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Encouraging Exclusivity:
The Electoral System and Campaigning in the 1999
South African Election

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A minor dissertation submitted in *partial fulfillment* of the requirements for the award
of the degree of Master of Arts in Political Studies (Democratic Governance)

Faculty of the Humanities

University of Cape Town

2003

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

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Abstract

This dissertation provides an analysis of the 1999 election campaign and considers how each of the main parties appealed to the politically salient groups in South Africa. The case is put forward that the electoral system—closed-list proportional representation—rewards parties that appeal to a particular race group (or groups) at the expense of others. Parties that adopt a conciliatory tone and attempt a ‘catch-all’ strategy are punished at the polls. The persistence of this phenomenon means that politics in South Africa is likely to remain racialised, as political entrepreneurs maximise votes by making narrow sectional appeals.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Jeremy Seekings for his comments, criticisms and suggestions. I am also grateful to Professor André du Toit, convenor of the Democratic Governance programme at the University of Cape Town, for his guidance.

The financial assistance of the National Research Foundation (NRF) towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at, are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the National Research Foundation.

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List of Abbreviations

ACDP	African Christian Democratic Party
AEB	Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging
ANC	African National Congress
AV	Alternative Vote
AWB	Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
Azapo	Azanian People's Liberation Organization
BCP	Basotho Congress Party
BNP	Basotho National party
Codesa	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
Cosatu	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DP	Democratic Party
EISA	Electoral Institute of South Africa
FA	Federal Alliance
FF	Freedom Front
FPTP	First-Past-the-Post
GNU	Government of National Unity
Idasa	Institute for a Democratic South Africa
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
KANU	Kenyan African National Union
MEC	Member of the Executive Council
MF	Minority Front
MK	Umkhonto weSizwe (Former armed wing of the ANC)
MP	Member of Parliament
NA	National Assembly
NCOP	National Council of Provinces
NNP	New National Party (formerly NP- National Party)
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PR	Proportional Representation
SMD	Single Member District
STV	Single Transferable Vote
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UCDP	United Christian Democratic Party
UDF	United Democratic Front
UDM	United Democratic Movement

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Introduction

Electoral systems—“the most fundamental element of representative democracy”¹—have profound consequences on political life. It is well known that the type of electoral system has a near causal effect on the type of party system that emerges.² Some electoral systems exclude parties from the political process that would be included under other systems. Certain types of electoral systems encourage strict party discipline and others enhance voter choice. Some electoral systems function to limit the inherent disproportionality of votes to seats, while others are designed to provide a strong territorial link between elected representatives and their constituents.

In societies where political cleavages run along ascriptive (usually ethnic, racial or religious) divisions, with little cross-cutting of party membership and support, the type of electoral system is especially important. As Horowitz writes: “The electoral system is by far the most powerful lever of constitutional engineering for accommodation and harmony in severely divided societies, as indeed it is a powerful tool for many other purposes.”³

Most studies of the effects of electoral systems in divided societies have focused on how the resultant party system serves to help or hinder ethnic accommodation. This thesis however, examines the impact of the electoral system on party campaigning, with the specific aim of demonstrating the relationship between the list proportional representation (PR) system and the campaign strategies of parties in South Africa.

The strategies adopted by competing parties defined partly, or wholly, in racial terms have serious consequences for the quality and sustainability of democracy in divided societies. Schrire notes that:

¹ Lijphart, Arend. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems* (New York: Oxford University Press) p.1

² See: Duverger, Maurice. 1964. *Political Parties- Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. (London: Methuen & Co.)

³ Horowitz, Donald. 1991. *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society*. (Cape Town: Oxford University Press) p.163

In fragile democracies, both the ruling and opposition parties may have the capacity to destroy democracy itself. Thus both the balance of political forces and the respective party strategies will be critical in shaping political developments.⁴

In a divided society, where politics is segmented along racial lines, party strategies that aim to entrench division along existing conflictual cleavages have an inimical effect on democracy. Parties playing the race card to consolidate and cement their support base, seriously hinder the ability of new democracies to overcome historical divisions. If these divisions are not surmounted, then politics is likely to take on a zero sum character whereby one group will be seen to rule at the expense of others. It is therefore imperative that measures are adopted that counteract the tendency for politicians to play the race card. The only way to achieve this is to promote the development of inclusive parties that do not direct their electoral appeals at some groups at the expense of others.

Reynolds has shown that electoral systems in Southern Africa that engender an “ethos of inclusion” enhance the prospects for democratic consolidation. According to Reynolds, this ethos can best be explained by the question: “To what degree do various groups within society feel that they are included, represented, and listened to within the structures of government which makes decisions affecting their interests?”⁵ For Reynolds, this ethos is encouraged through adopting a list PR electoral system, as well as other integrative institutional arrangements, such as bicameralism and a written constitution. The electoral system is the most decisive factor however:

...There is no more important choice than which electoral system is to be used. This single institution will help determine what parties look like, who is represented in parliament, and ultimately who governs.⁶

In a five-country comparative study, Reynolds found that South Africa and Namibia had engendered an “ethos of inclusion”—chiefly through the adoption of a list PR electoral system. Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi, with “exclusionary” first-past-the-

⁴ Schrire, Robert. 2001. “The Realities of Opposition in South Africa: Legitimacy, Strategies and Consequences.” In *Seminar Report: Opposition in South Africa’s New Democracy*. No.2 (Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung) p.27

⁵ Reynolds, Andrew. 1999. *Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press) p.7

⁶ Ibid. p.89

post (FPTP) electoral systems, have fared less well in the realm of ethnic accommodation. For Reynolds then, the chances of democratic success in Namibia and South Africa are much higher than in the other three countries, due to the inclusive spin that the electoral system puts on the political system.

It is true that South Africa's transition to democracy has been far more successful and bloodless than most observers predicted. Also, there is no doubt that 'race relations' have improved immeasurably since the end of apartheid. Of course, this progress may not be that surprising, given the systematic oppression of people of colour that was the hallmark of that regime. However, to say that ethnic and racial accommodation has occurred as a result of the electoral system is surely an ambitious claim.

Reynolds' lists some indicators that the transition to a non-racial democracy has been successful. The smooth integration in the fields of defence, education, business and sport, the emergence of a black middle class into the formal economy and a drop off in white emigration, are all cited as indicators that ethnic and racial accommodation is occurring.⁷ If we accept that great strides have been made in this area, it is unclear how they have come about as a result of the electoral system. Indeed, it seems that Reynolds relies too much on the *correlation* of list PR with racial and ethnic accommodation, without exploring other possible *causes*. It is quite plausible that the electoral system is a *countervailing* force to inter-group accommodation, but was overridden by other strong contextual factors in the transition, such as the project of nation-building, the widespread appeal of Nelson Mandela or the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Simply put, it is unclear how the list PR electoral system has contributed to racial accommodation in South Africa, over and above guaranteeing representation to minority groups in the legislature.

This is not to discount the validity of placing an emphasis on the electoral system when discussing racial accommodation. Rather, it is to challenge the theory that list PR, through including more parties in formal politics, necessarily leads to harmonious group relations in divided societies.

⁷ Reynolds, *Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa* p.51

Reynolds' 'ethos of inclusion' is a variable that is more suited to analysing the transition phase of democratisation than the consolidation phase. It is certainly true that governing structures in a new democracy must be inclusive in order for the system to be seen as legitimate. For democratic consolidation to occur in a divided society, however, it is not enough to simply include as many parties in the political process as possible. Political institutions, and particularly electoral systems, should be devised that encourage *the parties themselves* to be inclusive. Politics played out along racial lines runs counter to Rustow's precondition for the consolidation of democracy— national unity.⁸

An inclusive party can be defined as one that does not attempt to drum up racial fears in order to gain support. Instead, the party appeals to all race groups with a campaign that is strongly issue-based. Exclusive parties on the other hand, seek to make narrow sectional appeals. They seize on existing societal cleavages and politicise them in order to maximise votes. In real life of course, there are rarely parties that can be defined as wholly exclusive or inclusive. All parties are to some extent schizophrenic and may send out conflicting messages to electors. Nevertheless, it is possible to assess whether parties do, in the main, adopt an 'inclusive' or 'exclusive' strategy.

With these considerations in mind, the following hypothesis has been formulated:

List PR may have inimical effects in divided societies. The system does nothing to encourage political parties to be inclusive. In fact, the system lends itself to the mobilisation of ethnic and/or racial identities with potentially disastrous effects for democratic consolidation.

An analysis of the effects of the electoral system on racial politics should attempt to demonstrate the precise nature of the relationship between the two variables. For the purposes of exploration, this study posits the electoral system (closed list PR) as the independent variable and incentives to campaign inclusively or exclusively, as the dependent variable.

⁸ Rustow, Dankwart A. 1970. "Transitions to democracy—Toward a Dynamic Model" in *Comparative Politics* 2, 3 pp. 350-51

Chapter one takes the form of a theoretical framework. It briefly examines the meaning and usefulness of the divided society concept before reviewing the electoral proposals put forward for divided societies by constitutional engineers. Chapter two introduces the South African case and places it within the divided society framework. A brief explanation of the genesis and functioning of the electoral system is offered, as well as a preliminary assessment of the successes and failures of South Africa's electoral system thus far.

In order to show exactly how the main parties appeal to various sectors of the electorate, an extensive analysis of the 1999 election campaigns is undertaken in chapters three and four. Chapter three provides a rich description of each party's strategy in order to provide the reader with the background and context of each party's campaign. Chapter four offers a more systematic, quantitative account, taking the form of a content analysis. The aim of this chapter is to allow for more rigorous comparison between the parties. The thesis is concluded with an explanation of how list PR encourages party strategists to concentrate on securing a narrow support base and offers some thoughts on how alternative systems may counteract this phenomenon.

Chapter One:

Electoral Systems and Divided Societies

An appreciation for the effects of electoral systems in so-called 'divided societies' is evident from the large and growing literature on the subject. This chapter offers a brief survey of the key scholarly work done in this field. The aim of elucidating some important theoretical issues is to set up the analysis of closed list proportional representation in South Africa.

1.1 The divided society thesis

Scholars have used the concept of the divided or plural society in different ways. Here a suitable definition for the work at hand will be put forward. In doing so, a brief review of the validity of the concept as different authors have used it is proffered.

Rabushka and Shepsle attribute the notion of the "plural society" to the colonial administrator J S Furnivall who defined such a society as "comprising two or more elements or social orders, which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit."⁹ This definition, although somewhat vague, is important for making the qualitative distinction between homogeneous and heterogeneous societies.¹⁰

Rabushka and Shepsle point out that all definitions of the divided society place cultural diversity as the most important criteria for deciding whether a society is divided. They argue that this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a society to be considered 'divided', asserting that nearly all societies are culturally diverse. For a society to be considered a plural or divided society, ethnicity must have a great deal of *salience* in political conflicts. They write: "The hallmark of the plural society and the feature that distinguishes it from its pluralistic counterpart, is the practice of politics almost exclusively along ethnic lines."¹¹

⁹ Quoted in Rabushka, A and Shepsle, K. A. 1972. *Politics in Plural Societies* (Charles E Merrill: Ohio) p. 10

¹⁰ Ibid. p.12

¹¹ Ibid. p.20

This is similar to the definition used by Arend Lijphart. Drawing on the work of Harry Eckstein, Lijphart conceives of the divided (or what he calls plural) society as follows:

...A plural society is a society divided by what Harry Eckstein calls "segmental cleavages". (Eckstein) writes: 'This exists where political divisions follow very closely, and especially concern lines of objective social differentiation, especially those particularly salient in a society.' Segmental cleavages may be of a religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or ethnic nature... political parties, interest groups, media of communication, schools, and voluntary associations tend to be organised along the lines of segmental cleavages.¹²

Donald Horowitz concurs with the segmental nature of divided societies:

In deeply divided societies, strong ethnic allegiances permeate organisations, activities, and roles to which they are formally unrelated. The permeative character of ethnic affiliations, by infusing so many sectors of social life, imparts a pervasive quality to ethnic conflict and raises sharply the stakes of ethnic politics.¹³

The divided society thesis as it has been presented here can be summarised as a society where ascriptive group conflict largely determines the ends of politics. Ascriptive identities are the most salient feature of political life and consequently, these groups tend to be mobilised on the basis of this identity. This definition is compatible with Crawford Young's concept of "cultural pluralism" which refers to the "the existence within a given political unit, normally a state, of more than one socially salient and self-conscious ethnic, religious and/or racial group".¹⁴

It is pertinent at this point to briefly explain the conflict potential inherent in societies divided along ascriptive lines, compared to ones divided along class lines. History has shown that contrary to Marx's vision of worldwide proletarian revolution, class struggles have been resolved through collective bargaining. The rise of corporatist

¹² Lijphart, Arend. 1977. *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press) pp 4-5

¹³ Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. (California: University of California Press) p.8

¹⁴ Young, Crawford. 1997. "Democracy and the Ethnic Question in Africa" in *Africa Insight* 27. 1 fn. 3

structures of governance, whereby trade unions play a key role in policy-making, is evidence of this. The preponderance of ethnic conflict, resulting in great human tragedy in recent years, on the other hand, suggests that this conflict has the capacity to be more intense with much less scope for mediation.

A plausible explanation for this is that class, defined by occupation, is an economic characteristic and is therefore more likely to lead to economic conflict than political conflict.¹⁵ Classes are to some extent mutually dependent on each other and bargains can therefore be struck, sometimes without the necessity of entering the formal political sphere. In addition, classes are more difficult to define and there is the possibility of mobility between classes. Ethnic and other ascriptive identities are entrenched in divided societies and it is therefore a simple feat for politicians to mobilise the identity of a particular group. More importantly, ethnic groups are rarely, if ever, mutually dependent, leaving little room for bargaining.

For our purposes, all ascriptive identities (that is, *inter alia*, race, religion, language and ethnicity) have equal importance and societies may cleave along any of these identities. This is in keeping with Horowitz's broad definition of ethnicity that "embraces differences in colour, language, religion, or some other attribute of common origin".¹⁶ The definition of political cleavage used here is the one outlined by Lipset and Rokkan who use the term to refer to conflict groups that originate in the social realm, but become politicised by elites and tied to political parties.¹⁷

While Horowitz speaks of common origin, he is not an ethnic primordialist. An ethnic primordialist assumes ethnicity is basic, fixed and universal, carrying attributes of a social or psychological kind independent of its context.¹⁸ This position is closely associated with the work of Clifford Geertz who conceptualises ethnicity as a "primordial attachment":

¹⁵ Rose, Richard and Derek Urwin. 1970. "Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes" in *Comparative Political Studies*, 2 p. 39 cited in Zuckerman, Alan. 1975. "Political Cleavage: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis" in *British Journal of Political Science* 5, 2. p. 234

¹⁶ Young, "Democracy and the Ethnic Question in Africa" p.41

¹⁷ Zuckerman, "Political Cleavage: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis" p. 234

¹⁸ Schlemmer, Lawrence. 1999. *Factors in the Persistence and Decline of Ethnic Group Mobilisation* (Unpublished D Phil Thesis submitted to the University of Cape Town) p. 28

By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens' of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsmen, one's neighbour, one's fellow believer, ipso facto; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself.¹⁹

Constructivists on the other hand, argue that ethnic identities are imagined or constructed—ethnic boundaries are formed as groups “seek to defend their interests or increase their advantages by restricting recruitment and access to membership of the group.”²⁰ Whereas permanence is integral to the primordial conception of ethnicity, the constructivist position argues that ethnicity evolves in response to manipulation by political elites.

Horowitz would appear to take a middle position in the polemic:

...Ethnicity is connected to birth and blood, but not absolutely so...ethnic identity is established at birth for most group members, though the extent to which this is so varies. Ethnicity is based on the myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate.²¹

So, while Horowitz believes that the birth principle is important as far as it allows for the generation of the myth of common descent and immutable group differences, ascriptive identities can and do, change under different political conditions. Nevertheless, it is the illusion of permanency that is the problem for democracy to take root and flourish in divided societies:

¹⁹ Geertz, Clifford. 1963. “The Integrative Revolution- Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States” in Geertz, Clifford (ed) *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York: Free Press) p. 109

²⁰ Schlemmer, *Factors in the Persistence and Decline of Ethnic Group Mobilisation* p. 33

²¹ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* pp. 51-52

In severely divided societies, ethnic identity provides clear lines to determine who will be included and who will be excluded. Since the lines appear unalterable, being in and being out may quickly come to look permanent.²²

Courtney Jung argues that the divided society thesis is fundamentally and conceptually flawed on the basis of the permanency she believes that it ascribes to ethnic identity. Jung wrongly characterises the divided society thesis as an extension of the primordialist position:

‘Divided societies’ are those in which two or more politically salient racial, ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups are presumed to determine the possibilities of politics. Ethnic and racial groups are considered permanent, and group-based political affiliations are assumed to be stable over time and across space among a consistently bound group of people.²³

Authors such as Rabushka and Shepsle do indeed seem to view the divided society as a permanent arrangement: “Permanent ethnic communities acting cohesively on nearly all political issues determine a plural society and distinguish it from a culturally homogeneous, nonplural society.”²⁴ Lijphart, similarly adopts a primordial approach to ethnicity: “The basic problem is that primordial loyalties have extremely deep and strong roots, and that single leaders or oligarchies almost inevitably are exponents of particular segments and hence unacceptable to other segments.”²⁵

It is evident from Horowitz, however, that there is no reason why the notion of fluid and constructed identities cannot sit comfortably with the divided society thesis. A close reading of Horowitz reveals that the shifting of identities is integral to his theory of ethnic conflict. In his discussion of ethnic parties, for example, Horowitz recognises the role of elites in constructing ethnic identities:

By appealing to electorates in ethnic terms, by making ethnic demands on government, and by bolstering the influence of ethnically chauvinist elements within each group, parties that

²² Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa?* p.20

²³ Jung, Courtney. 2000. *Then I was Black*. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press) p. 10

²⁴ Rabushka and Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies* pp. 20-21

²⁵ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* p. 227

begin by merely mirroring ethnic divisions help *to deepen and extend them*. Hence the oft-heard remark in such states that the politicians *have created ethnic conflict*.²⁶

Elsewhere he argues that a shift in context creates new identities that can be mobilised by political elites:

In Asia and Africa, prior to independence, *ethnic differences among the subject peoples generally were muted*. Following independence, however, the context and the issues changed. With independence secured, the question was who in the new state would control it. At that point, *ethnic differences became relevant*, contradicting the expectations of those who saw in anti-colonial movements the makings of enduring transethnic nationalisms.²⁷

The following statement from Horowitz closes the case that a theory of a divided society is quite compatible with the constructivist position: “Research on ethnicity makes it abundantly clear that ethnic groups are by no means given, that ethnic identities have an element of malleability, that groups form and re-form their boundaries.”²⁸ It is clear from Horowitz that it is the *appearance of permanency*, rather than the permanency itself that makes ethnic conflict a dangerous phenomenon.

For our purposes, the divided society is one in which ascriptive identities such as race, ethnicity, language and religion play a key role in determining the ends of politics, with the society divided into competing segments. These identities are mobilised by political elites in order to achieve political ends and can compete with other non-ascriptive identities. Divided societies can be placed on a continuum ranging from societies where ascriptive identities are rarely, if ever, mobilised and class and other interests are more salient— to societies that are deeply divided and demonstrate deep structural cleavages. A divided society can be seen as one in which ascriptive identities are the focus of political mobilisation at that point in time. Such a concept is a soft or weaker version of the divided society put forward by Lijphart and Rabushka and Shepsle. It shares the notion that in some societies politics is conducted along segmental cleavages, but rejects the permanency of segmental cleavages. Under the

²⁶ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* p.291 (emphasis added)

²⁷ Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa?* P.44 (emphasis added)

²⁸ *Ibid.* p.47

right conditions, a society may move from being ethnically divided into one in which ethnic identities are no longer politically salient.

The divided society approach has been criticised in that it places an undue focus on ethnicity (and other ascriptive identities). Michael MacDonald labels Horowitz and Lijphart 'ethnic particularists' in that they posit ethnic diversity as the source of political problems. Accordingly, a focus on race and ethnicity was the same logic used by the National Party in South Africa to justify apartheid.²⁹ Horowitz acknowledges this type of view:

The study of ethnic conflict has often been a grudging concession to something distasteful, largely because, especially in the West, ethnic affiliations have been in disrepute, for deep ideological reasons...and the first response to the rising tide of ethnic conflict was to treat it as an epiphenomena.³⁰

MacDonald's claim that studying ethnic conflict is a nefarious business is wrongheaded. Political conflicts arising from the mobilisation of group identities should not be ignored or wished away. Instead, it is important that efforts are made to find explanations for the persistence of ethnic conflict, and means are sought to attenuate the likelihood of it occurring.

In an effort to mitigate the effects of ethnic conflict in such divided societies, theorists have put forward a number of constitutional mechanisms to this end. Devices such as federal and presidential systems have been mooted, as well as wholesale constitutional packages, such as consociational democracy. The chief constitutional mechanism to ameliorate ethnic conflict, however, is the electoral system. The consequences of the various electoral systems in divided societies are reviewed below.

²⁹ Macdonald, Michael. 1992. "The Siren's Song: The Political Logic of Power-Sharing in South Africa" in *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18. 4 p.710

³⁰ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* p.13

1.2 Electoral systems and their consequences in divided societies

The electoral system can be defined as the electoral laws that determine the method of converting votes into seats.³¹ There are three main categories of electoral system: plurality, majoritarian and proportional. Plurality systems are so-called because the candidate that obtains the most votes, or plurality of the votes, wins the election. Majoritarian systems contain mechanisms to 'manufacture' a majority (50% + 1) even where one does not occur as a direct result of the poll. Proportional systems aim, as far as possible, to allocate seats in proportion to the number of votes won by the party.

Each electoral system discussed below falls into one of the categories described above, and all have been used or recommended for divided societies. Each one will be assessed according to their suitability to alleviate the conflict inherent in divided societies.

1.2.1 Plurality systems

Writing on democracy in West Africa over 35 years ago, W Arthur Lewis famously claimed: "The surest way to kill the idea of democracy in a plural society is to adopt the Anglo-American electoral system of first past the post."³² This assertion stems from the observed disproportionality of plurality electoral systems, which shall be referred to as the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system.

FPTP is used most famously in Britain for elections to the House of Commons and in America for the House of Representatives. The system is based on the geographic or territorial notion of representation that developed in Britain and spread throughout the commonwealth. Under such a system, the country is divided into constituencies or districts, each represented by a single elected candidate. The winning candidate is the one that receives the most votes in the constituency.

The major criticism of this system is that it 'wastes' votes—the source of the system's disproportionality. Vote 'wastage' is a recognised effect of plurality systems and refers to votes that do not contribute to the election of a candidate. If two parties

³¹ Rae, Douglas. 1967. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. (New Haven, Yale University Press) p. 14; Bogdanor, Vernon. 1983. "Introduction" in Bogdanor, V and Butler, D (eds.) *Democracy and Elections*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) p. 1

³² Lewis, W Arthur. 1965. *Politics in West Africa* (London: George Allen and Unwin) p. 71

compete for a constituency and one gains 55 percent of the vote, another 35 percent, and another 10 percent, then 45 percent of the votes are 'wasted'.

When results such as the one above are repeated in a number of constituencies, the outcome is usually profound disproportionality between the total number of votes cast and seats won in the country as a whole. The Lesotho election of 1999 provides an illustration of this. In this case, the Basotho National Party (BNP) secured 22.6% of the vote against the Basotho Congress Party's (BCP) 74.7%. The BCP was able to win 75 seats, while the BNP won no representation in parliament.³³ If a party's support is dispersed then they are likely to be grossly underrepresented as they may not have sufficient numbers in any one constituency to win any seats.

This example illustrates the inbuilt tendency to over-represent larger parties and to under represent smaller ones in the legislature. This is encapsulated in one of Douglas Rae's important findings concerning the political consequences of electoral systems: "Plurality and majority formulae tend to give a greater advantage to first parties than do proportional representation formulae."³⁴

Disproportional election results and the exaggeration of majority support are routinely criticised, even in relatively homogenous societies. In divided societies, where electors vote primarily along ascriptive lines, the winner-takes-all nature of the system is seen by some as catastrophic. The chances of democracy succeeding where a significant portion of the population feels excluded are very slim indeed.

A further criticism of the plurality system centres on the drawing up of constituency boundaries. Gerrymandering is a method of drawing up constituencies in such a way that voters of one party are concentrated in an area and voters of another are dispersed.³⁵ In 1992, the first multi-party general election was held in Kenya since liberation in 1962. The ruling party KANU managed to secure re-election through winning 77 out of the 161 contested seats—for only 26.6% of the parliamentary vote. The three opposition parties were collectively only able to win 84 seats, despite

³³ Southall, Roger. 1999. "Electoral Systems and Democratization in Africa" in John Daniel, Roger Southall and Morris Szeftel (eds) *Voting for Democracy* (Hampshire: Ashgate) p. 27

³⁴ Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* p.91

³⁵ Sartori, Giovanni. 1994. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering* (MacMillan Press, London) p.21

getting a combined 75% of the vote share. This result was achieved through blatant gerrymandering on the part of the KANU government. The average number of registered voters in seats won by KANU was 32 699 compared to the 51 256 in seats won by the opposition.³⁶

The problem of vote 'wastage' leading to minority exclusion is a strong argument against the ability of the FPTP system to work in a divided society. There is an argument however, that some effects of the system may actually be useful in a divided society. Quentin L. Quade argues that the FPTP system encourages parties to adopt a "majority-forming attitude" that necessarily inclines parties towards moderation and to seek conciliation.³⁷ By forcing parties to adopt a catch-all strategy, parties are forced to temper ethnic and racial appeals. Guy Lardeyret echoes these sentiments:

Plurality elections force the parties to coalesce before the balloting occurs. They must synthesise the divergent interests and opinions of as many voters as possible, offer the electors a coherent program for governing, and prove their ability to gather a majority. Parties in plurality systems tend to be moderate because most votes are to be gained among the undecided voters of the centre.³⁸

It must be noted that this logic is limited to constituencies where there are a number of competing groups and where one group does not dominate. If one group were numerically dominant, then a "majority-forming attitude" would not be necessary to win, since a majority (defined along ethnic lines) would already be formed. Thus, the party representing that group would merely need to mobilise the salient political identity of that group at the expense of minorities.

Another defence of FPTP in divided societies makes the point that the system is not necessarily as disproportional as always claimed. Joel Barkan argues that in agrarian societies, FPTP systems actually turn out fairly proportional as party allegiances are concentrated territorially. A constituency that overwhelmingly supports a certain candidate will have few wasted votes and the outcome will thus be nearly proportional. He concedes that the FPTP systems are slightly more disproportional.

³⁶ Southall, "Electoral Systems and Democratization in Africa" p. 27

³⁷ Quade, Quentin L. 1991. "PR and Democratic Statecraft" in *Journal of Democracy* 2, 3 p. 41

³⁸ Lardeyret, Guy. 1991. "The Problem with PR" in *Journal of Democracy* 2, 3 p. 33

but argues that criteria for which an electoral system should be judged should not revolve solely around its proportionality. Other considerations, especially the close link between representatives and constituents afforded by FPTP, are just as important.³⁹

If a country conforms to the “agrarian” model described by Barkan, then the results may indeed be more or less proportional and therefore make for minority inclusion in national politics. A constituency overwhelmingly comprised of one ethnic group however, may lead to ethnic outbidding as parties aim to show voters that they are the most legitimate representatives of that group. The problem then remains that constituencies would need to be fairly heterogeneous to encourage moderate appeals. Heterogeneous constituencies however, are likely to lead to the problems of minority exclusion stemming from the problem of vote wastage described above. Either of these eventualities would be unsuitable for a divided society.

1.2.2 List proportional representation

List PR is the most proportional type of electoral system— a quality that has led many party negotiators and academics to recommend it for divided societies. Under list PR, every vote is counted and added to the vote total of each party. This percentage of the vote is then translated into a percentage of the total seats available, achieving a rough proportionality of votes to seats. Most list PR systems operate by means of a closed list where the party selects candidates. The party then publishes a list of candidates in order of importance to the party. If a party wins 40% of the vote in a constituency containing 100 seats, then the top forty candidates on that party’s list will represent the party in the legislature.

Other list PR systems use an open list in which voters are able to play a role in choosing the candidate’s position on the party list. In Finland, voters mark the space beside the candidate of his or her choice. This is taken as an automatic vote for the party and the party’s total vote is the sum of the number of votes for its candidates. Individual candidates then gain election according to the amount of votes they

³⁹ Barkan, Joel. 1998. “Re-Thinking the Applicability of PR for Africa” in Sisk, T and Reynolds, A. *Elections and Conflict Management in Africa* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press).p. 65

receive.⁴⁰ The free list system used in Switzerland and Luxembourg allows for even greater voter choice through allowing voters to place a cross next to a number of their preferred candidates and even place two crosses next to strongly preferred candidates.⁴¹

Most countries that use the list form of PR do so with a closed list and in a number of large multi-member constituencies⁴². Some countries, such as Israel and South Africa, use the whole country as a single multi-member constituency. The use of large districts has a significant impact on the proportionality that the system will achieve and is explained below.

Drawing on the work of Douglas Rae and Arend Lijphart, four key variables can be identified which affect the proportionality of votes to seats: electoral formula, district magnitude, electoral threshold and assembly size. The electoral formula is defined as the method of converting votes into seats (that is, PR, plurality or majoritarian systems) and naturally affects the proportionality of votes to seats. The higher the district magnitude or number of seats in a district, the greater the proportionality of votes to seats.⁴³ The single member districts used in the FPTP system usually result in disproportionality because competition for one seat is likely to produce more wasted votes. Electoral thresholds, that is, the minimum level of support a party needs in order to gain representation also affect proportionality. In some cases a threshold is imposed by law, but will occur naturally as a result of the district magnitude and electoral formula. High thresholds have the same effect as low magnitudes—a decrease in the system's proportionality.⁴⁴ Proportionality also decreases as assembly size (total number of seats in the legislature) decreases.⁴⁵

The proportionality of list PR systems is deemed by many to be crucial to the democratic success of divided societies. The most vociferous advocate is Arend

⁴⁰ Sarlvik, Bo. 1983. "Scandinavia" in Bogdanor, and Butler (eds.) *Democracy and Elections*, p.135

⁴¹ Bogdanor, Vernon. 1983. "Introduction" in Bogdanor and Butler (eds.) *Democracy and Elections*, p.15

⁴² Reynolds, Andrew. 1993. *Voting for a New South Africa*. (Maskew Miller Longman, Cape Town) p.40

⁴³ Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* p.153

⁴⁴ Lijphart, Arend. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems* p. 12

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 12-13

Lijphart, the leading proponent of consociational democracy. Lijphart's theory of consociationalism purports to create a political system based on consensus and inter-group compromise, rather than one founded on the principle of winner-takes-all. This is deemed crucial for democracy to succeed in societies that comprise competing segments defined in ethnic or racial terms.

A consociational democracy comprises four main elements: grand coalition of governing elites, mutual veto in the executive, segmental autonomy for groups to manage their own affairs and a proportional electoral system.⁴⁶ Each group is represented at executive level where consensus is sought on issues affecting the represented groups. The mutual veto is designed to encourage inter-group compromise. Segmental autonomy gives each group the right to manage its own affairs where this does not impinge on other groups. The proportional electoral system allows for the representation of each group roughly according to its share of the total population.⁴⁷ The governing grand coalition is made possible through a proportional system since it allows for the representation of all parties in the legislature.

Even without the other consociational measures in place, Lijphart is firm that list PR is the most suitable electoral system for a divided society. According to Lijphart, closed list PR is desirable as it allows for a high degree of proportionality, ensures minority representation and allows the segments of a society to define themselves.⁴⁸ The proportionality of the system means that the system avoids the exaggeration of majorities inherent in the FPTP system. The last point, that list PR allows for segments to define themselves, is made in response to critics who argue that consociational theory does not allow for any fluidity in politics. Lijphart argues that instead of institutionally entrenching segments, list PR allows segmentation to occur naturally. This is especially important in divided societies where "there is very little agreement on the identity of the segments that compose the plural society and even on whether politics is segmented or not."⁴⁹ The segmentation of politics into competing ethnic groups is therefore encouraged by Lijphart, or at least seen as inevitable in

⁴⁶ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* p.25

⁴⁷ Based on the assumption that voters will vote along ethnic lines.

⁴⁸ Lijphart, Arend, 1987. "Choosing an Electoral System for Democratic Elections in South Africa: An Evaluation of the Principal Options" (University of Cape Town Institute for the Study of Public Policy, Critical Choices for South African Society, occasional paper) pp. 3-7

⁴⁹ Ibid. p.5

divided societies. It will be argued below however that encouraging segmentation, especially in the absence of mechanisms of mutual compromise, is likely to intensify divisions rather than vitiate them.

Following Duverger's Law (that PR systems favour the establishment of a multi-party system and plurality systems favour a two-party system⁵⁰) Lijphart argues that the greatest virtue of list PR is to encourage a multi-party system. He writes:

Countries that use the plurality method of election are likely to have two-party systems, one-party governments, and executives that are dominant in relation to their legislatures...Conversely, PR is likely to be associated with multiparty systems, coalition governments and more equal executive-legislature relations.⁵¹

In divided societies that do not constitutionally demand a consociational governing coalition, it is likely that PR will encourage coalition building due to its ability to fragment the party system. Such coalitions are seen as desirable as they induce compromise between the principal (ethnic/racial) parties in the executive.

Deschouwer and Jans make the point that PR will not necessarily lead to a governing coalition:

Proportionality as such offers no electorally induced guarantees for minority participation at governmental level. Proportionality will merely translate a societal minority status into a (permanent) parliamentary minority.⁵²

It follows that if a party gains sufficient votes to govern alone under a PR system, then PR fails to engender inclusivity at the executive level, although it will still be inclusive at the legislative level.

At the legislative level another problem can be identified with PR in divided societies. By allowing for widespread representation, PR effectively 'mirrors' societal cleavages

⁵⁰ Duverger, Maurice. *Political Parties*. pp. 217; 239

⁵¹ Lijphart, Arend. 1991. "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies" in *Journal of Democracy* 2. 1, p.72

⁵² Deschouwer, Kris and Jans, Theo. 1998. "Electoral Systems and their Effects in Divided Societies." In Bertus de Villiers, Frank Delmartino and Andre Alen (Eds) *Institutional Development in Divided Societies* (Pretoria: HSRC Publishers) p.183

in the legislature, as each segment is represented by 'their' political party. Quentin L. Quade points out the danger of segmentation:

The only thing certain about PR is that it will tend to re-create society's divisions and create them in the legislature. That is its purpose, logic and result.⁵³

The 'mirroring effect' of PR leads Guy Lardeyret to prefer a plurality system for a divided society:

The best way to counteract (the propensity politics to split on ethnic lines) is to oblige members of each group to run against each other on (transethnic) political and ideological grounds in single-member districts. The worst way is to adopt PR, which tends to reproduce ethnic cleavages in the legislature.⁵⁴

Timothy D. Sisk concurs with this view and highlights the danger of politicians in such a system mobilising ascriptive identities:

...List PR voting often amounts to a "census" of communities in conflict—something its advocates consider an advantage—the representation of distinct groups by narrow political parties can serve to worsen divisions. Party leaders anxious to bolster their own support may sound ethnically divisive themes, contrary to Lijphart's contention that political elites are the primary moderating force in divided societies.⁵⁵

It is highly likely that parties in a divided society will campaign and mobilise along ascriptive group identities, as by definition, these are the most salient political identities in such societies. The danger then, is that PR effectively 'locks' parties into competing along ethnic and racial lines. Lodge succinctly sums up the benefits and shortcomings of PR in divided societies:

...Though list proportional representation ensures a wide spectrum of political diversity in Parliament, as well as incentives for participation by ethnic and regional parties, it does nothing to encourage cross-racial party membership and party support. Both are important

⁵³ Quade, "PR and Democratic Statecraft" pp. 36-7

⁵⁴ Lardeyret, "The Problem with PR" p. 35

⁵⁵ Sisk, Timothy D. 1993. "South Africa Seeks New Ground Rules" in *Journal of Democracy* 4, 1 p. 83

for promoting and sustaining vigorous opposition, as well as nurturing widely shared political values and social ethics.⁵⁶

Lijphart's recommendation of PR is informed by his conception of ethnicity as primordial and permanent. In such a situation, it may well be desirable to offer mutually antagonistic and immutable groups proportional representation in the legislature. However, research showing that ethnicity is a construct and is subject to manipulation by political elites, points us away from an arrangement that will serve to entrench societal differences in the legislature. As one critic of Lijphart writes: "What is required is a new approach...where the central issue is not seen as trying to accommodate division but of being concerned to break it down and demystify ethnic lines of division."⁵⁷ This is precisely the aim of the next two systems under review.

1.2.3 The alternative vote

The alternative vote (AV) is a variant of the majoritarian type of electoral system and is used in the Australian House of Representatives in single member constituencies. It is similar to the French double ballot method in that it ensures that the winning candidate obtains a majority of the vote share.⁵⁸ Unlike the French system however, the alternative vote does not require a run-off and voters need only vote once.

AV asks voters to rank order their preferences by marking 1, 2, 3, 4 etcetera next to the list of candidates on the ballot paper. This is known as a preferential (or ordinal) ballot as opposed to the categorical ballot used in the plurality and list PR systems. A candidate must obtain an absolute majority (50% of the votes plus one) to be elected. This is calculated by counting the amount of first preferences received by each candidate. Where no candidate receives an absolute majority, second, and if necessary, subsequent preferences of the least supported candidates are distributed until a majority is obtained. In most Australian AV elections the voter is required to

⁵⁶ Lodge, Tom. 1999. "Which criteria are most important in choosing an electoral system for a post-1999 South Africa?" Paper presented to the Electoral Systems Roundtable, Cape Town, 14-15 August 1998. (Auckland Park: Electoral Institute of South Africa)

⁵⁷ Taylor, Rupert. 1992. "South Africa: A Consociational Path to Peace?" in *Transformation* 17. p. 9

⁵⁸ For a detailed explanation of the French method, see: Goldey, David and Philip Williams, 1983. "France" in in Bogdanor and Butler (eds.) *Democracy and Elections*

indicate as many preferences as there are candidates in order for the ballot to be considered valid.⁵⁹

An important attribute of AV in divided societies is that it encourages parties to form alliances *before* the vote is cast. The fact that voters cast first and second preferences means that parties with common ground can stand separately in a competitive alliance without the danger that their vote will be split.⁶⁰

The preferential ballot also enhances voter choice, enabling her to choose candidates from within a party (which closed list PR does not) as well as to choose candidates from more than one party (which neither PR nor plurality systems allow). At the level of voter behaviour, preferential systems are more moderate than list PR and plurality systems. As Rae notes:

Under categorical systems the voter must act decisively, delivering his whole mandate to a single party. Under ordinal systems, the voter is not required to act so decisively, and is allowed to represent even his least powerful positive feelings in small parcels of support for each of several parties. In the microcosm of the single voter's behaviour, categorical systems are distinguished from ordinal systems by their intractable rejection of compromise solutions.⁶¹

By calling on electors to choose more than one candidate, the zero sum nature of the categorical ballot is diminished. This effect on voter behaviour has important implications for the way in which parties appeal to voters—the key to Donald Horowitz's electoral system proposal for divided societies.

Horowitz is critical of Lijphart's recommendation of list PR for divided societies for two main reasons. Firstly, he argues, as we have above, that PR does not guarantee sufficient party proliferation to necessitate a governing coalition. The second criticism is that the coalitions that result from list PR electoral systems are not cohesive enough to bring about compromise over ethnic/racial issues from the main parties. Citing the

⁵⁹ Jaensch, Dean. 1995. *Election! How and why Australia votes* (New South Wales: Allen and Unwin) p. 28

⁶⁰ Rose, Richard. 1983. "Elections and Electoral Systems: choices and alternatives" in Bogdanor and Butler (eds.) *Democracy and Elections* p.32

⁶¹ Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* p.18

experiences of Nigeria (1959), Uganda (1962), Benin (1957-1965) and the Indian Punjab (1967 and 1969), Horowitz notes that the resulting coalitions, which he calls “coalitions of convenience” rapidly disintegrated:

The coalitions were short-lived, they fell apart over a divisive ethnic issue, and they left ethnic conflict worse than it was when they took office. Unless there is an incentive to compromise over ethnic issues, the mere need to form a coalition will not produce a compromise. The incentive to compromise, and not merely the incentive to coalesce, is the key to accommodation.⁶²

It is the distinction between the incentive to coalesce and the incentive to compromise that forms the basis for Horowitz’s electoral proposals. The former refers to the incentives to pool *seats* to form a governing coalition, while the latter involves the pooling of *votes*. Vote pooling encourages parties to form an electoral alliance before the election. A party in a vote pooling arrangement will convince voters to vote for its alliance partners as second and perhaps third preferences in exchange for the guarantee that the parties may rule in an alliance together, should one of them win the right to govern. This allows for a stronger inter-ethnic coalition than seat pooling arrangements, since the parties become reliant on each other for electoral support.

Instead of parties in a divided society resorting to ‘ethnic out-bidding’, the AV system encourages parties to be moderate on ethnic issues in order to pick up the most second preferences. As Horowitz puts it: “Voters of one group could provide the margin of victory for a candidate of another group, who might then be responsive to their concerns.”⁶³ The parties that are the most moderate on ethnic and racial issues are likely to pick up the most support since they will be rewarded by securing the second preferences of voters. This stands in stark contrast to list PR systems where incentives to appeal to voters of other racial and ethnic groups is absent and voters are “locked wholly within their ethnic party.”⁶⁴

The ability of AV to provide a mechanism that ultimately diminishes ethnic and racial considerations in the rhetoric of political elites make it an attracting proposition for a

⁶² Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa?* p.171

⁶³ *Ibid.* p.173

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* p. 172

divided society. The majoritarian nature of the system, however, means that some parties may feel left out of the political process altogether, despite winning a considerable portion of votes. The single transferable vote system reviewed next achieves a degree of proportionality, while still going some way in encouraging elites to campaign moderately.

1.2.4 The single transferable vote

The single transferable vote (STV) is similar to the alternative vote in that it requires the elector to rank-order their preferred candidates. STV is a more proportional system as it is always used in multi-member districts. The vote is counted by first establishing a quota known as the Droop Quota:

$$\frac{\text{Votes}}{(\text{Seats} + 1)} + 1 = \text{Quota}$$

In a four-member constituency for example, where only four candidates out of those running can be elected and where, for example, 100 votes are cast, the quota would be:

$$\frac{100}{(4+1)} + 1 = 21$$

This means that each candidate needs to gain 21 votes in order to be assured of a seat. Once a candidate receives the quota of votes necessary to securing election, her surplus votes are redistributed to the second preferences on the ballot papers on which she is the first preference. In other words, the second-choice votes received by elected representatives are allocated to candidates who still need to reach the quota.

The fact that candidates rely on gaining the second preferences of other candidates means that this electoral system has similar effects to the AV in providing parties with incentives to be moderate on racial and ethnic issues. This leads Andrew Reynolds to argue that under certain conditions, STV would be the electoral system most likely to mitigate ethnic and/or racial conflict in a divided society.

Reynolds proposes 'integrative consensual power-sharing' a conflict attenuating mechanism that lies somewhere between Lijphart's consociationalism and Horowitz's

'integrative majoritarianism'.⁶⁵ Reynolds' consensual power-sharing arrangement represents a middle road in that it "makes use of institutional mechanisms which encourage cross-cutting ethnic cleavages, while at the same time ensuring the fair representation and inclusion of minorities in decision-making."⁶⁶ This system is designed for a society that is divided, but does exhibit some overlapping cleavages and where other cleavages such as those of class, wealth, regionalism, and clan may be more salient.⁶⁷

Whereas consociational theory is designed for societies that exhibit deep antagonistic cleavages based on ascriptive identities, Reynolds is suggesting a remedy for a society that exhibits weak cleavages, with some overlap. Reynolds argues that because consociationalism serves to entrench communal segments, thereby denying the breakdown of segmental division, that it should be considered only as a "stop-gap measure", "the lesser of two evils" and "the solution when all else fails".⁶⁸ Crawford Young agrees:

One may doubt the wisdom of committing the state through its own structuration to formalizing, constituting, and rigidifying a given temporal pattern of identity, rather than preserving the large degree of flux and fluidity which now exists.⁶⁹

The argument that under STV "there would be a great incentive for political elites to appeal to members of other segments, given that second preferences on the ballot paper are of prime importance"⁷⁰ mirrors the logic of Horowitz's AV proposal. It is therefore worth briefly comparing the effects of the Alternative Vote and STV.

Firstly, STV is a proportional system and AV is majoritarian, thus STV is likely to be viewed as more legitimate as it will include more groups in the democratic process. However, this advantage is tempered, according to Horowitz, by the weaker incentives that STV gives to politicians to make moderate appeals on ethnic issues.

⁶⁵ Reynolds' label of Horowitz's AV proposal.

⁶⁶ Reynolds, Andrew. 1999. "Majoritarian or Power-Sharing Government". Paper presented at the Kellogg Institute Conference. Constitutional Design 2000: Institutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Notre Dame, December 9-11, 1999.

⁶⁷ Ibid. p.2

⁶⁸ Reynolds, "Majoritarian or Power-Sharing Government" p.17

⁶⁹ Young, "Democracy and the Ethnic Question in Africa"

⁷⁰ Reynolds, "Majoritarian or Power-Sharing Government" p.20

Horowitz notes that the STV system used in Northern Ireland in 1973 was not successful in electing a moderate government. The extremist Protestant Party received more of the vote than the moderate Protestants campaigning for power-sharing structures.⁷¹ STV provides a weaker incentive structure than AV because a candidate under STV need only succeed in reaching the quota to be elected, whereas under AV she requires over 50% of the vote. If the quota is 21% under STV, then it is likely that a candidate or party will be elected outright— without needing to gain the second or third preferences from voters whose first preference is on the opposite side of the ethnic divide. This seriously diminishes the case that STV can provide strong incentives for moderation.

Reynolds raises two key criticisms of AV for a divided society. First, he argues that party coalitions within parliament carry similar incentives to Horowitz' vote pooling. He misses the point that vote-pooling carries incentives for politicians to appeal to the electorate on more moderate grounds, whereas seat-pooling is a convenient arrangement that can fall apart easily and does not greatly affect appeals to the electorate. Second, Reynolds claims that AV resembles the majority run-off method or French double ballot system that proved a failure in the divided societies of Europe in the nineteenth century.⁷² It is true that the AV does resemble the majority run-off method and is in fact a way of arriving at the same result without needing to run two elections. In the system used for French presidential elections for example, the top two candidates from the first round of voting face each other in a subsequent round where the candidate with the most votes wins. In both systems a voter may have neither of the top two candidates high up on his list of preferences and may therefore feel that his vote is wasted. In a divided society, minority ethnic groups will no doubt feel excluded from the political process, as 'their' candidates may not secure representation. To counter the majoritarian nature of AV, Horowitz proposes that multi-member instead of single-member constituencies be used. Presumably, in such a system, a candidate receiving the majority of votes would be deemed elected and then taken out of the counting process. The counting process would then start again without that candidate being included.

⁷¹ Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa?* p.173

⁷² Reynolds, *Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa* p.102

Horowitz argues that AV in multi-member constituencies will achieve much greater proportionality than existing plurality systems and will therefore achieve greater minority representation. Intuitively, this claim would seem correct given the higher district magnitude and lower threshold of multi-member systems compared to SMD systems. Reynolds, drawing on the work of J F H Wright, argues that when AV was used in multi-member constituencies in Australia, the disproportionality actually increased.

The dearth of countries using a preferential voting system means that comparative evidence is limited on the effects that such systems have in divided societies. The above discussion shows, however, that the traditional plurality-proportionality debate is not sufficient when discussing the best electoral options for a divided society. Plurality systems can have quite disastrous effects due to their exaggerating the seat share of majority groups. List PR on the other hand, is considered highly successful in that its proportionality greatly increases the legitimacy of the system and the feeling among minority groups that they are included in the democratic process. The position has been advanced in this chapter however, that list PR can have perverse effects in systems where one party is dominant, as list PR alone will not induce elite coalition and compromise. More importantly, list PR does not have the ability to moderate the appeals that politicians make with respect to voters. It follows that appeals to ethnic groups will remain the means of voter mobilisation if list PR is instituted in a society that is divided along ethnic lines, thus further entrenching social divisions.

A system that allows voters to cast their vote across the ethnic divide ensures that voter choice is not rigidly structured along societal cleavages. Such systems provide elites with incentives to moderate their rhetoric and policies on racial and ethnic issues, since their election may well depend on successfully convincing voters from across the ethnic divide to choose their party as their second preference.

1.3 Defending a focus on electoral systems

Implicit in the above discussion is the assumption that constitutional devices can make a difference to politics in divided societies. Courtney Jung dismisses “the fantasy that political scientists can devise electoral systems that will be used to

particular conflict-attenuating ends”.⁷³ She contends that electoral systems, and political institutions in general, have only a limited effect in explaining the politicisation of group identities.

For her, material conditions, organisation patterns and available ideology create incentives for political leaders to mobilise voters on the basis of ascriptive identities, and not the electoral system. In societies where material conditions more or less accord with race or ethnicity, organisations are racially segregated and prevailing ideologies have racial undercurrents, then politicians have an incentive to mobilise ascriptive identities *whatever* electoral system is in place. The only way to change the incentive structures for political elites is to change these variables.

Jung is quite correct in ascribing importance to these variables, as they no doubt affect the context within which politicians make strategic choices. After all, a politician will only be able to successfully mobilise voters on the basis of race or ethnicity if this is relevant to conflicts arising out of a society. Right wing parties in Europe tend to grow in strength and support when there is a rise in immigration and it is no doubt attractive for politicians to stir up ethnic hatred when one ethnic group is seen to benefit materially at the expense of another.

In a society where groups are mutually antagonistic, as in the concept of the divided society adopted earlier in this chapter, it is likely that material conditions, organisational structure and prevailing ideologies are determined to a great extent by the ethnic and racial fault lines of a society. One way of steering politicians away from playing on this division in order to gain votes (and thereby exacerbating divisions) is to make it electorally rewarding to stress moderation between groups. This can occur through crafting an electoral system to this end. If incentives to be moderate are absent in an electoral system, then it is likely that elites will play on ethnic and racial animosities arising out of the variables that Jung ascribes importance to.

⁷³ Jung, *Then I was Black* p.249

2.5 Conclusion

Electoral engineering is not a panacea for all ills. Ethnic and racial conflict is a pervasive phenomenon and there is no guarantee that either tweaking or completely overhauling the electoral system will lead to stable democratic politics in societies divided along ethnic and racial lines. However, one thing is clear. Some electoral systems suit a divided society better than others, and some electoral systems may have distinctly inimical effects in divided societies (such as first-past-the-post). Some may be ultimately harmful, in that they 'freeze' the party system (such as list PR) without providing for the overcoming of ethnic politics. Others, such as AV and STV, may carry incentives for politicians to engage in a politics of moderation and solicit a cross-racial support base.

The purpose of this chapter has not been to make any specific recommendations for the type of electoral system best suited to divided societies. Rather, it has shown how electoral systems carry incentives that shape elite behaviour in terms of whether they target specific segments or attempt to appeal across the racial and ethnic divide. We are now in a position to delve deeper into the effects of closed list PR on campaigning in our chosen case, South Africa. It is first necessary to examine whether South Africa is indeed the divided society it is so often portrayed as.

Chapter Two:

Closed List PR in a Divided South Africa

South Africa is often referred to as the paradigmatic case of a divided society and a good deal of the constitutional engineering literature was developed in response to the prospect of a democratic transition in South Africa. Whereas this literature sought to *propose* electoral mechanisms to create a viable democracy in South Africa, this thesis aims to *evaluate* the success of the electoral system chosen in the South African case. In order to do this, it is necessary to first decide whether South Africa conforms to the model of the divided society so far discussed and examine the nature of political divisions.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first part investigates the nature and extent of ethnic and racial division in South Africa with the focus limited to the political arena. The second section examines the party political considerations for a new electoral system. It shows how list PR was universally seen as the fairest system and briefly explains how the system works. The third section outlines some of the successes and shortcomings of the electoral system evident from the 1994 election and subsequent political alignment. Taken together, these three sections will provide the context for the analysis of the 1999 election campaign undertaken in the following chapter.

2.1 Is South Africa a divided society?

Apartheid, by definition, was a policy that socially engineered the separation of groups along racial and ethnic lines. As such, apartheid South Africa can indeed be classified as the paradigmatic case of a divided society.

Voting behaviour in the 1994 election confirmed the legacy of racial division, prompting Crawford Young to write:

Voting alignments since 1994 clearly indicate that the doctrine of nonracialism is insufficient to efface the racial rectangle in place. The enormous challenge of

transformation and redress of the racially defined imbalances of the past places a heavy burden upon democratic politics.⁷⁴

In divided societies, elections are often termed an ethnic or racial census, as parties that purport to represent a certain ethnic group can expect to gain the support of that group in an election. Horowitz sketches the hypothetical example of a country comprising two ethnic groups— A and B. Both groups are represented by political parties formed along ethnic lines, “as they tend to do in ethnically divided societies.”⁷⁵ When group A comprises the numerical majority of the electorate, party A will always form the government— whether the electoral system is first past the post or proportional representation. This leads to a situation where group B is forever excluded from power—a state of affairs that Horowitz believes is not conducive to a healthy democracy because permanent majority rule along ascriptive lines precludes shifting majorities. Instead of being “a vehicle of choice”, the election registers “not choice, but birth affiliation”. Commenting on the hypothetical election, Horowitz concludes that: “This was no election— it was a census.”⁷⁶

According to Horowitz, an ethnic party is one which: “Derives its support overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group (or cluster of ethnic groups) and serves the interests of that group.”⁷⁷ The test of an ethnic party is therefore the distribution of that party’s support. If a party derives its core support from a single ethnic group, and serves that group’s interests then it is considered an ethnic party. It is important to note that an ethnic party does not have to have an exclusive hold on all the members of a particular ethnic group. As Horowitz writes: “It is how the *party’s* support is distributed, not how the *ethnic group’s* support is distributed, that is decisive.”⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Young, “Democracy and the Ethnic Question in Africa” p. 11

⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 83

⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 86. Note: Pierre du Toit. argues that the ethnic census argument has wrongly been attributed to Horowitz who uses the hypothetical example only to “draw the reader into the nature of the problem” (p.9). In fact, as du Toit argues, Horowitz does not reduce all ethnic behaviour to primordial ethnic outbidding, but that under the right conditions, inter-ethnic bargaining can occur. Rather, du Toit (p.8) cites Lijpharts’s definition of the plural society as the view that elections are merely a census. See: du Toit, Pierre. 1999. “The South African Voter and the Racial Census, c 1994” in *Politeia* vol. 18, no. 2

⁷⁷ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* p. 291

⁷⁸ Ibid p.293

Political analysts in South Africa have typically adopted the racial census terminology to describe the nature of South African voting behaviour. The fact that the ANC received only two to three percent of the 'white vote' and that only four percent of blacks voted for the NP and the DP in 1994, led Welsh to conclude that race was the basis of voter choice.⁷⁹ Johnson claimed that the "ANC's enormous victory was founded less on the non-racialism it preached than on the reverse, with the election constituting to a large extent a mere 'ethnic census'."⁸⁰ This assessment is more implicitly followed by Southall: "... as predicted by the opinion polls, African and white voters (had) overwhelmingly followed racial lines, with the ANC and the NP emerging as major beneficiaries."⁸¹ Friedman, adopts a similar tack: "The ANC, the world's oldest 'liberation movement' has consolidated its status as the premier vehicle of black African aspirations, a seemingly sure-fire formula for electoral victory in a society with a history of racial polarisation, which prompts an inevitable tendency by the electorate to vote on largely racial lines."⁸²

It is not clear whether these prominent South African political analysts view South African voting behaviour as *motivated* by race or whether they simply use the ethnic census concept to *describe* the correlation between voting and race. In an article bemoaning the tendency of South African scholars to provide simplistic, descriptive accounts of South African voting behaviour, Seekings distinguishes between using the ethnic census terminology descriptively or as a theoretical construct to analyse voting behaviour. He finds that in at least some cases, notably the writings of Welsh mentioned above, that there was clearly an appropriation of Horowitz's ideas of "primordial voting."⁸³

⁷⁹ Welsh, David. 1994, "The Democratic Party" in Andrew Reynolds, *Election '94 South Africa- The campaigns, results and future prospects* (David Philip: Cape Town) p. 113

⁸⁰ Johnson, RW. 1996. "The 1994 election: Outcome and Analysis" in Johnson, RW and Schlemmer, Lawrence (eds) *Launching Democracy in South Africa- The First Open Election, April 1994* (New Haven: Yale University Press) p.319

⁸¹ Southall, Roger. 1994. "The South African Elections of 1994: The Remaking of a Dominant Party State" in *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 32, 4. p. 640

⁸² Friedman, Steven. 1999. "No Easy Stroll to Dominance: Party Dominance, Opposition and Civil Society in South Africa." In Giliomee, Herman and Simkins, Charles (eds) *The Awkward Embrace- One Party Domination and Democracy* (Cape Town: Tafelberg) p. 97

⁸³ Seekings, Jeremy. 1997. "From the Ballot Box to the Bookshelf: Studies of the 1994 South African General Election" in *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 15, 2. p. 297

In an analysis of the 1994 election in the Western Cape, Eldridge and Seekings find the racial census argument to be untenable. Drawing on opinion polls conducted before the campaign, they find that only one in three voters were planning to vote for their 'natural' ethnic parties. At this time, there was no distinct correlation between race and voting behaviour although many uncommitted coloured voters did eventually cast their vote for the NP, ensuring that party's victory in the province. This indicates that there was in fact a significant amount of 'floating' or independent voters who were not simply registering their racial affiliation, but voting in accordance with specific interests. Their second argument is that both the ANC and the NP ran issue-oriented campaigns on a non-racial basis. Thirdly, they point out that pre-election polling data suggests that voting intentions were determined more by voter's attitudes on key issues, than their ethnic identity.⁸⁴

Mattes similarly rejects the 'racial census' view. In an extensive survey conducted before and during the 1994 election campaigns, he found that voters' economic and class status, ideology, judgement of government performance as well as voters' perception of the parties best-equipped to deal with the nation's problems, all motivated voting behaviour. Racial or ethnic concerns were not widely cited as primary reasons for party and candidate support. Voters strongly imbued with such ascriptive identities did not behave much differently from those who did not demonstrate strong ethnic and racial ties. In fact, the majority of voters saw the political parties they supported as being representative of all South Africans.⁸⁵ Mattes criticises the ethnic/racial census view on the grounds that the high degree of correlation between voting behaviour and ethnic and racial identity leads its proponents to assume causation:

... A high degree of correlation between race or ethnicity and the vote need not necessarily be the result of non-rational or primordial motivations. Especially in a divided society like South Africa, it is likely that issues and interests run parallel to factors such as race and ethnicity.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Eldridge, Matt and Seekings, Jeremy. 1995. "An Uphill Battle: Voter Attitudes and ANC Strategy in the Western Cape in the 1994 South African Elections." Paper presented at the Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town. 28 August 1995. pp 2-4

⁸⁵ Mattes, Robert. 1995. *The Election Book-Judgement and Choice in South Africa's 1994 Election* (Cape Town: Idasa) p. 5

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* p. 11

Race and ethnicity then, do not drive voting behaviour; rather they themselves correlate to a great extent with interests and ideology. As Mattes writes:

Given that the very essence of apartheid meant that life-chances significantly differed according to race, race structured individual interests and perceptions of interests. Thus, race may provide an informational short cut which serves to tell voters where their interests lie.⁸⁷

Similarly, Schlemmer argues that voting patterns in 1994 should not be understood as collective acts of ethnic solidarity, but that “other non-ethnic interests have tended to become structured in terms of racial and ethnic identity in South Africa’s apartheid past.”⁸⁸ However, Schlemmer also writes: “The pattern of results, though not necessarily based on motives of group solidarity, come uncomfortably close to being a census of mobilised racial-cum-ethnic categories in South Africa.”⁸⁹ This leads Mattes to place Schlemmer in the racial census camp and he cites Schlemmer as a proponent of the racial census argument adapted from Horowitz.⁹⁰ However, both authors evidently agree that racial and ethnic identities have structured the interests of voters, although these identities do not of themselves determine voting behaviour.

The racial census view holds at the descriptive level, but fails analytically. While voters in South Africa do appear to have a degree of choice over and above ethnic and racial affiliations, race and ethnicity play a part in structuring their choice. Instead of being irrational, ethnic voters simply registering birth affiliation, South African voters exhibit a degree of sophistication when marking the ballot. However, while race and ethnicity do not in themselves cause people to vote in a particular way, the historical experience of South Africans have imbued them with certain interests and ideologies. This view is shared with prominent political commentators Robert Schrire (“Historical ties thus largely determine political loyalties”)⁹¹ and Eddie Maloka (“It is scarcely surprising... that the form and content of political parties has been shaped by

⁸⁷ Mattes, *The Election Book* p. 11

⁸⁸ Schlemmer, Lawrence. 1994. “South Africa’s First Open Election and the Future of its New Democracy.” In Giliomee, Herman; Schlemmer, Lawrence and Hauptfleisch, Sarita (eds) *The Bold Experiment-South Africa’s New Democracy* (Halfway House: Southern) p.161

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* p.158

⁹⁰ Mattes, *The Election Book* p. 9

⁹¹ Schrire. “The Realities of Opposition in South Africa” p.31

South Africa's past")⁹². This is dangerous for the future of race relations in South Africa, and by extension, democratic politics. Schlemmer raises the prospect that the racial structuring of interests could lead to racial and ethnic identities becoming a "popular surrogate for the more valid alternative interests with which [they] are correlated. Inasmuch as this surrogate concept becomes lodged in popular consciousness, it can become self-perpetuating, and a powerful focus of political mobilisation."⁹³

We have argued that elections in South Africa do follow the pattern in other divided societies at least in terms of the correlation of voters' race to their choice of party. This implies, without demonstrating, that South African parties are 'ethnic parties'. Let us consider the racial support of each of the main parties in turn. The ANC's support base in the 1994 election was overwhelmingly black. Of the 62% of its national share of the vote, an estimated 94% of the ANC's vote came from black voters, with 4% coming from coloureds, 1.5% from Indians and 0,5% from whites.⁹⁴ According to Horowitz's criteria, the ANC would qualify as an ethnic party going in to the 1999 election since its core support is derived from one group and it serves the interests of that group. Whites formed the majority of the National Party's support base (49%), although a significant amount of its support in 1994 came from coloureds (30%), blacks (14%) and Indians (7%).⁹⁵ Perhaps surprisingly, the party responsible for apartheid had the most diverse support base and cannot be considered as a truly ethnic party. The fact that a minority group comprise nearly half of the NP's support base leads us to conclude that the party represented whites primarily. The DP fell squarely into the ethnic party category in 1994, with between 80 and 90% of its vote coming from the white community.⁹⁶ The IFP would also fall into the category of an ethnic party going into the 1999 election since 90% of its vote came from Zulu-speakers in KwaZulu-Natal and the party had explicitly mobilised the ethnic identity of this group in the run-up to the first democratic election. From this brief analysis, it

⁹² Maloka, Eddie. 2001. " 'White' Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in South Africa" in *Seminar Report: Opposition in South Africa's New Democracy*. No.2 (Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Siftung) p.97

⁹³ Schlemmer, "South Africa's First Open Election and the Future of its New Democracy" p.161

⁹⁴ Reynolds. 1994. "The Results" in Reynolds, Andrew *Election '94* (Cape Town: David Philip) p.191

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* p.184 (Note: Reynolds' figures are estimates).

⁹⁶ *Ibid.* p.185

is fair to say that, with the possible exception of the National Party, political parties going into the 1999 election had a clear ethnic or racial base.

The observation that political parties are defined in ethnic and racial terms does not necessarily mean that South Africa should be classified as a rigidly divided society with primordial and permanent ethnic divisions. The relatively smooth racial integration of the military, civil service, schools and residential areas illustrates the potential for harmonious race relations in South Africa. The development of a black middle class also holds the promise of cleavages that cut across race and class lines, thus weakening the deep structural cleavages of race and ethnicity. Lipset and Rokkan, as we noted in the previous chapter, define a political cleavage as a social division that has been politicised by elites. In other words, it is the politicisation of divisions that polarise the electorate. In order to allow for political fluidity and cross-cutting cleavages, it is vital that politicians refrain from making narrow sectional appeals and are encouraged to appeal to groups outside their traditional constituencies. Unfortunately, this was apparently not a consideration for any of the parties going into the multi-party talks at Codesa.

2.2 Choosing a post-apartheid electoral system

In the period subsequent to de Klerk's historic Groote Schuur speech signalling the coming end of apartheid, the issue of the electoral system to be used in a democratic South Africa was placed on the public agenda. The NP government's position emerged in a report by the President's Council in 1990 that strongly advocated PR as the most suitable system for a democratic South Africa.⁹⁷ This was confirmed in the NP's constitutional proposals set out in 1991.⁹⁸

The President's Council issued a special report in 1992 on proportional representation. List PR was advocated on the grounds that it was the most democratic, that there was "near consensus that majoritarian and relative majority electoral systems were unsuitable for deeply divided societies", that it would allow fringe

⁹⁷ President's Council. 1990 *Report of the Committee for Constitutional Affairs on Decision-making and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms and Techniques in Constitutional Systems* (Cape Town: Government Printer)

⁹⁸ National Party. September 1991. "Constitutional Rule in a Participatory Democracy" Appendix F in Robert Schrire *Adapt or Die: The End of White Rule in South Africa*. (Ford Foundation) p.206

parties to participate in governance, that there was consensus amongst the major parties for PR, and that such a system would receive international support.⁹⁹ It was the view of the council that the choice of electoral system is largely determined by the “potential electorate’s high level of illiteracy.”¹⁰⁰

In his budget speech in May 1992, then Minister of Constitutional Development, Roelf Meyer, outlined the Government’s preference for PR. He noted that PR was desirable as it is not complex, allows for wider participation, is fairer and allows for coalition building between minorities. He criticised the existing plurality system on the grounds that it produces “strange” election results.¹⁰¹

Ironically, the National Party found itself strongly advocating against a system that for years had artificially bolstered its support in whites-only elections. It was obvious that in a democratic election the NP’s chances of electoral success would be greatly enhanced by proportional representation due to the under representation of geographically dispersed minorities inherent in the Anglo-American FPTP system.

The ANC initially favoured a constituency-based system, as it feared that PR would force the ANC into governing coalitions. It was only when the ANC realised that opinion poll data showed that PR would not hinder their chances of gaining a majority that they endorsed PR.¹⁰²

In November 1990, Professor Kader Asmal, head of the ANC Constitutional Affairs Committee, noted that PR, specifically list PR, had the advantages of proportionality between votes and seats, the impossibility of manipulating boundaries, minority representation and ease of voting.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ President’s Council. 1992. *Report of the Committee for Constitutional Affairs on a Proportional Polling System for South Africa in a New Constitutional Dispensation*. (Cape Town: Government Printer) pp 62-64

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. p.85

¹⁰¹ Meyer, Roelf. 1992. Speech in A New South Africa: Extracts from Speeches by the State President and the Minister of Constitutional Development, September 1989- February 1993. p.75

¹⁰² Pottie, David. 2001. “The Electoral System and Opposition Parties in South Africa” in *Opposition in South Africa’s New Democracy*. Seminar hosted at Kariega Game Reserve, Eastern Cape by Rhodes University. (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Johannesburg) p 154

¹⁰³ Asmal, Kader. November 1990. “Electoral Systems: A Critical Survey.” In *UWC/ CDS Workshop: Electoral Systems- A Discussion Document*. Cape Town. p.27

The system proposed by Asmal formed the basis of the ANC's Constitutional Proposals released in May 1991. It was proposed that a combined regional and national list PR system be introduced. Regions would be allocated half of the total seats, which would be divided among the regions in proportion to the registered voters in each region. Voters would vote for a party within their region and the regional seats would be allocated between the parties according to the percentages obtained by each party in each region. The remaining half of the seats would be allocated according to the share of the national vote.¹⁰⁴

The PR system outlined above was seen as favourable by the ANC as it encouraged participation in government by groups with a substantial following, there would be a little wastage of votes as votes, the popularity of parties would be reflected in the legislature and that the time, expense and accusation of bias in delimiting constituencies could be avoided.¹⁰⁵

The IFP's constitutional proposals were largely based on the KwaZulu Natal Indaba that took place in 1987.¹⁰⁶ The Indaba proposed that PR was a favourable electoral system on the grounds that minority representation would be assured, as "it is unlikely that any single party would have more than fifty percent of the seats in the first chamber."¹⁰⁷

In a discussion document published in 1991, the DP proposed a PR system whereby 300 of the 400 members of the National Assembly would be elected from 100 three-member constituencies, with the remaining 100 elected from national lists.¹⁰⁸ The aim of such a system was to ensure proportional representation while maintaining a strong link with public representatives.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁴ African National Congress. 1991. *Discussion Document: Constitutional Principles and Structures for a Democratic South Africa*. (Published by the United Nations Centre Against Apartheid) p.11

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Sisk, Timothy D. 1995. *Democratization in South Africa* (Princeton University Press, New Jersey) p.148

¹⁰⁷ KwaZulu Natal Indaba. 1987. *Constitutional Proposals and Memoranda Submitted to the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning on 13 January 1987*. p. 5

¹⁰⁸ Faure, Murray. 1999. "The Electoral Systems Issue in South African Politics." in *Occasional Paper* February 1999. (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Johannesburg) p.3

¹⁰⁹ Democratic Party. 1993. *Submission to the Technical Committee on Constitutional Matters, 13 May 1993*. (<http://constitution.uct.ac.za/cgi-bin/catdoc.sh/cama/data/data/multi/subs/25005.doc>)

The PAC expressed a preference for proportional representation despite favouring an unqualified majoritarian system. Sisk explains this as an attempt to outbid the ANC on the revolutionary left while taking cognisance of its status as a minority party.¹¹⁰

Consensus on PR had been formed by the time of the inaugural meeting of Codesa.¹¹¹ The fragile nature of the transition underlined the need to bring as many parties into the democratic process as possible. It was agreed that the best way to do this was the introduction of a list proportional representation system. Self-interested motives, rather than considerations of fairness motivated the parties to propose list PR. Smaller parties undoubtedly favoured PR as it virtually guaranteed them representation. For the ANC, PR was a strategic choice in that they needed a concession that did not give ascriptive groups privileges and it was doubtful that the electoral system chosen would affect their chance of obtaining over 50% of the vote.¹¹²

The electoral system adopted in terms of the 1993 Interim Constitution remained in place for the Final Constitution promulgated in 1996. It is described in the interim constitution as follows: "There shall be a representative government embracing multi-party democracy, regular elections, universal adult suffrage, a common voter's roll, and, in general, proportional representation."¹¹³ Section 1 of Schedule 2 of the interim constitution states that the type of PR to be adopted is the closed or party list system: " Parties... shall nominate candidates for such an election on lists of candidates."¹¹⁴

The Parliament is composed of a 400-member National Assembly (NA) and 90-member National Council of Provinces (NCOP). There are also nine provincial legislatures as well as representative structures at municipal or local level.¹¹⁵ 200 members of the NA are elected according to regional party lists, with the other 200

¹¹⁰ Sisk, *Democratization in South Africa* p. 192

¹¹¹ Sisk, Timothy D. 1993. "South Africa Seeks New Ground Rules" in *Journal of Democracy* 4, 1. p. 84

¹¹² Friedman, Steven. 1998. "Too Little Knowledge is a Dangerous Thing: South Africa's Bargained Transition and John Rawls's 'Veil of Ignorance'" in *Politikon* 25, 1. p.64

¹¹³ Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993
[<http://www.gov.za/constitution/1993/1993cons.htm#SCHEDUL2>]

¹¹⁴ Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993
[<http://www.gov.za/constitution/1993/1993cons.htm#SCHEDUL2>]

¹¹⁵ At local level, a mixture of PR and FPTP is used. The effects of this mixed electoral system are beyond the scope of this analysis, but could be interesting comparatively.

elected according to national lists, effectively creating one large 400-member constituency.¹¹⁶ Each of the nine provinces has a provincial legislature that is also elected using the party list system. Voting for national and provincial level takes place on the same day and voters are given two ballot papers. This affords voters the opportunity to ‘split’ their vote by voting for different parties at national and provincial level.

2.3 Successes and shortcomings of closed list PR: a preliminary assessment

The major achievement of the electoral system in the first democratic election in 1994 was to ensure that a wide array of parties (including potential ‘spoilers’) were represented in the first democratic National Assembly tasked with drawing up the Final Constitution. In 1994 seven parties won seats in the National Assembly with this amount increasing to thirteen in 1999. This is due largely to the high district magnitude (400) and the absence of an imposed threshold for representation.

A hypothetical re-run of the 1994 election in South Africa under different systems shows that under a plurality system and an alternative vote system, only three parties - the ANC, the NNP and the IFP - would have been represented in the National Assembly.¹¹⁷ Under list PR, the Freedom Front— a right wing party advocating the establishment of a white homeland or *volkstaat*— achieved representation with nine seats. The Pan Africanist Congress—notorious for its rallying cry, “one settler, one bullet”— won five seats in the first democratic National Assembly.

That most parties were included in the first democratic Parliament and that virtually all parties agreed on the use of list PR, greatly enhanced the legitimacy of the system during the formative years of democracy. As South Africa moves out of the transition however, these considerations have diminished in importance. For democracy to be consolidated, it is more important that parties acquire a character over and above their ethnic and racial affiliations.

¹¹⁶ For a more detailed explanation of the exact workings of the electoral system, see: Faure, “The Electoral Systems Issue in South African Politics.” pp. 6-7

¹¹⁷ Reynolds, Andrew. 1999. ‘Testing Voting Systems in South Africa - Re-running the 1994 elections with Different Systems’ [<http://www.fairvote.org/reports/1995/spot4/reynolds.html>]

Despite the proliferation of parties brought about by list PR, a dominant party system has emerged and is seen by some analysts as one of the key obstacles to the consolidation of democracy in South Africa.¹¹⁸ By gaining over 62% of the vote in the first election, the ANC found itself in the position of being able to govern alone. Of course, the power-sharing arrangement that emerged out of the 'sunset clauses' in the interim constitution meant that the ANC was forced to enter into a government of national unity with the NP and the IFP. The coalition fell apart however after three years when the NP voluntarily left the coalition. The final constitution adopted in 1996 does not provide for a constitutionally mandated power-sharing government, although the IFP continues to be represented in the Executive.

Lijphart's major rationale for introducing closed list PR into a divided society— the proliferation of parties necessitating a governing coalition— is therefore absent as one party is able to secure well over 50% of the vote. Coalitions that have emerged are a product of the quasi-federal system rather than the electoral system as bargains at provincial level have typically involved some rewards at national level.¹¹⁹ In South Africa then, PR has not been sufficient to ensure a governing coalition. While PR has not ensured any degree of inclusivity at the executive level, its proportionality still allows for widespread representation in the legislature— a definite advantage in a divided society.

The fact that most parties continue to derive support largely along ethnic and racial lines means that parties face each other in the legislature with a mandate from opposing constituencies demarcated by race. The consequence is that politics in South Africa remains racialised. As Horowitz notes: "The test of a good electoral system is not to be found merely in the ratio of seats to votes or in the number of parties that emerge. The test lies instead in the posture adopted by the parties with respect to other parties and with respect to voters."¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ See: Giliomee, Herman and Simkins, Charles (eds) 1999. *The Awkward Embrace-One Party Domination and Democracy* (Cape Town: Tafelberg)

¹¹⁹ The IFP remains in a coalition with the ANC as it receives some ministerial posts in the national government, while the ANC have some posts in the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government.

¹²⁰ Horowitz, Donald, *A Democratic South Africa?* p.165

In the deeply divided society, there is possibly a need for such a restrictive electoral system as it allows diametrically opposed groups to be represented in the national legislature. South Africa since 1994 however exhibits the potential for overlapping cleavages and cross-cutting membership. This potential is dependent on breaking down the racial and ethnic nature of political parties in South Africa. This will only be achieved by encouraging parties to actively campaign for the support of voters from outside their traditional support base. The next two chapters assess how the main political parties campaigned in the 1999 election and demonstrate how each party attempted to appeal to the politically salient groups in South African politics.

University of Cape Town

Chapter Three:

The 1999 Election Campaign

The election campaigns of political parties provide an ideal opportunity to study how parties appeal to the various sectors of society. In an extremely divided society we would expect rigidly ethnic parties to appeal to only sections of the electorate that comprise 'their' group. In a relatively homogeneous society on the other hand, we would expect campaigns to be strongly issue-based with little, if any, appeals to ascriptive identities. We shall see that in South Africa, a society that has been characterised as divided with some overlapping cleavages, campaigning by some parties conforms to the patterns of ethnic parties in deeply divided societies. Other parties largely refrain from mobilising racial and ethnic identities. Alarming, it is the parties that play the race card most often that are the most successful in the election.

This chapter takes a qualitative, descriptive approach in order to understand the party campaigns in their context and demonstrate how the parties appealed to each racial group during the 1999 election campaign. While this approach is useful in that it provides the contextual information that is lost in quantitative methods, it is open to criticism of selection bias and does not allow for the systematic comparison of the party campaigns. The next chapter builds on and corroborates the claims made here by analysing the campaigns quantitatively, thus providing a more systematic and rigorous analysis.

The 1999 general election is a useful case for our purposes. Whereas the 1994 election was surrounded by a great degree of uncertainty, this election took place in a comparatively stable party system. Each party had a strong indication of its support and voters could judge parties based on their performance in a functioning democratic polity. Secondly, the election is noteworthy because it saw a re-alignment of parties, with the DP emerging as the official opposition to the ANC. The ANC itself achieved a near two-thirds majority poll in the election. Every other party saw a drop in its vote share from 1994. Thirdly, as the most recent election, it is possible to draw out

relevant implications for future campaigns and for the future of South African democracy itself.

The argument advanced here is that parties which campaigned in an exclusive manner attracted the most votes, while those parties that attempted to cast themselves as more inclusive suffered a decline in vote share, or in the case of the UDM, failed to live up to their initial promise. Exclusive campaigning refers to a strategy whereby a party appeals mainly to its traditional support base by playing on issues that arise out of its supporters' racial identity, thus excluding other groups from their campaign. Inclusive campaigning describes attempts by a party to appeal to groups *outside* its traditional support base as well as appealing to its traditional support base with an inclusive message that stresses reconciliation or national unity. These definitions are useful to bear in mind, but become more significant in the next chapter.

The analysis will be limited to the top five political parties nationally in the 1999 election—the ANC, the DP, the IFP, the NNP and the UDM. Taken together, these parties won 94% of the national vote and are all significant players in at least one province. All five are clustered around the moderate centre. Other smaller parties such as the FF, PAC, AEB and MF explicitly mobilised on an ethnic/racial ticket. These 'fringe' parties are destined to remain small parties in South Africa, because as we shall see, some of the larger and more 'moderate' parties have appropriated their tactics.

This chapter will show that the DP, and to a lesser extent the ANC, campaigned with an exclusive message. The DP presented itself as the party of minority interests, while the ANC emphasised its role as emancipator of the black majority. The IFP, the UDM and particularly the NNP, adopted a more inclusive message. The outcome of the election saw the ANC and the DP make great gains from their 1994 vote totals, while the vote share of the IFP and the NNP declined. The UDM did well in the Transkei where it campaigned as an ethnic party, but worse nationally where it attempted to be more inclusive. In other words, the parties that campaigned the most exclusively were rewarded, while those that attempted to be more inclusive were punished at the polls.

3.1 Do campaigns matter?

The implicit assumption in the above is that the election campaign influences voting behaviour and therefore has an impact on the outcome of an election. Holbrook sums up three classic arguments that campaigns do *not* matter in influencing the outcome of the election:

- Campaigns merely reinforce existing preferences for voters that already express a voting intention before the campaign starts.¹²¹
- Party identification is not likely to change during an election campaign.¹²²
- Public opinion of the performance of political parties since the last election is more likely to influence voters.¹²³

Holbrook points out however that a significant number of people, at least in America, decide how to vote during the campaign, indicating that the campaign does play a part in structuring voter choice. He also argues that party identification is not as strong as it used to be.¹²⁴ In South Africa, it is true that a significant amount of voters decide how to vote during the campaign and that party identification is not as strong as is often assumed. This was demonstrated in the run up to, and during, the 1999 election by the “Opinion ’99” series of surveys:

Table 3.1 Party Identification 1994-1999.¹²⁵

<i>"Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party/ies" / "Regardless of how you actually voted on Election Day (in April) was there one particular political party which you felt especially close to?" (1994)</i>							
	Sept / Oct 1994	Sept / Oct 1995	June / July 1997	Sept 1998	Oct / Nov 1998	Feb/Mar 1999	April 1999
Yes	88	58	58	45	43	50	55
No	12	37	37	53	55	46	41
Don't know	-	4	4	3	3	4	4

¹²¹ Lazarsfeld, Paul, Bernard Berelson and Helen Gaudet. 1944. *The People's Choice*. (New York: Duell, Sloane and Pearce) cited in Holbrook, Thomas M. 1996. *Do Campaigns Matter?* (California: Sage)

¹²² Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) cited in Holbrook, *Do Campaigns Matter?*

¹²³ Key, V O. 1966. *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap) cited in Holbrook, *Do Campaigns Matter?*

¹²⁴ Holbrook. *Do Campaigns Matter?*

¹²⁵ Taylor, Helen; Mattes, Robert and Africa, Cherrel. 1999. "Opinion '99 Press Release", May 24 1999, www.idasa.org.za.

In table 3.1 we can see that around half of voters prior to the election campaign identified with a particular party, meaning that a half of all voters could be considered independent. This is evidence that the campaign plays a role in formulating people's opinions on who to vote for come election day. This is why parties spend millions of rands and a great deal of energy formulating and waging their campaigns.

Another function of election campaigns in South Africa is to encourage voters to turn out on election day. The ANC, for example, has an interest in convincing as many black voters as possible to turn out. While many who voted for the ANC in 1994 would not consider 'defecting' to another party, they may feel that their vote is not necessary as the ANC has a secure majority or that the ANC government has not delivered or they are simply apathetic. In all three cases, it would be in the interest of the ANC to wage an emotive campaign convincing these voters to vote for the ANC.

Election campaigns do not of themselves cause voters to vote in a certain way. Party identification and retrospective assessments of political parties are evidently key variables informing voter choice. The importance of an election campaign becomes apparent however, if the campaign is viewed as a period in which the party 'sells' itself to voters, based on the 'product' it has developed since the last election. In other words, most parties begin their campaign before the actual electioneering starts in the few months preceding the election. As Harrop and Miller point out, the distinction between the campaign and the pre-campaign is largely formal, "the political reality is that the next campaign begins as soon as the last one is over, with a steady build-up in intensity as polling day approaches."¹²⁶

For this reason, we shall begin by examining the development of each party's strategy during the first term of democratic government. It is the campaign itself however, that intensifies the feelings of voters and plays a role in educating them about whom best to vote for.

3.2 African National Congress

The ANC distinguished itself at the forefront of the anti-apartheid struggle as a non-racial movement that transcended ethnic politics. In the Freedom Charter, the ANC stated: "...that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no

¹²⁶ Harrop, Martin and William L. Miller. 1987. *Elections and Voters* (Hampshire: MacMillan) p. 228

government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people...”¹²⁷. Nelson Mandela’s readiness to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Nationalist Government and his message of forgiveness and reconciliation continued the ANC’s tradition of non-racial struggle during the transition.

Despite the non-racial stance of the ANC, its support base comprised mainly blacks in the 1994 election. The skewed nature of the ANC’s support can be attributed to the fear of minorities that the party would rule according to the sole interests of the black majority. This put the ANC in a precarious position during its first term of government. On the one hand, the ANC-led government had to stabilise the economy, which necessitated allaying the fears of whites, who had the largest stake in business. On the other hand, it needed to make concessions to the labour movement who demanded better working conditions and a minimum wage. The government also had to be seen to be improving the lives of those disadvantaged through the separate development policies of apartheid. At the same time, whites needed to be assured that they had a place in the new dispensation, despite the introduction of affirmative action programmes and the restructuring of the civil service to reflect the racial demographics of the country.

The emphasis on reconciliation under Nelson Mandela’s presidency, and the accompanying discourse of nation building and the ‘Rainbow Nation’, did much to allay minority fears in the immediate post-election period. Deputy President Thabo Mbeki’s “I am an African” speech to mark the promulgation of the final constitution in 1996, affirmed the non-racial message of the Freedom Charter.¹²⁸ In May 1998, a speech by Mbeki to open the debate on reconciliation and nation building signalled a shift in the ANC’s nation building discourse. Mbeki told the National Assembly that South Africa was a country divided into two nations:

¹²⁷ Freedom Charter. 1955. Adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown, on 26 June 1955. (<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/charter.html>)

¹²⁸ Mbeki. Thabo. 1998. “I am an African” in *Africa-The Time has come* (Cape Town: Tafelberg) p.34

One of these nations is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographic dispersal... the second and larger nation is black and poor, with the worst affected being women in the rural areas, the black rural population and the disabled.¹²⁹

A plausible interpretation of this statement is that the ANC leadership aimed to cover over the government's inability to deliver many basic goods and services by racialising poverty and, in doing so, legitimise the growth of a growing black elite.

Marks Chabedi argues that South Africa has moved into the second phase of nation building, which is having a divisive effect on South African politics. Whereas the first phase stressed commonalities and sought to organise society on the basis of inclusion, the second phase sees conflict and difference replacing co-operation and commonality.¹³⁰ This is largely a result of the ANC continuing to see itself as the "mouthpiece of an 'oppressed nation'", leading it to downplay intra-black inequalities and to emphasise the relative wealth of whites.¹³¹ This strategy, outlined in a 1997 ANC discussion document, is not explicitly based on race and is rather portrayed as a battle between the "motive forces of transformation" and "forces against change". These forces are defined as "those who were the African majority and the members of the minority who supported the ANC", versus those "forces which benefited from the system of apartheid, constituted by the former white rulers and their black appendages."¹³² While care is taken not to overtly racialise the opposing forces, it is clear that the ANC is attempting to reduce politics to continuing racial conflict. Mbeki confirmed this tendency in a speech at the debate on the final report of the TRC, saying: "The defining parameter in our continuing struggle for national unity and reconciliation is the question of race."¹³³

Voting intention for the ANC, as reflected in opinion polls, dropped alarmingly during 1998, as the following graph illustrates:

¹²⁹ Mbeki, Thabo. 1998. "Two Nations" in *Africa-The Time has come* (Cape Town: Tafelberg) p. 71-72


¹³⁰ Chabedi, Marks. 2001. "Whither the Rainbow Nation?: The ANC, the Black Middle Class and Changing Perceptions of 'Blackness' in the Post-Apartheid South Africa". Paper presented to Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. p. 2

¹³¹ *Ibid.* p.3

¹³² *Ibid.* p.13

¹³³ Financial Mail, March 5 1999. *Race on the long road to reconciliation*

Figure 3.2¹³⁴



Only 51% of all voters in September 1998 said that they would vote for the ANC “if there was an election tomorrow”.¹³⁵ While 67% of black voters in September 1998 said that they would vote for the ANC, only 46% of black voters surveyed said they identified with the ANC—down from 75% in September 1994.¹³⁶ This suggests that black voters at this point did not feel especially close to the ANC, but would vote for them for the lack of a credible alternative. It therefore became crucial for the ANC to prevent any other party emerging as credible in the eyes of black voters. In fact, it is quite possible that the timing of the ‘two nations’ speech was designed to buoy up support among black voters at this juncture.

In late 1998, the ANC embarked on its ‘listening campaigns’—public meetings held in order to elicit feedback from constituents on government performance, as well as door-to-door visits by ANC fieldworkers. This phase was intended to help formulate the election manifesto and was especially conspicuous in the Western Cape, targeting

¹³⁴ Data sourced from Taylor, Mattes and Africa, “Opinion ‘99 Press Release”

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

blacks (25 000 voters were visited in Khayelitsha in one weekend) and urban coloureds.¹³⁷

In January 1999, the ANC released a document urging people to vote for the ANC for it to continue its emancipatory project.¹³⁸ Opposition parties are described as counter-revolutionaries, with the sole aim of defeating the democratic movement as a whole, and the ANC in particular. These parties are derided for being opponents of “the fundamental transformation of our country into a non-racial and non-sexist democracy”.¹³⁹ In contrast, the ANC is posited as the liberator of the oppressed (black) masses, requiring the renewed mandate of its people to continue with transformation. This strategy is straightforward: encourage black voters to turn out and vote by stressing racial solidarity in the face of opponents bent on reversing the gains made by the ANC since 1994. In the same document, the ANC pledged its solidarity with its coalition partner, welcoming the IFP’s contribution to rebuilding South African society.¹⁴⁰

The ANC’s 1999 election manifesto is largely silent on issues pertaining to race. It trumpets the ANC government’s successes in sweeping away the injustices of the apartheid system, but takes as its central theme: “Change must go on at a faster pace!” Besides highlighting the successes of the ANC government in establishing affirmative action legislation and public service restructuring,¹⁴¹ there is little mention of race, or issues pertaining to race, in the manifesto.

The ANC’s campaign was based on the principles of ‘advance and consolidate’ and was aimed at defending the areas that were most threatened—the Eastern Cape and Gauteng, and where the ANC had the potential to win fresh support—the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal.¹⁴²

¹³⁷ Lodge, Tom. 1999. *Consolidating Democracy- South Africa’s Second Popular Election* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press) pp. 80-81

¹³⁸ African National Congress, 1999. *1999-Year of Mass Mobilisation for the Renewal of the Democratic Mandate*. (Marshalltown: ANC Department of Information and Publicity)

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. p.7

¹⁴¹ African National Congress, 1999. *Change Must Go on at a Faster Pace!* ANC Election Manifesto.

¹⁴² Lodge, Tom. 1999. “The African National Congress” in Reynolds, Andrew (ed.) *Election '99* (Cape Town: David Philip) p.70

In the Eastern Cape the ANC faced a fresh challenge from the UDM—the party it had identified as its biggest threat at its 1998 provincial conference.¹⁴³ The strategy of the ANC was twofold: to blame poor delivery on the legacy of apartheid and to denounce the UDM as a party of apartheid collaborators. ANC National Chairman, ‘Terror’ Lekota, told black Grahamstown residents: “The ANC did not put you in the shackles and mud houses in which you live. It was the government of the boers.”¹⁴⁴ Mbeki repeated this line in the Transkei, blaming ‘white’ parties for the problems: “These people created problems for 350 years. Today they appear and say why doesn’t the ANC solve them in five years.”¹⁴⁵

The second ANC strategy in the province was to delegitimise the UDM by casting it as a reactionary party, leaving the ANC as the only true vehicle of black aspiration. An ANC pamphlet published early in 1999 was devoted to denouncing the UDM leader, Bantu Holomisa, as a “military agent who went wrong”. Premier Makhenkesi Stofile labelled Holomisa an “oppressor” for his role as a homeland leader in the previous regime, while Nelson Mandela accused Holomisa of being an apartheid collaborator at a visit to the great place of Pondo Paramount Chief Mpondombini Sigcau at Qawukeni. Meanwhile, Thabo Mbeki told traditional leaders at Gobe Village and Peddie that the ANC “wanted nothing to do with Bantu Holomisa’s United Democratic Movement.”¹⁴⁶ At a Freedom Day rally in Umtata, Nelson Mandela said that while the ANC was fighting for freedom, some members of the UDM were “running around avoiding a fight with their tails between their legs... They were eating the bones left by their oppressors”.¹⁴⁷ A month later he told a crowd at a village near Idutywa in the Southern Transkei the same thing.¹⁴⁸

Key themes of a joint Mandela and Mbeki address in Soweto, Gauteng province, were that the ANC had succeeded in local service delivery and that the party was pushing on with transformation.¹⁴⁹ In KwaZulu-Natal, Winnie Madikizela-Mandela of the

¹⁴³ EISA (Electoral Institute of Southern Africa). 1999. *South African Election Update November 1998- June 1999*. (Auckland Park: EISA) p. 48

¹⁴⁴ Sowetan, March 29 1999. *Apartheid to blame, says Lekota*.

¹⁴⁵ Sowetan, April 12 1999. *Mbeki pledges to develop poor provinces*.

¹⁴⁶ EISA, *South African Election Update* pp. 269-70

¹⁴⁷ Cape Argus, April 28 1999 *UDM members drown out Mandela's address*

¹⁴⁸ Sowetan, May 24 1999. *Mandela dismisses UDM as a political force*

¹⁴⁹ Sowetan, March 29 1999. *ANC to Pick up Speed*

ANC was intent on turning potential anti-IFP feelings into anti-white sentiment. At a gathering to commemorate the killing of 19 ANC supporters by the IFP in the village of Shobashane she said that it was white farmers who were killing each other in a bid to fan racism in South Africa by provoking retaliatory attacks on blacks.¹⁵⁰ Later that day at Port Shepstone, she told black voters: “The problem is that the whites stole our money and that is why we are not able to build you roads and houses as quickly as you need them”.¹⁵¹ At a gathering of the main political parties in KwaZulu-Natal, ANC premier designate, S’bu Ndebele, said that parties like the NNP and the DP are “irrelevant” and have “fulfilled their racial mandates of the past.”¹⁵²

Addresses to coloured voters typically stressed the need for solidarity between coloureds and blacks due to their common history of oppression. Commenting on ANC strategy in the majority-coloured Western Cape in mid-March, provincial leader Ebrahim Rasool said: “It is obviously no secret that African areas are the ANC’s traditional base. Rural areas are another strong base and the coloured middle class areas.” Rasool challenged the white community to share its privileges: “You can’t be secure in Bishopscourt while there is insecurity on the Cape Flats” and called for a “broad unity based on coloured-African solidarity.” He said: “We see our priority as delivering to both communities rather than those communities competing. Our key target has to be white privilege, which remains untouched.”¹⁵³ In the province where most coloured voters had plumped for the NP in 1994, the ANC’s message was more exclusive. In the other provinces it was sufficient to repeat the mantra that the ANC was the party of black liberation and that this could only continue with the renewed mandate of black voters. In the Western Cape however, the ANC’s message to coloureds was that they must switch their allegiance from the party of apartheid to the party that would ensure the ultimate liberation of all formerly oppressed people. In order to achieve this, a strategy that served to exclude whites and deride the ‘white’ parties was used.

Mbeki, accompanied by Rasool, told a coloured audience in Mitchells Plein: “We must all agree that in 1994 we made a mistake of voting for party responsible for our

¹⁵⁰ Sowetan, March 23 1999. *Winnie Shocker*

¹⁵¹ Sowetan, March 23 1999. *Winnie blames whites for ANC woes.*

¹⁵² Sowetan, May 11 1999. *Mixed masala affair of politics in KZN*

¹⁵³ Sowetan, March 11 1999. *ANC builds black solidarity.*

oppression. We must not repeat that mistake.”¹⁵⁴ At a rally in Delft, ANC Western Cape spokesperson, Cameron Dugmore said that Delft was a place where blacks and coloureds live together. “It is a success story of our vision for the province and we plan to popularise non-racialism as opposed to the narrow race-based politics of the NNP.”¹⁵⁵ Rasool attacked the NNP for “using” coloured people to get votes and then entrenching white privilege, as well as the DP who “did not have the guts to fight back during the liberation struggle”.¹⁵⁶ Mandela told coloured voters in Clanwilliam that his government did not discriminate and that there was a “place for everyone” and boasted of the number of coloureds in the Cabinet. He added: “Our people are composed of coloureds, Indians, Africans and whites...before 1994 they were all divided.”¹⁵⁷ In Gauteng he told a coloured audience in May that voting for the NNP was tantamount to considering themselves “second class whites” before mentioning that a key cabinet minister, Trevor Manuel, was coloured and assuring the crowd that Thabo Mbeki was “very sensitive” to the needs of coloured people.¹⁵⁸

Indian voters were similarly urged to join “the majority”. Mandela told Indian voters in Lenasia that Indians were the most represented group in government with five cabinet ministers.¹⁵⁹ The ANC’s strategy was to cite Indian contributions to the struggle against apartheid and meet with prominent members of the Indian community.¹⁶⁰ In March, Mbeki conducted a tour that included visits to Isipingo, Chatsworth, and Verulam— predominantly Indian communities in KwaZulu-Natal. Referring to the large percentage of support for the NNP in these areas, Mbeki urged Indian voters to become part of the mainstream: “We must accept the very fundamental and basic requirement that we are all South Africans,” he said.¹⁶¹ At another rally, Mbeki played on the ‘Africanism’ of South African Indians: “There’s no way you can talk about the South African liberation struggle without the Indians— not just Dadoo and Naicker, but going back to Gandhi— who were African and loyal to this country.”¹⁶²

¹⁵⁴ Sowetan, May 3 1999. *Unite for a better life, Mbeki urges*

¹⁵⁵ Sowetan, May 11 1999. *ANC intensifies Western Cape campaign*

¹⁵⁶ Cape Times, May 13 1999. *Coloureds dumped.*

¹⁵⁷ Sowetan, May 13 1999. *Madiba magic has town in a tizz.*

¹⁵⁸ Sowetan, May 27 1999. *Coloureds must take pride, says Mandela.*

¹⁵⁹ Sowetan, April 20 1999. *Mandela allays Minority Fears.*

¹⁶⁰ Mail and Guardian, May 28- June 3. *Parties Appeal to Indian Fears*

¹⁶¹ EISA, *South African Election Update* p.162

¹⁶² Financial Mail, March 26 1999. *Mbeki issues rallying call to ‘African Indians’*

To white voters, the message wavered between praising them for their role in reconciliation, as Mandela did at a parade in Johannesburg,¹⁶³ to berating them for regarding themselves as a minority. Addressing Afrikaners in Pretoria, Mandela said that whites should put fear behind them and start thinking of themselves as part of the majority. He added that black people (that is, “Africans”, Indians and coloureds) were holding out a hand of friendship and that whites should not spurn it.¹⁶⁴ Mandela told English speakers in Houghton and Afrikaners in Vereeniging that white supremacy had been destroyed. Parties like the DP and the NNP—who wanted to protect white privilege—would never rule the country.¹⁶⁵

The ANC did not always play the race card overtly and it could be argued that their appeal to minorities to ‘become part of the majority’ was a conciliatory message. However, in most cases the ANC told coloureds and Indians that they must not vote like whites and that they should instead join the black majority as similarly oppressed people. The message to whites was that they should get rid of their apartheid baggage. In black areas, the message was mostly that the ANC would deliver faster over the next five years. In many instances, ANC speakers resorted to blaming whites, or at least the legacy of apartheid, for the slow pace of delivery.

3.3 Democratic Party

The DP was formed in 1989 as an amalgam of white parliamentary opposition to the left of the ruling National Party. At its inception, the DP included the old Progressive Federal Party, the Independent Party and the National Democratic Movement, as well as a ‘fourth force’ of disillusioned Afrikaners.¹⁶⁶

The DP, espousing liberal values, managed to attract 21% of white support in the last whites-only election in 1989. The party also enjoyed some support in the (coloured)

¹⁶³ Sowetan, May 11 1999. *Mandela praises SA's efforts as Reconciliation*

¹⁶⁴ Sowetan, April 19 1999. *Honesty our policy*

¹⁶⁵ The Star, March 9 1999. *Mandela berates neighbours for past*; Cape Times, May 26 1999. *Don't resist change, Madiba urges whites*

¹⁶⁶ Welsh, 1994. “The Democratic Party” p.107 and;

Kotze, Hennie. 2001. “The Potential Constituency of the DA: What Dowries do the DP and the NNP bring to the Marriage?” in *Seminar Report: Opposition in South Africa's New Democracy*. No.2 (Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Siftung) p.115

House of Representatives and the (Indian) House of Delegates.¹⁶⁷ The first racially inclusive election of 1994 saw the DP attract a meagre 1.73% of the national vote. Analysts typically attributed the poor result to the party's failure to break out of its suburban white base, with between 80 and 90 percent of the DP's vote coming from the white community.¹⁶⁸ Some went further, blaming the party's "cerebral approach" to politics where "carefully worked out, rational policies, lack mass appeal in a political system where calls to racial and ethnic 'blood' are the stock-in-trade of politicians on the stump"¹⁶⁹ It will be shown here that the development of such a 'racial' or 'ethnic' approach leading up to the 1999 election was instrumental in the party's metamorphosis from an all but insignificant party into the official opposition.

The disappointing result in 1994 led to the resignation of party leader Zach de Beer. De Beer's successor was Tony Leon, who in 1992, had proposed that the DP merge with the NP.¹⁷⁰ Leon's acceptance speech as leader of the party indicated the start of a more aggressive strategy from 1994:

Victory does not belong to the faint of heart. We must not be too fastidious, precious or prissy. Certainly not if we are to attract the numbers we need to make a difference. And we must make deals and arrangements, even pacts, wherever and whenever it will be to our advantage, and will cause our support to be maximised.¹⁷¹

The DP's 'fight back' strategy that evolved from these sentiments was certainly an aggressive one, justified by the party as necessary in order to keep an increasingly powerful government in check. It also quickly became evident that the DP was not concerned how their support was increased, even if vote maximisation meant a strategy that was widely interpreted as conservative, if not actually racist, in tone.

The DP was to establish a reputation in the first democratic National Assembly as vociferous opponents of the ANC, despite having only seven representatives. It was reported in *Finance Week* that the DP, with its seven MPs, had asked almost as many

¹⁶⁷ Welsh, 1994. "The Democratic Party" p.108

¹⁶⁸ Reynolds, 1994. "The Results" p.185

¹⁶⁹ Welsh, 1994. "The Democratic Party" p.115

¹⁷⁰ Kotze. "The Potential Constituency of the DA" p.115

¹⁷¹ Leon, Tony. 1998. "Acceptance speech as DP leader: Charting a new course and keeping faith with values," Durban, 23 October 1994 in *Hope and Fear: Reflections of a Democrat* (Johannesburg. Jonathan Ball)

questions as the NNP (with its 82 MPs) during question time in the National Assembly between 1994 and 1998.¹⁷²

By 1998, political opponents began to make allegations of racism in the DP as opinion polls began to show increased (traditionally conservative) Afrikaner support for the DP and the party began to win municipal by-elections in former NNP strongholds.¹⁷³ The DP argued that, on the contrary, it was Nelson Mandela who was guilty of “racial demagoguery” and it was the ANC that played the race card under the guise of representivity.¹⁷⁴ These tit-for-tat accusations of racism between the two parties were a key feature of the campaign and suited both parties equally well as they each mobilised their relative constituencies.

A newspaper article written by Leon in February 1999, claimed: “representivity is the new apartheid.” Pointing to the quota system and affirmative action policies used in medical schools, the judiciary, the public service and sport, Leon makes the case that the ANC is re-racialising South African society at the expense of education and job creation. ‘Representivity’ is being used by the ANC for political gains as a form of political patronage and the ANC is blurring the distinction between party and State through making political appointments to the civil service.¹⁷⁵

The DP’s confrontational stance was making the party an attractive political home for disaffected white right-wingers. In February, three politicians affiliated to the Freedom Front defected to the DP,¹⁷⁶ and the NNP MEC for education in the Western Cape, Nic Koornhof defected to the DP in March.¹⁷⁷ As conservatives found a new home in the DP, black members of the party began to feel increasingly alienated. Dr Bukelwa Mbulawa, the party’s only black National Assembly representative, defected to the ANC on the grounds that the DP was “fundamentally opposed to transformation

¹⁷² Camay, Phiroshaw and Anne J. Gordon. 1999. *The People Have Spoken...A Review of the 1999 South African Election* (Johannesburg: Co-operative for Research and Education) p.170

¹⁷³ Welsh, David. 1999. “The Democratic Party” in Reynolds, Andrew (ed.) *Election '99* (Cape Town: David Philip) p. 95

¹⁷⁴ Leon, Tony. 1999. “Media Statement on ‘The Corruption of Transformation’” p.1

¹⁷⁵ The Star, February 18 1999. *Representivity is the new apartheid.*


¹⁷⁶ The Star, February 15 1999. *Freedom Front pair defect to DP*; The Star February 17 1999. *Former FF man Werth joins DP*

¹⁷⁷ The Star, March 24 1999. *Blow for Nats as senior member defects to DP*

in our country".¹⁷⁸ These defections signalled a rightward shift in the party and were no doubt perceived as such by the electorate.

As opinion polls show, the DP's standing grew dramatically during the first term. By September 1998, 7% of all voters declared their intention to vote for the party. The following graph tracks voting intention for the party between 1994 and 1999.¹⁷⁹

Figure 3.3



The growth of the party during this period was achieved mainly in white areas, with some support evident in coloured and Indian areas. A survey conducted in April 1999 showed that 37% of whites, 6% of coloureds and 16% of Indians intended to vote for the DP. Less than 1% of black voters surveyed said that they would vote for the party.¹⁸⁰ These figures indicate that the DP had managed to attract new white support, as well as some coloured and Indian support, but had failed to market itself successfully to black voters. As we shall see in the next section, the growing weakness of the NNP was no doubt a significant contributing factor to the 'groundswell' of support that the DP had begun to enjoy by late 1998.

¹⁷⁸ The Star, March 25 1999. *DP's Mbulawa defects to ANC*

¹⁷⁹ This graph was created with data from Taylor, Mattes and Africa, "Opinion '99 Press Release."

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

The DP manifesto for the 1999 election—*Fight Back for a Better Future*—set out the DP’s plans to fight crime, encourage economic growth, improve the health system, tackle AIDS, provide housing and implement land reform. The document is strongly issue-based and provides ‘liberal’ solutions to the issues at hand. The sub-text running through the document however, is clearly designed to play on minority fears of a black-dominated government.

In the foreword, Tony Leon claims that the DP is the torchbearer of individual freedom contrasted with the “ANC approach”. Leon writes: “Every vote for the DP will be a vote against crime, corruption, cronyism and centralisation.”¹⁸¹ He concludes: “In this election, every DP vote will be for creating a South Africa based on merit, hard work, non-racialism, anchored by respect for the Constitution and grounded on the strict, but fair, application of the rule of law.”¹⁸²

In the introduction to the manifesto, the DP claim that a power-hungry ANC elite is emerging that is attempting to enrich itself at the expense of the poor, while simultaneously re-introducing racial factors as a smokescreen for lining the pockets of the elite.¹⁸³ The manifesto paints a picture of the “empowerment feast” where already wealthy black elites reap the benefits of transformation, while the poor are left to “feed on the crumbs.”¹⁸⁴

The DP’s charge of race-based elitism is clearly aimed to appeal to minority groups who may feel excluded from access to the resources of the State. It is likely that they resent being dictated to by whom they may see as a self-interested elite. This assertion represented an opportunity for the party to appeal to poor black voters. The mention of the poor missing out on the “empowerment feast”, contains some truth and no doubt resonates with many poor black voters.¹⁸⁵ The DP however, did not make a

¹⁸¹ Democratic Party. 1999. *Fight Back for a Better Future- The Democratic Party’s Plan for South Africa*. (Cape Town: Democratic Party)

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁸³ *Ibid.* p. 1

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 5-7

¹⁸⁵ A growing consciousness among the black poor of growing intra-black inequalities is apparent from the following response by an informant who took part in focus group discussions in Soweto: “South Africa is a country of three nations. One is white and rich and is out in the apartheid suburbs. The other is black and rich and has moved from our townships to join them [whites] in the suburbs. The other

serious attempt to court these voters during the campaign and the call for merit-based employment policies was hardly likely to appeal to those voters who had been the most disadvantaged under apartheid. In fact, this 'missed opportunity' was a calculated attempt by the DP to throw in its lot with disaffected minorities, rather than compete directly with the ANC for the votes of poor blacks.

Most of the DP's campaigning took place in white areas, with a focus on traditionally conservative Afrikaans-speaking towns. At a meeting in Krugersdorp in March, Leon expressed the desire to take his supporters into an anti-ANC alliance and he reiterated fears that the ANC would change the constitution with a two-thirds majority.¹⁸⁶ The forming of an anti-ANC alliance was to become a main theme of the party's campaigning, particularly in the Western Cape, where the DP's provincial leader, Hennie Bester had earlier ruled out joining a provincial government with the ANC.¹⁸⁷

A recurrent theme of a speech to the South African Institute of Race Relations at a breakfast in Johannesburg was the failure of democracy elsewhere in Africa and particularly Zimbabwe. Leon strongly intimated that South Africa showed signs of following these countries. Leon said that in light of sure-fire victory for the ANC and in order to prevent the reversion to authoritarian rule, "those in power should be watched ceaselessly and be open at all times to inspection and criticism", a role that that only the DP could fulfil. In the same speech, Leon referred to the irrationality of African voters in the 1994 election with their "understanding of democracy imperfect"¹⁸⁸ Without needing to read between the lines, Leon's message is clear. A vote for the DP is a vote against the tyranny of the majority, a majority that consists of irrational, backward people who will fail to halt the inevitable slide of the country into chaos and economic ruin.

Leon addressed a handful of black and white supporters in Ventersdorp, traditionally a bastion of the white supremacist paramilitary group, the AWB. Speaking in Afrikaans, Leon offered a hard line on crime, affirmative action and police killings.

nation is us here, black and poor. We have been abandoned and forgotten... cited in Chabedi, "Whither the Rainbow Nation" p.21)

¹⁸⁶ Cape Argus, March 20 1999 *Opposition parties may form alliance after poll*

¹⁸⁷ Cape Argus, March 16 1999. *DP Leader rules out Cape coalition with ANC*

¹⁸⁸ The Sunday Independent, March 13 1999. *ANC's inheritance of Nat legacy makes opposition role more vital than ever.*

While the few blacks at the meeting greeted Leon's speech with derision, the DP leader clearly found favour with the Afrikaners present. Leon said that the ANC stood for "Another National Crisis" prompting supporters to chant: "Slaan terug, Tony, Slaan Terug!" Alan Jones, chairman of the DP's Ventersdorp branch confirmed that many of the town's right-wingers now supported the DP.¹⁸⁹ In mid-March, at a fundraiser in the predominantly Afrikaans-speaking town of Fochsville, Leon promised to fight for the "protection of Afrikaans language and culture".¹⁹⁰ In the Northern Cape, the DP took up issues of direct concern to farmers, especially the government's withdrawal of subsidies to white farmers.¹⁹¹

In May, Leon addressed a group of Afrikaans-speaking farmers, professionals and business people at a restaurant in Upington. He attempted to demonstrate his solidarity with the Afrikaner leadership in a speech that referred to his visits to Boer war monuments and his appreciation of commercial agricultural interests.¹⁹² Talking to Afrikaners in Kimberley, Leon played on the disenchantment many Afrikaners feel with the NNP by reminding them of their "betrayal" at the hands of the Nationalist Government.¹⁹³

The focus of the DP's campaign in traditionally conservative areas evidently began to irk some of its more liberal members. At a DP meeting in Grahamstown in April, white supporters voiced their concern that the DP was destined to remain an elitist white party and that the party was not as colour-blind as it professed to be. One long-standing DP supporter said that while the party claimed to have "the guts to fight back", they did not seem to have the "guts to put up Xhosa posters".¹⁹⁴

Bossie Boshoff, eighth on the DP's provincial list for the Northern Cape, responded to the charge that the DP was only catering for white interests in an interview with researcher, Steven Robbins. Boshoff said that the DP is not just the party of white farmers, but also coloureds who feel that before, "they were seen to be too black and

¹⁸⁹ Cape Argus, May 11 1999. *DP battle bus steams into AWB Lair*

¹⁹⁰ Stober, Paul. 1999. "Party Profile: The Democratic Party". Paper prepared for the SABC.

¹⁹¹ EISA, *South African Election Update* p.242

¹⁹² Ibid. p. 276

¹⁹³ Sunday Times. June 6 1999. *Groundzero: Where the election action happened*

¹⁹⁴ Addis, Megan. 1999. *Report on Democratic Party Meeting, 7 April 1999, St George's Hall, Grahamstown*. (Unpublished)

now they are too white.” He added that although the DP does try to campaign in black areas, “most black people in this country are anti-white, and don’t want to support white parties.”¹⁹⁵

Despite the DP’s claim that they canvassed in black areas, there is little evidence of the DP campaigning in black townships, although there were some exceptions to the rule. Leon addressed about 300 Tsonga and North Sotho-speaking people at the kraal of Chief Samuel Mpumalana, near Tzaneen, with the message that the ANC was disrespectful to traditional leaders and that the DP would create employment in the area.¹⁹⁶ Leon also visited Chief Ndamase Jong’imfazwe, in Ngqeleni in the Transkei. Leon expressed concern for the quality of life in the rural areas and told the chief of his respect for traditional authority.¹⁹⁷ At a party meeting in Keate’s Drift in Msinga, DP candidate, Graham McIntosh, told the audience that whites were important for the country as they had a good education and that many white DP supporters had fought against apartheid. McIntosh also said that minorities and some blacks were leaving the country due to spiralling crime and “apartheid job reservation”. He added that the DP was not interested in skin colour and urged South Africans of all races to unite.¹⁹⁸ This was one of the few times that a DP leader preached racial unity and it is perhaps significant that McIntosh did not have a high national profile.

The DP’s fierce anti-ANC stance meant that the party found it difficult to appeal to black voters, fuelling perceptions that the party was anti-black. The ANC published posters in the Western Cape that twisted the DP’s election slogan of “Fight back” to “Don’t fight blacks”, but agreed to withdraw the posters after the intervention of the IEC.¹⁹⁹ Cameron Dugmore of the ANC pointed out that the DP’s Xhosa posters were about half the size of the English and Afrikaans ones and that the DP’s Xhosa posters translated as “the DP fights for the rights of people”, a notable toning down of the ‘fight back’ or ‘*slaan terug*’ message.²⁰⁰ This indicates that the DP itself realised that the ‘fight back’ slogan was likely to alienate black voters.

¹⁹⁵ EISA, *South African Election Update* p.241

¹⁹⁶ Cape Times, April 21 1999. *Leon woos traditional leaders* ; The Star, April 21 1999. *DP promises rural jobs if it succeeds in N Province*

¹⁹⁷ Daily Dispatch. *Leon goes bundu bashing to make symbolic journey.*

¹⁹⁸ Daily Dispatch, May 12 1999. *Whites important for country- DP*

¹⁹⁹ Cape Times, May 7 1999. *DP Won’t press charges*

²⁰⁰ Cape Argus, May 7 1999. *Poll foes go back to the poster wars*

The DP's concerns of the tyranny of the (black) majority placed them in the position to appeal to coloured and Indian voters in much the same way as white voters. At a Freedom Day rally in the coloured township of Booyesen's Park, outside Port Elizabeth, Leon told the coloured audience that five years after the birth of democracy, the exclusion of minority groups was setting in. "This new exclusion is being executed not on behalf of the majority, but on behalf of a small, increasingly powerful and arrogant ANC elite", he said.²⁰¹ Leon went on to tell the audience, in Afrikaans, that under apartheid the coloured community were not white enough to get work and now under an ANC government, they were not black enough.²⁰²

In the Western Cape, DP activity in coloured areas was somewhat overshadowed by the fierce battle between the ANC and the NNP for these voters. In a phone-in organised by the Cape Argus newspaper, readers from traditionally coloured and black areas expressed concern that the DP had not made itself visible in these areas. Members of the DP argued that party resources were limited, especially because they received little over R1 million in public funding, while the ANC and the NNP received R30 million and R10million respectively.²⁰³ In KwaZulu-Natal, the DP took up the case of Privani Reddy, an Indian woman whose application to University of Natal Medical School was denied because the Indian quota of applicants had been filled.²⁰⁴ DP members picketed outside the gates of the University of Natal on 7 April with banners reading: "Merit not quotas"²⁰⁵

The strategy of the DP can be summed up as an attempt to play on the fears of minority voters who felt threatened by an ANC government, especially one with the ability to change the Constitution unilaterally. Black empowerment, affirmative action, the allegedly racist agenda of the ANC and the decline of democracy in other

²⁰¹ The Star, April 28 1999. *Minorities don't have a say, Leon and Viljoen warn*

²⁰² Leon, Tony. 1999. "Democracy means giving every minority a place in the sun." Speech given at Booyesen's Park, Port Elizabeth, 27 April 1999. p.2

²⁰³ Cape Argus, May 13 1999. *Callers challenge DP's invisible men*

²⁰⁴ The Star, April 13 1999. *Zuma issued 'racist' statement to rebut criticism, says DP*

²⁰⁵ EISA, *South African Election Update* p. 221

African countries all formed part of the DP's armoury of *swart gevaar*²⁰⁶ tactics when campaigning for the votes of minorities.

3.4 New National Party

In the 1994 election, the National Party (NP) received just over 20 percent of the seats in the National Assembly, with the most diverse support base of any of the parties. As a partner in the Government of National Unity, (GNU), the NP was placed in the precarious position of simultaneously working with the ANC and opposing it at the same time. Frustrated at the "bulldozing" tactics of the ANC and citing the impossibility for the party to influence public policy-making, the NP left the GNU in 1996.²⁰⁷ By 1997, whites, particularly Afrikaners, felt betrayed by the suddenness of the loss of power.²⁰⁸ De Klerk's resignation that year and his replacement with the inexperienced Marthinus van Schalkwyk signalled the beginning of a new era for the party.

In a statement after he was elected NNP leader, van Schalkwyk attempted to show the electorate that the party had moved away from its co-operation with the ANC:

I honestly believe that one of the most important steps to achieve a realignment of party politics in South Africa, will be to establish an opposition initiative for co-operation. This will give new hope to many disillusioned South Africans. By joining hands and working together, we can ensure that the ANC does not achieve a two-thirds majority and even succeed in keeping the Western Cape, Northern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng out of the clutches of the ANC.²⁰⁹

By the time of the 1999 election campaign however, the party had turned away from its overtly anti-ANC stance and, unlike the DP, was beginning to make itself available for a coalition with the ANC as well as other parties.

²⁰⁶ Afrikaans for 'black peril' — A term often used to describe campaigning by the National Party during apartheid.

²⁰⁷ Kotze, Hennie. 1999. "The New National Party in the 1999 Election: End of the road or a new beginning?" in *Politikon* 26, 2. p.168

²⁰⁸ Breytenbach, Willie. 1999. "The New National Party" in Reynolds, Andrew. *Election '99* (Cape Town: David Philip) p.116

²⁰⁹ Marthinus van Schalkwyk quoted in: National Party. 1998. *NP News*. 1,1 (May 1998)

Idasa opinion polls showed the dramatic decline in voting intention during the period of turmoil for the party, especially apparent from June 1997 to July 1998 where voting intention for the party declined from 15% to 9%.²¹⁰ Van Schalkwyk, widely nicknamed *Kortbroek*²¹¹ because of his inexperience and age, set about revamping the NP's image in order to get rid of the Party's association with apartheid. The party was renamed the New National Party (NNP) and given new colours and insignia. According to Idasa survey data, the evolution of the NNP's support base for this period looked like this:

Table 3.4 Racial Breakdown of NNP Support 1994-1997²¹²:

	1994	1995	1997
Black	7.8	8.2	10.8
White	52.2	58.6	44.8
Coloured	31.1	31.4	36.3
Indian	8.9	1.8	8.0

The glaring increase in the ratio of black, coloured and Indian support to white support possibly informed the decision by the NNP to undergo an image makeover. As Willie Breytenbach notes: "The NNP's repositioning under van Schalkwyk was indeed an attempt to make it more inclusive, as the election of David Malatsi as deputy leader, testified."²¹³ The new image of the NNP was apparent in van Schalkwyk's speech to the National Assembly debate on the final report of the TRC:

The pain and suffering, the injustice of the apartheid era, we must never allow to happen again. Therefore it calls for a pact between the responsible leaders of today, to close the book on past conflict and despair and to open a new book for future hope.²¹⁴

The NNP's manifesto for the 1999 election argues that "the ANC is authoritarian and inept" and blames the ANC for the "crisis" in South Africa, because "after five years of almost unfettered ANC power...the ANC has failed disastrously to deliver on its

²¹⁰ Taylor, Helen; Mattes, Robert and Africa, Cherrel. 1999. "Opinion '99 Press Release"

²¹¹ Afrikaans for short trousers

²¹² Mattes, Robert; Africa, Cherrel and; Jacobs, Sean. 1998. "The evolution of party support since 1994" *Public Opinion Service Reports, no.1 February 1998*. (Cape Town: Idasa)

²¹³ Breytenbach, "The New National Party" p.123

²¹⁴ Financial Mail, March 5 1999. *Race on the long road to reconciliation*

election promises.”²¹⁵ The ANC is accused of a “creeping dictatorship” and blurring the interests of the ruling party and those of the state.²¹⁶ While this greatly resembles the line taken by the DP, the NNP goes on to propose a different solution and opts for a more inclusive form of government “where opposition parties are not relegated to the sterile role of critics, but are regarded as constructive players in the political system.”²¹⁷ They offer a choice between “inclusive government or adversarial, polarising politics”.²¹⁸

In the manifesto, the NNP professes to be the “most multi-racial party in South Africa”. They argue that the NNP’s membership is the most multi-racial (“to the embarrassment of the ANC and other fringe parties”), that the NNP stands for “genuine tolerance and respect for diversity”, “represent a broad and inclusive South African patriotism that transcends race, language and religion,” “make co-operation between communities work” and internally “reflect unity and our nation’s cultural diversity”.²¹⁹ From the manifesto, the desire to be inclusive, or at least be seen as inclusive, clearly forms one of the core strategies of the NNP. This stands in contrast to the strategy of the DP. While both parties agree that ANC power must be curtailed, each adopts a different strategy to achieve this. Whereas the DP argue for a strong and effective opposition, the NNP assert that opposition is most effective in a system where all parties are prepared to work together. A cynical interpretation would be that the NNP had become so weak by the time of the 1999 campaign that their catch-all strategy was a desperate attempt for political survival. However, the fact that the NNP attempted to pass itself off as a multi-racial party and ran a campaign that attempted to appeal to black voters is enough to classify the party as running an inclusive campaign, whatever the strategic concerns of the party.

NNP campaigning in historically white areas preached the party’s new message of inclusion and co-operation between all race groups and political parties. In a speech to Afrikaners in Bethlehem, van Schalkwyk told those gathered that they were faced with a choice between joining hands with their countrymen or isolating themselves in

²¹⁵ New National Party. 1999. *Our Blueprint for Real Democracy* (Manifesto of the New National Party) pp. 2-3

²¹⁶ Ibid. p.3

²¹⁷ Ibid. p.3

²¹⁸ Ibid. p.6

²¹⁹ Ibid. p.13

the same way as whites in other African countries. Van Schalkwyk said Afrikaners were engaged in a second Great Trek, and were in danger of being misled by "self-appointed generals" who were trying to organise their own little treks.²²⁰ Van Schalkwyk told (mainly white) business leaders in Upington that the DP was "succumbing to the cancer of conservatism and racism"²²¹. Referring to the DP's 'fight back' campaign, he said: "The message is that this is a desperate effort to separate whites from other people. Our party is not going to do it. Our party will work with other parties, but it must be our ultimate aim to represent all the people."²²² At a meeting at Stellenbosch University, van Schalkwyk harshly criticised the DP's moves for an anti-ANC coalition in the province and responded to comments in the press that the NNP had been "outflanked" by the DP. He said: "We weren't outflanked," van Schalkwyk said, "There was a vacuum (to the right) that the DP is filling. They are the new right." He added that the DP's 'fight back' election slogan was reactionary before claiming that a third of the NNP's support was black, while a third of it was white and another third coloured. "We are a bigger black party than the PAC and the UDM," he said.²²³ Addressing a crowd of coloured and white voters in Warrentvale in the Northern Cape, van Schalkwyk told those present: "It doesn't help at all to be a negative and destructive opposition that only tries to score points by harping on people's deepest racial fears; and exploiting the *gatvol*²²⁴ factor as crudely stated on DP posters". In contrast to the negative and narrow-based tactics of the DP who "will lead white voters into an Ian Smith type of psychological homeland", the NNP had a "big enough heart to accommodate all communities to ensure (voters) interests are not sidelined."²²⁵

NNP Premier designate Pete Saaiman told a journalist: "I am the most acceptable leader for the [Northern Cape]. Our party is a rainbow party for the province. Manne Dipico [the ANC's candidate for Premier] will always be seen as a person who represents only a part of the people—it will take years before he can overcome

²²⁰ The Star, April 15 1999. *Choice of opposites for Afrikaners*

²²¹ Cape Argus, May 15 1999. *Desperate DP is succumbing to the cancer of conservatism, says Van Schalkwyk.*

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Cape Times, May 6 1999. *NNP was not outflanked'*

²²⁴ Afrikaans for 'fed up'.

²²⁵ Diamond Fields Advertiser, April 28 1999. *Van Schalkwyk slams other political parties.*

that.”²²⁶ Saaiman also signalled the willingness of the NNP to work with other parties: “There is a great will in the province to form coalitions, and after the election we will immediately go about co-operative government.”²²⁷

The NNP made some attempts to campaign in black areas and to preach a message of reconciliation. The lack of NNP organisational structures in black rural areas as well as in townships clearly hampered the ability of the party to run an effective campaign in these areas. The story of the three black NNP members who returned to the ANC after their poor treatment campaigning in the townships,²²⁸ illustrates the problems that historically white parties have campaigning in some areas populated mainly by black voters, especially where support for the ANC is high.

Nevertheless, the NNP did attempt to reach out to black voters on issues that appealed to this constituency. Manie Schoeman addressed mainly black supporters in East London concerning the ANC’s numerous failings in the fields of service delivery, education and crime.²²⁹ Van Schalkwyk and Schoeman also visited former homeland leader Kaizer Matanzima in his great place at Qamata. Schoeman told the crowd through a translator that there were many in the Transkei who yearned for the years “when things went well.” He said that the NNP could recreate the days when “the fields were full. There were crops and the people had enough food to eat, and the cattle and the goats and the sheep were fat.” Van Schalkwyk continued by criticising corruption in the civil services and poor delivery of basic services.²³⁰ In the Free State, NNP activity in the province included a tour through Qwa Qwa, Thabong, Maokeng, Manguang and Bethlehem. Free State NNP leader Inus Aucamp said that the party had been well received in local communities compared to 1994. At an NNP rally in Botshabelo, an observer noted a “carnival” atmosphere as community members danced to the music supplied by the NNP campaigners, with pamphlets and manifestos handed out in Sesotho.²³¹ On Freedom Day, Van Schalkwyk laid a wreath at the Hector Petersen Memorial at Sharpeville, addressing an audience that was roughly two thirds black and one third white. “It is only when white South Africans

²²⁶ Mail and Guardian, May 28-June 3 1999. *ANC, NNP ready to lead N Cape*

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Sowetan, May 4 1999. *NNP trio rejoins ANC*

²²⁹ EISA, *South African Election Update* p. 213

²³⁰ The Star, May 11 1999. *NNP brings out band, topless maidens to woo voters.*

²³¹ EISA, *South African Election Update* p. 255

understand the struggle of black South Africans to be free that they will be really free,” he told the audience.²³² While some analysts accused the party of crude electioneering, the action was nevertheless a symbolic attempt to appeal to black voters by convincing them that the party had shaken off its apartheid past.

One of the main targets of the NNP in the 1999 election were coloured voters in the Western Cape, the majority of whom had voted for the party in 1994. Matt Eldridge explains the failure of the ANC to win the province in 1994 as partly due to its inability to convince coloured voters that they had a place in an ‘African’ party and the readiness of the NP to wage a *swart gevaar* campaign by playing on coloured fears of African domination under an ANC government.²³³ As we noted in the discussion of the ANC’s campaign, the ANC was more prepared this time around to play the race card, accusing the NNP of using coloured votes to entrench white privilege. The NNP, for its part, dispensed with the *swart gevaar* tactics and presented itself as a non-racial party concentrating on issues that were important to coloured voters.

Van Schalkwyk addressed a predominantly coloured crowd in Bishop Lavis at the end of May. He said that ANC had not delivered the “peace, jobs and freedom” they had promised in 1994 and that instead crime had soared and jobs had been lost. Van Schalkwyk said the NNP is “the most non-racist” of all the parties, a fact he said is reflected in its leadership. He related a story about an ANC leader who recently said it was hard to get the coloured vote because coloured people vote with their stomachs. “The reason (the ANC) struggles to get the coloured vote is because they belittle coloureds like that. What arrogance,” van Schalkwyk said.²³⁴

The most active NNP politician in the Western Cape was Health MEC Peter Marais who traversed the province with his message of ‘brown power’. Marais urged coloured voters all over the province to be proud of their group and not to think of

²³² Mail and Guardian, April 30- May 6 1999. *Selling whites a dubious notion*.

²³³ Eldridge, Matt. 1997. *Now Wasn't the Time: The ANC's 1994 Election Campaign in South Africa's Western Cape Province*. (Unpublished MA thesis submitted to the Faculty of Social Science and Humanities of the University of Cape Town.) P. 139-140

²³⁴ Cape Times, May 25 1999. *NNP finds favour in Tygerberg*

themselves simply as blacks. Marais pointed out that coloured unity was important, but took care to stress that this should not necessitate ill feeling with other races.²³⁵

The perception that the NNP was weak clearly damaged the party in the election campaign. This was not helped by the many high profile defections from the party to the ANC and the DP.²³⁶ The NNP also displayed ambivalence about whether it would join the ANC or the DP in a post-election coalition in the province with Peter Marais telling a crowd in Lamberts Bay that he wanted to “leave the doors open” with regards to a post-election alliance.²³⁷

The NNP’s message was, in the main, one of reconciliation and co-operation. White voters—the traditional support base of the party—were urged not to follow the DP into the politics of racial exclusivity. The NNP also attempted to assure black and coloured voters that the NNP was the most non-racial party and would not simply oppose for the sake of opposing, but would be willing to play a constructive role in a co-operative government.

3.5 Inkatha Freedom Party

Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi formed Inkatha in 1975 as a “cultural liberation movement” in the homeland of KwaZulu. The aim of the organisation was to unite Zulus in a common struggle against apartheid. Organisations such as the UDF, the ANC and COSATU were dismissed as having “alien” values and led by non-Zulus, with the national thrust of such movements running counter to its quest to unite Zulu’s in the Natal region.²³⁸ Relations between Inkatha and the UDF-ANC were characterised by high levels of violence and threatened to derail the democratic transition that began in the early 1990s.

Inkatha became the Inkatha Freedom Party when it began to play its part in the negotiation process at Codesa. Its participation was marked by walkouts and alliances

²³⁵ Business Day, May 27 1999. *Western Cape voters told to exert their ‘brown power’*.

²³⁶ High profile defections of coloured leaders in the province included Henry and Pauline Cupido to the DP in February and Patrick McKenzie, Mario Masher, James George and Louisa Jansen to the ANC in March.

²³⁷ Cape Times, April 1 1999. *Meeting today with van Schalkwyk*.

²³⁸ Hamilton, Georgina and Mare, Gerhard. 1994. “The Inkatha Freedom Party” in Reynolds, Andrew *Election ’94* (Cape Town: David Philip) p.78

with white right wing groups and disgruntled homeland leaders, united in opposition to the perceived bilateralism of the NP and the ANC. The IFP garnered 10.5% of the national vote in the 1994 election, enough to secure it a place in the GNU. The relatively strong showing in the national election was due to the concentration of support that the party enjoyed among Zulu-speakers in KwaZulu-Natal, rather than a widespread national following. The party was regionally strong enough to take control of the province in a negotiated result with the ANC and the IEC.²³⁹ As the party had more than 10% of the national vote, it was offered two cabinet positions in the GNU. This was reciprocated through giving the ANC positions in the IFP-led KwaZulu-Natal provincial cabinet.

According to opinion polls, voting intention for the IFP fluctuated in the period from the 1994 election until the end of 1998, but never reached more than 6%.²⁴⁰ Table 3.5 shows that support for the party was overwhelmingly black (the vast majority being Zulu), with a net decrease in white support and the gaining of some Indian support by 1997.

Table 3.5 Racial Breakdown of IFP Support 1994-1997.²⁴¹

	1994	1995	1997
Black	88.1	95.4	92.6
White	11.9	4.6	6.6
Coloured	-	-	-
Indian	-	-	0.8

In June 1998 the party underwent an image makeover to persuade the voting public that it had moved beyond its Zulu nationalist and traditional rural base. Buthelezi said at a press conference in Durban that the party's concerns were federalism, pluralism and freedom. To add credence to their claims that they were attempting to diversify, the IFP set up a committee under MP Kamal Pillay to build support in Indian communities.²⁴²

²³⁹ Mare, Gerhard. 1999. "The Inkatha Freedom Party" in Reynolds, Andrew (ed.) *Election '99* (Cape Town: David Philip) p.101

²⁴⁰ Taylor, Mattes and Africa, "Opinion '99 Press Release"

²⁴¹ Mattes, Robert; Africa, Cherrel and; Jacobs, Sean. 1998. "The evolution of party support since 1994" *Public Opinion Service Reports, no.1 February 1998*. (Cape Town: Idasa) p.11

²⁴² Lodge, *Consolidating Democracy* p. 85

The IFP's manifesto for 1999 argued that the country had become ungovernable due to rampant unemployment, crime, poverty, disease, corruption, breakdown of the social fabric, lack of discipline and respect as well as indolence. In his foreword, Buthelezi claims that it is not enough to blame the problems on the legacy of apartheid as "there comes a time when we have to stop justifying present failure to deliver on problems inherited from the past."²⁴³ This signalled the willingness of the party not to play the blame game, and rather to adopt positive solutions that were not aimed at any one group, but the nation as a whole.

After outlining its plans for unemployment, crime, service delivery, education and values, the manifesto calls all "South Africans of goodwill to join hands together in this long-term effort. Join our Revolution of Goodwill and make South Africa a better place for all."²⁴⁴ The IFP chose the Umlazi stadium, north of Durban to launch its provincial campaign on 18 March 1999 where Buthelezi and Premier Lionel Mtshali addressed the crowd. Buthelezi told supporters that the policies of the IFP included "firm and entrenched notions around federalism, the devolution of power, free market enterprise, pluralism and strong and effective government."²⁴⁵

The manifesto is positive and neutral on race and ethnic issues. It sets out solutions to perceived problems and does not target specific groups for blame or as the beneficiaries of the proposed solutions. One journalist noted: "The Zulu kingdom is all but forgotten in the Inkatha Freedom Party's election manifesto. Hardly a word about self-determination, the status of traditional leaders or secession."²⁴⁶ This suggests that the IFP had become comfortable with its role in cooperative governance with the ANC and wanted to foster good relations with the ruling party. This commitment was confirmed by IFP spokesperson Musa Zondi:

In this country you need a loyal opposition. You need a corrective opposition, not an opposition that stands in the way of government executing its mandate. We need 10-15 years to effect transformation before we can become a normal democracy.²⁴⁷

²⁴³ Inkatha Freedom Party, 1999. *Make South Africa Governable- 1999 Election Manifesto*.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁵ Lodge, *Consolidating Democracy*. 156

²⁴⁶ Pamela Dube writing in *The Sunday Independent*. March 20 1999. *IFP manifesto abandons Zulu past to focus on need for governability as manifesto*

²⁴⁷ *Financial Mail*, May 14 1999. *Taming the elephant*

Relations between the IFP and the ruling party had improved immeasurably since the first election. The IFP's Lionel Mtshali addressed the ANC conference in December 1998 and Thabo Mbeki made a speech to the IFP's Annual General Conference in July of that year. On that occasion, Mbeki reminded the IFP members present that some of the key founders of the ANC were Zulu and that Mangosuthu Buthelezi himself had been a member of the ANC before Inkatha. Significantly, Mbeki stressed the importance of African solidarity due to the shared experience of oppression at the hands of the apartheid regime: "...we who were killing one another were brothers and sisters. Together we suffered under the yoke of apartheid oppression and together we shared one vision, the liberation of our country and our people."²⁴⁸ On Freedom Day, Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini and Buthelezi joined thousands of ANC and IFP supporters in celebrations urging political leaders to refrain from making provocative statements and calling for an end to no-go areas in the province.²⁴⁹

Mbeki and Buthelezi signed a peace pact in Durban in May, while supporters of both parties chanted: "*Woza Woza ANC! Woza Woza IFP!*" (Come on ANC! Come on IFP!). Lionel Mtshali said: "It is a day of reconciliation. It is hopefully a day marking the start of a process that in time will play itself out in the complete normalisation of relations between us."²⁵⁰ The growing spirit of co-operation between the parties meant that campaigning was neutral in terms of ethnic issues and actually fairly vague due to the IFP's precarious role as both opposition and partner in government.

In KwaZulu-Natal, campaigning was centred on neutral issues such as crime and corruption. At the IFP's campaign launch in Durban, Buthelezi deflected questions about his age and distanced the party from an arms cache recently discovered in the province. His main theme was that parties knew what was wrong in the country and now they needed to work together to solve them:

²⁴⁸ Mbeki, Thabo. 1998. "Speech to the Annual General Conference of the IFP, Emandleni, KwaZulu-Natal, 18 July 1998." p.3

²⁴⁹ The Star, April 28 1999. *Freedom Day marked by peaceful rallies, despite tensions*

²⁵⁰ Daily Dispatch, May 15 1999. *ANC, IFP sign KZN peace pact*

Despite political differences and some bickering between political parties, all parties had agreed that the main issues confronting the nation related to criminality, joblessness, poverty, poor quality of education and insufficient government delivery²⁵¹

At a meeting at the Royal Hotel in Durban, Buthelezi repeated this 'shopping list' of issues. He argued that only a strong IFP working with the government would be able to solve these problems. Buthelezi said the June 2 elections were not a choice between the government and the opposition, but a choice between the present type of government and a better government willing to do more: "The viewpoint of my party is that only by strengthening the IFP will we be able to ensure that the next government can be a better one."²⁵²

The IFP engaged in door-to-door canvassing on the East Rand in Gauteng, where 10 000 volunteers were deployed, in a bid to consolidate support from IFP-supporting mineworkers.²⁵³ Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Ruth Rabinowitz, Ben Skosana and Hennie Bekker addressed over 10 000 supporters in the Alexandra Stadium in Johannesburg. The central message was that the IFP could bridge the divide between the rich and poor. The IFP leader was neutral on issues of race and ethnicity and was not overtly negative of other political parties: "We must stand against the rising tide of criminality and the ever-growing culture of indolence, entitlement, greed, corruption, indiscipline, lack of respect for authority, lack of work ethic, low productivity, lawlessness and resentment."²⁵⁴ Buthelezi told black rural voters in Umtata that the party was the only party to defend traditional leaders and raised the issues of corruption, crime and joblessness.²⁵⁵

Buthelezi did attempt to campaign in areas outside the African townships. The IFP had announced in November 1998 that it would use the election to gain votes among minorities, especially Indians. In an interview in the *Post*, Indian IFP leader, Kamal Panday said: "Indians should no longer sit on the fence and split their votes".²⁵⁶ Buthelezi told Indian voters at the Islamic Cultural Centre in Umzinto, Durban "unity

²⁵¹ Daily Dispatch, May 19 1999. *Buthelezi launches 'goodwill revolution'*

²⁵² Daily Dispatch, April 17 1999. *IFP: SA worse off in last 5 years*

²⁵³ Lodge. *Consolidating Democracy* p. 128

²⁵⁴ The Star, May 10 1999. *Buthelezi vows Alexandra voters with call to tackle challenges courageously.*

²⁵⁵ Daily Dispatch, April 26 1999. *IFP woos EC tribal leaders at Umtata Rally*

²⁵⁶ EISA. *South African Election Update* p.10

cannot mean uniformity” and reassured them that the IFP supported every cultural group’s “inalienable right” to self-expression.²⁵⁷ He took his “revolution of goodwill” message to Reiger Park, a coloured area near Boksburg in early May. A reporter at the event said that the rally was a lacklustre affair and blamed this on the fact that the IFP found it difficult to project themselves as a party with a national profile, only promising to do what the ANC is doing, but better.²⁵⁸ Buthelezi told coloured voters in the Northern Cape that the IFP had been successful in checking ANC power as a partner in government and that it had the interests of the people in this region at heart.²⁵⁹ In Mitchells Plein, in the Western Cape, Buthelezi made reference to the growing crime, corruption and inept governance, citing the IFP’s ‘revolution of goodwill’ as the answer. He also told the coloured audience that affirmative action should be tailored to the needs of each province—an issue of direct concern to these voters.²⁶⁰

The IFP’s campaign can be summed up as primarily issue-based. The party sought to distance itself from its image as a Zulu party in order to secure its position as junior partner of the ANC. Fears that recurring conflict would threaten the coalition no doubt motivated this strategy.

3.6 United Democratic Movement

A former minister in the Nationalist Government, Roelf Meyer, joined with the former military leader of the Transkei, Bantu Holomisa, to form the UDM in September 1997. Meyer, one of the key NP negotiators with the ANC during the multi-party negotiations, had left the party in May 1997 after the NNP’s withdrawal from the GNU. During his rule in the Transkei, Holomisa had endeared himself to the ANC through allowing its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), to operate in the Transkei. He was rewarded with the post of Deputy Minister of Environmental Affairs in 1994, but was ousted from the ANC in September 1996 following his allegations that the Minister of Public Enterprises, Stella Sigcau had taken bribes.²⁶¹

²⁵⁷ Lodge, *Consolidating Democracy* p.156

²⁵⁸ Mail and Guardian, May 7-13 1999. *Speaking the language of visions past*

²⁵⁹ Diamond Fields Advertiser, April 12 1999. *IFP kicks off in Northern Cape*

²⁶⁰ Cape Argus, May 17 1999. *IFP elephant can save W Cape, says Buthelezi*

²⁶¹ Southall, Roger. 1999. “The struggle for a place called home: the ANC versus the UDM in the Eastern Cape” in *Politikon* 26, 2. pp. 156-7

Public perceptions of the new party ranged from those who believed that the formation smacked of opportunism, to those that welcomed what they believed to be a genuine non-racial party. As we shall see, the party did work hard to foster a non-racial image, but it became increasingly clear that the parties' support base was largely confined to the Eastern Cape, specifically around Umtata in the Transkei. Despite the infancy of the organisation, by September 1998, the party claimed that it had 600 branches, with 500 of these in the Eastern Cape.²⁶² Polling data saw the voting intention for the party rise from 4% at its inception in 1997 to 5% in July 1998. This initial flurry of support started dropping by late 1998, until it reached a mere 2% just before the election.²⁶³

The UDM's manifesto for 1999 was overtly non-racial. 'Addressed' to "all South Africans", the stated mission is to "unite all South Africans from all communities in a new political home, built on the foundation of the principles and ideals of our national Constitution."²⁶⁴ The manifesto prioritises unemployment, crime and corruption, offering specific proposals to deal with these issues. The economic policies of the party are typically neo-liberal—calling for a privatisation programme and a "macro-economic plan that will ensure higher investor confidence."²⁶⁵ Other noteworthy issues are the promise of referendums on the abortion issue as well as on the death penalty, the review of employment equity legislation and the pledge to revitalise structures of traditional leadership. On the whole, the manifesto is a positive one. It recognises existing problems without apportioning blame, and then offers alternatives. The manifesto also states that the UDM will not seek alliances with other political parties, as its vision is "to serve the long-term interests of the country through strong opposition and true multi-party competition."²⁶⁶ The manifesto then, is based largely on the premise that South Africans can work together in overcoming the nation's problems. The document is infused with a pragmatic and racially neutral tone to appeal to all South Africans.

²⁶² Lodge, *Consolidating Democracy* p.86

²⁶³ Taylor, Mattes and Africa. "Opinion '99 Press Release"

²⁶⁴ UDM, 1999. *The Better Future Plan*. (Manifesto of the United Democratic Movement) p.1

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.* p. 8

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.* p.27

A recurrent theme of the UDM's national campaign was that the party was racially and ethnically inclusive. Meyer told the press in March that the UDM was confident that it would become the country's largest opposition because "our membership and support base is a mirror reflection of the nation".²⁶⁷ In a phone-in organised by a newspaper, UDM spokesperson, Johan Steenkamp said: "We are the only party which can make serious inroads into the country's black townships."²⁶⁸

The national list of the party certainly did demonstrate a diverse membership, with Bantu Holomisa and Roelf Meyer at first and second, followed by national chairperson Masilo Mabeta, former NNP MP and Gauteng leader Sam de Beer, and former IFP MP and Correctional Services Minister Sipo Mzimela. Cynics may have suggested that the party was merely a band of opportunists, with one newspaper saying that the list could be read as a "who's who" of deserters from longer established parties.²⁶⁹ Nevertheless, the tone and issues identified in the manifesto and the campaign are clearly an attempt to foster an inclusive party, aiming to cast as wide a net as possible to catch votes.

The main thrust of the campaign took place in the Eastern Cape and mainly around Umtata in the old Transkei region. The UDM sought to capitalise on the antagonistic relationship that had developed between the chiefs and the ANC-led Bisho administration, as well as Holomisa's good standing amongst chiefs in the Transkei.²⁷⁰ By early March, the UDM was claiming to have the support of 20 to 25 of the most senior traditional leaders in the province. Dumisani Gwadiso, the party's Premier designate and number one on the provincial list was the leader of the Transkei Traditional Leaders Association, an organisation highly critical of the Bisho administration.²⁷¹ Holomisa also played on perceptions of poor service delivery at a rally by calling Mbeki a grey haired *tsotsi* who led a privileged life overseas and did not know the harshness of life in the rural areas.²⁷² In Umtata, Holomisa told a crowd of 4500 supporters that South Africa would become another banana republic if Mbeki were allowed to rule. He also played up to his own role in the liberation struggle,

²⁶⁷ The Star, March 30 1999. *UDM list a gender and racial mix*

²⁶⁸ Cape Argus, April 29 1999. *We're a government in waiting – UDM*

²⁶⁹ Cape Times, March 30 1999. *UDM's election lists read like who was who' of defectors*

²⁷⁰ Financial Mail, June 12 1998. *Democracy's Chief Problem*

²⁷¹ Southall. "The struggle for a place called home" p. 163

²⁷² EISA, *South African Election Update* p. 331

reminding the audience that he had sheltered MK.²⁷³ Support for the UDM in Umtata was apparent when UDM supporters at a Freedom Day Rally booed Nelson Mandela.

The priority of the Transkei for the UDM was evident in the prominence of its posters in the region, although it was observed that for every UDM poster, there were five to seven ANC posters. In Umtata, the party's stronghold however, there was an equal amount of ANC and UDM posters. An observer in Umtata noted that the billboards in the region featured pictures of Holomisa only, whereas in other parts of the country, both Holomisa and Meyer were featured.²⁷⁴ This indicates that the party's strategy was to play up to Holomisa's popularity in this region, but to promote the party as the vehicle of reconciliation elsewhere. The fact that top five of the UDM's candidates in the Eastern Cape were from the Transkei demonstrates that the UDM's priority was to consolidate support in the region.²⁷⁵

Outside the Transkei, UDM activity was mute in comparison. The thrust of the national campaign was to criticise the ANC government for its failure to deliver, and to present the UDM as the only viable alternative to the ANC.

Roelf Meyer had held a series of meetings with opinion makers in coloured communities in the Eastern Cape in 1998,²⁷⁶ while Holomisa told a coloured working class audience that Cosatu was only interested in enriching themselves and that he would set up a social upliftment programme in coloured communities if he were elected.²⁷⁷ UDM activity in coloured and white areas was sufficient enough to be perceived as a threat to the DP, with provincial leader Eddie Trent labelling the party as a "Xhosa, ethnic Transkei party."²⁷⁸

The 'catch-all' strategy of the UDM can be clearly discerned from its activity in KwaZulu-Natal. UDM National Chairman, Masilo Mabeta told an audience in Durban that the UDM existed to challenge the ANC and that South Africans had no reason to believe that their lives would improve under an Mbeki Presidency. The

²⁷³ The Star, April 27 1999. *A banana republic if Mbeki rules*

²⁷⁴ EISA, *South African Election Update* p. 272

²⁷⁵ Ibid. p.146

²⁷⁶ EISA, *South African Election Update* p.102

²⁷⁷ Ibid. p.187

²⁷⁸ Southall, Roger. 1999. "The struggle for a place called home" p.159

audience expressed concern regarding Roelf Meyer's prominent role in the apartheid government. Mabeta said that Meyer and others like him, had joined the party because they have felt the desire to "bring about a redress."²⁷⁹ Roelf Meyer told an audience on the Durban Beachfront that the UDM would protect minority rights and that it provided a political home for all people including Indians and coloureds. Meyer then visited Richmond where he told 1000 supporters that the party's manifesto had a better plan for all South Africans.²⁸⁰ Holomisa and Meyer addressed supporters in a series of road shows in early May including visits to areas such as Edendale, Dambuza and Kokstad.²⁸¹

The UDM's strategy in the 1999 election was to consolidate its support in the Transkei, where the party could bank on the popularity of Holomisa and dissatisfaction with the ANC-led Bisho administration. In order to do this, the UDM presented itself as a more exclusively 'black' party and the only viable opposition to the ANC. Elsewhere, the message of the party was overwhelmingly one of reconciliation.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has summarised the messages of the top five parties and how each party approached issues of race and how it attempted to appeal to the electorate. The ANC's message was aimed mainly at black voters and, on occasion, the ANC blamed the previous 'white' regime for the slow pace of transformation. Black voters were urged to turn out and vote in order to renew the ANC's mandate to "speed up change." The message to Indians and coloureds were more exclusive in that the ANC sought to reverse the tide of support that these communities had given the NP in 1994. By stressing black solidarity with Indian and coloureds in the face of continuing white privilege, the ANC's campaign largely excluded whites. The DP's message was aimed primarily at minorities, particularly white Afrikaners, and painted a picture of the ANC government re-racialising society to the benefit of blacks while excluding minorities. The New National Party also warned of an ANC government wielding too much power, but refrained from adopting an aggressive anti-ANC tone. Instead, the

²⁷⁹EISA, *South African Election Update* p. 163

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.* p.197

²⁸¹ *Ibid.* p.253

party argued for co-operative governance where all parties had a hand in ruling. Unlike the DP, the NNP explicitly campaigned for reconciliation among South Africans of all races and instead of playing on white fears of exclusion, urged them to join hands with other races in taking the country forward. The UDM similarly stressed the need for reconciliation, except in its heartland, where it played on dissatisfaction with the ANC-led provincial government. The IFP chose to focus on neutral issues, rather than play the ethnic card, mainly because of its desire to remain in cooperative government with the ANC.

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Chapter Four:

Content Analysis of Party Meetings

The aim of this chapter is to bolster the case made so far that parties that attempted to campaign with a more exclusive message achieved greater electoral success than those that were neutral or inclusive, on ethnic and racial issues. As a “heterogeneous domain of techniques which are focused upon the (more or less) systematic, objective, and quantitative description or series of communications,”²⁸² the content analysis aims to provide some analytical rigour to the mainly descriptive account offered so far.

4.1 Methodology

The unit of analysis is the themes addressed in party meetings during the campaign. In order to uncover the themes, the unit of observation is press reports of party meetings. One possible criticism of this approach is that a focus on press reports means that the research may be subject to the selection bias of reporters who covered the event. Journalists are likely to focus on one aspect of a meeting, largely ignoring other important themes. Other gatekeepers such as sub-editors may cut out important parts of a report, while news-editors may reject the publication of some reports on the grounds that they are not newsworthy or ‘juicy’ enough.

Ideally, the researcher would be present at every party meeting or would at least have access to a large sample of complete written speeches. Unfortunately this is not possible. In any event, the fact that large samples of newspapers, serving a diverse readership, have been used would mean that any selection bias in one report would most likely be cancelled out in another, notwithstanding systemic biases in the media generally.

There are some advantages to this approach. Newspaper reports provide easy access to information and are usually fairly succinct, addressing the key themes. This speeds the work of the researcher and avoids getting bogged down in reams of party

²⁸² Crano, WD and Brewer, MB. 1973. *Principles of Research in Social Psychology* (New York: McGraw Hill) p. 198

speeches, enabling more meetings to be analysed. This approach also provides us with a sample of meetings that were deemed to be important in some way. They therefore impacted on a larger audience through being published in the newspaper. So, while only 60 people may turn out to see a politician in their local town hall, thousands may read an article on the address in the newspaper the next day.

The following publications were searched for articles on party meetings for the period March 1- June 1 for the five parties under examination: The Cape Argus, The Cape Times, The Sowetan, the Daily Dispatch, the Mail and Guardian, the Natal Mercury, the Diamond Fields Advertiser, the Eastern Province Herald and The Star.²⁸³ While this sample primarily covers the Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Gauteng, Northern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, all of these newspapers do provide coverage of other regions of the country.

Each article covering a party meeting was analysed through isolating the key themes of the address and tabulated in date order (see appendix). Once all the themes had been isolated, the key themes were coded in terms of whether the message that it sent out to the electorate was inclusive, neutral or exclusive. These variables are conceptualised as follows:

Inclusive: An inclusive theme is one in which a party attempts to appeal to voters beyond its core constituency through expressing solidarity with that group and without attempting to do this by excluding another group. Appeals to a party's core group that emphasise reconciliation with other groups are also considered inclusive.

Exclusive: An exclusive theme is one where parties attempt to propagate implicit or explicit narrow appeals on racial or ethnic lines. This includes instances where a party appeals to a group outside its core group by being seen as exclusionary towards another group.

Neutral: When no attempt is made to either include or exclude racial groups.

²⁸³ Note: The Star, Cape Argus and Cape Times were examined utilising the online archives for Independent Newspapers- www.iol.co.za. The party acronym was entered in the search field for the period under examination and then those articles that referred to party meetings were isolated. Data from the Daily Dispatch was obtained through their online archive-www.dispatch.co.za- by sifting through every issue for the relevant period. A similar strategy was used for the Sowetan, Mail and Guardian, Natal Mercury, Diamond Fields Advertiser and the EP Herald except this was carried out manually.

The judgement of whether party appeals were inclusive, exclusive or neutral depend to a great extent on the conception of the party in terms of Horowitz's analysis of ethnic parties in relation to the audience present. We noted in chapter three that the ANC was a 'black' party, the DP a 'white' party and the IFP a 'Zulu' party. The NNP was not an ethnic party, although most of its supporters were white, while the UDM's support base was largely unknown at the time of the election.

A 'white' party such as the DP evoking images of democratic breakdown and the perpetuation of ethnic conflict in the rest of Africa to a white audience was coded as exclusive in that the intent was clearly to imply that blacks cannot run the State effectively. The NNP pledging allegiance with other population groups to a white audience is coded as inclusive. When references were made to issues such as housing, education etc, the issue was coded as neutral. In cases where the avowed aim of raising a seemingly neutral issue was to exacerbate ethnic or racial tensions however, the theme was coded as exclusive. An example would be the DP referring to apparently racially-motivated farm-murders in addresses to conservative Afrikaners. Criticisms of other parties in terms of their ability to deliver or the effectiveness of their policy proposals were coded neutral. Criticisms of parties in terms of their racial support base, their role during apartheid, or other racially sensitive matters were coded as exclusive. For example, the ANC referring to the NNP as a 'weak' party was coded as neutral, whereas references to the NNP as a racist or illegitimate party were regarded as exclusive. Similarly, the ANC referring to the UDM as a 'weak' party was coded as neutral, whereas references to the party as apartheid collaborators were coded as exclusive, since the aim was to dismiss the party as legitimately representing the concerns of black voters.

4.2 Analysis


The data is presented in its entirety in the appendix. The results are summarised here in Table 4.1:

Table 4.1 *Results of content analysis*

	ANC	DP	NNP	IFP	UDM
Total Meetings	63	45	27	23	20
Total Themes	138	95	60	54	47
'Exclusive' Themes	48 (34.8%)	48 (50.5%)	6 (10%)	1 (1.9%)	5 (10.6%)
'Inclusive' Themes	13 (9.4%)	6 (6.3%)	30 (50%)	12 (22.2%)	7 (20.4%)
'Neutral' Themes	77 (55.8%)	41 (43.2%)	24 (40%)	41 (75.9%)	35 (68.5%)

In total, 178 party meetings and interviews were used to generate 394 themes. Of these themes, 108 of them were coded as 'exclusive', 68 as 'inclusive' and 218 as 'neutral'. The graph below shows a comparative assessment of each party and enables us to see at a glance how each party approached its campaign.

Figure 4.2 *Comparison of party campaign themes (figures in percentages):*



The party espousing the most 'exclusive' message was the DP—the only party to have totalled more exclusive themes than neutral ones. The ANC had less of a proportion of exclusive themes than the DP, but like the DP, had a considerable amount more of exclusive than inclusive themes. The IFP and the UDM were similar in terms of the proportion of their themes with both having an overwhelmingly

neutral message. Both parties, however, were more willing to adopt a more inclusive discourse than the ANC and the DP. The only party to have more inclusive themes than neutral or exclusive ones was the NNP.

The success of the content analysis largely depends on the way in which the messages are coded. As there is not an established conceptualisation for this, the exercise necessarily relies on the interpretation of the observer. Below, each party is analysed in terms of their most popular messages and how this was deemed 'inclusive', 'neutral' or 'exclusive'. A full breakdown of each meeting, the themes identified and the code that each theme received is set out in the appendix.

The main thrust of the ANC's campaign generally was to convince voters that the party had done everything in its power to deliver and to renew promises made in 1994. The ANC was not above self-criticism, with Mbeki often promising to root out corruption in the government. In general then, the ANC's message was mainly neutral and was more concerned with policy issues and problems of delivery, rather than mobilising voters on racial grounds. However, when the amount of inclusive messages is contrasted with those with an exclusive bent, it emerges that the ANC did prefer to send out exclusive messages.

Common exclusive messages of the ANC included attempts to paint other black parties as "apartheid collaborators" and white parties as remaining steeped in the past. They were coded exclusive as they aimed to convince black voters that the ANC were the only true party of black aspiration. Other parties were 'too white' or they were collaborators with white parties. Campaigning for affirmative action was also coded exclusive since it aimed to raise the issue of racial inclusion and exclusion. Calls for African-Coloured and African-Indian solidarity were coded as exclusive as the message was that the former oppressed should stick together against whites.

In general however, the ANC campaign was largely neutral in tone, although there was a discernible tendency for the party to resort to more exclusive appeals in areas where it felt threatened, such as the Eastern Cape, or where it aimed to convert voters such as in the Western Cape.

The DP's campaign was an overwhelmingly exclusive one. One of the most common themes was that the ANC was re-racialising society and excluding minorities. The desired effect of this was to convince minorities that their future was threatened due to affirmative action and black empowerment. Another popular theme of DP meetings was that the ANC was authoritarian and bent on centralising power. This was also coded exclusive in that it aimed to make minorities' fear that democracy existed at the whim of a ruling party that prioritised issues important to black voters. The recurrent theme that the ANC wished to gain a two-thirds majority to alter the constitution had a similar aim and was thus also coded exclusive. The call for an anti-ANC alliance was also coded exclusive. DP supporters would no doubt argue that the party's anti-ANC stance was not anti-black, but against the absolute power of any party. However, in a party system whereby the overwhelming majority of black voters vote for the ANC, this can be viewed as exclusive, since it fuels the perception that the party is anti-black. Other exclusive themes included accusing Winnie Madikizela-Mandela of human rights violations, alluding to democratic breakdown in Africa and references to farm murders in rural Afrikaans areas as they all served to stir up racial fears. Themes such as labelling the ANC a black party and racist were more obviously exclusive.

Inclusive themes were few and far between and were classified as those in which the party attempted to cross the black-white divide. The issue of land reform was coded as inclusive since the aim is to restore land to black Africans. References to the ANC as an elitist party only concerned with the rich were also deemed inclusive since such appeals were aimed to resonate with poor, mostly black voters. Appeals to traditional leaders were also deemed inclusive, as were concerns voiced for the rural poor. Attempts by the party to shake of its reactionary image were also deemed inclusive.

The data shows, however, that the DP's campaign can be categorised as largely exclusive, with just over half the themes identified attempting to mobilise group identities to the exclusion of other groups.

The NNP had similar 'exclusive' messages to the DP, only they reverted to such themes only rarely. As with the DP, references to the ANC or the UDM as a black party was considered exclusive, since such themes implied that people of other races had no business voting for such a party.

Neutral themes accounted for nearly 40% of the NNP's campaign message. Neutral themes were coded as such because either they were purely issue-based or they did not play on race at all. Examples of neutral themes would be ones highlighting the ANC's failure to deliver or insisting that the NNP provincial government in the Western Cape had had fared well.

The NNP was the only party to have more inclusive than neutral themes. The most common example of their inclusive campaigning was their message of reconciliation and their message to whites that they should join hands with their countrymen by voting for the NNP, the only true non-racial party. The party also attempted to address the concerns of black voters directly, asserting that the NNP had a great deal of black support while labelling the DP and the ANC as only appealing to narrow interests. It is interesting that there was a discernible shift from being willing to enter into an anti-ANC alliance early in the campaign, to stressing the need for co-operation among *all* parties by the end of the campaign. These latter appeals for co-operation were coded as inclusive in that in a racial party system, co-operation between parties across race lines can be interpreted as co-operation across race lines.

The IFP ran an overwhelmingly neutral campaign. The only message that could be construed as mobilising Zulu identity was a call for the Zulu monarch to be recognised. The theme of federalism was coded as neutral since it did not appeal directly to identity and was based more explicitly on a concern for good governance. Other neutral themes included the calls for an end to political violence, the failing of the economy and the need for effective government. The IFP's overall message was perhaps the most vague of all the parties, with no real discernible stance, apart from the proposed 'revolution of goodwill'. Inclusive themes were those where Buthelezi affirmed the good relationship between the IFP and the ANC and stressed the importance of national unity.

The UDM's campaign was largely a neutral one, although the party did attempt to reach out to all race groups. The most common inclusive message was that the UDM was a multi-racial party and therefore a home for all South Africans. In addresses to black voters, UDM members often played up to the role of Holomisa in the struggle against apartheid or that Mbeki did not understand the plight of the rural poor. These

were deemed 'exclusive' since they attempted to represent Holomisa as the champion of blacks who had lost out in the new dispensation. Raising the spectre of a one-party state under the ANC to whites was also deemed exclusive since it attempted to play on white fears of racial domination at the hands of the ANC.

4.3 Election results

It is a useful exercise to examine how each party performed in the election given their strategies in the election campaign outlined already. Nationally the parties lined up as follows (the 1994 result is in brackets):

Table 4.3 1999 National Election Result²⁸⁴:

	%Vote	Seats
ANC	66.35 (62.65)	266 (252)
DP	9.56 (1.73)	38 (7)
IFP	8.58 (10.54)	34 (43)
NNP	6.87 (20.39)	28 (82)
UDM	3.42 (DNS) ²⁸⁵	14 (DNS)
ACDP	1.43 (0.45)	6 (2)
FF	0.80 (2.17)	3 (9)
UCDP	0.78 (DNS)	3 (DNS)
PAC	0.71 (1.25)	3 (5)
FA	0.54 (DNS)	2 (DNS)
MF	0.30 (0.07)	1 (0)
AEB	0.29 (DNS)	1 (DNS)
AZAPO	0.17 (DNS)	1 (DNS)
Others	0.20 (0.82)	0 (0)
Total	100.00	400

The most striking feature is the ascendance of the DP and concomitant decline in the fortunes of the NNP. This correlates with the changing attitudes of the parties as described so far in the analysis of the party campaigns. As the NNP attempted to change its message to a more inclusive one, it lost voters, particularly white voters who felt the most threatened by the ANC government. As the DP intensified its anti-ANC stance—presenting itself as the party with the “guts to fight back”—it began to gain support in white areas that were previously mainly NNP supporting.

²⁸⁴ Electoral Institute of South Africa website: <http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/southafrica1.htm>

²⁸⁵ DNS- Did not stand.

The NNP lost to the DP at every voting station in its former stronghold of Centurion. This pattern was repeated in Vereeniging, Heidelberg, Randburg and Potchefstroom. The DP emerged triumphant in strongly Afrikaans-speaking neighbourhoods, with majorities in such traditional NNP terrain as Krugersdorp North, Johannesburg's Mondeor, Vereeniging's Drie Riviere and Pretoria's Lynwood Ridge.²⁸⁶ In the traditionally conservative areas of Ventersdorp and Potchefstroom, the DP emerged second to the ANC, suggesting that it beat the NNP in gaining the 'white' vote here.²⁸⁷ The DP emerged as the main contender to the ANC in coloured and Indian areas, with a 25% share of the vote in such communities. Gains in these areas had not been at the expense of the ANC, but from conservative coloureds that had voted NNP in 1994.²⁸⁸ The DP also did well in urban coloured areas around Port Elizabeth and achieved some of its highest levels of support in rural coloured areas in the far western districts. of the Eastern Cape²⁸⁹

A comparison of the racial breakdown of the NNP and the DP's support shows the emerging popularity of the DP among white voters:

Table 4.4 Racial breakdown of NNP and DP support in the 1999 election²⁹⁰:

	DP vote share	% of DP support	NNP vote share	% of NNP support
Black	180 000	12%	200 000	18%
White	1 200 000	77%	340 000	31%
Coloured	75 000	5%	480 000	44%
Indian	90 000	6%	80 000	7%
Total	1 545 000	100%	1 100 000	100%

The DP managed to attract over three and a half times more white votes than the NNP, with white voters accounting for over three quarters of the DP's 1999 support base. White voters made up less than a third of the NNP's support base in the 1999

²⁸⁶ EISA, *South African Election Update* p.342

²⁸⁷ Ibid. p.358

²⁸⁸ Ibid. p.341

²⁸⁹ Ibid. p.328

²⁹⁰ Adapted from Reynolds, 1999. "The Results" in Reynolds, Andrew *Election '99* (Cape Town: David Philip)pp. 183-185

election. Despite attaining 445 000 less votes in total, the NNP still managed to gain 20 000 more black voters than the DP and 405 000 more coloured voters, who now accounted for the greatest share of the NNP's support base.

The ANC improved on its 1994 poll, landing just short of a two-thirds majority. Reynolds attributes the ANC's success to the fact that there is no populist black opposition party that can challenge the ANC. The PAC and Azapo had a miserable showing and the UCDP²⁹¹ and the UDM had only regional support.²⁹² This suggests that the ANC has been able to outbid such parties in attempts to secure the 'African' vote. From the evidence presented already, there is certainly a case to be made that the ANC was successful in mobilising black nationalist sentiment. At a voting station in Alexandra Township, the ANC obtained 91% of the vote, while support for the ANC reached 99% at the Ivory Park informal settlement in Brakpan.²⁹³

Reynolds also attributes the failure of the NNP to gain coloured votes as a factor for a gain in the support of the ANC.²⁹⁴ Results from the Western Cape, where 55% of voters are coloured, confirm this. The ANC saw an increase in support from 33% to 42% and support for the NNP dropped from 53% to 38%. The readiness of the ANC to mobilise coloured voters through appeals that excluded whites won through over the discourse of reconciliation preached by the NNP. The racial breakdown of the ANC's vote was as follows:

Table 4.5 *Racial breakdown of ANC support in the 1999 election.*²⁹⁵

	Vote Share	% of ANC support
Black	9 500 000	90.0%
White	100 000	1.0%
Coloured	800 000	7.5%
Indian	150 000	1.5%
Total	10 600 000	100%

²⁹¹ United Christian Democratic Party led by former Bophuthatswana leader Lucas Mangope became the official opposition in the North-West Province.

²⁹² Reynolds, 1999. "The Results" p.176

²⁹³ EISA, *South African Election Update* p. 340

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ Reynolds, 1999. "The Results" pp. 183-185

The breakdown shows that the ANC remained a 'black' party, although it was successful in gaining a significant amount of coloured votes—320 000 more than the NNP. Support for the ANC in white areas was meagre, while the party gained a little less than the combined share of the NNP and the DP's Indian vote.

The ANC managed to clean up in the Eastern Cape, although it lost out to the UDM in Umtata and surrounding areas in the former Transkei. The UDM won 53% of the vote in Umtata and 56% in the surrounding areas. Outside this region, the UDM met with less success. In a typical Ciskei voting station for example, the UDM received 6% compared with the ANC's 91%.²⁹⁶ This suggests that Holomisa was able to bank on his own popularity in the Transkei and to play on the discontent felt by many under the ANC provincial administration run from Bisho. In doing so, Holomisa was not averse to attempting to "ethnically outbid" the ANC, saying that Mbeki did not know the real needs of rural people and that it was Holomisa who had fought the struggle in the Eastern Cape. The ANC responded by referring to Holomisa as an 'apartheid collaborator'. Outside the Transkei, the UDM was more willing to expound an inclusive message. There is no data that offers a breakdown of the UDM's support, although it can be safely said that the party's core support was to be found in the Transkei, with a smattering of support from elsewhere in the country distributed fairly evenly among all race groups.

The IFP's decrease from 10.5% of the national vote to 8.5% surprised many analysts who had predicted a much lower vote share for the party. According to Reynolds, it is evident that the IFP lost its conservative white and Indian vote from 1994 as well as some Zulu support outside KwaZulu-Natal.²⁹⁷ Within the IFP's stronghold in KwaZulu-Natal, it was evident that the ANC made some serious inroads. In the Ugu region around Port Shepstone where the ANC polled around 27 percent of the votes in the 1994 elections and the 1996 local election, the ANC took 47 percent of the vote.²⁹⁸ At the Chipeta School voting station in Pongola the ANC obtained 43% to the IFP's 54%, and in Empangeni's Pesheya School district, the ANC actually obtained

²⁹⁶ Sunday Times, June 6 1999. *Groundzero: Where the election action happened*

²⁹⁷ Reynolds, 1999. "The Results" p.183

²⁹⁸ Sunday Times, June 6 1999. *Groundzero: Where the election action happened*

the majority of votes with 52%.²⁹⁹ The 'vague' policy proposals and the allegiance to co-operative government no doubt alienated many non-Zulu voters, while the standing of the IFP as the 'Zulu party' sustained the party's support base, for the most part, although the party did not explicitly mobilise on a Zulu-ethnic ticket. The unwillingness of the party to engage in ethnic mobilisation is a positive feature of the 1999 campaign, especially in light of the violent history of KwaZulu-Natal, although it is difficult to see how this will secure votes for the party in future.

4.4 Conclusion

The DP's rise began long before the beginning of the 1999 election campaign. During the first term of parliament, the DP was able to rely on good organisational structures to punch above its weight by asking probing questions while remaining outside of the GNU. Conversely, the NNP's position in the GNU made it difficult for the party to be seen as credible opposition to the ANC-led government.

While some have argued that the decline of the NNP was largely down to the weakness of party structure and the departure of de Klerk, the argument advanced here is that the NNP's downfall can be attributed to the party's failure to hold on to its white support, mainly due to its perceived collusion with the ANC. Disaffected NNP voters were alienated further by the NNP's attempts during the campaign to cast itself as a multi-cultural and non-racial party and this strategy did little to endear the party to black voters. This failed 'catch-all' strategy stood in stark contrast to the ANC and the DP's successful campaigns.

Schrire has described the strategy of the DP as 'robust opposition' which he says "is much a style of politics as it reflects deep-seated policy and ideological disagreements" as opposed to the 'cooperative' strategy used by the NNP and the 'cooptive' strategy of the IFP.³⁰⁰ He argues that the decision by the IFP and the NNP not to engage in robust politics since 1994 led the smaller DP to fill the gap and attract voters attracted to such adversarial campaigning.³⁰¹ By 'filling the gap', the DP has successfully outbid the NNP for the votes of whites and other disaffected

²⁹⁹ EISA, *South African Election Update* p.343

³⁰⁰ Schrire, "The Realities of Opposition in South Africa" p.31

³⁰¹ *Ibid.* p.32

minorities. While Tony Leon argued “only those blinded by a bizarre racial bigotry could assume [the fight back message] was directed at any group,”³⁰² it is most likely that the DP’s campaign was seen by most, particularly black, voters as the ranting of a reactionary white party bent on maintaining white privilege. As Mattes wrote:

... the DP must have guessed how this message would be seen in the black community... they must have foreseen that it would be perceived as a fundamental attack on the competence and integrity of the black government as well as on keys to black advancement such as affirmative action and government intervention in the workplace.³⁰³

It was not just the black community that viewed the DP’s campaign as an attack on the black government. Reports of an AWB zealot urging people to vote for Leon in an East Rand by-election— to support “*daardie klein Jood*” —would indicate that this was attractive to conservative whites.³⁰⁴ The racially skewed nature of the DP’s support base did not apparently worry Tony Leon who commented to an analyst: “The DP does not care where its support comes from, as long as it obtains it.”³⁰⁵

The reality of the demographics of the South African electorate means that the ANC need only maintain its status as the party of black liberation in order to win a majority of votes. A major problem for the ANC is that the increasing poverty experienced in some areas sits uneasily with the rise of a black business and political elite. The ANC’s strategy to cope with this since 1998 has been to downplay intra-black inequality and play up to the gaps between whites and blacks. Despite the ANC’s historical commitment to non-racial struggle, there is growing evidence to suggest that the party is becoming more willing to present the struggle in purely racial terms. Both ‘black’ and ‘white’ parties were attacked on the grounds that they were apartheid collaborators. Promises to speed up delivery were accompanied with the explicit or implicit statement that it was ‘the boers’ who were to blame for the slow pace of transformation. While such a strategy may not in itself ring alarm bells for the future of democracy and race relations in South Africa (as the DP’s does), it is potentially dangerous. We saw that the ANC was most likely to revert to exclusive

³⁰² Daily Dispatch, May 5 1999. *Leon compares ANC with worst of old NP*

³⁰³ Mail and Guardian May 21-27. *A list of opposition campaign opportunities lost*

³⁰⁴ Afrikaans for “that little Jew”. Reported in Financial Mail, April 16 1999. *Is SA liberal legacy alive?*

³⁰⁵ EISA, *South African Election Update* p. 12

appeals in areas where it finds itself most threatened. As disillusionment grows among the black working class, the likelihood that the ruling party will make stronger appeals to black nationalist or Africanist sentiments increases, thus further polarising the electorate.

The IFP and the UDM were successful in consolidating support in 'their' respective constituencies- Zulu-speakers around Ulundi and Xhosa-speakers from Umtata. The IFP did not mobilise ethnic interests to any significant degree and experienced a decline in support. As one journalist noted toward the end of the campaign:

"This is a different Buthelezi. A far cry from the tense, belligerent man who refused to take part in the 1994 elections and took KwaZulu-Natal to the brink of a civil war before finally joining the race with only seven days to the April 27 polls."³⁰⁶

The UDM similarly did not mobilise ethnic interests, although it did focus to a great extent on the Transkei vote. Both parties failed to elicit much support from those outside their core groups, despite attempts by both parties to campaign in other parts of the country and to present themselves as racially and ethnically neutral. The final result saw the NNP join them as a regional party with its support drawn mainly from coloured voters in the Western Cape.

This re-alignment of South African politics is potentially fatal to the chances of democratic success. As politics becomes re-racialised, the stakes of the political game are raised. A feeling of exclusion has begun to permeate minority groups, while the ruling party attempts to bind the majority together by reverting to an increasingly racialised discourse. In such a society, the potential for cross-cutting cleavages—universally seen as the key to minimising conflict in a democracy—diminishes. Instead, divisions are entrenched and politics takes on the zero-sum character of the deeply divided societies.

In the next chapter, we shall draw together the independent (closed-list PR) and dependent variables (incentive to campaign exclusively) in order to demonstrate the precise relationship between them. Thereafter, some suggestions for electoral reform

³⁰⁶ The Star, May 27 1999. *Buthelezi loses will to oppose*

based on the comparative study of electoral systems in divided societies, will be put forward.

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Conclusion:

Considerations for a New Electoral System

We saw in the previous two chapters that parties that embarked on exclusive campaigns were rewarded in the 1999 South African election. The party that made an attempt to appeal to voters outside its traditional support base, the NNP, was punished at the polls. This is not to say that list PR *causes* parties to campaign exclusively. If this were the case, then all parties would have been expected to embark on exclusive campaigns. Only the ANC and the DP's campaigns can be considered exclusive, while the NNP's was overtly inclusive. The argument is that the electoral system generates an incentive structure that rewards exclusive parties. Over time, rational strategists will be likely to take advantage of this system of punishment and reward and mobilise certain groups to the exclusion of others. It is also unlikely that the DP's *fight back* campaign was the outcome of rational strategising that took into account the incentive structure of the electoral system. It is more probable that the electoral system plays a less conscious role when strategists formulate campaign strategy. In fact, there were a multitude of contextual factors that overtly affected how each party ran its campaign in 1999.

5.1 The importance of contextual factors on campaigning

The ANC's campaign took on an exclusive character, as it was necessary to convince sectors of its support base that had grown apathetic since 1994, to turn out and cast their vote. By defining the political struggle as between the majority who sought transformation and the reactionary minority, the ANC aimed to instil a sense of urgency into the electorate. As a multi-ethnic coalition and a broad church of political opinion, there is also the possibility that the ANC played the race card in order to strengthen solidarity within the movement and prevent the possible fragmentation of the party. The DP played the race card in order to capitalise on the growing perception, especially among whites, that the NNP had betrayed its supporters and that the party did not have the guts to stand up to an ANC government. The NNP's decision to be inclusive was influenced by the fact that the DP had already taken the mantle as the 'most effective and vociferous opposition' before van Schalkwyk took

over. The changing demographics of its support base, indicating the growing ratio of black, coloured and Indian support to white support must have also played a role. The IFP desisted from drumming up Zulu nationalist sentiment for fear of alienating its senior coalition partners, the ANC. The UDM's national campaign stressed reconciliation, as the party did not have a racially or ethnically defined support base prior to the election. In the Transkei, however, the campaign took on a more exclusive character as the UDM tried to convince voters that the ANC did not have the interests of rural blacks at heart.

While these (and perhaps other) contextual factors informed party strategists of the content of party messages to be communicated to the electorate, it is the electoral system that generates an incentive structure through rewarding exclusive parties and punishing inclusive parties at the polls. To be sure, factors beside the electoral system contributed to some parties being punished and others rewarded at the polls. It could be argued for instance, that the ability of the DP to pick up votes from the NNP, had more to do with the DP's more coherent policy proposals than its propensity for exclusive campaigning. Perhaps the ANC was able to consolidate its position by trading on the 'Mandela factor' during the campaign or through positive retrospective assessments of its record in government.

Motivations to vote for a certain party no doubt vary from voter to voter. In a divided society however, we can expect most voters to vote for the party that convincingly best represents the interests of their group. As we argued in chapter two, voters' interests are structured along racial/historical lines. It is therefore inevitable that parties will wish to capitalise on this by playing the race card. In a situation where it is necessary to curb this tendency, list PR actually exacerbates it, as explained below.

5.2 The role of list PR in encouraging exclusive campaigning

There are three main ways in which the electoral system generates incentives for parties to be exclusive:

Firstly, as was noted in chapter one, the electoral system does not provide any incentives for parties to campaign inclusively and moderately. This stands in contrast to preferential systems, which putatively force party strategists to attract second

preferences of voters outside their party's traditional support base to gain election. There are also strong arguments that plurality systems offer incentives for parties to build large multi-ethnic coalitions in order to attract undecided and usually moderate voters, although this is difficult to engineer.

Secondly, list PR creates a political system in which societal and ethnic cleavages are mirrored in the legislature. Parties based on ethnic and racial fault-lines are likely to continue to espouse a message that appeals to 'their' constituents.

Thirdly, and most importantly, list PR has a tendency of fragmenting the party system as it offers representation to parties with small bases of support. In such circumstances it is likely that 'ethnic outbidders'—smaller parties with a *raison d'être* to appeal to one ethnic or racial group—will form. The priority of political parties becomes to consolidate existing support, or face the prospect of losing votes to parties who convince voters that they can best represent that group. This is not to say that a party will not attempt to exploit new gaps that arise. However, the willingness of a party to do this will depend on whether it will cost them the votes of their primary support base. In other words, attempts to 'catch-all' will most often result in the loss of a party's core support in a fragmented party system.

The contest between the two traditionally 'white' parties—the DP and the NNP provides a neat illustration of the phenomenon of ethnic outbidding. The NNP attempted to exude a more inclusive message of reconciliation and non-racialism, while the DP was more inclined to whip up racial fears of minority exclusion. In doing so, the DP was able to make serious inroads in to the NNP's support base, effectively 'outbidding' the NNP for the 'white' vote. This assertion is overwhelmingly supported by evidence that shows the gains made by the DP in right wing constituencies that traditionally supported the FF and the NP. Similarly, the demise of the Africanist-oriented PAC and Azapo can be attributed to the ANC's appropriation of this ideological strand in its discourse, particularly under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki. While the DP played the part of the outbidder, the ANC managed to prevent a challenge from potential outbidders by appropriating some of their rhetoric.

Over time, it is likely that parties will realise that, under list PR, they will be able to maximise support through waging an exclusive campaign, as the ANC and the DP did in 1999. It is for this reason that a new electoral system be implemented that encourages parties to be inclusive, whatever contextual factors exist.

For an electoral system to encourage parties to campaign inclusively, parties must be reliant on gaining the support of voters outside their traditional support base, without losing that traditional support, in order to win the election. As Horowitz puts it: “The proliferation of parties must be accompanied by the rewards of moderation that accrue when parties are dependent, in part, on vote transfers from members of groups other than groups they principally represent.”³⁰⁷ The two main contenders to encourage inclusive campaigning, as discussed in chapter one, are the STV and AV electoral systems. It is therefore worth briefly considering the likely effects of these systems on electoral politics in South Africa and whether they can achieve the vote-pooling that is crucial for moderation in divided societies.

5.3 Are South Africans ready for a preferential voting system?

Before examining how STV and AV might work in practice in South Africa, it is necessary to deal with the principal objection to these systems for South Africa— that South African voters are not sophisticated enough to effectively carry out a preferential vote.

In a paper assessing the feasibility of various electoral systems for South Africa, Michael Kremmerich writes: “...it should be noted that the STV system is quite complicated to operate. Hence it is not really appropriate for a country with a high illiteracy rate like South Africa”³⁰⁸ Similarly, the ANC rejected STV prior to Codesa, as it “requires a high degree of sophistication by the voter as numbers have to be used when voting”³⁰⁹

In a survey conducted prior to the 1994 election, respondents were asked to fill out a mock categorical or ‘single X’ ballot. Four percent of African voters indicated that

³⁰⁷ Horowitz, Donald. 1991. *A Democratic South Africa?* p. 177

³⁰⁸ Kremmerich, Michael. 1996. “Electoral Systems: A Global Overview” in Jacques de Villiers and Nico Steytler (eds) *Voting in 1999: Choosing an Electoral System* (Durban: Butterworths)

³⁰⁹ Asmal, “Electoral Systems: A Critical Survey.” p.9

they could not complete the ballot as they could not read or write, while another four percent made mistakes in voting due to illiteracy. In rural areas of the North West Province, spoilage rates of mock ballots reached 28%.³¹⁰ Mock voting on a preferential ballot paper would have undoubtedly led to that spoilage rate being higher.

Preferential voting requires that voters be able to place their favoured candidates in order of preference. The first skill necessary for this is to comprehend the concept of preferences. Reynolds argues that the concept is likely to be understood by voters with little or no formal education, pointing to everyday examples such as soccer league tables and the hierarchical structure of African families.³¹¹ It is difficult to say without empirical evidence however, whether poorly educated voters would understand the concept of preferences. Perhaps we can infer from the example of money that even the most poorly educated voters are able to articulate preferences. Everyone uses money and knows that one hundred rand is worth more than fifty rand, but they would prefer to get paid fifty rand for a day's work than twenty rand. Similarly, voters will be able to say that they prefer the ANC to the PAC, but prefer the PAC to the NNP.

Understanding how to work the ballot itself is more complicated. While illiterate voters should be able to recognise the symbol of the party or photograph of the candidate on a preferential ballot, they will need to count and/or write numbers. Reynolds points out that most voters will be able to count up to twenty, a sufficient figure for voting preferentially.³¹² Writing the numbers could be more problematic as many voters may not be able to write. This can be remedied by making provisions for voters to indicate their preferences by circling numbers next to their candidates in order of preference. If it is found that a significant amount of voters are unable to read these numbers, then perhaps a system of placing multiple 'X's'—five X's next to the most favourite candidate, four X's next to the second favourite and so on—would overcome the problem. While it would be disastrous to implement a voting system

³¹⁰ Booyesen, Susan. 1994. "Democracy, Liberation and the Vote in South Africa's First Democratic Election: The Matla Trust Voter Education Survey." Paper prepared for the History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand, 13-16 July 1994. p. 19

³¹¹ Reynolds, *Voting for a New South Africa* p. 64

³¹² Ibid.

that caused widespread confusion, Reynolds correctly warns against adopting patronising attitudes in assessing the abilities of South African voters:

There is a grave danger in underestimating the South African people. With such a highly politicised electorate, a widespread understanding of STV may well be achievable- if not immediately, then within the foreseeable future when literacy levels increase.³¹³

Evidence from surveys on voter education indicates that first time voters were highly responsive to voter education programmes prior to the 1994 election. As indicated earlier, spoilage rates prior to voter education were high, especially in rural areas with high rates of illiteracy. The comprehensive voter education programmes (approximately 99% of black South Africans received some voting information prior to the election)³¹⁴ appear to have paid off—only 1% of the 20 million votes cast in 1994 were spoiled.³¹⁵ It is likely that a similar voter education drive, coupled with a ballot moderated for the needs of illiterates, would produce a similarly low spoilage rate under STV or AV.

A consideration of voter comprehension aside, comparative evidence suggests that voters may embrace such a system. Paul McKee points out that STV in Ireland has led to high degrees of voter satisfaction – the option to change it has been rejected in two referendums. He cites three reasons for this. Firstly, because there is a minimum of wasted votes, voters are confident that their vote counts. Secondly, the electorate feels associated with an elected representative who is accountable to them. Thirdly, the system allows voters to ‘send messages’ of political relevance, through their ordering of candidates, without their necessarily breaking their party allegiance.³¹⁶

³¹³ Reynolds, *Voting for a New South Africa* p.64

³¹⁴ Møller, Valerie and Theodor Hanf. 1995. *Learning to Vote—Voter Education in South Africa's 1994 Elections*. (Durban: Indicator Press) p.70

³¹⁵ Booysen, Susan. 1994. “Democracy, Liberation and the Vote in South Africa's First Democratic Election: The Matla Trust Voter Education Survey” p. 20

³¹⁶ McKee, Paul. 1983. ‘The Republic of Ireland’ in Bogdanor and Butler (eds.) *Democracy and Elections* p. 184

5.4 Preferential voting systems in practice: Can STV and AV encourage inclusive campaigning in South Africa?

Recommending a new electoral system is beyond the scope of this paper as the intention has been to demonstrate some flaws in the current system. A task team has been set up that is reviewing the current electoral system and it is likely that a constituency-based system, 'topped up' with list PR, will be recommended. The ANC has stated however that it is satisfied with the current system of closed list PR. In the spirit of furthering academic debate, it is nevertheless worthwhile to briefly consider how an AV or STV system would work to counter the inimical effects of the current system explored in this dissertation.

STV is a proportional system, whereas AV is majoritarian. Party proliferation is therefore more likely to occur under STV, while AV will exaggerate the support of the larger parties and under-represent smaller parties. As we have seen, the principle of proportionality has been seen as particularly important in debates over the South African electoral system and has been enshrined in the final constitution. There is, however, a case to be made that the notion of proportionality has been given an unwarranted importance.

Horowitz, a proponent of AV, argues that while "AV does not stand in the way of majoritarianism, it makes majorities responsive to the interests of others as well," since that majority will most likely rely on the second preferences of voters outside their group.³¹⁷ In other words, in divided societies, majority rule is not in itself problematic, but *ascriptive* majority rule, that defines politics in terms of its societal cleavages, is. AV, however, can serve to change the nature of the majority party's support base by allowing for cross-cutting party membership as well as forcing the ruling party to consider the concerns of other groups and thereby including them in the policy process.

The proportionality of STV has the effect of weakening the incentives for politicians to cast a wider net and fish for votes outside the ethnic or race group that forms its core support. This is because a candidate is likely to achieve his or her quota of votes to

³¹⁷ Horowitz. *A Democratic South Africa?* p. 202

gain election without needing to appeal to voters from other groups³¹⁸. In a divided society where ethnic parties predominate, it is also likely that voters will list only the candidates from 'their' party in order of preference, although there is the option to vote across party lines.

Under STV, the propensity for candidates to play the race card is therefore likely to be as strong as under closed-list PR, since it will not often be necessary for a candidate to appeal to other groups. AV, on the other hand, is more likely to induce moderate and inclusive appeals since the quota is fixed at 50% of the votes plus one, making narrow, sectional appeals a doomed strategy for electoral strategists. Candidates rely on the second preferences of votes from other groups to gain election and will address their concerns in their campaign.

A major hindrance to the ability of AV to generate these incentives is that it depends on constituencies being fairly heterogeneous. If a constituency in a divided society is made up almost exclusively of one ascriptive group, then the incentive to make inclusive appeals will be absent. Such a situation is in fact likely to lead to racial outbidding as candidates aim to cement the constituency along racial lines and present themselves as the legitimate representatives of that group in order to gain a majority of the vote in that constituency.

The ability of AV to work, as Horowitz believes it will, therefore depends on the demarcation of multi-ethnic and multi-racial constituencies. In South Africa, this would be particularly difficult to achieve, since apartheid social engineering was very effective in splitting up people geographically according into their race.

In response to this problem, Horowitz has mooted AV in large, multi-member constituencies.³¹⁹ Not only will this allow for the creation of heterogeneous constituencies, it will also, according to Horowitz, increase the proportionality of votes to seats since the district magnitude increases. Evidence from Australia however suggests that AV in multi-member constituencies has a tendency to produce some

³¹⁸ In a five-member constituency, for example, a candidate need only secure just over one-sixth of the vote.

³¹⁹ Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa?* p.195

'strange' election results. In 1925, Labour failed to win any seats in the election to the Federal Senate, despite attaining 45.03% of first preferences. In 1943, Labour won all the seats with 55.09% of first preferences.³²⁰

Putting considerations of proportionality aside, let us consider how such a system could work to encourage inclusive campaigning in heterogeneous constituencies. Let us consider the following hypothetical constituency containing 100 000 voters. The first count results in the following:

ANC ³²¹	35 000 votes
DP	20 000 votes
NNP	17 000 votes
IFP	15 000 votes
UDM	13 000 votes

The inability of any party to win a majority on first preferences necessitates a second count. Prior to the election, the UDM urged voters to vote for the NNP as their second choice as they felt that the ANC was too powerful and that the DP was interested in only serving the interests of whites. The second count, once the UDM's votes have been transferred, may look like this:

ANC	38 000 (3 000 transferred)
NNP	25 000 (8 000 transferred)
DP	21 000 (1 000 transferred)
IFP	16 000 (1000 transferred)

The NNP, because of a pre-election pact with the UDM, move into second place. As there is still no outright majority, the IFP's second preferences are transferred. A pre-election pact with the ANC ensure that the ANC get the lion's share, while the NNP who actively campaigned in Zulu-speaking areas, get a sizeable amount, compared to the exclusive DP:

³²⁰ Wright, Jack F. H. 1986. "Australian Experience with Majority-Preferential and Quota-Preferential Systems" p. 131

³²¹ For simplicity's sake, the candidate is represented by the party acronym.

ANC	48 000 (10 000 transferred)
NNP	30 000 (5 000 transferred)
DP	22 000 (1 000 transferred)

Still, no party has an outright majority. The transfer of the DP's second preferences now becomes crucial. The likelihood of DP voters placing the ANC as a second preference are slim, although there are enough DP voters, disgusted with the NNP's betrayal, who place the ANC before the NNP. The result is as follows:

ANC	54 000 (6 000 transferred)
NNP	46 000 (16 000 transferred)

This hypothetical example, although extremely simplistic and deliberately 'convenient' for our analysis, shows how the NNP is rewarded under AV for its inclusive campaigning, nearly securing election. A problem with the example is that it belies one of the key functions of AV, namely that no party is likely to campaign exclusively in the first place, for risk of losing out on the second and third preferences that may secure that party's election. All parties are likely to compete by aiming to 'outbid' each other on who can be the most inclusive.

The dearth of evidence on preferential systems in divided societies makes it difficult to speculate on how these systems will work and whether the desired effects will actually occur. From the discussion above however, it is clear that STV and AV will be able to promote inter-ethnic accommodation only under certain conditions and even Horowitz concedes, "vote exchange seems hard to arrange".³²² The notion that politicians should be rewarded for making inclusive appeals is however an important one and undoubtedly the key to inter-group accommodation and compromise in divided societies. The current system of list PR in use in South Africa, as has been demonstrated, holds no such promise. In fact, the incentive structure works to encourage parties to mobilise voters by making ethnic and racial appeals. The development of an electoral system that reverses this incentive structure should

³²² Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa?* p.182

therefore be the focus of researchers interested in ameliorating the conflict inherent in the 'divided societies'.

The aim of this dissertation has not been to recommend a new electoral system for South Africa, but to point out some of the problems of the one currently in use. The argument put forward can be summarised as follows.

To promote democratic stability and enhance the prospects of democratic consolidation in South Africa, parties must break out of their narrow, racial support bases. In order to do this, parties must be encouraged to campaign inclusively. One way of encouraging inclusive campaigning is to adopt an electoral system that provides incentives for parties to do this.

Unfortunately, the current closed list PR system in South Africa does not offer any incentives for parties to campaign inclusively. In fact, list PR encourages parties to play the race card as the fragmentation of the party system allows for the ascendance of ethnic or racial outbidders. At the same time, this puts pressure on established parties to 'outbid the outbidders' in order to keep their support base intact. The success of parties that concentrate on making narrow, sectional appeals indicates why parties in the future may be inclined to campaign exclusively.

Diminishing the salience of race as a category of political mobilisation is unlikely to occur through changing the electoral system alone. It is also dependent on the will of politicians to refrain from adopting racially exclusive and inflammatory tactics. This political will is most likely to come about when politicians are rewarded at the polls for inclusive campaigning and punished for drumming up racial fears.

Appendix: Party Meetings

African National Congress

Date	Location/Description	Speakers	Theme/s	Audience	Source
01.03.99	Ngcengane Great Place (EC)	Steve Tshwete	-UDM not a threat (N) -Holomisa misleading people (N)	Black	Daily Dispatch, March 1 1999
08.03.99	Houghton (GAU)	Nelson Mandela ¹	-Whites must join the majority (I) -Opposition parties reactionary (E)	White	The Star, March 9 1999; EP Herald, March 8 1999
09.03.99	Kliplaat (NC)	Winnie Madikizela-Mandela ²	-ANC owe whites nothing -White media is racist (E)	Coloured	Sowetan, March 10 1999
10.03.99	Newspaper Interview	Ebrahim Rasool	-Whites still enjoy privilege (E) -Call for Coloured-African solidarity (E)	All	Sowetan March 11 1999
14.03.99	Ekuvukeni (KZN)	Thabo Mbeki	-End to political violence (N)	Black	Diamond Fields Advertiser, March 15 1999
21.03.99	Uitenhage	Thabo Mbeki	-Honoured struggle heroes (N) -ANC to root out corruption (N) -NNP does not care about "the people" (E) -UDM not trustworthy (N) -ANC will deliver (N) -ANC constrained by Apartheid legacy (N)	Black	Daily Dispatch, March 22 1999; EP Herald, March 22 1999
21.03.99	Nyanga (WC)	Ebrahim Rasool ³	-End the violence between ANC and	Black	Cape Argus,

¹ State President

² ANC Women's League leader

			UDM (N)		March 22 1999
21.03.99	Richmond (KZN)	Sbu Ndebele ⁴ / Terror Lekota ⁵ / Andrew Ragovaloo ⁶	-End the violence between the ANC and the IFP (N)	Black	The Star, March 23 1999
22.03.99	Shobashane (KZN)	Winnie Madikizela-Mandela ⁷	-Whites attempting to perpetuate racism (E) -Strong ANC needed to deliver (N) -ANC impeded by Apartheid legacy (N) -Crime (N)	Black	Sowetan, March 23 1999, EP Herald, March 23 1999
22.03.99	Port Shepstone (KZN)	Winnie Madikizela-Mandela	-Whites to blame for failure to deliver (E)	Black	Sowetan, March 23 1999
28.03.99	Newspaper Interview	Manne Dipico ⁸	-NNP and the DP racist (E)	All	Cape Argus, March 29 1999
28.03.99	Manifesto Launch, Johannesburg (GAU)	Thabo Mbeki ⁹	-ANC will deliver (N) -ANC impeded by the legacy of Apartheid (N) -Crime (N) -Corruption (N) -Unemployment (N) -Health (N)	All	Cape Argus, March 29 1999

³ ANC Provincial Leader Western Cape

⁴ ANC Provincial Leader KwaZulu-Natal

⁵ ANC National Chairperson

⁶ Richmond Mayor

⁷ ANC Women's League leader

⁸ ANC Provincial Leader Northern Cape

			-Transport (N)		
28.03.99	Manifesto Launch, Soweto (GAU)	Thabo Mbeki	-DP, NNP and UDM racist/ apartheid collaborators (E)	Black	Cape Argus, March 29 1999
28.03.99	Rini-Grahamstown (EC)	Terror Lekota	-Whites to blame for failure to deliver (E)	Black	Sowetan, March 29 1999
05.04.99	Soweto (GAU)	Mathole Motshekga ¹⁰	-ANC will continue to deliver (N) -HIV/AIDS awareness (N)	Black	Cape Argus, April 6, 1999
08.04.99	Wits University (GAU)	Jeremy Cronin	-DP racist/reactionary (E)	All	Sowetan, April 9 1999
09.04.99	Wits University (GAU)	Paul Mashatile ¹¹	-ANC to make public sector more representative (E)	All	Daily Dispatch, April 10 1999
10.04.99	Brits (NWP)	Nelson Mandela	-White farmers still racist (E)	Black	Daily Dispatch, April 13 1999
11.04.99	Cofimvaba, Transkei (EC)	Thabo Mbeki	-ANC impeded by the legacy of Apartheid (N) -ANC will continue to deliver (N)	Black	Sowetan, April 12 1999
13.04.99	Election Campaign Launch, Cape Town (WC)	Trevor Manuel ¹²	-ANC will continue to deliver (N) -ANC impeded by the legacy of Apartheid (N) -Crime (N) -Corruption (N)	All	Cape Times, April 14 1999

⁹ Deputy State President/ANC President

¹⁰ Premier Gauteng

¹¹ Gauteng Safety and Security MEC

¹² Finance Minister

15.04.99	Rand Afrikaans University (GAU)	Thabo Mbeki	-ANC will continue to deliver (N) -Poverty (N) -Unemployment (N) -End to violence (N)	All	The Star, April 16 1999
16.04.99	Mqanduli (EC)	Steve Tshwete	-UDM done nothing for people (N) -ANC had delivered and would continue to deliver (N) -NNP and DP too weak to be a threat (N)	Black	Daily Dispatch, April 17 1999
18.04.99	Television Interview	Thabo Mbeki	-ANC will not rewrite constitution (N) -ANC not re-racialising society (I) -ANC not in favour of death penalty (N)	All	Cape Times, April 19 1999; Daily Dispatch, April 19 1999
18.04.99	Guguletu (WC)	Dullah Omar ¹³	-ANC welcomed coloured people (I) -NNP and DP weak (N) -ANC protects women's rights (N)	Black/ Coloured	Cape Argus, April 19 1999.
18.04.99	Pretoria (GAU)	Nelson Mandela	-Whites must join the majority (I)	White	Sowetan, April 19 1999
19.04.99	Lenasia (GAU)	Nelson Mandela	-Indians have a place in ANC (I)	Indian	Sowetan, April 20 1999
21.04.99	Pretoria (GAU)	Winnie Madikizela-Mandela	-ANC will continue to deliver (N) -Opposition parties weak (N)	Black	Cape Times, April 22 1999.
27.04.99	Umtata (EC)	Nelson Mandela	-UDM apartheid collaborators (E)	Black	Cape Argus, April 28 1999
27.04.99	Phokeng (GAU)	Thabo Mbeki	-Opposition parties reactionary (E) -ANC fought for liberation (E)	Black	Cape Argus, April 28 1999

¹³ Justice Minister

			-ANC have delivered/will continue to deliver (N)		
27.04.99	Impala Mine (GAU)	Thabo Mbeki	-ANC fights for Workers Rights (N) -ANC fought for Freedom (E) -Opposition parties reactionary (E)	Black	The Star, April 28 1999
27.04.99	Freedom Park Squatter Camp (GAU)	Thabo Mbeki	-ANC will continue to deliver (N)	Black	The Star, April 28 1999
27.04.99	Guguletu	Winnie Madikizela-Mandela	-No freedom without poverty alleviation (N) -DP and NNP weak (N) -White media racist (E) -ANC impeded by legacy of Apartheid (N) -Apartheid criminals still free (E)	Black	Daily Dispatch, April 28 1999
01.05.99	Queenstown	Steve Tshwete	-UDM did not know oppression of black people (E) -NNP and DP reactionary (E) -ANC will deal with corruption (N)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 3 1999
01.05.99	Workers rally in Mitchells Plein (WC)	Thabo Mbeki	-ANC fights for Workers Rights (N) -ANC impeded by the legacy of Apartheid (N) -ANC will implement skills training for Indian, coloured and black workers (E) -NNP and DP aim to protect white privilege (E)	Black/Coloured	Cape Times, May 3 1999.
02.05.99	Mitchells Plein (WC)	Thabo Mbeki/ Ebrahim Rasool	-NNP racist/reactionary (E)	Coloured	Sowetan, May 3 1999

07.05.99	Umbumbulu (KZN)	Thabo Mbeki	-IFP have not delivered in KZN (N)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 8 1999
10.05.99	ANC parade in Johannesburg (GAU)	Nelson Mandela	-Whites played a role in reconciliation (I)	All	Sowetan, May 11 1999
10.05.99	KZN	S'bu Ndebele	-NNP and DP racist (E)	All	Sowetan, May 11 1999
11.05.99	Newspaper Interview	Cameron Dugmore	-NNP racist (E) -Coloured and African solidarity (E)	All	Sowetan, May 11 1999
12.05.99	Delft Civic Centre (WC)	Ebrahim Rasool/ Dullah Omar/ Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi ¹⁴ / Frene Ginwala ¹⁵	-Nats 'used' coloureds to get votes (E) -Crime (N) -Economy (N) -Education (N) -Housing (N) -Environment (N) -Delivery of NNP-DP coalition skewed in favour of whites (E)	Coloured	Cape Times, May 13 1999
13.05.99	Clanwilliam (WC)	Nelson Mandela	-Whites must join the majority (I) -ANC welcomed coloured people (I) -NNP and DP racist/reactionary (E)	Coloured/White	Cape Argus, May 13 1999
14.05.99	University of Western Cape (WC)	Thabo Mbeki	-Opposition parties weak (N)	All	Daily Dispatch, May 15 1999
15.05.99	Tembisa (GAU)	Nelson Mandela	-Black opposition parties Apartheid collaborators (E) -Whites should not shun ANC (N) -ANC responsible for dismantling	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 17 1999

¹⁴ Welfare Minister

¹⁵ Speaker in the National Assembly

			Apartheid (E)		
18.05.99	Investec seminar- Johannesburg (GAU)	Thabo Mbeki	-ANC will not rewrite constitution (N) -ANC committed to neo-liberal macro-economic policies (N) -ANC committed to rooting out corruption (N)	All	The Star, May 19 1999.
18.05.99	Platfontein (NC)	Nelson Mandela	-NNP and DP 'Mickey Mouse' parties (N) -Whites rejected the "hand of friendship" extended by ANC (E)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 19 1999
19.05.99	Nqamakwe (EC)	Thabo Mbeki	-ANC have delivered/will continue to deliver (N) -ANC alone fought for Freedom (E) -IFP and UDM Apartheid collaborators (E)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 20 1999
20.05.99	Peddie (EC)	Thabo Mbeki	-ANC government and chiefs should work close together (N)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 21 1999
20.05.99	Interview on Radio Matie- Stellenbosch University (WC)	Ebrahim Rasool	-Other parties make narrow appeals (I) -Afrikaans as a medium of instruction should not be used to exclude people ¹⁶ (N)	White/Coloured	Cape Argus, May 21 1999.
21.05.99	Qawukeni (EC)	Nelson Mandela	-UDM apartheid collaborators (E)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 22 1999
23.05.99	Idutywa (EC)	Nelson Mandela	-UDM apartheid collaborators (E)	Black	Sowetan, May 24 1999

N=8 E=6 I=1 TOT=15

23.05.99	Bolotwa (EC)	Nelson Mandela	-ANC wants two-thirds majority (N)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 24 1999
24.05.99	Mitchells Plein (WC)	Terror Lekota	-NNP have interests of whites at heart (E)	Coloured	Cape Times, May 24 1999
24.05.99	Sterkspruit (??)	Kader Asmal ¹⁷	-ANC have delivered/will continue to deliver (N)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 25 1999
24.05.99	Phuthaditjhaba (FS)	Nelson Mandela	-ANC the only party that can promote reconciliation and nation-building (I)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 25 1999
25.05.99	Claremont (WC)	Ebrahim Rasool	-NNP and DP racist/reactionary (E) -Whites must join the majority (I)	White	Cape Argus, May 26 1999
25.05.99	Vereeniging Civic Centre (GAU)	Nelson Mandela	-Whites must join the majority (I)	White	Cape Times, May 26 1999
25.05.99	Sebokeng (GAU)	Nelson Mandela	-ANC have delivered/will continue to deliver (N) -ANC fighting unemployment (N)	Black	Cape Times, May 26 1999
26.05.99	Riverlea (GAU)	Nelson Mandela	-NNP and DP racist/reactionary (E) -ANC welcomed coloured people (I)	Coloured	The Star, May 27 1999.
26.05.99	Carletonville (GAU)	Nelson Mandela	-UDM Apartheid collaborators (E)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 27 1999
27.05.99	Nyameko High School, East London (EC)	Makenkhesi Stofile	-UDM a weak party (N) -ANC need "three-thirds" majority (N)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 29 1999
29.05.99	Mdantsane (EC)	Jacob Zuma	-ANC will not change Constitution (N) -ANC will root out corruption (N) -ANC fought for Freedom (E) -People should not vote UDM (N)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 31 1999

¹⁷ Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry

29.05.99	KwaZidenge (EC)	Mluleki George ¹⁸	-ANC to continue transformation (N) -UDM and IFP more interested in arms than elections (N) -Holomisa a white puppet (E)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 31 1999
29.05.99	Elliotdale (EC)	Steve Tshwete	-UDM apartheid collaborators (E) -DP represented a white elite (E) -Nothing new about the new NP (E) -PAC weak (N)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 31 1999

Democratic Party

Date	Location/Description	Speakers	Theme/s	Audience	Source
01.03.99	Chatsworth (KZN)	Tony Leon ¹⁹	-ANC re-racialising society and excluding minorities (E) -ANC authoritarian (E)	Indian	Diamond Fields Advertiser, March 2 1999
08.03.99	Rand Afrikaans University (GAU)	Tony Leon	-ANC re-racialising society and excluding minorities (E) -ANC a black party (E)	White	The Star, March 10 1999.
10.03.99	University of Natal-Durban (KZN)	Tony Leon	-ANC re-racialising society and excluding minorities (E)	All	The Sowetan, March 12 1999
12.03.99	SAIRR ²⁰ Breakfast (GAU)	Tony Leon	-Democratic breakdown in Africa (E) -DP equals strong opposition (N) -ANC re-racialising society (E) -Crime (N)	All	The Sunday Independent, March 13 1999
16.03.99	Newspaper Interview (CT)	Hennie Bester ²¹	-Anti-ANC alliance (E) -ANC government incompetent (N)	All	Cape Argus, March 16 1999

¹⁸ ANC Regional Chairman

¹⁹ Leader of the DP

²⁰ South African Institute of Race Relations

20.03.99	Krugersdorp (GAU)	Tony Leon	-DP equals strong opposition (N) -Anti-ANC alliance (E) -Danger of ANC two-thirds majority (E)	White	Cape Argus, March 20 1999
28.03.99	Durban (KZN)	Tony Leon/ Mike Ellis ²²	-ANC re-racialising society and excluding minorities (E) -DP equals strong opposition (N) -Crime (N) -Unemployment (N)	All	Cape Argus, March 29 1999
30.03.99	Port Elizabeth (EC)	Tony Leon	-Anti-ANC alliance (E) -Danger of ANC two-thirds majority (E) -ANC government corrupt (N)	White	Daily Dispatch, March 31 1999
31.03.99	Newspaper Interview	Hennie Bester	-ANC authoritarian (E) -Anti-ANC alliance (E)	All	Cape Argus, March 31 1999
06.04.99	Soweto (GAU)	Tony Leon	- ANC health policies are misdirected and lack focus (N)	Black	Daily Dispatch, April 6 1999
07.04.99	Tongaat (KZN)	Tony Leon	-ANC Re-racialising SA society (E)	Indian	Daily Dispatch, April 8 1999
08.04.99	Mtubatuba	Tony Leon	-Crime (N) -Corruption (N)	Don't Know	Daily Dispatch, April 9 1999

²¹ Western Cape leader of the DP

²² DP Federal Chairman

12.04.99	Rosebank (GAU)	Tony Leon/ Joe Seremane ²³ / Dan Maluleke ²⁴ / Ken Andrew ²⁵	-ANC re-racialising society and excluding minorities (E) -DP equals strong opposition (N) -Unemployment (N) -Economy (N) -Land reform (I) -Crime (N) -Streamlined state (N)	White	Cape Times, April 12 1999.
13.04.99	Bellville (CT)	Tony Leon/ Hennie Bester	-ANC re-racialising society and excluding minorities (E) -Anti-ANC alliance (E)	White/Coloured	Cape Times, April 14 1999.
13.04.99	Stellenbosch University (WC)	Tony Leon	-Accused ANC's Winnie Madikizela-Mandela of human rights violations (E)	White	Daily Dispatch, April 14 1999
15.04.99	Bloubergstrand (WC)	Tony Leon	-ANC not serious about privatisation (N)	White	The Star, April 16 1999
15.04.99	Oudsthoorn (WC)	Tony Leon	-ANC make racist statements (E)	White	Daily Dispatch, April 16 1999
15.04.99	Uitenhage (EC)	Bobby Stevenson ²⁶	-Fire-arms to be brought under control (N)	White	EP Herald, March 16 1999
19.04.99	Johannesburg (GAU)	Hennie Bester	-Anti-ANC alliance (E)	All	Cape Argus, April 19 1999
21.04.99	Tzaneen (NP)	Tony Leon	-ANC forgetting about 'the people' (I) -Unemployment (N)	Black	Cape Times and The Star, April 21 1999.

²³ DP candidate

²⁴ DP candidate

²⁵ DP MP

²⁶ DP Regional Director

			-Chiefs' salaries should be renegotiated (I)		
22.04.99	University of Pretoria (GAU)	Tony Leon	-Unemployment (N) -Crime (N) -Young people forced into 'exile' (N)	All	Daily Dispatch, April 23 1999
27.04.99	Booyesen's Park (EC)	Tony Leon	-ANC re-racialising society and excluding minorities (E) -Crime (N) -Unemployment (N) -Education (N)	Coloured	E P Herald, March 28 1999
28.04.99	Graff Reinet (EC)	Tony Leon	-Failure of ANC to deliver (N)	White	Daily Dispatch, April 29 1999
28.04.99	Middelburg (EC)	Tony Leon	-Unemployment (N) -Education (N) -Crime (farm murders) (E)	White	Daily Dispatch, April 29 1999
29.04.99	Aliwal North	Tony Leon	-Anti-ANC alliance (E) -ANC corrupt (N) - ANC re-racialising society and excluding minorities (E)	White	Daily Dispatch, April 30 1999
29.04.99	Television Interview	Tony Leon	-Anti-ANC alliance (E)	All	Cape Argus, April 30 1999.
30.04.99	Newspaper Interview	Hennie Bester	-Anti-ANC alliance (E)	All	Cape Argus, April 30 1999.
30.04.99	Newspaper Interview	Tony Leon	-Danger of ANC two-thirds majority (E) -ANC authoritarian (E)	All	Cape Argus, May 4 1999
30.04.99	Uitenhage	Tony Leon	-ANC re-racialising society and	Don't know	EP Herald, May 1

			excluding minorities (E) -Unemployment (N) -Stronger opposition needed (N)		1999
04.05.99	Durban	Tony Leon	-ANC use race card to trump reason (E) -ANC corrupt (N)	All	Daily Dispatch, May 5 1999
08.05.99	Durban	Tony Leon	-Fight Back campaign not reactionary/racist (I) -ANC re-racialising country and excluding minorities (E) -ANC authoritarian (E)	All	Daily Dispatch, May 10 1999
10.05.99	Ventersdorp (GAU)	Tony Leon	-Crime (N) -Affirmative Action (E) -DP equals strong opposition (N) -ANC authoritarian (E)	White/Black	Cape Argus, May 11 1999
11.05.99	Kroonstad (GAU?)	Tony Leon	-Danger of ANC two-thirds majority (E)	White	Daily Dispatch, May 12 1999
13.05.99	Msinga (KZN)	Graham McIntosh ²⁷	-Whites important for country (E) -Crime (N) -ANC re-racialising society and excluding minorities (E)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 14 1999
13.05.99	Barkley East (EC)	Eddie Trent ²⁸	-Criminalize corrupt officials (N)	All	EP Herald, May 14 1999
14.05.99	Newspaper Interview	Tony Leon	-ANC re-racialising society and excluding minorities (E)	All	Daily Dispatch, May 12 1999
16.05.99	Newspaper Interview	Felicity Fiellies ²⁹	-ANC re-racialising society and excluding minorities (E)	All	Cape Argus, May 17 1999

²⁷ DP candidate for KZN

²⁸ Provincial Leader in Eastern Cape

E= 46 N=38 I=5

19.05.99	Port Alfred (EC)	Errol Moorcroft	-Danger of ANC two-thirds majority (E)	White	EP Herald, May 20 1999
25.09.99	Johannesburg (GAU)	Tony Leon	-Danger of ANC two-thirds majority (E)	All	Daily Dispatch, May 26 1999
26.05.99	King Williamstown	Eddie Trent	-Unemployment (N) -Crime (N) -Corruption (N) -Danger of ANC two-thirds majority (E)	All	Daily Dispatch, May 26 1999
26.05.99	Grahamstown	Eddie Trent/ Donald Lee	-UDM a Xhosa-ethnic Transkei Party (E) -ANC re-racialising society (E)	Coloured	Daily Dispatch, May 27 1999
28.05.99	Ngqeleni (EC)	Tony Leon	-Rural conditions a concern to DP (I) -Traditional authority important to DP (I)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 29 1999
29.05.99	East London (EC)	Bobby Stevenson	-DP will fight for unemployed (N) -ANC only interested in elite (N)	All	Daily Dispatch, May 31 1999
30.05.99	Standard Bank Arena (GAU)	Tony Leon	-Anti-ANC Alliance (E)	All	Daily Dispatch, May 31 1999
Not available	Pietermaritzburg (KZN)	Tony Leon	-Danger of ANC two-thirds majority (E)	White	The Star, May 18 1999

²⁹ DP candidate for Northern Cape Legislature

New National Party

Date	Location/Description	Speakers	Theme/s	Audience	Source
05.03.99	Uitenhage (NC)	Marthinus van Schalkwyk	-Reinstate death penalty (N) -Anti-ANC alliance (E) -ANC only represents blacks (E) -NNP prepared to govern on behalf of whole nation (I)	Whites	EP Herald, March 6 1999
15.03.99	De Aar (NC)	Marthinus van Schalkwyk	-ANC failed to deliver (N) -NNP government in Western Cape a success (N) -Need for co-operation among all parties (I) -ANC authoritarian (E)	Don't Know	Diamond Fields Advertiser, March 16 1999
31.03.99	Lamberts Bay (WC)	Peter Marais	-NNP willing to co-operate with all other parties (I) -Eradicate coloured poverty (I)	Coloured	Cape Times, April 1 1999
09.04.99	Bisho (EC)	Manie Schoeman ³⁰	-ANC government inept (N)	Black	EP Herald, April 10 1999
10.04.99	East Lonodn (EC)	Manie Schoeman	-ANC government has failed to deliver (N)	Black	Daily Dispatch, April 12 1999
12.04.99	Warrenvale (NC)	Marthinus van Schalkwyk	-ANC failed to deliver (N) -Reinstate death penalty (N) -DP exclusive party of wealthy whites (I)	Coloured/ White	Diamond Fields Advertiser, April 13 1999
14.04.99	Johannesburg (GAU)	Marthinus van Schalkwyk	-Whites must join hands with countrymen (I)	White	Daily Dispatch, April 14 1999
17.04.99	Johannesburg (GAU)	Marthinus van	-Whites must join hands with	White	Daily Dispatch,

³⁰ Eastern Cape NNP provincial leader

		Schalkwyk	countrymen (I) -DP the new right-wing (I)		April 17 1999
24.04.99	George (WC)	Marthinus van Schalkwyk	-NNP record unsurpassed in Western Cape (N) -ANC not delivered (N)	White	EP Herald, April 24 1999
27.04.99	Sharpeville (GAU)	Marthinus van Schalkwyk	-Whites must join hands with countrymen (I)	Black/White	Mail and Guardian, April 30-May 6 1999
01.05.99	Cape Flats (WC)	Marthinus van Schalkwyk/Gerald Morkel ³¹	-ANC corrupt (N) -Unemployment (N)	Coloured	Cape Times, May 3 1999
02.05.99	Kimberley (NC)	Pete Saaiman	-Education (N) -Proposed a House of Traditional Leaders in Western Cape (I) -NNP has more black supporters than PAC (I)	Don't Know	Diamond Fields Advertiser, May 3 1999
06.05.99	Stellenbosch University (GAU)	Marthinus van Schalkwyk	-NNP willing to co-operate with all other parties (I) -DP appeal to racial fears (I) -NNP inclusive party (I)	All	Cape Times, May 6 1999
10.05.99	Qamata (EC)	Marthinus van Schalkwyk	-ANC failed to deliver (N) -ANC corrupt (N) -NNP experienced in governance (N) -NNP party for all races (I)	Black	The Star, May 11 1999; EP Herald, May 11 1999
11.05.99	Port Elizabeth (EC)	Marthinus van Schalkwyk	-Danger of ANC two-thirds majority (E)	All	Daily Dispatch, May 12 1999
11.05.99	Humansdorp (EC)	Marthinus van	-Re-instate death penalty (N)	Don't	EP Herald, May

³¹ Premier Western Cape

		Schalkwyk	-DP a party of right wing and rich (I)	Know	12 1999
14.05.99	Bethlehem (??)	Marthinus van Schalkwyk	-Whites must join hands with countrymen (I) -DP appeal to racial fears (I)	White	The Star, April 15 1999
14.05.99	Upington (NC)	Marthinus van Schalkwyk	-NNP willing to co-operate with all other parties (I) -DP appeal to racial fears (I)	White	Cape Argus, May 15 1999
17.05.99	Bloemfontein (FS)	Marthinus van Schalkwyk	-Education (N) -Racial unity important for SA (I)	All	Daily Dispatch, May 18 1999
19.05.99	Tzaneen (NP)	Marthinus van Schalkwyk	-Re-instate death penalty (N)	Don't Know	EP Herald, May 20 1999
20.05.99	East London (EC)	Manie Schoeman	-Danger of ANC two-thirds majority (E) -Crime (N) -Corruption (N)	All	Daily Dispatch, May 21 1999
24.05.99	Bishop Lavis (WC)	Marthinus van Schalkwyk	-ANC failed to deliver (N) -Unemployment (N) -Crime (N) -NNP inclusive party (I) -ANC 'using' coloureds to get votes (I)	Coloured	Cape Times, May 25 1999
25.05.99	Durban Christian Centre (KZN)	Marthinus van Schalkwyk	-ANC promote racial divisions by not appealing to whites (I) -Other opposition parties focusing on small, racially defined constituencies. (I)	All	Daily Dispatch, May 26 1999
26.05.99	Pretoria City Hall	Marthinus van	-DP appeal to racial fears (I)	White	Daily Dispatch,

	(GAU)	Schalkwyk	-NNP appealed to all race groups (I)		May 27 1999
26.05.99	Newspaper Interview	Pete Saaiman ³²	-NNP inclusive party (I) -NNP willing to co-operate with all other parties (I)	All	Mail and Guardian, May 28- June 3 1999
29.05.99	Hope Town (NC)	Pete Saaiman	-ANC full of empty promises (N) -NNP most representative party, serving people of all sexes, religion and races. (I)	Don't know	Diamond Fields Advertiser, May 31 1999
10.05.99	KwaZulu-Natal	Danie Schutte	-Danger of ANC two-thirds majority (E)	All	The Sowetan, May 11 1999

Inkatha Freedom Party

Date	Location/Description	Speakers	Theme/s	Audience	Source
14.03.99	Johannesburg (GAU)	Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-End to political violence (N) -ANC failed to deliver (N) -Greater provincial autonomy (N) -Lack of morality in SA society (N)	Don't Know	Diamond Fields Advertiser, March 15 1999
14.03.99	Soweto (GAU)	Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-Unemployment (N) -IFP can shape policy in GNU ³³ (I)	Black	EP Herald, March 15 1999
18.03.99	Umlazi Stadium (KZN)	Mangosuthu Buthelezi/ Lionel Mtshali ³⁴	-Federalism (N) -Free-market enterprise (N) -Pluralism (N) -Effective government (N)	Black	Natal Mercury, March 19 1999

³² NNP leader in Northern Cape

³³ Government of National Unity

³⁴ Premier KZN

10.04.99	Kimberley (NC)	Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-Decentralisation of power to allow for cultural diversity (N)	All	The Star, April 12 1999
11.04.99	Florianville Civic Centre (NC)	Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-IFP committed to Northern Cape (I) -ANC economic policy not liberal enough (N) -Crime (N) -Corruption (N) -IFP successful in limiting ANC power (N)	Coloured	Diamond Fields Advertiser, April 12 1999
12.04.99	Durban (KZN)	Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-IFP to fight crime (N)	All	Daily Dispatch, April 13 1999
15.04.99	Durban (KZN)	Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-Economy worsened in five years (N) -A strong IFP will help government deliver (N)	All	Daily Dispatch, April 17 1999
18.04.99	Carletonville (NWP)	Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-IFP will bring about a 'revolution of goodwill' (N) -ANC have not delivered (N) -Corruption (N) -Crime (N) -Unemployment (N) -Education (N) -Health (N) -Ineffective justice system (N)	Black	Daily Dispatch, April 19 1999; EP Herald April 19 1999
25.04.99	Umtata (EC)	Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-IFP defended the rights of traditional leaders (N)	Black	Daily Dispatch, April 26 1999

27.04.99	KwaZulu-Natal	Goodwill Zwelithini ³⁵ / Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-End to violence (I) -Unity of all the people is vital (I) -IFP monarchy should be recognised (E)	Black	The Star, April 28 1999; Cape Times, April 28 1999
29.04.99	Pinetown (KZN)	Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-ANC held to ransom by Cosatu (N)	All	Daily Dispatch, April 30
03.05.99	Television Interview	Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-Good relationship between ANC/IFP leadership (I) -Federalism would strengthen democracy (N)	All	Daily Dispatch, May 3 1999
06.05.99	Reiger Park (GAU)	Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-IFP will bring about a 'revolution of goodwill' (N)	Coloured	Mail and Guardian, May 7-13 1999
09.05.99	Alexandra (GAU)	Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-IFP can bridge wealth divide (N) -New South Africa must benefit all (I)	Black	The Star, May 10 1999
09.05.99	Hlabisa Stadium (KZN)	Lionel Mtshali	-ANC failed to deliver (N)	Black	EP Herald, May 10 1999
15.05.99	Sebokeng (GAU)	Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-Gauteng to be run by Cosatu (N)	All	Daily Dispatch, May 17 1999
16.05.99	Mitchells Plein (WC)	Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-IFP will bring about a 'revolution of goodwill' (N)	Coloured	Cape Argus, May 17

³⁵ Zulu Monarch

			-Corruption (N) -Poor Governance (N) -Crime (N) -Tourism (N) -Affirmative Action to meet needs of each province (I)		1999; Cape Times, May 17 1999
18.05.99	Durban (KZN)	Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-Provincial Government of National Unity good for KZN (I)	All	Daily Dispatch, May 19 1999
19.05.99	Ulundi (KZN)	Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-Let ANC campaign in peace (I)	Black	The Star, May 20 1999
23.05.99	Vodaworld Auditorium (GAU)	Sibongile Nkomo ³⁶	-HIV (N) -Child Abuse (N) -Femicide (N)	All	The Star, May 24 1999
29.05.99	Queenstown (EC)	Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-ANC struggle had created legacy of lawlessness (N) -IFP favoured passive resistance and negotiation (I) -IFP had good relationship with the people of the Eastern Cape (I)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 31 1999
Not available	Islamic Cultural Centre, Umzinto (KZN)	Mangosuthu Buthelezi	-IFP believe in every cultural groups right to self-expression (I)	Indian	Sunday Independent, May 16 1999

³⁶ IFP Premier designate for Gauteng

United Democratic Movement

Date	Location/Description	Speakers	Theme/s	Audience	Source
04.03.99	Port Elizabeth (EC)	Chief Dumisani Gwadiso ³⁷	-UDM can win Eastern Cape (N) -ANC provincial administration inept (N)	All	EP Herald, March 5 1999
10.03.99	Nyanga (WC)	Bantu Holomisa ³⁸	-End violence between ANC and UDM (N) -ANC corrupt (N) -ANC running IEC ³⁹ (N)	Black	Diamond Fields Advertiser, March 11 1999
18.03.99	Umtata (EC)	Billy Nel ⁴⁰	-UDM can change conservative outlook of whites (I) -NNP still trapped in Apartheid past (I) -UDM only party to speak for all races (I)	All	EP Herald, March 19 1999
22.03.99	Germiston (GAU)	Bantu Holomisa	-ANC government failed to deliver (N) -Crime (N) -Unemployment (N) -Corruption (N) -Referendum on death penalty (N) -Replace GEAR (N) -Danger of one-party state (E)	White	The Star, March 23 1999
29.03.99	Newspaper Interview	Roelf Meyer ⁴¹	-UDM most multi-racial party (I)	All	The Star, March 30 1999

³⁷ Eastern Cape Leader UDM

³⁸ Leader UDM

³⁹ Independent Electoral Commission

⁴⁰ UDM's East London and King William's Town organiser

⁴¹ Deputy Leader UDM

29.03.99	Grahamstown (EC)	Bantu Holomisa	-Create a civil order ministry to fight crime (N) -Social development programme (N) -ANC government failed to deliver (N)	Coloured	Daily Dispatch, March 30 1999
01.04.99	Umtata (EC)	Bantu Holomisa	-Cosatu corrupt (N)	Black	Daily Dispatch, April 2 1999
03.04.99	Durban (KZN)	Roelf Meyer	-UDM a home for all races (I)	All	Natal Mercury, April 5 1999
27.04.99	Umtata (EC)	Bantu Holomisa	-ANC government failed to deliver (N) -Holomisa fought for liberation (E)	Black	The Star, April 27 1999
28.04.99	Radio Phone-in	Johan Steenkamp ⁴²	-UDM most multi-racial party (I)	All	
29.04.99	University of Port Elizabeth (EC)	Roelf Meyer	-UDM most effective opposition to ANC (N)	All	Daily Dispatch, April 30 1999
02.05.99	Galeshewe (NC)	Bantu Holomisa	-Not sorry for disruption of ANC freedom day rally (N) -ANC abusing powers (N) -ANC failed to deliver (N)	Black	Diamond Fields Advertiser, May 3 1999
07.05.99	Queenstown (EC)	Billy Nel Chief Dumisani Gwadiso ⁴³	-UDM tough on crime (N) -Time for political rewards over (N)	All	Daily Dispatch, May 10

⁴² Party Spokesperson

					1999
08.05.99	East London (EC)	Roelf Meyer	-UDM most effective opposition to ANC (N)	All	Daily Dispatch, May 10 1999
12.05.99	University of the Western Cape (WC)	Roelf Meyer	-Crime (N) -Job creation (N) -Referendum on death penalty (N) -Flexible labour legislation (N)	All	Daily Dispatch, May 13 1999
12.05.99	University of Port Elizabeth (EC)	Annelize van Wyk ⁴⁴	-UDM represents all races (I)	Don't Know	EP Herald, May 13 1999
23.05.99	Germiston (GAU)	Bantu Holomisa	-Create a civil order ministry to fight crime (N) -Corruption (N) -UDM most effective opposition to ANC (N) -DP party for wealthy whites (E)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 24 1999
24.05.99	Dadamba (EC)	Bantu Holomisa	-ANC to retrench workers (N) -ANC government failed to deliver (N)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 25 1999
26.05.99	Tsolo (EC)	Bantu Holomis	-Election a battle between ANC and UDM (N) -Mbeki a 'Tsotsi' who did not know life in rural areas (E) -ANC corrupt (N)	Black	Daily Dispatch, May 27 1999
29.05.99	Transkei (EC)	Bantu Holomisa	-Holomisa had played a part in the struggle	Black	Daily

⁴³ Provincial Organiser Eastern Cape

⁴⁴ UDM General Secretary

			(E) -ANC failed to deliver (N)		Dispatch, May 31 1999
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