

**IBSA'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY: A
LOOK FROM WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS**

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A [minor]dissertation submitted in *partial fulfilment* of the requirements for the
award of the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations

Faculty of the Humanities

University of Cape Town

2014

COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

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Abstract

In 2011, three democratic emerging powers, India, Brazil, and South Africa served as non-permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. This was the same year that civil wars in both Libya and Syria erupted. Using both qualitative and quantitative methods, this paper examines the involvement of India, Brazil, and South Africa through looking at their statements, actions, and votes made within the UN context. The qualitative section focuses almost exclusively on the statements and actions. The quantitative section builds on the qualitative section by analyzing the votes made within the UN General Assembly, the UN Human Rights Council, and the UN Security Council using factor analysis and crosstabulation. My results show that India, Brazil, and South Africa, despite their limited joint diplomatic institutionalization, presented an impressive degree of coordination, meriting them consideration as players within the international peace and security community.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS & WORD COUNT

ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
AUPSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
BRICS	Diplomatic coalition including Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
G4	Diplomatic coalition of Japan, Germany, Brazil, and India
G8	Group of Eight
G20	Group of 20
G77	UN Alliance of Southern countries
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IBSA	India, Brazil, and South Africa Dialogue Forum
ICC	International Criminal Court
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LAS	League of Arab States
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTC	National Transitional Council of Libya
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
P3	UK, US, and France
P5	UNSC's 5 permanent members
PCA	Principal Component Analysis
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RWP	Responsibility While Protecting
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
US	United States of America

Word Count: 23,605

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

The world is widely considered to be in the midst of a change to the global system. As the unipolar power of the United States (US) that dominated the latter portion of the twentieth century fades, the power of developing countries and countries from the global South has increased. In order to ensure that the views of developing countries are properly represented in the international community, many of these countries have banded together to form diplomatic coalitions to magnify their influence on the global stage. The IBSA Dialogue Forum (IBSA), containing India, Brazil, and South Africa is one of these coalitions (Qobo, 2011 and Habib, 2009). IBSA is commonly referred to as an association of emerging powers, in reference to their high economic growth rates and these states have taken on a more expansive role than the emerging powers title admits (Qobo, 2011). Due to their numerous similarities and shared interests, IBSA holds weight and is perceived as genuine within the international community (Qobo, 2011, p.17). The broad goals of IBSA are to strengthen South-South cooperation, share ideas and lessons learned, and further the common goals of the three countries domestically and within the international community (Brasilia Declaration, 2003). IBSA has also used its platform to push for increasing the geographic representation of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This has brought to attention IBSA's leadership on peace and security issues and speculation about what future changes in the geopolitical structure of the world might look like.

Substantively and rhetorically, while IBSA devotes much of its time to trade and energy, it has indeed been active on international peace and security issues (Flemes, 2007, p.6). The year 2011 presented a platform for IBSA to showcase its work on these issues because all three countries served as non-permanent members of the UNSC during that period. As IBSA's 2011 New Delhi Communiqué stated, "the concurrent presence of all three IBSA countries... provides a unique opportunity to work closely together in order to bring their perspectives into the work of the [United Nations Security] Council and strengthen the voice of the South." The simultaneous eruption of the "Arab Spring" conflicts at the beginning of 2011 presented the perfect opportunity for the countries to do so. The Arab Spring saw one regime after another fall in the Middle East and Libya and Syria quickly

became two of the most watched countries during that time- Libya, for the implementation of the no-fly zone and the death of its 41 year dictator, President Muammar Gaddafi, and Syria for its seeming inability to be resolved. Throughout the year, IBSA states took advantage of their increased platform on the UNSC and acted very publicly on both conflicts.

1.2. Rationale

There are several reasons why this study will prove useful. Firstly, this paper represents the first focus on the role of IBSA in the conflicts in Libya and Syria while the three countries were seated on the UNSC. The cases of Libya and Syria are important to study because IBSA has the potential to be influential in negotiations around current and future international peace and security issues. Therefore, having a better understanding of IBSA's role (specifically their cooperation and alignment) on the conflicts in Libya and Syria can help determine what is to be expected of similar emerging powers in future conflict negotiations. Cooperation is a key goal of IBSA; therefore, there is reason to expect high levels of it within IBSA's actions. And the fact that the temporal focus is on the year that IBSA states served as non-permanent members of the UNSC means that the UN is the most important lens from which to study their involvement.

Secondly, a comparison of IBSA's actions regarding the conflicts in both Libya and Syria can show the variation in IBSA's cooperation, coordination and alignment during that year. The Libyan and Syrian conflicts are two well-documented conflicts that saw active IBSA involvement; both were intra-state insurgencies in dictatorial regimes and can be generalized to conflicts of a similar nature. Despite there being numerous similarities, there were many differences in how the international community and IBSA reacted to the two conflicts. The Libyan conflict saw the UN make dramatic advances in implementing a military intervention, while the Syrian conflict persisted as the UN proved unable to agree to a suitable solution during that year. In the midst of these negotiations, IBSA's activities could be found on both ends of the diplomatic spectrum- from utter silence to the specialized IBSA delegation that visited Syria to call for an end to the violence (Embassy of India, Damascus, 2011). That delegation visit showed an increased level of coordination for IBSA beyond anything it did during the Libyan conflict where, in some cases, IBSA did not cooperate at all.

Third, the behaviour and decisions of IBSA inevitably impacted the diplomatic dynamics within the UN, at least to some degree. Both conflicts in Libya and Syria managed to polarize major actors of the international community, making 2011 a quarrelsome year within the UN. The implementation of the no-fly zone, the death of the Libyan President, and discussions on how to handle the Syrian conflict all generated immense contention within the UNSC. In 2011, the least amount of UNSC Presidential statements was adopted in ten years and the highest number of vetoes in five years was used. IBSA voted alongside the five veto-wielding permanent members of the UNSC- the US, the United Kingdom (UK), France, Russia, and China. During the negotiations on both the conflicts in Libya and Syria, two of the UNSC permanent members, Russia and China, largely managed to represent one side, while the three other permanent members -the US, UK, and France- represented the other (each side considered to be a separate “voting bloc”¹). The UNSC can legally authorize the use of force and is often considered one of the most important institutions in the field of peace and security, raising the stakes of the diplomatic debate.

Also, the conclusions that I draw in this study can help explore IBSA’s leadership potential and the extent to which it follows the lead of other major world actors. In recent history, there has been an increased focus on emerging powers and their role in matters of international peace and security. There is frequent speculation about how these emerging powers will align with other powerful global actors on critical issues. Whether or not IBSA aligns with China and Russia or the US or the UK, etc., can reveal what the continually evolving international conflict resolution regime might look like. After all, the IBSA countries were focused on making an impact and eventually gaining permanent seats on the UNSC, as evidenced by this statement in regards to their non-permanent seats on the UNSC that year: “This augurs positively for enhanced cooperation efforts that will contribute to a multilateral system that reflect participation by all to the benefit of all” (Government of South Africa, 2011). If IBSA does receive permanent seats on the UNSC one day, it will increase their diplomatic negotiating power, and make it even more important to understand their alignment tendencies.

Finally, this study can address the future of IBSA, which, according to many academics and commentators, seems to hang in the balance. Rumours about the possibility of an IBSA merger with BRICS or the complete dissolution of IBSA have circulated (Taylor,

¹ Voting blocs are “any group which consistently votes as a unit on all or particular kinds of issues,” grounded in any number of similarities (Ball 1951, p.3).

² Norms “are a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity”

2012; Soule-Kohndou, 2013; and Stuenkel, 2011). Some speculate that it is because the work of IBSA is potentially redundant to the work of the BRICS (Soulé-Kohndou, 2013, p.23). Even though the BRICS started to meet later than IBSA did, BRICS has become very popular and closely followed by the media. IBSA, on the other hand, cancelled its June 2013 meeting indefinitely and received extremely limited media coverage of the fact (Stuenkel, 2013). However, while IBSA formed of its own volition out of shared norms and values, the catalyst that formed the BRICS came merely from a paper written by Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs in 2001 (Qobo 2011, p.6). In short, this study can contribute to explaining the potential sustainability of IBSA on international peace and security issues over the long-term.

1.3. Research Aim and Questions

The aim of the research is to explore IBSA engagement and its level of internal cooperation (called internal cohesion) and alignment on international peace and security issues, with a focus on the 2011 violent intra-state conflicts in Libya and Syria. I have selected alignment and internal coherence because exploring alignment can reveal trends in geopolitical positioning and internal coherence can show IBSA's strength and coordination. Highly coordinated diplomatic coalitions have the potential to effect international diplomacy. In order to address these aims, I first qualitatively examine the statements and actions of India, Brazil, and South Africa on the Libyan and Syrian conflicts separately and as a unit to provide context and to see if there are / were any changes in their roles, views, alignment or level of cooperation over the course of the year. Secondly, correlated to this, IBSA's voting within the context of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), and the UNSC is examined. This can show the manifestation of IBSA's statements and actions, the degree of IBSA's alignment with China and Russia or the US, UK, and France, and IBSA's internal coherence. The project does not attempt to provide causality, but merely to examine the nature and strength of the internal coherence and alignment of IBSA as manifested in the conflicts in Libya and Syria. In order to achieve my research aim, I will focus on the following questions:

Internal Cohesion:

- What is the level of internal cohesion of the IBSA states in their voting in the United Nations?
- What is the level of internal cohesion on international peace and security issues?
- How does resolution substance affect internal cohesion, particularly around the conflicts in Libya and Syria?

Alignment:

- Does IBSA align with China and Russia or the UK, US, and France in the United Nations?
- How does the resolution substance affect alignment, particularly around the conflicts in Libya and Syria?

I expect to find strong internal coherence overall for IBSA states. They will vote unanimously much of the time and rarely disagree completely. In comparing the internal coherence of IBSA on the conflicts in Libya and Syria, there will not be enough quantitative data to determine through that method if one conflict saw more internal coherence than another. However, limited conclusions can be drawn on internal coherence from the quantitative analysis when I analyse the combined votes. Through the qualitative analysis I show how IBSA actually did demonstrate internal coordination through the diplomatic actions that it took. When I break down international peace and security votes into relevant categories for the purposes of analysis, I expect the highest levels of internal coherence on on-going conflict-related issues and human rights categories. Finally, I predict the lowest levels of internal coherence on disarmament and terrorism issues, including nuclear related issues, based on the findings of existing literature that will later be reviewed.

Regarding alignment, IBSA likely backs Chinese and Russian stances on all categorical issues, before it backs the P3. Any variation in IBSA's alignment likely depends heavily on the resolution's content. When analysing peace and security issues, IBSA's alignment with China and Russia is probably strongest on human rights and disarmament categories. IBSA votes independently, meaning with sufficient difference between its bloc voting and that of the P3 and China and Russia, a small percentage of the time. A good example of an incidence of independent voting is if IBSA votes negatively together, China

and Russia vote in favour, and the P3 abstain. Independent voting signifies a unified IBSA, resistant to the influences of the powerful P5. If IBSA votes unanimously, regardless of alignment, this shows there is some coordination and strength, whether inherent through shared norms and values or actual coordination.² The low number of votes for Syria and Libya mean that only limited conclusions can be drawn from the quantitative analysis regarding alignment. The qualitative analysis will provide a much more in-depth picture of alignment.

1.4. Research Design and Methodology

This empirical research project portion is done in two parts: one part qualitative analysis and one part quantitative. As a whole, the study focuses on a macro-level on countries as actors within the UN longitudinally over the course of calendar year 2011. It begins with a qualitative analysis of the role of IBSA in the conflicts in Libya and Syria. The analysis contains primary source documents from the UN, IBSA, and the Indian, Brazilian, and South African governments. Documents issued prior to the conflicts in Libya and Syria will be used to provide historical background information on IBSA and its perspective and views on international peace and security issues. Additionally, secondary sources, in the form of scholarly journal articles, organizational papers, and news articles, will be consulted.

In the qualitative analysis, I examine, but am not limited to, the following: changes in discourse, dialogues, bilateral or multilateral actions, offers of help, and actions. The UNSC is capable of legally authorizing the use of force and “has the legal authority to take measures to maintain or restore international peace;” therefore, the bulk of the analysis will focus on that forum (Dreher et al, 2008, p.3). However, UNGA and the UNHRC also dealt with the conflicts and peace and security issues, so the qualitative analysis portion will explore their involvement, but on a lower scale. Discourse is defined as written or spoken communication; including statements made by IBSA states or IBSA as a unit. Actions include delegations sent, votes made within the UN, and speeches given. Actions or statements may have significance because they prove change or coalescence, such as the use of more forceful language or an increase in the level of detail of request. By comparing the actions, I

² Norms “are a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.891).

can determine if change occurred, although this study will be limited in explaining the depth or causality behind the changes.

The quantitative analysis portion draws conclusions from an analysis of IBSA members' voting behaviour within the UNSC, UNGA and the UNHRC- looking at the votes and the substance of the resolutions. Votes are a "succinct statement[s] of a state's position on a matter," and indicate a state's alignment, and thus an analysis can prove fruitful (Graham, 2012, p.410). The full dataset includes the 66 resolutions passed by the UNSC; the 348 resolutions passed by the UNGA; and the 99 resolutions passed by UNHRC. All three forums handled peace and security issues and passed resolutions related to the Libyan and Syrian conflicts. China and Russia and the P3 are focuses because of their proven history of convergence, positioning on the UNSC, and the political positions they took during the Libyan and Syrian conflicts. Unlike the UNSC, UNGA has no legislative authority and its resolutions are not legally binding. However, this benefits the quantitative analysis, because it can potentially mean there will be more contentious votes in UNGA, because the countries can vote with less consequence (Hosli et al, 2010, p.5). Resolutions adopted without a vote, as commonly happens in the UNGA and UNHRC and those adopted unanimously, as occurs in the UNSC, are included in parts of the analysis. While this dilutes the findings, it more accurately represents the voting dynamics. Using the vote records, three separate variables were constructed. The first shows the internal cohesion of IBSA, P3, and China and Russia, the second shows the unification of those same voting blocs, and the final shows the alignment of IBSA to the P3 or China and Russia.

1.5. Limitations

Regarding chronology, I use background information from before 2003 on India, Brazil, and South Africa to give the brief history on the formation of IBSA. The bulk of my paper focuses on IBSA and its member states beginning in 2003 and uses the most recent sources necessary to cover IBSA engagement in Libya and Syria. I do not attempt to draw conclusions beyond international peace and security; issues outside of international peace and security potentially imply a different set of diplomatic tools. My examination will only look at the year 2011-2012, when all three IBSA countries served on the UNSC together. Extending the analysis beyond that time frame goes beyond the scope of this paper. On the multilateral stage, there are many other influential forces at work that can affect the

statements and actions of India, Brazil, and / or South Africa, such as regional organizations or bilateral relationships. The qualitative analysis section does not try to determine or quantify which influences were more significant or decisive; rather it merely explores those separate influences. Diplomatic actions cannot be explained by one causal factor; rather the actions are often the result of multiple causal factors.

There are several limitations inherent to the quantitative analysis portion of this study. Firstly, IBSA's strength as a voting bloc on international peace and security issues does not necessarily mean they are equally strong as a "bloc" when it comes to other issues (Holloway, 1990, pp.283-284). Secondly, vote bargaining within the UN, called "horsetrading," undoubtedly occurs and is challenging to isolate. Horsetrading implies that not all votes included in the sample are genuine reflections of a country's policy preferences. It occurs when a country or "bloc" offers to support or reject an issue in exchange for support from another country or "bloc" on an entirely separate issue possibly in a different forum (Dreher, et al 2008). In a 2008 analysis by academics Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland (Dreher et al), the authors found a relationship between those serving as non-permanent members of the UNSC and the quality of benefits they received from participation in International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs. This implied that the non-permanent members of the UNSC's votes were traded for IMF-related benefits (Dreher et al, 2008). Regrettably, this type of dynamic could only be uncovered through a targeted examination (Long, 2013). As for this project, votes will be accepted as is.

1.6. Chapter Outline

The second chapter begins with the history of the formation of IBSA, brief histories and explorations of the foreign policies of India, Brazil, and South Africa and what might have motivated them to share the norms and values that they do and to participate in IBSA. The chapter concludes with a brief review of what was covered on international peace and security in the initial IBSA meetings and summits to showcase the shared norms and values. Also, the IBSA focus on increasing cooperation will be featured. The third chapter opens with a background on the "Arab Spring" uprising in Libya in February 2011 until the point that the international community began to play a role. It then explores the extent and character of IBSA's involvement. The second and final qualitative analysis will be on the Arab Spring uprising in Syria that began in March 2011, also exploring IBSA's involvement.

The fifth chapter consists of a quantitative analysis of IBSA's voting record in the UN. It measures and investigates the level of internal coherence of IBSA and compares it to the voting blocs of Russia and China and the UK, US, and France. The concluding chapter presents the theoretical exploration of the findings, neoliberal institutionalism, and looks at soft balancing as an explanation for IBSA's rhetoric and behaviour. It finishes with a review of policy implications surfaced by the study and possible areas for future research.

CHAPTER 2: THE FORMATION OF IBSA

2.1. Introduction

The idea of IBSA officially materialized in 2003 on the margins of the G8 meeting in Evian, France (Graham, 2010, p.3). The G-8 is an informal international diplomatic grouping that meets regularly to discuss a variety of global issues; it includes the world's largest economies and the P5, but does not include India, Brazil, or South Africa (UK Government, 2013). Exclusion meant that IBSA was rendered unable to voice their interests or shared norms and values in the discussion. This largely helps to explain why IBSA formed, because even as powerful economies, they were unable to debate critical international issues, not only at the UNSC permanent members level, but also at the conventional G8 level. Forming IBSA was a way for the countries to magnify their influence at the international level and push for increased responsibility. Consequently, India, Brazil, and South Africa had "on-going trilateral consultations" that led to IBSA's official formation in June 2003, with the signing of the Brasilia Declaration by the member countries' Foreign Ministers (Graham, 2010, p.3). President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, President Lula Da Silva of Brazil, and President Atal Vajpayee of India officially announced the formation at the September 2003 UNGA meeting (Taylor, 2009, p.48). IBSA now has regular consultations at the senior level; ministerial meetings, which tend to occur on an annual basis; and Heads of State and/or Government levels, although those only occur every other year. IBSA also arranges "Track II" Diplomacy, meaning interactions, meetings and consultations amongst academics, businesses, non-governmental organizations and other sectors of civil society (IBSA Trilateral, 2013). The meetings and consultations provide opportunities for the countries to discuss issues vital to the coalition.

India, Brazil, and South Africa are governed democratically, have the largest economies of their respective regions, and maintain strong interests in international peace and security (CIA, 2013; CIA, 2013a; and CIA, 2013b). Firstly, their democratic systems of governance make for a critical difference between them and China and Russia of the BRICS.

According to Mzukisi Qobo, the differing governance systems (China and Russia both have authoritarian governments) and Chinese and Russian problems with “massive corporate governance weaknesses” ... are not to be easily bridged among the BRICS (Qobo, 2011, p.17). Academics Alden and Vieira also cite India, Brazil, and South Africa’s statuses as democracies as a crucial commonality among them (2005, p.1090). Comparing IBSA to the BRICS, Fletes states that cooperation will be stronger for IBSA than for the BRICS because:

“IBSA’s common identity is based on values such as democracy, personal freedoms and human rights. The participation of China and Russia, both not known for their democratic practices and commitment to human rights, would not only undercut collective norms and identities but also compromise the credibility and legitimacy of the group pursuing the milieu goals of international relations.” (Fletes 2007, p.25)

Participatory democracy is considered a value that “underpins” IBSA (Tshwane Declaration, 2011, pt.1). The democratic identities of IBSA will undoubtedly affect their diplomatic views and strategies.

Secondly, the language in the 2003 Brasilia Declaration of “three countries with vibrant democracies, from three regions of the developing world, active on a global scale” implies that each country is considered a leader of its geographic region/continent (Brasilia Declaration, 2003, p.2). Regardless of other regional perceptions of this leadership, IBSA states have “taken on a self-appointed role as leaders in various Southern alliances such as the G77 at the UN and the G20 at the WTO” (Stephen, 2012, p. 290). Alden and Vieira (2005, p.4) argue that not only does economic and military strength justify their leadership, but so does “their activism in the name of international norms and / or their position as an intermediary for those states (developing countries in fact) excluded from the ranks of power.” India, Brazil, and South Africa received recognition of leadership from other powerful international countries, which helped increase their legitimacy (Alden and Vieira, 2005, p.1091).

Finally, regarding issues of international peace and security, IBSA shared the same positive appraisal of international law and working within it, their desire to strengthen the UN, and “the exercise of diplomacy as a means to maintain international peace and security” (Brasilia Declaration, 2003, pt.3). More specifically, the IBSA countries also share an interest in democracy promotion, rule of law, human rights, and global governance reform. IBSA began to discuss issues of peace and security at its first meetings in Brasilia, Brazil and New Delhi, India in 2004 and has discussed them ever since (Alden and Vieira, 2005, p.1089 and Brasilia Declaration, 2003, pt. 3). With the commonalities of democracy, regional leadership,

and interest in peace and security established, this chapter now goes on to explore the motivations and histories of the three countries that has helped power their participation in IBSA. Then follows an explanation of IBSA's goals of sectoral cooperation and global governance reform, which are critical for this study.

2.2. Shared Motivations and History

2.2.1. India

Post-colonial history, an independence struggle, and its economic and demographic leadership within the Asian sub-continent all play a role in determining India's strategic role in the international community and can lend explanatory power to the reasons India joined IBSA. India, which received independence from the UK and became a democracy in the first half of the 20th century, has an identity that is still affected, debatably to this day, by its independence struggle (Smith, 2012, p.373). India's once limited material resources as a result of its post-colonial status demanded increased reliance on diplomatic power; therefore, it participates in several key diplomatic groupings in addition to IBSA. India's Former Prime Minister Nehru was a founding father of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), to which South Africa also belongs, but Brazil does not (Beri, 2003, p.217). India also belongs to the G77, which is a UN-based alliance of Southern hemisphere developing countries (Smith, 2012, p.7). Throughout the 1970s and 80s, India supported many liberation movements in Africa- in particular those in South Africa and Namibia (Beri, 2003, p.218). It provided support to the movements through multilateral institutions and diplomatic support by recognizing political organizations like the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia and the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa (Beri 2003, p.218). In recent history, India has seen an increase in its soft power, democratic institutions, and strong support for human rights and the rule of law (The Economist, 2013). India sees itself as a leader of the developing world and is strongly invested in the interests of developing countries. This interest and lingering anti-western tendencies have led India to seek increased alliances with Southern countries and improved South-South cooperation (Smith, 2012, pp.377, 381); all of which are benefits India would receive when joining IBSA.

2.2.2. South Africa

South Africa was largely motivated to join IBSA because of its history as a post-colonial state, its emergence from apartheid, and its position as the dominant economy on the African continent. South Africa transitioned to democracy after approximately half a century of apartheid rule in 1994 (Habib, 2009). South Africa is Africa's dominant economy with strong western ties; it frequently appears to have scattered foreign policy identities as a result of trying to satisfy its African and Western relationships (Rawoot, 2012 and Cornelissen, 2009). The leadership of the first President of democratic South Africa, Nelson Mandela of the ANC, had a strong focus on values that included human rights. Membership in IBSA for South Africa has given them an opportunity to speak on behalf of the African continent, furthering their image and self-perception as an African leader. In South Africa's post-apartheid diplomatic history, it has made actions and statements in support of its South-South partners and its desires for global governance reform, which are both key IBSA goals. In 2011, South Africa released a white paper delineating its foreign policy goals called "Building a Better World." The paper expands on global governance reform, the importance of South-South cooperation, internationalism, and the necessity of building partnerships among developing countries, and many other ideas and norms that IBSA prioritizes (2011). The White Paper (2011, p.14) elaborates on global governance reform by emphasizing South Africa's desire to see global governing institutions reflect "new political realities." South-South cooperation, particularly around trade, is highlighted (2011, pp.13, 28, and 33). Also within the paper, BRICS is mentioned twice, India is mentioned at least four times (2011, pp. 24, 29, and 30) and Brazil is mentioned twice (2011, pp.17 and 34). IBSA is mentioned once and in reference to multilateral groupings. The White Paper states that it "supports the use of such groupings as an important mechanism for consensus building" (White Paper, 2011, pp.25-26). Membership in IBSA would allow South Africa to build cooperation around the mutual goals of the coalition.

2.2.3. Brazil

Brazil ended its rule under an authoritarian military dictatorship in 1985 when the military ceded power to civilian rule (Bodman et al, 2011, p.50). Since 1985, Brazil's

economy has grown dramatically- some have recently called it “an engine of regional growth” (Bodman et al, 2011, p.55). When Brazil joined IBSA in 2003, its President was Lula Inácio da Silva, who kept his eye on his desired permanent seat on the UNSC for the duration of his tenure. For Brazil, joining IBSA provided a way to work in a more strategic fashion and on a team towards its goal of a permanent seat on the UNSC. Lula, a founder of the Worker’s Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores), devoted much of his time to building relationships with other Southern states and membership in IBSA brought him another opportunity to further the critical South-South relationships (Alden and Vieira, 2005). Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff, took power in 2011 and also wanted a permanent seat on the UNSC and to continue prioritizing South-South partnerships. The Council on Foreign Relations’ 2011 Brazil report stated that in Rousseff’s youth, she was tortured and imprisoned for her “underground activities,” to which the conclusion was drawn that, based on these experiences, she could “be a powerful voice for human rights and democratic values in Latin America” (Bodman et al, 2011, p.54). By extension, this can partially explain the human rights and democracy focus that Brazil has had recently in the international peace and security realm.

Brazil rarely maintains a consistent identity in international relations. Prior to President da Silva Lula, Brazil aligned with the US and only with President Da Silva’s presidency has this shifted. President Rousseff entered office in 2011 after President da Silva and President Rousseff had many competing priorities: increasing South-South cooperation, integrating South America even further, in addition to managing a complex and growing relationship with China (Bodman et al, 2011, p.9). Besides China, Brazil must also consider its relationship with the US, the other economic power of the Western hemisphere (Bodman et al, 2011, p.17). The maintenance of these relationships is laden with implications and destabilizes Brazil’s political identities. As Brazil’s economy has grown, it has seen its leadership role on the continent increase. In an attempt to show world leadership capabilities and further their bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC, Brazil has been one of the top 15 world troop contributors to UN peacekeeping (Alden and Vieira, 2005, p.1091 and Bodman et al, 2011, p.47). It has sent troops to more than twenty UN peacekeeping missions since 1985, when the military dictatorship ended (Bodman et al, 2011, p.47). In 2004, Brazil began leading the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, which has a Chapter 7 mandate that allows for the use of force (Norheim-Martinsen, 2012, p.4). This would give them leadership experience and credibility in UN peacekeeping and experience

dealing with the infrequently used UN use of force mandate that would be addressed in the conflict in Libya.

2.3. Sectoral Cooperation and Global Governance Reform

2.3.1. Sectoral Cooperation

The first official IBSA document, the Brasilia Declaration, says that any “new threats... must be handled with effective, coordinated and solidary international cooperation, in the concerned organizations based on respect for the sovereignty of States and for International Law” (2003, pt.5). And the purpose of IBSA, according to Alden and Vieira (2005, p.1088) was “to share views on relevant regional and international issues of mutual interest as well as promote cooperation.” Cooperation, to IBSA, will help the countries achieve their social and economic development goals and was expected to include areas as diverse as science, technology, trade, travel, and tourism (Brasilia Declaration, 2003, pt. 9). The sentiment that traditional power states, such as the G8 members, are operating outside of the realm of international power organization structure by dictating the decision-making on their own (or by dictating the decision-making of international law) drives much of this desire for South-South and genuine international cooperation. While cooperation indeed covers many sectors, IBSA does not have a formal secretariat or any sort of “home base.” Many of the IBSA meetings and working groups are held on an ad hoc basis in different locations and some academics have speculated that IBSA’s coordination is adversely affected by this lack of institutionalization (Flemes, 2007, p.25). Flemes, for instance, believed that with expanded institutionalization, IBSA could potentially increase its coordination and achieve a larger number of its goals. He thought that more frequent interactions among the states could further shared culture and ideas, bringing the states into even closer normative alignment (Flemes, 2007, p.25).

2.3.2. Global Governance Reform

A key goal of IBSA is the countries’ desire to expand the UNSC. In the 2003 Brasilia Declaration, the IBSA states “stressed the necessity of expanding the Security Council in both permanent and non-permanent member categories, with the participation of developing countries in both categories” (pt.4). Later, the first IBSA Joint Declaration from

2006, which was a result of the meeting that included IBSA Heads of State, “reaffirmed the need for a decision regarding the expansion of the Security Council, without which no reform of the United Nations will be complete. They reiterated their conviction that the Security Council must be expanded to include developing countries from Asia, Africa, and Latin America...” (Joint Declaration, 2006, pt.10). IBSA has been driven to reform international institutions and strengthen its role in them in part due to the fact that these institutions have increased in quantity and in governing capacity in recent history and are perceived to have “failing health” (Stephen, 2012, p. 290 and Alden and Vieira, 2005, p.1090). Alden and Vieira believe that the perceived poor health has led to IBSA’s push for permanent regional representation on the UNSC, to not only help “re-legitimise these institutions” but to increase their own leadership as well (2005, p.1090).

India, Brazil, and South Africa specifically advocate for the UNSC to expand both permanent and non-permanent membership to include members from Asia, Africa, and Latin America- one seat for each of them (Flemes, 2007, pp.11-12). The countries believe that the current configuration of the UNSC is not representative of the current geopolitical configuration of the world (Devraj, 2011). IBSA’s 2006 Joint Declaration stated that reform of the UNSC would help it “reflect contemporary realities and make it more democratic, legitimate, representative and responsive” (2006, pt.10). The combined population of the IBSA countries equals more than a sixth of the world’s population and IBSA countries would like a more powerful platform on which to advocate for their needs (Alden and Vieira, 2005, p.1090). The UN Charter gives the UNSC “responsibility for maintaining international peace and security” and holding these seats would increase IBSA’s power and enable them to further their agenda (Chapter 5, UN Charter). It is possible that IBSA invests its diplomatic resources and energies in resolving violent conflicts like Libya and Syria in order to prove to the international community that its members are capable of playing leadership roles in the preservation of peace and security and to maximize existing power and influence.

IBSA’s partners in the BRICS coalition, China and Russia, possess permanent UNSC seats, creating a serious power imbalance within that coalition as the present power dynamic favours the permanent UNSC members because they also have veto power. The balance cannot be rectified without UNSC reform. Despite disproportionate media attention on the BRICS, this power imbalance impels IBSA toward being a stronger emerging power coalition based more on shared interests and values. Consequently, IBSA has continued to work together on international peace and security issues and publicly push for UNSC reform

(Flemes, 2007, pp.11-12). India and Brazil even joined Japan and Germany in the G4 in 2012 to push for an expanded and reformed UNSC. South Africa was not included in the G4, but it still campaigned for UNSC reform (MOFA Statement, 2012). South Africa supported the African Union's guidelines for UNSC reform of "equitable continental representation" (Habib, 2009, p.153 and Flemes, 2007, pp.11-12). The G4's push included "the importance of Africa to be represented in the permanent membership of an enlarged Council" within its Ministerial statement (MOFA Statement, 2012). Permanent seats on the UNSC would make IBSA countries more visible actors in international diplomatic debates, thereby increasing their political leverage.

2.4. Initial IBSA Meetings

I now briefly explore what was said in the IBSA meetings before 2011, to give a baseline understanding of IBSA's mutual goals and interests surrounding peace and security and to highlight the emphasis placed on improving their cooperation.

The opening Brasilia Declaration, issued in 2003, is actually the briefest. At only four pages long, it is clearly only an agenda-setting document. It lays out initial plans for IBSA that included UN reform, social development, poverty alleviation, a commitment to documenting lessons learned and plans to meet again in the following year. Cooperation among the three countries is prioritized; in the four-page document it is mentioned nine times (New York Communiqué, 2003). According to the document, "trilateral cooperation among themselves is an important tool for achieving the promotion of social and economic development and they emphasized their intention to give greater impetus to cooperation among their countries" (New York Communiqué, 2003). Neither peace, nor security, nor conflict is mentioned one time (New York Communiqué, 2003). This is likely the result of it being merely an agenda-setting document and would evolve and grow as IBSA developed a shared history.

As can be expected, while the opening IBSA meeting briefly laid out goals and principles, the first official Ministerial-level meeting, called the "New Delhi Agenda for Cooperation," in 2004 went far more in depth. This was the first meeting that presented the opportunity to discuss progress made and the Ministers took advantage. Cooperation was one of the most serious priorities of the meeting- in addition to earning a spot in the title of the document; it is used in the document 15 times. The Ministers covered many of the same

issues from the first meeting, including UN reform, international peace and security, social development, terrorism, and economics issues (New Delhi Agenda for Cooperation, 2004). They agreed to enhanced coordination and consultations among themselves to further one of IBSA's primary goals of South-South cooperation. IBSA also discussed intensifying cooperation in their multi-lateral negotiations at the G-20, on sustainable development, sharing of expertise, and on a UNSC Resolution related to terrorism (New Delhi Agenda for Cooperation, 2004, pts. 11, 13-14, & 20). Two points of the document included a push for democratic reform of the UN and the UNSC (New Delhi Agenda for Cooperation, 2004, pts. 5-6). The 2005 Ministerial-level meeting focused on initiatives related to social development and economic programs. Reform of international institutions clearly played a major role in the 2005 final document, as did increasing South-South cooperation- not just within IBSA, but also among the broader global South.

The final Communiqué of the 2006 Ministerial meeting covered more issues critical to this study: UN reform, South-South cooperation, the Middle East conflict, and cooperation. The introductory section reiterated IBSA's support for the UN's role in managing conflict worldwide (Rio de Janeiro Communiqué, 2006) while the section on UN reform continued to push for expansion of the UNSC, increasing the stakes of what would happen if the IBSA countries ever were to be on the UNSC together. For instance, the Communiqué emphasized that the UNSC needed to echo "contemporary realities and not those of 1945" (Rio de Janeiro Communiqué, 2006, pt.8). The concept of human rights was only mentioned during an innocuous welcome of the 2006 creation of the UNHRC and an encouragement to follow the UN international human rights charter (Rio de Janeiro Communiqué, 2006). Also, even though this was after the passing of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document where the concept of "responsibility to protect" was first included, it was not mentioned in the Communiqué, making it difficult to glean the thoughts of IBSA as a whole (Rio de Janeiro Communiqué, 2006). Finally, 2006 was the same year as IBSA's first Summit-level meeting, which included all the IBSA Heads of State. The document from this meeting, the "Joint Declaration" prioritized cooperation; in the 19 pages, cooperation is mentioned 34 times (Joint Declaration, 2006).

2.5. Conclusion

With the foundation of mutual IBSA goals and principles established, it can be shown that the desire to cooperate in international peace and security was fundamental. However, given their limited meetings and lack of infrastructure, most of their goals remained solely rhetoric and the first eight years of IBSA saw little more than scheduled meetings. During the course of 2011, the conflicts in Libya and Syria and the international community's reaction to them forced them to evolve, increase their coordination and even attempt to use new diplomatic tools.

CHAPTER 3: THE CONFLICT IN LIBYA

3.1. Introduction

In one of the most notorious incidents thus far in the 21st century, a Tunisian fruit vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi, self-immolated on the steps of the local municipality office in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, which hours earlier had refused to see him to hear his complaints. Bouazizi had been disgusted with the corruption and abuses committed against him by Tunisian police and when he had sought justice from the local city authorities and been ignored, Bouazizi felt as though he had no other option. His self-immolation sparked immense outrage and Tunisians took to the streets to protest the regime that had been ruled by the same President, Zine Ben Ali, for approximately 30 years (Abouzeid, 2011). Bouazizi did not die immediately; he was admitted to the hospital with serious wounds. The protests continued for 28 days and at the end of the time, President Ben Ali fled in exile a mere 10 days after Bouazizi had died (Abouzeid, 2011).

A month later, Libyans planned their own “Day of Rage” for Thursday, February 17, 2011 (Hilsum, 2012). Libyans protested high levels of unemployment, limited housing, and the total lack of political opposition; the Libyan President, Muammar Gaddafi, had been in power for more than 41 years (BBC News, 2011). The “Day of Rage” began with a popular uprising in Benghazi, Libya and spread like wildfire to other cities. However, Gaddafi’s government forces quickly reversed the successes of the rebels and by March had closed in on the “epicentre” of rebel power in Benghazi (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p.838). Although President Ben Ali of Tunisia left power with little impertinence, Gaddafi would not do so. President Gaddafi refused to give in to the protesters and numerous media outlets and NGOs reported the Libyan Government used violence against the protesters (Spillius, 2013). The Libyan Government cut off Internet access and eliminated landline telephone

calls. It became clear at this point that the situation in the country was dire and left many outside of Libya to wonder if foreign intervention should occur. On February 22, 2011, Gaddafi addressed the nation in a speech that lasted more than an hour. He would never leave Libya; he would “die [in the country] as a martyr” (Meikle and Black, 2011). Gaddafi’s refusal to leave the country like Tunisian President Ben Ali had done, foretold many future events. These statements and the Libyan Government’s military action against the protesters immediately raised the issue in the minds of the international community of exactly how to resolve the conflict in Libya peacefully (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p.838-839).

3.2. The Role of the International Community

The Libyan government’s actions outraged the international community and many foreign governments publicly condemned the regime’s behaviour (Spillius, 2013). The Libyan government’s refusal to allow humanitarian aid into some besieged towns aggravated the situation even further (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p.840). Gaddafi’s inflammatory rhetoric, allegations of military action, and lack of compliance shattered the notion that he could be persuaded by diplomacy. Consequently, the UNSC passed Resolution 1970 unanimously four days after Gaddafi’s “rats” speech. UNSC Resolution 1970 imposed sanctions, travel bans, and asset freezes on government officials loyal to Gaddafi; referred the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC); imposed an arms embargo; and requested the facilitation of humanitarian aid delivery (UNSC SC/10187/Rev.1, 2011). If Gaddafi would not cooperate with the more informal diplomacy that had occurred prior, it was hoped that UNSC Resolution 1970 would appeal to him. Meanwhile, a UN Special Envoy and an AU High Level Panel would also be tasked with finding a diplomatic solution to the conflict (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p.840).

UNGA and UNHRC spoke up as well. UNHRC held a special session at the end of February 2011. The final Resolution that passed that session of the UNHRC called for “an end to human rights violations ... the release of the arbitrarily detained” and humanitarian access “to meet its responsibility to protect its people” (A/HRC/RES/S-15/1). Brazil (the only IBSA member on the UNHRC at the time) voted in favour of the Resolution (A/HRC/RES/S-15/1, 2011). In the following month, on March 1, 2011, UNGA unanimously adopted a resolution that removed Libya from serving on the UNHRC (A/RES/65/265,

2011). Libya’s membership was later reinstated in November after the fall of Gaddafi. The vote in November to reinstate Libya was nearly unanimous, only four countries voted against and six countries abstained. All P3 and BRICS states voted in favour of reinstating

Actor	Action	Date
Libyan people- “Day of Rage”	Protests begin	February 17, 2011
United Nations Human Rights Council	Special Session calls for end to violence	February 25, 2011
League of Arab States (LAS)	Suspends Libya’s membership	February 2011
United Nations General Assembly	Suspends Libya from UNHRC	March 1, 2011
Brazil	Releases statement opposed to military intervention	March 4, 2011
India	Releases statement opposed to no-fly zone	March 4, 2011
United Kingdom and France	Introduce no-fly zone draft	March 7, 2011
Gulf Cooperation Council	Issues statement favouring no-fly zone	March 7, 2011
IBSA Dialogue Forum	Issues statement cautioning against no-fly zone	March 8, 2011
Organization of Islamic Cooperation	Issues statement in favour of no-fly zone	March 8, 2011
African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC)	Warns against no-fly; establishes panel to resolve conflict with Heads of State	March 10, 2011
League of Arab States	Issues statement calling for no-fly zone	March 12, 2011
United Nations Security Council	Votes YES on Resolution 1973	March 17, 2011

Source: Author’s Own

Table 1: Timeline of Events Before Vote on UNSC Resolution 1973

Libya's membership on the UNHRC; however, South Africa did not, but only because they were absent at the time (A/RES/66/11, 2011). However, despite the more formal diplomatic actions, Gaddafi did not comply with UNSC Resolution 1970 or the Resolution from the UNHRC, but continued to use force against the protesters (Bellamy and Williams, 2011). The lack of persuasive power of UNSC Resolution 1970, UNGA, and UNHRC over Gaddafi prompted many in the international community to consider backup plans to the negotiations.

Rumours began about the likelihood of a "no-fly zone" when the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) disclosed that discussions on how to enact one in Libya were occurring within NATO walls (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, pp.840-841). Nearly simultaneously, on March 7, 2011, it was announced that UK and France were drafting a UNSC Resolution that requested a "no-fly zone" (NBC, 2011). The UK and France, both traditional powers, had historic relationships with Libya. France also had a history of active military engagements overseas. A no-fly zone would "impose a ban on all [non-military] flights in the country's airspace" including fixed wing aircraft and force could be used to impose it if necessary (UNSC/RES/1973, 2011). The Resolution also included the ability to use "all necessary measures ... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack ... while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory" (UNSC/RES/1973, 2011). This marked the beginning of intense discussion on the idea.

3.2.1. Role of Regional Organizations

Three critical regional organizations voiced their backing for the no-fly zone. The first to do so was the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which is an intergovernmental regional organization of states that are located on the Persian Gulf. The GCC requested that the UNSC 'take all necessary measures to protect civilians, including enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya,' and condemned "crimes committed against civilians, the use of heavy arms and the recruitment of mercenaries" by the Libyan regime (Bellamy and Williams, 2011). The mere possibility of a no-fly zone, in addition to the statement from the GCC, prompted an incredible flurry of statements from nations and other organizations. The following day the

Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC), an intergovernmental organization with 57 member states representing the “collective voice of the Muslim world,” issued a statement echoing the request “for a no-fly zone over Libya,” but without utilizing “foreign military operations on the ground” (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p.841 and OIC, 2013). The views of the OIC were likely to have been considered seriously because Libya was also a member.

Shortly after, the League of Arab States (LAS), an intergovernmental organization consisting of Arab nations in the Middle East and North Africa, despite traditionally being considered an opponent of humanitarian intervention, issued what would prove to be a decisive statement. It requested that the UNSC “impose immediately a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in Libya” (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, pp.841-842). Libya had been member of the LAS until its membership had been suspended a month earlier in February (Aboagye, 2012, p.39). The LAS statement went on to accuse the Libyan government of committing “serious violations and grave crimes” and said that the government had lost its legitimacy (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, pp.841-842). This marked the third prominent regional organization in the Middle East to make a statement in support of the no-fly zone. Bellamy and Williams (2011, p.846) stated that the regional organizations served as “gatekeepers” and that without the support from the LAS, “it is unlikely that [Resolution 1973] would ever have been tabled for a vote.” Other regional organizations would go on to make statements, but the LAS statement would be the one to fundamentally sway the UNSC and permanent members of the UNSC, such as China and Russia, who traditionally are opposed to any sort of foreign military intervention (Bellamy and Williams, 2011). India and Brazil publicly expressed concern about the establishment of a no-fly zone as well.

3.3. IBSA’s Involvement

Before the March IBSA meeting occurred, a spokesperson from Itamaraty, Brazil’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, stated the goals of Brazil’s position on the Libyan conflict: “the need to avoid militarising and exacerbating the situation, and the desire to find a negotiated, calm solution without foreign intervention” (Frayssinet, 2011). According to Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota, Brazil appeared not to be opposed to a military initiative, but very cautious as to how it was implemented: “Brazil believes the debate on the proposal of establishing a no-fly zone over Libya, or on any military initiative in that country, can

only be legitimate in a framework of strict respect for the UN Charter, within the Security Council” (Frayssinet, 2011). Foreign Minister Patriota issued another statement elaborating on the Brazilian concerns that the no-fly zone “might be misused for purposes other than protecting civilians, such as regime change” (Viotti, 2011). India was much more explicitly opposed to the no-fly zone, saying in an interview with *The Hindu* before the IBSA Commission meeting, “it will oppose any move to enforce a no-fly-zone or use force to end the civil war in the North African nation” (Dikshit, 2011).

On March 8, 2011, IBSA concluded a Trilateral Ministerial Commission meeting in New Delhi, India, which presented its first opportunity to make a coordinated public remark on conflict in Libya and the no-fly zone. The meeting was a little more than a week before the vote on UNSC Resolution 1973 and the matter was clearly discussed because the situation in Libya was included in the Commission’s Communiqué (New Delhi Communiqué, 2011). In the Communiqué, the IBSA Foreign Ministers stated their desire that:

“The situation will be resolved in a peaceful manner, in the best interests of the respective peoples... their deep concern with the present situation in Libya and manifested hope that a peaceful solution for the crisis may be found, in the best interests of the Libyan people.” (New Delhi, 2011, pt.24)

The above emphasis on a “peaceful solution” can be assumed to be referring to the work of the UN Special Envoy and the African Union team that had been deployed (New Delhi Communiqué, 2011, pt.24). When the Communiqué addressed the potential of establishing a “no-fly zone” over Libya; it said a “no-fly zone” could “only be legitimately contemplated in full compliance with the UN Charter and within the UNSC of the United Nations” further showing IBSA’s desire for international cooperation and coordination on such a serious matter (New Delhi Communiqué, 2011, pt.24). The no-fly zone went against the values of diplomacy and development that IBSA strenuously professed its devotion to. As time would show, this relatively cautious statement would be drowned out in the noise heard from regional organizations that were yelling at the same time.

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AUPSC) distributed a statement on March 10, 2011 regarding the possibility of a no-fly zone that was far less favourable to the idea than their counterparts in the OIC and the GCC. The AU, to which Libya and South Africa belong, “condemn[ed] the indiscriminate use of force and lethal weapons” and unequivocally forbid “any form of foreign military intervention,” instead,

favouring a solution based on mediation (Wolf, 2012, p.113). It laid out a “roadmap” that called for “African action” and “cessation of all hostilities... cooperation of competent Libyan authorities... adoption and implementation of the political reforms necessary” (African Union, 2011). It allowed President Gaddafi to gradually relinquish power and hand over the reins to a provisional government before allowing new elections to occur (African Union, 2011). The AU Constitutive Act states in section 4(j): “the right of member states to request intervention in order to restore peace and security” implying that the AU would have only supported such an intervention if the Libyans had been involved (Aboagye, 2012, p.33). The AU had even planned to send a mediation mission to Libya, but the mission had been cancelled because the bombing had begun (Tisdall, 2011). South African President Jacob Zuma had, in fact, been a part of the cancelled AU mission to Libya (Tisdall, 2011). Unfortunately for the AU, the March 10 statement would not prove enough to affect the UNSC. Given Gaddafi’s history as a critical financial supporter of the AU, the AUPSC’s statement appeared to be a conflict of interest and was not taken seriously (Bellamy and Williams, 2011). The lack of impact of this statement bothered IBSA. In a later statement issued by IBSA’s Ministers in September 2011, one point read of “The need for the UN to ensure stronger cooperation and coordination with regional representative bodies such as the African Union and its Peace and Security Council” (New York Ministerial Statement, 2011, pt.8).

3.4. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973

Surprisingly, South Africa voted in favour of UNSC Resolution 1973, officially authorizing the no-fly zone over Libya, the use of force for civilian protection, and an arms embargo, while Brazil and India abstained (UNSC/RES/1973, 2011). If South Africa had abstained and Brazil or India had voted no, the Resolution would have failed. Such a divergence among the IBSA states proved them to be entirely uncoordinated, though possibly still maintaining similar values. Maite Nkoana Mashabane, the Foreign Affairs Minister of South Africa, explained that the South Africans voted positively for UNSC Resolution 1973 because the resolution text appeared to focus on civilian protection and providing humanitarian assistance to affected populations and “exclud[ed] a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” (UNSC/RES/1973, 2011). The UK, one of the proponents of the no-fly zone, had insisted that the no-fly zone would be imposed solely to stop a humanitarian catastrophe (Cameron, 2011). The Russians

explained that “They had been persuaded to abstain ... on the grounds that the resolution provided for a humanitarian mission” (Gates 2014, p.530). In fact, the Resolution text did not demand regime change, but rather encouraged political dialogue (UNSC/RES/1973, 2011).

Considering the initial caution and reticence from Brazil and the opposition from India, one must wonder why the two countries merely abstained and did not vote against UNSC Resolution 1973 entirely. It is possible that the abstentions from Brazil, Russia, India, and China were not fruitless and could have reduced the intensity of the intervention. It is also possible that the fact that all countries voted in favour of UNSC Resolution 1970, which included enforcement measures, showed that they believed in the word of the UNSC and that it must be strictly followed. Since UNSC Resolution 1970 passed, unanimously with the support of IBSA countries, it had welcomed international involvement by referring the situation to the ICC. It also likely decreased the severity, if only marginally, to the resistance to the no-fly zone because Gaddafi had refused to acquiesce to the Resolution’s demands. Also, IBSA Declarations (Brasilia Declaration, 2009, pt.4) that included commitments to supporting regional organizations made it politically difficult for IBSA to ignore the pleas of the LAS, OIC, and GCC, even though the AU cautioned against “any form of military intervention” (Wolf, 2012, p.113). This would evidence an IBSA that is uncoordinated in voting, but still maintains similar values.

3.4.1. Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1973

Problems began with UNSC Resolution 1973 nearly as soon as it was passed. Implementation of a no-fly zone is logistically extremely challenging and NATO was quickly criticized for its “overly expansive interpretation of [the mandate]” (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p.846). Interpretation of the no-fly zone’s mandate from the Resolution divided the involved member states (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p.845). As the intervention lengthened, there was a growing sense that NATO was no longer serving as a defensive shield for populations at risk, but rather acting to eliminate Gaddafi (Gates 2014, p.530). An ever-growing list of bombing targets had revealed, “that very few targets were off-limits” (Gates 2014, p.530). There were accusations of NATO arming the Libyan rebels and perhaps even training them, and making unjustified bombing raids on non-military targets and even fleeing civilians (Banerjee, 2012, pp.99-100). In fact, the French admitted to arming the

rebel fighters with serious munitions, including tanks, surprising even NATO (Hopkins, 2011 and BBC News, 2011).

The IBSA states, India in particular, expressed their concern at the perceived manipulation of the UNSC that ran counter to IBSA's professed devotion to diplomacy as a method of resolving matters of international peace and security. The IBSA statement that had been issued in March 2011 had only permitted the no-fly zone if it were in "full compliance" with the UN (New Delhi Communiqué, 2011). Such a violation of the IBSA principles would no doubt evoke its ire and further action at the diplomatic level. Soon after, the Indian government referred to NATO as the "armed wing" of the UNSC (Plett, 2011). It appeared that, in the opinion of Indian Ambassador to the UN, Hardeep Puri, the UN's primary objective in Libya was no longer civilian protection or providing humanitarian relief, but rather overthrowing the regime in Tripoli (Plett, 2011). During a debate in the UNSC in June 2012 (subject: protection of civilians), India stated it had a "considerable sense of unease about the manner in which the humanitarian imperative of protecting civilians has been interpreted for actual action on the ground" (Puri, 2012a). India was concerned that this escalation would not ameliorate matters in Libya, but rather exacerbate them (Tisdall, 2011). To India, arming rebels went too far beyond the mandate of "all necessary measures" to protect civilians (UNSC/RES/1973, 2011).

Within days of the affirmative vote for UNSC Resolution 1973, South Africa reversed its original position and disassociated from support for the NATO-led no-fly zone (Aboagye, 2012, p.38). Dismissing the AU's cautions rendered the AU bystanders to a conflict occurring on their own soil. Soon South Africa became as vocal of a critic of the no-fly zone as its IBSA partners had originally been, echoing their sentiments almost perfectly. South African President Jacob Zuma, according to Tisdall (2011, p.2), also went so far as to suggest the NATO mission had "more to do with regime change than humanitarian assistance." In a UNSC meeting that occurred the following year in 2012, in reference to the involvement of the LAS in resolving the on-going Arab Spring conflicts, South African Foreign Affairs Minister, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, said the UNSC should be "consistent in its collaboration with the League, rather than cooperating selectively on issues that served the national interests of its members" (SC/10775, 2012). This emphasized the belief that certain members of the UNSC were dictating the decision making of international law.

Meanwhile, in July 2011, the UN hosted an informal debate on the topic of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P was a concept that had been officially included in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document (Pattison, 2013, p.1). The three points of R2P represent three separate pillars. The points read:

- “1. The State carries the primary responsibility for the protection of populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.
2. The international community has a responsibility to assist States in fulfilling this responsibility.
3. The international community should use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State fails to protect its populations or is in fact the perpetrator of crimes, the international community must be prepared to take stronger measures, including the collective use of force through the UN Security Council.” (World Summit Outcome Document, 2005, pp.31-32)

From IBSA, only Brazil made a statement- India and South Africa did not. Brazil accentuated the “political subordination and chronological sequencing” of the R2P pillars in addition to the “last resort character” of the third pillar (Viotti, 2011). The French arming of the Libyan rebels and rumours of other countries going beyond Resolution 1973’s mandate upset Brazil. It was seen as hypocritical to IBSA that the arms embargo and calls for cease-fire that had been applied were to Gaddafi’s forces, but France could send arms to the Libyan rebels (Gaouette, 2011). Brazil’s statement expressed their continued disappointment in UNSC Resolution 1973 and the way it had been implemented.

UNGA and UNHRC passed Libya-related resolutions as well. In July, the UNHRC adopted a resolution without a vote comprehensively addressing all conflict-related issues in Libya. In short, the UNHRC Resolution called for an end to the violence and a resolution to the conflict (A/HRC/RES/17/17, 2011). Of the IBSA states, only Brazil had the opportunity to vote in favour (A/HRC/RES/17/17, 2011). Tensions were high in September as UNGA decided whether or not to accept the new government of Libya called the National Transitional Council (NTC). South Africa diverged from the P3, China and Russia, and its IBSA partners, but voted with AU when it voted against accepting the NTC’s leadership (A/RES/66/1a.1, 2011)- presenting yet another Libya vote with an uncoordinated IBSA.

In October 2011, the IBSA Summit occurred in Tshwane, South Africa. The Summit contained Heads of State of IBSA countries. The conflict in Libya was not explicitly mentioned in the final statement, but it did address the challenges faced by the Arab Spring. IBSA offered to share its “democratic and inclusive development model of their societies

with countries in transition to democracy” (Tshwane Declaration, 2011). No mention was made of the “responsibility to protect” or the no-fly zone. The diplomatic events surrounding 1973 and the NATO enforced no-fly zone later forced the international community to revisit the concept of R2P and that discussion would be led by Brazil.

3.5. The “Responsibility While Protecting”

Dramatically, on October 20, 2011, eight months after the revolution began and after more than 41 years of rule, President Gaddafi aka the “King of Kings and Supreme Guide of the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” was captured and murdered at the hands of opposition forces (Hilsum, 2012). The death of Gaddafi crystallized the appearance of “regime change,” which further angered IBSA countries. In response, South African President Zuma stated, “We expected him to be captured, given that everybody knew there was a warrant of arrest issued against him” (Staff Reporter, 2011). Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff spoke out against celebrating Gaddafi’s death and rather encouraged the processes of democratic reform taking place there (AFP, 2011a). India, on the other hand, never addressed the matter publicly.

Within weeks of Gaddafi’s death and two days of the November 9 UNSC debate on civilian protection, the Brazilian Ambassador to the UN, Maria Luisa Ribieiro Viotti, released a concept paper at the UN entitled, “Responsibility while protecting: elements for the development and promotion of a concept” aka “RWP” (Viotti, 2011a and S/2011/701, 2011). Brazil again expressed its feeling that the western world had mischaracterized their interests to the international system in UNSC Resolution 1973. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff had announced the formation of the idea at the September 2011 UNGA plenary (Bellamy, 2012). The November paper proposed a new framework of organizing the “Responsibility to Protect” concept, not replacing it, but merely strengthening the idea. The R2P pillar originally had no specific order to them. Building on their statement from the July 2011 UN debate on R2P, Brazil proposed in its RWP paper that the pillars “must follow a strict line of political subordination and chronological sequencing.” Naturally this would make any sort of armed or military intervention the last possible resort and place that type of decision-making firmly within the realm of the UNSC. RWP did not attempt to make serious changes to R2P, rather simply stressed, according to unofficial Indian remarks in

support of the concept, the importance of “proper interpretation and application of Pillar III” (Puri, 2012). The bottom line was that armed intervention should always be considered a measure of last resort with the implication that this was not done in Libya.

This sort of normative proposal is consistent with the rhetoric of IBSA. India and South Africa quickly made strong explanatory statements professing their support for this norm creation. During the same November debate, when the Indian representative spoke, he mentioned the same concern that Brazil had, of the protection of civilians within UNSC Resolution 1973 being used to excuse actions on the ground. India was clearly concerned about such an intervention happening again and closed by mentioning, “The Security Council must also be clear that its responsibility for protecting civilians does not end with a military or police response” (S/PV.6650, 2011). South Africa was even more explicit: “Regime change and the arming and harming of civilians cannot be justified in the name of protecting civilians, and those entrusted with such responsibilities must uphold them while protecting civilians, as clearly stated by the representative of Brazil” (S/PV.6650, 2011). This great degree of similarity in their remarks and references to each other’s concepts suggests dramatically increased coordination and normative alignment compared to earlier actions. Here IBSA, led by Brazil, is seen to be creating norms; not merely taking ownership of norms already in existence.

According to academic Jeffrey Checkel, the effect of norms “reach[es] deeper: they constitute actor identities and interests and do not simply regulate behaviour” (Checkel, 1998, p.328). When norms are created, they “make behavioural claims on actors.” This establishes a set of actors that are based on the created norm. These states and global norms interact and are “mutually constituted” (Checkel, 1998, p.328). In the case of IBSA, Brazil created the norm of RWP and the IBSA states rallied around it based on their rhetoric and behaviour. Academics that study constructivist thought have found that regime norms dictate much of a state’s behaviour and given that IBSA all have the same regime type, this implies great similarities in behaviour and by extension, support for norms.

Brazil later aborted the “RWP” concept, but not before hosting a well-attended informal discussion at the UN and eliciting declarations of support for the norm. Brazil’s IBSA partners attended and spoke (Benner, 2013, p.10). South Africa’s statement “fully associated” with RWP. South Africa accused NATO, consistent with previous statements, of “operat[ing] beyond the provisions of international law” (Government of South Africa, 2011). India and Brazil later promoted RWP on the margins of a bilateral meeting. They

made a joint statement on March 30, 2012 on RWP calling for “Enhanced Security Council procedures in order to monitor and assess the manner in which resolutions are interpreted and implemented. In this vein, they support the idea that the concept ... RWP should be further discussed at the UN” (Rousseff, 2012). And in the September 2012 meeting on R2P, both India and South Africa included positive remarks on it within their statements. Feelings of resentment from UNSC 1973 clearly still lingered with India, as even in September 2012, nearly a year after Gaddafi’s death, India still expressed concern that R2P would be hijacked by big powers for the purposes of accomplishing political objectives (2012, p.4). The continual promulgation of the RWP norm, nearly a year after its release, proved that IBSA does, despite the lack of institutionalization, share similar values and can be capable of coordination and cooperation.

Implementation of a newly constructed norm, especially one as broad as RWP, can take years. Norm growth occurs during robust dialogue and when emerging and powerful states, like IBSA, vocalize their support. RWP, strengthened by the backing of the IBSA countries, provided a catalyst for critical discussions in the international community about normative issues such as an intervention's accountability, transparency, and regime change (Hammann, 2012). Being members of IBSA increased the likelihood of the countries providing support to the norm. IBSA countries, having shared norms and values, could confidently speak their minds on the issues- knowing that they would receive political support from their partners. However, Brazil ceased to promote the norm or expand the RWP coalition, largely limiting the norm’s possibility for growth (Benner, 2013).

The next UNSC Resolution on Libya was UNSC Resolution 2009, which established the UN Support Mission in Libya, called UNSMIL. The mandate of the mission covered: “Assisting national efforts to extend State authority, strengthen institutions, restore public services, support transitional justice and protect human rights, particularly those of vulnerable groups” (UNSC/RES/2009, 2011). UNSC Resolution 2009 also kept the no-fly zone under review. In further demonstration of opposition to how the no-fly zone had been implemented, South Africa took this opportunity to make a statement, in alignment with the Russian Federation to “call for the early lifting of the no-fly zone” (SC/10389, 2011). Following the death of Gaddafi on October 20, the UNSC voted unanimously for UNSC Resolution 2016 to end the NATO civilian protection mandate and the no-fly zone on October 27 and it would end officially on October 31, 2011 (UNSC/RES/2016, 2011, pp.2-3). India, South Africa, and Brazil all voted in favour of the Resolution.

3.6. Findings

The results of this qualitative analysis show that despite the initial lack of coordination and internal coherence around the Libyan conflict, IBSA does indeed share similar values on international peace and security. Internal coherence appeared to improve towards the end of the year as the countries came into agreement around their opposition to foreign military intervention and especially foreign-imposed regime change. At the beginning of the international debate on the topic, it had appeared that the UNSC Resolution 1973 would only concentrate on providing humanitarian relief to Libyans. This partially explains why South Africa voted in favour of it. India and Brazil's scepticism of the plan for humanitarian intervention explains why both countries publicly expressed concern about the establishment of a no-fly zone before the vote on UNSC Resolution 1973 even occurred. After the no-fly zone began, the countries quickly came into strong rhetorical alignment around their problems with its implementation. Brazil's correlative development of RWP and India and South Africa's support for it demonstrates their strong feelings and increasing sense of identity around issues of state sovereignty and foreign intervention. As for alignment with other major powers, IBSA's politics and rhetoric were largely consistent with China and Russia during these diplomatic negotiations. The debate over state sovereignty and foreign intervention will play a huge role in how IBSA behaves during the negotiations on the conflict in Syria.

CHAPTER 4: THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA

4.1. Introduction

The Syrian Arab Republic was not immune from the fervour that unfurled through the Middle East and North Africa during the Arab Spring. In the Syrian case, the catalytic event that began the conflict was the arrest of 15 children, who had written anti-regime graffiti on the wall of a school in the Syrian town of Daraa, on March 18, 2011 (Lesch, 2011, p.424 and Sterling, 2012). The town's residents made an unprecedented move in an authoritarian regime and protested because it was reported that the children had been "beaten and tortured in prison" (Sterling, 2012). It was reported that several protesters were killed on the first day of the demonstrations and many more were injured. When the children were released, it became clear that the accusations of torture were true (Sterling, 2012). Inspired by this incident, a history of past abuses, and concurrent uprisings in other Arab countries, more Syrians throughout the country began protesting (Sterling, 2012). In response, the Syrian government forces fired into protesting crowds, cracking down against them. Rumours of torture and arbitrary arrest persisted as the protest movement grew and spread throughout the country (Sterling, 2012). The protesters demanded increased political and economic reforms and "increasingly call[ed] for the downfall of the regime" (S/PV/6524, 2011).

In April, in a conciliatory gesture, the President of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, inaugurated a new government and lifted the nearly 50 year-old state of emergency (S/PV/6524, 2011). Assad also "recognized the right to peacefully protest," although strictly regulated (S/PV6524, 2011, p.1). However, the protesters were dissatisfied with how long it had taken him to enact these measures (S/PV/6524, 2011, p.1). To make matters worse, Assad continued to allow his government security forces to use violence against the protests (Spillius, 2012 and S/PV/6524, 2011, p.1). In the days following President Assad's governmental reforms, reports surfaced of a terrible government crackdown on a large demonstration. Within a two-day period, the UN's Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported more than 100 deaths across the country (S/PV/6524, 2011, p.1). The violence intensified when, soon after, the Syrian government began a military operation against the villages where the protests had begun (S/PV/6524, 2011,

p.1). This aggressive action from the Syrian government fuelled the protesters fires and the clear lack of resolution motivated the interest of many in the international community.

What had emerged as disparate protests eventually transformed into a coherent political and militaristic opposition and the Syrian “Arab Spring” into a civil war. The official formation of the opposition force, the Syrian National Council, in July and August 2011, in Turkey, crystallized its demands and hardened its resolve (BBC News, 2013). The on-going conflict and Assad’s violent response to the protests concerned the international community and preventing the conflict from deteriorating further now preoccupied the minds of many.

4.2. The Role of the International Community

The Syrian conflict proved another fundamental challenge for the UNSC and an international community that was already concentrating on the Libyan uprising that had begun a month earlier. The on-going events in Libya coloured the international community’s response to Syria, particularly those, such as IBSA, who had been displeased with how the Libyan no-fly zone had been implemented. A series of UNSC Resolutions punctuated the Libyan uprising, while indecision, division, and draft resolutions plagued the Syrian. Particularly after the death of Gaddafi, the international community found Syria-related discussions increasingly stalled; all states that were opposed to the “no-fly zone” were made “dubious that anything the UNSC passes that makes mention of Assad stepping down could be used as *carte blanche* for folks interested in regime change” (Herszenhorn, 2012). China and Russia were most vocally opposed to any UNSC action in Syria and IBSA was often suspected of giving them tacit political support. Thus began a dramatic year of discussions, draft resolutions and debates on the conflict.

The IBSA Trilateral Commission met March 7-10, 2011, which was 10 days before the children were arrested in Daraa, sparking the initial revolts. Therefore, due to timing, no meaningful remarks were included on the Syrian conflict within the final Communiqué. However, the March IBSA meeting was late enough in the Arab Spring to warrant the inclusion of a general statement, indicating the directionality of IBSA’s views:

“In the context of mass protests in countries of the Middle East and North Africa, as an expression of the aspirations of the peoples of these countries for reform, the ministers expressed the hope that the situation will be resolved in a peaceful manner, in the best interests of the respective peoples.” (New Delhi Communiqué, 2011)

The emphasis on a peaceful resolution reflects IBSA's professed devotion to diplomacy over military intervention in the preservation of international peace and security. After this Communiqué was issued, there was no further action in the immediate aftermath from IBSA, except for from within UNGA, UNHRC, and the UNSC.

On April 27, the UNSC openly discussed the Syrian conflict for the first time; providing valuable insight into the views of the international community. On April 21, there had been a UNSC debate on the Middle East conflict (the focus was on Palestine) and many states, including India, Brazil and South Africa, mentioned briefly the importance of resolving the situation in Syria (S/PV.6520, 2011, p.25 and 27). Originally, the UNSC debated whether or not to issue a press statement on Syria, but was unable to agree upon one because of objections from Russia and Lebanon (Security Council Report, 2011). Consequently, the UNSC held a public debate instead. As non-permanent members of the UNSC, IBSA members participated and made statements (S/PV.6524, 2011). Their statements are largely consistent; all mentioned the need for political reforms, the fact that resolving the conflict was largely the responsibility of the Syrian government, and forbid the use of force. The statements indicated possession of similar values. This debate occurred shortly after UNSC Resolution 1973 passed and many countries were becoming concerned with the use of force in civilian protection efforts in Syria.

India's statement in the April 27th public debate encouraged "political dialogue and reform" and clarified that managing the protesters and their demands was the Syrian government's problem (S/PV/6524, 2011, p.8). The role of the UNSC, in India's view, was simply to forbid violence in any form and "to seek a resolution of grievances through peaceful means." India concluded by highlighting the important role that regional and sub-regional organizations have to play in resolving the crisis (S/PV/6524, 2011, p.8), possibly referencing its role in IBSA or at the least highlighting India's positive view of the role of regional organizations. When Brazilian Representative Ambassador Viotti spoke, she highlighted the vital role that regional organizations can play in resolving conflicts- showing again how valued regional organizations and cooperation are to the IBSA countries. Ambassador Viotti included a condemnation of violence against protesters and encouraged the Syrian government to be responsive to their demands (S/PV/6524, 2011, p.9); she went on to encourage the Syrian Government to "engage in a broad, inclusive political dialogue with all relevant parties" (S/PV/6524, 2011, p.9). In the shortest statement of the three

IBSA members, the South African representative encouraged the Syrian government to continue making “reforms towards democratization,” but did not mention regional organizations. South Africa stressed peaceful protests and that the Syrian government be responsive to them (S/PV/6524, 2011, p.8). South Africa asked to be associated with the statement made on behalf of the NAM, showing a lack of coordination of IBSA during this debate (S/PV/6520, 2011, p.25). However, the statements were all consistent with central IBSA tenets of promoting the role of diplomacy in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Meanwhile, at the end of April in a special session of the 16th UNHRC, the UNHRC passed a Resolution that was critical of the Syrian Government and mandated an investigation into human rights violations occurring in Syria. The investigation’s goal was to hold those responsible for the violence accountable. Aligned with the US, the UK and France, Brazil, the only IBSA member on the UNHRC voted “Yes” on the Resolution. China and Russia, on the other hand, voted it down, likely because it was too critical of the Syrian Government and did not address the fact that the Syrian opposition was also alleged to have committed abuses (A/HRC/RES/S-16-1, 2011). A little more than a week after the Resolution had passed, Syria withdrew its bid for membership in the UNHRC (Donnet, 2011).

Months after the conflict began, on May 25, 2011, France, Germany and the United Kingdom presented the first draft resolution to the UNSC on the conflict in Syria. The resolution was presented in the midst of some states, such as India, vocalizing concerns that UNSC Resolution 1973 was overreaching its mandate in Libya (S/PV.6531, 2011, p.11). IBSA states, among others, were wary of any similar action the UNSC might take on Syria (Security Council Report, 2011, p.3) and wanted to avoid ‘another Libya’ (Mabera, 2012, p.12). Using the argument that the conflict in Syria was an internal affair and outside intervention might only make the situation worse, China and Russia threatened to veto (Security Council Report, 2011, p.3). The draft Resolution was never voted on so it is unclear whether or not IBSA would have abstained or voted negatively. The situation in Libya and the surrounding controversy illuminated the fact that a solution to Syria that did not involve external military intervention would need to be found. As a result, versions with alternative options such as sanctions circulated. This Resolution would face many revisions before it was finally voted on in October 2011.

4.2.1. Bilateral Brazil-South Africa Meeting

Driven closer together by shared frustration of the evolution of the Libya situation, IBSA coordination on peace and security heightened. In July 2011, Brazil and South Africa met bilaterally to discuss a series of issues, including multilateral cooperation, global governance reform, and the conflict in Syria. Both countries promised to work for global governance reform through their participation in IBSA and recognized that “A critical avenue for cooperation also arises from the fact that both Brazil and South Africa serve on the UN Security Council this year” (Government of South Africa, 2011). In the meeting, the Brazilians and South Africans “discussed ways of engaging the Syrian Government with the aim of finding an end to the violence in Syria and to promote a sustainable political settlement that is inclusive and reflects the will of the Syrian people and addresses their legitimate concerns” (Government of South Africa, 2011). Shortly after this bilateral meeting occurred, on August 10, 2011, IBSA would send its first diplomatic delegation to meet with the Syrian leadership (Varner, 2011). Due to the fact that IBSA had most recently met in March 2011 and did not have another meeting scheduled until October 2011, the only way the delegation could have been planned is through discussion of the role of IBSA outside of the formal meetings and within the bilateral meetings. This elevated degree of planning implied IBSA’s most significant level of coordination yet in the realm of international peace and security.

4.3. IBSA’s Involvement

On August 3, 2011, nearly six months after the start of the conflict, India, during its month-long term as President of the UNSC, issued the first UNSC statement on Syria. Presidential statements, like resolutions, are adopted by the UNSC membership, and are made on behalf of the UNSC, but do not require a vote (United Nations, 2014). Therefore, although not a vote, this statement marked the first consensus that the UNSC had achieved in terms of Syria. In fact, it was the most agreement the UNSC came to on the Syrian conflict in the entire year. The rather limited statement “condemned widespread violations of human rights ... against civilians by the Syrian authorities” and asked “all sides to act with utmost restraint”- implying that even the opposition was using force (S/PRST/2011/16, 2011). Included in the statement was a plea for the Syrian authorities to “allow unhindered access for international humanitarian agencies and workers” (S/PRST/2011/16, 2011). The credit given to the Syrian government lent credence to those opposed to any sort of UNSC

intervention, such as those that abstained from the vote for UNSC 1973. This statement marked the beginning of an active month in the UNSC in regards to the conflict and provoked a series of statements from Middle East-based regional organizations.

As President Assad's security forces continued to attack Syrian towns in early August, the Arab League issued a statement that expressed their concern. The statement called for an end to "military operations" in order to encourage a political settlement (Perry, 2011). The Gulf Cooperation Council's statement consisted of their fears over the "mounting violence and the excessive use of force which resulted in killing and wounding large numbers" (AFP, 2011b). The Organization for Islamic Cooperation issued its statement on August 2, 2011, calling for "all parties to preserve the unity and cohesion of their country and to spare it the risks of infighting and external intervention" (Ihsanoglu, 2011). As evidenced by the situation in Libya, the UNSC tends to put great weight behind the words of regional organizations. While no organization pushed for intervention, the push for political dialogue from these organizations should have been considered and might have, if debates were not so stalled, provided the catalyst for a UNSC resolution of a similar character.

4.3.1. The IBSA Delegation Visits Syria

As a unified actor, IBSA sent a delegation composed of its Deputy Foreign Ministers to Syria for meetings with Syrian President Assad and the Syrian Foreign Minister, Walid Muallem, in the beginning of August (New York Ministerial Communiqué, 2011, pt. 9). The delegation expressed grave concern, asked for an "immediate end to all violence," "for all sides to act with utmost restraint," and condemned the use of force by all parties, not just the government (Embassy of India, Damascus, 2011). This statement provided political support to the argument that the Syrian opposition was also using force in the protests, by extension supporting the Chinese and Russians, the main opponents of any UNSC resolution. These opponents fixated to this point in negotiations and any resolution that did not acknowledge that both sides were using force- not just the Syrian government- was doomed to fail. IBSA issued a statement after the meeting, stating that President Assad had reassured them "of his commitment to reform, aimed at ushering in multiparty democracy, including thorough revision of the constitution" (Embassy of India, Damascus, 2011). IBSA was told that free and fair elections would be held within the year and that Syria would be a "free, pluralistic and multiparty democracy before the end of the year" (Embassy of India,

Damascus, 2011). The belief that these assurances would be upheld, affirmed IBSA's commitment to non-interference in the affairs of another state, because Syria would supposedly settle its own internal issues.

Even though RWP had not officially debuted as a concept at this point (it was only August), the joint decision to make a diplomatic visit to Syria demonstrated a significant degree of mutual support for the classic principles of conflict resolution. A diplomatic delegation can fall within the first two pillars of Brazil's proposed RWP framework that places all available options before military intervention. As the South African Ambassador to the UN later said in the February 2012 UNGA debate on R2P: "The dispatching of eminent persons, envoys or political groupings such as the Arab League or IBSA or influential bilateral partners, in the case of Syria, should be considered as the first line of approach" (South African Mission to the UN, 2012). The fact that South Africa mentioned IBSA in this statement, showed its pride in IBSA's action and solidified IBSA's increasing interest and sense of importance around international peace and security issues. In this case, without IBSA as an organizing mechanism, it is highly unlikely that the countries would have made the same visit. As IBSA valued diplomacy highly, they inevitably hoped that their visit would cause a cessation of violence. IBSA had reason to believe that progress would be made as President Assad said to them "that some mistakes had been made by the security forces and that efforts were under way to prevent their recurrence" (Embassy of India, 2011). However, despite the visit, the promises, and the primacy in diplomacy, the violence and repression in Syria aggravated. No actions or statements came from IBSA until the next IBSA Summit in October 2011. The lack of further action and follow-up with the Syrian government begged the question of how serious IBSA really was about diplomacy and the genuineness of its desire for a leadership role in international peace and security.

In August, discussions continued within the UNSC on the draft resolution that had been initiated in May by Western countries. The P3 (UK, US, and France) and Portugal and Germany disseminated a version containing sanctions against the Syrian authorities, including President Assad and 22 of his affiliates (Charbonneau, 2011 and Mabera, 2011). It also proposed an arms embargo- severing the arms trade between Russia and Syria (Charbonneau, 2011). The measures included in the draft resolution were not reported to be as severe as a proposed European Union step to "forbid the import of Syrian oil" or the sanctions that the US had in place against Syria (Charbonneau, 2011). Although India, Brazil, and South Africa did not participate in circulating the draft resolution, IBSA's diplomats

reportedly were “constructively engaging on the text” (Charbonneau, 2011). A Russian-oriented draft resolution also circulated. This draft resolution did not include sanctions, but focused on Libya-related concerns of sovereignty and non-intervention. It did not ask for sanctions, but encouraged faster reform processes and the opposition to dialogue with the Syrian government (Charbonneau, 2011). It is unclear exactly how IBSA was aligned at this point.

Meanwhile, Brazil, India and South Africa continued to worry about ‘another Libya’ in Syria, because some states felt that NATO was operating beyond the mandate of UNSC Resolution 1973 (Benner, 2013). China and Russia were still strongly opposed to any external intervention in Syria (Benner, 2013). Russia and China believed that international pressure from the UNSC was merely a screen for changing the regime in Syria and expanding the Western sphere of influence to Syria (Benner, 2013). On August 23, 2011, in the special session of the 17th UNHRC, a Commission of Inquiry for Syria was established that held more weight than the previous fact-finding mission (UNHRC/RES/S-17-1). The Commission would investigate human rights violations with a view of holding accountable those responsible (UNHRC/RES/S-17-1). This time, the lone IBSA representative on the UNHRC, India, abstained from the vote, lending tacit support to China and Russia, who had voted against the Resolution (UNHRC/RES/S-17-1). The Syrian government would later be accused of not cooperating fully with the Commission (A/RES/66/176).

4.3.2. IBSA after its Delegation Visits Syria

On October 4, 2011, the draft resolution, which had originally circulated in May, was finally voted on and (S/2011/612, 2011) failed as a result of Chinese and Russian vetoes. The draft resolution (S/2011/612, 2011) “condemned the violent Syrian government crackdown on protesters and called for an end to the violence against civilians” essentially the same language as the UNSC Presidential statement from August 3 (S/2011/612, 2011). It did not mention sanctions nor intervention, and had no references to the use of force (S/2011/612, 2011). India, Brazil, and South Africa all abstained from the vote, while China and Russia used their veto. The draft resolution’s opposition believed that it did not prioritize political dialogue and that the UNSC should not intervene in the internal affairs of Syria. Concern still strong about how UNSC Resolution 1973 was implemented, the Russian Ambassador said (S/PV/6627, 2011) “the situation in Syria cannot be considered in the

UNSC separately from the Libyan experience.” The supporters of the draft resolution contended that it addressed sufficiently the requests for political reform and dialogue, incorporated provisions for protection of civilians, and was in line with Arab League requests.

The UNSC debate on the situation presented a public opportunity for the IBSA countries to address the situation in Syria and explain their votes. All the IBSA states had abstained from the vote and all of their statements pushed for political dialogue as a solution to the conflict. What follows below are brief summaries of their statements in the debate:

South Africa

Consistent with many of their earlier statements and the public opposition to the implementation of UNSC 1973, the South African Ambassador to the United Nations, Baso Sangqu, continued to support the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria” and “expressed their grave concern” and condemned the violence (S/PV.6627, 2011, p.10). The South African statement pressed for a Syrian-led solution to the crisis avoiding any foreign intervention. South Africa stated concern about including accountability measures on the Syrian authorities but not the opposition forces (SC/10403, 2011). The Resolution’s supporters rejected including language unambiguously opposed to a military intervention (SC/10403, 2011). This made it appear that the draft resolution could have hidden an agenda for removing the Assad regime. South Africa clearly believed that UNSC resolutions could be manipulated in order to accomplish political objectives. South Africa’s statement called for access to affected populations for international humanitarian agencies. Sangqu firmly stated that a political process “must be launched to guarantee that fundamental rights and freedoms were respected” (Sangqu, 2011). Finally, Sangqu stressed that Syria’s “unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity” must be maintained because Syria could help settle the persistent Middle East situation (2011).

Brazil

The Brazilian statement, given by UN Ambassador Viotti, referenced their work in IBSA and continued to push for private dialogue, despite the limited visible

successes of the August delegation (S/PV.6627, 2011, p.11). Brazil, like many other states, demanded an end to all types of violence and access to be granted to humanitarian aid agencies (SC/10403, 2011). At the time, Brazil was set to chair the recently established UNHRC Commission of Inquiry on Syria. Brazil would not receive the requested cooperation from the Syrian authorities (A/HRC/RES/176). Ambassador Viotti expressed regret that more time had not been spent discussing some of the more contentious aspects of the text in order that the UNSC could have demonstrated better cooperation (SC/10403, 2011). In short, Brazil maintained its position that a “meaningful, inclusive dialogue” within international institutions would be the most realistic way to solve the crisis (SC/10403, 2011).

India

The Indian Ambassador to the United Nations, Hardeep Puri, explained that the “threat of sanctions did not accommodate New Delhi’s concerns” and while condemning the violence, it did not condemn the violence from the Syrian opposition forces. Like its IBSA partners, Puri addressed the gravity of the situation in Syria, but emphasized that a constructive political dialogue that included all parties was the only way forward rather than sanctions or regime change (SC/10403, 2011). India’s democratic identity is also revealed when in its statement, it calls on the Syrian authorities to “listen to the aspirations of their people” (SC/10403, 2011). In an expanded version of its explanation, Indian Ambassador Puri referenced its diplomatic work in Syria as a part of IBSA as one of the ways India is attempting to “engag[e] Syria in a collaborative and constructive dialogue and partnership” (S/PV.6627, 2011, p.6).

In abstaining from the October vote, the IBSA states tacitly sided with Russia and China and away from the UK, France, and US. The IBSA statements encouraged a dialogue and provided political cover to China and Russia. The rhetoric and action did not go without attention from non-governmental organizations. On October 16, Human Rights Watch (HRW) called into question the utility of IBSA’s push for a private dialogue and time for further discussion, given that the violence in Syria continued to compound by the day: “IBSA leaders shouldn’t sit by and watch as Syria implodes... Their efforts at private dialogue have achieved nothing, and hundreds more Syrians have died in the meantime” (HRW, 2011a).

However, IBSA states were not “sitting by”, they were trying to resolve the conflict in the way they thought was best. The unanimous IBSA abstention and parallels in their statements showed the high level of coordination and normative agreement at the time between the countries. Unlike UNSC Resolution 1973, South Africa sided with IBSA and not with the UNSC’s other African members, Nigeria and Gabon. However, despite the emphasis on diplomacy and development from IBSA, the violence in Syria endured, causing great consternation in the international community.

The declaration issued after the October 2011 IBSA Summit in Tshwane, South Africa did not include an explicit mention of the Syrian conflict, but it did include a reference to the Arab Spring within its opening statement (Tshwane Declaration, 2011). Given earlier enthusiasm for a resolution to the Syrian conflict, it is surprising that it was not explicitly mentioned in their statement. The countries shared again their fundamental belief in the power of diplomacy and development to bring peace and security. IBSA went so far as to volunteer their “democratic and inclusive development model” with Arab Spring countries (Tshwane Declaration, 2011). Working together to help Arab Spring countries transition to democracy marked an even further step forward in their coordination regarding international peace and security issues. Serious debate occurred over Syria that year and this would prove not to be the end of IBSA’s involvement in the conflict negotiations.

The beginning of November was marked with the suspension of Syria from the LAS due to the fact that the brutal government crackdowns had not stopped (Batty and Shenker, 2011). The Arab League’s suspension of Syria would galvanize those opposed to the Assad regime and further divide the UNSC- meaning the vetoed and draft resolutions of 2011 would not be the only ones. Attacks on the foreign embassies during the month provoked the UNSC into issuing one of its few statements in regards to the Syrian conflict, where they simply condemned attacks on the foreign embassies (SC/10321, 2011). By this point, IBSA was viewed by non-governmental organizations as acting as a unit, separately from China and Russia. HRW even made a set of targeted recommendations to India, Brazil, and South Africa in an official organizational report issued in November (HRW, 2011). The US Ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, expressed disappointment in the IBSA country’s actions and credited the countries with blocking the UN’s attempt to put pressure on the Assad regime, showing how influential IBSA had become (Gaouette, 2011).

December 2011 marked yet another violent month in the Syrian conflict. The beginning of the month featured informal consultations with the United Nations High Commissioner

for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, who is South African, citing that 5,000 people had died since the start of the conflict and warned of the possibility of a major assault on Homs, one of the largest towns in Syria (Pillay, 2011). Pillay indicated after the briefing “crimes against humanity had likely been committed by Syrian government force” (Pillay, 2011). This was yet another comment that divided the UNSC by providing fuel to Western countries to take measures in Syria to protect civilians. In December 2011, Syria finally agreed to and implemented an LAS initiative allowing LAS observers into Syria. The observers arrived in Syria, but unfortunately, the LAS suspended the mission the following month because the situation had so severely deteriorated (BBC News, 2013). In the middle of the month, Russia called emergency informal consultations in the UNSC to discuss a draft resolution that they had proposed on Syria. The draft would not be voted on that month.

In the special session of the 18th UNHRC in December, another Syria-related resolution passed. This time it condemned the violence by the Syrian Government (HRC/RES/S-18/1, 2011). It insinuated that even high levels of the Syrian armed forces were guilty of abuses such as obstructing medical assistance and committing sexual violence (HRC/RES/S-18/1). Russia and China voted against the resolution likely because it did not address the human rights violations that had allegedly been committed by the Syrian opposition forces. The United States voted in favour of it; the UK and France were not sitting on the UNHRC at the time. India, siding neither with the P3 nor Russia and China, abstained (HRC/RES/S-18/1, 2011). India was the only IBSA member on the UNHRC at the time. That same month provided another opportunity to evaluate the status of IBSA’s alignment. UNGA voted on Resolution 176 that addressed the human rights situation in Syria. In this instance, IBSA diverged- Brazil voted with the United States, while India and South Africa aligned with China and Russia by abstaining (UNGA/RES/66/176, 2011). Also in this Resolution, the Syrian authorities had been singled out for committing human rights abuses, but the Syrian opposition had not (UNGA/RES/66/176, 2011, pp.1-2). This was a sticking point for Russia and China, who wanted to make sure Syrian opposition forces were also held accountable.

4.5. Findings

The Libyan conflict undeniably had a massive effect on the role of IBSA and the international community in Syria. The decisions that were made relatively rapidly by the UNSC in the case of Libya were never even agreed upon in the case of Syria. IBSA had evolved significantly as a result of the no-fly zone implementation and debate over foreign

military intervention in Libya. During the Libya negotiations, despite the fact that IBSA demonstrated many shared values, it was not enough to translate into coordinated action. On the other hand, in Syria, IBSA acted with the greatest coordination seen thus far by sending an actual diplomatic delegation to Syria to discuss the conflict. Clearly, IBSA was seen as a significant actor because the delegation was able to hold audiences with Syrian President Assad and the Foreign Minister. The media even believed IBSA to have been strong enough to have blocked UN action in Syria (Gaouette, 2011). IBSA increased in stature regarding international peace and security further when it received targeted recommendations from HRW in its November 2011 report on the Syrian conflict (HRW, 2011a). HRW perceived IBSA to be an actor that could have an impact on the resolution of the Syrian conflict and IBSA wanted to be seen this way. In an IBSA statement issued in New York in September 2011, the Ministers expressed their desire that “three democracies from the South make a meaningful and unique contribution to global peace and security” (New York Ministerial Statement, 2011, pt.2). In the same statement, the countries’ Ministers also emphasized their “constructive” involvement in the UNSC deliberations “to find permanent solutions to highly complex issues” such as the conflicts in Libya and Syria (New York Ministerial Statement, 2011, pt. 9).

Although many considered IBSA to have been backing China and Russia during the Syria negotiations, IBSA should not be seen as having been completely aligned with China and Russia or against human rights or democratic tradition (Gaouette, 2011). In fact, IBSA explained its August 2011 delegation visit to Syria as centred on “encouraging democratic changes ...a peaceful resolution ... the promotion of democracy and human rights and the protection of civilians” (New York Ministerial Statement, 2011, pt.9). Civil society spokespersons Fabienne Hara and Mark Quarterman said that when it seemed like India, Brazil, and South Africa were opposed to the US actions on Syria, it was not rooted in opposition to human rights, rather sourced in their reluctance to allow another Western military intervention on foreign soil (Charbonneau, 2011 and Gaouette, 2011). This was phrased well by the South African Ambassador to the UN, Baso Sangqu, who explained that South Africa abstained from the October vote because “the trajectory, the template for the solution (in Syria) was very clear, it was along similar lines to Libya” (Plett, 2011). It was crucial to IBSA to see cooperation in international law and not any one side dictating the actions. Brazil’s explanation for its abstention vote on October 4, 2011 showed that it would have rather had the UNSC act with a single voice than to act at all if in a disjointed fashion

(Benner, 2013, p.5). This aligns with neoliberal institutionalist thinking, as these states believe that repeated meetings and interactions, whether positive or negative, can help states come to mutual cooperation, which, in this case, is probably the most promising hope for resolving the conflict (Grieco, 1988, p.493).

CHAPTER 5: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF 2011'S UN VOTING

5.1. Introduction

The study now transitions to analyse IBSA's internal coherence and alignment during the year by looking at the votes of IBSA and the permanent members of the UNSC. It can show the degree that IBSA voted like a "bloc." Internal coherence displays the degree of coordination and cooperation. Alignment displays IBSA independence or whether or not IBSA followed China and Russia or the P3 – on international peace and security and in regards to Libya and Syria. This analysis can reveal how IBSA's statements and actions manifested. While this will not prove causality, it can explore the strength and make-up of IBSA alignment and internal coherence.³

5.2. Why Examine Voting?

Voting is important to examine because while IBSA and its members may make statements professing their policy beliefs, these do not always automatically reflect in their behaviour. Voting presents an opportunity to examine a state's manifested policy preferences and it is directly comparable to other states. Foreign policy is often decided in secret or "cloaked in ambiguity and/or non-repeated"; therefore, public votes in the UN become one of the best options (Voeten et al 2013). While actions and statements show one aspect of an engagement, votes are "comparable and observable" and a "state's policy preferences manifested" (Graham, 2012, p.3). In 2012, the first analysis of IBSA's voting in the United Nations focusing on the relative alignment of South Africa to India and Brazil was completed (Graham, 2012). The study, done by South African academic Suzanne Graham, concentrated on UNGA sessions that occurred from 2003 till 2008, which were IBSA's initial five years of operation (Graham, 2012). No similar study has been done since, so after this time, little is known of the actual level of IBSA amalgamation (Long, 2013). The results of Graham's study found a small bump in IBSA's internal coherence during that time. Graham

³ This research is based on an empirical research project that was submitted in 2011 as part of the "Political Behavior" course at the University of Cape Town (Long, Abigail, 2013 "Toward a New World Order: The IBSA Dialogue Forum's Voting in the United Nations in 2011").

acknowledged that the increase was most likely part of a trend of India, Brazil, and South Africa's increasing convergence and was not caused by IBSA's 2003 formation alone (Graham, 2012, p.421). While the formation of IBSA was indeed significant, it probably correlated with, but did not cause the upsurge of collaboration in multilateral diplomacy. Graham's study also revealed divergence in IBSA voting within UNGA committees that focus on international security issues (Graham, 2012, pp.422-423). Deviating IBSA behaviour on international security issues will be a central postulation that this research project can either confirm or deny.

5.3. Conceptualization and Operationalization

The dependent variable of IBSA internal cohesion will be measured by how often IBSA votes in a unified manner. If IBSA votes unanimously consistently at least 66% of the time, I shall deem this to be a high level of internal coherence. The second dependent variable is the degree of IBSA alignment- either with China and Russia or the P3; the alignment will be measured by how often IBSA voted with or against those states. If IBSA voted independently, with China and Russia, or with the P3 at least 66% of the time in any way, I deem it to have been a high degree of alignment or independence. Politically, China and Russia generally represented one perspective in the discussions on the Syrian and Libyan conflicts and the P3 stood for the other perspective. All three of the voting blocs- China and Russia, IBSA, and the P3- actively participated in the discussions and debates; therefore, by comparing all of their votes, a reasonable estimate of alignment among the states can be glimpsed. All will be measured by international peace and security votes within the UN- the independent variable.

All international peace and security resolutions were categorized by substance and these were double-coded by a fellow researcher until we came to a 100% agreement on the proper categorization. When the substance of the resolution meant it could have applied to more than one category, we reviewed the resolutions in order to determine the most pertinent code (Long, 2013). The categories are 'International Law and Justice,' 'On-going Conflicts including Sanctions,' 'Disarmament and Terrorism', and 'Human Rights.' This includes all votes related to international peace and security. Votes that occurred but were not related to peace and security are not included unless otherwise specified.

5.4. Evidence

While India, Brazil, and South Africa served in 2011 on the UNSC, in UNGA in the 65th and 66th sessions, they did not serve simultaneously in the UNHRC in 2011. Therefore, I only consider IBSA members that served on the UNHRC at the time.⁴ When just one IBSA country is on UNHRC, I exclude those resolutions from the internal coherence measurements, but for alignment, I use those votes as a proxy for the rest of IBSA voting. The total dataset contains a total of 496 votes; 370 of which were adopted without a vote (Long, 2013). For internal coherence, the dataset contains 73 votes and for alignment, the dataset contains 59 votes. This is due to limitations in the degree of contention and instances when only one IBSA was present or voting. I will only examine those votes that pertain to international peace and security issues. The votes are either “Yes” indicating support; “No” indicating opposition; or an abstention, indicating neutrality. The variables are categorical and will either be Yes, No, Abstain, or Absent. Resolutions adopted without a vote are marked “Yes,” due to the fact that “adopted without a vote” typically implies a consensus agreement was reached.

I compiled the data unobtrusively and *ex post facto* directly from United Nations websites. Based on the aforementioned literature, IBSA, China and Russia and the P3 are considered their own voting blocs. According to academic Peter Ferdinand, he found that China and Russia and the P3 have common objectives, interests, and a history of convergence at the UN, supporting this choice (Ferdinand, 2013, pp.2-3). The data was collected systematically using the official UN websites and it is replicable. Numerous academics have used UN votes as a measure of the dependent variable of “internal cohesion” and / or “alignment,” proving that this is indeed a reliable method (Russett, 1966; Graham, 2012; Hosli et al, 2010; Voeten et al, 2013; Ferdinand, 2013; and Robinson, 1966). Factor analysis has also been deemed an imperfect, but adequate method for determining voting groups (Russett, 1966, p.328; Alker and Russett, 1965; and Newcombe et al, 1970). The votes gauge the same action- support or opposition to a policy- when the data is reproduced elsewhere. Also, in every case, each vote of yes, no, or abstain, means the same thing. In general, due to the regulated nature of the UN voting system, it cannot be biased.

⁴ Brazil served in the 16th Session, 16th Special Session, and 17th session; India served in the 17th Special Session, 18th Session, and 18th Special Session; and South Africa did not serve on the UNHRC this year.

I reclassify the eight absent votes in my dataset as “abstentions” because I consider abstentions to be neutral votes and unlikely to seriously alter the data (Russett, 1966, pp.329-330). Voeten advocates for classifying the absent votes as missing data due to the fact that most absences are simply nonappearances, as a result of a state attending a different event. According to Voeten, this can be seen when a state attends another event and misses multiple roll call votes in a row (Voeten, 2012, p.5). Thus, multiple roll call votes missed in a row are not demonstrations of neutrality or opposition, but only absence (Long, 2013). Consequently, it is unrealistic to classify the eight votes as neutral votes, according to Voeten (2012, p.5). However, in this case, since only 8 of the total 496 votes are absent (1.6%), and none of the absences occur for two or more consecutive votes, it appears that Voeten’s rule does not apply (Long, 2013).

5.5. The Voting Analysis

5.5.1. Factor Analysis

Although I have selected my voting blocs based on the literature review and qualitative analysis, I still deploy a factor analysis, which is a method that has been previously used in UN voting studies (Newcombe et al, 1970, p.101). I perform a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) that identifies and computes composite variables based on my eight country variables (Brazil, China, France, India, Russia, South Africa, the UK, and the US). The PCA “assumes the latent variables are determined independently of one another” (Long, 2013, p.19). Using orthogonal Varimax rotation and Kaiser Normalization, the PCA is performed. The “Kaiser Meyer Olkin” test, measuring sampling adequacy in factor analysis, is .798, which is higher than Field’s required score of .7 (Field, 2009). At $p < 0$, the test done for equal variance, called Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, also proves significant. After the factor analysis extracted two factors, the results could be interpreted as follows:

“The resultant scree plot could be viewed as inflecting at two factors. The factor analysis revealed two eigenvalues with factors larger than Kaiser’s criterion of 1. The largest factor had a value of 3 and the smallest had a value of 1. These two factors explain a combined 73.8% of the variance. The first factor exhibited strong loadings from the P3 countries (US, UK, France) and the second factor exhibited strong loadings from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.” (Long, 2013, p.19)

Table 2 contains factor loadings after the rotation and three iterations. As confirmed by Peter Ferdinand, the voting record of the UK and France correlated most highly of the eight countries tested, emphasizing the similarities of their voting records (Ferdinand, 2013). South Africa, India, and Brazil load onto one latent variable with Russia and China; however, this is not enough for me to consider the five countries to be a single voting bloc in my study. As one of IBSA’s goals is obtaining a permanent seat on the UNSC and the Chinese and Russians already have one, this will likely mean IBSA will make some decisions differently than China and Russia and it is important to the study to isolate any differences (Stephen, 2010, p.306). Consequently, I elect to use these three separate variables in my analysis.

To certify the internal consistency of the two factors, “China and Russia + IBSA” and the “P3,” a reliability test was conducted and both received high reliability measures. “China and Russia +IBSA” received a Cronbach’s α of .848 (Table 3) and the “P3” received a Cronbach’s α of .911 (Table 4); both surpassing the α level of .7, deemed reliable by Field (2009). Thus, I use the two latent variables, divided into three, for the above theoretical motives.

Table 2: Factor Analysis of Brazil, China, France, India, Russia, UK, and US Variables

Rotated Component Matrix^a

	Component	
	1	2
China	.906	.103
Brazil	.838	.101
Russian	.811	.299
India	.705	.205
South Africa	.683	-.025
France	.198	.940
UK	.171	.949
USA	.047	.870

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

- a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations

Table 3: Reliability Statistics: the P3

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	No. of Items
.911	.930	3

Table 4: Reliability Statistics: China and Russia +IBSA

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	No. of Items
.848	.860	5

5.5.2. Internal Coherence

According to the frequency analysis of the constructed variable for IBSA internal cohesion (Table 5), IBSA never voted in complete disagreement- where one country voted yes, the other abstained, and the final country voted no. IBSA was unanimous in vote 57% (42 out of 73 votes) of the time and IBSA “trended” toward unanimity 33% (24 out of 73 votes) of the time, meaning the third member did not vote in opposition, but rather abstained. Abstaining is a neutral vote, likely meaning that the party wanted to avoid offending either side and preferred to be impartial. Therefore, since 90% of the time, IBSA voted in complete agreement or two members voted in complete agreement and one abstained, it exceeds my requirement of 66% to be considered high-level of internal coherence. In the remaining 10% of the votes, two IBSA members agreed, while one voted opposite, showing the least coordination among them. The results show that when all votes are considered, IBSA exceeds my required level of internal coherence.

There are clearly areas where IBSA is in more agreement than others. Therefore, to further examine the nuances of IBSA’s internal coherence, I executed a cross-tabulation of the IBSA internal coherence variable with the substance of the resolution seen in Table 6. This can show if the substance of the resolution affected the degree of alignment. The total set of votes in this cross-tabulation is 73. IBSA’s highest level of unanimity (92%) occurred

when the resolution is on an on-going conflict or related to sanctions. The “Human Rights” category has a high-level of alignment with none of the states voting in complete opposition, four occurrences where one state votes absentee, and in the remaining seven, all states voted unanimously. IBSA showed the most disagreement within the “Disarmament and Terrorism” category. This divergence is remarkable and likely reflects India’s stances on nuclear weapons and energy-related issues (Graham, 2012, p.425). Despite the fact that disarmament and non-proliferation are one of the target areas for increased IBSA coordination, it is clear that this is one area where they were not succeeding (Graham, 2012, p.425).

Table 5: IBSA’s Internal Coherence





Table 6: Cross-tabulation of IBSA based on Resolution Substance

		International Law and Justice	On-going Conflict including Sanctions	Disarmament and Terrorism	Human Rights	Total
Degrees Internal Coherence of IBSA	Any two unanimous, other disagrees	0	0	7	0	7
	2/3s or 1/3 abstain, other aff or neg	2	1	17	4	24
	Unanimous	2	12	21	7	42
Total		4	13	45	11	73

5.5.3. Overall Alignment

Table 7: IBSA's Overall Alignment Compared to the P3 (UK, US, and France) and China and Russia



Overall, IBSA aligned more with China and Russia than the P3. As a matter of fact, IBSA voted more with China and Russia than it voted independently. A frequency analysis of the constructed alignment variable (Table 7), demonstrates that, of the 59 international peace and security votes with sufficient contention to validate a comparison (excluding the resolutions adopted unanimously and those without a vote), IBSA voted in complete alignment or partial alignment with China and Russia 66% (39 votes out of 59) of the time, perfectly meeting my requirement to be deemed a high level of alignment. On the other hand, IBSA voted in complete or partial alignment with the P3 17% (10 out of 59 votes) of the time. IBSA also voted independently 17% (10 out of 59 votes) of the time. However, when viewed with my qualitative analysis, this shows there was indeed independence in IBSA's and its members' statements and actions.

Table 8 presents a cross-tabulation of IBSA alignment with resolutions categorized and all related to international peace and security. There is found to be immense variation of alignment within resolution substance areas. It reveals IBSA's strong alignment with China and Russia under resolutions concerning conflicts and sanctions, or human rights. On human rights-related votes, IBSA at least partially aligned with China and Russia 68% of the time, exceeding my designated 66% mark to register a high degree of alignment. Different still, of the 25 votes in the Human Rights category, IBSA voted independently 16% of the time and at least partially with the P3 16% of the time. Once IBSA partially aligned with the P3 on UNGA Resolution 176, which condemned human rights violations in Syria and "called upon the Syrian authorities to end all human rights violations" (A/RES/66/176, 2011). China and Russia had most likely voted against UNGA Resolution 176 because it only addressed accountability for human rights violations committed by the Syrian authorities and not the Syrian opposition. In the "Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, and Terrorism" category, IBSA aligned with China and Russia thrice as often as it did with the P3. The high variation in alignment is likely a result of India's unique stance on nuclear-related issues compared to India and Brazil. This diminished the unanimity and fluctuated the alignment.

Table 8: Cross-tabulation of Alignment Based on Resolution Substance

	Human Rights	Disarm, Non-Proliferation and Terrorism	On-going Conflicts and Sanctions	International Law and Justice	Total	
Collapsed Alignment Scale	Complete Alignment with China and Russia	16	4	4	1	25
	Partial Alignment with China and Russia	1	12	1	0	14
	IBSA Votes Independently	4	5	1	0	10
	Partial Alignment with P3	2	4	0	0	6
	Complete Alignment with P3	2	0	2	0	4
Total	25	25	8	1	59	

5.5.4. The Conflicts in Libya and Syria

Analysis of the votes on the Libya and Syria related resolutions reveals the majority were adopted with great consensus; therefore there was not enough contention to draw serious conclusions. Of the 13 Libya-related resolutions, five were adopted without vote and seven of the remaining resolutions were voted on, but with great agreement among all eight countries. Perhaps this is a result of the fact that the diplomatic negotiations on the conflict in Libya began with more momentum than with Syria. On only one Libya-related resolution, UNSC Resolution 1973, did the IBSA states trend toward voting with China and Russia (Table 9). On the remainder of the Libya-related resolutions, China, Russia, the P3 and IBSA were all in complete agreement. China and Russia tended to vote against intervention in other states (Ferdinand, 2013), but have been known to defer to the views of relevant regional organizations, as happened with UNSC Resolution 1973 when the LAS lent its support to the no-fly zone. India, Brazil, and South Africa have anti-intervention tendencies, rooted in their colonial histories, but this was believed to have been an intervention for humanitarian and civilian protection purposes. IBSA countries became even more cautious about intervention after Libya, as can be seen in the support and creation of RWP and

hesitancy to allow any sort of UNSC Resolution 1973 to pass regarding Syria. Five resolutions on the Libyan conflict passed the UNSC, but none did on the Syrian.

Russia and China expressed extreme reluctance in allowing any resolutions to pass the UNSC that allowed for foreign intervention into Syria. After the implementation of the no-fly zone in Libya, Russia and China seriously mistrusted “Western” intentions in the region. IBSA unanimously abstained from the one Syria vote that occurred that year in the UNSC. Some considered the abstention to be in support of China and Russia (Benner, 2013, p.5), but I argue that not voting in complete alignment with China and Russia showed a measure of independent thought for IBSA countries. In fact, IBSA voted unaligned with the P3 or China and Russia in three out of the five votes on Syria-related resolutions. In the remaining two votes concerning the human rights situation in Syria, IBSA tended towards alignment with the P3 instead of China and Russia (A/HRC/RES/S-16/1, 2011 and A/RES/66/176, 2011). Benner argued that IBSA maintained independence out of a desire to push for more time for the UNSC to negotiate, in order that the UNSC could have acted in a more united fashion (Benner, 2013, p.5). Finally, on the subject of internal consistency, of the 12 Libya and Syria votes where at least two IBSA members were voting, IBSA voted unanimously 75% (9 votes) of the time, evidencing coordination that exceeds my required 66% level (Table 10).

Table 9: Crosstabulation: Alignment (IBSA) on Syria and Libya Votes

	Libya	Syria	Total
Votes deemed irrelevant	5	0	5
2/3 IBSA Votes China and Russia, One Abstains	1	0	1
IBSA Votes Independently	0	3*	3
Partial Alignment with P3	0	1	1
Aligns Completely with P3	0	1	1
2/3 Agree with China and Russia and P3	3	0	3
IBSA Fully Agrees with Both	4	0	4
Total	13	5	18

*Includes one failed UNSC Resolution. Total passed Syria resolutions are 4.

Table 10: Crosstabulation: IBSA Internal Consistency on the Conflicts in Libya and Syria

		Libya	Syria	Total
SA, India, and Brazil Vote Together	Any two unanimous, other disagrees	2	0	2
	2/3s or 1/3 abstain, other aff or neg	1	0	1
	Unanimous	7	2	9
	Only one Member voting	3	3	6
Total	13	5	18	

5.6. Results of Analysis

The frequency analysis of the alignment variable confirmed my hypothesis by showing that overall IBSA is extremely strongly aligned with China and Russia and votes in alignment with the P3 very infrequently. Surprisingly, IBSA did manage to vote independently from the P5 in 17% of the votes that occurred under enough contention to validate a comparison. As long as IBSA lacks a permanent seat on the UNSC, it can be expected they will exhibit at least a degree of independence from the P3 and China and Russia. Moreover, as evidenced by the differences in opinion on disarmament-related issues among IBSA states, the countries still have some issues to reconcile internally. The empirical results of the quantitative analysis largely support my hypothesis that IBSA maintained strong internal coherence. IBSA demonstrated strong internal consistency within the three international peace and security categories, but indeed showed variation when those votes concerned nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, when evaluating the internal consistency of the votes in Libya and Syria separately, there were too few votes to make any serious conclusions. When the vote totals are combined, it is enough to show that IBSA then did show strong internal consistency. From the qualitative analysis portion, it can be shown that IBSA was attentive to both conflicts and increased their coordination on certain aspects of the Libyan conflict and around the negotiations on the Syrian conflict in particular. Also on alignment, the limited votes make any serious conclusions difficult to draw from voting analysis; the qualitative analysis can show the trends best.

CHAPTER 6: Conclusion

6.1. Summary of Findings

Overall, the qualitative analysis of Libyan and Syrian conflicts paired with the quantitative analysis of IBSA voting in the United Nations that this study produced painted a detailed picture of IBSA's strength and role in international peace and security issues. An exclusively qualitative examination of IBSA's actions and statements in 2011 would have only offered an inchoate picture of IBSA's manifested behaviour. The study has revealed what can be expected of this emerging power coalition when they have increased power and now reasonable estimates can be made of their future strength and role. However, each conflict is unique and complex so exact behaviour cannot be predicted, but a sensible estimate of the possibilities is now within reach.

My analysis reveals that, while not perfect, IBSA did indeed have strong internal coherence. However, it was found that internal coherence could be stronger or weaker depending on the aspect of international peace and security. The findings from the study as a whole revealed that IBSA aligned with China and Russia strongly- confirming my hypothesis on alignment. IBSA also demonstrated a degree of independence in voting and voted with the P3 on several occasions. The conclusion now proceeds to explore the theoretical reasoning behind IBSA's behaviour in 2011. It ends with a series of policy implications and possible areas for future research that could advance the serious study of emerging powers in international peace and security even further.

6.2. Making Sense of IBSA's Behaviour: Soft Balancing

A possible strategy that could explain IBSA's behaviour is soft balancing. According to the strategy, there exists within the global community, a dominant military power that does not pose a direct threat and provides irreplaceable public goods to the international community, yet is not in a position to retaliate (Paul 2005, pp.57-58). In this case, the dominant power is the United States (Haass, 2008). Second-tier states can attempt to balance the power of the dominant power / United States by forming diplomatic coalitions within multilateral forums because the "hard power" of the dominant country will be impossible for emerging countries to surpass (Stephen, 2012, pp.294-295 and Paul, 2005).

Proponents of 'soft balancing' argue that middle powers, such as the IBSA countries, resort to international institutions because it is the only way it can relegate super powers to a level where they can compete on equal footing (Flemes, 2007, p.14). India, Brazil, and South Africa want to balance the power of the United States, in order to increase their ability to promote the norms and values most important to them. During the conflicts in Libya and Syria, IBSA states used their position on the UNSC to affect US and Western policies that were "perceive[d] as imperial and sovereignty limiting" (Paul, 2005, p.58). When an intervention does not receive support from the full UNSC, it is unlikely that it will happen. If an intervention is led by the United States, it is especially reliant on post-intervention support by the members of the United Nations (Paul, 2005, p.58). This is where support from IBSA countries is critical given their robust participation in United Nations peacekeeping. Therefore, when IBSA cooperates in opposition to a Western-pushed intervention, they are able to be very effective. If an intervention is given support from the full UNSC and the mandate is followed, it is seen as "transcend[ing] the sovereignty norm temporarily" (Paul, 2005, p.58).

Critically, in this case, the emerging powers are working within the confines of the international system, so they are not challenging the international system, but rather the strength of the current hegemon and the norms and values that they are able to dictate (Alden and Vieira, 2005, p.1079). Despite the fact that IBSA feels they do not have equitable representation in the system, the countries operate in accordance within the system and its values and principles.

6.3. Theoretical Underpinning: Neoliberal Institutionalism

IBSA's formation can be explained by neoliberal institutionalism. The countries desired greater cooperation amongst themselves and knew the best way to accomplish this was through forming a trilateral coalition, which has given them a certain level of coordination. This theory could also explain why academics, such as Daniel Flemes, so strongly encourage IBSA to institutionalize further in order to achieve more of its goals (2007). Regular coordination would no doubt allow their coordination and influence to surge and possibly even allow them to develop a serious international peace and security agenda. In fact, the possession of permanent seats on the UNSC would increase the

coordination level of IBSA, as the countries would sit together regularly- in fact, meeting more often than they do now. Cooperation must have institutionalization in order to be sustainable.

Much of IBSA's behaviour in these instances can also be explained by neoliberal institutionalism. Proponents of the school believe the benefits of international institutions, such as the United Nations, are many. International institutions "can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity" (Keohane and Martin, 1995, pp. 40-41). By providing the aforementioned services, international institutions can help states attain considerable goals that they never would have been able to attain while working alone. The cooperation is expected to be mutual among all participants in the international institution (Keohane and Martin, 1995, pp.40-41). IBSA does not want to work around international institutions because it understands their value. This can also explain IBSA's push for global governance reform, because it wants to work better within them. International institutions can help states overcome barriers to cheating and the simple act of meeting in these forums makes cooperation more possible. International institutions can also perform valuable tasks without violating state sovereignty and can punish cheaters by employing sanctions (Grieco, 1988, pp.490 & 495). In general, these shared institutions increase cooperation among states and are the best hope of resolving conflict in the world (Keohane and Martin, 1995).

6.4. Policy implications

Given the results of the analysis, speculation about a future without IBSA should be considered less valid. IBSA's critics call it merely a "gathering of friends; that it possesses no real clout internationally and is merely a 'lofty dream predicated on the tired and much touted political rhetoric of South solidarity" (Graham, 2012, p.416). The results of my research show strong internal coherence, which implies coordination whether it is through meetings or merely possessing strong enough shared values and norms. High internal coherence increases the likelihood of IBSA being able to impact the direction of an international peace and security issue. IBSA also appears to be increasing in relevance in the media. In a study done by Soule-Kohndou, she found that "the IBSA process has been covered by major newspapers" and received high levels of press coverage from media

outlets based outside of IBSA countries (Soule-Kohndou, 2013, p.17). As a result, states, NGOs, academics, and international or regional organizations and the like should consider when and how to engage IBSA in the diplomatic process and earlier speculation about the future of IBSA should be considered invalid. For instance, these actors could engage IBSA as an effective actor to work with to accomplish a goal (Hosli et al, 2010, p.5). If states see IBSA as a useful actor to work with, it will rely on IBSA more and as a result, IBSA is more likely to continue operating together.

In addition, a strong IBSA provides another avenue for non-Western states to follow, besides China and Russia, when voting in the UN. This is part of IBSA's goal: to provide a voice for developing countries. As was highlighted earlier by Alden and Vieira, IBSA wants to serve as an "intermediary for those states excluded from the ranks of power" (2005, p.1079). IBSA has value when it balances those major international powers (Graham, 2012, p.417). IBSA's behaviour in the Syria negotiations evidences this for the first time. If IBSA continues to balance emerging powers, it shows that the world is shifting to a different international order. Many academics have reported that declining American influence moves the world toward "nonpolarity"- which means new actors, such as the emerging powers, will have the opportunity to play a greater role (Haas, 2008 and Hart and Jones, 2011). The nature of the alignment of emerging powers is important as Hart and Jones state that "the relationship between US (and to a degree, European) strategy and the rising powers will shape global order in the era that is now upon us" and provide new leadership or at least new options in the resolution of international peace and security issues (2011, p.64).

Compared to other diplomatic instruments, IBSA meets relatively infrequently. This coupled with its extremely limited institutionalization- no common staff and no international headquarters- reduces the possibilities of diplomatic coordination. Regularly scheduled meetings of high-level IBSA leadership could give IBSA the wherewithal needed to act in a more strategic fashion on the international stage. Ministerial and Summit-level meetings present the best opportunities for countries to align their norms and values and agree upon controversial topics. For instance, the controversial nuclear-related issues are reducing IBSA's internal coherence score. Although this is an area that IBSA professes to have an interest in cooperating on, in the UN voting analysis, it was found that India's votes diverged significantly from its IBSA partners. The issue is clearly sensitive and IBSA countries would likely need a great deal of discussion before an increase in internal

coherence is seen. While nuclear-related issues are a serious topic of concern at the moment, there are other issues that will inevitably come along and divide IBSA.

To truly increase its coordination and sustainability and impact its many goals, IBSA should consider further full-time institutionalization (Alden and Vieira, 2005, p.1091). IBSA must also consider expanding the scope of its working groups to include foreign policy issues. This could give the countries more credibility in their push for a permanent seat on the UNSC. On the other hand, even with the limited institutionalization, IBSA has exhibited surprising coordination. IBSA believed that in 2011, the countries had played a “positive role ... in the maintenance of peace and security” (New York Ministerial Statement, 2011, pt.4). IBSA was also perceived by outsiders as having had a serious impact on negotiations at the UN (Gaouette, 2011). Perhaps the shared values and norms, in addition to practical similarities, are strong enough that meetings of the senior leadership are rendered unnecessary. Likewise, weak institutionalization could simply mean that the countries are able to remain flexible and uninhibited. This is where future research showing the evolution of IBSA internal coherence and alignment could be useful.

6.5. Areas for Future Research

IBSA and other emerging powers voting blocs should continue to be analysed in the future. As the literature review revealed, these studies provide an accurate picture of global political dynamics. Knowing and understanding the status of power dynamics and alliances is useful for academics, politicians, policymakers, and researchers alike. Russett stated that information on UN voting analysis “may give information which can assist American policy-makers to increase their gains in the UN political process” (Russett, 1966, p.327). This can doubtless be applied to diplomats from other countries as well. In this case, the research could prove especially useful to diplomats from emerging powers countries as they work to increase their influence within the international system. The IBSA countries could particularly find this useful as they continue to campaign for their seats on the UNSC. The factor analysis, in particular, is revealing as it shows how closely aligned Brazil is with China and Russia. This could be useful for policymakers who are interested in engaging IBSA, but are not sure of the proper avenue.

While UN voting analysis is often criticized, this study proves the results can be useful when paired with an in-depth qualitative analysis (Holloway, 1990, pp.283-284).

Further research should be done to gain a better understanding of how IBSA's internal coherence and alignment has evolved. The analysis should be extended into 2012 and 2013 because there continued to be violence and involvement in the conflicts in Libya and Syria from the international community even then. A finding of increasing internal coherence over the course of 2012 and 2013 could strengthen the main argument of this paper; decreasing internal coherence in 2012 and 2013 would disprove the argument. And although the causal inferences would be limited, possible differences in IBSA behaviour, on account of the fact that all IBSA states were not on the UNSC in 2012 and 2013, could be gleaned. In fact, adding another in-depth case study could develop an even clearer picture of IBSA's internal coherence and cooperation. Finally, a fuller data analysis could also reveal changes in alignment among all United Nations members. Due to limitations to the scope and resources of this paper, the data collection was limited to the key targets states of this study. An expansion of the dataset in the study could evaluate all of the states in the United Nations and members of the UNSC.

6.6. Conclusion

In the world of international peace and security diplomacy, IBSA made its mark in 2011. A serious discussion occurred on the merits of "RWP" and the IBSA countries provided an alternative perspective for states within the international community to consider. This study helps show how differently the UNSC looked that year because of the presence of the IBSA states. Regardless of whether or not they sped up the resolution of the conflicts, IBSA brought new ideas to the forefront of the debate and tried new diplomatic tactics. IBSA, it seems, is here to stay and its ideas should be valued in international debate. The countries bring a unique perspective compared to China and Russia and even still compared to the P3. As the emerging powers community welcomes new members, the leadership of IBSA within that community will become gradually more important. Also, IBSA's push for permanent seats on the UNSC is unlikely to disappear any time soon-meaning these countries will continue to campaign to rightfully represent their respective regions. Global governance reform, not just of the UNSC, but also of the G8 should happen. These institutions still reflect a post-World War Two world and need to be updated. In short, IBSA, despite its limited roots, has proved remarkably resilient and should be considered a worthwhile force in international peace and security diplomacy.

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