid., p. 576.

22. Ibid., p. 565.
23. Ibid., p. 565.
24. Ibid., p. 434.
25. "Every meaningful theoretical concept, every meaningful theoretical judgement, however highly 'formalized', presupposes the inter-modal synthesis and the cosmic systasis of meaning. A 'formal logic' can only be a 'formalized' logic in inter-modal meaning-synthesis. It particularly examines the analytical aspect in this 'formalization' whose limits are determined by the modal structure in its universal inter-modal meaning-coherence. As remarked, all analytical modal individuality and all total structures of individuality are eliminated in this case. Such a formal logic belongs to the special theory of the law spheres. It will be distinguished from the mathematical, physical, biological, psychological etc. fields of research. In these latter our theoretical attention is not directed to the analytical aspect itself, but to the opposed non-logical aspects analysed in the theoretical synthesis, which are only analytically encompassed by the logical categories." Ibid., p. 464.
26. Ibid., pp. 464-465.
27. Vollenhoven: Hoofdlijnen der Logica, pp. 29-30. For his development of the notion of a Christian logic, see also Logos and Ratio, and De Noodzakelijkheid eener Christelijke Logica, especially pp. 81-98.
28. A New Critique, Vol. II, p. 465.
29. Ibid., p. 579.
30. Ibid., p. 579.
31. Ibid., p. 572.

32. "But there is one thing that a truly Christian philosophy should never doubt, viz. that all relative truths, even the judgement 2×2 equals 4, becomes an untruth, if the law-conformable state of affairs, expressed in it, is detached from the temporal world-order and from the sovereignty of God as the Creator. It becomes an untruth, if it is absolutised into a 'truth in itself' (Wahrheit an sich). Creaturely reality itself has a perspectivist horizon which mocks at any absolutising of its temporal structure. A superficial (essentially apostate) resting in a temporal horizon of experience that is supposed to be firm in itself, is contrary to truth, contrary to the structure of our selfhood. Any one in the apostate attitude who clings to the temporal horizon in the supposition that it is self-sufficient, clings to a Fata Morgana." Ibid., p. 572.
33. Ibid., p. 592. According to Vollenhoven, the word 'truth' in Scripture in the majority of cases means steadfastness, certainty, reliability, which for Dooyeweerd gives the expression 'stand in the truth' its full meaning. "The truthful a priori attitude of thought has for its primary pre-requisite the standing of the thinking selfhood in the Truth, because of our heart's accepting Divine Revelation." Ibid., p. 572.
34. Ibid., p. 561.
35. Ibid., p. 562.
36. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 1.
37. Strictly speaking, the science which God has of Himself is cognitio rather than scientia, for science has principles and conclusions, i.e. it is discursive, but God's knowledge of Himself is not discursive. Only to our mode of conceiving things are there in God principles and conclusions.
38. Compare especially De Veritate, q.14, a.9, ad. 2.
39. "Sciendum est, quod duplex est scientiarum genus. Quaedam enim sunt quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine naturali intellectus, sicut arithmetica, geometria et huiusmodi; quaedam vero sunt quae procedunt ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, sicut perspectiva (id est optica) procedit ex principiis notificatis per geo-

metriam, et musica (seu harmonia) ex principiis per arithmetican notis. Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde sicut musica credit principia tradita sibi ab arithmetico, ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo." Summa Theologiae, I, a.q.I, a.2.

40. "Nam, ut ostendit S.Thomas, loc.cit. per assensum distinguitur credere ab operatione qua intellectus inspicit formas simplices, scilicet quidditates, et a dubitatione, et ab opinione (opinans enim non habet assensum, cum non firmetur eius acceptio circa alteram partem.) Per cogitationem vero separatur credere ab intellectu (principiorum), sed per hoc quod habet cogitationem et assensum quasi ex aequo, distinguitur a scientia. Cogitatio enim est motus intellectus nondum quietatus, quia objectum nondum est evidens et non sufficienter movet ac determinat. In scientia cogitatio inducit ad assensum et assensus quietat. Sed in fide est assensus et cogitatio quasi ex aequo: non enim assenses ex cogitatione causatur, sed ex voluntate, ut dictum est. Sed quia intellectus non hoc modo terminatur ad unum ut ad proprium terminum perducatur, qui est visio alicuius intelligibilis; inde est quod eius motus nondum est quietatus, sed adhuc habet cogitationem et inquisitionem de his quae credit, quamvis firmissime eis assentiat; quantum enim est ex seipso, non est ei satisfactum, nec est terminatus ad unum; sed terminatur tantum ex extrinseco. Et inde est quod intellectus credentis dicitur esse captivatus, quia tenetur terminis alienis et non propriis: II Cor. X, 5: 'in captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum.' Inde etiam est quod in credente potest insurgere motus de contrario huius quod firmissime tenet quamvis non in intelligente nec in sciente." Garrigou-Lagrange: De Revelatione, Vol.I, p. 415.

41. Summa Theologiae, II-II, q.45, a.

42. "Therefore, because Sacred Scripture considers things precisely under the formality of being divinely revealed, whatever has been divinely revealed possesses the one precise formality of the object of this science, and therefore is included under sacred doctrine as under one science." Ibid., I, I, 3.

43. Ibid., I, I, 2.

44. A New Critique, Vol. II, p. 562.

45. "Indien die teologie alleen uit die Skrif vir alle wetenskappe die principia moet opspoor en aanbied, sou dit benewens sy algemeen erkende taak om uit die organisme van Gods Woord Godskennis te sistematiseer, ook 'n algemeen-teoretiese en kosmiese taak hê. Indien dit sou poog om principia daar te stel wat sonder voorbehoud deur die wetenskappe aanvaar moet word, sou dit as gevolg hê dat die fête tussen teologie en die ongeloofsfilosofie verskerp word. Ons sou soveel filosofiese sisteme verkry as wat daar dogmatiese skole bestaan en die een filosofiese sisteem sou hom nie rekenskap van sy principia kan gee teenoor die ander nie, maar sal moet verwys na die dogmatiek. Dan sou die dogmatiese skole van Kant en Schleiermacher, van Hegel, Barth en Brunner, van Doedes en Kuyper, van Bavinck, Kuyper en Van Oosterzee, die stryd moet voer oor wysgerige principia." Van der Walt: Die Wysbegeerte van Dr. Herman Bavinck, p. 188.
46. "Die wysbegeerte het sy religieuse a priori, wat deur en deur wysgerig is en in sy grondideë, onder leiding van die teologie wysgerig geformuleer word, maar kan 'n teologiese formulering van sy a priori nie aanvaar, sonder om verteologiseer te word nie." Grepe uit 'n Calvinistiese Wysbegeerte, Koers, Vol. VIII, no. 4, Feb. 1941, p. 148.
47. "Er is een tijd beweest, dat de theologie algemeen gehouden werd voor de 'regina scientiarum', de koningin der wetenschappen, en er zijn zelf nog in onzen tijd theologen, die aan dit onjuiste denkbeeld menen te moeten vasthouden. Het koninklijk, dus heersend karakter der theologie zou onder meer ook hierin uitkomen, dat iedere man van wetenschap, op welk vakgebied ook en te meer nog de beoefenaar van de christelijke wijsbegeerte, en zelfs iedere Christgelovige in de uitvoering van zijn levenstaak, die zich op de Heilige Schrift zou beroepen, zich voor dat Schrift-beroeft noodzakelijk door de theologie zou moeten laten voorlichten. Daaruit zou consequent volgen, dat elke christelijke wetenschap, zowel wijsbegeerte als vakwetenschap, haar karakter van onderhorigheid onder de theologie zou moeten toegeven." J.M. Spier: Het Veld van Onderzoek voor de Theologie II, Phil.Ref. 16, ¹⁹⁵¹p. 13.
48. J.M. Spier: Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, p.96
49. "In this connection may not theology (not as a historical, practical or exegetical, but as a systematic and logical discipline) be looked upon as ultima philosophia as well as ultima scientia, as Dooyeweerd exclusively views it? Dooye-

weerd tends to obscure the universal character of theology by classing it as a special science, even the highest in the sense of the most complex and transcendental boundary-scienceSuch an outlook re-opens the door to a form of speculative theology or philosophy, bound to Revelation while using temporal categories to express the reality of the supra-temporal sphere. At the same time, it restricts philosophy in a sense in which the system of the Wetsidee does not, when the latter ranks theology with the special sciences but ascribes to philosophy a singularly unique position." Young: Towards a Reformed Philosophy, p. 138.

50. "Nie die Openbring nie, maar die herbore hart word as grondslag van die wysbegeerte gestel. Ons sien nie oor die hoof dat die Hoogleraar spesifiseer dat die 'Christelike vrijheid' van hierdie herbore hart 'slechts gewaarborgd' is in voortdurende gebondenheid aan het Woord Gods ...' nie. Dog juis hierin is ons beswaar geleë dat sodanige voortdurende gebondenheid aan die Woord, weens die verdorvenheid van ons natuur, nooit voorkom nie: en daarom mag die vaste basis van die revelatio specialis nooit ingeruïl word vir die onbestendigheid en feilbaarheid van die nog sondige wedergebore hart of ego regeneratus nie. Bowendien beantwoord die religio subjectiva nie aan die eise van 'n a priori nie. Dit is immers geen grondwaarheid nie, dog wijst noodzakelijk naar de openbaring als haar objectieven grondslag heen." F.J.M. Potgieter: Die Verhouding tussen die Teologie en die Filosofie by Calvyn, p. 219.
51. "Potgieter contends that a complete and constant submission of the ego regeneratus is nowhere found because no one is perfect. But surely such a submission does take place in principle or there would be no Christian theology any more than a Christian philosophy. Potgieter apparently desires that the Christian philosopher, instead of going directly to the Bible itself, shall come to a 'bekwame professor the ologicus' for a statement of what the Bible has to say to him. Are we then to understand that this is because this theological professor is perfect in degree as well as in principle? If the author had observed the simple distinction between perfection in principle and perfection in degree he could not have made the exceedingly serious charge of subjectivism against Dooyeweerd." Again: "Dooyeweerd has constantly subjected the ego regeneratus to the Scriptures. To be sure, Dooyeweerd finds in the ego regeneratus the immediate starting point and concentration point of philosophyBut in order to have such a vantage point, Dooyeweerd points outone must be self-consciously related to the Originator of the world

- Nothing could be more in accord with the genius of Calvinism than just this. Calvin in the very first section of the first book of his Institutes insists that we shall think concretely. We are to think of ourselves as creatures of God and as sinners before Him. It is the great virtue of the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee that it so persistently and obviously does what Potgieter says it does not do. Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven insist in all their writings that man should regard himself as a creature and a sinner and should therefore go to the Scriptures in order in the light of it to search out the meanings of the created world." Review by C. Van Til in Phil.Ref. p. 53, of F.J.M. Potgieter's "Die Verhouding tussen die Teologie en die Filosofie by Calvyn."
52. W. Masselink: New Views Regarding Common Grace, Calvin Forum, Vol. XIX, p. 173, April, 1954, no. 9.
53. "Want we betreden hier een wijsgeerig terrein, dat, vanuit de gezichtshoek van onze Calvinistische wijsbegeerte beschouwd, nog zo goed als onontginnen is." J.M. Spier: Het Veld van Onderzoek voor de Theologie, Phil. Ref. 15, 1950, p. 169.
54. Compare H.R. Rookmaker: Ontwerp ener Aesthetica op Grondslag der Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, Phil.Ref. no. II, 1946, pp. 140-167. Also H. Dooyeweerd: De Modale Structuur van het Juridisch Oprzakelijksverband (Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, Amsterdam, 1950.)
55. This was already done by Dooyeweerd in his analysis of the modal sphere of faith, and by Spier, Inleiding, p. 94: "Zoals reeds gezegd heeft deze grenskring geen anticipaties, maar daarentegen een maximum aan retrocipaties. We noemden al de retrocipaties op het ethische, het psychische, het oeconomische en het analytische in de geloofsverering, geloofsblijdschap, offer en geloofskennis. Zo vaak in het pistische over vorming wordt gesproken, hebben we te maken met historische analogieën, b.v. kerkvorm, vorming der belijdenissen, etc. Als de kerk haar geloofsinhoud uitdrukt in belijdenissen, die in kerkelijke taal symbolen heten, dan heeft die handeling niet alleen de historische, maar ook de linguïstische wetskring tot modaal substraat. In de gemeenschap der ephiligen ligt ook een sociaal element, de omgang met hen, die denzelfden Zaligma-ker liefhebben."

56. "In het dogma zijn de hoofdwaarheden der Heilige Schrift verwerkt. Deze verwerking van de inhoud der Woord-openbaring tot confessie is geen wetenschappelijke zaak, maar een geloofsactie, die niet van de enkele gelovige, doch van de kerk uitgaat. M.a.w. de theologie scheidt geen dogmata. Hoe zou het kunnen? Een analytisch gequalificeerd subject, zoals de wetenschap is, kan geen pistische norm voortbrengen. Neen, de theologie gaat in haar dogmatologie van de kerkelijk - geijkte confessie uit om deze wetenschappelijk te verwerken, te systematiseren, tegen dwaling te verdedigen en in haar wording te beschrijven, soms ook om nieuw dogma voor te bereiden. Al kan dus zulke dogmatologische wetenschappelijke arbeid wel zijdelings invloed hebben op nieuwe dogmavorming of tot correctie van het bestaande dogma stimuleren, toch is zowel de vorming van nieuw dogma als ook de correctie van het oude een zuiver kerkelijke actie, die niet door de wetenschap, maar door het geloof gequalificeerd is." J.M. Spier: Het Veld van Onderzoek voor de Theologie, II, Phil. Ref. 16, 16, 1951, p. 2.
57. "Ook het onderzoek van de pseudo-godsdiensten behoort tot de taak van de theologie. Dit onderzoek is echter niet onder te brengen bij één van de genoemde normatieve of subjectieve groepen van theologische vakken. Het moet daarentegen gezien worden als een afzonderlijk stuk theologie, dat - tegenover het tot nu toe besproken rechts-gerichte pistische leven - het links-gerichte tot veld van onderzoek heeft." Ibid., p. 12.
58. Spier criticises Kuyper's treatment of theology, saying that although Kuyper perceived that the gegenstand of theology is the modal sphere of faith, and although all four subjects mentioned by him are orientated to Scripture as their principium divisionis, Kuyper does not distinguish between the norm and the subject of faith, and the corresponding distinction between the normative and subject sciences, in the Encyclopaedia of Theology, Compare J.M. Spier: Het Veld van Onderzoek voor de Theologie, I, Phil. Ref. 15, 1950, p. 174.
59. "De Theologie was eenmaal de koningin der wetenschappen. Van haar gingen alle andere wetenschappen uit en zij achen het haar taak en hoogste eer nieuwe bouwstoffen aan te dragen voor het groote, alomvattende paleis der Theologie. Het is onze diepste overtuiging, dat de Theologie die positie nog heeft. En het is moeilijk in te zien, hoe een wetenschap, die over de openbaring Gods handelt, anders kan zijn dan uitgangspunt en doel van alle andere wetenschap.

God is toch niet een bijkomstigheid of een post naast anderder posten. Wie over God spreekt, spreekt over alles; en wie over iets anders spreekt, spreekt, of hij wil of niet, toch over God." G. van der Leeuw, Inleiding in de Theologie, p. 113.

60. "Toch neemt de theologie anderzijds in de rij der wetenschappen een uitzonderlijke plaats in. Dit uitzonderingskarakter echter ligt niet in het feit, dat de theologie zich tussen Gods Woord en iedere beoefenaar van Christelijke wetenschap inschuift, maar in het andere feit, dat het veld van onderzoek, dat aan haar is toegewezen, de laatste grenskring is in de kosmische orde der modale aspecten. Al het pistische wijst boven het geschapene uit naar Hem, die niet alleen de Schepper is van alle creatuur, maar die ook in Jezus Christus Zijn wereld verlost en bezig is Zijn werk te voltooien.

Deze stand van zaken geeft aan de theologie een bijzonder cachet. Want de beschouwing van den kosmos sub specie aeternitas accentueert in de eerste plaats dat al ons kennen op de aarde ten delen is. Voorts herinnert zij ons er aan, dat onze arbeid die in geloofsgehoorzaamheid volbracht wordt, ook ons wetenschappelijk werk, niet ijdel zal zijn in den Heere. En tenslotte vermaant zij ons te waken voor de zonde van wetenschapsverheerlijking, omdat niet de wetenschappelijke, maar de religieuze kennis van God in het aangezicht van Jezus Christus het eeuwige leven is." J.M. Spier: Het Veld van Onderzoek voor de Theologie, II, Phil. Ref. 16, 1951, p. 14.

61. Compare K.J. Popma: De Vrijheid der Exegese, p. 257: (Quoted by J.M. Spier, Het Veld van Onderzoek voor de Theologie, II, Phil. Ref. 16, 1951, p. 14.) "Maar ernstiger is nog de fout van de ambtsheisme in wetenschappelijken zin. De wetenschap is nooit subject des geloofs, omdat wetenschappelijke arbeid weliswaar door het geloof geleid wordt, maar nooit geloofsactie is. De bediening des Woords is geloofsactie, de theologische uiteenzetting is theoretisch werk. De theologie kan nooit meer doen dan a.h.v. een descriptieve en historische grammatica schrijven van het leven des geloofs. Dat is zeer veel, en er is iets voor te zeggen, dat dit op wetenschappelijk terrein het hoogste beteken, want het leven des geloofs is in de menselijke natuur het hoogste, daar het alle andere levensfuncties onderstelt en in zich bevat. Zo gezien is er zelfs geen bezwaar tegen de theologie de koningin der wetenschappen te noemen. Dat neemt echter niet weg, dat het theologische werk, zo goed als alle wetenschappelijke arbeid, niet door

het geloof word gequalificeerd, maar theoretisch van aard is, dus gequalificeerd door de secundaire analyse."

62. Compare, e.g. Garrigou-Lagrange: De Revelatione, p. 125 ff, p. 482 ff. For the formal heretic, Garrigou-Lagrange states, there remain many ideas concerning matters of faith, but the formality of theological science no longer remains. Hence there is theology materially only, not formally, for in its conclusions the word "is" is used opinionatively and not certainly, for the conclusion is deduced from the major premise, which is held not with certainty on account of the authority of God whom reveals, but with opinion only, on account of a motive which is nothing other than private and personal judgement. There remains in the heretic only the corpse of theological science, for science is a simple quality specified by the formal object which here is God known through virtual revelation. But Divine revelation being rejected by heresy, the simple habit of theology no longer remains, but notions which are materially united under some or other unstable opinion by the private judgement and will of the heretic.
63. "Van Roomse kant word die vraag gestel: indien julle onderling verskil ook ten opsigte van die interpretasie van die Skrif, hoe kom julle dan tot 'n beslissing? Ons antwoord hierop lui as volg: Christus het beloof dat Sy Gees die kerk in die hele waarheid sou lei. Die kerkgeskiedenis bevestig dat hy sy beloftes in stand gehou het. Die Pinkstergemeente en vroeë kerk het uit die Woord van God geleef: en deur die besluite van die vroeë sinodes, soos die van Nicea (325), Konstantinopel (381) en Chalcedon (451), loop dieselfde goudaar van die suiwere waarheid ooreenkomstig die Skrif. Hierdie konsilies of ekumeniese sinodes het hulle beslissings in gehoorsaamheid aan die Woord onder leiding van die Heilige Gees geneem. Allengs het die ware kerk ontaard In laaste instansie is dit die ekumeniese sinode wat in geval van meningsverskil in onderworpenheid aan die Heilige Skrif en met inagneming van die leiding van die Heilige Gees deur die loop van die eeue die beslissing vel. In sy kommentaar op I. Joh. 4:1 skryf Calvyn dat die Papiste hulle ook op konsilies beroep, maar dan op konsilies as sodanig sonder om ag te gee op die noodsaaklike onderwerping aan die Woord en Gees van God. En in Institusie IV, 9,1, beklemtoon hy dat dit "die reg van Christus is, dat Hy voorsitter is van alle konsilies en geen mens in dié waardigheid tot metgesel het nie. En ek sê dat Hy eers dan voorsitter is wanneer Hy die ganse vergadering deur sy woord en Gees bestuur. Sodanige konsilies vrywaar die Protestant van individualisme en subjektiwisme, en rig sy skrede op die weg van die waarheid. Per slot van rekening is daar geen ander vastigheid as die

wat bewerkstellig word deur die waaragtige geloofsbinding aan Christus nie." F.J.M. Potgieter: Rooms-Katolisisme en Reformasie, pp. 4-5.

64. "Tot dusver is die teologie net aangewys om te leen by 'n oorwegend nie-christelike wysbegeerte en nie-christelike wetenskap. Dis die valse posisie waarin die teologie verkeer, wat so grootliks bydra tot vervalsing en modernisering van die teologie. Die enigste weg om hierdie valse posisie te oorwen, is om doelbewus 'n kalvinistiese wysbegeerte en wetenskap op te bou, waarin die kalvinistiese teologie vryelik sou kan gebruik maak so ver as nodig, sonder om die gevaar te loop om ongemerk van die Skrif af te raak." H.G. Stoker: Die Nuwere Wysbegeerte aan die Vrije Universiteit, p. 9.

Notes to Chapter V.

1. "Sinds haar optreden op het toneel der Nederlandsche philosophie heeft de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee met toenemenden aandrang gepleit voor een doorbreking van het isolement der onderscheiden scholen en richtingen, die zich vooral in de eerste decennien der XXe eeuw in een zeker geestelijk exclusivisme van elkander hadden afgesloten.

Wat zij hierbij beoogde was uiteraard niet een formeele critische gedachtenwisseling, waarbij de tegenstander met meer of minder geluk bestreden wordt vanuit eigen uitgangspunt, maar het uitlokken van een wezenlijk tweegesprek van richting met richting, waarbij van weerszijden de begeerte zou voorzitten wezenlijk door te dringen tot de diepste grondslagen van het wijsgeerig denken en het standpunt van den tegenstander inderdaad vanuit diens eigen geestelijk grondmotief te benaderen.

Daartoe diende de transcendentale critiek van het theoretisch denken als zoodanig, die eindigde in een scherpe onderscheiding tusschen de wezenlijk theoretisch-wijsgeerige oordeelen en de - vaak aan den denker verborgen - boven-theoretische voor-oordeelen, die in het religieuze grondmotief van zijn denken geworteld zijn en de geheele richting van dit laatste bepalen.

Was deze transcendentale critiek gedoemd zonder weerklank te blijven bij wijsgeerige scholen, die zich op de autonomie van het wijsgeerig denken hebben vasgelegd? Dit zou inderdaad het geval zijn, wanneer zij aan de laatste de eisch zou hebben gesteld bij voorbaat het geloof in de autonomie prijs te geven Van de aanhangers van deze autonomie vroeg zij slechts, dat zij niet langer dogmatisch dit standpunt voor een wijsgeerig axioma zouden uitgeven, maar op conscientieus critische wijze zouden trachten te komen tot een bepaling van het ware karakter ervan." (Phil. Ref. 13, p. 26: Het Wijsgeerig Tweegesprek tusschen de Thomistische philosophie en de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee.)

2. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 115.
3. "De ex-cathedra-toon moet binnen de grenzen van een wezenlijk theoretische discussie dan plaats maken voor een eerlijke poging elkander critisch theoretisch te benaderen." (De Transcendentale Critiek van het Wijsgeerig Denken, Phil. Ref. 6, pp. 18-19. (1941))
4. Dooyeweerd also considers that the transcendental critique makes possible an unprejudiced philosophy of history. (A

New Critique, Vol.I, p. 115.) The meaning of philosophical terms like idealism, realism, materialism, etc. which are applied indiscriminately to movements in Greek, Scholastic and Humanistic philosophy, are dependent on deeper religious motives which determine the sense in which these terms are used. The critique, in unmasking these religious motives, thus causes great critical clarification in the use of terms denoting philosophical trends. Vollenhoven's attempts at such systematic analyses and classification of trends in the history of philosophy have, however, been sharply criticised. Compare Loenen and De Vos' criticism of Vollenhoven, counter-criticised by Popma in Historicale Methode en Historische Continuïteit, p. 97-145, Phil.Ref. 19, 1952.

5. "In de religieuze grondthema's, die den ontwikkelingsgang der westersche wijsbegeerte beheerschen, kan de subjectieve denkgemeenschap van het avondland niet gegrond zijn, omdat zij door de radicale religieuze anti-theze welke de Christelijke religie stelt, van elkander gescheiden zijn." Grondthema's van 't Wijsgeerig denken van 't avondland, pp.172-173, Phil. Ref. 6, 1941.
6. "What now is the fruit of this transcendental critique of thought for the discussion among the philosophical schools? It can pave the way for a real contact of thought among the various philosophical trends. For - paradoxical as it may sound - this contact is basically excluded on the dogmatic standpoint of the autonomy of theoretical reason. Our transcendental critique wages a merciless war against the masking of supra-theoretical prejudices as theoretical axioms which are forced upon the opponent on penalty of his being viewed as an outsider in philosophical matters. In other words, it aims its attack against the dogmatic exclusivism of the schools, all of which fancy themselves to possess the monopoly on philosophical truth. A sharp distinction between theoretical judgements and the supra-theoretical pre-judgements, which alone make the former possible, is a primary requisite of critical thought." A New Critique, Vol.I, p. 70.
7. Ibid., p. 57.
8. Ibid., p. 56.
9. Ibid., p. 56.

10. Ibid., p. 56.
11. Ibid., p. 56.
12. De Transcendentale Critiek van het Theoretisch Denken en de Thomistische Theologia Naturalis, Phil. Ref. 17, 1952, p. 169. Compare also Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, Vol. I, p. 116.
13. A New Critique, Vol. II, pp. 73-74.
14. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 117.
15. Ibid., p. 119.
16. Ibid., p. 56.
17. "In dem auf diese Weise beschriebenen Prozess der transcendentalen Kritik oder der Selbstbesinnung wären zwei Momente zu unterscheiden, fast zwei Perspektiven, die beide mitspielen und einander durchdringen bis zur unlöslichen Einheit: die Perspektive des sich selbst darstellenden Sachverhalts einerseits, und die Perspektive der göttlichen Offenbarung, des von Gott her Gezeigten, auf den anderen Seite. Sachverhalt ist das verweisende, hinweisende Wesen der empirischen Wirklichkeit: hinweisend nach dem Ausgangspunkt, der die modale Mannigfaltigkeit der in Gegenstandsbeziehung einander gegenübergestellten Aspekte übersteigt; der eben als Konzentrationspunkt des ganzen zeitlichen Kosmos überindividueller Art sein muss, so dass die individuelle Personmitte daran teilhat und in dieser Teilnahme von der Ursprungstendenz bestimmt wird. Die göttliche Offenbarung in Christo aber entdeckt und offenbart das Selbst sich selber in seiner Unterordnung unter diese sich selber als notwendiges Apriori zeigende Struktur. Oder kurz gefasst: das sich auf seine immanenten Grenzen besinnende Selbst, wird im religiösen Apriori seines philosophischen Denkens sich selber geoffenbart." M.J. Marlet, Grundlinien der Calvinistischen 'Philosophie der Gesetzesidee' als Christlicher Transcendentalphilosophie, p. 41.
18. D. Jellema: The Philosophy of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, II, Calvin Forum, Vol. XIX, no.X, May, 1954, p. 192.

19. Ibid., p. 192.
20. Compare James Feibleman: Ontology, especially pp. 245-267, where he describes the graded series of being.
21. The Philosophy of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven, ~~XX~~ II. Calvin Forum, Vol. XIX, No. X, May, 1954, p. 192, footnote.
22. J.P.A. Mekkes, A Reply to Mr. Jellema, Calvin Forum, Vol. XX, no. 11-12, June-July, 1955, p. 219.
23. H. Dooyeweerd: De Beteekenis der Wetsidee voor Rechtwetenschap en Rechtphilosophie, p. 64: "Slechts in een intuïtief schouwen komen die kwaliteiten der wetskringen ons tot bewustzijn. Zij scheppen voor het wetenschappelijk bewustzijn een gezichtskring, waarin de wetskwaliteit, als modaliteit der wetsidee, de soevereiniteit waarborgt."
24. A New Critique, Vol. II, p. 487.
25. Ibid., p. 489.
26. Ibid., p. 73.
27. New Views on Common Grace in the Light of historic Reformed Theology, Calvin Forum, Vol. XIX, no.X, May, 1954.
28. Ibid., p. 197.
29. C. Dawson: Religion and Culture, ch.II, p. 27 : "Yet even for Calvin," Dawson writes, "there is not a question of the fact that the human mind possesses a natural knowledge of the existence of God which is inseparable from its very constitution." He refers to the declaration of Calvin (Institutes, I,3): "A doctrine which has not to be learnt in schools but of which every man is master from birth, and which nature herself allows no man to forget although many strive with all their might to do so."

Dawson considers that natural theology as a science has a great tradition closely related to Western thought. It was the theology of the humanist culture at its best - Erasmus, More, the Christian

Platonists. The humanists saw the world as a rational order which could be explained only as the work of divine Reason, as a work of divine art, which shows forth the mind of the divine Artist. This, according to ~~the Fathers~~, Dawson, is substantially the same as the teaching of the Fathers, and he considers that Calvin has not departed from this tradition.

30. Reformatie en Scholastiek, Vol.I, p. 63.
31. A New Critique, Vol.I, p. 522-523. Dooyeweerd refers to Calvin's Institutes: I,17,7; II,5,14; II,2,16; III,3,25; III,20,15; III,24,2.
32. De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, Vol.II, p. 228.
33. V. Hepp: Het Testimonium Spiritus Sancti, p. 156-157.
34. A New Critique, Vol.II, p. 34 ff.
35. Ibid., p. 33.
36. "Men zal niet kunne loochenen, dat bij een opvatting van de transcendentale critiek der wijsbegeerte, gelijk zij hierboven werd ontwikkeld, de theoretische denkgemeenschap tusschen de onderscheiden richtingen gehandhaaft blijft, zelfs tusschen de zulke, die van radicaal verschillend uitgangspunt uitgaan. Dit is hieraan te danken, dat deze critiek zich op de inderdaad algemeen-geldige ontische structuur van het wijsgeerig denken baseert en niet op een bloot subjectief voor-oordeel." De Transcendentale Critiek van het Wijsgeerig Denken, Phil.Ref. 6, 1941, p. 18.
37. "Om op deze vraag een bevredigend antwoord te vinden dienen wij allereerst te bedenken, dat het theoretisch denken in den vollen zin des woords ontische structuur in den tijd heeft, die als zoodanig onveranderlijk en dus niet aan de historische ontwikkeling onderworpen is. 'Ontisch' wil zeggen, 'in de tijdelijke order der werkelijkheid gegrond'. De ontische structuur van het denken is in de eerste plaats van modaal-logisch geaardheid, maar de tijdsorde verplecht deze modale structuur van het logisch aspect onverbreekelijk met die van alle andere aspecten der werkelijkheid. Deze structuur is inderdaad van algemeen-geldigen aard voor alle tijden.

Niet een subjectief, bloot kennistheoretisch, apriori, maar een ontisch, structureel apriori waarborgt die mogelijkheid van theoretische denkgemeenschap van een latere generatie met alle vroegere, welke in de 'natuur' der wetenschap als zoodanig besloten ligt.

In de tweede plaats is in de theoretische tegenstandrelatie, d.i. de theoretische betrekking tusschen het logisch denken en zijn veld van onderzoek, ook de modale structuur van den Gegenstand van ontisch-aprioristischen, invarianten aard, evenzeer als de synthetische structuur der theoretische relatie zelve.

Deze stand van zaken waarborgt, dat wij in de wezenlijk immanent wijsgeerige werkzaamheid inderdaad die theoretische problemen met die vroegere generaties gemeen hebben, welke in de ontische structuur der tegenstandrelatie zelve besloten liggen. En hetzelfde geldt voor het theoretisch onderzoek der individualiteitsstructuren. Verder reikt de bedoelde garantie op zich zelve niet." Grondthemas' van't Wijsgeerig denken van't Avondland, pp. 172-173, Phil. Ref. 6, 1941.

38. J. Jansen: Het Vraagstuk van de Christelijke Wijsbegeerte, Phil. Ref. 17, 1952, pp. 64-65.
39. "Antinomy in the sense of a seeming contradiction between the essential laws of different modal aspects of meaning is refuted by the Idea of cosmic order. Anyone who accepts the cosmic order of time regulating the coherence of meaning between the laws of different modal spheres, cannot acknowledge any theoretical justification for antinomy. The transcendental Idea of cosmic order implies the principium exclusae antinomiae." A New Critique, Vol. II, p. 38.
40. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 544.

Notes to Chapter VI

1. "Sinds de laatste decennien van de vorige eeuw, zien wij intusschen een algemeen vervalproces van de humanistische levens- en wereldbeschouwing intreden, waardoor de laatste geleidelijk tegenover nieuw opkomende anti-humanistische cultuurmachten zelf in het defensief wordt gedrongen. Een geweldige overgangperiode kondigt zich hiermede in de wereldgeschiedenis aan, waarin een voorlopig onbesliste worsteling om de geestelijke leiding onzer westerse cultuur wordt gevoerd.
En in dezen schijnbaar chaotischen overgangstoestand, beginnen ook de oudere, geestelijk geconsolideerde cultuurmachten van het Westen, Rooms-Katholicisme en Reformatie, zich opnieuw, en nu met moderne wapenen, in de groote geestelijke worsteling te mengen, niet slechts om de christelijke grondslagen der moderne beschaving te verdedigen, maar om opnieuw de leiding op te eischen in den strijd om de, in haar naaste perspectieven nog zoo duistere, toekomst van het avondland." Reformatie en Scholastiek, pp. 17-19.
2. "Deze gedachtenuitwisseling kan daarom zoo vruchtbaar zijn, omdat de bekende principieele verschilpunten i.z. de verhouding van 'natuur' en 'genade', welke de calvinistische en thomistische wijsbegeerte verschillende wegen hebben inslaan, geenerlei afbreuk kunnen doen aan de nauwe verwantschap in geloofsstandpunt, die ons een gemeenschappelijk front doet vormen tegenover de idee der volstreckte autarkie der filosofie als wetenschap, die iedere band met het christelijk geloof principieel afwijst. In dagen van gemeenschappelijke beproeving kan dit front slechts in kracht toenemen." (Discussion by Dooyeweerd of: Vraagstukken uit de natuurfilosofie, Verslag van de zevende algemeene vergadering der Vereeniging voor Thomistische Wijsbegeerte, bijlage van Studio Catholica, Dekker en Van de Vegt, Nijmegen, 1940, in Phil. Ref. VI,⁹⁴p. 57.) Compare also L. Feisser: De Huidige Verhouding tussen Theologie en Wijsbegeerte, p. 47: "Op dit punt (de verabsolutisering van het denken) vinden alle filosofen van Protestantse en Rooms-Katholieke zijde elkaar in een eenheidsfront, dat gaandeweg - ondersteund door de gehele rehabilitatie der ontologie in de autonome wijsbegeerte - veld wint tegenover het afnemende rationalisme en idealisme."

3. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 524.
4. Ibid., p. 524.
5. Ibid., p. 525.
6. "Voor zover wij dat kunnen beoordelen, heeft Prof. Dooyeweerd zich in de 'Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee' consequent aan zijn Calvinistisch apriori gehouden. De souvereiniteit Gods - het fundamentele punt van Calvijn's leer - en daartegenover de geweldige nietigheid van de mens, die zijn hand durfde verheffen tegen Gods Aanschijn; de wet, die de absolute distantie afbakent tussen het schepsel en de Schepper aller dingen, uit Wie, tot Wie, en door Wie alles is; de hernieuwde vervulling van de wet door Christus' kruisdood; de allesoverheersende betekenis van Gods Woord, de Heilige Schrift; het stellen van het hart als religieus centrum van de menselijke existentie; de predestinatie tot het geloof en het heil; de rechtvaardiging alleen uit het geloof; het zijn alle typisch Calvinistische motieven, die doorspelen in het 'grondthema' en de 'doorwerking' van deze zeer opmerkelijke wijsgerige richting. Als zodanig heeft zij wellicht een unieke prestatie geleverd in de filosofiegeschiedenis; terwijl de Katholieken zich beperkten tot de fundering van een gebouw dat "christelijke wijsbegeerte" heet, hebben de inauguratoren van de 'Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee' met onverdroten werkracht en strenge systematiek zulk een gebouw ook feitelijk tot stand trachten te brengen. - In het algemeen is er zeker geen reden om aan het christelijk of aan het wijsgerige karakter van dit systeem te twijfelen."
J.Jansen: Het Vraagstuk van de Christelijke Wijsbegeerte, Phil. Ref. XVII, 1952, p. 61.
7. "Een Katholiek zou er gemakkelijk toe kunnen komen aan Prof. Dooyeweerd de vraag voor te leggen, of er tenslotte geen echt-religieuze dialectiek gelegen is in het feit, dat het werk van de souvereine Schepper, die de menselijke existentie goed geschapen had, totaal kon worden geperverteerd door een daad van die nietige mens: de miskennis zijner creatuurlijkheid. Met andere woorden: een Katholiek zal nooit kunnen en mogen accepteren, dat het 'valverlossing'-motief, althans wanneer het opgevat wordt zoals door Prof. Dooyeweerd, werkelijk schriftuurlijk is."
Ibid., p. 61.
8. "Wanneer dus een Katholiek bewust en met overtuiging het hoofd buigt voor dit Kerkelijke Leergezag, dat hem Gods Woord verkondigt over de gevallen en verlorene mens, wanneer

o hij zo de 'religieuze wortel' van zijn existentie richt op God en zich bij zijn wijsgerige arbeid bewust laat meevoeren door de leer over 'natuur en genade', dan zal ook Prof. Dooyeweerd o.i. moeten toegeven, dat hier geen sprake is van een 'theoretisch' immanentiestandpunt, maar van een echt-religieuze houding, en vervolgens, dat deze religieuze houding echte Gods-dienst is en geen afvallige afgoden-dienst. Maar weer staat een aanvaarden van deze 'natuur-genade-leer' gelijk met het aanvaarden van heel het Katholicisme, als een groot religieus apriori, evenals de Calvinist met het 'val-verlossing-schema' eigenlijk heel zijn Calvinisme als religieuze realiteit 'affirmeert'. Het bepaalde religieuze grondmotief is dus wel 'levensonmiddelijk verbonden met heel de religie." Ibid., pp. 67-68.

9. "Es ist wohl anzunehmen, dass eine originelle religiöse Erfahrung den Hintergrund der kalvinischen Anschauungen darstellt. Eine religiöse Erfahrung, die durch Übereinstimmung mit der Art und mit den Quellen der fröhscholastischen Denker auch Übereinstimmung in den Grundvorstellungen herbeigeführt hat. Wir möchten diese Erfahrung als Erlebnis der Herrlichkeit Gottes deuten, und diese als Gott selber, sich offenbarend in seiner universalen Bedeutung als der Herr, von dem allein alles hervorgeht, im heiligen Gegenüber von Bild und Abbild das ganze Weltall zu seinem Lobe gestaltend. So könnten wir das Ergebnis unserer Ausführungen auch folgendermassen ausdrücken: das Abbild Gottes, im Rhythmus der Heilsgeschichte durch die Heilsgewand Gottes zum Heilsinstrument geweiht, wird einseitig als 'Abglanz' gewertet, während es nach seiner anderen Seite, als Aufgabe und Einsatz der antwortenden Liebe, wohl ganz ausfällt. Und damit kommt zugleich die Gemeinschaft zwischen Gott und Geschöpf in Wegfall, die ja, als persönliche Beziehung in Liebe, von einander unterschiedene Aktzentren verlangt. Calvin behält das Abbild Gottes, es 'gilt' aber nur als Symbol.

Dadurch, dass wir in diesem Fall von 'gelten' reden, wollen wir zugleich in die Richtung eines Letzten hindeuten. Die Betonung eines Aspektes, das Gelten-Lassen einer Seite hält innerhalb der einen christlichen Denkgemeinschaft immer anderen Betonungen das Gleichgewicht. So war einmal die Hochscholastik ein Gleichgewicht in fruchtbarer Spannung zwischen verschiedenen Richtungen. Durch Abtrennung aber von der Mutterkirche, in der allein das Gleichgewicht der Wahrheit in Christo seinen Bestand haben kann, ist diese Betonung einseitig und ausschliesslich geworden. Mit Wilhelm Stählin könnte man da sagen, dass das 'Allein' der Einseitigkeit in der reformatorischen Formel vielmehr humanistischer als schriftgemässer Art ist."

M. Marlet: Gründlinien der Calvinistischen 'Philosophie der Gesetzesidee' als Christlicher Transcendentalphilosophie, p. 135.

10. "Wir betonten dabei die Ursprünglichkeit der Aquinaten bezüglich seiner griechischen philosophischen Quellen, welche allerdings auch philosophischer Art ist, aber in ihrem tiefsten Wesen durch den Glauben an die Christliche Offenbarung getragen wird." Ibid., p. 125.
11. "Want in welke tijdelijke openbaring de Christelijke levens- en wereldbeschouwing ook verschijne, welke onderlinge verschillen ook tusschen de hoofdtypen Katholicisme, Lutheranisme, Calvinisme en secten mogen bestaan, hoe zeer ook hier de pluriformiteit moge heerschen, immer bleef toch voor hen, die aan het Christendom niet in naam, maar in wesen vasthielden, de erkenning van de soevereiniteit Gods, de belijdenis der goddelijke voorzienigheid, van zonde en verlossing door Jezus Christus, de beschouwing van het 'Diessets' onder het goddelijk eeuwigheidslicht van het 'Jenseits', kortom de onderwerping van alle schepsel en denken en willen niet aan de idee der soevereine persoonlijkheid of der soevereine rede, maar aan den drieëenigen God, den Heere des hemels en der aarde, ze bleven de gemeensame belijdenis van het Christendom" Dooyeweerd: De Beteekenis der Wetsidee voor Rechtwetenschap en Rechtsphilosophie, p. 60.
12. Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, (The Harvill Press, London, 1954), pp. 106-111.
13. Edith Stein: Endliches und Ewiges Sein, p. 395. Compare also E. Gilson: The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 227, where he quotes Pascal: "To know God and yet nothing of our wretched state, breeds pride; to realise our misery and know nothing of God is mere despair; but if we come to the knowledge of Jesus Christ we find our true equilibrium, for there we find both human misery and God." Also Bossuet: "Wisdom lies in knowing

God and knowing oneself. From knowledge of self we rise to knowledge of God." (p.218)

14. The difficulty arises when we try to decide in what this image consists. St. Bernard finds the image in man's free-will, Augustine finds it in the mind of man, which is open to the illumination of the divine ideas. "The image of God," Gilson quotes from Aquinas, "is found in the soul according as the soul turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to God." Duns Scotus agrees with this, stating that although the image is stamped upon mind, it remains imperfect so long as it is merely shut down on itself, and only becomes fully itself when explicitly refers itself to its model. See Gilson's excellent chapters on this matter in The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, chapters on Christian Socratism and Christian Anthropology. Compare also Dooyeweerd, when he states that the image is expressed in man's radical unity and transcendence over all aspects of creation, A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 506.
15. The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 213. Compare also Robbers: Wijsbegeerte en Openbaring, p. 13. "Het gaat over een menselijke existentiële aangelegenheid van het allerhoogste gewicht. Zelfs bezien als een quaestie van wetenschapsteorie, moet er toch bedacht worden, dat er gevraagd wordt naar het eigenlijke wezen van weten als van een menselijk handelen, van een actus humanus, die door den mens in zijn volle bewustheid als mens gesteld wordt." Also p. 17: "Onze vraagstelling zal dus allereerst beogen een analyse te geven van het menselijk zijn en menselijk kennen, om daarin te ontdekken hoe dit zelfs verlangend uitziet naar méér dan natuurlijk weten geven kan." Again, p. 29: "De metaphysiek, die de mens beoefenen kan en moet, is derhalve vanzelfsprekend een metaphysische anthropologie, een wijsgerige analytica van den mens."
16. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 524.
17. Het Vraagstuk van de Christelijke Wijsbegeerte, Phil. Ref. XVII, p. 36.
18. Wijsbegeerte en Openbaring, pp. 109-110.
19. Grundlinien der Calvinistischen 'Philosophie der Gesetzes-idee' als Christlicher Transcendentalphilosophie, p. 90.

20. E. Brehier: Histoire de la Philosophie, I, Paris, 1927, pp. 493-94: "Nous espérons montrer que le développement de la pensée philosophique n'a pas été fortement influencée par l'avènement du christianisme et, pour résumer notre pensée en un mot, qu'il n'y a pas de philosophie chrétienne." Compare also the neo-Kantian Ovink, who states: "Was an einem Gedanken philosophisch ist, ist nicht christlich, was an ihm christlich ist, ist nicht philosophisch." ('B.J.H. Ovink: Philosophie und Sophistiek, Haag, 1940, p. 268.) The dominican, P. Mandonnet, holds a similar position, claiming that the only connection between philosophy and Christianity is their concurrence in one subject. (See F. Sassen: Wijsbegeerte van Onzen Tijd, p. 301-304.)
21. Compare Gilson: The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 5. "It is a fact that between ourselves and the Greeks the Christian revelation has intervened, and has profoundly altered the conditions under which reason has to work. Once you are in possession of that revelation, how can you possibly philosophise as if you had never heard of it? The errors of Plato and Aristotle are precisely the errors into which pure reason falls, and every philosophy which sets out to be self-sufficing will fall into them again, or perhaps into others will worse."
22. Gilson: God and Philosophy, chapter II.
23. Gilson: The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 39: "From the very fact that faith eliminates vain curiosity, the influence of revelation on philosophy facilitates the work of its constitution. From any Christian point of view, the merely curious man is engaged on an interminable enterprise. He takes all knowledge for his province, every reality falls within it, and of none is he entitled to say that, if he knew it, it would not transform his knowledge of all the rest Choosing man in relation to God as his central theme, the Christian philosopher acquires a fixed centre of reference, which helps him to bring order and unity into his thought. That is why the tendency to systematization is always so strong in a Christian philosophy: it has less to systematize than any other and it has the necessary centre for the system as well."
24. Ibid., p. 37. Compare also Christianisme et Philosophie, p. 32: "Une philosophie qui, bien que distinguant formellement les deux ordres, considère la révélation chré-

tienne comme un auxiliaire indispensable de la raison."

25. Christianisme et Philosophie, p. 37: "...qui ne voit qu'une 'philosophie chrétienne' est possible dans le catholicisme, qu'elle y est même nécessaire, et qu'elle n'est possible et nécessaire que là?"
26. Ibid., p. 38.
27. "Il importe de distinguer la nature de la philosophie et son état; autrement dit l'ordre de spécification et l'ordre d'exercice. Considérée dans sa pure nature ou dans sa pure essence la philosophie, spécifiée par un objet naturellement connaissable à la raison, ne dépend que des évidences et des critères de la raison naturelle; mais c'est une nature abstraite qui est ainsi considérée: prise d'une façon concrète, selon qu'elle est un habitus ou un ensemble d'habitus existant dans l'âme humaine, la philosophie est dans un certain état, préchrétien, chrétien ou achrétien, qui importe essentiellement à la façon dont elle existe et se développe." (Science et Sagesse, p. 138).
28. "De fait elle reçoit de la foi et de la révélation des secours sans lesquels les théologiens ont remarqué qu'elle est incapable de réaliser pleinement (je veux dire sans trop de malheurs) les exigences de sa nature; elle en reçoit des apports objectifs, qui concernent avant tout les vérités révélées d'ordre naturel (dont les plus hautes ont été régulièrement manquées ou altérées par les grands-païens), mais qui intéressent aussi les répercussions des vérités d'ordre surnaturel sur la réflexion philosophique, et dont à vrai dire les connexions et les résonances vont à l'infini; et elle en reçoit des confortations subjectives qui vont aussi à l'infini, les sagesse supérieures, sagesse théologique et sagesse infuse, purifiant, rectifiant dans l'âme les habitus philosophiques avec lesquels elles sont en continuité non pas d'essence, mais de mouvement et d'illumination, et les fortifiant dans leur ordre propre, et les attirant audessus d'eux-mêmesVoilà les positions que nous croyons justes, et qui nous montrent que l'expression de philosophie chrétienne désigne non pas une essence prise en elle-même, mais un complexe: une essence prise sous un état, sous des conditions d'exercice, d'existence et de vie, pour ou contre lesquelles à vrai l'homme est tenu d'opter." Ibid., p. 140.
29. "Juist als de wijsbegeerte integraal met natuurlijke redelijke middelen te werk gaat, moet zij er toe komen,

...te erkennen, dat zij onvolledig is, dat zij in zich en voor zich een leegte graaft, dat zij geprepareerd is niet alleen voor haar verdere ontdekkingen en op haar eigen terrein, maar voor licht en steun van wat zij niet meer self is en waarvan zij zelf niet de werkelijke oorsprong worden kan. De rede komt derhalve zuiver wijsgerig tot de erkenning van de ongenoegezaamheid van zuivere wijsbegeerte. Philosophie staat uit zich dus open en als het ware in hunkerende verwachting uit te zien naar openbaring, die echter nooit rechtens uit haar kan voortkomen; zou deze immers uit filosofie ontspruiten, dan zou op hetzelfde moment het bovennatuurlijk karakter daaraan ontnoment worden. Zoals volgens Tertullianus' woord de mensenziel van nature christen is, zo kan ook de filosofie van nature christelijk heten." Wijsbegeerte en Openbaring, p.110.

30. "Egofirmiter amplector ac recipio omnia ac singula, quae ab inerranti Ecclesiae magisterio definita, adserta, ac declarata sunt, praesertim ea doctrinae capita, quae hujus temporis erroribus directo adversantur. Ac primum quidem Deum, rerum omnium principium et finem, naturali rationis lumine per ea quae facta sunt, hoc est per visibilia creationis opera, tanquam causam per effectus, certo cognosci, adeoque demonstrari etiam posse, profiteor." Garrigou-Lagrange: God, His Existence and His Nature, Vol. I, p. 12. Compare also the definition of the Vatican Council (Dei Filius, ch. 2) quoted by Garrigou-Lagrange, Ibid., p. 8: "The same Holy Mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, may be known for certain by the natural light of human reason, by means of created things, 'for the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood from the things that are made.' (Romans I, 20); but that it pleased His wisdom and goodness to reveal Himself and the eternal decrees of His will to mankind by another, namely the supernatural way." Canon I of this chapter reads: "If any one shall say that the one true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be certainly known by the natural light of human reason through created things, let him be anathema."
31. Ibid., p. 55.
32. Ibid., p. 56.
33. Science et Sagesse, pp. 141-149.
34. Compare J. Jansen: Het Vraagstuk van de Christelijke Wijsbegeerte, Phil. Ref. XVII, p. 33, (1952)

35. "Het is deze laatste zienswijze - waarbij zich meerderen reeds, o.a. Sertillanges, aansloten - waarop onze voorafgaande onderzoekingen uitlopen, die het volledigst in de geest van S. Thomas' denken schijnt doorgedacht en die de beide vorige stellingen van Maritain en Gilson niet tegenspreekt, doch ze vervolledigt, ja, ze eerst houdbaar maakt." H. Robbers: Wijsbegeerte en Openbaring, p. 111.
36. De Transcendentale Critiek van het Theoretisch Denken en de Thomistisch Theologia Naturalis, Phil. Ref. XVII, 1952, pp. 151-184.
37. Ibid., p. 151.
38. De Leer der Analogie in de Thomistische Wijsbegeerte en in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, Phil. Ref. 7, 1942, p. 49. Compare also: Individualiteitsstructuur en Thomistisch Substantiebegrip, Phil. Ref. VIII, 1943, p. 72, also p. 74: "Alle theoretisch geanalyseerde verscheidenheid in de tijdelijke werkelijkheid vindt in de Thomistische metaphysica haar diepere eenheid in het begrip van het zijn."
39. "De thomistische metaphysica wil zelve de plaats innemen, die alleen aan de transcendentale critiek van het wijsgeerig denken toekomt. Zij meent langs den weg der zuiver wetenschappelijke gevolgtrekking haar oorsprongsidee als idee van den Eersten onbewogen Beweger en Oorzaak te kunnen vinden, evenals de idee van de eenheid van al het theoretisch onderscheidene. Zij wil de autonomie van het theoretisch denken handhaven, die door de transcendentale critiek als een boveno theoretisch, religieus vooroordeel wordt onthuld." Ind. Structuur en Thomistisch Substantiebegrip, Phil. Ref. VIII, p. 75 ff, 1943.
40. Compare Garrigou-Largange: God, His Existence and His Nature, pp. 242-390.
41. E. Mascall: Existence and Analogy, p. 78: "Their function is to exhibit to us five different characteristics of finite ~~existence~~ beings, all of which show that it does not account for its own existence." Compare especially ch. 3.
42. God, His Existence and His Nature, pp. 206-232.
43. The analogy of proportionality is divided into analogy of proper proportionality, where the element signified by the name is found intrinsically in all the analogates, and analogy of metaphorical proportionality, where the intrinsic meaning of the analogates is present properly only

in one, and in the others only virtually. Kingship belongs only to man, but we indicate it metaphorically in the lion in relation to the rest of the animals.

44. Endliches und Ewiges Sein, p. 311.
45. E. Mascall: Existence and Analogy, p. 113ff.
46. "Unaided reason alone cannot know what constitutes the Deity, in which the absolute perfections are identified. It can acquire positive knowledge only of the analogical predicates common to God and to creatures (such as being, act, one, true, good, etc.) and the divine mode of the absolute perfections is known only negatively and relatively." Garrigou-Lagrange: God, His Existence and His Nature, p. 229.
47. Ibid., p. 230. Garrigou-Lagrange quotes Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I, c.XXX: "But to express the super-eminent mode according to which these perfections exist in God, only such terms are available which have either a negative meaning, as when we say that God is eternal or infinite, or else express His relation to creatures, as when He is said to be the first cause and supreme God."
48. De Analogie van het Zijn, Verslag van de Achste Algemeene Vergadering der Vereeniging voor Thomistische Wijsbegeerte. Compare Angelinus: De Eenheid van het Analoge Zijnsbegrip, pp. 5-30; J. Groot: De Analogie in Barth's denken, pp. 55-86; and especially P. Kreling: De Beteekenis van de Analogie in de Kennis van God, pp. 31-54.
49. Summa Theologica, I, 48, 5.
50. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 10.
51. "Niets bestaat uit zichzelf, op zichzelf en om zichzelf. Ieder ding bestaat slechts in samenhang met andere dingen. Iedere zijde van de kosmische werkelijkheid wijst heen naar de andere zijden van de werkelijkheid. En ook: het geschapene vindt in zichzelf geen eindpunt, geen rustpunt. De hele kosmos wijst boven zichzelf uit naar z'n Schepper ... Maar God, de zin-Gever, is Zelf niet zin. Hij is boven alle zin verheven, want Hij alleen is zelfgenoegzaam ... Het zin-karakter der werkelijkheid duidt dus aan haar betrekkelijkheid, haar relativiteit. Alleen God is absoluut." J.M. Spier, Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, p. 29.

52. "It is religio, i.e. connection between the meaning of creation and the Being of the Arche, the two of which may not be brought on the same level." A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 104.
53. De transcendentale Critiek van het Theoretisch Denken en de Thomistische Theologia Naturalis, Phil. Ref. 17, 1952, p. 184. Compare also: A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 72: "Pure matter and pure Form are the two poles in the first (so-called transcendental) distinction of being. Pure matter is the principle of potentiality and imperfection: pure Form is identified with God as pure actuality and unmoved Mover of material nature. This Aristotelian concept of deity is of course accommodated to the Christian doctrine of creation. Here the metaphysical Idea of being and totality results in a transcendental Idea of the Origin which lies at the foundation of a 'natural theology'. The existence of God as unmoved Mover is proved in various ways, all of which apparently start from empirical data in nature, but which - besides their logically untenable leap from the relative to the absolute - presuppose the very conception of God which should be proved In the Thomistic system autonomous metaphysics should replace the transcendental critique of theoretical thought. However, all its metaphysical axioms and 'proofs' are nothing but religious presuppositions in a dogmatical theoretical elaboration, masked by the dogma concerning the autonomy of natural reason."
54. "Intussen schuilt reeds in deze synthese tussen de augustijnische negatieve theologie en de aristotelische conceptie van de theologia naturalis een moeilijk te loochenen innerlijke teenstrijdigheid.
De eerste heeft inderdaad geen andere strekking dan de onzelfgenoegzaamheid van het theoretisch denken en die van heel den geschapen kosmos te accentueren. De aristotelische conceptie gaat daarentegen uit van de autonomie van het theoretisch denken, dat vanuit de materiële dingen, waarin het materiemotief der gestadige beweging werkzaam is, eigenmachtig zal opklimmen tot den eerste onbewogen Beweger ... Augustinus verwierp de autonomie der natuurlijke rede, Thomas aanvaardt haar." De Transcendentale Critiek van het Theoretisch Denken en de Thomistische Theologia Naturalis, Phil. Ref. 17, 1952, p. 165.
55. Ibid., p. 177. See especially: A New Critique, Vol. II, p. 39: "Causality is conceived here in the transcendental analogical sense of the fundamental concept of being, with its general transcendental determinations of matter and

form, actuality and potentiality. This implies that the causal relation is used without any synthetical determination of its modal meaningBy making God the absolute or ultimate cause of a theoretically abstracted modal series of causes and effects, this modal aspect is absolutised because of its being related to the absolute Origin outside of its inter-modal coherence with the other aspects and outside of the religious centre of human existence." (p. 40) "God can never be the ultimate cause in a mechanical or other modal series of causes and effects. Rather, He is the Origin of causality in the temporal coherence and radical unity of all its modal aspects. A purely modal causality cannot refer to a real process, but only to a theoretical abstraction." (p. 41).

56. "Het thomistische zijnsbegrip daarentegen mist een eigenlijk centrum en kan het theoretisch denken dus nimmer den weg wijzen om de eigenlijke structuren der tijdelijke werkelijkheid te ontdekken." Ind. Structuur en Thomistisch Substantiebegrif, Phil. Ref. VIII, 1943, p. 75. Compare also A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 71 ff.
57. "De metaphysische 'analogia entis' schakelt de onherleibare kernmomenten der modale aspecten, die de modale analogiën eerst qualificeeren uit. Dit moet noodzakelijk voeren tot een theoretische nivelleering der modale aspecten binnen de tegenstandsrelatie en daarmee ook tot een nivelleering van de wezenlijke individualiteits-structuren der tijdelijke werkelijkheid, waarin deze modale aspecten tot typische totaliteiten zijn gegroepeerd." Ind. Structuur en Thomistisch Substantiebegrif, Phil. Ref. VIII, p. 75, 1943.
58. Ibid., p. 73.
59. J. Maritain: Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 30.
60. Compare Angelinus: De Eenheid van de Analoge Zijnsbegrip, (De Analogie van het Zijn, p. 5 ff.). Also p. 9: "Het is duidelijk, dat zulk een volslagen begripseenheid slechts mogelijk is ingeval er plaats is voor volmaakte abstractie. Zij veronderstelt, dat de dingen objectief met elkander overeenkomen in het bezit van een volmaaktheid, die door het verstand afzonderlijk kan worden begrepen, met terzijdelating van de verschillende wijzen waarop die volmaaktheid in de verschillende dingen werkelijk is.
Dat is evenwel slechts mogelijk, zolang we blijven binnen de veilige omheining van eenzelfde praedicament. Daar kan men, door terzijdelating van de differentiae, opstijgen tot steeds hogere soort-en geslachtsbegrippen, waarin de

onderhorigen een unitas specifica of generica vormen."

61. Preface to Metaphysics, p. 75^{ff}. Also: The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 258^{ff}.
62. "Gestel dat ons - in teenstelling met Aristoteles en Thomas - die opvatting huldig dat die ware goddelike in die ewig-vloeiende stroom van die lewe gesien moet word. Dan sal ons die volgende godsbewys kan saamstel: Ons neem oral voltooide vorme van plante, diere en mense waar. Ons sien egter ook hoe dat al hierdie vorme ontstaan het en weer tot niet gaan. Sodra hierdie proses van ontstaan en vergaan tot stilstand kom, sal die groot lewensstroom self ophou om te vloei. En dit sal ook die einde wees van alles wat in vorm en gestalte tot aansyn kom. Die groot stroom van die lewe wat self bo alle vorm verhewe en dus vormloos is, kan derhalwe nie ontstaan en vergaan nie. Hy is die eerste oorsaak van alles wat voltooide vorm gekry het. En hierdie eerste oorsaak is God.
Hierdie bewys is net so logies soos Thomas se godsbewys in sy theologia naturalis. Dit knoop eweneens by die ervaringswerklikheid aan. Daar is slegs hierdie een verskil: die geloofsonderstelling wat ten grondslag van hierdie tweede godsbewys lê, is dat die ware goddelike nie (soos Thomas leer) in die suiwere vorm maar in die materie-prinsipe gesoek moet word." Gesagsbeskouing by Calvyh, pp. 22-25.
63. E. Mascall: Existence and Analogy, p. 78.
64. God, His Existence and His Nature, p. 390.
65. See especially: E. Przywara: Analogia Entis I.
66. "Terecht is men in al deze kringen beducht voor een rechtstreekse erkenning van de analogia entis met het oog op de associatie met de specifieke wijze waarop de Thomistische wijsbegeerte van deze figuur gebruik heeft gemaakt Dat er echter in al deze Protestantse pogingen om tot christelijke wijsbegeerte te geraken uitdrukkelijk sprake is van een in het Zijn van God gewortelde betrekking tot het Zijn van wereld en mens, waarin analogie verondersteld is, valt moeilijk te ontkennen; hoe mens deze analogie nader omschrijft staat hier niet ter discussie. Prof. ^{Dr. W. A. T.} Aalders heeft wel gelijk gekregen toen hij uitdrukkelijk stipuleerde dat de analoge betrekking tussen God en mens een algemeen christelijke gedachte is, die door het Protestantse en Rooms-Katholieke denken ieder op eigensoortige wijze kan worden uitgewerkt." L. Feisser: De Huidige Ver-

houding Tussen de Theologie en de Philosophie, p. 45.

67. Prof. Dr. G.C. van Niftrik: Reden en Openbaring, (in De Christen-Academicus), p. 52.
68. In the publications of Dooyeweerd as well as of followers of the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea, similar transcendental criticisms of other Christian thinkers in both the Catholic and Protestant world appear. These criticisms reveal the same pattern, namely, the reduction of philosophical points of view to their religious basic motives, often accompanied by distortion of these philosophies in the interests of the rigid critical scheme imposed on them. Compare, for example, Dooyeweerd's criticisms of Augustine (A New Critique, Vol.I, p. 177 ff), of Melancthon (Ibid., p. 513), of Emil Brunner (Ibid., p. 519); Zuidema's criticism of Barth (Theologie en Wijsbegeerte in de 'Kirchliche Dogmatik' van Karl Barth, Phil.Ref. 18), of Kierkegaard (Het Existentialisme bij Kierkegaard, Phil.Ref.XIII, XIV); Van Teylingen's criticism of the philosophical background of the Barthian theology (Over den Wijsgeerigen Achtergrond der Dialectische Theologie, Phil.Ref. 9-10); Spier's criticism of Loen (Calvinisme en Existentie-Philosophie, pp. 201-223).
69. Wijsbegeerte van Onzen Tijd, p. 50. Compare also Dooyeweerd: La Probleme de la Philosophie Chrétienne: Une Confrontation de la philosophie blondélienne avec la nouvelle philosophie réformée en Hollande, Phil.Ref. 18, 1953, p. 49.
70. "Dans su lutte contre le rationalisme thomiste il s'est plutôt allié à l'irrationalisme et a (activisme de la philosophie dialectique post-kantienne, à une métaphysique de l' individualité totale et concrète, nourrie par le thème déterministe de la nature et de la nécessité." (Le Probleme de la philosophie Chrétienne, Phil.Ref. 18, p. 61. Compare also: A New Critique, Vol.I, p. 525: "By no means can Blondel's Christian philosophy be considered as an intrinsically reformed mode of thought. It lacks in principle a transcendental critique of philosophical thought as such. And its inner dialectical character is clearly shown by the fact that this Roman-Catholic thinker intends to break through the immanence-standpoint and to arrive at a Christian view by means of an activist, irrationalistic and universalistic metaphysics which in principle is ruled by the Humanistic ground-motive, in its accommodation to the scholastic motive of nature and grace."

71. "Beteekent dit nu, dat Prof. Robbers de autonomie der natuurlijke rede op wijsgeerig terrein zou hebben prijsgegeven? Allermint! Dit blijkt uit zijn geheele betoog wel zonneklaar. Maar dit was door de W.d.W. in haar transcendente critiek ook allermint bedoeld. De winst ligt hier op een ander punt: Het thomisme is in Prof. Robbers' verhandeling tot transcendente zelf-critiek gekomen en heeft erkend, dat haar opvatting van de autonomie in wezen door een religieuze grondhouding en een transcendente grondidee bepaald is, die dieper wortelt dan in het theoretisch denken zelve." Quoted by J.Jansen, Het Vraagstuk van die Christelijke Wijsbegeerte, Phil.Ref. 17¹⁹⁵², p.29.
72. "Gaarne aanvaarden wedat het reformatorisch Christendom met zijn opvatting omtrent rechtvaardiging alleen door het geloof, zijn eigen opvatting van Gods Woord, waarmede die over zonde, natuur en genade nauw verbonden is, een integrale eenheid vormt, en dat hierdoor een diepte van geloofsleven met een eigen cachet ontstaat, die voor Katholieken nagenoeg ontoegankelijk is, omdat deze zelf een eigen integrale geloofsbeleving hebben, waarin hun opvatting van natuur-genade geïmpliceerd ligt. Voor de wijsbegeerte staan hier ongetwijfeld twee religieuze grondhoudingen, twee transcendente grond-ideeën tegenover elkaar. De W.d.W. heeft zelf de vraag van de filosofie tot dit punt herleid, waar het een vraag wordt over de schriftuurlijke opvatting van natuur en openbaring, van zondeval en verlossing. Met filosofische speculatie alleen wordt hier niets meer beslist; hier komt het woord toe aan de theologie, aan de exegese, aan de gezamenlijke geloofsbeleving, volgens Katholieken ook beïnvloed door het gezagsorgaan van dat lichaam, van dat mystieke lichaam van Christus"Quoted by J.Jansen, Ibid., p. 28.
73. Het Wijsgeerig Tweegesprek tusschen de Thomistische filosofie en de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee II, Phil. Ref. 13,¹⁹⁴⁸ p.50.
74. Ibid., p. 55.
75. Ibid., p. 55.
76. Ibid., p. 57.
77. "Wie dit geheele betoog van Prof. Robbers in zijn samenhang leest en vertrouwd is geraakt met de transcendente critiek van het wijsgeerig denken, zal moeten toegeven, dat mijn geachte opponent er hier niet in is geslaagd een wezenlijk transcendente critiek van de W.d.W. te leverre.

Blijkbaar beschouwt hij nog steeds de scherpe onderscheiding van de theoretische oordeelen en de boven-theoretische voor-oordeelen als een vorm van irrationalisme, en houdt hij niet voldoende rekening met de onderscheiding van het theoretische en het boven-theoretische en de onderlinge verhouding dezer beide binnen de creatuurlijke sfeer van den zin zelve." Ibid, p.55.

78. "Daarmee zou dan natuurlijk de geheele transcendentale critiek haar zin hebben verloren en weer het dogmatisch standpunt in zake de 'autonomie der natuurlijke rede' in haar thomistische zin zijn aanvaard. Gevoelt Prof. R. die van zulk een verheugende toenadering tot de transcendentale critiek der wijsbegeerte heeft blijk gegeven, niet zelf, dat hier iets in zijn betoog wringt en dat hij weer volop vanuit den dogmatischen inzet der scholastieke zijnsleer redeneert?" Ibid,,pp 56.
79. "Zo gezien lijkt het toch niet geheel ten onrechte zich af te vragen, of de "wijsbegeerte der wetsidee' zich niet opsluit in een onhoudbaar isolement. Blijft - principieel - een tweegesprek 'op voet van gelijkgerechtigheid', zoals Prof. D. er een voerde met Prof. R., eigenlijk nog wel mogelijk? Zou men strikt aan de principes van Prof. Dooyeweerd vast willen houden, dan lijkt het toch wel, dat de partner bij zo'n gesprek telkens, ook in zijn 'immanent wijsgerige werkzaamheid' moet worden afgewezen, omdat hij op immanentiestandpunt deze activiteit uitoefent. Doch dat zat klaarblijkelijk in het geheel niet voor bij dit 'kampgevecht', waarover de 'ridderlijkheid van een middeleeuws toernooi' straalde en dat wilde zijn 'de voorbereiding tot een feest van broederlijke vereniging'. - Ook Prof. Robbers zelf spreekt ten aanzien van het tweegesprek de vrees uit, 'dat er geen gemeenschappelijke basis voor discussie meer aanwezig is', wanneer men radicaal en consequent doordenkt op de caesuren in de religieuze grondthema's." J.Jansen, Het Vraagstuk van de Christelijke Wijsbegeerte, Phil.Ref. 17, pp. 63-64, 1952.
80. "Het blijft er dus bij, dat de wijsgerige bezinning als zodanig volgens Barth geen aanknopingspunt voor de Woordopenbaring in Christus Jesus bezit, in deze zin, dat zij door deze laatste innerlijk ge-reformeerd kan worden. Dan moet zij dus 'autonoom' zijn in de gangbare dogmatische zin van het woord en zijn we in de grond der zaak weer beland bij een echt scholastisch standpunt. Ongetwyfeld niet bij de thomistische scholastiek met haar leer van de natuurlijke kennis als *praeambula gratiae*. Maar wel bij de 14e eeuwse nominalistische scholastiek uit de school van

Willem van Occam, die ieder aanknopingspunt tussen de 'natuurlijke' kennis en de 'boven-natuurlijke' openbaringswaarheid loochende en iedere metaphysica afwees. Dat daarbij de oude scholastische denkvormen in de barthiaanse theologie door zeer moderne zijn vervangen en de inhoud van deze theologie veelszins anders is geworden, is hier niet essentieel. Het gaat om het centrale grondmotief der 'christelijke scholastiek', dat niet van theoretisch wetenschappelijk, maar van religieus karakter is en dat een dialectisch karakter draagt, d.w.z. uit twee, zich in religieuze antithesis bevindende motieven bestaat, die ook aan het onder hun beslag gekomen wijsgerig en theologisch denken een dialectisch karakter opdrukken. Het scholastisch grondmotief van natuur en genade laat allerlei vormgevingen toe. Het kan zich ook in andere terminologie kleden, waarbij het woord 'natuur' door een andere term (b.v. 'wereld', 'tijd', enz. enz.) is vervangen. En het leent zich niet alleen tot een pseudo-synthese tussen christelijke religie en griekse (evezeer religieus bepaalde) metaphysica, gelijk bij Thomas van Aquino, maar evenzeer tot een polair-dualistische conceptie, waarin het Koninkrijk Gods in Christus Jezus zonder 'aanknopingspunt' antithetisch wordt gesteld tegenover een modern humanistische, irrationalistische en activistisch gevatte conceptie van de tijdelijke werkelijkheid, waarin wij leven, zonder dat een goddelijke eis tot reformatie dezer laatste aan het woord komt." De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee en de 'Barthianen', Phil. Ref. 16, p. 145, 1951.

81. "So mag denn dieses Buch als ein besonders bedeutungsvoller Beitrag zum gegenseitigen Verständnis zwischen dem römisch-katholischen und reformatorischen Denken begrüsst werden ... für das fortschreitende Gespräch zwischen Rom und der Reformation auf philosophische Gebiet hat er ohne Zweifel eine überaus fruchtbare Arbeit geleistet, und dafür sind beide ihm zu grossem Dank verpflichtet." M. Marlet: Grundlinien der Calvinistischen 'Philosophie der Gesetzesidee', Introduction, p. VI.
82. Compare: God, His Existence and His Nature, Vols. I. and II.
83. Grundlinien der Calvinistischen 'Philosophie der Gesetzesidee', p. 83.
84. Ibid., p. 84.
85. Ibid., p. 93.
86. "Eine Skizze der Auffassung vom Wesen der Christlichen Phi-

losophie, wohin die französische und die deutsche Tradition, auf dem Hintergrund der kirchlichen Lehrverkündigung, konvergieren, hat auszugehen von der grundsätzlichen Überzeugung, dass philosophisches Denken immer umgriffen ist von einem theologischen Apriori, im Sinne eines Offenbarungs-Apriori. Und zwar namentlich vom Apriori der einigen, christlichen Offenbarung, von der Tatsache der Menschwerdung." (Ibid., pp. 95-96.) See also p. 107: "Die lebendige, traditionelle Philosophie in der Kirche Gottes ist damit eine Philosophie, die sich (gläubig) ihres konkreten, christlichen Apriori bewusst ist."

87. Josef Pieper: Leisure as the Basis of Culture, p. 15 ff.

88. "Im Theoretischen nun gehen die Perspektiven des philosophischen und des theologischen Denkens auseinander. Das philosophische Denken geht vom (christlichen) Bewusstsein aus, gibt aber die Intuition wieder nach der Ganzheit des menschlichen Mitvollzuges, und besinnt sich also auf die Personstruktur als Antwortstruktur. Sein objectum formale ist die Wirklichkeit von der menschlichen Person-in-Gemeinschaft her, um den Menschen konzentriert. Um dieses Zentrum herum betrachtet die Philosophie den Kosmos Das theologische Denken geht von derselben Erkenntnisfülle aus, gibt aber die Intuition wieder von Christi eigenem Bewusstsein her." Grundlinien der Kalvinistischen 'Philosophie der Gesetzesidee', p. 105.

89. Ibid., p. 102: "Der konkrete historische Mensch ist der Mensch in Christo Dieser konkrete Mensch wird durch die Sünde bis in die Wurzel, die seine Ganzheit gestaltende Personmitte, getroffen, und so kann seine Vollendung durch die Gnade, nur Vollendung auf dem Wege der Kreuzigung, durch den Tod hindurch in das Leben, sein. Der ganze Mensch soll also den Kreuzweg gehen, sterben mit Christus, damit er als Mensch in Christo an dessen Leben teilhat. Sterben und auferstehen zum Leben im Mitvollzug mit Christus, denn im Sündenfall wird die eigene, ursprüngliche Struktur des Menschen gewahrt: die in Gottes Schöpfung gebliebene Möglichkeit zum Wahren und zum Guten ..."

Marlet continues:

90. "Betrachten wir diese Beziehung zwischen dem Herzen und der zeitlichen Sphäre nach der Erkenntnisseite, so ist im Herzen die Erkenntnisfülle oder Intuition. Weil der Mensch noch auf dem Wege ist, hat die Intuition impliziten Charakter, der sich in ihrer Abhängigkeit (Fundierung) vom zeitlichen Strukturganzen offenbart Zum seitlichen Strukturganzen aber gehört das reflektierende, begriffliche theoretische Denken (das Analytische)." Ibid., p. 104.

90. Ibid., p. 125.
91. Ibid., pp. 129-134.
92. Ibid., p. 116. Quoted from Descartes' Principia Philosophiae I, p. 51: "Per substantiam nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quam remquae ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum."
93. Ibid., p. 115.
94. Ibid., pp. 116-124.
95. "Zijnservaring is zijnsbevestiging, stellig inzicht in de zijnsabsolutheid. Het absolute is ten volle besloten in zichzelf, zonder enige verwijzing naar buiten. De grondwet van het zijn is volledige identiteit Het zijn wordt ons geopenbaard, en meteen erken en zeg ik: 'het is, het is zichzelf': en hiermee heb ik alles gezegd dat er te zeggen valt, ik heb n.l. ingezien dat het zijn in zichzelf absoluut volledig is." De Raeymaker: Het Metaphysiek van het Zijn, Arch. I, esp. p. 16 ff.
96. Gründlinien der Calvinistischen 'Philosophie der Gesetzes-
idee, p. 131.
97. "Kalvin betont die Wesenstranzsistenz Gottes in Beziehung auf das Geschöpf - die Grenze - so sehr, dass der von Gott mitgeteilten und getragenen Struktur des Geschöpfes das Sein als Existenzprinzip oder Prinzip des Vollzuges abgesprochen wird. Damit verneint er, was wir früher die konstitutive Bedeutung des Seins genannt haben. Auf der anderen Seite betont er die existenzielle Immanenz oder Immanenz des Vollzuges von Gott her so sehr, dass der geschöpfliche Vollzug nicht mehr als dem Geschöpfe strukturreigen betrachtet werden kann. In kürze: der einseitige Betonung der Alleinwirksamkeit Gottes bei Calvin ist theoretisch zu deuten als die Tendenz der Unterscheidung zwischen Struktur und Vollzug, Gesetz und Subjekt, zur absoluten Trennung hin." Ibid., p. 133. This position of Marlet is denied by Berkouwer, Identiteit of Conflict, Phil. Ref. 21, 1956, p. 28.
98. "Als vanzelf vraagt men zich bij zulk een conclusie af, of we hier staan voor de opheldering van een langdurig en ernstig misverstand en of hier via deze 'identiteit' wellicht perspectieven zichtbaar worden, die op den duur ook van betekenis zullen blijken te zijn buiten het terrein van de Wijsbegeerte." Dr. G.C. Berkouwer: Identiteit of Conflict? Een poging tot Analyse, Phil. Ref. 21, 1956, p. 1.
99. "In direct verband hiermee nu moet ook worden afgewezen de

mening van Marlet dat hier een Christelijk wijsgerig denken wordt geponeerd en dat dit nu de wijsbegeerte zou zijn, die in de kerk wordt geleerd. De 'philosophia Christiana' die in Aeterni Patris en in Humani Generis naar voren komt, houdt allermint in een religieus Christelijk gestructureerd wijsgerig denken maar betekent veelmeer concreet de traditionele aanvaarding der duplex ordo cognitionis. Zo spreekt Aeterni Patris over de 'philosophia Christiana ad mentem S. Thomae Aquinatis'. In het woord Christelijk gaat het niet om een structurele Christianisering van het denken of om een doorbreking van de natuurlijke theologie, maar om een theologie van het natuurlijke licht der rede tegenover agnostische (Aeterni Patris) of irrationalistische (Humani Generis) stromingen.

De sprong van het Vaticaanse concilie en van Humani Generis naar een religieus-Christelijke wijsbegeerte - in verband met het openbarings a priori - blijft een sprong." Ibid., p. 16.

100. "Dit alles neemt niet weg, dat de nieuwe theologie in de R.K. Kerk door velen als een ernstig crisisverschijnsel wordt beschouwd." Meuleman, Hernieuwing in de Rooms-Katholieke Theologie, in Bezinning, Gereformeerd Tijdschrift tot Bewaring en Bevordering van het Christelijk Leven, Vol. 11, 1956, no. 4, p. 192. Compare also p. 195: "Toch valt moeilijk in te zien, hoe verschillende fundamentele gedachten van de nieuwe theologie zich op den duur kunne handhaven naast bepaalde kerkelijke uitspraken."
101. Identiteit of Conflict? Een poging tot Analyse, p. 44.
102. E. Przywara: Polarity, p. 116.
103. The Philosophy of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, Part. 11, Calvin Forum, Vol. XIX, no. X, May, 1954, p. 192.
104. Towards a Reformed Philosophy, p. 130 ff.
105. Iets oor Kousaliteitskennis, Phil. Ref. 3, 1938, p. 9.
106. Die Wysbegeerte van die Skeppingsidee, p. 9.
107. Die Nuwere Wysbegeerte aan die Vrije Universiteit, p. 50.
108. De Huidige Verhouding tussen Theologie en Wijsbegeerte, p. 1 ff.
109. Het Vraagstuk van de Christelijke Wijsbegeerte. (Phil. Ref. 17, 1952, p. 41.

Notes to Conclusion.

1. J.M. Spier, Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, p. 32 ff.
2. Compare, for example, the criticisms of Dooyeweerd's doctrine of antithesis by D. Jellema: The Philosophy of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven, in Calvin Forum, Vol. XLX, no. 9, April, 1954; by De Vos: De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, in Kerk en Theologie, Vol. 111, no. 3, 1952; by J. Degenaar: 'n Paar Opmerkinge t.o.v. die Metode van die Transsendentale Kritiek, in Die Gereformeerde Vaandel, Vol. XXV, June, 1956, no. 2, p.7.
3. A New Critique, Vol. I, p. 523.

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V, VI, VII, VIII, (Phil. Ref., Vol. 6, 1941); VIII (Phil.
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