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University of Cape Town

THE WHITE RIGHTWING IN SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS. A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF ITS ROOTS; AN ASSESSMENT OF ITS STRENGTH, AND AN ELUCIDATION OF ITS TERRITORIAL POLICIES AND POLITICAL STRATEGIES: 1969 - 1991.

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DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES IN THE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN, FOR THE DEGREE DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

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ABSTRACT

To understand the intricacies of white rightwing politics in South Africa, an in-depth analysis of the roots, strength, policies and strategies of a very small but potentially potent sector of South Africa's diverse population is required. The aim of this dissertation is to provide an objective analysis of interlinking issues associated with the rightwing, the gathering and logical presentation of empirical data, the critical discussion of theories relating to ethnicity, and the provision of a framework in which to evaluate further developments in the sphere of rightwing politics.

The thesis is concerned with an assessment of the white rightwing movement as a potentially disruptive element within the process of transformation to a democratic dispensation in South Africa. It argues that Afrikaner ethnonationalism is the driving force of the rightwing, and discusses this phenomenon in the context of its historical roots, its class base, and its ethnic component. The thesis relies on the theoretical framework of Horowitz, which suggests that the rightwing should be analyzed in terms of a collective drive for power, which in turn could be used to confirm the social status of the Afrikaner ethnic group. It is argued that in the rightwing view, the best way to confirm Afrikaner social status and to protect the group from domination by other ethnic groups and races, is through self-determination. To achieve this goal, the rightwing has placed heavy emphasis on territorial aspects and has structured its territorial demands on the basis of achieving ethnic homogeneity in the Afrikaner 'fatherland'.

The increase in the level of rightwing support after 1969, from an insignificant figure to an estimated one-third of white and roughly half of Afrikaner voters, is an indication that almost one-million rightwing supporters (plus their dependents) prefer the ethnonational version of the Afrikaner identity, rather than the NP's version based on a territorial South African nationalism. The thesis concludes with the constitutional policies and political strategies of the various rightwing organizations, with special reference to the transformation and adaptation of

these policies and strategies in response to the demands of fundamental political changes between late 1989 and mid-1991. The latter date was chosen as a cut-off point as it indicated the repeal of the last remaining legislative pillars of racial segregation and, by implication, the provisional end of a rigid racially-based political system which ensured white domination for over three hundred years (developments within rightwing politics from the above cut-off date until August 1991, is included as a postscript).

The following conclusions can be drawn from this study:

The rightwing phenomenon can best be understood in terms of what Horowitz calls, 'group entitlement', i.e. the collective striving by ethnic groups for social status and power as a means to attain such group status. This approach accounts for the intensity of both racial and intraethnic conflict (broedertwis). The theory on the existence of an ethnic dynamic helps to provide a better understanding of the subordinate position of materialistic factors relative to ethnicity. It also explains why ethnic groups, or in this case, a segment of an ethnic group, propose policies which are contrary to 'rational' economic and political interests, and sometimes contrary to rational thought and civilized behaviour in general. When evaluating the seemingly 'irrational' policies of the rightwing on from this perspective, it becomes clear that many such policies and decisions are conceived not in ignorance or wishful thinking, but are often the result of calculated economic and political sacrifices for the sake of ethnic security and status.

Although the present-day rightwing officially came into existence in 1969 with the founding of the HNP, its origins can be traced back to the mobilization of Afrikaner nationalism during the 1930's, the fascist Afrikaner movement of the 1940's, and especially to the NP's apartheid policy after 1948. In other words, the rightwing did not emerge in an ideological vacuum, and should be seen as the heirs of the original Afrikaner nationalism propagated by the NP, until the latter began deviating from this path during the 1960's. The struggle for the 'soul'

(identity) of the Afrikaner during this period resulted in the broedertwis which became a prominent characteristic of Afrikanerdom and expressed itself as the struggle between verlig and verkramp and as a split in the NP on two occasions. Like the NP in the 1960's, the CP also realized that Afrikaner nationalism, useful as it may be, could act as a constraint on recruiting sympathetic English-speaking support. This forced the Party to open its ranks to English-speakers by defining Afrikanerdom more inclusively to include sympathetic 'non-Afrikaans' whites, but not Afrikaans-speaking coloureds. The adherence by the CP to a white communalism confirmed the strong racial component of the Party's philosophy and is proof of how ethnic identity can be re-created and re-defined at will to comply with political requirements.

Although the conflictual modernization approach accords to class factors a subordinate position relative to ethnicity, it is a fact that class and race largely overlaps in South Africa, and cannot be ignored. The same holds for the intraethnic struggle among Afrikaners, and in line with the universal phenomenon that lower socio-economic classes have a propensity towards racism, evidence cited in this study confirms that there is also a correlation between lower socio-economic class and support for the rightwing in South Africa. Apart from an inherent propensity towards racism due to income and education factors, the other reason why there is greater lower class support for the rightwing can be found in the considerable level of state subsidization and job protection which Afrikaners enjoyed, and which was being threatened by the loss of Afrikaner/white political domination.

The psychological dynamic of ethnicity and the greater importance of status and power issues tend to overwhelm class issues. In the case of Afrikaner nationalism, primordial elements such as language, religion, territory, history and ancestral ties are extremely important as symbols of Afrikaner identity. For the purposes of ethnic mobilization such symbols are reshaped to suit the propaganda requirements of rightwing nationalists, similar to the reshaping of pliable ethnic boundaries to include sympathetic English-speaking whites. Both the other two

aspects discussed under identity factors, namely racism and fear, are congruent with the nature of Afrikaner nationalism. Although the majority of the rightwing organizations deny that their brand of nationalism is linked in any way to racism, evidence indicates that rightwing nationalism can be linked to a xenophobic form of ethnocentrism. Rightwing racism, this context, should be seen as a subtype of the general category of ethnocentrism, and assumes that whites are superior to blacks by nature of their genes.

There is a direct correlation between the growth of the rightwing and the political reforms over the past decade. As these reforms are taken to their logical conclusion, i.e. a majority government in South Africa and the NP shifted further to the centre of the political spectrum, so growing numbers of white voters were won over by the rightwing's emotional appeal to ethnonationalism as the only guarantee to prevent domination of the Afrikaner in a non-racial society. Since 1982 and especially after 1989, increasing numbers of whites have been switching their political allegiance to the rightwing, although this trend is subject to a number of hampering factors.

A combination of growing electoral strength and the universal resurgence of nationalism and self-determination during recent years, encouraged the CP to promote its territorial policies with greater conviction. However, fast-changing economic and socio-political realities are forcing a structural reconsideration of certain basic assumptions underlying these policies. For this reason the CP is in the difficult process of adapting its rigid constitutional policies in order to face up to the changing political realities in South Africa. This is also reflected in the broad range of strategies devised by the rightwing to further its claims for self-determination.

The methodological approach used in this thesis is primarily of qualitative descriptive nature and the case study was selected as the unit of research. The research design is discussed separately in chapter two.

DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Cape Town. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

Johann van Rooyen

First day of November 1992

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AB	Afrikaner Broederbond
AGB	Afrikaanse Gereformeerde Bond
AHI	Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut
ANC	African National Congress
AP	Afrikaanse Protestante Kerk
AV	Afrikaner Volkswag
AVBOB	Afrikaanse Begrafnis Onderneming Beperk
AWB	Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
BBB	Blanke Bevrydingsbeweging
BSP	Boerestaat Party
BWB	Boereweerstandsbeweging
CCB	Civil Cooperation Bureau
CP	Conservative Party
DP	Democratic Party
DRC	Dutch Reformed Churches
FAK	Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings
GK	Gereformeerde Kerk
HNP	Herstigte Nasionale Party
KWV	Ko-operatiewe Wijnbouers Vereniging
M&M	Market and Opinion Surveys
MWU	Mine Workers Union
NCP	National Conservative Party
NGK	Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk
NHK	Nederduits Hervormde Kerk
NP	National Party
NRP	New Republic Party
OB	Ossewa Brandwag
OFS	Orange Free State
PFP	Progressive Federal Party
SAAU	South African Agricultural Union
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SABRA	South African Bureau for Racial Affairs
SACP	South African Communist Party
SAP	South African Party
TAU	Transvaal Agricultural Union
TPA	Transvaal Provincial Administration
TUCSA	Trade Union Council of South Africa
UP	United Party
WAM	World Apartheid Movement
ZAR	Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek

GLOSSARY OF AFRIKAANS WORDS AND NOTES ON TERMINOLOGY

aksie	:action/front
apartheid	:separateness
blanke	:white
bittereinders	:Boers who fought to the last
Boer	:farmer, citizen of former Boer Republics
Boerestaat	:Boer state
broedertwis	:strife/disunity among Afrikaners
geldmagte	:money powers/forces
Gereformeerde	:Reformed
hensoppers	:Boers who surrendered early
laager	:protective circle
Oranjewerkers	:Orange workers
rooi gevaar	:communist threat/danger
stryd	:struggle
swart gevaar	:black threat/danger
verbond	:covenant
verkramp	:conservative, less open to change
verlig	:enlightened
volk	:nation/people
volksfront	:people's front
volkseenheid	:peoples's unity
volkseie	:people's own
volkskapitalisme	:people's capitalism
volksleer	:people's army
volkstaat	:nation/people's state
volksvryhede	:people's freedoms
Volkswag	:people's guard
vryheidsbeweging	:freedom movement
weerstandsbeweging	:resistance movement

All long quotes in Afrikaans have been translated into English by the author and are denoted in the thesis by the word [translation].

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1. INTRODUCTION

The struggle between those whites who insist on a racially and ethnically segregated society and those who advocate a common (non-racial) society has long been a major conflict within white South African politics. Although both these ideologies have been supported throughout the years by parties who switched their allegiance to either side on a regular basis, it can be concluded, with the benefit of historical hindsight, that by the year 1991, a majority of white South Africans had accepted the inevitability of the demise of white domination and had acquiesced in a racially integrated society.

This thesis, however, is concerned with that considerable minority of white citizens who has not yet made that political shift, and for a variety of historical, socio-economic, psychological, and ideological reasons, may never do so. The size and disruptive potential of this rightwing minority has been the source of much debate and speculation in recent years, and with a few exceptions, the general tendency has been to reject it as an irrelevancy or, at most, as being a temporary hindrance on the road to a non-racial society. This line of argument was based on three assumptions:

Firstly, that even within the confines of white politics, the rightwing represented a minority of not much more than a third of white voters, an estimate that was based upon the results of the most recent general election held in South Africa up to 1989;

Secondly, that even if rightwing support had increased since then, the NP Government has ruled out another whites-only general election;

Thirdly, that under a new constitution with universal franchise, the support for the right would constitute between a minimum of 3% (CP supporters in the last election plus their dependents), and the maximum of about 6,5% (half of all whites) of the total population of South Africa,

which represents an insignificant minority.

However, the counter-argument, which motivated the research on this topic, rests on the assumption that far from being insignificant, the white rightwing presents a serious challenge and an obstacle to the transitional process towards a new non-racial, but not necessarily non-ethnic, South Africa. This argument is based on the strength of ethnicity, and on its permeative, passionate and pervasive qualities, all of which promote a comprehension of rightwing political behaviour.

This thesis attempts to answer the following questions on the rightwing:
- who constitute the rightwing?
- what distinguishes different rightwing organizations?
- what are its roots and origins?
- what motivates its behaviour?
- is the rightwing purely a racist phenomenon?
- how strong is the rightwing?
- what are its policies and objectives?
- how does it go about achieving these objectives?

The emergence of a white rightwing as a force to be reckoned with in South African politics in the 1980's, has come as a surprise to many and brought forth a varied response from both domestic and international political fronts. It led to some improvement of the image of the NP Government which was required to reposition itself more towards the centre of the political spectrum. The rightwing's policies served to remind the NP of what it had been like not very long ago, giving rise to a 'repulsion' effect, which strengthened the hand of the verligtes and weakened the position of the verkramptes within the NP.

Internationally the world came to know with some disbelief of the existence during the 1980's of a strong political movement in South Africa which held even more rightwing views than the NP-government. Among domestic opposition groups, the emergence of a relatively powerful rightwing

provoked anger, especially from a long-suffering black population, without whose non-enfranchisement in the first place, the potential rightwing threat would have been less relevant anyway. Similarly, it caused dismay among the liberal white opposition and resulted in the PFP being replaced as the Official Parliamentary Opposition in 1987, thereafter forced to watch almost as bystanders, as the political debate raged between National Party and the Conservative Party over who best represented Afrikaner interests.

Until the late-1980's both the NP and CP adhered to the notion of white domination, and the NP's policy of power-sharing and 'one citizenship for all' did little to alter the fundamental imbalance of power between black and white. Only the NP's radical change of direction in February 1990 resulted in a process of realignment within the sphere of white politics as the NP shifted considerably towards the left by virtually taking over the entire policy of the DP. This left the CP as the sole proponent of Afrikaner ethnonationalism, and was accompanied by a drastic surge in the activities of militant rightwing movements.

Two years later, as the country enters the transitional period and multi-party negotiations are about to commence, the rightwing faces a crucial question: Is there a further role for it within the confines of the constitution, and if not, would violence and an attempt to remove the NP from office or at least take over part of the country by force, be a feasible alternative? Or should it enter into negotiations to try to achieve its territorial goals or perhaps settle for a second-best option, such as minority protection in the form of regional autonomy? If the rightwing does decide on the latter option, should the parties on the opposite side of the political spectrum not prepare themselves favourably to consider requests by the rightwing for a modest degree of self-determination in whatever form? Ultimately such an option may provide a considerable boost to the prospects of a peaceful

transition to a post-apartheid era and may be beneficial to conflict regulation in a future non-racial society.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the disproportionate degree of prominence which the rightwing enjoys today, is a direct consequence of a political system in which political, economic and military power are concentrated predominantly in white hands: until an interim and eventually, a democratic dispensation are implemented, the rightwing will remain relevant and has the potential to disrupt the transitional process either within the framework of the current constitution or by violent means.

A note on terminology:

South Africa's heterogeneity has for long provided political scientists with innumerable terminological problems, exacerbated by the government's official and arbitrary classification of South Africans into four racial groups (white, coloured, Indian and black) and within these, several ethnic categories. To further confuse matters, a number of different ideologically-based perspectives on the true nature of this heterogeneity exist. In addition to the official view mentioned above, some believe that the demise of apartheid will result in a non-racial, non-ethnic society; others that the basic division is between black and white, or between Afrikaner and African nationalism. Other perspectives hold that the conflict is between the 'oppressed and the oppressors", or between the 'settler colonialist' and the indigenous population (see also Horowitz, 1991:3-9).

In academic discourse on South African politics the general practice has been to use race to delineate differences based on colour, while ethnicity refers to the cultural differences within racial groups. In some cases the term 'black' is used to denote all categories that are not classified as white, including those classified as Indians and coloureds, while in other cases 'black' denotes only Africans.

In this thesis the official racial classification is used for the sake of clarity but in no way implies an acceptance of the ideology behind it. The concept of 'racial conflict' refers to conflict between these categories, e.g. black and white. Ethnic conflict refers to differences between e.g. Afrikaners and Zulu, Xhosa and Sotho or Afrikaner and English-speakers. The difficulty with this approach can be found in trying to describe an 'ethnic-racial' conflict, e.g. between Afrikaners (an ethnic group) and blacks (a racial category). Horowitz (1985) suggests that race should be regarded as just another ethnic category, but such a proposal further confuses matters as the above Afrikaner-black conflict would then be viewed as an interethnic conflict (which assumes that blacks in South Africa constitute a uniform ethnic group, which is clearly not the case). Taking the opposite position, namely that an Afrikaner-black conflict is a racial conflict, also has a weakness, for it implies that Afrikaners constitute a racial rather than an ethnic group.

The solution to the terminological dilemma in this thesis is provided by the composition of the rightwing, in particular of the CP. Although Afrikaner nationalism is the driving force of the rightwing, the CP has a considerable English-speaking following and the Party has accepted as its mission the survival of a "white South Africa". This makes it possible to refer to the rightwing's position vis-a-vis the black majority as being of a racial or, as Giliomee suggested, a communal nature. Therefore, any references to the white rightwing incorporate not only Afrikaner nationalists but also white sympathizers of other language groups. There are certain rightwing organizations, intellectuals such as Carel Boshoff, and the pragmatist wing of the CP, which favour a more exclusive Afrikaner nationalism rather than a white racially-based nationalism, but they are, at the time of writing, still a minority. At the same time, the struggle within Afrikanerdom between the NP and the rightwing is clearly of an intraethnic nature and is referred to in these terms throughout.

2. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

2.1 A Theoretical Framework

The concept of ethnicity, expressed in sociological or social anthropological terms, refers to a readily definable way of expressing group identity. Expressed as a political concept, however, ethnicity becomes analogous with nationalism, i.e. the demand by an ethnic group to be defined, on the basis of primordial and other characteristics, as a nation with the right to self-determination within a homogeneous and separate territory. Politicized ethnicity has become synonamous with the widespread bloodshed, mass-genocide, population expulsions, forced assimilation, and the general instability which characterize 20th century politics.

Ethnicity is not specific to any one kind of state and is to be found in highly developed democracies as well as in developing states with authoritarian regimes. Its traditional/primordial characteristics are of cultural, linguistic, religious, territorial, racial and ancestral origins, supplemented, according to Weber, by a subjective belief in common descent. Ethnicity, as defined by Horowitz (1985:53), includes a "minimal scale requirement", which enables his definition to incorporate colour, language and religious differences, and covers tribes, races, nationalities and castes. Rothschild's generic description refers to "complex collective groups whose membership is largely determined by real or putative ancestral inherent ties" (1981:9). He adds that such groups "perceive these ties as systematically affecting their place and fate in the political and socio-economic structures of their state and society", a contention which shifts the focus to the conflictual aspects of ethnicity.

The study of ethnic conflict since 1945 has been shaped by the writings of Marx and Durkheim on the causes and effects

of economic modernization and political development. These concepts are similar in meaning to the phrase 'social mobilization', defined by Deutsch as "an overall process of change, which [affects] substantial parts of the population in countries which are moving from traditional to modern ways of life" (cited in Horowitz, 1985:99). Two approaches require further discussion, namely the modernization and conflictual modernization theories.

The modernization approach became dominant during the 1960's and 1970's, and tended to view ethnic identity as being of lesser importance relative to class concerns, and rested on the assumption that industrialization would erode the primordial identities, i.e. the identification of people with ties of kinship, culture, religion and language. Theorists arguing within the confines of this approach suggested that once modernization has been achieved and modern societies established, ethnic identification would become dysfunctional and disappear. This, it was argued, would be a result of the organic division of labour which would help to replace a mechanically integrated society with an organically integrated society in which people were guided by material interests and would associate with their class interests, rather than with ethnic identities of the past (Durkheim, cited in Newman, 1991:452).

The Marxist perspective, similar to the modernization perspective, regards ethnicity as a comparatively ephemeral phenomenon which is subordinate to material forces and would be shaped and eventually destroyed by the forces of modernization (Newman, 1991:454). Marxists further argued that if a mobilization of ethnic power does occur in advanced societies, it is the result of 'backwardness', or due to the manipulating powers of class elites using ethnicity to advance their own particular goals (Giliomee, 1991:3).

By the 1970's ethnic conflict showed no signs of declining,

not even in industrialized societies, and this gave rise to the conflictual modernization theories. This approach suggests that economic and social development increases, rather than decreases, the likelihood of ethnic conflict, as ethnic groups compete for political status and power. One of the foremost proponents of the conflictual modernization approach is Walker Connor, who argues that the increased competition between previously isolated groups for the same economic niches invigorates ethnic conflict. According to Connor, modernization theorists underestimated the power of ethnonationalism and over-emphasised materialism, and he claims that ethnic groups are often prepared to follow 'irrational' economic choices and make economic sacrifices to achieve some ethnonational goal, e.g. self-determination (1991:16).

The conflictual modernization approach further sees ethnicity as an identity that could be created and re-created to comply with particular economic and political requirements, and that the traditional ethnic characteristics (i.e. cultural, religious, territorial, ancestral and racial) are constantly being re-defined (Crawford Young, 1976). This line of argument was also espoused by Anthony Smith (1981), who declined to define ethnicity because, in his view, that task is the function of the manipulative ideologies of ethnic elites (cited in Newman, 1991:456). Similarly, George Schopflin argued that culture should not be understood only in terms of its outward manifestations such as language, religion, symbols and consumer habits, but should be seen as the sum total of subjective perceptions in a community, the rules by which it orders its life, its sense of a common past and a shared future (cited in Giliomee, 1991:5).

According to Newman (1991:459), serious shortcomings of the conflictual modernization approach were identified by theorists the 1980's, mainly with regard to insufficient explanations of many aspects of ethnic political activity. For example, it did not fully explain how economic modernization and political development, which depend on

the balance of political, social, demographic and economic resources among ethnic groups within a state, might result in different manifestations of ethnic political activity. Several theorists within the same tradition attempted to redress weaknesses of the conflictual modernization approach by analyzing the distribution of economic and political resources between groups. Among these was Joseph Rothschild (1981), who argued that both ethnic groups and the state are actors with economic and political resources at their disposal, and that the rise of politicised ethnic identifications is dependent on such economic, political and ideological resources rather than the forces of modernization and political development.

This argument is re-iterated by Rogowski (1985), who argues that although modernization could create the conditions necessary for ethnic poltical activity, the extent of the ethnic conflict depends on resources available to the various ethnic groups, which in turn, structure ethnic ideologies, strategies and poltical organizations. He uses rational choice theory to explain <u>when</u> ethnic conflicts will take place, <u>what</u> form they would take, and <u>how</u> ethnic groups would react to ethnic group dominance, be it assimilation, isolation, resistance, or minority autonomy. Rogowski claims that in a society with an unstable system of social stratification and a cultural division of labour (what Horowitz describes as a ranked society), an upward movement by members of the subordinate group will result in a reactive nationalism among nonelite members of the dominant ethnic group, as happened among Afrikaners in South Africa, whites in Rhodesia and Protestants in Northern Ireland (cited in Newman, 1991:461). Rogowski's theory is criticised by Newman (ibid) on grounds of its over-emphasis of the manipulative powers of an elite in shaping and controlling ethnic nationalism, but his work provides a valuable link with that of Horowitz, insofar as it describes how the members of a dominant ethnic group respond to growing challenges to its status from

competing ethnic groups in a ranked society.

The approach which is the primary guide to the theoretical framework of this thesis, is that of Donald Horowitz (1985), which emphasises the the psychological dynamic of ethnic conflict. Horowitz argues that the collective drive for social status and power in divided societies is a powerful force, and takes the shape of a unique ethnic dynamic which frequently triumphs over rational economic and political interests. This is especially the case in societies where the individual's status is linked to that of his ethnic group, and power is linked to the confirmation of ethnic status.

Horowitz argues that the nature of ethnic conflict depends on the social structure of the society in which such groups operate. These can be ranked, in which case class and ethnic origins largely coincide, and relations between groups organized on the basis of superordinate and subordinate groups), or unranked, in which case social class and ethnic group do not coincide and groups exist on a parallel basis (Horowitz, 1985:22-23). From the basis of this fundamental distinction, he attempts to develop a theory which explains amongst others, the causes and severity of ethnic conflict, the origins of ethnic groups, the relationship between ethnic and class conflict, the goals and strategies of politicised ethnic groups, and the dynamics of ethnic party politics.

Horowitz's approach can be criticised on several scores, particularly on his contention that ranked systems, such as in South Africa, "ethnic conflict is subsumed under the rubric of social revolutions fed by class conflict" (Newman, 1991:467). Although race and class largely coincide in South Africa, only a confirmed Marxist would see it as purely a class-based conflict. Furthermore, in most of the comparative cases of ethnic conflict reviewed by Horowitz, the structure of group relations is unranked/parallel, thereby making it difficult to apply his

theories and conclusions to the South African conflict, where the social structure between groups clearly is of an hierarchical nature. However, this approach provides a comprehensive guideline to certain aspects of ethnic conflict in general, as well as to other aspects which are particular to the nature of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflict found in South Africa.

The first section of Horowitz's approach deals with the dimensions of ethnic conflict, in which he argues that in deeply divided societies etnicity permeates organizations, activities and roles to which they are formally unrelated, a fact which imparts a pervasive quality to ethnic conflict and raises the stakes of politicised ethnicity. The salience of ethnicity is further reflected in the segmented organizational structure, in particular economic and political organization (1985:8-9). Horowitz rejects the modernization approach to ethnic conflict ('class interests will eclipse ethnic interests'), and criticises the conflictual modernization approach (which states that industrialization and competition for scarce resources and status cause ethnic competition to intensify), on the grounds that it does not explain <u>why</u> competing groups would organise on ethnic lines. He is also critical of the assumption that the formal/primordial characteristics of ethnicity such as language, religion or kinship are determining factors in the formation of ethnic groups, and points out that ethnic conflict occurs in societies even where there is only one language or religion (1985:15). In addition, Horowitz rejects the notion that racial conflict should be distinguished from ethnic conflict, and favours an inclusive conception of ethnicity which encompasses all ascriptive differences such as colour, appearance, language, religion, ancestry or some other indicator of common origin (1985:17-18).

As mentioned earlier, Horowtz draws a distinction between ranked and unranked groups, and although he admits that the distinction is blurred in practice, he suggests that ranked

systems can be identified by the following characteristics:

- stratification is synonymous with ethnic membership;
- mobility opportunities are restricted by group identity;
- political, economic and social status are cumulative so that the subordinate group is subordinate in each of these categories to the dominant group;
- it is logically impossible for a subordinate group to have an acknowledged upper class;
- the existence of ritualized modes of expressing lower status of subordinate groups, such as preventing social interaction between the ranked groups, by restricting education and occupational mobility among members of the subordinate group, and by the denial of prestige to subordinate groups by e.g. stereotyping;
- ranked systems are produced by conquest or capture in which the ensuing domination results in the creation of upper and lower ranks and an ideology of inferiority for subordinate groups;
- class and ethnic interests largely coincide in ranked groups which results in such societies having a class colouration (1985:22-32).

Horowitz claims that such a system is not static, but rather is constantly in a state of rapid transition or experience increasing pressure from the subordinate group to implement change. However, evidence indicates that ranked systems are on the decline because of the spread of egalitarian ideas, international contact and the diffusion of education. Under pressure to change, ranked systems face four possibilities: subordinate groups can attempt to displace superordinate groups; they can attempt to abolish ethnic divisions; they can attempt to raise their position in the ethnic hierarchy without challenging the legitimacy of the existing order; or they can attempt to move the system from ranked to unranked (1985:32-34). According to Horowitz none of these changes is likely to occur without the application of considerable force to maintain the existing system of stratefication (ibid).

A further spect of Horowitz's theory which has relevance to this study, concerns the creation and re-creation of ethnic groups and the redefinition of the size and scope of of such groups. Horowitz (1985:65) distinguishes between 'assimilation' and 'differentiation' of groups: under 'assimilation' two possibilities exist, namely, amalgamation (two or more groups unite to form a new, larger group), or incorporation (one group assumes the identity of another). Under 'differentiation there are possibilities of division (one group divides into two or several groups), or proliferation (one group or more produces an additional group from within its ranks). These processes are important in the South African context because it can assist in the understanding of the NP's attempts throughout the years to move from an ethnic Afrikaner party, to a communal party for whites, to a non-racial party or alliance of parties. The later phase involves the attempted creation of a 'South African' identity, i.e. along the lines of the process of amalgamation.

On the other hand, the question arises whether the direct consequence of the NP's attempts to 'amalgamate' ethnic and racial groups, i.e. two consecutive splits in the Afrikaner ethnic group, could be classified under the headings 'division' or 'proliferation', or whether it should be seen merely as an intra-ethnic squabble within the same ethnic group over ideological differences? This issue is addressed later in this chapter when an attempt is made to provide a definitional yardstick for the rightwing.

An issue related to the above-mentioned process of boundary changes between ethnic groups is the notion of boundary reinforcement. According to Horowitz (1985:70-71), group boundaries must be underpinned by "a suitable apparatus of myth and legend, which cannot be generated spontaneously". Cultural movements attempt to shape and reshape the contours of ethnic myth and legend:

> The progress of cultural ethnic movements to support boundary maintenance or reconstruction, was measured over decades, for they entail the reorientation of collective beliefs and practices, religious, linguistic and historical (Horowitz, 1985:70-71).

This describes, to a large extent, the process of ethnic mobilization launched by the NP in the 1930's and re-launched with great success by the CP during the 1980's, after the former embarked upon its efforts to incorporate black and white into a single nation to forge a new South African identity.

Earlier it was mentioned that Horowitz regards materialism as subordinate to status and honour as a factor to explain ethnic conflict: "I have been at pains to show that straightforward relationships between economic rivalry and ethnic conflict are difficult to establish" (1985:134-135). Although such relationships do exist, he argues, economic antagonism explains more about the conflict at the top rather than at the bottom of developing societies. In addition, the pursuit of economic interests in ways that could cause ethnic conflict is impeded by certain features of ethnic pluralism. He claims that ethnic diversity results in a segmented labour market which inhibits economic competition. Horowitz also criticizes class theorists for not attempting to explain issues linked to power and status, e.g. the striving for domination and autonomy, which he believes takes precedence over economic interests (Horowitz, 1985:134-135).

A further explanation of ethnic conflict can be found, according to Horowitz (1985:143-144), in group allegiances and comparison:

> Once groups have formed, group loyalties quickly takes hold. In interactions between groups, favouritism towards ingroups and discrimination against outgroups are demonstrated. What group members seem to desire is a positive evaluation of the group to which they belong. A favorable evaluation is attained by comparison to other groups in the environment.

To explain his proposition Horowitz uses the terms 'backward' and 'advanced' groups. Backward is used to describe groups which perceive themselves as weak in comparison to stronger groups. To enable groups to draw invidious comparisons with backward groups, stereotyping is used. As will be indicated in chapter five, racism and prejudice among members of the rightwing leans heavily on this perception.

Describing a fear of extinction as a further characteristic of backward groups and as a rationale for hostility, Horowitz (1985:175-181) argues that such groups demonstrate a severe anxiety not only of being dominated, but of physical extermination. Horowitz argues that such a fear is actually a projection whereby unacceptable impulses (e.g. the desire to commit genocide) are imputed to other groups. However, as indicated in chapter five, Afrikaner (and white) fears cannot be explained purely in terms of a projection of genocidal impulses, but actually consist of deep-seated white minority fears of extinction, massacres and of being dominated by a black majority in a 'dark' continent. The fear of extinction forms a major part of what is described by Horowitz as the "positional group psychology" of the rightwing, discussed in chapter five.

Horowitz places great emphasis on the collective drive for social status and power (group entitlement), not only as a means to secure tangible goods and benefits but also for its value in confirming ethnic status:

> In short, power may be desired, not only for the lesser things it can gain, but for the greater things it reflects and prevents....The fear of ethnic domination and suppression is a motivating force for the acquisition of power as an end. And power is also sought for confirmation of ethnic status. Broad matters of group status regularly have equal or superior standing to the narrow allocative decisions often taken to be the uniform stuff of everyday politics (Horowitz, 1985:187).

Fundamental issues such as citizenship, electoral systems, official languages and religions become crucial to politics, as these refer directly to ethnic status (ibid).

With reference to the importance of territory in the quest for power and status by one group to the exclusion of other groups, Horowitz argues that ethnic groups rely on the principle pertaining to legitimacy of a group's presence within a territory, which refers to "one's rightful place in the country" (1985:201). The foundation of such group legitimacy within a specific territory depends on the prior occupation of land, a perception of a special mission, traditional rule and the right to succeed the colonial power (1985:200-207). The first two of these possibilities have specific relevance to the claims of Afrikaner nationalists to substantiate their claims of legitimacy in respect of 'white' South Africa. This is discussed in detail in chapter five.

Horowitz also discusses the nature of symbolism, which he claims, is effective in ethnic conflict because

> it clothes ethnic claims in ideas and associations that have acknowledged moral force beyond the particular conflict, thereby masking something that would otherwise be controversial (1985:218).

According to Horowitz (1985:217-222) the objective of symbolic demands is a public affirmation of legitimacy where legitimacy is contested. Symbolic issues includes the status of ethnic languages, the names of towns and states, sports emblems, national anthems, among others. Language, in particular, is a symbol of domination, its importance deriving from the fact that its status denotes the status of the group that speaks it. The importance of Afrikaans in the Afrikaner nationalist struggle clearly illustrates Horowitz's proposition and is discussed in chapter five.

Horowitz further argues that a theory constructed around group entitlement, its position in terms of worth and legitimacy, greatly helps to understand the fundamental issues of ehthnic group behaviour. Furthermore, that status

and group psychology are not severable as both are part of struggles over symbols of prestige and dominance (1985:228).

A further aspect of Horowitz's explanation of ethnic conflict deals with attempts by ethnic groups to make their territories more homogeneous by withdrawing from the state, i.e. secession (which is viewed by him as a special kind of ethnic conflict modified by its territorial character). Calculations of group interests play a part in secession, although some ethnic groups opt for secession even when it would appear to be to their detriment to do so (Horowitz, 1985:231). Secession and separatism are used interchangeably by Horowitz and includes attempts both to obtain complete sovereignty as well as autonomy. He draws a distinction between separatist attempts by backward groups and advanced groups in backward and advanced economic regions, and argues that the interplay of relative group position and relative regional economic position determines the emergence of secession. The success of secession depends on the degree of foreign support a seceding region has, and whether it has a high degree of ethnic homogeneity (1985:231-281).

As none of the territorial claims of any of the rightwing groups in South Africa fit the above-mentioned categories, this issue needs no further exploration, except to repeat Horowitz's proposition that in the most frequent instances of secession, backward groups in backward regions, the economic sacrifices of secession are subordinate to ethnic anxiety. This reaffirms his earlier suggestion that the power and status components of ethnicity, and the fear of domination and extinction, tend to overwhelm rational economic and political interests. This proposition is discussed in chapter seven with regard to the secessionist proposals of Carel Boshoff.

Horowitz's theoretical approach focuses on ethnic groups in conflict, and seeks to explain its causes, strategies and agendas, and emphasises the psychological dynamic behind

such conflict. The question is, to what extent does this theory address the nature of the conflict in South Africa, and more important for the purpose of this study, the conflict situation created by the rightwing?

To answer this question, one should commence with the proposition that Afrikaner nationalism is the driving force of the rightwing, as it historically was in the case of the NP. This provides a foundation on which to analyse the existing perspectives on the roots and nature of Afrikaner nationalism, which are, inter alia, also applicable to the rightwing version of ethnonationalism. These approaches include Marxist and neo-Marxist theories which over-emphasise class and economic interests to explain the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism, e.g. Johnstone (1976), Wolpe (1973), O'Meara (1983) and others. It also includes those theorists who emphasise the importance of identity, status, psychological and ideological factors, such as Connor (1973), Rothschild (1981), Giliomee (1989), Schopflin, Horowitz (1985) and others. The latter category of approaches forms the basis for this thesis.

The question arises whether the 'ethnic group' is the correct unit of analysis by which to analyse the rightwing? Does the rightwing constitute an ethnic or an ideological group, or is it a combination of both of these? This study approaches the issue from a dual perspective: firstly, by viewing the existence of the rightwing as a manifestation of the conflict between Afrikaner nationalism (and its rightwing English-speaking sympathizers) and black nationalism; and secondlly as a form of intra-ethnic conflict between two ideological strains of Afrikanerdom, each with divergent ideas of how the state should be used to protect the status of Afrikaners and how to maintain their grip on power.

It is problematic to formulate an exact definition of these

two ideological strains within Afrikanerdom. Horowitz's explanation of ethnic group proliferation whereby an ethnic group produces an additional group from within its ranks without the parent group losing its identity, does not provide a way out of the dilemma because it is doubtful whether the rightwing group of Afrikaner nationalists/white supremacists can be viewed as an ethnic subgroup with a separate ethnic identity, engaged in ethnic conflict with the 'mother' group of non-nationalist Afrikaners.

Although the two strains of Afrikanerdom have divergent perceptions, strategies and goals on how best to protect the Afrikaner's identity and status, these are ideological, as both sides still share the same language, religion, territory, and ancestral ties. Horowitz's definiton of subgroups include only differences based on caste, clan, language, religion and region (1985:350), and although some of these differences exist to a lesser degree between rightwing and other Afrikaners, these are relatively insignificant and not sufficient to warrant subgroup-status (I refer to the findings in chapter four which indicate that there is a greater working-class element attached to the CP's support base than to that of the NP; to the fact that rightwing support is overwhelmingly located in the two northern provinces, and the claim by Robert van Tonder, leader of the Boerestaat Party, that the "Cape Dutch" spoken by Afrikaners in the Cape is not the same as the "Boeretaal" spoken by 'Boers' in the Transvaal and Free State).

Therefore, the rightwing can be defined as those organizations which form part of the white 'racial' group, but with a particular ideological agenda (described as Afrikaner ethnonationalism and white supremacy), which distinguishes it from those Afrikaners/whites who do not share this ideology.

The approaches which best describe the phenomenon of intra-ethnic conflict, are those of Horowitz (1985),

Giliomee (1991), and Linz (1985). Horowitz focuses on the concept of an ethnically based political party, which he defines as a party that "derives it support overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group", but he argues that such a party does not have to command an exclusive hold on the allegiance of all members of that group. In fact, it is possible for an ethnic group to split its support equally between two or more ethnically based parties (Horowitz, 1985:295). He claims that intra-group party competition can be intense and can result in the replacement of one ethnic party by another representing the same group, and is usually the result when followers begin to disapprove of the direction of an ethnic party (1985:342-343). Such a 'direction' may involve a shift away from being an ethnic party, as can be illustrated by the NP's move from an Afrikaner, to a white, to a South African nationalism over the past three decades, but according to Horowtiz, the loss of ethnic support may be compensated for by support from other groups which support the new direction. As illustrated in chapter three and six of the thesis, this is what also happened to the NP's former ethnic base, although as Giliomee (1991:23) points out, the NP remained fundamentally an ethnic party throughout the course of the 1980's, and was greatly concerned not to lose the majority of Afrikaner support.

The intense electoral rivalry between the NP and the CP during the 1980's-early 1990's to increase their share of support among Afrikaners, led to what Horowitz describes as "intraethnic outbidding" (1985:359). However, as the NP lost a substantial percentage of its Afrikaner followers to the rightwing, it expanded its ethnic base in order to recoup some of the losses from other ethnic groups, notably English-speakers, and later coloureds, Indians and blacks. The formation of a such a multiethnic party at the center, according to Horowitz (1985:410), is followed by the formation of parties on the ethnic flanks:

> The reason for this is straightforward. In a severely

> divided society, consorting and compromising with ethnic opponents are bound to to be viewed with a disapproval by members of the various groups. The sense of betrayal and the disagreement with the substance of the compromise give rise to electoral opportunities on the ethnic flanks, opportunities to which politicians will respond (Horowitz, 1985:410).

In such a flanking situation, an ethnic party has everything to gain and nothing to lose by taking a firm or extreme position on ethnic issues, and it will differ fundamentally with the multiethnic party in its policy on interethnic relations (Horowitz, 1985:411).

Juan Linz (1985) discusses the same phenomenon ('of an ethnic party turning multi-ethnic by seeking support across ethnic borders') from a different angle: according to Linz, ethnic peripheral nationalism will move from an emphasis on primordial characteristics to a definition based on territoriality, because primordialism is an insufficient basis for the creation of a self-governing political unit:

> the definition would change from an emphasis on common descent, race, language, distinctive cultural tradition, in some cases religion, to one based on "living and working" in an area, on the willingness to identify with that community, or on both (1985:205).

However, Linz claims that not all ethnic groups would necessarily have to go through this transition from primordialism to territorial nationalism, as some smaller and geographically dispersed groups in basically rural or traditional settings might be satisfied with the recognition of their primordial claims (1985:207). Linz's argument that smaller, dispersed ethnic groups would opt for primordialism to further their aims, corresponds with Horowitz's description of an ethnic party trying to outbid a multi-ethnic party by stressing ethnically-related issues. It also applies to rightwing's extreme position in general on symbolic and cultural issues relating to Afrikaner nationalism, and in the case of the CP, also references to the demands of the 'white' nation.

According to Giliomee (1989; 1992) the "fundamental differences" mentioned by Horowitz, can be illustrated by intraethnic conlict among Afrikaners on how explicitly state power could be used to protect Afrikaner identity and interests, and to conflicting conceptions of Afrikaner identity. Giliomee's argument emphasises the importance of political and emotional elements of Afrikaner ethnonationalism and like Horowitz, he claims that issues relating to status and power are crucial to understanding intra-ethnic conflict among Afrikaners (1989:121). He explains the 1969 and 1982 splits within the NP in these terms and attempts to show how two conflicting interpretations of ways to protect Afrikaner identity and ethnic strategies evolved during the 1960's to 1980's, namely those of the rightwing and of the NP.

In searching for an appropriate framework for analysis for this case study of the rightwing, it was decided to rely primarily on the psychological dynamic approach of Horowitz, which concentrates on the collective drive for social status and power as an explanation for the conflict situation created by rightwing ethnonationalism. Horowitz's approach is based on a comparative analysis of ethnic conflict in the world's divided societies, and provides an useful basis for understanding the various aspects of the 'ethnic dynamic' underlying such conflict. This thesis applies aspects of his theory to describe the rightwing within the broader South African perspective, i.e. as a form of racial conflict, but it also relies on other theories to expand on the nature of intraethnic conflict.

Chapter three reviews the historic roots of Afrikaner nationalism and attempts to explain how it was used by the NP from the 1930's onwards to mobilize the Afrikaner into a powerful political entity, only later to be supplemented by a broader white and eventually, a South African nationalism. This chapter closely follows Giliomee's (1991) explanation for what is basically, a description of the development of intra-ethnic Afrikaner rivalry (broedertwis) over conflicting conceptions of Afrikaner identity and

interests. The second part of this chapter is primarily a description of the numerous organizations which constitute the rightwing, each nominally with different objectives and located in different spheres of society, but with collocating factors in the form of a common Afrikaner/white nationalism, a demand for self-determination, and a tendency towards racism and white supremacy.

Chapter four deals with class as an explanation for intra-ethnic Afrikaner conflict, and addresses the question of whether rightwing support is class-related. Economistic issues played a role in the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and in the founding of the rightwing political parties in 1969 and 1982. Substantial evidence exists which links Afrikaner nationalism, as espoused by both the NP and the rightwing, to materialistic issues (O'Meara, Lipton, Giliomee), and an attempt is made in this chapter to illustrate the above proposition with existing as well as empirical evidence. If this link can be shown, the implication would be that as the economic position of whites deteriorates further as a consequence of the acceleration of the process of redistribution of wealth to blacks (all things being equal), greater numbers of whites would join the rightwing, which promises to reverse the redistributive trend.

However, when measured against the powerful and all-encompassing strength of the 'ethnic psychological dynamic', i.e. the collective drive of an ethnic group for social status and power, material issues are of lesser importance. Chapter five concentrates on the nature and strength of Afrikaner ethnonationalism as espoused by the rightwing, and an attempt is made to disprove Adam's proposition that

> It has yet to be proven...that [an Afrikaner] BMW-owning bureaucratic bourgeoisie with swimming-pools and servants readily sacrifices the good life for psychologically gratifying ethnic affinities (1990:236).

This chapter deals with the importance to the rightwing of the primordial elements of ethnonationalism, such as a common language, religion, territory and ancestral ties, especially in the light of Horowitz's claim that ethnic flanking parties, such as the CP, concentrate on these primordial aspects of ethnicity. With further reference to Horowitz, the chapter addresses the importance of Afrikaner symbolism, as well as the ethnocentric interpretation of historic symbols. In addition, attention is given to the elements of racism and fear as part of the socio-psychological components of rightwing-Afrikaner ethnonationalism. Fear in this regard pertains to, in Horowitz's terminology, the fear of "ethnic domination and suppression" (1985:187), but also incorporates the fear of extinction (what Crighton and Mac Iver refer to as the fear of genocide, 1991:127-140). It includes a discussion of the sources of white and Afrikaner anxiety in general, as well as particular rightwing fears.

Chapter six deals purely with intra-ethnic electoral competition primarily between the NP and rightwing parties during the period 1969 to 1991. It is suggested that a correlation exists between political reform and the NP's attempt to re-orientate itself away from an ethnic party to a multiethnic party/coalition on the one hand, and on the other, the growth of the rightwing's support during this period. This chapter addresses Horowitz's proposition that a flanking party (the CP) would invariably take a firm line on ethnic issues in its effort to outbid a multiethnic party (the NP). An analysis of the CP's electoral performance and strategies aims to determine whether the Party fits Horowitz's description of the relationship between an ethnically-orientated party and an emphasis on ethnic (primordial) issues.

Chapter seven deals with the territorial demands and political strategies employed and considered by the rightwing to achieve its objectives. According to Horowitz (1985:228) it is logical for ethnonational groups to attempt to reduce the risk of domination by other groups by

striving for homogeneity in territories perceived to belong to them, mostly by withdrawing from the 'mother' state. In this chapter all rightwing proposals in this respect are investigated, and these include not only those aimed at the withdrawal of an ethnonationalist group from the 'mother' state (secession), but also those aimed at enforcing the withdrawal of other groups and intended to leave the 'mother' state in the hands of the ethnonationalist group (the CP's policy of partition). The various political strategies of the rightwing are also discussed with reference to violent and non-violent strategies, the latter including the option of negotiations.

2.2 Research Design

While Horowitz (1985) uses a combination of "careful cross-national comparison" and the "intricacies of paradigm cases" to explain ethnic conflict, it was decided to conduct this research in the form of an intensive case study. No attempt is therefore made systematically to compare rightwing ethnonationalism with e.g. 'settler nationalism' elsewhere in Africa, and references in this regard are purely to illustrate a particular point. The case study method, according to Horowitz (1985:xiii), is helpful for tracking mechanisms and changes over time, which appeared to be the most useful way of dealing with rightwing's origins, evolution, growth, goals and strategies. This case study is located within the generic method of qualitative research, with its focus on a descriptive study.

These case study method is defined Paige (cited in Wasby, 1970:157) a case study is an in-depth study of a single unit of anlysis:

> A single case study is taken to be a body of factual statements at a low level of abstraction pertaining to a single unit of analysis or a number of interacting units and limiting conditions which the researcher

> considers relevant for the explanation of a particular outcome.... A single case is a "construct" whose empirical boundaries vary with the analytical choice - explicit or implicit - of the observer.

According to Paige, the social scientist's ability to describe far outruns his ability to account for what he has described in terms of general laws, which gives rise to a discrepancy between the total range of empirical phenomena reported in a case study and the amount of data which can be accounted for in terms of explicit theory (Paige cited in Wasby, 1970:159).

Wasby (1970:158-159) distinguishes between particularizing and generalizing case study analysis, with the former denoting that generalizations are used in carrying out the analysis of the particular case, but insists that not all the factual statements made in a case study can be explained by generalizations. Generalizing analysis denotes the development of empirical generalizations or theory through the analysis of the single case (ibid). This thesis follow the first approach, the implication being that the findings are not a basis for generalizations, although it has attempted to be systematic and precise and to adhere to the historical approach which uses chronology as an ordering device.

Descriptive research, as opposed to explanatory or predictive research, forms the analytical focus of this study, and is defined as "the process by which events and conditions are profiled in order to determine similarities, differences, ranges, variations and interrelationships" (Andriole and Hopple, 1984:183). In this thesis descriptive research (apart from chapter four which is implicitly explanatory) constitutes a detailed analysis of the issues that contribute to interethnic as well as intraethnic instability and conflict relating to the rightwing in South

Africa. Furthemore, the methodological approach used in this thesis is principally of qualitative nature, i.e. methods which rely primarily on upon the collection of subjective or expert-generated data and therefore depend on the wisdom, experience and judgement of the researcher (Andriole and Hopple, 1984:11). Qualitative researchers frequently adopt historical, institutional and sociological approaches within a case or comparative study, and often use quantitative concepts and data, but not in the same way as quantitative researchers who use 'hard' data to test hypotheses. Therefore, although this thesis relies principally on qualitative research, it contains also quantitative aspects in the form of original surveys, but these are suggestive rather than conclusive. Qualitative research is less rigidly structured with regard to the collection of data, such data consisting primarily of interviews, field observations and questionnaires.

Criticism against qualitative research pertains to the fact that it lacks the 'scientific' precision of quantitative research and together with its subjective bias, cannot be used as a basis for high-level generalizations (Wasby, 1970:159). In spite of the criticism, this thesis can be categorised as being of qualitative descriptive nature, and uses the individual case study as a method to research various aspects of the unit of analysis, the rightwing. The case study method was selected as an ideal vehicle to enact a intensive study of an often misunderstood sector of South African politics. It is difficult to conceptualize this research as representative of a particular paradigm, such as ethnically-divided societies per se, as the rightwing cannot be understood purely in terms of interethnic conflict. A substantial part of rightwing antagonism is directed at fellow-Afrikaners in the NP, i.e. intra-ethnic antagonism, and a description of this phenomenon forms a large part of this thesis.

Research data was obtained from primary sources such as rightwing publications, principally the CP mouthpiece, Patriot, and that of the HNP, Die Afrikaner, the Boerestaat

Nuusbrief, SABRA's Journal of Racial Affairs, the Oranje Perspektief of the Vereniging van Oranjewerkers and numerous other newsletters and propaganda leaflets. These were supplemented by formal and informal interviews, participant observation at CP congresses, public rightwing meetings and mass rallies. Secondary research was based on a regular survey of local and national newspapers, magazines and periodicals, and on the limited number of books dealing specifically with the rightwing.

3. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE WHITE RIGHTWING

3.1 AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: 1902- 1991

3.1.1 The origins of Afrikaner Nationalism

> As Afrikaners constitute over 60% of the white population of South Africa, a high degree of ethnic political unity has traditionally assured their grip on political power. Hence the almost mystical qualities associated with volkseenheid. As the record shows, however, unity was not the result of some inherent propensity among Afrikaners, who on the contrary have historically always been prone to a factionalism whose roots have lain variously in provincial and regional rivalries, class divisions, ideological differences, conflicts between ambitious rival leaders and in combinations of these sources (Welsh, 1988:2).

The emergence of the contemporary rightwing movement in South Africa can only be understood against the background of the rise of Afrikaner nationalism. An inherent characteristic of this particular brand of nationalism was that it was never a monolithic movement and was plagued by many ideological, socio-economic and even regional differences. These divisions began with the conflict between the Bittereinders and the Hensoppers during the Anglo-Boer war and has continued up to this day. It is therefore feasible to commence this study by providing a brief overview of the evolution of the phenomena of Afrikaner nationalism and disunity, both having had their

roots in the defeat suffered by the Afrikaner/Boer at the hands of Britain in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902.

Although this chapter commences with the ending of the above-mentioned war, the period between mid-1960's and 1982 is of particular importance to this study, as it represented the birth of the present-day rightwing. This formative period of the rightwing and the unfolding of a period of unrivalled broedertwis is analysed from the intraethnic perspective suggested by Giliomee (1991), who argues that the conflict was principally over how state power should be used to protect Afrikaner identity and interests. According to Giliomee this led to two conflicting conceptions of the Afrikaner identity, with the rightwing opting for an exclusive form of ethnonationalism and the NP for a broader white, and later, territorially-based South African nationalism. However, an explanation based on status and identity factors, does not mean that class factors should be ignored, as these played a distinct, although lesser important role in the emergence of the rightwing during this period. There is only a brief reference to class issues in this chapter, but it is more fully discussed in chapter four.

The Anglo-Boer War and its disastrous consequences left the Afrikaners, especially in the conquered republics, a defeated and demoralised group of people, who seemed destined to be absorbed by the British culture, without ever having had a reasonable opportunity of establishing themselves as a distinct and coherent nation. The hopeless position of the Afrikaner at the conclusion of the Anglo-Boer War in 1902 was characterized not only by the destruction of their independence and economic prosperity, but also by a loss of confidence in their nationhood, their language, culture and sense of belonging.

The consequences of the war resulted in extreme poverty among rural Afrikaners, exacerbated by rural dislocation and decline, and led to the rapid urbanization of a people who never really knew of any other form of subsistence

apart from the land. The poverty problem took on new dimensions in the cities as most of these Afrikaners lacked industrial and vocational education and ended up as unskilled labourers without much hope of promotion (Welsh, 1974:251). They were categorised as 'poor whites' and in the 1920's, between 30 and 50 percent of all Afrikaners were already part of, or came very close to being classified as part of this category (Lemon, 1987:65). The Carnegie Report placed this figure in 1932 at some 300 000. Apart from their severe financial difficulties, social and psychological problems were rife due to the seemingly hopeless nature of their plight. A kind of a 'loser-culture' developed, or as Leach describes it "people developed inherent poverty habits, losing all desire to fight for survival and falling back on welfare (1989:31). The Carnegie Report defined the term "poor whites" as a group of 300 000 white people who had become dependent to such an extent, whether from mental, moral, economic or physical causes, that they were unfit, without help from others, to find proper means of livelihood for themselves or their children (Davenport, 1987:319).

In the cities Afrikaners also had to contend with the superior position of their recent enemies, the English, whose culture and economic strength seemed overwhelming. A deliberate Anglicization policy followed by Alfred Milner after 1902 posed a serious threat to the continued existence of the Afrikaner culture and identity (Welsh, 1974:251). However, in the face of this adversity and the unfavourable comparison with the English, the first stirrings of Afrikaner nationalism appeared. The notion of being second-class citizens in their own country gave a boost to Afrikaner nationalism and eventually led to the process of 'ethnic mobilisation', a term referred to by Adam and Giliomee (1979:61). It refers to a process which started in the second decade of the 20th century and ultimately led the National Party to victory in 1948, and which had as goal the mobilisation of Afrikaner nationalism in order to grasp political control of the country. It is described by these authors as a two-fold strategy with a

materialistic appeal insofar as it offered distinct advantages to the various sections of Afrikanerdom such as farmers, businessmen and semi- or unskilled workers, but also appealing to status and psychological needs in the sense of belongingness ibid).

According to Welsh (1974:249-259) ethnic mobilisation had cultural, political and economic dimensions, which focused respectively on Afrikaans language and literature, on the idea of an Afrikaner-dominated republic and finally on overcoming Afrikaner poverty and inequality with English-speaking whites. These dimensions were linked by a network of informal voluntary organisations (Bekker and Grobbelaar, 1987:68-69). The end-result was a situation in which every institution of the Afrikaner community, including schools, the Dutch Reformed Churches, local officials, shopkeepers, voluntary societies and cultural organizations, reinforced Afrikaner nationalism. According to Lemon they all worked consciously or unconsciously towards building a remarkable degree of cohesion and single-mindedness (1987:64). The end-result of this process is described by Bloomberg (1989) as:

> A revival which established Afrikaner hegemony within the privileged white elite, ended the paramountcy of English settler culture and ideology, and eliminated the British imperial factor from South Africa.

Central to this process was the Broederbond, and its role in the three-pronged strategy to promote and establish Afrikaner nationalism was crucial in the cultural, economic and political spheres. Its ideology was founded in the firm conviction in the divinity of its mission and that of the Afrikaner volk:

> The Afrikaner Broederbond was born out of the deep conviction that the Afrikaner volk has been planted in this country by the Hand of God, destined to survive as a separate volk with its own calling (J.C. Van Rooy and I. Lombard, chairman and secretary, repectively, of the Broederbond in 1944, cited in Serfontein, 1979:29).

The Broederbond was founded in 1918 and became a secret society in 1928. It designed a distinctive ideology and promoted a separate Afrikaner identity by creating a consciousness among Afrikaners based on their language, religion, traditions, country and volk (Adam and Giliomee, 1979:247-249). Membership was restricted to Protestant Afrikaner males of sound financial standing in the economic, public and professional spheres of life (ibid). The organization emphasized the necessity of its secretive and confidential nature, and was divided into a network of cells countrywide: by 1925 there were eight cells with 162 members, by 1940 135 cells with 1 980 members, by 1968 8 191 members and 560 cells, and by 1978 a total of 11 190 members (ibid; Pelzer, 1979:33; Serfontein, 1979:35).

Although the Bond did not succeed during the war years between 1939 and 1945, in reconciling the NP and the Ossewa Brandwag, it did succeed in arranging the electoral pact between the NP and Afrikaner Party which led to the NP's 1948 victory over the United Party (Adam and Giliomee, 1979:247-248). Its stated rose to "use its influence to reconcile the divisions within the volk" had a mixed success and has received a varied reception from the respective leaders of the NP (Pelzer, 1979:12-33). Strydom rejected Bond interference in party policy, Verwoerd approved of a close relationship, while Vorster met with some resistance from the Bond over aspects of his policies (ibid). P.W. Botha ignored the Broederbond in favour of the security establishment, while the opposite happened under F.W. De Klerk. The organization failed to prevent the splits in the NP in 1969 and 1982, when the HNP and CP broke away.

a) Cultural developments

The Broederbond ideology was based on the doctrine of Christian Nationalism, later translated into the policy of Christian National Education, which had an influence on

most of of South Africa's educational institutions. It was also responsible for the creation of the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings (FAK) in 1929, which had the task of looking after the cultural interests of the Afrikaner and in particular the Afrikaans language. The revival of the language was a very important part of the process of ethnic mobilization and it played a crucial role especially in the cities where there was an overwhelming English dominance in all spheres of society. The popularity of the Afrikaans language was restored in the face of the anglicization forces of the urban environment, and was also increasingly used by the professions, in commerce and at universities. The translation of the Bible into Afrikaans and new Afrikaans literature further stimulated interest in the language, and in 1925 it replaced Dutch as an official language of South Africa under the Pact Government.

There was always a close link between the language issue and Afrikaans churches and as early as 1903, the Churches formed private Christian National Education schools to counter the policy of Anglicization (Serfontein, 1979:39). Bekker et al (1989:30) regard the Afrikaner churches as having had an integral part in the growth of Afrikaner nationalism and claim that these contributed to the legitimation of Afrikaner exclusivity: "The establishment of Afrikaner supremacy ...owes much to legitimation thus founded on religious belief". In similar vein, Lemon (1987:67) argues that no Protestant Church in any other country has had a stronger and more pervasive influence than the Dutch Reformed Church had on the Afrikaners, while Moodie refers to the strong link between the Afrikaner 'civil religion' and the Afrikaner 'sacred history' (1975).

b) Economic developments

Attempts to address the backward economic and financial situation of the Afrikaners also contributed to the process of ethnic mobilisation. The newly urbanised Afrikaners

faced enormous economic and financial problems and efforts to improve this aspect of their plight went hand in hand with social, cultural and political progress. In this respect they faced a serious obstacle in the form of an economy dominated by English-speaking capitalists.

The Helpmekaar organization was founded in 1914 originally to assist Afrikaners involved in the rebellion. It raised 190 000 pounds within a short period of time, and eventually funds were also channelled to the establishment of Afrikaner enterprises. These provided employment to Afrikaners and mobilized Afrikaner capital for further expansion, the idea being to establish Afrikaner-controlled businesses financed by the pooling of Afrikaner capital resources (Adam and Giliomee, 1979:147). Nasionale Pers, SANTAM and SANLAM were founded between 1915 and 1918 and Federale Volksbeleggings, Ko-operatiewe Wijnbouwers Vereeniging (KWV) and Afrikaanse Begrafnis Onderneming Beperk (AVBOB) came into being during and shortly after World War One, in what Welsh describes as the "the first Afrikaner economic renaissance" (1974:251). These were later followed by Volkskas, Rembrandt and many others, and in the face of enormous adversity, managed to prosper. This concept of volkskapitalisme (people's capitalism) is described by O'Meara (1983) and by Adam and Giliomee (1979:157) as an economic system whereby the means of production were owned by Afrikaners, who invested in and patronized Afrikaans enterprises, and were structured to employ and care for Afrikaner workers. The Pact Government under leadership of Herzog increased the participation of white workers in the state sector, by e.g. the founding of Iscor. It also implemented a number of protective measures to protect white labour, e.g. the job colour bar and 'civilized labour policy' (ibid)

Their success served to improve the self-confidence of Afrikaners and proved that they too, could be successful in fields other than agriculture. It also increased their collective wealth and placed them on the road to

middle-class respectability (Bekker and Grobbelaar, 1987:9). In addition Afrikaner workers began realizing the importance of trade unions in promoting their interests over and above the interests of the owners of capital and black workers. They had participated in the general strike of 1914, fought alongside English-speaking workers during the 1922 Rand Revolt in defence of the colour-bar and in 1924 voted the Nationalist-Labour alliance into power.

By 1934 a combination of the Great Depression and the crisis over the gold standard resulted in the fusion of the National and South African Parties to form the United Party, which led the more militant Afrikaner nationalists under D.F. Malan, to form the Purified NP. Although the UP followed policies that benefited Afrikaners as a group, the depression and drought among other factors left almost 300 000 whites in great poverty. The Broederbond's programme of ethnic mobilization and the concept of volkskapitalisme were launched during this period, which also saw the First Afrikaner Peoples' Economic Congress in Bloemfontein in 1939.. To combat welfare problems various welfare organizations were established: the FAK launched the Reddingsdaadbond and the Economic Institute in 1939 (Lemon, 1987:66) (Ironically, a similar programme, called Aksie Helpmekaar, was launched about 50 years later in response to the recurrence of the poor white problem in the early 1990's - only this time it was on the initiative of the Conservative Party). According to Davies et al (1988:19) the period 1936-47 also saw a major struggle between the established labour movement and the Broederbond for control of Afrikaner workers and key trade unions and by 1948 the crucial strata of white labour had been drawn away from the class-orientated unions and co-opted into the Afrikaner nationalist alliance.

Between 1948 to 1969 the NP introduced legislation which benefited the Afrikaner workers, farmers, civil servants and business to the detriment of blacks. These included the reaffirmation of the 'civilized labour policy', the job colour bar, the tightening of pass laws and the

establishing of labour bureaux (Lipton, 1985:25). State and semi-state corporations were also used to directly promote the economic progress of Afrikaners, to such an extent, that the state sector's share of the economy nearly doubled under NP rule. (Adam and Giliomee, 1979:164).

c) Political developments

Although the idea of a separate Afrikaner identity survived, and indeed was strengthened by the Anglo-Boer War, the Afrikaners from the various regions of South Africa were as far away from political unity as ever in the immediate post-war period. The differences between those who wanted unity with their English-speaking compatriots and maintenance of close links with the British Empire and those who were in favour of "Afrikaner-first" policies, were almost as great as the differences between Afrikaners and English-speakers. De Villiers describes it as follows:

> But while they failed to extinguish the idea of the volk, union in one government failed to extinguish the ancient tendency for Afrikaners to split into quarrelsome factions, each governed by a hero, a leader of substance (1987:249).

The Cape Afrikaners under Jan Hofmeyer held the former view and members of their Afrikaner Bond joined the Union Cabinet as the South African Party. In the Free State the Orangia Unie party of J.B.M. Hertzog enjoyed the support of most Afrikaners, while the Het Volk Party of of Jan Smuts and Louis Botha was the major party in the Transvaal.

Initially the majority of Afrikaners voiced their opposition to the British occupation and Smuts, Botha and Hertzog refused to serve on Milner's Legislative Council in 1903, insisting on self-government instead (Davenport, 1987:234-236). The founding of the above parties by the middle of the first decade of the new century, represented,

according to Davenport, the return of the Afrikaner to a purposeful role in active politics. Attempts to reconcile Afrikaners and the English so shortly after the war were not very successful, although the founding respectively of the Union in 1910 and the South African Party (SAP) under Smuts and Botha contributed to lessen feelings of hatred and suspicion between the two white ethnic groups. Adam and Giliomee (1979:104) saw the founding of the Union as a compromise between the ideologies of the two white groups. This compromise-ideology formed the basis on which the SAP was founded, a party whose policy envisaged the two white language groups flowing into one stream to form a single white nation.

However, the period of relative tranquility which characterized the founding of the Union did not last very long and was soon interrupted by the reappearance of old political differences. Hertzog was a reluctant member of Botha's cabinet and, contrary to Party policy, he strongly believed in the preservation of the Afrikaner volk as a separate entity and that South Africa should be ruled by Afrikaners (De Villiers, 1987:250). He openly advocated his "two-stream" policy, whereby the two language groups should develop equally but separately from one another, and his "South Africa first" policy, whereby the country should develop an independent political identity within the British Empire (Adam and Giliomee, 1979:105-106; De Villiers, 1987:250). Hertzog's beliefs resulted in his losing his Cabinet post and together with D.F. Malan he founded the National Party in 1914. The NP opposed South African participation in World War One, but it did not actively get involved with the rebellion of 1914. The rebellion was virtually an Afrikaner civil war and resulted in much bitterness, which created further divisions among the volk, especially after the death of a number of Anglo-Boer war heros and the execution in 1915 of an army officer, Jopie Fourie, who joined the rebels without resigning his Commission. The rebels accused the SAP of betraying its own people for the sake of the former enemy, an accusation frequently echoed by the rightwing some 75 years later.

By 1918 the SAP under Smuts and Botha found that many Afrikaners were now supporters of Hertzog's National Party. Hertzog realized that he could not defeat the SAP by himself, and was forced to enter into an alliance with the Labour Party (the so-called 'Dirty Alliance'), which necessitated the shifting of the emphasis from "Afrikaner interests first" policies to policies which emphasized the danger of 'big finance' (De Vlliers, 1987:266). It led to the alliance's achieving a victory over the SAP in 1924 and a Pact government which nominally ruled until 1933, although the NP won the 1929 general election on its own by a clear majority. Over the next four years the NP structured its policy around the following issues: the pursuit of sovereign independence and the rejection of British imperialism; the pursuit of language equality and thirdly, a 'South Africa First' economic policy (Adam and Giliomee, 1980:104-115). The achievements of Afrikaner nationalism during this period were significant and included the official recognition of Afrikaans, as opposed to Dutch, the creation of a single national flag, the introduction of a 'civilized labour policy' and employment of large numbers of jobless Afrikaners on the railways and other public bodies (De Villiers, 1987:267-269).

By the early 1930's Herzog's government began experiencing severe economic problems. This was due to the economy's trying to recover from the Great Depression, the decline in the international demand for South African grain, wool and wine, the severe and widespread drought, and the government's reluctance to leave the gold standard. Herzog also experienced problems within his own party. His more benign attitude towards the English and his attempts to heal the rifts between himself and Smuts resulted in his growing unpopularity within the NP, especially among the hardliners under D.F. Malan (ibid). The Broederbond also played a role in the growing opposition to Hertzog within the NP, e.g. by launching a campaign after 1926 to undermine Hertzog's leadership, by supporting a Republican Union within the caucus and encouraging a rival leadership faction consisting of men like Malan, J.G. Strydom and C.R.

Swart (Davenport, 1987:321-322).

These considerations gradually brought Hertzog to the realization that his Party could well lose the next general election scheduled for 1934, leading both he and Smuts decided in 1933 that a national government which included all parties, might be more beneficial to the country. This led initially to a coalition government between the National Party and the South African Party and the fusion to form the United Party in 1934, under leadership of both Herzog as Prime Minister and Smuts as his deputy. Although Malan initially considered joining, he later led the breakaway of a group representing most of the Cape Nationalists, and founded the Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party (The Purified Nationalists) in 1934. Malan argued that fusion was a betrayal of the Afrikaner volk, for the simple reason that it would force Afrikanerdom into a coalition with its arch-opponents, the English and the Rand capitalists, and would eventually lead to its material and spiritual demise (De Villiers (1987:270).

The Purified NP enjoyed the support of the Broederbond, who helped to consoliate an alliance of the Malanites in the western Cape, the 'Purifieds' in the Transvaal, consisting of civil servants, small farmers, teachers and the intellectuals of Potchefstroom, and the management of Nasionale Pers and Sanlam (Davenport, 1987:322). The Party's goal was total independence for South Africa and the transformation of the Afrikaner culture into the dominant culture of the country. It also hijacked the call for a republic since Hertzog, now part of the UP which had a strong monarchist wing, would have detroyed the Party by by continuing to demand a republic.

It was from this point onwards that Afrikaner nationalism took on a much more aggressive, more ideological and more organized form. As would be the case almost 50 years later between the NP and the Conservative Party, an intense struggle commenced for control of the political grassroots, i.e. party branches, constituency and provincial committees

and candidate selection committees (De Villiers, 1987:280). The Purified NP, with the aid of the Broederbond, took with it the soul of Hertzog's party. It also received a big psychological boost in 1938 in the form of the Ossewagedenktrek, which was organized to commemorate the Great Trek of the Voortrekkers a century earlier and became a very important symbol of the power of Afrikaner nationalism. With the help of the FAK the NP made full use of the propaganda value of these emotionally-charged celebrations, which resulted in the ordinary Afrikaner's accepting the main themes of his 'sacred history' (the civil religion) as part of his own psyche (Moodie, 1975:175-207). Moodie's argument that Afrikaners after 1938 regarded themselves on the basis of their sacred history, as an elect people, is disputed by Adam and Giliomee (1979:113-114), who claim that the Afrikaner's feelings of belonging to a distinct political entity only became decisive in 1939 when the country entered the War on the side of Britain. These authors argue that Smuts' decision to go to war rekindled all the old "anti-British and anti-imperialist sentiments and was ultimately decisive in persuading the majority of the Afrikaners to go it alone politically" (ibid) (see chapter three for greater detail on the argument relating to the Afrikaners' perception of themselves as an elect people).

Whichever way one looks at it, there is little doubt that the Second World War, like the first, further accelerated the process of nationalism, as many Afrikaners once again refused to fight on the side of Britain and came into conflict with the Smuts government. Ironically, it also led to a renewed conflict between Afrikaner Nationalists, as their loyalty was divided between the NP on the one hand, and three para-military organizations on the other (the Ossewa Brandwag, the Grey Shirts and the New Order). The para-military organizations promoted the ideology of National Socialism, and attempted to sabotage South Africa's war effort as they saw the realization of their ideal of a South African republic as totally dependent on a German victory (Van Rensburg, 1956, Van Heerden, 1972:386-388). Of these three organizations, the Ossewa

Brandwag (OB) was the most powerful, and at its peak enjoyed considerable support among Afrikaners, with nearly half-a-million members. It was founded in 1939 by J.C.C. Laas but later became a para-military organization with its own storm troopers, under a new leader, Hans van Rensburg. The OB faced determined opposition from Malan and Verwoerd, and after Germany's defeat appeared to be inevitable, its popularity began to wane (Davenport, 1987:37, De Villiers, 1987:306; Robert and Trollip, 1947; Van Rensburg, 1956). Many of its members (of whom the later Prime Minister, John Vorster, was one) eventually co-operated closely with the Afrikaner Party of Klasie Havenga, a fact that postponed unity between the the later and the HNP of Malan until 1951. By the end of 1943 Malan's determined efforts to isolate the OB resulted in the Purified NP becoming the most important representative of Afrikaner nationalism. It enjoyed the support of most of the Afrikaner intellectuals and had about a quarter (43) of the seats in parliament.

The UP won 89 seats in the 1943 general election, down from the 111 seats it had received in 1938. However, the Smuts Government basked in the glory of the South African participation in the Second World War and the prominent position which Smuts enjoyed internationally. Its standing was further enhanced by the visit of the British Royal family in 1947, although this visit failed to impress many Nationalists (Davenport, 1987:354). A degree of complacency and issues such as the UP's immigration scheme whereby 60 000 immigrants entered the country during 1947-48, made it vulnerable to the NP by 1948 (the latter viewed the immigration as an attempt to 'plough the Afrikaner under').

The NP, on the other hand, strengthened its position by entering into an election pact with the Afrikaner Party, and through the success of its candidates in enlisting the support of OB members at constituency level (ibid). The NP also enjoyed strong working-class support, and according to Albert Hertzog, the six seats won with the help of the Afrikaner mineworkers on the Rand, brought the Party to power (Naude', 1969:256). The election campaign which

preceded the 1948 general election was fought by the NP with a new-found vigour, and concentrated mainly on racial issues. The UP was accused of promoting racial integration with its acceptance of the Fagan Report, the latter recommending that urban blacks be accepted as permanent residents in white areas and declaring segregation to be impractical (De Villiers, 1987:307). In 1948 the National Party was finally re-elected as the government with a total of 70 seats plus the nine of the Afrikaner Party (later absorbed by the NP), as opposed to the 65 of the UP.

By being elected as government, the NP believed that it was in a position to achieve everything it believed the Afrikaner had lost in the Anglo-Boer War, and was committed to the creation of a republic, which became a reality in 1961. The new government actively endeavoured to reduce the English-speaking dominance in economic and political spheres, but more importantly, it soon took a new hardline stance towards blacks. It also entrenched the positions of all those organizations which up to then had assisted in the process of ethnic mobilization and further strengthened and developed the Nationalist ideology and its offspring, apartheid. According to Bekker and Grobbelaar (1987:31), the NP used these to create a "virtually monolithic institutional basis on which exclusivist Afrikaner nationalism grew and flourished"

Since the victorious NP had received only 38% of the votes cast in the 1948 general election (in conjunction with the Afrikaner Party it received 41% of the total number of votes cast and 52% of the seats in Parliament), its most important task was to consolidate its fragile position (Lemon, 1987:84). It used the issues of race and communism to strengthen its support among Afrikaners and to implement a wide range of laws aimed at promoting Afrikaner interests. According to Giliomee (1991:1-9) the period following the election victory was characterized by a need to maintain unity and by a concerted effort by the Party to cement the Volksbeweging, i.e. to bring closer together the Party, the government and other Afrikaner organizations

like the Broederbond, the Afrikaans press, the Reformed Churches, Afrikaner business and trade unions (Adam and Giliomee, 1979:116). Malan tried to achieve this by presenting the NP as the "mother" of the Afrikaner national consciousness and as protector of rights and privileges that would accompany the foremost position which the Party was now claiming for its Afrikaner supporters (ibid). As evidence to support his argument on the strength of the NP's desire for unity, Giliomee cites a 1941 speech by Malan, wherein the latter made a plea for Afrikaner unity as a goal in itself, under leadership of the Party (ibid).

Despite the best efforts of the NP, however, indications of disunity among certain of the elements of the Volksbeweging were present from the start. The Afrikaans press became a source of disunity because various Prime Ministers were linked with different newspaper groups. Malan's relationship with the Cape-based Nasionale Pers caused a negative reaction among members of the Transvaal NP. Furthermore, Strijdom and Verwoerd's Transvaal power-base and their association with the Transvaal-based Perskor, resulted in Nasionale Pers having to publish its own paper in the Transvaal to reverse its isolation and to spread "Cape nationalism" in the Transvaal in order to counter the ever-growing dominance of the Transvaal Nationalists (Giliomee, 1991:1-9; Pienaar, 1979:45-54). Relations between the Perskor group and the NP also became strained in 1968 when the editor of the new Pretoria-based paper Hoofstad, Andries Treurnicht, used the paper to "spread the pure message" of Afrikaner nationalism, thereby contradicting Vorster's new "outwards" foreign policy and reconciliatory approach to English-speakers (Schoeman, 1974:177).

Closely linked to differences between the Cape- and Transvaal-based Afrikaans press, was the overlapping issue of regional or provincial Party differences, in particular between the Transvaal and the Cape: The NP consisted of four relatively independent provincial parties with their own leaders, bureaucracies and congresses, which led to a

natural rivalry between provinces, often corresponding to the location of the power base of a particular prime minister (Giliomee, 1991:5). To an extent the rivalry was also the result of historical factors, in particular the fact that it was mainly Cape MP's who had declined to join the UP in 1934 - since they were well-organized, and were the first to reject Fusion, they felt that they could lay claim to ideological and logistical superiority over the Transvalers. On the other hand, the Transvaal's greater population, greater number of seats and dominant economical position, resulted in the Transvaal NP's regarding itself as the logical power base of the NP, a situation which placed the leader of the NP in that province in a very powerful position during the election of prime ministers. After Malan's retirement in 1948, most of his successors, namely J.G. Strijdom, H.F. Verwoerd, B.J. Vorster and F.W. De Klerk, were from the Transvaal (the exceptions being D.F. Malan and P.W. Botha).

Some explanations depict the provincial rivalry in terms of class factors, according to which the Afrikaner working class' incorporation into the state bureaucracy in the Transvaal, and in particular in the capital Pretoria, clashed with the interests of the Afrikaner bourgeoisie of the Cape which was based more on private enterprise and professional qualifications (Adam and Giliomee, 1979:87). The repeated criticism by Andreas Wassenaar of SANLAM, on behalf of the Cape business establishment, of (the Pretoria-based) bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency, substantiate this argument. The extreme cases of this type of bureaucratic excess were brought out in the open by Wassenaar's book Assault on Private Enterprise in the late 1970's, and by the eruption of the Information scandal shortly afterwards.

During the decade following its 1948-victory, the NP steadily increased its share of the vote, its number of seats and its majority over the United Party. Although the NP struggled to achieve a plurality of actual votes during the first general elections, it steadily increased its

parliamentary majority over the UP from 37 in 1953, to 50 in 1958 (Davenport, 1987:587). By concentrating its efforts largely on the Afrikaners and virtually disregarding English-speakers, the National Party went from strength to strength. It was also in this period that the foundation of the Nationalists' policy of apartheid was laid: the Mixed Marriages Act (1949); the Immorality Act (1950); the Population Registration Act (1950); the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953) and the Group Areas Act (1950).

By 1960 Verwoerd realised he needed English-speaking support in order to enable him to swing the referendum that year on the creation of a republic. This was achieved by a narrow margin and with the help of a small number of English-speaking voters. By achieving this long-standing Afrikaner ideal, there was no disputing the fact that the Afrikaner had established its dominant position in South African politics. In the next parliamentary elections in 1961 the National Party further increased its majority of seats in Parliament to 56, although it once again received a minority of electoral votes (if the uncontested seats are included, the NP would have had an overall majority of votes (Lemon, 1987:87-89). By this time Verwoerd had designed his plan for 'grand apartheid' which intended to turn the whites into a majority in South Africa by making all blacks citizens of homelands, which would eventually become 'independent' states. By 1966 the National Party won its largest victory ever (126 seats and almost 58% of the vote), which indicated that its policies had achieved wider appeal to include many English-speaking voters. Verwoerd was assassinated in the same year and the election of B.J. Vorster as Prime Minister, soon brought forth new divisions in Afrikaner ranks.

3.1.2 The period 1966 to 1982

The founding of the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) in 1969 was merely the symptom of the conflict that existed within the National Party for the greater part of the 1960's. Because of serious differences between themselves and the

Party leadership, four Nationalist members of Parliament, including Albert Hertzog, a member of the Cabinet, were dismissed from the National Party. The incident which brought the long-standing differences out in the open, referred to the government's concession in allowing the New Zealand rugby team to include a Maori in its team visiting South Africa. The rebels from the HNP regarded this as a violation of Afrikaner/South African sovereignty by bowing to foreign dictates and as a compromise of the policy of racial segregation, which included segregated sport. However, sport was only one of the issues which led to the split. Other issues concerned the projected independence of the homelands, the closer cooperation with English-speakers, the arrival of too many immigrants and an outward-looking foreign policy (Ben Schoeman, 1978:332-333). These were a part of deeper ideological differences between the verkramptes and verligtes, which are dealt with as a primary cause of the beginning of the breakup of Afrikaner hegemony in 1969.

The terms verlig and verkramp had been coined in 1966 by W.J. de Klerk to distinguish between those Afrikaners who resisted any structural changes to apartheid and those who believed that apartheid should adapt to changing circumstances. The struggle between these two groups for control of the NP had been present, albeit in a muted form, even before Verwoerd's death, but increased in intensity under the leadership of Vorster and eventually led to the first formal split within the Party since had become the government in 1948.

According to Davenport (1985:423-424), these early verkramptes were so caught up in the "Verwoerdian slipstream that they felt any modification of his policy to be downright betrayal", a situation which led to severe tension between this faction under the leadership of Albert Hertzog and the more relaxed approach of John Vorster. Shortly after his election as Prime Minister, Vorster initiated the relaxation of certain petty apartheid laws affecting segregated sport, segregated hotels, separate bus

queues and other measures (Schoeman, 1974:18-32). He was also prepared to drop previous opposition to admitting foreign black diplomats to South Africa and made approaches and guarantees to English-speakers in an effort to strengthen his electoral base. These developments were symptomatic of a decline of 'Afrikaner-first' policies and resulted in an improvement in Afrikaans-English relations, although English-speakers were still largely excluded from government, with the exceptions of Frank Waring and A.E.G. Trollip in Verwoerd's Cabinet.

These measures implemented by Vorster were seen by the verkramptes as the liberalization and subsequent betrayal of Afrikaner nationalism, the dismantling of the Afrikaner nation and then finally as the dilution of white supremacy (Bekker et al, 1989:23). The verkrampte front consisted of three groups: These were firstly, the Hertzog group, consisting of several MP's and activists in all spheres of Afrikaner society e.g. Albert Hertzog, Gert Beetge, Schalk Botha, Jaap Marais; secondly, those Afrikaners who remained in the background but kept close links with the Hertzog group e.g. Piet Meyer chairman of the Broederbond, A.P. Treurnicht, editor of Hoofstad, P.F.W. Weiss, chairman of SABRA and J. D. Vorster, brother of the Prime Minister and actuarius of the DRC; thirdly, the so-called "Purified" Nationalists, consisting of an informal pressure group within the NP, the Conservative Study Group outside of the NP and other individuals who had left the NP during the early 1960's (Serfontein, 1970:19). A number of front organizations represented the verkramptes, e.g. the Christelike Kultuuraksie, Die Genootskap vir die Handhawing van Afrikaans, Die Nasionale Raad teen die Kommunisme, Afrikanerverdedigingsfonds, the newspapers Die Vaderland and Hoofstad, the SABC under Piet Meyer, Die Kerkbode, Die Blanke Bouwerkersvakbond, Hertzog's Afrikaner Order and The S.A. Observer, among others. The latter was the cause of one of the first open instances of conflict between verlig and verkramp, when its editor, S.E.D. Brown, attacked the "Afrikaner liberalists" who had as a goal the subjugation

of "volks conservatism", and included the editors of four important Afrikaner newspapers (ibid).

One of Vorster's biggest opponents turned out to be P.J.Meyer, verkrampte chairman of the Broederbond, who viewed the government's new policies and the tensions it caused among Afrikaners with great concern. Meyer criticised Vorster's sport and Africa policies, but also his personal style of governing, e.g. his passion for golf and his inclination to tell jokes at "inappropriate occasions". He also made no secret of his desire to "get rid of John Vorster" (Schoeman, 1974:39). Another critic of Vorster's policies was Andries Treurnicht, who succeeded Meyer later as chairman of the Broederbond, but the platform he used to launch his attacks on Vorster and the verligtes, was the Pretoria-based Perskor newspaper, Hoofstad. With regard to Vorster's policy of rapprochement with English-speakers, Treurnicht made the following comment in 1968: "There are few things that cause such dismay among Afrikaners as the disavowal of Afrikanerdom for the sake of cooperation with English-speakers" (cited in Schoeman, 1974:183) [translation]. Later he referred indirectly to the verligte Piet Cillie' of Die Burger when he accused "certain people" of claiming that their interpretation of NP policy was the only true interpretation (ibid). Vorster's reaction was that Treurnicht was "not playing according to the rules" and he accused him of subverting his position as Prime Minister and party leader.

In April 1969 Hertzog delivered a speech in Parliament on the influence of Calvinism on Afrikaners and English-speakers. According to Hertzog only Afrikaners with their Calvinistic value-system could survive the "onslaught against whites in Africa, since liberalism formed an integral part of the English-speaking psyche (Schoeman, 1974:225-239). It should be noted that at the time, the 'accusation' of being a liberal was a major insult in the eyes of an Afrikaner nationalist (even the verligte Piet Koornhof objected on occasion to being "slandered as a

liberal" (Schoeman, 1974:252). Hertzog's speech directly contradicted the official NP policy of rapprochement with the English-speaking whites. Although Treurnicht and his deputy-editor, B.M. Schoeman, of Hoofstad, could find no fault with the speech, it had serious repercussions almost everywhere else (ibid). The United Party used the opportunity to question the NP's commitment to national unity among whites, and it eventually led to a repudiation of Hertzog's speech by both Vorster and the Transvaal leader of the NP, Ben Schoeman (not to be confused with his namesake at Hoofstad). Schoeman's reference to the verkramptes as "little men", at a NP meeting in Jaap Marais' constituency of Innesdal, did not help to improve matters, and the final break occurred during the provincial congress of the Transvaal NP in September 1969 over the issue of Maoris in the visiting New Zealand rugby team. Hertzog and three MP's were removed from the Party, while Treurnicht, who was confidently expected to join them, backed out at the last minute, and defended his decision on grounds that leaving the Party was not the right way to fight the verligte direction of the NP leadership. Treurnicht's decision soured the personal relationship between him and Marais to such an extent that it became one of the major obstacles in the way of unity between the HNP and CP after 1982. However, Treurnicht was not the only one who decided not to leave the NP at the time: with the founding of the HNP in October 1969, the overwhelming majority of the Afrikaner establishment, including many of the major verkrampte figures, were conspicuous by their absence, e.g. Piet Meyer, Koot Vorster, Daan van der Merwe, Cas Greyling and others (Schoeman, 1974:183).

O'Meara argues that the divergence between the Afrikaner agricultural capital and petty bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the the two Afrikaner-controlled conglomerates (Sanlam and Rembrandt) on the other, led to the verligte-verkrampte conflict and the 1969-split, but this is rejected by Giliomee, who claims that the split was the result of

differences over the purpose of the state and the goals of Afrikaner nationalism (African Affairs, 1992:344). As indicated earlier (see page 47), these differences concerned segregated sport, immigration, homeland indpendence and an outward-looking foreign policy.

Although the HNP's support base was rooted in the white working-class, impoverished farmers and a few smaller trade unions, class factors played only a minor role in the events which led to the 1969 break-up of Afrikaner hegemony. This was mainly due to the fact that the government's attempts to free black labour by scrapping e.g. statutory job reservation, and to narrow the size of the racial gap in the civil service and on spending on social services, only came into full effect in the 1970's, when it seriously began to affect the privileged position of the Afrikaner working class.

During the 1970's there was an ever-present shortage of white manpower in all sections of the economy, a problem which could only be overcame with the help of black labour, and the growth in capital-intensive production further increased the need for a stable, urban and semi-skilled black work force (Adam and Moodley, 1986:59). Although whites by now filled mostly skilled jobs they could not even meet the demand for these, and yet they insisted on the colour bar and other ways of safeguarding their jobs against black competition. The labour-protective policies acted as a brake on a potentially fast-growing economy and Vorster's government decided to implement a wide range of labour reforms. It included the lifting of restrictions on black training, a common industrial system, and a concerted effort to reduce the gap between black and white wages (Giliomee, 1988:110-118). These measures led to the quadrupling of black wages between 1971 and 1982, but more importantly, it led to a considerable decline in the income of whites, especially those on the lower-half of the income scale, while redistributive policies further increased

their tax burden (ibid).

During the 1970's Vorster decided to favour business interests over those of the white worker and to drop the white worker from state protection (Adam and Moodley, 1986:60). The power of white agriculture declined at the same time, as prices, concessions and subsidies were reduced. A combination of all these factors resulted in a divergence of class interests and shift to the HNP by parts of the white working-class, impoverished farmers, trade unions such as the white Mineworkers Union and the White Building Workers Union, and elements in the low and middle salary categories of the civil service (Lipton, 1985:307).

However, while a large section of the white working-class was now supporting the HNP, its numbers were fast declining, e.g. by the early 1970's only 7% of Afrikaners were engaging in blue-collar work, while the numbers of white workers engaging in blue-collar and agricultural work declined from 57% in 1960, to 42% in 1970, to 35% in 1977 (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989). The HNP was severely hampered from its birth by this and other factors: it had a limited socio-economic support base, an outdated political ideology and it had to face the full force of the Afrikaner establishment. The NP under Vorster had to act quickly to limit the damage caused by the break-away and did not hesitate to use the full power of the Party and the security apparatus to counter the HNP. Vorster called a general election one year prior to its scheduled date in an attempt to deprive the HNP of time to organize itself. The party lost all four of its MP's, most of its candidates lost their deposits in the 77 constituencies it contested, and it only drew about 53 000 votes in total (Lemon, 1987:91).

Apart from immediately losing its parliamentary representation, the HNP also had to face a determined onslaught from state organs and the civil service, in particular the security police, of which Vorster formerly

had been in charge, in his capacity as Minister of Justice (Lipton, 1985:314). In addition to these authoritarian measures the HNP were also driven out of all influential positions in the Afrikaner establishment, excluded from institutionalized activities and relegated to the fringes of Afrikaner social life (ibid). The purging of HNP supporters from the Broederbond in 1972 became probably the most symbolic act of the banishment of HNP members into the political wilderness and their condemnation to political 'leper' status (Bekker and Grobbelaar, 1987:71). Ironically Treurnicht, who was elected as chairman of the Broederbond in 1972 (over the wishes of the verligtes who wanted Gerrit Viljoen), was heavily involved in the act of purging the Bond of HNP sympathizers (Welsh, 1988:5). At the same time, however, Treurnicht used the Broederbond to delay the implementation of the new sports policy (Serfontein (1979:123).

Another factor which limited the growth of the HNP related to its own policies. The Party became a victim of its adherence to an outdated ideology which failed to take cognizance of the changing socio-econmic position and diversification of the majority of Afrikaners during the 1970's. The HNP revealed itself as rigid and sectarian in its appeal and concentrated on return to stricter application of apartheid, stricter Sunday observance and stricter immigration laws and on propagating Afrikaans as the sole official language (Lemon, 1987:90). It tried to draw voters with slogans from a bygone era and an image similar to that of the NP in the 1930's and 40's (Bekker & Grobbelaar, 1987:24). By following this strategy the HNP failed to recognize the changing socio-economic forces which had transformed the position of the Afrikaner in the seventies. According to Bekker et al (ibid) most Afrikaners shared in the rapid economic growth of that time and moved upwards into the ranks of the middle-classes. This new class of Afrikaner fast developed cosmopolitan ideas and values which had less in common with old ethnic ties and nationalistic slogans. By 1970 88% of Afrikaners were

urbanized and 65% held white-collar jobs (Lipton, 1985:307). These changes in class structure, combined with higher incomes, some international pressure (especially sport boycotts) and the educational role of television (introduced in 1976), soon brought about changes in attitude among Afrikaners. According to Lipton the tendency towards more liberal views expressed itself as follows: opinion polls indicated that Afrikaners who favoured mixed sport rose from 4% in 1970 to 76% in 1978 and those who would accept blacks in the same jobs as whites from 38% to 62% during the same period. This is confirmed in the conclusion drawn in chapter four, namely that more-educated, higher-income Afrikaners and whites are less racist (ibid) than those on the other end of the scale.

The HNP had a rough working-class image which held no attraction during most of the 1970's for a 'new' class of urban, respectable Afrikaner who hated its "loser and lower-class" stigma, its over-enthusiastic, overbearing parochialism and its narrow Afrikaner chauvinism (Welsh, 1988:4; Bekker et al, 1989:24). Consequently, the electoral performance of the HNP was dismal, as it failed to win any seats in parliament and its electoral support decreased even further in 1974 and 1977, when it only won 34 000 votes (3%) in the latter election. Its rural support was negligible and it had marginal support in only one urban area, Pretoria (Lemon, 1987:92-99).

Although the immediate verkrampte challenge had been overcome, the considerable number of verkramptes that remained within the NP resulted in a renewed build-up of tension within the Party over the next decade. The similarity of the ideologies of a leading verkrampte within the NP, Andries Treurnicht, and Jaap Marais from the HNP, even several years after the split, is quite significant.

For example, their respective views over the demand by verligtes within the NP to scrap 'petty apartheid' laws:

> Petty apartheid without grand apartheid and without political control, leads to an island-existance for whites in the country which they ruled once....Why should we spend all the money and make all the effort to segregate races constitutionally, if we scrap personal and social segregation between the same races? (Andries Treurnicht, 1975:25-28) [translation].

> Liberal Nationalists who distinguish between 'justifiable' grand apartheid (black homelands) and 'unjustifiable' petty apartheid (segregationist laws within 'white areas'), are ordinary liberalists who regard apartheid as a transition to racial equality. Apartheid in whatever form, is not a matter of pragmatism, but is a matter of principle (Jaap Marais, 1980:9) [translation].

It is also interesting to note the strength of the verkrampte element within the NP leadership by 1974 and by 1977 as found in the survey conducted by Hanf et al (1981:127-205): 35% of members of the NP who were interviewed approved of job reservation, which was the HNP's policy; with regard to 'petty apartheid' laws regulating social relations between race groups, almost one-half of NP MP's in the sample held a verkrampte view similar to that of HNP. With regard to grand apartheid, four-fifths of NP politicians supported the homeland policy in its entirety, while 16% of them also agreed with the HNP's view of the feasibility of a separate homeland for coloureds.

It is obvious from these and other figures that by 1974 there was still a strong verkrampte presence within the NP. Adam and Giliomee saw its ideological position by 1979 as follows:

> They favoured the implementation of separate development as an end in itself. The various subordinate groups can exercise authority only through their separate homeland structures, and all blacks who are not essential for the "white" economy should be

> settled in the homelands. Racial equality in the job market and further sharing of public facilities are opposed (Adam and Giliomee, 1979:219).

The above interpretation of apartheid also became the blueprint of the CP's policy when it broke with the NP three years later.

As mentioned before, the verkramptes who remained inside the NP fought a rear-guard action against reforms throughout the rest of the 1970's. Their influence within the Broederbond was curtailed to an extent after Treurnicht was replaced as Chairman by Viljoen in 1974, the latter being a known verligte. Viljoen was able to use his position in the Broederbond in 1977 when the new power-sharing constitutional proposals were formulated and caused a consternation among the verkramptes (Serfontein, 1979:125). However, outside of the Broederbond, the position of the verkramptes was strengthened greatly by the election of Treurnicht as leader of the Transvaal NP in 1978 and his appointment as member of the cabinet in 1979 (Welsh, 1988:5).

John Vorster's last few years as Prime Minister until his resignation in 1978 were marked by indecision, contradictions and paralysis as he was overtaken by events, including the increasingly bitter conflict within his party between verlig and verkramp, and finally, by the Information scandal. P.W. Botha became Prime Minister after narrowly defeating the verkrampte candidate, Connie Mulder. Mulder was the unofficial 'crown prince' tipped to succeed Vorster, but his involvement in the Information scandal, also known as 'Muldergate', destroyed his chances. The Information scandal referred to the illegal use of state funds by a number of officials in the Department of Information to improve the image of the NP as governing Party. The scandal greatly harmed Mulder's reputation and threw the verkramptes into disarray, which allowed the verligte candidate P.W. Botha, narrowly to defeat Mulder by 98 votes to 74 to become Prime Minister (Ries and Dommisse, 1983:75-107).

The ousting of Vorster and the defeat of their candidate for the post of Prime Minister greatly intensified the discontent among the verkrampte wing of the NP. The in-fighting which had taken place was unprecedented for the NP and the Party's ability to close ranks in the face of adversity, had been damaged beyond repair (Rees and Day (1980:76). Rhoodie (1989:21) described P.W. Botha's 'coup d'etat' as an attempt by "political assassins" (members the verligte wing of the NP in the Cape) "not only to secure the post of the Prime Minister for their man, but to change the ideology of the NP and remake the Afrikaner, even if it meant ripping into his very soul".

According to Rhoodie the scandal resulted in the hijacking of NP ideology by the verligtes of the Cape, which left the Transvaal-based conservative element of the Party without much power or say. He raises the question of whether the Information Scandal was inevitable and whether the timing thereof, so close to the leadership contest in 1978, was a mere co-incidence (Rhoodie, 1989:24-25). John Vorster eventually took the post of State President, but was forced to resign a year later in response to the findings of the Erasmus Commission. Mulder was forced to resign as cabinet Minister, as MP, and as member of the National Party, and later founded his own party, the National Conservative Party (NCP).

The demise of Mulder's political career inside the NP paved the way for Treurnicht to become leader of the NP in the Transvaal in 1978. From then on most verkrampte discontent inside the NP would originate with Treurnicht, whose election could be construed as an act of revenge by the verkramptes for the defeat of their candidate for the post of prime minister, Connie Mulder. Treurnicht acted as a counterweight to Botha's reforms and fought his obstructionist battle against the reformist initiatives with the moral support of several rightwing movements which had sprung up in the late seventies and early eighties.

Apart from the newly acquired prestige of the HNP and Mulder's NCP, who together drew about one third of the Afrikaner vote in the 1981 election, other prominent organizations were the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), the Kappiekommando and Aksie-Eie-Toekoms. Treurnicht's style of resistance to reforms was characterised by ideological conservatism, constant criticism of perceived deviations from what he regarded as the official NP policy and subtle efforts to replace Botha supporters with his own in influential positions of the Transvaal NP (Ries & Dommisse, 1983:75-107).

According to Lipton (1985:318-319), Botha's election as Prime Minister did not reflect the true power balance between verligtes and verkramptes in the NP at that stage and the powerful position of the latter was proven by Botha's difficulty in imposing his authority on the party, the caucus and the bureaucracy and by the strong showing of the HNP at by-elections and during the 1981 election. The verkramptes position was further strengthened over the next four years following Botha's reform programme. Botha, contrary to his earlier image (he was in charge of the destruction of the coloured suburb, District Six), quickly acquired the image of a reformer. His new approach emphasized that apartheid was a "recipe for permanent conflict" (Davenport:1987:438), and his "adapt or die" speech became the official NP-reformist slogan. In 1979 he announced a twelve-point plan which made provision for power-sharing between whites, coloureds and Indians and committed his Party to the termination of racial discrimination. At the same time, black resistance to apartheid had been on the increase ever since 1976 and caused anxiety among many whites. From 1976 onwards the Government faced an increasingly hostile attitude from abroad in the form of sanctions and boycotts and every reform was seen by rightwingers and verkramptes as concessions to foreign pressure.

Another political factor which further alienated the verkramptes within the NP concerned Botha's 'management style', by which he centralized decision-making and transferred more power to technocrats, later referred to as the securocrats. It led to NP congresses losing influence, a deterioration in the grass-roots party organization and the perception that the Party was losing its democratic mass base (Bekker & Grobbelaar, 1987:72).

Economic factors also played an important role in the revival and growth of the rightwing. These refer in particular to labour reforms and white worker disaffection. The major reforms in the field of labour were intended to "meet the needs of a capitalist class worried by an under-skilled and angry black workforce" (Charney, 1984:272). Reforms were based on the recommendations of the Riekert Report (1979 - greater mobility for urban blacks with Section 10 rights); the Wiehahn Commission report (1979 - abolishing statutory job reservation, the opening of apprenticeships to blacks, the registering of black trade unions); and the De Lange Report (1981 - equal quality of education for all races). According to Charney the intent was to close the skills gap and to increase demand by incorporating an organized black workforce into the labour aristocracy.

Many white workers saw the new labour system as a direct threat to their own economic security and in 1979 the white South African Confederation of Labour voiced its disapproval of these changes (Giliomee, 1988:119). Apart from lower relative income, white workers also resented the desegregation of facilities and the possibility of having to work under blacks, and feared the possibility of being replaced or having their wages undercut by the competition of cheaper black labour. The ranks of a resentful white working class were increased by civil servants at the lower end of the scale who feared black competition and had a vested interest in continued Afrikaner hegemony, and also by some teachers and clergy who had a vested interest in Afrikaner nationalism (Lipton, 1985:308). White worker

disaffection was exacerbated by a downturn in the economy after 1974, when the average annual growth of the GDP dropped from 5% to 3%, and the policy by the state and private sectors of reducing the wage gap between black and white workers - the white share of total personal income fell from 71,7% in 1970 to 61,5 in 1980 [and to just over 50% in 1990] (Giliomee, 1989:112-113). With a decline in the growth of the GDP and rising inflation, the living standards of whites declined in considerably during this period.

Linked to the economic factors mentioned above, are Lipton's (1985) and Charney's (1984) class explanation of the events leading up to the 1982 Conservative Party breakaway. According to Lipton the verligte-verkrampte split can be traced back to the divergent interests of the urban and mining capitalist class on the one hand and the Afrikaner working class/bureaucracy on the other. The balance of power swung back and forth between the two classes from the 1960's onwards, motivated by an interaction of economic and political issues. Changes in the class structure of Afrikaners, as could be seen by the shift to white-collar jobs, higher income and urbanisation, also brought about a more positive attitude towards reformist policies (as could be seen in dramatic changes in attitude towards integrated sport and equality in the working place, mentioned earlier). It must be emphasized that these changes excluded large numbers of Afrikaners in the less-affluent and less-educated strata, a fact confirmed by Charney, 1984:272-273). Responding to the findings of a survey done among Johannesburg-based whites by the Star Retail Data Library, Charney claimed that the middle-class 'A' and 'B' groups reacted favourably to the racial integration of state and private schools, public transport and the inclusion of coloureds into the white group, while the 'C' and 'D' working class groups reacted unfavourably (also see chapter four for an analysis of the class base of the rightwing).

This resentment among the white working class translated into political action and the first sign of the growing rightwing activity became noticeable in the by-election of 1979 when the HNP won 40% of votes cast in the three blue-collar constituencies of Koedoespoort, Rustenburg and Germiston (Lemon, 1987:100). Although the HNP won no seats, the very low turnout at the polls was interpreted as large-scale abstention by dissatisfied NP supporters who had not yet made the break with the Party due to the lack of an acceptable alternative.

The shift towards the right increased from 3% in 1977 to 16% of the vote in 1981 (the rightwing consisting at this stage of the HNP and the National Conservative Party of Connie Mulder). Although they won no seats the two Parties received a total of 211 000 votes, which represented almost a third of all Afrikaner votes. The HNP fielded 87 candidates and the NCP nine, and together they managed to reduce the NP's majority in two dozen constituencies to less than 2 000 votes. The rightwing campaign was based on a projection of white fears, especially after Zimbabwean independence, a strong rejection of black trade unions, a condemnation of the relaxation of 'petty apartheid' legislation and the perceived transfer of wealth from whites to blacks (see also chapter five for greater detail).

Several other events which occurred around the turn of the decade brought the long expected split between verligte and verkrampte closer to reality. In 1979 Treurnicht and a verligte Transvaal National Party MP, Louis Nel, became involved in a public argument over Nel's criticism of a joke told by Treurnicht at a NP function and the "insulting" way in which the latter had allegedly reacted to a congratulatory speech made by Fanie Botha (whom Treurnicht had previously defeated to become leader of the Tranvaal NP). Nel's position came under severe verkrampte pressure which led to his being expelled from the Party because he refused to apologize to Treurnicht. The departure of Nel was regarded as a victory for the

verkramptes and further embattled the remaining verligtes in the Tansvaal NP. Nel was allowed back into the Party only after interventions on his behalf from verligtes in the Party, the Prime Minister and newspapers like Beeld (Ries & Dommisse, 1983:75-117).

Apart from this incident, the first head-on collision between the newly-appointed Treurnicht and members of the Cabinet occurred in 1979 when he criticised Koornhof's "Apartheid is dead" speech, which was, in typical verligte style, meant for foreign consumption. Following Treurnicht's complaint, a compromise was reached whereby Koornhof was made out to have said that the former perception which the world had of apartheid, had changed beyond recognition. Discontent in the Transvaal circles grew when P.W. Botha warned the province's leaders to "get their house in order", after serious inroads had been made in the NP majorities in several Transvaal by-elections. In September 1979 Botha made a speech defending his policy of rapprochement towards the coloured community and again warned Treurnicht indirectly that "ministers should comply with the policies of the Party and government or else resign" (ibid).

The next issue which exacerbated the differences which existed in the NP was over the participation of a coloured schoolboy team in the Craven Week rugby tournament in 1980. The Transvaal Teaching Association headed by Hennie Maree, also a member of the Transvaal NP leadership, made known his rejection of racially mixed sport at school level. When Treurnicht intervened on the side of Maree, Botha decided to act and directly repudiated Treurnicht's stance by insisting that "attitudes which sour relations between coloureds and whites should be dropped without further ado" (ibid).

Treurnicht was still trying to formulate a response when Botha launched a further attack a few days later when he accused the verkramptes of opportunism and said that there could be only one leader in the country (referring to the

fact that Treurnicht had taken it apon himself to interpret and determine government policy). He added:

> There are politicians in this country who think they can engage in a political circus while the sons of South Africa are dying on the border. Can the luxury of disunity and opportunism be afforded? (Ries and Dommisse, 1983:87) [translation].

In response to what he regarded as unfair treatment of his provincial leader, another member of the Cabinet, Ferdie Hartzenberg, handed in his resignation, which was withdrawn only after lengthy negotiations during the second weekend of March 1982, when a provisional "peace accord" was reached (Ries and Dommisse, 1983:89-90). At this stage, in March 1980, matters were so serious that a head count was made by the two wings to determine how many supporters Treurnicht would take with him when the expected split took place. Through the intervention of F.W. De Klerk and Ben Schoeman a compromise was reached and shortly afterwards Ministers Treurnich and Hartzenberg and Koos van der Merwe, MP, proclaimed allegiance to the party and committed themselves fully to the leadership of P.W. Botha. Although the Craven Week tournament was completed with participation by the coloured team, Treurnicht never publicly withdrew his stance and in fact confirmed a few weeks later that "nothing has changed" (ibid). The compromise reached was obviously an agreement to disagree on certain policy matters.

3.1.3 The period 1982 to 1991

The uneasy truce was soon shattered by the contentious issue of power-sharing, which finally led to the break-away of the verkramptes in 1982. Power-sharing referred to the proposed inclusion of Indians and coloureds in the Parliament, albeit in separate chambers. These proposals had been formulated in 1977, and according to Treurnicht, they referred to three separate parliaments linked through

a multi-racial but white-dominated council of cabinets (Lemon, 1987:109-110). Treurnicht's interpretation differed from the "healthy power-sharing" interpretation of P.W. Botha, according to whom there would only be one government (i.e. one parliament) for whites, coloureds and Indians. The difference was that Botha's view implied a form of power-sharing as opposed to that of Treurnicht, which referred to a division of power. Treurnicht believed that his was the correct interpretation which had been agreed to by the NP in 1977, and that it would be unrealistic and unwise to create one political structure for these groups (Ries & Dommisse, 1983:75-107). He had expressed himself quite clearly on this matter as far back as 1975:

> The change of direction demanded by certain Afrikaners, which implies integration with coloureds, or one political dispensation for whites, coloureds, Indians and urban blacks, is not a change of direction but a reversal of direction, which would lead to political and social friction (Treurnicht, 1975:74) [translation].

The event that caused the actual break occurred in February 1982 when the NP leadership decided to force a showdown with the Treurnicht group. A motion was introduced at a caucus meeting by Minister Fanie Botha, which proposed "full confidence and unqualified support for the Prime Minister, his leadership and his interpretation of NP policy" (Davenport, 1987:452; Ries & Dommisse, 1983:119).

Twenty-two members refused to support this motion on the grounds that the concept of power-sharing was utterly foreign to Nationalist philosophy, that it compromised white/Afrikaner exclusivity, and that it would have a negative effect on the interests and survival prospects of the Afrikaner nation. To this Treurnicht added that he would support nobody unconditionally, except God, thereby implying that if Botha required unconditional support, he over-estimated his own importance (ibid).

In response to this incident, the Treurnicht group refused

to resign from the NP, even though their resignation would have been the logical step. Their argument was that they, and not P.W. Botha and his verligte followers, adhered to the official NP policy. Treurnicht called a meeting in Pretoria of the Transvaal Head Committee of the NP with the hope of getting the support of the majority of the 230 members for his rejection of the verligte interpretation of power-sharing. As part of a pre-arranged strategy to counter the Treurnicht challenge with a personal appearance by the Prime Minister himself, Botha, as overall leader of the NP, 'happened' to be in Pretoria on the same day and was invited to attend the meeting shortly after it had commenced. Botha's presence helped to persuade the majority of the members not to back Treurnicht, and a motion of full confidence in Botha and his interpretation of the power-sharing proposals was carried by an overwhelming majority of 172 votes to 36 (Davenport, 1987:452; Ries and Dommisse, 1983:153).

The events at the Transvaal NP meeting indicated that the scope of the rebellion inside the NP was limited, and signalled the end of the Treurnicht group as part of the NP. Treurnicht and Hartzenberg resigned from the Cabinet, and and all 16 MP's were expelled from the Party, later to be followed by two more, plus five MPC's in the Transvaal. In March 1982 the Conservative Party (CP) was formed in Pretoria before a crowd of 8 000 people, including delegates from 99 constituencies, members of the AWB, the Kappiekommando, the NCP of Connie Mulder, a variety of other well-known personalities, including the former minister of Justice, Jimmy Kruger, Betsie Verwoerd, the widow of the former Prime Minister, and many other rightwing organizations, with the exception of the HNP. The CP brought with it large parts of the organization of the NP, including almost one-quarter of the Transvaal district and branch committee members (Charney, 1984:273-275), and an estimated 40% of Afrikaner support (Lipton, 1985:319). The Party founded its own newspaper, Patriot, and enjoyed relatively sympathetic coverage from Perskor's two Pretoria-based newspapers, Oggendblad and Hoofstad (Ries and Dommisse, 1983:195).

Elements within the leadership of the Broederbond, such as its chairman Carel Boshoff, were supportive of the Treurnicht group, even though Boshoff indicated in March 1982 that the Broederbond would not take sides in the conflict (Ries and Dommisse, 1983:156-157). However, the organization opened its doors again to HNP members expelled in 1969. Boshoff resigned shortly afterwards, but remained chairman of a Broederbond front organization, SABRA, from which he launched his attacks on the concept of power-sharing. Another arm of the Broederbond, the Federasie van Afrikaanse Taal en Kultuurverenigings (FAK), also became a centre of conflict between the NP and the rightwing. Unlike SABRA, the FAK remained loyal to the NP, which resulted in the rightwing's having to found a separate cultural organization, the Afrikaner Volkswag, also under Boshoff's leadership.

Also on the religious front a struggle developed for the soul of the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK). Some rightwingers who had remained within the NGK founded the NG Bond, while others left the Church to found their own church, the Afrikaans Protestante Kerk (APK). The extent to which the major Afrikaans churches were affected by the split was indicated by a survey conducted among Afrikaans churchgoers shortly afterwards: 54% supported the NP to the 24% which supported the rightwing Parties (Charney, 1984:273-276). Other parts of the Transvaal Afrikaner establishment lent their support to the CP, including elements within the civil service, universities, school boards and town councils (ibid).

The split also reverberated in the business world in the form of clashes between verligte and verkrampte Afrikaner interests within companies and between companies. The Cape-based Sanlam and Nasionale Pers were solidly behind the verligtes, while in the Transvaal, Volkskas Bank and Perskor initially were more sympathetic towards the CP, because they had stronger ties via the Broederbond with civil servants, farmers and the Afrikaner working-class as a whole (ibid). Charney's over-emphasis of the class

character of the split should be questioned, but his reference to the rightwing sympathies of some Transvaal-based companies, is supported by research findings in chapter three of this thesis (these findings showed that Volkskas is today still the only large public company that supports the CP mouthpiece, Patriot, by advertising in it).

Strong support for the CP was also found in the lower sectors of the civil service, whose members felt anxious about increasing competition from blacks. This sector was also the hardest hit by the 23% decline in their real income after 1974. In the agricultural sector support for the two Parties depended on two factors: firstly, the size of the particular farming enterprise - the NP was seen as favouring the big farmer over the smaller one - and secondly, the northern farmers saw the Botha government as favouring the Cape and Natal export-orientated farmers over the Transvaal, Free State and Northern Cape food producers (Charney, 1984:275-276). These perceptions were supplemented by the different political cultures which exist in the Cape and Transvaal, which influence also the political views of farmers, e.g. the Transvaal Agricultural Union today is firmly under the control of the CP.

The electoral battles between the NP, CP and HNP since 1982 are discussed in detail in chapter six, as well as the influence of political developments on the results of the these elections. Therefore a brief summary of this aspect will suffice. The extent of popular support for the CP became visible with the Germiston by-election in September 1982, which was narrowly won by the NP, and only because of a split rightwing vote (Lemon, 1987:110-112). In the series of by-elections following this initial NP reversal, the CP and to a lesser extent, the HNP, established itself as a potent force in white politics. In almost every single by-election held after 1982, the combined rightwing vote, or for that matter, that of the CP alone, showed an increase over corresponding results in previous elections. These increases varied from 5% in Ceres in 1989 to to 27%

in Maitland in 1991, among others. The support which the rightwing enjoyed, as measured in terms of general elections, increased from just over 16% in 1981 (the HNP and NCP), to almost 30% in 1987 and to 31% in 1989 and greatly increased thereafter.

A combination of political and economic factors interacted throughout the 1980's to strengthen the fortunes of the CP. High inflation, the redistribution of wealth from whites to blacks by way of the narrowing of the income gap and greater spending on black education and welfare, represented some of the economic factors which positively influenced the growth of the right. Political reforms implemented by the Botha administration played an even greater role in this respect and in chapter six these reforms are discussed in chronological order with reference to by-election results. During the corresponding period, the rightwing's support steadily increased, as indicated by the swing towards the rightwing in several by-elections, e.g. Waterberg: 27% (1983), Parow: ave. of 22% (1984), Sasolburg: 17,7% (1985), Port Natal: 12% (1985), Bethlehem: 18,4% (1985, Vasco: 12,6% (1989), Umlazi: 20% (1990), and Maitland: 27% (1991) (for a detailed list see chapter six).

The above figures should be read in conjunction with the referendum results of 1983 (an estimated 27% rightwing 'no' vote), the general election result of 1987 (30% rightwing vote), the municipal elections of 1988 (the CP won control of 53% of local authorities in the Transvaal), and the general election results of 1989 (31% rightwing vote). If judged by themselves, the above statistics indicate a continued shift towards the right since 1980, with only a brief period of consolidation between 1986 and 1989, and a definite acceleration again during the first two years of the drastic reforms under the De Klerk administration. However, the inference that a direct correlation exists between reform and the growth of the rightwing could be qualified with the counter-argument that the NP itself shifted to the centre of the political spectrum over the

corresponding period, a shift which resulted in the total rightwing strength (consisting of the NP and the even more rightwing parties), declining from about 70% in 1981 to about 31% in 1987 (see also chapter six for a detailed analysis of the electoral history of the rightwing).

The years following the founding of the CP in 1982 were characterized also by a large increase in the number of extra-parliamentary rightwing groups, especially in the early part of the 1990's (see chapter 3.2). A further development of great significance to the rightwing was F.W. De Klerk's election as State President and the long-awaited 'crossing of the Rubicon' by the NP. The reforms implemented since September 1989 had a considerable impact on the position of the rightwing in South Africa, and the various elements within this movement were forced to adapt their policies and strategies accordingly: under reconsideration were the issues of violent and passive resistance against reform, negotiations, and the transformation of partition from Verwoerdian apartheid to a policy based on demands for a smaller white volkstaat.

To conclude this section of the chapter, reference must be made to the continuity of the struggle (broedertwis) within Afrikanerdom between the 1940's and the 1970/80's. As indicated earlier, Afrikaner nationalism has been plagued by internal strive since its beginnings, and the issues which led to periods of broedertwis, were often repeated, albeit in different forms. Therefore, parallels can be drawn between, for example, the OB-HNP struggle of the 1940's, and the struggles between the verligte and verkrampte wings of the NP during the 1960's and 1970's, between the rightwing and the NP during the 1970/80's, and eventually between factions within the CP itself in the early 1990's. Regardless of whether these struggles were the result of deep and fundamental ideological and regional differences over key political issues, or alternatively as O'Meara suggested, the result of the continuing struggle between the various classes in the nationalist alliance, it was a manifestation of the fact

that Afrikaner nationalism has never been a monolithic phenomenon.

A comparison can be drawn between the struggle for control of Afrikaner hegemony between the HNP of D.F. Malan and the OB of Van Rensburg during the late 1940's (which led to the eventual demise of the OB), and the competition between the CP and the AWB in recent years. The OB's commitment to extinguish parliamentary democracy and its association with violence, proved to be the biggest obstacle in its relations with the HNP of Malan, not unlike the fundamental differences between the CP and AWB. The AWB hardly ever tried to interfere in the political domain of the CP, in turn for which the CP seldom condemned the AWB's position on violence, claiming instead that it understood why Afrikaners felt compelled to take this road (It should be pointed out that four of the members of the CP caucus are also members of the AWB, and that the Party welcomed the AWB's role in mobilizing support for the rightwing cause, in spite of its militancy. In contrast, the OB, although it proclaimed to be a cultural organization, occasionally found itself in the political arena, to the dismay of the HNP (O'Meara, 1983:127).

A further link between the struggle within Afrikanerdom in the 1940's and that of especially the late 1960's/early 1970's with the founding of the HNP, can be identified in the role played by some the main actors which were involved in both cases, in particular Piet Meyer. Meyer, as a senior member of the Broederbond, supported the OB in the 1940's against the HNP of Malan, found himself on the side of the verkramptes in the 1960's, when he at first actively supported Dr Hertzog's position, and later opposed Vorster from within the confines of the NP. Ironically, while Meyer merely passively supported the OB, Vorster became actively involved in sabotage (although he denied this) and was interned by the UP government during the Second World War.

A further comparison can be drawn between the respective positions of the CP today and that of the OB in the 1940's,

on the issue of violence. The violent antipathy of the OB to parliamentary politics, the military training of its members, the acts of sabotage by its military arm, the Stormjaers, and its belief that it could only come to power through the military confrontation with the state, alienated many Afrikaner nationalists - together with the defeat of Nazi Germany, accelerated its demise after 1945. It is not possible to ascertain whether the final demise of the OB was a result of a propensity among Afrikaners towards non-violence (the 1914 Rebellion and the Mineworkers Strike of 1922 drew only limited support), but the AWB's limited growth since its founding in 1973 and the CP's commitment to parliamentary methods may be an indication to this effect. In spite of a tendency within the CP over the past two years, increasingly to lace its rhetoric with threats of violent opposition against reform, even on this respect there is dissension within its ranks between hardliners and pragmatists, the latter insisting that violence offers no viable alternative to negotiations (see chapter 7.2.3).

3.2 DIMENSIONS AND DIVISIONS

As mentioned in the first part of this chapter, Afrikaner nationalism has never been a monolithic phenomenon, and its history is interspersed with incidences of internal conflict and dissension. As Afrikaner nationalism is also the guiding principle of the rightwing, and the CP claims to be the major representative of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa, it is therefore not surprising that differences also exist within the rightwing. This section of the paper deals with the various categories in rightwing politics and with the issues and policies which cause these divisions. Although the sub-heading reads "Divisions", it should be emphasised that these do not refer to fundamental differences as such, but rather to different expressions of the demand for Afrikaner and white self-determination. These organizations are characterized by their attitude to the contentious issues in rightwing politics, such as divergent opinions on who the rightwing represents (Afrikaners, whites or Boers?), differences over strategies (partition or secession, violence or non-violence?), and philosophical differences over racism and prejudice. Generically they are termed the white rightwing movement, but their driving force and psyche largely identify with the aspirations of Afrikaner nationalism.

It should be clear that the above definiton is little more than a description of the issues which hold together and divide rightwing organizations, and says little about who or what the rightwing is. The rightwing clearly does not represent an ethnic group per se, as its support is limited to about half of all Afrikaners. Nor is its support limited to Afrikaners only, as it enjoys considerable support among English-speaking conservatives as well. These observations indicate that the rightwing should be viewed as a segment of the white racial group with a distinct ideological and strategical approach to the question of how the Afrikaner identity and status should best be preserved, namely, through self- determination and racial exclusiveness.

In spite of the diversity of the rightwing, in the final instance, one organization, the Conservative Party, stands out at as the the pivotal axis and also the parliamentary representative of the rightwing, and with a few exceptions, membership of the Party does not exclude membership of any of the other rightwing organizations. Since membership often overlaps, many CP supporters would also belong to one or more of the many rightwing cultural, religious or para-military organizations. The basic issues which separate these organizations are varied: Firstly, the different constitutional policies, ranging from partition, to a volkstaat, to secession, to the restoration of the Boer Republics. These policies are founded in different interpretations of history, represent divergent expectations, and vary with regard to their realism. For example, the CP propagates the re-introduction of Verwoerdian apartheid based on the geopolitical separation of races by the creation of sovereign black homelands on the fringes of South African territory. The AWB on the other hand, demands the secession by the "Boer Republics" of the Transvaal, Free State and Northern Natal from the rest of racially mixed Natal and Cape Province, whilst the Stigting Afrikanervryheid suggests secession by an Afrikaner volkstaat somewhere on the fringes of black-dominated South Africa. In short, while the CP wants to remove blacks from white South Africa, the others want to remove whites from black South Africa.

There are differences over the use of violent or peaceful methods to obtain their goals. Many of the para-military organizations have already used violence to further their objectives, whilst the CP for example, adheres to parliamentary opposition, although even it has diversified its strategy to include extra-parliamentary forms of passive opposition to reform in the period followng February 1990. A further issue is personality differences between leaders of for example, the HNP and the CP (Andries

Treurnicht and Jaap Marais), or between Eugene Terre' Blanche on the one hand and Treurnicht or Carel Boshoff on the other; differences exist over the question of whether the driving force behind the rightwing movement, namely Afrikaner nationalism, can be defined broadly enough to incorporate the large numbers of conservative English-speakers - the CP claims it can, the HNP rejects this and include only Afrikaners in its definition, while the Boerestaat Party and AWB represent only 'Boers'.

The rest of this chapter is concerned then with providing some background to the the various dimensions of the rightwing, their respective policies, and the differences which exist between them.

3.2.1 POLITICAL PARTIES

a) The Conservative Party

The CP can be regarded as the pivotal axis of the rightwing movement. It is the only rightwing organization with parliamentary representation and it received a total of 673 079 votes (31% of the total vote) in the 1989 parliamentary election. The Party was founded in 1982 under the leadership of A.P. Treurnicht after 17 MP's had left the National Party over the issue of power-sharing. It soon became the centre of the rightwing politics and its support continued to increase during subsequent years. It won 22 seats in the 1987 election and 26% of the vote. These figures increased to 39 seats and 31% of the vote in the 1989 elections. The following table provides some insight into the strength of the CP in terms of votes, seats and provincial spread of support during the only two general elections that the Party has fought in under the present constitution, compared to the NP:

Table 3.1 General election results: The NP v. the CP

Province	1987 votes	1987 seats	1989 votes	1989 seats
TRANSVAAL				
NP	526 919	47	520 034	34
CP	383 176	22	453 826	31
CAPE				
NP	335 793	48	315 956	42
CP	82 366	--	106 376	2
NATAL				
NP	119 299	14	107 077	10
CP	21 059	--	32 890	--
OFS				
NP	93 497	14	88 490	7
CP	60 958	--	80 068	6
Total				
NP	1 078 490	123	1 031 566	94
CP	538 640	22	673 490	39

(a more detailed version of these election results can be find in chapter six).

As the above statistics indicate, there was a strong regional trend in evidence in the CP's support base during these two general elections. When the Party broke with the NP in 1982, all the MP's apart from one were from the Transvaal. Ironically, when the Purified Nationalists under D.F. Malan broke with Hertzog in 1934, which, arguably, was also a split to the right, his followers were mostly Cape Nationalists - of the 19 four were from the OFS and one from the Transvaal (Vatcher, 1965:57). This remained the position in the 1987 general election when all 22 of its seats were located in the Transvaal and was confirmed by the CP's dominance in that province with the 1988 Municipal elections. In the 1989 general election the Party finally broke out of its narrow provincial base, and won seats in the Cape and Free State. Most of the CP-seats (except for four) were in rural areas, although this changed slightly in 1989 when the CP won a greater number of urban seats, especially in the PWV area and in Uitenhage.

Although support for the CP is not as strongly class based as that of the HNP, most of the Party's seats which are not rural, are predominantly Afrikaner, peri-urban, and working-class constituencies, e.g. Brakpan, Carletonville, Randfontein, Roodepoort and Uitenhage (Welsh, 1988:34). However, after 1989, the CP's support base began deviating from its previous pattern as was evident from the swing towards the Party among English-speaking voters (Umlazi: +20%), among middle-class voters (Randburg: +10,6%), and in traditionally NP seats in the western Cape (Ceres: +4,7%, Vasco: +12,6%, Maitland: +27%). The majority of surveys discussed in chapter three of this thesis confirm the theoretical assumption that a correlation exists between lower income voters and affiliation with the conservative political parties in South Africa (see Manzo and McGowan (1988), Rhoodie et al (1985), Gagiano (1989), Market and Opinion Surveys (1987-1989), and empirical research done at local government level (1990).

With regard to its constitutional policy, it is correct to say that, with a few modifications like the proposed coloured and Indian homelands, the CP basically took over the NP's policy of separate development and of classical apartheid espoused by H.F. Verwoerd some 20 years ago. The CP's policy is based on a particular model of partition, one which refers to the original Verwoerdian model of apartheid by which the 'black nations' are given independence in their own homelands in 13% of South African territory. Blacks residing within the borders of white South Africa are regarded as temporary migrant workers with no political rights and will eventually be repatriated to the homelands, involving mass forced removals. In addition this policy makes provision for the creation of coloured and Indian homelands, for the possible increase of the land allocated to homelands in terms of the 1936 Black Trust and Land Act and the creation of black city states e.g. Soweto, where blacks have become permanently urbanised on a scale that makes repatriation impossible (CP Election Manifesto 1989).

The policy of partition rests on two pillars, namely,

nationalism and self-determination. Nationalism in this context refers to Afrikaner nationalism, even though the Party actively courts English-speaking whites. The concept of the right to self-determination, in CP terminology, implies that this right is inherent in each of the 'nations' in South Africa, but with heavy emphasis on the right of Afrikaners/whites to rule themselves. Therefore the country needs to be divided into independent states, whose political boundaries should correspond with the existing ethnic and racial divisions. Since both the group definitions and the political boundaries have been determined solely by the NP and the Afrikaner establishment over the past 40 years, it follows naturally that under CP-rule, whites will be entitled to the largest part of the country. The CP's policy is based on the belief that if partition is successfully executed, it will actually improve race relations because it will reduce inter-racial conflict by separating the blacks and whites, and the violent but successful partitioning of Cyprus, the Indian sub-continent and Palestine are often used as examples (Zille, 1987:70-71). In conjunction with this, the CP totally rejects the concept of minority rights for whites as a way of safe-guarding white interests, by claiming that the constitutional protection of minorities has never been successful anywhere, least of all in Africa (ibid).

The CP's policy is in the process of undergoing some subtle changes in emphasis since 1989. These refer firstly, to the acceptance that the whites, under a CP government, would have to be satisfied with a considerably smaller portion of South Africa, and secondly, that it should concentrate solely on obtaining a volkstaat, rather than being prescriptive on how the rest of South Africa should organize itself politically. The extent of the shift in its policy away from Verwoerdian grand apartheid towards demands for a white volkstaat, is part of an ongoing struggle between 'traditionalists' (hardliners) and 'moderates' for the Party's soul, but by mid-1991, the idea of a considerably smaller white homeland appears to have taken root in the policies of the CP (see chapter six).

Although the CP denies that it is racist in any way other than wanting to promote the interests of Afrikaners, it rejects all forms of racial integration on social and political levels, and, as mentioned before, the issue of 'healthy power-sharing' with coloureds and Indians led originally to the CP breakaway in 1982. The CP's policy of complete racial segregation is based on the notion of racial exclusivity i.e. that the white community should have access to separate social institutions such as schools, housing, churches, medical services, central business districts and ultimately, political power. Especially important, until its repeal, was the strict enforcement of the Group Areas Act, which Treurnicht regarded as the key to the survival of white exclusivity:

> Only through the rigid enforcement of separate residential areas can separate schools, an own community life, own voters rolls and own political representation, be guaranteed (Sunday Times:3.9.1989).

The economic policy of the CP indicates a preference for a strong state presence in the economy which would enforce influx control and curb the influence of large monopolies and multi-national corporations. According to Treurnicht the subsidization of blacks by whites and the redistribution of wealth should be terminated, since this has led to "the impoverishment of the whites and a decline in foreign confidence" (ibid). Treurnicht justified his concern over foreign investment in the new South Africa as follows:

> We believe the international investment community is worried about the security of their investments, and they don't fancy the prospect of Nelson Mandela controlling their cash (Zille, 1988:84).

(Ironically, the events of February 1990 have substantiated Treurnicht's argument - a sharp decline of foreign investment interest in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange followed Nelson Mandela's re-affirmation of the ANC's nationalization policy shortly after his release).

Although the CP supports a free market system, it is not unconditionally committed to capitalism and free markets, since its partition policy by itself implies considerable central government intervention in the economy (e.g the closing of CBD's to traders of races other than whites). The CP expresses itself as follows on big business:

> We shall protect the consumer, small businessman and entrepreneur against monopolies which abuse the concept of free enterprise (CP Election Pamphlet in the Maitland by-election, February 1991).

Its labour policy is designed to place the interests of the white worker above everyone else by for example, restoring job reservation and influx control, and by banning black trade unions. CP officials have also been trying to integrate all the white trade unions into one "super" union under its control. The CP constantly attacks the NP for "betraying the white worker" by taking away state protection against black competition, and claims that its policy would provide for the preference of white workers in white areas. Much emphasis is placed on the impoverishment of whites because of high taxes and a high inflation rate. In addition, the Party objects strongly to what it perceives as a redistribution of wealth from white to black and to the government using white taxes to subsidize black local administrations, education, transport and housing.

The CP takes a hardline approach to security issues. In the Botha era it fully supported cross-border raids into neighbouring countries, the presence of the Defence Force in townships and a strong, politicized police force. Its relationship with the police force before and after F.W. de Klerk forms an interesting contrast: The CP initially sided with the Police as enforcers of "law and order" (read: apartheid), and even after the De Klerk administration tried to depoliticize the role of the police, the Party continued to back the police on the assumption that the latter was being prevented from doing its job by a weak, irresolute and pro-ANC government. The following anonymous letter published by the Daily Dispatch (2.11.1989), was

typical of this sentiment among CP supporters (and many of the NP), shortly after the first legal mass-anti-apartheid rallies in September 1989: "Our brave young policemen have had screws put on them and have to put up with the insults of an unruly mob and can do nothing about it....Where is law and order?"

However, as the government began taking a firmer stand against rightwing violence by mid-1990, and despatched the police to break up rightwing rallies and to detain and arrest rightwing perpetrators of violence, the CP's stance changed somewhat. It began viewing the security forces more as an extension of a government which was overseeing the transition to a black-ruled South Africa, rather than as an ally in its opposition to the transition. However, many within the CP believed this was a temporary situation, as almost 80% of the white members of the police force were supporters of the rightwing (Interview, Jan Hoon:7.2.91). Treurnicht's attitude towards the security forces was spelled out clearly during the 1989 election: "a vote for the CP is a vote for own security forces which will be under our own control for the protection of our own people's rights and freedoms" (Sunday Times:3.9.89). In other words, for the CP the security forces exist only for the purpose of protecting sectional white interests.

In response to the release of political prisoners in 1989, Treurnicht reacted as follows:

> it was completely irreconcilable with the ban on the ANC....either the government dispossesses us of our country and own political control by giving in to the ANC ultimatum, or the government disallows further demonstrations and rejects all radical claims (The Guardian Weekly:22.10.89).

The CP's foreign policy is firmly based on the rejection of foreign interference in South Africa's domestic affairs, which is regarded as motivated by blatant self-interest rather than as an outrage against apartheid (Zille, 1988:79). Although the Party believes it can normalize

relations with the outside world once its policy of partition has solved the 'national' question of South Africa, it claims that South Africa under CP-rule would be able to survive in total isolation if the worst comes to the worst. It emphasizes that it would not ask for the lifting of sanctions if this meant the capitulation of the whites (Patriot:6.7.90) (also see chapter five on foreign interference).

The CP does not believe that communism has ceased to be a danger to the world and in particular to South Africa, but it strongly emphasizes the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as examples of the strength of nationalism world-wide, including Afrikaner nationalism. It regards the USA in a particularly bad light, on the grounds of its "imperialistic" nature and its self-serving interference in South Africa's affairs. For this reason the CP denounced America's policy and military action in Iraq and criticized the South African government for offering its moral support to that superpower during the war, without the latter's withdrawing sanctions against South Africa.

Since its inception in 1982, the CP, as the parliamentary representative of the rightwing, has been committed to achieving power through democratic means by way of the ballot box. However, the Party's hopes of doing so by constitutional means received a serious setback in 1990, when the government announced that there would not be another general election under the existing constitution, thereby leaving the CP with one last hope of reversing the reform process, namely a referendum. The CP has adapted slowly to the changing realities of South African politics since the end of 1989, and as mentioned before, distinct differences over a new direction became visible in 1990-91 between the traditionalists and the moderates within the Party. The latter group realises the impossibility of reintroducing a policy which became outdated 20 years ago

and are in favour of entering into negotiations with all parties, whilst the former group rejects this.

The Conservative Party's other strategy is referred to as nonviolent resistance and is aimed at forcing the government through extra-parliamentary but peaceful pressure, to call a general election or at least to ensure a referendum on a new constitution. This strategy is based on the belief that the National Party does not represent the majority of Afrikaners and possibly not even the majority of white voters, and therefore has no mandate to negotiate on their behalf. Nonviolent resistance takes on the shape of the mass mobilization of the volk by organizing public protests, defiance campaigns, strikes and the boycotting of essential sevices, the refusal to pay taxes or doing military service, the drawing up of petitions and resisting reforms at the level of local government.

The final strategy under consideration by the CP is that of active resistance to the government's reform programme and to a future transition of power to the majority. The Party has assumed a more militant stance since 1990 by refering to a "Third Freedom War" and to a "civil war" launched by the rightwing on the day a black government comes to power. It has also called on the volk to "rise" against the NP, which is regarded as an "illegitimate regime" and made threats of a rightwing coup d'etat, supported by the Security Forces. On the strength of rightwing pronouncements it seems that the CP would adhere to democratic means only for as long as the possibility remains of peacefully preventing a predominantly black government from coming to power. In this respect Treurnicht has warned the government "not to underestimate the Afrikaner's ability and will to fight for his freedom (SABC news broadcast:6.12.89).

Finally, the political consequences for South Africa of the CP's coming to power, and perhaps the most convincing case put foreward for preventing it from doing so, are

summarized by political analyst Willem de Klerk, brother of the current State President:

> ...a harsh scenario in which a CP victory results in a final racial confrontation, a full-scale civil war....the retroactive radicalism of a CP government, build upon an unacceptable ideology, in a situation where it will no longer be possible to turn back, will inevitably bring on the national and international breaking point. In the light of this scenario, a CP takeover is an appalling prospect. It will amount to nothing less than pulling down the pillars in an act of self-destruction (cited in Leach, 1989:91):

b) The Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP)

The factors which led to the breakaway from the NP by Albert Hertzog, Jaap Marais and two other MP's in 1969 and the founding of the HNP were discussed previously (see pages 46-63). The direct cause was the inclusion of Maoris in the New Zealand rugby touring party to South Africa, but on a more general level, it concerned the Vorster government's policy of desegregating sport; the broadening of the NP's support base to include members of the English-speaking population

and the outward-looking foreign policy.

From a class perspective, the origins of the split can be traced to the material interests and the survival of the Afrikaner nation (Bekker et al, 1989:23-24). According to Adam and Moodley (1986:59-60), who describe the HNP as "labour racists", the split was a result of the alienation of the white worker by the government in favour of big business interests - it was important for the sake of economic growth to ensure the unhindered supply of black workers by removing the virtual veto which white unions had over issues concerning black labour. It led to a coalition between the state and big business which defeated organized white labour and resulted in the decline of state protection for white workers.

As was mentioned previously in this chapter (see page 54), many covert ideological supporters of the HNP remained within the National Party, but the question is why they did not follow Hertzog in 1969, and furthermore, why the HNP failed to attract significant Afrikaner support until its brief moment of glory in 1981 when it won a third of Afrikaner votes? One of the main reasons, according to Bekker et al (1989:24) could be found in the Party's inability to adapt to changing circumstances concerning the Afrikaner's socio-economic position. While Afrikaners were improving their economic position during the 1970's, the HNP, due to ideological restrictions, persisted with projecting a racist, working-class image. This limited the HNP's support base to the rapidly shrinking white working-class, some small farmers and a few white trade unions (see part one of this chapter).

The HNP's performance during subsequent elections reflected its declining support base. The Party never won any seats, except in 1986 when it won a by-election in Sasolburg with the help of the CP. With the one exception of the general election of 1981, its electoral results showed a downward trend: In 1970 it received 53 000 votes; in 1977, 34 000.

In 1981 the Party experienced a short-lived recovery as part of the emergence of the rightwing movement as a whole. In response to the reforms of the Botha government and white worker disaffection, it won 192 304 votes country-wide (13%), but no seats. After the birth of the CP the HNP's fortunes continued to decline: in 1987 it won 61 456 votes (3,14%) and in 1989, 5 531 votes (0,25%), which effectively finished the Party as a political entity of any relevance (Lemon, 1987:102-112). Only the persistence of its leader, Jaap Marais, kept it going by 1991, and then only in name.

The HNP's policy has not changed much over the years from the Verwoerdian model on which it was originally based. According to its philosophy the whole of South Africa apart from the homeland areas, belongs to whites. Therefore blacks working in 'white' South Africa are there only on a temporary basis. There is little difference between the policy of the HNP and that of the CP, both placing the interests of the whites first, although the HNP places more emphasis on Afrikaner nationalism than does the CP. Its definition of the volk excludes English-speakers, and stipulates that Afrikaans should be the official language of the country, although English could be used in foreign relations (Bekker et al, 1989:24-25). The Party is equally negative towards the Indian community, describing it as a "negative" group who remained in South Africa by accident and should have been repatriated back to India a century ago (Die Afrikaner:10.7.91).

The HNP believes that wealth created by Afrikaners belongs to the Afrikaner nation and strongly rejects any form of redistribution of wealth across racial lines. Its economic policy is socialist by nature and is similar to the notion of volkskapitalisme, as espoused by Afrikaner nationalists in the 1930-40's (which referred to the creation of jobs and businesses for Afrikaners with the help of state-run companies). The HNP remains close to its working-class origins by keeping close ties with certain white trade unions, in particular the Mine Workers Union (MWU) of Arrie

Paulus and the White Building Workers Union of Gert Beetge (Bekker et al, 1989:24).

The biggest difference between the HNP and the CP is probably the one that exists between the two leaders, Jaap Marais and Andries Treurnicht. Marais is of opinion that while he has been fighting the rightwing battle for two decades, Treurnicht had been part of the Government's reform program (ibid). As mentioned before, Treurnicht, even in his capacity as one of the leading verkrampte within the NP, attacked the HNP from his bases at Hoofstad and as chairman of the Broederbond. According to Marais, Treurnicht and his followers only broke with the NP when they had little choice, as they realized they would have been defeated by the HNP during the following election (Rapport:10.5.87).

However, as a result of the feud, the possibility of an amalgamation between the two parties remained distant throughout the 1980's and the closest they ever came to co-operation was the deal struck during a by-election in 1986 in Sasolburg, which allowed the HNP to win its first ever parliamentary seat. Marais' demands for the 'winnable' constituencies to be divided on an equal basis between the two parties made any further cooperation with the CP impossible, as this totally exceeded the number of seats which the CP were prepared to concede. In 1987 the CP decided to rid itself of the HNP and to fight the election without regard to the HNP. This decision cost the combined rightwing eight seats, i.e. where its combined vote surpassed that of the NP. The CP's rejection of the HNP's demands and the serious setback which the Party received in the election, was accepted by Marais as beneficial to the rightwing cause and to his Party's continued existence:
"We [the HNP] must continue to pressure the CP from the right to ensure that the latter does not shift towards the left too much in its efforts to draw away from the NP" (Rapport:10.5.87). The CP followed a similar strategy during the 1989 election and this time its decision was more successful, as only one seat was lost by a split

rightwing vote (Fauresmith, where the presence of the HNP resulted in a tie between the CP and NP, and after a recount, went to the NP).

For many years the HNP rejected all forms of cooperation with the AWB and even suspended the Party membership of anyone who was involved with or joined the AWB. The reason for this drastic action was that the HNP, being a parliamentary party, did not approve of the AWB's commitment to a dictatorship, (Kemp, 1990:26). The HNP also refused to become involved in the short-lived rightwing front founded in 1981 by Connie Mulder, called Aksie Red Blank Suid-Afrika (Action to Save White South Africa), which consisted of the NCP, AWB, Kappie Kommando, Aksie Eie Toekoms and the South Africa First Campaign (ibid). The poor performance of the HNP after 1981 and especially since 1987 resulted in the Party looking at other potential allies, even the AWB. During the 1987 general election Marais appeared with Terre'Blanche at election meetings and together they pleaded for rightwing unity, but did not succeed in convincing the CP to join them (ibid). Although the HNP maintaned a good relationship with the Boerestaat Party and the AWB, this was not enough to prevent it from being relegated into obscurity after the 1989 general election, which left the Party with only 0,25% of electoral support and no political relevance. In spite of all these reversals, the HNP keeps on publishing its weekly newspaper, Die Afrikaner, and Marais still manages the occasional interview on SABC-TV.

In spite of its poor electoral record, and the scorn and ridicule it had to endure for more than two decades, from the rightwing perspective, the HNP managed to keep the rightwing flag flying, and ensured that a radical rightwing view was always available in the days prior to the founding of the CP.

c) The Boerestaat Party (BSP)

The Boerestaat Party was founded in 1988 under the leadership of Robert van Tonder. Its founding congress was

attended by fewer than 120 people, and the Party has never officially participated in any election. Its deputy-leader, Piet Rudolph, achieved notoriety in 1990, when he, in his capacity as leader of the Orde Boerevolk, raided the Air Force HQ in Pretoria to steal weapons, and committed acts of sabotage. Van Tonder himself resigned from the NP in 1961 because of his opposition to Verwoerd's plan to encourage British immigration to South Africa, and later founded the Conservative Study Group. His book Die Stryd Duur Voort (The Struggle Continues) was published in 1966 and according to Van Tonder, was a direct cause of the breakaway of the HNP in 1969, as it spelled out the rightwing alternative. It was on Van Tonder's insistence that the HNP proposed Afrikaans as the only official language. His efforts to promote Afrikaans and to fight discrimination against the language in shops and elsewhere, earned him the nickname, Taalbul (Van Tonder, 1990:89, Interview: 10.4.91).

The BSP publishes a regular newsletter to propagate its nationalist and racist ideology. Issues which are frequently referred to, include the necessity for the destruction of Melrose House (the venue in Pretoria where the Treaty of Vereeniging was signed in 1902); the treachery of the State President (referred to occasionally as "Pienk Frikkie"); the liaison of the latter's son's with a girl of a different colour, the "heroic struggle" of Piet Rudolph while on the run from the police, and sympathetic and admiring articles on the Nazi war effort (Nuusbriewe:3/90, 1/91).

The political philosophy of the Boerestaat Party rests on three assumptions: The first is that South Africa consists of 15 separate nations, each with its own language, culture and territory. For this reason, Van Tonder denies that a uniform South African language or culture exists and he takes great pleasure in inviting anyone to speak "South African" to him (Interview:10.4.91); secondly, that the "citizens" of the former Boer Republics form a 'nation' by themselves, and do not belong to the "so-called" Afrikaner

nation, even though they happen to speak the same language; thirdly, that the sovereign Boer Republics were robbed of their independence by the British Empire in 1902, an incident which Van Tonder wants to contest at the UN.

The Boerestaat Party's policy is to restore the independence of the ZAR, the Orange Free State and Vryheid, by way of secession from the remaining part of South Africa, the latter being referred to as "Milner-South Africa". Although Bekker et al (1989:39) define the policy as partition, Van Tonder strongly denies this, claiming that "partition implies the separation of white, black and brown races, which is incorrect, as all whites are not Boere, but in reality constitute a separate volk" (Van Tonder, 1990:43-86).

According to the BSP the borders of the Boerestaat are a historical reality, although some adjustments could be made to render these more practicable, e.g. the consolidation of black homelands (ibid). At present, the proposed area of the Boerestaat has a white population of about 3,3 million, but the Party envisages that a population movement would change that figure, since Afrikaners from elsewhere would want to move there and English-speakers might want to leave the state. According to Van Tonder, the Cape Province, with its "Cape Dutch" Arikaners, has never been part of the Boer Republics and he therefore lays no claim to this region (ibid).

Van Tonder claims that the Boerestaat will be economically viable, since it possesses massive quantities of natural resources and presently provides two-thirds of South Africa's income derived from taxes. He insists that no international financial "interference", or the pernicious geldmagte (money forces) of the Anglo American Corporation, would be tolerated in the Boerestaat (ibid). The Boerestaat would have its own language, namely, Boeretaal or Boeraans, its own flag, the Vierkleur and the government system would be 'Boere-Republican' (ibid).

There are close links between the Boerestaat Party and the

Boereweerstandsbeweging (BWB) under Andrew Ford. The BWB is regarded by some as the military wing of the Party, but its Newsletter refers to an alliance of two separate organizations (3/90). There are also strong links between the BSP and Orde Boerevolk, founded by Piet Rudolph, but now under leadership of Nic Strydom. The latter is the father of the mass-murderer of Strijdomplein, self-proclaimed 'wit wolf', Barend Strydom.

d) Other Parties

These consist of the Blanke Party of Johan Schabort, formerly the Blanke Bevrydingsbeweging, founded in 1985, and the Blanke Volkstaat Party, the political arm of the AWB. Both these parties are overtly racist and propagated a secessionist version of partition. By 1989 the Blanke Party was supported by few more than the immediate family of its founder, Johan Schabort (Sunday Times:9.7.89). The AWB's Blanke Volkstaat Party had not yet been launched in an organizational sense by 1989 (Bekker et al, 1989:39-40),. Eugene Terre'Blanche's own attempts to get involved in parliamentary politics during the 1989 general election were unsuccessful, as the CP refused to accede to his demand to contest the Krugersdorp constituency on behalf of the rightwing (Kemp, 1990:130).

In all, these parties have little political relevance and do not merit serious consideration, except to add that they exemplify the propensity of extreme radical organizations to fission, and that their very existence (together with the more significant organizations) testifies to the vigorous underbrush of rightwing organizations.

3.2.2 INTELLECTUALLY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS

a) SABRA

The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs was formed in 1948 in an attempt to counter the liberal South African Institute of Race Relations (Zille, 1987:58). The organization was funded by the Broederbond and charged with

constructing the philosophical pillars of apartheid. It became the perfect "ideological assembly line for the Nationalist government" (Leach, 1989:168). The intellectual basis of SABRA consisted mainly of academics from the University of Stellenbosch, who sought to provide a moral and scientific rationale for apartheid after 1950. The academic members of SABRA proved themselves to be too liberal for the NP's liking, and clashed with Verwoerd over the report of the Tomlinson Commmission regarding the policy of creating black homelands. The Commission's recommendations suggested that all races had to develop as separate groups, that black homelands had to be created, that white capital should be permitted to invest in these homelands, and that £104 million had to be spent over a period of ten years, with the goal of turning them into viable entities (Schoeman, 1973:230). Instead, Verwoerd proposed that £3 million be spent for this purpose and opposed the idea of investment within these territories by the private sector. He also strongly objected to the criticism of his homeland policies voiced by SABRA and managed to eject the dissident academics from the organization.

After 1961 SABRA maintained a verkrampte bias on most policy matters and elements within the organization; e.g. its chairman until 1967, P.D.F. Weis, and its secretary, G.van Niekerk, supported the Hertzog group within the NP. Its conservative political stance was confirmed by the election of the well-known conservative, Carel Boshoff, as chairman in 1972. The organization was not totally supportive of the NP's new direction under John Vorster during the 1970's. According to Boshoff, divisions developed gradually during the 1970's when the government rejected in principle the policy of racial segregation in the spheres of labour, amenities and services, and began to accept that racial separation was a synonym for discrimination (SABRA: Verklaring van Voorneme:1987).

These differences between the NP and SABRA became irreconcilable as the former failed to persuade the

organization to accept its new racial policies, especially its new tricameral constitution (Bekker et al, 1989:42). Most ties between the NP and SABRA were broken after the CP break-away in 1982 and SABRA became an integral part of rightwing politics. In April 1984, just before the implementation of the tricameral constitution, SABRA expressed itself against power-sharing with coloureds and Indians as follows:

> The factors which influence the process of cultural interaction between white, coloured and Indian, are manipulated [by the Tricameral Constitution] to stimulate integration between the three groups. This process ignores the conflict potential which exist between these groups by nature of differences in their lifestyles, numbers and physical types (Journal of Racial Affairs, April 1984:Volume 35, no 2).

SABRA had provided the rightwing movement with some of the ideological foundations for its constitutional proposals and carried out research on models of partition under the guidance of Carel Boshoff, Hercules Booysen and others (Bekker et al, 1989:42). The organization claimed to do scientific research on racial issues and to suggest solutions, all within the context of separate development and racial segregation, in contrast to 'integrationist' organizations like the S.A. Institute of International Affairs and the S.A. Institute of Race Relations, Sprocas and others (SABRA, 1985).

In 1985 SABRA came to the conclusion that the Tricameral Constitution could not work, because it was unacceptable to the majority of blacks and large sections of the white community, and because it ignored the existence of volke (nations) in South Africa. The organization cited the violence and disruption since the implementation of the constitution as proof of its unacceptability among all groups. It offered a solution in the form of a volkstaat for each volk in South Africa, and insisted that it did not imply a return to the pre-1983 era, as "those bridges had been burned" (SABRA, A New Constitution for the RSA, 1985).

In 1986 SABRA issued a statement of intent on the creation of an Afrikaner Volkstaat, with the 'white' parts of the Transvaal, OFS, Northern Natal and large parts of the Cape demarcated to be included in such a state (SABRA, Declaration of Intent, 1986). Boshoff claimed that SABRA subscribed to the same principles as NP had in 1952, namely complete geopolitical separation of races as the basis for justice and order. It listed the following geographical requirements for the creation of a successful volkstaat:

> A continuous, uninterrupted geographical area, which takes cognizance of Afrikaner history and which could be defended by military means; sufficient natural resources, industry and a harbour; space for about four million people; the area would include white parts of the Transvaal, Free State, Northern and Eastern Cape, Northern Natal and parts of Namibia; these areas represent a departure point - the final area would probably be much smaller (SABRA, Declaration of Intent, 1987).

The organization also listed the economic guidelines for the envisaged separate Afrikaner state as follows: the economic system in South Africa contradicted the notion of Afrikaner independence, therefore an economy based on 'foreign' labour and multi-nationals and cartels should be opposed; the economy would be designed to support four million Afrikaners, rather than 30 million people, although white expertise would be utilised to develop neighbouring states; capital would have to be raised within Arikaner circles and the creation of an Afrikaner development bank would be considered (ibid).

By 1990 the idea of an Afrikaner Volkstaat was an integral part of SABRA's philosophy and the organization argued that Afrikaners would have to get involved in the process of negotiations, in order to put forward its "legitimate" case for self-determination. It accepted that South Africa would eventually be ruled by a black majority and proposed therefore that a volkstaat would have to achieve its

sovereignty by way of secession from the rump state (Journal of Racial Affairs, 1990: Volume 41, no 3).

From 1988 onwards a split seemed to have developed between the CP and SABRA over the direction of the rightwing policy. SABRA's proposals of a smaller Afrikaner state differed strongly from the CP's policy of partition. Boshoff personally went so far as to reject the CP's policies as unworkable and morally indefensible and claimed that the answer lay in a smaller Afrikaner state, whose independence could be achieved by secession from a larger black-dominated South Africa. By 1991 SABRA increased the distance between itself and other rightwing organizations to an even greater extent, by suggesting the possibility of a "Federal Afrikaner Republic" which could be part of the greater, non-racial South Africa (Die Burger:29.8.90). This proposal, suggested by SABRA's Executive director, A.J. de Beer, also deviated from SABRA's previous position on the "dangers of reliance on minority protection" and its declaration that the Afrikaner should accept nothing less than complete sovereignty (independence).

b) Stigting Afrikanervryheid

Without sacrificing his position as chairman of SABRA, Boshoff decided to promote his vision of an Afrikaner Volkstaat more actively by the founding of Stigting Afrikanervryheid (Afrikaner Freedom Foundation) in 1988. The philosophy of this organization is based on the following assumptions:

> Black majority rule is unavoidable; white minority rule is morally unjustifiable; the Verwoerdian concept of separate development cannot work; Afrikaners will therefore have to form their own volkstaat in a smaller part of South Africa (Sunday Times:10.6.88 and 19.6.88; Journal of Racial Affairs:July,1987).

Boshoff distanced himself even further from CP policy by suggesting that a scenario in which the CP were to be elected as government would be as detrimental to the

interests of whites as the current NP government. The reason for this, Boshoff claimed, was to be found in the extensive black resistance and international punitive action which would follow such an event (ibid). The CP, for its part, also sought to distance itself from Boshoff's proposals. Treurnicht declared that the origin of these proposals could not be found in CP policies, but agreed that similarities do exist in that both stand for a sovereign Afrikaner state (Die Burger:17.6.88).

In February 1989 Boshoff released detailed plans for the creation of an exclusive Afrikaner nation state. The boundaries of this state would encompass an area in the Northern Cape and Southern Namibia and include regions like the Kalahari, Namaqualand, Gordonia, Swartland and Northern Karoo. The fact that Boshoff's proposals exclude most of the area where Afrikaners traditionally reside, as well as areas which Afrikaners believe historically belongs to them, resulted in strong opposition from other rightwing organizations. The CP rejected it out of hand, since it believed that all territory presently in white hands should be part of a white state and predicted practical difficulties in implementing such a plan (Rapport:19.2.89). Boshoff received cautious support in academic circles and from some political commentators, for the "reasonable and modest" nature of his proposals and for the positive contribution it made to the constitutional debate. Boshoff's plan for a volkstaat came one small step closer to reality towards the end of 1990 after the purchase of a small town in the north-western Cape called Orania. The town is supposed to be the first growth-point of the Volkstaat, and managed to attract a few Afrikaner families from the Transvaal as permanent settlers (see chapter six).

c) Toekomsgesprek

This organization was founded in 1983 and is supposed to be the CP's alternative to the Broederbond (Zille, 1988:58-59). It has attempted to infiltrate civic organizations, school committees and agricultural

co-operatives with the objectives of spreading rightwing ideology and finally controlling them (ibid). The latest estimate of the strength of the organization is about 3 000, all prominent academics and rightwing leaders in other fields, including almost all CP-MP's (Die Burger:25.1.91, Insig, April 1990). The organization received publicity in 1991 because of its approval in principle of the formation of a volksleer as the military wing of the CP, and because it was suspected by the NP of being the driving force behind the 'Koos' document (Hansard:29.4.91) (see discussion of 'Koos' Document in chapter six).

d) Vereniging van Oranjewerkers

This organization was founded in 1980 and is led at present by its chairman, H. Booysen, and H.F. Verwoerd, the son of the 'father' of apartheid. There were 17 founding members, but membership had increased to an estimated 2 500 by 1986 (Bekker et al, 1989:42)). It publishes a quarterly journal, Oranje Perspektief, and through its publishing firm, Oranjewerkers Promosies, has published a number of brochures and books, the latest titled "Afrikaner - 'n Gebiedsaanduiding".

The constitution of the organization depicts its tasks as follows:
- The identification of Afrikaner territories as a basis for a volkstaat;
- The development of growth-points in these territories;
- To ensure that the Afrikaners/Boere become independent of black labour;
- To create job opportunities for unemployed Afrikaners;
- To start companies and development projects to further the goals of the organization.

The Oranjewerkers explain the basis of their demand for a

volkstaat as follows:

> A volkstaat is the only solution to the Afrikaner's quest for freedom in a country with many different nations;
> The concept of a volkstaat can be justified with the the help of the Bible, with reference to the chaos which was the result of the attempts to create a "world citizenship" at Babel, as described in Genesis;
> The definition of volk used by the Oranjewerkers refers to the Afrikaners, and in particular the Boere, i.e. the descendents of the Calvinist Protestants, the Huguenots, the Voortrekkers and the citizens of the former Boer Republics. Immigrants who are prepared to be assimilated into the volk, however, would be welcome in the volkstaat;
> Afrikaans will be the only official language, the form of government will be republican, education will have a Christian-national character, and a freemarket economy will be the norm;
> The area which the volkstaat would comprise (but is negotiable) includes the former Boer Republics, e.g. the northern part of the OFS, the eastern Transvaal, and a narrow corridor to the northern Natal coastline;
> Although up to 75% of Afrikaners currently live outside this territory, it is a starting point and many will follow;
> The volkstaat will be economically viable - "if Israel could make a success out of a desert, so can we";
> There should not be too much resistance from the black majority in South Africa, as the volkstaat would be a result of peaceful negotiations and such a state would help to eliminate conflict;
> All the various proposals for Afrikaner/white sovereignty are not as far apart as they seem, since they all have the ultimate goal of freedom, and therefore form part of the process leading to this goal;
> To eliminate discriminatory legislation in the volkstaat, occupation by a majority of whites will have to be ensured;

> Neither power-sharing nor minority protection within a unitary state can be relied upon to secure peace between the various nations comprising such a state - there are many examples in the world where such illusions have met with hard reality, and ultimately resulted in repression and conflict;
> Finally, the possibility of successfully implementing the idea of a volkstaat is dependent on the following requirements - its historical justification, its moral credibility, and its demographic, economic, military and political viability. The Vereniging van Oranjewerkers believes that it can satisfactorily address all these issues (Bruwer et al, 1990-19).

The Oranjewerkers desire for self-sufficiency and white labour was put to the test in the areas which it has set aside for development as growth-points for a future white homeland (growth-points are defined as areas which are occupied solely by whites/Afrikaners and will serve as the nucleus of the future state (Amended Constitution, 1991). The first of these growth-points was located in Morgenzon in the eastern Transvaal, where about 32 members of the movement have settled. According to Verwoerd these growthpoints would expand until large parts of north-eastern Free State and eastern Transvaal are included in an uninterrupted Afrikaner homeland (The Argus:6.8.88).

3.2.3 CULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS

a) The Afrikaner Volkswag (AV)

The Afrikaner Volkswag was formed in 1984 by Carel Boshoff, shortly after he resigned from the Broederbond. This was the fifth rightwing-orientated organization which he became affiliated with since leaving the fold of the NP, the other four being the CP, SABRA, the NG Bond, and Stigting

Afrikanervryheid. Since these organizations were located in different spheres, i.e. respectivelly in party political politics, and in religious, cultural and intellectually-based spheres, his involvement in each provided no contradiction, apart from some friction between him and the CP over his criticism of "old-style" apartheid and his proposals for a smaller Afrikaner homeland. According to Welsh (1988:3), Boshoff originally founded the AV to counter the Broederbond, and since the organization's intention was to establish a cultural people's front, it was set to act in particular as a counter to the FAK (the Broederbond's cultural arm). The organization's goals were to facilitate Afrikaner unity and to co-ordinate the cultural activities of the rightwing, and its membership traversed divisions within the movement, e.g. Andries Treurnicht, Jaap Marais and Eugene Terre'Blanche are all members (Bekker et al, 1989:41; Welsh, 1988:4).

The Volkswag's membership unit is the family. Zille (1988:58) estimated membership at about 7 000 families in 1988, i.e. approximately 35 000 members (at an average of five members per family unit). According to Bekker et al (1989:41), this figure is closer to 50 000. The organization promotes Afrikaner nationalism through the use of Afrikaner symbols such as the Oxwagon, the Voortrekker dress and traditional cultural events (ibid).

The AV's biggest success to date has been its organization of the alternative celebrations of the 150 year anniversary of the Great Trek in 1988, which in its sheer scope, overshadowed the 'official' celebrations held under the aegis of the FAK. The latter a low-key affair, attracted little interest, even though it culminated in a speech at the Voortrekker Monument by the then State President, P.W. Botha. The Volkswag Trek was a resounding success if measured against Afrikaner participation, and almost 25 000 people attended the volksfees in Pretoria on the final day (ibid). The government was deeply distressed by the hijacking of this symbolic event, and refused to provide any financial assistance to the Volkswag's celebrations.

The irony of the 1988 celebrations was the fact that they occurred against the background of a sharply divided Afrikaner people, while similar celebrations 50 years previously in 1938 (or the 1949 jamboree), had served to strengthen Afrikaner unity. This time the celebrations represented, in Boshoff's words

> A historic moment for Afrikaners to reject the government's diluted policies by throwing in their lot with those seeking to uphold the white nation....This is the new Great Trek facing the Afrikaner. Let's call it the final struggle for his own survival (cited in Leach, 1989:6).

In 1991 the AV, which was still saddled with debts it had incurred with the organization of the celebrations, requested towns and cities which were "sympathetic" to the cause, to help shoulder the burden.

In October 1990 Patriot reported on the the formation of a new cultural body, the Afrikaner Kultuurbond (AKB). According to the chairman of the launching committee the AKB did not intend to compete with the AV, but merely served as an umbrella federation for all Afrikaner cultural organizations (Patriot:16.11.90). Its name later changed to the Afrikaner Kultuurraad (Rapport:11.8.91).

3.2.4. RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

The process whereby Afrikaner Christianity became entangled with and helped to shape the nationalist ideology, resulted in what Bosch (1984) and T.D. Moody (1975) describe as the Afrikaner civil religion. This close interaction is described by Moody as follows:

> The roots of the Afrikaner doctrine of election grew out of the Calvinism of Paul Kruger and the experience of the Boer War, and the young shoots of Afrikaner nationalism were nurtured in the post-Boer War language movement. The divine agent of the Afrikaner civil faith

> is Christian and Calvinist - an active sovereign God, who calls the elect, who promises and punishes, who brings forth life from death in the course of history. The object of his saving activity - the Afrikaner people - is not a church, a community of the saved, however; it is a whole nation with a distinct language and culture, its own history and special destiny (1975:xvii).

Since early on the Afrikaans churches have regarded it as their duty to convey the above message and to strengthen the link between themselves and the nationalist and apartheid ideologies. Like the NP, their collective philosphy was also based on the belief that the Afrikaners were a distinct people elected and sent by God to spread Christianity among the black nations of South Africa, while at the same time, keeping a separate identity and racial purity (Bekker et al, 1989:36, Zille, 1988:66). The three Afrikaans Reformed churches, known as the Susterkerke, all became actively involved in the development of the apartheid ideology by providing it with a scriptural justification in accordance with the notion of racial segregation at all levels of society. Their contribution to promoting Afrikaner nationalism resulted in a continued close association with the NP and its policies after 1948.

By 1961 unity within and among the Susterkerke became strained after a group of Dutch Reformed theologians refuted on biblical and moral grounds all the arguments on which apartheid was founded, in a document entitled Delayed Action. These strains were exacerbated in 1966 when a special commission of the NGK published a report entitled Studiestukke, which questioned the position of the NGK as a volkskerk (Moodey, 1975:290). After a period of relative calm, the three Afrikaans Reformed churches again faced a challenge in 1982 following the split in the National Party. The political divisions among Afrikaners were also reflected in the churches: The Hervormde Kerk leaned towards the right insofar as it maintained racial

exclusivity: no blacks were allowed to become members of the church and common worship was prohibited (Bekker et al, 1989:37-39).

The Gereformeerde Kerk also showed a bias to the right as the conservatives in the Church had gained control ever since 1982 (Bekker et al, 1989:38). This could be seen from the fact that the Church's journal, Woord en Daad, lost its liberal stance, from the increasing dominance of conservatives at the unofficial headquarters of the Church at Pothchefstroom and from the resignation of the liberal principal of the Potchefstroom University (ibid). However, in 1991 the white synod of the Church rejected apartheid explicitly and said it could not be justified on biblical grounds. But even then, some conservative members of the synod, e.g. J. Jordaan, denied that it was a rejection of apartheid, "as the synod referred to an ideology, which apartheid is not" (Vrye Weekblad:25.11.91).

The NGK itself experienced tension among conservative and more liberal members as early as 1960 and especially after 1982. The rejection of the basic tenets of apartheid by the World Council of Churches at the Cottesloe conference in 1960, was supported by several delegates from the Transvaal and Cape synods of the NGK. In response to pressure from Verwoerd, who viewed the NGK's role and the possible effect it could have had on Afrikaner unity, with extreme concern, the Church leaders and synods rejected the Cottesloe consultation (Luckhoff, 1978).

Following the split in the NP in 1982, the changing political environment had the most profound effect on the NGK, being by far the largest Afrikaans church. According to Nico Smith, a liberal theologian, the NGK - for decades almost synonymous with the National Party - was poised to shift towards the Conservative Party after the split in 1982. Only after frantic efforts by the Broederbond and with the election of the relatively liberal Johan Heyns as moderator, did the NGK's direction turn away from the CP (cited in Leach, 1989:127). It was however, only the

beginning of the battle within the NGK between liberals and conservatives, and the next threat to its unity came in 1986 when it endorsed a document entitled Church and Society. After many years of relentless pressure from its daughter Churches, especially the NG Sendingkerk under Allan Boesak and the NG Kerk in Afrika under Sam Buti, the DRC finally distanced itself from apartheid in 1986 on moral grounds. Church and Society refuted the biblical foundations of apartheid and clearly stated that race no longer could be the denominator by which people were separated, that racism was a sin which must be rejected, and that the Church should be distanced from the government:

> The [NGK] is not a Volkskerk and, while it is not wrong for the church to be contextualized in a particular people or for the individual to have a sense of love and respect for his own cultural history, values, traditions and symbols, where this sense of 'one's own' is overemphasized at the cost and exclusion of other groups and their opportunities and possibilities in life are jeopardized, the emphasis on 'one's own' is sinfully absolutized and begins to take on the characteristics of racial discrimination. This needs to be condemned in the most uncompromising manner. The use of scripture to justify apartheid by the DRC in the past must be recognized as an error and be rejected. The political and social system of apartheid cannot be regarded as ethically acceptable (Church and Society, 1986:299-307, translated by Morphew, 1989:122-123).

Even though the report still left unanswered some crucial issues such as the "practical reasons for recognizing diversity" (Liebenberg, 1990:36), and the "equation of the concepts of 'Christian', 'nation' and 'culture'" (Morphew, 1989:127), the acceptance thereof by the NGK synod, brought tension within the church to breaking point. It led to dissent among its more conservative members, such as Carel Boshoff (a former Theology Professor), who argued that the church had lost its moral foundation by refusing to accept

that it cannot promote an open society without also insisting on the scrapping of all segregationist laws and extending full citizen rights to all. Another voice of dissent came from Willie Lubbe (a minister of the NGK), according to whom the NGK had become "internationalized" by surrendering its character as a church for white Afrikaner people (Patriot:16.11.90).

The dissidents tried to force the church to reject its commitment to open church membership and mixed marriages and even published their own report (Faith and Protest) in which it was argued that the separate existence and development of nations was in accordance with scripture. Boshoff, Treurnicht and others decided to remain part of the NGK and formed a conservative grouping, the NG Bond, which had the aim of opposing the 'liberalism' from within. These fifth columnists under the leadership of Boshoff made themselves heard by continuously criticizing the reform initiatives especially of the De Klerk administration. When the long-term political prisoners and ANC veterans were released in 1989, Boshoff responded as follows:

> This interference with the legal process and lack of sympathy with the grief and frustrations of people involved [meaning rightwingers] including members of the church, are much deplored (Daily Dispatch:4.12.89).

Other NGK members whose sympathies were allied to the rightwing cause decided to form their own church, the Afrikaanse Protestante Kerk (APK) in 1987.

After the events of 1986, tensions within the NGK did not disappear completely, due mainly to the activism of the NG Bond, but also because the church had not quite made the final break with the past. Apart from the examples mentioned earlier by Liebenberg and Morphew, the Church remained ambiguous and confused over the issue of unity with its daughter Churches and its own role in a new South Africa. Tension within the NGK emerged again in 1990 following a confession by Willie Jonker, a delegate of the NGK, at a conference of Churches. Jonker asked for

forgiveness for the injustices caused by apartheid, on behalf of the NGK and the Afrikaner as a whole (Rapport:18.11.90). His confession was supported by the moderator of the NGK, Pieter Potgieter, but rejected by Treurnicht and Boshoff, in their capacities as leaders of the NG Bond within the Church. They rejected the confession on grounds that they were not prepared "to confess for the sins of apartheid unconditionally and that a church body cannot confess on behalf of all of its members (Patriot:16.11.90). However, both refused to leave the NGK.

In June 1991 a possible split within the Church was again averted after the Western Transvaal synod, one of the most conservative of the NGK regions, "agreed to disagree" on the issues raised by Jonker's confession (Sunday Times:16.6.91).

a) The Afrikaanse Protestante Kerk (APK)

The APK was founded in 1987 under the leadership of Willie Lubbe. The new Church's membership three months later was about 15 000 members and 60 parishes, which increased to about 30 000 members and 150 congregations after its first year (Sunday Times:5.3.89). These figures are confirmed by the APK's director of church administration, M. Adendorf: 30 000 members and 91 ministers (Vrye Weekblad:23.11.90). The Church restricts membership to Afrikaners, and claims that it is not a political church, even though politics, was a reason for its founding (the NGK document Church and Society). Its own policy document is entitled Faith and Protest (Oranje Perspektief, September 1987). According to Adendorf, the Church believes that each nation will be represented separately in heaven. For this reason the mission of the Afrikaner volk is to "gather treasures on earth to prepare itself for a separate existence in heaven", in accordance with the Book of Revelations (21:24-26) (Vrye Weekblad:23.11.90).

b) The NG Bond

The NG Bond is an informal grouping within the NGK and was founded in 1986 under the leadership of Carel Boshoff, also in response to the acceptance by the NGK of Church and Society. The goal of this grouping is to "preserve the historical character" of the NGK and to fend off the challenges the Church faces in the form of "liberalism, an open society and the social revolution which will be brought about by the new South Africa" (ibid). The NG Bond's determination to stay with the NGK and to fight a rear-guard action against the effects of "liberalism" on the NGK, was indicated by the controversy surrounding the Jonker confession. In this the Bond succeeded so well that in 1991 the NGK accused it of deliberately sowing dissension within the Church, and of forming a pressure group "which does not fit the image of a church" (Patriot:22.3.91).

c) Fundamentalist Religious Organizations

Of these only the activities of the Israel Vision Church/ Gemeente van die Verbondsvolk (in short the Israelites) have any real significance. This sect propagates racial exclusivity and claims that only whites can go to heaven, since only they are descendents of the 'chosen people', the Israelites (Bekker et al, 1989:39). It also believes that blacks are animals, since they are not made by God but by Satan (Sunday Times:17.3.91). Two convicted AWB members of the sect based their defence during their trials for the murder of seven blacks, on indoctrination by the sect. Following this trial, the sect received greater publicity, and its spokesman, Gert Steenkamp, received prominent coverage on SABC-TV in May 1991. The sect is believed to have about 10 000 followers (ibid).

3.2.5 CIVIC INSTITUTIONS

The CP attempted to resist government policy also on the levels of local government and civic institutions, and by infiltrating agricultural cooperatives, school committees, Regional Services Councils (RSCs) and trade Unions. The CP perceived the contest between itself and the NP at this level as more equal than in Parliament, where its role as Official Opposition could not prevent the Government from repealing apartheid laws. However, at local government level and in other 'civic' fields, the CP's position was more powerful, as it controlled the majority of local authorities in the Transvaal, and its rightwing policies could actually be implemented without too much central government interference.

a) Local Government

The rightwing is at its most powerful position at municipal level, where the CP won 101 out of a possible 150 of the local councils in the Transvaal in 1988, and about 22% of all local authorities countrywide (Bekker et al, 1989:16-34). The CP-controlled councils followed a policy of obstructing and reversing the NP efforts aimed at reducing and later eliminating racial discrimination in public facilities, residential areas and central business districts. The CP-controlled town councils began to re-implement petty apartheid in facilities under its control after 1988, and in this fashion, Boksburg and Carletonville became testing grounds for the practical execution of CP policy.

Although the CP policy at this level was not much different from NP policy (until 1989-91), as it merely represented a strict application of the laws of the country, these two towns became a focal point of black consumer resistance. It also became an indication of the NP's political expediency, and a real test for the viability of the CP policies. The fact was that the CP-controlled Town Councils were able to

re-introduce 'petty' apartheid on the strength of legislation introduced by the NP, laws which the latter were not prepared to scrap until after De Klerk's accession to Presidency, even though much of it had fallen into disuse.

Finally in 1989, a firm commitment was made by the De Klerk government to abolish the Separate Amenities Act in 1990, but with some provisions being scrapped with immediate effect, e.g. beach segregation and the opening of the CBD's of cities and towns to all races. These measures took the wind out of the CP's sails, as its freedom to act in terms of central government legislation disappeared. The reaction of the rightwing was characterized by frustration and anger: the leader of the CP in the Boksburg Town Council made the following comment in reaction to the government's decision to open Boksburg's CBD to all races:

> The right of white people to decide their own future was being taken away from them....if white people were pushed beyond the point of resistance, they would make what the ANC had done look tame in comparison (Daily Dispatch:24.12.89).

Following the government's decision, several physical attacks on blacks were made by rightwingers at Boksburg's newly-opened recreational facilities - in more than one instance the Boksburg police and traffic officers refused to intervene and sided instead with the attackers (Sunday Times:10.12.89; Vrye Weekblad:8.12.89). In response to the government's request that all beaches be opened with immediate effect in November 1989, several Town Councils, including Richards Bay, Mossel Bay, Hartenbos and Durban, indicated their determination to enforce beach apartheid until the law was repealed by the government (ibid). Mossel Bay's mayor, J. Oosthuizen, insisted that his town's beaches would remain segregated, "as it is the only way by which white rights can be protected", and he rejected government interference in local affairs (The Argus:21.12.89; Rapport:19.12.89). In reaction to the gradual unofficial desegregation of certain of its

residential areas, the Town Council of Goodwood made a plea to its residents to report coloured people living in the whites-only area (Argus:21.12.89).

By 1990-91 the government began to make it more difficult for the CP to obstruct its reforms at local government level. Consequently the CP resorting to other methods: in response to black consumer boycotts, several CP-controlled Town Councils cut off water and electricity supplies to neighbouring black townships. The Town Council of Carolina's response to direct orders from the Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA), gives an indication of the powerful position of local government under CP rule: This Council waited several days before reconnecting the services to the disease-ridden neighbouring black township of Silobela, even after the TPA had directly ordered it to reconnect the services and even after the Administration had paid the outstanding bills of the township to the Council - there was little the TPA could do to force it to obey the Administration's orders (Star:9.4.91). Others used vagrancy and right-of-admission by-laws to obstruct the opening of amenities to all races. The strategy was intended simply to prevent blacks from using such facilities by allowing only 'existing' members to use them, i.e. whites living within the municipal borders of these towns, or by charging exorbitant fees to non-residents (blacks) (see also chapter six).

b) Regional Services Councils (RSCs)

A battle was also fought between the NP and CP also on the level of Regional Services Councils. These Councils are multi-racial bodies, but dominated by white local authorities. Because the RSCs are run on the principle of power-sharing they were initially rejected by the CP. This boycott decision was later reversed when the Party realized that its stance would result in local authorities under its control finding themselves at a serious disadvantage, and furthermore, that it would deprive the CP of the

opportunity to play an obstructionist role in the RSCs. According to Bekker et al (1989:17) the CP was in a position to exert strong influence over nine of the 12 RSC's in the Transvaal. It managed to play a negative role that aimed at obstructing any attempts to introduce reform initiatives on this level or depriving black areas of RSCs funds if such funds were deemed to be to the detriment of participating white local governments (ibid).

c) Agricultural Institutions

The rightwing made a determined effort to infiltrate and control agricultural cooperatives and provincial agricultural unions. The CP managed to take control of several, including the largest one, the Transvaal Agricultural Union (A CP-MP, Dries Bruwer, is chairman of this Union). Although not officially involved, the CP was strongly supportive of the farmers on two separate occasions during 1991. The first was during the disruptive rally held by farmers in the streets of Pretoria in January 1991, voicing their opposition against the intended scrapping of the Land Acts and the lack of state assistance to the agricultural community. When the 5 000 protesting farmers committed acts of violence and refused to move out of the CBD, they were arrested, which gave the the whole of the CP caucus the opportunity to fly from Cape Town to Pretoria to lend 'moral support' (Cape Times:15.2.91).

The second incident was during an attack by white farmers on a squatter camp on the farm Goegevonden near Ventersdorp in May 1991, forcing the police to use live ammunition to drive the farmers back. Several farmers were wounded, leading Ferdi Hartzenberg to compare the government's actions with that of the British government at Slagtersnek in 1815 (Cape Times:15.5.91).

The approaches made by the CP towards the farming community, did not always elicit the desired response from the agricultural unions. In April 1991 the CP expressed its

dismay over the slow response of the unions to register their protest over the intended repeal of the Land Acts before the Joint Committee on Land Reform Legislation. At the time, only the TAU and a few district agricultural unions had bothered to testify. CP-MP Pieter Gouws questioned the non-involvement of the agricultural unions and refused to accept that they represented the views of the farmers. However, he claimed that the TAU, and the Unions of the Free State and Northern Cape had stated in public that they favoured the retention of the Land Acts (Pretoria News:11.4.91).

By mid-1991, especially after the Ventersdorp episode a split gradually seemed to develop between the more conservative agricultural unions in the northern part of the country and the more liberal ones in the south, with the South African Agricultural Union caught in the middle. Apart from the fact that the Cape farmers were always regarded as less conservative than their Transvaal counterparts, they were in the process of winning back their traditional fruit and wine export markets in Europe, and feared that the bad publicity of the Venterdorp episode would hamper their efforts. According to some Cape farmers, a distinction should in the future be made between the Transvaal farmers and those in the rest of the country (Die Burger:15.5.91).

d) Schools

The rightwing also extended its influence to school committees, and according to estimates in e.g. Bethal, 75% of the local school committees are run by rightwingers (Bekker et al, 1989:43). At one of the most prominent schools in Pretoria, Menlo Park, the CP-controlled school committee refused to allow racially mixed sport at the school.

Another target was parents' associations. After the government had allowed schools in 1990 to decide for themselves whether or not to open their doors to all races, the CP made a concerted effort to convince the parents to vote against the 'model B' (which caters for open schools), or preferably, not to vote at all, i.e. to ignore the new legislation completely. The Party had some success, as the Parents Associations of the Cape and the majority of white parents in the Transvaal rejected racially integrated education, even though the Transvaal Parents Association (TAO) itself approved the proposals. After the CP had placed severe pressure on the TAO, the latter, together with the Cape and Northern Cape Parents Associations and the supreme Federation of Parents Associations (FOSA), rejected open schools (Patriot:2.11.90; Rapport:7.10.90) (see also chapter seven).

e) Trade Unions.

According to political consultant, Wim Booyse, the following trade unions are sympathetic to the rightwing cause: The white Mineworkers Union, the White Construction Workers Union, the Transvaal Municipal Workers Union and the South African Iron and Steel Workers Union (Argus:24.7.90). Of these, the last mentioned is the strongest in terms of numbers with 41 000 members, while the Mineworkers Union has 30 000 members. Seven white trade unions are affiliated to the South African Confederation of Labour (SACOL), which has 85 000 members , and of the total of 212 registered trade unions, 32 are exclusively white (Vrye Weekblad:1.3.91).

Of all the white trade unions, the white Mineworkers Union is probably the most well-known. It was an early supporter of the rightwing cause, and was linked to the HNP and Albert Hertzog when that Party broke with the NP in 1966, and later with the CP. The Union claims it has been

fighting since the early years of this century for the rights of white workers from all sectors of the economy, and that its role has became especially important with the new dangers facing the whites and the white worker, in the shape of the government's reforms and the massive black trade unions. According to Els and O' Donovan of the MWU, there was a general feeling among white workers of being threatened by the political changes following February 1990 and that efforts were in progress to mobilize the unions around rightwing political issues. The CP was also involved in the efforts to form an umbrella organization for all white trade unions (see chapter 6).

3.2.6 PARA-MILITARY/FUNDAMENTALIST ORGANIZATIONS

There are currently over 20 para-military groups with a combined membership of over 18 000, and a further 30 fundamentalist organizations in South Africa, according to Wim Booyse (1990:7). They vary in size, from the AWB with an estimated 5 000 to 9 000 members, to smaller groups that have just a few members (Zille, 1988:59). The philosophy underpinning these groups is that of white supremacy and therefore, they oppose any moves to dismantle the system of apartheid and the transition to a democracy. Their methods range from protest rallies, to the disruption of their opponents' meetings, to common assault on blacks, to outright terrorism and murder.

As new para-military and fundamentalist groups spring up almost overnight, and others disappear from time to time, it is difficult to keep a complete record. However, Wim Booyse's account is the most up to date and according to it, the following is an incomplete list of the more notorious of these groups:

The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), the Boereweerstandsbeweging (BWB), Kommandoleer, Brandwag Volksleer, White Front, Aquila Defence Unit, Stormvalke, Magsaksie Afrikaner Nasionalisme, White Security, National Manpower Action, Action Self-Defence, Wit Wolwe, Flamingoes, Order of Death, Cape Rebels, White National Movement, White Resistance Movement, Patriotic Front, Boer Army, White Commando, Orde Boerevolk, Purified Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, Transvaal Separatists, Blanke Bevrydingsbeweging (the latter disbanded in 1990).

Only the most important of these organizations warrant further discussion:

a) The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)

The AWB was founded in 1973 by Eugene Terre'Blanche and six other men, including the long-serving deputy-leader of the organization, Jan Groenewald (Kemp, 1990:5). It began as a small disorganized group which wanted to voice its concern over the direction of Vorster's government, and over what it perceived as the uselessness of the Westminster system of government, following the HNP's poor performances at the polls. The organization's early militancy was illustrated by its alleged plans to infest the Sun City hotel complex in BophuthaTswana with syphilis germs, plans to blow up several newly desegregated hotels early during the 1980's, and by the discovery by the police of an arms cache belonging to the AWB on a Transvaal farm (Kemp, 1990:47) An incident in 1979 gave the AWB instant notoriety when Terre'Blanche and others physically assaulted (with tar and feathers) a Pretoria academic, Floors van Jaarsveld, during a speech in which the latter questioned the Afrikaners' interpretation of the Day of the Covenant (Kotze and Beyers, 1988:39-50) According to Terre'Blanche, the court case and his conviction following the assault was a

victory:

> I have no remorse about the incident. I am very proud of it. I think it is one of the greatest actions the movement achieved as a volks movement. It effectively warded off the onslaught on our Day of the Covenant (Pretoria News:23.6.88).

During the same year the organization registered itself as a political party, namely the Blanke Volkstaat Party. Its standing received a further boost when Albert Hertzog, founder of the HNP and leader until 1979, threw in his support behind the organization, and provided it with much financial assistance (Kemp, 1989:8). From then onwards the AWB began to draw larger audiences to its public meetings and its support gradually began to increase. In 1982 the organization received a setback when Terre'Blanche and eight AWB members were arrested for the possession of arms, ammunition and explosives. Although two of Terre'Blanche's co-accused were sent to jail for 15 years, he himself only received a suspended sentence (Kemp, 1990:42). Following this incident, the organization spent much of its time during the 1980's disrupting NP meetings, and it achieved particular 'success' in this regard in 1986 when it disrupted meetings addressed by several members of the Cabinet: in Brits (Louis Nel), in Nylstroom (Kobie Coetzee), Standerton (F.W. de Klerk), Warden (Sarel Hayward) and in Pietersburg (Pik Botha).

Following these successess, and the accompanying media attention which the AWB received, its membership increased dramatically. In 1988 Zille estimated its strength at between 5 000 and 9 000 signed-up members, 150 000 supporters and about 500 000 tacit sympathizers (1988:59) Other estimates, e.g. that of Clive Derby-Lewis of the CP, ranged from between 50 000 to 150 000 members (Sunday Times:11.5.86), and 6 000 by political risk consultant, Wim Booyse (The Argus:15.10.90).

The AWB's position strengthened after 1987, which could be largely ascribed to a stagnant Botha-government, paralysed

by the rightwing's show of strength during the 1987 election when the CP became the Official Opposition. The government's reform programme came to a virtual halt and it provided no clear indication of its future plans. The AWB flourished in this vacuum, and received a further boost from the deteriorating economic conditions of the eighties. The powerful demagogic oratory of Terre'Blanche was a major reason for the increase in the number of people who came to listen to his speeches, and by openly challenging and threatening the authority of the government, he ensured prominent media coverage for himself and the AWB. In March 1988 the organization held a mass-meeting in Pretoria attended by between 6 000 and 10 000 supporters, which attracted considerable numbers of representatives of the world media (Kotze and Beyers, 1988:92; Kemp, 1990:71).

However, the early part of 1988 saw the AWB at its peak, whereafter the organization experienced a series of setbacks, starting with Terre'Blanche's arrest on charges of malicious damage to property and crimen injuria (Bekker et al, 1989:40). He was subsequently acquitted, but persistent rumours and newspaper reports linked him to a scandal involving a female newspaper reporter, Jani Allan. The adverse publicity led to the departure of several members of the AWB's Chief Council, including the deputy leader, Jan Groenewald, the editor of the AWB's newsletter, Sweepslag, and a further 266 members (Sunday Times:10.10.89). According to Wim Booyse, the AWB was losing members at a rate of 400 per month, until a turning point was reached in August 1990 (Interview:11.4.91). The defection of many of its members was followed by the organization having to move out of its offices in Pretoria. The extent of the drop in support for the AWB could be seen during a protest rally in Oct. 1989, at one of the rightwing's most sacred symbols, Pretoria's Church Square, when fewer than 500 people turned up (ibid). In the light of the declining fortunes of Terre'Blanche and the AWB by the end of 1989, the British newspaper, the Guardian

Weekly (22.10.89) expressed itself as follows:

> But his views can be said to represent the thinking of rightwing extremists who, if they no longer can identify with Mr Terre'Blanche personally, could give practical effect to his threats with explosive consequences.

According to Booyse, the Terre'Blanches' unpopularity reached a turning point towards the end of 1990, when 2 500 people attended an AWB meeting meeting in Goodwood near Cape Town (Interview:11.4.91).

The AWB has a definite policy on violence since its founding in 1974. Terre'Blanche often emphasized this aspect:

> if all else fails, it will take action, by force if necessary, to safeguard Afrikaner interests (Bekker et al, 1989:48);
>
> When law and order are non-existent in this country, the AWB will not run away like other white colonialists did, we will stay and fight (Pretoria News:25.6.88);
>
> Our main task is to be there when this government sells out the country, to restore law and order when it vanishes, to ensure our women and children are not maimed and raped by ANC murderers (cited in Leach, 1989:104).
>
> The struggle started by our fathers, will continue untill we emerge victorious or until we die (Kotze and Beyers, 1988:189).

In 1986 the organization established para-military units, the Brandwag (Sentries), in every large town outside of the Cape, whose main purpose was to crush a possible black uprising if the government was unable or unwilling to do so. It also infiltrated neighbourhood watches country-wide (Welsh, 1988:6, Kemp, 1990:159). Later an elite para-military youth wing, the 'Stormvalke', was formed, and links were established with a private security firm, Aquila (Kemp, 1990:161). Shortly after the split in the ranks of the AWB in 1989, new information leaked out over the

alleged activities of Aquila, which suggested that there had been a split in Aquila between the "intelligensia" and the "warriors", according to an AWB leader in Johannesburg (Sunday Times:1.10.89).

The ideology of the AWB is based on the belief that whites, specifically in Afrikaner culture, are superior to blacks and that this culture, and the nation from which it arises, is sacred. It is furthermore claimed that socialisation can only occur within the parameters of the nation and its culture (Liebenberg, 1989:23). Although Terre'Blanche denies that his organization is racist, racism is an integral part of its philosophy of racial superiority: "We will govern ourselves with our own superior white genes" (Terre'Blanche as quoted by Leach, 1989:100). It is also visible in its terminology, e.g. "Koelies, verkaffering and basters" (Liebenberg, 1989:28).

The goal towards which the AWB ultimately aspires, is that of a white homeland, based on the borders of the Boer Republics and northern Natal. This will be achieved through secession and is referred to as the Boerestaat. In this respect the AWB differs from the CP in its policy of partition, but the AWB's proposals could be regarded as more ambitious than Boshoff's proposals for an Afrikaner Volkstaat. The AWB's programme of principles make reference to the following constitutional issues: the creation of a Boer state based on the territory of the former Boer Republics of the ZAR, OFS and Vryheid, to be organized along Christian Nationalist lines with Afrikaans as the language and the Vierkleur (Four Colours) the flag; the rejection of racial segregation, as the new state will not have any racial problems; citizenship open to members of the Boerevolk and others who are prepared to be assimilated.

The AWB's organizational structure consists of local groupings or Citizens' Councils, Regional Councils, an Executive Council, a Head Council, an Executive Committee, a Great Council and an Upper Council (Kemp, 1990:146).

b) The Boere Weerstandsbeweging (BWB)

According to Booyse the BWB is currently the largest para-military organization, with an estimated 18 000 members (The Argus:15.10.90). Its leader, until mid-1991, was Andrew Ford, whilst Piet Bester was in charge of the Transvaal branch of the organization. Both were closely linked to the Boerestaat Party. The BWB has organized itself into self-defence units and provides military training for its members, of whom 80% have already received military training, through conscription into the SADF. The organization also has its own counter-intelligence unit to prevent attempts by government agents to infiltrate it. Its activities are explained by Van Tonder in characteristic BWB/BSP language:

> Since the FW torture police and security scum could not succeed in extracting information [from the detained BWB members], they changed their tactics to that of infiltration (Boerestaat Nuusbrief:3/90) [translation].

Van Tonder recommended that such suspected infiltrators should be given a simple test, namely to provide the names of two rightwing references who could attest to their bona fides.

c) The Blanke Bevrydingsbeweging (BBB)

This organization was founded in 1987 by Johan Schabort and shared the same paramilitary characteristics as the AWB. It believed that the whole of South Africa and Namibia belonged to whites and it conformed to other extreme racist ideas. It was banned by the government in 1988, changed its name to the Blanke Nasionale Beweging (BNB) and was banned again. Schabort also formed a political party by name of the Blanke Party (Bekker et al, 1989:40-41). In 1990 the BNB disbanded to join another para-military group.

d) The World Apartheid Movement

This organization is under the leadership of Koos Vermeulen and is suspected of having links with international rightwing movements such as DARE, The Companions of Justice, the French neo-Nazi movement, L'Assault and the Ku Klux Klan (Vrye Weekblad:30.11.90, Sunday Times:9.12.90). It has some Belgian and British citizens as members and its total membership is estimated at 800 (SA Foundation Review, September 1990). The organization's activities were curtailed during the second half of 1990, following a spate of bomb blasts. It was also suspected of planning to use biological and chemical weapons to kill large numbers of blacks, and to assassinate Cabinet members (Rapport:18.11.90).

e) The Order of Death

Members of this organization were also suspected of planning to kill members of the Cabinet, and two members of the Vaal Triangle cell, Lottering and Goosen, were convicted in 1990 for the murder of a black taxi driver. They claimed that the murder was committed to aid the survival of the volk and could be justified on biblical grounds.

f) Orde Boerevolk

This organization, founded by Piet Rudolph, achieved notoriety after several acts of violence, e.g. the bomb attacks on Melrose House, the offices of Beeld, FAWU (a black trade union) and those of the NP, and the theft of arms from the Air Force HQ in Pretoria. Another member of this organization, Eugene Marais, was involved in the killing of seven blacks in 1990 in retaliation for the

murder of whites in Durban by black youths.

3.2.7 RIGHTWING ELEMENTS WITHIN THE NATIONAL PARTY AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES

a) Within the National Party

As indicated in a previous section of this chapter, there have been divisions within the NP almost since its inception. In the post-1966 era the terms verlig and verkramp are used to describe the post-1966 ideological divisions within the Party. The terms were coined by Willem De Klerk in 1966, and are indicative of the two ideological forces within the Party up to this day, or as Hanf et al define it, "more open to change and less open to change" (1981:127). Initially the verligtes supported the scrapping of social apartheid, while the verkramptes demanded the retention thereof. Treurnicht, a member of the latter, explained that the verkrampte viewpoint implied that 'grand' or 'homeland' apartheid could not be justified without 'social' or 'petty' apartheid (1975:25). According to research done by Hanf et al, there was a considerable group within the NP caucus by 1974 which supported the status quo without reservation, and depending on which kind of reform measure suggested to them in the survey, their numbers varied from between one-third to one-half (1981:127-144). The two splits in the NP to the Right in 1969 and 1982 served to subdue tensions within the NP to a large extent, although there were still two distinct wings within the Party.

It is worthwhile to compare the views of four analysts of the changing ratio between verlig and verkramp within the NP since 1986: according to Lipton (1986:328), by 1986 most

members of the Cabinet were leaning towards the liberal side towards the middle of the 1980's, whilst the majority of the NP and its caucus were on the conservative side during the first half of the 1980's. By 1988, according to Eschel Rhoodie (1989:213), the NP could be divided into four groups: the neo-conservatives who admired the Vorster-era for its stability and security (40 members); the liberals, who wanted faster reform and saw an alignment with the PFP (27 members, led by Pik Botha); the total onslaughters, who were comfortable with everything P.W. Botha did (55 members); and finally the fence-sitters (12 members).

By 1989, according to Willem de Klerk, the NP under P.W. Botha could be divided into a 'conservative reformist' group (about 75% of NP MP's), and a 'liberal reformist' group (the remaining 25%). The latter were also known as the 'New Nats' and were in favour of greatly speeding up the reform process by scrapping all apartheid laws (an approach very similar in policy to that of the Democratic Party) (cited in Leach, 1989:54-57). On the other hand, the 'conservative reformists' adhered to the principle of group rights and had a vision of a race federation in which each racial group would rule over itself on local and regional levels, while all races would be represented in a central power-sharing body. Willem De Klerk described this group as the "gradualists", who were more concerned with the pace of reform than with its content. The latter clung to the notion of "calibrated reform", i.e. a situation whereby the political changes in the country build upon one another while the population grows accustomed to them (ibid). The gradualists held the view that the NP policy as it was formulated under the Botha government, was the correct one and that all reforms had to be devised within the existing framework. In 1989 Giliomee estimated that about 20% of the NP's caucus was considered "verkramp at heart". Giliomee postulated that in the event of a hung-parliament after the 1989 general election, the NP might have decided to form a coalition with the Democratic Party, a scenario which might have resulted in about 20% of verkrampte NP Caucus crossing

the floor to the CP. Giliomee based his assumption on Schlemmer's estimates that about 40% of NP voters could swing to the Conservative Party in the event of such a crossing of the floor (Cape Times:22.6.89).

The conclusion that can be drawn from these figures is that a considerable block of verkramptes remained within the NP even after the the CP breakaway in 1982. The estimates of these analysts varied between more than 50% of the Caucus during the early 1980's (Lipton), to a third (Rhoodie), to 20% (Giliomee), to 75% (Willem De Klerk). These estimates vary, and are subject to different interpretations of the term verkramp, for what De Klerk implies with 'conservative reformist' is probably not the same as what Giliomee means by 'at heart verkramp'. Furthermore, what was regarded as verkramp in 1982 is not the same as what is verkramp in 1991. However, it is clear that when F.W. De Klerk became President in 1989 and began to implement substantial reforms, a large part of the Caucus was verkramp. Whether they eventually shared the President's alleged 'Road to Damascus' experience (De Klerk, 1991:55), is debatable, but from the actions and speeches by many NP-MP's since September 1989, it is obvious that the NP Caucus was not en-mass reformist.

Although most Cabinet and Caucus members, at least publicly conformed to the new direction of the NP, there were cases to the contrary. On several occasions comments were made which seemed to contradict the 'new spirit'.

During the week of the State President's epoch-making speech in February 1990, a member of the Minister's Council in the House of Assembly with well-known verkrampte tendencies, Piet Clase, refused permission to two American children to attend a white school in Cape Town on grounds that it was not the policy of the government to allow blacks to attend white schools (he reconsidered after pressure from unknown sources). In July 1991 he again became involved in a controversy when he threatened, on the basis of some petty technicality, to withdraw permission

given to a number of white schools to admit children of all races. Also in 1989 the Minister of Home Affairs, Gene Louw, expelled two British journalists from the country after they had been accused of "negative reporting" (Cape Times:7.2.90). In August 1990 the CP mouthpiece, Patriot, reported that General Magnus Malan was threatening to leave the NP over the issue of Joe Slovo of the SACP's inclusion in the ANC negotiation team (3.8.90). Malan also did not let an opportunity pass to attack and threaten the ANC, in the midst of delicate negotiations between the organization and the government. His colleague, the Minister of Police, Adrian Vlok, caused embarrassment for the government when he had a "cozy chat" with the leader of the AWB, Terre'Blanche - The Times (of London) saw it as a "display of Afrikaner solidarity" (15.5.90) (finally in 1991 both Ministers Vlok and Malan were removed from their posts because they had "allowed their portfolios to become controversial").

The NP- MP for Umhlatuzana, Johan Steenkamp, was cheered in Parliament by the CP for insisting that there had to be separate political homes for Indians, coloureds, blacks and whites in the new South Africa (Hansard:18.4.90). The same Steenkamp attacked the DP a few months later for "morally harassing" parents to open white schools (Cape Times:30.10.90).

The NP image of solidarity received a further setback when the former State President, P.W. Botha, announced publicly that he was leaving the Party because of its direction which would "lead to abdication" to "communists" and terrorists (Rapport:6.5.90). Even Rapport admitted that this announcement came at a very inconvenient time for the NP, as the Party was at a delicate stage of negotiations (not to mention great numbers of disgruntled NP supporters joining the CP).

At the Cape Congress of the NP in September 1990, many ordinary delegates expressed their concern over the direction the Party was taking. Some delegates suggested

that the police should shoot anyone who lifted a stone against a policeman. Another suggested that only internal inquiries be held into allegations of police misconduct (The Argus:10.10.90).

Although the above indicate that a small number of Caucus and Cabinet members had difficulty in bringing themselves to accept the reality of a 'new' NP, the meagreness of the evidence suggests that opposition to reform from within the establishment more likely originated in the insecurity of ordinary Party members and in elements within the Civil Service.

b) The Civil Service.

Adam and Moodley expressed themselves as follows on the bureaucracy's power to obstruct government policy:

> The former politicization of the Afrikaner civil service with wide discretionary power, based on the underlying consensus of the incumbents, also seems to backfire now. No longer do all officials automatically implement orders from above; rather, they interpret them according to their own views (1986:64).

Lipton provides a detailed analysis of the role of the bureaucracy in limiting the scope of reforms initiated by the NP-goverment over the years. Some of the examples given include bureaucratic obstructionism over the removal of black squatters from townships around Cape Town and the retention of the decentralization policy, even though it was opposed by both white capital and labour. According to Lipton, the reasons why the bureaucracy fought so hard to resist certain reforms, were as follows: firstly, many civil servants' jobs were based on enforcing apartheid measures and they gained their power and extra benefits deriving from corruption in the system; secondly, apartheid measures and controls acted as a social control mechanism to reduce crime and overcrowding in the cities; and

thirdly, apartheid provided the preconditions which would ensure continued white and Afrikaner political hegemony (Lipton, 1985:324).

The extent of rightwing support among civil servants received much attention after the founding of the Conservative Party in 1982. The CP claimed strong support among certain groups of civil servants, e.g teachers. Charney (1984:277-278) confirmed the trend towards the CP and postulated that it would continue as long as bureaucrats felt that their functions or promotions were being threatened by reforms. The swing among civil servants towards the Right received impetus also from poor remuneration and a decline in their real income since the beginnings of salary equalization (ibid). Although Charney claimed that constant pay-offs and the discipline of government patronage had kept most of the civil service loyal to the NP, he sensed a "wavering loyalty" among certain categories.

This trend was confirmed by by Bekker and Grobbelaar (1987) and by Adam (1987), according to whom the Right received significant support from the middle and lower echelons of the civil service. With regard to the upper strata, no figures are available, but during the 1989 general election, the NP won the Verwoerdburg constituency by an overwhelming majority - Verwoerdburg's residents are mostly civil servants, but have the highest per capita income of any city or town in South Africa.

Although it is difficult to find specific examples of bureaucratic obstruction within State departments, a recent case provides a clear example of sentiment towards reform on this level by late-1991: the Department of Local Government, Housing and Works, refused to grant a coloured headmaster of a school in Bellville a permit to buy a house in a white suburb of the city. What makes this so remarkable (apart from the racism behind the Group Areas Act which caused the incident in the first place) is that the headmaster's new neighbours apparently approved of his buying the house, and his application enjoyed the support

of the National Party MP for Bellville, Neels Ackermann (Cape Times:21.12.90). Even more telling is the fact that the incident occurred in December 1990, after the government had already said that the repeal of the Group Areas Act would be announced two months later (during the President's 1 February 1991 speech in Parliament). Incidents such as this confirm the perception that the power of the South African bureaucracy to obstruct the transitional process was still firmly intact well into the De Klerk era.

c) The Security Forces

The security forces under the Botha-administration maintained a very powerful position throughout the 1980's: a system of Joint Management Committees which included police and army representatives, effectively took control of many areas of public administration and policy-making. They thereby bypassed Parliament and were accountable only to the State Security Council. This resulted in the security forces' being drawn into everyday politics, accountable only to themselves and a small body of securocrats, as members of Botha's creation became known. Thus although the securocrats became a law unto themselves, they remained firmly loyal to the government ideology. This was confirmed by the CP, who claimed that the government had succeded in drawing senior military personnel into political structures, in particular through the National Security Management System (Zille, 1988:81).

The increasingly powerful position of the security forces and the government's waning ability to control bureaucratic excesses during the 1980's can be illustrated by the continuation of deaths in detention, even though this practice resulted in worldwide condemnation and extreme embarrassment to the government (Adam & Moodley, 1986:64-65). Another example was the continued support which the Renamo terrorist organization in Mozambique received from military sources inside South Africa, even after the government had officially claimed to have stopped

its support to its former protege. In 1989 the SADF became involved in a further controversy in Namibia when rogue elements rigged radio messages and thereby implicated SWAPO in an attempt to disrupt the Namibian peace process. It almost wrecked the whole Namibian peace plan and caused South Africa, in particular the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, a great deal of embarrassment. Allegations were made against the military intelligence and other elements which may have regarded Namibian independence as treason to the whites, but attempts to investigate the issue were thwarted by the SADF.

In February 1990 further allegations were made concerning the activities of the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB), which was a secret SADF organization linked to death-squads and with a chain of command allegedly leading right to the Minister of Defence. It also involved the chief of the SADF, Jannie Geldenhuys, the chief of Military Intelligence and other highly-placed officers in the SADF. The CCB had 16 cells countrywide, and according to Denis Worrall, these allegations indicated beyond all doubt that persons in their official capacity had engaged in "the calculated elimination of leading opponents of the NP government" (Cape Times:22.2.90).

Back in 1986 Adam and Moodley predicted that:

> South Africa has so far only experienced the beginnings of the kind of death squads Latin American regimes often employ. Unrestrained killing of suspected dissidents remains a distinct possibility if the legitimacy of authority is eroded and the combatants perceive mediators as the main stumbling block to a polarized commitment (1986:65).

However, only towards the end of 1989 did the true extent of clandestine operations of elements within the security forces become public. In November 1989 the Vrye Weekblad, a liberal Afrikaans newspaper, published the revelations of a former captain in the security police claiming to have led a death squad, sanctioned by senior police officers. His allegations implicated people such as former SAP Commissioner General Johan Coetzee, the 'superspy' and NP

member of the President's Council, Craig Williamson, and the head of the police's forensic branch, General Lothar Neethling (Vrye Weekblad:17.11.89). Coetzee's claims were subsequently substantiated by other former members of death squads and by the judgement of Justige Kriegler in 1991 (see chapter six). The slow rate at which the deaths of opponents of the government have been solved by the police, led the Cape Times (2.2.90) to remark as follows:

> The South African CID, with a worldwide reputation as first-class murder investigators, so consistently and inexplicably failed to solve these murders that there were growing suspicions that death squads, South American style, were operating with official approval, sponsorship or condonation.

These suspicions were strengthened when President De Klerk initially refused to appoint an independent judicial commission to investigate the allegations: the Sunday Times (31.12.89) commented as follows:

> In the face of the government's refusal to establish a judicial commission of enquiry into these allegations, grave suspicion and distrust must now exist regarding the activities of the police.

Only after intense pressure did De Klerk replace the police officer who had initially been appointed to investigate, with an independent commission under Judge Harmse.

Although the CCB could not per se be described as rightwing, it can probably be assumed that the majority of its members were, especially since they were so reluctant to allow themselves to be disbanded after the government had given a promise to this effect. The existence of death squads, however, was not the only worrying issue concerning the police force. Many other allegations had been made about partiality of the police to the rightwing cause including: siding with the 'witdoeke' in Crossroads and with Inkatha in Natal; failing properly to investigate or act where crimes were committed against opponents of the government; brutality and torture of suspects; a discrepancy in law enforcement against lawful organizations on opposing sides of the political spectrum (Sunday Times:31.12.89).

Just as serious was the allegation of disloyalty towards the government and anti-NP sentiment among the police force, especially after De Klerk had become President. Even under P.W. Botha there were strong indications that large numbers of the police had switched allegiance towards the rightwing, illustrated by the fact that the police until then had never taken direct action against the AWB (Zille, 1988:81), and had on occasion allowed the rightwingers to disrupt NP election meetings. The concern which this issue caused among NP politicians became clear at the Transvaal NP congress in November 1988: according to one delegate from Nigel, all the members of the SAP Reactionary unit in his town voted for the CP in the 1988 municipal elections, following a similar trend in the rest of the Transvaal. Another delegate described how the CP took care of policemen manning roadblocks by providing them with refreshments (The Argus:11.88). The leader of the Conservative Party, Andries Treurnicht, claimed that the CP made the police force "feel like they are part of us" and the CP's general secretary, Andries Beyers, claimed that 80% of the security forces supported the CP (ibid). According to Barney Uys, formerly the CP's statistician, support for the CP was very strong among the rank and file of the security forces, and among members who had been deployed in the townships and who experienced "the revolutionary climate personally" (Zille, 1988:82).

The reforms implemented after 1989 opened new divisions in the ranks of the security forces. Events like the release of political prisoners, permission for mass rallies, the desegregation of beaches and the unbanning of black opposition movements, including the ANC and SACP, caused open dissent among parts of the police force. Many members of the force resigned (although this was exacerbated by poor pay and long hours) and there were fears that many in the junior ranks might deliberately try to sabotage the reform process (Vrye Weekblad:3.11.89). Much resentment originated in the request by the government that the police should ignore the strict provisions of the law in some instances, e.g the mass rallies under ANC banners after the release of Sisulu and other political prisoners and the

protest actions on the beaches. The typical reaction of the police in response was one of: "If the government don't want us to enforce the law then they must change the law" (policeman quoted by the Daily Dispatch 2.11.89). The chief police spokesman, Brig. Leon Mellet confirmed that resentment was rife among policemen when he said that members of the force "had recently refused to continue to take responsibility for approving or refusing public protest" (Daily Dispatch:2.11.89).

According to the CP's spokesman on Law and Order, Moolman Mentz, the Party had received complaints on a daily basis from policemen who were prevented from doing their job because of the government's "hands-off" policy (Vrye Weekblad:27.10.89). During one of the last beach protests in Durban before beaches were opened to all in December 1989, divisions in the police force were clear for all to see: initially the police refused to act when rightwingers assaulted beachgoers and later, small groups of police participated in acts of brutality (Daily News:4.9.89). It should be added however, that the police did their job very well on three occasions during 1991 when they were ordered to break up a mass-demonstration by white farmers in Pretoria, when they had to intervene to protect black squatters from hostile white farmers on the farm near Ventersdorp, and when they had to keep 2 000 violent AWB members at bay during the State President's meeting in Ventersdorp.

An indication of dissent within the police force became noticeable in the late 1980's when the number of police reservists had declined from 18 000 in 1988 to 11 000 in 1989, a decline which began soon after Minister Vlok indicated that he wanted to prevent reservists from belonging to political parties and political organizations (Patriot:22.3.91). In a BBC documentary in 1991 members of the Cape riot police claimed that 99% of their force did not trust the government (Cape Times:16.4.91). Even the

Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, claimed that there were members of the Defence Force who did not feel comfortable over certain political developments (Die Burger:6.3.91).

The issue of the loyalty of the security forces, is summarized by the British newspaper, The Guardian:

> Ill-disciplined, badly paid and recruited from the lower levels of white society, the police are considerably to the right of the government which is meant to control them (17.9.89).

As rightwing support among the civil service and security forces is a sensitive issue and information is not readily obtainable, a request was put forward to M&M in this regard. Although the firm had no data available, it was decided that a question on this issue could be included in the next survey scheduled for June 1991. The survey panel included 1 500 people, of whom about 1 000 were prepared to answer a question which linked their carreers and political preferences. The survey indicated that the support for the various parties was distributed as follows:
NP: 50,6%; CP 24,1% (an under-estimation); DP 10%;
6,6% would not vote.
The results of the survey are presented in table 3.2:

Table 3.2 M&M, August 1991: Party support as measured by employment categories: public and private sectors

Category	NP	CP	DP
Large Companies	46%	33,6%	8,3%
Medium Companies	56	19,4	9,8
Own Business	50,4	18,5	9
Private Companies	75,1	7,5	4,7
Public Hospitals	66,3	10	7,9
Teaching	52	24,7	15,6
Defence Force	60,7	35,7	--
Police	50	6,7	--
Semi-government	42,3	36,7	5,3
Other Government	57,9	20,1	11,5

Note:
The figures in the table do not add up to 100% as 'uncertain', 'would not vote' and HNP figures have been excluded;
The figures should be read against the background of M&M's under-estimation of the CP's support, normally by between 7% and 10%;
Private sector figures are included merely for the sake of comparison.

The results indicate that half of the members of the police force in the survey supported the NP and only 6,7% the CP. However, an unusually high number of respondents in this category (43%) refused to reveal which party they supported, possibly as a reaction to Minister Vlok's directive that members of the force are not allowed to be members of political organizations. Support among members of the Defence Force and teachers was 2:1 in favour of the NP, which corresponds with the general support levels of these two Parties. In all, there appears to be little difference in the degree of support which the CP enjoys among the private sector relative to the public sector.

Although these figures refute previous allegations that the CP has an overwhelming share of support in the security forces, the crux of the findings is that the CP enjoys the support of approximately one third of the Defence Force, a large percentage of the semi-government sector and possibly, by implication, more than half of the police force. It should also be remembered, as indicated above, that these figures are an underestimation of the Party's true strength.

3.2.8 ENGLISH-SPEAKING SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHTWING

Political conservatism and racial prejudice have never been alien to the ideology of many English-speaking white South Africans. Large sections of the two million English-speakers since early times shared the Afrikaner's fear of being overwhelmed by the numerical superiority of blacks. The stereotypical British colonial mentality, strengthened by a racial prejudice shared with the Afrikaner, is personified by the English-speaking Prime Minister of Natal who in 1908 declared that the history of the world proved that the black man was incapable of civilization (Leach, 1989:256). Racism among English-speakers was further strengthened by the influx of immigrants from Britain in the decades after 1945. South Africa was especially popular among those British immigrants who already carried with them a degree of racial prejudice and were attracted by South Africa's image of being a country "where the white man knew how to keep the black man in his place" (ibid)

During the 1960's-1980's South Africa experienced a further influx of immigrants from the former Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia. All were fleeing from countries which had been through a protracted civil war in order to secure the end of white minority rule. The 100 000 or so whites who left Zimbabwe were those who refused to accept black rule, lost most of their possessions and who came to South Africa, determined not to repeat the process. David Welsh claimed that many "ex-Rhodesians were unreconstructed racists, spreading a racist poison" (cited in Leach, 1989:257).

Most of the English-speakers chose the former United Party as a political home for many decades, not because its ideology was that much more liberal than that of the NP, but because it kept close ties with Britain and provided an alternative to the rampant Afrikaner nationalism of the NP and latent anti-English sentiments privalent among many Afrikaner nationalists. This was especially noticeable during the period 1948-1960, after which Verwoerd began

realising that he would need the support of some English-speakers to win the referendum of 1961. The support among English-speakers for the NP was further strengthened as the NP moved from a purely Afrikaner nationalism to a more inclusive white nationalism in the 1970's.

However, the policy of rapprochement with English-speakers, initiated by Verwoerd and expanded by Vorster, met with fierce resistance in some Afrikaner circles, among others Albert Hertog and Piet Meyer, who argued that the ideal of Afrikaner dominance was being sacrificed to achieve English-speaking support for the NP's racial policies (Moodie, 1975:286). Meyer insisted that the only solution to what he described as the problem of the "anglicization of Afrikaners", was a policy of deliberate "Afrikanerization of English-speakers", whereby the latter would gradually accept Christian National ideals and the Afrikaner's language and history as their own (ibid). This concept had been part of the Broederbond's political programme since 1934 and of the draft republican constitution of 1942, and later reappeared as part of the the newly-formed HNP's policies in 1969. One of the issues which finally led to the break-away of the HNP in 1969, was the 'Calvinism' speech by Hertzog, in which he 'accused' English-speakers of not being able to withstand the onslaught against whites because they did not have the same Calvinist value system than had Afrikaners. Although he was later repudiated by Vorster and Ben Schoeman, being 'tainted' by accusations of liberalism were be the plight of the English-speaking part of the white population for many years to come (liberalism equated with political weakness in the Afrikaner nationalist mind).

When the NP came to power in 1948, it used the tactic of scaring the English-speakers with the swart gevaar (the black threat) to ensure that some chose an alliance with the NP rather than with blacks. The swart gevaar tactic, which was meant to ensure English-speaking support for the NP, worked so efficiently that it led to unexpected consequences when the NP decided to move in the direction of an even broader South African nationalism, to also

include blacks in the late 1980's. This led to the perception among some English-speakers that the NP was surrendering to the black majority, which resulted in this category becoming easy prey for the rightwing during the 1980's.

Although the relative success of the CP was rooted in the resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism, the Party was prepared and eager to compete for English-speaking support, on the condition that Afrikaner ideals and leadership were accepted (Bekker et al, 1989:57). This is confirmed by Adam and Moodley (1986:61): "The open expression of conservatism and racism by some English South Africans has been welcomed by the CP, although it dilutes its Afrikaner exclusivity". Even English-speaking supporters of the CP agree with the primacy of the Afrikaans culture in the rightwing struggle:

> While nobody denies that Afrikaner nationalism is the driving force of active conservative politics in South Africa today, thousands of English-speakers have declared their support for a party and a policy that they know will secure their future in a very dark continent (English-supplement to Patriot:15.3.90).

In exchange for the acknowledgement of the primacy of Afrikaner nationalism, the CP, unlike the HNP, accepted English as an official language. The Party distanced itself from phrases like 'Boerevolk' and 'Boerestaat' and prefer to speak of 'whites' or 'Afrikaners' (the latter having fewer emotional connotations in the English psyche than'Boer'). For example, the headlines in the official CP newspaper, Patriot read: "Natal Congress demands white land" (3.11.89); "White anger mounts warns CP Congress" (ibid); "The response by rightwing students is a clear illustration of the revival of white nationalism" (CP-MP Jurg Prinsloo in Patriot:1.5.91).

However, every so often, the CP's true sentiments on the overwhelming importance of Afrikaner nationalism is revealed when emotions run high, e.g. after President de Klerk 'crossed the Rubicon' for the first time in February

1990: "**Afrikaner** tiger awakened, says CP" (The Argus:6.2.90); "The CP is undivided on the issue of the right to self-determination of the **Afrikaner** volk" (Koos van der Merwe in Patriot:1.5.91).

It appears that most of the English-speaking supporters of the rightwing are probably prepared to accept Afrikaner domination, as long as they can return to the levels of white prosperity and security of the 1960's (Bekker et al, 1989:51). Clive Derby-Lewis argues that the CP will be the first political movement in South Africa's history to succeed in bridging the remaining cultural differences between the two white groups (cited in Leach, 1989:260). This argument is questioned by Zille (1988:65), who argues that although Afrikaner and English-speaking whites may unite to ward off a threat to their survival from blacks, it does not imply that they form a solid national entity.

Zille's argument was supported by the opposing viewpoints in Patriot over the relationship between Afrikaner and English-speaker in the CP. Clive Derby-Lewis, CP member of the President's Council and unofficial spokesman for the English-speaking section of the CP, argued that the CP was co-founded by English-speakers and that the Party was fully bilingual, with ample English-speakers elected to the top posts in the Party (Interview:10.9.90; CP Election Pamphlet, February 1991). According to Derby-Lewis, the English-speakers were never a threat to Afrikaner nationalism, and that patriotism should be the only criterion for membership and support of the CP (Patriot:11.1.91). He was supported by Treurnicht:

> [The favourable election result at] Umlazi has proven that the English-speakers have crossed their rubicon....When it came to cultural interests, these were no longer obstacles in the way of cooperation for the sake of white survival as a white nation (Patriot:10.8.90) [translation].

Arguing from the opposite perspective, readers of Patriot

have expressed their doubts over English-speaking participation in "their" struggle:

> The CP stands for the right to self-determination of the Afrikaner volk, not of that of the white nation. When English-speakers support the CP, they should realize that they are in fact supporting the Afrikaner's fight for freedom (R.D. Rens in Patriot:15.2.91) [translation].

> I've got nothing against the English-speakers...but as Leipoldt said, it is not that easy to forgive and forget....If the CP creates a white state when it comes to power, it will alienate the Afrikaners over the long-term (M. Visser in Patriot:16.11.90) [translation].

The editor of Patriot, Z.B. du Toit, indicated that as far as he is concerned, the CP should stop worrying about stepping on the toes of its English-speakers, and state unambiguously that it stands for Afrikaner nationalism above all else (Interview:8.4.91). His view sharply contradicted that of the CP's Chief Secretary, Andries Beyers, who argued that in the same way that the Afrikaner evolved from Dutch, French and German ancestors, it could also assimilate English-speakers (Interview:11.4.910).

Today the Stallard Foundation is the only rightwing organization that caters specifically for English-speakers. It was founded by a conservative English-speaking segregationist, Stallard, who, ironically, was also a staunch monarchist who joined the Dominion Party. The Foundation has as its goal the promotion of the conservative philosophy and policies, it sponsors conferences and seminars, hosts foreign visitors sympathetic to the rightwing cause, and generally opposes reform. The organization is headed by CP-member of the President's Council and former MP, Clive Derby-Lewis and claims a membership of approximately 1 000 (Zille, 1988:59). It has a mailing list with 25 000 addresses, many of which belong to unsympathetic academics countrywide.

The overall English-speaking support for the rightwing has been showing an upward trend over the past few years. Since it is difficult to determine how many English-speakers have voted for the CP purely on the basis of election results, the alternative is to use opinion polls and to make vague abstractions from individual constituency results. According to surveys done by Market and Opinion Surveys, English-speaking support for the CP over the past two years has been as follows:

Table 3.3. English-speaking support for the CP

Date	% support
Jan. 1988	7%
June 1988	3%
Apr. 1989	6%
Jul. 1989	6,8%
Nov. 1989	7,4%
Feb. 1990	12,7%
May 1990	14,7%
Sept.1990	10,7%
Mar. 1991	9%

(M&M).

Of the 2 040 740 voters in the 1987 general election, about 40% would have been English-speaking, a total number of 816 000. From the above figures provided by M&M, it can be deduced that the average CP support between January 1988 and March 1991 among English-speakers was 8,6%, which translated into a total of 70 176 voters, based on the election statistics of 1987 (Note: interestingly enough, this figure can also be used to great effect to verify the CP's claim to be the 'authentic political representative' of the Afrikaner: if the 70 176 English-speaking votes which the CP received in the 1989 general election are subtracted from its total number of votes received, i.e. 673 079 minus 70 176, that leaves the Party with 602 903 Afrikaner votes - if one accepts that 60% of white voters are Afrikaners, i.e. 1 224 444, and subtracts the 602 903

Afrikaans votes of the CP and the 61 222 (an estimated 5%) of the DP from that total, it leaves the NP with only 560 319 Afrikaans votes, i.e. considerably less than those of the CP).

Other surveys give an indication of the views of the English-speakers on the pace of reform: according to a Market and Opinion Survey in January 1990, 47% of English-speaking whites regarded De Klerk's pace of reform as satisfactory, 40% regarded it as 'too slow', leaving 13% who thought it was too fast (a logical assumption would be that the latter group consisted of CP supporters). Nothing more definite can be found in the 1989 general election results either, apart from the fact that the CP only received 13% of the total vote in Natal, the most English of all provinces, compared to 40% in the Transvaal, 46% in the Free State, 18% in the Cape and a country-wide average of 31% (Weekly Mail:14.9.89). It should be noted also that 48% of English-speakers still supported separate residential areas for races by 1988, i.e. in accordance with the policies of the CP and the NP at that time (Rapport:8.10.89). A recent survey dealing with the political views of white students at South African universities, revealed that only 1,2% and 3,2% of white English-speaking students supported rightwing parties (Gagiano, August 1989:49).

Of particular relevance is the CP's good performance over the past two years in the predominantly English-speaking constituencies of Umlazi and Maitland. In Umlazi the CP increased its share of the vote from 9% in 1987, to 20% in 1989, to 44% in 1990, a swing of 20% towards the Party. In Maitland there was a swing of 27% from 1989 to 1991.

3.2.9 FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHTWING

There has never been much affinity between the business sector and the Conservative Party since its founding in 1982. The dominant Afrikaner groups Sanlam and Nasionale

Pers have always been strong supporters of the Cape NP, while other groups such as Federale Volksbeleggings formed the basis of the Party's Transvaal financial support. However, in the Transvaal Volkskas Bank and the Perskor newspaper group were closely intertwined with civil servants, farmers and white workers, who were strongly represented in the CP (Charney, 1984:276). On the boards of these organizations were many rightwing elements which opposed the government's reform programme as initiated by P.W. Botha, e.g. Perskor's Marius Jooste, who threatened to support the CP, and in fact did so through sympathetic reporting in his Pretoria newspapers Hoofstad and Oggenblad. Strong pressure was put on companies with leanings towards the Right by the the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut and some of the larger corporations like Rembrandt and Sanlam (ibid). Most English-orientated companies had been supporting for quite some time any moves in the direction of reform.

The rightwing's standing among the business community received a further setback in the aftermath of the Boksburg episode when the CP-controlled town council reintroduced petty-apartheid measures. These measures were meant to prevent blacks from using public facilities, which technically, was still the legally acceptable position, but resulted in a massive black consumer boycott of white-owned business in Boksburg and provided the business community with a taste of a future South Africa dominated by a party intent on reimplementing a policy of undiluted racial discrimination. White business was quick to condemn the CP policy as turnover in stores and shops in the town dropped by between 10 and 90% (Sunday Times:5.3.89; Sunday Tribune:7.5.89). The Boksburg Town Council's decision was followed by that of Carletonville and others, with the same disasterous consequences. Large corporations such as Edgars, Woolworths and Clicks made their displeasure known by refusing to open shops in a major shopping centre development, resulting in the whole project's being shelved (Financial Mail:15.12.88) (see chapter five).

The very negative attitude of the business community towards the CP manifested itself during fundraising efforts by the Party during the 1989 general election. While the NP received almost half of its campaign funds from big business, the CP received almost nothing. Clive Derby-Lewis of the CP explained that the Party received "very little funding from there, we don't even waste our time approaching businesses" (Business Day:6.9.89). Bekker et al (1989:12-13) agree that the CP's financial base is individual rather than corporate, but mention the Party's conviction that larger concerns in the Transvaal platteland would probably support the CP, especially after it became the Official Opposition. Relations especially with Volkskas Bank have improved and it is not difficult for the Party to obtain financial loans.

It is interesting to note that Volkskas is the only well-known corporate name that supports the CP's newspaper, the Patriot, on a regular basis by advertising in it (e.g. Patriot:3.11.89; 12.1.90; 11.1.91). Other advertisements in this paper are from CP-controlled town councils in e.g. Phalaborwa, Zeerust, Louis Trichardt, Middelburg, Carletonville, Boksburg, Schweizer-Reneke, Potgietersrus, Ventersdorp, Uitenhage, Marble Hall, Bethal and Brits. These mostly advertise tenders and posts for secretaries, traffic officials etc. Advertising support also comes from small businesses e.g. "Eric Barnard Meubeleurders" in Pretoria, Abrie Spies Property in St Michael's-On-Sea, holiday accommodation in places such as Warmbad, Scottburgh, Vryheid, Uvongo, all with the obligatory "whites only" logo and with specific reference to "our CP friends" (Patriot:8.9.89; 31.1.90).

Irrespective of the individual nature of the CP's financing, its financial position seems relatively secure in the light of the considerable effort it puts into each general- and by-election. However, the Party's attempt to launch its own publishing concern, Volkspers, in 1990 met with some resistance, as only R1 million of the R20 million needed had been received by early 1991.

Conclusion

This chapter has dealt primarily with the historic origins and evolution of Afrikaner nationalism, which was, as indicated, the driving force of the rightwing, as it was in the case of the NP for the larger part of the 20th century. Although the rightwing officially came into existence in 1969 with the founding of the HNP and received further momentum with the founding of the CP in 1982, its true origins can be traced back to the mobilization of Afrikaner nationalism during the 1930's, the Afrikaner fascist movement of the 1940's, and especially the NP's apartheid policy in the post-1948 period. In other words, the rightwing did not emerge in an ideological vacuum, and should be seen as the heirs of Afrikaner nationalism propagated by the NP until the mid-1960's.

Contrary to the common belief that Afrikaners were historically a united people bound by their nationalist aspirations, this chapter has shown that Afrikaner nationalism has long been plagued by disunity, caused by ideological, class, regional and leadership differences. Such incidences of intra-ethnic conflict among Afrikaners (also known as broedertwis) emerged periodically throughout the 20th century, and were often more intense than the intra-ethnic conflict between Afrikaners and English-speakers.

The conflict beteen the NP and the rightwing and between verlig and verkramp in the post-1960's, has analogies in the early intra-Afrikaner struggles, e.g. the rivalry between Hertzog and the South African Party of Botha and Smuts which led to the founding of the National Party in 1914, the Rebellion of 1914, the Rand Rebellion of 1922, the founding of the Purified National Party in 1934, and the activities of the Ossewa Brandwag, to name but a few.

The struggle during the 1960's - 90's between the rightwing and the NP, basically conformed to the established pattern

of earlier incidences of broedertwis, and should be viewed essentially as a struggle for the ideological 'soul' of the Afrikaner, i.e. between those 'more open' (the verligtes) and those 'less open' (the verkramptes) to the forces of modernization. At the core of this struggle were different interpretations of how best to use the state to protect the status and identity of the Afrikaner. Those holding rightwing and verkrampte positions, defined Afrikaner nationalism exclusively by emphasizing its primordial characteritics, while verligtes defined it inclusively by emphasizing racial and later territorial aspects.

The overt antagonism and the large number of rightwing organizations and numerous spheres (political, cultural, religious, economic and military) in which this intra-Afrikaner conflict is being fought, are an indication of the permeative and pervasive nature even of intra-ethnic conflicts.

In spite of the diversity of the rightwing, it has been shown that the CP represents the core of the rightwing movement, which in that capacity, determines the agenda and shapes the philosophy of virtually all rightwing organizations. The Party has systematically spread its influence through all spheres of white society, which enables it to operate both in parliamentary and extra-parliamentary spheres, as well as within existing state structures. The CP also gained support among English-speakers and its inclusive definition of Afrikaner ethnicity, i.e. the inclusion of sympathetic English-speakers in the CP's support base, is reminiscent of the NP's attempts to broaden its own support base through ethnic engineering. It also gives practical substance to Horowitz's claim that ethnic groups are re-created and re-defined at will, in accordance with the interests of the ruling elite and ethnic engineers.

While this chapter was concerned with the historic origins of Afrikaner nationalism and the various dimensions of the present-day rightwing, the following two chapters deal with

the socio-economic and primordial roots of Afrikaner nationalism. Among the various issues which are focussed upon, are the roles that class, language, history, land, racism, ethnocentrism and fear, have played in the shaping of Afrikaner nationalism, and how the latter, in turn, influenced the behaviour, philosophy and policies of the rightwing.

4. THE ROOTS OF RIGHTWING ETHNONATIONALISM: SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS

> It is universally evident that lower-class people are more conservatively orientated towards changes in conventional behaviour patterns than people in the higher professional, income and educational strata are. Ignorance and faulty insights into the ways in which society functions and changes, coupled with a tendency to cling to any custom or system that protects survival-related interests, influence lower-class people to oppose radical social change to a greater degree than higher class persons (Rhoodie et al, 1985:327).

The need for research on the class base of the rightwing is two-fold: firstly, to establish whether the 'universal evidence' mentioned by Rhoodie et al is also applicable to the white rightwing in South Africa, and if the answer is in the affirmative, to what extent that would influence the electoral fortunes of the rightwing political parties; secondly, to determine the relative importance of socio-economic factors in the hierarchy of rightwing concerns, as compared with, e.g. identity factors, nationalism and security issues.

The scope of this chapter is limited to establishing the class base of the rightwing, and no attempts are therefore made to analyze the complexities of the inter-related issues of class and race, and capitalism and apartheid. Apart from a brief overview of some of the theories which emphasize a class explanation of racial domination, the study concentrates on the works of Lipton, O'Meara, Giliomee and others, for an explanation of the existence of the class element of Afrikaner nationalism, and all things being equal, of the rightwing. This takes the form of a summary of the various hypotheses proposed by these authors, followed by a discussion of specific evidence relevant to the correlation between class and political

conservatism in South Africa. The findings of Gagiano (1989), Manzo and McGowan (1989), Rhoodie, De Kock and Couper (1985), Hanf et al (1981), and Market and Opinion Surveys (1987, 1988, 1989) are of particular importance, and are supplemented by the results of empirical research conducted on the correlation between the socio-economic status of white voters as measured by the value of their residential properties, and their political preferences at local government level during the 1988 countrywide municipal elections.

4.1. Afrikaner Nationalism and Class in the Literature

In the literature on racial domination in South Africa, two approaches can be distinguished: the first refers to the primacy of economic and class factors in the achievement and maintenance of white domination (either from a liberal perspective, i.e. income maximization for personal utility, or from a Marxist perspective, i.e. capital accumulation and power); the second approach refers to the primacy of ethnicity, race, security and power (Lipton, 1985:10).

Traditional Marxist views claim that race relations are fundamentally class relations (Slabbert and Welsh:1979:14). The reference to economic factors as the key to the behaviour of whites forms the crux of explanations of racial antagonism offered by various analysts such as F.A. Johnstone (1976), who holds the view that the South African system of racial domination is a product of the system of production of which it formed a part; and O' Meara (1983), who argues that Afrikaner nationalism:

> is a historically specific, flexible and differentiated response of various identifiable and changing class forces - in alliance to the contradictions and struggles generated by the development of capitalism.

Others such as Wolpe (1973) argue that racial antagonism only masks the real conflict between classes:

> For the Afrikaner capitalist class, African

> labour power could be maintained as cheap labour by repression - for the white worker this also guaranteed their own position in the labour-aristocracy (1972:446);

And Bonacich (1972), who claims that racial and ethnic antagonism is a result of a split labour market, characterized by three-way conflict between two ethnic groups, one of which is prepared to accept lower wages than the other, and business, seeking to displace higher-paid with cheaper labour.

The class-based theories mostly underestimate the considerable influence of ethnicity and race as a force in its own right, which is incapable of being reduced to class. The opposing viewpoint, which emphasizes the importance of ideological, nationalistic, security and even psychological issues, forms the basis of the next chapter. For the present it is sufficient to say that race and class largely overlap in South Africa, with whites mostly in the upper-half and blacks in the lower-half of the socio-economic hierarchy (as measured by income and education). But even within the white group class differences were always present: these initially coincided with the divisions between the two language groups during the early part of the 20th century, when Afrikaners, due to historical and structural factors, occupied the lower-end of the socio-economic stratum. These differences only gradually disappeared after the process of the ethnic mobilization of the Afrikaner was completed following the NP's assumption of power in 1948. Thereafter differences widened between the various classes which made up the Afrikaner volk and eventually facilitated the HNP's breakaway in 1969, accompanied by a large section of its close ally, the white working class. Of crucial importance is how the rift between the Afrikaner establishment and the largely Afrikaner working class developed and why the latter opposed the new political direction of the NP after the mid-1960's; furthermore, why the white working class was so reluctant to form an alliance with the black working class (its supposed 'natural ally' in Marxist theory) in order to more effectively oppose capital.

Lipton's analysis (1985) deals with these and other class issues and is next discussed in greater detail. After initially "flirting" (by her own admission) solely with class and economic analyses, Lipton came to the conclusion that both ethnic/racial and class factors are essential to an understanding of political behaviour in South Africa:

> Neither the broad class categories of capital and labour, nor ethnic/racial categories such as whites, Blacks, English, Afrikaners, provide an adequate means of comprehending the behaviour of individuals and groups (1985:10-11).

Lipton (supported by O' Meara) further claims that there has been a recent shift away from psychological and ideological factors (as identified e.g. by Adam and Giliomee, 1979:11) to structural factors, to explain discrimination:

> It now seems widely agreed among scholars that the behaviour of white South Africans does not, alas, diverge much from the behaviour of comparable groups in other societies, faced with competition for resources from people readily distinguished from themselves by colour, culture or religion, and that the key to their behaviour must be sought primarily in structural (i.e. social, economic and political) rather than in psychological or ideological factors" (Lipton, 1985:11).

Lipton's analysis, entitled the 'Interests of white labour', provides a detailed account of the close relationship between white labour and apartheid during the period 1893 to the 1960's. According to Lipton,

> white workers actively promoted many apartheid policies, particularly the job bar, which gave them a monopoly of skilled jobs and preferential employment in other jobs. This policy was costly to white capital (and to black labour), but benefitted white workers, whose interests thus reinforced their prejudices (1985:184).

However, rapid economic growth and preferential labour policies ensured high wages and a very secure position for white labour only up to a point: because of the widening

gap between black and white wages, capital attempted to reduce its costs by substituting white labour with black labour. This led to a struggle between white labour and capital over the retention of the job bar, the exclusionist instrument chosen by the former to protect its privileged position against black infringement.

These efforts by white labour to exclude blacks from certain jobs, received support from the NP government in the form of segregation policies after 1948, although white labour benefitted from racially exclusivist legislation ever since 1911. Preferential labour policies provided substantial benefits to white labour by putting whites at the top of the job queue, helping to solve the poor white problem and protecting white wages from black competition (e.g. by 1970 the ratio between white and black wages was 21:1 in mining and 6:1 in manufacturing). The relationship between white labour and the NP government at this stage was so close that the former Cabinet Minister, Ben Schoeman, claimed on occasion that the NP was a workers party (Lipton, 1985:183-226).

By 1970 the acute shortage (artificially created) of white labour increased the pressure to get rid of the job bar and led to divisions within the white labour unions. By 1971 some labour leaders like Arthur Grobbelaar of the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA), argued for the disciplined relaxation of the bar while the South African Confederation of Labour (SACOL) was split e.g. between the verligte Railway Artisans Staff Association on the one hand and the verkrampte Building Workers Union, MWU and Yster en Staal on the other (ibid). The scrapping of job reservation in 1978 and the legislation based on the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission which advocated full trade union rights for blacks, caused strong resistance among members of white trade unions and eventually led to a split in the white labour movement. Some unions, like the MWU, which failed to organize a single successful strike, had succeeded in obstructing the implementation of the Wiehahn recommendations, and by 1984

the job bar was still intact on the mines (in areas organized by this union). The reaction of the white labour market confirmed the positive correlation between class/status on the one hand, and the acceptance of black advancement on the other:

> The economic security and prosperity of the mid-1960's had reduced the need for apartheid, especially among the top-level white workers with high skills and qualifications. The middle group also did not feel threatened by black advancement especially during the initial stages, leaving the bottom-level worker to carry the burden of facing black competition unprotected by artificial barriers. Their plight was softened by generous financial and other compensation, but it did not prevent the decline of their industrial and political power (Lipton, 1985:212-216).

From a class perspective, the political struggles of the post-1968 era between white labour, capital and the NP government, were interpreted as a result from the divergence of Afrikaner class interests, because of the changing socio-economic circumstances of its members (see also chapter three for the ideological reasons behind the split). By 1970 the Afrikaner's socio-economic composition had been transformed from a group consisting mainly of farmers, workers and lower-echelon bureaucrats, to a highly urbanised people mostly employed as white-collar workers. The following figures explain the Afrikaner's position in the economic hierarchy by the early 1970's:

> 8% of Afrikaners were involved in agriculture;
> 7% " " " " " blue-collar work;
> 65% " " " " " white-collar work;
> Afrikaner ownership of private sector outside of agriculture increased from 10% in 1948 to 25% in 1975.

At this point, the Afrikaner class structure began to coincide with that of the English, which expedited the decline in their support for racist policies. Research conducted in 1974 by Hanf et al, confirmed that political reforms enjoyed more support from the more-educated and higher-income Afrikaners (1981:112, 164), the reason for

which can be found, according to one of the Afrikaner respondents in Hanf's survey, in the fact that "Our lower classes are naturally far more conservative, especially those on the fringes of society who have little more to sell than their white skin" (1981:165). Lipton concurs:

> While the verligtes were Afrikaners who had made it and no longer needed protection against blacks, English or foreigners, verkramptes still wanted the retention of 'Afrikaners first' policies. They tended to be the less well-off and less educated, although they also received support from those with a vested interest in nationalism (teachers, clergy) and in continued Afrikaner hegemony (the political and bureaucratic establishment) (1985:308).

Therefore, from the perspective of white labour, apartheid remained beneficial in that it provided an effective 'closed shop', with protection from competition and undercutting by black workers, as well as providing them with preferential access to benefits such as housing, welfare, education, social status and some political power to protect these privileges (ibid).

After the 1970's government policies followed, and in some cases led to, the socio-economic changes which accompanied the changing power balance in the Afrikaner class structure. The declining power of white agriculture and white labour and the strengthening position of the Afrikaner urban capital, bureaucracy and political establishment could be seen in labour and subsidy policies which adversely affected these previously protected sectors. In turn this led to a deteriorating relationship between white mineworkers and the government, as the former defied laws which were intended to relax the job bar in homeland mines, and withdrew their support for the NP. At the same time there was a marked improvement in the relations between the State and urban and mining capital, but a further breach with white labour occurred when the Wiehahn recommendations of 1979 were implemented.

O'Meara's analysis (1983) deals with the influence of

class, capital and ideology on the development of Afrikaner nationalism during the period 1934-1948. This has been discussed in chapter two. He provides a detailed analysis of the economic movement (Volkskapitalisme) during this period whereby Afrikaner organizations, in particular the Broederbond, attempted to uplift the Afrikaner by mobilizing Afrikaner capital and funneling it into building powerful financial institutions.

The divisions in the 'Afrikaner nationalist class alliances' shortly before the 'crisis of apartheid' began in 1973, are explained by O'Meara et al as follows: monopoly capital became the preponderant force of this class alliance, which included some Afrikaner conglomerates, but strategic differences emerged between some of the other members of the alliance, namely agricultural capital, the petty bourgeoisie and white labour. Within the ranks of agricultural capital some more efficient farmers emerged who linked up with monopoly capital, while large numbers of the petty bourgeoisie sided with the state as they were dependent on the continued existence of the state bureaucracy for their privileged status.

The majority of white workers, who were mostly in clerical, supervisory, administrative and technical positions, identified with the basic tenets of capitalism, e.g. free markets and private ownership, and inter alia, should have rejected central planning and government intervention in the economy. However, this was not the case as they realized that their privileged position with regard to black workers was dependent on the racial structures within the workplace, e.g. statutory job reservation, racially-based wage differentials and other forms of state intervention on their behalf. The 'organic' crisis in the economy in the early-1970's led to division within the class alliance, as monopoly capitalists favoured a degree of restructuring while the petty bourgeoisie and white labour were opposed to such reform measures (1988:30-38).

O'Meara et al explain even the provincial rivalries within the NP as a result of conflicting class forces - on the one hand there was the petty bourgeoisie of the Transvaal and the Free State (organized into the Broederbond) and, on the other, the financial capitalist of the Cape e.g. SANLAM and Rembrandt. The latter corporations ceased to be dependent on "the surplus profits of Afrikaner capitalist farmers", and began following an independent direction from the official NP policy. This led to the verligte-verkrampte struggle and the 1969 and 1982 split in the NP, which according to O'Meara et al, essentially was a class-based struggle:

> between those who wished to preserve the nationalist alliance of 1948 as a class alliance dominated by the interests of small farmers and the petty bourgeoisie, and those who ... wanted to transform its ideology to suit the changing class composition of the volk (1988:141-143).

The reformist views gained dominance only after the Vorster era, when certain labour restrictions, influx control and many of the remaining petty apartheid measures which directly impinged on the position of the white working class, were rapidly repealed (under P.W. Botha). White labour and the petty bourgeoisie regarded these reforms as a threat to the interests of the white man. For this reason, O'Meara et al claim, P.W. Botha failed to win over the historic mass base of Afrikaner nationalism in its entirety, which resulted in the "unconverted" sections of this base becoming the backbone of the HNP and CP (which included the petty bourgeoisie, white workers and small farmers) (ibid).

Giliomee's analysis (1989) of the origins of white disunity rests on the claim that the period between 1970 and 1987 was characterized by a "steady erosion of undiluted white supremacy and white prosperity", the causes of which could be found in the following factors:

1. The declining white demographic base which led to a

shortage of white manpower in the public and private sectors, forced the government to alleviate this shortage by implementing labour reforms to open the reservoir of black labour. The removal of restrictions on the training of black labour and the setting up of a common industrial relations system, changed the racial profile of the labour market - by 1981 the percentage of whites in medium-level jobs dropped from 82% to 65%.

2. Economic stagnation and efforts by the public and private sectors to redistribute wages in favour of blacks: this led to the white share of total personal income falling from 71% in 1970 to 61% in 1980 [and to about 50% in 1990], and white wages declined by about 9,7% between 1975 and 1979, while those of blacks increased by about the same percentage. According to Giliomee a combination of declining income, high inflation and a growing tax burden resulted in a sharp white political backlash against the redistributive policies of the government. Arguments put forward by the rightwing insinuated that the government was selling out lower-level white civil servants in order to improve the living standards of blacks.

3. The decline of apartheid and white privilege began, according to Giliomee, when the government began relaxing some of the restrictions on black labour during the 1970's e.g. the scrapping of statutory job reservation, the attempts to narrow the racial gap in the civil service and to equalize spending on white and black social services. These moves inevitably led to a decline in white living standards and together with a deviation from existing NP policies, such as the scrapping of pass laws, the opening of CBD's to traders of all races, the introduction of the Tricameral Parliament, the opening up of certain residential areas, resulted in the rightwing's gaining momentum during the 1980's.

A large section of white workers, the "bottom-level", as Lipton described them, saw socio-economic reforms and black

advancement as a direct threat to their position and were quite unprepared for it, having been under State protection for so long. They tried to block reforms on every level, but, according to Giliomee their numbers were declining: the membership of white-only registered trade unions dropped from 240 000 in 1980 to below 100 000 in 1989. He cites two surveys as evidence of the existence of strong white worker resistance to issues like the desegregation of facilities, to working under blacks and a fear that black labour would be used to undercut white wages and that they might become victims of reverse discrimination (Griffiths and Jones, 1980; Human and Icely, 1985). The latter survey was conducted in 1985 among whites in the artisan and workshop environment and indicated that the majority of them rejected blacks as equals in the working place, and objected to blacks' receiving the same training, and generally had negative perceptions towards black advancement in the workplace (Giliomee, 1989:118-125).

According to Giliomee, the intensifying conflict between the white working class and the government manifested itself in the political arena rather than on the shopfloor. It led to the HNP/NCP receiving almost a third of all Afrikaner votes during the 1981 general election, and later to the strengthening of the CP's support among white workers, as the HNP's appeal declined. Evidence cited by Schlemmer (1988:20) indicated that in 1986 41% of the CP/HNP support was located in the lower-middle/lower income group, against the 49% in the middle income group - compared to respectively 35 and 45% of the NP. This indicates a narrow, almost insignificant margin, and suggests that the class bases of the CP/HNP and NP were quite similar at the time (these findings are confirmed by other M&M findings cited later in this chapter). However, the weakness of this survey lies in the fact that the HNP and CP are regarded as one category, while in reality, the class bases of the two Parties are actually quite different: the HNP was distinctly an Afrikaner working-class party, while the CP extended its support base outside the confines of the Afrikaner working-class. This

is not surprising, as the numbers of working-class whites had constantly declined after 1936, as whites moved up the job market, therefore reducing this component of the traditional rightwing support base: evidence thereof is provided by Giliomee and Schlemmer (1989): The numbers of white workers employed in blue collar and agricultural occupations declined as follows between 1936 and 1977:

72% in 1936;
71% in 1946;
57% in 1960;
42% in 1970;
35% in 1977.

Charney's hypothesis postulates that the 1982 split in the NP was a result of the process of a class realignment whereby a new Afrikaner middle-class emerged, whose view on socio-economic and political issues differed substantially from that of the old ethnic alliance which brought the National Party to power in 1948. This resulted in class tensions which cut across ethnic blocks (Afrikaners and English-speakers). Charney illustrates this point with reference to the findings of a 1982-survey, according to which middle-class 'A and B groups' of both languages, reacted favourably to racial integration, while the working-class 'C and D groups'of both language groups reacted unfavourably.

These findings, cited by Charney (1984) from the Star Retail Data Library Survey: Johannesburg whites, April 1982, provided some relevant information on the relationship between class and racism: the reaction of whites at the lower end of the socio-economic scale to the possible opening of government schools and public transport to all races indicated that the views of the 'A' category (higher professional and managerial personnel) differed considerably from those in the 'D' category whites (lower supervisory, clerical, artisan and unskilled workers):

Table 4.1. The correlation between job status and ideology: Johannesburg whites: 1982

% against the integration of public transport:

Among Afrikaners in 'A' category- 25%
" " " 'D' " - 82%
" English " 'A' " - 20%
" " " 'D' " - 44%

% against the racial integration of government schools:

Among Afrikaners in 'A' category- 60%
" " " 'D' " - 86%
" English " 'A' " - 32%
" " " 'D' " - 42%

These findings clearly indicated a correlation between the socio-economic status of lower-class whites and their espousal of apartheid legislation. The vast majority of Afrikaners on the lower-end of the job hierarchy rejected the repeal of either measure, while only 25% of Afrikaners in the 'A' category were against the integration of public transport. This is not surprising as whites in this category were highly likely to have their own vehicles and would therefore not be affected by such a measure. However, with reference to racially-desegregated schooling, a majority of Afrikaners in the 'A' category turned out to be as racist as those Afrikaners in the 'D' category.

According to Charney, the process of class realignment received a further boost from the government's intention to promote the idea of economic stratification among blacks, by creating a black middle class as an antipode to black instability. This required the labour reforms discussed earlier, e.g. permitting apprenticeships for blacks, the recognition of legal black trade unions, the abolition of statutory job reservation, the introduction of education of

supposedly equal quality, and greater mobility for urban blacks with Section 10 rights. These labour reforms became a direct threat to the prosperity and status of white workers. The threat was felt also by white civil servants who feared black competition and the loss of white control of the state. Class conflict within Afrikanerdom increased and became more visible with white miners' strikes, a massive increase of support for the combined rightwing (the HNP and the NCP received 211 000 votes in the 1981 general election), and finally, the split of the NP in 1982 when the Conservative Party was founded. The white working class and the lower echelons of the civil service, who experienced a decline in wages/income of 9,7% between 1975 and 1979, both supported the CP (Giliomee, 1989), in addition to the maize farmers in the northern provinces who relied heavily on labour-repressive policies (Charney, 1984:278).

Kotze and Lourens (1987:367) argue that Afrikaner political hegemony is largely rooted in the support of the artisan and lower middle classes and consequently, that the battle to secure Afrikaner hegemony has a "definite class dimension" attached to it. The authors' explanation of the causes of white working class disaffection, is similar to those of previous theorists, i.e. the result of an interaction between an economic downturn and the withdrawal of state's tutelage over the working class, which severely affected its ability to maintain its previous standard of living. However, Kotze and Lourens, concurring with Giliomee, maintain that if the CP support was based solely on the working class, the party would have had little growth potential, because this class, as represented by the white semi-skilled worker, was fast shrinking (assuming continued economic growth). They mention the possible emergence of a "new labouring class" which would vote against the government purely out of resentment, and cite Charney as evidence to illustrate that the CP also enjoys significant support among sections of the petty bourgeoisie, such as teachers, farmers and civil servants and some Afrikaner capitalists.

Adam and Moodley (1986) suggest that working-class whites constituted about one-third of Afrikaner voters during the late 1970's, at the time when the government began to favour business interests over those of white workers. The formation of the HNP in 1969 briefly mobilised the white workers politically, but with the decline of the white white working class during the 1970's, the Party lost its appeal to most Afrikaners, except for the remnants of the working class and some farmers. The HNP briefly gained some ground during the general election in 1981, but subsequently lost virtually all its supporters to the Conservative Party. The CP avoided the blatant racism of the HNP and soon managed to achieve a level of respectability among various classes of whites, something the HNP never succeeded in doing. The CP's success in this respect was due to the considerable section of the Afrikaner establishment that it took away from the NP. However, these authors were of the opinion that the bulk of CP's support was among the lower echelons of the civil service and the lower middle classes. For this reason the CP, like the HNP, also concentrated heavily on economic issues and blamed the government for the continuing impoverishment of the whites (e.g. by implying that white poverty was the result of greater government spending on blacks, paid for by white taxpayers) (ibid).

Welsh (1989) cautions that the split in Afrikaner hegemony, in particular the splintering off in 1982 by the CP, should not be analysed purely from a class perspective. In his view the impetus for the 1982 split was ideological and boosted by other factors such as the "disappointed office-seeker syndrome" and provincialism. The NP members who hived off to form the CP were therefore not in a different socio-economic class (see also Schlemmer's findings cited previously) but used socio-economic grievances to attack the NP and to define their party's position in the political spectrum.

However, Welsh does not deny the existence of a correlation between class and rightwing support, as indicated by the

blue-collar constituencies which the CP won in 1987 (such as Brakpan, Carletonville, Randfontein and Roodepoort), the support for the party among struggling maize farmers in the rural Transvaal and Free State districts, and the strong support among those members of the lower-echelons civil service (whose incomes did not keep up with inflation).

He further points to the lack of support for the rightwing among big business, which he regards as not surprising if one considers the hostile relationship between the two: hostility which flowed out of the CP's desire to keep its working-class supporters' loyalty, and therefore to avoid moving too close to big business and the upper-classes. The reverse is also true: considering the potentially disastrous consequences for the economy of the country if the CP did come to power, of which the Boksburg episode was just a small reminder (see chapter five), it is not surprising that big business would hinder the progress of the rightwing wherever it could. However, he mentions that some smaller businessmen tended to support the CP and that strains have been felt in the Afrikaanse Handelinstituut.

Although Welsh agrees that much of the above evidence indicates that the rightwing could be a class phenomenon, he finds this to be insufficient. He points to the complex support-base of the CP, consisting of not only working-class whites, but also clergy, academics, teachers, doctors and other professionals. In addition to this, he adds, it is "inherently difficult to put precise boundaries around classes, [as] they are clear-cut only in obsolete sociological theory", (which leads him also strongly to reject the term 'petty bourgeoisie' as a "term so loose as to be meaningless") (ibid). He also mentions that available statistics derived from household income do not reveal any "marked tendency for lower income groups to favour the CP, even though the other index of class, namely level of education, tends to provide a more positive correlation.

In summary: The theories and findings of various analysts

discussed above indicate that class factors played a significant role in the formation of the rightwing, in particular of the HNP in 1969. It stands to reason that lower-class whites, especially Afrikaners, who had relied to a considerable extent on the protection and support of the state for their privileged position (compared to black workers), had strongly objected when the state began to remove its tutelage from the 1970's onward - this was regarded as necessary because it hindered the mobility of black labour, and therefore, stood in the way of a fast-growing economy.

The position of the white worker was further weakened by a rising inflation rate and a declining rate of growth of the GDP during the 1970's and 1980's, and by the government's redistributive economic policies in favour of blacks (e.g. the narrowing of the racial wage gap). Large parts of the declining white working-class responded to these developments by supporting the rightwing political parties, although by the time of the CP's founding in 1982, the numbers of white workers had declined to such an extent that they had lost much of their electoral importance as a category (from 57% in 1960, to 44% in 1970, to 35% in 1977). Furthermore, the the white working-class was not <u>en bloc</u> rightwing, as was illustrated by the fact that remaining members of the white working-class were almost equaly divided between the NP and the CP (Schlemmer, 1988:20).

4.2. AN OVERVIEW OF SURVEYS RELATING TO THE RIGHTWING'S CLASS BASE

The purpose of citing findings from these surveys is to find specific evidence which will either refute or substantiate the perception that rightwing support has a

strong class base.

The first survey to be discussed is that of **Rhoodie, De Kock and Couper** (1985). Its findings confirmed the existence of a positive correlation between the politically conservative ideology and voters on the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum in South Africa. The survey was conducted early in 1984, with a test sample of 1 024 adult whites, and with the goal of providing an empirically-based analysis of the perceptions of urban whites of socio-political change in South Africa. Six primary socio-demographic characteristics of the sample were used as variables against which to analyse these perceptions. These were sex, age, educational level, marital status, language and annual income (geographical distribution of population and provincial differences were not used as a variable). The respondents were questioned on their support for apartheid measures which existed at the time or were in the process of being scrapped. These measures were categorised by Rhoodie et al as follows:

a) the five most sensitive micro-apartheid measures (segregated creches and nursery schools, hospital wards, public toilets, swimming-baths and beaches);
b) all seven macro-apartheid measures (Mixed Marriages Act, Immorality Act, Group Areas Act, racially separate schools, separate public amenities/services, black homelands, separate voters' rolls);
c) all 14 micro-apartheid measures (in addition to 'A' above, also separate bars, cinemas, hotels, restaurants, parks, cemeteries, public transport and public libraries);
d) all 21 apartheid measures.

For the purpose of this study only the findings which relate to income and educational variables are relevant, as these two are directly linked to class:

Table 4.2. The relation between class and ideology: the findings of Rhoodie et al: 1985.

% Support for apartheid measures A, B, C and D, as listed above, according to educational level:

	A	B	C	D
Educational level: nil to std 9	67	46	44	28
Educational level: std 10 and over	42	36	18	13

% Support for one particular measure, namely the Immorality Act:

	support Act	reject Act
Educational level:nil to std 9	68	21
Educational level:std 10 and over	56	29
Income level:R0 to R15 000 p.a.	67	21
Income level:R15 000 p.a. and over	56	30

(Rhoodie, De Kock and Couper, 1985:311-317).

The above findings indicate the existence of very definite differences in the perception which respondents have of socio-political change, depending on their levels of personal income and education. In each category of apartheid legislation a considerable majority of respondents in the lower educational strata supported the retention of those laws, compared to those respondents who had a higher level of education. These differences however, were influenced also by the other variables such as sex, marital status, and especially language.

To illustrate this distorting effect on the above figures, Rhoodie et al provided a table listing the percentage variation in attitudes, explained by each of the five variables in isolation: home language - 16,3%; educational status - 3%; marital status - 2,3%; income - 1,6%; sex - 1,1%). From these it is clear that that language

differences accounted for the greatest variation in attitudes towards change, and that class factors came low down the list.

The distorting effect caused by other variables does not imply that class factors are of no relevance in establishing the reason for political conservatism among South African whites. In fact, the differences between those in the lower half and those in the upper half are substantiated by the findings, e.g. whilst 28% of respondents who were in the below-std 10-category wanted all 21 apartheid measures to remain, only 13% of those in the higher education bracket were in favour of the retention of all these measures. With regard to the Immorality Act, 68% of those with lower educational qualifications supported its retention, against the 56% in the higher education bracket. Similarly, 67% of those in the lower-income group were in favour of retaining the Act against 56% in the higher-income group.

The final comment regarding this survey concerns speculation by the authors that the high incidence of socio-political conservatism among their Afrikaner respondents indicated that the tolerance threshold of conservative NP-inclined supporters was coming under increasing pressure (tolerance threshold defined as the amount of reform NP supporters can tolerate before switching to the rightwing). The authors speculated that this tolerance threshold might be raised to enable them to accept reforms more readily.

Several surveys during the mid-1980's indicated that apartheid was very much part of the Afrikaner psyche in particular: Schlemmer's findings, for example, indicated that 78% of Afrikaners still supported basic apartheid (cited in Lipton, 1985:307). This was also confirmed by the findings of Rhoodie et al, which indicated that 84% of less-educated and 79% of higher-educated Afrikaners

supported the Immorality Act in 1984, an act which had a 'religious/moral' basis, and hardly affected the power structure of Afrikaner dominance or privilege (and was scrapped shortly afterwards).

It is worthwhile to compare the verkramptheid of whites in 1985 with regard to the retention of these 21 apartheid acts, as they were all scapped within the following six years. The most important of these included: the Mixed Marriages Act, the Immorality Act, the Separate Amenities Act; the Group Areas Act, the Population Registration Act, and the Land Acts. In spite of the repeal of all these apartheid acts by mid-1991, the government is still in power, whilst the Conservative Party, which has vowed to re-implement apartheid if it comes to power, received about 31% of the vote in 1989 and presently enjoys less than half of white support. The implication is that electoral statisitics have substantiated the thesis of Rhoodie et al, which suggested that the tolerance threshold of the Afrikaner, and indeed of the whites as a whole, could be raised.

The survey conducted by Gagiano (1989) is useful insofar as the survey sample, consisting of white South African students, highlights the variable of education as a component of class. The research dealt with the impact of political reforms on the attitudes of white students of both language groups. Gagiano introduces his survey findings with a general discussion on the correlation between redistributive government policies and the voting behaviour of white working class voters:

> reforms aimed at the redistribution of publicly controlled resources across racial boundaries met with stiff resistance from those sections of the white community which stood to lose most by their implementation. Whenever recessionary conditions in the economy take their toll the murmuring from the tents of the white working class grow louder and the political

fortunes of the right wing parties take a turn for the better (1989:15).

He claims that "statist political engineering" (presumably reform) will eventually result in a society which will be structured in such a way as to cut across racial and ethnic cleavages and settle into a class-based configuration. This, in turn, will lead to further tensions within the Afrikaner community and a strengthening of rightwing forces that will enable them to challenge the "hegemonic position" of the NP. Gagiano estimated the strength of rightwing support among Afrikaners at about 35% in 1989 (a M&M survey conducted six months later in February 1990, found that Afrikaner support for the right reached almost 41%, while NP-MP Boy Geldenhuys estimated it at over 50% (Interview:28.7.91).

The results of Gagiano's survey, conducted among intramurally enrolled white university students country-wide, placed students as a category, to the left of the political spectrum, and even Afrikaans students were found to be slightly to the left of the Afrikaans voting community as a whole. More than 80% of Afrikaans students supported the two parties on the right and centre-right of the political spectrum, i.e. the NP and CP/HNP (it should be emphasized that the NP, at the time of Gagiano's survey early in 1989, was still a centre-right party, but that this changed considerably over the following 24 months). Other significant results of the survey indicated that only 14% of white students supported the rightwing parties, compared with the 42,5% which supported the NP and 37,7% the DP. A total of 23,8% of Afrikaners and 1,2% of English-speaking students supported rightwing parties.

According to Gagiano the University of Pretoria most accurately represented the party affiliation of the Afrikaner community at large:

CP/HNP: 32,8%, NP: 55,9%, DP: 10,3%

At the University of Stellenbosch, regarded as the most liberal of the Afrikaans universities, results were as follows:

CP/HNP: 8%, NP: 60%, DP: 35%

These results indicate little support for the rightwing among the larger body of white students. It suggests that white students, on their way to becoming part of the educated middle and upper classes, have little empathy for the rightwing ideology, which corresponds with the perception that the CP has not yet made significant inroads into this stratum.

This conclusion, however, does not correspond with the views of students on issues such as the security establishment, reaction to a prospective ANC government, alternative political dispensations, and repression. The findings of Gagiano on these matters, it should be recalled, reflect the situation prior to the government's drastic reforms during the period following the survey, which was published in August 1989: these included the unbanning of the ANC, the release of Nelson Mandela and other long-term security prisoners, the commencement with the early stages of negotiations with the ANC, a scaling-down of the power of the security establishment, the repeal of remaining discriminatory legislation, a commitment to a system with an equal vote for all citizens, and most important, a public confirmation that the NP-government would voluntarily relinquish its exclusive grip on power within five years.

If these substantial reforms are contrasted with the political attitudes of Afrikaner students and NP-supporting Afrikaner and English-speaking students surveyed by Gagiano in 1989, a remarkable picture emerges, one which largely refutes the perception of white students as being in the vanguard of progressive political change:

> Support for the security establishment (at the time still very powerful) ranged from about 84% of Afrikaners who indicated "very sympathetic and sympathetic" sentiments towards it or held the security apparatus in "high esteem", to the 33,5% of English-speaking students with similar sentiments.

> Only 7,7% of Afrikaner and 27% of English students would be prepared to accept an ANC government, while

34% and 30% respectively of both language groups would either emigrate or physically resist such a possibility. Similarly, 39% of NP supporters indicated they would emigrate and 40% would offer physical resistance to prevent an ANC government from coming to power.

> Judging solely by party political affiliation, 99,6% of CP supporting and 95,4% of NP-supporting students were unsympathetic or very unsympathetic towards the ANC.

> Questioned about their preferences for an alternative political dispensation for South Africa, 10,7% of Afrikaner students favoured partition (CP policy), and a further 56% favoured a system incorporating white control or a racial federation (the NP policy at the time). Only 26,6% of Afrikaans students supported a geographical federation (DP policy at the time and NP policy today).

> Of crucial importance are the findings which indicated party preference for the various constitutional models: 64% of NP-supporting students indicated a preference either for partition, white control or a racial federation, all of which implied continued white domination, a policy to which the NP bade farewell in 1990 (if one can take the Party's policy declarations and actions at their face value).

This leaves unanswered one important question: If the National Party government has moved politically ahead of most of its white/Afrikaner student supporters (64%), who are according to the 'class/ideology' thesis and Gagiano's findings, supposed to be slightly less conservative than the Afrikaner community at large, where does this leave the bulk of the NP's supporters in 1991? Have they been left behind permanently, easy prey for the CP, or will the NP manage to further increase the "reform tolerance threshold" of its wavering supporters. Even if the NP does succeed in taking some of its supporters along by sheer persuasive power, at what point of future reform will this ability to persuade and educate become insufficient ?

The survey of **Manzo and McGowan** (1989) was conducted with the intention of identifying the fears which haunt Afrikaners at a period during which they have to make critical choices concerning their future. The findings as a whole will be discussed in detail in chapter four, which deals with the Rightwing psyche, and for the present, only findings relating directly to the class basis of the rightwing are discussed.

The authors selected a sample of 842 Afrikaner elites (of whom 54% responded) in fields such as politics, civil service, public and private sector business, religion, universities and the media. They were chosen either at random from a particular category (e.g. 150 out of 1 200 university professors), or in totality (e.g. all Afrikaner members of parliament). Of the repondents, 81% received incomes of over R45 000 a year and 36% incomes of more than R85 000 a year. With regard to education, 96% of the test sample had received some post-secondary education, 38% were university graduates and 18% had received at least one post-graduate degree.

Certain limitations hampered the findings: firstly, the refusal of the SADF to co-operate, and secondly, the uneven distribution of responses from the various categories, which resulted in academics and clergy being over-represented while the more powerful politicians and civil servants were under-represented. The authors therefore insist that their findings should not be generalized beyond the sample of respondents, but at the same time suggest that the Afrikaner elite as a whole may hold views similar to those of the test sample.

The findings represent the views of upper-class Afrikaners as measured against income, education and status levels, and indicated little support for rightwing parties: the CP received only 10% and the HNP 1% of the elite support in the sample, which is less than one third of the

rightwing's total strength. The NP received 74% and the former PFP received 5% support. The conclusion drawn from these findings is that the rightwing's support would appear to be concentrated among the mass of Afrkaners rather than in the community's leadership stratum. It further indicates though that prominent Afrikaners have deep fears regarding their security, property, status, lifestyle and also about educational standards, medical services and their prosperity under black majority rule. With regard to perceptions of internal threats to South African security, 93% of Afrikaner elites polled regarded the SACP as "some threat" or a "serious threat"; while 99% regarded black rioting and resistance in townships in a similar vein. At the same time, however, 82% of respondents viewed the system of apartheid as "some threat" or "serious threat", while 83,3% saw the rightwing in similar vein.

According to Manzo and McGowan,

> The white population of South Africa may be divided into two groups, a majority of irreconcilables who refuse to bargain with blacks about the country's future and a minority of reconcilables whose words and sometimes daring actions indicate that they would willingly enter into serious good faith negotiations.

When the survey was conducted during 1988, the vast majority of whites and Afrikaners still belonged in the former group, e.g. 85% voted either CP/HNP or NP, which at the time was still only slightly to the left of the CP with regard to the maintenance of white domination. Therefore, although the findings of the survey indicate a conservative bias among Afrikaners, especially with regard to security and in their perception of black rule, the majority of respondents (80%), indicated that they view apartheid and the rightwing as a threat or serious threat to the country's security. This would therefore place many of the prominent Afrikaners, who fall into the upper-bracket of the socio-economic spectrum, in the second group (the reconcilables), who are prepared to negotiate and hold

more liberal views than the average white voter.

To verify previous findings, Market and Opinion Surveys was consulted: At the request of the author M&M extracted unpublished data from its data bank for the purpose of trying to establish more precise correlations between class and political affiliation. The quarterly surveys conducted by M&M on behalf of Rapport, deal with the opinions of members of its regular test sample, on political and socio-economic issues. Although information on their incomes is always solicited along with other variables such as language, sex, age and demographical factors, the income variable is normally not published in M&M's surveys. It was therefore most useful to retrieve the data regarding the correlation between the financial profile and the voting pattern of respondents, for the months of January 1987, March 1988 and August 1989.

The surveys normally have a test sample of 2 000 (referred to as the "white consumer panel") and usually have a response rate of about 80%. They are designed to represent the total white population with regard to age, language, sex and geographical distribution. For the purposes of this research project the sample was divided according to four income groups:

'A': R4 000 and over per month
'B': R2 000- R4 000 per month
'C': R700- R2 000 per month
'D': below R700 per month

The question which is normally asked in the surveys, is also applicable in this regard, and reads as follows:

> "If a general election had to be held now and all political parties put up a candidate in your constituency, would you vote, and if your answer is yes, for which party"?

The findings were as follows:

Table 4.3 Financial profile of voters versus political party preference: M&M findings

Pol. Party	Number of votes and percentages	Income group D	C	B	A
January 1987					
Total	1589 (100%)	16%	41%	21%	23%
NP	785 (49%)	16	42	21	21
CP/HNP	286 (18%)	18	41	22	20
PFP	309 (19%)	11	34	22	33
March 1988		D	C	B	A
Total	1502 (100%)	15%	37%	21%	27%
NP	666 (44%)	16	38	22	24
CP/HNP	292 (19%)	21	38	22	20
PFP	134 (9%)	6	42	22	30
August 1989		D	C	B	A
Total	1507 (100%)	16%	46%	22%	16%
NP	612 (41%)	16	46	24	15
CP/HNP	365 (24%)	19	55	19	12
DP	450 (30%)	13	39	23	25

Notes:

Percentages have been rounded off and therefore do not always add up to one hundred; these tables should be read as follows: The first vertical column represents the political parties; the second column represents the total number of respondents in the sample who supported each party, as well as those numbers expressed as percentages; the following columns represent the percentages of each income category which supported a particular party, i.e the class base of the parties as suggested by the incomes of their supporters. For example, in August 1989 the NP's support base consisted of 16% in the 'D'income category, 46% in the 'C' category, 24% in the 'B' category and 15% in the 'A' category of income index).

From these figures it is obvious that there is no simple correlation between income level and party preference among voters in the sample, apart from the fact that the C and D income groups in the surveys made up 59%, 59% and 74% respectively of the CP/HNP's support base. This is only marginally higher than comparable figures for the NP. In relation to the NP and the rightwing, the PFP/DP received considerably less support from the lower-income 'D' group relative to other categories compared to the NP and rightwing alliance.

The reverse is also true when one looks at the size of the higher-income 'A' category in the liberal opposition's support base compared to that of the NP and CP/HNP. The PFP support base has always been perceived as being located in the upper-end of the socio-economic spectrum, a perception which is confirmed by these findings: the PFP in particular, received three times and five times more support from the 'A' category than from the 'D' category - this discrepancy is less marked with the DP, where the 'A' category was only twice the size of the 'B' category, which is not surprising if one keeps in mind that the DP expanded its support base away from the 'English middle-upper classes' to include greater numbers of verligte Afrikaners. When adding the language variable to the support each party enjoyed in each of the income categories, the findings then were as follows:

Table 4.4. Income levels and party preference: Afrikaners; (English-speakers in bold print):August 1989

Income in Rands	Number of respondents	% Support for parties by income categories		
		NP	CP	DP
00 -> 12 000	142 **61**	47% **15**	39% **10**	7% **66**
12 000-> 20 000	143 **81**	56% **23**	31% **11**	4% **60**
20 000-> 30 000	215 **121**	47% **30**	37% **7**	11% **58**
30 000-> 50 000	298 **176**	52% **23**	33% **6**	8% **63**
50 000->	124 **115**	54% **17**	23% **3**	17% **77**

Notes:

Totals will not add up to a hundred because of the fact that percentages were rounded off to nearest decimal figure and support for NRP, independents and HNP not included; the inclusion of HNP support would marginally improve the combined rightwing totals by about 0,5%; these figures should be read against the background of the total support received by the parties in the survey:

NP total: 40,6%, Afr: 51,1%, Eng: 22,9%;
CP total: 23,1%, Afr: 33,1%, Eng: 6.2%;
DP total: 29,9%, Afr: 9,3%, Eng: 64,3%

The following conclusions can be drawn from this table:

> Among both language groups support for the NP was quite far ahead of the CP, even among the lower-income groups i.e. below R20 000. This lead generally increases further up the income scale, e.g. the NP's share of the 'above- R50 000' category is 31% higher than that of the CP. It is quite clear that the the NP's support matrix did not confirm a correlation between lower-income and the conservative ideology - among Afrikaners in all categories it remained constant, and among English-speakers it increased and then declined again as one goes up the income scale.

> The DP enjoyed very little support among Afrikaners, but, as expected, its support among this language group increased from 7% in the lowest income category to 17% in the highest. It received the most English-speaking support in all categories, in fact, more than both other parties combined.

> The CP's support declined almost proportionally with the increase in income per category, e.g. among Afrikaners from 39% in the lowest category to 23% in the highest, and among English-speakers from 10% to 3% - over 9% on average, as opposed to its total support of 29.9%. Among English-speakers the NP was strongest in the middle income group i.e in R20 000 to R30 000 bracket, but the CP seems to have little support here.

> The CP is slightly stronger in the lower income brackets, namely 10% and 11% as opposed to its support among the two top brackets, 6% and 3%. The DP support appears to remain relatively constant among English-speaking income groups, increases strongly from the lowest-income Afrikaner group to the highest-income Afrikaner group (7% to 17%). Both the DP's (17%) and the CP's (23%) share of support in the above-R50 000 category in Aug. 1989 respectively was double and triple the figures provided by Manzo and McGowan in their 1988 survey of 'prominent Afrikaners' earning R45 000 and above, namely 5% for the former PFP and 10% for the CP - this is an indication of the defections from the NP to both opposition Parties shortly before the Sept. 1989 general election when the NP lost numerous seats.

In summary: the M&M surveys indicate a definite correlation between income and ideology in white politics, as is depicted in Table 4.4. and discussed above (e.g the pattern of the DP's Afrikaner support, the CP's English-speaking and Afrikaner support; also the inverse relationship between the CP's support and the income categories). In the findings of Rhoodie et al, both the income and educational variable confirm the hypothesis, as well as that of Gagiano (educational variable), and Manzo and McGowan (education/status). On the other hand, some statistics provide little, e.g. the NP's support pattern among both languages and the DP's English-speaking support. Furthermore, it should be emphasised again that income, occupation and education cannot, as independent variables, be equated with class. Furthermore, income can be an unreliable indicator of class, e.g white miners probably earn as much or more than white school teachers or middle-level bank/insurance clerks, yet one would not label them as similar in class terms. This problem is encountered also in the empirical research which follows in chapter 5.3, which deals with only one variable of class, namely income, as measured by the value of private property.

4.3 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: THE CORRELATION BETWEEN CLASS AND IDEOLOGY DURING THE 1988 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

During September 1990 research was conducted at local government level to establish whether the findings of earlier surveys on the correlation between class and ideology, also pertained to municipal elections and socio-economic position of white municipal voters. Since data on the income-levels of whites in electoral districts countrywide were difficult to obtain, it was decided to concentrate on the local government level. This was done through an examination of a common indicator of wealth/status, namely the value of residential property in municipal wards: a ward is the electoral unit of local government, often spanning several suburbs in a town/city. Each ward is represented by one or more councillors in the town or city councils (see Table 4.5). The goal was to establish the existence of a link between the value of a municipal voter's residential property, as measured per ward or suburb, and the way he or she voted in municipal elections, as established by the complete results of the 1988-municipal elections in the five selected towns/cities.

For this purpose requests for data were made to several towns and cities which were known to have a considerable rightwing presence, as measured during the October 1988 countrywide municipal elections. The information required included a list of all suburbs and neighbourhoods which make up a particular ward, a list of all the wards which make up a municipality, the average value of private property (land and/or dwellings) per suburb, and the average value of all the suburbs combined, which give the average value of private property per ward. This information, after being processed, made it possible to establish roughly whether wards won by the rightwing differed in socio-economic profile from those won by the NP or liberal parties, as measured by the average value of private property of all potential voters in that ward.

The five towns which were targeted for this project were Pretoria (its being the capital not only of the country

but also of the province with the largest rightwing presence and representing a wide spectrum of white voters in the civil service, business, military and working class); Mossel Bay and Kraaifontein, representing the smaller southern and western Cape towns with a strong rightwing presence, although located in traditionally NP territory; Port Elizabeth, a major city located in the eastern Cape, traditionally NP-orientated but in a region with a growing rightwing presence, as the CP victory in the neighbouring town of Uitenhage in the 1989 general election illustrated; and finally Durban, the country's third largest city, traditionally United Party and New Republican Party territory, but since their demise, split between the DP, the NP and to a lesser extent, the CP - at the time of the survey the Durban City Council was regarded as being one of the most politically conservative of all major cities in the country, which brought forth images of the old British colonial mentality, and allowed for speculation that the former United Party probably did not differ that much in ideology from the NP (up to 1989) and to an extent from the CP today. The local government structure on which this study is based, is graphicaly explained in table 3.5.

Table 4.5. Local government electoral structures



To determine the average value of private property (land and/or dwellings) the following calculations had to be

made, e.g.

> Total value of property of all plots/houses in a specific suburb (e.g.R10 000 000), divided by total number of residential units (e.g.1 000), equals an average property value per unit of R10 000 in that suburb. A total of the averages of each suburb making up a specific ward (e.g.R10 000 + R12 000 + R14 000 + R16 000, = R52 000), divided by four suburbs, equals an average property value of R13 000 for that specific ward.

One of the drawbacks of this approach is that some towns do not distinguish industrial and residential property, a situation which could possibly have caused distortions in the calculation of the average value of property within the boundaries of a suburb or ward. In most cases it was possible to leave out areas with industrial property as these were clearly identified; in others, shops and factories were often interspersed with residential property, in which case allowances were made to reduce the distorting effect. Another problem was that the boundaries of suburbs and wards often did not coincide - in many instances, data on residential property valuations in suburbs which were received had to be adapted to take it into consideration, e.g some suburbs were spread out over two or even three wards. To simplify calculations it was decided to give equal value to all suburbs within a ward, regardless of whether they are located completely or partially within the boundaries of a particular ward, i.e. for the purposes of ascertaining averages, a suburb which was spread over two wards, was counted as a full suburb in both wards, not as a half. This may distort results to a slight extent.

Another weakness of the structure of this research is the fact that since original data on income and education levels were impossible to obtain, the solution was to measure socio-economic status against more readily available data, such as property ownership. The inherent limitations of this methodology are obvious, in particular

the fact that only one element of one of the variables used to identify class, namely property ownership (as an element of wealth or credit), was used, the others being labour, trade, profession and in some cases, landed nobility (Scruton, 1989:68).

The findings of the research in each of the five selected cities/towns were as follows:

a) Pretoria

Pretoria is traditionally a politically conservative city, and the physical and spiritual capital of the rightwing movement. It has a sizeable working class, civil service and military sector, and remnants of the 'poor white' phenomenon of the 1930's are still present in the western part of the city. Although the NP controls the City Council, which consists of 42 wards, the city and its hinterland have several parliamentary consttituencies under CP control, including Pretoria West, Hercules, Wonderboom, Brits and Meyerton. The Pretoria City Council was won by the NP in 1988 with a total of 22 seats. The CP came a close second with 18 seats and the Independents/ Ratepayers Association third with 2 seats on the Council. The results by ward, together with the average property valuation of each ward, were as follows:

Table 4.6 (a) Pretoria: Wards won by the NP

Ward No.	Votes received: NP	Votes received: CP	NP-majority over nearest opponent	Ave. property valuation per ward in Rands
4	1051	1008	43	57 813
5	1716	1235	481	73 077
7	1155	719	436	42 640
8	937	727	210	42 640
10	1492	639	591	113 111
11	1232	674	558	74 410
12	1452	657	795	74 410
13	1575	949	626	68 163
14	1646	490	131	119 929
15	1521	946	575	84 812
16	2060	654	1050	109 114
17	2697	1565	1132	94 427
18	2378	1421	957	108 352
19	2449	1140	1309	89 213
20	2008	908	1100	90 729
21	2364	944	1420	116 420
22	2526	1131	1395	109 330
23	2109	1279	830	93 262
26	2023	1800	223	69 115
28	2509	850	1759	71 460
29	1452	753	699	72 542
35	1994	1630	364	117 858

Ave. value of residential prop. in NP-wards: R86 038

Table 4.6 (b) Pretoria : Wards won by the CP

Ward No.	Votes received: CP	Votes received: NP/Ind.	CP-majority over nearest opponent	Ave. prop. valuation ward in Rands
1	1552	968	584	40 434
2	993	787	206	45 258
3	1532	558	973	40 286
9	1451	1401	50	68 163
24	1441	1163	278	66 693
25	1681	608	1073	48 884
27	1729	1685	44	67 533
30	1865	1780	85	56 697
31	2028	1449	579	60 801
32	1619	1381	237	64 802
33	2197	1644	553	98 472
34	1778	1694	84	80 704
37	1815	1507	308	54 126
38	1468	1099	368	58 225
39	2047	799	1338	50 797
40	1741	772	969	52 719
41	1906	1345	560	60 837
42	2289	1277	1012	80 110

Ave. value of residential property in CP-wards: R60 893

These results confirm the correlation between class and the electoral support of the rightwing: the average property value of all the wards won by the NP amounts to R86 038, in contrast to that of the wards won by the CP, which amounts to R60 893. This implies that the average value of residential property in the NP-controlled wards is 41% higher than those under CP-control. Furthermore, if one uses the average property value of all wards in Pretoria, i.e. R73 443, as basis, it can be argued that only three out of 18 CP-controlled wards (16%) are above this average, as opposed to 14 out of 22 NP-controlled wards (63%).

b) Port Elizabeth

The City Council of this city in the Eastern Cape leaned strongly towards the National Party during the 1988 municipal elections. The city consists of 13 wards, with two councillors elected from each ward, i.e. 26 councillors. After some by-elections in the interim, the results, based on party-political affiliations, were as follows: the NP had 16 members on the city council; the DP (formerly the PFP) had nine, and the CP one.

The breakdown per ward with average property valuations is provided below; In these elections, the two candidates who received the most votes were elected to the city council. Therefore, in many cases, two candidates belonging to the same party represent one ward. In the table below, the votes received by the two elected candidates in each ward are given, although the votes received by the CP candidates in each ward are also included (in brackets), as the rightwing figures are of importance to this study:

Table 4.7 Port Elizabeth

Ward	votes received by two elected candidates			ave. property valuation per ward in Rands.
	NP	CP	PFP/DP	
1	980	(145)	949	63 307
2	1145/984	---	---	36 734
3	---	---	1569/1442	62 748
4	---	---	971 / 917	39 473
5	612	---	1034	38 927
6	1226/1284	(967/959)	---	39 401
7	1393/1362	---	---	62 212
8	1938/1931	(994/959)	---	55 906
9	921/883	(306/688)	---	51 748
10	261	700	---	29 203
11	792	---	436	47 156
12	---	---	1678/1669	65 075
13	1573/1716	(665/748)	---	54 368

From the above table it appears that the correlation between socio-economic status, as measured by average property valuations of voters, and their political preferences, can be confirmed. The average value of all residential property in this table equals R49 712. The average value of residential property in the wards which were won by the NP, amounts to R42 068, compared to R55 765 in the wards won by the PFP/DP, and the R29 203 in the ward won by the CP. The two wards shared by the NP and PFP/DP had an average value of R51 617. The CP-controlled ward's average residential property valuation of R29 203 was R12 865 (31,5%) less than that of the NP-controlled wards, and R26 562 (48%) less than that of PFP/DP controlled wards.

In the four wards where the CP-candidates achieved notable number of votes, i.e. where their candidates achieved between 33% and 75% of the number of votes of the strongest winning candidate in those wards, the picture is less clear. The average value of property in these four wards (6, 8, 9 and 13) is R50 355: in ward 6 the correlation between low property values and CP support is visible - the two CP candidates obtained respectively 75% and 74,6% of the number of votes which the NP candidate received, in a ward where the average property is worth only R39 401. In wards 8, 9 and 13, the average values range from R55 906, to R51 748 to R54 368, i.e. considerably above even the average of all property (R49 712), i.e. no correlation.

It is worthwhile to look briefly at the developments subsequent to this survey in the one ward controlled by the CP, ward 10, which consists of the conservative suburb of Algoa Park with about 10 000 white residents. It is located about 10 kilometres from the CBD of Port Elizabeth, and is surrounded by several black and coloured towns. In 1987 the City Council proposed that Algoa Park be zoned as a coloured group area, a proposal which was refused by the government shortly before the 1988 municipal elections (not unexpectedly). Since then, market forces and the granting of permits by the government to blacks to move to the

suburb, have gradually begun to alter its racial character, to the horror of most white residents. In addition, the possibility of declaring it an 'open' area at first and the proposed repeal of the Group Areas Act altogether in July 1991, has resulted in further hostility in the white community towards blacks and the government. In February 1991 one of the CP city councillors for Algoa Park, Chris Meyer, indicated that blacks were not welcome in the suburb, and that force and intimidation would be used if necessary to keep it white:

> It does not matter if he [a black person] is a doctor, policeman, or priest - the issue is the protection of our own identity and the protection of the character of our suburb - if you allow one black, where do you draw the line ? [translation] (Vrye Weekblad:1.2.91).

His sentiments were corroborated in more crudely racist terms by another anonymous white resident:

> We will all stand together and fight. The most of us here are AWB and nobody wants a mixed neighbourhood. My husband is also AWB - he hates kaffirs.... We don't want scum to move into our neighbourhood (ibid).

The above information on Algoa Park serves merely as background to the findings, i.e. to highlight how strongly politicised even municipal elections have become and to indicate which issues were crucial to the white voters of a typical CP-controlled ward. It would seem, however, that Algoa Park's sentiments are not shared by the rest of Port Elizabeth's white residents, except for the few working class enclaves.

c) MOSSEL BAY

The white municipal voters of Mossel Bay elected four CP councillors to its Town Council in 1988, compared to the three of the NP and one independent. The town is one of the most politically conservative in the Cape Province as could be seen in the initial refusal of the Town Council to

desegregate its beaches towards the end of 1989 in defiance of President De Klerk's directive intended to scrap beach apartheid. As late as November 1989, the town's Mayor, J. Oosthuizen, rejected the State President's directive to coastal municipalities to desegregate their beaches:

> I regard white beaches as belonging to the own community life of whites, and expect the government to respect this view, in accordance with its election manifesto. It is therefore not possible to comply with the State President's request (Mossel Bay Advertiser:24.11.89) [translation].

The remaining 'whites only' signs on its beaches, which gave Mossel Bay the dubious honour of being the last remaining 'bastion' of segregated beaches in the country, were finally removed in September 1989 after heavy pressure from the government. One year earlier the Town Council had almost managed to wreck the Dias Festival by refusing to allow coloured participants on the beaches of Mossel Bay where the celebrations were held. Only after the coloured chairman of the Dias Festival committee, Richard van der Ross, pulled out of the Mossel Bay activities, and Allan Hendrickse, leader of the Labour Party called for a boycott, did the Administrator of the Cape, Gene Louw, intervene temporarily to set aside the racial restrictions on the beaches (Argus:25.1.88).

These two racially-based incidents over the town's segregated beaches, were an indication of the highly politicized nature of the town's local politics, and it was this kind of political environment which strongly influenced the municipal elections of October 1988.

The town is divided into four wards for the purpose of municipal elections, and these formed the basis for the research done on the municipal elections of 1988. Difficulties were experienced with the gathering of data because the Town Council's records did not segment property valuations according to wards. To get the average property

valuations per ward would have required the calculation of the total value of each of several thousand houses and plots individually, which was not possible given time constraints. It was decided therefore to take random samples of property valuations in each ward in order to determine an average value per ward. Although this method was much less accurate than the normal method of using the average of all residential property in a ward, it was the only option available in the case of Mossel Bay (and Durban).

A sample consisting of the values of 20 residential properties in each of the four wards in Mossel Bay was selected with the help of officials of the municipality. Since Mossel Bay is a coastal town, care was taken to obtain a cross-section of property values, which included properties facing the sea, ones further inland and ones much further back, i.e. a cross-section of property values in the various wards. The unit of valuation was the value of houses/dwellings in the year 1984 and two councillors were elected in each ward. The results were as follows:

Table 4.8 Mossel Bay

Ward	Results: elected candidates	Average value of property per ward in Rands
1	338 (CP) 207 (CP)	31 006
2	289 (NP) 263 (Ind)	58 642
3	230 (NP) 209 (NP)	57 047
4	502 (CP) 482 (CP)	38 811

Notes:

In 1990 a by-election changed the situation somewhat, to give the NP and the CP four councillors each, but with the newly elected NP-oriented mayor having a decisive vote; it should again be emphasized that the property valuations represent merely a sample and are therefore subject to factors which normally influence the accuracy of small random samples.

The results indicated the same correlation between property values and voting patterns as in previous cases, namely that municipal voters in the wards where property valuations are lower, tend to vote more conservatively. The average value of property in the samples taken in wards one and four, which the CP won, is considerably lower than in the wards which the NP and Independents won: R34 908 versus R57 844, i.e. a 65% difference. The average value of all residential property in the sample came to R46 376, which is far above the averages of the two CP-controlled wards (R31 006 and R38 811).

d) Kraaifontein

Kraaifontein is a small, predominantly Afrikaans-speaking town about 50 km north of Cape Town, and according to CP-spokesmen, its town council is the only one in the western Cape under control of the Conservative Party (*interviews*, Koos Jonker and Jan Hoon:10.9.90). Since few of the candidates stood under any party political banner during the 1988 municipal election, it was difficult to verify this claim. On the surface the Town Council seemed to be engaged only in matters of local government, with little reference to broader political issues. However, the fact that it is largely a blue-collar town, and the many references by local residents to the growing squatter problem within the boundaries of the town, necessitated more in-depth research, which turned out to have been most fruitful. After many queries and several rejections, interesting information was obtained, with the help of the Town Clerk, a Mr Du Preez, and a town councillor, a Mr

Marais. The findings confirmed the existence of four CP-members in the Town Council, in accordance with the CP's claim.

Unfortunately, determining the average property values of the four wards of Kraaifontein presented another problem insofar as all rateable property in the town was on a common list with no distinction between residential and business properties. This obstacle was overcome with the help of officials of the Town Council, who identified and excluded business, school and other non-residential properties from the common municipal valuation list.

The town is divided into four wards with two councillors to each ward, i.e. 8. The complete results of the 1988 municipal elections were as follows:

Table 4.9 Kraaifontein

Ward	Results	Average property valuation per ward in Rands
1	392 (NP) 647 (CP)	42 295
2	600 (NP) 488 (NP)	43 200
3	874 (NP) 842 (CP)	45 020
4	697 (CP) 560 (CP)	46 600

Notes:

These results represent only the votes received by the elected candidates.

The average poll in the four wards combined was 51%.

The average property valuations per ward were obtained by subtracting from the total value all the large businesses in the wards. Small business properties

which had approximately the same value of a house were included in the calculations, which may have led to distortions of the averages.

These results neither confirm nor reject the hypothesis. Several weaknesses in the structure of the research in the case of Kraaifontein may help to explain the results: the differences in property valuations between the wards were too small to be really significant; distortions caused by the influence of small businesses may have played a role; and the fact that very few of the candidates stood under party political banner during the election may also have had an influence on the findings. Purely on the basis of the statistical findings it would seem that the ward won outright by the CP had an average property value of about 8% more than the ward where both councillors were NP-orientated. However, according to Du Preez, at least three of the CP-orientated candidates would not have been elected if they had stood openly under the CP banner during the election, an opinion which may have carried some weight back in 1988, although it is doubtful whether this would be the case in 1990, as local government in many towns in the Cape Province has become just as politicized as is the case in the Transvaal.

e) Durban

The case study of the city of Durban was very interesting, for a variety of reasons: It is the largest predominantly English-speaking city in South Africa and has long had the reputation of being a relatively liberal, strongly anti-government city in a province run traditionally, at local and provincial levels, by the Opposition to the left of the government. However, following the demise of the former UP and its successor, the NRP, their supporters had to look for new political homes in the late 1980's. This led to the NP's making inroads into this traditionally anti-NP province, including at local government level.

This led to a openly-verkrampte stance by the City Council, as was illustrated by the fact that it refused to desegregate all of its beaches until it was forced to do so by the directive of the government in this regard in November 1989.

It therefore came as no surprise in October 1988 when liberal and verligte candidates just managed to keep control of the City Council. However, Durban's 'liberal' reputation became further tarnished in September 1990, when several parties and groupings in the City Council, including the National Party, formed a rightwing alliance in an attempt to oust almost all liberal councillors from influential positions on controlling committees in the council. In this the alliance succeeded so well that the city received the unofficial title as the most rightwing council of any predominantly English-speaking city in the country (M. Winter, Interview:9.10.90; Argus:26.9.90).

The fact that the NP became part of this rightwing alliance was most useful for the purpose of this research project, as it now became possible to contrast the wards won by liberal-Independents and the non-aligned but progressive Durban 2000 grouping, with those won by members of the alliance. The rightwing alliance included the NP, the CP, the rightwing Civic Action League (CAL) and conservative-minded Independents, the latter mostly coming from the defunct NRP. As with other case studies analyzed previously, the basis of the Durban project was to establish a correlation between the socio-economic position of municipal voters (as measured by the average value of their residential property), and their political preferences during the 1988 municipal elections.

During the 1988 elections only the NP and CP candidates stood under a specific party political banner, but the political identities of the Durban 2000 group (liberal/PFP) and CAL (almost as rightwing as the CP), were common knowledge. It was slightly more problematical to establish the political affiliation of Independent candidates (both

left- and right-leaning). The dilemma was solved by getting the personal view of an insider in the Durban City Council, and Deputy-Mayor, Mrs Margaret Winter, who represented ward 29 and had a wide knowledge of the political leanings of her fellow councillors. According to Mrs Winter, most of the Independents were elected on a definite political programme anyway, so the voters knew what they were voting for in these cases (Interview, M. Winter:9.10.90).

One councillor was elected for each of the thirty wards, and the results of the election left the NP in control of nine wards, the CP none, the CAL three, Durban 2000 nine (one of whom was described as rightwing). Of the remaining nine councillors elected as Independents, four were described as liberal, three as rightwing and two as neutral (ibid). In summary, a total of 12 liberal councillors was elected, against the 16 who were elected on a more politically conservative or rightwing ticket, which left two of the councillors apparently as politically neutral.

The next step was to determine whether there was a correlation between the way the various wards had voted during the 1988 elections and the average value of residential property in each of those wards, i.e. the relationship between class and ideology. In the case of Durban this proved extremely problematic, as no average private property values for the different wards were available. This necessitated, as in the case of Mossel Bay, taking a sample of residential property values from each ward, with the intention of providing a representative sample. Officials of Durban's Estates Department assisted in the selection of samples and indicated the extent to which they regarded each as representative of a whole ward.

The results of the 1988 Durban municipal election, together with relevant property evaluations per ward, are listed in table 4.9 below:

Table 4.10 Durban

A WARD NUMBER AND AREA.	B ELECTED PARTY/ASSOC. AND POLIT. ORIENTATION.	C AVE. VALUE OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY PER WARD IN RAND.	D COMBINED RIGHTWING VOTE AS A % OF THE TOTAL VOTE INCL. NP	E RIGHTWING VOTE EXCL. THE NP
1 Central	CAL (right.)	34 600	100%	51%
2 Beach	Ind.(right.)	252 000	100	69
3 Point	CAL (right.)	81 020	100	52
4 Esplan.	NP (right.)	128 500	68	29
5 Fynnland	Ind.(right.)	137 460	100	64
6 Grosvenor	NP (right.)	132 660	100	--
7 Brighton.	NP (right.)	131 780	100	31
8 Wentworth	NP (right.)	133 600	100	29
9 Woodlands	NP (right.)	94 240	100	--
10 Montclair	NP (right.)	112 140	100	--
11 Umhlat.E.	NP (right.)	121 220	68	21
12 Umhlat.W.	NP (right.)	112 820	100	--
13 Stella	Ind.(neutral)	139 860	44	--
14 Umbilo	Ind.(neutral)	145 100	40	--
15 Univers.	Ind.(lib.)	188 040	46	--
16 Glenwood	Ind.(lib.)	191 660	44	--
17 Botha Gar.	CAL (right.)	133 080	70	40
18 Albert P.	NP (right.)	131 780	100	49
19 Westridge	Dbn 2000 (lib.)	150 700	34	--
20 Essenwood	Dbn 2000 (lib.)	149 780	--	--
21 Botanic G.	Ind. (lib.)	199 800	--	--
22 Berea	Dbn 2000 (lib.)	130 680	--	--
23 Stamford	Dbn 2000(right)	135 980	100	53
24 Greyville	Ind. (lib.)	200 100	21	--
25 Mitch. P.	Dbn 2000 (lib.)	159 440	--	--
26 Mornings.	Ind. (right.)	204 080	--	54
27 Umgeni P.	Dbn 2000 (lib.)	114 180	--	--
28 North H.	Dbn 2000 (lib.)	202 180	--	--
29 Durban N.	Dbn 2000 (lib.)	199 180	--	--
30 Virginia	Dbn 2000 (lib.)	213 860	--	--

Note:

The percentages in column D which denote rightwing support include those of the NP, in the light of the party's political philosophy back in 1988 and following the party's participation in the rightwing 'coup d'etat' in the City Council in September 1990;
Column E refers only to the 'extreme Right'; it should also be realized that although Durban 2000 was a liberal grouping, one of the councillors elected under its banner was reported as having rightwing political views and this was taken into account in the final calculations.

Although one would hesitate to draw any definite conclusions based on a relatively small sample of properties as was the case with Durban, certain broad generalizations can be made:

1. The average value of the residential properties in the 30 wards of Durban, according to the sample drawn, came to R148 723.
2. Using column D as a basis, i.e. including the NP as part of the Durban-rightwing, a total of 16 wards were identified where more than 50% of the votes cast went to rightwing parties. The average value of residential property in these 16 wards was R129 821.
3. Using column E as the basis, i.e. excluding the NP from the rightwing (which then consisted of the CP, CAL and rightwing-orientated Independents), a total of seven wards were identified where this group received more than 50% of the vote. The average value of residential property in these seven wards was R139 560.
4. This left a total of 12 wards in which liberal candidates were elected, either as liberal-Independents or under the banner of Durban 2000. The average value of residential property in these 12 wards was R174 966. If the two wards where Independent candidates stood who were classified as politically-neutral were included, the average value of property in these 14 wards was R170 325. In these wards the combined rightwing received less than half of total of votes cast.

5. The average value of residential property of those wards with more than 50% rightwing support (including the NP) is considerably less than that of those wards where the rightwing received less than 50% of the vote, i.e. R129 821 v. R174 966, a difference of 35%.

6. If one compares only the two extremes on the political spectrum of the Durban city council, i.e. the rightwing CAL and the liberal Durban 2000, and leaves out for the moment all groups in the middle and those who received no representation on the council at al, e.g. the CP, the contrast becomes even more noticeable: The average value of residential property in wards won by CAL was R82 900, compared to the R165 000 of wards won by Durban 2000, a difference of 99%.

NB: for the sake of judging the political climate in Durban at present, (one year subsequent to the survey date), it could be mentioned that the CP managed to win Ward Six in August 1991, in spite of the fact that the ward was formerly held by the NP, and was not even contested by the CP in 1988. It would appear that if the NP has moved to the left within the confines of the City Council during the past 12 months, the municipal voters of Durban have stuck to the right, at least in Ward Six.

These results confirmed those of three of the other four case studies with regard to an identifiable pattern between political conservatism and whites who belong to the lower socio-economic stratum.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to explore a possible correlation between class and ideology in rightwing politics. In general the findings indicated a positive correlation, although this should be qualified as follows:

> some exceptions were noted which indicated the opposite;

> the findings were subject to the limitations in methodology, i.e. by equating individual indicators of class with class per se, and by equating values with voting

behaviour.

However, in general the overview of the historical evolvement of the HNP, and the majority of survey findings, lend support to the hypothesis, namely that class plays a considerable role in support for a racially-based ideology, whether it be located with the CP/HNP or the NP. These included research conducted by Manzo and McGowan, Rhoodie et al, Gagiano and Market and Opinion Surveys. Most other analysts cited in this chapter, e.g. Giliomee, Schlemmer, Bekker et al and Welsh, hold similar views with regard to the class base of the rightwing.

These findings correspond to the findings of researchers elsewhere, e.g. Simpson and Yinger (1985), who found strong evidence for class differentials in prejudice; Westie and Westie (1957) who found that lower-class whites in the USA expressed the greatest feelings of social distance from blacks; Stouffer (1955) who found that intolerance went up as position on the status ladder went down; and the National Opinion Research Centre in the USA (1972-1980), which found that attitudes of whites on racial intermarriage, school desegregation, interracial socializing, neighbourhood integration, became more tolerant as they achieved higher socio-economic status as measured by income or education (cited in Simpson and Yinger, 1985:67).

These findings are significant insofar as they imply that the NP could lose greater numbers of supporters to the rightwing as the policies relating to the socio-economic upliftment of blacks through increased spending on education, housing and welfare services, continue to erode the privileged socio-economic position of whites. Although the government's economic upliftment policies were aimed at narrowing the gap between the economic positions of white and black, the inevitable consequence in a stagnating economy such as that of South Africa during most of the

1980's, was a decline in the rate of white incomes. Pierre du Toit mentions that the income of "Africans" increased from 19% in 1970 to 45% in 1985, while the economy grew e.g. by only 0,4% between 1980 and 1987 (1991:42-70). Giliomee (1989) mentions that white wages actually declined (presumably in real terms) by 9,7% between 1975 and 1979.

The perception among many whites was that the government is busy with a voluntary redistribution of wealth in favour of blacks. As whites move down on the socio-economic ladder, their political views most likely would also become more rigid, if the experience of other societies is anything to go by. Furthermore, much of future political reform in South Africa will probably occur at the level of local government, e.g. the scrapping of the Group Areas Act, the complete opening of white schools and the introduction of non-racial local government structures. It can be expected that at local level, lower-class whites will strongly resist reforms which affect them directly, as in the case of the repeal of above measures. The repeal of the Group Areas Act is a good example: the repeal of this Act will primarily affect (racist) whites at the lower-end of the socio-economic stratum, as it is their neighbourhoods which are likely to become desegregated most rapidly, since homes in these localities will be more affordable by blacks than those in the more affluent areas. Support for the Conservative Party in the wards with lower property values in the towns and cities researched, illustrates this point very clearly.

Having established a correlation between class factors and the emergence of the rightwing and its current support base, it can safely be assumed that lower-class whites support the rightwing parties because of a firm conviction that their policies, if implemented, would imply a return to the former system of socio-economic subsidies and privileges guaranteed and provided for by the state. The NP has been curtailing preferential treatment of farmers and white workers since the 1970's, exacerbating the pattern of

steady decline in their living standards. However, as only about 40% of the CP's support is located in the lower-middle income group, the above proposition does not explain why so many Afrikaners from higher income and educational groups support the CP, nor why they would support a Party whose policies would surely bring about a greater degree of ruinous international economic sanctions. In addition it does explain why supporters of constitutional policies aimed at secession, as suggested by the Volkstaters and the Oranjewerkers, would be prepared to endure considerable economic hardships to achieve their goal of self-determination within an artificially-created homogeneous territory.

The explanation for this 'seemingly irrational political behaviour, lies with the 'ethnic dynamic' suggested by Horowitz, i.e. the collective drive for ethnic power and status, and an analysis of this phenomenon forms the basis for chapter five.

5. THE ROOTS OF AFRIKANER NATIONALISM: IDENTITY AND STATUS ISSUES

> As I have suggested, Afrikaner political behaviour over the centuries was underpinned by two motivating and justifying forces: nationalist aspiration and racial ideology (Horowitz, 1991:13).

The previous chapter dealt with class factors as a possible explanation for the existence of the rightwing. In general, the evidence cited supported the contention that the rightwing phenomenon had strong roots in the desire of Afrikaners (and whites in general) on the lower-end of the economic spectrum to protect their economic privileges, possessions and relatively high standard of living (compared to that of their black compatriots). Class issues however, do not fully explain rightwing political behaviour, and when measured against the powerful and emotional characteristics of an ethnic group's striving for status and honour, it comes a poor second.

This chapter addresses the nationalist aspirations of the rightwing as the vehicle to obtain political power with which to protect Afrikaner status and identity. It is, however, argued that these aspirations are, for the largest part, founded in ethnocentrism and racism, which in turn, are partially rooted in anxiety and the fear of group domination and genocide. Such an interpretation of nationalist aspirations results in Afrikaner nationalism being equated with racism and white supremacy, and prevents it from receiving a favourable comparison with the universally accepted principle of self-determination of peoples.

The concept of racism is closely related that of ethnocentrism and white supremacy, and denotes a belief in the superiority of a particular race, which, by implication, provides grounds for the justification of racial discrimination. Although accusations of racism are strongly rejected by all but the most extreme rightwing

organizations, evidence cited substantiates the belief that racism is an inherent part of the rightwing psyche. The third aspect is fear, which is also linked to the previous two aspects, insofar as it is a causal factor of the existence of both nationalism and racism (i.e. the fear by a group of losing its identity by being assimilated into a different group). But the scope of rightwing fear is much more extensive than merely losing the Afrikaner identity, since it also encompasses the fear of physical survival and it is illustrated in this chapter how important the fear of genocide, expulsion, violence and revenge has become within the rightwing psyche. A complete analysis of racism and fear would ideally also include a discussion of individual personality processes and prejudice, as explained by the social psychological theories dealing with e.g. the frustration-aggression and the authoritarian-personality approaches. These however, fall outside the scope of this study, and are therefore referred to only superficially.

Although the issues relating to nationalism, racism and fear are discussed separately, they are strongly interrelated. In this respect this chapter follows Horowitz (1985:179), who claims that a correlation exists between group self-esteem, anxiety and prejudice. Prejudice allows for a discharge of hostility, thereby reducing anxiety, and the degree of group self-esteem (status-related) determines the degree of hostility towards other groups (ibid). Viewing these three issues as interrelated allows for an understanding of the 'ethnic dynamic' which drives a group to seek power with which to dominate other groups or to prevent being dominated itself. As Horowitz said: "Power may be desired, not only for the lesser things it can gain, but for the greater things it reflects and prevents" (1985:187). The need to confirm the status of the Afrikaner in response to a challenge of its legitimacy, is reflected in the high degree of symbolism so characteristic of Afrikaner nationalism in times of political change.

5.1. THE ROLE OF NATIONALISM

> If the process of rapid change removes people from the roles and positions they had once occupied ...they will be unable to identify themselves in terms of what they do and their social relationships with others .... Such people will have to fasten upon those attributes they 'carry' around with themselves, such as language, religion and skin colour. Nationalism bases itself upon an appeal to precisely such attributes(Gellner, 1964).

The consequences of the process of modernization to which Gellner refers, could easily be made applicable to the position of rightwing Afrikaners as the society enters the transitional period leading away from white minority rule towards democracy. The "attributes" mentioned by Gellner, are the primordial characteristics which distinguish ethnic groups from one another, and can lead to conflict because of the: "common evaluative significance accorded...to acknowledged group differences and then played out in public rituals of affirmation and contradiction" (Horowitz, 1985:227).

This section of chapter five deals with the importance attached by rightwing Afrikaner nationalists to primordial issues such as the Afrikaans language, Reformed religion, Afrikaner history and common 'fatherland', as a way to confirm the status of the Afrikaner as a distinct nation entitled to self-determination in its own territory. The concept of nationalism basically refers to the political expression of a shared ethnic consciousness by people sharing any number of the following: a common area, descent, language, religion, history or custom. However, it becomes more problematic when these common denominators are perceived by a people in an emotional and chauvinistic way, leading to ethnocentrism.

Ethnocentrism, a term coined by W.G. Sumner in 1906 and denoting attitudes which suppose the superiority of one's own ethnic or racial group, has become the hallmark of the white rightwing. Its ethnocentric interpretation of

nationalism has combined the 'positive' aspects of nationalism, such as the desire to protect and promote the Afrikaner language and religion, with ethnocentric notions of the 'superiority' of the Afrikaner people and the white race, over 'inferior' black peoples. Ethnocentrism by itself does not necessarily imply hostility towards other groups, according to Slabbert and Welsh (1979:12), who define the concept as "the propensity to evaluate one's own group in more favourable terms than other groups". However, according to these authors, it does contain a predisposition to regard other groups as different, which in turn may lead to the view that these groups are inferior.

For the rightwing, as in the case of the NP after 1948, Afrikaner nationalism was the guiding principle, and led to the perception that this form of nationalism was unique and superior in all respects. Like the NP before it, the rightwing attempted to interpret the elements of Afrikaner nationalism in a way that would serve its ideology of self-determination and racially-based territorial separation. The element of nationalism which constitutes the most important part of the rightwing psyche, is the firm belief in the right of self-determination as an Afrikaner people and in the case of the CP, a white 'nation', based on the following premises: common European-based languages, i.e. Afrikaans/English; shared customs and history based on three hundred years of settlement in Africa; a common Christian religion; a shared group consciousness as whites; a common territory based on the geographical area of 'white' South Africa.

The above are broad generalizations, and as indicated in chapter three, differences on the particulars do exist among the various rightwing groups, e.g. the various definitions of the term 'Afrikaner' (denoting respectively Afrikaans-speaking whites, 'Boers' or all whites sympathetic to the Afrikaner's cause). A further difference between rightwing organizations is over the definition of

group's claim to nationhood. As mentioned in chapter two, some scholars such as Juan Linz argue that primordial ties such as language, religion, race, and descent, constitute a weak and insufficient basis for the creation of a nation-state, and that ethnic groups, once mobilized, would shift to a territorial conception of nationhood. Giliomee (1992:346) argues that this also happened in the case of Afrikaner nationalism when Vorster and his successors shifted from an ethnic to a territorial nationalism, first for whites and later to include coloureds and Indians (and under De Klerk, blacks as well). However, the NP's shift left the door wide open for the rightwing to focus on the primordial issues which the NP previously used very successfully to mobilize Afrikanerdom. Although the CP took care not to offend its considerable English-speaking constituency by emphasizing 'white' supremacy and domination, it focussed with the same intensity as other rightwing organizations on issues such as the Afrikaner culture, language, religion and mythology to mobilize its core supporters.

5.1.1 Primordialism: Cultural issues

The importance and the dangers involved in the process of cultural socialisation are explained by Simpson and Yinger (1985:43):

> In almost every society, if not all, each new generation is taught what are considered to appropriate beliefs regarding other groups. Such beliefs are part of the folkways; we learn them in the same way as we learn other beliefs, attitudes, and values. Belief in the superiority of one's own group is as natural to the dominant members of many societies as the belief in the rightness of their marriage customs or their political structures. The speech and action of others, one's observation of status differentials among races, the jokes, the histories, the rewards and punishments for various actions towards members of minority groups all teach one the correct behaviour as it is defined by society.

Cultural ethnicity, according to Adam and Moodley includes language (as a decisive identity-forming device), religious beliefs (which frequently include rules of endogamy and exclusion) and regional particularities (such as music, food, customs, and accent). The authors claim furthermore that:

> a good case can be made for its perpetuation and cultivation if group members so desire [because] cultural ethnicity is inextricably intertwined with individual identity (1986:29-33) .

However, the concept of cultural ethnicity has been politicized by the Afrikaner nationalists, who view a separate political identity as a precondition for cultural survival (ibid).

According to Horowitz (1985:217-222), language is a powerful symbol of domination because its status denotes the status of the group that speaks it. This is also the case in South Africa, where Afrikaans, being an official language, conferred and confirmed the special status of the Afrikaner nation. Cultural ethnicity has been a useful tool in the hands of the rightwing in its efforts to re-mobilise Afrikaner nationalism in the 1980's. The Afrikaans language forms a crucial part of this process and is regarded as one of the major justifications for the right of the Afrikaner to exist as a sovereign nation (Zille, 1988:69). The survival of Afrikaans is seen as a function of education, and for this reason the rightwing insists on separate schools and educational institutions.

Some factions of the rightwing view the primacy of the Afrikaans language with more fervour than others, e.g. the growth in the CP's support among English-speakers resulted in the Party making an effort to include the latter group into the rightwing community. For the HNP, the AWB, the Boerestaat Party and others, the 'purity' of the Boer or Afrikaner people is not negotiable, while the latter two organizations even reject the term 'Afrikaner' in favour of

'Boer', for historical reasons. The leader of the Boerestaat Party, Robert van Tonder, refers to Afrikaans spoken in the Transvaal and OFS as Boeretaal or Boeraans (Van Tonder, 1990:65).

The rightwing's religious beliefs are based on Calvinist Protestantism. According to Zille (1988:66), this has a profound influence on its view of things, in particular the belief that its nationhood has been "divinely ordained and enjoys divine sanction". This element of the rightwing philosophy has its roots firmly in the traditional Afrikaner belief system, the latter described by Moodie as the Afrikaner civil religion:

> The roots of the Afrikaner doctrine of election grew out of the Calvinism of Paul Kruger and the experience of the Boer War, and the young shoots of Afrikaner nationalism were nurtured in the post-Boer War language movement. The divine agent of the Afrikaner civil faith is Christian and Calvinist - an active sovereign God, who calls the elect, who promises and punishes, who brings forth life from death in the course of history. The object of His saving activity - the Afrikaner People - is not a church, [or] a community of the saved, [but] a whole nation with its distinct language and culture, its own history and destiny (1975:xvii).

Various interpretations of the origins and precise nature of the Afrikaner's belief in himself as part of a 'chosen' people, exists and neccessitates a brief explanation: Loubser (1968) argues that the Calvinist distinction between the elect and the damned led to a natural classification of the 'heathen' as the damned and that widespread beliefs tended to serve widespread interests - this belief system gave meaning to the existence of the frontiersmen living in isolation and it justified hostile acts. Ridge (1987:103-109) provides an analysis of two divergent opinions of the 'Israelite myth', in particular the aspects of 'Chosen People and Promised Land'. Whereas Van Jaarsveld argued that the Voortrekkers literally

applied themselves to the history of Israel, Andre' du Toit argues that even though the Voortrekkers directly applied the vocabulary from the Bible to their own situation, this is not the same as literally identifying themselves with the Israel of the Old Testament, as the Lords's Chosen People. Ridge argues that much of the use by the Voortrekkers of Israelite analogies is more literary than literal and cites examples which refer to Natal as the "promised land"; of the Voortrekkers entering the wilderness without a "Moses and Aaron"; and Kruger's use of the words "God's people" to describe his Boers. Ridge concludes with the contention that the Voortrekkers did not see themselves as a 'chosen people' in any dogmatic way, but rather used a cluster of Israelite metaphors to give some tentative form to their own view of themselves.

Although all but the most extremist rightwing organizations deny that they regard the Afrikaners are members of a 'chosen people' destined to rule others because of a divinely ordained superiority, most rightwingers believe that the Afrikaner nationhood enjoys divine sanction (Zille, 1988:66). In this respect, events with historical and religious significance to the Afrikaner were appropriated by the rightwing, in a very similar fashion to the NP during the first half of the 20th century. The events which are discussed here are all based on historical facts, but presented or interpreted in such a way as to justify the Afrikaner nationalist ideology as propagated by the rightwing. They include the Slagtersnek Rebellion, the Great Trek, the Covenant, the Anglo-Boer War and the 1914 Rebellion.

Before discussing these events which form the basis of what Leonard Thompson (1985) refers to as Afrikaner nationalist mythology, a brief look at the educational system which helped to facilitate this phenomenon is necessary. Christian National Education (CNE) refers to primary, secondary and even tertiary education which sought to indoctrinate Afrikaner youth with the fundamentals of

Afrikaner nationalism and Calvinistic Christianity. CNE led to young Afrikaners being brought up in the belief of the superiority of their religion and their people. The impression created by Afrikaner educationalists of racial superiority was an integral part of Afrikaner and white education and undoubtedly played an important part in ideological indoctrination of most of today's Afrikaners. This was recently confirmed by H.J. van Daalden, Professor of Industrial Sociology at the University of Fort Hare, who said: "Researchers aiming at a better understanding of the Barend Strydom syndrome should focus their research on the Std.2 history curriculum" (Rapport:21.7.91) (Strydom killed eight blacks in Pretoria in 1988 because he believed blacks were inferior people and deserved to have their numbers reduced).

A communication analyst, J.M. du Preez (1986), made a study of the indoctrination in schools and identified the following master symbols which appeared in the prescribed history, geography and literature books of Afrikaans schoolchildren, and were intended to project the 'God-given' 'superiority' and 'special' status of whites and Afrikaners in South Africa:

>> Legal authority is never questioned and since the leader of the country acts in accordance with directives from God, criticism of him would be tantamount to treason;
>> whites are superior, blacks inferior, and the former have to fulfil their paternal duty towards the latter by acting in a firm and just way;
>> the Afrikaner has a very special relationship with God and has entered into a covenant with God; South Africa rightfully belongs to the Afrikaner and comparisons are drawn with Israel and the promised land;
>> South Africa is seen as an agricultural land and the Afrikaners as farmers, while rural life is glorified and city life often described as alien and dangerous;

>> South Africa is seen as a hard and hostile land while the Afrikaners are seen as an uncompromising people who not only are able to cope with these elements, but in fact enjoy the hardships, in accordance with their puritanical perspective of life;
>> the Afrikaner is seen as an independent being who lives in isolation, is physically strong and instilled with tradition;
>> the symbolism of David and Goliath is used to illustrate the fact that the the Afrikaner, although totally outnumbered, is strong and clever enough to stand up against any enemy, and the overwhelming British forces during the Anglo-Boer war are frequently used as an example;
>> threats are perceived to come from all sides, whether they be by the English, the communists, blacks, urbanisation, poverty, immigrants, capitalism (geldmagte) or the international community.

Du Preez's main argument is that the system of symbols adopted by Afrikaners had serious shortcomings insofar as it lacked objectivity and was out of touch with modern industrial society. Furthermore, she argued that Afrikaner children had inadequate role models, which promoted a paternalistic way of life and which tended to be prejudiced against any form of change and progress. This archaic system of symbols, according to Du Preez, was the reason why so many Afrikaners were unable to adapt to political and social changes since the 1970's, an observation confirmed by Thompson (1985:237):

> Nevertheless, most Afrikaners of the younger as well as the older generations retain from their schooling a generalized assumption that racial and ethnic categories are fundamental, a strong sense of identity as Afrikaners and as white South Africans, and indeed, a belief in the master symbols.

With reference to the first master symbol identified by Du Preez, namely that the legitimate authority of the state

should never be challenged, a qualification should be made: the history of the Afrikaner is characterized by an inclination to rebel against authority when the state is perceived as not acting in the best interests of the volk. Apart from the events at Slagtersnek in 1815, this proclivity manifested itself in several other events in Afrikaner history, e.g. the Great Trek, the 1914 Rebellion (although the DRC opposed these two events), the 1922 Rand Rebellion, the resistance against participation in World War Two, and the activities of rightwing organizations over the past two decades. With elements of the rightwing challenging the state more openly in recent years by accusing it of treacherous behaviour and threatening to resist its reformist direction with armed resistance, it is clear that this rebellious streak is still very prominent.

In this vein, Andries Treurnicht, in August 1990, defended the right of Afrikaners to confront the government on the grounds that

> God appoints governments, citizens should accept their authority, but that this authority is limited and should not be obeyed at all costs; therefore, if laws made by a government which defy God's will or interfere with the freedom of the nation (volksvryhede), such laws should not be obeyed (Die Burger:20.8.90) [translation].

A rightwing educationist from UNISA, J.J. Pienaar, explains the rightwing view on Christian National Education (CNE) as follows: the rightwing rejects the term 'Christian National Education' on grounds that the terminology has been "hijacked" by integrationists, and suggests that it should instead be referred to as Christelik-volkseie Onderwys, roughly translated as Christian Peoples Education. Pienaar rejects the holistic interpretation of the term 'Christian', as it indicates that one must support the revolution of the oppressed against their oppressors and should be prepared to compromise and to accommodate to such an extent that "you would assist your own nation's downfall and see it as God's will" (Patriot:13.8.90). Pienaar also objects to the 'liberal' interpretation of the term

'national', which implies the accommodation of all inhabitants of a country, irrespective of race, colour, religion or gender in one state. For these reasons he prefers the description of volkseie, which clearly refers to the exclusivity of the Afrikaner nation. According to Pienaar, the basic requirements for Christelik-volkseie Onderwys stipulate that it should be aimed at promoting both personal and national identity; it should be founded in the Scriptures. Here he mentions several books of the Bible which, according to him, reject the integration of nations within one dispensation based on equality, e.g. Psalms 86:9 and the Acts of the Apostles 17:26. Finally, it should acknowledge the existence of a separate Afrikaner nation based on the Will of God (Patriot: 13.8.90).

5.1.2 Primordialism: The Evolvement of a Shared History and Mythology

It can be assumed that the shared historical experiences of the Afrikaner during three hundred years of settlement in South Africa, played a major role in the thought processes of the rightwing movement today. Afrikaner nationalism, which forms the basis of the rightwing movement, is in itself a product of the centuries-old conflict between an embattled minority of Afrikaners and their opponents, which ranged from indigenous black opponents, to the British empire, to mass-poverty, to the Roomse, Swart and Rooi Gevaar (the Roman Catholic Church, and black and communist-inspired Total Onslaught). Regardless of the nature of the enemy, successive conflict situations have given the Afrikaner an eventful history to fall back on, interspersed with heroic battles, heroic personalities and epics, all of which were invoked during the process of ethnic mobilization in the twentieth century. The historically-founded emotions and demands which are part of Afrikaner politics today, can probably best be described as the 'desire never to lose sovereignty again'. It is present not only in rightwing politics, but also in the National Party, which has incorporated into its post-1989 reform policies the 'willingness to share power, but a refusal

ever to capitulate'.

Several historical events helped to shape the Afrikaner psyche and to awaken its national consciousness. Some of these events, such as the Great Trek and the Anglo-Boer War, are today symbolically used by the rightwing to prove that it, and not the National Party, is the real representative of Afrikanerdom. This virtual 'hijacking' of Afrikaner history by the Right was most clearly illustrated during the commemorative celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the symbolic 1938 Great Trek in 1988, when it not only secured the Voortrekker Monument, shrine of Afrikanerdom, for its celebrations, but also drew vastly greater numbers of Afrikaners to its event than that of the official government-sponsored gathering (see chapter two). What follows is a discussion of the historical events which played a significant part in Afrikaner history and had an influence on its collective psyche, and became part of the Afrikaner mythology, later to be appropriated by the rightwing.

Apart from the exhausting border wars against the Xhosa and the constant 'interference' by the distant British colonial government in Cape Town, one particular incident left a deep mark on the consciousness of the colonists in the Eastern Cape. This was the Slagtersnek Rebellion of 1815, which had its roots in white opposition to the Black Circuit of 1812, which investigated alleged cases of maltreatment of black servants by the colonists. When a farmer called Frederick Bezuidenhout was killed trying to resist arrest as ordered by the court, about sixty colonists rebelled against the British authority. After they were subjugated, the execution of five rebels was bungled, which led to a belief among the colonists of Divine intervention, and the lack of compassion from the authorities resulted in great bitterness. Thompson regards Slagtersnek as a typical secular myth of Afrikaner nationalist history, rooted in actual history but deviating from the facts, and used to activate colonial resistance to British cultural and political imperialism:

So long as Great Britain seemed a serious threat to

their group interests, Afrikaner poets, journalists, politicians, teachers and historians made it penetrate deep into the minds of their people (1985:142) .

Of much greater significance was the Great Trek, an event which occurred in response to what the Eastern Cape colonists regarded as an interference in their affairs by by the Colonial government in Cape Town. Much of the dissatisfaction originated in the emancipation of slaves and the issue of equalization of the Khoikhoi before the law, which were regarded by the white colonists as being in conflict with Biblical prescriptions and with natural distinctions of origin and belief (Leatt et al, 1986:71). These perceptions accompanied the Voortrekkers during the Great Trek of the 1830's, and were re-enforced after the series of battles with black groups in the interior.

According to Davenport (1987:53) the Trek was used by Afrikaner historians and ideologues as a milestone in the development of conscious Afrikaner nationalism, and it became the central event in the evolution of the Afrikaner mystique. Thompson (1985:180) concurs:

> The Great Trek became the central theme in the Afrikaner nationalist mythology that came to maturity in the first half of the twentieth century ...And at the core of the story was the Covenant.

Thompson explains how Voortrekker leaders such as Retief, Pretorius and Cilliers became heroic figures, and how events such as happened at Blaauwkrantz and Blood River, and the Voortrekker Monument became sacred to Afrikaner nationalists during the 20th century.

Having appropriated Afrikaner nationalism, it followed that the 'sacred history' of the Great Trek also became a dominant part of the rightwing mythology. Of particular importance to the Afrikaner and especially to the rightwing today, is the Battle of Blood River, where the Voortrekkers defeated the Zulu and entered into a Covenant with God, to commemorate the day of victory as a sacred day in perpetuity. Whereas the Government has tried to scale down

the racial undertones of the Day of the Vow in recent years, and especially during the 150th anniversary of the event in 1988, the rightwing regards it with extreme reverence and as proof that the Afrikaner does have divine blessing for his mission in South Africa. Andries Treurnicht describes the CP's view of the Covenant as follows:

> [The Day of the Covenant] is the day when Afrikaners thank God for our deliverance and commemorate a particular historical battle in which our people survived and which brought us to safety (cited by Thompson, 1985:226).

Another event of great consequence in the Afrikaner and rightwing mythology was that of the Anglo-Boer War. The courageous manner in which the outnumbered Republican Boers conducted the war, the tremendous suffering of non-combatants in British concentration camps, the aggressive post-war anglicization policy, the loss of prosperity and ultimately freedom, left an indelible mark on the national consciousness of the Afrikaner to this day. It led to bitterness between Afrikaner and English-speaker which even now provides for a dilemma among rightwing organizations, which have difficulty reconciling Afrikaner nationalism and the primacy of the Afrikaner culture with the greater practical need for a common white rightwing front.

Apart from the fact that the Afrikaners in the Boer Republics again lost their independence, Boer homes and farms were destroyed and their families placed in concentration camps, eventually leading to the death of almost 28 000 women and children because of poor medical conditions and disease (Davenport, 1977:217). The emotions among Afrikaners over the concentration camps deaths were very intense and recollections of sufferings are part of many Afrikaner family traditions. Today, almost a century later this remains an emotional issue in rightwing circles and the Vrouemonument in Bloemfontein has become another one of its shrines. Van Tonder describes this aspect of the war as follows:

> Britain fought for three years but could not defeat the Boers. Then began the largest instance of genocide in modern history - 35 000 homes in the Transvaal and Free State were burnt down and all our women and children were thrown in concentration camps. These were the first concentration camps in the world, in which the British purposefully killed 27 000 defenseless people (Van Tonder, 1990:26) [translation].

The guerrilla warfare, which the Boers fought with great skill, also left the rightwing with its share of hero's, such as Cronje, De La Rey, and De Wet. Paul Kruger enjoys reverential admiration and his statue on Church Square in Pretoria and his grave in Heroes' Acre in a cemetery in Pretoria are seen by the rightwing as part of its heritage. In 1989 the AWB and other rightwing groups chose Church Square to make a stand against the policies of the government. Hundreds of supporters gathered on the square using physical force to keep black onlookers at a distance, while gathering into a laager with women and children on the inside (Sunday Star:24.9.89). The monument at Paardekraal, where the Boers decided to declare war on Britain in 1899, also became a shrine, especially to the AWB, which has held rallies at the venue.

Another emotional issue which had its roots in the final phases of the Anglo-Boer War, concerned the divisions between the bittereinders (those who wanted to keep on fighting) and the hensoppers (those who preferred peace above further conflict). Many of the latter joined the British army to fight against their fellow Boers. These divisions between Afrikaners persisted throughout the 20th century albeit in different guises, and were translated into the broedertwis between verligte and verkampte Afrikaners during the post-1966 era. Patriot (3.8.90) explains the division between bittereinder and hensopper/joiner in historical perspective, in an article entitled "Realists and Traitors":

> The divisions between these two groups originated in the Boer war when a group of Afrikaners decided after the occupation of Pretoria and Johannesburg, that since the war could not be won anymore, peace should be sought to avoid any further bloodshed - this argument developed even further into open collaboration when Boers joined the enemy forces [translation].

The latter are referred to by the Patriot as the 'realists' or hensoppers. According to the newspaper this tendency continued throughout the 1914 Rebellion and again during the Ossewa Brandwag era of the 1940's. Even today, Patriot argues, the "so-called realists" base their philosophy on the belief that the whites are in a minority anyway, and that there is no sense in further opposing black majority government, hence the reform and surrender tactics of the National Party government.

A related theme was that of treachery, which was present throughout the Anglo-Boer War and emerged occasionally afterwards to describe the behaviour of any member of the Afrikaner people who was deemed to have turned his back on the volk. This was the case during South African participation in the two World Wars when the country fought on the side of its previous enemy, Britain. Van Tonder describes the suppression of the 1914 Rebellion by Smuts and Botha as "the action of two former anglicized Boer leaders who turned against their own people" (1990:28). The theme of treachery again became prominent in speeches by rightwingers following February 1989 and the new era of reforms by the De Klerk administration: "The members of the NP have become a lot of traitors" (Koos van der Merwe, Hansard:6.2.90); "The NP is committing acts of treason against its own people" (Moolman Mentz, Patriot:7.6.91); "If one disregards the land of one's own people, it is akin to treachery" (Andries Treurnicht, Patriot:7.6.91) [translations].

The Anglo-Boer War and its consequences remained an

important rallying call for many rightwing Afrikaners. Apart from its earlier force as an historical grievance that contributed to the strengthening of Afrikaner nationalism, it has also become the historical raison d'etre for the claims made by the extreme right organizations such as the AWB and the Boerestaat Party which are demanding the restoration of the Boer Republics. This claim is based on the territory which was occupied by the Boers in the Transvaal, Free Sate and Vryheid, and which enjoyed internationally recognized independence until 1902.

According to Robert van Tonder these sovereign states

> were wrongfully seized by the English in 1902 after the English War and forcefully incorporated with the Union of South Africa....they are our territory, we've fought for them, we were first to settle on them. We trekked for them, we say, give it back (Argus:26.7.90).

The emotional and symbolic relevance of the Anglo-Boer War to the rightwing is undeniable. The reverence with which the rightwing views the Vrouemonument in Bloemfontein, the shots fired at the British Embassy in Pretoria in 1990 and bomb attack on Melrose House, scene of the Boer surrender in 1902, are evidence thereof (Argus:26.7.90). The Conservative Party has also made it part of its rhetoric to speak of the Derde Vryheidsoorlog (third war of freedom), obviously drawing comparisons with the previous such wars in 1880-81 and in 1899-1902 (Die Burger:15.8.90).

Other symbols carried over from the Anglo-Boer War and used in particular by the Boerestaat Party and the AWB include the Vierkleur (the Four Colour flag) of the former Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek, and its former national anthem, Ken u die volk (the Vierkleur is today even used by the Boksburg Town Council).

Another event of great symbolic significance to the rightwing is the 1914 Rebellion, which occurred in response to the decision of the South African government to join the

First World War on the side of Britain. It was unthinkable to many Afrikaners to join forces with their former (British) enemy which had humiliated them a mere 12 years previously and, furthermore, the supposed enemy, Germany, had been sympathetic to the Boer cause during the Anglo-Boer War. Some Arikaners also saw it as an opportunity to rid themselves of British domination. The rebellion was suppressed within weeks by the Smuts-Botha government using only Afrikaner troops (Davenport, 1977:272). Many existing Boer heroes like De Wet, Beyers, Kemp and Maritz, became involved but never succeeded in organizing their campaigns properly. The rebels were, in the words of the Patriot (3.8.90), "systematically dispersed, defeated, humiliated and imprisoned", although most historians are of opinion that the Smuts/Botha government dealt very leniently with the rebels, executing only one, namely Jopie Fourie. The execution of Jopie Fourie became an especially sensitive issue among Afrikaner rebels. Fourie was executed because he failed to resign his Commission in the army and technically committed high treason. His bravery (he faced his executioners without a blindfold, while singing a psalm), turned him into an instant legend. According to Patriot (3.8.90), the rebellion imprinted a "great truth" into the consciousness of the Afrikaner, namely that the "nation's honour is often saved by small groups of men and women who face the greatest odds against them" (no doubt referring to the rightwing's 'struggle' against an overwhelming tide of non-racialism).

The rebellion was very successful if measured against its contribution to Afrikaner nationalism, as Davenport (1977:272) aptly says: "Yet the rebellion added to the Afrikaner hall of fame producing more legends and martyrs to inspire a new nationalist movement in the 1930's". According to Moodie (1975:11) the execution of Jopie Fourie reaffirmed, but also brought to a close, the theme of Afrikaner suffering which started in 1806 with the British occupation of the Cape. Although the 1914 Rebellion may

have brought an end to the period of the 'sacred history' of the Afrikaner, the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 created new opportunities for elements within Afrikaner nationalism to espouse new symbols, some of which have remained important to this day among organizations such as the AWB and others.

The decision of the government to participate in the Second World War on the side of Britain led many Afrikaners actively to resist such a move. Admiration for certain aspects of the National Socialist ideology of Hitler, led to the formation of the Ossewa Brandwag (OB) during the war. It was initially a cultural organization, formed with the ideal of maintaining Afrikaner values derived from the Great Trek, promoting patriotism and organizing cultural events which would revive Afrikaner nationalism, e.g. public festivals, wreathlayings, target-shoots, jukskei matches, camps, lectures on folk history and folk literature (Davenport, 1977:333). The OB was further influenced by the ideology of national socialism, especially with regard to its belief in the primacy of the nation, and also by its belief in the superiority of the white race (Liebenberg, 1989:24), although it was left to another organization, the Greyshirts under leadership of Louis Weichardt, to become the foremost champion of anti-semitism in South Africa. The OB developed a more militant character under Hans Van Rensburg and succeeded in attracting several hundred thousand members, but generally did not commit acts of violence or sabotage until 1942. Its alter-ego, the Stormjaers, did commit sabotage by blowing up railway lines and vital installations (ibid).

The real significance of the neo-fascist organizations can be found in the fact that they, to a large extent, became the spiritual forefather of the present AWB and other rightwing groups such as the Afrikaner National Socialists. Similarities between the fascist organizations of the 1940's and those of today are especially visible in their approaches to violence, their obsession with the primacy of the volk, the extraordinary cult of 'The Leader',

anti-semitism, and symbols like flags and emblems. The OB's belief that a state can represent only one nation, and that the individual can subsist only within the sphere of the nation, is also present in the AWB philosophy, in addition to the concept of racial superiority.

Furthermore, the AWB's threats of violence and accusations of treachery are strongly reminiscent of behaviour of the OB and Greyshirts in the 1940's. The claim by the OB that the supporters of the Union government were traitors (Kruger, 1969:208), is comparable to the AWB's and the CP's accusations of the treachery committed by the De Klerk Administration. Furthermore, almost all rightwing organizations have threatened the government with violent resistance if it were to hand over the country to blacks (see chapter six). According to the leader of the AWB, Eugene Terre'Blanche, there are parallels between the 1914 rebellion, the activities of the OB during the Second World War, and the situation today:

> In 1914 the Boers would not accept even a white British authority. In 1939 they wanted to back out of the war and they saw a chance, by violence, to win back their freedom - even from the civilised, white British who had brought in such vast funds and contributed so much to development....It is unthinkable that the Boers should now accept a [ANC] government whose leaders have already declared war on them [the Boers] (The Argus:25.7.90).

The other similarity between the fascist organizations in the 1940's and the rightwing today, is the adherence to anti-semitism. This phenomenon was fairly wide-spread throughout the Afrikaner society during the 1940's, e.g. D.F. Malan initiated a NP proposal in Parliament demanding that Jewish immigration to the country should be stopped and that Jews be refused entry to certain occupations, while H.F. Verwoerd also demanded a quota system to prevent Jews from entering businesses and the professions (Moodie, 1975166-167). However, the most virulent form of

anti-semitism came from the Greyshirts under Weichardt, who planned to rule by dictatorship like Hitler, which coincidently, also corresponds to the dictatorship idea in the original AWB Programme of Principles (Kemp, 1990:19). In the same programme the AWB explains its view of the Jews as follows:

> True to the methods of the anti-Christ, which resides in International Judaism, this anti-Christ has carefully stretched its tentacles around the resources of the fatherland (ibid).

Terre'Blanche also suggested that South African Jews should not be allowed to vote and, in 1987 he joined with the Afrikaner National socialists in commemorating the death of Hitler's former deputy, Rudolph Hess (Kemp, 1990:78, 154).

Other similarities between the AWB and the fascism of the 1940's can be found in the symbols and emblems of the organization. Its distinctive triple seven flag has a strong similarity to the Nazi flag, insofar as the black-coloured swastika appears quite similar to the three sevens (also in black), while the red and white background colours also correspond. Although the AWB claims that the emblem of the three sevens was chosen because it stands in direct contrast to the triple-six emblem of the 'anti-Christ', the organization's former deputy leader, Jan Groenewald admitted later that German history influenced the AWB's choice of flag. Similarly the AWB's choice of the eagle as an emblem also appears to have Nazi origins, although the organization denies this, claiming instead that it has its origins in the Bible and in the coat-of-arms of the former Boer Republics (Kemp, 1990:151).

Author Hans Strydom (Sunday Times:29.4.90) sees other striking similarities between today's extreme right and the OB: Both the OB and AWB disclaim parliamentary politics but both use political arms (OB:National Party and the AWB:CP and HNP). The OB saw the war as an opportunity to rid South Africa of British rule and regarded Hitler as an ally, while the AWB is demanding the restoration of independence of the Boer Republics and is fighting to prevent the

Afrikaner-controlled state from being replaced by a non-racial or black dominated state. The Vierkleur was the flag of the former ZAR and just as thousands of these flags were seen at OB meetings, so they are seen today at AWB meetings. Both organizations found strong support among the police - e.g. Robey Leibbrandt, the Nazi agent who came back to South Africa to organize anti-government resistance during the War; both Terre'Blanche of the AWB and Piet Rudolph were former policemen. Furthermore, Strydom claims that large sections of the police were supportive of Leibrandt and in some cases even refused to help with the investigation against him or to put up a "wanted" poster of Leibbrandt in their police stations (ibid); Similarly the investigators who were trying to apprehend Piet Rudolph complained that they could not trust anyone, and it was not surprising that Rudolph remained free for so long.

Although it is apparently the case that the AWB and other rightwing organizations derive some of their ideology and style from a particular strand within historical Afrikaner nationalism, and there are even office-bearers in the AWB who themselves were OB activists (e.g. Manie Maritz), it is an exaggeration to claim that the AWB is merely some form of a resurrected OB. The social context of the 1940's and the 1980's differ widely. Morever, as Strydom notes, the organizations also differ considerably: the OB was a mass movement (400 000 members) and had an intellectual base (e.g. Hans van Rensburg), while the AWB is much smaller and, according to Strydom, "a motley band of discontents and ware politieke takhare" (real political anachronisms). This makes them more dangerous, as reason does not prevail with fanatics, Strydom argues (ibid).

5.1.3 Primordialism: A distinct territory (a Fatherland)

> Territory is, at the least, a critical factor in maintaining group separateness. Without it a nationality has difficulty becoming a nation and a nation cannot become a state (Isaacs, 1975:45).

> The relationship between a land and a people is one of the most significant parts of nationhood. The land is the estate of the people: it is where they are rooted and where they belong (Patriot:28.9.90).

The importance of a distinct and contiguous geographical area to the rightwing ideology, should not be underestimated. Proof of such a territory helps to substantiate the rightwing's claim to nationhood and self-determination. Both the constitutional proposals which form part of rightwing politics today, namely partition and secession, are based on the belief of the existence of such a territory, which stands in direct contrast to the more widely held belief that South Africa should be an undivided state. As in the case of historical myths appropriated by the rightwing, the issue of 'white' land is also subject to subjective interpretations and mythology.

According to Isaacs the environment itself powerfully shapes the history, mores and character of a group and the life patterns of its individual members. However, it cannot be scientifically demonsrated that the harshness, severity and inhospitality of the natural features of a land or territory affect the social characteristics of a nation, or specifically that the colonists and settlers in the New world regions like Australia, North and South America or Africa, were physically and spiritually more hardened than their European kin. It has been shown earlier how the Afrikaner educational and cultural systems have tried to promote the idea that the harsh African environment did in fact shape the Afrikaner in these ways, as illustrated by subtle references in schoolbooks, referred to as master symbols. These included references to South Africa as a harsh, punishing country because of lack of rain and extreme climates, with the implication that the Afrikaners are a hardy nation, capable of great feats of endurance.

Foremost in the rightwing belief-system is the conviction that South Africa, with the exception of black homelands,

belongs to the whites. As indicated in chapters three and seven, differences exist over the exact borders of the white territory, but the vast majority of rightwingers, however, still cling to the official CP policy which insists that 87% of South Africa rightly belongs to the white group.

This belief has a special religious dimension to it, the analogy being made with the promised land given to Israel by God. The Battle of Blood River and the Covenant play a prominent role in the belief that God wanted the land to belong to the Afrikaner and to white civilization as a whole. Another Afrikaner nationalist myth which features prominently in rightwing claims is the myth of 'vacant land', which rests on several contentious assumptions:

1. That the black tribes arrived in South Africa virtually at the same time as the white settlers and therefore had no prior claims to the land;
2. That large-scale genocide (Difaqane) occurred because of inter-ethnic warfare between black tribes which virtually left the whole interior depopulated;
3. That the Boers traded and bought land from the remaining black tribes on a totally honest and justified basis.

The myth of vacant land has been proven false by various historians, as mentioned by Thompson (1985:206):

> The persistent reiteration by South African propagandists and educationalists that Bantu-speaking Africans began to arrive in South Africa only at about the same time as whites, exposes them to ridicule.

However, historical facts have never succeeded in changing rightwing perceptions on this score, having been ingrained in their consciousness since their early school years. For example, apart from the CP's Verwoerdian-based belief that 87% of the country is 'white', many rightwingers still adhere to the myth of vacant land:

> The search for land was facilitated by the Difaqane, which left large parts of the interior depopulated. The Voortrekkers found a vacuum which they were able to

> fill by their own migration. It is therefore obvious that the Afrikaners settled only in depopulated areas and never stole or acquired black land unjustly (Bruwer et al, 1990:30) [translation];
>
> When the Boers arrived in the Transvaal and Free State, most of the land was totally unoccupied. However after repeated attacks by the Zulu chief Moselekatse, the Boers defeated and drove him across the Vaal River (Van Tonder, 1990:10-11) [translation];
>
> It is of extreme importance to realize that at no stage did the Trekkers take land away from blacks who were occupying it at the time of the trekkers arrival - all land that was settled by blacks before the whites arrived was granted to them as their own territory - hence the resultant countries of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana. The black people presently residing in the original Boer Republics of the Transvaal, OFS and Northern Natal came to the area in search of food and work after it had been settled by whites (AWB pamphlet cited by Kemp, 1990:109) [translation].
>
> We lay no claim to the land of other nations. We obtained our land through legal occupation of unoccupied areas, through agreements, cession, trade and to a lesser extent, justifiable conquest (Andries Treurnicht as cited in Vrye Weekblad:22.3.91) [translation].

Arguing on the basis of these myths, Eugene Terre'Blanche claims "We don't want the whole of South Africa - just the land which they [his forefathers] struggled for, land which is the sole property of my people" (cited by Leach, 1989:103). While Terre'Blance refers to the former Boer Republics, Carel Boshoff indicates a preference for territory in the north-western Cape as exclusive Afrikaner territory. Although he does not rely on mythology to justify his demand for this territory, he is equally

insistent on the issue of a separate territory for the Afrikaner:

> The Afrikaner should therefore be prepared to exist as a separate nation under his own government in his own land which he owns, inhabits, preserves and cultivates more or less exclusively Vrye Weekblad:22.3.91) [translation].

The Conservative Party argues that historically-based ethnic and racial settlement patterns confirm the validity and forms the basis of their policy of partition. Hereby 87% of South Africa, with the exception of some extra land put aside for coloured and Indian homelands and further consolidation of existing black homelands, belongs to the whites. The Party defends its claim to 87% of the country's territory by claiming that the 13% allocated to blacks does not take cognizance of the huge territory that today constitutes Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland and was originally part of the territory of South Africa (Vrye Weekblad:22.3.91). Ferdi Hartzenberg, deputy leader of the Party, bases his party's claim to an exclusive white territory on religious grounds: "Our fatherland is a gift from God and we won't ask Mandela if we can live here or have any rights." (Cape Times:16.8.90). Although no more realistic, Treurnicht at least recognizes that the uneven distribution of land is a source of concern for others:

> We own land, which we didn't steal. There are various ways in which land becomes the property of the people. Actually, that is something that people blame us for. We have 87% of the land. (Time:13.8.90).

It is interesting to note that Terre'Blanche, Boshoff and Treurnicht, respectively use the terms 'Boers','Afrikaners' and 'whites' and that each has a different territory in mind for the exclusive use of their individually-defined sections of the rightwing. What stands out though, is the insistence of rightwingers that they can lay claim to a separate and distinct territory, and that this belief has its roots in actual and distorted perceptions of reality, based on religious, historical and political factors. These

distorted beliefs or myths form the crux of their strong opposition to the repeal of the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 and the Group Areas Act, as the repeal of these laws is deemed to take away the foundation of their claim to an own fatherland:

> An own territory is one of the foundation stones of political power. The government's intention to repeal [the Land Acts] is a flagrant attack on our right to self-determination on our own territory....The government's decision forces us to engage in a freedom struggle (CP Press release, Vrye Weekblad:22.3.91) [translation].

5.2. THE INFLUENCE OF RACISM

> The policy of the CP is not one of racism, but is one which recognizes the reality of ethnicity and nationalism (Andries Treurnicht, Patriot, 28.9.90) [translation].

> I am quite frank in saying that I am race conscious. I am aware of the fact that I am a white man. I don't think that's racism. I would say racism, in the negative sense of the word, would mean not only being conscious of the fact that you belong to a certain racial group, but denying other people certain rights and discriminating in the negative sense of the word against people (Andries Treurnicht, cited in Time:13.8.90).

Earlier in this chapter it was argued that Afrikaner symbols and other status related issues had a strong

influence on the shaping of Afrikaner nationalism. Issues such as the Afrikaner culture, territory and history, made a powerful impression on the rightwing psyche and helped to explain its insistence on self-determination as a separate and sovereign nation. However, Afrikaner nationalism cannot be explained in isolation from its ethnocentric and racist components, as Horowitz was previousely quoted as saying (1991:13). The racial ideology, which is part of Afrikaner nationalism, is again rooted in inter-group anxiety and apprehension. The latter concepts refer to the all-pervasive fear which forms such a dominant part of the psychological dynamic, not only the rightwing, but of many other Afrikaners and whites as well. The remainder of this chapter concentrates on these aspects.

A discussion of rightwing racism requires a basic understanding of the concept, with reference to its psychological and sociological components. Scruton (1982:390) distinguishes between race (a term which denotes the belief that there are significant distinctions between races) and racism, the latter denoting a belief that such differences provide adequate grounds for differential treatment, in particular for granting rights and privileges to members of one race and withholding them from members of another. The emotional roots of racism lie in the perception that somepeople are 'alien', partially because of their physical characteristics. Welsh and Slabbert define racism as "the imputation of inferiority to another racial/ethnic group", but argue that it is caused by the conflict situation:

> It is not racism or prejudice that causes discrimination and other manifestations of racial antagonisms: rather it is a conflict situation that creates these predispositions and the ensuing pattern of discriminatory structures and measures (Slabbert and Welsh, 1979:10).

Pierre Van der Berghe's definition reads as follows:

> Racism is any set of beliefs that organic, genetically transmitted differences (whether real or imagined) between human groups are intrinsically associated with the presence or absence of certain socially relevant abilities or characteristics, hence that such differences are a legitimate basis of invidious distinctions between groups socially defined as races (1978:11).

The concepts of prejudice and discrimination are closely related to that of racism. Prejudice is an emotional, rigid attitude towards a group of people; it signifies an attitude, but never involves overt action towards a minority group. Discrimination on the other hand, refers to action taken against or differential treatment of persons, on grounds rationally irrelevant to a situation (Scruton, 1982:130; Simpson and Yinger, 1985:23).

The definition of prejudice invites a discussion of the psychological approach to racism, but this falls outside the scope of this thesis. For the sake of completeness it is worth briefly mentioning the basic tenets of this approach, which states that racism is ultimately reducible to a set of attitudes which are socially derived but become part of the individual personality. The two theories which deal with personality as a source of racism, are the frustration-aggresion and the authoritarian approach.

The frustration-aggresion approach can be summarized as follows: every person is a cluster of forces which often experience a blocking of goal-directed behaviour, which in turn creates hostile impulses in the individual. This frustration cannot always be directed toward the source of the frustration because the source may be too powerful or unknown. It leads to free-floating undirected frustrations which are then displaced or targeted to an unrelated victim or scapegoat, which cannot realistically be shown to be

the cause of the difficulties. This aggression is accompanied by some emotional and intellectual strains because of the irrationality and injustice of such action, which in turn lead to the aggressor looking for justification for his behaviour. Then follows a 'discovery' or fabrication of evidence of undesirable traits which proves that the victim deserved the treatment meeted out by the aggressor. When the choice of victims becomes culturally stabilized on members of a certain group, racial or ethnic prejudice will result (Van den Berghe, 1978:19; Simpson and Yinger, 1985:73).

The authoritarian personality approach is explained by the same authors as a complicated personality syndrome which predisposes certain personalities to be prejudiced against members of other racial and ethnic groups. Prejudice in this case, is a manifestation of a basically insecure person who repressed many of his own impulses, perceives life as capricious and threatening and sees all human relationships in competitive power terms. Among the personality traits characteristic of an authoritarian personality are respect for force, submission towards superiors, aggression towards subordinates, lack of self-insight, acceptance of ready-made ideas, intolerance of deviance, destructiveness and cynicism, a tendency towards superstition and an exaggerated interest in sex (ibid).

Although it is not possible within the scope of the present research, it would be interesting to match the personality profiles of racist mass-murders like Wit Wolf Barend Strydom or AWB and Orde Boerevolk member Eugene Marais, with the character traits suggested by the two personality theories: for example, would Marais' attempt to justify the murder of several innocent black people on grounds that "blacks are animals", fit the description of the frustration-aggresion personality, whereby free-floating unrelated frustration is directed to an unrelated victim? This theory postulates that the irrationality of such

action would force the aggressor to justify his action by fabricating evidence of undesirable traits which prove that the victim deserved the treatment, which seems similar to the claims by Marais and Strydom to the effect that blacks were nothing but animals and that it therefore was not a sin to kill them.

Another psychological approach to racism is that of status needs, a concept which refers to the heightened ethnic and racial intolerance flowing from status insecurities. Although the concept of status is also closely related to that of class and economic factors, it is discussed here as part of the psyche. According to Van den Berghe (1978:22), race can be treated as a special case of invidious status differentiation or stratification. Status is defined by Scruton (1982:448) as

> a kind of social stratification that is not a matter either of class or of political position ...which is based on social recognition rather than on any kind of material power; it is sometimes argued that status groups have replaced classes as the recognizable social divisions in modern societies.

The term 'status needs' is examined as a independent element of ethnic hostility by Adam and Moodley. Arguing from the basis of the centrality of occupation to individual identity, these authors claim that the phenomenon of "occupational exclusiveness or occupational ethnocentrism" is a psychologically-based cause of racial antagonism. White workers in South Africa, for example, are racist not because of a fear of replacement by black workers, but because they fear they may have to do 'devalued' labour normally done by blacks, i.e. the perception of status reduction:

> An individual's occupation provides much of the person's sense of identity. To share this occupation with outgroups degrades it and thus lowers the individual's sense of self-worth (1986:33-35).

The satisfaction of status needs which the professional, middle and upper-class worker derives from his job,

explains why the working-class often is more racist. According to the authors, the average industrial worker is often alienated from his work and may choose to base his identity on the denigration of other lower-class workers. In South Africa, the process of 'normalization' incorporates the principle of racial equality, thereby placing in jeopardy the traditional principle of the link between colour and status. The demand by white mineworkers for job reservation, and reluctance of whites to work under black supervision, an to an extent, even the opposition from lower-class whites to the repeal of social apartheid and the Group Areas Act, may to a degree support the theory of status insecurities, although in some instances, the decisive issue was probably financial expediency rather than status needs (see also the findings of Hanf et al, cited in chapter four, on the perceptions of whites of the 'proper' racial hierarchy in the workplace).

Other theories dealing with the causes of racism refer to sociological, structural and historical factors, collectivelly termed social determinism. According to Van den Berghe (1978:20), most people living in racist societies regard racial prejudice merely as a special kind of convenient rationalization for rewarding behaviour. In societies where racism is constantly rewarded in terms of power, prestige, approval and wealth, racial tolerance, liberalism and colour-blindness are beliefs which are severely punished. Most members of the dominant group in such societies will be prejudiced and will discriminate, irrespective of personality factors. Therefore, in societies where blatant racism is disapproved of and social pressures and rewards for racist behaviour are absent, personality-based racism will be more prevalent.

The social approach explains racism as the product of the socialization of the individual into a specific culture, leaving him with an array of 'learned' racial responses:

> We are taught to be prejudiced against certain groups just as we are taught to dislike certain foods that people in other societies consider great delicacies....

> individuals may be equipped with a number of culturally learned responses to minority groups...that are part of the standard cultural equipment (Simson and Yinger, 1985:91).

Accordingly, there are no innate antipathies towards members of other racial or ethnic groups. Racism therefore, is a learned response, and the acquisition of language may facilitate the learning of the traditions of prejudice - some things are 'white and clean' and others are 'black and dirty' (Simpson and Yinger, 1985:91). Slabbert and Welsh (1979:13) concur:

> 'blackness' itself seems to have had some effect on the genesis of racism - from early times in Christendom, for example, 'black' as a colour had certain adverse connotations like 'ugly', 'dirt', 'sin', 'death', and 'impurity' whereas the colour 'white' represented in each case the opposite.

This approach is relevant to the South African context from two perspectives. Firstly, the socialization of generation upon generation of whites into a society obsessed with racial superiority imprinted racist beliefs into the psyche of individual whites, and helps to explain the tenacity of racism among whites. Secondly, the long-held perception among whites that 'blackness' has negative connotations ('ugly, sin and dirt'), might explain the introduction of social ('petty') apartheid - the latter, in essence, was not crucial to the 'grand apartheid' ideals of the NP (the creation of a homogeneous white South Africa), and was in reality an attempt to protect whites from day-to-day contact with the 'impure' black population. Such contact was forbidden in most spheres, e.g. sexual relations and marriage; in public ammenities such as parks and pools, in restuarants, hotels, sport and churches.

It can therefore be said that racism has been an integral part of the white psyche ever since 1652 when the first settlers came to the Cape with preconceived ideas of blacks as barbarians and heathens (Leatt et al, 1986; Elphick and Gliomee, 1979, Slabbert and Welsh, 1979). During the

language to describe their sentiments. During a rightwing rally in Pretoria in 1989, abuse directed at blacks was expressed as "Let the kaffirs kill themselves"; and "go away baboons"; "World apartheid movement - solution for Aids"; and "a white man in South Africa is a dead man" (Sunday Star:24.9.89). At a public meeting in Germiston in 1990, Terreblanche accused President de Klerk and the Minister of Law and Order, Adrian Vlok, as "meidagtig" (a discredited racist Afrikaans word translated as 'like a maidservant', but meaning coward), and referred to Mandela as a "damned Xhosa who wants to take way the Boers' republics" (Vrye Weekblad:27.7.90). At the same meeting he also threatened to demolish the ANC ("Ons sal hulle gelykblaas met die aarde" and made more explicit threats with regard to the well-being of Chris Hani, chief of the ANC's military wing.

More moderate members of the rightwing like Carel Boshoff of the Afrikaner Volkswag, reject racism as an "attitude of life", and insist that a nation's desire to maintain its identity, should not be viewed as racist (Zille, 1988:65). The CP also rejects racism "in the sense of negative discrimination regarding others" but sees nothing wrong with "positive discrimination regarding their own members" (Bekker et al, 1989:13).

The leader of the CP, Andries Treurnicht, claims that the CP is not racist, because racism implies "denying other people certain rights" (Time:13.8.90). However, this is precisely what the policy of partition implies, namely the denial of all the rights to which blacks as citizens of South Africa are entitled. The same blatant racism which is so prominent among the extremists, is also occasionally discernible among rank-and-file CP supporters. At the 1990 CP's Natal Congress, delegates aired their concerns over the "sexual dangers which white girls will face from black boys in integrated schools"; over "the existence of cultural differences which will result in white scholars being drawn down to the level of blacks"; "that blacks

should be sent to industrial schools to be taught to work ith their hands, as they cannot benefit from subjects like history and geography"; "that separate white and black blood banks should be introduced at hospitals because of the danger of AIDS in the blood of blacks"; "that the black birthrate should be curbed, (to which somebody suggested that blacks should be culled, with reference to the culling of seals)" (Rapport:5.8.90; Cape Times:6.8.90).

In all fairness, it should be emphasized that although the CP's policies are founded on a racist philosophy, the Party leadership at least attempted to project its image as nationalist- rather than racist-orientated. Responding to the threat made by Joe Slovo of the SACP, that a party such as the CP which promoted racism, would be banned under a new constitution, Treurnicht defended his party's policy on grounds that it was purely concerned with the right of self-determination of the Afrikaner people (Patriot 25.1.91). This theme crops up repeatedly in speeches made by members of the CP over the past two years, and, as indicated in chapter six, the pragmatic wing of the Party strongly advocates a total rejection of racist sentiments and "negative conduct" ('Koos' document, 1990).

This leaves us with the final ingredient of the rightwing psyche, an element of great importance in the understanding of not only rightwing behaviour, but also that of many other Afrikaners and whites. It refers to fear, real and imagined, fears concerning security, personal safety, loss of culture, wealth and privileges. Of these the most important is the question of survival, i.e physical safety of individuals and of the nation. These fears should be analyzed against the background of several cases of mass-genocide of nations during the 20th century, and examples of instability, lawlessness which often accompany periods of great structural change.

5.3 THE INFLUENCE OF FEAR

> It must be recognized that the dominant white group has real fears....They fear the loss of privileges, the possible expropriation of property, and being swamped by a huge black majority. Ignoring their own repressive, undemocratic practices, they fear the instability and 'chaos' which they believe would follow from black participation in a democratic system of government. Idi Amin becomes the symbol of black majority rule (Slabbert and Welsh, 1979:29-30).

> It is unusual for a white South African to admit he is afraid. Social esteem more often attaches to expressions of confidence and self-assurance....But the observer may be suspicious of the thunderous applause which such statements usually receive. Does a person who really feels secure and unthreatened constantly seek this kind of assurance? Is it not perhaps a mechanism of group reassurance in the face of threats? (Hanf et al, 1981:206-207).

> The emotive salience and magnitude of the fears described (which are not limited to Afrikaners) suggest that they will have to be taken into account by all parties involved in the South African struggle, including foreign governments. Least of all can these fears be ignored by South Africa's own liberation movement (Piere Hugo, 1988).

> Fear is the driving force of white politics - that is why the rightwing will keep growing Z.B. du Toit (cited in Zille, 1988:76).

The fears of whites traditionally are directly related to their political, economic and social position under a future majority government, i.e. what Horowitz refers to as "the fear of ethnic domination and suppression", which he claims, is a motivating force for the acquisition of power

as an end (1985:187). The nature of such fears has changed over time as few whites had ever contemplated the possibility of black rule, until the decolonization of Africa commenced during the 1950's, and even then the possibility of it happening in South Africa did not remotely seem possible. This perception changed considerably during the 1980's as the inevitability of majority rule became obvious to most whites. White fears of black domination and suppression partially had its roots in the incidences of violence and anarchy, often targeted against whites, which accompanied the decolonization of Africa. It received a further impetus from the swart and rooi gevaar propaganda devised by the National Party, and was fuelled by the 'refugees' from black rule elsewhere in Africa.

In a comparative study on the evolution of the protracted ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland and Lebanon, Crighton and MacIver (1991:127) come to the conclusion that protracted conflicts are identity-driven and

> the result of an underlying fear of extinction that grows out the experience of being a vulnerable ethnic group living with memories of persecution and massacre.

According to these authors, the experiences of settler communities in both these countries (the Maronites in Lebanon and the Protestants in Northern Ireland) have led to the common perception of threat and fear of annhilation, which made survival their most salient goal (1991:128). Their deep-seated fears of antagonistic majorities,together with group insecurity led to the establishment of policies and political institutions which guarenteed their political dominance (1991:137).

What Crighton and Mac Iver said about these two states, also holds for the Afrikaners in South Africa, who had similar experiences during their settler-era, and whose political institutions had similar characteristics (i.e. minority domination to prevent domination by the majority).

The centuries-old fears of being dominated by the black majority, and actual periods of being subjected to British domination, provided the impetus for Afrikaner nationalism's determination 'never to be dominated again in their own fatherland', and also forms the basis for the rightwing's demand for Afrikaner self-determination.

5.3.1 Specific rightwing fears

White fears of black rule can be divided into two dimensions. The first is what Pierre Hugo (1988:5) calls "fears of a non-violent nature, concerning the fear of reverse discrimination, loss of privilege, possessions, cultural identity (among Afrikaners), and a lowering of living standards and quality of life. The second dimension of fear concerns the physical survival of whites and includes the fear of genocide, mass-expulsion, anarchy, violence and crime. These fears are discernible among whites of all language groups and political persuasions, only the extent thereof differs.

Many of these fears have already been realized even before majority rule becomes a reality. According to Ken Owen (Cape Times:23.7.90) proof thereof could be found in the ungovernability of parts of the country and the lack of respect for property, law and human life: "The white population lives in an acute fear, not simply of losing privilege, but of losing life and loved ones". According to Owen this "sea of fear and personal insecurity" has resulted in white civilians at present having two-and-a-half million firearms in their possession, denoting almost one firearm per white adult.

Being part of the 'dark' continent and having the fear of blacks etched on their consciousness, white South Africans

have always been easy targets for the swart gevaar propaganda of the NP. For many years the NP used the rather unfortunate political experiences of Africa during and after decolonization to indoctrinate whites and to justify its own policies. Over the past few years the rightwing has been using the same tactics to scare white voters away from the NP's reform policies. Like the NP until recently, the rightwing sees Africa as an example of how not to go about things - its slogan "nowhere in Africa did a written constitution and one-man-one-vote system ensure democracy", sounds distinctly like the one which the NP so frequently used against the PFP and DP. The rightwing draws comparisons based on the 'fact' that the continent has the same majority-minority problem as South Africa, and that the process of decolonization involved similar racial conditions as in South Africa. For example:

> In the final analysis, Namibia simply could not be any different from the rest of Africa. The same anti-white mentality which controls Africa is now running Namibia. Resentment at what Western civilization has done for a continent which slumbered for millenia will always outstrip good sense and pragmatism. (Patriot:22.6.90).

Similarly Pieter Mulder of the CP argues:

> If I were living in Europe or the United States where there is a respect for democracy then I would be prepared to take the risk [of majority rule], but not in Africa....Look at the rest of Africa. No capitalism. No moderates. No multi-party governments (Patriot:22.6.90).

As part of its argument on Africa's bad record on democracy, human and minority rights, the rightwing often refers to particular African states with similar racial configurations to those of South Africa, e.g. Algeria, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Namibia.

One of the worst cases of racial conflicts was that of Algeria during its liberation struggle between 1954 and 1962. A civil war between French military units and the

pied noirs (the French settlers comprising about 12% of the population) on the one hand and the Algerian Arabs on the other. From 1955 onwards the FLN (the Arab organization Front de Liberation Nationale) adopted a deliberate policy of genocide - to kill all French without distinction of age or sex. The Algerian independence in 1962 was described as setting a pattern of "public crime and disorder which was to be imitated throughout Africa", a sentiment shared also by many whites in South Africa at the time, (Johnson, 1983:498). Atrocities were committed on both sides, but the international community received mostly only the French colonial authorities' interpretation of events, e.g. Ian Todd, reporter with the Johannesburg-based Star, reported that colonial Algeria was a model of democratic rule but that the Algerians were a host of ferocious fanatics (cited by Knightley, 1989:365). The book A savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954 to 1962 by Alistair Horne, which deals with the Algerian war, became very popular in South Africa and evoked feelings of deja vu and of foreboding among whites, when they compared failed attempts of reform and the increased urban terror which both Algeria and South Africa experienced (Berger and Godsell, 1988:271).

The message of the mass-flight by white Algerians to France, was clear: Afrikaners had no "France" to flee to. Treurnicht recently referred indirectly to what happened to the white Algerians, to emphasize that Afrikaners do not have that choice:

> No white community in Africa has so far been able to tolerate [being a powerless minority under a revolutionary black government]: most of them have fled, thousands to our country. Our people on the other hand, have no boat waiting in the harbour. We cannot flee, nor will we flee. We will not submit ourselves to this type of domination (CP announcement on the White Paper on Land Reform, March 1991).

A further analogy between Algeria and South Africa is drawn by Giliomee (Argus:6.4.91), who claims that a single

incident of violence, e.g. a large-scale massacre of whites, could result in a violent partition of South Africa into a predominantly black northern state and a predominantly white/coloured southern state, with the border roughly following a line from Upington in the northern Cape to Port Elizabeth in the eastern Cape (i.e. similar to the Eiselen line of the 1950's). Giliomee's analogy is not far-fetched if one considers the fact that of the five million whites, only about one million either have or are eligible for British passports, a further half-a-million probably have Portugese passports, and another half-a-million could probably claim other foreign passports by virtue of their origin or their financial and educational assets. This leaves three million whites without an 'Algeria' which to flee to, resulting in the south-western part of the country having to fullfil the role of a 'safe haven' for whites.

However, is very doubtful whether the Afrikaners of the northern provinces, being largely rightwing, would ever consider such a step, an assumption which is supported by an earlier analysis of the fierce nationalistic component of the rightwing psyche. The CP made its feelings on the issue of territory very clear:

> A nation's own territory is one of the cornerstones of political power. In terms of the White Paper on Land Reform, the government intends to deprive us of our collective ownership of land as a national asset; this is an extremely serious assault upon a nations's right to self-government in its own territory, and an obvious onslaught against our political power. No self-respecting people will tolerate this....Our people are prepared to sacrifice their lives for these rights (CP Announcement on White Paper on Land Reform, March 1991.

A further African example concerned the events in the Belgian Congo in 1960, during which a black garrison looted, raped and killed Europeans who remained behind,

following Belgium's withdrawal from its former colony. According to Hugo (1988:12-13) the Congo-reflex is still present among South Africans, especially the rightwing, e.g. the reference by Eugene Terre'Blanche of the AWB to the haven offered by South Africa to white refugees from the Congo. Further south, the Portugese colonies, Angola and Mozambique, won their independence in the mid-seventies after a lengthy military confrontation with the Portugese authorities, but the transfer of power occurred reasonably peacefully, although Stultz (cited in Hugo, 1988:16) wrote of 300 000 Portugese who were airlifted out of Angola in 1975 amid scenes of panic and hysteria. The Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya which commenced in the 1950's led to the death of only 32 of the 70 000 whites, but it had a considerable impact on South African whites because of the presence of 2 000 Afrikaans-speaking whites in Kenya. The enduring impact of the rebellion on the white South African psyche is described by Maughan-Brown (cited in Hugo, 1988:10):

> The term 'Mau Mau' evokes images of isolated farms, lonely little groups of whites ...being crept up on by black figures. There are probably no two words which have greater power to arouse in white people every conceivable racially based fear.

The case of Zimbabwe is more frequently used as an analogy to South Africa. However, in the case of Zimbabwe, the reality differs from the picture painted by the rightwing. Zimbabwe on the whole experienced a relatively stable transition to black majority rule and the white minority did not experience revenge or retaliation from the black majority. It came as a surprise to many South African whites who expected differently, in the light of the injustices done to black Zimbabweans under the Smith Regime and in the light of the build-up of emotions during a bush war which lasted 14 years, surpassing in severity similar conflicts against SWAPO and the ANC to date. Mugabe honoured the constitutional agreement which guaranteed

whites 20 seats in the Parliament for a certain period, and only got rid of these provisions after its legal expiry. In 1990 he appointed three whites to his cabinet, withdrew the state of emergency and according to Dennis Norman, his former Agricultural Minister, not a single property had been expropriated, nor had a single industry been nationalized since independence, and the country had honoured all its external debts and paid every external pension (Cape Times:11.4.90). The Government only paid lip-service to its marginal Marxist economic philosophy, dropping it completely in 1991.

The only negative aspects of the Mugabe government's policies are constant references to becoming a one-party state, although his own party has rejected this possibility, and threats to expropriate the land of some of the large white farmers.

In spite of Zimbabwe's relatively good record (from the perspective of white Zimbabweans), the rightwing has endeavoured to present the independence of Zimbabwe in the worst possible light. It gained much mileage from it during elections, by using slogans such as "Rhodesia Reformed And Surrendered" and "For her sake, don't repeat Rhodesia". According to Berger and Godsell (1988:269) the rightwing sees Zimbabwe as another example of the forlorn struggle fought by white settler societies against the logic of Africa and that any form of concession or change would result in a slow form of suicide, therefore, "fight, don't compromise". Recently the CP has concentrated on the one negative aspect of Zimbabwean policy, namely the proposed (but thereafter repudiated) one-party state, as a likely model for South Africa under a black government:

> What grounds does the Hon State President have for saying that what happened in Zimbabwe will not happen here? In March we will see the last election in Zimbabwe (CP-MP F.J. le Roux, Hansard:26.2.90).

The case of Namibia has strong symbolic meaning to the

rightwing, as certain rightwing organizations still regard part of that country as part of South Africa, and because of the considerable rightwing presence among Namibian whites.

When Namibia became independent in 1990, its white population, which numbered over 100 000 before independence, had declined to about 30 000, although those who left, did so voluntarily. Namibia's President, Sam Nujoma, has stressed national reconciliation at every opportunity and has appointed whites in several senior government positions, including his Cabinet, and has followed a very moderate economic policy to date (Argus:24.3.90). With regard to the issue of land redistribution, Peter Vale (UWC), claims that the government of Namibia has committed itself to honouring the letter and spirit of Article 16 of the Constitution, which reads as follows: "The State or a component body or organ authorized by law may expropriate property in the public interest subject to the payment of just compensation."(Cape Times:24.9.90)

However, the rightwing sees the Namibian issue very differently. According to Patriot (22.6.90) in an article titled: "The Bubble Bursts In Namibia", the new Namibia has already started to commence with its Africanization policies in the civil service:

> SWAPO has replaced all former departmental heads with its own appointees, ignoring white officials; the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation's entire board has been replaced in similar fashion; Afrikaans is no longer recognized as a primary language; control over mining will be tightened and the repatriation of profits will be reduced (Patriot:22.6.90).

Patriot further claims that urbanization and unemployment are increasing at an alarming rate, medical standards are declining and former SWAPO guerrillas (it is interesting to

note that Patriot doesn't use the word "terrorists", in this case) are apparently plundering civilians and recognize no authority. The article concludes by saying that the same mentality which exists in Namibia, is also present at the negotiating table in South Africa and would lead to South Africa becoming another "basket case in the dark continent".

According to CP-MP J.J.C.Botha, the independence of Namibia has stripped the whites in that country of their citizenship rights, which he expected also to happen in South Africa. He further claimed that Namibia would soon revert to a communist state:

> If you want to see what the new South Africa is going to look like, look at Namibia. They have stopped religious devotions at schools. There is no Die Stem or Day of Vow (Argus:4.4.90).

While the experiences of colonial whites in Africa may in some cases confirm the worst suspicions of the rightwing, it must be stressed that these suspicions are to a great extent supported by preconceived perceptions inherent to the rightwing's racist philosophy. However, the fears of the rightwing are a function of its existence, and the fact that these fears are shared by most Afrikaners and many whites, makes it a relevant issue.

Certain themes appear repeatedly when analyzing rightwing fears of a black majority government. Apart from the fear of losing their economically privileged position and its manifestations, e.g. jobs (status), houses, cars, savings, they also fear the loss of their way of life, the lowering of standards, the loss the Afrikaner culture and identity. Also prevalent is a fear of communism, anarchy, violence, crime and ultimately, the complete extinction of the whites as a viable community in South Africa. All these

are discernible in excerpts from pronouncements made by rightwing leaders - often tinged by racist, crude and violent language, and in most cases, founded in rightwing mythology and racial and ideological preconceptions, rather than in fact. The following quotes are but a small sample representative of the more general fears and anxieties of the rightwing:

a) Fears of being swamped under majority rule:

> You can't give them local government rights and offer them national power-sharing and expect it to all end there. Its bound to result in black majority rule and the extinction of the white man in Africa - CP candidate in Standerton, R. De Ville, during the 1987 election (cited in Leach, 1989:81).

> The Nationalists ...are creating a dispensation in which we run the risk of being swamped, overwhelmed and overpowered by a black majority and a black majority government....You have neglected to protect those [white] people, their property and their community life and now there is great anxiety - Treurnicht (cited in Leach, 1989:82).

b) Fear of loss of identity:

> Since when is the well-being of Afrikaans a priority among black political organizations? They are without exception hostile towards the Afrikaner and his language and will remove its status as official language, as happened in Namibia (Patriot, editorial:31.8.90).

c) Fear of communist-inspired conspiracies:

> Nowhere more in Africa does the old Maoist dictum that power flows from the barrel of a gun, hold true. And once the whites of South Africa have handed over their guns, not all the paper constitutions lawyers can devise are likely to confine the power of the ANC and its communist masters - George Barrell in (Patriot:29.6.90).

> Lenin and Marx and all their fellow-travellers must be rubbing their hands with glee as the West swallows the Kremlin's latest concoction of deceit. For there can never be a truce with the Soviet bear. And so it follows that those South Africans who believe they can negotiate with the communist-dominated ANC are simply useful idiots (Patriot:10.8.90).

d) Fear of genocide:

> It becomes clear that African states never succeeded in constitutionally protecting minorities. They all inherited multi-party democratic systems from the colonial powers and some even had a Bill of Rights. Unfortunately this Bill of Rights did not prevent millions of Biafrians in Nigeria from being exterminated - CP MP, Pieter Mulder (Patriot:1.6.90).

e) Fear of violence, crime, anarchy and a lowering of standards:

> The period of peace which the NP expected would flow from the signing of the Pretoria-Minute, instead became an orgy of violence, crime, arson and murder (Patriot:31.8.90).

> South Africa is reeling before a a wave of black crime which is costing millions of rands and many lives....this includes daily robberies, attacks on elderly people and rape, and is a direct consequence of uncontrolled urbanization and squatting and can be linked to the anti-white politics (Patriot:6.7.90).

f) Fear of revenge and reverse discrimination:

> Allies of the ANC are busy making up a list of prominent rightwingers with the intention of taking legal measures against them, and for possible future victimization (Patriot:20.7.90).
> The ANC still has plans for a 'Nuremberg'-style trial to punish people for crimes against humanity, such 'crimes' including measures taken to separate races (Patriot :11.5.90).

g) Fear of a 'typical' Africa-democracy:

> What will Mr de Klerk do in a few years time when a black government introduces a one-party state, introduces mass-nationalization and press censorship (Patriot:11.5.90).
> It was pointed out that similar documents in other parts of Africa had always proved completely ineffective...and in the Third World such documents were totally ignored (Patriot:10.8.90).

5.3 2 Survey findings on the fears of whites

As surveys dealing with in particular rightwing fears were small in number it was decided to concentrate on existing surveys dealing with white and Afrikaner fears as a whole.

From a Market and Opinion Survey of February 1990, valuable information concerning the fears and insecurities of Afrikaners, English-speakers, and supporters of the various parties, has come to light. The survey concentrated on the following issues: the degree of optimism/pessimism among whites on the future of South Africa; their reaction to the reforms implemented by the government in February 1990; their reaction to declarations made by Nelson Mandela after his release in February 1990. The survey was conducted shortly after President de Klerk announced the

comprehensive reform package by releasing ANC prisoners, unbanning the ANC and other political organizations but prior to the acknowledgment that NP would not be ruling the country five years hence, and before the level of black on black violence rose dramatically a few months later.

Table 5.1. M&M Survey, February 1990: The sentiment among white voters with regard to particular reform measures

reform measure	% opposing it	Afr.	Eng.	NP	CP	DP
Unbanning of ANC, PAC etc.....	43	58	19	25	90	7
Release of certain political prisoners.....	31	42	13	14	72	5
To revoke state of emergency.....	18	23	11	9	40	1
To repeal Separate Amenities Act.....	35	51	11	15	84	2

From the above figures it can be deduced that one-third of whites in the survey were very uneasy about the release of long-term security prisoners, the repeal of the Separate Amenities Act and the unbanning of black resistance organizations like the ANC. Almost half of all Afrikaners were nervous of these developments, together with more than three-quarters of CP supporters. These reforms could have been perceived as an indirect threat to their way of life under 40 years of security offered by the NP. It is also obvious that the greatest anxiety was centred around the unbanning of black resistance movements, indicating that the NP's propaganda has been efficient in indoctrinating and keeping the vast majority of whites in the dark about the real nature of these organizations.

Table 5.2. M&M Survey, February 1990: White reaction to Nelson Mandela's first policy speech

Statement by Mandela	reaction: %disquieted or very disquieted	Afr.	Eng.	NP	CP	DP
No black or white domination	31	35	25	20	62	3
ANC to continue armed struggle	87	85	69	89	81	89
Nationalisation of mines	82	78	87	86	73	86
Committed to a position of peace	21	23	19	14	44	1

From these figures is it obvious that the overwhelming majority of people questioned were strongly perturbed by Nelson Mandela's references to violence and nationalization. The reaction to these issues remained relatively constant amongst all categories of the sample, irrespective of whether they were Afrikaans, English, NP-, CP- or DP supporters, which indicates that these fears are a very real part of the total white consciousness.

Another worthwhile research project which can be of assistance in an analysis of the nature of white fears, is that of Manzo and McGowan, both professors of political science at American universities. Their research is entitled: "The fears of prominent Afrikaners- is racial reconciliation possible in South Africa?".

Table 5.3. Manzo and MacGowan, 1988: Prominent Afrikaners' perceptions of internal threats to South African security

sources of threat	serious threat	some threat
Sabotage and urban terror. :	72%	28%
Rioting and violence in black townships :	64	35
Strikes and activities of militant trade unions :	48	52
Boycotts of schools :	40	57
SACP :	38	58
Black consumer boycotts :	32	64

The results indicate that over 95% of prominent Afrikaners regarded every aspect of black resistance as a serious or some threat. As to be expected, violence and terror aimed at whites in urban areas are regarded as the most serious threat by the respondents, while violence in black areas came a close second, most probably because of the fear that it might spread to white areas at some stage. It is quite surprising that the SACP was regarded by only 38% of respondents as a serious threat, in spite of the fact that the Party at this stage still possessed much of its mystique as it was still banned and the demise of communism worldwide had not yet become as obvious as it would two or three years hence.

Other statistics provided by the authors concerned the perceptions of prominent Afrikaners regarding the impact of black majority rule on the economy, on bureaucracy, on group relations, on social services and to white lifestyles:

Table 5.4. Manzo and McGowan, 1988: The consequences of majority rule in South Africa - the perceptions of prominent Afrikaners

Sphere	would decrease	would increase
economic growth	67	24
free enterprise	47	34
The protect. of minor. rights	82	11
racial cooperation	30	51
tribal conflict	6	76
government efficiency	92	3
communist influence	9	78
democracy	78	14
government corruption	15	73
standard of education	90	4
medical services	84	2
white prosperity	86	5
white safety	86	10
white employment	61	5

From these figures it is clear that there was much concern and pessimism among the Afrikaner elite in the sample over many aspects of majority rule, especially with regard to violence, and standards of living/quality of life and the competence of a black government. The percentage of respondents concerned about economic issues, such as economic growth, free enterprise, white employment and white prosperity, averaged at 66%, while 83% feared that a majority government would be inept, 87% feared a deterioration in their quality of life, while 80% feared that democracy and minority rights will suffer under a majority government.

The surveys conduted by Hugo in 1979, 1984 and 1987 on white attitudes to black majority rule in South Africa, correspond closely to the findings of both the M&M and Manzo and McGowan surveys. Since Hugo's findings on the three occasions correspond also closely to one another, only the latest survey, conducted in 1987, will be

discussed. The findings which indicate the perceptions of a "nationally-representative sample" of whites, of their lives under a black government, were as follows:

Table 5.5 Afrikaner and English-speaking perceptions of the prospect of majority rule - Hugo, 1987

Perceived Threat	Afrikaner	English
Physical safety would be threatened:	78,5%	70,1%
Lanuage and culture won't be protected	88,5	75,2
Income and living standards would suffer	82,4	78,9
Law and order won't be upheld	84	73,3
Blacks would discriminate against whites	91,4	78,2
White women would be molested by blacks	85,3	60,1
Communist policies would be implemented	88,3	67,9
White possessions would not be safe	87,5	69,5

From these figures it appears that the vast majority of whites from both language groups was distinctly nervous of a black government. Apart from serious doubts about the inability of such a government to maintain law and order, over three-quarters of Afrikaner respondents feared that under a black government their physical safety, possessions and culture would be threatened. In addition, they were convinced that such a government would be of communist origin and would permit reverse discrimination. The majority of English-speakers had similar fears, which is a clear indication that such fears are deeply ingrained in the white South Afican psyche.

Significantly, the survey was done in the same year as the 1987 general election, which the NP won overwhelmingly with 58,3% of the vote, on a hardline security ticket. The CP came second with almost 30% of the vote, an indication that these two Parties, both strong on security, were well-placed to capitalize on the mood of the white voters at the time. Their combined vote of 88% also corresponds with the extraordinary high numbers of whites in Hugo's survey who had negative perceptions of their security under a PFP, and inter alia, a black government.

Hugo's 1984-findings correspond remarkably closely with Manzo and McGowan's survey. Even more important, both findings also also correspond closely to Hugo's second survey conducted in 1984 among rightwing farmers in the Waterberg constituency, seat of the leader of the CP, Andries Treurnicht.

These three surveys compare as follows: (in chronological order of: (1) Hugo's 1984 survey among whites in Waterberg, (2) his nationally-representative survey of 1987, and (3) Manzo and McGowan's survey among Afrikaner elites of 1988):

> White perceptions that law and order would not be upheld under a black government: (all percentages):
1) 77,8;
2) 84;
3) 71;
> White perceptions that their physical safety would decline:
1) 80;
2) 78,5;
3) 86;
> White perceptions that their language and culture would not be protected:
1) 76,3;
2) 88,5;
3) 82;
> White perceptions that a black government would be communistic:
1) 94,1;
2) 88,3;
3) 78

These comparative findings indicate that there was little difference between the fears of white respondents in the various samples, which indicates that these fears are common to the majority of whites. Also noticeable is the fact that the fears have changed very little between 1984 and 1988. Slight discrepancies are to be found in the perceptions of communism, where the rightwing farmers

regard it as a considerably greater threat than the Afrikaner elite, the latter perhaps having a greater understanding of the concept of communism. On the other hand, the farmers are much less concerned over their physical safety than the elite sample, probably because of the more hardened lifestyles of farmers in the northern Transvaal border areas.

It is clear from the above findings that Afrikaners and whites as a whole have strong fears and anxiety over the issue of majority rule, which is not surprising as at least three surveys indicate that between 78% and 86% of whites believe that their physical safety would be threatened by such a development. The findings tend to confirm Z.B. Du Toit's earlier contention that 'fear is the driving force of white politics', and the implication is that these fears, whether founded in fact or fiction, are a very real part of the Afrikaner and white psyche, and will have to be addressed by a future constitutional system. Ultimately, however, the solution to anxiety, mistrust and fear probably lies in the changing of people's perceptions away from the belief that the solution to South Africa's problems is one where somebody has to lose out in the end, to the belief that everyone will benefit from a solution. In the words of Slabbert and Welsh (1979:30):

> to orient people's perceptions away from this view [of the conflict in zero-sum terms], and to induce them to think in terms of joint efforts to attain common or superordinate goals whose realization will make all groups better off.

Conclusion

This chapter dealt, firstly, with the non-material, socio-psychological roots of Afrikaner nationalism, and secondly, with the way in which the rightwing had re-mobilized the concept to legitimise its demand for Afrikaner self-determination. The psychological dynamic to

which Horowitz refers, explains ethnic conflict in terms of the need for a group to confirm and protect its group identity and group worth. Group insecurity and the need of a group to confirm its status leads to the quest for power and control of the state, which in turn would enable a dominant group to prevent other groups from dominating it. The need of a group such as the Afrikaners, or in this case, rightwing Afrikaners, to attempt to legitimize its 'special' position, explains why symbolic issues, such as the official emblems, languages, religions, citizenship etc, are so important in explaining the 'inexplicable' nature of ethnic conflict. Horowitz's theory, which emphasises the communal drive for group status, explains why Afrikaner nationalists were, and are, so determined not to lose control over their own destiny, and why their claim for self-determination in their own fatherland often overwhelms rational behaviour patterns.

This chapter argued that the forces which motivate the rightwing's political behaviour today are identical to the forces which for long have motivated Afrikaner political behaviour, forces identified by Horowitz as nationalist aspiration and racial ideology. The discussion of Afrikaner nationalism focussed on the primordial characteristics which were so important to the early creators of an Afrikaner identity, i.e. the Afrikaans language, Reformed religion, Afrikaner history and, one could add, a white skin. Only once the status and position of the Afrikaner had been secured under NP rule after 1948, did Afrikaner nationalists begin to move away from ethnicity towards what Juan Linz described as "a territorial conception of nationhood". Primordialism again became important during the period of reform of the 1980's and early 1990's, this time to be utilized by rightwing Afrikaner nationalists, and in line with Gellner's argument that periods of rapid change entice people to fasten upon those (promordial) attributes they carry around with themselves, such as language, religion, race and a common descent.

This chapter also showed how the above indicators of Afrikaner ethnicity became politicized by a retrospective mythology and ethnocentric interpretations of history, a phenomenon so aptly described by Ernest Renan in 1882: "Forgetting history, or even getting history wrong, is an essential factor in the fromation of a nation" (cited by Eric Hobsbawn in New Statesman & Society:24.4.92).

This chapter also dealt extensively with racial ideology, which according to Horowitz, helps to explain the behaviour of Afrikaner nationalists, and therefore, also of the rightwing. Although most of the rightwing leadership, apart from the most extreme radicals, deny that their brand of Afrikaner nationalism is in any way affiliated to racism, research indicates the opposite. Firstly, the CP's terminology mostly refers to the demands and rights of 'whites' and a 'white' homeland rather than those of Afrikaners, which, by implication, denotes a philosophy founded in race rather than in ethnicity. This acts as an obstacle to the CP's claim to being the true heir of Afrikaner nationalism. It also prevents the Party from relying too heavily on Afrikaner primordial characteristics to mobilise its supporters and forced it, like the NP earlier, to embrace a white communalism. This is especially the case with language, as a policy of unilingualism would cost the CP thousands of English-speaking supporters.

Secondly, from the actions and words of individual rightwingers, covert racism and prejudice appear to be inherent in the philosophy of a large section of the CP, but are expressed in even more overt terminology by those to the extreme right, such as the AWB. Racism, however, has not originated with, nor is confined to the rightwing. It has been an integral part of the white psyche since the founding of a settlement in 1652. The first white settlers came to the Cape with preconceived ideas of blacks as barbarians, a sentiment which was hardened by slavery, many racial wars, enduring conflict situations between black and white, and exacerbated by a new degree of institutionalized racial segregation after 1948. As the National Party began deviating from the tenets of apartheid, not only its

policies but also its racist philosophy were taken over by the Right.

The third issue dealt with in this chapter concerns the fears of Afrikaners and whites in general. It has been argued that the fear of suppression, domination and genocide, which are inherent to most minority groups, serves as a powerful motivating force for the acquisition of power by such groups. This is also the case in South Africa, where the core of the conflict lies in the fact that Afrikaners and whites insist upon clinging to power in order to prevent 'black domination'. While the NP hides its intention under the guise of power-sharing, and the CP expressess it as the demand for self-determination, the ultimate goal is the same: to prevent control of the state slipping from Afrikaner and white hands. Loss of such control, in their view, would leave whites and Afrikaners vulnerable to domination by the majority, and would put at risk their privileged status and endanger the identity of the Afrikaner. This helps to explain the tendency of the Afrikaner to attempt to maintain his dominance through various ways of constitutional engineering, mostly in the form of territorial solutions to the perceived threat of a heterogeneous society.

Whereas this chapter dealt primarily with the roots of Afrikaner nationalism in the context of inter-racial conflict and competing Afrikaner and African nationalisms, the following chapter deals with the nature and evolution of intra-Afrikaner electoral conflict and the growth of rightwing support. As shown in this chapter, ethnic political movements rely on primordial issues when attempting to mobilize ethnicity. The CP, in its attempt to outflank the NP, follows this pattern although the nature of its electoral support forces it to accept a broader, communal definition of Afrikaner nationalism to include all rightwing whites.

6. THE ELECTORAL STRENGTH OF THE RIGHTWING

The electoral strength of the rightwing has been a topic of much debate over the past decade. The volatility of its support has forced most analysts regularly to adjust their estimates and the only certainty which emerged from such efforts, was that there existed some correlation between the growth of rightwing support and political reforms. The four general elections held since the late 1970's established the level of rightwing electoral support among white voters at 3% in 1977, 16% in 1981, 30% in 1987 and 31% in 1989 and an estimated 36,5% in 1990. It should be emphasized, however, that the Conservative Party, as the true home for conservative whites, was founded only in 1982. Before this date most rightwingers were active supporters of the National Party, whose policies were, at the time, very similar to those of the CP today. In other words, the NP of the 1970's was the CP of the 1980's, and only after the early reforms of P.W. Botha, did the NP begin shifting to the centre of the political spectrum. Even after the founding of the CP in 1982, the ideological differences between the two parties did not differ substantially. The introduction of power-sharing and the co-option of some Indian, coloured, urban and homeland black leaders, and even the acceptance in principle of one citizenship for all in 1986, did not fundamentaly affect the overriding and all-important principle of white domination and control of political, economic and military power. It remained the foundation of Botha's political ideology until his forced retirement in 1989.

The prominence of the concepts of white domination and a white veto, in the ideologies of both the CP and the NP (before F.W. De Klerk's assumption of power in 1989) makes it difficult to prove a distinct correlation between the growth of the rightwing during the 1980's and the half-hearted political reforms implemented by the

government during this period. Although one would hesitate to refer to Botha's reforms as merely cosmetic, the fact is that they were the result of the desire to eliminate some of the more damaging apartheid measures (because of economic requirements, increasing black resistance, and international condemnation), and never were intended truly to share power or to relinquish the government's grip on power. However, during the period September 1989 to mid-1991 the correlation between the strength of the rightwing and political reforms by the government became very obvious. This was a direct result of the De Klerk administration's implementation of substantial reforms and the commitment of the NP to a democratic dispensation and the termination of white domination within the foreseeable future.

The final ideological break with the past, and the realization by whites that it implied the end of white rule in South Africa within their lifetimes (in fact, most likely before the next general election under the present constitution due in 1994), resulted in considerable numbers of whites leaving the NP to join the CP, and equally large numbers positioning themselves in the 'undecided or uncertain' category.

The extent of these defections first became noticeable during the by-elections in Vasco and Ceres in November 1989, and in all subsequent by-elections, e.g at Umlazi, Randburg, Maitland and Ladysmith. The warning lights for the NP began flickering after the Umlazi result, and concern over the NP's ability to drag its reluctant supporters into the new South Africa, also found reverberation internationally, and led to the influential London-based <u>The Times</u> making the following observation:

> On the evidence of the Umlazi by-election result, the right-wing Conservative Party could come close to defeating the government in a referendum on a non-racial constitution promised by Pretoria before implementation of any new power-sharing arrangement... if the Natal poll result were repeated in a general election, President de Klerk's National Party, which

had ruled since 1948, would be swept from power by the right-wing (The Times:7.6.90).

This chapter relies on Horowitz's contention that in severely divided societies, any attempt by an ethnic party to move to the centre by becoming a multiethnic party or alliance, would result in the formation of ethnic flanking parties. Such flanking parties would take a firm position on ethnic issues and would differ fundamentally from the centrist party on interethnic relations:

> consorting and compromising with ethnic opponents are bound to be viewed with disapproval by members of the various groups. The sense of betrayal and the disagreement with the substance of the compromise give rise to electoral opportunities on the ethnic flanks (1985:411).

It is suggested in this chapter is that the NP's political reforms were an attempt to become 'multiethnic' and 'multiracial' by moving away from a purely Afrikaner, and later, a white nationalism, towards a territorially based South African nationalism. This shift to the centre had commenced during the 1960 and 1970's and accelerated during the 1980's, and led to the formation of ethnonationalist flanking parties on the right, first in the form of the HNP in 1969 and then the CP in 1982. In other words, the reform programme of the NP during this period had a direct influence on the electoral fortunes of the rightwing. This occured when the rightwing and the NP attempted to outbid each other for the support of the Afrikaners and whites as a whole, by presenting opposing ideologies and strategies.

During the 1980's these developments manifested themselves in the CP's espousal of Afrikaner ethnonationalism with the emphasis on primordial characteristics (which included skin colour). At the same time the NP shifted to a definition of Afrikanerdom within a broader South African nationalism, what Linz referred to as 'territorial nationalism', and what the NP describes as nationalism based on 'common values and interests'. These conflicting interpretations of

Afrikaner nationalism and of how the identity and status of the Afrikaner could best be protected, resulted in the bitter electoral rivalry during the 1980's between the NP and the rightwing. As the NP moved further to the centre, the CP positioned itself firmly on its right-flank to garner the votes of those who did not share the NP's new vision.

The CP's and HNP's attempts to position themselves are clearly discernable from an analysis of the issues over which the elections during the period under review were fought. How successful the two rightwing Parties were, can be derived from an analysis of the results of these elections. The first part of this chapter deals with the electoral performance of the rightwing parties during the 1980's and early 1990's, with reference to political developments and issues which have influenced these elections. The second part of the chapter constitutes a summary of the general issues which have been influencing the strength of the rightwing movement, both positively and negatively. These include, among others, the positive influence of meaningful political reform, the rise of strong black opposition to apartheid, worsening economic conditions, and the negative influence of the effects of sanctions and consumer boycotts on rightwing morale, a slowdown of reforms, and the liberalization of the white political culture.

The methodology of this chapter is based on the gathering of information from newspapers dealing with general- and by-election campaigns contested over the past 11 years between white political parties. It required a detailed analysis of pre-election propaganda and the actual election issues, of election results, and finally, of election post-mortems by the various parties, newspaper editors, and analysts. It also required a compilation of a list of notable domestic political developments over the past 11 years in chronological order, which were interspersed with the results of the various general- and by-elections. To create a continuous rendition of the political sentiment among white voters, the results of public opinion polls were used to supplement election results.

6.1 AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTORAL RESULTS FOR THE PERIOD 1981 TO 1991

The reason for limiting the scope of this section of the research to the post-1980 period, can be found in the relative insignificance of the sole rightwing electoral representative, the HNP, as an electoral force until 1981. Since its founding in 1969 the HNP never succeeded in having a candidate elected to Parliament, and received about 3% of the total vote during the 1977 general election.

The election of PW Botha as Prime Minister in 1978 had a direct impact on the electoral fortunes of the HNP. Botha's reformist speeches, e.g his description of apartheid as a "recipe for permanent conflict" and his warning to the white electorate to "adapt or die" early during his reign as Prime Minister, set the tone for later reforms: in 1979 he announced a twelve-point plan which made provision for power-sharing between whites, coloureds and Indians and committed his party to the termination of racial discrimination. Botha also attempted to draw the business community closer to the government with the Carlton conference in 1979, and with the acceptance of the Riekert and Wiehahn recommendations, he sent a clear message to the white working class to the effect that its days of preferential treatment were over. The result was, in Giliomee's terminology, the beginning of a period of large-scale "white worker disaffection", during which resentful white workers, supported by lower-echelon civil servants, perceived a direct threat to their economic security and transformed their resentment into political action (1989:118-121). The result was a gradual increase in support for the HNP which manifested itself during three by-elections in 1979 in the Transvaal blue-collar constituencies of Koedoespoort, Rustenburg and Germiston where the Party on average won 40% of the vote.

The 1981 general election

South Africa entered the decade of the eighties with a rejuvenated rightwing, represented on the electoral front by the HNP and the NCP. As mentioned previously, the gradual political and labour reforms which negatively affected the position of the white working class, led to a resurgence of the rightwing by the end of the 1970's and by 1980 both parties were poised for further growth. Their position was greatly strengthened during the general election of 1981, when they collectively received almost 16% of the total vote, compared to the 3% of the HNP in 1977. The combined rightwing support amounted to a total of 211 553 votes including almost a third of all Afrikaner votes. Due to the distorting effect of the 'first-past-the-post' electoral system, the rightwing parties failed to win any seats, but managed to reduce the NP's majority in two dozen constituencies to less than 2000 (under proportional representation the rightwing would have received about 15 seats).

Specific factors which had contributed to the strengthened position of the rightwing subsequent to the previous election, mainly dealt with the worsening economic position of the white worker and the relaxing of controls which hampered the mobility of black labour, e.g. the recognition of black trade unions in 1979 as proposed by the Wiehahn Commission. Also exploited by the rightwing were the independence of Zimbabwe, the continuing unrest in black schools, and the suggestion by a member of the Cabinet, Lapa Munnik, that pensioners could live on R20 a month.

The results of the 1981 general election were as follows:

Table 6.1 Results of the 1981 general election

Party	Votes received	percentage votes	seats	% seats
Cape Province				
NP	229 033	59,1%	43	78%
PFP	98 112	25,3	11	20
NRP	22 889	5,9	1	2
HNP	35 386	9,1	--	--
NCP	1 573	0,4	--	--
Transvaal				
NP	396 425	59,9	67	88
PFP	120 954	18,2	9	12
NRP	24 316	3,6	--	--
HNP	119 379	18	--	--
NCP	17 156	2,6	--	--
Natal				
NP	67 282	37,4	7	35
PFP	46 231	25,7%	6	30
NRP	57 451	31,9	7	35
HNP	8 206	4,5	--	--
NCP	520	0,2	--	--
OFS				
NP	84 818	72,4	14	100
PFP	--	--	--	--
NRP	2 108	1,8	--	--
HNP	29 333	25,2	--	--
NCP	--	--	--	--
Total				
NP	777 558	57,8	131	79
PFP	265 297	19,7	26	16
NRP	106 764	7,9	8	5
HNP	192 304	14,3	--	--
NCP	19 249	1,4	--	--

The general election was a clear victory for the NP, which won 131 seats (79%) and about 58% of the total vote (down from 67% in 1977). The Party fought a successful election campaign against the PFP, NRP and the rightwing, on a hardline election platform which embraced virtually all the basic tenets of apartheid, with the exception of some labour reforms and the vague promises of a new constitution in the offing. The two parties on the NP's left, the PFP and the NRP, respectively won 20% and 7% of the vote, but their combined share of the total number of seats was only 21%.

The NP's opposition from the right came from the HNP and the NCP of Connie Mulder, which focussed their campaigns on the rising level of white anxiety following the 1980 independence of Zimbabwe, a rejection of black trade unions and the repeal of some 'petty' apartheid measures. However, there was also the powerful verkrampte wing within the NP, under leadership of Treurnicht, which occasionally challenged PW Botha's course of reform. Botha regarded the election as an important test of the support for his verligte policies, and needed a strong mandate for the implementation of some sort of power-sharing with coloureds and Indians in a new constitution.

In the event, the combined rightwing won no seats but increased its share of the vote from 3% in 1977 to 16% in 1981. It received the vote of almost one-third of all Afrikaners, and reduced the NP-majority in two dozen constituencies to less than 2 000 votes. However, the fact that the HNP and NCP received a total of 211 000 votes but no seats, was to become a source of great discontent for the rightwing during future elections, even though it was the same 'first-past-the-post' electoral system which empowered Afrikaner nationalism in 1948.

The NP interpreted the election results as a vindication of its reformist direction which characterised the first few years of Botha's rule. However, Botha had reason to be worried, as the NP lost one-third of its traditional ethnic core to the rightwing. He also must have been well-aware

that the growing discontent among members of the NP's verkrampte wing had to come to a head sooner or later. The only questions were when this would happen, over which issue, and with what consequences ?

1982 - The founding of the Conservative Party

The events leading to the split of the NP in 1982 have been discussed in detail in chapter two. These referred mainly to Treurnicht's course of resistance while being a Cabinet Minister, against the reformist stance of P.W. Botha. His obstructionist actions caused a rift within the Cabinet and the Caucus, and when the split finally occurred it was as a direct result of divergent interpretations of the issue of power-sharing with coloureds and Indians within a single parliament. The Treurnicht group of rebel MP's founded the CP in March 1982 with the estimated support of about 22% of all voters, including 40% of Afrikaners and 17 members in the Parliament (Pottinger, 1988:147; Lipton, 1985:319). The CP also brought along a considerable slice of the Afrikaner establishment and of the NP organizational structure, and at its founding congress, there were representatives from 65 Transvaal-, 18 Cape-, 12 Free State- and 4 Natal constituencies (Ries and Dommisse, 1983:188).

According to a survey conducted by M&M shortly after the split, in April 1982, support for the various rightwing Parties were as follows: CP - 18,3%, HNP - 2,7%, NCP - 0,5%. It amounted to a combined total for the rightwing of 21,5% (as opposed to the 43% of the NP). M&M came to the conclusion that a part of the support which the CP enjoyed, came from the large group of voters who formerly indicated, before the founding of the CP, that they would have abstained from voting because of "present circumstances" (referring to Botha's verligte actions). The number of these abstaining voters declined from 16% in January 1982 to 8% after the founding of the CP - which indicated that a number of voters who were dissatisfied with the NP but could not identify with the working-class image of the HNP, finally found a political home with the CP. During the same period, the NP's support declined from 48,1% to 43%, while

support of parties to the left remained constant. The HNP and the NCP also experienced a decline in support from 7,5% to 3,2% during this period, most likely in favour of the CP (M&M's estimate of the HNP/NCP's support in January 1982 should be questioned, as these Parties received about 16% of the vote a few months earlier during the 1981 general election). The M&M survey indicated that the demographic support of the CP was as follows (support for the NP in brackets):

Table 6.2 Demographic support for the CP in April 1982 (NP support in brackets)

Province	Afrikaner support	English-speaking support
Cape:	12,7% (77,7%)	2,7% (27,2%)
OFS:	18,3% (67,1%)	17,4% (23,3%)
Tvl:	38,1% (44.2%)	4,7% (21,7%)
Natal:	23% (51,7%)	1,8% (27,8%)
Total:	27,4% (54,6%)	4% (24,6%

The figures in table 6.2 indicate that the CP enjoyed considerable support among Afrikaners mainly and although all but one of its MP's were from the Transvaal, the Party also enjoyed a degree of support among Afrikaners in the other three provinces.

The Germiston provincial by-election of September 1982

During the course of 1982 the government implemented the Black Local Authorities Act which gave urban blacks greater authority to govern themselves. At the same time, Botha's iron fist also became more visible: the government-appointed Steyn commission proposed that firmer control should be placed on the media; the Rabie commission proposed stronger security legislation, while the defence force launched 'preventative' counter-insurgency attacks on ANC and SWAPO bases in Angola and Lesotho (Vrye Weekblad: 15.12.89). Incursions into neighbouring countries became a

common method during subsequent years of demonstrating to the white electorate that the NP had not lost its capacity for strong-arm tactics.

The first opportunity for testing the actual support of the newly-formed CP came in September 1982 during the municipal by-election in Germiston District. During the previous election in 1981 the NP candidate was unopposed, but the results of the 1982 by-election presented the NP with the first of many surprises during the 1980's: it scraped home with a majority of 308 votes over the CP, but the combined support of the CP and HNP exceeded the NP's vote by 1 330 votes (Sunday Express:22.8.82).

The results, regarded by the United States government as a "severe setback", were seen by the CP as the start of a new era in white politics in which language no longer determined political alignments - according to Clive Derby-Lewis of the CP, about 75% of English-speakers in one particular polling station in a predominantly English-speaking part of Germiston voted for the CP, while the overall English support for the Party was estimated at about 20% (ibid). Many of these voters gave the NP's power-sharing proposals and the Zimbabwean independence as reasons why they voted for the CP. The indications that support for the CP was larger than initially suspected, were partly confirmed and partly refuted during a 'mini-by-election' three months later, in November 1982.

The 'mini-election' of November 1982

This round of by-elections was heralded as the most important by-elections in the histories of the five white political parties (Cape Times:2.11.82). Issues which cropped up repeatedly during the by-election campaigns, were the government's constitutional proposals and a possible settlement in Namibia. On the latter issue, the rightwing made itself very clear: the CP totally rejected any settlement which would have led to a SWAPO victory, on

the grounds that the "terrorist" border would then be moved to the Orange River and "we will sit with the same problem" (ibid); the HNP claimed that the Party regarded the whole of 'South-West Africa' as part of South Africa. More interesting is the response by the NP candidate in the Free State constituency of Parys, who also rejected such a settlement on the grounds that the NP regarded SWAPO as "communist-orientated" and therefore unacceptable as an alternative government (Cape Times:2.11.82). This was the official view of the NP at the time, according to Lipton who cites the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, as saying:

> A settlement would not bring any rewards to South Africa. On the contrary, instead of 'buying time' for reform, it would merely reduce the time-scale for further action against South Africa (Lipton, 1985:395).

Although the Namibian issue was merely one example, it confirms the belief that, apart from power-sharing and 'petty' apartheid, there was little difference between the policies of the NP and the rightwing in 1982. On other prominent by-election issues, such as the participation of blacks in the central government, there were no major differences between the two Parties. As could be expected, the CP rejected this out-of-hand and claimed that power-sharing with coloureds and Indians would hasten the day when blacks, too, would have to be given representation in the central government. The NP, although accepting coloureds and Indians into the Parliament, rejected the notion of blacks in Parliament as strongly as the CP. Its policy at the time was to strengthen the ties between urban-based blacks and the homelands. The intention was that each urban black should have the vote, as long as those votes were cast in the 'independent' homelands. P.W. Botha expressed himself on this issue as follows:

> No National Party can accept the principle of majority rule in one state. That we reject. But we are prepared to consult with the black leaders...to carry out a system in South Africa which will make it possible for them to achieve their own independence (Pottinger, 1988:124).

The convergence on basic ideology and the fact that the C was still struggling to establish its own identity so soon after the split, helped to limit the degree of animosity between the two Parties during this mini-election, but this 'calm before the storm' continued only until 1983.

The results of the NP and the rightwing parties in the 1982 by-elections were as follows:

Table 6.3 By-election results of November 1982

Stellenbosch :	NP: 7 002
	CP: 599
	NP maj.: 6 403
	poll:62%
	(NP maj. in 1981: 4 003; poll:57%)
Parys :	NP: 5 303
	CP: 3 701
	HNP: 1 592
	NP maj. 1 602
	poll: 77,4%
	(NP maj. 1981: 3 389).
Walvis Bay :	NP: 1 792
	CP: 606
	HNP: 153
	NP maj. 1 186
	poll: 70,2%

(the Johannesburg North by-election was contested between the NRP and PFP).

(Cape Times:4.11.82).

The rightwing parties were convincingly beaten in Walvis Bay and Stellenbosch, and even in Parys the NP achieved an overall majority over both parties. It therefore is not surprising that some analysts regarded the results as "disasterous" for the rightwing (Cape Times:4.11.82), but that is not the whole truth. In Parys especially, the

combined rightwing vote was just 10 votes short of the NP's total, and the NP's majority had been reduced from 3 389 in 1981 to 1 602 in 1982 (this was also the pattern in a municipal by-election held in Bothaville on the same day, in which the combined rightwing vote surpassed that of the NP by 570).

The significance of the Parys and Bothaville results was that it represented the beginning of a trend over the next few years, until 1989, of seats lost to the NP because of a split vote caused by rightwing disunity. In spite of various attempts during this period to reach an electoral agreement between the two rightwing parties, in this they succeeded only once, namely in Sasolburg in 1986. However, as the HNP's popularity declined, and many of its erstwhile supporters switched allegiance to the CP, the problem of a split rightwing vote virtually disappeared, so much so that in the 1989 general election, only one seat was lost by the rightwing to the NP in this manner.

The by-elections of 1983: The Battle of the Bergs

Several important political developments occurred in 1983, including the holding of a referendum to test the white support for the new Tricameral constitution, the founding of the UDF and National Forum, further 'pre-emptive' strikes by the SADF on ANC and SWAPO bases in neighbouring countries, and the strike by the ANC on the Air Force HQ in Pretoria.

In January 1983 a M&M survey found that support for the CP was 12,9%, the lowest yet since its inception (compared to 15,6% in October 1982, 14,5% in July 1982 and 18,3% in April 1982). Support for the HNP was down to 2,1%, giving the combined rightwing about 15% support among the white electorate. During the same period the NP's support increased from 43% to 48,9%. Among Afrikaners, support for the CP declined from 23,6% in October 1982 to 20,7% in January 1983, and English-speaking support from 3,1 to 1,3%

over the same period. The CP's pattern of support still followed the previously noted provincial trend, with almost two-and-half times as much support in the Transvaal than in the Cape (26,6% v. 9,5%).

The results of this M&M survey were refuted by the strong showing of the rightwing in a round of by-elections in the Transvaal, described by journalists as the 'battle of the bergs'. Instead of a decline in rightwing support, the two rightwing parties experienced a considerable swing of between 11% and 27% towards them. Although the NP won three of the four seats, its majorities declined considerably. In **Soutpansberg**, the NP scraped through with a majority of 621 over the CP, compared to its 3 647 majority in 1981 over the HNP (a swing of 10,7%, in a percentage poll of 78%). In **Waterberg** the CP overturned the NP's majority of 1 461 over the HNP in the 1981 election to a CP majority of 1 894. The combined rightwing majority in this constituency amounted to 4 533 votes. The swing away from the NP towards the CP was about 27% in a poll of 78%. In **Carletonville** the NP held on to the seat with a majority of 1 359, but the combined rightwing vote surpassed that of the NP by 314 votes (poll: 53%). In **Waterkloof** the NP received a majority of 1 951 over the PFP, but the CP managed to attract 2 887 votes, in spite of the fact that no rightwing party had contested this seat during the previous election (Die Burger:12.5.83).

A detailed analysis of the Waterberg results provides the following statistics: in 1981 Andries Treurnicht received 5 233 votes in 1981 under the NP banner, compared to the 5 706 he received in 1983 as leader of the CP. The HNP's support declined by about 1 200, while that of the NP declined by about 1 400. At the same time the percentage poll varied very little: 75% and 78%. This would suggest that the CP's support in 1983 consisted of more than just disgruntled NP and HNP supporters, as the combined decline it these two parties' totals was about 2 600, which was considerably lower than the number of votes the CP received (5 706). Since the percentage poll remained almost static,

it can be deduced that the number of voters in the constituency must have increased and that this directly benefitted the CP, the implication being that the Party actually developed a dynamic of its own instead of just taking voters from the opposition parties.

The by-election results were seen by the NP as an indication that it would have to compete in the future with a much stronger rightwing in the form of the CP than was the case of the HNP, but both the Prime Minister, P.W. Botha and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, insisted that it would not deter the government from its path of reform (Die Burger:12.5.83). The NP's poor performance was attributed to the fact that the CP took with it about 80% of the NP's party organization in these constituencies when the split occurred in 1982, and on the proximity of the constituencies to the northern border with Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Botswana (which may help to explain the cross-border raids by the SADF prior to the elections in 1983).

Among commentators to the left of the NP the results were seen as unfavourable to the NP and reform. The Rand Daily Mail (14.5.83) saw the significance of the results in the fact that the NP polled substantially fewer votes in the four constituencies than the combined votes of its rivals on the right and the left: the NP received 21 578 votes in these four constituencies compared to the 21 774 of the combined rightwing. Although the results indicated strong support for the CP in rural constituencies, it also received considerable support in the urban constituencies of Waterkloof and Carletonville. Toz Wentzel of the Argus (14.5.83), advised the NP to expect the possible loss of 10 to 20 seats in Parliament but he urged the Party to carry on undaunted with reform. Foreign newspapers such as the Guardian (12.5.83) claimed that the results indicated a lack of substantial support for reforms, while the Daily Telegraph (12.5.83) warned the NP to employ caution and tact to ensure the support of whites for its reforms.

The next by-election was held in November 1983 in **Middleburg** in the Transvaal. It was only a provincial council by-election, but it was held on the same day as the national referendum. Since the previous by-elections, the white voters had to absorb the shock of the Pretoria bomb blast in May (an ANC attack on the Air Force HQ in the heart of the Capital in which several people were killed and over a hundred injured). The by-election was preceded by further rivalry between the CP and HNP, which led to the HNP suggesting that both parties should withdraw from the election to "show solidarity" before the referendum. This offer was rejected by the CP, but the split vote which saw the NP win the seat, intensified pressure on both parties to reach some kind of electoral agreement. Die Burger (4.11.83) speculated that former leader of the NP in the Transvaal, Connie Mulder, may have been asked to try to reconcile the two Parties.

The results once again came as a shock to the NP, as the combined rightwing vote surpassed that of the NP by 404 votes:

Table 6.4 The Middelburg by-election of November 1983

NP: 6 271
CP: 4 647
HNP: 2 028
NP maj. 1 624,
poll: 58%
(NP maj. in 1981: 1 445, poll:67%)

The 1983 Referendum

During 1983 the NP government enacted into law a new constitution which provided for power-sharing with coloureds and Indians at central government level. The

Tricameral Constitution first had to be placed before the electorate by way of a referendum and was approved in 1983 by a two-thirds majority among whites (1 360 223 v. 691 577 votes), but because the 'no' votes were not differentiated between left and right in the ballot, it was virtually impossible to determine how many voters opposed the new constitution from the left and how many from the right.

The government's constitutional proposals were opposed from the left and the right. From the left the PFP argued that it would give too much power to the executive president and that the exclusion of blacks would lead to increased racial polarization, while from the right the CP and HNP argued that by allowing coloureds and Indians into central government structures, the whites' grip on power would be weakened and would inevitably lead to the inclusion of blacks as well. The NP enjoyed the support of all Afrikaans- and most of the English-speaking press, the vast majority of business leaders, and had an unfair advantage over the opposition with regard to its access to, and control of, the electronic media.

The referendum was not held on a constituency basis as would be the case in a general election, but instead the white electorate was divided into the 15 referendum regions depicted below, each consisting of several parliamentary consituencies. As it was a referendum and dealt with a single issue, there were no candidates and voters could cast their ballots in whichever referendum region they were physically present during the election day. The results of the 1983-referendum, per region, are tabled on the following page:

Table 6.5 The 1983 Referendum results per region

Region	Yes	No
Beaufort West	22 509	7 733
Bloemfontein	52 019	26 960
Cape Town	221 511	71 456
Durban	123 783	44 442
East London	53 202	15 087
George	31 256	11 426
Germiston	113 600	60 241
JHB	194 396	85 554
Kimberley	34 815	17 898
Kroonstad	55 486	32 321
Pietermaritzburg	50 519	20 060
Pietersburg	31 403	34 827
Port Elizabeth	60 661	25 901
Pretoria	209 763	157 433
Roodepoort	105 307	80 238

(Dirk Laurie, 1987:261).

According to Laurie, who projected the 1981 and 1987 general election results onto the referendum regions, the breakdown of the 'no' votes into 'left-'no' and 'right-no' was as follows: based on the 1981 election results, the rightwing 'no' vote would have totalled 557 231 votes (27,2% of 33% total 'no' votes); and based on the 1987 election results, 555 672 (27,1%) would have voted 'no' from the rightwing perspective, i.e of the total 'no' vote, 80% would have come from the rightwing (1987:254-262).

A worthwhile exercise is to combine Laurie's data with statistics on CP-held constituencies. If Laurie's 1987-general election results are projected onto the referendum regions, and compared with the constituencies won by the CP during the 1989 general election, the

following conclusion is reached: the rightwing 'no' votes were more heavily concentrated in certain regions than in others, especially in Kroonstad, Pietersburg, Pretoria and Roodepoort, where the rightwing 'no-vote' represented was more than 40% of the total number of votes (as opposed to the average rightwing 'no-vote' of 27%). It was not coincidental that these four referendum regions were also the same regions in which the CP won the majority of the constituencies in the 1989 general election. In the Kroonstad referendum region it won four of the seven constituencies; in the Pietersburg region five out of five; in the Pretoria region 13 out of 23; and in the Roodepoort region, nine out of 14. These statistics indicate that these four referendum regions had a strong rightwing presence in 1989, and, inter alia, that in them the 'no' vote in 1983 must have been an overwhelming rightwing 'no'.

The 1984 by-elections

The year of 1984 saw more regional co-operation between Southern African states with the signing of the Lusaka and Nkomati accords, but it soon became obvious that the South African government was not intending to refrain from its destabilizing activities in the region. At the parliamentary level the coloureds and Indians turned out in only small numbers to vote for representatives to their newly-founded Houses of Parliament, the Houses of Delegates and Representatives. Only about 30% of coloureds and 20% of Indians voted, but nevertheless the new Constitution did achieve the symbolic end to exclusive white rule and the Westminster system, in September 1984. Black opposition to the new Constitution took the form of unrest, violence, school boycotts, strikes, consumer boycotts, sabotage and attacks on co-opted black officials. These were followed by repressive measures introduced by the State: several black people were killed by security forces in Sharpeville in September. On the labour front the National Union of Mineworkers was founded in November, and a mass stay-away

on the Reef gave an indication of the growing power of black workers.

According to surveys conducted by M&M in 1984, the rightwing parties did not succeed in increasing their support among white voters during the course of that year. The results of the surveys are presented in table 6.6:

Table 6.6 Rightwing support: 1983 - 1984

	Jul. '83	Feb. '84	July '84	Oct. '84
CP	12,1%	11,1%	9,8%	10,9%
HNP	2,5%	2%	1,9%	2,3%
NP	50,8%	54,4%	55,8%	51,4%

These figures indicated that the gains which the NP showed shortly after the referendum of November 1983, disappeared afterwards, leaving the Party almost at the same level as before the referendum. Its support among Afrikaners declined from almost 70% to about 60% over the three months after July 1984. The CP's support also declined slightly after the referendum while the HNP remained static.

The results of the by-election in **Soutpansberg** in February 1984 provided a further boost to the CP and indicated a further erosion of the NP's support base in the Northern Transvaal. The NP lost the seat to the CP, following a decline in its majority from 3 647 in 1981 to 621 in 1983, with the CP receiving 53% of the vote. The swing towards the right in the Transvaal Platteland received further momentum during two provincial by-elections in July 1984 in **Potgietersrus** and **Rosettenville**, the latter being a predominantly English-speaking, middle-income and conservative urban constituency. In Potgietersrus the CP achieved a majority of 1 034 over the NP and retained the seat it had acquired earlier when the NP incumbent defected to the CP in 1982.

The CP received 7 515 votes, up from 4 273 in 1981, i.e from 42% to 54%, which indicated a 12% swing away from the NP towards the CP. In Rosettenville the NP won, but the CP received a surprisingly large number of votes, (30,4%), even though no rightwing party had contested the seat in 1981 (Sunday Times:1.7.84).

The results were a confirmation of the electoral trend in the Transvaal since 1981, but there was serious concern among Nationalists over the so-called 'lie factor' and the positive effect the results could have on the efforts towards unity between the CP and the HNP (Cape Times:28.6.84). The government further argued that Potgietersrus represented the most favourable conditions that the CP could expect anywhere, and that the Party was helped by the effects that poor economic conditions and drought had on the voters (Vaderland:28.6.84). The result in Rosettenville was seen as an indication of the presence of the CP in blue-collar urban areas also, but without enough support to displace the NP in this type of constituency (Sunday Times:1.7.84). As to be expected, Treurnicht disagreed, and claimed that the results were proof of how deeply worried the whites were about the way the country was being led, and as an indication of the "power of a volk standing together and working together with one political objective" (Cape Times:29.6.84).

Parliamentary by-elections were also held in November 1984 in **Primrose (Transvaal), and George and Parow (Cape Province)**. The election issues still centred around the the economy as the country was in the worst economic crisis since 1910, according to F.W. de Klerk (Die Burger:30.11.84). Other relevant issues concerned the 'management style' of P.W. Botha, the swart gevaar and 'total onslaught' propaganda campaigns, and the new Constitution (The Argus:10.11.84). With regard to the latter, the CP claimed that voters were not made aware before the referendum of the fact that coloureds and Indians were actually going to be joining the Cabinet and that 93% of the portfolios were going to be general affairs

and only 7% own affairs (The Argus:10.11.84). The NP candidate in Parow at the time, Hernus Kriel (now a Cabinet Minister) was quick to reassure concerned NP supporters that "our policy is still separate development" (ibid). The CP also made an electoral issue out of the statement by the Director-General of Finance, in which he claimed that the country was "technically bankrupt" towards the end of 1984.

The parliamentary by-election results, pertaining to the NP and rightwing parties in particular, were as follows:

Table 6.7 By-election results: November 1984

George:	NP: 6 501
	HNP: 1 836
	NP maj. 4 665
	poll: 57%
	(NP maj. in 1981: 5 604, poll:75%)
Primrose:	NP: 6 053
	CP: 5 305
	NP maj. 748
	poll: 56%
	(NP maj. in 1981: 3 990, poll:60%)
Parow:	NP: 6 532
	CP: 1 419
	NP maj. 5 113
	poll: 48%
	(NP maj. in 1981: 6 488, poll:60%)

The results were interpreted by the NP as a mandate to continue with its reform programme and as a clear indication that the CP could not repeat in the Cape its recent strong performances in the Transvaal (Die Burger:30.11.84). According to Lawrence Schlemmer, the results were an indication that the government should continue with reform, and that unrest and the poor economic conditions were the real cause of the rightwing's growth.

The CP claimed a swing of up to 22% towards it and was

especially happy with the result in Primrose, where the NP majority shrank from 4 399 in 1981 to 748, an indication that many formerly safe NP seats in the Transvaal had become marginal. The NP's majorities declined in all six by-elections and there was a considerable stay-away vote in protest against the NP policies. In Parow this trend was very noticeable as the percentage poll declined from 60% in 1981 to 47% in 1984, as well as in George, where it declined from 73,8% to 56,7%. The so-called protest vote, consisting of former NP supporters who had thus far been unable to bring themselves to vote for the CP, would henceforth gradually switch towards the CP during the second half of the 1980's.

Reform, unrest, the Rubicon speech and the by-elections of 1985

During 1985 several important reform measures were introduced. These included the repeal of the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts and the repeal of the Prohibition of Political Interference Act. In May the government announced its points of departure concerning the political rights of blacks. The gist of these were the creation of democratic institutions to accommodate black political rights and the granting of self-determination to groups without one population group dominating another (Van Vuuren, 1985:56). These were totally unacceptable to most blacks, and political unrest and violence increased dramatically during the course of the year, causing the government to introduce a state of emergency in 36 magisterial districts in June. The year also saw the founding of the non-racial trade union body, COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions), and further

labour unrest and school boycotts.

According to Giliomee (1989:123) a widespread suspicion existed among sections of the white population during 1985-86 that the government was caving in to foreign pressure, a perception which may have resulted in Botha's 'Rubicon' speech in September 1985. This speech, beforehand promoted as the watershed in South African politics, was a disaster in terms of reform and the country's international standing. More than anything else, its total rejection of international demands opened the way for large-scale disinvestment, economic sanctions and hastened the drastic devaluation of the Rand. All in all, the year of 1985 contained a mixture of political reform and repression, but with the killing of 19 black protesters in Uitenhage in the eastern Cape, the pattern for the hardline approach of the second half of the decade had been established.

In June 1985 M&M estimated the combined rightwing Parties' support at 22,8%, as opposed to the NP's 48% and parties on the left at 16,3%, with 13% abstaining or not sure who to vote for. The actual strength of the parties was tested during the October 'mini-election'. By-elections were held in Bethlehem, Port Natal, Sasolburg, Springs and Vryburg, covering a large spread of the northern part of South Africa.

The results are presented on the following page:

Table 6.8 Results of by-elections held in October 1985

Bethlehem: NP: 6 623
CP: 5 435
NP maj. 1 188
poll: 70%
(1981: NP maj. 3 826, poll:86%)

Port Natal: NP: 4 307
CP: 1 914
NP maj. 2 205
poll: 53%
(1981: NP maj. 685, poll:65%)

Sasolburg: NP: 6 239
HNP: 6 606
HNP maj. 367
poll: 58%
(1981: NP maj. 2 619, poll:63%)

Springs: NP: 5 288
CP: 4 539
NP maj. 749
poll: 57%
(1981: NP maj. 2 481, poll:59,5%)

Vryburg: NP: 4 605
CP: 3 417
HNP: 636
NP maj. 1 186
poll: 76%
(1981: NP maj. 2 355, poll:68%)

(Cape Times:1.11.85).

The results once again came as a shock to the NP, as its majorities declined in three of the five constituencies by between 50% and 70%, while it lost Sasolburg to the HNP. According to political analyst, Willem Kleynhans, it was an indication to the government that it must accelerate reform, as only a swing to the left "could save the NP from a further disastrous erosion of its voter support by the

advance of the rightwing". According to Kleynhans the massive inroads made by the rightwing parties into NP majorities indicated that only one political division remained, namely the one between the right and the left. For the NP to be accepted as part of the left, it had to show in a convincing way that it accepted the idea of real power-sharing (Argus:2.11.85). Kleynhans substantiated his claim concerning the swing towards the right with the following statistics:

Springs: +18%
Sasolburg: +17,7%
Vryburg: +15,3%
Port Natal: +12,2%
Bethlehem: +18,4%

These figures represent an average swing towards the rightwing of 16,3%. Of the total number of votes cast in all five constituencies, the NP received 47,5% and the combined rightwing parties 39,5%.

Kleynhans's argument concerning the link between a slowdown of reform and the erosion of NP support was corroborated by F. Van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the PFP, who claimed that the lack of a clear and systematic reform programme would result in the erosion of support to both left and right (Cape Times:1.11.85). Similar advice came from the British Labour Party, who warned the President "not "to look over his right shoulder, but instead to act in a statesmanlike manner and create a genuine democracy" (ibid).

It becomes clear as this chapter progresses that the NP did not take any of the above-mentioned advice to heart, as the Party, in spite of minor reforms, continued to occupy the centre of the white political spectrum, and experienced further losses to the right, and after 1987, to both the left and right.

According to Welsh the results should be seen against the background of various factors which favoured the rightwing, as "it is difficult to imagine a more promising context for major right-wing gains, given the economic crisis, the turbulence and the siege atmosphere" (Cape Times: 1.11.85). This view was shared by P.W. Botha, who claimed that in light of the recession, drought and unrest which plagued the country, the NP could be satisfied with the results and would continue with its reform programme. He spoke also of large numbers of conservative people who had to be convinced to follow the path of "realism and level-headedness" which the NP had mapped out, and he expressed his concern over the disunity among whites in the face of the threats facing the country (Cape Times:1.11.85). Botha further mentioned the "growing opposition" among white South Africans to attempts from "outside" to prescribe to South Africa and to weaken its economy (a definite response to counter the perception which was developing among some whites, namely that the government was caving in to foreign pressure).

Die Burger:1.11.85), regarded as the most loyal media supporter of the NP, noted that in spite of the rightwing's propaganda, a majority of voters accepted the principle of power-sharing among all population groups, and that the existence and growth of rightwing parties would be limited to certain parts of the country. It conceded that there would be many more marginal seats during the next general election, but argued that this would be balanced by the increasing hostility between the HNP and CP as a result of the Sasolburg result (implying that the CP was not happy about the handing over of Sasolburg on a platter to the HNP).

The rightwing Parties were elated over the results, and especially the HNP's victory in Sasolburg gave the party a new (but short-lived) lease of life. The view was that if an urban NP seat like Sasolburg could fall to the right and a previously safe Reef seat such as Springs become marginal, the rightwing could "destroy" the NP during the next general election (Sunday Star:3.11.85). Future

co-operation between the CP and the HNP seemed doomed as differences still existed over how many seats each Party should be allowed to contest. The CP also became more hostile towards the HNP because of the growing number of seats that had been lost to the NP because of the HNP's "interference". Treurnicht saw the solution in the formation of one party, but the HNP would not agree to the terms of such a union, a fact which caused much frustration among rightwing supporters, as the perception existed that 45 NP seats in the Transvaal had become marginal, but could be won only by a combined rightwing vote (Rapport:3.11.85; Sunday Star:3.11.85).

The official end of South Africa's 'Prague Spring' and the Kliprvier by-election of 1986

The survey conducted by M&M in June 1986 indicated that the support for rightwing parties had declined from almost 23% the previous year to just below 20%. At the same time the NP's support increased by 3% to almost 52%, while that of the opposition on the left had declined to 15,6%. Significant political developments during 1986 included the repeal of Influx Control, the beginning of the Kwazulu/Natal Indaba, the rejection by the NGK of apartheid "as a heresy", the visit (and the scuttling) of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) and the proclamation of a national state of emergency. The EPG's mission to South Africa was intended to broker a settlement between the government and the ANC. The mission was wrecked by another round of cross-border raids by the SADF on ANC bases in three neighbouring black states, suspected to have been ordered by P.W. Botha for this specific purpose (Pottinger, 1988:332). Apart from wrecking a possible breakthrough in negotiations with the ANC, the raids also achieved the expected and desired result of proving to the white electorate that the government had not gone soft on the external threat and was not caving in to foreign pressure.

If this was not enough to convince even the most sceptical white voter of the government's intentions, then the introduction of a national state of emergency in June 1986, did. It led to large-scale state repression of most forms of anti-government protest, including pre-publication censorship, the transfer of great powers of discretion to even junior members of the security forces, and resulted in the detention of 25 000 people in the 11 months after its proclamation (Schlemmer, 1988:35). These events led to what journalist, Brian Pottinger, with reference to the short-lived Czechoslovakian experiment with democracy in 1968, described as the "end of South Africa's Prague Spring", i.e. the end of the reformist and enlightened period of the P.W Botha era (Sunday Times:16.8.87).

Apart from these general circumstances under which the Kliprivier by-election was contested in September 1986, there was also another factor, peculiar to this constituency, which influenced matters. This referred to the presence in the constituency of about 450 members of the South African Transport Services who were dissatisfied with their salaries and the treatment they were receiving from the government. Together with their families, they constituted at least 1 000 possible protest votes against the NP, and represented a microcosm of the white working class. The HNP, with its strong working-class origins, was well placed to attract support from this sector, and received a further boost from a public endorsement by the AWB and the CP, as a result of a pre-election agreement. The HNP formulated its election strategy around the grievances of the transport workers, along with general issues such as a weak economy and a recent increase in the salaries of politicians (Cape Times:15.9.86).

As usual the NP tried to straddle two chairs, fighting left and right at the same time. The Minister of National Education at the time, F.W. de Klerk, explained his party's middle-of-the-road policy during an election meeting as the only viable one, which ensured an 'own' community life, 'own' schools, and a built-in guarantee for white survival and security. He added that the voters of Kliprivier should

reject not only the "flagrant racism and the pie-in-the-sky" solutions of the right, but also the "suicidal" policy of one-person-one-vote on a common voters role as proposed by the PFP (Die Burger:15.9.86). The result in Kliprivier was as follows:

NP: 5 863, HNP: 2 830, NP maj. 3 033, poll: 59% (1981: NP maj. 3 929, poll:67%).

These results indicated a decline of 22% in the NP's majority since 1981, which paled into insignificance when compared to the large declines in most other by-elections since 1982 in which NP majorities were often halved or wiped out. Dirk Laurie suggested that the result was a setback for the Right, and predicted that it could expect only 25 to 30 seats in a general election (Cape Times:19.9.86). The NP saw the result as a vote of confidence in the government's reform programme and as an indication that the rightwing might have reached its ceiling, thereby erroneously equating the HNP with the rightwing. Die Burger (19.9.86), however, warned that the considerable number of votes which the HNP had received, showed that the white worker could not be ignored.

The HNP was elated over the doubling of its support since the last election (1 402 votes in 1981 to the 2 830 votes in 1986), and regarded the result as proof of the irrepressible growth of the rightwing cause. However, the consensus among most analysts was that the results were favourable enough to the NP to have increased the chances of an early general election during 1987.

The general election of May 1987

In March 1987 a pre-election survey conducted by M&M estimated the support of the various parties as follows:

NP: 46,3%, CP:14,7%, HNP:3,5%, PFP:19,8%, NRP:2,9%, Ind:7,1%..

After M&M adjusted the results by excluding the number of respondents who were not going to vote or who knew they were in an uncontested constituency, they predicted the general election results as follows:

NP:53,4%, CP:16,9%, HNP:3,3%, PFP:23,2%, NRP:2,5%, Ind.:0,8%.

These findings largely underestimated the actual strength of the rightwing Parties and overestimated the strength of the PFP and the NRP (sometimes by as much as 10%). This was a problem of M&M's surveys throughout the years, which can be explained by the fact that rightwing voters were more eager voters with a greater sense of loyalty to their cause, and therefore turned out in greater numbers on election days than their NP and liberal counterparts, and perhaps were more paranoid about indicating their political preferences (Interview, Frans Badenhorst of M&M, 12.7.91).

The general election of 1987 took place under a country-wide state of emergency, which resulted in the prominence of security and law and order issues during the election campaign. The NP's election strategy was based on the twin pillars of reform and security, and its election slogan said it all: "Reform yes, surrender, no". The NP used the old swart gevaar and 'total onslaught' tactics to scare voters away from the parties on the left, and in this it succeeded so well that it chased some of its own supporters even further right, and into the rightwing fold.

The rightwing parties based their campaigns on the "failure of power-sharing". The CP placed heavy emphasis on the worsening unrest in the country, the economic decline and increased foreign pressure, as proof that power-sharing did not work. The HNP took a similar view by claiming that power-sharing with coloureds and Indians in 1983 led to the acceptance by the NP of power-sharing with blacks and would eventually lead to the transfer of power to blacks (Suid-Africa-Stigting Nuus:April 1987). To avoid the damaging results of a split rightwing vote, attempts were made by the AWB to broker an election agreement between the HNP and CP. To force the issue, Eugene Terre'Blanche

threatened to activate the AWB's Party, the Blanke Volkstaat Party, but because of the HNP's insistence on a 50-50 division of seats, nothing came of these efforts.

Table 6.9 The results of the 1987 general election

Party	Votes received	percentage votes	seats	% seats
Cape Province				
NP	335 739	60,6%	48	86%
CP	82 366	14,8	0	0
HNP	14 006	2,5	0	0
PFP	95 420	17,2	8	14
NRP	12 272	2,2	0	0
Ind.	13 417	2,4	0	0
Transvaal				
NP	526 919	48,7	47	62
CP	383 176	35,4	22	29
HNP	32 499	3,0	0	0
PFP	123 657	11,4	6	8
NRP	4 895	0,4	0	0
Ind.	11 201	1,0	1	1
Orange Free State				
NP	93 497	55,0	14	100
CP	60 958	37,3	0	0
HNP	10 505	5,6	0	0
PFP	2 612	1,5	0	0
Natal				
NP	119 299	49,9	14	70
CP	21 059	8,8	0	0
HNP	4 446	1,3	0	0
PFP	66 885	28,0	5	25
NRP	23 327	9,7	1	5
Ind.	2 531	1,5	0	0
Total				
NP	1 078 490	52,4	123	74
CP	538 640	26,4	22	13
HNP	67 561	3,1	0	0
PFP	297 243	14,4	19	11
NRP	39 587	2,0	1	1
Ind.	27 149	1,3	1	1

The most important patterns which emerged from the election were the increase in its electoral support for the rightwing from about 14% of the total vote in 1981 to almost 30% during this election. This was an increase in seats from zero in 1981 to 22 in 1987, a total of 13,3% of all seats in Parliament, which is an indication of the distorting effect of the electoral system on the rightwing's parliamentary representation. It also resulted in the CP becoming the Official Opposition, which was an event of great symbolic value for the Party. The outcome also indicated the demise of the HNP, as it lost its deposit in all but four of the seats it contested, leaving the CP as the true parliamentary representative of the right. However, the lack of an election agreement between the two rightwing parties, cost the CP eight seats.

The results showed that the rightwing's support base was still mostly in the Transvaal, where it won all its seats, but that it also enjoyed considerable support in the OFS. Its support in the Transvaal was mostly concentrated in the rural districts, e.g. in the northern Transvaal areas of Soutpansberg, Waterberg, Potgietersrus, Brits, Pietersburg, where it received almost 57% of the vote compared to the NP's 43%. In the eastern and western Transvaal, a mixture of mining and agricultural towns, the rightwing received 52,6% and 54,3% of the vote respectively (Kotze and Lourens, 1987:371). In the urban districts of the Vaal Triangle (46%) and the West Rand (42%), which had a considerable blue-collar element, it also performed strongly, but was less successful in the East Rand (37%) and Pretoria (39%), and fared badly in Johannesburg (12,2%) and in Midrand, Sandton and Randburg (9,2%).

The NP's strength declined from 131 seats and 58,3% of the total number of votes in 1981, to 123 seats and 54,1% of votes in 1987. However, it should be added that due to the CP breakaway in 1982 and subsequent by-elections, the NP had held only 118 seats prior to the election. The PFP-NRP alliance won only 20 (12% of seats) and received 329 861 of the votes (16,4%) in 1987, compared to the 33 seats and 372 184 votes in 1981 (Cape Times:9.5.87). It was obvious that

many liberal voters were influenced by the scare tactics of the government and believed that security took priority over reform, resulting in the PFP being replaced by the CP as Official Opposition in the House of Assembly.

With regard to the implications of the election, the general opinion was split between those who believed the CP's growth indicated a shift to the left and those who believed the shift was to the right. The latter view was held by most newspapers, some analysts, and of the course by the rightwing itself. According to Clive Derby-Lewis, the fact that the CP had become the Official Opposition within a mere five years, meant that it could win the next election:

> The number of seats we won is not a good indication of our relative strength. It is more important to look at the number of votes and the shift in support it represents. If our support had been proportionately reflected in terms of seats, we would have had 43 seats (cited in Zille, 1988:87),

He also claimed that although the CP received 42% of the vote in the OFS, it had received no seats, and that an additional 12 000 votes would give it a majority of votes in that province. The CP's official statistician, Barney Uys, claimed that the rightwing had "every reason to be smug" - according to Uys, there was a swing of 20% away from the Left towards the NP from 1981 to 1987, but at the same time, there was also a swing of 25% away from the NP towards the right, implying that the NP would lose more support to the Right than it would gain from the Left if it continued with its reforms. By dividing the number of votes received by each party by the number of seats in Parliament, Uys claimed that each CP MP represented 27 700 rightwing voters, the PFP/NRP 16 700, and the NP only 8 700 voters. These figures, he argued, were a more accurate reflection of the true strength of each party in Parliament, as opposed to the actual representation, which was a result of the distortions of the plurality system. (Sunday Tribune:10.5.87).

Presenting even more bad news to the NP was Donald Simpson from Potchefstroom University, who confidently predicted that the CP could win the next election, if fewer than a quarter of present NP voters switched to the CP. According to his calculations, the CP (like the NP/Afrikaner Party in 1948) needed to win only 43% of the total votes to control the House of Assembly, i.e. a swing of about 12% (the 12% swing supposedly needed by the rightwing was consideraly less than the 16% average swing to the Right between 1982 and 1987). Such a swing, Simpson argued, would give the CP 850 000 votes and 84 seats in Parliament (The Argus:23.5.87). Over the short-term, however, he estimated the CP's strength at about 40 seats, which turned out to be very close to the exact number of seats which the Party received two years later during the 1989 election. Although Simpson was inaccurate in his prediction of a 12% swing towards the CP before the 1989 election, his long-term predictions could be relevant for the period after September 1989 and especially after February 1990, when the reform process greatly accelerated.

Bekker et al (1989:10) indicated that the election results gave rise to an anomalous situation insofar as the rightwing had received a third of the white vote in 1987, but only 13% of the seats in Parliament (proportionally it would have had 50 instead of 22 seats). According to Kotze and Lourens (1987:366) the most notable feature of the election was a substantial and surprising swing to the right. They substantiated their interpretation of the results by emphasizing the increase in the rightwing's vote from 15% in 1981 to 30% in 1987. The reasons for this swing, they claimed, could be found in the large-scale dissatisfaction among many white voters over the government's constitutional proposals and the abolition of legislation aimed at maintaining racial exclusivity. Other issues which played a role were the worsening position of the white working class, a general discontent because of the downturn in the economy, the vulnerability of rural areas to armed insurgency, and the moralist outrage among some whites over the new 'enlightened' stance on

censorship. Author Alan Paton agreed that the white voters moved "decidedly and spectacularly to the right", a turn of events which he blamed on the international sanctions campaign and on the need for security - whites feared the future, the UDF, Cosatu, the ANC, and thought that the NP could best provide it. Paton (with some foresight) predicted that the government, in the face of half-a million rightwing voters over its shoulder, would use the tools of repression, the army and police, over the next two years to maintain the status quo and would only reform at its own slow pace (Sunday Times:17.5.87).

Newspapers were almost unanimous in their verdict of the results indicating a decisive move back to the laager. The headlines read:
"No one can ignore the swing to the right" (Rapport:10.5.87); "Voters crossed all cultural, religious and language barriers to enter the white laager and to shut out the rest" (Business Day:8.5.87); "Swing to the right reduces pressure for reform" (Southern Africa Report:8.5.87); "The NP has, in fact, lost voter support in spite of its wins, the CP has shown astonishing growth" (Sunday Star:10.5.87); "Those who did not scurry back into the laager took another frightened step back to the ox-wagon days by voting for the CP" (The Sowetan:8.5.87).

From an opposite perspective, Schlemmer (1987:321) and Swilling (Weekly Mail:15.5.87) argued that the swing actually was to the left. According to Schlemmer the result was best explained as

> a funnelling of support to the white centre. Since this centre has shifted to the left, leaving the rightwing in the position of the NP under Vorster, the support for rigid separate development and partition has declined from 64% in 1977 to 26% in 1987

According to Swilling, the policies of the CP in 1987 were identical to those of the NP in 1981, i.e. the exclusion of blacks from the central political institutions, influx control and independence for homelands including urban blacks. The NP's policy, as it was in 1987, proposed negotiations on the basis of universal suffrage and one

citizenship. Therefore, he argued, support for the 'ultra-right' declined by 15,5% between 1981 and 1987, and support for the conservative policies from 57% in 1981 to 30,7% in 1987 (with the NP's support at 53,7% in 1987). Both these analysts argued that the media were under the mistaken impression that there had been a swing to the right because of failure to recognize that the centre of politics had moved to the left over the past few years.

This point of view was also held by Welsh (1989), who argued that the 30% support which the rightwing had received in 1987 was roughly the same as in the 1983 referendum, which suggested that no major swing to the right had occurred since then. Dirk Laurie concurred:

> One is forced to the conclusion that the events of 1981 produced a sudden, fairly large shift of a block from the NP to the right, but that there has been no significant move in either direction since then. In particular, there was no swing to the right in the 1987 election, only a re-alignment within the ranks of the right. (1987:266-267):

Rhoodie and Couper also argued against the perception of a swing to the right on the grounds that ideologically rightist-orientated voters who had previously voted for the NP, moved to their logical ideological home with the CP. However these voters were not new converts to the rightwing cause because they were already rightwing (in spirit) even though they had voted for the NP earlier - therefore the election results should be regarded by the NP as a mandate for reform (1987:233).

Willie Esterhuyse, a leading NP-supporting academic from the University of Stellenbosch, argued that the NP's emphasis on the total onslaught, and its laager mentality, had backfired, since it scared many Afrikaners to the CP. However, the support the NP gained from the English-speaking community more than made up for the loss of Afrikaners to the CP, a factor which significantly changed the NP's support base. He advised the NP to go all-out to strengthen its base among reform-minded voters,

instead of trying to win back the voters it had lost to the right. The vast majority of whites agreed with the NP's perception of the threats to security and demanded a strong government, one which would not sacrifice security for reform, but at the same time, the majority of NP supporters also accepted the idea of power-sharing with blacks (even though the NP did not spell out any specifics during the election). Esterhuyse questioned the perception of the election results as a swing to the right or a retreat into the laager because the new NP support base would not allow it, since many of the new NP-converts, e.g English-speakers and businessmen, wanted to see rewards for their support in terms of reform (1987:336-341) .

The different interpretations of the election results left the NP confused. The party had to decide on its style of government prior to the next election. It faced international condemnation for its policies, and sanctions and disinvestment began to have a strongly detrimental effect on the economy. Foreign pressure intensified because the election was also interpreted internationally as a move towards isolation, e.g. the statement by the Australian acting Foreign Affairs minister, Gareth Evans, that "the whites-only election appeared to have entrenched white supremacy" (Cape Times:12.5.87). The government also faced increasing pressure from the more verligte members within its own ranks. Of these verligtes, the ultra-verligte MP, Albert Nothnagel (at the time the most vocal), was soon removed from local politics by being sent to the Netherlands as an ambassador. This was an indication of the intolerance to verligte ideas which characterized P.W. Botha's last two years in office and which also strengthened the position of the liberal opposition. Another factor which the NP had to contend with, was the new Official Opposition, which commanded the support of about 600 000 voters, i.e. six for every 10 who voted NP. The CP believed that its strong support and the fact that Afrikaner support was now divided on a 47%-47% basis between the NP and CP, would exert enormous pressure on the NP to put a brake on reform (Uys cited in Zille, 1985:87).

After considering these options, the NP decided to slow down its reform programme and to focus more upon security. Over the next two years President Botha repeatedly made overtures to Treurnicht to help restore unity among Afrikaners for the sake of Afrikanerdom, reminescent of the relationship between Smuts and Hertzog after 1913 (see also pages 36-37). However, his efforts to appease the rightwing and to win back former NP voters met with little success, and resulted in the NP losing support to Left and Right over the next two years.

The by-elections of March 1988

The by-elections in Standerton, Schweizer-Reneke and Randfontein in March 1988 represented the first real opportunity for the new Official Opposition to test its strength against the NP since the 1987 election. Standerton, in particular, was of great symbolic significance as it was here that the former Prime Minister Jan Smuts, was defeated by the NP in 1948. It has been NP territory since then, but the CP won the seat in 1987.

The CP focused its election strategy on the disadvantages of the reform programme of the NP and the accusation that the government was 'selling out' the whites. It used the issues of sanctions and disinvestment, the unrest in Natal, the failure of the Tricameral Parliament, the 'chaos' on Durban's beaches, the 'greying' of suburbs like Hillbrow, the freezing of salaries of public servants, and the personal unpopularity of P.W. Botha in some Transvaal areas, to fight a very successful campaign against the NP.

The NP's response to these accusations was that the CP based its campaign on "emotionalism, coupled with half-truths and and blatant untruths" (Citizen:1.3.88). In an effort to win some rightwing support, it tried its usual strong-arm tactics just before the election by ordering the Defence Force to attack ANC bases in Angola and by banning 17 anti-apartheid organizations. Another desperate attempt by the NP was a smear campaign against the CP by linking

the Party to the AWB. To balance its security-orientated approach, some of NP leaders made reformist speeches, notably F.W. de Klerk, who argued that a change in the Constitution was possible in order to accommodate blacks, although not without asking for white permission first by way of a referendum. He also said that separate residential areas were not always 'practical' (Star:25.3.88).

The results of these by-elections, all which were won by the CP, were not unexpected, but still came as a shock to the NP because of the extent of the swing towards the Right and because of the Smuts-analogy in Standerton.

Table 6.10. Results of the by-elections of March 1988

Schweizer-Reneke:	NP: 5 606
	CP: 6 400
	HNP: 414
	CP maj. 794
	poll: 82%
	(1987: CP maj. 191, poll:77%)
Standerton:	NP: 6 224
	CP: 9 078
	HNP: 261
	CP maj. 2 854
	poll: 69%
	(1987: CP maj. 952, poll:71%)
Randfontein:	NP: 4 726
	CP: 8 437
	CP maj. 3 711
	poll: 61%
	(1987: CP maj. 1 732, poll:56%)

(Die Burger:4.3.88).

These results indicated a further swing towards the rightwing of 5% in Schweizer-Reneke, 8% in Standerton and 9% in Randfontein, while it once again confirmed the HNP's irrelevancy in white politics. Of further importance was

the huge increase in the CP's majorities: +315% in Schweizer-Reneke, +200% in Standerton and +114% in Randfontein.

As was to be expected, newspapers sympathetic to the government expressed their disappointment with the results and suggested that the NP would have to address the issues of white fears and insecurity. Die Burger (4.3.88) mentioned the problems experienced at Durban beaches and the relaxing of the Group Areas Act, as particular problems within the broader spectrum of white fears of being 'swamped'. To this Citizen (4.3.88) added the negative effect sanctions and disinvestment had on white voters, a view shared by South Africa's former ambassador in Canada, Glen Babb, who claimed that the CP had used the sanctions issue to imply that the government was caving in to foreign pressure and was ready to hand over power to radical activists (Die Burger:4.3.88). Other issues which favoured the rightwing, according to these two newspapers, included foreign interference in the country's domestic affairs, unrest, the demands of black 'radicals', the absence of black moderates around the negotiation table, the 'Prog' newspapers, the CP's refusal to accept change, the 'obstruction' of the Tricameral system by Alan Hendrickse of the Labour Party, the privatization of parastatals like Escom and the public servants pay-freeze.

From his response to the by-election results, it was clear that the leader of the NP, P.W. Botha, realized the need to address the insecurities of white voters if the growth of the CP was to be contained. Although he referred to the "overwhelming majority" which the NP received in 1987, as a mandate to seek for solutions to the country's problems, he stated by implication that the government would from now on give priority to the 'security of South Africans' and only then, would continue with reform (Die Burger:4.3.88).

The CP's response to the by-election victories indicated that the Party regarded its increased majorities as a

massive boost for its electoral campaign later that year during the countrywide municipal elections. On the basis of the results, the CP believed it would win control of the Transvaal and possibly the whole country during the next general election. CP spokesmen, Thomas Langley and Pieter Mulder, referred to projections (probably those of Simpson, discussed earlier) which indicated that a 10% swing towards the right would give it the 84 seats in Parliament required for an overall majority (Cape Times:4.3.88). According to Mulder, CP candidate in Randfontein, the results indicated that 47 seats would be safe CP seats if an election were to be held immediately, and that the CP's support was not confined to the platteland or blue-collar areas (Citizen:31.3.88). Treurnicht claimed that there was a dramatic swing towards the right which proved that there was no longer room for leftwing politics, and that it was a signal that whites wanted their own country and government (The Argus:30.3.88). It also proved, according to the CP, that the NP's smear tactics concerning its association with the AWB had backfired, which drove many undecided voters to the Right (Sunday Times:7.3.88).

According to liberal-opposition supporting newspapers the NP had suffered a devastating defeat. Apart from the usual glee, some of the banner headlines indicated a growing concern over the growth of the rightwing:
"Routed! Nats lose election by a landslide";
"Conservatives rampant" (The Argus:30.3.88);
"Secret cabinet talks on CP threat" (Sunday Times:7.3.88);
"CP could topple Nats if election rules not changed (The Argus:5.3.88);
"By-elections thrashing! PW slams foreign elements" (Weekly Mail:4.3.88);
"CP says it can win the next election" (Cape Times:4.3.88).

The October 1988 Municipal Elections

Immediately after the by-election shocks of March 1988, the Cape Times reported that senior Nationalists had admitted privately "that a brake would now be placed on racial

reform" (4.3.88), which confirmed P.W. Botha's previously mentioned statement. In spite of the warnings by the majority of political analysts mentioned earlier, a shift towards the Right was perceived by the NP as the only solution that could stop the swing towards the Right. The NP had only six months to reverse this swing before the next big test of electoral support was due, namely the countrywide municipal elections scheduled for October 1988.

The municipal elections had a symbolic value as they were the first ever in which people of all races could go to the polls in a country-wide election (albeit separately). The further significance lay in the fact that many of the reforms introduced so far, like the gradual opening of certain beaches, the creation of 'grey' areas, the opening of CBD's to all races, brought many whites into contact with other races for the first time in the spheres of living together, swimming together, and competing for the same business in CBD's . This resulted in many whites deciding that, since they could not influence central government policies, they could at least elect a local government which would protect the exisiting racial order, and cater for their racial prejudices within their towns.

The NP, realizing that it faced a determined onslaught from the rightwing at the level where the latter was at its most powerful, was initially reluctant to contest the elections on a party-political basis, especially in the Transvaal and Free State. However, because the CP was using the NP's reluctance for propaganda purposes, and the fact that it was virtually impossible to fight any kind of election on a non-political basis in a highly politicized country such as South Africa, the NP eventually entered the fray under its own banner (although many of its candidates stood as independents). The CP made early predictions that it would gain effective control over almost all the local councils in the Transvaal, except for Johannesburg. From the CP's point of view, gaining control of the local authorities in the Transvaal became a very important part of its political

strategy. The party regarded municipal government as a good platform from which to resist reforms at local level and "to promote its image as the protector of local [white] communities against the government's reform and integrationist policies", in particular any deviations from the Group Areas Act and the desegregation of public facilities (Barney Uys cited in Zille, 1988:88; Welsh, 1988:17).

The CP concentrated its electoral efforts on the Transvaal and OFS and it managed to win the majority of contested local authorities in the Transvaal. The CP received 37% of votes under its own banner, as opposed to the 27% of the NP. These percentages were adjusted to 42% to each party after the ideological persuasions of the so-called independent councillors became known, but the CP maintained control over 101 out of a possible 150 councils in the Transvaal (CP Information pamphlet, Feb. 1989). Bekker et al (1989:34) estimated the CP's election gains in the Transvaal to be slightly lower, with the CP controlling 53% of the local councils and NP 38%. Welsh (1988) estimates that the CP won control of 21 out of 68 in the Free State.

The results of the 1988 Municipal elections are presented on the following page.

Table 6.11. The results of the 1988 municipal elections

Province	Party	% control of Local Authority
Transvaal	NP	38,5
	CP	53,3
	NP/CP doubtful	6,1
	Others	2,1
OFS	NP	78
	CP	18,1
	NP/CP doubtful	3,9
Cape	NP	90,7
	CP	3
	NP/CP doubtful	4,6
	Others	1,7
Natal	NP	87,3
	CP	0
	NP/CP doubtful	1,7
	Other	11
Total	NP	71
	CP	22
	NP/CP doubtful	4
	Other	3

(Bekker et al, 1989:34).

In response to the election results the NP suggested that the CP's claims were an exaggeration as many of the local authorities won by the CP were only small towns. If the results are analyzed properly, it appears that the NP's claim was incorrect. Although the NP won three of the four bigger City Councils (Pretoria, Roodepoort and Germiston; Johannesburg was governed by a centre-left coalition), the CP won 43 of the 65 City and large Town Councils, (with 40,8% of the vote) and the NP 11 (with 19% of the vote). Of the 28 Town Councils, the CP won 19 (with 42% of the vote)

and the NP 6 (with 6,5 % of the vote). Of the total number of votes cast in the Transvaal the CP received 303 400 (37,5%) and the NP 217 110 (26,8%) (CP Information Pamphlet).

After the independent councillors had associated themselves with one of the two Parties, the situation was as follows:
CP - 343 344 votes (42,4%) and 101 councils;
NP - 341 347 votes (42,1%) and 32 councils.
The CP was in control of most of the City and Town Councils in the Transvaal, and controlled the majority of Regional and Health Committees (CP Information Pamphlet, February 1989).

The CP regarded its performance in the municipal elections as a mandate to halt and reverse political reforms implemented by the NP. Many cities and towns under CP control began to re-implement petty-apartheid measures soon after these elections. The Town Councils of Boksburg and Carletonville were the first to do so by closing recreational halls, public parks and swimming areas to blacks. The response of blacks to these actions took the form of consumer boycotts, and these became one of the most serious impediments to the continued growth of rightwing support. For the first time, the conservative citizens of Boksburg were asked to pay the financial cost for their political ideology, and as the turnover and profit margins of white-owned stores were slashed, political realism and a sober assessment of the costs of apartheid soon occurred. In Boksburg, a CP candidate who contested a local by-election previously held by the CP, lost by a landslide a few weeks later, and during the general election of 1989, the CP was soundly beaten by the NP in towns on the East Rand that had re-implemented petty-apartheid measures. These included Boksburg, Springs and Geduld.

The General Election of September 1989

Table 6.12 indicates the various political parties' levels of support, (the November 1988 levels in brackets) (M&M

survey, March 1989).

Table 6.12 The support of political parties: March 1989

NP:	46,7% (46%)
CP:	20,3% (22,8%)
HNP:	1,8% (1,8%)
Parties to the left:	22,5% (22,5%)
Will not vote:	8,7% (6,9%)

Based on these figures, M&M's made the following predictions with reference to the general election due in September 1989:

NP: 46,6%
CP: 24,5%
HNP: 1%
DP: 27,5%

For the purpose of verifying the accuracy of M&M's predictions, the actual 1989 election results indicated the standing of the various parties as follows: NP (48%), CP (31%), DP (20%), HNP (0,002%). As usual, M&M repeated its tendency to underestimate the strength of the rightwing, but even with the CP's support at about 25%, it deserved, on a proportional basis, at least 42 seats in Parliament, instead of the 22 seats it had prior to the 1989 general election. The question was whether the forces inherent in the plurality or 'first-past-the-post' electoral system of South Africa would allow the CP finally to reach its due number of seats in the 1989 election? After all, the same forces which gave the NP 74% (123) of the seats in the House of Assembly but only 52% of the total vote during the 1987 general election, were due to also start working in favour of the CP, which had the same basic support base as that of the NP when it came to power in 1948 with only 44% of the vote.

Several political analysts also gave their view of the strength of the rightwing just before the election. According to Bekker and Grobbelaar, 62 seats were within reach of the CP, while Donald Simpson argued that, based on the 1987 election, the CP could win the 1989 election if there was a swing of 24% towards the CP, which would be necessary to give the Party the 84 seats for a majority in the House of Assembly (Rapport:2.7.89) (two years previously he mentioned a figure of 12%). Dirk Laurie argued that there would be an increase in the number of seats won by the CP and predicted the election results in terms of seats as follows: NP:79, CP:52, DP:35 (Rapport:2.7.89).

According to a survey carried out on behalf of Sunday Times (23.7.89) by Schlemmer, Humphries and Stack, the election results, in terms of seats, would be as follows:
Estimate one, based on an 80% voter turnout: NP:78, CP:52, DP:36.
Estimate two, based on a 70% turnout: NP:65, CP:64, DP:37.
Both these estimates excluded the possibility of a hung parliament (in which the NP would not have an overall majority).

The CP predictions were based on the 22 seats in its possession, to which it added another eight which were lost to the NP in 1987 due to a split vote because of HNP interference. With a two percent swing it could pick up another six seats, with a four percent swing four more seats and with the DP splitting the vote, a further two seats (a grand total of 34 seats). A larger swing of seven percent would give the CP 43 or 44 seats. This was about equal to the actual average percentage swing indicated by several by-elections after 1987, e.g Schweizer Reneke, Standerton and Randfontein, respectively 3%, 8% and 9%, an average of 6,6%. In the end the CP's tally of 39 seats was a good indication of the almost 7% swing indicated by these by-elections. The CP went on to estimate that a 16% swing would give it 65 seats, while a 24% swing would give it a majority in the House of Assembly (Sunday Star:27.8.89).

The reasons behind the optimistic electoral expectations of the CP could be found not only in the rising curve of its by-election fortunes, but also in the leadership struggle within the NP during the months leading up to the election. This struggle rocked the Party and culmunated in PW Botha stepping down as leader of the NP and in his (forced) resignation as State President. It occurred after Botha suffered a stroke early in the year, whereupon he resigned as leader of the NP and requested that the posts of Party leader and the Presidency be separated. The NP caucus elected F.W. de Klerk as new party leader in February but in March it decided to reject Botha's proclamation of the separation of the posts. This led to the start of a five month long power struggle between Botha on the one hand, and the NP caucus and De Klerk on the other. The situation became acrimonious, with Botha refusing even to attend farewell functions in his honour given by the NP and by his attempts openly to discredit De Klerk's style of governing.

Botha finally resigned as State President during a television broadcast in August 1989, and took a final swipe at De Klerk by implying that the cabinet was guilty of 'treacherous' behaviour through its talks with Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. As R.W. Johnson observed "it is not often that one sees a retiring president accusing his duly-chosen successor - on prime time TV - of being a liar and virtual traitor" (The Times:17.8.89) (and being accused in turn, by Pik Botha, of having lost his memory).

There was much concern within the NP that the controversy surrounding P.W. Botha would be exploited as an election issue by the CP and damage even further the NP's unity. In July 1989 a survey conducted by M&M tried to determine whether the resignation of Botha from the posts of State President and as leader of the NP, would entice or prevent voters from supporting the NP: the results indicated that 6% of respondents fully agreed and 6% partially agreed that Botha's departure would lead them to vote for the NP. A total of 9% said Botha's departure might cause them not to vote for the NP, while 73% indicated that it would not affect them either way.

Botha's demise as political force, gave rise to the 'Give F.W. a chance' factor, which was a plea to voters to give the new State President an opportunity to prove his bona fides, and was intended to draw the gatvol and keelvol ('exasperated' and' fed-up') voters back to the NP. De Klerk's own brother and founder-member of the DP, Willem de Klerk, was among the people who proclaimed this view. De Klerk's political initiatives, even before he became State President, gave many verligte NP members hope that a new approach might be in the offing and viewed this as a big selling point for the National Party. According to Rapport (23.8.89) De Klerk's visits to Zaire and Zambia were conducted in such a way as to project a new and fresh Presidential image (as it turned out, the 'F.W.' factor made little difference, as NP supporters deserted the Party in large numbers during the election one month later).

The rest of the NP's election campaign was based on the following fundamental issues:

> Group control over own affairs would be retained;
> Each racial group would have its own voter's roll;
> Each group would have its own community life, residential areas and schools;
> Different groups would participate as groups in government;
> Public amenities would be opened to all races, where necessary and where it could be done without causing serious conflict.

(NP Five Year Plan of Action, 1989).

Furthermore, security was still regarded as the government's foremost duty and strong action had been taken against anti-apartheid demonstrators on beaches and elsewhere, while the UDF and COSATU's defiance campaign had been condemned as an ANC- and communist-inspired plot by Ministers Vlok and Malan (The Argus:2.9.89). According to Schlemmer et al (Sunday Times:10.9.89), the NP's election manifesto committed the party to negotiations with unspecified black leaders without any specific goals in mind, except to ensure white self-determination and presumably a retention of crucial powers.

The CP's election campaign concentrated on three accusations: firstly, the that the NP was in the process of 'selling out' the whites in the country; secondly, that it had mismanaged the economy and impoverished whites through its redistributive policies (a survey conducted by M&M in July 1989 on the correlation between the poor economic situation and NP support, indicated that 36% of respondents would not vote for the NP for this reason and a further 23% said they would "consider" not voting for the NP for this reason); thirdly, that the settlement in Namibia was not in the interests of that country's whites and might have similar implications for South African whites (Bekker et al, 1989:11-12).

However, the Party failed to explain how white territorial integrity could be reconciled with modern-day economic and demographic realities: the basic tenets of this policy were the "inalienable" right of whites to rule over themselves, but other important aspects included:

> partition would create separate states for each population group;
> whites would lead a totally segregated community life in all spheres;
> There would be no power-sharing with any non-white group;
> Influx control would be reinstated and the redistribution of wealth from white to black would be stopped;
> Black trade unions would be banned;
> No negotiation with the ANC or any 'terrorist' organizations would take place;
> The rejection of minority protection in a unitary black-ruled state as impractical (CP Election manifesto).

A comparison of the policies presented to the white electorate by the NP and the CP, suggests that even though they had less in common now than they had immediately after the split in 1982, both still rejected a unitary black-ruled state, refused to negotiate with the ANC, and insisted on the right of whites to an own community life.

During the run-up to the election, attempts were made once again to form a united rightwing front, but the CP was not

interested, having greatly reduced the HNP electoral threat after the previous election. After Eugene Terre'Blanche's bid to stand for Parliament in the Krugersdorp constituency under the AWB banner, had been rejected by the CP, the AWB, HNP and Boerestaat Party formalized a rightwing unity front (Kemp, 1990:130-133).

Table 6.13. The general election results of Sept. 1989

Party/ Province	Number of votes received by Parties	Percentage of total votes cast	Number of seats won by each Party	% seats
Cape				
NP	315 956	54%	42	75%
CP	106 376	18%	2	4
DP	162 887	28%	12	21
Transvaal				
NP	520 034	46%	34	45
CP	453 826	40%	31	41
DP	159 383	14%	11	14
HNP	3 308	0,28%	0	0
OFS				
NP	88 490	51%	8	57
CP	80 068	46 %	6	43
DP	4 382	3%	0	0
Natal				
NP	107 077	44%	10	50
CP	32 809	13%	0	0
DP	103 547	42%	10	50
Total				
NP	1 031 566	48%	94	57
CP	673 079	31	39	23
DP	430 199	20	33	20
HNP	5 501	0,25%	0	0

The results represented a loss of 29 seats to the NP, of which 17 went to the CP and 12 to the DP. Even though the NP maintained its overall majority in a number of seats (94 against 72) it lost its overall majority in votes (1 031 566 against 1 108 779, a difference of 77 213). The CP increased its share of the vote by only three percent compared to 1987, but increased its number of seats by 77%, from 22 to 39. The Party also made a breakthrough in the OFS by winning six seats, and also won two in the Cape. The number of former safe NP seats which became marginal had increased dramatically - these included the seat lost to the NP because of HNP intervention, seven seats where the NP majority was less than 500 votes, nine seats with a NP majority of less than 1 000 and 14 seats with a NP majority of less than 1 500. Of these 31 marginal seats, five were in the OFS, four in Natal and ten in the Cape.

According to Patriot (8.9.89), the election had demonstrated the following points: the CP had become a major force in white politics; the NP received its lowest number of seats since 1953 and had a vulnerable majority of only 10 in Parliament; the CP was poised to take advantage of the inevitable shift to the left by the government when it entered negotiations with the ANC; most grassroots NP supporters would opt for the CP when faced with the alternative choice of an alliance with the ANC.

Despite the large losses that the NP suffered to both left and right and the fact that it was the Party's worst electoral performance since 1948, Die Burger (8.9.89) could detect "no new trend" from the election results, except that the CP secured its former marginal seats and increased its share of the vote in almost every constituency. It conceded that the CP had consolidated its base in the Transvaal and expanded it in the Free State, but claimed that almost all of these seats were either rural or working-class constituencies. In its editorial, the newspaper blamed the damaging effect of the P.W. Botha - F.W de Klerk leadership-struggle, the weak economy, corruption, and the fact that reforms had come to

a halt, but insisted that the Party was still strongly in control. The Afrikaans newspaper, Rapport noticed that, apart from the four urban constituencies in Pretoria, the CP's support remained in rural and working-class orientated constituencies (10.9.89).

According to Dirk Laurie, the growth potential of the CP was limited, since the electoral statistics indicated that the swing to the right was levelling off: in Transvaal there was an average swing to the right by one percent in 32 seats, in the Cape five percent in 24 seats, in Natal, three percent in seven seats, and in the OFS, 6,5% in 11 seats. Compared to the large swings in all the by-elections and in the previous general election, these figures indicated that the ceiling may have been reached, and that further growth in support of the CP was limited (Rapport:17.9.89).

Other analysts agreed with Laurie. Mariechen Waldner (Rapport:10.9.89) claimed that in spite of the battles won by the CP, it had lost the war. She referred to the CP's belief that it could win the election, in spite of the fact that it only achieved one percent more support than the combined rightwing had in 1987. The Sunday Tribune (10.9.89) argued in an article headlined "CP licks its wounds", that the Boksburg episode backfired on the CP, and that the results were disappointing from the Party's point of view as it won only 39 of the expected 45 to 70 seats. Furthermore, the newspaper argued, the CP had gained no seats on the Reef industrial belt (e.g. Potchefstroom, Geduld, Krugersdorp) or in Natal, and had failed to capitalize on its strong showing in urban areas during the 1988 municipal elections.

According to Swilling (Sunday Star:10.9.89) the results indicated a swing to the left, which came as a result of increasing pressure from the international community and from black protest, and brought the urgency of black political demands to the attention of most whites. Swilling

expanded on the hypothesis which he had propounded after the 1987 general election, the essence of which was that white politics had shifted to the left throughout the 1980's - firstly with the NP accepting power-sharing with coloureds and Indians in 1983 and then committing itself in principle to power-sharing with blacks from 1986 onwards - this left the CP to propagate the grand apartheid ideology (the validity of this argument is further discussed later in the chapter).

The Weekly Mail (8.9.89), argued that it was the "Gatvol factor that knocked the Nats", referring to the number of former NP supporters that had become disillusioned with the Party's lack of direction, arrogance and corruption. It claimed that the election would be remembered more for the DP's gains than for those of the CP. However, it also raised the possibility that a further swing towards the right of just two percent could hand the CP more than 50 seats and that it was far too early to conclude that the CP had reached its ceiling, as the imminent release of Nelson Mandela and the SWAPO victory in Namibia had not yet been discounted by the white electorate (let alone the variety of other reform measures which were to follow in February 1990 and in 1991). This view was shared by Van Heerden (Sunday Times:10.9.89), and Schlemmer who warned that there was no certainty that all the voters who supported the NP would follow the reform path.

The outstanding features of the election were the final demise of the HNP; the CP's breakthrough in the Free State; its first successes in the Cape; the increased majorities of the CP in its marginal seats; and its poor performance in the east Rand (it lost at Boksburg, Springs, Brentwood and Geduld). Van Heerden ascribed this to the actions of local authorities in these areas which began implementing segregationist policies and which left the residents in these towns very nervous. With regard to the link between the AWB and the CP, Van Heerden claimed that this association may have had an adverse effect on the CP's performance. It is interesting to note that a survey

conducted by M&M in July 1989 on this issue, indicated that 40% of respondents gave the CP's association with the AWB as a reason for not voting for the CP, 6% said the opposite was true, while 46% said this was not applicable to them (leading M&M to the conclusion that the association counted in favour of the CP).

Tertius Myburgh, then-editor of the Sunday Times (10.9.89) claimed that the outcome "supported the forces of enlightenment and checked the growth of the forces of darkness" and cited F.W. de Klerk's argument that 70% of the voters had supported reform, as proof. He argued that the CP had peaked in the Transvaal and that its growth in other provinces would be limited to constituencies with a similar socio-economic profile to those in the Transvaal which the Party had made its own. However, he warned that

> in an uncomfortably high number of seats it [the CP] has garnered sufficient support to render them disquietingly marginal. Thus Dr. Treurnicht's CP still lurks in the wings, just offstage, ready to pounce if the NP should falter. It is enough to give a lot of Nats the wind-up, but we must accept Mr De Klerk's assurance that his party has forever stopped looking over its right shoulder (Sunday Times:10.9.89).

In summary, what were the immediate and long-term implications of the election results for the government?

>> Firstly, while the NP lost some seats, it lost relatively few votes (33 000), which forms a contrast with the CP's performance. The latter increased its share of the vote only be 1,1% (from 29,9% in 1987 to 31%), but its share in seats from 13,2% to 23,4%. In other words, although the rightwing did not greatly increase its number of votes, it almost doubled its number of seats. This was not surprising as it was to be expected that the negative effect of the simple majority system on the CP's parliamentary representation would eventually have evened itself out and narrowed the gap between the actual number of seats and what it should receive proportionally. In 1948

the NP came to power (with the help of the Afrikaner Party) with only 43% of the vote but almost 52% of the seats (79 out of 153). Keeping in mind that the CP's electoral base in 1989 was probably not that much different from that of the NP in 1948, it was to be expected that the gap would narrow between the actual number of seats and what it should have received under a proportional system. In fact it was surprising that the CP's tally did not correspond closer to or even exceed the percentage of votes it received, as was the case with the NP, but this was a direct result of the plurality system, which mostly acts to the disadvantage of smaller parties or those whose support is not concentrated in fewer areas.

>> Secondly, the results indicated a defection of English-speaking support from the NP, an issue of great concern to the Party and one which demanded a careful reconsideration of the position of this sector of its support base. The growing English-speaking support for the NP during the 1980's had become an accepted fact, according to several analysts. Adam (1989) and Giliomee (1983) argued that the NP had adopted more pragmatic policies and 'disguised' its commitment to the Afrikaner culture in order to attract English-speakers to the Party, which could act as a counter to the defection to the Right by Afrikaner nationalists. According to Giliomee this 'disguise' worked so well that the Afrikaner-English support coalition was taken for granted by the early 1980's, while Schlemmer (1983) added that English-speakers displayed a "remarkably consistant pattern of rallying" to the NP when the latter was in need for electoral support. This was also the case during the 1987 general election, when the NP received over 40% of the English-speaking vote, and led to Party officials claiming that support from this sector had "become a permanent and integral part of the National Party structure" (Schlemmer, 1988:24). Concurring, Esterhuyse (1987:337) claimed that the NP "now encompasses the political aspirations and ideals of a major part of the two language groups", and argued that the NP then had no option but to go "all-out to retain and strengthen its present

base of support", rather than trying to win back supporters lost to the CP.

As indicated earlier, the NP under PW Botha followed the opposite strategy, and reform came to a virtual halt between 1987 and 1989. The result was a considerable loss in support for the NP among English-speakers, leading to a decline from over 40% in 1987 to about 28% in 1989, according to Schlemmer et al (Sunday Times:10.9.89). According to these analysts, the NP had to decide, on the basis of these statistics, whether to dismiss English-speaking voters as fickle and rather concentrate winning back its traditional Afrikaner support base back from the CP, or whether to accellerate the pace of reform in order to win back the English-speakers from the DP.

The NP decided that the latter option was decidedly more attainable and that it could strengthen its position considerably with the additional support of two million English-speakers behind it, but that this could be achieved only by way of a drastic shift to the left. Therefore. soon after the 1989 election, the De Klerk administration began introducing substantial changes and injected some fresh life into the stale political atmosphere. But with the CP lurking in the background and increasing its strength with every new reform measure, the NP began to realize that even its greater English-speaking support could not guarantee its continued dominance in white politics. Over the following 24 months a fast-changing political environment (which would not allow for another whites-only election), together with the growing risk that that the government might not survive another rightwing onslaught, brought about a realization within the NP that there could not be another whites-only election. This was confirmed by analyst Lester Venter in the Sunday Times (11.6.90):

> Nevertheless, talk of a general election is academic. [The by-election at] Umlazi vividly illustrated something that has become a latter-day truism of SA politics: there is not going to be another all-white election. Even before Umlazi, this was taken quietly for granted in inner NP circles.

This was to be the clear message from the by-elections over the following 24 months (September 1989 to August 1991), in constituencies as diverse as Ceres, Vasco, Umlazi, Randburg, Maitland and Ladybrand, which on the average, resulted in a 14% swing to the Right.

The by-elections after September 1989

Political changes after the election were introduced with great speed. In October 1989 the government released the seven remaining Rivonia trialists, except for Nelson Mandela, and the welcome rally organized for them in Johannesburg implied the de facto unbanning of the ANC. The government ordered the opening of all beaches, and in response to a mass-defiance campaign by the UDF and other organizations, announced its intention to repeal the Separate Amenities Act, and gave permission for a protest march in Cape Town, led by Archbishop Tutu, the mayor of the city and other dignitaries. It also announced the proclamation of the first Free Settlement Areas and in November the President received a visit from Mandela at Tuynhuis (he had also been received by P.W. Botha six months earlier). In Namibia SWAPO won the election with a convincing majority, in spite of the South African government's financial backing of opposition parties in that country (as disclosed by F.W. de Klerk in July 1991).

With this preliminary series of reforms and political changes at the back of their minds, the voters of the traditionally safe Cape NP seats of Ceres and Vasco went to the polls for by-elections in late November 1989. Ever since D.F. Malan founded the Purified NP in 1934 with the help of most of the Cape Nationalists (those in the northern provinces followed Hertzog into the UP), the western Cape has been a NP stronghold. The CP had never succeeded in gaining a foothold there, but the Party hoped that the recent political developments would bolster its support in the traditional heartland of the NP.

Table 6.14. Results of the November 1989 by-elections

Ceres: NP: 4 514
CP: 2 944
NP maj. 1 570
poll: 70%
(1989: NP maj. 2 519, poll:77%)

Vasco: NP: 4 165
CP: 2 922
NP maj. 1 243
poll: 44%
(1989 NP maj. 3 899, poll:56%)

Athough the NP retained both seats, its majorities were drastically reduced from those of the general election three months earlier. In Ceres the NP majority declined from 2 860 in 1987, to 2 519 in 1989 and 1 570 now. In Vasco, the NP majority declined from 5 243 in 1987, to 3899 in 1989, to 1 243 now. The results indicated a swing towards the CP over a period of just three months of 4,72% in Ceres and of 12,64% in Vasco, in an area not traditionally inclined to the rightwing, although Vasco had a strong working-class element. Therefore, the swing could be interpreted in one way only, namely that the initial minor political changes announced by De Klerk had claimed its first victims, in the form of the defection of about 4 000 NP supporters to the CP in two constituencies.

According to the Cape leader of the NP, Dawie de Villiers, the results did not indicate a rejection of the NP's reform policy, but Die Burger (1.12.89) took a gloomier view, by acknowledging that there was a considerable swing towards the right. The newspaper argued that the swing was a clear manifestation that many voters "did not understand" the need for drastic reforms or were unnerved by the opening of beaches, SWAPO's victory and the proclamation of the first

free settlement areas. Die Burger:2.12.89) also suggested that some white voters did not have the courage of their convictions:

> Even though they gave the government a strong mandate for reform during the general election, these voters refused to accept the realities of reform, and now that things actually start to change, they were having second thoughts [translation].

The Johannesburg-based NP-orientated newspaper, Citizen (1.12.89), reserved its criticism for the government, "for leaving the ordinary NP supporter behind" by its fast pace of reform:

> This newspaper has been warning the NP that it may be going too fast with its reforms and that it must not outdistance itself from its own constituency. Too much is happening too quickly for the ordinary man to digest comfortably.

As was the case after the 1987 election, the newspaper deemed it necessary to present to the government a list of the issues which it perceived were causing uneasiness in the 'ordinary' white mind, which included the way the ANC and other radicals seemed to march at will, the way laws were being flouted, the way ANC leaders were openly propagating the aims of the ANC, SWAPO's victory in Namibia and the fear of chaos on the beaches following the repeal of beach apartheid.

The CP claimed that there had been a dramatic swing towards it and that the "writing was on the wall for the NP" (Citizen:1.12.89, Die Burger:1.12.89). Treurnicht furthermore argued that even the safest NP seats had now become marginal, i.e those with majorities of less than 1 500 votes, and that a swing of about 12% away from the NP had occurred in just three months (ibid).

A survey conducted by M&M in November 1989 and published in January 1990 indicated that support for the main political

parties was as follows (June 1989 percentages in brackets):

NP: 41,6% (41,1%), CP: 27,6% (23,9%), DP: 24,6% (28,2%).

Given the fact that M&M consistently underestimated the CP's support by between 7% and 10% (e.g. it estimated CP support at 23,9% just before the 1989-election compared to the 31% it actually received), it can probably be assumed that the actual CP support now was closer to 35%. Another M&M survey conducted eight months later, in February 1990, gave the following estimate:
NP: 46,3%, CP: 31%, DP: 18,3%.

If one considers the normal underestimation of the CP's support found in M&M's surveys, support for the CP probably stood close to 38%, from which can be deduced that the CP's support increased from 31% in September 1989, to 35% in November 1989, to 38% in February 1990 (Riordan's survey of March 1990 placed the CP's support at 36,5%, Monitor, April 1991). It should also be noted that the NP was in the process of attracting large numbers of former DP supporters during this period, thereby keeping its own level of support constant.

Despite the setbacks in Ceres and Vasco, the government greatly accelerated its reform programme and the remaining part of 1989 and the first few months of 1990 saw the following drastic changes: the shortening of military service, a moratorium on executions, the release of Nelson Mandela, the unbanning of the ANC, SACP, PAC and other organizations, the first meetings between the government and the ANC/SACP, a commitment to the repeal of the Group Areas and Population Registration Acts, the intention to open white schools to all races under certain conditions.

These announcements, especially those made in February, met with strong opposition from the rightwing. According to Treurnicht the government's "revolutionary" measures and its failure to keep its promises made before the last election, would force the CP to intensify its struggle for survival on all fronts. Terre'Blanche said that the NP had

surrendered its honour and given in to the wishes of leftist radicals, while Jaap Marais claimed that De Klerk had now become the "prisoner and Mandela the warder" (Vrye Weekblad:9.2.90).

The issue of the NP's mandate became a focal point of rightwing criticism of the NP over the next two years. The CP strongly believed that the NP had deceived the white electorate by not spelling out the full implications of its reforms: "If you had spelled out your current policy to the voters before the 1989 general election, you would have lost that election" (Treurnicht, cited in Patriot:9.11.90) [translation].

The CP based its argument on the discrepancies which it believed existed between the reforms proposed by the NP before the election, and the actual reforms implemented afterwards. These discrepancies concerned the following pre-election statements by the NP in its Five Year Plan of Action, September 1989:

> All groups must participate in the decision-making about general affairs....The different groups must participate as groups in the processes of government;
> In practice each group will have its own voters' role....;
> Own residential areas are and remain NP policy;
> Although the initial period of two years military service cannot be shortened in the light of the above....;
> Shouldn't we give a new party like the DP a chance?: [no, because] the DP is only a new party in name. In reality it is not....Mrs Suzman described Black majority rule as 'the inevitable outcome of my Party's policy';
> As long as the ANC relies on violence, this organization has no place in a South Africa governed by the NP.

Without attempting in any way to provide support or

sympathy for the rightwing view on these matters, it should, however, be said that the CP's challenge to the NP over deviations from its pre-election guarantees, if not the mandate itself, seems to rest on very firm ground. For example, the Five Year Plan of 1989 refers to 'groups' and 'population groups', while the NP seldom refers to such groups nowadays, and has even repealed the basis of racial group classification, the Population Registration Act. The policy of 'own' residential areas was scrapped in 1991, while military service for whites was reduced to one year in 1990. While the Five Year Plan rejected "giving the DP a chance" because that Party's policy "would lead to Black majority rule", the NP virtually took over the DP's entire (and elements of the former UP's) policy during the following two years, entered into by-election agreements with the DP and even appointed a DP-MP, Harry Schwartz, as the ambassador in Washington. Furthermore, the NP unbanned the ANC and began negotiating with the organization before it suspended violence.

These discrepancies formed the basis of the CP's claim that the NP had no mandate for its radical reforms, and that the government had to resign because it no longer represented the wishes of the electorate:

> On the basis of what has been said, there can be no doubt that before the election the NP not only remained silent about its intention to repeal the Population Registration Act and the Separate Amenities Act, but also stated unequivocally that it would maintain these Acts. If it is honest in its intention to abolish [these Acts] and related legislation, it should immediately resign (CP MP, J.J.S. Prinsloo, cited in Hansard, 26.2.90).

However, as the subsequent by-elections would show, not all the opposition to the reforms came from the rightwing. The NP seemed to have left behind large numbers of its own supporters. A survey conducted by M&M in February 1990, indicated that 57% of voters approved of Mandela's release, while 32% disapproved, i.e. a percentage similar to the rightwing's electoral strength. However, among

Afrikaners, the percentage which approved almost equalled that which disapproved - 45% v. 43%, while 6% of NP supporters disapproved this step. Of greater concern to the NP was the response of voters to the unbanning of the ANC, SACP and PAC: only 44% of respondents approved, while 43% disapproved. Among Afrikaners it was even worse - only 30% approved, 58% disapproved. Alarmingly, a full 25% of NP supporters disapproved of the unbanning of these organizations. The repeal of the Separate Amenities Act caused a similar negative response: 48% approved this step while 35% disapproved; among Afrikaners 35% approved and 51% disapproved, while a further 15% of NP supporters disapproved.

These figures indicated that the NP faced an uphill battle in trying to convince its traditional supporters of the benefits of reforms. The Party realized that it had to educate white voters and accustom them to the idea of fundamental reform, but it was a task for which it had no hope of completing in the short-term, and definitely not before the next-by-election was to be held at Umlazi.

The Umlazi by-election of June 1990

This by-election was held in a predominantly lower/working class constituency of Natal where 80% of the voters were English-speaking. It had been regarded as a safe NP seat for many years, but the recent political reform, the possible repeal of the Group Areas Act and the overcrowding of Natal beaches, together with the violence in Natal and murders of white farmers on the Natal south coast, introduced an element of doubt to the expected result. Natal was the CP's weakest province, but in spite of this the CP had increased its share of the vote in recent elections in Umlazi from 9% in 1987 to 20% in 1989. However, for the CP to take the seat in 1990, a further swing of 16% towards the Party was necessary (Financial Mail:1.6.90).

The by-election was regarded as the first real test for the government since the announcement of the substantial reforms in February 1990. The CP used these reforms to its own advantage by using the rooi and swart gevaar tactic of the NP. Its campaign strongly centred on anti-communism: "a vote for the NP and DP is a vote for the SACP"; "Stop Slovo, Say no to the ANC" (Sunday Times (of London):3.6.90; Die Burger:4.6.90; 5.6.90). The Party's campaign received a further moral boost with the well-attended rightwing mass meeting (volksvergadering) held in Pretoria on 31 May 1990, which the CP claimed was attended by between 100 000 and 150 000 people (Patriot:1.6.90). At this meeting Treurnicht announced that the "Third Freedom Struggle" has begun and that "nothing would stop the tide of Afrikaner nationalism" (ibid).

Table 6.15 The results of the Umlazi by-election

NP: 5 762
CP: 5 215
DP: 982
NP maj. 547
poll: 59%
(1989 NP maj. 2 835, poll:61%)

The CP more than doubled its support in Umlazi since 1989, which indicated a swing of more than 20% to the Right. It increased its share of the vote from 9% in 1987, to 20% in 1989, to 43,6% in 1990, and showed that it now enjoyed considerable support in Natal, including among English-speakers. The Party regarded its victory as proof that the majority of whites supported the CP and that they completely rejected the reform policy of the NP (Patriot:15.6.90). Treurnicht claimed that the results showed growing white rejection of proposals which would lead to majority rule, but he refused to extrapolate the results countrywide, as politics were too "fluid at present" (Citizen:8.6.90). He did, however, insist that the NP could no more claim to speak on behalf of the white voters (Cape Times:7.6.90).

South Africa, and the unrest in Natal. To emphasize the strength of white disaffection, Rapport cited Dirk Laurie who estimated that the CP would win 71 seats in the next general election.

Gerald Shaw of the Cape Times (8.6.90) argued that the threat did not come from the voters of Umlazi, but from the rightwing elements within the security forces, especially the CCB (the state-run agency allegedly responsible for violence targeted at opponents of the government). The CCB, Shaw claimed, might be more difficult to contain than the CP. He furthermore argued that there would not be another whites-only election, mainly because the NP knew it could not win such an election. His argument was supported by Lester Venter of the Sunday Times (11.6.90), who claimed that in the absence of another whites-only election, any anxiety about the CP's electoral strength was unnecessary (also see chapter six).

The Times (of London) (8.6.90) claimed that the CP would defeat the NP in a general election and would come close to defeating it in a referendum on a new constitution. Its editorial commended the government for the lifting of the state of emergency and releasing more political prisoners on the same day the by-election results became known. In the same newspaper, R.W. Johnson suggested that the President may be "suffering a drift towards political impotence" with more than half the Afrikaners deserting his Party and with the security forces seemingly beyond his control. Although Johnson's statement on the security forces may have been a slight exaggeration, it was an indication of the growing concern internationally over the alleged 'third force' and the role of elements within the security forces in destabilizing the peace process.

During the period following the Umlazi election, the NP did not deviate from its reform programme and continued with strongly reformist pronouncements, e.g the acknowledgement in 1990 by Dr.Gerrit Viljoen, the Minister of Constitutional Planning and Development, that South Africa

would not have another whites-only election (a statement repeated on several occassions during 1991-1992 by the State President: see Schire, 1991:139; The Argus:29.11.91; Rapport:23.2.92; Time:30.3.92; see also chapter 7.2 for the rightwing's response to these anouncements). In addition the NP also rejected of the concept of racial 'groups' as the foundation for any constitution, and, most striking of all, the public acknowledgment that the NP would not be controlling the government four years hence. The specific reforms during this period included the opening of the NP to all races, the final scrapping of the Separate Amenities Act, the announcement of the opening of white schools to all races by 1991 (subject to the approval of an overwhelming majority of white parents and a ministerial veto in each case), and the announcement of the intention to repeal the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936.

In between the Umlazi by-election in June and the Randburg by-election in November, a few less important local council by-elections were held. In ward 11 in Pretoria the CP halved the NP's majority, and in Kimberley's ward 6 the CP defeated the NP candidate while overturning the NP majority of 184 in 1989 to a CP majority of 65 (Cape Times:6.9.90; 7.9.90). In the Boland town of Wellington the CP won a local Town Council election against a NP-Presidents Council member, who stood in the election as a member of the Ratepayers Association. The CP regarded this victory as further proof of the "massive swing" towards them in the western Cape (Cape Times:26.10.90).

A survey conducted by M&M in October 1990 indicated that the NP had increased its support from 47,3% in May, to 50%, while the CP's support declined from 28,7% to 25,5%, giving the combined right a total of 27,1%. Support of the CP among Afrikaners remained constant between May 1990 and September of that year, and among English voters declined from 14,7% to 10,7% over the same period. M&M further claimed that the level of rightwing support fell from 28,4% immediately after the September 1989 general election, to 27,1% in September 1990. If one compares these figures with the results of all the by-elections since the 1989

general election, it is clear that M&M's figures continued to under-represent the strength of the CP, and in particular the swing towards the Party after October 1989.

The Randburg by-election of November 1990

The Randburg by-election was a result of Democratic Party's co-leader Wynand Malan's resignation from parliamentary politics for personal reasons. The seat had been won by Malan in 1987 as an Independent candidate with a majority of 2 646, and again by him in 1989 for the DP with a majority of 1 714. The election of November 1990 took on great significance in spite of the acceptance that there would not be another whites-only election. Its significance lay in the undertaking given by the government to seek approval for a new constitution by means of a referendum among the white electorate. Furthermore, the NP had to strengthen its support within its white constituency at the time, to enable the Party to claim that it, and not the CP, represented the majority of whites at the negotiation table. The DP did not put up a candidate, hoping for an election pact with the NP, but although the NP backed out of such an election deal at the last minute, its reformist stance resulted in certain DP leaders calling on its supporters to vote for the NP.

The CP argued that its calls for a general election would be strengthened if it performed strongly in Randburg against the combined reformist forces of the NP and DP. The CP received respectively 884 and 755 votes in the two previous general elections in 1987 and 1989 and Randburg was regarded as the seat where the party enjoyed its lowest level of support in the Transvaal. According to political analyst, Willem Kleynhans, the results of this particular by-election would be interpreted as a setback for reform if the NP's support was less than the combined support of the NP and DP in 1989 of about 14 500 votes. Treurnicht predicted that a swing of 12% towards the CP would indicate that the Party could win in a general election and a swing of 17% that it could win a referendum on a new constitution (Patriot:2.11.90).

Table 6.16 The result of the Randburg by-election

NP: 10 882
CP: 1 969
NP maj. 8 913
poll: 56,5%
(1989 DP maj. 959, CP: 755, poll:74%).

It represented a swing of 10,6% to the CP from the 1989 election as the Party increased its share of the vote from 4,7% in 1989 to 15,6%. According to Treurnicht the real significance of the results lay in the fact that the support for the NP was 5 500 votes less than the combined NP/DP support of 14 400 in 1989, which indicated a large swing against reform (Die Burger:8.11.90). The NP's response was that the voters of Randburg rejected the "racist policies" of the CP and were irrevocably committed to a "new South Africa" while the Cape Times and Die Burger regarded the NP's victory respectively as "resounding" and as "brilliant" (ibid).

Even though the CP lost its deposit in Randburg, it still managed to triple its support in the Transvaal constituency where it had fared the worst in the 1989 general election. This is significant if one considers that the almost 50% English-speaking constituency is mostly upper-middle class and urban, which represents a socio-economic category that had never favoured the CP in the past. A ten percent swing towards the CP in such a constituency could imply a swing of much greater proportions elsewhere in the country. The low percentage poll of 55,6% was possibly a further reason for the decline in the reformist vote (due to the fact that the Democratic Party did not contest the Randburg by-election).

Randburg was the last by-election in 1990, and towards the end of the year the government began to prepare the white electorate for a further series of reforms relating to the repeal of the last major apartheid legislation, to be announced at the opening of Parliament in February 1991.

Reflecting on the CP's electoral fortunes subsequent to the September 1989 general election, Patriot (7.12.90) came to the conclusion that "South Africa can be retrieved". The paper recalled the predictions of certain political analysts in September 1989 who argued that a a further 6% swing to the right would enable the CP to win the next general election. According to Patriot the minimum swing of 6% was surpassed by the election results of 13% in Vasco, 10,6% in Randburg and the 23% in Umlazi. It further argued that a swing of 11%, which it believed was the average by which the support for the CP had increased since 1989, would place a further 52 seats within reach of the CP, if extrapolated throughout the country, giving the CP a total number of 91 seats and control of the Parliament.

There was no indication that the above projections of the CP caused too much concern among members of the government or caused it to have second thoughts about its direction. In fact, if anything, the reform programme was accelerated: in February 1991 the State President announced the repeal of the final major apartheid legislation and issued a manifesto spelling out his vision for the future: this included a commitment to a free and democratic political system, universal franchise, equality before the law, a bill of rights, government based on the consent of the governed and freedom of expression, religion, movement and association, and a free and equitable economic system. The former obsession with group and minority rights was replaced in this manifesto by references to "the right to an own community life for each community that so desires" (Hansard:1.2.91).

The first electoral test for the government following the State President's speech was a municipal by-election in ward 42 (The Hill) in Johannesburg in February. Although the NP candidate won this by-election, the results indicated an 18% swing towards the CP, and gave the combined rightwing vote (the CP and an independent conservative candidate) a majority over the NP: 838 v. 891 votes. While the CP managed to draw only 25% of the vote during the 1988 municipal elections, it increased its share

of the vote to 43% in this by-election, i.e an 18% swing. The chief secretary of the CP, Andries Beyers, argued that these results, if extrapolated countrywide, implied a victory for the CP both in a general election and a referendum (Patriot:22.2.91).

The Maitland by-election of March 1991

The next electoral test for the government was in the NP-and, until 1981, United Party-held seat of Maitland, close to Cape Town, in March 1991. Early in February, one month before this election, a HSRC poll indicated that 51% of whites supported President De Klerk as their first choice leader, against the 7% for Treurnicht (the same poll estimated the President's support among all population groups at about 11,15 million people, against Nelson Mandela's support of 11,075 million). As with the surveys conducted by M&M in September 1989 and by Markinor in November 1989 (the latter claiming a drop from 14% in May to 8% in the approval rating for Treurnicht), the HSRC survey also underestimated the support of the CP - in the light of results of the 1989 general election alone, Treurnicht could rely on the support of 31% of white voters, and even this figure is an underestimate as it ignores the swing towards the rightwing after 1989. The discrepancy between the HSRC, Markinor and M&M surveys on the one hand, and the results of by-elections during this period, was further highlighted by the Maitland by-election.

As mentioned earlier, the by-election was the first real test of the white political climate since F.W. de Klerk's second 'Rubicon' speech on 1 February 1991. Maitland was an urban lower-middle class constituency and had been regarded as a safe NP seat for many years, with the main opposition coming from the PFP in 1987 and the DP in 1989. The combined rightwing had managed to attract only 14% of the total vote in 1987 and 3,5% in 1989. The electoral contest centred on the intended repeal of the Group Areas Act and

the other previously-mentioned reforms, which were announced five weeks prior to the election date. Election issues peculiar to the constituency, concerned the increase in the number of squatters and higher crime figures in the area.

The NP devised its campaign strategy around three issues: the first of these centred on the presumed long-term benefits which the white voters of Maitland would receive from the reform programme - reform would enable the country to break free from its isolation and to regain its rightful place in the international community, which in turn would allow for the recovery of a fast-deteriorating economy. The second issue which the NP concentrated upon was the safeguarding of white pensions, job security and separate education for any community which so desired. According to the President, the NP would not agree to a constitution which would adversely affect the position of whites within the civil service, including the security forces, teachers and others. The third prong of the NP's campaign strategy was intended to scare voters away from the CP. In this respect the NP candidate, Louis Pienaar, predicted that a CP victory would change Milnerton into "a Boksburg", which would lead to a "similar economic disaster for its inhabitants in the form of cancelled development projects, black consumer boycotts and international condemnation" (Die Burger:5.3.91).

The CP's electoral strategy emphasized the 'negative' effect which the NP's latest reforms had on white security, in particular: the NP's "capitulation to the black majority" and the "selling-out" of white interests; the increase in violence and crime, "as could be seen in the fact that the past 12 months had been the most violent in the country's history"; the accusation that the NP was acting contrary to the mandate it received from the electorate during the 1989 general election; the CP also emphasized the "NP/DP alliance" and accused the NP of not only stealing the DP's policy, but also of executing it

poorly (Interview, Jan Hoon:7.2.91).

Repeating its (by now) well-known allegation that the NP was acting without a mandate, the CP's election pamphlet for Maitland contained an extensive list of reform measures for which the CP believed the government had no mandate at all:

> On 6 September 1989, did you give the NP a mandate to: Unban the Communist Party, the ANC and other terrorist organizations? Negotiate your and your children's future with convicted terrorists and communists? Integrate swimming pools, recreation areas, schools, hospital wards and beaches? Allow uncontrolled squatting in white residential areas with the accompanying crime and bloodshed? Abolish the Separate Amenities and Group Areas Acts thereby affording squatters rights in your community areas? Allow integrated municipal government and structures which will give the squatters the right to decide how your tax money is spent? If you did not, you the voters of Maitland, have a unique opportunity to show your disapproval of this kind of political treachery (CP Maitland Election Pamphlet, February 1991; Patriot:1.3.91) [translation].

The CP's attitude towards these reforms was shared by many NP supporters as well, as the following letter in the Cape NP mouthpiece, Die Burger, had illustrated - it was written by one Eben Brits of Bellville, in the form of a request to the NP to clarify its policies:

> In light of the Maitland by-election it is important that the NP explain its policy in clear and concise language to the voters on the following issues: will another whites-only general election be held again? Will whites have a veto when a referendum is held on a new constitution? Will Afrikaans be maintained as an official language in the new South Africa? It appears that the government is in the process of repealing

> legislation for which the NP did not ask a mandate during the previous election (Die Burger:5.3.91) [translation].

The tone of this letter was clearly not that of a hardline CP supporter, but rather of a wavering Nationalist who was being left behind by the pace of the government's reforms. The fact that it was published by Die Burger so close to the by-election, and the elaborate space that was provided for the reply by the Senior Director of Information of the National Party, Piet Coetzer, indicated the concern within the NP over the growing number of its supporters being left behind.

The role of the Democratic Party in this by-election also deserves mention. During the 1989 general election, the DP received almost 5 000 votes, only 1 405 fewer than the NP. However, in spite of the NP's earlier refusal to "give the DP a chance" (NP's Five Year Plan of Action), a tacit agreement was reached between the NP and DP not to oppose each other in seats held by either. This made Maitland a straightforward fight between the NP and the CP. As in the case of Randburg, the DP did not instruct its supporters whom to vote for, although its leader, Zach de Beer, suggested by implication that those who wanted to vote, should oppose the CP (The Argus:4.3.91). In an effort to mobilize DP support, F.W. De Klerk unambiguously declared that an abstention would be an implicit vote against the new South Africa and for the CP's opposition to renewal (The Argus:8.3.91).

It was expected that if only half of the DP supporters supported the NP, and the latter managed to maintain its own support garnered during the previous election, the NP would receive about 10 700 votes. Even if one takes cognizance of the low poll of 46% (it was 10% lower than in 1989, which could possibly ascribed to the DP's non-participation), the NP still should have received about 9 700 votes. In the event, the Party received almost 40% fewer votes than the above projection. The results of the 1991 by-election and results of two previous elections are presented in table 6.17.

Table 6.17 The results of the Maitland by-election

NP: 6 009
CP: 3 152
NP maj. 2 857
poll:46,5%
(1989: NP maj. 1 405, poll:56%)

The results indicated a huge swing towards the CP of 27%, and was a significant setback to the NP. It was not unexpected, in the light of the fast pace of reforms since February 1990, the poor economic conditions (Maitland had a considerable working-class component), the squatter problem, and the lack of any tangible benefits of reform, such as the lifting of sanctions or international sport tours (the first sanctions were lifted shortly afterwards). The only surprises were the extent of the increase in the CP's support since 1987 (+300%), and the fact that it occurred in a former UP seat with a large English-speaking component.

In the view of the CP the results were a clear indication that the NP did not enjoy the support of the majority of whites and that it had no right to negotiate with the ANC on behalf of the whites. According to Treurnicht the swing of 27% towards the CP was the largest yet in the history of South African politics, and the NP now had no chance to win either a general election or a referendum (Patriot:8.3.91).

The NP's response to the results was, understandably, one of great relief, and the Party emphasized that it had doubled its previous majority. Both the NP candidate, Louis Pienaar, and the Cape leader of the Party, Dawie de Villiers, argued that the result was a clear indication that the majority of voters supported the government's reform initiatives (Die Burger:7.3.91). As was the case after other recent by-elections, it was once again left to the government-supporting newspapers to present a more critical viewpoint. Die Burger took a cautious approach and looked for scapegoats to blame for what it regarded as the

"relatively poor NP performance". True to form, it blamed the abstaining DP supporters for the low poll, as "this was mainly to the disadvantage of the NP". The Argus suggested that the NP now had a momentous task to convince the increasing number of "stragglers that the reform policy is in the long run meant to secure a safer future also for whites" (8.3.91).

Political analyst, Willem Kleynhans, claimed that the results of Maitland "must be frightening" for the NP, seen in light of there having been a five-fold increase in the rightwing vote, in spite of a 10% lower poll (Cape Times:8.3.91). Similar interpretations came from two other analysts, Japie Spoenstra and Donald Simpson, who argued that the results, if extrapolated countrywide, suggested that the NP would win 81 seats in a general election, the CP 75 and the DP 10 (ibid) (these figures were confirmed by another analyst, Louwrens Pretorius of Unisa, who privately estimated that the CP could possibly win about 73 seats based on the Maitland results). However, both Simpson and Spoenstra predicted that the NP might still win a referendum on a new constitution (ibid).

The Ladybrand by-election of May 1991

The final by-election discussed in this chapter was held at Ladybrand in May 1991. This by-election was the only one of the series of by-elections after September 1989 to be contested in a rural constituency, and was also the only one in a seat previously held by the CP. The by-election was symbolic in the sense that it was the last to be contested before the final apartheid laws were scrapped in June 1991. Moreover, because of the growing realization that there would not be another whites-only election, there was also a perception of the increasing irrelevance of such elections. The by-election was described beforehand as the "battle for the soul of the Afrikaner", and various economic and political factors affected the outcome (Cape

Times:22.5.91). The factors which were deemed positively to influence the CP's chances were:

> The effects on white morale caused by the economic recession which had the country in its grip for over 22 months, and caused increasing hardship among all sectors of the business world and consumers;

> The various political developments which boosted the rightwing's election campaign, including the country-wide violence which had been raging unabated during the months prior to the election;

> The refusal of the ANC to participate in a peace conference organized by the government, and its suspension of dialogue with the government because the latter refused to comply with an ultimatum from the ANC;

> Linked to the ANC-factor, was the 'Winnie' factor, referring to Winnie Mandela's conviction for kidnapping by the Rand Supreme Court, and her subsequent arrest a few days later on grounds of disrupting traffic in downtown Johannesburg;

> Another political factor of particular importance in this rural constituency, was the scheduled repeal of the Land Acts, which caused great consternation among white farmers in the northern provinces. This was exacerbated by the events one week before the by-election at Goedgevonden near Ventersdorp in the western Transvaal, where several hundred white farmers attempted to destroy a squatter camp, but were prevented from doing so by the police, who used buckshot to drive the farmers back;

> Finally, on the day of the election a racially-inspired riot erupted in Maseru, the capital of Lesotho, which is located just a few kilometres from Ladybrand. The residents of the town saw hundreds of whites fleeing Lesotho in fear of their lives, and arriving in Ladybrand with rumours of 'fearsome atrocities' which had been committed against whites in Maseru. The effect which images of whites fleeing for their lives from 'black hordes' would have on the psyche of whites, was explained in the previous chapter - in Ladybrand this was no different.

These issues provided an almost insurmountable obstacle to the NP's chances in Ladybrand. The negative perception which most whites had of the ANC, and of the relationship between the NP and the ANC, probably cost the NP the most votes, as the survey conducted by Riordan in November//December 1990 indicated that:

> 73% of all voters and 69% NP supporters agreed/strongly agreed with the statement that the ANC was 'run by communists';
> 71% of all voters and 66% of NP supporters agreed/strongly agreed with the statement that the ANC was a 'terrorist organization';
> 90% of all voters and 90% of NP supporters agreed/strongly agreed with the statement that the ANC was 'incapable of running South Africa;
> 62% of all voters and 52% of NP supporters disagreed/strongly disagreed with the statement that the ANC 'was determined to accommodate whites' in a future South Africa (Monitor, April 1991).

To counter the negative effects of its relationship with the ANC, the NP became much more critical of the ANC's policies, with the then-Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, leading the onslaught. It half-heartedly hoped that the widening political distance between itself and the ANC over the issue of violence would count in its favour, as it would show that the 'NP/ANC alliance', as the CP described this unstable relationship, was in fact not that close. Other NP tactics to counter the CP challenge revolved around the alleged suggestion by a CP-MP, Koos Botha, that the Free State might be excluded from the CP's proposed smaller white homeland, and secondly, around divisions within the CP over the 'Koos' document (see chapter six). The visit by Margeret Thatcher, former British Prime Minister, and her criticism of CP policy and praise for the NP, might also have been intended positively to influence the NP's chances.

6.18 The results of the Ladybrand by-election

NP: 5 018
CP: 6 276
CP maj. 1 258
poll 81%
(1989 CP maj. 70, poll:70%)

The results indicated a swing of 7,8% towards the CP, and a decline of the NP's share of the vote from 54% in 1987, to 47% in 1989, and to 45,5% in 1991. During the same period the CP's share increased from 46%, to 48%, to 55,5%. The high percentage poll indicated a level of interest which was unusually high for a by-election.

According to Willem Kleynhans, the NP had now reached its "final stage of disintegration" and that it was living in a "dream world" if it believed that it still enjoyed the support of the majority of Afrikaners, while Dirk Laurie argued that the 15% swing towards the CP was not enough to enable the Party to win a referendum on a new constitution (Patriot:24.5.91; The Argus:23.5.91).

The leader of the NP, F.W de Klerk, claimed that the result was not a setback for the government, as it 'proved' that the majority of whites countrywide supported the reforms. Die Burger (24.5.91), at this stage downright pessimistic, suggested that the results were 'not much cause for celebration' (a euphemism for 'disastrous'), and suggested that the NP should be careful not to neglect its traditional support-base (the Afrikaners).

It was doubtful, however, whether the NP still had the 'traditional' support base which Die Burger referred to, as the Ladybrand by-election confirmed suspicions that the CP had the support of the majority of the Afrikaners, and that the NP, to a large extent, had lost this element of its support matrix. This was also the opinion of a NP-MP, Boy

Geldenhuys shortly afterwards (Interview:28.5.91). In return, the NP, having taken over most of the DP's policies, enjoyed the support of a majority of English-speakers (following De Klerk's reforms the DP's support levels declined from 28% in September 1989, to 18% in February 1990, and to about 10% in 1991 - M&M polls, see page 322). The NP also increasingly enjoyed support across racial lines, e.g. as was indicated by the defection to the NP by almost half the members of the (coloured) Labour Party during the weeks subsequent to the Ladybrand by-election. Other commentators such as Gerald Shaw shared this view:

> The swing to the CP in Ladybrand...indicates how rapidly the NP is moving away from its Afrikaner Nationalist roots and, in fits and starts, seeking to become a non-racial party of the urban middle classes (Cape Times:24.5.91).

The CP went a step further by arguing that the NP had not only lost its traditional Afrikaner support, but in fact the support of white voters:

> The mass defections of Labour Party members of Parliament and the President's Council to the NP were a clear indication that the NP's future support did not lie with white voters (Patriot:31.5.91) [translation].

Treurnicht saw the election results as a vindication of the power of 'true nationalism' and as a major defeat for the "Tuynhuis-ANC Alliance". He believed that the Ladybrand results were a clear indication that the CP would easily win a general election if it were held then, and it predicted that such an election would give the CP 87 seats, the NP 67 and the DP 2. He further claimed that the government was now under a "moral obligation" to call such a general election (Patriot:4.5.91, Interview, Andries Beyers:11.4.91).

The opening of the NP to all races in 1990 and the defections from the Labour Party in May and June 1991, added 34 coloured members to the NP's Caucus, and left the CP as the only 'white' Party in Parliament. However, during the second half of 1991, political developments of historic importance occurred outside of Parliament, pertaining to the run-up to the first full-scale negotiations between the NP and its chief opponent, the ANC, at Codesa. Considering the possibility that a new political dispensation might soon be in place, the CP began to realize that its relevance as a poltical force would fade unless it could force the NP, through a series of heavy by-election defeats, to agree to a final contest for the support of the white electorate. As the NP had already excluded the possibility of a general election under the existing constitution, it was clear to the CP that it had to focus on the whites-only referendum. Once a referendum was won, there was no doubt in the CP's mind that it could enforce a general election in which a rightwing victory would be a formality.

6.2.1 Issues which assisted the electoral strength of the rightwing

A. The reform programme of the NP

It was mentioned before that the political reforms which were initiated first by John Vorster during the late 1970's led to the break-away by Albert Hertzog from the NP, to form the HNP (see pages 46-63). However, the verligte/ erkrampte struggle within the NP did not disappear with the split, but merely subsided for a while in the light of the indecision and paralysis which characterized Vorster's last years in office. It flared up again as his successor, P.W. Botha, began implementing reforms aimed at the greater mobility of black labour. In response to what white workers saw as a threat to their economic security, the HNP and NCP greatly increased their combined support during the 1981 general election from 3% in 1977 to 16% in 1981. The breakaway by a further 17 MP's from the NP in 1982 was in response to the policy of power-sharing between whites, Indians and coloureds at central government level.

Between the 1981 and the 1989 the general elections the rightwing increased its support among white voters from 17% to 31%, while the NP, during the same period, shifted its political philosophy from unbridled white racial domination, to 'healthy' power-sharing with coloureds and Indians (1982), to the acceptance in principle of power-sharing with blacks but with a white veto and based on statutorily prescriptive racial groups (1986), to the possibility of power-sharing between ethnic, open and self-defined (non-racial) groups with definite minority protection (1989), to the acceptance in principle of a majority government with some form of protection for cultural minorities/communities, but without an explicit white veto (1990). During this period the NP transformed itself from a party obsessed with racial segregation and white self-determination to one which would go to the negotiation table without any proposals based on race or white domination. Throughout this era of transformation of the NP, the CP had managed to increase its support in

virtually in every by-election it participated between 1982 and 1987. In the 1987 general election the CP, together with the HNP, received 30% of the vote, but due to Botha's slowdown on reform and emphasis on security during the period 1987 to 1989, the CP's growth spurt came to a stop. Although it almost doubled its number of seats, its support among voters increased by only 1% in 1989. However, the further increase in the CP's support following the reforms implemented by F.W. de Klerk during 1989-91, confirmed the link between substantial reforms and the rightwing's strength, as could be detected from the swing towards the CP of 4%, 12% and 20%, 27% and 7% in the by-elections during this period.

Some analysts like Swilling, reject the link between reform and the increase in support for the rightwing. According to his thesis, support for the 'rightwing' philosophy, as espoused by the NP, the NCP and the HNP in 1981 declined from 74% to about 31% in 1989 (only the CP and the HNP), as the NP shifted to the centre-left. This argument rests on three doubtful assumptions: firstly, that the NP's ideology was sufficiently conservative in 1981 to be classified per se in the same 'rightwing' category as the HNP and the NCP of Connie Mulder - at this stage the NP already had accepted in principle the idea of power-sharing; secondly, that the NP's caucus is described as en bloc verkramp, but on the contrary, the verligte/verkrampte struggle within the Party was at its peak at that stage; thirdly, the assumption that the NP's reform between 1981 and 1989 actually represented a shift to the left. Compared to the substantial reforms of the post-1989 period, the P.W. Botha-induced reforms were rather limited in scope, so much so that the NP could hardly be classified as centrist, let alone as a centre-left Party.

An indication of how badly prepared the NP supporters were for the substantial reforms associated with the NP under De Klerk, is illustrated by a survey conducted by M&M in February 1990: it indicated that 43% of all voters, 58% of Afrikaners and 25% of NP supporters disapproved of the

unbanning of the ANC, PAC and SACP; a further 35% of white voters, 51% of Afrikaners and 15% of NP supporters disapproved of the repeal of the Separate Amenities Act; only 30% of all respondents and 15% of Afrikaners were in favour of the repeal of the Group Areas Act. To see these findings in perspective, one should remember that the reforms announced in February 1990 merely represented the 'normalization' of the political situation and did not address the scrapping of the pillars of apartheid or the termination of white domination. A fundamental change in the NP's philosophy came only later in 1990, when the Party opened its doors to all races, which theoretically meant that blacks could become the majority within the Party. Other fundamental changes in the old NP philosophy included the first-time announcement by Minister Gerrit Viljoen that the NP rejected, in principle, the idea of group rights, and his suggestion that the NP might not be the government in four years time (The Argus:19.5.90). Soon afterwards the President himself took the unheard of step by a public acknowledgment that he would be prepared to serve under a black President, including Nelson Mandela (two years previously, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was repudiated in public by P.W. Botha for making a similar comment).

Back in 1989 the CP correctly predicted that the relatively small step of the repeal of the Separate Amenities Act would be "the beginning of the end" for white self-determination, and would eventually lead to the scrapping of separate residential areas and separate voters rolls (The Argus:16.11.89). The CP scorned the opening of the NP to all races as a "dead-end move which will gain nothing" and described the announcement of the repeal of the Land Acts as part of the demolition of white South Africa which would lead to the redistribution of agricultural land (Patriot:12.10.90). The CP-MP Koos Botha summarized the CP's view of the NP's negotiation proposals as an attempt to "reach reconciliation with the forces of darkness" (Patriot:18.5.90).

As the M&M surveys and the by-election results indicated, the response to these changes by large parts of the white electorate, including many NP supporters, was less than enthusiastic. Several commentators noted that the NP was leaving its supporters behind by moving too fast with reform. Apart from the government-supporting Citizen's regular warnings, the Cape Times commented as follows:

> If recent NP congresses are anything to go by, many rank and file supporters are going to have to be dragged kicking into the new South Africa ....One of the many difficulties facing the NP is that many - but not all - its leaders and public representatives have shifted their positions markedly in recent months, leaving ordinary members battling to keep up .... Indisputably, the task of re-educating grassroots supporters of the NP to the new realities [before they defect to the CP] is considerable (17.10.90).

On the same issue of wavering NP supporters The Argus (1.11.90) commented as follows, and also implicated stragglers within the Cabinet:

> Has there been any attempt to ease the ordeal of bewildered NP supporters panting in the rear by converting them to the insights of the leadership?...So long as Mr De Klerk's own party and caucus show a lack of commitment to the new South Africa, there will be doubt at home and abroad about change being irreversible.

According to journalist Allister Sparks, angry Nationalists had turned to the CP in droves after the CP accused the NP of reforming without a mandate, a statement with which Giliomee agrees:

> It is important to understand that the rightwing has a point in arguing that Mr De Klerk did not really ask for a mandate in the September election for his present actions (The Argus:24.2.90; 19.5.90).

The dilemma in which the NP found itself is obvious. The Party saw its support base (mainly Afrikaners) gradually declining throughout the 1980's as P.W Botha attempted to

change the face of apartheid, but these losses were easily recouped by enticing more English-speaking voters to vote for the NP with vague promises of more reform. When the wheels came off the reform programme after 1986 in response to the heightened black resistance and because of the rightwing's strengthened position after the 1987 general election, the haemorrhage to the right was slowed down temporarily until 1989. When the government continued its reform programme again under the leadership of De Klerk and seemed poised at last to take reform to its logical conclusion, namely the end of white domination, many white voters had second thoughts. By 1991 many analysts (like Willem Kleynhans) were of the opinion that the NP has lost the majority of Afrikaner voters to the CP, and according to the CP itself (and Dr. Zach de Beer of the DP, Daily Telegraph:31.1.91), the majority of white voters as well.

B. The increase in unrest and crime

> The level of political violence is certainly appalling but it is hardly surprising, given the social setting of desperate poverty and group insecurity, the products of a repressive apartheid society maintained for decades by force (Gerald Shaw in the Cape Times:24.8.90).

During the 1980's there was a dramatic increase in black opposition to apartheid, which took the form of unrest and violence, school and consumer boycotts, strikes, sabotage and attacks on co-opted black officials. Black-on-black violence which was concentrated in Natal, also spread to Transvaal in 1989, which led R.W. Johnson to warn that South Africa could become a sort of giant Lebanon

> with warring communities tearing up all the rules of civil society and reducing the land to a series of no-go areas and contested zones ....[De Kerk] has more to lose than almost anyone from the violence, which pushes more and more white votes towards the extreme right, and destabilizes the negotiation process on which he has risked everything (The Argus:1.9.90).

unrest to spill over to white areas, while 64% of the first, 66% of the second, and 44% of the third group were of the opinion that the security forces had enough control to maintain law and order in black residential areas.

The most significant aspect of these findings was that violence was the single most important issue which affected the approaches of all parties to the 1987 election. Furthermore, that the different political groupings perceived the violence differently: the rightwing felt that reform was at the root of violence and that it could only be curbed by less reform and more repression; the NP suporters felt that the government was coping satisfactorily with the violence; the Left was very aware of the violence but as in the case of 43% of NP supporters, it also felt that reform should be accelerated.

Throughout the many by-elections and the three general elections of the 1980's and early 90's, the rightwing had repeatedly used the theme of the growing black self-assertiveness, of unrest, violence and crime to draw whites into its laager. In this aspect the Right had to compete with the NP, who used similar tactics during the same period in order to entice voters away from the liberal opposition (the successful strategies of the rooi en swart gevaar and 'total onslaught' come to mind).

The CP claimed that it predicted as far back as 1983 that the concept of power-sharing would result in a power struggle among blacks where whites would be mere bystanders, and that the ethnic conflict present in the country was a clear indication that a single constitution for all the 'nations' in South Africa was not feasible (Patriot:24.8.90; 21.9.90). The Party described the ANC as an organization intent upon grabbing control of the whole country, and which threatened the government with violence if its demands were not met (ibid). Constant references were made to the "ANC's rule of terror" whereby the organization was accused of using violence and sabotage as a method of pressurizing the government during negotiations (Patriot:1.6.90; 8.6.90; 17.8.90).

The CP furthermore claimed that reform was the direct cause of unrest and contrasted the expectations of peace which followed De Klerk's speech of February 1990, with the "orgy of violence, crime, arson and murder" six months later. Statistics were produced, which, it was claimed, demonstrated a direct correlation between the political violence of the period January 1990 to August 1990, and the reforms introduced by the government during the same period:

> **Unrest-related deaths per month: January:100, April:200, June:300, July:400, August:500.**

Furthermore, acts of 'terrorism' increased from four in 1976 to 58 in 1981 (described as the 'era of separate development') to 136 in 1985 and 280 in 1988 (the 'era of power-sharing') (CP Maitland Election Pamphlet, February 1991).

In November 1989, in response to the the initial reforms of the De Klerk administration, the CP claimed that the government was "letting loose revolutionary forces" by allowing demonstrations and freeing activists, while the deputy leader of the CP, Ferdie Hartzenberg, responded as follows:

> We want to tell the government that there is a limit. We are not looking for bloodshed. Therefore, we have to engage in the struggle to prevent Mr De Klerk from creating a situation of bloodshed (Daily Dispatch:2.11.89).

Treurnicht claimed that the first of these huge anti-apartheid marches scared nervous whites into the arms of the CP, and that the "image of uncertainty and insecurity" had become a trademark of the government's actions. He added that whites took strong exception to the use of Church Square in Pretoria by black demonstrators, who used the opportunity to climb onto Paul Kruger's statue (one of the most revered symbols of rightwing nationalism) (Sunday Star:24.9.89).

Another white security issue which ranked high in the rightwing's list of grievances was the co-operation between the police and members of the ANC/UDF on issues of mutual concern (such as shared responsibility with regard to public rallies and other security issues). This was described as a "dangerous situation" by Patriot (17.8.90):

> given the present ludicrous situation of the police having to co-operate with the perpetrators of violence, anything can happen in today's NP-run South Africa;
>
> In a desperate attempt to get negotiations on track the government offered the ANC joint control of the security forces (Patriot:28.6.91).

Other issues relating to stiffer black opposition to apartheid, also featured prominently in CP rhetoric. These included statements made by the leader of the ANC's military wing (MK), Chris Hani, with regard to continued military activities against the state should negotiations fail; Winnie Mandela's actions; the PAC's slogan of "one settler, one bullet" (although this slogan was mis-interpreted by the media, insofar the PAC intended the term 'settler' only to refer to white racists, Interview, Richard Ramodipa of PAC's Legal Affairs Committee:27.5.91); the proposed campaign by the ANC/UDF to encourage squatters to occupy vacant white-owned land; and threats by the UDF to take mass action against CP-controlled town councils who kept their facilities closed to blacks through legal loopholes.

b) Crime

The massive increase in crime over the past few years has become another recruiting factor for the CP. The reasons for an increase in crime could be found partly in the

worsening economic conditions because of apartheid, sanctions and other structural factors, and partly because crime and the breakdown of social structures often go hand in hand with fast changing political conditions which touch the basic structure of a society. In this regard, Gerald Shaw (Cape Times:24.8.90) commented:

> The culture of violence is all-pervasive. Unacceptable levels of criminal violence are the norm...and criminal violence has been spilling over from the townships into white areas for some time.

According to Ken Owen (Cape Times:23.7.90) the wave of crime has resulted in whites living in a sea of fear and personal insecurity, with predictable negative results:

> But even if physical fear - of murder, robbery, rape, hijacking or random shootings - does not drive the white population into the arms of the right, it will cause rising emigration of skills.

Particularly poignant is Owen's follow-up article six months later and his description of "Soweto's lost generation", which brought to the average white mind vivid images of the killing fields of Cambodia. He claimed that ever since the days of the frontier, whites have feared nothing so much as "to be drawn into the African heart of darkness". According to Owen much of the present incidence of anarchy and lawlessness came in the aftermath of President De Klerk's February 1990 speech:

> A year later...this country stands close to the heart of darkness. Both the universal oppression of apartheid and particular horrors like the necklace are giving way to a general barbarization. All institutions and amenities of civilized life - the law and the courts, the centres of learning and the schools, cities and parks, police and local authorities, streets and suburbs, hospitals, sewerage and electricity - are under strain (Sunday Times:20.1.91).

Owen provided recent examples of incidents of terror, which

he claims, have become part of South African society:

> So a soccer match turns into a slaughter, a funeral into carnage. Young girls are abducted from a Salvation Army home, and gang raped. Picnickers at a deceptively peaceful riverside in the Free State are attacked, the men beaten and the women raped. Policemen are set on fire by barbarized teenagers. A banker walks into a restaurant and is shot through the head, a woman is killed casually by car thieves, not a household does not have a story to tell of burglary, theft, assault, murder, violation (Sunday Times:20.1.91).

If one did not know Owen better, it would have been a logical assumption that he was a copywriter for the CP's election propaganda - however, the fact that a well-known liberal like Owen felt so strongly about the rising tide of violence and crime, must have been an indication of how the average NP and CP supporter viewed this negative aspect of F.W. de Klerk's 'new South Africa'.

The CP regarded the unprecedented crime wave as a direct result of reform. It blamed the government's more 'sensitive' approach to squatting, the repeal of influx control laws, and the relaxing of the Group Areas Act for the rise in crime (Patriot:6.7.90). But the Party also saw a more sinister aspect of crime: according to Patriot (17.8.90) many blacks regard crimes against whites not as crime as such, but as acts of revenge against the white population. In response to the rise in crime in white suburbs, the CP requested that the government should introduce a nightly curfew in white suburbs which would "prevent unemployed blacks from entering white suburbs" (Patriot:5.10.90). It also strongly criticized the lifting of the state of emergency in June 1990, as this was done in spite of the "highest murder, unrest and violence statistics in ten years" (Patriot:15.6.90). The Party also strongly criticized the release from prison of common criminals under a general amnesty plan for (first-time offenders) in 1991, and emphasized statistics which

indicated that 70% of such criminals would eventually go back to criminal activities.

The drastic increase in crime over the past few years has come as a shock to most whites, especially because crime, unlike unrest-related incidences and township violence, spilled over to white suburbs. The economic costs of personal safety and of securing property have greatly increased as could be seen in increased insurance premiums and the booming security industry. Even liberal newspapers and analysts show a deep concern over this issue. The reason why crime has a tremendous potential to force even voters on the left of the political spectrum to harden their attitudes, is that crime is not selective i.e. it affects a liberal and a conservative white to an equal extent. It is therefore not difficult to understand why a white victim of a crime directed at his property or even worse, his person, could switch his political allegiance to a party, like the CP (or like the NP in 1987), which claimed to offer greater security to whites by promising to re-implement influx control, to declare a state of emergency or to give the security forces free reign.

C. The worsening economic position of whites and the perceived transfer of wealth to blacks

> The government not only shares its political power, but also its economic resources....At the tempo with which this is occurring, there will be little left to do for the ANC with regard to redistribution, as the government would have done it all (Patriot:8.3.91) [translation].

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education, housing, transport and pensions, had contributed to the economic decline of whites (Zille, 1988:84). To substantiate this allegation, much emphasis was placed on the increase in government debt from about R18 billion in 1983 when the Tricameral Constitution was implemented, to R55 billion in 1989. In addition to the decline in white incomes, the purchasing power of the Rand has declined from 100 cents in 1970 to 7 cents in 1991 (Patriot:7.6.91). These are hard-hitting statistics, and it came as no surprise that this theme has been repeated by the CP and HNP during every by-election throughout the 1980's and early 90's. As the results of these elections indicated, it was a very effective part of both the CP and the HNP's campaign strategies, especially in predominantly working-class constituencies where both Parties were strongly represented.

It also formed an important part of the CP's election campaign during the 1989 general election, combined with several proven incidents of corruption within government departments. The CP accused the NP of wasting money as a result of poor administration and misdirected state spending, which were evident from: senior bureaucrats and ministers who were forced to resign but still received massive pensions; NP propaganda paid for with state funds; exorbitant renovations on ministerial housing, e.g. the R2 million taxpayer's money spent on renovating Minister Pik Botha's home; massive corruption as evident in the findings of no fewer than six commissions which had investigated financial irregularities within government departments; this again leading to the resignation of two MP's, one cabinet minister and two director-generals.
(CP Election News, 1989).

Further 'evidence' of government-sponsored black 'enrichment' to the detriment of whites, frequently appeared in Patriot, especially close to by-elections. These included claims that whites had to subsidize black services and rentals, and that blacks in Soweto received free electricity while electricity to whites in the poorer

parts of Johannesburg was disconnected after they had missed one instalment (Patriot:7.9.90; 12.10.90) (the 'free' electricity referred to by the CP was the once-off absolution of outstanding fees for rent and services in Soweto).

White unemployment has also been used as ammunition for the CP's attacks on the government. The Party claimed that the increase in white unemployment of 113% between 1990 and 1991 was a direct result of inept government policies such as privatization and less spending on corporations such as ARMSCOR and ATLAS (Patriot:17.5.91). In addition, the poverty among whites has forced whites to do "unusual" jobs, i.e. jobs which are regarded by (racist) whites as normally reserved for blacks, such as domestic helpers and filling station attendants Patriot:17.5.91) (see also chapter four on the issue of status needs and insecurities).

The reappearance over the past few years of the 'poor white' problem of the 1930's, is further evidence, according to the CP, of the government's uncaring attitude towards lower-class whites, which led to "unprecedented misery and poverty which today exist among thousands of whites ...while no attempts are made by the government to address this problem" (Patriot:21.6.91) [translation]. The CP was quick to exploit the issue of white poverty, as the Party realized that it, rather than the government, could become the champion of the present poor white cause. In 1991 the CP, in conjunction with other rightwing organizations, launched a campaign called Aksie Helpmekaar, which was similar to the Reddingsdaadbond of the 1940's, with the goal of forming a labour bureau and providing the basic necessities to poor whites (Patriot:5.7.91). A similar organization, Boere Krisis Aksie (Farmers Crisis Front), was founded by rightwing farmers to provide aid and drought relief to needy farmers who opposed the government's land reforms (Cape Times:9.8.91).

D. Namibian Independence

The issue of Namibian independence and SWAPO's convincing victory in the election of 1989, was used by the rightwing as the probable model which the NP would like to impose upon South Africa. This especially was the case during the 1989 general election. The correlation which the CP saw between the Namibian independence and South Africa's future was perhaps best summarized by an earlier quote by CP-MP J.J.C. Botha:

> The same mentality which exists in Namibia is also present at the negotiation table in South Africa and will lead the country into becoming another basket case in the dark continent....If you want to see what the new South Africa is going to look like, look at Namibia (Patriot:22.6.90) [translation].

It is difficult to judge to what extent the Namibian independence has influenced white voters to switch to the CP, as it never was an election issue by itself, but instead became synonymous with the other fundamental changes introduced under the De Klerk administration. The CP tried its utmost to identify real and imaginary problem areas within the newly-independent state, with a mixed degree of success. Patriot published an article shortly before the Maitland by-election which described Namibia as a 'typical' African state plagued by corruption, mismanagement, economic decline and the abuse of power (8.2.91). The article mentioned the following 'facts' as proof of its allegations: discrimination against whites under the cloak of affirmative action (only four of the 17 heads of departments in the civil service are white and only one out of nine ambassadors is white); forced integration at school level; the disregard of Afrikaans; government spending was out of control; and crime has increased by 500% since independence (see also chapter five).

However, these allegations would carry little weight under normal circumstances, as they merely represent a return to

government in 1986, the NP fought several by-elections and the general election of 1987, on the premise that it would not allow any foreign power to prescribe or to influence policies of the South Africa government, irrespective of whether the interference was based on enticement or coercion. The issue of foreign 'interference' became an electoral boon to the NP's election campaigns as the Party believed that the siege atmosphere created in this fashion would come in handy to draw voters away from opposition parties. This strategy worked very well, as the strong showing of the NP in 1987 indicated. Sometimes the strategy worked so well that voters deserted the NP for the CP, as the latter was regarded as even a safer option in a society under siege, which in turn allowed the NP to blame foreign interference for its poor performance against the rightwing.

After the NP was forced to drop its 'foreign interference/society-under-siege' strategy, in tandem with the De Klerk administration's new relationship with the international community, the rightwing in its turn, eagerly took over this strategy, something it could not successfully do while P.W. Botha was in power as he already had occupied that niche of the <u>laager</u> market.

The basic philosophy of the rightwing on 'foreign meddling' could be described as similar to the traditional NP argument that the international community was practising double-standards by interfering in South Africa's domestic affairs. According to Zille (1988:79):

> They [the rightwing] believe that foreign intervention has nothing to do with 'moral outrage' against apartheid, but is a blatant self-interest masquerading behind a moral mask.

This position was also clearly spelled out in <u>Patriot</u> (25.1.91):

> Why should South Africa have to meet this condition [of majority rule], when there are absolutely no moral

> grounds for such demands (America trade with the world's most appalling dictatorships), and when we ourselves could sanction the American establishment with the minerals which they so obviously need to subsist? (Patriot:25.1.91) [translation]

The CP also held strong views on what they claim was the government's 'selling out' of the whites in exchange for international recognition. In an article entitled "A second Jannie Smuts?", Patriot (5.10.90) compared State President De Klerk with former Prime Minister Smuts:

> Both men forsook their nation's interests and sought international acclaim instead of home popularity. Smuts' contribution to international politics included helping to draft the charter to the UN, an institution which has ever since been a curse upon South Africa and all white nations. What will De Klerk's contribution to international politics be? The final destruction of Afrikaner nationalism? He must, however, remember that, like Smuts before him, people will reject him when the stakes are down [translation].

The newspaper further claimed that the government was receiving nothing tangible in return for its reforms, except vague promises and praise for De Klerk, or, as it exclaimed in another edition: "Red carpet for FW in exchange for white suicide" (18.5.90). According to CP-MP Thomas Langley, the State President's visits to Europe would be judged against his success in getting the EEC to lift sanctions - little had been gained, because sanctions would not be lifted until "total capitulation" by the whites occurred in South Africa (Patriot:6.7.90). When the EEC announced its intention in 1991 to lift sanctions within the immediate future, the CP argued that the lifting of sanctions was to be expected in exchange for the government's intention to accept a black majority government, in which case it was not really a break-through.

In July 1990 the CP took strong exception to what it described as the British Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher's, hostile and "preposterous interference in South Africa's internal affairs". This was in response to Thatcher's reference to the CP as a party "for whom there is no longer any room in South Africa". According to Patriot, the Prime Minister had never shown any insight into the position of the whites in Africa, of which her "delivery of the whites in Rhodesia to a black government" was proof. The reason for this disproportionately testy response to the British leader's comments, was, that until then, the CP revered her in the same way as the NP did, she being the only Western leader who consistently opposed sanctions against South Africa (Patriot:27.7.90; 3.8.90).

In line with the NP's past obsession (and success at the polls) on the issue of 'interference' by the United Nations, the CP took a similar stance, and especially during 1990, the UN came under constant criticism from the rightwing. Patriot (8.6.90) claimed that the "crudest form of interference in South Africa's domestic affairs in years" had occurred when a UN mission visited the country in June 1990. Thomas Langley of the CP described the visit as a triumph for the ANC and as an explicit acknowledgment by the government of the "international character of South Africa's domestic problems" (ibid). Members of the rightwing also saw the UN as trying to position itself as a mediator in South Africa. Patriot (27.7.90) commented:

> With their foot in the door, it is possible that the UN now sees itself as playing a possible role in the future 'transfer of power' to the black majority [translation].

The CP firmly believed that the South African government has "confidently requested that the United Nations send troops to South Africa to oversee the implementation of whatever agreement emerges from the current government/ANC talks" It also suggested that the State President's

position had been compromised by the UN:

> With the United Nations firmly entrenched within the structures organizing the return of 'exiles' [the repatriation of over 40 000 apartheid exiles from neigbouring states] to this country, it is clear that State President de Klerk is slowly being ensnared by the internationalists (Patriot:7.6.91) [translation].

From the above comments it is clear that the CP regards the issue of foreign interference as a useful tool to mobilize white support. As with the NP some years ago, the philosophy behind this strategy is the laager, a term which denotes a small but cohesive group of whites with a 'just' cause, facing an unsympathetic and hostile world.

6.2 Issues which hindered the growth of the rightwing

A. The economic and cultural costs of apartheid: sanctions, disinvestment, consumer, sport and cultural boycotts

> It would be naive to believe that economic pressure, as well as the sporting and cultural boycotts that have turned white South Africans into pariahs, has played no part in convincing the ruling National Party that apartheid must end and blacks must get the vote (Time:2.7.90).

As previously mentioned, Lipton (1986:394) argued that external pressures, if pushed too far, could result in a white backlash, with even greater emphasis on security (see page 360). However, she agreed that such pressure had contributed to making whites realize the need for reform and illustrated her argument with examples of the effectiveness of international pressure in promoting desegregation in the fields of sport and labour, and pressure aimed at specific goals such as the prevention of forced removals.

In recent times, usually in an effort to undermine support for the CP, several members of the government had acknowledged the considerable influence which international pressure had on the government's policies: the former Minister of Labour, Fanie Botha, agreed that the pressure from the international trade union movement had become too great to ignore; P.W. Botha stated that the Western world is extremely sensitive to the large-scale removal of people and that the government cannot simply ignore it; while Chris Heunis, former Minister of Constitutional Affairs and Planning, stated that "the South African problem had been internationalized and the opinion of the international community could no longer be disregarded in the context of domestic reforms" (cited in Lipton, 1986:354-355). To these one can add the acknowledgement by Minister Gene Louw in March 1991, that "sanctions had brought the economy to its knees" (SABC-TV).

The detrimental effect of economic sanctions and disinvestment on the South African economy is not difficult to determine. According to Time (2.7.90) the country has lost up to $27 billion over the years as a result of the bans on loans and credits by the Western world. Import substitution arising from the fear of international sanctions has cost South Africa a further R70 billion over the past 20 years (report published by the Investor Responsibility Research Centre, September 1990). According to Chris Van Wyk, chairman of Trust Bank, sanctions and disinvestments had resulted in a lowering of 12% in the standard of living of South Africans, and the loss of between 500 000 to a million potential jobs (Finansies and Tegniek:6.7.90). A related effect was the emigration of about 100 000 whites from South Africa between 1980 and 1985 alone, of which 23 000 were university graduates (although not all left because of sanctions and South Africa's isolation). Another result was the decline in the economic growth rate from 4% in the early 1980's, to 2% in 1990 and a projected 0,75% in the year 2000 (ibid). According to The Economist (20.5.89) the average South African will be 10% poorer and the economic growth rate below 3% in 1990, because of sanctions.

The implication of these statistics is obvious to most white voters, especially when contrasted against the CP's stated policy of not letting itself be blackmailed by sanctions. The reality with which increasing numbers of rightwing supporters had to deal, was that the CP's policies would lead to even harsher sanctions and greater isolation of the country than so far experienced under NP-rule.

In spite of the obvious consequences that its policies would have, the CP upheld its policy because it regarded the price which has to be paid to end sanctions, namely the 'surrender of white self-determination', as a price too high to pay. By contrasting the detrimental effects of sanctions with the alternative, namely the loss of white sovereignty, the CP believed that most white voters would prefer the former: "If the CP must choose between these two extremes viz. a black majority rule or international sanctions and boycotts, the CP will choose sanctions any day" (CP Election Pamphlet, February 1991).

In other words, the Party regarded the effects of sanctions as short-term: a sacrifice worth making for long-term peace and security for the whites (Interview, Jan Hoon:7.2.91). The CP's strategy in this regard was to spread the message that the detrimental effect of sanctions could be overcome and that sanctions could be reversed and used as a weapon:

> South Africa has survived sanctions; in fact, we have prospered because of them. When we have the money to spend, morality takes a back seat to profit (Patriot:25.1.91);
>
> The CP would regard economic sanctions against South Africa as a declaration of war and would act accordingly....We would reduce platinum exports by half....We would tell the Mugabes of Africa to behave, if not, we would close our harbours and railway lines to their exports (Patriot:7.6.91) [translations].

It also campaigned strongly against what it referred to as the "overseas investment hoax", whereby it rejected the perception that existed among whites that foreign funds would flow into the country on a large scale after a black government comes to power:

> Nobody, not even the most starry-eyed liberal, is going to invest in a country with a black government. Evidence of this is there for all to see in the rest of Africa (Patriot:11.1.91).

According to Bekker et al, the rightwing was equally firm in its stance against the effectiveness of foreign pressure as it is with regard to the morality thereof. The CP made it clear that it would not let itself be dictated to by threats of sanctions, since sanctions have not been successful anywhere "because they are contrary to the dictates of economic laws" (1989:15). In its Maitland by-election pamphlet, the CP expanded on this theme:

> Although sanctions can be instituted against a country, there are numerous methods by which businessmen can still import and export goods.... businessmen are primarily concerned with making money and as long as the product and the price is right, they will buy. (Maitland By-election Pamphlet, 1989).

To illustrate the validity of this point of view, the ineffectiveness of the oil, arms and fruit boycotts against South Africa is used as an example (to avoid distracting from its argument, the CP ignored the effectiveness of sports and cultural boycotts, the embargo on coal, steel and Kruger Rand exports, and the withdrawal of landing and over-flying rights for South African Airways in most countries of the world).

The effectiveness of sport and cultural boycotts is more difficult to determine, but the eagerness with which the local media have welcomed De Klerk's policy of rapprochement with most of the Western world, Eastern Europe and Africa, might be an indication of how starved the country has become of such contacts. According to Willie Esterhuyse of the University of Stellenbosch, the

government will be able to swing a white referendum on a new constitution in its favour if it can show the voters concrete benefits of reform, such as e.g. an international rugby tour and the lifting of sanctions (The Argus:1.11.90). This kind of comment used to be made in jest, but has lately acquired a hint of urgency when uttered by sports administrators and politicians alike. Since sport is often likened to a second religion among South African whites, there is little doubt that a not-inconsiderable number of rightwing sport fanatics might reconsider their prejudices if offered the opportunity on a regular basis to see a New Zealand rugby team or a West Indian cricket team touring the country, or a South African team participating in the Olympic Games.

Some members of the CP early on recognized the danger of the loss of support among the electorate because of the normalization of South Africa's political, cultural and sport ties:

> Mr. De Klerk's foreign and domestic partners would ensure that the CP's image is damaged by allowing an All Black and British Lion rugby tours, an Australian cricket tour, a mini-Olympic Games and by allowing billions of dollars to flow into the country, so that even 'Mrs CP' would feel the difference in her purse (CP-MP, J.H. van der Merwe, author of the 'Koos' Document, 1990:25).

The CP's sensitivity on this issue was noticeable from the barrage of negative and critical comments in response to any breakthrough that has been achieved at these levels. For example, in response to SAA obtaining flying and landing rights over Africa and particularly in Egypt, Patriot, trying to down-play the significance, commented as follows:

> Egypt is a poor, backward country. It survives to a large degree on foreign aid. There is little foreign investment, much corruption and latent political instability. By abolishing apartheid South Africa may have made an impression on Egypt, but there is little more to gain for us than just a few pats on the back

> and, more probably, request for aid from the ancient land (5.7.91).

The attempts of South African sporting bodies to emerge from decades of almost complete isolation received the same contempt:

> South African sportsmen have really only themselves to blame for allowing themselves to be caught in the net of so-called international acceptance, and allowing themselves to be tricked into surrendering their country to appease the likes of Sam Ramsamy and his ilk (ibid).
>
> Seen against the background of our people's total loss of freedom, it [S.A.'s readmission to the International Olympic Committee] is no breakthrough, but an admission of the government's willingness to accede to black rule (Treurnicht, quoted by Die Burger:11.7.91) [translation].

Patriot (14.6.91) negatively commented on visits to African states by members of the government:

> The state has now been reached where SA's State President is literally inveigled into visiting tinpot dictatorships on the African continent to shore up his credibility with the remaining white voters who support the NP [translation].

B. Domestic economic costs of apartheid:consumer boycotts

The significance of consumer boycotts was that white racists had to put a price on their desire for racial exclusivity. For many of the shop-owners who helped to vote the CP into power in towns and cities of the Transvaal and Free State in 1988, the idea of directly experiencing the costs of apartheid was a novel one. Until then, these whites had only read about the effects of sanctions, disinvestment and boycotts, but apart from having a more limited selection of consumer products to choose from, being unable to see British television programmes on TV, not having proper international sport tours, not being able to fly directly to the USA, Australia or Japan, and a few other 'minor inconvieniences', they never had to consider

the direct costs to themselves when erecting a "whites-only" sign in a park, on a beach or at a public swimming pool. Events in Boksburg and Carletonville changed all this: the re-implemenation of 'petty' apartheid by CP-controlled local authorities led to a black consumer backlash with significant implications for the CP.

The CP saw in the country-wide municipal elections of October 1988 the opportunity to counter the government's reform policies on local level. To achieve this it had to establish itself as the dominant political party on local government level, in which it succeeded, at least in the Transvaal, where it obtained the control of the majority of local authorities and received the majority of votes. The CP argued that it could use the platform of local government to resist political reform and significantly to increase its support before the next general election:

> the CP will promote its image as the protector of local communities against the government's reform and integrationist policies, particularly any deviations from the Group Areas Act (Barney Uys cited in Zille, 1988:88).

What the CP either did not realize, or if they did, refused to acknowledge, was that the socio-economic position of blacks in relation to that of whites, had improved markedly over the past few years. By 1988 black consumers represented more than half the country's buying power and in Boksburg in particular, they accounted for two-thirds of retail spending, while outnumbering whites in the area by three to one (Newsweek:12.12.88).

The announcement of the Boksburg CP-controlled City Council to close its parks, halls and swimming areas to blacks, led to a boycott by black consumers of all white-owned shops in the city. The result on turnover and profit margins of white-owned businesses was devastating: Newsweek cites the example of one shop whose turnover declined from R9 000 per week to R300 per week (ibid). Retail food chain, Checkers,

reported that its branch in Boksburg had lost about 50% of its business in the five months following the start of the boycott. A local retailer, Champions Clothing, reported a 40% decline in sales, while the the overall turnover of businesses in Boksburg dropped by between 10% and 90% between December 1988 and February 1989 (Sunday Tribune:7.5.89).

The medium-term consequences were even worse: in Boksburg nine businesses and 18 shops had to close down towards the end of 1989; furniture shops' turnovers declined by 30%-40% and that of hardware stores by 20%-25%; the development of a hypermarket worth R110 million and a shopping centre worth R30 million were shelved, while approved house plans declined by 40% (Rapport:30.7.89; Finance Week:15.12.89).

Neighbouring towns such as Krugersdorp, Stilfontein, Lichtenburg and Sannieshof were not affected to the same extent, but Carletonville was hard hit: 44% of businesses suffered losses in turnover of between 70 to 100%, 61% of businesses indicated they could only last for another month under similar trading conditions. The OK Bazaars in the town saw its turnover reduced by 50% after nine weeks of boycotts (Sunday Tribune:7.5.89). In contrast, in neighbouring Fochville where the CP-controlled town council decided to maintain the status quo, the OK Bazaars branch saw an increase of 90% in its turnover (ibid).

Case study

Empirical research conducted in this regard confirmed the devastating effects of black consumer boycotts on business. Two companies were approached with the request to supply information on the sales figures for their branches located in towns which were being boycotted. Both companies were in the retail sector and specialized in clothing and shoes, primarily to the black market. Information was supplied by both companies on the condition that they remain anonymous. Asked to provide a reason for the anonymity, the managing director of one of these companies replied that the

information could be harmful to his firm's reputation and that the statistics supplied could be used by the boycotters to their advantage, should they link it up to a specific company.

Company 'A' was one of the largest clothing retailers in the country with about 850 stores. Its turnover for the financial year ending February 1990 was R988 million, up from R804 million in 1988. This represented an increase of about 23% in turnover and the company predicted further growth for the financial year ending February 1991, which indicated a normal, healthy growth pattern. Operating profit increased from R102 million to R120 million during the same period, an 18% increase. Each of the branches normally receives a target turnover figure which it would try to obtain during the course of a particular month. These figures are based on the actual monthly sales of the previous year plus the percentage growth expected, depending on current and expected economic conditions (the above statistics are relevant only insofar as they provide an idea of the general pattern of growth of the company, including individual branches).

The turnover figures obtained from company 'A' concerned five branches country-wide and reflected the percentage actual increase in turnover during selected months in 1990, compared to the projected increase in turnover for those months. The company's past history suggested that the actual sales figures almost always corresponded with, or surpassed, the projected figures, unless something went drastically wrong, e.g. a consumer boycott. In such a case the actual figures would be lower than projected or might be even lower than the corresponding figure of the previous year. If such a pattern is repeated enough times, the company would experience a decline in sales and profit, and the shareholders would suffer a cut in dividends. This however, would be unusual for most well-run companies, and the statistics in table 5.19 should be read against that background.

Table 6.19. The effect of consumer boycotts: Company 'A'

Branch	Month	% Growth/decline in sales for 1990 compared to 1989		Projected growth in sales - 1990 (percentages)
Burgersdorp	March	11,29%	(normal)	11%
	April	16,02	"	21
	May	36,49	"	33
	June	7,22	(boycott)	28
	July	-3,77	"	30
	Aug.	-36,39	"	20
Alberton	March	20,09	(normal)	11
	April	23,57	"	21
	May	25,81	"	33
	June	9,08	(boycott)	28
	July	-14,99	"	30
	Aug.	44,34	(normal)	0
Nelspruit	March	-24,85	(boycott)	11
	April	-17,65	"	21
	May	1,89	"	33
	June	10,74	"	28
	July	2,94	"	30
	Aug.	- 3,89	"	20
V/d/bijlpark	March	- 0,58	"	11
	April	1,44	"	21
	May	32,15	(normal)	33
	June	6,11	(boycott)	28
	July	-19,20	"	30
	Aug.	-62,24	"	20
Vryburg	March	-27,66	(boycott)	11
	April	40,67	(normal)	21
	May	56,13	"	33
	June	21,97	"	28
	July	10,93	(boycott)	30
	Aug.	- 0,17	"	20

The serious consequences of consumer boycotts on the turnover of these five branches are clear from this table. During months affected by such boycotts, the turnover figures were much lower than projected, and in some cases, were actually negative, i.e. a decline on the 1989-figures.

Company 'B' was much smaller than company 'A', but still had a considerable turnover of over R70 million for the financial year 1989/90, and a total of almost 200 stores countrywide. Several of the company's stores were located in towns which experienced consumer boycotts during 1990. The turnover figures for these stores indicated a strong decrease from the similar figures for the same month, one year ago before the boycotts started. These figures should be analyzed in light of the company's projected increase in turnover from R70 million in 1989 to over R100 million in 1990 and an expected 60% increase in profit after tax.

Table 6.20a. The effect of consumer boycotts:Company 'B'

Store/town	Turnover for Aug 1989 in Rand	Projected turnover for Aug 1990 in Rand	Actual turnover for Aug 1990 in Rand as result of boycotts
Marble Hall	33 108	41 400	17 853
Groblersdal	34 056	40 800	20 014
Carolina	34 671	44 000	15 657

These figures speak for themselves, but it is interesting to note how the actual sales totals were not only less than half the projected totals, but were in fact much less than the sales figures for the same month of the previous year. This was a most unusual state of affairs for a company which predicted a 30% growth in sales and was confident of achieving it.

In September 1990 the boycotts were lifted, with the result that the actual turnover figures in table 5.20b (column C) for all three stores actually surpassed not only the

figures for the same month of the previous year (column A), but also the projected turnover for Sept. 1990 (column B):

Table 6.20b. The lifting of consumer boycotts:Company 'B'

	A	B	C
	Turnover for Sept 1989	Projected turnover	Actual turnover
Marble Hall	45 141	49 000	54 454
Groblersdal	44 487	49 000	54 647
Carolina	35 617	45 000	53 008

Although these and other figures represented a clear indication of the financial implications of the CP's policies, the Party's response to what happened in Boksburg and elsewhere was one of recalcitrance. It argued that the NP and the media were presenting a false picture of the events. According to CP-town Councillor, T.J. Ferreira, the town had received a mandate from the voters and would therefore keep Boksburg white, even if sacrifices had to be made:

> I'm also a businessman but I'm prepared to make sacrifices to survive as a white community. There are a lot of hensoppers who will sell out the white man for a few rands. Not me (The Argus:1.4.89).

CP leader Andries Treurnicht admitted that the the Boksburg boycott might have had a temporarily negative effect, but insisted that when "a people's real freedom is at stake a choice has to be made" (Leadership Volume 7, 1988:8-11).

The NP saw in the aftermath of Boksburg a chance to deliver a decisive blow to the CP and according to Piet Coetzer and Sakkie Blanche of the NP (both east Rand NP-MP's), "hundreds of voters" would leave the CP because they realized the "realities" in South Africa. They claimed that the CP misjudged the purchasing power of black consumers and the strong reaction from the business sector (Vrye Weekblad:13.1.89; Rapport:3.9.89). According to the Sunday Times (5.3.89) the CP "is being hoisted with its own petard" and that the many whites who "flirted" with the

CP's policy of racial segregation during the 1988 elections, have found themselves repulsed by its application.

The general perception following the events in Boksburg and elsewhere was that the CP had overplayed its segregationist hand. During a municipal by-election in Boksburg in December 1988, a liberal candidate defeated the CP candidate by a large majority. (see also pages 358-359). It was also significant that the CP performed poorly in the 1989 general election in the East Rand constituencies where 'petty' apartheid had been reimplemented, including Boksburg. Rapport (17.9.89) also provides significant statistics in this regard: the swing away from the NP towards the CP had been least significant in several of the towns which had experimented with petty apartheid after 1988 - these include Lichtenburg (+1,8%), Carletonville (+1,1%) and Pietersburg (+0,6%) - while there actually had been a swing away from the CP in several others in this category - Vanderbijlpark (-3,4%), Potchefstroom (-5,6%) and Krugersdorp (-5,7%) (the median swing towards the CP in the Transvaal had been 3% and the highest percentage was in Pretoria West, with a 14% swing towards the CP).

Another survey conducted in Boksburg confirmed the shift away from the CP after the effects of its policies were fully realized by the town's white citizens. The survey, conducted early in 1989 by the Policy Research Unit of the American Chamber of Commerce, indicated that 54% of Boksburg's white residents were now prepared to share power at local government level with the coloured people from neighbouring Reiger Park in a racially integrated municipality (it mentioned nothing about the blacks of neighbouring Vosloorus); and that the CP-controlled Town Council had changed its mind and was now prepared to accept the opening of the central business district and amenities to all races (The Argus:5.90).

The conclusion drawn from the events in Boksburg and elsewhere, was that racial segregation was becoming too expensive to enforce, even at local government level

because of the growing power of black consumers, trade unions and better organized black resistance. However, the lessons of Boksburg and the new political realities in the country did not prevent the white residents of Nigel, Phalaborwa, Mossel Bay, Calvinia, Warrenton, Bloemhof and Villiers from voting with overwhelming majorities of up to 90% to reject the opening up of public facilities, residential areas and racially mixed Councils in their towns. These local referenda were held during the course of 1990 and were in response to the repeal of the Separate Amenities Act and other reform proposals by the government. They received the full support of the Transvaal Municipal Association which also rejected racially integrated facilities (Patriot:2.11.90).

C. The liberalization of the white political culture

Swilling's argument which suggested that there has been a shift to the Left rather than to the Right in white South African politics since 1982, has been discussed earlier in this chapter, together with its basic weaknesses. The position taken in this thesis is that the definition of the term rightwing in 1981 should not include the NP because the Party (excluding the verkramptes) at that stage had already moved away from rightwing philosophy by accepting the principle of power-sharing and rejecting various petty-apartheid measures. The conclusion is that the swing since 1981 occurred to the Right: the rightwing's support increased from about 16% of the total electorate in 1981 to 31% in 1989, and then subsequently to an estimated 36%, although this does not deny the process of liberalization which gradually transformed the attitudes (up to a point) of many whites during this period.

Surveys carried out over the past two decades confirm the liberalization of whites' perception of changes at social and political levels. Already mentioned were statistics provided by Lipton (1986:307) which indicated that whites favouring mixed sport rose from 4% in 1970 to 76% in 1978

and that those whites who would accept blacks in the same jobs as whites, increased from 38% to 62% in the same period. A survey conducted by Schlemmer and Bot in 1989 indicated a decline in the number of whites who wanted strict segregation of schools and residential areas (The Argus:16.11.89); those conducted by Market and Opinion Surveys (M&M) between 1982 and 1989, indicated that the support among whites for open residential areas has increased from 17% in 1982, to 25% in 1988, to 30% in 1989. Among Afrikaners support increased from 12% to 15% between 1982 and 1989 (The Argus:16.11.89; Rapport:8.10.89).

The findings of Hanf et al (1981:230-240) provide further confirmation of this trend. They tested the opinions of white voters between 1974 and 1977 and came to the conclusion that although the fears of whites increased during that period, ironically their political beliefs became more liberal: the percentage of whites who believed that all races should receive equal pay for equal work increased from 62% in 1974 to 72% in 1977; the percentage of whites who believed that blacks could be in charge of whites in the work place increased from 25% to 37% during this period; similarly, the percentage of whites in favour of abolishing segregation in lifts increased from 44% in 1974 to 61% in 1977, in public transport from 25% to 33%, and in residential areas from 9% to 13%.

The findings of Hofmeyer also confirmed the above-mentioned trend (Monitor, April 1990). He argued that the period 1977 to 1990, was marked by an "undeniable shift of white opinion in the direction of non-racialism", and was accompanied by changes in the structure of South African society. He cited statistics which correlated to a large extent with previously mentioned findings, e.g the support for racial integration in churches increased from 52% in 1978 to 70% in 1986, for the repeal of the Separate Amenities Act from 24% in 1978 to 48% in 1990, and for the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela from 6% in 1985 to 57% in 1990. Hofmeyer came to the following conclusion:

To judge by the research above, white South Africans

have been shifting towards a commitment to fundamental change and the pressures associated with the liberation movements have played a role in this process. However, the scales are not yet tipped decisively in favour of change. Many people remain uncertain. If the process does not deliver results, then the reaction to the nature of change represented by the CP could continue to grow in strength.

A more detailed analysis was provided by M&M between 1976 and 1984, some of which had been discussed by Hofmeyer:

Table 6.21. The liberalization of white racial attitudes

Respondents' views on the repeal of the Immorality Act:

	Oct. 1976	Oct. 1984
% in favour of repeal	36	46
% against	50	36
% not sure	13	16
% Afrikaners in favour	24	33
% English-speakers in favour	55	65
% NP supporters in favour	25	47
% PFP supporters in favour	82	85
% CP supporters in favour	n/a	4

Respondents' views on the repeal of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act:

	Oct. 1976	Oct. 1984
% in favour	31	44
% against	57	42
% not sure	12	13
% Afrikaners in favour	18	29
% English-speakers in favour	49	65
% NP supporters in favour	19	41
% PFP supporters in favour	82	84
% CP supporters in favour	n/a	7

These findings indicate that the percentage of respondents who favoured these and other reforms had increased considerably between 1976 and 1984. Also significant is the fact that the percentages of respondents who favoured the implementation of these reforms in 1984 were still relatively low, which implied that the government had gone ahead with these reforms in the subsequent years without the initial approval of about half of white voters. If one considers that all these reforms had eventually been implemented by 1989 when the CP support was 31% of the electorate, it follows that almost 20% of formerly sceptical whites have since 1984 come to accept these reforms rather than to vote for the CP. Differently put, their racial attitudes were transformed by the process of liberalization.

D. Rightwing disunity

Disunity among rightwing organizations occurred mainly at electoral level between the CP and HNP. It has cost the combined rightwing a number of seats on several occasions, but did not really effect the total rightwing number of votes. Although attempts were made throughout the 1980's to form a unified rightwing, these were only partially successful, e.g. the agreement which led to the HNP winning its only seat ever, in Sasolburg. The reasons why attempts to amalgamate the two Parties failed on the whole, are to be found in the following:

> the first was the HNP's unrealistic visions of grandeur, based solely on the fact that it existed long before the CP, and on the 190 000 votes it received during the 1981 general election - the HNP insisted on a 50-50 division of winnable seats between the two Parties;

> secondly, on policy differences e.g. the HNP's position on the primacy of the Afrikaans language and its Afrikaner-orientated quasi-socialist economic policy, referred to as Volkskapitalisme (Bekker et al, 1989:25);

> thirdly, because of personality differences between the

two leaders, Andries Treurnicht and Jaap Marais, the origins of which were found in the events surrounding the HNP split from the NP in 1969 (see chapter two).

Shortly after the CP's breakaway from the NP in 1982, M&M conducted a survey on the support which the two Parties could expect if they amalgamated. It indicated that support for the CP was 12,9% and for the HNP 2,1%, i.e. a combined total of 15%. In a hypothetical situation where there was just a single, amalgamated rightwing party, support for it would have been 14,2%, i.e. 0,8% less than the two Parties separately. The survey indicated that 88% of Afrikaans-speaking CP supporters and 96% HNP Afrikaner supporters would support an amalgamated party. Less than one percent of NP Afrikaner supporters would switch allegiance to such a united party. This survey concluded that unity was not a major divisive issue among the voters, as the prospects of unity hardly affected the rightwing vote.

The inability of the two Parties to reach an agreement, led the CP to 'go it alone' during the 1987 general election in an effort to destroy the HNP as an electoral force. This decision cost the CP dearly in terms of seats, as the Party failed to win in eight constituencies because of the HNP's intervention. However, the CP received seven times more votes than the HNP, and established itself as the dominant rightwing Party (538 640 votes v. 67 561). In spite of unifying efforts by the AWB, the two Parties drifted further apart, and in the 1989 general election the HNP support declined to 5 501 votes. Although the results spelled the end of the HNP as a party of any significance, it managed to lash out one final time at the CP, causing a tied result in Fauresmith in the Free State (the NP later received the seat after a recount).

Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with the growth of the rightwing electoral support during the 1980's and early 1990's.

It was suggested that the level of its support was influenced by various internal and external factors, of which the gradual dismantling of racial segregation was the most important. While the rightwing increased its support from about 16% in 1981 to almost 30% in 1987, its growth in terms of votes then temporarily slowed down and it increased only by 1% in the 1989 general election. Many analysts predicted a ceiling on rightwing support at about one-third of the white electorate after these two elections. However, this line of argument ignored the possibility of the much accelerated pace of reform during the next two years as the NP accelerated its shift to a multiethnic centrist alliance, leaving the CP as the sole proponents of Afrikaner nationalism.

The new direction of the NP under leadership of President De Klerk, completely surpassed in magnitude the sum-total of all other positive political change in South Africa since 1948, and resulted in the continued growth in rightwing support, if the results of by-elections since the end of 1989 could be used as a measure. However, various factor stands in the way of such unabated growth, including the economic and cultural costs of maintaining racial segregation, the gradual process of the liberalization of the white political culture, and the growing acceptance among whites of the irreversibility of the fundamental political change which occurred subsequent to February 1990.

The final issue that needs to be considered concerns the political relevance of a political grouping which represents only about 5% of the total South African population, and which may well be denied the opportunity to contest another general election under the present constitution. Three issues stand in the way of the right sliding into a position of total political irrelevancy:

> The first is the referendum on a new constitution to which the government has committed itself, and which needs to be approved also by a majority of whites (although the

government is becoming more ambiguous over this 'white veto'). The CP strongly believes that it could win such a referendum, especially if the implication of such a new constitution, namely a majority government, is clearly spelled out.

> The second factor concerns the question of whether the NP, in fact, did receive a mandate for its reform programme during the 1989 general election and whether it should represent the white population at the negotiation table if doubts exist over whether the Party represents the majority of whites.

> The third factor refers to the CP's growing extra-parliamentary network, which is intended to strengthen and support its parliamentary position. This network consists of local government bodies, agricultural organizations, school committees, churches, trade unions and a myriad other organizations. It is supplemented by a policy of non-violent resistance, which refers to the mass-mobilization of the volk and includes mass gatherings, strikes, boycotts, defiance campaigns and others. The network also tacitly relies on threats of active resistance (violence, sabotage, terrorism or a revolution), 'if pushed too far'. The rightwing's extra-parliamentary strategies are further discussed in chapter seven of this thesis.

Having established the roots of Afrikaner nationalism, both material and non-material, as an indication of what motivates rightwing behaviour, and having looked at the strength of its parliamentary representative, the CP, the remaining issue concerns the territorial demands and direction of the rightwing. Its political options and strategies form the basis of the penultimate chapter.

7. THE TERRITORIAL DEMANDS AND POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF THE RIGHTWING

> As long as there remain constitutional methods by which the nation can regain its freedom, the CP will concentrate on a victory at the ballot box (CP General Secretary Andries Beyers, Rapport:8.4.90) [translation].
>
> This gives us no other choice but to get ready for a war which was started by Mr De Klerk against his own people (Piet Rudolf, Cape Times:12.8.91).

This chapter should be analysed in the light of the conclusions reached in previous chapters, especially chapter five, which dealt with the status and identity of Afrikaners and whites in general, as perceived by the rightwing. According to Horowitz (1985:228), understanding the position of a group in the above terms, make it possible to forecast the political demands of that group. These demands could constitute attempts by a group to transform a state into an ethnically homogeneous unit, either by expelling other groups from that state, or by withdrawing itself from the core state.

One of the objectives of Afrikaner nationalists after 1948 was to turn South Africa into a homogeneous Afrikaner and white state. The prime example of these attempts at constitutional engineering was the NP's policy of 'grand' apartheid which had a goal the unilateral removal of blacks from 'white' South Africa through the creation of homelands. The CP duplicated virtually the entire NP policy in 1982 and renamed it partition. With the exception the CP's proposal of creating coloured and Indian homelands (the NP attempted to co-opt these two racial groups within the white parliamentary structure), the two Parties had the same ultimate goal - the creation of a homogeneous white state through the removal of other races, either physically by forced removals and expulsion, or by redrawing political boundaries.

The first part of this chapter reviews with the origins and the nature of the territorial components of the rightwing's constitutional policies, including an analysis of the recent shifts in emphasis in certain of these policies. The second part deals with the strategies which were being considered and have been implemented in response to the fast-changing political circumstances initiated by the De Klerk administration over the past two years (1989 - 1991), which led to the repeal of the final pillars of apartheid in June 1991.

Since its founding in 1982 the Conservative Party has espoused parliamentary politics, believing that it stood a good chance of winning a general election at some point in the future. Such an election victory would have allowed the Party to reverse the reforms of the PW Botha era and to implement the CP's version of the Verwoerdian policy of 'grand apartheid', namely partition. As discussed in chapter six, the CP's electoral ambitions were strengthened after it became the Official Opposition in 1987, and in the light of the perceived swing towards the Party as evident from by-elections subsequent to the 1989 general election.

However, the CP's hopes of achieving power through constitutional means received a serious blow in 1990 when the government suggested that it did not forsee the country's having another general election under the Tricameral Constitution. The implication was that the CP would never again have an opportunity to contest a general election under the present electoral circumstances, since the next scheduled general election in 1995 would be held under a new non-racial constitution with universal franchise and a single non-racial voters roll, if negotiations could be concluded successfully and timeously. Under such a democratic scenario the CP, based on current estimates, could hope for a maximum of about one million (or 5%) of the votes, if the electoral system was based on proportional representation.

Apart from a reliance on a total collapse of the negotiation process between the NP and the ANC, the

remainder of the CP's political strategy was based on a promise made by the NP that it would test white support for a new constitution by way of a referendum, which it believed would be rejected by the majority of whites. This did not mean that the CP at any stage relinquished its attempts to force the government to call a general election. In fact, the party intensified its campaign of putting pressure on the government by using the results of by-elections to indicate that the NP had lost the support of the majority of whites and therefore lacked legitimacy, and furthermore, that it had acted contrary to the mandate it had received from the electorate in the 1989 election. According to CP-MP, Koos van der Merwe, the CP would sooner or later expose the NP's vulnerability on these scores and would make the pressure to call an election "unbearable" (Monitor:August 1990).

These political developments, unforeseen before February 1990, forced the rightwing, and in particular the CP, carefully to reconsider its political future as the country entered the 1990's. Existing policies began to look outdated, new options had to be considered and different strategies implemented. The political strategies from which the rightwing had to choose were:

> Firstly, to continue the constitutional efforts of the CP to win power through the ballot box, while relying on the cumulative effects of the by-election swings towards the right and forms of nonviolent resistance, to exert sufficient pressure on the government to help bring about a general election;

> Secondly, the option of active resistance against reform, either by way of an orchestrated campaign of terrorism, an armed insurrection, a coup d'etat or a violent secession;

> Thirdly, to consider the option of participating in the process of multi-party negotiations (an option unthinkable even to the NP until February 1990). This would necessitate a re-evaluation of the policy of partition in order to transform it into a more realistic set of proposals which would strengthen the possibility of successfully realizing

the ultimate goal of white self-determination at the negotiation table.

The period following the State President's speech of February 1990 saw the tentative beginnings of such a transformation in the CP's policy of partition, away from its Verwoerdian origins, and closer to the less ambitious secessionist proposals of Carel Boshoff and other proponents of a smaller white homeland. This process of evolution in rightwing constitutional thinking forms an integral part of this chapter, which commences with a detailed analysis of the origin and structure of the policies of racially-based constitutional policies as propagated by the various rightwing organizations.

7.1 THE TERRITORIAL DEMANDS OF THE RIGHTWING

7.1.1 PARTITION

Partition is defined by Scruton (1982:345) as the political division of a territory into autonomous sections, with or without migration of peoples resident there, in order to establish two separate governments, and similarly by Johnstone (1976:5-6) as "the division of a territory of a state into two or more geopolitical units or regions which subsequently function as separate political entities or states".

From these and other similar definitions, it can be assumed that the practical implication of partition is spatially to separate members of a heterogeneous population by the political division of their common territory. The rationale behind partition can be found, according to Deutsch (1984:134), in the quest for a reduction in collision and conflict opportunities among different groups. Du Pisanie sees the "fundamental irreconcilability" between the values and interests of such groups as the rationale, while he defines groups in this context as "ethno-cultural" or as

"distinguishable population groups", which include racial, language and religious variations.

Partition is suggested as a method of reducing friction between such groups by creating more homogeneous political units and by separating the antagonists (Horowitz, 1985:589). Compared to other methods of accommodating ethnic diversity, such as consociational democracy and federalism, partition is different insofar as it emphasizes the "territorial-spatial dimension", which, according to Du Pisanie (1983:238), largely coincides with the dividing cleavages in a "dominant bi-polar conflict".

The creation of more homogeneous political units is regarded as an important criterion by which to judge the success of partition, and would be facilitated if groups were territorially concentrated (Horowitz, 1985:589). The success of partition further depends on the issues of the political and economical viability of the partitioned units, and whether the process occurred voluntarily (Lijphart, 1985:32). Partition is often regarded as the last-resort option in a no-win situation (Slabbert and Welsh, 1979:169) and in most cases where it has been implemented, it was the only 'solution' after decades of ethnic conflict (e.g. Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Pakistan/India.

How do the various models of partition in South Africa measure up against the above-mentioned aims and requirements of sucessful partition ?

A. Homeland Partition

In South Africa today, the concept of partition is identified primarily with the policy of the Conservative Party and the HNP. However, the CP merely adopted the Verwoerdian concept of 'grand or macro apartheid' after the NP had rejected aspects of it during the 1980's, and transformed it into the official Conservative policy (e.g. by making provision for coloured and Indian homelands). The

traditional homeland partition, as the NP's former policy was referred to, implied that the whole of South Africa belonged to the whites, except for the 13% of the country that had been set aside for the various black 'nations'. The ideology behind this policy was that the country's population consisted of four 'races', but that the black 'race' consisted of a further 10 ethnic groups, each representing a nation with its own national area where its citizens could exercise their political rights.

Homeland partition had its origin in the the system of 'native reserves' which Shepstone had implemented in Natal and in a similar reserve system in the ZAR (neither the Cape nor the Free State ever had a systematic 'reserve' system). This process of territorial delimitation was followed by a phase of "the definition of land tenure in terms of racial considerations" (Du Pisanie, 1983:241-242). The latter was introduced by the Black Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, and followed by the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951 (validated in 1956), the Promotion of Black Self-government Act of 1959, the Citizenship of Black States Act of 1970 and the Constitution of Black States Act of 1971. This policy eventually led to the formation of ten black national states: Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Lebowa, KwaZulu, Qwa Qwa, Kangwane, KwaNdebele and Gazankulu. Only the first four mentioned achieved 'statehood' by being granted 'independence' by the South African government.

The policy of 'grand apartheid' was never a viable one, for the simple reason that the vast majority of people in South Africa, the blacks, who makes up 70% of the population, was allotted only 13% of the land-area, while 16% of the population, the whites, controlled the remaining 87%. Furthermore, the majority of blacks lived outside the homelands in the urban areas of South Africa, and had no intention of either moving back to these homelands, or exerting their political rights there. In addition, none of these states was ever economically viable and the 'independent' states were for the most part ruled by corrupt political/military elites, propped up by subsidies

from the South African government.

If compared to the theoretical criteria for successful partitioning provided by previously-mentioned authors, it becomes clear why homeland partition was doomed from the start. None of the requirements for successful partitioning were ever met, e.g. to make political units more homogeneous (Horowitz), or to create viable economic political units (Lijphart). In addition, the whole concept was devised and formulated by only one party, namely the Afrikaners/NP, and therefore did not occur voluntarily (Lijphart). This, together with the other fundamental weaknessess, resulted in the early demise of 'grand apartheid', and would eventually lead to the incorporation also of the four 'independent' TBVC states. (see Map 1 on next page).

B. Radical Partition

Apart from homeland partition, proposals for radical partition also attracted a great deal of attention throughout the 1970's and early 1980's. Radical partition referred to proposals which had as a goal the more equitable division of the country between black and white, as opposed to the 87%-13% proposal of homeland partition. Many of the proposals relating to radical partition were based on the plan of the former Secretary of Native Affairs, W.W.M. Eiselen, who in 1955 proposed the demarcation of an area in which black residence was to be discouraged, with the goal of maintaining the numerical dominance of "non-blacks", i.e. whites and coloureds. The Eiselen Line, as it became known, demarcated the area in the Western part of the Cape Province behind a line stretching from the Kalahari in the Northwestern Cape to an area close to, but excluding Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape (an adjustment of an earlier line which stretched from the Orange River border with Namibia, south towards the area around Mossel Bay) (Maasdorp, 1980:117-119) (see Map 2 on next page).

Map 1. South Africa and the four 'independent' homelands, 1991: the incomplete version of Verwoerdian 'grand' apartheid.



Map 2. The adjusted Eiselen Line, 1955: the area west of this Line was to be maintained as a white and coloured area.



Maasdorp suggested that partition was a feasible option, but because of its "high opportunity costs", would only be a last-resort measure. He based his suggestion for a possible partition on the adjusted Eiselen Line (a proposal by a former Secretary of Native Affairs to demarcate the south-western half of the country as an area where black residency was to be discouraged - see Map 3 on next page). Maasdorp's suggestion would divide the country into two independent states, one with a predominantly black and the other with a predominantly white and coloured population. The borders of the southern state, with the fictitious name of 'Capeland', followed the Eiselen line, but for a few exceptions, e.g.the inclusion of Port Elizabeth. In this area blacks were in the minority of most of the magisterial districts (according to the 1970 census on which Maasdorp's statistics were based). This proposed state would have comprised 47% of the total area of South Africa, 22,5% of its GDP and 16% of its population. The northern state, 'Capricornia', would have an overwhelmingly black population, 53% of the area, 78% of the GDP and 84% of the total population of South Africa. Regarding homogeneity, whites would still be in a minority in 'Capeland' in relation to coloureds, while there would have been more whites in 'Capricornia' than in 'Capeland', before any population transfer. According to Maasdorp the preconditions for such a successful partition were the following: it had to be a result of negotiation at a national convention; relocation of groups had to be voluntary; universal suffrage had to be the norm in both states; boundaries had to be determined by historical factors and economic viability; and the 'independant' homelands had to be willing to be incorporated (Maasdorp, 1980:107-133).

Other radical partitionist proposals came from Blenk and von der Ropp (1976) who suggested a division of the country into two states of similar size and location to those of Maasdorp, (the border corresponding with a line stretching from Sishen, to Bloemfontein, to Port Elizabeth) but which would differ in that Bloemfontein would be incorporated

Map 3. Radical partition: a suggestion by Gavin Maasdorp in 1980 for a possible division of South Africa into a predominantly white/coloured state (A), and a predominantly black state (B).



into the southern state. These authors suggested a large-scale transfer of population, involving mostly whites, and they emphasized the importance of the stability, viability and equality of both states, to allow partition to succeed in its primary goal of eliminating racial conflict in South Africa.

Tiryakian (1967) proposed a partitioning of the country into two states, with whites keeping the western half of the Cape, Free State and southern Transvaal, but excluding Johannesburg. His proposal also allotted Durban and the eastern Cape to the black state, and suggested the inclusion of Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Namibia in such a Southern African confederation. The SABRA proposals (1978) followed a similar pattern, but included central and southern Transvaal, as well as a corridor to Durban as part of the white state - this would have left the proposed black state with 40% of the total area, while self-governing areas for coloureds and Indians would be provided for. Both Schlemmer (1970) and Leistner (1976) identified the PWV area as the one part of South Africa which neither proposed state would be prepared to surrender, and therefore suggested the creation of a multiracial state in its case.

Most of the above-mentioned proposals, dating from 10 or 20 years back, suggested radical partition as a straightforward territorial division between the two areas where respectively the majority of blacks and the majority of whites in South Africa have settled. The majority of these proposals described partition as a practical, last-resort alternative to South Africa's racial/ethnic problems. As in the case of homeland partition, radical partition proposals do not really satisfy the requirements for successful partitioning mentioned earlier, namely viability, fairness, and practicality, and will therefore always remain a last-resort option.

The concept of radical partition as a last-resort option to a situation of anarchy, was mentioned again in recent times

by Giliomee as one of the possible scenarios for a future South Africa (The Argus:6.4.91). He drew an analogy between the downfall of the pied noirs of Algeria and a full-scale black-white civil war in South Africa, and came to the conclusion that "wide-spread racial strife, vigilante attacks on suburbs and townships and perhaps a large-scale white massacre" could lead to mass population shifts and eventually, partition. Giliomee predicted that the line of such a partition could follow the pattern of white settlement before the Great Trek, i.e. the area west of an imaginary line stretching from Upington to Port Elizabeth. The chances of such an outcome would be strengthened if the settlement reached between the NP government and the black opposition was based on federal principles and resulted in two or three federal units being formed in the western region in which whites and coloureds were in the majority (ibid).

However, apart from the fact that all of the major black political organizations, excluding the Inkatha Freedom Party, insist on a unitary state and reject any form of partition or even federalism, the broad definition of the term "whites" as one of the components of successful partition, has also become outdated during the 1980's and early-1990's. The significant shift to the left by the NP has greatly reduced the percentage of whites who might consider radical partition as a solution. This was proved during the 1989 general election when almost 70% of white voters supported the two parties who either proposed power-sharing or the transfer of power to a democratically-elected majority, within an undivided (if not unitary) state. The approximately 31% of white voters who rejected power-sharing, did not necessarily espouse radical partition, or even secession - they voted for the Conservative Party's policy of partition, which, at the time, implied a return to traditional 'grand apartheid', on the basis of the 87% white ownership of South Africa.

C. The Conservative Party's Policy of Partition

The CP's policy of partition, in its purest form, implied a return to Verwoerdian homeland apartheid, and to a situation where the white minority would decide on behalf of the majority in South Africa how this policy would be implemented. However, fast-changing demographic, socio-economic circumstances (black urbanization and economic integration), as well as political factors, gradually also made rational elements within the CP realize the impracticality of implementing such a policy, just as the NP had realized when it tried a similar approach. This realization has led to the gradual evolution of the philosophy underpinning the partition proposals of the CP, causing a shift in emphasis away from a traditional interpretation of partition, towards a policy more oriented towards 'self-determination' and less ambitious territorial claims by 1990-91.

Two practical implications of this shift are relevant: the first is that the CP began to accept that it would have to be satisfied with a much smaller portion of 'white' South Africa, i.e. a partial reversal of the former 87%- 13% division. Secondly, the CP's recognition that it was no longer able to prescribe how the rest of South Africa should be divided (the 'rest' referring to the area remaining after the rightwing whites have claimed their smaller portion of the country). The realization that the CP might never have the opportunity to implement its policy, i.e. as an elected government, gave rise also to a change in the strategies considered by the Party and other rightwing elements which is discussed in the second part of this chapter.

The policy of partition is based on the "right to self-determination of every nation in South Africa, in

particular the Afrikaner and all those who identify with the Afrikaner's struggle for freedom". The 'white homeland' would consist of all land occupied by whites after the borders of black homelands have been consolidated in line with the 1936 Land Act, and in this territory blacks would have no political rights. This version of partition differed from the Verwoerdian homeland partition in so far as it made provision for coloured and Indian territorial autonomy, as well as for the 'coupling' of urban blacks with independent homelands by way of "city states" (Bekker et al, 1989:18; Sunday Times:3.9.89; Rapport:18.3.90; Vrye Weekblad:7.9.90).

For detail on the size and location of the proposed territory, see Map 4 on the next page). ------>>

Map 4. Verwoerdian partition - the CP's proposals, 1989: including the whole of South Africa minus the black homelands and with coloured and Indian homelands to be created (the unshaded area).



The CP explained its policy during the 1989 general election campaign as follows: all 'nations' would govern themselves in their own 'fatherlands', where every such nation can fulfil its desire for self-determination - there is enough land in South Africa which could be divided among the various nations, of which the ten black nations are already in possession of a 'fatherland' each; also the coloureds and Indians are in possession of land and the Houses of Delegates and Representatives in Parliament should become Parliaments of their own to enable them to rule over their own people in their own territories; everything possible would be done to develop black homelands to assist them to accommodate as many blacks as possible, and measures would be taken to facilitate the process of getting blacks to move back to their homelands and to discourage them from coming to white South Africa e.g. by not subsidizing black transport, housing and other services inside white South Africa and by encouraging decentralization to border industries; influx control would be reinstated and strictly applied and black urbanization would be limited to black homelands or bordering areas; blacks within 'white' South Africa could participate in local black government, which would be organized on an ethnic basis and would be coupled to the governments of black homelands; only whites could be citizens of white South Africa and blacks would have to exercise their political rights inside their own states, irrespective of where they lived; no blacks could possess land within 'white' South Africa (CP Election News, July 1989).

According to the CP, partition could succeed because most blacks already live inside or close to their homelands. As supporting evidence the Party cited the study carried out in 1976 by Nel and Venter of the University of the Orange Free State, which claimed that black settlement in South Africa followed a specific pattern: 51% of all Zulu lived inside their homeland and 76% lived either inside or in surrounding areas of their homeland; the figures for the Xhosa were 55% and 68% and for the Tswana 36% and 70%. Of

the total number of blacks, 33% lived inside their own homelands in 1951, but the figure increased to 37% in 1960 and to 52% in 1978, according to Nel and Venter. From these figures the CP concluded that the majority of blacks preferred their own homelands because they either lived inside or very near to these, and that the Party's policy of partition was therefore not only viable, but morally tenable because it promoted "true nationalism which brings out the best and most attractive characteristics in each nation" (CP Election News, July 1989).

In making these claims the CP appeared to be on shaky ground, since the figures provided by the authors cited were totally outdated by the end of the 1980's, and since 1990 estimates placed the number of blacks who lived outside homelands at 18 million out of a total black population of 27 million, i.e. 66% (Die Burger:12.9.90). The number of blacks who lived inside homelands by 1990 (9 million or 33%), differs greatly from the figure of 52% suggested by these authors in 1978. The discrepancy could be ascribed to demographic changes in the black population, which in turn led to the new socio-economic and political realities in South Africa.

The above-mentioned demographic developments made the NP realize during the late 1970's that Verwoerdian 'grand apartheid' was not possible and that the expected flow of urban blacks back to the homelands would never become a reality. The NP adapted its policy accordingly: firstly, by rejecting as a myth Verwoerd's estimate of 1978 as the year in which the flow of blacks to 'white' urban areas would reverse; secondly, by recognizing the permanence of urban blacks (as had been recommended in the Riekert Report of the Commision of Inquiry into Legislation affecting the Utilization of Manpower, 1979); thirdly, by accepting in principle in 1986 that South Africa was an indivisible entity and by rejecting the ideology of territorial separation of races in 1990; fourthly, by repealing all laws in 1991 which prevented people on racial grounds from occupying land.

The CP was of the opinion that the NP's failure to implement "meaningful partition" was the cause of the failure of homeland partition (Zille, 1988:71). However, by 1990 it became obvious to elements within the CP that it was impractical and absurd to propagate a policy which aimed at turning back the clock 20 years. During 1990 several references to changing policies were made by the CP inside and outside of Parliament, while at the same time a clear indication of the existence of two ideological camps within the Party became noticeable.

In May 1990 Andries Treuricht said in Parliament that "We are no longer prepared to...prescribe to black peoples what they should do [to organize themselves constitutionaly]" (Hansard:11.5.1990). This theme was repeated at the CP Congress in October 1990, presumably under the influence of its more pragmatic wing, which indicated a shift in emphasis on various other aspects of its traditional partition policy. The notion that whites should be able to lay claim to their own territory without being prescriptive to other groups, suggested a considerable shift away from the '13-nation-states' policy as prescribed by Verwoerdian guidelines. It implied that partition did not necessarily have to be applied to the remaining part of 'black' South Africa to ensure the formation of a white state. This deviation was also noticeable in the CP's revised set of policy guidelines, in which the term "Republic of South Africa", which referred to the Party's name for a white South African state, was replaced with the term "our fatherland"; furthermore, references to the creation of Indian, coloured and new or consolidated black homelands were also dropped, although the amended policy document stated that the Party still believed that black interests would best be served by separate geographic areas (The Argus:18.10.90; Interview, Corne' Mulder:11.2.91).

By late-1990 the "rejection" of prescriptive policies appeared to have been a victory for the pragmatic faction within the CP and for their proposals of a smaller white homeland, albeit with unspecified borders (The Argus:18.10.90; Cape Times:18.10.90). Although it did not always seem

apparent from his comments, a leading member of this group was CP-MP Koos van der Merwe, who strongly advocated the pragmatic approach:

> While the CP's policy in the past had placed much emphasis on a separate state for each black nation, the scope of reference today has narrowed to solely the white nation, leaving the black nations to decide for themselves on the issue of a unitary state (Vrye Weekblad:14.9.90) [translation].

Although Van der Merwe merely echoed what Treurnicht said in Parliament a few months earlier, clearly not all members of the Party shared this view, as an interview with CP-MP Jan Hoon and remarks made by him during the Maitland by-election campaign in February 1991 showed. According to Hoon, the borders of the homelands had been determined by legislation long ago, while the area where coloureds and Indians were allowed to live was prescribed by the Group Areas Act. The coloured people, according to Hoon, lived mainly in 23 rural and four metropolitan areas, while 70% of the Indian population was confined to three districts of Natal. In spite of these 'clearly defined' borders which separated the various 'nations' of South Africa, Hoon refused to draw a map indicating the final borders of a CP-controlled South Africa, because the repeal of the Group Areas and Influx Control Acts "would have made any map outdated within six months" (Interview:7.2.91; CP Election Pamphlet, February 1991).

Closely related to the new-found inclination not to be prescriptive over how the rest of South Africa organized itself constitutionally, was the acceptance among a faction of the Party, that the CP would have to be satisfied with a much smaller white homeland than formerly envisaged and would have comprised 87% of South Africa. Once again, indications were that the rift over the size of white territory, which already existed between the CP and the proponents of a smaller Afrikaner or Boer state, had begun

to spread within the Party itself. This led to further conflicting declarations by its various members.

The official position was spelled out by Andries Treurnicht after the Party's national congress in October 1990, during which he said that the white state consisted of everything outside of the present black homelands, in accordance with the Land Act of 1936, although the final borders could be negotiated with their respective governments (The Argus:16.10.90; 18.10.90). This stance appears to deviate very little from previous positions, but some anonymous sources within the Party regarded it merely as a "negotiable departure point" and not as an "absolute" position (ibid). Treurnicht's hardline position was shared by the Party's deputy leader, Hartzenberg, and by MP Jan Hoon, who claimed that the borders of the white fatherland were already determined by existing legislation, namely the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 and the Group Areas Act (Interview:7.2.91).

By contrast, comments by other CP members indicated a significant discrepancy. In March 1990 Koos van der Merwe said that while the CP was not interested in a "smallholding" like Morgezon, partition should recognize the historical. logical, legal and economic realities, and the Party would therefore be prepared to negotiate over the sixe of an Afrikaner homeland (Die Burger:19.3.90) (The 'Morgenzon' to which Van der Merwe referred, is the growthpoint of the Afrikanerland envisaged by the Vereniging van Oranjewerkers, which is certainly not intended to be a smallholding - see Map 6 on page 417). Subsequently he said that certain parts of 'white' South Africa had already become racially integrated to such an extent that these areas would have to be left out of the proposed white 'fatherland', including possibly Johannesburg (Vrye Weekblad:14.9.90); The Argus:26.10.90). Although Van der Merwe did not explicitly exclude Johannesburg, both newspapers claimed that he said it by implication, which provided the NP with ammunition during the Randburg by-election in October 1990. The NP claimed

that the CP was prepared to sacrifice Randburg and Johannesburg in its bid to keep Pretoria 'white'. What Van der Merwe actually said was that the CP would be prepared to accept a smaller white South Africa, but would never give up Pretoria: "We will have to sacrifice important land, but I can't tell you which land. People will have to think for themselves" (The Argus:26.10.90).

It is interesting to note that this by-election tactic of the NP - intended to scare white voters away from the CP by implying that the CP's envisaged plan for a white homeland was going to sacrifice a particular white area (including the contested constituency) - was again used during the Ladybrand by-election in 1991. In Ladybrand, Nic Koornhof of the NP, accused the CP of wanting to "sacrifice" the whole of the Free State to achieve its goal of a smaller white homeland (Die Burger:17.5.91) (as in the case of Randburg, it did not do the NP much good).

Van der Merwe's viewpoint on the CP's possible renunciation of claims to "important parts" of South Africa, was repudiated by the Party's chief secretary, Andries Beyers, and by Treurnicht, who gave the assurance that the whole of Johannesburg and Randburg were regarded as 'white' land (Die Burger:1.11.90). Subsequently, however, Beyers himself acknowledged that the CP might be prepared to make "much greater sacrifices" with regard to territory than previously stated in public, but without specifing what he had in mind (Interview:11.4.91).

Shortly after this episode, another CP-MP, Willem Snyman, spelled out his vision for a considerably smaller Afrikaner homeland, situated in the far-northern Transvaal, with Pietersburg as its capital. According to Snyman, this area, also known as Economic Development Area 'G, was home to 200 000 whites and only 55 000 blacks, while the rest of the blacks in this area were working on white farms and were therefore only in the area subject to a labour contract with white farmers (Die Burger:20.11.90). The newspaper rejected Snyman's statistics and suggested that

only 3% of the 5 million people in this area, including the homelands, are white, in other words, a black population of 4 850 000, instead of Snyman's figure of 55 000. Snyman later explained that he merely suggested the Pietersburg area as one possible growthpoint of the white fatherland, as this was a typical rural area in which the black population was declining because of urbanization (Interview:24.7.91).

By mid-1990 there was a realization among a growing number of CP MP's and members of the Party's unofficial 'think-tank', Toekomsgesprek, that in the light of 'irreversible' political and demographic realities, only a much smaller homeland (perhaps even without complete sovereignty), would constitute a viable and realistic CP policy. This point of view was held by about one-third of the caucus which became known as the more moderate or pragmatic wing of the party. Their beliefs were summarized in a policy document entitled Strategie vir n Veranderende Situasie, October 1990 (the so-called 'Koos document'), the authors of which were Koos van der Merwe and other senior CP-MP's, in what was described as the result of a team effort. The constitutional elements contained in this document referred to the impracticality of the traditional CP policy, e.g. to clear 'white' South Africa of blacks by repatriating seven million to the homelands. The document argued that blacks have become a permanent fixture of 'white' South Africa and for this reason, the CP will have to settle for a smaller state to be created by way of "sacrificial partition" and occupation by a majority of whites (1990:37). It also suggested that if such a state consisted of various parts, it would imply less disruption as whites could remain where they are at present and not have to move to one white state (hints of Friedrich's corporate federalism?).

The 'Koos' document represented a shift towards the secessionist philosophy upon which the proposals of Robert Van Tonder and Eugene Terre'Blanche (Boerestaat), Carel Boshoff (an Afrikaner volkstaat) and the Oranjewerkers (an Afrikanerland), were based: they all had as a goal the

creation of a much smaller white state which would separate itself from the rest of South Africa (as opposed to the traditional partition policy which envisaged the forced separation of black states from the body of the remaining greater white state). Unfortunately for the moderates within the CP, the document was rejected in its entirety by the Party leadership, and Van der Merwe was discharged from his position as head of its Information committee in mid-1991. The leak of the document caused considerable embarrassment to the CP, and was an immense windfall to the NP, who sold it at R6 a copy to interested parties (the strategic implications of the Koos document are discussed in section two of this chapter).

Finally, how does the policy of partition as formulated by the CP measure up to the theoretical requirements of partition? Partition, as originally interpreted by the CP, shows all the same weaknesses as the original homeland partition, as it basically was the same policy, apart from the idea of city states and homelands for coloureds and Indians. However, the revised interpretation, namely the idea of a smaller white homeland and the decision not to be "prescriptive", alters matters considerably, as the proposals then might be regarded as more equitable and negotiable. This, however, does not address the basic requirement of "creating more homogeneous political units", nor does it imply the acquiescence of the black majority.

7.1.2 SECESSION

a) Perspectives in the Literature

Secession can be defined as the ambition of some group within a state to renounce its allegiance to that state, in order to form a sovereign state of its own (Scruton, 1982:425). According to Horowitz (1985:230) secession is a special type of ethnic conflict which is modified by its

territorial character, and exhibits many of the traits of ethnic conflict in general. His definition includes both movements which explicitly seek independence as well as those which demand a measure of regional autonomy for the area in which they reside, i.e. measures short of independence. Horowitz therefore uses the terms secession and separatism interchangeably, which corresponds also with the view taken in this thesis, namely that the term secession can be used inclusively, to incorporate both total (independence) and partial (autonomy) secession.

In his authoritative study of secession, Buchheit (1978) focuses on the link between the principle of self-determination and the right to secede. A survey of modern secessionist movements and their desire to seek to legitimize their claims by invoking the international doctrine of self-determination, forms the basis of his analysis. The desire by members of an ethnic group to be associated with fellow-ethnics and to be governed by members of that group rather than by an 'alien' government, is described by Buchheit as the "urge to parochialism" which, he claims, is deeply embedded in human psychology (see also chapter four of this thesis which deals with the rightwing psyche). Such groups are defined by their objective characteristics (religious, historic, geographic, economic, ethnologic, linguistic and racial) as well as the subjective perception by groups of themselves being distinct from their neighbours. A group's need for a sense of comfort and security which can be obtained within a parochial environment has often led groups to reject involuntary political association in favour of self-determination (Buchheit, 1978:2-11).

Buchheit evaluates such claims against the norms of positive international laws, the supposed existence of a natural right to secede, the practice of states and juristic opinion. Regarding the first of the "rights of secession", he expresses the opinion that natural law theory contains serious obstacles and imposes clear qualifications upon the notion of a natural right to

secede. These objections are based not only on the philosophic reluctance which he found in the works of Grotius, Hobbes, Locke and Vattel, but also on practical considerations, e.g. if one agrees in principle to the existence of such a natural right, there seems to be no end to the process until that right is granted to every "atomistic" group or even each individual. Secondly, he claims, such a right would lead to a conflict with the "equally fundamental rights of established states" to maintain their integrity (1978:43-137).

Dealing with the right to secede under positive international law, Buchheit provides an overview of the historic development of the concept of self-determination in international forums, from the Congress of Vienna to the League of Nations and the United Nations. Here he finds only a limited acceptance of the legitimacy of secessionist self-determination, e.g. the League's international guarantees of minority rights was a direct result of the impracticality of the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination, and of the reluctance to accept separatism as a solution to ethnic conflict. In the Charter of the United Nations two Articles refer to the "respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples", but there is no conclusive support for a right of secession within the meaning of the phrase "self-determination" (1978:43-137).

With regard to the practice of states, Buchheit lists several examples in recent times of states which were formed by way of amicable secession: these include the secession of Norway from Sweden in 1905, Senegal from Mali in 1960, Singapore from Malaysia in 1965 and Syria from United Arab Republic (Egypt) in 1961 (although if one accepts the dissolution of a federation or union as an act of secession, the emergence of Malawi, Rhodesia and Zambia from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland should also be included, among many others). On the other hand, many cases are listed which were not similarly peaceful or successful. These include the separation/attempted

separation of India and Pakistan; Pakistan and Bangladesh; Biafra from Nigeria; Katanga from the former Congo; the Kurds from Iraq and Turkey; the American South during the Civil War, Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia, the Baltic Republics from the Soviet Union, to name but a few.

In the Third World, in particular, secession has been vigorously opposed by states, and this is reflected in the Charter of the Organization for African Unity, which places high priority on territorial integrity of its members. According to Buchheit, this is representative of the trend away from secession as a political solution among many states which have found that a devolution of power to regions is an adequate safeguard against potential ehtno-regional secession (ibid) (although the recent cases of Quebec, Slovenia and Croatia, the Baltic States, Armenia, to name but a few, strongly refute this position).

With reference to the fourth method of evaluating the right to secede - namely juristic opinion - Buchheit concludes that as in the case of the previous three, such opinion is neither uniformly in favour nor uniformly in opposition to the right of secession. The consensus seems to be that no rule of international law prevents a movement from attempting to secede from the rump state, nor is there a rule which forbids the rump state to crush such an attempt. Apart from some moral outrage from certain states over the extent of violence used, the outcome will be accepted as legal in the eyes of international law (ibid).

Rothschild (1981:48-49) discusses the four basic principles underlying ethno-secession:

1. Like Buchheit and Horowitz, he shows that secession is not popular among new (post-1945) and ex-colonial states;
2. Seceding states do not necessarily have to be insignificant in size and strength compared to the rump states from which they seceded, e.g. the possible secession of Quebec, Scotland, Wales, Croatia, Ukraine and Catalonia, which could all be viable states in their own right;

3. Secessionist movements always seek to legitimate themselves by appealing to the principle of ethnic self-determination; mere economic or administrative grievances would not warrant secession;

4. Secession would not always be the preferred strategy, as the economic and institutional costs of secession could force such movements to opt for something short of independence, but possible secession always remains a potential bargaining manoeuvre (this is part of the debate on rightwing constitutional options, i.e. to demand complete sovereinty via secession, or to opt for a form of autonomy within the framework of either the ANC's proposed a unitary and undivided state, or the NP's federal/consociational state).

On the question of what determines the success or failure of secessionist movements, Horowitz (1985:231-281) argues that although secessionist movements emerge because of domestic political factors, their success is determined largely by international factors. Most secessionist movements since 1945 have received international support from various backers, and the greater this support is, the better will be the chances of the secessionist movement. He comes to the conclusion that the more heterogeneous the rump state is, the more secessionist movements will appear, and the more determined the original state will be to resist these at all costs; on the other hand, the more heterogeneous the secessionist region is, the more divided it will be once it attempts secession, which may lead to further attempts at secession.

A similar verdict comes from Scruton (1982:425), who argues that successful secession will depend on whether there is sufficient political cohesion in the seceding region for it to achieve a true political identity, and furthermore, whether it would be in the interests of either the seceding party or the rump state that this entity should be brought into being. If the intended secession is not in the

economic interests of the seceding party or if the institutional costs are too high, a secessionist movement may opt for political status that falls short of independence (Rothschild, 1981:49). The legitimacy and, therefore, international acceptance of an attempted secession would depend on the evaluation of the internal merits of the secessionist demands, compared to the justifiable concerns of the international community over such a step (political and economical disruption, violence and turmoil) (Buchheit, 1978:238-239) .

In summary it can be said that secession leading to independence, in conjunction with the right to self-determination, appears to be a concept which theoretically is accepted as a moral and a legal right, but in practice is frowned upon as a destabilizing factor to the existing world order, because it seldom occurs peacefully. For this reason, seceding regions/nations are more inclined to agree to partial secession/regional autonomy, or some other form of minority accommodation, although the events in the Baltic states and in Yugoslavia in recent months, question this assumption. This is particularly relevant to the South African situation, where there are strong claims from rightwing groups for self-determination leading to total independence, and an equally strong rejection from black liberation movements of secession, or even autonomy as found in federal and consociational systems of government.

b) Contemporary secession proposals in South Africa

In South Africa there is some uncertainty about the distinction between partition and secessionist proposals. Some analysts use the two concepts interchangeably, e.g.

Zille (1988) who regards the secessionist proposals of Carel Boshoff and the Oranjewerkers merely as variants of partition; Bekker et al (1989) who only refer to "different models of partition"; Dries van Heerden of the Sunday Times who refers to secession merely as a "novel suggestion on partition" coming from the "reasonable right" (18.3.90).

However, the argument put forward in this thesis, supported by several theorists, is that there is a distinct difference between the two concepts, and this is especially the case in the context of the South African rightwing. Partition generally is a much more complex and comprehensive process than secession, and is normally a result of negotiation, as opposed to the unilateralism of secession (Du Pisanie, 1983:237). Similarly, Scruton (1982:345, 425) defines partition as the political division of a territory into autonomous sections, while separation and secession refer to the withdrawal of a state from its politically-intact mother state (or alternatively as the aim of some group within a state to renounce allegiance to that state).

Because both concepts refer to the geopolitical division of a single state, differences between these are often therefore regarded as semantic, rather than substantive. This perception should be qualified: although the end-result is the same, namely two or more separate political units, the difference is located in the way by which these units are created. Partition therefore refers to the division of a state, normally into two or more parts, either as a result of violence or through peaceful negotiations, with or without foreign intervention (the partition of Cyprus and Palestine are classic examples). Secession on the other hand, refers to the unilateral withdrawal by an ethnic group from the mother state to create a (normally) smaller but independent new state (the classic examples being the secession of the southern states from the USA, in order to form the Confederacy; the secession of the mineral-rich Katanga from the former

Congo; the secession of Biafra from Nigeria, the attempts of the Baltic states to secede from the Soviet Union, and those of Croatia and Slovenia to secede from Yugoslavia).

In South Africa, the CP stands for the partitioning of the country into white and black parts, based on existing homeland divisions, with further consolidation to be negotiated. The key to this proposal is the desire of the Party to keep the main rump of the country white, and to remove the blacks so as to ensure homogeneity (the 87%-13% formula). The radical partition proposals of Maasdorp et al probably come closer to the real partition model, i.e. a fairer division of the country to create two more homogeneous parts. These proposals differ from the secessionist proposals of Boshoff et al insofar as the latter relinquish all claims to the rump of the country, and propose the withdrawal of whites to smaller regions, i.e. the geopolitical removal of whites from the rump of South Africa. Strictly speaking, secession refers only to Boshoff's and the Oranjewerkers' plans, but the Boerestaat proposals of the AWB and Robert van Tonder, and those of the Oranjewerkers, are also discussed below, since they have also acknowledged that Boers/Afrikaners have no legal or moral claim to the larger part of the country.

c) The Proposals for an Afrikaner Volkstaat

In a policy document published in 1985 by SABRA (of which Boshoff was then chairman), the organization called for a separate Volkstaat for Afrikaners and described it as a credible alternative to a unitary and non-racial South Africa. SABRA believed that a volk was entitled to self-determination and therefore rejected the term 'groups' which was used in the 1983 Constitution (SABRA Publication: A New Constitution for the RSA, 1985). In 1986 a statement

of intent was issued by SABRA which indicated that the organization was trying to determine the borders of an Afrikaner state and suggested as a point of departure, the 'white' parts of Transvaal, OFS and Northern Natal, the Cape Midlands, Eastern and Southern Cape, and the southern part of Namibia (SABRA: Statement of Intent, Journal for Racial Affairs, 1986).

Further indications of a new development in rightwing circles with regard to an alternative for the CP's policy of partition, came in 1987 when Boshoff insisted that the Afrikaner should not be prescriptive as far as the future of other groups is concerned, but should concentrate rather on his own right to self-determination (a point of view accepted by the CP only three years later, in 1990). According to Boshoff the reality of different 'nations' in South Africa should not be ignored, and these nations were entitled to self-determination and an own fatherland, a right which is recognized by the international community, the UN and the "big powers". He claimed that the world's refusal to accept Afrikaner domination over black South Africans and to recognize black homelands, was understandable, and that the only alternative therefore was a separate state for the Afrikaner (ibid).

In 1988 Boshoff proposed the creation of an Afrikaner Volkstaat (national state). He established an organization called Stigting Afrikanervryheid (Institute for Afrikaner Freedom) and distanced it from the mainstream rightwing ideology of the time: the foundation claimed that black majority rule was unavoidable; that white minority rule was morally unjustifiable and impossible to maintain over the long term; that the Verwoerdian concept of separate development was obsolete; and that political chaos and international intervention would be the result of the CP's obtaining power (Rapport:19.6.88; Sunday Times:19.6.88; Journal for Racial Affairs, July 1987). For these reasons, the logical and morally correct solution to the Afrikaner's fear of black domination was the secession of an Afrikaner state from the rest of South Africa, in conjunction with an

internal settlement whereby the rest of the country would have to have been transferred to black majority rule.

By 1990 these early calls for an Afrikaner state had been transformed into a definite set of principles which included:

> The fundamental right of every volk to self-determination, which in turn included several other rights;
> Cultural self-determination by itself was worthless without political self-determination;
> The Afrikaner's demand for self-determination was founded in international law;
> It included right of secession of the Afrikaner from a black-ruled South Africa;
> The right to self-determination of Afrikaners had to be presented at a negotiation table (Journal for Racial Affairs, July 1990, Vol 41, no 3).

Boshoff's plans for an Afrikaner state, as announced in 1988, envisaged a much smaller territory than that suggested earlier by SABRA, and excluded the traditional Afrikaner/Boer areas in the Transvaal and Free State.

It was located in the northwestern Cape and southern Namibia, and included regions such as the northern Karoo, Kalahari, Namaqualand, Gordonia, Swartland, and towns such as Upington, Saldanha Bay, Beaufort West, Colesburg, Graaff-Reinet and Luderitz (the latter being part of Namibia) (see Map 5 on next page). This area was economically under-developed and located mostly in semi-desert, but had some potential for economic growth because of the presence of a part of the Orange River, the three harbours of Saldanha Bay, Luderitz and Lamberts Bay, and a variety of minerals such as diamonds, copper and iron (Sunday Times:19.2.89). It also had an international airport at Upington and a railway line catering in particular for the transport of iron ore from Sishen to Saldanha. Its GDP was about R4 billion in 1989, which represented 2% of South Africa's total GDP in that year,

Map 5. Secession: the Afrikaner Volkstaat (Orania), proposed by Carel Boshoff and Stigting Afrikanervryheid, 1989 (the shaded area).



and a population of 934 000, of which 126 000 were white, 605 000 coloured and 201 000 black (Finansies & Tegniek:31.8.90). Population statistics varied, depending on the source: according to Vrye Weekblad (7.9.90) the area is populated by 250 000 people, of which about one quarter is white.

Boshoff proposed that this state would be inhabited, cultivated and developed only by Afrikaners (and assimilated whites), who would form the majority of the population after the initial migration of 250 000 Afrikaners and perhaps a further two million later on (Vrye Weekblad:7.9.90; 28.9.90; Sunday Times:19.2.89). The new state would negotiate with the present coloured inhabitants to be resettled, but it would occur on a voluntary basis and once the whites formed a large majority, there might not even be a need for population removals (Argus:26.7.90).

Boshoff defended his decision to leave out of his proposed volkstaat parts of 'white' South Africa which most rightwingers perceived to be theirs, by invoking the Verwoerdian dictum of 'rather poor and free than rich in a mixed society'. The relevant part of Verwoerd's speech, of 20 May 1959, went as follows:

> ...in the final instance I would rather accept a smaller white state in South Africa, which has control over its own police and defence force and would be the bulwark of white civilization...than a greater state which has already handed over to black domination [translation] (cited in Vrye Weekblad:28.9.90).

Boshoff, a son-in-law of Verwoerd, expanded on this theme:

> One would rather have the best and be rich, but the PWV [Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging triangle] is not compatible with a Volkstaat. There would either be a continual power struggle or domination or a combination of both (The Argus:26.7.90).

Furthermore, Boshoff believed that the proposed volkstaat would not necessarily be an economic wasteland and he used the analogy of Israel to support his claim that a nation can thrive in any geographic part of the world,

irrespective of the presence or lack of natural resources in that area, as long as it has the necessary ambition, drive and technical expertise (Interview:June 1988). He proposed to transform Saldanha Bay into the volkstaat's university town, and suggested that the town could become the "Silicon Valley" of the southern hemisphere. Upington, Springbok and Kuruman could be the bases for steel and chemical factories, as well as technikons (Cape Times:27.9.90). Moreover, research done by the Department of Water Affairs, indicated that the Orange River-Development Project, which falls within the borders of the volkstaat, provides for 260 000 hectares of irrigation land (Die Burger:19.3.90).

Boshoff's proposals were still in the preliminary stage at the beginning of 1991, but he predicted that it could become a reality within the following two years - if not, the Afrikaner "would not hesitate to take recourse in violence to achieve this objective" (Die Burger:26.11.90).

During the course of 1990-91 several rightwing supporters moved to areas within the borders of the proposed state, and about 92 families have settled so far in the Northern Cape, especially Olifantshoek - this migration of Afrikaners from various parts of the country referred to as Treks (e.g. the Meyerton Trek, the Valhalla Trek and the Tzaneen Trek) (Sunday Times:21.10.90). According to the spokesman for the Orandee Development Corporation which assists with the migration, Andre Putter, over 12 000 people have already signed a petition whereby they undertook to move to Boshoff's volkstaat (Die Burger:17.10.90). In February 1991 the Afrikaner Volkswag bought the town of Orania from the Department of Water Affairs for R1 million. The town had 90 existing houses and consisted of an area comprising 400 hectares. According to Boshoff, Orania was intended to be the basis of the volkstaat, which would only come into existence once Afrikaners physically occupied growth points such as Orania (Vrye Weekblad:15.2.91). He dismissed as 'irrelevant' the fact that the 70 coloured families who lived in the town

had to be removed elsewhere, since "we bought only the town, not the people". By March 1991 the town of Orania offered potential Afrikaner investors a timeshare holiday resort, a home for senior citizens, a farming co-operative, various businesses, a private hospital ("be nursed by your own people") and Afrikaner volkskole (Rapport:31.3.91).

Boshoff's proposals for a smaller Afrikaner state received much criticism, but also some cautious praise from sources from the left to the right of the political spectrum. Fellow rightwingers rejected Boshoff's proposals as being out of touch with the true demands of the rightwing. The CP claimed that all land at present in white hands should be part of the greater white state (as determined by its partition policy) (Rapport:19.2.89; Vrye Weekblad:24.2.89). Treurnicht himself refused to associate himself with Boshoff's comments, but said that the CP agreed with Boshoff's idea of a white fatherland (Die Burger:17.6.88). ZB du Toit of the CP's mouthpiece, Patriot, explained his Party's opposition to a smaller Afrikaner state as follows:

> Even if the boundaries of white South Africa shrink, will this save the whites? Will it satisfy the outside world? It will still be seen as an apartheid state. The ANC and the UDF will never accept it because it will be seen as the last bastion of the evil of apartheid. That is where these organizations are mistaken. They try to use a moral argument. They think that if they give the greatest part of South Africa to the blacks and pull themselves back into a small area where they try to be self-supporting, then the world will say that is allright; you have given up everything else, you can keep that little bit. But this issue has nothing to do with morality. It is a struggle for power (cited in Zille, 1988:75).

Koos van der Merwe of the CP rejected Boshoff's proposals on the grounds that the CP was not satisfied with a "smallholding" (Monitor, Aug. 1990). According to Corne Mulder, the idea of a smaller white state was not new, as even Verwoerd had held the same view. He claimed that the

CP did not differ in principle with Boshoff over the idea of a separate state, but disagreed over the size and location thereof - the major problem with Boshoff's proposals was that he had no political base or power, which prevented him from negotiating from a position of strength, which was why the CP was trying to achieve political power where it counted, i.e. in Parliament (Interview, Corne' Mulder:11.2.91).

The AWB rejected the proposals on the grounds that all the territory of the former Boer republics of the Transvaal, Free State and Vryheid belonged to the Boers (Vrye Weekblad:24.2.89). Robert van Tonder's Boerestaat Party indicated that it rejected the term 'Afrikaner' and therefore an Afrikaner state, and reaffirmed its commitment to re-establish the Boer republics, similar to the viewpoint of the AWB (ibid). Van Tonder described Boshoff's volkstaat as a desert state which would attract no Boers, and raised the issue of the coloureds living in the region, whom he regarded as 'brown Afrikaners' (Vrye Weekblad:15.2.91). Van Tonder was also concerned that the government might concede to Boshoff's demands for a sovereign state in the north-western Cape, thereby rejecting any further rightwing claims, such as those of his Boerestaat Party (ibid).

According to Gerrit Viljoen, the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, such a proposal could be taken to the negotiation table, but he suggested that the NP did not see much merit in it, even as a part of a federal unit, if it were based purely on race or ethnicity (Insig, March 1990). Another NP official agreed: "The NP understands that intellectually there may be a logic behind such proposals, but doubts whether it is practically viable" (Rapport:18.3.90) [translation]. Die Burger, scathingly rejected Boshoff's proposals:

> The result of this soul-searching is a ridiculously small white state [witmanslandjie]...in an area where nobody else wants to settle, except for the 'foolish' Afrikaners (23.2.89) [translation].

From a different ideological perspective, Aziz Pahad, a member of the ANC's National Executive, rejected the proposals on the grounds that

> the division of the country into racial groups and racially-based states is a recipe for conflict. South Africa is a modern growing society in which the diversity of cultures and religions is acknowledged, but to artificially create racially-based states would lead to political divisions. Most South Africans and whites reject partition and few would be prepared to live in separate ghettos (Vrye Weekblad:5.10.90) [translation].

However, both he and Thabo Mbeki (also on the ANC's National Executive) suggested that these proposals should be brought to the conference table (The Argus:6.10.90). Their invitation to Boshoff and other secessionists was supported by the President of the ANC, Nelson Mandela:

> We welcomed the expressed willingness of Dr Carel Boshoff and his colleagues to engage in the national dialogue about the future of our country despite our vastly differing perspectives of what that future should be (Graduation speech at UCT:30.11.90).

Other political analysts had mixed feelings over the proposals. John Kane-Berman of the Institute of Race Relations, was of the opinion that the concept of a "mini-white homeland" should form part of the constitutional negotiations, and that the political accommodation of about one million rightwing whites in such a way, would be a small price to pay if it would help to achieve a solution for the rest of the country (Rapport:18.3.90). Hennie Kotze, head of the Department of Political Studies at the University of Stellenbosch, agreed that the secession of a white homeland could help speed up the finding of a solution for the rest of South Africa, but insisted that it could only became a reality as a result of negotiations (ibid). Deon Geldenhuys of RAU also considered it as a "good idea" which could become part of negotiations, but that it was weakened by the proposed

inclusion of southern Namibia as part of the volkstaat (Vrye Weekblad:24.2.89). Fanie Cloete of the University of Witwatersrand and Marinus Wiechers of Unisa were highly sceptical and described the proposal as an example of "escapist" politics and as a "heroic last stand" that cannot work (ibid). Gavin Maasdorp of the University of Natal, whose ideas on the radical partitioning of South Africa were discussed earlier (see page 393), regarded the lack of "economic growth potential" of the proposed area, as the reason why it was not a viable option (ibid). Another earlier proponent of radical partition, Klaus von der Ropp, was more positive, regarding the proposal as a "last resort of sanctuary" for Afrikaners, which would facilitate the transition to majority rule in South Africa (Vrye Weekblad:27.10.89).

Political journalist and founder member of the DP, Harold Pakendorf drew an analogy between Boshoff's volkstaat and Taiwan and argued that it should be judged against the central theme of Afrikaner thinking, namely to survive as an Afrikaner entity:

> ...to ridicule or reject out of hand Carel Boshoff's proposal of an Afrikaner homeland is to miss out on a potentially serious contribution to a future settlement in South Africa...[a white homeland] will mean that a potentially disruptive element in the future non-racial South Africa will have a psychological backdoor....it's not necessary for all Afrikaners to move to the homeland. But it's important for all of them that there is such a homeland, a place which is their own (Sunday Times:10.7.88).

Concurring, Max du Preez, editor of Vrye Weekblad, supported the idea on the grounds that it may help to prevent a bloodbath, and it should therefore seriously be considered by both the ANC and the government (9.2.90).

Political analyst and brother of the State President, Willem de Klerk, regarded the proposal as "the tip of the iceberg", for the reason that it is the direction in which the CP's own policy will gradually move, and because many

Nationalist Afrikaners and even some English-speakers regard it as a definite back door. He argued that the philosophy behind the idea was not necessarily blind racism, but rather a fear of suppression and an urge for self-determination. He therefore pleaded for

> a greater understanding on the part of whites and blacks for this political dream....the fact remains that the politics of white secession cannot be ignored lightly. It will be forced onto the agenda (Sunday Times:10.7.88).

Finally, the idea of an "Afrikaner Bantustan" was also supported by Heribert Adam, who had rejected earlier partition proposals in 1986, on the grounds that ethnicity in South Africa could not be territorialized and that the human costs of large-scale population transfers would be too high (Adam and Moodley:1986:209). However, he regarded the idea of a white homeland as worthy of consideration, for the following reasons:

> If white racist ideologues would like to purchase their own land and work it without the use of black labour, why stop such self-imposed, isolated segregation? Whatever the outcome of the struggle, the new rulers will be saddled with a substantial number of recalcitrant elements. These are not susceptible to re-education or rehabilitation (at least in the first generation), but would be a grave danger as a fifth column in the bureaucracy. As an alternative to unfeasible repression, these elements could act out their racist fantasies in a rural 'white' area. A semi-autonomous, negotiated Afrikaner Bantustan in the Northern Transvaal or Orange Free State as a symbol of security could also facilitate the transfer of power in the main state. (Journal of International Affairs, Winter/Spring 1987).

It is interesting to note that Adam listed only the possible bureaucratic obstruction by Afrikaners as a reason to allow an Afrikaner Bantustan. The emergence of rightwing

violence and the potential for even greater violence, since he wrote the article in 1987, has since then become a much more compelling reason for considering some form of Afrikaner (rightwing) autonomy/independence.

Adam's idea of a "semi-autonomous Afrikaner Bantustan", has been taken up by two other analysts. Schlemmer agreed that a homeland for Afrikaners would provide them with the necessary security, but he suggested that it would have to be as an autonomous region as part of greater federal South Africa. Within such a federal unit Afrikaners could ensure the protection of their minority rights. He argued that it was irrelevant at this stage where it should be located, and that it was not crucial for a majority of Afrikaners to have moved there (Rapport:10.7.88). Marinus Wiechers of Unisa rejected the secession proposals as an impractical dream. He believed that such a state would have no governmental or economic infrastructure and would have to start from scratch with total dependence on South Africa. For this reason he suggested that the most rightwingers could hope for in a new South Africa, would be kultuurparke (cultural parks), a concept which refers to small Afrikaner growth points in which they can maintain some degree of autonomy for a transitional period. The purpose of such an interim compromise would be purely to accommodate initial white fears and to allow them to get used to the new dispensation (Vrye Weekblad:5.10.90). To this one can add the example of Walvis Bay, which, after the independence of Namibia, served as a kind of 'safety blanket' for Namibian whites', in case things went drastically wrong from their perspective.

It is interesting to note that a recent proposal by the executive director of SABRA, A.J. de Beer, advanced a similar view, namely that a "Federal Afrikaner Republic" could be part of greater South Africa, similar to the canton system of Switzerland. He said such a political unit could consist of several parts, e.g Pretoria and surroundings, Eastern Transvaal including Morgenzon,

Northern and Western Cape including Saldanha Bay, Bloemfontein and surrounding areas (Die Burger:29.8.90). This proposal represents quite a radical departure from all existing rightwing proposals, and seems to have been taken straight from the book by Leon Louw and Frances Kendall, South Africa: The Solution (1986) in which they propose the devolution of political power to cantons and communes, in accordance with the Swiss model. De Beer made these proposals in the quarterly journal of SABRA, of which Carel Boshoff is chairman. Boshoff, however, has given no indication to date that he would be prepared to accept anything less than complete independence for his volkstaat. The article therefore might be interpreted as an attempt by SABRA to test rightwing sentiment on this deviation from existing policy.

What are the economic implications and viability of Boshoff's proposals? According to Jan Hupkes of UNISA, the proposal, in terms of economic viability, is an "idylic dream". His view is based on the following factors: the volkstaat will have a population of about two million, of which 40% (or 800 000) will be economically active and according to Hupkes, with such a small labour force it will not be possible to create a proper economic and political infrastructure. Without schools, universities, colleges, hospitals, a communication network, including post, radio, telex and television facilities, sufficient water supplies and energy, transport and distribution systems, such a state would not be viable. Without massive foreign investment it would be very difficult to develop an infrastructure, and few investors would like to be associated with a racist economy. He compares the volkstaat's chances with that of Namibia, which is dependent on South Africa for transport, communication, a harbour in Walvis Bay, its monetary system, and receives financial aid from a friendly outside world. The volkstaat might have a hostile South Africa as a neighbour, and will probably face international sanctions. For these reasons, Hupkes regards the proposals as a recipe for economic and political suicide (Finansies & Tegniek:6.7.90).

Christo Volschenk (Finansies & Tegniek) is similarly pessimistic about the volkstaat's economic prospects. He bases his predictions on the assumption that the population of the volkstaat will initially be about 300 000 Afrikaners, which implies a labour force of 105 000 people, not large enough to keep even a small economy intact. This will also result in a very small tax basis, and because of the lack of exportable products, the state's budget cannot be supplemented by means of a trade surplus. Volschenk doubts whether there will be an inflow of capital, not only because of the above-mentioned factor, but also because there will be an international reluctance to invest in a racist state, and because of Boshoff's reluctance to allow foreign capital to reduce his proposed state's true independence (the old Afrikaner phobia of the vreemde geldmag).

In summary, the general view on the viability of the volkstaat appears to be negative, apart from that of Boshoff, who could hardly be expected to be objective. Economists paint a bleak picture of the volkstaat's economic prospects: a very small economy, depending in true third world fashion almost completely on agriculture, very few job opportunities, a labour force which may be totally over-qualified for an agriculturally-based economy, and lack of investment in the manufacturing sector (Finansies & Tegniek:31.8.90).

However, as most of the political analysts cited above, as well as the NP and ANC, have indicated, there is scope for such a proposal at the negotiation table, and Boshoff's apparent willingness to negotiate only serves to strengthen his cause. In addition, the relative modesty and realism of Boshoff's demands, together with a degree of moral and legal legitimacy as measured against internationally accepted norms for secession, might ensure that this proposal has a chance of being considered in the negotiating process, probably not as a sovereign state, but possibly as a semi-autonomous province or region.

Finally, how do Boshoff's proposals measure up to some of the principles underlying secession? Buchheit's proposition that seceding states do not necessarily have to be insignificant in size, could be reconciled with the proposed area of Orania, which covers a large geographical area, although there are major doubts about its economic viability. Unlike the CP, Boshoff attempts to locate his Volkstaat within the realm of ethnic self-determination for Afrikaners, which differs from the often-used economic, administrative or ideological grounds, which, according to Rothschild (1981:48-49), do not warrant secession. Furthermore, according to Rothschild, due to the costs of secession, ethnic groups may often demand something short of secession, such as autonomy. This is not the case with Boshoff - although the economic outlook of the Volkstaat appears bleak, he has never given the indication that he would be satisfied with anything less than complete sovereignty, although this notion has been suggested by e.g De Beer of SABRA and Cehill Pienaar of the CP.

d) Proposals of the Oranjewerkers: Afrikanerland

Apart from the activities of Stigting Afrikanervryheid and the Orandee Development Corporation, the Morgenzon project of the Vereniging of Oranjewerkers represented the only other physical attempt to establish an Afrikaner state of sorts. This organization also held the view that the Afrikaner had no moral right to the largest part of South Africa, and proposed to buy up land for exclusive Afrikaner settlement. It identified certain growth points ('heartlands') which will be developed to facilitate the creation of the future homeland. The first of these was established at Morgenzon in the Eastern Transvaal where about 30 families and followers of H.F Verwoerd, son of the former Prime Minister, have settled. According to Verwoerd these growth points will be expanded eventually to include

large parts of the north-eastern Free State, the Mossel Bay area and of the eastern Transvaal, a total of 25% of South Africa's territory. The organization received financial support from the Genootskap van Oranje-Sakekringe and has about 2 500 members (The Argus:6.8.88; Zille, 1988:75; Bekker et al, 1989:42) (see also chapter two and Map 6 on next page for greater detail).

Verwoerd suggested that blacks would have to be expelled by force from the heartlands, if necessary. Members of the organization who settled in Morgenzon refused to serve blacks in shops, and were consequently exposed to black consumer boycotts. These boycotts, together with the hostility they received from other whites in Morgenzon, and the fact that neither big industries nor large numbers of Afrikaners settled in the town, indicated that there was little hope for success for the Oranjewerkers' plans. However, Verwoerd insisted that his followers were prepared to make short-term sacrifices to enjoy long-term freedom (Natal Mercury:25.5.90). It would appear that the 'sacrifices' required were too great, for in 1991 the Oranjewerkers indicated that they were planning to change the name of the organization and move its headquarters back to Pretoria. This was in response to Verwoerd resigning from the organization because of 'irreversible political realities' (Rapport:4.8.91).

e) The Proposals for a Boerestaat

By 1990 several organizations were subscribing to the creation of an independent state for Boers: of these, the most important were the AWB and the Boerestaat Party. Others included Andrew Ford's Boere Weerstandsbeweging, Piet Cloete's Transvaal Separatists and the Boere Vryheidsbeweging led by Jan Groenewald. The proposed area of this state would include the whole of the Transvaal, Orange Free State and northern Natal, with the exception of the self-governing and 'independent' black states. The northern Natal region was formerly the Republic of Vryheid, and includes the coastal areas around Richards Bay, Kosi

Map 6. Secession: the Morgenzon proposals for an Afrikanerland, proposed by the Vereniging van Oranjewerkers, 1990 (shaded area).



Bay and St. Lucia (ibid).

The philosophy behind these proposals was that the former Boer republics were deprived of their internationally acknowledged independence by the British after the Anglo-Boer War, and that the descendants of these Boers were legally entitled to the the reconstitution of these republics (Zille, 1988:73; Vrye Weekblad:21.9.90). It further suggested that the issue should be approached not from a racial point of view, but rather from the perspective of nationalism, according to which South Africa's problems would be solved by giving each of the competing nationalist forces its own territories. On this principle the Boers were entitled to the land in the northern provinces by right of occupation, as these areas were previously unoccupied (Kemp, 1990:106).

Although the Boerestaat proposals are regarded as secessionist because they imply the separation of the 'Boer' areas from the rest of South Africa, some of them also subscribe to the Verwoerdian belief that the rest of South Africa should be divided into enlarged independent homelands such as KwaZulu, Transkei, Ciskei, Hexania (the Cape), Bophutatswana, Lebowa and Venda. These boundaries differ from those of the CP's partitionist proposal only insofar as the Boerestaat excluded the Cape and Natal, but were otherwise just as prescriptive as the partition policy of the CP. For example, Van Tonder argued that South Africa consisted of 15 different nations and therefore had to create 15 countries for these nations (Interview:10.4.91). His proposed Boer state differed slightly from the other two as it included the "rebel areas" of the Anglo-Boer War in the northern and eastern Cape.

The term 'Boer' is defined by these organizations as representing the Afrikaners who moved to the northern part of the country with the Great Trek, founded the former Boer Republics, and fought in the Anglo-Boer War. It excluded the Afrikaners in the Cape and Natal, referred to as the "Cape Dutch" and "Afrikaner liberals" (Interview, Van Tonder:10.4.91). The Boer nation developed its own culture,

history, language and was a separate race, and Van Tonder claimed that the language and way of thinking of Afrikaans-speaking whites in the Cape was different to those of the Boers in the northern provinces. He predicted that a Boer nation would eventually consist of a population of about three million and would incorporate many French-, German-, Dutch-, and Portugese speakers. The position of English-speakers was ambiguous, but Terre'Blanche seemed to have left the door open for this group in his definition, on the condition that they assimilate the Afrikaans culture and support the concept of an independent Afrikaner state" - later he added the condition of Christianity, which excluded Jews by implication (Kemp, 1990:111).

Van Tonder was convinced that the majority of the security forces would support his proposals and that the Boerestaat would come into being by way of a "UDI" (ibid). Like Boshoff, but with much greater conviction, he claims that the Boerestaat would have the potential to become the economic heart of Southern Africa - this is hardly surprising as this area contains more than half the industry and almost all the mineral resources of South Africa. Political analyst Wim Booyse regards the Boerestaat as much more viable and realistic than the CP's partition policy and Boshoff's proposal of an Afrikaner Volkstaat (Vrye Weekblad:21.9.90). Booyse may be correct regarding the Boerestaat's viability (and perhaps even the historic base), but these proposals are utterly unrealistic in present-day political realities - it can hardly be expected of any South African government to sacrifice an area which is the driving force behind the country's economy and contains almost half its black population.

The proposals of the AWB (see Map 7 on next page) were originally intended to include the whole country, except the homelands and a coloured state in the western Cape, but Terre'Blanche firmly rejected an Indian homeland, as Indians were "not white, not Christian and had a different culture, tradition and language and...would be lucky to

Map 7. Proposals for a Boerestaat: the AWB and the Boerestaat Party, 1990 (shaded area).



remain in South Africa" (Kemp, 1990:104). Only in 1985, under the influence of Robert van Tonder, did the AWB transform its policy to that of one calling for the restoration of the Boer Republics.

The proposals of the HNP

The HNP's proposals are not secessionist and are therefore merely mentioned here as an addendum. Although the Party is involved with the ABW and the Boerestaat Party in an attempt to form a rightwing front, its constitutional policy is similar to the partition policy of the CP, i.e. the 87-13% model. However, the HNP does not envisage an Indian homeland and proposes that all Indians should be repatriated to India (Interview, H. van de Graaff, news editor of Die Afrikaner, 19.7.91).

Conclusion

The constitutional concepts of partition and secession are at the core of the rightwing's demand to self-determination and its belief that a separate state is the only way in which to safeguard the interests and status of the whites and Afrikaners in South Africa. It confirms Horowitz's thesis that an ethnic group would try to achieve homogeneity in the territory which it shares with other groups, as a way to prevent itself from being dominated, especially if that group constitutes a minority.

Although the reasons for secession are varied, it often pertains to economic as well as political issues: in many cases groups would attempt secession to escape economic domination or because they refuse to continue to subsidise poorer or dominant groups. However, in other cases

secession requires economic sacrifices by the group which is seceding, and then the reason might be found in issues relating to group identity and status. When these are threatened, the group experiences insecurity over its survival prospects and develops a fear of domination, in which case economic penalties tend to be ignored. This could explain the seemingly irrational decisions taken by the Volkstaters on matters such as the location of the proposed Volkstaat, its labour policies, attitude to foreign capital etc.

Although there is a divergence of opinion among the various rightwing organizations on how to achieve homogeneity and where the 'fatherland' should be, the basic principles remained the same for all rightwing groups: territorial separation between races and ethnic groups. Although the emphasis shifted, in the case of the CP, from a 'grand' design for all 'groups', to the interests of primarily the whites and Afrikaners, the overriding principle was the right to self-determination guaranteed by a separate geographical area.

From the views of various analysts and politicians outside of the rightwing perspective, it would appear that any form of geopolitical separation based on race would be frowned upon, although considerable empathy exists for the relatively modest, ethnically-based proposals of the Boshoff group. If the CP wants to have any say in the determination of its followers' future, the Party would have to transform its grand apartheid racially-based policy into one similar to Boshoff's, as nothing else would seem to have even the remotest chance of reaching the negotiating table, irrespective of how 'convincingly' the Party refers the 'universal' principle of self-determination.

From the statements of the major participants at Codesa, it appears that the rightwing, if it could formulate its

white, self-determination. In contrast, the CP's hardline faction under leadership of Ferdi Hartzenberg, argues that the size of the white homeland has already been determined by the grand apartheid policy of Verwoerd, and refuses to negotiate or deviate from this position. The intractibility of the latter's position could be seen as an embracement of the third strategy, namely to defend its position with all means at its disposal, including violence.

These strategies are discussed in full in the second part of this chapter.

7.2 THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF THE RIGHTWING: THE PERIOD 1989-91

> We may take it that President De Klerk will do anything in his power to prevent [another whites-only election] by having a new non-racial power-sharing constitution in place before five years have passed and the next general election is due, even if it is only a transitional arrangement. So the parliamentary game is up for the CP, it seems, unless they can blackmail the NP government into playing the game by the old rules just one more time - Gerald Shaw in the Cape Times (9.2.90).

In order to move closer to achieving its objectives of self-determination through the implementation of partition or secession, the rightwing had to decide among a number of strategies, such as negotiation, passive resistance and violence. From 1990 onwards the credibility of the CP's parliamentary strategy increasingly came under fire from elements within and outside of the Party. This was a direct result of the fast changing political environment in South Africa after February 1990, and it forced the rightwing, in particular the CP, to review its existing strategy to enable the Party adequately to respond to the challenge of fundamental reform. The repeated statements by the government to the effect that there would not be another whites-only general election in South Africa, threw the CP's parliamentary strategy into disarray, and forced the Party to widen the scope of its whole counter-reform strategy. In response it increased its activities outside of Parliament, which became a characteristic of the Party's activities during the period which followed the political developments of early 1990. In deciding which of the three strategies should be followed, the CP had to consider the following:

Firstly, if it accepted that the process which was leading to a majority government in South Africa, was in fact irreversible, participation in constitutional negotiations was the only remaining option. Rightwing

participation at this level would then have had as its goal the recognition of the claim by rightwing whites to self-determination. The option of negotiations with "recognized and democratically-elected black leaders" (referring to the array of co-opted and undemocratic homeland administrations and selected church leaders) had long been part of the CP's policy, as was the case with the NP until February 1990. But for negotiations to have been politically worthwhile, it would have had to include talks with the ANC and other groups regarded as radical by the Right. The strategy of negotiation became the subject of intense debate within the CP during 1990-91. It gradually gained acceptance among a section of the Caucus, but had not become official Party policy towards the end of 1991.

The second strategy concerned the use of nonviolent methods. These refer to all those forms of extra-parliamentary activities which had as a goal the mobilization of rightwing opposition to reform, including civil disobedience, but excluding rebellion, subversion or other explicit forms of violence. This strategy was mainly identified with the CP, and was meant, not only actively to resist reforms at all levels of society, but also to increase the pressure on the government to call an election or referendum. When the NP anounced in 1990 that there would not be another general election for the Tricameral Parliament, new nonviolent measures were implemented in various spheres, in addition to those which formed part of the CP's general mobilization against the government's.

The CP countered the NP slogan that "the process of reform was irreversible", with its own version of the same slogan: "nothing is irreversible, except for NP rule". This became the guideline for renewed attempts to counter the reform process and to force the NP to the polls, and took the form of threatened strikes by rightwing workers, organizing mass protests, and resisting reform at the level of local government, education, and agriculture. It also included the disruption of NP meetings at constituency level, the

proposed creation of a proper rightwing newspaper and the gathering of one-million signatures to prove support for the rightwing cause. It should be added, however, that several violent confrontations between the police and rightwingers when the latter disrupted NP meetings or organised mass protests, had neccesitated a a broader interpretation of the term 'nonviolent', than for example, Gandhi's usage of passive resistance/civil disobedience. However, for the purposes of this study, 'nonviolent' opposition includes all those rightwing activities which are not targeted against property and persons and which do not have the intention to cause destruction or injury.

The third strategy which came under consideration and had in effect already been implemented by certain rightwing elements, was that of active resistance/violence. Such acts of political violence is defined by Gurr and Duvall (1976:141) as "deliberate and unambigious attacks against the state, its agents, or specific policies". However, since the use of political violence by elements in the rightwing not only targeted the state (threats of terrorism, a rebellion, revolution or a coup d'etat), but was also aimed at the eliminition of hostile white and black targets, the following definition by Gurr (1970:3-4) might be more suitable to a definition of the rightwing threat:

> Political violence refers to all collective attacks within a political community against the poltical regime, its actors - including competing groups as well as incumbents - or its policies.

These three strategies are next discussed in greater detail.

7.2.1 NEGOTIATIONS

The official stance of the CP, as it was during late-1990, was summarized by CP-MP Corne' Mulder as follows:

> It is naive to believe that the proposed negotiations would provide the ideal opportunity for all parties to

> present their constitutional proposals to a non-prejudiced audience. The reason being that there will not be a neutral judge, and secondly, that one cannot expect political opponents to come to the negotiating table without a set of definite bargaining points which they are prepared and able to implement. Thirdly, conflict in South Africa has not yet reached the point where the various parties would rather try to reach a compromise because they believe there is no other option (Patriot:16.11.90) [translation].

Mulder had doubts as to whether the political antagonists in South Africa really were prepared to negotiate, and whether they were ready to compromise on their ultimate goals. He further explained that the CP had no objection in principle to negotiations, and that negotiations had always been a part of the Afrikaner history, e.g. negotiations between Piet Retief and Dingane and between Paul Kruger and Britain, although in neither of these cases did it result in any benefits for the Afrikaner (Interview:11.2.91).

However, certain issues were not negotiable and would never form part of any negotiations, according to Mulder:

> The CP will never negotiate over certain fundamental values, rights and freedoms which it embraces, and the CP is therefore not prepared to negotiate over the right to self-determination of the Afrikaner or the surrender and capitulation of whites (Patriot:16.11.90) [translation].

With regard to possible negotiating partners, Mulder stated that the CP was not prepared to negotiate with the ANC or any other "terrorist/communist organization which committed violence, but it would be prepared to negotiate with democratically-elected leaders of black communities" (ibid). Sharing his view was another CP-MP, Jan Hoon, who claimed that he would not remain a member of the CP if the Party did eventually decide to enter all-party negotiations (Interview:7.2.91).

In spite of the official policy of the CP not to get involved in the proposed multi-party negotiations, a subtle shift away from this hardline stance seems to have taken place within the Party during the last few months of 1990 and early in 1991. The shift became noticeable after heightened pressure on the Party to adapt to the new political realities, not only from some of its own members, but also from the ANC and the NP. The ANC, in the person of Thabo Mbeki, among others, indicated that the rightwing would be welcome to bring its proposals to the negotiating table. Mbeki said the ANC would be willing to discuss rightwing fears about the future and that all proposals which might help to dispel such fears would be considered (The Argus:6.10.90).

Also the NP has repeatedly invited the CP to join the negotiation process, e.g. President De Klerk on SABC TV (17.2.91) and Minister Gerrit Viljoen in Parliament (Hansard:4.2.91). In addition, government-supporting newspapers actively encouraged members of the CP who supported negotiations, to "make themselves heard" (Rapport:10.2.91; Interviews, Jan Hoon:7.2.91, Corne Mulder:11.2.91). According to Hoon, the reason why the NP exerts pressure on the CP to put its case at the negotiation table, can be found in the fact that it regards the CP's proposals for a white homeland as a "safeguard" in case its own plans for a non-racial South Africa end in disaster (ibid).

Pressure to change its policy on negotiations came also from within the CP itself: members of the CP's pragmatic wing, who feared that the Party was being left behind by the fast-moving political developments, argued that it should concentrate on the principle of self-determination and the reality of a smaller white state. This would have made it possible for the CP to have taken such proposals to the negotiating table to attempt to obtain a form of white self-determination (Vrye Weekblad:14.9.90; The Argus:16.10.90; 18.10.90). In March 1990, a member of this pragmatic wing, CP-MP Koos van der Merwe, agreed that the

CP would be prepared to negotiate over the borders of a white state, but not over the principle behind such a state (Die Burger:19.3.90).

He was supported by another Party member, Carel Boshoff of the Afrikaner Volkswag, who said that the issue of the Afrikaner's future existence should be dealt with at the "Great Indaba" (Die Burger:19.3.90). Boshoff repeated his view later during that year:

> The freedom of the Afrikaner is not something that can be negotiated on, but my opinion is that the case for an Afrikaner state must be set out plainly and convincingly wherever it is done Cape Times (24.8.90).

It was interpreted by the latter newspaper as implying that Boshoff supported participation in multi-party negotiations (its headline read: "Right-winger is willing to talk"). A week later, probably under some pressure from the CP leadership, Boshoff qualified his statement as follows:

> It is incorrect to state that I said I would beprepared to join the constitutional negotiations - I only said that the independence of the Afrikaner is not negotiable and this should be spelled out at every possible occasion, and anyway, I have no mandate or constituency on whose behalf I can negotiate (Patriot:31.8.90) [translation].

But apart from the tactful rephrasing of his position on this occasion, Boshoff's support for a negotiated settlement to achieve his ideal of an Afrikaner Volkstaat, irrespective of who the parties to such a settlement were, was beyond doubt.

According to Michael Olivier, chairman of the Five Freedoms Forum, several leaders of the CP agreed during private interviews that the CP would eventually have to participate in the negotiation process (Die Burger:22.11.90). Treurnicht himself indicated in October 1990 that he would accept the government's invitation to the negotiating table if President De Klerk "clarified" reform statements, in particular the issue of one-person-one-vote on a single

voters list (The Argus:16.10.90; Die Burger:17.10.90). He also explained the conditions under which he would negotiate with black leaders:

> The CP recognized the right of any black nation to rule over itself in its own territory as long as blacks accepted that whites had a similar right. The CP did not regard federalism as a solution to South Africa's problems, but supported the idea of economic co-operation between people, on the basis of political segregation (ibid) [translation].

On the basis of these broad preconditions, the CP indicated its willingness to talk to certain black leaders, although they would not include ANC members, even if the latter "eventually renounced violence". Koos van der Merwe explained it as follows:

> As far as the ANC is concerned, at this stage it is completely out of the question. There are reasons why we cannot talk to them. Firstly, they are a communist, terrorist organization. Secondly, they are still bent on isolating South Africa, urging the world to sanctions, enforcing more hunger and misery on the country. Thirdly, they have a 'non-negotiable'. That is 'one man one vote'. We say, we also have a non-negotiable, and that is exactly the contrary - 'one man one vote for the whites alone'. We demand self-determination for the whites in a part of Africa. They say we are not entitled to it. Fourthly, one should ask - what legitimacy do they hold? I am entitled to talk, because I represent something. I've been elected. I have an admission ticket, because of centuries of custom. But the ANC has no legitimacy to be here. They have no admission ticket (Monitor, August 1990).

Shortly after this interview the ANC suspended violence, and Thabo Mbeki invited the CP to join the negotiation process, two steps which should have contributed to reducing the Party's reluctance to enter multi-party negotiations. However, the main obstacle to negotiations

would only be overcome if the ANC beforehand explicitly recognized the CP's demand for self-determination and dropped its call for sanctions, according to Van der Merwe (ibid).

In spite of Koos van der Merwe's earlier statements in which he stuck to the official Party line, in private he and other members of the Party's pragmatic wing began to have serious doubts over the tenability of the policy on negotiations. The more pragmatic members of the CP Caucus (about 12 in all) - including the Mulder brothers, Cehill Pienaar, Fanie Jacobs, Chris de Jager, Moolman Mentz, Willie Snyman, Tom Langley, Joseph Chiole and Koos Botha - insisted on a new approach to negotiations, which would include the freedom of Party members to make contact with any organization, including the ANC, PAC and SACP. They also proposed participation at the future multi-party conference, the only precondition being that the government accept white self-determination as one of the "options to be negotiated" at such a conference (Rapport:3.2.91, Vrye Weekblad:8.2.91). This precondition differed considerably from the Party's official stance (as amended late in 1990), that white self-determination should be the guaranteed result of any process of negotiations (ibid).

Directly opposing the above view, were the traditionalists of the CP under the leadership of Ferdi Hartzenberg and including Jan Hoon, Daan van der Merwe, Casper Uys, Frank le Roux and Pikkie Coetzee, among others. They were reported to adhere to the existing policies of the Party, including a refusal to negotiate with any organization which had not rejected violence, sanctions and communism.

In spite of attempts to cover up differences over the issue of negotiations, the whole issue became prominent again in February 1991 when reports of a looming split between the traditional and the pragmatic wings of the Party were published by the media. The spark for this new tension in the Party was the 'Koos' document. Already in February 1991 the differences in approach between these groups were

illustrated when Koos van der Merwe said in Parliament that for the CP to join the negotiations, the government had to "acknowledge the right to self-determination of groups", to which Hartzenberg replied on the same day that "the CP would not participate in negotiations over a new constitutional dispensation for South Africa" (Vrye Weekblad:8.2.91).

The Party leader, Andries Treurnicht, was reported to have been caught up between these two groups, his main concern being to prevent a split in the CP. His resultant careful and non-committal approach to the issue of negotiations was clearly illustrated by an interview with Die Burger (15.2.91):

> We have not excluded negotiations in principle, but the government has positioned itself politically so distant from the demand for self-determination for whites, that it would be almost practically nonsensical to enter into negotiations with it, let alone with the ANC [translation].

It is important to note that he used the word 'almost' thereby leaving a door open in case circumstances necessitated a change in policy.

Treurnicht repeated this point in March 1991 and again left open a backdoor to negotiations under certain vague conditions:

> Promises made by the government, undertakings given and concessions make it extremely difficult [but not impossible - the author] for the CP just to take part in discussions without getting certain definite guarantees as to the self-determination of white people (The Argus:2.3.91).

A few weeks later there was still no indication that Van der Merwe had backed down on the issue. In Parliament he said:

> the era during which whites could prescribe to blacks, had long passed and that the CP would listen to suggestions from blacks on how to solve problems

> affecting them, as long as it would not involve the right to self-determination of whites (Die Burger:7.3.91) [translation].

At about the same time he was photographed, in a friendly pose, with Thabo Mbeki of the ANC, at a conference in Switzerland. When later questioned about the photograph in Parliament, Van der Merwe was quick to point out that he considered asking Mbeki (jokingly) to address him as 'baas' (master) at the conference, and denied that any differences existed between him and Treurnicht over the issue of negotiations (Die Burger:13.3.91, 14.3.91).

In April 1991 the contents of the 'Koos document' were leaked to the NP and press. This helped to clarify the discrepancies which became so characteristic of the CP's policy on this issue after the end of 1990. This document, drafted by Koos van der Merwe in October 1990, in conjunction with several colleagues, was based upon the following assumptions: the government's reforms were irreversible; the government had a mandate for its reforms and that it would probably win a referendum on a new constitution; the presence of urban blacks was permanent and that they had to be accommodated at the highest political level, as long as this did not interfere with the right to self-determination of whites; racial integration had become the norm at all levels of society; none of the democratic black organizations could be banned again ('Koos' document, 1990:1-14).

The document suggested that the CP was in danger of becoming irrelevant if it stuck to its present policy, and it would be forced to watch from the sidelines how other organizations determined the future of its followers (ibid). It accused the traditionalists within the Party who opposed negotiations with the ANC, SACP and PAC, of being unrealistic and said their objections could not be morally justified as they were prepared to talk to other "former terrorists and communists" in Angola and Mozambique. It further speculated whether the refusal by some Party members to negotiate was not perhaps the result of jealousy

and hatred which existed between CP and NP Members of Parliament over the fact that the latter were in a position of power (1990:29).

The document argued that the CP had formally to announce its willingness to help shape the "new South Africa" and should be prepared to negotiate with anybody to achieve this. Furthermore, that the Party should join the negotiation process immediately, on the single condition that the important parties recognize the principle of self-determination (ibid).

The rejection of the 'Koos document' by the Party leadership, and contradictory statements by Van der Merwe on the one hand, and Treurnicht on the other, sparked off intense speculation over the unity of the CP. Opportunistically, the NP saw that it could score some political points from the issue prior to the Ladybrandby-election in May 1991. In a full page advertisement the NP demanded an explanation from Andries Treurnicht ("in the interest of frank and open public debate") on the following contradictions:

> When did you remember the directive you had given to Mr Koos van der Merwe or did you hope to get away with dodging the issue in your usual evasive fashion?

> How can a document be an "old document" and at the same time "a matter that had not been finally concluded"?

> How can Mr van der Merwe work on the same document both on his "own initiative" and on your instructions?

> Are you and the CP eventually going to give definitive answers to the important questions raised in the document compiled by Mr van der Merwe and his several colleagues? (Sunday Times:25.4.91).

Although this was typical NP by-election propaganda, it served to accentuate the obvious differences which by now had clearly emerged between the moderate and traditional wings of the CP. In May 1990 Koos van der Merwe was still arguing that the document was a team effort (spanpoging)

and proved that the CP was a dynamic and modern party which was aware of the political and economical realities of the day (Die Burger:1.5.91). A few weeks later the CP announced that the Party leadership rejected the document in its entirety, and a month later Van der Merwe was fired from his position as head of the Information Committee of the CP.

Rapport attempted to exploit the humiliation which Van der Merwe had suffered, by urging him to break with the CP: its editorial exclaimed "Kom huis toe Koos" (come home Koos), and it suggested that Van der Merwe belonged to the NP because his views were pragmatic and adapted to changing times, unlike those of his party (23.6.91). Although Van der Merwe denied that there was a rift in the Party, these events led to the impression that the pragmatic wing had been defeated by the hardliners, at least temporarily. Even the CP mouthpiece, Patriot, showed its concern over disunity and a possible split in the Party: it tried to explain the tension within the Party as follows:

> Those who dream of a split in the CP do not understand the nature and the character of the Party. They do not realise that the CP is a people's front which allows for divergent opinions among its supporters, rather than a normal political party which enforces its dictatorial viewpoints (19.4.91) [translation].

However, Patriot also sent a warning to Koos van der Merwe:

> In the final instance, however, it is expected of each Party member to subject himself to the policies as determined by the congresses (ibid) [translation].

The internal debate within the CP's leadership over the issue of negotiations, also gave rise to a debate among rank-and-file Party supporters. This was especially noticeable from the letters written to the CP's mouthpiece, Patriot. From past editorials the perception developed that its editor, ZB du Toit, had leaned towards the side promoting negotiations with all parties, i.e the pragmatists like Koos van der Merwe. He confirmed this

during April 1991, but emphasized that this represented his personal viewpoint, not that of the Party (Interview:8.4.91). However, by means of challenging editorials Du Toit encouraged a public debate in his newspaper on the issue. To illustrate the typical arguments of both sides, the following two letters are cited:

> I can't imagine that the Party would participate in negotiations which would deprive the whites of their self-determination and own community life....The CP would lose its support base among its supporters and thousands would leave the Party for a more aggressive political home elsewhere...any so-called verligte MP who propagates such a view should resign immediately, as he does not represent the views of the voters (L. J. Van Deventer of Bellville, Patriot:8.4.91) [translation].

> Before long an agreement will be reached with the communists. The NP and ANC will not give us our rights of their own free will - we will have to negotiate to obtain these rights (T. Pieterse of Brakpan, Patriot:29.3.91) [translation].

In spite of the continuing debate over the issue of participating in formal negotiations at a multi-party conference, the Party indicated that it would continue with informal negotiations with black organizations which rejected violence and shared its view on the self-determination of nations. To this end a meeting was organized in October 1990 between the CP and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The Chief Minister of KwaZulu and president of the IFP, Mangosuthu Buthelezi defended his meeting with the CP by suggesting that the CP represented a large constituency, and although the two Parties differed on the political models to accommodate the various groups in South Africa, both subscribed to "Christian principles, and rejected communism, terrorism and domination" (Cape

Times:3.11.90). Patriot (9.11.90) described the significance of this meeting as follows:

> It has been a while since the standard-bearer of Afrikaner nationalism and the representative of the majority of Afrikaners (if not whites), had an opportunity to deliberate with the the leader of the party to which most Zulus belong [translation].

The relative success of the meeting was not a surprise, considering that both parties were strong proponents of ethnonationalism. CP-MP Jan Hoon claimed afterwards that Buthelezi had mentioned the possibility of the Afrikaners' and Zulus having to fight the ANC "shoulder by shoulder" at some point in the future (Interview:7.2.91).

In January 1991 Treurnicht met with an opposition leader in the KwaNdebele Parliament, George Mahlangu, and afterwards described the meeting as useful, as both parties shared "common goals" (Patriot:25.1.91). In March 1991 Treurnicht met with the military leader of the Transkei, General Bantu Holomisa, in Parliament in Cape Town at the request of the latter. Treurnicht described the meeting as "an honour" but insisted that he met with Holomisa in his capacity as the leader of an independent state, and not in his capacity as a member of the ANC (The Argus:2.3.91). Treurnicht described his Party as "the representative of the whites", while the Transkeian leader said he hoped that Treurnicht would "one day take his place at the big table to present his case to the people" (ibid).

The fact that Holomisa requested the meeting caught many observers by surprise, especially as Transkei was strongly supportive of the ANC, with the head of the organization's military wing, Chris Hani, playing a key role in affairs of the homeland. The meeting could in part be explained by the acrimonious nature of the relationship between the South African and Transkeian governments at the time, and by Holomisa's defiant attitude towards military and economic threats made by the South African President and Pik Botha. (e.g. to cut-off South Africa's contribution to the Transkei budget or military to intervene).

At a by-election meeting in Parow in February 1991 Treurnicht spoke of the "large numbers of blacks" who supported the CP, especially with regard to the Party's policy on terrorism, and in its hardline stance on the ANC/SACP and the release of Nelson Mandela. Although none of these black organizations (conservative homeland-governments and certain black churches) supported apartheid, they had in common with the CP a dislike of the ANC, and could therefore be regarded as allies of the CP, according to Treurnicht (Die Burger:13.2.91; 15.2.91).

7.2.2 FORMS OF NONVIOLENT OPPOSITION TO REFORM

The CP felt strongly about the government's statements about the 1989 general election's being the last whites-only election and about the "irreversibility" of the reform process. This is how Andries Treurnicht viewed the NP's claim that reforms were irreversible:

> The government says: 'irreversible?'. We say 'incredible'. What an achievement of abdication....That irreversibility is without fame and honour....Speaking about irreversibility, I wonder whether it is not only the Divine Plan of the Almighty which is really irreversible (Hansard:4.2.91).

As indicated before, the 'Koos document' heralded a different opinion, claiming instead that reforms were in fact irreversible:

> The State President has had some success with his immoral efforts to make his reforms irreversible, i.e. that they become so permanent and fundamental that no future government could turn them around again....[in particular] the permanence of urban blacks, the granting of political rights to blacks, coloureds and Indians in 'white' South Africa, the unbanning of the

> ANC, SACP and PAC, black trade union rights and the repeal of certain segregation measures (1990:12) [translation].

In chapter six it was shown how the CP's electoral strength had increased over the past ten years to a point where the Party and many former sceptical analysts came to believe that it could possibly win a future whites-only general election. This perception and the belief that the NP had acted dishonestly by not telling the white voters precisely what its plans were before the 1989 general election, formed the basis of the CP's accusation that the NP had lost the support of the majority of whites and had implemented reform without a mandate. The motivation behind the CP's repeated demands for the NP to resign and to call an election was further explained by Treurnicht in a petition addressed to F.W. De Klerk:

> It is blatantly misleading and immoral to promise voters a certain policy before an election, but to follow a different one afterwards....Today you do not represent the majority of whites, and for this reason, you owe the whites an election. Should you refuse, it will be an infringement of the nation's constitutional rights and will force us to use different methods (Patriot:9.11.90) [translation].

Both Treurnicht and Hartzenberg repeatedly called for the government's resignation throughout 1990-91, and both were very confident that the CP enjoyed the support of the majority of whites (Argus:6.2.90; Cape Times:6.2.90; Patriot:6.7.90; 5.10.90; 9.10.90; 26.10.90).

However, as Gerald Shaw previously indicated (see page 424), the NP would not easily risk everything it had achieved through reform by having another election under the existing constitution, and as stated previously, the stronger the CP appears to be, the smaller the chances of having such an election (see page 331). Realizing this, the CP began concentrating on winning a referendum on a new constitution. However, while it was very optimistic over its chances in a general election, it was less so when the alternative option of a referendum was

discussed. Although some of the leaders of the CP like Andries Treurnicht and Jan Hoon seemed confident that it could sway a referendum in its favour, others felt differently - among the latter were MP's Corne' Mulder and Koos van der Merwe, who predicted that NP propaganda and the rewards for reforms such as the lifting of sanctions and sports boycotts, would enable the NP to win a referendum (Interview:11.2.91; 'Koos' document, 1990:25). The official mouthpiece of the CP, Patriot expressed this view on several occasions:

> We all know how the government manipulates the press and television to the extent that their mass psychological onslaughts and propaganda could have devastating results for those who see self-determination as the only way to survive (11.5.90);
>
> Reports which have reached Patriot indicate that the NP has lost its enthusiasm for a whites-only referendum...indications are that coloured and Indian votes will be used to out-vote whites (22.6.90) [translations].
>
> The CP will not be party to the structuring of that question [concerning the referendum issue], so the government will definitely 'slant' the statement to suit its own purposes....The white voter will be further conditioned into believing that whatever he votes in the referendum, the process is irreversible (26.10.90);

The editor of Patriot, Z.B du Toit, confirmed that this remained his newspaper's viewpoint, even though it differed from the official Party policy. He argued that by participating in a referendum, the CP would accept the government's rules, which would imply that the Party would accept the outcome of such a referendum, whether it was in its favour or not. Since the CP would not accept a majority government (the presumed result of a referendum), du Toit argued that there was no point in taking part in the

referendum if the Party was not prepared to accept its outcome (Interview:8.4.91).

However, from the government's assurances to the contrary, and in spite of the promised referendum, the ultimate goal of the CP remained a general election. All elements within the rightwing explicitly committed themselves to active resistance (violence) if a new constitution came into existence without the white electorate's approval. But as long as the NP did not change the rules of the game, the CP, in particular was prepared to adhere to peaceful forms of protest, i.e. nonviolent opposition.

The proposals for nonviolent opposition were based on organizing resistance against reform at various levels, e.g. the media, the business sector, trade unions, education, religion, local government; it also included rightwing mass protests in the form of marches and gatherings and the interruption of NP political meetings; also considered were the options of strikes, the refusal to pay taxes, the refusal to acknowledge call-ups for military service, and to issue an identity document for whites (as opposed to the non-racial identity document which the government issued).

Andries Treurnicht described the co-ordination of the various elements of passive resistance, as the formation of a broad national movement and an all-inclusive volksaksie (people's front) (Rapport:8.4.90). According to Koos van der Merwe, the Party had devised a carefully-planned operation to exert pressure on the government, following the announcement of the repeal of the remaining apartheid legislation in February 1991. It became known as Operasie Spierwys (the flexing of the Party's muscles) (Rapport:3.2.91). This campaign was similar in many aspects to the one proposed by Van der Merwe one year earlier in February 1990, which suggested short one-day strikes by white workers in mines, at Eskom, the railways, the national airline, the post office and in the civil service (Cape Times:8.2.90; Rapport:11.2.90; International Herald Tribune:7.2.90).

a) White worker resistance

The reasoning behind labour-related white resistance was explained as follows:

> The most important element in White resistance is the ordinary working man; the man who keeps the wheels of South African industry going. Without him, South Africa would collapse. There would be nobody to keep the water supplies going, no one to repair the typewriters and computers, no one to make the bread, keep the water pure, fix the cars, aeroplanes and trains; no one to maintain roads, control the traffic lights, manufacture the furniture, keep the milk pure. If these people are mobilized into holding back their labour for just one week (after careful and secret preparation), the South Africa that remains wouldn't be worth having (Patriot:3.11.89) [translation].

To strengthen the political bargaining position of white workers, the CP strongly advocated the creation of an overarching trade union body (Patriot:1.2.91) - the all-white Mine Workers Union (MWU) indicated its desire for such a "super trade union" which it claimed, would be more capable of fending off "the onslaught on white workers from the combined forces of massive black trade unions, leftwing employees and an unsympathetic government [translation].

b) Mass protests

These took the form of huge gatherings and marches and became an important part of the rightwing strategy during the early stages of the De Klerk reforms. One of the largest of these was organized shortly after the President's February 1990 speech, and took the form of a gathering on 15 February at Church Square in Pretoria and a meeting in the Pretoria city hall, attended by about 30 000

people. Another mass meeting was held on 31 May 1990 at the Voortrekker Monument, which was attended by an estimated 60 000, 110 000, or 150 000 rightwing supporters (depending respectively on the estimates of Rapport, Citizen and Patriot). The CP regarded these meetings as proof of its support and as part of the "intensification of the people's freedom struggle" (Cape Times:6.2.90; 17.2.90).

The CP's success in organizing these huge rallies, can largely be explained by the emotionalism attached to the 'rightwing cause', as expressed in its 'colourful' political language and its use of Afrikaner symbols and cultural traditions. The size of its crowds today is equaled only by those attending ANC rallies.

c) Petitions

To further intensify its pressure on the government to call an election, a petition was circulated with the aim of gathering one million signatures. This campaign became known as Aksie Een Miljoen (Action one million), but it was not very successful, and Treurnicht later argued that it was more difficult to collect one million signatures than it would be to get one million votes during an election (Die Burger:15.2.91). The Party's Chief Secretary, Andries Beyers, blamed the ineffectiveness of the campaign on a 'misunderstanding', but he nevertheless claimed that a few hundred thousand signatures had been collected up to February 1991 (Interview:11.4.91).

d) The Media

The lack of a sympathetic press had been one of the CP's main weaknessess after its founding in 1982. Its own party

mouthpiece, Patriot, had a limited circulation and functioned mainly as an information/propaganda pamphlet, rather than a proper newspaper. Shortly after the split of the NP in 1982, Marius Jooste of Perskor had threatened to throw in his support behind the CP, but apart from some early sympathetic coverage of CP activities, Perskor remained committed to the NP. Since then the CP could at most rely on some marginally sympathetic editorials in the Natal Mercury and Citizen. As a result the CP decided that there was a definite need for an independent rightwing newspaper. Treurnicht claimed that there was a "hunger" in the country for a medium which could convey the rightwing whites the "message of nationalism and survival of our nation" (Patriot:1.6.90).

By 1990 efforts to launch such a paper were in full swing. A prospectus was issued with the goal of creating a capital fund of R20 million. The Prospectus motivated the creation of Volkspers as follows:

> The purpose of the company is to create media structures which have to start amongst others, a newspaper which propagates the conservative viewpoint in the present political climate....The directors are of the opinion that there is a great need for the publication of such a newspaper in the present circumstances and although it is expected that there will be no profit for the first few years, such an undertaking will be profitable over the long term [translation].

With such rather pessimistic profit projections it was to be expected that the average rightwing supporter would not make his own money freely available, irrespective of how worthwhile he thought a CP-supporting newspaper would be. Consequently, by February 1991 only R1 million of the projected R20 million worth of shares in the venture had been sold and by August 1991 this figure stood at a paltry R1,2 million (Patriot:1.2.91, 9.8.91). According to CP-MP Jan Hoon, weak economic conditions hindered the creation of the capital fund (in spite of the fact that only R30 each was required from the 670 000 people who voted for the CP

in 1989), and he did not foresee that the newspaper would commence publication before 1992 (Interview:7.2.91).

The failure to raise sufficient capital to start a newspaper was an indication that the Party still had not convinced any large businesses to invest money in the rightwing cause. It also indicated that the average CP supporter was not prepared to gamble even a small part of his savings in a high-risk venture in a sector notorious for its high casualty rate among smaller newspapers, no matter how much he supported the rightwing cause (postscript: it later turned out that even the low-key Patriot had suffered losses amounting to hundreds of thousands of Rands during the last few months of 1991 and the first half on 1992 - Die Burger:16.8.92).

e) Diverse Strategies

These concerned the possibility of issuing a whites-only identity document in response to the repeal of the Population Registration Act; the withholding of taxes by rightwing taxpayers; the refusal to pay TV licences because of the 'misuse' of the SABC by the government to 'indoctrinate' whites, and the distribution of "thousands of pamphlets exposing the NP's crookery" (Cape Times:8.2.90; Die Burger:28.8.90; Patriot:14.6.91).

Another strategy implemented with great success concerned the disruption of NP meetings in various constituencies, to such an extent that several meetings had to be cancelled. Others were held only with the help of massive police protection and resulted in great violence and even in the death of rightwingers, e.g during the State President's meeting in Ventersdorp in August 1991. This form of protest was strongly defended by Treurnicht:

> Mr De Klerk is being too hasty in pointing a finger at the CP. He knows very well that political meetings can become a little robust...he stirred up the volk. Now he wants me to calm them down (Sunday Times:19.8.90).

Within the ambit of Parliament the CP has threatened the

government with Nuremberg-style trials (Die Burger: 25.9.90), and walked out of Parliament on more than one occasion in protest against the government's reforms, the most recent being during the opening of Parliament during the State President's speech in February 1991. On this occasion several CP MP's heckled him by accusing him of being a traitor to the Afrikaner nation (SABC TV:1.2.91).

f) Local government

One of the most effective strategies employed against reform occurred on the level of local government in CP-controlled local authorities. The intention was to obstruct the repeal of apartheid legislation without breaking any laws, and in some cases, blatantly to overrule the directives of the government:

Steps were taken against neighbouring black townships whose municipal services they controlled. In response to rent and consumer boycotts by blacks, several local councils cut off water and electricity supplies to black townships (The Argus:19.10.90). For example, the Town Council of Carolina caused a major health crisis in the adjacent black township of Silobela by disconnecting its water supply and by stopping the refuse removal system. Even after the Transvaal Provincial Administration had paid the township's water account, the Town Council refused to connect the water until the electricity bill was paid (Star:9.4.91).

The Transvaal Municipal Association (TMA) announced its opposition to racially-mixed amenities and town- and city councils (Patriot:12.10.90). The CP, being in control of the TMA, exerted a powerful influence in such decisions. During a meeting of all CP local councillors in Pretoria in January 1991, the Party challenged the government to disband "democratically-elected" city councils who would refuse to become racially integrated (with reference to the recommendations of the government-sponsored Thornhill Report which recommended the integration of racially-based local authorities) (Patriot:18.1.91; 1.2.91). According to the CP such action by the government would have meant the

"destruction of white self-determination on the level of local government" and would lead to the "deterioration of the standard of services to that typical of the Third World" (ibid). The argument against racially-integrated town councils was further emphasized by claiming white municipal taxpayers would have to pay more tax to subsidise black residents (Interview, Pikkie Coetzee, chairman of the CP's General Municipal Committee:15.7.91). The leader of the CP in the Pretoria City Council, Paul Fouche, predicted a fourfold increase in the municipal rates if that council became racially-integrated (Patriot:15.3.91). The proposed integration of the local government structures of Durban was described by Patriot (11.1.91) as "legalised plunder", because of the suspected 'subsidization' of black residents by Durban's white taxpayers.

Several individual CP-controlled towns took it upon themselves to hold local whites-only referendums on these matters, and up to March 1991, the towns of Nigel, Phalaborwa, Mossel Bay, Calvinia, Warrenton, Bloemhof, Villiers, Kraaifontein and Ottosdal were among those towns which rejected the racial integration of their Town Councils (Patriot:2.11.90; Interviews: officials of the Town Councils of Mossel Bay, Van Heerden:19.9.90, and Kraaifontein, Du Preez:13.9.90).

Further obstructionist action by certain CP-controlled councils followed the repeal of the Separate Amenities Act in October 1990. These councils used existing vagrancy and rights-of-admission by-laws legally to obstruct the process of desegregating amenities. The retention of their municipal facilities for whites only, without the help of the Act, was guaranteed by the following measures: Springs closed its municipal pool rather than open it to all races; Sasolburg allowed only season ticket-holders, available only to residents from within the 'white' boundaries of the town, to use its pool; Vanderbijlpark residents had to show their water and electricity accounts to avoid an entrance fee to the municipal pool; in Witbank, "non-residents" had to pay a R20 deposit for each book borrowed from the library; Bethal charged R500 and Pietersburg R100

membership fees per year to 'non-residents' of the 'white' town to use their libraries; Newcastle refused to accept any new members to its library, while Potchefstroom increased the entrance fees to the local dam (Sunday Times:14.10.90). The strategy was simply to prevent blacks from using public facilities by making such facilities private and allowing existing 'members' (whites) only, to use them, or alternatively to charge exorbitant fees to 'non-members' (blacks). Although the government tried to stop these practices by the force of the law, it was very difficult to prove whether a higher entrance fee implied the practice of racial discrimination per se, especially since this is the convention in many 'exclusive' resorts all over the world.

Some of these local authorities received support from privately-owned resorts within their municipal boundaries: Patriot published several advertisements each week of resorts which turned into private and exclusive clubs, for the use of their [white] members only. The following examples illustrate this trend: the Silversands resort in Gordons Bay sold their holiday units on the basis of "joint ownership", i.e. a certain number of pre-selected (white) owners jointly bought a unit which remained theirs for the rest of their lives. The promoters of Silversands stated blatantly that these holiday units would be sold only to whites and that every buyer who showed his CP-membeship card would receive R2 000 discount. Another resort in Naboomspruit followed a similar pattern by guaranteeing prospective buyers an exclusive whites-only resort, limited to three hundred joint white owners (Patriot:27.7.90).

g) Agriculture

In the sphere of agriculture, the CP enjoyed considerable success in mobilizing farmers to oppose reforms. In addition to its control of both the powerful Transvaal and Free State Agricultural Unions, the CP also controlled some smaller unions. These were used as a basis from which to oppose land and other reforms. Reaction was particularly fierce over the announcement in October 1990 that the

government intended to repeal the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, a step which would allow blacks to buy white farms. This was preceded by the Urban Foundation's recommendation that black farmers who could obtain financing should be allowed to buy out white farmers who were saddled with heavy debts. The Transvaal Agricultural Union decided by referendum to reject this decision. It also demanded that the government ensure that white agricultural land remained in white hands unless farmers agreed to the alienation of such land and demanded greater financial assistance (Cape Times:6.10.90; Patriot:2.11.90; Rapport:7.10.90).

Towards the end of 1990 disgruntled Transvaal farmers met in Pretoria and threatened to take measures that could "surpass the boundaries of decency" if the government did not respond in a satisfactory way. The government relented with regard to further financial assistance to farmers, but insisted that the Land Acts were definitely to be repealed. In January 1991 between 1 500 and 5 000 farmers (the estimates by Cape Times:15.2.91, and The Argus:15.2.91, differed considerably), decided to hold a mass protest meeting in the streets of Pretoria, thereby completely disrupting the traffic flow. Although several grievances of a financial nature were aired, objections to the repeal of the Land Acts became an important mobilizing factor. Although the CP claimed that it did not organize the protest meeting, the CP-controlled Transvaal Agricultural Union (TAU) must have had a hand in it. When the police intervened to limit the disruption of the traffic by arresting farmers and towing their vehicles away, members of the CP caucus hastily left Cape Town for Pretoria to show solidarity with the farmers.

The fiasco in Pretoria provided the CP with a political victory, as the CP's guarantee that "it stood by the farmers" contrasted sharply with the State President's condemnation of the protest and the clashes between a number of farmers and the police. A referendum held by the TAU two weeks later, in February 1991, showed that 95% of Transvaal farmers were against the repeal of the Land Acts, i.e. firmly in line with the policy of the CP (ibid).

Rightwing resistance reached a crescendo when the White Paper on Land Reform was published in March 1991. The White Paper proposed that there would be no more racial restrictions to land ownership in South Africa. The CP warned that these proposals were an attempt to deprive the volk of its collective property ownership, and promised that it would meet with fierce resistance from the rightwing - Treurnicht announced that the 'freedom struggle' has now reached a very serious and intense phase" (Patriot:22.3.91; Vrye Weekblad:22.3.91; Rapport:17.3.91).

The Transvaal Agricultural Union regarded the White Paper as a "declaration of war" against white farmers, but besides the symbolic burning of the White Paper in public, and vague proposals to form closed corporations to buy all 'white' land, not much came from the TAU threats. The reaction of farmers and organized agriculture outside of the Transvaal to the CP's call for mass protest was lukewarm. By mid-April 1991, i.e. two months after the government announced its intention to repeal the Land Acts, only the Transvaal Agricultural Union and a few district agricultural unions had testified before the Parliament's Joint Committee on Land Reform. The CP had expected an avalanche of fury and strongly criticised the "non-involvement" of organized agriculture, claiming that the envisaged reforms concerned the continued existence of every white farmer (Pretoria News:11.4.91).

In May 1991 a combination of about 1 000 militant farmers and AWB members became involved in a 'battle' with police and SADF troops, after they had taken the law into their own hands to drive squatters off the farm Goedgevonden near Ventersdorp in the Transvaal. The farmers claimed that the government was too "cowardly" to act against these "illegal" squatters, and the farmers therefore were determined to remove the squatters by force. Several farmers were wounded when they refused to back down, causing the security forces to use buckshot to drive them back (Sunday Times:12.5.91). The CP was very supportive of the farmers, and accused the government of "shooting its

own people to protect anarchists" (Patriot:17.5.91). The CP's deputy-leader, Ferdie Hartzenberg, warned in Parliament that the security foces might have come off second best if the farmers had shot back, and suggested that a monument should be erected to honour them for refraining from doing so (Hansard:14.5.91). The rightwing strongly emphasized the 'civil war' aspect of the Goedgevonden incident: the CP claimed that this incident represented the first time that government forces had fired on whites since the Mineworkers' Strike of 1922, while Patriot (17.5.91) expressed its doubts over the continued viability of constitutionally-based opposition to the government's reforms.

The actual repeal of the Land Acts in June 1991 resulted in little physical protest other than the public burning of the White Paper on Land Reforms, and the threats by the CP and TAU that the government would have to kill Afrikaners before it would be able to take their land away. Shortly after the repeal of these Acts, the rightwing's clamour about the sanctity of Afrikaner land, met its match in market forces: a white farmer and member of the AWB, Bill Ruthvin, sold his Delmas farm in July to a black millionare, Charlie Moloi, after having received an offer he could not refuse. The extent to which this incident embarrassed the rightwing is obvious, especially seen in the light of the vows by the leaders of the CP and others that they would resist the 'alienation' of 'white' land with their lives. At the time of writing, the CP has not managed to eject the black farmer from his land, but it stated publicly that it would not recognize the property- or occupation rights of blacks buying 'white' land (Die Burger:22.7.91).

h) Education

A further strategy of passive resistance concerned the white educational system. The CP managed to organize resistance against reforms targeted at the system of racially-based education. Early in 1990 the government announced its intention to allow white schools to choose

for themselves whether they would like to become racially integrated. In April 1990 the Cape Parents' Association rejected this proposal during a meeting in Port Elizabeth, and in June of the same year Afrikaans parents in the Transvaal followed suit (Patriot:22.6.90). However, the executive committee of the Transvaal Afrikaans Parents' Association (TAO) reacted positively to the proposals, which led to conflict between it and the CP (Patriot:21.9.90). The CP used its influence to point out that the TAO would act against the wishes of the majority of white parents in the Transvaal if it approved the open-school models (ibid). A month later the TAO, together with the Cape and Northern Cape Parents' Association, and the over-arching Federation of Parents' Associations (FOSA), were noted as having rejected racially-mixed schools (Patriot:2.11.90; Rapport:7.10.90).

Patriot did its best to persuade parents to reject the government's 'open school' model in its entirety: in several articles during the public debate on the issue, the paper put forward arguments which emphasized the benefits of segregated teaching (volkseie onderwys) and the disadvantages of racially-integrated teaching. The headlines of these articles read:
"Why do parents want open schools? - US experience says it's a disaster";
"Uproar as blacks opt for school apartheid";
"The white education hoax; Commission of enquiry called for in open schools debacle";
"Parents being inveigled into open schools vote";
"Why separate/own teaching?";
"Racially-mixed schools destroy own identity"
(Patriot:25.5.90; 27.7.90; 2.11.90).

A pamphlet distributed towards the end of 1990 by Aksie Bekommerde Ouers (The Front for Worried Parents), a conservative organization under the chairmanship of Prof. J. H. van der Wateren, attempted to discourage parents from voting for the opening of public schools to all races. The pamphlet, entitled Die politiek agter die huidige onderwyshervorming (the politics behind current

educational reforms), made the following broad generalizations and misrepresentations to substantiate the argument that white education would be adversely affected by integration at school level:

> The proportion of white and black school children of 1:7 would become the norm in every classroom; it would destroy the Christian and national character of white education and it is doubtful whether Afrikaans could be retained as a medium of education; parental discipline and authority would be adversely affected by the revolutionary aspirations of the black youth; a black teacher's trade union would promote people's education in all schools and a single education department run by this union would have a strong influence over all school children; the large-scale failure of black children at school would be blamed on the racism of white teachers, which would lead to school boycotts; teachers would be uncertain as to which values and norms should be used to educate pupils and the presence of atheists, Hindus, Muslims, Christians and traditionally-related beliefs in one classroom would adversely affect Christian-based education; curricula and prescribed books would have to be adapted to reflect the new political dispensation, which would result in the distortion of the Afrikaner history; standards would consequently deteriorate.

The pamphlet requested all white parents actively to organize committees which would promote the cause of Christian national (segregated) education.

To further counter what it perceived as a threat to racially separate education, the CP founded the Volkskomitee vir Christelik-volkseie onderwys (People's committee for Christian people's education), which held its first congress in March 1991, during which it was decided that the issue of separate education for Afrikaners was not negotiable and should be provided for by a future constitution. This position did not differ much from that of the NP as the latter agreed that such education should be available for those who insisted on it. However,

the congress distanced itself from the NP by rejecting "parity in education, open schools and one education system for all" (Die Burger:25.3.91).

i) Resistance in the religious sphere

The effect of the split in the NP in 1982 on the unity of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) was discussed in chapter two. Disunity reached a climax with the election of the relatively liberal-minded Johan Heyns as Moderator of the Church in 1986 and the endorsement of the report "Church and Society", which refuted the biblical "justification" of apartheid. Some disgruntled members of the NGK broke away to form their own church, the Afrikaanse Protestante Kerk, in 1987 under leadership of Willie Lubbe. Others, including Andries Treurnicht and Carel Boshoff, remained part of the NGK, but formed a conservative grouping within the church, the Afrikaanse Gereformeerde Bond (AGB), which was used as a vehicle to launch attacks on the government's reform policies and liberal tendencies within the NGK.

The NGK experienced another major upheaval within its ranks in November 1990, which was an indication of how strong the rightwing element still was within the church. This followed the confession by a NGK delegate to a conference of churches, Willie Jonker, a leading theologian, in which he asked for forgiveness for the injustices caused by apartheid, on behalf of the NGK and the Afrikaner people as a whole. His confession was supported by the moderator of the Church, Pieter Potgieter (Rapport:18.11.90). Treurnicht, as a member of the NGK, rejected this confession and said that he was not prepared to confess for the 'sins of apartheid' without qualification (Patriot:16.11.90). It was also rejected by Boshoff on grounds that a church body cannot confess to sins on behalf of all its members (ibid). Rightwing members of the NGK organized a protest meeting in December 1990 and said they would do everything in their power to reverse the decision by the General Synod to support Jonker, but indicated that

they did not intend to leave the Church at that stage (Vrye Weekblad:30.11.90). However, one CP-MP, Andrew Gerber, left the NGK shortly afterwards to join the APK.

The actions of rightwing members of the NGK drew condemnation from the mouthpiece of the Church, Die Kerkbode, "for sowing discord within the Church", and the Afrikaanse Gereformeerde Bond, of which Boshoff was the chairman, was accused of "becoming a church within a church" (Patriot:22.3.91).

All in all the rightwing had relatively little success in its efforts to undermine the unity of the NGK. An indication of how strong the unity of the NGK was in spite of subversive activities by its rightwing members, came from the decision in June 1991 by the very conservative synod of the western Transvaal region of the NGK, not to split with the General Synod over its acceptance of the "apartheid is a sin" confession of Willie Jonker one year earlier (Sunday Times:16.6.91). Even when a document entitled n' Noodroep: Die Damwal Breek (A distress call: the dike is giving way) was published in May 1991 by some disgruntled ministers to express concern over the Churchs' rejection of apartheid, only 12 NGK ministers were prepared to support it (Patriot:31.5.91).

7.2.3 THE STRATEGY OF ACTIVE RESISTANCE: VIOLENCE AND CIVIL WAR

> Obviously a thwarted, frustrated Right, who are prepared to take up arms, can do untold damage. When you think that the IRA and the Provisional IRA between them probably have no more than about 500 activists, and you look at what they have been able to do, it's very frightening indeed - David Welsh, cited in the Cape Times:20.12.90).

> If you have a small group of highly motivated people with a total ideology that includes origin, land, history and God, and you couple that to them having access to resources, money, skill and weapons, then the potential for the creation of highly motivated small terrorist groups becomes a reality - Mark Swilling, cited in The Argus:12.5.90).

> As long as the road is open for negotiation we will use that and prevent any kind of rightwing radicalism. But when every road is closed I don't think you will prevent the Afrikaner fighting for his survival. We will fight and die for the freedom of the Afrikaner nation (Carel Boshoff, cited in Leach, 1989:95).

Rightwing violence against the state and against elements on the left increased substantially during 1989-91, and all indications point to a further conflagration in this area of rightwing activity as the political system continues its transition to a more broadly-based democracy. Violence on this level is propagated quite openly by the AWB and by the many other rightwing splinter groups. So far it has taken two forms: firstly, a commitment to use violence to prevent political power from being transferred to the black majority, by threatening the state with insurrection or a coup d'etat; and secondly, actual acts of violence directed against any organization to the left, including the NP.

A further issue which has become relevant during 1990 and the first part of 1991 concerns a change in the previous non-violent stance of the Conservative Party. Since its inception in 1981 the CP has been in favour of peaceful opposition through parliamentary means. However, following the developments which commenced in February 1990, its position has gradually undergone a transformation. In response to the State President's watershed speech and his government's assurances not to allow another whites-only general election, the CP undertook, in addition to its parliamentary role, to resist the government outside

Parliament on various levels. As previously indicated, this strategy was centred on passive resistance, but also included the formation of "self-defence" units, and a public campaign morally to justify the eventual use of violence to achieve its objective of a white fatherland, if all constitutional options became exhausted. The gradual shift from a non-violent position to a more militant posture by the CP from mid-1990 onwards, forms the first part of this section on rightwing violence.

a) Violence: the Conservative Party's position

The CP's declared intention to achieve power through the ballot box received a serious setback after the government proclaimed in February 1990 that reforms implemented so far were irreversible and that it would not allow the rightwing to wreck its reform programme. In this regard President De Klerk expressed himself as follows: "I want to tell the leader of the Official Opposition to his face: neither the NP, nor the government or myself will allow anybody to set fire to the country" (Rapport:11.2.90) [translation].

Repeated declarations by government officials concerning the 'irreversibility' of reform predictably caused quite a stir among members of the CP and were perceived as a 'change in the rules'. According to MP Koos van der Merwe, the CP rejected violence and was committed to constitutional methods, but:

> if Mr De Klerk acts against the wishes of the whites, or refuses to hold an election or referendum, or forces a communist system upon South Africa, the result will be a civil war (Die Burger:25.10.90) [translation].

Explicit threats such as these, along with attempts to justify on moral and biblical grounds the use of violence against the state, were characteristic of the CP's heightened emphasis on violent alternatives.

According to Wim Booyse, the CP MP's returned to a special session of Parliament in August 1990 in a more aggressive and militant mood, which reflected the changed mood in their constituencies. Booyse claimed that this was a turning point and that the new militancy was visible also in the Party congresses from that date onwards (Interview:11.4.91). However, the first indication of a shift in the CP's previously docile stance came shortly after De Klerk's February 1990 speech, when Treurnicht warned that the NP had "awakened the tiger in the Afrikaner" (The Argus:6.2.90). In April/May 1990 a racially tense situation developed in Welkom between black and white residents, which resulted in several incidents of violence. The CP leader indicated that the Party fully supported white civilian street patrols and blamed government actions for making it necessary for whites to protect themselves:

> People have armed themselves and they have a right to defend themselves. We support them. They have their weapons ready and some are threatening to shoot. It is not necessary for me to alert them to the need to be prepared. The government is doing this through its decisions (The Argus:26.4.90).

Earlier Treurnicht requested his followers who demanded a form of armed response to the government's reforms, to wait for a sign: "to those who talk of weapons and shooting, I say, don't be so hasty, hold your horses, don't jump the gun" (ibid). He also warned that if the NP continued to hand over power to the ANC, it would result in the start of the Third Freedom Struggle" (The Argus:9.5.90; Die Burger:10.5.90).

These indications of a higher degree of militancy within the CP registered alarm among NP-supporting newspapers. Rapport (11.2.90) argued that the rightwing was playing with fire by calling upon the volk to rise, and urged

that the time had come to get to grips with the rightwing threat. Two months later Rapport (8.4.90) repeated this theme by warning of the growing militancy within the CP, as characterized among other things, the formation of a private army called Brandwag, and the CP's support of the Blanke Veiligheid (White Security) organization in Welkom.

The Brandwag Volksleer was labelled as an alternative defence force and was under the supreme command of former Ossewa Brandwag member, Manie Maritz (Sunday Times:29.4.90). However, according to Maritz, its function was purely defensive, aimed at the protection of the white community "when the revolution came" (ibid). Further response came from Die Burger (10.5.90) which objected strongly to the creation of private armies and to a reference by the CP to the "Third Freedom War", which implied, according to the paper, a civil war against fellow citizens and not against a foreign power, unlike the previous "wars of freedom" against the British Empire. In response to Treurnicht's reference to the CP's registering the "most serious form of protest", NP-MP Renier Schoeman argued that Treurnicht insinuated armed resistance which formed part of the "increasingly evident pattern of violence rhetoric in CP ranks" (The Argus:19.4.90). Even political journalist Ormande Pollok warned of "a new air of determination and a strong sense of purpose [among members of the CP]...an almost fatalistic acceptance that if this means war, so be it" (Cape Times:23.8.90).

Towards the end of 1990 and during 1991 the CP's references to armed resistance became more provocative. The CP indicated that it had a tolerance threshold against reform, and in "extreme circumstances", e.g. in the case of reform leading to whites being subjected to a black majority, the Party would revert to violent resistance (Patriot:5.10.90; Die Burger:28.8.90; Cape Times:19.10.90). Addressing the possibility of a coup d'etat, Treurnicht argued that such an option would only be considered under extreme conditions and that people should be patient. However, if the government refused the CP's demand for a separate white

election, it would cause the CP to "lose confidence" in the constitutional methods, according to Hartzenberg (Patriot:6.7.90). Several other CP-MP's supported this viewpoint, e.g. Casper Uys warned that the government would have to use violence to subject the Afrikaner people to a black majority, which would lead to the Afrikaner responding in kind (Patriot:8.7.90). CP Chief Secretary Andries Beyers expressed himself in a similar fashion:

> If President De Klerk and Nelson Mandela should between them close the avenue of the ballot box for Afrikaners to regain their freedom in their own fatherland, we would regard ourselves as an oppressed people. And if we become the oppressed people, at that stage we will have no choice other than to use basically the same methods that oppressed people normally use to regain their freedom (The Argus:24.7.90).
>
> If the government refuses to call a general election for whites, the CP will have a moral basis to launch an armed struggle...which could last weeks, months, years or even decades (Patriot:21.6.91) [translation].

Beyers later repeated this ultimatum and added that even a referendum which was regarded as "unfair" by the CP, would have the same implication as no referendum or no election, i.e. the Party would not accept it and would revert to "alternative measures", including violence (Interview: 11.4.91).

Even Koos van der Merwe, reputed to have kicked open a door in Parliament in 1982, also unambiguously expressed his opinion on violence and a civil war. In August 1990 he claimed that the CP would declare war if the government did not hold a referendum or an election, and that he personally "would shoot" if reforms are taken too far (Monitor, August 1990; Die Burger:28.8.90; 25.10.90). In November 1990 Van der Merwe threatened President De Klerk with a similar fate as that of Ceausescu of Rumania. He referred to the overthrow and execution of the former Rumanian dictator and used it as an example of how De Klerk

could be ousted (Die Burger:16.11.90; 22.11.90; Rapport:18.11.90). Van der Merwe also described how members of the CP were ready to fight with all kinds of weapons, including tanks, jet fighters and submarines, and that the majority of the '500 000' male CP supporters had already received military training as part of their National Service. However, he predicted that a South African civil war would be fought not in conventional style, but with shotguns, probably implying a guerilla-style uprising by the rightwing (Rapport:18.11.90).

Ironically, while Van der Merwe's public statements were hostile and threatening during this period, there was no evidence of this in the 'Koos document', which he was busy compiling at the same time. In this document the attitude was that violence would be an extreme last-resort option, for which nobody really had an "appetite", and should not be readily considered without a proper evaluation of the drastic consequences thereof (1990:11)

Van der Merwe's public threats of a military struggle were echoed by other MP's, including Jan Hoon and Corne Mulder (Interviews:7.2.91; 11.2.91). Mulder further spoke of about three million Afrikaners who could not emigrate like their English-speaking compatriots, and would be forced to fight for their freedom. The description of Afrikaners not being able to flee the country at will, unlike their English counterparts, became an important part of the CP's imagery of the Afrikaner's commitment to fight to the death to achieve "freedom and self-determination". Treurnicht repeated this theme when he responded to the White Paper on Land Reform "We have not got a boat waiting for us in the harbour to allow us to escape - we cannot and will not flee" (Vrye Weekblad:22.3.91) [translation].

Apart from setting ultimatums and making threats, the CP also made a concerted effort to find moral and political justification for violent resistance against an "illegal and immoral" regime. After the Umlazi by-election in May 1990, the CP claimed that it represented the majority of whites. This claim was based on projections by certain

analysts who extrapolated the results country-wide and concluded that the CP would win a future general election with ease (e.g. Donald Simpson of Potchefstroom University who estimated that the CP would win 110 seats compared to the 56 of the NP). Based on this line of thinking, the CP presumed that it represented the majority of whites, and the logical assumption was that the government did not have a mandate to govern the country or to negotiate on behalf of the whites. This theme was taken up by Patriot (24.8.90) to explain the incidence of rightwing violence "why, if the government refuses to adhere to the rules of the political game, should we expect rightwing groups to adhere to these?".

Patriot further argued that if the government acts against the interests of its citizens (meaning whites), those citizens have no further obligations to the government and that they then have the right to look after their own interests (ibid). According to Treurnicht the government was directly responsible for rightwing violence since its reforms undermined the security of the whites in South Africa, leading them to take matters into their own hands (Patriot:29.6.90). Z.B. du Toit agreed "[De Klerk] created the climate within which whites regard violence as justified, and [he] makes matters worse by claiming that reforms are irreversible" (Patriot:13.7.90) [translation].

Treurnicht also attempted to find moral and even biblical justification for a nation's 'right' to resist a government which acted against its interests and freedom. He claimed:

> it is not a crime to think about resistance when your rights and your whole existence are being threatened....it is not treason to mobilize support to get rid of an erring government at the ballot box....However, if the government continues to play into the hands of the ANC by moving towards majority rule, we will exercise our rights to resistance even more strongly. There are instances where violence must be used to prevent further violence (Sunday Times:19.8.90; Patriot:24.8.90).

The London-based Sunday Times (28.5.90) quoted Treurnicht as saying "if you put a proud nation in chains, uprising against the law becomes its right". With reference to biblical justification for violence, Treurnicht claimed:

> the Bible does not take the side of tyrants who ignore the rights and freedom of their people and who destroy laws which protect them. The authority of a government is limited by the authority of God....if a law made by a government contradicts the authority of God or that of the freedom of a nation, it is not only permissible, but also acceptable, to disobey the government (Die Burger:20.8.90; Patriot:24.8.90) [translation].

The above-mentioned reference by Treurnicht to justified opposition to laws which "contradict the authority of God", had its origins in a book written by him 15 years earlier: In this book entitled Credo van 'n Afrikaner (1975:20), Treurnicht quoted from a publication by the NGK, Uit Een Bloed, to substantiate his claim that measures/laws which were devised to make a nation lose its national identity, contradicted the Old Testament and could therefore be regarded as sinful. He further said:

> As a volk we want to live and let live....We fight for our survival, because we understand that to commit [national] suicide is as sinful as committing murder [genocide] (ibid) [translation].

It is obvious that even as far back as 1975, Treurnicht had already decided in his own mind that racial integration was a sin, and should therefore be resisted at all costs. The use of the words 'fight', 'suicide' and 'murder' (or in broader terms, national suicide and genocide), emphasized that the term 'resistance' in this context was comprehensively defined to encompass civil war and rebellion.

A further method of trying to find justification for violent resistance to reform was to draw comparisons with

the struggles for independence of ethnic groups all over the world. An often-used example is the attempts of the Baltic Republics of the Soviet Union to regain their independence. Patriot closely monitored events in that region, and regularly published articles comparing the (heroic) secessionist struggles of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Slovenia and Croatia, with the "freedom struggle of the Afrikaner nation" (Patriot:6.7.90; 3.8.90; 10.8.90; 9.11.90; 16.11.90; 14.12.90; 18.1.91; 1.2.91; 8.2.91; 8.3.91; 15.3.91; 17.5.91; 14.6.91; 28.6.91; 5.7.91). Exerpts from some of these articles illustrate this point:

> The right of nations to use an armed struggle to achieve political freedom is universally acknowledged as moral and justified. For this reason no one is condemning the Baltic states for using violence to oppose Soviet imperialism. The contemporary world is moved by the drama of smaller nations resisting domination by larger ones, e.g. in Afghanistan and the Baltics. Against this background it would be surprising if the Afrikaner is denied the right to achieve his political freedom through violent means if necessary. The impression is gained that South Africa will be the scene of a classical freedom struggle by the Afrikaner nationalists, since their political enemies refuse to acknowledge their right to freedom (Patriot:15.2.91) [translation].

> Yugoslavia's agony: A lesson for De Klerk: White South Africans should learn from Yugoslavia's bitter struggle, and the forces which precipitated it. Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it (Patriot:5.7.91) [translation].

> [these events] prove that violence has become the most effective way whereby small nations can express their sentiments (Patriot 17.5.91) [translation].

In March 1991 allegations were made by the monthly magazine

Insig, which belongs to Nasionale Pers, which accused the CP of planning the creation of its own volksleer (people's army), and of planning to use an existing rightwing organization as a front for its military activities. The CP did not deny these allegations, but admitted that it supported the formation of "self-protection units" and "local guards units" (tuiswagte) by whites. It also pointed out that the government allowed the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, to keep its weapons, which left the whites with no option but to defend their freedom with the "necessary means" (Die Burger:25.3.91, 26.3.91).

b) Incidents of rightwing violence

One of the first public acts of lethal rightwing terror in modern South African times, the brutal slaying of several blacks on Strijdom Square in Pretoria in November 1988 by self-proclaimed Wit Wolf, Barend Strydom, was regarded at the time as an isolated incident by a lone madman. The relative lull in rightwing violence which followed this incident, gave credibility to this perception, but a few months later, everything had changed for the worse. From the middle of 1989 onwards, there was a proliferation of militant rightwing groups and a great increase in the number of acts of violence committed by such groups.

This was, firstly, a direct result of the political developments under the De Klerk administration, and secondly, because of the collapse of the AWB as the cohesive force in rightwing militancy. The AWB lost its primary position following the public antics of its leader, Eugene Terre'Blanche (including his involvement with former Sunday Times journalist Jani Allen, and accusations of womanizing and alcoholism thrown at him by close aides), and the organization's perceived lack of militancy (Kemp, 1990:113-129; The Argus:23.7.90). Many militant AWB members began to realize that their leader's revolutionary zeal extended little further than empty rhetoric and empty bravado, and that violent resistance had to be organized elsewhere. It led to what political analyst Wim Booyse, described as the "diaspora" of rightwing organizations from one to 28 para-military and 29 fundamentalist groups (Interview, 11.4.91; The Argus:23.7.90; 15.10.90; Vrye Weekblad:14.12.90). These groups were responsible for more than 50 acts of terror during the course of 1990, which represent about 15% of all acts of violence committed during that year (Vrye Weekblad:14.12.90).

During the years 1990-1991 rightwing violence was directed at government targets, leftwing organizations and against black civilians. Although many cases of (suspected)

mightwing terror were unsolved, an extensive list was compiled of the most serious proven and suspected acts of rightwing violence and disruption which resulted in the loss of life, injuries and damage to property, during the period September 1989 to December 1990. Data was obtained from four main sources, namely The Argus (12.5.90), Patriot (24.8.90), Vrye Weekblad (14.12.90) and a publication by the Institute of Criminology at UCT "Back to the Laager: The rise of white rightwing violence in South Africa, February 1991. These are present in chronological order.

September 12, 1989: SWAPO member Anton Lubowski murdered in Windoek - two members of the CCB, Calla Botha and Ferdi Barnard were detained by the police on suspicion of being involved in Lubowski's killing, but later released on a technicality;
February 3, 1990: The British Embassy in Pretoria is attacked with shotguns and the vierkleur is hoisted from the embassy flagpole;
April 14, 1990: Theft of weapons from the Air Force HQ in Pretoria by Piet Rudolf and collaborators;
April 17, 1990: Theft of weapons from the Wemmerspan Comando in Johannesburg;
May 5, 1990: Two Mamelodi men were shot dead by three white men after being forced off the road;
May 23, 1990: Explosion at Melrose House in Pretoria;
May 26, 1990: Explosion at offices of the Allied Workers Union in Rustenburg;
June 9, 1990: Explosion at National Union of Mineworkers in Welkom;
June 23, 1990: Bomb attack on NP headquarters in Johannesburg;
June 23, 1990: Bomb attack on NP election offices in Florida;
June 29, 1990: Bomb attack on DP city councillor, Clive Gilbert's house;
July 1, 1990: Bomb attack on a synagogue in Rosettenville;
July 2, 1990: Bomb attack on former NP city councillor, Jan Burger's house in Turffontein;

July 4, 1990: Bomb attack on the offices of the Vrye Weekblad in Johannesburg;
July 4 and 5, 1990: Bomb attacks on the offices of the National Union of Mineworkers in Carletonville;
July 6, 1990: Bomb attack on taxi ranks used by blacks in Johannesburg;
July 14, 1990: Hand grenade attacks on two hotels frequented by blacks in Florida and Roodepoort;
July 17, 1990: Explosion at the venue for an ECC meeting in East London;
July 22, 1990: Bomb attack on NP's Free State headquarters;
August 11, 1990: Bomb attack on black taxi ranks in Pretoria with the loss of several lives;
August 23, 1990: Explosion outside a hotel in Johannesburg used by ANC/SACP supporters;
September 2, 1990: Bomb attack at Beeld's offices in Johannesburg;
September 13, 1990: A white man petrol-bombed a bus full of black passengers in Johannesburg;
October 2, 1990: White owner of a computer firm in Durban, who supplied computer-related services to anti-apartheid organizations such as the ANC and MDM, killed by a parcelbomb;
October 3, 1990: Explosion at the home of the American Ambassador in Pretoria;
October 9, 1990: Seven blacks killed and 18 wounded in a revenge attack with on a bus at Avoca in Natal by three members of the AWB and Orde Boerevolk;
November 24, 1990: 40 AWB members attack a group of 400 black children in Louis Trichardt;
November 26, 1990: 30 Whites in uniform attack members of the National Union of Mineworkers in Welkom;
November 27, 1990: Eyewitnesses saw whites participating in the killing of 11 blacks at Kathlehong;
January 11, 1991: CCB-sponsored assassin, Donald Acheson, confessed to newspapers that the CCB killed Anton Lubowski and that he himself was sent to Namibia to kill newspaper editor Gwen Lister;

January 11, 1991: Another self-confessed CCB agent, Edward Gordon, murdered on a freeway in Cape Town by unidentified gunmen;
February 15, 1991: ANC laywer Bheki Mlangeni is killed at his home by an explosive device delivered by mail, originally intended for Dirk Coetzee;
May 11, 1991: Rightwing farmers attack squatters on the farm, Goegevonden near Ventersdorp, and become involved in running battle with police;
July 15, 1991: A powerful bomb blast devastates a former white school in Pretoria which was earmarked for occupation by returning children of ANC exiles.
August 9, 1991: Members of the AWB try to disrupt a meeting by the State President in Ventersdorp - three killed in the chaos that followed.

The above list represents some of the more notable incidences of violence which have occurred over the past 18 months and were either proven or suspected of being linked to rightwing groups. It includes suspected activities of the CCB's deathsquads and of the alleged "third force" in the violence in black townships in Natal and the Rand (In the case of the latter, suspicions were confirmed in July 1991, when a former member of the army's special forces, Five Reconnaissance Regiment, claimed that this unit was involved in the massacre on a train in September 1990 during which 26 people were killed, Cape Times:19.7.91).

It should be noted that these incidents of violence were targeted at various organizations across the political spectrum (except of course the Right), including the ANC and its affiliates, state institutions, academics, the press, the NP, the DP, foreigners, and even monuments. It should further be noted that incidents of rightwing violence has increased during the period under review, specifically in comparison to preceding years, but it is difficult to judge whether this is a reflection of the heightened white opposition to the De Klerk reforms, (i.e a trend particular to rightwing violence), or whether it merely is proportional to the overall increase in the levels of violence in South Africa during this period.

c) Violence: extremist rightwing organizations

Various rightwing groups have held different views and policies towards the use of violence against the state and other organizations. Wim Booyse classified these as follows:
The first is the social/friendship opportunist groups ("brandy and coke set") which consist of people who mostly talk about violence, but do very little in practice to this end - they are mostly without much of an ideology or carefully defined objectives. The second group, called "the transitional group", have an agenda, objectives and logistics. They form the backbone of the "extremist right" and consist of 87 organizations with membership ranging from three to more than 10 000. He identified 20 intellectual think-tanks, 20 para-military organizations of which the AWB and the BWB are the largest, and a further 30 fundamentalist organizations. According to Booyse the latter group is overtly fascist and could be described as "Hizbullah and IRA-types" in their approach, which is further characterized by a "Holy War" syndrome. The third group was identified by Booyse as the "counter-revolutionary group" which is regarded by him as the most sophisticated and dangerous. It consists of a number of highly sophisticated strategists and tacticians, but has no reason to expose itself at present (Interview:11.4.91; Argus:23.7.90; S.A. Foundation Review, September 1990).

Being the longest-established para-military rightwing group in the country, the **Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging's** philosophy towards violence can be summarized as follows: it regards itself as the supreme guarantor of Afrikaner nationalism - if developments in South Africa ever turned completely against the interests of the Afrikaner, the AWB believes that it would stand between the extermination and survival of the volk. For the most part the AWB's militancy has been confined to threats and the military training of its members. Since its founding it had several armed factions, e.g the Stormvalke (Storm Falcons), Blitsvalke (Lightening Falcons), the Witwagte (White Watch) and

finally the Brandwag (The Sentinel) (Kemp, 1990:158-159). Another group, Aquila, which served as Terre'Blanche's personal bodyguard, was never part of the AWB, but remained a private registered security firm which merely granted protection to members of the organization (ibid). In 1990 the training of the new "Boer Army" was publicly displayed for the first time. Afterwards Terre'Blanche gave members of this army the instruction to form their own commandos in their respective hometowns (Rapport:13.5.90).

During a speech in May 1990 in Ventersdorp Terre'Blanche mentioned the possibility of a Boer "holy war", and according to Terre'Blanche the day had arrived that the volk must take back its fatherland. He gave the Minister of Law and Order the following warning:

> Vlok, I want to tell you today that we are also policemen and soldiers and we can look after ourselves. And if you are going to prevent us from carrying our weapons at public meetings, I warn you: don't interfere with a Boer's weapons (Rapport:13.5.90) [translation].

He also emphasized that the AWB would declare war on the same day that the ANC became part of the government (ibid). Declarations of war seemed to be a normal part of the AWB's day-to-day activities - AWB area secretary, Blignaut, also declared an "all-out" war on the ANC a short while before (The Argus:9.5.90). He repeated his warning in July 1990, following the statement made by Chris Hani of the ANC, concerning the taking of power from the government:

> Hani is warned: The AWB accepts his provocative challenges in the same spirit in which he made them. If the ANC wants to take over our armed forces or wants to maintain law and order in their place, all hell will break loose in the Republic and the Boers will root them out (Cape Times:24.7.90).

Throughout 1990 the AWB's threats were aimed in equal measures at the ANC on the one hand, and at the government on the other. In August the organization again threatened to chase Hani "all the way back to the Transkei", but also

referred to the government: "The blacks have never been a threat. Our threat comes from the miserable white traitors who are selling us out" (Servaas de Wet, "kommandant-generaal" (colonel) of the AWB commandos, The Argus:25.8.90).

When the police began detaining rightwingers suspected of attempts of violence in 1990, Terre'Blanche issued a further warning against the government's "friendship" with the ANC:

> No government can force a nation to give in. In this case the government is trying by means of arrests and intimidation to force the people to hand over to the communists. Innocent whites and true Boer nationalists, who are only true to their people and fatherland, are now becoming the target of the government's obsequious politics in order to demonstrate their acceptability to the ANC. This transgression must be stopped immediately, and our people who have already been detained for longer than a month under Article 29 must now be brought before court so that their innocence or guilt can be proven. Should this not happen, greater resistance and anger can be expected from whites (Cape Times:10.7.90).

During the same week that Terre'Blanche made this speech, three members of the AWB attacked a bus carrying black passengers, killing seven and injuring 26. They were arrested a few days later and sentenced to death by the Court (Cape Times:18.10.90).

Towards the middle of 1990 many more suspected rightwing activists were arrested and detained by the police, so much so that by December of that year 57 were jailed or awaiting trial in detention (Sunday Times:23.12.90). The state's tougher approach towards rightwing militants and their detention under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act, made the AWB more cautious about getting involved in violence. After incidents of terror in which blacks were killed, Terre'Blanche was quick to distance the AWB from the "Wild West approach", and said the organization did not

approve of violence and did not plant bombs indiscriminately (Cape Times:17.7.90). His sentiments were echoed by Colonel De Wet, who said the organization would act within the limitations of the Internal Security Act as it could not afford to have any more Afrikaners locked up in jail (The Argus:25.8.90).

The views of the **Boerestaat Party** under leadership of Robert van Tonder conform with those of the AWB, and the two organizations formed an alliance to create a "Boer army" early during 1990. This army was organized on commando-lines and was similar to those of the former Boer republics (a commandant in every town and a general for every region). Van Tonder was quoted as saying that the possibility of a rightwing revolution depended on whether the "quisling"government intended to hand over power to the ANC, PAC and SACP. He would act when the government sacrificed the Boer nation's independence and identity, and was confident that such a revolution would enjoy the support of the majority of the army and police (Vrye Weekblad:27.4.90). At the same time he denied that the Boerestaat Party members had any intention op killing members of the ANC, and claimed that he recognized the aspirations of certain ANC members. He also compared the intended Boer rebellion with those of the Basques in Spain, the Irish and the Lithuanians (Interview:10.4.9).

Another rightwing group, **Orde Boerevolk**, founded by Piet Skiet Rudolph, had achieved notoriety by actively getting involved in various incidents of violence. This group was accused of the bomb explosions at Melrose House (a Pretoria museum), and at the offices of FAWU, the Beeld and the National Party. The group's biggest 'achievement' was the theft of firearms, amunition and equipment from the Air Force headquarters in Pretoria in April 1990. Rudolph and his colleague, Bredenhann, committed the theft with the help of national servicemen within the SAAF, and managed to avoid arrest for several months with the help of friends and a 'fifth column' of rightwing supporters within the

security forces (Sunday Times:22.4.90). Rudolph spoke on occasion of the need for a counter revolution:

> The volk already face a revolution. The more reform concessions, the greater the chance of revolution. That's why the Afrikaner must organize a counter-revolutionary movement (The Argus:19.4.90).

While on the run from the police, Rudolph became known as the Boere Pimpernel and according to his friend, Robert van Tonder, Rudolph would never have been caught alive, and if he was, would probably have gone on a hunger strike immediately (Vrye Weekblad:14.9.90). The high expectations which his admirers had of him were quickly dispelled. A few days before his arrest in Septmenber 1990, Rudolph became nervous and called on his followers to hand back the stolen weapons (Weekly Mail:20.12.90). He also called on the "fighting section" of the Boerevolk to stop all aggressive and illegal action, since its goal had been achieved, namely to bring the cause of the Boers under the attention of the "treacherous leader", De Klerk and his "second-rate band of thugs" (Die Burger:28.8.90).

When Rudolph was finally arrested by the police, his hunger strike lasted two days, and shortly afterwards he rejected, on behalf of Orde Boerevolk, violence as a method of achieving the goals of the organization, in favour of negotiation (Rapport:7.1.91). Rudolph's turnabout was regarded by many of his followers as treacherous, but according to Robert van Tonder, it must have been the result of "torture" and pressure by the security police, while Wim Booyse regarded Rudolph as an opportunist whose sudden conversion to peaceful negotiations is merely a ploy to enable him to request political amnesty (Vrye Weekblad:11.1.91). He was also accused by Koos van der Merwe of being a government agent ('Koos' document, 1990). Stung by allegations of treachery and cowardice, Rudolph commenced his hunger strike in February 1991, which led various rightwing groups to threaten the government with "violent repercussions" if he died (Sunday Times:3.3.91). In March 1991 Rudolph was granted indemnity by the

government and released from prison, but he was briefly arrested a few days later for obstructing the police from fulfilling its tasks. Subsequently he has been involved in acts of public violence and was arrested more than once.

Members of the rightwing group, Order of Death, were also involved in the planning and execution of deeds of terror. They planned among other things, the assassination of at least seven Cabinet Ministers. Two members of the Vaal Triangle cell, Goosen and Lottering, admitted in court that they killed a black taxi driver in order to prove their commitment to the cause (Sunday Times:18.11.90). Lottering defended the murder on religious grounds and claimed that it was done in aid of the "survival" of the nation:

> My battle is against the heathen forces which threaten my volk's existence as a Christian nation....As a soldier of the Boerevolk I am compelled to act against elements which endanger our safety....Because blacks are my natural enemies and I am entitled, according to the Bible, to destroy my enemies, the act (of murder) did not perturb me at all (ibid).

Lottering's defence was almost identical to that of another member of Orde Boerevolk, Eugene Marais, who appeared in court for the murder of seven blacks:

> All those people who were not Israelites had not been made by God, but by Satan. Blacks were animals of the field, animals that looked like people....it was therefore not a sin to kill blacks (Die Burger:14.3.91; Sunday Times:17.3.91).

The Boere Weerstandsbeweging, which was also associated with Van Tonder's Boerestaat Party, was numerically the strongest of all the militant rightwing groups and boasted about 18 000 members in 1990 (as opposed to the 6 000 of the AWB), of whom about 80% have had military training courtesy of the SADF (Booyse, cited in The Argus:15.10.90). This group had its own self-defence structures and its own independent intelligence and counter-intelligence units (Booyse, interview:11.4.91). Its leader, Andrew Ford, recently claimed that at least 1 500 government spies had infiltrated the rightwing, but that members of the BWB, in

its turn, had agents in all branches of the security forces Rapport:19.5.91). Ironically, another leader of this organization, Piet Bester, on occasion claimed that none of the rightwing organizations had the capability, discipline or infrastructure to commit large-scale violence (Vrye Weekblad:19.7.91). He claimed that the whole rightwing movement was a farce: "After preaching violence for 19 years, nothing had been achieved in practice". Bester was also one of the rightwing leaders who met with the ANC on two occasions, in October 1990 and in May 1991, to discuss the "historic claims" of the Boers and their 'right' to protect their identity. He claimed that he and other rightwingers came out of these negotiations with the ANC (including Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and Aziz Pahad) with the conviction that a compromise can be achieved with regard to a "separate state and a federal system" (ibid). Later Bester was later accused of being a government agent by Ford, and condemned to death, before the latter left the organization (ibid).

The **White Liberation Army** claimed responsibility for a taxi-rank blast in July 1990 and further threatened to assassinate the Minister for Law and Order, Adrian Vlok, as well as Chris Hani of the ANC, if detained rightwingers were not released (Cape Times:10.7.90). The activities of the **World Apartheid Movement**, with a foreign component of Belgian and British citizens, was curtailed after the arrest of some of its members following a spate of bomb attacks during the second half of 1990. Members of this organization were also suspected of being involved in planning to use chemical and biological weapons to kill large numbers of blacks, and to assassinate Cabinet Ministers Pik Botha, Gerrit Viljoen and President De Klerk (Rapport:18.11.90; Vrye Weekblad:30.11.90). Its leader, Koos Vermeulen, was suspected by the government of being the link between the organization and other international rightwing movements such as the Basque Separatist Movement in Spain (although it is doubtful whether the Basques can be regarded as rightwing), the British movement, DARE, the Companions of Justice, the New Force Party, the French

neo-Nazi movement L'Assaut and the Ku Klux Klan in the USA (Vrye Weekblad:30.11.90; Sunday Times:9.12.90).

A group which expressed a similar admiration for international terror groups, in particular the Irish Republican Army, was identified early in 1991 - this was the Boer Republican Army (BRA), which also kept a hit list containing the names of all the "enemies of the Boers", including members of the government, the Broederbond, the ANC, British and American consular staff and the offices of multinationals such as Shell and BP (Cape Times:4.3.91).

Another rightwing group with no pretences about its goals, is the Boerekommando under leadership of Gawie Volschenk. This group regarded its attack on the former white school building in Pretoria in July 1991, which was earmarked for occupation by the children of ANC exiles, as the beginning of a new phase of violent resistance (Vrye Weekblad:19.7.91). According to Volschenk, his supporters were past the era of "banners and protests", and were prepared to use violence and to sacrifice their lives to resist the "communist-inspired and godless" government, which was busy "giving away their land" (ibid). Confirming what had been said by Wim Booyse earlier, namely that these rightwing groups were entering the "C3" phase, namely to create and refine their infrastructure, Volschenk claimed:

> We are in the process of preparing ourselves physically and mentally, and working out the finer detail of the struggle....We don't appear in public anymore (ibid).

A further alarming trend during the period under review was the formation of white vigilante groups and the transformation of neighbourhood watches from relatively harmless to rightwing-controlled militant organizations. According to Booyse the rightwing's seizure of neighbourhood watches should not be seen in a vacuum, but rather as the creation of grassroots organizations which

could be powerful forces in future if and when activated (The Argus:23.7.90). In Boksburg 8 000 armed whites formed "Blanke Veiligheid" under leadership of Hennie Mulder, who regarded the organization as a logical antipode to the ANC's Umkhonto we Sizwe (Sunday Times:13.5.90). According to Vrye Weekblad (13.7.90) members of the Boksburg town council planned to incorporate neighbourhood watches over the whole country into one system, controlled by a communications network centred at Jan Smuts airport.

The activities of **rightwing elements within the security forces**, in particular the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) and its alleged death squads, form an important part of an analysis of rightwing militancy in South Africa. The activities of the CCB became public first in 1989, after reporters from the Star and Vrye Weekblad newspapers unveiled its existence. This was followed by the revelations in October 1989 by former CCB member, Almond Nofomela, then awaiting execution for murder, of his activities while a member of the organization. His allegations were confirmed shortly afterwards by the leader of Nofemela's CCB cell, Dirk Coetzee, who made public his part in the Bureau's activities in the Vrye Weekblad. Coetzee, a former police captain, claimed to have led a death squad sanctioned by senior police officers, with the goal of eliminating enemies of the State. His allegations implicated people such as former SAP Commissioner General Coetzee, the former 'superspy' Craig Williamson, and head of the police's forensic department, General Lothar Neethling.

Coetzee's claims were subsequently substantiated by other members of these death squads, while statistics on politically-motivated assassinations lent further credibility to these claims (these exclude non-political murders by policemen, e.g. the murder of a black drug dealer by two policemen, Jack la Grange and Robert van der Merwe, for no political cause whatsoever). According to

human rights organizations at least 45 opponents of apartheid have been assassinated by death squads up to 1989. These included victims like Rick Turner (1978), Griffiths Mxenge (1981), Matthew Goniwe (1985), Frank Martin (1986), Fabian and Florence Ribeiro (1986), Ruth First, Marius Schoon and his family, Eric Gumede, David Webster (1989), Anton Lubowski (1989), Dulcie September (1988). Not surprising is the fact that only one of these murders has been solved over the past 12 years by the police, compared to the outstandingly successful figures of between 50% and 89% for normal crimes (Newsweek:13.11.89).

The CCB received further mention during an investigation by the commander of the Brixton Murder and Robbery Squad, Brig. Floris Mostert, into the assassination of anti-apartheid activist, David Webster. Mostert claimed that he found evidence that "the aforementioned secret organization was responsible for different incidents of murder, arson, bomb explosions at buildings, and intimidation" (Laurence, 1990:26).

After intense pressure, De Klerk appointed a commission of enquiry into the activities of the CCB under Judge Harms early in 1990. The Commission's findings revealed little new, as most evidence of the CCB's activities was destroyed beforehand, in contravention of the explicit orders of the Minister of Defence: whole files dealing with certain projects disappeared; in addition the diary of the coordinator of one of the CCB's cells (who appeared before the Commission in disguise and using the pseudonym "Brits") was incomplete, as some of the pages were missing - in particular the pages dealing with events of 12 and 13 September 1989 - the 12th, by some 'coincidence', being the same day of the assassination of Anton Lubowski in Windhoek in 1989 (Rapport:13.5.90). Furthermore, most CCB members who were asked to testify in front of the Commission, refused to answer questions relating to specific incidents on grounds that their answers could have incriminated them (Laurence, 1990:45).

Although the findings of the Harms Commission did not succeed in opening the Pandora's Box of state-sponsored terrorism, it proved the existence of about 140 CCB members, who had been involved in at least 200 clandestine operations against opponents of the government. However, long-held suspicions were finally confirmed by the findings of Mr Justice Kriegler of the Supreme Court in January 1991 in the Lothar Neethling case. Kriegler found that Dirk Coetzee was speaking the truth when he implicated Neethling as an important figure in the death squad saga, which put a new perspective on all the allegations regarding the activities of the CCB.

However, the disbanding of the CCB in June 1990 and the absorption of its members into the SADF did not lead to the end of its activities. According to Laurence (1990:60) the CCB remained active during 1990, when several more black activists were killed, e.g Maswanganye of the Soweto Civic Association, Nonno, a trade union official and Molokwane, a Brits activist. In addition, there was evidence that CCB agents had been and were still operating in South Africa in 1991, with the sole intention of committing acts of terror which would harm the peaceful transition process or to settle old scores. To these can be added the disclosure in January 1991, by Donald Acheson, self-proclaimed assassin, that the CCB did murder Lubowski, and that he himself had been sent by the CCB to Namibia to kill newspaper editor, Gwen Lister, a disclosure which resulted in him going into hiding out of fear of revenge from his former CCB 'masters' (Vrye Weekblad:11.1.91). Acheson also claimed that the CCB had set up 42 cells across the country, the activities of only one having been revealed so far (Sunday Times:13.1.91). During the same week that Acheson spoke out, in January 1991, another former CCB agent, Edward Gordon, who became an informer on the activities of the CCB, was murdered in Cape Town (ibid).

These events indicate that elements of the CCB were still active early during 1991, a view shared by other analysts

like Booyse, who mentioned the existence of a "silent faction of rightwing subversives operating inside the governmental system" (Sunday Times:23.12.90). Further evidence of activities after the supposed disbanding of the CCB came to light in February 1991. It was revealed that financial irregularities had occurred within the CCB six months after the public suspension of its activities. The Auditor-General reported that members of the CCB had tried to hand themselves a further unauthorized R4 million in retirement gratuities (Cape Times:18.2.91).

What became clear from the CCB affair was that elements within the State had been killing opponents of the State with the State's blessing, and that these elements, although officially disowned by the State, were still active by early 1991, albeit with a different agenda. Their only goal at this stage could be to wreck the negotiation process by fanning violence between IFP and the ANC.

Among those who held this view was Nelson Mandela, who accused elements of the military intelligence, the National Intelligence Service and the CCB of being responsible for the black-on-black violence which has been wracking the country during 1990 (Cape Times:12.10.90). His opinion was shared by an editor of the Sowetan, Thami Mazwai:

> The fighting has been exploited by rightwingers in the white community and government security forces. Elements in the police, incensed by De Klerk's liberalization policies are accused of stoking the violence and even arming factions as a way to 'prove' that blacks are not ready to join in governing the nation. Circumstantial evidence points strongly at the participation of whites in some of the slaughter. It seems clear that some third force, whoever is behind it, is determined to turn the black townships into little Beiruts, and thus frustrate negotiations (cited in The Seattle Times:14.10.90).

The role of the government in the activities of the CCB has not as yet been fully clarified, and so far the Ministers

of Defence and of Law and Order have denied any knowledge of its activities. However, it is unlikely that the government under leadership of PW Botha was not aware of these, as the official ideology of the government, until De Klerk came to power in September 1989, was much more rightwing than it is under the present administration - which implies that the activities of the CCB coincided very much with the Botha government's policies at the time. This would mean that the CCB was not regarded as extra-ordinary or particularly rightwing-orientated during the Botha-era of destabilization. Simply put, if one classifies the CCB's activities as rightwing, then the whole state structure of the Botha-era should also be classified as such. It is therefore very likely that the securocrats, some of whom are still in power at the time of writing, not only knew of the CCB, but in fact gave it direct orders.

With the scaling down of the security establishment under President De Klerk and the revelations of the CCB's activities, it was possible that there had been a temporary lull in its activities or even that the military establishment had disowned the organization, but this did not imply that the goals of its members and the ideology which they stood for, had been extinguished. Former members of the CCB have the potential and resources to form the "unknown rightwing entity" of which Booyse had warned, especially with its considerable funds stashed away and with its experience in the practise of terror.

The danger of leaving the CCB-issue unresolved is summarized by Gerald Shaw of the Cape Times (25.1.91):

> The death squad scandal remains unresolved and the CCB killer squads, which remain at large, could become the core of a spreading malignancy in the body politic, again following the OAS precedent in Algeria...which unleashed, in a last-ditch stand, a campaign of bloody terror.

Closely related to the CCB is the issue of **rightwing elements within the security forces**. It is especially

relevant when considering the possibility of a rightwing coup supported by the elements within the military. Evidence in support of the belief of a strong rightwing presence in the defence force and especially in the police is difficult to obtain, but the few anlysts who have made claims in this regard all were of opinion that a coup was not a possibility in South Africa under present conditions.

According to General Bob Rogers, former chief of the Air Force, the CP enjoyed widespread support among members of the SADF, but he doubted whether it would ever result in a coup attempt since this support would be scattered and few officers would participate (Report by Institute of Criminology, UCT: Back to the Laager, February 1991). This view was supported by General Jannie Geldenhuys, former Chief of the Defence Force, who said that permanent force soldiers made up less than 2% of the total numbers in the Defence Force and that [even if they all are rightwing supporters], it would not be possible for such a small group to manipulate the whole Force. He also cautioned against drawing comparisons between the SADF and e.g. the OAS of Algeria and said that the SADF had no tradition of a coup d'etat (Insig, April 1991).

The views of these two former Defence Force officers corresponded with those of analysts Wim Booyse, Deon Fourie of Unisa and Mike Hough of the University of Pretoria, who all were of the opinion that the officer corps in the SADF had a reputation of respect for the civilian authority and was too professional to take up arms if it was unhappy with the government (ibid). However Booyse believed that there was a considerable degree of strife within the Army which was exacerbated by the demoralizing effect of the CCB affair, but that this would present itself mostly in the actions of individual key-officers and units, rather than the Defence Force as a whole. Such units could for example mobilize to assist in the proclamation of a volkstaat and to defend its borders (ibid). Booyse estimated the support for the rightwing among senior officer corps of the Defence

Force at about 40% and among that of the police force at about 10% (Interview:11.4.91).

A common characteristic of rightwing organizations is their belief that the security forces would stand by them in times of need. Robert van Tonder for example firmly believed that the army and police would never shoot at members of their own families or friends and would therefore refuse to act against a rightwing rebellion (Interview:10.4.91) (this belief was proven incorrect by the events at Goedgevonden and at Ventersdorp in May and August 1991).

Attempts were made by the rightwing to substantiate its belief in the strength of its support among the security forces. Derby-Lewis of the CP claimed that the Party enjoyed the support of the "vast majority" of the security forces, while Barney Uys offered 'first-hand' information that 93% of army troops voted for the CP in Vereeniging in the 1987 general election (Zille, 1988:82).

While many rightwing claims in this respect are highly exaggerated, an interesting case was that of CP MP Jan Hoon's estimate on the strength of rightwing support within the police. Hoon declared in an interview that at least 80% of the white members of the police force were rightwing, but refused to say how he calculated this figure (Interview:7.2.91). Two months later Hoon's estimate was confirmed by a member of the Cape Town riot squad, Sergeant Geoff MacMaster, who claimed in a BBC interview that 99% of South African policemen do not trust the government (Cape Times:16.4.91). A different picture comes from a M&M survey conducted in August 1991, which included a question on the careers of the members of its panel. The findings indicated that 50% of the police supported the NP, 7% the CP and 43% were not prepared to respond to the question. Of the respondents in the Defence Force, 60,7% supported the NP and 35% the CP (see also chapter three, page 131).

In summary, on the basis of existing information, the consensus among political analysts seems to be that rightwing elements within the security forces are not powerful enough to organize a successful coup d'etat in South Africa under present conditions. This does not exclude the possibility of a coup if the transitional process goes awry and turns the country into a state of total anarchy. It also does not exclude the possibility of rogue army units in specific areas from individually supporting a localized attempt at seccession e.g. in the northern Transvaal or northern Cape by elements of the rightwing.

Conclusion

This chapter dealt with the territorial demands and political strategies of the rightwing. It was shown that demands relating to partition and secession are manifestations of the desire by rightwingers to create homogeneity in the territory regarded as the Afrikaner or white fatherland. Such demands are not unique to the rightwing, and according to Horowitz, are the expected response of groups which are plagued by insecurity and the fear of domination and extinction, and often appear to be irrational on economic or other grounds.

As has been found in the case of the rightwing, such apparent irrationality reflects the deeper fear for the loss of Afrikaner identity and status, and of domination and genocide. The examples of often-irrational constitutional proposals of the rightwing cited in this chapter, illustrate this phenomenon. For example, the CP's firm belief, as late as 1991, that it can reintroduce the major pillars of grand apartheid against the wishes of about 30 million blacks on the verge of liberation, or the AWB's demand for the ressurection of the Boer Republics destroyed in 1902, or Carel Boshoff's plans to create a state for three million highly-urbanized Afrikaners in the

arrid, inhospitable and very rural northwestern Cape. Yet, seen in the light of the pervasive, permeative and highly emotional nature of ethnic conflict in general, it is obvious that rightwing Afrikaner nationalism had developed an "ethnic dynamic" of its own, one in which the forces of industrialization, and rational economic and political 'guidelines' play little or no role.

The CP's territorial demands are a continuation of the NP's former homeland policy, which, since 1948, attempted to transform South Africa into a racially-homogeneous white state by unilaterally removing blacks from 'white' territory. The Afrikaner secessionist organizations, such as Stigting Afrikanervryheid, have a slightly different philosophy insofar as they want to achieve homogeneity and create a fatherland by withdrawing Afrikaners from 'black' South Africa. However, whereas the Afrikaner secessionists have limited goals and envisage a fatherland drastically reduced in size, the CP's ambitious constitutional plans are confronted by the same economic and political realities which forced the NP to abandon key elements of its policy during the 1980's. For this reason the CP's policy of partition has been facing increasingly hostile challenges not only from other political entities, but also from within its own ranks in the form of a pragmatic wing which is urging the Party to adopt to the changed political environment caused by reform. The pragmatists within the CP are arguing that the Party's policy of partition is interspersed with racism and ethnocentrism and therefore disqualifies the Party from representing the Afrikaner's case for self-determination.

To further its demands for an Afrikaner or white fatherland, the rightwing has been following a number of political strategies. These ranged from the CP's vehement opposition to the government's reform programme in Parliament, at municipal level, in the spheres of education, labour, religion, the Security Forces, agriculture, by organising mass protests and by attempting to force the government to

call another whites-only election. Also under consideration is the possibility of trying to achieve the goal of self-determination at the negotiation table, possibily in alliance with conservative black homeland leaders, but this option is propagated only by a small number of pragmatists in the CP and rightwing think-tanks. The third strategy concerns violent opposition to reform and encompasses the threat by the CP to unleash a civil war if the government "capitulates", as well as murder and sabotage by extremist rightwing organizations and rightwing elements within the Security Forces.

The focus of this chapter on the inter-relationship between ideology, territorial demands and political strategies, revealed inherent contradictions within the rightwing. The awkward position in which the CP found itself in 1991 serves as a prime example: as the Party struggled to reconcile the growing tension between its two wings over matters such as the size, location and ethnic composition of the proposed fatherland, it was forced into changing its policy on these matters. However, such policy changes necessitated strategy options to be reviewed in tandem, e.g. the adherence to the policy of racially-based grand apartheid excluded the possibility of participating in all-party negotiations. On the other hand, switching to an ethnic Afrikaner Party with a claim to a homeland with clearly-defined boundaries, could alienate not only tens of thousands of English-speaking supporters, but also hundreds of thousands of Afrikaner supporters who found themselves outside of the borders of the proposed fatherland.

It is doubtful whether the CP could withstand these contradictory forces for any extended period of time without disintegrating.

8. CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to isolate and analyze the issues which have become synonymous with white rightwing politics between 1969 and 1991. It described its Afrikaner nationalist roots, provided an analyses of these roots in class and status terms, and revieved its current strength, policies and strategies. Since no other project of this magnitude has been published on this topic, it was deemed necessary to cover a comprehensive range of issues, using qualitative descriptive research. The thesis was guided in many respects by Donald Horowitz's theoretical framework, although other approaches were also considered where Horowitz' theory were deemed inadequate to explain the particular characteristics of the interethnic (macro) and intraethnic (micro) nature of the rightwing dynamic.

Horowitz's hypothesis implies that there is a psychological dynamic inherent in ethnicity which tends overwhelm seemingly rational economic and political interests, and that ethnic conflict should be understood in terms of the collective drive by ethnic groups to obtain or maintain social status and power. As applied to this thesis, Horowitz's approach facilitates an understanding of issues relating to the roots of Afrikaner nationalism, the subordinate status of materialist issues in comparison to identity and social status issues, the policies and objectives of the rightwing, and the strategies considered by the rightwing to achieve its goals.

In chapter three it was found that the Afrikaner nationalism is the driving force behind the rightwing, and therefore, that the origins of the present-day rightwing can be traced back to the emergence and mobilization of Afrikaner nationalism during the 1930's and 1940's. The process of mobilization resulted in an ethnic group with rigid social boundaries strongly reliant on the primordial aspects of Afrikaner ethnicity, such as a common language, religion, history and territory. Once the NP began to stray

from this narrow ethnic path during the mid-1960's, the result was growing disunity between the verkramptes and the verligtes which led to the founding of the Herstigte Nationale Party in 1969 and the Conservative Party in 1982. It should emphasised, therefore, that the rightwing did not emerge within an ideological vacuum, but merely represented a continuation of the NP's policies conceived before and after 1948. As the NP transformed itself into a party which represented broader white interests during the 1970's and 1980's, and eventually to an even more inclusive South African nationalism in the early-1990's, it remained for the rightwing to carry the flame of 'pure' unbridled Afrikaner nationalism.

The remainder of chapter three dealt with the identity and dimensions of the rightwing, and an attempt was made to formulate an operational definition. Although the rightwing claims the support of 50% or more of Afrikaners, it clearly cannot be regarded as an ethnic group per se, nor as an ethnic subgroup, as Horowitz's definition of this concept pertains to languistic, religious, caste, clan and territorial distinctions, and not ideological or strategical differences. Neither can it be regarded purely as a political entity with a particular ideological agenda based on political conservatism, white supremacy and racism, for the reason that as its support base operates within a clearly identifiable ethnic group, of which the boundaries are sufficiently pliable to include all like-minded members of the white 'racial' group. A more accurate description would be that of a segment of the white racial group espousing a particular ideological agenda based on both white supremacy and Afrikaner ethnonationalism, and with the strategic objectives of racial separation and ethnic self-determination. This inclusive definition allows for a wide number of organizations to be analyzed under the term rightwing, all of which fit the above description, but are divided by differences of method by which they hope to achieve their objectives. Such differences refer to conflicting interpretations of the term 'Afrikaner', over

parliamentary/extra-parliamentary politics, over violent/nonviolent strategies, and over the size and location of the white, Afrikaner or 'Boer' fatherland. The foundation of the rightwing movement is the CP, which, over the past ten years, had systematically spread its influence through all spheres of the white South African society and was able to function both as a parliamentary party and as the convener of an extra-parliamentary rightwing front.

Chapters four and five analyzed the forces which shaped Afrikaner nationalism and dealt with material and non-material explanations for the existence of the rightwing. Although this thesis rejected the modernization approach (which suggested that ethnicity would be overtaken by class) and it was argued that symbolic issues related to status and power are the key to understanding the rightwing and its commitment to ethnonationalism, the influence of material factors cannot be ignored. Chapter four dealt the class aspect of the intra-Afrikaner conflict, and by tracing the evolvement of broedertwis from the 1960's onwards, came to the conclusion that in addition to identity factors, there is a considerable class element attached to the rightwing support base. This is in line with the universal phenomenon that lower-class people are more racist, and is supported by various analysts, surveys and empirical research.

However, while an analysis of the emergence of the rightwing would be incomplete without an analysis of its class base, the conflictual modernization approach confirms that rightwing ethnonationalism closely followed the patterns in other divided societies with respect to the overwhelming strength, and the permeative, pervasive and passionate nature of ethnicity. While both Linz and Giliomee argue that primordialism forms a weak basis for a drive to nationhood, the opposite holds for the rightwing, as the virtual deification of the Afrikaner status symbols such as language, religion, history and territory testifies to. This follows Horowitz's proposition that an ethnic flanking party has nothing to lose by taking an extreme

position on ethnic issues which, it is argued in this chapter, includes ethnocentrism and racism. In addition, it was found that the fear of ethnic domination and suppression, a major reason why ethnic groups vie for power, contribute greatly to the understanding of the psychological dynamic of rightwing political behaviour. This dynamic often continues to shape ethnic behaviour even when such behaviour appears to be irrational in economic and political terms, e.g. the overwhelming desire by the rightwing to achieve self-determination at all costs. It was further found that fear of ethnic domination and suppression can easily be translated in divided societies into a fear of physical extermination or genocide, which was a prominent feature not only of the rightwing, but was also ingrained in the collective consciousness of the vast majority of whites in South Africa.

The electoral strength of the rightwing and the factors which strengthened and weakened its support, are analyzed in detail in chapter six as the practical manifestation of what Horowitz described as intraethnic 'outbidding and outflanking' between the CP and the NP. It was found that the strength of the official rightwing increased from about 3% of whites by 1977 to 31% in 1989, and if by-elections were used as a measure, that its rate of growth steadily accelerated with an average of a further 14% between 1989 and 1991. This was in response to far-reaching political reforms during this period, as the NP moved closer to the multiethnic (non-racial) centre and further away from its own ethnic support base, and risked being outflanked by the CP. Apart from reform, numerous other issues further assisted the growth of the rightwing, the most important of these being the social and economic disruptions which often accompany periods of great structural change. However, as in the case of most ethnic political movements, the CP also experienced limitations to its growth rate, especially because of the increasing international and domestic costs of policies which advocate white domination and racial exclusivity.

According to Horowitz, a knowledge of a group's status and legitimacy would allow for a forecast on its political claims. Prediction has no place in this thesis, but in chapter seven the stated territorial objectives of the rightwing is discussed in detail, all of which contain the demand for complete racial exclusivity and Afrikaner and white self-determination, to be facilitated by making the territory perceived to be the 'fatherland', more homogenous. Depending on the perspectives of various rightwing organizations, the latter objective was to be achieved either through partition or secession. These concepts differed insofar as they both envisaged different areas, in some cases where boundaries were based in historical considerations, and others with practical considerations in mind.

Although the rightwing's constitutional proposals are fundamentally irreconcilable with the current political and economical realities in South Africa, they should judged against the background of Horowitz's proposition that the demands of ethnic groups might appear to be irrational, but could be the result of an ethnic dynamic - in this case, the desire to maintain the social status and identity of the Afrikaner and to prevent domination by the majority at all costs. The volkstaat proposals best illustrate this point, as Boshoff fully realized that considerable economic sacrifices would have to be made in order to create a politically and economically viable Afrikaner homeland in the northwestern Cape.

The political changes of the period subsequent to February 1990 resulted in the re-evaluation of existing rightwing policies, in particular those of the CP. This led to the emergence of ideological differences within the Party between the pragmatists and the traditionalists and confirmed the proposition that the brief periods of unity in Afrikaner history were the exception rather than the rule. New strategies were devised with which to combat what the CP perceived to be a government reforming without a

mandate. These included non-violent resistance with the aim of obstructing reform measures and enforcing a whites-only general election or a referendum on a new constitution. It also resulted in a more militant approach and an acceptance in principle of violence as a means of preventing the government from relinquishing white domination. This attitude, prevalent for several years among many extra-parliamentary rightwing groups, spilled over to the CP after February 1990, as the Party vowed to oppose the government's 'treachery' with force and to unleash a civil war if need be.

Finally, what are the implications of the above findings for South African politics in general, and more specific, for future research in the field of rightwing politics?

> The rightwing is the spiritual heir of the powerful but destructive ideology of racial exclusivity and white domination, which was characteristic of South Africa for over three hundred years. In a society which remains de facto and de jure under white domination, the rightwing therefore cannot be regarded as insignificant, at least not until a new non-racial constitution is implemented and the balance of political, economical and military power shifts from the white minority to the majority.

> The concept of Afrikaner ethnonationalism has been the driving force behind Afrikaner politics for the largest part of the 20th century, and being based on the preservation of the Afrikaner identity and status through self-determination, is the single most important element of the rightwing's raison d'etre. If conceptualized in purely ethnic terms without the traditional racist baggage, it is the only part of its ideology which could possibly meet with the internationally accepted norms for the self-determination of peoples. It goes without saying that other elements of the rightwing ideology, such as the demands based on racism and the desire to maintain economic privileges, would be rejected as incompatible with such norms. The demand for Afrikaner self-determination is

currently receiving strong reinforcement by way of comparison from the emerging nationalisms of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Croatia, Scotland and Quebec, to name but a few. These examples are perceived by the rightwing as proof of the fact that it is not possible to force competing nationalisms into one state and that its claims are legitimate and compatible with those of nations elsewhere.

> The implications of strong lower-class support for the rightwing are quite obvious. As the economic position of whites worsens and the numbers of lower-class whites increase as a result of redistributive policies by the government and the reduction of state subsidization of whites, so the support for the CP, whose policies imply the reversal of this trend, should increase.

> In line with the universal fear of majority domination common among all ethnic minorities, fear based on real and imagined threats is very much a part of the rightwing's political dynamic. Fear in this sense refers not only to the loss of economic privileges or Afrikaner identity, but also to fear of personal safety and group-based genocide. As the research findings indicated, this kind of fear stretches far beyond the confines of rightwing psyche, for when it comes to self-preservation, there is little difference between a rightwing and a liberal white. Although these fears are largely unfounded, they are a real part of the rightwing (and white) psyche, and successfully allaying them would contribute greatly to the reduction of rightwing resistance to a new political system. This point is accepted by the ANC, and Nelson Mandela has repeatedly emphasised that the "very real fears of Afrikaners" needed to be addressed.

> The powerful and passionate nature of ethnicity has caused rightwing support levels to assume a highly volatile and unpredictable character, and has made predictions difficult. The far-reaching reforms under the De Klerk administration after 1989 have clearly proven the link

between political change and the growth of rightwing support, and suggested that assumptions of a one-third ceiling on such support were premature. However, as the white electorate gradually grows accustomed to a radically altered political environment, and as economic, cultural and sport boycotts against the country are lifted, the benefits of reforms and of internationally acceptable policies should also filter through to a number of lukewarm supporters of the rightwing cause, so that any thought of going back to the apartheid era would become inconceivable to them. Such a trend should not affect the die-hard core of the rightwing (about one-third of white voters and half of Afrikaners), whose commitment to the protection of the Afrikaner identity through self-determination is non-negotiable.

A further consideration is the relevance of a Party which, in spite of its considerable support among white voters, represents only about 5% of the total South African population. Three factors stand between the rightwing and the drift to political irrelevancy and should be considered when assessing the importance of the rightwing during the transitional phase in South African politics:

> A white veto over a new non-racial constitution by way of a referendum;

> The claim by the CP, that it represents close to - or more than - half of the white electorate, a claim which questions the legitimacy of the NP's mandate to negotiate a new constitution on behalf of the whites;

> The potential of the rightwing successfully to implement its strategies of non-violent and violent resistance to hinder a peaceful transition to a non-racial South Africa. Even though it is unlikely that such resistance would ever lead to an all-out civil war between whites (unless the security forces also divide along ideological lines), it is highly probable that the extent thereof would surpass the isolated incidents of rightwing terrorism experienced so far. The result might be a rebellion or armed insurrection of limited scope, perhaps in some rightwing stronghold

e.g. in the northern Transvaal. However, as the events in Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 have proved, it is difficult for an insurrection to succeed without a properly equipped army, the logistical support of neighbouring states and the moral acquiescence of the international community.

The constitutional policies of the rightwing, in particular the CP, are undergoing a process of transformation. Just as the NP came to realize the unworkability of its policies, the same is happening to the CP, and the Party at present is in the process of charting a new direction, although this is not occurring without intense struggle between the moderates and the adherents of Verwoerdian grand apartheid. Eventually, as the CP slowly drifts into obscurity, reason might prevail, either as the result of a split in the Party, or a 'Road to Damascus' turnabout, similar to that of the NP. The end-result might be a CP policy insisting on a smaller white homeland, very much in line with the proposals of Carel Boshoff, with the degree of autonomy left to the negotiation table or to a democratically-elected post-apartheid government. Whether it would be an autonomous white province within a federal South Africa, or an Afrikaner 'culture park' within a unitary state, or even complete sovereignity through secession, would be decided at that time. Whichever of the above constitutional mechanisms are finally decided upon, all of them would be a better solution for the purposes of conflict regulation than the complete denial of reasonable rightwing aspirations.

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