

VOLUME 2

STATE CONTROL AND STREET GANGS IN CAPE TOWN

Towards an understanding of social and spatial development

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degree in Economic History.

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STATE INSTITUTIONS AND STREET-CORNER KIDS

A central point that can be distilled from the discussion so far is this: that the development of capitalism in the city and its hinterland has been the acid in which the working class family has dissolved. Urban migration, the destruction of settled urban areas, mechanisation, unemployment and poverty have gradually unpicked the fabric of extended families and of working class culture. And as communities dissolved, the institutions of the state have moved to replace family socialisation and control with bureaucratic regulation. The school, the clinic, the social work agency, the police, the children's home, the reformatory and even perhaps the prison are in a way bureaucratic extensions of family regulation. But they are different. Of necessity they are less flexible than the family, more impersonal and more punitive. People are held to sets of rules and regulations which often pass their understanding. And in a country such as South Africa, with its emphasis on racial difference and on an unequal division of wealth, the main focus of the state's social apparatus becomes that of control.

It is understandable, therefore, that the major responses of many working class youths to these institutions has been anger and despair. For children from poorer families, or from families with a high level of internal dislocation or strife, state institutions set goals and standards which are often impossible to meet. This has tended to brutalise the self-esteem and integrity of youths who are not 'making it'. Very often they are, very impersonally, rejected from the mainstream. And in a tough environment it often takes only one harsh contact with bureaucracy to spark off a corresponding and face-saving rejection from

a youth with nothing to inherit but chronic poverty. A study done among black Americans after the riots in Watt, Los Angeles, during the mid-1960s makes the point that:

early learning difficulty in mastering the basic intellectual skills which the schools and thus the broader society demands, leads to defeat and failure, a developing negative self-image, rebellion against the increasingly defeating school experiences, a search for status outside the school together with an active resentment against the society which the school represents. Quite early the child finds status and protection in the street and the gang which requires none of the skills which are needed in the school but makes heavy use of the kinds of survival skills which he learnt in his early home and street experiences.¹

Usually it is in education that this clash of values comes, because it is here that the ideas of the ruling class first penetrate ghetto consciousness in a systematic way. It is in the classroom that the poor learn that the survival behaviour which the white rulers consider destructive is the one great protection kids have against a system in which failure is almost assured. It is this point at which many begin to live out a terrible contradiction: striving for a 'respectable' standard of living through commodity consumption while living in an income bracket where this standard and these commodities are simply not obtainable. A number solve the contradiction by hard work or luck and scramble up into respectability: a shiny car, a TV set and home-ownership in a good suburb. But for many this is a fading dream, which has only one chance of coming true - through acts defined as crime.

It is significant that a study of more than 500 youths under the age of 18 in Cape Town during 1980, showed that 73 per cent were charged with various forms of theft (what one might call a crime of pverty) and 16 per cent with robbery. Only 11 per cent were charged with assault or rape.² The search by these youths for high profile commodities and a higher standard of living generally leads to confrontation with the police, a court case, corporal punishment and perhaps even a reformatory or prison. In this way the initial rejection is simply reinforced, hardening into the sharp 'boer/bandiet' dichotomy of the prison gangs.³

What we must consider here is the effects that State institutions have on working class kids with no work to do and nowhere to go. Often the best way to do this is through the experiences of the youths themselves:

SCHOOLS: SIMON'S STORY

School was just a way of passing time. Other pupils felt this too. When I was younger I was in a class where the teacher would almost tear your ear off or put you across her lap and beat you with the heel of her shoe. It was very frightening. I often dreamed about growing up quickly and joining my big brother working as a messenger or a cleaner and buying myself the latest fashions that the boys in the street wear.

We were ranked according to the marks we scored in exams. The pupil with the highest marks sat under the teacher's nose and the poor marks people sat right at the back. We were constantly reminded about our clothes because they were different colours and they should have been a uniform. This reminding happened even in the middle of a lesson! It was very embarrassing. Then you had to cover your books with brown paper and plastic. No 'vetterige merke' (fat marks) were allowed. But how can you avoid getting stains on books when the only table where you can do your homework is where your mother cooks? And you can't sit up late with your books because candles are expensive. You never see any other books - except perhaps if you go with your parents to their bosses house.

At the three schools I attended there was always at least one teacher feared by everyone and who would beat you with his fist or anything. When I was in Standard one we heard the teacher next year would be Mr. Z, the most hated teacher at the school. Because of this the next year five pupils didn't come back to school - among them were the brightest students in the class. I remember one person, Joseph Martin, he was later the leader of the most fearful gang in Athlone. He has been in and out of prison often. He was a bright student.

Fridays were the favourite days for staying out of school. Firstly it is turn-out day (house cleaning day) then perhaps you had to accompany your mom to the old man's place of work so she can get some money before he spends it on booze. Usually we were sent in to get it. Then on Mondays the folks usually stayed at home after a very pissed (drunken) weekend. You aren't allowed to stay out of school, so on Monday you must have a letter from your parents. My bigger sister would write it because my parents couldn't read or write.

Then there was the problem of hidings. We would get them at home. But mothers didn't like to see their kids hit by somebody else at school. We were reluctant to tell my mom because we knew what would happen. Mom would turn up at school in her housecoat ready to fight. I remember once she arrived at school because my little brother's abdomen was covered in blue marks - she came with a lepel (spoon) in her hand! But then after this the teacher would victimise you and you might end up failing your exams. You've got to spend a whole year with that teacher, and maybe more.

Schools for working people in Cape Town date back to the First decade of colonization.

In his diary on April 17 1658 van Riebeeck wrote:

Began holding school for young slaves... To stimulate the slaves attention while at school, and to induce them to learn the Christian prayers, they were promised each a glass of brandy and two inches of tobacco when they finish their task.⁴

By 1676 the Church Council in the Cape was pressing for racially segregated schooling.⁵ This was not, however, legally enforced until 1911, when the Appellate Division of the Union Supreme Court ruled that 'it was part of the policy of the Cape School Board Act of 1905 to promote the establishment of separate public schools' for 'white and non-white children'.⁶

In 1962 moves were begun to transfer control of coloured education from the provinces to the central State. Then in 1964 the Coloured Persons' Education Act brought this tuition under the Department of Coloured Affairs. This was deeply resented by the coloured community and was seen as a move towards racist and inferior education.⁷ However despite centralisation of education control, schooling for the majority of children defined as coloured was not made compulsory until the late 1970s - and even then it was not always strictly enforced.⁸

One of the main problems of compulsory education was the lack of facilities. In 1979 the number of pupils in the Cape affected by 'double-session' schooling (a method of literally doubling the number of pupils using a school building) was 56,944.⁹ In March 1980 the Secretary of Coloured Affairs admitted a backlog of 10,680 classrooms for coloured children.¹⁰


Added to the overcrowding in schools is the 'put-down' of a basically alien school curriculum. Both the teachers and the educational material expect working class pupils to adopt paths to success and forms of behaviour with which they are largely unfamiliar and which have little association with their daily lives.

Most of the stories coloured children are required to read and the examples given in books are about another society - bourgeois and usually 'white'. The result is that the split between school and the real world gradually widens, and the skills that poor children need most to survive are frowned on or ridiculed by their education. What often develops is an agonising and internalised contradiction between a desire to conform to the schools' values and a rejection of the whole

The choices open to ghetto youths in this position are sketched out by Douglas Glasgow in his study of Watts before the 1965 riot.¹¹ Firstly, he says they can choose to adopt the perspective of the educational system. However this requires that they reject the ghetto culture and even their peers and alienate themselves from their immediate social base. The second option is to make a somewhat marginal adaptation - retaining some ghetto behaviours and selecting certain other 'alien' cultural values and perspectives. The third option is to adopt the aspirations and social context which has the most familiarity. However this tends to alienate a youth from his or her education and requires the acceptance of 'second-class' status. Reinforced by the difficulty of actually staying at school and, often, a lack of encouragement from parents, this option leads to an anti-school bias. However this third choice was seen, in Watts, as the most logical course of the many young men who fuelled the riot.¹²

In Cape Town the reasons for a rejection of the educational system by coloured pupils are perhaps greater than in the United States. The school boycotts of 1980 make it clear that 'Coloured Education' was seen as second-rate, racist 'boere' indoctrination carried on in overcrowded and undersupplied schools by often under-trained teachers.¹³ One of the most dynamic features of the boycott was a total rejection of the set curriculum by students and the mounting of 'appropriate' seminars and lectures.

The pressures and contradictions of working class schooling in Cape Town has led to an appalling drop-out rate among coloured pupils. Figure 7a is a comparison between the percentages of coloured and white pupils enrolled in the various standards during 1980.



(Source: Race Relations Yearbook)

A study done in Bishop Lavis on the Cape Flats showed that more than 16% of those interviewed had no formal education at all. Thirty per cent had not progressed beyond Standard 2 and 97% did not have a Matric pass. The median education level was only Standard 4.¹⁴ Another Cape Flats study showed that among 500 men with criminal records, 58% had been truants from school, 42% had been taken out of school to supplement their family income and 14% couldn't cope with school because they had moved house and school too frequently.¹⁵ And a poll among youths who were members of street gangs in Cape Town showed that 70% had failed to reach Standard 5.¹⁶

CHILDREN'S HOMES: FRANSIE'S STORY

My parents separated from each other when I was nine years old, but up until that time the family was together. I went to the Wingfield Primary School until Standard 3 when I left school because of the hidings I got. We lived in a council house in Lion Street near Bloemhof Flats in District Six. My father never worked. He stole gun parts and made them up himself. I saw him making the guns. One day he shot a man in my oma's back yard. So he's in jail now. My oma told the police the guns were buried in the ground in the yard. They asked me also and said they'd give me R15,00. But I didn't want to say. When they took my father I cried all night and couldn't eat or sleep.

My mother worked in a tyre factory in Kensington. She earned R150,00 per month. She couldn't look after us all and I was the eldest so I had to get out of the house. I went to stay with friends. But they were gangsters so I went home again but my mother didn't want me so she got me sent here (Bruce Duncan Children's Home).

When I was at school there was the CTS (Cape Town Scorpions) gang there, their ages from 10 to 16. I knew four of them and they were stealing. I soon learned what to do. Later they were locked up in 'reform', in Bonnytoun (place of safety). To be with them I went on the rampage. We broke into Shawco at Kensington and broken open the safe. We got R3 500 but my buddy took it all for himself and gave it to his family. He was 13. The people opposite Shawco phoned the police and they came and took fingerprints and locked me up in the police station... for three months and 10 days. The magistrate sent me to Bonnytoun. Then from there the welfare nurse sent me here (Bruce Duncan Home). I was in Bonnytoun for three weeks. But the older guys used to hit me and tried to tattoo me to become one of their gang, one of the BFK (Born Free Kids). But I didn't want to. When I came here I was glad to see that the people wore ordinary clothes and not khaki's. Khaki is just being inside. I like it here... not locked up. Except at school here they hit me and laugh at the way I write. My hands shake and it comes out funny.

When I was in the cells there were two other boys of 10 years old with me. One of them broke into a safe and the other stole a bicycle. One had a TLK (Terrible Lightning Kids) tattoo on him. We used to eat katkop and bitter coffee. We only had two blankets and it was very cold. We had a mat to sleep on. And the toilets stank and there was never any toilet paper. We went to the court in a remand-truck in our own compartment. I don't know what happened to my other buddies.

When I was locked in the big cells, in Pollsmoor, this big guy told me to take my clothes off. I didn't want to so I starting banging on the door and screaming. He threw a shoe at me which hurt and I started crying. When the warder came I told him what was going on. He just said the guy should have fucked me 'till I was dead. They moved the guy away, but later I was raped and the gangsters there tool my jeans and shoes and leather jacket. They gave me broken stuff. Lots of guys make big trouble - especially on the way to court or when we're waiting there. They tell the other guys to take off their clothes, and if they have those balls and chains on they hit them with the chains and the balls.

Also the police at the cells take all papers and pictures and rings and watches and money when you go to court. When you come back they give back the pictures and rings and watches, but they keep the money. The police are terrible, they just want to kill guys! They shot this girl's brother because he stabbed somebody and tried to run away over the roofs. The police get you into trouble if you just pee in the road or swear or throw stones at doves or anything. We didn't even kill the doves. We built a big cage and saw how many we could keep. Some days the same policemen will arrest you for doing the same thing he saw you doing yesterday.

In prison one night some policemen came to my cell because they said they wanted to teach me to shoot. But I didn't want to go so they locked me up again. They were drunk and I was scared they'd shoot me by mistake. They used to call us 'hotnots' and told us to work harder and quicker and called us 'fucking bastards'. They used to hit us with metal rulers on our heads if we wouldn't clean for them or wash up or make food. Sometimes in the evening the Captain would come around and ask us how we were.

When I told him what the warders did he said: "That's okay. Why don't you come to jail more often?" But the night the judge comes around all the police are quiet. He only comes once a month.

Here (in Bruce Duncan) my old gangster buddies still phone me at weekends - just to make trouble. They want to come and bring other skollies with them. Even if they got a lekker job they'd steal from their boss. They'll always be gangsters. In my area there were Terrible Josters, the CTS, the BFK, the TLK, the MGS (Mongrels) and the Nice Time Kids. There was also the Mafia and the Jesters. My mother's brother is also a gangster. When my mother told him to stop being a gangster and shooting people he left home. He carries knives on him and thing like a sword. My other brother isn't a gangster. He also was sent to Bonnytown but when he came out he was good and he worked.

I used to work with the CTS. There were over 200 members. They used to send us to shebeens to steal wine and dagga for them. Me and my buddies would go there and wait 'till the people were drunk and stoned and then steal their dagga and wine and money. The big-time gangsters thought we were their servants. They would make us buy cigarettes and peanuts and sweets for them. And they would make us steal for them. Once they sent me into a school to open the safe. When they had the money they gave me only R1,00 and told me to go home and buy sweets. Also they used to pickpocket. They tried to teach me but I didn't want to. My friends did - and they bought long velvet three-piece suits. We used to steal from supermarkets - tins of food - and go to sleep in a broken, ruined house. We stole a primus stove and we lived there.

I like it here at Bruce Duncan. But I get home-sick when I have to sleep alone at night. I would like to sleep in the room with other guys. Its like a big family here. It's nice like a big family. I can't really go home. My mother is married again. My stepfather's name is Ridwaan. When I go home at weekends my sister always fights with me and my step-father helps my sister and never me.

According to Muslim News, during 1981 there were up to 200 000 young people in homes for child care in South Africa. Of these 95% were not orphans but had one or both parents living.¹⁷ These homes are partly State-funded and have to comply with State regulations. In one of these institutions, in Cape Town and coloured children, just over 84% of the inmates were from families which were ultimately destroyed as a result of the excessive use of alcohol.¹⁸

The divorce rate in South Africa is correspondingly high. Between July 1980 and June 1981 there were 19,710 divorces - 54 a day.¹⁹ To compound this, as we have seen, there is a very high rate of births to single mothers, and the Theron Commission found that among coloured mothers in 1970 this rate was 43% (whites 3%). Even if this figure is adjusted for couples living as families but who are not officially married, it is still greater than one third of all coloured births.

Initially Children's Homes in Cape Town were not designed to take in the overspill of broken families but to house children left homeless and parentless by wars and, particularly, epidemics. Their brief was to 'civilise' these 'waifs and street Arabs' and put them to service. Girls, from these homes were in some demand as domestic labour. In 1876 the Superintendent-General of Education was moved to note that:

I was very much gratified to find from the Inspector's Report of the St. Michael's Home Mission School, that the standard of instruction and the discipline were satisfactory. When I call to mind the wild, unkept, heterogeneous, lot of human waifs and strays, which you introduced to my notice a year or two ago, I feel that a real work both in teaching and training has been done. You have succeeded in elevating 70 or 80 nondescripts to the ordinary level of civilised humanity.²⁰

Today the emphasis has shifted from the parentless children of some disaster to (almost exclusively) the products of broken families. And it is the lucky ones who go to children's homes. Their street brothers - and there are perhaps thousands in Cape Town - scratch out a living by petty theft and selling newspapers, sleeping around the warm air-conditioning pipes of big buildings in the inner city at night. In the children's homes children receive food, clothing and shelter as well as counselling and medical care. But children's homes do not - and cannot - shield youths from the contradictions which assail children in all working class families. Generally under-staffed and often under-financed, they are forced to fight (and often lose) a battle against the lure of the streets.

REFORMATORIES: THE TEACHERS' STORY

At the end of 1980 there were 2421 coloured youths under the age of 18 committed to reformatories, schools of industry or children's homes in the Western Cape.²² More than half of these were in what are known as Children's Act Schools, where they are placed by courts for misdemeanour or felony. The largest of these is Porter School situated on a farm in the beautiful Tokai valley. During the past five years it has had an annual inmate population of just under 600 boys, but in April 1981 it was as high as 733. It was started with a bequest of £20,000 from Mr. William Porter in 1881.²³ The previous year 66 youths had been convicted of offences which were thought to warrant detention in a reformatory (24 for theft, 14 for gambling and 9 for vagrancy). By 1891 the reformatory contained 54 boys and the first case of sodomy was reported.²⁴

The problems of detaining large numbers of youths - many of whom are tough and street-wise - within a confined area call for tight control measures. When a boy first enters the reformatory he is placed in the 'strafkoshuis' (cells) for about two weeks to 'cool off'. Then he is sent to work in the fields for about three months where he becomes part of the 'bandiet' workforce. Here treatment is severe. Boys are taken out early in the morning and often do the work of ploughs by hand. Many youths who passed through the reformatory remember great brutality on the part of the white farm overseers and beatings for 'slacking'.

Porter has about 140 staff members, of whom about 90 are white. They are divided into the administrative, academic and psychological sections, which are fairly small, and the trade and hostel sections which are large. A staff member admitted that the hostel staff were 'fairly crude' in their handling of the boys, having a 'rough and ready' approach without previous experience in juvenile problems.

These hostels are the core of gang activity. Although ganging is banned in the reformatory it is extensive, and together with the Ottery and Faure institutions, Porter is the heart of the two Cape 'super-gangs': The CTS (Cape Town Scorpions) and the BFK (Born Free Kids). A former staff member agreed that, in a way, the gangs were beneficial to the youths because:

white people tend to look at the coloured people as a homogeneous group, whereas there is actually a great variety of outlooks and allegiances. So a boy coming into Porter could find his "spiritual" home in one particular group. They are very frightened when they

come in. In the gang a boy would be protected. He would find a "family" where he could feel solidarity and support - and in a sense make some progress.²⁵

If a boy has no gang affiliation on leaving the 'strafkoshuis' cells he is immediately grabbed by one of the gangs and given a tattoo behind his ear. This will either be 'BFK', 'CTS' or 'KFS' (King Fighting Souls or 'Kafferslagters'). A staff member pointed out that the youths rapidly realise that their position in the gang is more a matter of self-protection than self-expression.²⁶

Another staff member outlined the gang structure in the hostels:

I found this out from the BFK's. The CTS were not forthcoming with information. The gangs all seemed to have a 'General' at the top. The general of the BFK was a guy called Madoppie, he used to be an Argie boy (newspaper vendor) in Long Street. He was helped as a small kid by the bergies (tramps) and slept in a pipe. His instructions were law. Later in the year, when he was pinned down, among his possessions were many knives and sharp instruments. He was arrested and tried in the reformatory for dagga charges and 'bende aktiwiteite' (gang activity). The others told me this boy would hand out a knife and say, right, go and knife that one - and make sure you get him tonight.

It was a power thing really, being a member of a gang. They had a network which sought to exploit the reformatory situation and find glory among their peers. There was this very repressive regime, and these boys would seek out the weak links and exploit these. And the gang leaders, like Madoppie, would hoard dagga and sort of reward his lieutenants with it. Dagga was a kind

of lever. But Madoppie knew how to use physical power - pure intimidation of a fairly brutish kind. I think this was the basis of his power. The authorities did everything possible to disrupt the gangs, but the gangs fed on the system, they are part of it, and gang allegiance almost always would over-ride the reformatory epaulette (privilege) system.

Also homosexuality is rife among the boys. It's part of the way of life there. This one small boy in Standard 7, I remember, he was continually raped by the others. He was considered 'easy'. Sometimes boys are also gang-raped.²⁷

Punishments within the reformatory are usually carried out in the hostels. A staff member observed the hostel staff to be 'extremely authoritarian... they have a jail mentality'.²⁸

Each hostel had two or three house fathers and a number of assistants.

These people probably have standard 6 qualifications, if that. So the standard of treatment of the "hotnots" and "kaffirs", as they are called, is abysmal. The staff will refer to the boys like this: "Jou fokken hotnot, ek skop you wind uit, you fokken bek stukkend". That's standard procedure. When a boy commits a crime - violence, dishonesty, dagga - he's brought before a "court" of these uneducated whites who are required to give him a hearing and mete out punishment. There's a set of punishment codes. But often justice can go awry. For dagga a boy gets six lashes - the cane is raised to the ceiling and the man puts every ounce of strength into it. Frequently he opens the skin on the boy's buttocks. Then he's put in a cell, stripped of his epaulette (privileges) and has to do three months in the fields.²⁹

Often, however the staff feel justified in meting out harsh treatment because of the tough boys they are being paid to control. Here is a selection from some of the many interviews done with institutionalised youths in Cape Town:

Gamaat: The only other jail I've been in is Pollsmoor - for murder and a rape case. There was a whole lot of chommies, she was a big girl, man, about 16, in Belhar. We also used to steal cars - and money, then we'd buy wine and dagga. At the time I was 13, and now I'm 15.

Pietie: I went to school 'till standard 3, then I came here (to the reformatory). I've never worked - me and another guy would do things. He was 17 and I was 15. I thought that if you're 17 you're really big and know everything - he was in high school. He used to tell me to joll with him and break into houses. We did it a lot.

Chicken: I am 18 years old and have been here since I was 16. But I first went to Bonnytoun when I was eight years old. That was because two chommies and I killed a BFK. My one chommie stuck a knife in his back and we left him in the bushes. The police soon found out and they came and took me away. Long ago my father was locked up also. He killed his own brother.

However, evidence suggests that a question mark be placed over the possibilities of actual 'reform' in Cape Town reformatories and schools of industry, especially when they provide environments not much harsher than the streets from which the youths come. One teacher at a Children's Act school claimed that:

A newspaper article supporting these views was published in the Argus in 1982 by a former Porter psychologist

PORTER: REFORMING OR PUNISHING

QUOTE: "I feel the subsequent viciousness of many of the boys is directly correlated to the excessive punishment and beatings they received at the reformatory."

A psychologist who worked for three years at the Porter Reformatory believes the heavy emphasis on punishment at the institution "made the boys' lives miserable without having the desired effect of rehabilitation."

Mr Ernst Kroneberg, who is a lecturer in pedagogics at Wesley Training College, resigned from Porter Reformatory in 1979 because of the racial prejudice of many staff members and because he felt "the nature of the institution was not likely to lead to rehabilitation."

Mr Kroneberg, who has 30 years' experience as a teacher and psychologist, worked for many years in a British community home and regional assessment centre for children found guilty of committing offences. He has a master's degree in psychology from London University and is now writing his doctoral thesis on the treatment of juvenile delinquents in South Africa.

In an interview with Woman's Argus he described savage beatings which he witnessed at Porter. He also told of how basic health care was inadequate and how a man with a standard 5 education and no medical training decided whether the boys were fit to do punishment drill.

He said although some minor improvements had been made since the Coloured Representative Persons Council Commit-

tee of Inquiry into all welfare institutions, reformatory and industrial schools in 1979, basic conditions at the school remained unchanged.

He said Porter reminded him of "a French Rococo castle — the surroundings are beautiful and they have lovely ornamental ponds and flower beds but they are not doing things to improve the lot of the boys. The staff use the boys to create acceptable and charming conditions for themselves."

Boys were sent to the reformatory by magistrate or supreme courts instead of punishment. Yet rather than performing an educational role the reformatory had a punitive role.

During his time at the school the "number of beatings received by the boys each year had been quite phenomenal."

"Because of the nature of the staff and their prejudices they quite often interpret normal behaviour as insubordination. The thing that the boys most seriously objected to was that they were not given the opportunity to explain what happened — they were tried in a sort of kangaroo court where they had

to prove they were not guilty."

"The staff members who administered the punishment did it with a degree of severity I found astonishing. Some of them would administer the strokes in as sadistic a manner as possible — really lamming out at the boys.

"I am of the opinion that if you hurt people that hurt produces aggression that must come out. I feel the subsequent viciousness of many of the boys is directly correlated to the excessive punishment and beatings they received at the reformatory.

"I'll give you an example. I saw one boy being given four of the hardest blows I have ever seen administered. I followed him outside and saw him strike out and really smash into the first boy he came across.

"To my mind there ought not to be any corporal punishment at all. There is no evidence that punishment creates any improvement in behaviour. Most Porter boys have probably been sentenced to at least two beatings by a magistrate before they arrive at the institution. It is usually only after they have committed a third offence that they are sentenced to a reformatory. If the whippings had helped they would not have landed at Porter.

The reformatory has punishment codes which

allow for whippings even in the case of trivial offences like using the telephone without permission.

"The very fact that they have such complicated codes of punishment suggests that Porter is a punitive rather than a rehabilitative institute."

Mr Kroneberg said boys who absconded from the reformatory were sometimes sentenced to whippings by the court and then whipped again on their return to Porter.

"In one case a boy who ran away from Porter and committed a crime was sentenced to five strokes by a magistrate. He was given the five strokes in the morning and when he returned to Porter in the afternoon given six more strokes for absconding," he said. "He got a total of 11 strokes in one day."

"Another factor that caused great distress was the inadequate health care. Although the District Surgeon made a weekly visit and seriously ill boys were sent to Victoria Hospital daily health inspections were done by two wardens.

"One of the wardens had only a standard 5 education yet he was allowed to decide whether a boy should be admitted to the sick bay and more importantly whether he was fit to do punishment drill.

"The punishment drill consists of half an hour of continuous strong physical training. Any boy seen to falter is immediately caned. If a boy complains that he is in pain or ill the warden examines him. If he says nothing is wrong then the boy is given cuts for wasting time.

"Many of these boys are in poor physical condition when they arrive at the reformatory. They may have been in serious fights and have old injuries which trouble them.

Yet they are suspected of malingering if they complain.

"One boy complained of severe headaches. He said he had been beaten on the head during a fight. They said he was putting it on. After I intervened he was admitted to hospital and found to have severe secondary syphilis."

Another "very unsatisfactory aspect" was the long period of retention. Boys were usually sentenced to two years in the reformatory.

Mr Kroneberg said: "If they committed the same offence as an adult they would often have got a far shorter prison term."

The chief aim of the institution seemed to be to make boys conform to the rules and regulations of the institution rather than teaching them to adapt to society. Often the type of boy who best conformed to the rules of the institution was most unsuccessful when he left.

"We had one boy whose behaviour at Porter was top rate yet a week after leaving he landed in prison. In my opinion there is no rehabilitation at all if rehabilitation means going out into society and adapting and living with other people," said Mr Kroneberg.

"Being deprived of the normal social activities of a free society is punishment enough. The longer you keep young people away from free society the harder it is for them to adapt when they return.

"They don't learn to relate to their families because their mothers and fathers are allowed visits only once a month. They are not allowed visits by their brothers and sisters or their friends. How can they form and maintain meaningful relationships if they're not given the opportunity to meet people?

"Porter's answer to the boys' problems is to beat them or keep them longer. If they don't improve after two years then they are kept for three years.

"Take the case of three of my boys, who were kept at Porter in excess of two years. Soon after their release they were hanged because they murdered a former pupil of Porter by beating him to death with bricks and spades."

The final irony came when the boys were released.

"Porter sends boys out with the clothes they have on and perhaps R 1.50 in their pockets and then wonders why they end up in prison. No preparation is made at the material level to allow them to adjust to society. In most cases their parents haven't the money to support them.

"One of our best behaved boys — a champion runner who never committed an offence in the institution — was

sent home to Pretoria to his blind father and crippled mother. They had no means of supporting him and within a week he was caught stealing and sent to prison.

"If they are going to sentence boys to two years in the reformatory then the last six months should be spent doing work which is remunerated so the boys can have some savings to tide them over when they are released. The little they do earn is absorbed in buying things like toothpaste and cigarettes.

"Any boy who comes to Porter has to make the decision within the first few days as to which gang he will join for his self protection. Boys came to me and said they did not want to join a gang but they had to for their own self-pro-

tection. A new boy needs friends and gang membership assures him of friends. protection against assault and sodomy and also some of the necessities he needs.

Mr Kroneberg said that in contrast to Porter, boys at the British institutions where he worked were never caned.

"Punishment consisted of taking away rights rather than whippings and we would try and get the child to reflect on the reasons for his behaviour which was a great deal more constructive," he said.

Cases were individually assessed by a team of psychologists, psychiatrists, a social worker, teachers and the boys' house parents.

"The important thing was that very little consideration was taken of the boy's past in relating to his future. You were concerned with the boy and not so much what he has done."

The number of boys at the reformatories was small and at the institution where he worked the staff to pupil ratio was three to one.

"You were always aware of the individual and were able to do a much more worthwhile and effective job because you could develop a personal relationship with the children," Mr Kroneberg said. "The interests of the child came first rather than the efficiency with which you could run the institution."

LINDA VERGNANI

PORTER REPLIES

These are the main points in a written reply by the Directorate of Education of the Department of Internal Affairs to the allegations made by Mr Kroneberg.

● " Corporal punishment is applied at this institution strictly in accordance with the Children's Act (Act 33 of 1960). In addition, in order to make quite sure that at no Children's Act institution of the directorate excessive punishment is given, guidelines have been issued to principals by the directorate and must be strictly adhered to. The punishment code you referred to has not substantially changed (from 1979). The application and the effect of corporal punishment is reviewed periodically and as a result of the latter corporal punishment does not now feature prominently.

● " Punishment drill was abolished in January 1982.

● " Regarding medical attention, all senior personnel and those in charge of hostels have instructions to keep a close check on the health of inmates. Psychologists, school teachers, superintendents at hostels and heads of departments are notified when inmates suffer light injuries. They are immediately referred to the sick bay. Serious cases are referred to the Victoria Hospital. Many cases are referred directly to the District Surgeon who visits the institution once weekly, and who is also on standby. There is also a standby assistant day and night to take emergency cases to hospital.

● " There has been a long standing vacancy for a qualified nursing

sister for which no applications were received. Fortunately an appointment has now been made with effect from November 1, 1982. Inmates with serious psychopathological problems are referred to the full-time registered clinical psychologist on the staff who arranges referral to a psychiatric hospital when necessary.

● " Inmates who are discharged from the institution and have to travel overnight to their destination receive R1.50 pocket money per night as prescribed by the directorate as well as provisions for their journey and their rail ticket. Most of the inmates also have their own money received from their parents deposited in a savings bank account and controlled by this institution. These amounts are paid out to them when they leave. Great care is taken to ensure that no child is released without being adequately provided for in all respects.

● " An observation that Porter School is seen as a punitive institution is doing it an injustice as it is in fact a rehabilitation and care centre for juvenile delinquents. Therapy is an important form of rehabilitation in which punishment hardly plays a significant role. The major emphasis is on academic and technical

training and education in its broadest sense. One should expect that in any institution of this nature behavioural problems do come to the fore and strict but fair disciplinary action is enforced. Problems are in the first instance referred to the psychology section where the principle of a psychotherapeutic approach receives preference in solving emotional and behavioural problems.

● " In conclusion the directorate would like to point out that Mr Kroneberg, on whose information your article is based, was employed as a teacher psychologist at the Porter School for approximately four years until 1980. During this period Mr Kroneberg who lays claim to a knowledge of the British reformatory system never at any time made any suggestions or recommendations to the directorate concerning an improvement to the rehabilitation programme in vogue in Children's Act institutions in South Africa. It must also be pointed out that Mr Kroneberg's experience of Children's Act schools is extremely limited, being confined to the relatively short period spent at Porter. He is thus hardly in a position to express an authoritative opinion on the South African system or to express valid criticism. He

has also never been registered as a psychologist with the South African Medical and Dental Council.

"While Mr Kroneberg can most probably make worthwhile comments on educational matters which fall within the purview of his experience, it is apparent that he is not qualified to judge on the directorate's Children's Act institutions. From the nature and spirit of certain of his observations his impartiality to achieve objectivity is seriously questioned."

The reply is signed by the Press liaison officer for the Director of Education

NOTE: Mr Kroneberg is registered as a psychologist with the British Psychological services. He says: "When I returned to South Africa I did not register with the Medical and Dental Council because it was unnecessary for my work at Porter."

PRISONS: PAUL'S STORY

Look I'm going to jail tomorrow (for seven years for stabbing a policeman) and I'm a bit heartsore. Jail isn't a place for a human being. Prison life is no life. I'm really sorry I'm going there. Although this is the land where I was born they make me feel not part of it. I've got a pale complexion. I know my daddy was European. But he had to leave my mommy because of these Dutch laws, what do they call it... the Immorality Act. After that things were bad for us... some nights you'd come back, all four of us, and there'd just be two cups of black coffee. We used to make up stories... and steal mild from doorsteps and bread from the bakery. That's how I started stealing, doing this and that just to make ends meet. Sometimes I'd think: "when was the last meal - yesterday afternoon at 4 o'clock and its already again 4 o'clock and I haven't eaten yet". Now you can think for yourself... you can go blind, you must have something to eat. Who is going to give you food for nothing? But when I was little I was very wakey, you know. What makes me wakey wakey? Hard times!.

Then I ran away from home, I started getting naughty, then I came under probation. You understand? They always take me home again, but oraait, life there is just the same, I didn't want to be there because my father he was not there. I just left. I went to school as far as Standard 6 - but most of my time when I was small I spent in a reformatory... my parents were very poor.

Reformatory is hard when you're a little lightie. Like I got solitary confinement... locked up one, one. There you got a cup of castor oil - three fingers of milk. And if you drink that it makes you start shitting, you know, everything out. You become so hungry you don't know what to do with yourself - only a lavatory pot with you. You get a dose each day for three days. By the thrid day you're so weak you can't stand. Then on the fourth day they take you out and give you a full ration. But you're so sick you can't eat.

Then on the fifth day you go back for three days - perhaps you get 12 days like this. And when you finished you go straight into the span (work team). They don't even keep you in the yard to get your strength back.

The authority thing there got me. Every morning you do P.T. These exercises are not to help you, they are to day "I am the boss here. You do as I say, not like the way you want it". It's running up steps and down steps for an hour.

So I ran away. I was working in the officer's room one night and I saw the main gate's key there. I took it and a hat and scarf with a handkerchief and a mouthorgan and went. I was lying in the grass outside and I could hear them hunting for me. I could hear them say if they got me they would murder me. But they passed me. I stayed out three days before they caught me. They undressed me and locked me in a cell. Then at 5 o'clock they made the whole reformatory stand in two lines with towels. They're canvas towels, they're hard, they crack like something breaking when you dry yourself. The two lines had to fold the towel like an ox's tail and I had to walk between them and everyone hit me - as hard as they could. There were about 500 guys! After that they pulled me over a table - your arms one way and your legs the other way - and they gave me 12 shots with the heavy cane on my back. I've still got blue marks all over - also on my sides, ribs, my arms and some on my neck.

Alright I got over that, and I escaped again. I went to join the army - but the reformatory people were there signing in a batch of reformatory boys. They caught me and said I was too young for the army and couldn't sign the papers. But I wanted to and they found my dad and he signed. So I joined the army. That was December 1939. I went to Robben Island for a six-week course and then Durban. There were a lot of gangsters and crooks in the Cape Corps! After that I went to Port St Johns then to the desert. We went on and on - 1940, 1941, 1942. We were digging trenches and they said the coloureds weren't fighting. But we were fucking carrying rifles and bullets and why do you do that if you're not fighting?

Then in 1943 - I think it was June - Tubruk fell. I got caught. I was stabbed in the chest with a bayonet... there's still a big hole, it came right out the back. They left me there thinking I was dead. Then the German's Red Cross came behind and took me in an ambulance to a concentration camp. There I was again! Then they were moving us one day - about 50 in a truck. We started smoking dagga which we

had and blowing at the guard. He was sitting there with a machine gun and he was yawning and sleepy. We jumped on him and killed him. We made a hole in the side of the truck and got out. We drove until we came to a farm with Italians. Fucking traitors! They can't fight. But they called the Americans who took us to the British lines.

We went to England for about two months and then they sent us back to South Africa. They said they would give us trucks and things to help us out after the army. But where are they?

My people didn't expect me. I went to see my mother and she said it's no use going home to your wife because she's having an affair with another man. I didn't want to believe it. I went to the house that night. I knew where the key was so I went in at the back door and locked the door behind me. I locked the front door and took the key also. Then I went to the room where my wife was lying with this other man. I took out a bayonet. They were so intimate with each other they didn't even notice me. So I stabbed him, thinking I was stabbing through both of them together. But she jumped out and ran away.

So I received a sentence for the hangman's noose. I went to Pretoria for three months. One morning they called us and I thought it was time but I never heard the preacher come around yet. We were 12 in Death Row. Then the one officer said to the other: "Take this one (me) to the office." Then he told me they wanted to give me a chance because I had been fighting for my land. But they said I mustn't fight with my own land's people. I got a life sentence. The other 11 were hanged. I never got the rope. And as with life, I finished it. And then again I went to prison. And tomorrow prison again.


When I went in for life there were about 60 men in one cell. Long-term indeterminate sentence prisoners. There was a lot of fighting in jail. And there was a code among them. There's the 26, 27, 28 and Big Five. The code among them is not actually a piece of paper that you carry. You have to remember - Die Boek, Die Wet, Die Plank. This prison gang thing started on the mines. Each gang has a judge, a magistrate, a doctor and an office man they call a mbalan who takes the names of new

recruits. Each gang identifies itself by singing. They must tell each other things through stories. When you come in they try to frighten you when you are in that fearful stage and they watch you.

When this thing first started there were two gangs. They used to rob people. One would rob you with his mind, the other would rob you with force. Then some pulled out and made another gang, and then there were three. That's where they come from. They are different to outside gangs. But they are connected. Like when we're outside I do you a dirty and then you tell your brother and when I come inside the prison I'm finished. But they work different. In prison they come up behind you and stab you. Outside its by force... they'll grab you and your gun and jump into the car and there you go to Texas.

Inside, if they like your trousers they take them. You can't say nothing. And if you do you're gonna be stabbed. When you make a fault with these people they go and sit in a kring (circle) first. Then they discuss you. Then three men get the knife. They issue it from the magazine stores - they've underground. And if the knife is taken out it doesn't come back the way it went out. Its gotta come back with blood or a report behind it. The three men are: one to stab and two to escort and do the job if he misses. They use a short blade for punishment shots and a long one for hang-paal. The sentence of a magistrate is a short blade and of a judge its a long blade.

Now if its a 26 they stab you in this way: A light sentence, the first, is in six minutes, the second in six hours, the third in six days, the fourth in six weeks and the fifth in six years. So like for the last one you know they're gonna stab you for what you've done but don't know when for six years! Even if you're transferred to another prison the sentence goes with you. You think nobody knows you but they're there, just waiting.



That's how prison life is. It's terrible man. Now if I'm not a gangster what am I to do? Save myself? You know I don't like violence. It's not a matter of being violent. But sometimes prisoners make you mad because they interfere with your self-respect. You are not worrying anybody but they are worrying you. I'm a slow starter. I take long to get cross. But when I get cross nothing will stop me, not even my mother. And she's dead now. You must join something. To be loose means everyone can clout and kick you whenever he likes, even fuck you. So you have to join something. And what is right is right. I'll die for it. And if there's a way I can help to get South Africa down, especially white South Africa, I'll do it.

Black Panther activist George Jackson commented that 'black men born in the United States and fortunate enough to live past the age of 18 are conditioned to accept the inevitability of prison... I was prepared for prison. It required only minor psychic adjustments.'³²

In South Africa the problem is, if anything, more acute with a prison population among the highest in the world. The daily average of inmates is around 100 000.³³

A racial breakdown of the South African prison population per 100 000 (official statistics here are obsessively racial) for the period June 1979 to June 1980 was:

Coloureds: 729 per 100,000 of the Coloured population
 Africans: 362 per 100,000 of the African population
 Whites: 81 per 100,000 of the White population
 Asians: 57 per 100,000 of the Asian population.³⁴

The figure for so-called coloureds is extremely high - 66% higher than the national average, which is in turn one of the highest in the world. It is nearly double the figure for Africans, even although the number of black prisoners is inflated by the many sentenced for technical (mainly Pass) offences which do not affect the coloured population.

The rate of recidivism (repeated conviction and imprisonment) is also extremely high and rising. Between 1965 and 1975 it rose by 13%. A study of former male prisoners in Cape Town showed an alarming cycle of institutionalisation take place:

- 63.6% had been in prison between 1 and 3 times
- 36.4% had been in prison 4 times or more
- 53.6% had been to a reformatory at least once
- 32.6% had been in a children's home
- 36% had been in a school of industry, and
- 16.8% had been treated in a psychiatric hospital.³⁵

To go by statistics, more criminal activity takes place in Cape Town than anywhere else in the country. In 1979 the city, with 18% of the population among South Africa's principle urban areas, had 25% of the reported crime. Johannesburg, with 23% of the population, had 18% of the crime.³⁶ At this point officials, and often the Press, tend to settle for the analysis that 'the Coloured temperament is crime and violence prone'. And the statistics 'prove' it. But this is a form of selective myopia. Firstly one must remember that other South African cities 'export' their unemployed and destitute to Bantustans through a cruel system of Passes and labour legislation. This skews conviction

and prison statistics in their 'favour'. And secondly people defined as coloured are subjected to a more subtle but often more damaging form of racism than Africans. This tends to raise their living standard goals while binding them to second-class income possibilities. Commenting on a parallel situation in the U.S., George Jackson points out that:

after one concedes that racism is stamped unalterably into the present nature of (the) socio-political and economic life in general . . . and concede further that criminals and crime arise from material, economic, socio-political causes, we can then burn all of the criminology and penology libraries and direct our attention to where it will do some good . . . For a real understanding of the failure of prison policies, it is senseless to continue to study the criminal- . . . men are brutalised by their environment - not the reverse.³⁷

People defined as 'non-white' are in one way or another prisoners of an oppressive structure whether they are inside or outside prison. But for thousands of people in Cape Town the prison - like the reformatory - has become a way of life. What they find there is taken back onto the streets when they are released. To understand the street-corner culture it is therefore essential to begin to understand the rhythm of life in the prisons.

Prison gangs

Tradition places the origin of prison gangs in the early days of the Rand mines. An official report, based purely on oral tradition, has their date of origin as 1920 when a Zulu named Paul Mabasa came up to the Witwatersrand to work on the mines.³⁸ Another report, based on both oral and documentary sources, finds evidence of these gangs during the

Boer War, 20 years earlier.³⁹ According to this work, by Charles van Onselen, the origin of the first prison gang, the 28s, came about in this way:

A man called Mzoozepe, born in 1867, migrated to the Rand from Harrismith in 1887. He finally secured employment with four gentlemen who subsequently turned out to be robbers. After a brief apprenticeship with these four he broke away to operate independently. He joined a group of 'sigebengas' (criminals) and started practicing the 'abathelisa' trick (impersonating officials to rob migrants on their way home).⁴⁰

Mzoozepe changed his name to Jan Note and rose to second in command of a band of Izegelekege (brigands) under Mohlopa. This gang numbering some 200 hid in the caves and hills south of Johannesburg at a place called Shabulawawa.⁴¹

After Mohlopa's imprisonment and subsequent conversion to Christianity, Jan Note assumed command of the gang. Note himself derived inspiration from the Bible, saying that he read in the Book of Nahum

about the state of Nineveh which rebelled against the Lord and I selected this name for my Gang as rebels against the Government's laws.⁴²

Jan Note then changed his name to Nongoloza and began to tighten discipline in his 'umkosi wa Ntaba' (regiment of the hills). 'I had', he wrote, 'an induna called the Governor-General. I had my fighting general on the model of the Boer Vecht general. The administration of justice was confined to a judge for serious cases and a landdrost for petty cases. The medical

side was entrusted to a chief doctor or inyanga. Then I had colonels, captains and sergeants in charge of the rank and file soldiers.⁴³ By 1903 the Izelegelekege had found their way into the Amalaita brigand bands in Natal and their presence was noted in the Pietermaritzburg prison (to this day the 28 gang is referred to alternatively as Nongoloza, Amalaita or Ninevites).

At a certain stage one of Nongoloza's lieutenants, Kikilijaan (or Ngelejane) broke away to form the 27 gang. It seems that the split occurred over Kikilijaan's refusal to accept the Ninevite custom of homosexuality. There is some doubt over why numbers were chosen as gang names. One account says the leaders parted with 28 fighters and 27 fighters.⁴⁴ Another says the officers divided their allegiance seven to eight in the two gangs.⁴⁵ The third major prison gang, the 26s, evidently came about when Kikilijaan, locked in the isolation cells in Pietermaritzburg, gave permission to six 'voeltjies' (non-gang members) to operate as a gang, supplying the 27 gang with money and tobacco. In return the 27s would protect the 26s by fighting on their behalf.⁴⁶ All three gangs agreed not to fight among themselves and defined for themselves different times and areas of operation (28s from sunset to midnight, 27s and 26s from midnight to sunrise).

In 1907 Nongoloza was detained in Volksrust prison. By 1912 his Ninevites were to receive Parliamentary attention because of waves of crime and because of the visible existence on the Rand of a disciplined army of soldiers operating outside the law.⁴⁷ It was recognised that to throw the Ninevites into prison was to put them into the heart of the gang operation. A state crackdown occurred both within and outside prisons.

Gangs on the Rand were flushed out of disused mine shafts and gang membership in prison was made punishable. Nongoloza had his life sentence commuted on condition he disclaimed any involvement with gangs. He later became a 'native' constable.

By 1914 the Minister of Justice was confident that the State had the upper hand outside prisons, and by about 1920 the gangs were non-existent in their original form. But they had become entrenched in the prisons, and were operating inside these institutions on the Rand as well as in Durban, Cape Town and Kimberley. In 1927 the gang opened operations in Barberton Prison.⁴⁸

Prison gang structure

Present-day prison gangs are both an ideological response to an unequal system, and a method by which scarce resources are both obtained and allocated. The Institute of Criminology found in a study that in a prison:

the scraping of butter off one's bread, the splitting of matches, etc., are an attempt to create a small surplus, a bargainingship in dealing and swopping. The competition and reward flowing from the distribution of forbidden dagga and cash is even more intense . . .⁴⁹

Although they have a long history, the gangs cannot be explained only in terms of this history, and they draw their life from the present prison conditions and culture. The gangs, the Institute found, were

organised in a hierarchically ordered quasi-military structure. Membership is in form, though not in reality, voluntary. Membership is further non-racial and non-ethnic. Each gang draws on its own oral tradition and bears its distinctive colourful (but mostly imaginary) uniforms, tattoos, flags, salutes and other military paraphernalia.⁵⁰

Each rank has specific duties and their officers 'wear' distinctive but imaginary uniforms. If an officer is transferred to another prison he will be asked to identify himself by describing this 'uniform' in exact detail and by reciting 'The Book' (a code of orally-transmitted laws). The uniform that is worn, for example, by a 'Neksman' is brown boots and white leggings with three buckles on each. khaki trousers with a thin red stripe down the outside of the legs and a jacket with silver buttons, a khaki helmet with a white band on which is fixed the gang number (26). The sign of rank is worn on the right forearm and a revolver (a spoon) is worn on the right side. A notebook is also carried in which the names of new members are written. A regular soldier does not wear the sign of rank and carries a rifle (a tin mug with a length of cloth looped through the handle - a deadly weapon). The Judge wears a dark cloak over his clothes, Captains carry an imaginary radio, and a General wears six gold stars on each shoulder.⁵¹

Each gang distinguishes itself from the others according to its goals:

The 28s pamper, protect and organise catamites or 'wyfies'.
 The 26 steal and rob by patience and cunning. The 27 protect and enforce the codes of 27 and 26 . . . The Big Five (25) through informing and collaborating with the authorities seek to maximise their privileges (very often these are men who turn State witnesses in trials).⁵²

The ranking within the gangs is highly structured. The 28s have a 'Bloodline' (the 'male' line) which commits violence and protects their 'wives', and the 'Private' line which comprises the sexual partners of the fighters and who do 'feminine' domestic chores. Ranking in the 26 gang is as follows:

Government Makwezie

General No. 1

Inspector No. 1

Doctor No. 1

Mbalan No. 1 (clerk)

Prokureur No. 1 (advocate)

Landdros No. 1 (magistrate)

Judge No. 1

Captain No. 1

General No. 2

Inspector No. 2

Doctor No. 2

Mbalan No. 2

Judge No. 2

Captain No. 2

Sergeant Major

Sergeant No. 2

Sergeant No. 1

The 'Heksman' (guard)

Soldiers.⁵³

The Institute of Criminology's conclusions about prison gangs are interesting. It found that although the distribution of services and scarce resources was perhaps at the core of gang formation there were other inducements. One arose because of the high prison-inmate turnover and the difficulty an ex-prisoner faced in getting a job and re-integrating into the community. The man was thus constantly aware that he might return to prison. Therefore turning to the prison sub-culture was a form of investment, in that it

brought rewards and security as well as eventual rank and prestige. And because the gangs are nationwide he would keep his rank whatever prison he was sent to. A more subtle appeal to join a gang was the separation of inmates from their family or community.

The separation may be the result of the inability to correspond (illiteracy), or the inability to visit the inmate because of the cost of travelling. Or the separation may simply be the rejection by the family of a prisoner who has begun to serve a long-term sentence. Or his family may have disintegrated.⁵⁴

The result is that the prisoner is cut off from external sources of cash or food, and this may force him to move away from an outward-looking perspective and turn towards the prison community for security and brotherhood. He will then measure his self-esteem in terms of the standards of the prison sub-culture and join a gang.

Once in the gang the laws of the brotherhood take over. At an initiation of a 26 gang member the 'Doctor' steps up to the initiate, and bending his arm says: 'I bend your arm and break your power and share it with all the members of the 26. We are equally strong. If you do wrong, you must take your punishment (from slaps to the death sentence - DP). If you refuse then you still have your own strength and your brothers will kill you because we have only 26 thoughts and we share our power equally.'⁵⁵ A soldier in the 28 gang must swear to abide by rules which include the following:

Indeed one of the 'super gangs' of the Cape Flats, the Mongrels, is a street version of the 26s. Members abide by the '26 thoughts' (laws) of the prison gang. The Mongrels draw on the prisons for members, organisation and skills. This connection is yet another piece in the puzzle which makes up the hundreds of street gangs of the Cape Flats.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7

1. M. Goldberg: President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 1976, Washington Government Printing Office, p. 230. Quoted in M. Slabbert: Repetitive Cycles, Institute of Criminology, UCT. 1980.
2. W. Barnard: 514 cases at the Retreat Magistrates Court, Institute of Criminology, 1981.
3. Literally farmer/bandit. However 'boer' also carries the meaning of Afrikaner and, more particularly, policeman.
4. Quoted in Muriel Horrel: The education of the Coloured community in South Africa, 1652 to 1970, S.A. Institute of Race Relations, JHB. 1970 p. 3.
5. Ibid. p. 4.
6. Ibid. p. 14.
7. Ibid. p. 98.
8. The dates for compulsory education for 'coloureds' was staggered as follows:

7-year-olds	-	1974	
Up to the age of 8	-	1975	
Up to the age of 9	-	1976	Source: Report of the
Up to the age of 12	-	1977	Administration of
Up to the age of 13	-	1978	Coloured Affairs 1978-79
Up to the age of 14	-	1979	
9. Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1980. S.A. Institute of Race Relations p. 483.
10. Ibid. p. 482.
11. D.G. Glasgow: The Black Underclass: poverty, unemployment and entrapment of ghetto youth. Vintage Books, New York, 1981.
12. Ibid. pp. 63, 64, 65.
13. See D. Pinnock: Elsies River, Institute of Criminology, UCT, 1980.
14. J. Thomas & A. Blau: Coloured Unemployment in Bishop Lavis: the story behind the statistics - S.A. Labour and Development Research Unit, UCT, 1982.
15. Mana Slabbert, op. cit. pp 22-26.
16. D. Pinnock 1981
17. Muslim News Vol. 21 No. 22, November 1981.

18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. The Church News 1876 (month undated). St. Michaels Children's Home archives.
21. The interview was conducted at the Bruce Duncan Home in Hanover Park. The work of Mr. Bruce Duncan on the Cape Flats is of inestimable value, I am also indebted to him for his assistance in this work.
22. The breakdown inmate population was:
- | | |
|---|-----|
| Faure School for Girls | 110 |
| Faure School for Boys | 252 |
| Wellington School of Industry for girls | 95 |
| Ottery School of Industries for Boys | 299 |
| Porter Reformatory | 516 |
| Bonnytown Place of Safety | 200 |
- (Source: Department of Coloured Affairs)
23. House of Assembly Reports of Select Committees 1881 (A1 1881).
24. Ibid. (A17, 1891).
25. Interview with previous staff member 'A' who requested to remain anonymous.
26. Staff member 'B'.
27. Staff member 'A'.
28. Staff member 'B'.
29. Staff member 'B'. The reference is: "You fucking hottentot, I'll kick your wind out, your fucking mouth out".
30. Staff member 'C'.
31. Staff member 'A'.
32. Soledad Brother: the prison letters of George Jackson, Jonathan Cape and Penguin, 1970, p. 27.

33. A fuller list is:

World Prison Population Figures per 100,000 of the population

Republic of South Africa	440	Germany	81
United States of America	189	United Kingdom	75
Columbia	178	Australia	70
El Salvador	175	Syrian Arab Republic	69
Kenya	165	Iraq	59
Venezuela	150	Ecuador	58
Israel	137	Belgium	58
Thailand	133	Dahomey	55
Ivory Coast	130	Denmark	54
Fiji	124	Phillipines	53
Jamaica	121	France	52
Panama & Lebanon	120	Italy	51
Argentina	109	Portugal	44
Chile & Morocco	108	Sweden	43
Austria	104	Japan	43
Tunisia	103	Nigeria	42
Finland	101	Spain	40
Sri Lanka	98	Norway	39
Canada	95	Malasia	37
Sierra Leone	88	India	36
Trinidad & Tobago	86	Ireland	35
New Zealand	85	Cyprus	31
Mexico	83	Netherlands	21
		Cambodia	9

Source: Mana Slabbert: Repetitive Cycles, an analysis of socialisation and institutionalisation patterns and discussion of crime prevention, intervention and diversion strategies, Institute of Criminology, UCT, 1980 p. 50.

34. The Argus October 14 1980 based on calculations by M. Slabbert, UCT.
35. M. Slabbert: Repetitive Cycles, op. cit. p. 29.
36. Op. Cit. p. 2.
37. George Jackson, op. cit. p. 42.
38. Bendebedrywighede in Gevangenis en die Ontstaan Daarvan (28, 27 en 26 bendes) (Brandvlei Report).
39. C. van Onselen: South Africa's lumpenproletarian army: 'Umkosi Wa Ntaba' - the 'Regiment of the Hills', 1890-1920. I.C.S. Collected Seminar Papers Vol. 7 1976.
40. This summary of van Onselen's paper is from: Towards an Understanding of prison gangs, Institute of Criminology, U.C.T. 1981 p. 2.
41. Ibid. p. 2.

42. Ibid. p. 2.
43. Jan Note's Life. 'Introduction to Crime', Department of Justice Annual Report 1912, pp 238-240. Quoted in Institute of Criminology, U.C.T., op. cit. p. 3.
44. Van Onselen, op. cit.
45. Brandvlei Report, a report into gang conditions in Brandvlei Prison (undated).
46. Towards an understanding of prison gangs, p. 4.
47. Ibid. p. 5.
48. Ibid. p. 5.
49. Ibid. p. 29.
50. Ibid. p. 6.
51. Brandvlei Report p. 16.
52. Ibid. p. 7.
53. Ibid. p. 8.
54. Towards an understanding of prison gangs, op. cit. p. 30.
55. Ibid. p. 10.
56. Brandvlei Report p. 12.
57. Towards an understanding of prison gangs, op. cit. pp. 26, 27.
58. George Jackson, op. cit. p. 49.

8

POLICING THE APARTHEID CITY

Whether liberal or conservative, most commentators on the role of the police in South Africa share a common assumption: They take the existence of the police for granted. They assume that any modern society necessarily has to have a large and ever-present body of people whose job it is to coerce other people. The police are seen either as a necessary component in the growing complexity of modern urban society, or as the thin blue line between order and anarchy. Always they are considered to be the mechanism of social control. We must dig beneath these assumptions.

Any apparatus of the State (and it is well to remember that the police are a state apparatus) is dependent on the form of that state. In South Africa the state has been responding to a hegemonic crisis of long duration, continually balancing and rebalancing its forces in order to reabsorb control. The result has been a shift of weight within the police force and between it and the S.A. Defence Force. It makes no sense to consider these shifts in isolation from the central impetus of control coming from the state itself. So it is to this that we must turn as a starting point.

Until the mid-1970s internal control in South Africa was predominantly a police function. Between 1945 and 1960 the Force doubled, by which stage it was more than twice the size of the SADF.¹ Until the early 1970s the SAP were also responsible for most border patrols in Namibia and elsewhere. The political power of the police apparatus came to be centralised in the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) under Lt. General H.S. van der Bergh who, together with the Prime Minister (B.J. Vorster) and the Minister of the Interior (Connie Mulder) was a key figure in the formulation of state policy. All

formulation of national objectives in which all the country's resources are mustered and managed on a co-ordinated level to ensure survival.²

A month later he outlined the evolution of a purely military initiative into a verligte 'game plan' which was to be implemented at all levels of the state:

A: "All my answers must be seen within the framework of the concept of total war. In this I refer to the Mao Tse-tung interpretation which has become the essential character of revolutionary strategy since the end of World War II. It implies that every activity of a state must be seen and understood as a function of total war."

Q: "Has any attempt been made to devise such a total strategy for South Africa - to work out a game plan whereby all the different elements are co-ordinated to meet the continuing challenge to our security?"

A: "Yes. There are, of course, two characteristic snags with which we are constantly confronted: The conflicting requirements of a total strategy and a democratic system of government. The fact that strategy is dynamic and requires constant and continued adaptation. A 'game plan' is, of course, the theoretical ideal. We are working towards something like it within the restrictions inherent in our democratic institutions."

Q: "Would this (co-ordination with commerce and industry) not require continual forward planning, involving some sort of superbody and co-ordinated command structures at national, regional and local level?"

A. "I would balk at the term 'superbody' but otherwise I agree. I would refer you once again to the problem of reconciling democratic principles with total strategy within the framework of our existing Constitution."

Q. "At what point would this (coordinated planning at all levels) require a total rethink of all our national resources, including, as you suggest, manpower?"

A. The time for a 'rethink' of all our national resources is now . . .

This 'rethink' definitely does not mean changes in the Constitution or social system, but it aims at a reorientation of activities within the framework of the prevailing order . . . For whites, moderate blacks and co-operative tribal leaders the issue at stake is survival. . . .

We must satisfy the country's military needs while at the same time expanding our peacetime economy. It demands an unprecedented economic flexibility to shift back and forth along a sliding scale between a war and a peace economy according to prevailing priorities.

This demand, on which our survival may well depend, means that the economy must be able to handle at the same time: conflict and development; survival and growth; central guidance, free enterprise."³

This conflict/development approach was soon to mature into a co-ordinated X
Total Strategy. In short, it was seen to be necessary to grant limited concessions, a 'reorientation of activities within the framework of the prevailing order'. As with state housing, each concession was a response to pressure put on the state by the oppressed people and their organisations, but each aimed to absorb the conflict by carrying with it the means to

co-opt a 'black middle class'. In this the state had by then gained a breathing space through the spatial re-organization of white cities and its curb on progressive black politics:

The 'Age of Social Engineers' (as T.R.H. Davenport called it) is over: coloured and Indian people have been removed from most desirable residential and trading areas, largely to the benefit of Afrikaner workers and petty bourgeois elements. The market can now be trusted to retain these patterns. Likewise, disenfranchising the coloured and indian populations was a Nationalist priority in the 1940s and 1950s, when they feared black votes could be used to oust them, but the NP is now confident enough of its ability to co-opt leading segments that it is willing to re-admit them (in terms of the President's Council proposals) to a subordinate political role.⁴

These reforms and concessions, however, were unable to solve the problem of growing urban unemployment nor, on their own, contain the intensifying resistance. So alongside the co-optive strategies was to go increased repression. In other words the reforms were to be a complement to, and not a substitute for, increased repression. (The coercive side of this concession/repression couplet of Total Strategy was to confuse many opposition commentators hopeful about the Botha government's new deal.)

From about 1976, however, the structures of co-optation and control began to break down. There are several reasons for this. One is certainly the implementation of some of the Riekert commission proposals about urban blacks. The commission, which delivered its report in 1979, recommended certain advantages in jobs and housing be granted to those blacks who had rights qualifying them to remain in urban areas. 'Qualifieds' would be

able to change jobs without going through a labour bureau (which control the allocation of African labour). They would also be allowed to change urban areas and have their families with them in the towns. The full implication of the Riekert proposals became clear in the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill which was debated in 1982. The Bill sought to push the fine for the employment of 'illegal' blacks to R5,000 plus 12 months in prison. The effect of these penalties, as Sheena Duncan of the Black Sash has pointed out, would make everyone into a policeman to enforce the legislation.⁵ Another effect would be a massive step-up of pass raids, an increase of poverty and misery in the Bantustans where these people would be sent, and probably a radicalisation of black awareness among progressive worker organisations. This last point has come to the fore as the State finds itself increasingly unable to 'deliver the goods' of Total Strategy's co-optive wing.

By the early 1970s a new generation of young people had emerged, untouched by the repression of the early 1960s and increasingly angry about poverty and the shortage of school facilities and township amenities. In a recessionary period, furthermore, the most important stream of state patronage - housing - began drying up.⁶ Among the results were the schools boycotts in 1976 and again in 1980. Despite the heavy death tolls among students and workers the people were not cowed, and the boycotts led to intense trade union activity and the rapid growth of township civic associations organising around grass-roots issues. The rejection of state solutions can be seen from the 90 per cent stay-away in the 1981 S.A. Indian Council elections, and by the solidarity between 'legal' and 'illegal' blacks in strike action.⁷

Increasingly during the early 1980s one heard more about Total Onslaught and 'threats to law and order' than about Total Strategy as the shaky balance between controlled consent and force tipped towards the latter.⁸ This was to parallel the rise of the military.

MILITARY MEN AND THE RISE OF THE EXECUTIVE

By the standards of the time, the South African Defence Force in the 1960s was 'practically obsolete'.⁹ Its growth, however, coincides with the beginning of the armed struggle in South Africa in 1961. That year Defence Minister Jim Fouché introduced a ballot system of conscription and called on white mothers 'to give up their sons in defence of their land'. Initially there was a selective intake of 7 000 men for nine months service. This was extended so that by 1964 there was an annual intake of 16 500. In the course of four years the size of the Citizen Force rose by over six times, and the Permanent Force nearly doubled in size. In the same period the defence budget increased by over 5 times, so that by 1964/5 it was 21 per cent of the government budget.¹⁰

In 1967 universal conscription (9 months) of all white males between 17 and 65 was introduced, and in 1972 conscription was increased from nine to 12 months. By 1982 it had been raised again, this time to 2 years, and military spending was running at more than R8m a day.¹¹ The late 1970s also saw the phenomenal growth of arms manufacture, which by 1982 was the biggest in the Southern Hemisphere and the 10th largest in the world, employing about 100 000 workers.¹² Given the line-up of industrialists, financiers and economists behind this enterprise (the third biggest in South Africa) together

with armed engagements on several borders of the state, the South African army of the 1980s could, in General Malan's words, definitely be seen to be engaged in a 'total war'.

This growth of the SADF was reflected at all levels of the state and particularly in the formation and composition of the all-powerful State Security Council (SSC). The SSC was established in the early 1970s as an advisory body to the government. According to a White Paper on Defence its role was:

to advise the Government regarding the formulation of national policy and strategy in connection with the security of the Republic, the manner in which this policy or strategy must be carried out, and a policy to combat any particular threat against the security of the Republic; and to determine an intelligence priority.¹³

By 1977, however, the functions of the SSC included 'interdepartmental co-ordination', and its brief had expanded to the investigation of:

- Political action
- Military/para military action
- Economic action
- Psychological action
- Scientific and technological action
- Religious-cultural action
- Manpower services
- Intelligence services
- Security services
- National supplies, resources and production services
- Transport and distribution services

- Financial services
- Community services
- Communication services

Together with the above fields (the SSC must) cover the whole spectrum of national security.¹⁴

By the late 1970s the SSC was clearly at the centre of the executive web, with power concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister. Parliament had become little more than a talking-shop, the Senate was disbanded and even the Cabinet had been virtually abolished as a responsible decision-making institution, leading a largely formal existence.

The Cabinet functions had been taken over by six Cabinet Committees (concerned with State Security, Finance, Economics, Internal Affairs, Welfare and Legislation and Parliamentary Affairs) as well as the SSC (which was operating both as a Cabinet Committee and a security council). These had become the effective executive bodies of government, and were answerable only to the Prime Minister. They were made up of individual Cabinet ministers together with an unspecified and changeable number of Prime Ministers' appointees, who did not have to be drawn from Parliament.

The significance of this (according to a Nusas publication on SA militarization) lies in the extent to which it has shifted executive responsibility away from Parliament and even the parliamentary caucus of the National Party, and into the hands of a non-parliamentary group, which includes many prominent businessmen and senior military officers.¹⁵

In 1980 the SSC consisted of the political leaders P.W. Botha, Fanie Botha, Pik Botha and Chris Hennis, the head of the Department of National Security (DONS, previously BOSS and later the National Intelligence Service, NIS) the

chief of the Defence Force (General Malan), the secretaries for foreign affairs and justice, the Commissioner of Police and the chairmen of each of the other Cabinet committees. The secretary and chairman of the SSC's working group was General A.J. van Deventer who was serving on all other Cabinet Committee groups. Another person with power on the SSC was the secretary to the Department of the Prime Minister, J.E. du Plessis who was also Secretary to the Cabinet and on all working groups within the Cabinet Committees.

By 1982 the SSC was co-ordinating the activities of 15 interdepartmental committees, all of which included permanent military advisors regardless of whether SADF interests were involved. It had also been proposed that the SSC take control of all policy decisions of government departments and the semi-state organs such as ESCOM, ISCOR and the Atomic Energy Corporation. 16

Real power in South Africa is therefore rapidly being concentrated in tighter and tighter structures. And as the separation of legislative, executive and judicial functions breaks down, so the political centralism of the state apparatus is continually being strengthened, particularly around the upper levels of administration. This is even taking spatial form. The city of Pretoria, for example, is hundreds of kilometres from the coast but even houses the headquarters and (concrete) flagship of the Navy. In such a process of bureaucratic condensation, says Poulantzas in State, Power, Socialism, the administration is no longer merely the apparatus charged with the execution of policy.

. . . placed under the authority of the Executive, the state bureaucracy is becoming not merely the principal site, but also the principal actor in the elaboration of state policy.¹⁷

For this reason, therefore, it is becoming less necessary for the ruling class alliance to strike political compromises in the Parliamentary arena and to elaborate hegemonic interests in the form of a 'national interest'. Increasingly the various interests of the state apparatuses and of monopoly capital can be found directly within the administration - within the Cabinet Committees and on the SSC.

This drawing together of the administration and monopoly capital which characterises the Botha government is based on capital's need for a stable national state at almost any cost and the growing economic role of the state itself in the provision of weapons and infrastructure for capitalist development. From the centralism of power that this implies flow a number of consequences. One is, as I have mentioned, that even the dubious legitimacy of a whites-only parliament is passing over into a legitimacy of instrumental rationality and efficiency embodied by the executive-administration. Pacing this is a decline of law, a sharp rise in executive secrecy, government by the generation of increasingly unspecific fear, and a tendency for power to be personalised in the man at the top of the executive.

(a) The fall of Parliament

For more than a decade, behind the backs of the white population, the limited racial democracy of the white parliament and of the Nationalist Party has been whittled away. This has brought with it a decisive

curtailment of Parliament's authority over the administration. Indeed the process of government has become autonomous from parliament, and the administration distanced from the process of national representation. In this situation, says Poulantzas, 'while the opposition is first to be hit . . . these limitations of parliamentary power also affect majority deputies: they too are reduced to the position of government foot soldiers . . . The state bureaucracy has shut itself up in a water-tight container, almost completely blocking the access channel formerly open to deputies and political parties as legitimate representatives of the "national interest"'.¹⁸

Moves in this direction have been on the agenda for some time in South Africa, but have been delayed by the need to convince the electorate of a crisis great enough to warrant a surrender of their rights to the executive. In 1977 the Minister of the Interior, Dr. Connie Mulder, said publicly he would welcome a one-party state in South Africa 'should this come about in a normal way'. Speaking at the Cape National Party Congress he said the Congress 'should not create the impression that elections had become bothersome merely because the National Party was strong'.¹⁹

We are not a one-party state, but should we develop into one in a normal way I would welcome it. It looks as if, though, it is going to happen. However we should not create the impression that we deal lightly with democracy.²⁰

The same year a 'senior Nationalist MP' was quoted as having told the Sunday Express that:

the government would not be able to meet future demands without giving heads of the Defence Force a definite say in the decision-making process in the country, and that South Africa may ultimately be ruled by a civilian-military junta.²¹

The machinery set up to legitimate executive centralism in the late 1970s was the President's Council, a wholly nominated body of 'experts' on issues of national importance. Probably its most important proposal to date has been to provide guidelines for the abolition of Parliament and the installation of a Gaullist-type executive presidency - a bonapartist strong-man to lead in a time of crisis.²² In this proposal the Council was simply confirming the power already concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister. Such a personalized presidentialism is not, of course, the signal of a despotic power. It would function rather as the focal point of various administrative power centres and networks, making them converge at the apex of power. In this way it simply accords with the new political role of the administrative structure. The president would not be a dictator but the prime administrator, empowered to make fast decisions in 'worrying times'. In such a situation the man at the top of the Executive is also the hostage of a political-administrative mechanism which, to a large degree, allocates him the pre-eminent position.²³

The chipping away of party power, however, has not gone unnoticed by the white electorate. By apparently entering into an alliance with the Broederbond boogey of 'Hoggenheimer', the hated Imperial capitalist, the new Afrikaner executive has gradually lost the need for a base in the small farmers, urban middle class and white workers who constituted the hard centre of the Afrikaner 'volk'. The cement of this volk coalition

has been the guarantee of material privileges, protection of jobs, higher wages and the provision of social welfare for whites. It promised the defence of the volk against, on the one hand, the pressures of big business and, on the other, the rising demands for equality from the black majority. However the token multi-racialism and the advancement of a small black middle-class under the banner of Total Strategy, coupled with an alliance with monopoly capital, has weakened the cohesion of Afrikaner nationalism. As the upper layers of the middle class have been drawn together the lower layers of white society have become separated. This development can be seen in the formation of the ultra-right 'verkrampste' political groupings like the Herstigte ^{Nasionale} ~~Nasionale~~ Party and the Conservative Party. This has clearly been a gamble the Executive has been forced to take, banking on the decreasing power of Parliamentary politics and the moulding of a national fear in the form of a 'Total Onslaught' to keep the volk in line. More and more, therefore, the legitimisation process for state action has tended to shift to a one-way communication process - to the manipulatory circuits of the media dominated by the Executive.²⁴

(b) Secrecy and the Press

The media have become vital in the maintenance of control by the Executive. It is significant that one of the 'leaks' in the 'Muldergate' Information scandal was that the state had used public funds to start an English-language daily newspaper (a hugely expensive undertaking) and a glossy magazine aimed at the black petty bourgeoisie.²⁵ The state also controls the only television network and all locally-based radio stations.

On the other side, larger numbers of student publications and overseas material are ritually banned weekly, and all films have to be submitted to a control board for laundering before public viewing. During the past decade increasingly severe curbs have also been placed on the commercial Press.

Professor John Dugard has pointed out that one of the most skilfully nurtured South African myths is that there is a genuinely free Press. This myth, he says,

is perpetuated by the apparent freedom with which the English-language press criticizes governmental policies and practices in certain legally and conventionally defined areas; by the praise of foreign critics who are continually surprised to find any criticism tolerated; and, particularly, by the shower of abuse poured upon the English-language press by Government spokesmen who regularly accuse it of disloyalty and subversion and threaten to deprive it of its 'freedom'.²⁶

The truth, as Dugard points out, is probably more accurately stated by the historian Professor Leonard Thompson: 'the liberal Press has been reduced to insecurity and near impotence and the great English dailies are impeded from discovering and reporting the worst evils of apartheid and are under great pressure to refrain from fundamental criticisms of the Government'.²⁷

Legislative restrictions on the Press can be divided into three categories: those directed at freedom of speech, those directed at journalists themselves, and those directed at newspapers as a whole. It is impossible for the Press to criticize some of the most important areas of political life - namely, matters affecting prisons, police and defence. The Prisons Act of 1959 makes it an offence to publish 'any false information concerning the behaviour or experience in prison of any prisoner or ex-prisoner or concerning the administration of any prison... without taking reasonable steps to verify such information', and the onus of proving that reasonable steps were taken is placed upon the accused.²⁸

The police are protected from scrutiny by various acts which include prohibitions on the publication or communication of 'police matters' (any matter relating to the preservation of internal security or the maintenance of law and order by the police) or 'security matters' (any matter relating to the preservation of internal security). In terms of the Police Act anyone who communicates secret or confidential defence information gained by reason of office or employment to any other person (such information is presumed to be secret or confidential unless the contrary is proved) is guilty of a crime.²⁹

On matters of 'national defence', all statements or reports which the Press wish to publish have to first be referred to a Defence Department public relations officer or to the military chiefs, and all matters of military policy must be referred to the Minister or Commandant-General.³⁰ The Press may not even publish the fact that the Minister has been approached, making gagging itself secret. With these procedures it is obvious that censorship could be exercised simply by chilling the communication channels and sanctions to the Press, these curbs on information are also contained in the Police Act of 1958. In terms of Section 27B, if anyone

publishes any untrue matter in relation to any action by the Police Force, part thereof or any member thereof in relation to the performance and functions of its members, without having reasonable grounds for believing that such statement is true (the onus is on the person to prove this), the person shall be guilty of an offense and will on conviction be liable to a fine up to R10 000 or imprisonment up to five years or both fine and imprisonment.

Section 27C prohibits the publication in any newspaper, book, pamphlet or magazine or by radio any information relating to

- (a) the constitution, methods, movements and deployment of members or part of the Force, concerned in any action for combatting and prevention of terroristic activities (as referred to in Section 2 of the Terrorism Act No 83 of 1967)
- (b) persons or groups against which such action is directed
- (c) any action referred to in (a) above by any member or part of the Police Force together with the South African Defence Force or the South African Railways Police.

Contravention of the Act carries a maximum fine of R15 000 or eight years in jail or both.

The Internal Security Act of 1982 carries presumptions which transfer the burden of proof to the accused, and caters for a range of actions extending far beyond that which would ordinarily be regarded as terrorism or treason. It prohibits any activity which attempts to 'endanger the State authority'. or 'achieve, bring about or promote any constitutional, political, industrial, social or economic aim or change in the Republic' or 'put in fear or demoralise the general public...' Attempts to commit or attempts to or conspire with someone to commit an act of violence is also prohibited. It is also an offence to intend to do the above, and in so doing interrupt a production process or industry, promote 'general dislocation or disorder at any place in the Republic', disrupt traffic on land, sea or in the air, or encourage racial hostility (Section 54). The Act also provides for indefinite detention without trial.

The threat of legislative, executive or conventional sanction therefore hangs heavily over all South African newspapers opposed to the Government. In Dugard's words,

the disappearance of in-depth, critical feature articles about some of the greatest injustices of South African society, and the enlargement of the number of journalistically taboo subjects, testify to the effectiveness of this threat. Government spokesmen, however, continue to declaim on the licentious freedom of the English press and thereby conceal from the general public the absence of real freedom on the part of the press.³¹

This concealment simply hides from view the development of administrative secrecy - the hermetic insulation of power from any form of democratic control.³²

Secrecy is the hallmark of absolutist tendencies, becoming a permanent matter of State through hidden mechanisms and a regime of administrative procedures that almost entirely escapes the control of public opinion. This is hardly surprising. The bureaucracy was always the State institution which rebelled most against the principles of representative democracy, no matter how limited this may have been in South Africa. This was because democracy was erected precisely in order to place institutional limits upon the privileges bequeathed to the administration by the Absolutist State.³³

Secrecy and criminal justice system

Beyond the secrecy created by the official blocking of information through the media is another more complex kind: the secrecy caused by bureaucratic complexity. At the level of criminal procedure this is at work both within the structures and within the law itself. The fact that the courts and police stations where gang members find themselves are not just legal institutions but the daily work places of policemen, lawyers, clerks of court, leads to the development of stereotypes, networks of shared understandings, alliances of alleged adversaries, techniques for routinising the work of policing or processing cases, to a situation where the suspect or dependent is the only one who is not part of the routine, is

mystified by the language, bureaucracy and process of justice. Added to these subtleties are interaction on the beat, information extraction games, remedial routines, court ceremonies and the structure of arrest, investigation, plea and trial.³⁴ No less complex, however, is the law itself.

Criminal law (says Pashukanis) starts out not at all from the damage suffered by the injured party, but from the violation of the norm established by the State.³⁵

It is worth asking how this norm is established. In South Africa it is based on a combination of Roman-Dutch Law as developed by the courts into a South African common law, and legislative enactment.³⁶ The scope and ambit of common law crimes are fairly settled in South African law. Their definitions have been formulated more or less authoritatively in textbooks followed daily in the courts.³⁷ No new common law crimes can be created by the courts.³⁸ However, the meaning given to the words in these relatively plain definitions is often very narrow from the point of view of the layman.

Thus a working legal definition of theft might be 'the unlawful taking of the property of another without his consent and with the intention of terminating the enjoyment of his rights therein'.³⁹ While this could refer to the work of a common pickpocket, it would also hold water as a description of colonial conquest. The crucial word here is 'unlawful', and we are back again to the problem of the eye of the beholder. One fares no better with assault. A standard South African legal textbook describes this act as:

unlawfully and intentionally: (1) applying force to the person of another, or (2) inspiring belief in that other than force is immediately to be applied to him.⁴⁰

Any street-corner kid would be excused if he mistook this for a description of police arrest procedure - how else could he be coaxed into the back of a patrol van?

In the same textbook murder is defined as 'the unlawful and intentional killing of another person'.⁴¹ (It is seen as justifiable if it is carried out 'by authority' or 'in abedience to orders'.) If we look for a moment beneath the cloak of legality and authority, it can be seen that 'private' murder throughout history has never been comparable to public murder by those very institutions which uphold law. Yet, in the course of their duties between 1968 and 1978 the South African Police shot dead 2 384 people.⁴²

In 1970 South Africa accounted for nearly 50 per cent of all legal executions in the world. In just one year (July 1981 to July 1982) the South African Defence Force claimed more than 1 700 kills on the Angolan border alone.⁴³ These figures may not yet equal annual murder rates, but with the escalation of civil war in the sub-continent the imbalance is soon likely to be rectified. Such statistics, however, are nothing compared to the carnage of events like the two World Wars, the Vietnam war and endless other localised battles fought this century - all undoubtedly 'in the interests of State security'.

Once we move outside the ambit of common law crimes to crimes created by legislation the bounds of the common law largely disappear. South African courts have adopted a literalist, positivist view of their interpretative function. The legislature is not constrained by a Bill of Rights. Any form of conduct can be criminalised. Such 'crimes' are direct reflections of the will of the State. Yet they share the measure of legitimacy which still attaches to forms of conduct which have 'always' been prohibited by the common law as 'natural' crime.

What I am suggesting is that criminal law is not so much based on ancient moral principles as on expedience, and that the majesty of the law may be little more than an ideological cloak thrown around the daily business of social control. 'Crime', says Colin Sumner in Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment, 'is not behaviour universally given in human nature and history, but a moral-political

concept with culturally and historically varying forms and content... Modern criminal justice procedures are not universal, inevitable or "natural", but legitimated practices and moral-political controls which develop in response to conflicts spawned by the class relationships of exploitation and domination constituting the capitalist mode of production'.⁴⁴ To which Tony Platt adds quite bluntly: 'Under the legal definition of crime, the solutions are primarily aimed at controlling victims of exploitation...'⁴⁵

At best, then, criminal law in South Africa can be seen as a key force in the stabilization of conflictful social relations. But in times of crisis, in a recession or in the face of political challenge, it is a stick held to the marginalised workforce and the young in a period when manufacturing cannot fully satisfy their needs or absorb their labour power. As we have seen, monopoly capital has developed alongside the expropriation of land from the powerless, the division of shared land, the dissolution of extended family support systems and the destruction of areas which supported 'informal' economic activity. These processes which are so often called the 'modernization of the traditional economy' inevitably transform attempts to preserve the old ways, resist the new order, accommodate to its hardships and to play the system at its own game into 'criminal behaviours'. Such forms of social action, says Sumner, 'frequently become crimes against the State... separated out in law from the community social relations which were their source (and) judicially constituted as a distinct category of reality!'.⁴⁶

The dominated classes encounter law not only as a barrier, but also as the reality which assigns the place they must occupy. But this reality is in essence a mystery. It is a fundamental maxim of the modern juridical system that no-one should be ignorant of the law. However this knowledge required of every citizen is not even a special subject of study at school - as if everything were done

to keep one in ignorance of what one is supposedly obliged to know. This maxim, according to Poulantzas, therefore expresses a relationship 'whereby the popular masses, whose ignorance of the law's secrets is built into this law and juridical language itself, remain dependent upon, and subordinated to, State functionaries as the makers, protectors and appliers of the law'.⁴⁷ The law in its complexity can be known by nobody but State representatives and those who can afford years of legal training. It is a State secret which grounds a form of knowledge monopolized for reasons of State. About kids caught between poverty and the complexity of the law; Stuart Hall et al view the question: 'Why do ghetto youths turn to crime?' as a 'practical obscenity'.⁴⁸

The obvious result of this bureaucratic secrecy, coupled with increasingly repressive legislation, is that people have lost confidence in the legal system. A Gallup survey conducted in 1982 showed that only 39 per cent of Afrikaners, 24 per cent of blacks, 23 per cent of Asians, 18 per cent of English speakers and 11 per cent of Coloureds said they had a 'great deal' of confidence in the legal system. A seminar of advocates, attorneys and academic lawyers held shortly after the survey submitted that 'this disturbing loss of confidence in our legal system' was not unconnected to 'the abolition of habeas corpus and the introduction of practices incompatible with notions of fairness, justice and the Rule of Law...'⁴⁹

(d) The generation of fear

There can be little doubt that the shift of the centre of gravity to the State bureaucracy has involved a parallel restriction of personal and political liberties for the majority of the population.

The control structures have been centralised and improved, laws concerning their activity have become dangerously open-ended and less disputable, and in the courts the proof of innocence is shifting to the individual. Indeed anyone in any way opposed to the Executive now tends to operate on the internalised assumption of his or her own guilt in terms of the law.

This is reinforced by the fact that such a person can be detained indefinitely in solitary confinement by the Security Police without the chance of proving their innocence in court.

This position, however, is not confined to political opponents. In September 1971 the president of the Association of Law Societies of South Africa, Mr Tjaart Vorster, told the Association that, over the centuries, criminal law had developed around the primary principle that the State had to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. But he warned that in South Africa:

the authorities are now showing increasingly a disposition to break down this cardinal principle by means of regulations, ordinances and Acts which provide presumptions in favour of the State and thus impose the burden of proof on the accused.⁵⁰

Officials of the State, particularly those involved in the control apparatus, are also increasingly being empowered to violate individual liberty. A policeman can, for example, bring a charge against anyone who annoys him in the course of his duty, search without a warrant on suspicion of certain crimes, in certain circumstances kill a person fleeing arrest or close down premises or prevent a meeting. In terms of Indemnity Act of 1977 the State or its officials are provided indemnity against civil or criminal proceedings 'in respect of any actions or statements ordered or done by them in good faith... to prevent or terminate internal disorder'. Although passed in March 1977 it was made retroactive to June 16 the previous year - the day on which police action against student boycotters took place in Soweto. The Dean of Law at the University of the Witwatersrand, Professor John Dugard, pointed out at the time that the Act ran contrary to the normal legal principle that policemen were held responsible for any unlawful acts they commit. He said the qualification about acting in good faith was meaningless because 'it is very difficult in most cases impossible, to prove that a policeman acted in bad faith'.⁵¹

The effect of the withdrawal of the Executive and its officials from democratic control, together with urban racial polarisation, has served to shape fear of the unexpected or the unknown as a means of social control. In its extreme form this could be stated as fear of death by legal sanction (by those who are somehow 'outside' the system) and fear of the 'black threat' (by those 'inside' the system).

The first fear is well illustrated in an essay entitled Reflections Before a Glass Cage by Hans Enzenberger, in which he explores the 'ancient, intimate and dark connexion between law, politics and murder'.⁵² Using Freud's rather controversial conclusion that 'the original political act . . . coincides with the original crime', he begins from the premise that power is exercised by those who can have their underlings killed. The ruler is the survivor. This he sees as the basis of command in the modern state. No matter how attenuated it is, any command is still a 'suspended death sentence'. Within the state the maximum penalty is always death. Beyond the borders of the state it is war. In a sense we cede to the state our right to kill. The hangman is our deputy. Therefore what is forbidden to the individual - that is, to kill - is permitted to him as a member of the collective.⁵³ This, says Enzenberger, is the very heart of sovereignty. And if the state, as the overlord of the legal order, is permitted to kill one individual, it is also permitted to kill many or if necessary everyone, in its and the peoples' name, and to make the execution of this sovereign act a duty to its citizens.⁵⁴ (At this point crime having become total, explodes its concept.)⁵⁵

By thus bending back upon itself the definition of crime, Enzenberger underlines again that 'crime' is a definition and not an act. But if the state is dedicated to creating and maintaining this definition, if it forbids the powerless to kill, protest or organise, protecting this prohibition by itself killing and organising, it is bound to create a climate of extreme social tension and fear.

At an ideological level, however, at the level of 'race consciousness', definitions of crime are very real, marking the borderline of societal tolerance. And stripped of its moral furniture we find that this boundary is negotiable, has a basis in history and is dependent on the power structure. It is in fact none other than the point of contact in a class struggle, and the working class is always, in a sense, on the 'other' side. Inside the boundary of 'common (bourgeois) decency' one finds those activities which, even if they do not necessarily support the 'system', are at least not a threat to it. Outside are activities which, even if they may not immediately threaten the system, are upheld as being a danger to it. The 'line', furthermore, tends to be a heterogenous, frequently bizarre assemblage of historically deposited orders to protect the most varied kinds of legal prerogatives and interests, codified concepts of taboos and morality and rules of the game', uncomfortably packaged under the heading of 'law' and frequently sold as common sense.⁵⁶

In their book Policing the Crisis, Stuart Hall et al call this boundary the violence threshold,⁵⁷ the point beyond which 'measures must be taken'.

A particular feature of this ideological line, they found, was that definitions of social behaviour tended to become transmuted. On the one hand a political issue may be presented as a criminal one, depoliticising

and criminalizing it. This is often convenient: The public might be reluctant to see the law used against political protesters, but who would stand between the law and a bunch of 'hooligans'? On the other hand criminal acts (murder, rape, robbery, theft) may be shifted into the political arena, focussing public attention on an 'urban crisis', justifying the use of 'more than usual' force against the growing number of unemployed in a period of recession. It could be argued that in the latter case the transmutation simply acts as an aid to policing. But a single example will show that it can also become an orchestration of public fear which feeds back into the control apparatus at a higher level.

In early September 1981 an increasing number of rape cases began appearing on the Supreme Court rolls in Cape Town. Their number escalated until the Public Prosecutor called for the death penalty for the rape of a white woman by two coloured men on the grounds that 'eight rape cases had come before the court during the current session and four more were on the roll'.⁵⁸ The sanctity of the home is being departed from', he said. 'Are we going to have to wait until women are strangled, raped and beaten to a pulp before imposing the ultimate sentence?' Sentencing a man for murder and rape two days later the Judge President, Mr. Justice Munnik, declared that 'the flag of rape is blowing through the Cape like a strong south-easter. It must come to rest at some time. The winds of lust must cease'.⁵⁹ He said it was 'frightening to open the three local Cape newspapers and to see how many rape cases were coming before court'.

These statements were picked up in the Press and by Parliament. The wife of a former Cabinet Minister called for castration and a Nationalist MP demanded the use of the cat o' nine tails.⁶⁰ In the Parliamentary Justice Debate, as we saw in Chapter 1, a

Member declared rape to be 'a new form of terrorism', and linked it to 'Total Onslaught' ~~against~~ the State.⁶¹ Sentences for offenses which previously carried penalties of around four years in jail went up to as many as 12 years. Several 20-year sentences were handed down.⁶²

However, in August of the following year the Attorney General of the Cape admitted that 'he had grouped together a number of rape cases on the Cape Town Supreme Court roll last year, and in so doing, drawn the attention of the public to the seriousness of the rape situation'.⁶³ He was clearly pleased with the result, and now 'hoped to give similar prominence^e to armed robberies and related cases' because 'the publicity they will receive when grouped together will hopefully serve as an effective deterrent'.⁶⁴

But if rapists are terrorists what will robbers with guns be? Only the Total Strategists can tell! One thing is sure though: The focus will be on the violence, on the skollie 'folk devil' with a gun in the dark places of the city. This is not to say that rape and violence are not a serious problem. But a violent act is more amenable to dramatization than are the conditions which shape its development. Through a process of ideological convergence separate activities tend to become linked and parallels drawn: Crime - rape - violence - guns - agitators - terrorists - threat to law and order . . . raw material for a climate of fear in a city divided against itself. In this climate the police become the moral guardians of the existing order, sentries along the barricades of fear, and it is to them that our investigation must now turn.

X

POLICING THE TOWNSHIPS

In 1982, following recommendations in the Rabie Commission on internal security legislation, the security functions of the Department of Justice were placed under a Directorate for Internal Security which forms part of the Department of Law and Order. The reason given by Rabie for the change was 'because it is important that the Department of Justice should be seen as the protector of the interests of the citizens of the country' (leaving open the question about the role of the police).⁶⁵

The new Department thus created was to have two separate functions, daily policing under a Commissioner of Police, and political policing - 'maintaining a balance between justice and effectiveness' - under a Director of Internal Security.⁶⁶ Both branches were to be answerable to the Minister of Law and Order, the SSC and ultimately the Prime Minister. However the Directorate for Internal Security is also closely linked to the Department of Military Intelligence - to a point where, given the increasingly paramilitary nature of the police, the South African Police could even be seen to be a wing of the South African Defence Force with further training in crime prevention.

These shifts of emphasis within the police force have closely followed X the form of the state in its efforts to maintain hegemony, and they have been going on for a long time. Basic policing can be seen as a combination of two separate functions: the uniform branch which patrols the city, answers radio calls for assistance and is basically in the business of crime prevention; and the detective branch which investigates committed crime, constructs cases against suspects and brings them to court for trial.

A more recent development has been what may be called the 'specials', units concerned with political, military or technological policing. An indication of the various functions in Cape Town can be represented like this.

TABLE 8A
POLICE DIVISIONS IN CAPE TOWN, 1982⁶⁷

DISTRICTS	UNIFORM BRANCH	DETECTIVES	SPECIALS
Cape Town Bellville Athlone Wynberg	*patrolmen	*C.I.D.	*Riot Squad Patrols
Divisional Headquarters	*patrolmen *Patrol Dog Unit	*Murder & Robbery Squad Diamond & Gold Branch *Narcotic Branch Commercial Branch Fingerprint Branch	*Riot Squad Patrols *Security Branch

*Connected by Radio Control

These functions are the result of needs which manifested themselves at different times in the historical development of the state.

The uniform branch is the oldest police force, descending from the soldiers who defended the early Cape settlement in the 17th Century. The first men to whom the term 'police' may be applied were ten farmers recruited in 1686 to form a regular watch for raiding Khoisan. They were termed the 'Burgerwacht'.⁶⁸ The following year a magistrate and police officer were appointed in Cape Town with a few armed constables at their disposal. However the major policing

functions remained in the hands of the 'rural police' which were mainly military units in the frontier areas invested with some police functions.⁶⁹

In 1855 these were amalgamated into the Frontier Armed Mounted Police (later the South African Mounted Riflemen) and charged with the 'maintenance of peace on the frontier'. Troopers were paid 5s.6d. a day and had to provide their own horses, equipment, food and clothing. Their uniform was yellow corduroy with a leather helmet.⁷⁰ The primary function of these Frontier police was the pacification and control of the indigenous people of the colony.

Crime prevention and detection in the Cape has a different and less definite history. By 1817 (when Lord Charles Somerset divided Cape Town into 16 wards) the Burgerwacht had developed into a system of watchmen under the control of a Fiscal.⁷¹ They were supplemented by police riders who were armed and wore a uniform consisting of a green jacket, a yellow waistcoat, and trousers of Flemish linen.⁷² Then in 1839 the city force was reorganised by John King, who had served as an inspector in Sir Robert Peel's Metropolitan Police in London. He oversaw a system of four sub-inspectors, four sergeants and 37 constables.⁷³ By 1844 the Chief Justice, Sir John Wylde, noted a 'total absence of public disorder and the almost absence of crime'.⁷⁴ (However the system was not without its problems: Although the full enrolment of King's force never exceeded 45, between 1840 and 1855 there were 749 changes from dismissals, resignations and deaths.⁷⁵)

The establishment of a stable crime detection unit had to await a more serious need. This came in the 1870s with the discovery of diamonds. About a third of all stones being found at the Kimberley diggings during that period were subsequently stolen.⁷⁶ In 1880 a detective branch was

established by Cape Ordinance II for special duties on the diamond fields and its first compliment was 34 men. The branch was soon expanded to other areas, and parallel development took place in the Transvaal with the formation of Die Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek Politie (ZARP) following the discovery of gold.⁷⁷ These organizations were later to form the basis of a criminal investigation department (C.I.D.).

When the South African Union was created in 1910 the two police forces maintained their separate functions - pacification and crime detection:

There were to be two forces for the Union: the South African Police and the South African Mounted Riflemen (S.A.M.R.). The former were to be a regular police force in terms of the Police Act, but in time of war its members were to be subject to conscription in terms of the Defence Act. Conversely the S.A.M.R. were to be a regular military force under the Defence Act, but in time of peace were to perform police duties exclusively, especially in areas with a fairly dense Bantu population.⁷⁸

The combined units and forces were finally constituted as the South African Police in terms of the Police Act of 1912, and in 1920 the S.A.M.R. was disbanded and its members incorporated into the S.A.P. This amalgamation signals a major shift of emphasis in state control - and for good reason. By 1920 the wars of dispossession had been fought and won by the colonists. With the growth of an urban proletariat, the 'frontier' was shifting into the cities themselves. The struggles, in Gramscian terms, had moved from a war of manoeuvre to a war of fixed position. This shift was evidenced by the activity of the S.A.P. shortly after its establishment on April 1 1913.

Within months of its formation 3,104 policemen were called in to put down a strike by 19,000 workers on the Rand mines. With the aid of the military they succeeded in doing this in 'a bloody confrontation'.⁷⁹ Two months later reinforcements were rushed to Natal to control a passive resistance campaign by Indians refusing to carry passes. The very next month they were back on the Rand in an alert following a national strike by industrial workers. Then in 1921 the police shot dead 163 people during 'the removal for unlawful squatting of a fanatic religious sect known as "Israelites" from the Bulhock location near Queenstown'.⁸⁰ And the following year 7,610 policemen assisted in containing the so-called Rand Revolt of white mineworkers.⁸¹ The pattern of policing was being clearly established.

Moreover, as the cities filled with people and the distance between wealth and poverty grew greater in financial terms and smaller in terms of physical proximity, the problems of daily crime prevention were to escalate. An indication of this can be seen in Tables 8A and 8B. The result was an increasing pressure on the urban police forces. Together with other problems both within and beyond the Force, this situation was to lead to a crisis of urban crime prevention in the 1970s.

(a) The problems of the station cop

In every State, law is an integral part of the organisation of coercion. By issuing rules and passing laws the State establishes an initial field of injunctions, prohibitions and censorship, and in this way institutes the terrain and object of coercion. In this sense, law is a code of organised public coercion. But the efficiency of law is clearly more than the issuing of rules. In a society, particularly a class-divided one like South Africa,

Fig. 8a

Total South Africa:
Assaults (common and CPI)
reported to the police per
100 000 of population




Fig. 8b

Total South Africa:
Murders reported to the
police per 100 000 of
the population



the State takes precedence over law, in that there can be no law here without an apparatus that compels its observance and ensures its social existence. (Strength must remain on the side of the law). The police force forms the front line of this apparatus.

It would be wrong, however, to consider the police to be mere instruments^X of the State. They possess an autonomy, what Poulantzas calls a 'structural specificity', which is not reducible to a simple analysis of state power.⁸² In fact major contradictions exist - both between organs and branches of the state, and between these apparati and civil society. The one which concerns us here, however, is between the laws and directives of the Executive which sanction physical coercion^C, and the fact that the police who carry out these laws have to penetrate into the heart of civil society and win a measure of consent there in order to remain effective.

This problem, which is common to all police forces, is compounded in South^X Africa by several factors. In its current form the law in this country does not so much set a standard of legality from which the police might deviate as to provide a licence to ignore it. The police are sanctioned to search without warrant in many situations, stop meetings, close down premises, shoot to kill and arrest people for a wide range of reasons. Many of their actions carried out 'in the interests of state security' need not be made public, and this secrecy can be corrupting. Given the wide legal sanction offered to the police, it would be surprising if they did not grasp it. Discussing this in Parliament during the 1982 session, Opposition Member H. Pitman observed that:

If one gives unlimited and uncontrolled power to any branch of the executive, they being only human are going to use that power in their work. The problem we have is that power is being given to be exercised in secret without scrutiny by the House, without scrutiny by the public and without the control of the Supreme Court. The blame therefore does not rest entirely with the police.⁸³

Behind this official screen it is obvious that policemen will attempt to cut corners to obtain evidence, particularly if they are dealing with known criminals. The daily demand is on efficiency in solving cases before more harm is done, and the emphasis is on force - get your man and maintain order. The temptation is always there to extort confessions or information, the due process of law can be so easily forgotten (and anyway if the law is a puzzle for the people, it is also a puzzle for the police). For many people on the other side of the charge-office counter, therefore, the rule of law becomes indistinguishable from the rule of force, and justice no more than the right of the stronger.⁸⁴

This seemingly omnipotent position of the police is also reinforced ideologically. Commenting on the increased number of police assaults on members of the public during 1981/82, the chairman of the Civil Rights League, Brian Bishop, said this increase was being supported by the rising sanction of violence used to prevent democratic change through

warped reports of a total onslaught by SABC/TV and by Cabinet Ministers. What is a young policeman to think after hearing a Cabinet Minister say: "When survival is at stake, no rules apply"?

Disrespect for the individual resulting from unjust laws and from certain churches, schools and newspapers ignoring the ancient principles of human dignity and impressing hostile emotions in the young;


Using the police force for unsavoury purposes such as raids on the women and children of Nyanga, intervention in labour disputes or interference with Black Sash stands;

Obsessional denials and cover-ups that encourage immature young men to believe that actions of violence receive support from above.

(Argus 27.2.82)

Fig. 8c

People shot by policemen
in the course of their
duties 1968 - 1978



(Source: Questions in Parliament reported in SAIRR yearbook)

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'Hard' policing in turn leads to bad police/public relations. Speaking in a 1982 Parliamentary debate, Ray Swart pointed out that

no Police Force can operate successfully unless it has support and sympathy of the general public. (In this respect) the lot of the South African policeman is perhaps amongst the most unenviable of any policeman in the world. This is so because of the nature of the society in which he has to operate and because of the unjust and inequitable laws which he is expected to enforce . . . Amongst (black) groups (police) authority is used to enforce (these) unpopular and unjust laws, whether in respect of pass law offences, forced removal of people from their homes, demolition of shacks or whatever it may be . . . in circumstances like that the policeman is very often . . . seen as a symbol of oppression.⁸⁵

In terms of daily crime prevention, therefore, the power available to the police can generate as many problems as solutions for the station-based policeman, isolating him behind his uniform and inside the system he represents. Observing this situation in the United States, William Westley suggests that what tends to get amplified in such circumstances is the use of violence.

The policeman finds his most pressing problems in his relationships to the public. His is a service occupation but of an incongruous kind, since he must discipline those whom he serves. He is regarded as corrupt and inefficient by, and meets with hostility and criticism from, the public. He regards the public as his enemy, feels his occupation to be in conflict with the community, and regards himself to be a pariah. The experience and the feeling give rise to a collective emphasis on

secrecy, an attempt to coerce respect from the public, and a belief that almost any means are legitimate in completing an important arrest.⁸⁶

The police are further isolated from the community by time, function, geography, patterns of sociability and often by race. They work when many people are at home, asleep or at leisure. Often they work long overtime, are separated from their families for considerable spells, and are in many cases temporarily out of phase with the normal population. This social distance increases when the police are confined to living in certain areas, whether they be suburbs or, more particularly, in police barracks or rows (a police estate has been built on the site of District Six). These factors tend to give rise to a police subculture, and this development is reinforced by the fact that all police come up through the ranks and that class distinction among them is not marked.


However this subcultural formation is greatly strengthened when policemen see themselves as an over-stretched and embattled minority faced with an indifferent bureaucracy and a staff shortage of crisis proportions. In 1979 South Africa's police force of 34,646 men was the same size as that of New York City - for a population twice the size of New York spread out over an area five times the size of Britain.⁸⁷ That year a newspaper complained that:

Thirty years ago in Cape Town more than 100 policemen walked the night beat, assisted by a van and five on bicycle patrol. Today there are not more than six men on the streets at night. (Cape Times 15.2.79)

If anything the situation has since worsened. In 1982 the Minister of Law and Order admitted a police shortage among lower ranks in the metropolitan areas of 40 per cent and a total shortfall of 9,000 men.⁸⁸ He appealed for the enlistment of more reserve policemen.

Fig. 8d

Numbers of SAP who bought their discharges as a percent of the total Force 1960 - 1980



(Source: Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Police)

The effect of this manpower drain has been to shorten the long arm of the law in the precise area that is desperate for its extension - routine crime prevention. Police Headquarters were unable to give me numbers and deployment concentration in Cape Town for strategic reasons, but, manpower problems have

appeared in the Press and elsewhere from time to time. In 1975 Police Radio Control received 300,000 calls but could dispatch a patrol van to attend to only 18,000 or 6 per cent (U.S. city police receive on average one million calls and respond to 65 per cent).⁸⁹ The Grassy Park police district in Cape Town contains about 100,000 people and is patrolled by one van and two policemen per shift. The Bonteheuwel/Bishop Lavis district has two vans a shift, but each must deal with one call every 15 minutes (including travel time).⁹⁰ The shortage of policemen has prompted To The Point magazine to describe them as 'South Africa's most wanted men'. (August 1 1975)

Our chaps are feeling the strain and are getting frustrated (a policeman told me). - People criticize us but they don't know our problem. A fellow 'phones and says: 'This is the third time I've 'phoned and that fellow that assaulted me, he's still walking up and down in the street and when are you coming?' Or a policeman's sitting in the office and someone 'phones and says somebody's burgling his house. But the policeman can do nothing because there's nobody to help - he walks out of the office to look for someone and there's not a single person to send. Or there's no van and he must use his own car . . . and there's no refund for petrol. There's just not enough policemen! We're just the step-child of the army. We get what's left - second-class equipment and a tight budget.⁹¹

The detectives fare no better than patrolmen. In Cape Town they can carry up to 80 dockets at once. This means that if they worked an hour a day on each - and this is hardly possible as people have to be traced and questioned - their working week would be 80 hours. Even those men prepared to do this would not be paid overtime for more than four hours a week.⁹² In 1978 the detective staff position for Cape Town was given as follows:⁹³

C.I.D. ONLY: CAPE TOWN	ESTABLISHMENT	ACTUAL STAFF	SHORTFALL
Whites - com. officers	28	36)	16
- non. com. officers	175	151)	
Coloured - com. officers	4	4)	95
- non. com. officers	125	91)	
Indians - com. officers	-	-	
- non. com. officers	-	-	
Blacks - com. officers	-	-)	12
- non. com. officers	42	30)	
TOTALS:	374	312	62(16.6%)

(Source: Questions in Parliament 1979)

The police shortage is undoubtedly a major contributing factor towards the sharp rise during the 1970s of both crimes of violence and property.

'The skollies are making hay now', a policeman told me, 'because they know we can't get to them all'. The incidence of assault in Cape Town can be seen in Figures 8E and 8F of assaulted victims conveyed by the ambulance service during the 1970s.

Fig. 8e




Fig. 8f




Fig. 8g

Reported robberies:
South Africa 1970 - 1980
 (Total increase 47.3%)




Fig. 8i

Reported burglaries:
South Africa 1970 - 1980
 (Total increase 66%)





Fig. 8h

Reported theft of firearms:
South Africa 1970 - 1980
 (Total increase 98.5%)



(Source: Statistical Yearbooks and Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Police)

During the same period the number of reported robberies throughout South Africa increased by 47 per cent (Figure 8G), fire-arm theft went up by 99 per cent (Figure 8H) and burglaries by 66 per cent (Figure 8I). In the last category white residential premises were hardest hit, with an increase of 103 per cent.⁹⁴ In Cape Town during 1981 the non-solution rate of all reported crimes was 56 per cent, with some of the white mountain suburbs reaching as high as 75 per cent.⁹⁵ The solution to this high crime success is often seen as the placing of 'a cop on every corner'. The Viljoen Commission into the South African penal system noted that:

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a policeman patrolling an area on foot is in a far better position to develop an experienced eye and to smell out would-be criminals than a policeman patrolling an area in a vehicle. The vehicle moves too fast to enable the policeman to reconnoitre an area properly. The danger (of vehicle patrols) is that persons who either individually or in groups appear from a moving vehicle to act or move or loiter suspiciously, may be perfectly law-abiding . . . The motor vehicle has its advantages (but) there are criminologists and others who would like to see a full-scale return to the 'bobby on the beat.'⁹⁶


However, such saturation patrolling would produce its own problems. It would be as politically volatile to flood working class areas with policemen as it would be uneconomical (patrol activity being the single most expensive component of police labour). It would also instantly clog the control apparatus, as a policeman pointed out to me:

If we had a full staff - all the men we required - and made the number of arrests we would like to, the people at the courts would chuck up their job and go home. Because at the moment they can't cope, they're so snowed up. They're even having court on Saturday mornings! But then even if the police and the courts could cope, then the prisons couldn't because they're too full. It's a crazy situation.⁹⁷

This no-win situation is depressing for policemen working long hours and seemingly going backwards. Often these problems manifest themselves publicly as complaints about pay. Although policemen do not have a union and complaints are officially deemed 'unpatriotic', pay gripes do find their way into the Press (usually from ex-policemen) or get raised in Parliament (often by the Opposition before an election).

Fig. 8j

Reports about SAP pay in
the Cape Times and Argus
1970 - 1981



As early as 1951 the Former Deputy Commissioner of Police for the Free State, Colonel du Toit, told the Press that:

we have fought for better pensions since 1924 and still nothing has been done. During the past 12 months it has been proved that salaries were inadequate to afford members of the force a decent living. If the cost of living allowance is stopped (as had been suggested) more than half the police will land in the debtors' prison.⁹⁸

In 1958 the Witwatersrand Deputy Commissioner, Colonel Grobler, complained that 'it is not humanly possible for a policeman to run a home and maintain a family on the meagre salary he receives'.⁹⁹ And the following year newspapers disclosed that a third of the entire force was comprised of badly-paid youths under the age of 21.¹⁰⁰ In 1965, after a wage increase described in the Press as 'a few crumbs', policemen were warned that 'in terms of standing orders members of the Force are not allowed to make public any complaints about conditions of service or other administrative grievances', and moves were made to bring police affairs under the Official Secrets Act.¹⁰¹ Five years later policemen were still complaining in the Press that 'a policeman with seven years service earns less than the typist in his new office'.¹⁰²

Pay increases which followed in 1972 were described by a Brigadier as 'utterly scandalous - we can now expect a flood of resignations', and two years later a university professor found in a poll, taken after a pay increment, that policemen were 'bitterly disappointed by what they regarded as inadequate rises and 82 per cent of constables in Johannesburg are thinking of resigning'.¹⁰³ In 1975, the year when police strength was at

its lowest, it was found that 'more than 100 SAP had been given permission to work at remunerative employment in off-hours - including 28 commissioned officers, 18 warrant officers, 50 sergeants and 31 constables'.¹⁰⁴ In 1978 an ex-detective attacked the Minister of Police in the Press for refusing to disclose police salaries 'as if they are a state secret. But the real reason (he said) is that they know that if the public knew what a policeman earned they would get no recruits'.¹⁰⁵ The following year, after disclosures about poor police pay in the Press, the Minister introduced a Bill to amend the Police Act 'to prohibit the publication of certain statements' about police conditions. The Bill was passed, and carried a fine of R10,000 or 5 years in jail for publishing 'uncleared or untruthful reports' about the police.¹⁰⁶ In 1981 it was disclosed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police that, despite a 15 per cent pay rise, 166 policemen a month had left the force in 1980 and by 1981 the figure was up to 200.¹⁰⁷ The following year police shortages were being described in Parliament as having reached 'crisis proportions', with shortages running at 40 per cent in some areas. 'Policemen these days are only working because they want to be policemen (a Major told me) not for the money or the conditions. You can't get anything out of the Public Services Commission (which determines wages)'.

Considering the problems of staff shortages and discontentment 'hard' policing is to be expected. Nobody can condone the action of a detective who carries a suspect to the cells in the boot of his car

(See Argus 4.4.82). But given that the suspect is dangerous, that there is no patrol van, that the car is probably the detective's own, and that there is no colleague to help restrain the suspect, his seemingly callous action can at least be understood as a choice between

unconventional methods or letting the suspect go. Impossible situations give rise to improbable and often morally unacceptable solutions. The frustration of confronting a situation beyond his control was clear when I asked a policeman what could be done about the city gangs:

I don't know what you can do - except maybe Nazi style line them up and shoot them. But that's not in the law . . . even the public think sentences are too soft. You should remove skollies from society to solve the problem. But then where would you put them? Perhaps you could send them to help Britain in the Falklands! But I say you cannot solve the problem according to the law . . . You need to drag them in here and give them all hangpaal (death sentences), you need public hanging or something.¹⁰⁸

I will discuss presently the effects of the policing crisis on crime prevention patterns on the Cape Flats. But to understand this it is first necessary to look briefly at the rise of the police 'specials', the Security Branch and the Special Task Force.

(c) The rise of the 'specials'

If the incorporation of the Mounted Riflemen into the SAP marked a new phase in the class struggle (a shift from frontier warfare to urban control), then Sharpville was to mark another. The repression of black political and labour organisations drove them underground and shifted the struggle to one of sabotage and armed resistance. Many black leaders were imprisoned. Others fled the country and began the struggle from beyond the borders. In the undeclared 'state of emergency' which followed the Security Branch was formed 'to maintain internal security in regard to sabotage, Communism and other subversive activities'.¹⁰⁹ Its formation was to erase any ambiguity between policing and politics.


It is understandably difficult to gather information on the rise of the SB. By 1963 the Commissioner of Police, General Keevy, could announce that it had 'more than trebled to meet any threat to the country's safety'.¹¹⁰

An indication of its growth from this point can be seen from annual Treasury allocations for 'secret services':¹¹¹


1963	R	25,000
1964	R	224,000
1965	R	312,000
1967	R	412,000
1968	R5,	281,000

'These financial statistics' commented The Argus on the 1968 figures, 'confirm the importance now being played by Lt. Gen. H.S. van der Bergh, former Chief of Security, Police and now the Prime Minister's special adviser on security matters'.¹¹² The importance of Van der Bergh was confirmed when he emerged as head of the newly-formed Bureau for State Security (BOSS) which was to centralise all security planning. However, after van der Bergh was discredited by the 'Muldergate' leaks, BOSS was effectively downgraded (first to the Department National Security, DONS, and then the National Intelligence Service, NIS), and placed in subordination to the Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) which emerged as the leading security service. The Security branch, however, has continued to grow, and has become known and feared for its ruthlessness and efficiency. It is of mounting concern that between 1963 and 1982 at least 50 people have died in detentions initiated by the SB.

SA Police budget
1974 - 1980



Expenditure on
police secret
services
1964 - 1969



X

A police unit of more central importance to this study, however, is the Special Task Force. Its growth dates from the mid-1970s. By this time the African National Congress had re-oriented its strategy to that of an exiled liberation movement - at a time when inflation and repression was sharpening trade union action. When the Frontline states surrounding South Africa became independent they also formed a base for guerilla action, orienting the SADF towards border conflict. And in the cities, with rapidly growing populations, unemployment and labour action, the undermanned police force was increasingly less able to feel secure about working-class action or urban 'disorders'. From the perspective of the State, the war of fixed position was undoubtedly seen as shifting to a war of manoeuvre.

If the growth of SADF influence was one strategy to contain this movement, another was the creation (in 1976) of an urban army called the Special Task Force. A captain in the Force described its specificity this way:


The army's involved in conventional warfare. We study urban warfare and guerilla tactics. This is a completely new field. We liaise with the Special Branch and the army and work with the police. We go into everything.

114

Plans for the Task Force were begun in 1975, a time when the strength of the SAP was at its lowest ebb and the recession was at its height.

Fig. 8k

Number of policemen in
South Africa per 100 000
of population 1960 - 1982



The first urban units were formed as Riot Squads in early 1976 and forced their way to public attention as the men in camouflage and Hippo gun-wagons at the heart of upheavals in June that year. John Kane-Berman estimates that at least 700 people - mostly youths - were killed during the boycotts.¹¹⁵ It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Riot Police were the cause of much of the violence in an otherwise peaceful boycott by black pupils refusing to be taught in Afrikaans. The Cillié Commission into the disturbances was told that 92 of the 97 people who died in the boycotts in Cape Town had been killed by the police. Of the 417 injured, 387 were injured by the police.¹¹⁶ There were also reports and allegations of beatings and apparently unprovoked attacks on and shootings of children.¹¹⁷ Speaking in Parliament in January 1977, Helen Suzman said that she heard

a great many ugly stories about unprovoked violence in almost every township where there were disturbances. I have statements and affidavits which make one's hair stand up.

Of course, the police have denied all charges of unprovoked violence. They say they shoot only when their lives are endangered, and I have no doubt that in some cases this is certainly true, but equally in other cases it is manifestly untrue . . . Africans say to me: 'The police can say what they like. We saw what happened and we know what happened; we don't care how many denials are made.' As I say, I have no doubt, from what I have heard, that there were many cases of unprovoked violence . . . I believe that the allegation that the riot police used arms indiscriminately is borne out by numerous eye-witnesses.¹¹⁸


The official view of the exercise was captured some months later by the Minister of Police, Mr. Jimmy Kruger, when he opened a new police station in Heilbron:

It is so that the all-knowing God thought fit to exercise His authority on earth using the service of people, parents, officials, the Government. Therefore the wearers of the fine uniforms of the police are also the mandate-holders of God . . . Evil and permissive forces are almost unstopably at work in the process of destroying authority in nearly every sphere (but) timeous and responsible action has, fortunately, always controlled this degeneration of life.¹¹⁹

Nobody is recruited into the Riot Squads without having first seen service against guerillas in a neighbouring country (Angola, Zimbabwe and possibly Mozambique). The cream of the local Squads are then picked to serve in the Special Task Force which is in turn the recruiting ground for an even more elite unit known simply as Koefoert. This unit is fully operational in the border wars at all times, using this arena as a training ground for urban insurgency and a testing site for new weaponry. A captain in the Cape Town Riot Squad told me:

The major guidelines for the Local Reaction Squads come from the Special Task Force. The Task Force men are trained in urban control. There's nothing they can't do -from parachutes to diving, from driving a bulldozer to a Mini. These guys are incredible! They're based in Pretoria but at the moment they're operational. They are specially equipped and they're having huge successes on the border. You're totally into a different world here. We're not seeing ghosts in every cupboard. But we believe in preparedness.¹²⁰

The development of the urban para-military units can be seen from the number of men being trained in counter-insurgency and anti-riot action. Starting in 1960, the numbers had increased 28 times by 1970. Between 1970 and 1980 the numbers had jumped by a further 150 per cent.¹²¹ It may be simply coincidental that the years in which the greatest numbers of police were trained in riot action (1970/71, 1975, 1979) coincided with flashpoints in the black struggle in the years which followed (the Durban strikes in 1971/2, Soweto in 1976 and Elsie's River in 1980).



(Source: Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Police)

In Cape Town in mid-1982 the Riot Squad consisted of around 70 men under a 'Riot Colonel'. They were operating independently of the South African Police and, according to the Captain I spoke to, were being paid from a separate source. 'We are the military wing of the South African Police', I was told, 'but we are not like the army. We are not centralised. Each city operates under its own initiative along the guidelines of the Special Task Force. The men all know each other and every morning you see them on parade. They have a very high level of training and morale. We also are always gathering information. At every incident you will see there someone of the Riot Squad with a clip-board making notes. We are the eyes and ears of the Force'.¹²² The Squad also has an 'incident vehicle' - a 'driving armoury with an operations room, five telephones and 200m of cable that can connect with anywhere in the country almost immediately'.¹²³

But the Riot Squad also has another function, which is important in the context of this study. During 'peacetime', or as the Head of Criminal Investigation told me, 'in between riots', it is considered to be the Crime Prevention Unit. Its members patrol the streets in civilian clothes, on foot or with patrolmen on their beat, 'checking out the scene'. They compile photographic lists of law-breakers and liaise with the uniform patrols and detectives. The squad's function, I was told, was not to investigate cases but to identify them. The purpose of the patrols was clearly to get to 'know' the city both physically and socially, and to keep the men on the spot when they were needed. The riot captain put it this way:

In between riots we train and care for our weapons. But we have X amount of men and we have to keep them fully employed - there's money at stake. We cannot train them all day, they'd get fed up. Now you've got to play around with ideas to keep them busy. So: Crime prevention! And when you need them, they're in.¹²⁴

The Riot Squads in South Africa are similar in many ways to the Special Patrols in Britain and the Los Angeles Police Department's Special Weapons and Tactics Unit (SWAT) - with the same advantages to the State and the same problems. The advantages are speed, secrecy and military ruthlessness. At a time when city police forces are under-manned, overburdened and have to maintain a level of community credibility to remain effective, the Riot Squads can move in where patrolmen cannot tread. They have access to sophisticated weapons and technology, are at peak training and have a command and communications network ultimately responsive to Pretoria. Indeed they are the urban shock-troops of the Executive.

But they are not unproblematical. For maximum effectiveness the Riot Squads need a minimum of legal constraint, and as we have seen, they have received this. Virtually the only public control over the action of the Squads therefore becomes negative publicity. But almost all of their activities fall under Section 27C of the Police Act and may not be communicated or written about. When such para-military units are controlled by rules created within the police bureaucracy, when they operate beyond the constraint of the public, they can get out of control and have a tendency towards over-policing and excessive violence. In this way they can actually contribute to public violence and accelerate the decline in legitimacy of the state.

This over-policing by the Special Patrols was criticised by the Scarman Report into the 1981 riots in the London suburb of Brixton. The report found that 'hard' policing in the predominantly black area culminated in an exercise known as 'Operation Swamp'. Hundreds of policemen were poured into the area and more than 1,000 people were stopped and searched. 'Courtesy . . . was sometimes lacking.'¹²⁵ The angry response by the community was described by the Guardian as

appalling scenes of violence and mayhem . . . It was as if we were brought to the edge of an abyss beyond which lay anarchy, the breakdown of law and order, and social catastrophe.¹²⁶

In his recommendations, Lord Scarman laid particular stress on accountability, which

renders the police answerable for what they do. Thereby it prevents them from slipping into an enclosed fortress of inward thinking and social isolation which would in the long term result in a siege mentality - the police in their fortress (happy as long as it is secure) and the rest of us outside, unhappy, uncertain and insecure (for we do not know what they will do or how they will do it).¹²⁷

A Los Angeles Times report indicates a similar over-reaction from a SWAT force in the arrest of Black Panther members at the party headquarters in 1969:

. . . a 40-man police team clad in black coveralls and black baseball caps, armed with automatic rifles and sniper rifles, opened fire on the headquarters. During the siege that followed police planted dynamite charges on the roof to blast their way in from the top, a police helicopter circled over the building, and an armoured personnel carrier stood by for possible use in the final assault . . . Thirteen Panthers were arrested for conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to commit assault on a police officer, and conspiracy to possess illegal weapons . . . the jury acquitted them of all but the last and least serious charge. The jury's decision showed that the L.A. Police Department's attempts to portray the Panthers as a threat to the community failed, and that it was clear to the citizens of Los Angeles that the Panthers had been set up and attacked by an overzealous and over-armed police assault team, for reasons that had nothing to do with public safety.¹²⁸

In a similar attack on a house containing members of the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) in 1975, a SWAT force of 29 members and seven FBI men used weapons which included four automatic weapons that expended 5371 rounds

and launched 83 tear gas cannisters into an area equivalent to a 25 x 30 foot room. At one point the SWAT commander was reported to have requested fragmentation grenades. The SLA members were killed, the house was levelled and surrounding homes, cars and apartments were riddled with bullets.¹²⁹


As a result of an amendment to the Police Act, passed shortly after the upheavals in Cape Town in 1980, Riot Squad actions cannot be reported in South Africa. However certain facts did emerge in the Press about the origins of the flare-up between boycotting students and the police during that period. On May 29 the Argus reported that in Elsies River, during an extremely orderly boycott of classes by Coloured pupils, a police van

suddenly stopped and policemen, both uniformed and in camouflage gear, jumped out and baton-charged people on the pavements. People fled down side streets, across backyards and into houses. One youth was caught, brought to the ground and beaten by at least four policemen with batons . . . The police continued with this type of action along Halt Road and minutes later a car driven by a white woman had its side windows smashed by stones . . . a group again gathered on the corner of Halt Road and 20th Avenue about 2.30 p.m. According to Mrs. Enid November, who lives opposite, a blue kombi drove past and was stoned by the group. A man lying flat on the back seat of the kombi passed a shotgun to the driver who opened fire on the crowd. The men in the kombi were not wearing full camouflage gear, according to Mrs. November. It has been established, however, that the kombi is registered under the South African Police.¹³⁰

Two youths were killed in the shotgun fire. Anger simmered over the deaths but order was maintained by student leaders as Riot Police reinforcements were airlifted into the city.¹³¹ Then on June 17, on the second day of a


Tyres burning in the streets of Elsie's River June 1980







Police move in During
the 1980 schools' boycotts
in Cape Town








MANS SHOP



WASHOP


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




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work stay-away to mark the anniversary of the Soweto unrest, youths began burning disused motor car tyres in the streets of the townships and stoned vehicles. In the confusion the gangs began to loot shops. Police used this as a signal to open fire on the crowds which had gathered on the streets. Although the police were later to be praised for their great restraint, at least 40 people were shot dead and many more injured.¹³² It was officially announced that the police had been issued with 'orders to shoot to kill', but this statement was later retracted.¹³³

These examples suggest that in all these cases triggers were being pulled too soon and that little negotiation or understanding existed between the community and Riot Squad-type units. But while the state might be hard-pressed to justify such action to the public, it is an effective form of crisis-policing for two reasons. Firstly it tends to blurr the boundary between political action and crime. This is particularly true when the Riot Squads become Crime Prevention Units 'between riots'. And secondly it serves to generate fear in populations in 'problem' areas, making them, in Lord Scarman's words, 'unhappy, uncertain and insecure', not knowing what the police will do or how they will do it. This fear is amplified when communities have been disrupted through urban relocation and housed in new townships, the very shape of which reinforce population control.

(d) New patterns of policing

One may ask what all this has to do with street gangs. The answer is that gang activity, whether brutal, acquisitive or simply social, is a complex network of relationships, and in this the police are key actors. For the purpose of illustration one could narrow the scenario of law and order down to a battle between two rival gangs, both composed of young, single, working-

class males, each seeking territorial control over a class habitat. But the difference is that one mob have the full weight of the State behind them, the other only themselves and their mates to fall back on. The scores they have to settle revolve, in the end, around the question 'Who rules?'¹³⁴ Since the 1940s the strategies of the street gangs has altered only in the magnitude of their members. From the other side, however, definite tactical changes have occurred.

Informal policing: This is not a new strategy, but simply a survival tactic developed by policemen faced with the sharp disparity between Police College and the real world. On the beat in a working class township the patrolman is not simply the upholder of law and order he was taught to be, but an actor in a complex social network in which he is both aggressor and victim.

On the one side he has trouble with the official 'system'. Firstly policemen see the complexity of the law as a threat to them when in the hands of a clever lawyer in court. And secondly known criminals are freed through what a policeman sees as technical loopholes in the judicial process. According to a detective interviewed by Cathy Albert in Cape Town, 'even when he was 100 per cent sure of a case he could only be 50-50 per cent sure of getting a conviction'.¹³⁵

There's a big problem with the courts (a detective told me) You get a skollie, he's a killer and he's been living away from home for years but he's under 18. Then when you get him to court you have to have his parents with him or a welfare officer. And his mother says he's a good boy and he's the only breadwinner and she's under oath and you have to believe her but it's all lies. And when he gets sentenced he gets sentenced as a kid and he goes to Porter and that's like a holiday for him. And next week he's back here, escaped from Porter.

Also in court cases witnesses get smashed. The gang says: 'You testify and you and your family are dead'. And you can't get witnesses - they don't want to testify in court although they will tell you all privately.

Then if gangs fight they will come in here to the Police Station and lay charges against each other. But in court the complainant is a gangster and the accused is a gangster and the witnesses are gangsters and they're all under oath and all telling the truth of course but their stories are all totally different and the case is thrown out. Or they all withdraw charges. It's useless!¹³⁶

Given the porous nature of the justice system from the point of view of the detective or patrolman, the temptation to give a street youth a thrashing for some misdemeanour or an hour in the van and let him go must be strong indeed. However any doubt about the justice system leaves the policeman in a dilemma about his base-line of operation. It is here that an informal or grass-roots police science grows, where norms and techniques are absorbed from fellow officers with experience 'on the ground'. It is all part of 'getting to know the area', finding out who the informers are, who runs the rackets and who to leave alone. This was well captured by William Whyte in his study of Chicago street-corner society in 1943:

Observation of the situation in Cornerville indicates that the primary function of the police department is not the enforcement of the law but the regulation of illegal activities . . . Under these circumstances the smoothest course for the officer is to conform to the social organization with which he is in direct contact and at the same time try to give the impression to the outside world that he is enforcing the law. He must play an elaborate role of make-believe and, in so doing,

he serves as a buffer between divergent social organisations with their conflicting standards . . . An outbreak of violence arouses the 'good people' to make demands for law enforcement . . . therefore it is in the interest of the department to help maintain a peaceful racket organisation. Since competition in illegal activities leads to violence, it is also in the interest of the department to co-operate with the racket organisation in eliminating competition. By regulating the racket and keeping the peace, the officer can satisfy the demands for law enforcement with a number of token arrests and be free to make his adjustment to the local situation.¹³⁷

Even if policemen worked to the rule book, this would (as we have seen) simply snarl up the courts and the prisons. They are therefore confronted with the impossible task of enforcing law or order and applying norms in the townships which they would not apply in the white areas. They must perform a delicate balance between productivity and acceptability within a lay police theory of crime and enforcement. And in a staffing crisis the police are drawn, through the necessity to maintain order, further into the township networks. In his study of the police, Paul Rock found that when crime

is transformed into a stable organisation which generates a steady income, engages in a multitude of petty transactions and supports a network of dependants in a community, integration (with the police) is enhanced. Police action in this relationship will tend to focus on protecting it from disruption by other criminals or agencies, on ensuring that the activity of the organised criminal is confined within mutually defined limits of licence, and on maintaining a token display of control. When other segments of deviancy require extra attention, this particular form of rule-breaking can become virtually unpoliced.¹³⁸

In my work with gangs a feature which constantly startled me was the arrival of policemen at a gang headquarters while I was there. They would hardly glance at me (an obvious outsider) or the circle of men passing around a white pipe, and would move into private discussion with the gang leader.

A detective later clarified this for me:

We work with the gang leaders. If we go to them and say we are looking for so and so they bring him here to the station. They know that if they don't we can get them, and they want peace with us. Also if we want to find out about this gang we go to the leader of the opposition gang and they tell us everything they know. We pay for information.¹³⁹

In this way gangs and officers can co-police an area, keeping it 'quiet', picking up 'nuisances' and leaving the cores of gangs untouched. A case study done for this book by Wilfried Schärf found this delicate co-operation operating around a shebeen in Elsie's River.

Joker's shebeen operation made it necessary for him to exercise a control over his area which approximated the law. His private police (a gang) and their allies were a constant presence, but they were not the only contenders for power in the township. Opposition shebeeners' gangs and the SAP competed for that distinction.

From the Police point of view it is clear that a number of shebeener's functions actually complemented their work. The 30-odd gangsters kept some 500 people in a state of relative submission using unorthodox techniques. Their street domination which inhibited mobility, social interaction and the possible release of tensions and conflicts outside the home, probably intensified conflict in the

homes. And their intimidating presence and the threat of reprisals rendered the number of crimes reported to the police a mere fraction of 'crimes' actually committed.

The gang, of course, performed a lot of its own policing functions, enforcing its own 'law' and processing 'offenders' by its own informal 'justice' procedures. The only counter to this power for the community was a seldom vocalised belief that police protection and law enforcement was their just due.

An aspect of the shebeen's private policing methods was its widespread network of contacts and alliances, all furnishing information which was probably inaccessible to the police. Joker's ability to extract almost any information he desired from the community was a vital asset to him in his relation to the police. They frequently approached him for clues and leads in pursuance of routine crime detection, often using his pointers as the only information in an investigation. Joker fostered this connection as it extended his influence and power in the township. The information he divulged was obviously never chosen to the detriment of his business interests. Indeed, in that respect the official police force worked for him, as their mutual interests coincided. The provisions of the Police Act unfortunately preclude any further development of this theme.¹⁴⁰

The police, on the other hand, had to be seen as the ruling force in the township. Not all aspects of the shebeen's existence dovetailed with the interests they were expected to protect. But they focused their battle for township dominance on the most visible, the least experienced, and the most replaceable members of the shebeen, the guards. They were the frontline of Joker's business, peddling drugs and dispensing violence, whereas his power was far more subtly disguised. The police continuously harrassed the guards by repeated searches for drugs and dangerous weapons.

The guards, in turn, developed their own strategies to cope under such conditions, increasing their shrewdness in concealing incriminating evidence. If they failed, the guards faced processing through the justice industry (police, court, prison and back), but their age usually favoured a speedy ejection, juveniles frequently being sentenced to strokes rather than imprisonment for minor offences.¹⁴¹ Joker chose youngsters as his employees for this reason, and because the reserve army of unemployed young gangsters could easily replace any convicted members in shebeen duties. The dependence on Joker and fear of reprisals constrained the arrested guards from betraying him as their source of supply, even if it was common knowledge in the township.

Hardly any of the police activity struck at the core of the operation. But Joker was also an extremely shrewd businessman who knew how to manipulate other gang-members so that he was only minimally exposed to the police. And his diverse alliances, backed up by the force he commanded, were relied on when his safety or business interests were in jeopardy. Witnesses who intended to testify against him were 'persuaded' to change their perception of the facts. His business continued to thrive but there was no guarantee that it always would. The forces that sustained it had to be carefully nurtured and balanced against each other without the contradictions becoming too apparent.¹⁴²

Shebeeners' gangs are therefore performing a quasi-policing role in pursuance of their survival needs which to some degree dovetails with the State's duty to reproduce a labour force that is suitably subdued and politically docile. The division of potential worker solidarity that gangs contribute towards is also in the political interests of the State.

Informal policing by both police and syndicate bosses is therefore effective in terms of state control, but ineffective for the community as it tends to focus on high-profile street youths and leaves most of the big rackets untouched. This slack is in some sense taken up by the specialist units such as the Narcotics Bureau and the Murder and Robbery Squad, which can come in 'over the top' of regular policing. But if crime figures are any indication these are unable to reduce property crime or urban violence. Several other lines of defence have therefore been constructed.

Informers, vigilantes, guards and the Reserves: At the time of writing Cape Town was clearly in a transitional phase between precinct and para-military policing. The confusion of the period was giving rise to a range of strategies from both policemen and the public. The oldest technique is that of financial 'inducements' for information. It was not possible to find figures on the total amounts paid to police informers, but it is undoubtedly considerable. 'We have plenty of informers', a detective told me, 'we must because there are not many of us and there are many skollies'. The informer network is bolstered by 'agreements' and 'favours' worked out between the police and the community, and by 'leaning' on certain individuals who are threatened with arrest for some misdemeanour unless they 'squeal'.

A more organised response to the police shortage is the Police Reserve Force. Started in the 1970s, it had 11,152 adult members and 275 schoolboys by 1982.¹⁴³ Reservists are simply unpaid policemen, and were described by a policeman as 'the best thing that ever happened to the Force. We cannot work without them any longer. In fact we misuse their goodness. If they stopped working for us there would be chaos'.¹⁴⁴ However they are also the cause of some resentment in the SAP.

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Reservists often give the force a bad name (a newspaper was told). They are just not experienced and make mistakes . . . and we get the blame. Why doesn't the department employ more police? They are using cheap labour by taking on reservists (and) closing their eyes to the alarming need for more policemen.¹⁴⁵

A community response to rising insecurity in the townships has been the creation of vigilantes or citizen patrols, a move supported by the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce (which also called for the formation of a municipal police force). Several vigilante patrols were started during the 1970s but most of them collapsed. One reason for this is that they were penetrated by the gangs who then used them for their own purposes. The other reason was SAP refusal to recognise the patrols, probably because they tended to upset the delicate balance of control in the townships. In 1977 the Minister of Police told Parliament that

the formation of vigilantes is not supported because the Police Reserve Force offers adequate opportunities to members of the public to perform vigilance duties in their own areas.¹⁴⁶

Industry's response to a fall-off in police surveillance and rising urban property crime has been a massive increase during the 1970s of the use of private security guards. These men receive a brief training in security work and are issued with a gun. In 1982 the numbers of contract guards in South Africa was 50,000, a force 56 per cent bigger than the entire SAP. (This figure excludes 'in-house' guards employed by individual firms as part of their staff.)¹⁴⁷ This trend follows that of the more industrialised countries. In New York, for example, there are 30,000 policemen and 40,000 private guards.¹⁴⁸ Cape Town alone had 4,500 such guards in 1982.

These forms of policing operate largely as crime preventors - patrolling, guarding and finding out information. Increasingly, however, strategies to contain social deviancy in South Africa have been moving towards control through the generation of fear.

Dragnets and raids: The growing para-military nature of state policing can be seen in the decline of street policing and an escalation of what the Press like to call 'police swoops'. These take two forms (which are not unrelated), dragnets for 'subversive political elements' and pass raids which scoop up anyone who looks 'suspicious'.

The former cause greater public outcry, possibly because the people picked up are usually held under laws which allow detention without trial for indefinite periods, and because pass raids are far more frequent occurrences, taking place almost daily. The impression is inescapable that political dragnets are often for the purpose of compiling information and inducing fear in those opposed to the state, as this newspaper article indicates:

When the Security Police swooped on the homes of more than 150 South Africans last October in a pre-dawn raid one Sunday morning, strong hints were dropped that a nation-wide conspiracy to undermine the State had been uncovered.

Now that a year has passed since those raids the time is opportune to inquire what happened to the "conspiracy".

Here are the facts: of the 150 people raided, 48 were taken into detention without trial.

Of these 48 detainees, 36 were released - no charges having been brought against them. Some were released within weeks, but others were held in custody incommunicado, for months.

Of the remaining 12 detainees, one was charged under the Suppression of Communism and Terrorism Acts, but acquitted and allowed to return to Britain, and another detainee, who gave evidence at his trial, was released and also allowed to leave the country.

A third detainee was released after he had paid a R20 admission of guilt fine on a drugs charge, and a fourth detainee was convicted under the Suppression of Communism Act and Customs and Excise Act of being in unlawful possession of banned books.

This left eight detainees. Three were released and charged under the Suppression of Communism Act but estreated their bail and escaped to Botswana.

Of the remaining five detainees, one was Ahmed Timol, who fell to his death from the tenth floor of police headquarters in Johannesburg and four were each sentenced to five years' imprisonment under the Terrorism Act for conspiring with Timol to promote the cause of the banned African National Congress and Communist Party in South Africa.

Excluding the three who estreated their bail, this means the State secured Terrorism Act convictions against only four people, and lesser convictions against two others.

That is the sum total of the "conspiracy" for which more than 150 people - among them 10 lecturers, two bishops, a newspaper editor and other prominent citizens - were rudely roused from their beds.

(Sunday Times 12.11.72)

Unlike police dragnets, 'crime swoops' have the air of military invasions into enemy territory, with heavy vehicles, dogs, machine guns and often men in camouflage. The Executive has admitted that on occasion the army has been used in these exercises.¹⁴⁹ The success of these raids is made possible by the sealed-off structure of the townships with their limited access roads and broad encircling buffer strips. This pin-point saturation policing can be seen as a new form of political domination and procedure in the management/reproduction of labour power, regulating urban migrancy and calling the unemployed to heel. In this regard, Poulantzas points out that with the decline of popular democracy

the traditional form of social control, which is organised by general and universal norms defining guilt and distinguishing loyal subjects from those outside the law, is now combined with individualized regulation that starts out from the 'mentality' (the presumed intention) of each member of the society considered as a potentially guilty suspect. The general enclosure of outlaws in such total institutions as prisons or asylums . . . is now articulated to a process whereby diverse networks spreading throughout society's structure the population through administrative-police procedures adapted to the specifications of each category of suspect. From the punishable offence laid down by a universal and general act of parliament, we are moving towards the 'suspicious circumstance' whose contours are administratively defined by supple, malleable and particularist regulation . . .¹⁵⁰

In the creation of group areas we are also witnessing the creation of 'prisons with horizontal walls' (Mumford) which can be sealed off by state warders in times of trouble. Cape Town citizens were first made aware of the new-style policing in 1961 with a massive drive by 'officers and men of the uniformed

police, CID and Security Police' to pick up 'loiterers, idlers and otherwise unoccupied people of all races found in the streets or on premises in suspicious circumstances' or people who 'could not give satisfactory account of themselves'.¹⁵¹ In parallel raids throughout the country about 10,000 people, described by police as 'mostly idlers, vagrants, tsotsis and foreign Natives', were held.¹⁵² Three months later another such raid was carried out on the Cape Flats by 600 policemen working through the night, and similar swoops were reported in the city in 1966 (400 arrested), 1969 (1,032 arrested), 1971 (543 arrested), 1973 (1,270 arrested) and increasingly from 1976 (although Press reports decreased).¹⁵³

The dictionary definition of a raid is 'a sudden swift inroad, originally of horsemen, for assault or seizure'. As the class struggle in South Africa polarises, the raid and the spy - the original function of the 17th Century border patrols - are becoming the pattern of urban policing. Crime prevention - daily uniformed police penetration into civil society for the maintenance of peace and social harmony - is a withering function often dependent on crime syndicates for its operation. Working in the interface areas, therefore, one gets a strong feeling that battle lines are being drawn in a conflict that transcends crime.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 8

1. Nusas: Total War in South Africa: militarization and the apartheid state, October 1982, p 4.
2. Sunday Times 13.2.77. Quoted in W.I.P. September 1977 p 39.
3. Ibid. 13.3.77.
4. W.I.P. 24, 1982, p 12.
5. Public address 19.7.82.
6. See Constitutional Proposals in W.I.P. 24, 1982, p 13.
7. Ibid. p 13.
8. This is based on a reading of Hansard for the period - particularly the various Appropriation Bills.
9. Chester Crocker: Current and Projected Military Balances in Southern Africa, in Bissel and Crocker (eds): South Africa in the 1980s, Westview Press, 1979, p 81.
10. Argus newsclips.
11. Argus newsclips.
12. Argus newsclips.
13. White Paper on Defence 29.3.77 Section 5.
14. Ibid. Section 10.
15. Ibid. p 15.
16. Ibid. p 16 and Militarization in South Africa, W.I.P. 24, p 18.
17. Poulantzas, N: State, Power, Socialism, New Left Books, London, 1978, p 224.
18. Ibid. pp 222, 223.
19. Natal Witness 25.8.77.
20. Ibid.
21. Sunday Express 22.5.77.
22. Proposed early in 1982.
23. Poulantzas, op. cit. p 228.
24. See Ibid p 229.
25. The Citizen newspaper and Pace.
26. Dugard, J: Human Rights and the South African Legal Order, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1978 p 181.

27. Ibid p 181.
28. Ibid. p 182.
29. Mathews, A: The Darker Reaches of Government: access to information about public administration in three societies, Juta, Cape Town, 1978 p 145
30. Ibid p 146.
31. Dugard, op. cit. p 186.
32. In addition, of course, all big English-language newspapers are owned either by the Argus Company or South African Allied Newspapers, subsidiary companies of giant corporations which are increasingly pacing the State's moves towards authoritarian statism.
33. Poulantzas, op. cit. p 226.
34. See Doreen J McBarnet: Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice, McMillan, London, 1981 p 4.
35. Pashukanis (1978) quoted in Pat Carlin: Radical Issues in Criminology, Robertson, Oxford, 1980 p 18.
36. See E M Burchell & P.M.A. Hunt: South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol I, Juta, Cape Town, 1970. The first chapter of this work deals authoritatively with the historical development of South African criminal law.
37. In particular, P M A Hunt: South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol 11 2nd edition (by J R L Milton) Juta, Cape Town, 1982 and J C de Wet and H L Swanepoel Strafreg, Butterworths, Durban, 1975.
38. Burchell and Hunt op.cit.pp 55-6
39. S.E.S.A. 3 (Nasionale Bookhandel, London, 1971) p 493. The definition in the standard legal texts (footnote 37 above) is more complex (cf Hunt op cit p 602 et seq). However, these complexities do not affect the general point made here.
40. Hunt op cit p 467.
41. Ibid p 340.
42. These figures come from:
Argus and Cape Times newspaper reports of questions asked in Parliament over the decade.
South African Institute of Race Relations yearbooks.
The figures for the shootings during the 1976 boycotts are conservatively estimated by John Kane-Berman at 700 in his book Soweto.
43. Cape Times and Argus 11.8.82.
44. Sumner, C (ed): Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment, Heineman, London, 1982, p 10.

45. Platt, T: Prospects for a radical criminology in the USA. In Taylor, Walton & Young (eds): Critical Criminology, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1975 p 103.
46. Summer, op cit p 10.
47. Poulantzas, op cit p 90.
48. Stuart Hall et al: Policing the Crisis p 359.
49. Centre for Applied Legal Studies: Report on the Rabie report: an examination of security legislation in South Africa, Wits. Occasional Papers 3, March 1982 p 95 (data from the Gollup poll were also drawn from this report).
50. Quoted in S.A. Institute of Race Relations Yearbook for 1971, p 76.
51. SAIRR yearbook for 1977, p 107.
52. Hans Magnus Enzenberger: Raids and reconstructions: essays in politics, crime and culture, Pluto Press, London, 1976.
53. Ibid p 77.
54. The extreme form of this is the cedeing of power to perhaps one single individual to press a single button that would bring on a nuclear war which could destroy the entire planet.
55. Enzenberger, op. cit. p 94.
56. Ibid p 73.
57. Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jeggerson, John Clarke, Brian Roberts: Policing the Crisis: mugging, the State, and law and order, MacMillan, London, 1980, p 225.
58. Cape Times 10.9.81
59. Weekend Argus 12.9.81.
60. Joyce Waring and John Wiley in the Cape Times 3.9.81.
61. F J Le Roux, Hansard, Wednesday, September 16 1981 cols 3952/3954.
62. See Rape: Criminology sourcebook 6, Institute of Criminology, UCT, January 1982.
63. Cape Times 16.8.82.
64. Ibid
65. Quoted by Ray Swart (PFPP) in Parliament, Friday May 17 1982, Hansard col 6303.
66. Quotation by the new Minister of Law and Order (Le Grange) on Friday May 7 1982, Hansard Col 6369.
67. Supplied by the South African Police.
68. Standard Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa, (SESA), Nasionale Boekhandel, London, 1973 p 633.

69. Ibid p 635.
70. Ibid p 635.
71. Ibid p 633.
72. Ibid p 633.
73. Ibid p 633.
74. Ibid p 634.
75. Ibid p 634.
76. Ibid p 634.
77. Eddie Koch: The development of a police force on the Witwatersrand, 1886-1906, in Africa Perspective, No. 8, July 1978.
78. S.E.S.A. op cit p 625.
79. Ibid p 629.
80. Ibid p 629.
81. Ibid p 629.
82. Poulantzas, N: Political Power and Social Classes, New Left Books, London, 1973 p 115.
83. Hansard Friday May 7 1982 col 6353.
84. See Kathleen Albert: The police and their image: a comparative study of the American and Cape Town Policemen, Social Science Masters Thesis (unpublished) UCT 1978.
85. Hansard, op cit cols 6304, 6305.
86. W A Westley: Violence and the Police. American Journal of Sociology, July 1953, vol 49 p 35.
87. Cape Times 15.2.79.
88. Cape Times 15.10.82 and 22.10.82. By 1982 the total enlistment number was 34 271, a drop from the 1979 figure of 375 men.
89. Argus 3.10.1975, quoted in K Albert, op cit p 48.
90. Interviews with policemen in these areas.
91. Interview with policement, 1982.
92. Cape Times 14.2.79 and interviews with policemen.
93. House of Assembly: Questions in Replies Vol 76 para. 565.
94. Statistics taken from Police reports.

95. Ibid, A breakdown by suburbs is as follows:

Unsolved as Percentage of Reported Crime in Cape Town during 1981

Rondebosch	75
Pinelands	75
Mowbray	71.4
Woodstock	70.6
Camps Bay	69.8
Claremont	67.5
Sea Point	66.8
Diep River	63.8
Wynberg	63.4
Milnerton	62.2
Bellville	62.1
Cape Town	59.8
Athlone	59.2
Lansdowne	59.1
Maitland	58.7
Kensington	56.7
Goodwood	56.6
Parow	56.6
Durbanville	54.4
Philippi	52.7
Kraaifontein	50.3
Fish Hoek	50.2
Elsies River	49.6
Bishop Lavis	49.1
Manenberg	48.9
Retreat	48.6
Muizenberg	43.5
Grassy Park	43.2
Kuils River	41.2
Brackenfell	40.8
Hout Bay	39.9
Simonstown	37.9
Langa	26.2
Guguletu	25.5
Mitchells Plain	15.3

(Source: Police dockets, Cape Town 1981).

TOTAL 56.3% unsolved

96. Commission of Inquiry into the Penal system of the Republic of South Africa par. 3.1.15 p. 35.
97. Interview conducted 1982.
98. Argus 26.11.51
99. Argus 28.6.58.
100. London Daily Mirror 15.5.59, reported in the Argus of the same day.

101. Argus Jan. 29, March 5 and March 17, 1965.
102. Argus 9.7.70.
103. Argus 4.2.72 and 25.7.74.
104. Question in Parliament. Reported in the Argus 5.3.75
105. Sunday Times 28.5.78.
106. Argus 15.3.79 and 16.3.79.
107. Argus 7.3.81.
108. Interview during 1982, Cape Flats.
109. S.E.S.A. op. cit. p. 627.
110. Argus 18.7.63.
111. S.A. Institute of Race Relations Yearbooks and Argus newsclips on police.
112. Argus 27.3.69.
113. Report on the Rabie Report, op. cit. p. 100.
114. Interview with a captain in the Riot Squad 14.7.82.
By June 1976 there were Riot Squads in the following centres:
- | | | |
|---------------|-------------------|--------------|
| Pretoria | Middleberg (Tvl.) | East London |
| Johannesburg | Maritzburg | Oudtshoorn |
| Soweto | Durban | Kimberley |
| Potchefstroom | Cape Town | Welkom |
| Krugersdorp | Paarl | Bloemfontein |
| Springs | Port Elizabeth | Windhoek |
- (House of Assembly Questions and Replies Vol. 76 Tuesday, June 22 1976)
115. John Kane-Berman: Soweto: black revolt, white reaction. Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1978.
116. Ibid, p. 29.
117. Ibid, p. 30.
118. Hansard 1 (1977) cols, 136, 140, quoted by Kane-Berman, Ibid, p. 30.
119. Argus, 6.8.77.
120. Interview with Riot Squad captain, op. cit.
121. Figures from Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Police.
122. Interview with Riot Squad captain, op. cit. This note-taking was confirmed in a submission to the Cillie Commission by a Riot squad commander, who said that each member of each riot section had kept a minute-by-minute record of the events in Cape Town during June 1976. See Kane-Berman, op. cit. p. 29.

123. Riot captain interview, op. cit.
124. Ibid.
125. Reported in the Cape Times 17.12.81.
126. Cape Times 16.12.81
127. Cape Times 17.12.81.
128. Quoted in The iron fist and the velvet glove: an analysis of the U.S. Police, Centre for Research on Criminal Justice, Berkeley, California, 1975, p. 95.
129. Ibid. p. 96.
130. Argus 29.5.80.
131. Ibid.
132. Police reported 29 deaths but the Cape Times, counting hospital admissions, put the figure nearer 50.
133. Cape Times 23.6.80.
134. See Cohen, op. cit. p. 135.
135. Albert, op. cit. p. 111.
136. Interview with detective, Cape Town, 1980.
137. William Whyte: Street Corner Society: the structure of an Italian Slum. (University of Chicago Press, 1943) pp 138, 139.
138. Paul Rock: Deviant Behaviour (Hutchinson, London, 1973) p. 197.
139. Interview with detective, Cape Town, 1982.
140. Act. No. 8 of 1959 Sec. 27.
141. J. Midgley: "Children on Trial" (a study of juvenile justice) quoted in R. Graser(ed.) South African Studies in Criminology 1975 Cape Town at 107.
142. W. Scharf: Shebeeners in the Western Cape.
143. Hansard Friday May 7, 1982 cols. 6346, 6347, 6349.
144. Cape Times 14.2.71.
145. Ibid.
146. House of Assembly Questions & Answers Vol. 76. Tuesday, April 26 1977.
147. Information from John McBreary of the S.A. National Security Employers Association, Johannesburg.

148. The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove, op. cit. p. 149.
149. House of Assembly Questions and Replies, Vol. 76, Wednesday, April 12 1978.
150. Poulantzas: State, power, socialism, op. cit. p. 220.
151. Argus 17.5.61. and 18.5.61.
152. Ibid.
153. Taken from Argus newsclips for those years.

9 ✓

CRIME AND THE MAGICAL RECOVERY OF COMMUNITY

What has been outlined so far is the rise of the defensive city and its effect on people displaced or impoverished in the process. The new Cape Town is a city built to protect capital accumulation and to control any resistance to its logic: a sanitized central office cluster and several shopping nodes, factory parks ringed with high fences and fast roads, the rich separated from the poor by buffer zones of open land, and the workers in separate ghettos with no back alleys. Police man the boundaries.

I must now turn to our original inquiry and ask: What part do the youth gangs play in all this? There is a fundamental point that must be made right here:

The central reason for gang formation is not lack of motivation, laziness or poor education among the street youth; it is stark poverty. Ganging is primarily a survival technique, and it is obvious that as long as the city is part of a socio-economic system which reproduces this poverty, no amount of policing will stop the ghetto brotherhoods. This situation is not particular to South Africa. It seems to occur wherever employment and income are a privilege and not a right, where the primary social motive is profit and not the greatest good for the greatest number. Phil Cohen found in Britain that

for the kids who are caught up in the internal contradictions of a subculture, what begins as a break in the continuum of social control can easily become a permanent hiatus in their lives. Although there is a certain amount of subcultural mobility... there are no career prospects!¹

La Fontaine has charted a similar situation in Zaire

Deprivation has driven more street gangs to outright delinquency. Unemployment has made the transition from the marginal position of youth to adult responsibility ever more difficult. Far more youths are excluded from a 'normal' adult existence. This has meant that the upper age-limit of street-gang members has slowly risen and these older youths appear likely to form the nucleus of a class of permanent criminals. In addition, the products of secondary schools find their opportunities curtailed and leave school only to enter the world of the unemployed. The street gangs are thus in the process of re-acquiring... educated members.²

Even Fredric Thrasher, an apologist for rapid capitalist development in the United States of the 1920s, observed that

the process of breakneck competition in the development of (Chicago's) new wealth and the consequent tendency towards increasing division of labour and specialization have stimulated the rapid growth of (the city)... and the creation of a semicircular 'poverty belt' around the (inner) loop.³

In Cape Town while family disruption is causing an increase at the younger end of ganging, unemployment is extending the upper age limit, carrying a strong probability of permanent criminalisation. More than 95 percent of the gang members interviewed in the city said they would accept any job if it was offered to them, and two thirds said they would then leave the gang. In an open-ended question about what alternatives they would find acceptable to gang life, they answered

No alternative	26%	
Business	48%	
School	12%	
Church	8%	
Politics	3%	
Other	3%	(Source: Survey of Street gangs)

Union fights to protect unemployed

THE current economic recession is hitting thousands of workers in the Western Cape, who have already lost or will lose their jobs as bosses try to cut down on costs.

Workers in the steel and engineering industry and in the building industry have already been badly affected and many have been retrenched.

The most hard hit are unskilled contract workers. Unskilled workers are the first to be out on the streets when work is short and in South Africa most contract workers are offered little protection against retrenchments.

Workers from "independent homelands" find it very difficult to get their unemployment insurance benefits (UIF), if they manage to get them at all.

Contract workers who lose their jobs are no longer allowed to stay in the towns and look for new jobs.

They are endorsed out under influx control legislation, back to

impoverished homelands, where they once more have to join the long queues of unemployed outside the labour bureaux.

For those workers organised into trade unions, the battle against retrenchment is one of the most difficult. When bosses no longer need the workers, their position is weak.

Workers are sometimes so desperate in times of high unemployment, they are often prepared to take anything, no matter what the wages or working conditions.

The General Workers' Union, which has many contract workers as members, have been negotiating retrenchment procedure with bosses in the factories where they have a majority for the past few months.

Although it is very difficult to abolish retrenchment altogether, the union says there are ways to fight retrenchments and so

to lessen the blow for the workers.

An important principle to establish with the bosses is that workers must be given long notice of an intended retrenchment.

The amount of notice differs in various factories.

Options

In the stevedoring industry, for example, it is two weeks notice. This gives the workers' committee time to fight the retrenchment, says the union.

Bosses must explain exactly why they need to retrench certain workers.

The more information workers have, the easier it becomes to protect themselves against bosses trying to use a smaller number of workers to do the same amount of work as a way of cutting costs. It also gives workers time to think about alternatives to retrenchment.

Workers in the GWU have thought of three main alternatives to

retrenchment. The first is a ban on all overtime. The second alternative is to put all workers on short time, so that all workers in a factory work fewer hours, rather than some of the workers being retrenched.

A third alternative, which has been taken up by workers at Dorman Long, is for workers to take unpaid leave in cycles. This means that all workers share the burden of the work shortage and are guaranteed their jobs back at the end of their cycle of unpaid leave.

An old union principle, and one that many of the progressive unions in South Africa, including the GWU try to stick to is the "last in, first out" principle.

If retrenchments seem inevitable, then workers with the shortest service should be the first to go.

The practise of "last in, first out" avoids victimisation and makes it difficult for the bosses to use retrench-

ments as a 'disciplinary procedure'.

When workers are retrenched many workers ask that "job-loss" pay be paid out to those who have lost their jobs. Bosses are often reluctant to do this.

But, says the GWU, why should workers be the only ones made to suffer the effects of retrenchment.

During the boom that usually precedes a recession, profits are usually high. The workers who have made those profits should also be entitled to share when times are bad.

Protection

In factories where workers have been retrenched, the first available jobs should go to those retrenched workers. Bosses should also try to find jobs in other factories.

As the unemployment queues get longer and the recession gets bleaker, workers are trying even harder to protect themselves against retrenchment.

That the employment problem is being reproduced over generations can be seen in the fact that 66 percent of the gang members said their own fathers had been out of work. Of these, 85 percent said their fathers had been without work for periods longer than six months and 31 percent for more than a year.

Mass removals from the inner city, as we have seen, destroyed both the informal economy and many family support structures, networks which softened the hard dichotomy between wage labour and destitution. Coupled with rising inflation during the 1970s, this was to lead to increasing economic brittleness among the city's working class.

In 1980, for example, Divisional Council tenants in the city were served with 100 993 eviction notices, mainly because of their inability to pay the rent. This means that an average of about six eviction notices were issued for each Divisional Council housing unit during the year.⁴ In June 1980 a massive worker boycott of buses began in response to fares increases of between 30 percent and 100 percent. Many buses were stoned.⁵ This took place amid a boycott of 'coloured' schools in Cape Town and a consumer boycott of red meat products. A reading of the Grassroots community newsletter (effectively a Cape Flats newspaper) shows a constant struggle against the rising cost of State-provided and Council-provided items such as houses, water, electricity and transport, and the under-provision of creches, schools and amenities.

In times of a fall in the standard of living, people, of course, refuse to simply disappear when they are unable to become 'rational' consumers and producers.

As Wilkinson and Webster have found:

they resolve the problem for their continued survival by gathering together whatever skills they may have acquired and whatever means of production capital has either by-passed or produced as readily accessible commodities in the expansion of its market, in order to fashion some object or provide some service with an exchange value which will yield some sort of income.⁶


In the new ghettos informal economic activity was to continue, but under reduced circumstances. Unpicked from the urban fabric, pushed out of walking distance from the inner city and the wealthy suburbs, and sealed off in single-class townships, the poor found themselves with nobody to sell their labour or products to but the poor. And in times of hardship the latter concentrated on the bare essentials.

It is here that we see the almost imperceptible slip from domestic production and services into what is defined as crime. And in the crisis of reproduction in the housing estates it is always the youths who are hit hardest. They are weaker physically, have less job experience, are less docile and have easier access to support within a gang. In a survey of juvenile offenders in Cape Town, 81 percent were convicted for crimes against property - mostly petty theft - while the total number of property crimes in the city was a much lower 54 percent. Seventy percent of the youths had no previous convictions and 90 percent of the offenders were boys.⁷ Policemen on the Cape Flats estimate that 80 percent of all crimes in the area are committed by youths under the age of 18.⁸ During 1981 property crime in Cape Town was made up of theft (68 percent), housebreaking (22 percent) and robbery (10 percent).⁹ The root cause of all these offences can generally be traced back to simple material need.


Youths from poor families on the Cape Flats are therefore caught in a pincer between their decreasing access to income opportunities and tough penal laws. And these laws bear down heavily on 'informal' ghetto income. Indeed South Africa's prisons are filled mainly with poor people and political dissidents.

In Cape Town gang activity takes three forms: illegal services (drug sales, shebeens), property crime (robbery, theft, housebreaking and to a certain extent 'protection') and violence (assault, rape, murder). The first two are by far the most prevalent, the last being more of a spin-off of property crime and services.


Survey of gang members:
Number of people living
in the family house





Survey of gang members:
Number of brothers and
sisters




Survey of gang members:
Size of house






Survey of gang members:
Who looked after them
as a child



Survey of gang members:
Highest educational
standard achieved



ILLEGAL SERVICES

The first chapter outlined the services provided by gangs, both as the provision of illicit commodities and the sale of labour (as hit-men and a police force). The law with regard to illegal services is, on the face of it, curious. The sale of dagga and mandrax carries heavy penalties, yet the sale of tobacco, liquor and 'medical' drugs carries none. Prostitution is punishable, but marrying a man for his money or bestowing favours free of charge is not. The sale of liquor from a shebeen is illegal, yet the difference between it and a bottle store or hotel is the possession of a piece of paper bearing a stamp of authority. A licenced baker may produce and sell bread, yet a housewife may not. The defence of these contradictions is usually the argument that the legal transaction takes place under more sanitary conditions. But on closer inspection it can be seen that such laws are the weapon which monopoly capital uses in an attempt to stamp out competition from the informal sector. They simply serve to drive such activity underground.

Property Crime

Property crime is rather more complex, and a useful distinction between it and illegal services is made by Chris Birkbeck in his work on Cali, Colombia:

Property crime (he says) is not a free exchange of money for a commodity or service, but a forced appropriation of goods or money from the victim with no recompense by the criminal. The relation is not governed by supply and demand, but by the ability of the victim to protect himself against such crime, and the ability of the criminal to overcome this.¹⁰

Property crime, like violent crime, has a victim. It is not morally justifiable whether it is carried out by the rich or the poor. But in the ghettos it must be understood in the context within which it arises. It is generally carried out by the poor on the poor, and through it very few escape their poverty. Property crime in the new single-class ghettos tends to generate and maintain poverty.

Another factor acting against a high income from hustling and hitting is that these activities do not represent undifferentiated income opportunities; they do not necessarily represent an opportunity structure which people can enter at the bottom and move up the scale of accumulated criminal earnings. In this sense crime has much in common with legitimate economic activity under capitalism: what you get out of it depends on what you invest.

A police officer in the Grassy Park housing estate described these class distinctions of the crime world like this:

The gang leaders they are well off - like Robbie, he has a new Datsun and a bakkie. You see the older men are organised - and the lighties take the rap. Most crime is done by juveniles - kids under 18. They're often working for somebody. But they'll never say they are or they'll get smashed up. Most of these young guys are not rich. They only have their clothes they are wearing... and they wear them for three weeks! All they want is their broek, baadjie, 'n bietjie kos en 'n plek om te slaap (trousers, jacket, a bit of food and a place to sleep). They're mostly from poor families. They'll sleep twelve in an old motorcar with one blanket, all cuddled up together - and they never get sick even in winter somehow. Their parents are always away at work or they're drinking all the time and they fight. Then the lightie thinks he can't stay there anymore and out he goes. And there's only the gang for him. You don't get rich being a skollie. But the main guys, the big ones... well that's different.¹¹

An important distinction therefore exists between those who break the law to add to what they have, and those who break it simply in order to live. Birkbeck seeks to understand this by locating property crime within the broader capitalist social relations. Crime and delinquency, he says, cannot be explained simply in terms of poverty, because it is distributed throughout the social formation. (Indeed, in terms of magnitude, hustling pales into insignificance in the face of the crimes of the rich and powerful).

Within working class areas, however, it can be seen to contain three elements:

First, there is an overriding preoccupation with being successful and attaining the 'good life': crime is inextricably bound up with the eternal question of when and how one will escape poverty.

Second, the road to the better life is defined in individual and personal terms: arrival is achieved through one's own efforts and no one else's... (And thirdly) crime embodies the essential elements necessary for the achievement of status. It is a means for achieving a universally defined, universally desired, end...

Much crime also implies violence, and violence too commands respect.¹²

Like most 'informal' economic activity in District Six, property crime on the Cape Flats is governed, in the last instance, by capitalist relations, for all that it appears in a somewhat refracted form. Status is dependent on individual material success and power; and what cannot be achieved in fact may be attained through the manipulation of the symbols of that success (as will be shown presently). The desire for personal success and status is incorporated into the gang in a complex and often inverse way and is mostly given life only vacariously through the media and bragging. Often these preoccupations corrode the very goals gang members may hold before them. If individualism and distrust of others are seen as characteristics for 'getting on' in life, these attitudes act against the co-operation necessary to pull off a profitable crime outside the township. These antagonisms are held in check within the gang by a strong leader or sheer necessity to stay alive. But gangs often break up over suspected intentions or unequal distribution of gains.

In the first months of 1982, for example, the Born Free Kids gang in Lavender Hill split over profits from drug sales. The two factions, one led by Kaffirtjie Des (aged 48) and the other by a man called Crow, were involved in a shooting war in the township which lasted for three weeks of almost continuous fighting. A common occurrence on the Cape Flats, too, are raids by a gang on drug merchants, shebeens and the homes of housebreakers known to have made big hauls, all people

involved in similar activities to the gang. It is the rare exception, rather than the rule, to find poor people who are involved in property crime organising and disciplining themselves in such a way as to gradually increase their scale of operation... investing the proceeds of one crime in the planning and execution of a further and more ambitious project. There is a general lack of organisation for striking at more lucrative targets. Thus the poor become the ready victims. For this reason property crime among the poor is generally not a means to lasting upward socio-economic mobility. However it is the most prevalent, constituting 55 percent of all reported crime in Cape Town during 1981.¹³

Violent Crime

More than any thing else it is the fear of violence that patrols the barrier between rich and poor in Cape Town, and this is not unjustified. Within a population of 1.5 million there were 764 reported murders in 1981... one every 11 hours.¹⁴ By way of comparison, the murder rate per 100 000 people in Britain during 1979 was one, in West Germany 5.8, in the United States 9.7 and in Cape Town 24.¹⁵ More than 18 000 crimes of violence were reported in the city during 1981, the ambulance service transported 22 800 assault victims.¹⁶ Four rapes a day were reported and nearly 6 000 people were robbed.¹⁷ By mid-1982 the head of Criminal Investigations in Cape Town was describing the increase in armed robbery as 'alarming' (Cape Times 16.8.82). On the basis of such figures there were innumerable reports and letters in the Press calling for more police protection to control the 'crime wave'. And all areas among the ten with the highest levels of violence in 1980 were on the Cape Flats.¹⁸ On the other side of the colour line, an average of one white person in three owns a firearm. However we must not be blinded by statistics. Quite apart from the fact that (at the best of times) they are very narrow representations of reality and often simply biased, presented in this way they tend to isolate ghetto violence as a distinct category of reality, a phenomenon unattached to any social matrix.


Gangs are a product of a social system, children of urban racial capitalism in a period of recession. One can go further and say that they are a parody of this system - a State within a State and a fairly faithful reflection of the rules of government employed by their rivals and competitors, whether it be the police or capitalist enterprise. It is because of this that although the gangs are no match for State power, although the power of the latter is never in doubt, they become its competitors for 'law and order' - they question the State's monopoly on violence. It is this violence which in the official mind forms the bridge between 'crime' and 'threats to State security', and gives rise to the funding of studies such as this one.

The State (says Enzenberger) loves to claim that its "foundations" are endangered. And it does not take a holdup murder to "shake" them - a simple pickpocket or the writing of an article can be quite sufficient. However, what seems to irritate modern legislators more than anything else is "resistance to the power of the State". Whenever this crime is mentioned, the text gladly abandons its anachronistic equanimity. Foam begins to form at the guardians' mouths, the harmless get-together becomes a "conspiracy", the trespasser a delinquent...¹⁹

The State, which holds a monopoly of legitimate violence, understandably tends to see any challenge to this monopoly as treasonable. (Each condemnation of another constitutes an acquittal of oneself.) After reading the headlines one would be excused for thinking that a simple murder interests us more than a war, and that a sharp knife was a more terrible weapon than a nuclear bomb.

REGAINING THE LOST COMMUNITY

It would be a poor account, however, which viewed township gangs only as a response to poverty or the search for wealth. They are clearly much more than that. In perhaps the most thorough empirical study done on gangs - in Chicago in 1927 - Thrasher suggested that the gang represents 'the spontaneous effort of boys to create a society for themselves where none adequate to their need exists'.²⁰



Mongrels gang graffiti in Hanover Park, Cape Flats

Discussing the roots of ganging, Thrasher's observations have a familiar ring about them:

The failure of the normally directing and controlling customs and institutions to function efficiently in the boy's experience is indicated by disintegration of family life, inefficiency of schools, formalism and externality of religion, corruption and indifference in local politics, low wages and monotony in occupational activities, unemployment, and lack of opportunity for wholesome recreation. All these factors enter into the picture of the moral and economic frontier, and, coupled with deterioration in housing, sanitation, and other conditions of life in the slum, give the impression of general disorganisation and decay.

The gang functions with reference to these conditions in two ways: It offers a substitute for what society fails to give; and it provides a relief from suppression and distasteful behavior. It fills a gap and affords an escape... Thus the gang, itself a natural and spontaneous type of organisation arising through conflict, is a symptom of disorganisation in the larger social framework.²¹

The adolescent gang, says Thrasher, occupies a period in the life of a boy 'between childhood, when he is usually incorporated in a family structure, and marriage, when he is re-incorporated into a family and the orderly relations of work'. It is his pseudo-kin. This group becomes important at a time of 'cultural disorganisation', a development likely to have been taking place in Chicago at the time of Thrasher's study (between 1900 and 1930 the city's population increased by 500 000, causing overcrowding and family atomization).

Working on the East End of London in the mid-1970s, Phil Cohen was to reflect some of Thrasher's observations about the effects of this disorganisation and the need of youths to find a symbolic substitute for their lost cultural base.

It seems to me (says Cohen) that the latent function of subculture is this: to express and resolve, albeit "magically", the

contradictions which remain hidden or unresolved in the parent culture. The succession of subcultures which this parent culture generated can thus all be considered so many variations on a central theme - the contradiction, at an ideological level, between traditional working-class puritanism and the new hedonism of consumption: at an economic level, between a future as part of the socially mobile elite or as part of the new lumpen proletariat. (Youth subcultures) all represent, in their different ways, an attempt to retrieve some of the socially cohesive elements destroyed in their parent culture, and to combine these with elements selected from other class fractions, symbolizing one or other of the options confronting it.²²

We cannot, therefore, understand a youth subculture without understanding its parent culture because of the way in which this parent culture's problems are 'lived' by the youths. Cohen found, for example, that the London gangs were not only bound together by collective behaviour or need, but more particularly by territoriality. It was by staking out a geographical area that a gang became 'anchored in the collective reality of its members' and rooted in the community.²³ This was, he suggests, a 'magical' way of expressing territorial ownership lost by the relocated parent culture; a way of retrieving the solidarities of the traditional neighbourhood destroyed by urban redevelopment. This binding of a subculture to its parent culture is sketched by Clarke et al in their study of British street youth:

Members of a sub-culture may walk, talk, act, look 'different' from their parents and from some of their peers: but they belong to the same families, go to the same schools, work at much the same jobs, live down the same 'mean streets' as their peers and parents. In certain crucial respects, they share the same position (vis-a-vis the dominant culture), the same fundamental and determining life-experiences as the 'parent' culture from which they derive. Through dress, activities, leisure pursuits and life-style, they may project a different cultural response or 'solution' to the problems posed for them by their material and

social class position and experiences. But the membership of a sub-culture cannot protect them from the determining matrix of experiences and conditions which shape the life of their class as a whole. They experience and respond to the same basic problematic as other members of their class who are not so differentiated and distinctive in a 'sub-cultural' sense. Especially in relation to the dominant culture, their sub-culture remains like other elements in their class culture - subordinate and subordinated.²⁴

These youths are socialised into a class identity and position primarily through the family and the neighbourhood. However this socialisation is not a simple rubber-stamp process. It is contradictory; (1) It is at the weak points in the chain of socialisation - at the points between the family/school nexus and the work process - that the subculture differentiates itself. (2) Working class subcultures are not simply a transcription of the contradictions of the parent culture at a micro-social level. They are rather a compromise solution to two contradictory needs: the need to express autonomy from their parent culture, and the need to maintain the security of ego defences which are supported by this parent culture. (3) Youth subgroups do not merely exist in the individual's biographical space between family and work, they are also ideologically located in the intersection between the parent culture and the dominant culture.²⁵

The interface can be found most forcefully in schools and other State institutions. But for gang members with little school experience (my survey showed 55 percent had not gone beyond Standard 2) a major source of ruling class ideology comes through the media. A booklet produced after the shootings and arson in Elsie's River in June 1980 at the height of a school's boycott made this clear:

... nobody in the ghetto (or elsewhere) is actually uneducated. People pick up education where they find it, and we must not think of 'education' as being only what happens in a classroom or in a book. Children are being educated right where they are, in the streets, in a society where great poverty and great riches can be seen side by side.

They are taught by advertisements, pictures and trips to the big city shops how they should live when they are rich. The advertisements tell them: When you are rich you are beautiful, and often 'white' as well.

They are taught that privilege and power come when you have money.

They are taught by prison experience (either directly or from friends or older brothers) that you've got to have a strong gang to get power and money, privilege and protection.

They are taught by the media (bioscope and TV) that the way to get money, or to defend what you've got, is with violence and weapons. In Elsie's River during June this year, the month of unrest, about 60 different movies were shown. This is a list of the type and number of movies that were on at the two big cinemas nearest the areas of unrest during June:

- 63% - involving scenes of violence, killing and death
- 8,6% - horror movies
- 4,3% - movies involving disaster and scenes of destruction
- 6,5% - anti-hero movies where the 'bad' guy is the hero or where the hero comes off worst
- 10,8% - romance
- 8,6% - Comedy

More than 800 people saw a movie in Elsie's River every day except Sundays. About 20 000 tickets were sold at the 4 cinemas in Elsie's River during the month.²⁶

The importance of the cinema to gang members can be seen in this quote from the owner of the biggest cinema in Elsie's River:

When they come to the Panorama, they're like angels. What they do after they've left the Panorama... they could be the worst devils on earth. But when they come to the Panorama... the worst skollie is in the Panorama but you can hear a pin drop. They respect us. We're giving them entertainment so they've got to like us. When I see someone doing something wrong they hide their face and they run... because they know if I see their face I'll stop them coming to the Panorama, and that's their world.²⁷

(4) Youth gangs are constantly in opposition to other peer groups. They fight for territory, control of markets, to strengthen their own gang or to avenge an 'insult'.

It can be seen therefore that any strategy worked out by a gang will stand in complex relation to that of other peers, to 'adult' strategies and solutions, and to the dominant culture with its repertoire of control. One cannot therefore simply 'read off' subcultural attitudes from the form or intentions of the media or of State institutions. Hegemony can never wholly absorb the working class into the dominant order. Like the defensive city, ruling ideology is full of holes. Rather like birds building a nest, gangs will tend to borrow 'bits' of attitude and material from their entire cultural environment to construct a whole expression of group position.

Cohen identifies four basic forms which this expression takes: dress, music, argot and ritual. These make up a visible style. In an article on class consciousness, Graham Murdock and Robin McCron agree that subcultural styles are made up of an amalgam of elements drawn from both sides of the cultural boundary: the "situated" class cultures embedded in the family and the local neighbourhood, and the mediated symbol systems sponsored by the youth-orientated sectors of the entertainment industry. These elements are the product of a cumulative process of selection and transformation through which available objects, symbols and activities are removed from their normal context, stripped of some or all of their conventional connotations and reworked by members of the group into a new and coherent whole with its own special significance.²⁸

On the Cape Flats gang style is easy to recognise - and it is often essential to do this in order to avoid trouble. In the 1950s Oscar Wollheim was able to identify gang members by their dress:

In most gangs the same traits are to be observed; a mode of dress easily identifiable as different from the usual form... (they) usually wear caps back to front, or with peaks turned up sideways;

these caps are usually stuffed with folded newspaper so that the sides stand out and away from the head, giving protection if struck; they may also wear some or other unusual form of headgear and often have a piece of cloth or "doek" tied round the head underneath the headgear but showing at the bottom; the trousers are usually "half-mast" (known as 'hoppels' or reformatory pants), and their jackets, shirts or belts display emblems of various kinds. The particular style of dress and method of fixing the emblem often denote the particular gang or group or district to which they belong.²⁹

More recently, gang dress includes a 'tiger' jacket (a standard lumber-jacket turned inside out showing the tartan lining and a 'Tiger' trade label), 'hang-gat' (baggy seated) trousers, a cloth cap and 'tackies' (tennis shoes) laced in an elaborate weave. An identifiable musical preference was until recently the traditional 'moppies' and 'liedjies' of the Coon Carnival, but this has given way to 'disco' music of little depth and with an unmistakable beat. The argot of the gangs is 'gantaal', a fast-spoken mixture of Afrikaans, English and Xhosa with innumerable variations in different areas.

The predominant subcultural ritual since the mid-1970s has been the smoking of 'white pipe'. This usually happens in the gang 'place' - backyard or a shebeen. While one member 'cleans' the dagga, removing the seeds and sticks, another folds the mandrax 'buttons' into brown paper and pulverises them with the neck of a bottle. This 'bottle neck' is severed by heating the bottle around its circumference and then spitting onto the fingers and touching the heated parts. The bottle splits with a sharp 'ting'. The dagga and the mandrax are then mixed, while the brown paper is rolled to form a filter at the narrowest part of the 'neck'. The mixture is then poured into the mouth of the neck and lit from a double match. Who is to 'bust' the pipe (smoke first) is determined by unspoken agreement. If there is an 'outsider' he will be given the honour.

Otherwise it will be the leader, unless he wishes to express magnanimity to a gang member. The pipe is passed in a circle, usually from left to right, each member taking a huge draft and handing it on. A gang can smoke up to thirty of these pipes a day.

Through rituals, dress, language and territory gangs are therefore attempting both a material and an ideological solution to the circumstances in which they find themselves. We must now enquire what effect this may have on the development of wider social relations in the city.

Brotherhoods and the Class Struggle

A brief acquaintance with street gangs may impress one with their potential for resistance to the forces which constrain them. They are organised and have access to firearms, including shotguns and the occasional Russian AK47. When I put this question to a senior policeman he was dismissive:

Political? Perhaps they'll join a riot. But there's nothing political in them - they only work for money. Also if its a political thing then the police are the complainant. If they hit someone in the street then he's the complainant. They can go to him and say: 'If you complain we'll bugger you up.' But they can't do that to me.

The only way you get these guys is you'll have to pay. I can't see a political group getting control of a gang. Even a guerilla from outside - he'd be competition - they'd cut his throat. He's not going to last - he's not one of them. And there's no secrecy in the gang. They just want fun and booze and dagga.³⁰

With this analysis Eric Hobsbawm would agree, placing as he does the weight of the historical class struggle upon organised labour:

as a conscious social movement and especially a labour movement developes, the role of 'criminal' forms of social protest diminishes; except, of course, insofar as they involve political crime'... For the historian of labour movements, the study of 'social criminality' is important during the prehistoric and

formative periods of the movements of the labouring poor, in pre-industrial countries, and possibly during periods of great social effervescence, but otherwise he will be only marginally concerned with it.³¹

Elsewhere he has argued that:

The underworld (as its name implies) is an anti-society, which exists by reversing the values of the 'straight' world - it is, in its own phrase, 'bent' - but it is otherwise parasitic on it. A revolutionary world is a 'straight' world... The underworld enters the history of revolutions only insofar as the classes dangereuses are mixed up with the classes laborieuses, mainly in certain quarters of the city, and because rebels and insurgents are often treated by the authorities as criminals and outlaws; but in principle the distinction is clear.³²

Deviants and criminals are seen here as a classic lumpenproletariat, as colourful actors without a historical mission, in line with Marx's well-known passage from the Eighteenth Brumaire on the 1851 Paris crisis:

Alongside decayed roues with dubious means of subsistence and of dubious origins, alongside ruined and adventurous off-shoots of the bourgeoisie, were vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged jail-birds, escaped galley slaves, swindlers, mountebanks, lazzaroni, pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, maquereaus, brothel-keepers, porters, litterati, organ-grinders, ragpickers, knife grinders, tinkers, beggars - in short, the whole indefinite, disintegrated mass thrown hither and thither, which the French term la boheme.³³

Marx considered this class to be unreliable, bribable and reactionary, living parasitically off the working class and ready to sell its services to the highest bidder.

But there are problems with these formulations because, to quote Hall et al, 'it is open to question whether a class stratum with this precise social composition could so easily be identified under the conditions of monopoly capitalism'.³⁴

In his more mature work, Marx was to develop the concept of a 'relative surplus population' - workers thrown off the land and out of employment by the development of capitalist production.³⁵ This conceptualises more clearly the relationship between the unemployed and the productive or waged sectors of the working class.

In a country with some 3 million unemployed, it can be seen that the search for a job becomes a war of skilled against unskilled, experienced against inexperienced and worker against worker. As I suggested earlier, it is the youth who lose out on all counts - they are workers who never get near a factory or a construction site, making out by the only means possible - by crime. But if this connection to labour is tenable if the street youths are not irretrievably cut loose from the working class, then their relationship to the struggles of that class (however tenuous) is not an unimportant one. One can only speculate about the possibilities of their increasing political awareness and the consequences. Several factors are worth mentioning here.

On the Cape Flats I found very little professional criminal intent among young gang members. Rather they were 'making out until something turned up', and were angry at their lack of chances in life. Often acts of theft or violence were a mixture of necessity and an expression of defiance in the face of the 'boere' or 'witey', even although they were also often subversive of any worker struggle against exploitation. Few Cape Flats youths consciously chose crime. Rather they drifted or were pushed into it as one of the few remaining strategies for survival open to them. From this inevitability they developed a mixture of resignation and anger and a reservoir of charged feelings about racism. This was fuelled by the geographical homogeneity of the townships, the mono-class housing estates that reinforced the collective hurt and anger.

Into this situation were ploughed the school leavers unable to complete their education, or unable to find a job when they did. A Bonteheuwel gang, the Hobos, were almost entirely comprised of youths who left school during the 1980 school boycotts.

The name of another large gang in Hanover Park, the Genuine School Boys, indicates a link to better educated youths. Many of the 'school' youths carried into the gangs a strong sense of social injustice and the inequalities of racial capitalism. And this racial awareness was not necessarily negative. Hall et al suggest that race can be:

the principal modality in which the black members of that class 'live', experience, make sense of and thus come to consciousness of their structural subordination. It is through the modality of race that blacks comprehend, handle and then begin to resist the exploitation which is an objective feature of their class situation. Race is therefore not only an element of the 'structures', it is a key element in the class struggle - and thus the cultures - of black labour... It is in the modality of race that those whom the structures systematically exploit, exclude and subordinate discover themselves as an exploited, excluded and subordinated class.³⁶

Crime is not a political strategy: It is simply a rip-off. But the anger of the urban sub-proletariat is something still to be reckoned with. In a relatively stable (albeit oppressive) urban environment it can be held in check by spatial insulation, by playing gangs off against each other, or by unexpected swamp policing. But if the class struggle in the cities sharpens, if control starts slipping from the hands of the State, its anybody's guess which way the gangs will move.

However, with their history, their prison experience, their overcrowded living conditions and their poverty, it is unlikely that they will fill the role of the classic lumpenproletariat in the pay of the highest bidder. This caveat should alert progressive organisations not to abandon street kids to the possibility of permanent criminilisation. On this score much work still needs to be done, both at the level of organisation and consciousness.

CHAPTER 9 : NOTES

1. P Cohen: Subcultural conflict and working-class community. In Culture, Media, Language, Working Papers in Cultural Studies 1972-79, Hutchison, London, 1980, p 85.
2. JS La Fontaine: Two types of youth group in Kinshasa (Leopoldville), quoted in C Sumner: Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment, Heinemann, London 1982 p 19.
3. FM Thrasher: The gang; a study of 1313 gangs in Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1927, pp 447, 448.
4. News release of the Cape Areas Housing Action Committee, Argus, December 21 1981.
5. Work in Progress 13, July 1980 p 12.
6. Wilkinson and Webster op cit p 10.
7. Survey of 514 youths convicted at the Retreat Juvenile Court in Retreat, Cape Town, 1980.
8. Based on interviews with 16 detectives at various police stations in the area.
9. Taken from police dockets.
10. Chris Birkbeck: Property crime and the poor: some evidence from Cali, Columbia. In Sumner: Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment op cit p 162. ✓
11. Interview with WO Isola, Grassy Park, 25.5.82.
12. Birkbeck, op cit pp 178, 1979.
13. Taken from South African Police dockets.
14. Ibid
15. City Council report on crime in Cape Town issued by Technical Management Services, 1979.
16. Cape Metropolitan Ambulance service figures collected from daily returns, 1981. and Police Dockets for 1981
17. South African Police dockets.

18.	Guguletu	2979
	Bishop Lavis	1759
	Elsies River	1753
	Grassy Park	932
	Parow	853
	Retreat	834
	Manenberg	823
	Mitchells Plain	813
	Langa	785
	Athlone	683

Taken from South African Police dockets.

19. Enzenberger p91.
20. Thrasher op cit p 37.
21. Thrasher op cit
22. Cohen, op cit p 82 (Emphasis added).
23. Cohen Ibid p 85.
24. J Clarke, S Hall, T Jefferson & B Roberts: Subcultures, cultures and class: a theoretical overview. In Resistance through Rituals by Hall and Clarke Hutchison, 1975 p 14/15.
25. See Clarke et al p 53.
26. D Pinnock: Elsies River, Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town, 1980 p 67.
27. Ibid p 68.
28. G Murdock & R McCron: Consciousness of Class and Consciousness of Generation. In Resistance through Rituals p 203.
29. OD Wollheim: The Cape Skolly. Race Relations Journal 3 - 4, 1950 p 46.
30. Interview with a Major in Bishop Lavis, 1982.

31. E Hobsbawn: Conference Report. Bulletin No. 25 Autumn 1972, Quoted in Hall et al op cit p 363.
32. E Hobsbawn: Bandits, Quoted in Hall et al Ibid p 363.
33. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works, volume one, (Progress Publishers, Moscow 1977) p 442.
34. Hall et al op cit p 365.
35. Marx: Capital Volume 1 (Penguin) p 782.
36. Hall et al op cit p 347.

APPENDIX AGANGS IN CAPE FLATS AREAS

Athlone: Cape Town Scorpions (CT\$), Born Free kids (BFK), Cisco Yakis, Junior Cisco Yakis, B.B. Boys, Holl Boys.

Belville: CT\$, Mongrels (MG\$), Fluffies.

Bishop Lavis: CT\$, BEK, MCS, Blink Ding Kykers (BDK\$), Mystery Kids, Flamingo Kids (FL\$), Boba Kids, Naughty Boys, Posbere, Cisco Yakis, Back Street Kids, Klawe Kids, Wena Pipes, Panorama Kids (PK\$), Mariatas, Weekend Spoilers (WE\$), Restorama Kids.

Bo-Kaap: MG\$, Gambling Boys, Junkie Funkies, Fancy Boys, Holl Boys, Jesters (JK\$), Genuine School Boys (G\$B), Bun Boys, Uru Cats.

Boknakerie: CT\$, Stupids, Sexy Americans, Sexy Young Ones, Holl Boys, School Boys.

Bonteheuwel: CT\$, MG\$, YBK, Dirty Bastards (DB\$), C\$B, Seventy Sevens, Sexy Young Ones, Sexy Wild Ones, Sexy Boys, Fancy Boys.

Claremont: Doolins, Sexy Boys, Last Porn Kids (LBK\$).

Constantia: BEK, CT\$, MG\$, Gissies, Stalag Seventeen, Bishops.

Diep River: CT\$, BEK, MG\$, Stalag Seventeen, Mafias.

Elsies River: CT\$, BEK, MG\$, Kaffir Slogters (KF\$), Sicilians, Naughty Cats (NC\$), Nice Time Kids (NTK), DK\$, Jesters, Stalag 17, Crime Josters, ML\$, Mafias, Fire Boys, Sexy Jacksons, Fluffies, Fun Makers, Junior Brommers, Terrible Saam Staeners, Young Chargers, Six Mabona Kids (SMK), Back Street Kids (BSK), Weekend Spoilers, Devil Kids, Virgin.

Breakers, Weed Boys, Mobsters, ORO.

Sactretton: CT\$, BFK, HL\$, Terrible Josters, Takoeza Kids, Wonder Boys, NTK\$.

Hanover Park: CT\$, MG\$, GSB, Three Eobs, Vultures, Holl Boys, Sexy Boys, Caszay Boys, Gipsies, Houthappers, Fancy Boys, Laughing Boys (LB\$), Dingle Kids, Terminus Kids.

Kensington: BFK, CT\$.

Kraaifontein: CT\$ BFK, GSB, Stoute 'outers, Bosbere, Robaaners, Tamatie Kids, Sexy Boys, Hobos, Sexy Jacksons, Fancy Boys, Hardlivings, Phantom Pirates.

Louwe's Bush: CT\$, BFK, 'C\$, Stalag 17, Mafias.

Lotus River: BFK, 'C\$, Jesters, HL\$, Kaffir Kids.

Macassar: CT\$, BFK, 'Mur Killers, Mafias, Radio 5's, Fire Kids (FK\$), Snowball Kids (SRK).

Manenberg: CT\$, 'C\$, Jesters, Terrible Josters, Dingsters, HL\$, Incredible Josters, Fluffies, 'PK, Slice Corner Kids (SCK), Stoute 'outers, 'New News, Josters, Lethaba Kids, School Boys, Mafias, Stalag 17, Zoraks, Sexy Young Ones, Evil Young Bastards (EYB), Holnaaiers, Station Kids, Innocent Boys.

Mitchell's Plain: CT\$, BFK, Josters, Incredible Josters, Terrible Josters (TJ\$).

Netreg: CT\$.

Ottery: 'C\$, BFK, Fast Guns, 'Mo Mo's Gipsies, JK\$, Park Killers, Yankee Boys.

Paarl: CT\$, BFK, 'C\$, Sexy Boys, Terrible Josters, DRK, Lover Boys (LB\$), Going Line Kids, Fluffies, Nice Time Kids (NTK), Apache Kids (AK\$), Pipe Killers (PK\$), Naughty

Little Bastards (NLB), Genuine Boys (GB), Weekend Spoilers (WE\$), Mafia Kids, Midnight Kids (MIDK), Cavalla Kids, Woodstock Boys (WB\$), Corner Boys (CB\$), Bad Boys.

Phillipi: CT\$, BFK, Josters, K77s, Crazy Kids, Pipe Killers.

Porterville: CT\$, BFK, MG\$, Jesters.

Potsdam/Wilnerton: CT\$, BFK, MG\$, Bun Boys, Holl Boys.

Retreat: CT\$, BFK, Hard Livings, Sonstrale, Fluffies, Holl Boys, Doolins, Best Blends.

Steenberg: CT\$, MG\$, Mafias, HL\$, Fluffies, Cisco Mafias, Sexy Jacksons, Sexy Boys, BFK, Uru Kids, Sonstrale, Suffering Kids.

Tierville: CT\$, BFK, MG\$, Holy Ones, Vultures, BK\$, G\$B, YSK, ZPK.

Wvngrend: CT\$, BFK, MG\$, Sexy Boys, Terrible Josters, Uru Cats, Cobra Kids, Kung Fu's Mafias Josters.

Worcester: CT\$, BFK, Slice Corner Kids (SCK\$), Barbarians (SB\$), TJ Josters, Call Boys, Lover Boys (LB\$), Dobermans, Mexicans, Fish tails, Jerry Boys

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Patrick 'Chicken' Edwards was born in Harfield Village and worked in several clothing factories before ^{be} coming a street person. I met him on the corner and was captured by his intelligence and sparkling wit. He was later evicted from the house in which he was staying (being defined a coloured in a white area), and moved to the Cape Flats.

The emotional implications of the stigma that this definition of my friend carried for him was one of my early shocks in this study. Before I met him he had been picked up several times by the police for dealing, and had served one year in Pollsmoor Prison. While I was doing this study he was convicted for dealing mandrax and given a five-year prison sentence. At the moment of writing, his case is on appeal, with only a slim chance of success.

Without Chicken's help and range of contacts I could not have done this study. His insight into the problems of the poor and his understanding of the dynamics of the city went far beyond mine. The thought of such a person and others like him living for years in overcrowded prison cells is one of the most painful experiences that I take away from this study. Prisons are no place for a dog, let alone a human being, whatever the nature of their social misdemeanour! The sooner they are pulled down the better.

Many other people helped me to write this book, not least the people who consented to my questions with patience and good grace. But special mention (in no order of precedence) must go to Mana Slabbert and Linda Wedepohl who supported me in many ways throughout my work, Dave Kaplan who supervised it, Marcelle Kooy who cleared the bureaucratic underbrush, Judge JJ Fagan who provided support, data and a sense of protection, Dennis Davis and Wilfried Schärf for their ideas and enthusiasm, Simon Fredericks and Pat Davids for their help with questionnaires, Matt Esau for his sense of proportion, Vanessa Watson

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A NOTE ON SOURCES

From the beginning it became clear that the type of material I was looking for was not to be found in written sources. The urban underclass seldom records its passage through history in retrievable form, and is depicted largely through the eyes of state commissions of inquiry or medical officers of health. A range of techniques, approaches and strategies was therefore necessary. The first was to survey secondary sources, which were rich in European and American studies and theories, but extremely poor on Cape Town. The second approach was to people considered to be knowledgeable on urban issues and community affairs, particularly older members. This proved extremely fruitful, and most interviews were recorded on tape for later transcription (a JVC KD2 portable tape deck was used). My trajectory was superficially random, being dictated by who knew whom and could vouch for my credibility (mostly I was crossing both race and class boundaries). But in retrospect it covered a wide spectrum. A third strategy was the use of surveys and questionnaires - a useful way of covering a wide area, but a technique so filled with dangers of interpretation as to render it only partially useful. Altogether 243 working class mothers, 100 gang members and 85 family groups were interviewed. In addition the records of 514 juvenile offenders and 100 reformatory boys were studied. A further statistical survey was done on all assault victims who entered the Groote Schuur Hospital Trauma Unit between 1977 and 1979.

From here a complete break was necessary if I was to connect with street-corner youths. An initial strategy was to research (through interviews) the history of the legendary Globe Gang of District Six, an exercise which allowed me to map out the trajectory of the modern gangs, find out their structure and historical connexions. I then began to talk to corner 'dope'

merchants, buy some 'stuff' and sit around in the local shebeen. From here people passed me on to other people, all of whom were incredibly trusting and helpful. In this way I slowly gained the confidence of members of defence and reformatory gangs, and later access to a large mafia (mainly as their photographer).

I was, during the final stage of the research, also granted access to members of the police force on the Cape Flats, who added another and very necessary dimension to ghet^to life.

Throughout the study it was necessary to undertake theoretical excursions into areas which the empirical data failed to fill or which was a necessary framework before an empirical advance could be made. Again this seemed hopelessly random at the time, but in retrospect was a necessary method of progress. The struggle between empirical data and theory is the most exhausting of struggles, but it is better done on the spot as the empirical problems arise and not 'before' or 'after'. My main endeavours in this vein were into theoretical works on the state, urban sociology, planning ideology housing and deviancy.

Invaluable assistance here came from the meetings of the Western Cape Research Group at U.C.T.

A final mention must be made of press clippings. Throughout this study my wife, Patricia, cut articles on some 30 categories from several daily newspapers (these were later published as Criminology source books).

The trends and press report differences that could only be plotted in this way formed the beginnings of an understanding of moral panics and the relationship between social fear and state control..

In the end, though, this study was an exercise in participant observation. The books mentioned in the Bibliography merely filled out the spaces in between. The overall pattern came from the people about whom I have attempted to write. This is my interpretation of their story. A far better strategy would have been to assist them to write their own story, but time was not on my side. A partial attempt to do this was published by the U.C.T. Institute of Criminology as a 80 page publication called Elsies River.

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Vol. 9, No. 4, July 1980.

JOURNALS

Work in Progress

Africa Perspective

S.A. Labour Bulletin

Janus

Hansard

SURVEYS

- 1 Survey of Cape Flats Mothers 1981 (243 interviews)
- 2 Survey of gang members 1981 (100 interviews)
- 3 Survey of Harfield Village 1981 (85 interviews)
- 4 Survey of Juvenile Crime, Retreat Juvenile courts 1980 (514 interviews)
- 5 Sample from Porter Reformatory Files 1981 (100 interviews)
- 6 Groote Schuur Hospital Data printout on assault victims 1977-1979.

NEWSPAPERS/MAGAZINES

Cape Times

The Argus

The Torch

Grassroots

The Sunday Times

The Tribune

Umsebenzi

Saspu National

Varsity

Muslim News

To The Point

Time

Frontline

PRESS CUTTINGS

Argus pressclips

Institute of Criminology Sourcebooks

TAPES

200 hours of interviews of which about 15 hours has been transcribed.

All recordings on a JVC KD2 portable tape deck using four-track TDK C90 tape.

LIBRARIES

Argus Editorial Library, St. Georges Street, Cape Town

Cape Archives Depot, Queen Victoria Street, Cape Town.

City Council of Cape Town Library, City Hall.

Library of Parliament, Parliament Street, Cape Town.

Micro Library (National Institute for crime prevention and rehabilitation of offenders) Barrack Street, Cape Town.

South African Library, Queen Victoria Street, Cape Town.

Survey Library, Rhodes Avenue, Mowbray, Cape Town.

Town Planning Data Bank, Divisional council of the Cape, Wale Street, Cape Town.

University of Cape Town Libraries, Rondebosch, Cape Town.

24 HOW MANY PEOPLE

25 GENERAL AREA

26 Were you ever moved by Group Areas?

Yes	No
Yes	No

27 Do you have a job?

28 If yes, what do you do?

29 If yes, what do you earn a week?

Less than R10	R20	R50	R100	R500
---------------	-----	-----	------	------

FRIENDS

30 Where do most of your friends live?

--

31 Have you known them for a long time?

Yes	No
Yes	No

32 Do you hang around together often

SCHOOLING

33 Are you at school?

Have been	Have never been	Are there now
-----------	-----------------	---------------

34 What standard are you in/did you reach?

A	B	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	M
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

35 What do you think of school?

36 Are there gangs in schools?

Yes	No
Yes	No

37 Are they different from other gangs?

38 What do they do?

MEDIA/INFLUENCES

39 Do you watch films

Once a week	more often
-------------	------------

40 How many days a week do you watch TV?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

41 What is your favourite film or TV programme?

--

42 Do you think what is shown is true?

Yes	No
-----	----

43 Would you like to be like the people in the films?

Yes	No
-----	----

GANG44 Are you a member of a gang
(If no discontinue interview at this stage)

Yes	No
-----	----

45 Were you forced to join or did you want to join?

Forced	Want to
--------	---------

46 Have you ever been stabbed or robbed before?

No	Stabbed	Robbed	Both
----	---------	--------	------

47 How do your parents feel about you being in a gang?

48 Have your parents ever been in a gang?

Yes	No
-----	----

49 What does it mean to you to be in a gang?

50 What is your gang's name?

51 What is its territory (describe boundaries)

52 How many members are in your gang?

about	10	20	50	100	200	500
-------	----	----	----	-----	-----	-----

53 Where in the territory do you usually meet?

54 Is there a single leader or a group in charge?

Leader	group	other
--------	-------	-------

55 Who is the most powerful person in your territory?

56 Why is he powerful?

57 How many of your gang's members have been in prison?

None	few	many	all
------	-----	------	-----

58 Are you afraid of going to prison?

Yes	No
-----	----

59 What does your gang do during:

Week days

60 Week nights

61 Weekends

62 What are the names of other gangs in your area?

63 Which gangs are friends and which are enemies with your gang?

Friends -----

64 Enemies -----

65 Why are some friends and some enemies?

66 Has your gang ever fought a gang war?

Yes	No
-----	----

67 What usually starts a war?

68 What weapons are used?

69 What part do you take in a fight?

70 How does a gang war end?

71 Which is the strongest gang in Cape Town?

72 Where does it operate?

73 Why is it strong?

74 What does it do?

75 Is it connected to important people?

Yes	No
-----	----

76 Who are these people?

77 Do you like being in a gang

Yes	No
-----	----

78 Is there something else you would rather be involved in?

church	club	school	business	politics	other (specify)
--------	------	--------	----------	----------	-----------------

79 Why do you think there are gangs?

80 Who are you most close to?

Father	mother	gang
--------	--------	------

CONNECTIONS TO GROUPS/TRADES/PEOPLE

Do members of your gang get money/goods from

	Yes	No	Money	Goods
Shebeens	81			
Shops	82			
Dagga Selling	83			
Mandrax selling	84			
Robbery in	85			
Housebreaking	86			
Protection	87			
Other people (specify)	88			

89 What does your gang do to get the money/goods?

90 How much money do you make a week? Less than

R5	R10	R30	R50	R100	R200	R500+
----	-----	-----	-----	------	------	-------

Describe the connection between your gang and

- 91 Shebeen owners
 92 Shop keepers
 93 Dagga merchants
 94 Hawkers
 95 Clubs
 96 Brothel owners
 97 Gambling
 98 Businessmen
 99 Politicians
 100 What other people/groups is the gang connected to?

101 Describe the supply and selling of

102 Dagga

103 Mandrax

104 Liquor

105 Which of these does your gang work with most

Dagga	Mandrax	Liquor	Other (specify)
-------	---------	--------	-----------------

106 How big are sales of the stuff your gang deals with a month?

R1-10	R10-50	R50-100	R100-500	R500-1000	R1000-5000	More
-------	--------	---------	----------	-----------	------------	------

107 What do you feel about people trying to form political groups in your territories?

108 If you were offered a good ordinary job would you accept it

Yes	No
Yes	No

109 Would you like to stay in the gang if you had a good job

110 How do you feel about your girlfriend?

111 Would you leave the gang if you got married?

Yes	No
Yes	No

112 Would you like children of your own ?

POLICE

113 Do police ever try to stop a gang war?

Yes	No
-----	----

114 What would happen if they tried?

- 115 What do you feel about the police?
- 116 What sort of activities do the police arrest you for?
- 117 If you gave a policeman money or goods would he let you off?

Yes	No
-----	----
- 118 Why do shebeen owners get arrested sometimes and other times they don't?

JUSTICE

- 119 If you were in court, would your friends be able to bribe the magistrate or prosecutor to get you off?

Yes	No
-----	----
- 120 If yes, how often does it happen?

Often	seldom	never
-------	--------	-------
- 121 How much money does it cost to bribe these people?
Less than

R10	R100	R500	R1000	R5000
-----	------	------	-------	-------
- 122 If someone was a state witness against you, would your gang try to stop him giving evidence?

Yes	No
-----	----
- 123 If yes, how would they do this?
- 124 If you ever landed in the cells, did you feel you were locked up unnecessarily?

Yes	No	Not applicable
-----	----	----------------
- 125 Do you think that you have done things that could get you locked up if the police found out?

Yes	No
-----	----
- 126 What do you think about doekoms?
- 127 How much does it cost to get one?
Less than

R2	R5	R10	R20	R50	R100	R500	R1000
----	----	-----	-----	-----	------	------	-------
- 128 How successful are doekems?
- 129 How many doekems are there in Cape Town?

NUMBER OF COLUMNS USED HERE IS 110

NUMBER OF CASES IN THIS SURVEY IS 101

S U R V E Y O N G A N G S .

1. WHERE WAS YOUR MOTHER BORN?

CAPE TOWN
DORP
FARM

36 35.6%
41 40.6%
7 6.9%

5. WHERE WAS YOUR FATHER BORN?

CAPE TOWN
DORP
FARM

36 35.6%
40 39.6%
8 7.9%

7. WHERE WERE YOU BORN?

CAPE TOWN
DORP
FARM

58 57.4%
34 33.7%
4 4.0%

8. WHERE DID YOU LIVE?

PAARL
DISTRICT SIX
MANENBERG/MACASSAR
KENNINGTON/KHAALFONTEIN
STELLENBOSCH/STRAND
ELSIES RIVER/LAVENDER HILL

9 8.9%
11 10.9%
6 5.9%
10 9.9%
5 5.0%
9 8.9%

BELLYLLE/GOODWOOD	6	5.9%
RETREAT/HEATHFIELD/DIEP RIVER/IOKIA	8	7.9%
FINGROVE/FACRETION	2	2.0%
WOKCESTER/OLSFLEY	6	5.9%
OTTERY/LOTUS RIV./PARKWOOD/HYLANS	3	3.0%
HANOVER PARK	0	.0%
CITRUSDAL/VREDENRUNG/LAMBERTSRAAI	5	5.0%
CHAMFORD	2	2.0%
PORT ELIZABETH/JUITENHAGE/GRAAF REINET	0	4.0%
MUSSELBAAI/GEORGE	4	4.0%
NFTHEG/RONTEHEUWEL	1	1.0%
ATHLONE/BHINDGF TOWN	2	2.0%
RO-SAAP	6	5.9%

9. DID PARENTS LIVE TOGETHER?

THEY DID	71	70.3%
NO	26	25.7%

10. WHO LOOKED AFTER YOU?

MUM	50	49.5%
DAU	1	1.0%
GRANDPARENTS	14	13.9%
SISTER	22	21.8%
BROTHER	4	4.0%
OTHER	8	7.9%

12. WHAT JOB YOUR MOTHER?

DOMESTIC	39	38.6%
HOUSEWIFE	20	19.8%
DIED	0	.0%
UNEMPLOYED	3	3.0%

LABOURER	0	4.0%
NEEDLEWORK	3	3.0%
MACHINIST	1	1.0%

LABOURER	4	4.0%
NEEDLEWORK	3	3.0%
MACHINIST	13	12.9%
FARM WORKER	1	1.0%
FACTORY WORKER	2	2.0%
CLEANER	0	.0%
NURSE	3	3.0%
CLERK	2	2.0%
NOT ANSWERED	9	8.9%

13. WHAT JOB YOUR FATHER?

UNEMPLOYED	3	3.0%
GARDINER	2	2.0%
DIED	4	4.0%
PAINTER	5	5.0%
DRIVER	9	8.9%
FACTORY WORKER	1	1.0%
SHOP ASSIST.	1	1.0%
FISHERMAN	2	2.0%
CARPENTER	3	3.0%
BLOCKMAN	1	1.0%
WATCHMAN	2	2.0%
CLEANER/PORTER	2	2.0%
HAWKER	1	1.0%
MECHANIC/PANELBEATER	5	5.0%
IN J A I L.	3	3.0%
CLERK	1	1.0%
FARM WORKER	5	5.0%
LABOURER/BRICKLAYER/BUILDER	46	45.5%
DRUG PUSHER/SHEBEEEN/GANGSTER	2	2.0%

4. FATHER EVER OUT OF WORK?

YES	67	66.3%
NOT	30	29.7%

15. HOW LONG?

LESS THAN 1 MONTH	10	9.9%
SIX MONTHS	36	35.6%
YEAR	10	9.9%
2 YEARS	6	5.9%
5 YEARS	5	5.0%

19. HOW MANY BROTHERS + SISTERS?

NONE	1	1.0%
ONE	0	.0%
TWO	6	5.9%
THREE	8	7.9%
FOUR	9	8.9%
FIVE	16	15.8%
SIX	19	18.8%
SEVEN	10	9.9%
EIGHT	13	12.9%
MORE	17	16.8%

20. BOARDERS IN HOME?

NONE	57	56.4%
ONE	6	5.9%
TWO	13	12.9%
THREE	7	6.9%
FOUR	2	2.0%
FIVE	3	3.0%
EIGHT	1	1.0%

NINE

1 1.0%

NINE

1 1.0%

21. WHERE DO YOU LIVE NOW?

HOME

85 84.2%

FRIENDS

14 13.9%

STREET

0 .0%

22. FLAT OR HOUSE?

FLAT

12 11.9%

HOUSE

88 87.1%

23. HOW MANY ROOMS?

ONE

10 9.9%

TWO

60 59.0%

THREE

19 18.8%

FOUR

9 8.9%

FIVE

1 1.0%

24. HOW MANY PEOPLE?

ONE

0 .0%

TWO

2 2.0%

THREE

2 2.0%

FOUR

6 5.9%

FIVE

4 4.0%

SIX

8 7.9%

SEVEN

13 12.9%

EIGHT

15 14.9%

NINE

8 7.9%

TEN

12 11.9%

ELEVEN

8 7.9%

TWELVE

10 9.9%

THIRTEEN	6	5.9%
FOURTEEN	2	2.0%
FIFTEEN	1	1.0%
SIXTEEN	0	.0%
SEVENTEEN	1	1.0%

26. MOVED BY GROUP AREAS?
 MOVED 40 39.6%

27. DO YOU HAVE A JOB?
 HAVE A JOB 41 40.6%

28. WHAT DO YOU DO?
 LABOURER 25 24.8%
 NOT ANSWERED (I CAN GIVE YOU FURTHER DETAILS IF YOU WANT) 58 57.4%

29. WHAT DO YOU EARN PER WEEK?
 LESS THAN R10 8 7.9%
 R20 30 29.7%
 R50 6 5.9%
 R100 1 1.0%
 R500 0 .0%

30. WHERE DO YOUR FRIENDS LIVE?
 (I CAN ELABORATE)

31. HAVE YOU KNOWN THEM FOR LONG?
 YES 92 91.1%
 NO 7 6.9%

32. DO YOU MANG AROUND OFTEN?
 YES 97 96.0%
 NO 2 2.0%

33. ARE YOU AT SCHOOL?
 HAVE BEEN 92 91.1%

32. DO YOU HANG AROUND OFTEN?

YES
NO

97 96.0%
2 2.0%

33. ARE YOU AT SCHOOL?

HAVE BEEN
NEVER BEEN
ARE THERE NOW

92 91.1%
7 6.9%
1 1.0%

34. WHAT STANDARD?

SUB A
SUN H
STD 1
STD 2
STD 3
STD 4
STD 7

2 2.0%
2 2.0%
16 15.8%
25 24.8%
15 14.9%
11 10.9%
4 4.0%

36. ARE THERE GANGS IN SCHOOL?

THERE ARE
NO
NOT ANSWERED

52 51.5%
46 45.5%
2 2.0%

37. ARE THEY DIFFERENT FROM OTHER GANGS?

YES
NO
NOT ANSWERED

16 15.8%
41 40.6%
43 42.6%

39. HOW OFTEN DO YOU WATCH FILMS?

ONCE A WEEK
MORE OFTEN

49 48.5%
19 18.8%

NOT 31 30.7%

40. HOW OFTEN DO YOU WATCH TV?

DON'T 32 31.7%
ONCE PER WEEK 3 3.0%
2X 18 17.8%
3X 14 13.9%
4X 7 6.9%
5X 1 1.0%
6 TIMES PER WEEK 2 2.0%

41. WHAT FAVOURITE PROGRAM?

KARATE/BRUCE LEE 19 18.8%
COWBOYS 14 13.9%
DALLAS 16 15.8%
LOVE STORIES 6 5.9%
AGENTS 13 12.9%
STARTREK 1 1.0%
POPSHOP 3 3.0%
HI CHAPERAL 4 4.0%

42. IS IT ALL TRUE

YES 64 63.4%
NO 35 34.7%

43. WOULD YOU LIKE TO BE THOSE PEOPLE?

YES 69 68.3%

44. ARE YOU A GANG MEMBER?

ALL OF THEM ARE 100 99.0%

45. WERE YOU FORCED TO JOIN?

YES 3 3.0%

46. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN STABBED/ROBBED?

STABBED 39 38.6%
ROBBED 4 4.0%

45. WERE YOU FORCED TO JOIN?

YES
3 3.0%

46. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN STABBED/ROBBED?

STABBED 39 38.6%
ROBBED 4 4.0%
BOTH 51 50.5%

47. HOW DO YOUR PARENTS FEEL ABOUT IT?

'DONT KNOW' (COULD MEAN 'I DONT KNOW' OR 'THEY DONT KNOW') 32 31.7%
THEY DON'T MIND 10 9.9%
THEY DON'T LIKE IT 49 48.5%
THEY WORRY 3 3.0%

48. HAVE YOUR PARENTS BEEN IN A GANG?

YES 19 18.8%

49. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO YOU?

'NOTHING' 19 18.8%
FRIENDSHIP 25 24.8%
PROTECTION/POWER 19 18.8%
MONEY 7 6.9%
SURVIVAL 5 5.0%
THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMIT CRIME (STEAL, DAGGA) 9 8.9%
'DIT MERK NIE UIT VIR MY NIE' 4 4.0%

*friends 31
income 20 of 21 - 17.5% 31
friends 26 of 25 - 25 34
Killing 32%
protection 19 - 19 29
69 198*

50. NAME OF YOUR GANG?

CTS 52 51.5%
BFK 27 26.7%
MGS 3 3.0%
MONGRELS 2 2.0%

FLUFFIES	2	2.0%
KATAT BEMDE	1	1.0%
DK\$	1	1.0%
G\$B	2	2.0%
CIXD YAKIES	1	1.0%
Y\$K	1	1.0%
KF\$	1	1.0%
HL\$	1	1.0%
SEXY BOYS	2	2.0%
DOOLINS	1	1.0%
TERRIRLE JOSTERS	1	1.0%
GAMBLING BOYS	1	1.0%
CRIME JOSTERS	1	1.0%
LAUGHING ROYS	1	1.0%

52. HOW MANY IN GANG?

10	0	.0%
20	3	3.0%
50	17	16.8%
100	23	22.8%
200	55	54.5%
500	1	1.0%

53. WHO IS IN CHARGE?

LEADER	56	55.4%
GROUP	35	34.7%
OTHER	6	5.9%

54. HOW MANY HAVE BEEN IN PRISON?

NONE	0	.0%
MANY	48	47.5%

ALL

50 49.5%

55. AFRAID TO GO TO PRISON?

I AM

12 11.9%

56. GANG FOUGHT A WAR?

50 49.5%

55. AFRAID TO GO TO PRISON?
I AM

12 11.9%

66. GANG FOUGHT A WAR?
WE HAVE

98 97.0%

71. THE STRONGEST GANG IN CAPE?
CAPE TOWN SCORPIONS
BPK
NOT ANSWERED

14 13.9%
2 2.0%
84 83.2%

75. ARE THEY CONNECTED TO IMPORTANT PEOPLE?
THEY ARE

27 26.7%

77. DO YOU LIKE BEING IN THE GANG?
I LIKE IT

71 70.3%

78. SOMETHING ELSE YOU WOULD LIKE?
NOT ANSWERED

24 23.8%

CHURCH

8 7.9%

SCHOOL

12 11.9%

BUSINESS

48 47.5%

POLITICS

3 3.0%

OTHER

2 2.0%

DEFINITE 'NO'

3 3.0%

80. CLOSE TO YOU?

MY FATHER

7 6.9%

MY MOTHER

89 88.1%

no diff 26.8

FIRST MY GANG.

1 1.0%

81. TO 88. ALMOST ALL SAY BOTH (I CAN SPECIFY!!!)

89. ALMOST ALL SAY STEAL, ROB, PROTECTION.(DITO)

90. HOW MUCH MONEY DO YOU MAKE A WEEK?

R5	2	2.0%
R10	8	7.9%
R30	23	22.8%
R50	36	35.6%
R100	15	14.9%
R200	6	5.9%
R500+	3	3.0%

105. WHAT DOES THE GANG DEAL WITH?

DAGGA	84	83.2%
MANDRAX	3	3.0%
LIGUOR	8	7.9%

106. HOW MUCH PER MONTH?

R50 TO R100	1	1.0%
R100 TO R500	11	10.9%
R500 TO R1000	54	53.5%
R1000 TO R5000	19	18.8%

108. WOULD YOU ACCEPT A JOB?

YES, I WOULD. 96 95.0%

109. WOULD YOU THEN STAY IN THE GANG?

I WOULD 33 32.7%

111. WOULD YOU LEAVE IF YOU MARRIED?

YES. 87 86.1%

112. WOULD YOU HAVE CHILDRENT?

I WOULD. 97 96.0%

111. WOULD YOU LEAVE IF YOU MARRIED?
YES.

87 86.1%

112. WOULD YOU HAVE CHILDREN?
I WOULD.

97 96.0%

113. DO POLICE TRY TO STOP GANG WAR?
THEY DO

85 84.2%

117. COULD YOU BRIBE A POLICEMAN?
IT IS POSSIBLE

95 94.1%

118. WHY DO SMERREEN OWNERS GET ARRESTED?
THEY DONT PAY UP
THEY GET 'SPLIT'
THE COPS DONT LIKE THEM

57 56.4%
6 5.9%
3 3.0%
66

119. BRIBE THE PROSECUTOR OR MAGISTRATE?
YES.

32 31.7%

120. HOW OFTEN DOES THIS OCCUR?
OFTEN
SELDOM
NEVER

0 .0%
35 34.7%
47 46.5%

121. HOW MUCH DOES IT COST?
R10
R100
R500
R1000

0 .0%
1 1.0%
7 6.9%
20 19.8%

R500

R1000

6 5.9%

0 .0%

128. HOW SUCCESSFUL ARE DOEKEMS?

IT WORKS

12 11.9%

THEY ARE FAIRLY SUCCESSFUL

41 40.6%

NOT SUCCESSFUL. (SUCCES IN TERMS OF MONEY, OR SPELLS - UNCLEAR)

6 5.9%

on original sheets
(not others)

Household Questionnaire

1. How long have you lived in this house?

50 years-

2. Who lives here with you?

	husband	
	wife	
	mother	1
	father	
	grandmother	
	grandfather	
How many:	children under 16	2
	children over 16	
	uncles	
	aunts	
	cousins	
	brothers	
	sisters	
	other relations or boarders	
	children of brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles or other relations	3

3. On the map which is shown to you, mark with a circle (O) the houses in which your relatives live. 0

4. On the map mark with a cross (X) the houses in which friends of yours live who you visit or who visit you. 15

5. During the day, who looks after your children?

no children	
yourself	✓
your husband	
your mother	
your father	
your grandmother	
your grandfather	
your brother	
your sister	
your aunt/uncle/cousin	
your older children	
friends	
your neighbours	
they play in the street	
nobody mentioned above	
nobody	

6. How many families related to you presently live in Claremont?

7. How many families related to you were moved out of Claremont by the Group Areas?

8. What do you feel about the possibility of being moved by Group Areas?

*Very Dissappointed
Heartbroken*

9. What do you think will be the biggest problem for you after you have moved to a new area on the Cape Flats?

Transport costs

NUMBER OF COLUMNS USED HERE IS 30

NUMBER OF CASES IN THIS SURVEY IS 85

SURVEY IN WARFIELD VILLAGE.

1. HOW LONG HAVE YOU LIVED HERE?

NOT YET 10 YEARS.	35	41.2%
NOT YET 20 YEARS.	20	23.5%
NOT YET 30 YEARS.	6	7.1%
NOT YET 40 YEARS.	4	4.7%
NOT YET 50 YEARS.	9	10.6%
LONGER THAN 50 YEARS.	9	10.6%
	1	1.2%

11% longer than 50 yrs

Not answer.

MEAN 19.0 YEARS.

2. WHO LIVES HERE?

HUSBAND.	60	75.3%
WIFE.	80	98.1%
MOTHER.	12	14.1%
FATHER.	2	2.4%
GRANDMOTHER.	1	1.2%
GRANDFATHER.	1	1.2%
ONE CHILD BELOW 16	16	18.8%
TWO CHILDREN BELOW 16	20	23.5%
THREE BELOW 16	14	16.5%
FOUR BELOW 16	5	5.9%
FIVE BELOW 16	1	1.2%
ONE CHILD OLDER THAN 16	7	8.2%

No. with more than nuclear family = 16

% of total = 28%

TWO OLDER THAN 16	14	16.5%
THREE OVER 16	8	9.4%
FOUR OVER 16	2	2.4%
FIVE OVER 16	1	1.2%
SIX OVER 16	1	1.2%
UNCLE	2	2.4%
AUNT	2	2.4%

THERE WERE NO COUSINS

BROTHER	5	5.9%
TWO BROTHERS	1	1.2%
SISTER	4	4.7%
TWO SISTERS	3	3.5%
FOUR SISTERS	1	1.2%
OTHER RELATIVE	3	3.5%
2 OTHER RELATIVES	3	3.5%
6 OTHER RELATIVES	1	1.2%
BORDER	7	8.2%
TWO BORDERS	3	3.5%
OTHER ONE	3	3.5%
OTHER TWO	3	3.5%
OTHER THREE	1	1.2%
OTHER FOUR	1	1.2%
OTHER SEVEN	1	1.2%

2. TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN HOUSE.

TWO	7	8.2%
THREE	11	12.9%
FOUR	20	23.5%
FIVE	16	18.8%
SIX	11	12.9%

36% had more than 5 in house

SEVEN	8	9.4%
EIGHT	7	8.2%
NINE	4	4.7%
TWELVE	1	1.2%

MEAN 5.1 PERSONS.

36% had more than 5 in house

MEAN 5.1 PERSONS

MEAN 1.6 HOUSES

SEVEN
EIGHT
NINE
TWELVE

6 9.0%
7 6.2%
8 4.7%
1 1.2%

3. HOW MANY RELATIVE HOUSES IN HARFIELD?

NONE
ONE
TWO
THREE
FOUR
FIVE
SIX
NINE

17 20.0%
31 36.5%
19 22.4%
10 11.8%
4 4.7%
2 2.4%
1 1.2%
1 1.2%

4. HOW MANY FRIENDS HOUSES IN HARFIELD?

ZERO
ONE
TWO
THREE
FOUR
FIVE
SIX
SEVEN
EIGHT
NINE
TEN
ELEVEN
TWELVE
THIRTEEN
FOURTEEN

15 17.6%
3 3.5%
4 4.7%
8 9.4%
8 9.4%
3 3.5%
9 10.6%
4 4.7%
5 5.9%
3 3.5%
2 2.4%
4 4.7%
2 2.4%
2 2.4%
0 .0%

FIFTEEN 3 3.5X
 SIXTEEN 1 1.2X
 SEVENTEEN 1 1.2X
 EIGHTEEN 1 1.2X
 TWENTY THREE 2 2.4X
 TWENTY FIVE 1 1.2X
 TWENTY NINE 1 1.2X
 THIRTY 1 1.2X
 GREATER. (ONE OF THESE HAS ONLY BEEN HERE 1 YEAR - I DON'T KNOW!!)

MILAN 7, 15 MEMBERS
 Comprehensive

5. WHO LOOKS AFTER YOUR CHILDREN?

RELATIONSHIP	Count	Total %	Weighted %	Child
HAVE NO CHILDREN	19	22.4X		
SELF	58	68.2X	68.2%	67
MOTHER	3	3.5X	by self 64.2	4
SISTER	1	1.2X	mother 2.4	
GRANDMOTHER	1	1.2X	grandfather 1.2	
NOT ANSWERED	3	3.5X	husband 4.7	5
			sister 13.0	5
			brother 1.2	16
			aunt/uncle 2.4	
			other child 7	
			friends 1.2	
			neighbors 3.5	

6. WHO DOES WHEN THE ABOVE IS NOT THERE?

RELATIONSHIP	Count	Total %	Weighted %	Child
HUSBAND	4	4.7X		
MOTHER	15	17.6X		
GRANDMOTHER	1	1.2X		
GRANDFATHER	1	1.2X		
BROTHER	1	1.2X		
SISTER	10	11.8X		
AUNT/UNCLE	2	2.4X		
OLDER CHILD	6	7.1X		
FRIENDS	1	1.2X		
NEIGHBOURS	3	3.5X		

by self 64.2
 mother 2.4
 grandchild 7
 grandparent 1.2
 neighbor friends 1.2
 other 0

6. HOW MANY FAMILIES DO YOU KNOW IN CLAREMONT?

Count	Total %
NONE	40 47.1X
ONE	25 29.4X
TWO	9 10.6X
THREE	5 5.9X
FOUR	2 2.4X

51.8%

Related

NONE
ONE
TWO
THREE
FOUR
SEVEN

40 47.1%
25 29.8%
9 10.6%
5 5.9%
2 2.4%
3 3.5%

51.8%

117 ADJ. 1.94 FAMILIES

7. HOW MANY FAMILIES MOVE BY GRP AREAS.

NONE
ONE
TWO
THREE
FOUR
FIVE
SIX
SEVEN
EIGHT
TEN
ELEVEN
TWELVE
THIRTEEN
TWENTY
24
25
28.

30 35.3%
6 7.1%
15 17.6%
7 8.2%
5 5.9%
1 1.2%
4 4.7%
1 1.2%
1 1.2%
2 2.4%
2 2.4%
1 1.2%
1 1.2%
1 1.2%
1 1.2%
4 4.7%
1 1.2%

64.7%

MEAN 4.2 FAMILIES

8. HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT MOVING?

UNHAPPY
WOULD FIND DIFFICULTY WITH NEW ENVIRONMENT.
WOULD NOT MIND MOVING (AND GETTING BETTER HOUSE)

55 60.7%
25 29.4%
5 5.9%

9. WHAT PROBLEMS DO YOU FORSEE?

TRANSPORT COSTS (FIRST)	57	67.1%	} 96.5%
TRANSPORT COSTS (SECOND)	25	29.9%	
SCHOOLING (FIRST)	-20	23.5%	} 45.4
SCHOOLING (SECOND)	19	22.8%	
NEW ENVIRONMENT (FIRST)	7	8.2%	} 16.6
NEW ENVIRONMENT (SECOND)	2	2.4%	
TOP EXPENSIVE (FIRST)	1	1.2%	} 2.4
TOP EXPENSIVE (SECOND)	1	1.2%	

H
T

END PROGRAM EXECUTION

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MOTHERS

--

1 Where do you live (eg Athlone, Manover Park etc)

2 Do you live

in a house	
in a flat	
in a pondok	
tent & room	
somewhere else (specify)	

(Vir Afrikaans sien keersy)

3 Do you work

full-time	
casually	
don't work	

4 Are you married? Yes No

5 Are you living with your husband (or any other man)? Yes No

6 If yes, does he work? Yes No

7 Do any of your children work? Yes No

Who helps you support your family?

8 your husband Yes No

9 The man who stays with you

10 your parents

11 grants, pensions/welfare etc

12 your children

13 other

14 Do you live with your children? Yes No

15 During the day, who looks after your children who are not at school?

yourself	
your mother	
your older child	
a relation	
a friend	
a creche	
nobody	

16 Do you have any children under 16 years old who do not work and who do not go to school? Yes No

17 Are any of your children members of a gang? Yes No

18 If they are, do you think gang membership is:

good	
bad	
you don't mind	

19 Are there gangs/skollies in your area? Yes No

20 Are you afraid of them? Yes No

21 Have they ever hurt or robbed you? Yes No

23 In what area or town were your parents born?

Name of area in Cape Town	Mother	Father
Name of town/area outside Cape Town		

25 If it was not in Cape Town, when did they come to Cape Town?

Before World War II	Mother	Father
Just after the War		
In the 1950s		
In the 1960s		
In the 1970s		

26 In what area were you born?

Name of area in Cape Town	
Name of town/area outside Cape Town	

27 If you were not born in Cape Town, when did you come to Cape Town?

Before World War II	
Just after the War	
In the 1950s	
In the 1960s	
In the 1970s	

28 If you moved house while in Cape Town, where were you living before your present place?

29 Were you moved by Group Areas? Yes No

When you were young were there lots of relations (grandparents, aunts etc) living:

in your parents house	
in the same street	
within walking distance	

33 When you were very young, who looked after you during the day?

mother	
grandmother	
aunt	
sister	
a friend	
creche	
nobody	

Where you are now living, are there lots of relations living:

in your house	
in the same street	
within walking distance	

37 Can you suggest anything that would make life easier for you?

VRAAGS VIR MOEDERS

24/25 An dit nie in Kaapstad was nie, wanneer het hulle Kaapstad toe gekom?

Voor die 2de Wêreld oorlog		Ma	Pa
net na die oorlog			

26 In watter area was jy gebore?

Naam van area in Kaapstad		
Naam van dorp/area buitekant Kaapstad		

27 As jy nie in Kaapstad gebore is nie, wanneer het jy Kaapstad toe gekom?

Voor die Tweede Wêreld Oorlog	Ma	Pa
Net na die oorlog		
In die 1950s		
In die 1960s		
In die 1970s		

28 As jy al verhuis het terwyl jy in Kaapstad was waar het jy gebly voordat jy hier kom woon het?

Ja Nee

29 Was jy al deur Group areas gemove?

Ja Nee

30 Toe u nog jonk was, het daar 'n klein familie lede by u gebly? (bv oma's, tante's)

In u ouers se huis	
In dieselfde straat	
Binneloopt afstand	

31 Toe u nog jonk was, wie het na u omgesien gedurende die dag?

ma	ouma	tante	suster	'n vriend	kleuterskool	niesmand
----	------	-------	--------	-----------	--------------	----------

32 Waar u nou bly wat woon daar baie familie lede?

In u huis	
In dieselfde straat	
Binneloopt afstand	

33 Kan u enige iets aanbeveel wat die lewe vir u makliker sal maak?

(For English see other side)

1 Waar woon u? (by Hanover Park)

In 'n huis	
In 'n flat	
In 'n kondok	
In 'n huurkamer	
enige ander plek? (beskryf)	

3 Werk u

voltyd	
deeltyd	
werk nie	

4 Is u getroud?

Ja Nee

5 Bly u met u man (of enige ander man)?

Ja Nee

6 Indien ja, wat werk u man?

Ja Nee

7 Werk enige van u kinders?

Ja Nee

8 Wie help jou om jou familie te onderhou?

Jou man	
die man met wie jy bly	
Jou ouers	
onderhoud, pensioens ens	
Jou kinders	
andere	

9 Bly u met u kinders?

Ja Nee

10 Wie sien gedurende die dag om na jou kinders wat nie op skool is nie?

Jouself Jou ma 'n ouer kind 'n familie lid 'n vriend kleuterskool Geeneen

11 Het u enige kinders wat onder 16 jr oud is en wat nie werk of skool gaan nie?

Ja Nee

12 Behoort enige van jou kinders aan 'n bende?

Ja Nee

13 As enige van hulle aan 'n bende behoort, wat dink u dat om aan 'n bende te behoort?

goed is	
alg is	
gee nie om nie	

14 Is daar bendes in u area?

Ja Nee

15 Is u bang vir hulle?

Ja Nee

16 Het bulle u al beroof of seergemaak?

Ja Nee

17/18 In watter area of stad was jou ouers gebore?

Naam van plek in Kaapstad	Ma	Pa
Naam van dorp buitekant Kaapstad		

NUMBER OF COLUMNS USED HERE IS 11

NUMBER OF CASES IN THIS SURVEY IS 243

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MOTHEPS.

1. WHERE DO YOU LIVE?

ATHLONE	11	4.5%
BONTEHEUWEL	15	6.2%
CRUSSHOGS	3	1.2%
DIEP RIVER	0	.0%
ELSTERS RIVER	25	10.3%
BELLVILLE	3	1.2%
GOORHOU	0	.0%
HANOVER PARK	9	3.7%
GUGULFTU	15	6.2%
KENNINGTON	2	.8%
KAAPSTAD	5	2.1%
LANGA	6	2.5%
MDABENI	0	.0%
NYANGA	5	2.1%
CLAREMONT/LANSDOWNE/CRAWFORD	4	1.6%
PHILLIPT	22	9.1%
MANFRERG	21	8.6%
RAVENSMED	4	1.6%
DISTRICT SIX	0	.0%
MITCHELS PLAIN	18	7.4%
VALHALLA PARK	1	.4%
VASCO	0	.0%
WOODSTOCK	4	1.6%

ROUYEH UMFL	10	0.12
NYNBERG/KENILWORTH	11	0.5X
SILVERTOWN	3	1.2X
BRIDGETON	1	.4X
WIDEVELD	5	2.1X
HEATHFIELD/PETREAT	9	3.7X
PRIMROSE PARK	1	.4X
STANSTON/OCEAN VIEW	2	.8X
WELLINGTON???	10	0.1X
ATLANTIS	1	.4X
MYLANS ESTATE	8	3.1X
VRYCHOND	5	2.1X
NOT ANSWERED	4	1.6X

2. TYPE OF DWELLING

HOUSE	136	56.0X
FLAT	48	19.1X
CONDOR	35	14.0X
RENTED ROOM	26	10.7X
SOMEWHERE ELSE	1	.0X
NOT ANSWERED	1	.4X

3. TYPE OF WORK

FULL TIME	85	35.0X
PART TIME	22	9.1X
OUT OF WORK	13	53.9X
NOT ANSWERED	5	2.1X

4. MARITAL STATUS

MARRIED	195	80.2X
NOT MARRIED	41	16.9X

5. LIVING WITH HUSBAND?

YES	7	2.9X
NOT ANSWERED		
YES	182	78.9X

NOT ANSWERED

7 2.9%

5. LIVING WITH HUSBAND?

YES

182 70.9%

NO

51 21.0%

NOT ANSWERED

10 4.1%

123

6. DOES HE WORK?

YES

109 61.3%

NO

60 18.1%

NOT ANSWERED

50 20.6%

22% of husbands
out of work

7. DO ANY CHILDREN WORK?

YES

90 37.0%

NO

137 56.8%

NOT ANSWERED

15 6.2%

8. WHO SUPPORTS FAMILY?

HUSBAND

152 62.6%

THE MAN WHO STAYS HERE

14 5.8%

PARENTS

8 3.3%

PENSIONS/WELFARE

41 16.0%

CHILDREN

13 5.3%

OTHER

7 2.9%

NOT ANSWERED

7 2.9%

9. DO CHILDREN STAY HERE?

YES

222 91.8%

NO

13 5.3%

NOT ANSWERED

7 2.9%

20. ARE YOU AFRAID?

YES	185	74.1%
NO	42	17.3%
NOT ANSWERED	16	6.6%

21. HAVE THEY HURT YOU?

YES	54	22.7%
NO	180	74.1%
NOT ANSWERED	9	3.7%

22. WHERE WAS YOUR MOTHER BORN? IN CAPE TOWN?

ATHLONE	0	1.6%
BONTIFUMEL	0	.0%
CROSSROADS	0	.0%
DIPPOTVIER	5	2.1%
FLSIES RIVER	6	2.5%
PELVILLE	0	1.6%
GOODWOOD	1	.4%
MANOVER PARK	1	.4%
GURULETU	0	.0%
KENSINGTON	2	.8%
CAPE TOWN	54	23.9%
LANGA	1	.4%
NDABENT	0	.0%
NYANCA	0	.0%
CLAREMONT/LANSDOWNE/CRAWFORD	14	4.5%
PHILLIPI	1	.4%
MANENBERG	0	.0%
RAVENSHAW	0	.0%
DISTRICT SIX	6	2.5%
MITCHELLS PLAIN	0	.0%

VALHALLA PARK	0	.0%
VASCO	1	.0%
WOODSTACK	3	1.2%
ROUPEHEWEL	0	.0%
WYNBERG/KENILWORTH	4	3.3%
SILVERTOWN	0	.0%
RIJDRETOEN	0	.0%
HEIDVVELD	0	.0%
HEATHFIELD/RETREAT	2	.0%
PRIMROSE PARK	0	.0%
OCEAN VIEW/SIMONSTOWN	5	2.1%
WELLINGTON???	0	.0%
ATLANTIS	1	.0%
RYLANS ESTATE	0	.0%
VRYGROND	0	.0%
NOT ANSWERED	123	50.6%

23. WHERE WAS YOUR MOTHER BORN? OUTSIDE CAPE?

ADELATOE/ALICE	2	.0%
CALVINIA	5	2.1%
CFRS	5	2.1%
DOUGLAS/ELLIOT	3	1.2%
ENGOROU/PEDRIE	5	2.1%
LADY FRERE/NOGAMAKHE	5	2.1%
GEORGE	6	2.5%
KEETHANSHOOP	2	.0%
LUSTIKSTIK	1	.0%
KINGWILLIAMS TOWN	1	.0%
O KIEP	0	.0%
LADYSMITH	2	.0%
MATATIEL/MAFIKENG	1	.0%

NAMAKWALAND	6	2.5%
OU'DTSHOORN	5	2.1%
PORT ELIZABETH	6	2.5%
QUEENSTOWN	3	1.2%
RIVERDAL	5	2.1%
SARKIESHOOP/STELLERENBURGH	1	.0%

NAMAKWALAND	6	2.5%
ODDTSHOORN	5	2.1%
PORT ELIZABETH	6	2.5%
QUEENSTOWN	3	1.2%
RIVERSDAL	5	2.1%
SAKKIJSOORP/STELLFENROSC	7	2.9%
UTTENHAGE	2	.8%
UMTATA	3	1.2%
JOHANNESBURG	2	.8%
WELLINGTON	13	5.3%
WUMRU	0	.0%
TRANSVAAL	0	.0%
ZWELITSHIA	0	.0%
PAAPL	4	1.6%
EIJM	1	.8%
MAMPE	3	1.2%
PNJFL	0	.0%
SWELLENDAM	6	2.5%
KIMREPLEY	4	1.6%
ST HELENA	0	.0%
GRAAFF PETNFT	4	1.6%
ALJWAL NORTH	0	.0%
NOT ANSWERED	131	53.9%

23. WHERE WAS YOUR FATHER BORN? IN CAPE TOWN?

ATHLONE	5	2.1%
PONTIFUMEL	0	.0%
CROSSROADS	0	.0%
DIEPRIVIER	2	.8%
FLSIFS RIVER	2	.8%
BELLVILLE	2	.8%

GOODWOOD	1	.4X
HANOVER PARK	0	.0X
RUGULETU	0	.0X
KENSTINGTON	1	.4X
CAPE TOWN	52	21.4X
LANGA	0	.0X
NDABFUT	1	.4X
NYANGA	0	.0X
CLAREMONT/LANSDOWNE/CRAWFORD	8	3.3X
PHILLIPI	1	.4X
MANENBERG	0	.0X
PAVENSHEAD	0	.0X
DISTRICT SIX	8	3.3X
MITCHELLS PLAIN	0	.0X
VALHALLA PARK	0	.0X
VASCO	1	.4X
WOODSTOCK	2	.8X
RONTFHEUHEL	0	.0X
WYNBERG/GRASSY PARK	9	3.7X
SILVERTOWN	0	.0X
RHODETOWN	0	.0X
HEIDFELD	0	.0X
STEENBERG/RETRFAT	5	2.1X
PRIMROSE PARK	0	.0X
SIMONSTOWN/OCEAN VIEW	4	1.6X
WELLINGTON???	0	.0X
PYLANS ESTATE	0	.0X
VRYSPOND	0	.0X
NOT ANSWERED	138	56.8X

24. WHERE WAS YOUR FATHER BORN? OUTSIDE CAPE TOWN? ✓

ADFLAIDE/Alice	2	.8X
CALVINTA/PIKREBERG	3	1.2X
CERES/WORCESTER	7	2.9X
DOUGLAS/FLLIOT	3	1.2X
FMCORR/PEDDIE	5	2.1X
LADY FRERE/NOORAMAKE	5	2.1X

ADELAIDE/ALICE	2	.82
CALVINTA/PIKETREPG	3	1.22
CERES/WORCESTER	7	2.92
DOUGLAS/ELLIOT	3	1.22
FMCORNO/PELDUTE	5	2.12
LADY FREDE/NOGAMAKWE	5	2.12
GEORGE	5	2.12
KEETMANSHOOP	1	.82
KINGWILLIAMSTOWN	0	.82
O KIPP	1	.82
LADYSHITH	1	.82
MAFKENG/MATIJEL	2	.82
NAMAKWALAND	6	2.52
QUITSHOOP	4	1.62
PORT ELIZABETH/EAST LONDEN	4	1.62
RUFENSTOWN	4	1.62
RIVERSDAL/PIVJERSONDREND	5	2.12
STELLENBOSCH/STRAND/SAKKIESDORP	5	2.12
UIJTENHAGE	2	.82
UMTATA	3	1.22
JOHANNESBURG	2	.82
WELLINGTON	11	4.52
QUMRII	1	.82
TRANSVAAL	2	.82
ZWELITSHA	0	.82
PABHI	4	1.62
FLTH	1	.82
MARF/MALRESURY	4	1.62
PNTEL	4	1.62
SWELLENHAM/CALFDON	7	2.92
KIMBERLEY/PIPINGTON	6	2.52

ST HELFNA/WASHINGTON
 GRAAF PEINFT
 ALIMAL NORTH
 NOT ANSWERFD

3 1.2X
 3 1.2X
 1 .4X
 124 51.0X

24. WHEN DID MOTHER COME TO CAPE TOWN?

BEFORE WW II
 AFTER WW II
 1950S
 1960S
 1970S
 NOT ANSWERFD

17 7.0X
 16 6.6X
 12 4.9X
 9 3.7X
 1 .8X
 1RR 77.8X

30.9%
 29
 55 people 21.9
 16.3
 1.8

25. WHEN DID FATHER COME TO CAPE TOWN?

BEFORE WW II
 AFTER WW II
 1950S
 1960S
 1970S
 NOT ANSWERFD

16 6.6X
 17 7.0X
 4 1.6X
 7 2.9X
 0 .0X
 198 81.5X

36.4
 34.6
 9
 15.9

26. WHERE WERE YOU BORN?
 IN CAPE TOWN.
 OUTSIDE CAPE TOWN.

166 68.3X
 RR 36.2X

27. WHEN DID YOU COME TO CAPE TOWN?

BEFORE WW II
 AFTER WW II
 1950S
 1960S
 1970S

2 .4X
 5 2.1X
 3 1.2X
 4 1.6X
 0 .0X

14.2
 35.7
 4

NOT ANSWERFD

166 68.3X

28. IF MOVED HOUSE, WHERE LIVING BEFORE? (IT HAVE IGNORED FOR THE TIME)

29. MOVED BY THE GROUP AREAS ACT?

35. HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE LIVING IN YOUR HOUSE OR FLAT? / *See above*

ONE	0	.0%
TWO	4	1.6%
THREE	12	4.9%
FOUR	28	11.5%
FIVE	35	14.4%
SIX	29	11.9%
SEVEN	32	13.2%
EIGHT	30	12.3%
NINE	16	6.6%
TEN	20	8.2%
ELEVEN	7	2.9%
TWELVE	4	1.6%
THIRTEEN	3	1.2%
FOURTEEN	1	.4%
FIFTEEN	2	.8%
SIXTEEN	3	1.2%
SEVENTEEN	1	.4%
EIGHTEEN	2	.8%
NINETEEN	3	1.2%
TWENTY	10	4.1%
NOT ANSWERED		

Mean: 7.32 people

NUMBER OF COLUMNS USED HERE IS 12.

Kentwood Juvenile Court, Cape Town

NUMBER OF CASES IN THIS SURVEY IS 510

1980

SURVEY ON JUVENILE CRIME.

1. AGE			
BELOW 10	6	1.2%	
10	5	1.0%	
11	7	1.4%	
12	29	5.6%	
13	38	7.4%	
14	43	8.4%	
15	83	16.1%	
16	115	22.4%	
17	108	21.0%	
18	79	15.4%	

AVERAGE AGE OF GROUP IS 15.53 YEARS

2. SEX		
MALE	460	89.5%
FEMALE	50	10.5%
3. RACE		
AFRICAN	19	3.7%

WHITE 31 6.0%
COLOURED 464 90.3%

4. CHARGE
HOUSEBREAKING & THEFT 178 34.6%
ASSAULT GRH 55 10.7%
THEFT 196 38.1%
ARMFD ROBRERY 42 8.2%
UTFRK 41 8.0%
RAPE 1 .2%
ASSAULT COMMON 1 .2%

5. SENTENCE
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 288 56.0%
SUSPENDED SENTENCE 93 18.1%
DISCHARGED 72 14.0%
WARNED, CAUTIONED & DISCHARGED 17 3.3%
REFORM SCHOOL 16 3.1%
FINE 8 1.6%
PRISON 0-3 MONTHS 2 .4%
3-6 3 .6%
6-9 3 .6%
9-12 2 .4%
PRISON 12-18 MONTHS 5 1.0%
18-24 2 .4%
24+ MONTHS 1 .2%

6. NUMBER OF PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS
NONE 357 69.5%
ONE 80 15.6%
TWO 35 6.8%

FOUR	8	1.6X
FIVE	6	1.2X
SIX	5	1.0X
SEVEN	4	.8X
EIGHT	2	.4X
NINE OR MORE	2	.4X

AVERAGE IS 0.6686 CONVICTIONS PER CHILD

7. FORMS OF PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS

NO PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS	357	69.5%
THEFT	56	10.9%
HOUSEBREAKING & THEFT	56	10.9%
ARMED ROBBERY	12	2.3%
OTHER	12	2.3%
DAGGA POSSESSION	7	1.4%
RAPE	3	.6%
DAGGA DEALING	1	.2%
ASSAULT GHH	10	1.9%
	157	

Prison 75%
Juven 5%
Visum 20%

13. WERE THE PROCEEDINGS IN CAMERA?

YES	409	87.4%
-----	-----	-------

8. TOTAL LENGTH OF IMPRISONMENT

0-3 MONTHS	1	.2%
3-6 MONTHS	1	.2%
NO PREVIOUS IMPRISONMENT	148	28.8%
NO PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS	363	70.6%

9. OTHER FORMS OF PUNISHMENT

CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
 SUSPENDED SENTENCE
 WARNED, CAUTIONED & DISCHARGED
 REFORM SCHOOL
 NO PREVIOUS CONVICTION

25 4.9%
 10 1.9%
 3 .6%
 357 69.5%

10. EDUCATIONAL STANDARD

NIL
 KINDERGARDEN
 STD 1-4
 4-5
 5-7
 7-10
 NOT AVAILABLE

2 .4%
 3 .6%
 4 .8%
 3 .6%
 5 1.0%
 8 1.6%
 489 95.1%

PORTER SCHOOL

RETREAT

DATA ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION

RANDOM SAMPLE (100) TAKEN FROM CURRENT FILES

AUGUST 1981

Squibbs

* The Chief Psychologist Subsequent to
interviewed all the 900 boys in Porter
at present about no present file in

NUMBER	LEGALLY REPRESENTED (MOST RECENT OFFENCES)	SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND	OFFENCE FOR WHICH ADMITTED TO REFORM SCHOOL	PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS	YEAR OF BIRTH	EDUCATIONAL LEVEL ON ADMISSION
1	No	Working Class	HBT <i>involuntary & Prof.</i>	HBT; Robbery; Robbery (3)	1963	Std. 3
2	No	Working Class	HBT	Probation	1964	M7
3	No	Working Class	Robbery	Robbery, Assault	1964	S2
4	No	Working Class	HBT	Theft	1960	S3
5	No	Working Class	Assault GBH	Assault GBH	1962	S1
6	No	Working Class	HB <i>involuntary</i>	HB	1966	S6
7	No	Working Class	HB	HBT; Stolen Goods	1966	Std. 4
8	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT; Theft	1964	Sub. A
9	No	Working Class	Malicious damage	HBT; Robbery; Assault	1963	B2
10	Ex Ottery	Working Class	HBT	HBT; Attempted Murder	1964	B1
11	No	Working Class	Theft from car	HBT	1964	Std. 3
12	No	Working Class	Theft; Malicious damage	Assault	1965	S1
13	Ex Ottery	Working Class	HBT	Children's Home	1964	S5
14	Transcript not available	Working Class	Theft	HBT	1964	S5
15	No	Working Class	Assault on police	Stolen fruit; Bad language; Assault	1964	S5
16	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1962	B2
17	No	Working Class	HB	HB	1964	M5
18	No	Working Class	Theft	HB; Escape; Malicious Damage	1963	Std. 4

B = 346
 S = Sub A
 102 = 54
 3/4 = 5/10
 S6 = 80
 7/8 =
 5/16 = k

NUMBER	LEGALLY REPRESENTED (MOST RECENT OFFENCES)	SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND	OFFENCE FOR WHICH ADMITTED TO REFORM SCHOOL	PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS	YEAR OF BIRTH	EDUCATIONAL LEVEL ON ADMISSION
19	Ex Ottery	Working Class	Transfer from Ottery	Unknown	1963	Std. 4
20	No	Working Class	HB	HBT	1965	B4
21	No	Not available	Robbery	Not Available	1964	S1
22	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1963	B1
23	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1964	B2
24	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1963	S7
25	No	Working Class	Theft	HBT	1962	M5
26	No	Working Class	HBT	Theft	1963	4A
27	No	Working Class	Cattle theft	HBT; Theft	1963	S3
28	No	Working Class	HBT	Theft; HBT	1965	M5
29	No	Working Class	Theft	Probation; Theft	1964	B4
30	Transcript not available	Working Class	HBT	Theft; HBT	1964	Std. 5
31	No	Working Class	Assault GBH	Robbery; Assault	1964	B2
32	No	Working Class	Robbery	Malicious Damage	1966	4B
33	No	Working Class	Theft	HBT	1960	B
34	No	Working Class	HB	HB; Assault GBH	1962	Sub.A
35	Ex Ottery	Working Class	Transferred from Ottery	In need of care - Ottery	1964	M1
36	No	Working Class	HB	HBT	1964	S4
37	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1966	M5
38	No	Working Class	HBT	HB	1964	Std. 3

NUMBER	LEGALLY REPRESENTED (MOST RECENT OFFENCES)	SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND	OFFENCE FOR WHICH ADMITTED TO REFORM SCHOOL	PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS	YEAR OF BIRTH	EDUCATIONAL LEVEL ON ADMISSION
39	No	Working Class	HBT	HB (from parents)	1964	Std. 2
40	No	Working Class	HBT	Theft	1964	Std. 5
41	No	Working Class	Theft	Theft; dagga	1962	M1
42	No	Working Class	Attempted robbery	Theft; Robbery	1965	S5
43	No	Working Class	Theft	Theft	1965	5B
44	No	Working Class	HBT	HB	1966	B1
45	No	Working Class	Robbery	Theft; HB	1961	B2
46	No	Working Class	HB	Theft	1964	M5
47	No	Working Class	Theft	-	1961	S4
48	Transcript not available	Working Class	Murder (extenuating)	Not available	1963	B1
49	No	Working Class	Attempted robbery	Theft; Robbery	1965	Std. 2
50	No	Working Class	HBT	Theft	1964	S1
51	Ex Ottery	Working Class	Ex Ottery (uncontrollable)	-	1963	M5
52	No	Working Class	HBT	Theft, dagga	1962	M5
53	No	Working Class	Dagga dealing	Dagga	1964	M5
54	No	Working Class	Attempted theft	Robbery	1964	S3
55	Ex Ottery	Working Class	Ex Ottery	-	1966	M3
56	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1964	
57	Transcript not available	Working Class	HBT	-	1963	Sub A
58	Ex Ottery	Working Class	Orphan (Ottery)	-	1962	M2
59	No	Working Class	Dangerous weapon	Assault GBH sodomy; theft	1963	S1

NUMBER	LEGALLY REPRESENTED (MOST RECENT OFFENCES)	SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND	OFFENCE FOR WHICH ADMITTED TO REFORM SCHOOL	PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS	YEAR OF BIRTH	EDUCATIONAL LEVEL ON ADMISSION
60	Transcript not available	Working Class	Theft	Attempted theft	1964	B1
61	Pro Deo Advocate (Mej. Fouché)	Working Class	Murder	Theft	1964	B5
62	Ex Steintal	Working Class	Ex children's home	-	1965	
63	Yes (Zietsman)	Working Class	Attempted Rape	-	1964	4C
64	Ex Ottery	Working Class	Robbery; HBT	HB	1961	M5
65	Ex Ottery	Working Class	Uncontrollable Ottery	-	1964	B1
66	No	Working Class	Theft	HB; Theft	1964	S7
67	No	Working Class	HB	HBT	1965	S1
68	No	Working Class	Assault	Theft	1964	M2
69	No	Working Class	Theft	Theft	1962	4A
70	No	Working Class	Dagga	Robbery; Assault GHB; Dagga	1963	M3
71	No	Working Class	Malicious damage	Not known	1962	B1
72	Yes JJ Swart (from Athlone)	Working Class	Rape	-	1963	S5
73	No	Working Class	Theft		1963	B4
74	No	Working Class	Robbery	HBT; Dangerous weapon	1964	4A
75	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1965	S5
76	No	Working Class	Attempted theft	HBT	1963	S5
77	No	Working Class	Fraud	HBT	1963	5B
78	No	Working Class	Theft	Theft; HBT; Assault	1964	M1

NUMBER	LEGALLY REPRESENTED (MOST RECENT OFFENCES)	SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND	OFFENCE FOR WHICH ADMITTED TO REFORM SCHOOL	PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS	YEAR OF BIRTH	EDUCATIONAL LEVEL ON ADMISSION
79	No	Working Class	Car Theft	Car theft; Assault; Theft	1961	4
80	No	Working Class	Robbery	Theft; Car Theft	1964	Left School no money Std. 3
81	No	Working Class	Theft	Children's Home; malicious damage	1963	M5
82	No	Working Class	Escape custody	Theft	1963	S5
83	No	Working Class	Robbery	HBT; Robbery; Theft; Malicious damage	1963	M1
84	No	Working Class	Theft	HBT; Theft	1964	
85	No	Working Class	Theft	Theft	1963	B2
86	No	Working Class	Car Theft	Theft	1964	B1
87	Yes - C Botha	Middle Class	Car Theft		1962	S5
88	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1963	S5
89	No	Working Class	HBT	HB	1964	B1
90	No	Working Class	HBT	Theft	1964	B1
91	No	Working Class	Assault GFB	Malicious Damage; Dagga	1964	S5
92	No	Working Class	HBT	Theft; HBT	1963	S3
93	No	Working Class	Rape	HBT	1964	S2
94	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1964	S3
95	No	Working Class	HBT		1966	B2
96	No	Working Class	Robbery	Several thefts; Robbery	1964	-
97	No	Middle Class	Theft	Theft; HBT	1964	Std. 7

NUMBER LEGALLY REPRESENTED (MOST RECENT OFFENCES) SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OFFENCE FOR WHICH ADMITTED TO REFORM SCHOOL PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS YEAR OF BIRTH EDUCATIONAL LEVEL ON ADMISSION

98	No	Working Class	HBT	HBT	1966	-
99	No	Working Class	HBT	Theft; robbery	1965	Sub A
100	No	Working Class	Theft	Theft	1962	Sub A

birth	%	age
1960	2	= 20
1961	5	= 19
1962	9	= 18
1963	23	= 17
1964	46	= 16
1965	10	= 15
1966	9	= 14

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INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY,
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN

offence for which admitted
89% non-violent crimes
68% for theft